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Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 178 Article Theme: Author Meets CritiCs Gregg D. Caruso Corning Community College (SUNY) Email: [email protected] Derk Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life (2014) provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will (2001). Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished-for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one's actions are causally determined (ch.5) and develops a forward-looking theory of moral responsibility consistent with free will skepticism (ch.6). A significant contribution to the field, Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life is destined to become a classic and is essential reading for anyone interested in free will and moral responsibility. The goal of the book is to advocate for free will skepticism: the view that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense-the sense that would make us truly deserving of blame or praise. Pereboom follows tradition here in defining "free will" in terms of the control in action required for a core sense of moral responsibility. "This sense of moral responsibility, the one at issue in the free will debate, is set apart by the notion of basic desert (Feinberg 1970; Pereboom 2001, 2007a; G. Strawson 1994; Fischer 2007: 82; Clarke 2005; Scanlon 2013). For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it to be hers in such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally exemplary" (2). Such desert is basic in the sense that "the agent would deserve to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of consequentialist or contractualist considerations" (2). Pereboom's argument against this sort of free will is known as hard incompatibilism, which amounts to a rejection of both compatibilism and libertarianism. Hard incompatibilism maintains that the sort of free will required for basic desert moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determination by factors beyond the agent's control and also with the kind of indeterminacy in action required by the most plausible versions of libertarianism. In addition to hard incompatibilism, Pereboom also defends optimistic skepticism-which maintains that life without free will and desert-based moral responsibility would not be as devastating to our conceptions of agency, morality, and meaning in life as some suggest, and in certain respects it may even be beneficial. "In particular, this conception is wholly compatible with rational deliberation, with practically viable notions of morality and moral responsibility, with a workable system of dealing with criminal behavior, and with a secure sense of meaning in life" (4). Pereboom's overall argument can be sketched as follows: Against the view that free will is compatible with the causal determination of our actions by natural factors beyond our control, Pereboom argues that there is no relevant difference between this prospect and our actions being causally determined by manipulators. Against event causal libertarianism, he advances the disappearing agent objection, according to which on this view the agent cannot settle whether a decision Précis of Derk Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 179 Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com occurs, and hence cannot have the control required for moral responsibility. Against a non-causal libertarianism, he likewise argues that it has no plausible proposal of the control in action required for responsibility. He goes on to argue that while agent-causal libertarianism may supply this sort of control, it cannot be reconciled with our best physical theories. Since this exhausts the options for views on which we have the sort of free will at issue, he concludes that free will skepticism is the only remaining position. Finally, Pereboom defends the optimistic view that conceiving of life without free will would not be devastating to our conceptions of agency, morality, and meaning in life, and may even be beneficial. In this précis I will provide a detailed summary of the arguments that lead Pereboom to these conclusions- including his disappearing agent objection (ch.2), his argument against agent-causal libertarianism (ch.3), his four-case argument (ch.4), and his defense of optimistic skepticism (ch.5-8). My goal is simply to present Pereboom's arguments in a clear and concise manner. Providing a comprehensive summary of Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life, without any additional commentary or critical comments, will allow readers to evaluate Pereboom's arguments for themselves. It will also allow the articles to follow in this book symposium-those by John Martin Fisher, Dana Nelkin, and Derk Pereboom-to provide their comments without having to summarize the arguments in full. Readers can then refer back to this précis for additional clarification or details on any particular argument. Chapter 1: Defending a Source View Pereboom begins by arguing for a source view of moral responsibility by way of a Frankfurt-style case he first developed in Living without Free Will. Before laying out that case, however, it is important to first draw some distinctions and define some terminology. Source views contend that an agent's being morally responsible for an action (in the basic desert sense) is, or would be, explained primarily by the action's having a causal history in which she is the source of her action in a specific way. Such views are contrasted with leeway accounts, which instead maintain that an agent's moral responsibility for an action is explained by the availability to her of alternative possibilities, for example by the ability to refrain from doing what she has actually done. Additionally, a source theorist might be a compatibilist (Fischer 1994; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; McKenna 2005; Sartorio 2011, 2013) or an incompatibilist (Stump 1990, 1996; Zagzebski 1991, 2000; Hunt 2000, 2005; Shabo 2010); just as a leeway theorist may be a compatibilist (Moore 1912; Ayer 1954; Vihvelin 2013) or incompatibilist (van Inwagen 1983; Kane 1996). Incompatibilists maintain that the causal determination of our actions by factors beyond our control is incompatible with the sort of free will required for basic desert moral responsibility -either because it precludes the ability to do otherwise (leeway incompatibilism) or because it is inconsistent with one's being the "ultimate source" of action (source incompatibilism). Compatibilists, on the other hand, maintain that determinism is in fact compatible with the ability to do otherwise (leeway compatibilism) or with the agent's being the source of her action in the required way (source compatibilism). Pereboom is a source incompatibilist. He rejects the sort of incompatibilism for which the availability of alternative possibilities is crucial to explaining moral responsibility in the basic desert sense, and accepts instead an incompatibilism that ascribes the more significant role to an action's causal history, to the actual causal sequence that produces it (Fischer 1982, 1994, 2007; Fischer and Ravizza 1998; Satorio 2011). As Pereboom describes it: My view is thus a source as opposed to a leeway incompatibilism. Agent-causal libertarianism is commonly conceived as an incompatibilist position in which an agent can be the source of her action in the way required for moral responsibility in the sense at issue, and as a result proponents of this view are typically source incompatibilists. But one might also be a source incompatibilist and seriously doubt that we have the sort of free will required for this sort of moral responsibility, and this is the position I advocate. (4) Pereboom's free will skepticism is therefore a result of his source incompatibilism combined with his rejection of libertarianism. Pereboom lays out his arguments against libertarianism in chapters 2 and 3, and presents his manipulation argument against compatibilism in chapter 4. The goal of chapter 1, however, is simply to defend the source view against recent obSmith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 180 jections. In recent decades, and largely due to Frankfurt-style examples (Frankfurt 1969) against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP), it has become common to claim that an agent's moral responsibility for an action is not explained by the availability to her of alternative possibilities but rather by the agent's being the actual source of her action in a specific way (9). Some philosophers, however, have resisted this trend and have criticized Frankfurt-style cases by presenting the dilemma defense of the leeway view (Kane 1985; Widerker 1995; Ginet 1996). In this chapter, Pereboom defends his Frankfurt-style case, known as the Tax Evasion Case, against such objections. In addition, he argues that "this sort of case yields an effective response to a different sort of objection which was originally raised by Ginet and recently developed by Christopher Franklin (2011) and David Palmer (2011), which focuses on the precise timing of what it is that the agent is responsible for" (5). In typical Frankfurt cases, an agent considers performing some action, but a neuroscientist is concerned that she will not come through. So if she were to manifest an indication that she will not or might not perform the action, the neuroscientist would intervene. But as things actually go, the neuroscientist remains idle, since the agent performs the action on her own. "The idea is that even though the agent could not have avoided the action she performs, she is still intuitively morally responsible for this action" (9). While Frankfurt cases have been extremely influential in moving people away from leeway and toward source accounts of moral responsibility, Robert Kane (1985), David Widerker (1995), and Carle Ginet (1996) have developed a significant objection against them. According to the Kane/Widerker/Ginet objection, Frankfurt cases face a dilemma: either the proponents of Frankfurt-style examples are presupposing the truth of causal determinism (in which case they are begging the question against the incompatibilist) or they are presupposing the truth of indeterminism (in which case they are wrong in assuming the agent could not have chosen otherwise). As Pereboom summarizes the objection: "In Frankfurt examples the actual situation will feature a prior sign that signals the fact that intervention is not required. If in a proposed case the prior sign causally determined the action, or if it were associated with some factor that did, the intervener's (or his device's) predictive ability could be explained. However, then the libertarian would not and could not be expected to have the intuition that the agent is morally responsible. But if the relationship between the prior sign and the action was not causally deterministic in such ways, then it's open that the agent could have done otherwise despite the occurrence of the prior sign" (2014, 14). Critics therefore maintain that, either way, an alternative-possibilities condition on moral responsibility emerges unscathed. To understand Pereboom's response to this objection, it's important to first understand his criterion for robustness. "The core intuition that underlies the proposal to explain moral responsibility by access to alternative possibilities is that to be blameworthy for an action, an agent must have been able to do something that would have resulted in her being 'off the hook' (Pereboom 2001: 1)" (10-11). Put differently, "to be blameworthy for an action an agent must have an exempting alternative possibility, one that, should he avail himself of it, would exempt him from blame (Moya 2006: 67)" (11). In earlier work, Pereboom spelled this out in terms of robustness-that for an alternative possibility to be robust, it must be one that, had the agent taken it instead, would have precluded him from the particular responsibility he actually has for his action. Robustness also has an epistemic component: if an agent were blameworthy because he had an alternative possibility available to him, it must be that he in some sense understood that or how it was available to him (11). Trying to capture these two components, Pereboom originally stated the robustness criterion as follows- this was meant as a substantial necessary condition for what it is for an alternative possibility to be robust: Robustness (A): For an agent to have a robust alternative to her action A, that is, an alternative relevant per se to explaining why she is morally responsible for A, she must have understood that instead she could have voluntarily done something as a result of which she would have been precluded from the moral responsibility she actually has for A. (11) But due to objections raised by Jonathan Vance, Dana Nelkin, and others, Pereboom acknowledges in chapter 1 that a more precise criterion for robustness is needed. After considering four main concerns for the Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 181 Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Robustness (A) formulation, he arrives at the following new criterion: Robustness (B): For an agent to have a robust alternative to her immoral action A, that is, an alternative relevant per se to explaining why she is blameworthy for performing A, it must be that 1. She instead could have voluntarily acted or refrained from acting as a result of which she would be blameless, and 2. For at least one such exempting acting or refraining, she was cognitively sensitive to the fact that she could so voluntarily act or refrain, and to the fact that if she voluntarily so acted or refrained she would then be, or would likely be, blameless. (13) We can now characterize leeway views, whether compatibilist or incompatibilist, "as those that affirm that for an agent to be blameworthy for an action, she must have available to her a robust alternative possibility, that is, one that satisfies Robustness (B)" (13). Additionally, leeway incompatibilists hold that "the reason causal determinism precludes moral responsibility is that it rules out alternative possibilities altogether, but most importantly, those of the robust sort" (14). Source views, by contrast, deny this. Pereboom, being a source theorist, now introduces his Tax Evasion Cases-a modified Frankfurt-style example designed to avoid the dilemma reply. Tax Evasion (2): Joe is considering claiming a tax deduction for the registration fee that he paid when he bought a house. He knows that claiming this deduction is illegal, but that he probably won't be caught, and that if he were, he could convincingly plead ignorance. Suppose he has a strong but not always overriding desire to advance his self-interest regardless of its cost to others and even if it involves illegal activity. In addition, the only way that in this situation he could fail to choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons, of which he is aware. He could not, for example, fail to make this choice for no reason or simply on a whim. Moreover, it is causally necessary for his failing to choose to evade taxes in this situation that he attain a level of attentiveness to moral reasons. Joe can secure this level of attentiveness voluntarily. However, his attaining this level of attentiveness is not causally sufficient for his failing to choose to evade taxes. If he were to attain this level of attentiveness, he could, exercising his libertarian free will, either choose to evade taxes or refrain from so choosing (without the intervener's device in place). However, to ensure that he will choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist has, unbeknownst to Joe, implanted a device in his brain which, were it to sense the requisite level of attentiveness, would electronically simulate the right neural centers so as to inevitably result in his making this choice. As it happens, Joe does not attain this level of attentiveness to his moral reasons, and he chooses to evade taxes on his own, while the device remains idle (Pereboom 2000, 2001, 2003, 2009b). (15) Pereboom maintains that in this situation, Joe is intuitively blameworthy for choosing to evade taxes despite the fact that he did not have a robust alternative (15). And because the case includes a number of features that distinguish it from earlier Frankfurt cases, it is claimed to avoid the dilemma outlined above. The unique features are these: "the cue for intervention is a necessary condition for the agent's availing herself of any robust alternative possibility (without the intervener's device in place), while the cue for intervention itself is not a robust alternative possibility, and the absence at any specific time of the cue for intervention in no sense causally determines the action the agent actually performs" (15). In Tax Evasion (2), it's not merely the presence of a necessary condition for doing otherwise that's important. Rather, "this case features a necessary condition for doing otherwise the absence of which at any specific time will not causally determine the agent to perform the action" (15). According to Pereboom, this allows it to be the case that "at no specific time is the agent causally determined to perform the action, which facilitates satisfaction of a key libertarian condition on moral responsibility" (15). Here's how Pereboom describes it: In Tax Evasion (2), the necessary condition for Joe's not deciding to evade taxes, i.e., his having the requisite level of attentiveness to the moral reasons, is the right sort, since its absence at any specific time does not causally determine his deciding to evade taxes. For at any particuSmith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 182 lar time at which the level of attentiveness is absent, Joe could still make it occur at a later time, and thus he is not causally determined to decide to evade taxes by its absence at the previous time...(15) It's also important to note that the case does feature alternative possibilities that are available to the agent-Joe's achieving higher levels of attentiveness to moral reasons-but Pereboom argues that these alternatives are not robust. At this point one might object that given that the intervener's device is in place, by voluntarily achieving the specified higher level of attentiveness Joe would have voluntarily done something as a result of which he would have been precluded from the blameworthiness he actually incurs. Had he voluntarily achieved the requisite level of attentiveness, the intervention would have taken place, whereupon he would not have been blameworthy for deciding to evade taxes. But this alternative possibility is not robust. Joe is not even minimally cognitively sensitive to the fact that by voluntarily achieving the requisite level of attentiveness he would not be (or would likely not be) blameworthy. Moreover, he has no reason whatsoever to believe this. True, were he voluntarily to attain this attentiveness, the intervention would take place, and he would then not have been blameworthy. Still, Joe has no inkling, and no evidence, that the intervention would then take place and that as a result he would not be blameworthy. (16) According to Pereboom, Joe believes that achieving this level of attentiveness is compatible with his freely deciding to evade taxes anyway, and he has no reason to suspect otherwise. "We can even specify that he believes that if he did achieve this level of attentiveness, he would still be very likely to decide to evade taxes" (16). Intuitively, then, Joe is blameworthy for actually so deciding. The remainder of ch.1 is dedicated to addressing objections to the Tax Evasion (2) Case. Pereboom responds to objections by Widerker (2006), Kane (2007), Ginet (2002), and others, and argues that each of them can be adequately dealt with. He concludes that there is good reason to reject the leeway view and adopt a source view, which maintains that for an agent to be morally responsible for an action she must be the source of her action in an appropriate way. More specifically, he embraces source incompatibilism, which contends that this requires the action's actual causal history be indeterminisitic-i.e., "the action cannot be causally determined by factors beyond the agent's control, such as the remote past together with the laws of nature" (28). Chapter 2: Problems for Event-Causal and Non-Causal Libertarianism After having defended the source view in ch.1, Pereboom turns his attention in ch.2 to arguing against two leading varieties of libertarianism. In particular, Pereboom develops his "disappearing agent" objection against event-causal libertarianism, which argues that this position cannot accommodate the requirement that in an indeterministic context the agent or something about the agent settles whether the decision in question occurs, and for this reason lacks the control in action required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense (5). In Living without Free Will, Pereboom directed this objection toward Robert Kane's (1996) famed account, but here he focuses instead on Mark Balaguer's (2009) version of event-causal libertarianism. Pereboom also takes the opportunity in this chapter to argue against non-causal libertarianism, objecting that advocates of this position "use prima facie causal language to express the purportedly non-causal relation, and that either causation is being invoked, or if it is not, the control required for moral responsibility is absent" (40). Pereboom begins by differentiating three major versions of libertarianism: event-causal, non-causal, and agent-causal types (30-31). Libertarian views, in general, maintain that human beings have the capacity to freely will actions, and crucial to an agent's being freely willed is that it not be causally determined by factors beyond the agent's control. Event-causal libertarianism, in particular, maintains that actions (conceived as agent-involving events) are caused solely by prior events, such as an agent's having a desire or a belief at a time, and some type of indeterminacy in the production of action by appropriate events is held to be necessary for the sort of free will under discussion (Kane 1996; Ekstrom 2000; Balaguer 2009). Non-causal libertarianism, on the other hand, maintains that no cause is needed for human decisions. Contemporary Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 183 non-causal theorists include Carl Ginet (1990, 1996, 2007), Hugh McCann (1998), and Stewart Goetz (2008). Typically, non-causal theorists also maintain that additional conditions must be met for an action to be free. Agent-causal libertarianism, the most metaphysically demanding of the three views, appeals to agents who as substances have the power to cause decisions without being causally determined to do so (Kant 1781/1787/1987; Reid 1788/1983; Taylor 1966, 1974; Chisholm 1964, 1976; O'Connor 2000, 2009; Clarke 1993, 2003; Griffith 2010). Pereboom notes that "event-causal libertarianism is typically regarded as the most attractive of these views, all else being equal." And this is because the "idea of an uncaused event and the notion of a substance-cause are regarded with suspicion" (2014, 31). Yet despite its attractiveness, event-causal libertarianism faces a devastating objection known as the disappearing agent objection. The objection runs as follows: The disappearing agent objection: Consider a decision that occurs in a context in which the agent's moral motivations favor that decision, and her prudential motivations favor her refraining from making it, and the strengths of these motivations are in equipoise. On an event-causal libertarian picture, the relevant causal conditions antecedent to the decision, i.e., the occurrence of certain agent-involving events, do not settle whether the decision will occur, but only render the occurrence of the decision about 50% probable. In fact, because no occurrence of antecedent events settles whether the decision will occur, and only antecedent events are causally relevant, nothing settles whether the decision will occur. Thus it can't be that the agent or anything about the agent settles whether the decision will occur, and she therefore will lack the control required for basic desert moral responsibility for it (Pereboom 2001, 2004, 2007a). (32) The concern raised by Pereboom's disappearing agent objection is that "because event-causal libertarian agents will not have the power to settle whether the decision will occur, they cannot have the role in action that this sort of moral responsibility demands" (32). Consider, for instance, Balaguer's event-causal libertarian account. As Balaguer describes it, his view "does not involve any sort of irreducible agent causation, but it does hold that undetermined L-free decisions are (ordinarily) causally influenced by-indeed, probabilistically caused by-agent-involving events, most notably, events having to do with the agent having certain reasons and intentions" (2009, 67). For Balaguer, the paradigm case of a free choice is one in which the agent's reasons and motivation are in equipoise. He calls this a torn decision: a decision in which the agent (a) has reasons for two or more options and feels torn as to which set of reasons is stronger, that is, has no conscious belief as to which option is best, given her reasons; and that (b) decides without resolving the conflict-that is, the person has the experience of "just choosing" (Balaguer 2009, 71). This definition of a torn decision sets up Balaguer's conception of libertarian freedom-L-freedom: If an ordinary human torn decision is wholly undetermined, then it is L-free-that is, it is not just undetermined but also appropriately non-random, and the indeterminacy increases or procures the appropriate non-randomness. (2009, 78) Balaguer, in turn, characterizes appropriate non-randomness in terms of authorship and control: "in order for a decision to be L-free, it has to be authored and controlled by the agent in question; that is, it has to be her decision, and she has to control which option is chosen" (2009, 83). Bringing all the pieces together, Balaguer defines the notion of torn-decision indeterminism, or TDW-indeterminism, as follows: TDW-indeterminism: Some of our torn decisions are wholly undetermined at the moment of choice, that is, the moment-of-choice probabilities of the various reasons-based tied-for-best option match the reasons-based probabilities, so that these moments-of-choice probabilities are all roughly even, given the complete state of the world and the laws of nature, and the choice occurs without any further input, that is, without anything else being significantly causally relevant to which option is chosen. (2009, 34) In the case of a torn TDW-indeterminist decision, then, there is no mismatch between the underlying probabilities for the various options at the time of the Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 184 decision and the probabilities for those options at that time based on the agent's consciously available reasons (34). While this account does a nice job articulating a plausible set of epistemic and metaphysical conditions necessary for event-causal libertarianism, Pereboom objects that it does not adequately deal with the disappearing agent objection since it fails to secure the control necessary for basic desert moral responsibility. "Intuitively, this sort of control requires the agent or at least something about the agent to settle whether the decision in question will occur, and the event-causal libertarian view does not allow for this in the case of torn decisions" (34). Pereboom's objection therefore maintains that "on the event-causal libertarian view, torn decisions cannot, in Balaguer's terminology, be appropriately non-random, and the indeterminacy in question cannot increase or procure the appropriate non-randomness, because the theory does not allow either the agent or anything about the agent to settle whether such a decision will occur, and so the requisite control in action is precluded." Moreover, adds Pereboom, "authorship is missing given that such control is required for authorship" (35). The remainder of ch.2 is dedicated to (a) defending the disappearing agent objection against possible replies, (b) extending the basic concern to non-causal views, (c) considering a possible mixed theory-one that includes event-causal and non-causal components, and (d) arguing against a phenomenological defense of libertarianism. Against non-causal views, Pereboom argues that the control required for desert-based moral responsibility is once again absent. He also notes how advocates of such views use prima facie causal language to express the purportedly non-causal relation, compromising their non-causalism (see pages 40-41). Mixed theories, which incorporate components of both event-causal and non-causal accounts, fair no better according to Pereboom-and this is because they either smuggle in causal notions (in ways they deny) through a "making happen" or "difference-making" relation, or they become incoherent (43-45). Finally, Pereboom considers a phenomenological defense of event-causal libertarianism, which cites phenomenology in support of the claim that event-causal agents have the requisite kind of control in deciding (see, e.g., Balaguer 2009, 89-91; Kane 1996). Pereboom acknowledges that "when we make decisions we often have the phenomenology of control in acting, and perhaps even of the sort of control or free will that's required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense." Yet in the free will debate, "serious questions are raised about whether a theory of agency that is causally deterministic or one that endorses pure event-causal indeterminism can accommodate the veridicality of such phenomenology of control." Pereboom therefore concludes that, "In the absence of a satisfying response to this concern, citing the phenomenology in support of control should not [be] counted as effective" (47). The conclusion of ch.2 is that event-causal and non-causal libertarian accounts both fail to secure the control in action necessary for basic desert moral responsibility. Chapter 3, to which I will now turn, provides Pereboom's argument against agent-causal libertarianism. The conclusion reached at the end of ch.3 is that either a compatibilist view of free will is viable, or else free will skepticism is true. But chapter 4 is devoted to setting out a manipulation argument against any form of compatibilism. Hence, chapters 2-4 collectively represent Pereboom's argument for free will skepticism. Chapter 3: The Prospects for Agent-Causal Libertarianism Agent-causal libertarianism attempts to secure the control missing from event-causal accounts by reintroducing the agent as a cause, not merely as involved in events, but rather fundamentally as a substance. Agent-causal theorists posit an agent who possesses a causal power, fundamentally as a substance, to cause a decision-or as O'Connor (2009) specifies, "the coming to be of a state of intention to carry out some action"-without being causally determined to do so, and thereby to settle, with the requisite control, whether this state of intention will occur (51). Pereboom maintains that agent-causal accounts are "substantive" and can withstand the kind of concerns outlined in the previous chapter, including the luck objection (cf. Mele 1999, 2006; Haji 2004). Agent-causal accounts, Pereboom maintains, "deliver what the luck objection indicates is lacking in the event-causal libertarian's account" (55)-i.e., involvement of the agent in the making of her decision. Yet despite the advantage agent-causal accounts have over event-causal accounts in specifying the control Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 185 needed for moral responsibility, they too are ultimately unsatisfying (but for a different reason). Pereboom's criticism of agent-causal libertarianism is rather straightforward: "our best empirical theories yield strong reasons to doubt that we are in fact agent causes of the sort that this theory specifies" (50). These reasons concern whether agent-causal libertarianism can be reconciled with what we would expect given our best physical theories. According to agent-causation, when an agent-cause makes a free decision, she causes it without being causally determined to do so. "But she at some point would affect the physical world distinct from the agent-cause" (66). Given that on our best physical theories the physical world is law-governed, the challenge is to reconcile agent-causation with the claim that the laws of physics govern the physical components of human action. There are two distinct options for an agent-causal libertarianism to attempt this reconciliation, but neither seems satisfying: Suppose first that the physical laws are deterministic, as they are, for example on Kant's view. In his agent-causal picture, when an agent makes a free decision, she causes the decision without being causally determined to do so. On the path to action that results from this undetermined decision, alterations in the physical world, for example in her brain or some other part of her body, are produced. But it would seem that we would at this point encourage divergences from the deterministic laws. For the alterations in the physical world that result from the undetermined decisions would themselves not be causally determined, and they would thus not be governed by deterministic law. One might object that it is possible that the physical alterations that result from free decisions just happens to dovetail with what could in principle be predicted on the basis of the deterministic laws, so nothing actually occurs that diverges from these laws. But this proposal would, at least prima facie, involve coincidences too wild to be credible. For this reason, it seems that agent-causal libertarianism is not reconcilable with the physical world's being governed by deterministic laws. (66) What if it was suggested instead that quantum indeterminacy could help reconcile this problem (see, e.g., Clarke 1993, 2003; O'Connor 2000, 2009)? As Pereboom notes, "On one interpretation of quantum mechanics, the physical world is not in fact deterministic, but is rather governed by laws that are fundamentally merely probabilistic or statistical" (66). Let us suppose, then, that significant quantum indeterminacy percolates up to neural indeterminacy at the level of decision or intention-formation. Still, it appears that wild coincidences would also arise on this suggestion. Consider the class of possible human actions each of which has a physical component whose antecedent probability of occurring is approximately 0.32... Are free choices on the agent-causal libertarian model compatible with what the statistical laws lead us to expect about them? If agentcaused free action were compatible with what according to the statistical law is overwhelmingly likely, then for a large enough number of instances the possible actions in our class would have to be freely chosen close to 32 percent of the time. Then, for a large enough number of instances, the possible actions whose physical components have an antecedent probability of 0.32 would almost certainly be freely chosen close to 32 percent of the time. But if the occurrence of these physical components were settled by the choices of agent-causes, then their actually being chosen close to 32 percent of the time would amount to a coincidence no less wild than the coincident of possible actions whose physical components have an antecedent probability of about 0.99 being chosen, over a large enough number of instances, close to 99 percent of time. The proposal that agent-caused free choices do not diverge from what the statistical laws predict for the physical components of our actions would run so sharply counter to what we would expect as to make it incredible (Pereboom 1995, 2001). (67) Given that both options lead to wild coincidences, coincidences not to be expected and without an explanation, Pereboom concludes that agent-causal libertarianism is unsatisfying. Hence, the conclusion of chapters 2 and 3 combined is that "while we might hope that we are free agents Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 186 of the libertarian kind, we shouldn't regard this option as credible" (70). This leaves compatibilism as the remaining view that stands to vindicate the belief that we have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense. Chapter 4: A Manipulation Argument against Compatibilism Compatibilism maintains that the sort of free will required for desert-based moral responsibility is compatible with an agent's being causally determined to act by factors beyond her control. Such a view has been so attractive that "a large proportion of contemporary philosophers classify themselves as compatibilists" (71). Pereboom identifies two prominent routes to compatibilism. The first and more common route aims to differentiate causal circumstances of actions that exclude moral responsibility from those that do not. "The core idea is that moral responsibility requires some type of causal integration between the agent's psychology and her action, while it does not demand the absence of causal determination" (71). The second route, the one advocated by P. F. Strawson (1962), "specifies that despite what incompatibilists suppose, the truth of determinism is irrelevant to whether we have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility" (72). In the past, it was common for compatibilists to defend a conditional account of the ability to do otherwise (Hume 1748/2000; Hobbes 1654; Moore 1912; Ayer 1954). According to such accounts, to say that I could have acted otherwise is to claim that I would have acted otherwise if I had so chosen. But if Pereboom's defense of the source view in ch.1 succeeds and a successful Frankfurt-style example is available, then "alternative possibilities will not play the prominent role...these conditional accounts suggest" (72). According to Pereboom: "If the availability of alternative possibilities is not crucial to the sort of free will required for moral responsibility, the Consequence Argument, which aims to show that if determinism is true, no agent can ever do otherwise, can be sidestepped..." (73). It is for this reason that Pereboom thinks the best anti-compatibilist strategy involves an argument from manipulation. The core idea of manipulation arguments is that "an action's being produced by a deterministic process that traces back to factors beyond the agent's control, even when she satisfies all the causal conditions on moral responsibility specified by the contending compatibilist theories, presents in principle no less of a threat to moral responsibility than does deterministic manipulation by other agents" (73). Pereboom's manipulation argument is known as the four-case argument. The argument sets out three examples of actions that involve manipulation, "the first of which features the most radical sort of manipulation consistent with the proposed compatibilist conditions and with intuitive conditions on agency, each progressively more like the fourth, which the compatibilist might envision to be ordinary and realistic, in which the action is causally determined in a natural way" (74-75). The challenge is for the compatibilist to point out a relevant and principled difference between any two adjacent cases that would show why the agent might be morally responsible in the latter example but not in the earlier one. Pereboom maintains that "this can't be done, and that the agent's non-responsibility therefore generalizes from the first of the manipulation examples to the ordinary case" (75). Furthermore, since the first three cases set out examples of actions that involve manipulation, and in which the prominent compatibilist causal conditions on moral responsibility are satisfied, they also indicate that these conditions are inadequate-"that is, they are not, together with some other uncontroversial necessary conditions for moral responsibility, sufficient for it" (74). Here's the set-up (75-76): In each of the four cases Professor Plum decides to murder White for the sake of some personal advantage, and succeeds in doing so. The action under consideration is his decision to kill White-"a basic mental action" (75). Pereboom specifies that in each of the four cases, Plum's decision to kill White satisfies the relevant compatibilist-friendly conditions for acting freely. For example, it meets certain compatibilist conditions proposed by Hume: "it is not out of character, since for Plum it is generally true that selfish reasons weigh heavily- too heavily when considered from the moral point of view-while in addition the desire that motivates him to act is nevertheless not irresistible for him, and in this sense he is not constrained to act" (75). The action also meets the compatibilist condition proposed by Harry Frankfurt (1971): "Plum's effective desire (i.e., his will) to murder White conforms appropriately to his second-order desires for which effective desire he will have. That is, he wills to murder her, and wants to will to do so" (75). In addition, the action satisfies the Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 187 reasons-responsiveness condition advocated by John Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998): "Plum's desire can be modified by, and some of them arise from, the rational consideration of his reasons, and if he believed that the bad consequences for himself that would result from his killing White would be more serve than he actually expects them to be, he would not have decided to kill her" (75). Finally, this action also satisfies the related condition advanced by Jay Wallace (1994): "Plum has the general ability to grasp, apply, and regulate his actions by moral reasons. For instance, when egoistic reasons that count against acting morally are weak, he will typically act for moral reasons instead" (75). The question, then, is that supposing Plum is causally determined by factors beyond his control to decide as he does, is it plausible that he is morally responsible for his decision? The following four cases exhibit varying ways in which Plum's decision to kill White might be causally determined by factors beyond his control. Case 1 involves manipulation by a team of neuroscientists. Case 1: A team of neuroscientists has the ability to manipulate Plum's neural states at any time by radio-like technology. In this particular case, they do so by pressing a button just before he begins to reason about his situation, which they know will produce in him a neural state that realizes a strongly egoistic reason process, which the neuroscientists know will deterministically result in his decision to kill White. Plum would not have killed White had the neuroscientists not intervened, since his reasoning would then not have been sufficiently egoistic to produce this decision. But at the same time, Plum's effective first-order desire to kill White conforms to his second-order desire. In addition, his process of deliberation from which the decision results is reason-responsive; in particular, this type of process would have resulted in Plum's refraining from deciding to kill White in certain situations in which his reasons were different. His reasoning is consistent with his character because it is frequently egoistic and sometimes strongly so. Still, it is not in general exclusively egoistic, because he sometimes successfully regulates his behavior by moral reasons, especially when the egoistic reasons are relatively weak. Plum is also not constrained to act as he does, for he does not act because of an irresistible desire- the neuroscientists do not induce a desire of this sort. (76-77) It's intuitive, argues Pereboom, that Plum is not morally responsible in Case 1 despite the fact that his actions satisfy each of the compatibilist conditions. And Plum's lack of moral responsibility is explained (at least on one candidate explanation) by the fact that his decision is causally determined by the neuroscientists' intervention, which is beyond his control, together with the fact that he would not have decided to kill White had this intervention not occurred (77). The next case is more like the ordinary situation than Case 1 but it still involves manipulation. Case 2: Plum is just like an ordinary human being, except that a team of neuroscientists programmed him at the beginning of his life so that his reasoning is often but not always egoistic (as in Case 1), and at times strongly so, with the intended consequence that in his current circumstances he is causally determined to engage in the egoistic reasons-responsive process of deliberation and to have the set of first and second-order desires that result in his decision to kill White. Plum has the general ability to regulate his actions by moral reasons, but in his circumstances, due to the strongly egoistic nature of his deliberative reasoning, he is causally determined to make his decision to kill. Yet he does not decide as he does because of an irresistible desire. The neural realization of his reasoning process and of his decision is exactly the same as it is in Case 1 (although their causal histories are different). (77) Pereboom maintains that here again Plum is not morally responsible for his decision since "it would seem unprincipled to claim that here, by contract with Case 1, Plum is morally responsible because the length of time between the programming and his decision is now great enough" (77-78). It's irrelevant, argues Pereboom, whether the programming occurs a few seconds before or forty years prior to the action. What is of relevance is that in both cases Plum's decision to kill White is causally determined by factors beyond his control: "Causal determination by what the neuroscientists do, which is beyond his control, plausibly Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 188 explains Plum's not being morally responsible in the first case, and it's intuitive that he is not morally responsible in the second case for the same reason" (78). Pereboom further notes that if Plum lacks moral responsibility in Case 2, this once again indicates that the compatibilist conditions specified, either individually or in conjunction, are not sufficient for moral responsibility. Case 3 is more similar yet to our ordinary situation. It supposes that Plum was brought up in an environment in which self-interest and violence are more strongly encouraged than they are in ours, even though morality also has a part. Case 3: Plum is an ordinary human being, except that the training practices of his community causally determined the nature of his deliberative reasoning process so that they are frequently but not exclusively rationally egoistic (the resulting nature of his deliberative reasoning processes are exactly as they are in Cases 1 and 2). This training was completed before he developed the ability to prevent or alter these practices. Due to the aspect of his character produced by this training, in his present circumstances he is causally determined to engage in the strongly egoistic reasons-responsive process of deliberation and to have the first and second-order desires that issue in his decision to kill White. While Plum does have the general ability to regulate his behavior by moral reasons, in virtue of this aspect of his character and his circumstances he is causally determined to make his immoral decision, although he does not decide as he does due to an irresistible desire. The neural realization of his deliberative reasoning process and of the decision is just as it is in Cases 1 and 2. (78) The challenge for the compatibilist is to explain how Plum could be morally responsible in Case 3 but fail to be morally responsible in Case 2. To successfully do this he must identify a feature of these scenarios that would explain the difference. But this is impossible, argues Pereboom, since "there is no such feature" (78). Hence, Plum's exemption from responsibility in Cases 1 and 2 generalizes to the near-to-normal Case 3. Case 4 deals with ordinary determinism. It differs from the previous cases in that other agents do not bring about Plum's decision, but in all other relevant respects it is similar. Case 4: Everything that happens in our universe is causally determined by virtue of its past states together with the laws of nature. Plum is an ordinary human being, raised in normal circumstances, and again his reasoning processes are frequently but not exclusively egoistic, and sometimes strongly so (as in Cases 1-3). His decision to kill White issues from his strongly egoistic but reasons-responsive process of deliberation, and he has the specified first and second-order desires. The neural realization of Plum's reasoning process and decision is exactly as it is in Cases 1-3; he has the general ability to grasp, apply, and regulate his actions by moral reasons, and it is not because of an irresistible desire that he decides to kill. (79) Pereboom argues that Plum's exemption from moral responsibility generalizes to this ordinary case because "there are no differences between Case 3 and Case 4 that would justify the claim that Plum is not responsible in Case 3 but is in Case 4" (79). The fact that in Case 4 other agents do not bring about the causal determination of Plum's decision is not a relevant difference according to Pereboom. Imagine, for example, further cases that are exactly the same as Case 1 or Case 2, "except that states at issue are instead produced by a spontaneously generated machine-a machine with no intelligent designer (Pereboom 2001: 115) or a force field (Mele 2005)" (79). Since Plum would lack moral responsibility here as well, Pereboom concludes "causal determination by other agents was not essential to what was driving the intuition of non-responsibility in the earlier cases" (79). For Pereboom, the best explanation for Plum's non-responsibility in all four cases is that, in each, he is causally determined by factors beyond his control to decide as he does. And since Plum is not morally responsible in Case 1, and there are no differences between Cases 1 and 2, 2 and 3, and 3 and 4 that can explain in a principled way why he would not be responsible in the former of each pair but would be in the latter, "[w]e are thus driven to the conclusion that he is not responsible in Case 4" (79). This, then, is Pereboom's four-case argument and it represents his reason for rejecting compatibilism. Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 189 The remainder of ch.4 is dedicated to addressing objections to the manipulation argument, especially those of Alfred Mele, John Martin Fischer, Michael McKenna, and Daniel Haas. Roughly speaking, these objects can be placed in one of two general categories. As Michael McKenna (2008) characterizes them, hard-line replies to the four-case argument claim that Plum is morally responsible in all of the manipulation cases, or at the very least that it is not clear that Plum is not responsible in these cases (91). Soft-line replies, on the other hand, claim that Plum is responsible in some of the cases although not in others. Mele and Fischer put forth soft-line replies to the four-case argument, while McKenna and Haas opt for hardline replies. Since the exchange between Fischer and Pereboom elsewhere in this issue addresses soft-line replies, I will focus my attention here on McKenna's hard-line reply and Pereboom's response. McKenna's central idea is that whatever attitude it is rational initially to have about Plum's responsibility in the ordinary deterministic example transfers to the manipulation cases. As Pereboom describes the objection, "In his view, since it is at the outset rational for us to have an agnostic attitude about the claim that Plum is morally responsible in the ordinary deterministic example..., the absence of relevant differences [between the cases] allows this rational agnosticism to transfer unimpeded to the manipulation cases, thereby depriving them of counting in favor of incompatibilism" (91). According to McKenna, the initial attitude we should have in the ordinary deterministic example is that, "It is not clear that Plum is not morally responsible" (92). Pereboom, however, responds that McKenna is mistaken about the rationality of this initial attitude. As he describes it: I have a different take on the dialectic...In everyday life, we assume that people can be, and often are, morally responsible in the basic desert sense for their actions. However, we ordinarily do not bring to bear on this assumption any theory about the general causal nature of the universe that might threaten its rationality. For example, we do not seriously question the rationality of this assumption given the theory that every event, including choices and actions, results from deterministic causal processes that trace back to a time before agents existed. (92) Pereboom maintains that if we did engage in such questioning, the epistemically rational attitude to adopt would be the neutral inquiring attitude rather than McKenna's confirmed agnostic attitude. There are a number of different initial attitudes one can bring to the ordinary deterministic example. As Pereboom identifies them, the resolute compatibilist response is to "deny that under these circumstances causal determination poses even a prima facie threat to our everyday assumption, and that it is rational to refuse to take seriously any further consideration for there being such a threat" (93). A distinct approach affirms that causal determination provides a reason for giving up the responsibility assumption, but claims that so far the issue has not been settled. Pereboom calls this the neutral inquiring response. "By this response it is initially epistemically rational not to believe that the agent in an ordinary deterministic example is morally responsible in the basic desert sense, and not to believe that he isn't, but to be open to clarifying considerations that would make one or other of these beliefs rational" (93). It is crucial to note that the neutral inquiring attitude differs significantly from what Pereboom calls the confirmed agnostic. The confirmed agnostic "claims that it is not clear that the ordinary causally determined agent is morally responsible in the sense at issue, and that it is not clear that he isn't, but, like the resolute compatibilist, maintains that it is rational to consider enquiry into the issue closed, and for this reason it is not open to further clarifying considerations" (93). Pereboom argues that the confirmed agnostic response, the response that generates McKenna's conclusion, is not the appropriate response to take. Instead, "the most attractive way of conceiving manipulation arguments involves supposing that the neutral inquiring attitude about ordinary determined agents is initially epistemically rational" (94). If we adopt the neutral inquiring attitude, "it might then be that an analogous manipulation case functions as a clarifying consideration that makes rational the belief that the ordinary causally determined agent is not morally responsible" (94). While the confirmed agnostic rules out this possibility, the neutral inquirer leaves it open. This means that "the neutral inquiring response is open to the potential rational influence of manipulation examples, and so we cannot assume that it transfers to the manipulation cases unaltered" (94). Pereboom therefore concludes that an argument that Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 190 begins with the neutral inquiring response to the ordinary deterministic case (the most epistemically rational attitude to adopt) will not secure agnosticism about manipulation cases. Chapter 5: Free Will Skepticism and Rational Deliberation The remaining four chapters explores the implications of free will skepticism, addresses several practical concerns, and defends the optimistic view that life without free will and desert-based moral responsibility would not be devastating to our conceptions of agency, morality, and meaning in life. Unlike the objections to libertarianism and compatibilism, resistance to free will skepticism is typically driven by practical concerns over its implications: What would it mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Could we live with the belief that it is true? Critics contend that free will skepticism threatens to "undercut our self-conception as deliberative and rational agents, to make morality incoherent, leave no reason to be moral, render unjustifiable our policies for dealing with wrongdoers, and undermine the emotions and attitudes that lie at the core of human interpersonal relationships" (104). In these concluding chapters Pereboom addresses these concerns one-by-one, and in the process develops the most thoroughgoing and nuanced account of free will skepticism in the literature. Chapter 5 begins by addressing the concern that free will skepticism, or more generally the belief that our actions are causally determined by factors beyond our control, threatens to conflict with the presuppositions of rational deliberation. Whenever we deliberate about what to do, we typically believe in the "openness" of our options-that is, we believe we have more than one distinct option for which action to perform, each of which is available to us in the sense that we can or could perform each of these actions. It is often argued that belief in such openness is required for deliberation, or at least for rational deliberation (105). Some have argued, however, that this belief in openness would conflict with the truth of determinism in the sense that, in any deliberative situation, the truth of determinism would rule out the availability to us of all but one distinct option for what to do, and this would rule out openness about what to do (106). The concern is that "a belief required for rational deliberation would be inconsistent with an evident consequence of determinism for one's actions, and if determinism were true, such a belief would be false" (106). Worse still, "a rational deliberator who believed determinism and its evident consequences for her actions would have inconsistent beliefs" (106). This line of reasoning suggests an incompatibility between rational deliberation and believing in causal determinism-a position Pereboom calls deliberation-incompatibilism. Deliberation-incompatibilism: S's deliberating and being rational is incompatible with S's believing that her actions are causally determined (by causal antecedents beyond her control). (106) The contrary position is: Deliberation-compatibilism: S's deliberating and being rational is compatible with S's believing that her actions are causally determined. (106) Pereboom sets out in ch.5 to develop and defend a version of deliberation-compatibilism. Taking as its starting point extant compatibilist responses to this challenge, Pereboom begins by rejecting a metaphysical reading of openness, opting instead for an epistemic openness requirement. While other philosophers have developed similar epistemic conditions, existing proposals of this kind have met with significant opposition (107). According to Pereboom, "the preferable position has it that there are two such compatibilist beliefs-or more precisely, compatibilist epistemic states, and that this dual proposal meets what are in effect two distinct strands in the incompatibilist objections to such proposals. One of these specifies an epistemic notion of openness for what to do and the other is an epistemic condition on the efficacy of deliberation" (107). Pereboom's account of deliberation-compatibilism therefore requires two kinds of epistemic conditions: an epistemic openness condition and a deliberative efficacy condition. Pereboom's epistemic openness condition builds off conditions first proposed by Tomis Kapitan (1986) and Dana Nelkin (2004b). In an attempt to avoid objections to these conditions, Pereboom puts forth the following revised version: Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 191 (S) In order to deliberate rationally among distinct actions A1...An, for each Ai, S cannot be certain of the proposition that she will do Ai, nor of the proposition that she will not do Ai; and either (a) the proposition that she will do Ai is consistent with every proposition that, in the present context, is settled for her, or (b) if it is inconsistent with some such proposition, she cannot believe that it is. (113) Clause (a) deals with cases of consistent settled propositions, where a proposition's being settled for an agent is defined as follows: (Settled) A proposition is settled for an agent just in case she believes it and disregards any uncertainty she has that it is true, e.g., for the purpose of deliberation. (113). Clause (b) is included to deal with the concern that I can rationally deliberate about whether to do A even if in fact doing A is inconsistent with a proposition I regard as settled in that context. Here, Pereboom maintains, "it is crucial that I then not believe that it is inconsistent; if I did believe this, it's intuitive that I couldn't rationally deliberate about whether to do A" (114). While condition (S) together with (Settled) is capable of dealing with a number of deliberation-incompatibilist objections, Pereboom maintains that an additional condition is required that incorporates the belief in the efficacy of deliberation. This condition maintains: (DE) In order to rationally deliberate about whether to do A1 or A2, where A1 and A2 are distinct actions, an agent must believe that if as a result of her deliberating about whether to do A1 or A2 she were to judge that it would be best to do A1, then, under normal conditions, she would also, on the basis of this deliberation, do A1; and similarly for A2. (118-19). This condition is needed to deal with cases like Peter van Inwagen's locked door example: ...imagine that [an agent] is in a room with two doors and that he believes one of the doors to be unlocked and other door to be locked and impassable, though he has no idea which is which; let him then attempt to imagine himself deliberating about which door to leave by. (1983, 154) In this example, I am neither certain that I will open door 1, nor that I will not (and the same for door 2). And my opening door 1 (or door 2) is consistent with what is settled for me in the sense specified. "Thus this example poses a threat to (S) together with (Settled) as a compatibilist account for beliefs required for deliberation" (116). It is for this reason that Pereboom adds the efficacy of deliberation requirement. Once (DE) is introduced, van Inwagen's concern, along with several other concerns Pereboom considers, can be addressed since (DE) is not met by the agent in such situations. The conclusion of ch.5 is that rational deliberation requires satisfaction of both an epistemic-openness condition and a belief-in-deliberative-efficacy condition. According to Pereboom, "(S) together with (Settled), and (DE) appear not to be vulnerable to objections that have been raised against other compatibilist proposals for the beliefs required for deliberation, and this in turn provides reason to think that a deliberation-incompatibilism...can be successfully resisted" (126). If Pereboom's account succeeds, then there is no inconsistency between rational deliberation and believing in causal determinism-that is, it is possible for an agent to believe that causal antecedents beyond her control causally determine her actions and still be capable of rational deliberation. Chapter 6: Moral Responsibility without Basic Desert As we've seen, free will skepticism denies that we have the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense. There are, however, other notions of moral responsibility besides basic desert whose essential features can be endorsed by the skeptic. Pereboom, for example, sets out and defends a forward-looking account of moral responsibility that is perfectly consistent with free will skepticism. He argues that "moral axiological judgments can serve as a foundation for this forward-looking sense of responsibility, and that such judgments are not threatened by the kinds of considerations that undermine moral responsibility in the basic desert sense" (127). While deontological judgments may not fare as well, Pereboom contends that "the axiological moral judgments Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 192 and the forward-looking sense of responsibility are sufficient given the interests of morality" (127). The justification and goal of Pereboom's forward-looking account of moral responsibility is to "moderate or eliminate dispositions to misconduct" (131) and to provide protection from harm and reconciliation in relationships. It's reasonable to assume that if such dispositions to misconduct are manifest in past actions they will persist unless corrective measures are taken. Thus when an agent has acted badly, one might ask him: "Why did you decide to do that? Or, Do you think it was the right thing to do?" where the point of asking such questions is to have him recognize and acknowledge a disposition to behave immorally. If the reasons given in response to such questions indicate that he does have such a disposition, it then becomes apt to request an effort to eliminate it. Engaging in such interactions will be legitimate in light of how they contribute to the agent's moral improvement. (132) This model is a variety of the answerability sense of moral responsibility defended by Scanlon (1998) and Hilary Bok (1998), and it's available for free will skeptics to endorse without inconsistency. Pereboom's more specific proposal takes as its inspiration a revised version of Michael McKenna's (2012) recently developed conversational theory of moral responsibility. McKenna's account holds that blaming someone is an expression of a sentiment or attitude, such as moral resentment or indignation, and its function is to communicate moral disapproval to the agent in light of the quality of will she indicated through her actions. As Pereboom describes McKenna's account: When a morally responsible person acts, she understands that members of the moral community might assign such a meaning to her action. When her acts are morally charged, she appreciates that she might be introducing a meaningful contribution to such a conversational exchange with others. This initial stage McKenna calls moral contribution. The second stage, in which that agent is blamed by a respondent, he labels moral address. In the third stage, moral account, the blamed agent extends the conversation by offering an excuse, a justification, or an apology. The responded might at this point continue the conversation perhaps by forgiving or punishing. In a further stage the blamed agent may be restored to full status in the moral community. This moral responsibility exchange is modeled on analogy with an ordinary conversational exchange between speakers of a natural language. (132) Pereboom maintains that an amended version of McKenna's account is available for free will skeptics to adopt without inconsistence, as long as it avoids an appeal to basic desert and to expressions of reactive attitudes that are linked with beliefs about basic desert (133). Pereboom's modified account grounds blame, not in basic desert, but in three non-desert invoking moral desiderata: "protection of potential victims, reconciliation to relationships both personal and with the moral community more generally, and moral formation" (134). Pereboom argues, "Immoral actions are often harmful, and we have a right to protect ourselves and others from those who are disposed to behave harmfully. Immoral actions can also impair relationships and we have a moral interest undoing such impairment through reconciliation. And because we value morally good character and resulting action, we have a stake in the formation of moral character when it is plagued by dispositions to misconduct" (134). A forward-looking account of moral responsibility grounded in future protection, future reconciliation, and future moral formation is in harmony with free will skepticism since it does not appeal to basic desert in any way. While Pereboom focuses primarily on his account of blame, he does note that a corresponding account of praise is available as well. Of the three aims of blame- moral formation, protection, and reconciliation-the one most clearly amendable to praise, he argues, is moral formation. "We praise an agent for a morally exemplary action to encourage him to strengthen the disposition that produced it." Furthermore, "This can have a protective function, since strengthening such dispositions has the effect of reducing dangerous behavior." As for reconciliation, the corresponding notion with regard to praise could be "celebrating success in a relationship" (135). Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 193 On the conversational model, it is the agent's rationality that is engaged in the proposed process for both blame and praise. In the case of blame, for example, "at the stage of moral address we request an explanation with the intent of having the agent acknowledge a disposition to act badly, and then, if he has in fact so acted without excuse or justification, we aim for him to come to see that the disposition issuing in the action is best eliminated" (135). In normal cases, this change is produced by way of the agent's recognition of moral reasons to eliminate the disposition. Accordingly, on Pereboom's account "it is an agent's responsiveness to reasons (cf. Fischer and Ravizza 1998), together with the fact that we have a moral interest in our protection, his moral formation, and our reconciliation with him, that explains why he is an appropriate recipient of blame in this forward-looking sense" (135-36). A similar case can be made for praise. So while many compatibilists see some type of attunement to reasons as the key condition for basic desert moral responsibility, Pereboom instead views it "as the most significant condition for a notion of responsibility that focuses on protection, reconciliation, and moral formation" (136). A critic may question what form blame will take absent overt expressions of moral resentment and indignation, and will it be effective? But here Pereboom argues, "first, that there are alternative attitudes expression of which is not linked with beliefs about basic desert, communication of which can be as effective morally as expressions of resentment and indignation, and second, that in certain important respects blame without expression of these reactive attitudes is to be preferred (Pereboom 2001, 2009a; cf. Honderich 1988)" (146). For example, when someone is mistreated in a relationship, there are other emotions available besides resentment and indignation-these emotions include "feeling disappointed, hurt or shocked about what the offender has done, moral concern for him, and moral sadness and sorrow generated by this concern when the harm done is serious" (146). Communicating such disappointment, sadness, or concern can be quite effective in motivating avoidance of future misbehavior. In addition, communication of such alternatives to resentment and indignation "is not typically aggressive in the way that expression of anger can be, and will usually not have its intimidating effect" (147). Pereboom acknowledges that sometimes circumstances require a more aggressive and intimidating emotional attitude. But here too skeptical alternatives are available. Take, for example, the right of self defense and defense of others. Here we are justified in expressing fury since it is an attitude consistent with free will skepticism. Fury, according to Pereboom, "is an emotion we share with bears and wolves, and has no cognitive content or presupposition or associated belief that involves the notion of desert" (147). Pereboom's account therefore maintains that "moral sadness and sorrow-accompanied by a resolve for fairness and justice, or to improve personal relationships-will serve societal and personal relationships as well as resent and indignation does. And when acting on the right of self defense and defense of others in a dangerous situation is at issue, fury is appropriate, and not in conflict with free will skepticism" (148). Additionally, adopting this skeptical account of moral responsibility has the potential benefit of relinquishing us of an often-destructive form of moral anger. Anger in relationships is nourished by the belief that its target is blameworthy in some way for having done wrong (149). Furthermore, the "anger that fuels ethnic conflict often results partly from the belief that an opposing group so deserves blame for some atrocity" (149). Free will skepticism "advocates retracting such beliefs because they are false, as a result of which the associated anger might be diminished, and its expressions reduced" (150). Expression of resentment and indignation is potentially harmful since it is "more likely to occasion destructive resistance than is expression of moral concern and the moral sadness or sorrow that such concern is apt to generate" (150). Furthermore, "overt blame fueled by resentment and indignation arguably renders it particularly susceptible to errors that threaten to undermine the integrity and effectiveness of the moral conversation" (150). It would be beneficial, therefore, if we could rid ourselves of these potentially harmful reactive attitudes, and adopting free will skepticism and Pereboom's forward-looking account of moral responsibility provides us with a path forward for doing so. Chapter 7: Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Behavior Chapter 7 deals with another frequently voiced criticism of free will skepticism: that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 194 acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that "one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism" (153). The second, which Pereboom willingly acknowledges, is that "alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per se face significant independent moral objections." Yet despite these concerns, Pereboom forcefully argues that "free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior, in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions," and "these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy" (153). First, it's important to note that retributive punishment is incompatible with free will skepticism because it maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that he deserves something bad to happen to him just because he has knowingly done wrong-this could include pain, deprivation, or death (157). For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal's immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible to consequentialist considerations nor does it appeal "to a good such as the safety of society, or the moral improvement of the criminal in justifying punishment" (157). Free will skepticism undermines this justification for punishment because it does away with the idea of basic desert-"if agents do not deserve blame just because they have knowingly done wrong, neither do they deserve punishment just because they have knowingly done wrong" (157). Some critics worry that without retributive punishment the free will skeptic is left unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior. But Pereboom notes that there are several alternative ways of justifying criminal punishment (and dealing with criminal behavior more generally) that do not appeal to the notion of basic desert and are thus not threatened by free will skepticism. These include moral education theories, deterrence theories, punishment justified by the right to harm in self-defense, and incapacitation theories. While Pereboom maintains the first two approaches face independent moral objections-objections that, though perhaps not devastating, make them less desirable than their alternative-he argues that an incapacitation account built on the right to harm in self-defense provides the best option for justifying a policy for treatment of criminals consistent with free will skepticism. Before turning to Pereboom's positive account, let me briefly say something about the first two alternative approaches. Moral education theories draw an analogy with justification of the punishment of children. "Children are typically not punished to exact retribution, but rather to educate them morally" (161). Since moral education is a generally acceptable goal, a justification for criminal punishment based on this analogy is one the free will skeptic can potentially accept. Pereboom notes, however, that a "serious concern for this type of theory is that it is far from evident that punishing adult criminals is similarly likely to result in moral improvement" (161). Children and adult criminals differ in significant respects. For example, "[a]dult criminals, unlike children, typically understand the moral code accepted in their society" (161). Furthermore, "[c] hildren are generally more psychologically malleable than adult criminals are" (162). For these and other reasons, Pereboom sees this approach as less desirable than an alternative incapacitation account. Deterrence theories, especially utilitarian deterrence theories, have probably been the most discussed alternative to retributivism. According to deterrence theories, "the prevention of criminal wrongdoing serves as the good on the basis of which punishment is justified" (163). The classic deterrence theory is Jeremy Bentham's: In his conception, the state's policy on criminal behavior should aim at maximizing utility, and punishment is legitimately administered if and only if it does so. The pain or unhappiness produced by punishment results from the restriction on freedom that ensues from the threat of punishment, the anticipation of punishment by the person who has been sentenced, the pain of actual punishment, and the sympathetic pain felt by others such as the friends and family of the criminal (Bentham 1823). The most significant pleasure or happiness that results from punishment derives from the security of those who benefit from its capacity to deter. (163-64) While deterrence theories are completely compatible with free will skepticism, Pereboom notes three general moral objections against them. The first is that they Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 195 will justify punishments that are intuitively too severe: "For it would seem that in certain cases harsh punishment would be more effective deterrents than milder forms, while the harsh punishments are intuitively too severe to be fair" (164). The second concern is that such accounts would seem to justify punishing the innocent: "If after a series of horrible crimes the actual perpetrator is not caught, potential criminals might come to believe that they can get away with serious wrongdoing. Under such circumstances it might maximize utility to frame and punish an innocent person" (164). Lastly, there is the "use" objection, which is a problem for utilitarianism more generally. Utilitarianism "sometimes requires people to be harmed severely, without their consent, in order to benefit others, and this is often intuitively wrong" (165). Despite Pereboom's rejection of these alternatives to retributivism, he does believe there is a legitimate theory for prevention of especially dangerous crime that is neither undercut by free will skepticism nor by other moral considerations. This theory is based on an analogy with quarantine and draws on a comparison between treatment of dangerous criminals and treatment of carriers of dangerous diseases. As Pereboom describes it: The free will skeptic claims that criminals are not morally responsible for their actions in the basic desert sense. Plainly, many carriers of dangerous diseases are not responsible in this or in any sense for having contracted these diseases. We generally agree that it is sometimes permissible to quarantine them nevertheless. But then, even if a dangerous criminal is not morally responsible for his crimes in the basic desert sense (perhaps because no one is ever in this way morally responsible) it could be as legitimate to preventatively detain him as to quarantine the non-responsible carrier of a serious communicable disease. (156) Furthermore, this analogy places several constraints on the treatment of criminals. ...as less dangerous diseases justify only preventative measures less restrictive than quarantine, so less dangerous criminal tendencies justify only more moderate restraints. In addition, the incapacitation account that results from this analogy demands a degree of concern for the rehabilitation and well-being of the criminal that would alter much of current practice. Just as fairness recommends that we seek to cure the diseased we quarantine, so fairness would counsel that we attempt to rehabilitate the criminals we detain (cf. D'Angelo 1968: 56-9). If a criminal cannot be rehabilitated, and our safety requires his indefinite confinement, this account provides no justification for making his life more miserable than would be required to guard against the danger he poses. Finally, there are measures for preventing crime more generally, such as providing for adequate education and mental health care, which the free will skeptic can readily endorse. (156) This is Pereboom's incapacitation account and it provides a more resilient proposal for justifying treatment of criminals than either the moral education or deterrence theories of criminal punishment. One advantage this approach has over the utilitarian deterrence theory is that it has more restrictions placed on it with regard to using people merely as a means. Concerns over the "use" objection, for example, "count more heavily against punishment policy justified on consequentialist grounds than they do against incapacitation based on the quarantine analogy" (169). And this is because, "on the quarantine analogy, as it is illegitimate to treat carriers of a disease more harmfully than is necessary to neutralize the danger they pose, treating those with violent criminal tendencies more harshly than is required to protect society will be illegitimate as well" (169). Furthermore, "the less dangerous the disease, the less invasive the justified prevention methods would be, and similarly, the less dangerous the criminal, the less invasive the justified forms of incapacitation would be" (170). In fact, for certain minor crimes "perhaps only some degree of monitoring could be defended" (170). Summarizing Pereboom's proposal, then, the core idea is that "the right to harm in self-defense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with the minimum harm required for adequate protection" (174). The resulting account would not justify the sort of criminal punishment whose legitimacy is most dubious, "such as death or confinement in the most common kinds of prisons in our society" (174). Pereboom's account also "demands a certain Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 196 level of care and attention to the well-being of criminals, which would change much of current policy" (174). Furthermore, free will skeptics would continue to endorse measures for reducing crime that aim at altering social conditions, "such as improving education, increasing opportunities for fulfilling employment, and enhancing care for the mentally ill" (174). This combined approach to dealing with criminal behavior, it is argued, is sufficient for dealing with dangerous criminals, leads to a more humane and affective social policy, and is actually preferable to the harsh and often excessive forms of punishment that typically come with retributivism. Chapter 8: Personal Relationships and Meaning in Life Another set of concerns people have with free will skepticism is that it would negatively impact our personal relationships and meaning in life. Some fear that life without free will would have no point or purpose and a dispirited resignation to fate would result (175). Another closely related concern is that taking the skeptical view would threaten our personal relationships and the fulfillment in life that they provide. P. F. Strawson (1962), for example, developed a philosophical elaboration of this reaction. "For him a skeptical conviction, supposing it was psychologically possible for us, would undermine expressions of the other-directed reactive attitudes essential to good personal relationships, and would jeopardize self-directed reactive attitudes such as guilt, and repentance, crucial to relationships and also to personal moral development" (175). Pereboom, in his final chapter, responds to these concerns and makes his final case for optimistic skepticism. Pereboom argues that "the skeptical perspective does not threaten personal relationships, and that it holds out the promise of better relationships through release from reactive attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation" (175). Just as the Stoics argued that "affirming determinism while taking a broader perspective can produce an advantageous sort of equanimity" (175), Pereboom maintains that "Spinoza was right to contend that skepticism about free will can encourage a kind of peace of mind that would be a significant benefit for us" (176). While it is an empirical question (currently without answer) whether living in accordance with the skeptical perspective would be on the whole better for us, Pereboom is "optimistic that this sort of life would be better for us all things considered" (176). It has already been argued in previous chapters that free will skepticism leaves intact much of what is important to us in human life: the rationality of deliberation, a forward-looking sense of moral responsibility, preventing crime, etc. Here Pereboom considers the additional question: Is the assumption that we are morally responsible in the basic desert sense required for the meaningful and fulfilling personal relationships we have? P. F. Strawson delivers a positive answer, fearing that if we embraced the skeptical perspective we would end up adopting an "objectivity of attitude" toward others, an attitude that rules out good personal relationships. Pereboom disagrees. I think that Strawson is right to believe that objectivity of attitude would jeopardize our personal relationships, but that he is mistaken to hold that such a stance would result or be appropriate if the causal determination of our actions by factors beyond our control did pose a genuine threat to expression of the reactive attitudes (Pereboom 1995, 2001). First, some of our reactive attitudes, although their expressions would be doxastically irrational for free will skeptics, are not required for good personal relationships. On the skeptical view, an expression of resentment or indignation will invoke doxastic irrationality when it is accompanied by the belief-as in my view it always is-that its target deserves in the basic sense to be its recipient. But I maintain that expressions of these reactive attitudes are suboptimal as modes of communication in relationships relative to alternative attitudes available to us. Second, the attitudes whose expression we would want to retain either are not threatened by a skeptical conviction because they are not associated with beliefs that conflict with this view, or else they have analogues not connected with such beliefs. The attitudes and analogues expressions of which would survive do not amount to Strawson's objectivity of attitude, and are sufficient to sustain good personal relationships (Pereboom 1995, 2001, 2007a, 2009a). (179) Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 197 The remainder of ch.8 is dedicated to examining the suboptimal nature of resentment and indignation, spelling out the benefits of alternative attitudes and analogues that are left unaffected by the skeptical perspective, and briefly discussing the consequences of free will skepticism for our life's projects. Moral resentment, as Pereboom defines it, is "anger with an agent due to a wrong he has done to oneself," and indignation is "anger with an agent because of a wrong he has done to a third party" (179). While these attitudes play an important communicative role in personal and societal relationships, Pereboom argues that there are other emotions present or available not challenged by the skeptical view that are preferable to anger and "whose expression can also convey the relevant information" (180). These emotions include "feeling hurt or shocked or disappointed about what the offending agent has done, and moral sadness or sorrow and concern for him" (180). These substitutes are preferable to resentment and indignation because the latter attitudes are "apt to have harmful effects." Expression of resentment and indignation "often fails to contribute to the well being of those to whom it is directed" (180). And as Pereboom notes: "Frequently it is intended to cause physical or emotional pain, and can give rise to destructive resistance instead of reconciliation. As a result, it has the potential to damage or destroy relationships" (180). To be clear, though, Pereboom is not committed to the view that we can generally succeed in completely overcoming moral resentment and indignation, "but rather to the proposal that we can resist such attitudes and limit their expressions with some success, and that we can oppose actions and policies justified on the basis of the beliefs about basic desert that accompany such attitudes" (182). Following Shaun Nichols (2007), one could distinguish between narrow-profile emotional responses, which are local or immediate emotional reaction to situations, and wide-profile responses, which are not immediate and can involve rational reflections. Pereboom maintains that "[f ]ree will skeptics can expect that we will not keep ourselves from some degree of narrow-profile, immediate resentment when we are seriously wronged in our most intimate personal relationships." Nevertheless, "in some wide-profile cases, we could well have the ability to diminish or even eliminate resentment and indignation, or at least disavow it in the sense of rejecting any force it might be thought to have in justifying harmful reactions to the wrong done, and given a skeptical conviction we might take such measures for the sake of morality and rationality" (181). Moving on to the attitudes of guilt and repentance, Pereboom addresses the concern that such self-directed attitudes are threatened by free will skepticism. One may object that since these attitudes are essential to good interpersonal relationships for agent like us who can behavior immorally, and since these attitudes are incompatible with free will skepticism, adopting the skeptical perspective would have a negative affect on our relationships. "Without the attitudes of guilt and repentance," it could be argued, "we would not be motivated to moral improvement after acting badly, we would be barred from subsequent restoration of moral integrity" (186). Pereboom responds, however, by arguing that there are substitutes that work just as well as guilt and repentance. [S]uppose that you do wrong, but because you believe that free will skepticism is true, you reject the claim that you are blameworthy in the basic desert sense. Instead, you accept that you have done wrong, you feel deeply disappointed that you were the agent of wrongdoing, and as Waller advocates, you feel deep sorrow and regret for what you have done...In addition, because you have commitment to doing what is right, and to personal improvement, you resolve to do what you can to eliminate your disposition to act this way, and perhaps seek to help this change. (186-87) None of this, argues Pereboom, is undercut by the skeptical conviction. Similar arguments are given for the attitudes of forgiveness, gratitude, and love. Pereboom argues that the skeptical perspective has no trouble preserving all three of these attitudes-or at least the core aspects of each. Forgiveness, for example, need not presuppose that the person being forgiven deserves to be blamed in the basic desert sense (188). Gratitude, likewise, need not involve the belief that an agent is praiseworthy for some action. For example, "one can be thankful to a young child for some kindness without believing that she is morally responsible for it" (190). And the joy involved in gratitude is also consistent with skepticism: "No feature of the skeptical view poses a threat to the legitimacy of being joyful and expressing Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 198 joy when others are considerate or generous in one's behalf " (190). The same can be said about love. "Love of another involves, most fundamentally, wishing well for the other, taking on aims and projects of the other as one's own, and a desire to be together with the other." According to Pereboom, "[f ]ree will skepticism does not threaten any of this" (190). The final concern Pereboom addresses has to do with our life's projects. He asks: "Would it be difficult for us to cope without a conception of ourselves as creditor praiseworthy for achieving what makes our lives fulfilled, happy, satisfactory, or worthwhile-for realizing what Honderich calls our life-hopes (Honderich 1988: 382ff.)?" (193). Pereboom argues that while there is an aspect of these life-hopes that may be undercut by skepticism, the skeptical perspective nevertheless leaves them largely intact. Achievement and life-hopes are not as closely connected to basic desert praiseworthiness as some critics suppose. For example, "[i]f someone hopes for success in some project, and if she accomplishes what she hoped for, intuitively this outcome would be an achievement of hers even if she is not in this particular way praiseworthy for it..." (193). Free will skepticism need not instill in us an attitude of resignation to whatever our behavioral dispositions together with environmental conditions hold in store. "Even if what we know about our dispositions and environment give us reason to believe that our futures will turn out in a particular way, it can often be reasonable to hope that they will turn out differently" (194). But for this to be so, "it may be important that we lack complete knowledge of our dispositions and environmental conditions" (194). Suppose, for example, that someone reasonably believes that he has a particular disposition that might well be a hindrance to realizing a life-hope. Because he does not know "whether this disposition will in fact have this effect, it remains open for him-that is, epistemically possible for him-that another disposition of his will allow him to transcend this impediment" (194). As a result, he might reasonably hope that he will overcome his fear (or whatever the disposition may be) and achieve his goal. So for the free will skeptic, if he in fact does overcome his fear and succeed at his life's-hope, "this will not be an achievement of his in quite as robust a sense as we might naturally suppose, but it will be an achievement in a substantial sense nonetheless" (194). For Pereboom, our sense of self-worth "is to a non-trivial extent due to features not produced by our volitions, let alone by free will" (194). He points out that people "place great value on natural beauty, native athletic ability, and intelligence, none of which have their source in our volition" (194). Of course we also value voluntary efforts-"in productive work and altruistic behavior, and in the formation of moral character" (194)-but Pereboom argues that it does not matter much to us that these voluntary efforts are also freely willed. Consider how good character comes to be. It is plausibly formed to a significant degree by upbringing, and the belief that this is so is widespread. Parents regard themselves as having failed in raising their children if they turn out with immoral dispositions, and they typically take great care to bring their children up to prevent such an outcome. Accordingly, people often come to believe that they have the good moral character they do largely because they were raised with love and skill. But those who believe this about themselves seldom experience dismay because of it. We tend not to become dispirited upon coming to understand that good moral character is not our own doing, and that we do not deserve a great deal of praise or credit for it. By contrast, we often feel fortunate and thankful. (195) If Pereboom is correct, then there is no reason to think that our sense that we have value and that our lives are worth living is threatened by free will skepticism. Conclusion Pereboom's Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life makes a strong case for the conclusion that we lack the sort of free will required for moral responsibility in the basic desert sense. It also makes a strong case for optimistic skepticism, arguing that free will skepticism can preserve most of what we care about-including the rationality of deliberation, a forward-looking sense of moral responsibility, preventing crime, and meaning in life. Not only is the skeptical perspective "compatible with a veridical sense of accomplishment when we succeed in our projects," Pereboom argues that it's also compatible with good personal relationships and meaning in life. With regard to our friendships, for example, "it holds out the promise of greater Smith & Franklin Academic Publishing Corporation www.smithandfranklin.com Science, Religion & Culture October 2014 | Volume 1 | Issue 3 | Page 199 equanimity by reducing the expression of resentment and indignation that often impairs them" (199). It is for these reasons that Pereboom concludes: "If we did give up the assumption of the sort of free will at issue, then, perhaps surprisingly, we might be better off as a result" (199). References • Ayer, A. J. 1954. Freedom and necessity. In Philosophical essays, A.J. Ayer, 271-84. London: Macmillan. Reprinted in Free will, ed. Derk Pereboom, 110-18. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997. • Balaguer, Mark. 2009. Free will as an open scientific problem. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. • Bentham, Jeremy. 1823. An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation. New York: Macmilliam. • Bok, Hilary. 1998. Freedom and responsibility. 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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. • Widerker, David. 1995. Libertarianism and Frankfurt's attack on the principle of alternative possibilities. The Philosophical Review 104: 247-61. • ---. 2006. Libertarianism and the philosophical significance of Frankfurt scenarios. Journal of Philosophy 103: 163-97. • Zagzebski, Linda. 1991. The dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. New York: Oxford University Press. • ---. 2000. Does libertarian freedom require alternative possibilities? Philosophical Perspectives 14: 231-48.

The Parallel Manipulation Argument* Taylor W. Cyr Forthcoming in Ethics; please cite published version. *For helpful comments on previous drafts, I am grateful to John Martin Fischer, Matthew Flummer, Jonah Nagashima, and two anonymous reviewers for Ethics. I am also grateful to David Beglin and Andrew Law for helpful discussion. Abstract: Matt King has recently argued that the manipulation argument against compatibilism does not succeed by employing a dilemma: either the argument infelicitously relies on incompatibilist sourcehood conditions, or the proponent of the argument leaves a premise of the argument undefended. This article develops a reply to King's dilemma by showing that incompatibilists can accept its second horn. Key to King's argument for the second horn's being problematic is "the parallel manipulation argument." I argue that King's use of this argument is problematic, but I suggest that a (modified) parallel manipulation argument is effective for a different, though more restricted, purpose. I. The Manipulation Argument Many of us find something problematic about and are made uneasy by cases of manipulation. When the main character of the film The Truman Show, Truman (played by Jim Carrey), discovers that he has been manipulated (not only because his environment was manipulated, but also because his psychological characteristics were manipulated) into living out someone else's plan for his life, he is appalled by this and immediately seeks freedom from the influence of his manipulators. In extreme cases of manipulation, such as when a prisoner of war is "broken" by intense torture or total isolation and as a result comes to have a different set of values, the agent's moral responsibility for what she does after being manipulated is called into question. Several incompatibilists (about determinism and moral responsibility) find something similarly problematic about determinism, or more generally about the possibility that we are 2 causally determined to act as we do by factors beyond our control, and have argued that there is no relevant difference between manipulated agents and agents who are causally determined.1 Consider the following case of manipulation, which Matt King has recently adapted from an example by Alfred Mele: Ann is an exceptionally industrious philosopher who works diligently and continuously on being a good teacher, researcher, and colleague. Beth, an equally talented colleague, does not share Ann's devotion to the profession. Beth finds other pursuits more enjoyable and fulfilling, and thus teaches, researches, and does committee work only as much as she must. Their dean wants Beth to be more productive, and so directs a team of psychologists and neuroscientists to figure out what makes Ann tick, and then "brainwash" Beth so as to make her like Ann. The psychologists determine that it is Ann's "peculiar hierarchy of values" that makes her so industrious, and the neuroscientists implant the same hierarchy in Beth, while eradicating all competing values. The result is that Beth becomes, in the relevant respects, Ann's psychological twin, now possessing the same industriousness and devotion to her profession. Moreover, the ways in which Ann endorses these values and commitments is now also true of Beth; on critical reflection, they both fully support their ways of life.2 1 Two recent versions of the manipulation argument are the "Four-Case Argument" and the "Zygote Argument," which are given by Derk Pereboom and Alfred Mele, respectively. See Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), and Alfred R. Mele, Free Will and Luck (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Mele, it should be noted, is not an incompatibilist but rather an agnostic about the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility. 2 Matt King, "The Problem with Manipulation," Ethics 124 (2013): 65–83, 66. Adapted from Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 145–46. 3 Once the team of psychologists and neuroscientists have done their work, Beth apparently lacks moral responsibility for acting on her new values. This is a problem for compatibilists, because Beth is manipulated into satisfying certain compatibilist conditions on morally responsible conduct.3 This problem for compatibilists can be regimented into an argument against compatibilism itself. The first step is to invite the audience to judge that a certain manipulated agent is not morally responsible, and the second step is to argue that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents who are causally determined. The conclusion is that compatibilism is false. This form of manipulation argument has come to be known as the manipulation argument.4 Here is King's version of the manipulation argument: (M1) The manipulated agent is not morally responsible for acting on his implanted psychological states, despite satisfying compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility. (M2) There is no difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in a deterministic universe. 3 Many of the earlier discussions of manipulation in the recent literature on freedom and responsibility were concerned with showing problems with specific compatibilist conditions on free and responsible action, especially Harry Frankfurt's conditions developed in his article "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971): 5–20; whereas the more recent trend is to use manipulation to argue against compatibilism itself. For examples of the earlier trend, see Michael Slote, "Understanding Free Will," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980): 136-51; Gary Watson, "Free Action and Free Will," Mind 96 (1987): 14572; John Martin Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994); and Mele, Autonomous Agents. 4 See, for example, Michael McKenna, "Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism," Journal of Ethics 16 (2012): 145–74. 4 (MC) Thus, compatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient. In short, compatibilism is false.5 Since many compatibilists accept the second step, (M2), they are apparently forced to take a socalled "hard-line" reply to the argument, denying that the manipulated agent (e.g., Beth) lacks moral responsibility, to which incompatibilists are likely to reply with an incredulous stare.6 Recently, however, King has argued that things are not so bad for compatibilism. II. King's Dilemma According to King, the manipulation argument is not a problem for compatibilism because the proponent of the manipulation argument is subject to a dilemma: either the first premise, (M1), is defended, or it isn't defended. If (M1) is defended, King argues, then that defense will either appeal to some unique feature of manipulation or it won't.7 If it does, then we will have a reason to reject the second premise of the argument, (M2), which says that there is no (moral responsibility-relevant) difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in a deterministic universe. If the defense of (M1) does not appeal to some unique feature of manipulation, however, then King thinks the best option for the proponent of 5 King, "The Problem with Manipulation," 67. 6 For a defense of this strategy, see Michael McKenna, "A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom's FourCase Manipulation Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2008): 142-59. Most compatibilists, including McKenna, would presumably reject (M2) as it is stated, though, since one clear difference between the manipulated agent (Beth) and ordinary agents in a deterministic world is that ordinary agents in a deterministic world are not manipulated in the way that Beth is (or else such agents would not be ordinary). We should read (M2), then, as making the claim that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in a deterministic world. Even with this modification, some compatibilists will demur. See, for example, Robyn Repko Waller, "The Threat of Effective Intentions to Moral Responsibility in the Zygote Argument," Philosophia 42 (2014): 209-22. 7 A very similar response to an instance of the manipulation argument is made by Stephen Kearns, "Aborting the Zygote Argument," Philosophical Studies 160 (2012): 379-89. 5 the manipulation argument is to appeal to (contentious) sourcehood conditions on responsibility that are not satisfied by manipulated agents nor ordinary causally determined agents. But this appeal would be dialectically infelicitous, according to King, since this would be an appeal to specifically incompatibilist conditions in an argument for incompatibilism. If (M1) is left undefended (this is the second horn of King's dilemma), however, then the proponent of the manipulation argument is merely expecting the audience to find (M1) intuitive. This, King argues, is problematic because a parallel manipulation argument can be constructed such that manipulation is a problem for incompatibilism. After presenting a case in which an agent is indeterministically manipulated into acting, King offers the following argument (which is structurally parallel to the manipulation argument): (P1) The manipulated agent is not morally responsible for acting on her implanted psychological states, despite satisfying incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility. (P2) There is no difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in an indeterministic universe. (PC) Thus, incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient. In short, incompatibilism is false.8 If (M1) is left undefended, according to King, then the proponent of the manipulation argument will have no choice but to find (P1) of the parallel manipulation argument equally plausible. And 8 King, "The Problem with Manipulation," 70. Note that (P2), like (M2) of the original manipulation argument, is problematic as stated. A clear difference between a manipulated agent (Beth) and an ordinary agent in an indeterministic world is that ordinary agents in an indeterministic world are not manipulated in the way that Beth is (or else such agents would not be ordinary). We should read (P2), then, as making the claim that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in an indeterministic world. 6 since (P1) is part of an argument against incompatibilism, whereas (M1) is part of the manipulation argument against compatibilism, King thinks that failing to defend (M1) will result in a dialectical stalemate, not a victory for the incompatibilist. Neal Tognazzini has replied to King's dilemma by arguing that the proponent of the manipulation argument should accept the first horn, using the manipulation scenario as a way of motivating incompatibilist sourcehood conditions.9 This, according to Tognazzini, is not dialectically infelicitous, so the manipulation argument remains a challenge to the compatibilist. But, as I will argue for the remainder of the article, the proponent of the manipulation argument need not accept the first horn of the dilemma; King's use of the parallel manipulation argument (in attempt to make the second horn of the dilemma seem worrisome) is problematic, and there is nothing worrisome about leaving (M1) undefended. Thus, it is open to the proponent of the manipulation argument to accept the second horn of King's dilemma. In what follows, I argue that King's use of the parallel manipulation argument is problematic for several reasons. The first set of problems arises from considerations about who is advancing the original manipulation argument, and these are discussed in the next section of the article. The second set of problems arises from considerations about the parallel manipulation argument itself, and these are discussed in the final section of the article. I end by suggesting that a (modified) parallel manipulation argument can be used for a different, but more restricted, purpose; while it cannot be used to undermine incompatibilism, and thus cannot be used to make the second horn of King's dilemma seem worrisome, it is effective for extending worries about manipulation to libertarian accounts of free will, which is a noteworthy result since it shows that compatibilists are not uniquely plagued by worries about manipulation. 9 Neal A. Tognazzini, "The Structure of a Manipulation Argument," Ethics 124 (2014): 358-69. 7 III. The Dialectic: Who Is Advancing the Manipulation Argument? It is generally taken for granted that the manipulation argument is being advanced by incompatibilists (and King certainly takes this for granted).10 But even granting that it must be an incompatibilist who is advancing the manipulation argument, King has not shown that the parallel manipulation argument is problematic for the incompatibilist. In order to show this, King would need to establish that the parallel manipulation argument is a problem for the incompatibilist qua incompatibilist, but the parallel manipulation argument is only problematic for the incompatibilist who thinks that we (ordinary human beings) are morally responsible for some of what we do. Not all incompatibilists are libertarians (incompatibilists who think that we are morally responsible for some of what we do); some are hard incompatibilists, denying that anyone is ever morally responsible for anything. Such an incompatibilist will not find the inference made in the conclusion of the parallel manipulation argument to be convincing. The conclusion, (PC), says: (PC) Thus, incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient. In short, incompatibilism is false.11 Even if the hard incompatibilist is convinced by the argument to accept that some libertarian conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient, she would nevertheless deny that 10 There are other types of manipulation arguments (e.g., arguments which target a particular compatibilist account of the conditions on morally responsible action and arguments which aim to motivate historical conditions on moral responsibility), not all of which necessarily feature in an incompatibilist agenda. These kinds of manipulation arguments have a different form than the manipulation argument, since only the latter (i.e., the manipulation argument) aims to establish that compatibilism itself is false. King is only concerned with the manipulation argument against compatibilism, though, so we can leave aside the other types of manipulation arguments and assume that the proponent of the manipulation argument is an incompatibilist. 11 King, "The Problem with Manipulation," 70. 8 incompatibilism is false, since she thinks that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism and she thinks that libertarianism is false. Since certain incompatibilists (hard ones) can advance the manipulation argument without accepting the conclusion of the parallel manipulation argument, such incompatibilists need not accept that leaving (M1) undefended inevitably leads to a dialectical stalemate. For example, Derk Pereboom is an incompatibilist who denies the truth of libertarianism, and his version of the manipulation argument (the Four-Case Argument) aims to elicit the intuitive judgment that the manipulated agent lacks moral responsibility.12 According to King, Pereboom would need to defend the premise that codifies this judgment, or else Pereboom is subject to the parallel manipulation argument and we arrive at a dialectical stalemate. But, since Pereboom does not think that we are morally responsible, he need not accept the inference from (1) incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient for moral responsibility to (2) incompatibilism is false. Hard incompatibilists accept (1) but deny (2), and so hard incompatibilists advancing the manipulation argument need not concede that the parallel manipulation argument leads to a dialectical stalemate. IV. Against King's Parallel Manipulation Argument Even more problematic for King's use of the parallel manipulation argument is that both premises of the argument are false (though, as I will argue, the problem with the first premise can be fixed by modifying the indeterministic manipulation scenario to which it refers). Recall the premises of the argument: (P1) The manipulated agent is not morally responsible for acting on her implanted psychological states, despite satisfying incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility. 12 Pereboom, Living without Free Will, 110-17. 9 (P2) There is no difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in an indeterministic universe. As I will argue, the manipulated agent in King's indeterministic manipulation scenario does not satisfy libertarian conditions on moral responsibility, so (P1) is false. The scenario can be modified, though, such that (P1) comes out true. But, as I go on to argue, no tinkering with the indeterministic manipulation scenario will save (P2), for there will always be important (and, arguably, moral responsibility-relevant) differences between such cases of manipulation and ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds. Let us begin with (P1). King bases the indeterministic manipulation scenario to which (P1) refers on Robert Kane's influential and widely discussed event-causal libertarian account.13 Essential to Kane's account of moral responsibility is that there be points in agents' lives at which they perform "self-forming actions" (SFAs) which are not causally determined and which result from competing "efforts of will." One type of SFA occurs when an agent's choice between doing what morality requires and what she takes to be in her own best interest is causally undetermined. Kane's famous example involves a businesswoman who is on her way to an important meeting, witnesses a mugging, and must choose whether to hurry on or to stop and to call for help.14 No matter which effort of will succeeds, according to Kane, the woman can be responsible for the SFA she indeterministically performs. With the basics of Kane's account on the table, let us now consider King's indeterministic manipulation scenario, which is an adaptation of Mele's example discussed above: 13 Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 14 Ibid., 126. 10 Suppose that we have two businesswomen, Ann and Beth. Ann is driven by her career ambitions but still takes seriously the needs of others. When she witnesses the mugging, she must choose between her conflicting motives of self-interest and self-sacrifice. Beth the businesswoman, in contrast, has never been particularly driven by professional ambition, though she always puts in a good day's work, nor does she go out of her way to help others, though she refrains (as much as possible) from directly harming people. Now suppose that instead of making Beth more industrious, the "brainwashing" implants Ann's competing values in Beth. Now when Beth witnesses the mugging, she experiences the same conflict of values that Ann does, although Beth's conflicting values are a direct result of the manipulation.15 According to King, this is a case in which post-manipulation Beth satisfies Kane's conditions on moral responsibility. So, if the incompatibilist advancing the manipulation argument judged Beth not to be responsible in the original case (which made use of deterministic manipulation), the incompatibilist should also judge Beth not to be responsible in the new case (even though it uses indeterministic manipulation). An initial problem with King's indeterministic manipulation scenario is that it is not clear that the scenario actually involves manipulation.16 In paradigmatic cases of manipulation, the manipulator makes it likely (if not guaranteed) that the manipulated agent will act a certain way (or the manipulator at least precludes the manipulated agent from deviating from the manipulator's plan), but Beth is just as likely to opt for either option. The reason for this is that, given the values that have been implanted in Beth, there are only two salient actions that she 15 King, "The Problem with Manipulation," 71. 16 This worry is consistent with there being no univocal sense of manipulation in the literature, since King's "manipulation scenario" differs in important respects with virtually all other cases of manipulation discussed in the literature. 11 might perform, and neither is substantially more likely than the other (since Beth is torn between the two competing efforts of will). We might say that the "manipulator" in this case has manipulated Beth's options, since Beth will end up performing one of the two actions made salient by the values implanted in Beth, but Beth has not been manipulated into performing a particular action. Even if we set aside this initial worry, however, a bigger problem for King's indeterministic manipulation scenario is that Beth the businesswoman fails to satisfy Kane's libertarian conditions on moral responsibility. On Kane's view, in order to be ultimately responsible (in a non-derivative way) for an SFA, one must have a certain degree of control over the competing efforts of will. The standard of control is different here (for the dual efforts) than it is for the SFA itself. Kane calls the former kind of control "only a compatibilist kind of control...akin to what [John Martin] Fischer and [Mark] Ravizza also call 'guidance control.'"17 If we take Kane seriously when he says that the agent must exercise guidance control over each of her dual efforts in order to be ultimately responsible (in a non-derivative way) for an SFA, then she will need to satisfy (for each effort of will) Fischer and Ravizza's ownership condition on guidance control (according to which an agent must, in order to be morally responsible for an action, act on her own, reasons-responsive mechanism).18 In order for an agent's mechanism to be her own, according to Fischer and Ravizza, the agent must have taken responsibility for the mechanism, which Fischer and Ravizza claim involves three major ingredients: first, the agent must see herself as an agent whose actions are 17 Robert Kane, "Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem," in R. Kane (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 404. Kane's reference is to John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 18 See Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 170-239, for more on the ownership condition. 12 efficacious in the world; second, the agent must accept that she is a fair target of the reactive attitudes as a result of how she exercises her agency in certain contexts; and third, the agent's view of herself specified in the previous ingredients must be based, in an appropriate way, on the evidence.19 Fischer and Ravizza consider a case (not entirely unlike King's indeterministic manipulation scenario) in which a scientist has manipulated an agent, Judith, into punching her best friend, Jane, by inducing in Judith a "desire that is not literally irresistible but is nevertheless extremely strong." 20 In this case, the mechanism induced by the scientist is reasons-responsive, but, according to Fischer and Ravizza, the agent clearly lacks moral responsibility. The reason that the agent clearly lacks moral responsibility, on their view, is that the ownership component to guidance control is not satisfied by Judith since she is unaware of what her manipulator has done and thus "has not taken responsibility for the kind of mechanism that actually issues in the action (the 'manipulation mechanism')."21 Similarly, in King's indeterministic manipulation scenario involving Beth, taking responsibility for the mechanisms (which issue in the dual efforts of will) that have been bestowed on Beth would require that Beth see herself as a fair target for the reactive attitudes when those mechanisms issue in action and also that she see herself as such in a way that is appropriately based on the evidence. But even if Beth would see herself as a fair target of the reactive attitudes for actions that issue from her competing efforts of will, she would not see herself as such in a way that is appropriately based on the evidence; instead, she would see 19 Ibid., 210-13. 20 Ibid., 232. 21 Ibid., 233. 13 herself as such because of her manipulation.22 Because Beth is unaware of what her manipulators have done, she could not yet have taken responsibility for the "manipulation mechanisms" that have the potential to issue in her action. Thus, in King's indeterministic manipulation scenario, Beth lacks guidance control over each effort of will, since these efforts issue from mechanisms which are the direct result of manipulation and are not yet Beth's own. Since Beth fails to satisfy Kane's conditions on moral responsibility, it is false that Beth is not morally responsible despite satisfying incompatibilist conditions on moral responsibility, which is to say that (P1) is false. On my own view, it is possible to construct an indeterministic manipulation scenario such that (P1) comes out true. Consider the following case: Beth, unlike Ann, is a philosophy professor who teaches, researches, and does committee work only as much as she must, as she finds other pursuits more enjoyable and fulfilling. Their dean wants Beth to be more productive, and so directs a team of psychologists and neuroscientists to make Beth more like Ann by implanting various mechanisms in Beth that mirror Ann's mechanisms and by manipulating Beth into taking responsibility for those mechanisms. The team is able to do this first by finding out how Ann made herself 22 One might reasonably reply to this point by arguing that the manipulation has not affected the agent's mechanism (which actually issues in her action) but rather merely the circumstances to which the agent's mechanism responds, since the agent has only been given new values to which her mechanism (say, of practical reasoning) responds. While I admit that issues pertaining to mechanism-individuation can be thorny, I would argue that this must be a case in which the agent's mechanism has been affected by the manipulation. Indeed, this is what Fischer and Ravizza (whose ownership condition must be satisfied in the manipulation scenario in order for the agent to satisfy Kane's conditions on moral responsibility) say about relevantly similar cases of manipulation. Even if Beth sees herself as a fair target of the reactive attitudes for actions that result from her new values, she does so because of the manipulation, and so the manipulation has affected the mechanism, or, as Fischer and Ravizza describe it, "the process that leads to the action" (Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 38). And since Beth is unaware of the manipulation that has affected her mechanism such that it satisfies the first two ingredients of the ownership condition, Beth's view of herself as such has not been formed in the appropriate way (cf. Fischer and Ravizza, Responsibility and Control, 236). Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 14 the way she is and second by making sure Beth acts similarly when in relevantly similar circumstances. If Beth ever acts differently than Ann would have, the team of manipulators will incapacitate Beth. As it turns out, Beth goes on to act in just the right way to make herself like Ann. Moreover, as she makes herself like Ann, Beth comes to see herself both as an agent whose actions are efficacious in the world and as an agent who is sometimes a fair target of the reactive attitudes, and she sees herself as such on the basis of appropriate evidence (e.g., even though she doesn't know about the manipulators, she sees herself as described despite being convinced that most agents have no say over what mechanisms they inherit and that being given a mechanism by an agent is not relevantly different from being given a mechanism by blind natural forces). Now, when Beth witnesses a mugging, she quickly thinks about something else as she hurries along to do some committee work. The team of manipulators inform the dean, who celebrates this victory.23 Beth is clearly manipulated into becoming like Ann and into choosing the committee work over stopping to call for help, yet, in this case, she satisfies Kane's libertarian conditions on moral responsibility, for her manipulators have brought about a change to Beth's values without undermining her guidance control over who she is or what she does on this occasion. Importantly, when Beth witnesses the mugging, her competing efforts (one to stop and help and 23 This case is a hybrid of two of Mele's cases, the first discussed above and the second from Alfred R. Mele, "A Critique of Pereboom's 'Four-Case Argument' for Incompatibilism," Analysis 65 (2005): 75-80, 75-6. The latter case is adapted for a different purpose in Kearns, "Aborting the Zygote Argument," 385. My version of the case also resembles the so called "Fischer-type" variation of the classic "Frankfurt-style case." Beth is not ensured to act like Ann, but the manipulators do ensure that if Beth acts at all, she will act like Ann. See Harry Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829-39; John Martin Fischer, My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 150-151. 15 the other to hurry along to the committee work) satisfy Fischer and Ravizza's conditions on guidance control, including the ownership condition. This is so because, while the manipulators have implanted "manipulation mechanisms" into Beth, Beth nevertheless takes responsibility for those mechanisms (which issue in her efforts of will): in addition to seeing herself as an agent whose actions are efficacious in the world and accepting that she is a fair target of the reactive attitudes (the first two ingredients in the ownership condition), Beth's view of herself is based, in an appropriate way, on the evidence (the third and final ingredient); even though she does not know about the manipulators, Beth recognizes that she had no control over coming to have the mechanisms which eventually issue in her dual efforts (and, we can stipulate, this recognition is not the result of her manipulation), so Beth is not manipulated into viewing herself in the way specified.24 So, with the right modification, an indeterministic manipulation scenario can be constructed such that (P1) of King's parallel manipulation argument comes out true.25 Even if we modify the indeterministic manipulation scenario to which (P1) refers, however, the second premise of King's parallel manipulation argument remains problematic. Recall the second premise: 24 At this point, the libertarian might "bite the bullet" and admit the manipulated agent's moral responsibility in the manipulation scenario, but granting this is tantamount to giving up on the manipulation argument against compatibilism, for an exactly parallel response is open to the compatibilist in response to the original manipulation argument (indeed, this is the popular "hard-line" reply to the argument). 25 It is a further question whether an indeterministic manipulation scenario can be constructed such that the manipulated agent in the scenario satisfies all (or even most) libertarian conditions on moral responsibility. This is a challenge, given the number and disparity of libertarian accounts of the conditions on free and responsible action, but I argue that this can be done in "Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will" (unpublished manuscript). 16 (P2) There is no difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in an indeterministic universe.26 When considering whether, upon discovering that she had been manipulated, Beth might complain that her undetermined action was not her own but rather the result of Ann's competing values, King says: One with incompatibilist sympathies might at this point think that Beth's complaint is unfounded. He might remind her that all agents have values that are not yet theirs. Whether through inculcation, unreflective habit formation, or similar mechanisms, agents have suites of motives and values that they have not come to "own" yet. But this is just the point upon which the parallel manipulation argument plays. If there is no difference between these engineered values and ordinarily acquired ones, then, should manipulation undermine responsibility brutely, it would generalize to all cases of ordinary action (even in an indeterministic universe).27 Unfortunately, King does not say more in defense of (P2). This is unfortunate because there simply is no reason to think that ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds-agents who (at times) take ownership of the values that they had not previously come to "own"-are not relevantly different from manipulated agents who are manipulated into taking ownership of values. In the modified indeterministic manipulation scenario constructed above, the manipulators limit Beth's options in some sense, despite leaving intact the alternative 26 Recall that (as I mentioned in n. 8) we should read (P2) as making the claim that there is no moral responsibility-relevant difference between the manipulated agent and ordinary agents in an indeterministic world. 27 King, "The Problem with Manipulation," 72. 17 possibilities required for Kane's libertarian account.28 Moreover, the manipulators are in an important sense the (perhaps partial) source of Beth's new values (even if Beth is a source of them as well).29 But we have no reason to think that such limiting of options or other agential sources would be present in ordinary indeterministic universes. A prima facie plausible response by King and others convinced by his defense of (P2) would be to suggest that the very thing that is had in common between ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds and manipulated agents is that the choices of both can be traced back to values and motives which they did not initially "own."30 But the "tracing" involved in these two sets of cases are relevantly different: the earlier stages to which the values and motives of ordinary indeterministic agents "trace" do not guarantee or even make it likely that some specific action occurs years down the line, yet the manipulated agent is in the position of having her actions made likely to occur as the result of values and motives which are not her own. It is true that, at the beginnings of their moral responsibility-careers, ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds must rely on evaluative "seemings" which are not their own, which is akin to the situation 28 Recall that, in the description of this case, it was stipulated that Beth sees herself as efficacious and as a fair target of the reactive attitudes despite being convinced that most agents have no say over what mechanisms they inherit and that being given a mechanism by an agent is not relevantly different from being given a mechanism by blind natural forces. These convictions of Beth's are in the case by design but, as I will argue in the next paragraph, are not convictions that I think that anyone should hold. 29 One might read my claims about sourcehood here as an indication that I am denying King's "dilemma" to be a genuine dilemma, for the worry on the first horn of the dilemma is that the incompatibilist is problematically assuming an incompatibilist conception of sourcehood, and the issue of sourcehood arises here, too, in a response to the second horn of the dilemma. But this is not what I mean to suggest; rather, I am only pointing out a potentially moral responsibilityrelevant difference between agents who are indeterministically manipulated and agents in deterministic worlds who are not manipulated (i.e., "ordinary" agents in indeterministic worlds), namely that former involves manipulation of a certain kind while the latter does not. This difference can be granted without taking on an incompatibilist conception of sourcehood. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to be clearer about this aspect of the dialectic. 30 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 18 of an agent who has been manipulated. Still, ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds are not obviously in this situation with respect to all subsequent actions for which they are morally responsible, since ordinarily they can (perhaps decades down the line) come to reflect on the evaluative "seemings" with which they started and can bring about changes to their evaluative schemes (and, given that their worlds are indeterministic, these reflections are not guaranteed or even made likely by the unowned starting points). And at these later points, ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds are relevantly different from manipulated agents.31 The problem I have raised for (P2) reveals an important difference between the original manipulation argument, which seeks to undermine compatibilism, and the parallel manipulation argument, which seeks to undermine libertarian accounts of the conditions on moral responsibility. Recall the second premise of the original manipulation argument: (M2) There is no difference between the manipulated agent's action and the actions of ordinary agents in a deterministic universe. (M2) is not prima facie problematic in the way that (P2) is-in fact, many compatibilists accept that (M2) is true and thus deny the first premise of the manipulation argument instead.32 Both manipulated agents and ordinary causally determined agents have in common that they are 31 Of course, one could argue that, given the lack of ownership of their starting points, agents in indeterministic worlds could not possibly become morally responsible for anything, since all subsequent reflection would be guided (either directly or indirectly) by the unowned starting point. While I grant that it is a challenge to explain how later reflections (and subsequent modifications to one's evaluative set) could be "one's own" given the unowned starting point, I believe that the challenge can be met (see Mele, Free Will and Luck, 129-33, for a libertarian proposal for meeting this challenge). Moreover, it is plausible that manipulated agents might also (eventually) be able to take ownership of certain "starting points" over which they had no control. This is consistent with there being a relevant difference between ordinary (adult) agents in indeterministic worlds and manipulated agents who have not had enough time to take ownership of their new "starting points." 32 Some compatibilists have denied (M2), though, as I mentioned in n. 6, where I also noted that (M2) requires some modification in order to be plausible. 19 causally determined to act as they do by factors beyond their control. But there is nothing like "being determined by factors beyond their control" that both indeterministically manipulated agents and ordinary agents in indeterministic worlds have in common (that is, there is no candidate commonality between these sets of agents that is intuitively relevant to ascriptions of moral responsibility, in the way that "being determined by factors beyond their control" is intuitively relevant), so the parallel manipulation argument will not be able to succeed if it relies on the kind of generalization found in (P2). With the right modification, however, the parallel manipulation argument can play an important role in framing debates about manipulation arguments. Even though the parallel manipulation argument cannot successfully undermine libertarianism in general (since the second premise's generalization is problematic), a modified parallel manipulation argument can attack particular libertarian accounts of the conditions on moral responsibility. As we have seen, with the right indeterministic manipulation scenario, Kane's libertarian conditions can be satisfied by a manipulated agent; if the agent in such a scenario is not morally responsible, then Kane's conditions on moral responsibility are insufficient. But notice that this puts Kane's account in the same position as compatibilist accounts-both must deal with manipulation. If an indeterministic manipulation scenario can be constructed such that an agent is manipulated into satisfying other libertarian conditions on moral responsibility as well, then this modified parallel manipulation argument will show the insufficiency of other libertarian conditions. The more libertarian accounts targeted by the modified parallel manipulation argument, the more libertarian accounts are shown to be in the same position as compatibilist ones.33 33 On my own view, the modified parallel manipulation argument raises the same problem for all libertarian accounts of the conditions on moral responsibility, so libertarians are in the same position as compatibilists. Thus, on my view, manipulation arguments should be seen as dividing 20 Despite the problems with the parallel manipulation argument as King presents it, then, there are insights to be gleaned from the argument. King attempted to show (on one horn of his dilemma) that if the first premise of the manipulation argument against compatibilism is left undefended, then the one advancing the manipulation argument would run into a dialectical stalemate, since the parallel manipulation argument would raise the same problem for incompatibilism. We have seen that this use of the parallel manipulation argument is problematic for several reasons, including that it leaves hard incompatibilists unscathed-and so they can leave the first premise of the original manipulation argument undefended without inevitably running into a dialectical stalemate-and also that we have no reason to think that the second premise of the argument is true. With the right modification, however, the parallel manipulation argument can be used by compatibilists to show that their accounts are not uniquely subject to worries about manipulation; some (and perhaps all) libertarian accounts are subject to worries about manipulation as well. This is not exactly a defense of compatibilism, as King had originally hoped for the parallel manipulation argument to be, since it does not make the second horn of King's dilemma seem worrisome for incompatibilists in general. Nevertheless, a modified parallel manipulation argument does show that compatibilists are not uniquely plagued by worries about manipulation, and that is some consolation. the pro-free will camp from the no-free will camp, rather than as dividing the compatibilist from the incompatibilist. I defend this view in "Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will."

Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 45 No tan distintos. El secularismo estatal, la politización eclesiástica y el imperativo del consenso1 Not so different. State secularism, ecclesiastical politization, and the imperative of consensus Macarena Marey2 Universidad de Buenos Aires /CONICET Argentina Fecha de recepción: 16-03-2020 Fecha de aceptación: 28-05-2020 Resumen ¿Es el desideratum secularista de separación Iglesia-Estado capaz de enfrentar las consecuencias negativas de la revitalización política de los conservadurismos religiosos y la instrumentalización de la religiosidad popular para fines antiigualitarios? La respuesta negativa es la tesis de la que parto para analizar por qué los liberalismos secularistas y postsecularistas no pueden procesar ni en la teoría ni en la práctica la reordenación política de las iglesias cristianas conservadoras (católicas y evangélicas) en nuestra región. Abstract Can the secularist desideratum of separation of church and state face the negative consequences of the political revitalization of religious conservatisms and the instrumentalization of popular religiosity to advance antiegalitarian ends? I take the negative answer as my basic thesis to analyze why secularist and postsecularist liberalisms cannot process in theory or praxis the political reordination of the conservative Christian (Catholic and Evangelist) churches in our region. This does not mean I will defend 1 Este artículo es parte de las investigaciones del proyecto PICT-2018-01575, "La noción de consentimiento en las teorías modernas del contrato social: cuestiones conceptuales y normativas", bajo mi dirección. Agradezco la lectura atenta de las personas que evaluaron este artículo y a Diego Fernández Peychaux por nuestros debates sobre la religión en la filosofía política moderna, tan enriquecedores para mí. 2 Investigadora adjunta de CONICET y profesora de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad de Buenos Aires. Correo electrónico: [email protected]. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 46 Esto no me conduce a abrazar una teología política ni un relativismo abstencionista. Me interesa estudiar la plausibilidad de desarrollar una postura ético-política anticlerical que no desprecia la religiosidad popular ni el potencial emancipador en los fenómenos religiosos, en un mundo en el que no es ni moral ni históricamente viable soslayarlos insistiendo en colocarlos en la esfera inasible de lo privado o en un pasado sublimado en procesos de secularización. La hipótesis guía de este artículo es que la cuestión normativa y política básica sobre la que tratan la mayor parte de los debates sobre secularización en la actualidad es la participación de las iglesias en lo político por medio de la formación del juicio y la voluntad públicos. political theology or an abstentionist relativism. I am interested in studying the plausibility of developing an ethico-political anti-clerical position that does not despise popular religiosity or the emancipating potential of religious phenomena in a world where it is neither historically nor morally viable ignoring them by placing them in the private sphere and a past sublimated by process of secularization. The hypothesis organizing this paper is that the normative and political question at the core of most debates around secularization is participation of institutionalized churches in the ethico-political realm, by means of the formation of public judging and willing. Palabras clave: secularismo; religión; consenso; politización; lo político. Keywords: secularism; religion; consensus; politization; the political. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 47 I. Introducción ¿Es el desideratum secularista laicista de separación iglesia-Estado ("Iglesia y Estado, asuntos separados") capaz de enfrentar las consecuencias negativas de las reconfiguraciones y revitalizaciones políticas de los conservadurismos religiosos y la instrumentalización de la religiosidad popular para fines antiigualitarios? Esta es la pregunta que motiva mi artículo. La respuesta negativa es la tesis básica de la que parto para analizar por qué los liberalismos secularistas y postsecularistas no pueden procesar ni en la teoría ni en la práctica la reordenación política de las iglesias cristianas conservadoras (católicas y evangélicas) en nuestra región. Esto no me conduce a abrazar una teología política ni un relativismo abstencionista. Por el contrario, me interesa estudiar la plausibilidad de una postura ético-política anticlerical que no desprecia la religiosidad popular ni la posibilidad de pensar que hay un potencial ético-político emancipador en los fenómenos religiosos y las formas religiosas de ver el mundo, en un mundo en el que no es ni moral ni históricamente viable soslayarlos insistiendo en colocarlos en la esfera inasible de lo privado o en un pasado sublimado en procesos de secularización. El objetivo es trabajar para conseguir una superación del mito de la secularización de lo político que termine por desclericalizar lo religioso al reconocer lo eclesiástico en el Estado, por un lado, y el potencial emancipatorio que pueden tener la religiosidad y las prácticas religiosas en la elaboración de éticas políticas igualitarias, por el otro. También lo litúrgico es político. Así como no hemos conocido procesos históricos de secularización que no privilegien unas religiones por sobre otras ni dejen grandes extensiones de territorio a la jurisdicción inapelable de los entramados normativos eclesiásticos, pero sí conocemos el uso de la idea normativa de la secularización como promesa de igualdad religiosa y no religiosa en diversos discursos políticos, no vivimos tampoco presentes postseculares ni postreligiosos. Por eso, explorar e imaginar esas alternativas es una de las tareas teóricas y prácticas que nos demanda la praxis contemporánea. Las religiones existen y no son simples conjuntos de creencias individuales, también son prácticas comunitarias sin las cuales muchas personas verían sus vidas empobrecidas. También existen iglesias mayoritarias que recurren al discurso de la libertad religiosa para desactivar reclamos políticos y sociales, para obturar el Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 48 potencial transformativo del disenso. Hay que poder dar cuenta de estos dos aspectos de la relación de las religiones con lo político y con la política para hacer teorías y prácticas a la altura de nuestras realidades. En la sección II resumo concisamente algunos de los dilemas normativos que suscitan las religiones e iglesias en lo público, en la política y en lo político contemporáneos en el marco de Estados formalmente laicos y seculares, con el fin de presentar el mapa sistemático-conceptual general de las posiciones más difundidas y representativas al respecto en las discusiones filosóficas de este siglo (tema de la sección III), para a su vez localizar en él la cuestión básica de la que tratan estos debates implícitamente y la orientación que podríamos tomar para destrabar los impasses políticos a los que llevan (sección IV). No pretendo afirmar taxativamente un núcleo filosófico fijo de todas las reflexiones sobre lo religioso y lo político sino sugerir qué es lo que está en juego hoy y aquí (América Latina en la entrada a la tercera década del siglo) desde un posicionamiento ético-político con compromisos igualitarios y de transformación de las injusticias estructurales. En respuesta a este interrogante, la hipótesis guía de este artículo es que la cuestión normativa y política básica sobre la que tratan la mayor parte de los debates sobre secularización en la actualidad (como también lo fue en muchos momentos de la modernidad filosófica) es la participación de las iglesias en lo político (o, quizás mejor, en lo ético-político) por medio de la formación del juicio y la voluntad públicos. Si bien esto parece una obviedad, creo que en esos mismos debates filosóficos y en los discursos políticos no suele haber consciencia de que se trata fundamentalmente de esto en vez de, en primer lugar, choques de derechos individuales o de jurisdicciones autoritativas y de cuestiones de búsqueda de consenso o de la verdad política en asambleas deliberativas idealizadas. La negligencia de los liberalismos secularistas y postsecularistas respecto del ámbito de lo ético-político frente a la sobredimensionalización de la institucionalidad de la política es, de hecho, la causa principal por la que estas posturas hegemónicas en los debates filosóficos no consiguen abordar eficazmente las nuevas ordenaciones políticas de aquellas iglesias cristianas conservadoras que revitalizaron su participación política en las últimas décadas para obstaculizar ampliaciones de derechos. El mayor obstáculo analítico y normativo que se nos presenta en esos esquemas conceptuales y marcos teóricos es lo que llamo el "imperativo del consenso". Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 49 II. La cuestión ¿Cuáles son las cuestiones problemáticas típicas que las religiones y las iglesias le plantean a nuestras comunidades políticas y a nuestro Estado en sus configuraciones contemporáneas? Una somera enumeración de estas cuestiones alcanza para intuir que la relación iglesias-comunidades políticas en la estatalidad contemporánea, de algunas de nuestras realidades jurídicas y políticas, se expresa prima facie continuamente en dilemas y paradojas. Mientras que las empresas privadas y el Estado como empleador tienen que respetar las creencias religiosas y no religiosas de las personas que emplean y no pueden ni echarlas ni negarles un contrato laboral por causa de ellas, en el mismo territorio en el que esto es ley se protegen instituciones religiosas que ejercen discriminación laboral de manera abierta, por ejemplo en el caso de las religiones en las que la división de tareas pastorales (laborales) y las jerarquías institucionales están estrictamente delimitadas por género. Mientras que el Estado y las empresas privadas tienen formalmente prohibido discriminar a las personas por causa de su orientación sexual, muchas iglesias cristianas no permiten el matrimonio igualitario y rechazan el derecho a la identidad de personas trans en sus registros oficiales. ¿Esto se debe a que las iglesias cristianas tienen en algunos Estados, como por ejemplo en aquellos que tienen Concordato con el Vaticano, un estatuto cuasi soberano, una jurisdicción en la que son soberanas independientemente de la legislación con intenciones igualitarias, o esos casos quedan amparados por la libertad religiosa y las versiones vernáculas de la cláusula de establecimiento y de un principio de acomodación?3 3 El concordato del Estado Argentino con el Vaticano (Ley 17.032, de 1966) se orienta, según el texto oficial, "a asegurar a la Iglesia Católica la libertad necesaria para el cumplimiento de su alta misión espiritual dando así satisfacción a lo pedido en el Concilio Vaticano II", por medio de la garantía de la no interferencia del Estado Argentino en el nombramiento de las autoridades eclesiásticas, la determinación de las jurisdicciones territoriales y la relación con autoridades eclesiásticas en el exterior, entre otras actividades. El artículo 1° reza: "El Estado Argentino reconoce y garantiza a la Iglesia Católica Apostólica Romana el libre y pleno ejercicio de su poder espiritual, el libre y público ejercicio de su culto, así como de su jurisdicción en el ámbito de su competencia, para la realización de sus fines específicos". El texto puede consultarse en: http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/15000-19999/18799/norma.htm y http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/archivio/documents/rc_seg-st_19661010_santa-sede-repargent_sp.html. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 50 El Estado Argentino, por ejemplo, no puede discriminar a nadie por causa de su religión, pero al mismo tiempo sigue manteniendo símbolos religiosos de una única religión (la católica romana) en lugares públicos como juzgados y escuelas. Estos hechos abren debates conocidos acerca de si esta presencia de símbolos religiosos en espacios institucionales influye o no en el reconocimiento de las personas no católicas, sean religiosas, agnósticas o ateas. ¿Puede permitirse la presencia de estos símbolos cuando la postura oficial de la jerarquía de esa iglesia en particular (aunque no de la totalidad sus feligreses) se opone abiertamente y sin ambages a los derechos e incluso a la expresión política misma de personas y colectivos enteros? ¿O por el contrario se puede argumentar que los crucifijos en espacios públicos son ya meros símbolos culturales pasivos que denotan la herencia cultural de una nación, sin implicar posturas determinadas acerca de la sexualidad, la familia y cuestiones de género, y que por lo tanto su presencia en escuelas y juzgados no viola ningún principio secularista de los que los Estados democráticos suelen suscribir? Esto es de hecho lo que sostuvieron el Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos en Lautsi contra Italia en 2011 y la Suprema Corte de los Estados Unidos en American Legion contra American Humanist Association en 2019. ¿Pueden funcionarias y funcionarios y miembros del poder legislativo justificar decisiones y votos con base en sus creencias religiosas apelando a un derecho individual subjetivo de libertad de religión, o pueden apoyarse en el hecho de que existe una religión mayoritaria en esa cultura política? ¿Cuál es la ponderación exacta que debemos hacer entre libertad religiosa y libertad de comunicación cuando aparecen grupos que reclaman que se censuren obras de arte que consideran ofensivas para sus creencias, mientras al mismo tiempo esas mismas creencias incluyen la tesis de que quien hizo esa obra de arte merece sufrir torturas Rudas (2020) argumenta una sólida critica al Concordato como "ventaja política ilegitima otorgada a las elites católicas" que "crea una forma de desigualdad política que es contraria con el ideal igualitario de la democracia liberal" (6). Por mi parte, creo que es importante no desestimar la participación de los Estados democráticos formales en esta forma de otorgamiento de privilegios antidemocráticos. El Concordato entre Argentina y el Vaticano se firmó bajo una dictadura pero continúa en vigencia. El artículo 2° de la Constitución Nacional es otro recordatorio de las limitaciones de los discursos secularistas y postsecularistas, al menos en sus versiones liberales. Para un recorrido conciso y muy adecuado de la relación entre la Iglesia Católica y el Estado y la clase política en la Argentina hasta el año 2009, consúltese el trabajo de Esquivel (2009). Para un excelente estado de la cuestión de las discusiones sobre laicidad, secularismo y secularización en la sociología, la historia y la antropología y el modo en el que la realidad social de Brasil (país que también tiene Concordato con la Iglesia Católica Romana y en el que las religiones neopentecostales tienen una abrumadora presencia en los espacios públicos y políticos) pone en cuestión estas categorías, véase el trabajo de Paula Montero (2013). Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 51 eternas por el mero hecho de tener otros modos de vida y expresar creencias diferentes? ¿Puede hacerse tal ponderación, o acaso los fenómenos que la suscitan exigen ser comprendidos de una manera distinta a la supuesta colisión entre derechos individuales, como sea muy probablemente el caso? Y al mismo tiempo: dado que en nuestras sociedades las religiones son hechos sociales de raíces profundas que exceden a la imposición histórica de la Iglesia Católica Romana y se expresan de maneras no cristianas y no europeas, expresiones que además han sido históricamente oprimidas, ¿no es el laicismo secular, diseñado mayormente con moldes del talle de las religiones cristianas en sus configuraciones europeas westfalianas, una imposición injustificada para esas otras expresiones religiosas? Hasta el compromiso con una posición igualitarista nos conduce a tensiones: si tenemos un compromiso igualitario, oponernos a las intenciones totalizantes de algunas corrientes eclesiásticas y religiosas de la actualidad, que pretenden regir las vidas no sólo de sus feligreses sino de todas las personas cuando participan en lo político y en la política en contra de la garantía de los derechos reproductivos y no reproductivos, no puede conducirnos a denigrar y menospreciar formas de vivir que incluyen creencias, prácticas y concepciones religiosas del mundo tan sólo porque son religiosas. Un compromiso real con la igualdad y la equidad tendría que dar lugar tanto a la lucha por el derecho al aborto legal, seguro y gratuito como a un genuino respeto por las diferentes formas en las que se manifiestan las religiosidades populares. ¿Podemos tener las dos cosas? ¿Tienen soberanía las Iglesias, pueden ser fuentes de deberes y autoridades legítimas en competencia con el Estado? ¿Qué sentido tiene hablar de separación de iglesia y Estado en culturas políticas marcadas por la constante operatividad de las religiones institucionalizadas sobre las subjetividades? ¿Existe algún modo en el que las instituciones religiosas puedan autonomizarse con claridad analítica de las personas que las encarnan? Los Estados democráticos de América del Sur no son teocracias, pero ¿cuánta separación entre iglesia y Estado puede haber si las Iglesias participan en lo político y en la política porque en primer lugar ya participan en lo personal y en lo cotidiano? ¿No es la frase misma "separación iglesia-Estado" ya una manera obsoleta de plantear la cuestión de que se trata en definitiva, a ya más de 350 años de Leviathan y de la Paz de Westfalia? ¿Es posible siquiera concebir lo religioso como algo perteneciente al ámbito inasible de "lo privado" cuando el modo en que las personas ven el mundo determina el modo en que participan de lo político y las decisiones que se toman en la política? ¿Es Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 52 compatible con la igualdad religiosa reducir lo religioso a un conjunto de creencias privadas sostenidas por individuos autónomos? De entre todos estos problemas conceptuales y prácticos, hay uno que hoy debería insumirnos una atención especial y es el hecho de que las posiciones conservadoras de las religiones e Iglesias sexistas son traducibles al lenguaje secular, como bien ha quedado en claro en la Argentina en los debates parlamentarios sobre la ley de Interrupción Legal del Embarazo durante 2018 o en torno a la Ley de Matrimonio Igualitario durante 2010. En un artículo de 2005 que diagnosticaba (y pronosticaba) la configuración actual de la eticidad política de las Iglesias en la Argentina, Juan Marco Vaggione propuso dos conceptos para comprender la especificidad de los modos políticos de la participación pública de las Iglesias y de los grupos religiosos en nuestros contextos prácticos. El primero de ellos es la "politización reaccionaria", que da cuenta de "la revitalización religiosa que defiende la familia tradicional sin necesariamente ponerla en tensión con la democracia o la modernidad" (Vaggione, 2005: 238): estos grupos religiosos reaccionan y se organizan contra lo que perciben como la crisis de la familia generada por la modernidad y la globalización. Sin embargo, paradójicamente se vuelven globales y modernos a su vez. Incluso si sus articulaciones son meramente estratégicas, son no obstante componentes legítimos de la política democrática. (...) Estas mutaciones reactivas son "políticas" en el sentido de que son una parte legitimada del juego democrático. El término politización intenta capturar lo que usualmente se pasa por alto en los acercamientos que enfatizan la secularización: la inclusión como actores públicos legítimos de grupos religiosos que defienden la familia [como recurso discursivo contra la ampliación de derechos] (Vaggione, 2005: 238-239).4 El segundo de ellos es capturado con el concepto de "disidencia religiosa": "Algunas feministas y minorías sexuales abrazan identidades religiosas como un camino para la liberación de género y sexual. Las feministas musulmanas, las católicas por el derecho al aborto y los gays evangélicos son ejemplos de las muchas maneras en las que las identidades religiosas están siendo politizadas para volver a las religiones tradicionales compatibles con las demandas de feministas y minorías sexuales" (Vaggione, 2005: 235). Ambos fenómenos tienen su lugar "en 4 Todas las traducciones en este artículo son mías. Como es usual en la literatura académica, las palabras entre corchetes son agregados aclaratorios míos. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 53 las fronteras entre lo religioso y lo secular" (Vaggione, 2005: 234) y arrojan todavía más dudas sobre la viabilidad de una separación Iglesia-Estado. Un riesgo que acarrea ignorar que la secularización es tematizable como mito, contraparte del mito de la violencia religiosa descrito por Cavanaugh (2009), es que al pensarse a sí mismo como neutral respecto de las religiones, el secularismo político ha perdido capacidad explicativa frente a la revitalización religiosa. Saba Mahmood conceptualizó al secularismo político en la línea de Talal Asad como El poder soberano del Estado moderno para reorganizar aspectos y rasgos sustantivos de la vida religiosa, con la estipulación de qué es religión o de qué debería ser, la asignación de un contenido determinado y la diseminación de subjetividades concomitantes, marcos éticos y prácticas cotidianas (Mahmood, 2016: 3). Las perspectivas secularistas se convierten en muchos contextos políticos y sociales en causa de la ignorancia voluntaria acerca de la complicidad estatal y de la política secular en la reactivación de agendas religiosas antiderechos. Los problemas que suscitan las religiones en lo político no son externos al Estado secular sino productos inmediatos de la paradoja esencial del Estado secular, que podemos llamar con Mahmood una "contradicción generativa": Por un lado, el Estado liberal afirma mantener una separación entre iglesia y Estado al relegar la religión a la esfera privada, el dominio sacrosanto de la creencia religiosa y la libertad individual.5 Por el otro lado, la gubernamentalidad moderna implica la intervención y regulación estatal de muchos aspectos de la vida socioreligiosa, lo que disuelve la distinción entre lo público y lo privado y con ello contraviene su primera afirmación (Mahmood, 2016: 4). El Concordato de la Iglesia Católica con el Estado Argentino es entendible como un caso de la "contradicción generativa" del Estado secular de la que habla Mahmood (2016): la Iglesia demanda una mayor separación iglesia-Estado, lo que regenera el secularismo político para provecho de esta Iglesia en particular: las dos propensiones internas al secularismo (la regulación de la vida religiosa y la construcción de la religión como un espacio libre de intervención estatal) dan cuenta de su 5 Y agreguemos: coincidentemente, el mismo dominio en el que muchos discursos colocan la sexualidad y la vida familiar. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 54 [del "compromiso ideológico del Estado liberal de mantener iglesia y Estado separados"] fenomenal poder de regeneración: cualquier incursión del Estado en la vida religiosa a menudo engendra la demanda de mantener iglesia y Estado separados, avivando con ello la premisa normativa y promesa del secularismo (Mahmood, 2016: 4). En nuestro contexto político, la crítica asadiana-mahmoodiana quiere decir, por tomar el caso de los derechos reproductivos y no-reproductivos, que si la estructura deliberativa institucional y política permite la traducción al lenguaje secular de posiciones religiosas sexistas y contrarias a los derechos reproductivos y no reproductivos, si permite recanalizar secularmente las posiciones conservadoras de iglesias sexistas, es porque esa estructura también es sexista. Si hay traducción en este punto es porque el lenguaje receptor la permite; específicamente en este caso permite la reconfiguración jurídico-política de posiciones contrarias a la ampliación de derechos en términos jurídico-políticos autonomizados de su raigambre religiosa. Hay algo en la estructura secular y laica de nuestros procedimientos legales y políticos del Estado liberal mismo que tiende a proteger y privilegiar determinadas configuraciones de la religión por sobre otras configuraciones religiosas y no religiosas. La pregunta "¿qué es religión?" no puede separarse de la pregunta por quién dice qué es religión: esa definición es una cuestión de poder. No todas las manifestaciones y expresiones religiosas (o no religiosas) son, entonces, traducibles al lenguaje jurídico secular o laico porque no todas las manifestaciones religiosas (o no religiosas) participaron efectivamente o fueron tenidas en cuenta en los momentos en los que se establecieron esos lenguajes. La ampliación de derechos es, en definitiva, producto de movilizaciones de colectivos antes oprimidos y de luchas populares frente al Estado, no una donación estatal espontánea. Al mismo tiempo, la traducción formal al lenguaje secular de los discursos religiosos soportados por él no consigue modificar el corazón normativo sustantivo de las posturas antiderechos, de las posiciones totalizantes y de los reclamos basados en meras preferencias externas. La estructura deliberativa de lo secular no consigue evitar el impasse normativo del fin de la deliberación y la preponderancia del más desnudo agonismo que conduce y legitima la negociación asimétrica. Resalto esto último: no es que el problema sea que la mayoría de las veces la deliberación es en rigor de verdad una negociación más o menos encubierta, el problema es que las partes que negocian no tienen las mismas oportunidades de sacar un beneficio que cubra siquiera los costos que ha implicado entrar en una deliberación sin isegoría. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 55 Pero esto no es algo que la estructura institucional de la deliberación del Estado liberal pueda cambiar, precisamente porque no está diseñada para modificar esas posturas antiigualitarias sino para reflejarlas. La estructura institucional y los procedimientos deliberativos que funcionan de esta manera son también producto de agentes y actores políticos, económicos y eclesiásticos y tienden a reproducir y privilegiar su agencia. En pocas palabras, si están montados sobre sistemas de opresión, los procedimientos deliberativos institucionales y estatales tienden a reproducir opresiones y no podemos separar Iglesias de Estados si estos dos tipos de instituciones se moldean mutuamente en la historia pero sobre todo en el concepto. En resumen, el principio secular de separación iglesia-Estado alberga la tendencia a proteger una concepción determinada de la religión frente a un eventual proceso de desclericalización, frente a una eventual igualdad plena entre las religiones y respecto de posibles procesos sociales de liberalizaciones de género y sexuales, liberalizaciones que también están condicionadas por la relegación de la sexualidad a la misma jurisdicción a la que el discurso secularista relega las religiones, lo privado. Por esto no es sorprendente que cuando colectivos antes excluidos de la participación política plena y efectiva toman protagonismo en lo público-político para conquistar derechos hasta el momento negados y cuando lo sexual se vuelve manifiestamente público en esas situaciones, diferentes iglesias reaccionen con el movimiento complementario: llevar lo religioso desde lo privado a lo público para reclamar el control perdido sobre lo personal, lo familiar y la privacidad, no sólo de sus feligreses sino de la comunidad política toda. En pocas palabras, la situación de las religiones en lo político no es tan clara y distinta como para quedar explicada en términos de un reclamo de separación iglesia-Estado, porque ni siquiera lo es el supuesto de este reclamo, i. e., que existe un modo claro de deslindar religión y estatalidad. No podemos simplemente trazar una línea de tiza porque, aunque pudiéramos, la cuestión normativa y política principal sigue siendo de quién es la mano que traza los círculos de tiza. Y sin embargo los debates sobre secularismo, laicismo, la relación entre el Estado y las religiones, grupos religiosos e Iglesias en las sociedades así llamadas "pluralistas" son ineludibles porque la problematicidad que generan las religiones en lo político es, en nuestras sociedades, constante y fundamental. Esa problematicidad es fundamental porque afecta nuestras condiciones de vida, nuestras cotidianeidades, de maneras simbólicas pero más que nada Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 56 eminentemente materiales. Se juega mucho en los debates sobre separación iglesia-Estado porque tienen como objeto último la cuestión práctica radical de cuál es la fuente de la que brotan las normas, cuál es la raíz de la normatividad que regula nuestros cuerpos, nuestras subjetividades, nuestras relaciones y nuestras interacciones. La discusión sobre cuál es el lugar de lo religioso y de lo eclesiástico en lo político afecta dimensiones cruciales de nuestras vidas hoy al igual (o quizás más) que hace tres siglos y medio, cuando Hobbes marcó parte de la agenda de estas discusiones para gran parte de la modernidad y que hace más de dos siglos y medio, cuando Rousseau refinó el modo de acercarse al problema con sus críticas a la doble soberanía que instauran los cristianismos modernos en el seno de las comunidades políticas. III. Los debates sobre secularismo Este siglo comenzó con una reedición de los debates sobre la relación entre religiones y Estados y sobre secularismo. Los debates contemporáneos discurren con refinamientos argumentativos y cambios definicionales suscitados por las nuevas configuraciones políticas postseculares en la globalización. Estos refinamientos impactan tanto en el concepto de soberanía estatal como en la idea, puesta en cuestión, de que la religión tiene un carácter único respecto de otros modos de vidano religiosos que la hace merecedora de privilegios frente a la legislación estatal (Laborde, 2017; Cohen, 2018). Ya en un momento refinado de su desarrollo, los debates actuales internacionales más pertinentes respecto del tema pueden ser organizados (con trazo grueso) en torno a tres posiciones principales. La primera de ellas es el conjunto de posturas liberales seculares y postseculares que recogen la línea normativa más recurrente de la segunda mitad del siglo XX, aquella representada por las posiciones rawlsianas y habermasianas. La perspectiva rectora de análisis en esta línea es la pregunta por el consenso: ¿deben las expresiones y los juicios religiosos ser aceptados en la justificación pública y en los procedimientos deliberativos? La exclusión o inclusión restringida de lo religioso en la esfera pública es, en este marco, consecuencia práctica de una necesidad normativa postulada de alcanzar consenso, entendido básicamente como un gran acuerdo razonable anclado en razones "que todas las personas puedan aceptar", y, por lo tanto, en la necesidad normativa de que cada persona involucrada pueda dar un consentimiento voluntario razonable a las normas para que ellas queden justificadas, aunque cada quien dé su Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 57 acuerdo por diferentes razones. Así, en contextos pluralistas concretos en los que no es normativamente viable excluir expresiones religiosas de los procedimientos deliberativos, el secularismo deviene postsecularismo. Volver a permitir la entrada de juicios religiosos en la deliberación pública es justificado del mismo modo, es decir por la deseabilidad de alcanzar un consenso acordado por razones más fuertes que la mera negociación orientada por el razonamiento instrumental, en sociedades complejas en las que perduran tradiciones religiosas de varios tipos. El consenso se construye así sobre razones y argumentos muy diferentes entre sí, pero que pueden superponerse o formar intersecciones de conjunto. Estas posiciones secularistas y postsecularistas de la tradición rawlsiana y habermasiana comparten el principio de separación de iglesia y Estado y la aspiración a la neutralidad estatal respecto de la diversidad religiosa6. La pregunta crítica más importante que podemos hacer en este lugar es acerca de la deseabilidad del consenso, acerca de cuán adecuado es para un compromiso con la igualdad el insistir en principios consensuales del estilo de la cláusula "que todas las personas puedan aceptar" cuando están en juego, por ejemplo, derechos asociados a precondiciones de la agencia. Si en un contexto político (por ejemplo, el nuestro aquí y ahora) hay personas y colectivos que no están dispuestos a aceptar por ninguna razón en lo absoluto ni los derechos ni incluso las formas mismas de vivir, las existencias, de otras personas y colectivos, buscar un consenso en términos de aceptación universal puede redundar en resultados contraigualitarios y, por lo tanto, contrademocráticos, i. e., frustra el propósito que se supone que persigue, viola el principio normativo del que se supone es la aplicación. Agregar la cláusula de la razonabilidad y reformular el principio del consenso en términos de "lo que nadie que desee llegar a consensos podría razonablemente rechazar" con la esperanza de que esas posturas "fanáticas" queden excluidas del momento de la justificación colectiva de los juicios y decisiones políticos no soluciona el problema. En primer lugar, esas posturas son plenamente traducibles al lenguaje deliberativo jurídico secular, y de hecho muchas posturas "fanáticas" son legitimadas como prácticas religiosas protegidas en el coto de asuntos religiosos sobre los que el secularismo liberal no permite que la comunidad política se pronuncie. Pero esto no es lo más importante 6 Para un resumen conciso de las posturas seculares y postseculares en los debates del siglo XXI (sobre todo, en el ámbito anglófono), véanse Rudas (2020) y Bailey y Driessen (2017). Posturas seculares laicas tradicionales pueden encontrarse en Audi (2011, 2000), Macedo (2000) y Rorty (1999). Posturas postseculares son las de Habermas (2005, 2010, 2011), Rawls (1999), Dworkin (2013) y Eisgruber y Sager (2007). A lo largo de todo su libro, Laborde (2017) analiza pormenorizadamente las principales críticas a los acercamientos liberales a la cuestión religiónEstado. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 58 porque los problemas más difíciles son los que entraña la supremacía de la búsqueda neutral de consenso por sobre consideraciones asociadas a la igualdad y la equidad, dos de los cuales son los que siguen. En segundo lugar, el imperativo teleológico del consenso condiciona el modo de participación y la inclusión misma de voces e identidades en la deliberación y tiende a silenciar a quienes tienen buenos motivos para disentir con el estado jurídico y político de las cosas. En palabras de Elizabeth Anderson (2006: 16): "Condicionar decisiones al logro del consenso con frecuencia conduce a una presión excesiva e incluso a la coerción sobre minorías que disienten" y nos hace correr el riesgo de que quienes tienen dudas y críticas a la decisión tomada se llamen al silencio, dado que la supremacía del consenso conduce a la idea de que la decisión ya ha respondido todas las posibles objeciones. Poner al consenso como horizonte moral de las prácticas políticas conduce a la percepción de que los resultados son justos porque se han respetado las precondiciones que se supone debe tener un procedimiento deliberativo en una democracia liberal. En palabras de Lynn Sanders: Si asumimos que la deliberación no puede ocurrir sin que exista respeto mutuo, y luego parece que está ocurriendo una deliberación, puede suceder que equivocadamente decidamos que las condiciones de respeto mutuo han sido logradas por quienes deliberan. De este modo, tomar la deliberación como signo de práctica democrática opera paradójicamente de manera antidemocrática, desacreditando sobre premisas más o menos democráticas las visiones de quienes tienen menos probabilidades de presentar sus argumentos de maneras que reconozcamos como característicamente deliberativas. En nuestra cultura política [en este caso, los Estados Unidos], estas personas son muy probablemente las mismas que ya están subrepresentadas en las instituciones políticas formales y que son sistemática y materialmente desaventajadas, a saber: mujeres, minorías raciales y las personas más pobres (Sanders 1997: 349). José Medina (2013) retoma la teoría de la integración de Anderson para elaborar su modelo democrático de resistencia que acoge las virtudes epistémicas del disenso. Aquí no me pronuncio sobre las virtudes epistémicas del disenso, pero sí señalo la necesidad de tener en cuenta los perjuicios que la inflación moral del consenso y del consentimiento causa a las personas que disienten con normas y decisiones que las oprimen, vulneran y precarizan. En efecto, y en tercer lugar, el imperativo del consenso involucra una moral determinada y por su Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 59 mismo carácter normativo se convierte en evaluativo de las prácticas ético-políticas, con el resultado de que penaliza el disenso, especialmente cuando está en la voz de personas históricamente excluidas de la agencia política institucionalizada. Su disenso queda empujado a los márgenes de la política y la consecuente criminalización de la protesta social (sea como fuere que esta se manifieste) queda legitimada por cuenta de que esas personas cuyos reclamos no son tomados en serio en la deliberación son consideradas como incapaces de consensuar y consentir. Podríamos agregar entonces a la crítica de Sanders que el problema principal del imperativo del consenso no es sólo que se imponga un modo determinado de participación política (aunque esto es problemático también en sí mismo), sino un problema previo: incluso si se participa de un modo que se reconoce como característicamente deliberativo, las personas excluidas no son realmente escuchadas pues son estigmatizadas como disidentes sin remedio ni causa. Aquí la injusticia estructural se duplica. Por último, si quisiéramos definir de manera igualitaria, equitativa y democrática qué es "razonable" y llegar a un consenso sobre ello para que el principio sea aceptable, el procedimiento reproduciría los tres fenómenos recién mencionados. Así, ya no resulta llamativo que oponerse sin más a la ampliación de derechos sea "razonable" dentro de las prácticas políticas institucionales de justificación del Estado laico secular, al menos tal como se desarrollan en este momento histórico en nuestra cultura política. Fenómenos como este son lo que obtura el cambio social hacia sistemas más justos. Pero la postura intransigente de quienes insisten en la necesidad de proteger un estado de cosas que les niega a personas y colectivos enteros el acceso formal y material al goce efectivo de derechos no puede ser aceptada como razón para negarles esos derechos a esas personas y colectivos que históricamente han venido luchando por el reconocimiento de su agencia política en el territorio político, cotidiano e institucional. En todo caso, una alternativa es reformular las cuestiones generalmente tematizadas en términos de secularización en términos de cómo defender las condiciones y precondiciones materiales y normativas de una democracia sustantiva y material, no meramente formal, que consiga procesar democráticamente la inclusión de la negatividad inmodificable de esas posturas contrarias a la ampliación de derechos, y esto de modo tal que supere las paradojas antiigualitarias y excluyentes que genera aquí la supremacía del consenso. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 60 Otra línea de críticas fuertes al (post) secularismo liberal es la que proviene de la segunda gran postura en los debates, que engloba a las teorías que heredan las críticas religiosas de Talal Asad en Formations of the secular7. El núcleo conceptual de la línea abierta por Asad es la impugnación (que entiendo correcta) al secularismo liberal por cuenta de que enmascara la supremacía cultural de un tipo determinado cristianismo bajo la pretensión de neutralidad laica, con la marginalización consecuente de otras religiones8. Esta postura apunta, así, contra los presupuestos secularistas y postsecularistas liberales sobre qué es religión. En este marco crítico, el secularismo puede ser definido como un intento por delimitar el lugar exacto de la religión (de las religiones) dentro del Estado y por definir las fronteras normativas exactas entre Iglesias y Estado frente a dos objetivos diferentes: a) procesar de manera lo más pacífica posible las diferencias religiosas (así lo entiende eminentemente Saba Mahmood en Religious Difference in a Secular Age; es un momento que podemos llamar "hobbesiano" del secularismo) y b) resolver a favor del Estado la competencia entre política y religión por la soberanía y por la KompetenzKompetenz (el momento "rousseauniano" del secularismo). El problema con el secularismo no es simplemente que en los Estados contemporáneos secularizados (occidentales o no) no pueden definirse esas fronteras de manera descriptiva. La cuestión es que no es posible hacerlo normativamente sin asumir un concepto determinado de qué es y qué debe ser "religión" y de dónde debemos ubicarla y limitarla en la comunidad política. Una clara caracterización del secularismo político es la de Rudas (2020: 2). La "tesis de la secularización" contiene dos afirmaciones: La primera es empírica y sostiene que religión y modernidad (entendida, en líneas generales, como la consolidación del gobierno democrático, una economía capitalista y el desarrollo científico y tecnológico) están inversamente relacionadas. En consecuencia, desde el siglo XIX ha sido común esperar la eventual desaparición de la religión en las sociedades modernas. Esta tesis ha sido refutada empíricamente. La segunda afirmación presupone la 7 Véase el laborioso análisis de Laborde (2017, especialmente el capítulo 1) a las críticas al secularismo liberal de la tradición asadiana. Laborde distingue tres líneas de críticas para luego proponer un tratamiento de la relación entre religión y Estado que consiga superarlas: 1) crítica semántica ("no hay un referente estable universalmente válido para la categoría de religión", 2017: 18); 2) crítica protestante ("el derecho liberal tiene un sesgo hacia las religiones individualistas centradas en creencias", 2017: 21; i. e., el secularismo liberal tiende a reducir lo religioso a libertad de conciencia); 3) crítica realista ("señala que la regulación liberal de la religión es o un desnudo ejercicio de poder arbitrario o el establecimiento de una religión alternativa, la del liberalismo", 2017: 24). 8 Aquí me he concentrado en las obras más salientes de la crítica religiosa: Asad (2003), Mahmood (2005, 2016) y Cavanaugh (2009). Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 61 primera y es normativa. Sostiene que un lugar adecuado para la religión en las sociedades modernas es la esfera privada (...). Se asume que en un Estado moderno sano la religión tiene que ubicarse en la vida privada: el hogar, la familia, la conciencia individual e instituciones privadas. Una esfera en la que ha habido una reticencia especial a dejar que la religión entre es la esfera política, esto es, en instituciones estatales y fórums de política formal. Pero la tesis normativa de la reticencia de la secularización a dejar que la religión ingrese en la política también ha sido refutada, empírica y conceptualmente. Como sostuvo Cavanaugh (2009), cualquier intento por definir transcultural y suprahistóricamente qué es religión será inevitablemente totalizante y excluyente y las concepciones de "secular" y "religioso" son producto de los modos en los que se configuran las relaciones de poder en un contexto determinado. Pero si bien lo que cuenta como religión en un tiempo y lugar y la atribución de jurisdicciones religiosas y estatales es una función de las relaciones de poder de una cultura en particular, esto no tiene que conducirnos a abstenernos de ejercer una crítica política respecto de los roles regresivos que Iglesias, grupos religiosos y religiones han asumido y asumen en muchos contextos políticos y en muchos momentos de la historia, contando incluso el rol de definirse y defenderse a sí mismas en términos seculares como reguladoras de lo privado. La despolitización de las esferas de acción de las Iglesias también es una función de coordenadas determinadas, no una nota esencial de lo religioso en la modernidad. Lo que aprendemos hoy en nuestra región es que cuando temen perder jurisdicciones, como por ejemplo sobre la definición de "familia", ejercen con mucha eficacia su agencia política en todos los foros públicos disponibles. La crítica a la promesa de la secularización no debe dejarnos impasibles frente a las intenciones totalizantes de las Iglesias y grupos religiosos que están presentes con lobby, poder económico, movilización de masas y participación eclesiástica directa en diferentes instituciones estatales, desde el poder legislativo hasta en cargos claves en oficinas de diseño e implementación políticas públicas. En otras palabras, la duda sobre la secularización y sus pretensiones de neutralidad no debe conducirnos a la misma actitud imparcial que guarda el discurso secularista respecto de las participaciones política de las Iglesias. Una vez que se trata de un asunto político, la crítica y el posicionamiento políticos son posibles y necesarios. Una tercera postura en los debates recientes en torno al secularismo es la de quienes revitalizan el viejo pluralismo jurídico medieval en clara defensa de reclamos soberanistas y Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 62 autoritativos por parte de las Iglesias cristianas dentro de y frente a los Estados democráticos más o menos laicistas e igualitarios. Esta postura (que en sus críticas Schragger y Schwartzman (2013, 2016) llaman "institucionalismo religioso"9 y Cohen (2017) "pluralismo jurisdiccional político" e "integralismo religioso", y que yo llamo "soberanismo clerical", pues tal es su significado operacional en la práctica) está hoy representada fundamentalmente por Greene (2012) y Muñiz-Fraticelli (2014). Como sugiere correctamente Cohen, el riesgo de soberanizar una "comunidad-nomos" está inscripto en que "el propósito del pluralismo jurisdiccional de los grupos religiosos no es invocar ni al demos ni a los demoi para que el poder público o privado rinda cuentas" (Cohen, 2017: 550). El mayor problema normativo y político de esta postura es que si una iglesia como comunidad-nomos no sólo es fuente de normas sino también una autoridad soberanizada a la que una comunidad política no puede fijarle su jurisdicción radica precisamente en el carácter autoritativo supremo de la soberanía. En efecto, la multiplicación de la soberanía suprema y la eliminación de una instancia de delimitación de jurisdicciones no tienen como objetivo resguardar el disenso y el modo en que este enriquece y fortalece una democracia, ni proteger a miembros de las iglesias de los abusos de la autoridad estatal, sino su contrario: la obstaculización del cambio social y de la ampliación de derechos por medio de la desprotección jurídica de miembros y no miembros de esas iglesias frente a prácticas y normas eclesiásticas. El pluralismo jurisdiccional protege las estructuras autoritativas de gubernamentalidad de las 9 Schragger y Schwartzman (2013: 919-920) definen muy bien la postura en cuestión: "La idea de libertad eclesiástica [distinta de la autonomía de las iglesias] se refiere a un conjunto de tesis sobre las instituciones religiosas que comienzan con la proposición de que son entidades soberanas con el poder de establecer límites jurisdiccionales contra el Estado. Así, las instituciones religiosas no están protegidas por derechos que puedan balancearse contra derechos de otras personas o medidos contra intereses estatales importantes; antes bien, su autonomía soberana pone límites absolutos al poder estatal. Asimismo, las instituciones religiosas son las únicas que tienen esta forma de soberanía y a diferencia de asociaciones voluntarias no religiosas, tienen derecho a una protección legal especial. (...) Quienes defienden la libertad eclesiástica ofrecen diferentes justificaciones para explicar el estatuto único de las instituciones religiosas. Lo que tienen en común es la idea de que los grupos religiosos no les deben a los derechos e intereses de sus miembros este carácter distintivo, sino que su soberanía sería básica e irreductible, no una función de otro fundamento legal o moral". El criterio básico por el que Schragger y Schwartzman (2013) critican el institucionalismo religioso es que "los derechos individuales de libertad de conciencia son suficientes para proteger el ejercicio libre" y la protección de la autonomía de las iglesias. Por esto, "las instituciones por sí mismas no originan ningún conjunto distintivo de derechos, autonomía o soberanía y lo que podemos llamar la autonomía institucional o eclesial se deriva en última instancia de los derechos individuales de conciencia" (2013: 920). Esta objeción no es a mi juicio satisfactoria porque es vulnerable a la crítica religiosa de que se presupone una concepción determinada de "qué es religión", una noción de religión que reduce las prácticas religiosas comunitarias a la conciencia individual y por lo tanto resulta insensible a las manifestaciones religiosas que no son comprensibles en términos de un conjunto de creencias cosmogónicas y morales individuales y colectivas. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 63 iglesias, no a las comunidades religiosas qua comunidades éticas en las que vivir una vida con sentido. IV. Orientaciones en lo político Este escenario problemático incrementa la complejidad de la relación iglesia-Estado y por momentos parecemos asistir a un impasse conceptual en el que la relación iglesia-Estado y los fenómenos dilemáticos que dispara ya no son tematizables de un modo fértil para la praxis. Para sortear este impasse, propongo dos estrategias. Una estrategia es la orientación política que inspira este trabajo: defender una postura anticlerical que sea compatible con una concepción popular de la soberanía tal que nos permita una apertura teórica para incluir las diversas manifestaciones de las religiosidades populares y los derechos religiosos de las minorías religiosas sin por ello dar rienda suelta a las estructuras eclesiales autoritativas que se oponen a la ampliación de derechos. La segunda es una orientación metodológica, que tomo de Laborde (2017), y que aplico para abordar la relación iglesia-Estado como un eco localizador en la orientación normativa: desagregar "religión". De manera algo provocativa, Laborde propone dejar de lado la categoría de religión en teoría política: Al sugerir que la categoría de religión puede ser dejada de lado en la teoría política, no quiero decir que la religión no sea una categoría central y de hecho indispensable de nuestra experiencia ética, social y espiritual. Tampoco niego que la categoría semántica de religión sea una herramienta heurística útil en muchas empresas académicas. Lo que sugiero es que la categoría de religión es menos que adecuada como categoría político-legal. Podemos explicar los valores implícitos en la libertad de religión, la igualdad entre religiones y la neutralidad del Estado (por mencionar algunos de los ideales liberales relevantes) sin un recurso directo a la categoría semántica de religión. Lo que necesitamos en teoría política y legal no es una noción semántica o descriptiva de religión sino una noción interpretativa: necesitamos articular los múltiples valores que realizan las dimensiones particulares de la religión (Laborde, 2017: 2). Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 64 No sigo a Laborde en la intención de defender una versión igualitarista del liberalismo secularista que supere las objeciones de la crítica religiosa asadiana, pero sí creo que es necesario emplear un método desagregativo para trabajar la religión en lo político. La desagregación de la religión en una "pluralidad de dimensiones normativas relevantes" nos permite además superar la analogía de la religión con la categoría privatizante de "concepciones del bien" (Laborde, 2017: 5), lo que a su vez permite, y esto es lo que propongo específicamente, focalizarnos en el aspecto autoritativo de las religiones institucionalizadas y el impacto de esas estructuras normativas en las prácticas políticas. Con esto podemos mover las apelaciones a la libertad de conciencia y el énfasis en la creencia individual del centro del tratamiento de la relación religión-Estado y del sentido político de lo religioso como práctica. Desagregar la religión es necesario para poder hacer foco sobre las diferentes dimensiones normativas y prácticas en las que se manifiesta; existen muchas dimensiones de lo religioso en lo ético-político que un abordaje crítico tiene que tratar en términos de su relación normativa con otros principios normativos (como la ampliación de derechos y de la participación política) y con otros modos de vida cuyo eje identitario no es religioso. También nos permite ejercer una crítica política al proceder de ciertas Iglesias en nuestro contexto político sin con ello lesionar ni poner en cuestión el sentido de las vidas de las personas para quienes la religiosidad y las prácticas comunitarias religiosas son valiosas en sí mismas. Así, podemos trabajar la relación entre las Iglesias, los grupos religiosos y lo estatal sin la pretensión tácita de definir "religión". No todas las visiones de lo religioso pueden ser mejor comprendidas del modo en el que se autocomprendieron generalmente los cristianismos modernos y contemporáneos en las sociedades más o menos pluralistas bajo el prisma del Estado (post) westfaliano, i. e., como un fenómeno centrado en la conciencia individual que sirve para establecer la demarcación entre lo público y lo privado y por lo tanto para repartir aspectos de nuestras vidas en uno u otro lado. Ni siquiera todos los cristianismos pueden ser mejor comprendidos de ese modo. Pero sí ocurre que la libertad religiosa se usa como una excusa para exculpar acciones discriminatorias y lesivas de la dignidad de otras personas, como si el derecho de libertad religiosa fuera reductible a la protección jurídica de meras preferencias externas. Una consideración desagregada de la religión tiene sentido cuando queremos analizar el rol de la religión en la formación de la voluntad pública más allá de la problematización del Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 65 pluralismo religioso en los términos seculares y postseculares de tolerancia y de búsqueda de consenso. También nos permite esbozar una orientación ético-política a la altura de las circunstancias. En Serene Khader (2019) se puede encontrar una ética feminista transnacional que incorpora los aportes de Mahmood críticos del secularismo, con el fin de decolonizar el feminismo de sus tendencias antitradicionales, pero que no resigna la solidaridad intercomunitaria ni los principios mínimamente universales que implica cualquier práctica efectiva contra la opresión. Intentos como este son fundamentales dadas las coordenadas normativas que plantean hoy las religiones en lo político, principalmente porque el costo de la relegación de lo religioso a lo privado es el de la subordinación de la vida familiar y de la sexualidad (también relegadas a lo privado) a lo religioso y seguimos enfrentando los intereses de ese costo en muchos ámbitos de derechos conquistados y derechos por conquistar. Necesitamos reformular cuál es el territorio en el que se despliegan las prácticas que pueden transformar eficazmente lo religioso y lo estatal de modo tal que el secularismo no resulte una regeneración de posturas antiigualitarias. Ese territorio es el de las éticas políticas de la participación política (militancia, activismo) en el que lo religioso puede ser emancipador porque puede ser ejercido para contradecir las tendencias proeclesiásticas de nuestro Estado laico secular. Asimismo, cuando lo religioso se publicita, cuando la participación y la agencia políticas de las iglesias poderosas se vuelve explícita, entonces antes que insistir en una neutralidad imparcial frente a diferentes concepciones de la buena vida, lo que necesitamos es ejercer públicamente la crítica a estas pretensiones eclesiásticas antiigualitarias. Esta crítica, es importante insistir, no puede provenir simplemente del Estado sino que se ejerce en la praxis política popular. IV. Conclusiones No prestarle la atención suficiente al hecho de que la cuestión religión-Estado es un epifenómeno de la cuestión anterior del rol de las religiones y de las iglesias en lo ético-político nos hace correr demasiados riesgos, desde el riesgo estratégico de subestimar el alcance político de las religiones sexistas, antiigualitarias e incluso individualistas (la teología de la prosperidad es una extraña sacralización de un discurso ético-económico capitalista neoliberal) en la política Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 66 electoralista de las democracias contemporáneas, hasta el riesgo moral de menospreciar y discriminar diferentes expresiones de religiosidad popular y faltar a la dignidad de formas de vivir que no se adecuen a las prácticas religiosas y no religiosas mayoritarias. Para una postura política anticlerical que tenga un compromiso serio con la igualdad religiosa y el respeto por la soberanía popular y las formas religiosas de vivir, la cuestión central es al mismo tiempo la cuestión probablemente más problemática de todo el rango de dilemas, paradojas y tensiones que causa la convivencia de las iglesias con los Estados, i. e., el hecho de que las posturas eclesiásticas contrarias a la ampliación de derechos (antiderechos) son plenamente traducibles al lenguaje liberal deliberativo que se habla en las instituciones políticas de nuestros Estados. Pero la cuestión normativa crítica fundamental del cambio social se dirime en el territorio popular de lo político, en el plano interactivo de las éticas políticas en el que se forman las voluntades públicas, y no en los pasillos discursivos de los edificios conceptuales de la política electoral. En este territorio de lo político no podemos pedir un principio de neutralidad respecto del proceder de las iglesias. Para desclericalizar lo estatal se necesitará desmitologizar lo secular y sus promesas de imparcialidad religiosa y también se necesitará (necesitaremos) desagregar "religión" y aprender a separar clericalismo de religiosidad. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 67 Bibliografía Anderson, E. (2010). The imperative of Integration. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Asad, T. (2003). Formations of the Secular. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Audi, R. (2000). Religious Commitment and Secular Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Audi, R. (2011). Democratic Authority and the Separation of Church and State. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bailey, T. y Driessen, M. (2017). "Engaging Post-Secularism: Rethinking Catholic Politics in Italy". Constellations, 24, 2, 232-244. Cavanaugh, W. T. (2009). 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Oxford: Oxford University Press. Montero, P. (2013). "Religião, Laicidade e Secularismo. Um debate contemporâneo à luz do caso brasileiro". Revista Cultura y Religión, VII, 2, junio-diciembre, 132-150. Muñiz-Fraticelli, V. (2014). The structure of pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, J. (1999). "The Idea of Public Reason Revisited", en The Law of Peoples. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Rorty, R. (1999). "Religion as Conversation-stopper" en Philosophy and Social Hope (pp. 168174). New York: Penguin. Rudas, S. (2020). "Lack of pluralism and post-secularism in Catholic countries", Constellations, 2020, early view. Sanders, L. (1997). "Against deliberation". Political Theory, 25, 3, 347-376. Schragger, R. y Schwartzman, M. (2013). "Against religious institutionalism". Virgina Law Review, 99, 5, 917-985. Schragger, R. y Schwartzman, M. (2016). "Some realism about corporate rights", en Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders & Zoë Robinson (eds.), The rise of corporate religious liberty (pp. 345-374). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Revista Argentina de Ciencia Política | Vol. 1 | Núm. 24 | pp. 45-69 | Marey, M. 69 Stephen M. (2000). "In Defense of Liberal Public Reason: Are Slavery and Abortion Hard Cases?", en Robert P. George, y Christopher Wolfe (eds.), Natural Law and Public Reason (pp. 11-49). Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Vaggione, J. M. (2005). "Reactive Politicization and Religious Dissidence: The Political Mutations of the Religious", Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 31, N°. 2, 233-255.

Phenomenology and Mind, n. 12 2017, pp. 174-183 DOI: 10.13128/Phe_Mi-21116 Web: www.fupress.net/index.php/pam © The Author(s) 2017 CC BY 4.0 Firenze University Press ISSN 2280-7853 (print) ISSN 2239-4028 (on line) LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS1 abstract Despite its recent popularity, Emergence is still a field where philosophers and physicists often talk past each other. In fact, while philosophical discussions focus mostly on ontological emergence, physical theory is inherently limited to the epistemological level and the impossibility of its conclusions to provide direct evidence for ontological claims is often underestimated. Nevertheless, the emergentist philosopher's case against reductionist theories of how the different levels of reality are related to each other can still gain from the assessment of paradigmatic examples of discontinuity between models in physics, even though their implications must be handled with care. keywords emergentism, ontological emergence, epistemological emergence, reductionism, physics, singular limits JOANA RIGATO Champalimaud Center for the Unknown Lisbon [email protected] 175 LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS Emergentism, in its various forms, is the view according to which there are features of1 reality (properties, objects or laws) that are irreducible to the lower-level basis from which they emerge, in the sense that they are more than just the result of the combination of the system's parts and their interactions. These features are paradoxically (or so it seems) both dependent on and autonomous from their emergence base, i.e. from the lower-level that brings them about. They are dependent in the sense that they cannot exist unless the lower-level structure is in place, but they are autonomous insofar as that structure does not suffice for the novel features that arise to be fully explained and predicted. This inexplicability and unpredictability is, of course, in the eyes of the beholder and amounts to what is commonly known as epistemological emergence. Still, metaphysical or ontological emergence can be assumed to underlie this apparent underivability, in which case there is a radical discontinuity in the hierarchical organization of reality, whereby the causal effects of emergent phenomena in the world cannot even in principle be accounted for by the causal powers of the lower-level structure on which they depend (Kim, 1999; O'Connor & Wong, 2005). This type of theory has been developed in very many areas, from different scientific branches to philosophy. In the latter field, its study ranges from metaphysics and the philosophy of mind (in which the focus has been mainly on the relationship between mental/conscious entities and their physiological substrate – Kim, 1993; Searle, 1992), to philosophy of science in general (where the focus is on whether certain theories are reducible to others or not – Bedau, 1997), to philosophy of physics (where emergence seems to be a good conceptual tool for explaining nonlinear phenomena – Andersen, 1972) and philosophy of biology (where the main interest is top-down causation in self-organizing systems – Arp, 2008). What is common in all these fields is the opposition to the reductionist ideal of a Lego world where the elements of the bottom-most domain provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the phenomena taking place at higher levels of organization. According to reductionism, the lower-level properties and laws of a system determine its upper-levels properties and laws. The instantiation of the former necessitates the instantiation of the latter. This implies, as a consequence, that the scientific domain that explains the lower-level occurrences is in principle sufficient to explain the upper-level ones (Sober, 1999). Emergentist views all counter this 1 Acknowledgments: I thank Margarida Telo da Gama, Robert Bishop and Pranab Das for helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 1. Introduction 176 JOANA RIGATO perspective with various examples that are used as evidence for the existence of upper-level phenomena that challenge microphysical explanation, not only in practice, but allegedly in principle. However, needless to say, there is no uniformity in the way the concept of emergence is used and in the candidates that are accepted as good examples of emergent phenomena (Bedau & Humphreys, 2008). In this paper, I chose to focus on the debate about emergence going on in philosophy of physics, hoping to show its relevance to the general discussion. A commendable tendency in the past years in philosophy of science has been to develop accounts of emergence that move away from armchair metaphysics and anchor philosophical analyses in scientific theory and practice. Philosopher and physicist Robert Bishop, for example, has been working in questions of Emergence and Complex Systems for many years. Alone (2005, 2009) or together with theoretical physicist Harald Atmanspacher (2006), Bishop developed an account of what he calls "contextual emergence", which is a relation between different levels of description (in its epistemological form) or between domains of reality (in its ontological form), whereby the description, properties or behaviors of the lower domain provide some necessary but no sufficient conditions for the novelty existing at the upper-level. The remaining conditions must be provided by the context, which includes the stability conditions of the emergent states and observables (i.e. the conditions that guarantee their existence and persistence), which are not given by lower-level descriptions. Bishop uses several examples as evidence for the ubiquity of contextual emergence, from the domain of quantum chemistry to that of human society. All of them have to do with scale transformations: how the laws of microphysics give rise to the laws and properties of the macro world. Bishop is in good company, as voices have been rising in the attempt to tell philosophers and unexamined reductionists that real-world science does not actually have any models that drill down from many-body physics to some mythical microphysical state and that, in fact, productive scientific models largely ignore such thinking altogether. According to nobel laureate Robert Laughlin, for example, the idea that one might in principle deduce the goingson in the domains of chemistry, biology and other special sciences from a complete knowledge of particle physics is totally unfounded and, even though reductionism is a belief that is central to much of physical research, "the safety that comes from acknowledging only the facts one likes is fundamentally incompatible with science. Sooner or later it must be swept away by the forces of history" (Laughlin & Pines, 2000, p. 264). Let us now look at some examples of emergence in physics that have been put forward in the literature. The examples challenge the reductionist ideal from different fronts: first, the need for singular limits, for example in the transition from quantum to classical mechanics (section 2.1), is used to call into question the idea that a macro-physical state can be derived from a micro-physical equation. Second, the case of criticality, which is an example of universality (section 2.2), questions the assumption that a macro-physical state has a unique microphysical basis, which is commonly taken as a consequence of a reductionistic world. Finally, the phenomenon of liquidity (section 2.3) highlights the role of stability conditions which are often not provided by the underlying emergence base. 2. Emergence in Physics 177 LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS The transition from quantum to classical mechanics is a mysterious one. Mathematically, these two realms are separated by singular limits (mathematical expansions in which some quantities are assumed to tend either to zero or to infinity), which means that the transition between the formalism that describes the behavior of particles at the quantum level (the Hamiltonian dynamics) and the equations used in the field of many-body physics is discontinuous. The behavior before and after that transition is qualitatively different and has to be described by a totally distinct equation. And in order to move from one equation to the other, Planck's constant is assumed to tend to zero, which is a mathematical trick that departs from reality (where it is actually non-zero). Hence, between the classical and the quantum domains there is a radical epistemological gap which can be bridged only with the help of a formal artifact. This can be illustrated with the example of molecular shape. Isomers are molecules that share identical chemical formulas but have different spatial arrangements which give them very different properties. According to Bishop, these are good candidates as examples of contextually emergent phenomena since the specific structure into which a certain quantum description (the so-called Hamiltonian) will evolve at the chemical level cannot be deduced from quantum mechanical data alone. Even though QM [i.e. quantum mechanics] contains necessary conditions in terms of nucleons, electrons and their properties, fundamental force laws and so forth, observables relevant for molecular structure do not exist in the domain of QM. For such observables to obtain, an additional context not given by QM must be specified (Bishop, 2009, p. 177). Only with the help of heuristic formal procedures, like assuming the nucleus of the atom to be stationary and infinitely larger than the electron mass, can one derive the equation encoding molecular shape.2 This means that the chemical context (the stability conditions of a "clamped nucleus" together with the ratio of the electron mass over the nucleus mass tending to zero) must be fed into the mathematical treatment of the quantum mechanical information. It is thanks to these constraints that come from "outside" the quantum realm that the quantum correlations between nuclei and electrons are broken and classical position and momentum observables, as well as molecular shape, can arise. Several natural phenomena share with the previous case this feature of being theoretically dependent on mathematical tricks, such as the postulation of the infinite or null value of certain observables that we know to be finite. They are cases in which the appearance of the macro property is not a mere quantitative derivation from a smaller scale to a larger scale, but rather a qualitative transformation which can be explained and predicted (at least on the basis of the models and theories presently available to us) only through the artificial normalization of singular limits. According to Robert Batterman, a leading figure in Philosophy of Physics, emergence happens precisely there where singular limits cause our theories to break down. And as a matter of fact, our most important physical theories are asymptotically related in pairs: 2 This "clamped-nucleus" assumption is part of the so called Born-Oppenheimer "approximation". Mathematically, it corresponds to an asymptotic series expansion in which the parameter ε (= electron mass/ nuclear mass) diverges to zero, that is, the nuclear mass is assumed to be infinitely large with respect to the electron mass. 2.1. When a Macro State Cannot Be Derived From a Micro Equation 2.2. When a Macro State Is Compatible With Multiple Micro States 178 JOANA RIGATO Lim1/c → 0 (special relativity) → Newtonian mechanics Lim λ → 0 (wave optics) → ray optics Limh → 0 (quantum mechanics) → classical mechanics. This can be interpreted as an indicator of the inadequacy of our theories and models, or instead as a "source of information". Batterman has been arguing for the latter attitude for several years now: If it were not for the singularities that appear in our theories and models we would have no understanding of the emergence at different scales of distinct and apparently "protected" states of matter (2011, p. 1040). The "protected" states of matter that Batterman is referring to are what Laughlin and Pines (2000) call "protectorates", which are stable states of matter which are not only mathematically underivable from more fundamental equations without the help of singular limits, but are also insensitive to changes at the micro-level. These protectorates are the units of the phenomenon physicists call "universality", which is what philosophers dub "multiple realizability". One example of such a phenomenon is thermodynamic criticality. The critical point of a fluid is a state in which liquid and vapor can coexist, and it is determined by a specific temperature and pressure (which is different from fluid to fluid).3 Surprisingly, once they reach their specific critical point, all fluids (as well as magnets) behave in an identical manner, even if their properties are radically different in other phases and even if the values of their critical points are as diverse as 1,040.85oC/270 atm for sulfur and -239.95oC/12.8 atm for hydrogen. This macroscopic similarity beyond microscopic differences has been mathematically accounted for by the renormalization group theory (Batterman, 2002, 2011, 2014). This mathematical technique (for which Kenneth Wilson won the Nobel Prize) shows how the molecular details that are specific to each fluid are irrelevant for the macroscopic behavior that it shares with all other fluids.4 Batterman's conclusion (2014, p. 15) is that this concrete method for explicating a process whereby higher order patterns arise that are not derivable from micro-structure can be considered as evidence against reductionism. In the words of Laughlin, who uses examples such as these in his battle against the reductionistic framework often used in physics, it is obvious at the eyes of solid-state physicists, chemists and biologists that nature is filled with phenomena that are insensitive to microphysical variability, the behavior of which is determined by higher organizing principles, and that we may confidently call emergent.5 This is one of the reasons why "predicting protein functionality or the behavior of the human brain from [quantum mechanical] equations is patently absurd" (Laughlin & Pines, 2000, p. 260). 3 As with the previous cases, this phenomenon too is described as the result of assuming a variable to be infinite: viz. the number of particles or the correlation lengths between them (the distance over which one particle can influence another). 4 The process, developed by Kadanoff, Fisher, and Wilson (cf. Batterman, 2002), is based on an iterated transformation of the Hamiltonian of each system, by which as one gradually changes scale, more and more finegrained information is lost and the resulting function ends up being the same for all the elements of the universality class in question (a value that is called a "fixed point"). 5 Laughlin and Pines (2000) provide various examples. Here are two more: "The Josephson quantum is exact because of the principle of continuous symmetry breaking. The quantum Hall effect is exact because of localization. Neither of these things can be deduced from microscopics and both are transcendent, in that they would continue to be true and to lead to exact results even if the Theory of Everything were changed" (p. 261). 179 LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS But are emergent phenomena exhausted by cases such as these, where we find radical discontinuities between theories? What can physics tell us regarding properties that do not look so mysterious to us? Liquidity, for example, is a very familiar property (or cluster of properties) which we may resist considering emergent. In spite of its in practice unpredictability and novelty with respect to the properties of the components of the liquid taken in isolation (Weisskopf, 1977), the macroscopic properties of liquids (like viscosity or surface tension) and their causal powers seem straightforwardly derivable from the laws governing chemical bonds and other microscopic states and events. What we see at the level of the liquid is not something over and above the goings-on at the level of the molecules and their interactions. So reducibility seems possible, almost unavoidable. However, condensed-matter physicists reply, it is not that simple. The stability of liquids depends on temperature, which cannot be derived from the particle's interactions. Even though in the philosophical literature temperature is still cited as a good example of reduction (it is taken to be nothing but the mean translational kinetic energy of molecules in a system), it is actually considered to be a case of emergence by most condensedmatter physicists. Temperature is a property that arises out of two mathematical transitions (from particle mechanics to statistical mechanics, and from there to thermodynamics), the calculation of which depends upon mathematical limits (e.g. the thermodynamic limit, which assumes the container of a gas to be infinitely large) as well as on stability conditions which are not available in the underlying domain, such as thermodynamic equilibrium. Hence the calculation of the macro properties of liquids cannot be made without first establishing the stability conditions upon which the liquid depends, that is, without taking into account the macro conditions that make it so that some laws of interaction rather than others apply. Molecular shape and criticality are considered to be good candidates for emergence because of the irreducibility of their macro description to the underlying quantum properties. This happens also in the case of liquids, since they cannot exist unless there is a certain sort of symmetry breaking induced by temperature, which in turn depends on conditions that can be provided only at the macro level. Therefore, if molecular shape and criticality are emergent, liquids should be considered to be so as well. What the aforementioned examples show is that the reductionist ideal of macro properties being derivable from microscopic features and laws is not grounded in scientific practice. Scale transformations are highly problematic and many aspects of reality seem to simply pop up when a certain threshold of complexity is crossed, which mathematically corresponds to unphysical singular limits. But is this not a merely epistemic matter? Even if we cannot predict upper-level phenomena on the basis of our lower-level knowledge, this does not imply that we are dealing with ontologically irreducible features. As a matter of fact, besides the misunderstandings caused by the lack of agreement regarding the definition of emergence to which I alluded briefly in the introduction, another major source of confusion, especially in the scientific community, is the lack of clarity concerning the distinction between epistemological and ontological forms of emergence. Epistemological emergence is a relation existing between theories or models of the world. Ontological emergence is a relation existing between objects or properties in the world. Even though the latter implies the former, the inverse is not true. Epistemological emergence is no guarantee for ontological emergence. The impossibility of reducing a certain theory, with which we explain a certain upper-level domain, to a lower-level theory may be due only to our lack 2.3. When Macro Context is as Crucial as Micro Structure 3. From Epistemology to Ontology in Physics 180 JOANA RIGATO of knowledge of the details and intricacies of that lower level, its parts and the relations obtaining between them. Our theories may be incomplete. If the epistemic irreducibility we found in the cases described in the previous section were to express a deeper ontological irreducibility, that would mean that there is a spontaneous and unexplained symmetry breaking at a certain point in the evolution of the system, whereby new properties with new causal powers come about. Isomers with different boiling points and densities, critical points in which new visible phenomena such as opalescence take place (the fluid becomes opaque and colored), temperature with different effects on macroscopic bodies (such as melting). If our epistemic limits express true ontological irreducibility, these examples, as well as many others, which might be more or less familiar and more or less complex, all seem to be cases of causally new and irreducible, hence emergent, macro features. However, it is very hard to apply the epistemological/ontological distinction to physics. Physics does not have the pretense of knowing reality. All physics does is designing models that are quantitative, predictive and falsifiable. Whether those models correspond to the actual objective truth is something physics cannot tell us. Such an instrumentalist approach, which is the physicist's default standpoint, can make it hard on the philosopher to extract useful information from physical theory and practice for her metaphysical speculations. Of course, philosophers of a realist inclination would consider it legitimate to move from epistemological facts about physical theorizing to facts about the world. However, they would be moving alone. Physicists would hardly approve of such an extrapolation, which would hence be missing the safety net provided by the scientific method and the credibility that comes with intersubjective agreement. But philosophers do not give up easily on what might be a fruitful dialogue. Even if physics only provides us with models of the world, one can still hypothesize a laplacean demon, a universal and omniscient calculator, whose complete and truthful knowledge of a certain system might be sufficient to explain all its macro properties. Could such a calculator predict the formation of a certain molecule in a fluid with such and such initial and boundary conditions? Granted, the conceivability of this omniscient being is traditionally used as an argument for universal determinism, not ontological reductionism, the truth of which it assumes from the start. Still, this theoretical exercise serves as a way to flesh out what can otherwise seem too abstract a hypothesis and allow physicists to more easily explicate their case against it. Unfortunately, they will likely find the idea of a laplacean demon to be inapplicable to current physical science for several reasons. First, because in the world of particles at the subatomic scale, classical physics does not apply. Only once a certain measurement is made, is the system in a well determinate state; before, in general, it is considered to be in what is called a superposition of states. There is no way of knowing with absolute certainty all the information that fully characterizes a physical system: if we know precisely where a particle is located – its position in a certain spatial coordinate –, we will miss all knowledge about its momentum (in the same coordinate), and vice-versa.6 The laplacean demon, therefore, cannot do his job in the quantum realm. Second, because the in practice impossibility of calculating all the information contained in any macro system, not to mention the whole universe, is considered by physicists to be an in principle impossibility. It is presently established that no computer can ever accurately solve the equations describing the total energy of a system with more than ten particles at the quantum level (Laughlin & Pines, 2000, p. 160), because the interactions, which grow with the 6 This is, of course, an extreme example of the renowned Heisenberg uncertainty relations. 181 LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS factorial of N (number of particles), are intractable. So to imagine a universal calculation of the evolution of an ideal "system of the world" just sounds plainly absurd. Third, because the theories we have that describe and explain macro properties on the basis of molecular properties are statistical in nature. They do not express the sort of one-to-one causality relations we would like a laplacean demon to have access to. This means that a really carefully imagined omniscient being would have to have a theory set that is fully coherent across scales, which is something we are nowhere near to achieving and cannot even know is possible. A philosopher may tend to react to such arguments with dismay and call attention again to the hypothetical nature of the laplacean demon that need not suffer from the physical limitations of our brains, theories and actual computers, but the dialogue with the physicist will likely have come to a halt. It seems like the philosopher and the physicist are talking past each other. The former aims at inferences about the ontology underlying our theories, which the latter will never be able to provide. In principle reductionism is impossible to prove and so is non-derivability. Even if we ignored the distance between the epistemological and the ontological levels, we still could not use as arguments what science might be able to reveal in the future, but only what it is able to verify right now. And even that is extremely difficult to generalize. Every microphysical law, which is an abstract construct formulated by theoreticians in as simple and context-free a way as possible, is tacitly implying that its application depends on the absence of outside influences (influences from upper levels of organization). What happens in a laboratory, then, is the testing of such abstract physical laws in equally aseptic environments, carefully designed to exclude any disturbing factor. However, outside these controlled setups, things get very messy. Even though the results of the experiments often corroborate the laws we wish to test, they cannot confirm their applicability to real-case scenarios where the boundaries between organization levels are loose and causal interactions between them much more likely (Dupré, 2001). Hence, it would be fallacious to infer from the results of experimental scientific research such a strong metaphysical assumption as reductionism, which would require us to be able to ascertain with profound detail what happens in increasingly complex and ever changing contexts. Evidence for reductionism should consist in the verification that the behavior of all complex systems (from chemical, to biological, to neurological, to psychological, to social), in real-case situations, can be fully explained by microphysical laws, which is something that cannot even be done at a molecular level. While one single case attesting to the failure of the universal claim of reductionism would suffice to falsify it, the same argument cannot be applied to emergentism, which is committed only to the existence of some irreducible phenomena. We would not need to survey the whole natural realm in order to prove it true; one relevant case of irreducibility would be enough. In this sense, even if the epistemological emergence of many-body properties and the radical mathematical discontinuity between theories at different levels cannot prove the truth of ontological emergentism, they do come in handy as circumstantial evidence against the ontological reducibility of the macro to the micro. In short, given the impossibility of using physics to prove their ontological claims, what both reductionists and emergentists must do is try to make the case for the higher implausibility of their rival position. That is much easier for a weaker, existential claim (emergentism) than for a strong, universal one (reductionism). And while the empirical evidence we have surveyed in section 2 cannot prove the truth of ontological emergence, it can shed strong doubts on its alternative and thus make the case for emergentism stronger. 4. Weakening the Reductionist's Case 182 JOANA RIGATO Let us sum up. All the examples used in this paper consist in systemic properties that are qualitatively different from the properties of the parts. They can be calculated once we know the stability conditions that allow them to persist, but the singular limits that separate the theories that describe them render it impossible to explain the whole only on the basis of the parts. Nevertheless, the fact that we cannot know whether this epistemic irreducibility corresponds to an ontological gap rather than to mere limitations of our models prevents us from being able to assert conclusively whether these are cases of ontological emergence or not. In the end, the move from the epistemic to the ontological level of analysis is a matter of personal preference and intuition. Physics is silent about what is really there and so all it can do to help the emergentist's case is tell her that ontological emergence is not an absurd anti-scientific hypothesis. It is actually plausible, if our theories are true, since the way our models relate to each other is exactly what one should expect if ontological emergence were the case. Brian MacLauglin has famously said: Given the advent of quantum mechanics and these other scientific theories, there seems not a scintilla of evidence that there are emergent causal powers or laws (1992, p. 23). As we have seen, this statement is highly questionable. Despite the advent of quantum mechanics and other scientific theories that allow us to explain the behavior of the smallest portions of matter we know, there is much more than a few "scintillas of evidence" that there are emergent causal powers and laws in the world. And they might be much more common than usually supposed, even though reductionism cannot be disproven. REFERENCES Anderson, P.W. (1972). More is Different: Broken Symmetry and the Nature of the Hierarchical Structure of Science. In M.A. Bedau & P. Humphreys (Eds.) (2008). Emergence. Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 221-229. Arp, R. (2008). Emergence in Biology. Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, 4, 260-285. Batterman, R.W. (2002). The Devil in the Details: Asymptotic Reasoning in Explanation, Reduction, and Emergence. New York: Oxford University Press. Batterman, R.W. (2011). Emergence, Singularities, and Symmetry Breaking. Foundations of Physics, 41, 1031-1050. Batterman, R.W. (2014). Reduction and multiple realizability. www.robertbatterman.org. Bedau, M. (1997). Weak Emergence. Noûs, 3, 375-399. Bedau, M.A. & Humphreys, P. (2008). Emergence. Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Bishop, R.C. (2005). Patching physics and chemistry together. Philosophy of Science, 72, 710-722. Bishop, R.C. (2009). Whence chemistry? Reductionism and neoreductionism. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41, 171-177. Bishop, R.C. & Atmanspacher, H. (2006). Contextual emergence in the description of properties. Foundations of Physics, 36, 1753-1777. Dupré, H. (2001). Human nature and the limits of science. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kim, J. (1993). Supervenience and Mind: Selected Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kim, J. (1999). Making Sense of Emergence. Philosophical Studies, 95, 3-36. Laughlin, R.B. & Pines, D. (2000). The Theory of Everything. In M.A. Bedau & P. Humphreys (Eds.) (2008). Emergence. Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 259-268. McLaughlin, B. (1992). The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism. In M.A. Bedau & P. Humphreys 5. Conclusion 183 LOOKING FOR EMERGENCE IN PHYSICS (Eds.) (2008). Emergence. Contemporary Readings in Philosophy and Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 19-59. O'Connor, T. & Wong, H.Y. (2005). The Metaphysics of Emergence. Nôus, 39, 658-678. Searle, J.R. (1992). The Rediscovery of the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sober, E. (1999). The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism. Philosophy of Science, 66, 542-564. Weisskopf, V.F. (1977). About Liquids. Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences, 38, 202-218.

The search for New Philosophy ( From Language to Mind ) Ningombam Bupenda Meitei (St.Stephen's College) Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi Background Philosophy which has been the discourse of rational inquiry has witnessed centuries of changes both internally necessitated and externally influenced since Greek philosophy of Socrates , Plato and Aristotle and even since their predecessors too. The rise of Copernican Revolution, Archimedes and Galileo's astronomical telescope which led not only to bring up the foundational change of heliocentric theory motivating succeeding philosophers like Newton but also, had impacted in the journey of philosophy as philosophy was not void of natural philosophy which later branched off to today's natural sciences particularly physical sciences. The empirical observations of Darwin to form his evolutionary theories also have influenced the growth of philosophy. Besides mathematics which has played a significant role in rationalizing philosophy, the notion of rationalism versus empiricism debate still persists today which marks the fundamental issue of discussion between a priori analytic truth and a posteriori synthetic truth which has been addressed thoroughly by Kant. The rise of Descartes till the end of Kant could be considered philosophically very enlightening in the view of modern western world which is also due to Renaissance period, but after Kant's era, the emergence of Newtonian classical physics particularly his theory of Gravity had moved the world and disturbed the problem of Descartes' mind-body dualism through Newtonian non-contact mechanics which went against contact-mechanics of Descartes. From Newton to Einstein, the world and science have phenomenally changed and matured to such an extent that classical physics is almost overtaken by modern physics and even further by quantum mechanics , elementary particle physics and strings theory. Since the end of Newton who was philosopher , mathematician and alchemist, the study of philosophy became a more segmented rational inquiry void of natural philosophy or physics and, thus , the departure of philosophy from physics started and thereby, natural sciences got drifted away from the then holistic rational inquiry though could get along with mathematics to some extent. This drifting away has later become a valid point of weakness in understanding the nature of fundamental of rational inquiry which is done by human and the fundamentals which make an attempt to do so could be strongly possible to study if today's drifted philosophy could be unified with today's advanced modern science particularly in modern phyics and the possibility of such unification would lead to the emergence of new approach of rational inquiry which could be coined as the need for New Philosophy. 2 Motivation The need for New Philosophy which could be a come back experiment of bringing back the holistic rational inquiry of the then pre-Newtonian era and this possibility could perhaps be done at least in more than one way but one approach of inquiry which is of interest in this paper is to expound the notion of study of human mind via human language and distinguishing human language from non-human language in understanding the discussion on 'From Language to Mind', the understanding of human language per se which could be done by differentiating its uniqueness from other sub-human or non-human species languages if at all if non-humans also have languages which could be found empirically, which would be discussed needs fundamental issues to be addressed and the addressing of such issues is possible when there is a unification of different disciplines which are required in the study of the rational inquiry such as brain sciences , linguistics , psychology , genetics and biological evolution besides physics. The unification process is the utmost motivating factor as the modern science particularly in modern physics awaits the unification of four interactions such as for quantum gravity and black holes to understand Universe, besides strings theory using topology and many dimensional physics to study Universe which consists of almost 95% dark matter which is not known to man. The search of Einstein's Theory of Everything could be a motivating force behind the unification of brain sciences and linguistics in particular by using genetics too in understanding human language. The role of physics in human language is difficult to think of but perhaps could be found in understanding the role of biophysics in unlocking the mystery behind protein unfolding of the gene responsible for human speech and this attempt could be a matter of discussion based on scientifically observed empirical data. The more motivating factor besides the unification process for philosophy is also the fact that in understanding mind and language, one can not do so by being in a compartmentalized manner which has evolved as a result in the last almost two centuries in the form of analytic philosophy by taking some help from mathematics and value laden philosophy namely continental philosophy. The more becoming redundancy of the branched off two schools of the then undivided philosophy i,e. analytic and continental philosophy of today which are primarily due to its inability and also its internal rigidity from not accepting and even not making an attempt to understand the development of advanced modern physics ,chemistry and biology, have not only made the discourse of philosophy in today's 21 st century draggy but also have failed to get themselves updated and understood in the context of the modern scientific era where in, even the Einsteinian physics is almost critiqued by many including quantum mechanics and strings theory and in such scenario, making an attempt to bring unification process possible and working in those disciplines which are responsible for understanding language per se would not only be merely a revolutionary change in the discourse of rational inquiry but also would bring back the real essence of what philosophy could be, hence , the need for New Philosophy. 3 From Language to Mind ( the search for New Philosophy ) After having been gone through the understanding of what is the search or the aim of the paper and why the search or the aim is required in a sense of what is the reason of motivating to project such aim in the previous sections in the form of background and motivation discussing about what and why the project is respectively, the solution or the methodology or perhaps , the approach is needed and this question of – how the project or the aim could be understood is what it is going to be discussed hereafter. From language to mind signifies the significance of knowing mind which is human mind in this case via language which is in turn human language , but the issue is, mind could be known through a medium which is nothing but language and the next obvious question is , it is prior to the knowing of mind , one needs to know its medium i,e. language , hence , the natural urge to ask what language is. To define what language is, is normally not discussed in the time of Descartes and his predecessors in the manner it is discussed today, simply because of their accepted notion of language being only specific to human which is the only rational being with mind and hence , no other being has mind. This has led to Cartesian dualism of body and mind distinguishing man from brutes and animals also. The issue has become a means of developing Turing's machine in the form of Artificial Intelligence challenging the mind of human that machines too can think like humans, which later gets criticized and rejected by philosophers of mind. The question is, is mind per se only specific to human or can not mind be attributable to non-human species ? To enable to reply to this question , one needs to understand its medium which is language , but the larger question in language too could be asked in similar manner to mind, asking , is language per se specific to human only and not to other non-human species and if so, then it is needed to be found empirically and if that is possible, then there is a further need to split and pin-pointedly find that part of language which is specific and unique to human only , thus , there is a requirement of zooming in by getting the focus right on the smallest region of language which remains only in humans. The natural urge to now ask is, what is this language ? Hence, there is a shift in the methodology from faculty of mind to faculty of language. But , what is this faculty of language and how can it be understood? Analogously , to make an attempt to understand neutrino from its observed phenomenon in the form of effects visible to experimental particle physicists in the form of the counter results or in the form of some graphs given by super-computers , physicists' attempt to 4 realize and understand naively in Popperian manner is extremely difficult , simply because human eyes are tuned to macro-sized objects governed by classical mechanics of Newton and are not made for observing elementary particles ruled by quantum mechanics. But, there is a complex approach of zooming down to study neutrino to really know what neutrino is and getting an inspiration from such experimental particle physics laboratory , one too could think of after analyzing the language usage in space and time , socio-cultural contexts i,e. functional perspective besides going through evolutionary features in phylogenetic perspective , genetic and environmental factors in ontogenetic perspective , psychological or physiological factors in mechanistic perspective , or minds being emergent properties of brains , one could also go for cognitive neuroscience in trying to find out what language is. It could also be exciting to use modern physics to study language . But , the larger issue is, which method is to be used or which approach is to be applied or whether the application of the complex fields of study if applied could produce some better result or not and this last notion of complex analysis of combined existing disciplines perhaps carries an underlying unity which is fundamental for unification , is possibly the best fit approach to unlock the quest – what language is. Darwin's evolutionary theory which led to his acceptance of continuity thesis of showing the evolution of human species had gone against the discontinuity thesis of Descartes who propounded the mind-body dualism and the notion of human being only has rational mind. Later, Darwin's science has been treated as pseudo science by his predecessors in the field of evolutionary biology. There are philosophers who have been debating following the traditional line of Internalist and Externalist debate for language in the form of modern philosophers such as Noam Chomsky for Internalist approach and philosophers like Quine , Davidson and Wittgenstein for Externalist approach. The aim here is to understand the unique features of language which are specific to human only and in doing so, the notion of Chomsky which is scientific and based on the developments of modern physics , chemistry and biology besides his urge for searching the unification process of disciplines like cognitive psychology , neurobiology , genetics and linguistics or bio-linguistics ,etc. which are required in understanding language, needs to discussed as his standpoint rests on the results of updated modern science based on empirical data. Human language if one goes back to proto-language ( the fictitious language used by protohuman or direct ancestor of human before human language in evolutionary line ) is unique but when looked closely, its uniqueness is so complex to be found but when looked grossly in a superficial manner, ordinarily , it is considered to be unique from other animals or non-human beings but when observed empirically, it has been found that there are so many similarities in terms of DNA and genetic code with other nearer animals in evolutionary line besides having some functional organs responsible for human speech and language in other animals like birds 5 but do not function like human's organs. Thus, despite such similarities, an attempt to find a set of unique features or a unique feature is so complex and for that, simply , the notion of recurring could not be used but there is a requirement of finding the least elements of the set which is going to make up the faculty of human language possible and to do that , that smallest unique region which Chomsky calls as Minimalist Program needs to be identified and cornered by applying Cartesian criterion or conceptually the notion of mind-body dualism which here means, finding out that unique part or region or portion which is unique and specific to human only. After the application of Cartesian criterion, Duhem-Quine thesis is required as it is impossible to test a scientific hypothesis in isolation. This test is required to expand the understanding of language per se which needs a scientific validation and approval. Thus , the search for the minimal region of language which is specific and unique to human is the need for the Minimalist Program of Chomsky and the possibility of such search is bound to be found if Chomsky's dream of unification process becomes successful and hence, the unified theory of language could be the hope . Conclusion The question of , what language per se which is specific and unique to human is, is not only going to understand mind of human per se but also, is going to unlock the mystery of missing link between homo-sapiens and other nearest relatives of human in its evolutionary line, and also is making an attempt to understand the languages of non-human species and other beings too. Thus, the hard core walled of body-mind dualism or Descartes' notion of mind being only unique to man could be challenged if mind becomes attributable to any species using language is found empirically but again, unless the question of what mind per se is, is known, such proclamation is bound to be so complex. References  Chomsky, N. (2002). On nature and language. Ch.2 & 3. Cambridge University Press.  Chomsky, N. (2005). Rules and representations. Ch.1 & 5. Columbia University Press.  Mukherji, N. (2010).The primacy of grammar. Ch.1. MIT Press.

The paper was presented at the 2018 conference "Analytic Theology and the Tri-Personal God: the Trinitarian Renewal in Analytic Tradition" at Université catholique de Louvain Publication is forthcoming in a volume in Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium What Exactly Are the Intra-Trinitarian Relations? I. WHAT IS A TRINITARIAN MODEL? In his Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, Thomas McCall claims that analytic theology should be a "retrieval theology" – that it should examine and critically engage various theological proposals from Christian tradition. McCall insists that such a retrieval is especially wanted in the contemporary analytic discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity, which have been "fairly loose" in their use of the tradition 1 . It is true that the majority of analytic debates over social vs. Latin models of the Trinity are quite independent from theological heritage of the Early and Medieval Church. Very few contemporary philosophers have used arguments from the tradition in their own reasoning about the Trinity. Even those who have incorporated some of the historical material into their theories usually treat the tradition uncritically, either as a convenient example of a kindred spirit in the past, or as an authoritative point of reference. McCall's ideal of the retrieval theology requires critical examination of the traditional Trinitarian models. Such a retrieval of the historical models is a promising area of research in itself, and it would be of great value for the contemporary analytic debates about models of the Trinity. If we are to embark on a quest to retrieve the traditional Trinitarian models, what exactly should we be looking for? What is a Trinitarian model? I take it that the minimal requirements for a conception to qualify as a Trinitarian model consist of addressing the following questions: 1. What are "the three" in the Trinity, and what is "one" about them? The very idea of the "Tri-nity" implies that there are things to count, things of the same ilk; so the question is, what are those entities that we count ending up with the number 3? And what is this entity that we count as one in connection with those three? 2. How is there unity in plurality, and plurality in unity? In other words, what is responsible, or what accounts for the three being one, and what accounts for the one being three? To my knowledge, this is the question which contemporary analytic Trinitarian theology finds to 1 T.H. MCCALL, An Invitation to Analytic Christian Theology, Downers Grove, IL, InterVarsity Press, 2015, pp. 85-87. 2 be most appealing, since the majority of the debates are about some proper mixture of unity and plurality. 3. How each of the three is distinguished from the others? Answering this question is necessary for a Trinitarian model to be exhaustive. Unfortunately, most of the contemporary analytic models of the Trinity do not even attempt addressing it. As I see it, this is a major deficiency of the contemporary models, and this is where the retrieval of the traditional models could be of great value. I guess, I should have added yet another question: Why is the number 3 not accidental to the Trinity? But that would be unfair. There are so few models that address this question, not only in our time but also in the tradition, that adding this requirement would be too much of a burden. So, if we want to retrieve different Trinitarian models from the tradition, we should look there for answers to those three questions. What are those traditional answers? 1. As for the first question, there is only one orthodox answer. Initially, there was a variety of opinions, but the synod of Alexandria in 362 A.D. validated only one conventional formula: that which is one in the Godhead is essence, and those which are three are hypostases, or persons. 2. There is also a remarkable unanimity among the Church fathers in their answers to the second question: the foundation of unity is the divine essence, and the foundation of plurality are the intra-Trinitarian relations. Why relations? In the early 3 rd century Christian theologians came up with the idea that the names "Father" and "Son" indicate relations, and relations indicate plurality 2 . But the real breakthrough occurred somewhere in the middle of the 4 th century. In the thick of the debates with the followers of Arius, some pro-Nicene theologians happily stumbled upon a convenient philosophical idea: the Aristotelian category of relation is the only category that is not predicated to the essence. This maneuver was immediately taken up and transformed into an argument against the Arians. While the Arians argued that any plurality endangers the unity of the divine essence, the pro-Nicene theologians answered that since relation says nothing about the essence, then the relative distinctions in the Godhead do not violate the unity of the divine essence; therefore the distinctions in the Trinity must be according to the category of 2 L. TURCESCU, Gregory of Nyssa and the Concept of Divine Persons, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 81; L. AYRES, Nicaea and its Legacy. An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 43, 201-202. 3 relation. From then onward it became the standard way of treating plurality in the Godhead in Catholic theology 3 . 3. At this point, however, the patristic consensus has reached its end. There was no unanimity about a proper way of distinguishing the divine persons. While the Church fathers agreed that we should somehow apply relations to the distinctions in the Trinity, they did not have the same understanding of what the intra-Trinitarian relations really are. Unlike the widespread Aristotelian and Stoic lists of categories, which involved a category of relation, there was no conventional metaphysical theory of relations at the time. Different theologians came up with different ideas about the nature of relations, and that resulted in different ways of distinguishing one divine person from another. The only patristic consensus here was about the general rule that the distinction between the persons must be described according to their relations, but how one should interpret that rule was a matter of individual metaphysical preferences. II. HOW TO RETRIEVE A TRINITARIAN MODEL? Since the answers to the first two questions from our list are standard and well-known, our quest for patristic Trinitarian models should be focused only on the third one. We should also keep in mind that the only distinction between the persons that was approved by the Church Fathers is the difference in their mutual relations. Therefore, we have to narrow down our question for the patristic writers. Formulated in a more technical way, our main question (henceforth: "our main question") should look like this: "What is the relational internal structure of the Godhead, and how does it allow identifying the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?" 4 . Looking for answers to our main question in the patristic writings would be more efficient if we could equip ourselves with up-to-date tools of analytic metaphysics. Unfortunately, as in the patristic era, the contemporary metaphysics of relations is "still in its infancy" 5 . Nevertheless, in spite of its infancy, it is already capable of providing some apparatus for the analysis of the patristic relational models. I suggest using the taxonomy of relations that is widely applied in mathematics and analytic philosophy. We will need such categories as the degree of relations, the symmetry, and the externality. 3 AYRES, Nicaea, (n. 2), p. 201; C.A. BEELEY, Gregory of Nazianzus on the Trinity and the Knowledge of God, New York, NY, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 161, 208, 312. 4 I borrow the phrase "internal structure of the Godhead" from Tertullian's concept of dispensatio, or οἰκονομία in the One God (Adv. Prax. 2.1). 5 P. SIMONS, Relations and Truthmaking, in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (2010), 199-213, p. 199. 4 The degree of relation (also known as adicity or arity) is the number of things that are involved in the relation. Thus, a "two-place" relation (a.k.a. dyadic or binary) has the degree of 2, a "three-place" relation (triadic or ternary) has the degree of 3, and so on. If the relation has a definite degree (for example, it is always binary, or always ternary), then it is a unigrade relation. If it does not have a definite degree, i.e. it can be either binary, or ternary, or something else, it is called a multigrade relation. We will also use a distinction between symmetric and asymmetric relations. By definition, if x has a symmetric relation to y, then y has the same relation to x. And, by definition, if x has an asymmetric relation to y, then y does not have that same relation to x. Finally, we will need the distinction between external and internal relations. This distinction is not entirely clear and there are ongoing debates about its proper criteria 6 . Nevertheless, the basic idea is that a relation is internal if it is necessitated by the intrinsic properties of the related objects, otherwise it is external. Having equipped ourselves with this taxonomy of relations, we are ready to proceed with our quest for retrieval of traditional Trinitarian models. Due to the limits of this paper I will mention only a few models – those of Basil, Gregory Nazianzen, and Boethius. In addition I will examine a medieval attempt to combine the patristic ideas – the Trinitarian model of Aquinas. III. PATRISTIC TRINITARIAN MODELS 1. Pre-Cappadocian Trinitarian relations The earliest complete answers to our main question in the history of Christian theology are given by the Great Cappadocians, namely, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory Nazianzen, and Gregory of Nyssa. But before we proceed to their relational Trinitarian models, we should take a quick look at the earlier tradition. From the time of Tertullian and Origen 7 , there was a persistent theological line of reasoning that the name "Father" indicates that there is an eternal relation of fatherhood in God, and that, in turn, implies that there must be an eternal relation of sonship in God, which does not belong to the Father. This was not, however, a complete Trinitarian model, because the pre-Cappadocian theology did not address relations with the Holy Spirit. Since it fails to identify the third person of the Trinity, it does not provide a satisfactory answer to our main question. The incomplete model includes only two relations – fatherhood and sonship, which are binary, asymmetric, and internal (Figure 1). 6 Ibid., pp. 203-206. 7 TERTULLIAN, Adv. Prax. 4.4; ORIGEN, De Princ. I.2.2-3. See also AYRES, Nicaea, (n. 2), p. 22, BEELEY, Gregory, (n. 3), p. 312, n. 245. 5 Persons: F = Father, S = Son, HS = Holy Spirit. Relations: R1 = "fatherhood", R2 = "sonship". Figure 1. Pre-Cappadocian relational model Why bring it up if this was not yet an exhaustive model? There are two reasons for that. First, it was a meaningful step towards later fully developed relational models, and it would be worthwhile to compare this early idea with its future developments. The second reason has to do with the fact that the later Church fathers considered this reasoning to be a part of their authoritative tradition. They would often reproduce this discourse even if their own treatment of Trinitarian relations was quite different. In other words, not every statement which comes from the mouth of a Church father is an integral part of his own characteristic doctrine. And we have to be aware of those extraneous elements while retrieving original Trinitarian models. 2. Basil of Caesarea The first complete Trinitarian model comes from Basil of Caesarea. His writings on the Trinity are not entirely consistent, and his ideas are vulnerable to many criticisms; nevertheless, Basil provides the necessary elements of an exhaustive Trinitarian model. Before introducing his own ideas, Basil repeats the traditional discourse about the names "Father" and "Son" that indicate mutual relations 8 . Afterwards, he claims that divine persons can be distinguished by their peculiar properties (ἰδιώματα) – "fatherhood", "sonship", and "sanctifying power" 9 . Since those properties are distinctive for the persons, they must be relations (Figure 2). Relations: R1 = "fatherhood", R2 = "sonship", R3 = "sanctifying power". Figure 2. Trinitarian model of Basil of Caesarea 8 BASIL, Adv. Eun. II, 22. 9 BASIL, Ep. 214.4. 6 Basil's Trinitarian relations differ from the traditional ones. While his predecessors taught that "fatherhood" is that which distinguishes the Father from the Son, Basil's idea implies that "fatherhood" is not a mutual relation, but it is simply a property which defines the Father. In other words, for the predecessors, "fatherhood" was a binary relation, but in Basil's model it becomes unary. Thus, Basil's model can be described as containing three different unary relations, and each of the three relations pertains to only one of the divine persons. As for their symmetry and externality, unary relations are, obviously, internal, and symmetry does not apply to them. 3. Gregory Nazianzen The next model we will address belongs to Basil's younger friend, Gregory Nazianzen. It would be misleading to assume that the Cappadocians must have a common Trinitarian theology 10 . Gregory's model and his relational terminology are unique 11 . It is not easy, however, to extract his original model from his writings. While talking about the Father and the Son, he does not hesitate to repeat and even build upon the traditional binary fatherhood/sonship approach. Moreover, he also pays his respects to his senior friend's idea of personal distinctive properties, simply changing Basil's terminology of unary "fatherhood, sonship, sanctifying power" into "ungenerated, generated, proceeding". It is only when he addresses our main question, i.e. attempts to identify each of the three persons (especially the Holy Spirit), we can see his own original ideas. Gregory introduces two Trinitarian relations – "generation" for the Father and the Son, and "procession" for the Father and the Spirit (Figure 3). Relations: R1 = "generation", R2 = "procession". Figure 3. Trinitarian model of Gregory Nazianzen 10 I agree with Andrew Radde-Gallwitz that Gregory Nazianzen has significantly different Trinitarian views from the two brothers – Basil and Gregory of Nyssa (A. RADDE-GALLWITZ, Basil of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009. p.87, n.1). I disagree with him, however, that the two brothers are "sufficiently like-minded", because their Trinitarian models have nothing in common. While Basil builds his Trinity upon three different unary relations, Gregory of Nyssa suffices with only one multigrade symmetric external relation of "communion" (TURCESCU, Gregory, (n. 2), pp. 58, 59, 117). 11 For Nazianzen, the technical term σχέσις, which generally denoted "relation" in Stoic and later Aristotelian philosophy, pre-Cappadocian theologians, and the other two Cappadocians, surprisingly has a different meaning of mutual disposition or position in a relational scheme (P. BUTAKOV, Dispositions and Relations in Gregory Nazianzen [in Russian], in Schole. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 9 (2015), no. 2, 363-372). 7 For his predecessors, a relation pertains to only one of the persons; but for Gregory, relations pertain to pairs of persons 12 . Thus, the Spirit is identified as the one who does not participate in "generation", and the Son is the one who is not in "procession". This relational model is complete and fully functional, and it successfully answers our main question. It consists of two different binary relations, which are symmetric and external. 4. Boethius Our next model is of the Western origin. It has its roots in Augustine 13 , and it was brought to completion by Boethius. Boethius claims that there is only one relation that obtains in the simple divine essence, and that is the relation of identity or sameness. But, strangely enough, this relation of identity is not symmetric – it is directed from the Father to the Son, and from both of them to the Holy Spirit (see Figure 4) 14 . Relation R = "identity" (or "procession"). Figure 4. Trinitarian model of Boethius Boethius allows likening this relation of identity to the creedal term "procession". The Son proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son 15 . This elegant solution allows answering our main question: he, who the relation is from, is the Father; he, who the relation is to and from, is the Son; he, who the relation is to, is the Holy Spirit. Thus, Boethius manages to produce an exhaustive Trinitarian model by utilizing only one relation, which is multigrade, asymmetric, and internal. Let us stop here for a moment and compare the three Trinitarian models (Figure 5). It is obvious that they are completely different and incompatible. Each one of them has its own set of 12 Gregory's peculiar approach to relations as referring to pairs of persons becomes obvious when he says that "Father" is the name of the "mutual disposition and relation of the Father to the Son or of the Son to the Father" (Or. 29.16). I provide a more substantiated account of Gregory's Trinitarian model in P. BUTAKOV, Relations in the Trinitarian Reality: Two Approaches, in Schole. Ancient Philosophy and the Classical Tradition 8 (2014), no. 2, 505-519, pp. 507-509. 13 AUGUSTINE, De Trinitate, books V, VII (e.g. V.5.6, VII.1.2). While being considered as typically Western, Augustine can also be seen as a successor of the Trinitarian ideas of Gregory of Nyssa (AYRES, Nicaea, (n. 2), p. 366). 14 BOETHIUS, De Trinitate, 6.20-22. 15 Ibid., 5.46-48. 8 relations, uses different types of relations, and identifies the divine persons in its own unique way. Each one of them, however, is an exhaustive and viable model, and each one conforms to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity. Author Number of relations Degree of relations Symmetry Externality Basil of Caesarea 3 1 n/a internal Gregory Nazianzen 2 2 symmetric external Boethius 1 multigrade asymmetric internal Figure 5. Patristic Trinitarian relations Will it be worthwhile to bring them all together, as if they were just fragments of a greater picture? Should we consolidate them into one extensive Trinitarian model? I am certain that we ought not to do that. Each of them already is a complete picture and does not require any enhancement. There was, however, a theologian who attempted to produce an all-embracing Trinitarian model – St. Thomas Aquinas. 5. Thomas Aquinas The model of Aquinas is a complex arrangement of several types of Trinitarian relations (see Figure 6). Subsistent relations: R1 = "fatherhood", R2 = "sonship", R3 = "procession". Relations of origin: opposite: R4 = "fatherhood", R5 = "sonship"; non-opposite: R6 = "spiration", R7 = "procession". Figure 6. Trinitarian model of Thomas Aquinas The first type is the subsistent relations 16 : fatherhood, sonship, and procession 17 . The three subsistent relations are the personal properties, which constitute the divine persons. These three relations are unary, and they function in the same way as Basil's relations: each divine person is identified with a certain relation. In addition to the subsistent relations, Aquinas introduces 16 AQUINAS, Summa Theologiae, I, 29, 4. 17 Ibid., I, 30, 2, ad 1. 9 another type – relations of origin 18 . There are four of them: fatherhood, sonship, spiration, and procession. Moreover, there is a further subdivision: two of the four relations of origin – fatherhood and sonship – are opposite relations, and two – spiration and procession – are not, because spiration belongs not to one, but to two persons – the Father and the Son 19 . Fatherhood and sonship are similar to the pre-Cappadocian relations, spiration resembles the procession of the Spirit in the model of Boethius, and the division of the relations of origin into two types – towards the Son, and towards the Spirit – follows the idea of Gregory. Aquinas claims that the persons can be distinguished only through opposite relations of origin 20 . Thus, the Father and the Son are distinguished through the opposite relations of fatherhood and sonship. It is not entirely clear, however, how Aquinas's model identifies the person of the Holy Spirit, since there is no opposite relation of origin for the Spirit's procession. All of the relations of origin are asymmetric and internal, while the opposite ones are binary, and the non-opposite are ternary. Type of relations Number of relations Degree of relations Symmetry Externality Subsistent relations 3 1 n/a internal Opposite relations of origin 2 2 asymmetric internal Non-opposite relations of origin 2 3 asymmetric internal Figure 7. Trinitarian relations in the model of Aquinas The combined model of Aquinas was hardly a success. Apparently, it has no advantage over the models of his predecessors and does not allow achieving more than they already did. It is cumbersome, excessively complex, and it still fails to properly distinguish the person of the Holy Spirit. It utilizes seven different relations of three different types (see Figure 7), which does not sit well with Aquinas's ideal of divine simplicity. I do not imply that one could do a better job of combining the traditional models – I believe that they are mutually exclusive, and the very project of their unification is doomed to failure. 18 Ibid., I, 28, 4. 19 Ibid., I, 30, 2. 20 Ibid. 10 IV. A BONUS: THE FILIOQUE Instead of trying to mix the incompatible ingredients together, I suggest dealing with the traditional models as they are. We should remember, however, that those models are not the sacred doctrine. Albeit being authoritative, they are, nevertheless, negotiable metaphysical theories. If we want to retrieve those traditional models for our contemporary needs, we ought to examine and critically evaluate them, preferably by using the tools provided by analytic philosophy 21 . I hope that this approach has the potential for going beyond the confines of armchair philosophy into the area of systematic theology. For example, it can offer a new solution to the embarrassing problem of the filioque 22 . A closer look at the relational language of the Eastern and Western Trinitarian theologies shows that the fight over the filioque, at its core, is an opposition between metaphysical models. The Western church generally follows the model of Boethius. In that model there is only one relation in the Trinity – the relation of procession, which is from the Father to the Son, and from both of them to the Holy Spirit. In order for the Western Trinitarian model to be functional, there has to be the relation of the Son to the Spirit, otherwise the two persons would be indistinguishable (see Figure 8). Thus, within the framework of the Boethius's model, the Spirit must proceed from the Father and the Son. Figure 8. The filioque in the Western model 21 Such an analysis, for example, is made by John Lamont, who, using the tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics, reveals incoherence in Aquinas's concept of subsistent relations (J. LAMONT, Aquinas on Subsistent Relation, in Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie Médiévales 71 (2004), no. 2, 260-279). Also elsewhere I question the tenability of introduction of external relations into the Godhead by Gregory Nazianzen (BUTAKOV, Relations, (n. 12), pp. 509, 512). 22 I do not suggest that in order to overcome the division over the filioque we should invent yet another relational model à la Nikk Effingham's latest Trinity in N. EFFINGHAM, The Philosophy of Filioque, in Religious Studies 54 (2018), no. 3, 297-312. We should rather sort out the mess that is already on our hands. 11 The Eastern theology operates within the framework of Gregory Nazianzen's model 23 . This model has two different Trinitarian relations – "generation", which is between the Father and the Son, and "procession", which is between the Father and the Holy Spirit. If one would add an additional "procession" between the Son and the Spirit, then the model would fail to distinguish between the Father and the Son (see Figure 9). Therefore, within the Nazianzen's relational model, the Spirit must proceed only from the Father. Figure 9. The filioque in the Eastern model The relation of procession of the Spirit from the Son – the filioque – neither should be forced into the Eastern model, nor should be taken away from the Western model. The Western "procession" is nothing like the Eastern "procession". For the West, "procession" is the name of the only relation in the Trinity, which is multigrade, asymmetric, and internal. For the East, "procession" designates one of the two Trinitarian relations; it is binary, symmetric, and external. Arguing about the filioque without acknowledging the difference in the meaning of "procession" is simply talking past each other. Instead, analytic theologians of the East and the West ought to address the source of the disagreement – their metaphysical models, with unwavering open-mindedness and humility. 23 It was Gregory Nazianzen, and not the other two Cappadocians, who became the definitive theologian for the Eastern church (hence, his title: "Gregory the Theologian"). "Byzantine Christianity, in a real sense, was Gregory's mind-child and masterpiece" (J.A. MCGUCKIN, St. Gregory of Nazianzus: an intellectual biography. Crestwood, NY, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2001, p. xxiv). The great systematician of Eastern theology John of Damascus in his magnum opus teaches about the Trinity following the model of Gregory Nazianzen (DAMASCENE, De Fid. Orth., I.8).

v minulosti a je nucen vymezovat svá preferovaná témata stále strategičtěji s ohledem na podporu jeho strategických výzkumných zájmů jak ze strany svých členů, tak ze strany UNESCO, soustřeďuje stále více svou podporu mezinárodní výzkumné mobilitě, setkávání mladých vědců, organizací workshopů a výzkumných pobytů. Klíčovými tématy se dnes stávají – nebo ze starší agendy přetrvávají – otázky produkce vědění, otázky životního prostředí, otázky nerovností a spravedlnosti, otázky chudoby a nedostatku či otázky rizik. Tématem World Social Science Forum byla sociální transformace a digitální média. Způsob uchopení tohoto tématu byl velice rozmanitý: panelů a sekcí bylo několik desítek, řečníků a účastníků mnoho. Diskutovala se role a proměny sociálních hnutí, obecně otázka proměn společnosti a konkrétněji vzestup digitálních médií a jejich vliv na občanskou participaci. Důležitou otázkou byla také proměna samotných sociálních věd, možností a limitů interdisciplinárního zkoumání, konkrétních dopadů na produkci vědění, organizaci vědecké práce, otevřenosti i regulaci přístupu k informacím. Celkově vzato Forum představilo, jak si „v praxi" (v konkrétní podobě tohoto setkání) stojí koncept mezinárodní (nebo, jak bylo často slyšet, „globální") interdisciplinární sociální vědy, jaký je jeho příslib a možná úskalí jak ve vztahu k jednotlivým oborovým sociálním vědám zasazeným v rámci jednotlivých národních tradic, tak ve vztahu k širší veřejnosti a otázkám veřejné relevance sociálněvědního poznání. ///// recenze ///////////////// Kuhnovské paradigma pro sou!asnou " loso" i v#dy K. Brad WRAY, Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2011, xiv + 229 s. Libor Benda * omas Kuhn patří mezi klíčové představitele + loso+ e a historie vědy 20. století, a to zejména díky své Struktu!e v"deck#ch revolucí, která ve vývoji tohoto oboru zanechala nesmazatelnou stopu. Není proto s podivem, že jeho pojetí vědy, pro něž ve jmenovaném díle položil základy, byla věnována již celá řada odborných publikací, ať už se jednalo o pouhé přehledové práce, anebo naopak o takové, které se Kuhnovo pojetí vědy snažily dále kriticky rozvíjet. Monogra+ e K. Brada Wraye s názvem Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology, která vyšla krátce před padesátiletým výročím prvního vydání miscelanea 471 Kuhnovy Struktury a která, jak napovídá její název, představuje další přírůstek mezi pracemi věnovanými dílu jmenovaného autora, náleží do obou těchto kategorií. Oba dva autorské záměry se v ní totiž svébytným způsobem propojují. V úvodu své knihy Wray připomíná, že Kuhnova Struktura v!deck"ch revolucí byla sama skutečně „revoluční" prací, neboť se zásadním způsobem vymezovala proti dosavadní pozitivistické a popperovské tradici * loso* e vědy, a to hned v několika ohledech. Těmi klíčovými prvky Kuhnova nového pojetí vědy a vědeckého vývoje bylo odmítnutí kumulativismu (na základě nově zavedeného konceptu „nesouměřitelnosti"), odmítnutí ideálu „vědecké metody" a zdůraznění sociální dimenze vědeckého výzkumu (tzn. činitelem vědeckého vývoje je podle Kuhna vědecké společenství, nikoli individuální vědec). Jak známo, proti Kuhnovu pojetí vědy předloženému ve Struktu#e se mezi * losofy vědy zvedla vlna silné kritiky (vzpomeňme si jen na slavnou londýnskou konferenci z roku 1965), která směřovala nejen na jeho nejasné vymezení pojmu „paradigma", ale zejména na jeho pojetí „normální vědy" jako činnosti, jejímž určujícím prvkem je dogmatismus, nikoli kritické myšlení, přičemž totéž pak platí i pro jeho výklad vědeckého výcviku. Jak uvádí Wray, „pro mnohé se ukázalo být velmi obtížné sladit Kuhnovo vyobrazení vědy s jeho akceptovaným pojetím jako kritického zkoumání nepřátelského vůči dogmatismu a řízeného zdravě skeptickým smýšlením" (s. 3). Svůj podíl na tom měla dle jeho názoru i skutečnost, že ke Kuhnovu dílu se zhruba od poloviny sedmdesátých let začali otevřeně hlásit představitelé nově vzniklé sociologie vědeckého poznání, která se ještě ostřeji vymezovala proti * loso* i vědy a svoji pozornost zaměřovala právě na ty aspekty vědeckého výzkumu, jež byly z hlediska * loso* e vědy (avšak dodejme, že nikoli z hlediska samotné sociologie vědeckého poznání) pokládány za iracionální. Sociologie vědeckého poznání tak byla od svého vzniku vystavena důrazné kritice ze strany * losofů vědy, kteří ji označovali za zcela zavádějící a hluboce pomýlenou, a jelikož byla mnohými pokládána za pouhé domyšlení důsledků vyplývajících ze Struktury, Kuhnovo pojetí vědy, jak poznamenává Wray, do značné míry postihl stejný osud. V reakci na kritiku, jež proti němu byla vznesena, se Kuhn ve svých nadcházejících pracích snažil své pojetí vědy a vědeckého vývoje zpřesnit a jasněji vymezit, aby tak vyvrátil mnohá nařčení, kterým musel čelit, ale jejichž příčinu přitom nespatřoval v ničem jiném než v nepochopení svého vlastního postoje. V průběhu tohoto zpřesňování a vyjasňování ve svém miscellanea 472 pojetí vědy zároveň provedl několik dílčích úprav, které mají podle Wraye pro adekvátní porozumění Kuhnovu pohledu na vědu zcela zásadní význam, navzdory tomu jim však Kuhnovi kritici a komentátoři dosud nevěnovali téměř žádnou pozornost, což pokládá za velmi nešťastné. Jak Wray sám uvádí, „zdá se, že * losofové vědy se do značné míry spokojili s přijetím existence jakési standardní kuhnovské pozice, která představuje určitou hrozbu, ale v konečném důsledku je neudržitelná, a vymezují vůči ní své vlastní pozice" (s. 4). Kuhnovo pojetí vědy je tak dnes podle Wraye převážně vnímáno jako vyčerpané, kterému náleží určitý historický význam, ale které nemá současné * loso* i vědy již co nabídnout. S tímto postojem Wray hluboce nesouhlasí a záměrem jeho knihy není nic jiného než ukázat, že právě opak je pravdou. K tomu je podle Wraye potřeba věnovat pečlivou pozornost Kuhnovým pozdějším pracím, zejména těm shromážděným ve výboru ! e Road since Structure, jejichž klíčový význam v kontextu Kuhnovy * loso* e vědy byl ovšem dodnes spíše přehlížen. Výchozím bodem jeho snažení je tak analýza vývoje, kterým Kuhnovo pojetí vědy prošlo od prvního vydání Struktury, a rekonstrukce jeho „rozvinutého" pojetí na základě Kuhnových pozdních prací, které se v některých ohledech zásadním způsobem odlišuje od pojetí původního.1 Wray se přitom ovšem nechce spokojit s pouhým tvrzením, že toto Kuhnovo „rozvinuté" pojetí vědy nabízí současným * losofům vědy řadu dosud nevyužitých – avšak inspirativních – podnětů, jejichž zohlednění by pro ně v jejich úsilí mohlo být přínosné: jeho záměr sahá daleko hlouběji. Podle Wrayova mínění je Kuhnova * loso* e vědy v dosavadním vývoji celého oboru zcela výjimečná v tom smyslu, že se v jejím přístupu k analýze vědeckého vývoje propojuje speci* cká evolu"ní perspektiva s perspektivou sociální. Wrayovým druhým, hlavním záměrem je tak na základě podrobného rozboru těchto charakteristických aspektů Kuhnovy * loso* e vědy ukázat, že právě tyto dva aspekty jsou klíčové pro vybudování jakékoli adekvátní * loso* e vědy a že Kuhnovo pojetí vědy ve své rozvinuté podobě může ve snaze o vybudování takové * loso* e vědy posloužit jako nejlepší možný výchozí bod. Kniha je rozdělena do tří relativně samostatných částí o čtyřech 1 Autor v knize rozlišuje mezi Kuhnovým „standardním" pojetím vědy, které se opírá primárně o Strukturu v#deck$ch revolucí, a „rozvinutým" pojetím, které zohledňuje veškerá zpřesnění, změny a úpravy obsažené v Kuhnových pracích publikovaných po Struktu%e. Nebude-li v textu uvedeno jinak, budu mít Kuhnovým pojetím vědy nadále na mysli vždy jeho rozvinuté pojetí, které je ústředním tématem recenzované knihy. miscelanea 473 kapitolách. V první části zaměřuje Wray svoje úsilí na analýzu vývoje, který Kuhnovo pojetí vědy prodělalo, a na výklad a obhajobu jeho pozdního, rozvinutého pojetí, vycházejícího z Kuhnových pozdějších prací publikovaných po Struktu!e. Jak napovídá název této části, jenž zní „Revolutions, paradigms and incommensurability", podle Wraye prošly důležitými změnami konkrétně tři klíčové koncepty Kuhnovy ) loso) e vědy, a to „vědecká revoluce", „paradigma" a „nesouměřitelnost". V příslušných kapitolách této části Wray postupuje v zásadě tak, že vždy nejprve představí standardní pojetí jednotlivých konceptů vycházející primárně ze Struktury v"deck#ch revolucí, které posléze konfrontuje s rozličnými kritickými argumenty, jež proti těmto konceptům byly vzneseny a na jejichž základě byla – a dle Wraye mnohými autory dodnes je – zpochybňována jejich relevance pro ) loso) i vědy. Wray s těmito argumenty zprvu nikterak nepolemizuje, namísto toho se však snaží ukázat, že jsou založeny na takovém výkladu jednotlivých konceptů, který naprosto nere+ ektuje jejich modi) kace a zpřesnění v Kuhnových pozdějších pracích, a jako takové tedy nejsou zcela průkazné – k tomu by musely obstát i tváří v tvář Kuhnovu rozvinutému pojetí jednotlivých konceptů. Značnou část jednotlivých kapitol této části tak Wray následně věnuje právě výkladu změn, k nimž v případech jednotlivých konceptů v průběhu let došlo, a ucelenému vymezení jejich „rozvinutých" pojetí: v případě vědeckých revolucí je klíčovou změnou přechod od jejich chápání jako „nahrazení stávajícího paradigmatu jiným, nesouměřitelným paradigmatem" k jejich chápání jako „nahrazení stávajícího jazykového rámce jiným, nesouměřitelným jazykovým rámcem"; co se týče paradigmat, tak je to přechod od jejich poněkud vágního vymezení k jejich jednoznačnému ztotožnění se „vzorovými příklady"; a v případě nesouměřitelnosti je zde upozorněno na posun od jejího rovněž poněkud vágního vymezení k jednoznačnému rozlišení několika speci) ckých druhů nesouměřitelnosti. Wray následně testuje validitu jednotlivých kritických argumentů v jejich konfrontaci s těmito rozvinutými, přesněji vymezenými pojetími jednotlivých konceptů, a jak se snaží ukázat, tyto argumenty v tomto případě selhávají. Smyslem celé této části je tak jaksi „aktualizovat" čtení a výklad Kuhnovy ) loso- ) e vědy, a vyvrátit tak některé zažité a dnes již v podstatě nekriticky přijímané „kritické" argumenty proti Kuhnově ) loso) i vědy, které, jak se Wray snaží ukázat, jsou sice legitimními námitkami proti určitému standardizovanému, konvenčnímu výkladu Kuhnovy ) loso) e vědy, ale miscellanea 474 nedokáží obstát při konfrontaci s jejím rozvinutým pojetím. Tím chce Wray poukázat jednak na klíčový význam Kuhnových pozdějších prací, které je v zájmu adekvátního porozumění Kuhnově ( loso( i vědy nutno re) ektovat, a jednak na skutečnost, že toto rozvinuté pojetí stojí na pevných, dosud nevyvrácených základech, a Kuhnova ( loso( e vědy tedy není jakýmsi dnes již překonaným historickým reliktem, nýbrž jako celek je stále aktuální. Ve druhé části, která nese název „Kuhn's evolutionary epistemology", Wray zaměřuje svoji pozornost na jeden ze dvou klíčových aspektů Kuhnovy ( loso( e vědy, a to na její evolu!ní aspekt. Jeho správné pochopení je dle Wraye zcela nezbytné k adekvátnímu porozumění Kuhnovu pojetí vědy, navzdory tomu je však evoluční aspekt Kuhnovy epistemologie dodnes do značné míry opomíjen či dezinterpretován a často zcela ignorován. V úvodu k této části se tak Wray nejprve táže, proč tomu tak je, přičemž vysvětlení nachází v existenci množství různých a diametrálně odlišných projektů, které nesou označení „evoluční epistemologie" (jako nejznámější příklady autor uvádí Popperovo či Toulminovo pojetí, ale zmiňuje i další), v důsledku čehož ustupují speci( cké rozdíly mezi nimi do pozadí. Jeho počáteční úsilí je tedy směřováno nejprve ke stručné charakteristice „evolučnosti" těchto jednotlivých projektů, a posléze k nastínění některých obecných rysů, jimiž se Kuhnovo evoluční pojetí vědy od těch ostatních v tomto ohledu odlišuje. V jednotlivých kapitolách této části pak Wray analyzuje evoluční aspekt Kuhnovy ( loso( e vědy podrobněji. První z těchto kapitol je věnována Kuhnovu přechodu od jeho původního „historického obratu" ve ( loso( i vědy k tomu, co Wray označuje jako „historickou" nebo „vývojovou perspektivu", a která je podle něj jádrem Kuhnova evolučního pojetí vědy. Zatímco historický obrat ve ( loso( i vědy, který je, jak známo, spojován právě s publikací Struktury v"deck#ch revolucí, spočíval v Kuhnově novém pohledu na dějiny vědy jako na zásobárnu dat, jichž lze využít k budování adekvátní ( loso( e vědy a k testování hypotéz ohledně povahy vědy a jejího vývoje, Kuhnův pozdější obrat k „historické perspektivě" spočívá dle Wraye ve využití dějin vědy ke změně celkového náhledu na vědecký vývoj, a to ve třech ohledech: 1) věda je z této perspektivy nahlížena jako probíhající proces, nikoli jako statický soubor přesvědčení; 2) vědci proto vždy pracují v rámci určité tradice a východiskem jejich zkoumání je soubor přesvědčení zděděný po jejich předchůdcích; 3) zájem vědců je soustředěn nikoli na hodnocení p$esv"d!ení, ale na hodnocení zm"n miscelanea 475 přesvědčení. Na třetí z těchto bodů pak navazuje další kapitola, která je věnována roli pravdy v Kuhnově ' loso' i vědy a jeho pojetí vědeckého vývoje jako otevřeného procesu, který nesměřuje k nějakému konečnému, předem stanovenému cíli. Wray zde před rozličnými kritickými argumenty obhajuje Kuhnovo evoluční pojetí vědeckého vývoje a jeho odmítnutí korespondenční teorie pravdy a konvergentního realismu. V této souvislosti upozorňuje zejména na klíčový význam, který Kuhn ve svém pohledu na vědecký vývoj přisuzuje postupnému vydělování nových specializovaných oborů, a právě tomuto dosud nepříliš re* ektovanému aspektu Kuhnovy ' loso' e vědy, v němž se nejzřetelněji ukazuje analogie mezi jeho pojetím vědeckého vývoje a biologickou evolucí, ale o němž Kuhn sám nikde systematicky nepojednal, se pak podrobně věnuje i v následující kapitole. V poslední kapitole této části se pak Wray snaží ukázat, že mezi „evolučním" a „revolučním" aspektem Kuhnovy ' loso' e vědy není navzdory jejich zdánlivé neslučitelnosti žádný vzájemný rozpor. Třetí, poslední část, pojmenovaná „Kuhn's social epistemology", je věnována sociálnímu aspektu Kuhnovy ' loso' e vědy, který Wray vedle aspektu evolučního pokládá rovněž za klíčový, ale který podle něj dodnes nebyl systematicky zpracován. Jak sám uvádí, jakákoli adekvátní epistemologie vědy „musí být sociální epistemologií, tedy takovou, která bude věnovat pozornost sociální dimenzi vědy a bude se jí snažit porozumět" (s. 147). Celou touto částí se prolínají zejména dvě otázky, a to 1) v jakém smyslu lze Kuhnovo pojetí vědy označit za sociálně konstruktivistické a 2) zda Kuhnova ' loso' e vědy představuje určitou hrozbu pro racionalitu vědy v tom smyslu, že by v procesu vědeckého rozhodování přisuzovala rozhodující roli zájmům a jiným „nevědeckým" faktorům namísto vědecké evidence, podobně jako se traduje – ne zcela oprávněně, jak Wray sám podotýká – o představitelích sociologie vědeckého poznání. Wray nejprve charakterizuje Kuhnův konstruktivismus prostřednictvím jeho komparace s konstruktivismem silného programu sociologie vědění, na jejímž základě mj. velmi pěkně ukazuje, že Kuhnovo pojetí vědy je navzdory mnoha opačným názorům důsledně internalistické, tedy že v procesu vědeckého rozhodování např. při volbě mezi soupeřícími teoriemi nepřipouští účast jakýchkoli jiných než v pravém slova smyslu vědeckých, racionálních faktorů. Nutným předpokladem k pochopení Kuhnova internalismu je podle Wraye přijetí kuhnovské perspektivy, která jako činitele změn ve vědě chápe vědecké společenství, nikoli individuální vědce. Z této miscellanea 476 perspektivy, jak názorně ukazuje, pak kupříkladu účast subjektivních faktorů ve vědeckém výzkumu, jejíž uznání je Kuhnovi právě vytýkáno jako iracionální, ve skutečnosti nepředstavuje hrozbu pro vědeckou racionalitu, ale naopak ji posiluje, neboť zajišťuje potřebnou diverzitu názorů ve vědeckém společenství, které mezi nimi posléze může racionálně volit. Následně Wray podrobněji analyzuje konkrétní rysy Kuhnova pojetí vědy, které z něj činí pojetí sociální, a snaží se poukázat na jejich nenahraditelný význam pro * loso* i vědy, přičemž ve zvláštní kapitole pak na příkladu vybrané epizody z dějin vědy ukazuje, v jakých konkrétních ohledech může být sociologická analýza vědy – v té podobě, v jaké ji obhajuje Kuhn – pro * loso* i vědy přínosná, aniž by přitom jakkoli ohrožovala vědeckou racionalitu. Wrayovu knihu jako celek pokládám za velice zdařilou. Je napsána velmi hutně, a tak ačkoli její hlavní část svým rozsahem jen o něco málo převyšuje dvě stě stran, je obsahově velice bohatá a jednotlivými nastolenými otázkami se zabývá skutečně do hloubky – v této recenzi jsem se omezil pouze na nezbytné představení těch skutečně hlavních, zastřešujících témat, kterým Wray v knize věnuje pozornost. Veliký přínos knihy spatřuji zejména v jejím velice oprávněném upozornění na dominanci určitého ustáleného, konvenčního, a především, jak Wray přesvědčivě dokládá, neadekvátního výkladu Kuhnova pojetí vědy, a v její systematické prezentaci jeho „aktualizovaného" výkladu, který se ve Wrayově podání ukazuje jako překvapivě životaschopný a jako takový dává tušit, že Kuhnova * loso* e vědy v rámci tohoto oboru ještě zdaleka nemusí být uzavřenou kapitolou. Za hlavní přínos knihy však pokládám její tolik potřebný apel na vzájemnou spolupráci mezi * loso* í a sociologií vědy – v tomto ohledu se zatím jedná o spíše ojedinělý, ale o to důležitější počin. Nemohu zkrátka než souhlasit s Wrayovým trefným prohlášením, že mnozí současní * losofové vědy mají neopodstatněný „strach ze sociologie vědy", který je velice „nešťastný, protože vědě a jejímu vývoji budeme schopni adekvátně porozumět jen tehdy, budou-li * losofové a sociologové vzájemně spolupracovat" (s. 206–207). Kuhnův důležitý přínos spočívá právě v tom, že si nutnost této spolupráce v zájmu * loso* e vědy sám velice dobře uvědomoval a že naznačil, jak by taková spolupráce mohla vypadat. Tento aspekt Kuhnova díla byl nicméně buďto zcela opomenut, anebo byl v zápalu boje * losofů vědy proti sociologii vědeckého poznání mylně interpretován. Wrayova kniha tak svojí snahou o rehabilitaci Kuhnova díla a zdůrazněním tohoto jeho aspektu představuje mj. také pokus miscelanea 477 o ukončení vleklého sporu mezi # loso# ckým a sociologickým přístupem ke zkoumání vědy ve prospěch vzájemného dialogu obou přístupů, pro jehož účely Kuhnova # loso# e vědy představuje bezpochyby vynikající počáteční bod. My můžeme jen doufat, že tento apel padne na úrodnou půdu a že se brzy dočkáme dalších podobných prací, které budou v tomto směru pokračovat. miscellanea

Utility Monsters for the Fission Age Introduction At least since Parfit 1984, there have been connections drawn between puzzle cases about personal identity, on the one hand, and normative questions, on the other. The relevant cases are hypothetical cases involving apparent fission of one person into multiple people (through separation of brain hemispheres, teletransportation accidents, and so on), fusion of multiple people into one, slow changes in one organism that yields a different person at the start than at the end, and suchlike. Questions that arise include the following. What is the practically rational thing to do, from the standpoint of a person facing the prospect of splitting into two people? Should the products of such fission be held morally responsible for the actions of their progenitors? How does fission bear on special duties created by family ties, friendships, and personal debts? However, we think reflection on puzzle cases from the personal identity literature impacts on moral theorising in another important way. To date, much of the focus has been on potential consequences for moral and practical questions focused on obligations or duties of people in particular personal relationships: how should I think about my future welfare how might my obligations differ between my friends and family and their qualitative clones, how should we distribute moral rewards and punishments, praise and blame, given that intuitively these should go to the same person who performed the relevant earlier actions. (See, for instance, Williams 1981, Unger 1992, Jeske 1993, Eklund 2004, and Shoemaker 2007.) We claim that the metaphysics of identity also has implications for impersonal moral requirements: that is, obligations to people regardless of whether they happen to share a particular connection with 2 the agent. We aim to show that on one popular account of what is going on in cases of fission, fusion etc., put together with two popular normative accounts of what (or who) matters for moral action and how what matters should be aggregated, yields what seems to be an unacceptable moral reductio. While we discuss ways of responding to this clash in the final section of this paper, the cases we consider raise the prospect that, given one of the common stances in the metaphysics of personal identity, some common (plausible, frequently defended) fundamental normative commitments are not jointly tenable, and stand in need of revision. 1. Multiple Occupancy We consider the moral implications of: Multiple Occupancy Two or more distinct, temporally extended persons can completely overlap for a span of time. Versions of Multiple Occupancy are defended by David Lewis 1976, Denis Robinson (Robinson 1985), from whom we get the label, Eugene Mills (Mills 1993), David Braddon-Mitchell and Caroline West (Braddon-Mitchell and West 2001), John Perry (Perry 2002), Harold Noonan (Noonan 2003), and Simon Langford (Langford 2007). One common reason for endorsing multiple occupancy is to address puzzles of fission and fusion: cases where what is apparently one person at one time becomes two at another, or two at one time apparently merge to become one. Many paradoxes of fission, for example, can be addressed if there were two people there all along before fission, sharing all their parts: then the two later people can each be identical to an earlier person, without any failure of transitivity of identity. Multiple 3 Occupancy can be of use in addressing fission and fusion puzzles associated with gaining and losing parts as well: one response to the ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon, where Dion loses his foot and arguably becomes identical to the pre-existing object which was Dion-less-that-foot (Theon), is to say that after the foot is lost both Dion and Theon continue to exist, but now Theon, instead of being a large part of a person, is a person in his own right (albeit one that shares all his parts with another person, Dion). One way to endorse Multiple Occupancy is to claim that people persist by having different temporal parts at different times, which we will call person-stages, and that one person-stage can be a part of more than one person. According to this framework, what it is for two persons to overlap for a span of time is for them to share all of their temporal parts within that span, so that every person-stage located in that span which is part of one, is also part of the other. While Multiple Occupancy fits naturally with an ontology of temporal parts, however, it can be endorsed by those who reject the "perdurantist" view that people have different temporal parts at different times. It is open to endurantist theories to endorse Multiple Occupancy (see Robinson 1985): two enduring objects may be able to share all their parts at a particular time while being distinct; or one could adopt the view that two distinct people can both be constituted by the same underlying physical material, even if they do not share some of their parts. The metaphysical differences between perdurantist and endurantist Multiple Occupancy are not important for present purposes: while we will continue to talk of person stages for convenience, endurantist partisans of Multiple Occupancy should reinterpret this in more endurantist-friendly language. Lewis 1976 invokes Multiple Occupancy in fission cases, where (apparently) one person is divided into two, and also in fusion cases, where two persons (apparently) fuse into one. He begins with 4 Derek Parfit's concept of an R-relation: a placeholder for whatever relation ultimately matters to survival. Candidates for the R-relation include continuity of personality, connectedness by links of quasi-memory and quasi-anticipation1, and physical continuity, but we do not need to settle what the R-relation consists of here. The important point is that it need not be one-one. A person, says Lewis, is a maximal aggregate of R-interrelated person stages: an aggregate of stages such that each is R-related to each of the others, and which is not a proper part of any larger such aggregate. In the case of fission, there are two such aggregates that share an initial part; in the case of fusion, there are two such aggregates that share a final part. Braddon-Mitchell and West suggest another reason to accept Multiple Occupancy. They argue that what counts as an R-relation is partly conventional: the survival and identity conditions of persons depend partly on their own attitudes, such as accepting responsibility for the actions of particular person-stages or anticipating the experiences of others, and partly on the practices of the societies they inhabit, such as the transmission of property rights from one person-stage to another or the punishment of one person-stage for another's misdeeds.2 In other words, what counts as a continuant person depends on what gets treated as a continuant person: for every reasonable set of conventions, there is a different R-relation. ("R-related" thus picks out a role property with many potential realisers.) A person is a maximal R-interrelated aggregate of person stages, where the realiser of R is fixed by the practices of the person and those around her. But what happens if someone changes her practices? Braddon-Mitchell and West (2001 pp 62-64) imagine the case of two societies: the Somataphiles, who view teletransportation as a kind of death, 1 Quasi-memory and quasi-anticipation are the states that constitute memory and anticipation in cases where the person-stage doing the remembering or anticipation is part of the same person as the person-stage that is remembered or anticipated, but may relate person-states that are not part of the same person. 2 For more arguments in favour of the view that the persistence conditions of persons are conventional, see BraddonMitchell and Miller 2004. 5 and the Teletransporters, who view it as a fast and convenient means of travel. Suppose a Somataphile converts to Teletransportation before stepping into a teletransporting machine for a vacation at the Sunshine Coast. Does this person survive teletransportation, or not? Braddon-Mitchell and West claim that there are two overlapping people, one of whom (being a Teletransporter) survives teletransportation, and another of whom (being a Somataphile) does not. More generally, a person is a maximal X-interrelated set of person-stages, where X is a potential realiser of the R relation, and at least one of person-stages adopts practices that make X the realiser R relation. So in the case at hand, one person is the maximal aggregate of person-stages connected by what we might call the T-relation-the candidate R-relation picked out by Teletransporter practices. Since some of the later person-stages adopt Teletransporter practices, there is a person composed of all the T-interrelated stages related to them. This person survives teletransportation to the Sunshine Coast. Another person is the maximal aggregate of person-stages connected by what we might call the S-relation-the candidate R-relation picked out by Somataphile practices. Since some of the earlier stages adopt Somataphile practices, there is a person composed of all the Sinterrelated stages related to them. This person perishes upon being teletransported. 2. Normative Assumptions Let us adopt, as a theory of impersonal moral requirements: Maximising Consequentialism One morally ought to do whatever will result in the greatest wellbeing for everyone. Maximising Consequentialism admits of a further key distinction: should one maximise total 6 wellbeing (Total Maximising Consequentialism), or average wellbeing (Average Maximising Consequentialism)? It turns that on both versions of the view, Multiple Occupancy causes trouble. The exact type of trouble will depend on the exact type of Maximising Consequentialism; we will flag these issues as they arise. (While we will focus on maximising views for simplicity, the cases we will discuss cause trouble for other distributional principles as well, in ways that are straightforward to work out.) In tricky cases of fission and fusion, we must draw another distinction. Should we aim to bring the greatest aggregate wellbeing to persons, or person-stages? We will restrict our attention to versions of Maximising Consequentialism that give the former answer. Thus, we favour: Count the Happy People The aggregate of wellbeing in the world is given by taking the welfare of each person, and aggregating those levels of welfare. That is, we should count the people and their welfare rather than, for instance, person-stages, or parts of people. Count the Happy People will be particularly tempting to philosophers who, with Slote 1982 and Velleman 1981, believe that the value of a life cannot be reduced to the values of its individual parts.3 We are simplifying a little by restricting our focus to people: in a less simplistic account, the welfare of animals that do not have person status, or other entities besides animals and people, may play a role as well. Again for simplicity, we will neglect these potential components of overall 3 Some consequentialists hold that only valuable states matter: JJC Smart, for example, famously claimed "A utilitarian has to think of people rather as buckets into which happiness can be poured" (Smart 1991 p 361). Even Smart-style consequentialists have to decide how to aggregate across buckets: and "counting the happy buckets" can be contrasted with other measures, including the analogue of measuring the welfare in each bucket-stage. (Other consequentialists will reject Smart's attitude: there is nothing in consequentialism per se that holds that the value of people derives from their states.) 7 welfare, but not because we are indifferent to the plight of kittens or other-worldly world-spirits. Together with Maximising Consequentialism and Count the Happy People, Multiple Occupancy yields strange moral consequences in a variety of cases. 3. Many-Headed Utility Monsters Suppose a group, consisting of six person-stages at the time of the story, is deliberating about the best way to divide a delicious cherry pie. Each member of the group would derive considerable enjoyment from eating 1/6 of the pie. More pie would give more enjoyment, but, due to the diminishing marginal utility of pie, each subsequent slice would make only half the difference of the previous slice. (Suppose eating no pie provided 0 utiles and eating 1/6 of the pie provided 32 utiles. Then eating 1/3 of the pie would provide 48 utiles, eating 1/2 of the pie would provide 56 utiles, and so on.) Assume that the pie consumption has no relevant long-term consequences beyond immediate pleasure: nobody is going to gain enlightenment through delicious experience, or contract diabetes, no matter how much of this one pie they eat. Since the members of the group are good Maximising Consequentialists, they agree to divide the pie six ways. "But wait!" one of the group members pipes up, "I have a fission appointment scheduled for next week, when the doctors will divide me into one hundred separate persons. (Don't be misled by figures of speech, like `divide' and `I'; thanks to my future fission, you are currently speaking with a hundred overlapping persons who will one day lead separate lives.) Are any of you planning to undergo fission? No, I thought not. Then you should give your pie to me. By foregoing one slice of pie, you can provide extra happiness for a hundred people!" What should the other five do, as good Maximising Consequentialists? They seem bound to give 8 up their pie, at least if they are also committed to Count the Happy Persons. Giving up the pie means a net loss of 160 utiles for the five-more than enough to outweigh the 31-utile gain that would result from giving the whole pie to one person, but tiny in comparison to the 3100-utile gain that would result in 100 people each getting to enjoy an entire pie. Those are the calculations relevant for Total Maximising Consequentialism. If instead they are Average Maximising Consequentialists, seeking to create the highest average wellbeing, the verdict for pie-distribution is the same. 3100/105 (=29.52) easily outweighs 16, the average if the pie is split six ways. Notice that the verdict here isn't based on any future benefits that might accrue to the hundred after fission. Even if the pie is digested and forgotten by the time the fission takes place, the consumption of the pie still brings enjoyment to 100 different people. What goes for pie goes for other goods. This seems counter-intuitive: there seems a good sense that, at the time, six people are splitting a pie that they all deserve equally, but one gets it all and the others get nothing. This case is like one that Robert Nozick mentions (Nozick 1974 p 41) as a problem for consequentialism: the utility monster. A utility monster derives much more good from resources than the rest of us: since a utility monster would derive a hundred times more utility from 1/6 of the pie, the consequentialist verdict seems to be that the entire pie should be given to the utility monster. This, Nozick argues, violates intuitions we have about morally appropriate distributions. In our case the verdict that the "person" to undergo fission deserves more utility (or desiresatisfaction, or resources, or what-have-you) is not because any one person is privileged over another: rather, where it appears to be 6 people sharing a pie, it is in fact 105: and the 100 9 outweigh the 5, in a way familiar to consequentialists. Still, insofar as we are inclined to think that future fission should not entitle a stage to more pie now, as opposed to otherwise similar stages now, the pie distribution apparently endorsed by the combination of Maximising Consequentialism, Multiple Occupancy, and Count the Happy People seems on the face of it unfair, immoral and absurd.4 4. Infinite Overlap? Things get even worse when we consider David Lewis's Methuselah, who lives for 969 years, undergoing psychological change at the same rate as an ordinary person (Lewis 1976 pp 30). It takes exactly 137 years for Methuselah's memories, ambitions, and personality traits to change completely, so that by the time Methuselah is 200, nothing is left of the 63-year old who preceded him. Some views of personal identity require that the R-relation be transitive, but setting these views aside, we can plausibly suppose that two stages of Methuselah are R-related if and only if they are within 137 years of each other. Thus, every 137-year long aggregate of Methuselah-stages will form a distinct person, since it will be a maximal aggregate of R-related person-stages. Consider now a stage of Methuselah located at midnight on his 300th birthday. This person-stage is part of many distinct, 137-year long persons: the one stretching from year 250 to year 387, the one stretching from year 193 to year 310... and so on. Thus, whatever happens to the 300th-birthday stage of Methuselah happens to many people. If space and time are infinitely subdivisible, it 4 Zimmerman 2002 and Olson 2010 raise related problems for ontologies where each person overlaps one or more non-people, and where those non-people have features we consider morally important in people. Zimmerman considers the ontology of Baker 2000, who posits that each person is constituted by a person-shaped hunk of matter; Olson focuses on a four-dimensionalist ontology, which posits long-lived temporal parts of people, and aggregates of those parts, which are not themselves people. Both authors frame the problem as one of how to discount the interests of the apparently person-like entities as derivative of the interests of people. In our problems, solutions that discount the interests of one or more entity are off the table. Our Multiple Occupancy principle says that one or more persons can overlap at a time-not merely that one or more entities that superficially resemble persons can overlap at a time. Unlike Zimmerman and Olson's cases, our cases are symmetric, so that all the overlapping persons involved have an equal claim to moral consideration. 10 happens to infinitely many people. This is already enough to cause trouble for Total Maximising Consequentialism. Infinite populations paralyse Total Maximising Consequentialism even in the face of simple questions. For instance, if you can make Methuselah's 300th-birthday stage happy by bringing him a surprise birthday cake, and the cake costs you nothing, should you bring it? On the one hand, it seems that you should: you will provide infinitely many people each with the same finite increase in wellbeing, and therefore generate an infinite increase in wellbeing. On the other hand, it seems that you needn't. If all of Methuselah's lives are already worth living, the people who overlap Methuselah's 300th stage already have infinite wellbeing in aggregate. If you were to bring the cake, they would still have infinite wellbeing in aggregate, and therefore, collectively, they would be no better off than before. The trouble is that traditional decision theory is not equipped to aggregate finite utilities distributed across infinitely many locations. However, there is a growing literature in infinite decision theory. How does this literature fare when against our monstrous Methuselah? Let us set aside hard problems involving uncertainty and variation in the domain of persons and begin with a simple question. Suppose we hold fixed Methuselah's lifespan and the degree of R-relatedness between his stages. Then how can we maximise the collective welfare of all the overlapping persons who compose Methuselah? In the cake example, there is a simple answer. Since bringing the cake makes everyone better off, and makes no one worse off, a weak dominance principle gives you a reason to bring the cake. But now consider a variant on the cake example. Suppose that eating the cake will bring enjoyment to anyone who eats it, but will cause severe indigestion the next morning. The indigestion is twice as 11 bad as the cake is good: anyone who eats the cake will gain 10 utiles, but anyone who experiences the indigestion will lose 20 utiles. Now should you bring the cake? Notice that some of the guests at Methuselah's 300th birthday party will perish before morning, and these guests will enjoy the benefits of the cake without the costs. Notice that other people will turn up too late for cake, but in time to suffer indigestion. So bringing the cake will benefit some guests and harm others, and the dominance principle falls silent. A proposal by Vallentyne and Kagan (1997) for extending the dominance principle in infinite cases appeals to the convergence properties of various infinite sums. (For similar proposals, see (Lauwers and Vallentyne 2004), (Atsumi 1965), and (Von Weizsäcker 1965).) Consider two worlds, w1 and w2, containing exactly the same locations-in this case, persons who are part of the 969-year continuant object Methuselah. Begin with a sequence of finite sets of locations such that each set is a superset of the previous one. (Intuitively, each set contains all the individuals in the previous set and a few nearby ones.) For each S in the sequence, there will be a number measuring the total wellbeing of the members of S in w1, and another number measuring the total wellbeing of the members of the set in w2. The difference dS between these two numbers measures how much better off members of S are collectively in w1 than in w2. If for all suitable sequences, the dSes converge to a positive limit as the sets expand, then w1 is better than w2. Some authors criticise Vallentyne and Kagan's version of the proposal on the grounds that it grants too much significance to the spatiotemporal locations of persons-rearrange the persons in a world, and you are liable to get different verdicts about how that world compares to others (Hamkins and Montero 2000; Mulgan 2002). But in the case of Methuselah, there is a much more serious problem. If time is continuous, countably infinite sums will be useless, since the guest list at Methuselah's birthday will be uncountably long. Furthermore, the most natural way of lining up the 12 guests, by age, will produce a dense ordering, destroying any hope of a weakly converging sum (as if the crowded guest list was not already bad enough). Infinite decision theory does not even get started. The prospects are slightly brighter for Average Maximising Consequentialism. We can take an average of infinitely many-even continuously many-points, so long as there is some measure over them. In Methuselah's case, we might again line the birthday guests up from oldest to youngest. We might then assign the measure according to anniversary of `birth', so that the group of persons created between t and t' years old and the group of persons created between s and s' years old have equal measure whenever |t-t'| = |s-s'|. Alternatively, we might line the guests up according to anniversary of `death', so that the group of persons destroyed between t and t' years after Methuselah's birthday and the group of persons destroyed between s and s' years after Methuselah's birthday have equal measure. In Lewis's example of Methuselah, both ways of measuring come to the same thing. But in other versions of the example, they needn't. Methuselah's rate of psychological change might slow down as a constant function c of age, so that persons created within n years of each other are destroyed within ecn years of each other. If there is more than one possible measure over the different Methuselahs, how are we to fix on one? Even if we can fix on a single, natural measure for the Methuselahs, there are more troubles for Average Maximising Consequentialism. Suppose two short-lived guests, Bill and Ted, attend Methuselah's birthday party. Bill and Ted have a natural lifespan of threescore and ten years apiece-a time span too short to allow the type of change the Methuselah undergoes. All the Billstages are R-interrelated, and all the Ted-stages are R-interrelated, so that Bill and Ted comprise 13 only one person each. Since Bill and Ted are only two persons among infinitely many, it seems that the set {Bill, Ted} ought to have measure zero. After all, all the finite sets of persons who share a body with Methuselah have measure zero. Why should Bill and Ted get special treatment? But if the set {Bill, Ted} has measure zero, then Bill and Ted's welfare does not count at all toward the average wellbeing. Bringing Methuselah a diamond on his birthday would bring joy to a set of persons with positive measure, and so increases the average wellbeing. If the diamond is available only at a terrible price to Bill and Ted-years of miserable, under-paid toil in the mines-no matter. So long as Methuselah gets even a tiny amount of joy from the diamond on his 300th birthday, this enjoyment will make up for any amount of torture we can inflict on Bill and Ted. On some theories of the R-relation, Methuselah cases will be ruled out. Let person-stages a and b be forwards connected just in case the links of memory, anticipation, physical similarity, and psychological similarity which ground the R-relation obtain between a and b, and a is earlier than b. And let a be backwards connected to b iff b is forwards connected to a. One might then say that the forwards R-relation was the transitive closure of forwards connectedness, the backwards R-relation was the transitive closure of backwards connectedness, and two stages were R-related iff one was forwards R-related to the other or backwards R-related to the other. Imposing this kind of transitivity on the forwards and backwards R-relation rules Methuselah's case out as impossible. Methuselah's 10-year old stages are forwards R-related to his 110-year old stages, and his 110-year old stages are forwards R-related to his 210-year old stages; thus, it cannot be the case that, as stipulated in the example, the forwards R-relation fails to obtain. Denying the possibility of Methuselah does not save maximising consequentialism from paradoxes flowing from infinite multiple occupancy, however. Methuselah makes the point about infinite 14 multiple occupancy nicely, but we can have infinite multiple occupancy even if the metaphysics of personal identity somehow rules out this case. Infinite fission seems possible. We do our first teletransportation or brain hemisphere transplants after one minute. Our second, to each of the products, after a further half minute (perhaps after some quick regeneration if we are producing fission through brain transplants). Our third splitting, to each of the 4 products of the previous procedure, after a further quarter of a minute... at the end of two minutes, we have infinitely many copies. (We leave the logistical details of where to store everyone and all the equipment to the imaginative reader-feel free to use spaceships heading in different directions in infinite space, alternate dimensions, or whatever other thought-experiment technology you need.) If Anna is about to go through such a Zeno-fission series, she will cohabit with countably infinitely many others: not quite as many as Methuselah, but enough for a serious utility-monster problem. On most ways of summing utility, keeping Bill and Ted in miserable suffering to confer a trivial benefit on Anna (and her co-occupiers) might well end up the maximising thing to do. (More exotic cases of fission into more-than-countably-many people can be dreamed up, but we will resist the temptation to elaborate.)5 5. A New Repugnant Conclusion In addition to many-headed utility monsters, which create obligations concerning the distribution of resources based on fixed facts about fission, we can create a version of Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion (Parfit 1984 chapter 17). In Parfit's example, Total Maximising Consequentialists are 5 There will also be problems of massive overlap, and plausibly infinite overlap, if "many" solutions to the problem of the many are endorsed: that is, if we respond to the puzzle that there are many person-like aggregates where I am with some claim to be my parts by saying there are in fact many people where I am, differing slightly in their parts. (See Lewis 1993.) There are many versions of the problem of the many, including modal ones (perhaps there are as many people here as there are functions from worlds to occupied locations of objects in those worlds that map the actual world to this location). If we give a "many" response to the modal problem of the many, there will be a high infinity of multiple occupiers whenever we ordinarily think there is one person. Even temporal and spatial problems of the many can motivate the view that there are continuum-many people wherever I am. Moral views that have trouble with infinities of people, especially multiple occupancy people, have a number of hostages to metaphysical fortune. 15 forced to conclude that a world with a few extremely happy people is worse than a world with a great many people, all of whose lives are barely worth living. The Parfit example has terrifying consequences for population ethics: if the Total Maximising Consequentialist is right, then we are obligated to have more children even in cases where doing so will make everyone else worse off. In our example, if Total Maximising Consequentialism is right, then we are sometimes obligated to promote fission-even at significant expense to human happiness. Suppose you are nearing the end of a full and happy life; your doctor has determined that you have a week to live. The hospital where you spend your dying days also houses a fission machine, once considered promising in anti-ageing research. Sadly, that research program was a failure: instead of prolonging life, the machine merely caused chronic pain in all of its subjects. To be more precise: products of fission enjoyed the same life span that the original person would have enjoyed, had no fission occurred, but experienced more pain than the original person would have experienced, had no fission occurred. Every subsequent pass through the machine resulted in slightly more severe chronic pain for the resulting people. Your doctor, the former P.I. of the fission research program, projects that you have one more week to live. She would like to put you through the machine, just for old times' sake. But before she does, she needs to clear her decision with the hospital's ethics committee. What should the ethics committee conclude?6 Let us add a few more details. If fission occurs, the two resulting people will each be worse off than the person who would have existed, had fission never occurred. However, they will not be too much worse off; the bad of the pain outweighs less than half the good of the good of their pre- 6 If you think that the fact that this is your doctor should make a difference, due to special duties doctors bear to patients, change the example so that the researcher has no special personal connection to the patient. 16 fission lives. Similarly for subsequent fissions: the fission products will be a bit more than half as well off as the alternative individual who never undergoes fission. If the ethics committee are Total Maximising Consequentialists, they should conclude that the doctor is morally obligated to put you through fission. Furthermore, once she's done that, she is morally obligated to repeat the procedure on each of the resulting people. She is obligated to create the procedure as much as she can, up to the point where the extra people perish in such agony that the pain of their torture nearly outweighs the accumulated good of the rest of their lives. Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion is bad for Total Maximising Consequentialism. But in one respect, our Repugnant Conclusion may even be worse. In Parfit's example, there are some people for whom the supposedly better world-the one full of people whose lives are barely worth living is- is arguably better than the alternative. Those people exist with a life of positive utility rather than fail to exist, and so arguably do better existing than not. In our example, every person is worse off in the supposedly better world than they would have been in the supposedly worse world with no fission. For the one, unsplit person in the world without fission is plausibly a counterpart of each of the fission products in the world with plenty of fission: if this is the way to understand the case, each of them would have been much better off if no fission had occurred, since each of them would have been the one, unfissioned, person. 6. How Should Maximising Consequentialists Respond? While the problems we have raised can be avoided by rejecting any of Multiple Occupancy, Maximising Consequentialism, and Count the Happy People, we will focus in this section on what the most appealing responses to the problem might be for those interested in maintaining Maximising Consequentialism. Not that we think that this premise is compulsory either: but since 17 problems similar to those that arise for maximising consequentialists will beset many other ethical theories if they accept Multiple Occupancy and Count the Happy People, we think the most interesting ways to avoid the sorts of problems we raise require questioning the other two assumptions. The intuitive problem with many-headed utility monsters is that fission leads us to double-count overlapping persons. Therefore, the Maximising Consequentialist might seek solace from Lewis's solution to a problem involving counting. We describe fission as a situation in which one person becomes two. In the pie case, where there are six time-slices dividing up the pie, it seems that the pie is divided among six people and not among 105. How is the defender of Multiple Occupancy to account for this data? Lewis argues that at any given time t, we do not individuate persons according to identity, but by the weaker relation identity-at-t-roughly, total overlap of temporal parts. Two persons, P1 and P2 are identical at t iff each has a stage at t, and all and only P1-stages located at t are P2-stages located at t. Since all the fission products have a single stage at the time when the pie is divided, we count them as only one person, rather than one hundred. In order to determine how many people there are at any time t, we count according to identity at t. Might the Maximising Consequentialist use Lewis's method of counting for weighing up harms and benefits? We fear not. Lewis's method is useful for counting at a time, and we can use it to determine how much aggregate wellbeing there is at any given time. But presumably, the Maximising Consequentialist wants to make the world better-not better at this or that time, but better simpliciter. To focus on making the world better only at a time seems like a hopelessly parochial attitude with no place in a fundamental moral theory. A Maximising Consequentialist 18 should surely care about acting to promote the good across all times she can affect, not some privileged moment. And if we need a measure of welfare across times and not just at a time, a proposal that only tells us how to measure welfare at a time will not be sufficient. A more promising option for the Maximising Consequentialist is to reject Count The Happy People, and instead adopt Measure the Happy Person-Stages: The aggregate of wellbeing in the world is given by taking the welfare of each person-stage, and aggregating those levels of welfare. Since time may turn out to be infinitely subdivisible, a continuous measure rather than a simple count is in order. (Measure the Happy Person-Stages also seems to us like the natural way to extend the proposal of the previous paragraph to a measure over worlds, not just over a single given time: though it does not rely on the Lewisian picture of identity-at-a-time for its appeal.) The advocate of Measure the Happy Person-Stages will need to address an objection raised by Slote 1982 and Velleman 1991. These authors argue that one person can be better off than another, even when every person-stage of one can be mapped to an equally well-off person-stage of the other.7 Velleman imagines two fictional lives: one that starts off with a destitute childhood and improves steadily to a fulfilled and contented twilight, and the other that starts off with an idyllic childhood and declines steadily to miserable old age. From the standpoint of the wellbeing of person-stages, the second life is just the first life run backwards. Yet someone who lives the first life is better off, all things considered, than someone who lives the second life: at least according to Velleman. 7 This somewhat simplistic statement of the claim presupposes that each person is composed of finitely many personstages. In full generality, the claim ought is that one person can be better off than another even if for every level of wellbeing w, the measure of person-stages with wellbeing w belonging to one person is equal to the measure of person-stages with wellbeing w belonging to the other person. 19 Therefore, it seems that the wellbeing of a person cannot be reduced to the wellbeing of the stages that compose the person. In responding to this objection, the advocate of Measure the Happy Person-Stages has two options. The first is to reject the apparent data as somehow misleading. Perhaps we have trouble truly imagining the two cases as they are described in the example, and tend to fill the first story in so that the person-stages in the first story are happier, on average, than in the second story. Or perhaps our tendency to prefer happy endings over sad ones fails to track any distinction in wellbeing. The second option for the advocate of Measure the Happy Person-stages is to claim that wellbeing is extrinsic, so that the wellbeing of one person-stage is entangled with the wellbeing of other personstages R-related to it. For instance, a version of this view might posit that person-stages have intrinsic levels of proto-wellbeing, and a person-stage's wellbeing is an aggregate of the amount of proto-wellbeing it experiences together with the amount of proto-wellbeing experienced by forward R-related stages (perhaps with some discounting). This view may be bound up with our ability to Measure The Happy Person-Stages at all, since, as Sider 1996 and Hawley 2000 point out, most of the properties we attribute to persons are had by stages extrinsically if at all. It is not entirely clear how such a theory would interact with the Braddon-Mitchell and West view, which posits multiple R-relations, but there are nonetheless potential views in the vicinity whose details might be worked out. Another option for Maximising Consequentialists is to reject Multiple Occupancy. We see three basic options here. First, Maximising Consequentialists might deny that there are persisting persons at all, instead preferring talk of person-stages and counterpart relations. Such a Maximising Consequentialist will also have to give up on Count the Happy Persons, and instead opt for Measure the Happy Person-Stages. Second, Maximising Consequentialists might claim that in puzzle cases 20 that appear to involve fission, continuant persons are destroyed and replaced with other (groups of) continuant persons. It is simple to see how this works in the case of fission, but more difficult to see how it would work in the case of Braddon-Mitchell and West's `transfiguration'. A third option is to adopt some more complicated view of identity across time, so that identity need not always be one-one (see, for example, the view developed in Gallois 1998). The cost here is that it is no longer clear how to Count the Happy Persons. Yet another option for Maximising Consequentialists is to bite the bullet about our conclusions. There are a few arguments for doing so. Our maximising consequentialist could wax lyrical about the equal value of every person, whether common-sense morality recognises this or not. Just as Bentham and Mill argued to a sceptical public that every person mattered, slave or free, African or European, female or male, contemporary consequentialists can argue that temporary multiple occupancy is no bar to moral status as people: and a clearheaded following-through of this status leads to surprising conclusions that should nonetheless be accepted, here as in those other cases. Or she could complain about the strangeness of the cases: when we consult our intuitions about strange situations, very different from actual cases, perhaps it should not be surprising that the verdicts are themselves sometimes strange. That response does depend on there not being many actual cases of fission or fusion: if every gain or loss of parts results in an extra cohabiting person, as might be suggested by Dion and Theon cases, then actual multiple occupancy might be widespread, in which case paradoxical ethical consequences become much more pressing. The other possible response, of course, is to give up Maximising Consequentialism in favour of some other moral theory, such as Kantianism or virtue ethics. Opponents of Maximising Consequentialism will doubtless see our results as more grist for their mill-worse even than ordinary utility monsters and repugnant conclusions. We think this is a fine response for Kantians 21 and virtue ethicists. (Though utility monsters potentially cause trouble for these theories too once they want to allow some role for beneficence, at least if they are tempted to allow that helping more people is better than helping fewer.) However, rejecting Maximising Consequentialism seems a strange response for philosophers otherwise tempted by Maximising Consequentialism-why swallow ordinary utility monsters and repugnant conclusions, only to strain at our metaphysically souped-up version? Maximising Consequentialists would do better to change their beliefs about exactly what ought to be maximised, or accept our conclusions.8 Rachael Briggs Australian National University, Griffith University [email protected] Daniel Nolan Australian National University [email protected] 8 Thanks to David Braddon-Mitchell, Carrie Jenkins and an audience at the University of Kentucky for discussion. 22 References Atsumi, H. 1965. "Neoclassical growth and the efficient program of capital accumulation". Review of Economic Studies 32: 127-36. Baker, L. R. 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and K. Miller. 2004. "How to Be a Conventional Person". The Monist 87.4: 457-474. Braddon-Mitchell, D. and C. West. 2001. "Temporal Phase Pluralism". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62.1: 59-83. Eklund, M. 2004. "Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy". The Monist 87.4: 489-511. Gallois, A. 1998. Occasions of Identity. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Hamkins, J. D. and B. Montero. 2000. "With infinite utility, more needn't be better". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78: 231-40. Hawley, K. 2001. How Things Persist. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Jeske, D. 1993. "Persons, compensation, and utilitarianism". Philosophical Review 102.4: 541-575. Lewis, D. 1976. "Survival and Identity. Survival and Identity. In A.O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press, Berkeley. Lewis, D. 1993. "Many, but Almost One" in Campbell, K., Bacon, J. and Reinhardt, L. (eds.) Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the Philosophy of D.M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 23-37 Langford, S. 2007. "How to Defend the Cohabitation Theory". Philosophical Quarterly 57.227: 212-224. Mills, E. 1993. "Dividing without Reducing: Bodily Fission and Personal Identity". Mind 102.405: 37-51. 23 Mulgan, T. 2002. "Transcending the Infinite Utility Debate". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 164-177 Noonan, H. 2003. Personal Identity. Routledge, London. Nozick, R. 1974. Anarchy, State and Utopia. Blackwell, Oxford. Olson, E. T. 2010. "Ethics and the generous ontology". Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31.4: 259-270. Parfit, D. 1984. Reasons and Persons. Clarendon, Oxford. Perry, J. 2002. Identity, Personal Identity and the Self. Hackett, Indianapolis. Robinson, D. 1985. "Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63.3: 299-319. Shoemaker, D. 2007. "Personal Identity and Practical Concerns". Mind 116.462: 317-357. Sider, T. 1996. "All the world's a stage". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74.3: 433-453. Slote, M. 1982. "Goods and Lives". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63: 311-26. Smart J.J.C. "Utilitarianism and Punishment". Israel Law Review 25: 360-375. Unger, P. 1992. Identity, Consciousness, and Value. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Vallentyne, P. and Kagan, S. 1997. "Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory". Journal of Philosophy 94.1 :5-26. Velleman, J. D. 1991. "Well-Being and Time," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 72.1: 48-77. Von Weizsäcker, C. C. 1965. "Existence of optimal programs of accumulation for an infinite time horizon". Review of Economic Studies 32: 85-104. Williams, B. 1981. "Persons, Character, and Morality". In Moral Luck. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1-19. Zimmerman, D. 2002. "Persons and bodies: Constitution without mereology?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64.3: 599-606.

María G. Navarro (2015) 'El lugar de la controversia en la argumentación.' En Fernando Leal Carretero (coord.) Argumentación y pragma-dialéctica: Estudios en honor a Frans van Eemeren. Guadalajara (MX): Editorial Universitaria. (capítulo 16) [ISBN 9786077423348] BORRADOR | DRAFT El lugar de la controversia en la argumentación María G. Navarro Instituto de Filosofía Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 1. Je maintiendrai La oposición a una estricta separación entre las dimensiones dialéctica y retórica de la actividad argumentativa es una de las aportaciones más destacadas y peculiares de la denominada escuela holandesa sobre argumentación. Frans H. van Eemeren y Peter Houtlosser reaccionaron contra una separación estricta entre dialéctica y retórica en varios trabajos, pero uno de los más inspiradores es sin duda su artículo "William the Silent's argumentative discourse" (1998) presentado en la ciudad de Ámsterdam con ocasión de la cuarta conferencia organizada por la International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA). Sobre este tema siguieron investigando para presentar un análisis de la perspectiva dialéctica inherente al caso de Guillermo I de Orange en un congreso de la Japan Debate Association en Tokio (van Eemeren y Houtlosser, 2000). Fruto de estos trabajos es una publicación posterior titulada "Strategic Manoeuvring: William the Silent's Apologie. A Case in Point" en la que van Eemeren y Houtlosser (2003) defienden una integración metodológica de dialéctica y retórica apoyándose para ello en una interpretación estratégica del famoso texto Apologie escrito en 1580 por Guillermo I de Orange. No es un hecho que carezca de relevancia histórica (y académica) la elección de esta emblemática figura y su Apologie como fuente de inspiración para esta escuela sobre teoría de la argumentación. Guillermo de Orange fue líder de la revuelta en contra de la monarquía española; su vida y su violenta muerte fueron decisivas para la independencia de las provincias holandesas. La comunicación política desarrollada por su sucesor, el príncipe Mauricio, le consiguió representar no sólo como un militar que luchó contra los españoles 2 sino como verdadero padre de la nación holandesa. La historiografía holandesa ha construido una innumerable cantidad de narraciones sobre este héroe nacional asesinado por Baltasar Gérard, un pistolero fanático católico originario del Franco-Condado que, en cierto modo, obedecía las órdenes del monarca español cuando le disparó tres tiros a quemarropa al pie de las escaleras de su palacio en Delft. Felipe II había ofrecido una recompensa de 25.000 coronas a quien matase a Guillermo de Orange, el Silencioso o el Taciturno, calificado y dado a conocer por el monarca como "peste del conjunto de la cristiandad y enemigo de la raza humana". Tras perpetrar el asesinato, y durante varios días, Gérard fue interrogado, torturado, quemado, destripado y decapitado. Como la recompensa no le fue entregada, Felipe II concedió a los padres de Gérard un título nobiliario además de los estados de Lievremont, Hostal y Dampmartin del Franco-Condado. Existe todo un legado visual en torno a la figura de Guillermo, un héroe nacional cuya tumba fue encargada por sus herederos (la Casa de Orange) y puede visitarse en la Iglesia Nueva de Delft. Guillermo fue apodado el Taciturno o el Silencioso por su gran enemigo, Antoine Perrenot de Granvela, el cardenal y arzobispo que presidió el Consejo de Estado en Flandes durante la regencia de Margarita de Parma, hermana de Felipe II. Al parecer, el Taciturno tenía por costumbre permanecer callado en el Consejo de Estado, del que formó parte desde los 23 años. Van Eemeren y Houtlosser se hacen eco de ello cuando explican que el sobrenombre se debía a su "habilidad diplomática para ocultar sus intenciones" (2003, 177), aunque en realidad algunos historiadores aseguran que el sobrenombre se debe a una corrupción de la palabra latina relativa a 'taimado' o 'astuto' (Rodríguez y Mínguez, 2010, 172). Sea como fuere, el caso es que los procedimientos de retórica visual y narrativa que la historiografía en su conjunto ha desplegado acerca de este importante miembro de la Casa de Orange son tan dignos de investigación que, en cierto modo, explican y justifican la atención que van Eemeren y Houtlosser conceden al análisis de su Apologie, un documento calificado por ambos, y no sin razón, de auténtico bestseller del siglo XVI. El objetivo de los autores es analizar el documento histórico desde una perspectiva argumentativa, por lo que advierten al lector de que, en publicaciones anteriores, han expuesto una propuesta original y propia encaminada a la reconstrucción dialéctica. Van Eemeren y Houtlosser sostienen que se puede analizar el discurso argumentativo de manera 3 metódica en el sentido de que se puede proyectar el ideal de una discusión crítica con el fin de -conforme a dicho ideal- determinar analíticamente qué movimientos son relevantes cuando se resuelve una diferencia de opinión. En este punto, van Eemeren y Houtlosser se refieren a resultados obtenidos en publicaciones anteriores (1984, 1992 y 2003), pero llaman la atención sobre un proyecto en curso que denominan strategic maneuvering (un tipo de procedimiento que tiene lugar en el discurso argumentativo). Sobre lo que llamamos aquí la atención es que la presentación y las explicaciones acerca de este importante complemento o desarrollo de su método de análisis pragma-dialéctico están precedidas de una breve introducción a la historia de Guillermo I de Orange. ¿Por qué eligen sus autores presentar su concepción sobre las maniobras estratégicas asociándola tan estrechamente con este emblemático pasaje de la historia? Una primera respuesta podría ser que, al cabo, es en la Apologie donde van Eemeren y Houtlosser encuentran un perfecto ejemplo de maniobra estratégica en el discurso argumentativo o, al menos, un caso de evento de habla específico revestido de un significado histórico especial. Así lo calificará van Eemeren en una obra posterior (2010, 129-162). Sin embargo, si la decisión de sus autores es acertada, o sea, si esta tiene éxito comunicativo se debe a razones que tienen que ver precisamente con la figura del Taciturno. Al igual que el resto de los detalles, retratos, tapices, esculturas, emblemas, lemas y estrategias de comunicación política asociadas a la compleja historiografía sobre los Orange, el tema elegido por van Eemeren y Houtlosser refuerza una tradición de representación sobre las virtudes retóricas del Taciturno en un contexto de confrontación dialéctica de gran intensidad: entre católicos y protestantes; entre todos ellos y los defensores de la tolerancia religiosa; entre el poder mermado de los nobles de las provincias y la asfixiante política de obediencia del cardenal de Holanda, etc. El recurso más sobresaliente del artículo de los holandeses especialistas en argumentación no es simplemente pedagógico. Su finalidad no es ilustrar a través de la Apologie en qué consiste lo que denominan 'maniobras estratégicas'. Dicho de otro modo: no es propiamente el Silencioso quien es presentado como estratega, son los propios autores del artículo - encarnando ahora las virtudes retóricas asociadas a Guillermo- quienes, al emplear una maniobra estratégica con la que seleccionan un tópico y un dispositivo de comunicación como este, confían en que su audiencia reconocerá al instante la historiografía holandesa 4 producida en torno al padre de la patria al evocar su particular invención de la tradición (Hobsbawm, 1983). Según dicha tradición, es decir, gracias por ejemplo a la apoteósica imagen propagandística producida por el grabador Antonij van Leest que ilustró con quince estampas el libro del poeta holandés Johann Baptist Houwaert, sabemos que Guillermo de Orange hizo una entrada triunfal en naves a lo largo de los canales de la ciudad de Bruselas en 1576. La entrada se efectuaba tras llevar a cabo la pacificación de Gante entre católicos y calvinistas. Y traigo aquí a colación dicha entrada triunfal para resaltar la Cámara de la Retórica, un escenario que se desarrolló en varias barcazas y que realzaba las virtudes retóricas de Guillermo; en particular, su capacidad para ejercer la persuasión política vinculada mediante referencia bíblica a la salvación del pueblo oprimido (Baptist Houwaert, 1579). Van Eemeren y Houtlosser sostienen en este artículo seminal que las estrategias argumentativas son diseños metodológicos de movimientos para influir (en beneficio propio) en el resultado de una etapa dialéctica particular, o en la discusión en su conjunto. Dicho diseño de movimientos se manifiesta, en definitiva, en una explotación sistemática, coordinada y simultánea de las oportunidades que ofrece cada etapa. Dado que previamente han especificado que las etapas se dividen según criterios de confrontación, apertura, medios argumentativos y resultados finales o conclusiones, mantienen que el tipo de ventaja retórica alcanzada por un proponente y/o un oponente depende de la etapa del discurso en la que estos se encuentren. Por consiguiente, siguiendo este conciso esquema de trabajo, se emplean a fondo en la busca de las maniobras estratégicas exhibidas por Guillermo de Orange en la etapa de apertura, asumiendo que un modelo de interpretación textual será suficiente para mostrar la reconciliación entre los objetivos de la retórica y las obligaciones de la dialéctica. Pero ¿es suficiente? Van Eemeren y Houtlosser están en lo cierto cuando afirman que, en respuesta a las extremas acusaciones del monarca, parece innegable que procedimientos retóricos como el consistente en acudir al topos de la modestia refuerzan inmediatamente la posición de Guillermo de Orange para auditorios y lectores nobles como los que tuvo el panfleto, traducido y puesto en circulación de inmediato hasta en cinco idiomas. Después de todo, las acusaciones del monarca no están sustanciadas ni se apoyan en hechos, sino que más bien parecen basarse "en sus emociones haciendo imposible para ellos discutir asuntos de manera razonable" (van Eemeren y 5 Houtlosser, 2003, 181). Detrás de esta afirmación se reconoce la influencia que ejerció Toulmin sobre las primeras aportaciones de van Eemeren, influencia reconocida por los autores si bien no se explicita aquí en ningún momento en qué sentido aceptan su impronta. Sin embargo, cabe objetar que una descripción más completa de la maniobra estratégica por medio de la cual el Orange estaría explotando las oportunidades dialécticas de esta etapa de apertura exigiría explicar con más detalle no sólo quién es la audiencia o el público receptor de este panfleto, sino cómo describe el autor las obligaciones dialécticas del monarca -su oponente-, a cuyo Edicto de prohibición responde. Después de todo, lo extraordinario del texto es precisamente el punto de vista elegido por el Silencioso. De acuerdo a este, las inconsistencias y otras debilidades dialécticas y retóricas en las que incurre el monarca (no es fin del Edicto presentarle como razonable) ofrecen a Guillermo I la oportunidad de mostrar, y acaso forzar (haciendo gala de la divisa que hizo famosa Je maintiendrai –Yo no cejaré) una comparación entre las actitudes y acaso las disposiciones de ambos. Lo sobresaliente del caso es que el Orange se presenta sujeto a unos requisitos de razonabilidad que, sin embargo, no obligan al monarca quien cuenta con dispositivos para la persuasión característicos de su posición de autoridad, por despótica que esta fuera. Como en muchas otras historias de confrontación este es un caso en el que el proponente dicta para imponer su punto de vista y el oponente contraargumenta empleando maniobras estratégicas para seleccionar tópicos, dirigirse a una audiencia y asegurarse la adhesión de esta mediante el despliegue de sus habilidades retóricas para la persuasión. Sin embargo, por poco que escudriñemos en la historia de esa especie de confrontación con la que comienza una importante gesta nacional y en la que hallan ejemplo e inspiración representantes de uno de los focos de difusión más importantes a día de hoy sobre teoría de la argumentación, nos encontramos ante una trama de la argumentación realmente vasta y compleja que incluye un importante repertorio de aspectos relacionados con el análisis predecisional y posdecisional de la factibilidad política (Majone, 1989) cuando no con (dispositivos propios de) la argumentación visual. Este diagnóstico se basa en las siguientes razones: (a) la Apologie forma parte de un fuerte aparato de propaganda a favor de la libertad holandesa en la que jugó un papel determinante el talento de Philip Marnix, un hábil diplomático calvinista que actuó como embajador de la causa de los rebeldes en las cortes de Inglaterra y Francia; (b) el Orange, formado en un ambiente cortesano y muy 6 próximo al monarca, conocía con detalle cómo construir su apariencia y su poder, por eso difundió su imagen (en este punto nobles y soldados fueron destinatarios valorados por igual) con ayuda de estampas realizadas de manera anónima por algunos de los mejores grabadores holandeses (Wyerix, Hogenberg, Gheeraerts y Martin de Vos) y fue pintado, entre otros muchos, por Antonio Moro, retratista de la corte de Carlos V; (c) no hay que omitir que la Apologie de 1580 incluía también un retrato de él a sus 48 años, un grabado realizado por H. Goltzius, en el que el autor del panfleto está rodeado de cuatro emblemas e imágenes relacionados con el Éxodo del Antiguo Testamento, estableciéndose una analogía con el pueblo israelí guiado por Dios de noche mediante una columna de fuego y de día mediante una nube. Pero la historia de las analogías y comparaciones efectuadas nos muestra un nuevo pliegue de complejidad si atendemos a eventos comunicativos como el protagonizado por el defensor de los derechos civiles, Frederick Douglass. Durante su conferencia pública "William the Silent" escrita probablemente en torno a 1868, Douglass establecía una doble analogía: la primera entre, por una parte, las estrategias y decisiones político-militares en las postrimerías de la Guerra Civil de los Estados Unidos de América, la turbulencia de la guerra y de la paz y la historia de los Países Bajos durante el siglo XVI. Para realzar lo anterior, Douglass establecía una segunda analogía entre la figura de Guillermo de Orange y Abraham Lincoln como impulsores de la liberación humana frente a fuerzas opresoras. Al análisis de este caso le dedica Angela G. Ray (2012) un capítulo de extraordinaria claridad ("Making history by analogy") que recoge un volumen dedicado a un aspecto determinante en la escuela holandesa sobre argumentación, Exploring Argumentative Contexts (van Eemeren y Garssen, 2012). No obstante, el planteamiento teórico del colectivo se ensaya con suficiente precisión teórica en el artículo de van Eemeren y Houtlosser (2003) al que nos hemos referido, se recoge con más amplitud en van Eemeren (2010) y se termina de sustanciar y presentar en "In Context" (van Eemeren, 2011). 2. Raison d'être de la institución Ni el análisis de las maniobras estratégicas en prácticas comunicativas convencionalizadas ni el problema teórico de la contextualización en el estudio de la argumentación puede conllevar recuentos, descripciones, pesquisas y elucubraciones de mayor enjundia o proeza 7 que las relacionadas, por ejemplo, con la investigación del singular empleo de la retórica llevada a cabo por la Casa de Orange. Es cierto que se podrían analizar las maniobras estratégicas en que se sustenta el incendiario panfleto asumiendo, por ejemplo, que la Apologie es, al fin y al cabo, un discurso, y solo un discurso. Sin embargo, ni los tópicos disponibles en ese discurso ni su particular adaptación a la audiencia y a los dispositivos o posibilidades de presentación y plasmación de su posicionamiento nos dicen nada acerca del hipotético conjunto de opciones de las que disponía el Taciturno. Por eso hay que analizar "la ruta que se toma para la realización de esta maniobra estratégica" (van Eemeren, 2012, 408). Esa ruta es un continuo que no solo lleva al pasado sino a la oportunidades de maniobra estratégica presentes y futuras no ya para la Casa de Orange, sino para otra aún más antigua en la que nos empleamos todos: la casa de la retórica y la dialéctica. Incluso aceptando las constricciones y limitaciones institucionales que van Eemeren atribuye a los requisitos convencionales de las maniobras estratégicas, no parece fácil esclarecer "cuál era el estado real de cosas en el discurso cuando la maniobra estratégica se llevó a cabo, de manera que puedan tenerse en cuenta las demandas de la situación (...)" (2012, 409). No es una tarea exenta de controversia determinar cuál fue la ruta institucional del Orange: ni la utilizada por él para conseguir su propósito, ni la emprendida por nosotros para comprender sus efectos, ni la establecida en rutas diferentes para guiar y crear, por ejemplo, nuevas identidades nacionales mediante analogías. Consiguientemente, ni se pueden dimensionar inequívocamente los efectos retóricos de la historiografía en torno a este caso, ni inventariar estrictamente la historia de sus efectos, un diagnóstico en el que coincide una reputada especialista sobre la historia de los procedimientos retóricos empleados por la Casa de Orange (Stern, 2004, 2010). Las prácticas comunicativas están conectadas con tipos específicos de contextos institucionales y se convencionalizan conforme a diferentes requisitos precisamente para realizar los objetivos mismos de cada institución. Esta es una de las ideas más sobresalientes en el planteamiento de van Eemeren. Establece o, más bien, describe límites de enorme trascendencia como, por ejemplo, que las posibilidades de maniobrar estratégicamente en el discurso argumentativo están determinadas por constricciones de tipo institucional que permean cada práctica comunicativa, cada campo de comunicación, cada dominio. No obstante, a mi modo de ver, también introduce un reto muy difícil de 8 salvar si no se asume una teoría de las controversias porque ¿cómo se podría entonces evaluar la conducta del argumentador en un evento de habla mixto? No menos problemático me parece el propósito de desarrollar modelos ideales de diálogos argumentativos cuando para ello es imprescindible historiar un conjunto de maniobras estratégicas difícil de inventariar porque (i) están indisolublemente asociadas a nuestra concepción sociológica y política de la legitimidad, (ii) consiguientemente, puede resultar una empresa contradictoria la consistente en distinguir contextos de argumentación, suponer que existe una misión institucional en cada actividad comunicativa, y, al mismo tiempo, defender que existe un modelo de discusión crítica para resolver óptimamente diferencias de opinión. Sería necesario estudiar la aplicación de dicho análisis crítico, caso por caso, para determinar si se salvan o no finalmente las aparentes contradicciones; pero lo que sí parece seguro es que dicha empresa no nos permite ni describir ni dirimir de manera incontrovertible (a) cuál es el conjunto completo de prácticas comunicativas, (b) cuál es y cómo es en cada caso el dominio de la comunicación, (c) quiénes participan en tal dominio, es decir, quiénes deberían participar como miembros socializados de una comunidad primaria, y quiénes deberían hacerlo secundariamente, como miembros de una comunidad profesional; (d) incluso suponiendo la aplicación de criterios por medio de los cuales se motivaran racionalmente las descripciones acerca de dichas prácticas comunicativas así como el modelo normativo aplicado, ni los criterios normativos empleados para describir cada esquema de argumentación asociado a un dominio de comunicación, ni las descripciones realizadas acerca de las posibles falacias cometidas son elementos que se puedan sustraer del análisis en clave de justicia epistémica (Mouffe, 1999; Gutmann y Thompson, 2003; Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2012; Navarro, 2015). Por ejemplo, estudios y aproximaciones recientes sobre el género de la deliberación -no solo en sentido normativo sino en el sentido positivo- nos describen cuál es el efecto de mantener estas inquietantes preguntas sobre el modelo de democracia deliberativa que estamos dispuestos a defender, y nos muestran las contradicciones -tal vez irresolubles- de los modelos normativos de la deliberación (Beltrán y Vallespín, 2012). Pero estas no son, en definitiva, objeciones al modelo defendido por la escuela holandesa o, al menos, no son objeciones novedosas (Lewinski y Mohammed, 2013). Sin embargo, a pesar de ser cuestiones conocidas, y precisamente por ello, no deja de ser parte del reto enfrentado por esta escuela de 9 argumentación que investigar las maniobras estratégicas en el discurso argumentativo exige colaborar con expertos de diferentes tipos de prácticas institucionalizadas y con especialistas en distintos ámbitos de comunicación. Y en mi opinión, es un importante acierto que se haya llegado a aceptar que la meta normativa de resolver una diferencia de opinión de manera crítica no es un asunto incontrovertible en el campo de la (argumentación) política, donde existe un conjunto realmente amplio de maniobras estratégicas (Zarefsky, 2009). De hecho, tanto la Apologie como sus usos político-artísticos de emblema nacional, así como las rutas de investigación necesarias para determinar sus diferentes audiencias, las subsiguientes maniobras estrategias que se inspiran en el panfleto, en el personaje, en la misma Casa de Orange (bien para apelar a supuestos, bien para usar argumentativamente figuras, etc.), parecen avisarnos de que, tal y como sostenía Quintiliano, no puede haber lugar a un argumento si no es dentro de cuestiones controvertidas (Cattani y Alcolea, 2011, 146). Hay al menos tres tipos de razones por las que esto es así. Van Eemeren y Garssen las enumeran de manera sintética (2008, 3) cuando se refieren al trabajo del filósofo británico Crawshay-Williams (1957) según el cual las controversias aparecen cuando entre el proponente y el oponente existe un claro desacuerdo acerca del criterio que habría que seguirse para testar (por ejemplo, la validez de) un enunciado. Noción esta última de extraordinaria complejidad sobre cuya definición conviene reflexionar (Frápolli, 2011; Broncano 2000; Rodríguez, 2000). Y esos tres tipos de criterios que las partes pueden emplear para resolver sus desacuerdos son (i) el criterio lógico (referido a reglas de inferencia aceptadas implícita y/o explícitamente por los contendientes), (ii) el criterio de la convención (relacionada con enunciados y/o procedimientos dialécticos aceptados, negociaciones, etc.), y (iii) el criterio empírico (que refiere una noción elemental de objetividad según la cual tanto los hechos como el contexto conforme al cual estos son descritos deben reflejarse en el contenido del enunciado). Es a partir del análisis de los tres tipos de criterios -según los cuales proponentes y contendientes hallan razones para atrincherarse en la defensa de sus puntos de vista como controversistas- como van Eemeren llega a la conclusión de que el más decisivo de todos es el criterio del contexto. Decisivo tanto para disolver el estado de controversia (conforme a la validez de un contexto declarado universal o común para la comunidad de contendientes) como para -si no se declara y/o se quebranta tal acuerdo- estimular y 10 prolongar procesos de controversia. Es seguro que existen otras muchas razones para explicar por qué es determinante el lugar ocupado por la controversia en la argumentación; pero si lo que queremos entender es por qué es significativa la controversia -tal y como esta es teorizada por Dascal (1998), Dascal y Chang (2007) y Nudler (2004, 2009) - para la teoría pragma-dialéctica, nuestra atención se debería dirigir ahora hacia la noción de contexto. 3. Tegeltjeswijsheid En sus reflexiones históricas sobre la teoría de la argumentación, Carlos Pereda afirmaba que los diálogos de Platón "conforman el primer documento de que disponemos en donde se articula lo que podríamos llamar una práctica argumental masiva" (1985, 74). Con una facilidad y un acierto igualmente llamativos, un poco más adelante, junto a la expresión anterior, Pereda proponía una fórmula no menos interesante al referirse a los Tópicos y las Refutaciones sofísticas, a saber, la "fenomenología de la atención argumental". Dicha fenomenología tendría por objetivo resaltar una serie de técnicas, estrategias, actitudes, etc. que comportan (la experiencia de) una teoría argumental. Con todo ello, su autor sugería que se debería ampliar la teoría de la argumentación para que esta no se reduzca simplemente a la lógica formal, de manera que incluya lo que denominó una teoría de los argumentos subdeterminados (de este tipo son, por ejemplo, la inducción y la analogía). Estas dos expresiones bien pueden servir ahora para alumbrar la experiencia de quien, al vivir y viajar por Holanda, haya contemplado esa gran cantidad de pequeños azulejos surgidos en el siglo XVI en los que luce una escena cotidiana y se escribe un refrán siempre con una pintura azul que emula una técnica china de pintura sobre porcelana. Son los tegeltjeswijsheid, aforismos escritos sobre azulejos, que dan lugar a toda una especie de 'sabiduría de los azulejitos'. Según yo lo veo, la exposición de estos refranes y contrarefranes forma parte de una práctica argumental masiva con la que en Holanda se nos proporciona una experiencia de argumentación subdeterminada. Para dar más empaque a esta afirmación, basta recordar una obra de la misma época: el impresionante Nederlandse Spreekwoorden (Los proverbios flamencos) (1559) del pintor Pieter Brueghel el Viejo, en donde se representan más de cien escenas de la vida cotidiana que solo interpretamos consistentemente si aplicamos los más de cien refranes con los que el cuadro queda 11 saturado por una galería de actos de habla orientados tanto a la práctica de argumentar y contraargumentar como a la de proporcionar al espectador rutas (visuales, dialécticas y acaso político-morales) de experiencia argumental. Fermín Bouza Álvarez (1983) se refería al "carácter masivo de la persuasión" en un interesante trabajo que, sin embargo, suele pasar inadvertido en los estudios sobre retórica y argumentación visual incluso contando con un prólogo de José Luis López Aranguren, bien que breve y no muy prolijo en halagos. En él, Bouza Álvarez se refería al hecho de que la "tecnología de la persuasión" desborda los objetos primarios del derecho y la filosofía hasta abarcar la totalidad de la conducta humana (1983, 22). Junto a las experiencias visuales y estéticas a las que me refería antes, Bouza añade el cartel publicitario como expresión de esa tecnología de la persuasión. Pero si hay un ejemplo con el que alcanzar a comprender en qué sentido una fenomenología de la atención (y la experiencia) argumental puede quedar desbordada por la práctica argumental masiva, ese ejemplo habría que buscarlo en el fenómeno del big data tal y como pone de manifiesto David Casacuberta (2013) en un artículo relevante para atisbar futuras líneas de investigación en teoría argumental. Las bases de datos masivamente alimentadas por millones de entradas en tiempo real que pueden procesarse y que nos permiten investigar correlaciones estadísticas exigen establecer mecanismos causales como los que nos proporciona la práctica argumentativa. Es cierto que ese desafío (pongamos que para una fenomenología de la atención argumental) ya estaba presente en la interpretación de cualquiera de esos sencillos refranes escritos en azul que cuelgan por doquier no solo en Holanda sino en las miles de terrazas, descansillos y patios con los que los viajeros decoran sus espacios cotidianos al regresar de los Países Bajos. Nunca se insistirá lo suficiente sobre la necesaria y compleja tarea de aprender a distinguir patrones de representación y tópicos. Sus implicaciones epistémicas o -si se prefiere- doxásticas (Rosengren, 2002; Wolrath Söderberg, 2008) nos ayudan a reconocer de manera tan inmediata como asombrada el continuo existente entre nuestra cultura visual, nuestras prácticas y técnicas masivas de persuasión argumental y el conjunto de nuestros enclaves deliberativos, en cuyo espacio no dejamos de ensayar e innovar esquemas y modelos conocidos. Para que esas prácticas se puedan llevar a cabo es necesario suponer la existencia de un contexto, y su determinación es una cuestión que no se puede establecer ni acotar dogmáticamente sin producir al instante espacios de confrontación y, en determinados casos, espacios controversiales. De 12 manera que, al repasar el hilo argumental de esa sabiduría recogida en pequeños azulejos, nos preguntamos cuál es el contexto que dota de significado a sus signos. ¿Cuál es el contexto adecuado para interpretar argumentadamente ese complejo refranero que, según autores como Keith Moxey (1994), pudo formar parte de las muchas y muy distintas técnicas de persuasión utilizadas por autores como El Bosco para hacer más difícil extraer significados unívocos de su complejísima imaginería? La propuesta de van Eemeren interesará con seguridad a quien se formule estas preguntas: ¿historiadores?, ¿viajeros curiosos?, ¿especialistas en big data?, ¿juristas, lingüistas, politólogos, o acaso publicistas, especialistas en mercadotecnia electoral, psicólogos del razonamiento, especialistas en lingüística clínica, investigadores en inferencia y análisis bayesiano, ingenieros informáticos, filósofos de la mente y un largo etcétera? Uno de los rasgos de la escuela holandesa de argumentación es su interdisciplinariedad, que resulta congruente y necesaria no sólo desde el punto de vista teórico, pues es un rasgo característico del ideal y la cultura (en torno a lo) profesional en Holanda. Para entender la respuesta de van Eemeren es necesario que volvamos a contemplar esas expresiones coloquiales -fórmulas con las que se actualizan tópicos-, para analizar los requisitos de la argumentación, es decir, la estructura argumentativa por medio de la cual se adaptan, y quedan como embebidos contextualmente, mostrando al viajero de todos los tiempos un mensaje por lo general tan elocuente como para llegar a proporcionarle, al mismo tiempo, la oportunidad de adoptar un punto de vista desde el que disentir e incluso contraargumentar. Para decirlo de manera sumaria, creo interpretar consistentemente el pensamiento de van Eemeren cuando, por medio de esta sencilla analogía, afirmo que para él existiría ciertamente texto, contexto, procesos lógicos de razonamiento y un conocimiento previo tanto en las complejas composiciones de Pieter Brueghel el Viejo como en los entrañables tegeltjeswijsheid. Es debido a la existencia de estos cuatro factores como podemos realizar nuestros análisis en clave argumental (seguramente masivos si reparamos en lo mucho que se ha escrito sobre nuestros ejemplos visuales). Pero es al tercero de ellos, denominado 'conocimiento e información previa', al que acudimos por lo general en busca de la fuente de recursos (no menos masiva) para la justificación de nuestros análisis. Tan es así que van Eemeren se muestra cauteloso cuando admite que, tanto el contexto como la interpretación que los participantes en una discusión crítica 13 pueden efectuar en base a los cuatro elementos (i.e. texto, contexto, razonamiento y conocimiento e informaciones previas), pueden de hecho cambiar continuamente en el transcurso de un intercambio argumental. Este factor es determinante para entender una elaboración conceptual posterior, a saber, la de macro-contexto, con la que van Eemeren presenta una propuesta de argumentación en contexto que no olvida caracterizar confrontándola con la de Douglas Walton y Erik Krabbe (1995, 1998) con el claro propósito de que, tal y como suele insistir, el concepto de razonabilidad no caiga en relatividades posmodernas. Como ya hemos visto, la defensa de la razonabilidad es un imperativo tan importante para nuestro autor holandés y para la escuela de Ámsterdam que incluso han efectuado una interpretación en clave de razonabilidad del panfleto del Orange. Walton y Krabbe proponen que cada tipo de diálogo (i.e. diálogo persuasivo, negociación, investigación, deliberación, diálogo orientado a la búsqueda de información, erística) de algún modo constituye y refleja un modelo propio de argumentación. Razón por la que el desarrollo teórico de su propuesta conduce, en palabras de ambos autores, a un modelo de racionalidad posmoderno, relativista. Cada diálogo prescribiría normas específicas para llevar a cabo una argumentación ajustada al género de diálogo en cuestión. Las objeciones de van Eemeren a esta propuesta son básicamente tres, si bien pueden encontrarse documentos en los que hay razón para pensar que se subdividen y ramifican. La primera es que, en esta concepción, permanece oculta la relación entre los tipos normativos de diálogos y el conjunto de contextos comunicativos para los que sería congruente suponer la existencia de agentes de la argumentación. La segunda objeción tiene que ver con la noción de argumentación falaz que cabe defender siguiendo este modelo, al que, a lo que se ve, van Eemeren considera débil desde el punto de vista normativo. Como corolario de su análisis crítico, creo que cabe extraer una tercera objeción de carácter general referida por van Eemeren en la nota número 27 donde sugiere que esta concepción sobre los objetivos de los distintos tipos de diálogo parece estar a un tiempo formulada conforme a análisis empíricos y estipulada en base a consideraciones teóricas (2011, 158). O para decirlo con una expresión que gusta en decir mucho su autor "a theory of error cannot be constructed independently of a theory of correctness". En definitiva, la debilidad de sus oponentes consiste en que en las muchas funciones comunicativas que cabe atribuir a cada uno de los géneros dialogales, parece diluirse la cuestión acerca de en qué consiste su peculiar función 14 argumentativa. El propósito de van Eemeren al presentar su noción de macro-contexto de un tipo de actividad comunicativa (en la que, se sobreentiende, se da una maniobra estrategia argumentativa) consiste en mostrar que dichos actos de habla están convencionalizados de tal manera que se los reconoce intersubjetivamente como expresión de una elección racional institucionalizada. De alguna manera, van Eemeren amplía el nuevo institucionalismo ya que a la idea de que existe una relativa autonomía de las instituciones políticas para explicar el "comportamiento" institucional, él añade una noción de strategic maneuvering y, en general, una teoría de la argumentación que es (bien que circularmente) razón de ser del conjunto de actos (comunicativos) simbólicos con los que se construye una cierta autonomía de lo institucional. Esta aportación no es solo significativa desde el punto de vista del nuevo institucionalismo, lo es además porque determina qué clase de fundamento teórico puede avalar una concepción normativa de la práctica argumental. Para decirlo en una palabra, lo que se desprende de su análisis es que es precisamente en virtud del concepto de macro-contexto como cabe diferenciar la (mera) noción de falacia, independiente del contexto, de aquella otra clase de argumentar falaz enteramente dependiente del macro-contexto en el que tiene lugar una maniobra estratégica empleada en una de las innumerables prácticas de discurso argumentativo en las que nos vemos inmersos como agentes oponentes y/o proponentes. 4. Coda No es una tarea fácil establecer la función que habría que asignar a la teoría de controversias dentro de la teoría pragma-dialéctica de la argumentación. Tal y como aquí se sostiene, de la obra de van Eemeren se desprende que la noción de contexto es fundamental para establecer la conexión entre ambas líneas de investigación (i.e. la teoría pragmadialéctica de la escuela de Ámsterdam, la International Association for the Study of Controversies (IASC) liderada por Dascal, y los resultados del grupo de investigación sobre espacios controversiales liderado por Nudler). Resulta evidente que las colaboraciones son fundamentales para establecer qué función tiene la confrontación de argumentos en el desenvolvimiento histórico de controversias. A mi modo de ver, si tenemos presente que el análisis de controversias no se puede disociar de su desenvolvimiento histórico, resulta difícil de comprender cómo encaja la determinación con la que van Eemeren relaciona el 15 macro-contexto con el análisis en clave normativa de la práctica argumentativa en espacios controversiales. Al escribir estas líneas tengo en mente lo que escribía recientemente Broncano (2014) en su blog El laberinto de la identidad: "La escolástica y actualmente la filosofía analítica (muchos sostienen que son lo mismo, quizá justamente, pero no está claro si eso es bueno o malo, es parte de la controversia) sostienen que todo trabajo filosófico debe comenzar por la disputatio de dos posiciones contrapuestas. Tienen razón, aunque el ejercicio que proponen suele carecer de historia y relato. Y las controversias son procesos largos, que modifican a las partes implicadas y recorren paisajes históricos extensos en los que cobran sentido las palabras." La propuesta de argumentación en contexto de van Eemeren parece estar concebida inicialmente para que la disputatio de las posiciones contrapuestas no esté aislada de los elementos retóricos y dialécticos que le permiten desenvolverse en la historia en un sentido amplio. Su apelación al panfleto escrito por el Orange podría entenderse como un compromiso con ese propósito. Sin embargo, nos encontramos con que el auténtico desideratum teórico de su proponente "es establecer los criterios generales para juzgar la solidez de los distintos modos o tipos (...) de las maniobras estratégicas y los criterios específicos aplicables a las particularidades de los contextos comunicativos. Esto podría lograrse, en primer lugar, determinando la validez de las condiciones generales aplicables en todos los casos a un modo particular de maniobras estratégicas y, a continuación, detallando las condiciones específicas que se aplican en forma válida y que pueden ser formuladas en un modo particular de maniobras estratégicas." (van Emeren, 2012, 414). El propósito de van Eemeren es conseguir formular sistemáticamente criterios con los que determinar si las normas de razonabilidad se incorporan finalmente o no en las reglas que deben regir una discusión crítica. Es cierto que una interpretación completa de este propósito exigiría analizar los elementos normativos que parece propugnar su autor. Esta no es una cuestión nueva: ha dado lugar a interesantes análisis como el propuesto por Cristina Corredor (1998) en relación al pensamiento del Wittgenstein de Sobre la certeza, en el que se han identificado elementos pragmáticoformales, procedimentales y generales de contexto. Pero en el caso que nos ocupa, la realización del desideratum teórico expresado por van Eemeren es cuando menos paradójico ya que su realización eliminaría la razón de ser de los espacios controversiales. Esta es la razón por la que considero deseable que la argumentación en contexto dé (acaso 16 de nuevo, acaso de manera diferente) un profundo giro contextual -según lo ha preconizado Quentin Skinner- con el fin de que la proyección normativa de su importante teoría pragma-dialéctica de la argumentación no impida reconocer a sus proponentes los procesos de evolución y desenvolvimiento histórico de su propia aportación. Agradecimientos Agradezco a Javier Moscoso, Constanza Ihnen, Cristóbal Joannon y Fernando Leal sus comentarios a este texto. Una versión previa de este trabajo se presentó en el JuriLog Seminar on Human Rights 2014-2015. Este artículo se inscribe en los desarrollos del proyecto de investigación FFI2013-46361-R financiado por el Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad español, y el proyecto FP7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES/Ref.612644 financiado por la Comisión Europea. 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Tornando a Verdade Explícita: Um Recurso Expressivo Crucial ainda que Explanatoriamente Deflacionário 1 Aislan Fernandes Pereira 2 UFPB [email protected] O objetivo básico desta comunicação é indicar um caminho (a ser percorrido), para uma explicitação da natureza e importância da verdade, bem como sua discussão, em torno de questões como "Qual é a relação entre verdade e justificação?" ou "Em que medida faz ainda sentido falar em verdade?", tanto na atualidade filosófica como na antiguidade, especificamente aristotélica. Esse caminho foi construído a partir de um recorte, de uma pesquisa em andamento, em torno da noção de expressão, sob projetos filosóficos bem distintos e distantes. Um desses projetos é o Making It Explicit (MIE) (1994), pelo filósofo de Pittsburgh, Robert Bob Brandom (foco desta comunicação). E o outro é a Teoria Aristotélica da Explanação Científica, desenvolvida pela "escola de Campinas", um grupo de pesquisadores aristotélicos da Unicamp, sob a orientação principal de Lucas Angioni (2014, p. 9–10). Entre 1950 e 1970, após a virada linguística, na qual predominava a análise formal lógica, e até metafísica, da linguagem, ocorre a virada pragmática (SELLARS, 2008, p. 13). Com essa última virada, passa-se a adotar a ideia de que toda linguagem é um jogo, de modo que enunciações verbais são "lances" ou "jogadas", e o significado de uma palavra já não é mais um ente mental, um objeto denotado ou um objeto especial, como o Verdadeiro e o Falso, do "terceiro reino" de Frege, mas a ação linguística do uso (PENCO, 2006, p. 135, 137). Desse modo a expressão "jogo de linguagem" salienta que "falar uma língua é parte de uma atividade" vital (WITTGENSTEIN, 2014, p. 27). Bebendo dessa tradição pragmática, mas retomando o espírito analítico da primeira virada, Brandom (1994, 2000) sistematiza uma teoria da prática discursiva, como núcleo da prática linguística. Nessa teoria, a semântica é pensada de uma nova forma (o Inferencialismo Semântico), por conseguinte uma nova forma de pensar a lógica (o Expressivismo Lógico, foco inicial desta comunicação) (BRANDOM, 2013, p. 59). Essa lógica inferencialista, no entanto, é apenas uma linha intermediária entre as camadas de um empreendimento filosófico, bem mais amplo, desenvolvido a partir do MIE. Há ainda a camada da Pragmática Normativa, ao ponto de Brandom (1994, p. 83) empregar comumente a fórmula "a semântica deve responder à pragmática". Figura 1 – Camadas do empreendimento filosófico de Brandom. Comunicação apresentada na XXVIII Semana de Filosofia "Verdade", Natal, 24 a 27 de abril de 2018 1 (UFRN). Mestrando do Departamento de Filosofia – Universidade Federal da Paraíba, Brasil.2 No inferencialismo semântico, a tarefa da lógica é antes expressiva: em codificar (não em provar) as inferências implícitas (não formais) no uso do vocabulário comum não lógico. O sentido formal aqui é subsidiário e instrumental à explicitação dos compromissos inferenciais (das propriedades materiais), que governam o uso desse vocabulário não lógico (BRANDOM, 2000, p. 30). Esse papel auxiliar não implica abandonar a formalização da lógica, uma vez que Brandom (2008, p. 30) já apresenta definições e provas que articulam uma semântica de incompatibilidade, que não apela à verdade, numa lógica clássica (de dois valores) e modal. Um exemplo de compromisso inferencial é a inferência de "Campina Grande está a oeste de João Pessoa" para "João Pessoa está a leste de Campina Grande". O que torna essa inferência correta são os conteúdos (do vocabulário comum não lógico) dos conceitos oeste e leste, os quais também fornecem o material para fundamentar, inclusive, a crença num condicional implícito. O vocabulário lógico, assim, é o recurso expressivo central para a tarefa de explicitação de conceitos (BRANDOM, 2000, p. 19). Esse vocabulário é distintivamente lógico, porque leva o conteúdo material, implícito na prática, ao controle racional, do jogo de dar e pedir por razões, e tornado consciente, enquanto tópico de discussão e justificação (BRANDOM, 1994, p. 106, 1988, p. 270). Esse seria o projeto original ou núcleo da filosofia, desde o seu aparecimento socrático: a ideia de racionalidade elucidatória ou expressiva (BRANDOM, 2000, p. 56, 77). Nesse contexto, a noção de justificação depende das noções de inferência e de expressão. Para Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein do Tractatus, Tarski e Carnap, a verdade é o conceito básico, em termos do que uma teoria do significado, logo uma teoria da linguagem, deve ser desenvolvida. Nesse tipo de teoria, o aspecto essencial da linguagem é sua capacidade de representar a maneira como as coisas são. Nesse sentido, a semântica formal é o estudo das condições de verdade dos vários tipos de discurso (BRANDOM, 1976, p. 137). Nessa semântica, compromissos representacionais envolvem tradicionalmente o vocabulário técnico semântico com os termos "refere", "denota", "representa" (menos formal) e "é verdadeiro", como na clássica "concepção semântica" de Tarski (""A neve é branca" é verdadeira, se, e somente se, a neve é branca"). No entanto, abordar a linguagem primariamente como uma prática social ou "forma de vida" é um desafio a quem pensa que a verdade e as condições de verdade devem jogar um papel central em nossa abordagem da linguagem (BRANDOM, 1976, Fonte: Própria. ! Expressivimo Lógico Inferencialismo Pragmática Normativa p. 139). Uma classe de abordagens teóricas da verdade, que recebe a qualificação de "deflacionária", leva esse desafio a patamares em que os discursos da verdade são redundantes ou elimináveis. Uma das principais teorias nessa linha é a teoria prosentencial da verdade de Grover, Camp e Belnap (BRANDOM, 2002, p. 103). A teoria, contudo, proposta, pelo autor do MIE, toma locuções tais como "...é verdadeiro" e seus relativos como operadores formadores de proforma (proform-forming operators). Essa é uma teoria anafórica da verdade – é o que se faz quando se emprega tais locuções em truth talk. No caso mais simples dessa teoria, a sinalização linguística "Que é verdadeiro" é uma prosentença, que se relaciona com, e herda seu conteúdo de, um antecedente anafórico - por exemplo, a sinalização "A neve é branca" -, e da mesma maneira que um pronome tal como 'ele' se relaciona com e herda seu conteúdo de um antecedente anafórico - por exemplo, a sinalização "Tarski". Anáfora é essa relação de acordo com a qual o conteúdo de uma sinalização é determinado por sua relação com outra sinalização ou classe de sinalizações: seu(s) antecedente(s) anafórico(s) (BRANDOM, 2002, p. 104). A relação anafórica, numa teoria da verdade, amplia o poder expressivo das linguagens naturais de maneiras substanciais, sem estar restrito a usos quantificacionais, como no caso de Tarski. Desse poder expressivo, vale mencionar as capacidades, entre outras, de proteger a comunicação interpessoal através de diferenças substanciais de crença e informação entre os interlocutores, e de explicitar quem é responsável pelo o que, quando um interlocutor caracteriza as crenças do outro (BRANDOM, 2002, p. 114). Mecanismos anafóricos, na verdade, são o que possibilitam incorporar à linguagem expressões outrora irrepetíveis, paradigmaticamente demonstrativos e indexicais ("eu", "agora", "aqui") (BRANDOM, 2002, p. 110, 111). Porém entendendo esse papel, tal locução é desqualificada a expressar conceitos em que se baseiam certos tipos de explanações de conteúdo proposicional em geral, isto é, seu papel expressivo é incompatível com um papel explanatório (BRANDOM, 2002, p. 103). Ser um deflacionista do papel explanatório, dos termos "refere" e "verdadeiro", não é, contudo, ser um deflacionista do seu papel expressivo, o qual é essencial para dizer coisas como "Tudo que Frege disse é verdadeiro". Esses termos expressivos, porém, não estão em princípio disponíveis como matéria prima da qual possa elaborar uma explanação dos conteúdos que herdam (BRANDOM, 2010, p. 343). A explanação desses conteúdos, por outro lado, é o escopo da pragmática normativa, no MIE, especificamente de como o conteúdo conceitual se constitui, na prática discursiva, da camada anafórica à camada inferencial, e como se atualiza por meio de um modelo de pontuação deôntica. Desse modo, faz-se sentido sim falar em verdade, na medida de uma teoria semanticamente expressiva, como a da anáfora, mas não explanatória, de um modo geral. Palavras-chave: Verdade. Semântica. Pragmática. Referências ANGIONI, L. (ED.). Lógica e Ciência em Aristóteles. Campinas: PHI, 2014. BRANDOM, R. B. Truth and Assertibility. The Journal of Philosophy, v. LXXIII, n. 6, p. 137–149, 1976. BRANDOM, R. B. Inference, Expression, and Induction (Sellarsian Themes). Philosophical Studies, v. 54, p. 257–285, 1988. BRANDOM, R. B. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1994. BRANDOM, R. B. Articulating Reasons : An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000. BRANDOM, R. B. Expressive vs. Explanatory Deflationism About Truth. In: RICHARD SCHANTZ (Ed.). . What Is Truth. [s.l.] Walter de Gruyter, 2002. v. 1p. 103–119. BRANDOM, R. B. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. BRANDOM, R. B. Reply to Michael Dummett's "Should Semantics be Deflated?" In: BERNHARD WEISS; JEREMY WANDERER (Eds.). . Reading Brandom: on Making It Explicit. New York: Routledge, 2010. p. 342–346. BRANDOM, R. B. Articulando razões: uma introdução ao inferencialismo. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2013. PENCO, C. Introdução à Filosofia da Linguagem. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2006. SELLARS, W. Empirismo e filosofia da mente. 1. ed. [s.l.] Vozes, 2008. WITTGENSTEIN, L. Investigações Filosóficas. 9. ed. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2014.

© Copyright 2009 by Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 35, No. 4 (October 2009) 577 The Problem with Negligence 1. Introduction When an individual is negligent and as a result injures someone else, we tend to hold her responsible for those injuries and judge her blameworthy. Indeed, blaming people for their negligence, or thoughtlessness, or carelessness, is an all too common occurrence. It is quite surprising, then, that very little has been said about responsibility for negligently produced harms outside of discussions in legal theory. In fact, the literature on moral responsibility has been virtually silent on the matter.1 Given our readiness to blame negligent agents and the pervasiveness of accusations of thoughtlessness or carelessness in our lives, negligence remains an area that any theory of responsibility must address one way or another.2 This paper argues for two conclusions. First, the fact that negligence is characterized by the absence of certain conscious mental states, rather than by any positive feature, poses a deep and general problem to any theory of responsibility. I show that tracing, the primary tool in the literature for explaining responsibility in the absence of a conscious mental element, is inadequate: though tracing works in some related cases, it can't work for negligence, as I understand it. Second, the paper argues that it is difficult to distinguish between negligence and simple inadvertence. This fact poses a problem, since we have good reason for thinking that inadvertence counts as an excuse, whereas negligence is generally thought not to excuse. I argue that the parallels between negligence and inadvertence suggest that negligent agents are not responsible for the harms they produce. 1One especially notable exception is Michael Zimmerman, "Negligence and Moral Responsibility," Noûs 20 (1986): 199-218. But Zimmerman's treatment begins by giving an overly restrictive gloss on negligence, one characterized by the agent's previous consideration of the possibility of harm, and then arguing that we can explain responsibility in such cases. Given this artificial scope, he misses a good many, I would even say most, cases of negligence, wherein the agent never before consciously considered the risk of harm such conduct might pose. 2Manuel Vargas has also emphasized this point. See his "The Trouble With Tracing," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 269-91, esp. p. 283. 578 Matt King The arguments for these conclusions are advanced in sections 2 and 4, respectively. Section 3 illustrates why tracing's failure is important. And section 5 proposes an alternative model for distinguishing between negligence and inadvertence that does justice to our intuitions, while holding that in neither case is the agent morally responsible. 2. The Nature of Negligence Negligence constitutes a special class of cases. Unlike harms that agents bring about on purpose, or knowingly, or even recklessly, negligently produced harms are brought about because of an absence of care. Negligent agents risk harm by not taking sufficient care in acting. They fail to pay appropriate attention to the possible consequences of their conduct, and thus substantially increase the risk of harm such conduct poses. For example, suppose that Nate, tired from waking up early, is backing out of his driveway. His thoughts turn to his meetings that day, and his attention is partially focused on a radio commercial. Due to his inattention, Nate doesn't see a child walking to school and so hits him, breaking the child's leg. Nate is negligent: he fails to pay proper attention to what he is doing and so risks harm to others, a risk that is unfortunately realized. Moreover, Nate seems both responsible and blameworthy for his negligent conduct. He is at fault because he didn't pay attention, and as a result is morally responsible for the child's injuries. What is noteworthy about Nate's case is that lots of activities risk harm. But negligence is unique in that it does not require consciously entertaining the risk one's conduct poses. It only has to be the case that one's conduct is unreasonably risky, not that one acted in the recognition that it was so. Thus, negligence abandons the element of conscious consideration often required for blameworthy conduct. To do x negligently is to do x as a result of not consciously entertaining the risk of x posed by one's directly intended conduct and refraining from (or adequately modifying) that conduct. Thus, we should consider negligence as characterized by the failure to consider the risk. The hallmark of negligence is the lack of a conscious element. My characterization is meant to capture a wide range of ordinary cases, but for all that, it is also semi-stipulative. There is no doubt, I think, that we do blame people for harms they bring about due to their unconscious inattention. I'm calling such agents "negligent." Of course, there may be other linguistically legitimate uses of "negligence" (and its cognates) than mine here; naturally, my arguments won't necessarily extend to such cases. But I don't think it controversial that agents who are careless, thoughtless, or inattentive, and cause harm as a result, are blamed (and judged blameworthy) for that harm. So even if "negligence" The Problem with Negligence 579 can be treated more broadly to include cases outside my characterization, this does little to blunt the scope of the problems I raise here.3 The problem with negligence begins with the simple observation that while negligence is characterized by the lack of a conscious mental element, paradigmatic cases of responsibility seem to require at least some conscious mental element tying the agent to the outcome in question.4 If I decide to stab someone, and then stab him intentionally, then I am responsible for doing so at least partially because I did so intentionally and with full awareness. Indeed, some of our most common excuses to blame are considerations that show that some outcome was unintentional or that the agent wasn't aware of what he was doing (subject to certain constraints).5 So if Negligent Nate is responsible for the child's injuries, but has no conscious mental state tying him to those injuries, we need some special explanation for how this could be so. If we are to be responsible for the products of our negligence, as Negligent Nate's6 case suggests, then it must be that responsibility doesn't always require some connecting conscious mental state. This is no special problem, one might think, because we already have in the literature a strategy for explaining responsibility in the absence of a conscious mental element. We call it tracing, because responsibility for some conduct without the conscious mental element can be "traced back" to some previous decision or action that does have the conscious mental element. For example, Sven is drinking at a bar, and has one (or maybe more) too many. Sven is sloshed. Nevertheless, he drives toward home. En route, and due to his drunkenness, he hits a family sedan, seriously injuring all four passengers. Suppose that Sven is sufficiently intoxicated that he lacks the relevant conscious mental states for responsibility at the time of the crash. If we want to maintain that Sven is still responsible for hitting the sedan, then his responsibility for that must be located elsewhere. This is where tracing comes in. We can trace his responsibility for the crash to his responsibility for a prior act (or condition) that contributed to the crash. Sloshed Sven elects to drink to excess, and as a result of this choice, he hits and injures a number of people. His choice left him drunk, and therefore severely impaired with respect to his ability to control his 3I should also note that on my characterization of negligence, an agent can be negligent without actually causing any harm. If Nate backs out of the driveway without looking and doesn't hit anything, he is still negligent, for he still fails to consider the risk his conduct poses. 4I take paradigmatic cases of responsibility to be cases of fully intentional action by competent agents. In such a case, an agent S brings about x by A-ing, and S intended to bring about x by A-ing. 5This is a point I will return to in detail in section 4. 6Negligent Nate's name here is not meant to suggest a general character trait, but merely to help remind the reader of the specifics of the case when it is later brought up. 580 Matt King conduct. In this case we can say that the initial choice creates a condition of impairment that later clearly contributes to some harm. The above is, roughly, the structure of tracing.7 It is worth noting that this is a general way of explaining cases like Sven's. It is a strategy that can be adopted by all theories of responsibility to handle cases in which the usually requisite mental states are not present. We can ascribe responsibility for the harm so long as we can trace the harm back to some prior action that did include the relevant conscious mental element. Then all that's required is that the agent satisfied the conditions on responsibility for that prior choice or action, and responsibility can be transmitted to the later outcome.8 Tracing works, then, only when the prior action meets two conditions: (1) the agent is responsible for that action; and, (2) that action caused the agent to fail to satisfy the conditions on responsibility for the later action.9 Tracing plainly will not work, however, in cases of negligence, for in such cases it is difficult to demonstrate what the initial choice is. Sloshed Sven's accident is largely due to his drunkenness, for which, by hypothesis, he was responsible.10 Tracing claims that in such circumstances responsibility is transmitted to (at least some of) the outcomes produced by his drunkenness, even if at the time of those later actions Sven lacks the conditions normally required for responsibility. This is because Sven, 7At least as it applies in the case of negligence. "Tracing" is a broad label used for a variety of appeals to the importance of an agent's history on his present responsibility. This broad notion has been an explicit interest of theories at least since Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1984), and especially in responses to that work in Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Free Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), John Fischer and Mark Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), and Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). The core notion is also discussed by Peter van Inwagen, "When the Will Is Not Free," Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 95-113, and, in response, by Gordon Pettit, "Are We Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism," Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 219-37, and David Vander Laan, "A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism," Philosophical Studies 103 (2001): 201-15. But more recently, the focus on tracing has been as represented in the text, as a tool for explaining responsibility in cases in which the agent presently lacks the conscious mental states typically present in paradigmatic cases of responsibility. See John Fischer and Neal Tognazzini, "The Truth About Tracing," Noûs 43 (2009), in press; Michael McKenna, "Putting the Lie on the Control Condition for Moral Responsibility," Philosophical Studies 139 (2008): 29-37; and Vargas, "The Trouble With Tracing." 8The "can" here is important; tracing merely allows us to explain how an agent can be responsible for the subsequent harm, not that he must be. 9There is a related discussion in legal theory that concerns "prior choice" accounts of criminal liability. For a discussion of these accounts, see Stephen Garvey, "What's Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?" Texas Law Review 85 (2007): 333-83. 10If one doubts his responsibility, we'll just have to come up with another case, since his will no longer illustrate how tracing is supposed to work. The Problem with Negligence 581 roughly, chooses to get drunk. Contrast this case with Negligent Nate. He doesn't choose to be inattentive, nor does he do anything else for which he is responsible that also obviously creates the condition of his inattentiveness. First, recall that the carelessness associated with negligence is characterized by the lack of a conscious awareness of potential harm. It is not the disregarding of any consideration nor does it involve the realization of risk. Negligence is crucially defined by the absence of consideration, not its conscious dismissal. Second, we need to consider the potential contributing factors to his unawareness. In the example as stated, Nate is groggy, part of his attention is focused on his meetings that day, and he is somewhat distracted by the radio. These do not seem to resemble choices in the way that Sven's continued drinking is a choice. At the very least, one needs to show how these three factors would create a condition of carelessness (as Sven's drinking creates his drunkenness), one characterized by its nonconscious nature. Nate plausibly does not choose to think about his meetings that day, nor is it obvious that such thinking would lead one to be inattentive. Often thoughts simply occur to us, and it is certainly common to have thoughts about one's upcoming day just "rise to the surface" of conscious attention. It also doesn't seem as though Nate chooses to be groggy. He may choose to go to bed at a given time, and also to wake up (or at least get up), but we need not suppose that this entails he chooses to be groggy. Perhaps he got plenty of sleep and allotted plenty of time to "wake up" before leaving. It could nevertheless be the case that despite his precautions he is still groggy when he leaves the house. It also isn't clear that he chooses to drive while groggy; that is, he may not realize that he is groggy. And if he doesn't realize it, and he took the aforementioned reasonable steps to avoid grogginess, this would seem sufficient for undermining his responsibility for his grogginess. Lastly, though he may choose to turn on the radio, he doesn't choose to be distracted by it. Often background music or commercials can simply grab hold of our attention, even when we wish them not to, and it can be a hard matter to predict when this will be the case. Even if we think that Nate should have done more to guard against distraction, we could simply modify the case to remove the worries. Perhaps he is distracted by the sunrise, or a bird nearby, instead of the radio. Perhaps he isn't even groggy; he just gets distracted or otherwise fails to pay attention and so hits the child. The point is that simply failing to look behind him and hitting the child will be sufficient to demonstrate negligence, but nevertheless there will be no conscious choice to trace respon582 Matt King sibility back to. Thus, it seems tracing is an insufficient explanation for Nate's responsibility for the negligently produced harm.11 3. The Importance of the Failure of Tracing If I'm right, then we can't appeal to tracing, the standard explanation for nonparadigmatic cases, to explain responsibility in instances of negligence. It follows that if we are unable to give a general explanation of responsibility that can account for cases involving negligence, either negligence requires an exceptional ad hoc explanation, or else we ought to reject the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they bring about. In this section, I first argue that the most dominant general account of responsibility on offer cannot handle negligence cases in the same way as standard cases of action, but is forced to give a disjunctive explanation. I then argue that such an account of responsibility in negligence cases would be objectionably ad hoc. Explanation by tracing is an attempt to extend a general account of responsibility to cases involving negligence. Tracing tries to explain all cases in which the relevant conscious states are absent by reference to those same conscious states in some prior action. Tracing purports to show how cases of paradigmatic responsible action and Sloshed Sven's case are alike, and how this similarity explains responsibility in both cases. But tracing cannot bridge the gap between Sloshed Sven and Negligent Nate. Nate lacks the conscious mental element and there is nothing to trace back to. So the problem isn't just that tracing fails to explain responsibility in cases of negligence, it is that whatever the explanation is for negligence, if negligent agents are responsible, then the explanation should appeal to the same considerations as the explanation of responsibility both in cases like Sven's and in cases of paradigmatic responsible action. But this looks like a very unpromising project, for it seems that responsibility in paradigmatic cases is (at least in part) due to the presence of certain conscious mental states, just those sorts of states the absence of which characterizes negligence and to which tracing is supposed to trace back. But perhaps there is an alternative general explanation of responsibil- 11Steven Sverdlik argues that agents can be "culpable" for negligence even in the absence of prior choices. Instead, he claims that responsibility is explained by the fact that the agent could have engaged in "moral reflection" that would have exposed the risk of harm. See Steven Sverdlik, "Pure Negligence," American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993): 137-49. (In this respect he mirrors Hart; see n. 19 below.) Sverdlik and I agree that tracing is insufficient to explain responsibility in cases of negligence, and disagree about negligent agents being responsible. The reasons for this disagreement will be made clear below. The Problem with Negligence 583 ity that one might appeal to. There is a family of views for explaining responsibility that gives priority not to conscious mental states, but rather to the quality of will an agent's conduct "manifests."12 On this view, that an agent's conduct manifests an ill quality of will is sufficient for demonstrating responsibility. If Mad Max punches out the bartender, then this conduct manifests a quality of ill will on Max's part toward the bartender. The upshot for our purposes is that conduct that isn't chosen can still plausibly manifest qualities of will. For instance,13 a husband who routinely fails to consider his wife's interests and to at least occasionally place them above his own seems to express some quality of ill will toward her. In another example, repeatedly forgetting a close friend's birthday seems to manifest a lack of consideration toward him. When we do things that manifest ill qualities of will, so the view goes, we are the legitimate targets of certain kinds of criticism on the basis of that conduct (the kinds of criticism intimately associated with responsibility).14 One might think that such views have an easier time explaining negligence. It doesn't matter that Negligent Nate doesn't consciously choose to risk running the child over, his failure to pay adequate attention nevertheless manifests a quality of ill will. Naturally, it's not as bad a quality of will as if he had harmed the child intentionally or knowingly, say. Nevertheless, failure to pay attention when one is engaged in activities that pose a risk of serious harm displays a lack of consideration for those who you risk harm to. So, Negligent Nate displays ill will toward the child, and is thus responsible for harming him. I think these approaches fare no better than tracing in explaining responsibility in negligence cases. To see this, we first need an account of what it means for an action to "manifest" a quality of will. Unfortunately, the main proponents of these views say very little about what the "manifesting" relation is. As I see it, then, there are two main options: "mani- 12The classic statement is P.F. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," reprinted in Gary Watson, Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 59-80, who speaks in terms of actions "reflecting" and "expressing" qualities of will (p. 63). Other developed quality of will accounts include Pete Graham, Blame, Determinism, and Ignorance (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, New York University, 2005), and R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). Michael McKenna and Gary Watson endorse at least the core aspects of Strawson's original approach in, respectively, "The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism," The Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 123-42, and "Responsibility and the Limits of Evil," in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 256-86. For a quality of will approach applied to responsibility for one's attitudes, see Angela Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life," Ethics 115 (2005): 236-71. 13The following examples are from Smith, "Responsibility for Attitudes." 14Ibid., p. 243. 584 Matt King fest" could be a causal relation or an evidential relation. There is textual evidence for either gloss. Some authors use "manifest" simultaneously with "express," which often looks causal, but the use of the relation on these views is to draw inferences from actions to qualities of will. No matter our gloss, however, on neither understanding will quality of will approaches be able to explain negligence responsibility.15 Indeed, they both fail for the same reason. One possible reading of "manifest" is as an evidential reading because the role it plays in the theory is to support inferences from actions to qualities of ill will. Unfortunately, on this reading, quality of will theories will fail to explain negligence responsibility. On the evidential reading, we are supposed to think that Negligent Nate's conduct evinces an ill quality of will. He should have paid more attention to what he was doing, and the fact that he didn't is evidence that he doesn't give the appropriate consideration to those to whom he risks harm in operating a vehicle carelessly. But this conclusion is too strong. The power of the evidential relation surely rests on the reliability of the inference from conduct to ill qualities of will. The reliability of such an inference requires, it seems, some regularity in its connections. Notice that in sketching the examples above I used words like "repeatedly" and "routinely." Of course, any conduct can count as some evidence for the underlying quality of will, but we generally require more before we are justified in actually drawing the inference. In order to justifiably draw the inference, we need something like a pattern of response. But ascriptions of responsibility in cases of negligence need not rest on regularities. In fact, such ascriptions can fly in the face of compelling additional evidence: Negligent Nate could have at all times previously been the paragon of careful driving. This is counterevidence, it would seem, for thinking that in the particular case in question, Nate manifests ill will toward anyone, even the child. Nevertheless, one transgression is sufficient for negligence, and if negligence itself is to be sufficient for responsibility, then it seems that quality of will views (on the evidential reading) fare no better in explaining it, for the transgression itself won't be sufficient evidence for an ill quality of will. A perhaps more plausible reading of "manifests" is as a causal reading, but unfortunately quality of will views will fail on such a reading for much the same reason. On this reading, we are supposed to think that Nate's negligence, his failure to pay attention, is caused by some ill quality of will, either toward the child or in general. It seems to me we should be initially skeptical of such a claim, for Nate doesn't even know the 15For the remainder of the paper I will use "negligence responsibility" merely as convenient shorthand for "responsibility for the products of negligent conduct." The Problem with Negligence 585 child is there, or that anyone is there for that matter. Nor is he even consciously thinking about backing up, so we might seriously doubt that his current frame of mind is such that his attitudes toward others, whatever they are, would be engaged to cause his lack of care. More importantly, however, Nate could very well hold quite positive attitudes toward the child he injures. Perhaps the child is a neighbor's son, who mows Nate's grass and shovels his sidewalk when it snows. Nate is very grateful for the son's work, thinks him a fine young man, and so on. If this were the case, it would be hard to claim that Nate holds any ill will toward the child, much less that that ill will caused his failure to pay attention. Indeed, it seems our causal judgments will be tied up again with the reliability of our inferences from the conduct to the agent's attitudes, and will therefore be subject to counterevidence of the above sort.16 No matter the gloss we give to "manifest," quality of will approaches fare no better at explaining responsibility for negligently produced harms. Quality of will accounts seem to require some regularity of conduct. Repeatedly disregarding someone's interests might count as sufficient evidence for an ill quality of will, but a one-time offense would be insufficient. Compare again the case of the inconsiderate husband with a case of negligence like Nate's. Filling in some details, the husband in question makes plans, chooses, and acts, usually with no concern for his wife's interests, preferences, or values. He doesn't purposely act contrary to his wife's wishes; he just habitually fails to consider them. When he deliberates, facts about his wife's interests simply don't enter in as reasons for or against his options. If we examine his actions, then, we are led to suppose that he doesn't actually value his wife in a particular way. If he did, he wouldn't continuously fail to factor her interests into his deliberations. This inference is supported by the copious evidence we have for the conclusion. In our context, it seems plain that the husband lacks concern for his wife, and this fact is apparent in the choices he makes and the actions he takes. For cases such as his, quality of will views look promising. Even though he doesn't consciously disregard his wife's interests, the fact that he disregards them at all seems to reveal something about his values and commitments. Moreover, the copious evidence we have makes more plausible the notion that when he fails to consider her interests he does so because of a lack of concern. But Nate's case is importantly different from the husband case. We don't have copious evidence about Nate. We have a single instance of negligence. He fails to consider the risk he is posing to those behind him 16I am not here suggesting that quality of will views require that actions be the product of stable dispositions of character. My focus is on the relevant considerations for reasonably drawing inferences about an agent's quality of will from his action, not on the causal connections themselves. 586 Matt King as he backs out of his driveway. But this is insufficient evidence for drawing the conclusion that Nate holds a lack of concern for those around him. If Nate had developed a habit of backing out without looking, then matters would be different; then his case would look like the husband's. But even without such regularity in conduct, Nate is negligent. His lack of care suffices for that. So quality of will views cannot explain why his negligence is sufficient for responsibility because we don't have sufficient reason to think Nate holds ill will toward anyone. This is especially true anytime we have counterevidence involving positive qualities of will. But once is enough for an ascription of responsibility in negligence cases. Even someone who in all other respects is the acme of consideration and care can be responsible for negligent conduct, it seems, should he fail to pay proper attention in just one instance. Quality of will accounts, therefore, even if they could explain responsibility in some cases of negligence, cannot explain responsibility across cases of negligence. It might seem there's a simpler response a quality of will proponent might make. One could claim that it is the lack of attention itself that constitutes the ill will in cases of negligence. Nate, for example, fails to consider the risk of harm he's posing to others as he backs out, and it is this failure that constitutes his negative quality of will. Such a response is no doubt an attractive one for quality of will theorists to take, but it doesn't really address the issue at hand. The first problem with this answer is that it solves the matter only by fiat. We have just seen that we don't have good evidence for an ill quality of will on Nate's part. The solution on offer here simply lowers the bar for what we need in order to draw the inference. In short, the response here suggests that Nate's case can be treated just like the husband case: both involve lacks of consideration, and a single demonstration of such a lack licenses us to infer an ill quality of will. But this just can't be right. A consultation with our own past experiences should be enough to see why. We don't automatically ascribe ill quality of will to our friends who fail to consider our interests on one occasion, forgetting a birthday, say. We require more. Part of this reaction is surely that we have ample evidence of their good will for us. But while it may be the case that in the absence of such counterevidence, when we consider a case like Nate's in a vacuum, we are more apt to make inferential leaps, it is equally apparent that when given such counterevidence, the inference is all the more difficult to sustain. And if this is right, then quality of will views simply do not give the right explanation of responsibility in negligence cases. The second problem with this response is that it fails to give us a general explanation of responsibility across cases. It was supposed to show how negligent agents manifest qualities of ill will just like in paradigThe Problem with Negligence 587 matic cases. But the ill will doing the work in Nate's case according to this last response isn't the same as the ill will in Mad Max's case of punching the bartender. In the latter case, there is clearly an "active" quality of ill will at work, one that is engaged and "expressed" in action. Indeed, it seems to play a causal/explanatory role. But in Nate's case, according to this last response, his negligence constitutes the ill will. It is a "passive" ill will, one that is posited in order to give a verdict that accords with common sense.17 So we don't have a general account of responsibility that can explain both cases together; we have two accounts, one for each. In this way, the view fares no better than any disjunctive account we could give. The model for such a view would go like this: A is responsible for x when he meets some set of conditions α (those obtaining in paradigmatic cases) OR when he meets some different set of conditions β (those obtaining in negligence cases). Disjunctive accounts, however, ignore the fact that in both cases the agent involved is supposed to be responsible for x. So if there's something interesting to the notion that both are responsible, that both deserve certain treatment because they are responsible, we should want our theory to explain why this is so in a way that sheds light on this shared feature of the cases. We should want a general explanation. Quality of will views cannot accomplish this task, and so fail as a satisfactory explanation of negligence responsibility. 4. Negligence as a Species of Inadvertence If I'm right, then, tracing fails as an explanation for responsibility for negligently produced outcomes. It fails because it requires tracing responsibility back to some conscious mental element, usually a choice or action. But negligence is defined by a lack of conscious mental states, an unconscious inattention, and there need be no choices or decisions that contribute to that inattention. Thus, tracing is unable to help us explain responsibility for negligently produced outcomes. If I'm right that no general explanation is available to cover cases of negligence, we are seemingly left with two options: either add ad hoc clauses to our theories to explain negligence responsibility as a special case, or drop the intuitive conclusion that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they produce. I argued in the previous section that the first option is unsatisfactory. The other option one can take is to reject the claim that Negligent 17I should note that "active" quality of wills can still be described in terms of dispositions, say, in the way that the husband counts as "callous" or "indifferent." But to count as such one will still need a pattern of behavior (as in the husband's case) or some awareness of the situation (as in the case of intentional action). 588 Matt King Nate is responsible for the child's injuries. If that were the case, then we should expect tracing to fail as an explanation. Indeed, no satisfactory explanation could be given that would cover such cases and paradigmatic cases of responsible actions. And as I will now argue, we actually have some reason to think that negligent agents are not responsible for the outcomes they produce because negligence seems indistinguishable from simple inadvertence from the perspective of responsibility, and inadvertence counts as an excuse. Explaining these cases together, then, pressures us to treat negligence like inadvertence, and therefore either reject the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they produce, or else accept that inadvertent agents are also responsible. I'll argue that the second option is unattractive, and thus that negligent agents are not in fact responsible for the harms they bring about. Now it is likely the case that intuitions will still diverge about negligence cases and cases of inadvertence. That is, many will still judge negligent agents worse than their inadvertent counterparts. We can explain this fact, however, by reference to what does distinguish negligent agents from their inadvertent counterparts. It is a difference that I think will show why we tend to treat negligent agents more harshly, but it is not a difference that will actually demonstrate them to be responsible. I outline a model for such an explanation in section 5. We know what Negligent Nate did, but let's compare him with a new case. Leadfoot Lenny18 is at a party where a group of friends are gathered watching a movie. There are more people than seats, and some have gotten comfortable lying on the floor. Lenny gets up to get a soda from the fridge, and in the course of stepping around and over people, he inadvertently steps on his friend's hand. He didn't mean to step on his friend's hand, but he was distracted by the movie, and so he did. Nevertheless, it seems Lenny's responsibility in this case is undermined due to his inadvertence, which makes his stepping on the hand unintentional. We seem to treat negligence as preserving responsibility, whereas inadvertence seems to undermine it. But if this is the case, then there must be a way of distinguishing between Nate's case and Lenny's in a way that explains why Nate is responsible and Lenny is not. Otherwise, we're forced to conclude that either negligence does undermine responsibility, or else inadvertence doesn't undermine responsibility. I think the latter disjunct is far more problematic than the first, and I'll defend this claim at the end of the section. First I want to demonstrate that there is no satisfactory way to distinguish between Nate and Lenny that indicates a difference in responsibility. 18Lenny's name here, like Nate's, does not reveal a character trait, but makes clear the facts of the case. The Problem with Negligence 589 An initial observation about cases of negligence is that they involve a failure to do something the agent should have done; negligent agents should have paid more attention. We say, "Nate should have looked where he was going." Unfortunately, such claims are ambiguous. There are two possible interpretations for how to treat the "should have," and each interpretation seems to fail to distinguish properly between Negligent Nate and Leadfoot Lenny. On the first interpretation, the "should have" means simply that it would have been better had Nate done what he failed to do. It would have been better had Nate looked because then the child wouldn't have been hit. The problem with this first interpretation is that, while true of Nate's case, it is equally true of Lenny's case. It would have been better if Lenny had been more careful, because then his friend wouldn't have gotten his hand stepped on. So the first interpretation fails to distinguish between the cases at all. On the second, more plausible, interpretation, the "should have" refers to some sort of standard that was violated.19 We require individuals to look when they back out of driveways (in part because we expect them to recognize the dangers posed by operating vehicles). Moreover, this seems to be an instance of a general duty to take extra care when engaging in activities that pose a risk of harm (or, perhaps, just a standing duty to take care in our conduct). The problem on this second interpretation is that we can always ask why supposedly nonresponsible counterparts (like Lenny) aren't under a similar sort of standing duty. Navigating around people lying on the floor poses a risk of harm. If a standing duty is sufficient for securing responsibility, then Lenny would seem to be responsible as well. While our expectations are surely stronger in Negligent Nate's case, this seems insufficient for setting negligence cases apart as a distinct class of cases with respect to responsibility. After all, a standing duty governing a given activity applies to all those who engage in the relevant activity. But the relevant requirement here isn't driving carefully. If it were, it wouldn't apply to negligent agents whose negligence has nothing to do with driving, like a bricklayer who tosses defective bricks off a rooftop without looking.20 But the bricklayer seems negligent in the same way as Nate is: he should have paid more attention to the harm he risked. And even if we have scores of standing duties finely 19Compare H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), who grants that inadvertence implies a "blank" state of mind to the consequences of one's actions even when negligent, but argues that negligence lies not in inadvertence but in failing to live up to some objective standard. See also Claire Finkelstein, "Responsibility for Unintended Consequences," Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2005): 579-99. 20This example is from Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, and is often reused in discussions of negligence in legal theory. See also Finkelstein, "Responsibility for Unintended Consequences," and Zimmerman, "Negligence and Moral Responsibility." 590 Matt King individuated by activity, so that there's one governing driving, and another governing bricklaying, and another governing firing a gun, and so on, this is only because they fall out of a quite general standing duty to take care in everything we do. It might be thought that satisfying the standard may require different thresholds of care depending on the specific activity. So, when one is driving or bricklaying on a roof, one needs to take special care, but not when one is walking around prone people on the way to getting a soda. I'm not convinced that this is really a demand for more care than in Lenny's hand-stepping case, and not just a different side of the same point about driving and bricklaying on a roof having the potential for more harm than stepping around prone people.21 That is, it seems to me that a demand for more care in a given activity is really just a statement that the activity is more dangerous. Nevertheless, even if we think you do have to be more careful in certain situations, this wouldn't distinguish between the cases on grounds that evince a difference in responsibility. For the mere violation of a standing duty of care wouldn't suffice to show that an agent is responsible for the effects of such a violation. And if it did, Leadfoot Lenny would be responsible too. If negligence and inadvertence are indistinguishable from the perspective of responsibility, then I think we're forced to conclude either that (a) negligent agents aren't responsible for the harms they cause, or (b) inadvertent agents are responsible for the harms they cause. In short, either both Nate and Lenny are responsible or neither is. In favor of (a), I think it true that inadvertence seems to count as a consideration that undermines responsibility precisely because it involves the lack of a conscious mental element. When one does something only inadvertently, it is an unintentional result, one the individual didn't mean to bring about. Thus, it seems a mistake to think that such a result reflects on the agent in a way such that we can evaluate the agent by the inadvertent outcome's lights. It doesn't seem as if the agent deserves any sort of treatment on the basis that outcome. In short, he isn't responsible for it. But what about (b)? Some might be attracted to the view that Lenny and Nate are both responsible for the harms they bring about. After all, we might say the same things to both: "Watch where you're going!" or 21It has been suggested to me that we license people for driving (Nate), whereas we don't license people for stepping around prone people (Lenny). This is true, no doubt in large part because of the importance we place on driving. It is obvious that such activities pose the risk of especially serious harm, more so than stepping around prone people. But I don't think this amounts to a claim about demanding more care in such instances, but rather a certification that those we license can demonstrate those skills that constitute taking care in the circumstances germane to the activity. Plus, the costs of requiring and regulating licenses are worth it, given the seriousness of the potential harm. This isn't the case in the matter of prone-people-stepping. The Problem with Negligence 591 "You're supposed to pay attention to what you're doing!" Indeed, one convinced by my argument that negligence and inadvertence are really indistinguishable from the perspective of responsibility might well point to the shared standing duty of care and claim that the symmetrical violations by Nate and Lenny suggest that they are both responsible. One who is attracted to such a position, however, still faces a significant hurdle: the explanation for such responsibility still won't explain responsibility in paradigmatic cases. It is worth remembering that if negligence and inadvertence are indistinguishable from the perspective of responsibility, then both will require exceptional explanations since both are characterized by the absence of a conscious element. It should also be apparent that just as tracing won't work for negligence, it won't work for inadvertence either. Moreover, a view that claimed that inadvertent agents, too, were responsible, would seem to yield the wrong result in cases of praiseworthiness. An agent who brings about some good outcome inadvertently surely isn't praiseworthy for it, no matter how great the good achieved. And even if there are important differences between praiseworthiness and blameworthiness, it doesn't seem as if an agent who brings about some good inadvertently is even responsible for it, claims of praise aside. So while insisting that both negligent and inadvertent agents are responsible is an available option, I think such a claim both conflicts with a natural view about inadvertence and gets us no closer to explaining responsibility in either case. 5. Preserving a Distinction Comparing negligence with inadvertence leads me to suspect that negligent agents really aren't responsible for the outcomes they bring about. But why does the intuition that Negligent Nate is responsible seem so strong? Why does negligence still seem importantly different from mere inadvertence? Well, one important difference between Nate's case and Lenny's is that Nate causes much more harm. A broken leg is much worse than a trod-upon hand (we're assuming the hand isn't broken). Additionally, there's only so much harm you can cause by inattentively walking around prone people, whereas the risk of serious injury by inattentively operating a car is much greater. But it doesn't seem to me that considerations such as these can support differing judgments of responsibility. First, I'll defend this claim, and then I'll show how these considerations may yet help explain our differing reactions to the cases, and in turn distinguish between negligence and inadvertence themselves. I don't think the severity of the harm caused can make a difference to responsibility. Suppose you knew that an agent caused some harm en592 Matt King tirely by mistake, by making an entirely reasonable choice, say. If you were convinced that the agent wasn't responsible, would the fact that it was a serious harm make a difference? To put the point generally, suppose we take a case in which it's obvious an agent isn't responsible and then ratchet up the seriousness of the harm brought about. Is there a threshold in which responsibility "appears"? I find the very suggestion to be implausible. One reason to think it's implausible surfaces if we compare paradigm cases of responsibility. So, suppose Deirdre hates Emma and wants her to suffer. So Deidre waits for Emma to get off work, sneaks up behind her in the parking lot and beats her with a baseball bat. Emma suffers multiple contusions, a cracked skull, and a concussion. Deidre is responsible for Emma's injuries if anyone ever is. Now suppose that Fran hates Ginny and wants her to suffer. So Fran waits for Ginny to get off work, sneaks up behind her in the parking lot and pulls down her pants, causing Ginny to trip and fall. Ginny skins her knees and is humiliated. Fran, too, seems responsible for Ginny's injuries if anyone ever is. Indeed, in comparison, Deidre and Fran seem equally responsible for their respective harms. The paradigm of responsible action is cases of intentional action (by ordinary agents) aimed at a particular outcome as the intended end. Deidre and Fran's actions fit the bill. Both are out solely to harm (in different ways) their targets, and this is precisely what they do. In fact, I don't see how one could be more responsible for some outcome than they are in their respective scenarios. It should be apparent, however, that the harm done to Emma is much worse than the harm done to Ginny. Indeed, Deidre is certainly more blameworthy than Fran for what she does precisely because the harm Deidre brings about is so much worse.22 But the amount of harm brought about isn't pertinent to the ladies' responsibility for bringing it about. Both are equally responsible in their respective scenarios. So, while the amount of harm brought about is certainly relevant for how blameworthy an agent is, it isn't relevant to her responsibility for bringing it about. That's why Deidre and Fran are both equally responsible for their respective harms, even while Deidre is more blameworthy for her harm than Fran is for hers. This result can be applied to Nate's situation. First, let's change the case slightly, and let's call the new Nate, Nate*. Suppose everything is as before, but instead of not seeing the child, he doesn't see a child's bike. 22There may be other relevant factors in play here. We may judge Deidre more blameworthy overall because we also think it's worse to intend to physically assault someone than to harass them a bit. But I want to limit the discussion above to comparative judgments regarding blameworthiness for what they do, blameworthiness for particular mental states notwithstanding. The Problem with Negligence 593 So Nate* runs over a child's bike. This is a much less serious harm than what Nate brings about. Is Nate* less responsible for running over the child's bike? I don't think so. Responsibility ascriptions seem importantly insulated from the amount of harm caused, as Deidre and Fran showed. So I think the answer one gives should match whatever one thinks about Nate's case, and the same goes if Nate* runs over a prized rosebush or three hundred nuns. Since we should treat these cases alike, and I think Nate* isn't responsible, Nate isn't responsible either. Now we have an explanation for our differing reactions to Negligent Nate and Leadfoot Lenny. We tend to treat Nate more harshly because his failure of the standing duty of care is worse than Lenny's. Interestingly, this difference can also be used to distinguish between negligence and inadvertence. We can understand this comparison in terms of the amount of harm risked by the activity each is engaged in. I am assuming here that the probability of harm is equivalent in these two cases. The reader is invited to tweak the example suitably if the reader doubts that the probabilities are in fact the same.23 This assumption will be important below. Now, Nate is operating a vehicle, which poses the risk for quite serious harm. Driving a vehicle carelessly can kill multiple people; and this is a serious harm indeed. Lenny's activity, while it does risk harm, risks a much more minor amount of harm. One could dislocate a finger or perhaps even break a bone by having one's hand stepped on, but these are fairly minor harms. This comparison helps explain what distinguishes Nate's negligence from Lenny's simple inadvertence. The difference can be highlighted by reference to the expected negative value of the harms risked by engaging in such activities without due care. In both cases, the agent fails a standard of care. Indeed, as experience will reveal, we would admonish both Lenny and Nate for their failures. "Watch where you're going!" we might snap. And in keeping with my story for our reactions to Nate, this response also has as its source the general standing duty of care, and our providing it serves to reinforce that standard (and hopefully encourages Lenny to be more careful in the future). But driving vehicles poses a much more serious risk of harm because the sorts of harms that could result if one doesn't satisfy the standard are so much worse. Thus, Nate's violation is worse; it more severely flouts the duty to avoid harm by engaging in a more dangerous activity without being sufficiently careful. However, this isn't the only way to fail the standing duty of care. The line between Nate and Lenny (and thus between negligence and inadvertence) is drawn by the expected negative value of the harm risked with- 23We could do this artificially by example, but the examples would be contrived. I prefer to assume the equivalence of probability and work with more ordinary examples. 594 Matt King out due care. But there are two ways one can increase the expected negative value of the harm. The first way, as demonstrated by comparing Nate and Lenny, is to increase the amount of harm risked by the activity. Driving vehicles risks more harm than stepping around prone people. So Nate is negligent because the expected negative value of driving without due care is too high, because driving without due care poses a certain risk of very serious harm. Lenny is inadvertent and acts without due care, but the negative expected value of his conduct is relatively low, given the amount of harm risked. The other way to increase the expected negative value of the harm, however, is to increase the risk of harm; that is, to engage in riskier activities. For example, shooting one's firearm without care in the middle of Montana risks a certain amount of harm (e.g., a gunshot wound that could lead to death). Shooting one's firearm without care in the middle of Manhattan risks the same amount of harm, but it poses a much higher risk of that harm actually occurring. The chances that you will shoot someone in the middle of Montana are quite slim when compared to shooting someone in the middle of Manhattan. So, failing the standard in Manhattan, in this instance, is worse than failing it in Montana. It also seems to me that in the very unlikely event that the Montana shooter injured someone, this would seem to be a case of inadvertent shooting, whereas if the Manhattan shooter injured someone, he would do so negligently.24 This verdict matches natural reactions to these cases, I think, and captures what is essential in distinguishing negligence from inadvertence. Negligence involves the failure to pay appropriate attention when the expected negative value of the risked harms meets or exceeds some threshold. Inadvertence involves the same sort of inattentiveness, but the negative expected value of the harm risked is much lower. When one's carelessness increases the negative expected value of the harm risked too much, that agent is negligent. This means that for all I've said the Montana shooter may also be negligent. Similarly, there may be cases like Nate's that don't qualify as negligence. For example, if Norene lives in rural Virginia and is backing out of her driveway without looking, where she is 10 miles from her nearest neighbor, where kids don't walk to school, and it's 5 a.m., perhaps she is only inadvertent, even if she hit a child. I happen to think that this is probably not right, and the explanation for this fact is that driving without due care always increases the negative expected value to unacceptable levels. Nevertheless, these cases 24If it helps, we can suppose that both are shooting at soda cans they've propped up 100 ft. away. Here, the confines and population of Manhattan make it much more likely that the Manhattan shooter will hit someone if he's not careful. Indeed, it may be that no amount of care could keep a bystander from being shot. The Problem with Negligence 595 help illustrate how negligence is a form of inadvertence, one in which the expected negative value of the inattentive conduct is too great. 6. Conclusion In this paper I hope to have accomplished three objectives. First, the unconscious nature of negligence poses a deep and interesting problem for all theories of responsibility, one that isn't solved by tracing, the main tool in the literature for handling similar cases. The problem is that explanations of responsibility need to extend across cases of responsibility, but the difference between negligence cases and paradigm cases of action seems too big a gulf for a single explanation to span. Second, negligence's similarity to inadvertence puts pressure on theories to treat both on a par. And since inadvertence seems to excuse agents from responsibility, this fact suggests that negligent agents, too, are not responsible. Finally, I proposed an alternative model for distinguishing between negligence and inadvertence, which explains them in terms of a shared inattentiveness and the expected negative value of the potential consequences of the conduct. Of course, this means the alternative model rejects the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they bring about. But given the fact that negligence is characterized by the absence of a conscious mental element and moral responsibility seemingly depends on such an element, this denial is merely a consequence of the problem with negligence. Furthermore, the alternative model captures a natural explanation of our reactions to cases of negligence, and perhaps more importantly, our differing reactions to inadvertent agents. Given tracing's failure to explain negligence, and the general worry that no general explanation could be given for negligence, I'm forced to conclude that negligent agents are not responsible for the harms they bring about.25 Matt King Department of Philosophy University of Maryland [email protected] 25I'd like to thank Mark Schroeder and Manuel Vargas for helpful comments on numerous drafts, and to thank Bénédicte Veillet for insightful and illuminating conversations on this topic. Versions of this paper were given at the University of Maryland and Carleton College. My thanks to those audiences and to two anonymous referees for Social Theory and Practice.

Forthcoming in Social Research: an International Quarterly, Vol 81, No 4 (Winter 2014) Monsters on the Brain: An Evolutionary Epistemology of Horror Stephen T. Asma Stephen T. Asma is the author of On Monsters: an Unnatural History of our Worst Fears (Oxford University Press), and Against Fairness (University of Chicago Press). Asma is a Fulbright Scholar, a fellow at the Research Group in Mind, Science and Culture, and professor of philosophy at Columbia College Chicago. Fear of the dark (nyctophobia), spiders (arachnophobia), and snakes (herpetophobia) are universal terrors among human beings, whereas zombies, vampires, and psychopaths are more culturally specific. But do the cultures of horror (from folktales to Hollywood monsters) have roots in the evolution of our cognitive operating--‐system? Is our brain hard--‐wired with instinctual fears of certain morphologies, or does culture alone write our biases on the blank slate of developing consciousness? Horror is a biocultural nexus and can serve as an interdisciplinary bridge between humanities and scientific methodologies -a kind of case study for triangulating philosophy, psychology and biology. Recent research into the neuroscience of fear and cognition will be applied to some of the perennial experiences of horror, and an epistemology of horror will shed light on certain debates in the philosophy and evolution of mind. "Suddenly he heard a groan –his teeth chattered," writes Washington Irving, about the frightened teacher Ichabod Crane, in The Legend of Sleepy Hollow. Crane finds himself in headless--‐horseman territory, tentatively riding his stubborn horse along a dark road. In what many regard as the first American horror story, Irving describes Crane's charged emotional state. "In the dark shadow of the grove, on the margin of the brook, he beheld something huge, misshapen and towering. It stirred not, but seemed gathered up in the gloom, like some gigantic monster ready to spring upon the traveler. The hair of the affrighted pedagogue rose upon his head with terror. What was to be done?" (Irving 2006, 342) 2 A Physiology of Fear Not only does one's hair stand up with terror, but many other common physiological changes overtake a frightened person. The sympathetic nervous system is stimulated in cases of fight, freeze or flight. Sometimes the rage and attack system will activate, and initiate intense aggression. Neurologist Melvin Konner explains "the nerve net, balanced by the braking power of the parasympathetic system, spurs the increase of heart rate, rise in blood pressure, increased flow of blood to the muscles, and decreased circulation to the viscera that accompany fear and flight in many animals. The shifting balance also causes the reflexive emptying of bladder and bowel that helps to prepare an animal for fight or flight and may humiliate a man on the verge of a battle he cannot flee." (Konner 2002, 209) We also know that fear has a significant hormonal component. Corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH), cortisol, and adrenaline are some of the hormonal triggers and gates associated with fear. We've been able to manipulate these in the laboratory and thereby produce more and less fearful behavior in mammals. Experiments with mice have shown that if scientists insert a gene that makes corticotropin releasing hormone (CRH), they will produce a more fearful mouse. But removing the gene that builds the CRH receptor, thereby gating the entry of the hormone, will result in an extremely fearless mouse. All mammals are equipped with adaptive instincts like fight or flight, but these are old--‐brain systems, housed primarily in the brain stem. Built on top of these midbrain systems are the limbic emotional circuits. Emotional neuroscience (Panksepp 1998) has located seven major emotional systems that mammals share: fear, care, lust, rage, panic, seeking, and play.1 Each of these circuits has unique pathways through the brain, enlist specific neurotransmitters and hormones, and result in specific mammal behaviors. Fear, for example, has a neuro--‐circuitry that passes from the amygdala through the hypothalamus to the periaqueductal gray (PAG), down to the brain stem, and out through the spinal cord. Natural selection built this operating system in most vertebrates. It helped them survive in a hostile world. 3 Human and other mammal fear is regulated largely in the amygdala, and neuroscientist Joseph E. LeDoux has mapped the pathway by which fear and memory (in the hippocampus) work in tandem to create conditioned learning (LeDoux 1996, 2002). When a person associates dogs with aggression (and biting), for example, and then crosses the street when dogs approach, her brain is cycling through a similar circuit that governs rodent lab learning (foot shocks and associated images/smells). Fear is homologous across the mammal clade. Darwinian Roots of Horror Like any other biological trait, fear is subject to evolution. We have evidence that mammals have heritable dispositional levels of fear or timidity. And these levels of shyness can be artificially selected by breeders, resulting in more fearful populations. Rats, for example, have been analyzed in new threatening environments, and those animals that displayed fearful behaviors (e.g., immediate defecation and reluctance to explore) were bred together. In only ten generations of breeding, scientists were able to measure ten times more fear in the population, and thirty generations produced thirty times more fear. Thinking about fear from a Darwinian perspective is revealing. Darwin himself repeatedly brought snakes (real and fake) down to the London Zoo primate house. He discovered that chimps had an extreme fear of snakes, and concluded that some rudimentary taxonomic recognition--‐system seemed hard--‐wired into the animals –some classification system (probably morphological) carried emotional responses with it, and helped give the chimps a useful instinctual dread of threatening species. Is it possible, then, that some of our own deep--‐seated monster fears may be rooted in real predators or environmental threats from our prehistory? Modular or Conditioned Phobias? Evolutionary psychology, typified by the work of Steven Pinker, John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, posits the existence of human cognitive modules that were shaped during the Pleistocene era. These modules are genetically engraved archetypes that all humans inherit from our savanna ancestors, and they help us to 4 instinctively classify snakes and spiders as bad (dangerous).2 But this nativist view of phobias is problematic. Not least of the trouble is that we know of no biological mechanism by which cognitive content can be replicated in the next generation of brains. Of course, cultural mechanisms allow for transmission of content horizontally (across a contemporary tribe) and vertically (down to offspring), but nativists expect the modules to be innate. The universality of spider and snake phobia is proffered as a kind of proof that such modules precede human cultures. But there is no direct evidence that genes build brains with preset fear of creepy--‐ crawly creatures. Instead, I want to articulate --‐--‐especially in light of a growing data about early childhood neuroplasticity --‐--‐a more flexible notion of phobias. The deeply primitive and automatic aspect of fear and horror leads many to search for innate switches, but an alternative model can account for both the automatic/instinctual aspects of horror response and the modifiable/learnable aspects. In the 1940s, psychologist Donald Hebb continued Darwin's experiments, and showed that infant chimpanzees, who had no earlier exposure to snakes, were nonetheless terrified of them when first presented. But Hebb continued to introduce novel objects and animals to the chimps and discovered something more subtle than just snake phobia. Hebb concluded that chimps had alarmed and frightful responses to any extremely varied morphologies they encountered. When something in their perceptual field "jumped out" as radically different, then it could not be processed by the cognitive categories already in place. As Konner (2002) describes it, "Against the background of knowledge already accumulated by the infant chimps, the new objects were different; they aroused many perceptual schemas or patterns stored in the brain but fitted into none, causing arousal and then fear. The brain was somehow designed to generate fear as the result of such a cognitive mismatch." (219) Subsequent experiments by ethologist Wolfgang Schleidt discovered similar emotional/cognitive responses in birds (Schleidt 2011 & 2012). Chicks were exposed to a hawk--‐like cut out shape, which was passed over their nest. As one might expect from the Darwin and Hebb findings, the hawk shape struck fear in the 5 chicks, while a goose--‐shaped cut out garnered no such fearful behavior and physiology. One might conclude from this that some rather species--‐specific instinctual fears were embedded in animal instincts. But Schleidt showed that when new chicks were first exposed to repeated hawk--‐like shapes, and then afterward presented with the goose shape, they were frightened by the goose and not the hawk –corroborating Hebb's idea that some discrepancy between a new perception and previous background stored experiences causes the fearful response. Theoretically, one could condition an animal to be unresponsive to snakes and hawks, but utterly terrified of fluffy bunnies. The template of taxonomic fear gets built upon the earliest experiences and categorial formations of the animal. Manipulation of the original perceptual environment of the animal will alter its later default anxieties. This may explain the snake--‐fearing chimps differently than Darwin, because now we have a generic pattern recognition system at work rather than a specific preset snake phobia. But these new findings make even better sense under Darwin's theory of natural selection, because a general mechanism for "fearful reaction to categorial mismatch" could be serviceable for any animal born into its native habitat, where friends will be ubiquitous and foes will be atypical. So such a general mechanism would be highly favored by selection. Turkey chicks in the wild will develop default fears for hawks, and chimps will develop default fears about snakes. The local environment will condition the infant animal and then the cognitive development will lock--‐in the categories, creating a software program that recognizes some animals and mismatch novelties. This theory also avoids the troublesome implication that some very specific cognitive content (like the idea of a snake) could be genetically heritable. Instead of the improbable idea that a phobia module could be a specific cognitive/perceptual "representation" that is inherited over generations (a perception to gene to perception process), this model suggests a content--‐free recognition system only. One objection to the theory, that novel creatures cause fearful responses, is to ask; why doesn't every new experience scare the infant? After all, absolutely everything is "new" once. Why isn't the animal in a constant state of terror, as new 6 experiences meet old stored experiences? The answer is located in the findings of developmental psychologist Mary Ainsworth's "strange situation' experiments. Ainsworth (1913--‐1999) tested for infant fear by devising an experiment in which a baby and mother are introduced to an unfamiliar woman. The two women talk for a while and then the mother leaves the room, returning after a three--‐minute interval. Over many trials with different subjects from diverse racial, cultural, and class backgrounds, the results showed that infant fear in the "strange situation" spiked dramatically after six months old (Ainsworth and Bell 1970). What this appears to demonstrate, and brain science seems to confirm, is that there is a window of opportunity for template formation. It's a window that closes after six months, but prior to that allows all manner of new experiences to be stored as normal. Before the six months everything is recorded and the categories are laid down, whereas after the six months, novelties are read against the now congealed defaults. Fear from category mismatches cannot occur until the normal categories are laid down, and that foundation is laid down in the first six months –a time when infants can peacefully absorb almost any stimuli. Phobias and Phylogenetic Memory? Many of the creatures of the horror genre –like the "face--‐hugger" creature in Alien –are composites of real--‐life natural history enemies. Snakes and spiders horrify most humans, so mixing them together into one creature may well amplify the terror. Arachnophobia, or fear of spiders, is a universal human dread –especially in children. Biologist Tim Flannery asks, "Why do so many of us react so strongly, and with such primal fear, to spiders? The world is full of far more dangerous creatures such as stinging jellyfish, stonefish, and blue ringed octopi that –by comparison –appear to barely worry most people."(Flannery 2008) Flannery speculates a Darwinian story that connects human arachnophobia to our African prehistory. Since Homo sapiens emerged in Africa, he wonders whether a species or genus of spider could have been present as an environmental pressure. If humans evolved in an environment with venomous spiders, then a phobia could have been advantageous for human survival and such a trait could be expected to gain greater 7 frequency in the larger human populations. The six--‐eyed sand spider, of Western and Southern Africa, actually fits that prediction very well. It is a crab--‐like spider that hides in the sand and leaps out to capture prey. Its venom is extremely dangerous to children, and one can see how a fear of spiders, in this African context, would have been highly advantageous. So our contemporary arachnophobia may be a leftover from our prehistory on the savanna. Is the phylogenetic "memory" of ancient danger somehow rewritten in our contemporary ontogeny as Flannery seems to be suggesting here, or is the categorial mismatch system enough to make spiders and snakes horrible? The modular nativists expect to find a morphological archetype of "scary spider" somewhere in the inherited mental landscape, but the developmental mismatch theory suggests a different mechanism to explain the same universal phobia. If early Homo sapiens babies spent most of their first year strapped to their mothers or otherwise protected (and off the ground) by parents and alloparents, then creepy--‐ crawlies of every variety would, once encountered, radically disturb the default categorial systems laid down in the child's first six months. The same argument can be enlisted to explain other cases of predator--‐based phobias, like fear of big cats, crocodiles and murky water, and other ecological threats. It also explains similar phobias in our primate cousins. And if we add the emerging imagery and stories of early human culture (e.g., cave paintings and gestural reenactments), we can see how "adaptive horror "can be strengthened, reinforced and transmitted beyond the automatic process of categorial mismatch. The Horrors of Category Jamming Research in the development of cognition and emotions demonstrates that the effects of stimuli on the organisms are delicate matters of degree. Moderate perceptual variations (e.g., meeting subtly different creatures) from previously known schema, only produce arousal and attention in the perceiver, not fear. When Ichabod Crane, or anybody in this genre, encounters a menacing headless person, their fear might be broken down and analyzed in terms of cognitive mismatch. Perhaps the sight of a combined normal (human) and abnormal (headless) creature 8 bearing down on one is a mental confusion between what should be the case (having a head) and what is the case (no head). And perhaps this confusion produces fear as an automatic secretion from the cognitive tangle. Of course, in this kind of rational reconstruction, one feels a little like a dullard trying to give a scientific explanation of a successful joke. In the order of felt experience, the fear is primary and doesn't seem to need an intellectual/cognitive glitch to kick--‐start it. In some important sense, Ichabod is not afraid because he's undergoing a categorial mismatch –he's afraid because a headless monster is bearing down on him. Isn't that good enough to cause fear in the protagonist and fear in the audience –do we really need a cognitive theory to explain it? But then we are forced back, given the experimental research of Hebb and Schleidt, to ask why fears are associated with certain experiences and not others? There seems to be some undeniable cognitive component to monster fear.3 Is the headless man particularly scary (when compared with the moustache--‐less man, or the hatless man) because we've never experienced such an anomaly, or because we have some deep conceptual understanding that heads are essential for human life? And therefore, the headless monster is a multiple piece of "category jamming" –both morphologically incoherent, and also transgressing the categories of animate and inanimate? The philosopher of horror Noel Carroll invented this term "category jamming" and makes an argument that fits quite nicely with Hebb's and Schleidt's mismatch theory. Carroll (1990) arrives at his own mismatch theory by noticing that most horror monsters are disgusting as well as threatening. Carroll follows the argument of British anthropologist Dame Mary Douglas (1921--‐2007), who argued that human beings appear especially disgusted by "impurity." Things that we find impure, and consider as abominations, are usually interstitial entities –in between normal categories of being. For example, blood, feces, spit, snot, and vomit all blur the usual categories of me and not me, or human and not human. Pushing this idea of transgressing categories further, Carroll extends the unsettling aspect of interstitial awareness to the experience of all monsters in horror genres. The argument is made more compelling by the fact that so many monsters are depicted as truly disgusting. 9 One thinks of the mucus--‐like slime oozing off most aliens, or the gelatinous blob monsters, or the undulating goopy transformations of shape--‐shifters, or the viscous twisting of monster reproduction. Carroll thinks that it is this cognitive slippage, invoked by monsters, that explains why we are both repelled and drawn to horror films and novels. The fascination or arousal produced by categorial mismatch, is the solution to the paradox of why we seek out an experience that is at least partly unpleasant. This argument has compelling features, but also seems slightly too cognitive and intellectual (i.e., pertaining to the conscious mind) and not sensitive enough to the unconscious non--‐cognitive aspects of monster fascination. The Woman with Horror--‐Blindness Recent neuropsychology experiments present a way to synthesize many of these philosophical and phenomenological insights. A woman, referred to as SM in neuroscience literature, suffers from focal bilateral amygdala lesions.4 Her compromised amygdala means that she lacks the usual fear affect that normal mammals experience. She is fearless. And researchers have studied her while they exposed her to fear--‐inducing experiences (e.g., real snakes and tarantulas, haunted houses, and horror films). Experiments repeatedly showed that the frightening stimuli elicited high degrees of attention arousal in SM, but no fear per se. She would approach many of the threats with great curiosity and cognitive excitement, but she did not have normal physiological or psychological fear responses. "The hidden monsters attempted to scare SM numerous times, but to no avail," researchers reported. "She reacted to the monsters by smiling, laughing, or trying to talk to them. In contrast, their scare tactics typically elicited loud screams of fright from the other members of the group. More than showing a lack of fear, SM exhibited an unusual inclination to approach and touch the monsters." (Feinstein et al 2011, 36) In some cases she had to be prevented by the researchers from putting herself in actual danger because she seemed to lack the instinctual wherewithal. 10 Cultural theorist Mathias Clasen takes the SM case as evidence that "Horror monsters are not only terrifying; they are captivating." (Clasen 2012, 224) He recognizes, in the pathology case of SM, a failure or breakdown of a universal affective system that explains (when healthy) some of the cross--‐cultural features of horror. "Why," he asks, "do horror stories generally travel well across cultural borders, if all they do is encode salient culturally contingent anxieties?" Cases like SM suggest that horror has a finite set of triggers/responses that were built during our hominid past. And we can glimpse how it works when the system goes wrong, as in cases like SM. One way to interpret the fearless woman is to see her as experiencing category jamming, in Noel Carroll's sense, but failing to experience the affective feelings (e.g., avoidance, retreat, dread, etc.) that usually spark the appropriate adaptive response. The SM case also seems consistent with the developmental story of fear acquisition that we saw in Schleidt's bird experiments. The default cognitive categories, laid down in SM's early childhood, are violated by horror images – producing arousal –but the affective system of fear (based in the lateral amygdala) is never appropriately triggered. While the SM case seems to corroborate a correlation between category jamming and arousal, it seems neutral regarding the theory that such categorial mismatch is the cause of affective fear. It's possible that normal amygdalae are programed to respond with fear to the kind of mismatches that occur in the prefrontal cortex, and SM simply has a broken link in this causal chain. But alternatively, it's also possible that fear precedes all this cognitive machinery and triggers more directly from perceptual data. Fear, on this view, is not a result of cognitive confusion, but runs on a different physiological pathway altogether. Placing fear before cognition (rather than as a consequence) is more consistent with our understanding of evolution. Mammal emotional adaptations (like fear) were under construction for hundreds of millions of years before symbolic cognition arose in Homo. The emotion/cognition complex in horror is a Janus--‐faced experience, partly imperative (e.g., I should run away) and partly indicative (e.g., that creature is part--‐ 11 man and part--‐snake). According to some philosophers of mind, like Ruth Millikan (2004), this Janus--‐faced representation is strongly coupled together in lower animals –mice, for example, simultaneously recognize cats as a kind of thing (in a category) and as dangerous (fear affect). Humans, on the other hand, can decouple these two pathways (indicative and imperative) and fear can be reattached to alternative kinds of creatures/perceptions. We may need to distill the horror experience, and other emotionally charged judgments, into a parallel process of affect and cognition, a process usually so interwoven that it appears as one unified experience (and in animals always remains so). Embodied Cognition and Emotional Learning The growing field of embodied cognition is trying to undo the mistakes of earlier artificial intelligence and cognitive science, by reintroducing feelings and affect into judgment itself. Judgments of fear and horror may be excellent case studies in a more mature view of human cognition generally. While there are still psychologists and cognitive scientists who think of the mind as a computer –one that is occasionally "contaminated" by our emotions –there is an alternative view. This alternative guard, people like George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Antonio Damasio, Louise Barrett, and Jaak Panksepp, recognize that the mind is hopelessly (albeit beautifully) entangled in the body. Reason is embedded in emotions and cannot be separated. So, ethical emotions like empathy (care), which we find in primates, are matters of the heart or at least matters of the limbic system. Not only do primate studies reveal high degrees of empathy and sharing in social animals (i.e. rudimentary ethics), but we now have neurological evidence that emotional decision--‐making helps us resolve complex ethical quandaries in fast real--‐time scenarios. And in the same way that pro--‐social emotions like empathy can aid us in our ethical lives, other emotions like fear, disgust and horror can be double--‐edged swords when wielded in the social arena. They might protect us from enemies, but they might also make "enemies" out of xenotypical individuals and groups. Neurologist Antonio Damasio (1991) suggests that there are emotional 12 settings or pathways, called "somatic markers," that help us make all kinds of decisions and especially automatic judgments. Remember that the amygdala controls emotion and the adjacent hippocampus handles memory, but these are in direct communication with the ventromedial prefrontal cortex –the new brain area of decision--‐making and executive control. Damasio suggests that somatic markers (created in the communication between the amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex) create weighted behavioral options for us. Should I run, when I see the shadow approaching? Should I protect my brother? Should I throw myself on a hand--‐grenade that's landed in an orphanage? What about a hand--‐grenade that's landed in a corporate lawyers' convention? From the trivial to the sublime, fast decisions (including both survival and ethical decisions) are heavily biased by the emotional pathways that have been laid--‐down by reward/punishment associations in our previous experiences. This is different from other forms of information learning. A positivist epistemology about sense--‐data, recall and syntactical manipulation is not enough to account for the uniquely "instinctual" and imperative aspects of emotional judgments like horror and fear.5 As we grow up, we meet our environment with associated physiological affective states. These affective responses to stimuli become default emotional settings –for example, snakes give me the creeps. But on the positive side, family and friends give me feelings of love and affective bonds of loyalty (cemented by oxytocin and opioid production). These somatic markers are processed in the pathway between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex and the limbic brain. When we encounter new decision--‐making situations (e.g., the police are after my father) the somatic marker associations are triggered and these physiological feelings quickly bias or influence our cognitive processing. Positive feelings might well lead me to shelter my father from the police, in the scenario I've described. Or if my father had been abusive I might show the cops exactly where he is hiding. These are complex associations, but they are not different in kind from the affective natural taxonomies that Schleidt discovered in birds and Ainsworth discovered in babies. Attraction (love) and repulsion (fear) color our world in an early encoded configuration, but 13 these shift and modify according to later experiential patterns. The point is that these emotional responses are not instincts in the sense of pre--‐wired or genetically engraved responses. The affective systems are ancient in the sense that they have many homologies with non--‐human animals, but in our individual lives they are idiosyncratically assigned and have significant plasticity. Emotional tendencies and values can help us make fast appropriate responses to environmental challenges, but they can also be retrained or reeducated. Art and the Adaptive Imagination Emotionally charged aesthetic experiences, like Greek tragedy or horror films, can shape somatic markers in the viewer. You can't know for sure how you will face the kind of horrors portrayed by Euripides and Sophocles. And you probably can't predict your responses to a headless zombie, an alien face--‐hugger, an approaching sea monster, or a chainsaw--‐wielding psycho. Hopefully, you're never going to be put to the test. But you might face similarly terrifying trials. You might be assaulted, be put on the frontlines of some war, or be robbed, raped, or otherwise harassed and assailed. We may be fortunate enough to avoid such horrors, but we have all nonetheless played them out in our mind's eye. And though we can't know for sure how we'll face an enemy soldier or a rapist, it doesn't stop us from imaginatively formulating responses. We use the imagination in order to establish and guide our own agency in chaotic and uncontrollable situations. The horror story is probably a permanent player in the moral imagination because human vulnerability is permanent. The monster is a beneficial foe, helping us to virtually represent the obstacles that real life will surely send our way. As long as there are real enemies in the world, there will be useful dramatic versions of them in our heads. And these rehearsals are voluntary sketches that both compose and employ our somatic markers. People frequently underestimate the role of art and imagery in their own value convictions. Through artwork (e.g., Shelley's Frankenstein, Hitchcock's Psycho, King's and Kubrick's The Shining, etc.), artists convey moral visions and audiences 14 can reflect on them, reject or embrace them, take inspiration from them, and otherwise be enriched beyond entertainment and catharsis. Good monster stories can transmit values to us by showing us examples of dignity and depravity without preaching or proselytizing. The horror we feel while watching or reading The Walking Dead is matched only by the inspirational awe we feel at the heroic family members in the bleak drama. Following Leo Tolstoy's theory (1996), powerful art should "infect" the audience with specific emotional content. But while Tolstoy thought the infection should be "Christian love," contemporary scholars recognize a plurality of legitimate emotional themes and cognitive strategies. We can see now that these virtual rehearsals and strategies can be interpreted in terms of evolutionary fitness. Our big neocortical brains don't need to actually fall off a cliff to understand what such an accident will do to us --‐--‐our survival fitness is increased by simply playing out such scenarios in our imaginations. If I, living on the ancient Serengeti, see a conspecific attacked by a crocodile or lion, then my brain quickly assigns a negative somatic marker (terror) to crocodile or lion morphologies. I don't need to reason much about it the next time I encounter these creatures. Like other mammals, I need a fast response to such threats –so, fear instincts (that are soft--‐wired rather than hard--‐ wired) do the trick. Horror genres, along with the more ethical genres, have unique powers to sculpt our somatic markers. Why does art communicate, explore, and even reprogram values better than science? Because art is a secret language that speaks directly to the limbic system. Art doesn't just tell us about emotional conflicts or clashes of values, it actually speaks directly to our affective system –bypassing the discursive (syllogistic) rationality. Art triggers the emotions in us directly, it doesn't represent them to us. The story of a novel or a film may be a representation of another place and time, but the emotional content is a direct infection in Tolstoy's sense. It is not a representation of a feeling of horror, but a contagion of horror. 15 Neocortical Horror and the Existential Component Of course, horror is more than just fear. Horror, unlike fear, seems to have existential significance embedded within it. Edgar Allan Poe describes a species of horror in The Tell--‐Tale Heart: "Presently I heard a slight groan, and I knew it was the groan of mortal terror. It was not a groan of pain or of grief --‐--‐oh, no! --‐--‐it was the low stifled sound that arises from the bottom of the soul when overcharged with awe." (Poe 2009, 200) Horror master H. P. Lovecraft (1890--‐1937) tried to articulate a difference between real horror and just common fear. Lovecraft argues, in his 1927 Supernatural Horror in Literature, that good horror evokes a unique subjective emotion, which he refers to as "cosmic fear." There is something in the horror experience, Lovecraft claims, that resonates a deep instinctual awe of the unknown. "The one test," Lovecraft explains, "of the really weird is simply this –whether or not there be excited in the reader a profound sense of dread, and of contact with unknown spheres and powers; a subtle attitude of awed listening, as if for the beating of black wings or the scratching of outside shapes on the known universe's utmost rim." (1973, 7) Lovecraft suggests that all humans have an instinctual awareness (some more refined than others) of the paltry state of human understanding –especially when compared with the almost limitless domain of the strange and unfamiliar. That sense of fragility and vulnerability is a major aspect of the "cosmic fear" that horror triggers in us. The same year that Lovecraft published his Supernatural Horror in Literature, German philosopher Martin Heidegger published his magnum opus Sein und Zeit, Being and Time. From quite a different starting place, Heidegger, and other existential writers like Jean Paul Sartre, argued that there is a radical kind of human experience, which is like fear but in a way deeper. Heidegger calls this radical dread "angst," a now famous German word for anxiety. Fear, he argued, is different from angst, because fear is a response to a definite, identifiable threat. One will have a fearful response to an assailant in a dark alley, an approaching aggressive animal, a 16 felt earthquake or other natural disaster, and so on. But angst is an indefinite threat –the danger is nowhere in particular and yet everywhere. Like Lovecraft's "cosmic fear," Heidegger's angst is an ineffable mood of metaphysical proportion. Angst doesn't make me aware of a particular threat, but instead draws me out of my ordinary utilitarian ways of operating in the day--‐to--‐day world and makes me aware of my existential quandary –who and what am I? "Being--‐anxious," Heidegger says, "discloses, primordially and directly, the world as world."6 And brings human beings into a face--‐to--‐face crisis with their own finitude. Angst is that unsettling philosophical sense that you, and every other thing in the world, is just "pulvis et umbra." These philosophical demarcations of horror may now be correlated with insights from brain science and evolution theory. Animals, as we've already noted, are more constrained by their emotional operating system. Fear in most mammals is dedicated to specific enemies and comes charged with specific behavioral responses, but in human beings the dedicated circuit can be broken. The relatively massive human neocortex (which expanded between 800,000 and 200,000 years ago) allows for remarkable degrees of reflection. Unlike most other animals, we can take our memories, ideas, goals, and emotions off--‐line so to speak, and entertain them in a parallel universe of mental space. The frightening monsters of the savanna can be decoupled from real--‐time and represented on cave walls and in stories, and we can embellish them without constraint inside this unique mental space. In the mind, teeth and claws become sharper, predators become faster, tentacles reach longer, and so on. Reflection can turn finite threats into infinitely recurring vulnerabilities, and add totalizing or cosmic dimension to our affective anxieties – principal among these apprehensions being death itself. Neocortical expansion creates space for reflective symbolic counter--‐factual thinking, and along with that great privilege comes relentless horror. The nihilist is a brain with a negative somatic marker attached not to this--‐or--‐that but to the concept of the whole cosmos. Political Horror and Xenophobia 17 Arguably, one of the central functions of culture itself is to guide somatic marker associations into prosocial pathways (using ritual, art, and politics). In this sense, the somatic marker hypothesis modernizes Freud's repression thesis (in Civilization and Its Discontents) that prosocial harmony comes at the cost of a difficult retraining of individual affects.7 Assigning the experience of horror to antisocial feelings and behaviors (e.g., aggression, incest, murder) is part of culture's job. Somatic markers are socially engineered (mostly unconsciously, but sometimes consciously, as in propaganda) by dedicating the flexible affective systems of fear and aggression to specific "enemies" (of the tribe or state). The epistemology of flexible horror is not merely an academic question. It may seem trivial to track the way ancient biological fears become reassigned to creatures in monster movies (default snake phobias, for example, are heightened by Hollywood horror), but the triviality fades when we realize that racism and xenophobia are subspecies of the same epistemic processing. Horror and monsters have always been politically useful. If imaginative monsters (extrapolated from nature) can help train us for survival in a hostile world, they can also easily corrupt our view of the Other. The history of monsters (Asma 2009), from the ancients to the present, is rife with political demonization and dangerous propaganda. In--‐group tribal affiliation seems to thrive when it can oppose an out--‐group, and one of the best ways to distance one's own from another group is to characterize the other as uncivilized, monstrous, inhuman, horrifying. A brief historical example will illustrate the way individuals and groups can be transformed into monsters. In 1484 Pope Innocent VIII gave Dominican inquisitor Heinrich Institoris wide ranging legal powers to pursue and eradicate witches (Papal Bull Summis desiderantes affectibus). The Bull was used as a justification preface for Institoris' famous demon hunting guide Malleus Maleficarum. The Malleus foments many primordial fears and apprehensions --‐--‐and no greater wellspring of irrational fear and worry exists than the emotions surrounding the subject of one's children. When you first become a parent, charged 18 with the greatest responsibility possible, you discover subterranean emotional deposits of vulnerability in yourself that you didn't know existed. Parents of the medieval era had the Malleus to help nourish their worst hysterical fears, because witches were apparently very interested in stealing and eating babies. As Institoris describes it, "Midwives who work harmful magic kill fetuses in the womb in different ways, procure a miscarriage, and, when they do not do this, offer newly born children to evil spirits." (Institoris 2007, Question 11) There are three ways that witches go after the sacred purpose of procreation. The first is to render the man's penis flaccid. The second is to produce a miscarriage or prevent conception altogether. And the third is to steal the infant shortly after birth, in order to eat the baby or offer it to an evil spirit. "Those who are indisputably witches are accustomed, against the inclination of human nature – indeed contrary to the temperament of every animal (at least, with the exception of the wolf) – to devour and feast on young children." Institoris relates a story from his colleague, the Inquisitor of Como, that "a man had lost his child from its cradle and, while he was searching for it, he saw some women who had gathered together during the nighttime, and he came to the conclusion that they were slaughtering a child, drinking its fluid, and then devouring." In response to that event, the Inquisitor of Como came down very hard on the local witches, burning over forty--‐one of them in a single year. One might well ask how all this baby stealing and torturing was possible, and the answer is simple; midwives. The Malleus takes a very dim view of midwifery –associating midwives with witches, and witches with baby eating.8 It's hard to imagine a more horrific charge than baby--‐eating, which is precisely why some inquisitors made the same charge against the Jews. And this legend can be added to the others, like the Gates of Alexander, that sought to demonize Jews as monsters.9 For Institoris, Jews were like witches in another important way. Unlike other heathen, Jews and witches had been exposed to the Christian faith (had understood the teachings of the Gospel) but had then decided to reject it or turn away from it. This was considered worse than those people who 19 were oblivious to the Gospel. It was an old anti--‐Semitic charge, further heightened by Institoris' theological attempt to link demonic witches and Jews directly. This crude association of midwives and Jews with fear and aggression is cultural work (e.g., myth, imagery, stories), but cultural work upon the underlying mechanism of fear conditioning –the amygdala. Unconscious bias against different races, genders, ethnic groups, and economic groups is a growing research area in social psychology. Repeatedly associating a token of an out--‐group type with negative affect, will tag all members of the type with a negative somatic marker. The amygdala system does this nefarious work. The End of Horror? David Amodio (2013), at the New York University Social Neuroscience Lab has been researching our bigoted brains. His experiments find that many whites (around 75%) have split--‐second negative responses to blacks, and these are subconscious and unavailable to conscious introspection. Our brains evolved to do fast pattern recognition and make unreflective judgments, often equating "difference" with negative affect. Our amygdala is highly activated when we assess strangers. Our brain is helping us make predictions about what and who will be threatening, and our whole body is then tilted toward an appropriate action potential. If our cultural milieu is filled with negative racial stereotypes, then we have unconsciously generated many negative affect somatic markers for those people who are different. Even below this cultural level of subconscious taxonomy or classification, we should also incorporate the developmental xenophobia that Schleidt's birds and Ainsworth's babies demonstrate. If you're white and you never encounter a black person when you're a baby, then you may have categorial mismatch issues (and negative affect) later when you do.10 As Amodio points out, however, we are not prisoners of our fear--‐conditioned patterns. We have the complex frontal cortex that helps us inhibit knee--‐jerk negative impulses, but also gives us the reflective powers to reimagine and retrain 20 our antisocial somatic markers. "The human mind is extremely adept at control and regulation," Amodio says, "and the fact that we have these biases should really be seen as an opportunity for us to be aware and do something about them." (Amodio 2014) But what exactly can we do about them? We know, cognitively speaking, that this--‐or--‐that racial member is not a baby eater, a monster, a horror, but such knowledge is relatively effete when compared with subconscious amygdala motivation –which is so robust that it appears instinctual. If the epistemology that I've been sketching is correct, then the solution to xenophobia and the demonization of the Other is affect replacement, not information enrichment. Just as Tolstoy thought his novels could infect readers with love, Charles Dickens also saw his novels as a way of inspiring prosocial affect and thereby improving social policies. In the 1840s, Dickens was mortified by a government report about the child labor abuses of factories and mines. He knew firsthand about the social injustices in the underclass and he tried composing pamphlets with stilted titles like "An Appeal to the People of England on Behalf of the Poor Man's Child." Dickens' philosophical and political screeds fell to the ground unread, so he vowed to "strike a sledge--‐hammer blow" on behalf of the poor man's child. This eventual sledge--‐hammer blow, which showed the dignity of poor Victorians and revealed their hidden struggles, was called A Christmas Carol (1843). In Somerset Maugham's book The Summing Up (1938) he reflects on his own ethical novels, including Of Human Bondage and the Razor's Edge, and echoes Tolstoy's earlier call for socially conscious art. Art, Maugham argued, should not succumb to elite, aesthete tendencies. It should not turn--‐in on itself in an art--‐for--‐art--‐ sake narcissism, but look outward. "For art, if it is to be reckoned as one of the great values of life, must teach men humility, tolerance, wisdom and magnanimity. The value of art is not beauty, but right action." Art, like religion and political rhetoric, has the ability to cultivate moral sentiments and inspire moral action. As "affect 21 management," culture has the potential to paint the Other as horrifying (e.g., Islamophobia, homophobia, etc.) or paint the Other as brethren. Reconfiguring the antisocial somatic markers created by political horror is fundamentally a cultural therapy project, but some recent neuroscience pulls back the curtain on how such reconfiguring happens. Kateri McRea et al (2008) conducted a series of fMRI studies on emotional regulation. The study measured brain activity while male and female subjects were first exposed to disturbing negatively valenced images, and then while the subjects engaged in calming methods (emotional down--‐regulating strategies). In addition to cognitive reappraisal strategies (e.g., subjects reminding themselves that the horrible image is only a movie, etc.), many subjects (especially women) appeared to diminish negative feelings by enlisting positive feelings (e.g., happy memories) to supersede the adverse emotions. In men, the amygdala down--‐regulates more rapidly upon cognitive reappraisal, but in women the amygdala stays more active and appears to be processing positive affect from the ventral striatum (a reward/pleasure processor). The gender issue aside for our purposes here, the interesting issue is that neuroscience reveals a brain system that helps us replace fear, horror, disgust, with positive affects. The brain has a therapeutic architecture. Recent social psychology suggests that human tribalism (underwritten by amygdala--‐based fears about out--‐groups) might be inevitable, but also highly susceptible to revision. So flexible and promiscuous is in--‐group favoritism that it can be weaned off the usual nefarious criteria of blood ties, race, sex, and class, to be reassigned to more benign affiliations. Psychological experiments (Tajfel 2010) reveal a whole range of criteria for in--‐group bias. For example, test subjects have been shown to award higher payoffs to arbitrary in--‐groups, like people who just happen to share the same birthday as the test subject. And in--‐group bias can be demonstrably strong when subjects share allegiance to the same sports teams, and so on. A fickleness of tribalism is potentially good news for reeducating bigots, giving new hope to liberalism generally. But of course such promiscuity or flexibility of affective bonds also reduces positive solidarity mechanisms too, like loyalty 22 (Asma 2012). Liberalism often forgets that strong tribal forms of socio--‐economic organization, like families, still do most of the day--‐to--‐day living, dying, cooperating and conflicting well below the radar (and the ideals) of abstract State--‐level egalitarianism (Earle and Johnson 2000). Many small subsistence groups, like families, tribes and chiefdoms continue to struggle for resources inside the larger political frameworks of nation states, and this means that the psychology of vulnerability is a daily experience. These smaller us/them dynamics continue to draw on the ancient epistemology of xeno--‐processing. Therefore, horror, like other emotions, may continue to have adaptive utility in our contemporary biological and political environments. References Ainsworth, M. D. & Bell, S. M. (1970), "Attachment, exploration, and separation: Illustrated by the behavior of one--‐year--‐olds in a strange situation" Child Development, 41:49--‐67 Amodio, D. M. (2013). "The social neuroscience of prejudice: Then, now, and what's to come" in C. Stangor and C. Crandall (Eds.), Stereotyping and Prejudice (pp. 1--‐28). New York: Psychology Press. And Amodio, D. M. (2013) "Contributions of neuroscience to the psychology of prejudice" In B. Derks, N. Ellemers, and D. Scheepers, The Neuroscience of Prejudice (pp. 167--‐189). New York: Psychology Press. Amodio (2014) Amodio's interview "The Science of Your Racist Brain" by Indre Viskontas and Chris Mooney at Motherjones.com, Fri May 9, 2014. Asma, S. 2009. On Monsters: An Unnatural History of Our Worst Fears (Oxford University Press). Asma, S. 2012 Against Fairness (University of Chicago Press). 23 Carroll, N. (1990) The Philosophy of Horror (Routledge). Clasen, M. (2012) "Monster Evolve: A Biocultural Approach to Horror Stories" Review of General Psychology Vol.16, No. 2, 222--‐229. Damasio, A., Tranel, D. & Damasio, H. (1991) "Somatic Markers and the Guidance of Behavior" in Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction, edited by H. Levin, H. Eisenberg & A. Benton. 217--‐230 (Oxford University Press). Earle, T. and A. Johnson (2000) The Evolution of Human Societies (Stanford University Press). Flannery, T. (2008) "Queens of the Web" in The New York Review of Books, Vol.LV, No. 7, May. Institoris, Heinrich (2007) The Malleus Malificarum translated by P.G. Maxwell--‐ Stuart (Manchester University Press). Irving, Washington. 2006. The Legend of Sleepy Hollow and Other Stories From the Sketch Book (Signet Classics) Signet Classics; Signet Classics edition. Konner M. (2002) The Tangled Wing (Times Books: Henry Holt). LeDoux, J.E. (1996), The Emotional Brain (New York, Simon and Schuster). LeDoux J.E. (2002) The Synaptic Self (New York, Viking). Lovecraft, H. P. (1973) Supernatural Horror in Literature (Dover Publications). McRea, K. Ochsner, I. Mauss, J. Gabrieli, and J. Gross (2008) "Gender Differences in Emotion Regulation: An fMRI Study of Cognitive Reappraisal" Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, Vol. 11 (2) 143--‐162. Millikan, R. G. (2004) "On Reading Signs: Some Differences between Us and the Others." In D. Kimbrough Oller and Ulrike Griebel, editors, Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach, pages 15--‐--‐30. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Panksepp, J. (1998) Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions (Oxford University Press). Poe, E. (2009) Edgar Allan Poe: Complete Tales and Poems (Castle Books). Schleidt, W., Moura--‐Neto, H. & Shalter, M. (2001) "The Hawk/Goose Story: The Classical Ethological Experiments of Lorenz and Tinbergen, Revisited" Journal of Comparative Psychology, Vol. 125, No. 2, 121--‐133. 24 Schleidt, W. (2012) website of Schleidt's relevant publications on hawks and turkeys, and autobiography sketch of his work with zoologist and psychologist Konrad Lorentz (1903--‐1989). http://www.schleidt.org/wolfgang/ Tajfel, H. (2010) Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge University Press). Tolstoy, L. (1996) What is Art (Hackett Pub Co Inc.) Notes 1 In addition to Jaak Panksepp, Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson are crucial researchers into the affective springs of human and animal emotions. And while they may quibble about Panksepp's master list of emotions, they all share an empirically grounded commitment to the importance of bio--‐ social adaptive affect and expression. 2 See the many articles by evolutionary psychologists Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, particularly "The Lords of Many Domains" The Times Higher Education Supplement, June 25, 1993. Philosopher Jerry Fodor surveys the general thesis, in his book The Modularity of Mind (1983) and elsewhere, that the mind may be more "modular" than we previously thought, and strong phobias (and language acquisition) may be evidence of these modules –each module being like a hard--‐wired preset that evolved for guiding human thinking and behaving. Fodor still maintains the primacy of a general adaptive intelligence (an open information system), and does not want to reduce the mind to these modules. But contemporary evolutionary psychology is still enchanted by the modularity hypothesis. 3 In 1962 S. Shachter and J. Singer demonstrated, in their paper "Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State" (Psychological Review, 69), that an emotion requires both a physiological arousal and a correlate cognition. For example, if a subject is injected with adrenalin, they do not automatically have an emotional response to the chemical. If however, the subject is first questioned about a painful event, then the injection will trigger an upsetting emotional response. The cognitive interpretation of, or even just correlation with, physiological arousal, is crucial to defining the subsequent felt emotion. The cognitive aspect is not just an epiphenomenon of the chemical. This question, of the relationship between cognitive and affective states has an earlier incarnation in the disagreement between William James and Walter Cannon. As Dr. Rami Gabriel points out, in his Affective Reactions in a Prosopagnosic Patient (Psychology dissertation, UC, Santa Barbara, 2007), "William James (1890) argued that the internal changes occur because of an arousing event, and we subsequently interpret these internal feelings as an emotion. Cannon (1929) disagreed claiming that the same changes occur in the internal organs in a range of emotional responses, so it is implausible that one emotion is attached to one particular feeling, furthermore artificial changes brought about by for example, adrenalin do not necessarily produce an emotional feeling." 4 See J. Feinstein, R. Adolphs, A. Damasio, & D. Tranel's "The Human Amygdala and the Induction and Experience of Fear" in Current Biology, Jan. 11, 2011, 21(1) 34--‐38. 25 5 Neuroscience has begun to correct the computational model by showing how our rational, linguistic mind depends on the ancient limbic brain, where emotions hold sway and social skills dominate. In fact, the cognitive mind works only when emotions preferentially tilt our deliberations. Damasio (1991) worked with patients who had damage in the communication system between the cognitive and emotional brain. The subjects could compute all the informational aspects of a decision in detail, but they couldn't actually commit to anything. Without clear limbic values (that is, valenced feelings), Damasio's patients couldn't decide their own social calendars, prioritise jobs at work, or even make decisions in their own best interest. Our rational mind is embodied, and without this emotional embodiment we have no preferences. In order for our minds to go beyond syntax to semantics, we need feelings. And our ancestral minds were rich in feelings before they were adept in computations. 6 The contrast between fear and angst is articulated in Part I, Chapter VI "Care as the Being of Dasein" in Being and Time (Blackwell, 1978). 7 Retraining our "pleasure principle" to accommodate other egos and conform to the "reality principle" is accomplished by affective associational reeducation, not merely cognitive reassessment. One must, according to Freud, learn to loath one's selfish desires, not merely calculate their social liability. 8 No particular compelling reason is given in the text for this hostility. Institoris claimed, however, that penitent witch--‐midwives had confessed to him (doubtlessly under duress) that, "No one does more harm to the Catholic faith than midwives. When they don't kill the children, they take the babies out of the room, as though they are going to do something out of doors, lift them up in the air, and offer them to evil spirits." While the Malleus itself offers little clue to the anti--‐midwife campaign, some recent social scientists, in Germany, have suggested that midwives represented a threat to procreation because they knew the herbal arts of contraception and abortion. In a time when European populations had been decimated by plagues, the Church sought to rebuild its people. Disease, schism, Muslims, and infidels of all stripe, seemed to be at the door of Catholicism. Midwives, with their contraceptive "magic" seemed to the Inquisition to exacerbate the problems, and this may be why they became prime suspects in the witch trials. See See Gunnar Heinsohn/Otto Steiger: "Witchcraft, Population Catastrophe and Economic Crisis in Renaissance Europe: An Alternative Macroeconomic Explanation." University of Bremen, 2004 (IKSF Discussion Paper #31). 9 "Alexander's Gates," the story of a barrier against barbarian enemies, seems to have first appeared in sixth century accounts of the Alexander Romance, but the legend is probably much older. Alexander supposedly chased his foreign enemies through a mountain pass in the Caucasus region and then closed them all behind unbreachable iron gates. The details and the symbolic significance of the story changed slightly in every Medieval retelling, but it was very often retold –especially in the age of exploration. According legend, the monsters' incarceration behind Alexander's Gates is only temporary. They await their imminent release, the medievals believed, and would be upon us shortly. The famous Travels of Sir John Mandeville (published between 1357--‐1371) reveals precisely how this unleashing will finally occur. Mandeville retells the story of a monster zone (full of dragons, serpents, and venomous beasts) in the Caspian Mountains, but he adds another ethnic group –indeed, what he considers the main ethnic group –to the famous confinement. In Chapter XXIX, he states that "Between those mountains the Jews of ten lineages be enclosed, that men call Gog and Magog and they may not go out on any side." Here he is referring to the legendary ten lost tribes that disappeared from history after the Assyrian conquest in the eighth century BCE. These Jews, according to Mandeville, will escape during the time of the Antichrist and "make great slaughter of Christian men. And therefore all the Jews that dwell in all lands learn always to speak Hebrew, in hope, that when the other Jews shall go out, that they may understand their speech, and to lead them into Christendom for to destroy the Christian people." 26 10 Eventually Homo sapiens evolved representational ways to communicate and improve the norms of our social contract. But before rules, morals, and laws we had prosocial affective systems – kin loyalty, empathy and so on – which served to bond small groups together. Even our basic folk--‐ taxonomy of the world into friends and foes requires that perceptions and memories be emotionally coded with feelings of approach or avoid. The cognitive psychologist Elizabeth Spelke, who runs Harvard's famous 'baby lab', has interpreted the problem--‐solving skills of prelinguistic human babies as evidence for inborn core knowledge – innate modules of cognition. And the psychologists Karen Wynne and Paul Bloom at Yale have interpreted babies' early social preference for cooperative companions as cognitively smart – the product of early conceptual thought. I have been suggesting an alternative, emotions--‐based model for things like social preferences. Affection, not cost--‐benefit computation, is the true spring of primate social life.

For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 1 Non-causal explanations in physics Juha Saatsi School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science Woodhouse Lane, Leeds LS2 9JT University of Leeds [email protected] Juha Saatsi is Associate Professor at University of Leeds. He works on various topics in philosophy of science, and he has particular interests in the philosophy of explanation and the scientific realism debate. 1. Introduction The nature of scientific explanation and understanding are of central interest to philosophers of science. How (or by virtue of what) does a given theory, model, or body of information explain? What is the relationship between what is being explained (the explanandum), and what is doing the explaining (the explanans)? These questions lie at the heart of general philosophy of science, where they connect in important ways to broader issues concerning, e.g., scientific realism and the nature of scientific inferences, evidence, and theory-choice (see Saatsi 2017a for a recent review). Over the last decade or so these debates have become increasingly deeply informed by the history and philosophy of physics. Since the demise of the Deductive-Nomological ('DN') account of explanation in the 1970s and 80s, philosophy of explanation has been largely dominated by the idea that explanation is intimately associated with causation. Unificationist theories of explanation have been the only serious competitor to causal-mechanical accounts for much of the period spanning from Hempel and Oppenheim's 'epoch-making' DN-account (1948) to the current state of the art (see Salmon 1989 for a classic review). Some of the best developed and most influential contemporary accounts, e.g. by Woodward (2003) and Strevens (2008), have further reinforced the hegemony of causal theories of explanation (the latter putting a unificationist spin on the causal ideology). For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 2 Undoubtedly there are countless explanations in physics that nicely fit the intuitive causal ideology, according to which explanatory information is suitably regimented causalmechanical information (see the chapters by Laura Felline and Mattahias Frisch in this volume). But looking at the explanatory practices of physics more broadly, it is also easy to identify numerous examples of seemingly non-causal explanations. Detailed studies of such explanations have led to steadily growing interest in understanding exactly how these explanations work: how they explain, and how they differ from causal explanations. There are also substantial issues concerning the relationship between causal and non-causal explanations, and whether some phenomena can only be explained in non-causal terms. I will review some prominent answers to these questions, but first I will bring out the richness of our subject matter with a menagerie of explanations that have been regarded as non-causal. 2. A menagerie of non-causal (?) explanations I have divided the examples below under three headings, involving (i) geometry, (ii) symmetries, and (iii) inter-theoretic relations. These broad headings serve to regiment the discussion for presentational purpose first and foremost, and many of these explanations cut across this 'classification' in interesting ways. For the sake of brevity, I will only sketch each case; fuller details can be found in the literature cited. Whether all of these explanations really are non-causal is itself a contested issue to be discussed in the next section. Explanations involving geometry. Inertially moving particles in curved space can (say) decrease in distance over time due to the 'shape of space'. Since no forces are involved- inertial particles are moving straight along geodesics-one may want to say that nothing causes this change in the particles' relative distance. Rather, what explains it is the curvature of space. This exemplifies a simple geometrical explanation according to Nerlich (1979). Geometrical explanations can also involve global features of space, such as its dimensionality, or orientability. Asymmetrical objects, like hands, can be enantiomorphic if they are embedded in orientable space of appropriate dimensionality. No continuous movement in two-dimensional orientable space takes a left-handed rigid L-shape to match a corresponding right-handed one, for instance. Add a third dimension, or make your twodimensional space non-orientable (e.g. Moebius strip), then such continuous transformations do exist. What determines-and thus arguably explains, in some sense-that two objects are For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 3 enantiomorphic (or otherwise), are global features of space in which these objects are 'embedded' (Nerlich 1979). In a somewhat similar manner, it has been suggested that in Newtonian mechanics an explanatory relationship holds between the dimensionality of space, on the one hand, and the stability of planetary orbits, on the other. Although there is disagreement here which way the explanation really runs-this can depend, e.g., on whether we are relationists or substantivalists about Newtonian space (see Callender 2005)-the basic idea turns on the fact that natural generalisations of Newtonian gravitational potential to n-dimensional (n>3) spaces implies the impossibility of stable periodical gravitational orbits (Ehrenfest 1917, Buchel 1969). If we regard the dimensionality of space as a specific global feature of the world that could have been different, whilst holding the rest of Newtonian dynamics fixed (by generalising Newtonian gravitational potential in a natural way), then the stability of planetary orbits depends on-and thus is arguably explained by, in some sense-this global feature of the space in which the planets orbit (see e.g. Woodward 2018). The examples above involve features of physical space. Physical theories of course deal also with various kinds of more abstract spaces, the geometrical features of which can be explanatorily relevant as well. Kinematics (in contrast to dynamics) is sometimes characterised as 'the study of the geometry of motion'-the study of the geometrical features of physical systems' possible configurations, relating e.g. displacement, velocity, acceleration, and time, without reference to forces or causes of motion. Some purely kinematic explanations are naturally contrasted with causal explanations. For a paradigmatic toy example, consider the space of possible instantaneous configurations of a stick the origin of which is confined to a curved 2-dimensional surface: think of spherical surface, say, and its tangent vectors. Some of these states are related to one another by parallel transport, viz. moving the stick along the surface so that it is kept 'straight' along the way. Now, why does the stick, having been parallel-transported over a closed loop on a curved surface, return to the starting point so that its direction differs by angle α from the initial configuration? The standard geometrical explanation turns on the way in which α is determined by-and thus arguably explained by, in some sense-the curvature of the surface and the area enclosed by the path. (For spherical surface, this is simply given by the equation α = r−2 × A, where A is the enclosed area and r is the radius.) These non-local geometrical For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 4 features do not seem causally responsible for α, and none of the dynamical features or laws of nature (governing how the stick moves around in the specified manner) feature in the explanation either, making this a plausible example of non-causal explanation (Saatsi 2018). The ideology of this paradigmatic kinematic explanation arguably also applies to broadranging phenomena of 'geometrical phase' of suitable dynamical systems, involving, e.g., the precession of Foucault's pendulum and other similar exemplifications of the so-called Hannay's angle that shows up when a classical dynamical system travels a closed loop in a parameter space without returning to its original state. (The daily precession α′ experienced by a Foucault pendulum, as a function of the latitude λ, is given by α′ = −2π sin λ. For a geometrical explanation see e.g. von Bergmann and von Bergmann 2007.) It also generalises to various other areas of physics where a system's parameter space has a rich enough structure to give rise to geometrical (an)holonomies upon which some explanandum phenomenon can depend. Interesting examples can be found in, e.g., classical optics, nuclear magnetic resonance, hydrodynamics, and quantum field theory (see Wilczek et al. 1989). The much-studied phenomenon of Berry phase in quantum mechanics is a particularly important and well-known example (see Batterman 2003, Lyre 2014, Saatsi 2018). The space of a physical system's possible configurations can also have global topological features that can be deemed to be explanatory in a non-causal way. For example, why do all double pendulums have at least four equilibrium configurations? Arguably a critical part of this explanation turns on the fact their configuration space is a torus-a fact that holds regardless of the specifics of pendulum design and dynamics, and even regardless of the specifics of the dynamical laws that connect force to acceleration (Lange 2017). This is a very simple example of a topological explanation, well suited for philosophical discussion and analysis; more involved real-life explanations involving topological notions abound, ranging from the Aharonov-Bohm effect to topological phases of matter. (See Healey 2007 for in-depth philosophical discussion of the Aharonov-Bohm effect. Little has been written, in general, about topological explanations in physics.) Explanations involving symmetries. Amongst the numerous and varied examples of symmetry-based explanations in physics one finds appeal to both discrete and continuous symmetries. I will give a paradigmatic example of each. For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 5 In many-particle quantum mechanics a system's wavefunction must be either symmetric or anti-symmetric under particle permutations. This exemplifies a discrete symmetry. This fundamental symmetry underlies quantum statistics, and it plays an indispensable explanatory role in explanations of various physical phenomena. For instance, the Pauli Exclusion Principle (PEP) for fermions follows from this symmetry, dictating that no two electrons (say) can be in the same quantum state. Various explanations involving PEP-including, e.g., the stability of matter, various features of chemical bonding, and the halting of white dwarf collapse-can be viewed as non-causal explanations: these phenomena are arguably essentially explained, not by reference to any causal features of the world, but rather in terms of a fundamental global kinematic constraint on the possible physical states of multi-particle quantum system (see French and Saatsi 2018, Skow 2014). For a specific example, consider the explanation of solubility of salt, for instance. An important part of the explanation turns on the role of the so-called 'Pauli repulsion' in determining the chemical bond-dissociation energy for the ionic bond between Na+ and Clin NaCl molecules. Despite its name, 'Pauli repulsion' arguably really should not be thought of as involving a force of any kind, or even having a causal basis more broadly construed. Rather, it is grounded in PEP (and the more fundamental quantum symmetry that underlies PEP, ultimately deriving from the so-called permutation invariance of quantum mechanics). In a similar way, the so-called 'degeneracy pressure', which halts the gravitational collapse of a white dwarf star, is arguably best understood in non-causal terms as a kinematic consequence of the same quantum symmetry (see French and Saatsi 2018 for details.). Moving on to explanatory use of continuous symmetries in physics, consider the intimate connection that Noether's theorem brings out as holding between a system's conserved physical quantities, on the one hand, and its continuous symmetries, on the other. Assuming that we are operating in the framework of Euler-Lagrange equations of motion for fields or particles, the generality of Noether's theorem is remarkable, applying to any symmetry of the system's Lagrangian, whether these involve external degrees of freedom (e.g. homogeneity and isotropy of space), or internal degrees of freedom (e.g. gauge symmetries). Given the connection brought out by Noether's theorem, we know that if a particular physical system displays some conserved quantities, there is a corresponding symmetry, and vice versa. Can one explain the other? Arguably so: a system's symmetries are often naturally For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 6 viewed as determining-and hence, in some sense, explaining-those aspects of the system's behaviour that we identify as the conserved quantities. For a simple concrete example, consider a classical particle moving under a constant central force. (Its potential energy depends only on the radial coordinate.) Why is the particle's trajectory constrained to a plane? This regularity of the system's dynamics follows from the symmetries of the particle's kinetic and potential energy functions (which together give the Lagrangian, of course). Arguably these symmetries explain the system's constant of motion, because Noether's theorem tells how the latter would have been different, if e.g. the potential energy function were different in some way. For instance, it tells us what the constants of motion would have been, had the potential energy function been time-dependent in a particular way, say. In the physics literature Noether's theorem is often also associated with the idea that conservation laws can be explained terms of global symmetries. This connection is harder to make sense of without introducing substantial assumptions regarding the metaphysics of laws. Lange (2007) argues that Noether's theorem is altogether irrelevant for accounting for conservation laws, and that symmetries can explain conservation laws only if they are modally stronger 'meta-laws' that govern ordinary laws. Explanations involving inter-theoretic relations. Various explanatory practices in physics involve relating one theory to another in some systematic, understanding-inducing way. (We are interpreting 'theory' broadly here, to include mathematical models.) The idea of intertheoretic reduction in Nagel's (1961) sense provides an example of this: if two theories are so related that the laws of the reduced theory can be logically deduced from the laws of the reducing theory, given some well-defined bridge-principles that relate the two theories' theoretical vocabularies, then we arguably have a DN-type explanation of the reduced theory by the reducing theory. In these terms we can understand in plausibly non-causal terms, for example, the applicability and effectiveness of the reduced theory as turning on logical connections between two theoretical structures and the synthetic identity claims stated by the bridge-principles. Insofar as physics features reductions like this (or something close enough), and such reductions really do count as explanatory (see Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010), we have found For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 7 yet another class of explanations that are plausibly non-causal. Admittedly purely deductive relations between theories in Nagel's spirit are arguably very few and far between-as anyone familiar with the extensive debates on (anti-)reductionism in physics very well knows. (See, however, Dizadji-Bahmani et al. 2010 and Schaffner 2012.) Be that as it may, for our current discussion little hangs on this, since the kinds of inter-theoretic relations capable of supporting non-causal explanations can take many forms other than Nagelian relations of logical deduction. Similarly, whether or not we can uphold any of the various reductionist theses, it is undeniable that much of physics involves attempts to link in explanatory ways theories at different 'levels'. Physics unquestionably offers explanatory understanding aplenty regarding how, e.g., thermodynamic phenomena relates to (both classical and quantum) mechanics; how phenomena described in ray-optics relates to wave optics and electromagnetism; how classical mechanics relates to quantum mechanics; how chemical phenomena relates to quantum mechanics; how phenomena described in Newtonian gravitation relates to general relativity; and so on. The explanatory importance of numerous inter-theoretic relationships uncovered by physics is not eroded by the fact that reductionism faces important challenges in relation to various purported reductions of one theory to another. Furthermore, plausibly many of the explanations furnished by inter-theoretic relations in physics are non-causal, and not amenable to a causal-mechanical (or causal-role functionalist) treatment. I will now briefly sketch two examples. In Newtonian Gravity (NG) inertial and gravitational mass are conceptually entirely distinct, yet they turn out to be identical. Why? The answer is given, of course, by examining the relevant phenomena in relation to General Relativity (GR). But it is not the case that GR shows how the two concepts of mass get identified: gravitational mass does not feature in GR at all, given that the concept of gravitational force makes no sense in GR. Rather, the explanation involves showing how NG relates to GR, so as to answer the question: "why if GR is true, [NG] is such an effective theory in some contexts?" (Weatherall 2011, p. 429) Answering this question explains away the seeming coincidence of gravitational and inertial masses, thereby providing an answer to the why-question above. As Weatherall explains: "The explanation consists in showing that if the world is to be understood as a model of GR, then any model of [NG] that successfully approximates the world, even in limited regimes, must satisfy the conditions that [the two masses are identical]." (p.437) Showing this requires bringing out in detail the relevant relationship between NG and GR, which is done in terms of For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 8 showing mathematically how models of (geometrized) NG arise as a limiting case of GR in a rigorous sense of 'flattening' the light-cone structure of GR. My second example concerns the so-called renormalisation group explanation of critical phenomena that involve (second-order) phase transitions in macroscopic systems near their critical point. Thermodynamic properties near criticality obey power laws as a function of (reduced) temperature. Micro-physically very different systems can obey the same power laws, in which case they belong to the same 'universality class', identified by the exponents of the relevant power laws. These exponents depend only on the system's spatial dimensionality and certain abstract features of the micro-interaction (e.g. the dimensionality of the 'spin' parameter). Why do the macroscopic phenomena quantified by the power laws- obeyed by all systems that belong to the same universality class-only depend on these features? The answer to this question involves mathematical relationships amongst extremely large classes of possible micro-physical models of statistical physical systems. These relationships are brought out by employing 'renormalization transformations', which form equivalence classes of those models (in the abstract mathematical space of possible models) that share the same long-distance physics. It can be shown that this space-which is assumed to include the models that correctly capture the actual micro-physics of systems that physicists actually measure or simulate-has a rich mathematical structure that reveals the fact that while the power laws are strikingly independent of the specifics of the micro-physical interactions, they only depend on the abstract features mentioned above (Batterman 2002, Saatsi and Reutlinger 2018, Morrison 2015). The explanation furnished by such renormalisation group techniques is again arguably non-causal, turning on rich mathematical relationships in the space of possible models of physical systems of very many interacting parts. (However, see Sullivan, forthcoming, for a criticism of this verdict). Other examples? Physics features numerous other examples of purportedly non-causal explanations, many of which do not fall neatly under the three broad headings above. For some further examples and 'headings', see, e.g., Lange's (2009) and Pexton's (2014) discussion of dimensional explanations; Lange's (2017, Ch. 5) discussion of 'really statistical' explanations; the discussion of some quantum mechanical explanations in Clifton (1998) and Healey (2017); and Batterman's (2002) discussion of asymptotic explanations. For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 9 3. How do these explanations work? How do the above examples of (allegedly) non-causal explanations work? Where do their 'explanatory power' derive from? Philosophers have attempted to articulate the explanatoriness of explanations like these in various ways. While many are happy to do this in non-causal terms, others find ways to regard as causal at least some of the above explanations (e.g., Strevens 2018, Skow 2016). Whether or not a given explanation counts as 'non-causal' will partly depend, of course, how the foil, 'causal explanation', is construed. Even the most ardent current proponents of non-causal explanations regard some of the examples above as causal. For example, Lange (2017) views as causal the simple 'geometrical' explanation involving inertially moving particles in curved space, while he regards as non-causal the explanation involving enantiomorphic figures in an orientable space (see start of §2). According to Lange, the former explanation is causal, "since it works by specifying the causes (forces) that are acting on the dust particles (namely none) as well as the laws and conditions determining how things in the particles' locations would behave were they under the influence of no causes." (p. 403) The latter explanation Lange analyses as a non-causal explanation 'by constraint'. (p. 126) Given the disagreement about the status of many of the examples cited, one may ask what point there is to demarcate between causal and non-causal explanations? What exactly hangs on it? As I see it, a central aim of philosophy of explanation is to faithfully capture the explanatory practice of science, and to mark significant distinctions that scientists themselves draw between types of explanations. What do physicists regard as explanatory, and why? The contrast between causal vs. non-causal explanations can be a useful way to articulate such distinctions, the philosophical point of such a contrast being underwritten by the corresponding distinctions' significance to science. Scientists do, after all, care what kinds of explanations there are, or could be, and how these relate and contrast with one another (see Lange 2017 and Saatsi 2018). In the rest of this section I will briefly look at some prominent analyses of non-causal explanations. I do not have space to get into the details of the particular accounts, but I will highlight two competing trends in the currently booming literature. One trend is exemplified by philosophers who emphasise the independence of the explanandum of non-causal explanations from specific causal features of the system in question: many non-causal For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 10 explanations have been thought to work by bringing out (in one way or another) such independence. The second, competing trend is exemplified by philosophers who emphasise the (counterfactual) dependence of the explanandum on the explanans, in broad analogy with causal explanations. According to this line of thought many non-causal explanations explain in a way analogous to causal explanations, but by tracking relations of non-causal dependence instead of causal dependence. Let's begin with the first trend. There are many ways in which many non-causal explanations can be independent of, or abstract away from, causal features. According to Pincock (2007), some non-causal mathematical explanations-such as Euler's well-known graph-theoretic explanation of why one cannot traverse Koenigsberg's bridges in a particular way-work by "abstracting away from the microphysics". And not just microphysics: Euler's explanation is independent of all the physical details regarding the bridges lengths, angles, and so. According to Batterman and Rice (2014), some scientific models are capable of explaining "universal patterns" amongst micro-physically heterogeneous systems by demonstrating that the micro-details, distinguishing all these systems (as well as the explanatory model system) from one another, are irrelevant for the universal behaviour being explained. These explanatory 'minimal models' are extreme caricatures of real system, but according to Batterman and Rice they do not explain by virtue of capturing any 'common features' between the different systems as explanatorily underlying the universal behaviour. Rather, minimal model explanations arguably work by showing how micro-physically heterogeneous systems can partake in a "universal pattern"-belong to one and the same "universality class", such as those involved in renormalization group explanations-by virtue of some features of the phenomenon at stake that renders irrelevant the details that distinguish the model system and various real systems. Lange (2017) offers a very different account of non-causal explanations that also in a way exemplifies the trend that emphasises the independence of the explanandum from specific causal features. According to Lange, a broad range of non-causal explanations work "by describing how the explanandum arises from certain facts ('constraints') possessing some variety of necessity stronger than ordinary laws of nature possess" (p.10). He presents varied examples of such 'explanations by constraint', which also include some of the examples discussed above (§2), such as the topological double-pendulum explanation. Many other For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 11 geometrical explanations would also count as explanation by constraint. For an illustration, consider the example involving the parallel-transported stick along the spherical surface (cf. §2). The standard geometrical explanation of α is independent of contingent causal, dynamical, and nomological features of the world, thereby holding with mathematical or logical necessity. (Due to this modal strength of the 'constraint', Lange would call this 'distinctly mathematical' explanation. Other explanations 'by constraint' involve grades of necessity strictly weaker than this, but nevertheless stronger than those of ordinary causal laws.) Lange argues that explanations by constraint explain by virtue of showing why the explanandum had to be the way it is, for reasons that are modally stronger than ordinary causal laws. The relative modal strength of explanatory constraints Lange in turn characterises in terms of their independence from actual causal laws. It is undeniably true that a distinctive feature of many non-causal explanations in physics is a kind of independence or abstraction away from causal features of the world. It does not automatically follow that this feature is what makes these explanations explanatory, however. In particular, philosophers exemplifying the second trend highlighted above have argued that various purported examples of non-causal explanations work by virtue of providing dependence information, despite their extreme level of abstraction from causal features of the world. In this spirit Jansson and Saatsi (forthcoming) critically discuss the accounts of Pincock and Lange, for example, arguing that many of the key examples motivating their accounts also involve information about non-causal dependence relations, and that this information furthermore is naturally construed as explanatory very much in the spirit of a popular counterfactual account of causal explanation (Woodward 2003). The 'minimal models' account of Batterman and Rice is critically analysed by Lange (2015), who argues that their examples can be construed as involving information about essential common features shared by otherwise heterogeneous systems. Furthermore, one could argue that these features, although highly abstract, are explanatory by virtue of showing what the explanandum depends on. (This further claim is not part of Lange's brief, however.) This would be in tune with Saatsi and Reutlinger (2018), who emphasise the role of counterfactual dependence information specifically in connection with renormalisation group explanations of critical phenomena. (See also Reutlinger 2016 and Woodward 2018.) For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 12 The proponents of counterfactual accounts to explanations have sought to generalise the ideology of causal explanation to non-causal cases quite generally. This is motivated by noting that in a wide range of examples given above there is some interesting, non-trivial modal information in play that seems to inform us of the dependence of the explanandum on some other factors. For example, arguably important symmetry-based explanations- including those mentioned above-provide answers to counterfactual what-if-things-hadbeen-different questions (French and Saatsi 2018). Similarly, Saatsi (2018) argues that many geometrical explanations in physics-including those involving a geometrical phase-are naturally understood in counterfactual terms, and Saatsi (2017b) suggest likewise regarding explanations furnished by phase-spaces and attractors in dynamical systems theory. Bokulich (2008) appropriates the counterfactual approach to a model-based explanation of the semiclassical phenomenon of wavefunction scarring, and Reutlinger (2018) discusses various further cases in the same spirit. Consider again, for example, the paradigmatic geometrical explanation involving a stick's parallel transport over a closed loop on a spherical surface. In Saatsi's (2018) analysis this explanation is best understood in counterfactual terms, supported by the equation that connects the shift in the stick's angle, α, on the one hand, and the area of closed loop and the curvature of the surface, on the other. What is it that renders this explanation non-causal (or mathematical, perhaps), if the ideology of explanatory counterfactual information is apt? According to Saatsi, the difference between this non-causal geometrical explanation and causal explanations boils down to the inapplicability of the (causal) notion of intervention in the non-causal case, due to some of the explanans variables being suitably non-local. Another key feature of this kind of non-causal explanation is that the explanatory connection between the explanandum and explanans variables is too intimate to count as a contingent causal connection (Woodward 2018). There is still a good deal of work to be done on the metaphysics and epistemology of noncausal explanations. (See Reutlinger 2017 for a recent review of philosophy of non-causal explanation, and Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018) for a collection of recent research.) The nature of purported non-causal dependence relations is murkier than their causal counterparts, for instance, and there is a prominent challenge faced by everyone in the debate: how to account for the directionality of explanation? This challenge is unsurprising in the light of the wellknown challenges to the DN-account and the subsequent appeal to causation and unification For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 13 as offering a response to these challenges. Adopting the ideology of counterfactual causal accounts of explanation, sans causation, clearly leaves open the question what grounds the directionality of explanation. (For different responses, see e.g. Jansson 2015, Jansson and Saatsi forthcoming, Reutlinger 2018.) The directionality challenge has been explicitly raised against the 'minimal models' account (by Lange 2015); counterfactual accounts (by Lange 2019), and against Lange's account of distinctly mathematical explanations (by Craver and Povich 2017). Acknowledgments. Many thanks to Alex Reutlinger and Eleanor Knox for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. References Batterman, R. W. (2003). 'Falling cats, parallel parking, and polarized light,' Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34(4), 527–557. Batterman, R. W., & Rice, C. C. (2014). 'Minimal model explanations,' Philosophy of Science, 81(3), 349–376. Bokulich, A. (2008). 'Can classical structures explain quantum phenomena?' The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59 (2), 217–235. Buchel, W. (1969). 'Why is space three-dimensional?' American Journal of Physics, 37, 1222–24. Callender, C. (2005). 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Because without Cause: Non-causal Explanations in Science and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lange, M. (2019). 'Asymmetry as a challenge to counterfactual accounts,' Synthese, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02317-3. Lyre, H. (2014). 'Berry phase and quantum structure,' Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 48, 45–51. Morrison, M. (2015). Reconstructing Reality: Models, Mathematics, and Simulations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nagel, E. (1961). The structure of science. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul. Nerlich, G. (1979). 'What can geometry explain,' The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 30(1), 69-83. Pexton, M. (2014). 'How dimensional analysis can explain,' Synthese, 191(10), 2333–51. Pincock, C. (2007). 'A role for mathematics in the physical sciences,' Noûs, 41(2), 253–275. Reutlinger, A. (2016). 'Is there a monist theory of causal and non-causal explanations?' Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 733–745. Reutlinger, A. (2017). 'Explanation beyond causation? New directions in the philosophy of scientific explanation: Explanation Beyond Causation,' Philosophy Compass, 12(2), e12395. Reutlinger, A. (2018). 'Extending the counterfactual theory of explanation,' in Reutlinger and Saatsi (2018). Reutlinger, A. & J. Saatsi (2018), Explanation Beyond Causation: Philosophical Perspectives on Non-Causal Explanations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Physics (Eds. E. Knox and A. Wilson) 16 Saatsi, J. (2017a). 'Realism and the limits of explanatory reasoning,' in J. Saatsi (Ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. Saatsi, J. (2017b). 'Dynamical Systems Theory and Explanatory Indispensability,' Philosophy of Science, 84(December), 1–14. Saatsi, J. (2018). 'On Explanations from Geometry of Motion,' The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(1), 253–73. Saatsi, J., & Reutlinger, A. (2018). 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Liberalismo, comunitarismo e oltre. Un dialogo fra sordi con un paio di utili sviluppi. di Sergio Cremaschi La critica comunitaria del liberalismo costituisce una caratteristica ricorrente della politica e dell'organizzazione sociale liberale (Michael Walzer) La riproposizione rawlsiana del liberalismo politico. Il libro di John Rawls La teoria della giustizia, pubblicato nel 1971 ha rappresentato il punto di partenza di una ripresa della filosofia politica negli Stati Uniti. Il proposito di Rawls è di formulare una teoria della giustizia alternativa all'utilitarismo, nel quale vede il rischio di una possibile giustificazione dell'oppressione delle minoranze in vista del benessere delle maggioranze. La sua alternativa è quella della giustizia come equità. Il procedimento attraverso cui la teoria è costruita è quello dell'`equilibrio riflessivo': individuati giudizi etici elementari che comunemente condividiamo (qui ed ora, nella nostra civiltà e dato il nostro quadro di istituzioni ci sono alcune convinzioni condivise: nessuno ad esempio difende la schiavitù), si tratterebbe di mettere in accordo con questi i nostri giudizi su casi meno elementari. La giustizia come equità vuole essere un criterio di giustizia non sostanziale ma procedurale. É costruita attraverso una finzione: la tavola rotonda alla quale sederebbero delle parti contraenti per stabilire principi di giustizia adeguati a regolare la convivenza d'ora in poi. Queste parti contraenti si suppone siano egoisti razionali. Si suppone che siano protetti dal "velo dell'ignoranza" che impedisce loro di sapere quale posizione sociale occuperanno nella società, ma anche quale concezione del "bene" (cioè quali valori, quale progetto di vita personale) avranno. Devono perciò accordarsi solo su una concezione del "giusto" che permetta a convivenza di diverse nozioni di bene e di progetti di vita radicalmente diversi. Le regole sulle quali i contraenti si accorderebbero sarebbero: (a) l'uguale (e non scambiabile) ammontare di libertà; (b) una distribuzione degli altri beni diversa da una distribuzione totalmente egualitaria soltanto a patto che una maggiore dotazione sia collegata a posizioni accessibili a ognuno per merito, e che gli incentivi risultanti conducano a risultati che implichino una migliore condizione del più svantaggiato (non una migliore condizione media). Quest'ultimo sottoprincipio è detto regola del maximin (Rawls 1982; vedi anche Cremaschi 1989). In realtà nell'argomentazione di Rawls si intrecciano due filoni: (a) il tentativo di una riedizione di una teoria etica di stampo kantiano, che faccia della dignità delle persone il fine più elevato e della giustizia non solo un requisito della convivenza sociale, ma anche la massima virtù personale; (b) una nuova argomentazione a favore della tradizione del liberalismo politico, che proprio in nome del liberalismo (e quindi della tolleranza e del pluralismo) vuole limitarsi esclusivamente al terreno politico senza invadere quello etico (Larmore 1992). Questa – che ritengo fosse una vera e propria ambiguità della proposta di Rawls – fu l'occasione di una serie di vivaci reazioni critiche che presero di mira una (supposta) contraddittorietà di fondo della teoria rawlsiana e di tutta la "tradizione liberale" dal Seicento a oggi. Questa contraddittorietà deriverebbe dall'avere adottato un'immagine del tutto svuotata del soggetto individuale e un'immagine falsamente universalistica della società umana. Queste, e critiche simili, sono state fatte proprie da autori che sono stati classificati come neocomunitari, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, e da altri due autori dei quali uno, Roberto Unger, ha condiviso questa linea di critica per una fase, e l'altro, Michael Walzer, ne ha ripreso un elemento importante pur nel contesto di un'impostazione sostanzialmente `liberale'. Lo stesso Rawls – come illustrerò in seguito – in Liberalismo politico 64 (1993) ha sciolto questa ambiguità in favore di una concezione soltanto politica, e non etica, del liberalismo. Sandel e la critica alla priorità del giusto sul bene Il primo e fortunatissimo libro di Rawls diede l'avvio, fra l'altro a un filone di critica di cui l'esponente più tipico è Sandel (1982; 1984; 1992) che si è autodefinito comunitario. Questo filone riprendeva motivi di diverse tradizioni che avevano criticato l'"individualismo" moderno: la critica hegeliana all'astratto individualismo illuminista (e quella connessa del giovane Marx e di tutti i neomarxisti umanisti); la critica di tutti i neoaristotelici, buona ultima la Arendt, allo stato moderno contrapposto alla polis teorizzata da Aristotele come fondata sull'amicizia fra i cittadini; la critica del repubblicanesimo neoclassico (da Machiavelli agli scozzesi del Settecento ai padri della Costituzione americana) alle tendenze disgregatrici della società moderna (vedi Cremaschi 1993; Passerin d'Entrèves 1990). I punti su cui si è concentrata la critica di Sandel sono i seguenti: (i) la concezione del soggetto. Il liberalismo avrebbe presupposto un soggetto disincarnato (unencumbered); nella versione utilitarista lo avrebbe ridotto a un massimizzatore di utilità; nella versione kantiana ne avrebbe avuto una visione astratta (fuori dal contesto storico, politico e sociale). Occorre invece secondo Sandel una concezione del soggetto agente che lo situi in un concreto contesto storico o sociale, e che sottolinei il ruolo costitutivo dei fine e dei valori della comunità di appartenenza per l'identità politica e morale dell'individuo. (ii) la concezione della razionalità. Per l'utilitarismo si riduce al calcolo strumentale di costi e benefici. Il kantismo ne ha una concezione puramente formale e procedurale. Occorre invece una concezione della razionalità che privilegi il ruolo della riflessione, della deliberazione, della valutazione razionale delle norme e dei valori. (iii) la concezione della comunità. La concezione kantiana ne ha una visione astratta; la concezione utilitarista la vede solo in termini strumentali. Invece io non sono portatore di un sé separato e indipendente non soltanto dai miei fini e dalle cose a cui sono legato, ma anche dalle comunità dalle quali derivo la mia identità, famiglia, città, popolo, nazione, partito o causa. Dal punto di vista comunitario la storia di queste comunità ha una rilevanza morale, non soltanto psicologica. (iv) la concezione della giustizia. É soltanto se il sé viene concepito come precedente i fini che persegue che si può sostenere la priorità del giusto rispetto al bene. Ma posto che i fini e i valori condivisi dalla comunità di appartenenza hanno un ruolo costitutivo per il sé la neutralità della giustizia rispetto a una concezione del bene comune non sarebbe difendibile. MacIntyre e la nostalgia della virtù Alasdair MacIntyre è un personaggio dalle esperienze complesse. Irlandese-scozzese e cattolico, negli anni 50 e 60 è stato ad un tempo filosofo analitico e marxista dissidente. Nei primi anni 70, quando si è trasferito negli Stati Uniti, ha dichiarato il suo distacco dal marxismo per via dei suoi fallimenti morali. Tuttavia in Dopo la virtù, come Sandel, critica il liberalismo in nome di un comunitarismo di sinistra. Nei due libri successivi la caratterizzazione di sinistra sembrerà, tutto sommato, svanire. Dopo la virtù è una sorta di De Profundis sul progetto dell'illuminismo di fondare un'etica autonoma nonché sulle tradizioni politiche (marxismo e liberalismo) che a questo progetto si sono ispirate. Ricordiamo la linea generale dell'argomentazione svolta nel libro. Secondo l'autore il linguaggio morale nel mondo odierno si trova in uno stato di grave disordine: utilizza espressioni di epoche precedenti in modo arbitrario non collocandole entro un compiuto schema concettuale ed entro una forma di vita coerente. Il disordine linguistico impedisce che di possa riconoscere la verità della tesi precedente; la caratteristica fondamentale della discussione morale contemporanea è perciò l'"incommensurabilità" delle argomentazioni contrapposte, caratteristica che fa sì ci si riduca a scelte fra opzioni fondamentali contrapposte. Per incommensurabilità si intende l'impossibilità di confrontare due diverse tesi o teorie, in quanto ognuna delle due porta con sé anche diversi criteri 65 di valutazione della validità di una tesi. L'emotivismo, dottrina secondo la quale i giudizi di valore sono soltanto espressioni di preferenze, è espressione dell'atteggiamento più radicato nella nostra cultura. Questa dottrina è una filosofia 'vera' nella nostra cultura perché i "caratteri" (nel senso che al termine dà Irving Goffmann) che la nostra cultura ci mette a disposizione da impersonare sono quelli resi possibili da un "io emotivista" (il corrispettivo dello enuncumbered self di Sandel). Questa situazione (nelle teorie e nella realtà della vita sociale) deriva dal fallimento del progetto dell'illuminismo di fondare una morale razionale. Questo progetto doveva necessariamente fallire perché aveva ereditato un edificio aristotelico senza conservarne le fondamenta; la riduzione dell'etica da etica delle virtù a etica delle norme (a partire da Kant per giungere a Rawls) è conseguenza della perdita di queste fondamenta (l'idea di un telos (un fine intrinseco) dell'essere umano e l'immagine aristotelica della razionalità pratica, imperniata sulla nozione di deliberazione saggia. Il concetto di virtù era concepibile soltanto entro comunità che assegnassero ai propri membri dei ruoli comprensibili e in relazione ai quali avesse senso l'idea di un 'buono' svolgimento del ruolo. Oggi le tradizioni politiche del liberalismo e del marxismo si sono esaurite; la prospettiva per il futuro è quella della costituzione di comunità ristrette che – come le comunità dei benedettini nel medioevo – ricostituiscano tradizioni di vita civile e la possibilità di comprendere il significato della 'vita buona'. I due punti di maggiore interesse per noi sono la diagnosi di incommensurabilità fra le opposte concezioni della giustizia di Rawls e di Nozick e la contrapposizione fra la `comunità' antica e medievale e la società liberale moderna. Esaminiamo il primo punto. Nel capitolo 17 di Dopo la Virtù si confrontano la teoria della giustizia di Rawls con la teoria dei diritti di Nozick. Si parte dal confronto fra due approcci diffusi nel senso comune di fronte ai problemi di giustizia distributiva: l'individuo A ritiene che ciò che ha legittimamente guadagnato attraverso una serie di transazioni legittime non debba essere soggetto ad alcun prelievo fiscali a scopi perequativi perché è ciò che ha meritato; l'individuo B, constatando l'arbitrarietà della distribuzione di beni esistente, ritiene che chi ha bisogno meriti una ridistribuzione di benefici. MacIntyre ritiene che "la nostra cultura pluralistica non possiede alcun metodo per... decidere fra tesi basate sul possesso legittimo e tesi basate sul bisogno. Perciò questi due tipi di pretese sono davvero incommensurabili" (MacIntyre 1988a, p. 294). I due atteggiamenti di fatto diffusi nelle società odierne rispecchiano le opposte teorie di Rawls e Nozick. L'una e l'altra teoria, valutata dal punto di vista dell'individuo razionale, si presenta come pienamente coerente. In realtà però, né l'una né l'altra fa appello al concetto di merito, a cui ricorre il senso comune sia pure a sostegno di due posizioni opposte; la nozione di merito (implicando una collocazione dell'individuo nel contesto di una collettività) è in realtà un residuo di moralità precedenti, residuo che sopravvive nella società liberale, ma non può essere giustificata coerentemente nei termini dell'atteggiamento individualistico proprio delle teorie liberali. Un'idea centrale per quanto riguarda il secondo punto è una certa immagine della polis greca: in primo luogo è essenziale all'argomentazione di MacIntyre che la polis greca reale, come pure la società medievale storicamente data, corrispondesse nei tratti essenziali alle caratteristiche teorizzate da Aristotele; in secondo luogo la caratteristica centrale è l'amicizia fra i cittadini come condizione per l'esistenza della polis. In altri termini: il metro di paragone per giudicare le moderne società liberali sarebbe rappresentato da una ipotetica società che si identificasse con una famiglia o un gruppo di amici (Larmore 1992). Così MacIntyre può scrivere che da un punto di vista aristotelico una società politica liberale moderna può apparire solo una raccolta di cittadini di nessun luogo che si sono raggruppati in vista della protezione comune. Nella migliore delle ipotesi essi posseggono quella forma inferiore di amicizia che si fonda sul vantaggio reciproco. Che non abbiano il vincolo dell'amicizia è ovviamente connesso al consapevole pluralismo morale di queste società liberali" (MacIntyre 1988a, p. 189). Va infine notata l'evoluzione di MacIntyre nei due testi successivi, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 66 e Enciclopedia, genealogia, tradizione. Qui l'autore si sforza di precisare il carattere razionale delle tradizioni, da intendersi non come patrimoni di credenze accettate in modo acritico ma come `programmi di ricerca' che costantemente si sforzano di chiarire i propri punti di partenza (Macintyre 1988), ma d'altra parte accentua l'idea dell'impossibilità di argomentazione razionale fra approcci diversi per cui fra gli eredi attuali della "tradizione" (aristotelica e tomista) che sono i neotomisti, gli eredi del progetto dell'illuminismo che chiama "enciclopedisti" (e che in Italia chiameremmo i "moderni"), e i seguaci di Nietzsche negatori di questo progetto che chiama "genealogisti" (e che in Italia chiameremmo "postmoderni"). La sua ultima proposta è quella di istituzionalizzare la coesistenza di approcci diversi concorrenti costituendo quelli che chiamerei tre ghetti nelle istituzioni universitarie, in ognuno dei quali si porti avanti uno dei tre programmi di ricerca (MacIntyre 1992a; vedi anche 1992b). MacIntyre non dice che fine farebbe chi non si riconosce in nessuno dei tre approcci. Questa visione di un mondo futuro composto di riserve indiane è in sintonia con una tendenza che conta molto nell'opinione pubblica americana: la tendenza separatista che vorrebbe che i neri avessero un sistema educativo separato con un 'canone' solo di autori neri, e così per gli ispanici, le donne, gli omosessuali ecc. Pur con tutto il rispetto dovuto alla statura intellettuale di MacIntyre, che non viene meno in questi ultimi testi, i motivi di interesse del comunitarismo di Dopo la Virtù sono svaniti: quello che resta è il quadro un po' cupo di un pensiero illiberale più che antiliberale. Taylor e l'invenzione del soggetto moderno Charles Taylor è noto come studioso di Hegel, epistemologo delle scienze umane antibehaviorista, filosofo politico comunitario (vedi Taylor 1992b; 1992c), ma soprattutto, autore di un'interpretazione della civiltà occidentale moderna non difforme da quella di MacIntyre anche se meno pessimista (vedi Taylor 1992a; 1993). Il suo testo maggiore, Radici dell'io verte sull'interpretazione della modernità e in particolare sui modi in cui si è venuto a costruire l'esperienza dell'io o del soggetto nella civiltà occidentale moderna. Taylor prende posizione contro il filone dominante della filosofia morale contemporanea, viziata dal formalismo. Si propone di esplorare lo spazio fra "ciò che la gente, per così dire, crede ufficialmente e consapevolmente, e addirittura si gloria di professare, e ciò di cui ha bisogno per dare un senso alle proprie reazioni morali", perché "l'ontologia morale che sta alla base della prospettiva di una persona può restare in larga misura implicita". Nella filosofia moderna ha avuta larga presa la tesi naturalistica che fa delle reazioni morali nulla più che reazioni biologiche. I sostenitori della tesi "naturalistica" erano spinti da motivazioni che Taylor condivide, cioè dalla diffidenza per le motivazioni ontologiche per via dell'uso che ne era stato fatto per giustificare "la negazione o la limitazione del diritto alla considerazione morale di eretici e di presunti esseri inferiori". Tuttavia la filosofia morale moderna nelle sue versioni kantiane come in quelle utilitariste ha elevato a dogma l'unitarietà del bene (cancellando le differenze qualitative fra beni) e si è ridotta a filosofia dell'azione obbligatoria. Si sono dimenticate così due nozioni tradizionali di bene: il bene come vita buona e il bene come oggetto del nostro amore e della nostra fedeltà. In realtà esistono beni costitutivi o iperbeni, cioè fonti di moralità, cose "il cui amore ci consente di fare il bene e di essere buoni". Questi fanno parte anche del bagaglio occulto delle teorie morali moderne. Infatti anche l'umanesimo moderno che non ha, diversamente dal platonismo e dal teismo cristiano ed ebraico, un bene costitutivo esterno (l'idea del bene o il Dio della rivelazione), prevede una forma superiore di vita umana che consiste "precisamente nell'affrontare con coraggio e lucidità un universo disincantato" ed è il nostro senso di ammirazione per questa capacità ciò che ci consente di vivere in modo che le si conforma. Taylor si rivela quindi molto più ottimista di MacIntyre: anzi nella coscienza dell'umanesimo moderno ritrova motivi e istanze che ritiene possano conciliarsi con lo spirito del teismo giudaico-cristiano. Anche il naturalismo illuminista, pur offuscando alcune precondizioni essenziali della moralità, giunge a quest'esito in sede di teoria etica in parte sulla spinta di mal digeriti presupposti epistemologici, in parte sulla spinta di motivazioni morali più che rispettabili: la benevolenza, cioè la preoccupazione per un effettivo operare che 67 renda il mondo migliore. Il romanticismo, in quanto forma di reazione antinaturalistica, rappresenta la speranza di riscatto dell'identità moderna, e la situazione spirituale del nostro secolo è dominata proprio dal conflitto fra istanze romantiche e teorizzazioni filosofiche che non riconoscono loro possibilità di espressione teorica per via della negazione delle differenze qualitative fra beni e della tesi connessa (che accomuna Kant, Habermas e Rawls) della priorità del giusto sul bene. L'idea centrale di questo suggestivo affresco, cioè l'idea delle differenze qualitative all'interno del bene è quella di cui Taylor fa uso anche su un terreno più strettamente politico (Taylor 1992b). La contrapposizione fra seguaci di Bentham e seguaci di Kant è falsata dall'assunto dogmatico della necessità di ridurre tutti i beni o a oggetti di imperativi incondizionati o a oggetto di calcolo di preferenze. I diversi beni vanno collocati invece entro contesti diversi, contesti che discendono da una natura intrinseca di cui ognuno di questi beni è dotato e che fa sì che questi si dispongano fra loro in un ordine gerarchico. Va notato che una nozione simile, quella della pluralità dei beni, è centrale anche per la teoria di Walzer della pluralità delle sfere di giustizia. Sulla base della sua tesi della non omogeneità del bene Taylor contesta il caposaldo della teoria rawlsiana: il primato del giusto sul bene. Il primato del giusto sul bene può avere senso solo laddove per "bene" si intende "l'obiettivo primario di una teoria consequenzialistica (cioè una teoria etica che valuta la bontà delle azioni solo in base alle loro conseguenze) e il giusto si decide semplicemente sulla scorta della sua funzionalità strumentale rispetto al conseguimento di questo obiettivo". Ma dove il termine "bene" viene usato... per indicare tutto ciò che spicca sulle altre cose in virtù di una distinzione qualitativa, allora possiamo dire che è vero il contrario, che... il bene ha la priorità sul giusto... perché il bene, nel suo articolarsi, fornisce la ragion d'essere delle regole che definiscono il giusto (Taylor 1993, p. 120) Walzer e la giustizia come eguaglianza complessa In Sfere di giustizia Michael Walzer propone una alternativa alla teoria della giustizia di Rawls. Di questa rifiuta l'idea che vi possa essere un unico criterio. La giustizia va identificata con l'eguaglianza, ma questa non deve essere necessariamente né quella degli egualitari alla Babeuf né quella della maximin di Rawls; deve essere l'"eguaglianza complessa". L'ideale di eguaglianza ha sempre trattato origine da una politica abolizionista (rivolta cioè a eliminare una specifica forma di dominio di un gruppo su un altro). Lo scopo dell'eguaglianza deve essere una società senza dominio di un gruppo su un altro, non l'eliminazione delle differenze. L'ideale dell'eguaglianza è scritto nella storia delle nostre società e della nostra civiltà nel suo complesso. Infatti "noi facciamo il mondo sociale tanto con la nostra mente quanto con le nostre mani, e il mondo particolare che abbiamo fatto si presta a interpretazioni egualitarie". Queste interpretazioni tendono costantemente a proscrivere l'uso delle cose a fini di dominio. La fonte degli ideale egualitari sta meno in una concezione universalistica delle persone (come secondo Rawls nei suoi momenti kantiani) che in una concezione pluralista dei beni). Nessuna società ha mai evitato la molteplicità; infatti, in primo luogo, non c' è mai stato un mezzo di scambio universale (ci sono sempre certe cose che il denaro non può comprare); in secondo luogo, non c' è mai stato un singolo punto di decisione dal quale vengono controllate tutte le distribuzioni, e neppure un singolo insieme di agenti che compiono decisioni; in terzo luogo, non c' è mai stato un singolo criterio per tutte le distribuzioni (merito, qualificazione, nascita e sangue, bisogno, libero scambio...). I principi di giustizia hanno anch' essi una forma pluralistica: che beni sociali diversi debbono venire distribuiti per ragioni diverse, secondo procedure diverse, da parte di agenti diversi, e che queste differenze derivino da modi diversi di intendere i beni sociali stessi "è il prodotto inevitabile del particolarismo storico e culturale" (Walzer 1987, c. 1). La gente concepisce e crea e poi distribuisce ad altri dei beni. In questi processi possono crearsi due fenomeni: (i) la dominanza (un bene è dominante se coloro che lo posseggono dispongono di 68 un'ampia gamma di altri beni); (ii) il monopolio (un bene è monopolizzato ogni volta che una persona o gruppo riesce a tenerlo per sé). Da queste caratteristiche dei beni deriva che un regime di eguaglianza semplice è instabile; la ragione di questa instabilità sta nel fatto che la perdita del monopolio del bene porta la perdita della sua dominanza, e quindi lo stesso fatto della distribuzione eguale di un bene (che sia la proprietà terriera, i diritti politici o altro) dà maggiore peso ad altri beni. Storicamente il problema che è stato visto come centrale è quello del monopolio, infatti "le lotte distributive dell'età moderna iniziano con una guerra contro il controllo esclusivo dell'aristocrazia su terra, cariche politiche, onore". Invece è necessario concentrare l'azione sulla riduzione della dominanza e non sulla rottura del monopolio. La società egualitaria complessa è quella in cui i vari beni sociali possono venire monopolizzati ma in cui nessun bene particolare è convertibile universalmente. Il risultato sarà l'esistenza di molte piccole diseguaglianze, ma il processo di conversione fra beni non le moltiplicherà né si sommeranno quelle relative a beni diversi. L'eguaglianza complessa è una relazione complessa fra persone, mediata dai beni che creiamo, condividiamo e spartiamo; non è l'identità dei possessi; richiede una varietà di criteri distributivi che rispecchi la varietà dei beni sociali. I beni sociali hanno significati sociali, dei significati che sono condivisi perché attribuiti loro dalla particolare cultura di una particolare società. La tirannia è il disprezzo dei principi interni a ogni sfera distributiva. Il principio anti-tirannico che Walzer formula afferma che nessun bene sociali x deve essere distribuito a uomini e donne che possiedono un altro bene y solo perché possiedono y e senza considerare il significato di x. Walzer nota che libero scambio, merito, bisogno sembrano soddisfare il principio e sono stati difesi da autori diversi e in momenti diversi come l'alfa e l'omega della giustizia distributiva. Invece la miopia dei sostenitori di ognuno di questi principi è stata l'incapacità di vedere come nessuno di questi criteri fosse giustificabile per la distribuzione di ogni bene possibile. Walzer esamina poi come si è posto in contesti e epoche diverse il problema di criteri per l'assegnazione di beni diversi. Il primo di questi è l'appartenenza, per il quale deve essere ammesso un diritto – seppure limitato – di chiusura, senza il quale non potrebbe esistere alcuna comunità). Altri beni sono sicurezza e assistenza, per i quali c' è in ogni società una qualche forma di ridistribuzione. Ciò che non esiste invece è un insieme di regole come quelle di Rawls che possano valere per individui ignari della loro collocazione sociale particolare. Le domande a cui una teoria alla Rawls non può rispondere è: quanto? e per che cosa? Ad Atene venivano rimborsati i giorni lavorativi perduti non solo per fare i giurati nei tribunali ma anche per assistere agli spettacoli teatrali. Perché? Perché il tribunale e il teatro erano le attività che definivano la cittadinanza. Infatti nei conflitti "si fa appello non a degli interessi particolari e nemmeno a un interesse pubblico concepito come la loro somma, ma a dei valori collettivi, alle concezioni comuni dell'appartenenza, della salute, del cibo, dell'alloggio" (Walzer 1988, p. 89). Un terzo gruppo di beni è rappresentato da denaro e merce: qui è essenziale stabilire che cosa si può comprare e come viene distribuito. In ogni società esiste un elenco delle cose non comprabili o un certo numero di scambi bloccati. Il problema centrale è quello di rendere innocuo il denaro: ciò che viola il senso di giustizia come eguaglianza che abbiamo ereditato dalle tradizioni della nostra civiltà che hanno costituito il nostro patrimonio attuale non è che qualcuno possa mangiare più aragoste, ma soprattutto che il denaro in più possa essere usato solo per fini stupidi e relativamente innocui come il consumo di aragoste e champagne. La proposta di Walzer è così quella di una complessa alternativa a Rawls, alternativa che si pone in diretta concorrenza in quanto vuole interpretare proprio la tradizione del pensiero e delle istituzioni liberali che caratterizzano la storia della civiltà occidentale moderna. Il liberalismo è però una tradizione, e i suoi principi hanno senso solo se messi all'opera entro un contesto particolare, rappresentato da una cultura o una forma di vita, propria di una comunità. Walzer fa così propria l'idea centrale dei critici comunitari, ma la usa per difendere una versione non astorica del liberalismo (un liberalismo estremamente di sinistra, va detto, che in realtà propone di realizzare quanto hanno fatto le migliori socialdemocrazie con un di più di federalismo, di 69 autogoverno e di antistatalismo). Recentemente Walzer (1990) ha collocato la propria posizione nel contesto del dibattito fra comunitari e liberali: i critici comunitari – sostiene – hanno pescato molto nella mitologia marxista-umanista, aristotelica, civico-repubblicana. Al di là della forza evocativa di queste mitologie, in sostanza hanno mosso due critiche alla tradizione liberale, critiche che non possono essere entrambe vere: secondo la prima le dottrine liberali riflettono realmente lo stato (decaduto) delle società moderne che sono ormai delle "comunità di estranei"; ma – obietta Walzer – se realmente siamo nulla più che estranei, come possiamo fare qualcos' altro che mettere la giustizia al primo posto? Secondo la seconda critica la teoria liberale distorce la vita sociale reale, nella quale noi abbiamo legami e appartenenze di comunità, salvo a fingerci individui isolati nella società politica. Walzer obietta che in realtà il liberalismo stesso è una tradizione e costituisce una comunità, seppure molto elastica e articolata (una "unione di unioni" nel linguaggio dell'ultimo Rawls). Il problema vero che i comunitari hanno colto (seppure male) è che "il liberalismo è una dottrina autosovvertentesi, e per questa ragione esige realmente una periodica correzione comunitaria". Ciò che caratterizza il liberalismo è non tanto la garanzia della possibilità di formare associazioni volontarie, ma la permanente garanzia al singolo di uscirne. Mantenere queste garanzie (che d'altra parte nessuno dei comunitari propone seriamente di abolire) ha dei costi: mette le forme associative perennemente a rischio di erosione. Il correttivo che Walzer propone è una modifica al principio della neutralità dello stato liberale: lo stato dovrebbe adottare un atteggiamento di esplicito intervento volto a sostenere l'esistenza di tutte quelle associazioni volontarie che sembrano promuovere valori congeniali ai valori (minimali) condivisi da una società liberale. Il primo Unger e la critica totale della coscienza liberale. In due volumi degli anni 70, Conoscenza e politica e Law in Modern Society, Roberto Unger ha svolto il progetto di una critica "totale" del liberalismo, definito come la forma dominante della coscienza moderna (vedi Cremaschi 1984). Questa forma di coscienza esiste come teoria filosofica (la filosofia hobbesiana ne è il prototipo), e come un senso comune diffuso (e dal fatto di essere un'esplicitazione di quest'ultimo la teoria filosofica ha tratto la sua plausibilità); a sua volta questo senso comune trae la sua fora dal fatto di avere un rapporto particolare con le forme di ordine sociale prevalenti nelle società occidentali dal Seicento ai primi decenni del nostro secolo. In Conoscenza e politica Unger si è proposto in primo luogo di delineare un quadro unitario del pensiero liberale (risultante dalla somma di psicologia, politica, metafisica), in secondo luogo di formulare una diagnosi dell'attuale società postliberale che mostri come l evoluzione storia ponga all'ordine del giorno una critica totale del liberalismo, infine di suggerire una teoria della natura umana che superi la psicologia liberale e una teoria politica alternativa alla politica liberale. Law in Modern Society sviluppa un capitolo particolare di questa critica: l'esame di quel fenomeno unico nella storia umana che è rappresentato dal ruolo primario che il diritto è giunto ad assumere nella realtà sociale e nella coscienza della società liberale. Il liberalismo è un sistema di pensiero unitario anche se le varie parti di questo pensiero si contraddicono – al livello delle implicazioni logiche – portando ad antinomie incapaci di risoluzione. La sua unità sta tuttavia nella sua "struttura profonda", cioè in una serie di presupposti mai pienamente esplicitati fino in fondo. Inoltre questo pensiero è parzialmente vero finché sussiste l'ordine sociale a cui la forma di coscienza liberale si accompagna (non vero tout court come vorrebbe un atteggiamento storicista). Perciò il superamento di questo sistema di pensiero non può essere affidato semplicemente a una sua confutazione. Ciò che si richiede è una "critica totale", capace di tematizzare i postulati di questo pensiero (che si riducono poi a un piccolo numero) nel loro insieme. È quanto hanno saputo fare Hobbes e i suoi contemporanei nei confronti dell'aristotelismo (Unger 1983, p. 14). Dalla loro critica ha avuto origine un sistema altrettanto unitario, il pensiero liberale. Il pensiero del nostro secolo si trova in una situazione simile a quella dei seicenteschi: dall'Ottocento in poi sono stati elaborati numerose critiche di singole parti del sistema di pensiero liberale (Marx, Weber, Freud, lo strutturalismo). Questi tentativi sono rimasti 70 però prigionieri dell'avversario, in quanto hanno tentato di confutare la politica liberale appoggiandosi alla psicologia liberale, o la psicologia non sospettando i suoi legami con la politica. L'epoca d'oro del pensiero liberale nella cultura `alta' è il periodo che va da Hobbes a Kant, mentre con l'Ottocento (Hegel e i romantici) inizia l'epoca delle critiche parziali. Nel senso comune questo pensiero ha avuto una forte presa fino ai giorni nostri, esercitando la sua egemonia anche su forme di coscienza antagonistiche come quelle della classe operaia europea. I primi sintomi di crisi di questo senso comune si possono avvertire nel romanticismo ottocentesco, una forma di coscienza deviante subalterna. Le istanze del romanticismo ottocentesco sono riprese in modo molto più organico da forme di coscienza emergenti nell'attuale società postliberale, in movimenti che esprimono esigenze di comunità democratica (o, da destra, di comunità gerarchica), di rifiuto della divisione del lavoro, di riconciliazione con la natura. Il punto di forza del sistema di pensiero liberale sta nel suo legame con l'' ordine sociale della società liberale. Questa si è affermata nell'Europa moderna dopo la società tribale e la società degli "stati" e sta ormai tramontando, cedendo il campo a forme diverse di società postliberale: lo stato corporato assistenziale, le società tradizionalistiche, le società socialiste rivoluzionarie. Il motivo di instabilità che spinge la società liberale a evolvere verso lo stato corporato assistenziale è il conflitto fra il principio della classe e il principio del ruolo. Il secondo principio tende a prevalere sul primo; di conseguenza da un lato si estende a nuovi ambiti l'esigenza di potere politico capace di prendere decisioni, dall'altro questo potere appare sempre più privo di legittimazione. La distinzione fra stato e società civile tende a offuscarsi per via del carattere assistenziale dello stato e del carattere semi-pubblico che viene assunto da ogni grande organizzazione privata. In questo contesto il problema politico diviene onnipresente, diventando il problema della legittimità della distribuzione del potere. Anche una distribuzione meritocratico legata al "principio di differenza" rawlsiano (secondo il quale le differenze sono accettabili esclusivamente nei casi in cui fungano da incentivi a produrre una situazione migliore per il più svantaggiato) viene a buon diritto rifiutata dalla coscienza emergente perché si configura semplicemente come una gerarchia dei talenti anziché della ricchezza e delle opportunità ereditate (Unger 1983, p. 239). Il problema politico, oltre a diffondersi a ogni ambito, assume anche un risvolto esistenziale legato all'esperienza della scissione della personalità degli individui collocati in una organizzazione meritocratica. Ne discende nella coscienza emergente un'esigenza di comunità, l'esigenza cioè di trasformare le organizzazioni burocratiche in comunità governate democraticamente, nelle quali la divisione del lavoro secondo il principio del ruolo riguardi soltanto l'esecuzione di compiti, non la distribuzione del potere decisionale. Questa esigenza conosce una versione reazionaria propria del fascismo e delle nuove destre (il progetto di restaurare la comunità gerarchica premoderna) e una versione di sinistra, che aspira all'instaurazione di forme di comunità egualitaria. Una caratteristica peculiare della società liberale è rappresentata dal rilievo che il diritto ha avuto in questa società. La difficoltà maggiore a cui l'ordine liberale ha dovuto fare fronte è derivata dalla radicale delegittimazione del suo ordine sociale. Questo ordine comunque esisteva in quanto l'immagine della società come somma di individui restava una fantasia e si aveva invece una pesante ineguaglianza nella distribuzione del potere fra gruppi, le classi sociali, e non fra individui, ma, diversamente che in forme di società precedenti, si celava dietro la finzione opposta (l'eguaglianza fra gli individui). Il tentativo di instaurare un ordine legale (un sistema giuridico caratterizzato dalla neutralità, uniformità e predittibilità della legge) nella società liberale è nato proprio come risposta al problema della legittimazione dell'ordine sociale. Questa vorrebbe essere la via per eliminare il dominio (il potere ingiustificato) attraverso la spersonalizzazione del potere e l'assegnazione di limiti precisi. ma questo progetto, per essere realizzabile, implicherebbe la possibilità di concentrare il potere nel governo (mentre in realtà le gerarchie che più toccano la vita dei singoli sono quelle della famiglia, del lavoro, del mercato), e inoltre la possibilità di limitare realmente il potere mediante norme (mentre in realtà nella legislazione la procedura è insperabile dall'esito, e ogni sistema legislativo incorpora già certi valori). Al di là dei tentativi teorici (da Kant e Bentham a Rawls) di legittimare la rule of law dell'ordine sociale liberale, in realtà nella società 71 postliberale il diritto è sottoposti a una tensione fra giustizia formale e equità (il senso intuitivo della giustizia nel caso particolare). Il formalismo delegittima le leggi di fronte al senso di giustizia dell'opinione pubblica; d'altra parte le tentazioni di praticare l'equità portano il rischio di consacrare le pratiche di certi gruppi dominanti (Unger 1976, pp. 214-15). La sfida va però affrontata. Una nuova forma di diritto consuetudinario che miri alla realizzazione di una giustizia sostanziale potrebbe presentarsi non come la consacrazione dei pregiudizi di un gruppo, ma come un tentativo limitato e perfettibile di dare vita qui e ora a un ordine universale della vita sociale, le cui potenzialità saranno esplorate dall'umanità in epoche successive. La comunità aperta e democratica da realizzare è chiamata "gruppo organico" in Conoscenza e politica. Nell'opera successiva questa nozione non viene già più impiegata in quanto Unger vi avverte il rischio di un capovolgimento speculare dell'immagine liberale della società. Il compito dovrà rimanere più critico e `negativo'. Con l'abbandono di questa nozione, in realtà, Unger va decisamente oltre il comunitarismo. Negli anni Ottanta lo si vedrà sostenere, invece del comunitarismo democratico, una forma di democrazia radicale o di superliberalismo. Il secondo Unger e il programma superliberale Nella amplissima trilogia raccolta sotto il titolo generale Politics (Unger 1987a; 1987b; 1987c) e in particolare nel secondo volume, False Necessity, Unger svolge il suo nuovo programma superliberale. Questo programma è espresso bene dallo slogan: "la dominazione politica di oggi è stata la liberazione di ieri". Il programma "si ripropone l'allentamento dell'ordine sociale irrigidito, la liberazione delle esperienze di vita individuali dal despotismo di categorie sociali arbitrarie quali il ruolo, la classe economica, il genere, l'appartenenza nazionale, l'attenuazione della contrapposizione fra routine e rivoluzione attraverso l'accrescimento del potere degli individui di ripensare e rifare le strutture della vita sociale nella politica locale di ogni giorno" (Belliotti 1989, p. 322).. Vanno ricordati due punti di partenza teorici di Unger. Il primo è una tesi sulla natura umana: l'unico fatto non contingente della personalità umana è la illimitata plasticità. Il secondo è una tesi sociologica: le opposte teorie politiche liberal-centriste e marxiste si sono appoggiate a un postulato comune: quello dell'esistenza di leggi sociali da intendere in termini deterministici, leggi che vengono stabilite da quelle che chiama le teorie "di livello profondo". In realtà le storia umana testimonia della possibilità di sviluppi multiformi e imprevisti che contestano la "falsa necessità" invocata dagli opposti approcci finora prevalenti. L'azione degli attori sociali (transazioni, argomentazioni, conflitti ordinari) riceve la sua forma da un "contesto formativo" istituzionale e immaginario (che costituisce un ordine, un quadro, una struttura della vita sociale) che rimane in larga misura indifferente agli effetti destabilizzanti di questa azione. Questo contesto "esercita un grande influsso sulla forma e sul corso delle routine sociali, ma può venire difficilmente messo in questione, modificato, e perfino identificato in quanto tale in mezzo alle preoccupazioni quotidiane" (Unger 1987b, p. 58). Va detto che questo contesto, nelle società odierne, non è il "capitalismo" ma qualcosa di molto più specifico e contingente. Al proposito dei contesti vanno evitati due errori opposti: il primo è quello di non riconoscere il loro ruolo; il secondo è di prenderli come un pacco chiuso, laddove si tratta invece di costellazioni (ogni singolo elemento può venire sostituito senza sapere con certezza se come risultato si avrà un equivalente funzionale o una riforma rivoluzionaria. Il programma superliberale consiste di tre elementi: (i) un sistema di diritti; (ii) un principio economico centrale; (iii) un'organizzazione del governo. Determinazioni più specifiche sono da lasciare alle deliberazioni collettive del popolo. Uno schema di diritti non dovrebbe reificare una versione particolare della vita sociale perché una tale sacralizzazione sarebbe solo un'ulteriore manifestazione della falsa necessità. Dovrebbe comprendere: (i) diritti di immunità, cioè diritti che fondano una rivendicazione quasi assoluta da parte degli individui di non subire intrusioni da parte dello stato, di altri individui, e di altre organizzazioni e 72 istituzioni; diritti civici di organizzazione politica, di espressione, di partecipazione; titoli all'assistenza sociale; l'opzione di ritirarsi funzionalmente o fisicamente dall'ordine sociale stabilito; (ii) diritti destabilizzanti, cioè un titolo collettivi allo smantellamento delle istituzioni stabilite; il loro scopo è lo smantellamento della gerarchia e della divisione sociale; (iii) diritti di mercato, cioè rivendicazioni condizionali e provvisorie a porzioni divisibili del capitale sociale; (iv) diritti di solidarietà, cioè diritti che assicurino che la formazione di contratti sia caratterizzata da buona fede, lealtà e reciprocità Il principio economico centrale prevede l'istituzione di un fondo capitale a rotazione. Le agenzie governative centrali dovrebbero stabilire limiti esterni alle differenze di reddito e di autorità all'interno delle organizzazioni lavorative e alla distribuzione di redditi da profitto. Il capitale dovrebbe venire reso disponibile, temporaneamente e a un certo tasso di interesse, a squadre di lavoratori. Il fondo sarebbe destinato a mantenere un flusso costante di nuovi ingressi nell'economia e ad assicurare che nessuna impresa economica possa usare strumenti legali per sottrarsi alle instabilità del mercato. L'obiettivo a lungo termine del fondo potrebbe comprendere maggiore decentralizzazione e sperimentazione economica. L'organizzazione del governo dovrebbe seguire i seguenti principi: (i) moltiplicare le articolazioni del governo per assicuarer che ogni dimensione dell'ordine sociale sia soggetta a destabilizzazione e a conflitto su ampie basi; (ii) i conflitti fra articolazioni diverse vanno risolti sulla base di principi di priorità fra articolazioni e sulla base del ricorso all'elettorato; (iii) il partito politico al potere deve avere una reale opportunità di mettere in atto i suoi programmi. Per concludere, la trilogia dell'87 sconfina dalla filosofia, dalla politologia e dalla teoria del diritto nell'elaborazione di un programma politico. É un programma politico che contiene volutamente delle vaghezze (proprio in omaggio alla tesi della falsa necessità) ma che porta le preoccupazioni teoriche espresse in Conoscenza e politica su un terreno ben diverso da quello tuttora percorso da Sandel, Taylor e MacIntyre. Per spiegare il doverso percorso seguito da Unger bisogna ricordare la sua esperienza personale: brasiliano di nascita, pur insegnando a Cambridge in Massachussets, ha trascorso in Brasile lunghi periodi impegnandosi a sostenere un partito progressista alleato del PT brasiliano (il partito dei lavoratori di Igancio Lula da Silva). In una parola, Unger cerca di superare l'alternativa fra due possibilità ben note a noi italiani: l'atteggiamento del riformista progressista ormai ammalato di ragionevolezza e quello del rivoluzionario disilluso ormai vaccinato contro il contagio della realtà e votato all'opposizione a vita. Secondo Unger lo sviluppo dall'interno della grande promessa emancipatoria del liberalismo classico, rifacendosi a una particolare tradizione di elaborazione politica, quella del radicalismo piccolo-borghese, fornisce una diversa alternativa. Le risposte liberali: l'ultimo Rawls e Dworkin Come punto d'arrivo di un processo di revisione durato vent'anni, Rawls (1994) ha riformulato la sua concezione della giustizia come liberalismo politico, esplicitamente separato dalle filosofie complessive liberali a cui hanno dato origine Kant e Stuart Mill. Questo liberalismo politico trae ora la sua giustificazione non più dalla posizione originaria ma dallo overlapping consensus (il consenso per sovrapposizione) fra diverse concezioni morali complessive (cattolicesimo, protestantesimo, liberalismi complessivi ecc.) che riconoscono di avere in comune (seppure per motivi diversi) una concezione minimale del bene, comprendente la tolleranza, il pluralismo, l'eguale rispetto per le persone. Va notato che la critica comunitaria ha pesato forse più di quanto Rawls non ammetta su questa riformulazione. Come risultato la stessa società liberale viene presentata come un specie di comunità, una "unione di unione", in quanto possiede una tradizione comune (o meglio una pluralità di tradizioni parzialmente sovrapponentisi). Ronald Dworkin è stato un esponente del pensiero politico liberale di peso non minore a quello di Rawls. Il suo contributo si è concentrato sulla teoria giuridica. Il bersaglio critico di Dworkin è rappresentato dalle teorie utilitaristiche, e il punto centrale della proposta svolta in I diritti presi sul 73 serio è l'idea dell'esistenza di diritti degli individui da intendere come elemento originale che ogni sistema giuridico deve riconoscere. Questo riconoscimento implica dei costi per ogni sistema politico, in quanto rappresenterà inevitabilmente un freno alla realizzazione delle scelte politiche della maggioranza, ma "è cruciale perché rappresenta la promessa della maggioranza alla minoranza che la sua dignità e eguaglianza saranno rispettate" (Dworkin 1982, p. 292). Nella disputa fra liberali e comunitari, Dworkin si è inserito con la proposta di un communityfriendly liberalism. Dworkin difende contro le obiezioni comunitarie "la desiderabilità dell'imporre con la forza del diritto penale solo quei contenuti morali su cui esiste un accertato overlapping consensus fra tutte le componenti della comunità e del'eserictare un atteggiamento di tolleranza riguardo ai contenuti morali, forme di condotta, credenze, concezioni del bene che travalicano questo overlapping consensus" (Ferrara 1992, p. xliii). Fra gli argomenti comunitari riconosce un certo peso soltanto all'argomento che chiama "integrazionista", secondo il quale la qualità della vita di ogni individuo dipende in un certo grado dalla qualità della vita collettiva. Dworkin accetta l'idea che la vita collettiva possa essere migliore o peggiore in conseguenza di scelte collettive (ed è questo ciò che da del suo un community-friendly liberalism), ma ne restringe l'ambito alla vita politica, lasciando gli altri ambiti dell'agire sotto la giurisdizione del principio di tolleranza. Ne deriva che la maggioranza ha il diritto di proibire pratiche che danneggiano la vita politica comune ma non ha il diritto di proibire, sulla base di concezioni del bene controverse, pratiche individuali che non danneggiano la vita collettiva della comunità politica (Dworkin 1992). Dentro e oltre la tradizione liberale? In appendice alla descrizione svolta aggiungo qualche considerazione personale: (i) le tematiche sollevate dai neocomunitari sono tematiche ricorrenti da almeno due secoli. Ricalcano la critica di Hegel a Kant e ripropongono motivi di diverse tradizioni (repubblicana aristotelica, romantica) che si sono volute critiche nei confronti della immagine di sé ufficiale della civiltà occidentale moderna. Vanno notate le somiglianze con tematiche di certi filoni di pensiero europeo, particolarmente francese del nostro secolo (Mounier ne riassume bene i motivi principali) che questi autori non sembrano conoscere. Anche la `terza via' di Walzer e quella di Unger hanno somiglianze con autori europei pochissimo noti che cercarono, in decenni ben più impervi a queste imprese, terze vie fra liberalismo e socialismo (si pensi fra gli italiani a Aldo Capitini, Adriano Olivetti, Carlo Rosselli; quest'ultimo è stato appena tradotto in inglese e la cosa contribuirà a farlo conoscere anche da noi). (ii) I comunitari puri e duri come il neomedievale MacIntyre, ma anche Sandel sono caduti in alcune grosse ingenuità: tutto il discorso sul sé o sul soggetto è un po' fuori luogo; riguarda la philosophy of mind, non la filosofia politica, perché le dottrine politiche liberali si pongono il problema di regolare la convivenza fra soggetti diversi (ognuno con fini, appartenenze, valori, con una identità e una socializzazione già acquisite altrove, nelle varie comunità prepolitiche di cui fa parte, vedi Kymlicka 1991, pp. 207 ss.). Anche tutto il discorso sulla polis perduta confonde due cose diverse. La prima è il federalismo, cioè la auspicabilità del decentramento dei luoghi della società politica per dare la massima opportunità di partecipazione e controllo ai cittadini che non implica la restaurazione di una società politica locale che sia anche una comunità (vi ricordate il buon Carducci e "del Comune la rustica virtù"?); ciò è reso inconcepibile dal fatto della complessità della vita sociale attuale e dell'elevato livello di interdipendenza anche su scala planetaria; ciò è reso inconcepibile anche dalla valutazione da tutti condivisa (anche dai comunitari, salvo forse l'ultimo MacIntyre) che l'adesione a una tradizione o a una comunità con una sua concezione del bene non può essere imposta. Infatti la seconda cosa da non confondere con il federalismo è il pluralismo, cioè il fatto constatato da secoli e per fortuna non deprecato quasi da nessuno, della coesistenza di diverse fedi, tradizioni, culture, e, buone ultime, anche forme di associazione volontaria. (iii) Questo fatto del pluralismo, seppure rappresentato in modo un po' etereo (non ci sono in realtà solo le associazioni volontarie; si hanno e si conservano volenti o nolenti identità che non si deducono da una concezione del bene che si sceglie o meno di accettare; vedi Galeotti 1993) è il 74 punto di partenza anche dell'ultima opera di Rawls. Questo è un sintomo che la discussione non ha lasciato i contendenti ai loro punti di partenza. (iv) Un'altra modificazione interessante che la discussione ha portato è la distinzione fra liberalismo politico e liberalismo morale che è divenuta centrale per Rawls (1994; vedi anche Larmore 1992). In realtà, come hanno messo in luce le ricostruzioni della modernità di Unger, MacIntyre, Taylor (che sono poi molto più solide delle tesi politiche comunitarie), il progetto della modernità ha avuto due facce: il progetto politico-istituzionale della laicità si è contingentemente accompagnato per un paio di secoli a un progetto filosofico-morale, che potremmo chiamare laicismo. La distinzione fra liberalismo politico, difficilmente confutabile perché scritto nelle tradizioni che hanno costruito il nostro mondo sociale (Walzer 1987) o perché giustificabile per overlapping consensus sulla base delle diverse tradizioni morali della nostra civiltà (Rawls 1994), e liberalismo come concezione morale complessiva è un chiarimento importante che la discussione ha comunque aiutato a fare emergere. (v) Il dialogo fra sordi sembra giunto a un punto di arrivo affermato da tutti, MacIntyre incluso (anche se poi i contendenti non riconoscono di dire la stessa cosa; vedi Kymlicka 1991, p. 215). Il punto di arrivo è che il liberalismo è anch' esso una tradizione e che tutti facciamo parte di almeno una comunità (oltre che fare parte, salvo casi molto sfortunati, di diverse altre più ristrette): l'unione di unioni che è rappresentata dalla società `liberale moderna. É un'ovvietà non da poco: Rawls nel 71 poneva una sorta di stato di natura (la posizione originaria) e non delle tradizioni come punto di partenza. Il ruolo dello overlapping consensus del 1993 è equivalente a quello del "velo di ignoranza" del 1971, ma l'immagine trasmessa non è indifferente. É lo stesso chiarimento che si è dovuto faticosamente fare per gli ideali dell'illuminismo che si erano presentati come fondati sulla natura o sulla ragione laddove erano in realtà la riproposizione di contenuti di due tradizioni morali: quella giudeo-cristiana e quella stoica. (vi) va ricordata la verità che viene riconosciuta da Walzer nella critica comunitaria: le forme associative sono in processo di costante erosione; ha perciò senso il progetto di uno stato liberale community-friendly (parzialmente antistatalista); ma le forme associative si ricreano anche (lo statu nascenti che si manifesta nei movimenti collettivi); infine le 'comunità' di cui si fa parte non sono soltanto associazioni volontarie, sono anche fonti di identità che si ricevono senza poterne entrare e uscire a richiesta (si è neri, ebrei, cattolici, occidentali...); si può favorire un programma politico dei azione positiva da parte dello stato (in questo caso non puramente neutrale) per favorire la formazione e conservazione di forme associative (anche con vincoli larghissimi) ma anche per tutelare la possibilità dei singoli di entrare e uscire dalle comunità. (vii) le due diverse proposte di Unger e di Walzer devono molto a questo dibattito; hanno il pregio di essere anche progetti politici con applicazioni possibili e il fatto che i loro autori abbiano preso sul serio queste grosse questioni di filosofia politica ha soltanto giovato, e non nuociuto, alla attualità delle loro proposte. Per essere realisti non sempre è necessario chiedere l'impossibile, ma giova avere qualche capacità di visione a largo raggio. SCHEDA DI LETTURA Il primo testo di cui suggerirei la lettura è l'opera di Michael Walzer, Sfere di giustizia, Feltrinelli, Milano 1987, dove viene presentata la teoria della giustizia come eguaglianza complessa. Si tratta di un testo di lettura piacevole e non difficile: gli argomenti affrontati nei diversi capitoli (denaro e merce, sicurezza e assistenza, le cariche pubbliche ecc.) sono illustrati con esempi storici (l'antica Atene, descritta in modo interessante anche per chi ha fatto il classico, e una comunità ebraica nella Spagna medievale) e casi contemporanei (compreso un resoconto di come funzioni – con criteri egualitari da fare impallidire la comune di Da-chai – la cooperativa di italo-americani che gestisce la nettezza urbana di San Francisco). Suggerirei poi, in attesa che un editore italiano trovi il coraggio di affrontare l'impresa (in fondo non tanto proibitiva) di tradurre le 630 pagine di Roberto Unger, False Necessity, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge 1987, di affrontarne la lettura in inglese. Iniziare dal (lunghissimo) capitolo 5, dove viene esposto il programma politico della "democrazia potenziata". Il libro, per chi non ha a disposizione una buona biblioteca universitaria, è pubblicato in paperbak e – pur 75 con le nefandezze del cambio librario – viene a costare meno della metà di un libro italiano di uguale mole. Una terza lettura consigliabile è l'antologia curata da Alessandro Ferrara, Comunitarismo e liberalismo, Editori Riuniti, Roma 1992. L'ampio saggio introduttivo fornirà al lettore tutto ciò che può desiderare, in aggiunta a quanto gli è stato fornito nelle pagine che precedono, per inquadrare il dibattito americano degli ultimi venti anni. L'antologia fornisce una scelta più che sufficiente di tutto ciò che avreste voluto leggere dei comunitari ma non siete mai riusciti a trovare: si tratta di saggi comparsi per lo più su riviste difficilmente reperibili anche nelle biblioteche italiane e che rappresentano bene ciò che i comunitari hanno avuto da dire sul terreno strettamente politico (Si noti che Ferrara esclude Unger e Walzer, ritenendo secondaria la componente comunitaria nel loro bagaglio di idee). Di ciò che gli autori legati al comunitarismo hanno avuto da dire su un terreno più ampio, quello della critica della modernità (e che è di gran lunga la parte più interessante della loro produzione) si possono leggere Alasdair, MacIntyre, Dopo la virtù, Feltrinelli, Milano 1988; Roberto Unger, Conoscenza e politica, Il Mulino, Bologna 1983; Charles Taylor, Radici dell'io, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1993. Sono tre grossi volumi, letture di un certo impegno ma affascinanti. Hanno per tema una domanda non nuova ma ripresa in una nuova chiave da quando Habermas e Lyotard hanno dato vita al ben noto dibattito fra i moderni e i postmoderni: che cosa è andato storto nel percorso della civiltà occidentale moderna a partire dall'epoca in cui sembravano porsi le basi per una nuova scienza della natura, per una nuova morale e una nuova politica su basi universalistiche, e infine per la "tolleranza" che permettesse la convivenza fra i seguaci di fedi e morali diverse? Al di là della debolezza delle tesi politiche comunitarie, questa pista di indagine merita di essere seguita: ne risulteranno probabilmente alcuni argomenti per ritenere che se la tradizione politica liberale ha tuttora la capacità di mantenere grandi promesse, la visione del mondo (della società umana, della morale, della religione, della scienza) che ha accompagnato questo tradizione politica nei tre secoli trascorsi ha appesantito condivisibili progetti di assunzioni poco condivisibili che hanno reso ciechi i sostenitori di questi progetti a molti dei disagi della modernità. BIBLIOGRAFIA Belliotti, Raymond A., 1989, "Beyond Capitalism and Communism: Roberto Unger' s Superliberal Political Theory", Praxis International 9/3: 321-334. Cremaschi, Sergio, 1984, "Recensione: R. M. Unger, Knowledge and Politics; Id., Law in Modern Society", Jus 31/1-2: 217-224 ––-, 1989, "Diritti, equità, etica sociale: proposte e limiti del neocontrattualismo", Quaderni di azione sociale, n.70: 37-54. ––-, 1993, "Individualismo", in Dizionario delle idee politiche, a cura di Enrico Berti e Giorgio Campanini, AVE, Roma, pp. 389-392. Dworkin, Ronald, [1977] 1982, I diritti presi sul serio, Il Mulino, Bologna. ––, 1992, "La comunità liberale", in Ferrara 1992: 195-228. Ferrara, Alessandro, 1992, "Introduzione", in Comunitarismo e liberalismo, Editori Riuniti, Roma. Galeotti, Anna Elisabetta, 1993, "Citizenship and Equality. The Place for Toleration", Political Theory, 21/4: 585-605. Kymlicka, 1991, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford U. P., Oxford. Larmore, Charles, 1992, "Liberalismo politico" [tr. it. di un capitolo di Patterns of Moral Complexity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1987] in Ferrara 1992: 169-194. MacIntyre, Alasdair, [1981] 1988, Dopo la virtù, Feltrinelli, Milano. ––, 1988b, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana. ––, [1990] 1992a Enciclopedia, genealogia, tradizione. Tre versioni rivali dell'indagine morale, Massimo, Roma. ––, 1992b, "Il patriottismo è una virtù?", in Ferrara 1992: 55-76. Passerin d'Entrèves, Maurizio, 1990, "Comunitarismo", Notizie di Politeia 6, n. 18: 20-25. Rawls, John, [1971] 1982, Teoria della giustizia, Feltrinelli, Milano. Rawls, [1993] 1994, Liberalismo politico, Comunità, Milano. Sandel, Michael, 1982, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. ––, 1984, "The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self", Political Theory 12/1: 81-96. ––, 1992, "La giustizia e il bene" [tr. it. di un capitolo di Sandel 1982], in Ferrara 1992: 3-54. Taylor, Charles, 1992a, The Ethics of Authenticity, Harvard U.P., Cambridge (Mass.). ––, 1992b, "La natura e la portata della giustizia distributiva", in Ferrara 1992: 77-114. ––, 1992c, "Il dibattito fra sordi di liberali e comunitaristi", in Ferrara 1992: 137-168. –––, [1989] 1993, Radici dell'io. La costruzione dell'identità moderna, Feltrinelli, Milano. Unger, Roberto M., [1975] 1983, Conoscenza e politica, Il Mulino, Bologna. ––-, 1976, Law in modern society. Toward a Criticism of Social Theory, The Free Press, New York. ––-, 1987a, Social Theory: Its Situation and Its Task, Cambridge U.P. ––-, 1987b, False Necessity. Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy, Cambridge U.P., Cambridge. ––-, 1987c, Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional Conditions of Economic and Military Success, Cambridge U.P. Walzer, Michael, [1983] 1987, Sfere di giustizia, Feltrinelli, Milano. ––, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism", Political Theory 18/1 (1990): 6-23.

Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 1 How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification Soohyun Ahn Department of Philosophy University of Calgary Abstract: The boundaries of social categories are frequently altered to serve normative projects, such as social reform. Griffiths and Khalidi argue that the value-driven modification of categories diminishes the epistemic value of social categories. I argue that concerns over value-modified categories stem from problematic assumptions of the value-free ideal of science. Contrary to those concerns, non-epistemic value considerations can increase the epistemic success of a scientific category. For example, the early history of the category infantile autism shows how non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to delimiting and establishing infantile autism as a distinct category in mainstream psychiatry. In the case of infantile autism, non-epistemic considerations have led to a new interpretation of existing data, the expansion of research to include biology, and the creation of diagnostic criteria that further contribute to collecting relevant data. Given this case study, we see that non-epistemic considerations may not be epistemically detrimental but can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification. Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 2 How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification Soohyun Ahn Department of Philosophy University of Calgary 1. Introduction Paul Griffiths (1997, 2003, 2004) defines natural kinds as categories that allow reliable extrapolation from known to unknown instances. Such kinds have greater epistemic value as they are further confirmed by empirical evidence. He notes that the boundaries of social categories are frequently altered to serve normative projects, such as social reform, without "theoretical warrant" (Griffiths, 1997, p. 196). This observation becomes a source of trouble for him since it is possible for a category to be pressured to respond to two different types of projects-epistemic and normative-simultaneously. According to Griffiths, a category under such pressure ends up being fractured and loses its epistemic utility (2004, p. 909). Muhammad Ali Khalidi (2013) develops Griffiths' observation into a substantial worry for social, psychological, and psychiatric categories being natural kinds. These categories are employed to describe and explain human behavior and are value-laden to some extent. The problem Khalidi focuses on is that "there is often an added moral dimension to them that puts pressure on us to modify the category in certain ways" (ibid., p. 195). For Khalidi, the aim of scientific classification is to have categories that reflect "real causal patterns" in the world. The more accurately they reflect causal patterns, the more epistemically useful scientific categories are. He argues that when non-epistemic values, such as social, moral, and political values, influence delimiting scientific categories, these categories may no longer track the causal structure of the world. Khalidi's prescription is that scientists should be guided solely by epistemic purposes and eliminate non-epistemic purposes altogether. Griffiths and Khalidi present non-epistemic value considerations as harmful in scientific classification. Non-epistemic value influences on scientific categories result in the epistemically detrimental consequences of hindering scientific understanding (for Griffiths) and distracting us from the causal structures of the world (for Khalidi). It is noteworthy that such a view regarding non-epistemic values is part and parcel of the value-free ideal (VFI) in science. The current version of the VFI endorses an exclusive commitment to epistemic values while allowing no role for nonForthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 3 epistemic values in the core of scientific reasoning, e.g., generating data and assessing theories.1 The ideal maintains that scientific objectivity and integrity are achieved to the extent that scientific reasoning is insulated from non-epistemic value influences. If we see the concern over values affecting categories through the lens of the VFI, the normative implication for scientific classification becomes clear: scientists should strive to minimize the influence of non-epistemic values in identifying natural kinds. This implication is clearly echoed in Khalidi's suggestion of excluding non-epistemic purposes in the pursuit of natural kinds. However, as will be shown in this paper, far from being epistemically detrimental, value-driven research in scientific classification can be epistemically beneficial. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I address the concern over value-modified categories by analyzing the case study of child abuse presented by several philosophers (Hacking, 1988, 1991, 1999; Griffiths, 1997, 2004; Khalidi, 2013). Upon reflection, the category child abuse is not a good example to motivate this concern. In section 3, I provide another case study, infantile autism, to illustrate how non-epistemic value considerations can contribute to the epistemic improvement of that category. In section 4, I respond to some potential objections to my account with the help of some arguments against the VFI. I conclude that the argument for rejecting nonepistemic values in identifying natural kinds in the social and psychological sciences is not effective. 2. The Concern: Illegitimacy of Non-Epistemic Values in Natural Kinds In this section, I pursue two aims. First, I want to elaborate Griffiths' and Khalidi's concerns over the value-driven modification of categories. They focus on the case study of the category child abuse presented by Ian Hacking (1988; 1991; 1999). Second, I want to point out that the category of child abuse is not a good example for raising their concerns. This is because the category of child abuse does not show the conflict between epistemic and non-epistemic purposes. In his 2004 article, Griffiths introduces the notion of "normative kinds," which are contrasted with natural kinds. A category is a "normative kind" when it "derives its unity from a role in normative practices...rather than from any role it may have in describing and explaining behavior" (p. 903). Griffiths considers the category of child abuse as a prime example of a normative kind. We place seemingly unrelated behaviors, such as neglect and sexual harassment, in the category child abuse. This practice is justified by our moral approval or disapproval of certain types of human behavior. Consider, for example, corporal punishment. Until recently, physical punishment for children was common and even encouraged as an effective means to teach children to conform to authority and social order. Identifying corporal punishment as a type of child abuse can be 1 Here I follow Daniel Hicks' formulation of the VFI, according to which, "ethical and political values may not legitimately influence the standards for acceptance and rejection in" the "epistemic phase" of scientific inquiry (Hicks, 2014, p. 3274). Many formulations articulate the VFI in terms of "absence of contextual values" and "exclusive commitment to epistemic values in scientific reasoning" (Reiss & Sprenger, 2017, p. 21). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 4 explained by the change in our normative attitudes toward children and our preference for autonomy and self-fulfillment over social conformity and social stability. In line with Hacking, Griffiths argues that socially or politically value-laden concepts, such as the concept of child abuse, "are used to structure social systems, to further the interests of individuals or groups, and to promote programs of political action" (1997, p. 7). According to Griffiths, studying this type of category modification reveals "the full range of dynamics at work in conceptual change" and, in doing so, directs our attention to social issues and pushes us to take action to address them (ibid., p. 198). For example, if common wisdom views leaving children at home without adult supervision as a form of child abuse, then society should seek solutions for those parents who cannot afford childcare. However, Griffiths is clear that such a value-driven alteration of a category does not improve our scientific understanding of the relevant phenomena (ibid., 200). Non-epistemic projects are seen as forces that sidetrack the discovery of natural kinds. Khalidi (2013) builds on Hacking's (1991) analysis of legal attempts in the USA to classify fetal abuse as a form of child abuse. By doing so, he wants to reinforce Griffiths' idea that the moral dimensions of a category can undermine the epistemic roles the category plays: normative kinds or "evaluative kinds" can reduce their "epistemic efficacy" when "they are being put (at least partly) to evaluative uses (Khalidi, 2013, pp. 162–163). Let me add some more details about legal attempts to charge pregnant women with child endangerment when abusing substances. The Wisconsin State Legislature passed the so-called "Cocaine Mom" Law in 1997. Under this law, pregnant women who drink alcohol or take drugs are indicted on charges of abusing their "unborn child" ("1997 Wisconsin Act 292"). The issue of whether a fetus should be understood as an "unborn child" possessing legal rights is highly controversial. As Khalidi speculates, the legislature's move was mainly motivated by the desire for moral censure, especially by pro-life advocates. Khalidi regards the fetal abuse case as a clear example demonstrating how "a valuedriven revision of a category pulls in a different direction from the epistemic," and the valuedriven modification undermines the epistemic, thereby rendering the category not a natural kind (Khalidi, 2013, p. 163). According to Khalidi, if fetal abuse cases do not share the same cause and effect with other incidents of child abuse, they will add exceptions to the phenomenon of child abuse. Having a heterogeneous category prevents scientists from generalizing and explaining the phenomenon of child abuse. Different purposes "serve different needs and can therefore come to be opposed to one another (ibid., p. 162). He goes on to argue that "there is a legitimate reason for thinking that some social categories do not track natural kinds when they are being put (at least partly) to evaluative uses" (ibid., p. 162). Thus, Khalidi concludes that value-driven modifications of a category are likely to frustrate the epistemic aims of generalization and explanation, thereby becoming "the largest obstacle to the discovery of natural kinds in the social sciences" (ibid., p. 163). It is questionable whether evaluative or non-epistemic dimensions of a scientific category pose a threat to the good epistemic functioning of that category. One line of research that can test Khalidi's claim is etiological research on intergenerational transmission of child abuse. It has been widely studied whether and to what extent the parental history of abuse plays a causal role in the perpetration of abuse. Research on the transmission hypothesis has an epistemic aim of revealing the causal relation of the transmission of abuse from one generation to the next. At the same time, Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 5 it aims to find effective intervention measures to break the cycle of abuse. It would be helpful to review a recent study on the intergenerational transmission hypothesis to see whether nonepistemic aims sidetrack epistemic aims. The research conducted by RaeAnn E. Anderson and her colleagues (2018) is motivated to identify a reliable predictor of child abuse potential among racially diverse mothers who reside in domestic violence shelters. That research is also dedicated to providing practical help for the mothers in shelters since they belong to "a marginalized group with unique vulnerabilities" (ibid., p. 88). Anderson's team's research was successful in achieving the two aims without sacrificing one for the other. In terms of epistemic aims, it discovered that the diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) caused by domestic violence is strongly associated with the perpetration of child maltreatment, and it disproved the common assumption that the history of child abuse is the most powerful predictor of future abuse. In terms of non-epistemic aims, the research advocated serving the mental health needs of mothers by customized intervention strategies (e.g., home-delivered care by experts other than doctors, the offering of services outside of traditional office hours and so on.) (ibid., p. 88). In this research, serving the non-epistemic aim of helping mothers in domestic violence shelters does not stand in the way of revealing the causal path of child abuse. In other words, epistemic and non-epistemic aims need not be opposed to one another. Griffiths' and Khalidi's concerns derive from observing the co-existence of epistemic and nonepistemic aims within social categories. In this section, I have examined the category of child abuse to see to what extent it can motivate their concern. Based on the purported clash between epistemic and non-epistemic purposes, Griffiths and Khalidi frame the latter purposes as a hindrance to attaining the former. However, the category of child abuse is not a good case for raising their concerns. As Hacking and Griffiths point out, the category of child abuse is heavily normative from inception. Further, as seen in the previously cited research, the way child abuse figures in epistemic practice is tightly entangled with non-epistemic considerations. However, more importantly, non-epistemic considerations need not hinder epistemic aims. Indeed, in the next section, we will see that normative, non-epistemic considerations can help promote epistemic ends. 3. Infantile Autism In this section, I examine the early history of the category of infantile autism. In common with other psychiatric categories, the concept of infantile autism is loaded with normative assumptions about what counts as normal behaviors, such as our positive evaluation of communicative ability and social interaction. When it first appeared in the literature in the 1940s, it was understood as a psychosis mainly caused by emotional disturbance, leaving cognition intact (Zeldovich, 2018). However, the psychogenic explanation gradually gave way to neurobiological explanations through the mid-twentieth century. With progress in genetics and neurobiology, infantile autism2 2 In the early 1990s, the idea that autism is not a single condition, but a spectrum of disorders different in degree and types was proposed. In the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), Asperger's disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and pervasive developmental Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 6 has been identified as a neurodevelopmental disorder, and the role of combined genetic and environmental risk factors has been extensively studied (Chaste & Leboyer, 2012; Lai et al., 2014). In 1980, infantile autism was finally recognized by mainstream psychiatry as a formal developmental disorder in the DSM-III. My case study tracks what drove the change in viewing infantile autism as a psychosis to a distinct neurodevelopmental disorder. By focusing on the role of value commitments, I aim to show the following: i) how research motivated by non-epistemic value judgments led to a critical examination of the received view, thereby revealing its empirical inadequacy; ii) how value-driven research led to the expansion of the research field; and iii) how value commitments contributed to the creation and development of diagnostic criteria, helping to demarcate the category. 3.1. Mothers Blamed for Infantile Autism Until the mid-twentieth century, autistic children were not distinguished from children who were schizophrenic or mentally ill. It was the child psychiatrist Leo Kanner (1943) who first identified infantile autism as a distinct group. He provided detailed studies of eleven children who exhibited traits that were different from the traditional description of such children as "feebleminded or schizophrenic" (ibid., p. 242). The characteristics of the children Kanner noticed included extreme autistic aloneness, an inability to relate in an ordinary way to people and situations, and an anxiously obsessive desire for the maintenance of sameness. Kanner was particularly attentive to the parental personalities: most of the parents were highly intelligent but rarely appeared warmhearted (ibid., p. 250). In a subsequent paper, he analyzed parental characteristics and concluded that "parental coldness, obsessiveness, and a mechanical type of attention to material needs only" is the main cause of infantile autism (Kanner, 1949, p. 425). The image of cold and unloving parents of autistic children has continued since then and has deeply influenced subsequent research. The mother-blaming account, succinctly captured in the term "refrigerator mother," was popularized by the child development specialist Bruno Bettelheim (1967). Not surprisingly, when professionals diagnosed a child with autism, the whole family, especially the mother, suffered from the classification.3 3.2. Empirical Inadequacy of the Received View It was Bernard Rimland's book Infantile Autism: The Syndrome and Its Implications for a Neural Theory of Behavior (1964) that initiated modern autism research by replacing the mainstream psychogenic views about autism (Associated Press, 2006; Maugh II, 2006; Casanova & Casanova, 2019). The book was a product of Rimland's five years' research on autism after his first-born son was diagnosed with it. Though Rimland was a research psychologist, he was ignorant of autism and perplexed by his son's unusual behaviors. When he learned about autism and its purported cause, he was hurt by the "pernicious implications" of the psychogenic hypothesis (Rimland, 1964, p. 65). He deplored the added "heavy burden of shame and guilt" placed on the parents of autistic disorder-not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) were brought together with autistic disorder to form a single category of "autism spectrum disorder." 3 Hacking also notes in his study of autism, the purported cause-cold mothering-"damaged" the whole family (Hacking, 1999, p. 115). Unfortunately, he does not tell us what propelled the replacement of the mother-blaming view with the currently endorsed view. Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 7 children and criticized the "heartless and inconsiderate" nature of the psychogenic view (ibid., p. 65). In the book, he declared that "there is no need for the parents of these children to suffer the shame, guilt, inconvenience, financial expense and marital discord which so often accompany the assumption of psychogenic etiology" (ibid., p. 40). Since the dominant view was based on the psychogenic account, it was common for practitioners to inspect parental characteristics. For example, practitioners tended to report in their papers the details of conversations with the mother to show how she exemplified the "typical mother" with "cold, impersonal, and ritualistic" attitudes towards her child (For example, see Eveloff, 1960, pp. 77–78). The standard of explanation in pediatric psychiatry was prejudiced against parents, especially mothers. To argue against this trend, Rimland carefully reviewed cases in the literature to propose alternative explanations. He realized that much of the evidence supporting the psychogenic view was compatible with or better fit the biological hypotheses. One common observation made by psychogenic theorists was that "[a]utistic children are behaviorally unusual from the moment of birth" (Rimland, 1964, p. 51). For Rimland, it was a strong indicator of neurobiological causation of autism. Thus, it came as a surprise to him that little attention was paid to the innateness of autism, and even Kanner, who first recognized autism as an innate condition, did not investigate deeper the biological roots of autism.4 One distinguishing feature of autism from schizophrenia was extreme aloneness (Kanner, 1943, p. 242). Kanner highlighted this autistic aloneness in terms of the relationship with the mother and interpreted the withdrawal of a child from the mother as an act of seeking comfort in solitude (Kanner, 1949, p. 425). Rimland challenged this explanation by citing animal experiments where if offspring are raised by indifferent mothers, then the offspring exhibit continued efforts to draw the mother's attention, rather than turning away from the mother (Rimland, 1964, pp. 44–45). Thus, Rimland expanded what counted as a legitimate explanation in mainstream psychiatry by exposing the weaknesses of the psychogenic view and, at the same time, by showing the superiority of biological explanations in many of the cases. 3.3. The Expansion of the Research Area Rimland focused on suggesting alternative explanations to the psychogenic explanation. He wanted to expand the research field to include neurobiology that rarely figured in the literature. For Rimland, the most serious problem of the psychogenic account was that it discouraged researchers from searching for the biological basis of autism. If autism could be thoroughly explained by psychogenic factors, then any attempt to find neurobiological causes would be futile: So long as the practitioners who actually deal with autistic children feel satisfied that the disease is largely or entirely psychogenic, biologically trained research 4 Kanner briefly suggested the biological roots of autism at the end of his seminal paper: "these children have come into the world with innate inability to form the usual, biologically provided affective contact with people" (Kanner, 1943, p. 250). He also occasionally acknowledged the biological underpinnings of autism (e.g., Eisenberg and Kanner 1956). Despite his initial insight, however, Kanner persistently emphasized parental coldness as a primary cause of autism in his ensuing research and magazine interviews (e.g., Kanner 1960). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 8 workers will feel disinclined to concentrate their efforts on the problem. (ibid., p. 40) Having the belief that "no avenue for learning all that we can about the etiology of mental disorder should be unexplored," Rimland proposed multiple lines of research that seemed to be fruitful (ibid., p. 61). One thing Rimland noticed was the relationship between mental disorder and complications of pregnancy. Atypical behaviors of autistic children might be "the consequences of prenatal stress rather than of affectional insufficiency" (ibid. p. 145). In his support of this line of research, Rimland emphasized how biological hypotheses can shift "the burden of guilt from purely speculative parental influences to proven prenatal factors" (ibid., p. 145; emphasis in original). Rimland also noted other features that called for biological explanations; for example, the higher frequency of diagnosis of autism in boys than girls. Another fruitful line of research for Rimland was "the brain mechanisms for processing information" (ibid., p. 144). To put his idea in action, he established the Institute for Child Behavior Research (now known as the Autism Research Institute, ARI) in 1967. The institute began to fund biologically driven "research in immune, gastrointestinal, metabolic, neurological, and sensory issues" and research aiming to find treatments for autism. It is clear that Rimland's analysis of the received view expanded the field of study to cover the neurobiological research that was urgently needed at that time (Crowell et al., 2019). Rimland is regarded as a pathfinder who "reoriented research from a focus on the parents to a focus on the brain" (Carey, 2006, p. A21). At this point, we need to be reminded of what propelled Rimland to advocate the expansion of the research filed to include neurobiological research. As a parent of an autistic son, he was fighting against the prejudiced view about parents with autistic children. Not only was the psychogenic view inadequate in its evidential standing, but it also had pernicious implications for the emotional well-being of the parents. In his objections to the psychogenic account, he asserted that "there is no need for the parents of these children to suffer the shame, guilt, inconvenience, financial expense and marital discord which so often accompany the assumption of psychogenic etiology" (Rimland, 1964, p. 40). His non-epistemic value judgments, such as that the well-being of parents with autistic children is important, caused him to expand the research area. 3.4. Creation of Diagnostic Checklist for Parents Another achievement of Rimland is the creation of a diagnostic checklist for parents. As a parent of an autistic child, he was aware of the difficulties faced by families with children suspected of being autistic. Part of the difficulty was the lack of expertise-only a handful of professionals were competent in diagnosing infantile autism in the 1960s (Shattock, 2006). Another difficulty parents faced in the 1950s and 1960s was antagonistic attitudes and pointed questions, such as "Why do you hate your child?" from their visits to professionals and their casual interactions with acquaintances (Grove, 1984; Baker, 2010; Silberman, 2015). To assist the perplexed and distressed parents, Rimland developed a rough checklist, the "Diagnostic Checklist for Behavior-Disturbed Children (Form E-1)," building on existing criteria Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 9 available to professionals. It was a systematic diagnostic assessment tool, but the primary target was the parents. Designed to be completed by parents, E-1 questionnaires comprised of "a carefully selected range of symptoms rather than more abstract and inconsistently defined concepts, especially of emotional withdrawal" (Lord & Corsello, 2005, p. 744).5 What is important in our discussion is that Rimland's motivation for developing a checklist for infantile autism was not entirely epistemic. Rimland's diagnostic form is well-known to be "most useful to parents who are beginning to familiarize themselves with behaviors associated with autism, rather than as a measure of standard diagnoses of autism or related disorders" (Lord & Corsello, 2005, p. 744). Of course, the checklist had several epistemic aims including collecting statistical data (Rimland, 1964, 1993) or distinguishing infantile autism from other childhood disorder and types of mental retardation (Rimland, 1964, 1971; Douglas & Sanders, 1968; Boullin, Coleman, O'Brien, & Rimland, 1971; Lord & Corsello, 2005). However, as Rimland remarked here and there, the primary aim of the checklist was to assist the perplexed parents. As mentioned earlier, families with autistic children greatly suffered from prejudice on top of financial burdens. To share their emotional struggles, Rimland always answered phone calls from parents, whether day or night, listening to them with all his heart. To reduce their financial burdens, Rimland made the checklist available to parents free of charge, including scoring, analysis, and delivery of results back to the parents6 (Rimland, 1984; Lord & Corsello, 2005). Rimland's value judgments (e.g., the parents with autistic children should not suffer from the prejudiced view against them) drew the cooperation of the parents. When the checklist was published as an appendix to Rimland's book, many parents with autistic children completed the list and mailed it back to Rimland for his records. It is said that some parents reported symptoms of their autistic children that were not recognized by practitioners at that time (Edelson, 2014). With the help of sympathetic parents, the list quickly improved to become the "Diagnostic Check List (Experimental Form 2)" within a year of the first printing of the book. The updated questionnaire included "questions gleaned from the reading of numerous letters and reports from parents" (Rimland, 1971, p. 163). The ARI created a large database based on the form and analyzed results from more than 40,000 cases. As a result, it can now differentiate more than ten types of infantile autism. Given the common belief that scientific research ought to be free from personal, social, political, and cultural values, it is noteworthy that in this case, the incorporation of a researcher's values produced epistemically fruitful outcomes. Those values helped delimit the boundaries of the category by expanding its extension to neurobiological explanations.7 As mentioned earlier, it was 5 Given the prevalent tendency of professionals at that time to disregarded the reliability of retrospective parental reports, the checklist represented a significant move that took seriously the engagement of parents in the diagnosis of autism (Rimland, 1971). 6 Looking back at the last thirty years since the publication of his book, Rimland judged the increased role of parents in autism research as a crucial contribution of his book. He writes: "parents are taking a much stronger and more active role in determining what is done to help their children...These changes are taking place on both the educational and biological fronts" (Rimland, 1994, p. 3). 7 The "defect-based" idea that autism is a disease (disorder) to be treated is now outdated, especially in considering the current neurodiversity movement (Jaarsma & Welin, 2012). According to the Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 10 in 1980 when the DSM-III was published that infantile autism was accorded the status of a separate category. However, exactly how did Rimland's creation of the diagnostic checklist contribute to the demarcation of the category of infantile autism?8 In his pioneering paper, Kanner (1943) recognizes the distinctive characteristics of the eleven children and named the shared condition infantile autism. However, he did not aggressively pursue the idea that infantile autism is separable from childhood schizophrenia. For example, in his second paper on infantile autism, Kanner regarded infantile autism "as the earliest possible manifestation of childhood schizophrenia" (Kanner, 1949, p. 419). He didn't believe that "there is any likelihood that early infantile autism will at any future time have to be separated from the schizophrenias" (ibid., pp. 419–420). Therefore, coining the term infantile autism can be credited to Kanner, but it is controversial whether he deserves the credit for demarcating infantile autism from mental retardation or childhood schizophrenia. When Rimland created the checklist, it included questions related to childhood schizophrenia, mental retardation, emotional disturbance, et cetera. The inclusion of the traits that are non-autistic was meant to differentiate genuine cases of autism from other types of psychoses. The scoring of the checklist was based on "the difference between his autism (+) and nonautism (-) scores." (Rimland, 1971, p. 164). Moreover, when infantile autism was listed in the DSM-III, its definition adopted a working definition proposed by Rimland and other parents of autistic children (Badesch, 2011, p. 9).9 So, Rimland provided a clearer division between infantile autism and childhood schizophrenia as well as how to distinguish the two. 3.5. Other Case Studies: Divorce and Intimate Partner Violence At this point, let me compare my case study with two other noteworthy ones, divorce and intimate partner violence, presented by Elizabeth Anderson (2004) and Janet Kourany (2010), respectively. According to Anderson, feminist research on divorce conducted by Abigail Steward et al. (1997) demonstrates how a feminist value-driven inquiry can produce "epistemically fruitful" outcomes by uncovering evidence that is neglected by purportedly value-free inquiry. Traditional research frames divorce as a failure of marriage and loss of opportunity to live a happy life. Accordingly, such research only looked for the negative outcomes of divorce, such as the economic hardship women experience after their divorce. In contrast, Stewart's team was open to the possibility that divorce can provide "an opportunity for personal growth" (E. Anderson, 2004, p. 14). Due to this value commitment, the researchers were able to find evidence that divorced women can develop a sense of autonomy by achieving financial independence from their husbands (Stewart et al., neurodiversity paradigm, the biological fact that there are variations in neurocognitive functioning within the human species leads to the normative conclusion that each form of variation should be valued and respected. In other words, it has been noted that the perceived "impairments" or "disabilities" of autistic people is due to our society's inability to accommodate the various needs of neurodiverse people. 8 I am indebted to an anonymous referee for pushing me to clarify this point. 9 Rimland and other parents established the National Society for Autistic Children (NSAC) in 1965, a grassroots organization advocating the rights of autistic children and their families. The Board of Directors and the Professional Advisory Board of the NSAC came up with a working definition of infantile autism in the late 1970s, and it made clear that "No known factors in the psychological environment of a child have been shown to cause autism" (Ritvo & Freeman, 1977, p. 146). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 11 1997, p. 102). These positive outcomes added a new understanding of divorce that was not possible by traditional research. In sum, appealing to Stewart's team's research on divorce, Anderson argues that non-epistemic value considerations can play "knowledge-enhancing roles" in scientific inquiry without harming the impartiality of science and the fair treatment of evidence (E. Anderson, 2004, p. 3). Kourany (2010) suggests another example where non-epistemic values can positively contribute to the epistemic success of a research program. She highlights research by Carolyn West (2002a, 2002b) on intimate partner violence. In intimate partner violence research, challenges are faced when dealing with similarities and differences across racial groups when it comes to inflicting violence on intimate partners. This is particularly noticeable when researchers want to reveal racial similarities across racial groups "without negating the experiences of Black women" subject to such violence, while, at the same time, emphasizing differences "without perpetuating the stereotype that Black Americans are inherently more violent than other ethnic groups" (West, 2002a, p. 216). Kourany focuses on how West was able to acquire relevant information from the African American women who were reluctant to cooperate due to the fear of reinforcing racial stereotypes. It was the explicit commitment to feminist egalitarian values, such as the assumption that the experiences of Black women matter and that they deserve to live free from domestic violence, which was crucial in drawing cooperation from the community (Kourany, 2010, pp. 68– 75). West's research on domestic violence has a direct implication for our discussion of categorization in the social sciences.10 Committed to feminist egalitarian values, West emphasizes the need to "broaden the definition of partner violence to include psychological, emotional, and verbal abuse" (West, 2002a, p. 219). Earlier research on domestic violence only focused on physical violence and measured its severity and frequency. Not surprisingly, the phenomenon of "escalation of violence" from verbal and psychological to physical abuse was not fully appreciated (ibid., p. 220). The fact that many African American women who are victims of physical assault had prior psychological abuse, often more frequent and severe than women of other ethnic groups, would not have been revealed if researchers like West were not motivated to investigate it. Valuecommitted research of domestic violence called for expansion of its definition, and that change in definition influenced the entire process of research on domestic violence (Brigandt, 2015, p. 334). Here again, we have an example where value-laden research produces epistemically beneficial outcomes. 4. Objections: The Value-Free Ideal? In the preceding section, I provided case studies from the literature against the VFI to suggest that the current discussion of values and classification can benefit from the existing values and science literature. My case study of infantile autism directly shows how value-driven inquiry led to the 10 The case of domestic violence provides a good example of how researchers should make value-laden decisions before undertaking empirical research. Researchers should "specify the boundaries of entities," such as who is considered an intimate partner and what types of harm are considered to be violence, whose experiences should count (only Caucasian women?), and so forth (Ludwig, 2016, p. 1268). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 12 epistemic improvement of the category. The current understanding of infantile autism as a neurodevelopmental disorder can be attributed to Rimland's dedication to autistic children and their families. According to Griffiths and Khalidi, allowing non-epistemic purposes to shape scientific categories can be worrisome because these purposes tend to diminish the epistemic value of those categories. Contrary to that concern, the case study of infantile autism shows that serving non-epistemic purposes can have epistemically beneficial outcomes in establishing and delimiting a scientific category. In the following, I will address some potential objections to my account. In doing so, I will make it clear that Griffiths and Khalidi's concern is an endorsement of problematic assumptions of the value-free ideal of science. 4.1. The Context Distinction Objection The first objection proceeds from the perception that every researcher, to some extent, brings their values, biases, and beliefs to bear on deciding what research to pursue. Values can legitimately influence the choice of research questions, but they do not and should not influence how theories are evaluated. It might be objected that the autism case only illustrates how a researcher used his value judgments in choosing a research topic and conceiving hypotheses, which is irrelevant to the stage of inquiry where evaluating hypotheses happens. In other words, the case study of autism does not show how value considerations directly affected the assessment of two competing hypotheses-the psychogenic hypothesis and the biological hypothesis. The scientific community accepted the biological hypothesis over the psychogenic one, and this choice involved purely epistemic considerations, such as which one is more empirically adequate. This objection is based on the so-called "context distinction," which separates the process of conceiving and developing a hypothesis (i.e., the context of discovery) from the process of justifying and evaluating the hypothesis (i.e., the context of justification). It is often argued that non-epistemic value influence in the context of discovery is innocuous, while in the context of justification such an influence can corrupt parts of science. This objection, however, suggests a more fine-grained distinction between contexts of discovery and justification than Khalidi assumes. What he takes to be problematic are non-epistemic purposes that divert the purpose of discovering natural kinds. He suggests that "[t]he surest way to ensure that our categories identify real kinds is to pursue a scientific method that serves epistemic purposes" (Khalidi, 2013, p. xiv). He also claims that "in order to identify [natural kinds] we must be guided by epistemic purposes and not be deflected by non-epistemic interests" (ibid., p. 213). For Khalidi, following epistemic purposes is also essential in demarcating natural kinds from folk categories: "[F]olk categories can be expected to correspond to natural kinds only when they serve an epistemic purpose" (ibid., p. 64). Here, Khalidi does not seem to care about the context distinction. His account suggests that scientific inquiry ought to be guided by epistemic purposes alone from the outset. Khalidi does not consider whether the context of discovery provides values that are then weeded out in the context of justification. Even if we grant that the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification matters, it is important to note that it has been substantially challenged during the last few decades. Many philosophers of science have challenged the distinction by showing that the purported epistemic independence of the context of justification from the context of discovery cannot be maintained in practice (Okruhlik, 1994; Brigandt, 2015; Bueter, 2015; Elliott & Mckaughan, 2016). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 13 According to Katheleen Okruhlik (1994), non-epistemic factors influencing decisions in the context of discovery have a significant impact on theory appraisal and the content of science by limiting the pool of available theories. For example, if a sexist bias is pervasive in the current scientific community, then it tends to restrict scientists' mindset in such a way that alternative (not sexist) theories are inconceivable or prohibited. Consequently, even if the best theory is selected on purely objective grounds (in the context of justification), the selected theory can still contain sexist assumptions. Okruhlik's argument is not just about implicit bias. The general lesson we can draw from her argument is that once values enter the context of discovery, methodological rigor in the context of justification does not guarantee the elimination of values in science. Recall that Rimland's non-epistemic value judgments in the context of discovery resulted in positive epistemic benefits in the context of justification. His value judgment that familial wellbeing matters motivated him to investigate the disorder and enabled him to find shortcomings with the psychogenic view. More importantly, his value judgments functioned as a check on the background assumptions that supplement the gap between data and hypothesis (Longino, 1990, 2002). In the psychogenic view, the data that autistic children sought excessive aloneness was interpreted as withdrawal from their uncaring mothers. Rimland's value of familial well-being enabled him to question that background assumption of the psychogenic view and explore other background assumptions. Rimland interpreted existing data differently and evaluated the received view with available experimental data. Data interpretation and theory evaluation occur at the core of scientific reasoning-the "epistemic phase" (Hicks, 2014). The case of infantile autism shows that non-epistemic value judgments can positively affect the epistemic phase of scientific inquiry-the so-called the context of justification. 4.2. The Problem of Wishful Thinking Objection Another concern one might have is that the autism case would fail to dissuade scientists from following Khalidi's prescription. In particular, it might be argued that Khalidi's prescription is an effective tactic to pursue, given that scientific objectivity and integrity may be threatened by commercialization of science. Profit-driven research has been forming an ever-greater part of the scientific research, and the worry that this type of research only serves the interests of the sponsors has been growing. In biomedical research, for example, it has been noted that pharmaceutical company sponsored research tends to reach positive conclusions about new drugs (Friedberg et al., 1999). Although this "preference bias" is not the same as outright fabrication of research outcomes, it seriously degrades scientific objectivity, and thus it is epistemically harmful (Wilholt, 2009, p. 92).11 It has also been reported that researchers with financial ties measure only favorable factors and intentionally avoid measuring some risk factors that can undermine the safety of the tested drugs (Resnik, 2007). In addition, the very fact that the research proving the safety of a new drug is funded by the pharmaceutical company that developed the drug can severely damage public trust.12 These are a few examples of external influences corrupting scientific research. 11 David Resnik (2000) identifies a number of types of research bias caused by financial interests. Profitdriven considerations can affect research at all stages of research, from the selection of a research topic to dissemination of research outcomes. 12 Some scholars have expressed such a concern when investigating the association between researchers' positive evaluation of the safety of new drugs and their financial ties with pharmaceutical companies. Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 14 Accordingly, perhaps it is better to mandate that scientists should stick to epistemic purposes and reject all non-epistemic considerations. This objection is a familiar argument promoted by proponents of the VFI. The worry that allowing non-epistemic values to influence scientific inquiry makes researchers reach preferred conclusions has been named as the "problem of wishful thinking" (Brown, 2013, p. 835). This problem is directly relevant to the pharmaceutical cases, and it seems to provide a reason to support Khalidi's position that we should exclude non-epistemically value-laden influences all together. For example, some might criticize Rimland's research by arguing that he attempted to revise the notion of autism in such a way as to conform to or accord with his value judgments, which is an instance of the problem of wishful thinking. If the VFI is appealed to, then both the psychogenic hypothesis and the biological hypothesis, are examples of corrupted science. Work on both hypotheses violates the norm that scientists should "minimize the influence of contextual [nonepistemic] values on scientific reasoning, e.g., in gathering evidence and assessing/accepting scientific theories" (Reiss & Sprenger, 2017, p. 21). Anderson suggests that what advocates of the VFI are worried about is the "dogmatic character of value judgments," meaning that people who hold their values in research will be blind to disconfirming evidence and drive their research to preferred conclusions (E. Anderson, 2004, p. 3). Anderson not only argues that value judgments need not be held dogmatically, but also shows that research conducted by "nonfanatical valuer(s)" can better satisfy epistemic standards of scientific inquiry, such as fruitfulness, broad scope, and explanatory power, than other purportedly neutral research (ibid., p. 9). Returning to Anderson's example discussed earlier, what the Stewart research team did serves as a model for non-neutral but epistemically sound research. Stewart's team found cases where children exhibited high anxiety during regular visits from their noncustodial fathers after divorce. These cases were disturbing to the researchers since they were directly in conflict with the aim of revealing positive aspects of divorce. Rather than narrowmindedly holding their beliefs at the expense of the truth, the researchers decided to "continue analyzing displeasing findings in the hope of explaining them away" (ibid., p. 17). Further analysis revealed that the intense anxiety of children during the scheduled visit of their fathers was due to the anticipation of the parents' fight upon meeting, which was a typical routine prior to divorce. Based on this analysis, the Stewart team was able to make practical recommendations for the parents who divorced after much conflict, e.g., to arrange spontaneous visits (ibid., p. 17). The point of the Stewart team's research here is to demonstrate that value-committed researchers can live up to the standards of scientific inquiry, such as that any inquiry should be open to the "possibility of discovering otherwise" regardless of the inquirer's value commitments (ibid., p. 20). So, the objection that all research influenced by non-epistemic values will lead to wishful thinking is unfounded. Their worry is exemplified in the following: "We wonder how the public would interpret the debate over calcium-channel antagonists if it knew that most of the authors participating in the debate had undisclosed financial ties with pharmaceutical manufacturers" (Stelfox et al., 1998, p. 105). Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 15 4.3. Ethically Neutral Classification Objection Those who sympathize with Khalidi can still argue that epistemically fruitful outcomes of the case studies provided in this paper do not establish the analogous result for conceptual issues.13 In other words, conceptual issues-how to delimit boundaries of concepts-can be unaffected by arguments for the indispensable roles of non-epistemic values in science in general. For example, when it comes to judging what counts as genuine instances of child abuse, researchers can and should make classificatory choices without taking a subjective stance on normative issues. This objection is well captured in Ernest Nagel's (1961) work on the possibility of social science being "ethically neutral." Arguing against the idea that "an ethically neutral social science is inherently impossible" (ibid., p. 495), Nagel offers a way to do so regardless of the heavily normladen nature of social concepts.14 Whenever social scientists "assess" or "estimate" whether "a given characteristic is in some degree present (or absent) in a given instance," they can do their job by operationalizing social concepts (ibid., p. 492). John Dupré (2007) provides an example of how a Nagelian strategy "converts an evaluative term to a descriptive one" (p. 30). Let us assume that a social researcher investigates violent behavior in children. How can the researcher describe the degree of violence of a child? Instead of saying that "Sam is a violent little boy," the researcher can report, "Sam scored 84 on the Smith-Jones physical assertiveness scale" (Dupré, 2007, p. 29). The former statement delivers a sense of the reporter's disapproval of violence, whereas the latter statement only estimates a given case according to a given standard. By refraining from using value-laden terms, e.g., "violent," the operationalized statement specifies the object of measurement, i.e., "physical assertiveness." The first problem with this strategy is its impracticality and inefficiency. To come up with an operationalization, a researcher has to consider a variety of theoretical accounts on violence. There can be multiple accounts of violence, not just those about physical assertiveness. Converting all possible accounts into descriptive statements is neither feasible nor efficient given limited resources. The second problem is that operationalization does not get rid of value judgments. Instead, it "eliminates values at one stage, but it only pushes them to another, less appropriate stage" (Alexandrova, 2018, p. 430) or it makes them less visible (Intemann, 2015, p. 224). In short, the conversion from evaluation to description still requires value-laden choices. Eventually, which conceptual scheme a researcher adopts turns on what actions are considered undesirable or harmful, and which scheme is considered manageable. Moreover, how to delimit the boundaries of concepts not only requires having adequate empirical data but also careful considerations of why we need that data and how to promote the aim of inquiry (Intemann, 2015, p. 224).15 The third problem is that the conversion from evaluation to description is achieved at the expense of losing "reasons for action" (Dupré, 2007, p. 30). Not only do we want to have an accurate description of violence, but we also want to do something to reduce violence. The normative consideration is not 13 I thank anonymous referees for raising this worry and making suggestions. 14 Anna Alexandrova (2018) explores three possible strategies a "Nagelian" can pursue. What I consider in this paper corresponds to her second formulation of a Nagelian strategy. 15 Kristen Intemann (2015) provides another relevant example, the case of "biodiversity" in climate change research. Measuring impacts of climate change on biodiversity invites numerous decisions that are valueladen, such as what constitutes a significant loss to be measured. Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 16 something attached to a descriptive account of violence at a later time. The normative consideration is "fundamental to negotiations about what should and should not count as" violence (ibid., p. 37).16 In the end, the elimination of "hybrid concepts" (Dupré, 2007) or "mixed claims" (Alexandrova, 2018) by converting them into purely descriptive statements is both unattainable and undesirable. 5. Conclusion As we have seen, some scholars are skeptical about whether social, psychological, and psychiatric kinds can be natural kinds, because the boundaries of such kinds are partly shaped by nonepistemic considerations. Using Griffiths' terminology, both natural kinds and normative kinds go through conceptual changes but with different purposes. Normative kinds serve the aim of social reform, while natural kinds serve epistemic aims, such as inductive inference, explanation, et cetera. The worry arises when scientific categories are pressured to pursue two heterogenous aims, epistemic and normative, simultaneously. The worry is that when a category is revised due to the influence of non-epistemic values, the epistemic value of those categories will be diminished and the discovery of natural kinds will be derailed. Thus, the best strategy to uncover natural kinds, according to Khalidi, is to pursue epistemic purposes and, at the same time, exclude non-epistemic purposes. In this paper, I have responded to this worry by providing the case study of infantile autism. The early evolution of the concept of infantile autism exhibits changes from understanding infantile autism as a form of psychosis, caused by cold parenting, to a neurodevelopmental disorder substantially involving biological factors. Establishment of the notion of infantile autism as a scientific category involved non-epistemic value judgments, e.g., that the well-being of a family with autistic children is important. The positive contributions value-driven research made in establishing and delimiting the scientific category of infantile autism included: i) how research motivated by non-epistemic value judgments led to a critical examination of the received view, thereby revealing its empirical inadequacy; ii) how value-driven research led to the expansion of the research field; and iii) how value commitments contributed to the creation and development of diagnostic criteria, helping to demarcate the category. Rather than diminishing the epistemic value of the category, non-epistemic value commitments led to the epistemic improvement of the category. By considering potential objections, I have also tried to show that the concern over value-driven modifications of natural kinds is motivated by the VFI. Given the various arguments against the VFI, we have reasons to doubt the claim that value influence per se is harmful in scientific classification. More importantly, as shown in the case study of infantile autism, non-epistemic value judgments can be epistemically beneficial in scientific classification. 16 Here, I replace "rape" from the original paper with "violence." Forthcoming in: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A (2020) Preprint How Non-Epistemic Values Can Be Epistemically Beneficial in Scientific Classification 17 Acknowledgement My thanks to Marc Ereshefsky, Megan Delehanty, Ken Waters, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Ingo Brigandt, Daniel Hicks, Stijn Conix, Celso Neto, Nima Khodabandeh and two anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article. I also thank audiences at the 26th Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 2018 Poster Forum and the symposium "The Role of Non-Epistemic Values in Scientific Classification" at the 2019 Meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy and Social Studies of Biology. 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Juli 2009, Bd. 2 Müller, Olaf L.: Moralische Beobachtung und andere Arten ethischer Erkenntnis Müller, Olaf L.: Moralische Beobachtung und andere Arten ethischer Erkenntnis. Plädoyer für Respekt vor der Moral, Paderborn: Mentis 2008 ISBN-13: 978-3-89785-581-6, 285 S., EUR 38,00, sfr 62.80 Rezensiert von: Thorsten Sander, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Institut für Philosophie E-Mail: [email protected] Der Verdacht, dass die konstativ wirkende Oberflächenstruktur unseres moralischen Redens nicht für bare Münze zu nehmen ist, verdankt sich nicht zuletzt dem Vergleich zwischen der moralischen und der empirischen bzw. naturwissenschaftlichen Rede: Während wir in unserem empirischen Denken prima facie einer genuinen Kontrolle durch etwas von uns Unabhängiges unterliegen, scheinen sich hinter den moralischen Aussagesätzen nur Projektionen unserer jeweiligen Wertungen auf eine an sich wertfreie Welt zu verbergen. Will man verhindern, dass die Moral bei diesem Vergleich allzu schlecht abschneidet, bieten sich grundsätzlich zwei Strategien an: Man kann einerseits für eine kohärentistische Deutung unseres empirischen Denkens und für eine kohärentistische Begründung der Moral plädieren (so dass wir letztlich nirgendwo einer äusseren Kontrolle unterlägen); andererseits kann man sich auf den Gedanken einer genuin moralischen Beobachtung stützen (so dass wir in unserem moralischen Reden ebenso sehr einer Kontrolle von aussen unterliegen wie im empirischen Sprachspiel). Der erste Teil von Müllers Buch stellt dar, in welchen Hinsichten Ethik und Naturwissenschaft epistemologisch übereinstimmen und verbindet hierbei beide aufgeführten Strategien, wobei jedoch der Focus klar auf der zweiten liegt. Müller stellt zwar die These auf, dass „Empirie und Beobachtung in den Naturwissenschaften eine geringere Rolle [spielen], als manche denken" (S. 19), weist aber zugleich darauf hin, dass es als Ausweis der Respektabilität der Moral nicht genügt, die „empirische Überprüfbarkeit der theoretischen Sätze [in der Naturwissenschaft] so lange herunterzureden, bis sie auf das niedrige Niveau der ethischen Sätze abgesunken sind" (S. 91; vgl. S. 75). Das entscheidende Problem ist für Müller dementsprechend, ob es gelingt, die Möglichkeit genuiner moralischer Beobachtung(ssätze) aufzuzeigen. Nach der Einleitung und einigen Überlegungen zu den verschiedenen „Variationen eines Verdachts" (Kap. II) gegen die Moral widmet sich Müller in den Kap. III und IV zunächst relativ knapp der apriorischen Rechtfertigung moralischer Normen. Diese kann uns über die „Form zulässiger Moralsysteme" (S. 67) aufklären, indem man mit transzendentalen Argumenten einige „extreme Gebote" (S. 56) wie z.B. „Ihr sollt immer Eure Versprechen brechen", aber auch radikale Varianten des Utilitarismus widerlegt. Nachdem sich Kap. V mit der Möglichkeit einer holistischen Theorie moralischer Bestätigung beschäftigt, setzen sich die Kap. VI und VII kritisch mit der Theorie von Morton White auseinander, der zufolge Revisionen unseres Überzeugungssystems nicht nur durch Wahrnehmungen angestossen werden können, sondern gleichfalls durch Emotionen. Für seinen eigenen Ansatz rekurriert Müller jedoch nicht auf moralische Emotionen, sondern auf den Quineschen Begriff des 1 / 3 Beobachtungssatzes, für den lediglich zwei Bedingungen einschlägig sind: das Urteil muss erstens ausschliesslich von der jeweiligen Reizung der Sinnesrezeptoren abhängig sein und zweitens innerhalb der jeweiligen Sprachgemeinschaft von allen Sprechern in gleicher Weise gefällt werden (Kap. VIII). Moralische Beobachtungssätze wie „Das ist sichtbares Unrecht" kann es – so Kap. IX und X – aber nur geben, wenn sich die Sprecher einer Sprache in den meisten moralischen Fragen hinreichend einig sind und wenn dieser Konsens dem Kind in der Phase des Spracherwerbs „aufgezwungen" wird. Der zweite Teil des Buches stellt demgegenüber die Aspekte der moralischen Sprache in den Vordergrund, die zu einer unterschiedlichen Einstufung von moralischer und empirischer Erkenntnis führen. Hier führt Müller etwa die Lerndauer an (Kap. XI), v.a. aber zwei zentrale Punkte: Moralische Urteile sind erstens wesentlich handlungsleitend (Kap. XII): Wer ein moralisches Urteil fällt, hat notwendigerweise ein Motiv, entsprechend zu handeln. Zweitens ist zwar für die Existenz moralischer Beobachtungssätze ein umfassender intrakultureller Konsens notwendig (Kap. XIII); transkulturell kann hingegen auch in fundamentalen moralischen Fragen ein sehr weitreichender Dissens bestehen (v.a. Kap. XVIII). Dementsprechend kann sich das vom „principle of charity" verlangte „Wohlwollen" bei der Interpretation fremder moralischer Äusserungen (Kap. XIV, XV und XVII) nicht auf die jeweiligen Inhalte beziehen. Den nahe liegenden Verdacht, dass die nicht nur möglichen, sondern allenthalben beobachtbaren transkulturellen Unterschiede in den moralischen Urteilen gegen die Respektabilität der Moral sprechen, versucht Müller in Kap. XVIII zu entkräften. Das Buch schliesst mit Überlegungen zum Lernen von anderen Kulturen (Kap. XIX) und einem Ausblick (Kap. XX). Müllers Arbeit überzeugt durch eine überaus klare Darstellung, einen unverkrampften, aber nicht zu saloppen Stil und durch eine Konzentration auf die wesentlichen Punkte (längere Diskussionen der philosophischen Literatur sind selten und werden meist ins Kleingedruckte abgeschoben). Das Buch enthält eine Fülle von interessanten und kontroversen Überlegungen, etwa zum synthetischen Apriori; der Frage, ob aus moralischen Sätzen empirische Aussagen folgen können; zur Interpretation fremder Sprachen und Kulturen; wie auch zum handlungsleitenden Charakter der moralischen Sprache. Ich möchte mich in den kritischen Anmerkungen auf die Punkte beschränken, die sich direkt auf Müllers „Plädoyer für Respekt vor der Moral" beziehen. Gerade angesichts des gegenwärtigen Booms in der Philosophie der Wahrnehmung wäre es interessant zu untersuchen, wie sich verschiedene Wahrnehmungstheorien jeweils zum Gedanken einer moralischen Beobachtung verhalten. Müller entschliesst sich jedoch, ausschliesslich einen an Quine orientierten Begriff der Beobachtung bzw. des Beobachtungssatzes zur Basis der Untersuchung zu machen, und zwar mit der Begründung: „Wenn die Blumen der Moral im Wüstensand blühen können, dann braucht man sich um sie auf reicheren Böden keine Sorgen zu machen." (S. 21) Ob dies auf der metaphorischen Ebene korrekt ist, mögen kompetente Botaniker klären; es scheint mir jedoch fragwürdig, ob aus der Tatsache, dass der Quinesche Begriff des Beobachtungssatzes den Gedanken einer moralischen Beobachtung nicht ausschliesst, bereits folgt, dass etwa die in Kap. II aufgeführten Gegner der Respektabilität der Moral widerlegt wären. Wer im Bereich der Moral nicht die diskursive, sondern die intuitive Erkenntnis in den Vordergrund rückt (ob nun in Gestalt einer eigenen „Intuition", spezifischen Emotionen oder der normalen Beobachtung), wird damit üblicherweise die Hoffnung verbinden, eine Grundlage – oder wenigstens eine Kontrollinstanz – für das moralische Urteilen auszuweisen, die von kulturellen Prägungen unabhängig ist und insofern eine besonders hohe 2 / 3 epistemische Dignität besitzt. Es ist aber zweifelhaft, ob der Begriff der Beobachtung, den Müller in Anschlag bringt, diese Last schultern kann. Dass ein „Dissens in moralischen Beobachtungsfragen erkenntnistheoretisch gefährlich" (S. 231) ist und sich auf der Basis seiner Überlegungen nicht etwa eine bestimmte Moral als kulturinvariant gültig ausweisen lässt, wird von Müller insbesondere in Kap. XVIII klar konzediert. Um zu zeigen, dass dies für die Moral unschädlich ist, greift Müller nun auf zwei Argumente zurück: Zum einen bestehe – was empirisch überaus fragwürdig ist – in fundamentalen Fragen wie der Beurteilung von Tierquälerei oder Vergewaltigung „auch über die Grenzen benachbarter Kulturen" (S. 231) im grossen und ganzen ein Konsens. Zum anderen bedürfe die Moral, wenn sie eine Antwort auf die Frage „Was soll ich tun?" geben wolle, gar nicht der Zustimmung aller (S. 227); auch blutige Menschenopfer der Azteken würden den handlungsleitenden Wert unserer moralischen Beobachtungssätze nicht abschwächen (S. 230). Können wir aber unsere Moral noch ernst nehmen, wenn wir eingesehen haben, dass es nur unsere Moral ist? Dass sein partikularistisches Gegenargument für den Status der Moral bedrohlich ist, scheint auch Müller klar zu sein: An mehreren Stellen stützt er sich zumindest implizit auf Massstäbe der moralischen Beurteilung, die anscheinend kulturinvariant gelten sollen: So litten an Völkermorden und ethnischen Säuberungen Beteiligte unter einem eingeschränkten „Einfühlungsvermögen" (S. 234), und ebenso könnten bestimmte Kulturen „einen schärferen moralischen Blick" (S. 237) haben als andere. Dabei bleibt allerdings unklar, mit welchen Kriterien sich darüber befinden liesse, dass eine Kultur über eine adäquate moralische Sichtweise verfügt. In Kap. XIX schlägt Müller immerhin ein formales Kriterium für den Vergleich zwischen verschiedenen Moralen vor: Insofern es am wichtigsten sei, „das Verbotene bleiben zu lassen", müssten im Zweifelsfall die strengeren Verbote Vorrang besitzen (S. 243). Dies würde aber eventuell bedeuten, dass offene Gesellschaften, die sich ja dadurch auszeichnen, nicht jeden Lebensbereich – Ernährung, Kleidung, Sexualität, Kunst etc. – mit einem dichten Netz von Vorschriften zu überziehen, bei der Konfrontation mit traditionellen Kulturen stets den Kürzeren ziehen würden. (Und würde eine liberale Kultur versuchen, nacheinander von mehreren traditionellen Kulturen zu lernen, wäre das Resultat u.U. eine Kultur, in der praktisch alles verboten ist.) Gerade dieser Punkt verdeutlicht, dass in Müllers in vielen Hinsichten beidruckendem moralphilosophischen Gewölbe gleichsam der Schlussstein fehlt: Eine allgemeine und überzeugende Antwort auf die Frage, wie mit divergierenden moralischen Überzeugungen zu verfahren ist, hat das Buch bei all seinen Stärken nicht zu bieten. Diese Rezension ist veröffentlicht unter der Creative Commons BY-NC-ND-Lizenz. Wollen Sie einen Beitrag weitergehend nutzen, nehmen Sie bitte Kontakt mit der Autorin / dem Autor auf. 3 /

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013263 Justice, Legitimacy and (Normative) Authority for Political Realists Enzo Rossi [Forthcoming in Critical Review of Social and International Political Philosophy , March 2012.] Abstract One of the main challenges faced by realists in political philosophy is that of offering an account of authority that is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. Political moralists typically start by devising a conception of justice based on their pre-political moral commitments; authority would then be legitimate only if political power is exercised in accordance with justice. As an alternative to that dominant approach I put forward the idea that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality, and thus avoids some serious problems faced by mainstream theories of justice. I then argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independently-grounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a contextand practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power. 0. Introductory 0.1 Mainstream contemporary Anglo-American political philosophy tends to conceive of itself as a branch of applied ethics: the task of normative political theory would be that of guiding politics so as to promote or honour certain pre-political moral commitments. However in recent years-under the labels of 'political realism'1 or 'the realist critique of liberalism'-a 1 Not to be confused, of course, with the related but much more circumscribed realist tradition in international relations theory. 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013263 radically different approach to political theory has begun to emerge and take the form of a recognisable if spontaneous current.2 In a nutshell, realists contend that normative political theory should not try to silence, circumvent, contain, or ignore the non-moral forces that shape politics-all tendencies that realists ascribe to mainstream contemporary political philosophy. In other words, political philosophy should not try to prescribe behaviour that runs against the grain of the practice of real politics. A standard story in support of that approach has to do with the critique of purportedly 'purely normative' political theory as (an at least potential) expression of ideology. As Raymond Geuss puts it, "ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future." (2008: 42) Another-related and vaguely Hobbesian-line of realist critique says that moralist political philosophy is ill-suited to its subject matter: we need politics just because we disagree on ethics, so applied ethics-based political theory will not do.3 One of the main aims of this paper is to advance the realist critique in a way that relies less on general observations of that sort-however convincing they may be-and more on a direct engagement with the object of its critique. I would like to show how adopting a realist approach can help us in making progress in debates where moralist theories are at an impasse.4 More specifically, I will argue that debates on justice can be moved beyond a conflict between irreconcilable assumptions or intuitions if we abandon the moralist idea that justice is the first question of political philosophy.5 Rather, legitimacy (as understood by realists) is the fundamental problem, and once a realist account of legitimacy is in place we will have a new angle from which to approach some seemingly intractable disagreements about justice. 2 The work of theorists as disparate as William Connolly, John Dunn, John Gray, Bonnie Honig, John Horton, Chantal Mouffe, Glen Newey, Mark Philp, Judith Shklar, and Bernard Williams is beginning to be seen as contributing to the development of a the realist literature. For an overview, see Sangiovanni (2009) and Galston (2010). 3 Cf. Newey (2001), Williams (2005), Rossi (2010). Rawlsians might object that the project of political liberalism is precisely that of overcoming disagreements about comprehensive conceptions of the good by relying on political ideas of the good. That response elicits at least two separate rejoinders. On the one hand, some realists (Sangiovanni 2008, Sleat 2010) have put forward an interpretation of Rawls' later work that highlights its more contextand practice-sensitive aspects; but it also seems fair to say that much of mainstream political philosophy has not followed in the footsteps of what some have seen as Rawls' departure from moralism (in fact that aspect has attracted much criticism from Rawls' own followers ― cf., for example, Scheffler 1994). On the other hand, the political-comprehensive distinction has been subjected to a number of powerful criticisms (e.g. Gaus 1999), so simply pointing to it will not be enough to fend off the realist challenges. 4 This paper's main focus is simply the realist critique of mainstream political philosophy, rather than the formulation of an alternative first-order realist theory of justice. For a sense of what the latter might look like, Sangiovanni (2008) provides examples of how a broadly realist approach can help us making progress on a number of familiar questions such as the right to free speech and the justification of human rights in a global context. 5 The incipit of Rawls' A Theory of Justice (1999 [1971]) comes to mind here. I will return to it in 1.1 below. 2 That argument also takes on a wider challenge faced by realists in political philosophy, namely that of offering an account of authority that goes beyond the notion of de facto authority―that is, and account which is genuinely normative and yet does not consist of a moralistic application of general, abstract ethical principles to the practice of politics. I would like to show that upturning the relationship between justice and legitimacy affords a normative notion of authority that does not depend on a pre-political account of morality. I argue that the appropriate purpose of justice is simply to specify the implementation of an independentlygrounded conception of legitimacy, which in turn rests on a contextand practice-sensitive understanding of the purpose of political power. Unlike mainstream approaches that take justice as their first question, by giving priority to (realist) legitimacy my proposed sequence makes it possible to specify the scope of application of our theory of justice in a freestanding way, allowing it to be genuinely normative and action-guiding, but also grounded in an adequate account of the sphere it is meant to regulate. 0.2 The paper is structured as follows. In section 1 I characterise political moralism and argue that it fails to provide an adequate account of the scope of justice. In section 2 I show how that problem can be overcome through the priority of (realist) legitimacy over justice. In the third and final section I summarise my argument and briefly canvass some of the further questions it prompts. 1. Rejecting Moralism 1.1 The view that justice is the fundamental subject matter of political philosophy is closely connected to the moralistic approach to political philosophy, as I shall clarify shortly; so we begin with a thumbnail sketch of what I take to be the two ways in which mainstream political philosophy seeks to apply ethics to politics.6 (i) Substantive/teleological approach: The idea here is to set out an account of the good, and then devise the right (i.e. justice) accordingly. The paradigmatic example of this approach is utilitarianism, whereby justice requires the implementation of the set of rules that maximises utility. The good is prior to the right on this approach, nonetheless the fundamental political6 Bernard Williams (2005: 3) puts forward a similar distinction between the 'enactment' and the 'structural' model of political philosophy. 3 philosophical problems are still cashed out in terms of justice. The account of the good is presupposed and pre-political, so the role of political philosophy just is to work out a set of principles of right to maximise the good. (ii) Procedural/deontological approach: The aim here is to specify the right independently of the good.7Rawls' theory of justice is perhaps the most familiar example of this approach: some prepolitical moral commitments are identified as constitutive of the concept of justice and are then formulated as a conception of justice through an appropriately specified procedure. Politicalphilosophical problems are then addressed by applying that conception. As anticipated both approaches share the (moralistic) aspiration to guide political action on the basis of moral ideals (such as impartiality or well-being, say) that are external and prior to politics, in the sense that they are valued prior to and independently of any assessment of how suitable they are as organising principles for the regulation of political matters in any particular context. In fact Raymond Geuss calls this approach the 'ethics first' view (2008: 9), and Bernard Williams dubs it 'political moralism' (2005: 2). In a similar vein, Andrea Sangiovanni recently characterised the mainstream approach to justice as 'practice-independent': In each case, the principle of entitlement, utility, equality or priority (and the currency in which it is specified), is justified by appealing solely to moral values or to facts about human beings as such. No reference is made to existing institutions or practices, and the content, scope and justification of such principles in no way depend on the underlying structure of functioning of such practices and institutions. (2008: 139-140)8 Now that characterisation may well raise some important issues to do with the relation between moralism, fact-(in)sensitivity and ideal theory;9 however those issues are not of direct concern here. Rather, our focus should remain on the point that both variants of mainstream political philosophy try to achieve the priority of ethics over politics by affording centrality and priority to the question of justice. On the substantive approach justice is the means by which the moral ideal is implemented. On the procedural approach the role of justice is even more central: to implement the guiding moral ideal just is to implement a conception of justice.10 7 Set aside the familiar question―which I have discussed in Rossi (2009)―of whether procedural accounts of justice need to rely on a substantive account of desirable outcomes. On this issue also see Ceva (2009 and 2012) and Newey (2012). 8 One may object that Rawls' notion of a realistic utopia is meant to anticipate precisely this sort of charge. Yet, arguably, Sangiovanni's notion of practice-dependence (to which I will return in 2.2 below) is more contextspecific and thus more demanding than Rawls' rather abstract concern with laws of nature, "persons' moral and psychological natures" and "general facts about human society" (1999: 119, 175). 9 See Cohen (2003) and, for a critical discussion, Guay (2009). 10 This discussion provisionally presupposes the viability of Rawls' distinction between the concept and the 4 More precisely, my claim here is that moralism's reliance on pre-political moral commitments is a necessary and sufficient condition for the priority of justice. If we decide that the point of political philosophy is to specify how to implement some pre-political moral commitments, then we will think of our primary task as that of specifying a set of rules to bring about that implementation. Our conception of justice, then, is constituted by the specific rules we devise to implement our pre-political values.11 Consistently with the distinction between the two variants of moralism outlined above, those rules and values may then be teleological or deontological, as the priority of justice is separate from the priority of the right over the good. 12 But the need to translate pre-political moral commitments into first-order principles of justice only explains why moralism is a sufficient condition for the priority of justice. The stronger claim that it is also a necessary condition can be explained by pointing out how, if we want justice to be "the first virtue of social institutions" so that "laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust" (Rawls 1971: 3), we need to draw on pre-political normative commitments exclusively: that categorical role can only be performed if justice is grounded in abstract moral ideals (or practice-independent in the sense seen above), lest our judgment be swayed by historically-situated political contingencies such as a particular society's track record with the implementation of constitutional changes, say. In other words, if justice is to be the fundamental test for whether a political system stands or falls from the normative point of view, on pain of circularity the principles guiding judgments of justice should not be shaped by the nature of their subject matter. However, as we will see in the next sub-section, this pratice-independence spells serious difficulties for either version of the moralistic approach. 1.2 Given the relationship between moralism and the priority of justice, even if the two general arguments against moralism mentioned in the introductory section (the critical theory one and the Hobbesian one, neither of which I discuss here) were to fail, if the priority of justice can be shown to have undesirable effects moralism would still be undermined. But what could be wrong with the priority of justice? My contention is that moralist accounts of justice generate intractable controversies because they are incomplete. In a nutshell, my argument is this. conceptions of justice. 11 I will spell out this point I more detail in my discussion of the justice-legitimacy distinction in 2.1 below. 12 See Sandel (1998: 2-3): Not only Kant, but even J.S. Mill gives priority to justice, at least at the first order level (but, unlike Kant, not at the level of justification). 5 The normative outcome of any theory of justice is partly determined by the scope of justice, but the scope of justice cannot be determined with reference to pre-political moral values. Since on the moralist approaches the salient content of any conception of justice is determined by prepolitical values, those conceptions cannot contain an account of their scope. Therefore the moralist approaches yield incompleteness about matters of justice, in the sense that disagreements between competing moralist conceptions of justice cannot be adjudicated purely within the conceptual space of those theories. So, crudely, my claim is that moralist theories of justice talk past each other in a crucial respect. Consider, for example, the familiar contrast in distributive justice theory between liberal egalitarians and libertarians on the issue of taxation and redistribution. The dispute is usually carried out in terms of the implications of self-ownership, or the nature of the basic structure, and so on. Typically the dialectic reaches an impasse where some basic intuitions conflict, as there is no widely shared adjudication methodology for such conflicts. My conjecture here is that the indeterminacy of those disagreements is due to a lack of agreement about the scope of justice. The scope question is the question of where coercive political power should reach. In other words, it is the question of which part of 'the political' should be regulated by the sort of norms laid out by political philosophy. If we begin from the scope question we will have a common ground on which to debate justice; but I want to argue that no moralist theory of justice can contain an account of its scope and, therefore, justice (as understood by moralists) cannot be the first question of political philosophy. Moralists want to start from a conception of justice, yet those conceptions are constituted by non-political ethical principles applied to politics, whereas determining the scope of justice is a question about the nature of politics itself. So we need to start from a realist theory of legitimacy instead, i.e. a theory of what politics is actually for in a given context. For instance, in the case of the libertarian/egalitarian dispute, an account of the scope of justice would go a long way towards settling the issue of whether certain individual entitlements are defeasible (at least in a given context). Whether the state can legitimately redistribute a percentage of private income for particular purposes would no longer be a matter of whether such an exercise of political power is compatible with respect or promotion of certain abstract pre-political moral commitments (autonomy, rights, etc.); on a legitimacy-driven realist approach the matter would be discussed as the partly empirical and hermeneutical issue of the meaning and purpose of politics in that particular context. And, as I will argue, that should provide a 6 firmer basis for philosophical discussion than a clash of (allegedly) pre-political moral intuitions. Before expounding the argument I just sketched it may be useful to lay out its bare structure: P1: An account of the scope of justice is necessary (but not sufficient) to determine the normative outcome of any theory of justice. So the scope is part of the normatively salient content of a theory of justice. P2: The normatively salient content of moralist conceptions of justice is entirely derived from pre-political moral values. P3: An account of the scope of justice cannot be adequately provided with reference to pre-political moral values. C1: Moralist conceptions of justice cannot adequately specify their scope. (From P1, P2, P3.) C2: Moralist conceptions of justice are incomplete. (From P1, C1.) First, what exactly is the scope of justice, and why does it matter to the normative outcome of a theory of justice? As we have seen, the scope of justice is the sphere that ought to be regulated by a theory of justice. Even if we simply maintained that the whole of 'the political' ought to be directly regulated by principles of justice we would need an account of why that should be the case. In Rawls' paradigmatic theory, the scope of justice is famously characterised through the idea of the basic structure of society (1999 [1971]: 6-10; 1993: 257ff.). Below I will argue that this characterisation is unsatisfactory due to Rawls' moralism; but first we need to see how the account of the scope affects the normative content of a theory of justice. To continue with the example of justice as fairness, the point is simply that the parties in the original position know that they are selecting principles for the basic structure; so, for instance, the content of (say) the difference principle is shaped by both a normative commitment to impartiality and the need to shape "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantage from social cooperation" (Ibid.: 7). More generally, principles of justice are always implicitly formulated on the basis of an account of their scope insofar as ought implies can, and to know what is possible we need to know what sphere a norm is supposed to regulate (among other things). The second premise of my argument is the claim that the normatively salient content of 7 moralist conceptions of justice is entirely derived from pre-political moral values. Here the thought is simply that most contemporary political philosophers' prescriptions are entirely derived from or at least justified in terms of the articulation of a set of politics-independent moral values-as shown in the account of the deontological and teleological approach above. In other words, if we think of the formulation of principles of justice as an input-processingoutput operation, we may say that the input, or the raw material (as it were), is entirely constituted by those pre-political moral commitments. Again, consider Rawls' theory of justice as fairness (or at least its early formulation in the first edition of A Theory of Justice).13 Moral intuitions on freedom, equality and impartiality are systematised through the method of reflective equilibrium, which in turn yields the normative commitments that inform the design of the original position. The resulting two principles of justice, then, are the result of a series of manipulations of those initial, pre-political moral commitments. The same is true of Robert Nozick's libertarianism, where entitlements are derived from an account of moral agency in a 'state of nature' (1974: 48ff), or of various versions of consequentialism (which are rooted in a general moral account of well-being or perfection, say). We can now move on to the third premise, namely why an adequate account of the scope of justice cannot be provided with reference to pre-political moral commitments (such as impartiality, reciprocity etc.), which are, however, the only source of the salient content of moralistic theories of justice. So the argument for this premise is in two steps: first I need to show that even the account of the scope in moralist theories of justice is derived from prepolitical moral commitments, and then why that is not an adequate way of characterising the scope of justice. The first step may appear particularly controversial. To take the example of justice as fairness again, one may just observe how Rawls has a separate account of the basic structure as the domain of application of his theory. But I wish to argue that Rawls' basic structure is not a satisfactory account of the scope of justice, because the pre-political normative commitments that give rise to the original position and the ensuing principles of justice also inform the account of the basic structure: "once we think of the parties to a social contract as free and equal (and rational) moral persons, then there are strong reasons for taking the basic structure as the primary subject." (1993: 258-9). Put another way, even though the parties in the original position know that they have to work out principles of justice for the regulation of the 13 Since the 1980's Rawls has progressively been introducing contextual elements in his account of justice (on this point see Sangiovanni 2008), so his position has become increasingly less moralistic. However for our present purposes it will be necessary to focus on clear-cut cases of moralist approaches to justice. 8 basic structure, the account of the basic structure is informed by a prior understanding of what counts as background justice: We start with the basic structure and try to see how this structure itself should make the adjustments necessary to preserve background justice. [...] Certain background conditions are necessary if transactions between individuals are to be fair." (Ibid.: 268-9).14 That ethics-driven process is even more straightforward in the case of other moralistic theories of justice. As Rawls cogently argues, libertarian and utilitarian theories do not even have a special place for something akin to the basic structure, so they proceed directly from prepolitical moral commitments to political prescriptions, making no principled distinctions between moral and political norms (Ibid.: 262-5). Their account of the scope of justice, then, depends implicitly but entirely on their pre-political moral commitments: the account of the institutions to be regulated is just an implication of those commitments. Now the second step of the argument for the third premise: what exactly is wrong with having an account of the scope of justice that depends on pre-political normative commitments? After all, while one may find fault with the way in which libertarianism and utilitarianism do not deal explicitly with the scope issue, Rawls' move may appear compelling, insofar as it explicitly specifies what institutions15 we should regulate if we are committed to certain values.16 But my contention is that that move begs the question of whether regulating those institutions rather than others is actually a pressing political problem, or simply becomes one if one has certain prepolitical normative commitments. In other words, the problem is that moralist theories of justice do not really provide a freestanding account of their scope-they just spell out the implications of their pre-political normative commitments. And that is why they talk past each other: if the account of the scope is not grounded independently of the pre-political normative commitments, then we cannot have a debate on which principles are best suited to a given set of problems (despite the fact that debates are often framed in this way), and the substance of the disagreement is actually a clash between conflicting intuitions about the preferability of certain pre-political normative commitments over others.17 14 Set aside, for now, the issue of whether this need for a prior understanding of the notion of background justice makes the original position a somewhat circular decision procedure. 15 I use the word 'institutions' in a deliberately loose and wide-ranging way here. One may however note that, as Christopher Bertram (2009) has persuasively argued, much of the literature on the basic structure tends to blur two conceptions of that concept: a quasi-legal one, focused on rules and institutions, and a sociological one, focused on broader features of society. My argument should be able to range over that distinction. 16 However, if my analysis is correct, at a deeper level the account of the basic structure does not mark a significant structural difference between justice as fairness and libertarianism or utilitarianism. 17 Here one might object that some normative assumptions are needed to begin to identify the normatively 9 The three premises I just defended should lead us to the conclusion that moralist conceptions of justice do not have the resources to provide an adequate account of their own scope. They will of course presuppose such an account (for the reasons seen when discussing the first premise), but it will not be adequate in so far as it will be dependent on pre-political moral commitments. If we accept the first conclusion we should also accept the second one: moralist conceptions of justice are incomplete, in the sense that their normative outcomes are not adequately determined (because their account of the scope of justice is not freestanding). This objection may arguably be presented as a kind of circularity charge: moralistic theories of justice present their normative outcome as a solution to the problems raised by the application of their pre-political normative commitments to an account of the scope of justice, but that account is itself dependent on those normative commitments. So the problem is characterised in a way that is biased towards the envisaged solution.18 However, that may not be too serious a worry if there were no alternative way of formulating action-guiding principles for the exercise of political power; so in the reminder of this paper I shall attempt to show how a realist approach may overcome the difficulties I just pointed out. 2. The Priority of Legitimacy 2.1 To avoid the difficulty pointed out by my argument against the moralist priority of justice we need a freestanding account of the scope of justice, i.e. one that is not dependent on pre-political moral commitments. I argued that such an account cannot be provided within a theory of justice; in other words, the priority of justice is inescapably connected to moralism. That is why, as I will argue in this section, we need to move from moralism to realism, which involves taking legitimacy rather than justice as our first question. Let me outline that move more thoroughly. Mainstream, moralist theories of justice begin from an account of what (pre-political) values should regulate the exercise of political power. They identify a set of relevant general moral commitments and proceed to apply them to salient features of a political context, and so the moralistic way of construing the scope of justice is inevitable. I do not deny that; my reply would be simply to point out that, on the the moralist approach, all of the salient content of the scope is derived from pre-political moral commitments. 18 I will not discuss whether my argument should be considered fatal to the moralist approach to justice, as that judgment is best left to the reader; but I do hope to have at least shown that incompleteness is a serious shortcoming. 10 politics, either in a substantive or in a procedural way. My argument in the previous section aimed to show that if the source material―as it were―of a normative political theory is entirely constituted by those pre-political moral commitments we cannot have an adequate account of the scope of justice. But of course we do need such an account, because any normative theory that aspires to be action-guiding needs an effective theory of justice. So the challenge is to devise an appropriate theorising sequence that yields a theory of justice only after we have secured an independent account of the scope of justice. As anticipated, my suggestion is to start from a realist account of legitimacy, i.e. an empirically informed account of what politics is for in a given context. That, in turn, should allow us to adequately specify the scope of justice. The basic thought here is that, since the scope of justice is the sphere that ought to be regulated by principles of justice but cannot itself be adequately individuated through the pre-political moral commitments that constitute the salient content of moralistic accounts of justice, we need to recast the issue of scope as one to do mainly with the practice of politics itself, rather than the values that we would like to inform that practice. In other words, the question of where political power can legitimately reach should precede that of what principles should guide its exercise (call this the priority of legitimacy thesis), and it should be answered―at least in part―through an empirically informed account of the meaning and purpose of politics in the relevant cultural and historical context (call this the realist thesis). To clarify that point it may be useful to explore the (somewhat stipulative)19 distinction between the concepts of justice and legitimacy I am employing here. The question of justice is the question of what principles, rules, or action-guiding norms should regulate the exercise of political power in a given polity.20 The question of legitimacy, on the other hand, concerns the purpose of the exercise of political power in a given polity. Crudely, justice tells us how to exercise political power, whereas legitimacy tells us what the exercise of political power is for-which should explain why I maintain that the latter should question be prior to the former. The two concepts are obviously related and it may even be possible to envisage conceptions of both that give them the same extension;21 but my point here is simply to show how it is possible to drive a conceptual wedge between the norms that should regulate political action (justice) and the 19 While a degree of stipulation is inevitable when dealing with contestable concepts such as justice and legitimacy, that should not pose serious problems here, insofar as my argument simply aims to show a sequence of steps that lead to adequately grounded action-guiding principles. What names we attach to those steps is not crucial. 20 Set aside the familiar questions of whether all political power is exercised by the state, or whether justice need only concern the political power exercised by the state, and so on (Cf. Cohen 2011: 227)―my argument is general enough to range over the various possible answers to those questions. 21 If, for instance, we maintained that a state is legitimate if and only if it is just. 11 considerations that inform that choice of norms (legitimacy). In other words, legitimacy concerns the question of why we need politics in the first place, whereas justice concerns the rules through which politics should be regulated. Now that characterisation of the justice-legitimacy distinction should point us towards the way in which giving priority to a realist account of legitimacy can solve the problem with the scope of justice I described in the previous section (1.2). Recall how the moralistic priority of justice cannot yield a freestanding account of the scope of justice, i.e. of the limits of the sphere of action to be regulated by a conception of justice. In light of my argument we may say that, on the moralist approach, the difficulty with scope appears two-pronged. On the one hand the priority of justice aspires to spell out action-guiding norms before specifying the purpose of those norms. On the other hand, drawing the account of the scope of justice from pre-political moral commitments fails to ensure that the scope encompasses genuine political concerns, rather than what counts as a political concern in light of certain pre-political moral commitments. So the two prongs are really the two sides of the same coin:22 pre-political normative commitments cannot yield an adequate account of the scope of justice because they are geared towards generating general action-guiding principles, not an account of the purposes of politics in a given context. And it would not be possible to start from purpose-oriented pre-political commitments because we have seen (in 1.1 above) how moralism requires the priority of justice, and vice versa. That is why I maintain that the difficulty posed by the scope problem can only be overcome by starting our sequence of normative theorising from a realist account of legitimacy: we need to start from an account of the deep purpose of the exercise of political power (i.e. of legitimacy), which justice (as defined above) cannot provide, and since that account cannot be grounded on pre-political moral commitments we need it to be empirically informed (i.e. realist).23 But how can we generate such an account of legitimacy, and does it yield genuinely normative and action-guiding notions of political authority and justice? In the next sub-section I will sketch the general structure of a realist theory of legitimacy, and the way in which an adequate account of the scope of justice (and so an action-guiding conception of justice) can 22 That is unsurprising, as in 1.1 we saw that the relationship between the priority of justice and moralism is a biconditional. 23 In discussing the need for the empirical grounding of a realist conception of legitimacy both Williams (2005: 9) and Geuss (2008: 34-36) refer to the exemplar of Weber's seminal work, which, regrettably, has been largely neglected by post-Rawlsian political philosophy. Relatedly, until the last few years David Beetham (1991) has been a relatively lone voice in putting forward the view that the normative and descriptive aspects of legitimacy cannot be disentangled. I will return to this general issue in 2.2 below. 12 emerge from it. 2.2 One may ask in what sense, exactly, a realist account of legitimacy should be empirically informed, and what that implies with regard to the way in which the role of normative political theory is traditionally conceived. My suggestion would be to move beyond gesturing at a vaguely Weberian notion of legitimacy,24 and answer both questions by drawing on Andrea Sangiovanni's (2008) account of practice-dependence in normative political theory. More specifically, while Sangiovanni puts forward a theory of practice-dependent justice, I would like to show how, in light of my argument against the priority of justice, the realist cause of practice-dependence is best served by a focus on legitimacy. That is not to say, of course, that there is no role for justice; my contention is simply that a realist and practice-dependent account of justice cannot stand alone or be our first question-it should rather descend from an account of legitimacy. Sangiovanni's practice-dependent account of justice explicitly incorporates many insights from the realist critique of mainstream political philosophy.25 Most importantly for our present purposes, it offers a hermeneutic approach to the articulation of the empirical component of any realist approach to normative political theory: The content, scope, and justification of a conception of justice depends on the structure and form of the practices that the conception is intended to govern. [Therefore] in justifying any conception of justice, we first need an interpretation both of the point and purpose of the institutions that the conception is intended to govern, and of the role principles are intended to play within them. (Ibid.: 138, 141, my italics) I will not rehearse Sangiovanni's argument for practice-dependence,26 as my argument from the scope of justice should already have established the case for realism. What I do wish to establish now, however, is that the argument from the scope of justice should also lead us to a form of realism that proceeds from a practice-dependent account of justice to an action-guiding account of justice, rather than yielding a freestanding conception of justice. Simplifying somewhat, Sangiovanni maintains that the existence of institutional systems gives rise to peculiar relations between persons, and those relations in turn generate a demand for regulation through a conception of justice. The way to devise such a conception, then, is to interpret the purpose of 24 See previous footnote. 25 In fact Sangiovanni points out the close connections between his views and those of Williams, Geuss, and even Weber and Morgenthau (2008: 158n, 163n). 26 Nor, more specifically, his argument for the particular form of practice-dependence he favours, namely one focused on institutional rather than cultural practices. 13 those institutions in a way that is sufficiently critically aware to generate a normative assessment of existing arrangements as well as action-guiding principles of justice. But Sangiovanni recognises a potential difficulty with that move: We may be worried that in interpreting an institutional system in this way, we must apply standards of value that we already endorse independently of the institutions we are considering. Without such initial assessment of value, we will not be able to make sense of the point and purpose of a practice or activity [...] And this may seem to make the interpretive step in the justification of a conception of justice viciously circular. (Ibid.: 149) To address that worry Sangiovanni points out that the interpretation of existing practices is only an initial and provisional step. The conception of justice cannot be entirely derived from the interpretive understanding of institutions; that understanding must be 'extended' into a further, critical stage. While "without the constraints provided by the interpretive step, justice [...] would have neither a determinate content nor an application", taking those constraints into account is not sufficient to derive a conception of justice. To complete the critical stage, then, we need to "move from the point and purpose of institutions and the reasons those involved have for affirming them, to the way they shape relations among participants" (ibid.: 150). Presumably those relations are to be critically assessed by the lights of freestanding, perhaps even prepolitical normative commitments that are able to yield action-guiding principles.27 So it would appear that, by delaying the introduction of those normative commitments until after the interpretation of the point and purpose of the relevant institutions, Sangiovanni has managed to avoid the moralistic pitfall of characterising the scope of justice through the distorting lens of abstract, pre-political moral values. However, if we pay closer attention to the interpretive stage we should come to realise that, while Sangiovanni may well have dispelled the circularity worry in the terms in which he formulated it, my account of the problem of the scope of justice could be recast it in a more insidious way. The problem is that Sangiovanni's interpretive process is geared towards picking out the features of institutions that are relevant to some prior notion of justice: "the aim of the interpretive stage is to establish the parameters and fixed points which a full-blown conception of justice must take into account. [It] is meant to provide structure to the justification of a conception of justice" (ibid.: 149). Interpreting a practice through the lens of a concept of justice cannot yield a freestanding account of the scope of justice, i.e. the sphere of action that ought to be regulated by normative political theory. 27 Sangiovanni clarifies this point through an interpretation of Rawls' theory of justice as fairness in its later recasting as well as through a discussion of a number of aspects of recent debates on global justice (ibid.: 150-6). I take those illustrations to be successful, so I will not provide examples here. 14 In other words, how do we know (without projecting our own pre-political normative commitments, that is) whether a certain practice is meant to contribute to the establishment of justice? It seems to me that, in looking for justice at the interpretive stage, Sangiovanni skipped a step of the sequence required by a genuinely realistic mode of normative theorising. As anticipated, my suggestion would be to postpone the search for justice until we have an account of legitimacy; so, if the interpretive stage is to genuinely explore the 'point and purpose' of institutions, it should rather focus on drawing out an account of legitimacy.28 That is because, unlike justice, legitimacy is actually about the purpose of the exercise of political power,29 so using it as a hermeneutic lens will not cause any distortion, as it were. Such a genuinely freestanding account of the purposes of politics in a given context will then yield an adequate account of the scope of justice, and on that basis, as envisaged in Sangiovanni's critical stage of realist theorising, we will of course be able to devise suitably action-guiding principles of justice. 3. Conclusion 3.1 Let us now briefly review the paper's argument. I started by identifying a tendency, in mainstream contemporary political philosophy, to generate action-guiding principles whose salient content is drawn entirely from pre-political moral commitments. This moralistic tendency is strictly tied to the idea that justice is the first question of political philosophy. I then argued that, however, the moralistic approach yields inadequate theories of justice, insofar as it is unable to provide a freestanding account of the scope of justice, i.e. of the boundaries of the sphere of the exercise of political power that ought to be regulated by principles of justice. To overcome that difficulty I proposed to give priority to the question of legitimacy over justice, understanding the former in an empirically informed, realist way. I then showed how a realist account of legitimacy can generate a practice-dependent but genuinely normative conception of justice. In that way the realist approach to political philosophy can move beyond the notion of mere de facto authority and carve some space for a critical and action-guiding alternative to mainstream political moralism. To be sure, my argument points to a number of open questions. Tackling them in any detail, 28 So we may say that Sangiovanni's practice-dependence yields a contextualist position about justice. But I maintain that contextualism is not enough of a departure from moralism to overcome the problem of the scope of justice; for that we need the priority of legitimacy, which yields a full-blown realist position (as contextualism is just a component of realism). 29 See 2.1 above. 15 or even listing them, would be beyond the scope of this paper; yet, in order to sketch a possible direction for the realist research programme, it may be helpful to mention what may well be the most pressing worry, namely whether practice-dependence does not place excessive constraints upon the sort of prescriptions that a theory may envisage-however the realist may well point out that a solid grounding in a context's factual constraints is the best platform on which to construct radical alternatives.30 The challenge, then, becomes that of tackling the descriptive and hermeneutic element of political theory in a way that is sufficiently critically aware to pave the way for realistic normative solutions. 31 References Beetham, D., 1991. The Legitimation of Power. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Bertram, C., 2010. Institutions and the Limits of Procedural Justice. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol. Ceva, E., 2009. Just Procedures with Controversial Outcomes: On the Grounds for Substantive Disputation within a Procedural Theory of Justice. Res Publica, 15(3), 219-235. Ceva, E. 2012. Beyond Legitimacy: Can Proceduralism Say Anything Relevant about Justice? Forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy . Cohen, G.A., 2003. Facts and Principles. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 31(3), 211€-245. Cohen, G.A., 2011. How to Do Political Philosophy. In On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice and Other Essays in Political Philosophy, 225-235. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Galston, W.A., 2007. Realism in Political Theory. European Journal of Political Theory, 9(4), 385-411. Gaus, G.F., 1999. Reasonable Pluralism and the Domain of the Political: How the Weaknesses of John Rawls's Political Liberalism Can be Overcome by a Justificatory Liberalism. Inquiry 42(2), 259-284. Geuss, R., 2008. Philosophy and Real Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Geuss, R., 2010. Politics and the Imagination, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Guay, R., 2009. On Being Constrained by the Facts: Cohen on Facts and Principles. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Philosophy, SUNY Binghampton. 30 See Geuss (2010: x-xi). 31 Various versions of this paper were presented at Central European University, Bayreuth University, the University of Wales, Newport, and Warwick University – I am grateful to all audiences for their feedback. I would also like to thank Emanuela Ceva, Chandran Kukathas, Richard North and Janosch Prinz for their helpful written comments. 16 Newey, G., 2001. After Politics, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Newey, G., 2012. Just Politics. Forthcoming in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy. Rawls, J., 1999 [1971]. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. Rawls, J., 1999. The Law of Peoples: With 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rossi, E. 2009. The Exemption That Confirms the Rule: Reflections on Proceduralism and the UK Hybrid Embryos Controversy, Res Publica 15(3), 237-50 Rossi, E. 2010. Reality and Imagination in Political Theory and Practice: On Raymond Geuss' Realism. European Journal of Political Theory, 9(4), 204-212 Sandel, M., 1998. Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sangiovanni, A., 2008. Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality. Journal of Political Philosophy, 16(2), 137-164. Sangiovanni, A. 2009. Normative Political Theory: A Flight from Reality? In Political Thought and International Relations, ed. Duncan Bell, 219-239. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scheffler, S., 1994. The Appeal of Political Liberalism. Ethics 105(1), 4- €22. Sleat, M., 2010. Bernard Williams and the Possibility of a Realist Political Theory. European Journal of Political Theory 9(4), 485-503. Williams, B., 2005. Realism and Moralism in Political Theory. In In the Beginning Was the Deed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 1-17.

How To Do Things With Modals Matthew Mandelkern∗ November 26, 2018 To appear in Mind & Language Abstract According to a prominent line of thought, epistemic possibility claims do not communicate propositions; instead, they are proposals to leave certain possibilities open. This idea is at the heart of recent arguments that, to make sense of the dynamics of epistemic modality, we must reject the contextualist account of conversational dynamics, on which the fundamental role of assertions-including "might"claims-is to communicate information. I argue, on the contrary, that we can capture the dynamics of epistemic modality within the contextualist framework by taking the content of "might"-claims to be determined by the prospective common attitudes of the conversants. Keywords: epistemic modals; semantics; pragmatics; philosophy of language; contextualism 1 Introduction In a brief but trenchant discussion of epistemic modals, Wittgenstein warns against "regard[ing] a hesitant assertion as an assertion of hesitancy."1 An epistemic modal claim like "It might be raining," the thought goes, should not be regarded as an assertion of the speaker's uncertainty as to whether it is raining, but rather as something quite different in kind: a proposal to treat the possibility of rain as live. Wittgenstein's admonition provides a helpful lens for viewing the subsequent debate about the meaning of epistemic modal claims, and the system of communication that these claims fit into. The standard account treats "It might be raining" as expressing an ordinary piece of information, namely that the proposition that it is raining is compatible with some contextually salient piece of evidence. On the face of it, the standard account thus treats modal claims as assertions of hesitancy, in Wittgenstein's phrase; because of this, it has been taken to task for failing to make sense of what speakers do with modal claims.2 An array of heterodox accounts have re-engineered not only the standard theory of the meaning of epistemic modals, but also the contextualist theory of communication-on which communication is simply the transfer of information-in order to make sense of the dynamics of modal language. In this paper I will show that there is a way to walk a line between these two options. It is indeed wrong to view a "might"-claim simply as an assertion of uncertainty. This fails to capture a fundamental observation about the dynamics of epistemic modality, namely, that an assertion of pMight pq is in general a proposal to ∗All Souls College, Oxford, OX1 4AL, United Kingdom, [email protected] 1"Betrachte nicht die zaghafte Behauptung als Behauptung der Zaghaftigkeit" (Wittgenstein, 1953, II.x.110). 2I will often use "modal claim" for "epistemic modal claim"; my focus in this paper will be exclusively on epistemic modals. 1 make p compatible with the common ground.3 It is overhasty, however, to conclude that there is no content that we can assign to "might"-claims which will capture this observation. In this paper, I show that we can in fact capture this observation within the contextualist framework. We can do so by assigning pMight pq an assertoric content which is about the conversation's common ground itself. In particular, we maintain that pMight pq says that p is compatible with the common ground as it stands after the claim in question has been made and negotiated. I show that this approach, together with the background contextualist theory of communication, guarantees that an assertion of pMight pq amounts to a proposal to make p compatible with the common ground. In the second part of the paper, I consider the attractions and drawbacks of this approach, arguing that some natural objections can be answered by exploring a parallel between modal claims and performative uses of language. 2 Contextualism and its discontents I begin by sketching the contextualist framework, and the challenge that epistemic modals pose to it. 2.1 Contextualism "Contextualist" is sometimes used to describe a theory of how a particular term works; for instance, any plausible theory of the meaning of "I" will be contextualist, insofar as it will say that the denotation of "I" varies with the context. I will use "contextualist" here in a more general way, to describe a wholesale model of communication.4 In the contextualist framework, semantics is responsible for compositionally assigning contents (propositions) to well-formed declarative sentences (or logical forms), relative to contexts.5 Pragmatics concerns the application of domain-general reasoning to these semantic outputs. In particular, contextualism commits to a simple theory of the basic thing speakers do with these contents: they use them to coordinate on their information. To model this, contextualism tracks the common commitments in a conversation at a given time-the conversation's common ground-and then says that an assertion of a declarative sentence is a proposal to add the proposition expressed by the sentence at that context to the common ground. An assertion, in other words, is just a proposal for the interlocutors to come to commonly believe the content asserted. Contextualism provides an elegant model of the dynamics of conversation; and, since it views conversation as the mutual exchange of information, this model is also predictive (at least once we couple it with an independently motivated theory of how agents assimilate new information): on this model, the evolution of conversation just is the evolution of (common) belief. 3The common ground is the set of propositions commonly accepted in a conversation: the set of propositions accepted by all conversants, accepted to be accepted, and so on, where acceptance is an attitude like belief or knowledge (I move freely between talk of belief and acceptance here). Note that the common ground is defined for any number of conversants, including just one.This claim is only ceteris paribus because of the purely descriptive uses of modal claims of the kind discussed in Section 5.2 below. I use roman letters to stand for sentences and italic letters to stand for the corresponding propositions; I leave relativization to contexts implicit. 4My theory of modals is contextualist in both these senses. On the latter, especially Stalnaker 1970, 1978, Karttunen 1974. 5We can model these propositions as sets of possible worlds-intuitively, the set of all and only those worlds which verify the sentence in question-though this modeling choice is independent of the basic framework. 2 2.2 Discontents Despite its attractions, however, it is easy to get in a mood in which contextualism looks too simple. Conversation is replete with uses of language which, at first blush, go far beyond the simple exchange of information. In the rest of this paper I make a case study of one use of language which poses this problem: epistemic modal claims. What do speakers do with epistemic modal claims? Focus for now on "might"-claims, like "It might be raining" or "John might be in his office." Intuitively, a "might"-claim is a way of proposing that some possibility should be taken seriously in inquiry: e.g. "It might be raining" says "Let us take seriously the possibility that it is raining." In the contextualist framework, we can, at least as a first pass, make this precise by saying that a claim of pMight pq is a proposal to make p compatible with the common ground, and to make this fact itself common ground.6 Thus an assertion of "John might be in his office" is a proposal to make it compatible with the common ground that John is in his office, and to make this fact itself common ground. This description of the dynamics of "might"-claims, which I will refer to in what follows as the guiding observation, makes sense of intuitions about what speakers are trying to do when they assert a "might"claim: namely, to ensure that we treat its prejacent (the proposition it embeds) as a live possibility in our investigation of what the world is like. It also makes sense of intuitions about what speakers are doing when they agree or disagree about "might"-claims. If you say that John might be in his office and I object that he cannot be, what we are arguing about is whether to treat as live the possibility that John is in his office: you are saying we should, I am saying we should not. If we treat "must" as the dual of "might," then the guiding observation also makes sense of the dynamics of "must"-claims, predicting that an assertion of pMust pq is a proposal to ensure that p is entailed by the common ground. This, again, conforms to intuitions and makes sense of agreement and disagreement about "must"-claims. We are now in a position to formulate the challenge epistemic modals pose to contextualism. The issue is that an assertion, on the contextualist theory, is a proposal to accept some piece of information. But, if the guiding observation is right, a "might"-claim does not look like a proposal to accept a piece of information, but rather a proposal to make some piece of information compatible with the common ground: in Wittgenstein's phrase, a hesitant assertion, not an assertion of hesitancy. To make this more pressing, consider the standard theory of the meaning of epistemic modal claims. On this theory, pMight pq means that p is compatible with a set of accessible worlds: those compatible with a body of evidence or attitude made salient by the context of utterance.7 At first blush this looks reasonable enough, but, when we try to say more about how the accessibility relation in question is actually determined 6See Stalnaker 1970 and many since. The latter part of this is non-trivial, since something can be compatible with the common ground without this fact itself being common ground. This is one way, in the present framework, that we can make sense of the way in which a "might"-claim is used not only to make its prejacent compatible with the common ground, but also to make this fact salient. As an anonymous referee for this journal helpfully points out, there is no doubt more that is required for an adequate model of the attention-getting role of "might"-claims; such a model will presumably involve something more fine-grained than the Hintikkan approach I am assuming here, e.g. QUDs/partitions (Roberts, 2012; Yablo, 2014; Yalcin, 2012), inquisitive contents (Ciardelli et al., 2009), or covers of attitude states (Willer, 2013). I will stick with a Hintikkan model of attitudes here for the sake of simplicity; while the resulting model of the attention-getting role of "might"-claims is certainly partial, it nevertheless does go some way, I think, towards accounting for the role of epistemic modal claims in coordinating common information. 7E.g. Moore 1962, Hacking 1967, Teller 1972, Kratzer 1977, 1981, and many since. 3 at given contexts, it is hard to see how to bring this theory in line with the guiding observation.8 A natural first thought would be to take the accessibility relation to be determined by the knowledge of the speaker. Then pMight pq would be equivalent to pFor all I know, pq. But this clearly does not conform to the guiding observation: a claim with the form pFor all I know, pq is not a proposal to treat p as compatible with the common ground, but a statement that p already is compatible with what you know (and, therefore, with the common ground). This model thus fails to account for the way in which speakers negotiate about modal claims. If you say "John might be in his office" and I reply, "No, he is in England," I am not disputing that it is compatible with your antecedent knowledge that John is in his office (you should know); instead, I am disputing whether this is a good thing for us to leave open in our inquiry. Likewise, if I agree, I am not agreeing that it is compatible with your knowledge that John is in his office (again, you should know), but rather that it is a good thing to leave open in inquiry. A natural second attempt would take the accessibility relation to be determined, not by the speaker's knowledge, but rather the knowledge of the group of conversants: the knowledge state that would result if all the individuals in the group pooled their knowledge.9 But this approach still fails to conform to the guiding observation. Suppose we're in a big group. You see John's office light on. I ask you where John is. You can say, "He might be in his office": you are proposing to treat as live the possibility that John is in his office. You are not asserting that, if everyone in the group pooled their knowledge, it would remain compatible with our knowledge that John is in his office. Indeed, you may think that, if we pooled all our knowledge, we might well discover that John was not in his office. These two options do not exhaust the space of possibilities-a point which will play a central role in what follows-but it is tempting at this point to echo Wittgenstein: the standard theory, and the contextualist framework in which it is embedded, makes the mistake of trying to analyze "might"-claims-a special kind of speech act whose aim is to coordinate on which possibilities to treat as live-as assertions of uncertainty. It looks like a mistake to analyze modal claims as any kind of assertion at all; modal claims do not aim to transfer information, but rather constitute a different speech act, something which takes us altogether out of the bounds of the contextualist framework. This pessimistic line is implicit or explicit in much recent work on epistemic modals; here is a characteristic statement: In general, there is no single proposition one can accept such that one does not rule out p if and only if one accepts that proposition (p itself is too strong). So if our language provides the resources to simply express that we do not rule out p, then it seems we will not be able to understand that bit of language if we confine ourselves to a framework where sentences express propositions. (Rothschild, 2013, p. 50)10 8See Price 1983, MacFarlane 2011, von Fintel and Gillies 2011, and others. 9I.e., the group's distributed knowledge: where KS,w represents the set of worlds compatible with S's knowledge in w and I is a given group, ⋂ i∈I Ki,w. A weaker approach, which takes the accessibility relation to be determined by the weakest thing known- i.e., by ⋃ i∈I Ki,w-would fail to make sense of disagreement, like the view just discussed. 10Rothschild (2013) himself does not take a stand on this pessimistic conclusion. Another characteristic statement comes in Swanson 2011, p. 251: "Construing subjective uncertainty about whether φ in terms of near certainty about some other proposition seems wrongheaded. But unless the truth conditional theorist [i.e., the contextualist] can find such propositions, there is no reason to suppose that an assertion of a doxastically hedged sentence will inculcate the appropriate partial belief in the addressee. And the project of finding such propositions looks quixotic if not impossible." Accounts which follow this pessimistic line in rejecting the 4 3 Prospective contextualism But this pessimistic conclusion is too fast. There is a proposition we can assign as the content of pMight pq which captures the guiding observation. The basic idea is to preserve the structure of the standard theory, but to have the modal's accessibility relation determined by the common ground itself. In this section I show that, if we do this in the right way, then, thanks to properties of the logic of common ground, an assertion of pMight pq will amount to a proposal to make p compatible with the common ground (and to make this fact itself common ground). As a first pass at implementing this idea, we could take "It might be raining" to mean that the proposition that it is raining is compatible with the common ground.11 But this would not have the desired effect. On this view, modal claims would merely describe the common ground. Like the views discussed in the last section, this cannot make sense of the way that speakers use "might"-claims to negotiate about the common ground. If I say that it might be raining, and you say it is not, we are not arguing about whether the common ground is presently compatible with the proposition that it is raining. We know this in part because if you think that the common ground is compatible with p, then it follows from the logic of the common ground that the common ground is compatible with p.12 We are, rather, arguing about whether the common ground should be compatible with the proposition that it is raining. A parallel point extends to "must." On the present account, pMust pq would say that p is already entailed by the common ground. That would mean that "It must be raining" could not be used to inform one's interlocutors that it is raining; it could only be truly asserted in a context where it is already accepted that it is raining. This again fails to capture the way in which "must"-claims are used to negotiate about the common ground. A close variant on this approach, however, avoids these problems. On this view-which I call prospective contextualism-"It might be raining" means that the proposition that it is raining will be compatible with the common ground as it stands after the assertion has been made and either accepted or rejected by all interlocutors (call this the prospective common ground).13 In general, on this view, pMight pq means that p is compatible with the prospective common ground, pMust pq that p is entailed by the prospective common ground. This approach, together with the contextualist theory of communication, ensures that an assertion of pMight pq amounts to a proposal to make p compatible with the common ground (and to make this fact contextualist framework include dynamic accounts such as Veltman 1996; Beaver 2001; von Fintel and Gillies 2007; Willer 2013; Yalcin 2015; expressivist accounts such as Yalcin 2007, 2012, 2011; Rothschild 2011; Swanson 2015; Moss 2015; revisionary contextualist accounts such as Stalnaker 2014, and relativist accounts such as Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007a; Kölbel 2009; Egan 2011; MacFarlane 2011, 2014. For different defenses of contextualism, see e.g. Dowell 2011; Khoo 2015; Stojnić 2016, 2017. 11For ideas in this direction, see Groenendijk and Stokhof 1975, Yalcin 2007, MacFarlane 2011. 12Models for common ground for a group I can be constructed by taking the transitive closure of the accessibility relations for acceptance for each i ∈ I , where the transitive closure R* of a set of relations {Ri : i ∈ I} is the smallest relation such that xR*y just in case there is a sequence of worlds 〈w1 . . . wn〉 such that w1 = x, wn = y, and, for each wj : j ≤ n − 1, ∃k ∈ I : wjRkwj+1. That means that if a p-world is accessible under i's accessibility relation for any i ∈ I , it will be accessible under the accessibility relation for common ground. 13What the prospective common ground actually amounts to is of course a vague matter. Importantly, the prospective common ground differs from the common ground at the point just after it has been updated with the fact that the claim has been made (see Stalnaker 1998; von Fintel 2008). Using that common ground to determine accessibility does not avoid the problems just discussed for the non-prospective view. 5 itself common ground). Here's why. Suppose that pMight pq is asserted at time t; let t′ be the prospective time, when the assertion has been either accepted or rejected. Suppose first that pMight pq is accepted by all parties. In the contextualist framework, that means, again, that its content will be added to the common ground. If pMight pq has the meaning attributed to it by prospective contextualism, it follows that it will be common ground at t′ that the common ground at t′ is compatible with p. In the logic of common ground, assuming that the attitude of at least one party to the conversation is logically consistent, "It is common ground that the common ground is compatible with p" entails "The common ground is compatible with p."14 In other words, when the common ground consistently thinks something is compatible with it, it is always right. Importantly, this does not follow from substantive assumptions about the logic of the attitudes which constitute the common ground beyond the mild assumption that some underlying attitude is logically consistent, but rather from the structure of the common ground itself. Given this fact about the logic of the common ground, it thus follows that an assertion of pMight pq is a proposal which, if accepted, ensures that p is compatible with the common ground (at the time after the assertion has been negotiated), and that this fact itself is common ground. Suppose second that pMight pq is rejected by all parties to the conversation, in the strong sense that its negation is common ground at t′. According to prospective contextualism, the negation of pMight pq says that the prospective common ground is not compatible with p; that is, that it entails p. Thus it will be common ground at t′ that p is common ground. This, again, is not yet what we want, but, once more, the logic of common ground helps us close the gap. Assuming that the underlying attitudes represent themselves as being veridical, it follows that, if the common ground entails that the common ground entails p, then the common ground entails p.15 In short, when the common ground thinks that it accepts something, it is always right. Thus it follows from the logic of the common ground that, if pMight pq is commonly rejected at t′, then p is common ground at t′. In sum: an assertion of pMight pq, according to prospective contextualism, will amount to a proposal which, if commonly accepted, makes p compatible with the common ground (and makes this fact itself common ground); and which, if commonly rejected, makes p common ground. Assuming "must" is the dual of "might," exactly parallel reasoning shows that pMust pq is a proposal which, if accepted, makes p part of the common ground; and, if rejected, ensures that p is not common ground, and thus that p is compatible with the common ground.16 14Interpreting "t" as "it is common ground at t that," and "♦t" as its dual, this is the claim that pt♦tp → ♦tpq is a theorem in the logic of common ground, assuming that some underlying attitude of acceptance is individually consistent. Suppose every accessible common ground world accesses some p-world. Since the relation for common ground is the transitive closure of the individual underlying relations, the consistency of at least one underlying attitude ensures that some worlds are accessible; since the relation is transitive, it follows that, since some accessible world can access a p-world, the world of evaluation can access a p-world. 15I.e., we assume the C4 axiom, pttp → tpq (corresponding to the density constraint on accessibility relations, which says ∀a∀b : aRb → (∃c : aRc ∧ cRb)). This follows, inter alia, from the assumption that accessibility for the underlying attitudes is quasi-reflexive-every world which is accessed by a world accesses itself-corresponding to the intuitive assumption that attitudes of acceptance represent themselves as being veridical, i.e. for i ∈ I , |=pi,t(i,tp→ p)q. 16 We can make this reasoning more formal by modeling the common ground at t with a consistent, logically closed set of sentences Γt (a common ground set) in a standard modal language, interpreted: p is common ground at t iff ptpq ∈ Γt. To encode the assumption that monotonicity is presupposed, Γt contains pt′pq : t′ > t whenever it contains ptpq. An assertion of p at time t is a proposal which, if accepted, has the effect of ensuring that pt′pq is in Γt′ , where t′ is the time at which p has been accepted or rejected (the prospective time); Γt′ is the smallest common ground set which includes Γt, updated with the fact that 6 Prospective contextualism, together with the contextualist model of conversation dynamics, thus predicts that assertions of pMight pq and pMust pq will have exactly the update properties ascribed to them by the guiding observation. In this framework, given mild assumptions about the logic of the attitudes that compose the common ground, when we accept pMight pq, we accept a proposition which says that p is compatible with our own (prospective) common ground. And to accept such a proposition just is to render p compatible with our common ground. Likewise, when we accept pMust pq, we accept a proposition which says that p is entailed by our own (prospective) common ground. And to accept such a proposition just is to make p entailed by our common ground. Prospective contextualism thus shows that the guiding observation can be reconciled with the contextualist framework: by taking modal assertions to have contents that are themselves about the common ground, we can view modal assertions as proposals to add a proposition to the common ground, yet still make sense of the fundamental dynamics of modal language. Before moving on, let me note two important features of prospective contextualism. First, prospective contextualism is a theory about the assertoric content of unembedded modal claims-what proposition they contribute to the common ground when asserted-not their semantic content (see Ninan 2010 for relevant discussion of the distinction). Thus, while prospective contextualism is committed to the claim that pMight pq and pp is compatible with the prospective common groundq generally contribute the same proposition to the common ground when asserted, it is no part of prospective contextualism that these have the same compositional semantic content, and thus no part of prospective contextualism that they will embed in the same way. This is important, since a little reflection shows that these in fact embed in different ways. There are a variety of different ways we could develop a semantic theory to implement prospective contextualism. I will not address this issue substantively here, but let me very briefly say how I think this might best be done. We could simply build prospective contextualism as a default mode of interpretation on top of the standard Kratzerian theory. That theory, however, has difficulty accounting for certain embedding data, as Groenendijk et al. (1996); Aloni (2001); Yalcin (2007) discuss. In Mandelkern 2019a, I develop a variant of the standard theory which augments it with the assumption that modals come with a constraint that ensures that only worlds in the modal's local context are accessible (on local contexts, see Stalnaker 1974; Karttunen 1974; Schlenker 2009). I argue that this approach accounts for the embedding behavior of epistemic modals. The local context for unembedded claims is the set of worlds compatible with the common ground, of which the prospective common ground will be (presupposed to be) a subset; so the prospective contextualist interpretation will be an admissible interpretation. Absent other clues, this will be an obvious default, since the assertion in question has been made and anything that follows from this fact, and which includes pt′pq. Some revision of the common ground may be necessary to ensure that this set is consistent. The mechanics of such a revision are beyond our scope-although this topic is of special interest for the theory of epistemic modals, since assertions of epistemic possibility claims are a standard tactic for creating such a clash, the question of how such a revision goes, in our framework, is just an instance of the general problem of belief revision (see e.g. C.E Alchourrón and P. Gärdenfors and D. Makinson 1985). According to prospective contextualism, a claim of pMight pq as asserted at t will be regimented as p♦t′pq, where t′ is the prospective time. Suppose first that this claim is accepted. Then pt′♦t′pq is in Γt′ . We assume that our underlying attitudes obey the two assumptions mentioned above: at least one of the underlying attitudes' accessibility relations is serial, and all are quasi-reflexive. Since pt′♦t′p→ ♦t′pq is thus a theorem, given that Γt′ is logically closed, it follows that p♦t′pq∈ Γt′ . Since Γt′ is consistent, it follows that the pt′¬pq /∈ Γt′ , and thus p is not common ground at t′, and thus p is compatible with the common ground at t′. Suppose second that this claim is rejected (equivalently, that pMust not pq is accepted). Then pt′¬♦t′pq∈ Γt′ ; equivalently, pt′t′¬pq ∈ Γt′ . Since pt′t′¬p→ t′¬pq is a theorem given our assumptions, given that Γt′ is logically closed, it follows that pt′¬pq∈ Γt′ , and thus that p is common ground at t′, and thus that p is not compatible with the common ground at t′. 7 it provides a strong and natural interpretation of what speakers might be trying to do with modal words. But this default can be overridden, which is important for accounting for the fact that, provided suitable contextual set-up, modals may be used simply to describe someone's state of mind, as in the "stand your ground" cases discussed in Section 5.2, or in "exocentric" readings of modals.17 Second, what is essential to prospective contextualism is that it assigns to a modal claim a content which has certain introspective properties with regard to the common ground.18 Making epistemic modal claims about the prospective common ground is an obvious way of accomplishing this, but there may be other ways-for instance, by making them about the prospective common evidence, and adopting introspective constraints regarding evidence. What is really essential to prospective contextualism, then, is not that the content of modal claims be itself about prospective attitudes, but that it be related to those attitudes in the right kind of way. Making the content of modal claims about those attitudes is a simple and natural way to accomplish this, but the basic insights of this approach can thus be extended to any variants which preserve these logical principles. Having said this, I will set aside exploration of such variations for present purposes, focusing on the simple version of the view which I have presented here. 4 Performativity Prospective contextualism shows that we can capture the guiding observation within the contextualist framework. It does not follow that we should do so. The main claim of this paper is the weaker, first one: that we cannot dismiss contextualism based on its putative inability to capture the guiding observation. I will not argue that prospective contextualism provides the correct theory of the assertoric content of epistemic modal claims; whether it does turns on a wide array of issues which I cannot hope to adequately address in this paper. In the rest of the paper, instead, I will address some obvious concerns about prospective contextualism, trying to bring out some of its attractions along the way. I will begin by addressing a natural worry about prospective contextualism. The worry is that there is something very weird about prospective contextualism. It captures the guiding observation in a way which is both structurally and normatively implausible. According to prospective contextualism, an assertion of an epistemic modal claim is a proposal about how the common ground should evolve which is made by saying something about how it will evolve. This looks structurally roundabout: the truth conditions in this account look like idle wheels. And this looks normatively implausible: speakers can assert modal claims without having any idea of what will actually happen to the common ground, and thus without knowing or believing the content which prospective contextualism assigns to modal claims. Given that you generally have to believe what you say, prospective contextualism cannot be the right theory. I will address this worry by arguing that the method of negotiation which I have attributed to epistemic modal claims-making a proposal about how some contextual parameter ought to be set by making a truth 17See Egan et al. 2005; von Fintel and Gillies 2008; Kratzer 2012. Prospectivity may still play an important role in the interpretation of embedded modals; thus e.g. pIf p, then must qq might, as a default, be interpreted as saying that q is true in all the p-worlds of the prospective context, which lets us understand how speakers negotiate with these (restricted) modal claims; thus in particular an assertion of pIf p, then must qq would have the same update effect as an assertion of pNot p or qq (despite having a different semantic value). 18In particular, that it has the properties that pt′(Mightt p)q entails p♦t′pq; and that pt′(Mustt p)q entails pt′pq. 8 conditional claim about how it will be set-is in fact widespread in natural language. In particular, epistemic modal claims, on this approach, recapitulate the structure of a wide variety of performative assertions.19 This shows that there is nothing suspicious about the structure which prospective contextualism attributes to epistemic modal claims. It also puts us in a position to address the normative issue for prospective contextualism, by arguing that performatives in general are governed by norms which do not require one to know or believe their content. 4.1 Performatives in natural language We can very roughly characterize performatives as assertions which aim in the first instance not to describe the world, but rather to change it. There are many different kinds of performative, and there has been much debate about their structure.20 I will focus here on one kind of performative which involves a particularly simple formulation, and thus is, I think, particularly revealing about the structure of at least some performatives. These are performatives which are made using sentences which appear to have ordinary truth conditions: sentences which can be used in a purely descriptive manner, simply to describe the world; but can also be used performatively. To see the kind of thing I have in mind, suppose Mark tells Mary, "This afternoon, John will be cleaning the rabbit cage." There is nothing unusual about this claim, and it has straightforward truth-conditions: it is true just in case John will be cleaning the rabbit cage this afternoon. Now suppose that Mark says the same thing (modulo a change of "John" to "you") to John: "This afternoon, you will be cleaning the rabbit cage." Assume that Mark has the right kind of authority over John to tell him what to do. In that circumstance, this sentence can be used to not (just) inform John about the future, but to make that future come about: to make it the case that John will clean the rabbit cage, by establishing normative facts about what John may do. And, crucially, the assertion in question does this by making a claim about what he will do. When Mark tells John that he will be cleaning the rabbit cage this afternoon, Mark (according to the contextualist model I am assuming) communicates to John that Mark believes John will be cleaning the rabbit cage this afternoon. If John had no prior intention to clean the rabbit cage, but John thinks that Mark has the authority to determine what John will do this afternoon, then John will reason that Mark would only believe that John will clean the rabbit cage if Mark is requiring that he do so; and thus John (assuming he recognizes Mark's authority to impose requirements on him) will change his plans to accord with Mark's beliefs. What is nice about performatives like this one is that they wear their structure on their sleeves. There is no obvious reason to think that Mark's sentence in the second (performative) use is semantically different from his sentence in the first (descriptive) use. It is natural to think that these sentences have the same content in the two contexts: it is just that, in the second context, Mark's assertion serves not just to describe the world, but also to bring about the state of affairs which it describes. By describing what the future will be like in the right normative setting, Mark's assertion functions to bring about the future that he is describing. 19This treatment of epistemic modal claims as performatives can be seen as an extension of the approach in Lewis 1979, which treats some uses of deontic modals in this way. 20"Performative" is sometimes reserved for more specific kinds of speech act, but I aim here to bring out parallels that narrower usage might obscure. For some of the debate, see e.g. Austin 1962; Cohen 1964; Strawson 1964; Searle 1968, 1969; Bach 1975; Bach and Harnish 1979; Davidson 1979; Bach 1994. 9 One could, of course, maintain that sentences like this are ambiguous between a purely descriptive meaning, on which they have ordinary truth-conditions; and a performative meaning, on which they do not. One argument that this would be the wrong tack comes from the fact that, in many cases, a single assertion of a sentence like this can serve to both describe the world and change it. Anscombe (1963) gives an example along these lines. Imagine a doctor telling a patient, in the presence of a nurse, "The nurse will now take you to the operating theater." In this context, the doctor's claim is both a description of what is going to happen- a claim that the world will be one in which the nurse takes the patient to the operating theater-and a means by which she makes it the case that the world will be this way-given the background normative conditions in play in the context, the nurse, in hearing the doctor's claim, will be required to act so as to bring it about that her claim is made true. If the doctor's sentence was ambiguous between a descriptive and a performative meaning, then we would not be able to derive both meanings from a single assertion. On the face of it, there is just one thing going on here: an assertion which both describes a certain future and (thereby) brings it about.21 What is helpful about examples like this is that they attest the same structure that I am attributing to epistemic modal claims. They make claims with ordinary truth conditions. But these claims also amount to proposals to change the world-proposals which are made by way of a claim with ordinary, but prospective, truth conditions, which, if accepted, ensures that the change in question takes place. And so these kinds of assertions show that the performative structure that prospective contextualism attributes to modal claims is, in fact, widely attested in natural language.22 This should allay fears that that structure is implausibly roundabout.23 4.2 Conversational norms: The perspective from performatives It also helps us answer a natural objection concerning norms of assertion. The concern, again, is that, if modal claims have the content I am ascribing to them, then speakers will often be able to assert epistemic modal claims without knowing, or even believing, that their content is true. I can propose, for instance, to make the common ground entail that Sue is in her office, by asserting "Sue must be in her office," without knowing or even believing that the common ground will come to entail this: for all I know, you may fail to accept my proposal, in which case the content ascribed to it by prospective contextualism will be literally false. If assertions in general were governed by a norm along the lines "Only assert what you believe [or know]," as is widely accepted, prospective contextualism would leave it puzzling how people could assert epistemic modal claims in ordinary circumstances. I will argue in this section that a similar puzzle arises for performatives in general, and suggest that performative assertions are not governed by a belief or knowledge norm of this form in the first place, but rather by a norm oriented towards what agents do with their words. 21We cannot, of course, assume that all performatives have the same structure, and thus these examples do not show that all performatives have truth-conditions, or more generally share the structure of these performatives (though I think these performatives suggest that it would be fruitful to look for an account along those lines); it is consistent with everything I say here that some performatives lack truth conditions. 22See Truckenbrodt 2009, Eckardt and Schwager 2009, Eckardt 2009 and Condoravdi and Lauer 2011 for similar ideas about performatives. 23These cases are explicitly marked out as being about the future, whereas epistemic modal claims are not, which may make the analogy I am drawing seem strained. But note that prospective contextualism does not claim that modal claims are interpreted in the future tense, but simply that they are assigned accessibility relations in a way which references the future. 10 This provides a principled explanation of how, and when, we can reasonably assert epistemic modal claims even if we do not know or believe their contents. Let us consider first performatives like those discussed in the last subsection, such as "This afternoon, you will be cleaning the rabbit cage." Could a performative like this be governed by a norm along the lines: Assert p only if you believe (or know) p?24 Clearly not. Mark may well tell John that he'll be cleaning the rabbit cage as an attempt to get him to do it, even though he knows this attempt may not be successful. One way to see this point is to compare a sentence like "You will be cleaning the rabbit cage" to "You have to clean the rabbit cage." In many contexts, these sentences play the same role: to try to get John to clean the rabbit cage. It would be implausible to think that the latter of these can be asserted only if the speaker knows the addressee will clean the rabbit cage. And it seems no more plausible to hold that such a norm governs the former. This, of course, is in stark contrast to non-performative assertions: if Mark asks John what he was doing in the morning, then it is generally not permissible for John to say that he was playing outside, if he does not believe this to be true.25 This is prima facie puzzling. But these observations are not hard to make sense of. Performatives are used to do things, and so the norms that govern their production (and negotiation) will concern in the first instance what the performative is being used to do, and only derivatively the speaker's doxastic relation to its content. In short, I propose that performatives are governed by a very general norm along the lines: Assert p only if the action which you aim to accomplish with your assertion is permissible. Call this the Speech Act Norm. This norm rightly predicts that whether or not Mark may tell John that he will be cleaning the rabbit cage depends on whether it is permissible for him to require John to clean the rabbit cage-not whether he knows, or believes, that John will clean the rabbit cage. In general, I propose that the best way to make sense of the observations just adduced is to hold that performatives are in the first instance governed only by the Speech Act Norm, and are governed by more specific doxastic norms only when those follow from the Speech Act Norm. In some cases, more specific norms will indeed follow. But in the cases under consideration, nothing in the Speech Act Norm entails that speakers must know or believe the contents in question. This should, I think, be fairly uncontroversial. I suspect that a bolder claim is also true: that what goes for performatives of the kind under discussion goes also for assertions in general. In other words, I think it is plausible that the Speech Act Norm governs assertions in general, not just performative assertions. The fundamental norm governing assertions, I propose, cares in the first instance about what is done with those assertions. Assertions can have diverse goals; it is natural to think that the norms which govern assertions should be sensitive to that diversity, and should in the first instance target the basic kind of thing that assertions are-speech acts. More specific norms, however, may follow from the Speech Act Norm, given 24As in e.g. Williamson 2000; Lackey 2007. It does not matter for present purposes which of these mental states is the relevant one. 25One reaction to these observations is to argue that performative "assertions" are not really assertions in the fullest sense: we should reserve "assertion" for the class of speech acts which are governed by doxastic norms. This dispute seems essentially terminological: there are cross-cutting taxonomies which we can bring to bear on speech acts, which may be useful for different purposes. I will continue to use "assertion" here to refer to the class of speech acts which are attempts to update the common ground with a given content; this class includes both non-performative assertions and performative ones, since performatives of the kind I have been discussing, both epistemic and non-epistemic, are at least in part proposals to update the common ground with their content. (For instance, "This afternoon, you will be cleaning the rabbit cage" is a bid to get John to clean the rabbit cage, but it is an attempt to do this which goes by way of an attempt to update the common ground with its content.) 11 ancillary normative assumptions. For instance, in most situations, it is not permissible to take actions that mislead others. In those situations, it follows from this normative fact, together with the Speech Act Norm, that an assertion will be permissible only if it does not mislead others. Indeed, it is plausible that in many situations a more demanding Gricean norm is in play, which requires that an assertion contribute to coordination on common knowledge or belief. Call this norm, which follows from the Speech Act Norm plus independent assumptions about the general norms of communication, the Common Ground Norm. The Common Ground Norm, in turn, entails a limited norm of the kind familiar from the literature on norms of assertion, again given plausible ancillary assumptions. Consider a sentence whose content is exclusively about a state of affairs which does not depend on the assertion of the sentence. Given the Common Ground Norm, you plausibly should assert a sentence like this only if you know and believe it: since an assertion is a proposal to update the common ground with the asserted content, an assertion of something you do not know, or do not believe, will not generally be conducive to the end of coordinating on common knowledge. It follows that you should know what you assert (or at least believe it, if we take a more subjective approach to norms), when what you assert is not a performative. But when it comes to performative assertions-assertions which aim to bring about a state of affairs, not just describe one-nothing in the Common Ground Norm entails that one must know or even believe the content of the assertion when asserting it. Indeed, it is easy to see that in many cases knowing or believing the asserted content may be positively inconsistent with the Speech Act Norm: sometimes the best thing to do-even in cases in which a conversation is generally speaking aiming at the truth-is to assert something which one does not believe or know, in the hopes (or the knowledge) that it will become true in virtue of your assertion (as e.g. in the rabbit cage or nurse case above). The Common Ground Norm does entail that one's claim should generally contribute, or at least not detract, from the good epistemic standing of the conversation. It follows that performatives should generally be such that, if they are accepted, they will be commonly known.26 But it does not follow that performatives have to be known-or believed-antecedently: one can assert risky performatives, performatives the speaker does not know will be accepted (and thus does not know will be made true), provided the aim of the assertion is a permissible one. This is particularly clear, I think, in the case of the practical performatives we considered in the last section. But, from the perspective of the Speech Act Norm, it is also very plausible in the case of epistemic performatives of the kind I am arguing epistemic modal claims may be. Sometimes an epistemically useful assertion can be one whose content is not antecedently known, provided that its content will be known if it is accepted; and that the assertion serves the purpose of coordinating on the conversants' common knowledge. Epistemic modal claims, in the 26Among other things, this suffices to explain the infelicity of performatives which command the addressee to do something that is not in their power, like "You will win the lottery," said as a command to buy a lottery ticket. It also goes some way towards explaining the infelicity of Moore sentences containing performatives as a conjunct: "You'll clean the rabbit cage but I do not know you will" cannot amount to common knowledge, even if it is accepted (provided the time interval relative to which "know" is evaluated includes the prospective time). In theory, this does not rule out performative Moore sentences if care is taken to ensure that the interval relative to which "knows" is evaluated does not include the prospective time. Sentences like this seem to be ruled out on independent grounds, however: you should not tell someone to do something, and then say you are not sure if they will. To see this, note the oddity of "You have to clean the rabbit cage, but I do not know if you will," or "Clean the rabbit cage! I do not know if you will." See Silk 2015, 2018 for this observation. The data here are subtle, but there does seem to generally be something marked about these conjunctions, something which can be brought out by contrasting these with corresponding weaker modal claims, like "You should clean the rabbit cage, but I do not know if you will." It seems as though, in trying to get someone to do something, you must act as if you are confident that they will; see Mandelkern 2018b for further discussion. 12 framework of prospective contextualism, have just this profile. One need not antecedently know these claims in order to assert them; one need only know (or have sufficiently good reason to believe) that the proposals these claims make are epistemically valuable. There is much more to do in exploring this perspective on the norms of conversation, but I will leave the discussion at this sketch for the present. The key point for our purposes is that this approach to the norms of conversation makes sense of intuitions about both when ordinary, non-performative claims can be asserted, as well as when broadly performative claims can be asserted. And, if epistemic modal claims are performatives, as prospective contextualism maintains, then, given the normative regime that governs performatives in general, we can resolve the normative concern about prospective contextualism. According to prospective contextualism, one can often assert modal claims without knowing their content to be true. But if modal claims are performatives, we can give a principled account of why this should be so: they are in the first instance used to do things-make proposals about what entailment and compatibility properties the common ground should have-and thus that they are governed by norms which look, in the first instance, at those actions, rather than at agents' relation to the truth conditional content of those claims. It may be objected at this point that, although the prospective contextualist framework is technically within the bounds of contextualism, it has abandoned one of the principle attractions of contextualism: namely, that in a contextualist framework, we can view assertions as aiming at coordination on the speakers' knowledge and beliefs. If you can assert propositions without believing them, the thought goes, we lose this attractive feature of contextualism. But this is mistaken. The normative framework I have sketched here still views conversation as (among other things) aiming at the coordination of speakers' knowledge and beliefs. It just turns out that-when the truth of a given content depends on the speech act of asserting that content- you need not know or believe that content in advance of it being accepted in order for your assertion to contribute towards epistemic coordination. 5 Loose ends This completes the core of my presentation of prospective contextualism. In this section, I will briefly address a few remaining issues. 5.1 Comparisons The discussion in the last section showed that prospective contextualism's treatment of epistemic modal claims is more plausible than it might first seem: provided we pay careful attention to the phenomena of performativity in natural language in general, we can make sense of the way that speakers assert, and negotiate about, epistemic modal claims within the prospective contextualist framework. A natural question to ask at this point is whether prospective contextualism does a better job of this than competitor views, like expressivism, relativism, or dynamic semantics. I will not try to answer this question here. I will instead briefly compare prospective contextualism with just one other view in the literature, namely that given in Stalnaker 2014. My view owes a substantial debt to Stalnaker's, and is similar in many ways to his, but has 13 some important differences.27 The comparison with his proposal will help bring out what is distinctive about prospective contextualism. Stalnaker adopts the standard Kratzerian semantics for epistemic modals, and then proposes that epistemic modal claims are coupled with a special force rule, which specifies that an epistemic modal claim is to be interpreted as a proposal to make the prospective common ground verify the modal claim: in other words, as a proposal to make it the case that, if the modal claim is evaluated relative to the set of worlds in the intersection of the prospective common ground, the claim comes out true. Stalnaker's proposal nicely conforms to the guiding observation, along very similar lines to prospective contextualism. But the proposal diverges from the contextualist framework in an interesting way, by associating epistemic modal claims with a distinctive force rule. Stalnaker's proposal and mine are essentially routes to the same end. But where prospective contextualism is set within the contextualist framework laid out above, in treating updates with epistemic modal claims in the same way as updates with non-modal claims, Stalnaker's approach diverges from it: instead of assimilating modal updates to other kinds of propositional updates, Stalnaker introduces a special force rule that applies only to modal updates. This move, in my view, has some drawbacks. First, the multiplication of force rules in Stalnaker's account adds complexity to the pragmatic framework which looks unmerited from the point of view of prospective contextualism, which has only one force rule-the standard assertoric update rule-for both modal and non-modal claims. This multiplication of force rules also entangles the pragmatic theory with lexical semantics in an unattractive way: on Stalnaker's view, what triggers the distinctive prospective force rule is a claim's being an epistemic modal claim. This pragmatic rule thus makes reference to specific lexical items- modal words-rather than to the output of the semantic operations.28 A closely related, more technical point concerns sentences which involve both modal and non-modal constituents. Consider a disjunction with the form pp or might qq. What update rule applies to this sentence? The prospective update rule simply does not make sense in application to the first disjunct; but the ordinary update rule will bleach out the proposal-like quality of the second conjunct. It looks like to make sense of assertions like this (and similar conjunctions) we need a single update rule which applies to both modal and non-modal sentences. This is not to say that there is not something right at a descriptive level about Stalnaker's characterization of the force of modal claims. A comparison with performatives like "This afternoon, you will be cleaning the rabbit cage" is, again, helpful. There are prescriptive uses of this sentence, and also descriptive uses. These uses have different effects, and, at the level of descriptive taxonomy, it is helpful to distinguish them. But I do not think there is reason to say that these uses are associated with distinctive force rules from the perspective of formal semantics and pragmatics. Instead, it seems preferable to adopt a unified force rule that predicts that which of these different uses (prescriptive or descriptive) is brought out in a given occasion of use depends on varying background conditions (the normative authority of the speaker, their relationship to the addressee, and so on). Things are parallel for epistemic modals. While there is, at a descriptive level, 27Stalnaker's own presentation is brief, and there are different ways to interpret it; the present interpretation at least provides a useful foil for my own view, whether or not it is precisely what Stalnaker had in mind. For an earlier intimation of Stalnaker (2014)'s approach, see Stalnaker 1993. 28See Szabó 2016 for related criticism. Importantly, this is in part because the meaning of modal claims will be structurally just like other propositions; compare the situation with questions or imperatives, which are standardly associated with distinctive force rules, but also have contents with distinctive semantic types. 14 something right in saying that modal claims have a distinctive force, in that they have a characteristic update effect of making a proposal about how the prospective common ground will look, I am inclined to think that we should not encode this in our pragmatic system; if we are to make sense of mixed modal/nonmodal disjunctions and conjunctions, then, from the perspective of our general pragmatic system, we need a single unified force rule for both modal and non-modal claims. Together with an appropriate account of the assertoric content of modal claims, the relevant descriptive generalization of the force of modal claims will then fall out as a consequence, rather than being stipulated. These points help bring out the differences between my proposal and Stalnaker's, and one central attraction of the prospective contextualist framework. In the prospective contextualist framework, modal claims, like all assertions, express propositions, and updating with a modal claim just is updating with an ordinary proposition-in other words, coming to accept a piece of information. Once we have a theory of belief revision in place, we will thereby have a fully explicit theory of how such updates will go. By contrast, in most revisionary theories, modal claims do not express propositional contents, or else (as we have just seen in Stalnaker's account) come along with an idiosyncratic update rule; and thus modal updating cannot be assimilated to belief updating in general. Those theories can, of course, propose rules that connect modal updating and belief revision. My point here is the simple and pro tanto one that those theories must give an account of the connection between modal updating and belief revision, whereas on prospective contextualism, there is no such obligation: modal updating simply is belief revision, and so a theory of the latter will suffice for a theory of the former.29 5.2 Descriptive uses According to prospective contextualism, epistemic modal claims have truth-conditions; it is in virtue of those truth conditions' prospective nature, and the interlocutors' privileged position with respect to determining features of the common ground, that epistemic modal claims have the force they have. One feature of the truth-conditional performatives we looked at in Section 4.1 was that, in the right contexts, those sentences had clearly distinguishable descriptive content, and could be used in a purely descriptive fashion: thus, for example, if the nurse has already been told what to do and is out of earshot, "The nurse will now take you to the operating theater" is purely descriptive. This leads us to expect that, if prospective contextualism is correct, epistemic modal claims, even in their performative uses, have descriptive content; and, furthermore, that they will have purely descriptive uses (cf. Lewis (1979)'s claim that deontic modals likewise can have 29For an illustration of this point, consider dynamic semantics. Consider an update with pMust pq, in a context c which does not entail p or p. The most natural update rule we could associate with dynamic semantics simply says that, when a sentence q is asserted in context s, we move to context s[q], where [q] is q's context change potential. This is a fully deterministic update rule. But if we applied this rule in the present case, an assertion of pMust pq would take us to the empty set. Presumably dynamic semanticists will invoke some kind of pragmatic rescue mechanism to avoid this result. (Willer (2013)'s variant on dynamic semantics avoids this particular problem, but faces a related version of the problem: in a context in which pMight p and might not pq has been accepted, any subsequent assertion of pMust pq will take the context to the empty set.) The point is not that there is nothing that can be said here, just that something must be said that goes beyond the simple update rule under consideration. A similar point, mutatis mutandis, can be made in the case of Yalcin's expressivism. On that view, an assertion of a sentence is a proposal to move to a context that accepts that sentence. This means in particular that an assertion of pMight pq is a proposal to move to a context that is compatible with p. But which context? Nothing in the system answers that question. Again, there are responses available here; my point is simply that something must be said to fill out these theories to cover the case of modal updates. 15 both descriptive and a performative uses). In this section I will explore the case that this is the correct prediction, concluding that things are not altogether clear here.30 Let me first make a case that epistemic modal claims do have descriptive content which can be distinguished from their performative force. The first part of the case is based on the "stand your ground" cases discussed in von Fintel and Gillies 2011. Suppose Ann says "The keys might be in the car"; Bill accepts her claim. Then, sometime later, they both discover that the keys are not in the car. If Bill takes Ann to task for not knowing where the keys were, Ann might reply: "Look, I didn't say they were in the car. I only said they might be there-and they might have been." Here, we can interpret Ann as standing by the truth-conditions of her claim-namely, that the prospective common ground in her conversation was compatible with the keys being in the car-even if she no longer stands by the proposal that she made to leave it open that the keys were in the car. Cases like this thus seem to provide evidence that epistemic modal claims do indeed have a descriptive content which can be distinguished from their performative function, and which plays an independent role in conversational practice. In this sense they seem parallel to the truth-conditional performatives I discussed above. In particular, compare overtly epistemic performatives, like "Ok, we now all recognize that we're in agreement that the keys are in the car." Suppose that Ann says this as a way to make it the case that the group recognizes that they agree that the keys are in the car. If Mark then discovers the keys are not in the car, he can say: "You were wrong about the keys!" Ann might concede that the group was wrong to agree that the keys were in the car, but she could also fall back on the descriptive content of her claim: that is, she could point out that it was true that the group recognized they agreed that the keys were in the car. This case seems parallel to the stand your ground case: in both cases, speakers can stand their ground on the descriptive content of their claim, even if they no longer endorse the proposal it was used to make.31 Do modal claims also have purely descriptive uses, like other truth-conditional performatives? Consider a claim of the form "Ok, we now all recognize that we as a group leave it open that the keys are in the car." This has performative uses, but it also has purely descriptive uses: Ann could assert this as a way, not of getting her interlocutors to recognize that it is compatible with the common ground that the keys are in the 30Thanks to two anonymous referees for this journal for very helpful comments on these issues. 31An anonymous referee for this journal points out that the parallel looks more limited when we look at a broader range of "stand your ground" cases. For instance, suppose that Bill rejects Ann's claim, and shows her that the keys are in the kitchen. It still seems like Ann can say "I only said the keys might be in the car." But in this case, the descriptive content ascribed to Ann's claim by prospective contextualism is false, since the prospective common ground did not end up being consistent with the keys being in the car. Presumably we want a unified explanation of this kind of case with the kind of case introduced in the main text. One response to this worry sticks with the line taken in the main text, and holds that in cases like the one just described, Ann is insisting that we interpret her claim as not being prospective at all, but rather as describing the context as it stood when she made her claim. A worry with this line of response is that "stand your ground" responses seem available in most cases, so this seems to undermine the claim of this paper that a prospective interpretation is the default one. But we could couple the present response with something along the lines of von Fintel and Gillies (2011)'s cloudy contextualism, maintaining that what proposition modal claims express is typically underdetermined; that, when all interlocutors are content with it, the prospective interpretation is the default one; but that interlocutors may fall back on a weaker, non-prospective interpretation when pressured to do so as in cases like this one. On this way of thinking, both "stand your ground" cases given here do indeed point to the descriptive component of epistemic modal claims, even though, after the interlocutors' negotiation, only the first case has a prospective interpretation. A second response is to explain all the "stand your ground" cases in a different way-as drawing attention, not to some true descriptive content, but rather to the relative weakness of the proposal they made (namely, as proposals to leave a content open, not to accept it). If we go this way, then of course "stand your ground" cases do not have the dialectic force of pointing to a descriptive content of epistemic modal claims separable from their performative force. However, independent support for this comes from the Mastermind cases below. 16 car, but rather as a way of simply stating something that is already commonly known. Moreover, Ann need not herself think there is any chance that the keys are in the car in order to felicitously assert this. Do we find parallels in the modal domain? I think we do. von Fintel and Gillies (2008) supply a useful illustration. Pascal and Mordecai are playing Mastermind, and Mordecai has given Pascal some hints. It is compatible with all these hints that there are two reds. Pascal says, "There might be two reds." Mordecai can accept Pascal's claim, even if he knows that there are not two reds. Likewise, Mordecai could himself assert "There might be two reds," as a way of summarizing the hints he has given to Pascal. In both cases, it seems that Mordecai is simply describing the information jointly available to the interlocutors; in light of Pascal's limited information, Mordecai knows it will remain compatible with the common ground that there are two reds, even though Mordecai himself knows that there are not two reds. This seems like a good candidate for a purely descriptive use of an epistemic modal claim. On the other hand, in this case, although it is intuitive to describe Mordecai as simply describing the group's limited information, it is not as though Mordecai objects to leaving it open that there are two reds: he rather recognizes that it is part of the norms of the game that he must keep Pascal's information limited. So-while this case provides further support for the claim that epistemic modal claims have descriptive content which can be distinguished from their performative force-it is somewhat less clear whether this case provides support for the claim that epistemic modal claims have uses which are purely descriptive and not at all performative. To really distinguish a purely descriptive use from a performative one, we should see whether speakers can use epistemic modal claims while positively objecting to the proposal that they make. Suppose that Ann is absolutely convinced the keys are in the car, and Mark is convinced they might be upstairs. Ann tries to convince Mark that they are in the car, but she recognizes that Mark simply will not rule out the possibility that they are upstairs. Could Ann say, "Ok, fine. The keys might be upstairs. Let's check"? It certainly seems acceptable for Ann to say this. It is hard to diagnose exactly what is happening when she does, however. One perspective on this is that Ann is simply describing the common ground, and thus that this is indeed a purely descriptive modal claim. On the other hand, we might view this simply as a concession by Ann to Mark, and thus as having performative force. I do not see a clear way to decide between these two options; but the pattern here at least looks consistent with the existence of purely descriptive modal claims.32 One way to try to distinguish these options is to make Mark's claim a totally outlandish one, to make it clearer that Ann is not just conceding the point. Suppose that Mark is convinced that there might be monsters under his bed and wants Ann to check for him. Ann knows that there are not monsters under Mark's bed, and does not even entertain this possibility. It seems that she might, however, say "Fine, so there might be monsters under your bed. What do you want me to do about it?" This kind of unendorsed "might"-claim-which has much in common with Egan et al. (2005)'s "exocentric" modal claims-seems like a clear candidate for a clearly descriptive "might"-claim. In some more outlandish cases, a purely descriptive reading is at least prima facie harder to get. To take 32We might try to distinguish these by noting that Ann cannot say, "Ok, well the keys are not upstairs, but they might be." We might expect this to be acceptable if a purely descriptive reading were available. But this test will not work because there are independent reasons (based on embedding behavior) to think that sentences like this are contradictions; see Mandelkern 2019a. 17 a case suggested by an anonymous referee for this journal, suppose that Ann and Mark take a pill which in ten seconds time will change their beliefs, so that they will leave it open that they are on Mars. In this context, Ann could truly assert "It will shortly be compatible with the common ground that we are on Mars." But it does not seem that Ann could truly assert here "We might be on Mars." I am not sure what to say about this case, but let me sketch two possible responses. The first is to note that timing is important. The prospective time of Ann's assertion is by definition whatever time negotiation finishes, and it is that time that "might"-claims target on my account. In ordinary conversations, agreement is immediate or at least very fast-extended negotiation is the exception. So if Ann says "We might be on Mars" and Mark immediately agrees before the drug kicks in, then her claim will be descriptively false. It only has a shot at being descriptively true if the drug kicks in before the negotiation is finished. And if we think about the situation this way, it is less clear to me that Ann's claim is unacceptable. Suppose that Ann knows the drug will kick in at exactly 10 pm. She is watching the second hand on the clock, and, just before it hits 12, she says "We might be on Mars starting. . .now!" (with "now" asserted at exactly 10 pm). Here her assertion, though still odd, sounds less strange to me. The prospective time is not just any time in the near future: it is usually a very proximal time. When we adjust the case so that the prospective time really is a time at which the interlocutors leave it open that they live on Mars, the modal claim is improved. A second response to cases like this one and the preceding one would be to argue that epistemic modal claims, unlike the truth-conditional performatives above, have some kind of mandatory performativity built in. Given the parallels surveyed so far, I am somewhat disinclined to go this way. However, let me note that, if we did go this way, we could do so in a way that left intact many of the features of prospective contextualism. Consider again performatives like "I am commanding you to clean the rabbit cage." A sentence like this can be used in a performative sense, as a way of getting someone to clean the rabbit cage; or in a purely descriptive sense-say, if you have just ordered someone to clean their rabbit cage in a language they do not understand, and you are explaining to them what you have just done. But adding "hereby" rules out the purely descriptive sense: "I am hereby commanding you to clean the rabbit cage" cannot be a description of an order you have just given in another language; it must itself be the performance of an order. There is much to say about how "hereby" brings this about (see Eckardt 2012 and citations therein for discussion). But it is natural to think that the fundamental dynamics of a performative like "I am hereby commanding you to clean the rabbit cage" are not all that different from those of a performative without "hereby," like "I am commanding you to clean the rabbit cage" (used as a performative): I think it is plausible (though of course not uncontroversial) that these operate in similar ways, are governed by similar norms, and so on.33 So if we did want to say that epistemic modal claims encode a kind of mandatory performativity, one option would be to do so by building on the truth conditions of prospective contextualism and saying that epistemic modals also encode something like a "hereby" operator. Such an account could leave intact much of the picture put forward here, in particular the truth-conditions of epistemic modal claims, the mechanism by which they can change the context, and the norms that govern them, and would simply augment this account with the stipulation that they must be used in a performative way. This move does not seem implausible. Having said that, it would complicate the picture; and I am not convinced it is necessary, given the cases discussed above 33Although "hereby" seems not to sit well with truth-conditional performatives like those considered above, other adverbials seem to have the same effect in those cases, e.g. "You will in virtue of this utterance clean the rabbit cage." 18 which provide at least some evidence that epistemic modal claims do have purely descriptive uses. 5.3 Disagreement and retraction A final issue concerns disagreement with, and retraction of, modal claims. Some kinds of reactions along these lines have motivated relativism about epistemic modals. If I overhear Sue saying, "John might be in his office," and I know that John is not in his office, then relativists claim that it is appropriate for me to respond to Sue by saying "No" or "That's not true," even if I am not part of Sue's conversation. This is a prima facie puzzle for any brand of contextualism, including prospective contextualism, which predicts that Sue's assertion is a proposal to leave it compatible with her common ground that John is in his office, not with my common ground. Puzzles like this have led some to reject contextualism, arguing that truth is determined relative not only to a world but also to a judge or information state supplied by the context of assessment.34 This challenge is complicated, both theoretically and empirically. I will, again, not attempt to fully address it here, but let me make two brief remarks about it. The first is that there are theoretical reasons to resist a move to a relativist framework. When we move to a relativist framework, we must abandon the view of conversation as figuring out, together, which world we are in, since, from a relativist perspective, different conversants are in different "worlds"-different relativist points of evaluation. This makes it hard to see what the point of conversation is and how we should model its dynamics; although there have been some attempts to answer these challenges, I do not think they have been entirely successful.35 This makes it worthwhile to explore whether the move to relativism can be resisted within a contextualist framework. The second point is that, by giving a contextualist model of the basic intra-contextual dynamics of modal claims, prospective contextualism may provide a theoretical foundation for a successful model of the cases which have motivated relativism. Whether it can do so depends on what exactly the empirical picture is, 34See e.g. Egan et al. 2005; Stephenson 2007b,a; Lasersohn 2009; MacFarlane 2011. 35Cf. Stojanovic 2007 for related criticism. See Egan 2007; Stephenson 2007a,b for attempts to answer these challenges. Egan proposes that pMight pq is evaluated relative to world-individual pairs, and true just in case p is compatible with what's in the "epistemic reach" of the individual at that world. He models the common ground as a set of world-individual pairs, and models assertions as adding information to the common ground by intersection. For this to make sense, Egan shows that there must be a presupposition in place that all conversants are relevantly the same with respect to their epistemic reach (otherwise, assertions will end up "stranding" conversants). Egan argues that this is plausible, since it is just part of the notion of epistemic reach that if I am talking to someone for whom p is entailed by what's in their epistemic reach, then p is entailed by what's in my epistemic reach. But such a strong notion of epistemic reach leads to trouble. Egan argues that you must believe what you assert; thus to assert pMight pq in Egan's system, a speaker would have to believe that p is compatible with what's in her epistemic reach; it follows from this strong notion of epistemic reach that she would have to believe p is compatible with what everyone in the group knows (since whatever someone knows is, presumably, entailed by their epistemic reach). But, like the group contextualism considered and rejected in Section 2.2, this makes the assertion of "might"-claims implausibly demanding. Stephenson's account avoids this issue by arguing that the content one must believe in order to assert pMight pq is substantially weaker than the content that gets added to the common ground. Stephenson (2007a, p. 509) writes: [I]n order for a speaker A to assert a sentence S, it must be the case that for all of A's doxastic alternatives 〈w′, t′, x〉, S is true at the index 〈w′, t′, x〉 . . .this means that A must believe that S is true as judged by A, but does not need to believe that S is true as judged by the whole group of conversational participants. Thus the norm of assertion is crucially weak. . .In order for A to assert that S, A only needs to believe that S is true as judged by A, but if A's assertion is accepted by the other speakers and added to the common ground, it has the same effect as adding the proposition that S is true as judged by the group of conversational participants. This mismatch between asserted content and updated content avoids the problem I raise for Egan, but it seems ad hoc: we lose the simple contextualist picture on which what gets added to the common ground is the same proposition that is believed. 19 which turns out to be complicated. Recent work in Knobe and Yalcin 2014; Khoo 2015 suggests that, contrary to early relativist literature, subjects are not actually much inclined towards cross-contextual truth-value contestations: that is, if I overhear Sue saying that John might be in his office, subjects do not find it to be particularly appropriate for me to reply "That's not true" (they find this to be markedly less appropriate than in corresponding non-modal cases). That finding is in line with the predictions of prospective contextualism, and contextualist approaches to epistemic modals more broadly speaking.36 But that same work shows that expressions of disagreement ("No, Joe is at home") and subsequent retraction ("Scratch that, Joe is at home") are generally felt to be reasonably acceptable in contexts like the one described, which remains a prima facie challenge for contextualism. Khoo (2015), however, has provided a persuasive account of how a contextualist account can make sense of these facts. The basic idea is that, if a contextualist account can predict the guiding observation, then "might"-claims will be felt to be proposals to make their prejacents compatible with the common ground, and cross-contextual or retrospective disagreement can target exactly this proposal. To reject or retract a "might"-claim is, on this approach, to signal that one does not stand behind the proposal made by the "might"-claim in the first place. Thus a response of the form "No, Joe is at home!" can be interpreted as, essentially, saying that it is a bad idea to leave open the possibility that Joe is in his office-what Sue is proposing in saying "Joe might be in his office." Khoo provides a careful exposition of this idea; I refer readers to the paper for details. Crucially, Khoo notes that the plausibility of this response is contingent on finding a version of contextualism which predicts the guiding observation. He writes: "No contextualist theory has attempted to predict the dynamic update effects of uttering epistemic modal sentences" (Khoo, 2015, p. 529). But prospective contextualism does just this, showing how we can make sense of the dynamics of epistemic modality within a contextualist framework. Thus, in concert with a story about (dis)agreement along the lines Khoo gives, prospective contextualism provides a promising platform for responding to the relativist challenge to contextualism. There is, of course, much more to explore with respect to this complicated empirical domain, but this discussion shows that, insofar as it accounts for the guiding observation, prospective contextualism provides substantial new resources to the defender of a contextualist theory of conversation against relativist challenges.37 Let me close this section by addressing a kind of intra-contextual disagreement which appears to pose a particular challenge to my view, brought to my attention by an anonymous referee for this journal and Robert Stalnaker: persistent modal disagreement. Suppose that Sue is convinced that the keys might be under the 36To the degree that subjects still find it to be slightly appropriate, there remains something to be explained here. Here are two possibilities which seem plausible to me: first, expressions like "That's (not) true" can sometimes serve simply to register broad (dis)agreement, rather than to contest a truth-value. (E.g. note that expressions like this can be used in response to questions. "Have you done a follow-up examining cross-cultural variations in this result?" "That's true, that would be an excellent line to pursue.") Second, pronominal expressions like "That" or "What S said" may in some cases refer to something other than the proposition expressed by S. It is well known that pronouns in general have "sloppy" uses (see Karttunen 1969), and it seems perfectly plausible that this goes for these pronominal expressions, too: they may be able to pick out something like a function from assignments of contextual parameters to propositions, rather than a proposition. There are obvious limits to the extent to which this is possible, limits which I think are fairly straightforward to make sense of within standard theories of the φ-features of pronouns, but that is a topic for another time. 37One area for further exploration comes from interesting recent work in Beddor and Egan 2018, which suggests that the question under discussion in the context of assessment plays a key role in how speakers interpret epistemic modal claims. 20 bed. Louise has already looked under the bed, and did not find them. Sue does not trust Louise's ability to find things, however, and Louise knows this. Sue says, "The keys might be under the bed!" Louise says, "No, they cannot be. I searched carefully." Sue stands her ground: "They still might be. You might have missed them!" Louise stands her ground: "No, you are wrong. They cannot be." And so on. If Sue and Louise are suitably conflictual, we could imagine this going on for a while. The question for my account is what Louise is doing here. If Louise knows that Sue is going to stubbornly stand her ground, then she knows that the prospective common ground will remain consistent with the keys being under the bed. But then she knows that what she is asserting is false. Why is it nonetheless acceptable for Louise to go on asserting that the keys cannot be under the bed? Here (following a suggestion by the same referee) it is helpful to compare the situation to one of practical negotiation. Suppose that Mark is convinced that John will not clean the rabbit cage: John never has in the past, is chronically disobedient, and so on. It somehow nevertheless seems permissible for him to say to John "You will clean the rabbit cage tonight." For the sake of practical negotiation, it seems that Mark is able to suspend his disbelief and operate under the assumption that there is at least a possibility that this time will be different (whether this is a rational strategy or pathology no doubt depends on the particular relationship). I suspect that something similar is going on in the case of Sue and Louise. Despite being confident that Sue will remain intransigent, it seems that Louise is able to suspend her disbelief and operate under the assumption that there is some chance that Sue will change her position-and thus some chance that what Louise is saying will turn out to be true. I do not have a theory of exactly why this kind of suspension of disbelief seems to be acceptable in cases like this; but the comparison with the practical case suggests that it is indeed possible. 6 Conclusion Prospective contextualism makes sense of the fundamental dynamics of epistemic modality within the bounds of contextualism. This shows that we can preserve contextualism's elegant model of communication as information transfer while still making sense of the way in which speakers use modal claims to negotiate about what possibilities to treat as live. That we can do so does not mean that we should. I have addressed an obvious objection to prospective contextualism, arguing that the performative structure which prospective contextualism attributes to modal claims is widely attested in natural language, a fact which also helps us make sense of the norms of assertion within the prospective contextualist framework. I have also brought out some attractive features of prospective contextualism. Whether prospective contextualism is the correct theory of epistemic modal claims depends on a range of further questions involving the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic modals, some of which I flagged above. One of these questions, which I take up in Mandelkern 2019b,a, concerns their embedding behavior. Another concerns relativist challenges. Yet another concerns the pragmatic role of "must." I have focused here on "might"-claims, but "must"-claims have peculiarities which must be accounted for by any theory of epistemic modals (see e.g. Karttunen 1972; von Fintel and Gillies 2010). On my theory, an assertion of pMust pq is predicted to have the same main update effect as an assertion of p alone. This is broadly plausible, but there are also subtle but important differences; see Mandelkern 2017b, 21 2018a for an attempt to account for these differences within the present framework.38 In concluding, I would like to suggest that the framework I have sketched here can be generalized to analyze not just epistemic modal claims but also a wide variety of other constructions that we use to negotiate matters that depend, in part or in whole, on parameters of the context. The extension to probability modals like "Probably," which have much in common with epistemic modals, will be straightforward. These can be seen as making claims about what the contextually provided measure structure will be like at the prospective time; provided the identity of that measure structure depends on what it is commonly accepted to be, then probability modals can be used to negotiate about what measure structures to coordinate on. Deontic modals can receive a similar treatment. The standard theory of deontic modals faces a similar puzzle to that raised at the outset for the standard theory of epistemic modals: how do speakers use deontic modals to negotiate about what to do? If I say we should go to Chinese, and you disagree, we are clearly not disagreeing about what norms are accepted by me or you. Instead, it looks like we are disagreeing about what norms to accept. We can capture this by saying that we are making assertions about what norms will be commonly accepted at the prospective time; provided the identity of those norms depends on what is commonly accepted about them, deontic modals can be used to negotiate about what norms to coordinate on.39 A similar treatment may be available for a variety of other phenomena, such as negotiation about standards of vagueness, matters of taste, and performatives of the kind discussed in Austin 1979, like "I promise." It is tempting to think that phenomena involving negotiation of this kind take us beyond the contextualist framework, since in these cases we seem not to be describing how things are vis-à-vis some contextual parameter, but rather proposing how they ought to be. But the contextualist framework can make sense of this if we take these constructions to describe the way that parameter will be. Provided that the identity of the parameter depends in the right way on what the interlocutors accept it to be, constructions which describe how the parameter will be amount to performative proposals about how the parameter ought to be. Acknowledgements Many thanks to Kai von Fintel, Justin Khoo, Robert Stalnaker, Stephen Yablo, and two anonymous referees for this journal for helpful and extensive feedback on this paper. Thanks also to audiences at MIT, Rutgers, and UMass Amherst, and to David Boylan, Fabrizio Cariani, Daniel Drucker, Andy Egan, Peter van Elswyk, Cosmo Grant, Irene Heim, Matthias Jenny, Brendan de Kenessey, Rose Lenehan, Pengbo Liu, Milo Phillips-Brown, Agustın Rayo, Kevin Richardson, Bernhard Salow, Paolo Santorio, Ginger Schultheis, Kieran Setiya, Bradford Skow, Shane Steinert-Threlkeld, and Brian Weatherson for very helpful discussion. This paper develops the second chapter of my dissertation (Mandelkern, 2017a). 38One issue which von Fintel and Gillies discuss is whether pMust pq entails p. On my account, the answer to this question will depend on whether we treat the common ground as factive or non-factive, which I have not taken a stand on. 39Cf. Khoo and Knobe (2018)'s contextualist approach to normative negotiation and disagreement. I think that an approach like the one I am suggesting would fit naturally into the overall picture they advocate. Their approach essentially supervaluates over contexts instead of talking about prospective contexts; as far as I can tell, the resulting picture is very similar to the picture that would result from spelling out the idea I am suggesting here. 22 References Aloni, M. D. (2001). Quantification Under Conceptual Covers. PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam. Anscombe, G. (1963). Intention. Cornell University Press. Austin, J. (1962). How To Do Things With Words. 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Voting Voting [Stemme, Ballotation, Votum – noun; stemme - verb] From Old Danish staem(m)ae (noun) and stemmelse, stemming, stemning (verbal nouns). Both seem to go back to Middle Low German, stemme, stemne, stimme and stemmen, though the noun is widely attested in Germanic languages. The base, lexical meaning in Danish is voice; letting your voice ring out, be heard. Qualified, it means voicing one's opinion, making one's views known, giving one's consent. It's related to the Danish bestemme, decide or determine, and most likely to Staevne as well (Old Danish, stefnae, Old Norse, stefna) which means gathering, negotiation meeting. Ballotation simply means a ballot and comes from the French balloter, which refers to the procedure of using black and white balls to decide a vote. Votum means a ballot or election too, or the written or oral statement meant to influence people to cast their vote in a certain way. It's a loanword from Latin where it had clear religious overtones again, meaning solemnly swear, taking an oath.1 The semantic range of the words Kierkegaard uses is quite broad then, echoing a rich political culture and history. This can be schematized in the following way: Actual participation in deliberating, determining, and ratifying Published in Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, vol. 15, tome VI, Emmanuel, S. M., McDonald, W. & Stewart, J. (eds.)(Ashgate, 2015): 229-34. Author's version. Please do not quote or cite. 1 Ordbog over det Danske Sprog, online edition (http://ordnet.dk/ods/). policies or laws (i), judging or criticizing these publicly (ii), taking an oath for government service (iii), casting a vote (iv). As far as we can tell pre-state Denmark (before c. 900 A.D.) had a mixed system of government,2 meaning that a chieftain or king usually took the lead in public affairs but since his authority or power wasn't meant to be absolute he always had to rely on the active support of the aristocracy and the common people. The public arenas for this mutual trust were deliberative and general assemblies. Every free man who could carry a weapon basically had the right to attend the latter. Even if only the King and the aristocrats could speak on matters of policy and law here, ordinary people had a voice too, making their judgment heard by shouts of approval or dissent (cf. ( i).3 With state-formation and the coming of Christianity there's an ideological shift towards absolute monarchy, but the Danish king remained quite weak for a long time and still had to rely a great deal on the consent of his subjects. Representative assemblies were set up, a state assembly (Rigsdag) above all, with broad veto powers and the participation of all estates of the land (church, nobility, ordinary people). Peasant farmers and artisans remained free for a long time therefore, enjoying a political and economical standing unheard of even by Western European standards. It's only after the Reformation and with the emergence of the Modern bureaucratic state really (c. 1600-1800 A.D.) that Denmark turns into an absolute monarchy, with the Danish king becoming one of 2 See A. R. Meyers, Parliaments and Estates in Europe to 1789, London: Thames and Hudson Ltd. 1975, for the general political trajectory of Europe and Denmark. 3 Cf. also Tacitus, Germ. c. 11, 40. the most absolute rulers in all of Europe (cf. (iii).4 By this time, however, the Enlightenment sets in and events out in Europe are starting to put pressure on the Danish Crown to allow freedom of the press (cf. ( ii) and universal male suffrage (cf. (iv). This leads to the establishing of constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary system in 1849, making Denmark into one of the most liberal democracies in Europe at that time (cf. (i)-(iv). This is the Denmark of Kierkegaard's lifetime, a society and culture he remained largely at odds with as we'll see. You don't find a fully thought-out concept of voting in the Kierkegaardian corpus. The words appear most often in the Nachlass by far. A quick survey reveals a negative and even disparaging take on the notion and practice of voting itself, as well as most of its semantic range. By cross-referencing "voting" with words like "The Numerical", "The Majority", and "Democracy" one gets a sense of why that is: Voting stands opposed to single individuality (1). The most eloquent attack is found in his review of the Two Ages however. Here Kierkegaard charges contemporary society with being worldly-wise and shallow in its thinking and for lacking true passion. He blames Modern, representational government and the rise of the public and the printing press for this general lack of spirit, all of which are tied up with voting (2). Kierkegaard thinks active citizenship and single individuality cancel each other out somehow, and he seems to have preferred 4 See also Philip S. Gorski, "The Protestant Ethic and the Bureaucratic Revolution: Ascetic Protestantism and Administrative Rationalization in Early Modern Europe", in Max Weber's 'Economy and Society', ed. by Charles Camic, Philip S. Gorski, and David M. Trubek, Stanford: Stanford University Press 2005, pp. 267-296. going back to absolute monarchy instead. This bent for personal, non-reciprocal ties over public ones also comes out well in his ethico-religious writings (3). What the Kierkegaardian corpus is trying to do basically is to criticize or else get beyond the Danish-European-political tradition. This raises the question of what his stance towards politics actually is (4). (1) The Journals, Papers, Notebooks: If we turn to the places where voting is mentioned, we see the uses are all negative (or else literary or reporting only). (a) Truth isn't decided by mass vote or public opinion, but by individuals basically.5 (b) Nothing infinite, nothing of real weight and significance in fact, can ever be settled this way.6 (c) There's no real learning or character formation that happens by discussion or balloting either.7 (d) Voting is a form of dispersion, a nonsensical (Nonsens) way of reaching a decision (Afgjørelses Middel).8 To think one can achieve anything by voting is irresponsible (Uforsvarligt).9 (e) To deny any of this or to submit real matters to majority judgment is to confuse and externalize everything. Truth is exchanged for mere need and gain;10 majority rule turns into a 5 SKS 20, 127 / KJN 4, 127-8; SKS 24, 224/ JP 4, 4875. 6 SKS 17, 295 / KJN 1, 286-7; SKS 24, 224, 227, 230-1 / JP 4, 4875, 4199, 4201. 7 SKS 24, 224-5/ JP 6, 6728; SKS 24, 256 / JP 4, 4208. 8 SKS 23, 246; SKS 24, 239-40 / JP 4, 4203. 9 SKS 24, 224-5 / JP 6, 6728. 10 SKS 23, 59-60 / JP 1, 986. kind of idolatry-evil. The Christian has a positive duty to stay away from all this.11 There's a general slide here (a)-(d) that's kind of hard to track. It's difficult to see how (e) follows too. What is it about voting, exactly, that makes it so trivial yet highly dangerous at the same time? (f) Voting is based on the principle of multiplicity or number (Det Numeriske), which means rule by the majority (Majoriteten) and the crowd (Maengden). Where there are many, there is relativity. This is directly opposed to the single individual.12 (g) Democracy (Demokratiet, Folkeregjeringen) has multiplicity as its basic, organizing principle. This means the downfall of everything great, everything holy. The demand for positive participation and recognition from everybody makes it the most tyrannical form of government, certainly the most void of spirit (aandløseste).13Democracy is the true image of hell.14 It's tempting to see all this as a piece of hyperbole: To take Kierkegaard's negative comments about voting and majority rule (a)-(g) as a healthy corrective 11 SKS 23, 37-38. 12 SKS 20, 371-2 / KJN 4, 371-2; SKS 24, 97 / JP 4, 4190. 13 SKS 20, 371-2 / KJN 4, 371-2; Pap. VIII A 557 / JP 4, 4144. Cf. SKS 7, 563 / CUP 1, 620-1. 14 Pap. VIII A 557. to mixing up politics with either morality or religion, or as a warning perhaps against giving clear priority to the former over the latter two in our lives. This guarding against the tyranny of majority opinion as well as majority rule makes good liberal sense and Kierkegaard is one of the first Modern thinkers to do this actually. There's still a sense in which voting is disparaged here though, indeed political life as a whole (cf. (i)-(iv). (2) Two Ages: The same deep misgivings are found here, a work also written under his real name. First we get a brilliant lesson on the dangers of Modern, representative rule: (a) There's a real difference between reflection (Reflexion) or deliberation (Overveielse) on the one hand, and decision (Afgjørelse) and action (Handling) on the other. This must always be kept in mind.15 (b) Every form of reflection or deliberation that doesn't lead to real decision and action isn't only an abstraction, but a kind of evasion and dodging of real, individual responsibility.16 (c) Modern democracy is based on representation, which means it tends to restrict the scope for real decision-making and action on the part of the many, the ordinary citizens.17 (d) This is closely tied to the rise of the public (Publikum) and a printing press (Pressen) devoted to public opinion (Publikums Mening). Both the public itself and its opinions are abstractions that tend to foster 15 SKS 8, 62-6, 74 / TA, 64-8; 77. 16 Ibid. 17 SKS 8, 66-7, 72-3, 76 / TA, 68-9, 74-5, 79. calculation (Beregning); a worldly-wise (Forstandighed, Klogskab) and at bottom irresponsible way of thinking and behaving.18 (e) This leads to a general leveling (Nivellering) of all meaningful distinctions again. The tearing-down of the wall between the public and the private spheres isn't only damaging to government, but to real learning and character formation as well.19 (f) It's the reciprocal recognition (gjensidig Anerkjendelse) underlying this kind of shallow, shared deliberation (gjensidig Klogskab) that's to blame for all this.20 (g) That and the purely numerical, arithmetic way of gauging public opinion and deciding things in general.21 The reason Kierkegaard is highly critical of Modern democracy then is that it confuses key distinctions in human life and that it tends to encourage irresponsibility (cf. (1e) over). If it's objected that this might be true of the masses perhaps but that their representatives still have room for real decision-making here and therefore for genuine reflection or deliberation as well, then Kierkegaard would answer back: Since they're ultimately bound by public opinion and the decision of the voters, they tend to hide or avoid real authority and leadership. So 18 SKS 8, 66ff. / TA, 68ff. 19 SKS 8, 80ff. / TA, 84ff. 20 SKS 8, 69 / TA, 72. 21 SKS 8, 80, 95ff. / TA, 84, 100ff. their deliberation is bound to be shallow as well.22 This is a deep and original point about Modern democracy. Irresponsibility it seems is a structural trait about representational rule. It's no secret that it's voting that lies at the root of all this for Kierkegaard. That's also why he seems to think you can't have more authentic forms of public reason under this form of government either (cf. (i)-(ii). (3) The Ethico-Religious Writings: To get a sharper sense how that's a given for Kierkegaard, we need to link this up with his thoughts on the human being in general. Why is it that more authentic forms of deliberation and active citizenship can't be combined with a system of government based on voting? The quick answer: (a) Because there's no such thing as positive or real reciprocity among humans.23 Reciprocity is fake, or only acceptable in a Pickwickian sense. Voting assumes the contrary, which is why it's the root of all evil for Kierkegaard. (4) Kierkegaard and the Political: It would seem that insofar as democracy is based on voting it's not a legitimate form of government in Kierkegaard's eyes. It's hard to see how the new-fangled parliamentary democracy of 1849 in Denmark or the Liberal democracy we have today-or any democracy we can imagine for that matter-can be kept or reformed if Kierkegaard is right. One gets the sense it's the very mutuality of the trust itself, and the freedom and equality of 22 SKS 8, 100ff. / TA, 106ff. 23 This is always assumed, but never argued, in the Kierkegaardian corpus. [See also Narve Strand, "World that Matters", In the Shadow of Kierkegaard, ed. by Roman Kralik et al., Toronto, Acta Kierkegaardiana 2011] active citizens that goes with it, that troubles Kierkegaard most. It's this he thinks has lead to the present order of things, and which stands in the way of a more single, inward form of human existence. That's why a preference for absolute monarchy is in the cards, being that form of government which has the least amount of citizen participation and which isn't based on voting, allowing thereby for the maximum amount of privacy to its subjects.24 The ideal for Kierkegaard, it seems, would be a world without politics. To sum up: The notion and practice of voting is tied up with political participation, public deliberation, and office-holding. It's a purely extensive, inauthentic means of reaching decisions for Kierkegaard; being based, he thinks, on an illusory idea of positive, reciprocal freedom and equality. At best it tends to foster shallow reflection and irresponsibility. At worst, it simply levels the distinction between the public and the private spheres. This means it's directly opposed to single individuality (and to religious life). Voting is the organizing principle in a democracy, which makes it the worst form of government from a religious existentialist point of view. The ideal would be a world where voting, citizen politics itself, played little or no part. Absolute monarchy then is the best form of government to live under for a Christian. 24 SKS 7, 563/ CUP 1, 620; Pap. VIII A 557 / JP 4, 4144. See also: common man; crowd, the/public, the; decision/resolve; individual; law; leveling; politics; press, the/journalism; Protestantism/Reformation; society; state, the; truth; will. Narve Strand

TECHNIQUES ET CONCEPTS DU VIVANT EN BIOLOGIE SYNTHÉTIQUE ALBERTO MOLINA PÉREZ La biologie synthétique pourrait bientôt répondre à deux questions fondamentales pour la philosophie de la biologie : « Qu'est-ce que la vie ? » et « Que sont les fonctions biologiques ? ». En effet, cette discipline biotechnologique 1, 2 promet d'un côté de réduire les organismes vivants à leur plus simple expression en identifiant les constituants d'une cellule minimale 3-5, et, d'un autre côté, de créer des formes de vie dotées de fonctions nouvelles par le biais de la reprogrammation génétique 6-8, de l'assemblage de biobriques (BioBricksTM) 9,10 ou de protéines inédites 11. La première approche, descendante, consiste à simplifier le génome d'organismes actuels jusqu'à atteindre l'ensemble minimal de gènes nécessaires pour que la cellule accomplisse ses fonctions de base. L'autre approche, ascendante, a notamment pour objectif de comprendre le passage de l'inerte au vivant à partir de processus physicochimiques simples comme ceux ayant pû se produire sur Terre il y a quatre milliards d'années 5, 11-13. Dans la mesure où elles explorent les conditions de possibilité du vivant, ces recherches devraient donc également nous renseigner sur les conditions de possibilité des fonctions biologiques 14-16. Elles pourraient, par exemple, nous permettre de comprendre comment les fonctions d'un système apparaissent lorsque ce système passe du statut de processus chimique prébiotique à celui d'organisme vivant à part entière. Mais le succès technique de ces recherches ne garantit pas leur succès conceptuel. C'est-à-dire que leur capacité à produire des cellules minimales ne garantit pas leur capacité à dire si elles sont vivantes, ou plutôt, elle ne garantit pas leur capacité à trancher parmi les définitions concurrentes du concept de 'vie' 13, 17, 18. Malgré la promesse de créer des cellules vivantes minimales, quelques chercheurs se demandent en effet s'il faut considérer comme telles les entités qui sortiront de leurs éprouvettes. D'autant plus que certaines vésicules autocatalytiques produites en laboratoire peuvent d'ors et déjà être considérées comme vivantes selon l'une Université Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne, UFR 10 philosophie. / [email protected] Último trabajo en Ludus Vitalis: "Objetividad versus inteligibilidad de las funciones biológicas: La paradoja normativa y el autismo epistemológico de las ciencias modernas", vol. XIV, num. 26, 2006, pp. 39-67 Ludus Vitalis, vol. XVII, num. 31, 2009, pp. 237-240. des définitions proposées 19, mais pas selon d'autres. Cette incertitude est responsable d'un curieux flottement terminologique. Certains chercheurs n'hésitent pas considérer leurs créatures de laboratoire comme ''vivantes'' dès lors qu'elles satisfont quelques critères plus ou moins arbitrairement choisis par eux (sans se rendre compte qu'ils refuseraient probablement cette appellation à d'autres systèmes qui satisfont pourtant les mêmes critères). D'autres chercheurs, plus prudents, les appellent parfois des systèmes ''suprachimiques'' ou ''infrabiologiques'', ou les considèrent comme des ''approximations à la vie cellulaire'' qu'ils disent ''similaires à des systèmes vivants'' ou ''presque mais pas tout à fait vivants'', ou encore ''partiellement vivants'', comme si la dichotomie traditionnelle entre le vivant et le non-vivant cessait d'être valable. Dans quelle catégorie doit-on en effet ranger des entités qui remplissent certaines mais pas toutes les conditions jusqu'ici jugées nécessaires pour appartenir à la catégorie des êtres vivants ? Ces entités sont capables d'auto-maintenance mais pas d'auto-reproduction, ou vice-versa, ou leur auto-reproduction est limitée à quelques générations, ou elle n'est pas limitée mais ne donne pas lieu à une évolution darwinienne, ou lorsqu'elles sont capables de se reproduire et d'évoluer, c'est le métabolisme qui fait défaut, comme chez les virus. L'arbitraire qu'on observe dans le choix des critères du vivant se retrouve dans l'usage du quantificateur ''minimal'' appliqué aussi bien aux cellules (minimal cells) qu'à la vie elle-même (minimal life). Il désigne le seuil en-deça duquel un système cesse d'être considéré comme vivant. Les chercheurs s'accordent pour l'interpréter en termes de complexité mais ils divergent quant à l'unité de mesure pertinente. Pour les partisans de l'approche descendante, c'est le nombre de gènes ; pour les autres, c'est moins clair. Comment mesure-t-on en effet la complexité d'un réseau de réactions chimiques auto-catalytiques ? (Et on peut imaginer d'autres critères de minimalité : protéique, moléculaire, spatiale, métabolique, entropique, reproductive, évolutive, adaptative, etc.) Mais le critère génétique lui-même n'est pas clair, car ce qui détermine la présence ou non d'un gène dans l'ensemble minimal que veulent créer les chercheurs c'est sa fonction. C'est-à-dire que ce qui sous-tend la minimalité génétique, c'est une minimalité fonctionnelle. Or, le nombre de fonctions n'est pas forcément égal au nombre de gènes. Par ailleurs, c'est aussi en termes fonctionnels que sont exprimées la plupart des définitions du vivant. On pourrait par conséquent s'interroger non pas sur le nombre minimal de gènes mais sur le nombre de fonctions nécessaires et suffisantes pour qu'un organisme soit considéré comme vivant. Autrement dit, ne faudrait-il pas d'abord identifier l'ensemble minimal de fonctions qui caractérisent le vivant pour ensuite chercher le(s) plus petit(s) génome(s) qui code(nt) pour ces fonctions là ? 238 / LUDUS VITALIS / vol. XVII / num. 31 / 2009 Il est presque aussi difficile de définir le concept de fonction que de définir la vie. Or, bien que le but de la biologie synthétique soit la conception, l'implémentation et le contrôle de fonctions biologiques nouvelles dans les organismes vivants, les chercheurs ne s'inquiètent apparemment pas des problèmes de définition. Peut-être (ou sans doute) parce que leur travail de laboratoire ne requiert pas davantage de précision conceptuelle que celle que leur procure un usage intuitif de ces termes. Un éditorial de la revue Nature reconnaissait que la vie n'a pas besoin d'être un concept scientifique précis : « It would be a service to more than synthetic biology if we might now be permitted to dismiss the idea that life is a precise scientific concept 20 ». Peut-être n'est-il pas non plus nécessaire que les êtres vivants soient une catégorie naturelle. Le concept de vie, tel qu'on tente de le définir actuellement, est né vers le début du XIXeme siècle, en même temps que la science du vivant elle-même. Aujourd'hui, à l'heure où nous nous préparons à découvrir de la vie sur d'autres planètes, à la fabriquer en laboratoire et à la programmer sur ordinateur, la catégorie autour de laquelle Lamarck et Treviranus ont inventé la biologie n'est peut-être plus aussi pertinente qu'il y a deux siècles (voir à ce propos les contributions de Michel Morange et Evelyn Fox Keller dans Bersini 2007 18). Au fur et à mesure que nous étendons, grâce à la technique, le domaine des actions possibles, nous avons besoin de redéfinir ou de construire de nouvelles catégories. Il ne s'agit plus en effet pour la biologie synthétique de découvrir ce que sont les êtres vivants, à supposer qu'il y ait quelque chose à découvrir, mais plutôt de les fabriquer. Et il sera sans doute possible de fabriquer autant d'êtres « vivants » différents qu'il y a de définitions alternatives. Jusqu'à présent, nous étions capables d'identifier les êtres vivants, mais pas de les définir. Bientôt, nous serons capables de les fabriquer, mais peut-être pas de les reconnaître. Il y a manifestement un décalage paradoxal entre notre capacité de faire (création de nouvelles entités), notre capacité de voir ou de savoir (identification de leur statut vital, attribution de fonctions, explication téléologique), et notre capacité de dire ou de définir (définition de la vie et des fonctions, justification des explications téléologiques). Longtemps, nous les avons confondu, et de cette confusion s'alimentait le débat entre vitalistes et mécanismes. En 1970, les progrès de la biologie moléculaire faisaient dire à Jacques Monod que le mystère de la vie était en grande partie résolu. Quarante ans plus tard, alors que nous nous apprêtons à créer des formes de vie nouvelles, il faut reconnaître que le mystère reste entier. Est-ce le même ? Non, car Monod faisait référence au problème de comprendre comment fonctionnent les êtres vivants, alors qu'il s'agit pour nous de comprendre ce qu'ils sont. En reposant le problème de la définition du vivant, les entités nouvelles remettent en question les limites et l'unité de la biologie. Elles déroutent nos habitudes de pensée, troublent nos intuitions catégorielles et sèment la pagaille dans MOLINA PÉREZ / BIOLOGIE SYNTÉTIQUE / 239 l'ameublement ontologique de l'univers. Au-delà des communautés scientifiques directement impliquées, exobiologistes, informaticiens, biochimistes, etc., nous sommes tous concernés par le statut de ces objets dont l'apparition affectera notre représentation du monde et transformera nos modes de vie. Le progrès des biotechnologies non seulement féconde l'élaboration et l'innovation conceptuelle, mais il les rend d'autant plus nécessaires que la société aura besoin d'en comprendre, d'en discuter et d'en apprécier les résultats, y compris du point de vue de ses implications éthiques. RÉFÉRENCES 1 S. Jaffe (2005), "In the business of synthetic life," Scientific American 292:40-41. 2 S.A. Benner, M.A. Sismour (2005), "Synthetic biology," Nature 6: 533-543. 3 J.I. Glass, et al. (2006), "Essential genes of a minimal bacterium," PNAS 103: 425-430. 4 M.E. Schrader (2006), "From the minimal genome to the minimal cell: theoretical and experimental investigations," dans Life As we Know It, J. Seckbach, éd., Dordrecht: Springer. 5 E. Szathmary (2005), "In search of the simplest cell," Nature 433: 469-470. 6 D.G. Gibson, et al. (2008), "Complete chemical synthesis, assembly, and cloning of a mycoplasma genitalium genome," Science 319: 1215-1220. 7 J.I. Glass, et al. (2006), "Essential genes of a minimal bacterium," PNAS 103: 425-430. 8 D. Sprinzak, M.B. Elowitz (2005), "Reconstruction of genetic circuits," Nature 438: 443-448. 9 D. Endy (2005), "Foundations for engineering biology," Nature 438: 449-453. 10 W.W. Gibbs (2004), "Synthetic life," Scientific American, Mai 2004, pp. 74-81. 11 P.L. Luisi, C. Chiarabelli, P. Stano (2006), "From never born proteins to minimal living cells: two projects in synthetic biology," Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere 36: 605-616. 12 J.W. Szostak, D.P. Bartel, P.L. Luisi (2001), "Synthetizing life," Nature 409: 387-390. 13 P.L. Luisi (1998), "About various definitions of life," Origins of Life and Evolution of the Biosphere 28: 613-622. 14 J.W. Szostak (2008), "The origins of function in biological nucleic acids, proteins, and membranes," http://www.hhmi.org/research/investigators/szostak.html (accédé le 17/07/09). 15 M.A. Bedau (2007), "Une vue fonctionnelle de la cellule vivante minimale," dans Comment définir la vie ?, H. Bersini et J. Reisse, éd., pp. 5-13. 16 S. Rasmussen, et al. (2003), "Bridging non living and living matter," Artificial Life 9: 269-317. 17 C.E. Cleland, C.F. Chyba (2002), "Defining 'life'," Origins of Life and Evolution of Biospheres 32: 387-393. 18 H. Bersini, J. Reisse, éd. (2007), Comment définir la vie ?, Paris, Vuibert. 19 P.L. Luisi (2003), "Autopoiesis: a review and a reapraisal," Naturwissenschaften 90: 49-59. 20 "Meanings of 'life'," Nature 447(2007): 1031-1032. 240 / LUDUS VITALIS / vol. XVII / num. 31 /

Derrida's Open and Its Closure: The Aporia of Différance and the Only Logic of Thinking Mengxue Wu "...for an opening is relative to a 'surrounding plenitude.'" 1 "The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits: we have never come upon it as upon a particular case of experience-that which Husserl believes he is describing." 2 Metaphysics-the entire history of metaphysics has been considered as the metaphysics of presence-is closed; it is closed like a dead end. In its "surrounding plenitude" no exit can be found and it is meeting its own death. Though a system of philosophy with incompleteness is not a perfect theory, but the rebuke of how comprehensive and close a philosophy is and the demand of that philosophy to open its house to the alien and the ungraspable would be a preposterous importunity. However, upon the stage where the entire history of Western philosophy has been played, "...nothing is staged or displayed theatrically. Rather, the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought" (Heidegger 22). This battle, between the new gods and the old, between the new thoughts and the old, is a battle of breaking into new ruptures and finding new openings in the old thoughts. At the moment when traditional philosophy has become a closure of the metaphysics of presence, even those streams of thought that already broke new phenomenological grounds in the beginning of twentieth century and Levinas's ethical breaking are closed "as the self-presence in absolute knowledge" (Derrida 102, SP). Derrida states that we need an "un-heard-of" thought, far away from the system of presence and meaning, called "trace," "différance" by Derrida. It is the movement before the formation of meaning that is continuously differing and deferring before the formation of presence. It is a perception that cannot be sensed (seen, heard, and touched) by oneself 1 Jacques Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," in Writing and Difference, Trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 106; hereafter WD. 2 Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs. Trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 104; hereafter SP. Language, Literature, and Interdisciplinary Studies (LLIDS) ISSN: 2547-0044 http://ellids.com/archives/2018/09/2.1-Wu.pdf CC Attribution-No Derivatives 4.0 International License www.ellids.com Mengxue Wu 77 in consciousness-it is un-seen, un-heard, and un-touched. Therefore, it "indicates a way out of the closure" (141, italics mine)-the closed circle of auto-affection of sensing (hearing) oneself and presentation. However can this "un-heard-of" thought indicate a way out? Can this thought open the closure of metaphysics? Is this thought of openness a different mode of thinking, pointing towards"...possibilities for a new kind of meditation?" 3 To discuss these issues in Derrida's writings, a close reading of the following texts is proposed-Speech and Phenomena (1973), "Violence and Metaphysics" (1964) in Writing and Difference (1978), Of Grammatology (1976), and "Différance" (1968) in Speech and Phenomena. The "difference," the movement of traces, and the play of differences, for their structural commonality in endless references, will be provisionally called "open structure." 4 The way in which an open structure operates is through trace, writing, différance, and supplement. They are open to the difference with another trace, to another supplement, to the substitution, to the effacement of every trace and supplement, and to the postponement of deferral. The tracing/erasing of traces and the seeking of the next 3 David B. Allison in his "Translator's Introduction" of Speech and Phenomena writes that deconstruction is not as negative as "destruction" in the context of Nietzsche or Heidegger. Deconstruction has no intention to overthrow or overcome metaphysics, instead, it sets its task to "...set forth the possibilities for a new kind of meditation, one no longer founded on the metaphysics of presence" (See page xxxiii footnote). However, it is always necessary to remember to switch one's perspectives. From one perspective, deconstruction indeed presents us a possibility to think differently other than the metaphysics of presence. From the other perspective, however, this different thinking, this is to say, trace, différance, writing, and supplement, with its powerless "power" of spreading everywhere and encompassing everything, including the possibility of thinking differently other than deconstruction, itself has no possibility for "a new kind of meditation," one is no longer on the structure of deconstruction. 4 Open is questioned in several ways. First, the question "How does différance open words, concepts, and categories?" concerns the opening of the horizon of metaphysics, the reduced pure expression, and ideal meaning, as Derrida discussed in Speech and Phenomena, essays on Husserl and phenomenology. Secondly, we might ask, "Do 'open,' 'outside,' and 'the way out' remain on the metaphysical level and upon that level, are they the 'absolute, ideal, and perfect open?'" This question without doubt takes the same position with Derrida's critique of Levinas in the essay "Violence and Metaphysics," in which Derrida emphasizes that the other must not be an absolute and conceptual "other," rather, it is before every concept, and thereby it is before the level of metaphysics. Without a doubt, for Derrida, open is not a "solid" open-it is not solid as Husserl's perfect ideality and Levinas's absolute open; on the contrary, Derrida will never speak of this "open" "the perfect open," "the pure open," "the absolute open," or "the totally-open." LLIDS 2.1 78 supplement for the current one are the structures of open. We could say a trace traces and erases/effaces itself: trace traces and writes with erasing and effacing and at the same time, it erases and effaces with tracing and writing. Open lies in the very erasing, writing, and deferring. In other words, open lies in the very moment-let us still use "moment" as an expedient-that is about to remove, to write, and to defer. This "moment" of "about," is always deferring, about to defer, or about to defer the deferring. Open happens at the very moment when the trace is going to disorder the common time and the deferral is going to defer between traces and during the movement of supplements. In this sense, open means "allowing," "permitting," and "promise." It allows and promises différance, the play of traces, and vice versa. From one supplement to another, open promises the freedom of substituting, erasing, and moving thus, endowing the openness of what is erasable and replaceable. Only in this condition, a supplement could be replaced by another supplement, and therefore, a chain of supplements becomes possible. On the one hand, in the circumstance of open traces, différance, and supplements happen, and vice versa. On the other hand, in the chain of supplements and the play between traces, open happens. It is this process of open that makes trace and supplement not stop at their own and become determinate and certain concept. Open maintains that trace is an interruption and a disorder of metaphysical order. By being always able to differing and deferring itself, open prevents the risk of being petrified and beingfixed into one certain trace or supplement. When open occurs between traces and supplements, it naturally means it is in certain limit. When open has the meaning of "unfolding," it first means "folding" and "close." A metaphor of an onion would help us. Imagine peeling an onion. To open and unfold an onion means to peel the onion. When we peel an onion's layers, we see that inside a layer, there is another layer. We differentiate layers by other nearby layers. The process of erasing and detaching layers is the process of opening and unfolding an onion. By the same token, supplying is always substituting one for another, playing is always one playing with others. This inter-trace, inter-supplement implies a finite opening and a certain close. Open is from one supplement to another assupplement can never occur without the other supplement. Thus, open cannot only mean pure, absolute, and infinite open, rather it is finite-it is in certain closure. Open is at work where and when traces trace and efface, supplements substitute, and both meaning in language and Being in beings arise and arrive at their limitation. Mengxue Wu 79 Though trace, différance, and supplement condition words, concepts, and categories, they themselves are neither words nor concepts. They do not even cause words. They have no power to control, govern, or manage words. However, to say that trace is a "common root" for words, concepts, and categories does not mean that trace is a "root," a substantial root, or an origin. Open and the openness of trace, too, are not a substantial root or origin. In the metaphor of peeling an onion, there is a notable and interesting fact: when one finishes peeling, the center of an onion is nothing. On facing the nothingness of the center, the metaphysical assertions on "concept," "essence," and its related question ("What is open?") will turn out to be untenable to hold, for how can one give a "concept" before the formation of a concept, that is, before the play of traces? Prior to predicates, trace and différance escape the fate of being presence and metaphysics. However, words and concepts are possible only by inscribing them into the movement of traces and differences. There are no words outside this structure of trace. As Derrida himself always states, "...there is nothing outside of the text," and "...the gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits" (Derrida 104).This open structure of différance is endless like the fabric of text and the labyrinth of the gallery. This structure of open spreads over everything, in other words, it includes all. No-thing can be outside of this structure-in this sense the open structure is closed. But at the same time, it is not closed because the structure of différance always expands everywhere. There is no "bound" of this structure and there is no frontier for différance. It never closes. But-again-it is never open. It is both open and closure; but at the same time, it is neither open nor closure. Moreover, it includes its own "exit," includes the "outside," therefore, "the outside is the inside," and as a whole where there is no "outside" or "inside," thus, "the outside is (with cross) the inside." Is not this allincluding structure another kind of closure? Speaking from the perspective of the history of philosophy, does this structure not share the same essence of metaphysics with other (metaphysical) categories like Being and idea which attempt to grasp everything? Moreover, if the risk of misunderstanding arises, ask a question in Saussurean way: what makes trace a trace, temporization a temporization, and supplement a supplement? What are we talking about when we talk about trace, temporization, and Derrida's other terms? When we are talking about trace and temporization, are we LLIDS 2.1 80 really speaking of trace and temporization? Though from Derrida's perspective, these questions would be nonsense, because there is no need to recognize them, no need to "be" trace, différance, and supplement. As Derrida writes, "The Being of the existent is not the absolute existent, nor the infinite existent, nor even the foundation of the existent in general" (WD 143).When trace disorders and deferral defers, trace and temporization enter into anunstable, uncertain, and disordered status. This status of instability, uncertainty, and disorder- just as trace, différance, and supplement are endless-is endless. The web of différance maintains itself and prevails endlessly; accordingly, the status of this instability, uncertainty, and disorder maintains itself and prevails endlessly. Therefore, is this "disorder" another order of metaphysics, an order of disorder, an order as disorder, a disordered order-in one word, an order?, Though everything is tracing and erasing and is in an unstable condition in Derrida's structure of différance, this structure as a whole, by maintaining and prevailing itself, achieves a stable and even a static status. From this holistic view, due to the unstable stability, deconstruction is never destruction. 5 The first point for Derrida's open-that it implies the dissolution of the center, of the central ideal, and positive meaning-is inspired by Ferdinand de Saussure. Derrida draws upon the key Saussurean insight, "...in language there are only differences." Each word must refer to other words. The only connection in language system is the differential connection between words and it is "Arbitrary in that it actually has no natural connection with the signified" (Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 68-69; italics mine). Saussure writes, Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor 5 Many scholars have come up with the same conclusion: "Deconstruction is never destruction." David B. Allison in his "Translator's Introduction" of Speech and Phenomena states the similar idea. Cf. Speech and Phenomena xxxii and see my footnote 3.However, one must also notice that this same conclusion comes from different reasons. Behind the surface of same conclusion, my argument is distinctly different from other scholars' arguments. In this paper, from a macroscopic point of view, deconstruction is found to have provided "supports" and "grounds" to metaphysics by removing its ground, and this move is another kind of protection for metaphysics, far from destroying it. Therefore, this is the reason behind my concluding that "deconstruction is never destruction." Mengxue Wu 81 sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea of phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it. (120) There is no such thing called "the positive meaning" of each word. A word does not have a meaning of its own, rather, only through the differences between this word and other surrounding words is a word's meaning determined. Referring to others, depending on others, and differing with others, make the word open to the "outside" of itself. The "outside" of a word is relative to this word itself; the "outside" here means other words. Derrida in his "Différance" after citing Saussure points out, The first consequence to be drawn from this is that the signified concept is never present in itself...Every concept is necessarily and essentially inscribed in a chain or a system, within which it refers to another and to other concepts, by the systematic play of differences. (SP 140) It is the difference that operates in language and makes language possible, rather than positive meaning, the determined sound, or the absolute idea. However, difference itself is neither a word, nor concept, nor meaning; or to put it in the language of metaphysics, it is neither a substance, nor a subject, nor a predicate, nor being. Difference is not a concept, it is the condition for conceptuality; it is not even a "principle" as Saussure names his "differentiation principle." It is just a "play" which Derrida names-the play of differences-différance. Are difference and différance, by putting "positive meaning" in question and "indicating a way out (141, italics mine)," opening a certain closure? At this point, the answer is certainly yes. For the differences between words as well as différance-the play of differences-indicate an open place where one word can have meaning only via opening it and relating it with other words. The frontiers between allword disperse. A word cannot self-sufficiently own its plentitude of meaning. Counter to classical linguists' assumption, there is neither presence of any signified "true" thing nor any natural connection between a word and its "ideal meaning." There are only differences and references between words as well as rupture between word and its meaning. Among references and differences of words, open is shown as differences and ruptures. Beneath these LLIDS 2.1 82 demonstrations of differences and ruptures, open implies an incomplete and deficient "self-sufficiency." In other words, open implies a disillusion of "self-sufficiency," a disillusion of an ideal status not only for the signified present of classical linguistics, but also for Husserl's "ideal meaning." Instead of speaking of complete and perfect "self-sufficiency," Derrida comes up with "insufficient" to designate a fundamental lack that he also identifies as the original supplement. This fundamental lack of positive center accordingly means that the supplement to what was a lack is as fundamental as lack. With the lack of origin, or with the supplement of origin, Derrida can firstly, avoid asserting any full presence of a signified "positive meaning"-for once, if one only speaks the certain and determinate "positive meaning," one actually says nothing but nonsense-"Différance is the non-full, non-simple 'origin'" (SP 141). Secondly, guided by this "non-full," "non-simple origin," the lack and consequently the supplement to the lack, he can avoid speaking of a plentitude, the plentitude as the ideal meaning in the Husserlian sense, or the plentitude in the sense of the "antimetaphysical" Other and exteriority in Levinas's philosophy. The breaking of the centric and positive meaning is the first step to open. This is the departure point from closure: not only the departure point for linguistic meaning, but for meaning in general, especially, ideal meaning and pure expression as they are understood in Husserl's theory of ideal meaning. Husserl clearly indicates that the ideal meaning intention is indifferent to the fulfillment of the meaning intuition because whether or not there is any possible intuition is not the criteria for judging an assertion and the meaning intuition qua empirical experience is already reduced. He arrived at the conclusion that "truth is lacking." Husserl notices two levels in expression which he distinguishes as "presentation of words" and "sense-giving act" (Logical Investigations 193). The former i.e. the presentation of expression, which is also called "appearance" of empirical expression, must be reduced; no one really cares about the presentation of the expression, what sound it likes, when and where it is expressed, and who expresses it-all these acts of expressing are vanishing. All of these belong to the domain of indication that must be bracketed and put aside. As Husserl writes, "My act of judging is a transient experience: it arises and passes away" (195). The opposite side of this transient experience, that is to say, what people really care about, is the meaning of the assertion: "But what my assertion asserts, the content that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point, neither arises nor passes away. It is an identity in the strict sense, one and the Mengxue Wu 83 same geometrical truth" (195). It is easy to understand by using a selfevident geometrical truth as an example. Moreover, the sentence will be understandable when this geometrical assertion is false, say, "...that the three perpendiculars of a triangle do not intersect in a point." This apparently false and absurd assertion still makes sense, and its meaning, too, is still repeatable. In this situation, that is, in a false or absurd assertion its "truth" is lost. Putting this to the system of object-subject and a priori knowledge and logic, the wrong meaning can never be fulfilled and the false assertion can never be fulfilled with its correlative object. Meaning-intention here works emptily. Truth is lacking: If "possibility" or "truth" is lacking, an assertion's intention can only be carried out symbolically: it cannot derive any "fullness" from intuition or from the categorical functions performed on the latter, in which "fullness" value for knowledge consists. It then lacks, as one says, a "true," a "genuine" meaning. 6 (196) "Truth is lacking" because the content as truth is not necessary for expression, and the objectivity that is based on any real object is replaced by any ideal objectivity. Yet this "ideal" does not mean correctness and truth of expression; it does not correspond to true or false knowledge. There emerges an essential problem of phenomenology from "...the false assertion can express objectively." Husserl can naturally and easily get the conclusion that "truth is lacking" in order to show and prove that phenomenology is indifferent to the real object, however, he unwittingly admits another presupposition: even though the content is false, there is no possible object to fulfill the intention of assertions, the objectivity of false expressions is always valid by judging according to our a priori knowledge and logic-sense. It is not only the lack of truth, but also the lack of sense; in fact, the place of truth-a place of a self-evident foundation-is merely replaced by sense: here, sense supplies truth. Whether or not having sense is the presupposition for phenomenological judgments-judgments such as "it is evident true," or "it is false and absurd," or "it is nonsense at all." Beyond truth, Husserl finds sense as his foundation. In other words, in 6 Edmund Husserl, "First Investigation," in Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 196; Derrida also cited this passage in Speech and Phenomena, 97, however, to use for his own idea. LLIDS 2.1 84 this lack of truth, there arises another foundation and presupposition: sense that is always there and is already in expressions, without any doubt. Because sense can traverse "sense-only" and "sense-relatedobjects" it may or may not be fulfilled by real and possible objects but infact, it does not care about this fulfillment. At the same time when Husserl abandons truth, which "is lacking," Derrida, standing on the opposite and using the same words, would argue the same conclusion to prove his idea by using the very same words from Husserl: the lack of the ultimate and the lack of the absolute presence. In addition, after the abandonment of truth, Husserl finds another presupposition regarding sense, and Derrida, again, would hold his position that sense qua truth, likewise truth, is lost. As Derrida says, "There is already sense in the first proposition...it only precedes truth as its anticipation" (SP 98). Truth is promised but it has not come yet. Now, this radical lack of sense, from which results the lack of foundation and origin, tears, ruptures, and holes open in the solid ground of phenomenology. To say it more radically, an assertion is judged by the relationship between sense and the object. By judging whether it is true or false one judges sense's relationship with the object. For Derrida, no matter how radically Husserl denies assertion's relation with the object, he is still using the criterion of the object, which, according to Derrida, is the norm of knowledge. The whole explanation of Husserl, though it touched on "truth is lacking," seemingly steps backward to the object-subject relationship, and thereby, the whole analysis is still stuck in the domain of metaphysics. Thus, according to Derrida, sense relates to words in exactly the same way in which object relates to words. The difference between the real object and sense is not as sharp as Husserl's thought. If the intuition/corresponding object is lacking so is sense and vice versa, while if one fulfills intuition, one can also fulfill sense. By assessing whether an assertion has truth or not, one already relies on the criteria of the object and knowledge. As Derrida confirms, "Apparently independent from fulfilling intuitions, the 'pure' forms of signification, as 'empty' or cancelled sense, are always governed by the epistemological criterion of the relation with objects" (98). Therefore, without such a radical distinction between truth and sense, if truth is not necessary for phenomenological assertions, then sense, according to Derrida, is also not necessary either. Depending heavily upon knowledge or logic, sense can be lacking. Therefore, sense is lacking in the very beginning. And because sense is lacking, what is shown in speech is lacking; only the sign is left with its relation/reference/difference with other signs. When the foundation Mengxue Wu 85 qua sense is lacking fundamentally, the so called "secondary and derivative" sign, originally belonging to sense, comes to the place. If we understand by "outside" that a sign is not something that is added to the "insufficient," then we can say more precisely that the sign taking the place of sense does not come from outside. The sufficient sense due to some reasons becomes insufficient. Sense is always something other than sense. In this understanding, sense and the sign are no longer distinguishable. This is why when sense is lacking, the sign can supply it immediately. To understand this as correctly as possible, one must try to accept that the integrity of sense is lacking and thus, sense is no longer sense, rather, it is sense in a supplementary way. What does this mean? Let us relate this to Derrida's analysis of Rousseau's Confession in Of Grammatology. When speaking of the issue of masturbation-Rousseau thinks it is a "model of vice habit"-Derrida and Rousseau have totally different ideas regarding the same. Compared to the "normal" sexual activity, Rousseau thinks masturbation is just a special case, just an assistant, and that the imagined presence of beauties is only an addition to the real presence. He will never think that this "harmless" "assistant" is rather "original," more original so that it is in itself the subject, "corrupting" the integrity of the subject fundamentally. Derrida writes, Affecting oneself by another presence, one corrupts oneself [makes oneself other] by oneself [on s' altèresoi-même]. Rousseau neither wishes to think nor can think that this alteration does not simply happen to the self, that it is the self's very origin. He must consider it a contingent evil coming from without to affect the integrity of the subject. (Of Grammatology 153, hereafter OG) For Derrida, the integrity of the subject and the ideality of sense are now put into question. Masturbation comes immediately because it is in the beginning of the so-called "Nature" and "origin." This "evil habit" merges into, and then breaks the integrity of the subject and becomes a part of the subject in the very beginning, just as the sign mingles with and adulterates the ideality of sense. Sense itself makes it other, that is, the sign. Under this circumstance, auto-affection-both in the case of Rousseau and the case of speaking to oneself in solitary mental life-is not pure and perfect as Husserl and Rousseau would wish; it functions rather by the substitutive symbol of the presence. The presence presents itself as an illusion, a symbol for substituting the presence itself. In the process of auto-affection, pleasure is LLIDS 2.1 86 satisfied immediately by imagining the absent present, because it is nothing but symbolic present, a substitution for the real presence. On one hand the auto-affection could be possible and pleasure, could be immediate because of the substitution, but on the other hand, the coming of the immediate satisfaction implies the deferral of the true pleasure. For Derrida deferral means that pleasure is never coming. The never-coming pleasure is but the lack of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure, or sense, or presence, or "truth," "is lacking." The enjoyment of the thing itself is thus undermined, in its act and in its essence, by frustration. One cannot therefore say that it has an essence or an act (eidos, ousia, energeia, etc.). Something promises itself as it escapes, gives itself as it moves away, and strictly speaking it cannot even be called presence. (Of Grammatology 154) The essence is the center, and the center (if there is such a thing) is non-center. To play with the thing itself is to play with its symbol, illusion, and the supplement. In other words, one plays with symbol, illusion, and substitution from the outset. The so-called "that dangerous supplement" is not dangerous at all; on the contrary, what is really "dangerous" is the presence, the thing itself, the pleasure in the full plentitude, the purest ideality, and the most perfect meaning, in which the true menace-death-is dwelling. Supplements protect people from the danger of exposureto the too-strong light of purity and plenitude and from the menace of death. According to Derrida, there must be no center, no pure meaning/sense; otherwise it would be death. By the same reason, Derrida writes, "Pleasure itself, without symbol or suppletory, that which would accord us (to) pure presence itself, if such a thing were possible, would be only another name for death" (155).Then he cites from Rousseau himself: "Enjoyment! Is such a thing made for man? Ah! If I had ever in my life tasted the delights of love even once in their plenitude, I do not imagine that my frail existence would have been sufficient for them, I would have been dead in the act" (155). Once there is a thing that is in its plentitude, it would be death. And once there is a thing that is in its purity and absoluteness, it would be a dead thing. In order to endow the ideal and full meaning of "the I," "I" have to be dead and in order to speak well the expression "I am alive," I have to be dead because the pure-self-presence is the announcement for death. Therefore, I present, I die. This is why the beginning question "what is the sign" must be lacking, for the Mengxue Wu 87 sense/meaning is lacking and for the sign already substituted for sense. This metaphysical mode of questioning "what is x" has no answer but one, which is deludedly answered in Husserl's pursuit of absolute and ideal knowledge. Under this circumstance, a closest closure occurs: In this sense, within the metaphysics of presence, within philosophy as knowledge of the presence of the object, as the being-before-oneself of knowledge in consciousness, we believe, quite simply and literally, in absolute knowledge as the closure if not the end of history. And we believe that such a closure has taken place. (SP 102) A bit further, Derrida writes, "This history is closed when this infinite absolute appears to itself as its own death" (102). In this way, sense-rather than the object-is asserted as a starting point of phenomenology. This foundation of phenomenology is taken away in Derrida's interpretation of "sense is lacking." To say that "truth is lacking" shows Husserl's confidence in how phenomenology keeps away from empirical "blood and flesh" and only keeps its ideal unity of meaning. However, at the same time, Husserl also shows how heavily he depends on sense. Once Derrida takes away sense from phenomenology, he takes away the foundation of phenomenology. Sense, and other synonyms of it: meaning, purity, ideality, universality, the absolute, the ultimate, and the full-presence, are closed. They are as closed as death. Derrida in the end of Speech and Phenomena comes up with an "un-heard-of" thought. The openness of this "un-heard-of" thought concerns something beyond knowledge and beyond presence- knowledge and presence are lack in the very beginning. When fullpresence dies-it dies "in the act"-supplements come. 7 Supplement replacing sense/meaning/center/truth and thus breaking the foundation of metaphysics-the pure and full presence, ideal, and ultimate absoluteness-is Derrida's open. Lacking happens originally and the supplement is in the origin. If one denies the perfection of the purity, one can naturally avoid saying such as "the absolute open," or "the absoluteness of the open." These latter expressions are quite Levinasian. Therefore, the open, in this sense, by taking a lesson from Levinas, must be non-open. 7 In Derrida's corpus, Supplement has several names: "sign," "trace," "writing," and "différance." LLIDS 2.1 88 In "Violence and Metaphysics," Levinas's presupposition is, as Derrida claims, that "there would be no interior difference, fundamental and autochthonous alterity within the ego" (WD 109). When Levinas does not want to accept the "inner-difference," he naturally imagines a "pure ethics" that avoids violence. Derrida analyzes, "It is true that Ethics, in Levinas's sense, is an Ethics without law and without concept, which maintains its non-violent purity only before being determined as concepts and laws" (111). The "purity" of something-this "something" could be "Ethics," "exteriority," "alterity," as well as the "other"-and the rejection of the innerdifference, inner-other, share the same logic as in Rousseau's "problem" of masturbation: both neither wish "to think nor can think that this alternation does not simply happen to the self, that is the self's very origin" (OG 153). Derrida concludes that phenomenology is the metaphysics of presence in which a closure takes place. Levinas's way, by announcing an opening from totality (the synonym of closure for Levinas) via the absolute other and infinity, however, cannot be taken either. The open that Derrida seeks must occurs at a more "original" level where there is no "transcendence" or "beyond of," where this open must be open within itself and so must confront its own closure. Open does not transcend closure, but rather, being closed itself is a way of being open. Therefore, Derrida seeks an open in a more "fundamental" way-"older": older than categories and predicates, thus and accordingly, older than the concepts such as "pure open," "closure," "same," "other," etc. Derrida writes, Either there is only the same, which can no longer even appear and be said, nor even exercise violence (pure infinity or finitude); or indeed there is the same and the other, and then the other cannot be the other-of the same-except by being the same (as itself: ego), and the same cannot be the same (as itself: ego) except by being the other's other: alter ego. (WD 128) The same and the other, in fact, transcend and are beyond their own categories. To be precise about it, the same and the other diffuse in each other, thus there is no "pure same" against the other or "pure other" against the same, and thus you can no longer point out distinctly the boundary between "pure same" and "pure other." The play of this dissemination of the same and the other is performed secretly behind Mengxue Wu 89 the stage, before they walk into stage lights and transform into clear shapes of concepts and categories. "Behind the stage" is not a stage, nor a ground at all, to use Derrida's own words. It is in such a stage that the open has to be rooted and inscribed, so deeply, originally, and "fundamentally," thus, open and the play between open and closure, cannot be open except by open qua closure, otherwise open cannot be open if there is nothing but openness, without the limit of the closure. Open, by taking this logic, has already undermined every concept and category. It is open qua closure, as well as closure qua open. This open takes place so deeply and so fundamentally that nothing can escape its open range, which is also as known as "closed" range. Because open is not simply the opposite of Husserl's closure, it is one that does not simply follow Levinas's "absolute totality-absolute other" logic. As Derrida argues, the other must happen before being a concept, it must happen on the stage of pre-concepts, the stage of the verb "to be," of the phrase "let it be," and the stage of Being with its dissimulation, which in this context, the other and its dissimulation, the same. Open acts as closure and vice versa. For this dissimulation of open, it is but that of closure. Being, before concepts and categories, is itself just a play of differences from which concepts and categories arise. Derrida writes, Now, Being is not simply a predicate of the existent, no more than it is the existent's subject. If it is taken as essence or as existence (as Being-such or Being-there),if it is taken as copula or as position of existence, or, more profoundly and more originally, if it is taken as the unitary focal point of all these possibilities, then the Being of the existent does not belong to the realm of predication, because it is already implied in all predication in general, and makes predication possible. And it makes every synthetic or analytic judgment possible. It is beyond genre and categories... (136) Being itself just "lets be." One may wish to think that judgment is power and concepts and categories are powers to grasp things. Even though Being lets the concept remain a concept and the category be a category, and the judgment be a judgment, it itself has no power. Because it is before concept, the effort of trying to understand Being by concepts would be a vain attempt, and for the same reason, saying and asking the question "What is Being/différance?" would amount to "nonsense." On this understanding, we can say that the same, open, and closure are neither concepts, nor categories, or judgments. The play of Being is the play of the other and the same, the play of open LLIDS 2.1 90 and closure. How do they play? The other hides itself with the mask of the same; the open covers itself with the appearance of closure. They dissemble themselves. Being lets it be, lets it be such and such things; because it is nothing. This is to say, it is never such and such a thing according to their preset categories and concepts in plenitude. Being is not the absoluteness of something. From the very "beginning", non-plenitude, not perfect, and not absolute entail difference-different from itself and being the other of itself. : If to understand Being is to be able to let be (that is, to respect Being in essence and existence, and to be responsible for one's respect), then the understanding of Being always concerns alterity, and par excellence the alterity of the Other in all its originality: one can have to let be only that which one is not.(141) To be different from itself or to be the other of itself is the structure of open. Difference is open, open to difference, to the alterity and the other within something itself, to the uncertainty and in determination. Open and closure have to be mingled and this mixing in certain sense is Heideggerian, having Heideggerian names like dissimulation, concealment, and the "very veiling of Being." Being is open to itself that is different from itself; in other words, Being is open to itself that it is not itself: Being is against itself. As Derrida writes, Therefore, the thought of Being, in its unveiling, is never foreign to a certain violence. That this thought always appears in difference, and that the same-thought (and) (of) Being-is never the identical, means first that Being is history, that Being dissimulates itself in its occurrence, and originally does violence to itself in order to be stated and in order to appear.(147) The absolute Being or the thought of Being as concept in its own plenitude is nothing but death. "A Being without violence would be a Being which would occur outside the existent: nothing, nonhistory, nonoccurrence, nonphenomenality" (147).This "outside the existent," is the stage of pre-concept and pre-category, a stage where the open, the closure, the same, and the other occur. On this stage, open is originally open to differences. Mengxue Wu 91 Up till now, in order to dislodge Derrida's open, we have examined Derrida's thoughts step by step from different perspectives. We started from Saussure then stopped by Husserl and Levinas. What can we know from the above discussion? When the infinite and repeatable ideality must be dissolved in differences, in both perspectives of logic and time, Husserl's "ideal-meaning-truth" freedom for true or false assertions finds itself in the closures of knowledge. And by the same token, Levinas, though took the totally opposite track from Husserl, emphasizes on the absolute other that takes the same form of fatal "perfectionism." In the perfect and pure Other there is no other but the same; in the motto "open to the other," there is no open but only closure. On the way to open, this dead and petrified perfectionism must be cleared up. Or we can choose another logic by asking: Is there any perfection, absoluteness, or plenitude? If there is any "open" in Derrida's thought-first let us assume there is-then what does this open mean? Perhaps the thought of plenitude can tell us. Derrida uses trace-neither substance nor concept-to counter the perfect "open." This is to say, he uses more "fundamental" difference-différance-against absoluteness. In this "strange" structure of différance what should be present is always on its way "about to present." By "on this way" I mean that it is always and never arrive sat completion, determination, and perfection. Perfect presence is always deferring its own arrival; once it arrives, it would be something other than itself like the imagined beauty in Rousseau's Confession where the presence is the imagination of the presence of beauties. This open of différance, as both the temporal deferral and the logical difference, compose the general structure of the Human Being. This "defectiveness of oneself" gives us time and the possibility to live. One must not be totally identical with oneself (to avoid being dead) rather one must be the other of oneself, open to the difference of oneself. Moreover, one is always living in the deferral of death, and by this postponement, one can have time. Not only death, pleasure shares the same logic. The incomplete and defective pleasure keeps one alive; otherwise pleasure in plenitude belongs to the domain of death- "I would have been dead in the act." One is same, but not identical with oneself; completely identical is plenitude. Derrida clearly writes in "Violence and Metaphysics" that "...an opening is relative to a 'surrounding plenitude'" (WD 106).This "never in plenitude," "undecided," which is différance that is always already in the structure of other-than-itself LLIDS 2.1 92 and in the structure of alterity, is open. Alterity is always already included: "If to understand Being is to be able to let be... then the understanding of Being always concerns alterity, and par excellence the alterity of the Other in all its originality: one can have to let be only that which one is not" (141). For Derrida, the open is trace tracing, writing, and erasing, that is to say, trace opening to all other "things" other than itself. Open is also différance differing and deferring to the "thing" that is not itself. Thus, one can easily get to the "conclusion" that, for Derrida, open is just and exactly trace, différance, writing, and supplement. Is this true? Trace, différance, and writing, are never beings, concepts, and categories. Therefore, they do not exist; they are not. Because they are not beings, concepts, or categories, they have no power to control or govern beings, therefore they are not any totality or supreme form of beings. Because the pure and absolute other would be nothing but the same, the same logic works here: The mirroring or imaginary "pure" open would be nothing but closure. Therefore, our discussion about "Derrida's open" is never an absolute open. Upon consideration of the above, the question arises that how did trace, différance, and writing work in order to be open? Trace, différance, and writing are the condition for words; and furthermore, the condition for consciousness, concepts as well as beings. And only upon this huge web of différance (and trace, writing), which indeed opens to differences and in determinations, beings are possible. There is no being outside of the web of differentiation. This web becomes all-including for it is the only possibility and condition for words, concepts, beings, as well as consciousness. An extraordinary metaphor in Derrida's Speech and Phenomena, "The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exits" (SP 104). Does not this mean that there is no way out of this "gallery"? Is that to say that there is no way out of this web? This is perhaps true, for Derrida clearly says this in Of Grammatology, "There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; iln'y a pas de hors-texte]" (OG 158). Text is a web of différance or play of differences, a web so secure that nothing can be possible without it. But at bottom it can provide nothing "secure" for it is groundless. Therefore, in this all-including web there is no way out. Moreover, we already know the reason; the exit is in itself. In this boundless web there is no outside-in this sense, it is not only "there is not outside of the text" but rather "there is no outside," or in more precise words, in this boundless web, there is no possibility for the "outside." To put it in Heideggerian expression is to say that it itself conceals the outside but here the implied meaning is rather theordinary Mengxue Wu 93 meaning of the word. In this sense, this web-the structure of différance-is neither open or closed, for it is both open and closed. And this all-including web extends even beyond the field of signified presence of linguistic (differential) to the presence in general. This web becomes so protective because every presence in general in our every consciousness is involved and thus appears as substitution. How does Derrida make this transition? A passage in "Différance" cannot be ignored. At the beginning of his argument, Derrida indeed prudently limits his discussion to linguistics, where he talks about the signified presence. After engaging with Saussure's principle of differentiation, Derrida draws his first consequence, "...that the signified concept is never present in itself, in an adequate presence that would refer only to itself" (SP 140). A little further, we can see that Derrida expands this to all signs in general: "As there is no presence before the semiological difference or outside it, we can extend what Saussure writes about language in sign in general" (141). "Signs in general" is involved into the web of différance: "...we shall designate by the term différance the movement by which language, or only code, any system, of reference in general, becomes 'historically' constituted as a fabric of differences" (141). In this web of linguistic differences, questions that have the syntax "what?" "what is," "who is," are not valid independently because the speaking subject is already inscribed in the differences of language. However, this web is not just the web of language it is also a web for the presence in general. The passage that follows the analysis of language is very important for this expansion. What we discussed above-the signified presence and the presence in general-remain in the domain of language and the sign. Then what about the presence that is not in this domain? Does it still belong to presence and in turn, the structure of différance? Or the question would be precise if one asks it in a different way: Is this system of différance still suitable for other fields beyond language, for example, consciousness prior to language? Derrida has anticipated this sort of question. He writes, We might be tempted by an objection: to be sure, the subject becomes a speaking subject only by dealing with the system of linguistic differences, or again, he becomes a signified subject (generally by speech or other signs) only by entering into the system of differences. In this sense, certainly, the speaking or signifying subject would not be self-present, insofar as he speaks or signifies, except for the play of linguistic or semiological difference. But can we not conceive of a presence LLIDS 2.1 94 and self-presence of the subject before speech or its signs, a subject's self-presence in a silent and intuitive consciousness? (146) An answer to this question allows Derrida to expand the presence from the signified and concept to the presence in general. Thus, he expands the web of linguistic differences into différance, an all-including system and a condition for all presence, a gallery that has no bound and no outside, for it "...includes in itself its own exits." This question shows itself as a question concerning consciousness: consciousness that is "before" language. As Derrida writes, "...such a question therefore supposes that prior to signs and outside them, and excluding every trace and différance, something such as consciousness is possible" (146-7). The question now is focused on whether or not consciousness can be presented by itself without referring to others. For Derrida, consciousness is always the consciousness of a "subjective existence in general,"(147)and since the subjective existence is involved in the question of the presence in general, and particularly, in the self-presence, so does consciousness. "Just as the category of subject is not and never has been conceivable without reference to presence as hypokeimenonorousia, etc., so the subject as consciousness has never been able to be evinced otherwise than as self-presence" (147). Consciousness, shown as self-presence, returns to Derrida's discussion of presence and therefore, belongs to the web of différance, trace, that is, "the text." The process of Derrida's analysis, from linguistic signs, presence in general, and consciousness as self-presence, to "the text" of trace/différance, is the process of the expansion of the domain of "the text." "There is nothing outside of the text" (OG 158).This strong statement concludes that all kinds of presence, signified, concepts, the self-presence of consciousness, in one word, presence in general, have to be involved in "the text," the strange structure of différance and supplement. In that the web of différance and the knots on the web- the supplements-are all-including and boundless, this web is spreading endlessly so that everything is engaged indifférance as the substitution of différance. Therefore, according to this logic, what we get is because différance does not exist, and it just sends its relegates/representatives/proxies; there is nothing but supplements; there is nothing but text. The text itself is closed even though inside the text there are possibilities and necessities of opening onto Mengxue Wu 95 différance; and this closedness is not simply because of Derrida's logic of open-logically defined by closedness. 8 It is closed because "...there is nothing outside of the text." In this specific example of Rousseau, Derrida defends this nothing-buttext and the absence of the Nature and "real mother," which is the natural consequence of nothing-but-text. He says: There is nothing outside of the text [there is no outside-text; iln'y a pas de hors-texte]. And that is neither because JeanJacques' life, or the existence of Mamma or Thérèse themselves, is not of prime interest to us, nor because we have access to their so-called "real" existence only in the text and we have neither any means of altering this, nor any right to neglect this limitation. All reasons of this type would already be sufficient, to be sure, but there are more radical reasons. What we have tried to show by following the guiding line of the "dangerous supplement," is that in what one calls the real life of these existences "of flesh and bone," beyond and behind what one believes can be circumscribed as Rousseau's text, there has never been anything but writing; there have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the 'real' supervening, and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation of the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, in the text, that the absolute present, Nature, that which words like "real mother" name, have always already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing as the disappearance of natural presence.(OG 158-9) In this passage, what we can see is that there is nothing outside of the text because the real mother of Nature does not exist and also because, what we have is just supplement. Nature and "real mother" are purely absent, also, différance-the movement of traces-does not exist; what we have is just the supplement-the addition of what is absent. Because the absence is abyss and différance is groundlessness, supplements thus are a chain with infinite supplements. This "adding" movement is the structure of différance, which it is always differing and deferring, and which it is always tracing, 8 Cf. Derrida, "Violence and Metaphysics," the analysis concerning the other and the same. LLIDS 2.1 96 writing, and erasing. Everything is in the difference and deferral. From différance not only rises the unstable surface-supplement, word, the text, the "delegate, representative, and proxy," (SP 152) but also rises the meaning of language by the adroit and clever balance game of différance. Therefore, what should be "abnormal" becomes "normal"; what is differed and deferred becomes substitution; disorder becomes an order as disorder, a disordered order, or to put it in one word, order. Supplement, trace, and the text, as difference and deferral between words, though unstable and disordered, fill the dictionary in complete and platitude. Derrida's open and its closure are like a dictionary, being opened, and after it has been read, closed. As Derrida emphasizes several times, "There is nothing outside of the text"; "The gallery is the labyrinth which includes in itself its own exit"; and in "Violence and Metaphysics," he comments on Husserl, "Nothing can appear outside, the appurtenance to 'my world' for an 'I am'" (WD 131). There is no outside. And thus, there is no "overcoming" of metaphysics" (Heidegger, the Question of Being and History 63).Derrida cannot agree with Heidegger who tries to use "dissemblance" and "disguise" as the concealment of the truth of Being and thus let the truth of Being be. Derrida calls this belief "Heideggerean hope" (SP 159). For Derrida, however, there is no such hope. He writes in Heidegger, the Question of Being and History, ...that there is no chance, that there will never be any chance for those who might think of metaphor as a disguise of thought or of the truth of being. There will never be any chance of undressing or stripping down this naked thinking of being which was never naked and never will be. (62) If one really "undresses" the thinking of Being, according to Derrida, one will find nothing. Because this Being, as well as "real mother" and Nature for Rousseau, as well as the "truth of Being" for Heidegger, are from the outset absent, like the center of an onion. This is quite a sad news for there is no hope, no outside, and no possibility of going out of this web. One might object this "impossibility of going to the outside" by taking up Derrida's position of "aporia"-the relationship between possibility and impossibility. In this position, as Derrida addresses, the only possibility is nothing but impossibility. You can only forgive someone when this person is unforgivable; otherwise, when the misdeed is minor and this person is easily forgiven, you are forgiving nothing. "Forgiving, if it is possible, Mengxue Wu 97 can only come to be as impossible" ("A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event" 449). The impossibility of forgiving is the possibility of it. Thereby the impossibility of going to the outside is exactly the possibility to go to the outside. This objection by using the logic of aporia flips over the possibility and impossibility of going to the outside: if one can get to the outside so easily, it is even not "getting out", on the contrary, if it is an impossibility to get to the exit, then this is the possibility of going to the outside. Is not this logic the only logic: the logic of différance, the only logic of thinking? Via this logic, even the thinking of "the impossibility of going to the outside" involves in the web of différance. In the web of différance, any raised question or objection will just be a "part" of différance, a possibility of the impossibility. Therefore, in this structure of différance, there is no open. Indeed, deconstruction is not destruction. It is just an inner "explosion" on the "root," under the surface. Though the root and its stability are undermined by differing, deferring, tracing, and supplying, the surface is well-maintained. This is the strategy of deconstruction: digging deeply. Speaking metaphorically, this strategy jeopardizes the root of the tree of Western philosophy. However, the tree is still blooming, rather, this tree is even more flowery just because the root is removed by deconstruction so that no one can hurt its root fundamentally. By the name of deconstruction, metaphysics can never and will never be overcome or overthrown. In the huge and bottomless chess game, everything seems open and chaotic, in fact, it obeys the "rule" of trace. This web is boundless and groundless, needless to say, it does not exist and has no power and governs nothing. However, all things are all in it and cannot escape it. It is powerless but also powerful. No one can deny it and no one can resist it. There is no resistance for it because it will engulf resistance in its web and its game by revealing that there is no "enemy" to begin with. This web takes metaphysics apart not to destroy it but to protect it, therefore, no one can destroy it from its foundation. This is because of nothing but the fact that there is no foundation at all. We must affirm it [différance]-in the sense that Nietzsche brings affirmation into play-with a certain laughter and with a certain dance (SP 159). This is true. For this aporia's play of différance, boundless, and groundless, no outside and no overcoming, when it comes to denial, resistance, and objection, the play will laugh secretly and mock at any rejections, at their energy and impetuosity. LLIDS 2.1 98 Works Cited Derrida, Jacques. "A Certain Impossible Possibility of Saying the Event." Translated by Gila Walker. Critical Inquiry, vol. 33, no. 2, winter 2007, pp. 441-461. ---. Heidegger, the Question of Being and History. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington. University of Chicago Press, 2016. ---. Of Grammatology. Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. ---. Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs. Translated by David B. Allison. Northwestern University Press, 1973. ---. Writing and Difference.Translated by Alan Bass. University of Chicago Press, 1978. Heidegger, Martin. Off the Beaten Track. Edited and translated by Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge University Press, 2002. Husserl, Edmund. Logical Investigations. Translated by J. N. Findlay. Routledge, 2001. Saussure, Ferdinand de.Course in General Linguistics. Translated by Wade Baskin. Philosophical Library, 1959.

LOGOS & EPISTEME, X, 2 (2019): 207-213 QUINE AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENT Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinctionwhen coupled with some other plausible and related viewsimplies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework. This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot apparently be captured in the orthodox Quienan framework. For the purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine's problem of demarcation. In this paper this problem will be articulated and it will be shown that the typical sorts of responses to this problem are all unworkable within the Quinean framework. It will then be shown that the lack of resources to solve this problem within the Quinean framework implies that Quine's version of the indispensability argument cannot get off the ground, for it presupposes the possibility of making such a distinction. KEYWORDS: mathematics, indispensability, knowledge, holism, confirmation, ontology 1. Introduction It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction-when coupled with some other plausible and related views-implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework.1 This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot apparently be captured in the orthodox Quinean framework. For the purpose of simplicity let us call this Quine's problem of demarcation. In this paper this problem will be articulated and it will be shown that the typical sorts of responses to this problem are all unworkable within the Quinean framework. It will then be shown that the lack of resources to solve this problem within the Quinean framework undermines Quine's version of the indispensability argument, for it presupposes the possibility of such a distinction. 1 See W.V.O. Quine "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 20-43. Michael J. Shaffer 208 2. Quine and the Problem of Demarcating Science and Mathematics Quine is duly famous for his critique of the analytic/synthetic distinction in his 1951 article "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," despite persistent disagreement about the significance of this work. Nevertheless, given Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine (and those who follow in his naturalistic footsteps) regard all statements as being empirical in character in some important sense. Thus, every statement is supposed to be subject to revision in light of empirical evidence. Of course, this is not news to us today, but what this implies about teasing apart pure mathematics from empirical theory has not been properly appreciated. What it immediately and most obviously implies is that Quineans cannot discriminate pure mathematics from empirical science by asserting that the propositions that make up mathematical theories are analytic, whereas the propositions that make up empirical theories are synthetic. This is troubling because in practice there appears to be a quite sharp distinction between the practices of mathematics and the empirical sciences. Presumably we would then like to be able to partition the complete body of known statements K into M––the mathematical statements––and E––the empirical statements, such that E  K and M  K. But, in order to accomplish this task, a plausible criterion C that grounds the distinction between the elements of E and M must exist. This figure captures the necessary distinction: K E & M E & M E & M E & M Quine and the Incoherence of the Indispensability Argument 209 Here, according to the Quinean view, we are only to adopt ontological commitment to those claims that lay within the E regions of K. What we then need, in the spirit of Quine's "no entity without identity" dictum, is a criterion of identity that could demarcate mathematical statements from empirical statements (and thereby also a related criterion to demarcate the statements of pure mathematics from those of applied mathematics). Without such an identity criterion, Quineans would violate their own ontological scruples. Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction immediately shows that Quineans cannot use analyticity as the criterion for demarcating mathematical statements from empirical statements in K and so we must look elsewhere if we are to solve the Quinean problem of demarcation This inability to discriminate pure mathematics from empirical science on the basis of the analytic/synthetic distinction in the Quinean framework is then exacerbated further when it is also recognized that traditional methodological accounts of pure mathematics are wildly unrealistic and depend on the viability of a workable notion of a priority. Those accounts typically treat the methodology of pure mathematics as the development of necessarily true axiomatic systems where theorems are proved on the basis of the axioms by the use of a priori methods, but this is simply not true of the actual practice of mathematics as numerous philosophers of mathematics have now come to realize. Lakatos in particular is largely responsible for this recognition.2 More importantly, Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction also simultaneously eliminates the viability of using either the a priori/a posteriori distinction or the necessary/contingent distinction as the basis for demarcating empirical science from pure mathematics because, at least for Quineans, as a result of the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction, there is no a priori knowledge and there are no necessarily true propositions. Quine held that the class of analytic truths is the just the class of a priori knowable truths and the class of a priori knowable truth is just the class of necessary truths. Similarly, the class of synthetic truths is just the class of a posteriori knowable truths and the class of a posteriori knowable truths is just the class of contingent truths. But according to Quine there 2 See Imre Lakatos, "Proofs and Refutations," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 14 (1963-4): 1-25, 120-139, 221-243, 296, 342, Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1976) and Imre Lakatos, "A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of Mathematics," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 27 (1976): 201223. Michael J. Shaffer 210 are no analytic truths and so there are no truths that are knowable a priori and there are no necessary truths. So, as we saw earlier Quineans cannot use the analytic/synthetic distinction to do the work of C and for the same basic reason they can use neither the a priori/a posteriori distinction nor the necessary/contingent distinction to do the work of C. Moreover, they cannot use any criterion that employs any of these conceptual distinctions, for there are no such distinctions according to Quine.3 Yet more troubling still is the recognition that Quine's rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction also implies a radical sort of confirmational holism, whereby the whole of our system of beliefs is the proper unit of confirmation relative to observational data.4 In other words the whole body of our beliefs is at issue when it comes to the issue of confirmation. This means that when we consider the acceptability of our beliefs it must be done in a global manner and when our system of beliefs conflicts with observational data we are then confronted with the infamous Quine/Duhem thesis.5 This is the assertion that 3 Quine makes an alternative and more mature attempt to specify C later on in W. V. O. Quine, From Stimulus to Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 52-57. There he argues that the distinction between empirical statements and those of pure mathematics can perhaps be established as follows. Empirical statements and sets of empirical statements imply observation categoricals, whereas the statements of pure mathematics individually and jointly do not. This suggestion is variously problematic as follows. First, this approach fails to specify a defining feature of specifically mathematical statements, as opposed to other non-empirical statements. Moreover, it makes the statements of pure mathematics meaningless and devoid of truth values given his adherence to the view that all semantic content is ultimately grounded empirically. Finally, semantic content is typically generated only by sets of statements that must involve at least some empirical claims, but in Quine's system there is no way in practice tease apart which statements in a testable set with semantic content are specifically conferring the empirical content on that set. This is due to his subscription to a form of semantic holism. We cannot in most cases selectively and sequentially delete statements and then check to see if semantic content remains and this is simply because critical semantic mass is not a property of single sentences (From Stimulus to Science, 48-49). Elsewhere, he famously tells us that "It is misleading to speak of the empirical content of an individual statement ("Two Dogmas," 43)," and also that "the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science ("Two Dogmas," 42)." In fact, Quine admits all of these charges (From Stimulus to Science, 55-57) and so even he acknowledges that this approach is problematic. 4 In Quine's later work this more extreme view is relaxed and Quine holds that "large" chunks of our systems of belief are the units of confirmation. See W.V.O. Quine, "Five Milestones of Empiricism," (1975) reprinted in Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981). 5 See W.V.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970) and W.V.O. Quine and Joseph Ullian, The Web of Belief (New York: Random House, 1970). Quine and the Incoherence of the Indispensability Argument 211 when our holistic system of beliefs is faced with empirical falsification, we must give up something to restore consistency, but that there is nothing in particular we must give up. We can give up the observation statement itself or one or more theoretical beliefs that give rise to the contradiction. As a result, when our system of beliefs is faced with falsification we must give something up, but we can typically restore consistency in a number of ways by adjusting our beliefs. This view then also undermines the principled possibility of using the concept of revisability to make the distinction between the statements of mathematics and those of science. What is the of great interest is that in discussing the role of mathematics and its ontology in the context of its application in empirical theory, Quine––along with Putnam––subscribed to the infamous indispensability arguments.6 Such indispensability arguments take the following generic form: P1: We ought to have ontological commitments to all and only entities that are indispensible to our best scientific theories. P2: Mathematical entities are indispensible to our best scientific theories. Therefore, we ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities. These arguments essentially conclude that our ontological commitments to the existence of mathematical entities should be on a par with our ontological commitments to the theoretical entities appealed to in empirical theories because indispensable mathematical propositions employed in such theorizing accrue confirmation holistically when the empirical propositions in question are confirmed. That is to say, all of the propositions used in some given empirical endeavor––including those that are a part of mathematics––accrue confirmation jointly because no proposition can be confirmed in isolation and mathematics is in some crucially important sense indispensable to the conduct of the work of the empirical sciences. But this also means that the difference between the statements of pure mathematics and the statements of the empirical sciences also cannot be grounded 6 For the origin of the indispensability arguments see W.V.O. Quine, "On What There Is," Review of Metaphysics 2 (1948): 21-38, "Two Dogmas," Word and Object (New York, MIT Press, 1960), "Carnap and Logical Truth," Synthese 12 (1960): 350-374, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), Theories and Things (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981), Hilary Putnam, Philosophy of Logic (New York: Allen and Unwin, 1972), Mathematics, Matter and Method, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1979). For discussion of these arguments see Mark Colyvan, The Indispensability of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Penelope Maddy, Realism in Mathematics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990). Michael J. Shaffer 212 in the differing ontological attitudes towards the referents of mathematical statements and the referents of empirical statements, for what we should take to exist is just what our best total theory of the world indicates as existing.7 So given the Quinean stance on ontology the criterion C cannot be difference in ontological attitude, for there are no such differences. But, commitment to the indispensability arguments strongly indicates that Quine and those who follow his lead must identify some principled manner by which mathematical propositions can be distinguished from other propositions. Otherwise, the indispensability arguments verge on being nonsensical, for their very formulation depends on such a distinction. In the indispensability argument both P1 and P2 assume such a distinction. In order to make the indispensability argument work we must already have in hand a viable criterion C by which we can distinguish statements involving mathematical entities from statements of empirical science. Otherwise we would have no way to establish P2, i.e. that some specifically mathematical entities are indispensable to any scientific theory. This is because we would have no way to determine which statements concern mathematical entities and it might turn out that unbeknownst to us there are no mathematical entities involved in science at all. If that were true, then the indispensability argument would just be pointless. Similarly, absent some criterion to ground the principled difference between mathematical and scientific statements we would have no way to determine that we ought to be ontologically committed to. This is because we could not follow P1––the claim that the only entities that we should be committed to are those that are indispensable only to our scientific theories––in practice if we do not know what count as specifically scientific claims and what count as statements of pure mathematics. What all of this ultimately appears to imply about discriminating pure mathematics from empirical science within the Quinean framework should now be apparent and it is deeply troubling. Namely, there is no obvious way to ground the clearly real and important distinction between the empirical sciences and pure mathematics in light of orthodox Quinean principles. Quine explicitly recognizes in his 1951 article that the statements of pure mathematics are as revisable as those of any empirical science, but does not appear to see how deeply that this threatens the very distinction between the two types of statements and between the two disciplines. What he does not recognize is that his views, when taken together, threaten the identity conditions for mathematical and empirical statements. Quine himself seems only to have recognized that at the superficial level the difference between the mathematical elements of our belief systems and the more properly 7 See Quine, "On What There Is." Quine and the Incoherence of the Indispensability Argument 213 empirical elements is one of degree of entrenchment in our belief system. More specifically, typically then the propositions of mathematics are supposed to be more deeply entrenched than the propositions of empirical theories. But, that is just to say that when our belief system faces falsification we are (typically) psychologically less inclined to give up the propositions of pure mathematics than we are to give up observation statements or more properly empirical statements of the empirical sciences. But, this is nothing more than a difference in psychological attitudes towards those types of statements which (1) is itself totally ungrounded on a theoretical level––although it does serve to explain the "felt" necessity of mathematics, and (2) which may vary across individuals. Nevertheless, this simply and directly implies that there is no obvious, principled and theoretically grounded criterion C that can be used to make distinction between the statements of pure mathematics and the statements of the empirical sciences within the Quinean corpus. So, for Quineans it appears to be the case that there really is no identifiable principled difference between science and pure mathematics. But, this conclusion is wildly implausible given the practice of both mathematics and the empirical sciences and it renders the indispensability argument incoherent. Moreover, if Quineans simply fall back to the view that conformational holism is ultimately the source of support for all statements in the web of belief––including those of mathematics––and thus fixes ontological commitment, it would simply be a concession that the indispensability argument is simply irrelevant because that would require conceding P1. Doing so would also presumably entail the kind of indiscriminate and comprehensive Platonism that is at odds with the conservative nature of Quine's attitude towards the existence of mathematical entities in particular and abstract objects in general as forcefully argued for in his 1960a and which is clearly precluded by P1. Quine wants us to commit only to the existence of those mathematical entities that are in fact indispensable to science and not indiscriminately to the existence of all mathematical entities. So, especially given the "no entity without identity" principle, Quineans need to acknowledge the problem and to provide a principled manner in which pure mathematics can be distinguished from empirical science that retains all––or at least most––of the basic Quinean views and which allows us to makes sense of the indispensability arguments. However, it is not at all clear how this might be accomplished while retaining the core of Quine's argument against the viability of the analytic/ synthetic distinction. So, Quine's views may simply be inconsistent when it comes to this particular issue.

Stanley Cavell: Phtlosophy, literature and criticism, edited by James Loxley and Andrew Taylor (Manchester University Press, 201 1), 76-91. A soteriology of reading: Cavell's excerpts from memory WilliamDay I can see that my clinical issues may have enabled a couple of critical insights here. But what does it take for the critical to inspire the clinical? Sta;iley Cavell, A Pitch of Philosophy The dificulty in understanding Stanley Cavell's relation to literary criticism is felt, typically if not rnost acutely, not so much by those trained in philosophy as by those trained in literary criticism. This undoubtedly is a by-product of the fact that most philosophers trained in the tradition in lv;hich Cavell himself was trained are, by and large, happy to ignore his writings in and about criticism. Still, it is not surprising that those trained in literary criticism can find his critical writings perplexing. There is, after all, an intimate overlapping and criss-crossingbetween Cavell's writing aboutJ. L. Austin and LudwigWittgenstein and scepticism and acknowledgement, on the one hand, and his subsequent (and often, his immediately succeeding) writing about Shakespeare and film and opera, on the other hand. Absent serious and sustained engagement with that philosophical writing and the philosophical texts that provoke it, you rvill find that sizeable regions of Cavell's thought are simply opaque to you. One might imagine that the best advice to give such readers of Cavells writings in and about criticism is, simply: read more philosophy. But beyond its unhelpfulness (because it says the obvious), that advice runs the danger of encouraging the sarne error that it wants to locate in others, of separating Cavell tire philosopher from Cavell the literary (and 61m and opera) critic and theorist. Beginning with his {irst essays, however, Cavell himself has describe<i the work of literary criticism ar.rd of philosophy in ways that show them to be profoundly revealing of one another. More recently, Caveli has been drarvn to the parallel between the demands of philosophy as he conceives it * illustrated A soteriology oJ reading in the method, ofth. 1.t., Wittgenstein and of ordinary language philosophy and the demands of autobiography. If the former parallel (between philosoplry and literary criticism) shows itself in operation to be part of a sketch of a theory of criticism what Caveil has chosen to call 'a theology of reading' (TOS 53) so, toof his recent efforts at philosophy-as-autobiography are concerned with the point of reading no less than with the practice of writing, and they express cavells interest in a soteriological or redemptive understanding ofreading. ln what follows I will want to bring out the intimacy between Cavell,s practice of philosophy and his remarks on literary criticism by considering fwo pairs of sentences from cavell! essay 'T.he politics of Interpretationl first published (under the title 'Philosophy as Opposed to What?') in 1982. I will then work my way from some pertinent descriptions in cavellk semi-autobiographical'Philosophy and the Arrogation ofvoice' (the first chapter of Apitclr of Philosophy from 1994) to rhe fragment of cavell's autobiography pubrished in 2006 as 'Excerpts from Memory' (republished, though not without some minor textual variations, as the opening chapter of Little Did I Knor.u). My aim in reading these three texts together is to make explicit an argument I find in them for the redemptive structure of the work of reading, an argument that moves through these texts from theory to practice, culminating in the latter text's climactic retold memory that cavell labels his 'revelation of paternal hatred' {EM779; IDK 16). Philosophy and criticism The intimacy befween Cavell's practice of phllosophy and his remarks on literary criticism is found almost everywhere in the pages of his first collection of essays, MastWeMeanWhatWeSay?, where the thought ofWittgenstein and Kierkegaard is revealed through the same attention to the impact or impression oftheir words that caveil brings to his readings ofBeckett and shakespeare. An illuminating statement of this cornection is given a dozen years iater in cavell's essay'The Politics of Interpretationl while there is much in this essay that bears on the topic of the present volume, I want to concentrate on two pairs of sentences from this essay as prelude to what I will say about'Excerpts from Memoryl The first pair of sentences appears sornewhat buried in a footnote which they conclude: 'The underlying subject of what I take criticism to be is the subject of examples. I suppose it is the underlying subject ofwhat I take philosophy as such to be' (TOS 47 n.l}). As I read it, Cavellt claim is not merely that criticism deais with or trades in examples, that it takes specific works (of literature, painting, music, etc.) for its subject, but that its sublect is examples. 77 7978 WilliamDay That is, criticism practised rightly is inevitably concerned with the status ofthe examples it employs to alter our way of seeing or hearing, with what they have to teach us about such things, and especially with how anything ever should come to serue as an example, an example oJ this rather than of something else. What determines such a status? To appreciate how this question can be meant quite generally, consider the following brief series of wonders from Cavell's The Claim of Reason: 'What is the difference between regarding an object now as an individual, now as an example? One way of putting the problem about examples (and hence one problem of universals) is: How is the question'bf whatisthis object (saywhat we call a shoe) an example?" to be answered? One wants to answer it by holding up the shoe and crying out, "Why, an example of this!" Would it help to hold up a different shoe? If you did, and someone then replies, "Nor.u I see what it (the first shoe) is an example ofi'what would he have seen? (This seems to be what Berkeleyt idea of a particular idea (or object) representing others of "the same sort" amounts to)' (CR 186).I The context of Cavellt remark it is, roughly put, an aesthetic context suggests to me that the following distinction might direct the question about examples to fertile ground. The underlying interest in examples in literary criticism and in philosophy is not, curiously, an interest in what an example shares with whatever it is an example of; whereas that does seem to be our interest in examples when we are, say, choosing a carpet or a sofa fabric, or when we do natural science. That is, while in these activities we do speak of examples (or rather, of samples and of controlled experiments) as being of interest to us because of how they are like what they exemplify (an example as an instance or token), we also speak in aesthetic contexts of something being the 'right' or 'telling' or'perfect' example, one which interests us because of its emblematic aptness or richness (example as exemplar).2 While I do not say that this is an absolutely clean distinction, it seems right to say that when we are interested in something as instance or token we mostly are not interested in it as exemplar, and vice versa. Our interest in one eclipses our interest in the other, like two aspects of the same figure. What this means is that these two senses of 'example' are distinguished not by the classes ofobjects they pertain to but by the interest we happen to take in something. I can point to one and the same instance of 'clutch hitting' in baseball, for example, with an interest in teaching the use of the term to someone new to the game, but also in the course of explaining why pst this hit at this late moment in fhis championship game produces such an explosion of admiration and disbelief and praise why, thanks to that effect on :us, it epitomizes clutch hitting. We can take an example that seems to sit at the crossroads of literature and philosophy: the early dialogues of Plato, in their proposing to find the definitions ofpiety or virtue or beauty, often can be read, A soteriology of reading and perhaps are best read, as moving from some pitifully poor example or set ofexamples ofthe quality in question offered by Socrates' interlocutor at the beginning of the dialogue to what one might call the exemplary exemplification of that quality, and of its absence, in what Socrates and his interlocutors, respectively, inevitably show of themselves that is, in the action of the dialogue. (Here the pertinence of the question about examples to autobiography, the topic ofthe second section below, should begin to show itself.) To understand that philosophy could be concerned at bottom with examples is, in the mouth of Cavell, to understand the stunning accuracy, and the discerning ear, employed in the procedures ofJ. L. Austin and of ordinary language philosophy. While one can be impressed by the glorious mundanenessofAustin'sprofferedexamplestoillustrate'whatwesaywhen (forinstance: when we knock things over at the dinner table; when we step on a snail; when we tie a string across a stairhead; when we feed the penguins peanuts3), their mundaneness does not imply that they function as mere instance or token for Austin, as they might, say, for Plato. (Here I have in mind those moments in the Platonic dialogues where Socrates introduces the activities of the farmer or physician or carpenter or athletic trainer in order to advance, or disguise, his line of questioning.) Something else, something dificult to see, is being asked of us when Austin reminds us that 'we may join the army or make a gift voluntarily, we may hiccough or make a small gesture involuntarily', but we cannot, ordinarily, join the army involuntarily or hiccough voluntarily.a What we are to do with any such example of our speaking life, proffered in the practice of ordinary language philosophy, is not to treat it as an instance ofa kind, that is, to generalize it (as if all such examples point to the same moral: 'language is llke thk') , but to do something mo rellke perJorm the example, or try it on. We are asked to imaginatively hear the words surrounded by our originary interest in them, by the form of life in which they are at home. In 'The Politics of Interpretation', Cavell characterizes ordinary language philosophy as 'the recovery of fthe human] voice' (TOS 48). It is as if he were claiming that our coming to speak (again) depended on our knowing how to take the right interest in things that is, roughly, on our knowing how to read examples as exemplary.s (This thought will be key to my reading of 'Excerpts from Memory' in the second and third sections below.) I turn next to a second pair of sentences from 'The Politics of Interpretation', sentences from the stretch of argument culminating in Cavellt claim to be producing'a theology ofreading': 'It is not first ofall the text that is subject to interpretation but we in the gaze or hearing of the text ... Access to the text is provided not by the mechanism ofprojection but by that oftransference' (TOS 52). The aim ofour reading, ifwe recognize ourselves as the textt Y 80 WilliamDay victim, or patient, is to be guided by the text, past the risks of its seductiory to our freedom from the person of the author. As Cavell explains when he returns to this thought some years later, 'that idea implies that the fantasy of a textt analyzirg its reader is as much the guide of a certain ambition of reading of philosophy as reading as that ofthe reader s analyzing the text' (Cf t t:). fo read a text in the former way under the fantasy of the text analyzing me is to find ways in which it shows me how to find myself beyond it, which is to say beyond myself as its reader. While this emblem of reading as psychoanalytic transference is among Cavell! most memorable claims or discoveries, it is not his immediate counter. proposal to the views of Stanley Fish and Paul de Man, the particular exponents of the theory of reading as deconstruction whom Cavell addresses in 'The Politics of Interpretationl6 Prior to his arriving at this emblem borrowed from a central concept of Freudt teaching, Cavell detours through a specification of what he wants to claim is 'the underwriting of Austin and Wittgenstein by Emerson and Thoreau' (TOS 48) that culminates in his presenting a counteremblem of reading (not as transference but) as salvation or redemption. Here are two observations made along the way of this detour. First, in discussing Emerson while drawing out his difference from de Man, Cavell writes: 'There is always humanly a reason to postpone salvation. But it is part of Emersonk gesture to claim that his genius is redemptive beyond himself. The implication is that if you are not willing to make such claims for your work, do not call it philosophy' (TOS 50). And in the following paragraph, in discussing Thoreau, he says: At the moment I focus on Thoreaut way of saying that reading his book is redemptive. I take it for granted that the scene [described by this sentence fromWalden: "You only need sit still long enough in some attractive spot in the woods that all its inhabitants may exhibit themselves to you by turns"] is oneofinterpretation,ofreadingandbeingread... Sothewritertsilence(that is, this writert writing) declares itself redemptive religiously, aesthetically, and politically' (ToS 5l).' If Cavell s most telling term of criticism of the theory of reading as decon. struction is that it distracts us from what truly requires justification in our philosophical discourse, and that thereby deconstruction shows by its distrac. tion that 'there is always humanly a reason to postpone salvation', why does this language of redemption give way to the related, but differently entangled, language of psychoanalysis? Listen to how Cavell explains it: 'For most of us, I believe, the idea of redemption or redemptive reading and interpretation will not be credible apart from a plausible model or picture of how a text can be therapeutic, that is, apart from an idea ofthe redemptive as psychological, ... [and] I imagine that the credible psychological model of redemption will A soteriology of reading have to be psychoanalytic in character' (fOS St-Z). It seems to me that cavell's shift from the language of redemption to that of psychoanalysis is not completely willed here, as if something makes cavell reluctant to give Freud pride of place.s Or perhaps I should say that the shift is made almost apologetically, as if guided by the thought that, however easy it is to misconstrue this employment of Freud's language in characterizing the aim of reading, it is less easily misconstrued than employing the language of redemption the language of, say, Paul (and I don t mean Paul de Man).e Indeed, the reason for the ease of misconstruing the claim 'reading is to be understood psychoanalytically'is that most'psychoanalytic'readings of texts (including some of Freudt own readings for example, of Hoffmant ,The Sandman') take the text as the primary object of interpretation rather than the reader.l. That this is not how the later wittgenstein sees our relation to his difEcult writing that he describes his methods as offering (not solutions to problems but) treatments, 'like different therapies'rl is one of the principal points of contact between him and the American Transcendentalists Emerson and Thoreau. (Perhaps the best advice one can give in interpreting philosophical Inuestigations is to bear in mind that wittgenstein, as cavell says, tonceives ofphilosophy as a kind ofreading' (TOS 52).) To summarize this first section, I have emphasized and slightly amended the following two claims from'The Politics of Interpretation', (t) the underlying subject of both criticism and philosophy is examples conceived as exemplars; (2) reading is to be understood redemptively, which one can construe to mean 'therapeutically' or 'psychoanalytically] as the reader's being read by the text. The philosophical text so conceived is meant to free us not only from our unexamined or dogmatic beliefs (a familiar task under the traditional conception of philosophy) but also from our unthinking ways of taking in what we read. Similarly, literary criticism so conceived should free us not only from the error of simply projecting ourselves onto the text (a bad theory of interpretation from most any theoretical standpoint) but also from the calamity of sacrificing our thinking to the text, to what cavell calls its seductions. It is in characterizing this latter danger that cavell alludes to Emersont 'Divinity School Address', noting that the point of that address is'to free us from our attachment to the person of the one who brings the message [call thisJesus], an attachment . . . of idolatryl My aim here has been to reveal or flesh out how cavellt signature claim from'The Politics oflnterpretation the claim that reading has the structure oftransference is framed, on one side, by a picture of reading as redemption and, on the other, by Cavellt summary assertion that 'what I arn producing here . . . might be thought of as a theology of reading' ( TOS 53 ). 8l 82 WilliamDay Philosophy and autobio graphy Ifthe goal ofreading is freedom from the person ofthe author, how do we overcome the author whose story we pick up precisely because it is her or his story? That is, how can we be read by someone elset autobiography _ in the instance we are about to take up, the autobiographical 'Exc..pt, frotrr"-o.y' by stanley cavell? Does it help to observe thai autobiography is a genre that from the beginning has been preoccupied with the qo.rtio,' of thi author,s exemplarity thinking ofAugustine and, differentry, of Rousseau and so with the reader's relation to what is there to be emulated or imitated? It may help, but not enough: for even if Augustinet conJessions dramatizes the reader's potential for conversion through an act ofreading even ifits knowredge of every prevarication and postponement I can employ or have employea "guirrrtsalvation somehow opens me to (what Augustine would call) Godt gr;ce _ I may still be at a loss when faced with an autobiography by a -or"-"orl.r,secularJew of four score who claims the mantle of philosophy. And even if the methods of ordinary language philosophy are, as *e ha.,re s"en, concerned with exemplarity and sg as Cavell says, demand a systematic engagement with the autobiographi cal' (Pe 6), we may stil wonder what gaining our freedom from this-ordinary language philosopher engaged with autobiography (this way) might look like (this time). In order to address these questions, we must first add a further piece to the picture of cavell's picture of reading, gleaned from the first chapter-ofhis semiautobiographical text A pitch of phitosophy. one,third of the way through that chapter,-where its recognizably autobiographical part begins, cavel delcribes in brief but vivid detail his parents'contrasting rnfluenJe on his image of or expectations for reading. Here I will consider explicitly only his mothei's influ_ ence. The image of reading that he inherits from his mother pertains to .her uncanny ability to sight-read' music not her facility at it but her attitude while in the midst of it, an attitude cavell comes to identify with the onset of migraine and with 'some kind of melancholy] but which he describes before that as precisely not ... a knack of interpretation, but somethinq like the contrary, a capacity to put aside any interference, as of her o*r, *ill, "rrd to let the body be moved, unmechanically, by the mind of those racing notes' (PP_18). What I imagine Cavell to be noticing in rhinking of readinion the model of sight-reading music, letting'the bodyle moved, ,rn-".h"rri"lly, by themind of those racing notes,, is that the sight_readert ongoing recept**.r, to the passing notes is dependent on her ability t o imagine the sounds of those notes' without some such performative imagination, the body rs fated to move mechanically. ,A soteriology of reading 83 'Imagine the sound' is the imperative characterizing virtually every instance of interpretation in cavellt oeuvre, whether it concerns a work for the theatre, a film or a philosophical text. We reed consider here only some obvious instances. In distinguishing wittgenstein's methods from those of American pragmatism with which they might appear to overlap, cavell observes that 'we must keep in mind how different their arguments sound, and admit that in philosophy it is the sound which makes all the difference' (MWM 36 n. 3t). The flurry of questions that open the first section of cavellt essay onEndgame concludes, 'What gives to fthese characters'] conversation its sound, at once of madness and of plainness>.' (MWM 1r7). cavellt masterfur reading of King Lear rests on his critical attention to the voice uttering the words hnd through that to the phenomenology of the straits of mind'that at each moment inform the characters' progress (UW\UZel). Similarly, the weight Cavell gives to the words spoken in the films that he identifies as comedies of remarriage depends on his conviction that 'the words of dialogue put on the page ... have to be taken from the page and put back, in memory, onto the screen .. . Apart form a clear recall, or a vivid imagination, of these words as spoken by these actors in these environments, my attention to the words may well seem, indeed ought to seem, misplaced or overdone' (PH ll). perhaps it is not surprising in the case of dialogue from the theatre or film, just as in Austinian examples, that imaginatively hearing the words in their originating environrnent is described as something like hearing or being receptive to the sounds of the notes. But to see the extent to which cavell relies on the act ofimaginative hearing, compare this remark on reading Thoreaut writingr again from A pitch of philosophy: 'Writing appe ars inWalden not as an extension but as an experience of speech; . .. it is not different in means or in medium [from speech] . . . for reading with understanding requires reborn sensations, and first in hearing' (ru +t). nut where and how can access to onet imaginative powers, to an equivalent of the enigmatic faculty of perfect pitch' (lf Zt), be construed as an imperative for reading? That such powers of imagination are called for by Cavellt 'Excerpts from Memory', and that satisfying these demands is required for reading this work as redemptive in Emersont and fhoreaut sense as discussed above, is evident in two early passages, both from the first entry of2July 2003. ('Excerpts from Memory'unfolds as a series of dated entries, like a diary of remembrances.) In the first, cavell explains his eschewing a chronological presentation or narrative for this attempt at autobiography because, as he says, 'such a narrative strikes me as leading fairly directly to death, without clearly enough implying the singularity of this life, in distinction from the singularity of all others, all headed in that direction.' Then comes the accurate and familiar term of \ 8584 WilliamDay criticism: 'So the sound of such a narrative would I believe amount to too little help, to me or others' (ntvf zz o; LDK 4,my italics). The second passage occurs even earlier and is, strictly speaking, Cavellt first act of memory in'Excerpts from Memory', a text Cavell begins to write as he awaits an invasive medical procedure, the catheterization of his heart. Remembering 'a previous such period of awaiting surgery',r2 Cavell tells us: 'I discovered fthen] that reading a bookbyVladimirJank6l6vitch on the music of Debussy ... effectively concentrated my attention, partly because of the beauty of the musical illustrations along with the very effort it required for my rusty musicianship to imagine the sounds of the illustrations unfamiliar to me that Jank6l6vitch includes in his text' (EM 768; LDK 2, my iralics). Here it helps to know that musical illustrations (typically, excerpts from a score), in contradistinction to (fu11) musical scores, do not necessarily require of readers 'the effort to imagine the soundsl Depending on how they are used, they might require only that readers spot the similar motion in the notes, or read the quality of a chord, or check that a variant line is the retrograde of another, and so on. Musical illustrations, like any textual illustration, can be used for different purposes. For Cavell to tell us that the illustrations inJank6l6vitcht text demand a greater responsibility, a greater imaginative responsiveness, is thus an important distinguishing feature of this text. The mention of the detail of imagining the sounds of Debussy's music from the score (a singularly difficult task in the case of Debussy as compared wittr, say, a score by Bach or Mozart or Beethoven) together with the fact, dropped between the lines, that Cavell purchasedJank6l6vitch's text in preparation for writing his autobiography (or more specifically, for writing the third chapter of his semi autobiographical text A Pitch of Philosophy) thus prepares Cavellt reader for the kind of reading that will open up the text called'Excerpts from Memoryl The necessity of freeing onet powers of imagination is underscored immediately before that essayt climactic story, to which we are about to turn. Cavell relates and joins two events from his undergraduate days at Berkeley: his fathert request, and his inability to meet the request, to write an acceptance speech for him (his father's written English was worse than his accented spoken English); and Cavell's signing up for an acting class that followed Stanislavski's An Actor Prepares in order to, as he puts it, explore this virtue of imaginationl As he considers the unusualness of this as preparation for a life in philosophy he notes that 'my philosophy teachers would not have accepted Stanislavsikan exercises as bearing on the issues of what we were calling the problem of the existence of other minds. But then those teachers did not need me to write speeches for them' (nm ZZ t ; LDK 14). So Cavellt failure to find words for his father leads him to study Stanislavski on imagining how another feels. If the A soteriology of reading demands of the text before us on our imaginative powers are not yet clear, then we are not imagining hard enough. Cavellt autobiographical entry for 7 J:uiry 2003 begins, 'I believe I can date the moment at which I realized that my father hated me or, perhaps I can more accurately say, wished I did not elst' (EM 778; LDK 14-15). The scene of revelation is the following. Cavell (who is about to turn seven), his mother and his father have on this day moved from the house in Atlanta where he has lived with not only his parents but his grandmother and two beloved uncles (a house he calls for this reason'paradise') to an apartment on the north side of Atlanta where the occupants will be just his parents and him. We are given his state of mind: 'Walking up the stairs to the top floor of the boxlike three-story brick apartment building . . . the catastrophe of the move broke over me in waves that I have periodically felt have never entirely stopped breaking' (EM 780; LDK l7). He enters the darkened front room, his mother in the room off to the right with some women friends, and notices, in particular and in this order, two things. The first is 'a purple glass bowl ... covered with a dome top of matching silver inset with purple glass panels.' He finds that the bowl contains tmall chocolate mint wafers whose tops were covered with tiny white dots of hard candy, a treat I loved to sample when these used to fill this container in anticipation of company coming to the old housel The second object of Cavell's notice is his father, ttanding silently in the semidark at the other end of the sofa', with whom, Cavell tells us, he was rarely in a room alone. Then in the last of several postponements in his relating the moment of his 'revelation of paternal hatred', Cavell reminds us one more time of the importance of sound and imagination in sight-reading (so to speak) the notes of this text, by relating in these words the game he would play as his parents drove into the driveway late at night after he had gone to bed words that could stand for the task of his reader: 'I imagined them getting out of the car, my mother from the left since my father did not drive, then walking up the driveway and across the front porch into the house, measuring my accuracy oJ imagination by how closely the distant sound oJ the opening of thefront door coincided with my imagination of their hauing reached it' (EM 7 8l ; LDI( I 8, my italics). Back in the new apartment with the glass bowl of wafers and Stanleyt father, the story reaches its climax with these sentences: As I took one of the speckled wafers from the purple bowl, I said aimlessly, but somehow to break the silence with my father, "I didn't know we had these here'l He lurched at me, wrenched the dome top and the wafer out of my hands, and said in a violent, growling whisper, "And you still don't know itl"' (EM 781-2i LDK l8). The shock of this telling is surely in the fathert lurch, in the words meant to hurt long before they can be appreciated for their irony in denying what is 86 WilliamDay evident to the senses, and not least in their being whispered, as iftheir violence is to be kept hidden from the women in the next room. Whether that is enough to call on my imagination of the scene not only to picture it in my mind, say, but to take on its philosophical significance, and not to jump at the similarity, however shallow or deep, between the fathert denial of the childt knowledge and the grown-up Cavell s unending interest in the problem of scepticism I find that the shiny purple glass bowl with the speclded wafers has caught my attention. The name for these speckled wafers, as for the speckles or sprinkles themselves, is, of course, 'nonpareils', and they are still a popular confection. Am I to believe that the Stanley Cavell writing in 2003 is unfamiliar with these wafers' proper name? Without deciding that I cannot believe this, even as I notice that Cavell makes a point of telling us that he looks up the term'Mason jar' at a later uncertainty over kitchen vocabulary (EM 805; the observation is omitted from the text in Liffle Did I l{now),1 am content to note that the word he has settled on is not honpareil' or 'disc' but 'wafer113 The purple glass bowl with the dome top, meanwhile, is described as 'somewhat wider but less deep than a drinking tumblerl Such a home for wafers in the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, at least, is called a ciborium (or, if smaller, a pyx). The silver dome 'of matching silver inset with purple glass panels' might call to mind as well a church of the Eastern Orthodox faith, the sort of structure one finds in Cavellt fathert native Poland. But what would be Cavells point in describing the scene with his father so as to allow this imaginative revisioning? The scene is, before all, a scene of deprivation that carries with it at some level for the reader the threat of castration. What is to be gained by recasting it as the childt offer as theJewish child Stanleyt offer of the Eucharist, what we also call communion? But then, what is to be gained by telling the story at all? It clearly costs Cavell dearly, even while its secret has cost him considerably more. Yet he has come to feel that 'its silence [is] blocking something irreplaceablyvaluable' (nUZZl; LOff 6). Bur for whom? If the telling enacts some long-awaited catharsis, how are we invited to feel it, and how does our doing so invite philosophy? Redemptive reading I{ following Emerson and Thoreau, the autobiographical spirit informing Cavell's'Excerpts from Memory'is redemptive, then what is redeemed in the telling ofthis scene ofpaternal hatred is, before all else, the episode itself. The episode began as an offer inJact of communion of sorts, in itself a small thing, from a son to his father with the crippled voice.ta (Cavellt words 'I didn t know , Asoteriology ofreading 87 we had these here' are spoken 'aimlessly, but somehow to break the silence with my father' (ZUZey fDI( 18).) That the boywas punished for this offer by the fathert refusal of it is why, of course, it has singed the outer skin of his memory, altering his sensation of what else not. We may find ourselves wondering not so much what has made Stanley Cavell the philosophical spirit he is, but what saved this boy and allowed him to become Stanley Cavell. But there is more to the episode than its merely autobiographical (that is, its Cavell-specific) interest. By offering his gesture and words as the ritual of the Eucharist, Cavell has cast them in the place of the most representative of representative acts (the giving of the bodys self in words, or the projection of the self's body into language)' an excerpt from memory as exemplar. But that is to say, there is philosophical work for the reader to do here. Here are some work sites: howis it possible to redeem what I experience as an irredeemable act? How do sons grow up to understand their fathers sympathetically rather than self-justifiably? What must a father give up to accept a sont offer of comfort? And how could that sacrifice seem impossible to make? If these questions are asked with their full weight, not only might we come to see how this child prepares himself for the understanding of questions that populate Cavellt essays and books, but we might find ourselves guided to a renewed consideration of the representativeness of our own experiences. Here is where an exemplary moment in our reading offers a path to freedom from the author through the possibility of redeeming the moment. The risk we run of being taken in by what we read, diverted from our orbit by the gravitational pull ofthe text, is present in spades in the autobiographical text. What might it take to notice that the attractions of the genre reside not only in the authort reflections on events and acquaintances in his life but in the remarkably mundane details of that life, including, and perhaps especially, his life before he became an author, became who he is? Even in its most illustrious, because most self-deprecatingr instances the Confessions ofAugustine and the Confessions of Rousseau we are, as it were, set up to be struck by the distinctive banality of the protagonist's actions and transgressions. [n the present instance, a time and a place that I could not have fancied as containing more than the merest possibility of romance the Eastern EuropeanJewish quarter of 1930s Atlanta, Georgia, USA is revealed in Cavell's narrative to be a time and a place where the most life-altering memories were born. And that this discovery is no illusion, not merely the result of a literary conceit, is confirmed, of course, by the quality of the self-reflective or world-important thoughts in Cavellt autobiography, in his philosophical writings and so on by whatever prompts one to take up his story, whatever one imagines Stanley Cavell to have become. 8988 WilliamDay Some such dynamic is what leads to the impression (which I simply assert on its behalf) that autobiography craves idolatry. And the author who wants to prevent such conquests knows if he has any experience at all of being drawn by a text that he cannot simply tell the reader to go her own way now, any more than a therapist can acknowledge a patient's transference for her. As Cavell writes in the foreword to his first book, 'the great teacher invariably claims not to want followers, that is, imitators. His problem is that he is never more seductive than at those moments of rejection (MWMxxxix). It is in this light that I imagine we are asked to see Cavellt gesture of the proffered wafer. Incorporating that simple and familiar emblem of redemption, the gesture helps to dissolve the threat ofidolatryby returning us to our individual work sites that is, if we take Cavellt advice and make the effort (with'reborn sensations, and first in hearing') to'imagine the sounds'of these words in their full resonance at the time of our reading them. For when we do, we have the opportunity to notice that the drama of the moment is not just that between the child Stanley and his father. There is, evidently or manifestly, also the drama between the adult Stanley, writing these words, and his blocked, singed memory of that first drama, the pain of which explains the text's enactment of his delays and postponements in telling it. (To miss this piece of the drama is to miss nothing less than what it takes to transform such memories into words; not a small thing.) Similarly, just as there is the gesture of communion (anyway, an offer of conversation) made from the child Stanley to his father, so there is the adult Stanleyt gesture of writing that figure of communion into his text, the consequences ofwhich it is up to the reader to accept or refuse, a gesture to receive or deny. If the gesture is read as an emblem of redemption, then to receive the gesture is not quite to find oneself, or one's reading, redeemed. (The author is neither our father nor a Father, neither the Son nor his representative.) To receive this author's offer of an emblem of redemption is, in the therapeutic reversal of one's reading, to be moved to redeem it.ts You may do this, for example, by finding yourself returned to excerpts of memories of your father, the one who in a sense cannot be known to you but who, in a critical sense, is known to you alone, the father ofyour vivid and dull and joyful and searing memories, particular memories waiting for their particular redemption in critical self-reflection which is to say, philosophically that you alone can give to them. Ifthat suggestion is an example (ofwhich sort?) ofan answer to the question, 'What, in your reading of Cavell, is to be redeemed?', then it also points the way to answering the questiory 'And what if I don t redeem it?' If a theory of reading were to tell me what musthappen in my engagement with a text, then I cannot imagine what I would do with it. And if a theory of reading knew what A soteriology of reading I am to discover that the text before me knows about me, it still could not tell me. Redemption (of any sort) does not come so easily. It used to be that to redeem was to pay a ransom to get someone out of captivity.t6 Nowadays we might just swipe a card or read offsome numbers over the phone. (And so for us redemption is merely a metaphor if not something less, or worse.) Who is not familiar with such practices, and such theories, of reading? Cavellt 'Excerpts from Memory', with its figure for the Christian figure of a literal offering of the selft body, exemplifies its authort understanding of the aim of reading what I have called Cavell's soteriology of reading as resting on the difficult, but not for that reason unpleasant, work of imaging a thing's proper sound. Where might this work lead? Perhaps, wherever else, to an answer to the perennial and critical question: is there salvation through works?t7 Notes I See also CR 205 for its discussion of the traditional philosopher's appeal to examples to illustrate or make 'a particular claim to knowledgel 2 An important corollary to this distinction, ifnot this distinction itself, is noted in the following passage late in Part I of Wittgensteint Philosophical Investigations: 'We speak ofunderstanding a sentence in the sense in which it can be replaced by another which says the same; but also in the sense in which it cannot be replaced by any other. (Any more than one musical theme can be replaced by another.)' (LudwigWittgenstein,Philosophicallnvestigations,2ndedn, ed. G. E. M.Anscombe and Rush Rhees, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), $531.) 3 See, for example,J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses' and'Three Ways of Spilling lnkl in PhilosophicalPapers,3rdedn, ed.J. O. lJrmson and G.J.Warnock (Oxford: Oxford University Pres s, 7979), 17 5-204,272-87 . 4 Austin, APleaforExcusesl 191. 5 On the idea that learning to talk is conceptually connected to onet taking an interest in onet experience, see my'Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language', in William Day and Mctor J. Krebs, eds., Seeing Wittgenstein Anew (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 20+-24. 6 My interest in Cavellt critique of deconstruction is here limited tq and so exhausted by, its being the occasion for Cavell's articulation of his own view on the work of reading. For those interested in the particulars ofCavellb critique ofdeconstruction, see (naturally) 'The Politics oflnterpretationl TOS 34-59, and PP 55-127. For a reasonably accurate secondary account, see Espen Hammer, Stanley Cavell: Skepticism, Subjectivity, and the Ordinary (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2OO2), 149-63. 7 Cavellt interest in the notion even more than in the frgure ofredemption begins at least as early as his early essays on Beckett and IQerkegaard and figures in his reading ofworks as disparate as Poet'The Black Cat' and the Holl)'wood remarriage comedy 90 WilliamDay The Awful Truth.Particular passages are too numerous and lengthy to include here, but compare'Ending the Waiting Game: A Reading of Beckettt Endgame', MWM 133; SW2 43-4 (where the problem of redemption is linked to, though not solved by, exemplarity); 'Being Odd, Getting Even (Descartes, Emerson, Poe)] IQO 305, 316; and'The Same and Different: The Awt'uI Truth', PH 252 (where the idea of redemption realized through a performance in this case, through Lucyt performance, asJerryt sister, of 'MyDreams are GoneWith the Wind'is perhaps closest to the idea ofa redemptive reading that I sketch in the third section ofthis chapter). 8 The language of (self-)redemption evidently prevailed in its interplay with the psychological when Cavell at an earlier date characterized Emersont and Thoreaut writing: 'Kierkegaard wrote a book about our having lost the authority, hence so much as the possibility, of claiming to have received a revelation. If this means, as Kierkegaard sometimes seems to take it to mean, the end of Christianity, then if what is to succeed Christianity is a redemptive politics or a redemptive psychology, these will require a newburden of faith in the authority of one's everyday experience, onet experience ofthe everyday, ofearth not ofheaven (ifyou get the distinction). I understand this to be the burden undertaken in the writing ofEmerson and of Thoreau ... One might take the newburden of one's experience to amount to the claim to be onet own apostle, to forerun oneseli to be capable of deliverances of oneself ' ( PH 240\ . 9 Readers of Wittgenstein might be reminded here of his writing in the foreword to PhilosophicalRemarks,'Iwotldlike to say "This bookis written to the glory of God'] but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it would not be rightly understood' (ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. Rush Rhees, trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 197 5),7). 10 See Sigmund Freud, 'The Uncanny', inWritings on Art and Literature (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997), 193-233, esp. 201-9, and more particularly the footnotes on 206 and 207-8.I arn not claiming that interpreting the text and interpretlng the reader of the text are mutually exclusive (or that Freud is not sometimes engaged in both); compare CT ll2-13. 1 1 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, $133. 12 The linking of these two surgeries at the start of an autobiographical exercise suggests that we are being asked to imagine, or to try to imagine, a writing born from opening up or tearing open the body. 13 After reading a version ofthis chapter, with Stanley Cavell in the audience, at the conference in Edinburgh that was the originating occasion for the present volume, I asked Cavell the question that I here say I do not want to decide. He responded that, while writing'Excerpts] (1) he didn'tknow that the confection he describes is called 'nonpareils', and (2) he did not want to know, did not want to look it up somehow' 'wafer'was the word he wanted. I took his response as encouragement for the interpretation that follows. 14 Cavell describes the father of his memory as having 'no ordinary language, his Russian and Polish fragmentary, his Hebrew primitive, his Yiddish frozen, his A soteriology of reading English broken from the beginning' (PP 2l). 15'Thereversalsofreading'isaguidingnotioninthelaterstagesofTimGouldsstudy of Stanley Cavell's authorial voice and philosophical methods, and it bears comparison (but for another time) to the soteriological aspect under consideration here. See Timothy Gould,HearingThings:Voice andMethodintheWritingoJ Stanley Cavell (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1998). 16 I owe this observation to Kate Lufkin Day. 17 I am fortunate to be able to thank Bill Rothman, Tim Gould and Stanley Cavell for words of encouragement on a first draft of this paper, words that allowed me to return to it with harder questions but not without hope for better answers. I also wish to thank Richard Deming, Bernie Rhie, and Rob Flower for the generous time they gave over to reminding me what the harder questions were that needed asking.

Studies in HistoryStud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa and Philosophy of SciencePlotinus's conception of unity and multiplicity as the root to the medieval distinction between lux and lumen Yael Raizman-Kedar Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa 31905, Israel Received 30 June 2005; received in revised form 12 November 2005Abstract Plotinus resolved the paradox of the immanent transcendence, characterizing the relation between the One and the universe, through his theory of the two energeiai. According to this doctrine, all existents have an internal activity and an external activity: the internal activity comprises the true essence and substance of each being; the external activity is emitted outwards as its image. The source of the emission is thus present in the lower layer of being by virtue of its manifold images. The prominence given to light in elucidating this solution led to a distinction between two types of lights: an original light, corresponding to the internal energeia of every existent, and a secondary light, which is the outflow and image of the first light, existing outside of the luminous body. This paper demonstrates the striking similarity between these two Plotinian lights and the concepts of lux and lumen developed by two thirteenth-century philosophers: Robert Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus. Moreover, the paper contends that the purpose of these two medieval concepts of light was identical to what Plotinus had in mind when he first made the distinction: to account for the relation between the one and the many.  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Plotinus; Albertus Magnus; Robert Grosseteste; Light; Lux; Lumen0039-3681/$ see front matter  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2006.06.006 E-mail address: [email protected] (Y. Raizman-Kedar). 380 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–3971. Introduction From the second half of the twelfth century through the time of Kepler (1571–1630) and Descartes (1596–1650), light was referred to by two distinct terms: lux and lumen. This distinction was used in various contexts, whether scientific, philosophical or theological. The most crucial definition of the two terms as distinct was likely that of the Muslim philosopher and physician Ibn Sina (980–1037). In his commentary on Aristotle's De anima,1 he wrote:1 Tra 2 Av of Ibn Aristo an Ari a bent 3 Fo 4 See 5 On (1997) everythThere are these three intentions . . . of which one is the quality which sight perceives in the sun and in fire . . . the second is that which shines back due to these [sun or fire], that is, the splendour which is seen to fall on bodies and white or black or green is revealed in them . . . If this takes place in one of the phenomena that have light inherently, it will be called lux and its offshoot will be called lumen.2This definition became standard terminology in medieval literature, pervading all areas and disciplines. This paper is concerned with the philosophical motivation for viewing light as a concept split in two. It claims that the distinction between two kinds of lights had long preceded the actual coining of distinct terms for these types. It further demonstrates that the origin for this need can be found within the metaphysical system developed by Plotinus (204– 270). Plotinus's assertion of two basic metaphysical poles of existence-unity and multiplicity-will be shown to stand at the heart of the matter. Among other things, the position taken here implies that light was not divided into lux and lumen in order to draw a line between the physical and geometrical, or between the sensible and spiritual aspects of light, nor was the division intended to reconcile the Platonic and Aristotelian explanations of light.3 Indeed, once formulated the distinction was used for various purposes, among them those mentioned above.4 Nevertheless, I contend that the origin of this clear cut division can be found exclusively within the philosophy of Plotinus, as expressed in his Enneads. The Aristotelian influences leading to this division- and surely there were such influences5-are already present in the Enneads, and therefore may not be attributed to the influence of the new twelfth-century translations. In order to establish the claim that the distinction between two types of light originated in the work of Plotinus, I first examine the notion of the Plotinian One and its relation to multiplicity. Next, I demonstrate the pivotal role of light as the most appropriate analogy for these relations. The split of light in two is shown to be the outcome of the role of light as the leading metaphor elucidating the complicated relations of proximity and distance,nslated into Latin in the second half of the twelfth century by Avendauth and Dominicus Gundissalinus. icenna, Liber de anima III, c.1. Quoted and translated in Gilson (2000), pp. 25–26. For a detailed analysis -Sina's definitions see Hasse (2000), pp. 107–123. Hasse stresses (p. 113) that Ibn-Sina did not accept the telian doctrine of light. He concludes (p. 115) that 'There is hardly any Western reader who does not give stotelian or Grossetestian bent to Avicenna's concept of acquired light (lumen)'. Hasse himself thinks such to be a mistake. r such accounts, see Ronchi (1970), pp. 61–62; Jay (1993), p. 106; Zajonc (1993), p. 98. Smith (2000), pp. 315–336. e example of Aristotelian influence is the use of the Aristotelian term energeia or 'activity'. See Gerson , p. 295, and Bradshaw (2004), pp. 91–92. Another Aristotelian principle employed by Plotinus is that ing complete or perfect tends to reproduce itself. See Bussanich (1996), p. 47. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 381identity and difference between the One and what ensues from it. In the following, I exhibit a close correspondence between the medieval use of lux and lumen as two distinct terms for light on the one hand, and the Plotinian notion of 'light from light' on the other. The relation between lux and lumen, like the relation between the generator and its images, are shown to resemble those existing between a unified principle and its particular instances on every level of the Plotinian universe. Establishing the above correspondence is based on the writings of two thirteenth-century scholars: Robert Grosseteste (1168–1253) and Albertus Magnus (1193/1200–1280). Both devoted extensive discussions to light, and both lived during the decisive period when Greek writings were rediscovered and translated into Latin, as were the commentaries and innovations made by Arab scholarship. Hence, the terms as used by these two scholars had a definitive impact over the next three hundred years. The question of the precise textual transmission of the Plotinian ideas in the Middle Ages is only slightly dealt with here, since the paper proposes a philosophical rather than historical analysis. For the argument to work, all that needs to be shown is that both Grosseteste and Albertus had access to some version or adaptation of Plotinian ideas. The enquiry of exactly when and where these two distinct terms were coined is important and deserving of study, yet it is beyond the scope of this paper.6 The proposal of this paper is to point out the striking similarity between the Plotinian handling of unity and multiplicity through the division of light on the one hand, and the high medieval tendency to split light on the other. 2. Plotinus on unity and multiplicity The problem of creating multiplicity from unity is present throughout the Enneads, and seems to be of major concern for Plotinus. He asks:6 Ibn Hayth substa 7 En transla 8 Th intellec for on case 'c (1993) influen betweeHow from the One, if it is such as we say it is, anything else, whether a multiplicity or a dyad or a number, came into existence, and why it did not on the contrary remain by itself, but such a great multiplicity flowed from it as that which is seen to exist in beings, but which we think is right to refer back to the One.7Plotinus's answer to this question is formulated primarily in terms of a necessary begetting, overflowing, emanation or proceeding.8 But the important point in this process, by which the One transcends its unity to become particularized, is that it does so without its unity being lessened, without its transcendence hampered and without being changedSina used two distinct Arab terms for light-nur and daw. Nur was translated as lux; daw as lumen. Ibn Alam (965–1040) used only daw, although as Sabra (1989, pp. 21–23), notes, he did distinguish between ntial and accidental lights. neads 5.1.6, Vol.5, p. 29. All the references to the Enneads are-unless stated otherwise-to Armstrong's tion (Plotinus, 1966–1988). e accuracy of the metaphor of emanation in describing the peculiar relationship between the One and the t had been doubted by prominent researchers such as Arthur Armstrong and Lloyd Gerson. Armstrong e writes that emanation in Plotinus 'has not got any precise philosophical meaning' and that Plotinus in this onceals a confusion of thought under a cloud of metaphors' (Armstrong, 1937, p. 61). See also Gerson . However, in this paper I am concerned not with the adequacy of the metaphor, but rather with its ce upon the understanding of light. Hence, the determination of the exact nature of the correspondence n the metaphor and what it is supposed to describe does not seem to be vital for this study. 382 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397or moved. Whatever comes into being from it 'does not come into being from it, but from it as it abides unchanged'.9 The perfect and real is eternal and not liable to change. The One has to be transcendental because, according to Plato's doctrine as presented in the Republic, the measure which produces essence-in other words the One-cannot be itself an essence.10 That which gives form cannot itself be a form. The formlessness of the One attests that it is not limited in the way that being or essence is limited.11 If it were limited, this would not only be a sign of a limited perfection, but would also render it a particular being among other particular beings.12 Further, the One can have nothing in common with the things that come after it; the common element would otherwise be anterior to it.13 The One appears accordingly in Plotinus as a non-being, endowing being to all,14 and as a formless principle which is the source of forms for the entire universe.15 Yet, this 'measure', whose transcendence had to be preserved in order for something to be defined, must also be present in the defined from within. The One is needed here as the principle of unity as a condition of an ordered system,16 and in fact, of existence. Unity is the power endowing existence to all beings, giving them their essential nature, their identity and recognizability.17 When things stop being one, they disintegrate and cease to exist. This has to do as well with the Plotinian insistence on the continuity of the universe. Such continuity cannot exist if there is no absorption of the lower reality into the higher. Accurately interpreted, the Platonic transcendence fundamentally implies-according to Plotinus- immanence.18 In sharp contrast to the Platonic and Gnostic outlooks, Plotinus strives to keep the universe as one. The highest realities are present here and now.19 The One is to be defined accordingly as at the same time transcendent and omnipresent:9 Enn 10 Bre 11 Bu 12 Ha 13 See 14 Enn 15 Ibi also 6. 16 Bre 17 Ha 18 Ibi 19 Fo 20 Enn 21 IbiFor there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other before all things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a different being and then one.20The same problem is repeated in the lower levels of being. How can the separate and independent nature of intelligible reality be present in the sensible world without corruption of its unity and identity? And how can the Soul be 'indivisibly divided' when it comes to be in different bodies?21 The solution offered by Plotinus is the universal principle of two energeiai: the one internal to the engendering entity; the other external. According to this principle:eads, Vol.5, 5.4.2, p. 147. hier (1962), p. 135. For the One as 'measure and not measured' see Enneads 5.5.3 and 5.8.18. ssanich (1996), p. 44. ger (1993), p. 53. Roeser (1945), p. 93. eads 5.2.1, Vol. 5, p. 59: 'the one is not being, but the generator of being'. See also 6.7.32, 6.8.16 and 6.2.9. d., 6.7.17, Vol. 7, p. 141: 'and the form was in that which was shaped, but the shaper was shapeless'. See 7.28 and 6.7.33. hier (1962), p. 136. For the One as imparting unity, see also Enneads 5.3.15, 5.5.3 and 5.6.3. ger (1993), p. 49. d., p. 59. r this theme see Hadley (1997). eads 5.4.1, Vol. 5, p. 141. d., 4.2.1, Vol. 4, pp. 21–23. 22 Ibi 23 Th examp expres Plotinu and a Trinity order lumen (1996b 24 En 25 Ar also as 26 Bra 27 Ric 28 Fo ornam convey that la outsid Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 383All things which exist, as long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances. . . a surrounding reality directed to what is outside them, a kind of image of the archetypes from which it was produced . . . 22The higher level of being is thus present in the lower, not as itself, but as an image. The source of these images remains distinct and unchanged. Every entity at each level is now producing, and its product is an extension of its being, yet not identical with it:23In each and every thing there is an activity which belongs to substance and one which goes out from substance; and that which belongs to substance is the active actuality which is each particular thing, and the other activity derives from that first one, and must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself. 24Both the source and the image are denominated as activities or energeiai, 25 yet the source is called 'active actuality' and identified with substance. The first is the cause, while the second is an effect. They are ordered, with the substance coming first and its outcome second and there is a delicate play of identity and difference between them. David Bradshaw writes that the doctrine of two energeiai is used by Plotinus to achieve exactly this: a balanced emphasis on likeness, distinctness and an ongoing dependence.26 The notion of image enables Plotinus to speak of the One, the Intellect or the Soul as being at the same time transcendent and omnipresent. They are omnipresent through their generated images, while as sources, as the thing in itself, they remain aloof. The relation of 'being an image of' is a relation of resemblance. This notion was analyzed by Paul Ricoeur as a concept that 'opposes and unites identity and difference'.27 Ricoeur believes that the use of metaphor is the best way to demonstrate and, in fact, create the relation of resemblance. The use of metaphor in solving the problem of the immanent transcendence is therefore not a mere illustration. It is, indeed, the instrument that provides the most direct access to resemblance itself. It is not a description of this notion, but rather its presentation. Given his mistrust in discursive thinking,28 Plotinus recruited several metaphors in order to explain the notion of a unity that manifests its presence within multiplicityd., 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 31. e relation between a hypostasis and its product is often expressed in Plotinus by the term logos (for le, see 5.1.6). One meaning of logos in Plotinus is the formative force proceeding from a higher principle, sing that principle in a lower plane of being. Thus, the second, external energeia can be identified with s's notion of logos (Armstrong, 1967, p. 105). Just the same, Plotinus often suggests that light is a logos form-giving principle (see n. 56). In the writings of Augustine (354–430) logos becomes the aspect of the involved with the incarnation of Jesus, and in the thirteenth century we find that lux and lumen are used in to illustrate the relations between the members of the Trinity, with lux playing the role of the Father, and the role of the Son. One such example is found in Grosseteste's Hexaëmeron, pa. 8, ch. 3.1; Grosseteste ), p. 224. neads 5.4.2, Vol. 5, p. 147. istotle thought of energeia as actuality or an exercise of a capacity. Plotinus envisioned the internal energeia intrinsically productive. For the meaning of this term in both Aristotle and Plotinus, see Bradshaw (2004). dshaw (2004), p. 80. oeur (1977), p. 196. r this theme see Bussinach (1996), p. 39, and Brehier (1962), p. 30: 'the image in Plotinus is not an external ent but an integral element. . . he aspires. . . to give utterance to realities which language is powerless to . The alternative left is to suggest them through analogy'. See also Rappe (1995), p. 156: 'Plotinus thinks nguage fails as a vehicle for conveying metaphysical truth since words necessarily refer to entities standing e of the linguistic system, whereas truth is both self-certifying and self-revealing'. 384 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397through its generated images. But which metaphor would be the most suitable for this task? 3. Light is the answer Before approaching these metaphors, I first examine the structure of the relation that these figures of speech are intended to explicate. John Fielder suggests four such characteristics for the relation between an archetype and its images: difference; similarity, that is, resemblance; inferiority and dependence of the image on the archetype.29 Based on this list and on Frederic Schroeder's suggestions,30 I propose the following traits: (1) the source must logically and ontologically precede its offspring; (2) the existence of progeny must be totally dependent on the source, and when the source ceases to exist, the offspring must immediately disappear as well; (3) the offspring must maintain an immediate, dynamic and continuous relationship with its source in order to preserve its existence; (4) the copy must resemble the source in some way; (5) and yet it has to be different from it; if it would spread itself, the source would be diminished; (6) the source must be wholly present in a plurality of different offsprings in different spatial locations without being divided among them. Plotinus uses a number of explicative metaphors for the paradox: fire producing heat and snow generating cold; perfumed objects spreading their smell;31 a plant growing from a seed or from a root; a spring and the rivers that rise from it;32 a model and its portrait; a mirror image33 and light emanating from the sun or any other luminous body.34 As Fielder notes, each of these metaphors suggests a different sense of generation. The mature plant comes into being only through the destruction of the seed, whereas the sun continues to exist despite its production of light. Perfumes are weakened or diluted by the air as they are diffused, but a mature plant and the mirror image are not similarly diminished copies.35 The relation between a portrait and a person portrayed is disqualified as an appropriate metaphor based upon conditions (2), (3) and (6) above: the portrait remains viable even in the absence of the origin, and nothing of the portrayed person remains within its image. Similarly, the fire and its heat are not suitable as illustrations for the One and its images based upon conditions (3) and (4): some warmth remains when fire is put out. Furthermore, warmth cannot be called the image of fire, since it does not resemble it.36 Hence, I agree with Fielder, Schroeder and Werner Beierwaltes37 who claimed that light is the most adequate of all metaphors used by Plotinus to clarify the relation between a source and its copy, and for any kind of generation of one level of being from another. It is the most suitable paradigm for several reasons, but most of all since it is the only sensible analogy that has something in common with what it accounts for: incorporeality. The incorporeality of the One is a prominent element in Plotinus's explanation of its ability to be29 See Fielder (1976), pp. 103–104; Schroeder (1996), p. 338. 30 Schroeder (1992), p. 24. 31 Enneads 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 31 and 5.4.1, Vol. 5, p. 143. 32 Ibid., 3.8.10, Vol. 3, p. 395. 33 Ibid., 6.4.10, Vol. 6, p. 305. 34 Ibid., 5.3.12, Vol. 5, p. 117. 35 Fielder (1976), pp. 106–107. 36 Enneads 6.4.10, Vol. 6, p. 305. 37 See Fielder (1976), pp. 107–108; Schroeder (1992), pp. 32–35; Beierwaltes (1961). Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 385omnipresent without being divided. In fact, light is the only analogy that does not violate requirement (6). When Plotinus inquires 'how it is the same which is over all',38 he immediately presents a lengthy demonstration of the incorporeality of the source of light, which although present within a luminous body, is not in fact a part of its mass. It is, rather, a power, residing within that body:38 En 39 Ibi 40 Ibi 41 En 42 En 43 See accord meanin 44 No rather hold eFor it is not in that it is body that it has the light, but in that it is luminous body, by another power which is not bodily.39Once defined as a power that cannot be located spatially, light can be said to reside in many locations without being divided: 'that which belongs to no body. . . cannot be divided into parts' for 'how would you divide that which has no magnitude?'40 Thus light is 'equally diffused within and throughout the entire sphere. . . simultaneously present at each and every point in the sphere'.41 Plotinus stresses another feature which renders light the most suitable metaphor to explicate the connection between the One and being: its necessary dependence on its source:Just as the image of something, like the weaker light, if cut off from that from which it is, would no longer exist, and in general one cannot cut off and make exist [separately] anything at all which derives its existence from something else and is its image.42Hence, light remains as the only suitable metaphor for the analyzed relations. This comes as no surprise to either Schroeder or Beierwaltes, for according to them the image of light in Plotinus is much more than an illustration. It becomes a mode that actually casts and directs the terms of analysis. They believe that light in Plotinus is not another metaphor: the One is light proprio sensu, and the procession from it is the procession of light from a source.43 Even if we choose not to follow this line of thought to its limits,44 we are still compelled to acknowledge the centrality and uniqueness of the function of light in explicating the relation between the One and what proceeds from it. 4. One light is not enough In this section I put forward the following argument: Plotinus's solution to the paradox of the immanent transcendence, in terms of two energeiai combined with light as a leading metaphor, entails a split of light in two, each light corresponding to a different energeia or activity.neads 6.4.7, Vol. 6, p. 293. d., p. 295. d., 6.4.8, p. 299. neads 6.4.7; Plotinus (1991), p. 446. Due to its clarity, I favored MacKenna's translation here. neads 6.4.9, Vol. 6, p. 303. Beierwaltes (1961); Schroeder (1996), pp. 341–344. Rein Ferwerda (1965) represents the alternative view, ing to which symbols in the Enneads only redescribe the doctrinal content, and do not contribute to g. That is, light in his view does not designate the true nature of the three hypostases. t withstanding my conviction that the selection and use of analogies in Plotinus is not ornamental, but inherent to his philosophical outlook, my argument does not depend on accepting this position and can ven if light is viewed as an illustrative metaphor and nothing else. 386 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397Let us examine a few passages in which light is employed in order to clarify the relation of generation and image between the different levels of being:45 Enn 46 Ibi 47 Ibi 48 Ibi 49 Ibi 50 EnnBut the activity within the luminous body, which is like its life, is greater and is a kind of source and origin of its [outward] activity; that which is outside the limits of the body, an image of that within, is a second activity which is not separated from the first.45This quotation clearly shows how light is considered a particular instance for the general principle of an active, internal actuality generating an outward actuality-the external actuality being different from the first and weaker, yet similar and connected: it is its image. Plotinus writes of two lights again in 2.1.7:But by fire he [Plato] does not mean either of the other kinds of fire but the light which he says is other than flame, and only gently warm. This light is a body, but another light shines from it which has the same name, which we teach is incorporeal. This is given from the first light, shining out from it as its flower and splendour; that first light is the truly bright and clear body.46Here the difference between the two lights seems to be the difference between the corporeal and spiritual lights. However, as indicated above, this is not the case. According to Plotinus, the light inside the luminous source resides in a body, but is not itself material: 'but one must consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a body'.47 It seems to me that the difference here is that between light as substance and light as a quality or an accident. The substantial light is the 'true' light, while the accidental quality is its image. The image depends upon the source in the same way as a quality depends on a substance. When the substance ceases to exist, its qualities disappear with it. Plotinus specifically says that:The light in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, which are primarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponding to the form of the primarily luminous body.48From the split of light into substantial and accidental, it follows necessarily that of the two lights, only the second-that is, the splendor-is accessible to the sense of sight. Plotinus held to the principle according to 'that which is known by our sense-perception is an image of the thing, and sense-perception does not apprehend the thing itself; for that remains outside'.49 However, as far as sunlight is concerned, Plotinus seems to think that we can sometimes see it directly, before it has illuminated the intermediate air:For when the light of the sun approaches. . . we often perceive it when it is elsewhere, before it comes near our eyes. . . and when the light with which our sight must connect has not arrived.50eads 4.5.7, Vol. 4, pp. 305–307. d., 2.1.7., Vol.2, pp. 29–31. d. d., 4.5.7, Vol. 4, p. 309. d., 5.5.1, Vol. 5, p. 157 and 2.6.1. See also Emilsson (1988), p. 52. eads 4.5.4, Vol. 4, p. 297. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 387Yet this is an exception, and normally that 'light with which our sight must connect' is the second, not the first light. In discussing the relation between the One and the intellect, Plotinus again refers to the two lights. The intellect in relation to the One51 Ibi 52 Gu 53 En 54 Co 55 Ibi 56 Fo explici darkne and inIs like a light dispersed far and wide from some one thing translucent in itself; what is dispersed is image, but that from which it comes is truth; though certainly the dispersed image, Intellect, is not of alien form.51This is a straightforward indication for the claim that the split of light accounts for the relations between unity and plurality. The Intellect is the first dyad according to Plotinus, for it involves the duality of a thought and its object. Here it is compared with the second light, the dispersed one. The scattered light is thus born in plurality. The point stressed in this last citation, is that although the second light is an image of the first, it nevertheless shares similarity of genre with it: they are of the same kind. The distinction between light and its source can thus account both for the continuity of the various levels-as the two lights are of the same kind and continuously connected-and for their otherness. Otherness in Plotinus consists in the notion of image as less than and dependent upon its prior.52 And this is the essence of their difference. Plotinus further states that the Intellect is separated from the One 'only by otherness'.53 In his paper on light in Plotinus and Aquinas, Kevin Corrigan attempts to define these two lights discussed by Plotinus. In Corrigan's view, the light inside a luminous body is an incorporeal energeia, a dynamic, substantial activity, while the light in the diaphanous is a quality of a substrate, an accident to the substance of the object. This external activity is the visible, perceptible light.54 Accordingly, he set the first, 'internal' light as the substantial meaning of light, which is intelligible. The internal, intelligible light becomes thus a source both of being and of understanding of the external light, that is, of the 'physical', corporeal light.55 I find this interpretation difficult to accept, despite its appealing nature as far as the treatment of metaphor is concerned. My difficulty lies in the fact that in Plotinus both lights are incorporeal, and the second light is specifically defined as a form, and, as has just been indicated, equated with the Intellect.56 Moreover, light in Plotinus is used to define the exact nature of the immaterial, and only through its attributes can he begin to formulate a positive account of relation between the forms and their sensible participants. In my view, the difference between the two kinds of light is not the difference between the spiritual and the corporeal, but rather between the principles of unity and of multiplicity. The second light in Plotinus is the Intellect with its manifold forms, not the material world. The two lights are referred to again when the relation of the universal Soul to the particular souls is explained, and here too, only incorporeal entities are at stake. It is true that at a certain level the tension between unity and multiplicity becomes the tension between the one intelligible form and the many material entities defined by it. Yet, if we concentrate ond., 6.8.18, Vol. 7, p. 289. rtler (1992), p. 456. neads 5.6.1, Vol. 5, p. 33. See also Rist (1967), pp. 29–30. rrigan (1993), p. 192. d., p. 193. r example, in Enneads 1.6.3, the light present in the lower level, that of corporeal particular entities, is tly said to be unembodied: 'The simple beauty of color comes about by shape and the mastery of the ss in matter by the presence of light which is incorporeal and formative power and form' (Vol. 1, p. 241); 2.4.5, Plotinus writes: 'the light [in each thing] is the rational forming principle' (Vol. 4, p. 115). 388 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397this level of being alone, we might loose sight of the general problem, repeated at all levels of existence, that of the relation between the one and the many, a problem of concern for Plotinus throughout. It is possible, however, to view the split as that between the immanent forms, which Plotinus associates with accidents, and the transcendent forms, which he associates with substance.57 The transcendent forms are the first kind of light, while the immanent ones are the second. Plotinus refers, therefore, to two lights: a first and a second. The first light is internal to a luminous body; it is an inner activity, which is also the true thing or the 'thing itself', or maybe even the (spiritual) substance of such a body; it is unmoved and unchanged, yet it is productive. Ontologically, it precedes the second and it is the source and origin of this other light, which is its image. The second light is placed outside; it is diffused afar and travels in space. This last attribute enables it to reach our eyes and be seen, a quality lacking in the first light. In the following I show that the notions of lux and lumen in the writings of Grosseteste and Albertus are used and defined by these very same qualifications. Yet before that a comment is in place concerning the way Grosseteste and Albertus became familiar with the Plotinian ideas. 5. The two lights transmitted I draw attention to two routes through which Grosseteste and Albertus could have learnt the Plotinian idea of two lights. Indeed, it seems likely that these two routes had a parallel impact upon the two writers.58 One path of influence runs through Ibn Sina, whose famous definitions for lux and lumen have been quoted above. He had at his disposal the Arabic Plotinian texts: the so called Theology of Aristotle, the Letter on divine science and the fragments attributed to the Greek sage (Dicta sapientis Graecis). These were not straight forward translations of the Enneads, but rather a translation-cum-paraphrase, belonging to the body of translations and adaptations made by al-Kindi's (d. 866) circle in ninth century Baghdad.59 Al-Kindi's translations were, in turn, extracts from an earlier Arabic paraphrase (now lost) of Plotinus, which itself 'derives ultimately from the Greek of Plotinus' Enneads IV–VI much as we have it today'.60 Both the theory of the two energeiai61 and the notion of two lights are clearly present in these texts. One example is quoted here, yet more can be found:57 See 58 Th necessa (1080– 59 Ad 60 Zim 61 Epi 62 DicThe action of the sun-that is, light-is life of the pure, transparent body, and is the source and beginning of light. The light on the outer surface of the pure body is but a reflection of the inner light.62Gurtler (1992), p. 456. ere are a few other possible paths. For example, Hasse (2000), p. 115, mentions the theory of the tria ria, transmitted through Calcidius (ca. fourth century), Macrobius (ca. 430) and William of Conches 1154), as a possible source of the dual terminology for light. Another source could be al-Kindi. amson (2000), p. 8. mermann (1986), p. 113. stola de scientia divina 173–175. see Plotinus. (1959), p. 337. ta sapientis graeci VI 2–3 and I 17–19. See Plotinus. (1959), p. 165 and 367 respectively. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 389The other path runs through the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius the Aeropagite (ca. 500), which were translated from the Greek in the ninth century by John Scotus Eurigena (810– 877), and again in the thirteenth century by Grosseteste. In On the divine names Dionysius refers explicitly to the two lights:63 On 64 See 65 On 66 Mc 67 On 68 Ibi 69 DeFrom the Good comes the light which is an image of Goodness; wherefore the Good is described by the name of 'Light', being the archetype thereof which is revealed in that image.63This notion is wrapped in a language of emanation, presenting the Good as pouring itself forth while remaining undiminished, unmingled, unified and complete in its distinction.64 Interesting to note is that both Eurigena and Grosseteste translated this passage using lumen for the light which is from the Good, and lux for the light as a name of the Good (note the capital 'L'). Dionysius was also a major channel through which the doctrine of two energeai had come to the medieval Latins. This principle, found in the forth chapter of On the divine names, was expressed by Dionysius as bonum est diffusivum sui, and was taken up from there by various thinkers, such as Bonaventure (1221–1274) and Thomas Aquinas (1225/7–1274) to be used in accounts of creation. 6. Two medieval lights Notwithstanding the substantial differences between their uses of the term lux, both Grosseteste and Albertus define lux as the first form and as the form of the luminaries. In Grosseteste, lux is the first corporeal form: 'the first corporeal form which some call corporeity is in my opinion lux'; 'thus lux, which is the first form created in first matter'.65 As such it is present everywhere in the material world as a principle of extension and energy.66 Grosseteste stresses that the firmament-the first created body-is made from lux: both the matter and form of the firmament is the lux prima, and the sun and the other luminaries were made from the firmament, that is, from the primordial lux.67 In Grosseteste's view, the bodies of the luminaries and their lux are of 'one and the same nature and one and the same creation'.68 Hence, lux is not only the form of the luminaries, it is also their matter. This position is consistent with Grosseteste's insistence on the materiality of light. In the writings of Albertus, lux is defined as the form of a luminous body:The luminary is a body, which holds in itself lux as a form. . . lux is called the form of lumen in luminaries or in where there is a first source of lumen69However, it is not defined as its substantial form. A substantial form cannot be active, whereas according to Albertus lux is active, moving towards all forms and instilling them with power. Due to this delivering function, lux can no longer be considered a substantial form, nor an accidental form:the divine names, 4.4; Dionysius the Areopagite (1951), p. 91. , for example, ibid., 2.11, pp. 78–81. light; Grosseteste (1996a), p. 765. Evoy (1982), p. 283. the six days of creation, pa. 5, ch. 4.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 161. d., ch. 5.1, p. 162. anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 8; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 110: 63–69. 70 Sup 71 On 72 De things (Ennea 73 On 74 De 75 Fro species Spruit 76 De 77 Ibi anothe 78 Th author 390 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397That which moves towards all the forms of generation and corruption, whether substantial or accidental, is not one with them: that which is moving is not the movement.70The description of lux as in motion marks a difference from the first Plotinian light, which was characterized as unchanging and unmoved. Yet the complete otherness of lux is preserved. Thus, lux is a special form, which cannot be treated according to the categories of the 'regular' forms. For both authors then, lux enjoys an ontological priority: it is the first created form and identified as the form of a source of light. These characteristics render it similar to Plotinus's first light. In relation to lumen, lux is explicitly said to be its ontological precedent, as it is its source and origin. Lux is defined by both Grosseteste and Albertus as begetting or transmitting by essence. Grosseteste writes that 'every lux has by nature and essence its splendor that it begets';71 and Albertus states thatIt is not the first agent, unless by that which transmits by essence, as lux shines by its essence: and which transmits by essence any action, and does so always and incessantly.72Lumen, in turn, is presented as the outcome of this necessary begetting. It is thus the offspring, copy or image of lux. Grosseteste states that 'one point of lux can fill a whole hemisphere with lumen',73 and in another place he refers to the sun, which hides the stars and the moon because 'it does not allow at the same time with her the species of another's lux'.74 I do not wish to consider the complicated issue of the exact denotation of the term species in medieval use. Suffice it to say that the term species refers to a likeness emanating from an object, which is a sign and representation of the known thing.75 Lux is defined in another way by Albertus as the form of lumen in a body that pours the lux,76 that is, the origin of which lumen is the copy. As for the other light, Albertus states that 'lumen is now the received form from that which shines at first',77 and that which shines at first is, of course, lux. Lumen is then the form lux takes when it is received within the various bodies, including the transparent medium. Hence, in Albertus we find the same denotation of lumen as the species or intentio of lux.78 Another common feature of lux mentioned by both authors is that it is locked inside bodies. In Grosseteste lux is always attached to matter as the form of corporeity. Forer Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 2; Albertus Magnus (1972), p. 62: 38–41. the six days of creation, pa. 8, ch. 3.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 224. intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 3; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 507. Recall Plotinus assertion that 'all when they came to perfection produce; the One is always perfect and therefore produces everlastingly' ds 5.1.6, Vol. 5, p. 33). the six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.1; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 97. operatione solis 26; Grosseteste (1974a), p. 85. m the perspective of this paper it is important to note that according to Roger Bacon's list, synonyms for are, among others: 'image', 'similitude' and 'intentio'. See Bacon (1983), p. 6. For more on this term see (1994). intellectu, tr. 3, cap. 1; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 498. d.; Bonin (2001), p. 31, also suggests that lux be considered a source in Albertus, while lumen as its effect in r. e claim that lumen is the species of lux had been made in contemporary literature regarding other medieval s. See Smith (2000), pp. 325–326; and Lindberg (1986), p. 20. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 391instance, in his discussion of color, we find lux to be a cause of color only from within the colored body: 'for color is lux embodied in a wet transparent medium'.79 It is locked inside such a body and cannot express itself without the assistance of the lumen in the diaphanous.80 In Albertus lux never moves in space, and is always placed within its proper matter-the thickened transparency.79 On p. 167 80 De 81 Alb 82 I n their in 83 On 84 De 85 Alb 86 On 87 IbiAnd the purer it is, the more remote it is from transparency, that is, as it more resembles a thing of higher nature; and the proper actuality of this is the lux which comes into being in that nature, for it comes into being as often as its parts become clearer and nobler, and therefore all such things shine.81According to Albertus, once a transparency becomes clear and pure enough, it loses its transparent nature and becomes thickened. Things that shine are not transparent, because a transparent object can only receive light, not produce it. Therefore, only a thickened transparency can produce light, and lux can inhere only in such matter, whether in heaven or within our eyes. The notion of lux as locked inside bodies conforms to another trait of the Plotinian first light: its being internal to a self luminous body. In contrast, for both authors, lumen is always out there in the transparent medium, just like the Plotinian second light, which is 'diffused afar'.82 Thus, for Grosseteste, while lux is the cause of color from within the colored body, lumen is such a cause when it is mixed with a transparent medium (diaphanous).83 Albertus believes that 'lumen is an intentio having spiritual being in the transparent medium',84 and he repeats his assertion in De meteoris:Lumen is an intentio of the form of a luminous body, which, having spiritual being, is generated in the transparent medium.85The notion of lux as a substance and lumen as its accidental quality is present only in Grosseteste. In his discussion of the question of the substantiality of light, Grosseteste cites John Damascene (676–754/787), who claimed that lumen is a quality of fire, and that since it is always generated by fire it does not have its own ''hypostasis'', that is, existence in its own right.86 Grosseteste then argues that lux has two senses: (1) a very subtle bodily substance which is by nature self-generative; and (2) an accidental quality that proceeds from the natural generative action of the substance of lux.87 Grosseteste does not state this explicitly, but it seems that to him lux is the active substance, and lumen (according to Damascene's own words) is the accidental quality that proceeds from it. In Albertus's view, as already noted, lux is neither substantial nor accidental. Lumen, however, cannot only be considered an accident, but anthe six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.2; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 99. I favored Gilson's translation here (2000, ) over Martin's ('embodied in a clear liquid'). operatione solis 6; Grosseteste (1974a), pp. 69–70. ertus, On sense and sensibles, ch. 12. See Akdogan (1978), p. 173. ote one exception: Albertus thought that in regard to transparent bodies, such as stars, lumen can enter terior and be gathered within them. See Grant (1994), p. 397. the rainbow; Grosseteste (1974b), p. 391. anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 12; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 116: 73–74. ertus, De meteoris, lib. 2, tr. 2, cap. 6. Quoted and trans. in Gilson (2000), p. 64. the six days of creation, pa. 2, ch. 10.2; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 98. d. 88 Sup 89 De 90 De 91 Ibi 92 On 93 Ibi 94 De 95 Th we do 96 He illumin Magnu throug 97 'W tr. 1, c 392 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397Accidental accident of a body illuminated from another, as the heat is [in itself] an accident of fire and an accidental accident of the heated body.88The two writers also make the same distinction as made by Plotinus between the two lights in regard to their visibility. According to Plotinus, as well as according to Grosseteste and Albertus, only the second light is accessible to our sense of sight. In the latter's writings lumen is often treated as color, and 'color is with the number of those who are visible according to themselves'.89 As mentioned above, Grosseteste believes that since lux is always inside bodies, it cannot reach our eyes. The agent traveling in space approaching our senses is lumen. Color according to Albertus 'has the essence and form of color from lumen'.90 Yet Albertus goes even further, stating that:Lumen is the common nature, that makes the visible visible, and color is seen only because it participates within the flow of lumen.91Moreover, Grosseteste sees lumen not only as color, but as daylight as well, for lux, when it is in the sublunary world, incorporated within the elements, looses its power to affect its surrounding and thus cause visibility. But lumen, when it is in the air, has the greatest powers: the air is 'being lit up only as long as lumen is present, and when lumen is gone-it goes back to darkness'.92 Lumen, then, is seen as brightness, shining, or daylight. It often appears accompanied by the noun fulgor, that is, 'shining' or 'brightness'. One such an example appears when Grosseteste explains that the stars are beautiful 'simply because they shine with lumen' (luminis fulgore).93 In another place Grosseteste explicitly identifies lumen with the power of being seen: 'the sun is in the view of the seeing eye through the strength of its lumen'.94 And what about lux? Is it also visible? Clearly not, according to Grosseteste, at least not without the help of its messenger lumen, and only through it.95 In Albertus the lux of the sun is endowed with visibility, in a way similar to Plotinus.96 However, its visibility is unique: it is not seen in the same way as other things are seen. Albertus crowns lux as 'the perfect visible',97 meaning that it is seen directly and not through its encounter with matter or through an intermediate. As claimed above, the Plotinian invention of the two lights results from the principal function given to light in explicating the relations between unity and multiplicity. Next, I seek to show that lux and lumen are used by Grosseteste and Albertus exactly for theer Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 2. 32; Albertus Magnus (1972), p. 64: 17–26. anima, lib. 2, tr. 3, cap. 7; Albertus Magnus (1968), p. 108: 22–23. intellectu, tr. 3, cap.1; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 488. d., p. 109: 13–14. the six days of creation, pa. 8, ch. 27.11; Grosseteste (1996b), p. 343. d., pa. 2, ch. 10.4, p. 99. operatione solis 7; Grosseteste (1974a), p. 71. e situation is different when it comes to the beatific vision. In this kind of vision, according to both authors, get to see lux directly. However, this issue will not be developed here due to its extensiveness. writes: 'our sun, that is, which is seen to us with perceiving through its own being, which is the bright, ates as if sharing its intentio, which is lux'. Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, cap. 4. 9; Albertus s (1972), p. 119: 18–22. Note that lux here is only 'as if' an intentio, and the sun is thus perceived directly, h its own being. e see everything [visible] to be made from that which is by itself and the perfect visible'. De intellectu, lib. 1, ap. 5; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 480. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 393same purpose. For both, lux functions as a principle of unity, whereas lumen represents its multiple fragments or splinters. The fact that both are one and the same entity, namely light, demonstrates the feature of immanence in transcendence so vital to the Plotinian outlook. As the form of corporeity, lux, according to Grosseteste, is present throughout the material universe and is an inherent part of it. Through its powers of self-generation, it endows matter with the most basic bodily feature: extension. The idea of common corporeity links directly to Ibn Gabirol's (1020/1–1070) notion of common corporeity, which was conceived as the form that all things have in common, the simple that imparts unity to all.98 Grosseteste had used an existing notion, but its identification with lux is new and original.99 It is lux then that, according to Grosseteste, assures the unity of the material universe. The concept of lux defined as the common corporeity abolishes the difference in principle whereby the superlunary universe was thought to be of an essentially different make up than the earth (aether), establishing one physical system out of what for Aristotle had been two separated ones. This unified physical system is based on lux. Grosseteste replaced the differences in kind with a distinction in degree of density, perfection and beauty: the lux of the upper world is more rare, noble and perfect that the lux in the sublunary world, yet they are principally the same.100 The unitary role of lux does not end here. In De motu corporali et luce, Grosseteste distinguishes (following Aristotle) between two kinds of motion: local motion (motus localis), which takes place through time, and alteration (alteratio, mutatio), which is immediate. He then poses lux as responsible for both. When it drags matter with it while generating, it produces local motion. Alteration occurs when lux is cast from within a body out to the diaphanous without being accompanied by matter. It then passes through the diaphanous at once.101 Lux, then, is the generator of motion. Through its necessary self multiplication, lux also serves as the principle of connection. Grosseteste adopts the essentials of al-Kindi's claim that everything acts on everything else through the radiation of force or lux.102 According to al-Kindi, Lux is the power residing inside natural bodies, and is the source of their multiplication, that is, the source of their ability to affect their surrounding. No causality is possible without lux and therefore no regularity as well. Grosseteste thus deems lux as the principle of unity in the world, not merely because it is everywhere, but because it enables the different, separate, particular objects to be connected, and to be connected in an ordered, regular manner. Another example of the unitary function of lux can be found in Albertus's theory of the agent intellect. The relation between the corporeal lux and the intentiones of the colors is compared time and again by Albertus with the relation between the universals within the agent intellect and the universals in each particular soul. That comparison is meant to exemplify the way in which the universals are not individuated when grasped by particular intellects. The agent intellect thus is said to be like lux, which, even though it is in many colored bodies, still has a power that remains universal.103 The lux of the sun is something98 Simson (1962), p. 54. 99 McEvoy (1982), p. 161. 100 Ibid., p. 185. 101 De motu corporali et luce; Grosseteste (1912), p. 92. 102 Lindberg (1986), pp. 16–17. 103 De intellectu, lib. 1, tr. I, cap. 7; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 488. 394 Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397determinate in bodies, yet its power, which constitutes the domain of the visible, is not individuated. In exactly the same manner the agent intellect, which constitutes the domain of intelligible forms, is not individuated.104 In Albertus, the agent intellect as lux stands out against the plurality of the specific, determinate forms. Albertus states that the agent intellect is similar to lux because both are 'first beings'. He poses the principle that104 Th follow Christi intellec 105 De 106 Ibi 107 Alb 108 De 109 IbiIn the whole world in which some deliver and some are delivered, there is necessarily one first being, which is so great an agent.105The first agent of the whole physical universe is the lux of the sun. Albertus then presents another principle: the human soul is an echo or image of the form of the world. It is similar to the whole universe because its multitude of intellectual beings requires a first agent. This first agent resembles lux, because like lux it is universal, and like lux it flows and delivers the forms.106 However, these forms themselves are not lux; they are lumen: 'form, since it makes a thing knowable, is a sort of lumen';107 and 'these lumina are the forms of the world'.108 Lux, then, is the first universal form and the source of all the forms in the universe, and the lumina are the specific forms issued from it: 'lumen always extends itself towards the more determinate things, it is inserted into them, thus giving them being'.109 The different, specific colors, as well as the different, specific forms, are all lumen. Lux is thus present throughout the material and intelligible worlds through its image and messenger-lumen. 7. Conclusions In this paper, I proposed that the central paradox of the Plotinian metaphysics-that of unity in multiplicity, in which a unity is present within and throughout the plurality of beings while remaining at the same time an undivided, separate whole-can be resolved by the doctrine of two energeiai. According to this doctrine, for each and every entity in the universe, and at every level of being, a differentiation can be made between, on the one hand, the thing in itself, that is, its inner true substance and selfhood, and, on the other hand, an outer spread of representations or images. Further, I pointed out how the relations between these inner and outer activities are elucidated through the relations between a source of light and its external manifestation in the visible splendour. Plotinus weaves a fabric of identity and difference, continuity and dependence between the two lights. The ability to insist on the source's presence through its images depends on this delicate interplay. The central function of light in accounting for this paradox led Plotinus to speak of it as twofold. The general principle of two energeiai, which when applied to snow produces the couple 'snow–cold', and when applied to perfume produces the pair 'perfume–smell', also produces the pair 'light–light' when applied to light. This double naming underlies similarity between the members of the pair. They are of the samee question of the unity of the agent intellect had been the center of a hot debate in the discussed period, ing the claim of Averroes (1126–1198) that it is one and the same for all people. Albertus, as many other an thinkers, abhorred that assertion and took pains to show, that along with its universality, the agent t was also individuated. He wrote the De unitate intellectu especially for that purpose. intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 3; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 506. d., p. 507. ertus, De causis et processu universitatis 2. 1. 1 [61:25]. Quoted in Latin by Bonin (2001), p. 105 n. 34. intellectu, lib. 2, tr. 1, cap. 11; Albertus Magnus (1800–1899), p. 519. d. Y. Raizman-Kedar / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 37 (2006) 379–397 395kind, whereas for snow and cold, fire and heat, root and tree, the disparity is obvious, and similarity minor. Such pairs cannot be considered one. Again I stress that these two lights are not the intelligible and corporeal lights, and therefore do not stand for the disparity between the intelligible and the corporeal worlds. Rather, they represent the singular and universal versus the plural and particular. The relations between them are depicted by Plotinus through the characteristics of a source and its copy, an ontological precedent and its antecedent which is similar and dependent on it, a cause and its effect, something that is visible and its invisible principle. All these features can be discerned to exist within the medieval division of light into lux and lumen. The medieval emphasis upon the distinct existence of these two lights, as manifested in giving them two names, can be considered both as a continuation and an expansion of the Plotinian tradition. The medieval thinkers were not satisfied with applying this distinction to optical descriptions only, and elaborated it far beyond the original use, extending it to new domains. This evolution is exemplified in Albertus's account of the agent intellect as lux, and of the specific forms residing in the possible intellect as lumen. 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De Dierlijke Rede, of: Kennen om te overleven1 Wohl kann man die Formen, also gewissermassen den leer ablaufenden Mechanismus der Erkenntnisleistungen, zum Gegenstand der Untersuchung machen, "reine" Erkenntnistheorie treiben. Man würde dabei so verfahren, als ob man etwa die Mechanismen einer Photokamera, sagen wir ein Leica, in ihren inneren Gesetzmässigkeiten untersuchte, ohne dabei in Betracht zu ziehen, dass das ganze Apparat zum Photographieren da ist und von der Firma Leitz/Wetzlar im Dienst dieser Funktion aus einfacheren, früheren Typen entwickelt worden ist. Vor allem aber wird man bei einem solchen Vorgehen weder über die Leistung noch über die Leistungsgrenzen des untersuchten Apparates dasjenige erfahren, was zu wissen nötig ist, will man die Leistung verstehen und verbessern lernen, um jene Grenzen zu erweitern. Konrad Lorenz, 1959 Wetenschappelijke vooruitgang is vaak mogelijk door het verbinden van voorheen onafhankelijk geachte feiten in één verklaring 2 . Newton verbond het idee van een vallende appel met dat van roterende planeten en Darwin verbond inzichten in het fokken van verschillende huisdierenrassen met kennis van fossielen en van de verscheidenheid aan soorten. Hoe aannemelijk dergelijke verbindingen achteraf mogen lijken, op het moment dat ze het eerst gelegd werden waren ze ongetwijfeld zeer gewaagd en hoogst speculatief. Ditzelfde geldt voor de eerste wetenschappelijke theorie ter verklaring van kennis, de evolutionistische kenleer, die door vele denkers afzonderlijk als een logische gevolgtrekking uit de evolutieleer is ontwikkeld 3 . De evolutionistisch kenleer verbindt twee feiten die gewoonlijk totaal los van elkaar worden gezien: namelijk het biologische gegeven van aanpassing door natuurlijke selectie en het traditionele filosofische probleem van de mogelijkheid van kennis. De problemen zijn voor de evolutionistische kenleer, door Vollmer gekenschetst als een "Copernikaanse wending" ten opzichte van de transcendentale kenleer, zeker zo groot als bij de twee andere genoemde voorbeelden van vooruitgang door integratie. In de eerste plaats zitten er allerlei haken en ogen aan het begrip aanpassing: één van de belangrijkste is wel dat aanpassingen altijd toevallige en onvolmaakte evolutionaire improvisaties zijn. In de tweede plaats is kennis niet zo'n vanzelfsprekend empirisch gegeven als een vallende appel of een kropduif. Filosofen zijn al zo'n vijfentwintig eeuwen aan het twisten over de vraag wat kennis eigenlijk is en hoe kennis mogelijk is en het idee dat de evolutiebiologie wel even een oplossing zal komen aandragen ontmoette in eerste instantie soms weinig meer dan gefronste 1 Met dank aan Dr. W. Callebout, Dr. F.C.L.M. Jacobs, Prof. Th. Kuipers en Drs. H. de Regt voor hun nuttige kanttekeningen. 2 P. Kitcher, 'Explanatory Unification', Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981), 507-531. 3 Zie onder andere R.W. Sellars, Evolutionary Naturalism, Chigago, 1922; K. Lorenz, Die Rückseite des Spiegels, München, 1973; D.T. Campbell, 'Evolutionary Epistemology', in: P. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Karl Popper, LaSalle, 1974; G. Vollmer, Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie, Stuttgart, 1975, 1983; R. Giere, 'Philosophy of Science Naturalized', Philosophy of Science, 52 (1985), 331-356; M. Bradie, 'Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology', Biology and Philosophy, 1 (1986), 401459, M. Ruse, Taking Darwin Seriously, Oxford, 1986. 39 wenkbrauwen en venijnige spot 4 . In het komende wil ik echter de opvatting verdedigen dat de evolutionaire kenleer een onvermijdelijke consequentie is van ontwikkelingen in ons huidig wereldbeeld en dat deze kenleer wel degelijk vergaande implicaties heeft voor onze filosofische overpeinzingen over de aard van kennis. Daarmee wordt echter allerminst gesuggereerd dat hierdoor alle kentheoretische problemen in één keer zijn opgelost of dat een nadere analyse van het onstaan van de specifieke menselijke kenvormen niet meer nodig zou zijn, integendeel. Zoals enkele van de belangrijkste ontwikkelaars van de evolutionistische kenleer hebben aangegeven blijft de evolutionistische kenleer een wetenschappelijke theorie die berust op een aantal vooronderstellingen die zij deelt met andere wetenschappelijke theorieën: één daarvan is het "realiteitspostulaat" 5 . Zij is geen a priori analyse van de mogelijkheid tot kennis, noch een absolute rechtvaardiging van onze kenvormen. Zij geeft geen doorslaggevende argumenten tegen een antirealistische scepticus en kan niet functioneren ter onderscheiding van ware en onware theorieën. Bovenal moet gesteld worden dat zij slechts indirect normatieve implicaties heeft. In die zin neemt zij niet de plaats in die traditionele epistemologieën wilden innemen. In het komende wil ik proberen aan te geven waarin haar belang dan wèl schuilt. Mijn uitgangspunt daarbij is dat de evolutionistische kenleer in de eerste plaats een wetenschappelijke theorie is over onze natuurlijke, alledaagse wereldervaring. Juist vanuit een analyse van deze wereldervaring werpt zij licht op verschillende eigenschappen van kennis die filosofen al eeuwen in verwarring hebben gebracht. Daartoe behoren onder andere het perspectivistische en dikwijls subjectieve karakter van kennis en de ondergedetermineerdheid van onze modellen van de wereld door zintuigelijke data. Het een en ander werpt een nieuw licht op wetenschap als de poging kennis van de wereld te krijgen die minder onderhevig is aan de beperkingen van onze primaire wereldervaring, maar daar uiteindelijk altijd aan gebonden blijft. Vanuit deze beschouwingen zal ik proberen aan te geven waarin de mogelijke (beperkte) normatieve betekenis van de evolutionistische kenleer schuilt. De beperkte normatieve waarde van de evolutionistische kenleer moet onze aandacht niet afleiden van haar grote wijsgerige betekenis. Zij leidt tot een meer compleet en geïntegreerd beeld van kennis dan de verschillende traditionele kentheorieën die ze in zekere zin in zich opslorpt en transformeert. Zij maakt bijvoorbeeld begrijpelijk waarom traditionele modellen/funderingen van kennis zoals empirisme en rationalisme geen kans van slagen hebben. Ongetwijfeld haar grootste verdienste is echter dat zij in tegenstelling tot deze traditionele kentheorieën kan verklaren wat kennis wezenlijk is en waarom het zo moeilijk is haar te bereiken, laat staan haar te voorzien van absolute fundamenten. 4 Zie bijvoorbeeld H. Putnam, 'Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized', Synthese, 52 (1982) 3-23; Th. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, Oxford 1986, 78-81. 5 Vgl. bijvoorbeeld Monod, Le hasard et la necessité, Paris, 1971, over "le postulat d'objectivé" en Lorenz, 1973, en Vollmer, 1983, over het "Hypothetischer Realismus". Eerlijkheidshalve moet worden toegegeven dat er anti-realistische versies van de evolutionistische kenleer bestaan, die zich echter eerder tegen een naïef realisme lijken te verzetten dan tegen het hier voorgestane kritisch of hypothetisch realisme. 39 WAT DE EVOLUTIONISTISCHE KENLEER NIET IS Een naturalistisch equivalent van een transcendentale rechtvaardiging Voordat ik echter verder ga met grootse claims op elkaar te stapelen is het zinnig wat uitgebreider in te gaan op alles wat de evolutionistische kenleer niet is. Hoe vreemd het ook lijkt, het schijnt namelijk toegestaan te zijn haar naar eigen goeddunken bepaalde opvattingen in de schoenen te schuiven die geen van haar representanten er op nahouden en dat te doen zonder enige verwijzing of bewijsmateriaal. Dit is namelijk precies wat Hilary Putnam doet in zijn artikel Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized 6 . Wat hij daar presenteert als evolutionistische kenleer is in zijn geheel een door hem zelf gecreëerde hersenschim zonder feitelijke basis in de literatuur. Putnam presenteert hier de evolutionistische kenleer als een doctrine die ons in staat zou moeten stellen ware of rationeel verantwoorde van onware of irrationele uitspraken te scheiden of ware/rationele opvattingen te rechtvaardigen. De evolutionistische kenleer zou stellen dat een geloof rationeel is als het de overleving dient. Uiteraard is het gemakkelijk een dergelijke karikatuur belachelijk te maken: zoals Putnam al zelf aangeeft, er zit geen contradictie in de voorstelling van een wereld vol mensen met zeer irrationele opvattingen die hen juist in staat stellen te overleven of in de voorstelling van een wereld waarin de meest rationele opvattingen snel leiden tot het uitsterven van degenen die ze koesteren (Putnam, pag. 6). Het is echter de vraag of een dergelijke evolutionistische kenleer ooit verdedigd is. Ze zou in ieder geval niet aansluiten bij verschillende geluiden uit de moderne sociobiologie, waarvan één belangrijke representant uitdrukkelijk stelt dat het naïef zou zijn te denken dat zenuwstelsels, naarmate ze complexer worden, de realiteit steeds beter kunnen reconstrueren 7 . Zelfbedrog over het eigen altruïsme, dat wil zeggen een foutieve representatie van de eigen altruïstische investeringen, kan in complexe reciprook altruïstische relaties zeer functioneel zijn, omdat het een individu in staat kan stellen de ander met meer overtuigingskracht te misleiden 8 . Zelfbedrog en verdringing zouden daarom juist bij mensen die in zo'n vergaande mate afhankelijk zijn van reciprook altruïsme veel voorkomen. Ook in andere contexten zou niet zozeer kennis als wel een gebrek aan kennis en een vertekening van de werkelijkheid als buitengewoon adaptief kunnen gelden. Flohr 9 laat bijvoorbeeld, onder andere onder verwijzing naar Lorenz en Vollmer, zien dat een combinatie van eigenschappen van ons cognitief apparaat de neiging onzekerheid te reduceren, de neiging tot het denken in opposities en het verlangen tot een groep te behoren gemakkelijk kunnen leiden tot politieke vooroordelen. Ongetwijfeld zouden er minder vooroordelen en extreme visies op de wereld zijn als het niet bepaalde voordelen had (of ooit had gehad) een duidelijk en simpel wereldbeeld te hebben, waarvan de juistheid op de tweede plaats komt. Zoals Flohr 6 Zie hierboven, noot 4. 7 R. Trivers, 'Foreword' bij R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Oxford, 1986. 8 R. Trivers, Social Evolution, Menlo Park, 1985. 9 H. Flohr, 'Biological Bases of Social Prejudices', in: V. Reynolds, V. Falger, I. Vine, The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism, London/Sydney, 1987. 39 opmerkt is ons denken geëvolueerd voor het oplossen van praktische vragen en niet als een optimale manier om de waarheid te benaderen. Een naïeve versie van de correspondentietheorie van waarheid De evolutionistische kenleer berust ook niet noodzakelijk op een versie van naïef "metafysisch" realisme, zoals Putnam en in navolging van hem Ruse (1986: 197) meent. Volgens Putnam en Ruse zou de evolutionistische kenleer impliceren dat we keninhouden en dingen kunnen vergelijken als een soort objectieve buitenstaanders, die de mate van overeenstemming tussen beide kunnen bestuderen. Met name Ruse verlustigt zich in een karikaturale weergave van Lorenz' essay van 1941, dat dikwijls als de oorsprong van de evolutionistische kenleer wordt gezien. Lorenz zet zich hierin inderdaad af tegen het kantiaanse dogma van de onkenbaarheid van het Ding an Sich en spreekt hier nogal onbezonnen over het "passen" van onze kenvormen op de structuren van de wereld. Tegelijkertijd noemt hij onze categoriëen echter evolutionaire "Arbeitshypothesen" die in het normale leven steeds "bewährt" worden, maar juist in de wetenschap vaak ontoereikend blijken 10 . Het is daarom de vraag of Lorenz' visie hier wel zo'n naïeve versie van de correspondentietheorie van de waarheid impliceert. Het "passen" van kenvorm en realiteit waar hij het over heeft is iets anders dan een "gelijkenis" tussen die twee, waarover Locke het heeft 11 . Het aansluiten van kenvormen op de werkelijkheid kan het kennend wezen ervaren binnen de feedback loop tussen kenvermogen en realiteit. Er is geen extern standpunt nodig. Goldman merkt daarom terecht op dat het beeld van de spiegel, dat door velen (waaronder Putnam en Rorty) als ontoereikend terzijde is geschoven, beter vervangen kan worden door het beeld van een kledingstuk. Het kledingstuk moet ook aansluiten, maar hoeft niet te gelijken. Bovendien kunnen diverse kledingstukken over dezelfde lichaamsdelen worden geschoven, net zoals verschillende categorieën en theorieën de werkelijkheid tegelijk kunnen dekken 12 . Goldman doopt zijn versie van de correspondentieleer "correspondentie2". Correspondentie1 gaat er volgens hem van uit dat de wereld al onafhankelijk van onze kennis is gestructureerd volgens categorieën en concepten en dat "ware" kennis deze structuur in taal en gedachten "weerspiegelt". Correspondentie2 schept echter ruimte voor meerdere mogelijke categoriseringssystemen van de wereld en houdt rekening met het standpunt van waaruit de kennende instantie zijn categorieënnet over de wereld uitwerpt. 10K. Lorenz, 'Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie', 1941, in: K. Lorenz & F. Wuketits (Hrsg.), Die Evolution des Denkens, Zürich/München, 1983. 11 Locke kapt enerzijds de rechtstreekse referentiële verbinding tussen ideeën en dingen door: niet het ding is (hoezeer ook bemiddeld door onze kenvormen) het object van kennis, maar het idee. Vervolgens probeert hij de verbinding te herstellen door een mysterieuze "resemblance" op te voeren tussen ideeën en primaire kwaliteiten ("the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are resemblances of them, and their patterns do really exist in the bodies themselves, but the ideas produced in us by these secundary qualities have no resemblance of them at all", An Essay Concerning Human Understanding). Daarmee creëert hij het correspondentie-probleem, door R.W. Sellars omschreven als de "Lockian impasse" die de kenleer dikwijls domineert: "Ideas were taken to be the primary objects of knowledge and yet there was the belief in a material world beyond, which some ideas copied" ('"True" as Contextually Implying Correspondence', Journal of Philosophy, 56 (1959), 717-722, herdrukt in: W. Preston Warren, Principles of Emergent Realism, Philosophical Essays by R.W. Sellars, St. Louis, 1970. 12 A.I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition, Harvard, 1986, 151 e.v. 39 Het is daarom nogal goedkoop van Ruse om de hele evolutionistische kenleer af te willen doen onder verwijzing naar een paar misleidende citaten van Lorenz, die geïnterpreteerd kúnnen worden als Goldman's "correspondentie1". Dit temeer daar hij het klaarblijkelijk doet om voor zijn éigen versie van de evolutionistische kenleer - "darwinistische kenleer" meer originaliteit te kunnen claimen dan ze in feite verdient en om haar bovendien bij voorbaat in te dekken tegen filosofische critici als Putnam. Overigens gebruikt Ruse in een recent opstel weer gewoon de term evolutionistische kenleer en vermeldt hij daar opeens openlijk dat hij een realist is 13 . Dat de evolutionistische kenleer in feite allerminst naïef realistisch is, blijkt uit de nadruk die zij steeds weer legt op het perspectivistisch karakter van alle kennis. Als Lorenz zich verzet tegen de onkenbaarheid van het Ding an Sich hoeft dit niet te impliceren dat hij het kan vergelijken met de Erscheinung vanuit een niet door bepaalde denkvormen gestructureerd standpunt, waarvan Kant de mogelijkheid alleen voor de engelen en God schijnt open te laten 14 . Het enige dat hij hoeft vol te houden is dat de wijze waarop de wereld ons verschijnt mede bepaald wordt door denkvormen die onze voorouders gedurende millennia in staat hebben gesteld zich succesvol te oriënteren in de wereld en die dus waarschijnlijk op de een of andere manier op die wereld aansluiten. De Kantiaanse Erscheinung is dus (binnen de interpretatie van de evolutionistische kenleer) een perspectief op het an Sich vanuit een bepaalde a priori-structuur, maar deze a priori-structuur is zeker niet de enig mogelijke. In feite claimt de evolutionistische kenleer iets te kunnen zeggen over de relatie tussen de verschillende perspectieven en het overlevingsprogramma waar ze deel van uitmaken. Dit impliceert al weer geen triadische relatie tussen kenvormen wereld epistemologisch standpunt, zoals Ruse aan Lorenz toeschrijft, alsof wij als "objectieve" perspectiefloze buitenstaanders de relaties tussen verschillende soorten subjecten en verschillende soorten objecten kunnen bestuderen. Wél impliceert het dat wij vanuit ons standpunt en vanuit onze kenvormen kennis kunnen hebben van de relatie die vanuit andere standpunten en kenvormen met de wereld mogelijk is. In feite is het aannemen van dergelijke kennis namelijk óók noodzakelijk voor een scepticus die anderen van zijn standpunt wil overtuigen. Het opschrijven van je mening heeft nu eenmaal voornamelijk zin als iemand haar ooit leest en dat kan alleen als de lezende instantie een relatie heeft tot dezelfde wereld. Op dezelfde wijze zou het nogal moeilijk worden onze interactie met dieren begrijpelijk te maken zonder de aanname van een bepaalde vorm van dierlijke kennis van een gemeenschappelijke wereld. Op het moment dat er een fazant voor mij opvliegt kan ik er zeker van zijn dat de vogel op de een of ander wijze een representatie van mij heeft, de wijze waarop is een andere zaak. Op het moment dat ik bij het benaderen van een haviknest ontdek dat de havik mij vrijwel altijd eerder heeft ontdekt dan ik haar kan ik al beginnen met uitspraken over de verschillende cognitieve capaciteiten van haviken en mensen. De verschillende representaties van de wereld van haviken en mensen hoeven niet "beter" of "slechter" met de wereld te corresponderen, maar het moeten wel verschillende perspectieven zijn op één en dezelfde wereld. 13 M. Ruse, 'Sociobiology and Epistemology: Is Evolutionary Epistemology a Viable Option?', In: C. Crawford, M. Smith, D. Krebs (eds.), Sociobiology and Psychology, Hillsdale NJ, 1987. 14 Intellektuelle Anschauung scheint allein dem Urwesen, niemals aber einem abhängigen Wesen zuzukommen. KRV A 123. 39 Een bewijs voor het bestaan van een "buitenwereld" De evolutionistische kenleer claimt echter geen bewijs te geven voor het bestaan van een "buiten"-wereld zoals M. Ruse Lorenz probeert aan te wrijven. Het enige dat Lorenz zegt is dat alleen vanuit realistische premissen de functie van het kenapparaat begrijpelijk wordt: alleen als er een milieu is, kan het kenapparaat aangepast zijn aan het milieu. De evolutionistische kenleer fundeert dus geen realisme, maar is zelf op realisme gefundeerd 15 . Daarmee is zij dus niet zozeer een fundament voor een bouwwerk van hypotheses over de realiteit, maar eerder een sluitsteen van het uit hypotheses opgebouwde wetenschappelijk wereldbeeld: een hypothese ingewoven in het web van andere hypothesen die probeert te verklaren waarom er een kenvermogen is ontstaan en waar de verschillende eigenaardigheden van dit kenvermogen eigenlijk vandaan komen. Een cirkel? Vanuit de traditionele gedachte dat de kenleer een zeker fundament moet geven aan het gebouw van de wetenschappen is de evolutionistische kenleer een cirkel: immers zij is zelf gefundeerd in een (onzekere) wetenschappelijke hypothese en kan dus onmogelijk alle andere wetenschappelijke hypothesen funderen. Maar vanuit het naturalistisch perspectief van de evolutionistische kenleer zélf is de eis van absolute zekerheid onzinnig: de enige zekerheden die een stelsel van wetenschappelijke hypothesen kunnen gaan begeleiden bestaan uit hun onderlinge consistentie en hun empirisch succes. Welke andere indicatoren voor de betrouwbaarheid van kennis kunnen we ons voor een geëvolueerd brein eigenlijk voorstellen? Het feit dat we al uitgaan van de evolutieleer impliceert dat voor de naturalist een theorie die een groot aantal afzonderlijke feiten als beste kan verklaren een gokje waard is 16 . De naturalist weet maar al te goed dat ook de scepticus een theorie moet hebben waarop zijn scepsis gebaseerd is, maar dat deze theorie hem waarschijnlijk niet kan verlossen van de meest elementaire vooroordelen. De scepticus die absolute bewijzen en absolute fundamenten eist dient zich te realiseren dat zijn keuze voor scepsis niet beter gefundeerd is dan de weg die de naturalist kiest en minder mogelijkheden biedt om de wereld eens vanuit een ander perspectief waar te nemen en zo nieuwe dingen te ontdekken. Wie absolute zekerheid wenst komt uiteindelijk niet veel verder dan het telkens herhalen van zijn sceptische uitgangspunten. Wie daarentegen uitgaat van de in de wetenschappelijke praktijk meest vruchtbaar gebleken uitgangspunten loopt weliswaar risico's, maar kan nog eens tegen iets nieuws aanlopen. Een alternatief demarcatiecriterium of een richtlijn voor wetenschappelijke "evolutie" Een aantal filosofen, waaronder Putnam, menen dat de uniciteit van de filosofie deels ligt in haar normatieve missie. Vandaar dat zij in een bepaalde fase van de discussie het gelijk van de 15 Uit het voorafgaande moge duidelijk zijn dat ze überhaupt geen absoluut fundament van onze kennis geeft, maar veeleer uitgaat van een bepaalde hoeveelheid kennis (de evolutieleer) en vandaar begrijpelijk probeert te maken hoe kennis mogelijk is en wat kennis eigenlijk is. 16 Ik zeg niet: noodzakelijk waar is. Een inference to the best explanation heeft geen logische bewijskracht, maar is louter pragmatisch. Voor het filosofisch mijnenveld van de inference to the best explanation verwijs ik graag naar H. de Regt, '"Inference to the Best Explanation" en de Verdediging van het Wetenschappelijk Realisme", ANTW 84 (1992). 39 naturalist zullen toegeven en vervolgens zullen betogen dat zijn theorie wetenschappelijk weliswaar interessant en wellicht juist is, maar wijsgerig waardeloos. Het is immers niet mogelijk er normen uit af te leiden 17 . Mijns insziens is het idee dat de normatieve dimensie het eigenlijk "specialisme" van de filosoof is een bedenkelijke concessie aan de dictatuur van de laboratoria, de specialistenmentaliteit waartegen Ortega y Gasset ooit al gewaarschuwd heeft 18 . Sommige filosofen zijn kennelijk zo bang dat er na de opdeling van de wereld in domeinen voor de verschillende specialismen voor hen geen plekje in het huis van het Zijn meer over is, dat ze hun toevlucht maar meteen menen te moeten zoeken in de weidse horizonten van het Behoren. Maar ook al zou het normatieve één van de belangrijkste dossiers in de filosofenportefeuille uitmaken dan nog zou het onmogelijk een losstaand specialisme kunnen zijn. De oorzaak daarvan is dat het opstellen van normen los van de feiten een vrij zinloze aangelegenheid is en dat normen pas ontstaan door wensen te paren aan kennis. Op het moment dat we het ideaal koesteren van betrouwbare kennis en we weten dat zelfs de angst voor een malin génie een vergissing nog niet uitsluit is het misschien verstandig in eerste instantie bedacht te zijn op de verschillende mogelijke bronnen van dwaling. En juist hierin kan de evolutionistische kenleer een grote rol spelen. Zij laat namelijk zien dat onze kennis oorspronkelijk geëvolueerd is binnen een bepaalde context en dat deze natuurlijke context haar bepaalde beperkingen oplegt. Zo wijzen Lorenz en Vollmer erop dat ons voorstellingsvermogen is aangepast aan de verhoudingen van de mesokosmos (het niveau tussen microen macrokosmos). Toch is het duidelijk dat we dit beperkte voorstellingsvermogen in eerste instantie ook zullen gebruiken om de macroen microkosmos te begrijpen, wat allerlei problemen tot gevolg heeft. Door te laten zien wat kennis eigenlijk is kan de evolutionistische kenleer ook helpen te voorkomen dat er onhaalbare eisen aan kennis gesteld worden. Evolutionair epistemologen wijzen er bijvoorbeeld steeds op hoezeer kennis van de wereld ondergedetermineerd wordt door louter zintuiglijke prikkels en hoezeer organismen zich laten leiden door evolutionair succesvolle "werkhypothesen" 19 . Als echter al de verwerking van visuele prikkels op ons netvlies een "hypothetisch-constructief" karakter heeft, is het nogal onzinnig om een absoluut fundament in zintuiglijke data te eisen voor het geheel van onze kennis. Uit dit alles moge duidelijk zijn dat de evolutionistische kenleer niet in staat is a priori principes op te stellen voor het bereiken van betrouwbare kennis. Zij gelooft niet dat er volledig bewegwijzerde routes naar de waarheid kunnen zijn, maar probeert eerder lessen te leren uit een herhaald verdwalen. Hieruit volgt tegelijkertijd dat zij niet gelooft in categorische normen die je voorafgaande aan de wetenschap zou kunnen bedenken. Alle normen zijn hypothetisch en volgen uit het doel van betrouwbare kennis gecombineerd met de in de feedback relatie tussen kennis en wereld opgedane ervaringen omtrent de mogelijkheden van dwaling, die steeds in 17 H. Putnam, 1981 (zie noot 4); zie bijvoorbeeld ook H. Siegel, 'Philosophy of Science Naturalized?' In: Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci, 20 (1989), 365-375. 18J. Ortega y Gasset, La rebelión de las Mass, Madrid, 1931. 19 Vgl. met name R. Riedl, Biologie der Erkenntnis, Berlin/Hamburg, 1981, die probeert de hiërarchie van hypothesen die al voor de meest elementaire kennis nodig is systematisch te analyseren. 39 ontwikkeling zijn. Omdat onze kennis omtrent ons dwalen steeds in beweging is, zijn ook onze normen die ons moeten leiden naar het ideaal van betrouwbare kennis steeds in beweging 20 . De identificatie van evolutie met kennisverwerving Om misverstanden te voorkomen is het belangrijk dat we de evolutionistische kenleer ook onderscheiden van twee andere modellen die vaak in de literatuur opduiken. In de eerste plaats lezen we vaak, om te beginnen al bij Lorenz, dat niet alleen het kenvermogen een produkt is van evolutie, maar dat we het hele proces van evolutie zouden kunnen beschouwen als een proces van kennisverwerving 21 . Aangezien aanpassing altijd aanpassing aan een bepaalde omgeving is zou men kunnen zeggen dat in een aangepast organisme "know-how" over het hem omringende milieu is neergeslagen. Evolutie door natuurlijke selectie is leren door trial and error. De aangepastheid van organismen is het produkt van in DNA opgeslagen ervaring. Terecht merkt Vollmer op dat hier de term "kennis" een gevaarlijke verbreding heeft ondergaan 22 . Kennis als interne representatie maakt plaats voor kennis als causaal spoor. Strikt genomen zou men volgens dit losse gebruik van de term kennis ook een ingelopen schoen kennis toe moeten toeschrijven van haar eigenaar of een schroef kennis van de bijbehorende moer. Er zijn echter goede redenen dichter bij het alledaagse gebruik van de term "kennis" te blijven. In de eerste plaats zouden we door alle informatie "kennis" te noemen voorbijgaan aan een belangrijk verschil tussen kennis en informatie: kennis veronderstelt namelijk de neerslag van een actieve wisselwerking tussen kenvermogen en wereld in een vorm van categoriserend geheugen. Het kennend subject moet het object als x herkennen 23 . Er moet dus een voortdurende vergelijking van binnenkomende informatie met al opgeslagen informatie plaatsvinden. In de tweede plaats is kennis altijd actieve wisselwerking met de wereld en daarom up to date, in tegenstelling tot de informatie op DNA. DNA loopt altijd achter op veranderingen van het milieu. Als een organisme gedurende millennia is aangepast aan een bepaalde temperatuur en er treedt plotseling een ijstijd op "weet" DNA daar niets van (DNA weet überhaupt niets, het bevat constructiecodes voor eiwitten). Kennis als het vermogen te leren binnen één generatie is echter juist geëvolueerd om een organisme in staat te stellen zich aan de voor DNA onvoorzienbare omstandigheden aan te passen. Het genetische programma van een graafwesp kan eenvoudig geen informatie bevatten over de exacte plaats van haar 20 Vergelijkbare opmerkingen maakt R. Giere in zijn reactie op Siegel in 'Scientific Rationality as Instumental Rationality', Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci, 20 (1989), 377-384. Hij stelt hier onder andere dat normen onderzoeksstrategieën verbinden met de doelen van het onderzoek, die per onderzoeksgebied kunnen verschillen en soms meer "instrumentalistisch" zijn, soms meer "realistisch". Wat het beste doel is is dus niet altijd a priori vast te stellen. 21 Zie bijvoorbeeld F.M. Wuketits, 'Evolution as a Cognition Process: Towards an Evolutionary Epistemology', Biology and Philosophy, 1 (1986), 191-206, en recentelijk K.R. Popper, A World of Propensities, (hierin m.n. 'Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge'), Bristol, 1990. 22 G. Vollmer, 'Eine Kopernikanische Wende?', in: W. Lütterfelds (hrsg.), Transzendentale oder evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie?, Darmstadt, 1987, 85-90. Zie ook E.M. Engels, 'Was leistet die Evolutionäre Erkenntnistheorie?', Zs. f. allg. Wissenschaftstheorie, 16 (1985), 113-146. 23 Vgl. Vollmer, 1987. 39 holletje: daarom moet de wesp wel een soort "kaart" van zijn omgeving maken. Voor die "kaart" mag de term "kennis" mijns insziens wél gebruikt worden, omdat de graafwesp in staat is haar te corrigeren in wisselwerking met de omgeving 24 . Er zijn dus goede redenen om de term "kennis" te reserveren voor de interne representatie van onderscheidbare entiteiten en haar dus eerder te gebruiken voor informatie opgeslagen in één of andere zenuwknoop of centraal zenuwstelsel dan voor informatie opgeslagen op DNA. Evolutionistische wetenschapsleer In de tweede plaats worden sinds Lorenz en Campbell analogieën gesignaleerd tussen natuurlijke selectie en de variatie en selectieve "retentie" van denkinhouden en hypothesen. Het idee dat onze geest een "Darwin machine" is werd onlangs nog door de neurobioloog William Calvin verdedigt 25 en het idee dat de ontwikkeling van de wetenschap een Darwinistisch proces is werd recentelijk nog verdedigt door David Hull 26 . In beide gevallen betreft het interessante en veelbelovende analogieën, die echter vooralsnog speculatief van aard zijn, omdat er nog weinig bekend is over voortplanting en dood van ideeën en theorieën. De traditionele evolutionistische kenleer gaat echter niet over het reproductiesucces van ideeën en theorieën, maar over dat van individuele organismen met al of niet toereikende kenstrategieën. Zij kan zich daarmee losmaken van de lastige taak de adequaatheid van de analogie tussen wetenschappelijke en organische evolutie te beoordelen 27 . TRANSCENDENTAALFILOSOFIE EN DE ECOLOGISCHE CONTEXT VAN KENNIS Uit dit alles moge duidelijk zijn dat de methodologie van de evolutionistische kenleer zich nogal onderscheidt van alle pogingen tot een transcendentale kenleer. De evolutionistische kenleer start volledig a posteriori met een biologische benadering van het kenvermogen en probeert niet het antwoord op de vraag naar de genese en dat op de vraag naar de geldigheid van kennis te scheiden. Kennis is voor de evolutionistische kenleer niet alleen kennis van de wereld, maar vooral ook kennis in de wereld: als zodanig kan ze dus net zo onderzocht worden als andere natuurlijke processen. Men kan zich echter afvragen of deze benadering niet terug naar af is, terug naar een naïef-realistische benadering waarin het subject behandeld wordt als één van de vele objecten. Voor de evolutionistische kenleer is de poging de kentheorie te scheiden van de rest van het wereldbeeld gedoemd te mislukken. De oorsprong van de transcendentale manoeuvre of impasse, de loskoppeling van bewustzijnsinhouden en dingen, ligt in het Cartesiaans zoeken naar absoluut zekere kennis. Men kon in de zeventiende en achttiende eeuw geen reden 24 Of in wisselwerking met de manipulaties van lastige ethologen, zie N. Tinbergen, Curious Naturalists, Harmondsworth, 1958. 25 W. Calvin, The Cerebral Symphony, New York/Toronto/London/Sydney, 1990. 26 D. Hull, A Mechanism and Its Metaphysics: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science, Biology and Philosophy, 3 (1988), 123-155, en ook Science as a Process, Chigago, 1988. 27 Zie ook Bradie, Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology, Biology and Philosophy, 1 (1986), 401-459, en Thagard, Computational Philosophy of Science, 1988, hoofdstuk 6. 39 bedenken waarom onze voorstellingen zouden aansluiten op reële objecten, vooral omdat ze dat lang niet altijd doen en omdat er voldoende reden is om aan te nemen dat ze slechts gedeeltelijk adequaat zijn. Descartes en Leibniz riepen God aan als een onzichtbare garantie, Locke en Hume probeerden het via zintuiglijke prikkels, maar het werd in toenemende mate duidelijk dat het onmogelijk is bewustzijnsinhouden op te vatten als een bewijs voor dat waarnaar ze schijnen te verwijzen. Mijns inziens is de kentheorie van Kant eenvoudig een poging een antwoord te geven op het raadsel van de relatie tussen bewustzijnsvormen en werkelijkheid in een situatie waarin dat antwoord eenvoudig niet voorhanden was. Kant ging net als bijvoorbeeld Locke zonder meer uit van de juistheid van de mechanica van Newton, zag tegelijkertijd in dat het empirisme haar niet kon funderen en vond een door God ingestelde harmonie préétablie onbevredigend. Dus scheidde hij het "feit" van kennis van haar "rechtvaardiging", "empirisch realisme" van "transcendentaal idealisme". Maar zijn zogenaamde transcendentale rechtvaardiging houdt eigenlijk slechts in dat we (om met Nietzsche te spreken) slechts een wereld kunnen begrijpen die we zelf gemaakt hebben. De wereld van de ervaring en van de mechanica is al een produkt van onze aanschouwingsvormen en categorieën, Erscheinung. Ons kenvermogen richt zich niet naar de dingen maar de dingen richten zich naar onze kennis. In strikte zin is dit eigenlijk geen rechtvaardiging van kennis te noemen, maar eerder een relativering 28 . Het is in ieder geval geen geslaagde poging kentheorie van wereldbeeld te scheiden. Kant vermijdt inderdaad conclusies over het kenvermogen waartoe hij zou kunnen komen door het op te vatten als een deel van de wereld. Hij plaatst in die zin het kenvermogen buiten de wereld van de Erscheinung. Maar hij maakt tegelijk een model van dit kenvermogen en wel op basis van de veronderstelde eigenschappen van de wereld van de Erscheinung die het produkt zijn van haar transcendentale activiteiten. Omdat hij niet kan verklaren waarom het kenvermogen in staat zou zijn tot een beschrijving van de ruimte zonder raadpleging van zintuigen concludeert hij dat het kenvermogen de chaos van binnenkomende zintuiglijke prikkels plaatst binnen bepaalde "aanschouwingsvormen". Omdat hij niet kan verklaren waarom het kenvermogen entiteiten, eenheden, relaties enz. kan onderscheiden, concludeert hij dat het kenvermogen deze zelf aan de wereld oplegt. Hij construeert met andere woorden een model van een kenvermogen dat in staat is tot meetkunde, fysica, kortom "synthetische kennis a priori" van een fenomenale wereld, zonder dat er een daardoor ontsloten reële wereld nodig is. Zijn vooronderstelling is het ontbreken van elke "harmonie préétablie" tussen kenvermogen en reële wereld (Ding an sich). Zijn onvermijdelijke conclusie is een zeer specifiek model van een supercreatief kenvermogen dat fenomenale werelden afscheidt die zich lenen voor Euclidische meetkunde en Newtoniaanse fysica. De kentheorie van Kant is hier natuurlijk maar een voorbeeld van een steeds terugkerend patroon dat optreedt bij kennistheoretische modellen waarin de kentheorie gescheiden wordt van alle andere theorieën over de wereld: ten eerste treden er in dergelijke modellen steeds vergissingen op, omdat vooronderstellingen omtrent het kenvermogen niet gecorrigeerd kunnen worden met behulp van kennis over kenvermogens in het algemeen (een voorbeeld is ook het empiristisch idee dat kennis noodzakelijk opgebouwd zou moeten worden uit eenvoudige basiseenheden); ten tweede onstaat er steeds een onvermijdelijke aporie, doordat de wereld ons slechts gegeven is als bewustzijnsinhoud en bewustzijnsinhouden altijd in een bepaalde mate "blosse Gedankenformen" zijn (de oorzaak van het hardnekkig terugkeren van vormen van 28 Uiteraard ontkent Kant dit. 39 idealisme 29 ). Zolang het kenvermogen niet gezien wordt als een deel van de wereld dat binnen een ecologische context ontstaan is als oriëntatie-orgaan is het altijd mogelijk de wereld "achter" haar voorstellingen tussen haakjes te zetten en in het wilde weg te speculeren over de transcendentale horizon waarbinnen de wereld ons overkomt. Zolang er geen kader is waarbinnen geoordeeld kan worden over de keiharde noodzaak van oriënterende kennis van de eigen omgeving die op zijn minst ten dele moet aansluiten bij die omgeving kunnen we ons verlustigen in een vrijwel oneindige variatie aan kennistheoretische bespiegelingen over de relatie van onze bewustzijnsinhouden en een al of niet, in meerdere of in mindere mate door hen gepresenteerde, gerepresenteerde of geperspectiveerde wereld. Maar een theorie over behoefte en noodzaak is niet langer a priori. Een dergelijke kentheorie heeft andere theoriëen nodig, theorieën die zij eigenlijk liever zou willen helpen onderbouwen. Daarmee wordt dus eenvoudig het programma van een zelfstandige buiten alle theorieën staande, alle theorieën funderende en zekerheid gevende kentheorie opgegeven. De boom van Descartes, met zijn metafysische wortels epistemologische vastigheid en voeding gevend aan de stevige stam van de fysica, uitmondend in allerlei takken van concrete en toegepaste wetenschap 30 , blijkt water nodig te hebben, omver te kunnen waaien, deel uit te maken van een park. Er is geen fundament van een gebouw van de kennis, maar er bestaat een vlechtwerk van elkaar vastbindende theorieën die alleen samen enige kans hebben te blijven drijven. Daarmee wordt zekerheid niet langer bereikt door alle theorieën op te willen hangen aan één Archimedisch punt, maar door het hele stelsel van theorieën steeds te laten leunen op de theorieën die elkaar onderling het sterkst steunen. Het risico van dwaling wordt verminderd door modellen op te zetten van de omstandigheden waarin dwalingen kunnen optreden of zelfs te verwachten zijn. De eis van een logisch dwingende absolute fundering maakt plaats voor beproefd gokken en subtiele kansberekening. Dit impliceert allesbehalve een terugkeer naar een naïef realisme dat geen behoefte voelt zichzelf te rechtvaardigen. Doorzoeken naar absolute zekerheid als alles erop wijst dat zoiets principieel niet kan bestaan zou pas echt naïef zijn. De keus voor de evolutieleer als een door veel elkaar onderling versterkende aanwijzingen gesteund kader waarbinnen predicties gedaan kunnen worden over kenvermogens maakt een terugkeer naar een naïef niet-middellijk realisme eenvoudig onmogelijk: immers het dwingt ons tot de ongemakkelijke taak te verklaren waarom een organisch oriëntatievermogen ons in staat stelt tot het bereiken van ogenschijnlijke evolutionaire luxeartikelen zoals zelfkennis en wetenschap. Het realisme van de evolutionistische kenleer vertoont eerder vage parallellen met het problematisch realisme van Leibniz' monadologie, waarin individuele monaden enerzijds vensterloos kunnen zijn (geen directe kennis van de wereld hebben) en anderzijds ieder op hun eigen wijze het universum weerspiegelen. Maar hier kan geen sprake zijn van een door God ingestelde harmonie 29 Dit werd door R.W. Sellars de "Lockian impasse" genoemd, omdat Locke volgens hem begon niet de dingen zelf, maar ideeën het object van kennis te noemen. Zie noot 11. 30 "Ainsi toute la philosophie est comme un arbre, dont les racines sont la métaphysique, le tronc est la physique, et les branches qui sortent de ce tronc sont toutes les autres sciences ..." Lettre de l'autheur a celuy qui traduit le livre (les principes), 1647, editie Tannery, IX-2, 1971, 14. Uit de beschrijving van Descartes blijkt dat metafysica bij hem vooral kenleer omvat en kennis van heldere begrippen (zoals God) en dat kennis van de mens pas ná metafysica en fysica kan komen. 39 préétablie tussen bewustzijnsvormen en realiteit 31 . Alleen de organische behoefte aan oriënterende informatie legt een link (vergeef me het anglicisme); en deze link kan niet anders dan link zijn. Daarmee zien we tegelijkertijd dat binnen deze benadering er onmogelijk een scheiding kan worden gemaakt tussen het antwoord op de vraag naar de geldigheid van kennis en die op de vraag naar haar genese. Alleen de ecologische context waarbinnen kennis geëvolueerd is garandeert tot op zekere hoogte haar geldigheid. Dat verklaart waarom het zoeken naar een rechtvaariging van onze kenvormen buiten deze ecologische context om zoals Kant deed met zijn transcendentale rechtvaardiging nooit werkelijk lukt. Er is maar één verklaring voor het gegeven dat we niet altijd dwalen: en dat is dat dwalen letterlijk levensgevaarlijk is 32 . KENNIS ALS BEHOEFTE In plaats van een transcendentale poging tot een inventarisatie van de voorwaarden van kennis aan de zijde van het subject probeert de evolutionistische kenleer er dus vanuit de genealogische analyse van de kenrelatie van organisme en milieu achter te komen hoe kennis in deze relatie tot stand is gekomen en komt. Omdat de evolutieleer ons in staat stelt tot generalisaties over processen van evolutie in elke geschikte uithoek van het heelal kan het perspectief van de evolutionistische kenleer worden omschreven als genealogisch en exobiologisch (ons kenvermogen benaderend als analoog aan dat van een buitenaardse intelligentie). De centrale vraag is niet langer alleen "Hoe is kennis mogelijk?" in de zin van "Wat zijn de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van kennis aan de zijde van het subject?", maar vooral óók in de zin van "Waarom ontstaat er soms (op sommige planeten, in sommige groepen van levende wezens) kennis en wat ìs kennis gezien haar functie?". Het fundament waarop onze genealogische en exobiologische reconstructie van het ontstaan van kennis berust moet de beste kennis van het ontstaan en de verdere evolutie van leven zijn. Uiteraard kan ik hier niet meer dan een schets geven om te laten zien hoe vruchtbaar deze benadering in meerdere opzichten is 33 . Een door verschillende filosofen van de biologie verdedigde opvatting wil dat levende wezens hun doelgerichtheid danken aan het hun groei leidende genetische programma 34 . Dit programma repliceert zich generatie na generatie en verandert ten gevolge van het verschillend replicatiesucces van haar varianten die telkens varianten bouwen die meer of minder succesvol zijn onder de omstandigheden waaronder ze worden beproefd. De oudste programma's waren toevallig ontstane variaties van de zichzelf "succesvol" replicerende moleculen waarmee het proces van variatie en selectie aanving. De huidige levende wezens kunnen om diverse redenen worden gezien als de "overlevingsmachines" die de afstammelingen van deze "oerreplicatoren" 31 Vollmer, 1983, spreekt van een "harmonie postétablie", maar het is de vraag in hoeverre er überhaupt sprake is van een harmonie. 32 Een uitwerking van dit argument kan men vinden in A.A. Derksen, 'Realisme en Naturalisme', in: J. van Brakel en D. Raven (red.), Realisme en Waarheid, Assen, 1991. 33 Iets uitgebreider staat het een en ander in P. Slurink, Natuurlijke Selectie en de Tragiek van de Menselijke Idealen, Delft, 1989, hoofdstuk 3. 34 E. Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology, Cambridge/London, 1988. 39 nu nog moeten helpen bij hun verspreiding 35 . Het genetisch programma dat hen opbouwt is ontstaan door haar replicatiesucces in het verleden en wordt nu getest in strikt genomen nieuwe en onvoorzienbare omstandigheden. Levende wezens zijn in die zin biologische projectielen afgevuurd met als doel de verspreiding van hun intern programma, dat via trial and error en de zelfselectie van succes zich zo heeft ontwikkeld dat het een kans heeft raak te schieten. Moderne op genetische analyse gebaseerde indelingen van levende wezens delen hen in in drie hoofdgroepen, archaebacteriën, eubacteriën en de rest, die veel later ontstaan is. Planten en dieren vormen in deze indeling slechts twee takken van die "rest", waartoe ook microsporia, flagelaten, ciliaten en fungi behoren. Toch verhindert niets ons een indeling te maken die op de oude indeling in planten en dieren lijkt en die alle levende wezens opdeelt in "rechtstreeks energie puttend uit de omgeving of van de zon" en "parasitair, van roof levend". Vooral in die laatste groep heeft zich een grote variatie aan zich verplaatsende organismen ontwikkeld, enerzijds omdat zij zich moeten verplaatsen om aan energie te komen, anderzijds omdat zij dankzij die verplaatsing ook aan voldoende energie kunnen komen om die verplaatsing zelf mogelijk te maken. En het is juist die verplaatsing die de behoefte doet ontstaan aan actuele informatie uit de omgeving. Als levende wezens biologische projectielen zijn dan lijken de oudste vormen het meest op ballistische projectielen (zoals de Russisch/Irakese Scud-raketten). De planning van hun levensloop is geheel voorgeprogrammeerd. Zelfs als zij in staat zijn op hun omgeving te reageren is deze reactie standaard; er is geen koerscorrectie mogelijk nadat het projectiel is afgevuurd. Naarmate een organisme gecompliceerdere taken moet uitvoeren in de zin van het opsporen en aanboren van energiebronnen en/of het vinden van sexuele partners wordt het risico van missers op deze manier steeds groter. Koerscorrecties worden in toenemende mate noodzakelijk en daarmee een intern herkenningssysteem dat het projectiel in staat stelt zijn doelen te herkennen (vergelijk geleide raketten zoals kruisraketten en patriot-raketten, die tot op het laatste moment hun koers kunnen corrigeren). Op het moment dat een organisme niet langer afhankelijk is van één voedselbron kan ook deze niet langer standaard worden voorgeprogrammeerd. Er moeten kaders worden aangegeven waarbinnen het doel als zodanig wordt herkend en het organisme moet op basis van trial and error voorkeuren ontwikkelen. Het is bijvoorbeeld bekend dat er zich op het netvlies van kikkers speciale cellen bevinden die vuren in reactie op kleine bewegende voorwerpen en die de kikker onmiddelijk met de tong vooruit voorwaarts doen schieten. Het prooidier lijkt hier min of meer standaard voorgeprogrammeerd. Anderzijds wijzen de kleurvariaties van rupsen (en hun nabootsing) erop dat rupsenetende vogels in staat zijn een vieze smaak te associëren met een bepaald kleurpatroon. Dit systeem eist veel meer hersenactiviteit en de ontwikkeling van een aangeboren waarderingssysteem van binnenkomende brandstof dat het organisme in staat stelt tot keuzen, smaak. Hetzelfde geldt natuurlijk voor bronnen van gevaar. Een kakkerlak heeft op zijn achterlijf twee uitsteeksels of cerci die met één grote zenuwcel rechtstreeks gekoppeld is aan zijn pootspieren. Hersenen heeft zij niet nodig om te vluchten de kleinste aanraking van de cerci doet haar in een fractie van een seconde wegglippen 36 . Naarmate een organisme echter langer 35 R. Dawkins, 1976, ook Idem, The Extended Phenotype, Oxford, 1982. 36 H.E. Evans, Life on a Little-known Planet, New York, 1966. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat helemaal over "The Intellectual and Emotional World of the Cockroach". 39 leeft en beschermd moet worden tegen een groter aantal potentiële bedreigingen begint een uitgebreider en subtieler waarschuwingssysteem meer te lonen. Om te voorkomen dat het leven van een organisme onmogelijk wordt doordat bepaalde alarmknoppen voortdurend staan te knipperen is een verfijning door allerlei leerprocessen onvermijdelijk. Dit verklaart waarom veel dieren bijvoorbeeld aan menselijke onderzoekers kunnen wennen. Om de koers van een organisch projectiel te optimaliseren zou natuurlijk op elk afzonderlijk moment de meest recente informatie over allerlei afzonderlijke voedselen gevarenbronnen in een evenwichtige beslissing moeten worden meegewogen. Het organisme kan bijvoorbeeld voorzien worden van een interne kaartachtige representatie van zijn omgeving waarop een aantal voedselbronnen staan ingetekend en waarop tegelijk de risico's staan ingeschaald die eraan verbonden zijn op die plek te fourageren (plus eventueel de kans op die plek een sexuele partner te vinden, etc.). De relatie tussen de voedselbron en de huidige positie kan op die kaart worden weergegeven als een vector en de dikte van die vector kan correleren met de honger van het organisme gedeeld door de risico's verbonden aan die fourageerplaats. De optelsom van al deze vectoren zou een "wilsvector" kunnen opleveren die de feitelijk koers van het organisme in het nu bepaalt. Uiteraard kan deze "wilsvector" op elk moment door nieuwe binnenkomende informatie gecorrigeerd worden. Naarmate de mogelijkheden en eisen van de omgeving complexer zijn is er niet alleen meer behoefte aan een uitgebreidere inwendige representatie, maar ook aan meer ruimte voor leerprocessen. Het is geen wonder dat de relatief slimme primaten (ze zeggen het meestal zelf) in de tropen geëvolueerd zijn en wel in oerwouden met een enorme variatie aan voedselen gevarenbronnen. Leerprocessen zijn echter niet mogelijk op een tabula rasa: er zijn allerlei zintuiglijke structuren nodig die de omgeving op een specifieke manier scannen, aangeboren waarderingen en selectiesystemen die de aandacht richten en de relevante aspecten isoleren. Leren is niet geëvolueerd als een soort evolutionaire vrijetijdsbesteding. Leren vindt meestal binnen vrij strakke kaders plaats die ervoor zorgen dat het organisme niet van zijn overlevingsdoelen afdwaalt. De resulterende representatie van de omgeving mag vooral niet "neutraal" en "objectief" zijn. In eerste instantie is de informatie die een organisme opslaat puur voor eigen gebruik: er mogen allerlei labels aanzitten die hyperindividuele beslissingen gemakkelijker maken. Dingen moeten voortdurend positief of negatief beoordeeld worden om een berekening van hun invloed op de wilsvector mogelijk te maken 37 . Daarmee komen we op één van de mijns inziens belangrijkste consequenties van de evolutionistische kenleer. Dieren zijn niet in eerste instantie informatieverwerkende systemen, maar beslissingssystemen. Kennis is er niet voor de kennis, maar voor de "juiste" beslissing. Waarheid en haar niet-sociale voorgangster adequaatheid van representatie heeft een overlevingswaarde. Dat betekent echter tegelijk dat kennis altijd perspectivistisch en strategisch is 38 . Kennis wordt opgebouwd vanuit het standpunt van een organische belanghebbende die de 37 Dit soort waardering is opvallend lang meeverhuisd tot in de ivoren torens der wetenschap. Nog maar één generatie geleden deelden sommige biologen hun mededieren op in "schadelijk" en "nuttig" wild. 38 J. Ortega y Gasset corrigeerde het relativistisch perspectivisme van F. Nietzsche tot een vitalistisch perspectivisme of "ratiovitalisme". Hij stelt heel scherp dat perspectieven perspectieven moeten zijn op één wereld om het leven te kunnen dienen. Ortega y Gasset, El tema de nuestro tiempo, Madrid, 1923. 39 wereld indeelt in meer of minder positieve en negatieve entiteiten. Kennis moet het organisch projectiel in staat stellen tot manoeuvres die de kans vergroten dat het zijn doel raakt (de explosie resulteert in een generatie nieuwe projectieltjes). In zijn indrukwekkende studie The Biological Origin of Human Values laat G.E. Pugh zien dat beslissingen in zowel kunstmatige als organische beslissingssystemen geoptimaliseerd kunnen worden door de erin gerepresenteerde entiteiten van waarden te voorzien. Een zo geconstrueerd beslissingssysteem is niet langer afhankelijk van een voorgeprogrammeerd set standaardreacties, maar kan in elke nieuwe situatie een volstrekt nieuwe en optimale oplossing bedenken. Het is waarschijnlijk niet toevallig dat Pugh tot zijn ideeën kwam toen hij voor het Amerikaanse ministerie van defensie een programma moest meehelpen te ontwikkelen dat optimale vliegroutes voor bommenwerpers kon ontdekken. In het ontwikkelde programma werden waarden toegekend aan de vernietiging van vijandig materieel, aan de eigen bommenwerpers en aan het eigen personeel. Voor elke mogelijke vliegroute kon de waarde van het vijandige doel worden vermenigvuldigd met de kans op succesvolle destructie en kon de waarde van de eigen bommenwerpers en bemanningen worden vermenigvuldigd met het risico dat ze verloren zouden gaan. Het programma koos dan automatisch de vliegroute met de gunstigste balans tussen deze variabelen. Pugh is zich er bewust van dat in levende wezens allerlei waarden niet uitgedrukt worden in getallen, maar stelt dat juist een subjectieve kwalitatieve representatie het gedrag van een levend wezen optimaal gidst. Het verschil tussen "epitheelweefsel linkerpink, 150° C" en iets wat op "Au" lijkt is dat dat laatste waarschijnlijk minder uitnodigt tot beschouwelijke omwegen. (Dat kan tegelijk een aanwijzing zijn dat dieren iets als "au" moeten voelen als ze er zich naar gedragen.) Het wordt nu begrijpelijker waarom op het moment dat een dier niet langer kan vertrouwen op een set vaste standaardreacties het leervermogen zich tegelijk ontwikkelt met een symfonie van subjectieve belevingen, zoals gevoelens. In het relatief soepele beslissingssysteem garanderen zij dat alle facetten van een zaak innerlijk worden afgewogen. Als "aangeboren belevingsstructuren" 39 verraden zij het strategische aspect van de interne representatie die het dier van zijn omgeving heeft. Tegelijk kunnen ze tot uitdrukking gebracht door middel van geluiden, lichaamshouding, kleur, positie van de staart of gelaatsuitdrukkingen ook een signaalfunctie hebben naar soortgenoten toe. Daarmee komen we op een ander aspect van kennis waarvoor een evolutionaire benadering onze ogen kan openen. Het is opvallend dat weliswaar niet alle sociale soorten intelligent zijn, maar dat wel veel intelligente soorten sociaal zijn. Een sociaal milieu creëert ongekende nieuwe mogelijkheden voor de ontwikkeling van cognitieve capaciteiten 40 . Op het moment dat een bepaalde diersooort enerzijds door de dreiging van rovers voordelen ontleent aan het leven in groepen en anderzijds een echte leerder is ontstaat er een situatie waarin in principe voor de overleving relevante informatie voorwerp kan worden van allerlei nieuwe vormen van interactie. Kennis kan handelswaar worden en er ontstaat ruimte voor het ontstaan van vormen van niet erfelijke doorgifte van informatie, cultuur. Bonner geeft als voorbeelden onder andere de "ontdekking" door pimpelmeesjes dat het inpikken van de dop van melkflessen een lekker maal oplevert die zich in Groot-Brittanië onder pimpelmezen verspreidde als een olievlek en de 39Slurink, 1989, 23. 40 R.Byrne & A. Whiten, Machiavellian Intelligence, Social Expertise and the Evolution of Intellect in Monkeys, Apes and Humans, Oxford, 1988. 39 hysterische angst voor mensen die zich in een bepaalde groep Zuid-Afrikaanse olifanten na een brute slachtpartij generaties lang wist te handhaven 41 . Het bestaan van "culturele" doorgifte van informatie kan echter bij veel dieren die leven in groepen met meerdere generaties gewoner zijn dan op het eerste gezicht lijkt, omdat in dergelijke groepen jonge dieren onwillekeurig geografische kennis overnemen van de oudere dieren en ook geneigd kunnen zijn bepaalde gedragspatronen (vogelzang, fourageertechnieken) te leren door imitatie. Het leven in groepen stelt dieren echter niet alleen in staat van elkaar te leren, maar dwingt hen ook elkaar zo nu en dan te slim af te zijn. Het spanningsveld tussen coöperatie en concurrentie binnen een groep onderling van elkaar afhankelijke dieren stelt ongekende nieuwe eisen aan het vermogen tot subtiele sociale manoeuvres, waarbij niet alleen een inwendige representatie van de rang en positie van soortgenoten nodig is, maar ook een inwendige representatie van de eigen positie in de groep. Zelfbewustzijn zoals dat tenminste bij de mensapen (uitgezonderd wellicht de gorilla) schijnt voor te komen 42 kan hierdoor wellicht verklaard worden. Dit zou impliceren dat het beeld dat wij van onszelf hebben oorspronkelijk tot functie gehad heeft om het beeld dat anderen van ons hebben te begrijpen en te manipuleren. Daar zijn wel enkele argumenten voor te geven, zoals de mogelijke co-evolutie van oogwit, subtiele gelaatsuitdrukkingen en zelfbewustzijn, en de observatie van Sartre dat het beeld dat wij van onszelf hebben niet los staat van het beeld dat anderen van ons hebben 43 . De evolutionaire benadering kan tenslotte licht werpen op een aantal specifiek menselijke aanpassingen, zoals eigenaardigheden van onze grammaticale taal. De evolutieleer doet ons verwachten dat taal niet uit het niets geëvolueerd is. Er moeten specifieke selectiedrukken zijn geweest die onze voorouders ertoe aanzetten steeds meer informatie met elkaar te delen en elkaars gedrag steeds meer door middel van taal te beïnvloeden. Mogelijkerwijs is de evolutie van taal een indicatie dat vroegmenselijke groepen op het moment dat zij de meeste roofdieren de baas waren in toenemende mate gedwongen werden tot onderlinge competitie en daarmee tot een hechtere interne samenwerking. In ieder geval doet de evolutionaire benadering ons niet verwachten dat eigenschappen van taaluitingen alleen bepaald worden door de mogelijkheden van de monden keelholte en de relevante hersendelen om zo efficiënt mogelijk het-doet-erniet-toe-welke kosmische toedrachten in verzendbare codes te vangen 44 . Taal is veel meer dan een medium voor de louter zakelijke overdracht van informatie over toedrachten. Wat relevante toedrachten zijn wordt immers al door de gemeenschappelijke ervaringswereld van de communicerende partijen bepaald. Bovendien zijn taaluitingen primair sociale handelingen. In 41 J.T. Bonner, The Evolution of Culture in Animals, Oxford 1980. 42 Geoperationaliseerd als het vermogen zichzelf in een spiegel te herkennen, zie Gallup, 'Selfawareness and the emergence of mind in primates, Am. J. Primatol.', 2 (1982), 237-248. Frans de Waal acht dit geen operationalisering van zelfbewustzijn, dat volgens hem ook bij andere apen voorkomt, maar van een relatief hoge graad van narcisme of "chimpocentrisme" (F. de Waal, Peacemaking among Primates, Cambridge/London, 1988). 43 L'Etre et le Néant, Paris, 1943. 44 Vollmer, 1983, 153-157, spreekt over de ontoereikendheid van de natuurlijke taal en tegelijk over de onmogelijkheid deze door middel van geformaliseerde talen te boven te komen. 39 die zin is er geen principieel verschil tussen wat wij met onze monden keelholte doen en wat pijlinktvissen met hun lichaamskleuren doen en wolven met hun staart 45 . Onze taal is tegelijk een superieur medium voor samenwerking als een superieur middel tot misleiding. Daarom zitten taaluitingen doorgaans vol van subtiele waarderingen en andere vormen van manipulatie. Ambiguïteiten kunnen de onwil van één partij verraden om al te veel gratis informatie te verschaffen, maar ook een voorzichtigheid met betrekking tot eventueel door de taaluiting gewekte verwachtingen. Stemwisselingen kunnen een vriendelijk verzoek de lading meegeven van een bevel en een ernstige beschuldiging transformeren in een grappig plagerijtje 46 . Alternatieve woordkeuzes kunnen gebruikt worden om impliciete aanspraken te maken op een bepaalde status of op het lidmaatschap tot een bepaalde groep. Al met al is taal niet minder dan de geweien van een hert of de epauletten van een vink een strategisch wapen in de strijd om het bestaan 47 . Ongetwijfeld vergiste Johannes zich met de stelling dat in den beginne het woord was, maar hij had gelijk in zoverre er met het woord veel nieuws is begonnen, in ieder geval veel nieuwe variaties op oude thema's. CONCLUSIE: DE DIERLIJKE REDE, ONZE UITEINDELIJKE GIDS Daarmee is de centrale boodschap van de evolutionistische kenleer aangegeven. De traditionele epistemologie is het slachtoffer geweest van een historische misleiding. Eeuwenlang hebben filosofen gemeend dat de uniciteit van de mens gedefinieerd kon worden in oppositie tot de eigenschappen van andere dieren. Tegenover de mens met zijn geest stonden de geestloze automaten die volgens Descartes en consorten de dieren waren. Dit heeft ertoe geleid dat men de gedachte dat kennis en subjectiviteit haar oorsprong zou kunnen hebben in het dierlijk oriëntatievermogen en in de dierlijke wereldbeleving nooit een serieuze basis heeft gevonden voor een kentheorie 48 . Pogingen het gebouw van de kennis te funderen werden steeds gebaseerd op oncontroleerbare vooronderstellingen over de oorsprong van betrouwbare kennis zoals empirisme en rationalisme en leidden steeds weer tot wat ik hierboven de transcendentale impasse noemde. Omdat men kennis niet plaatste binnen de ecologische context waar zij haar 45 Trivers, 1985, 2-4, 418-420, maakt een begin van een typisch sociobiologische benadering van de taal. Dit is hard nodig omdat zelfs taalkundigen die het biologisch karakter van taal inzien (bijv. P. Lieberman in zijn Uniquely Human, Cambridge/London, 1991) vaak eenzijdig gericht zijn op de uniciteit van de menselijke taal (een beroepskwaal die overigens vaker bij menswetenschappers voorkomt). 46 Voor het belang van stemwisselingen zie J.J. Ohala, 'An ethological perspective on common cross-language utilization of Fo of voice', Phonetica, 41 (1984), 1-16. 47 Omdat de mens van nature een groepssamenwerker is, waarvan de rang voor een deel wordt bepaald door verdienste, gaat veel menselijke grootmakerij en bluf over morele kwaliteiten, met name "beneffectance, being beneficial and effective at the same time" (Trivers, 1985, 418). Dat neemt echter niet weg dat de sociaal-strategisch waarde van deze bluf gelijkenis kan vertonen met de bluf van andere diersoorten, waar mooie staartveren of sterke spieren belangrijke reclame-artikelen zijn. 48 Alleen Hume is een opvallende uitzondering: in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understandig § IX heeft hij het over de "reason of animals" en analyseert hij onze inductieve gewoontes als een instinct. 39 oorsprong vindt, stuitte men steeds weer op de onmogelijkheid alle kennis te herleiden tot onbetwijfelbare basisfeiten. Soms leidde dit tot een gezond scepsis, maar nog vaker leidde het tot een relativisme en idealisme waarin geen mogelijkheid meer bestond vooroordelen te corrigeren aan de hand van de best beschikbare kennis. Hieruit kunnen we leren dat een geen onderscheid makende scepsis tegenover alle kennis überhaupt dwalingen juist in de hand kan werken. Het risico van dwaling kan het best bestreden worden door te gokken op de meest solide denkweefsels die in staat zijn het breedste bereik van de ervaring van alledaagse directe wereldbeleving tot sophisticated wetenschappelijke proeven en experimenten te dekken en te verhelderen. Het zoeken van een absoluut fundament voor menselijke kennis is een uiting van hoogmoed, want het impliceert dat alleen de mens tussen alle andere dieren buiten de feedback relatie tussen kenvermogen en werkelijkheid zou kunnen treden 49 . Alleen de mens zou de realiteit kunnen overstijgen en zijn inwendig "plaatje" van de werkelijkheid kunnen vergelijken met het geheel, wat natuurlijk onmogelijk is. Het paradoxale (en ironische) is nu dat de enige garantie van een gedeeltelijke adequaatheid van onze kennis niet voortkomt uit ons verschil, maar juist uit onze overeenkomst met de andere dieren. De door filosofen vaak in oppositie tot de natuur geplaatste "rede" is van origine een dierlijk vermogen dat tot taak heeft het dier in staat te stellen tot voor de overleving van zijn genen gunstige beslissingen. Betrouwbare informatie over de omgeving is een eerste vereiste voor het nemen van deze beslissingen. Daarom kunnen we verwachten dat de zintuigen en het brein van dieren een representatie opbouwen van de omgeving die gedeeltelijk aansluit bij haar feitelijke fysische eigenschappen. Anderzijds moet deze aansluiting zo zijn dat ze het nemen van de juiste beslissingen mogelijk maakt: daarom kunnen we verwachten dat het kenapparaat de wereld schildert in de kleuren van de dierlijke belangen in functie waarvan het staat opgesteld. Pas toen mensen voor het eerst door middel van wetenschappelijke modelvorming over hun onmiddellijke dierlijke horizon begonnen te turen, ontstonden de grote kentheoretische conflicten die het duidelijkst naar voren komen tijdens de laatste vier eeuwen. Er ontstond een conflict tussen twee verschillende evolutionaire erfenissen: enerzijds de ongereflecteerde realiteitszin van ons kenapparaat die ons altijd ons beeld van de werkelijkheid doet identificeren met de werkelijkheid zelve, anderzijds ons vermogen informatie uit meerdere bronnen te integreren tot een coherente reconstructie van niet direct waarneembare feiten. Naarmate de wetenschap vorderde kwam de geloofwaardigheid van de natuurlijke wereldervaring steeds verder op de tocht te staan en dwong de eis tot consistentie denkers ertoe haar te betwijfelen. Ik denk dat elk ander dier dat binnen een zo korte tijd door allerlei nieuwe meetinstrumenten en denkmodellen boven zijn dierlijke horizon uitgetild zou worden wel een paar wanhopige exemplaren zou tellen die in een hoekje zouden kruipen om epistemologische hersenspinsels af te scheiden en daarbij in een chronische transcendentale impasse zouden raken 50 . 49 R.W. Sellars beschrijft de kenrelatie in termen van een feed-back, zie o.a. The Philosophy of Physical Realism, augmented by two chapters New York, (1932), 1966. 50 Wat dat betreft kunnen theoretisch ooit de stoutste verwachtingen van de exobiologen nog eens geschokt worden op het moment dat zij ergens uit de oneindige ruimtes een signaal opvangen dat niets minder blijkt te stellen dan cogito ergo sum, ook al is dat een denkfout. 39 Na een paar eeuwen vol vergeefse pogingen kennis te voorzien van een absolute fundering, is het denk ik tijd om in te zien dat het zoeken naar een dergelijke fundering een vergissing is 51 . Uitgaande van de beste kennis waarover we op dit moment beschikken is er geen enkele reden om te geloven dat er bepaalde basiszekerheden zijn, waaraan een speciaal keurmerk is bevestigd dat elke twijfel verder uitsluit. Dwaling is altijd mogelijk voor een eindig brein en de enige garantie tegen dwaling is het feit dat onze voorouders er tot nu toe al miljoenen generaties lang in zijn geslaagd te overleven en elkaar te vinden op de oppervlakte van deze planeet, in tegenstelling tot vele van hun broers en zussen. Dat betekent echter dat waarheid en dwaling verwant zijn zoals ook succes en mislukking, leven en dood in de evolutie twee zijden van één medaille zijn. Er is geen a priori garantie tegen dwaling en we zullen altijd meerdere doodlopende paden moeten uitproberen om uiteindelijk een kans te hebben weer op een goed spoor terecht te komen. Er bestaat geen wetenschap zonder de moed om te gokken. Vanuit het inzicht dat ons kenvermogen een dierlijk oriëntatieorgaan is lost de evolutionistische kenleer een groot aantal problemen op waar andere epistemologieën niet eens oog voor hadden. De evolutionistische kenleer belicht en verklaart in de eerste plaats de kloof tussen onze 'natuurlijke wereldervaring' en het 'wetenschappelijk wereldbeeld'. De ene biedt ons de wereld, zoals we die tijdens het grootste deel van onze evolutie behoefd hebben, de andere werkt aan een model dat ook bruikbaar is vanuit een minder subjectief standpunt en dat ons ook kan oriënteren in een steeds wijdere kosmische kring 52 . Daarnaast verklaart de evolutionistische kenleer als enige kenleer tot dusver waarom er kennis bestaat. Mobiele organismen hebben eenvoudig informatie uit hun omgeving nodig om zich te kunnen oriënteren. Als enige is zij in staat tot een definitie van kennis die niet circulair is. Kennis is volgens die definitie het gebruik van fysische eigenschappen van de omgeving voor de opbouw en voortdurende bijstelling van een inwendig model dat de mogelijkheid biedt tot doelgericht handelen van een zichzelf sturend wezen. Deze definitie impliceert dat kennis enerzijds moet aansluiten bij reële wereldstructuren, anderzijds noodzakelijkerwijs een subjectieve, sturende kant heeft. De spanning tussen de noodzaak van oriëntatie (het aansluiten bij werkelijke structuren) en die van "sturing" (het subjectief waarderen van informatie om geprikkeld te worden tot fitness maximaliserende keuzen) levert de perspectiviteit van kennis op, die filosofen steeds weer doet aarzelen tussen realisme enerzijds en idealisme of scepticisme anderzijds. De evolutionistische kenleer kan zo een zeker relativisme ten aanzien van onze kenvormen verbinden met een realisme. De kracht van de evolutionaire benadering ligt dan ook in de mogelijkheid van een naturalistische "rechtvaardiging" èn "kritiek" van onze kenvormen en kenstrategieën 53 , ook al hebben 51 De scepticus heeft eenvoudig gelijk: elk bewijs berust op vooronderstellingen waarvan iedereen uitgaat en het is altijd mogelijk deze vooronderstellingen te betwijfelen. De scepticus vergeet alleen dat ook hij bepaalde vooronderstellingen koestert en dat het juist erg riskant is vooronderstellingen te koesteren die niet gecorrigeerd kunnen worden door verder wetenschappelijk onderzoek. 52 Dit onderscheid valt niet zondermeer samen met het onderscheid dat Locke maakte tussen primaire en secundaire kwaliteiten. Locke's idee van een "gelijkenis" tussen idee en ding is naïef realistisch en zijn idee van een onkenbare "substantie" onder de kenbare eigenschappen heeft veel weg van een overbodige hypothese. Roy Wood Sellars verdedigde deels in discussie met Locke een subtielere versie van middellijk realisme die mij compatibel lijkt met de evolutionistische kenleer. 53 Zie Slurink, geciteerde werk. 39 verschillende evolutionair epistemologen, zoals Vollmer en Ruse, eenzijdig geprobeerd één van deze aspecten centraal te stellen. Daarmee rekent de evolutionistische kenleer ook af met het nogal beschouwelijke en individualistische beeld van kennis dat veel traditionele filosofen koesterden. Kennis is wezenlijk een schematisering van de kosmische omgeving om handelen mogelijk te maken. Kennis is nooit alleen de prestatie van één individu, want er was een lange evolutionaire en culturele evolutie voor nodig om de kennende feedback relatie van het individueel denkend brein en de wereld tot stand te brengen. Omdat kennis een oriënterende schematisering van wereldstructuren in een subject is, is het uitgesloten dat kennis ooit compleet is. Elke schematisering van de wereld is immers een soort samenvatting van structuren vanuit de optiek van de samenvattende instantie. De grote ontdekking van de wetenschap is de mogelijkheid regelmatige patronen van de ons omringende natuur in kaart te brengen, die meestal globale voorspellingen mogelijk maken, maar die ons bijvoorbeeld maar zeer ten dele in staat stellen ons eigen gedrag te voorspellen. Al "begrijpend" blijven we een deel van het universum waarin we zijn ondergedompeld en we kunnen het niet "van buiten af" begrijpen en begrijpen waarom het zo is en niet anders. Kennis is niet alleen kennis van de wereld, maar blijft tegelijk altijd kennis in de wereld. Daarmee blijkt de kloof tussen onze natuurlijke wereldervaring en het wetenschappelijk wereldbeeld minder absoluut te zijn dan iemand als Locke dacht. De schematiseringen van kosmische samenhangen die de wetenschap opstelt reiken weliswaar verder over onze onmiddellijke horizon dan onze natuurlijke wereldervaring, maar het blijven schematiseringen vanuit een organisch perspectief dat actief moet ordenen en structureren, moet delen en abstraheren om te begrijpen. Zoals het woord "begrijpen" al zegt blijft het archetype van begrip toch de primatenhand die een voorwerp in zijn blikveld kan isoleren en vatten 54 . Kennis is geen passief ontvangen of weerspiegelen, maar een actieve poging grip te krijgen op wereldstructuren. Als onderdeel van de wereld kunnen we echter nooit grip krijgen op de hele wereld en slechts indirect op onze eigen hand. De onvermijdelijke conclusie is dat we, ondanks al onze meetinstrumenten, nooit méér wereld kunnen begrijpen als past in een primatenhand (of -brein). Daarmee blijkt dat kennis altijd reconstructie en modelvorming vanuit een bepaald perspectief zal blijven. Ook al ontwikkelen onze categorieën zich in wisselwerking met de wereld, het blijft aannemelijk dat ze elementen van willekeur in zich blijven dragen. Hoe groot dat element is zouden we echter pas kunnen ontdekken op het moment dat we wetenschappers van andere planeten zouden ontmoeten. De enige hoop die wij hebben dat communicatie met dergelijke wezens mogelijk zou zijn als we ze tegenkwamen, schuilt erin dat zij en hun categorieënstelsels geëvolueerd zouden zijn in dezelfde wereld 55 . De evolutionistische kenleer rekent dus niet alleen af met de illusie van een absolute zekerheden gevende kenleer, maar ook met de illusie dat onze meest elementaire begrippen de enig mogelijke zijn of überhaupt een vaststaande betekenis hebben los van de rest van onze 54 Lorenz, 1973. 55 Vgl. M. Ruse, 'Is Rape Wrong on Andromeda', in: The Darwinian Perspective, London/New York, 1989, 209-246. Het is overigens opvallend dat de toon die Ruse in dit stuk aanslaat een stuk minder relativistisch is dan die in zijn Taking Darwin Seriously. 39 kennis 56 . Er is geen perspectiefloze kennis, er zijn geen gepriviligieerde basiswaarheden van waaruit alle andere waarheden logisch afleidbaar zijn, er is geen enkele a priori mogelijkheid om een adequate van een inadequate voorstelling te scheiden. Pas in de concrete wisselwerking met het milieu merkt een levend wezen dat zijn voorstellingen en begrippen gecorrigeerd moeten worden als het geluk heeft hoeft het zijn dwaling niet met de dood te bekopen. Daarmee is de kenleer niet de eerste wetenschappelijke discipline, de discipline die normenstellend aan alle andere disciplines vooraf gaat, maar in zekere zin juist de laatste. Alle wetenschappelijke kennis is nodig om erachter te komen wat wetenschappelijke kennis is. Kenleer is kennis van de wereld, toegepast op de mens en zijn kennis van de wereld. Het wetenschappelijk wereldbeeld vormt een immense cirkel, die begint bij hypotheses over de nietorganische en buitenmenselijke natuur en van daar uit uiteindelijk ook de mens plaatst en zijn vermogen wetenschappelijke hypotheses te vormen. De evolutionistische kenleer vormt hier het punt, waar de cirkel zich sluit en de draak zijn eigen staart opeet. Summary Animal reason, or: to know in order to survive. In this article evolutionary epistemology is presented as a scientific theory concerning our natural experience of the world. We are capable of knowledge of the world, because we are animals in need of orientation. Our internal representation of the world is not designed to be ontologically adequate, but to ensure decisions that promote survival. Our "innate structures of experience" constitute an evaluative perspective in which information concerning the world is sieved and transformed in a way that enables us to reach evolutionary optimal decisions. It is claimed that with this evolutionary perspectivism many problems of traditional epistemology can be evaded or solved. 56 Als ik haar uiterst moeilijke tekst goed interpreteer beweert R.G. Millikan in Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, Cambridge, 1984, dat "betekenis" pas ontstaat in het proces van cognitieve wisselwerking met de wereld. "We cannot know a priori that we mean". Begrippen buiten de cognitieve feed back zijn leeg!

Dialogues on disability Shelley Tremain I n mid-January of 2015, I accepted an invitation from Thomas Nadelhoffer (College of Charleston) and Kevin Timpe (Northwest Nazarene University) to become a contributor to "Discrimination and Disadvantage", a blog that they intended to launch several weeks later whose focus would be the various forms that discrimination and disadvantage take, especially within professional philosophy. Because word about the impending blog spread rapidly throughout the philosophy blogosphere and other social media, Discrimination and Disadvantage became fully operational in advance of the proposed date when, at the end of January, Joseph Stramondo (Drexel University) wrote an inaugural blog post about the medicalisation of the legal concept of "reasonable accommodation". Since the inception of the blog, I have regularly contributed short essays, announcements, and links to articles that concern philosophical, political, ethical, and other theoretical issues related to disability, that is, contributions that are likely to interest philosophers who work in the emerging sub-field of philosophy of disability, including items about (for example) accessibility to philosophy conferences, disabled identity, ableism, the underrepresentation of disabled philosophers, and universal design. Occasionally, I have posted items on other subjects, such as the employment conditions and status of untenured faculty, the whiteness and Eurocentrism of philosophy, and animal ethics. I recently joined Nadelhoffer and Timpe as a co-ordinator of the blog. In March 2015, I asked the philosophers on my Facebook page for their opinions on my idea to conduct interviews with disabled philosophers that I would in turn post to the blog. The idea garnered enthusiastic responses, as did my proposal to name the prospective series of interviews "Dialogues on Disability". The next day, I circulated a call for participants and began to extend invitations for interviews to disabled philosophers whom I know through Facebook, conferences, and my editing work, know through other colleagues, or whom I do not know at all, but whose work I admire. The first instalment of the Dialogues on Disability series, in which I interviewed Bryce Huebner, an associate professor in the philosophy department at Georgetown University, was posted on Wednesday, April 15, 2015. Subsequent instalments in the series have been posted on the third Wednesday of every month since then, making the Dialogues on Disability series a centrepiece of the Discrimination and Disadvantage blog. My interviewees thus far comprise a diverse group of philosophers in 1ST QUARTER 2016 tpm 109 id e a s/disability terms of disability, race, gender, class, age, and sexuality and come from various corners and sub-fields of the discipline – including cognitive science, feminist philosophy, indigenous philosophy, philosophy of love, Africana aesthetics, and political philosophy – as well as from a range of professional positions and ranks – including adjunct professors, graduate students, associate professors, and an associate dean. I have not used any sort of criteria (i.e., administrative, juridical, or medical terms of reference) to establish the qualifications of any given philosopher to be interviewed, apart from the expectation that the interviewee in question self-identify as disabled (although, in fact, Huebner, in the very first interview of the series, indicated his ambivalence about such self-identification). The Dialogues on Disability series of interviews is designed to be an organisational tool that aims to forge a community of disabled philosophers by providing a public avenue for discussion with disabled philosophers about a range of topics, including their philosophical work on disability; the place of philosophy of disability visà-vis the discipline and profession; the distinct ways in which disabled philosophers experience institutional discrimination and personal prejudice in philosophy in particular and academia more generally; accessibility; ableism; and antioppressive pedagogy. Disabled philosophers are among the most underrepresented and marginalised members of the profession. The data available, to date, indicates that disabled philosophers comprise between 1–4% of philosophy faculty, despite the fact that working-age disabled people make up an estimated 17–22% of the general population. These grievous demographics signal the urgent need for disabled philosophers to publicise the discrimination and disadvantages that they confront throughout the profession and across academia. The Discrimination and Disadvantage blog has proven to be a vital site for this sort of consciousness-raising within the profession. The Dialogues on Disability interview series in particular has enabled disabled philosophers to draw attention to issues pertinent to them that are not adequately or appropriately addressed in venues such as standard journal articles, department meetings, or conferences. Furthermore, the series has enabled disabled philosophers to demonstrate – in very concrete and specific ways – to their nondisabled colleagues that the disadvantages that they confront are not medical in nature, are not natural, nor are they isolated occurrences to be rectified through individualised means; on the contrary, as my interviewees continue to show, these disadvantages are political, socially constituted, and systemic states of affairs whose elimination requires that the philosophical community develop broad structural and institutional strategies and solutions for that distinct purpose. The Dialogues on Disability interview series is a guide to that end. Further reading: The Discrimination and Disadvantage blog: tinyurl.com/za3fpqk Shelley Tremain has a PhD in philosophy and specialises in philosophy of disability, feminist philosophy, social theory, Foucault, and bioethics. Tremain publishes widely on a range of topics, including ableism in (feminist) philosophy, the constitution of impairment, and Foucault and disability. She is the editor of Foucault and the Government of Disability and her monograph Foucault and (A) Feminist Philosophy of Disability is forthcoming from the University of Michigan Press in 2017. tpm 1ST QUARTER 2016 110 id e a s/ di sa bi lit y

EXÉGESIS Revista de la Escuela de Posgrado DOCTOR LUIS CLAUDIO CERVANTES LIÑAN Año 4 Numero N°5 Febrero 2014 2 SUMARIO SUMARIO....................................................................................................2 CAPITULO I: EDUCACION Y CCIENCIAS SOCIALES.........................................7 EL STATUS ONTOLÓGICO DEL PRINCIPIO DE NO-CONTRADICCIÓN Obdulio Italo Banda Marroquín*........................................................................8 LA EVALUACIÓN COMOSISTEMA DE INFORMACIÓN Y CONTROL Víctor Armando Barreda Delgado....................................................................16 La Universidad Peruana, ¿investiga? Dr.Claudio O. Tume Yenque.......................................................................................23 PERSONALIDAD SITUACIONAL EN ADOLESCENTES DE COLEGIOS ESTATALES DE LIMA METROPOLITANA. Elizabeth Dany Araujo Robles*........................................................................27 DOCENCIA UNIVERSITARIA Y COMPETENCIAS PROFESIONALES Dra.Martha Jordan Campos,...........................................................................39 PROCESO DE REESTRUCTURACIÓN DEL CURRÍCULO, FACTOR INFLUYENTE EN LA FORMACIÓN UNIVERSITARI RosaPuente...........................................................................................................44 LA EVALUACIÓN COMO EJE TRANSVERSAL DE LA CALIDAD EDUCATIVA Laura Esponda Versace................................................................................48 Redes Educativas Rurales Dr.Walter Rabanal Salas...........................................................................................55 Para el Ensayo: "El método La humanidad de la humanidad – La identidad humana. Obra de Edgar Morín. Dr. José Casiano Collazos.........................................................................................62 EL PRIMER PERUANO Dr. Francisco Vvargas Vaca..........................................................................................73 LA CAPACITACION DEBE SER UNA INVERSIÓN Julio Fidel Príncipe López*....................................................................................................................79 3 IMPORTANCIA DEL TALENTO HUMANO EN LAS EMPRESAS Dr. Orlando Cuadra Rodriguez........................................................................85 CARÁCTER, GENIO Y COSTUMBRES DE LOS LIMEÑOS 1790 Julian Ernesto Roller Gonzales*......................................................................89 EL ESTADO DE LA SITUACIÓN DE LA NIÑEZ TRABAJADORA EN EL PERÚ – 2010 Jorge García Escobar ........................................................................................97 APLICACIÓN DEL PROGRAMA DE TÉCNICAS COGNITIVO-CONDUCTUALES EN EL RENDIMIENTO ACADÉMICO DE ESTUDIANTES DEL INSTITUTO ALAS PERUANAS Mg. Milagritos Simona Barriga Vásquez..........................................................113 ESTILOS PARENTALES: NUEVOS DESAFIOS EN EL ENTRENAMIENTO A PADRES Juan Carlos Montero Ordinola.......................................................................119 CAPITULO II : GESTION EN CIENCIAS ADMINISTRATIVAS Y ECONOMICAS................................................................................126 LA UNIDAD CIENTÍFICA EN CONTABILIDAD Dr. Víctor Ayala Bayona...............................................................................127 EFECTOS DE LA CRISIS INTERNACIONAL EN LAS EXPORTACIONES Mg. Fernando Bellido Gutierrez............................................................139 AUDITORIA TRIBUTARIA Dr.Roberto Cumpén Vidaurre,(Ph.D).....................................................143 IMPACTO DE LA LEY DE FORTALECIMIENTO SOBRE LA GESTION DE LA SUPERINTENDENCIA NACIONAL DE ADUANAS Y ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA-SUNAT Dr. Jorge Luis Sánchez Vecorena..................................................................159 CRISIS ECONÓMICA MUNDIAL (Dos Caras De Una Misma Moneda) Dr. Juan Carlos Espinoza Giráldez (1) ............................................................167 PROBLEMAS EN EL MUNDO Y LA GERENCIA SOCIAL MBA – MA Hugo Concha Ibarra...........................................................175 PROSPECTIVA Y EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO EN LAS ORGANIZACIONES Dr. Carlos Eduardo Vásquez Perales ..................................................182 FACTORES DE ÉXITO DE LOS SUPERMERCADOS EN LIMA METROPOLITANA Y CALLAO Dr. Fernando Vigil-Cornejo...........................................................................198 4 COMPRENSION DE LOS ESTADOS FINANCIEROS MBA. José Benavides Póveda.......................................................................................218 ADMINISTRACION MODERNA PARA LOGRAR UNA EMPRESA COMPETITIVA DR. Juan Cosió Cárdenas............................................................................................223 EL POTENCIAL EXPORTADOR PERUANO Y ESTRATEGIAS DEL SECTOR EN EL CORTO Y EL LARGO PLAZO Dr. Adolfo Hinojosa Pérez ..........................................................................................230 MANAGER,MEANS "KNOWLEDGE WORKER" :GERENTE,SINONIMO DE "TRABAJADOR DEL CONOCIMIENTO" Dra: Irma Corina Adrianzen Ibárcena..............................................................................234 EL GERENTE DE OPERACIONES INDUSTRIALES Y LAS HERRAMIENTAS DE GESTION Dr.Oswaldo W. Brown Suarez.......................................................................................244 RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL Y REDES SOCIALES Dra. Leonor Ponce Luyo.............................................................................................249 El ejercicio del control gubernamental en las entidades públicas María J. Leyton Falen........................................................................252 Cárnicas serrano y su éxito en la unión europea Julio la Cruz Arévalo..........................................................................256 CAPITULO III: : DERECHO....................................................................................260 LA FE PUBLICA NOTARIAL Ph.D.Luis Alfredo Cuba Ovalle......................................................................................261 LA PROPIEDAD DE LOS RECURSOS MINERALES EN PREDIOS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DEL ANALISIS ECONOMICO DEL DERECHO. MBA .Juan Jesús Abregú López ....................................................................................277 EL NEGOCIO JURIDICO FAMILIAR Dr. José Antonio Rengifo Hurtado..................................................................................281 EL DERECHO REGISTRAL Y LA PUBLICIDAD JURIDICA Mag. Rubén Guevara Vargas.........................................................................................288 EL FEMINICIDIO COMO TIPO PENAL AUTONOMO Dr. Iván Pedro Guevara Vásquez....................................................................................292 LAS AUDIENCIAS PUBLICAS ENE L DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO Dr. Gastón Jorge Quevedo Pereyra..................................................................................309 5 0EL NUEVO REGIMEN DEL SERVICIO CIVIL:LA ADMINISTRACION PUBLICA Y LOS REGIMENES LABORALES. ¿QUIENES GANAN, QUIENES PIERDEN? DR.Julio Haro Carranza...............................................................................................318 APUNTES SOBRE LA CALIFICACION REGISTRAL DE LA COMPRA VENTA DE TOERRAS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS. Dr. Hugo Luis Sedano Núñez.......................................................................................338 LA EXCLUSION DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR Dr. Luis Fernando Pastor Salazar...................................................................................348 POSIBILIDAD DE LA INCORPORACION DEL VELO SOCIETARIO EN EL PERU Dra. Giovanna VásquezCaicedo Pérez............................................................................354 EL CONTROL INTERNO. Dr Juvenal MariluzVeramendi.................................................................................................367 Programa Juvenil Dra.Loayza Alfaro Lina.......................................................................375 El principio de responsabilidad del estado por la administración de justicia" Oscar Cubas Barrueto.......................................................................389 3.17 El cumplimiento de la ley y la necesidad de establecer un sistema jurídico 3.17Dr. Julio César Guzmán Galindo....................................................400 CAPITULO IV: CIENCIAS DE LA SALUD Y MEDIO AMBIENTE..................................416 MANEJO DE HUMEDALES POR LAS COMUNIDADES EN LA COSTA DEL PERÚ: EL CASO DE EL BALSAR DE HUANCHACO Dr.Victor Pulido capurro..........................................................................................417 POLITICA Y NORMATIVIDAD AMBIENTAL DE LA CONTAMINACION. Dr. Pedro Antonio Martínez Letona ..............................................................................428 LA UBICACIÓN SISTEMICA DE LOS DELITOS AMBIENTALES Mg.Alberto Orlando Rosel Alvarado...............................................................................436 LA PROTECCION JURIDICA DEL MEDIO MAMBIENTE Dr.Cluber Fernando Aliaga Lodtmann.............................................................................446 SOSTENIBILIDAD EN EL USO DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES DE LA AMAZONIA PERUANA Dra. Vicenta Irene Tafur Anzualdo..................................................................................454 CAPITULO V: INVESTIGACION......................................................................462 IDENTIFICACION DE VARIABLES PARA INICIAR EL PROCESO DE INVESTIGACION Dra. María Isabel Vigil Cornejo....................................................................................463 LA INVESTIGACION CIENTIFICA DOCUMENTAL Dr. Julio Jaimes Ascencio.............................................................................................467 6 BREVES APUNTES PARA REALIZAR UNA TESIS EN EL CAMPO JURIDICO Dr. Roberto Ramón Zapata Villar...................................................................................472 EL ESTADO DE LA SITUACIÓN DE LA NIÑEZ TRABAJADORA EN EL PERÚ – 2010 JORGE GARCÍA ESCOBAR.......................................................................................487 Pruebas de significancia estadística aplicadas a la investigación a nivel de posgrado Mg. Jorge Luis Medina Gutiérrez..........................................................503 Renuncia del personal de pilotos de la fuerza aérea del Perú. Jacqueline Roxana Huamán Fernández................................................514 7 CAPITULO I EDUCACION Y CCIENCIAS SOCIALES 8 EL STATUS ONTOLÓGICO DEL PRINCIPIO DE NOCONTRADICCIÓN Obdulio Italo Banda Marroquín* RESUMEN El presente trabajo, se avoca a determinar cuál es el status ontológico del principio de no-contradicción –(P . -P). Rechazo que la exigencia que dicho principio implica, sea de naturaleza entitativa, es decir, que sea una dimensión constitutiva de los entes exteriores a la función racional de la mente humana. Afirmo que la exigencia que impone dicho principio, se reduce a ser nada más que una exigencia emanada de la humana mente racional, siempre que ésta participe como uno de los miembros de la relación mente-objeto. Palabras claves: "principio no-contradicción", "principios lógicos", ontología 1. Exigencia óntica y exigencia racional El principio de no-contradicción, en su versión lógica, reza así: "una proposición no puede ser verdadera y falsa a la vez": -( p . –p ). O bien: "dos proposiciones contradictorias, no pueden ser ambas verdaderas o ambas falsas". Aristóteles formuló este principio en clave ontológica: "es imposible que al mismo tiempo, un ente sea y no sea" [Aristóteles, Metafísica, Libro IV (Gamma), 1005b 181006a]. Por su parte, G. Leibnitz en sus Nuevos Ensayos, repetía: "es imposible que una cosa sea y no sea al mismo tiempo" (g. Leibnitz, Nuevos ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano); esto es, la idea de ser y la idea de noser, son percibidas como no convenientes (disconvenance): es imposible que A sea no-A, siendo A no-A, contradictorios. Nicolai Hartmann por su parte, declara que las leyes lógicas, incluido el "principio de contradicción", son primitivamente, "leyes del ser" (Nicolai Hartmann, Ontología, Tomo III, Capítulo 19-b). Pregunto: la exigencia que encierra la estructura lógica -(P . –P ), ¿es una exigencia que proviene del ente extra-mental, cual dimensión intrínseca suya, independientemente de la mente humana? Veamos: en los hechos extra-mentales, la negación no es de carácter lógico, sino de carácter entitativo, y en los entes reales, es de carácter fáctico; por ejemplo: subida – bajada; carga positiva – carga negativa; crecer – decrecer... La negación es expresiva, no de contradictoriedad, sino de contradicción dialéctica; por lo tanto, el que un ente "sea" y a la vez "no sea", es admisible en este sentido dialéctico y heracliteano. El mundo extra-mental ( en cualesquiera de sus esferas entitativas o "reinos del ser" ), solamente reconoce la contradicción dialéctica (por ejemplo, electricidad * Autor de "El status ontológico de la esencia o del "qué" de la cosa" (Universitätsbibliotheke Tübingen), y de "Hacia el análisis ontológico-categorial de lo lógico" (Biblioteca Nacional de España). 9 positiva y electricidad negativa; derecha e izquierda...); desconoce la oposición atributiva. Lo que hay en la entidad "real" es, contradicción dialéctica; por ejemplo, cargas eléctricas positivas y cargas eléctricas negativas; pero la oposición atributiva, es una categoría ajena a la entidad real. En tales hechos extra-mentales, la negación no puede ser lógica. La imposibilidad de que una piedra negra sea no-negra bajo el mismo respecto, es una imposibilidad que supone la inaceptable posibilidad de una atribución negativa. Y es que cuando el susodicho principio prescribe la imposibilidad de que algo "sea" y a la vez "no sea", se está refiriendo a un "ser" predicativo; se está refiriendo a la imposibilidad de atribuirle algo a un sujeto, y a la vez, no atribuírselo. La connotación es de índole exclusivamente atributiva: fuera de este ámbito, la mencionada imposibilidad no tiene sentido. En consecuencia, el aludido principio de no contradicción, lo que prohíbe no es la contradicción, sino la contradictoriedad. La exigencia de no-contradicción, no es ubicable en lo fáctico: una cualidad o entidad, simplemente existe o no existe. Ni su existencia ni su no-existencia, remiten a la imposibilidad de un opuesto excluyente. En lo fáctico, la imposibilidad que prescribe el principio aludido, la entendemos por intuición inteligible, sin necesitar de la experiencia sensorial; y además, se nos impone de modo apodíctico. Esto revela que es una "verdad de razón", como las verdades de las matemáticas. Luego, la prescripción rige tan sólo para el operar racional: se trata de una prescripción exclusivamente lógica. Toda verdad de razón, expresa una exigencia puramente racional: su exigencia no deriva de lo extra-mental, sino de la razón; es exigencia que norma el manejo de la razón al "manipular" los hechos extra-mentales: ( a > b. b > c ) a > c La oposición, y la imposibilidad de la compatibilidad de los opuestos, es puramente mental. Es imposible que esta mesa sea de madera y, bajo el mismo respecto, no sea de madera; pero esta imposibilidad es puramente mental, racional. Alguien me podría replicar: ¿cómo prueba usted que en la mesa de madera, no existe la exigencia de que es imposible que no sea a la vez de madera? Respondo: en primer lugar, la carga de la prueba no me corresponde a mí, sino a quienes postulan una "versión ontológica" del aludido principio. En segundo lugar: respondo diciendo lo siguiente: la susodicha exigencia de la fórmula -(P . –P), es extraña al mundo extra-mental. ¿Por qué?: ante todo: la prescripción contenida en el principio, de la imposibilidad de la coexistencia de los opuestos, se expresa a través del "complemento directo" de la oración, y éste a su vez, puede ser manifestado por medio de verbos, o de adjetivos, pe- se a cumplir estas categorías, heterogéneas funciones gramaticales y lógicas. La exigencia de nocontradictoriedad, se expresa por ejemplo, en estos pares de oraciones opuestas: El tigre come - El tigre no come El tigre es feroz - El tigre no es feroz Si bien es cierto, el verbo y el adjetivo, expresan variadas cualidades o acciones de la constitución del ente que hace de sujeto, ambos por igual son afectados por la prescripción de la disyunción excluyente que impone el principio: ante el principio, lo que interesa no es el particular contenido semántico que tenga cada cual de estas palabras: ante el principio de no-contradicción, lo único 10 que interesa es la función común que ambas desempeñan como complemento. Ahora bien: ese algo común que lo hace tanto al verbo como al adjetivo, excluyentes con respecto a sus opuestos, es su función por ellos desempeñada como atributos de algún sujeto. Son atributos, porque estamos hablando de una generalidad del complemento directo, es decir, lo que hay de común en el adjetivo y en el verbo como complemento directo, lo cual es el de ser atribuidos. Pues bien: la función de ser atributos, por trascender la peculiaridad de la función gramatical de cada cual, esa función sólo puede ser producto de una abstracción intelectiva. Y bien, la abstracción solamente puede efectuarla una mente racional. Respondiendo a la pregunta de mi posible objetante, le diré que la exigencia de que la mesa de madera no pueda no ser de madera, nace sólo de un acto mental judicativo; la mesa por sí sola, no puede plantear dicha exigencia, porque ni judica ni abstrae. La exigencia planteada por el principio de no-contradicción, es fruto exclusivo de una relación mental judicativa entre la mente humana y un ente judicado. Suponiendo que no existiera ningún ser racional: la tal imposibilidad no se daría en la mesa; ¿por qué?: porque la oposición es atributiva, y la realidad extra-mental "desconoce" la categoría de la oposición. Es que toda atribución es declarativa, y toda cláusula declarativa es bivalente, y sus dos únicas posibilidades son mutuamente excluyentes: es o no es, tiene o no tiene, marcha o no marcha... A diferencia del verbo atributivo, que puede, en doble dirección, atribuir o negar un complemento a un sujeto, la realidad extra-mental, es unidireccional, dado que en ella no existe tal disyuntiva. Admito que es imposible que la mesa sea de madera y a la vez no lo sea: pero en un sentido exclusivamente atributivo. Así, cuando alguien declara: "es imposible que la mesa sea de madera, y bajo el mismo respecto, no sea de madera", debe entenderse la sentencia como "es imposible atribuir a la mesa una determinada determinación, y a la vez, bajo el mismo respecto, negársela" Con respecto a las imposibilidades: en la realidad exterior a la mente, rige la categoría de la imposibilidad: en dicha realidad existen una serie de imposibilidades que son, categorialmente, necesidades negativas: es imposi- 3 ble, por ejemplo, que los cuerpos no se ajusten a la ley de la gravedad, o a cualquiera otra regularidad nómica o principio del mundo "real". En tal sentido, es imposible que ante el influjo causal del calor, un metal no se dilate. En el mundo extra-mental, las imposibilidades son ónticas no-racionales; por ejemplo, es imposible que a un cuerpo no le afecte la ley de la gravedad; es imposible que a un gas no le afecte la ley de Boyle-Mariotte. Empero, no es impensable que ocurra todo lo contrario; es decir, lo que es imposible en los entes reales, es teóricamente posible para la mente racional Ahora bien: hay imposibilidades que las impone, no el mundo extra-mental, sino el contenido semántico que el uso del habla, ha puesto en los signos lingüísticos; por ejemplo: (1) "Es imposible que el futuro sea antes que el pasado" (2) "Es imposible que los solteros sean casados" (3) "Es imposible que el mañana sea antes que el ayer" (4) "Es imposible que el hijo sea padre de su padre" Son proposiciones analíticas y tautológicas; "el mañana" implica futuro; y al decir "futuro", ya con ello estamos diciendo que es imposible que preceda al pasado. La exigencia se deriva no del mundo extra-mental, sino del contenido semántico que el habla les ha asignado a los términos del caso. Por lo tanto, las imposibilidades del caso, no son ónticas sino de carácter racional. En tal sentido, la proposición "esta mesa es de madera" (5), está diciéndonos: "no es el caso que esta mesa no sea de madera". Es que en la disyuntiva excluyente de la atribución, ya con haber asumido una opción, estamos anulando la posibilidad de la opción alternativa. Cualquier proposición apofántica, atributiva, encierra esta toma de partido con carácter excluyente. Si es 11 afirmación, queda automáticamente excluida la negación, y viceversa. Esto, porque si examinamos el cuadro de Boecio en cuanto a sus oposiciones verticales, las variedades del cuantificador no son excluyentes, e inclusive pueden ser no-binarias ("todos los S son P", "algunos S son P", "este S es P" ); por el contrario, en cuanto a sus oposiciones horizontales, que son de orden cualitativo, éstas son binarias y mutuamente excluyentes. Mas esta oposición binaria en la línea de la horizontalidad, no es exclusiva de la cópula "es", sino que la ofrece cualquier enunciado apofántico en el que la ilación esté desempeñada por cualquier otro verbo: "tener", "estudiar", etc. Una cosa es que la mesa encierre los contrarios dialécticos "electricidad positiva" – "electricidad negativa", y otra cosa muy diferente es, "esta mesa es de madera": allá hay implicancia mutua, acá hay exclusión implícita del "no es". Si comparamos las proposiciones arriba mencionadas, de la (1) a la (5), hallaremos en las cinco, una común exigencia lógica, formal. Me explico: de la 1 a la 4, la susodicha exigencia tiene una procedencia de orden semántico: la razón pone en alguno de los términos de la proposición, algún contenido semántico tácito, del cual se deriva analíticamente, cierta necesidad positiva o negativa. En la (3), al declarar "el mañana", estamos planteando que el futuro es posterior al pasado. En la (4), al declarar "el hijo", estamos suponiendo que 4 el hijo es posterior al padre. En la (5), la cópula de atribución "es", conlleva la suposición de que optamos por adjudicarle al sujeto, una atribución, y que renunciamos a la opción de no adjudicársela; luego, en esta proposición, la exigencia lógica tiene un origen atributivo. 2. Las proposiciones Las proposiciones a las que se aplica la no-contradicción, son sólo las proposiciones atómicas, no así las moleculares, dado que en su conjunto, no tienen una estructura atributiva: hay proposiciones moleculares de inclusión o implicación, bi-condicionales, de conjunción, de disyunción.... Hay además, las proposiciones no-declarativas, tales como las estructuras optativas, imperativas, que expresan ruegos, deseos, mandatos. Pero hay además, la proposición atómica apofántica: es la afirmación o negación de algo sobre algo, y que tiene valor veritativo, es decir, que puede ser verdadera o falsa. La exigencia de la no-contradicción (debiera decirse "no contradictoriedad"), es inaplicable a aquellas proposiciones que expresan ruegos, mandatos, deseos, dado que lo que reflejan no es algo del referente, sino el estado de ánimo de la mente humana. Entre ¿sálvanos, Señor todopoderoso! y ¡no nos salves, Señor todopoderoso!, no se percibe contradictoriedad, exclusión, sino compatibilidad. Y es que la mente humana puede desearlo y bajo otro matiz, no desearlo, debido a las contradicciones de nuestra vida mental. No hay pues, una contradicción formal, lógica, sino de contenido, dada la peculiaridad de este tipo de estructuras lógicas. En cuanto a las proposiciones atómicas que componen cualquier proposición molecular, siempre que sean apofánticas, del tipo "A tiene B", "A es B", "A no compra B", etc., éstas y sólo éstas, conllevan la exigencia de la no-contradicción: no podemos enunciar "A tiene B", y bajo el mismo respecto, "A no tiene B". No obstante, adviértase que a nivel de la macroestructura de la unidad molecular, las variaciones en la cualidad de las proposiciones atómicas, no altera su nocontradictoriedad; es decir, la validez de la proposición molecular, es independiente con respecto a las mutaciones cualitativas de cualesquiera de sus proposiciones atómicas integrantes.... ¡siempre que estas proposiciones atómicas sean apofánticas! Esto nos pone de manifiesto, 1) que las estructuras moleculares están vertebradas por funciones lógicas diferentes de la apofántica, y 2) que la exigencia de no-contradictoriedad, está ligada tan sólo y exclusivamente, a la función lógica judicativa o atributiva. 12 En la proposición apofántica, así entendida, la oposición atributiva, no es exclusiva de la cópula "es": la atribución, sea afirmativa o negativa, puede ser efectuada a través de cualquier verbo, y de cualquiera forma atributiva. Véase estas oposiciones: "Las estrellas emiten calor" - "Las estrellas no emiten calor" "Probablemente venga Juan" - "Probablemente no venga Juan" En estas proposiciones, la mente, o está atribuyendo algo a algún sujeto, o se lo está negando. La exclusión de la opción opuesta, es una exigencia implícita, siempre que se tome lo afirmativo o lo negativo, bajo el mismo respecto. Repito: las proposiciones que no caben dentro de esta exigencia, son las moleculares (por ejemplo, "Juan, o vendrá o no vendrá"). En la oposición atributiva de la judicación apofántica, la mente opta por un partido, entre dos posibilidades polarmente opuestas; y este es el caso de todas las proposiciones apofánticas o de atribución. Todas ellas suponen que la mente racional opta por asumir un partido ante una oposición: aun en la proposición: "esta sustancia contiene únicamente electricidad positiva": sí: aun en este caso, la mente opta por una opción, rechazando la opuesta, cual es el no adjudicarle a la sustancia el atributo de "contener únicamente electricidad positiva". 3. la logicidad de la atribución, y el mundo extra-mental noapofántico Puesto que tales proposiciones expresan un pronunciamiento racional o la asunción de un partido ante una disyuntiva, ante la alternativa entre "se lo atribuyo" y "se lo niego", resulta entonces que la imposibilidad del opuesto que en ellas detectamos, es una imposibilidad creada al asumir la mente racional el partido. No es el caso, por lo tanto, de que tal imposibilidad o exigencia fuera un reflejo de alguna supuesta imposibilidad extra-mental, pues la realidad extra-mental, careciendo de racionalidad lógica, no puede plantear esa exigencia: el efecto, no puede no tener fundamento en la causa. La razón es muy simple: la polaridad de la disyuntiva, significa asumir un partido entre "lo adjudico" y "no lo adjudico"; y el mundo extra-mental, es ajeno a dicha adopción de partido. La disyunción que allí hallamos entre ser algo y no serlo, es una disyunción sólo en apariencia, de status extra-mental: es una disyunción de carácter atributivo, y como tal, racional. La prueba más contundente de esta racionalidad de la aludida disyunción es, su carácter formal: esto es, se expresa a través de diversos verbos: La flor es roja - la flor no es roja El tigre come - el tigre no come Pedro vendrá - Pedro no vendrá Cada una de las citadas proposiciones es una opción, que excluye a su correlativo cualitativamente opuesto; y el alma de la oposición no es el contenido semántico del verbo: no interesa que se trate de comer, ser o venir...: el alma de la oposición es, el partido que se asume entre la polaridad de la oposición, entre atribuir o no atribuir, y además, la existencia de un sujeto como referente de ese partidismo. En efecto, el tigre del ejemplo ("sujeto") puede comer, dormir, correr, jugar...pero estas opciones no guardan oposición entre sí; cada una de las cuales sí encierra una oposición con relación al sujeto: se le atribuye o no se le atribuye. Entonces, la asunción de un partido, implica una estructura judicativa en la que se pone un subiectum, y al cual se le atribuye o se le niega algo. La logicidad se deriva del formalismo de esta función: supone la estructura lógica de un sujeto y un predicado (atribución afirmativa o negativa). Y aquí caben como materia o contenido, cualquier contenido semántico: come, viene, llueve... Pues bien: este formalismo o vacuidad, añadido al sujeto de atribuciones, es algo ajeno a la región extra-mental no-apofántica: en ésta, lo que hay son eventos, valores, entes irreales, estructuras lógicas y matemáticas: hallamos un tigre que está 13 comiendo, más tarde, hallamos ese mismo tigre durmiendo, más tarde saltando, más tarde no salta, más tarde no come...Cada cual de esas formaciones extra-mentales no-apofánticas, encierra múltiples características hic et nunc y también genéricas. Busquemos lo genérico de los eventos reales, y hallaremos siempre lo genérico material o de contenido: mamífero, animal, acción, reacciones...: son géneros categoriales fácticos; pero siempre lo genérico estará inserto en algún contenido material como dimensión de su constitución óntica: nunca hallaremos como común uniformizante en todos estos eventos individuales, una forma vacía, desprendida, desligada de contenido material o fáctico, y que además, asuma la función predicativa. Como bien sabemos, en la región extra-mental no-apofántica, la estructura no es la estructura apofántica ni la estructura relacional Rba: es pues, una estructura extra-lógica (Véase mi trabajo: "Hacia el análisis ontológicocategorial de lo lógico"). Lo interesante es que la extensión de la clase de los eventos extra-mentales, por mucho que queramos ampliarla, siempre estará limitada por la materialidad del contenido: llegaremos a "objeto", "movimiento", como categorías supremas..., pero siempre bajo el lastre de alguna materialidad; esto, aun abarcando dentro de una clase toda la diversidad de eventos que quisiéramos. Es que allí no hay la estructura de sujeto-predicado. Cuando descubrimos en cada uno de estos eventos algo común, que es la estructura sujeto-predicado, ya ingresamos a una dimensión de formalismo, en la que nos liberamos de toda atadura de materialidad o contenido. Las formas S es P, S no es P, Rba..., son formas vacías, ajenas a todo contenido, obtenidas por abstracción; en la región extra-mental no-apofántica hay sólo eventos concretos, valores o aun estructuras lógicas y matemáticas, generalizables pero bajo ciertos parámetros de "contenido". Por lo tanto, aquellas formas atributivas, no siendo consustanciales o connaturales con la región extra-mental noapofántica, le son ajenas. En todas las proposiciones de los ejemplos arriba citados, hallamos una indiferencia ante el contenido: son pura forma, pura estructura formal: el contenido puede cambiar, ser lo uno o lo otro: pero, por el contrario, hay algo que en ellas no puede cambiar: es su forma o estructura. La oposición que encierra el verbo ilativo es puramente racional, y por lo tanto, es formal, vacía de contenido; es una disposición mental que se mueve entre los polos opuestos de una disyunción: o "lo atribuyo", o "no lo atribuyo". De esto se deduce que el contenido es ajeno a la consistencia de la proposición, y que en ella queda sólo la estructura sin contenido. Por lo tanto, esta estructura apofántica es exclusivamente racional. Pero adviértase que aun la estructura, representa formalismo y abstracción: en efecto: la esencia de la función lógica es indiferente a que el verbo lo unamos al sujeto, afirmativa o negativamente; y es indiferente también, a que se use o no la cópula es; también es indiferente a la unidad o pluralidad de sus conceptos: El tigre y el león son carnívoros y mamíferos El tigre es carnívoro El tigre come El tigre no es carnívoro El tigre no come Entonces, debe haber algo que es común en la forma de toda esta diversidad de proposiciones: lo común no es su contenido, no es su sentido negativo, no es el tener cópula ilativa, no es el carecer de cópula, no es ni la singularidad ni la pluralidad de sus conceptos...El darse cualesquiera de esos detalles en una proposición, le es accidental, esto es, que su presencia no es indispensable para que la proposición sea tal. 14 Lo que es común e infaltable en este tipo de estructuras es, la función lógica de atribución. Dicha función es disyuntiva: o "le adjudico", o "no le adjudico". Adviértase el carácter humano de ambas alternativas: es una mente la que decide. Pues bien: toda función mental, está signada por la disyunción o polaridad; es decir, asume tan sólo una de las dos alternativas excluyentes: es imposible, bajo el mismo respecto y bajo las mismas circunstancias, amar a alguien y a la vez no amarlo, desear algo y a la vez no desearlo, estar alegre por algo y a la vez estar triste por ese algo, recordar algo, y a la vez, no recordarlo. Aun en la conciencia valorativa: ésta no puede por ejemplo, valorar algo como vil, y bajo el mismo respecto, valorarlo a su vez como noble. Obsérvese: siempre hay algún obiectum intencional, ante el cual la mente no puede asumir, bajo el mismo respecto, y a la vez, posiciones opuestas, excluyentes. Puede haber deliberación y determinación en cuanto a dos posibles y opuestas decisiones a tomarse, mas estas posiciones que asume la humana mente, no son simultáneas: son pendulares, y cada cual se aplica a diferentes facetas del referente, tomadas cada cual a su turno. ¿Por qué es así?: porque el fenómeno psíquico es una respuesta refleja ante algún estímulo del medio exterior; y cada acto psíquico, responde a una determinada faceta del referente o fuente. Si por sorpresa, con un altavoz muy fuerte y estridente me convocan para que me acerque a recibir u n premio, el placer y el displacer que todo ello me produce, responden, por canales distintos, a facetas distintas, no-idénticas, del referente. Esta exclusión en el operar de la mente humana, es compartida por sus funciones racionales. Por eso es que, ante el mismo sujeto, la mente no le puede, bajo el mismo respecto, adjudicarle y negarle un mismo predicado. Luego, la imposibilidad que esto significa, es exclusivamente de índole lógica, racional, y es expresión de la naturaleza de la mente humana. Volviendo a las imposibilidades: la imposibilidad de que esta mesa sea de madera y a la vez no sea de madera, obedece a una idiosincrasia de nuestra mente, y por lo tanto, es una exigencia de carácter mental. 4. Imposibilidad fáctica, e imposibilidad racional Alguien me podría replicar: "pero cómo prueba usted, de que la imposibilidad de que una cosa sea algo y a la vez no lo sea, no es una imposibilidad fáctica. Por mucho de que no existiera ninguna mente racional, ¿me podría usted negar de que es imposible de que una mesa sea de madera y a la vez, no sea de madera?" Yo respondo: la imposibilidad en el ejemplo señalado, no es cualquiera imposibilidad del mundo fáctico, sino una imposibilidad disyuntiva. Me explico: Adviértase la diferencia: en el mundo extra-mental, la imposibilidad no deriva de una comparación, ni de una postulación tautológica, ni es analítica: Por ejemplo: es imposible que un cuerpo no se ajuste a la ley de la gravitación; es imposible que un metal, ante el influjo del calor, no se dilate; es imposible que un bebito se convierta en hombre adulto en el transcurso de veinticuatro horas...Ahora bien: esta opción, bien sea de elevarse el cuerpo, o de no dilatarse el metal –que ciertamente es imposible-, no es que su imposibilidad esté dictada por su incompatibilidad atributiva con una opción opuesta: no es el caso de que sea imposible que el cuerpo se eleve porque ello obedeciera a una necesidad negativa racional: que la proposición del caso "este cuerpo se eleva", fuera contradictoria con la proposición "este cuerpo no se eleva". No: es imposible que el cuerpo se eleve, porque existe una regularidad nómica fáctica que se lo impide. Más claro: la imposibilidad de la opción del caso, deriva de una ley fáctica, no de la incompatibilidad de una disyuntiva. Acá, en este caso, no hay una opción opuesta que la anule a nuestra opción como imposibilidad, por incompatible. 15 De otra parte, una imposibilidad fáctica, no es impensable como opción: es concebible que un bebito pueda convertirse en hombre adulto en el transcurso de veinticuatro horas. Precisamente es concebible esto, en tanto que no haya ninguna incompatibilidad atributiva que nos lo impida hacerlo. Por el contrario: la imposibilidad de que esta mesa sea de madera y bajo el mismo respecto, no lo sea, es una imposibilidad que se sustenta en una comparación entre dos opciones atributivas: si le adjudicamos una cualidad, no podemos, a la vez, negársela, o viceversa. Una mesa, puede no ser de madera: puede ser de vidrio, de plástico...Pero cuándo es imposible que no sea de madera: ¿cuando no se ajusta a alguna ley de la naturaleza?: no: es imposible que no sea de madera, únicamente cuando ya hemos anunciado que es de madera. Lo que neutraliza a la opción del caso es pues, el situarla en la excluyente disyuntiva: A v B, pero no ambas a la vez. En consecuencia: es preciso hacer el distingo entre la imposibilidad fáctica, y la imposibilidad racional-atributiva. Esta última, es consecuencia de una comparación entre opuestos atributivos, que como tal, es una función racional, inexistente en la realidad extra-mental. 9 Respondiendo más precisamente a mi supuesto objetante, diría yo: si no existiera ninguna mente racional en el Universo, no existiría la propuesta alternativa, la propuesta disyuntiva racional; en consecuencia, no existirían ni la imposibilidad ni la posibilidad del caso, por ser opciones racionales. La imposibilidad racional entraña una analiticidad inexistente en la imposibilidad extra-mental. La proposición declarativa "la mesa es de madera", encierra un contenido tácito, que incluye la disyunción de su opuesto: cuando enuncio: "la mesa es de madera", ya con ello estoy diciendo tácitamente: "es imposible que la mesa a la vez no sea de madera". Y es que, dada la unilateralidad polar de todo acto mental, al adjudicarle algo a la mesa, mi mente no puede a la vez negárselo: o se lo adjudica o se lo niega, pero no puede la mente, efectuar ambas operaciones a la vez. Al dejar sentado S es P, estoy con ello dejando sentada la imposibilidad racional de "S no es P", o lo que es lo mismo: enuncio "es imposible que S no sea P". Esta última proposición, es el segundo miembro de una estructura racional más amplia, y sólo explicita aquello que ya está contenido en el primer miembro de dicha estructura, y que es "S es P". Bibliografía * Aristóteles (1,986), Metafísica, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, segunda edición. * Banda Marroquín, Obdulio (2,007), El status ontológico de la esencia o del "qué" de la cosa, Lima, Fondo Editorial IIPCIAL. * Banda Marroquín, Obdulio (2,008), Hacia el análisis ontológico-categorial de lo lógico, Lima, Fondo Editorial IIPCIAL. * Leibnitz, Gotfried (1,992), Nuevos ensayos sobre el entendimiento humano, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, S. A. * Mc Cadden, Carlos (1,990), "El principio de contradicción en Leibnitz y en Aristóteles": biblioteca.itam.mx/estudios/estudio/letras23/coloq1/sec_1.html (Tomado el 21 de Agosto de 2,013). 16 LA EVALUACIÓN COMOSISTEMA DE INFORMACIÓN Y CONTROL Víctor Armando Barreda Delgado RESUMEN En este artículo se presenta el aprendizaje como un proceso psicológico para el logro de objetivos de acuerdo a las teorías de información y control de ShannonWeaver, Norbert Wiener y William Ross Ashby. Se establece que el aprendizaje se halla sometido en un conjunto de principios como el Principio del Refuerzo o Premio de Thorndike, el Principio de la Realimentación Negativa y otros. Palabras claves: Información y comunicación. Mecanismos reguladores de realimentación negativa o fead back. Ley de la pérdida de información. Código común. Libertad e incertidumbre. Enseñanza – aprendizaje. Principio del refuerzo y autorefuerzo. 17 Educación, aprendizaje, evaluación La educación puede considerarse como un proceso de comunicación y aprendizaje social y cultural, por el cual las generaciones pasadas trasmiten a las futuras un conjunto de conocimientos, habilidades, sentimientos, valores y actitudes que contribuyen a la formación de personas y grupos útiles a la sociedad. En este sentido la educación no sólo sirve a la conservación y supervivencia del grupo sino también a su cambio y mejoramiento permanentes. La educación es pues, al mismo tiempo, un factor de conservación y continuidad de la especie y un factor de cambio y mejoramiento, de la sociedad y la cultura. Tiene un doble rostro de Jano: a) Se enraíza en lo biológico y se eleva a lo espiritual; b) Se genera en el pasado y se proyecta al futuro. La educación se alcanza por un variado conjunto de procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje. En este contexto, la evaluación se presenta como una parte y fase integrante de los procesos de enseñanza-aprendizaje. La evaluación sirve para dirigir el comportamiento hacia la realización de determinados objetivos personales, sociales e institucionales. En lo que sigue se presenta una idea de la evaluación académica, desde el punto de vista de la comunicación, de los sistemas informacionales, y considerando que la evaluación es uno de los aspectos esenciales de la educación, indispensable para lograr un rendimiento educativo eficiente y óptimo. Lugar de la evaluación FUENTE DE INFORM CION TRANSMIS OR CANAL RECEPTOR DESTINO Es MENSA JE SEÑAL RECIBID A III III 18 El aprendizaje es un proceso compuesto por una serie de unidades que Skinner llama unidades de estudio y que son verdaderos, aunque pequeños, sistemas retroalimentativos cuyo detalle se aprecia en el siguiente esquema: UNIDADES DE ESTUDIO NOTA: Si la respuesta es correcta, el alumno pasa a la unidad siguiente. Si la respuesta es incorrecta el alumno regresa a la unidad anterior para repasarla de nuevo. Este esquema nos hace ver que la evaluación, primariamente, se presenta. a) Como una parte del sistema retroalimentativo enseñanza-aprendizaje (unidad de estudio); b) Como un mecanismo de comparación entre las respuestas reales del alumno (EL ES) y las respuestas correctas (EL DEBE). Obviamente, si se considera que una asignatura se halla constituida por un conjunto de unidades de estudios, que se aprenden en forma sucesiva -a lo largo del tiempo-, el aprendizaje en realidad es un proceso que se halla constituido por una sucesión de unidades de estudio, como se aprecia es el esquema anterior. INFORMACION Y PREGUNTA I (ESTADO DE NO SABER) (Reali menta ción o Fead Back) RESPUESTA DEL ALUMNO (Evalu ación por compa ración) Regreso al comienzo de la unidad (Mensaje del profesor) UNIDAD ANTERIOR UNIDAD SIGUIENTE UNIDAD SIGUIENTE RESPUESTA CORRECTA Debe RESPUESTA DEL ALUMNO Es RESPUESTA CORRECTA II PRO FES OR ENS EÑA NZA ALU MN O APR END IZAJ E RES PUE STA INC ORR ECT A 19 Concepto y funciones de la evaluación Si bien es corriente describir la evaluación como proceso que nos permite determinar –por comparación-,en qué medida se han alcanzadolos objetivos, una idea más completa de ella se alcanza cuando se tienen en cuenta sus funciones esenciales de la evaluación que son las siguientes: a) La función de conducción o dirección del aprendizaje hacia ciertos objetivos. Esta función de dirección se cumple por medio de la corrección permanente y oportuna de los errores cometidos, se basa en la comparación permanente de los objetivos (DEBE) y de los resultados (ES) alcanzados en cada momento. b) La función de refuerzo o premio (Thorndike) de los comportamientos acertados1; y la función complementaria de extinción de los errores; por falta de refuerzo. El refuerzo hace que los comportamientos deseados sean más probables en el futuro. c) La función de promoción del alumno hacia nuevos objetivos y/o unidades de estudio Definido así el aprendizaje, en forma operativa y funcional, pasamos a describir los detalles y mecanismos de su dinámica interior. El aprendizaje se halla determinado y dirigido por sus errores. En principio, los errores son momentos componentes de todo aprendizaje, ya que todo aprendizaje es un proceso de comunicación, que implica errores como cuando se aprende un idioma por ejemplo. En el proceso del aprendizaje es natural y típico que se cometan una serie de errores ya que los errores son variables que intervienen en todo proceso de comunicación, en mayor o menor grado. Los errores que, desde cierta perspectiva clásica pueden resultar indeseables cumplen, sin embargo, una función importante, ya que ellos proporcionan la información necesaria para que se pongan en acción los mecanismos correctores y reguladores del caso. Algo más, se puede decir que sólo la continua corrección de los errores permite dirigir el comportamiento hacia los objetivos fijados. Uno de los tipos fundamentales de aprendizaje es el aprendizaje por ensayo-error (Thorndike), debidamente reformulado por Ashby y Skinner como aprendizaje por: - "búsqueda y adhesión" (Ashby), por : "elección y fijación" (Skinner) o por: objetivos (Bonsack, Wiener, Ross Ashby) En este tipo de aprendizaje, las conductas acertadas se retienen y se hacen más frecuentes, mientras que las conductas erróneas, inútiles, se hacen cada vez más infrecuentes (extinción, olvido) Pavlov y Skinner dirían: Las conductas reforzadas se hacen más probables, mientras que las no reforzadas tienden a extinguirse; subrayándose así el carácter probabilístico del aprendizaje. Se advierte aquí el carácter selectivo y regulador de la evaluación Selectivo, puesto que sólo admite los comportamientos que se aproximan o llegan al objetivo. Regulador, en cuanto, mantiene el comportamiento dentro de los límites (objetivos) fijados. Cabe formular aquí una regla práctica: "Si dominas una unidad de estudio, pasa a la siguiente"; "Si no dominas una unidad de estudio vuelve a estudiarla hasta dominarla"; o "vuelve atrás e intenta o ensaya de nuevo". Sólo después de dominada una unidad de estudio, el alumno se halla en condiciones de pasar a la siguiente. En este sentido, el aprendizaje es un proceso dinámico que insume tiempo y que implica el dominio sucesivo de un conjunto de unidades que, se supone, integran un determinado sistema 1El refuerzo o premio está implícito en el paso a la unidad siguiente, que significa el éxito parcial obtenido en el aprendizaje. 20 de conocimientos: Física, Química, etc. Skinner habla de "aproximaciones sucesivas", hacia el objetivo. El aprendizaje por computadoras se basa exactamente en los mismos mecanismos realimentativos y en los mismos principios. Algunas propiedades de la evaluación controlada por el error Ante todo, como acaba de verse, debe dejarse claramente establecido que toda evaluación es una forma especial de regulación, ya que la evaluación permite mantener una variable, un estado o un objetivo, dentro de ciertos límites fijados o deseados. (Equilibrio) En este sentido, la evaluación controlada por el error se caracteriza porque sólo interviene después que se han cometido los errores o sea después que se han presentado los comportamientos equivocados, como ocurre en todo proceso de aprendizaje. Todo aprendizaje, en este sentido, implica una permanente corrección de los errores. Una propiedad de este tipo de evaluación es su imperfección. Esta imperfección se evidencia en el hecho de que los éxitos alcanzados en cada ensayo o intento, sólo son parciales y probabilísticos. Es decir, que una evaluación positiva (refuerzo) sólo indica que el comportamiento en cuestión será más frecuente en el futuro.... (Skinner). La evaluación positiva no nos proporciona la certeza absoluta de que el comportamiento evaluado se presentará siempre y necesariamente en el futuro, sólo indica un grado de probabilidad. Una evaluación negativa, en cambio, indica que el objetivo todavía no se ha alcanzado aunque, proporciona una valiosa información acerca de las fallas cometidas y señala el camino para las acciones correctoras del caso. Otra propiedad importante de esta clase de evaluación, consiste en que ella actúa como refuerzo del alumno, ya que una calificación positiva o éxito funciona como un premio que estimula y consolida los comportamientos deseados, haciendo que dichos comportamientos se hagan más frecuentes. El alumno, al percibir que sus respuestas son correctas y confirmadas se siente estimulado, o auto estimulado. Y por ello "se mantienen sus deseos de aprender, e incluso aumenta su satisfacción en el aprendizaje" (Fuchs) De esta manera, y como ha demostrado Skinner, el comportamiento del alumno se halla determinado por sus consecuencias, es decir por los resultados de su acción. Esto significa también que el profesor, por medio de la evaluación, puede cumplir una dirección efectiva del comportamiento (Fuchs) Principios de la evaluación Desde el punto de vista de la Teoría de Sistemas, los principios fundamentales de la evaluación son los siguientes: a. El Principio de la Regulación y/o Dirección del comportamiento por realimentación (Feed Back) Según este Principio, todo proceso evaluativo implica necesariamente, por su propia estructura y dinámica realimentativa, un circuito funcional de comunicación que comprende dos canales: 1) Por el primero va el mensaje del profesor hacia el alumno (conjunto de informaciones y preguntas); 2) Por el segundo canal el alumno envía sus respuestas al profesor. Es esta segunda información de regreso -Fead Back-la que permite dirigir el comportamiento del alumno hacia determinados objetivos. La evaluación, en este sentido, funciona como un mecanismo regulador, de dirección y control, que permite alcanzar objetivos, es decir, mantener los objetivos (o variables del caso) dentro de ciertos límites fijados o deseados. De hecho, y por Principio, se puede decir que no hay evaluación sin retroalimentación, o sea sin un circuito informacional cerrado. 21 Principio de la fijación de objetivos (Derivado del anterior) La evaluación no es un proceso aislado ni absoluto, sino siempre relativo a ciertos objetivos, referido a comportamientos que persiguen fines determinados. En este sentido, puede decirse que no hay evaluación sin objetivos que le sirvan de referencia. Estos objetivos generalmente se manifiestan en forma de comportamientos que pueden observarse y medirse en escalas graduadas, que permitan la mensuración o medida del aprendizaje. En principio, todos los objetivos corresponden a los estados de equilibrio de un sistema. b. El Principio de la comparación Toda evaluación implica una comparación permanente (control de la respuesta): Entre el comportamiento real y el comportamiento deseado; Entre el ES y el DEBE Puede decirse que sin comparación no hay evaluación. Incluso en el caso de las evaluaciones cualitativas. c. El Principio del refuerzo Como ha establecido la Psicología (Thorndike) "Las personas y los animales tienden a proseguir ciertas actividades en la medida que tienen éxito"; es decir, en nuestro caso, en la medida en que son recompensados o premiados del algún modo. De esta manera, la evaluación supone un mecanismo que permite la dirección del comportamiento por medio de una serie de refuerzos (Feed Back) y por la promoción permanente hacia nuevos objetivos es decir, hacia nuevos estados de equilibrio. d. Ley de la Pérdida de Información En principio toda información que parte de un transmisor (profesor, libro, ordenador, etc.) por el simple hecho de transmitirse a través de uno o más canales está sujeto a la Ley de la Pérdida de Información por la presencia de diversas perturbaciones o ruidos que afectan los mensajes transmitidos. En este sentido los receptores en general reciben una cantidad menor de información que la cantidad emitida por el transmisor. Esto se ilustra con el ejemplo del juego llamado "teléfono malogrado". Nota: El esquema de Shannon Weaver permite además comparar la libertad del transmisor para seleccionar sus ideas y palabras, frente a la incertidumbre del receptor, hasta que no reciba el mensaje completo. e. El Principio del código común Para que exista una comunicación real y efectiva es necesario e indispensable que el transmisor y receptor utilicen un código común por ejemplo el Código Morse, Código Braille, Código Binario, o un idioma común, por ejemplo, pues en caso contrario la comunicación sería imposible y todo sería como una Torre de Babel. En el caso de los hombres y las computadoras éste código común es el Código Binario, ya que tanto el cerebro como las máquinas computadoras funcionan de acuerdo a la Ley del todo o nada. Bibliografía 1. Ashby, William Ross (1960). Introducción a la Cibernética. Buenos Aires, Nueva Visión. 2. Ashby, William Ross (1965). Proyecto para un cerebro. Madrid, Tecnos. 22 3. Barreda D., Armando (2006). La Historia como sistema adaptativo. Lima, Fondo Editorial UIGV. 4. Barreda Delgado, Armando. La palabra como factor sugestivo y terapéutico. 5. Coloquios de Royamount (1965). El concepto de información en la ciencia contemporánea de Francois Bonsack. México, siglo XXI editores. 6. Piaget Jean. Epistemología de las ciencias humanas. Buenos Aires. 7. Piaget Jean (1969). Biología y conocimiento. Siglo XXI. 8. Wiener, Nobert (1969). Cibernética y sociedad. Buenos Aires. Sudamérica. 9. Wiener, Norbert (1985). Cibernética o el control y la comunicación en animales y máquinas. Barcelona, Tusquets editores. RESEÑA DEL AUTOR: El profesor Barreda tiene los grados de Bachiller en Educación, Bachiller en Letras y Doctor en Filosofía. Es Catedrático de Post Grado en la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y Catedrático invitado en la Facultad de Medicina de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, en el curso de Epistemología de las Ciencias Neurológicas. Entre sus publicaciones figuran: La Palabra como Factor Sugestivo y Terapéutico, la Historia como Sistema Adaptativo, e Intervenciones del Imperialismo Norteamericano en los siglos XIX y XX. LA UNIVERSIDAD PERUANA, ¿INVESTIGA? "Es de importancia para quien desee alcanzar una certeza en su investigación, el saber dudar a tiempo". Aristóteles 23 Dr.Claudio O. Tume Yenque Resumen El artículo precisado por el autor como reflexión, describe la problemática de la educación superior en la línea de la investigación, siendo esta con el proceso de docencia y la extensión, pilares de la Universidad Peruana. El autor observa, la carencia de lineamientos políticos institucionales en investigación, adherencia a paradigmas educativos desfasados, como la necesidad de una re-ingeniería o metanoia en los procesos de enseñanza que promuevan líneas de investigación. Indica además que, el sentido de ser de la Universidad es la investigación, pues no se puede concebir una Institución educativa que no investigue; de esta manera se logrará la institución de nuevas generaciones que promuevan el desarrollo del País formando estudiantes y profesionales felices que investigan, aludiendo al pensamiento greco del "hombre feliz". Palabras claves: Universidad Peruana, líneas políticas de investigación, TICs, hombre feliz, Estado Peruano. Me parece oportuno iniciar esta reflexión sobre investigación en la Universidad Peruana, considerando algunos puntos importantes del pensamiento greco, cuando en el caso de Aristóteles y la eudonomía precisa quién es el hombre feliz. Al respecto, repensando este modus vivendi del mundo greco hoy, considero que esta felicidad se iniciaría en el estudiante peruano, en cuanto aprenda dentro de una excelente infraestructura, cuando use lo mejor de la tecnología de información y comunicación (TICs), cuando utilice las bibliotecas virtuales, cuando tenga profesores altamente preparados que empleen metodologías de enseñanza motivados por una constante creación de conocimiento, cuando el docente mismo investigue, cuando se implante una política institucional que promueva líneas de investigación y cuando además, se le estructure como persona cimentado en valores. Considero que el Estado Peruano debe tener una mejor aptitud en la manera de crear una sociedad peruana de crecimiento continuo, formando jóvenes felices para que lo sean igual al profesionalizarse, puntualizando que para el greco la felicidad era toda persona que poseía conocimiento y procuraba desarrollar más virtud; y precisando además, que la razón y la experiencia son dos maneras de hacer conocimiento. Este micro contexto, al cual me refiero de esta manera de nuestra realidad peruana, se enmarca dentro del macro contexto mundial al cual todos conocemos como Sociedad del Conocimiento a propósito del advenimiento de la globalización; es el momento de afirmar, que no se puede concebir actualmente una educación que no promueva en su quehacer de enseñar, el desarrollo del conocimiento y por tanto, la investigación científica. La Universidad Peruana debe transitar a paso ligero por esta Sociedad del Conocimiento investigando, diversamente quedará desfasada de su propio contexto. Han habido instituciones y personajes en particular desde el siglo pasadoen el Perú, como el Doctor Jorge Basadre quien desde 1951 a 1956 escribió artículos sobre la problemática universitaria, él proponía un "mejoramiento universitario" el cual reta a reformular la Universidad, dice al respecto: "...una universidad que no investiga o investiga poco evade una función esencial; para investigar se necesita la cooperación constante y siempre renovada de estudiantes maduros y preparados". La preocupación de un cambio era evidente, el Dr. Nemesio Espinoza Herrera por otra parte en su estudio "La crisis estructural de la Universidad Peruana y la Asamblea Nacional de Rectores" demuestra que hubieron condiciones políticas desde la década de 1960 que intentaron establecer las bases de una ambiciosa política nacional de investigación, en este diseño, la institución universitaria pasó a formar parte de la estructura de organización y planificación del sistema nacional de investigación, esto fue propuesto por un grupo de intelectuales dirigidos por Salazar Bondy. Considero necesario mencionar que, uno de los puntos referentes a tomar en cuenta en el proceso de enseñar para fortalecer la investigación, es el de no entrar nuevamente en el círculo vicioso de paradigmas desfasados como el conductismo que si bien tiene aportes favorables a la educación como: la preparación de clase con interés, aulas acondicionadas para la enseñanza, estimulación de la memoria, este resulta dañino pues se considera al alumno recipientes de conocimiento e información, más no creación de ellos; no se estimula la formación de nuevas generaciones de investigadores. Mario Bunge (1989) nos propone al 24 respecto, lograr un status de alto nivel con sistemas científicos locales y nacionales al igual de los países desarrollados en integridad y cohesión, que fomenten flujos incesantes de investigadores. Este fenómeno lo observamos en niveles superiores, al respecto, me motiva mencionar un comentario ocurrente que da cuenta que en la educación superior se da en muchos casos de modo recurrente: "la copia de un artículo o estudio se llama plagio, de varios estudios, se llama trabajo de investigación", es en cierto modo verdad, pues se ha acostumbrado en el mundo académico aceptar como absoluto, que un trabajo de investigación puede ser: copia y pega que, aunque sean de las mejores fuentes de investigación esto no deja de ser solo copias, y no realmente lo que lleva a precisar que siguiendo los pasos del método científico se haga investigación; caer en esta tentación es inmensa para varios . Nuestra Universidad peruana, debe por lo tanto reforzar puntualmente este aspecto, su deber ser, es la investigación. Estamos entrando entonces, en otros espacios, es decir, que al hablar de investigación se debe hacer en referencia lógica a la necesidad de la sociedad, hablo de la pertinencia social de la investigación, pues no se puede investigar si no se sabe para quién o para qué estamos investigando. La educadora venezolana Lesbia Colina Colina, (2007) indica a propósito que, la pertinencia social de la investigación está en función de la adecuación entre las actividades de investigación que desarrollan y lo que requiere y espera de su accionar; la sociedad necesita una respuesta que esté sustentada no en el utilitarismo y la inmediatez si no, no tiene pertinencia social. Supone por tanto, el cuestionamiento si realmente la Universidad está frecuentemente observando las necesidades de la sociedad peruana para satisfacer estos requerimientos es decir, ¿conoce toda la fenomenología de la sociedad peruana para proporcionar respuestas a sus requerimientos? En este contexto considero como la investigadora, la urgente necesidad de tomar conciencia hacia el interior de la Universidad peruana, de establecer lineamientos de política de investigación de proyectos de corto, mediano y largo plazo, soportados por una planificación con objetivos y necesidades dentro del contexto de la diversidad peruana. Conviene en este sentido, preguntarse: ¿es posible formar investigadores en universidades que no hacen investigación? El contexto educativo precisa actualmente que en el Perú hay 137 universidades, de entre ellas 50 públicas. Hay cerca de un millón de estudiantes, 70 mil docentes universitarios, 50 mil trabajadores administrativos. Según el informe en este junio pasado de la Comisión de Ciencia y Tecnología del Congreso (2013), se aceptó que en el Perú de S/. 2,156 millones que han recibido las universidades estatales por concepto de canon entre 2004 y 2012 para inversiones en investigación científica, el 65% –es decir, S/.1,410 millones no han sido utilizados por falta de personal calificado y de proyectos. Esto francamente enerva a todo peruano. Y no es problema de la Universidad solamente, sino que hay un indicador básico que es la inversión en investigación y Desarrollo (I+D). Este mismo informe indica que el Estado Peruano invierte alrededor de 2.19 US$ per cápita. Nuestro país solo supera a Nicaragua, Honduras y Paraguay. Espanta además, la diferencia de inversión con lo realizado por Estados Unidos (US$ 971.17), Canadá (US$ 459.01) o España (US$ 138.52)." Menciono además con desaliento, que el Informe SIR (2013) considerado uno de los más completos del mundo, debido a la precisión con la que trabajan con sus indicadores y fuentes de información para la verificación de los estudios presentados por las casas de estudios, menciona que según el perfil detallado de la actividad investigadora de las instituciones, tomando datos cuantitativos de publicación y citación, cuya elaboración se ha basado en el estudio de toda la producción científica, tuvo en cuenta a las instituciones que en el último año del quinquenio analizado (20072011) publicaron al menos 100 documentos científicos de cualquier tipo (artículos, revisiones, cartas, conferencias, entre otros) El estudio refiere además, que según el Ranking Iberoamericano SIR 2010, el Perú tiene una producción científica de 1,825 proyectos de investigación científica y tecnológica, mientras que Colombia tiene 9,792 y Chile 24,154 proyectos, verdaderamente se hace lo mínimo. El gráfico n° 1 revela además un ranking que establece a 11 universidades peruanas que realizan investigación, de las cuales 8 son estatales. Gráfico N° 1 25 Informe del grupo SCImago analizó la producción científica de las universidades iberoamericanas durante el periodo 20072011 Estos indicadores observados en la investigación científica de las universidades nacionales peruanas se dan también en universidades no estatales, ¿acaso falta rigor científico en el marco de la enseñanza universitaria peruana? Quizá sea un elemento desfavorable, como lo mencionaba en la parte introductoria, que hay modelos o paradigmas educativos que se mantienen vigentes en la enseñanza universitaria que hacen daño a la investigación. Algunos alumnos suponen que investigar es retomar investigaciones de otros, eso es solo copiar y pegar como venimos insistiendo. Se necesita entonces hacer: una re-ingeniería, una metanoia en la educación superior entendido como cambio de raíz, desde los mismos lineamientos políticos institucionales referente a la investigación, se deben revisar los artículos 65o, 66o y 67o de la Ley Universitaria No 23733 relacionados a la investigación universitaria, además de promover espacios de investigación a través de las Tecnologías de Información y Comunicación (TICs), entre otros. Nuestra Universidad debe por sí misma, promoverse en la investigación para transitar por los caminos de la Sociedad del Conocimiento como lo decía Peter Senge aludido por Mireia Tintoré Espuny (2010) convirtiéndose en "una institución que aprende", rehaciendo a cada momento estrategias de alto nivel académico, permitiendo la calidad y eficiencia antes que la corrupción que hacen que nuestra Universidad nos dé siempre de lo mismo. Creo finalmente como se manifiesta al inicio de esta reflexión retomando a Aristóteles que, es importante para que el alumno desee alcanzar una certeza en su investigación, motivarlo a saber dudar a tiempo en su formación profesional; y, nuestra Universidad Peruana en muchos momentos es conformista, no duda ni a tiempo ni a destiempo. Conviene de igual manera preguntarnos ¿Cómo hacer de nuestra Universidad un lugar de alumnos y docentes felices? Afirmo que, en la manera que se determinen líneas políticas institucionales de investigación creceremos en conocimiento y lográndolo gerenciar, impulsaremos el desarrollo de nuestro Perú; conviene además, promover espacios que estimulen la investigación científica de todos los alumnos plasmándolos en revistas que cada universidad frecuentemente debe elaborar. Termino esta reflexión preguntándonos como lo refiere el doctor Luis Piscoya (2011) en su libro: diversamente "¿A dónde nos llevan nuestras universidades?" Citas bibliográficas Aristóteles "Ética a Nicómaco Libro I o" Centro de Estudios Políticos (1970) Bunge, Mario (1989) "Ciencia y desarrollo" Taller El Gráfico. Buenos Aires. Colina Colina, Lesbia [2007] "La investigación en la educación superior y su aplicabilidad social" Ed. Laurus. Volumen 13. N° 25 Universidad Pedagógica Experimental Libertador. Venezuela. Congreso de la república del Perú [2013], "Informe de la Comisión de Ciencia y Tecnología" Lima. Espinoza Herrera, Nemesio. [2013] "La crisis estructural de la Universidad Peruana y la Asamblea Nacional de Rectores" UNMSM. Lima. Ministerio de Educación. [1983] Ley Universitaria No 23733 Lima. Perú 26 Piscoya Hermoza, Luis. [2011]. ¿A dónde nos llevan nuestras universidades? Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Fondo Editorial. Lima Salazar Bondy, Augusto, "En torno al sentido de la educación superior", Serie Cuadernos de Reflexión y Debate, No 3, Oficina de Coordinación Universitaria Ministerio de Educación, 2005. Lima SCImago Institutions Rankings SIR CImago Research Group, [2013] España. Tintoré Espuny, Mireia [2010] "Las Universidades como organizaciones que aprenden". Universitat Internacional de Catalunya. España. Autor: Claudio O. Tume Yenque Licenciado en Ciencias Sociales y Comunicación [USMP] Maestro en Investigación y Docencia Universitaria [UIGV] Doctor en Educación [UIGV] Coordinador de Área de Ciencias Básicas Aplicadas [Facultad de Estomatología] [UIGV] Docente de Posgrado – Maestría; Asignaturas: Filosofía de la Educación Superior. Epistemología [UIGV] Docente de Pregrado: Filosofía [UIGV] Facultades de Estomatología y Enfermería 27 PERSONALIDAD SITUACIONAL EN ADOLESCENTES DE COLEGIOS ESTATALES DE LIMA METROPOLITANA. Elizabeth Dany Araujo Robles* Resumen Se aborda una visión de la personalidad y se presenta los rasgos de personalidad situacional del adolescente de colegios estatales de lima Metropolitana, Para ello se estratifico de 128 adolescentes del 4to y 5to de estudios de secundaria de ambos sexos con el propósito de ver su perfil de actuación frente a situaciones de la vida diaria. Se aplicó la Escala de Personalidad Situacional. Encontrando que las dimensiones de personalidad situacional, los resultados apuntan en tres direcciones: 1. Los varones muestran más estabilidad, autonomía, tolerancia y menos preocupación por ocultar sus debilidades; 2. Las mujeres se muestran más asertivas (para organizar grupos), más amables, más hábiles socialmente y con mayor sentimiento de confianza en sí mismas. 3. Ambos géneros muestran un nivel similar de ansiedad, autoconcepto (autoestima), eficacia, autoconfianza, dominancia, ajuste social, agresividad, integridad y deseabilidad social. Así como el adolescente de quinto año muestran mejor confianza en sí mismos, más habilidad social y mejor autoconcepto en general, que los de cuarto año. Estas diferencias pueden describirse de manera resumida mediante la afirmación de que el grupo de quinto año muestra más madurez social y emocional mientras que el adolescentes de cuarto año muestran una tendencia más alta que los de quinto en cuanto a actuar con mayor de control interno antes de responder o actuar y mayor disposición para desenvolverse de manera precavida. Palabras claves: Adolescente, Prevención y Personalidad * Doctora en Psicología, Docente en la Maestría de Terapia Cognitiva-Conductual UIGV. Docente y asesora de Pre y post grado en UIGV, UNFV y UA. Investigadora y Autora de publicaciones sobre estandarización de instrumentos psicológicos, adolescencia, familia, conducta antisocial y personalidad. Personalidad situacional El enfoque de los rasgos en el estudio de la personalidad El área de la personalidad en los estudios psicológicos, se ha sustentado tradicionalmente en la suposición de que cada individuo posee patrones o estilos propios de conducta, los llamados rasgos, que lo diferencian de cualquiera otro, que esos patrones de conducta son consistentes en el tiempo y entre las situaciones y que, hasta cierto punto, es posible predecir la conducta de dicho individuo a partir del conocimiento previo de dichos estilos de conducta (Funder, 1991; Goldberg, 28 1993). La idea básica de los rasgos es que las personas exhiben características psicológicas similares en situaciones distintas (Cervone&Shoda, 1999). Un aporte histórico en el estudio de la personalidad desde este punto de vista fue la teoría de la personalidad de Gordon Allport. Este autor sostenía que la conducta de un individuo era consistente a lo largo del tiempo y de las situaciones, y ello justificaba la utilidad teórica del concepto de personalidad. Pero, además, como señala Cloninger (2003), para Allport la personalidad era también una causa de la conducta. Dice Allport, "los rasgos no son creaciones en la mente del observador, ni son ficciones verbales; son aceptados aquí como hechos biofísicos, disposiciones psicofísicas reales relacionadas –aunque nadie sabe cómocon sistemas nerviosos persistentes de estrés y determinación" (Allport, 1937, citado por Cloninger, 2003, pp. 203). Según Allport, de los rasgos que constituyen la a personalidad, algunos son universales (compartidos por todos los individuos) y otros son únicos en cada individuo. Aunque, en realidad, Allport sostenía que los rasgos compartidos no eran más que un aspecto medible de los rasgos individuales. Los rasgos verdaderos siempre eran únicos al individuo. Un rasgo, para Allport, era "un sistema neuropsíquico generalizado y focalizado (peculiar al individuo), con la capacidad para hacer muchos estímulos funcionalmente equivalentes y para iniciar y guiar formas consistentes (equivalentes) de conducta adaptativa y expresiva" (Allport, 1937, citado por Cloninger, 2003, pp. 204-205). Los rasgos pueden inferirse a partir de las expresiones del lenguaje ordinario, de la conducta observable, de los intereses personales, de los documentos dejados por el sujeto y de los resultados de las mediciones psicológicas. Un pensamiento guía en las teorías de Allport es el de la unicidad de la personalidad, y por lo tanto, su enfoque es el estudio no tanto de procesos generales como los que son analizados por la psicología científica, sino principalmente de rasgos únicos individuales, estudio más bien propio de un enfoque idiográfico. Dice Allport (1955): Cada persona es un idioma en sí mismo... un idioma se desarrolla en su contexto peculiar, y este contexto debe ser comprendido con el fin de comprender el idioma. Sin embargo, al mismo tiempo, los idiomas no son enteramente arbitrarios... (pero) el entrenamiento científico del psicólogo lo conduce a buscar procesos universales comunes a las especies (p. 19). Yo argumento que la individualidad es el objeto legítimo de curiosidad, especialmente al nivel humano... yo aventuro la opinión de que todos los animales en el mundo son psicológicamente menos distintos unos de otros de lo que lo es un hombre de los otros (p. 23). Esta visión clásica de la personalidad como disposiciones, y como causa de la conducta, fue la dominante durante varias décadas. Lazarus (1961), la resume de este modo: Las personas parecen llevar consigo disposiciones para pensar o para actuar en ciertas formas, que son independientes de la situación... el patrón u organización de estas disposiciones es lo que llamamos personalidad... la personalidad de un individuo hace ciertas conductas altamente probables y otras improbables (p. 25). La teoría de los rasgos se expresó de una manera completamente diferente en los estudios factoriales del temperamento. A diferencia del enfoque defendido por Allport, los modelos biológicofactoriales son radicalmente nomotéticos, pues plantean la existencia de rasgos comunes a todos los individuos y la posibilidad de describir a cualquier individuo por su posición particular en cada uno de ellos. Dos de las tendencias dominantes en la actualidad desde este enfoque son el modelo tri-factorial y el modelo de los Cinco Grandes. El modelo tri-factorial se estructura con base en las dimensiones de neuroticismo (o emocionalidad negativa), extraversión (o emocionalidad positiva) y desinhibición-inhibición (por ejemplo, Markon, Krueger&Watson, 2005). Esta estructura, por supuesto, proviene del modelo originalmente propuesto por Eysenck (por ejemplo, 1997). La dimensión de desinhibición-inhibición corresponde a la que Eysenck denominó psicoticismo. Otros modelos tri-factoriales proponen dimensiones equivalentes a las tres mencionadas. El modelo de los Cinco Grandes fue desarrollado originalmente como un intento de comprender el lenguaje ordinario referido a rasgos (McCrae et al., 2000). Análisis estructurales de estos descriptores revelaron consistentemente cinco dimensiones o factores amplios: Extraversión, Agradabilidad, Escrupulosidad, Neuroticismo y Apertura a la Experiencia. Esta estructura ha demostrado ser particularmente fuerte, con los mismos cinco factores emergiendo tanto de autoreportes como de calificaciones por otros, tanto en niños como en adultos y a lo largo de una variedad de idiomas y culturas (McCrae& Costa, 1997). Por ejemplo, una investigación de Romero, 29 Luengo, Gómez-Fraguela y Sobral (2002) en adolescentes españoles (15-19 años), empleando el NEO-PI-R confirmó en lo esencial la estructura de los cinco factores. Recientemente se ha señalado también que estos cinco factores no son grupos independientes de rasgos, sino que cada uno de ellos se relaciona con procesos autoregulatorios de la conducta que actúan de manera interdependiente para lograr las metas preestablecidas para la conducta (Van Egeren, 2009). Ambos enfoques dentro de la tradición factorial han sido aplicados exitosamente a una inmensa variedad de temas. En páginas posteriores revisaremos algunos estudios representativos, pero por ahora podemos proponer como ejemplo la investigación acerca del bienestar subjetivo. Una investigación realizada en adultos españoles (Fierro & Cardenal, 1996) halló que la extraversión está correlacionada positivamente con los sentimientos de satisfacción personal, mientras que el neuroticismo y el psicoticismo se relacionan negativamente con esta variable. La satisfacción se encuentra conceptualmente cerca de la variable de bienestar subjetivo. Varias investigaciones muestran que la personalidad también se relaciona con la sensación subjetiva de bienestar psicológico. Un metanálisis realizado por DeNeve y Cooper (1998) examinó 137 distintos constructos de personalidad como correlatos del bienestar subjetivo. Los resultados mostraron que la personalidad fue igualmente predictiva de variables como satisfacción con la vida, felicidad y afecto positivo, aunque significativamente menos predictiva del afecto negativo. Entre los rasgos agrupados de acuerdo con el modelo de los Cinco Grandes, el neuroticismo fue el más fuerte predictor de la satisfacción con la vida, felicidad y afecto negativo. El afecto positivo fue predicho igualmente bien por la extraversión y la agradabilidad. Sin embargo, también se ha notado que, aunque los rasgos de personalidad se relacionan fuertemente con las diversas medidas de bienestar subjetivo, las circunstancias vitales y los factores culturales (a través de la riqueza económica y la valoración cultural del bienestar psicológico) también tienen una influencia importante sobre los niveles de bienestar subjetivo (Diener, Oishi& Lucas, 2003, Diener, Lucas &Scollon, 2006). Como queda dicho, las tres o cinco dimensiones de la personalidad postuladas son propiamente dimensiones del temperamento. Es decir, se asume que dichas dimensiones tienen un fundamento biológico y son, por tanto, más o menos estables en el individuo. Sobre esta base, algunos estudios han tratado de esclarecer la base neurológica de dichas dimensiones. Por ejemplo, Wright, Williams, Feczko, Barrett, Dickerson, Schwartz, y Wedig(2006) hallaron correlaciones significativas entre extraversión y neuroticismo y el espesor de ciertas regiones específicas de la corteza prefrontal. Por otro lado, Blankstein, Chen, Mincic, McGrath y Davis (2009). reportaron que el volumen de la corteza cingulada anterior estaba correlacionado positiva y significativamente con medidas de extraversión y neuroticismo. La crítica al enfoque de los rasgos y un modelo interactivo La concepción de la personalidad como una estructura estable fue retada por Mischel (1980) en su clásico texto Personality and assessment. La visión "situacionista" defendida por Mischel sostenía que las personas ajustan su conducta característicamente a las diversas situaciones, concepción que minimizaba la importancia de posibles patrones estables de conducta. La búsqueda de patrones indiscutibles de consistencia entre situaciones ha arrojado generalmente coeficientes de correlación bajos, aunque no de cero (Mischel, 1980). La estrecha relación entre situación y conducta puso en un serio entredicho a la teoría de los rasgos (Bower, 2007). Sin embargo, el propioMischel (Mischel&Shoda, 1995, 1998) ha planteado que un enfoque situacionista no es necesariamente contradictorio con la existencia de tendencias individuales estables en la conducta: Cuando la personalidad es conceptualizada como un sistema estable que media cómo el individuo selecciona, construye y procesa la información social, se hace posible explicar simultáneamente tanto las cualidades invariantes de la personalidad subyacente y la variabilidad predecible entre las situaciones en algunas de sus expresiones conductuales características... tales patrones de variabilidad son vistos no como mero "error" sino como reflejando expresiones esenciales del mismo sistema estable de personalidad subyacente que produce los niveles de conducta promedio característicos del individuo (Mischel&Shoda, 1995, p. 246). 30 Aquí es importante la visión de la personalidad como un sistema que media la manera en que el individuo procesa la información social y emocional, sobre la base de que existen diferencias individuales en tales procesos. En otras palabras, las diferencias de personalidad determinan, o en su defecto, tienen como componentes, las diferencias individuales en dichas actividades de procesamiento. Mischel y Shoda (1995) consideran que esta concepción de la personalidad es superior a aquella que visualiza la personalidad como un conjunto de disposiciones conductuales. En general, considerar la personalidad como disposiciones conductuales permite tan solamente predicciones gruesas, como tendencias genéricas, de la conducta, como cuando se dice que un individuo tiende a ser más agresivo (en general) que otro, pero es inadecuada si se busca una comprensión más completa de la conducta, con una mejor posibilidad de predicción (por ejemplo, explicar y predecir la conducta individual concreta en situaciones concretas). Así pues, una teoría de la personalidad debe incorporar el rol de las situaciones, los eventos y los contextos, lo que incluye no solamente acontecimientos externos, sino también los internos como pensamientos, fantasía e imaginación.Pero lo que debe entenderse como "situación" depende en parte de las percepciones del propio individuo, es decir, del "significado adquirido de los rasgos situacionales para la persona" (Mischel&Shoda, 1995, p. 252). En la siguiente cita, Mischel y Shoda resumen su visión del contenido de una teoría de la personalidad: Proponemos una concepción unificada de un sistema de personalidad en el cual los individuos son caracterizados en términos de (a) las cogniciones y los afectos que están disponibles y accesibles... y (b) la distintiva organización de las interrelaciones entre ellas y los rasgos psicológicos de las situaciones. Esta organización guía y limita la activación de las ocurrencias específicas de cogniciones, afectos y conductas potenciales cuando un individuo procesa rasgos situacionales. Esta constituye la estructura básica de la personalidad y refleja y subyace a la unicidad individual. Dentro de cada individuo, la organización de este sistema se asume que es estable y única (p. 254). Como observan estos autores, "la organización de las cogniciones y afectos en el sistema refleja la experiencia total del individuo, y de aquí la historia de aprendizaje social cognitiva, pero... refleja también variables genéticas y constitucionales tales como el temperamento" (Mischel&Shoda, 1995, p. 252). La teoría, entonces, enfoca en aquellos procesos psicológicos mediadores que subyacen a las diferencias individuales en la conducta social, lo que incluye los constructos personales (de sí mismo, de los otros, de las situaciones), expectativas (sobre los resultados y sobre la propia eficacia de uno mismo), valores subjetivos, competencias (para el desarrollo de conducta social) y estrategias autoregulatorias y planes en la persecución de metas. Tales procesos constituyen el sistema de personalidad. Un volumen de datos ha mostrado la importancia de la manera en que una persona se representa a sí mismo como determinante de las diferencias individuales. También hay evidencia de que las reacciones afectivas relacionadas con la evaluación de las situaciones pueden ser automáticas e inconscientes y pueden excitar cogniciones y conductas. Estas reacciones pueden reflejar bien establecidas diferencias individuales, que a su vez pueden estar relacionadas con el temperamento y variables biológicas y pueden tener una influencia clara sobre las estrategias de procesamiento de información (Mischel&Shoda, 1995). En suma, las personas adecúan su comportamiento a las situaciones, pero es posible encontrar diferencias individuales estables en la manera en que lo hacen. Otros autores también han propuesto concepciones de la personalidad como sistemas de organización de la conducta. Por ejemplo, Oubrayrie, Lescarret&De Léonardis (1996) consideran el control o el autocontrol como un factor esencial en la organización de las conductas del individuo. Según ellos, existen tres tipos de control: (a) la organización de los actos y los comportamientos implicando estrategias adaptativas y ejecutivas, (b) el control cognitivo, reflejando la búsqueda de información, pero también en la forma de interiorización de prescripciones, como de organización de proyectos y (c) la gestión afectiva, asociando a la vez el control de la motivación, de las emociones y de las aspiraciones. La personalidad es el sistema central que coordina estos tres controles: 31 En el curso de su desarrollo, el sujeto en tanto que sistema, va a desarrollar y constituir sus propios procesos de control. De modo más preciso, la personalidad va a establecer un proceso de autocontrol para asegurar su estabilidad y la organización de las conductas (Oubrayrie et al., 1996, pp. 385-386). En conclusión, cuando se tiene que explicar los sesgos cognitivos de los individuos en el análisis de las situaciones, el conocimiento de las disposiciones del individuo (personalidad) aporta coherencia a los comportamientos observados. Los individuos tienen particulares formas de reaccionar ante distintas situaciones y la predicción de la conducta requiere determinar cómo los rasgos influyen en la manera en que las personas se comportaran en situaciones definidas. Este análisis nos conduce al concepto de personalidad situacional. El concepto de personalidad situacional. El concepto de personalidad situacional precisamente hace referencia a aquellos rasgos que los sujetos manifiestan cuando interactúan con su entorno, el cual puede ser el laboral, social o familiar. Este concepto de alguna manera se propone sintetizar y marca un punto de equilibrio entre las dos grandes tradiciones en la investigación de la personalidad que se acaba de revisar, es decir, el modelo de los rasgos y el modelo situacional (Fernández, Seisdedos& Mielgo, 2001). Ya hemos mencionado que la imagen tradicional acerca de la edad adolescente podría no ser más que una sobregeneralización que oculta importantes diferencias individuales, tanto personales como de contexto. Esas diferencias explicarían las representaciones ambiguas de la adolescencia remarcadas por Dubet (1993) que, como afirma este autor, por un lado, la valorizan en sus aspectos de vitalidad, espontaneidad, inocencia, fuerza y belleza, y, por el otro, la consideran como una edad peligrosa, irresponsable, agresiva o demasiado pasiva, ignorante e irrespetuosa. Sin embargo, estas diferentes expresiones conductuales podrían constituir maneras individualmente configuradas de procesos que sí operan en la generalidad de los casos. Le Valois y Aulenbacher (2006, p. 21) hablan de la triple mutación del adolescente (la metamorfosis de su ser, la afirmación de su singularidad y la conquista de su autonomía) y explican que en razón de esa triple mutación, el adolescente "tiene una necesidad de desmarcarse del medio familiar para existir por sí mismo" (p. 16). Estas tensiones se expresan individualmente, según las características de personalidad de cada uno, y dichas diferencias individuales ayudan también a explicar cómo y cuándo estos cambios pueden devenir en consecuencias positivas o no en la salud mental del adolescente. Por ejemplo, existe evidencia de que, en algunos casos, y dependiendo de los factores de personalidad y la calidad de la relación con los padres, tales cambios pueden derivar en desórdenes de conducta o emocionales. Van Der Akker, Dekociv&Prinzie (2010) estudiaron un grupo de adolescentes tempranos, obteniendo en tres oportunidades (con intervalos de dos años), calificaciones de la personalidad de dichos adolescentes por parte de sus padres y maestros, así como, de los padres, información sobre su estilo parental. En la tercera ocasión obtuvieron también reportes de problemas psicológicos en los adolescentes. Se pudo comprobar una disminución en el nivel promedio en extraversión, escrupulosidad e imaginación. Los niveles medios de benevolencia, estabilidad emocional y un estilo parental sobre-reactivo permanecieron estables. El análisis reveló que los decrementos en extraversión y estabilidad emocional predijeron problemas internalizantes, mientras que los decrementos en benevolencia, escrupulosidad y estabilidad emocional predijeron problemas externalizantes. El aumento en el estilo parental sobre-reactivo predijo solamente problemas externalizantes. En suma, los cambios en la personalidad del adolescente y un estilo parental sobre-reactivo durante la transición a la adolescencia están asociados con problemas de ajuste en los adolescentes. Como en otros grupos etarios, en el caso de los adolescentes, la personalidad determina aspectos importantes de su ajuste a las presiones sociales y el estrés. Por ejemplo, en estudios realizados en adolescentes argentinos, se comprobó que existen correlaciones significativas entre diferentes estrategias de afrontamiento y diferentes estilos de personalidad (Fantín, Florentino &Correché, 2005). La personalidad también predice las metas personales en los adolescentes. En una investigación realizada en adolescentes españoles, y empleando el Cuestionario de Personalidad Situacional 32 (Sanz de Acedo, Ugarte, Lumbreras & Sanz de Acedo, 2006), las escalas de ese cuestionario se agruparon en cinco grandes factores y se halló que todos estos factores predecían diferentes tipos de metas personales. Así, por ejemplo, el deseo de proyectar una imagen positiva de sí mismo se encuentra en aquellas personas caracterizadas por un perfil definido por tendencias hacia la superioridad (dominación, liderazgo, falta de tolerancia y agresividad), en tanto que la búsqueda de libertad, confort y satisfacción de los impulsos se asocia con perfiles definidos por independencia (actuar sin tomar en cuenta los intereses de los otros) y superioridad, por otro lado, la búsqueda de logros académicos y educativos se relaciona en las chicas con el factor de ajuste social (integridad, control cognitivo, inteligencia social), y en los chicos con el de superioridad. Metodo Diseño Descriptivo comparativo Participantes La población está constituida por adolescentes (N: 2260) se selecciono 128 estudiantes adolescentes de cuarto y quinto grado de secundaria de ambos sexos y equivalentes edades, matriculados en colegios seleccionados de manera aleatoria. Los criterios de inclusión en las tres muestras fueron ser alumnos regulares y participación voluntaria mientras que los criterios de exclusión fue se alumnos repitentes.La distribución de la muestra final se obtuvo por el método de afijación óptima con un error que oscila de 0,31 al 0,42. Variables 1. Variable de estudio: Rasgos de Personalidad Situacional. Variable evaluada por la puntuación obtenida en el Cuestionario de Personalidad Situacional (CPS), el cual mide rasgos de personalidad que se hacen presentes por medio de las reacciones del individuo en diversas interacciones con el medio. Estos rasgos son 17, cada uno de los cuales es medido por una sub-escala. Los rasgos evaluados son las siguientes (basado en Fernández et al., 1998, 2001). 1. Estabilidad emocional (Est). Control (o excitabilidad) emocional en general, nivel de tensión (o de tranquilidad emocional). 2. Ansiedad (Ans). Grado de irritabilidad, sensaciones de impaciencia y culpabilidad, turbación, presencia de miedos y tensión, dificultades en la concentración. 3. Autoconcepto (Auc). En general, autoestima, opinión de sí mismo, autoimagen, apreciación de los recursos propios, aceptación de sí mismo, sentimiento personal de valía. 4. Eficacia (Efi). Sentimiento de competencia personal, capacidad emprendedora, iniciativa, seguridad y confianza en sí mismo, disposición a aceptar responsabilidades. 5. Autoconfianza y seguridad en sí mismo (Csg). Confianza en las propias posibilidades, seguridad personal en los actos propios y en la manera de realizarlos. 6. Independencia (Ind). Sentimiento de autonomía personal, autosuficiencia, grado de necesidad de aprobación externa y de interés en la opinión ajena. 7. Dominancia (Dom). Asertividad, ascendencia sobre las personas, deseos de organizar la actividad del grupo y mandar, competitividad. 8. Control cognitivo. Control interno antes de responder o actuar, propensión a la actitud prudente y precavida, esfuerzo personal para resolver los problemas por sí solo. 9. Sociabilidad (Soc). Amabilidad, búsqueda y facilidad para entablar relaciones interpersonales, iniciativa social, expresividad. 10. Ajuste social (Ajs). Convencionalidad, ajuste a las normas, apego a las costumbres, sometimiento a las reglas familiares, cumplimiento frente a las obligaciones. 11. Agresividad (Agr). Tendencia agresiva principalmente en respuesta a una agresión ajena o a la frustración. 12. Tolerancia (Tol). Flexibilidad, permisividad, comprensión y aceptación frente a las opiniones e ideas ajenas, amplitud de intereses. 33 13. Inteligencia social (Ins). Habilidad social, capacidad para desenvolverse de manera efectiva ante situaciones sociales cambiantes. 14. Integridad-honestidad (Inh). Responsabilidad, seriedad, disciplina y confiabilidad en los compromisos y cumplimiento de obligaciones sociales y laborales. 15. Liderazgo (Lid). Capacidad de dirección, motivación para dirigir y mandar a otros y hacer prevalecer su propia opinión, autosuficiencia y seguridad en sí mismo. 16. Sinceridad (Sin). Veracidad, falta de necesidad de fingimiento o de esconder debilidades propias. 17. Deseabilidad social (Des). Deseo de proyectar ante los demás una imagen positiva de sí mismo 2. Variable de comparación : Género y grado de estudio Instrumento Cuestionario de personalidad situacional. Fue elaborado en España por Fernández et al. (2001). Su objetivo es evaluar determinados rasgos de personalidad, considerando dichos rasgos como estilos de comportamiento estables y consistentes tanto en el tiempo como entre las diversas situaciones, pero, a la vez, reconociendo la fuerte dependencia de las conductas específicas respecto de las situaciones, tal como hemos planteado en la discusión teórica de este trabajo. Análisis de datos En la muestra definitiva se obtuvo las puntuaciones medias y desviación estándar para cada rasgo de personalidad situacional y cada variable de actitudes y estrategias (pensamiento) cognitivas sociales. Estas medias se calcularon para la muestra total y para grupos de género y grado escolar. Se realizó un análisis (Kolmogorov-Smirnoff) para determinar si las puntuaciones se distribuyen normalmente o no y de este modo, tomar decisión sobre qué estadísticos de comparación emplear. De tratarse de una distribución normal, las comparaciones según género y grado escolar se realizarían mediante el estadístico z, de no ser así, se emplearía la U de Mann-Whitney. Resultados Se presentan los resultados de la prueba de normalidad de Kolmogorov-Smirnov de las puntuaciones de las diferentes escalas de personalidad situacional. Estos resultados muestran, como puede verse, que las puntuaciones de todas las escalas correspondientes al grupo investigado tienen una distribución no normal. Por tanto, para realizar las comparaciones en personalidad situacional según año de estudio y género, se hará empleo también de pruebas no paramétricas. Personalidad situacional según año de estudio. Las comparaciones según año de estudio en las escalas de personalidad situacional mediante la prueba U de Mann-Whitney se muestran en la Tabla 1 las escalas en las que se aprecian mayores diferencias entre ambos grupos son las de ansiedad, autoconcepto, eficacia, dominancia, control cognitivo, ajuste social, tolerancia, integridad/honestidad, liderazgo, sinceridad y deseabilidad social. Se hallaron diferencias significativas entre ambos grupos en ansiedad, autoconcepto, eficacia, control cognitivo, ajuste social, tolerancia, integridad/honestidad, liderazgo y sinceridad. En las escalas mencionadas, con excepción de control cognitivo y deseabilidad social, la puntuación más alta corresponde al grupo de quinto año. 34 De estos resultados se infieren ciertas características de personalidad que diferencian, en promedio, a los grupos de cuarto y quinto año. Los estudiantes de quinto año tienen mayor tendencia que los de cuarto año a mostrar indicadores de: Tabla 1. Prueba U de Mann-Whitney de personalidad situacional según año de estudios. Escalas Año Rango promedio U p Estabilidad emocional 4 261.01 33668,000 ,938 5 259,99 Ansiedad 4 245,11 29798,500 ,019 5 275,89 Autoconcepto 4 244,83 29726,000 ,016 5 276,17 Eficacia 4 241,41 28836,000 ,004 5 279,59 Autoconfianza 4 267,86 31886,000 ,261 5 253,14 Independencia 4 251,50 31460,500 ,169 5 269,50 Dominancia 4 248,75 30744,000 ,073 5 272,25 Control cognitivo 4 273,98 30296,000 ,040 5 247,02 Sociabilidad 4 256,73 32821,000 ,566 5 264,27 Ajuste social 4 239,45 28327,000 ,001 5 281,55 Agresividad 4 255,40 32474,000 ,436 5 265,60 Tolerancia 4 241,73 28920,500 ,004 5 279,27 Inteligencia social 4 257,22 32946,500 ,615 5 263,78 Integridad/Honestidad 4 245,87 29995,000 ,026 5 275,13 Liderazgo 4 245,74 29963,000 ,024 5 275,26 Sinceridad 4 243,14 29287,000 ,008 5 277,86 Deseabilidad social 4 271,40 30966,000 ,096 5 249,60 1. Tensión, temores y preocupación; 2. Alta opinión de sí mismos, autoestima; 3. Iniciativa, seguridad en las decisiones y en los actos; 4. Buena adaptación social, cumplimiento de las normas; 5. Flexibilidad y permisividad frente a las ideas ajenas; 6. Responsabilidad, seriedad y disciplina en los compromisos; 7. Autosuficiencia, independencia, deseos de dominio sobre los otros y 35 8. Veracidad, falta de fingimiento. En cambio, los alumnos de cuarto año tienen mayor tendencia que los de quinto a mostrar indicadores de control interno antes de responder o actuar y mayor propensión a desenvolverse de manera precavida. Personalidad situacional según género. En la Tabla 2 apreciamos las diferencias en las escalas de personalidad situacional según el género, evaluadas con la prueba U de Mann-Whitney. Las escalas en las que pueden observarse diferencias significativas según el género son las de estabilidad emocional, independencia, sociabilidad, tolerancia, inteligencia social, liderazgo y sinceridad. Dentro de este grupo de escalas, los varones obtuvieron una puntuación más elevada que las mujeres en estabilidad, independencia, tolerancia y sinceridad. De acuerdo con estos resultados, se puede señalar que los varones presentan un nivel promedio más elevado que las mujeres en las tendencias a mostrar indicadores de: 1. Estabilidad, ajuste emocional y ausencia de tensión; 2. Autonomía, autosuficiencia, sentimientos de libertad de acción e iniciativa; 3. Tolerancia y comprensión frente a las ideas ajenas, variedad de intereses y aceptación de las creencias ajeas y 4. Capacidad para expresarse libremente sin fingimiento y con veracidad. Tabla 2. Prueba U de Mann-Whitney de personalidad situacional según género. Escalas Género Rango promedio U P Estabilidad emocional M 303,20 23008,000 ,000 F 220,35 Ansiedad M 261,13 33608,000 ,925 F 259,90 Autoconcepto M 273,45 30504,000 ,055 F 248,32 Eficacia M 261,72 33460,000 ,857 F 259,35 Autoconfianza M 256,60 32784,000 ,563 F 264,17 Independencia M 294,65 25162,000 ,000 F 228,39 Dominancia M 247,62 30522,000 ,057 F 272,61 Control cognitivo M 209,42 20896,000 ,000 F 308,53 Sociabilidad M 221,96 24056,000 ,000 F 296,74 Ajuste social M 264,91 32656,000 ,513 F 256,35 Agresividad M 264,80 32684,000 ,524 F 256,46 Tolerancia M 288,68 26666,000 ,000 F 234,00 Inteligencia social M 229,63 25988,000 ,000 F 289,53 Integridad/Honestidad M 262,66 33224,000 ,750 F 258,47 Liderazgo M 234,27 27158,000 ,000 36 F 285,16 Sinceridad M 288,82 26632,000 ,000 F 233,87 Deseabilidad social M 259,33 33472,000 ,862 F 261,60 Por otro lado, las mujeres muestran un nivel más elevado que los varones en los indicadores de: 1. Asertividad, deseos de organizar la actividad del grupo y competitividad; 2. Amabilidad, facilidad para las relaciones sociales, iniciativa social, expresividad; 3. Habilidad social y 4. Seguridad en sí mismas y capacidad de dirección. No se halló diferencias entre géneros en ansiedad, autoconcepto, eficacia, autoconfianza, dominancia, ajuste social, agresividad, integridad y deseabilidad social. Discusión En cuanto a la personalidad situacional, se hallaron diferencias significativas entre los grupos de cuarto y quinto año de secundaria en ansiedad, autoconcepto, eficacia, control cognitivo, ajuste social, tolerancia, integridad/honestidad, liderazgo y sinceridad. En resumen, estos resultados indican que los estudiantes de quinto año, presentan en promedio una mayor tendencia que los de cuarto a las siguientes formas de actitud y comportamiento: 1. Tensión, temores y preocupación; 2. Alta opinión de sí mismos, autoestima; 3. Iniciativa, seguridad en las decisiones y en los actos; 4. Buena adaptación social, cumplimiento de las normas; 5. Flexibilidad y permisividad frente a las ideas ajenas; 6. Responsabilidad, seriedad y disciplina en los compromisos; 7. Autosuficiencia, independencia, deseos de dominio sobre los otros y 8. Veracidad, falta de fingimiento. En suma, los estudiantes de quinto año muestran mejor confianza en sí mismos, más habilidad social y mejor autoconcepto en general, que los de cuarto año. Estas diferencias pueden describirse de manera resumida mediante la afirmación de que el grupo de quinto año muestra más madurez social y emocional. Tal afirmación no constituye una explicación, por lo que hay que insistir en que se trata más bien de una descripción. El concepto de "madurez" social o emocional incluye como categoría amplia a diversos comportamientos característicos de los rasgos enumerados, no es su causa. Por otro lado, los adolescentes de cuarto año muestran una tendencia más alta que los de quinto en cuanto a actuar con mayor de control interno antes de responder o actuar y mayor disposición para desenvolverse de manera precavida. Este resultado no necesariamente indica un mejor control de impulsos en este grupo, sino quizá, más bien, cierta inseguridad, la cual es probablemente menor entre los adolescentes de quinto año, dado que éstos muestran mejor autoestima y seguridad en sus decisiones.Es posible que en este caso, se trate también de otra expresión de las diferencias en desenvolvimiento emocional o social. Sin embargo, como se ha indicado antes, ambos grupos son muy próximos en edad y experiencia escolar, lo que llevaría a predecir menos diferencias que las encontradas en este grupo de variables, lo que además, se esperaría en un constructo de personalidad. Hay que tener en cuenta dos aspectos que se complementan entre sí como posible explicación. El primero es que el concepto de personalidad situacional hace referencia, como se ha explicado antes, no a rasgos fijos, sino a tendencias de comportamiento en función de las situaciones. En segundo lugar, si bien muchas de tales situaciones son similares para ambos grupos, existen también diferencias importantes. Los adolescentes de quinto año enfrentan decisiones importantes en su vida personal (como la elección vocacional o el ingreso al mercado laboral), que son todavía algo lejanas en el tiempo para los estudiantes de cuarto año. En cuanto a las diferencias entre géneros en las dimensiones de personalidad situacional, los resultados apuntan en tres direcciones: 1. Los varones muestran más estabilidad, autonomía, tolerancia y menos preocupación por ocultar sus debilidades; 2. Las mujeres se muestran más asertivas (para organizar grupos), más amables, más hábiles socialmente y con mayor sentimiento 37 de confianza en sí mismas. 3. Ambos géneros muestran un nivel similar de ansiedad, autoconcepto (autoestima), eficacia, autoconfianza, dominancia, ajuste social, agresividad, integridad y deseabilidad social. Algunos de estos resultados confirman hallazgos tradicionalmente obtenidos en otras latitudes. Por ejemplo, estudiosmetanalíticos de Feingold (1994), que abarcaron la literatura (1958-1992) y los datos normativos de algunos conocidos tests de personalidad (1940-1992), en varias edades y naciones, mostraron que las mujeres tienen a ser más extravertidas y a exhibir más ansiedad, confianza y afectividad, que los hombres, resultados en general consistentes con los nuestros, a excepción del concerniente a la ansiedad. Los varones tienden a mostrar más asertividad y ligeramente más autoestima que las mujeres, datos que, por el contrario, no se ajustan a lo que hemos hallado. La ausencia de diferencias entre géneros en agresividad, ansiedad y autoestima llama especialmente la atención. En párrafos anteriores se ha analizado la falta de diferencia entre los hombres y mujeres de la presente muestra en la agresividad considerada como una tendencia de la conducta. Conviene señalar que examinando los ítems que componen la escala de agresividad en el cuestionario de personalidad situacional, éstos parecen más relacionados con la evaluación de lo que ya antes hemos descrito como agresión reactiva, la que es suscitada como respuesta a una agresión previa, en vez de vincularse con la agresión como tendencia. Ambas formas de agresión están relacionadas con la conducta agresiva (Bettencourt et al., 2006), pero no están necesariamente relacionadas entre sí, como lo muestra el hecho de que cada una de ellas se relaciona con distintos rasgos de personalidad (Bettencourt et al., 2006). De todas maneras, como vimos antes, es claro que la agresividad, ya sea como tendencia global de la conducta o como pauta reactiva frente a la provocación, ya no distingue entre géneros tan claramente como en épocas anteriores. En cuanto a la ansiedad, es tradicional que ésta se exprese más en las mujeres, como ya lo indicó el estudio de Feingold (1994). Por ejemplo, los desórdenes y síntomas de ansiedad son más frecuentes entre las adolescentes que entre los adolescentes. Se ha mencionado también que las diferencias entre géneros en cuanto a las expresiones de ansiedad en la adolescencia tienen relación con las diferencias de género en cuanto a la experiencia del estrés y las reacciones emocionales al mismo (Rudolph, 2002). La explicación de no diferencia de géneros en autoestima, o autoconcepto como se llama en el CPS, es también compleja. Como ya se dijo, el estudio de Feingold (1994) reveló un nivel ligeramente más alto en autoestima entre los varones. Otros metanálisis confirman dicho resultado entre adolescentes, indicando también que tal diferencia se acrecienta en la adolescencia tardía (Kling, Hyde, Showers&Buswell, 1999). Profundizando en esas diferencias, Crocker y Quinn (2003) observan que la autoestima de las mujeres está más correlacionada con su atractivo físico percibido, mientras que en los hombres está más fuertemente correlacionada con su efectividad física percibida. Ello no es sorprendente, dados los permanentes mensajes culturales en los que la mujer es evaluada de acuerdo con su apariencia física. Josephs, Markus y Tafarodi (1992, citados por Crocker&Quinn, 2003) señalan que la autoestima del hombre se deriva, así sea parcialmente, del cumplimiento de las metas prescritas para su género, como ser independiente, autónomo y mejor que otros, en tanto que la autoestima de la mujer se deriva, también en parte, del hecho de ser sensitiva e interdependiente con los demás. Un dato que apoya estas visiones es el hecho de que la tendencia de verse a sí mismo como superior a otros está más fuertemente correlacionada con la autoestima en los hombres que en las mujeres. De este modo, la falta de diferencia en autoconcepto (autoestima) entre hombres y mujeres en el presente estudio puede estar relacionada con los diferentes mecanismos psicológicos subyacentes a esta variable en cada género. Los rasgos atribuidos por Josephs et al. a cada género en su explicación de las expresiones de la autoestima en hombres y en mujeres, coinciden además con aquellos rasgos en los que sobresalen, respectivamente, cada uno de los géneros de la muestra de la presente investigación, a saber, los hombres son más independientes y las mujeres más sensitivas e interdependientes. Sin embargo, Hyde (2005) ha observado que en muchos de estos metanálisis el tamaño de efecto (la expresión de la diferencia de puntuaciones, en este caso, entre hombres y mujeres) es cercano a cero o pequeño (hasta un valor de d=0,35). Más aún, ella argumenta que las diferencias entre 38 géneros observadas en muchas medidas psicológicas dependen de la edad y de una serie de factores contextuales. Como ella misma señala "el contexto puede ejercer influencia a varios niveles, incluyendo las instrucciones escritas dadas para un examen, las interacciones diádicas entre participantes o entre un participante y un experimentador o el nivel sociocultural" (Hyde, 2005, p. 588). Un aspecto de importancia que debe también resaltarse es la naturaleza de los constructos que son comparados en estos estudios. Referencias Allport, G. W. (1955). Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychology of personality.Nueva Haven: Yale University Press. Cervone, D. &Shoda, Y. (1999).The coherence of personality. 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E., Krueger, R. F. & Watson, D. (2005).Delineating the structure of normal and abnormal personality: An integrative hierarchical approach.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 139–157. McCrae, R. R. & Costa, P. T., Jr. (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal.American Psychologist, 52, 509–516. Mischel, W. &Shoda, Y. (1995). A cognitive-affective system theory of personality: Reconceptualizing situations, dispositions, dynamics, and invariance in personality structure. PsychologicalReview, 102, 246-268. Oubrayrie, N., Lescarret, O. & De Léonardis, M. (1996). Le contrôle psychologique et l'évaluation de soi de l'enfance à l'adolescence. Enfance,49, 3, 383-403. Van Der Akker, A. L., Dekociv, M. &Prinzie, P. (2010). Transitioning to adolescence: How changes in child personality and overreactive parenting predict adolescent adjustment problems.Development and Psychopathology, 22, 151–163. Van Egeren, L. F. (2009). A cybernetic model of global personality traits.Personality and Social Psychology Review, 13, 92-108. 39 DOCENCIA UNIVERSITARIA Y COMPETENCIAS PROFESIONALES Dra.Martha Jordan Campos, * [email protected], [email protected] La educación será mucho más plena Cuando sea un acto de conocimiento, Un acto político, un compromiso ético Y una experiencia estética. Paulo Freyre Resumen El artículo plantea reflexionar acerca de la docencia universitaria en relación con las competencias profesionales. La educación universitaria está, en el Perú, cada vez más necesitada de ser encarada con los avances científicos y tecnológicos del siglo XXI. La mayor parte de universidades, a pesar de declarar en su Visión Institucional, ser entidades formativas, eficientes y de calidad; sin embargo, todavía no es posible observar en sus aulas, los cambios metodológicos propios de la enseñanza-aprendizaje que propicie en los estudiantes, el desarrollo de capacidades, de competencias y comportamientos éticos que caracterizan una formación de calidad, que les permitan enfrentar la globalización económica y el incremento permanente de la información y el conocimiento, para beneficio propio y de la sociedad a la que pertenecen. El país requiere, con urgencia, del aporte de docentes universitarios , en todas las profesiones, capaces de crear las condiciones favorables para que los alumnos logren, en las aulas, alcanzar la comprensión funcional de los conocimientos, las habilidades y los comportamientos; así como, las experiencias necesarias para un ejercicio profesional creativo, innovativo, en permanente revisión teórica y aplicativa. Palabras Clave-Visión institucional,Competencias, Capacidades, Formación de calidad, Comprensión funcional, innovativo. 1. El profesional docente universitario Toda acción docente comporta una dimensión técnica, una dimensión política, una dimensión estética y una dimensión moral. No obstante, esta afirmación no implica que la acción docente sea buena o mala calidad. Por tanto, es necesario indagar qué características debe presentar cada una de las dimensiones de la acción docente para que podamos calificarla de competente y, en consecuencia, de buena calidad. (Azerëdo, 2003. p.73). Un profesionalque hace docencia en la universidad, tiene las capacidades y experiencia que lo hacen idóneo para ejercer dicha profesión; sin embargo, no hay esta misma seguridad en su actuación, para hacer docencia. Las prioridades de la educación y la 40 enseñanza, son más que una exposición de conocimientos o experiencias personales; apuntan a la formación integral del ser que se educa, a su desarrollo como persona y al logro de sus expectativas acuñadas en suproyecto de vida. Así también, la enseñanza prioriza el trabajo tutorial del docente, como guía en el proceso de aprendizaje, con el fin de conseguir al final, un profesional con autonomía intelectual y un alto grado metacognitivo. Ya no es, el docente universitario, sólo el expositor que hace gala de su "sabiduría" frente a un grupo de alumnos que lo escuchan y anotan apuntes en sus cuadernos. El docente del siglo XXI, con alumnos que desde niños manejan y dominan los "artefactos" de la era digital y están pendientes de las novedades que aparecen cada vez con más frecuencia, tiene que ponerse a tono y marchar al ritmo que le marcan sus alumnos. El docente universitario, tiene que aprovechar las tecnologías de la información y la comunicación y hablarles en su mismo "lenguaje" para que a través de sus habilidades capten la ciencia y las tecnologías de la profesión, no solamente de los libros sino que sepan ubicar, seleccionar, y utilizar las informaciones y transformarlas en conocimiento nuevo a través de la investigación. Las tareas de su actuación docente empiezan por la planeación de los aprendizajes, la selección de los contenidos científicos, los materiales y fuentes de información, capacidades y competencias que permitirán la adquisición de los conocimientos previstos, las actitudes y comportamientos para una sociedad democrática que se desarrolla dentro de una economía social de mercado. El profesional que asume la docencia universitaria, en cualesquiera de las carreras que ofrecen las universidades, se compromete con dos grandes responsabilidades:  Emplear métodos didácticos de enseñanza-aprendizaje referidos al Modelo Educativo Institucional; y,  Proporcionar la información científica y tecnológica actual de la profesión; y orientar la comprensión teórica y la aplicación de las mismas. Para el cumplimiento de este compromiso, está en la obligación moral de capacitarse, en teoría y métodos de enseñanza-aprendizaje universitarios; además, informarse sobre el modelo educativo institucional, que orienta el proceso educativo intencional de la universidad. Sin un modelo educativo, la universidad, no tiene una direccionalidad que permita a sus miembros confluir al logro de sus fines, tener características que la distingan de otras universidades y darles a sus egresados un sello particular de su formación humanística, científica y tecnológica. 2.La normatividad educativa peruana. Los países democráticos en el mundo, determinan las bases para el desarrollo de la educación en todos sus niveles de organización, a través de los consensos que se dan en sus respectivos Congresos y se concretan en normas legales. En el Perú, el proceso educativo, se desarrolla dentro de los siguientes parámetros normativos: * La Constitución Política del Perú (1993). * La Ley General de Educación (N°28044). * La Ley del SINEACE (N°28740) * La ley Universitaria (N° 23733) * El Estatuto de la Universidad. En ellos se encuentran los dispositivos legales que indican los fines y objetivos de la educación en general y de la educación universitaria en particular; y, también, en qué condiciones y cómo hacer realidad estas aspiraciones, de acuerdo a las circunstancias de cada región y lugar del país, visualizadas en su carácter flexible. 41 3.El modelo educativo universitario. A partir de esta normatividad, las universidades elaboran sus Modelos Educativos, teniendo en cuenta, además, otros referentes a los cuales responder: el contexto internacional y el contexto nacional. Del contexto internacional, reciben las tendencias educativas mundiales expuestas en Congresos llevados a cabo por organizaciones internacionales como la UNESCO, UNICEF, BM, y otros; los acuerdos de las reuniones y los compromisos que se asumen; pero también, la universidad responde a la sociedad dentro de cual actúa, con el propósito de liderar su desarrollo, atendiendo a sus demandas, necesidades y expectativas a través de sus funciones principales de: docencia, investigación y proyección social. En el modelo educativo, las universidades declaran los fundamentos filosóficos institucionales, los fundamentos pedagógicos, los principios y valores formativos compartidos, las competencias genéricas comprendidas en el Perfil Profesional, los lineamientos del diseño curricular adoptados por sus Facultades, las concepciones de aprendizaje, enseñanza, evaluación, coherentes con su enfoque pedagógico. Para el cumplimiento de su Misión, la universidad, a través de sus autoridades académicas, organiza los niveles de concreción del Modelo Educativo Institucional: * A nivel curricular, el Modelo asume las previsiones para el accionar pedagógico, es decir, se convierten las expectativas e intenciones educativas, en planes y proyectos que orientan el desarrollo de los procesos de enseñanza y aprendizaje a lo largo de toda la carrera universitaria. En un currículo, se pueden distinguir diferentes elementos: los propósitos, que atañen al sentido y la finalidad de la educación establecidos en la normatividad nacional; los contenidos de los aspectos científicos, tecnológicos y humanísticos seleccionados y señalados en el Perfil Profesional; La secuencia en el Plan de Estudios; las orientaciones metodológicas generales; los recursos; y, el sistema de evaluación de los aprendizajes. Estos elementos están concatenados de manera tal, que la reflexión sobre alguno de ellos, lleva a la reflexión sobre el elemento siguiente o aseguran la continuidad del anterior. Esta coherencia permite a los docentes planificar sus actividades en el nivel del cumplimiento del sílabo. * A nivel silabular, el Modelo se centra, específicamente, en los aprendizajes previstosa nivel de aula y de asignatura, en concordancia con el Perfil Profesional de la carrera. El docente, en la universidad, es el responsable del desarrollo y cumplimiento del sílabo; y, por lo tanto, de todo aquello que signifique cumplimiento de los objetivos formativos y de los objetivos informativos, a través del desarrollo y/o formación de capacidades y competencias genéricas y específicas de la profesión. 4.Las capacidades y competencias profesionales en la universidad. En el Perú, la Constitución Política del 93, señala, en cierta manera, la necesidad de una educación basada en competencias, al establecer en su Artículo 58°, la Economía Social de Mercado. En una economía de mercado, no sólo compiten los países, las empresas, también lo hacen las personas, los profesionales; por lo que, la universidad en su rol de formador, debió renovar sus currículos a partir de entonces. La Ley General de Educación, si marca en diferentes artículos, el concepto de competencia cuando se refiere a logros de aprendizaje. Así, por ejemplo: el Art. 9° Fines de la educación peruana. inc. a) ...así como el desarrollo de sus capacidades y habilidades para vincular su vida con el mundo del trabajo y para afrontar los incesantes cambios en la sociedad y el conocimiento. En el Art.16° Funciones del SINEACE, inc. d) Certifican y recertifican las competencias profesionales. Art. 29° Etapas del sistema Educativo. Inc. b) La Educación Superior está destinada a la investigación, creación y difusión de conocimientos; proyección a la comunidad; al logro de competencias profesionales de alto nivel, de acuerdo con la demanda y la necesidad del desarrollo sostenible del país. La Ley del SINEACE en su Art.5° Finalidad del SINEACE : ... recomienda acciones para superar las debilidades y carencias identificadas en los resultados de las autoevaluaciones 42 yevaluaciones externas, con el propósito de optimizar los factores que inciden en los aprendizajes y en el desarrollo de las destrezas y competencias necesarias para alcanzar mejores niveles de calificación profesional y desempeño laboral. A pesar de declarar en los respectivos documentos universitarios que el currículo de las Facultades está basado en competencias, todavía esta disposición, suscita discusiones entre los docentes, o simplemente, éstos optan por hacer lo de siempre en el aula. Al declarar una institución educativa la formación profesional basada en competencias, debe, también, asumir su filosofía, con un enfoque humanista; y por lo tanto, tomar en consideración los valores, actitudes, conocimientos y habilidades que permitan a las personas desempeñarse apropiadamente frente a la vida y al trabajo. Hablar de competencias no es hablar de cosas nuevas, desde siempre, el propósito de la educación, ha sido formar personas capaces (competentes) de valerse por sí mismas y afrontar situaciones laborales, profesionales y cotidianas. Sin embargo, debemos considerar que los tiempos no son los mismos, ni los contextos son iguales. No es lo mismo enfrentar situaciones en la Era Industrial que responder a demandas en la Era del Conocimiento. Los avances de las ciencias y las tecnologías de diversos tipos, al alcance de todas las edades, requieren de una mayor preparación de los docentes, desde inicial, hasta el posgrado. La decisión de trabajar la formación de profesionales en base a capacidades y competencias, requiere de un proceso progresivo de estudio y entendimiento, por parte de directivos y docentes, de la filosofía, teoría y práctica de las mismas, sus aspectos positivos y las críticas que se hacen alrededor de su aplicación en la educación superior; así como, de las experiencias y proyectos internacionales que llevan a cabo este enfoque, como por ejemplo: el Proyecto del Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior, El Proyecto Alfa Tuning de Latino América y otros. La Constitución Política del 93, cambió significativamente la educación en el Perú; sin embargo, como que no se enteraron en las universidades. Si el modelo económico social de mercado, cambia las funciones del Estado, en su vida económica y productiva, la universidad tenía que cambiar currículos para formar profesionales que respondan a esas circunstancias. Así mismo, tenían que modificarse los métodos y las estrategias didácticas para generar en los alumnos la formación de capacidades y competencias genéricas y especializadas, según cada profesión. Muy poco se hizo, sólo algunas universidades interpretaron esta alternativa., sin duda porque sus profesores, alternaron estudios en el extranjero y asimilaron sus métodos, sobre todo, orientados hacia la investigación. A pesar de todas las Reformas Educativas en el país, la universidad, no fue tocada, posiblemente por la autonomía académica de que goza. Esto va para bien o para mal, según lo entiendan las autoridades. Sin embargo, desde el año 2005, con la promulgación de la Ley del SINEACE (N°28740), se vienen implementando las etapas para la acreditación de las universidades del país. Algunas facultades de las universidades han cumplido con la primera etapa: la autoevaluación; otras, han preferido contratar organismos de países que ya pasaron por esto y tienen agencias acreditadoras. Un buen entendimiento en la universidad, permite a los directivos, trabajar un Plan Estratégico acorde con los requerimientos del país, en las funciones que le competen; y, en otros retos que debe asumir, en su condición de entidad promotora del conocimiento y del desarrollo social y económico. 5.Didáctica de la enseñanza-aprendizaje de competencias. El trabajo docente competente es un trabajo que beneficia. Es aquel trabajo en el que el docente pone en juego todas las dimensiones de su acción con el objetivo de obtener algo positivo para sí mismo, para los alumnos, para la sociedad. En él, emplea todos los 43 recursos que tiene a su disposición, recursos que están presentes o que se construyen o en su interior o en el entorno, y lo hace en forma crítica, consciente y comprometida con las necesidades concretas del contexto social, donde vive y desarrolla su labor. (Azeredo, 2003, p.84) La implantación del currículo basado en competencias, implica para universidades, dejar de insistir en las exposiciones frontales de los temas del sílabo, en la idea de que están "transmitiendo conocimiento", para pasar a formar o desarrollar métodos y estrategias, que permitan a los estudiantes aprender a buscar, seleccionar, analizar, comprender, sistematizar y aplicar con idoneidad la información y el conocimiento. Referencias bibliográficas. Ander-Egg, Ezequiel (2005) Debates y propuestas sobre la problemática educativa. Homo Sapiens Ediciones. Rosario. Santa Fe. Argentina. Azerëdo Ríos, Terezinha (2003) Comprender y enseñar. Editorial GRAÓ. Barcelona. Constitución Política (1993). Ley General de Educación (28044) Ley del SINEACE (28740) Ley Universitaria (23733) Maldonado García, Miguel A. (2005) Las Competencias, una opción de vida. Ecoe Ediciones. Bogotá. Molina Bogantes, Zaida (1999) Planeamiento didáctico. Ed. EUNED San José, Costa Rica. Tobón, Sergio, Rial Sánchez, A. y otros (2006) Competencias, calidad y educación superior. Cooperativa Editorial Magisterio. Bogotá. Zabalza Miguel A. (2006) Competencias docentes del profesorado universitario. NARCEA,S.A.Ediciones.Madrid. 44 PROCESO DE REESTRUCTURACIÓN DEL CURRÍCULO, FACTOR INFLUYENTE EN LA FORMACIÓN UNIVERSITARIA Dra. Rosa Puente Resumen Conceptuamos que el problema curricular es central y de carácter decisivo en las instituciones universitarias, porque el currículo encierra el sentido de la formación que queremos impartir a nuestros alumnos. Encierra la forma de actuación y la forma de vida que una universidad deja en sus egresados, la manera cómo ellos afrontarán los asuntos de su profesión y más que eso aún, la manera cómo verán a la sociedad, a su país, a los hombres de carne y hueso con los cuales han de convivir y a los cuales han de servir en el futuro (Peñaloza, Walter 2003). Hoy, nos encontramos en un proceso de acreditación, sin embargo poco o nada se hace con respecto a las estructuras curriculares, pareciera que nos hemos olvidado de nuestra tarea, nuestra misión: formar, y no hay otra forma de hacerlo que a través del currículo, de él dependen todos los otros aspectos: el personal, la infraestructura, la administración y la economía en la Universidad. Según los contenidos del currículo se seleccionarán a los profesores, aulas, talleres, laboratorios, es decir, todo aquello que hace posible una universidad. Ortega y Gasset sostiene con su impresionante frase que "Hacer cambios en las Universidades es como remover cementerios", es más cómodo seguir con lo mismo, todo cambio requiere un esfuerzo, tiempo, y lo más importante cambio de paradigmas. En el presente trabajo se plantean procesos de reestructuración curricular con nueve fases o momentos que orientarán a toda la comunidad universitaria hacia la calidad en la formación profesional. Palabras clave: currículo, formación, calidad, acreditación 45 Hacer cambios en las Universidades es como remover cementerios», esta frase de Ortega y Gasset grafica lo difícil que resulta la innovación en la educación superior. Las rutinas ya establecidas, la tradición acuñada por tantos años en los estilos docentes, la raigambre positivista que muchas veces consolida una postura rígida del profesor, son algunos de los obstáculos que dificultan la innovación en la educación universitaria. La enseñanza tradicional que se sigue manteniendo con gran fuerza como el único método didáctico en muchas universidades, por otra parte, el avance tecnológico y la interconexión de las ciencias hacen que la transmisión oral como única vía, si bien puede ser muy eficiente no es necesariamente la más adecuada para generar aprendizajes conexos y complejos. En consecuencia el uso de simuladores y metodologías que generan procesos sistémicos de aprendizajes son cada vez más necesarios de aplicar. Se une a lo anterior la velocidad del cambio científico y tecnológico. Esta situación obliga a un cuestionamiento severo de las estrategias curriculares vigentes y plantea la necesidad de establecer un proceso de educación permanente con currículos que dejen siempre abierta la posibilidad de una continua actualización. Los cambios que se realizan en las organizaciones no radican tanto en determinar cuáles deben ser las funciones de la institución, pues estas ya están contenidas claramente en su ley o estatutos, sino en buscar las formas de cumplirlas con eficacia y eficiencia. El caso específico de la Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de Ica (1998) con la Comisión Reorganizadora que promovió la reforma institucional de manera enérgica los aspectos administrativos, académicos y económicos. Este entorno político de reforma favoreció las decisiones de cambio a nivel de facultades y escuelas profesionales, generando mejores condiciones para el desarrollo entre los diversos estamentos y organismos de la universidad. La planificación estratégica fue una de las herramientas fundamentales para el cambio, a diferencia de la planificación tradicional, ésta planificación tiene como requisito el involucramiento de los niveles intermedios y operativos tanto para la definición como para el ajuste de los objetivos y de las estrategias organizacionales (Roel, Santiago 1996). El proceso de planificación estratégica de la Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de Ica fue producto de una reflexión colectiva (Instituciones y Organizaciones de todos los sectores del departamento de Ica) entorno a los cuales se plantearon los mecanismos para superar las carencias institucionales, respetando las características propias de la universidad y reduciendo los riesgos que implicó introducir nuevas formas de gestión. En virtud de la problemática de la formación profesional, enfrentada por la institución, y en concordancia con los objetivos que se planteó la administración, se asumió la responsabilidad y la decisión de promover un programa que reestructure el currículo en la Universidad, que contribuya sustancialmente en la calidad de la formación profesional en las diferentes facultades de la universidad. En consecuencia, se procedió a diseñar y construir un proceso específico de reestructuración del currículo teniendo como referente metodológico la reingeniería de procesos y algunas características de la calidad total, pasar del nivel cualitativo y asegurar con la calidad total la permanencia de la mejora de los índices de calidad. Esto permitió enfrentar dos grandes retos: establecer en el corto tiempo canales de participación que se involucren a los directivos y docentes con el proceso de reestructuración del currículo, y por otra parte, capacitarlos para entender y utilizar el modelo de Reestructuración Curricular en la organización de su propio trabajo de revisión y ajuste de los planes curriculares de las carreras profesionales. El referente metodológico de la reingeniería de procesos orientó el trabajo de rediseño de los planes curriculares en base a procesos y no a partir del principio de la división del trabajo por funciones o tareas (Hammer, Michel (1992).Este principio consiste en dividir el trabajo de la organización en diversas áreas o departamentos, especializándolos en cada una de las pequeñas partes que integran el proceso, fraccionando así la labor del personal. Si bien la división del trabajo históricamente permitió resultados sorprendentes, con el tiempo esta situación generó diversos problemas al interior de las organizaciones que fue necesario promover una serie de supervisiones, controles etc.; en estricto sentido, no enriquece ni modifica su producto 46 final, contando con poca capacidad para adaptarse a su entorno, generando un alejamiento cada vez más del logro de los objetivos institucionales. Similar situación se produce en el caso de nuestras universidades nacionales, enredada en sus propios trabajos y conflictos organizacionales, forma profesionales con planes curriculares con más de 15 años de antigüedad sin tener en cuenta las exigencias del desarrollo científico tecnológico y las necesidades de la dinámica social. A partir de esta problemática, la reingeniería propone abandonar el enfoque del trabajo por funciones y reorganizarse de acuerdo a sus procesos esenciales; es decir, en el caso de la universidad, la formación de profesionales, el desarrollo de la investigación, y la promoción y extensión de la universidad a la sociedad. El proceso de reestructuración se desarrolló a través de una intensa capacitación de directivos y docentes, promoviendo la participación en seminarios de análisis de las bases y fundamentos científicos, doctrinarios y tecnológicos del currículo, talleres prácticos para el diagnóstico, el rediseño y ajuste de los planes curriculares respectivos. En el proceso sistemático de rediseño del currículo, se promovió una estrategia institucional y la aplicación de una metodología participante que compromete a todos los directivos, docentes, estudiantes y personal en general de la universidad, y de profesionales, egresados, instituciones profesionales, colegiados, empresas y la comunidad. Se consideraron las siguientes fases: Fase 1 Preliminar, se presenta los fundamentos del cambio, se identifica y prioriza las oportunidades para el cambio. Se establece el compromiso institucional con el cambio. Fase 2 Organización y Plan, se determina la Comisión Central de Currículo a nivel universitario, las comisiones de currículo a nivel de Escuela Profesional, los organismos de apoyo técnico (Equipo de Asesoramiento Técnico) y apoyo administrativo (secretaria, logística, etc.). Fase 3 Promoción y Difusión de la Información, científica, tecnológica y doctrinaria sobre currículo. Se define el modelo curricular. Se establece una línea de capacitación: con los seminarios de análisis y discusión. Esta acción se realiza a nivel de directivos y docentes preferentemente. Fase 4 Análisis y Diagnóstico Curricular, se establece a nivel de las Comisiones de Currículo de Escuela Profesionales, los talleres de análisis y diagnóstico de los planes curriculares respectivos se tiene como referente el modelo de currículo integral. Fase 5 Estructuración del Currículo, se determina una estructura básica curricular común, que permita articular con los componentes curriculares hacia el logro de los perfiles profesionales postulados de las carreras respectivas. Los talleres de estructuración curricular se desarrollarán primero a nivel de directivos y Comisión Central; y luego a nivel de Comisiones de Escuelas Profesionales. Se formula el perfil del egresado, se clasifican los componentes curriculares vigentes por las áreas de formación, y de acuerdo a las exigencias del perfil del egresado propuesto, se orientan los componentes curriculares vigentes hacia una confrontación estructural, Este análisis genera una serie de decisiones sobre los componentes curriculares en vigencia: el ajuste o la sustitución. Fase 6 Los Planes Curriculares, en esta fase se elabora los planes curriculares en función de la estructura básica del currículo logrado en la fase 5. Los talleres se orientan por los aspectos normativos académicos y de acreditación. Se elaboran las nuevas normas en relación con el modelo y las exigencias del desarrollo del plan curricular. Se recomienda la elaboración de tablas de equivalencia con el plan o planes que han estado en vigencia, de tal forma que progresivamente funcione solo un plan curricular: el reajustado. Fase 7 Proyectos de implementación y funcionamiento de los planes curriculares revisados. En esta fase las Comisiones de Currículo de cada Escuela Profesional elaboraron el proyecto de implementación y funcionamiento de los planes curriculares reajustados estableciendo un proceso de conversión gradual de los planes de estudio vigentes, promoviendo programas de capacitación y actualización de docentes sobre la doctrina curricular y la especialidad; programas de selección 47 de nuevos docentes, de ajuste y preparación de los sílabos, los horarios, incorporar las nuevas normas de evaluación de aprendizaje y del trabajo académico determinando los requerimientos de personal administrativo y docente, de materiales, medios e infraestructura para el funcionamiento. Esta actividad está enmarcada por un conjunto de normas de implementación y funcionamiento, coordinada y emitida por la Comisión Central de Currículo, con aprobación del Consejo Universitaria. Fase 8 Formulación del Sistema de Evaluación Curricular. En esta fase se establecen las normas que regularán el proceso de evaluación de los planes curriculares, se fija los principios y las pautas orientadoras del proceso. Fase 9 Formulación del Proyecto de Política y Doctrina Curricular. En esta fase se elaboran los lineamientos orientadores de política y doctrina del proceso de reestructuración del currículo que permitirán caracterizar la naturaleza continua y permanente del perfeccionamiento y desarrollo académico en la universidad. Esta alternativa de aplicación curricular permitirá promover un cambio en la concepción de la educación a impartir a los estudiantes en los diferentes niveles de la educación peruana garantizando una sólida formación humanística y por ende integral. Bibliografía Hammer, Michel (1992) Reingeniería. Editorial Limusa, México Peñaloza, Walter (1995) El curriculum integral, Editorial de la Universidad de Zulia, Venezuela Roel, Santiago (1996) Estrategias para un gobierno competitivo. Monterrey Nuevo León. México 48 LA EVALUACIÓN COMO EJE TRANSVERSAL DE LA CALIDAD EDUCATIVA Laura Esponda Versace Resumen La evaluación en la educación superior se debe considerar un eje transversal porque ésta se encuentra presente a lo largo de toda la vida académica del estudiante y lo seguirá acompañando en su vida profesional y personal. Es imprescindible hacer uso de las variadas técnicas e instrumentos de evaluación: Portafolios, entrevista, pruebas situacionales, rúbricas, escalas, estudio de casos, observación, entre otras. No dando prioridad a las pruebas escritas como instrumento infalible de evaluación. Palabras clave Evaluación, calidad educativa, competencia, técnicas, instrumentos. Introducción La evaluación es un proceso permanente en nuestra vida, evaluamos todo el tiempo; las actividades cotidianas, los proyectos profesionales, los logros familiares, los aprendizajes; ¿Con qué fin? Con el fin de mejorar, de lograr la eficiencia, eficacia, la calidad, la excelencia. En estos tiempos la sociedad exige calidad; en el desempeño profesional, en los resultados de la educación en todos los niveles: básica, tecnológica y universitaria. El proceso de evaluación funge como un eje transversal en todas las actividades que realiza el hombre del Siglo XXI. La evaluación va a asegurar la calidad educativa y profesional en la medida que se utilicen sus resultados para mejorar los logros en los diferentes niveles de la educación y en el desempeño profesional. En la actualidad es utilizado y conocido el término competencia tanto en el proceso de aprendizaje como en el desarrollo profesional. Por ello es importante delimitar el término competencia como "la capacidad de una persona para combinar conocimientos, habilidades y actitudes, con el fin de realizar eficientemente una actividad". (Benites 2012:103). Evaluación La evaluación es un proceso dinámico, sistemático para obtener información, formular juicios de valor, tomar decisiones respecto a los logros adquiridos. La evaluación debe orientarse a mejorar los logros en los aprendizajes, las competencias profesionales, las actividades cotidianas. 49 Calidad educativa La calidad educativa se refiere al logro del nivel óptimo de desarrollo de las capacidades de los estudiantes que se evidencian en su realización integral logrando el bienestar y la resolución de problemas. La realización integral se refiere al desarrollo del pensamiento lógico, el pensamiento crítico, la producción intelectual, la resolución de problemas, la autonomía, el tabaco cooperativo, la socialización. La calidad educativa no solo se debe lograr en los resultados del aprendizaje, también se debe evaluar la calidad de los currículos, de las estrategias, de los instrumentos, de los recursos, de la infraestructura, la administración y organización de una institución. Evaluación de aprendizajes en el nivel superior En un mundo que experimenta cambios rápidos, se percibe la necesidad de una nueva visión y un nuevo paradigma de la enseñanza superior, que tendrá que estar más orientada al estudiante, a formar por competencias , a desarrollar la capacidad de aprender a emprender, a construir su propio conocimiento. Se han incorporado nuevas estrategias en el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje del nivel superior como son: el Aprendizaje Basado en Problemas (ABP), el estudio de casos, el trabajo cooperativo, entre otros. Por ello es necesario que los docentes empleen nuevas estrategias, técnicas e instrumentos de evaluación que proporcionen información veraz y útil sobre los logros de aprendizaje obtenidos por los estudiantes. Funciones de la Evaluación  Función Pedagógica, Es la razón de ser de la evaluación. Permite reflexionar y revisar los procesos de aprendizaje y de enseñanza con el fin de optimizarlos. Contribuye a que el estudiante se plantee mayores exigencias, desarrolle un trabajo eficiente, defienda y argumente sus explicaciones, lo que favorece la formación de convicciones y de hábitos de estudio, el desarrollo del sentido de la responsabilidad y la autoevaluación, además de contribuir a desarrollar una motivación positiva por los estudios.  Función Social: Se asume el compromiso de desarrollo integral y social, determinar qué estudiantes han logrado el progreso necesario en sus aprendizajes (capacidades, conocimientos, actitudes), para otorgarles la certificación o constatación del logro de determinados aprendizajes al término de un período, curso o ciclo, para la promoción o no a grados inmediatos superiores.  Función de Comprobación o de Información: Informa sobre el logro de los objetivos de enseñanza, el grado en que se cumplen. Si la evaluación es adecuadamente elaborada y aplicada. Sus resultados informan sobre el aprendizaje logrado por los estudiantes (evaluación del aprendizaje). Este aspecto permite verificar si estos han adquirido la preparación requerida conforme a los objetivos a cumplir.  Función Formativa: En toda su extensión, como atributo y razón de ser del sistema de evaluación del aprendizaje y que subsume las restantes funciones, implica que sirva para corregir, regular, mejorar y producir aprendizajes. El carácter formativo está más en la intención con la que se realiza y en el uso de la información, que en las técnicas o procedimientos que se emplean, sin restar importancia a estos últimos. En el proceso de evaluación se deben considerar las etapas: evaluación inicial, de proceso y final. 50  Evaluación inicial o evaluación diagnóstica recoge información sobre los aprendizajes previos que traen los estudiantes sobre la asignatura, determinado los que son débiles o no se presentan.  Evaluación de proceso o formativa, se efectúa durante todo el proceso de enseñanza aprendizaje y proporciona información sobre los avances y dificultades de los estudiantes con la finalidad de reajustar y mejorar el proceso educativo. El docente debe utilizar estrategias, técnicas e instrumentos de evaluación acorde a los indicadores que se van a evaluar, no siempre se deben aplicar las tradicionales pruebas escritas o test de evaluación.  Evaluación final, se realiza al término del desarrollo del curso o asignatura, al final del ciclo, semestre o año; para determinar si se lograron los objetivos o competencias propuestos en el sílabo. Tipos de Evaluación Según el sujeto evaluador: Lo general ha sido que el docente era la persona encargada y autorizada en evaluar a los alumnos, actualmente nos encontramos en una evaluación por competencias donde la participación del alumno es dinámica , significativa, siendo ellos también parte importante en la acción de evaluar. Autoevaluación Es el proceso mediante el cual el alumno participa directamente en la evaluación , valorando su actuación y desempeño de acuerdo a los indicadores de evaluación. Reconoce sus posibilidades, limitaciones y cambios necesarios para mejorar su aprendizaje. La Autoevaluación permite al alumno:  Emitir juicios de valor sobre sí mismo en función de ciertos criterios de evaluación o indicadores previamente establecidos.  Estimular la retroalimentación constante de sí mismo y de otras personas para mejorar su proceso de aprendizaje.  Participar de una manera crítica en la construcción de su aprendizaje. Coevaluación III UNIDAD SIGUIENTE AUTOEVALUACIÓ N 51 Es un proceso mediante el cual los alumnos por medio de la interacción social valorizan con sus pares teniendo en cuenta criterios e indicadores los aprendizajes logrados por los miembros del grupo. La Coevaluación permite al alumno y al docente:  Identificar los logros personales y grupales.  Fomentar la participación, reflexión y crítica constructiva ante situaciones de aprendizaje.  Opinar sobre su actuación dentro del grupo.  Desarrollar actitudes que se orienten hacia la integración del grupo.  Mejorar su responsabilidad e identificación con el trabajo.  Emitir juicios valorativos acerca de otros en un ambiente de libertad, compromiso y responsabilidad. Heteroevaluación Es el proceso mediante el cual el profesor valora los logros alcanzados por los estudiantes en función de los objetivos, competencias e indicadores propuestos. Es el tipo de evaluación que con mayor frecuencia se aplica. 1. Técnicas e instrumentos de evaluación en educación superior Si la tendencia en educación superior es no utilizar exclusivamente la clase magistral como estrategia de enseñanza aprendizaje, los exámenes escritos puramente teóricos no se deben utilizar como herramienta principal de evaluación. Observación,Es una técnica de evaluación informal que se utiliza para darnos cuenta cuando los alumnos aprenden, de lo que dicen o hacen. Puede ser en forma incidental o intencional asistemática o sistemática, abierta o focalizada, en contextos naturales o creados especialmente.  La observación sistemática es aquella en que el observador tiene objetivos definidos y ha decidido que aspectos evaluará. Se emplea como instrumentos la lista de chequeo, las escalas, diarios de clase. Guías de observación  L a observaci ón asistemát ica es aquella que se refiere a las experienc ias casuales, donde no existen objetivos definidos, en ocasiones se produce al azar y el observador registrar el mayor número de datos que puede. La entrevista 52 La entrevista es una técnica que propicia la recolección de datos de naturaleza cuantitativa y cualitativa. Puede ser individual y grupal. Requiere planificación y tiene un propósito. Existen dos clases: estructurada y no estructurada "Lafourcade citado por (Delgado2012:200) sostiene que durante la entrevista no solamente obtenemos información de la persona entrevistada, sino que también podemos observar el tono de voz, los gestos, inhibiciones, etc." Pruebas situacionales Las pruebas situacionales se utilizan para evaluar el grado en que los aprendices son capaces de poner en práctica los conocimientos, las habilidades y actitudes desarrolladas y trabajadas en una asignatura durante un período (semanas, meses, ciclo). Tipos de pruebas situacionales:  Ejercicios de ejecución Laboral, la prueba debe basarse en las condiciones simuladas de trabajo que desempeñará en su ejercicio profesional: recursos, espacios, estrategias, Se debe utilizar como instrumentos listas de control o chequeo y fichas de observación de acuerdo a los criterios que se van a evaluar.  Estudio de casos, se elabora una situación problemática referida a su futuro desempeño profesional para que se analice y se proponga una solución. Se puede realizar en forma individual o grupal. El caso se puede presentar escrito, en forma de dramatización o en un video. Se desarrolla el pensamiento divergente, la sustentación de hipótesis, la resolución de problemas.  Bandeja de Entrada o "in básquet", consiste en gestionar una serie de documentos (informes, memorias, proyectos, resoluciones, gráficos, cartas, etc.) según la carrera. El estudiante debe analizar y evaluar el contenido de los documentos y decidir la forma que se pueden gestionar. Se puede utilizar en las diferentes profesiones: derecho, educación, contabilidad etc. Portafolio El portafolio es una colección o recopilación de documentos que describen el desempeño del estudiante en su proceso de aprendizaje.Los documentos que se colocan en el portafolio deben tener una reflexión del estudiante sobre el trabajo realizado destacando su esfuerzo, sus dificultades, debilidades y fortalezas. Asimismo debe tener el comentario del docente, de sus compañeros. La Universidad de las Américas (UDLA) propone a sus estudiantes tres secciones que denomina espacios para elaborar su propia carpeta de competencias en soporte digital, organizadas de la siguiente manera : ( Del Pozo 2012:39)  Espacio Personal Información personal: en esta sección se presenta un pequeño cuadro que muestra la información básica del alumno como su nombre, carrera, correo electrónico, foto y fecha de ingreso a la universidad. Acerca de mi persona: esta sección corresponde a una pequeña biografía del estudiante, de modo que pueda realizar una descripción de sí mismo. Áreas de interés: en esta sección el alumno puede colocar la descripción de las áreas, temas o actividades que son de interés para él. -Mis documentos compartidos: en este espacio podrá compartir cualquier documento (Word, Excel o Power Point) que considere importante mostrar en el portafolio. Mis imágenes compartidas: podrá compartir cualquier imagen o fotografía que considere importante mostrar en su portafolio.  Espacio profesional Currículo vitae del estudiante. 53 CRITERIO/ VALORACIÓN MUY COMPETENTE COMPETENTE ACEPTABLE NO ACEPTABLE Contenido Demuestra que es un experto sobre el tema. Demuestra buen conocimiento del tema. Demuestra buen conocimiento sobre partes del tema. No parece entender muy bien el tema. Comprensión del tema El alumno contesta con precisión casi todas las preguntas planteadas sobre el tema por sus compañeros. El alumno contesta con precisión la mayoría de las preguntas planteadas sobre el tema por sus compañeros. El alumno contesta unas pocas preguntas planteadas sobre el tema por sus compañeros. El alumno no pude contestar las preguntas planteadas sobre el tema por sus compañeros de clase. Desarrollo del Tema Se mantiene en el tema todo el tiempo (100%) Se mantiene en el tema la mayor parte (99-75%) del tiempo. Se mantiene en el tema algunas veces (7450%) Es difícil decir cuál era el tema. Vocabulario Usa vocabulario apropiado para la audiencia. Aumenta el vocabulario de la audiencia definiendo las palabras que podrían ser nuevas. Usa vocabulario apropiado para la audiencia. Incluye 1-2 palabras que podrían ser nuevas para la mayor parte de la audiencia, pero no las define Usa vocabulario apropiado para la audiencia. No incluye vocabulario que podría ser nuevo para la audiencia. Usa (5 o más) palabras o frases que nos son entendidas por la audiencia. Habla claramente Habla claramente todo el tiempo. Su dicción es buena. Habla claramente todo el tiempo (100-95%), pero con una dicción mejorable. Habla claramente la mayor parte del tiempo (94-75%) La dicción es A menudo habla entre dientes o no se le puede entender o tiene una inadecuada 54 - - - - Prácticas profesionales: en este espacio el estudiante documentará sus prácticas profesionales. Tesis: en esta sección aparecerá las tesis, tesina o proyecto de investigación, si los tuviese. Mejores ensayos y trabajos escritos: el alumno podrá compartir cada uno de los ensayos, trabajos, sesiones o actividades simuladas, materiales diseñados de las asignaturas que cursa.  Espacio Académico Mis asignaturas: se tendrá acceso a los portales o áreas en las que el alumno se encuentre inscrito, así como un espacio donde colocará los trabajos que realice en cada asignatura. Otras actividades y programas: esta herramienta funciona como un blog donde el estudiante podrá agregar las experiencias que tiene al participar en exposiciones y congresos, equipos representativos, asociaciones estudiantiles, experiencias internacionales (intercambios y visitas a otras universidades), voluntariado y otras. Rúbrica La rúbrica es un instrumento que se utiliza para medir y describir cualitativamente el desarrollo de una tarea concreta. Las escalas de valoración suelen tener cuatro puntos: Muy bueno – Bueno – RegularDeficiente ; Muy Satisfactorio Satisfactorio – Satisfactorio con recomendaciones – Insatisfactorio. Diseño de una rúbrica: Determinar qué aprendizaje se va a medir. Decidir los niveles de valoración. Describir los niveles de desempeño específicos de los criterios que se van a utilizar para evaluar la tarea. Construir la tabla Fuente:(Del Pozo 2012:68) REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS: Benites, María y Benites, Jorge. (2012). Efecto Dominó en la gestión de la educalidad. Lima: Benart editores. Castillo, Santiago.(2008). Compromisos de la evaluación educativa. Madrid, Pearson Educación S.A. Delgado, Keneth. (2012). Aprendizaje y evaluación.Lima, Editorial san Marcos. Del Pozo, José. (2012). Competencias profesionales. Herramientas de evaluación:elportafolios, la rúbrica y las pruebas situacionales. Madrid ,Narcea ediciones. Sánchez, María Paz. (2010). Técnicas docentes y sistemas de evaluación en educación superior. Madrid, Narcea ediciones. Magister en Investigación y Docencia Universitaria (Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega), Licenciada en Educación Inicial ( Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega), Especialista en Didáctica Universitaria, docente de maestría en las asignaturas de Enseñanza Universitaria y Gestión Educativa en la Escuela de Posgrado de la UIGV. mejorable. pronunciación. COEVALUACIÓN 55 REDES EDUCATIVAS RURALES DR. WALTER RABANAL SALAS Este artículo es una síntesis del documento "La Red Educativa Rural, Modelo de Gestión Educativa Descentralizada y Participativa" del autor Walter Rabanal Salas, docente de la Escuela de Postgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Antecedentes. Las redes educativas rurales tienen como antecedente a los Núcleos Educativos Campesinos (NEC), que se crearon y funcionaron en el país en la década de los 40 y 60 del siglo pasado. En aquel periodo, durante el gobierno del Presidente José Luis Bustamante y Rivero y siendo Ministro de Educación el ilustre indigenista Luis E. Valcárcel, los NEC funcionaron como un modelo de gestión descentralizado y participativo en el área rural que se extendió por la región andina, desde Puno hasta Cajamarca, llegando a funcionar un total de 123 NEC, en aproximadamente 25 años de experiencia educativa. Núcleos Educativos Campesinos. NEC Fue un modelo de gestión educativa descentralizada y participativa para el área rural, como respuesta del gobierno de Bustamante y Rivero (1945-1948), a la escasez de escuelas en el área andina, por cuya razón, los estados de analfabetismo en aquellas zonas eran muy altos (aproximadamente el 60% de la población, según una de las conclusiones del Censo Nacional de Población de 1941) Para encarar este problema, el gobierno de entonces, dispuso la creación de los primeros NEC en la región del altiplano (Puno) y en el Valle del Vilcanota (Cusco), cuyas principales características fueron las siguientes a) Cada NEC contaba con una escuela matriz que ofrecía educación primaria para atender a niñas y niños campesinos de la zona. La escuela matriz se articulaba con las escuelas de su entorno, que solo ofrecían los primeros grados de estudios. b) La escuela matriz funcionaba como sede del núcleo, porque contaba con adecuada infraestructura física, biblioteca escolar, farmacia, campos deportivos, comedor escolar, tienda escolar, peluquería, chacras escolares y ambientes para la crianza y estudio de animales menores de la zona. 56 c) Las niñas y niños campesinos que asistían a la escuela matriz utilizaban todos sus servicios como elementos de su proceso de aprendizaje. La educación campesina que se implementó en los NEC, tuvo una marcada orientación hacia el trabajo productivo, por la ligazón que tenía con la agricultura y ganadería como actividades económicas predominantes de la zona. d) En la escuela matriz las niñas y niños campesinos estudiaban sus cursos del programa curricular de lunes a sábado, en el turno de las mañana y por la tardes, junto a sus profesores y padres de familia, realizaban sus prácticas escolares en el huerto y la chacra escolar, en actividades denominadas "faenas comunales". e) El programa curricular y los materiales educativos fueron elaborados por los profesores que trabajaban en la escuela matriz y por tanto, respondían a la realidad cultural del medio. Los contenidos del currículo tenían una marcada orientación hacia el campo agropecuario, siendo zonas rurales, era la alternativa más aconsejable. f) Para ser director y docente en la escuela matriz, era requisito indispensable, tener estudios de capacitación en #Salcedo#, que fue un centro de especialización en educación campesina que funcionaba en la Provincia de Chucuito. Departamento de Puno. g) En la estructura orgánica de la escuela matriz, funcionaba el Consejo Comunal presidido por el director del NEC e integrado por los presidentes de las comunidades campesinas circundantes. Como órgano de participación, el Consejo Comunal, tomaba las decisiones en materia educativa. h) La escuela matriz funcionaba como unidad ejecutora de presupuesto para aspectos de administración de personal y uso de bienes y servicios en el ámbito del núcleo. Los Núcleos Educativos Campesinos representan en la historia de la educación rural del país, la puesta en ejecución de un modelo de gestión educativa descentralizada y participativa para las áreas rurales. Funciono con singular éxito en la zona andina, es especial en los departamentos de Cusco y Puno. La razón por la cual los NEC tuvieron más éxito en Cusco y Puno, respecto a los siete departamentos andinos donde también se organizaron (Apurímac, Ayacucho, Junín, 57 Huancavelica, Pasco, Huánuco y Cajamarca), estuvo en las raíces, valores y principios de solidaridad, reciprocidad y ayuda mutua que caracterizaron siempre a las comunidades campesinas ubicadas en el Valle del Vilcanota y la región del altiplano. Estas comunidades campesinas se han caracterizado por ser organizaciones solidarias con principios y tradiciones ancestrales. El Ayni, la Minka y el Ayllu, son algunas de sus formas organizativas, que utilizaron desde épocas remotas y pese al tiempo transcurrido, se mantienen aún vigentes, porque representan las raíces de cada comunidad campesina Con la creación de las primeras Direcciones Regionales de Educación, como órganos desconcentrados del Ministerio de Educación, en la década del 60, paradójicamente se inició la desactivación de los NEC. Así culmino la experiencia más valiosa de gestión educativa rural que se organizó en el país, y nunca el Ministerio de Educación ni los gobiernos regionales, han tenido la capacidad de replicar este modelo en las áreas rurales. Núcleos Educativos Comunales La reforma educativa de los años 70 intento revalorar la filosofía de los Núcleos Educativos Campesinos, con la denominación de Núcleos Educativos Comunales, sin embargo no hubo éxito en esta gestión, debido a que la reforma que se aplicó entre 1972 y 1975, empezó a desmontarse en 1976, debido a los cambios políticos que se produjeron en la conducción del movimiento militar que gobernó entre 1968 y 1980. La llamada "segunda fase" del gobierno militar que tomo el poder en agosto de 1975, desactivo no solo la reforma educativa, sino todas las demás reformas que se llevaron a cabo entre 1968 y 1975, bajo la conducción del General Velasco Alvarado. Redes Educativas Rurales Con el propósito de recuperar la filosofía de los Núcleos Educativos Campesinos, en el 2002 se creó el "Programa de Educación para las Áreas Rurales", (PEAR) cuyo financiamiento corrió a cargo del Banco Mundial, mediante un préstamo del gobierno por aproximadamente 100 millones de dólares reembolsables en 20 años. Para la ejecución del PEAR se focalizaron siete regiones: Amazonas, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, Piura, Puno y San Martin. Al interior de cada región, se focalizaron a la vez, una o dos provincias con marcada área rural. 58 El PEAR tuvo cuatro componentes básicos. La propuesta pedagógica destinada a formular el diseño curricular para cada una de las regiones en base a su realidad regional, la educación secundaria a distancia, la construcción de módulos de infraestructura en cada una de las provincias implicadas en el proyecto y la propuesta de gestión, mediante la creación y organización de las redes educativas rurales. Criterios para crear las redes educativas rurales a) Focalización de las zonas de intervención, teniendo en cuenta los vínculos históricos, culturales y económicos de las comunidades campesinas, donde se instalarían las redes educativas, analizando los sistemas productivos y circuitos de comercialización entre comunidades rurales. b) El ámbito territorial de una red educativa puede comprender una cuenca, microcuenca, un valle, una meseta, teniendo en cuenta el factor lingüístico. c) El distrito como unidad geográfica puede ser un referente para crear la red educativa. Al interior de un distrito se puede crear una o más redes educativas, dependiendo de su extensión y características culturales. d) Las vías y medios de comunicación entre las poblaciones rurales, son elementos de integración que deben tomarse en cuenta el diseñar el ámbito de la red educativa. e) El ámbito de la red educativa debe tener una extensión promedio, para que los actores educativos que trabajen en ella puedan tener facilidades en su desplazamiento. No ser muy extensa para evitar problemas de comunicación ni muy pequeña, para no caer en problemas de atomización. f) Cada red educativa rural debe estar constituida como promedio, por 10 centros educativos, para que las tareas de monitoreo y supervisión cumplan su propósito. Con estos criterios se determinó que en cada una de las siete regiones seleccionadas, se organicen 10 redes educativas (70 en total) como meta del componente gestión del PEAR. Organización de la red educativa rural. a) El órgano rector de la red educativa rural es el centro base, ubicado en un sector del ámbito territorial que ofrece las mejores condiciones de infraestructura física, equipamiento y servicios educativos. b) El centro base debe tener áreas y superficies de terreno para desarrollar actividades productivas e instalar servicios conexos para desarrollar proyectos educativos específicos. 59 c) Por sus características físicas, el centro base debe ser un colegio secundario de la localidad o una escuela primaria polidocente que atiende todos los grados de este nivel educativo y que cuente con instalaciones pedagógicas básicas. d) El centro base está dirigido por un coordinador que tiene el apoyo pedagógico de un docente para el área de comunicación, uno para el área de matemática y un tercero, para atender el área productiva e) Articulados al centro base, están las escuelas unidocentes (que cuentan solo con un docente para atender los primeros grados de la educación primaria) y las escuelas multigrado (que cuentan con dos docentes para atender los seis grados de la educación primaria). En las zonas rurales así como en la frontera y selva del país, las escuelas primaria generalmente son unidocentes o multigrado y están ubicadas en las comunidades campesinas andinas y en las comunidades nativas de la amazonia. f) La red educativa rural cuenta con un comité de desarrollo educativo, presidido por el coordinador del centro base e integrado por un docente que representa a cada una de las escuelas articuladas al centro base. El comité de desarrollo educativo es responsable de formular el proyecto educativo de la red, para ser ejecutado por cada una de las escuelas que la integran. Procedimiento para implementar la red educativa rural a) La red educativa rural fue el componente de gestión del PEAR, por tanto, su implementación estuvo a cargo de la coordinación general del proyecto que se instaló en el Ministerio de Educación en el periodo 2002.2005. La coordinación general del proyecto estuvo a cargo de un funcionario designado por la alta dirección e integrado por directores generales de las áreas pedagógicas y de gestión. La coordinación general del proyecto contaba con el apoyo técnico de un equipo de consultores, expertos en formulación y evaluación de proyectos educativos b) En cada dirección regional de educación y unidad de gestión educativa rural donde se ejecutó el proyecto, se conformaron equipos de educación rural encargados de las tareas de sensibilización y difusión del proyecto en las zonas de intervención así como del monitoreo, acompañamiento y supervisión correspondiente. c) Los equipos de educación rural regional y local con asesoramiento de especialistas de la sede central del Ministerio de Educación, se encargaron de focalizar la red 60 educativa, dimensionando los ámbitos de aplicación y proponiendo el centro base de cada red, así como las escuelas integrantes d) Definido el centro base y sus escuelas integrantes, se desarrolló un programa de capacitación del personal, para involucrar a los profesores en los temas pedagógicos y de gestión. e) Cumplidas estas actividades, se instalaron las redes educativas rurales de acuerdo a una programación específica en cada una de las siete regiones seleccionadas. Lecciones aprendidas. Los proyectos ejecutados por el Ministerio de Educación y en general por otros organismos del aparato del Estado, tienen como característica común, el manejo centralizado de los recursos, decisiones y actividades del proyecto, de tal manera que estos se diluyen en una vorágine interminable de trámites y procedimientos burocráticos, que retardan la ejecución del proyecto o simplemente lo hacen inviable. El PEAR ha transitado por esos mismos caminos, por esa razón, las metas fijadas para la primera etapa, no obtuvieron los resultados esperados. Según la estrategia trazada, el proyecto debía realizarse en tres etapas. La primera entre el 2002 y el 2005, fue considerada como la etapa de implementación del proyecto, la segunda entre el 2006 al 2009, como expansión del proyecto y la tercera entre el 2010 y 2014, como consolidación del proyecto. En el caso del PEAR, solo se culminó con la primera etapa, pues el 2006 por el cambio de gobierno, se dispuso el cierre del proyecto. Una vez más, proyectos educativos para las áreas rurales, destinados a cerrar las enormes brechas de inequidad entre la educación urbana y rural, volvió a truncarse, no solo, por la decisión que tomo la nueva administración de cerrar el proyecto cuando llego al poder el 2006, sino porque durante la fase de implementación entre el 2002 y 2005, el proyecto se manejó de manera irresponsable a cargo de algunos funcionarios y consultores del Ministerio de Educación, a quienes se confió la conducción del proyecto. 61 La oficina de control interno del Ministerio de Educación, encargado de ejercer control concurrente y posterior sobre los actos administrativos de funcionarios y servidores en la ejecución de proyectos educativos con préstamos de organismos internacionales, como fue el PEAR, al parecer, no conoció los entretelones con que se ejecutó este proyecto. Por las evidencias que encontraron los encargados de investigar la ejecución de este proyecto, durante el año 2006, algunos funcionarios y consultores que dirigieron y coordinaron el proyecto, especialmente el año 2005, debieron ser investigados y en este caso, sancionados ejemplarmente, por jugar con las expectativas de los pobladores de las áreas rurales, quienes nunca vieron la concreción efectiva de este proyecto en su fase de implementación. la Contraloría General de la Republica, máximo órgano de control del Estado, parece que tampoco conoció los entramados del PEAR, pues a más de 10 años de la forma como se ejecutó este proyecto educativo para las áreas rurales, nunca se ha sabido los resultados de una acción de control gubernamental de parte de este organismo. 62 PARA EL ENSAYO: "EL MÉTODO LA HUMANIDAD DE LA HUMANIDAD – LA IDENTIDAD HUMANA. Obra de Edgar Morín. Autor ensayo: Dr. José Casiano Collazos) RESUMEN: Este ensayo explora las implicancias y desafíos epistemológicos y metodológicos que las teorías de la complejidad plantean para la investigación en ciencias sociales y así realizar una articulación para entender y estudiar la complejidad; el pensamiento crítico de Morín, quien busca estrategias para enfrentar los desafío de la humanidad en la era planetaria: la antropolítica y la política de civilización. Morín, al conceptualizare las "ciencias de la complejidad" nos habla que la complejidad demuestra que el ser humano se está como sujeto al interior de una configuración totalizadora y por lo tanto la visión transdisciplinaria es aplicable en cualquier ámbito de la vida, haciéndola realmente sustentable, viable de educación hacia el futuro y respetada en toda su dimensión de identidad humana. La sociedad académica, enfrenta un sin número de retos y problemas, en esta centuria en que vivimos, el reto no sólo de la investigación si no de la educación, es que debe conciliarse la materia y el espíritu, la naturaleza y la cultura, la ciencia y las humanidades, propiciando un reencuentro entre la tecnología y el humanismo, integrando la memoria y el proyecto. PLABRAS CLAVES: Transdisciplinariedad, Epistemología, Ciencias de la Complejidad, Pensamiento complejo, Del cosmos a lo humano, Identidad polimorfa, la Trinidad humana, razón humana. P R E F A C I O Aunque deseemos sobre todas las cosas ver el cese de la humillación, el desprecio, la mentira, ya no tenemos la necesidad de la certidumbre de Victoria para continuar la lucha. Las verdades Exigentes prescinden de la victoria y resisten para resistir. E. Morin Lo vertiginoso del cambio en nuestro tiempo es, en si mismo, una fuerza elemental. Este impulso acelerador acarrea consecuencias personales, psicológicas y también sociológicas que con profunda investigación aborda Edgar Morin "El Método V. La humanidad de la humanidad. La identidad humana". Esta investigación está dedicada a la búsqueda de un "método" apto que ponga de manifiesto el desafío de la complejidad que se impone tanto al conocimiento científico como al estudio de los problemas humanos, sociales y políticos. Preocupado por mostrar un conocimiento sin divisiones ni compartimientos, respeta lo individual y lo singular considerando su interrelación con el contexto y el todo. Su concepción de la complejidad ántropo-social incluye las dimensiones de lo biológico y lo imaginario. 63 Esta obra ha generado algunas críticas así como también algunas diferencias conceptuales con Fritjot Capra ("Las conexiones ocultas" y gestor del Paradigma Ecológico), que ha enriquecido la apreciación al considerarse para la humanidad (luchan por su dignificación) en un elemento de posibilidades de inteligibilidad de la realidad y de los fenómenos circunscritos a la llamada globalización. Al tratar de la humanidad, al menos para nuestro actual objeto, es importante ser imaginativo y perceptivo que un cien por ciento exacto. Las teorías no tienen que ser exactas para ser enormemente útiles. Incluso el error tiene su utilidad. Los seres humanos somos impredecibles y por lo tanto somos inexactos, estamos llenos de errores fácticos que provocan sonrisas condescendientes. Sin ellos no se hubieran podido trazar audaces investigaciones que nos aproximen a realidades, nos muestren los peligros y promesas y nos permitan la adaptación en un mundo que jamás llegaremos a conocerlo en su total concepción. Edgar Morín, filósofo y político, nacido en París el 08 de julio de 1921, bajo el seno de una familia de origen judío Sefradí, su nombre de nacimiento es Edgar Nahum Beressi. Su padre, Vidal Nahum, nació en 1894 en Salónica (Grecia) y, posteriormente, se naturaliza francés. Su madre, Luna Beressi, quien sufría de una serie lesión en el corazón que le prohibía tener hijos (hecho nunca revelado a su padre); debido a ello, el embarazo en el que se concibió a Edgar evoluciona en condiciones dramáticas y, consecuentemente, el parto fue bastante traumático y riesgoso, tanto para la madre como para el hijo. Sus primeros diez años los pasa al lado de sus padres, pero cuando Luna Nahum su, madre, muere en 1931, Edgar pasa a ser criado por su padre y Corinne Beressi, su tía materna. En 1931 es atacado por la fiebre Aftosa, hecho que casi lo lleva a la muerte. La pérdida de su madre tiene un fuerte impacto en su infancia que deja huellas indelebles durante el resto de su vida. Edgar trata de llenar el vacío que deja la partida de su madre con la literatura convirtiéndose así, tempranamente, en un gran lector que devora libros de las más variadas temáticas; se advierte que es este el origen más remoto de su espíritu autodidacta e investigador que le ha de caracterizar en el transcurso de su vida. A sus 15 años, se compromete en acciones militantes en solidaridad con los anarquistas catalanes y participa en su primera asamblea política, un mitin trotskista en el mulle de Valm. Entre los 17 y 18, se adhiere a los Estudiantes Frontistas que preconizaban un socialismo nacional y un rechazo a la guerra. A los 19 años tenía ya un espíritu acucioso, irreverente y audaz, más por curiosidad y en busca de conocimiento, cursa estudios universitarios. Más por el interés de hacer una carrera, lo movía hacia la lectura, el cine, la música y la observación de la naturaleza y la sociedad, su deseo de aprender; con esta motivación se inscribe en "La Sorbonne", matriculándose simultáneamente en la Facultad de Letras, en la de Derecho y en la Escuela de Ciencias Políticas. Interrumpe sus estudios por la invasión a Francia por el ejército alemán. En Julio 1940 huye a Toulouse, ahí se desempeña como Secretario de la Asociación de Estudiantes Refugiados. En 1942 se licencia en "La Sorbonne" en Historia, Geografía y Derecho. Interesado, cada vez más, por la Unión Soviética, participa en actividades callejeras y distribución de panfletos, a fines de 1941 se une al Partido Comunista Francés. De los 21 a 23 años, Edgar está muy comprometido en actividades "subversivas", en contra de la ocupación alemana, por lo que decide cambiarse de apellido Nahum por "MORIN" pues, obligado a vivir una doble clandestinidad –como judío y comunistaactuando en el corazón de la Resistencia Francesa, como militante oculto del Partido Comunista y acechado por la GESTAPO. En Agosto 1944 participa en la Insurrección de París. En 1945 es nombrado Teniente Coronel e incorporado al gobierno militar de la zona francesa de ocupación. Su espíritu critico, su conciencia reflexiva y profundamente liberal lo hacen discrepar y denunciar las desviaciones y los exceso del estalinismo soviético; sus diferencias en relación a Tito, la Revolución China y el proceso Rajk; de tal manera que, en 1951, fue expulsado del Partido Comunista Francés. Edgar, continúo participando activamente en los Comités de Intelectuales por la Paz, contra la remilitarización de Alemania y contra la guerra de Argelia. En 1945 se caso, en París, con Violette Chapellaubeau, socióloga, amiga de estudiante y compañera desde 1941. Tuvo dos hijos Irene (1947) y Véronique (1948). En 1963 se casa con la artista plástica Joahnne. Con Edwige L. Agnes –última esposacomparte los días de su vida y sus aún pujantes ímpetus por continuar el camino hacia la metamorfosis social que se ha creado en su imaginario, como una vía para solventar los grandes problemas sociales y redimir la conciencia de la humanidad. Su intelecto ha producido vastas obras –aproximadamente 60siendo la primera "El año cero de Alemania" (1946), y por enumerar algunas tenemos: En 1951 "El hombre y la muerte", "El cine o el hombre imaginario" (1956), "Las Estrellas; mito y seducción del cine" (1957), "Autocrítica" (1959), "Introducción a una política del Hombre" (1965), "El espíritu del Tiempo" (1966), "La vida del sujeto" (1969), "El paradigma perdido: La naturaleza humana" (1973), "La unidad del hombre" (1974), "EL METODO I. LA NATURALEZA DE LA NATURALEZA" (1977), "EL METODO II. LA VIDA DE LA VIDA" 64 (1980), "Para salir del siglo veinte" (1981), "Ciencia con conciencia" (1982), "EL METODO III. EL CONOCIMIENTO DEL CONOCIMIENTO" (1986), "Introducción al Pensamiento Complejo" (1986), "EL METODO IV. LAS IDEAS" ( 1991), "La Complejidad Humana" (1994), "Los siete saberes necesarios para una educación del futuro" (2000), En 2001, "EL METODO V. LA HUMANIDAD DE LA HUMANIDAD: LA IDENTIDAD HUMANA". "Por una política de civilización" (2002), "Educar en la Era Planetaria" (2002), "La violencia en el mundo" (2003), "EL METODO VI. LA ETICA" en 2004. Desde sus 25 años produce casi un libro por años. Fundador de muchas instituciones y organizaciones entre ellos periódicos y revistas, escribiendo cientos de artículos, ha producido una película. Ha recibido innumerables reconocimientos y honores como Doctor Honoris Causa de casi 20 universidades de diferentes países, Condecoraciones, Premios, Medallas, Se han develado estatuas en su honor, recibe salutaciones de todas partes del mundo, en el 2006 se inició la filmación de una película sobre la vida de Edgar Morin, el filosofo mas grande del siglo XX y XXI, el "Pensador Planetario", como fue llamado por Alan Tourraine Quizá este ensayo sea desmesurado en tanto y en cuanto el mismo no constituye, reconociendo hidalgamente, un análisis integral sino de algunos pasajes; pero eso no quiere decir que no pueda constituir una muestra más o menos digna del pensamiento del célebre autor francés; pues las consideraciones que en el mismo se defienden se apoyan no solamente en este libro, sino también en otras obras del autor. Nuestro objetivo fundamental es mostrar que el vasto conjunto de ideas presentadas por Morin es potente sin duda, y resulta una importante aclaración de las condiciones de existencia del ser humano en la presente época; pero también es deudor, en más de un aspecto, de reflexiones, é incluso ideas fundamentales, de otros autores. El MÉTODO V El formidable progreso de las ciencias de la vida (desde la teoría de la evolución y la biología molecular a la ecología, la ingeniería genética y la sociobióloga) no debe llevarnos a rechazar las ideas de la vida, existencia, individuo y sujeto, sino a comprenderlas más profundamente. La vida, que emerge por entero del universo físico, es al mismo tiempo algo enteramente original en ese universo. Comparar la vida con la no-vida no sería suficiente; hay que captar también la vida de la vida. La frontera que nos separa de los otros vivientes es una frontera cultural, que no anula a la vida, sino que la abre al desarrollo del espíritu. Toda ciencia del hombre que reduzca la vida a lo privado es una ciencia privada de vida. Pensar la vida ha llegado a ser algo vital para nosotros, y la biología ha resultado ser la ciencia en cuestión. ¿Podremos consentir que la intervención genética y cerebral transformen nuestras vidas, nuestros espíritus, antes de que sepamos verdaderamente lo que son la vida, el cerebro, el espíritu, antes que seamos capaces de controlarnos a nosotros mismos y de controlar a nuestros controladores?. "Cuando más conocemos menos comprendemos al ser humano", es la constatación de una paradoja fundamental de donde parte Morin; según él, se debe a cuestiones metodológicas, el modo de conocimiento inhibe nuestra posibilidad de concebir el complejo humano. Nos propone entonces una regla fundamental que: "todas las ciencias particulares están unidas entre si y dependen unas de las otras". Concibe su empresa como integración reflexiva de los diversos saberes que conciernen al ser humano "no se trata de adicionarlos, sino unirlos, articularlos e interpretarlos. Sostiene que el conocimiento humano debe ser a la vez mucho más científico, mucho más filosófico y también mucho más poético de los que es. Su campo de observación y de reflexión es un laboratorio muy extenso, el planeta tierra, en su totalidad, su pasado, su devenir y también su finitud, con sus documentos humanos que comienzan hace seis millones de años. Morin, nos lega que "todas las variaciones son significativas, todas las constancias son fundamentales", concepto éste a mi parecer erróneo, porque contradice con el punto de vista expresado por él mismo en otros trabajos. Lo importante es tener presente lo señalado por Morin, que el problema humano no es teórico, no es un problema del conocimiento, sino de destino, se trata de una cuestión de vida o muerte en virtud de los peligros que amenazan hoy a la existencia humana. El Método, Tomo V, aborda directamente el tema de "La humanidad de la humanidad", trata "La identidad humana". En este texto se encuentran muchos puntos comunes con el "Paradigma perdido", pero esta vez han sido llevados más allá, se ha profundizado en su contenido y a pesar de la vieja andadura hay novedad. Aquí, sobre la base construida se avanza, se complejiza y simultáneamente se aclara. Desde los preliminares vuelve Morin a la paradoja pascaliana, y en este espíritu, en el exordio, cita a Ortega y Gasset, quien afirma que "el hombre se compone de lo que es y de lo que carece"; y a Descartes, quien afirma que "si alguien quiere seriamente buscar la verdad, no debe elegir una ciencia particular; están todas unidas entre sí y dependen unas de otras", une a esto una sentencia de Marc Bloch, quien habla de su investigación orientada por el "comprender". Apertrechado con ese enfoque emprende el camino, constatando que seguimos siendo un misterio para nosotros mismos, ya que la unidad compleja que proporciona la identidad del ser humano se 65 escapa, y encuentra que el problema se debe al principio de disyunción y de reducción que ha imperado en la ciencia moderna, cuyo enfoque deja de lado que "la humanidad también comporta la inhumanidad". LA TRINIDAD HUMANA La condición humana está dada por "la trinidad humana", cuya última y primera raíz está en el cosmos, allí, dentro de él, con él y en él, se produce "la emergencia humana". De ahí que existe una inseparable unidad en las preguntas ¿Dónde estamos? ¿De dónde venimos? ¿A dónde vamos? La condición humana es uno de los resultados de la evolución del cosmos y se podría afirmar con Carl Sagan: "somos materia estrellas mirando las estrellas", somos creación cósmica. Lo que plantea la naturaleza y el destino cosmo-físico de lo humano, el cual está dado por un bucle en orden-desordendesorganización-organización, todo ello mediado por interacciones. A partir de este análisis, se puede pensar que la muerte no sólo afecta a lo biológico sino también a lo físico, es el destino de todo el cosmos. Pero la condición del ser humano también posee un profundo enraizamiento biológico, el cual se puede percibir en el hecho de que cada ser humano es una síntesis bioquímica, así como genética, fruto y resumen de la vida en el planeta, el ser humano es el producto de un torbellino que incluye la físicala biologíala antopo-sociología, de ahí que el ser humano, entre otras cosas es, un hiperviniente, un hipermamífero, un hipersexuado y a la vez un superprimate. Gracias al tercer enraizamiento, esta vez en el reino animal, entre los primates, el ser humano posee una larga infancia, es flexible, adaptable, lo que lo faculta para realizar trabajos especializados. Existe un vórtice creado por el cerebro-mano-lenguaje-mente-cultura-sociedad que lleva a la condición humana a un despliegue de hominización con dimensiones planetarias, en el cual, el hombre no se reduce a la animalidad pero sin ella tampoco es posible. "La humanidad de la humanidad" se produce, se hace manifiesta, se desarrolla, evoluciona en el bucle cerebro-mente-cultura-lenguaje, que produce como una especie de "segunda naturaleza" dada por la cultura, la que es impensable sin la capacidad cerebral, sin los pensamientos, sobre los cuales a su vez incide. La cultura es la que posibilita y prepara al ser humano para conocer y para aprender, pero, simultáneamente, ella, imposibilita el aprender y el conocer fuera de los marcos de la propia cultura. Dentro de este torbellino resurge y re-surge el lenguaje, una " máquina " cuya función consiste en hacer funcionar las otras máquinas, entre otras, la megamáquina social. En ella se manifiestan todas las formas del ser humano y ella a su vez las hace posibles; el ser humano en su conjunto se encuentra contenido y es el continente del lenguaje, "el hombre se ha hecho en el lenguaje, que ha hecho al hombre". El lenguaje hace posible, mediante un nuevo vórtice, en el que interviene cerebro-lenguaje-cultura-mente, la conciencia, que es una emergencia específicamente humana, que a su vez es producto y productora de sí misma, y que posee la capacidad de producir la con-ciencia, el conocimiento del conocimiento, el conocimiento de sí mismo mediante la re-flexión. La naturaleza del hombre es mucho más que la conciencia, ella contiene y a la vez es contenida también por el Eros, en donde la mente y el sexo interretroactúan mutuamente, se complican, produciendo ese fenómeno maravilloso que llena de sentido la condición humana, el amor humano, emergencia en la cual lo biológico se espiritualiza y lo espiritual se biologiza. Esa conciencia, enriquecida por la complejidad del amor, permite una apertura al mundo en donde el ser humano se percibe como parte del mundo, insertado en el mundo y a su vez lejos, ajeno al mundo. La conciencia también produce la racionalidad y la técnica que le da la posibilidad al ser humano de sentirse soberano, sobre la materia física y desde hace algún tiempo, también soberano de la materia viva. Esa conciencia, además, le permite lo imaginario y el mito en donde la analogía es la forma fundamental del pensamiento, así como el pensamiento racional en donde la lógica dirige el proceso. Lo imaginario y el mito es constitutivo del ser humano, cuando el ser humano cree haberse desecho de ellos es cuando está imaginando y está mitificando de la peor forma posible. Entonces, el mito, la magia y la razón surgen de la condición humana ineludible, de la muerte y del misterio del destino humano, como ya se vio. La conciencia productora y producto de la noosfera afronta la incertidumbre de la muerte, esa especie de abismo sin fondo, de agujero negro en donde se pierde todo hasta el individuo humano, pero gracias a esto, el ser humano produce una extraordinaria riqueza de mitos, de magia, de ritos, el hombre responde de esta forma a su angustia permanente. La presencia de la muerte en la conciencia humana lleva a que el ser humano con la magia, el rito y el sacrificio intente manipular, operar la realidad y ponerla a su favor; en el rito se busca una integración comunitaria religiosa, cósmica. Con el sacrificio se produce una respuesta a la angustia. Obedeciendo, las fuerzas extrañas, se busca poner en operación un principio de reciprocidad, en donde hay una transferencia purificadora, que canaliza la violencia, obedeciendo a la naturaleza o a los dioses y entregándoles lo exigido se busca aplacarlos y de esta forma condicionarlos poniéndolos a favor. En todo este proceso se refuerza el sentido de comunidad. Cuando se mira la diversidad infinita que se manifiesta en los rostros, en los fenotipos, en la psicología, en los mitos, en los ritos, en los pensamientos, en las cultura de los seres humanos, también se puede ver la unidad genérica, que se manifiesta en la unidad cerebral, en la unidad 66 afectiva, en los grandes sentimientos y en una tendencia manifiesta en todos los pueblos a crear fantasmas y espíritus, pero sobre todo, la unidad humana ante la muerte, que constituye la gran paradoja el ser humano. Todo esto constituye la noosfera, esfera producida por el pensamiento humano que permea y envuelve al hombre. Sus productos buscan su proliferación, su propagación, su reproducción, ellos, aunque intangibles, son en ocasiones, más fuertes y testarudos que la misma realidad. Se evidencia con lo anteriormente dicho que ser humano es un ser totalmente, íntegramente, físico pero a la vez es un ser totalmente, íntegramente metafísico, de igual forma, el ser humano es plenamente biológico y totalmente meta biológico es decir, cultural. Esto nos muestra como el ser humano es fruto del cosmos pero se ha desarrollado más allá y ahí está su humanidad y su inhumanidad. Además de las tres inserciones que se intersectan para producir al ser humano, en el ser humano hay una trinidad, que a su vez es fruto de diversas trinidades, hay una trinidad individuosociedad-especie; otra, cerebro-cultura-mente; otra conformada por razón-afectividad-pulsión. Todas estas trinidades son inseparables, cada una de ellas es principio, medio y fin de todo el proceso humano, por eso ha sido necesario reiniciar la conexión de las ciencias biológicas y las ciencias humanas, de ahí que necesario entender la complejidad de la ciencia y buscar la autoorganización de la misma o, para ser más exactos, la auto-eco-re-organización y así captar lo uno múltiple de la condición humana. La condición humana posee una unidad dialéctica que es necesario percibir, concebir y pensar, que es causa y es causada por la diversidad que produce la unidad, el "hombre genérico", que se podría pensar y expresar así: "El tesoro de la humanidad está en su diversidad creadora, y pero la fuente de su creatividad está en su unidad generadora". LA IDENTIDAD INDIVIDUAL Dentro de este proceso en torbellino es necesario resaltar la identidad individual, ya que en el ser humano hay una verdadera paradoja, que es a la vez individuo, particular, único y al mismo tiempo es parte del todo y contiene el todo, es un microcosmos que contiene el cosmos, volviendo a una idea que parte de Demócrito. En este sentido, el individuo es irreductible y es el resultado de todo un proceso en el cual es un punto de llegada y simultáneamente es un punto de salida, es un verdadero "nudo gordiano". Esta identidad individual conduce a Morin a "lo vivo del sujeto", en donde se hace evidente cómo, entre los seres humanos, todo se puede compartir menos la idea, el sentimiento, el sentido del yo; pero a la vez, es necesario, para construir este sentido, la relación con el otro, que aparece inscrita en la relación del sujeto consigo mismo. Lo que quiere decir, que la relación subjetiva es inherente a la relación intersubjetiva, la relación con el otro es radical, es decir, a ésta en la raíz misma del sujeto. Otra de las características fundamentales del individuo, del sujeto, es el "sujetamiento", que se expresa en la capacidad del sujeto de hacerse objetivo, de objetivar todo, aun a sí mismo. Desde esta perspectiva, la relación entre el sujeto y el objeto, frente a la conciencia de la muerte, se presenta como la unión de la subjetivación y la objetivación absoluta. Lo anterior lleva a la identidad polimorfa que está manifiesta en la paradoja de lo masculinofemenino y de cada sujeto humano, ya que en cada sujeto humano se tiene tanto lo masculino como femenino, este fenómeno está inscrito en la composición genética, anatómica, fisiológica, psicológica, y cultural de ser humano. En el análisis del individuo es necesario entender que existen diversas paradojas. Desde la perspectiva del philum, cada individuo humano sintetiza y hace presente a los demás seres humanos y a sus ancestros; desde la óptica del cuerpo humano, durante el transcurso de la vida de cada ser humano cambia, literalmente, en diversas ocasiones de equipo biológico; desde la perspectiva de las características psicológicas, cada edad tiene sus verdades, sus experiencias y sus secretos, de ahí que cada edad tiene su forma de expresar su personalidad, esto expresa, de otra manera, la diversidad en la unidad, la pluriidentidad en la identidad humana. De igual forma, cada persona humana tiene multiplicidades y duplicidades internas en las cuales en un mismo sujeto puede haber varios sujetos, varias personalidades, situación evidente en la psicopatología denominada "trastorno de las múltiples personalidades". La persona humana y es un ser que se manifiesta desarrollando roles de vida, vida de teatro, imitando a los otros mediante la proyección y la identificación, es decir, realizando mímesis que lo lleva a la histeria, que es el nombre ordinario de la simulación. Cada ser humano tiene un cosmos secreto en el cual se hace presente todo el cosmos, el yo es un principio unificador de esa pluralidad y multidimensionalidad que se presenta en la condición humana pero, a pesar de esto y gracias a esto, es un sujeto único e individual. LA MENTE Y LA CONCIENCIA Al volver sobre la mente y la conciencia es necesario evidenciar los poderes y la debilidad de la mente, y reconocer que el error es un fenómeno humano, pero a la vez, el cerebro humano es un sistema cerrado que permite al sujeto humano a abrirse al mundo, al cosmos. Todo conocimiento es una traducción, una interpretación, una reconstrucción y en el conocimiento no hay mecanismo 67 posible para distinguir la verdad y el error, de ahí que la racionalidad se presenta como esa capacidad para criticar, verificar, controlar la objetividad y la distancia entre el sujeto humano y el mundo. Al comparar el cerebro y el ordenador, se encuentra que del ordenador no se origina ninguna mente y el ordenador está limitado a la computación, la mente humana además de esto permite la cogitación, el pensamiento. Los ordenadores trabajan con un proceso digital que separa lo que está unido y analógico que une lo que está separado. En el caso de la mente humana el pensamiento es uno y plural, ya que al desarrollarse progresivamente resuelve muchos problemas pero simultáneamente problematiza las soluciones encontradas y se plantea a sí mismo como problema. El problema de la sociedad contemporánea es la súper especialización, que hace imposible el pensamiento integrador, complejo, que articula, que reúne, que junta, lo que estaba, para el pensamiento especializado, separado, disjunto. El pensamiento humano es un pensamiento doble, paradójico; por un lado, desarrolla el "logos" y por otro el "mito". Hay siempre en el pensamiento humano una unión dialógica en la que se manifiesta la oposición de las dos formas de pensamiento, pero aquí hay una relación compleja, es decir, las dos formas de pensamiento son concurrentes y antagónicas cada una con su propia lógica y con su propia verdad. Coincide Morin con Marx quien afirmaba en 1843 que: "la razón ha existido siempre, pero no siempre de forma racional", lo que lleva a concluir, que siempre, en la mente humana, habrá racionalidad, mitología y religión. El cerebro ha producido la mente creadora que ha sido capaz de crear los medios para actuar sobre el cerebro y a su vez ha creado los medios para actuar sobre los propios genes. Pero también de ese cerebro ha emergido el alma, esa que no tiene fronteras ni fondo, que sufre dolor moral, que vive el éxtasis, la felicidad, la alegría infinita. Esa que la ciencia oficial ha exorcizado y ha sacado de su mundo. En este estudio, es necesario hacer presentes los poderes y la debilidad de la conciencia. La conciencia posee siempre dos dimensiones: es conciencia de lo externo y conciencia de sí; ella manifiesta la necesidad del sujeto de objetivarse y la necesidad del sujeto de subjetivizar lo externo. La conciencia vive entre la verdad y el error, ella emerge de las interdependencias que se producen en su historia. "Nacida en la historia, viviendo su historia, sometida a la historia, un golpe de viento histórico e histérico puede apagarla". EL PENSAMIENTO, LA RAZON, LA INTUICION: Unidad Múltiple. El ser humano es un ser complejo, pero para tratar de comprender el complejo humano y su locura, la paradoja humana del sapiens demens, se repiensa aquello de Santayana de que: "no es de sabios ser únicamente sabios". Así como lo de Pascal, quien afirmaba que "los hombres están tan necesariamente locos que sería una locura no estar loco". En un principio, en la historia del pensamiento, se pensó sólo en la razón humana, así como en la capacidad del hombre para hacer útiles y desarrollar la técnica, para definir al hombre. Posteriormente, se pensó que el hombre era capaz de ser interesado, de buscar la utilidad y así se definió al hombre como sapiens, faber, oeconomicus. Pero estas caracterizaciones de la condición humana son insuficientes, ya que en el ser humano se presenta la locura, el delirio, la hybris, con tanta fuerza como con las otras capacidades. Es conocido, no hace falta sino mirar la historia para ver, cómo la racionalidad puede estar al servicio de las pasiones más oscuras. Demasiada racionalidad convierte al hombre en loco. La locura -como ya se afirmó a partir de Freídes un problema central en el hombre y no uno periférico, adjetivo, producto de una enfermedad. Investigando "más allá de la razón y de la locura" es necesario recordar una afirmación del biólogo, neurocientífico chileno, Humberto Maturana, quien sostiene que "nosotros los seres humanos, somos animales que dependemos del amor" apuntando, una vez más, al homo complexus. Que integra el homo consumans y el homo oeconomicus quienes en un principio y a primera vista son opuestos, esta integración, se entiende si se concibe que el ser humano sobreviva para vivir y vive para vivir plenamente. Ese homo complexus también es homo ludens, lo que quiere decir, que en el hombre el juego tiene una finalidad muy seria, que tiene que ver con la estrategia, la regla, la concentración de actividades importantes en la vida. También en el ser humano, en el homo complexus, es importante lo imaginario que impregna todos los diversos ámbitos de la vida, durante toda la vida. La imaginación conforma todo lo que el ser humano denomina realidad, conduce y coproduce el estado estético, entendiendo éste, en el sentido original, de la palabra griega, que significaba "sentir". En el ser humano hay una comunicación profunda entre el sentido y lo mágico, lo mitológico y lo religioso. El ser humano es "homo complexus", ya que es un gran vórtice, un gran torbellino que une lo que aparentemente es opuesto, antagónico, de ahí que el ser humano es bipolar, en él no existe una frontera definida y definible entre esos opuestos. De ahí que otra forma de ser del homo complexus es el homo poeticus, en el cual se manifiesta la emoción, la afectividad, la fiesta, que juegan tan importante papel en la existencia humana. La vida para el ser humano es poesía y amor, pero junto a esto convive el homo prosaicus, que es complementario y antagónico al homo poeticus. El ser humano mediante su complejidad hace posible "la soportable realidad" y esta es tal, debido a que es 68 enigmática, críptica, cruel, impasible para el ser humano. Éste está en la tierra, tendido entre dos infinitos, según apreciación de Pascal, desconociendo su futuro pero sabiendo con certeza de su muerte y sin poderse sustraer del azar que se presenta cada vez más inhumano en la medida en que hay más conciencia, por ello establece una especie de compromiso neurótico entre la mente y lo real, en el cual la mente crea los ritos, la magia tratando de exorcizar todo aquello que lo horroriza que le produce miedo, que encuentra brutal. Frete a este sentido, Marx tenía mucha razón, la religión es un consuelo interesado del hombre. Se ratifica, a esta altura, la intuición desarrollada por Freud que concibe que "si lo neurótico es patológico, entonces lo patológico es normal". De ahí, que es necesaria la cooperación en la cual los dos opuestos del pensamiento, el mito, la magia, la religión, es decir, el pensamiento analógicosimbólico-mitológico-mágico, se unen dialógicamente al pensamiento racional-lógico-empíricotécnico, los que permiten, hacen posible, que el ser humano haga soportable la realidad. Pero a la vez, simultáneamente, en estos diversos tipos de pensamiento se manifiestan dos formas distintas de voluntades de dominio expresadas mediante la ciencia y la magia, cada uno por su lado y de forma distinta, busca actuar e imponer su propia voluntad a la realidad. Todo esto lleva a un pacto superrealista en el cual la estética juega un papel fundamental, produciendo una interrelación entre el pensamiento mítico y el pensamiento racional que supera a los dos y llega a un superrealismo. Es imposible escapar a esa vía lógica, compleja del sapiens-demens que urden la existencia humana y que son como una flecha lanzada al futuro en la búsqueda de lo que se podría llamar progreso humano. Al concluir esta visión sobre la condición humana, es necesario dejar responder a Morin la pregunta: "¿qué significa vivir para vivir? Vivir para gozar en la plenitud de la vida. Vivir para realizarse. La felicidad constituye ciertamente la plenitud de la vida. Pero puede adoptar múltiples rostros: el amor, el bienestar, el mejor-estar, la acción, la contemplación, el conocimiento. No hay una finalidad imperiosa que subordine a todas la demás, sino aquella que cada uno puede elegir según su sentimiento por su idea propia. La pluralidad de los fines significa también la pluralidad de los medios para realizarse". LAS CUATRO IDENTIDADES La condición humana posee y es poseída simultáneamente por sus identidades. Las cuatro grandes identidades de la condición humana son: Identidad social, Identidad histórica, Identidad planetaria é identidad futura. En ellas se formó, se vive y se juega el futuro de la especie humana. Identidad social En su forma originaria, se denomina "el núcleo arcaico" partiendo de la consideración de que el ser humano en sociedad conforma un sistema. Y es indispensable aclarar el sentido de este término, al que en el primer tomo de "El Método", Morin de dedicó varias y densas páginas. Con este término se alude a la integración de partes diferentes en un todo que establece constreñimientos a las partes, así como emergencias de cualidades nuevas, propias, fruto de la interacción de las partes, en donde se produce una acción recíproca de las partes actuando sobre el todo y el todo actuando sobre las partes. En el caso de la sociedad humana, se manifiesta al estudioso que ésta tiene una autonomía, una identidad, que surge de la interacción de sus partes, pero a la vez vive de la extracción de energía que no depende solo de sus partes, en este sentido la sociedad humana es cerrada y a la vez abierta a su en torno, es decir, es dependiente independiente, por eso es auto-eco-organizada. Esta característica de las sociedades humanas permitió crear asentamientos, aldeas, que se multiplicaron por el planeta. Allí entre los grupos humanos aparece la cultura como un patrimonio organizador que sirve para autoperpetuar la complejidad de las sociedades humanas. Ella "integra a los individuos en la complejidad social y condiciona el desarrollo de su complejidad individual". En ese proceso individuo-sociedad-cultura, hay una relación "hologramática", ya que el individuo está en la sociedad que está en el individuo; "recursiva" ya que los individuos producen la sociedad que produce a los individuos; "dialógica" en muchos sentidos, entre otros: de complementariedad, individuo sociedad individuo; antagonismo, oposición, entre siocentrismo-egocentrismo; ambivalente en la complementariedad y complementariedad en el antagonismo; resistencia-colaboracionistas con el orden social; grupos escondidos dentro de la sociedad; clandestinidad, marginalidad; y en general, una relación siempre problemática individuo-sociedad. En estas culturas, mediante sus normas se presenta una organización sexual de la sociedad y simultáneamente una organización social de la sexualidad, de esa manera la sociedad se auto-eco-reproduce biológicamente a partir de normas culturales y sociológicas. La normativa cultural-social va conformando la familia, en ella hay una posesión de los sujetos, pero también los sujetos poseen a la familia. La personalidad del padre y de la madre crean una impronta que acompañará la vida de los hijos. Este desarrollo histórico de la familia llegará hasta el día de hoy, en el que la pareja es muy inestable y sin embargo, es manifiesta la necesidad que existe de ésta. Entonces se vuelve sobre la aparición del "Leviatán" ("hombre como un lobo para otro hombre"), el Estado que, de un lado, aparece como dominador, estableciendo un orden y ejerciendo el monopolio 69 de la violencia, conjugando a la vez el poder material, el poder psicológico y el poder sagrado, utilizando todo para subyugar, dominar, agredir y destruir a sus opositores, creando una megamáquina social. Por otro lado, también el Estado civilizador. En la agrupación social y promovida por el Estado se actualizan y emergen potencialidades humanas de convivencia inéditas, e impensables. Emerge, en este contexto, el ejercicio de la política, ya que el ejercicio del poder es político, "la política supera a la cibernética del aparato; es el dominio de la decisión, de la elección, de las estrategias de acción interior y exterior, y necesita reflexión, consejo, debate, conciencia, voluntad de individuos responsables. Es un arte complejo, incierto, y decisivo que, en los momentos críticos y crísicos, compromete a la sociedad por entero. Y, en el riesgo y el alea, toda sociedad, incluso democrática, necesita jefes responsables". La megamáquina estatal se ha desarrollado produciendo un modelo en el que hay un centro de mando control, una jerarquía de funciones responsabilidades y prestigio, una jerarquía de niveles de organización y administración, que va desde la nación, provincias, circunspección, aldea y, por último, como cualidad fundamental producto y productora de las demás variables, aparece la división del trabajo y la especialización, esto, según el grado de desarrollo técnico y científico de la sociedad. Además de lo anterior, el Estado se presenta de múltiples formas. En ocasiones aparece desde el punto de vista de la organización como céntrica, policéntrica, acéntrica; desde el punto de vista del ejercicio y repartición del poder, jerárquica, poliárquica y anárquica; y desde el punto de vista de la especialización, especializada, policompetente y con competencias generales. Haciendo un paralelo entre los dos polos de la organización del Estado, la democracia y el totalitarismo, se encuentra que: uno de ellos es de baja complejidad y el otro de alta complejidad. En el modelo de baja complejidad se encuentra que la megamáquina es esclavista, totalitaria, centralizada, hay una fuerte jerarquía de dominación y control, hay una hiperespecialización, hay una integración rígida y represiva, pocas libertades, muchos controles, ritos, hay fuertes constreñimientos, poca comunicación entre grupos y entre individuos, predominio del programa, poca autonomía de los individuos y aparece una optimización simplificadora. De otra parte, el modelo de alta complejidad, es una megamáquina pluralista en donde funciona el policentrismo y el acentrismo, allí los individuos son autónomos pero no autosuficientes, hay diversidad en las comunicaciones, hay niveles organización débiles en jerarquía de control, hay débiles constreñimientos como muchas comunicaciones entre individuos y grupos, predomina la estrategia, hay una optimización compleja (con incertidumbres, libertades, desórdenes, antagonismo, concurrencia). Desde aquí se le echa una mirada al Estado Nación moderno, un ser del tercer tipo, manifiesto en el concepto de "patria" que se convierte en la religión del ciudadano, que une lo masculino, "pater", y lo femenino "mater". En el Estado es necesaria la espontaneidad coorganizadora, no es posible un estado sujeto a un orden mecánico. El estado vive con el desorden, con la anarquía, o también con la poliarquía. Ese Estado Nación moderno, hoy está organizado mediante la forma democrática, que integra y hace posible la pluralidad de las concurrencias en los antagonismos, es decir, es un sistema político complejo en el que se debe producir una regeneración permanente, continua; desde los ciudadanos hacia la democracia que hace a los ciudadanos. En este estado es necesario desarrollar causes de enfrentamientos no violentos, en donde la unión y la desunión son posibles, en donde el sistema vive de sus conflictos, lo que lo hace, de alguna manera, muy vulnerable el sistema. De ahí, que el porvenir de la democracia siempre sea incierto. Los Estados modernos con sistemas democráticos imperfectos son cada día más acabados pero a su vez más dependientes y vulnerables. La síntesis de las ideas sobre la sociedad humana son planteadas por Morin en diez preceptos, ellos son: La sociedad humana es una sociedad que no puede estar sometida totalmente a un orden mecánico; Una sociedad en la que siempre se presentará la unión de la comunidad y la rivalidad, de ahí que la autoridad coercitiva no es suficiente para la unión permanente de la sociedad. En la sociedad del futuro el sojuzgamiento podría ser eliminado, pero el sujetamiento puede ser eliminado solo con la sociedad misma; Toda sociedad compleja comporta la lógica jerarquía, poliarquía, anarquía, así como centrismopolicentrismo-acentrismo, y especialización-policompetencia-competencia generales; Toda sociedad compleja dotada de Estado comporta una parte de organización espontánea que se combina con la organización promovida por el Estado; En una sociedad hay fuerzas de desorganización y el amor que no ha podido reducir los antagonismos; 70 La relación estado sociedad es dialógica; El estado asistencial protege e infantiliza a los individuos; Con el desarrollo económico y social, el destino de los individuos deviene un destino individualista; y por último La alta complejidad social comporta libertades y creatividades que se mantienen a la temperatura de su destrucción. Es necesario un título especial para la democracia, que se origina en Grecia. Allí existe un control de los ciudadanos, una división del poder, gran variedad de opiniones, vivo debate, de ahí que ésta surge como la forma de oponerse al totalitarismo, al poder tiránico, equivalente al poder personal inconsulto y autócrata. Pero, paradoja histórica, muchos de estos estados democráticos, que hacia dentro fueron emancipadores, liberadores, hacia fuera fueron opresores. Sin embargo, Morin ve la salida de la humanidad, el futuro humanizante de la sociedad humana, en el desarrollo de una "antropo-política" multidimensional de escala planetaria, que conciba a la tierra como "patria-matria", es decir, padre y madre a la vez a la "tierra patria"; un socialismo democrático que lleve a confederar las naciones de la tierra, ya que la alternativa es "solidaridad o muerte", expresión que recuerda, a nuestro juicio, la afirmación de Rosa Luxemburgo: "socialismo o barbarie". Identidad Histórica Morin, estudia en la condición humana, la identidad histórica y acude a Gadamer, quien entiende la conciencia histórica del hombre actual como la capacidad que éste posee de tener en cuenta la historia de todo lo presente. Se podría pensar que aquí Morin plantea, desde la complejidad, una especie de filosofía de la historia. Empieza volviendo atrás, pero es necesario anotar que en Morin el volver es dialéctico, lo que quiere decir que en él, el volver es avanzar un poco cada vez que se vuelve. Se constata el nacimiento de la historia hace unos 10.000 años, en el momento en que aparece la ciudad, el estado, la explotación, la guerra y se produce el desencadenamiento histórico que tiene dos rostros, como todo es bifronte, como el ser que lo produce, que a la vez es sapiensdemens. Por un lado, se detiene en las grandiosas civilizaciones, los grandes logros humanos, arquitectónicos, ingenieriles, técnicos, científicos, artísticos; y, de otro, la barbarie, el Estado, su omnipotencia, la ebriedad del poder, las guerras, los saqueos, las violaciones, la destrucción de las grandes obras. El desarrollo histórico prolonga la lógica orden-desorden-organización, que a su vez es una extensión del proceso del universo de génesis-aniquilación. Aquí hace Morin una valoración de las valoraciones epistemológicas de la historia. Por un lado, hay una concepción que valora epistémicamente solo las grandes tendencias, la visión del conjunto, de los grandes procesos, de los grandes movimientos; y, hay otra, en la cual sólo el evento, las grandes personalidades, los grandes sujetos y sus grandes hazañas, las grandes batallas, hacen la historia. Morin aboga por una historia que conciba las grandes tendencias, los grandes procesos, el conjunto, pero a la vez que entienda que el evento, el individuo, el azar, lo aleatorio, también hace y mueve la historia produciendo en ocasiones las grandes tendencias. Es lo que denomina los pilotos e inspiradores, en donde el sujeto humano juega un papel importante, desencadenante en el proceso histórico, en el juego de la historia. La historia no es lineal ni predeterminada, en ella orden y desorden así como organización, se hacen presentes, en ella se manifiestan los determinismos y los azares, las turbulencias, las bifurcaciones, las derivas, las fases inmóviles, los éxtasis, y los éxtasis. Todo eso es la historia humana. También hace la historia la técnica y el mito que son productos y productores. En la historia no hay leyes de progreso, tampoco hay leyes de complejidad creciente, como lo pensara Chardin. La humanidad siempre está en riesgo, los grandes avances la pueden poner, y de hecho la ponen, como en el presente, en peligro, al borde de la desaparición. En ella siempre hay progresión-regresión, cimas y simas. La historia es la expresión, actualización, construcción de la complejidad del hombre. En ella se manifiesta, se revela, el sapiens, el demens, el faber, el ludens, el oeconomicus, el consumans, el prosaicus, el poeticus, el funtionalis, el esthethicus. La historia es historia pero a la vez es histeria. En la historia siempre hay nuevos desafíos, nuevos problemas producidos por la complejidad del ser que hace y piensa la historia. Identidad Planetaria La condición humana, también posee la identidad planetaria. Mirando hacia atrás, en la prehistoria e historia se evidencia la gran diáspora del ser humano por todo el planeta, en donde, el hombre, saliendo del África se expandió por Asia, Europa, Australia, y llegó hasta las américas. Este proceso 71 de planetarización comporta un doble sentido, en lo que se denomina "la doble hélice de la era planetaria". De una parte, hoy la planetarización se produce bajo el dominio y el imperialismo de occidente, que amenaza con un nuevo "Leviatán", esta vez de carácter planetario, en donde cada parte del mundo posee en sí todo el mundo. Una planetarización que se produce explícitamente a los ojos de todo el mundo, e implícitamente cuando las élites del mundo asumen las formas de ser de una cultura, que se hace presente en todo. De otra parte, hay también, una planetarización y humanista que se manifiesta en las contracorrientes ecológicas, cualitativas, anticonsumistas, respetuosa de las identidades culturales, antimercantilistas, antimonetaristas, antiutilitaristas, pacifistas, que tienden a unir todos los esfuerzos en la defensa del hombre y que busca superar conservando la división de las sociedades humanas en una sociedad planetaria. Hoy, el sistema económico mundial con su empuje promueve un pensamiento único y lleva al planeta a la nueva megamáquina, al "Leviatán planetario". Este proceso se produce mediante el modo de producción capitalista en interrretrorrelación con la burocracia, la tecnología, la tecnocracia, las cuales conforman un tetramotor. Todo este proceso tiene grandes carencias, ya que no se hace manifiesto un conjunto de bienes comunes a toda la humanidad, que sean promovidos por las misma naciones las cuales deben ser integradas en una verdadera comunidad planetaria que entienda la comunidad de destino humano. La humanidad se encuentra hoy en este proceso en el cual convergen, en un proceso antagónico, la actividad producida por la primera hélice, ese cuatrimotor que produce pobreza, exclusión y la otra hélice, empujada por la solidaridad, fraternidad y la universalidad de género humano. Hoy se está ante una complejidad, un caos y una incertidumbre que desborda la capacidad humana de comprensión. El ser humano se encuentra avanzando, caminando hacia el futuro, a la sombra la muerte y la incertidumbre, la cual es cada vez mayor, al grado que se es consciente de que no se sabe si habrá futuro. Identidad futura Morin, explora en la condición humana la identidad de futuro. Se parte de la premisa de que éste es indescifrable e impredecible. El destino de todos los humanos depende del tetramotor que incluye la ciencia, la técnica, la industria y el capital, pero aun cuando éste sea precedido por la incertidumbre, es posible prever el acceso a la sociedad mundo, a la construcción de la metamáquina y el advenimiento de la metahumanidad. Existe la posibilidad de que el "Leviatán planetario" emergente sea gobernado por una superpotencia y sus satélites, pero Morin apuesta, y en esto recuerda la apuesta Pascaliana, por la mejor de las posibilidades, el advenimiento de la "Tierra Patria". También es previsible el desarrollo de la tecnología que produce las máquinas con dos alternativas: de una parte, se puede prever, se puede pensar en la auto organización de las máquinas, su liberación, y el posterior sojuzgamiento de los hombres por éstas. Pero, también es posible una sociedad en la cual las máquinas liberen realmente a la condición humana. Es previsible el desarrollo de la inteligencia artificial, en un proceso en el cual se puedan producir formas más adecuadas y análogas a la vida animal y a la vida humana. Frente a la condición humana actual es posible una metahumanidad o una súperhumanidad. Asistimos al control de la mente por la mente, esto en el mejor de los escenarios pensables. Pero, por otro lado, podemos estar asistiendo al inicio del porvenir funesto en donde la mente controlaría todo, es cierto, pero no se controlaría a sí misma. Esa mente es a la vez omnipotente e incapaz. Es capaz de producir, sino la inmortalidad del ser humano, sí la práctica amortalidad, el aumento de las expectativas de vida a unos niveles insospechados hasta por los más optimistas, mediante las manipulaciones del material genético así como a todos los avances de la ingeniería genética y las ciencias médicas, que hace, que en un futuro no muy lejano, sea previsible que sólo la muerte accidental y sea la forma de morir. Esa mente se puede volcar sobre el dominio del todo lo exterior y olvidarse del control de sí misma, produciendo uno de los mayores peligros para sí misma y para la vida del planeta. De ahí que, para recuperar la esperanza, en este punto es necesario volver la mirada a otra de las grandes producciones del ser humano y de sus culturas, las grandes tradiciones religiosas de la humanidad que han sido capaces de desarrollar el control de la mente. SÍNTESIS FUNDAMENTAL El pensar de Morin es pura actividad que no se limita a una colección más o menos glosable de pensamientos; desubicado por definición se mueve en las fronteras, en una cuarta dimensión entre los compartimientos estancos de las disciplinas. Su estrategia quizá se orienta mediante dos conceptos: complejidad y holismo. La complejidad como elemento irrenunciable de la realidad vivida (espacio poliédrico, multifacético, prolífico y masivamente interconectado) es el marco conceptual desde el que aborda el conocimiento (y el aprendizaje). El holismo, la teoría del todo, como 72 subversión de jerarquías, privilegios y provincianismos epistémicos. No es extraño que trate al mismo nivel elementos en principio tan dispares como la matemática fractal, la antropología social, la ecología, la arquitectura urbana, la física cuántica, la ciencia termodinámica y la teoría ética. Aunque, eso si, no deja de sorprender que lo haga con tanta soltura y profundidad. El Método V. La humanidad de la humanidad. La identidad humana. Como bien lo expresan los editores, sirve para reflexionar "a fin de pensar la complejidad humana, y considerar así una humanidad enriquecida por todas sus contradicciones: lo humano y lo inhumano, el repliegue sobre sí y la apertura a los otros, la racionalidad y la afectividad, la razón y el mito, lo arcaico y lo histórico, el determinismo y la libertad". El pensamiento de Morin, como lo expusimos al inicio de este ensayo tendrá muchos críticos, pero no dejarán de reconocer que es una fuente de riqueza conceptual y aprehensión teórica; y quien la tiene ante si no dejará de beber fortaleciendo los cimientos de la Teoría de la Complejidad. "Necesitamos un conocimiento cuya explicación no sea mutilación y cuya acción no sea manipulación. Hoy en día, en que lo más oscuro de la evolución humana actúa so capa de ciencia, en que lo más irracional se agazapa tras la cobertura de la razón, lo importante es plantear el problema de un método nuevo". Edgar Morin. "Todo lo animal está en el hombre, pero todo el hombre no está en lo animal". Lao-Tse "Si la vida tuviera una meta, no sería la vida". Paúl Valery 73 EL PRIMER PERUANO Dr. FRANCISCO A. VARGAS VACA RESUMEN DEL ARTÍCULO Se considera que a través de su historia, el Perú ha ido formando su identidad nacional; pero, ¿Cómo se inició este proceso? ¿Quiénes fueron las primeras personas que sintieron un arraigo al territorio que ocupamos? ¿Existe una persona que pueda considerarse el primer peruano? El autor explora en nuestra distorsionada historia de hace cinco siglos, buscando indicios que nos lleven a delinear algunas respuestas sobre el nacimiento de un ser colectivo llamado Nación Peruana. Ambicioso artículo sobre un tema controvertido. Como peruanos, defensores de nuestra cultura y patrimonio, este artículo nos interesa por tratarse de un asunto trascendente, por encima de los temas de coyuntura. PALABRAS CLAVES Historia, Perú, Proceso, Formación, Identidad, Inca, español, fusión, síntesis, primero, diferente, mestizo EL PRIMER PERUANO El Perú, a lo largo de su historia, ha hecho frente a una serie de eventos de naturaleza política, social, económica y militar, que han afectado en mayor o menor medida, el sentimiento de pertenencia a la nación peruana de sus pobladores, sentimiento que es conocido como Identidad Nacional. Pero ¿Cómo apareció este sentimiento? ¿Bajo qué circunstancias se fue formando nuestra Identidad Nacional? ¿Quiénes fueron los primeros pobladores que tuvieron ese sentimiento de apego al territorio? ¿Quiénes fueron las primeras personas que se consideraron como peruanos? ¿O tal vez hubo una persona que pueda calificarse como el primer peruano? Indagaremos en nuestra mal escrita y distorsionada historia del siglo XVI, en busca de las respuestas a estas y otras preguntas fundamentales. De manera referencial, podemos establecer como fecha para el inicio de nuestra búsqueda, el año de 1532, pues antes de este momento no existía el Perú como tal; en nuestro territorio se hallaba asentado el Tahuantinsuyo o Imperio de los Incas; sin embargo, como comprenderá el lector, será necesario ir más atrás en nuestra investigación, para una cabal indagación sobre los asuntos planteados. A LA LLEGADA DE LOS ESPAÑOLES En 1532 al producirse la invasión española sobre el Tahuantinsuyo, el Imperio de los Incas se encontraba en una grave crisis social y política. En efecto, desde el punto de vista social, la sociedad inca se encontraba muy dividida, por lo pronto se diferencian dos grandes estratos, la clase dominante y el pueblo, pero a su vez, estos grupos, tenían infinitas subdivisiones:  La clase dominante, encabezada por la nobleza quechua, cuyo vértice lo ocupaban los incas y sus panacas, luego venían las noblezas regionales.  En el estrato pueblo existían tres grandes divisiones: Los jatunrunas, los mitimaes y los yanacunas. Conforme la nobleza quechua incrementó su poderío, también multiplicó sus riquezas; ya desde los tiempos de la expansión, se introdujo la propiedad de la tierra, cuando Pachacutec desalojó a las otras etnias del valle del Cusco y repartió sus tierras entre las 10 panacas incas. Posteriormente, 74 cada Inca se fue apropiando de nuevas tierras y obsequió otras tantas a sus jefes militares y nobles favoritos; con lo cual, apareció la propiedad privada individual. Sin embargo, la apropiación de estas enormes riquezas, también tuvo efectos negativos, pues fue transformado en parasitaria a un sector de la nobleza cusqueña e incrementó las pugnas que siempre existieron en las panacas. Es por eso que, a la muerte de Huayna Capac, esta pugna devino en guerra civil entre las dos panacas cusqueñas: la de Huáscar que pertenecía al Hurin Cusco y la de Atahualpa del Hanan Cusco. "Los cronistas españoles deformaron el contenido de dicha confrontación y la historia oficial a continuado presentándola como un conflicto Norte – Sur, ocultando hechos como, por ejemplo, que fue Atahualpa (que era del Hanan Cusco) quien arrasó e incendió Tumipampa, por su lealtad a Huáscar; o que este último asesinó a gran parte de la nobleza cusqueña por su identificación con Atahualpa". (Alzamora 1992: 43) Como quiera que sea, es indudable que el Imperio de los Incas se encontraba profundamente dividido – en términos modernos: "polarizado" – y por ello, atravesando una profunda crisis social. Por otro lado, el Tahuantinsuyo, desde el punto de vista político, no era un "Imperio monolítico" en el completo sentido de la acepción. Tenía una estructura bastante complicada, pues las recientes conquistas incaicas no habían logrado la fusión absoluta de los diferentes elementos políticos en una sola entidad nacional. Esta variedad de elementos iba desde el simple ayllu, común a todos, hasta las más complicadas estructuras. Los grupos de Ayllus gobernados por curacas llegaron a formar Confederaciones como la de los Collas del Titicaca, la de los Chancas en Andahuaylas y la de los Chinchas en la costa; además, aparecen los estados señoriales o feudales, como los de Cuismancu, Chuquimancu, el Gran Chimú y el propio Reino de Quito. En realidad, lo que se denominó "Imperio" podría considerarse como una reciente superestructura política que mantuvo las formas y características regionales, por lo tanto políticamente muy frágil. Pizarro y sus hombres aprovecharon al máximo esta crisis social y política del Imperio y ofrecieron establecer la autonomía de los señoríos regionales, así como ofrecieron prebendas a los pueblos sojuzgados a fin que se enfrenten a sus opresores incaicos. Con ello buscaron aislar a los defensores del Tahuantinsuyo. Y aún dentro de la nobleza inca, una parte importante prefirió apoyar a los conquistadores y seguir gozando de sus privilegios que emprender el duro camino de la defensa del territorio americano, esto nos indica que los pueblos que habitaban esta zona de Sudamérica sólo disponían de una incipiente identidad. Al leer nuestra historia, da la impresión que los cronistas españoles minimizaron la trascendencia de los movimientos de resistencia indígena; muy poco se sabe de las campañas dirigidas por los Generales Quisquis, Chalcuchimac y Rumiñahui, con el apoyo de las etnias autonomistas y los partidarios de Huáscar. A pesar que estas campañas las ganaron los hispanos; la lucha fue continuada por Manco Inca, que casi expulsó a los españoles de las nuevas ciudades que habían construido, particularmente de Lima; luego, después de algunas derrotas, los Incas se replegaron a Vilcabamba, convirtiéndola en la nueva capital de su Estado, el mismo que se reestructuró incorporando a nuevos grupos étnicos, desde ahí hostigaron permanentemente a los españoles y mantuvieron su autoridad sobre gran parte del territorio nacional, al extremo que el poder de los hispanos sólo existía en las ciudades, sus alrededores y entre los curacas colaboracionistas. Asesinado Manco Inca por un agente español, la dirección de la resistencia pasó a manos de Sayri Túpac; luego esta recayó en Tito Cusi Yupanqui y, a la muerte de este en Túpac Amaru I. Es decir sólo en 1572, después de 42 años de guerra contra los defensores del Tahuantinsuyo, los españoles pudieron tomar la última ciudad de los Incas. Este es un pasaje poco difundido de nuestra historia, nuestros niños al estudiar la lista de Incas, terminan en Huáscar y Atahualpa, porque la Historia escrita mayormente por los cronistas españoles, deliberadamente olvida a cuatro Incas que dirigieron la resistencia, siendo el último de nuestros Incas Túpac Amaru I, y no Atahualpa como recitan nuestros escolares. Asimismo, nuestra Historia Oficial presenta a los españoles como astutos, poderosos y grandes guerreros que conquistaron rápidamente a unos asustados indígenas dedicados a luchar entre ellos, soslayando un periodo glorioso de más de cuatro décadas de luchas de resistencia incaica. 75 La razón de la victoria de los españoles no sólo radicó en el adelanto de su técnica y arte militar, sino sobre todo, en la falta de una clara visión de conjunto en la clase dominante del Tahuantinsuyo y también a la abierta traición de parte de la misma que, lejos de optar por la resistencia, prefirieron someterse al opresor. Es decir, los hombres del Ande no supieron responder coherentemente y en conjunto a la agresión extranjera; encontramos que la población del Tahuantinsuyo no actuó como un sólo pueblo con identidad. Los incas no lograron formar una verdadera Nación Andina. Definitivamente lo que nosotros entendemos por Identidad Nacional en el Perú no existía antes de la llegada de los españoles. Víctor A. Belaúnde coincide con este crudo diagnóstico: "Hay más – y esto es lo fundamental – no podemos considerar al Incario como una verdadera nación. Es verdad que la unidad política que creó el Imperio constituye un elemento que se ha transmitido a la peruanidad, pero no puede afirmarse que haya existido un alma incaica, una conciencia nacional en el Tahuantinsuyo, que haya perdurado y que pueda considerarse como subsistente hoy mismo, como la forma sustancial, diríamos en términos escolásticos de la peruanidad". (Belaunde 1957: 30). Si consideramos que la nación peruana se formó por un lento proceso de yuxtaposición, amalgamación y fusión de un componente indígena y un componente español; nuestro diagnóstico de la identidad en el elemento indígena es negativo; solo tenían una incipiente identidad; veamos el otro componente. LOS CONQUISTADORES Según diversos autores, los conquistadores que llegaron al Perú formaban un sector marginal de la sociedad española. Es sabido que Francisco Pizarro no puedo contratar buenos soldados en Panamá, porque los mejores se encontraban en la conquista de Nicaragua; por ello tuvo que reclutar gente de su natal Trujillo de Extremadura, para así asegurarse la lealtad a su causa y a él mismo. Es conocido que las huestes que invadieron el Imperio de los Incas no fueron conformadas por un Ejército profesional integrado por gente de gran conocimiento y valía personal, sino un conglomerado humano de diferentes intereses a quienes su codicia, vicios, poca fortuna y marginalidad social había ido desplazando sucesivamente desde España hasta las Antillas, luego a México y Panamá, siendo los más desplazados los que llegaron al Perú. El Perú fue el punto en que convergieron finalmente los desplazados de la península y de América toda; sin embargo, los tesoros del Cuzco y las encomiendas no llegaron a satisfacer sus expectativas y los más ambiciosos realizaron un nuevo desplazamiento hacia Chile liderados por Diego de Almagro, uno de los socios de la conquista; la frustración que significó Nueva Toledo y la posesión del Cusco originaron la Guerra Civil (15381541). Almagro fue decapitado en 1538 después de perder en la Batalla de Salinas, el clima de insurrección continuó hasta que los almagristas asesinaron a F. Pizarro en junio de 1541. Diego de Almagro el Mozo tomó el poder y se hizo Gobernador. Cristóbal Vaca de Castro, fue el primer funcionario español importante que vino al Perú, venció a Diego de Almagro el Mozo en la Batalla de Chupas (Set 1542) y lo mandó decapitar. En medio de estas guerras, los vencedores buscaron disfrutar los beneficios de la anhelada legalidad, pero tuvieron que hacer frente a un nuevo problema; sus privilegios se veían amenazados por la propia Corona 76 Española. Las Leyes Nuevas de 1542 constituyeron el primer intento de arrebatar a los conquistadores el poder local que habían obtenido en América, las cuales incluían la abolición de las encomiendas y la suspensión de los privilegios tan duramente ganados. Como era de esperarse, la reacción en América fue sumamente hostil, siendo en el Perú donde el rechazo alcanzó la mayor contundencia. Gonzalo Pizarro se rebela en Octubre de 1544 y vence al primer virrey del Perú Blasco Núñez de Vela en Iñaquito, ordenando su decapitación (Ene 1546); y gobierna hasta que fue derrotado por el Pacificador Pedro de la Gazca en la Batalla de Jaquijahuana en Cusco (Abril 1548). En una época en que la lealtad, fidelidad y justicia valía muy poco, los encomenderos llegaron a desarrollar un sentimiento de arraigo por la tierra que los cobijara; sentimiento que estaba por encima de su ambición por las riquezas del suelo peruano y que estaba relacionado con el status, con la posición, con el ansiado reconocimiento legal y social que habían adquirido con tanto sacrificio y que no estaban dispuestos a perder. En esta nueva tierra, por fin eran algo, tenían identidad... podrían decirse que los encomenderos rebeldes estaban expresando un sentimiento de arraigo hacia esta tierra, en buena cuenta, de amor hacia el Perú. Sobre la conquista y los conquistadores, coincidimos con Víctor A. Belaúnde, cuando afirma que: "Juzgar la conquista como una simple empresa económica es sólo concebible dentro de la menguada concepción materialista de la historia; Considerarla como una simple transformación política, sería revivir el criterio empírico de los narradores sin visión filosófica y estética de los acontecimientos. La conquista es un hecho de la más profunda complejidad humana. Hay que contemplarla desde muchos puntos de vista. El primero que se destaca es el relativo al individualismo español. Aunque apoyada por el Estado, la conquista es obra del hombre español. En este sentido la conquista es afirmación de la personalidad, voluntad de poder, sed de aventura, sentimiento heroico de la vida y embriaguez de paisaje. La conquista es el hecho máximo de heroísmo vital". (Belaunde 1957: 49). En resumen, como producto de un complejo proceso de yuxtaposición, amalgamación y unión de un componente indígena y un componente español; de una incipiente identidad incaica y una indefinida identidad española, va apareciendo lentamente el germen de una identidad diferente, propia, nativa, peruana. Los movimientos de resistencia indígena y las acciones de los encomenderos rebeldes son los primeros indicios de nuestra Identidad Nacional. En estas circunstancias, encontramos a la primera persona que es considerado por muchos como el primer peruano: El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. EL PRIMER PERUANO No nos extenderemos en los datos biográficos de Garcilaso, pues ello estaría fuera del propósito del presente artículo; sin embargo sólo mencionaremos que nace en 1539; su padre fue el Capitán español Sebastián Garcilaso de la Vega y Vargas, quien estableció una relación de concubinato con la ñusta Isabel Chimpu Ocllo, sobrina de Huayna Capac, y se le dio inicialmente el nombre de Gómez Suárez de Figueroa. Durante los primeros años de su vida aprendió el quechua y las tradiciones de su familia inca; no se conoce cuando aprendió el castellano, pero se sabe que el joven mestizo Garcilaso alternó en dos mundos culturalmente diferentes; con los cuales estableció un vínculo directo a través de su padre español y su madre cusqueña. Al parecer, durante su adolescencia realizó viajes que marcaron en él, impresiones auténticas y directas sobre la tierra, los usos, las costumbres y las leyendas del Tahuantinsuyo. En esta época también sufrió un proceso profundamente traumático: su padre en cumplimiento de una Real Ordenanza que pretendía propiciar la moralidad de la Colonia, entrega la ñusta Chimpu Ocllo a Juan de Pedroche, un español de bajo linaje, quien la desposa; mientras que él contrae matrimonio con doña Luisa Martel de los Ríos; era su deseo constituir un linaje que perpetuara las tradiciones familiares. El joven Garcilaso Gómez Suárez de Figueroa, como se llamaba en esa época, sirvió de escribiente a su padre, vivió con él y 77 compartió en alguna medida su esplendidez. Garcilaso asistía tanto las fiestas incaicas como las procesiones del Corpus y de San Marcos. Cuando Garcilaso tenía la edad de 19 años, muere su padre y con ello perdía las encomiendas, en un momento en que se debatía el establecimiento definitivo del sistema a perpetuidad; por lo que decide viajar a España, presentándose ante el Consejo de Indias con una demanda de restitución de tierras a favor de su madre. Su petición fue denegada, aduciendo la lealtad de su padre a Gonzalo Pizarro y a su causa insurgente, calificándolo de traidor a la Corona. Esta segunda gran adversidad marcaría nuevamente su vida. Entre su adolescencia y la joven adultez, se aprecia una crisis de identidad: "... Sobre el propio Garcilaso de la Vega se ha gastado mucha pluma y papel en encontrarlo humanista, renacentista, galano de estilo y de armas, olvidándose premeditadamente de que su vida es una crisis de identidad y no una resolución feliz de mestizaje". (Vargas 1979: 368). En 1565, a la edad de 26 años, cambia su nombre por el de su progenitor: Garcilaso de la Vega, y decidido a reparar la honra de su padre, se alista en el Ejército para participar en la guerra contra los moriscos, es ascendido al grado de Capitán de su Majestad, y obtiene cuatro conductas, dos del rey Felipe II y dos del príncipe don Juan de Austria, regresando con gloria. Luego, adquiere cierta tranquilidad económica al recibir una herencia de su tío don Alonso de Vargas y por esta época tiene un hijo que se llamó Diego de Vargas; el mestizo Garcilaso ahora se siente español. Posteriormente, se siente atraído por las letras y en 1590 publica su primera obra que lleva por título: "La traducción del indio de los tres diálogos de amor de León Hebreo, hecha del italiano en español por Garcilaso Inca de la Vega, natural de la gran ciudad del Cuzco, cabeza de los reinos y provincias del Perú". Es decir a los 50 años intercala el apelativo Inca al firmar su primera obra literaria. Ya no solamente se siente español, sino que destaca su vertiente inca, y se otorga de este modo, un signo de distinción. Este hombre, no era completamente un hidalgo español, ni un noble inca, era un mestizo biológica y culturalmente; habiendo encontrado y aceptado que él era diferente a sus dos vertientes. El profundo y prolongado conflicto de identidad en Garcilaso comienza a resolverse. A los 70 años, publica la primera parte de su obra Los Comentarios Reales, dedicada a testimoniar lo que vio y oyó del Imperio de los Incas; en ella, Garcilaso nos dice: "A los hijos de español y de india, o de indio y de española nos llaman mestizos por decir que somos mezclados de ambas naciones: fue impuesto por los primeros españoles que tuvieron hijos de indias y por ser nombre impuesto por nuestros padres, y por su significado me lo llamo yo a boca llena y me honro con él. Aunque en Indias si a uno de ellos le dicen sois un mestizo o es un mestizo, lo toman por menosprecio". (Hernández 1979: 109) A los 73 años escribe la segunda parte; en ella Garcilaso rinde homenaje a la conquista; de esa manera, las dos partes de su obra abarcan los dos componentes de su identidad. Garcilaso fallece en Abril de 1616, la grabación en su lápida, se inicia con su nombre definitivo: El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, varón insigne, digno de perpetua memoria. Ilustre en sangre. Perito en letras. Valiente en armas.... 78 Vemos en Garcilaso el ejemplo vivo de fusión, de transformación y de síntesis. Las variaciones de su nombre constituyen hitos en esta formación de su identidad:  1 año : Gómez Suárez de Figueroa.  16 años : Garcilaso Gómez Suárez de Figueroa.  26 años : Garcilaso de la Vega.  50 años : Garcilaso Inca de la Vega.  77 años : Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. El Dr. Aurelio Miroquesada Sosa en su libro "El Inca Garcilaso" señala que él fue el primer peruano que se pregunta ¿Qué es el Perú: país conquistado o país creado por la conquista? y avizora una respuesta de lo que iba a ser el país en el futuro. Del considerado primer peruano se ha escrito lo siguiente: "Al nombrar a Garcilaso; yo siento que una vibración emocionada se levanta en todos los delegados en homenaje al Padre de la Historia Peruana y al paradigma de la nacionalidad: herencias de sabiduría incaica y de heroísmo hispánico se juntaron en la alquimia del amor para forjar al poeta que debería describir la verdad profunda de nuestro heráldico pasado". (Belaunde 1957: 517). Creemos que en el siglo XVI, de manera lenta y dolorosa fue surgiendo la identidad nacional de nuestro país. De igual forma, Garcilaso a lo largo de su vida, lenta y dolorosamente fue apareciendo y aceptando su identidad personal; al término de este proceso, él no se siente cabalmente ni español ni inca, sino diferente a ellos, pero con elementos de ambos, una síntesis viviente; por ello, el Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, es cabalmente y con justicia: el primer peruano. BIBLIOGRAFÍA.  ALZAMORA GARCÍA, Edgardo. (1992) Pacificación: Clamor nacional. Lima.  BELAUNDE, Víctor Andrés. (1957) Peruanidad. 2da edición. Ediciones Librería Studium. Lima.  HERNÁNDEZ, Max. (1979) Garcilaso Inca de la Vega, Historia de un Patronímico. Perú: Identidad Nacional. Talleres de Industrial Gráfica. Lima.  VARGAS VEGA, Raúl. (1979) Educación e identidad nacional. Perú: Identidad Nacional. CEDEP. Lima.  VARGAS VACA Francisco Antonio. (2000) La Identidad Nacional, propuestas para su incremento y refuerzo ante las nuevas amenazas. Tesis del Centro de Altos Estudios Nacionales. Lima.  VARGAS VACA Francisco Antonio. (2011) "¿Cómo influyó la Identidad Nacional en la defensa de nuestro país?" Revista del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas. Lima. Septiembre, pp 131 151.  VARGAS VACA Francisco Antonio. (2011) "Identidad y Defensa Nacionales". Revista Vivir Bien 155. Lima. Octubre, pp 14 17. HETEROEVALUACIÓN 79 LA CAPACITACION DEBE SER UNA INVERSIÓN Julio Fidel Príncipe López* RESUMEN En tiempos de globalización y competitividad, la Gestión de Recursos Humanos no es ajena a los procesos de cambios; ya que es una de las funciones que más ha evolucionado, asumiendo un enfoque estratégico muy cercano a la cima de la estructura organizacional. Hay un mayor consenso en que los resultadosorganizacionales no sólo dependen de los ámbitos tecnológicos o financieros; sino fundamentalmente de la calidad técnica y humana de sus integrantes y en este proceso es fundamental saber gestionar la función de capacitación, que debe ser una verdadera inversión. PALABRAS CLAVES: Globalización, Competitividad, cambios, Talento Humano, Capacitación, Desarrollo, Planeamiento, Evaluación. El reto de la competitividad En el mundo global que vivimos, debemos estar de acuerdo con los empresarios, los gerentes de éxito y demás estudiosos de la gestión moderna de las organizaciones,que afirman, que la principal ventaja competitiva de las naciones y de las empresas ya no se basa en sus recursos naturales o financieros; pues, la verdadera ventaja competitiva radica en el conocimiento y su adecuada gestión. Por lo tanto, es el potencial humano, el que le da mayor valor añadido a la organización.La influencia del entorno global y competitivo sobre la vida de las organizaciones, lleva a que la gerencias consideren como prioritario su estudio y análisis, tanto desde la perspectiva organizacional como desde el campo de la gestión de las personas que integran la empresa. La competitividad organizacional no surge como fruto de una casualidad o un milagro, ni se desarrolla espontáneamente en el tiempo; se forma y se alcanzaen base a procesos planeados de aprendizaje de todos los trabajadores en los distintos niveles que configuran la dinámica organizacional. Las organizaciones de calidad no nacen, sino se hacen. En este entorno turbulento e incierto, las organizaciones que aprenden, se encuentran a tono con las tendencias modernas del diseño organizacional, como la estructura horizontal, la gestión conempowerment, la información compartida, gerencia participativa, liderazgo transformador, estrategias de colaboración y culturas flexibles. Las empresas buscan incrementar sus índices de productividad, lograr mayor eficiencia, desarrollar una cultura organizacional orientada a la innovación y brindar servicios de calidad; lo que está llevandoa que los gerentes adopten nuevos modelos de gestión, tomando como eje al talento humano, que es capaz de llevar a cabo eficazmente los procesos hacia el crecimiento, el desarrollo y la supervivencia organizacional. Las organizaciones trazan sus estrategias para captar a los mejores talentos que hay en el mercado de recursos humanos y luego desarrollarlos y retenerlos. El talento humano es la mayor ventaja competitiva y es prácticamente imposible de imitar. Saber gestionar el cambio es una necesidad para todas las organizaciones, sean privadas o públicas. El reto es tener velocidad de respuesta al generar sus procesos de adaptación, para así garantizar su competitividad, su permanencia y éxito en mercados cada vez más exigentes. 80 Se requiere un cambio organizacional planeado, orientado hacia la visión y las metas. "El cambio organizacional planeado es un intento deliberado, por parte de los gerentes y los empleados, por mejorar, en algún sentido importante, el funcionamiento de los equipos, los departamentos, las decisiones o de la organización entera" (Slocum 2009:497). Las organizaciones además del enfoque económico, tienen que abordar el enfoque del desarrollo organizacional para mejorar las competencias de los colaboradores, fomentando su sentido de pertenencia y su sentido de permanencia. Para gestionar a las empresas hacia la competitividad; con total seguridad se puede decir, que en las organizaciones todo puede cambiar; pero si la persona no cambia, nada habrá cambiado y en esta orientación, cuando propiciamos el aprovechamiento del talento humano, encontramos un proceso fundamental que es la capacitación. El reto es saber dirigir este proceso, para que en verdad constituya la mejor inversión. En un entorno como el que vivimos, se hace indispensable que tengamos en cuenta nuevas formas de entender el trabajo, nuevas formas de pensar, sentir y actuar y la necesidad de una capacitación y desarrollo permanentes para enfrentar los desafíos. Lo que está sucediendo es un cambio de paradigmas. El Talento Humano desde una perspectiva estratégica Las organizaciones aparecen y se desarrollan en base a un elemento común: todas están integradas por personas interesadas en alcanzar objetivos que individualmente no lo podrían lograr. La organización, debemos verla como un ente vivo, capaz de crear, transformar y de aprender, precisamente, porque tienen a las personas que son la sangre que les da vida. Por eso no es exagerado afirmar que las personas constituyen el verdadero capital de las organizaciones. Los colaboradores en una organización cuentan con una serie de conocimientos que están basados en su propia formación y experiencia. Este es el conocimiento individual que al ser utilizado les da poder y cuando el conocimiento individual de los integrantes se comparte, surge el conocimiento organizacional. Es así, que cuando aprovechamos el conocimiento individual y grupal, garantizamos que la eficiencia, la eficacia y la efectividad se alcancen. Estos conocimientos que constituyen un valor intangible es lo que llamamos capital humano, que haysaber gestionarlo. Las organizacionesque se comprometen con la gestión del talento, administran a las personas enfatizando el rol estratégico, más allá de lo puramente operativo y buscan atraer, seleccionar, capacitar, desarrollar y retener a las personas dentro de la organización. Está ya plenamente reconocido que cuando una organización administra el talento humano, se alcanzan los grandes objetivos: utilidades, satisfacción al cliente, calidad, productividad, innovación, reducción de costos, menos rotación laboral, etc.Se requiere entender que ya no administramos como en épocas remotas "mano de obra", sino "personas" que aportan a través de su desempeño un valor diferencial en los resultados. Las organizaciones de alto desempeño, sostienen que son las personas, en base a su talento, lo que les permite crecer, tener éxito, contar con un buen posicionamiento en el mercado y ser rentables. Es por eso que en su filosofía y su cultura organizacional toman muy en cuenta la orientación hacia las personas. Los nuevos modelos de gestión organizacional como el planeamiento estratégico, el cuadro de mando integral, la gestión del conocimiento, la gestión del talento, la gestión de la calidad, la gestión de competencias y el capital intelectual presentan un denominador común: todos buscan el alineamiento entre los objetivos y valores organizacionales con los objetivos y valores individuales. Este enfoque se ha convertido en un factor clave para lograr éxito empresarial, tanto en su gestión interna como en sus estrategias de competitividad en el mercado. 81 En el proceso de atraer, de desarrollar y de retener a colaboradores productivos; además del adecuado proceso de incorporación de nuevos elementos con las competencias requeridas, cumple un rol especial el campo de la capacitación y el desarrollo de las personas, que permite a estos integrantes mejorar sus competencias para lograr un alto desempeño en el puestoque ocupan y para alcanzar otros puestos de mayor responsabilidad en base a planes de carrera y planes de sucesión. El proceso de Capacitación La preocupación de hoy en las organizaciones y en la gerencia de recursos humanos, es medir la contribución del área de capacitación al logro de los objetivos organizacionales, ya que tradicionalmente el concepto que prevaleció fue cumplir simplemente con planear y ejecutar programas de capacitación, muchas veces desconociendo si existe o no potencial apto para desarrollar o si hay relación con los planes estratégicos de la organización, o si estos programas son los requeridos para mejorar el desempeño. Básicamente, la Capacitación está considerada como un proceso educativo a corto plazo, el cual utiliza un procedimiento planeado, sistemático y organizado a través del cual, el personal de una empresa u organización en general, adquieren los conocimientos y las habilidades técnicas necesarias para acrecentar su eficacia en el logro de las metas que se haya propuesto la organización en la cual se desempeña. Las empresas modernas, en sus procesos de capacitación ya vienen también aprovechando los avances tecnológicos. Se denomina e-learning a la formación que se realiza con uso intensivo de tecnología, y más específicamente mediante Internet. Es el resultado de los cambios en diferentes aspectos de la formación generados por la introducción de las tecnologías de la información y de la comunicación. La formación siempre ha ido acompañada de tecnología: desde la tiza y la pizarra,el video, el Power Point, y ahora es internet. De esta manera se ha ido modificando, especialmente la forma de enseñar, así como la de aprender, de desaprender y de reaprender. Entre otros objetivos de la capacitación, podemos señalar los siguientes:  Proporcionar a la empresa, losrecursos humanos altamente calificados en términos de competencias para un mejor desempeño de su trabajo.  Que los trabajadores mejoren su desempeño en sus puestos tanto actuales como futuros.  Mantener a los trabajadores permanentemente actualizados frente a los cambios científicos y tecnológicos que se generen, proporcionándoles información sobre su aplicación.  Lograr cambios en su comportamiento con el propósito de mejorar las relaciones interpersonales entre todos los integrantes de la empresa. Hoy estamos seguros que los programas de capacitación y desarrollo deben dar respuesta a las necesidades tanto individuales como organizacionales (presentes y futuras); de tal manera, que su objetivo sea desarrollar las competencias que cada uno de los procesos requiere para que haya valor añadido en toda la gestión productiva de bienes y/o servicios. El gran cambio que se está logrando es que la gestión de la capacitación, ya no sea simplemente ajustar al presupuesto una serie de programas masivos y especialmente de moda; sino, que este procesorealmente responda a las necesidades de capacitación tanto individuales, como organizacionales. Es decir, que en el plan de capacitación anual se consideren los programas, su nivel y la relación de los trabajadores que requieren dichos programas. Luego, con una buena medición del impacto de estos programas, se podrá alcanzar el objetivo de mejora en el desempeño y en los resultados organizacionales. Se considera que el proceso de capacitación, debe desarrollar las fases siguientes: a. Diagnóstico de Necesidades de Capacitación. b. Formulación del Plan de Capacitación y los Programas. 82 c. Administración de los Programas de Capacitación d. Evaluación o medición de los resultados de la capacitación. Es fundamental considerar que para que este proceso tenga éxito, los jefes directos deben ser verdaderos gestores; ya que ellos cumplen una labor imprescindible especialmente en el diagnóstico de necesidades de capacitación de sus colaboradores y en el seguimiento de las mejoras en el desempeño de los mismos luego del programa. Para que un jefe desarrolle esta labor debe desprenderse en cierta manera de tanta carga operativa y de control, para abordar este rol estratégico de desarrollo. Muchas organizaciones han enfatizado de alguna manera en la formulación y en la administración de los programas, pero no han desarrollado técnicamente el diagnóstico de necesidades y mucho menos la evaluación del impacto de los programas de capacitación. Se hace importante plantearse este tipo de preguntas: ¿Qué pasó después del curso?, ¿mejoró el desempeño del trabajador?, ¿la organización pudo lograr mejores resultados? Con muchos procesos de capacitación, especialmente en las instituciones públicas de nuestro país, poco se puede demostrar sobre los beneficios que genera este proceso o sobre la utilidad de destinar mayores recursos para la capacitación. Por lo general las entidades sólo pueden reportar: cuántas personas participaron en los cursos, de qué áreas, cuáles temáticas se trataron y cuál fue la intensidad horaria; pero el impacto de la capacitación sobre el aprendizaje o el desempeño en los puestos de trabajo o los resultados organizacionales, difícilmente son identificados. Menos aún se analiza, si lo que se programó, realmente obedece a un estudio de necesidades y si los objetivos considerados en el plan de capacitación y en los programas diseñados responden a dichas necesidades. Si a esto le agregamosque el interés fundamental de ciertos participantes es simplemente alcanzar los certificados o diplomas, la situación es más preocupante. ¿En estos casos se puede asegurar que la capacitación fue realmente una inversión? Por lo anterior, es preciso introducir procesos técnicos en las diferentes fases de la capacitación. En este artículo resaltaremos la fase de evaluación, que es tal vez la que menos se está desarrollando en nuestras organizaciones. Evaluación del impacto de la capacitación. Cuando revisamos las investigaciones realizadas en este campo, encontramos que muchos estudiosos han abordado la problemática de la evaluación de la capacitación desde diferentes ángulos, con resultados de mayor o menor relevancia. Posiblemente, uno de los modelos más conocidos y utilizadosy que destacaremos en este artículo, es el formulado por Donald Kirkpatrick. A pesar de lo difundido del modelo y del avance que significó, debemos reconocer que como todo enfoque, tiene algunas debilidades. El autor establece cuatro niveles de evaluación que presentamos a continuación: Primer nivel: Reacción. Satisfacción del participante con las acciones de capacitación. Una de las prácticas más comunes que se desarrollan en los diferentes cursos para evaluar la capacitación es medir la reacción de los participantes una vez finalizada la actividad. Podemos definir la reacción como el grado en que los participantes disfrutaron del programa de capacitación; o sea, se evalúan sólo los sentimientos, y emociones y no el aprendizaje. Se realiza mediante la utilización de diversas herramientas como: cuestionarios, entrevistas, discusiones (abiertas o cerradas, individuales o grupales), etc. Por lo tanto, refleja la medida de la satisfacción de la persona capacitada, entendiendo que las reacciones positivas no garantizan necesariamente que la capacitación haya tenido éxito, a menos que se traduzcan en mejoras en el desempeño del puesto. 83 De todas maneras, esta evaluación es importante porque permite contar con información en cuanto al programa, así como para encontrarcomentarios y sugerencias para mejorar futuros programas. Segundo nivel: Aprendizaje. ¿Qué se aprendió y qué se asimiló en las sesiones? Nos permite evaluar si en realidad los participantes aprendieron en términos de conocimientos, actitudes y habilidades. Kirkpatrick define aprendizaje, como el grado en que los participantes cambian sus actitudes, amplían sus conocimientos, aumentan sus habilidades, como resultado de haber participado en el programa. Se considera que el aprendizaje se ha logrado cuando las actitudes han cambiado, el conocimiento se ha incrementado o las habilidades han aumentado. Esta evaluación es mucho más difícil que la de reacción y lleva más tiempo. La evaluación del aprendizaje mide la efectividad del formador y del programa para lograr los objetivos de mejora de las competencias de los participantes. Nos permite tomar en cuenta qué nivel de aprendizaje se ha producido y luego tratar de predecir qué nivel de cambio de comportamiento puede esperarse. En este campo, se utiliza muchas veces las pruebas de entrada y salida. Tercer nivel: Comportamiento. Influencia en el desempeño. Implica que se identifiquen los cambios en el desempeño, fruto del programa de capacitación. Este proceso requiere dedicación del jefe como para hacer el seguimiento en el desempeño de sus trabajadores que se capacitaron y evaluar estas mejoras en base a indicadores previamente establecidos. Además se requiere la motivación para cambiar y trabajar en un ambiente que favorezca el aprendizaje y que sea tolerante inclusive al error, cuando se está aprendiendo. Se demuestra el aprendizaje, a través del cambio de comportamiento. En este caso se mide la transferencia de lo aprendido al puesto de trabajo. Cuarto nivel: Impacto en la organización. Reducción de costos, reducción de la rotación laboral y ausentismo del personal, reducción de quejas, incremento de la productividad, en cantidad y calidad, mejora de la calidad, rentabilidad, etc. La medición de los resultados de capacitación es difícil, pero posible. Cada vez más organizaciones buscan a través de la capacitación una estrategia de cambio a largo plazo. Es decir, perciben a la capacitación en términos de inversión a futuro. Cuando se miden los resultados, es importante que transcurra un tiempo para que el cambio haya tenido lugar. En algunos casos se mide a los seis meses, o a los doce meses, dependiendo de losobjetivos establecidos. ROI: El retorno de la inversión, a través del cual se mide la relación costo beneficio de un programa de capacitación. (Este nivel no es aplicado estrictamente por el modelo de Kirkpatrick). El ROI de la formación El ROI (Return Of Investment o retorno de la inversión) de la formación se calcula teniendo en cuenta los beneficios económicos que obtiene la empresa gracias a la transferencia de lo aprendido al desempeño de su trabajo. Este nivel de evaluación busca que el dinero destinado a la capacitación no sea un gasto, sino una inversión. El ROI de la formación se refiere a la rentabilidad obtenida por el dinero invertido en una acción formativa. Éste se calcula teniendo en cuenta los beneficios económicos que obtiene la empresa gracias a las mejoras en el desempeño de sus trabajadores capacitados. Estos beneficios económicos pueden encontrarse por la medición del impacto financiero, fruto de la capacitación, por ejemplo en: -Aumento de producción Disminución de costes. Disminución de tiempos en los procesos, etc 84 En definitiva, el ROI de la formación existe, y es posible medirlo. Lo que hay que tener en cuenta es que determinado resultado tal vez no pueda asociarse de manera directa e inequívoca con la capacitación, ya que pueden estar interviniendo también otras variables. El objetivo es que el coste de la formación, la cantidad de presupuesto que se invierte, retorne a la organización, de ser posible multiplicado. ¿Por qué debemos medir los resultados de la capacitación? Debemos valorar los resultados de la capacitación, de la misma forma en que se realiza con cualquier otra inversión, ya que la capacitación de ninguna manera debe ser un gasto. Pero, es importante volver a enfatizar que, para que podamos medir estos resultados, debemos partir por convencernos que se deben introducir cambios radicales en el proceso, para que no se continúen con programas generales y masivos; sino que éstos respondan a necesidades y se planifiquen considerando objetivos e indicadores, que permitan su evaluación. Para finalizar, me gustaría formular la siguiente similitud que encuentro entre la capacitación y la atención en medicina: Cuando un paciente se encuentra con algún malestar, acude al médico, que observa los síntomas y efectúa algunos exámenes para diagnosticar su enfermedad; luego le receta algunas medicinas y el tratamiento pertinente a su mal y le recomienda que en un lapso de tiempo retorne para verificar los resultados. En base a la evolución que se haya generado en el paciente, el médico le puede cambiar la dosis, o recomendar otro tratamiento o tal vez le dé el alta. Así, cuando un trabajador tiene algunas debilidades en su desempeño, el jefe diagnostica y le recomienda algún programa de capacitación personalizado y luego le hará el seguimiento pertinente para ver como evoluciona en su comportamiento y de acuerdo a sus observaciones, podrá pedir al área de capacitación tal vez un nuevo programa o un reforzamiento para este trabajador. De esta manera se eliminará la debilidad en el desempeño. La reflexión final es que se hace indispensable que los directivos de las Organizaciones identifiquen cómo debe ser el proceso de capacitación (debe ser) y luego revisen cómo lo están (cómo es); de tal manera que si encuentran la brecha, podrán formular sus estrategias para mejorarlo y así garantizar que la capacitación que realizan sea la mejor inversión. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS  Chiavenato, Idalberto (2002) Gestión del Talento Humano. Colombia. McGRAW-HILL  Palacios Plaza, Jorge (2008) Medición del Impacto y la rentabilidad de la formación. Cómo llegar al ROI de la formación. España. Ediciones. Díaz de Santos.  Menchén B. Francisco (2009) La creatividad y las nuevas tecnologías en las organizaciones modernas. Argentina. Ediciones Díaz de Santos. Slocum Hellriegel (2009) Comportamiento Organizacional. México. CENGAGE Learning __________________ *Magister en Administración y Gerencia Social. Docente de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y el Instituto Científico y Tecnológico del Ejército. Consultor de la Corporación Americana de Desarrollo.  [email protected] 85 IMPORTANCIA DEL TALENTO HUMANO EN LAS EMPRESAS Dr. ORLANDO CUADRA RODRIGUEZ "Ante la globalización de los negocios, el desarrollo Tecnológico, el gran efecto del cambio y el intenso movimiento en búsqueda de la calidad y de la productividad, se comprueba de manera elocuente en la mayoría de las organizaciones que la gran diferencia, la principal ventaja competitiva de las empresas, se deriva de las personas que laboran en ellas." Resumen Las viejas definiciones que usan el término Recurso Humano, se basan en la concepción de un hombre como un "sustituible" engranaje más de la maquinaria de producción, cuando se utiliza el término Recurso Humano se está catalogando a la persona como un instrumento, sin tomar en consideración que éste es el capital principal, el cual posee habilidades y características que le dan vida, movimiento y acción a toda organización, por lo que actualmente se utiliza el término de Talento Humano como el capital más importante y la Gestión del talento humano existe para mejorar la contribución de las personas a las organizaciones siendo la correcta administración de los mismos como una de sus tareas más decisivas para lograr el éxito de una organización. Las personas día a día contribuyen con sus ideas y dan lo mejor de sí mismos para el cumplimiento de las metas organizacionales. El objetivo de la administración del talento humano es que los hombres y las mujeres que participan en una empresa conozcan que constituyen el elemento básico para que la organización pueda lograr sus objetivos. El pensamiento debe estar siempre basado en el cambio, que es lo único constante en nuestros tiempos; orientado al análisis de capacidades, trabajo con la mejor iniciativa, trabajo en base a escenarios, contemplando un plan de negocios, conociendo los requerimientos del mercado, considerando la posibilidad del fracaso, calculando costos y utilidades y aprovechando los resultados de la excelencia que sostiene Tom Peter; cuando nos hable de la era del valor añadido gracias a la imaginación, la creatividad y el capital intelectual. 86 Talento humano El talento, según la real academia española de la lengua, refiere a la personas inteligentes o aptas para determinada ocupación; inteligente, en el sentido que entiende y comprende, tiene la capacidad de resolver problemas dado que tiene las habilidades, destrezas y experiencia necesario para ello, apta en el sentido que puede operar competentemente en una actividad debido a su capacidad y disposición para el buen desempeño de la ocupación. El término "talento" no designa una característica absoluta, sino que exige una comparación con algún tipo de estándar, para poder decidir si se trata de una capacidad o habilidad "destacada" o no. Es un concepto esencialmente relativo, y por lo tanto, necesariamente sujeto a las influencias de la época y la cultura, que definen, en primer lugar, qué capacidades o habilidades son "destacables" por su valor social, y también, qué nivel de superioridad respecto al promedio es necesario que un sujeto alcance para considerarlo realmente "destacado". Podemos decir que, Talento Humano es la combinación de varios aspectos, características de una persona, que implica saber (conocimientos), querer (compromiso) y poder (autoridad). El talento es un don complejo y completo porque involucra conocimientos, actitudes y destrezas. El talento humano es una mezcla de "sé hacer, quiero hacerlo y puedo hacerlo". Subrayo, que el talento humano, no solo es conocimiento o destrezas, es también compromiso y capacidad, es la suma de varias competencias, las cuales permiten enfrentar el escenario de un mundo tan dinámico, con procesos complejos y llenos de incertidumbre para las empresas hoy en día. Gestión del talento humano Tomaremos en cuenta la definición de gestión de talento humano dado por algunos autores: CHAVENATO, IDALBERTO (2002), afirma que la gestión de talento humano es un área muy sensible a la mentalidad que predomina en las organizaciones. Es contingente y situacional pues depende de aspectos como la cultura de cada organización, la estructura organizacional adoptada, los caracteres del contexto ambiental, el negocio de la organización, la tecnología utilizada, los procesos internos y otra infinidad de variable importantes. SCHULER R.S (1992), Puede definirse como la gestión estratégica de los recursos humanos, es todas aquellas actividades que afectan al comportamiento de las personas a la hora de formular e implantar las estrategias de las empresas o las decisiones respecto a la orientación dada a los procesos respecto a la orientación dada a los procesos de gestión de los recursos humanos ya afectan al comportamiento de los individuos a medios y largo plazo, tomando como referencia tanto los factores internos como de contexto a la organización. MILKOVICH GEORGE Y BOUDREW JOHN W. (1994), Afirma que la gestión del talento humano es una serie de decisiones acerca de las relaciones de los empleados que influye en la eficiencia de estos y de las organizaciones. De acuerdo a lo planteado por los autores podemos tener en cuenta que Gestionar el Talento Humano se ha convertido en la clave para que las empresas enfrenten las exigencias actuales y futuras del mercado, gestionarlo es el reto principal que tienen que afrontar, para ello es necesario incorporar una visión más integradora en la mentalidad de los directivos y trabajadores de las diferentes Organizaciones y siempre pensar que las 87 propuestas Metodológicas que se utilicen deben implementarse en su totalidad para lograr la sinergia funcional del proceso. Una vez logrado es dirigir el Talento hacia el destino de impacto deseado y con ello se obtendrán los resultados deseados, ya que a través de él es que se pueden implementar, reacomodar, adaptar y hacer factibles cualquier adelanto tecnológico, concepto teórico o aplicación práctica. Importancia de la gestión del talento Humano en las empresas EI mundo va en constante cambio y las empresas también están en esta ola de cambio. Algunas de ellas van a la vanguardia, otras las siguen y otras aún tratan de pensar sobre la marcha, casi paralizadas en el tiempo y confundidas, sin entender con exactitud lo que está ocurriendo a su alrededor. De este modo, si el mundo cambió y las empresas también cambiaron, el área de Recursos Humanos (RRHH) debe acompañar estos cambios. En muchas organizaciones el área de RRHH va al frente, como punta de lanza del cambio organizacional; en otras, es el obstáculo que impide el ajuste a las nuevas condiciones del mundo moderno. El Recurso Humano en las organizaciones se han convertido en Talento Humano, se abandonó su comportamiento pasivo y reactivo para adoptar una posición proactiva y orientada al futuro para anticiparse a las exigencias y necesidades de la organización. Las personas no son simples empleados ni se lIaman recursos humanos, sino participantes y colaboradores de la organización que brindan el conocimiento y las habilidades necesarias para el éxito de la iniciativa conjunta en plena era de la información. Entonces no es de extrañar que el área de Recursos Humanos, también experimente cambios. La globalización, el rápido desarrollo de la tecnología de la información, la competencia desenfrenada, la necesidad de reducir costos, el énfasis en el cliente, la calidad total y la necesidad de competitividad constituyen poderosos efectos que el área no puede ignorar. La empresa reconoce que existe una fuerte competencia y que necesita retener los mejores talentos y obtener el máximo de las personas, en términos de eficiencia y de eficacia, para alcanzar el éxito en los negocios. Bibliografía 1. ALBIZU, E. Y LANDETA, J. (2001): Dirección estratégica de los recursos humanos. Pirámide, Madrid. Partes 1 y 2. 2. CARDONA, PABLO (2000), Las Claves Del Talento: La Influencia Del Liderazgo En El Desarrollo Del Capital Humano. 3. CHAVENATO, IDALBERTO (2002), Gestión del Talento humano. Ed. McGrawHill. 4. DAVIS, JAMES & DAVIS, ADELAIDE (1998), Effective Training Strategies: A Comprehensive Guide to Maximizing Learning in Organizations (Berrett-Koehler Organizational Performance Series). 5. MARTINEZ, LUCIA (2002), Gestión Social del Talento Humano. 6. MILKOVICH, G.T. y BOUDREAU, J.W. (1994), Administración y Dirección de Recursos humanos. Ed. Addison-Wesley. EEUU. 7. SCHULER R.S. (1992), La Gestión de los Recursos Humanos. Ed. McGraw-Hill, Madrid. 88 Reseña Biográfica Título Licenciado en Administración Grados o Bachiller en Administración (UNFV) o Maestro en Administración (UIGV) o Doctor en Administración (UIGV) Docencia Escuela de Pos Grado de la Universidad " Inca Garcilaso de la Vega " 89 CARÁCTER, GENIO Y COSTUMBRES DE LOS LIMEÑOS 1790 JULIAN ERNESTO ROLLER GONZALES* Resumen Entérese como expresaban sus emociones los viajeros, sobre nuestra Lima en los años de la segunda mitad y finales de mil setecientos, en relación a sus usos y costumbres, carácter de sus habitantes sensualidad de sus mujeres, su fervor religioso y otros, hasta el extremo de denominarla "El Paraíso". Al leer este artículo, amigo lector, despliegue su imaginación pensando en la Lima de hoy. FELIPE BAUZA (o TADEO HAENKE) Viajero español, adscrito como oficial de marina a la expedición de Malaspina. Participó en varios recorridos peruanos con Tadeo Haenke, sabio botánico húngaro, de la misma expedición. Sus relaciones confundidas en archivos han dado lugar a que se atribuyera a Haenke lo escrito por Bauzá sobre costumbres peruanas. Palabras Clave. Paraíso, chapetón, desenfado, tapadas, sarao, corpus, cofradía, caporal, guarapo, sucumés, mandingo, cambundas, carabalíes, congas, misangas Para delinear con perfección el carácter de un pueblo, no son sin duda las mejores circunstancias las que acompañan a un viajero. La rapidez con que este debe formar sus juicios, la multitud de objetos nuevos que a cada paso distraen su atención, y el doble velo con que se ocultan las interioridades de los hombres son otros tantos obstáculos que impiden se pueda formar juicio exacto sobre esta parte tan interesante, y que ocupa el primer lugar en la historia de cualquier viajero. Si semejantes impedimentos concurren aún en pequeñas capitales y en pueblos que, por su situación local, no tienen motivos de adquirir y de renovar continuamente con los frutos de otros países sus vicios a sus costumbres ¿qué diremos de Lima, de la opulenta Lima, adonde, según la expresión de un escritor, vienen a rendir tributo las otras partes del globo que habitamos? ¿Qué diremos también de Lima cuando tantos europeos enamorados y arrebatados por el halagüeño atractivo de sus habitantes, es pecialmente de las mujeres, han llevado sus encomios hasta llamarla el Paraíso, elogiando el dulce trato de sus habitantes? Sin embargo, obligados a presentar el resultado de nuestras observaciones, y conociendo que el menor desliz en esta senda peligrosa arrastra tras sí el concepto de un pueblo entero, expondremos con la mayor imparcialidad el cuadro fiel de nuestras indagaciones, tal como nos lo ha hecho concebir la atenta observación de aquellas acciones que más repite el hombre, y cuya combinación manifiesta sus íntimos sentimientos y las pasiones que más le dominan.Se dice comúnmente que el hombre es un animal disimulado e hipócrita, y que todos contrahacen su 90 carácter mientras un interés muy grande los violenta. Con todo admite esta frase cierta restricción. El más diestro y político no puede sostener por mucho tiempo la simulación; es un estado forzado y contrario a la naturaleza que presto corre el velo en los momentos de su pasión. Si el que asecha aprovecha los instantes de descuido que tienen aún los hombres más grandes y disimulados, que con observar las costumbres y las acciones particulares sacan señas con las cuales al modo que por la diferencia de facciones se distinguen los rostros, así por las diversas pasiones e inclinaciones se distinguen las de los ánimos, son los limeños, en general, de buena disposición y de una viveza que generalmente los distingue de los habitantes de otras partes de América. Manifiéstase ésta en los movimientos de su mirada y aun en la pronunciación mas suelta, sin aquella languidez que se advierte en Buenos Aires y Chile. Tienen una percepción muy pronta, y se nota en las conversaciones la peculiar facilidad con que, sin muchas preguntas, se imponen en los asuntos que se tratan. Generalmente tienen feliz memoria: se ven jóvenes de muy corta edad graduados en las ciencias que se enseñan en sus Universidades, y se oyen con frecuencia actos del mayor lucimiento; pero lo que se hace más reparable es el desenfado y poca timidez con que se presentan a los actos públicos. Esta desenvoltura, hija sin duda del método de su educación, hará tal vez resplandecer en ellos un mérito que encaminado en el fondo, estribará solo en su buena memoria.Uno de los carácteres que sobresale más entre estos habitantes es la generosidad; pues sin embargo de que en las grandes capitales o la frecuencia de los huéspedes, por una parte, o el lujo que cercena las facultades por otra, hacen gravosa la hospitalidad, en la capital del Perú se ejerce con mucha facilidad en las casas de los amigos o personas para quienes se lleva recomendación. Se desprenden con facilidad de sus alhajas; son suntuosos en sus banquetes y pródigos del dinero; lo miran y gastan con la mayor indiferencia. Pero este mismo desprendimiento, que contenido dentro de sus justos límites haría el mejor elogio de los limeños, es por desgracia la causa de la mayor parte de sus ruinas. Llevan al exceso sus gastos, y lo peor es que, apoderándose este furor de derrochar de las clases más pobres, les acarrea incalculables daños, especialmente en los criollos. El chapetón es verdad que empieza a viciarse desde que llega a Lima, pero debe confesarse que a él se debe el tal o cual arreglo que se conserva en muchas familias. Acostumbraba decirnos un amigo que había puesto su estudio en conocer a los limeños: -El chapetón, decía, viene regularmente a edificar a este país; pero el criollo, su hijo, queda para destruir cuanto su padre edificó. En efecto, cuando una casa se halla atrasada se busca al chapetón para que la levante. Este se afana, la adelanta y la pone en tono; pero he aquí que sus hijos acaban con todo ayudados y aún instigados por la madre. No se halla ni se experimentan delitos atroces en estos vastos reinos, donde puede ser tan fácil la impunidad con la fuga a países y pueblos que distan entre sí tanto, y se caminan centenares de leguas sin tener enemigos de temer que las estaciones, los malos caminos, la escasez y la lluvia. Son compasivos en extremo, y desde que se hace público un delito todos conspiran a ocultar al reo, a disculparle, y hasta a empeñarse a ocultar al reo, a disculparle, y hasta a empeñarse en su defensa. Pero su humanidad en nada se conoce más que en el trato de sus esclavos: los visten, calzan y alimentan bastante bien, según su condición; y a pesar de que en estos suele haber demasiado motivo para los castigos, el más riguroso es ponerlos en una panadería, donde los hacen trabajar y les dan algunas correcciones. Raros son los esclavos que se quejan de que sus amos los traten con severidad. Ellos con el poco castigo, por el contrario, suelen ser consentidos y flojos servidores. Hay en Lima toda la política y urbanidad que se adquiere en el trato de una Corte. Los vicios que se les achacan son una especie de veleidad, que se suelen causar de lo que emprenden, varían de dictamen, y con poca firmeza acostumbran arrepentirse de sus tratos. Con efecto, fatigan su viveza trabajos de mucho tesón y constancia. Son fastuosos, aman los trenes y los vestidos ricos, y aunque en Lima se anda mucho de capa, la llevan de grana toda especie de personas blancas. Usan unas redecillas de hilo 91 finísimo y medias de seda de las mejores fábricas. Las capas son bordadas, las casacas de paños finos, y así todo lo que se ponen. Las calesas son las más costosas que caben en este género de carruajes; las que destinan para el paseo publico charoladas, cuestan hasta mil y dos mil pesos. En suma, el vestido de los hombres es lo más costoso que en América se gasta. Son ambiciosos por los empleos, y tratan de adquirirlos por cuantos medios crecen oportunos. Aman las riquezas para sus faustos; y por eso muchas casas ilustres, despreciando las perjudiciales preocupaciones que hay en la Península, ejercen abiertamente el comercio. Sujetos principales se emplean en la mercadería por menor, con tienda abierta; y se admiten en el trato y concurrencias de las principales sociedades a los maestres de las embarcaciones y a otros, que, no deben desmerecer, no se les eleva a tanto en otros países. Saben disimular en el trato con los españoles europeos, a quienes llaman chapetones, y se ve cuan poco traspira el sentimiento que a veces tienen de la riqueza rápida, personas que, siendo inferiores en nacimiento y quizá en capacidad y aptitud, se les prefiere; sufren la fortuna de éstos y ahogan prudentemente sus quejas. Bien sea por lealtad o por respeto, en pocas partes se ve más obedientes vasallos. En la Corte de Lima, al modo que en las de Europa, predomina el mismo genio de adulación y de intriga. Aquella se ejerce con frecuencia en muchas y pomposas ceremonias y arengas que se dirigen a los Virreyes. En las que suelen hacerse al tiempo de sus entradas no se economizan epítetos, ni se omiten las menores circunstancias que ilustren su familia. Por otra parte, una brillante soberbia los aparta de la concurrencia al Palacio de los Virreyes, se niegan a su obsequio hasta aquel punto que no haga reparable si éste los distingue o no tiene cierto agasajo y popularidad que los encanta sobre manera. Resalta este espíritu de orgullo en la manía que todos muestran por mudar hasta el nombre de las cosas, ampliándolas siempre que conducen a su engrandecimiento. Así llaman caballero a todo hombre blanco, ópera a cualquier concierto de instrumento, ayo al maestro de primeras letras, santo y ángel a cualquiera que tiene alguna apariencia de devoción; y de este modo siguen el mismo sistema con todas las demás cosas. Son dados a los placeres, al juego y a una vida regalada y ociosa. Idolatras de las mujeres, casi siempre estiman poco la suya propia. Se ven sujetos de carácter y personas cuyo estado los aparta de ciertas concurrencias, asistir a ellas con el disimulo y empacho que en otras partes. Se ve hombres graves entregados al juego y otras disoluciones. La juventud se corrompe fácilmente, y en Lima es crecido el número de mujeres prostitutas, cuyo lujo y riqueza prueban los muchos hombres acomodados que con ellas viven y las mantienen, hasta que se arruinan y sacrifican sus caudales. Es indecible lo que ganaría Lima con la sola providencia de recoger a tanto ocioso y vago como se encuentra a cada paso, aplicando muchos de ellos a grumetes de los navíos en las ocasiones de levas. Nótase el genio de la intriga, al que contribuye mucho su espíritu inquieto y su gran viveza, en las ocasiones que vaca cualquier empleo que proporcione mando u honor. Se mueven entonces todos los resortes de la política y el favor, hasta para el nombramiento del elector de la Universidad, en los empleos de Consulado, en las prelacías de convento, y últimamente en todas las elecciones públicas toma parte toda la ciudad, y no queda persona grande ni chica, mujer u hombre, que no se mezcle con un fervor increíble por sus amigos, parientes. Discúrrense lasmás complicadas e ingeniosas estratagemas, y se oye con este motivo antecedentes tan singulares que, al paso que entretienen por mucho tiempo las conversaciones de la tertulias, dan a conocer de cuanto soncapaces, y cuan peligrosos políticos serian si mudasen de objeto; pero, en Lima, todo se reduce (como ellos dicen) al número uno, esto es al individuo. Sin embargo de tales defectos, veo que sus buenas cualidades aventajan en mucho a las malas. Son dulces en su trato, tienen afabilidad y buena explicación, especialmente en materias amorosas en donde despliegan todos sus chistes y gracias, distinguiéndose en esto con particularidad las mujeres. Diferénciense estas de los hombres aventajándolos, no solo en aquellas cualidades físicas que parecen como inculcadas en el varón, sino en las dotes del ánimo y sus propiedades morales. Al más ligero examen percibe un observador 92 atento la superioridad de la limeña sobre el criollo, formando un contraste admirable y que la distingue de todas las demás de su sexo en otros países. Tienen el cuerpo mas fornido (a proporción) que el de los hombres; el espíritu mas sagaz y penetrante; las ideas mássólidas y permanentes; ejercen sobre los hombres influjo casi general; son hermosísimas, agraciadas y tan halagüeñas que arrebatan y enamoran; muestran, en sus palabras y acciones, cierto señorío y grandeza que la realza sobre manera; tienen el alma y chiste de las andaluzas, con otros muchos atractivos, y una facilidad en el hablar que las hace muy recomendables. Parece que la fecunda naturaleza ha derramado sobre ellas sus más preciosos dones. Desde muy temprano despliegan todos los resortes de su alma, y aun más que la físicaperfección de su cuerpo se anticipa la de su espíritu. Se oye a las muchachas discursos, razones y proposiciones que manifiestan lo mucho que se les adelanta el uso de la razón. Una limeña de diez años exige, en la conversación de un hombre bien criado, el mismo respeto y atención que una de quince en Europa. Encuéntrese en ellas, por lo común, mas formalidad y honradez que en los hombres, y son muy humanas y compasivas. No tienen para con los hombres todo aquel amor y tesón con que estos las aman, hasta parecer que las idolatran. Por Europa, en las ciudades corrompidas, las damas que pierden el respeto al público a su reputación, hacen gala del sambenito. Pero en las damas americanas no sucede así: disimulan sus desórdenes, y rara vez admiten en sus calesas a quien no sea o su marido o su inmediato pariente. Puede decirse que más reina la hipocresía que el escándalo. Sin embargo, cuando se comparan las limeñas con las europeas, cuando se examina con atención el espíritu de beatismo e hipocresía tan difundido por Italia y Francia antes de su Revolución, y aún por las misma España fácilmente se prefieren las limeñas, y se conoce que llevan a aquellas muchas ventajas. La práctica de los cortejos, que ha estado tan radicada en todos aquellos pueblos, seria en Lima la mayor degradación a que pudieran llegar el hombre y la mujer. Acostumbran los caballeros visitarse desde muy temprano, y ocupan la mañana en tratar sus negocios. Los más de ellos entienden bien los judiciales; y han estudiado las leyes. Andan de capa y gorro los ancianos, y los mozos llevan también su capa con una redecilla blanca, y el vestido de género rico o muy buen paño. Aficionándose algunos al uso de la patilla, y gastan sombreros redondos del mejor castor; el paño de la capa es de lo más exquisito, bien de grana o azul de San Fernando, con bordado en la esclavina. Preséntanse igualmente las mujeres con una ostentación que no se conoce en Europa; y sea por imitación, sea por el mal ejemplo o por natural deseo de brillar o sobresalir, manifiesta la limeña sobre este punto un prurito particular. Con efecto, son costosísimos los trajes que usan desde la cuna; guarnecen los de encajes de los más finos y ricos, usan sortijas cintillos y brazaletes engastados en piedras preciosas y nada cede a su magnificencia en el aparato de las camas y de los costosos ajuares de las casa. Pero los exorbitantes gastos a que obliga este lujo, aumentado por el indiferente aprecio y poco cuidado con que miran tan costosos adornos; las romerías bastantes frecuentes a los varios pueblos de las cercanías; la precisa asistencia al teatro, a los toros y toda clase de diversiones, en un país donde los placeres se compran a precio demasiado caro, hacen que, en Lima, el mantenimiento de una familia principal exponga a la ruina la más opulenta casa Las Tapadas, que ya no subsisten en España y con cuyo disfraz tenían las mujeres un velo para sus intrigas amorosas, como lo atestiguan nuestros cómicos, y con el que bajo de oscura nube del manto conciliaban, sin pérdida de su buena fama, los placeres de la libertad con la opinión de un aparente recato, se hallan todavía en la América meridional. En cubren sus ahuecados y el campanudo guardapiés, aunque en el día han variado de traje pues visten a la europea; pero conservan el traje de tapada con sayas o basquiñas de la misma hechura y tamaño; pliéganla, a lo largo con pliegues longitudinales y transversales, del mismo modo que al manto, con el cual se tapan perfectamente la cara, descubriendo solo la órbita del ojo, de manera que al más celoso marido y al más vigilante padre es imposible, cuando no muy difícil, el conocerlas. Adquiere, con este ahuecado vestido, la figura femenina un volumen tal, que no da pié para inferir su arte y venir en conocimiento de la tapada, a menos que la voz, la figura de los brazos u otras semejantes señales den indicios de la persona. 93 Pero al paso que con tan cuidadoso esmero procuran taparse aquellas damas desde la cintura arriba, tienen otro no menor por descubrir los bajos, desde la liga hasta la planta del pie. La más recatada limeña descubre sin escrúpulo la mitad de la caña de sus piernas. Y por muy escandaloso que parezca a nuestras europeas este traje, el uso común de él en todo aquel país acostumbra insensiblemente la vista, y hace al fin que no cause la menor novedad, por extraño y chocante que parezca al principio. Cuando van de guardapiés, traje que usan las personas blancas de noche, llevan sombreros blancos jerezanos con un cintillo, sus mantillas y rebozos. Con ellos se disfrazan perfectamente, y de este modo concurren a bailes las que no están convidadas, o a cualquierdiversiónpública, y todas aquellas concurrencias en que tienen interés que no las conozcan. La ocupación ordinaria de las mujeres es, por la mañana, los templos, y luego sus visitas. Atienden también a su familia y, excepto un corto número de señoras, pocas se ocupan en labores de mano, acostumbrando llamar oficiales de sastre que deshacen y remontan los vestidos, y se emplean en todas aquellas obras y reparos que se necesitan en un buen menaje. Para que nada falte a la decencia y ostentación con que procuran portarse las familias más distinguidas de aquella capital, usan también de coche a la europea; pero la mayor parte se sirven de calesas que se diferencian de las nuestras en que su caja es cerrada, con asientos en ambos testeros a la manera de berlinas, tiradas por una mula sobre la cual va montado el calesero, y a la zaga un lacayo. Concurren en estos carruajes a los paseos públicos, y en ellos se conoce bien el carácter de presunción de todos los limeños. Cofúndese frecuentemente el artesano con el poderoso; cada uno procura igualar al de más alta jerarquía; y como es consiguiente cuando el lujo ha subido a tan alto punto, reina mucho el capricho en esta clase de diversión. Se tiene por indecoroso presentarse a pie en el paseo, y muchas personas se ven obligadas a mantener calesa por no apartarse de los principios de la opinión. Así es que se consideran en Lima, por un cálculo juicioso, más de dos mil carruajes de esta clase. Decoran y hermosean aquella gran capital varios paseos públicos compuestos de calles de altos sauces y naranjos, adornados con fuentes de bronce; cada una consta de dos calles para coches, y dos intermedias para personas. La alameda, que es el mássuntuoso de todos los paseos, es también el más concurrido; y en la estación del año, desde San Juan a San Miguel, el de los Amancaes. Este es un cerro situado al N. de la población y corta distancia de ella, en cuyas colinas y faldas nacen y se críanuna flores amarillas que le dan nombre y le cubren a manera de una extendida alfombra. Concurren allí a divertirse, a almorzar y merendar. Mucha gente va a caballo, y en este variado cuadro se ve pintado con colores bien vivos el tipo del americano. Al son de una guitarrilla y de unas coplas mal cantadas, bailan, retozan y parecen como desterradas de su espíritu las taciturnas idas del meditabundo europeo. En Lima, a modo que en las ciudades de España, hay su plaza destinada para corrida de toros en los tiempos determinados. Los toreros, más ligeros que osados, tienen la costumbre de desjarretar al toro, si no embiste.Cuéntase, entre las diversiones públicas, la de la comedia, para cuya representación hay un teatro bastante capaz. Mantiénese en el teatro buen orden y aseo, a pesar de que no dejan de fumar los espectadores durante la representación; las decoraciones son medianas, y los actores bastante regulares. Por lo común no se representan otras comedias que las que llamamos de magia y de santos. Apláudelas mucho el público, y es de sentir que parezca todavía remota la época en que se destierren del teatro aquellas groseras producciones que, lejos de ilustrar, vician el entendimiento y arraigan el mal gusto. Antes del año 1771 no se conocían en Lima los cafés. En el día hay varios, y son muy concurridos por la mañana temprano, y a la hora de la siesta. Encuéntrase en ellos toda clase de bebidas y helados, y cada uno tiene su mesa de trucos o de billar. Hay también casa pública para el juego de pelota, en donde se atraviesa mucho dinero; pero entre todas las diversiones, las peleas de gallos es la que más llama la atención de los limeños, y puede mirarse como la diversión favorita de aquellos naturales. Hay edificios construidos al intento para la lid, y cada aficionado cría y mantiene en su casa, con el mayor 94 esmero, un crecido número de estos animales. Con ellos acude al coliseo de gallos en los días permitidos para esta función; y sobre la más o menos confianza que cada uno tiene en su regalado animal, se atraviesan apuestas considerables. Asiste a estas funciones un juez. El concurso es inmenso y de toda clase de gente, y el anfiteatro corresponde a la pasión que tienen por esta diversión. Es de figura circular, por asientos y gradas para los espectadores en el piso principal hay también varios cuartos y galerías que se ocupan igualmente por los asistentes. Págase a la entrada dos reales de América, uno por el asiento y otro por la galería. Corre este coliseo por el Gobierno, a cargo de una asentista que, en el día, paga siete mil pesos anuales. Concluido el tiempo del arriendo se saca nuevamente a pública subasta. Aunque el aumento del lujo en Lima de muebles., mesas, coches, trajes, ha desterrado en mucha parte los dulces y refrescos, sin embargo son estos frecuentes en algunas casas. Sírvense a la europea a distinción de asistir los criados bien vestidos y calzados al uso del día, y de presentar primero una especie de toalla larga que sirve al mismo tiempo a varias personas. En los saraos se bailan minués y bailes de escuela española, y otros que derivan su origen de los negros. Las personas de distinción aprenden la escuela francesa, y bailan tolerablemente, a pesar de que los maestros no tienen la mayor destreza. Muchas damas hay que sobresalen en el baile español. Los bailes de la gente más común se reducen a movimientos de los pies a compás, introduciéndose muchos pasos de la escuela inglesa. En algunos se acompañan con movimientos del cuerpo, que suelen ser más o menos indecorosos según el carácter de la persona que los baila. La variedad de las damas, sus ricos trajes y la peculiar belleza de que están dotadas, hacen muy interesantes y apetecibles estas horas de pasatiempo. Las procesiones de Lima, parecida a las de España en la ostentación y la solemnidad con que salen las santas imágenes, cuyas andas y blandones son de plata a martillo y de la mayor riqueza, además del numeroso concurso de Comunidades religiosas, Tribunales, Cabildos, y con el mismo orden que en España, se diversifican en todo con las gracias grotescas de las danzas quehacen los negros, los que tienen particular afición a ellas, ya por su humor paradivertirse, ya por ahorrarse aquellos días de trabajo. Estábamos en Lima a la sazón que se verificaba la procesión de Corpus, y tuvimos lugar de ser testigos de estas particularidades. Componíase la procesión de las comunidades de San Juan de Dios, la de los Mercenarios, la de Agustinos y la de los Franciscanos. Seguida después el Arzobispo y el Cabildo, y llevaba el palio la guardia de alabarderos del Virrey. Últimamente cerraba la procesión un regimiento de dragones y otro de infantería. En las demás funciones salen las santas imágenes, y se reducen a lo mismo con corta diferencia; pero en ésta solo salió la magnífica custodia que en dicha ciudad es de grande riqueza. Asistían los negros, unos con las cabezas adornadas con plumas de gallos, otros con tarjetas en los brazos y palos en las manos, figurando una especie de batalla, pegándose golpes a compás de la música en losescudos unos a los otros, quienes repetían lo mismo a su vez. Hacían otros de reyes y de reinas, yendo debajo de un quitasol con su compañía de criados y con una gravedad y mesura que excitaban la risa. No les falta gracia para bufones a estas pobres gentes, que se olvidanasí de su esclavitud y presentan varias de las costumbres de su patria. Los instrumentosque usaban eran también de bambú, llevados a espaldas de un negro, yendo detrás el que los toca. Además llevan una especie de salterio formado de varias tabletas de diferentes dimensiones puestas en serie, en cuya parte inferior cuelga de cada una, una calabacilla, cuyo conjunto suple la caja con cavidad que hay debajo de las cuerdas de cada instrumento para que se aumente el sonido. Este se pareceal zumbido del agua cuando cae de un pozo y retumba. Llevan también manojos de cascabeles y panderos, formando con todos estos instrumentos una música ruidosa y alborotadora. La ilación de este episodio nos conduce naturalmente a tratar con más detención de los negros, ya porque su casta forma en aquel país una tercera especie de habitantes, ya también por no privar a nuestros lectores de la curiosidad que ofrecen sus costumbres particulares. Las excelentes observaciones extendidas en el apreciable periódico que se 95 publicó en Lima con el título de "Mercurio Peruano", nos servirán en mucha parte para derramar sobre ese punto toda la luz necesaría. Procede esta casta del permiso concedido para introducir negros, con el fin de reparar la falta de población y auxiliar al mismo tiempo al indio en sus necesarias tareas de las minas.Regúlase en quinientos individuos la internación anual del Perú y sus castas principales se reducen a diez, a saber; la de los Terranovos, Sucumés, Mandingas, Cambundas, Carabalíes, Cangaes, Chalas, Huachiriés, Congos y Misangas, las cuales derivan su nombre del país originario, siendo muchos de ellos arbitrarios y otros procedidos del paraje de sus primeros desempaques. Los caracteres naturales de estos negros son: pelo como lanoso, ensortijado, y narices chatas; unos son barbudos y otros lampiños; la mayor parte tienen altas pantorrillas. Ocúpase a estos negros, como esclavos, en el servicio doméstico de las casas, en las chácaras y haciendas de siembra o plantío, y muchos también en los ingenios de moler metales. Júntanse ellos por si, y en cofradías, para el culto divino y recepción de los Sacramentos. Todas las cofradías obedecen a dos caporales mayores elegidos por ellos, y cuya dignidad conservan hasta la muerte. Hácese la elección a pluralidad de votos, entre unos negros que se llaman capataces y otros veinticuatro de cada nación, que han sido elegidos de antemano con las mismas formalidades. Asiste a ellas, pero sin intervenciónalguna de la Real Justicia, el padre capellán de la Cofradía, y se celebran en la capilla de Ntra. Sra. del Rosario que costean aquellas naciones en el convento grande de Santo Domingo. Elegido ya el caporal mayor, que procuran sea siempre uno de los sujetos más antiguos y descendientes de los fundadores, sientan su nombre en el libro que para este fin se tiene. Cuando falta algún hermano Veinticuatro o el caporal subalterno de alguna nación, se nombra también bajo las mismas reglas, y contribuye el caporal con diez pesos y el hermano con doce, cuyo dinero se invierte por mitad en el culto de Nuestra Señora, y de refrescos que se sirven a aquellos electores. Todas estas determinaciones se asientan en el libro insinuado. Fomentan aquellas naciones el culto de Nuestra Señora del Rosario. Para este efecto cada individuo da mensualmente medio real, con cuyo monto costean la fiesta que se la hace todos los años, e invierte lo demás en cuanto se necesita para su culto. Sufrágase del mismo modo la función de finados; y subordinados todos a las determinaciones de los caporales mayores, se reúnen en juntas que mantienen los enlaces sociales de las diversas congregaciones y les proporcionan participar de sus recreos. Tienen comprados para el intento diez y seis cuartos, como hospicio, a que llaman Cofradías; una para cada tribu o más, según son estas más o menos numerosas. Preside en cada una el Caporal de aquella nación. Comienzan sus Juntas como a las dos de la tarde, y emplean la primera hora en arreglar las contribuciones de sus funciones, en presentar y decidir las quejas entre capataces, dar cuenta de la inversión de los fondos y proponer el destino de lo que ha sobrado. Lo que ofrecen de interesantes estas sesiones para un observador filósofo, dice el citado Mercurio, es la imponderable formalidad con que los jefes y los subalternos asisten, opinan, escuchan y obedecen. No es menos admirable el fervor con que disponen y convivan la preferencia en los asientos de éstas juntas en lo cual, se sujetan a un riguroso método de antigüedad. No pueden tolerar la menor injusticia sobre este punto y, aunque envilecidos con la esclavitud, adquieren en estos momentos a la vista de sus compañeros una elevación de sentimientos que transforma, si puede decirse así, su condición y naturaleza. Tan poderoso es el sentimiento de la opinión. Acabada la hora de la consulta, pasan estos negros, con admirable rapidez, de un extremo de severidad a otro de gritería y bulla. Se ponen a bailar, y excitados a la vista de unas grotescas figuras que tienen en las paredes, y que representan a sus reyes originarios, sus batallas y regocijos, continúan de esta forma hasta las siete u ocho de la noche. Distínguese sus danzas con los nombres de Tarengo, Caballo cojo, Don Mateo, el Torito, el Matatoro, el Zango, el Agua de nieve, etc. Por lo general baila uno solo, y el mayor aguante constituye su habilidad. Otras veces bailan dos o cuatro personas, cantando al mismo tiempo y haciendo contorsiones ridículas y opuestas a la decencia, pero que no tienen la menor influencia entre estas gentes cuyas impresiones cesan con la diversión. Tocan durante esta sesión, además de los instrumentos ya citados, una pequeñas flautas que 96 suenan con la respiración de la nariz; golpean también con una quijada de caballo o borrico descarnada, con la dentadura movible, y frotando un palo liso con y otro entrecortado en la superficie. Forman con todos estos instrumentos una música ruidosa y desapacible. Congrégase la tribu cuando muere algún caporal o hermano veinticuatro, o las mujeres de estos. Allí velan el cadáver, que alumbran con cuatro velas de sebo. Colócanse los hijos a los pies del féretro, y a los lados los parientes, apostrofando de tiempo en tiempo al cadáver. Los condolientessaltan y dan vueltas alrededor, parándose de cuando en cuando para recitar en voz baja ciertas preces de sus ritos e idioma nativo. Cada concurrente da medio real para los gastos del entierro y para comprar la bebida que se reparte, que generalmente el guarapo. Antes de beber arriban la copa llena a la cara del cadáver, y le dirigen una larga conversación como paraconvidarle. Supuesta su libación, pasan el mismo recipiente a los dolientes más inmediatos, y de estos se transmite hasta el último, guardando la mayor escrupulosidad en la preferencia de antigüedad de cada uno. Al fin bebiendo, cantando y bailando, acaban la función con llanto. Cuando quiere contraer segundas nupcias la viuda de algún caporal de la tribu, tiene ante que hacer constar el amor que profeso a su antiguo marido. Para esto llevan a la viuda, el día que llaman de quitaluto, en silla de mano, desde su posada hasta la cofradía. Entra llorando, y si no sabe sostener el papel se expone a que la castiguen con azotes por el criminal defecto de ser ingrata. En el acto de su entrada degüellan un cordero, sacrificándolo a los manes del difunto, y la novia presenta una salvilla de plata con los zapatos que ha envejecido y roto durante su viudez. Concluidas esas ceremonias se verifican los preliminares civiles del casamiento, y todos se esfuerzan en obsequiar a los recién casados conlicores y comestibles de todas clases. Pero no se necesita ninguno de estos requisitos cuando vuelve a contraer esponsales un viudo, porque entre estas naciones, como entre todas las tribus salvajes, es mengua mostrar dolor por la muerte de una mujer. Las negras y mulatas andan en Lima, de día, con guardapiés parecidos a los de sus amas, aunque no de tanto diámetro. Otras llevan encima del raje una camisa hendida, a modo de sobrepelliz, con los brazos remangados. En general, estas esclavas y la gente de servidumbre procuran adornarse y tener un lujo que no poco perjudica a las costumbres y a los intereses de sus amos, y engreídas por la excesiva confianza que acostumbran depositar en ellas sus amas, aspiran a igualarlas hasta en el lenguaje y los placeres, y en cierto modo dan el tono a las modas. Concluiremos de una vez con las noticias relativas a los negros y negras, dando una idea del régimenque se observa en las haciendas. El número que se encuentra en lagunas constituye el de una mediana población: en varias llegan y pasan de cuatrocientos, y según las noticias que hemos podido adquirir, hay algunas hasta con mil. Comotancrecido elnúmero de hombres no podría dedicarse a la labor ni a la fatiga sin una especie de policía y disciplina, hay además del administrador o propietario, un mayordomo, que es un esclavo de confianza a quien se le distingue en el trato. Es el encargado de reglar las labores y señalar a cada uno su tarea, además nombrar dos alcaldes negros que celan el desempeño de sus compañeros, y los desórdenes que suceden por las noches. Sus alojamientos, según vemos en algunas chácaras, se reducen a una garita o celditas para los matrimonios; y los solteros se acomodan según las proporciones de la hacienda. La mayor parte de estos negro son esclavos. El precio de cada uno varía desde 500 a 1000 pesos, según sus talentos, robustez y habilidad.  (Tomado de T. Henke (Felipe Bauzá), Descripción del Perú, Lima, Imp. El Lucero, 1901, pp. 20-30. Magister en Derecho Civil. Profesor de Lengua y Literatura. Abogado. Diplomado en Educación a Distancia. Autor de textos universitarios. Docente en la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. 97 EL ESTADO DE LA SITUACIÓN DE LA NIÑEZ TRABAJADORA EN EL PERÚ – 20102 JORGE GARCÍA ESCOBAR RESUMEN El presente texto integra las principales constataciones de un estudio encaminado a determinar las características del trabajo infantil en el Perú, es un intento por dar razón de sus tendencias históricas y actuales. Se ha elaborado teniendo en cuenta las fuentes de información estatal que sistemáticamente van arrojando información que sirven de base para la planificación del desarrollo que implementan las organizaciones con tienen como foco de interés el trabajo infantil. Se busca presentar una visión integral, no prejuiciada, imparcial de la realidad, en la medida que es necesario analizar los fenómenos sociales objetivamente para no caer en errores de interpretación que luego conduzcan a prácticas sociales inadecuadas y a la dilapidación de los fondos de la inversión social. PALABRAS CLAVE Niñez trabajadora / políticas sociales / paradigmas de infancia / derechos humanos / gestión social INTRODUCCIÓN Distintas razones indican la necesidad de llevar a cabo un estudio que explore el "Estado de la situación de la niñez trabajadora". Es necesario reconocer en qué situación se encuentra la niñez trabajadora, su composición demográfica, las actividades laborales a las que se dedican, las características de sus ocupaciones, el estado de la educación escolarizada y no escolarizada, la situación y atención de la salud, la participación y organización en movimientos sociales. Así mismo, es necesario reconocer la situación e impacto de los planes públicos de acción por la niñez trabajadora, el impacto de la cooperación internacional y de las Naciones Unidas respecto a la situación y efecto de los planes civiles llevados a cabo por los organismos no gubernamentales y la cooperación técnica económica internacional, el estado nacional e internacional sobre las normas jurídicas del sector. Falta conocer realmente como vive y que aporta la niñez trabajadora, alejarnos un poco del mandato y de la obediencia cerrada de los mandatos internacionales, es por ello que se pensó en un estudio de carácter exploratorio en el sentido que pretendía actualizar el conocimiento procurando ser lo más prolijo que se pueda pero que simultáneamente sabrá 2 El presente trabajo es una síntesis de la investigación que lleva el mismo nombre, realizada con el auspicio de Save the Children Canadá, coordinada por el autor del presente artículo, y que contó con el apoyo de Giuliano Príncipe Barrios en el proceso de recolección y procesamiento de la data. 98 reconocer las limitaciones a las que se expone, teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones de las fuentes de información en general sobre infancia y adolescencia en el Perú. La presente investigación giro en torno al "Estado de la situación de la niñez trabajadora en el Perú al 2010", se trata pues de un esfuerzo de panorámica social más cercano a investigación diagnóstica, que como tal busca encontrar necesidades, demandas pero también potencialidades y capacidades en las personas, para el caso en las niñas y niños trabajadores. METODOLOGIA El presente estudio se orientó metodológicamente del modo siguiente: Al inicio, recoge, sistematiza e interpreta información oficial de entes públicos, privados, y sociales, nacionales e internacionales sobre niñez trabajadora. Luego, identifica y explica los hallazgos principales. Seguidamente, plantea conclusiones y recomendaciones, e inmediatamente después, plantea las lecciones aprendidas y las relevantes buenas prácticas. El proyecto de investigación, en toda su cobertura, tuvo el mismo enfoque metodológico atendiendo a las interrogantes planteadas en la problematización, recurriendo a las mismas fuentes básicas de consulta Las variables previstas por el estudio fueron: Población, actividad laboral / ocupaciones, educación, salud, organización, participación, prioridad de Estado, políticas y planes de organismos y organizaciones internacionales, normativa internacional y nacional, planes públicos de acción por la infancia, planes civiles de acción por la infancia, informes de Naciones Unidas. El desarrollo del estudio ha seguido dos etapas: una etapa preparatoria y una etapa de trabajo de campo e interpretación. En sí, se trata de dos momentos en los cuales se han ido develando los datos expuestos en el presente artículo. La etapa preparatoria fue enfocada en la definición del diseño del estudio. En ese sentido el objetivo quedó señalado de la siguiente manera: "Conocer el estado actual de la niñez trabajadora en sus variables: demográfica, laboral, educativa, salud, organización y participación, el estado actual y los efectos de las políticas, planes y programas públicos y privados, nacionales e internacionales, respecto a la niñez trabajadora". En síntesis tenemos que el esfuerzo investigativo fue de tipo descriptivo, basado en información consignada en los sistemas de información y de estadísticas del Estado peruano, aunque también contemplo entrevistas a profundidad con actores claves: niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores organizados, especialistas en el campo de la infancia y funcionarios de alto nivel del Estado y entidades privadas con responsabilidad de cara al bienestar de este sector de población. RESULTADOS Según el Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y Adolescencia 2002 – 2010 el número de niñas y niños trabajadores ascendía en 2002 a dos millones, para complementar esto, el estudio "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008" plantea que entre 2002 y 2008 la magnitud de la niñez trabajadora peruana parece haberse estancado en dos millones (INEI 2009, 22), lo cual es estadísticamente improbable y sociológicamente insostenible, la presunción de inamovilidad de la realidad numérica de la niñez trabajadora rompe con toda idea de dinámica y cambio constante de la sociedad, por demás omite la constatación empírica de la cotidianeidad en Lima que nos confronta con cada vez más niñas y niños trabajadores en calles, plazas, locales, ferias, etc. Una entrada un poco más realista y dinámica, es la que propone el CAD – "Ciudadanos al Día" que plantea un crecimiento sostenido de la niñez trabajadora entre 2001 y 2008, esta constatación se hace a partir de los datos proveídos por la "Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO" del 2008. Según el CAD en el lapso de tiempo entre el 2001 y el 2008, el número de niños y adolescentes que trabajan habría crecido en 6%, pasando de 1,987,200 a 2,115,400. Esta entidad rompiendo el pensamiento de estática numérica de las entidades estatales comunica cifras diferentes para los diferentes años de la primera década del siglo XXI. 99 Desde otra mirada el estudio desarrollado por Rodríguez y Vargas denominado "Trabajo infantil en el Perú" basándose en los datos conseguidos por la "Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil" del año 2007 estima la "Población Económicamente Activa" total entre los 5 y 17 años en 3,38 millones de personas. Un dato interesante proveído por el estudio en referencia es que la tasa de actividad laboral de niños asciende al 42,5% en comparación con el total de población infantil en ese rango de edad, según este planteamiento tenemos que en el rango de edad referido uno de cada dos niños trabaja (Rodríguez y Vargas 2009, 39). Esquema N°1: Cantidad de niños trabajadores entre 2001y 2008 Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de los datos expuestos en el Boletín CAD N°107 "Trabajo infantil y adolescente", y que se basan en la Encuesta Nacional de Hogares del INEI del 2008. La niñez trabajadora es principalmente población masculina, por ejemplo Rodríguez y Vargas informan que la tasa de actividad laboral de niños a nivel nacional asciende a 45,6% en comparación con el caso de las niñas que representa el 39,2%, es así como en términos comparativos de la "Población Económicamente Activa" total entre los 5 y 17 años tenemos que el 55% (1,163,470) es masculina y el 45% (951,930) femenina (Rodríguez y Vargas, 2009; CAD, 2010). La población de niños trabajadores hombres es mayor en sectores como agricultura, ganadería, caza y silvicultura, en industrias manufactureras y en el comercio por menor, sin embargo las niñas son mayoritarias en el servicio doméstico, en hogares de terceros exactamente representan el 91,8% del total (INEI 2009, 36). Si bien las niñas son la minoría en el total de niñez trabajadora, si son la amplia mayoría de niñez en el trabajo doméstico. Al respecto el trabajo doméstico en hogares de terceros es conocido como uno de los espacios laborales en el que puede darse un mayor riesgo de abuso y explotación, al carecer las jóvenes (en su mayoría del interior del país) del soporte familiar, por ejemplo el estudio "Situación de la trabajadora del hogar en el Perú" desarrollado por la "Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar" en el año 2006, a través de un levantamiento de información a nivel nacional mostraba que un 5% de la muestra informaban haber sido violentadas sexualmente dentro del hogar donde trabajaban y un 22% haber sido víctimas de maltrato físico y psicológico (Red TH 2006, 30). El trabajo de niños, niñas y adolescentes está concentrado en diversas actividades, que son desarrolladas dependiendo del contexto social y geográfico en el que se realizan. De acuerdo a los Censos Nacionales 2007, XI de Población y VI de Vivienda, se dedica a la agricultura, ganadería, caza y silvicultura el 38.6%, un 48.3% la población comprendida entre 6 a 13 años de edad, mientras que en los adolescentes entre 14 y 17 años de edad representan el 36% (INEI 2007, 39). MODELO DE RÚBRICA PARA EVALUAR UNA PRESENTACIÓN ORAL 100 En cuanto a la actividad de comercio al por menor, se ubica una proporción importante de niños, de manera primordial los niños comprendidos entre los 6 y 13 años de edad que representan el 21.0%, en tanto que los adolescentes se constituyen en el 14.9% del total de trabajadores dedicados a esta actividad (INEI 2007, 39). El documento citado añade que un 30.8% de niños y niñas que trabajan estaba dedicado a realizar actividades en hogares privados con servicio doméstico, industrias manufactureras, hoteles y restaurantes, transportes, almacenamiento y comunicaciones. Asimismo, los niños y niñas que realizan actividades de servicios comunales, sociales y personales, así como los que trabajan en construcción, actividades inmobiliarias, empresas, comercio por mayor, pesca y otras tareas relacionadas a servicios públicos, intermediación financiera, explotación de minas, venta, mantenimiento y reparación de vehículos, entre otras actividades no especificadas, se constituyen en el 14.4%. Dependiendo de cada actividad, los porcentajes varían en cuanto a los niños y niñas entre los 6 – 13 años y adolescentes entre 14 – 17 años de edad. Por ejemplo, para las actividades de servicio doméstico la proporción de adolescentes entre los 14 y 17 años representa el 10.4% frente a los niños entre 6-13 años que ascienden a un 4,9% (INEI 2007, 39). La Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008 señala que el 79.9% de niños en el país se dedica a ayudar en la chacra o pastoreo de animales, principalmente en el área rural en una representación del 91.3%, esto evidenciaría que el trabajo infantil es fundamentalmente rural y se da en actividades agropecuarias y en economías familiares campesinas. En contraparte, en las áreas urbanas, dicha actividad es realizada por un 24.8% de niños entre 6 a 13 años de edad, probablemente en contextos semi urbanos, según se indica (INEI 2008, 41). Mientras que los que ayudan en el negocio de la casa o de un familiar, 14.7% del total, se ubican primordialmente en las zonas urbanas (56.9%) en contraste con la zona rural (5.9%). La misma Encuesta referida indica que la población ocupada de 14 a 17 años de edad se desempeñan principalmente como peones de labranza (47.3%), en un porcentaje de 75.2% en el área rural y 10.0% en el área urbana, esta descripción significaría que la mayoría de los adolescentes han dejado de trabajar en la chacra de sus padres y venden su fuerza de trabajo a otros. La Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007 detalla que la mitad de sus entrevistados (45.7%) tiene por centro de trabajo la chacra, en tanto que un gran grupo (17.3%) labora dentro de su vivienda. Se indica que es razonable que en zonas rurales los niños y niñas que se desempeñan en la chacra asciendan a 79.9%, mientras que en las ciudades trabajan principalmente en sus hogares (27.5%). Así también, se sugiere que al pasar de la adolescencia los jóvenes de las ciudades pueden diversificar sus centros de trabajo (11.4%), en tanto que los jóvenes rurales continuando teniendo en la chacra el eje central de su trabajo (INEI 2007, 39). En general se concluye que en la calle se ubicaría sólo el 13.4% del total del trabajo infantil y adolescente urbano, lo cual va en contrasentido con la representación del trabajo de los niños y niñas que es difundido por los medios de comunicación que muestra en la medida de lo posible los escenarios más marginalizados de la explotación infantil en el trabajo en la áreas urbanas y en un sentido fácilmente generalizador, del mismo modo se deduce que las normas sobre trabajo de niños tendría que enfocarse en el mundo rural y no tanto en el limeñismo de las llamadas peores formas. Las condiciones laborales de la niñez trabajadora peruana se caracteriza por una total laxitud producto de los limitados esfuerzos estatales para conocer como, donde y cuanto tiempo están los niños y niñas en el trabajo, al tratarse de un grupo social ampliamente ubicado en el sector informal de la economía nacional la posibilidad de mantener algún tipo de información más o menos real en torno a las condiciones del desempeño laboral es muy lejana, y esto pese al esfuerzo de señalar en el Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N° 26102 del año 1992 que los gobiernos locales debían de tener un registro de la niñez trabajadora en la informalidad. Una primera dimensión de la condición laboral estaría relacionada con las horas del trabajo que despliegan los niños y niñas, un dato inicial proveído por las fuentes de Estado para el caso la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del año 2007 da a conocer que los niños, 101 niñas y adolescentes desde su perspectiva estarían trabajando 21 horas a la semana (en un cálculo simple por cinco días laborables estaría representando un mínimo de 4 horas por día de trabajo). A manera de comparación o grupo de control esta misma encuesta integra la opinión de los padres y madres de familia que al contrario de lo que exponen sus hijos e hijas reconocen que los niños y niñas en promedio estarían trabajando 24 horas a la semana (INEI 2007, 42). Para el caso de los adolescentes entre 15 y 17 años el desempeño temporal en el trabajo es mayor pues supone en el cálculo básico entregar 6 horas de labor por día en función a lo que indican los padres. Es sorprendente corroborar la diferencia de datos que presentan padres y niños trabajadores en todos los casos quienes informan un mayor lapso de desempeño laboral son los padres, esto se podría deber a la inhibición de los niños ante la pregunta proveniente de un adulto a informar con claridad y certidumbre cuando tiempo trabaja por día. Otro aspecto a tener en cuenta de cara a los datos expuestos es la búsqueda de exactitud para un trabajo de niños que se desarrolla más según la información en el área rural y que por lo tanto esta mas permeada por la vida cotidiana, la realidad del contexto rural es uno en el cual la familia culturalmente sigue funcionando como una unidad económica básica bajo parámetros mentales valoradores del trabajo, en ese sentido es de esperar que cálculos sobre el tiempo desplegado por el desempeño laboral de los niños y niñas sea inexacta. Sobre la posibilidad de riesgos, la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del 2007 da a conocer que los niños y niñas consideran como el principal riesgo a la salud el vinculado con la exposición climática, es decir con la humedad, frio o calor extremo en el cual se encuentren laborando (60.3%), al respecto llama la atención que para el caso de las niñas informantes este porcentaje representa el 73.7%3. Teniendo en cuenta que mayoritariamente se mencionan las condiciones climáticas en las cuales se desarrolla el trabajo como el principal riesgo a la salud no es de sorprender que las principales enfermedades que afectan a los niños y niñas trabajadoras según la Encuesta de Trabajo Infantil del año 2007 sean los problemas respiratorios (41%) y en un segundo lugar los dolores de cabeza, barriga y musculares (38.1%) que en buena medida también pueden tener como parte de la causa aspectos vinculados con los extremos climáticos en los cuales se desarrolla el trabajo (INEI 2007, 42). Sobre la posibilidad de ocurrencia de accidentes laborales el 46.9% de los niños y niñas informantes vez habían sufrido de accidentes en el trabajo, mientras que un 21% lleva carga pesada durante su desempeño laboral (INEI 2007: 42). El boletín CAD N°107 "Trabajo infantil y adolescente" teniendo como base los datos expuestos en la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del 2007 del INEI, plantea que el ingreso promedio de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores por mes asciende a S/. 162.00 (CAD 2010), lo que vendría a representar el 22% del presupuesto del hogar (de un ingreso familiar que llega a S/. 746.00 por mes). Lo que no se logra dilucidar con el indicador planteado es si esto se refiere al aporte total por cantidad de hijos pues por lógica se entendería que en un hogar donde se cuenta con tres o cuatro hijos trabajadores el ingreso total seria mayor, y por ende sería mayor la representatividad en la economía familiar. El aporte de los niños es ascendente, es decir mientras menor edad tiene el niño o niña más bajo será su ingreso económico mientras que a mayor edad el ingreso será mayor, así por ejemplo se indica que el adolescente entre 16 y 17 años logra en promedio de ingresos al mes S/. 269.00, cantidad que puede llegar a representar el 30% del ingreso familiar (INEI 2008). La gran debilidad del dato presentado nuevamente radica en su relatividad frente al trabajo desempeñado por los niños y adolescentes en las áreas rurales, donde en definitiva los ingresos son menores (en comparación con las zonas urbanas). De otro lado, si los montos refieren a ingresos que se obtienen en zonas rurales sean estos S/. 162.00 ó S/.269.00, el valor real del ingreso en significativo para cualquier familia rural, inclusive superan el monto brindado por "JUNTOS" como apoyo complementario consistente en transferencia de dinero a familias de bajos ingresos a cambio de ciertos compromisos de asistencia a servicios sociales. 3 Dato del texto del INEI "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008". 102 Bajo este nuevo parámetro o dimensionamiento del aporte proveniente del trabajo infantil y adolescente, puede deducirse que inclusive estos ingresos siguen siendo sumamente significativos para la satisfacción de las necesidades de los hogares de los sectores populares, superan largamente en promedio la asignación económica que viene ejecutando el Estado peruano en su intento por simplemente "aliviar" la pobreza. Algún dato adicional a tener en cuenta es que los niños y niñas más pequeños entre 6 y 9 años, y que según las normas preparadas por el Estado peruano en consonancia con los dictados de Naciones Unidas no estarían ni deberían estar trabajando, también brindan su aporte a la economía familiar y por ese medio a las economías comunitarias vinculadas con la sobrevivencia cotidiana, ellos y ellas según la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil aportan en promedio mensual un monto ascendente a S/. 41.00, el mismo que representa el 7% del presupuesto del hogar (CAD 2010). Sobre educación de la niñez trabajadora, según la Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008 la población que solo trabaja y no se encuentra en la Institución Educativa más cercana asciende al 6,1% mientras que tenemos un grupo de jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan que representan 5,0% (INEI 2008)., es decir tenemos promedios muy cercanos que nos vienen demostrando que la propuesta educativa peruana viene siendo incapaz de integrar a un grupo de población en su mayoría adolescente, quienes no la ven como el mejor proyecto de desarrollo a futuro. Los niños trabajadores optan por la búsqueda de compatibilizar o equilibrar horarios de estudio con su trabajo lo que no logra plenamente la propuesta formativa regular, tal como lo muestra el texto del INEI "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008", de cada cinco niños que asisten a la educación uno además de estudiar también trabaja (INEI 2009). En términos generales cuantos niños trabajan y a la vez estudian seguirá siendo una tarea de determinación aproximativa. En términos de la situación de la escolaridad de los niñas y niños trabajadores las Encuestas Nacionales de Hogares realizadas entre los años 2001 a 2008, mencionan que en el 2001, el 21,0% de la población de niños y niñas trabajadores entre 6 y 17 años de edad trabajaba y estudiaba, mientras que en el 2007 eran el 20.4% y en el año 2008 eran el 21,1%; en tanto que la población de niños, niñas y adolescentes que sólo trabajaba era de 5;4%, 6,3% y 6,1% en los años 2001, 2007 y 2008 respectivamente (INEI 2009: 57). Mientras que, en el año 2001, se hablaba de un 69,5% de la población entre 6 y 17 años que sólo estudiaba, esta cifra disminuye en el 2007 a un 68,2% y en 2008 al 67.8%. Para mayor detalle, la Encuesta de Trabajo Infantil de 2007 señala que sólo el 13,2% de los niños y niñas que trabaja no asisten al centro educativo, en tanto que el Censo Nacional del mismo año indica que es el 51,0% de niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores que no asiste, en contraparte la ENAHO del 2007 refiere que el 24,4% de los niños y niñas que trabajan no asisten a la escuela (INEI 2009: 59). Respecto al atraso escolar, la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007 manifiesta que el 0,59% de los niños y niñas que trabajan entre los 6 a 17 años tiene atraso escolar, mientras que la ENAHO 2008, dice que es el 0,56%. El tema de experiencias de niños y niñas se ve reflejado en el surgimiento de los Movimientos de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores en América Latina en los años setenta. Como organización pionera, surge el movimiento de adolescentes y niños trabajadores hijos de obreros cristianos, MANTHOC en el año de 1976. El Perú sufría una aguda crisis económica, alza de precios, cierre de fábricas, despidos masivos, contexto en el que gobernaba una dictadura militar; en tales circunstancias los trabajadores comenzaron a perder su estabilidad laboral. Frente a tal situación se llevó a cabo el Consejo Nacional de la JOC, Juventud Obrera Cristiana, en donde se reflexionó en torno a la realidad de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores, y se le dio a un grupo de miembros la responsabilidad de iniciar una experiencia de promoción de y con los niños y niñas trabajadores. Esta experiencia inicial tuvo algunas dificultades, pues era la primera vez que se organizaban a los niños y niñas trabajadores, tanto en Perú como en América Latina. Después de 3 años de compromiso, en el verano de 1979 varias comunidades (grupos) se reunieron en el balneario de Pucusana, al sur de Lima, y decidieron que su organización se denomine MANTHOC: Movimiento de Adolescentes y Niños Trabajadores Hijos de Obreros 103 Cristianos, porque la mayoría de los niños y niñas eran hijos de obreros cristianos despedidos. La experiencia va tomando forma y cada vez son más los niños que se reúnen con su equipo de trabajo, donde confluían otros niños provenientes de la plaza de mercado o de la economía informal: vendedores de dulces, cigarrillos, lustrabotas, entre otros. Más adelante surge la iniciativa de crear un Movimiento más grande a nivel nacional que luche no solo por los derechos de los niños y niñas trabajadores sino también por los derechos de toda la infancia en general, recogiendo las experiencias del MANTHOC, como movimiento pionero, creándose de esta manera el Movimiento Nacional de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes Trabajadores Organizados del Perú MNNATSOP, el cual "recoge y expresa la lucha histórica de casi 30 años por la dignidad de los niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores", del hogar, de la calle, del campo y la ciudad, así como la lucha por los derechos de aquellos niños y adolescentes que se encuentran en Explotación Sexual infantil, los discapacitados, los chicos en situación de calle. A su vez, el MNNATSOP forma parte de otros colectivos como la Red Nacional de Niñas, Niños y adolescentes del Perú, También integran La Conferencia Nacional sobre Desarrollo Social (CONADES), mientras que a nivel internacional integran el Movimiento Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Niños y Adolescentes Trabajadores – MOLACNATs, así como el Movimiento Mundial de Niños, niñas y Adolescentes Trabajadores (MMNATS) y participan del Foro Social Mundial. Entre sus aliados se encuentran fundamentalmente instituciones de la sociedad civil y de derechos humanos a nivel nacional e internacional, construyendo la posibilidad de un "movimiento social de infancia en el Perú. Tales organizaciones, a través de sus representantes y colaboradores han contribuido a la elaboración del Código de los Niños y Adolescentes del Perú y a sus revisiones para el goce y ejercicio de los derechos de toda la infancia. Saben por propia experiencia lo que se sufre en las condiciones en las que la mayoría de niños y niñas tienen que trabajar. En la actualidad, reclaman el reconocimiento de su condición como niños y niñas trabajadores, el valor del trabajo para sus vidas y la lucha por la sobrevivencia, rechazan la explotación, el maltrato y el abuso. El movimiento de niños y niñas trabajadores comparte sus experiencias a nivel nacional y son reconocidos a nivel internacional, lo cual permite el poder compartir sus vivencias con otros niños y adolescentes trabajadores y no trabajadores de otros países, que se encuentran en la misma situación. De acuerdo a la Convención Internacional de los derechos del Niño, todos los niños, niñas y adolescentes son sujetos de derechos, por tanto se les confiere el derecho de participar en todo aquello que les concierne desde las políticas públicas, desde la normatividad hasta los planes, programas o acciones destinadas para ellos. Sin embargo, estos derechos no considerados en la toma de decisiones que, desde el Estado y desde los organismos internacionales se imponen de manera vertical a todos los niños y niñas de nuestro país, principalmente a los niños y niñas trabajadores, cuya situación se agudiza frente a instrumentos jurídicos dirigidos por organismos internacionales como la Organización Internacional del Trabajo – OIT, y suscritos por el estado peruano; entelequias que tratan de abolir y erradicar la posibilidad del trabajo infantil como estrategia de sobrevivencia, excluyéndolo de decisiones que implican su quehacer y su práctica social. La participación en la definición de políticas de Estado requiere de una inicial partición en dos de la sociedad civil convocada a la lucha por los derechos de la infancia, por un lado el movimiento por la infancia y por otro el movimiento de infancia que para el caso de la infancia trabajadora podemos denotar como movimiento de niños trabajadores, digamos que en términos de escucha activa por parte del Estado de la agenda de la sociedad civil en el tiempo y especialmente en los últimas dos décadas se ha venido pasando de la primacía de los movimientos por la infancia a los movimientos de los niños trabajadores, es decir la tradición de la incidencia política de la sociedad civil hacia el Estado la ha venido copando los adultos sensibilizados. Aún en estos tiempos la puesta en consulta de los instrumentos de política social hacia la infancia pasa por la exposición a dos grupos: los niños y los adultos, pero para el caso de los niños trabajadores es más complejo pues la idea ha sido más bien recurrir a la infancia no trabajadora o a un porcentaje mayor de niños trabajadores para que limiten o superen en 104 cantidad a los niños trabajadores. Finalmente otras de las estrategias recurridas por los representantes del Estado para esquivar u obviar el punto de vista de la niñez trabajadora en la formulación de políticas han sido la desvalorización de la niñez trabajadora organizada acusándoles de ser maniatados por adultos o simplemente la consulta falaz, es decir escucharlos pero no tener en cuenta para nada su punto de vista el menos en lo referente al trato que merece la niñez y adolescencia trabajadora. De aquí a pensar que los niños trabajadores organizados se encuentran aún con la única alternativa para incidir en las políticas hacia ellos de poner en marcha las estrategias de presión social, pues pese a las tres décadas de experiencias como movimiento la omisión del Estado es evidente, y para verificar ello solo habría que revisar el contenido por ejemplo del Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010, texto abierta y directamente abolicionista en cuya consulta se supone la participación de los niños trabajadores pero que en el contenido expresa una apuesta que la niñez trabajadora no suscribe. Una segunda opción en el intento de incidir en las políticas sociales desde el movimiento de infancia trabajadora se viene dando a través de la participación en las mesas y redes interinstitucionales que para la promoción y defensa de los derechos de la niñez se han venido organizando, por ejemplo los "Comités Municipales por los Derechos del Niño – COMUDENA" se vienen constituyendo en espacios de este tipo, teniendo en cuenta que estos entes se vienen constituyendo en los impulsores de la formulación de los planes regionales y locales de acción por la infancia. En el plano de los derechos humanos y exclusivamente de los instrumentos internacionales y nacionales de derechos humanos sigue una senda similar a lo que ocurre con los instrumentos de políticas, el Estado peruano es un modelo de formulación y/o aprobación normativa, reconoce desde 1992 con la dación del Decreto Ley N° 26102 "Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes" un conjunto de programas y servicios dirigidos a la niñez trabajadora de los cuales solo se ha concretado algunos pocos y en precarias condiciones, consolidándose con ello como un Estado que incumple flagrantemente los derechos de la niñez en general y de la trabajadora en especifico. Los derechos de la niñez trabajadora en el Perú pueden encontrarse expuestos desde que en 1918 se aprobará la Ley N°2851 que reglamentaba el trabajo de las mujeres y de los niños, y que fue formulada y mejorada desde 1904 por José Matías Manzanilla y que realiza una clara distinción entre el trabajo entendido como venta de fuerza de trabajo a terceros (sobre el cual gira la Norma) y el que se desarrolla en la agricultura, así como el trabajo familiar no remunerado (formas de trabajo que quedan excluidas de la Norma). Puede decirse que desde entonces la atención legal de la niñez trabajadora va a ser inconstante en términos de elaboración y actualización pero carente de cumplimiento efectivo. La niñez trabajadora junto con toda la niñez se encuentra con el escenario de derechos humanos reconocidos pero difícilmente cumplidos, esta realidad es ampliable al conjunto de sectores sociales considerados como vulnerables en la sociedad peruana. Los derechos ciudadanos, sociales, y culturales de la niñez están plenamente comprendidos en la legislación peruana sin embargo para el caso de la niñez trabajadora se opta por una relativización de sus derechos económicos y por supuesto políticos al negársele el estatus de sociedad civil organizada y portadora de una agenda social autentica y digna de ser valorada – reconocida. En términos de alineamiento al consenso internacional en tiempos neoliberales habría que finalizar indicando que el Estado peruano ha aprobado los diversos instrumentos de derechos humanos sancionados en el marco del consenso mundial de las Naciones Unidas. Por ejemplo, la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño fue aprobada y ratificada en el derecho peruano en el año 1990, al año siguiente de su dictado a nivel internacional. Parte de la estrategia de integración en el mercado mundial además de la eliminación a las barreras impositivas para la inversión extranjera y la provisión de una mano de obra barata, es la consonancia con los mandatos internacionales de derechos humanos que se evidencia en la aprobación plena de los diversos instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos, justamente en el esfuerzo de aprobación al garete y sin atenuantes durante esta década el Estado peruano también ha aprobado los Convenios de la Organización Internacional del 105 Trabajo – OIT relativos al trabajo como el Convenio 138° y el 182°. Sin embargo, cuelga sobre el propio Estado peruano la responsabilidad que supone ser un frágil garante de derechos humanos, que difícilmente puede lograr cumplir con los compromisos y responsabilidades que contrae con el tiempo en términos de derechos humanos. El Estado peruano asume la labor de planificación de instrumentos de política social direccionados al sector social infancia y adolescencia recién desde la década de los años 90s, previamente la acción estatal orientada a la niñez se concretaba en función a una lógica fragmentada por áreas sociales, es decir se sobre entendía que la infancia se encontraba en la educación, en la salud, en la seguridad social, en la nutrición, esta etapa mucho más larga de planificación y ejecución de políticas de Estado se orienta y al mismo tiempo no a la infancia, es indirecta, descentrada en términos de sujeto integral con necesidades y demandas diversas e interrelacionadas. En los tiempos de la fragmentación de las políticas sociales los niños y adolescentes trabajadores emergen como un grupo vulnerable, con necesidades a nivel de cada una de las áreas sociales, como uno de los grupos con mayor cantidad de demandas y necesidades, cuando no se les vincula con los grupos de niños abandonados y en situación de calle, en ese sentido la lógica de la atención del Estado hacia la niñez se proyecta hacia su ubicación en hogares, en centros de cuarentena social donde se les pueda controlar, vigilar, disciplinar, formar, en la ausencia de una familia que no se muestre expulsora. La condición de trabajador de un niño pasa desapercibida hasta bien entrado el siglo XX, pues solo existen dos tipos de niños al menos en la primera mitad del siglo pasado: el bueno que está en su hogar y el malo que se encuentra en el espacio adulto de la calle, en ese sentido lo que correspondía era encerrar o caso contrario entregar a alguna persona o familia para la adecuada formación, respecto a esto último por ejemplo el Código Penal peruano Ley N. 4868 del 11 de enero de 1924 denominado también Código Maurtúa4 establecía que los niños menores de 13 años en abandono material y peligro moral debían de ser puestos al cuidado de una familia digna de confianza y los menores entre 13 y 18 años que cometieran alguna infracción deberían de ir a una escuela correccional, escuela de artes u oficios o granja escuela. Desde la perspectiva del Código Penal peruano de 1924 el trabajo emerge como la forma para recuperar a los niños en la calle ya sea como trabajador doméstico en hogares de terceros como eventualmente terminarían los niños de la primera categoría: menores de 13 años en abandono material y peligro moral en familias receptoras (Artículo 138°) o en los centros cerrados para quienes estén entre 13 y 18 años (Artículo 142°), en los cuales la perspectiva sería volverlos personas de bien a través del trabajo, en la formación y ejercicio de un oficio que les permita ir generando fondos y con ello ir cimentando su futuro laboral. Este Código elaborado muchas décadas antes de que existan Códigos específicos para la infancia y adolescencia peruana muestra de alguna forma en comparación con tiempos actuales como ha ido cambiando la manera de percibir y valorar desde el Estado el trabajo de los niños y niñas, la comprensión se ha ido moviendo en décadas recientes en orientaciones contrarias al paradigma subyacente en el Código Maúrtua y ello se va ir expresando en el devenir también en los instrumentos de política para la niñez en primer lugar y en los específicos de niñez trabajadora. Como se había venido anticipando los primeros instrumentos de políticas que como tales deberían de orientar, direccionar, proyectar los horizontes de nación respecto a la niñez y adolescencia comienzan a formularse en los noventas a través de la preparación y aprobación de dos planes nacionales de carácter quinquenal es decir de corto plazo, se trató del "Plan de acción por la infancia 1992 – 1995" y el "Plan de acción por la infancia 1996 – 2000", ambos surgidos en la coyuntura del gobierno de dictadura cívico militar de Fujimori, de alguna forma intentos primales pero muy básicos y que por demás no llegan a ser conocidos y mucho menos valorados en el escenario social peruano. El instrumento de política social que iniciaría en términos políticos una mayor visibilidad del sector social niñez y adolescencia trabajadora dentro de la estructura estatal va a ser al Plan 4 En honor a su creador el Dr. Víctor Manuel Maúrtua. 106 Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y la Adolescencia PNAIA 2002-20105, promulgado por el Estado peruano con dos años de retraso6, fue el primer esfuerzo de carácter decenal y por incorporar a la infancia y adolescencia dentro de las prioridades políticas de Estado, el mismo documento menciona en sus primeras páginas sobre la relación existente entre inversión social en la niñez y lucha contra la pobreza. El PNAIA 2002-2010 se estructura desde la orientación y enfoque de derechos consignados en la Convención sobre los derechos del Niño, a la vez incorpora el enfoque denominado evolutivo o de ciclo de vida lo que revierte en la definición de un contenido diagnóstico y propositivo por etapas de vida, es así que seleccionan tres etapas claves: inicio de vida, infancia y adolescencia7. El contenido en su totalidad va a ser definido en razón a estas tres etapas esto favorece en el texto un mayor detenimiento en las condición y propuestas por un lado hacia la niñez trabajadora y por otro lado hacia la adolescencia trabajadora, razón por la cual además este instrumento incluye dos resultados esperados hacia este sector social. El orden de estructuración del 2002-2010 está establecidos en razón a los ciclos que formalmente van a ser expuestos en su parte propositiva de la siguiente forma: 1. Asegurar una vida sana para niños y niñas de 0 5 años. 2. Ofrecer una educación básica de calidad para todos los niños y niñas de 6 a 11 años de edad. 3. Crear espacios de participación para los y las adolescentes de 12 a 17 años de edad y promover su desarrollo pleno. 4. Instituir un sistema de garantías para la protección de los derechos del niño (0-17 años de edad). De los veintidós resultados esperados que configuran la propuesta transformadora del PNAIA 2002-2010, dos se centran en el tema del niño y adolescente trabajando, el primero es el Resultado 9 "Las peores formas de trabajo infantil son erradicadas y se promueven alternativas educativas al mismo" y se encuentra ubicado dentro del grupo de resultados que persiguen en conjunto aportar al logro del segundo objetivo estratégico8. Este primer resultado esperado se proponía al 20109 erradicar lo que la Organización Internacional del Trabajo ha definido como las peores formas de trabajo infantil cabe añadir que esto no se ha evidenciado en la realidad peruana, diversas formas de explotación de la niñez en el trabajo persisten pese al título optimista de este noveno resultado. El paradigma complejo que define ¿qué es?, y ¿qué no es trabajo infantil?, se expresa en las metas que integran este noveno resultado del PNAIA 2002-2010 donde se habla indistintamente de peores formas de trabajo infantil pero también de mendicidad infantil, las metas señaladas a nivel de este resultado al termino de la primera década del siglo XXI son cuatro: 1. Se habrá erradicado el trabajo infantil en sus peores formas y disminuido la mendicidad infantil. 2. Se habrá reducido en un 50% el trabajo infantil. 5 En adelante al referirnos a este Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y la Adolescencia PNAIA 2002-2010, vamos a utilizar en el documento solamente las siglas "PNAIA 2002-2010". 6 Del 2000 al 2002 el Estado peruano no contó con lineamientos de política para la infancia y adolescencia. 7 Un cuarto objetivo estratégico del PNAIA 2002-2010 va girar alrededor de las necesidades y propuestas abarcadoras para toda la infancia y adolescencia por ello en el texto se va a encontrar un cuarto grupo a manera de una cuarta etapa que en realidad cobertura a todas las infancias. 8 "Ofrecer una educación básica de calidad para todos los niños y niñas de 6 a 11 años de edad". 9 El 2010 es el año de elaboración del presente informe, justamente año de cierre de la vigencia del PNAIA 2002-2010. 107 3. El 75% de los operadores de justicia intervendrá oportunamente en casos de explotación económica, denunciarán y sancionarán según competencia, a quienes vulneran derechos de niños y niñas. 4. Se habrán implementado mecanismos para retener en el sistema educativo a los niños y niñas que estén trabajando y reducir su deserción escolar. En consonancia con lo alcanzado para el resultado noveno del PNAIA 2002-2010 todas las metas comentadas están a la espera de su materialización pues hasta el momento siguen como pendientes, solamente bastaría con comparar la segunda meta expuesta con las cifras en torno a la cantidad de niños y niñas que trabajan en el Perú para mostrar el fracaso de la apuesta a todas luces abolicionista que encamina el Estado peruano. Los logros se alejan de lo pensado o anticipado sin duda expresión de una planeación equivoca o inconsistente. La última de las metas señaladas referida a que las Instituciones Educativas y el sector Educación en su conjunto van a volverse atractivas para los niños y niñas trabajadoras tal vez sea lo que más se ha avanzado sin embargo ello también podría definirse con un pendiente no solo para la niñez trabajadora sino también para la niñez en general que aún muestra indicadores alarmantes de deserción escolar en el país. El segundo resultado sobre niñez trabajadora expuesto en el PNAIA 2002-2010 es el resultado esperado 13 que se denomina "Mecanismos de control que aseguran condiciones adecuadas de trabajo a los adolescentes por encima de la edad mínima requerida" y que forma parte del conjunto de resultados esperados del tercer objetivo estratégico del Plan, este segundo objetivo referido a niñez trabajadora es menos abolicionista sino más bien se enmarca en la normatividad peruana que facultad en casos de necesidad que las y los adolescentes puedan trabajar en condiciones optimas para su bienestar y desarrollo integral. Al respecto se podría añadir que el Estado peruano ha mostrado un poco más de acción a este nivel desde el Ministerio de Trabajo aunque solamente cubra al grupo de adolescentes laborando en el sector formal de nuestra economía, la acción referida sigue siendo muy tímida sin mayor impacto. Las metas planeadas como parte de la profundización del resultado esperado 13 son de dos tipos: el primer grupo que va de la meta uno a la cinco se trata de apuestas básicamente de registro y retención de los adolescentes trabajadores en las Instituciones Educativas en un intento nuevamente por hacer más atractiva, motivadora y respetuosa a la entidad de formación. El segundo grupo de metas conformado por la 6 y la 7 tienen que ver con la erradicación del trabajo adolescente y especialmente de las denominadas peores formas de trabajo infantil: 1. El 100% de adolescentes trabajadores, estarán registrados e inscritos en programas especiales orientados a su promoción integral. 2. El 70% de los centros educativos contará con proyectos educativos institucionales que favorezcan la difusión de los derechos de los y las adolescentes que están trabajando y promoverá el desarrollo de iniciativas productivas acordes a su edad. 3. Se habrán implementado mecanismos para retener en el sistema educativo a los y las adolescentes que estén trabajando y reducir su deserción escolar. 4. Adecuar el currículo escolar a la realidad de los adolescentes que estén trabajando, en el marco de la legislación nacional sobre trabajo infantil. 5. Garantizar en los centros educativos el fortalecimiento de los niveles de aprendizaje de los adolescentes que estén trabajando, de modo que se cumpla lo establecido en la legislación. 6. Disminuir al menos en un 50% el número de adolescentes trabajadores por debajo de la edad mínima requerida para el trabajo. 108 7. Se habrá erradicado el trabajo adolescente en sus peores formas. En relación al nivel de logro de estas metas en términos generales este ha sido mínimo, el mayor avance se ha dado al nivel de las metas del primer grupo sin ser grandes transformaciones y llevar a los servicios educativos a todos los adolescentes, las metas abolicionistas al término de la década si han representado un error al verificar que mas que disminuir ha crecido el número de adolescentes trabajadores en el Perú. Los limitados logros alcanzados por el PNAIA 2002-2010 si es que se puede aseverar algún nivel de logro no solo se dan en el plano de la niñez trabajadora sino en términos de la niñez en general, expresan una apuesta muy empeñosa en términos de cambios radicales pero que no se condice con los diagnósticos de la realidad de las infancia en el Perú ni con la prioridad política y presupuestal mostrada por el Estado peruano de cara a las necesidades de la infancia y adolescencia. Lo que si seria nuevo para esta década en plena profundización de la orientación abolicionista del trabajo infantil del Estado peruano, sería la generación de un instrumento de política específico para afianzar la lucha contra la niñez trabajadora, es así que en el año 2005 se aprobó el "Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010"10. Se trata del único esfuerzo de atención a través de un instrumento de política de un grupo de infancia específico dentro del espectro de diversos grupos de niños y niñas con más o menos urgencias y demandas presentes en nuestra realidad nacional y este trato preferencial devino en la infancia y adolescencia trabajadora. La definición de importancia se vuelve controversial al constatar la preocupación existente por ejemplo por parte del Sistema de Naciones Unidas frente a la situación de la infancia y adolescencia victima de explotación sexual comercial infantil y que se expresa en la recomendación al tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" para la formulación e implementación de un Plan de lucha contra la explotación sexual comercial infantil, recomendación que hasta ahora no se toma en cuenta11. La preparación del PNPETI 2005 – 2010 se enmarca dentro de la priorización del Estado peruano inducida por la presión de Naciones Unidas a través de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y del conjunto de entidades nacionales y extranjeras que apuntan con su discurso y acción a la abolición del trabajo infantil en el país, se trata pues de la concreción de un horizonte compartido por un conjunto de entidades que asumen un discurso pre diseñado y exportado para su trato y valoración de la infancia y adolescencia trabajadora12. El Plan se encuentra planteado desde un enfoque de planeación tradicional, es decir cuenta con enfoques (derechos, enfoque de igualdad de oportunidades con equidad entre hombres y mujeres, desarrollo humano, de participación y corresponsabilidad social), principios, objetivos, componentes, áreas estratégicas, gestión del plan, metodología, etc.). El PNPETI 2005 – 2010 parte por la definición de lo que sus promotores entienden por el trabajo infantil que buscan enfrentar:  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas y niños por debajo de 14 años de edad que, tanto a corto o largo plazo, puedan poner en riesgo su bienestar. 10 En adelante y a lo largo del texto al referirnos al "Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010" estaremos utilizando las siglas "PNPETI 2005 – 2010". 11 El tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" fue presentado en el año 2004 ante el Comité de Naciones Unidas CRC. 12 Colectivo que formalmente ha asumido la denominación de CPETI – "Comité Directivo Nacional para la Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil" fue creado en el año 2003 y se encuentra conformado por los diversos Sectores del Estado peruano (Ministerios), la Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Poder Judicial, Gobiernos Regionales, Instituto de Estadística e Informática, Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú, Representantes de los Empleadores, Representantes de los trabajadores, ONGs abolicionistas y las redes de las ONGs abolicionistas, Organizaciones Internacionales (UNICEF, JICA, COSUDE, etc.), etc. 109  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas, niños y adolescentes menores de 18 años de edad que, sea por su naturaleza o condiciones en que se desarrollan, sean peligrosas para la salud física y mental, seguridad o moralidad.  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas, niños y adolescentes menores de 18 años de edad en actividades ilícitas o formas de trabajo forzoso.  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan adolescentes entre 14 hasta antes de cumplir los 18 años Una rápida mirada por estos criterios clasificadores del trabajo infantil que para el Estado no se quiere contar en el país pondría la cuota de selectividad en el proceso de determinar que trabajo puede ser bueno que desarrollen los niños y cual no, y por ende en la definición de prioridades, sin embargo el texto más específicamente en su contenido propositivo muestra una orientación estigmatizadora y por ende de erradicación de todo tipo de trabajo que pueda y/o quiera desempeñar la niñez pobre de nuestra nación. El ánimo de selectividad se pierde ante un discurso totalitario que cita constantemente que el trabajo infantil es malo y que por ende tiene que erradicarse y ello es evidente en el contenido PNPETI 2005 – 2010, buscando un poco más de precisión teórica en su inicio el Plan también integra lo que se denomina principios orientadores:  El trabajo, cuando pone en riesgo el bienestar y oportunidades sociales e individuales de niños y niñas, es una actividad negativa para los menores de edad.  Todos y todas los niños y niñas tienen los mismos derechos al bienestar y desarrollo integral, independiente de su condición laboral.  Las políticas públicas sobre el trabajo infantil tienen un sentido propositivo de transformación de la realidad vigente, apuntando a promover el bienestar de todos los niños y niñas.  La familia y la escuela son los espacios de socialización fundamentales para el desarrollo y bienestar de los niños y niñas. Los objetivos que se propone alcanzar el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 son muy parecidos a los que en su momento se planteaba José Matías Manzanilla en la primera década del siglo XX dado que se dividen en el trabajo erradicado por debajo de los 14 años y el controlado o bajo parámetros para los adolescentes ubicados entre los 14 y 18 años, con la salvedad de que este Plan no cae en la precisión realizada por Manzanilla hace casi cien años de diferenciar y no tomar en cuenta en un mismo instrumento condiciones como las de trabajador familiar no remunerado o trabajo de características campesinas, los objetivos del PNPETI 2005 – 2010 son directos, previsibles pero al mismo tiempo confusos por la diversidad de formas de trabajo que se hallan expuestos en la realidad peruana: • Prevenir y erradicar el trabajo infantil bajo los 14 años de edad, • Prevenir y erradicar las peores formas de trabajo infantil de menores de 18 años, • Proteger el bienestar y derechos de los adolescentes trabajadores entre 14 a 18 años. Para el logro de los objetivos propuestos en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 se proponen a diferencia de otros planes como el PNAIA 2002 – 2010 el desarrollo de componentes, estos componentes vienen a representar en la matriz de este plan las tres partes del contenido propositivo de este instrumento, algo así como las tres grandes brechas para transitar hacia un país sin trabajo de niños, estos componentes son: • Componente de prevención del trabajo infantil 110 • Componente de restitución de derechos de niñas, niños y adolescentes que trabajan • Componente de protección y formación del adolescente trabajador El desarrollo de las propuestas en razón al componente en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 tendrían que implementarse y llevarse a la práctica en razón a unos criterios de priorización que en buena medida persiguen proteger al niño y adolescente, esto criterios son: Desde el punto de vista de la edad del trabajador, desde el punto de vista del tipo de trabajo, desde el punto de vista del área geográfica, desde el punto de vista del tipo de intervención. El PNPETI 2005 – 2010 también logra pautear las áreas estratégicas de la inversión social y praxis del Estado para su finalidad de erradicación, estas serían las entradas específicas al tema en consonancia como los componentes previamente señalados. Las áreas estratégicas en el Plan son: sensibilización y comunicación, legislación, estadística e investigación, políticas sociales y derechos, y capacitación y fortalecimiento institucional. De esta manera el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 exhibe sus resultados esperados en una matriz de componentes por áreas estratégicas de acción que puede ser valorada como novedosa en la particular configuración de los instrumentos de política social del Estado peruano. El total de resultados esperados presentados en el Plan han contado con un relativo seguimiento, este por el contrario es conocido como uno de los instrumentos menos conocidos y valorados en la década inicial del siglo XXI, su cumplimiento también ha sido mínimo, en la medida que ni siquiera ha logrado en el área estratégica de estadísticas e investigación arribar con datos fiables sobre el trabajo de los niños y adolescentes al final de su vigencia que es el 2010. Manera de collage de los resultados tal vez más sorprendentes planteados en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010, de su orientación descalificadora del trabajo de los niños y niñas, a continuación se expone un pequeño listado sin orden ni la precisión de su matriz de origen de algunos resultados esperados: • Niñas, niños y adolescentes informados y sensibilizados sobre los riesgos del trabajo infantil • Ciudadanía identifica al trabajo infantil como problema sustancial del país • Familias sensibilizadas para superar situaciones críticas a través del diálogo y el respeto a niños y niñas • Conocimiento sistematizado sobre motivaciones y estrategias eficientes para prevenir el trabajo infantil • Padres de niños y niñas que trabajan crean un entorno de protección al niño o niña frente a los riesgos del trabajo infantil • Se ha armonizado la normativa internacional sobre trabajo infantil en función a los acuerdos y convenios internacionales • Se han realizado estudios cuantitativos y cualitativos sobre el trabajo infantil • Empoderar a los niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan • Los Comités Regionales de Prevención y Erradicación de Trabajo infantil están funcionando en todas las regiones del país 111 DISCUSIÓN Desde la academia la condición de la niñez trabajadora ha seguido una senda de prejuicios y sobre entendidos hechos sin mayor base, se ha asentado en apreciaciones realizadas desde el claro oscuro de la ausencia de indicadores fiables, veraces y actualizados. La responsabilidad directa del Estado como generador de datos constantes, sistemáticos como condición previa para la planificación de acciones de desarrollo especialmente dirigidas hacia los grupos de población considerada en alto riesgo tiene un severo revés en el análisis de la condición y posición de un grupo de población como el de los niños y niñas que trabajan. Tenemos que el número de niños y niñas que trabajan en el Perú ha mostrado un crecimiento constante en las últimas tres décadas, en términos objetivos se tiene un crecimiento sostenido, y cada vez tenemos más niños y niñas en diversos trabajos en las áreas rurales y urbanas. La explicación oficial frente a este fenómeno sostenido de crecimiento ha sido la comparación con el crecimiento proporcional del total de la población peruana, es decir bajo esta lógica somos cada vez más peruanos y peruana, y por ende cada vez tenemos más niños y niñas que en proporción reducida optan por el trabajo. Revisando los datos brindados por una u otra fuente, del Estado peruano o producto de una reinterpretación privada o de alguna entidad de Naciones Unidas se pueden inferir algunas ideas en razón a la cantidad de niños y niñas trabajando en el Perú: Se tiene un crecimiento sostenido de la población de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el país, salvo pequeñas oscilaciones tenemos que la realidad peruana incluye dentro de sus fenómenos sociales en crecimiento la niñez trabajadora, los procesos de la realidad: crisis económicas, vastos grupos de población en exclusión, centralismo de las industrias, crecimiento sin equidad, etc., son factores que han venido a aportar a la ampliación y a complejizar la situación de la población infantil trabajadora. El trabajo doméstico en hogares de terceros de la niña trabajadora debe de sumarse al trabajo doméstico en el propio hogar, que es impago y que se mimetiza bajo el supuesto de apoyo familiar, el hogar como espacio de riesgo emerge como el escenario preferido para la incidencia de las diversas formas de maltrato y abuso, para el caso de las niñas este riesgo se amplía inclusive a nivel de la indemnidad sexual, una lectura desde el enfoque de género podría posibilitar el reconocimiento de situaciones de riesgo a los cuales se haya expuesta la niña y adolescente trabajadora y que son específicos a su condición de mujer. Al respecto, el Estado peruano no cuenta ni con esa lectura ni con acciones integrales de carácter resolutivo de cara a la situación de la niña trabajadora. Los niños hacen lo posible por asistir a la escuela y trabajar, para los adolescentes esto es más difícil, se dice que es en función a una mayor exigencia del trabajo pero también tendrían que estar en el análisis la búsqueda adolescente de proyectos no gaseosos y especulativos, la necesidad de realismos y no espejismo en las propuestas que llegan a ellos, y el carácter cuestionador de este grupo de infancia, los adolescentes observan, evalúan, arriesgan y deciden, la metáfora aquella del economicismo académico en razón a la cual a menos educación menos ingreso a futuro no está llegando al debate de los adolescentes o a alguna porción de ellos. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRAFICAS CAD (2010). Trabajo infantil y adolescente. Lima: Boletín CAD N°107. Estado Peruano (1992). Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N°26102. Lima: Estado Peruano. Estado Peruano (2000). Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N°27337. Lima: Estado Peruano. Estado Peruano (1924). Código Penal del Estado peruano de 1924. Lima: Estado Peruano. Fernández, Carlos (2004). Elites políticas y pobreza en el Perú republicano: una visión panorámica. En: Perú, política, reducción de la pobreza. Lima. NDI. 112 INEI (2009). Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008. Lima: INEI. INEI (2001). Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2001. Lima: INEI. INEI (2008). Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008. Lima: INEI. INEI. Encuesta nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007. Lima: INEI. MIMDES (2007). Informe anual 2007 de cumplimiento del PNAIA 2002 – 2010. En sitio web www.mimdes.gob.pe. MIMDES (2002). Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y Adolescencia 2002 – 2010. Lima: MIMDES. MIMDES (2004). Tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Lima: MIMDES. MINSA (2008). Plan de Acción de Prevención y Erradicación del trabajo Infantil con enfoque del Sector Salud 2007-2008. Lima: Documento del MINSA. MNNATSOP (2008). Memoria del Décimo Encuentro Nacional. Lima: Documento del MNNATSOP. OIT (2008). Trabajo Infantil: Causa y Efecto de la Perpetuación de la Pobreza. Lima: IPEC-OIT. Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar – Red TH (2006). Situación de la trabajadora del hogar en el Perú. Lima: Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar. Rodríguez, José y Vargas, Silvana (2009). Trabajo infantil en el Perú: Magnitud y perfiles vulnerables. Informe Nacional 2007 – 2008. Lima: IPEC – OIT. UNICEF (2010). Situación de la niñez – Perú. Lima: UNICEF. 113 APLICACIÓN DEL PROGRAMA DE TÉCNICAS COGNITIVO-CONDUCTUALES EN EL RENDIMIENTO ACADÉMICO DE ESTUDIANTES DEL INSTITUTO ALAS PERUANAS MAG. MILAGRITOS SIMONA BARRIGA VÁSQUEZ PSICOTERAPEUTA COGNITIVO CONDUCTUAL INTRODUCCION En los últimos años, la disminución del rendimiento académico en estudiantes de educación superior y universitaria se ha convertido en motivo de preocupación de profesores y autoridades educativas. En el caso que nos ocupa, los estudiantes del Instituto Alas Peruanas registran en los dos últimos ciclos un descenso en su rendimiento académico. El propósito de este estudio es establecer si la aplicación de un Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales, al dirigirse a aumentar conductas adecuadas en cada uno de los estudiantes, contribuye en corto plazo a maximizar su rendimiento académico. PROBLEMA  El problema de la investigación se planteó del modo siguiente:  ¿En qué medida la aplicación del Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales influye en el rendimiento académico de los estudiantes del Instituto Alas Peruanas? OBJETIVOS Determinar la influencia de la aplicación del Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales en el rendimiento Académico de Estudiantes del Instituto Superior Alas Peruanas. OBJETIVOS ESPECIFICOS 1) Elaborar el Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales. 2) Identificar las características del rendimiento académico. 3) Describir las características cognitivo-conductuales (ansiedad, autoestima, asertividad y creencias irracionales) de los alumnos del Instituto Alas Peruanas. 4) Determinar la relación entre las características cognitivo-conductuales (ansiedad, autoestima, asertividad y creencias irracionales) y el rendimiento académico de los alumnos del Instituto Alas Peruanas. 114 MARCO TEORICO 115 HIPOTESIS  La hipótesis del estudio se formuló de la siguiente manera:  H: La aplicación de un Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales permite alcanzar mayor rendimiento académico en los alumnos del Instituto Alas Peruanas. 116 METODO  En esta investigación se aplicó el método explicativo experimental.  Y el diseño es de tipo pre experimental, con medición de pretest y postest, cuyo esquema es el siguiente:  GE: O1 x O2  La población estuvo constituida por los alumnos que cursaron el semestre 2005-1 del Instituto Alas Peruanas.  En tanto que la técnica de muestreo fue de tipo intencional, no probabilístico.  La muestra seleccionada es de 60 alumnos del primer ciclo del Instituto Alas Peruanas, del turno mañana. PROCEDIMIENTO  En primer lugar, se procedió a seleccionar la muestra de estudio. Luego, a establecer el rendimiento académico de los sujetos al inicio del Programa. Para ello se elaboró una prueba de Entrada con 10 preguntas de conocimientos básicos sobre la asignatura de Metodología del Trabajo Universitario, que corresponde a estudios generales. La calificación fue hecha en el sistema vigesimal (0-20).  Inmediatamente, se aplicó, a lo largo del semestre, el Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales a la muestra previamente seleccionada. En la aplicación del Programa se utilizaron los siguientes materiales: Pizarra, tizas, plumones, ayudas audiovisuales, hojas bond A4 en blanco, registros, separatas, etc. Posteriormente, se procedió a la obtención del rendimiento académico de los sujetos que completaron el Programa mencionado, administrándoles una prueba de Salida con 10 ítemes de conocimientos básicos de la asignatura de Metodología del Trabajo Universitario APLICACIÓN DEL PROGRAMA DE TECNICAS COGNITIVO CONDUCTUALES Distribución de la muestra de acuerdo a sus notas basal y final      A lo largo del semestre se aplicaron en total 14 sesiones, agrupadas en   módulos de acuerdo a la conducta que se pretendía tratar para lograr el incremento del rendimiento académico en los estudiantes del Instituto Alas Peruanas. Tales módulos son:  a) Ansiedad (5 sesiones) 117  b) Autoestima y control de las creencias irracionales (5 sesiones)  c) Asertividad y el logro del autocontrol (4 sesiones) RESULTADOS Cuadro 1 (continuación) Distribución de la muestra de acuerdo a sus notas basal y final Sujeto Nota Basal Nota Final Sujeto Nota Basal Nota Final 31 15 16 46 13 19 32 16 19 47 5 15 33 7 15 48 6 15 34 14 18 49 8 17 35 15 11 50 9 16 36 16 18 51 6 17 37 13 19 52 10 19 38 6 18 53 11 14 39 14 19 54 7 13 40 8 15 55 11 18 41 11 16 56 12 19 42 13 16 57 10 18 43 15 16 58 14 19 44 14 16 59 11 20 45 13 17 60 13 19 Sujeto Nota Basal Nota Final Sujeto Nota Basal Nota Final 31 15 16 46 13 19 32 16 19 47 5 15 33 7 15 48 6 15 34 14 18 49 8 17 35 15 11 50 9 16 6 16 18 51 6 17 37 13 19 52 10 19 38 6 18 53 11 14 39 14 19 54 7 13 40 8 15 55 11 18 41 11 16 56 12 19 42 13 16 57 10 18 43 15 16 58 14 19 44 14 16 59 11 20 45 13 17 60 13 19 118 CONCLUSIONES  1) Existen diferencias significativas entre las medias aritméticas de las notas Basal y Final, que corresponden a los momentos Antes y Después de la aplicación del Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales, respectivamente.  2) La aplicación de un Programa de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales ha tenido éxito en cuanto permitió incrementar significativamente el rendimiento académico en los alumnos del Instituto Alas Peruanas. RECOMENDACIONES  1) Que se diseñen y lleven a cabo Programas de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales en los centros educativos escolares y de educación superior de Lima Metropolitana, a fin de incrementar en los estudiantes conductas positivas para el adecuado desarrollo de su personalidad, mejorando, asimismo, su calidad de vida académica y familiar.  2) Promover la investigación a nivel nacional sobre la aplicación de Programas de Técnicas Cognitivo-Conductuales, a fin de aumentar la fiabilidad y validez de tales programas en el logro de sus objetivos.  3) Asimismo, se recomienda hacer extensivo este Programa de Técnicas CognitivoConductuales en la reducción de otras conductas inadecuadas que puedan estar perjudicando la formación académica y personal de los estudiantes de educación superior. FUENTE: MAG.BARRIGA VASQUEZ, LIMA – PERU, 2006 119 ESTILOS PARENTALES: NUEVOS DESAFIOS EN EL ENTRENAMIENTO A PADRES Juan Carlos Montero Ordinola INTRODUCCION El ser humano es básicamente un ser social y su desarrollo siempre tiene lugar dentro de una familia o comunidad que lo acepta y le da aprecio y reconocimiento. Los cambios culturales y educativos demandan a padres y madres en familia el reubicarse frente a los nuevos procesos que se dan en la escuela y en la sociedad. Esta situación plantea en los momentos actuales retos en la crianza. Ahora se habla de cualidades positivas como la autovalía, aspectos ligados a la sexualidad infantil y del adolescente, la violencia familiar y juvenil como problemas sociales, estrategias de vida frente a retos que generaciones anteriores desconocían y otros asuntos que se van planteando en el horizonte de la familia y la escuela. Ante este conjunto de cambios y retos que representa la crianza, más aún cuando la investigación ha encontrado correlaciones entre los estilos parentales y la conducta infantil, y el Estado busca dar atención preferentemente a la primera infancia, se hace más relevante para la institución familiar dotarle de nuevos patrones de acción y relación familiar, los estilos parentales son de especial importancia a la hora de iniciar procesos personales y grupales de aprendizaje y cambio en beneficio del desarrollo saludable de la familia, considerando que la mayor parte de la controversia sobre que constituye una paternidad buena o mala tiene que ver con los estilos parentales. Las complejidades del desafío no se deben soslayar, la familia es un sistema dinámico e interactivo en que padres e hijos se influyen entre sí. El presente artículo pretende exponer una temática de vigente actualidad para los padres y madres y, sensibilizar a toda la comunidad educativa a comprender a la familia como un sistema de apoyo instrumental y afectivo para las nuevas generaciones. PALABRAS CLAVE Crianza, familia, estilos parentales, conducta infantil, escuela, comunidad LO QUE SE ESPERA DE LOS PADRES Si lo único estable en un mundo de permanente cambio es la inestabilidad, hay que estar preparado para ella, señala Schneider (2013:74), y los cambios culturales y educativos demandan tanto a padres como a madres reubicarse frente a los nuevos procesos que se dan en la escuela y en la sociedad. Esta situación plantea en los momentos actuales retos en la crianza, además que es importante contextualizar la educación en la perspectiva del contexto social en que los niños, niñas y jóvenes están viviendo y proyectándose hacia una sociedad en que les tocará vivir y construir. Se sabe que las niñas y niños que estamos educando hoy serán personas que a pesar de haber nacido en el añejo siglo XX, a fines del segundo milenio, tendrán que habitar otro siglo y el tercer milenio de la humanidad. Tal 120 como anotan Arón y Milicic (2009: 17) la herencia recibida de la historia de los primeros milenios está marcada por episodios de violencia, destrucción y miedo que hemos sido incapaces de erradicar y que son producto de una sociedad patriarcal. El contexto social se relaciona no sólo con factores macrosistémicos, sino también con las responsabilidades personales de los miembros que lo componen, y por lo tanto la consideración del desarrollo personal que no sólo en el contexto escolar sino también a lo largo de su vida debe tener un rol protagónico. La inserción en el entramado social hace que determinados agentes sociales vayan "enseñando" aquellos comportamientos que son propios de nuestra cultura y, por tanto, aceptados o rechazados por la mayor parte de los que vivimos en ella. Dos de esos grupos, la familia y la escuela, se sitúan en la base del proceso y constituyen los pilares básicos de nuestra socialización. La familia, como agente que precede en el tiempo a cualquier otro grupo social, emerge aquí con un estatus de privilegio por su gran poder conformador de acuerdo con lo expresado por Olivares (2006:24). En la siguiente figura se pueden distinguir al menos cuatro funciones o responsabilidades de lo que se espera de la familia en relación con los hijos. Siguiendo a Cataldo (1991:35), se puede decir que la familia y concretamente los padres deben proporcionar sustento, cuidado y protección a sus hijos, mediante las conductas de apoyo y afecto el niño percibe que es querido y aceptado dentro del núcleo familiar. La función de apoyo y afecto puede dividirse, a su vez, en dos dimensiones bipolares que caracterizan las relaciones afectivas de los padres con los niños ya sea en forma de aceptación-rechazo, dimensión que oscila por una parte entre el afecto, cariño y la expresión de sentimientos afectivos hacia la conducta del niño y las expresiones físicas o verbales de agresividad, hostilidad o indiferencia, por otra, sobreprotección-distanciamiento, referida a familias que se aglutinan en torno a un miembro familiar, frente a las familias que carecen de identidad de grupo y se caracterizan por una comunicación muy poco fluida. De la socialización se puede describir como el proceso por el cual los individuos, en interacción con otros, desarrollan las maneras de pensar, sentir y actuar que son esenciales para su participación eficaz en la sociedad, mediante la implicación de padres, hermanos, abuelos, a través de estrategias diversas como el modelado y la instrucción directa o experiencia compartida. Todo ello en el contexto de una lata implicación emocional. La responsabilidad de control social se asume como un proceso en que la familia modela, orienta, conduce y limita la conducta de sus miembros. La disciplina o control que los padres utilizan para educar a sus hijos es un factor fundamental para lograr la socialización de los niños, además de constituir un medio de interacción entre las conductas de éstos y los valores y fines deseados por los padres. El control se refiere, por tanto, al modo en que los padres pretenden influir en la conducta de sus hijos y el mejor modo de conocer cómo influye esta modalidad de control en el proceso socializador del niño, es examinar la mayor o menor o implicación y participación de los padres en las actuaciones de sus hijos, así como las técnicas o estrategias disciplinares que ponen en juego tanto para conseguir y mantener el comportamiento deseado como para eliminar o reducir un comportamiento desadaptativo. Dada la especial relevancia que tiene el tipo de control que los padres ejercen sobre los hijos, se hace necesario enfatizar esta cuestión, tal como Blechman (1990:27) lo sugiere y recuerda que la familia también posee funciones educativas tanto en su propio dominio, proporcionando pautas educativas útiles para el desarrollo de sus miembros: la influencia como fuente de poder, generado por la administración de las recompensas o cuando proporciona ejemplos y modos concretos de actuar que ayudan a que la conducta tenga éxito, entonces se dice que el adulto utiliza el poder habilidosamente. Ostenta los más altos grados académico y militar que se otorgan en el Perú: Doctor en Administración y General de División de nuestro Ejército. 121 Eso explicaría el porqué los educadores con frecuencia se sienten desorientados acerca del tema de los límites y de la disciplina que deben establecerse en la educación de los jóvenes, mucho depende del control social y los criterios básicos que deberían guiar la implantación de las normas a cumplir. RELACIONES FAMILIARES: LA FAMILIA COMO SISTEMA La familia consta de elementos que interactúan: progenitores e hijos influyen unos en otros, y recibe el influjo de otros sistemas sociales como la vecindad y las organizaciones comunales, en la visión de la familia desde una perspectiva ecológica. En el enfoque de sistemas los padres de familia siguen ejerciendo sobre sus hijos un influjo directo, por ejemplo, alentándolos a poner empeño en el estudio e indirecto siendo generosos y amables. Pero la influencia ya no es exclusiva de padres hacia hijos, sino recíproca: también estos influyen en aquellos. Con sus conductas, sus actitudes e intereses inciden en cómo son tratados. Una influencia aún más sutil descrita por Kail y Cavanaugh (2006:258) se manifiesta cuando vemos las familias como un sistema de elementos interactuantes. Así la conducta de los padres incide en la relación entre madre e hijo: un esposo exigente le dejará a su esposa poco tiempo, energía o interés para ayudarle a su hija en la tarea escolar. O cuando los hermanos discuten constantemente, los progenitores tratarán a toda costa de evitar los problemas en vez de estimular el desarrollo de sus hijos. Los ejemplos descritos en las líneas anteriores muestran que, si nos concentramos demasiado en el impacto que los progenitores tienen en sus hijos, es posible que no reparemos en las complejidades de la vida familiar. El enfoque de sistemas no se agota en eso. La familia forma parte de otros sistemas sociales, entre ellos el barrio y las instituciones comunales, en las que se incluye la iglesia que afectan a la dinámica familiar, algunas veces facilitan la crianza, como cuando los vecinos amigos y de confianza se ofrecen a ayudar a cuidar a los hijos ajenos. Pero otras veces complican las cosas, las visitas de los abuelos frecuentes pueden provocar fricciones en la familia. El siguiente diagrama sintetiza las numerosas influencias interactivas que incluye una concepción de la familia basada en los sistemas AREAS PROBLEMÁTICAS IDENTIFICADAS Una experiencia realizada por Montero y Delgado (2001:5) permitió desarrollar un programa para promover la participación de la familia en el apoyo de los aprendizajes de sus hijos, en actividades y prácticas de comportamientos saludables, alentando la creación de espacios útiles e integrando al grupo familiar en la organización escolar, de modo que conozca y asuma su corresponsabilidad en la educación de sus hijos. En el programa los padres aprenden a desarrollar habilidades de relación con los hijos según las necesidades de sus hijos como cambiar las conductas de sus hijos y mejorar su relación con ellos. Previamente, se recogió información acerca de las áreas problema tanto por parte de los padres como de los propios hijos que se resumen en la siguiente tabla: FAMILIA TRABAJOVECINDAD 122 TABLA 1: AREAS PROBLEMATICAS IDENTIFICADAS INFORMADAS POR LOS HIJOS INFORMADAS POR LOS PADRES Expresión de afecto Dominante Comunicación Poco comunicativo Críticas Creo conocer a los hijos Exigentes Poco tiempo juntos Muy controlador Poco afectuoso Desinterés en lo que hago Desconozco como orientar a los hijos Elaboración propia En síntesis, las relaciones afectivas, el nivel de comunicación, la intimidad y privacidad, la confianza, los estilos paternos que determinan el grado y el tipo de control ejercido, así como los mecanismos de adaptación a los cambios constituyen las variables que más frecuentemente se relacionan con un desarrollo personal positivo o negativo. DIMENSIONES Y ESTILOS PARENTALES En función de la presencia e intensidad de los componentes de apoyo o afecto, control, valores y creencias de los padres, se va a desarrollar en cada familia, en cada padre/madre, un modelo de estilo educativo, entendido éste como el conjunto de ideas, creencias, valores, actitudes y hábitos de comportamiento que los padres mantienen respecto de la educación de sus hijos y que guían y orientan su relación con éstos. (Olivares, 2006: 37). Es evidente que educar hoy, en la familia o en la escuela, es un asunto difícil, lo es porque la realidad social ha cambiado drásticamente. Piénsese simplemente en la complejidad de nuestro mundo: grandes empresas, poder adquisitivo, medios de comunicación de masas, , nuevas tecnologías, competencia profesional requerida, competitividad, masificación, reclamos placenteros o de ocio. Piénsese ahora en la familia actual, con características como las siguientes: familia simplificada a su núcleo principal "padres e hijos", predominando, además, las familias de uno o dos hijos; trabajo externo de la mamá, familias monoparentales, frecuentes divorcios y separaciones; soledad y autosuficiencia de los hijos en casa, papel central de la televisión en el hogar... (Hernández, 2005: 462). Con estas dos estampas, ya nadie duda de la dificultad educativa, si además se habla de un escenario generalmente democrático donde no vale la imposición, sino la reflexión, el respeto y el sentido de libertad. Los planteamientos son de mayor calidad, pero los procedimientos, más complicados. Estos y otros hechos están modificando seriamente, en el mundo el comportamiento de la gente, la estructura de la gente, la estructura general de la sociedad y las nuevas relaciones intergeneracionales (Roa, 2004: 4). Por lo tanto, en respuesta al cambio social, los individuos desarrollan nuevas estructuras de comportamiento con relación a la edad, llegando a convertirse en reglas y normas que son reforzadas, hasta el punto de institucionalizarse. En una sociedad que evoluciona tan rápidamente, los patrones clásicos de comportamiento se difuminan y desaparecen, mientras que los nuevos patrones empiezan a establecerse. Esta situación de permanente cambio llega a desarmar y desconcertar a padres y educadores: "¿Cómo actuar, cómo educar, que es lo mejor para mi hijo, cómo tratar a los alumnos para que éstos sean más responsables, autónomos, eficaces o simplemente, más felices?". No se puede ser tan pesimista como Freud cuando decía: "Hay una profesión muy desgraciada, pues haga lo que haga, lo hará mal, y ésa es la profesión de padre. Y se piensa que nunca se hará tan bien como es de desear, pero si se puede pensar que se puede hacer lo mejor posible. Se coincide con Hernández (2005: 463) no queda más remedio que "profesionalizarse", incluso como padres, y cuando decimos "profesionalizarse", estamos hablando de tomar conciencia de los factores que inciden en la educación, tales como el clima familiar, el liderazgo educativo, los estilos de educar, las estrategias a utilizar y las consecuencias de una forma u otra de actuar. Con todo, setenemos que ser conscientes de que el proyecto educativo que se desarrolla sobre un hijo o un alumno es un proceso largo y complejo, que va configurando su identidad. 123 DE LOS ESTILOS PARENTALES Muchos estudios de investigación han encontrado correlaciones entre los estilos paternos y la conducta infantil, consistentes con la teoría de Hoffman (Eisenberg, 2000: 436). El reconoce que a veces un grado de afirmación de poder puede ser necesario para impedir que el niño se involucre en alguna acción peligrosa o equivocada; en ese caso, de acuerdo con Hoffman, el uso adicional de la inducción puede suavizar los efectos potenciales dañinos de la afirmación del poder. Entiende la inducción como una forma de razonamiento verbal en la que el padre induce al niño a pensar sobre las consecuencias perjudiciales de las acciones del niño, desde el punto de vista de la persona que recibe el daño. Existen algunos acercamientos empíricos que favorecen la descripción y explicación de la disposición o modo de actuar que los padres muestran habitualmente hacia los hijos o alumnos. La contribución de Becker (1964: 230), Baumrind (1991: 75), Patterson (1995: 91) parecen indicar aspectos estrechamente relacionados con la crianza. Uno ligado con el nivel de afabilidad y sensibilidad (calidez) que se muestra ante los hijos: el otro relacionado al control que se ejerce sobre los hijos. Veamos la siguiente tabla: TABLA 2: ESTILOS PARENTALES CONTROL CALIDEZ CONTROL FIRME POCO AFECTO RAN CONTROL AFECTO Y SENSIBILIDAD POCO CONTROL AFECTO E INTERÉS NO HAY CONTROL NO TIENE AFECTO Fuente: Baumrind, D. ob.cit. La tabla muestra las dimensiones del estudio pionero mejor conocido realizado hace varios años por Diana Baumrind (Gray, 1971: 436) antes de que Hoffman desarrollara su teoría. Baumrind evaluó la conducta de niños pequeños observándolos en centros de cuidado y en sus causas, y evaluó los comportamientos de los padres hacia sus niños mediante entrevistas y observaciones en casa. Sobre la base de estas observaciones, clasificó a los padres en cuatro estilos arquetípicos de la conducta parental, como se aprecia en la siguiente: TABLA 3: CONTROL DE LOS PADRES P A R T IC IP A C IÓ N D E L O S P A D R E S MUCHA MUCHO ESCASO AUTORITATIVO INDULGENTEPERMISIVO ESCASA AUTORITARIO INDIFERENTEDESINTERESADO Elaboración propia Se puede describir el estilo parental a partir de dimensiones generales que se asemejan a los rasgos de la personalidad en que representan aspectos estables de la conducta de los padres: aspectos que se mantienen en situaciones diversas. (Álvarez, 2006: 19) Queda explicitado que la ternura y el control son dos aspectos universales de la conducta parental, pero la idea del nivel apropiado de ambas varía en las culturas. Para nuestra realidad los padres quisieran que sus hijos sean personas felices e independientes, metas que puede alcanzarse con el afecto y el control moderado, o quizá que el individualismo es menos importante que la cooperación y la colaboración. A continuación se analiza la contribución de Baumrind, no sin antes precisar que los modelos de relación familiar son constructos teóricos que realmente no se presentan de 124 forma pura, salvo excepciones, que a nuestro entender resulta el modelo más relevante, práctico a la hora de establecer una tipología de los estilos de crianza. El estilo parental autoritario combina un control firme con poco afecto. Los padres fijan las reglas y exigen que sean cumplidas sin discutir. Se manifiesta un deseo de inculcar el trabajo duro, el respeto y la obediencia, se dan pocos intercambios con sus hijos, porque prescinden de sus necesidades y deseos. El estilo parental autoritativo combina un gran control con afecto y sensibilidad hacia los niños. Los padres autoritativos explican las reglas y estimulan la discusión. El estilo parental indulgente-permisivo ofrece e interés, pero poco control. Estos padres de familia generalmente aceptan la conducta de su hijos y los castigan rara vez. El estilo parental indiferente-desinteresado no ofrece afecto ni control. Estos padres de familia atienden las necesidades básicas físicas y emocionales de los hijos nada más. Procuran pasar el menor tiempo posible con ellos, sin adquirir lazos afectivos. A los niños les favorece más entre los cuatro estilos, una combinación de afecto y de control, característico del estilo autoritativo (Olivares, 2006: 39). Sus hijos suelen ser responsables, confiables y amistosos. En cambio, los de padres autoritarios tienen poca autoestima y poseen menos habilidades sociales. Los de padres indulgentes-permisivos son a menudo impulsivos y se frustran fácilmente. Los de padres indiferentes-desinteresados tienen poca autoestima y son impulsivos, agresivos y malhumorados. Algunos investigadores ((Kail-Cavanaugh, 2006: 262) han comprobado que el estilo autoritario puede beneficiar a niños que crecen en la pobreza, la explicación dada es que cuando crecen en medio de la violencia y del crimen, la obediencia a sus padres puede protegerlos. Por mucho que estas dimensiones y estilos ayuden a entender el estilo parental, la crianza del niño no se limita a ellos, el propósito del presente escapa a la posibilidad de abordarlos. Queda claro que los padres de familia influyen en el desarrollo mediante la instrucción directa y el asesoramiento. Además sirven de modelo a sus hijos, quienes a veces imitan su conducta, se valen de la retroalimentación para influir en la conducta del niño APORTACIONES DEL NIÑO: INFLUENCIA RECÍPROCA Al inicio del artículo se anotó que la familia es un sistema dinámico e interactivo en que padres e hijos se influyen entre sí. Se diría que desde el nacimiento éstos inciden en el trato que reciben, los padres se comportan de modo diferente según la conducta del niño. Para entender esta influencia recíproca, imaginemos a dos niños de distintos temperamento mientras reaccionan ante el estilo autoritativo de un progenitor. El primero de los niños tiene un temperamento "agradable", no vacila en cumplir las órdenes y responde bien a las discusiones familiares en torno a las expectativas de sus padres. Estas relaciones son un ejemplo clásico de un estilo autoritativo exitoso. Pero imaginemos al otro niño, con un temperamento "difícil", que obedece de mala gana y que a veces no obedece en absoluto. Con el tiempo el progenitor se muestra más controlador y menos afectuoso. Por su parte, el infante cada vez es menos obediente y esto hace que su progenitor adopte un estilo autoritario. Como se ha podido advertir en el ejemplo, las conductas y estilos parentales a menudo cambian a raíz de la conducta del hijo. Con el transcurso del tiempo, las influencias recíprocas llevan a muchas familias a adoptar formas habituales de interactuar. Algunas termina funcionando bien, otras terminan con serios problemas por los frecuentes desacuerdos, pues les resulta difícil ver objetivamente el funcionamiento de la familia, porque después de todo forman parte de ella; y a menudo carecen de los conocimientos necesarios para modificar la conducta de sus hijos. En tales circunstancias la ayuda que puede ofrecer la Psicología puede darse y está en condiciones para identificar los obstáculos del funcionamiento familiar exitoso y recomendar los medios para eliminarlos. La relación recíproca entre progenitor e hijos es esencial para el desarrollo humano. CONCLUSIONES 125 El proceso a través del cual se produce nuestra inserción en el entramado social comienza en el momento mismo del nacimiento, tal como lo enfatiza Olivares (2006: 23). A partir de ese instante, determinados agentes sociales nos van "enseñando" aquellos comportamientos que son propios de nuestra cultura y, por tanto, aceptados o rechazados por la mayor parte de los que vivimos en ella. La familia es el grupo de referencia, aquel en el que vivimos nuestras primeras relaciones sociales, y comenzamos a asumir las normas y valores vigentes en la sociedad. En función de la presencia e intensidad de los componentes de apoyo o afecto, control y creencias de los padres, se va a desarrollar en cada familia, un modelo de estilo educativo, entendido éste como el conjunto de ideas, creencias, valores, actitudes y hábitos de comportamiento que los padres mantienen respecto de la educación de sus hijos y que guían y orientan su relación con éstos. Los estilos señalados son tipos puros, y los padres nos acercamos más o menos y sirven de espejo que nosotros como padres vernos aproximadamente reflejados en uno un u otro estilo. REFERENCIAS Álvarez C, María de los Ángeles (2006) Nadie nos enseña a ser padres. Manual de apoyo para padres y educadores. Santiago: Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile Arón, Ana María – Milicic, Neva (2004) Clima social escolar y desarrollo personal. Un programa de mejoramiento. Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello Carrobles, J.A.-Pérez-Pareja, J. (1999) Escuela de padres. Guía práctica para evitar problemas de conducta y mejorar el desarrollo infantil. Madrid: Pirámide Cataldo, CH. (1991) Aprendiendo a ser padres. Conceptos y contenidos para el diseño de programas de formación de padres. Madrid: Visor Eisenberg, N. (2000) Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of Psychology, 51, 665-697 Gray, Peter (2008) Psicología. Una nueva perspectiva. México: Mc Graw-Hill Hernández, Pedro (2005) Educación del pensamiento y las emociones. Madrid: Narcea Hoffman, M. L. (1994) Discipline and internalization. Development Psychology, 30, 26-28 Lyford-Pike, Alexander (1999) Ternura y firmeza con los hijos. México: Alfaomega Kail, Robert V. – Cavanaugh, John C. (2006) Desarrollo Humano. Una perspectiva del ciclo vital. México: Mc Graw-Hill Martín B. – Navarro Guzmán, José I. (2009) Psicología del desarrollo para docentes. Madrid: Pirámide Montero, Juan C. –Delgado, César H. (2001) Manual del Programa de sensibilización a padres de familia. Lima: UDECE-MED Olivares R., JoséRosa A, Ana Isabel-Olivares, Pablo J.(2006) Ser padres, actuar como padres. Un reto que requiere formación y tiempo. Madrid: Pirámide Roa, J. M. et al (2004) ¿Qué hay de común y de diferente en el estilo educador de los padres y madres, en función de su cultura, en un contexto socio-educativo pluricultural? Revista Iberoamericana de Educación, 33, 8 Schneider, Ben (2013) Post crisis. De una época de cambios a un cambio de época. Lima: El ComercioProducciones Cantabria 126 CAPITULO II GESTION EN CIENCIAS ADMINISTRATIVAS Y ECONOMICAS 127 LA UNIDAD CIENTÍFICA EN CONTABILIDAD Dr. Víctor Ayala Bayona (* ) Resumen Intenta lograr, a través del análisis descriptivo un replanteo sobre la Teoría y Práctica de la Contabilidad en los niveles micro y macroeconómico, con estudios deductivos empíricos que abarque los segmentos: demostrativo, descriptivo y corregibilidad en el área Patrimonial o financiera empresarial. PALABRAS CLAVE: Ciencia, Contabilidad, Unidad Científica en Contabilidad. Antecedentes del tema Para centrar el tema, es necesario presentar las definiciones de ciencia y contabilidad, así como sus relaciones con los segmentos planteados en la contabilidad. Objetivos En el alcance del objetivo general, debemos precisar claramente que el estudio trata de concretar los siguientes objetivos específicos: a) Determinar, si la ciencia, y la contabilidad, tienen relación con el dato contable, principios contables, funciones contables, e información contable, como unidad científica en contabilidad. b) Evaluar cuál de los factores mencionados tienen mayor importancia, para la unidad científica en contabilidad. c) Analizar si hay o no diferencias sobre la unidad científica en contabilidad. Importancia Consideramos que es de suma importancia en los momentos actuales de economía globalizada, estudiar la Unidad Científica en Contabilidad, porque interesa a la Comunidad Universitaria conocer esos criterios; igualmente interesa a las instituciones científicas dedicadas a la investigación, a la difusión del mismo, como son las Facultades de Contabilidad; y, por todo lo anterior, interesa al profesor universitario en contabilidad por estar inmerso en ello. Método * VÍCTOR AYALA BAYONA. Doctor en Contabilidad. Profesor Facultad de Ciencias Contables y Fianzas Corporativas. Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Docente de la Escuela de Posgrado de la UIGV. 128 Se presentan planteamientos teóricos sobre Ciencia y Contabilidad que permiten hacer un análisis descriptivo para determinar relaciones en las variables: dato contable, principios contables, funciones contables, e información contable, para la unidad científica en contabilidad. Antecedentes sobre el tema ciencia13 Se toma como referencia para este trabajo, que ciencia es un "conjunto de conocimientos que incluye una garantía de su propia validez". Encontramos "que la ciencia es conocimiento demostrativo". "En las diferentes concepciones de ciencia se pueden distinguir conforme con la garantía de validez que se le reconozca una característica: a) en la demostración; b) en la descripción; y, c) en la corregibilidad". a) Sobre, la concepción demostrativa de la ciencia, se extrae, "la doctrina anuncia que la ciencia garantiza la propia validez demostrando sus afirmaciones en un sistema unitario en el cual cada una de ellas sea necesaria y ninguna pueda ser dejada de lado, agregada o cambiada, es el ideal clásico de la ciencia". Luego, "que la ciencia sea, o tienda ser, un sistema, una unidad, una totalidad organizada, es una pretensión compartida por otras concepciones de la ciencia misma. Lo que esta pretensión conserva de valedero en todos los casos, es la exigencia de que las proposiciones, que constituyen el cuerpo lingüístico de la ciencia sean compatibles entre sí, esto es, no contradictorio. Esta exigencia es, sin duda, mucho más débil que la que pretende que tales proposiciones constituyen una unidad o un sistema; más bien hablando con exactitud, es una exigencia totalmente diferente ya que la no contradictoriedad no implica en modo alguno la unidad sistemática". b) Por otro lado, la concepción descriptiva de la ciencia, señala: "a partir de Bacon, con la obra de Newton se ha venido formando la concepción descriptiva de la ciencia". Newton estableció el concepto descriptivo de la ciencia, oponiendo el método del análisis al método de la síntesis. Este último consiste "en considerar que las causas han sido descubiertas, en colocarlas como principios y en explicar los fenómenos partiendo de tales principios, considerando como prueba esta explicación". El análisis consiste, en cambio, "en hacer experimentos y observaciones, en obtener conclusiones generales por medio de la inducción y en no admitir en contra de las conclusiones objeciones que no resulten de los experimentos o de otras verdades ciertas". Claude Bernard, a este respecto, considera que "la simple confirmación de los hechos nunca podrá llegar a construir una ciencia. Se pueden multiplicar los hechos y las observaciones, pero tal cosa no lleva a comprender nada. Para instruirse, es necesario razonar sobre lo que se ha observado, juzgar los hechos que sirven de control". (1865). "Desde este punto de vista, una ciencia de observación será una ciencia que razone sobre hechos de la observación natural, esto es, sobre hechos pura y simplemente confirmados; en tanto, una ciencia experimental o de experimento razonará sobre hechos obtenidos en las condiciones que el experimentador ha creado y determinado por sí mismo". Mach atribuye "una función económica a la ciencia, con mayor precisión, a los conceptos científicos, por lo tanto, no niega el carácter descriptivo de la ciencia, reconocible en la tesis de que tiene por objeto las relaciones entre los elementos. Precisamente por considerar las relaciones entre los hechos, la ciencia es una descripción económica y abreviada de los hechos mismos" (1883). Bergson reconoce el carácter convencional y económico de la ciencia por el hecho de que, "por tener la ciencia como órgano a la inteligencia, se detiene en las relaciones entre las cosas". (1911). El ideal descriptivo de la ciencia se encuentra, en Dewey que afirma: "Como en la ciencia los 1. AYALA BAYONA, Víctor. Tesis Doctoral. Formación de Contadores Públicos para una Racionalidad en Contabilidad.Modos de Orientación. UIGV. 1999. 129 sentidos son determinados en razón de su relación reciproca como sentidos, las relaciones se convierten en objetos de la investigación y las cualidades se relegan a un segundo plano, desempeñando un papel únicamente en la medida en que ayudan al establecimiento de relaciones" (1950). Asimismo, termina diciendo: "las relaciones no son más que otro nombre con el que se designan leyes, ya que la ley no es más que la expresión de una relación, y, de tal manera, el mismo concepto de ciencia se puede hallar en todos los autores que reconocen como tarea de la ciencia la formalización de la ley". c) La concepción de corregilibilidad de la ciencia, establece que: "La tercera concepción es la que reconoce como única garantía de validez de la ciencia su autocorregibilidad. Se trata de una concepción que ha asomado en las vanguardias más críticas o menos dogmáticas de la metodología contemporánea y que no ha logrado desarrollarse en la medida que las dos concepciones precedentes, pero que es significativa -aún asípor partir del abandono de toda pretensión a la garantía absoluta, ya sea porque abre nuevas perspectivas al estudio analítico de los instrumentos de investigación de que disponen las ciencias". Morros R. Cohen expresa: "Podemos definir la ciencia como un sistema autocorrectivo". "La ciencia invita a la duda. Si puede desarrollarse o progresar no es solamente porque ninguna proposición suya es, en sí misma absolutamente cierta, y así el proceso de corrección puede obrar para encontrar pruebas más adecuadas. Pero es necesario anotar que la duda y la corrección siempre están de acuerdo con los cánones del método científico y de tal manera esta última es su nexo de continuidad" (1949). M. Black ha adoptado un punto de vista análogo: "Los verdaderos principios del método científico deben ser considerados, en sí mismos, como provisionales y sujetos a ulteriores correcciones, de modo que una definición de método científico se verificaría en cualquier sentido del término" (1954). A parte de ello, dice que K. Popper había afirmado en su Lógica de la Investigación (1935) que "la completa armazón de la ciencia se dirige, no hacia la verificación, sino hacia la demostración de la falsedad de las proposiciones científicas". "Nuestro método de investigación -diceno está dirigido a defender nuestras anticipaciones para probar que tenemos razón, sino, por el contrario, se dirige a destruirlas". Poper ha querido señalar el abandono del ideal clásico de la ciencia: "El viejo ideal científico del episteme, del conocimiento absolutamente cierto y demostrable se ha revelado como un ídolo. La exigencia de la objetividad científica hace inevitable que toda aserción científica sea siempre tan sólo una tentativa", (1958). Luego encontramos, "que el hombre no puede conocer, pero sí sólo conjeturar. Afirmar que los instrumentos de la ciencia se dirijan a demostrar como falsas sus aserciones, es otro modo de expresar el concepto de autocorregibilidad, ya que probar como falsa una aserción significa, sustituirla por otra aserción, aun no probada como falsa y que por lo tanto, corrige la primera". La noción de la autocorregibilidad constituye la garantía menos dogmática que la ciencia puede exigir de su propia validez". Permite un análisis menos producido de los instrumentos de comprobación y de control de que disponen las ciencias particulares. Thomas S. Kuhn en su libro, La estructura de las revoluciones científicas, nos dice: "Ciencia normal, significa investigación basada firmemente en una o más realizaciones científicas pasadas, realizaciones que alguna comunidad científica particular reconoce, durante cierto tiempo, como fundamento para su práctica posterior". Luego agrega:"Esas realizaciones son relatadas, aunque raramente en su forma original, por libros de texto científicos, tanto elementales como avanzados". Kuhn dice, "pocas personas que no sean realmente practicantes de una ciencia madura llegan a comprender cuánto trabajo de limpieza de esta especie deja un paradigma para hacer, o cuán atrayente puede resultar la ejecución de dicho trabajo. Las operaciones de limpieza son las que ocupan a la mayoría de los científicos durante sus carreras. Constituyen lo que llamo ciencia normal". Agrega, "la ciencia normal posee un mecanismo interno que siempre que el paradigma del que proceden deja de funcionar de manera efectiva, segura el relajamiento de las restricciones que atan a la investigación". Kuhn señala: "Creo que hay sólo tres focos normales para la investigación científica fáctica y no son siempre ni permanentes, distintos. Primeramente, la clase de hechos que el paradigma ha demostrado que son particularmente reveladores de la naturaleza de las 130 cosas. Al emplearlos para resolver problemas, el paradigma ha hecho que valga la pena determinarlos con mayor precisión y en una mayor variedad de situaciones. Esas determinaciones fácticas importantes han incluido los esfuerzos por aumentar la exactitud y el alcance con que se conocen los hechos como ésos, ocupan una facción importante de la literatura de la ciencia de observación y experimentación, desde Tycho Brahe hasta E. O. Lawrence". "Una segunda clase habitual, aunque menor, de determinaciones fácticas se dirige hacia los hechos que, no tengan a menudo mucho interés intrínseco, pueden compararse directamente con predicciones de la teoría del paradigma. Cuando pasamos de los problemas experimentales a los problemas teóricos de la ciencia normal, es raro que haya muchos campos en los que una teoría científica, sobre todo si es formulado en una forma predominantemente matemática, pueda compararse directamente con la naturaleza. No más de tres de tales campos son accesibles, hasta ahora, a la teoría general de la relatividad de Einstein". "Una tercera clase de experimentos y observaciones agota, creo yo, las tareas de reunión de hechos de la ciencia normal. Consiste en el trabajo empírico emprendido para articular la teoría del paradigma, resolviendo algunas de sus ambigüedades residuales y permitiendo resolver problemas hacia los que anteriormente sólo se había llamado la atención. Esta clase resulta la más importante de todas y su descripción exige una subdivisión". Luego agrega Kuhn, "ahora los problemas teóricos de la ciencia normal, que caen muy aproximadamente dentro de las mismas clases que los experimentales o de observación. Una parte del trabajo teórico normal, aunque sólo una parte pequeña existente para predecir información fáctica de valor intrínseco". Más adelante acota: "La necesidad de este tipo de trabajo nace de las enormes dificultades que frecuentemente se encuentran para desarrollar puntos de contacto entre una teoría y la naturaleza". "Estas tres clases de problemas –las determinaciones de los hechos con la teoría y la articulación de la teoríaagotan , creo yo, la literatura de la ciencia normal, tanto empírica como teórica. Por su supuesto, no agotan completamente toda la literatura de la ciencia". Contabilidad En este trabajo, Contabilidad es un conjunto de conocimientos, que incluye una garantía de su propia validez patrimonial, mediante la comunicación de sucesos relacionados con fenómenos susceptibles de ser convertidos en información adecuada a toda clase de actividades humanas en la gestión empresarial. El criterio de validez en contabilidad, está en las características: demostrativa, descriptiva, y corregibilidad al convertirlos en información adecuada para toda clase de actividades humanas en la gestión empresarial. Resultados La concepción demostrativa en la contabilidad Tiene característica demostrativa la contabilidad, al demostrar sus afirmaciones en un sistema unitario compuesto por los elementos: dato de contabilidad, principios de contabilidad, método de contabilidad, función de la contabilidad e información de la contabilidad, cuyo esquema presenta el Dr. Antonio Ayllón Ferrari, en su libro Sistemas y Métodos de Contabilidad y Administración cuando dice: "Los elementos del sistema de contabilidad son: a) El dato contable, b) los principios de contabilidad, c) la función de la contabilidad, d) el método de contabilidad, y, e) la información de la contabilidad", en toda actividad humana empresarial, cuyos puntos presentamos: El dato contable 131 Los datos contables, se encuentran al interesarnos escuchar, resolver problemas y servir a los usuarios sobre compras, ventas de bienes y servicios, cobranzas, potencial humano, de donde se desprende todo un sistema contable por partida doble. Los principios de contabilidad Para un estudio comparativo de los principios de contabilidad, frente a los principios de la ciencia, se presentan lo que encontramos en la escuela norteamericana: a) El principio de la objetividad: "Los registros y los estados contables se basan en la información disponible más confiable, por lo que serán tan exactos y útiles como sea posible" Este es el principio de la confiabilidad. Cualquier observador independiente puede confirmarla. Por lo tanto, idealmente, los registros contables se basan en información confiable que fluye de actividades que están documentadas por evidencia objetiva. Sin el principio de confiabilidad, también llamado el principio de objetividad, los registros contables se basarían en caprichos y opiniones y estarían sujetos a discusiones. b) El principio de la comparabilidad: "Tiene dos requisitos. Primero, la información contable tiene que ser comparable de un negocio a otro. Segundo, los estados financieros de un negocio tienen que ser comparables de un periodo a otro". Los formatos estándar para estados financieros fomentan la comparabilidad entre diferentes compañías. El usar los mismos términos para escribir los elementos de los estados –activos, pasivos, ingresos, egresos, etc.ayuda también al proceso de comparación. Para alcanzar esta cualidad –que los contadores llaman consistencialas compañías tienen que seguir las mismas prácticas contables de un periodo a otro. De lo contrario, el usuario de un estado financiero no podría decir sí los cambios en la utilidad y en los valores de los activos son el resultado de las operaciones o de la forma en que la empresa contabiliza las mismas. c) El principio del costo o valor histórico: "Afirma que los activos y servicios que se adquieren se deben registrar a su costo real" Aunque quizá el comprador crea que el precio pagado es una ganga, el artículo se registra al precio pagado en la operación. El principio del costo histórico también sostiene que los registros contables deben mantener el costo histórico de un activo durante todo el tiempo que el negocio lo conserve. ¿Por qué? Porque el costo es una medida confiable. d) El principio de la exposición: "Sostiene que los estados financieros de una compañía deben presentar suficiente información para que las personas fuera del negocio puedan tomar decisiones sensatas con relación a la compañía". Este principio abarca los diferentes tipos de exposiciones como: i) Resumen de políticas de contabilidad importantes, para conocer cómo se prepararon sus estados financieros y así poder evaluar una compañía por parte de los inversionistas y los acreedores necesitan. Las compañías resumen sus políticas contables en nota de los estados financieros. Por lo general, las compañías exponen el método de reconocer los ingresos, el método de los inventarios y el método de la depreciación. ii) Probables pérdidas, el principio de exposición ordena a la empresa registrar y presentar una probable pérdida antes de que ésta ocurra si es probable la pérdida y si su importe se puede estimar. iii) Cambios en la contabilidad, el uso consistente de los métodos y procedimientos de contabilidad es importante en el estudio de su comparabilidad. Cuando una compañía cambia de un método o procedimiento de contabilidad a otro, tiene que exponer el cambio, la razón de hacerlo y el efecto del mismo sobre la utilidad neta. Dos cambios comunes en la contabilidad son los cambios en los principios de contabilidad y los cambios en los estimados de contabilidad. Un cambio en un estimado de contabilidad ocurre durante el curso normal de negocios cuando la compañía modifica expectativas anteriores. Si una compañía puede registrar el gasto por cuentas incobrables sobre la base del estimado de las cuentas malas, éstas serán igual al 2% de las ventas. Si los cobros reales exceden este estimado, la compañía puede rebajar su gasto estimado en el futuro al 1% de las ventas. 132 iv) Acontecimientos posteriores, es normal que una compañía necesite varias semanas después de que finalice el año para cerrar sus libros y publicar los estados financieros. En algunas ocasiones, durante este período, ocurren acontecimientos que afectan la interpretación de la información en esos estados financieros. Los ejemplos más comunes de acontecimientos posteriores son tomar prestado dinero, pagar deudas, hacer inversiones, vender activos y ser acusado en una demanda judicial. A estos casos, se les conoce como acontecimientos posteriores y se deben exponer en los estados del período anterior. v) Segmentos de negocio, las grandes compañías operan en más de un área. A cada área se le conoce como un segmento del negocio. Un corredor de bienes raíces puede ser propietario de un restaurante. Un distribuidor de automóviles puede ser propietario de una mueblería. Un agricultor puede al mismo tiempo vender implementos agrícolas. Al clasificar por segmentos de negocios, la información de la utilidad y de los activos, se puede determinar cuántos de los activos de la compañía están comprometidos con cada segmento y qué líneas de negocios son las más (o menos) rentables. vi) Técnicas de exposición, las compañías usan notas entre paréntesis en los estados financieros. Un ejemplo es la forma siguiente: 31 de diciembre: 200x2 200x1 Cuentas por cobrar comerciales (menos estimaciones de 200X2 y 01, respectivamente) 1,745 1,675 31 de diciembre: 200x2 200x1 Cuentas por cobrar comerciales 1,806 1,742 Provisiones para cuentas dudosas (61) (67) Ambas técnicas de exposición proporcionan información adecuada del importe total por cobrar y del importe neto que se espera cobrar. Finalmente, en el territorio peruano, la Comisión de Normas Internacionales de la Federación Internacional de Contadores, encargada de formular promover y publicar las Normas Internacionales de Contabilidad para preparar los Estados Financieros, considera que dichos estados descansan sobre ciertos "supuestos de contabilidad (principios de contabilidad generalmente aceptados) que descansan en los siguientes supuestos contables": a) El negocio en marcha. b) La consistencia. c) La acumulación (valor razonable, ingresos y egresos). El Comité de Normas Internacionales de Contabilidad (IASC) ignora los principios de la entidad, periodicidad, dualidad, valor histórico, moneda común. Es decir, un pragmatismo extremo, y con ello, la ciencia contable tiende a estancarse. Según el Dr. Ayllón Ferrari al respecto dijo: "En mi modesta opinión, creo que la IASC debería tomar la metodología de Paul Grady para armar las estructuras básicas de los estados financieros generales, y, entonces, con referencia a esas estructuras o formas, elaborar las normas internacionales de contabilidad". Las funciones de la contabilidad "Son los diferentes servicios de información que proporciona la contabilidad sobre las variaciones del patrimonio, de la gestión, asimismo, a los usuarios para la toma de las decisiones", acota el Dr. Ayllón Ferrari, en su obra citada. Además, señala: "Las principales 133 funciones contables son: Función de control financiero, de control económico y de control administrativo". 1) Función de control financiero, señala: "es la más importante de la contabilidad, y consiste en revelar las relaciones y proporciones patrimoniales expresados monetariamente en los estados contables", tanto en el origen como en la aplicación de fondos. "Al darle una expresión monetaria a los fenómenos patrimoniales, se homologan todos sus elementos integrantes (bienes, derechos y obligaciones) lo que permite establecer las relaciones financieras". Las relaciones financieras a nuestro entender pueden ser: * Bienes Financieros, representa la masa monetaria que maneja la empresa en un ejercicio económico. * Bienes Reales, representada por las existencias y los activos fijos, con la que opera la empresa en un ejercicio económico. * Niveles de Endeudamiento, indicador que muestra la confianza que tiene la empresa en el corto plazo. * Capitales Permanentes, indicador del monto con que opera la empresa en el largo plazo.  Patrimonio Neto, que muestra la rentabilidad que tiene la empresa en un mercado de competencia globalizada. El estado financiero, que guarda los elementos para la función de control financiero, es el balance general, cuyos elementos del Balance General de donde los activos son beneficios económicos futuros obtenidos o controlados por una entidad en particular como resultado de operaciones anteriores. Los pasivos son las obligaciones de una entidad para transferir activos o proporcionar servicios a otras entidades como resultado de operaciones anteriores. El capital es el interés en los activos de una entidad que queda después de rebajar sus pasivos. Es interés de propiedad en la entidad. 2) Función de control económico: Revela cómo se generan los ahorros del giro o explotación de la entidad contable en un ejercicio económico. ..."Por ser esta función eminentemente analítica, se le conoce como contabilidad analítica de explotación. Por esta función, se revela los centros de costos donde se han generado las inversiones para el mantenimiento de la fuente productora en la empresa, y las cargas realizadas por negligencia gerencial, conocidas como gastos extraordinarios del ejercicio". El estado económico que contiene los elementos de la función de control económica, es el Estado de Resultados. Los ingresos son flujos de entrada de activos que se producen por la entrega o producción de bienes, la prestación de servicios, o la realización de otras actividades que constituyen las operaciones centrales de la entidad en marcha. Los gastos son salidas de efectivo o el incurrimiento en pasivos que se producen por la entrega o producción de bienes, prestación de servicios, o realización de actividades que constituyen las operaciones centrales de la entidad en marcha. Las ganancias son aumentos en el capital contable que no son el resultado de ingresos o inversiones por parte de los propietarios. Las pérdidas son disminuciones en el capital contable que no son el resultado de gastos o distribuciones a los propietarios. Los ingresos y los gastos se producen por las operaciones básicas del negocio en marcha, mientras que las ganancias y las pérdidas no la son. 3) Función de control administrativo: "Con esta función, se encuentra la relación de los centros de responsabilidad en el manejo del patrimonio de la empresa. Esta función brinda información de nivel gerencial para la toma de decisiones en sus aspectos de planeamiento, ejecución, dirección y control del sistema administrativo de la empresa". El estado financiero que guarda los elementos de control administrativo, es, el resultado del Estado de Capital, tales elementos los encontramos en las inversiones por parte de los propietarios son aumentos en el capital contable que resultan de la transferencia que hace el propietario a la entidad de algo de valor. La inversión más común es mediante efectivo, pero 134 en ocasiones los propietarios invierten en terrenos, edificios, servicios legales u otros activos. En algunos casos la inversión del propietario del negocio puede consistir en liquidar sus pasivos. Las distribuciones a los propietarios son disminuciones del capital contable como resultado que el propietario se traspase a sí mismo activos o servicios del negocio, o de que el negocio se haga cargo del pasivo del propietario. Cuando el negocio es una sociedad anónima los retiros del propietario se conocen como dividendos. 4) Función de información para inversiones: "Es aquella que se revela en el análisis de los estados financieros certificados a través de una auditoría". 5) Función de información para tributación: "Es aquella que se revela en las declaraciones juradas para efectos tributarios, las mismas que son confirmadas por la SUNAT". 6) Función de información para el desarrollo empresarial: "Es aquella que revela contablemente las proyecciones de la actividad empresarial a través de estados proyectados". Los instrumentos de información, para el desarrollo empresarial se encuentran en los estados financieros y sus elementos complementarios. El método de la contabilidad Es la manera de proceder en el dominio de la contabilidad, ordenando la actividad empresarial para el control de la administración patrimonial, mediante la teneduría de libros. En el método científico, orientado y dirigido hacia la ciencia de la contabilidad, podemos distinguir dos aspectos: (a) Imponer un orden en las actividades que realiza el investigador en contabilidad y en los conocimientos obtenidos. (b) Orientar la investigación hacia un ejercicio económico, paso a paso, en un proceso. (a) El método de contabilidad como orden, es el que se sirve de reglas y técnicas que han resultado eficaces en el pasado, las cuales se perfecciona a la luz de la experiencia y del análisis racional, aprovechando los conocimientos anteriores como un paso dado. El método es un orden, que impone reglas y que requiere un plan para utilizar esas reglas. Orden y Plan sólo son posibles gracias a la racionalidad del investigador en contabilidad. La razón humana busca coherencia, y sólo se satisface cuando la logra. Esa coherencia o conexión lógica que estructura los conocimientos obtenidos se llama corrección. En resumen, el método es un orden que impone a las actividades, procedimientos, recursos y conocimientos, gracias a que es planeada racionalmente, y que tiende a lograr corrección en la investigación científica. Por racionalidad, en sentido científico, entendemos aquella actividad característica del hombre que impulsa a construir raciocinios cada vez más controlados en todas sus relaciones. Debemos reconocer que no puede agotarse con una sola técnica, y tampoco con un número preciso de técnicas. La originalidad está siempre presente en el pensamiento científico; puede sugerirle caminos conceptuales hoy imprevisibles. (b) El método de contabilidad como proceso. Puede entenderse que el método es también un proceso producido en el tiempo y que comprende varias fases, cada una de las cuales abarca y necesita de la anterior. Para lograr este proceso, se requiere el empleo de procedimientos empíricos (observación y experimentación) que se dan en la teneduría de libros de contabilidad por partida doble. Por otra parte, el método de contabilidad como proceso mecanizado, emplea mucho la observación, cuando fija la atención en un objeto para percibirlo por medio de los sentidos. Como proceso automático de datos, emplea la experimentación que consiste en cambiar las condiciones en que se presentan normalmente los datos, con el fin de obtener nuevos datos mediante el uso de la tecnología de punta. 135 La información de la contabilidad Adviértase que la doctrina que enuncia que la ciencia garantiza su propia validez, demostrando sus afirmaciones en un sistema unitario en el cual cada una de ellas sea necesaria y ninguna pueda ser dejada de lado, agregada o cambiada, es ideal en la relación de los elementos del sistema unitario en contabilidad, mediante el dato de contabilidad, los principios de contabilidad, la función de la contabilidad, el método de contabilidad. Esta conexión de los elementos del sistema, y el conjunto descriptivo que resulta de ese encadenamiento recibe el nombre de Información de la Contabilidad. "La información de la contabilidad consiste en determinar el cómo y el porqué de esa relación. Es decir, da una explicación sobre determinado campo de conocimiento que ha sido explicado de manera fragmentaria por los elementos, que requieren una explicación integral, como lo señaló el Dr. Ayllón Ferrari. La información de la contabilidad, como unidad explicativa, supone un objeto (el patrimonio) y un punto de vista (la cuenta), lo cual queda establecido el principio de investigación; es decir, desde el momento de obtener los datos. Los datos, por sí mismos, no nos dicen nada; es necesario interpretarlos por medio de términos. El Contador Público es quien interpreta los objetos de conocimiento, conforme al objeto o aspecto de la realidad que estudia, mediante el objetivo de los informes financieros. "El objetivo básico de la presentación de informes financieros es proporcionar información que sea útil para tomar decisiones de inversión y préstamos." 14 Para que sea útil en la toma de decisiones, se estima que la información contable debe ser pertinente, confiable y comparable. La información pertinente es útil para tomar decisiones y para evaluar el desempeño pasado. La información confiable está libre de errores importantes y libres de prejuicio de un punto de vista en particular. La información comparable se puede comparar de un periodo a otro para ayudar a los inversionistas y acreedores a seguir el progreso del negocio a través del tiempo. Estas características se combinan para dar forma a los conceptos y principios de contabilidad. La concepción descriptiva en la contabilidad Radica esta concepción en la observación de los hechos y a las inferencias o a los cálculos fundados en los hechos. En contabilidad la observación es determinada en razón de su relación recíproca con los hechos. Estas relaciones son leyes, ya que la ley, es la expresión de una relación. Lo que aquí se sostiene, se expone posteriormente. La contabilidad se reduce así a la observación de los hechos y a las inferencias o a los cálculos fundados en los hechos. "Para instruirse es necesario razonar sobre lo que se ha observado, juzgar los hechos que sirven de control". "El ideal descriptivo de la ciencia en contabilidad se encuentra en los sentidos, son determinados en razón de su relación reciproca como sentidos, las relaciones se convierten en objetos de la investigación y las cualidades se relegan a un segundo plano, desempeñando un papel únicamente en la medida en que ayudan al establecimiento de relaciones". Asimismo, las relaciones no son más que otro nombre con el que se designan leyes, ya que la ley no es más que la expresión de una relación, y se reconoce como tarea de la ciencia en contabilidad, la de formalizar leyes contables. El Plan Contable General de 1973 Tomo I páginas 69/70, señala, "para su práctica, en el desarrollo de la contabilidad se encuentra sustentada por leyes contables aplicadas universalmente a la contabilidad que son, entre las principales, las siguientes: ley de las 14 HoRNGREN & HARRISON. Charles T. Horngren y Walter T. Harrison, Jr. Contabilidad. Prince-Hall Hispanoarenericana S. A. México. 1991. . 136 inversiones; ley de los equipos; ley de las finanzas; ley de las relaciones; ley de los elementos básicos; ley de los costos; ley de las producciones; ley de las distribuciones; ley de los resultados". Ley de las inversiones: La intención de fundar una empresa requiere establecer previamente la cuenta de capitales a invertir en esta empresa. Ley de los equipos: Cualquiera que sea la explotación a la cual se desee lanzarse, es necesario forzosamente equiparse a este efecto; unas cuentas son necesarias para saber en qué medida esto ha podido hacerse. Ley de las finanzas: Toda operación económica se resuelve finalmente con la ayuda de disponibilidades financieras, por una cuenta de ingresos o de gastos. Ley de las relaciones: La economía es una perpetua sucesión de cambios ente partidas tomantes y cedentes que se concilian, pero no pueden establecer relaciones viables más que sobre la base de cuentas recíprocas. Ley de los elementos básicos: Cada célula económica solo existe a condición de tener unos elementos básicos principales o accesorios para explotar y tener en cuenta de ellos constantemente. Ley de los costos: No importa la actividad que entrañan los gastos de diversas naturalezas que constituyen el costo; el conocimiento de los costos es una necesidad absoluta. Ley de las producciones: Toda transformación de un elemento básico da nacimiento a uno o varios productos nuevos; se está obligando a contabilizarlos para apreciar la producción y organizarla. Ley de las distribuciones: La industria y el comercio no existen más que en virtud de la distribución de los productos tratados, lo que sería incoherente e insostenible sin diversas cuentas de las operaciones efectuadas. Ley de los resultados: Cualquiera que sea el vencimiento de una operación en el ciclo económico, da un resultado bueno, malo o nulo, que no se revele más que con la ayuda de cuentas que cada interesado quiere conocer. Es en el origen de una empresa donde es necesario considerar la manifestación de estas leyes; cada una sucede a la precedente en el orden citado arriba; pero enseguida, el ritmo de rotación está diversamente acentuado, en función del dinamismo de la empresa. La última ley creada conserva o desarrolla la primera, que es un potencial fundamental de la cédula económica". La concepción de corregibilidad en la contabilidad Esta concepción, establece nuevas perspectivas de estudio analítico con los instrumentos que disponen los ajustes de los estados financieros en época de inflación, su tratamiento lo encontramos en párrafos posteriores. Además, se puede definir la ciencia en contabilidad como "un sistema autocorrectivo. Su desarrollo o progreso no es solamente porque ninguna proposición suya es, en sí misma absolutamente cierta y, así el proceso de corrección puede obrar para encontrar pruebas más adecuadas". "Es necesario anotar que la duda y la corrección siempre están de acuerdo con los cánones del método científico, y, de tal manera esta última es su nexo de continuidad". La noción de la autocorregibilidad constituye la garantía menos "dogmática" que la ciencia en contabilidad puede exigir de su propia validez. En la contabilidad financiera, se permite ese análisis mediante instrumentos de comprobación y control de ajuste integral a los estados financieros por efecto de la inflación. Al respecto, el X Congreso Nacional de Contadores Públicos del Perú, celebrado en 1986, en su Resolución No 20, adopta el principio de ajuste de los estados financieros en época de inflación. Del párrafo explicativo, se extrae partes significativas que dice: "para restituir su significación a la información financiera transmitida a través de los estados contables bajo procesos inflacionarios, dos son los principales enfoques discutidos a nivel mundial: a) Actualización por cambios en el nivel general de precios. b) Actualización por cambios específicos de valor". 137 El enfoque de actualización por cambios en el nivel general de los precios trata de "convertir los costos históricos originales de las partidas no monetarias en unidades de valor monetario homogéneo, es decir, que permite expresar las transacciones que ocurren en distintas épocas en unidades monetarias de un mismo poder adquisitivo". Dicho enfoque representa una actualización del costo histórico a través de un cambio en la unidad de medición y no del atributo de costo del bien que está siendo medido; en consecuencia, se mantiene vigente el principio contable generalmente aceptado, de valuación al costo histórico. El enfoque de actualización por cambios específicos de valor sostiene que "la corrección debe efectuarse sustituyendo el costo original de cada partida monetaria por el costo actual de la misma". Bajo este enfoque, el atributo costo histórico deja de ser representativo del valor de los bienes y debe ser reemplazado por aquel valor que refleja las variaciones relativas de los precios de dichos bienes a la fecha de ajuste. Por lo tanto, representa un cambio al principio de contabilidad generalmente aceptado, de valuación al costo histórico. La diferencia fundamental entre ambos enfoques es que, en el de cambios en el nivel general de precios se busca mantener la consideración de costo histórico original, reemplazando en función de moneda actual el poder adquisitivo que tuvo aquella que se utilizó en la adquisición de los bienes materia de ajuste. Mientras que en la actualización por cambios específicos de valor se busca darle a dichos bienes un valor actualizado en la condición presente en que se encuentran y con independencia de su costo original. La adopción de alguna de estas alternativas plantea la necesidad de reflexionar sobre aspectos contables de fundamental consideración en los estados financieros, como son el patrimonio y los resultados de las empresas. Por otro lado, el enfoque de actualización por cambios específicos de valor, considera que el capital que debe permanecer intangible es aquel que mantiene la capacidad física u operativa de la empresa, similar a la que poseías en el momento original de la inversión. Bajo este enfoque, la contabilidad debe dar información sobre el esperado flujo de fondos futuros, más que un resumen histórico de lo ocurrido a la fecha de ajuste. Se considera que los enfoques descritos no son excluyentes si no que se proporcionan y que se complementan. Así bajo el enfoque del nivel de precios se pone énfasis en la actualización de situaciones pasadas, mientras que en el enfoque de actualización por cambios específicos se pone en relieve la capacidad operativa con que se enfrenta el futuro. Discusiones La unidad científica en contabilidad  Sostener que contabilidad, es un conjunto de conocimientos que incluye una garantía de su propia validez patrimonial, mediante la comunicación de sucesos relacionados con fenómenos susceptibles de ser procesados para convertirlos en información adecuada a toda clase de actividades humanas en la gestión empresarial, se logra a través del análisis critico para replantear a la Teoría y Práctica de la Contabilidad en los niveles micro y macroeconómicos, estudios deductivos empíricos que abarque los segmentos demostrativo, descriptivo y corregibilidad en las áreas: a) Patrimonial o financiera, b) Gerencial o administrativa, c) Gubernamental o pública, d) Económica o nacional, y e) Social (pequeño, mediano y grande).  Encontramos, que en las diferentes concepciones de la ciencia se pueden distinguir conforme con la garantía de validez, que se le reconozca una unidad científica en toda clase de actividad humana con la contabilidad, mediante la característica: a) en la demostración; b) en la descripción; y, c) en la corregibilidad. 138  La contabilidad demuestra validez patrimonial demostrativa, mediante un sistema conformado por el dato contable, los principios contables, las funciones contables, y la información contable.  La contabilidad demuestra validez patrimonial descriptiva, mediante las relaciones en las diferentes partidas contables de la empresa que determinan leyes contables.  La contabilidad demuestra validez patrimonial de corregibilidad, mediante los ajustes de los estados contables.  Esta unidad científica parte del dato, unido al proceso, en toda actividad humana de la empresa.  La contabilidad se encuentra en los momentos actuales inmerso dentro de una corriente de mundialización a partir del año 2000, en donde existe un ente, para todos los entes, en reemplazo de la globalización, que es todos los entes para un ente, por lo que es necesario replantear la teoría y practica de la contabilidad, en los momentos actuales. Bibliografía AYALA BAYONA, Víctor. Tesis Doctoral. Formación de Contadores Públicos para una Racionalidad en Contabilidad.Modos de Orientación. UIGV. 1999. Ayllón Ferrari, Antonio. Sistemas y Métodos de Contabilidad y Administración. Charles T. Horngren y Walter T. Harrison, Jr. Contabilidad. Prince-Hall Hispanoarenericana S. A. México. 1991. 139 EFECTOS DE LA CRISIS INTERNACIONAL EN LAS EXPORTACIONES Mg. Fernando Bellido Gutierrez Resumen El comercio internacional tiene su origen desde los fenicios y en la actualidad el desarrollo de la tecnología permite la producción a escala, permitiendo un comercio en tiempo real permitiendo el desarrollo de los países aprovechando sus ventajas comparativas. Sin embargo, la globalización así como provee de beneficios también origina desequilibrios externos que socavan la estabilidad económica de los países que se encuentran al otro lado del orbe. Cada una de las naciones busca vender sus productos creando de esta manera beneficios debido a que atraen inversiones y consecuentemente originan empleo. Palabra clave: El comercio contribuye al desarrollo de los países. Introducción Existe preocupación por cuanto en el año 2012 el comportamiento de las exportaciones ha sido afectado, como consecuencia que la Unión Europea vive una crisis que afecta la demanda de nuestros productos exportables. Asimismo, China registra una tasa de crecimiento inferior al 10% y por otro lado EE.UU. aun no se recupera del todo afectando la demanda de los productos agroindustriales y productos textiles. Otro factor que incide es el relacionado a los precios de los productos mineros que producen una contracción de la demanda externa de nuestros principales socios comerciales. En consecuencia la situación económica por la que atraviesa EE.UU., China y la Unión Europea está originando la reducción en la producción y el incremento del desempleo. Socios comerciales Unión Europea  Docente universitario de Post Grado: Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, Universidad Nacional San Luis Gonzaga de Ica. Analista Financiero del Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática. 140 En el año 2012 las exportaciones peruanas hacia la Unión Europea, se contrajeron en 11,4%, respecto al año 2011, totalizando US$ 7 712,1 millones, según información de la Asociación de Exportadores (ADEX). Con relación a las exportaciones tradicionales, las mismas, se redujeron en 13,3%, destacando por el monto despachado las mineras con US$ 3 756,4 millones, que retrocedieron 20,4%. Sin embargo los rubros petróleo y gas natural se incrementaron en 30,2% y la pesca en 45,5%. De otro lado, las exportaciones no tradicionales sufrieron una caída de 4,8%, resultando afectado los subsectores textil (-22,8%), prendas de vestir (20,7%), pesca (-17,8%), metalmecánica (-12,1%), químico (-32,1%), maderas (9,4%) y varios (-20,0%). El principal destino de los productos peruanos en el bloque europeo fue Alemania con US$ 1 847,3 millones, que experimentó una caída de 3,6%, explicado por las menores ventas mineras (-2,9%), agro tradicional (-26,7%), textil (-6,2%), confecciones (-12,5%), metalmecánica (-5,0%), químicos (-48,0%) y madera (57,6%), principalmente. El segundo destino importante fue España, que contrariamente, creció 7,0%, debido a los mayores envíos de gas natural. En tercer lugar está Italia con una disminución de 21,6%, Bélgica (-11,3%) y Países Bajos (38,4%), primordialmente. Estados Unidos Las exportaciones peruanas a Estados Unidos sumaron US$ 6 586 millones, registrando un incremento de 7% en relación al año 2011, según estadísticas de la agencia norteamericana US International Trade Commission (USITC). Estos resultados muestran cierta recuperación de los EE.UU., que aún afrontó inconvenientes en el frente interno por el proceso de solución del déficit en el presupuesto, niveles de desempleo y consumo que vienen recuperándose paulatinamente. Los principales productos que se exportó a EE.UU. fueron: oro (US$ 1 373 millones), petróleo, aceites ligeros y sus preparaciones (US$ 1 113 millones) y estaño (US$ 304 millones), entre otros. A su vez, café sin tostar (US$ 224 millones), espárrago fresco (US$ 216 millones), plata (US$ 214 millones), fosfatos (US$ 157 millones), y chompas tejidas de algodón (US$ 154 millones). Entre los productos agrícolas figura espárrago fresco (US$ 216 millones), que se incrementó respecto al envío de 2011, en 13,9%. Según la USITC, las exportaciones a Estados Unidos del sector agro y agroindustrial alcanzaron US$ 1 226 millones, 6,3% inferior a lo exportado el 2011, debido a menores ventas de café cacao, mango y azúcar. Por su parte, el sector pesca no tradicional tuvo un incremento de 12,5%, monto superior en US$ 168 millones en el 2011. China Las ventas externas del Perú a China totalizaron US$ 7 849 millones, siendo superior en 12,8% al total de envío s del año 2011, según la Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria (SUNAT). Del monto total de lo exportado, el 84,01% está conformado por minería tradicional y el 11,69% por la pesca tradicional. 141 Entre los principales productos resaltan los moluscos, jibias (sepias) y calamares, las demás jibias, globitos, calamares y potas, congeladas, secas, saladas o en salmuera; y el pescado congelado, excepto los filetes: hígados, huevas y lechas. Cotizaciones Uno de los factores que influenciaron sustantivamente en la reducción del valor exportado en el comercio con los principales socios comerciales fueron los precios de los commodities. Particularmente la cotización de los productos mineros los cuales están reflejando una reducción afectado por la crisis internacional. En el siguiente cuadro, el precio del estaño, el plomo, la plata y el zinc, experimentaron las mayores caídas; mientras que en menor grado el precio del cobre. Asimismo, otro factor que afectó las exportaciones fue el tipo de cambio de las principales monedas se fortalecieron frente al dólar. TIPO DE CAMBIO DE LAS PRINCIPALES MONEDAS Nuevos Soles por unidad monetaria (Datos promedio del período) Año Nuevo Sol Euro Yen Libra Esterlina S/. € ¥ £ 2011 2,75 3,830 0,035 4,410 2012 2,64 3,390 0,033 4,170 Var % -4,0 -11,49 -5,71 -5,4 Fuente: FMI y REUTERS Se observa que la moneda local se ha fortalecido respecto a las principales monedas, deteriorando de esta manera la venta externa de los principales productos exportables. Conclusiones Primera.-La exportación de productos a otros continentes conlleva a una especialización y compromiso de la empresa privada con el apoyo del Estado . COTIZACIONES INTERNACIONALES (Datos promedio) Año Cobre Estaño Plata Plomo Zinc Londres Londres H. Harman Londres Londres cUS$ /lb. cUS$ /lb. US$/oz.tr. cUS$ /lb. cUS$ /lb. 2011 400,20 1183,96 35,17 108,97 99,50 2012 360,55 958,08 31,17 93,54 88,35 Var % -9,9 -19,1 -11,4 -14,2 -11,2 Fuente: FMI y REUTERS 142 Segunda.-La diversificación de productos de exportación permite afrontar desaceleraciones que afectan la demanda externa de los países con los que se comercia. Tercera.-La globalización así como beneficia también origina desequilibrios debido al avance tecnológico del comercio internacional. Cuarta.-Es indudable que el no disponer de planes de contingencia ante crisis internacional conlleve a afectar aún más y la recuperación sea más lenta. Referencias bibliográficas  Comercio internacional. Jose Luis Jerez Riesco, Madrid. ESIC Editorial. 2011. España.  Economía internacional. Robert J. Carbaugh. Cengage Learning Editores. 2009. México.  La crisis financiera internacional y económica española. Antonio Torrero Mañas. Ediciones Encuentro. 2008. España.  Comercio internacional y globalización. Carlos Alberto Guajardo. Ediciones Jurídicas Cuyo. 2004. Argentina. 143 AUDITORIA TRIBUTARIA Dr.Roberto Cumpén Vidaurre,(Ph.D) [email protected] Resumen La presente investigación se ha desarrollado con el fin de analizar y evaluar la correcta aplicación de la normativa tributaria vigente, los objetivos de la determinación de la base imponible, verificación, adecuado cálculo del tributo, cumplimiento oportuno de pago, de las obligaciones formales y aplicación de los beneficios tributarios de las operaciones efectuadas en las entidades públicas y privadas. Es importante señalar, que cada vez cobra mayor relevancia el proceso de un sistema integral de auditoría tributaria; por las operaciones comerciales, industriales y de servicios realizados por los principales contribuyentes, y la información contenida en la base de datos, les permita monitorear, ejecutar cruce de información permanentemente entre empresas sujetas a este tipo de régimen. De un tiempo a esta parte se viene profundizando el comportamiento de las empresas internacionales, o Corporaciones multinacionales (CMN), en la actualidad han crecido de manera significativa; esta situación ha generado y obligado a las administraciones fiscales de cada país aplicar reglas administrativas para grabar a las empresas multinacionales, debiendo ser estas conocidas en el contexto internacional. Palabras claves Auditoria Tributaria, Normativa tributaria, Base imponible, Técnicas de auditoría, Beneficios Tributarios, Empresas multinacionales. I. Introducción Actualmente las empresas enfrentan a un mundo globalizado cada vez más competitivo; teniendo como objetivo principal conseguir posicionarse en el mercado y lograr ventaja potencial de diferenciación permanente, siendo esta una tarea muy difícil para las empresas y entidades del estado. Como sabemos cada país tiene sus normas particulares por tanto el cumplimiento de las leyes y los requisitos administrativos son distintos, generando altos costos y cargas adicionales para su cumplimiento. 144 En el Perú se ha generado cambios de fiscalización a contribuyentes, la SUNAT hoy en día tiene el control de Aduanas y la Base de Datos de la Institución se ha fortalecido al acrecentar la eficacia de nuevos instrumentos de fiscalización, del mismo modo se está reforzando con la colaboración de entidades del estado para compartir información sustancial. Este nuevo procedimiento de fiscalización contribuye agilizar los trabajos de auditoría tributaria, así como verificaciones de entrega de comprobantes de pago, centros de control y fiscalización, etc. Además la SUNAT ha desarrollado un plan piloto de inspección de trabajo en equipo, para fiscalizar las obligaciones tributarias provenientes del comercio internacional, en este caso es compartido el uso de información de tributos internos y aduaneros que cuenta la base de datos de la SUNAT a nivel nacional. II. Análisis general 3.1. ¿Qué es la Auditoria Tributaria? Vertiente Privada o Independiente Como parte de la auditoría financiera tiene el objeto de verificar el adecuado registro contable de las obligaciones tributarias y la provisión de las eventuales contingencias. La auditoria tributaria independiente con efecto tributario tendrá la finalidad de comprobar el debido cumplimiento de todas las obligaciones tributarías de una empresa, tanto en sus aspectos formales como sustanciales, para emitir un dictamen tributario para uso de la administración tributaria (AT). Vertiente Pública – Fiscalización por la Administración Tributaria Tiene por finalidad si la base imponible y los pagos de los tributos de los contribuyentes son correctos, de acuerdo con la Ley, y, de lo contrario demostrar fundadamente y la existencia de diferencias, infracciones u omisiones y disponer la cobranza de los adeudos determinados, mas las accesorias de ley. "Due Dilligence" Tributario Es una modalidad de examen que se ejecuta en un proceso de valorización de empresas en los casos de adquisiciones, fusiones, inscripción de valores, en bolsa, etc. Tiene un enfoque especial, dirigido hacia los aspectos más relevantes de la situación tributaria de la entidad y a la evaluación de los riesgos no contabilizados que influyan de manera significativa en el valor de la empresa. La auditoría tributaria es un examen realizado por el Auditor independiente, o el Auditor del Órgano de Control Institucional OCI, con la finalidad de verificar si se han cumplido en forma correcta la obligación tributaria sea formal o sustancial de los contribuyentes, del mismo modo determinar sus derechos tributarios a su favor. La auditoría tributaria tiene relación con la Auditoría financiera por utilizar las mismas técnicas, normas y procedimientos, con la finalidad de cumplir con el objetivo, generalmente se toma como un examen especial, particularmente a algunas cuentas de los estados financieros. Es importante señalar que a través de la auditoria tributaria se verifica si son razonables las provisiones del impuesto a la renta tanto del año en curso, así como de años anteriores. Del mismo modo se revisa la razonabilidad de los impuestos diferidos a una fecha determinada. Para realizar la auditoría tributaria se tienen que revisar los Estados financieros, libros principales auxiliares, registros contables y la documentación como sustento de las operaciones tanto económicas y financieras de la empresa (Cliente o Contribuyente), con el fin de determinar la situación tributaria al periodo fiscal. 145 También se define como el examen de la situación tributaria a una fecha determinada mediante el empleo de un conjunto de métodos, técnicas y procedimientos destinados a verificar el adecuado y oportuno cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias formales y sustanciales de naturaleza tributaria durante uno o varios periodos gravables determinados, de acuerdo con la legislación pertinente y vigente en el Perú.  ACCIÓN : EXAMEN  OBJETO : OPINIÓN  BASE : DD.JJ.  NORMAS : TRIBUTARIAS  ENTIDAD : CONTRIBUYENTE  ALCANCE : PERIODOS GRAVABLES 3.2. ¿Cuál es la diferencia y Semejanza de la Auditoría Financiera Vs. Auditoría Tributaria? DIFERENCIAS 1 OBJETIVO ALCANCE GENERAL EXPRESAR NORMAS UNA OPINIÓN APLICABLES AUDITORIA SITUACIÓN P.C.G.A. FINANCIERA FINANCIERA AUDITORIA SITUACIÓN LEGISLACIÓN TRIBUTARIA TRIBUTARIA VIGENTE 146 DIFERENCIA 2 SITUACIÓN SITUACION FINANCIERA TRIBUTARIA EXPRESIÓN EXPRESIÓN ESTADOS DECLARACIÓN FINANCIEROS JURADA BASE BASE PCGA NORMAS NIIF, NIC, SIC LEGALES DIFERENCIAS Y SEMEJANZAS DE LA AUDITORIA FINANCIERA Y TRIBUTARIA AUDITORIA FINANCIERA TRIBUTARIA ÁMBITO Estado de Situación Financiera. Situación Tributaria de la Estado del Resultado Integral del Periodo. Declaración Jurada. Estado de Cambios en el Patrimonio. Estado de Flujo de Efectivo, Notas, etc. A UNA FECHA 31.12.20XX YY.YY.20XX DETERMINADA PERIODOS 20XX y el Periodo sujeto a Fiscalización. COMPRENDIDOS Anterior 147 RESPONSABILIDAD Estados Financieros: Gerencia Declaración Jurada: Representantes OBJETO DE LA Proporcionar Seguridad Razonable en base a Establecer la correcta administración OPINIÓN los Principios de Contabilidad Generalmente de los recursos del estado, y el Aceptados, (NIIF y NIC). Cumplimiento de las Normas de obligación tributaria de acuerdo a la normativa legal vigente. SEMEJANZAS EL AUDITOR: Da su Opinión BASE DEL EXAMEN En ambos casos opinan en base a la Normas de Auditoría Generalmente Aceptados (NAGAs) AUDITORÍA FINANCIERA Alcance: "Hemos auditado el Estado de Situación Financiera adjuntos de al 31 de diciembre de 2011 y al 31 CONTIENE MANIFESTACIONES de Diciembre del 2012 y los DOCUMENTOS DE GERENCIA DE LA EMPRESA correspondientes estados de EXAMINADOS ACERCA DE LA SITUACIÓN Resultado Integral del Periodo, FINANCIERA Y RESULTADOS Estado de Cambios en el Patrimonio DE LAS y el estado de flujos de 148 OPERACIONES. efectivo por los años terminados en esas fechas (...)" AUDITORÍA TRIBUTARIA. Alcance: CONTIENE MANIFESTACIONES "Hemos auditado la declaración DOCUMENTOS DEL CONTRIBUYENTE SOBRE Jurada del tributo examinado de la EXAMINADOS EL SEÑALAMIENTO DE LOS empresa "XYZ" al 31 de diciembre de HECHOS IMPONIBLES, SUS BASES del 2012 y la correspondiente DE CALCULO Y LA CUANTIFICACIÓN documentación sustentatoria (...) DE LOS TRIBUTOS. 3.3. ¿Cuál es la clasificación de la Auditoría Tributaria? CLASIFICACIÓN DE LA AUDITORIA TRIBUTARIA Fiscal La Auditoria es realizada por un auditor tributario SUNAT. Preventiva Auditoría realizado por personal propio de la empresa o Auditor Independiente. Voluntaria La Auditoría se efectúa con la finalidad de determinar cálculos correctos de impuestos Y su declaración oportuna. Obligatoria La auditoría se efectúa a requerimiento de la entidad fiscalizadora SUNAT. Integral La auditoría se efectúa a todas las partidas con incidencia tributaria que forman parte Mantenimie nto físico de sus miembros. Apoyo social y afecto. Socializació n. Control social. Por su campo de cción 149 Del Balance General; Ganancias y Pérdidas de un periodo. Parcial Auditoría se realiza a partida específica de EE.FF. (IGV, IR) ó Área específica (Ventas, Prod.) 3.4. ¿Qué son las técnicas de la auditoria tributaria? Son: Recursos de investigación, utilizados sistemáticamente, orientados a la obtención de información suficiente y veraz, permite al auditor informarse y comprobar sobre la situación de cumplimiento de las obligaciones tributarias. Las técnicas aplicables se determinan durante la etapa de la planificación de auditoría y son permanentemente revisadas durante la ejecución del trabajo. La información permanentemente actualizada sobre el cliente y sus operaciones, permite revisar y actualizar adecuada y oportunamente los programas de auditoría y técnicas aplicables. Técnicas de Auditoría Clasificación (1) ESTUDIO GENERAL. Características Generales de la Empresa, Contexto Legal, Tipo de actividades, Ubicación Geográfica, Mercado de Operaciones. ANALISIS FINANCIERO Y ECONÓMICO. Estadísticas y Ratios, Tendencias Comerciales, Nivel de endeudamiento Técnicas de Auditoría Clasificación (2) Inspección: Examen físico de bienes, comprobación de existencia y autenticidad (revisión conceptual) Confirmación: Información proporcionada por terceros respecto de las manifestaciones empresariales (circularización). Investigación: Investigación proporcionada por funcionarios o empleados. Técnicas de Auditoría Clasificación (3) DECLARACIÓN: Constancia por escrito. OBSERVACIÓN: Verificación directa de la Ejecución de las operaciones. CÁLCULO: Verificación aritmética de intereses, depreciaciones provisiones, etc. VERIFICACIÓN: Examen y comprobación de la fehaciencia de operaciones contables y documentarias, la cual se debe verificar en forma selectiva o total. Técnicas de Auditoría Procedimientos de Auditoría Tributaria PROCEDIMIENTOS (1) La aplicación y desarrollo del conjunto de técnicas de auditoría sobre uno o más rubros de los estados financieros y sobre uno o más tipos de actividades desarrolladas por el contribuyente. PROCEDIMIENTOS (2) De acuerdo al juicio profesional del auditor, los procedimientos de auditoría deberán establecerse en cada caso teniendo en cuenta:  FORMAS Y DIVERSIDAD DE OPERACIONES.  PRÁCTICAS CONTABLES.  SISTEMAS DE ORGANIZACIÓN. 150  AMBIENTE DE CONTROL INTERNO.  LEGISLACIÓN TRIBUTARIA VIGENTE. 3.5. ¿Cuál es la Legislación Tributaria Vigente en el Perú? En cuanto a la Legislación Tributaria Vigente (según el sistema tributario nacional), es el siguiente: SISTEMA TRIBUTARIO PERUANO DERECHO Y CODIGO TRIBUTARIO TRIBUTOS LEY PENAL TRIBUTARIA GOBIERNO NACIONAL GOBIERNOS LOCALES OTROS FINES IMPUESTO A LA RENTA PREDIAL SENATI IMPUESTO GENERAL A LAS VENTAS ALCABALA SENCICO IMPUESTO SELECTO AL CONSUMO IMP. JUEGOS ESSALUD DERECHOS ARANCELARIOS IMP. APUESTAS ONP IMPUESTO CASINO Y TRAGAMONEDA IMP. PAT. VEHICULAR IMP.EXT. PROM/DES. TURISMO IMP. PROMOCIÓN MUNICIPAL IMPUESTO TEMPORAL ACTIVOS NETOS IMP. RODAJE IMP. TRANSACCIONES FIN. IMP. EMBARC. DE RECREO IMP. VENTA DE ARROZ PILADO TASAS CONT. ESP. OBRAS PUBLICAS Continuando con la auditoría tributaria tenemos: Obligaciones Sustanciales.  Identificación del deudor y acreedor tributario.  Determinación del hecho imponible: Hipótesis de incidencia tributaria.  Cuantificación de la base o matera imponible.  Aplicación de la tasa o alícuota del tributo.  Cumplimiento (pago) oportuno. Obligaciones Formales.  Declaraciones y comunicaciones relativas a la obligación sustancial.  Mantenimiento y conservación de libros y registros contables.  Documentación sustentatoria y archivo documentario.  Información y comparecencia por operaciones con terceros. 3.6. Aplicación de las técnicas y procedimientos de auditoría 151 Evidencia del trabajo realizado: Son los papeles de trabajo. Opinión del auditor, Examen, aplicación de las técnicas y procedimientos, Evidencia papeles de trabajo. Archivos de auditoría, archivo de planificación, archivo corriente, archivo resumen, archivo permanente. ADMINISTRACIÓN TRIBUTARIA Facultades según el Código Tributario. SUNAT. Superintendencia nacional de aduanas y administración tributaria. Recaudación capítulo I: art.55o al 58 Fiscalización, capítulo II: Art. 59o al 81o Sancionadora capitulo III:Art 82o OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA DETERMINACIÓN (1) según código Tributario. DETERMINACIÓN (2) según código Tributario. La Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y Administración Tributaria:  VERIFICA la ejecución del hecho imponible.  SEÑALA la base imponible.  LIQUIDA La cuantía del Tributo.  IDENTIFICA al deudor tributario. INICIO DE LA DETERMINACIÓN (Cód. Tributario Art. 60°) DEUDOR TRIBUTARIO.Acto o declaración ADMINISTRACIÓN TRIBUTARIA.Iniciativa o denuncia. Cualquier persona puede ser denunciante de un hecho generador de la obligación tributaria. FISCALIZACIÓN O VERIFICACIÓN Efectuada por el deudor tributario C.T. Artículo 61° Por iniciativa voluntaria Por el ámbito Funcional DEUDOR TRIBUTAR IO VERIFICA El hecho generador de la obligación tributaria. 152 Fiscalización facultad discrecional (1) (C.T. ARTÍCULO 62°) CUMPLIMIENTO DE LAS OBLIGACIONES TRIBUTARIAS: Inspección, Investigación, Control. INCLUYE A SUJETOS QUE GOCEN DE: Infectos. Exonerados, Exenciones tributarias o Beneficios tributarios especiales. FACULTAD DISCRECIONAL (2) (C.T. ARTÍCULO 62°) EXIGENCIA DE LA INFORMACIÓN CONTABLE: Solicitud de Comparecencia, Realizar inspecciones, Inmovilizar o incautar libros. REQUERIMIENTO DE INFORMACIÓN DE TERCEROS: Practicar inventarios, Realizar investigaciones. DETERMINACIÓN DE LA OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA BASE CIERTA Y BASE PRESUNTA: DETERMINACIÓN INFORMACIÓ N PROPORCION ADA DD.JJ. DEUDOR TRIBUTARIO SUNAT FISCALIZACIÓN O VERIFICACIÓN MODIFICACIÓ N OMISIÓN INEXACTITUD RESOLUCIONE S DE DETERMINACI ÓN SEÑALA La Base Imponible LIQUIDA La cuantía del Tributo ORDENES DE PAGO CIERTA RESOLUCI ONES DE MULTA 153 SE TOMAN EN CUENTA LOS SE REALIZA CUANDO LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ELEMENTOS EXISTENTES QUE CONOCE EL HECHO GENERADOR DE LA PERMITAN CONOCER EN FORMA OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA, PERO NO CUENTA DIRECTA EL HECHO GENERADOR CON LA INFORMACIÓN RESPECTO A LA BASE DE L A OBLIGACIÓN TRIBUTARIA IMPONIBLE Y LA CUANTÍA DEL TRIBUTO, DE Y SU CUANTÍA. SUBSIDIARIA A LA 1RA. METODOLOGÍA. Supuestos para aplicar la base presunta (CÓDIGO TRIBUTARIO ART. 64°)  Presentación fuera del plazo de la DD.JJ.  Dudas en las DD.JJ. o documentación.  No presentar registros y/o documentos contables.  Anulación o reducción de la base imponible.  Diferencias en los comprobantes y registros contables.  No otorgar comprobantes de pago.  No inscribirse en el RUC.  Registros contables no legalizados.  No exhibir registros contables.  Mención expresa de las normas tributarias.  Otros. 3.7. ¿Porque es importante la auditoria tributaria? o La razón principal para llevar a cabo una auditoría tributaria es la necesidad de detectar y superar las deficiencias. o La auditoría Interna ayuda a la administración tributaria a cumplir con los objetivos, a través de la actividad de aseguramiento, contribuye al mantenimiento y mejora constante del sistema de control interno, gestión de riesgos, asimismo como órgano de apoyo y consulta a la dirección de la administración tributaria. o Otra razón importante es que permite al contribuyente conocer su actual situación tributaria, así como la seguridad razonable sobre el cumplimiento de su obligación tributaria (en atención a la actividad específica del cliente) durante los periodos en los cuales se efectúa dicha auditoría. o Asimismo la auditoria tributaria es importante porque permite evaluar el adecuado registro contable a través de la revisión de los libros de contabilidad, así como la verificación de los documentos fuentes, operaciones y declaraciones juradas. 154 o Por lo tanto, el auditor tiene la obligación; que, al detectar debilidades indicar alternativas de solución a través de recomendaciones y sugerencias constructivas. NUEVOS CONCEPTOS DE AUDITORIA TRIBUTARIA El Auditor Tributario Integral: Es un profesional altamente calificado, experto en contabilidad, auditoría, control interno, impuestos, informática y con habilidades para evidenciar delitos como el contrabando, la evasión de impuestos, corrupción, etc. Administración Tributaria: Es un agente encargada de la gestión del sistema tributario. Análisis de Negocios.Objetivos De Aprendizaje:  Discutir la importancia de comprender los factores de mercado, las influencias de los interesados clave, así como los objetivos y estrategias de la gerencia.  Identificar los riesgos de negocio que surgen a partir del punto anterior.  Identificar los riesgos inherentes que afectan los estados financieros como consecuencia de estos factores.  Documentar el análisis de negocios y los riesgos identificados. Análisis de Negocio: Es un enfoque sistemático para la acumulación e interpretación de información sobre un cliente especifico y el entorno de sus negocios, y para la actualización continua de nuestros conocimientos sobre los mismos. Análisis del Ambiente del Negocio: Los pasos para completar esta actividad son:  Identificar la FODA.  Comprender las influencias de los interesados clave sobre las acciones de la gerencia.  Conocer las metas, objetivos y estrategias del negocio.  Identificar los factores críticos de éxito más importantes para el logro de las estrategias de la empresa. Riesgos del Negocio: Potencial para el evento, no acción, o acción para que:  Los objetivos del negocio no se logren.  Los objetivos desarrollados no respondan a las expectativas de los interesados clave. Control Interno:  Un proceso  Realizado por funcionarios y el personal.  Aporta seguridad razonable  Orientado al logro de los objetivos Defraudación Tributaria: Consiste en no pagar todo o en parte los tributos correspondientes utilizando para tal fin cualquier artificio, engaño, astucia, ardía y otra forma fraudulenta. Tributo: Son la materialización en la Ley del Poder del Estado para obligar a las personas a depositar. Ambiente de Control:  Integridad de los valores éticos.  Conciencia de control y estilo operativo de la gerencia.  Compromiso de la gerencia respecto a competencia. 155  Administración estratégica en el gobierno y vigilancia de la entidad.  Estructura organizacional y asignación de autoridad y responsabilidad.  Administración de recursos humanos. Actitud Emprendedora:  Modo de pensar y actuar.  postura emprendedora.  Hacer acontecer Ética. Conocimiento: Know-how de la actividad, actualización permanente, aprendizaje continúo. Informe: Es el documento en el cual se plasma el dictamen. Dictamen: Es la opinión que se emite con base a un juicio profesional idóneo conforme con una labor realizada y de acuerdo con la evidencia obtenida. Dictamen del auditor incluye aspectos de orden financiero, operacional, control interno, gestión de los administradores, de salvaguarda de activos, etc. Hallazgo de Auditoría: Todo hallazgo es principalmente de carácter administrativo. Revela una deficiencia de control interno y por lo tanto requiere de una acción correctiva que impida que se sigan generando las causas que dan origen al hallazgo. Delitos Tributarios: Es la amenaza o daño del patrimonio fiscal municipal mediante el incumplimiento doloso de las obligaciones tributarias del contribuyente o responsables retenedores, con clara intencionalidad dolosa del sujeto pasivo. Defraudación Tributaria: El que comete delito de defraudación tributaria es aquel individuo o contribuyente que omite en su totalidad o en parte el pago de una obligación o en beneficio propio sin derecho; valiéndose de: aEngaño para ocultar información de su obligación tributaria. bInformación incompletas o no sujeta a la verdad. cOmisión dolosa y fraudulenta de las declaraciones presentadas. Reparos a Contribuyentes: El área de fiscalización está facultada a efectuar reparos a los contribuyentes, cuando en los hallazgos de auditoría practicado a los contribuyentes se demuestre que el monto declarado y pagado era menor al encontrado, se realiza un reparo a favor de la municipalidad, el cual deberá de pagar la diferencia con una multa del cien por ciento de lo evadido. AVANCES CIENTÍFICOS Y TECNOLÓGICOS a) Se ha priorizado la iniciativa de ley presentada por la Contraloría general de la República en materia de lucha contra la corrupción. Optimizando el intercambio de información interconectándose a las entidades públicas que producen información de mucha utilidad para los fines de control, la cual se ha estructurado y organizado una Red de información anticorrupción que amplié las bases de datos en red concertadas con: 156 El Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil RENIEC, Superintendencia Nacional de Registros Públicos SUNARP Supervisor de las Contrataciones del Estado OSCE, para permitir la interconexión con otras entidades como la: Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria y Aduanas SUNAT, Superintendencia Nacional de Bienes Estatales SBN, Superintendencia de Banca y Seguros SBS, y los órganos encargados de la administración financiera e inversiones del Estado, fomentando el intercambio de información a tiempo real. b) Obligación de dictamen de EE.FF. Resolución 011-2012/SMV/01:  Las Entidades cuyos ingresos por ventas ó activos totales que al cierre del 2012 sean igual o mayor a 30,000 UIT, presentarán dictamen de auditoría del 2012, comparativo con la del ejercicio 2011. Será exigible a partir del ejercicio económico 2013.  Las sociedades cuyos ingresos por ventas o activos totales que al cierre del 2013 sean igual o mayores a 3,000 UIT presentarán información auditada del 2013, comparativa con el 2012 exigible 2014. c) Libros electronicos: normativa vigente res. de superintencia  Innovación de sistemas tributario.nuevo sistema de libros electrónicos Modifican la RS 286-2009/SUNAT determinándose el universo de obligados a llevar libros electrónicos. Obligatoriedad para los principales contribuyentes a partir 2013. III. Discusión A pesar que se está avanzando, todavía tenemos que desarrollar nuestros grandes esfuerzos a fin de lograr y prevenir la corrupción, la evasión de impuestos, el contrabando; en ese orden, pero nos preguntamos qué debemos hacer para lograr la convergencia de los valores y costumbres. La falta de conciencia tributaria es muy grave en el Perú. Todos tenemos que ver lo que generamos y cambiar de actitud. En la medida que la economía mejore, la auditoría va a enfrentar cada vez retos mayores. Y la actuación del contador auditor en el ejercicio independiente o como un miembro de una empresa; el conocimiento del Código de Ética regula su actuación, y preparan adecuadamente para enfrentar los nuevos retos de éste mundo globalizado. Reflexionar: ¿Debe ser el cliente auditado quien debe elegir y pagar al auditor? ¿De qué manera conseguiremos que el servidor público logre o recupere los valores éticos, la honestidad que siempre debe prevalecer en todo funcionario público, la moralidad, imparcialidad, transparencia, trato justo e igualitario, y rendición de cuentas por iniciativa propia? IV. Conclusión Es evidente que la globalización económica en el siglo XXI incurrirá decisivamente en las distintas formas de organizaciones empresariales, nos encontramos frente a una economía competitiva, cada vez más exigente mayor desarrollo, mayor 157 apertura, mayor competitividad, mayor demanda de servicios para la Sunat, es por estas razones que el auditor debe involucrarse en desarrollar sus conocimientos y habilidades en identificar problemas, dando soluciones, un investigador con carácter científico. El profesional contable auditor debe entender que el aprendizaje debe ser continuo, y aportar a su modificación especializándose constantemente para el desarrollo según las condiciones y situaciones del entorno nacional e internacional y que les aseguren un brillante porvenir hacia el futuro. Es importante difundir la necesidad de los contadores auditores tributarios con ÉTICA, y sobre todo con actitud de emprender una tarea algo complicada, debido a los obstáculos que se deben eliminar. Los que iniciamos en esta misión debemos colaborar con un granito de arena para que nuestro país sea mejor y dejar más transparente a las futuras generaciones. La auditoria tributaria tiene la finalidad de obtener evidencia, en base a pruebas selectivas de materialidad que aseguran que las normas tributarias y presentación de las declaraciones juradas han sido aplicadas adecuadamente durante el periodo bajo examen. Por estas razones es que la SUNAT (empresas privadas) y la Contraloría (entidades del estado) han incrementado los costos de control y de cumplimiento significativamente dando importancia al sistema del control interno y el rol que desempeña el auditor interno dentro de una empresa, o auditores independientes que ayudan a la Administración tributaria a cumplir con sus objetivos a través de la actividad de aseguramiento y consulta. Por lo consiguiente el control interno, es una herramienta primordial en los procesos de control tributario y de gestión, basado en el principio administrativo; de que el titular de la entidad junto con los trabajadores debe controlar permanentemente sus labores y cumplir con todas sus funciones, todos con un fin de lograr alcanzar los objetivos. El trabajo del auditor tributario contribuye a la mejora constante del sistema de control, gestión de riesgos, y se ocupa de aspectos relacionados a las conductas del personal de la entidad o empresa, emitiendo opinión al finalizar su labor, asimismo permite conocer si las actividades se están encaminando realmente a las metas, permite saber de qué manera se están logrando, y si éstas se desviaron se corrijan oportunamente. V. Referencia bibliográfica ALFARAZ, Eulogio J. (2008), Auditoría Interna y Gobierno Corporativo Editorial: Aplicación Tributaria S.A. Buenos Aires, Pág. 208. ALVARADO, Víctor & Jesús Cruz, (2008), Auditoria Tributaria, 4ta. Ed., Editorial: Librería J. Tiscón G. Venezuela, Pág. 120. ALVARADO, Víctor & Peña Francy, (2010), Auditoria Forense / Peritaje Contable Judicial , 2da. Ed., Edición Electrónica: 1, Venezuela, Pág. 168. 158 ALVIN A. Arens, (2007), Auditoría un Enfoque Integral 10mo. Primera edición , Editorial: Pearson Educación, México, Pág. 832. ÁLVAREZ ILLANES, (2007) Juan Francisco; Auditoría Gubernamental Integral, Editorial: Instituto Pacífico Lima – Perú Página 1008. CARRASCO, Luciano; (2007), Aplicación práctica del impuesto a la renta , Editorial Centro de Investigación Jurídico Contable S.A. LimaPerú. CASAL, ARMANDO, (2008) Controles Internos y Gestión de Riesgos, Informes COSO" Web. Profesional & Empresarial (D&D), Editorial Erepar, Argentina. COMISIÓN REPRESENTATIVA DEL IMCP), (2011) Lo que usted debe conocer del Dictamen Fiscal Ante las Administraciones Generales de Fiscalización del SAT 6ta. Ed. Pág. 208. EFFIO, Fernando; (2008) Auditoría Tributaria, Editorial: Entrelineas SRL., LimaPerú Pág. 390. EFFIO, Fernando; (2011) Manual de Auditoría Tributaria, Editorial: Entrelineas SRL., LimaPerú Pág. 450. ESTUPIÑÁN, Rodrigo; (2008), Administración de Riesgos E.R.M. y la Auditoría Interna , Editorial ECOE ediciones, Bogotá, Pág. 328. FLEITMAN, JACK (2008) "Evaluación Integral para Implantar Modelos de Calidad", Editorial: PAX México, Página 432. FLORES , Jaime; (2012), Auditoría Tributaria , Editorial: Centro de Especialización y Finanzas E.I.R.L. Perú Pág. 256 GARCÍA , José L., (2011) El Sistema de Libros y registros Electrónicos vinculados a asuntos tributarios en el nuevo PCGE, Perú, Pág. 336. PARRA ESCOBAR, Armando; (2007), Planeación Tributaria y Organización Empresarial , Editorial: Legis Editores S.A. Colombia, Pág. 1015. VIZCARRA MOSCOSO, J. (2007). Auditoría financiera: riesgos, control interno, gobierno corporativo y normas de información financiera. . Lima: Instituto Pacífico, Pág. 600. 159 IMPACTO DE LA LEY DE FORTALECIMIENTO SOBRE LA GESTION DE LA SUPERINTENDENCIA NACIONAL DE ADUANAS Y ADMINISTRACION TRIBUTARIA-SUNAT Dr. Jorge Luis Sánchez Vecorena15 Abstract/Resumen En autor destaca los resultados favorables de la gestión institucional de la SUNAT como consecuencia de la implementación de la Ley 29816 de Fortalecimiento aprobada a fines de diciembre 2011, luego de transcurridos 20 años desde la reforma integral del Sistema Tributario y Administración Tributaria implementada en 1991. La SUNAT fue creada en 1988 y es a partir de 1991 que se implementa una importante reforma tributaria que abarcó no solo cambios en el Sistema Tributario sino también de la Administración Tributaria. Esto último significó la renovación de personal y la implementación de los sistemas básicos: Registro Unico de Contribuyentes (RUC), Red Bancaria (pagos) y el Sistema de Comprobantes de Pago. Asimismo, la reforma permitió aplicar a los trabajadores el régimen laboral del sector privado y así poder ofrecer sueldos atractivos que aseguró la captación de profesionales de primer nivel. A partir de esta reforma, la SUNAT realizó una exitosa gestión institucional convirtiéndose en la entidad líder del Sector Público y recibiendo el reconocimiento de la opinión pública por sus logros en cuanto al incremento de la recaudación y la ampliación de la base tributaria. Sin embargo, esa mejora y exitosa gestión institucional fue decayendo de la mano de la aplicación de distintos dispositivos que significaron la pérdida de autonomía institucional para el manejo de recursos, lo que generó afrontar limitaciones de infraestructura, tecnología y sistemas informáticos; así como recursos humanos debido al clima laboral adverso ante falta de políticas de incentivos, imposibilidad de contratar personal, incremento de la edad promedio, entre otros. Está situación afectó la gestión institucional y por ello se generó consenso sobre la necesidad de una nueva reforma de la Administración Tributaria más aún si ya han pasado 20 años desde reforma de 1991. 15 MBA por la Universidad de Lima. Economista por la Pontificia Universidad Católica. Actualmente se desempeña como jefe de la Oficina de Coordinación de Tributos Internos de la SUNAT. Docente de maestría en cursos de economía y tributación. Profesor de los cursos de "Administración Tributaria", "Problemas en la Aplicación del Sistema Tributario" y "Teoría de los Impuestos" de la Maestría en Política Fiscal y Tributación de la Escuela de Posgrado de la UIGV. 160 En este contexto, la última semana de diciembre 2011 se logró aprobar la Ley N° 29816-Ley de Fortalecimiento de la SUNAT, la misma que ha significado dejar de lado una parte importante de las restricciones arriba mencionadas y permitiendo sentar las bases iniciales para que, en concordancia con un adecuado manejo de la economía y de la política tributaria por parte del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), se pueda ampliar la base tributaria, mejorar la conciencia fiscal y elevar los ingresos tributarios del Estado permitiendo obtener recursos adecuados para cumplir con el financiamiento del gasto público, así como la dotación de servicios adecuados a la población en el contexto de aplicación de las políticas de inclusión social llevadas a cabo por el gobierno actual. Es producto de esta Ley de Fortalecimiento que la SUNAT pudo contratar nuevo personal, destrabar su política de inversiones y con ello logro multiplicar significativamente sus acciones de fiscalización y cobranza con el consiguiente incremento de la recaudación tributaria; en especial aquella atribuible directamente a la gestión de la SUNAT la misma que creció 65% en el 2012 y se proyecta lo haga 33% en el 2013. Palabras Clave Reforma Tributaria, Sistema Tributario, Administración Tributaria, SUNAT, Ley de Fortalecimiento, acciones de Cobranza, acciones de Fiscalización, Recaudación tributaria, Presión Tributaria, Recaudación por Gestión, Dirección General de Contribuciones (DGC). La Superintendencia Nacional de Aduanas y Administración Tributaria (SUNAT) es una entidad pública descentralizada, perteneciente al Sector Economía y Finanzas, encargada de la administración y recaudación de los tributos del Gobierno Central. Cuenta con ámbito de acción a nivel nacional, autonomía económica, financiera y administrativa y es responsable de recaudar el 100% de los Ingresos Tributarios del Gobierno Central Consolidado, concepto que incluye las Contribuciones Sociales (Essalud y ONP). La SUNAT cumple un rol estratégico para el desarrollo del país a través de: Facilitar el comercio exterior Recaudar ingresos Reprimir el contrabando y la informalidad Controlar el tráfico ilícito de bienes Fue creada mediante Ley N° 24829 de junio de 1988 en reemplazo de la Dirección General de Contribuciones (DGC) que era una entidad, que forma parte del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF), encargada de las labores de recaudación tributaria pero que estaba caracterizada por una mala gestión debido a la carencia de personal calificado y altos niveles de corrupción, lo que sumado a la existencia de un sistema tributario complejo daba como resultado la captación de unos ingresos tributarios insuficientes para financiar el gasto público y ofrecer buenos servicios públicos a los ciudadanos. Si bien la SUNAT se crea en 1988, no es sino hasta 1991 en que empezó a funcionar eficientemente en el marco de la aplicación de una gran reforma tributaria que abarcó no solo cambios en el sistema tributario sino también cambios sustanciales en la Administración Tributaria. En el primer caso, se redujo el número de impuestos existente de cerca de 70 a solo 10 y se buscó simplificar las normas tributarias; mientras que en el segundo caso se 161 trató de una reforma integral que abarcó renovación de personal, creación de sistemas básicos (Registro Unico de ContribuyentesRUC, Recaudación a través de Red Bancaria, Comprobantes de Pago), así como la aprobación de un marco normativo que sustente el trabajo de esta entidad y le de facilidad para ofrecer remuneraciones competitivas que sean atractivas y permitan atraer a buenos profesionales. Los resultados obtenidos en los años siguientes a la reforma fueron muy favorables ya que se logró aumentar los niveles de recaudación tributaria y avanzar en la ampliación de la base tributaria; esto a partir de una SUNAT que se convirtió en ejemplo para otras entidades públicas debido a su trabajo técnico y profesionalismo. Es así que en desde 1991 hasta 1997, luego de la reforma implementada, se logró un incremento consecutivo de los ingresos tributarios expresados como porcentaje del PBI (Presión Tributaria), los que pasaron de 11,1% a 14,5% en dicho período. Ya entre 1997 y 2002 se observó una reducción gradual de los ingresos tributarios como porcentaje del PBI en un contexto en el cual la actividad económica se desaceleró y se implementaron algunas medidas de política tributaria con impacto negativo en los ingresos (como es la aprobación de algunos regímenes promocionales y reducción de algunas tasas impositivas). A este escenario negativo se sumó una Administración Tributaria que gradualmente fue perdiendo la autonomía que le daba su norma de creación y pasó a ser dependiente del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas; así como sujeta a distintos dispositivos normativos destinados a controlar la gestión de las entidades públicas, sin tener en cuenta la categoría especial que le debía corresponder como Administración Tributaria y encargada de ser la proveedora de recursos para el Estado. Es así que la Administración Tributaria fue sujeta de los controles y los complejos procedimientos aplicados al común de las entidades públicas, los que afectaron su gestión al limitarle el uso de sus recursos y restarle flexibilidad; haciendo lentos los procesos de ejecución de inversiones y gastos. Todo esto representó trabas que dificultaron potenciar su operatividad y afectaron sus resultados de gestión. Acorde con el contexto descrito, entre 1997 y 2002 se observó una disminución de los ingresos tributarios como porcentaje del PBI al pasar de 14,5% a 12,1% en un contexto en el que la evasión tributaria alcanzó niveles de 50% (IGV e Impuesto a la Renta) y además se registró una fuerte desaceleración de la actividad económica producto de las crisis económicas registradas a fines de los años 90 (principalmente crisis asiática). En este escenario, desde el segundo semestre 2002 se implementó un paquete de medidas destinadas a ampliar la base tributaria, las mismas que principalmente involucraron la aplicación de los sistemas de pago adelantado del IGV: Retenciones y Percepciones; así como las Detracciones. Estas medidas demandaron mucho esfuerzo y compromiso de la BASES 162 Administración Tributaria quien las implementó con resultados exitosos que se tradujeron en una recuperación de los ingresos Tributarios como resultado de la reducción del incumplimiento tributario que se alcanzó gracias a estos sistemas. En esta línea, desde 2002 se observó un crecimiento permanente de los ingresos tributarios que pasaron de 12,1% en 2002 hasta llegar a un 15,7% en el año 2008. Los años siguientes fueron marcados por el impacto de la crisis financiera internacional de modo que en 2009 los ingresos como porcentaje del PBI bajaron a 13,7% para luego recuperarse y llegar a 15,5% en el 2011. Esta mejora en los ingresos fue acompañada de un ciclo expansivo de la actividad económica y que se caracterizó por crecimientos promedio de 7% en el PBI nacional desde 2002, con excepción del año 2009 en que creció sólo 1% debido a los efectos negativos de la crisis financiera internacional. No obstante que entre 2002 y 2011 se registró la mejora de los resultados recaudatorios, sin embargo se observó que esto no fue acompañado por un fortalecimiento de la SUNAT sino que por el contrario, con el transcurso de los años la situación de pérdida de autonomía se mantuvo hasta incluso llegar, como señala Fuentes16, a declarar a la SUNAT como unidad ejecutora del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas, en aplicación de la Ley N° 29158; ello en vez de ser considerada Entidad Técnica Especializada con régimen especial. Esta situación afectó su desempeño institucional y dejó entrever que el gobierno no reconocía a la SUNAT el rol estratégico que le corresponde como la entidad recolectora y proveedora de recursos para el financiamiento de la actividad Estatal De esta forma al 2011, antes de la aprobación de la Ley de Fortalecimiento y ya pasados 20 años desde la gran reforma de 1991 que puso en funcionamiento a la SUNAT, esta entidad presentaba fuertes limitaciones y problemas en las áreas de infraestructura (hacinamiento, cobertura insuficiente), tecnología (sistemas obsoletos, servicios limitados), y recursos humanos (cantidad insuficiente, edad promedio avanzada, falta de incentivos por resultados, fuga de talentos, problemas de clima laboral). 16 Fuentes Acurio, Sandro. La SUNAT en Perspectiva. Apuntes sobre un balance y Agenda Pendientes.(2009) PRESUNTA 163 Limitaciones de la SUNAT antes de Ley de Fortalecimiento Adicionalmente, diversas reglas aplicables al sector público –especialmente en materia presupuestal y de gasto– se aplicaban frenando el accionar y desarrollo de la SUNAT. En líneas generales, se podían identificar los siguientes problemas: Incertidumbre en la disponibilidad de ingresos en el mediano plazo: Por las reglas que se establecían para cada año a través de la Ley de Presupuesto del Sector Público. Ello generaba restricciones e incompatibilidades para formular y llevar a cabo planes multianuales, especialmente en materia de inversión pues no se tenía certeza del nivel de ingresos que se asignarían a la institución. Se trabajaba con visión mayormente de corto plazo. Prohibiciones o limitaciones (principalmente las normas de austeridad): Que no permitían la contratación del personal especializado necesario, así como el desarrollo de una línea de carrera que permitiese atraer y retener el talento en la magnitud y la forma que la SUNAT necesitaba. También existían obstáculos para la adquisición de algunos bienes y servicios requeridos por la Institución para el cumplimiento de sus fines. Obligadas transferencias anuales de recursos al Tesoro Público (la diferencia entre los ingresos propios obtenidos y los gastos ejecutados en cada ejercicio anual): Esto impedía la implementación de una estrategia de inversión a largo plazo especialmente el proceso de potenciar oportunamente los sistemas informáticos. Inestabilidad del titular en el cargo: Lo que limitaba la sostenibilidad de los planes a mediano y largo plazo, toda vez que dichos instrumentos se modificaban conforme a las políticas de cada gestión. Cabe señalar que entre 1991 y 2011 la SUNAT ha tenido 13 superintendentes, incluso sólo en el año 2000 se tuvo tres superintendentes distintos. Como ya se señaló, el contexto descrito afectaba la gestión institucional y es por ello que existió consenso no solo al interior de la misma SUNAT, sino también entre un grupo importante de tributaristas connotados, académicos y líderes de opinión pública, ello sobre la necesidad de llevar a cabo una nueva reforma de la SUNAT que la fortalezca y otorgue mayor nivel de autonomía partiendo de entender su rol vital para la existencia del Estado no sólo por la recaudación que capta, sino por su labor de fomento de la cultura tributaria y aduanera. Esto se reforzaba considerando que ya se habían completado 20 años desde la reforma inicial. En un contexto de opiniones favorables sobre la necesidad de una nueva reforma de la Administración Tributaria, en diciembre 2011 se logró sacar adelante un proyecto de Ley para fortalecer a la SUNAT, el mismo que logró aprobarse y promulgarse como la Ley N° 29816 Ley de Fortalecimiento de la SUNAT el 22 de diciembre 2011; significando dejar de lado una parte importante de las restricciones mencionadas anteriormente y permitiendo sentar las bases iniciales para que, en concordancia con un adecuado manejo de la economía y de la política tributaria por parte del Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas (MEF); se pueda elevar la presión tributaria hasta alcanzar los niveles que permitan un adecuado financiamiento del gasto público y también la dotación de servicios adecuados a la población; además de la aplicación de las políticas de inclusión social llevadas a cabo por el SUNAT En Recursos Humanos En infraestructura En tecnología Apoyo de otros organismos 164 gobierno actual. Además del fortalecimiento, también se demandaba el compromiso firme de todo el Estado y de la sociedad en su conjunto en el desarrollo de la conciencia tributaria. Entre los aspectos principales de la Ley de Fortalecimiento aprobada para la SUNAT se pueden mencionar los siguientes: Se da a la SUNAT la denominación de Organismo técnico Especializado adscrito al Ministerio de Economía y Finanzas. Se crea un Consejo directivo Se da una estabilidad de 5 años al cargo de Superintendente Nacional. Se autoriza el otorgamiento a los trabajadores de un incentivo anual por desempeño. Se autoriza a otorgar una bonificación por función crítica o riesgosa a los algunos trabajadores que se desempeñen en determinados puestos que califiquen para esto. Se autoriza a financiar con cargo a su presupuesto institucional la adquisición de bienes y/o contratación de servicios para otras entidades públicas cuyas actividades estén vinculadas a las de la SUNAT. Se autoriza a aprobar directamente su Cuadro de Asignación de Personal. Se autoriza la implementación de un programa de desvinculación voluntaria. Otros La aplicación inmediata de la Ley de Fortalecimiento permitió a la SUNAT contratar más personal, para reforzar sus principales procesos, a la vez que dinamizar sus inversiones y otros gastos. Todo esto se aplicó desde finales de diciembre 2011 en que se aprobó la Ley. Los resultados han sido muy favorables ya que esto le ha permitido multiplicar y fortalecer sus acciones de fiscalización y cobranza, así como las acciones de servicio al contribuyente, todo esto con resultados favorables en los objetivos permanentes de ampliación de la base tributaria, incremento de la recaudación y combate a la evasión y el contrabando. En el caso de la cantidad de acciones de fiscalización terminadas, y producto de la Ley de fortalecimiento, entre 2011 y 2012 estas crecieron en 124,0% al pasar de 110 447 a 247 424. Al primer semestre 2013 estas sumaron 135 057, estimándose llegar al cierre de año a un total de 270 114. 11.1 11.6 12.8 12.7 13.6 14.1 14.5 14.5 13.6 12.8 12.4 12.3 12.1 0.0 2.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 10.0 12.0 14.0 16.0 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 INGRESOS TRIBUTARIOS % del PBI 165 En cuanto a las acciones de cobranza, estas también crecieron de manera importante tanto en cantidad de acciones como en los montos de deuda recuperados. Es así que, en línea con la mayor cantidad de recursos, el número de acciones creció 124,5% entre 2011 y 2012 al pasar de 270 544 a 607 419. En el primer semestre 2013 se realizaron 281 834 medidas de cobranza (superior a todo lo hecho en 2011), estimándose cerrar el año con 600 000. Por su parte, los montos de deuda recuperados crecieron 47,3% entre 2011 y 2012 al pasar de S/. 4 267 millones a S/. 6 287 millones. En el primer semestre 2013 el monto recuperado sumó S/. 3 730 millones estimándose al cierre de año sumar S/. 7 500 millones superando lo obtenido en el 201 De otro lado, el mayor despliegue de la SUNAT se reflejó también en el incremento de las acciones de verificación de entrega de comprobantes de pago (acciones masivas de fedatarios) que crecieron 187,6% entre 2011 y 2012 al pasar de 114 284 a 328 625. En el primer semestre 2013 se realizaron 155 333, nuevamente más que todo el año 2011, estimándose alcanzar al cierre de año 315 000. Todo este incremento de acciones, que se logró a partir de los mayores recursos obtenidos con la aplicación de la Ley de Fortalecimiento, se tradujo en un importante incremento del monto de recaudación tributaria correspondiente a la gestión directa de la SUNAT, concepto que incluye los montos obtenidos por las acciones directas de cobranza y fiscalización. Esta cifra creció 64,5% entre 2011 y 2012 al pasar de S/. 5 484 millones a S/. 9 019 millones. En el primer semestre 2013 se han obtenido un total de S/. 5 678 millones, estimando alcanzar al cierre de año S/. 12 000 millones como meta institucional, lo que significará un crecimiento de 33,1%. Como conclusión se puede señalar que la Ley de Fortalecimiento de la SUNAT fue promulgada en un momento necesario, cuando ya se habían cumplido 20 años de la primera reforma y en momentos que la SUNAT experimentaba problemas operativos y de recursos humanos. Esta Ley ha significado una segunda gran reforma o impulso a la Administración Tributaria y hasta el momento ha tenido un claro impacto positivo en los resultados 110,447 247,424 135,057 0 50000 100000 150000 200000 250000 300000 2011 2012 sem I 2013 Acciones de Fiscalización Terminadas 2011-2013 Estimado 2013: 270 114 4,267 6,287 3,730 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 2011 2012 sem I 2013 Estimado año: 7 500 Recaudación Cobranza 2011-2013 Millones Soles 270,544 607,419 281,834 0 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 600000 700000 2011 2012 sem I 2013 Cantidad de Medidas de Cobranza (Embargos) 2011-2013 Estimado 2013: 600 000 166 obtenidos por esta entidad, los que se han materializado en mayor cobertura de acciones, mayor recuperación de deuda y mayor recaudación tributaria; a la vez que mayores recursos para fomentar la conciencia tributaria en el país y brindar mejores servicios a los contribuyentes. Bibliografía ARIAS MINAYA, Luis Alberto (1994). El fortalecimiento Institucional de la Administración Tributaria Peruana. Documento de Trabajo N° 02/94 SUNAT. Boletín Estadístico Nota Tributaria. Junio 2013 FUENTES ACURIO, Sandro (2009). La SUNAT en perspectiva. Apuntes sobre un Balance y Agenda pendiente. Revista Análisis Tributario Junio 2009. DOS SANTOS, Paulo Sergio (2009). Una Visión moderna de la Administración Tributaria. Revista Análisis Tributario Junio 2009. Ley N° 29816 – Ley de Fortalecimiento de la SUNAT. Promulgada el 22 diciembre 2011. 167 CRISIS ECONÓMICA MUNDIAL (Dos Caras De Una Misma Moneda) Dr. Juan Carlos Espinoza Giráldez (1) [email protected] RESUMEN La crisis económica del 2008, generada por la desregulación financiera en Islandia y los créditos hipotecarios subprime" acaecida en los Estados Unidos y la caída de las bolsas en Europa para luego ser propagada en todo el mundo aún continúa su expansión y sigue latente; en Estados Unidos existe una recesión y en China con una inflación, los países emergentes ven caer sus exportaciones, los capitales golondrinos se van de un país a otro, el presidente Humala señala que la crisis llegó al Perú. ¿Qué crisis económica se nos presenta actualmente en nuestra realidad? Palabras claves: crisis mundial-desaceleracióncrecimiento-desarrollo Noticias: Con fecha 15 del presente mes de agosto en uno de los titulares de la portada del Diario Gestión señala: "no hay tiempo para pelearse", afirma mandatario. Humala dice que crisis mundial llegó al Perú, mientras Europa se recupera.(2) A renglón seguido señala: "Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó, por eso cae el canon". (3) En el mismo sentido el Semanario Hildebrandt en sus trece (4) tiene como titular principal: "crisis las vacas flacas y los gordos errores", todo ello por un lado de la moneda; por el otro lado de la moneda tenemos la Revista G de Gestión (5) en su titular principal de portada señala: "Exclusivo desde Wall Street. Mario Alvarado y José Graña. Los líderes que convirtieron a Graña y Montero en un conglomerado con ambición regional revelan los detalles de su IPO por US$ 413 millones en la bolsa de valores de Nueva York". Asimismo en el Diario El Comercio (6) señala como titular principal en su portada lo siguiente: "El reto del gobierno. Trabas burocráticas y conflictos sociales obstaculizan más proyectos. Hay concesiones en lista por US$ 12.800 millones". Esbozadas estas noticias acerca de nuestra realidad económica pasemos al análisis de cada una de las caras de esta moneda, por un lado una crisis mundial que aparentemente recién llega al Perú y por la otra cara las empresas peruanas invirtiendo en el extranjero, no solo unos cuantos miles de dólares sino millones de dólares, todo ello dentro de este sistema capitalista que ha puesto en riesgo su propia existencia sobre una nube a veces gris y a veces ácida que es la globalización y que dan la impresión de que al parecer la crisis económica esta fraccionada y sectorizada. 168 (1) Abogado, Árbitro, Doctor en Derecho, Magister en Derecho Civil, Catedrático en el MBA, en la Maestría en Derecho Procesal y en la Maestría en Política Fiscal y Tributación, en la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. (2) Portada Diario Gestión. "No hay tiempo para pelearse, Afirma Mandatario. Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó al Perú, mientras Europa se recupera. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 1 (3) PRADO GARCÍA, Alfredo. Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó, por eso cae el canon. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 11 (4) Portada Semanario Hildebrandt en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 1 (5) PORTADA Revista G de Gestión N° 33 Agosto 2013, pp. 1 (6) PORTADA Diario El Comercio, viernes 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 1 Quiero comenzar con la siguiente frase: An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday didn't happen today. (Lawrence Peter), que señala algo así como: un economista es un expertoque sabrá mañana porque las cosas que el predijo ayer no sucedieron hoy. Bien, dicho esto; pasemos a definir algunos conceptos sobre capitalismo: El capitalismo pone a las empresas en competencia en los mercados. Se enfrentan en los mercados de bienes y servicios para vender las mercancías que fabrican, pero también para adquirir los elementos que necesitan para producir (materias primas, maquinas, servicios). (...) El capital, se refiere en general al conjunto de medios de producción (materias primas, maquinas, locales, etc.) invertidos en las actividades con ánimo de lucro. (...) El crecimiento económico es el progreso del PIB (producto interior bruto) en el tiempo. (...) El capitalismo sufre crisis recurrentes y cíclicas. El último crack financiero, el que comenzó en 2008 y continúa, es muestra patente de ello. (...)(7) El liberalismo económico es una corriente de ideas que defiende, sobre todo, la libertad de contratar, intercambiar, emprender, así como el derecho de cada cual a disponer libremente de su trabajo. Los abanderados de estas tesis en los siglos XVIII y XIX fueron Adam Smith y David Ricardo. Ellos planteaban una regulación de los mercados dependiente únicamente del juego de la libre competencia. El neoliberalismo es una corriente renovada del liberalismo que se expandió a partir de 1970. Quienes la defienden abogan por la retirada total del Estado de la vida económica a través de medidas de desregulación, de privatización o de disminución de la carga fiscal soportada por los agentes económicos (...)(8) Según la definición académica, la globalización es la "tendencia de los mercados y de las empresas a extenderse, alcanzando una dimensión mundial que sobrepasa las fronteras nacionales". Sus críticos afirman que se trata de un proceso que, extendiendo un mercado capitalista sin regulación, agrava la dependencia de los países del Tercer Mundo, así como las condiciones de los sectores más débiles de las sociedades desarrolladas. En cambio, para sus defensores sus principios se sustentan en la afirmación de la liberación de la economía y la supresión de la intervención de los Estados en ella, como una forma de garantizar el desarrollo en todo el mundo. La mayoría de los estudiosos la asocian a un sistema económico mundial con unas reglas de juego únicas en las que la producción y el consumo tienen un papel determinante. (...) en una situación así descrita, los objetivos económicos de naturaleza privada han alcanzado un poder tal que, en nuestros días, supera al de legislaciones, gobiernos, estados e instituciones. la configuración a escala planetaria de producción, mercados y movimiento de capitales han implantado definitivamente la 169 sociedad de consumo en todo el mundo el tiempo que se ha hecho cada vez más débiles a las economías locales, que se han convertido en víctimas de cíclicas crisis económicas. La nueva economía global, tan volátil como impredecible, gobierna el planeta.(9) (7) DE LA VEGA, Xavier; CANONE, Justine y TESTOT, Laurent. Mercado, capital, crecimiento, crisis, desarrollo, liberalismo y neoliberalismo. En La gran historia del capitalismo. Para entender qué pasa hoy y qué va a pasar mañana. (2011) Globus Comunicación S.A. Impreso en España. pp. 12-13 (8) Ibidem, pp.14-15 (9) FISK, Robert. Historia Time del siglo XX. La Globalización. (2011) Editorial Sol 90. Barcelona. España. pp. 13 (10) Nunca antes se había producido un fenómeno semejante: todas las economías del mundo están tan estrechamente interconectadas, que las decisiones económicas a escala global tienen repercusiones en todos los lugares del planeta. La dimensión económica de la globalización, que muchos entienden como una nueva fase de expansión del voraz imperialismo capitalista, se caracteriza por la apertura de los sistemas económicos nacionales, por el aumento del comercio internacional, la expansión de los mercados financieros, la reorganización espacial de la producción y la búsqueda permanente de ventajas y de competitividad que proporciona la innovación tecnológica, pero también por la aparición de crisis, elevadas tasas de desempleo, el descenso de las remuneraciones, el aumento de las diferencias entre países ricos y pobres-y, dentro de los países, entre ricos y pobres-, y un acelerado deterioro del medio ambiente. Un escenario en el que tiene lugar una creciente pérdida de peso de las instituciones públicas locales y nacionales en beneficio de los conglomerados empresariales de alcance transnacional: en otras palabras, del dominio de la economía sobre la política y, por tanto, de los intereses privados frente a los proyectos de interés colectivo. La mundialización ha sido la respuesta de las empresas privadas al cambiante entorno de los negocios internacionales. Todo un paraíso para grandes corporaciones que, en apenas un cuarto de siglo, han conseguido tener en sus manos el presente del planeta y quién sabe si, también, su futuro. (10) Si algo caracteriza a la globalización es que plantea nuevos y cambiantes escenarios en todos los ámbitos dela vida humana. No sólo la determina la definición de una nueva economía. La concepción de la política y de su articulación; las ideas de estado, nación y soberanía, de seguridad y de defensa, la diplomacia, las leyes, los derechos humanos, y hasta los conceptos mismos de cultura, de identidad, ciudadanía o de sociedad civil, forman parte de un apasionado debate que apenas ha comenzado (...) cuando los efectos de la mundialización ya están en todas partes y a todos nos afectan. Así los analistas deben enfrentarse, antes que a su definición, a los retos y problemas que la globalización ya plantea, y que exigen de la sociedad misma soluciones urgentes. Sin embargo, la velocidad de la respuesta por parte de los organismos e instituciones a los que se ha otorgado representación de las comunidades humanas no se corresponde con la de los vertiginosos cambios que están ocurriendo. El mundo, que está viviendo un rapidísimo aumento de sus población, un notable deterioro de las condiciones medioambientales y un aumento de las desigualdades, demanda una profunda reestructuración política y social y la redefinición de conceptos que, si hasta habían resultado de utilidad para la conformación y la supervivencia de las naciones-estado, están demostrando ser ineficaces ante los desafíos de un fenómeno que, desde hace treinta años, parece haber superado la capacidad de reacción de gobernantes y gobernados.(11) 170 (11) FISK, Robert. Historia Time del siglo XX. La Globalización. (2011) Editorial Sol 90. Barcelona. España. pp. 29 (12) Ibidem, pp.43 La crisis económica del 2008: Han transcurrido casi cinco años desde el 2008 en que se desató la peor crisis financiera de la historia, la primera del mundo globalizado. Y todavía no nos reponemos de ella. Hoy la crisis pasó del sector privado al sector público del primer mundo(...)(12) La crisis financiera y económica que estalló en los Estados Unidos en setiembre de 2008 ha tenido impactos y consecuencias de tanta profundidad que se la equipara con la gran depresión de los años 30. El hundimiento de bancos, bolsas y mercados inmobiliarios provocó una profunda contracción del crédito a escala mundial y ha afectado a la mayoría de empresas del planeta. Esto trajo como consecuencia una reducción del empleo y de las inversiones en casi todos los países, así como una abrupta caída en las tasas de ganancia y un descenso en la producción y el comercio globales. (...)(13) El carácter global de la catástrofe financiera y económica se refleja en los grandes números: la pérdida de cerca de 2 billones de dólares (trillones de dólares en inglés) por los sistemas bancarios, la pérdida de muchos billones más en mercados hipotecarios y bursátiles, y el aumento del desempleo (que hoy alcanza entre 50 y 70 millones de personas en el mundo). Además, resulta manifiesto que los coletazos de la crisis se harán sentir durante años como consecuencia de los enormes rescates que se llevaron a cabo con dinero público y que implican un incremento espectacular de deudas de los gobiernos de estados Unidos y de muchos países europeos.(14) Latinoamérica pareció resistir al shock financiero externo desde la mitad del 2007 hasta mediados de 2008. Desde setiembre de 2008 empieza a apreciarse un debilitamiento de la mayoría de las monedas y el aumento de los spreads que indican un empeoramiento del riesgo de las economías. A pesar de las drásticas caídas de las bolsas de valores, la estabilidad de los tipos de interés parece indicar que Latinoamérica está en una mejor posición para absorber el contagio financiero que en crisis del pasado. De hecho, muchos países (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil y Ecuador) tienen superávits de cuenta corriente (que probablemente se transformen en déficits durante el 2009). Chile y Perú oscilan entre superávits y déficits dependiendo del precio de los metales. (15) Se establece que el choque o impacto que va tener tanto Perú como Chile está directamente relacionado con la exportación de metales; pero el debilitamiento del dólar no se puede asegurar de manera categórica ya que existe demasiada volatilidad y el precio del oro esta con una tendencia hacia la baja, es decir; luego de la crisis estas serán nuestras variables. (13) SCHNEIDER, Ben. La empresa y la gerencia. Post crisis de una época de cambios a un cambio de época. (2013) Empresa editora El Comercio S.A. (14) MARICHAL, Carlos. Nueva historia de las grandes crisis financieras. Una perspectiva global, 1873-2008. (2010) Editorial Sudamericana S.A. Buenos Aires. 171 (15) Ibidem, pp.324-325 (16) FARBER, Vanina. El impacto de la crisis en las economías emergentes. En Crisis. Análisis y perspectivas de la crisis económica mundial desde el Perú. (2009) CENTRUM y Grupo Editorial Norma S.A.C. pp. 268 El sistema capitalista global está aún hoy en día cerca de la cúspide de su poder. Es cierto que la actual crisis global representa un peligro, pero su supremacía ideológica no conoce límites. La crisis asiática se ha llevado a los regímenes autocráticos que combinaban los beneficios personales con la ética confuciana y los ha sustituido por gobiernos más democráticos y de ideología reformista.Pero la crisis ha socavado también la capacidad de las autoridades financieras internacionales para impedir y resolver las crisis financieras. ¿Cuánto tiempo pasará antes de que la crisis comience a llevarse a los gobiernos reformistas? Me temo que los acontecimientos políticos desencadenados por la crisis financiera, pueda llevarse finalmente al propio sistema capitalista global. No sería la primera vez que sucede.(16) La crisis económica en el Perú: El presidente Ollanta señala: "el mundo vive una crisis económica tremenda, la crisis (mundial) ya llegó a al Perú, por eso tenemos, hoy día, un bajón en lo que es el canon que afecta a las regiones que tienen ingreso por canon"(17) Como podemos inferir del anterior acápite, la crisis económica del 2008, siempre estuvo presente el Perú, solo que fueron diferentes factores que propiciaron que dicha crisis no se sienta en nuestra economía, factores como los capitales golondrinos, es decir; aquellos inversionistas con la finalidad de no mermar sus ingresos depositan provisionalmente su dinero en bancos donde aún no se sienta la pegada de la crisis, siendo otro factor el lavado de activos que se encuentra presente en todos los sectores en especial en el sector construcción, es por eso la razón de ser del boom inmobiliario que se ha creado un nicho donde se han encontrado tanto una mayor oferta como una fuerte demanda de viviendas, con la consecuente subida de los precios de la propiedades hasta en 150% por encima de su valor real, esto ha generado que exista mayor mano de obra es decir mayor empleo. Pero el Perú es netamente un país exportador de metales; por lo tanto está sujeto al precio de estos en el mercado internacional. Vista la crisis económica del 2008, se pensó mucho el hecho de que la moneda fuerte (dólar) debería de ser cambiada nuevamente por el patrón oro como era en aquel entonces antes de la crisis de 1929; es por ello que en sus inicios después de la crisis del 2008 el dólar bajo estrepitosamente su valor, esto asustó definitivamente a China quien ha adquirido bonos soberanos de Estados Unidos. Por otro lado el Euro moneda de la Unión Europea también tambaleaba y perdía su valor a consecuencia de esta crisis ya que existían diversos préstamos en carrusel entre estos siendo el país más castigado por la crisis el de Grecia y que arrastró a Portugal, España, Francia, Italia, hasta llegar a Alemania; como medida de acolchonamiento estos países tuvieron que vender parte de sus reservas (lingotes de oro) para poder afrontar las deudas de la crisis. Es por ello que últimamente el precio del oro ha bajado porque existe más oro en el mercado, con la consecuente estabilización del dólar. Es por ello que últimamente el precio del oro ha bajado porque existe más oro en el mercado, con la consecuente estabilización del dólar. (17) SOROS, George. La crisis del capitalismo global. La sociedad abierta en peligro. (1999) Plaza & Janes S.A. España. pp. 30 172 (18) PRADO GARCÍA, Alfredo. Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó, por eso cae el canon. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 11 La baja en el precio del oro ha mermado por obvias razones en lo que respecta al canon y no por lo que el presidente Humala señala de que la crisis llegó al Perú sino por otro factor que nos es de naturaleza internacional sino que tiene que ver con el gobierno mismo, es decir; las trabas burocráticas y los conflictos sociales en las concesiones, que no solamente se refieren al sector minero sino también al sector energía, sector transporte, saneamiento, agricultura, telecomunicaciones y turismo; esto ha ocasionado que los inversionistas vean a otros países de la región latinoamericana para poder invertir, es decir; el inversionista pone el capital donde las reglas sobre inversiones estén claras, pero si existe demora en el trámite por parte del gobierno ya sea por dolo o culpa, el inversionista simplemente se va a otro país donde las inversiones fluyan de manera rápida, adecuada y respectando ambas partes en lo que se refiere al aspecto medioambiental. Pero en donde se encuentra el hecho de que el desempleo haya aumentado, en cuanto al sector industria, propiamente lo que se refiere a confecciones, el desempleo ha aumentado y ello se debe al dumping de las prendas importadas de China y a la sobre protección del Brasil que brinda a sus productos industriales, asimismo ante la baja del precio de los metales y las postergaciones de las concesiones el desempleo ha aumentado en el sector minero; se está generando una bomba de tiempo en lo que respecta al empleo en estos sectores conforme los señala: Ghiovani Hinojosa(18) Según Pedro Franke señala sobre el canon: "Esta caída no es algo realmente sorpresivo. Por historia (hay registros de los precios de los metales de cientos de años atrás) sabemos que los precios de los metales suben un rato pero luego caen. No se puede predecir estos precios como las mareas, pero sí como el clima: no sabemos exactamente cuándo ni cuanto calentara la temperatura en Lima pero de que lo hará en los próximos meses, eso es seguro. Lo mismo sucede con los precios de los metales: sabíamos que caerían tarde o temprano".(19) En resumen podemos decir que existe una baja en el crecimiento y se avizora por ello una baja en el sector exportador; por la desaceleración de China, el débil crecimiento de Estados Unidos y la recesión de Europa, en cambio las importaciones vienen registrando un alza sostenible. En cuanto a la otra cara de la moneda existe una frase: "a rio revuelto ganancia de pescadores", en este tipo de crisis económica del 2008, gigantes caen y pequeños se levanta o se ponen de pie; en el caso del gobierno peruano se quedó espectando; lo que no ha ocurrido con algunas empresa peruanas como Graña y Montero(20), el Grupo Romero, Belcorp y Unique, aceros Arequipa, entre otros, empresas que ven su expansión no en el mercado local sino fuera de esta por lo que la mesa está servida todos están invitados la comida es de un gourmet internacional así que anímense las empresas nacionales al mercado internacional y el gobierno a recibir más inversiones a controlar conflictos sociales, a erradicar la informalidad y el contrabando para generar más empleo sostenible y sentar las bases de un desarrollo y no solamente vivir de un efímero crecimiento. Señor presidente no se duerma en sus laureles y siente las bases del desarrollo del país es el momento no habrá otra oportunidad. (19) HINOJOSA, Ghiovani. La industria condenada. Semanario Hildebrant en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 8-9 173 (20) FRANKE, Pedro. El canoncito de Castilla. Semanario Hildebrant en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 12-13 (21) RAMOS, Bertha. Exclusivo: El IPO de Graña y Montero en NYSE Cimientos para el Mundo. G de Gestión N° 33 Agosto 2013, pp.25-29 REFERENCIA BIBLIOGRÁFICA: Artículos de revistas y periódicos: ALVA PINO, Marco. Empresas pierden hasta 7% de su patrimonio por alza el dólar.Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 2 BLOOMBERG. Crecimiento de Alemania y Francia logra sacar a la eurozona de la recesión. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 18 CARRANZA, Gonzalo. Tiempo Record. El primer semestre del 2013 registró una cifra histórica en emisiones de deuda corporativa internacional por parte de las empresas peruanas: cerca de US$ 5.000 millones. Revista G de Gestión N° 32 Junio 2013, pp.48-50 CASTILLO ARÉVALO, Nicolás. Mejora económica depende del avance de los sectores construcción y servicios. Diario El Comercio. Viernes 16 de Agosto del 2013. pp. 2 CRUZ FIESTAS, Darwin. La economía del Perú creció 4,4% en junio, índice menor al 5,2% esperado. Diario El Comercio. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013, Sección Economía. pp.B3 DATUM. La expectativa de mayor inversión privada cayó diez puntos en tres meses. Diario Gestión, lunes 12 de agosto de 2013, pp. 6 EL-ERIAN, Mohamed A. La falsa normalidad de Europa. Portafolio Económico Año 2/N° 78, domingo 11 de agosto 2013, El Comercio. pp. 14-15 FRANKE, Pedro. El canoncito de Castilla. Semanario Hildebrant en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 12-13 GARCÍA, Elías. Recaudación en construcción compensa la caída en minería. Diario Gestión, lunes 12 de agosto de 2013, pp. 20 HIDALGO SUAREZ, Luís. Caída del ritmo de crecimiento de la economía no se detiene. Diario Gestión, viernes 16 de agosto del 2013, pp. 2 HINOJOSA, Ghiovani. La industria condenada. Semanario Hildebrant en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 8-9 LÓPEZ-DORIGA OSTOLAZA, Joaquín. ¿Realmente terminó la recesión en Europa? Diario Gestión, viernes 16 de agosto del 2013, pp. 7 MARIQUE P. Omar. Rentabilidad patrimonial de las empresas descenderá a 15% en los próximos años. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 22 PORTADA Diario El Comercio, viernes 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 1 PORTADA Diario Gestión. "No hay tiempo para pelearse, Afirma Mandatario. Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó al Perú, mientras Europa se recupera. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 1 PORTADA Revista G de Gestión N° 33 Agosto 2013, pp. 1 PORTADA Semanario Hildebrant en sus trece. Viernes 16 de agosto del 2013 Año 4 N° 165. pp. 1 PRADO GARCÍA, Alfredo. Vaticina el Ministro de Economía, Luis Miguel Castilla. "En los siguientes meses habrá inestabilidad en los mercados". Diario Gestión, miércoles 14 de Agosto del 2013, pp. 12 PRADO GARCÍA, Alfredo. Humala dice que la crisis mundial ya llegó, por eso cae el canon. Diario Gestión, jueves 15 de agosto del 2013, pp. 11 RAMOS, Bertha. Exclusivo: El IPO de Graña y Montero en NYSE Cimientos para el Mundo. G de Gestión N° 33 Agosto 2013, pp.25-29 SALDARRIAGA V. Juan. Entrevista a Ramón Espinaza. El Perú puede beneficiarse del Efecto "Shale Gas". Portafolio Económico Año 2/N° 78, domingo 11 de agosto 2013, Diario El Comercio. pp. 10-12 174 TAIPE, Abraham. Invasión Inca. Día_1 N° 472 Año 9, lunes 12 de Agosto del 2013, Diario El Comercio. pp. 16-17 Libros: ALARCO TOSONI, German. Principales tendencias internacionales. En Cuando despertemos en el 2062. (2012) Universidad Pacífico. BROSSARD, Oliver. 1929, la crisis que cambió la cara del capitalismo. En La gran historia del capitalismo. Para entender qué pasa hoy y qué va a pasar mañana. (2011) Globus Comunicación S.A. Impreso en España. DANCOURT, Oscar. La recesión de 2008-2009 y sus lecciones. En Perú ante los desafíos del siglo XXI. (2011) Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. DE LA VEGA, Xavier; CANONE, Justine y TESTOT, Laurent. Mercado, capital, crecimiento, crisis, desarrollo, liberalismo y neoliberalismo.En La gran historia del capitalismo. Para entender qué pasa hoy y qué va a pasar mañana. (2011) Globus Comunicación S.A. Impreso en España. FARBER, Vanina. El impacto de la crisis en las economías emergentes. En Crisis. Análisis y perspectivas de la crisis económica mundial desde el Perú. (2009) CENTRUM y Grupo Editorial Norma S.A.C. FISK, Robert. Historia Time del siglo XX. La Globalización. (2011) Editorial Sol 90. Barcelona. España. GHEMAWAT, Pankaj. Redefiniendo la globalización. (2008) Ediciones Deusto. España. MARICHAL, Carlos. Nueva historia de las grandes crisis financieras. Una perspectiva global, 1873-2008. (2010) Editorial Sudamericana S.A. Buenos Aires. OPPENHEIMER, Andrés. Se vienen años de vacas flacas. En La crisis mundial. (2008) Quintero Editores-Editorial oveja negra Ltda. Impreso en Colombia. RODRÍGUEZ ULLOA, Ricardo. Perspectiva sistémica de los efectos de la crisis financiera internacional en el Perú. En Crisis. Análisis y perspectivas de la crisis económica mundial desde el Perú. (2009) CENTRUM y Grupo Editorial Norma S.A.C. SCHNEIDER, Ben. La empresa y la gerencia. Post crisis de una época de cambios a un cambio de época. (2013) Empresa editora El Comercio S.A. SOROS, George. La crisis del capitalismo global. La sociedad abierta en peligro. (1999) Plaza & Janes S.A. España. 175 PROBLEMAS EN EL MUNDO Y LA GERENCIA SOCIAL MBA – MA Hugo Concha Ibarra17 RESUMEN El presente artículo trata de la observación de los principales problemas que aquejan al mundo en la actualidad que se convierten en los llamados "escándalos éticos", buscando encontrar la relación de la actualidad con el papel de la Gerencia Social PALABRAS CLAVES: Gerencia social, desigualdad, pobreza, ética, transparencia, cambio. Cuando uno observa las cifras de la actualidad en lo que se refiere a problemas sociales, realmente empieza a develarse una especie de tenue velo que sirve como consuelo a los que somos insensibles en lo que se refiere a los demás, a los que nos somos solidarios y simplemente nos preocupamos (al igual del casi del 98% de habitantes) por nosotros mismos teniendo como lema de vida el "primero yo, después yo, y siempre yo" o el conocido "no importa el cómo, lo más importante es conseguir el objetivo" y ese "objetivo" primordial es lamentablemente la acumulación de riqueza a cualquier costo, ya que vivimos con el paradigma de que la riqueza es la base de la felicidad, quitándonos la "carga moral" que significa pensar en el resto de la gente, ser solidarios, estar mas comprometidos por la sociedad en su conjunto, es decir no pensamos en conjugar el verbo "nosotros" simplemente pensamos en primera persona "yo". Por eso cuando empezamos a evaluar y analizar lo que aqueja a nuestra sociedad y al mundo lo primero que hacemos es reflexionar sobre la finalidad de la Gerencia Social, ya que es una de las pocas disciplinas en las cuales se especializa en buscar la forma de ayudar a la sociedad. La mayoría de maestrías o especializaciones en 17 MBA General and Strategic Management, Holanda y Magister en Administración Estratégica de Empresas Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú.. Experiencia gerencial internacional en áreas de Administración, Marketing y Gerencia Social. Experiencia en Docencia Universitaria a nivel pre y postgrado desarrollando cursos de Gerencia Social, Gestión Empresarial, Marketing y Negocios Internacionales. 176 el mercado actualmente buscan en líneas generales la rentabilidad de la empresa en relación con la inversión hecha, en promocionar mejor los productos, buscar estrategias para mejorar la productividad, utilización y mejora del rendimiento del capital humano, etc. Pero muy pocas buscan la propuesta específica para la gestión de políticas y programas en las áreas sociales buscando la solidaridad, es decir la utilización de recursos para tratar de llegar al "Valor Público". Como producto de esa reflexión es lógico llegar a la felicitación pertinente porque en base a los argumentos esgrimidos en la primera parte las personas que buscan especializarse en ser solidarios son escasos y preciados por que demuestran con su elección una sensibilidad extraordinaria ya que buscan ayudar a los demás identificando problemas y buscando caminos para ayudarlos. Ahí también es cuando surge las interrogantes que a pesar de ser tan obvias obligan a un análisis profundo ya que no solo es ver el efecto sino tratar de encontrar las causas de las mismas porque lo que se debe buscar alcanzar siempre es la sostenibilidad, la permanencia en el tiempo de soluciones, no para encontrar alternativas de momento sino por el contrario alcanzar la erradicación completa del problema, eso se logra no con el "asistencialismo" de simplemente dar lo que falta, sino de enseñar a conseguir lo que falta, o, por lo menos mantener lo que se consiguió. Dentro de toda la gama de problemas sociales vale la pena tratar de identificarlos plenamente y encontramos algo que se palpa día a día y en todos los lugares, quizás en unos sitios es más dramática la situación que en otros. Uno de los problemas que ha aquejado y permanecerá aún un buen tiempo entre nosotros es el de la pobreza que a pesar de que en el mundo actual se puede observar olas de cambio científico y tecnológico donde crecen a diario nuevas áreas del conocimiento entre ellas la genética, la microelectrónica, la informática la robótica, la biotecnología y muchas otras más, hacen sin embargo que estos avances lleguen a solo un sector del género humano. Grupos humanos masivos, están excluidos, y luchando simplemente por asegurar las necesidades más básicas de sus familias. 177 Todos los días perecen cerca de 26 mil niños por causas ligadas con la pobreza. Cada año mueren 18 millones de personas, la mayor parte niños, que causan en el espíritu un dolor innegable ya que esas muertes son totalmente evitables. Es allí que empiezan a aparecer los llamados "escándalos éticos de nuestro tiempo" muy bien enunciados por Bernardo Kliksberg en su último libro ¿Cómo enfrentar la pobreza y la desigualdad? y a los cuales quisiera mencionar porque son ineludibles en cualquier análisis de los problemas sociales, El hambre inexplicable Las nuevas tecnologías hacen que los niveles de productividad en las actividades generadoras de alimentos asciendan fuertemente. Las evaluaciones técnicas indican que se pueden producir alimentos suficientes para una población significativamente superior a la actual. Sin embargo el número de hambrientos supera los mil millones. Casi uno de cada seis habitantes padece de hambre. Y es en América Latina donde se ve nítidamente la contradicción de potencialidades alimentarias con la realidad. Según estimados de CEPALOPS por sus condiciones naturales la región es una de las mayores productoras de alimentos del planeta que puede generar alimentos para una población tres veces mayor a la que tiene. Sin embargo tiene 53 millones de desnutridos y un 16% de desnutrición crónica infantil. El déficit de agua potable e instalaciones sanitarias El agua potable conjugada con las instalaciones sanitarias son esenciales para la salud. Sin embargo 900 millones de personas carecen de agua potable y utilizan agua contaminada. 2,600 millones de personas no tienen instalación sanitaria Según el Programa de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado el 24% de la población peruana no cuenta con servicio de agua potable de calidad adecuada; Al 30 de junio del presente año, la población en el Perú llegó a los 30 millones 475 mil habitantes, según informó el Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI)por lo que se infiere que 7.314.000,00 de personas carecen de agua potable, el 44% (13.409.000,00 de personas) no está conectado a un sistema de alcantarillado de donde el 78% de las aguas residuales son 178 descargadas sin tratamiento directamente a los ríos o al mar. La descarga de aguas residuales sin tratamiento a los cuerpos de agua, agravará las consecuencias del cambio climático pronosticadas para el Perú, las cuales serán importantes sobre todo por el derretimiento de los glaciares en los Andes, el reservorio más importante del recurso hídrico de nuestro país. Si de una manera general tenemos en consideración que cada persona necesita 20 litros diarios; en el mundo 1,100 millones de personas tienen menos de 5 litros, por otro lado los países ricos gastan 200 litros diarios per cápita. Y se debe considerar también que anualmente mueren 1'800,000 niños por diarrea, causada en parte por falta de agua potable y de instalaciones sanitarias. Como consecuencia de todo esto la mitad de las camas de hospitales en el mundo están ocupadas por pacientes que tienen enfermedades ligadas a la ingesta de agua en mal estado. Analizando las cifras escalofriantemente llegamos a la conclusión que por esta carencia mueren más personas que por todas las otras formas de violencia incluidas la guerra. En América Latina a pesar de ser poseedora de la tercera parte de las aguas limpias del orbe, hay 50 millones de personas sin agua potable, y 119 millones sin instalaciones sanitarias apropiadas. De verdad que cuando se ve cifras de esta magnitud nos damos cuenta de que teniendo recursos no se utilizan de la forma más conveniente para resolver un problema crucial. Tasas de mortalidad infantil y mortalidad materna El número de niños que perecen antes de cumplir 5 años de edad según el acuerdo en la Asamblea General de las Naciones unidas en su compromiso por alcanzar el año 2015, debía bajar en 2/3 en el 2015 respecto a 1990, Se debía llegar a que fueran 3 de cada 100, en lugar de 10 de cada 100. En el 2010, la meta estaba distante. Murieron por causas evitables vinculadas a la pobreza 8.1 millones de niños menores de 5 años, es decir el 7.2% , el Perú sin embargo se convirtió en el primer país latinoamericano y el séptimo del mundo que más redujo la mortalidad infantil en menores de cinco años entre 1990 y 2011, al rebajarla en un 76 %, según indicó hoy el Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia (Unicef). Según nota periodística publicada en el diario La República del 179 4 de Octubre del 2012, aunque todavía se registró en 2011 la muerte de 11.000 niños menores de cinco años, de las que 5.000 fueron de bebés menores de un mes, cifra aún alta. Comparándonos con los países desarrollados en América Latina 30 de cada 1000 niños mueren antes de cumplir un año de edad comparando con Noruega o Suecia en las que perecen 3. La carencia en educación En el mundo en desarrollo 121 millones de niños no van a la escuela del todo, los porcentajes de deserción en primaria son significativos y en secundaria son muy altos, Según la UNESCO nos muestra las siguientes preocupantes cifras:  La etapa preescolar solo abarca sectores de la población, en algunos países solo llega al 30% del alumnado posible  Casi todos los niños ingresan a la escuela primaria, pero en el 20% mas pobre la deserción es de casi un 15%  6 millones de jóvenes entre 15 y 19 años no terminaron la primaria  En la educación secundaria solo la completa el 49% de los hombres y el 55% de las mujeres.  La inversión en educación es comparativamente muy baja, Costa Rica invierte según su Constitución no menos del 6% de su PBI, Argentina invierte el 6.47% y Perù según el Ministerio de Educación – 15 Agosto del 2013 – invierte solamente el 3.31% del PBI, equivalente también al 17.9 por ciento del presupuesto General de la República. La generación perdida La OIT califica de ese modo a los jóvenes que a consecuencia de la crisis económica actual no han podido siquiera ingresar al mercado de trabajo. La crisis destruyó millones de puestos de trabajo, llevando la desocupación europea al 10% actual y la de Estados Unidos al 9.2%. Las tasas de desocupación juvenil casi duplican la generales. En muchos países europeos y en Estados Unidos es superior al 25% según la OIT en el Perú (Diario Gestión, 15 Agosto del 2013) mas de un millón de jóvenes peruanos de entre 14 a 25 años de los cerca de seis millones que viven en el país, son 180 desempleados. Esta cifra ubica la tasa de desempleo juvenil en aproximadamente 18% El cambio climático Los efectos del cambio climático están causando 300,000 muertes anuales, por lo que cerca de 50 millones de personas se vieron obligadas a emigrar de sus comunidades. La desigualdad es muy alta comparativamente, por cada habitante del mundo desarrollado que es víctima personal de efectos del cambio climático, son 80 las víctimas del mundo en desarrollo. Los últimos datos son inquietantes. El 2010 se produjeron records climáticos. Fue el año de más calor desde 1880, en la última década se dieron 9 de los 10 años más calientes. Moscú tuvo la temperatura más alta de su historia en el 2010, durante 33 días seguidos. La ola de calor causó 11,000 muertos. El 2011 fue en Estados Unidos el año más caliente de los últimos 75 años. Uno de los peligros mayores que provoca el calentamiento global es el de las sequías y la desertificación. Se estima (Hertsgaard, 2011) que en 20 años el número de personas con problemas de agua pueda pasar de 800 millones a 3,000 millones. La desigualdad marcada La distribución de la riqueza es cada día más diferenciada siendo los datos recientes muy expresivos: El 1% de la población mundial es poseedor actualmente del 43% de los activos del mundo. El 10% más rico tiene el 83% de dichos activos. En Estados Unidos que tiene la economía más poderosa del planeta produciendo el 28% del producto bruto mundial, un estudio del Economic Policy Institute midió la distancia entre el 1% más rico y el 90% de la población, en el periodo de 1980 a 2006. El 1% tenía 10 veces más que el 90% al comienzo del periodo y 20% más a su término. Si se toma el 0.1% más rico, sus ganancias fueron aún mucho mayores. Pasó de tener 20 veces más que el 90% en 1980 a 80 veces en el 2006. Richard Wilkinson y Kate Picket (2010) en su libro The Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone muestran con detalladas estadísticas que comparan países más y menos desiguale, que la mayor desigualdad lleva a más 181 criminalidad, mayor mortalidad infantil, más obesidad, más embarazos adolescentes, mayor discriminación de género y menor esperanza de vida Así pues si nos ponemos a ver los puntos enunciados anteriormente podemos darnos cuenta que todos ellos son por causa del hombre y significativamente también afectan al hombre, entonces lo que se tiene que hacer es simplemente actuar tratando de cambiar el efecto llegando a la causa. Todo es consecuencia en síntesis de la falta de ética en las acciones de la humanidad, no hay transparencia y por ende la corrupción campea en todos los niveles. Debemos empezar a trabajar en cambiar el pensamiento que impera en el mundo y debemos empezar con la familia. Aquí es donde viene el enlace de la Gerencia Social como una herramienta para brindar ayuda cambiando la idea de recepcionistas a la de actores de cambio, hablando y trabajando con valores, donde el "hacer" sea equilibrado con el "decir", donde el trabajo empiece en la familia y termine en la sociedad. Ese es el rol de la Gerencia Social como filosofía de cambio en la utilización de recursos no solo para mejorar infraestructuras sino para mejorar actitudes, valores y ética Cuando lo hayamos conseguido, entonces podremos aspirar a un mundo mejor, mientras tanto conformémonos con analizar, recopilar datos, admirarnos, enternecernos, aterrarnos y nada de eso será suficiente para el cambio. Tenemos que cambiar y el cambio empieza por nosotros mismos despertando nuestra conciencia ya que al final "nadie da lo que no tiene". REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS Bernardo Kliksberg (2013) ¿Cómo enfrentar la pobreza y la desigualdad? Ediciones Etica y Economia S. A. Lima Ministerio de Vivienda, Construcción y Saneamiento Programa de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado http://www.proagua.org.pe/ Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica INEI http://www.inei.gob.pe/perucifrasHTM/inf-dem/cuadro.asp?cod=3642&name=po=1& ext=gif La Republica – 4 Octubre 2012 http://www.larepublica.pe/04-10-2012/mortalidadinfantil-en-el-peru-se-redujo-en-un-76-entre-1990-y-2011 Ministerio de educación – 15 Agosto 2013 http://www.minedu.gob.pe/noticias/index.php?id=13729 182 PROSPECTIVA Y EL PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO EN LAS ORGANIZACIONES Dr. Carlos Eduardo Vásquez Perales [email protected] RESUMEN El presente trabajo pretende resaltar la enorme importancia que tiene para los líderes de las empresas públicas y privadas, así como para las instituciones benéficas; el poder relacionar la prospectiva y el planeamiento estratégico, ya que mientras la primera nos señala el futuro lejano, la segunda lo hace con el cercano y el presente. La prospectiva es una disciplina que se viene empleando desde el siglo pasado con singular éxito tanto por gobiernos como Japón, EEUU, Alemania, Brasil, México, Colombia, Perú, etc., entre otros y también por la empresa privada en todo el mundo, para asesorar sobre el devenir de la actividad humana en el tiempo lejano y sobres éstas bases y líneas maestras, realizar el planeamiento estratégico concreto y real, que facilita alcanzar las metas y objetivos estratégicos de la organización. Tanto la prospectiva, como el planeamiento estratégico tienen su historia, sus defensores emplean matrices, así como beneficios en el afán de asegurar organizaciones serias y exitosas en sus respectivos ámbitos, en organizaciones con fines de lucro o no. En el mundo global tenemos las empresas internacionales como: General Electric, Ford, IBM y otras que emplean los conocimientos que les otorga la prospectiva y la planificación estratégica. En el caso peruano, el Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN), ya emplea ambas disciplinas para preparar el Plan de Desarrollo Nacional Bicentenario – 2021. De otro lado en la actividad privada también se emplea, habiendo una firma perteneciente a la Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola que brinda servicios de asesoramiento en prospectiva y planeamiento estratégico. Existen asimismo algunas Universidades que han incluido y desarrollan la asignatura de prospectiva para complementar y asegurar un mejor planeamiento estratégico. PALABRAS CLAVE: Prospectiva, planeamiento estratégico, lejano plazo, largo plazo, corto plazo. 183 ABSTRACT This paper aims to highlight the enormous importance for leaders of public and private companies, as well as charities, the power to link prospective and strategic planning, because while the first points the distant future, the second it does with the nearby and present. Foresight is a discipline which has been used since the last century with great success by both governments as Japan, USA, Germany, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, etc.., Among others, and also by private companies worldwide, to advise on the future of human activity in the distant time and on these bases and guidelines, conduct strategic planning concrete and real, which makes achieving the goals and strategic objectives of the organization. Both prospective and strategic planning have their history, their advocates used matrices as well as benefits in an effort to ensure serious and successful organizations in their respective areas, for-profit organizations or not. In the global world we have international companies such as General Electric, Ford, IBM and others that employ knowledge gives them the foresight and strategic planning. In Peru, the National Strategic Planning (CEPLAN), and employs both disciplines to prepare the Bicentennial National Development Plan 2021. On the other hand in the private sector also employed, having a firm belonging to the Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola providing prospective advisory services and strategic planning. There are also some universities that have included the subject and develop foresight to complement and ensure better strategic planning. INTRODUCCIÓN La Prospectiva es una disciplina que se viene empleando desde el siglo pasado y más precisamente desde 1920, pero este se vio interrumpido por la gran recesión de 1929 y por la II Guerra Mundial, y es una herramienta de planeamiento que sirve a las políticas públicas y empresariales con notable éxito. El diccionario de la Real Academia Española al referirse a la Prospectiva, señala que es "El conjunto de análisis y estudios realizados con el fin de explorar o predecir el futuro en una determinada materia". En consecuencia puede existir prospectiva en todos los campos y sectores de la sociedad como el social, económico, empresarial, científico, etc. La prospectiva está llegando a todos los campos del saber y la visualización del mañana será de mayor exigencia para la creación de escenarios futuros y presentes. 184 Y ¿qué es planeación estratégica? Viene a ser el proceso por el cual los dirigentes y empresarios ordenan sus objetivos y acciones en el tiempo. De hecho el concepto de prospectiva y planeamiento estratégico están indisolublemente ligados, mientras que el primero trabaja el futuro lejano, el segundo, lo hace en el cercano y en el momento presente. Es así que, los líderes se hacen preguntas como ¿Dónde debo invertir los recursos actuales de la empresa? ¿De dónde se van a obtener los recursos futuros? ¿Cómo asegurar la supervivencia, el crecimiento y las utilidades? Las respuestas a esas interrogantes las tenemos en la prospectiva y en el planeamiento estratégico. La prospectiva nos señala los grandes lineamientos o vigas maestras hacia donde se va el conocimiento humano en las diferentes actividades del ser humano mientras que la planeación estratégica debe seguir dichas pautas o señalamientos para lograr con mayor seguridad las metas y objetivos de la organización. La enorme importancia de la prospectiva y del planeamiento estratégico se da que frente al futuro, los seres humanos podemos adoptar las actitudes del avestruz pasivo que sufre el cambio, el bombero que se ocupa de combatir el fuego, luego de que se ha iniciado, del asegurador proactivo que está preparado para los cambios previsibles, o del conspirador proactivo que trata de provocar los cambios. En consecuencia la prospectiva, se construye y busca sustentarse en las dos últimas actitudes, teniendo como es razonable más fuerza la proactiva. Recordemos entonces a Bertrand de Jouvenel, quien al referirse a la prospectiva expreso que era "el arte de la conjetura" y sobre ella se erige vigoroso el planeamiento empresarial. 1. PROSPECTIVA. Con las tecnologías de la información y las comunicaciones, con redes interconectadas y la descentralización administrativa en países como el Perú, con la presencia de nuevos Gobiernos Regionales y una necesaria renovación de su antigua legislación estatal y laboral se irá desde una gerencia local cerrada hacia una gerencia abierta abriendo las puertas a un mundo sin fronteras, emprendedora y constructora de escenarios futuros, con las puertas abiertas al mundo. En los países desarrollados y del continente americano, los equipos gerenciales, públicos o privados, con fines de lucro o sin ellos, se preocupan por tener un futuro mejor. La gran mayoría busca crecer sobre un pasado y pocos se desprenden del mismo; algunos saben cómo ingresar al futuro, pero no lo conquistan; solo escogidos equipos conocen la forma de instalar procesos permanentes al futuro, muy convencidos de que el cambio es constante, atemporal, multiforme, multidisciplinario y que puede ser imaginado, guiado y gobernado. En el devenir, hay efectos que el líder debe controlar para saber si sigue su hoja de ruta. En realidad, todos vamos hacia el futuro y queremos tener el mejor; pero sucede que muchos no saben cómo llegar, pues ignoran que éste se puede idear, crear, innovar, guiar y desarrollar como un proceso mental, aún en los peores escenarios. Fue en la década de 1920 que se iniciaron los trabajos de la prospectiva, pero este se vio interrumpido por la Gran Recesión de 1929 y por la Guerra mundial. Los resultados del empleo de la prospectiva han sido exitosos. Japón reconoce en el uso de la prospectiva una de las razones para su sorprendente desarrollo industrial en el campo de la electrónica y en la actividad automotriz, desde la década del cuarenta con importantes resultados. En el Perú, la prospectiva se viene aplicando tímidamente aún desde el año 2001, por un grupo de investigadores preocupados por generar visiones consistentes del futuro del país y de sus organizaciones. 185 El presente trabajo busca motivar a la empresa pública, privada o instituciones benéficas, sobre el empleo sistemático de la prospectiva en las labores de planeamiento en todo tipo de instituciones. ¿Qué pasará mañana? ¿Estaremos realmente preparados para enfrentar el cambio? ¿Qué nos viene en el futuro? Estas y otras muchas preguntas acerca del futuro que se nos viene son realmente incógnitas que pretendemos contestar. Para responder a estas preguntas algunos echan mano a una bola de cristal, a científicos y filósofos o a especuladores financieros que nos aconsejan y asesoran acerca de donde debe dirigirse el destino del mundo y dentro de ello, los negocios. La respuesta que más nos satisface sobre la Prospectiva, proviene del Reino Unido, siendo Ben Martin (1995), que la definió como "el proceso de investigación que requiere mirar sistemáticamente el futuro de largo plazo en ciencia, tecnología, economía y sociedad, con el objetivo de identificar las áreas de investigación estratégica y las tecnologías genéricas emergente que generan los mayores beneficios económicos y sociales". Otro autor, Luke Georghiov (1996), se refería a la Prospectiva como "un medio sistemático de evaluar los desarrollos científicos y tecnológicos que podrían tener un fuerte impacto en la competitividad industrial, la creación de riqueza y la calidad de vida". Pero es ahora que una vez más la ciencia ha puesto a nuestra disposición métodos y técnicas serias y confiables que nos permiten anticiparnos a los hechos y saber con cierto grado de certeza lo que pasara en el futuro, sin hacer mayores especulaciones. Otras respuestas a la interrogante de saber sobre la Prospectiva proviene del Secretario General de la Sociedad Peruana de Prospectiva Fernando Jiménez, quien la describe como "una ciencia encargada de prever escenarios sociales, económicos, científicos y tecnológicos deseados, con el fin de tomar medidas para concretarlos, así como ejecutar planes y estrategias que nos permitan aprovechar las oportunidades que se presentaran. Un conocimiento sistematizado que nos facilita crearnos el futuro que ansiamos". La Prospectiva tal como vemos no es más que una disciplina científica que nos ayuda a reducir la incertidumbre. Si apreciamos las definiciones realizadas observamos que están conllevan un horizonte temporal que va del corto al largo plazo. Es importante señalar que los estudios no sólo deben orientarse al factor económico, sino a todas las actividades de la vida humana. Es por ello que estos estudios deben permitir la anticipación y proyección de las tendencias en las diferentes actividades, pero veamos con mayor precisión ¿cuál es la importancia de la prospectiva? Vivimos en una época en la que los cambios son acontecimientos de todos los días y se suceden a un ritmo nunca antes visto, por ser la antesala histórica de la época, y por lo tanto, la labor de planeamiento y de los gobiernos se ve seriamente impactada por los desarrollos que suelen tomar los acontecimientos científicos, tecnológicos, sociales, económicos, culturales y políticos. Por lo tanto, ya no es posible realizar un plan de desarrollo nacional, ni un planeamiento estratégico clásico, en lo político ni en lo empresarial, basados en una "visión" única y siempre deseable para el país o la empresa, sino que es preciso contar con estrategias que prevean escenarios futuros y planes de contingencia basados en los más diversos escenarios ambientes tanto posibles como probables. Es aquí donde la Prospectiva adquiere su mayor beneficio. 186 Como vemos son muchas las situaciones y circunstancias que nos obligan a tratar de entender y comprender de manera ordenada, sistemática e integral las tendencias dominantes en los diferentes campos de la actividad humana, hacia donde se dirige el mundo, en particular señalar que en base al conocimiento científico actual y con el empleo de matrices de proyección, se puede determinar que nos espera en los próximos 50 años. Ahora, nos enfocaremos particularmente en la economía y en los negocios, teniendo en cuenta que:  La globalización de la economía y de los mercados para su consolidación obligan a un entendimiento real y sincero del gobierno, las empresas y la comunidad; buscando una sociedad más justa, equitativa y con inclusión social.  La competitividad de los países y las empresas requieren desarrollar ciencia y tecnología capaces de emerger en los mercados globales con bienes y servicios con valores agregados.  En el nuevo escenario, es indispensable la articulación de esfuerzo tanto público como privada. En este contexto que surge la Prospectiva como una herramienta que está y va a seguir ayudando a proveer futuros inciertos e impensables del mañana. Como el cambio es lo natural y permanente en nuestros tiempos estaremos asistiendo a un reto de cierta estabilidad. No obstante si nos enfocamos en enfrentar y dar soluciones parciales a los problemas, estaremos perdiéndonos en el corto plazo, las cuales no necesariamente van a dar solución a los problemas de fondo. Las técnicas de la Prospectiva, se convierten en un poderoso instrumento que busca enfrentar los cambios y logra identificar las tendencias en todos los sectores estratégicos, para lo cual se tendrán que descubrir nuevos escenarios en la sociedad del futuro, estimando sus impactos, maneras de enfrentarlos y descubriendo nuevas oportunidades que se presenten. ANTECEDENTES HISTÓRICOS Es en la década de 1920 que se iniciaron los estudios de prospectiva; no obstante acontecimientos como la Gran Recesión de 1929 y la II Guerra Mundial, frenaron el impulso inicial por lograr su crecimiento y desarrollo en otras latitudes del planeta. Luego de la derrota de Japón en 1945, éste país para salir de la grave crisis en que se encontraba sumido; es que se busca manera y formas de levantarse particularmente en su economía; es con el gran aporte de Edward G. Demming, estudioso norteamericano en Administración y Calidad, poco apreciado en su país, que se inician formas y metodologías para tratar de reactivar su aparato productivo e hizo empleo de la Prospectiva, que le dio enormes y extraordinarios resultados en el relanzamiento de su economía. Japón fue entonces un país pionero en el empleo de la Prospectiva como herramienta imprescindible en el planeamiento empresarial y en la actividad estatal. La Corporación Rand, en 1950, empleó los pronósticos tecnológicos para fines de la defensa, como no destacar el formulario de medición "Delphi", como uno de los principales instrumentos que emplea la técnica. Es así como se llevaron a cabo grandes y valiosos ejercicios de pronósticos en las fuerzas armadas en especial en la Fuerza Aérea y Marina Norteamericana. Es de mencionar que dada su escasa difusión, tuvo poca relación con los negocios, por lo que fueron disminuyendo sus seguidores; a pesar que algunas empresas privadas la aplicaron en el campo de la energía. La experiencia exitosa de Japón convirtió a la Prospectiva en un instrumento valiosísimo para el sector de gobierno. Japón en la década del 70, determinó sus propias estrategias de Prospectiva para el campo de la ciencia y tecnología en los próximos 30 años, formulando políticas para 187 el gobierno y el sector privado. Buscaban inteligencia sobre los negocios y tendencias en el largo plazo que dieran las grandes vías de acción de la dirección para alcanzar la rentabilidad y el éxito en los negocios. Este esfuerzo congregó a miles de científicos y expertos del gobierno, actividad privada y universidades; evento que a partir de esa experiencia se realiza cada cinco años. En los años 80 EE.UU., tuvo que hacer frente a la amenaza japonesa en cuanto a competitividad, es así que las técnicas de la Prospectiva volvieron a utilizarse y aún más fueron perfeccionadas muchas de ellas. A partir de 1980, casi todas las naciones de Europa y Asia vienen desarrollando sus Programas Nacionales de Prospectiva, siendo el Foro de Corporación Económica Asía Pacífico (APEC), la Unión Europea que tiene sus Centros Especializados en el estudio y formulación de la Prospectiva como el Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) en Sevilla (España) y el APEC con el Centre of Technology Foresight en Bangkok (Tailandia). En América Latina y el Caribe se hizo eco de esta corriente y es en 1998 que la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Industrial (ONUDI), viene promocionando Programas Nacionales de Prospectiva. Brasil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Uruguay, Ecuador, Chile y México, ya viene ejecutando sus Programas Nacionales con singular éxito. Brasil destaca por haber logrado llevar los resultados de los estudios de prospectiva a los niveles de decisión política y al logro de un consenso Estado Academia, Sector Privado y Sindicatos. Las cadenas productivas priorizadas hasta ahora en el Brasil son: construcción civil, textiles y confecciones, madera y muebles, y plásticos. No obstante la prospectiva no ha sido empleada sólo por los gobiernos. Es en el campo empresarial donde ha tenido un impacto significativo en las tres últimas décadas. La primera empresa multinacional que empleó una de las metodologías de prospectiva; el planeamiento por escenarios, fue la petrolera Royal Shell en 1968. Anteriormente a esa fecha, la Shell sólo aplicaba métodos de pronóstico, lo que les impedía identificar e interpretar eventos cruciales para su industria como el ocurrido en Octubre de 1973 en Medio Oriente, que luego fue conocido como "la crisis del petróleo de 1973". Al aplicar las técnicas de prospectiva, la Shell pudo vislumbrar este escenario poco deseable y plantear planes contingentes que fueron empleados en su momento. Con los años, se demostró que el uso de la prospectiva "tuvo un impacto fundamental en la forma en que la empresa (Shell) en su totalidad atravesó la turbulenta década del 70 y principios de la de 1980. Nokia comenzó comercializando papel, pero después previo un mayor auge en el caucho y el plástico. Con la electricidad en las casas dio prioridad a los cables. Un análisis a fines de los 60, arrojó que el futuro estaba en la electrónica y dio el gran salto. BENEFICIOS  Dotar de inteligencia predictiva y anticipatoria al sector público y privado a través de información de base acerca de futuras tendencias y alerta temprana sobre desarrollos recientes.  Establecer direcciones estratégicas dando los grandes lineamientos de la estrategia a las empresas multinacionales y transnacionales.  Estimular y apoyar el proceso de innovación en las diferentes actividades de la vida humana. 188 Reconocer las tendencias en el campo tecnológico, la comprensión del funcionamiento y evolución de los mercados o el análisis informado de las políticas de la competencia son importantes beneficios arrojados por los ejercicios de prospectiva. Sin embargo, no hay que olvidar los relacionados con el descubrimiento y vinculación con potenciales aliados y socios comerciales / industriales así como el desarrollo de estrategia de negocios. La economía global de nuestros días, con la creatividad y dominada por la innovación y el cambio tecnológico y en un contexto donde los mercados comerciales y financieros se integran cada vez más rápido, las compañías enfrentan una intensa competencia. El comercio electrónico y la aparición de la "nueva" biotecnología son algunos ejemplos que ilustran lo anterior. Su aparición ha creado contextos dinámicos y complejos que, por su misma naturaleza, tienden generar una brecha en las capacidades humanas y sociales existentes y aquellas requeridas para enfrentar los cambios que vienen. Los problemas que surgen no pueden tratarse usando los procedimientos o métodos convencionales. Requieren nuevas alternativas y enfoques, una forma de pensar nueva y basada en un horizonte que investigue las relaciones y asociaciones entre ellos, teniendo en cuenta el gran número de factores que los influencian. En la década del 70, varias empresas en sectores tales como energía, automotor, telecomunicaciones y tecnología de la información han establecido grupos de prospectiva y procesos de planeamiento estratégico, que analizan las perspectivas de largo plazo de las nuevas tecnologías y su impacto en los mercados y estrategias corporativas. Daimler Crysler fue el primer grupo importante en hacerlo en 1979, cuando estableció el Grupo de Investigación en Tecnología y Sociedad. La suposición de estos grupos y, en particular la firma Daimler Crysler, es la de que si bien no es posible predecir el futuro si es posible prepararse para un futuro incierto pensando sobre una variedad de probables desarrollos y analizando las fuerzas que los influencian. Un tema crucial para ellos es estudiar las interacciones sociales y tecnológicas, para lo cual toman una mirada cercana de las tendencias y los cambios en las conductas del consumidor. En el año 2003 Becker analizó las actividades de prospectiva de 18 compañías detectando que la mayor parte de las actividades de prospectiva corporativas se basan en dos grandes categorías. Por un lado teniendo en cuenta el tipo de negocio en el que opera la compañía que por su naturaleza requiere una orientación de largo plazo y también la actitud proactiva de las compañías que buscan enfrentar en mejores condiciones las incertidumbres de los mercados. El entorno externo a la firma hacen deseable o conveniente practicar ejercicios de prospectiva, como la necesidad de ganar conocimiento acerca de las tecnologías emergentes y sus futuros usuarios para las compañías que operan en sectores particularmente intensivos en tecnología. Otras firmas buscan no ser sorprendidas por los desarrollos futuros en su mercado o simplemente abrir la compañía al mundo externo y encontrar puntos de partida para transferir sus innovaciones, cooperar con otras empresas o copiar las mejores prácticas del mercado. En todo caso, los ejercicios de prospectiva proveen una excelente información de base acerca de las futuras condiciones de operación de los mercados en los que las empresas tendrán que operar ¿Y que nos demanda o como nos ayuda la prospectiva en la política? Países de América Latina emplean la Prospectiva como un método para la política de Estado. 189 Colombia es uno de los países pioneros en el desarrollo de la Prospectiva y es con el ex Presidente Alvaro Uribe, que se concibió y preparó el Plan Visión Colombia al 2019, donde entre otras cosas se plantea objetivos y metas sobre como afianzar la democracia y garantizar el bienestar de sus ciudadanos. Brasil, también apela a la nueva metodología, apostando por el crecimiento de su industria maderera. Chile, busca consolidarse con su industria vitivinícola y la harina de pescado. En España, existe la Fundación Observatorio de Prospectiva Tecnológica, en el ámbito del Ministerio de Industria, asesorando y ayudando a identificar tecnologías emergentes y brindando asesoramiento e información privilegiada. Habiendo llegado a este punto, nos hacemos la pregunta y ¿Cómo podemos emplear esta valiosa disciplina? La respuesta es empleando las herramientas que se indican:  Método Delphi: que consiste en preguntarle a un grupo de personas (expertos y no expertos en el tema bajo análisis) sus opiniones (juicios de valor basados en conocimientos, experiencias, imaginación, sentido común o intuición), acerca del comportamiento a futuro de un grupo dado de variables (factores de cambio o "drivers"), con la finalidad de tener una idea lo más clara posible de la situación futura que esas variables producirán.  Método de Probabilidad de Bayes: es la aplicación de las fórmulas derivadas del Teorema de Bayes a las determinación de las llamadas probabilidades revisadas; y que están asociadas a un conjunto dado de hipótesis (escenarios posibles) mutuamente excluyentes, como consecuencia de la interacción de variables generadoras de futuros ("drivers")  Método de la Matriz de Impacto Cruzado: su lógica básica subyacente consiste en hacer una exploración del futuro (prospectiva) sobre la base de las interacciones de una serie de variables ("drivers") que pueden o no tener influencia sobre el tema bajo análisis dentro del horizonte temporal considerado.  Exploración del Entorno: es una técnica muy simple de aprender pero muy poderosa por el nivel de análisis que permite, y que se basa en la identificación de variables de cambio ("drivers") mediante el empleo de diferentes enfoques temáticos  Método de Análisis Morfológico: esta técnica persigue explorar todas las posibilidades en las que pueden evolucionar un sistema determinado. Para ello, es preciso identificar con gran precisión lo que se denominan los parámetros caracterizados del tema bajo estudio. PRESENTE Y FUTURO DE LA PROSPECTIVA EN EL PERÚ El Perú ha entrado tarde a esta corriente mundial de ejecución de estudios de prospectiva. Pero no podemos perder tiempo en lamentaciones, el futuro no nos espera. Dentro de estas actividades podemos destacar las que viene ejecutando desde Octubre 2001, la Oficina de Innovación y Prospectiva Tecnológica del Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología (CONCYTEC), especialmente el desarrollo de una Metodología de Formación de Especialistas en Prospectiva, que ha permitido que más de 300 profesionales de todo el país se hayan ya formado en el empleo de las herramientas metodológicas más usuales en los estudios de prospectiva, y que son 190 recomendadas por el Centro APEC de Prospectiva Tecnológica, como herramientas estándar para hacer comparables los estudios que realicen las diversas economías de la Región Asia – Pacífico. Desde Junio del 2008, en que se creó el Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN), con la misión de lograr el desarrollo de la Planificación Estratégica como instrumento técnico de gobierno y gestión para un desarrollo armónico y sostenido del país y el fortalecimiento de la gobernabilidad democrática en el marco del estado constitucional de derecho. Dentro de los objetivos del Sistemas Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN) está considerado la visión Prospectiva que deben contener todos los planes estratégicos que se formulen y en su organización se encuentra la Dirección Nacional de Prospectiva y Estudios Estratégicos. El gobierno anterior terminó el Plan Estratégico del Desarrollo Nacional al 2021, llamado "Plan Bicentenario", que tiene como objetivo central el desarrollo humano entendido como un proceso integrado de ampliación de las libertades humanas fundamentales que integra de manera articulada consideraciones de tipo económico, social, político, cultural y medio ambiental, entre otros. A través del diario La República del 27 de Setiembre del 2011, se indicó que el mencionado plan será actualizado para vincularlo a las políticas de desarrollo económico y social que aplicará el actual gobierno según declaraciones del entonces Jefe del CEPLAN, Sr. Germán Alarco Tosoni. La formación de especialistas locales está llevando a la constitución de unidades operativas en el campo de la prospectiva, denominadas Observatorios. El Ministerio de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo ha sido la primera institución del Estado en crear un observatorio especializado en el campo Socio Laboral. Varias Universidades del interior del país vienen formulando sus proyectos para constituir sus Observatorios Regionales de Prospectiva, que conjuntamente con los Gobiernos Regionales recientemente creados, puedan diseñar las mejores estrategias de desarrollo, aprovechando las oportunidades que el futuro generará. Con la finalidad que la prospectiva cale profundamente en la sociedad peruana, el CONCYTEC, CONFIEP (Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas), la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, la Universidad de San Martín de Porres y otras importantes instituciones públicas y privadas organizaron el Primer Congreso Nacional de Prospectiva, denominado PROSPECTA PERU 2003, en donde se presentaron los mejores trabajos nacionales en este campo, así como los últimos avances del empleo de la prospectiva en el mundo. Con fecha 29 de Agosto del 2008, se configuró la sede de PROSPECTIVA 2020 PERÚ, reconociendo a la organización INTERNACIONAL PROSPECTIVA 2020. Históricamente es en la década del 70 y 80 que empresas norteamericana y japonesas, debido a los profundos cambios que se producían en las economías de los países, la competitividad de la economía tanto por el difícil proceso productivo, la infraestructura, calidad y el advenimiento de nuevos productos, llevaron a desarrollar las técnicas de Prospectiva. Es así como debido a los éxitos alcanzados, en la década de 1990 los gobiernos de varios países europeos y la actividad privada inician y continúan con el desarrollo de esa práctica. PROSPECTIVA 2020 – PERÚ, tiene como Director Ejecutivo a un ex vicepresidente del Perú, Fundador de la Universidad San Ignacio de Loyola. Prospectiva 2020, cree e interpreta que los países desarrollados a pesar del éxito de sus negocios en la economía internacional, tienen claro que competir en el futuro, dependen de las decisiones que se adopten en el presente. Es así como selecciona 191 sus trabajos e investigación en áreas prioritarias de la economía como energía renovable y cambio climático, información, comunicaciones, biotecnología y agro negocios. Entonces son conscientes que el éxito en la economía a largo plazo depende de combinar excelente estrategias y políticas macroeconómicas de mayor alcance temporal para hacer frente a los retos y desafíos actuales. 2. PLANEAMIENTO ESTRATÉGICO "La mayoría de nosotros teme el cambio. Aún cuando dicen que el cambio es normal, nuestros estómagos se retuercen ante esa posibilidad. Pero los estrategas y gerentes de hoy, no hay más opción que cambiar" Robert Waterman La administración estratégica se define como el arte y la ciencia de formular, implementar y evaluar decisiones multifuncionales que le permitan a una organización lograr sus objetivos. Como la misma definición implica, la administración estratégica se enfoca en integrar la administración, el marketing, las finanzas y la compatibilidad, la producción y las operaciones, las actividades de investigación y desarrollo, así como los sistemas computarizados de información, para lograr el éxito de la organización. En el libro de Fred R. David (2008), el concepto de Administración Estratégica y Planeación, Planeamiento Empresarial; es el mismo, pudiendo señalar que Administración Estratégica se emplea en el mundo académico el de Planeamiento Estratégico, se emplea en los negocios. El proceso de administración estratégica consta de tres etapas: formulación, implementación y evaluación de la estrategia. Se hace notar que en todas ellas se emplean once (11) matrices; que nos permiten auditar o medir diferentes dimensiones o variables de la organización. La formulación de la estrategia incluye desarrollar la visión y la misión, identificar las oportunidades y amenazas externas para la organización, determinar las fortalezas y debilidades internas, establecer objetivos a largo plazo, generar estrategias alternativas y elegir las estrategias particulares que se habrán de seguir. La implementación o implantación de la estrategia requiere que la empresa establezca objetivos anuales, formule políticas, motive a los empleados y destine recursos para llevar a la práctica las estrategias. La implementación de la estrategia implica desarrollar una cultura que la apoye, crear una estructura organizacional eficaz, dar una nueva dirección a los esfuerzos de marketing, elaborar presupuestos, desarrollar y utilizar sistemas de información y vincular la remuneración del empleado con el desempeño de la organización. La evaluación de la estrategia es la etapa final de la administración estratégica. Los gerentes necesitan saber de inmediato que ciertas estrategias no están funcionando bien, y la evaluación de la estrategia es el principal medio para obtener esta información. Todas las estrategias son susceptibles a futuras modificaciones, ya que los factores tanto externos como internos cambian de manera constante y por ello el modelo es recursivo y adaptativo. 192 MODELO COMPLETO DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ESTRATÉGICA Una manera práctica de realizar la evaluación de la estrategia es haciéndose las preguntas que se indica; ¿la empresa está logrando las metas? ¿Ha cambiado el entorno externo? ¿Ha cambiado el entorno interno? Si se están alcanzando las metas y los entornos no ha variado; la acción a tomar, será continuar con el desarrollo de las estrategias actuales, en todos los demás casos, se tendrán que tomar acciones correctivas, revisando el planeamiento, especialmente los entornos (modelo recursivo). BENEFICIOS La administración estratégica permite a una organización ser más proactiva que reactiva cuando se trata de darle forma a su futuro; le permite iniciar e influir en las actividades (en vez de limitarse a responder a ellas) y, por lo tanto, ejercer control sobre su propio destino. Los dueños de pequeñas empresas, directores generales, presidentes y gerentes de muchas organizaciones con y sin fines de lucro reconocen y son conscientes de los beneficios de la administración estratégica. Desde siempre, el principal beneficio de la administración estratégica ha sido ayudar a las organizaciones a formular mejores estrategias utilizando un enfoque más sistemático, lógico y racional de la elección estratégica. Ésta sigue siendo una de las mayores ventajas de la administración estratégica, pero los estudios más recientes indican que su contribución más importante es el proceso en sí, más que las decisiones o los documentos. La comunicación es clave para una administración estratégica exitosa. A través de la participación en el proceso, los gerentes y empleados se comprometen más en apoyar a la organización. El diálogo y la participación son ingredientes esenciales. Hasta aquí podríamos hacernos entonces la pregunta y que beneficios concretos nos trae el Planeamiento Estratégico. Elaborar declaración de la misión Establecer objetivos a largo plazo Generar, evaluar y seleccio nar estrategi as Establecer políticas y objetivos anuales Asigna r recurso s Medir y evaluar los Realizar auditoría interna Formular estrategia s Imple mentar estrate 193 BENEFICIOS FINANCIEROS Las organizaciones que utilizan los conceptos de la administración estratégica son más rentables y exitosas que aquellas que no lo hacen. Además muestran mejoría significativa en las ventas, la rentabilidad y la productividad en comparación con las empresas que no llevan a cabo actividades de planeación sistemática. Las compañías de alto desempeño tienden a realizar la planeación sistemática para prepararse frente a futuros cambios en sus ambientes, tanto en el externo como en el interno. Las empresas cuyos sistemas de planeación se asemejan más a la teoría de la administración estratégica, por lo general, registran un rendimiento financiero superior a largo plazo en relación con los promedios de su industria. BENEFICIOS NO FINANCIEROS Tener una mayor conciencia sobre las amenazas externas, una mejor comprensión de la estrategias de los competidores, mayor productividad de los empleados, una menor resistencia al cambio y la comprensión más clara de la relaciones entre desempeño y recompensas. La administración estratégica mejora las capacidades de prevención de problemas de una organización porque fomenta la interacción entre los gerentes de todos los niveles divisionales y funcionales. Las empresas capacitan a sus gerentes y empleados, que comparten con ellos los objetivos de la organización, que les otorgan facultades de decisión para ayudar a mejorar los productos o servicios y que reconocen sus contribuciones seguramente podrán contar con ellos, gracias a esta interacción, cuando necesiten su ayuda. La administración estratégica ofrece los siguientes beneficios: Identificar, dar prioridad y aprovechar las oportunidades. Dar una visión objetiva de los problemas administrativos. Construir un marco para una mejor coordinación y control de las actividades. Minimizar los efectos de condiciones y cambios adversos. Permitir tomar decisiones importantes para apoyar mejor los objetivos establecidos. Facilitar una asignación más eficaz de tiempo y recursos a las oportunidades identificadas. Permitir que se destinen menos recursos y tiempo a corregir decisiones erróneas o tomadas en el momento. Crear un marco para la comunicación interna bidireccional entre el personal. Ayudar a integrar el comportamiento de los individuos en un esfuerzo total. Constituir la base para poner en claro las responsabilidades individuales. Fomentar el pensamiento proactivo. Ofrecer un enfoque cooperativo, integrado y entusiasta para enfrentar los problemas y oportunidades. Fomentar una actitud favorable hacia el cambio. Dar un grado de disciplina y formalidad a la administración de una empresa. PORQUÉ ALGUNAS EMPRESAS SE JUSTIFICAN PARA NO REALIZAN LA ADMINISTRACIÓN ESTRATÉGICA  Recompensas son deficientes  Soluciones de emergencias  Es una pérdida de tiempo  Es muy cara 194  Desgano  Satisfacción con el éxito  Miedo al fracaso  Exceso de confianza  Malas experiencias  Interés personal  Miedo a lo desconocido  Conflicto de opiniones  Desconfianza Algunos problemas que deben considerarse y evitar en la administración estratégica son los siguientes:  Utilizar la planeación estratégica para tener el control de las decisiones y los recursos.  Realizar la planeación estratégica sólo para satisfacer una acreditación o cumplir con requisitos de la regulación.  Pasar con demasiada rapidez de la definición de la misión a la formulación de la estrategia.  No comunicar el plan a los empleados y dejar que sigan trabajando sin saber nada.  Tomar demasiadas decisiones intuitivas que entren en conflicto con el plan formal.  No apoyar activamente el proceso de la planeación estratégica.  No utilizar planes como una pauta para medir el desempeño.  Delegar la planeación en una sola persona en vez de comprometer a todos los gerentes.  Impedir que los empleados clave participen en todas las fases de la planeación.  No crear un clima de colaboración que apoye el cambio.  Considerar que la planeación es innecesaria o poco importante.  Estar tan absorto en los problemas actuales que no se realiza la suficiente planeación.  Ser tan formal en la planeación que se repriman la flexibilidad y la creatividad. VEAMOS ALGUNAS REFLEXIONES PARA UNA PLANEACIÓN ESTRATÉGICA EFICAZ La administración estratégica no debe convertirse en un mecanismo burocrático que se perpetúe a sí mismo. Por el contrario, debe ser un proceso de aprendizaje reflexivo que familiarice a los gerentes y empleados de la organización con los problemas estratégicos clave y las alternativas factibles para resolverlos. La administración estratégica no deberá volverse ritualista, forzada, dirigida o muy formal, predecible y rígida. El medio para explicar los asuntos estratégicos y la respuesta que les de la organización deben ser las palabras sustentadas en los números, y no los números sustentados en las palabras. Un papel clave de los estrategas es facilitar el aprendizaje y cambio continuos en la organización. Las decisiones estratégicas requieren elegir entre aspectos opuestos, como las consideraciones a largo plazo frente a las de corto plazo o si es conveniente maximizar las ganancias en vez de incrementar la riqueza de los accionistas. Aunque también existen las cuestiones éticas. Estas elecciones de la estrategia requieren de juicios y preferencias subjetivos. En muchos casos, la falta de objetividad al formular la estrategia da como resultado que se pierdan la postura competitiva y la rentabilidad. En la actualidad la mayoría de las organizaciones 195 reconocen que los conceptos y técnicas de la administración estratégica pueden mejorar la efectividad de las decisiones. Ciertos factores subjetivos, como la actitud hacia el riesgo, la preocupación por la responsabilidad social y la cultura organizacional, siempre afectarán las decisiones relacionadas con la formulación de la estrategia, pero las organizaciones necesitan ser tan objetivas como sea posible al momento de considerar estos factores cualitativos. La ética empresarial se define como el conjunto de principios de conducta dentro de una organización que guían la toma de decisiones y el comportamiento. La ética empresarial es un requisito indispensable para la buena administración estratégica. ¡La ética es un buen negocio! Tanto Estados Unidos como el resto del mundo están presenciando el surgimiento de una ola cada vez mayor de conciencia sobre la importancia de la ética empresarial. Los estrategas son los principales responsables de asegurar que las organizaciones defiendan y practiquen los principios éticos más elevados. Todas las decisiones relacionadas con la formulación, implementación y evaluación de la estrategia tienen implicaciones éticas. En los periodos y las revistas empresariales de los países se reporta diariamente el incumplimiento legal y moral de la conducta ética por parte de organizaciones públicas y privadas. Los gerentes y empleados de las compañías deben tener cuidado de no volverse chivos expiatorios de éstas al ser señalados como los culpables de los errores ambientales. Dañar el ambiente natural en una acción ilegal, costo y poco ética. Cuando en la actualidad aluna organización enfrenta cargos criminales por contaminar el ambiente, es cada vez más frecuente que entreguen a sus gerentes y empleados para lograr indulgencias hacia ellas mismas. Una razón por la que los salarios de los estrategas son más altos en comparación con los del resto de los integrantes de una organización es que son ellos quienes deben asumir los riesgos morales de la empresa. Los estrategas son responsables de desarrollar, comunicar y aplicar el código de ética empresarial en sus organizaciones. Aunque la responsabilidad principal de asegurar el cumplimiento de una conducta ética descansa sobre los estrategas de la empresa, una parte integral de la responsabilidad de todos los gerentes es encarnar un liderazgo ético mediante el ejemplo y las demostraciones constantes. Los gerentes ocupan puestos que les permiten no sólo influir en muchas personas, sino también educarlas. Esto los hace responsables de efectuar una toma de decisiones éticas y de llevarlas a la práctica. "Algunos hombres ven cosas y dicen porqué, yo sueño con cosas y digo porqué no" Jhon Kennedy Ex Presidente de los EE.UU. 3. CONCLUSIONES Es indispensable en el mundo global y cambiante en que vivimos disponer de la prospectiva en las entidades de planeamiento del gobierno como el Centro Nacional de Planeamiento Estratégico (CEPLAN) y en la empresa para que nos señale el futuro lejano que se avizora en todos los campos de la actividad humana, como una gran vía que debemos seguir y además a partir de allí; emplear la planeación estratégica para que busque enfrentar con éxito el corto y el largo plazo con mayor veracidad y seguridad creando productos y servicios con valor agregado, si ansiamos y queremos estar como países desarrollados en los próximos años y con una calidad de vida aceptable. El mundo del futuro puede y debe ser creado y modificado por nosotros. No podemos, ni como país ni como empresa, ni como organizaciones sin fines de lucro, 196 esperar sentados a que se produzca un cambio positivo que nos ayude a crecer buscando nuevas oportunidades. Tener una actitud proactiva hacia el cambio y generar los escenarios futuros más deseables, es una necesidad absolutamente necesaria. La prospectiva nos ayudará en este esfuerzo y estamos seguros que seremos coronados por el éxito, tal como desde el siglo pasado lo hacen muchos gobiernos y empresas en el mundo. En los últimos años varias empresas de sectores tales como energía, automotor, comunicaciones y tecnologías de la información han creado sus propios equipos de prospectiva y planeamiento estratégico; que buscan analizar las prospectivas de largo plazo de las nuevas tecnologías y su impacto en los mercados y los gobiernos. 4. BIBLIOGRAFÍA Alvin Toffler (1970) Shock del Futuro. Nueva York. Random House Bas, Enric (1999). Prospectiva: herramientas para la gestión estratégica del cambio. Barcelona. Editorial Ariel. Bell, Daniel (1989) El Mundo en 2013. Negocios, Vol 2s, Un. 288. México. Bell, Wendell (1997) Foundations of Futures Studies: Human Science for a New Era. 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Simón & Doubleday http://ceplan.gob.pe Bachiller, Licenciado en Ciencias Militares Maestro, Doctor en Administración Asesor en Desarrollo y Defensa Nacional Docente Escuela de Posgrado Universidad (UIGV) Publicaciones: Comunicación Efectiva (Revista EXEGESIS Sep. 2009 UIGV) Prospectiva: Herramienta Indispensable para la Sociedad en la Era del Cambio (Revista ADMINISTER Sep. 2011 – UTP) ¿Qué tanto nos cuesta ser Líder? (Revista ADMINISTER Ene. 2011 – UTP) Supply Chain Management (Revista ADMINISTER Mar. 2012 – UTP) 198 FACTORES DE ÉXITO DE LOS SUPERMERCADOS EN LIMA METROPOLITANA Y CALLAO Dr. Fernando Vigil-Cornejo RESUMEN Objetivo: El objetivo general del trabajo de investigación fue determinar los factores de éxito de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao. Método: El tipo de investigación fue descriptivo y el nivel aplicado, el método y diseño de investigación fue retrospectivo ex post facto. La población en estudio estuvo representada por los consumidores de las cinco Limas: Lima Norte, Lima Sur, Lima Este, Lima Centro y el Callao. La muestra fue no probabilística, constituida por 514 consumidores y 10 retailers. Los instrumentos utilizados para la medición de las variables fueron dos encuestas realizadas a 514 consumidores y 10 retailers de las cinco Limas. La encuesta dirigida a los consumidores constó de 10 ítems o factores para el éxito de los supermercados. La encuesta dirigida a los retailers constó de 15 ítems o factores para el éxito de los supermercados, adicionalmente 10 ítems para medir el nivel de los factores como importancia que estos tienen para el desarrollo de los supermercados en el Perú. Se aplicó una prueba para medir la Validez y Confiabilidad de los Instrumentos resultando válidos ambos instrumentos con un alfa de Cronbach de 0.619 para la encuesta a los consumidores y 0.625 para la encuesta a retailers. Para la primera encuesta se realizó un análisis discriminante para intentar identificar las variables explicativas del éxito de los supermercados. Resultados: Los resultados de la primera encuesta fueron que el tamaño y las dimensiones, la modernidad de las instalaciones y el descongestionamiento son los factores más importantes para el éxito de los supermercados, según los consumidores. Para la segunda encuesta también se utilizó el análisis discriminante y el Lambda de Wilks, los cuales indican que, desde el punto de vista de los retailers, el 66,7 % de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo dos variables discriminadoras: la tecnología usada en los procesos operativos del supermercado y que la administración esté centralizada explican la mayor parte de la variancia de los resultados. Del mismo modo, indican que los factores proveedores y créditos de consumo de empresas financieras explican mejor el desarrollo de los supermercados. Queda demostrado que los principales factores claves para el éxito de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao son: Tamaño y Dimensiones, Modernidad de las Instalaciones, Descongestionamiento, Tecnología de las operaciones y administración centralizada. 199 Finalmente, se demostró que los proveedores y los créditos de consumo de las empresas financieras son los que explican mejor el desarrollo de los supermercados. Conclusiones: Los factores de éxito según los consumidores son: el tamaño y las dimensiones, modernidad de las instalaciones y que esté descongestionado, mientras que para los retailers son: La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos, la administración centralizada, los proveedores y los créditos de consumo. Palabras claves: Factores claves de éxito, tamaño y dimensiones, modernidad de las instalaciones, descongestionamiento, administración centralizada, tecnología de operaciones, competitividad, ventaja competitiva, hipercompetencia. THE SUCCESS FACTORS OF SUPERMARKETS FROM LIMA METROPOLITANA AND CALLAO ABSTRACT Objective: To determinate the success factors of supermarkets from Lima Metropolitana and Callao. Method: The kind of research was descriptive and the applied level, the method and the design of research was retrospective ex post facto. Population in this study was represented by consumers from five Limas: North Lima, South Lima, East Lima, Center Lima and Callao. The sample was non-probabilistics made up by 514 consumers and 10 retailers. Instruments used in order to measure the variables were two surveys applied to 514 consumers and 10 retailers from five Limas. The survey applied to consumers had 10 items or success factors of supermarkets. The survey applied to retailers had 15 items or success factors of supermarkets, besides those 10 ítems to measure level of factors like their importance to the develop of Peruvian supermarkets. A prove to measure validity and reliability of instruments was applied. Both instruments were valid with a Cronbach's alfa of 0.619 to the survey of consumers and 0.625 to the survey of retailers. In the first survey a discriminate analysis was used to try to identify the success explain variable of supermarkets. Results: Results from first survey were size of dimensions, modernity of places and easing of congestion as the most important factors to the success of supermarkets, according to consumers. Also, to the second survey was used the discriminant analysis and Wilks' Lambda that indicate from retailers' point of view, that 66,7 % of the cases have been classified correctly taking in consideration only two discriminator variables: technology used in supermarket's operative process and that administration was centralized explain the great part of different results. In the same way, suppliers and consumption credits from enterprise factors better indicate the develop of supermarkets. It was demonstrate that main key factors to success of supermarkets from Lima Metropolitana and Callao are: size and dimensions, 200 modernity of places, easing of congestion, Technology of operations and centralized administration. Finally, it was demonstrated that suppliers and consumption credits from enterprise are better applied to the develop of supermarkets. Conclusions: The success factors as consumers are: the size and dimensions, modern facilities and is uncrowded, while for retailers include: The technology used in business processes, centralized management, suppliers and consumer loans. Keywords: Key success factors, size and dimensions, modernity of places, easing of congestion, centralized administration, technology of operations, competitivity, competitivity advantage, hypercompetitivity. INTRODUCCIÓN En los últimos 15 años el sector retail ha mostrado gran dinamismo, lo que se ha traducido en una creciente expansión de cadenas de supermercados. Actualmente son tres los grupos económicos que manejan el supermercaderismo en el Perú, grupo Cencosud, que representa supermercados Wong y Metro, grupo Interbank, que representa supermercados Plaza Vea y Vivanda y el grupo Falabella que representa hipermercados Tottus. A Diciembre del 2009, los grupos Cencosud, Interbank y Falabella, tenían 56, 58 y 17 locales respectivamente. Este sostenido crecimiento del sector supermercados en el Perú y particularmente en la Ciudad de Lima, se debe principalmente al bajo nivel de penetración, 30% en Lima y 14% a nivel nacional, siendo el más bajo en la Región, la cual es liderada por Chile con 60% de penetración. El sector retail en el Perú cuenta con 131 supermercados, concentrándose la mayoría de estos (115) en La ciudad de Lima. Debido al bajo nivel de penetración que tiene nuestro país, existe un mercado potencial atractivo por desarrollar; es así que han aparecido en el escenario Limeño, nuevos formatos de negocio retail: minimercados, supermercados, hipermercados y cadenas de formato mayorista como la cadena holandesa Makro. Existen también otros competidores internacionales que están interesados por ingresar al mercado peruano, como por ejemplo la empresa norteamericana Walmart, líder mundial del sector, la cadena de supermercados Ketal de Bolivia y cadenas de supermercados de Ecuador, que tienen pensado incursionar en el norte del país. Dada la efervescencia de este sector y la gran oportunidad de mercado potencial que presenta el Perú, es de interés conocer los factores que han permitido desarrollar con éxito el supermercaderismo en el Perú. La presente investigación tiene como propósito determinar los factores que han determinado el éxito de los supermercados en Lima Metropolitana y el Callao y analizar sus perspectivas de desarrollo. Antecedentes de los supermercados en Lima Metropolitana Entre las décadas de los 60 s y 70 s aparecieron en Lima las primeras tiendas de supermercados: Monterrey, Tía, Galax, Scala Gigante, Maxi y Súper Market. A partir de 1975 y 1985 el sector experimentó cierto dinamismo y se inauguraron más locales en Lima y en algunas de las principales ciudades. Después la crisis económica, social y política que asoló al país a fines de los años 80 s afectó severamente al sector y las cadenas fueron cerrando paulatinamente sus tiendas. No obstante, hubo otras razones que contribuyeron al declive del negocio: las cadenas habían estandarizado sus productos, precios y servicios dirigidos a los niveles socioeconómicos de mayor poder adquisitivo, estrategia que en principio fue buena, pero no tomó en cuenta la incorporación de nuevos estratos y la evolución del comportamiento del consumidor, quien exigía cada vez mayor diferenciación y 207 variedad de productos y servicios, factores que otras empresas nacientes supieron aprovechar (como el caso de Wong). El grupo Supermercados Wong (GSW) inició sus operaciones en 1983 con su primer supermercado en San Isidro. Entre 1983 y 1990 abrió cinco tiendas. En 1992 inauguró su primer hipermercado Metro de Chorrillos. En 1993 compró la cadena de tiendas Galax y Todos, y en ese año inauguró 4 supermercados y un hipermercado. En el 2006 el Grupo Wong contaba con 41 tiendas. En diciembre del 2007 el grupo Cencocud, de Chile, compró el 100% de las acciones de una operación valorada en US$ 500 millones. SPSA, principal competidor del Grupo Wong, incursionó en el mercado peruano en 1993 bajo la denominación de Supermercados Santa Isabel, empresa de capitales chilenos que compró los supermercados Scala, Mass y Top Market y arrendó la cadena de Supermercados San Jorge. En 1998 Santa Isabel fue adquirida por la multinacional holandesa Royal Ahold. En diciembre del 2003 Ahold decide retirarse del mercado sudamericano y vendió el 100% de las acciones que mantenía en santa Isabel al Grupo Interbank. Así, el 19 de abril del 2007 como parte de un proceso de reorganización se transfirieron las participaciones de IFH Perú, Interseguro y el Banco Internacional del Perú a IFR Retail Corp. De ésta manera la composición del accionariado fue el 67,49% a favor de IFH Retail Corp y el porcentaje restante a Compass Capital Partners Corp. Al cierre del 2006, la firma contaba con 40 locales. Hipermercados Tottus, perteneciente al Grupo Saga Falabella (filial de la Chilena Falabella), ingresó en noviembre del 2002 con su primera tienda en el centro comercial Mega Plaza Norte (independencia). En noviembre del 2003 inauguró su segundo hipermercado en San Isidro, en octubre del 2004 abrió su tercer local en San Miguel conjuntamente con Sodimac, y en el segundo trimestre del 2006 abrió su cuarto local en CC. Plaza Atocongo. La diferencia entre supermercados e hipermercados está en el mayor abanico de productos y marcas, los supermercados al no contar con espacio ofrecen básicamente abarrotes y bienes de consumo no duraderos, mientras que los hipermercados incluyen productos durables en mayor proporción (desde electrodomésticos hasta motos). La incursión de Saga Falabella en el negocio de supermercados bajo la marca Tottus y el dinamismo expansivo del sector se sustenta en la oportunidad que representa la reducida tasa de penetración que tienen los supermercados en el Perú del total facturado por comercio minorista. Lima registra una tasa de penetración de 30%, contra casi 75% del promedio en otras ciudades de América Latina. La cadena holandesa de venta mayorista Makro, ingresó al mercado peruano en el 2009 con la apertura de su primera tienda en el centro comercial Lima Plaza Norte, en el distrito de Independencia, con una inversión de 5,5 millones de dólares, en un área de 5.800 m2. Makro invirtió US$ 35 millones durante el 2009 en la construcción de tres tiendas, dos en Lima y una en provincia. La segunda tienda de Makro se ubica en el Callao y la tercera en la Ciudad de Arequipa. La cadena holandesa proyecta cerrar el 2012 con 15 locales, en este gran crecimiento comercial no descarta su ingreso al segmento minorista, para lo cual ya han registrado su marca Mikro. La Figura N° 1 muestra la línea de tiempo en el desarrollo de los Supermercados en el Perú. Supermercados en el Perú Actualmente, el Perú es el país con menor penetración de supermercados en toda la Región, con14%, mientras que Chile presenta una penetración de mercado de casi 60%. Se puede apreciar que los puestos de mercado y bodegas (retail tradicional) son el principal medio de consumo en el Perú y algunos países en la Región. El cuadro N° 1 muestra la penetración de los supermercados en Latinoamérica. Analizando las principales ciudades de la Región, podemos apreciar que Lima es la ciudad con menos penetración en La Región, 30%, mientras que Río de Janeiro, México y Santiago de Chile son las ciudades que lideran la penetración de mercado en la Región con casi un 208 80%. En el Cuadro N° 2 se muestra la penetración de los supermercados en las principales ciudades de la Región para el año 2008. El 86% del comercio minorista nacional se concentra en canales tradicionales como bodegas, mientras que el 14% se concentra en supermercados. Si bien los supermercados se han expandido a nivel nacional, dado el continuo crecimiento de la economía, en el mercado interno las bodegas siguen siendo el lugar preferido de los consumidores para adquirir productos de diferente tipo. Los canales tradicionales no solamente se restringen a las bodegas, sino a otros establecimientos como casas ventas, puestos de mercado, minimarkets, ferreterías, kioskos y bares. Las bodegas son el punto de venta de mayor presencia de Lima Metropolitana, luego le siguen las casas venta, los puestos de mercado y los kioskos. En el 2007, en Lima existían 62,406 bodegas, 10,414 casas venta, 9,518 puestos de mercado y 6,537 kioskos. Para el 2008 se estimó que el número de bodegas se incrementó en 11,8%, alcanzando las 69,645 bodegas, según información del gerente general de la cadena de bodegas multitienda. El cuadro N° 3 muestra la distribución del mercado tradicional en Lima. La participación entendida como el porcentaje de ventas de un producto o servicio que una empresa tiene con respecto a las ventas totales del mercado en el que participa, se encuentra distribuida a nivel nacional como indica el cuadro N° 4. Se puede apreciar que los principales actores en el rubro supermercados son los grupos Cencosud, Interbank y Falabella. Cabe resaltar que se ha observado una disminución en la participación de mercado de Cencosud, debido a medidas prudenciales de sus accionistas. Mientras que supermercados peruanos del grupo Interbank creció en los 5 años de 27% a 33%. El sector supermercados en el Perú, ha mostrado gran crecimiento, principalmente durante los últimos 5 años. A Diciembre del 2009, el grupo Cencosud contaba con 56 locales, el grupo Interbank 58 locales y el grupo Falabella 17 locales. En al año 2009, dada la crisis internacional la expansión en supermercados fue moderada, permaneciendo sin crecimiento el grupo Falabella, el grupo Cencosud creció prudencialmente en 3 locales y el grupo Interbank en 7 locales. Para el año 2010 se tiene proyectado un crecimiento de 28 supermercados a nivel nacional, distribuidos de la siguiente manera: 8 locales grupo Falabella, 10 locales grupo Cencosud y 10 locales grupo Interbank. El cuadro N° 5 muestra la evolución de tiendas de los supermercados en el Perú. En relación al área de ventas también se ha incrementado en los últimos años, siendo el 2008 el año con mayor crecimiento, no sólo en ventas sino también en área de ventas. A Diciembre del 2009, la industria de supermercados presentó un área total de ventas de 431 mil metros cuadrados. El cuadro N° 6 indica la evolución del área de ventas de los supermercados en el Perú por grupo económico. Las ventas se han incrementado constantemente en los últimos años, esto asociado a la apertura de nuevos locales, al incremento del área de ventas (metros cuadrados) y a la incursión de supermercados en provincias. El cuadro N° 7 muestra la evolución de las ventas de los supermercados en el Perú. Hipótesis general Los factores de éxito de los supermercados de Lima y Callao son el tamaño y dimensiones del supermercado, la modernidad de las instalaciones, el descongestionamiento, el uso de la tecnología, administración centralizada, créditos de consumo y proveedores. H1. El tamaño y las dimensiones, la modernidad de las instalaciones y el descongestionamiento son factores que favorecen el éxito de los supermercados. H2. El uso de la tecnología de los procesos operativos del supermercado y la administración centralizada son factores que contribuyen al éxito de los supermercados. H3. Los créditos de consumo de las empresas financieras y los proveedores son factores que permiten el éxito de los supermercados. 209 MATERIAL Y MÉTODO Diseño de investigación El nivel de la investigación fue aplicado porque se buscó la comprobación de las hipótesis, por ello se recolectó información mediante instrumentos validados. El tipo de investigación se enmarcó dentro de la clasificación de orden explicativa porque pretendió identificar los factores causales del éxito de los supermercados. El método utilizado fue retrospectivo conocido como Ex Post Facto, porque ha sucedido en un pasado inmediato y el éxito continúa sucediendo en la actualidad, se pretende identificar las relaciones causales entre los hechos o fenómenos de la realidad concreta. El diseño que responde al tipo de método utilizado fue: Donde: M1: muestra de consumidores y retailers de los supermercados Ox3: Observaciones de las variables. f: en función de Oy: Observación del éxito de los supermercados. Población, muestra y muestreo La población estuvo constituida por la totalidad de supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y Callao considerados hasta Diciembre 2009, los cuales ascienden a 115. El tamaño de la muestra ha sido de 10 supermercados, utilizando el muestreo no probabilística intencionado para encuestar a los administradores de cada uno de ellos. También se tomó una muestra de 514 consumidores en los 10 establecimientos de manera no probabilística. La distribución de los 10 supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao seleccionados para el estudio se muestra en el cuadro N° 8. La selección de la muestra responde a la naturaleza de la investigación en el sentido en que se consideraron criterios de inclusión como: estatus económico en el caso de los supermercados Wong tomándose el de San Isidro y el de La Molina. En el caso de Metro por ser los primeros en el mercado Lima y Chorrillos, y en lo que respecta a Plaza Vea y Tottus por la gran afluencia de público a estos supermercados. Cabe mencionar que están incluidos los cinco conos de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Instrumentos de Recolección de Datos De acuerdo con el método de investigación empleado en esta investigación, se elaboró dos tipos de encuestas (anexo N°1 y anexo N°2) a fin de identificar los factores críticos de éxito de los supermercados en Lima Metropolitana y Callao. La primera estuvo dirigida al público usuario o consumidores que acuden a los supermercados, y la segunda se aplicó a los retailers representados por los administradores de los principales supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Para ambas encuestas, consumidores y administradores de retailers, se procedió de la siguiente manera: antes de iniciar el procesamiento de datos se realizó una prueba estadística de fiabilidad. Para determinar si los instrumentos eran consistentes y fiables se utilizó el coeficiente de confiabilidad Alfa de Cronbach, que a continuación se detalla para cada instrumento. Evaluar estrategias 210 Validez y Confiabilidad Para validar los dos instrumentos se realizó la prueba estadística utilizando el Coeficiente Alfa de Cronbach. Para el Instrumento 1: Encuesta a consumidores, la fiabilidad del instrumento considerada como consistencia interna de la prueba, alfa de Cronbach (α= 0,619) es considerada como regular (según Hernández Sampieri, 2005). Esta confiabilidad se ha determinado en relación a los 10 ítems centrales de la encuesta sobre los factores críticos relacionados con el éxito de los supermercados. Para el Instrumento 2: Encuesta a Retailers la fiabilidad del instrumento considerada como consistencia interna de la prueba, alfa de Cronbach (α=0,625) es considerada como regular (según Hernández Sampieri, 2005). Esta confiabilidad se ha determinado en relación a 15 ítems centrales de la encuesta sobre los factores críticos relacionados con el éxito de los supermercados. Los cuadros N°9 y N°10 muestran la prueba de fiabilidad. Técnicas de procesamiento y análisis de datos Una vez tomados todos los datos necesarios para medir las variables expuestas con anterioridad, se procedió a su preparación para analizarlos. Las escalas tipo Likert bipolares que son, en sentido estricto, una medición ordinal con un nivel de medición de 1 a 4, para indicar respectivamente desde una valoración de nada importante (escala 1) a muy importante (escala 4). Los datos fueron procesados por el paquete estadístico SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science) versión 17 para Windows. Se ha realizado cuatro tipos de análisis diferentes, teniendo en cuenta los objetivos fijados. En primer lugar, se realizaron algunos análisis descriptivos, tanto de la muestra en las diferentes variables por separado, como la descripción de relaciones entre variables, permitiendo hacer un primer acercamiento a la realidad objeto de estudio. Los estadísticos descriptivos calculados, son la mediana en relación a la utilización de escalas ordinales. Se analizaron también las relaciones entre las variables latentes (en la mayoría de los casos las puntuaciones totales obtenidas en los cuestionarios), mediante una matriz de correlaciones. En segundo lugar, con el fin de dar respuesta al problema de investigación planteado, se ha realizado la comprobación de las tres hipótesis formuladas. RESULTADOS Las Figura N° 2 y N°3, muestran la distribución de frecuencias expresada en porcentajes de los supermercados, siendo el supermercado Metro el preferido por los encuestados con un 53,3%, seguidamente Plaza Vea con 30,9% y Wong 20,8%. Resultados Descriptivos de los consumidores A continuación se reportan los resultados del análisis discriminante realizado a los consumidores, para intentar identificar las variables explicativas del éxito de los supermercados. Utilizaremos el análisis discriminante para probar la hipótesis general de la investigación. La explicación de los factores claves para el éxito de los Supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y Callao con el menor número de variables que permitan explicar el mayor porcentaje de la varianza total, respetando el principio de parsimonia. Los resultados más importantes relacionados con la función discriminante obtenida se expresan en las tablas de Autovalores y Lambda de Wilks. En las tablas N° 1 y N° 2 se muestran la combinación lineal de las variables explicativas que da lugar a tres funciones discriminativas que intentan explicar el éxito de los supermercados. 211 La varianza total puede ser explicada con solamente tres funciones: La primera función (Tamaño y dimensiones del supermercado) la más importante para discriminar el éxito logrado por los supermercados explica el 70,2 % de la variabilidad total, con un autovalor de 0,045, reflejándose claramente en la correlación canónica de 0,207; que indica bajo pero significativo desempeño en su función discriminante; mientras que la segunda función (modernidad de las instalaciones) presenta un autovalor de 0,012 con una correlación canónica de 0,108 que explica el 18,4 % de la variabilidad total. Y que esté descongestionado explica el 11,5 % de la varianza total. En la tabla N° 3 se muestra los factores que han sido los que explican en mayor porcentaje la varianza total, estos son: Descongestionado con 0,745, Modernidad de las instalaciones con 0,570 y Tamaño y dimensiones del supermercado con 0,560. Resultados Descriptivos de los Administradores o Retailers Los resultados más importantes relacionados con la función discriminante obtenida según retailers se expresan en las tablas de Autovalores y Lambda de Wilks. En las tablas N° 4 y N° 5 se muestran la combinación lineal de las variables explicativas que da lugar a dos funciones discriminativas que intentan explicar el éxito de los supermercados. La varianza total puede ser explicada con solamente dos funciones: La primera función (Administración Centralizada) la más importante para discriminar el éxito logrado por los supermercados explica el 92,7 % de la variabilidad total, con un autovalor de 2,368, reflejándose claramente en la correlación canónica de 0,838; que indica bajo pero significativo desempeño en su función discriminante; mientras que la segunda función (Tecnología de Operaciones) presenta un autovalor de 0,188 con una correlación canónica de 0,398 que explica el 7,3 % de la variabilidad total. En la tabla N° 6 se muestra los factores que han sido los que explican en mayor porcentaje la varianza total, estos son: La Tecnología usada en los procesos operativos del supermercado con 0,620 y la Administración Centralizada con 0,585. Otros resultados resaltantes en el presente Trabajo de Investigación se indican a continuación, en el cual se muestran cuáles son los factores que han determinado el desarrollo de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao. En las tablas N° 7 y N° 8 se muestran la combinación lineal de las variables explicativas que da lugar a dos funciones discriminativas que intentan explicar el desarrollo de los supermercados. La varianza total puede ser explicada con solamente dos funciones: La primera función (Créditos de consumo de empresas financieras) la más importante para discriminar los factores para el desarrollo logrado por los supermercados explica el 87,8 % de la variabilidad total, con un autovalor de 1,756, reflejándose claramente en la correlación canónica de 0,798; que indica bajo pero significativo desempeño en su función discriminante; mientras que la segunda función (Proveedores) presenta un autovalor de 0,244 con una correlación canónica de 0,443 que explica el 12,2 % de la variabilidad total. En la tabla N° 9 se muestra los factores que han sido los que explican en mayor porcentaje la varianza total, estos son: Créditos de Consumo de Empresas Financieras y Proveedores, con 0,864 y 0,830 respectivamente. CONTRASTACIÓN DE HIPÓTESIS A continuación se someterá a contraste las pruebas de hipótesis del presente trabajo de investigación. Prueba de la Hipótesis 1 Ho: El tamaño y las dimensiones, la modernidad de las instalaciones y que esté descongestionado no son factores de éxito de los supermercados. 212 H1: El tamaño y las dimensiones, la modernidad de las instalaciones y que esté descongestionado son factores de éxito de los supermercados. Como se puede observar en la tabla N°10, el análisis discriminante aplicado a las encuestas de los consumidores, la mayor parte de la varianza total puede ser explicada con tres variables, de las 10 implicadas en el estudio: La primera variable, la más importante (Tamaño y dimensiones del supermercado) la segunda variable (modernidad de las instalaciones) y la tercera variable (que esté descongestionado). Un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido que el 55,4% de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo estas tres variables discriminadoras de las 10 variables explicativas de los factores de éxito de los supermercados, con lo que se puede rechazar la hipótesis nula y aceptar la hipótesis alternativa, que indica que el tamaño de los supermercados, la modernidad de las instalaciones y que esté descongestionado son factores de éxito de los supermercados, desde la perspectiva de los consumidores. Prueba de la Hipótesis 2 Ho: La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada no son factores de éxito de los supermercados. H2: La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada son factores de éxito de los supermercados. Como se puede observar en la tabla N°11, desde la perspectiva de los retailers, una perspectiva más gerencial, un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido, es que el 66,7 % de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo dos variables discriminadoras. Es decir, de las 15 variables que median el éxito, La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada explican el mayor parte de la varianza de los resultados, con lo que se puede rechazar la hipótesis nula y aceptar la hipótesis alternativa de que La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada son factores de éxito de los supermercados, desde el punto de vista de la administración de los supermercados. Prueba de la Hipótesis 3 Ho: Los créditos de consumo de las empresas financieras y los proveedores no son factores que determinan el desarrollo de los supermercados. H3: Los créditos de consumo de las empresas financieras y los proveedores son factores que determinan el desarrollo de los supermercados. Como se puede apreciar en la tabla N°12, desde la óptica de los retailers, un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido, es que el 55,6 % de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo dos variables discriminadoras. Es decir, de las 10 variables que determinan el desarrollo de los supermercados en el Perú, Los créditos de consumo de las Empresas Financieras y los Proveedores explican en mayor parte de la varianza de los resultados. Se debe destacar que las variables Inversionistas y accionistas, proveedores y Asociación de centros comerciales del Perú (Accep) tienen altas cargas en la estructura de la matriz, con lo que se puede concluir que estas variables también son importantes para el desarrollo de los supermercados en el Perú. Contrastadas las hipótesis 1, 2 y 3, podemos dar por aceptada la hipótesis general formulada. DISCUSIÓN 213 A continuación se detallan los hallazgos encontrados en el estudio que han permitido identificar los factores claves para el éxito de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao: Según consumidores se obtuvo los siguientes resultados: Supermercado preferido Según el estudio, el supermercado de mayor preferencia fue Metro con el 32,7% seguido de Plaza Vea con 24,1%, resultado que coincide con la investigadora de mercados Apoyo y Opinión de Mercados y con las publicaciones realizadas por Maximixe. Estos factores nos permiten determinar que los supermercados son exitosos por el indicador participación de mercado. Tamaño y dimensiones Se encontró en el estudio que 70,2% de la varianza total es explicada por el factor Tamaño y Dimensiones. De igual manera, en la opinión de los expertos del retail, el tamaño y las dimensiones es un factor determinante en el éxito de los supermercados, motivo por el cual la tendencia es de expandir más cadenas de supermercados de formatos que tengan mayor demanda por los consumidores, como lo demuestra la evolución de áreas de ventas del retail de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Estos resultados son coincidentes con los hallados por Investiga (2009) quienes identificaron los factores que influyen en la elección del lugar de compra en supermercados de Trujillo, precisando en primer lugar el tamaño del local. Coincide también con el estudio de Esan en la mayoría de factores. Modernidad de instalaciones En cuanto a la modernidad de instalaciones, es otro factor que para los consumidores explica en aproximadamente 19% el éxito de los supermercados en Lima y Callao. Según el Diario Gestión la arquitectura del local y la modernidad de las instalaciones, promueve la modernización de la ciudad y la hace más atractiva, incentivando a los consumidores a asistir a estos lugares de compra. Descongestionamiento Según las encuestas realizadas a los consumidores, éstos indican que el hecho de que el supermercado se encuentre descongestionado y que se tenga vías de acceso libres para llegar es un factor clave para el éxito de los supermercados. El descongestionamiento según opinión de expertos del retail y el Diario Gestión es importante ya que los consumidores valoran el tiempo de compra y de atención, por este motivo los supermercados están evaluando a través de indicadores de demora, el desempeño de los diferentes cajeros de los supermercados y alcanzar el nivel óptimo para atender con comodidad y con una buena atención a los consumidores. Según consumidores se obtuvo los siguientes resultados: Tecnología de Operaciones Este resultado es concordante con las implementaciones actuales en tecnología de operaciones por parte de los tres grandes grupos que captan la mayor parte del mercado, como son, Cencosud, Interbank y Falabella. El Grupo Interbank, que representa los supermercados Plaza Vea y Vivanda ha implementado en Julio de este año el sistema operativo SAP, que le permitirá centralizar todas sus operaciones, obtener información en tiempo real, para así mejorar su toma de decisiones. 214 Administración Centralizada En relación a la administración centralizada es un factor que ha sido implementado por estos grupos económicos y que le han permitido reducir sus costos operativos y mejorar su rentabilidad, por lo que son los más exitosos. Estos resultados coinciden con los presentados por la Universidad Esan en el año 2009, cuando en una tesis se evaluaron los factores claves para el éxito de los centros comerciales de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao. Créditos de Consumo de Empresas Financieras En cuanto a créditos de consumo, este factor elegido por los expertos de los supermercados, coincide con el estudio realizado por Maximixe, quienes evaluando las oportunidades y riesgos encontraron que el bajo nivel de penetración en Perú (14%) y en Lima (30%) continuará impulsando las oportunidades de inversión en el sector, así como el crecimiento de los créditos de consumo de las empresas financieras especialmente en los sectores C y D de nuestra población. Los Proveedores El último factor clave de éxito indicado por los retailers de supermercados es los proveedores. Este resultado se relaciona con lo referido por el Diario Gestión, que indican que el 20% de proveedores, representan el 80% del negocio del mercado moderno. Según Marco Suárez, director ejecutivo de Chopin-Shopper Unconscious, señala que estando el mercado retail por el orden de los US$ 2,500 millones, el movimiento económico de los proveedores estaría superando los US$ 2,000 millones, lo cual confirma este hallazgo en la presente investigación. CONCLUSIONES 1) El tamaño y las dimensiones, la modernidad de las instalaciones y que esté descongestionado son factores de éxito de los supermercados, según opinión de los consumidores de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. La más importante para discriminar el éxito logrado por los supermercados es el tamaño y las dimensiones, que explica el 70,2 % de la variabilidad total, con un autovalor de 0,045, reflejándose claramente en la correlación canónica de 0,207; que indica significativo desempeño en su función discriminante; mientras que la segunda función, modernidad de las instalaciones, presenta un autovalor de 0,012 con una correlación canónica de 0,108 que explica el 18,4 % de la variabilidad total. Y que esté descongestionado explica el 11,5 % de la varianza total. Un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido que el 55,4% de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo estas tres variables discriminadoras de las 10 variables explicativas de los factores de éxito de los supermercados 2) La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada son factores de éxito de los supermercados, según los retailers de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. El factor Administración Centralizada es el más importante para discriminar el éxito logrado por los supermercados, explica el 92,7 % de la variabilidad total, con un autovalor de 2,368, reflejándose claramente en la correlación canónica de 0,838; que indica significativo desempeño en su función discriminante; mientras que el segundo factor, Tecnología de Operaciones, presenta un autovalor de 0,188 con una correlación canónica de 0,398 que explica el 7,3 % de la variabilidad total. Desde la perspectiva de los retailers, una perspectiva más gerencial, un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido, es que el 66,7 % de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo dos variables discriminadoras. Es decir, 215 de las 15 variables que median el éxito, La tecnología usada en los procesos operativos y la administración centralizada explican el mayor parte de la varianza de los resultados 3) Los créditos de consumo de las em presas financieras y los proveedores son factores que determinan el desarrollo de los supermercados, según opinión de los administradores de los supermercados de Lima Metropolitana y Callao. Desde la óptica de los retailers, un indicador interesante que muestra que el modelo matemático del análisis discriminante es válido, es que el 55,6 % de los casos han sido clasificados correctamente teniendo en cuenta solo dos variables discriminadoras. Es decir, de las 10 variables que son determinan el desarrollo de los supermercados en el Perú, Los créditos de consumo de las Empresas Financieras y los Proveedores explican en mayor parte de la varianza de los resultados. RECOMENDACIONES 1) Se recomienda realizar otro estudio similar, pero dirigido a consumidores y retailers en provincias, dado que este sector está viendo con muchas perspectivas el interior del país, sobre todo ciudades con factores atractivos para los inversionistas, como tasa de empleo, créditos de consumo, entre otros. 2) La relación entre supermercados y bancos se debe considerar, sobre todo aquellos supermercados locales que aún no cuentan con un grupo económico que pueda respaldar su expansión en el Perú. El negocio de los supermercados se repotencia si éste va acompañado de las facilidades que otorga el financiamiento de las compras. 3) Se debe tener en cuenta que un objetivo importante en los supermercados es lograr eficiencia operativa, para ello se recomienda que el mercado retail cuente con tecnología de operaciones acorde a las necesidades del mercado, así como una administración centralizada, que facilite la operación logística y la gestión comercial. El mercado retail debe evaluar qué formatos son los más atractivos para los consumidores, así como la rentabilidad metro cuadrado de estos locales, para determinar el tamaño y las dimensiones adecuado para los supermercados, de esta manera lograr una mayor utilidad para el negocio. REFERENCIAS 1. Abugattas, J. (2008). Prospectiva país y la declaración del milenio: un reto para el Perú.<http://palestra.pucp.edu.pe/index.php?id.99Senum=6> (23 de mayo de 2008). 2. Álvarez, J. (2006, febrero-marzo). Bancarización del limeño. ANDA News, 11, 56, 60-62. 3. Apoyo Consultoría. (2008a). lndicca, índice de confianza del consumidor deApoyo.http://www.apoyo.com/GrupoApoyo/apo_info_bajar_pdf.aspx?opcion=indicca&archi vo=14> (27 de marzo de 2008). 4. Apoyo Consultoría. (2008b). Perspectivas de la inversión en retail durante el 2008. <http: / /noticiasretailperu.blogspot.com / 2008 /05 /perspectivas-dela inversion-enretail.html> (22 de abril de 2008). 5. Apoyo Opinión y Mercado. (2008). 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Lima: Arellano Investigación de Marketing. 19. Castro, J. (2008). Economía II. Medición del producto e inflación. <http://www.docentes.up.edu.pe/jcastro/cursos/Economía/02a_Medicion_producto.pdf> (25 de julio de 2008). 20. Castro, R. & Espinoza, G. (2008). Informe especial: termómetro comercial 2007II.<http://www.semanaeconomica.com/articulo/16542> (23 de junio de 2008). 21. Centros comerciales, recuperando el tiempo Perdido. (2008). Economía, revista de actualidad, gestión y turismo, 24-26. 22. Chaparro, C. (2007). Wong en la mira. La República (Lima, 18 de junio). 23. Chávez, T. (1994, agosto). Tarjetas de crédito y el sistema financiero. Avance económico, 14, 169, 30. 24. Chevarría, F. (2008a). Supermercados Peruanos alista proyectos por unos US$20 millones. El Comercio, (Lima, 1 de febrero), sección B, 3. 217 25. Chevarría, F. (2008b). Una mirada hacia el futuro. Más jugadores y menos espacios. Día 1 suplemento de El Comercio, (Lima, 24 de marzo), 9-11. 26. Chevarría, F. (2007b). Tottus tendrá 25 tiendas en el 2008. El Comercio, (Lima, 25 de agosto), sección B, 2. 27. Chevarría, F. (2007g). En el 2008 se invertirán más de US$ 200 millones en supermercados. El Comercio, (Lima, 18 de diciembre), sección A, 2. 28. Chipana, L. (2008). En los próximos tres años se duplicaría el número de centros comerciales. Dial, suplemento de El Comercio, (Lima, 14 de abril), 22. 29. Kotler, P. (2005). Dirección de marketing. 10a ed. México D.E.: Pearson Education. 30. Mahuad, K. (2005, febrero-marzo). Evolución de los formatos comerciales. Anda News, Asociación Nacional de Anunciantes Pera, 10, 50, 40-42. 31. Matte, J., Jarufe, R. & Leiton, R. (2007). Sector retail. Santiago: Fitch Ratings. 32. Maximixe. (2009, Septiembre). Supermercados. Resumen Ejecutivo, antecedentes y situación actual. 78-101. 33. Pipoli de Butrón, G. (2006). El Marketing y sus aplicaciones a la Realidad Peruana. Biblioteca Universitaria. Universidad del Pacífico. 34. Pizarro, C. (2008). Gestión de retail. <http:/ /www.u-cursos.cl/ingenieria /2007/2/ 1N547/1/material_docente/objeto/137445> (7 de abril de 2008). 35. Regalado, O. Fuentes, C. Aguirre, G. García, N. Miu, R. Vallejo, R. (2009). Factores críticos de éxito en los centros comerciales de Lima Metropolitana y el Callao. Universidad Esan. 36. Servicio de Asesoría Empresarial. (SAE). (2008). Informes especiales. Perspectivas de la inversión retail durante 2008. <http://www.apoyoconsultoria.com/informes/informes.php?plDlnforme=4> (09 de junio de 2008). 37. Shibayama, G. (2008). Rechazan fusión entre Falabella y D&S en Chile. El Comercio, (Lima, 1 de febrero), sección B, 3. 38. Tottus y Sodimac van para el 2009. (2008). Dia_1, suplemento de El Comercio, (Lima, 18 de agosto), 28. 39.Trujillo, J. (2007, octubre). Los centros comerciales «toman por asalto, las ciudades del Perú. Modernidad S.A. Business Negocios en el Perú, 14, 152, 16-22. 40. Vigil, Percy. (2008). Centros comerciales en el Perú y oportunidades para nuevos retailers. Curso de la Universidad ESAN. 41. Wharton. (2007). El efecto arrastre del retail chileno. Universia Knowledge Wharton. 218 . COMPRENSION DE LOS ESTADOS FINANCIEROS MBA. José Benavides Póveda Introducción Este artículoestá dirigido a personas que tienen conocimientos de contabilidad, específicamente sobre los estados financieros básicos, balance general y estado de ganancias y pérdidas. La finalidad es analizar y profundizar el estudio de la información que contienen a fin de comprenderla y utilizarla en su real dimensión. Es importante saber qué información está siendo considerada y cuáles faltan y saber cuál es el efecto en la situación de una empresa. También debemos conocer y entender cuál es el rol de los principios de contabilidad generalmente aceptados (PCGA), las normas internacionales de contabilidad (NIC) y las normas internacionales de información financiera ( NIIF) con las cuales se elaboran. De igual manera, será necesario saber cuál es la responsabilidad de la gerencia sobre esta información y cuáles son los mecanismos de control típicos que se utilizan en las empresas. Este artículo tratará de aclarar éstas y otras interrogantes que pudiera haber al respecto. Objetivo de los Estados Financieros Debemos tener claro que los Estados Financieros para que sean útiles,deben proporcionar información clara, oportuna, ordenada, estructurada y estandarizada, sobre la situación financiera de una empresa y de los resultados que ésta obtenga en periodos determinados de tiempo y deben estar elaborados en base a principios y normas contables con la finalidad de brindar información relevante a los inversionistas, gerentes, instituciones, gobierno, etc. Rol de los Principios Contables y Normas Internacionales Los principios de contabilidad generalmente aceptados (PCGA), las normas internacionales de contabilidad (NIC) y últimamente las normas internacionales de información financiera (NIIF), tienen como objetivo que la información procesada por la contabilidad esté elaborada enbase a reglas, para contar con información estructurada y estandarizada a fin de que su lectura sea uniforme en cualquier lugar. Estas reglas han ido evolucionando en el tiempo de acuerdo a las necesidades de las empresas y del mercado, tal es así, que a los PCGA tradicionales (moneda, costo histórico, devengado, entidad, realización, partida doble, etc.), se han añadido posteriormente las NIC que están diseñadas para aplicarse en situaciones o actividades especificas (construcción, arrendamiento financiero, inventarios, activos fijos, estados financieros consolidados, inflación, intangibles, etc.), y últimamente se están aplicando las NIIF que tratan de incorporar conceptos financieros en la información contable con la finalidad de mostrar información real, transparente y relevante que sean de utilidad a los inversionistas y usuarios de la información empresarial. El Balance General o Situación financiera Si tratamos de profundizar un poco el análisis del Balance General o situación financiera, másallá de los conceptos básicos y generales, con la finalidad, de entender mejor esta 219 información y utilizarla adecuadamente en la gestión de los negocios, tendríamos que tener en cuenta lo siguiente: A. Uno de los cuestionamientos que han tenido durante mucho tiempo los estados financieros y específicamente el balance general ha sido el hecho que las adquisiciones de los bienes se registren al costo de adquisición y no a valores de reposición o de mercado lo cual reflejaba valores sub valuados de los activos de la empresa. De acuerdo a principios de contabilidad, se registraba al costo por prudencia o conservadorismo. No se registraba a valores de reposición o mercado ya que se argumentaba podrían ser cifras muy subjetivas y haber estado influenciadas por la opinión de la gerencia que se convertía en juez y parte. Con la implementación de las NIC (normas internacionales de contabilidad) y las NIIF ( normas internacionales de información financiera ) esto ha cambiado y ahora se da más importancia a la transparencia y a la información relevante y real de los negocios, por lo cual, las bases de medición y registro incluyen ahora los criterios de costo histórico ( valor de adquisición inicial), costo corriente( costo de adquisición vigente en un momento determinado), valor realizable o de liquidación (valor de venta en el momento actual) y valor presente (concepto financiero para actualizar flujos futuros de efectivo). Todos estos criterios permiten actualmente actualizar la información de los estados financieros y mostrar datosmás reales y útiles para los inversionistas y usuarios. B. En el caso de los inventarios que es uno de los rubros más importantes en un balance general, un problema importante que se presentaes la valuación del uso de bienes en la producción , ya que existen varios métodos contables para calcular el valor asignado a los costos de los productos: Primeras entradas primeras salidas (PEPS), Ultimas entradas primeras salidas (UEPS) y Promedio ponderado , lo que origina que los resultados finales puedan ser distintos dependiendo del método empleado. Debemos tener en consideración que según las NIIF solo está permitido utilizar el método PEPS y Promedio, el uso del método UEPS está prohibido por las distorsiones que genera su aplicación. Por otro lado tenemos que tener en cuenta que los inventarios deben mostrarse a su valor de realización o al costo, el que sea menor, lo cual implica llevar un control periódico de estos y cuyos ajustes por la variación o fluctuación de precios en el mercado podrían tener también un efecto en los resultados del negocio. C. Los activos fijos representan el monto invertido en infraestructura y bienes duraderos de una empresa y denotan la solvencia económica de las mismas. Se cuestionaba que los valores que se presentaban en el Balance General no representaban el valor real o de mercado por estar registrados al costo de adquisición y por calcularse la depreciación (desgaste por el uso), por un método contable lo cual originaba distintos resultados según el método utilizado. No obstante,de acuerdo a las NIC y NIIF, actualmente, se permite efectuar revaluaciones que garantizan su valuación a valores razonables de mercado, corrigiendo parte de los cuestionamientos. Por otro lado, las empresas tienen queescoger el método de cálculo de la depreciación más adecuada a sus necesidades y evaluar el efecto en sus resultados. Los métodos más utilizados son: el de línea recta, saldos decrecientes, años digito y unidades producidas. Una vez escogido alguno de los métodos éste no se debe cambiar, de acuerdo, al principio contable de uniformidad, el motivo es que las cifras calculadas sean comparables de un periodo a otro. D. Las empresas durante el tiempo de funcionamiento van ganando experiencia, prestigio e imagen, por la calidad de sus productos, por su responsabilidad social o por su profesionalismo. Esta situación crea un valor intangible para el negocio que muchas veces no se percibe ni cuantifica, esta es la marca de la empresa. Este valor creado no figura en los Balances Generales dado que su estimación sería muy subjetiva y estaría sujeta a mucha controversia. Sólo cuando se vende un negocio y hay un proceso de negociación entre las partes se pueden determinar estas cifras. E. El patrimonio contable sirve para determinar la cantidad y tipo de acciones en circulación de una empresa, así como el de mostrar el valor de los derechos que poseen los accionistas en la compañía, generalmente este valor registradono indica su valor real, aunque, actualmente con las NIC y NIIF este se aproxima más a la realidad. Anteriormente las diferencias eran más significativas debido a que los registros de los activos se realizabanbásicamente al costo de adquisición, adicionalmente, el intangible de la marca no registrado en los Balancescontribuía a mostrar un patrimonio menor. El patrimonio contable también indica si la empresa tiene utilidades retenidas de años anteriores o del año en 220 curso. El valor contable en conclusión muestra generalmente valores menores a los del mercado. F. Existen algunas contingencias –riesgospor determinadas operaciones que no se reflejan en un Balance General. Algunas de éstas pueden ser: los resultados pendientes de procesos judiciales, litigios laborales, garantías otorgadas, etc. Estas operaciones conllevan un riesgo potencial de tipo económico. Si bien no figuran en los Balances Generales, las normas contables establecen que esta información debe revelarse en notas a los mismos. G. En ciertas circunstancias, sobre todo en épocas de inestabilidad económica de un país, donde se dan procesos inflacionarios, es útil para la gerencia, clasificar la información de un Balance General en rubros monetarios y no monetarios. Entendiéndose como monetarios, a los activos, cuyo valor pueden disminuir en términos reales por estar expuestos a la inflación, ejemplos son: el dinero en efectivo, las cuentas por cobrar, los valores negociables.Así, si mantenemos S/1000 durante un año, siendo la inflación del 20%, no podríamos adquirir la misma cantidad de bienes al inicio o final del año, al final del año se adquirirían menos bienes por haber perdido poder adquisitivo, ya que los precios habrían aumentado en un 20%. Por el lado de los pasivos, son monetarios, todas las obligaciones en moneda nacional que también pierden su valor realpor estar expuestos a la inflación,ejemplos son: las cuentas por pagar a proveedores, los préstamos bancarios, los impuestos por pagar. Por otro lado, tenemos los rubros no monetarios que vienen a ser, en el caso de los activos, todos aquellos que por su naturaleza están protegidos ante la inflación. Es decir, que mantienen su valor real. Los más representativos son los inventarios y activos fijos. Así si adquirimos un equipo a inicios del año en S/ 10,000 y durante el año la inflación es del 15%, en el mercado, su valor a fin de año será de S/ 11,500,ya que el precio aumentó en 15% y la empresa podría venderlo eventualmente a ese precio, porque en términos reales ha mantenido su valor. En el caso de los pasivos, serán no monetarios, y por consiguientes estar protegidos ante la inflación, todas las obligaciones en moneda extranjera, el capital social y las utilidades. Un buen manejo en la estructura de un Balance General en base a estos conceptos puede hacer que una empresa obtenga ganancias financieras o en su defecto el desconocimiento o mal manejo puede originar pérdidas financieras importantes. H. Otra forma de interpretar la información de un Balance General es considerar que todos los pasivos, incluyendo el patrimonio,indican las FUENTES de fondos. Es decir, de dónde se han obtenido los recursos financieros de la empresa – préstamos, proveedores, aportes, utilidades, etc.-, mientras los activos nos indicarán cuáles han sido los USOS de esos fondos, es decir, cómo se invirtieron los recursos obtenidos – caja, inventarios, activos fijos, inversiones, etc.I . Sin tratar de profundizar en el tema de ANALISIS FINANCIERO, que es más amplio, en un Balance General se puede calcular rápidamente algunos índices que nos indiquen la situación financiera de negocio, tal como, la situación de liquidez de la empresa o su nivel de endeudamiento, indicadores importantes para la gerencia y usuarios. Para lo cual debemos entender como liquidez, la capacidad de la compañía para afrontar sus deudas en el corto plazo, para lo cual basta con dividir el total de activos corrientes entre el total de pasivos corrientes, es decir, los bienes que pueden convertirse en líquidos en el corto plazo y las deudas de corto plazo, el resultado, si es mayor a 1 nos indicará que la empresa puede afrontar sus obligaciones y si es menor a 1 nos indicará que no puede afrontar sus obligaciones en la proporción que resulte. Para saber el nivel de endeudamiento, bastar con dividir el total de pasivos entre el total del patrimonio, el resultado nos indicará cuántas veces equivale la deuda con relación al patrimonio. Lo recomendable es que este indicador no sea muy alto, de acuerdo a los estándares de cada negocio y a lo aceptado por los inversionistas o el sector financiero. Índices altos podrían indicar altos niveles de endeudamiento y poner en riesgo el control y propiedad de la empresa. J. El capital de trabajo es un concepto que indica la cantidad de recursos que posee una empresa para operar en el corto plazo y es útil para la gerencia ya que le permite planificar y administrar el corto plazo eficientemente. En el Balance General se determina el monto del capital de trabajo estableciendo la diferencia entre el total de activo corriente y el total de pasivo corriente. 221 El Estado de Ganancias y Pérdidas o Estado de resultados Si bien el Estado de Ganancias y Pérdidas nos informa sobre los resultados económicos de una empresa en un periodo de tiempo determinado, es bueno saber, que la información que brinda nos permite analizar y comparar las cifras que la conforman con información similar de otros años de la misma empresa o de otras empresas, para evaluar el desempeño y la gestión realizada, también, se puede profundizar en la revisión de cada rubro a fin de optimizar los resultados finales, algunas recomendaciones a seguir para su comprensión son: A. La utilidad o margen bruto, que es la diferencia entre las ventas totales y el costo de los productos vendidos, nos indica si hemos obtenido una ganancia o una pérdida en la comercialización de los principales productos fabricados en la empresa. Es recomendable leer estos resultados en porcentajes, teniendo como base el total de ventas. Este margen debe ser lo suficientemente ampliocomo para cubrir los demás gastos de la empresa y obtener una utilidad neta final, que debería ser consecuente con los objetivos y metas del negocio, creando valor y maximizando la riqueza de los accionistas. Dependiendo del margen bruto que se obtenga, la gerencia podrá revisar con más detalle los componentes de las ventas y costos, tales como: los precios unitarios de venta, el volumen de ventas, el costo de la mano de obra, el costo de los materiales utilizados, los gastos de fabricación, los rendimientos obtenidos, etc. B. La utilidad operativa que viene a ser la utilidad bruta menos los gastos administrativos y gastos de ventas se denomina así porque considera todas las operaciones propias del giro de negocio. Los gastos administrativos son los desembolsos incurridos para el funcionamiento del negocio (sueldos, capacitación, honorarios profesionales, mantenimiento, servicios, gratificaciones, depreciación, etc.) y los gastos de ventas son aquellos que sirven para impulsar las ventas (sueldos de vendedores, comisiones de ventas, propaganda, publicidad, etc.). Si bien las empresas son libres de manejar las estructuras de sus ingresos y costos, es recomendable que los gastos administrativos fluctúen en un rango entre 7% y 10% de las ventas totales y que los gastos de ventas no sobrepasen el 5% también de las ventas totales. C. La utilidad antes de impuestos se calcula sumando a la utilidad operativa las ganancias financieras (intereses ganados) y restando los gastos financieros (intereses pagados), operaciones que se originan por inversiones financieras realizadas o por financiamientos obtenidos, a las cuales también se debe incluir el efecto de otras operaciones extraordinarias que se realicen. Es la cifra sobre la que se calcula el impuesto a las ganancias o impuesto a la renta que tributan todas las empresas que generan utilidades. D. La utilidad neta, es el resultado final obtenido en un periodo determinado, luego de haber considerado todos los ingresos y gastos de acuerdo a normas y principios contables. Se consignan como parte del patrimonio de los accionistas, como utilidades del ejercicio. La calificación de esta cifra como buena o mala dependerá del tipo de negocio, su comparación con otras empresas similares y las metas y objetivos de la empresa. Para medir la utilidad y compararla se determina el porcentaje que salga de relacionar las utilidades netas sobre las ventas totales. Es importante tener presente, que el estado de ganancias y pérdidas, brinda información sobre los resultados de una empresa en forma aproximada. La aplicación de normas o principios contables que tengan distintos métodos de cálculo pueden originar distintos resultados, tal es el caso, de los métodos de depreciación o de valuación de inventarios, de igual forma debemos tener en cuenta que los criterios contables más importantes que se consideran al elaborar un estado de ganancias y pérdidas son el de devengado, acumulación y realización. Responsabilidad de los Estados Financieros Es importante saber que la responsabilidad de todas las cifras consignadas en los estados financieros de una empresa, recae en la gerencia y no en los contadores que la elaboran, ya que las decisiones y la gestión del negocio son de su competencia exclusivamente. Control 222 Las empresas tienen diversos mecanismos de control para asegurar que la información contenida en los estados financieros seacorrecta y estén elaborados de acuerdo a normas y principios contables, así como, para controlar el uso eficiente de los recursos asignados. Podríamos mencionar como algunos de estos mecanismos los siguientes: 1. Auditorías externas, que son las revisiones hechas por profesionales independientes, a los estados financieros de una empresa, generalmente son contadores públicos y realizan su trabajo en base a revisiones de muestras estadísticas, dando una opinión sobre la razonabilidad de las cifras y la utilización correcta de los principios y normas contables. 2. Auditorías Internas, que son revisiones permanentes realizadas por personal de la misma empresa a cualquier actividad operativa de la empresa, generalmente corresponden a un departamento de auditoría interna. Los trabajos se hacen en base a planes de auditoría establecidos con la gerencia, los resultados mayormente se reportan al más alto nivel de las empresas como podría ser un presidente ejecutivo o presidente de directorio. 3. Contraloría, es el área dentro de una empresa que se encarga de diseñar, implementar y coordinar un sistema integral de control gerencial, el cual incluye adicionalmente a las auditorías externas e internas ,el plan estratégico, la elaboración y control de presupuestos, la organización de la información, el uso de tecnología, el gobierno corporativo, mecanismos de motivación, etc. Al gerente encargado de estas funciones se le denomina Contralor o Controler. Reseña biográfica del autor: Magister en administración de empresas, Contador público colegiado certificado, experiencia laboral de más de 30 años en cargos gerenciales en el Perú y el extranjero, principalmente en Cosapi Organización Empresarial y Corporación Backus, Consultor independiente y docente universitario de post y pre grado. Correo electrónico: [email protected] Teléfono: 999662347 Referencia bibliográfica: .Normas internacionales de información financiera (NIIF ) y Normas internacionales de contabilidad ( NIC ), 2011, International Financialreportingstandards ( IFRS fundation ), London UnitedKingdom .Anthony Robert, contabilidad para la dirección, editorial ateneo, Argentina, Buenos aires. 223 ADMINISTRACION MODERNA PARA LOGRAR UNA EMPRESA COMPETITIVA 18*Dr. Juan Cosío Cárdenas RESUMEN Lo que se da a conocer en este artículo son las principales prácticas administrativas propuestas por los diversos enfoques modernos de la administración que se han desarrollado desde principios de la década de 1980 hasta la actualidad para efecto de encarar la conducción de las empresas ante el problema de la competencia global. Por tal situación, las empresas requieren ser competitivas siendo necesario para ello adoptar y adaptar las prácticas administrativas de validez y aplicación universal. PALABRAS CLAVE Globalización, competencia global, empresa competitiva, enfoques modernos de la administración, prácticas administrativas. La globalización obliga a toda empresa de un país a competir con las de otros países (competencia global): el problema y lo que hace posible lograr una empresa competitiva son los Enfoques Modernos de la administración (Administración Moderna): la solución  Administración estratégica.  Administración para la excelencia.  Administración de la calidad.  Administración dela reinvención(reingeniería)  Administración de clase mundial.  Administración del conocimiento. De acuerdo a los Enfoques Modernos de la Administración, lo que hace posible lograr una empresa competitiva es principalmente las siguientes prácticas administrativas: 1. La visión global en el negocio. 2. La selección estratégica. 3. La focalización en el cliente. 4. El ejercicio del liderazgo estratégico. 5. La cultura de excelencia. 6. El enfoque basado en procesos 7. Los equipos de procesos. 8. La mejora continua(kaizen) 9. El rediseño de los procesos. 10. El uso creativo y productivo de la tecnología. 18*Doctor en Administración, Profesor Principal de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega Realiza r auditor ía externa M1: Oy (f) Ox3 224 11. El involucramiento del empleado. 12. El aprendizaje continuo y la enseñanza continúa. 13. El mayor grado de conocimiento agregado al negocio. 14. El benchmarking. 15. La obtención de la Certificación ISO. 1. LA VISIÓN GLOBAL EN EL NEGOCIO 2. El fenómeno de la globalización ocasiona en la realidad empresarial de casi todos los países del mundo que las expresas (grandes, medianas y pequeñas) se enfrenten a la competencia de productos o servicios provenientes de mercados extranjeros (competencia global). Por esa situación todas las empresas están obligadas a ser competitivas a nivel internacional. Asímismo, se requiere de una administración que trascienda la visión reducida del mercado local y que considere en sus decisiones los aspectos internacionales de los negocios. De ahí la exigencia de administradores con pensamiento global, o sea, administradores, que dejan de pensar en mercados nacionales reducidos para pensar en el mundo como el gran mercado al que se debe conquistar. 3. LA SELECCIÓN ESTRATÉGICA Las estratégicas tienen el potencial de permitir a una empresa superar los resultados de sus rivales dentro del mismo sector. Entre los diversos tipos de estrategias cabe destacar las siguientes: Las tres que presenta Michael Porter  Estrategia de liderazgo en costos  Está basada en la creación de una posición de bajo costo en relación con las empresas competidoras. Con esta estrategia una empresa debe estar dispuesta a reducir costos a lo largo de toda la cadena de valor.  Estrategia de diferenciación  Con esta estrategia una empresa (o unidad de negocio) requiere crear productos y/o servicios únicos y que estén valorados como tal. Aquí, el énfasis básico está en los atributos que no son el precio y por los que el consumidor estará dispuesto a pagar un sobreprecio.  Estrategia de especialización 225 Con esta estrategia una empresa debe dirigir su atención o su enfoque hacia gamas de producto, grupos de compradores, o mercados geográficos objetivos más limitados. 4. LA FOCALIZACIÓN EN EL CLIENTE Involucra el ver al cliente como el punto de inicio y final de las actividades de la empresa y valorar a los clientes como fines y no medios. La empresa depende de clientes, deben comprender las necesidades actuales y futuras de los clientes satisfacer los requisitos y esforzarse en exceder sus expectativas. 5. EL EJERCICIO DEL LIDERAZGO ESTRATÉGICO En este liderazgo el líder desarrolla un enfoque sistemático para analizar el ambiente, evaluar las fortalezas y debilidades de su empresa e identificar oportunidades en las que la empresa podría tener una ventaja competitiva. Establece una visión que propone un futuro mejor que el del statu quo. Mientras mayor sea la disparidad entre esta visión y el statu quo, más probable será que los seguidores atribuyan una visión extraordinaria al líder. El líder estratégico es capaz de esclarecer y establecer la visión en términos que sean comprensibles paralos demás. Esta articulación demuestra una comprensión de las necesidades de los seguidores y, por tanto, actúa como una fuerza motivadora. 6. LA CULTURA DE EXCELENCIA En la cultura de excelencia los valores clave son los siguientes: a. Compromiso con el cliente Esto es, valorar a los clientes como fines y no medios. b. Calidad, excelencia y mejoramiento continuo La globa lizaci ón (causa ) Satisfac ción clientes Entrada Requisitos clientes Proceso Proceso Proceso Competencia global (efecto) 226 Son los temas de apoyo principales para traducir el compromiso con el cliente en niveles altos de satisfacción del cliente. c. Respecto por el individuo Es visto como crucial a la manera como los miembros de la organización se relacionan unos a otros y con los individuos fuera de la organización. d. Ética e integridad Un elevado nivel de ética individual y organizacional e integridad. e. Utilidad f. Las utilidades son reconocidas tanto como un indicador de exceder exitosamente las expectativas del cliente y como un requerimiento de supervivencia organizacional. Sin embargo, no es visto como el único o incluso el propósito más importante de la empre 7 EL ENFOQUE BASADO EN PROCESOS El tradicional enfoque basado en las funciones (departamentalización) se sustituye por el enfoque basado en procesos. Los procesos son una secuencia de actividades con una o más entrada y que crean una salida de valor para el cliente. Entre los procesos necesarios se incluyen los siguientes Salida Productos Proceso de la Dirección e s Proceso Proceso de la medición en el análisis de la mejora e s 227 7. LOS EQUIPOS DE PROCESOS Esto es, la sustitución de órganos permanentes y estables por equipos de procesos multifuncionales, autogestionados, flexibles y transitorios, como la manera de organizar y manejar el trabajo. Las organizaciones se constituyen de varios procesos fragmentados. 7. LA MEJORA CONTINUA (Kaizen) En la empresa las actividades rutinarias representan al mayor volumen, ya que incluyen todas las que se realizan de manera cotidiana como comprar, producir, vender, entregar, cobrar, contratar personal, pagar la nómina, elaborar los estados financieros, etc. En ambientes de trabajo en los que las personas tienen permiso de pensar y sugerir mejoras, existe una enorme área de oportunidades a través de lo que los japoneses llaman kaizen o mejora continua de las actividades rutinarias.Kaizen son pequeñas mejoras que las personas a nivel operativo incorporan en sus procesos, las cuales redundan en una optimización de los resultados sin que, en la mayoría de los casos, se necesiten cambios en los estándares de trabajo. 8. EL REDISEÑO DE LOS PROCESO Se refiere al descubrimiento de nuevas formas de hacer las cosas (rediseño radical de los procesos), no conformándose con "hacer mejor lo que siempre se ha hecho", para conseguir mejoras espectaculares en medidas de desempeño tan decisivas como costos, calidad, servicio y rapidez, que permitan a las empresas desarrollar ventajas competitivas. Con el rediseño de los procesos no se pretende mejorar los procesos ya existentes, su radical si no su radical sustitución por procesos totalmente nuevos y basados en la tecnología informática. Un método para hacer el rediseño de los procesos es el siguiente:  Primero: recopilación de los procesos actuales.  Segundo: análisis de los procesos. 228  Tercero: rediseño de los procesos. 10EL USO CREATIVO Y PRODUCTIVO DE LA TECNOLOGIA Es muy importante el uso creativo y productivo de las tecnologías de la información y comunicación entre todos los individuos de la empresa para optimizar los procesos e incrementar los resultados. El uso de la tecnología de internet:  Contribuye a disminuir los costos de transacción. En general con los costos de transacción nos referimos a todo tipo de gastos asociados al hecho de dirigir un negocio. Implica no solo las transacciones de compra – venta, sino los costos de interactuar con cada una de las partes de la cadena de valor de una empresa, dentro o fuera de ella.  Está creando nuevas formas de diferenciación ya que permite la personalización masiva que mejora la capacidad de respuesta de las empresas a los deseos de los clientes. Las posibilidades de diferenciarse están disponibles en todas las partes de la cadena de valor de la empresa.  Ofrece nuevas formas de competir a las empresas que siguen estrategias de especialización, ya que les permite acceder a mercados específicos de forma menos cara (bajo costo) y proporcionar más servicios y características ( diferenciación) 11. EL INVOLUCRAMIENTO DEL EMPLEADO Es clave para el éxito de una empresa el involucramiento de todos los empleados en el negocio de la empresa, a través del esfuerzo colectivo y el trabajo en equipo (organización horizontal). La filosofía de la organización horizontal es: todas las personas involucradas en un proceso de trabajo deben comprender el proceso total, como servir al cliente y como contribuir personalmente al trabajo. Esto es vital para la supervivencia de las empresas actuales. Las personas se vuelven responsables solidariamente por el trabajo realizado y por la satisfacción del cliente. 12. EL APRENDIZAJE CONTINUO Y LA ENSEÑANZA CONTINUA Es necesario incorporar en el trabajo el aprendizaje continuo y la enseñanza continua. El aprendizaje continuo encaminado a hacer bien el propio trabajo. Además tanto trabajadores como administradores deben estar preparados para identificar problemas y oportunidades de mejoramiento. Y la enseñanza continúa de parte del trabajador para del mismo modo ayudar a los otros hacer mejor su labor. 13. EL MAYOR GRADO DE CONOCIMIENTO AGREGADO AL NEGOCIO El autor Pablo L. Belly, expresa: "En la nueva economía, las personas y las empresas utilizan el conocimiento para generar nuevas riquezas, pues saben que los ingresos no provienen exclusivamente de lo tangible; por ejemplo, las máquinas para fabricar un reloj no son suficiente para generar riquezas, sino que se requiere conocimientos para fabricar 229 el mejor reloj, el más novedoso, el más barato, el más duradero, el mejor diseñado, en fin ... el más diferenciado"191 Queda claro entonces, que el conocimiento se ha convertido en la fuente principal de creación de riqueza.Ahora, se aplica al negocio la siguiente expresión: "trabaje con más cabeza no con más esfuerzo" 14. EL BENCHMARKING El benchmarking es la práctica de comparar el desempeño de nuestro propio negocio con los mejores en el mismo o también de otros negocios (organizaciones de clase mundial), para mejorar de modo significativo nuestra posición competitiva. Es decir, no sólo se estudia la competencia y el desempeño propio, de ser posible se busca el conocimiento de las prácticas por los líderes en otras ramas, adaptando y modificando aquellos elementos útiles que permitan desarrollar una ventaja competitiva y que lleven a un desempeño superior. 15. LA OBTENCION DE LA CERTIFICACION ISO La Certificación ISO se constituye en un requisito indispensable para que la organización pueda competir internacionalmente. Las Normas ISO 9000 fueron publicadas por primera vez en 1987 por la International Standards Organization (ISO), una organización europea dedicada a la edición de normas técnicas. Su objetivo es que las empresas que las adopten implementen un sistema de calidad que garantice que los productos de la empresa cubrirán los requerimientos de calidad establecidos por el cliente, lo que reducirá la necesidad de que los mismos clientes auditen a sus proveedores. Bibliografía  Belly, Pablo (2004); El Shock del Management. La Revolución del Conocimiento, México, McGraw-Hill Interamericana Editores S.A  Bernal Torres, César (2007), Introducción a la Administración de las organizaciones – Enfoque global e Integral, México, Pearson Educación.  Canals, Agusti (2003); Gestión del Conocimiento, Barcelona –España, Ediciones Gestión 2000  Chiavenato, Idalberto (2006); Introducción a la teoría General de la Administración, México, Mc GrawHill.  Dess, Gregory, y Lumpkim, G.T (2003); la Dirección Estratégica, España, Mc Graw – Hill  García, Apolinar (2006), Herramientas para administrar Empresas exitosas en el siglo XXI, Buenos Aires – Argentina, Sainte Claire Editora.  Garza Treviño, Juan (1999); Administración Contemporánea, México, McGraw-Hill  Kelly, Eamonn(2006); la década Decisiva: tres escenarios para el futuro del mundo, Bogotá, grupo Editorial Norma. 191 Belly, Pablo (2004), El shock del Management. La Revolución del Conocimiento. McGraw-Hill Interamericana Editores , S.A México, Pp. 9-10 230 EL POTENCIAL EXPORTADOR PERUANO Y ESTRATEGIAS DEL SECTOR EN EL CORTO Y EL LARGO PLAZO Dr.J. Adolfo Hinojosa Pérez* PALABRAS CLAVES Comercio exterior, Exportaciones tradicionales, Commodities, Exportaciones no tradicionales, Industria textil, Metalmecánica, Biocomercio, Turismo, Servicios informáticos, Productividad, Competitividad, Estrategias, Corto, mediano y largo plazo. RESUMEN Desde la inserción de la economía peruana a la economía internacional, en el Silgo XVI, esta se encuentra integrada esencialmente sobre la base de la exportación de materias primas (minerales). Sin embargo, en los últimos años, las políticas comerciales del Estado, han puesto énfasis en cambiar ese tipo de integración, por lo cual las exportaciones no tradicionales (ENT), han cobrado un fuerte dinamismo. En ese sentido, en el corto y mediano plazo, han tomado un fuerte impulso, la exportación de productos textiles, de metalmecánica, el biocomercio, la agroindustria y el turismo. No obstante, en el largo plazo, las ENT, con un mayor grado de complejidad tecnológica -tal como sucede con la experiencia asiáticaaún no han sido planteadas, dado que existe la necesidad del mejoramiento sustancial de los niveles de calidad, productividad y competitividad del país, para lograr esos objetivos. Es decir, el país necesita desarrollar en adelante sobre todo ventajas competitivas porterianas antes que ventajas comparativas ricardianas. La base del comercio exterior de nuestro país, actualmente se sustenta en la explotación y exportación de materias primas, es decir en la extracción y procesamiento de recursos naturales (comodities entre minerales, hidrocarburos, productos agropecuarios y pesqueros) dado que del total de las exportaciones nacionales a diciembre del 2011, según el BCRP, el 77% corresponden a este tipo de exportaciones y la diferencia es decir tan solo el 23%, corresponden a las exportaciones no tradicionales. No obstante, si bien en los últimos años, nuestro país ha mejorado de manera importante la estructura participativa de las ENT en el total de exportaciones, pues estas al año 2011, habían alcanzado los US $ 10, 130 millones de dólares (en dólares corrientes), comparado con la del año 2002, de US $ 2, 260 millones de dólares -lo cual significa que estas se habían más que quintuplicadoempero, el 231 peso específico de estas en la estructura total exportadora, siguen siendo aún bastante débiles. En ese sentido el Estado desde hace algunos años, viene implementando el Plan Estratégico Nacional Exportador (PENX) 2003-2013, propuesto por la autoridad competente del sector, en el cual se considera como uno de los objetivos centrales "Lograr una oferta estratégicamente diversificada, con significativo valor agregado, de calidad y volúmenes que permitan tener una presencia competitiva en los mercados internacionales"20. De esta forma, se observa pues que en los últimos años, el Estado, viene desarrollando importantes esfuerzos por impulsar las exportaciones nacionales no tradicionales, sobre la base de objetivos y planes específicos, los mismos que se ven expresados en una política agresiva en la concertación de acuerdos comerciales bilaterales (TLCs). Sin embargo, consideramos que la estrategia comercial que viene desarrollando el país, desde inicios de los años 2000s, adolecen de articulación con el conjunto del sector privado nacional, con la academia, con las autoridades políticas regionales, las autoridades locales, para que el PENX, no parezca solamente como un conjunto de lineamientos aislados y de carácter puramente doctrinario, sino contenga un carácter asimismo de tipo ejecutivo, en el cual estén involucrados y comprometidos todas los sectores económicos, académicos, políticos y sociales representativos del país. Asimismo, el nuevo PNEX, debe de ser formulado tomando en consideración otras propuestas de desarrollo de carácter mucho más global, formuladas por organismos gubernamentales competentes, tales como el CEPLAN, el CONCYTEC, que sabemos tienen competencias para formular propuestas de desarrollo integral del país. Tal es el caso del Plan Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica para el Desarrollo Productivo y Social Sostenible 2008-2012 del CONCYTEC21, quien definiera en su oportunidad que el Perú, debe de basar su crecimiento y desarrollo económico, sobre la base de seis sectores vitales en los cuales nuestro país, tiene un potencial y ventajas comparativas y competitivas importantes, tales como el sector agroindustrial, de la pesca y acuicultura, el textil y confecciones, el turismo, el forestal maderable y la industria de la información. Por tanto, nuestro país, en el corto y el mediano plazo, en la búsqueda de un mayor y mejor nivel de penetración en el mercado internacional, viene tratando de explotar su importante potencial en el desarrollo de la industria textil y confecciones (en algodón, lana y pelos finos). Dado que el Perú, es heredero de una actividad textil que se remonta a la época preincaica, pasando por la época virreinal. En ese sentido, esta rama industrial en los últimos años, ha mostrado un enorme dinamismo productivo y exportador, tal es el ejemplo del grupo empresarial Inca Alpaca, de la Región Arequipa, donde este grupo ha logrado desarrollar un cluster completo de una industria manufactura de productos textiles en base a la lana de alpaca "la fibra baby alpaca" con estándares de calidad 20 Mincetur, 2003. 21 El Concytec, a la fecha, no ha planteado o reformulado un nuevo Plan Nacional de Ciencia, Tecnología e Innovación Tecnológica, para los próximos años. 232 internacional, y cuyos mercados de destino son el europeo y norteamericano, con alto poder adquisitivo. Otro sector que se viene desarrollando de manera importante aunque insuficiente es el Biocomercio, definido como "el conjunto de actividades de recolección, producción, transformación y comercialización de bienes y servicios derivados de la biodiversidad nativa, desarrolladas de conformidad con los principios y los criterios de sostenibilidad ambiental, social y económica"22. En ese sentido, la explotación (racional) de la agricultura orgánica, de productos frutícolas, hortalizas, de granos andinos, de plantas medicinales, son un enorme potencial para continuar insertando a nuestro país de manera exitosa en el mercado internacional, dado que estos productos son utilizados por los consumidores potenciales extranjeros en suplementos dietéticos importantes, alimentos funcionales, en productos cosméticos de origen natural, y productos farmacéuticos de origen natural, los mismos que convergen con los cambios en las tendencias alimenticias en los países desarrollados; pues los habitantes de estos países, vienen sustituyendo el consumo de "comida chatarra" por una alimentación sana, que no deteriore su salud, sino que por el contrario la preserve. Al respecto, cabe señalar una citación de una publicación en el diario francés Le Monde Diplomatique de hace más de una década en la cual expresaban que "mientras que los peruanos en los andes consumían espaguettis, los astronautas en los cielos, consumían quinua y kiwicha". De otra parte, nuestro país, es considerado uno de los ocho focos originarios de cultura en el mundo y cuenta con el mayor número de sitios arqueológicos, ciudades con patrimonio histórico, cultural y con una gran variedad de climas y ecosistemas que muestran una gran diversidad de flora y fauna; cuenta asimismo con sitios adecuados para la práctica de deportes de aventura, turismo de playa, entre otros. Sin embargo, según el reporte mensual de llegada de visitantes extranjeros al país, proporcionado por el Vice-Ministerio de Turismo, durante el año 2009, habían ingresado al país, solo 2'140,000 personas. Empero, estas cifras, son completamente insuficientes en comparación a otros destinos turísticos en América Latina. Así, nuestro país, dentro de los 19 destinos turísticos de AL, se ubica en el puesto 9vno, después de Chile23 y Colombia y muy lejos de México y Argentina. En tal sentido, una de las estrategias principales para desarrollar la exportación de servicios dentro de los cuales destaca en primer lugar, el turismo, es la necesidad de reforzar la campaña de promoción de nuestros recursos turísticos en el exterior, luego, se necesita mejorar la captación de turistas extranjeros, a través de la de profundización del Sistema de Aplicación de Buenas Prácticas en destinos turísticos (SABP), y la Certificación de Calidad de los Servicios Turísticos, propiciado por el propio MICETUR, con la finalidad de mejorar de manera sustantiva, la calidad del servicio al turista extranjero. 22 Agenda de Investigación e Innovación para el Biocomercio 2012-2021, Concytec, 2012) 23 Chile no posee el potencial turístico como nosotros, pero si la infraestructura turística necesaria. 233 El largo plazo, no es todavía una variable que vengan manejando las autoridades competentes del sector, pues este campo siendo el más importante dentro de toda estrategia de desarrollo de un país, no es tan sencillo de abordarlo ni ejecutarlo, pues para incursionar en este importante campo, se requiere superar los altos niveles de informalidad económica e institucional del país, la superación "de la heterogeneidad de los regímenes empresariales, como el sector informal urbano y la agricultura campesina, con ingresos muy bajos (...) y los bajos niveles de transformación industrial de la producción primaria"24. A su vez plantearse el LP como estrategia de desarrollo requiere el mejoramiento sustancial de niveles de productividad y competitividad, dentro de las cuales destacan el impulso de capacidades de investigación científica, para los cuales se necesita que la actividad de la investigación, desarrollo e innovación (I+D+I), sea implantada en el Perú como sistema y como cultura, y una vez más de una "(mayor) interacción y sinergia entre los actores de los sectores público, privado y académico vinculados (al desarrollo nacional) para alcanzar mejores condiciones de competitividad a lo largo de las cadenas de valor"25. Pues según el CEPLAN, al año 2011, el Perú en el ranking de competitividad del World Economic Forum, se ubicaba en el puesto 78 entre 133 países, con un puntaje de 4,0., considerando que el puntaje máximo es de 7, "(por lo cual el Perú) alcanza (solo) un nivel medio de competitividad, que tendría que superar para lograr una inserción más favorable en el comercio mundial"26 De esta manera, en el largo plazo, una actividad importante a desarrollar, es la industria de la informática, tal es el caso del desarrollo de la industria del software y aplicaciones, y otras actividades de mayor contenido tecnológico e industrial. Asi, la industria del software, muestra una tasa de crecimiento anual de exportaciones en los últimos años del 35%, y un monto total de exportaciones cercano a los US $ 100 millones, y cuyos salarios promedios son de los más elevados de la actividad industrial. Sin embargo este tipo de industrias, requieren de una infraestructura mucho más sofisticada y a su vez de un mayor desarrollo e innovación de carácter tecnológico, lo cual supone simultáneamente la mejora del sistema educativo nacional, y la priorización de la investigación científicotecnológico, para cumplir con las exigencias de innovación permanente en este sector. En conclusión, nuestro país para penetrar exitosamente en el mercado internacional, debe en la actualidad desarrollar sobre todo ventajas competitivas porterianas, más que las ventajas clásicas comparativas ricardianas, pues el comercio internacional es cada vez más dominado por la operaciones comerciales con alto contenido tecnológico, puesto que este tipo de exportaciones generan altos efectos multiplicadores en el conjunto de la economía y a su vez generan altos niveles de empleo para la población, induciendo a su vez altos niveles salariales en el sector.  Docente de la Escuela de Postgrado de la UIGV. 24 Ceplan, Plan Bicentenario, 2011. 25 Ibid 26 Ceplan, Plan Bicentenario, 2011. 234 MANAGER, MEANS "KNOWLEDGE WORKER" Gerente, sinónimo de "trabajador del conocimiento" Dra.Irma Corina Adrianzén Ibárcena Resumen Este artículo se ocupa del concepto de Manager, means "knowledge worker", gerente, sinónimo de "trabajador del conocimiento" en donde se destaca las competencias gerenciales, enmarcadas al nuevo contexto de negocios saludables –binomio de salud y prosperidad.Por tanto, se resalta el planteamiento de un nuevo modelo de competencias gerenciales en el ámbito de la gestión de la prevención de los riesgos laborales,que debemos aplicar enel sector empresarial peruano -"Peruvian Business Sector". Abstract Manager, means "knowledge worker" Manager, synonymous with knowledge worker" This article deals with the concept of Manager, means "knowledge worker", manager, synonymous with "knowledge worker" which highlights managerial competencies, framed the new business context healthy-binomial health and prosperity. Therefore highlights the approach of a new model of management skills in the field of management of the prevention of occupational risks, we must apply Peruvian business sector - "Peruvian Business Sector". Palabras Clave: Competencias gerenciales, seguridad y salud ocupacional, entorno saludable. Keywords: 235 Managerial skills, occupational health and safety, healthy environment. Introducción "En América Latina existen 130,000 cargos en posiciones de ingeniería y especialistas en informática que no pueden cubrirse por no tener los talentos necesarios para ocuparlos" (Moreno, 2013). En los días comprendidos del 23 al 25 de abril de 2013, se llevó a cabo en LimaPerú el VIII Foro Económico Mundial para Latinoamérica, en donde participaron tres jefes de Estado y más de 700 empresarios de la región, el lema del Foro fue: "Logrando crecimiento fortaleciendo sociedades". CarlosRodríguez-Pastor, co-presidente del Foro, puso énfasis en el desafío de fortalecer la educación a nivel de la Región, manifestando la necesidad de involucramiento de las empresas en el tema. Existe una profunda preocupación ante la estimación probabilística para los años dos mil veinte de presentarse una dúplica de la cantidad actual y llegar a los 230,000 en cargos de posiciones ejecutivas en las empresas de la Región y no contar con los "talentos" para cubrirlos. La mundialización de los intercambios y la globalización de las nuevas tecnologías,nos apremia con urgencia la elaboración de diseños de programas de desarrollo de competencias, que permitan la inserción a nuevos mercados; asimismo, de forma paralela, se demanda el estudio de las causas de los emergentes riesgos laborales, que menoscaban la calidad de vida de la población económicamente activa-PEA, lo que conlleva a la imprescindible necesidad de contar con knowledge workers –trabajadores del conocimiento, que ocupen las gerencias de prevención de riesgos laborales. Una de las tareas fundamentales del mundo de los negocios, es anticipar el cambio y apuntalar siempre hacia el futuro, por lo que los directivos de las empresas deben de estar constantemente codificando, visionando y compartiendo de manera macro todos los campos del conocimiento de la organización. (Fig.N°1) 236 El activo estratégico más valioso para toda organización es la implementación de procesos y tecnologías de gestión del conocimiento, ya lo decía en el pasado Siglo veinte, Peter Drucker (1999, p.93): "La productividad del trabajador del conocimiento es el mayor desafío que enfrentará el management en el siglo XXI". En el año dos mil, las Naciones Unidas lanzó el Pacto Mundial, iniciativa de responsabilidad corporativa que a fecha del año 2013, cuenta con más de 7,500 signatarios de negocios en más de 140 países y 101 redes locales. La interacción del negocio global, como señala el Secretario General de la ONU, Ban Ki-moon, están alineados con los diez principios universales: áreas de derechos 237 humanos, trabajo, medio ambiente y lucha contra la corrupción, que apuntalan a los objetivos más amplios de las Naciones Unidas. Los resultados de la encuesta del Pacto Mundial Anual de Implementación 2012 (Fig. N° 2) en donde participaron 1,712 empresas pertenecientes a más de 100 países, señalaron en lo concerniente a la educación desde la perspectiva empresarial, que para la agenda post-2015, urge un abordaje de mayor firmeza en la implementación de diferencias en las formas de educación. Los cambios de aprendizajes que deben de darse, deben tener práctico-aplicativo y deben impartirse desde el lugar de trabajo y los niveles de gestión. Se evidencia entonces, la necesidad de trasformación de los métodos de capacitación, induciéndose a una permanente coordinación efectiva, entre los empleadores y las instituciones educativas. Los graduados deben estar preparados para ocupar puestos de trabajo con equidad, entre las tasas de remuneraciones con los niveles de productividad. (United Nations Global Compact, June 2013).Por lo que toda actividad de trabajo movilizaconocimientos, habilidades,destrezas y comprensión suficientes para solucionar situaciones, problemas y contingencias que surgen en el ejercicio de tareas y funciones de trabajo. El presente artículo se sustenta en la postura conceptual del "Chief knowledge officer" traducido, "Gerente del conocimiento", el cual resalta las competencias gerenciales, que son específicamente, formas y modos de desarrollo de procesos de mejora continua, dentro del concepto actual "organización saludable". "La prosperidad de los negocios se fundamenta mejor en la salud de los trabajadores" (Neira, María, 2010:IX). Revisión de literatura y marco conceptual Las organizaciones son sociedades de mentes, sus acciones y decisiones, noson simples resultados de actividades ordenadas, sino más bien, son el surgimiento de una ecología de procesos de información. Davenport, Thomas & Prusak, Laurence. (1997), autores de la introducción del concepto de ecología de la información, el cual permite examinar las propiedades claves del entorno de la información, que debe contar toda organización eficaz y saludable. Davenport& Prusak (1997), señalan que el concepto ecología de la información consta de seis componentes: estrategia de la información, política de la información, comportamiento de la información, cultura de la información, personal de la información, procesos de la información y arquitectura de la información. 238 Investigaciones recientes en el área de gestión del conocimiento sugieren nuevas formas de ver la gestión de la información (Chun Wei Choo, 2006; De Anta, Alex, 2004). Plantean la perspectiva de la organización como dueña de un stock de capital intelectual, que es utilizado para crear valor económico. El capital intelectual está conformado por el capital humano, capital estructural y capital clientelar. El capital humano abarca la experiencia de los individuos. El capital estructural comprende las rutinas y procesos que definen la forma distintiva de hacer las actividades dentro de la organización y el capital clientelar incluye el conocimiento de las necesidades del cliente y los puntos fuertes de los proveedores. La ventaja competitiva, no es más que el producto del tipo y grado de calidad del conocimiento. Toda organización trabaja con tres tipos de conocimiento: conocimiento tácito, que consiste en la práctica de las competencias que posee el individuo, que las muestra en el flujo de las actividades laborales, asegurando la eficacia del cumplimiento de sus tareas; conocimiento explícito, es el que permite a la organización disfrutar un cierto nivel de eficiencia y control operativo y el conocimiento previo o cultural, el cual forma parte de la cultura organizacional, es el que promueve el compromiso con la creación de significados y valores compartidos. La organización inteligente promueve el aprendizaje del conocimiento tácito para aumentar la habilidad y la capacidad creativa de sus empleados, se aprovecha del conocimiento explícito para maximizar la eficiencia y ecuanimidad y desarrolla el conocimiento cultural para unificar propósito y significado en su comunidad. La organización inteligente ha dominado una cuarta clase de conocimiento, el cual es meta-conocimiento u orden superior, que se utiliza para crear, integrar y reforzar todos sus recursos intelectuales con el fin de alcanzar niveles superiores de rendimiento (Chun Wei Choo y varios, 2006). Hoy, en el mundo de los negocios se tiene claro, que el rendimiento de una empresa está sujeto al nivel de salud que experimenta en su conjunto; se sabe que el trabajo puede afectar negativamente la salud física y mental, la seguridad y el bienestar de los colaboradores, obteniéndose resultados devastadores, es en este punto argüido, en donde la organización necesita del "meta-conocimiento"-competencias de orden superior- , quien será el "gerente en prevención de riesgos laborales" (trabajador del 239 conocimiento) quien desarrolle e implemente el sistema de prevención de riesgos laborales de la empresa. Estudios realizados por la EU-OSHAS en el año 2009, indican que el impacto de un accidente grave para las Pymes significa mayormente su extinción, revelan que el 60% de la Pymes que tuvieron una interrupción de funcionamiento por nueve días salieron del mercado (Roxane L. Gervais, Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL), United Kingdom, 2009). Otro aspecto perjudicial para las empresas es la persistencia del fenómeno del "presentismo", que es el que describe a la productividad reducida, de alguien que está enfermo bien sea física o mentalmente, en donde el rendimiento es por debajo del que daría en condiciones normales y a pesar de ello, el empleador le paga. El acuerdo de Tallin (producto de la Conferencia Ministerial de la OMS sobre sistemas de salud, 2008), destaca la conexión entre salud y prosperidad estableciendo que más allá de su valor intrínseco, la buena salud contribuye a una alta productividad y al éxito de la empresa, lo que lleva a una prosperidad económica al país, al bienestar individual y social y a la prosperidad de los trabajadores (Figura N°3). ¿Qué significa gerente del conocimiento? Un "gerente del conocimiento" o "director de conocimiento", "Chief knowledge officer" (CKO), es un individuo que posee un bagaje de sapiencias específicas, un saber o saberes -Competenciasque emplea en el trabajo, es decir, talento efectivo en la acción (ideas, información, datos, ...), el cual debe ser captado e integrado en los procesos de trabajo. Hoy, las organizaciones se encuentran en constantes desafíos, tanto en lo que concierne a la gestión, como en lo que refiere a laestructura organizacional. La nueva gestión, que alberga a los gerentes o trabajadores del conocimiento, demanda un entorno adecuado para el despliegue de las capacidades -competencias-. En lo que 240 respecta a la estructura organizacional, se urge cambios, no podrá darse en el nivel de jefes y subordinados, sino solo en la concepción de equipos. El nuevo gerente -trabajador de conocimientosasume la responsabilidad de la autogestión de su propio desarrollo y crecimiento, de la administración de su tiempo y de los resultados generados de su accionar, siendo el núcleo del éxito, su productividad competitiva, que viene hacer el alcance de la misión y visión de su autogestión gerencial. Competencias y habilidades del Gerente del Conocimiento Toda organización competitiva, se caracteriza por la forma de pensar, razonar y actuar, en función a las oportunidades y riesgos, formando parte de un liderazgo equilibrado y una gestión de riesgo calculado. Los especialistas (Earl, Michael J. & Scott, Ian A.1999; Drucker, Peter (1999); Rodríguez Esteban, Agustín (2007), coinciden que todo equipo gerencial de conocimiento debe de poseer un perfil de competencias básicas: pensamiento estratégico y holístico, capacidad cognitiva, comunicación, herramientas tecnológicas y liderazgo de gestión; adicionalmente, resaltan la importancia de contar con determinadas características psico-emocionales tales como: óptimo control, optimismo, moderación; buena tolerancia al stress, relevante nivel de energía, extroversión, comunicación; excelente flexibilidad conductual, cortesía y amabilidad. Al preguntarnos¿qué competencias gerenciales desarrollan las organizaciones saludables?, la respuesta la obtenemos del planteamiento de Boterf (2001:92)quien señala que las competencias son el conjunto de saberes y aptitudes necesarios para el desempeño de un puesto de trabajo".Estos saberes son: 1. Saber actuar, la competencia se expresa con una acción o encadenamiento de ellas. 2. En un contexto particular, la competencia siempre es contextualizada, saber actuar en un campo de exigencias, restricciones y recursos determinados. 3. Saber actuar validado, la competencia solo existe si ha realizado las pruebas delante de otros –demostración. 4. Con vistas a una finalidad, la competencia en acción está enfocada a un fin. En síntesis, las organizaciones saludables, cuentan con un capital intelectual que refleja saberes aprendidos en su operatividad en el mercado, en donde, su recurso humano ha desarrollado competencias profesionales que son reflejadas en la visión, misión y desarrollo de estrategias organizacionales; los recursos 241 estructurales que responden a la mayor expresión de valor agregado en el accionar del cuidado del medio ambiente, brindando al recurso clientelar, el óptimo aseguramiento y contribución de bienestar social. (Fig. N° 4). Conclusiones: La sociedad actual está inmersa en una constante transformación estructural, en donde el conocimiento es esencial para el desarrollo de toda actividad socio-laboral. Todo profesional de gerencia,deberá responder con efectividad la intensa búsqueda de demanda de competenciasde los saberes que garanticen la competitividad organizacional. Para que una organización pueda continuar en el mercado debe focalizarse en desarrollar su capital intelectual, cuyo sinónimo es valor económico para la organización. Los cambios en el escenario socio-laboral conllevan a un estilo nuevo de gerente trabajador de conocimientos. Todo equipo gerencial de conocimientos deben de poseer un perfil de competencias: Técnicas (saberes); metodológicas (saber hacer); personales (saber ser) y participativas (saber estar). Las organizaciones saludables, cuentan con un capital intelectual, el cual es direccionado por el knowledge worker, trabajador de conocimientos, maximizándose la responsabilidad corporativa en la gestión dela seguridad, salud y medio ambiente de 242 las empresas, implicando por tanto,el compromiso solidario con la sociedad del planeta. Bibliografía: Choo, Chun Wei; Furness, C.; Paquette, S.; Van den Berg, H.; Detlor, B.; Bergeron, P.& Heaton, L.(2006). Working with information: information management and culture in a professional services organization. Journal of Information Science, 32 (6) 2006, pp. 491– 510.Faculty of Information Studies, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Davenport, Thomas & Prusak, Laurence. (1997). Information Ecology: Mastering the Information and Knowledge Environment. Oxford University Press, New York. - De Anta, Alex (2004). El CKO, Chief Knowledge Officer. Drucker,Peter (1999). Knowledge-Worker Productivity: The Biggest Challenge . En California Management Review Vol 41, Nro2, Winter 1999, p.93 Earl, Michael J & Ian A. Scott (1999). What Is a Chief Knowledge Office? Sloan Management Review. Invierno de 1999, p. 29-38. Echevarría Samanes, Benito (2002). Gestión de las Competencias de Acción Profesional. Revista de Investigación Educativa. 2002, Volumen 20, n° págs. 7 al 43. Universidad de Barcelona. BarcelonaEspaña. -Gervais, Roxane L. Health and Safety Laboratory (HSL), United Kingdom (2009). Occupational safety and health and economic performance in small and medium-sized enterprises. European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA), Spain Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2009. Le Boterf G. (2001). Ingeniería de las competencias. Barcelona. Gestión 2000 S.A. - Martínez-Clares, P. ; Martínez-Juáres, M.& Muñoz-Cantero, J. M. (2008). Formación basada en competenciasen educación sanitaria: Aproximaciones a enfoques y modelos de competencias. Relieve, volumen 14, n° 2 Universidad de Murcia –España y Universidad A Coruña –España. Moreno, Luis Alberto(2013). VIII ForoEconómico Mundial de Latino-américa 23-25 abril, 2013. Lima-Perú. 243 Neira, María (2010: x) Directora de Salud Pública y Medio Ambiente). En Fundamentos de la OMS para entornos laborables saludables. fundamentos y modelo de la OMS: contextualización, prácticas y literatura de apoyo.OMS. Organización Mundial de la Salud (2009). OMS. Rodríguez Esteban, Agustín (2007). Las Competencias en Espacio Europeo de Educación Superior. Tipologías. Humanismo y Trabajo Social. Volumen 006, n° págs. 139-153. Universidad de León. León-España. United Nations Global Compact (2013).Internet www.unglobalcompact.org. Revisado el 06 de agosto del 2013. United Nations (2013). Report to the United Nations Secretary-General Corporate Sustainable an the s United Nations Post-2015 Development Agenda. Perspectives from UN Global Compact Participants on Global Priorities and How to Engage Business Towards Sustainable Development Goals. Lic. Psic. Organizacional; C.Ps.P. N° 11673. Drda. MIDE; Master SST; Espec.Ergonomía y Factores Psicosociales; Auditor en SST (Ley 29783-ISO 1901) –CIP.CASST.OO2; con estudios en RRII, Administración y Organización. Consultora en Prevención de Riesgos Laborales. Autora de Libros: Ergonomía: Empresas, Industrias y Oficinas (2012).Alto" Conductas no saludables, violencia hacia la mujer (2013) en impresión Otros estudios e investigaciones en el área de la SST, Ergonomía y RRHH. (*)Docente de Post-GradoEXCUTIVE-MBA, Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. 244 EL GERENTE DE OPERACIONES INDUSTRIALES Y LAS HERRAMIENTAS DE GESTION Mg. Oswaldo W. Brown Suarez. INTRODUCCION La eficiencia de las operaciones empresariales industriales es el resultado de la exitosa toma de decisiones manejadas dentro de un complejo de alternativas por demás exigentes. Hoy en día las empresas para desarrollarse dentro de un mundo de alta competencia deberá seleccionar al gerente de operaciones industriales que más se adecue a sus características que le permita manejar adecuadamente sus propias herramientas de gestión, algunas de las cuales serán explicadas a continuación. SISTEMA DE CONTABILIDAD Sistema es un conjunto de partes interrelacionadas que ejecuta uno o mas procesos para lograr objetivos específicos. La ley general de sociedades precisa que el gerente será el responsable de la veracidad de los informes y sistemas de contabilidad que comprenden los procedimientos utilizados para dar a conocer a los usuarios de las actividades económicas y financieras de una entidad. La generación y exhibición de información específica considera en desdoblar la misma, en contabilidad financiera o general y contabilidad de costos. La contabilidad financiera se refiere a mostrar información al entorno que rodea a la entidad, sean estos de carácter público o privado, autoridades y todo aquel que esté interesado de sus actividades. Esta contabilidad permite asimismo mostrar información relacionada con su posición financiera, su liquidez, solvencia. La contabilidad de costos va mas allá de la contabilidad financiera o general pues está en condiciones de mostrar el costo de producción y costos de ventas de un articulo o diversos de ellos o el costo de un servicio en particular. La aplicación del sistema de contabilidad de costos conduce a elaborar mediante informes oportunos, las comparaciones periódicas de los elementos del costo, permite determinar la capacidad adecuada de producción para evitar el sobre almacenamiento de materias primas de productos en proceso o de productos terminados. El conocimiento de la producción dañada, los desperdicios. Todos estos informes que son pertinentes de la contabilidad de costos permitirán a la gerencia tomar las decisiones más adecuadas para mantener la producción dentro de los rangos estándar para obtener la utilidad planeada y el mantenimiento de una rentabilidad competitiva. Serán de máxima importancia cuando se usen especialmente los costos estándar. El objetivo básico de un sistemas de contabilidad de costos es la determinación de los costos unitarios de fabricar varios productos o suministrar un servicio o distribuir determinados artículos.la gerencia usa esta información básica como guía en las decisiones que tiene que adoptar para mantener o aumentar las utilidades de la empresa 245 PRESUPUESTO EMPRESARIAL Es indudable que los diversos sistemas de contabilidad nos muestran información histórica, es decir pasada, sobre las cuales ya no podemos hacer nada. Que resulten adecuadas, confiables y que sirven para tomas decisiones, eso nadie lo duda, sin embargo tiene la limitación que no puede mostrarnos información futura. Partiendo de esta reflexión se debe admitir que las empresas también necesitan información futura y eso lo proporcionan los presupuestos empresariales. La elaboración de los presupuestos empresariales nunca ha sido fácil. Siempre los esfuerzos han sido particularmente difíciles pues el ambiente que rodea la empresa es altamente impredecible. No existe el talentoso ni el futurista exitoso de los negocios, tan solo se debe confiar en la experiencia del gerente industrial y en su habilidad para "ver "el futuro. Los riesgos para confeccionar los presupuestos son de carácter externo de la empresa, entre los cuales tenemos, la inflación, la alta competencia, la economía inestable, la informalidad. Esta herramienta obliga a los gerentes a pensar con anticipación, es decir, a adelantarse a los acontecimientos. Los instrumentos que usa la empresa para expresar la información para el futuro son los estados financieros proyectados. A través de ellos se planifica los negocios del futuro. Existen diversos tipos de presupuestos que utilizan los negocios. Un presupuesto maestro resume las actividades planeadas de todas las unidades de una organización: ventas, producción, distribución y finanzas. A través de los informes de los presupuestos, se presenta en forma comparada los datos del presupuesto con los datos reales, y las variaciones resultantes, tal como se muestra a continuación Por las operaciones al 31 de julio 2,013 Real Presupuesto Variación F o (D) Unidades 10,000 9,500 5,000 Ventas 200,000 180,000 20,000 Costo de venta 120,000 80,000 (40,000) --------- --------- --------- Utilidad Bruta 80,000 100,000 (20,000) Gastos administrativos 60,000 55,000 (5,000) --------- ---------- ---------- Utilidad (perdida) 20,000 45,000 (15,000) ===== ===== ====== El análisis de esas variaciones presupuestales son por demás importantes, sobre todo cuando se han utilizado los costos estándar en la elaboración de los presupuestos, pues permitirá a los gerentes industriales la revelación de las información acerca de las causas de las variaciones, que pueden ser de precios o costos, de cantidades, etc. 246 FINANZAS La empresa es una unidad económica constituida por una persona natural o jurídica que tiene por objeto desarrollar alguna de las siguientes actividades: extracción, transformación, producción, prestación de servicios. Sin embargo todas y cada una de ellas tienen un común denominador que consiste en desear manejar adecuadamente los activos y pasivos corrientes, lo cual nos invita a reflexionar sobre el capital de trabajo. También tienen problemas con la administración de las inversiones y el financiamiento a largo plazo. El capital de trabajo que consiste en establecer un equilibrio armonioso entre el efectivo y equivalente de efectivo, mas las cuentas por cobrar y los volúmenes razonables de los inventario, todo ello, menos los pasivos corrientes, constituido por las deudas a corto plazo. CAPITAL DE TRABAJO = ACTIVO CORRIENTE PASIVO CORRIENTE En tal sentido, la eficiencia de la administración del capital de trabajo es una actividad que tiene por objetivo asegurar que la entidad tenga la capacidad para asegurar el manejo de sus recursos en el corto plazo. Consecuente con ello el gerente dirigirá las actividades operativas sin restricciones o limitaciones. El manejo inadecuado del capital de trabajo conduce al fracaso de las empresas, que entre sus causas tenemos los siguientes. El fracaso es consecuencia de las deficiencias en el manejo del efectivo. La empresa no debe dar prioridad al pago de deudas a largo plazo y postergar las deudas corrientes. La sobre inversión en inventarios sin tener en cuenta el modelo de la cantidad económica de pedido que consiste en determinar la cantidad que minimiza el costo de la inversión en inventario. Este modelo es muy compatible con la administración de inventarios justo a tiempo (JIT). 2 F V CEP = E P Otro fracaso en el capital de trabajo es consecuencia de la mala política en el manejo de los créditos otorgado a los clientes por las ventas al crédito. Para recuperar el capital de trabajo se deben tomar decisiones adecuadas entre las cuales tenemos. Venta de activos fijos que no contribuyen a generar utilidades a la empresa. Aumento del Capital de la empresa. Refinanciar obligaciones corrientes con deudas a largo plazo. PUNTO DE EQUILIBRIO OPERATIVO Esta herramienta que usa el gerente industrial precisa que a través de la relación que existe entre el volumen de ventas y la rentabilidad operativa se explora la relación costo – volumen – utilidad y el análisis del punto de equilibrio operativo. A través de este estudio se determina el volumen de ventas que es igual a los costos operativos y no resultan ni utilidad ni pérdida. Estos costos operativos están constituidos por los costos variables y los costos fijos. El punto de equilibrio es el monto en el cual los ingresos totales son iguales a los costos totales, por lo tanto tenemos: 247 Ventas = Costos Totales Debe entenderse que el Costo Total es: Costo Total = Costo Fijo + Costo Variable y donde la utilidad es cero. Los costos variables son aquellos que cambian a medida que cambian los niveles de producción. Los costos fijos son aquellos cuyos totales no cambian con los cambios en el volumen dentro de una escala de volumen determinado. En el estudio del punto de equilibrio aparece el margen de contribución que es el exceso de ventas sobre todos los costos variables, puede ser expresado en una de las siguientes formas: 1.El margen de contribución es la diferencia entre las ventas totales y el total de los costos variables. 2.El margen unitario de contribución es la diferencia entre el precio unitario y el costo variable unitario. 3.La razón de margen de contribución es el margen de contribución total dividido entre las ventas totales. El margen de contribución en el corto plazo permite decidir qué productos impulsar y cuáles desestimular así como ayudan a valorar alternativas que surgen respecto a reducción de precios, descuentos extraordinarios, campañas publicitarias especiales y el uso de bonificaciones o rebajas para incentivar el incremento del volumen de ventas. En el largo plazo entre otros aspectos se utiliza para decidir acerca de compra de nuevos equipos y estrategias administrativas. RENTABILIDAD Dependiendo del objetivo empresarial, existen diversos planteamientos relacionados con la rentabilidad. Sin embargo debo ser objetivo y teniendo presente que estamos en las herramientas que usa el gerente industrial para un desempeño exitoso puedo precisar que rentabilidad es la medida de contribución que tienen las utilidades netas por las ventas realizadas o por los activos usados o el capital empleado. De esto se desprende que las medidas serán diversas lo cual dependerá de la información planteada y las medidas a obtener. Desde ese punto de vista al gerente industrial le interesara, no tanto el rendimiento de la inversión, que desde luego es otro tema a tratar, también interesante, sino el rendimiento de las utilidades netas comparadas con las ventas, la cual se obtiene a través de la razón de la utilidad en ventas. La razón de la utilidad en ventas, se obtiene de la siguiente forma: Ingreso neto _____________ Ventas Si cuantificamos esta información tendríamos lo siguiente: 130,000 _____________ = 0.13 = 13 % 1'000,000 Si el promedio de la industria fuera del 12 %, el rendimiento del 13 % resulta superior, lo cual indica la eficiencia de las utilidades y por lo tanto las que corresponde al gerente industrial. Indudablemente que estos datos se obtienen del Estado de Ganancias y Pérdidas, hoy denominado Estado de Resultados, en aplicación del NIC No.1. 248 CONCLUSION El éxito del gerente de operaciones industriales depende del uso y aplicación de cada una o de la combinación de las herramientas de gestión. Bibliografía Weston J.F. y Brigham E.F. (1986). Manual de Administración Financiera.Madrid. 8a. Edición. Interamericana. Lawrence Schall, Charles W. Haley, (1991). Administración Financiera. México. McGrawHill/Interamericana. Anthony, Robert N. (1971). La Contabilidad en la Administración de las Empresas. México Uteha. Román Gil, Isidoro. (1991). Introducción a la Contabilidad. Madrid. 2a. Eric. Editorial Comares. Kieso Donald E. -Weygandt, Jerry J. (1987). Contabilidad Moderna. México. 5 tomos. Ediciones Ciencia y Técnica S.A. Corcoran, A.Wayne. (1987). Costos, Contabilidad, Análisis y Control. 4o. Tomos. México. Ediciones Ciencia y Técnica S.A. Kennedy R.D y McMullen S.Y. (1972). Estados Financieros. Forma, Análisis e Interpretación. México. Uteha. Gitman, Lawrence J. (1990). Administración Financiera Básica. México. Harla. Blanco Dopico, María Isabel. (1994). Contabilidad de Costos: Análisis y Control. Madrid. Ediciones Pirámide S.A. Reyes Pérez, E. (1994). Contabilidad de Costos. México. 2 tomos. 3a.Edic. Editorial Limusa. Brown Suarez, Oswaldo W. (2008). La Aplicación de los Costos Industriales. Lima. Eddili. Jiménez, Carlos M. y Colaboradores. (1995). Costos para Empresarios. Buenos Aires. Ediciones Macchi. Horngren, Charles T. y Forter, George. (1991). Contabilidad de Costos: Un Enfoque Gerencial. México. Prentice-Hall Hispanoamérica S.A. Horngren, Charles. (2001). Introducción a la Contabilidad Administrativa. México. Prentice-Hall. Brown Suarez, Oswaldo W. (2007). Fundamentos del Presupuesto Maestro. Lima. Eddili. Scott Besley.Eugene F. Brigham. (2001). Fundamentos de Administración Financiera. México. McGraw_Hill Interamericana Editores. Stanley B. Block. Geoffrey A. Hirt. (2005). Administración Financiera. México. McGraw-Hill Interamericana Editores. Hansen. Mowen. (2007). Administración de Costos. Contabilidad y Control. México. International Thomson Editores. Ley General de Sociedades. Glosario de Terminología Contable.(1994). Conasev. 249 RESPONSABILIDAD SOCIAL Y LAS REDES SOCIALES Dra. Leonor Ponce Luyo La Responsabilidad Social Corporativa (RSC) o Responsabilidad Social Empresarial (RSE) también a veces mencionada como CSR por sus siglas en Inglés (Corporate Social Responsibility) ha tenido un amplio crecimiento en los últimos años, sobre todo en países desarrollados como los Estados Unidos y los países de la Unión Europea, mientras que en países emergentes o en vías de desarrollo su incursión en el medio es más bien reciente. Particularmente en el Perú se ha venido practicando de manera incipiente y con fines de previsión de conflictos sociales (minería e industria) El crecimiento de las redes sociales ha permitido a todo tipo de empresas, ya sea de bienes y servicios o productos que han optado tempranamente por incursionar en la colocación de su información en las redes, favorecerse de la publicidad inmediata, a un costo relativamente bajo. Está demostrado que en los últimos tiempos, las redes sociales han tenido una acogida cada vez más grande. A lo largo de todo el mundo Facebook y Tweeter se han encargado de acercar más a los consumidores con sus marcas. Incluso países como China, donde Facebook no está permitido, cuentan con su propia red social llamada Qzone, donde al igual que Facebook, ayuda a los consumidores a sentirse identificados con sus productos de mayor preferencia. Los líderes en redes sociales a nivel mundial son: Facebook y YouTube, seguidos por Qzone en China. El reporte de la firma de monitoreo en la web "BI Intelligence", indica que Facebook tiene 1.16 billones de nuevos usuarios activos al mes, YouTube tiene 1 billón y Qzone 712 millones. (Digital Strategy Consulting) Quienes nos encontramos más familiarizados con Facebook, nos podemos dar cuenta que ésta red social es prácticamente un concurso de popularidad. Al final todo se trata de quién tiene mas "Like"s o "Me Gusta". Lo mismo pasa con las compañías grandes como Coca Cola, Disney, Samsung, entre otros. Estos gigantes invierten mucho dinero en Marketing Digital entre los cuales está incluido todo lo que se refiere a redes sociales y especialmente asociado a la Responsabilidad Social Empresarial. Coca Cola es una de las 10 compañías con más votos por Facebook en los últimos años. En el 2013, Coca Cola tuvo 15 millones de fans nuevos y 58 millones de visitas nuevas en su canal de YouTube. (Enter.Co) Usar redes sociales es una forma económica y efectiva de publicidad, ya que cada vez que la compañía pone algo nuevo, todos sus fans pueden verlo. En Facebook, son virtualmente parte de nuestros contactos, ya que todos sus comentarios son públicos e ingresan a nuestras cuentas. Compañías grandes usan estas estrategias para acercarse de una manera más íntima a sus consumidores. Tweeter es otra red social que permite que la comunicación entre los consumidores y la marca sea casi instantánea. YouTube, tiene videos con los cuales los consumidores pueden aprender más sobre su marca. Esto, como se ve, se refiere a las redes sociales. Pero, ¿Cómo dar a conocer las acciones de las empresas en cuanto se refiere a responsabilidad social por medio de las redes sociales? Muchas compañías grandes 250 realizan eventos sociales que no son publicados en los medios tradicionales como radio y televisión y solo los promueven en las redes sociales, llegando algunas veces a no estar dentro de sus páginas oficiales, sino en foros. En otros casos, solo aquellos que están subscritos a sus páginas de Facebook, Tweeter, YouTube o Google Plus pueden verlo. Cuando se trata de responsabilidad social, muchas veces las empresas no publican la ayuda que aportan a la sociedad, sin embargo, sus campañas sociales están presentes en sus redes sociales y los beneficiarios de sus aportes se encargan gratuitamente de dar a conocer a los demás estas buenas acciones de las empresas. El hecho que se pueda difundir la responsabilidad social de una compañía es muy importante, no solo por el hecho de que significa la mejora de la imagen de su organización, sino también porque se puede lograr una campaña más exitosa cuando se involucran a sus consumidores en la labor social. Por ejemplo, si una compañía ofrece incentivos a sus seguidores para contribuir con la causa social, hay más probabilidades de que la campaña social tenga mas éxito porque habrán más personas que respondan a la ayuda aunque ésta sea mínima. De la misma manera, sus consumidores se sentirán satisfechos de sentirse retribuidos por su ayuda y de que la empresa los considere parte de ellos. Realizar labores sociales es importante porque crea un lazo importante entre la comunidad, la organización y sus empleados. Además, está comprobado que compañías con una imagen sólida de responsabilidad social son menos vulnerables a crisis dentro de la organización y en tiempos difíciles en lo económico por la solidaridad cliente – empresa que se desarrolla. En 1982, Johnson & Johnson, sufrió de una crisis que le costó alrededor de 100 millones de dólares. Tylenol, unas de las marcas más conocidas de Johnson & Johnson, habría sufrido imperfecciones en su proceso de fabricación, lo cual causó la muerte de 7 personas. En circunstancias similares otros quizás hubieran pensado en un retiro silencioso del producto sin reconocer el error y mucho menos pensar en el otorgamiento de indeminizaciones. James Burke, el presidente de J&J, por el contrario, respondió rápidamente y sacó todas las pastillas del mercado sin importarle el costo. Además de eso ofreció ayuda gratuita a todos aquellos que habían comprado las pastillas. El hecho que J&J pudiera responder rápidamente hizo que la situación se mantenga bajo control, pero lo más importante fue que la reputación de J&J como una organización con gran responsabilidad social, ayudara a que la crisis no dure mucho tiempo. Se creía que Tylenol no iba a recuperarse de esa gran caída, sin embargo, dos meses después, las ventas fueron aún más altas que antes de la crisis. La compañía ha seguido pagando dividendos incrementales en 39 años. El periódico New York describe a Tylenol como la causa de que Johnson & Johnson sea visto como un héroe. (New York Times) El avance de la tecnología permite que se pueda medir con una aceptable aproximación el éxito de campañas publicitarias usando redes sociales, originando un rápido crecimiento del Marketing Digital en los últimos años. Facebook ofrece a los usuarios de páginas de negocios, ver cuantas personas vieron sus comentarios, incluso cuando sus fans no le ponen "Me Gusta". Por su parte Google ofrece Google Analytics para medir el tiempo de visita en páginas web así como también la cantidad de clicks y los sitios mas visitados dentro de la página. El éxito de toda campaña publicitaria o social, reside en el planeamiento estratégico del uso de estas herramientas fáciles de usar tal como son las redes sociales, y es por eso que las organizaciones grandes en su mayoría tienen integradas casi todas las redes sociales disponibles, siendo una de las de mayor popularidad y de mayor impacto en la fidelización del cliente, las acciones de Responsabilidad Social Empresarial. 251 Sobre la Autora: Dra. Leonor Ponce Luyo  Doctora en Administración  Maestría en Gestión Empresarial  Maestría en Políticas Publicas  Estudiante de Doctorado en Políticas Públicas.  Docente de la Escuela de Postgrado asignada al Curso: Responsabilidad Social del Programa de Maestría de Gerencia Social. Cargos más importantes:  Ex-Secretaria General de EsSalud  Ex-Presidenta de la Junta General de Accionistas de Sedam Junín.  Ex Regidora de la Municipalidad Provincial de Huancayo  Ex miembro integrante de la Junta de Accionistas de la Caja Municipal – Huancayo  Ex miembro de la Junta de SILSA Y ESVICSA – Bibliografía Digital Strategy Consulting. Digital Strategy Consulting. 31 Octubre 2013. 5 Enero 2014 <http://www.digitalstrategyconsulting.com/intelligence/2013/10/top_24_social_networks_w orldwide_facebook_youtube_and_qzone_lead_the_way.php >. Enter.Co. www.enter.co. Ed. ÉRICKA DUARTE ROA. 24 Diciembre 2013. 5 Enero 2014 <http://www.enter.co/#!/especiales/universoandroid/samsung-fue-la-marca-mas-popularen-redes-sociales-en-2013/>. New York Times. www.nytimes.com. Ed. Judith Rehak. 23 Marzo 2002. 4 Enero 2014 <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/23/your-money/23iht-mjj_ed3_.html>. 252 EL EJERCICIO DEL CONTROL GUBERNAMENTAL EN LAS ENTIDADES PÚBLICAS María J. Leyton Falen27, [email protected] RESUMEN Dentro del sector público, es obligatorio ejercer el Control Gubernamental por parte del Sistema Nacional de Control – SNC que lo conforman la Contraloría General de la República CGR, los Órganos de Control Institucional -OCI y las Sociedades de Auditoría -SOA. Para enmarcarnos y entender en que consiste el Control Gubernamental o Auditoria Gubernamental es importante conocer que es la Contraloría General de la República el Órgano Rector del Sistema, quien emite las normas, directivas y reglamentos que rigen el ejercicio del control en las entidades del Estado. Por su parte, los Órganos de Control Institucional son las Unidades Orgánicas que dependen funcionalmente de la Contraloría pero que funcionan en cada Institución Pública, y tienen también como función ejercer el Control Gubernamental. Por último las Sociedades de Auditoría, son Empresas particulares que se inscriben en la Contraloría para participar en las Convocatorias para generalmente Auditar los Estados Financieros de las Instituciones del Estado. Es en este contexto, que estos tres estamentos conformantes del Sistema Nacional de Control desarrollan los procedimientos y técnicas de auditoría para evaluar si los recursos financieros, humanos y materiales del Estado han sido utilizados de acuerdo a las normas legales vigentes para el sector público. EJERCICIO DEL CONTROL GUBERNAMENTAL De acuerdo a la Constitución Política del Perú la Contraloría General de la República es una entidad descentralizada autónoma, supervisa la legalidad de la ejecución del Presupuesto del Estado, de las operaciones de la deuda pública y de los actos de las instituciones sujetas a control. Con este marco legal, entraremos a definir los conceptos del ejercicio de la auditoría gubernamental: Control Interno 27 Contadora Pública Colegiada, MBA, estudios Doctorado Gestión y Políticas Públicas, especialización en Control Gubernamental, estudios Ingeniería Agrícola, Estudios de Finanzas Internacionales Barcelona España. Gerente General, Gerente de Administración, Gerente Control Administrativo, Gerente de Control Financiero, Asesora de Alta Dirección, Directora General de Planeamiento Innovación y Desarrollo en el Sector Público, Docente Universitaria, Pre y Postgrado. 253 Los Órganos de Control Institucional efectúan el control interno a la Entidad a la que pertenecen, realizan el control gubernamental a través de Exámenes Especiales a las instituciones públicas, estos exámenes se realizan a determinadas áreas de acuerdo a una programación establecida en el Plan Anual de Control elaborado por cada OCI y aprobado por la CGR. Control Externo La contraloría General de la República ejercita el control gubernamental de manera externa a las entidades del Estado, asimismo, las Sociedades de Auditoría realizan el Control Externo a las Instituciones Públicas. En la Auditoría Gubernamental existen tres Acciones de Control: 1. Auditoría a los Estados Financieros 2. Auditoría de Desempeño 3. Exámenes Especiales La auditoría a los Estados Financieros, es una Acción de Control que se realiza anualmente para auditar los Estados Financieros de las Entidades del Estado. En su mayoría es ejecutada por las Sociedades de Auditoría – SOA, son muy pocos los Órganos de Control Interno – OCI, que realizan esta acción de control, por falta de capacidad operativa. Por su parte, la Contraloría evalúa la Cuenta General de la República, presentada ante el Congreso a efectos de recomendar medidas para el mejor uso de los recursos públicos a través de la evaluación de los estados financieros y presupuestarios del Estado. La Auditoria de Desempeño, es una auditoría nueva recién se ha aprobado (18.OCT.2013), todavía no se ha ejecutado ninguna auditoria de Desempeño. Este control es un Examen en términos de eficacia, eficiencia, economía y calidad de los bienes o servicios que realizan las Entidades Públicas a efectos de alcanzar resultados en beneficio de la sociedad, teniendo en cuenta el logro de los objetivos y metas institucionales. Los Exámenes Especiales, evalúan determinadas áreas, denuncias, encargos, son las acciones de control que permanentemente son ejercidos por la Contraloría y por los OCI, son evaluaciones específicas y puntuales que permiten revelar si se han desviado los procedimientos o actos administrativos o si existen errores en las operaciones financieras, económica o presupuestales del área examinada. Como resultado de los Exámenes Especiales se emiten informes administrativos de auditoria conteniendo las observaciones, conclusiones y recomendaciones, si como consecuencia de realizar la Acción de Control en un Examen Especial, los auditores encuentran indicios razonables de comisión de delito, se emite un Informe Especial, que puede dar lugar a una acción penal y de encontrar perjuicio económico al Estado una acción civil. Los auditores gubernamentales son los que desarrollan los procedimientos y técnicas de auditoria, a través de comisiones de auditoría que están conformadas por un supervisor, un auditor encargado del Examen Especial, y un determinado número de auditores que a criterio del Jefe del OCI, entre otros factores responde al tamaño de la muestra a auditar. Esta comisión auditora para iniciar sus labores debe ser acreditada mediante documento firmado por el Jefe del OCI ante la máxima autoridad institucional, a efectos que se brinden las facilidades para que la comisión revise los registros, documentos y verifique las acciones realizadas durante el período a examinar. Fases de una Acción de Control Etapa de Planeamiento La comisión de auditoría inmediatamente conformada, tiene que elaborar un programa de auditoría que contenga los procedimientos y métodos que se van a emplear durante la 254 acción de control, el mismo que es aprobado por el Jefe del órgano de Control Institucional. Es en el Plan de Auditoría que se establecen los objetivos de la acción de control, los cuales guían al auditor para el desarrollo de los procedimientos y métodos para garantizar que no se desnaturalice la acción de control. Esta primera etapa de la acción de control se desarrolla en la oficina del Órgano de Control Interno, también se acopia y sistematiza información referida a la acción de control a desarrollar. Sobre este punto, quisiera detenerme para exponer lo que sucede cuando una comisión auditora realiza una acción de control y no tiene en cuenta los objetivos de la misma:  Hay casos en los cuales cuando se emiten los Informes de las acciones de control, las observaciones que se revelan no corresponden a los objetivos de la misma.  Otra falencia se da cuando el objetivo de la acción de control determina el alcance por un período determinado, sin embargo en el informe de auditoría se consignan observaciones que comprenden períodos anteriores o posteriores a la acción de control. Etapa de Trabajo de Campo o Ejecución Lo primero que tiene que hacer la comisión auditora en esta etapa es aplicar el cuestionario de Control Interno, para poder medir el ambiente de Control en el que tendrá que desarrollar sus actividades, este procedimiento es muy importante para el auditor porque una vez detectadas las debilidades del área a examinar el auditor puede identificar los riesgos inherentes a sus funciones y los riesgos inherentes a la Entidad o área que está examinando. En esta etapa el auditor aplica el Programa de Auditoría, para evaluar los procedimientos y/o actos administrativos del área examinada. Es importante precisar, que el auditor siempre debe ejercer el control gubernamental teniendo en cuenta los principios de Control Gubernamental de "Presunción de Licitud": salvo prueba en contrario se reputa que el funcionario o servidor público ha actuado de acuerdo a Ley; es decir que el auditor debe ir al campo sin perjuicio de querer encontrar observaciones o querer imputar responsabilidad a los funcionarios o servidores auditados. Si después de aplicar los procedimientos y métodos de auditoría el auditor encontrase evidencia (pruebas) que el auditado ha transgredido las normas legales vigentes, recién el auditor puede comunicar a los involucrados las desviaciones encontradas, las cuales en auditoría se denominan: hallazgos de auditoría. Antes de comunicar un hallazgo de auditoría el auditor debe asegurarse que las pruebas encontradas cumplan las tres características concurrentes: Relevancia, Competencia y Suficiencia. La relevancia se asocia a la importancia de la prueba en relación al hecho observado objetivamente. La competencia, se refiere a la naturaleza de la evidencia, la misma que debe ser válida y confiable. La suficiencia, está representada por la cantidad de evidencias o pruebas que se pueden encontrar en el hecho observado. Si alguna evidencia o prueba de auditoría no reúne estos tres elementos deja de ser una evidencia objetiva y puede ser refutada por el auditado, por lo que los auditores deben tener mucho cuidado y esmero profesional para encontrarlas y sustentarlas objetivamente. Si comunicado el hallazgo de auditoría, el auditado no presenta sus descargos y/o aclaraciones debidamente sustentadas, el auditor revela el hallazgo en el Informe de Auditoría en el rubro Observaciones. (El hallazgo comunicado que no es levantado por el auditado se convierte en observación). 255 Etapa de Gabinete o Informe En esta etapa los auditores vuelven a su oficina y elaboran el informe borrador de auditoría teniendo como base la evaluación realizada durante el trabajo de campo. El borrador del informe es revisado por el Jefe del Órgano de Control Institucional y luego de sustentarlo de tener alguna observación es corregido, para luego elaborar el Informe Final, el cual de acuerdo a la Ley Orgánica de la Contraloría General de la República y del Sistema Nacional de Control Ley N° 27785, es elevado al Titular del Pliego, a la Contraloría General de la República y una copia queda en el OCI. 256 CÁRNICAS SERRANO Y SU ÉXITO EN LA UNIÓN EUROPEA JULIO LA CRUZ AREVALO La compañía de alimentación, Cárnicas Serrano a cerrado 2012 con 15,5 millones de euros de facturación en mercados de la Unión Europea, un 10% más que el ejercicio anterior, consolidando su tendencia de crecimiento. Además 2012 ha sido el año en la que esta compañía de larga tradición exportadora ha logrado afianzar su presencia en los grandes mercados de gran consumo europeos como son Francia y Alemania. Cárnicas Serrano se sitúa entre las primeras españolas de su sector en volumen de producción. Sus orígenes Cárnicas Serrano es una empresa familiar, fundada en 1959, de capital cien por cien valenciano, de la que forma ya la tercera generación. Aunque, en su día, la actividad de la compañía se limitaba a elaborar y distribuir morcillas y, más tarde, otros productos, llegando incluso a tener 25 tiendas propias, lo cierto es que hoy en día, la gama de productos de Cárnicas Serrano ofrece una gran variedad. Sin embargo, en 1974 la firma decidió echar el cierre a las tiendas y dedicarse exclusivamente a la elaboración de productos cárnicos. La misión de Cárnicas Serrano comprende fundamentalmente "hacer la vida del consumidor más cómoda, saludable y placentera". . Características de sus productos Su amplia gama de productos, son creados enmarcados en su misión de hacer la vida de sus consumidores más cómoda, saludable y placentera. La línea destinada a proporcionar comodidad está compuesta por productos de platos pre cocidos y de libre servicio, envasados en pequeñas porciones de 50 gramos, que permiten preparar un único bocadillo", comenta su Director Gerente. Mediantelos envasados pequeños la compañía ha entrado en el canal de conveniencia y se adaptaa los nuevos tiempos en los que, como comenta Serrano: "Los dos miembros de la familia trabajan y no tienen tiempo para cocinar. Además, cada vez existen más hogares en los que vive una única persona, que necesita comprar envases individuales". El eje de facilitar al consumidor una vida saludable, que representa el 28% de las ventas totales de la firma, se logra con la gama de productos enriquecidos con vitaminas, Omega 3 o calcio, y los que son bajos en grasas. En esta línea, cabe destacar la morcilla 99% libre de grasa, producto por el que Cárnicas Serrano ha recibido el Premio SIAL de Oro al mejor producto tradicional. Se trata de un galardón internacional concedido en el marco de la feria SIAL de alimentación de París, y compitió con otros 27 países. Política deI + D La l + D para Cárnicas Serrano tiene un ratio de innovación del 15%. "Nuestro objetivo es que el 15% de nuestras ventas sea siempre de productos que tengan menos de tres años de antigüedad. Este reto nos obliga a lanzar productos nuevos cada año y así 257 justificamos la inversión anual en I + D", asegura Serrano. La empresa destina cada año entre el 4% y 5% de su facturación equivalente a 900,000 euros en tecnología. Colabora en materia de l + D con la Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, con quien trabaja en un proyecto de esterilización de productos y elabora un estudio que certifica que la morcilla libre de grasa es un producto ideal para mujeres embarazadas, comofuente de hierro y libre de grasa, explica Serrano. También consigue la difusión científica de sus productos y certificaciones. "Con la Universidad Politécnica inventamos una máquina para esterilizar los productos loncheados sin que pierdan propiedades", asegura Serrano. Y colabora con el Instituto Tecnológico de Óptica Aido, en un proyecto de visión artificial para asegurar la calidad de los loncheados. Proceso de Internacionalización Hace más de veinte años que la compañía emprendió su proceso de internacionalización, siendo en 1991 la primera empresa valenciana de alimentación autorizada por la UE para exportar sus productos. Desde entonces ha ido ganando peso, principalmente en países como Francia y Alemania. En la actualidad el 30% de las ventas totales de la compañía corresponde a mercados de la UE. Tiene como objetivo estratégico acabar 2015 con el 50% de la facturación global procedente de mercados internacionales, consolidándose en países como Reino Unido, Portugal, Benelux, Dinamarca, Suecia y Noruega. Actualmente, tiene presencia en algunas de las principales cadenas de distribución europeas como son Edeka, Intermarché, NorgesGruppen, Leclerc o Auchan, entre otras. Por otro lado, Serrano lleva presente en Cuba, a través de la filial Cárnicas Bravo, desde el año 1996. Esta es la primera empresa cárnica de la isla con sede en La Habana y anualmente factura unos 37,1 millones de dólares y cuya producción está destinada principalmente al sector hostelero y turístico. Serrano transmiteensus consumidores la experiencia autentica y genuina de disfrutar de productos típicamente españoles, lo cual le ha permitido posicionarse como marcas de referencia en diferentes cadenas de distribución europeas. Una autenticidad que parte del modo tradicional de hacer sus productos y contribuye a abrir camino a cada vez más empresas españolas a mercados antes inaccesibles. De hecho en su última campaña de branding internacional, Cárnicas Serrano ha lanzado el websitewww.familaserrano.tv que desarrolla esta imagen. Serrano cuenta con un sistema de calidad y seguridad alimentaria (procesos de fabricación y manipulación de alimentos) avalado por las certificaciones europeas BRC e IFS, necesarias para operar con las grandes empresas de distribución europeas Política social Su afán por promocionar el deporte le ha llevado a crear su propio club de atletismo, que cuenta con cincuenta miembros, y a patrocinar el Fondo Vía de Paterna, una pequeña maratón que se celebra anualmente de quince kilómetros de recorrido. Mucho más importantes en su compromiso con el Centro de Transfusiones, con quien la firma colabora regularmente Mapa Estratégico A fin de garantizar el éxito de su estrategia y alcanzar los resultados financieros la empresa desarrollo el siguiente Mapa Estratégico integrando sus cuatro perspectivas: financiera, de clientes, de procesos y de capacidades estratégic MBA Julio La Cruz 258 Proce so de la provisi ón de recurs os e s Gestión de la Innovación Nuevos productos I +D (4-5% venta) Maquina esterilizar loncheras Procesos Reguladores y Sociales Premio SIAL ORO 2004 Club de Atletismo Patrocinio "Fonda Vía Paterna" (maratón) Cultura Liderazgo Crecimiento Sostenido CÁRNICAS SERRANO Proceso de la realización del producto e s C L A C R C C E N A N D O I N T E G R A L (Nuevos productos) Gran Cartera de Clientes Estrategia de Productividad Estrategia de Crecimient o Proposición de valor: Hacer la vida del consumidor más cómoda, saludable y placentera FINANCIERA Marca Serrano Product os de platos precocin ados y de libre servicio (envase reducido ) Produ ctos enriq uecid os con vitam inasO mega 3, calcio y bajos en grasa Alineación Trabajo en equipo Capital organizati vo CAPACIDADE S ESTRATÉGIC AS PROCESOS Relación CLIENTE Capital Humano (puertas abiertas para los trabajadores y sus familias) Capital de la información Atributos, producto / servicio Imagen Mercados Maduros Exportac ión (10%) Produc tos tradici onales Pueblo Serran o Asociaci ón Cadena 259 FUENTE BIBLIOGRÁFICA:  KAPLAN S. Robert. y NORTON P. David. (2004). "Mapas Estratégicos" El cuaderno de mando integral. Gestión 2000.com.  KAPLAN S. Robert. y NORTON P. David. (2009). "El cuadro de mando integral" The Balanced Scorecard. 3° Edición.  BILANCIO, Guillermo (2006). "Estrategia" El equilibrio entre el CAOS y el ORDEN para participar el futuro de la empresa. Person S.A. Printer Hall. 1° edición.  TARZIJÁN M. Jorge (2007). "Fundamentos de estrategia empresarial" . Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile. 496 págs.  http://www.cserrano.com/ Referencia: JULIO LA CRUZ AREVALO Magister en Administración de Negocios de Centrum Católica (PUCP), Catedrático de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega durante 10 años. Ex Director de Finanzas de la Universidad Científica del Sur y ex Ejecutivo de la empresa Redondos S.A. (Grupo Favre). Consultor en temas de Estrategia Empresarial, Responsabilidad Social y Finanzas. 260 CAPITULO III DERECHO Y CIENCIAS POLITICAS 261 LA FE PÚBLICA NOTARIAL Dr. Luis Alfredo CUBA OVALLE. Ph. D.* Resumen La idea de certeza, crédito y confianza traducidos en la creencia, como potestad de un individuo que ejerce la potestad de dar fe pública en representación del Estado, no a título de particular si no en nombre del Estado, como una verdad oficial, como medida de valor jurídico del instrumento notarial, aunado a la investidura que posee para dar fe de los actos y contratos que ante él se celebran, con la potestad de formalizar la voluntad de los otorgantes, de redactar los instrumentos a los que confiere autenticidad, de conservary custodiar los originales y expedir los traslados correspondientes,comprobando hechos e inclusive tramitando procedimientos no contenciosos previstos en las leyes de la materia. Este aspecto subjetivo se halla limitado en espacio y tiempo, no tiene valor fuera del instrumento notarial, sin embargo, una vez autorizado la carga de la fe se concentra exclusivamente en él y la sociedad debe creerlo, pues se convierte en una verdad oficial, revestida de presunción legal de veracidad. La fe pública notarial nos interesa como resultado objetivo de la medida de valor jurídico del instrumento notarial ya que éste al estar premunido de fe pública notarial es un instrumento que reverbera la autenticidad, es por ello los instrumentos públicos notariales otorgados con arreglo a lo dispuesto en la ley, producen fe respecto a la realización del acto jurídico y de los hechos y circunstancias que el notario presencie. SUMARIO: 1. Antecedentes.2. Definición de Fe Pública.3. Concepto de Fe Pública.4. Clasificación de Fe Pública.5. Fe de conocimiento.6. Responsabilidad del Notario en la Dación de la Fe.7. Fe Pública Notarial.8. Fe Pública Notarial y el negocio jurídico.9. Fe Pública Notarial y el catastro.10.Fe Pública Administrativa.11. Fe Pública Notarial y seguridad jurídica. 1. ANTECEDENTES.Cuando hablamos de Fe Pública, hoy por hoy, en nuestro ordenamiento, no estamos refiriéndonos únicamente a la Fe Pública Notarial, existe también la administrativa y la judicial. Conforme al Diccionario de la Lengua Española de * Abogado UCSM. Título profesional en Derecho Registral PUCP. Posgraduado en Derecho Notarial, Registral e Inmobiliario por la Universidad Notarial Argentina. Magister en Derecho Civil UIGV. Magister Sciantiae UNA. Magister en Gestión Empresarial UNA. Doctor en Derecho UIGV. Doctor en Administración UNFV. Ph.D. en Estudios Legales Universidad del Atlántico. Post Doctoral en Investigación Científica en la Universidad José Antonio Echevarría de La Habana. Docente pre y post grado. Investigador. Conferencista. Notario de Lima. Miembro Honorario del Colegio de Notarios de Ica. Miembro Honorario del Colegio de Notarios de Huánuco y Cerro de Pasco. Ex Notario de la Provincia de San Román. 262 la Real Academia Española, la fe pública es la autoridad legítima atribuida a notarios, escribanos, agentes de cambio y bolsa, cónsules y secretarios de juzgados, tribunales y otros institutos oficiales, para que los documentos que autorizan en debida forma sean considerados como auténticos y lo contenido en ellos sea tenido por verdadero mientras no se haga prueba en contrario. Guillermo Cabanellas considera a la fe pública es la veracidad, confianza o autoridad legítima o atribuida a notarios, secretarios judiciales, escribanos, agentes de cambio y bolsa, cónsules y otros funcionarios públicos, o empleados y representantes de establecimientos de igual índole, a cerca de actos, hechos y contratos realizados o producidos en su presencia; y que se tienen por auténticos y con fuerza probatoria mientras no se demuestre su falsedad. El mismo autor precisa que como expresión laudatoria de esa prerrogativa está la inscripción que ostentan los notarios en medalla peculiar: "Nihil prius fide"(nada antes que la fe). El maestro Juan Ramírez Gronda considera a la fe pública como la fe que merecen los actos de los funcionarios con potestad para otorgarlos. Para Eduardo Benavides Benavente, la fe pública es la potestad legítima atribuida por la ley a ciertos funcionarios públicos (notarios, cónsules, jefes de los registros civiles, registradores, etc) para que los documentos y actos que autorizan sean tenidos por auténticos y verdaderos mientras no se pruebe lo contrario y así lo declare una resolución judicial firme. Manzini señala que la fe pública es la confianza colectiva recíproca en la que se desenvuelven determinadas relaciones sociales, como son las relativas a la circulación monetaria, a los medios simbólicos de autenticación o certificación, a los documentos y a la actividad comercial e industrial. Para Amado Ezaine Chávez la fe pública es la confianza acordada a ciertas personas con referencia a determinados actos, o, el instrumento que sirva para determinadas pruebas, además el mismo autor precisa que la fe pública se traduce en la confianza que tiene una colectividad con relación a esos actos o instrumentos. En términos latos, la fe pública es la confianza que merecen los funcionarios públicos autorizados para intervenir en los contratos y otros actos solemnes.Como antecedentes de la fe pública, encontramos el formalismo antiguo referido por HIRAM POZZO28, que indica que es el punto de partida referencial, ya que las funciones notarias estuvieron durante siglos en Roma en la magistratura in iure; en la edad media, a cargo del juez: jurisdicción voluntaria. El juez, en la sentencia, no podía negar lo que había visto su propia evidencia; no podía rectificar lo que había dicho, dictado o narrado. Siglos después, hecho histórico y narración en manos del mismo juez, pero solo en funciones notariales, continuaron juntos en su coetaneidad; pero narración y proceso se separaron; sin embargo, separados en el tiempo estaban unidos por la unidad del juez, unidad del órgano, aunque, a la postre, por contingencias subjetivas del órgano judicial, fueron distintas personas físicas. El ensayo más antiguo de la función legitimadora se ofrece en Roma, mediante la jurisdicción, con la in iure cessio. Sus orígenes se remontan probablemente, a los tiempos anteriores a las XII tablas, si bien no alcanza pleno desarrollo hasta después de esta ley. Según las XII tablas, cuando la persona demandada y llevada ante el magistrado – in iure – confiesa el derecho que asiste al demandante, se le tiene por condenada sin necesidad de sentencia: confesus por indicatoest. Para transferir el dominio de una cosa basta, pues, con acudir ante el magistrado simulando un pleito; el adquirente, como fingido demandante, alega su derecho de propiedad y transmitente como demandado, allanándose a reconocerlo, visto lo cual, el magistrado pronuncia la orden confirmatoria – addictio adjudicación – a favor del primero... SANAHUJA Y SOLER, considera que al amparo del proceso pseudo-contencioso afloran, pues, a la realidad de la vida jurídica, lo 28 HIRAM POZZO, José. Fe Pública. En Enciclopedia Jurídica OMEBA. Tomo XII. Driskill S.A. Buenos Aires. 1987. 263 conceptos de autenticación, legitimación y forma constitutiva, como cualidades del acto, necesarias para asegurar su existencia dentro de la normalidad29. HIRAM POZZO30, señala que, el proceso romano era apto para ensayos de certidumbre jurídica en sus más elevadas manifestaciones. Así se nos presenta a veces no como un organismo de coacción, sino como puro instrumento de especificación de la voluntad expresada por la ley en forma general. Dentro de ese proceso, es decir, adjuntos en el corpus juris civiles se mencionan diversos funcionarios que con distintos nombres, por mandato de la autoridad imponían el sello de certeza a los edictos y documentos oficiales. Lentamente en el curso de largos años, de todos esos funcionarios agregados al procedimiento judicial, fue ascendiendo el tabellion. Entonces la fe pública dejo de ser exclusivamente una especie de concesión soberana o desprendimiento del poder de imperio para lograrse por la actuación social y privada que condensó la confianza pública. Nace de este modo un poder jurídico que, obedeciendo a exigencias de la realidad, se acentúa en la medida en que pierden vigor las formas oficiales. Se descubre entonces las nuevas formas como producto espontáneo de las necesidades del orden jurídico. Giménez Arnau31, precisaba, que el tabellión, letrado y experto en las solemnidades prevenidas, redactaba los documentos que poseían las garantías de veracidad y legalidad a las que los magistrados, en mérito de su fehaciente origen, acordaba denominarlos instrumenta pública confecta. La legislación imperial reglamento e incrementó los poderes de actuación de tabellión, exigió la intervención de testigos, la redacción de una minuta o scheda por el tabellión y la extensión de una copia en limpio (mundum) que debía llevar adherido un sello (protocolum).Desde entonces, en periodos seculares, a través de la escuela de Polonia, con el insigne Ronaldino (siglo XIII), las partidas de Alfonso el Sabio, la Pragmática de Alcalá (1503) y la ley francesa del 25 de Ventoso32, se llega paulatinamente a la configuración actual del notario del mundo latino con su autonomía, independencia y responsabilidad propia y por cierto la jerarquía y el privilegio que las leyes le atribuyen en el ejercicio de la fe pública. Original o no, se ha dicho que es la Ley del Ventoso (año de 1803), la primera que lleva al campo del notariado, las consecuencias de la revolución política. España, Austria, Piamonte, Portugal, Italia, principalmente y en menos medida Alemania, Inglaterra y Suiza, son poderosamente influidas por la legislación notarial francesa, antecedente histórico de la Unión Internacional del notariado Latino. Por lo que se refiere a la América del Sur, su influencia es manifiesta. Si bien, superado ya el modelo, se debe señalar como fenómeno histórico de trascendental importancia en la historia del notariado la ley de 1803, que pone fin a una etapa y comienza otra nueva33. 2. DEFINICIÓN DE FE PÚBLICA.Etimológicamente la palabra "fe", proviene del latín "facere", que significa crédito, confianza, seguridad. José Carneiro Silva, considera que la palabra fe, en su acepción genérica, es: "La idea de creencia en todas sus modalidades". La fe pública, es esa certeza, eficacia, firmeza, asentimiento, verdad que tiene el poder público representado por el notario cuando éste interviene en cada acto, documento o contrato. Es la autoridad legítima para que otorgue autenticidad en la relación de verdad entre lo dicho, lo ocurrido y lo documentado. La fe pública es la garantía que el Estado da en el sentido de que los hechos que interesan al derecho son verdaderos, auténticos. Lo anterior, por cuanto en la realidad social existen una serie de hechos y actos con relevancia jurídica que si bien no todos los ciudadanos pueden presenciar, deben ser creídos y aceptados como verdad oficial. 29 SANAHUJA Y SOLER, J.M. Tratado de Derecho Notarial. Barcelona. 1945. 30 HIRAM POZZO, José. Fe Pública. En Enciclopedia Jurídica OMEBA. Tomo XII. Driskill S.A. Buenos Aires. 1987. 31 GIMENEZ ARNAU, E. Introducción al Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1941. 32 GONZALES PALOMINO. J. Instituciones de Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1948. 33 GIMENEZ ARNAU, E. Introducción al Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1941. 264 La eficacia de la fe pública es erga omnes, pues no existe fe pública entre partes, y por ese motivo es oponible a terceros no relacionados con el documento en que se hubiere vertido dicha fe, ya que las manifestaciones que obraren bajo la cobran fuerza probatoria por sí mismas. La base para elaborar una definición de fe pública se encuentra en la noción de que es el género al que pertenece. La fe pública nació sin calificativo alguno, por cuanto que únicamente existía un oficio depositario de esta función. De esta manera, el escribano era el encargado de la misma, tanto en el terreno judicial como en el extrajudicial. No sólo se presentaba como una garantía de los justiciables frente al juzgador, sino que también se imponía en las relaciones del tráfico jurídico, tanto públicas como privadas.En la literatura jurídica se encuentran diversas definiciones que pueden agruparse en torno a dos ideas principales: el carácter de autoridad del sujeto activo y la imposición estatal. No obstante, alrededor de aquéllas giran dos notas que les son comunes: la certeza y la seguridad jurídica. La idea de «autoridad legítima» de que están investidos los fedatarios públicos. Esta calidad ha sido utilizada para decir que la fe pública tiene como fin la autorización de documentos, aunque, en realidad, la documentación constituye un medio para alcanzar aquélla. Según el origen del carácter de autoridad, se ha distinguido entre la fe (humana) pública y la fe privada: si se trata de una autoridad pública, entonces hablamos de fe pública. En efecto, la fe o credibilidad de esa autoridad pública se llama fe pública. Esto es, la fe pública es una certidumbre producida por el Derecho cuyo fundamento es la estabilidad en las relaciones de la vida social, cuya calidad y autoridad deriva de la intervención del funcionario de fe pública o del «magistrado de fe pública».Tradicionalmente, la fe pública se ha fundado en la necesidad de perpetuar los hechos que producen alteraciones en el equilibrio jurídico de la sociedad con el fin de vencer el transcurso del tiempo, para lo cual es preciso revestirlos «de una autoridad que les dé fuerza moral para imponérnoslos como ciertos,autenticar (es decir, autorizar o legalizar) con la presencia del fedatario actos y acuerdos ajustados a un rito o formulismo legalmente previsto. 3. CONCEPTO DE FE PÚBLICA.Etimológicamente la palabra "fe", proviene del latín "facere", que significa crédito, confianza, seguridad. José Carneiro Silva, considera que la palabra fe, en su acepción genérica, es: "La idea de creencia en todas sus modalidades"34. Recordemos que para GONZALO DE LAS CASAS35, la fe pública es la presunción legal de veracidad respecto a ciertos funcionarios a quienes la Ley reconoce como probos y verdaderos, facultándoles para darla a los hechos y convenciones que pasan entre los ciudadanos. Carneiro36, señalaba, que la fe pública es suficiente para acreditar -por si misma-, la verdad a que se refiere, en tanto que señala como fe pública notarial, a aquella que el notario declara en ejercicio de su función. Aseveración que emana del notario a fin de otorgar, garantía de autenticidad y certeza a los hechos, actos y contratos celebrados en su presencia y con su intervención. Hiram Poso37, señala que la doctrina uniforme que se da en un buen número de tratados, llama fe pública ala calidad de documentos determinados, suscritos por funcionarios cuyas aseveraciones, cumplidas determinadas formalidades, tiene la virtud de de garantizar la autenticidad de los hechos narrados y por consiguiente su validez y eficacia jurídica. Este autor considera que esa definición, se refiere a la valoración jurídica de una representación ontológica y se aparta del juicio lógico de la fe como creencia o 34 CARNEIRO SILVA. José. Régimen Legal del Notariado en el Perú. Ital Perú. Lima.1981. 35 Citado por GIMENEZ ARNAU. Derecho Notarial, cit. p. 6. 36 CARNEIRO SILVA. José. Régimen Legal del Notariado en el Perú. Ital Perú. Lima.1981. 37 HIRAM POZZO, José. Fe Pública. En Enciclopedia Jurídica OMEBA. Tomo XII. Driskill S.A. Buenos Aires. 1987. 265 convicción.Podemos afirmar que la fe pública es la convicción y certeza de lo que vemos o hallamos visto en razón de quién lo diga o de ante quién se halla redactado, que es el notario, en merito suyo, como autoridad legítima encargada de dar fe pública de los actos y contratos que ante él se celebran, así como de los hechos que personalmente percibe y ahora además de los asuntos no contenciosos que tramita y resuelve, con fuerza probatoria y autenticidad. Hiram Pozzo38, afirma que la fe pública, en suma involucra representaciones que relatan y reproducen hechos de existencia indiscutible en la empresa de reafirmar y confirmar derechos. Verdad válida, con eficacia jurídica. Teniendo en cuenta que el derecho es una operación espontánea de la sociedad, pero la sociedad es convivencia bajo instancias, de los senos profundos y ultra jurídicos de la sociedad surge en suma, la ley promovida por las costumbres, la fórmula de Horacio: Leges sine moribusvanae que significa que las leyes son nulas sin las costumbres, lo cual es uno de los grandes principios de la Sociología como lo señala Ortega y Gasset39. Para resaltar la importancia de un instrumento público, Bibiloni, que el documento privado judicialmente reconocido tiene recién el valor de un instrumento público, de ello comenta, que: "El instrumento privado reconocido judicialmente por la parte a quién se opone, o declarado debidamente reconocido, tiene el mismo valor que el instrumento público entre los que lo han suscrito y sus sucesores"40. En consecuencia, la fe pública, es esa certeza, eficacia, firmeza, asentimiento, verdad que tiene el poder público representado por el notario cuando éste interviene en cada acto, documento o contrato. Es la autoridad legítima para que otorgue autenticidad en la relación de verdad entre lo dicho, lo ocurrido y lo documentado.Por otro lado cabe dejar sentado que la fe pública no sólo se refieren a los documentos públicos, si no que va más allá, es decir que ahora hay que hablar de documentos de fe pública, los que no solamente son medios de prueba, si no que exceden en mucho esa significación, por ser certeza absoluta. A este respecto Nuñez Lagos dice: "El documento vale para el orden jurídico, con independencia de su aptitud probatoria, porque al exponer un hecho que no es indiferente al derecho, el documento es, a su vez, hecho jurídico. Los efectos de los hechos jurídicos, son independientes de su prueba"41. CastanTobeñas, señala que: "La fe pública no puede ser explicada ya como u mero ingrediente de las pruebas, ha quedado arrinconado para siempre el viejo punto de vista que ligaba exclusivamente el instrumento público notarial a la teoría de la prueba"42. Moises Jorge Savaransky43, señala: (...) que la "Fe Pública, es la garantía que da el Estado que determinados hechos, situaciones e intereses son ciertos. La fe pública, de acuerdo acon la doctrina clásica, puede dividirse en cuatro categorías: la veracidad de los hechos resultantes de disposiciones legislativas; la veracidad de los actos de declaración de los derechos; la veracidad de los actos de ejecución, y la veracidad de la realización de los presupuestos de los hechos de las normas, de los cuales derivan consecuencias jurídicas. Las normas son atributivas de deberes jurídicos y sus correlativos derechos. La manera de ejercitar los derechos, consiste en la demostración de la real existencia del factum de la norma de la cual derivan. De tal importancia son los intereses que de esa manera se protegen, que el estado se ocupa de garantizarlos, confiriendo a determinadas categorías de relaciones la calidad de ciertos. Ello resulta del ejercicio de la fe pública, 38 HIRAM POZZO, José. Fe Pública. En Enciclopedia Jurídica OMEBA. Tomo XII. Driskill S.A. Buenos Aires. 1987. 39 ORTEGA Y GASSET. José. Teoría de los complementos de la vida colectiva, en obras completas. T. 6. Madrid. 1952. 40 BIBILONI. J. A. Anteproyecto de las reformas del código civil argentino. Buenos Aires. 1928. 41 NUÑEZ LAGOS, R. Conceptos y clases de documentos. En revista del Derecho Notarial. N. 16. Madrid. 1957. 42 CASTAN TOBEÑAS, J. Hacia la constitución científica del derecho Notarial. En revista de Derecho Notarial. Madrid. Año 1. 43 MOISES JORGE SAVRANSKY. Función y Responsabilidad Notarial. AbeledoPerrot. Buenos Aires. 1962. 266 sea directamente por orden superior o sea indirectamente por delegación en persona competente, con facultad de declarar la veracidad de las relaciones que instrumenta. La existencia del notario, obedece a la necesidad general de la prueba, función que se cumple eficazmente en virtud de su calidad de técnico competente, que capta la realización del hecho en el momento de producirse". 4. CLASIFICACION DE LA FE PÚBLICA.Encontramos diversas clasificaciones de la fe pública en atención a la función de quién la otorga o a su propia naturaleza, veamos: 4.1. EN ATENCION A LA FUNCION DE QUIEN LA OTORGA.Como la fe pública es una calidad atribuida a los documentos otorgados por funcionarios, autoridades y profesionales, según su función, cargo, ocupación o profesión, desde esta perspectiva es necesario clasificarla por la cualidad diversa de sus autores o autorizantes, como lo dice Sanahuja y Soler44, puede haber una fe pública legislativa, judicial, administrativa y notarial. Para De Velazco45 la fe pública puede ser: administrativa, política y civil privada. Para Jiménez Arnau46 es también registral, y para Núñez Lagos47 es además mercantil. 4.2. SEGÚN SU NATURALEZA.Atendiendo a su naturaleza la fe pública se puede clasificar de la siguiente forma: a) La Fe Pública.Como se tiene dicho la fe pública, es la confianza, certeza y certidumbre de verdad respecto de los actos, hechos y contratos realizados en presencia de un notario, en ejercicio de sus atribuciones y por su sola intervención rogada. Es el notario el profesional del derecho del que fluye la verdad oficial, Es la otorgada por funcionario público, en ejercicio de sus atribuciones. b) Plena Fe.Es la que causa convencimiento pleno en las personas. Para Carnelutti48, es el crédito que se da a una cosa por autoridad del que la dice. Por ejemplo el abrogado Código de Procedimientos Civiles de 1912, reconocía plena fe a los instrumentos públicos, al darles el nivel de medios de prueba relevantes. c) Fe Legítima.Es la que emana de autoridad o persona revestida de autoridad legítima. Se dice que esta es la autoridad competente, debidamente establecida en el cargo o función. d) Concepto de Verdad.= Etimológicamente la palabra verdad provine del vocablo latino "veritas" que significa calidad de cierto o de lo que es cierto. Se le ha vinculado con la certeza, pues lo cierto es verdad, de allí lo verdades científicas, exactas y en lo que es el Derecho Notarial la verdad es la bona FIDE es decir la buena fe. e) Fe Pública Notarial.Es la fe que emana del notario, en el ejercicio de la función notarial, y que se traduce en la fe de conocimiento y en la fe de identificación. Núñez Lagos49, señala que: "La fe pública notarial, depurada de móviles circunstanciales o eventuales, es paradigma de la institución. Les jugements tirent leer autorité de la signatura de juge, et non de la signatura des greffiers, tandis que les actes notaires recoiventleerautiorité de la seule asignature de Notaire... Le Notairefaitacte de jurisdiction". La fe pública notarial, segregada de la función notarial que alguna vez ejercieron los estrados judiciales, heredada la misión que durante siglos estuvo a cargo del juez, el notario por virtud de la ley, es ahora el órgano que se constituye en el elemento activo de 44 SANAHUJA Y SOLER, J.M. Tratado de Derecho Notarial. Barcelona. 1945. 45 DE VELAZCO. Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1941. 46 GIMENEZ ARNAU, E. Introducción al Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1941. 47 NUÑEZ LAGOS, R. Conceptos y clases de documentos. En revista del Derecho Notarial. N. 16. Madrid. 1957. 48 CARNELUTTI, Francisco. La figura jurídica del notario, conferencia en la academia Matritense del Notariado. Madrid. 1950. 49 NUÑEZ LAGOS, R. En Revista de Derecho Notarial. Madrid. 1958. 267 la verdad a la que confiere certeza objetiva y la consiguiente eficacia, sin que se haya cambiado el fundamento de la estructura lógico jurídica de su formación producto de la ciencia y conciencia notarial: evidencia, coetaneidad de la fe pública originaria. Pero esa segregación que importo desasir a la función notarial de la dependencia judicial, no constituyo una simple bifurcación sino que, por sus esencias, su plenitud jurídica y la enjundia de su contenido adquirió pronto el carácter axiológico que se le reconoce. 5.FE DE CONOCIMIENTO.Conocida también por dación de fe notarial o en el derecho francés e italiano por identificación del documento y su constancia. El notario deba dar fe de que conoce a los otorgantes. Estas simples palabras nos introducen en un tema muy importante a la hora de analizar. ¿Qué es la fe de conocimiento?: Es una derivación de la fe pública en general. Es toda afirmación, certeza, verdad que el notario por delegación del Estado ejerce o reviste logrando un juicio o calificación sobre un sujeto en sí mismo, producto de en una convicción racional que el mismo emite o formula basado en medios adecuados actuando con prudencia y cautela. Esa afirmación positiva o negativa, racionalmente formada por el notario que asegura bajo su responsabilidad la identidad personal del sujeto, surge ya sea por conocimiento directo que tenga del compareciente o por los elementos identificatorios aportados. 5.1. MEDIOS CON QUE CUENTA EL NOTARIO EN ÉSTA TAREA.Consideramos que el notario en su función debe extremar los cuidados para que su opinión o juzgamiento a cerca de la identidad de la persona sometida a consideración sea realmente quién dice serlo; para ello debe recurrir a distintos medios de conocimientos. No se puede recurrir a hechos inciertos, pues como lo dice VIDAL RAMIREZ50, los hechos inciertos son contingentes, en el sentido que no pueden verificar. Pero existen medios directos e indirectos. Los primeros se refieren al conocimiento real que el notario tiene sobre la persona que tiene considerar, a tal punto que no necesita de ayuda ajena, simplemente porque sabe a ciencia cierta que fulano es quién dice ser; en cambio, cuando carece de un conocimiento anterior y tiene que adquirirlo allí comienzan a funcionar los medios indirectos. Dentro de éstos existen para el notario alternativas de identificación; por una parte, todos los elementos documentales tales como el documento nacional de identidad emitido por funcionarios públicos competentes del RENIEC (Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil), o instituciones autorizadas de la Fuerzas Armadas y Policía Nacional del Perú, por otro lado, es bueno realizar cotejo de firma cuando el notario ya a registrado a la persona anteriormente en su protocolo y comparece nuevamente obtenido así la conclusión correspondiente, según haya o no seguridad. Algunas leyes facultan al notario a requerir de testigos de conocimiento. Son dos personas conocidas por el notario que a su vez conocen y presentan a la persona que el notario tiene que identificar. Sólo actúan a requerimiento del escribano para que de ésta forma pueda dar fe de conocimiento a los otorgantes. El notario con todos los elementos descriptos tiene que formar su propia convicción y ejecutar el acto de acuerdo a su propia valoración o apreciación subjetiva sobre la identificación de los otorgantes. 5.2. LA AUTENTICIDAD DEL DOCUMENTO.El instrumento auténtico es aquel que está garantizado en su certeza, seguridad jurídica por haber intervenido el notario como delegado del Estado. Por tal motivo, dicho instrumento o documento tendrá presunción privilegiada de veracidad y gozará de una credibilidad que hará prueba por sí mismo de su contenido otorgando coacción para su imposición. 5.3. LA EXTRANEIDAD.El notario no puede ser parte interesada en el documento en que interviene, tampoco lo puede respecto de sus parientes consanguíneos. Este principio refleja la necesaria imparcialidad que debe tener el Notario al momento de ejercer su 50 VIDAL RAMIREZ, Fernando. Teoría General del Acto Jurídico. Primera Edición. Cultural Cuzco S.A. Lima 1985. 268 función, pues resulta cierto que muchas veces la profesionalidad se ve limitada por valoraciones pre impuestas, o por hipótesis preconcebidas, que pueden alterar más idóneo de los profesionales, es por ello que es conveniente evitar tentaciones de favorecerse a sí mismo o a sus propios familiares. 5.4.LA ROGACIÓN.El notario no actúa de oficio, sino a requerimiento de parte. Esa, así que la actuación del notario no puede ser oficiosa, pues siempre ha de ser rogatoria, esto es a instancia de la parte interesada en el servicio notarial. Dentro de las funciones del notario está la de calificar el negocio o acto jurídico que las partes quieren celebrar o el hecho que se dispusieron comprobar. 5.5. DOCUMENTO NOTARIAL.En sentido jurídico la palabra documento es el papel escrito y por lo general firmado para hacer constar un hecho o acto51. En el sentido estricto es el producto de un acto humano, perceptible, que sirve de prueba histórica, indirecta o representativa de un hecho o acto. El documento notarial es una subespecie del documento, que se caracteriza y se diferencia por su autor: el notario. El notario en tal caso procede a darle al documento forma y autenticidad, caracterizándose además por su corporalidad, causalidad, espacialidad, y temporalidad. Por ello es conveniente recordar el carácter de auténtico del documento notarial, BONNECASE52, señala que un documento auténtico es el autorizado por un oficial público competente, en cuanto a la naturaleza de los hechos que se hacen constar en el, y al lugar de su redacción. 5.6. CONDICIONES DE VALIDEZ DEL DOCUMENTO NOTARIAL.Si empezamos con lo elemental, es decir con la simple validez del acto jurídico, coincidimos con RUBIO CORREA53, cuando señala que la validez del acto jurídico implica las características que el acto jurídico asume al haberse reunido en él todos los requisitos fácticos y jurídicos establecidos por el Derecho para su conclusión debida. En consecuencia podemos afirmar que un documento notarial es válido cuando se cumplen los siguientes requisitos: Cuando el notario actúa en el ámbito de su competencia, material y territorial.Cuando se observan las disposiciones que hacen a la capacidad, libertad y conocimiento, etc., de los otorgantes y testigos del acto notarial.Cuando el profesional tiene en cuenta la forma establecida por la ley para que el acto exista, respetando las formas ad-solemnitaten y adprobationem según corresponda. Cuando el notario en su calidad de asesor, consejero e intérprete de la voluntad de los requirentes lo adapta a normas jurídicas vigentes y valederas, observando los requisitos de validez formal y material. Encontramos relaciones de identidad, lo que se encuentra debidamente enmarcado en la individualización de los comparecientes, para ello debemos recordar que en nuestro país los peruanos sólo se identifican con su Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI), tanto civiles como miembros de los institutos armados y de la Policía Nacional; 54 por otro lado las personas jurídicas se identifican su Registro Único de Contribuyentes (RUC); y, los extranjeros se identifican con su Carné de Extranjería si fueran residentes en el Perú, o con su pasaporte cuando son residentes temporales (en este caso deben contar con ingreso válido al país, y si es que van a celebrar actos o negocios jurídicos deberán contar 51 Definición lata. En vías de simplificación Larraud, en su Curso de Derecho Notarial, señala que todo documento en el que interviene el notario se reputa notarial. 52 BONNECASE, Julien. Elementos de Derecho Civil: Derecho de las obligaciones de los contratos y del crédito. Volumen XIV, Tomo II, Editorial José MariaCajica. Puebla. 1945. 53 RUBIO CORREA, Marcial. Para Leer el Código Civil. Nulidad y Anulabilidad. La invalidez del Acto Jurídico. Volumen IX. Primera Edición. Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima. 1989. 54 Cabe señalar que hasta hace poco tiempo los efectivos de las fuerzas armadas se identificaron únicamente con su Tarjeta de Identidad Personal (TIP) y los miembros de la Policía Nacional se identifican con su Carné de Identidad Policial (CIP), actualmente cuentan con su Documento Nacional de Identidad (DNI), que es el documento con el que identifican ante la sociedad. 269 además con la autorización para celebrar actos y contratos que otorga Migraciones previo pago de los derechos correspondientes), ya sea por Turismo o tránsito. 6. RESPONSABILIDAD DEL NOTARIO EN LA DACION DE FE.No podemos decir que no hay responsabilidad en ésta tarea, ya que "el derecho descansa en la idea de que el hombre es responsable de sus actos autor de un acto perjudicial no puede ampararse en una concepción fatalista o determinista del mundo a fin de librarse de las consecuencias de su actuación", han dicho Planiol y Ripert55. Lo que interesa destacar que se debe sancionar cuando hay una intención delictuosa, coparticipación, fraudes y suplantaciones o usurpaciones de identidad. Existe responsabilidad penal en el notario cuando en su accionar hay una falsedad deliberada que nos conduce al dolo. Igualmente será responsable civilmente por dolo, culpa o negligencia. Conocida también por dación de fe notarial o en el derecho francés e italiano por identificación del documento y su constancia. El Código Civil Argentino dispone que el escribano debe dar fe de que conoce a los otorgantes. Estas simples palabras nos introducen en un tema muy importante a la hora de analizar. Nuestro D. Leg. del Notariado, contenida en el Decreto Legislativo No 1049, establece la responsabilidad del Notario para sus diferentes actuaciones, como es el caso de las escrituras públicas, respecto de las cuales señala en su artículo 54 inciso h, que la: "La fe del notario de la capacidad, libertad y conocimiento con que se obligan los comparecientes"56; así mismo el tercer parágrafo del numeral 55 de este cuerpo legal señala que: "El Notario que diere fe de identidad de alguno de los comparecientes, inducido a error por la actuación maliciosa de los mismos o de otras personas, no incurrirá en responsabilidad"; de igual forma su numeral 102, respecto de las Cartas Notariales, señala que: "El notario no asume responsabilidad, sobre el contenido de la carta, ni de la firma, identidad, capacidad o representación de quienes aparecen suscribiéndolo (remitentes)"57. El artículo 2 de la Ley de Asuntos No Contenciosos de Competencia Notarial, para la regularización de edificaciones Ley No 27333 - (Ley complementaria de la Ley No 26662), señala literalmente: "El Notario no incurrirá en responsabilidad si es inducido a error de acuerdo a la actuación maliciosa de los interesados, siempre y cuando haya tomado todas la medidas necesarias en el proceso de verificación respecto de la legalidad de los documentos". También es necesario tomar en cuenta que el notario no es funcionario público, conforme lo preceptúa el artículo No 425 del D. Leg. No 635 (Código Penal Vigente), salvo los que desempeñan cargos públicos o de confianza, incluso si emanan de elección popular. Así mismo, respecto de las copias certificadas la Ley del Notariado precisa en su artículo 105, que: "El notario no asume responsabilidad por el contenido del libro u hojas sueltas, acta o documento, ni firma, identidad, capacidad o representación de quienes aparecen suscribiéndolo"58; así mismo el artículo 108 del mismo cuerpo legal señala que: "El notario no asume responsabilidad sobre el contenido del documento, salvo que constituya en sí mismo un acto ilícito o contrario a la moral o a las buenas costumbres"59. Todo esto nos lleva a analizar la gran importancia que significa la función notarial, donde el notario se encuentra con toda clase de personas, desde la más humildes hasta las más solventes, desde las más honestas hasta las más deshonestas, inmorales y hasta delictuales, y es que es sencillo el poder sorprender a un notario en esta época donde la ciencia y la tecnología han avanzado en forma imparable, donde la fabricación de 55 PLANIOL, Marcel y RIPERT, Georges. Tratado Práctico de Derecho Civil Francés. Traducción española del doctor Mario Díaz Cruz del Colegio de Abogados de la Habana, Cuba. Cultural S.A., La Habana. 1945. 56 D. LEG. DEL NOTARIADO PERUANO (DECRETO LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 1049). 57 D. LEG. DEL NOTARIADO PERUANO (DECRETO LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 1049). 58 D. LEG. DEL NOTARIADO PERUANO (DECRETO LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 1049. 59 D. LEG. DEL NOTARIADO PERUANO (DECRETO LEGISLATIVO NUMERO 1049. 270 documentos fraudulentos se realizan con el auxilio de las ciencias de la computación e informática, con scanner de última generación, con mecanismos digitalizados que han convertido a ciertos operadores de sistemas en grandes falsificadores, que han contribuido a generar situaciones de inseguridad y riesgo, encontrándose cada vez mas documentos fraudulentos que el notario muy difícilmente puede detectar, máxime si se tiene en cuenta que el notario no es un perito, ni experto en grafotecnia. 7.LA FE PÚBLICA NOTARIAL.La fe propiamente dicha en términos genéricos implica creencia, convicción, persuasión, certeza, seguridad, confianza. Es esa relación de verdad entre el hecho y el dicho. La fe se clasifica en divina y humana, a su vez, en la fe humana se distingue la fe particular y la pública y en ésta última se ubican la fe pública judicial, administrativa y notarial. Es motivo de exposición la fe pública notarial y decimos que es esa certeza, eficacia, veracidad, que otorga el poder público a los notarios para que por medio de éstos otorguen a los actos y contratos privados la verdadera autenticidad de los mismos. El notario es el verdadero representante de la fe, y de la verdad al servicio de todos los requirentes. El notario con su firma y sello robustecerá con presunción de verdad todo hecho y acto sometido a su amparo, y el documento valdrá por sí mismo. La prueba es sólo consecuencia de su existencia. Desde éste punto de vista, decimos que la función notarial constituye una de las actividades más importantes que engrandecen la seguridad y garantía de los negocios jurídicos, transformando algún hecho en derecho.En la actualidad la sociedad necesita de cierta estabilidad y seguridad en sus relaciones comerciales, es por ello que en muchos casos se busca un profesional para que oriente, aconseje, e ilustre con su saber entender, es allí, donde el notario debe actuar no sólo como consultor jurídico sino también como consultor moral. Por lo que en tiempos tan complejos y controvertidos la fe privada es enteramente ineficaz, más aún como lo dice CARNEIRO60, la autenticidad de la fe privada es siempre cuestionable (la fe privada es la que emana de la declaración de cualquier persona). Se conoce la fe según el origen de la autoridad de que provenga; puede ser fe religiosa o humana. La fe religiosa proviene de la autoridad de Dios, que ha revelado algo a los hombres. La fe humana proviene de aseveraciones hechas por el hombre. La fe significa confianza, creer en algo, es una convicción. Por tanto, para que la fe pueda ser pública, es decir, frente a todas las personas, necesita de la facultad legal para ser otorgada a determinados funcionarios tanto del Estado como particulares. La fe pública es una "presunción legal de veracidad respecto a ciertos funcionarios a quienes la ley reconoce como probos y verdaderos facultándoles para darla a los hechos y convenciones que pasan entre los ciudadanos." Esta afirmación es citada por Giménez-Arnau del Maestro Gonzalo de las Casas. Es por ello que Giménez-Arnau establece que "la fe pública no será la convicción del espíritu en lo que no se ve, sino la necesidad de carácter jurídico que nos obliga a estimar como auténticos e indiscutibles los hechos o actos sometidos a su amparo, queramos o no queramos creer en ellos". Giménez-Arnau comenta que la expresión fe pública tiene un doble significado; uno es en el sentido jurídico, dar fe significa atestiguar solemnemente, entendido como acto positivo; por el contrario dar fe en el sentido gramatical significa otorgar crédito a lo que otra persona manifiesta; significa una función pasiva. Doctrinalmente en el derecho notarial se conocen dos tipos de fe pública; la originaria y la derivada. La originaria cuando el hecho o el acto del que se pretende dar fe es percibido por los sentidos del notario. Por ejemplo cuando el notario asienta una certificación de 60 CARNEIRO SILVA, José A. Régimen Legal del Notariado en el Perú. Ital Perú. Lima. 1981. 271 hechos en su protocolo o da fe del otorgamiento de un testamento. La fe pública derivada consiste en dar fe de hechos o escritos de terceros, en este caso el notario no ha percibido sensorialmente el acontecimiento del hecho O el otorgamiento del acto que plasmará en su protocolo. Tal es el caso cuando el notario protocoliza el acuerdo del Consejo de Administración de una Sociedad Anónima, otorgándole poderes a un tercero. El Estado tiene dentro de sus fines la realización del derecho; para llegar a tal fin debe establecer la reglamentación de las diversas funciones de la fe pública. La fe pública puede distinguirse en las siguientes clases: fe pública administrativa, fe pública judicial, fe pública extrajudicial o notarial y en fe pública registral. La fe pública administrativa tiene por objeto dar notoriedad y valor de hechos auténticos a los actos realizados por el Estado. "Esta fe administrativa se ejerce a través de documentos expedidos por las propias autoridades que ejercen la gestión administrativa en los que se consignan órdenes, comunicaciones y resoluciones de la administración". Los documentos de carácter judicial, son los que gozan de la fe pública judicial. Debido a la trascendencia de las actuaciones ante los Tribunales -de la materia que seaes menester que estén revestidas de un sello de autenticidad que se imprime en ellas por virtud de la fe pública judicial. Las relaciones jurídicas realizadas entre particulares necesitan hacerse constar en escrituras públicas para producir sus efectos jurídicos. Por ello para hacer constar dichos actos es necesario hacerlo a través de la fe pública notarial. Más adelante se explicará la forma en que la fe notarial se apoya en la publicidad de los actos por medio del Registro Público de la Propiedad y del Comercio. Ya se comentó anteriormente que el Estado debe encargarse de otorgar seguridad jurídica a los particulares, de la misma forma en que se les da certidumbre a los actos del mismo. El Estado debe proteger los derechos privados, así como garantizarlos contra cualquier intento de violación. Por esto el Estado solamente podrá proteger aquello cuya existencia le conste. Es entonces el Estado quien reviste a determinadas personas con la fe pública notarial; la ley del notariado para el Distrito Federal de 1999 establece en el artículo 10 este carácter que posee el notario. La nueva ley contempla en el mismo sentido que el notario debe estar investido de fe pública en el artículo 42. Para robustecer lo plasmado anteriormente nos remitiremos a la teoría que plantea el maestro Pedro Ávila acerca de la fe pública, la cual indica que "la función del notario es la de dar fe de ciertos actos; y el valor del instrumento el de hacer fe de su existencia y de todo o parte de su contenido". Lo anterior nos indica que entre la fe que otorga el notario con su intervención y el instrumento donde plasma el acto existe una relación estrecha debido a que ambas se complementan mutuamente para realizar una función específica, que en este caso es la de dar fe de actos o hechos jurídicos y tener constancia de los mismos. Podemos afirmar entonces, que la fe pública notarial tiene una función preventiva, y su actual desarrollo forma la preparación de las pruebas pre-constituidas, dichas pruebas no nacen en el transcurso de un juicio, sino que son anteriores a él. El derecho notarial satisface la necesidad general de toda prueba, ya que el notario actúa en el mismo instante en que se produce el hecho; en cambio, en los sistemas de prueba en general el hecho se comprueba generalmente después de que ocurrió. Luis Carral y de Teresa hace referencia al comentario del Maestro Sanahuja, que a la letra dice" para que la fe pública pueda captar el hecho, precisa que el agente jurídico se halle interesado en hacer contar el acto que se propone llevar a cabo, lo que, como es natural, sólo ocurre cuando el hecho ha de producir un hecho jurídico favorable, o sea, la concesión o reconocimiento de derechos, y no cuando la consecuencia jurídica ha 272 de ser una sanción en cuyo caso el autor del acto (ilícito) tendrá interés en evitar la existencia de toda prueba". 8.LA FE PÚBLICA NOTARIAL Y EL NEGOCIO JURIDICO.En la esfera extrajudicial, un ciudadano que celebra un contrato con otro lo hará válidamente si el contrato cumple con los requisitos, de todos conocidos: Consentimiento de los contratantes, libremente prestado y sin error o vicio que lo invalide, objeto cierto y lícito que sea materia del contrato, causa lícita de la obligación que se establezca y cumplimiento de la forma que la ley preceptúe. Cuando todos esos elementos se reúnen, como ocurre habitualmente en la contratación, los Notarios dan forma a los negocios jurídicos, y el contrato así autorizado gozando de fe pública y su contenido se presume veraz e íntegro de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en esta u otras leyes. El contenido de ese documento público se encuentra, por tanto, bajo la salvaguarda de los Tribunales, y el negocio surte plenos efectos jurídicos con arreglo a las Leyes. En cuanto a lo que resulta amparado por la fe pública notarial, hay que referirlo a la fecha y el hecho del otorgamiento, tanto entre los otorgantes, cuanto respecto de terceros, la identidad de los otorgantes, la libertad del consentimiento y en relación al contenido del instrumento, las declaraciones que en el mismo hayan vertido los intervinientes, así como a la legitimidad de los títulos en los que se fundamentan sus derechos y la licitud de los pactos contenidos. La seguridad jurídica es completa cuando hablamos de derechos sobre bienes muebles o valores mobiliarios. Porque dichos casos el propio título que justifica el derecho del disponente define, por si mismo, el contenido del derecho. Y lo mismo cuando nos referimos a escrituras de contenido obligacional por las que las partes acuerdan el cumplimiento de obligaciones. Y también en materia inmobiliaria el sistema funciona con un altísimo nivel de seguridad debido a tres razones: Una es el carácter contradictorio en si del negocio jurídico, es decir, el vendedor está interesado en cobrar efectivamente el precio, pero el comprador se encarga de asegurarse de que lo que se le transmite se corresponde con lo que él, realmente, ha querido comprar;otra, es la responsabilidad exigible a los Notarios no sólo en supuestos de dolo, sino incluso de simple negligencia profesional. Y resulta curioso observar que esa responsabilidad no sólo está en la Ley Notarial, sino incluso en leyes conexas como las Leyes No 26662, 27157, 27333 entre otras, generándose la obligación de indemnizar si nos equivocamos. Lo que ha obligado a extremar el cuidado no ya en la verificación de los títulos sino en el contenido material o real, en la verdad que dichos títulos decían contener; y finalmente la progresiva administración de los contenidos civiles, la aparición del urbanismo y las actuaciones urbanísticas y la incorporación de la certificación catastral de SUNARP. 9.FE PÚBLICA NOTARIAL Y CATASTRO.Pues bien, la herramienta que necesita sustentar, servir de soporte a ese principio de legalidad, que va a permitir al Notario la correcta identificación de las predios, en definitiva, determinando la realidad física sobre la que actúa la fe pública notarial o administrativa en materia inmobiliaria, y aun la que puede acompañar a dicha fe pública ayudándola en la verificación previa de las titularidades jurídicas que corresponden a los bienes inmuebles, hoy por hoy, y en nuestro ordenamiento, lo constituye el Catastro.El Catastro, constituye el inventario detallado de la riqueza de una nación, y cuyo fin primordial es que sirva para el equitativo reparto de los tributos, siendo de vital importancia especialmente el Catastro de la Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Públicos, a efectos de establecer no sólo la descripción física del predio, sino su correcta ubicación, sus límites, linderos, colindancias y demás características, hacen inconfundible el predio.Es cierto que Notario también puede confrontar el Catastro Municipal a efectos de alcanzar mayor precisión de ubicuidad. 273 En España se lo define como un registro administrativo dependiente del Ministerio de Hacienda, en el que se describen los bienes inmuebles rústicos, urbanos y de características especiales tal y como se definen en esta Ley. La primera definición es más acertada, porque quedan allí más claras las dos notas que lo definen: Una nota adjetiva: que constituye una herramienta tributaria. Y una nota sustantiva: La complejidad, es decir, la voluntad de resultar universal. Y así tenemos que entender el término "inventario", palabra que viene del latín "invenio", encontrar, es decir, el Catastro constituiría, o aspiraría a constituirse como el catálogo completo donde "se encuentra" toda la riqueza inmobiliaria de un país. La Ley 13/1996 y a la todavía con olor a imprenta Ley 48/2002, la Carta Magna del Catastro para el siglo XXI. La primera entendemos que determinó el momento de inflexión, el punto de no retorno en un espíritu de colaboración de las dos instituciones. En efecto, como es sabido en los arts. 51 y 55 se imponen a los Notarios la obligación de hacer constar la referencia catastral en los instrumentos públicos que autoricen y de comunicarlos a la Gerencia Territorial del Catastro de la provincia en que radique el inmueble. Gracias a esa colaboración hoy por hoy, según datos suministrados por la Gerencia Territorial de la Comunidad Valenciana, más del setenta por ciento de los cambios de titularidad en mi Comunidad se están realizando ya con base exclusiva en las comunicaciones notariales. La Ley 48. Pues en principio parece que la Ley no quiere saber nada de los Notarios, porque en el art. 1.2 permite al Catastro colaborar con las Administradores públicas, con los jueces y los tribunales, con el registro y con los ciudadanos. Con los únicos con los que parece que no va a colaborar va a ser con los Notarios. Pero Vds. y nosotros sabemos que no es así. La Ley es permeable a la actual situación de cooperación y buena sintonía entre la función notarial y la Institución Catastral." 10. FE PÚBLICA ADMINISTRATIVA.Lo que nos lleva a hablar de la otra fe pública, la de la Administración Pública, conforme a la Ley del procedimiento Administrativo en General – Ley No 27444, Aunque el ámbito de ésta es mucho más limitado que la notarial, dado que se refiere exclusivamente a la facultad certificante de los servidores y funcionarios públicos que ostenten dicha facultad respecto de los actos administrativos que tengan obligación de presenciar, certificar y de los expedientes que se encuentren bajo su custodia. Lo fundamental dentro del ámbito administrativo no es, por supuesto, su fe pública, sino el principio de legalidad que se presupone en toda actuación administrativa. Este principio se encuentra sustentado en otros: El principio de utilidad pública o fin social para las actuaciones que impliquen una lesión en los derechos de los particulares, y el principio de contradicción en trámite de audiencia a los particulares en cualquier caso.Pero un ejemplo al que no renuncio como prueba del desarrollo de la fe pública administrativa en ámbitos que hasta hace poco habían sido exclusivamente notariales y que permite claramente el acceso al Registro Público, como es el caso de Cofopri (Comisión de Formalización de la propiedad Informal). 11. FE PÚBLICA NOTARIAL Y SEGURIDAD JURIDICA.La fe pública notarial otorga seguridad jurídica, traducida en confianza, certeza y certidumbre, especialmente en tranquilidad para el adquiriente y en general para los otorgantes, de ahí la retórica frase del maestro NUÑEZ LAGOS, cuando señala que el notario aprisiona a cadena perpetua, y en cárcel de papel, el instante fugaz que se va"; pero, que entendemos queda perennizado y vigente a través del tiempo. Por ello cabe también retrotraer las ideas del maestro VALLET DE GOYTISOLO61, cuando señala que sin una vida contractual sana no existe seguridad jurídica, y sin seguridad jurídica no puede haber prosperidad económica. 61 VALLET DE GOYTISOLO, Juan. La Función Notarial, en Revista de Derecho Notarial. Madrid 1984, páginas 314-315. 274 Es así que el maestro PEDRO ÁVILA62, en su obra denominada Derecho Notarial, señalaba: "Los actos y contratos en que se desarrolla la vida jurídica cristalizan documentalmente. Ahora bien un documento falso, inexacto o simplemente imperfecto es un peligro para el tráfico jurídico por el perjuicio que puede ocasionar no sólo a las partes (dificultades de interpretación, cumplimiento, etc.), sino también a los demás al crear una apariencia que no responde a la realidad. La probabilidad de que se produzca tal documento es grande cuando el acto contrato se confecciona sin más intervención que las partes y a veces algún testigo más o menor imperito y más o menos irresponsable; pero se minimiza con la intervención tanto de la configuración del negocio como en su plasmación documental de alguien con preparación jurídica especializada, imparcialidad profesional y responsabilidad por su actuación: el Notario. Por ello el ordenamiento provee a esa intervención y dando un paso más para facilitar aquel tráfico, impone a todos la confianza en el documento creado, dota a este con la cualidad de creíble forzosamente por todos". CONCLUSIONES: 1. La fe, es la idea de creencia, confianza o certeza, en todas sus modalidades. 2. La fe es pública cuando es otorgada por el Estado, ya sea a través de un funcionario público que se encuentra legalmente facultado e investido de autoridad para otorgarla, o por un Notario público quien ejerciendo la delegación parcial de la soberanía del Estado se encuentra por él facultado para otorgarla en representación del Estado. En tanto que la fe es privada cuando emana de la declaración prestada por cualquier otro individuo. 3. La fe pública, es el crédito, la confianza que se da a un acto por parte de una persona premunida de autoridad legítima para otorgarla. 4. La fe pública notarial es la potestad que el estado deposita en el notario facultándolo para que en su nombre y representación pueda conferir fe pública de los actos y contratos que ante él se celebren, de los hechos y sucesos que constate y de los procedimientos no contenciosos que tramite y resuelva, facultad que el notario ejercerá a instancia rogativa de parte interesada y con sujeción a la legalidad y a las formalidades establecidas en ella, asegurando la veracidad de los hechos y los actos jurídicos que le constan, garantizando el derecho de los otorgantes. 5. La fe pública notarial es la certeza, confianza, veracidad y autoridad atribuida por ley al profesional de la fe pública que es el Notario, de los hechos, actos, negocios, contratos y procedimientos no contenciosos, que se otorgan y tramitan en su presencia, los que se tiene por ciertos, verdaderos y auténticos, con fuerza probatoria juris tantum. 6. La buena fe, es el contenido deontológico de la fe ejercida conforme a la ley, a la moral, al orden público y a las buenas costumbres, englobando un contenido ético, de valores y de principios, que guían la función del Notario. 62 ÁVILA ÁLVAREZ, Pedro. Derecho Notarial, páginas 2 – 3. 275 7. La fe pública, es la eficacia, firmeza, asentimiento y verdad que tiene el poder público representado por el Notario, cuando este interviene en cada acto, documento o contrato. 8. La fe pública, es la autoridad legítima para que se otorgue autenticidad en relación de verdad entre lo dicho lo ocurrido y lo documentado. 9. La fe pública notarial converge además en la autenticidad, al presumirse auténticos los actos notariales. 10. La fe pública notarial es generadora de seguridad jurídica, de tranquilidad, confianza, certeza, certidumbre y paz. BIBLIOGRAFIA AVILA ALVAREZ, Pedro. 1990. Derecho Notarial, Bosch, Casa Editora, S.A., 7ma. Ed., Barcelona, España BIBILONI. J. A. 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La invalidez del Acto Jurídico. Volumen IX. Primera Edición. Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Lima. 1989. VALLET DE GOYTISOLO, Juan. La Función Notarial, en Revista de Derecho Notarial. Madrid 1984, páginas 314-315. VIDAL RAMIREZ, Fernando. Teoría General del Acto Jurídico. Primera Edición. Cultural Cuzco S.A. Lima 1985. 277 LA PROPIEDAD DE LOS RECURSOS MINERALES EN PREDIOS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS DESDE LA PERSPECTIVA DEL ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DEL DERECHO. Dr Juan Jesús Abregú López63 PLANTEMIENTO DEL PROBLEMA Descripción de la realidad problemática Nuestro país es eminentemente minero desde épocas pre incaicas, dados los ingentes recursos minerales que la naturaleza dotó a nuestro territorio. Hoy en día, y antaño también, la Minería representa una de las actividades económicas más importantes para nuestra sociedad, baste decir que representa aproximadamente el 50% de las divisas que ingresan a nuestro país; asimismo, es una fuente importante de ingresos directos para el erario nacional a través del impuesto a la renta que pagan las empresas mineras (el 30% de sus utilidades anuales); es fuente de trabajo formal directo e indirecto para miles de personas en zonas alejadas de los centros poblados nacionales. Por razones de orden geológico, los Recursos minerales se encuentran ubicados en la Cordillera de los Andes, en donde los predios pertenecen mayormente a las Comunidades Campesinas. La actividad minera ha requerido a lo largo de nuestra historia, una legislación que regule su explotación; es así, que actualmente, la Constitución Política, en su artículo 66° establece que los recursos naturales, renovables y no renovables, son patrimonio de la Nación. Asimismo; dispone que el Estado es soberano en su aprovechamiento; por ley orgánica se fijan las condiciones de su utilización y de su otorgamiento a particulares. La Ley que regula la actividad minera es el Texto Único Ordenado de la Ley General de Minería, aprobado por el Decreto Supremo N° 014-92-EM, norma que en su artículo 9° dispone que la concesión minera es un inmueble distinto y separado del predio donde se encuentre ubicada. Esta disposición, concordada con el artículo 66° de la Constitución Política del Perú comentada líneas arriba, determina que el propietario de un predio en donde se encuentre ubicado un yacimiento mineralizado, no tenga derecho alguno sobre dichos minerales, ya que como se ha dicho estos recursos naturales pertenecen a la Nación y su otorgamiento a particulares se rige por la Ley General de Minería, el mismo que establece al respecto, que el permiso para explotar minerales se otorga a través del régimen de concesiones luego de un procedimiento administrativo contemplado en la misma norma. Esta diferenciación de predios, o derechos de propiedad, ocasiona innumerables conflictos sociales los que a su vez tienen efecto en la economía nacional. 63Abogado y Licenciado en Ciencias Administrativas por la Universidad de Lima. MBA (ESAN). Maestría en Derecho Civil y Comercial (USMP). Profesor de la Maestria de Derecho Registral y Notarial en la UIGV y la USMP. Ex funcionario de la SUNARP. Asesor Legal de empresas Mineras y Energía. [email protected]. RPC: 991983071 278 Podemos graficar lo dicho con la siguiente circunstancia: Imaginemos un predio de 500 hectáreas de extensión, ubicado en los andes a 4,000 metros sobre el nivel del mar, predio de propiedad de una Comunidad Campesina, con 400 Comuneros Hábiles. Este predio es explotado económicamente únicamente como pastizales para auquénidos y ganado bovino. Evidentemente, esta actividad mantiene a los Comuneros en un estado de extrema pobreza. Para buena suerte o para mala suerte, una determinada compañía minera descubre un importante yacimiento aurífero en dicho predio; por ello, esta empresa asesorada con los abogados más renombrados del país obtiene de la instancia administrativa correspondiente la Concesión Minera sobre dichos recursos auríferos. Esta Concesión le otorga el derecho de explotar, extraer, los recursos minerales concedidos, los mismos que como ya se dijo se encuentran ubicados en el predio de la Comunidad Campesina. En este momento comienzan los problemas tanto para la Comunidad Campesina como para la empresa, ya que, la propiedad del terreno superficial la detenta la Comunidad Campesina, pero no puede extraer ni un gramo del oro encontrado en su terreno, si lo hace, incurre en el Delito de Minería Ilegal; y la empresa, a pesar de tener el derecho otorgado por el Estado para extraer ese mineral, no puede hacerlo porque no tiene ningún derecho para utilizar el terreno superficial por donde debe realizar sus operaciones mineras para explotar el mineral concedido. En efecto; de acuerdo con nuestro ordenamiento legal, la empresa minera deberá llegar a un acuerdo negociado con el propietario del terreno superficial, en este caso la Comunidad Campesina, para utilizar el terreno superficial de propiedad de la Comunidad y así posibilitar la explotación de los minerales concedidos. El conflicto nace precisamente en dicha negociación, ya que la empresa minera establecerá su oferta para obtener la autorización sobre el predio requerido, sea por compra, usufructo u otra modalidad, sobre la base del valor arancelario del predio; sin embargo, como se sabe estos valores son sumamente bajos en las zona alto andinas, por lo que dicha oferta parecerá írrita a la Comunidad teniendo en consideración el valor enorme que puede tener un yacimiento aurífero. La Comunidad internalizara el hecho de que su predio no solo vale lo que podría arrojar una valuación de predios común, sino que el precio debe reflejar la circunstancia de que en su terreno se encuentra un gran yacimiento minero, circunstancia obviamente no admitida por la empresa minera, por cuanto esta alegará que los minerales ya le pertenecen a ella por haber obtenido la concesión minera por parte del Estado peruano. Este impase originará negociaciones tirantes en las cuales la empresa utilizará diversos mecanismos para alcanzar la autorización de la Comunidad Campesina, obteniendo casi siempre el terreno superficial con valores que no reflejan la riqueza minera existente en dicho predio; esta circunstancia, origina que en el tiempo los Comuneros se sientan estafados y estén reclamando permanentemente mayores contraprestaciones por parte de la empresa. 1.2 Formulación del problema A la luz de los antecedentes descritos, nos planteamos la siguiente interrogante: ¿Qué es más eficiente: Que los recursos minerales pertenezcan a la Nación, como lo dispone actualmente nuestro sistema normativo? O que como en el Derecho Anglosajón, los recursos minerales sean de propiedad del propietario del terreno en donde se encuentran ubicados? 1.1. Planteamiento Evaluar la conveniencia en términos de eficiencia, concepto enmarcado a su vez dentro del Análisis Económico del Derecho, de modificar nuestro marco normativo, que incluye a la Constitución Política; a la Ley General de Minería, aprobada por el D.S. N° 014-92-EM; la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas, aprobada por la Ley N° 24656; entre otras vinculadas; en el extremo de disponer que los recursos minerales pertenecen alas Comunidades Campesinas y/o Nativas propietarias del predio en donde se encuentren ubicadas. 279 1.2. Formulación de la Hipótesis "Es más eficiente para nuestra sociedad, a la luz del Análisis Económico del Derecho, modificar nuestro marco normativo, en el extremo de disponer que los recursos minerales ubicados en los predios de propiedad de las Comunidades Campesinas y/o Nativas, pertenecen en propiedad a éstas y no al Estado, como actualmente se establece." 1.3. Temas a definirse. Una investigación posterior y con mayor desarrollo deberá plantear las bases legales que posibiliten la eliminación de las etapas pre operativas mineras; es decir en la etapa de adquisición de permisos y autorizaciones, los conflictos que se generan entre las empresas mineras con las Comunidades Campesinas, propietarias de los terrenos superficiales en donde han de llevar a cabo sus operaciones mineras en las concesiones mineras otorgadas a su favor; asimismo, que el clima de paz social sea perdurable en el tiempo. I. MARCO TEORICO Debemos precisar en primer lugar un concepto de lo que es el Mineral, y podemos decir que es una sustancia natural, homogénea, inorgánica, de composición química definida dentro de ciertos límites. Los minerales se encuentran en la naturaleza en concentraciones y que dependiendo de su volumen y calidad, determinaran una significancia económica para la sociedad. Estos recursos de mineral, o yacimientos, se ubicaran endiversos lugares de nuestro territorio, principalmente en la Cordillera de los Andes. El Derecho Minero se definirá como aquella parte del ordenamiento jurídico público y privado que regula lo concerniente al dominio originario de las substancias minerales, las actividades relativas a la adquisición, constitución, funcionamiento, conservación y pérdida de la propiedad de las minas y aquellas actividades auxiliares de la industria minera, como así también las relaciones que de estas actividades derivan. Los Recursos Naturales, entre los que se encuentran los Recursos Minerales, tienen su tratamiento legislativo en primer lugar, en la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993 la misma que trata sobre el dominio de los recursos naturales y la manera como los particulares acceden a ellos para su aprovechamiento. Así, el texto constitucional señala lo siguiente: "Artículo 66. Los recursos naturales, renovables y no renovables, son patrimonio de la nación. El Estado es soberano en su aprovechamiento. Por ley orgánica se fijan las condiciones de su utilización y de su otorgamiento a particulares. La concesión otorga a su titular un derecho real, sujeto a dicha norma legal." Con este texto queda claro que el dominio de los Recursos Minerales lo ejerce el Estado como patrimonio de la nación, y el Estado, como representante legal de la Nación otorgará a los particulares bajo las distintas formas legales, sin que ello signifique la transferencia de dicho dominio, simplemente se le autoriza a su explotación, bajo el régimen de Concesiones. El Estado puede detentar propiedades a título de dominio privado, igual que un particular; y a título de dominio público, dominio que a su vez se puede dividir en diversas formas. En el caso de los recursos minerales, y de acuerdo con la Constitución, el Estado tiene un dominio privado y como tal, lo puede conceder a los particulares bajo el régimen de concesiones; sin embargo, mantiene sudominiosobreellos. No debe confundirse Dominio Público con propiedad, entendiéndose este último las atribuciones de usar, aprovechar y disponer, sobre estos bienes de Dominio Público el Estado tiene la obligación de guardarlos y vigilarlos. En la doctrina, existen diversos sistemas que regulan el dominio de los recursos minerales, regímenes que su vez determinarán lasmodalidades de concesión para su explotación, siendo los mas conocidos los siguientes: El sistema de accesión, el sistema de ocupación, el sistema regalista, el sistema res nullius y el sistema de libertad de minas. El Sistema de accesión o fundiarioconsidera al recurso mineral como accesorio del dominio del suelo superficial en donde se encuentra ubicado, por lo que el dominio o propiedad de dichos recursos recae en el propietario del terreno superficial, en el entendido que lo accesorio sigue la suerte o condición del principal. 280 Este sistema de accesión es utilizado en Inglaterra y en otros países pertenecientes al CommonLaw. El Sistema de Ocupación, dispone que se entrega el dominio de los recursos minerales a quien los descubre y los explota;en tal sentido,no existe un otorgamiento de concesión minera o transferencia de propiedad por parte del Estado; simplemente, los recurso minerales no pertenecen a nadie. Este sistema no es adoptado a la fecha por ninguna legislación, salvo casos excepcionales cuando se trata de minerales muy raros. En el Sistema Regalista, se define el dominio de los recursos minerales como propiedad exclusiva dela Nación, representada por el Estado; y éste otorga a los particulares dichos recursos a cambio de una determinada regalía. Este sistema es el adoptado por nuestra legislación. En el Sistema de Res Nullios, se considera a los recursos minerales como cosas de nadie, su dominio no corresponde al propietario de los suelos como si sucede con el sistema de accesión ni al Estado como en el Regalista; sin embargo, el Estado adjudicará y/o otorgará el yacimiento minero a favor de quien ofrezca mayores garantías y a la vez una situación económicamente viable que permita su explotación. Este sistema es aplicado en países como Francia, Portugal, Chile, México y Bélgica. El Sistema Dominialistaconsidera que es el estado el titular de los recursos minerales ubicados en el suelo y en el subsuelo, ejerciendo su soberanía sin que signifique propiamente un derecho patrimonial; se atribuye el dominio originario de las minas al Estado, con lo cual participa de las características del sistema regalista, pero a diferencia de éste, el dominio del Estado no es un dominio completo, sino un dominio eminente, virtual o también llamado radical, es decir, una emanación de la soberanía, careciendo el Estado de las facultades de usar y gozar de las minas de manera directa. El análisis económico del Derecho es una corriente dentro de la teoría del Derecho que aplica métodos propios de la economía en el razonamiento jurídico; incluye el uso de la metodología y los conceptos propios de la ciencia económica para predecir el efecto de las normas jurídicas, con el objeto de determinar qué leyes o disposiciones jurídicas son económicamente eficientes, y predecir qué medidas deberían ser promulgadas o adoptadas. Bibliopgrafia 5.1 Referencias Bibliográficas BASADRE AYULO, Jorge(2001). Derecho de Minería y del Petróleo. Lima: Editorial San Marcos. Belaunde Moreyra, Martín(1998)."Derecho Minero y Concesión". Lima: Editorial San Marcos. 5.2 Leyes Constitución Política del Perú de 1993 (1993). Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas, Ley N° 24657. Ley General de Minería, cuyo Texto Unico Ordenado fue aprobado por el Decreto Supremo N° 014-92-EM (1992). 281 EL NEGOCIO JURÍDICO FAMILIAR DR. JOSE ANTONIO RENGIFO HURTADO Resumen El estudio de las relaciones del estado familiar es y será por siempre un tema de interés constante y, sobretodo, de actualidad. La familia trasciende. Es en esencia la asociación natural por antonomasia, el grupo primario y fundamental en el que todos y cada uno de nosotros encontramos la satisfacción de nuestras necesidades básicas, la paz, el sosiego y regocijo en cada día, en el despertar y descansar, de allí el interés directo que tiene la ley en protegerla. El Estado frente a las relaciones familiares se presenta como el guardián de los intereses vinculares. Una relación jurídica de contenido familiar implica la existencia, en términos generales, de un hecho jurídico y, en términos específicos, de un negocio jurídico. Palabras Clave Hecho Jurídico, Declaración de voluntad, Patrimonio, Familia. 1. Introducción El negocio jurídico familiar se presenta como una especie dentro de la categoría general del negocio jurídico, como dice Belluscio el acto jurídico familiar no constituye una categoría distinta al acto jurídico sino una especie de éste género caracterizada por el derecho civil a la cual corresponden las relaciones jurídicas o los derechos subjetivos sobre los cuales versa. A pesar de su especialidad y dimensión en cuanto a los efectos que regula no ha merecido el estudio del caso. Lo existente es poco difundido y se pierde 282 en contenido. En la estructura del Derecho privado existen dos tipos de negocios jurídicos: los patrimoniales y los no patrimoniales. A los primeros, después de la revolución industrial y de la producción en masa de los elementos que coadyuvan a la vida en sociedad, se les ha exteriorizado de su mundo normativo y difundido socialmente para lograr una mejora en las relaciones entre los hombres. Sin embargo, el segundo grupo, el de los no patrimoniales, ha sido poco trabajado a pesar de que contiene derechos, obligaciones, deberes y facultades (sean inherentes o propios, adquiridos o derivados) que sirven de medio natural para que las personas se realicen como tal en nuestra sociedad. Los negocios jurídicos familiares tienen un contenido patrimonial y no patrimonial y es que, con la idea de Von Thur, no sólo existen negocios jurídicos de derecho patrimonial y hereditario sino, también, de derecho de familia. En sentido distinto opina Emilio Betti quien no diferencia los negocios jurídicos familiares de los patrimoniales. 2. El negocio jurídico Si bien los romanos carecieron de una teoría general del negocio jurídico (negotion non existens) pero esto no les impidió ocuparse de los negocios en particular. Por ello les fue más fácil independizar, hasta cierto punto, el negocio jurídico familiar y real del negocio obligacional. Es a partir de 1954 que se comenzó a debatir en doctrina acerca de la existencia del negocio jurídico familiar. El primero que lo sistematizó fue Teixeira de Freitas en su Esbôço quien al tratar la teoría de los hechos describe de forma expresa a los actos jurídicos que contienen relaciones de familia: esponsales, matrimonio, emancipación, reconocimiento de hijos naturales, adopción, aceptación o exoneración de tutela o curatela, etc. Este el punto de partida a los que se suman, luego, Cicu, De Ruggiero, Betti, Orgaz, Lafaille, Mollinario, Spota y Enrique Díaz de Guijarro. Junto con el negocio jurídico familiar existen otros tipos de negocios jurídicos. Por ejemplo el negocio jurídico sucesoral es uno tan típico como el que estudiamos dentro del que tenemos el negocio jurídico testamentario entendido como aquel en virtud del cual el testador dispone de su patrimonio a favor de determinadas personas o en su caso 283 instituciones para después de su muerte. Son características de este tipo de negocio de derecho de sucesiones la solemnidad, unilateralidad, escrituralidad, revocabilidad conteniendo, además, un carácter estrictamente personal. Comúnmente se han regulado y sistemáticamente normado dos tipos de actos jurídicos: el contrato y el testamento mientras que los demás quedan solo con su contenido práctico. 3. Hechos jurídicos familiares En el Derecho de familia podemos encontrar hechos jurídicos naturales entendidos como aquellos en los que no participa la voluntad humana siendo su causa los fenómenos de la naturaleza. Entre ellos podemos mencionar la concepción, el nacimiento, la muerte y la filiación, así como la impotencia, esterilidad y, en cierta manera la desaparición. Debido a la existencia y variedad de hechos jurídicos el negocio jurídico familiar es entendido como aquel que regula la voluntad, actos y relaciones que emergen de un estado familiar. Surge de la ley, de la potestad jurisdiccional y de la voluntad de las partes. Como legítima especie del hecho jurígeno este tipo de negocios son la vértebra normativa sobre la que se estructura el Derecho de familia. El negocio familiar es especialísimo debido a que el Derecho de familia es social o mixto, confluye lo público y lo privado, la voluntad no es determinante siendo sus normas imperativas. Dice Lobo que el Derecho de familia es el Derecho más personal de los derechos civiles y que las normas de los Derechos de las cosas y las obligaciones no serían subsidiarias al Derecho de familia. En cuanto a su diferenciación con el acto jurídico que, como bien dice Belluscio no es en la sustancia sino en el objeto, consideremos que sí es decisiva para su ubicación en el sistema normativo de las relaciones familiares. Debemos aclarar que esta ecuación literal de Spota concuerda con la de Francis Le Febvre cuando habla del acto del estado civil. Nuestra adhesión a esta denominación radica en el hecho que tanto el sistema nacional como la doctrina contemporánea se orientan en llamar negocio jurídico a aquella declaración de voluntad con fines lícitos, amparada por el ordenamiento legal y que regula 284 relaciones jurídicas. No la llamamos acto jurídico familiar (aunque en esencia lo es, pues Actus es el generus y Negotium la specie) pues como bien dice Ennecerus existen tres tipos de actos jurídicos: los actos conforme a derecho, los actos contrarios a derecho y la declaración de voluntad. Estos, según el mencionado autor, son los negocios jurídicos. A nuestro parecer sólo estos últimos pueden configurar esta típica y especialísima figura que tiende a regular las relaciones y situaciones familiares. 5. Teoría de existencia del negocio jurídico familiar No existe en la doctrina uniformidad de criterios acerca de la existencia de una teoría sistemática del negocio jurídico familiar. Las teorías que al respecto lo tratan son: a. Teoría positiva Para la existencia del negocio jurídico familiar se requiere voluntad, libertad y consentimiento. Como dice Vidal Ramírez la voluntad que genera al acto jurídico es la de un sujeto que actúa como tal por eso el acto jurídico incide sobre toda clase de relaciones jurídicas, sean patrimoniales o extrapatrimoniales, o trátese de derechos sucesorios, de familia o personalísimos. b. Teoría negativa Esta corriente discute su admisibilidad. El sustento es que los pretendidos negocios familiares no derivan ex volutate sino ex lege. La voluntad por sí sola no puede ser nunca causa de efectos jurídicos. Las partes no pueden determinar, de manera autónoma, el contenido de una relación jurídica familiar necesitando, indefectiblemente, la intervención del Estado a través del funcionario público o de normas predeterminadas que regulen la relación familiar. Otra posición es tratada por De Castro y Bravo cuando considera que si bien se admite la existencia de negocios jurídicos dentro del ámbito del Derecho de familia, lo "íntimo de las relaciones familiares hace que, esa peculiar naturaleza, haga presumir que conductas de la que normalmente se induciría la existencia de un negocio jurídico, sean consideradas extrañas al ámbito negocial". c. Teoría mixta 285 Para que exista un negocio jurídico el ley debe admitir la producción de efectos jurídicos en virtud de una declaración de voluntad. Concluye que la teoría que línea a la ley con la existencia del negocio jurídico familiar es equivoca pues no existen actos ex lege puros, sino que todos derivan de la voluntad y que para que tengan efectos directos deben ser, en todo caso, admitidas por la Ley. Sin embargo, podemos decir que no existe una teoría negativa por excelencia pues en todo caso voluntad y libertad siempre estarían supeditadas a la ley, unas veces más y otras veces menos. 6. CONCLUSIONES El negocio jurídico familiar es una especie dentro del negocio jurídico en general. Se diferencia de este ultimo no en la sustancia sino en el objeto pues constituye el objeto propio del Derecho de familia, que es un derecho sui géneris. Es un negocio especial, voluntario, autónomo y delimitado por la ley que constituye, modifica, extingue o reglamenta un estado de familia. Su objeto principal es la regulación de la relación jurídica que emerge de un estado civil o una relación jurídica. De acuerdo a su especialidad cuenta con características propias y unitarias. Entre estas tenemos que: prima el interés público, existe una subordinación y autoridad; la voluntad individual está restringida por los límites de la ley, la moral y el orden público. Entre los principales negocios familiares tenemos a los esponsales, el matrimonio, la adopción, el régimen patrimonial, la tutela, la curatela (estos últimos para algunos debieran pertenecer al campo del Negocio Jurídico del Derecho de las Personas), los alimentos (reducción, aumento) y reconocimiento, entre otros. Los elementos esenciales del negocio jurídico familiar son, como en todo negocio, los mismos, sin embargo tienen especialidades. En cuanto a las partes o sujetos, la capacidad es bastante elástica y hasta cierto punto escapa de las reglas establecidas por las disposiciones del negocio jurídico en general; la manifestación de voluntad está regida por lineamientos formales; el consentimiento, prima facie, debe ser expreso para su conformación; en cuanto al objeto está constituido por los intereses que afectan o que 286 influyen la relación familiar, estos deben ser lícitos. Es esencialmente formal, pues la formalidad sirve para dar seguridad y publicidad al estado de familia de las personas y otorgarle la trascendencia que requiere para su validez y existencia en la sociedad. Por ultimo, podemos decir que es puro, personalísimo y típico en razón que las relaciones familiares se sustentan en la seguridad jurídica que para tales efectos les predetermina la Ley. En definitiva tenemos que el negocio jurídico familiar es el negotio súmmum que permite la vida en sociedad. BIBLIOGRARIA BELLUSCIO, Augusto: Manual de Derecho de familia,......, tomo I, Buenos Aires, Ed. Depalma, p.60. Cit. ZANNONI, Eduardo: Derecho de familia, tomo 1, 3a edic., Buenos Aires, Ed. Astrea, 1998, pp.57 y 58. BETTI, Emilio: Teoría general de los negocios jurídicos, Traducción del italiano por Martín Pérez, Madrid, s/f, p.212. TEIXEIRA DE FREITAS, Augusto: Código civil, Esbôço, tomo I, s/l, Ministerio da Justiça e negocios interiores, 1952, p. 235. En el Derecho Civil: acto jurídico obligacional, acto jurídico real, el típico acto jurídico patrimonial o contractual y, dentro del familiar existe otro que es llamado acto jurídico familiar-procesal que separación de cuerpos por mutuo disenso. Fuera del Derecho Civil: acto jurídico administrativo, acto jurídico procesal, acto jurídico financiero, por mencionar algunos. Esta definición la podemos concordar con la de Vélez Sarsfield (citado por Jorge Eugenio Castañeda, Derecho de Sucesiones, tomo II, Lima, 1975, p.17, nota 18) quien acerca del testamento dice que es un acto escrito por el cual una persona dispone de todo o parte de sus bienes para después de la muerte. ESPINOZA, Juan: Acto jurídico negocial, Lima, Gaceta Jurídica, 2008, p.28. 287 Para José León Barandiarán este es un hecho jurídico involuntario (vid. Comentarios al Código Civil Peruano, tomo I,.....,........,.........., p.21, citado por Melquíades Castillo (Filosofía del Derecho, Lima, Edigarf,......., p.169). Por otro lado Manuel A. Wagner (El Derecho y el hecho jurídico, Buenos Aires, Plus Ultra, 1985, p.87) en su interesante clasificación nos dice que el nacimiento es un hecho jurídico natural no externo en el que participa el hombre. Para Guillermo Lohman Luca de Tena (El Negocio Jurídico, Lima, Studium, 2da.edición, 1987, p.22) es un hecho natural positivo. Lohman (Loc. cit.) hecho jurídico negativo. Para José León Barandiarán (Curso del acto jurídico, 1ra. Edición, Lima, UNMSM, 1983, p.4) es un hecho jurídico involuntario. Datos del docente: José Rengifo Hurtado. Abogado, Magíster y Doctor en Derecho. Miembro de la red de académicos latinoamericanos en Derecho. Docente de pre y post grado en diversas universidades. 288 El Derecho Registral y la Publicidad Jurídica. Mag. Rubén Guevara Bringas* [email protected] Denominación Si bien nuestra materia es conocida entre nosotros, como Derecho Registral, habrá que considerar que se le denomina también Derecho Hipotecario o Derecho Inmobiliario Registral. En el primer caso estamos ante el hecho de ser la hipoteca el primer derecho real inscribible, gestado por la Ley Hipotecaria Española de 1861. En el segundo caso se hace referencia al Derecho Registral pero cuyo objeto es el derecho real inscribible y todas sus afectaciones, es decir la finca, sus cargas y gravámenes y las modificaciones que pueda sufrir. En ese sentido, muchas definiciones que se recogen de la doctrina, giran en torno al registro inmobiliario. La expresión Derecho Hipotecario, como dice MERINO, citado por ELENA VIVAR64, resulta demasiado estrecha y restringida, empezando porque el calificativo "hipotecario" etimológicamente apunta sólo al Derecho de Hipoteca, y aunque la hipoteca sea la forma más adecuada de garantía real, no agota la multiplicidad de instituciones que se integran en un Registro; y continuando por que tal denominación, en principio, se debe a que la Ley Hipotecaria Española de 1861 creó el Registro de la Propiedad y determinó originalmente su organización, requisitos de inscripción y eficacia de los derechos inscritos, justificándose históricamente la denominación por haber nacido este Derecho a impulso de las necesidades del derecho real de hipoteca, consagrando en la doctrina española el empleo del adjetivo hipotecario como sinónimo de registral, pero de ninguna manera llegando a agotar todos los matices de la disciplina bajo estudio. La aludida autora cita a ROCA SASTRE, mencionando que él es más enfático cuando nos menciona que las denominaciones "derecho inmobiliario" y "derecho hipotecario" tienden a fundirse, resultando que "el derecho hipotecario en su acepción amplia, no es más que el derecho inmobiliario funcionando a través del Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble creado en 1861 y que regula la hipoteca. Como puede apreciarse, ambas definiciones han respondido en su momento a realidades históricas, no pudiéndose afirmar, in estricto sensu, que fueran posiciones incorrectas, pues deben mirarse desde las perspectivas en que sus propugnadores actuaron, respondiendo a las maneras de enfocar los ordenamientos jurídicos los problemas de tipo registral65. El Derecho registral es el sistema de normas jurídicas y principios registrales que regulan la organización y funcionamiento de los registros públicos jurídicos que incorporan derechos, actos, contratos y demás, específicamente señalados por la ley, en los diversos registros. 64 VIVAR MORALES, Elena. "La Inscripción Registral de la Propiedad Inmueble en el Perú", Lima 1998, pág. 35 65 VIVAR MORALES, Elena, Op. Cit. pág. 35 289 Diversos autores han enriquecido la doctrina en materia registral con la construcción de conceptos que realzan diversos aspectos de la materia en comentario. Así tenemos a MOLINARIO66, quien señala "... El Derecho Registral Inmobiliario es la rama del Derecho Registral que tiene por objeto el estudio de los principios y normas que regulan: la organización y funcionamiento de los organismos estatales, nacionales y provinciales destinados a receptar los documentos notariales, decisiones judiciales y actos perfeccionados en ellos, concernientes a los derechos reales que se refieren a bienes inmuebles, así como también los derechos reales y creditorios que puedan afectarlos; la realización y la inscripción de los actos inscribibles y la inscripción en los libros o elementos conservatorios que lleven las oficinas competentes de tales negocios, documentos actos jurisdiccionales; la documentación que a su turno, puedan emitir los organismos en función de las inscripciones realizadas en ellos y los efectos y consecuencias jurídicas de las mismas; y por último los efectos y consecuencias que se desprenden de las inscripciones..." En el caso de ROCA SASTRE se refiere al "Derecho Inmobiliario Registral" definiéndolo como "... aquel derecho que regula la constitución, transmisión, modificación y extinción de los derechos reales sobre bienes inmuebles, en relación con el Registro de la Propiedad, así como las garantías estrictamente registrales". Para PASCUAL MARÍN67 el derecho registral se define en un sentido objetivo y otro subjetivo. Objetivamente, es "el conjunto de normas reguladoras de las relaciones jurídicas relativas a bienes aptos para engendrar titularidades "erga omnes" , mediante la publicidad del registro"; mientras que, subjetivamente, es "el conjunto de facultades derivadas de una relación jurídica en contacto con el registro, y por tal, dotada de similares efectos erga omnes" A decir de CANO TELLO68, los autores suelen dividir el Derecho Registral en tres partes: 1a Material o sustantiva: Comprende el concepto de finca entendido como entidad objetiva registral determinada por número propio y folio particular), la inmatriculación, los derechos reales inscribibles, los principios hipotecarios y la anotación preventiva. 2a Formal o adjetiva: Comprende la regulación del procedimiento de inscripción. 3a Orgánica: Regula todo lo referente a la organización de los Registros de la Propiedad. Publicidad jurídica y publicidad jurídica registral Para MANZANO SOLANO69, el concepto de publicidad surge por oposición al de clandestinidad. Si la clandestinidad implica ocultación y desconocimiento, la publicidad supone todo lo contrario, difusión y conocimiento. El concepto convencional, vulgar o periodístico de la publicidad hace referencia a propaganda o difusión, bien por medio de una publicación impresa (libro, revista, periódico), bien a través de un medio oral (conferencia, discurso, radio, disco) o visual (cine, televisión, vídeo, DVD, ordenador, Internet). Pero, en todos esos casos, lo que importa directamente es el conocimiento 66MOLINARIO, Alberto Domingo. "Del Derecho Registral y del Derecho Registral Inmobiliario". En: Curso de Derecho Registral Inmobiliario. Buenos Aires, 1971. p. 28. 67 MARIN PEREZ, Pascual. "Derecho Civil. Vol. III: Derechos Reales y Derecho Registral". Editorial Tecnos, Madrid, 1984, p. 325. 68 CANO TELLO, Celestino, "Manual de Derecho Hipotecario", Editorial Civitas, 2a edición, Madrid, 1992, págs. 44 y ss. 69 MANZANO SOLANO, Antonio y MANZANO FERNANDEZ, María Del Mar, "Instituciones del Derecho Registral Inmobiliario", Madrid, 2008, pág. 45 290 efectivo de la noticia o de la obra; la publicidad agota sus efectos en el hecho mismo de la difusión de la noticia o evento de que se trate. Este concepto es de escasa importancia para nuestro estudio, que debemos centrar en los aspectos jurídicos de la publicidad. En sentido jurídico, la publicidad es la exteriorización o divulgación de una situación jurídica para producir cognoscibilidad general o posibilidad de conocer. Se trata, como dice LACRUZ BERDEJO, no tanto de que las situaciones jurídicas lleguen a conocimiento de todos, como de que todos tengan un medio oficial de conocerlas. En cuanto al objeto de la publicidad, señala PAU PEDRÓN70, son las situaciones, jurídicas. Es decir, las circunstancias inherentes y duraderas que afectan a los inmuebles. Estas circunstancias pueden referirse: a) Al objeto: construcciones, plantaciones, excesos de cabida, volumen edificable, estado ecológico b) Al derecho: gravámenes, afecciones, cargas, condiciones, sustituciones, reservas, prohibiciones de disponer, estatutos de propiedad horizontal o de aprovechamiento por turno. Continua diciendo el profesor PAU PEDRÓN, que estas circunstancias duraderas tienen algún paralelismo -salvando las distanciascon los estados civiles de las personas. Así como el estado civil de las personas es el objeto del Registro Civil, el estado civil de los inmuebles es el objeto del Registro de la Propiedad. Las situaciones jurídicas inmobiliarias son circunstancias que afectan de manera inherente y estable a un inmueble. La inherencia y la estabilidad es lo que caracteriza las situaciones jurídicas frente a determinadas conductas que tienen por objeto un inmueble: las prestaciones. La prestación es, por naturaleza, externa al bien mismo, y transitoria, se agota con el cumplimiento. Paradigma de situación jurídica es el derecho real -tanto el derecho real pleno como los derechos limitadosEl derecho real es una circunstancia estable del inmueble (y, como circunstancia, sustancial, afectante a la sustancia). Pero hay otras muchas situaciones jurídicas que, por ser tales, pueden acceder al Registro, y no son derechos reales: prohibiciones de disponer, condiciones, derechos de arrendamiento y retorno, afecciones, cargas reales, volúmenes edificables, estado ecológico, estatutos de propiedad horizontal. Situaciones, como se ve, extraordinariamente heterogéneas, que tienen de común la estabilidad y la inherencia. Las situaciones jurídicas inmobiliarias, por afectara un inmueble, deben ser conocidas por todos: todos los que entren en relación jurídica con él deben quedar afectados por ese conjunto de situaciones que perfilan su particular estatuto jurídico. De ahí que se prevea su inscripción en el Registro, que es el instrumento técnico de publicidad. El legislador establece un concreto régimen de publicidad (presunción de exactitud, protección de adquirentes de buena fe...) para las situaciones jurídicas inscritas, y ese régimen se aplica a todas ellas (en la medida, naturalmente, que su naturaleza jurídica lo permita). En cuanto a situaciones jurídicas, todos esos fenómenos citados quedan sujetos al régimen de la publicidad. No tiene, pues, sentido, el razonamiento habitual de plantear la proximidad de una determinada situación inscribible a la naturaleza del 70 PAU PEDRÓN, Antonio, "La Publicidad Registral", Madrid, 2001, pág. 269 y ss. 291 derecho real, para deducir una mayor o menor aplicabilidad del régimen de la publicidad. Quizá el caso en que con mayor frecuencia se aplica este razonamiento sea el del arrendamiento. Como no es derecho real -se dice-, no es aplicable el régimen registral de los derechos reales; por tanto, su inscripción sólo determina la oponibilidad (y, correlativamente, su no inscripción, la inoponibilidad); como no es un derecho real, no se pueble aplicar a la inscripción de arrendamiento ni la legitimación ni la fe pública registral. El razonamiento es equivocado. El legislador establece un régimen para la publicidad de las situaciones jurídicas inmobiliarias, no un régimen de publicidad de los derechos reales que sólo pueda aplicarse por analogía cuando exista analogía sustantiva. Cuando el legislador declara inscribible el derecho arrendaticio, quiere, simplemente, sujetarlo al régimen registral -o, lo que es lo mismo, al régimen de la publicidad-. La ergaomnicidad o absolutividad no es una característica intrínseca o estructural de las situaciones jurídicas inmobiliarias: es su consecuencia. Lo que es inherente y duradero debe afectar a todos -a todos los que entren en relación con el inmueble-. Que de hecho les afecte depende de la publicidad. Como escribe Díez-Picazo respecto de los derechos reales, "puede decirse que un negocio constitutivo de un derecho real, al que no se le haya dotado de la necesaria publicidad, y en particular de la inscripción en el Registro, en relación con los terceros de buena fe no alcanza plena efectividad y, por consiguiente, en alguna medida no llega a ser un auténtico derecho real" La publicidad de los registros jurídicos y de los registros administrativos No resulta ocioso destacar que la publicidad que emana de los registros jurídicos difiere de aquellos llamados registros administrativos, pues en el caso de los primeros, los efectos que producen salvaguarda el interés jurídico del titular inscrito. En el caso de los segundos su finalidad es modesta, por cuanto solo se limita a fines de recolección de datos sin mayor trascendencia jurídica. AMOROS GUARDIOLA71 señala que la distinción entre el concepto de registros jurídicos y registros administrativos descansa, al menos, en dos notas; la publicidad y la eficacia sustantiva. Los primeros son registros con eficacia material o sustantiva sobre los derechos de las personas y su valor en el tráfico jurídico inmobiliario. Son instrumentos de publicidad jurídica, como expresión de la verdad jurídica oficial afectante a los bienes inmuebles que, como tal, se impone a todos y produce consecuencias jurídicas por sí mismas en el orden sustantivo. Los segundos, persiguen una finalidad más limitada: archivo o colección de datos, generalmente para uso interno de la Administración, con efectos estadísticos, fiscales, informativos, etc. Pero las presunciones de exactitud e integridad que se predican al respecto de los Registros jurídicos, no alcanzan a los Registros administrativos. (*) Abogado y economista, magister en Derecho de los Negocios por la Universidad de San Martín de Porres, profesor en la maestría de Derecho Civil de dicha casa de estudios, así como profesor de la Escuela de Posgrado de la UIGV, con cursos de especialización en Derecho Mercantil y Resolución de Conflictos en las universidades de Salamanca y Castilla La Mancha, España. 71 AMORÓS GUARDIOLA, Manuel, "Los Registros Jurídicos de Bienes en Derecho Español" En: II Congreso Internacional de derecho registral. Centro de Estudios Hipotecarios. Madrid, 1975, pág. 755 y ss. 292 EL FEMINICIDIO COMO TIPO PENAL AUTONOMO Dr.Iván Pedro Guevara Vásquez * Resumen Luego de haber sido tipificado el feminicidio a través de la Ley 29819, publicada con fecha 27 de diciembre de 2011, dentro de la órbita del parricidio al insertarse dentro de los alcances del artículo 107 del Código Penal, aquel delito ha alcanzado la autonomía formal con su modificación a través de la Ley 30068, publicada con fecha 18 de julio de 2013, que extrajo al feminicidio del ámbito del parricidio, llevándolo a un artículo aparte, el artículo 108-B, que expresa un desarrollo tanto cuantitativo como cualitativo del feminicidio, como homicidio en agravio de la mujer por razones de género. Palabras clave: Feminicidio. Razones de género. Taxonomía: Feminicidio básico, agravado y agravadísimo. 1 DESCRIPCIÓN TÍPICA: Art. 108-B: "Será reprimido con pena privativa de libertad no menor de quince años el que mata a una mujer por su condición de tal, en cualquiera de los siguientes contextos: 1. Violencia familiar; 2. Coacción, hostigamiento o acoso sexual; 3. Abuso de poder, confianza o de cualquier otra posición o relación que le confiera autoridad al agente; 4. Cualquier forma de discriminación contra la mujer, independientemente de que exista o haya existido una relación conyugal o de convivencia con el agente. La pena privativa de la libertad será no menor de veinticinco años, cuando concurra cualquiera de las siguientes circunstancias agravantes: 1. Si la víctima era menor de edad; * Docente e investigador a nivel de postgrado en la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, y Fiscal Penal Titular en el Distrito Judicial de Lima, Maestro en derecho con mención en Derecho Penal y Ciencias Criminológicas; Maestro en Filosofía e Investigación, con docencia a nivel de postgrado en la Universidad Nacional de Trujillo y en la Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal, y a nivel de pregrado en la Universidad Privada Norbert Wiener. Autor de las obras: "La Doctrina de Emmanuel Mounier en las Constituciones Latinoamericanas", publicada en Madrid-España; "El Parricidio. Entre la Infracción del Deber y el Feminicidio", publicada en Lima-Perú, entre otras. 293 2. Si la víctima se encontraba en estado de gestación; 3. Si la víctima se encontraba bajo cuidado o responsabilidad del agente; 4. Si la víctima fue sometida previamente a violación sexual o actos de mutilación; 5. Si al momento de cometerse el delito, la victima padeciera cualquier tipo de discapacidad; 6. Si la víctima fue sometida para fines de trata de personas; 7. Cuando hubiera concurrido cualquiera de las circunstancias agravantes establecidas en el artículo 108. La pena será de cadena perpetua cuando concurran dos o más circunstancias agravantes". CONSIDERACIONES GENERALES: El feminicidio fue introducido en nuestro Código Penal con la reforma del artículo 107 del Código punitivo a raíz de la Ley 29819, que lo insertó dentro de la órbita del parricidio. El feminicidio se legisló en el Código Penal peruano por primera vez en el mes de diciembre de 2011; mas su existencia a nivel internacional es de relativa larga data. Muestra de ello es su consideración en la normativa de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas (ONU), desde la cual se publicitó y divulgó en cuanto forma delictiva en la que la víctima por antonomasia es la mujer. Con los antecedentes de carácter internacional, el feminicidio peruano se insertó en el ámbito del delito de parricidio, puntualmente en lo que respecta al tercer párrafo del artículo 107 del Código Penal que a la letra estipulaba hasta antes de su modificación reciente a través de la Ley 30068: "Si la víctima del delito descrito es o ha sido la cónyuge o la conviviente del autor, o estuvo ligada a él por una relación análoga el delito tendrá el nombre de feminicidio". En ese sentido, no se entendió, en primer término, el feminicidio como todo crimen contra la vida cometido en agravio de una mujer; esto es, como todo homicidio contra las féminas, sino como el homicidio contra la mujer en circunstancias de parricidio, en las modalidades de conyugicidio, uxoricidio, homicidio en agravio del ex cónyuge, concubinicidio, homicidio en agravio de ex concubino propio, homicidio en agravio de concubino impropio y homicidio en agravio de ex concubino impropio, por lo que, en rigor, en un principio no se trató de un nuevo delito, sino de una nueva nomenclatura, distinta, para ilustrar el concepto de un acto negativo de discriminación traducido en hecho ilícito penal, en delito, con posesión de dolo de parricidio, que se basa en el estado subjetivo del agente masculino que, al margen de la actualidad o vigencia del vínculo, actúa criminalmente sobre la mujer que fue o es su esposa, conviviente propia o impropia. Pero tal regulación en realidad no se condecía con la visión de género, bajo la cual se habría construido el feminicidio a nivel internacional, en cuanto promoción de calidad de vida y dignidad para la mujer en las diferentes sociedades humanas del mundo, y por la cual se generaron políticas públicas de índole nacional y con el auspicio de las Naciones Unidas tratando de proteger al máximo al género femenino frente a los excesos de los varones. En esa medida, con la primera reforma, la nueva nomenclatura obedeció entonces no a un afán de nueva tipificación de un hecho que antes no era delito; esto es, que anteriormente era atípico, sino a un criterio semántico de reordenamiento que se expresó precisamente en el término "feminicidio", que no fue otra cosa, en el contexto de la primera reforma, que la denominación victimológica del conyugicidio, uxoricidio, homicidio en agravio de ex cónyuge, concubinicidio, homicidio en agravio de ex concubino propio, homicidio en agravio de concubino impropio y homicidio en agravio de ex concubino impropio, pues tal nomen iuris se acuñó desde la perspectiva de los intereses de la 294 víctima, específicamente cuando la mujer es el sujeto pasivo del delito en mención. Al ser la mujer un ser débil por naturaleza frente al hombre, el feminicidio trata de compensar la correlación de fuerzas entre los sexos opuestos, masculino y femenino, pues mientras el varón es de una mayor contextura y poder físico, partiendo por el hecho de tener una piel más gruesa, la mujer es un ser delicado, pese a tener dentro de sí a la maternidad y pese a haberse ocupado históricamente de la crianza y educación doméstica de los hijos, siempre hablando en términos de promedio, dado que la casuística nos ha mostrado casos en donde la mujer detenta concretamente el poder físico, al maltratar y golpear al marido, en los supuestos en donde el varón no ostenta mayor fuerza ni contundencia física, pues hay no pocos casos en donde el hombre, dotado de una mayor corpulencia, frena sus impulsos violentos por consideraciones morales expresadas en la frase "A la mujer, ni con el pétalo de una flor". Sea como sea, ya frenándose el hombre de responder a agresiones de su pareja o cónyuge mujer -en los casos de uniones legales restringidas a la heterosexualidad-, o estando en desventaja física respecto a la misma, la violencia puede provenir de la mujer, del ser femenino, y tal violencia se puede traducir en delito contra la vida, en la modalidad de parricidio. 2. ESTRUCTURA JURÍDICA: 2.1 BIEN JURÍDICO.El feminicidio se ha elaborado con abstracción de los casos en donde la mujer es la que muestra mayor poderío físico sobre el hombre que se traduce al final en un homicidio de autor. Y en ese sentido no cubre la generalidad de la casuística al respecto desde su mismo origen, mostrándose con la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal, desde el ángulo jurídico, como el parricidio en la perspectiva de la victimología centrada en la mujer, como el parricidio a partir de la víctima mujer, bajo el prisma de los intereses de género. Dentro de los alcances de la primera reforma, dada en el 2011, el feminicidio no constituyó en modo alguno un nuevo delito, al ser el delito de parricidio que se presentaba cuando el sujeto pasivo del mismo viene a ser una mujer. Al haberse circunscrito, en la primera reforma, el delito de feminicidio en el Código Penal peruano en el ámbito del parricidio quedó claro que tenía cierta deuda con el homicidio vincular; esto es, cuando el parricidio se definía como un homicidio en donde el vínculo de parentesco consanguíneo en línea recta o el vínculo legal de la adopción o el matrimonio tenían vigencia, permanencia y actualidad al momento de los hechos. Con la segunda reforma, dada en el mes de julio del 2013, se legisló el feminicidio como un crimen contra toda mujer, con independencia de relación conyugal o convivencial presente o pasada, y se habría presentado un acto de discriminación negativa frente al género masculino, habida cuenta que no existe un desdoblamiento en el bien jurídico vida humana; esto es, una fragmentación en vida humana de la mujer, por un lado, y vida humana del hombre, por el otro, ya que de existir tal diferenciación se quebraría el principio de unidad de la vida humana, por el cual solamente puede existir el bien jurídico vida humana en general, a manera de regla, pues la vida humana, como bien jurídico, admite matizaciones, por excepción, tratándose de la vida del concebido, para lo cual se fragmenta teóricamente el bien jurídico "vida humana" en vida humana independiente, respecto a los delitos de homicidio en general, y vida humana dependiente, respecto a los delitos de aborto. Pero más allá de esa fragmentación teorética no se admite en lo mínimo una consideración mayor de la vida humana de la mujer, por encima de la vida del hombre, como tampoco de la vida humana del hombre por encima de la vida humana de la mujer. En ese sentido, en el marco de la primera reforma, el delito de feminicidio no era un tipo penal autónomo, sino dependiente o incluido dentro de la órbita típica del parricidio, pues una desigualdad al respecto sería intolerable en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho, en 295 donde los derechos fundamentales de las personas humanas no pueden admitir ninguna discriminación o diferenciación por razón del sexo de las mismas, ya que las únicas excepciones contempladas en las legislaciones son los derechos de los niños y adolescentes, a los cuales les asiste el interés superior consagrado desde el nivel internacional con la Convención de los Derechos del Niño de 1989 que fue adoptada y abierta a la firma y ratificación por la Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas en su Resolución 44/25, de fecha 20 de noviembre de 1989, y cuya fecha de entrada en vigor data del 02 de setiembre de 1990, bajo la inspiración de una mayor protección de la especie humana, con una mejor cobertura de la misma por la expansión de los derechos a los sectores humanos más vulnerables, como es la niñez en este caso. Al margen de tales salvedades, el bien jurídico, desde el punto de vista jurídico-penal, sigue siendo único e indivisible: La vida humana. Claro que la muerte intencionalmente provocada de un niño, como de una mujer delicada, puede asimilarse a los supuestos de asesinato en la modalidad de alevosía, al aprovecharse el sujeto activo delincuente de la desventaja física de los niños y las mujeres en general; pero de allí a generalizar los homicidios contra los niños o las mujeres como actos discriminatorios y de lesa humanidad hay una cierta distancia. Tipos penales autónomos e independientes para los delitos contra la vida cometidos contra los mismos no sería dogmática ni políticocriminalmente correcto, aunque para medidas de política general lo correcto sería relativo y más estaría de acuerdo al impacto mediático del momento. 2.2 TIPO OBJETIVO.La legislación del feminicidio, dentro de los alcances de la primera reforma, como una modalidad del parricidio en el país se insertó dentro de la propaganda de la política de promoción de los derechos inalienables e irrenunciables del género femenino, considerando que el 18 de diciembre de 1979, la Asamblea General de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas aprobó "La Convención sobre la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación contra la mujer" (The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women CEDAW), que entró en vigor como tratado internacional el 03 de setiembre de 1981 tras su ratificación por 20 países, siendo de destacar que en 1989, en el décimo aniversario de la citada Convención, un aproximado de cien naciones ha declarado que se consideran obligadas por sus disposiciones. Pero tal inserción en el Código Penal del país no reflejó exactamente la política de promoción de los derechos de la mujer, en plano de igualdad con el varón, en la definición del feminicidio como todo crimen u homicidio cometido contra la mujer por razones de género, partiendo por el hecho que en la referida Convención se estipula en el artículo 2, inciso g), que los Estados Partes se comprometen a derogar todas las disposiciones penales nacionales que constituyan discriminación contra la mujer, por cuanto se delimitó la nomenclatura feminicidio al delito de parricidio cuando la víctima es la pareja o ex pareja mujer. En ese sentido, hubo con la primera reforma un cierto deslinde respecto a los denominados crímenes de odio, los cuales se dirigen contra determinado grupo social, a manera de un genocidio, entendido desde un punto de vista amplio o lato. La perspectiva penal que adquirió el feminicidio peruano, con la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal, fue distinta por la diferencia del ángulo de enfoque; esto es, por hacer hincapié en el hecho de las relaciones conyugales o ex conyugales, y convivenciales como ex convivenciales. La presencia de las relaciones sentimentales o afectivas en ese contexto primó al momento de la configuración típica del feminicidio, por lo que en el Perú el feminicidio, con la mencionada reforma, no vino a ser otra cosa que el delito de 296 parricidio desde la perspectiva victimológica centrada en la víctima mujer, por lo que los crímenes de grupos de mujeres en la Ciudad Juárez de México, por ejemplo, no se enmarcarían precisamente dentro de delitos de feminicidio, de acuerdo con la versión jurídico penal peruana del mismo, dentro de los alcances de la primera reforma, sino dentro de otra categoría de delitos, de mayor gravedad o dimensión, al tratarse de crímenes de feminicidio en el sentido de delito cometido contra la mujer por cuestiones de género, independientemente de la existencia vigente o pasada de relaciones afectivas de pareja. Respecto al ámbito de aplicación del feminicidio, en la primera reforma en mención, el tercer párrafo del artículo 107 del Código Penal peruano contempló un feminicidio restringido, basado en las relaciones sentimentales o afectivas, presentes o pasadas, de la víctima mujer, por lo que el feminicidio restringido del país no constituyó en puridad un delito autónomo e independiente, sino que expresó la nueva preocupación de una política penal centrada en los derechos de la mujer. Desde el lado de la victimología, el feminicidio peruano, tras la primera reforma, destacó a la víctima mujer en los supuestos de parricidio por vínculo afectivo, que comprendió la vigencia o no vigencia de matrimonio civil, convivencia propia e incluso impropia, al establecerse un numerus apertus en la descripción típica con la frase "una relación análoga". Sin embargo, con la segunda reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal se excluyó al feminicidio restringido del mismo, trasladándolo al artículo 108-B del Código Penal, tipificándolo como feminicidio amplio o extensivo, por el cual el feminicidio es un delito contra la mujer por estrictas razones de género, aunque con esto último –desde nuestro punto de vistase haya legalizado un acto de discriminación negativa, al ponerse al crimen contra la mujer de relieve por encima del crimen contra el hombre. 2.2.1 Sujetos.- a) Sujeto activo.Es necesariamente un hombre, un varón, al destacarse a la mujer como sujeto pasivo del feminicidio. Tal destacamiento excluye a su vez la posibilidad que otra mujer sea sujeto activo en el feminicidio, como es el caso que se puede presentar en los supuestos de homicidios cometidos en el seno de parejas sentimentales de lesbianas. El tenor literal del artículo 108-B del Código Penal es lo suficientemente claro al respecto: "Será reprimido con pena privativa de libertad no menor de quince años el que mata a una mujer por su condición de tal ... ". En una interpretación gramatical y teleológica el único sujeto activo en el feminicidio viene a ser un hombre, un varón, precisamente por la visión de los intereses de género que inspira la teleología del feminicidio. Asimismo, dentro de una interpretación sistemática, al interior del mismo sistema jurídico nacional, al no estar contemplado el matrimonio civil ni la convivencia legal entre parejas del mismo sexo, no es posible imputación alguna de feminicidio contra una mujer lesbiana. b) Sujeto pasivo.Asimismo, desde el lado del sujeto pasivo en el delito de feminicidio, es de mencionarse que solamente puede ser víctima del mismo la mujer, entendida ésta dentro de una visión natural del género femenino, pues aunque el número de transexuales femeninos está en aumento con el transcurrir del tiempo, la teleología de la norma jurídico-penal al respecto se enmarca en un contexto social determinado, como es el hecho de la ilegalidad del matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo, estando inspirado el feminicidio, a nivel internacional, en los intereses y razones de género, privativos de la mujer biológica, y no así de la mujer transexual; esto es, del ser humano nacido varón pero convertido en mujer aparente o artificial a través de numerosas 297 intervenciones quirúrgicas, incluida la relativa a la extirpación del órgano genital masculino –comúnmente conocida como "cambio de sexo"-. Las pruebas científicas, a partir de lo cromosómico siempre van a afirmar el género masculino en los transexuales femeninos, y el derecho –y con ello el derecho penal-, no puede hacer olvido de ello, al menos en lo que se refiere al feminicidio, dado que si en el país alguna vez es aprobado legal y constitucionalmente el matrimonio homosexual, ello no afectaría directamente el hecho que la muerte de la mujer o ex mujer por obra del marido o ex marido siga siendo catalogada como feminicidio. En este supuesto de la legalidad del matrimonio gay y lesbiano, los homicidios del esposo o ex esposo homosexual por manos del otro sería sancionado como conyugicidio o parricidio, así como los homicidios de la esposa o ex esposa lesbiana por obra de la otra. La esposa lesbiana que mata a su consorte no sería sancionada por feminicidio, estrictamente hablando, sino por conyugicidio –que es una forma de parricidio-, habida cuenta que en el feminicidio únicamente el varón puede ser sujeto activo. Más bien, en una unión entre un transexual femenino (hombre transformado en mujer) y un transexual masculino (mujer transformada en hombre) se daría –en el caso de la muerte del transexual masculino por obra del transexual femeninoel delito de feminicidio. 2.2.2 Conducta.Si bien al feminicidio como crimen cometido contra la mujer por razones de género, independientemente de las relaciones conyugales o convivenciales vigentes, no se le debe concebir dentro de la órbita de los actos de discriminación positiva, pues ontológicamente la mujer no puede ser catalogada como un ser desvalido o en minusvalía, es preciso analizar la acción descrita en el artículo 108-B del Código Penal por encima de cualquier desacuerdo en la tipificación al respecto (1). Las estadísticas respecto al feminicidio peruano fueron elaboradas incluso antes de la publicación de la ley que introdujo la primera reforma en el artículo 107 del Código Penal en el mes de diciembre de 2011. Así se tiene que el Ministerio Público, a través de su Observatorio de Criminalidad, realizó en el año 2010 la publicación "El Feminicidio en el Perú según Distritos: Con información sobre el homicidio en las familias. Enero –Octubre 2010", en la cual se destaca que la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que el feminicidio es el homicidio de mujeres por razones de género, en la Sentencia del 16 de noviembre de 2009 en el caso González y otras – "Campo Algodonero"vs. México, en lo específico de los párrafos 252, 253 y 258, que es el caso emblemático de la Ciudad Juárez. Más allá de la fórmula amplia o lata del feminicidio, como homicidio contra la mujer por razones de género, con la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal el feminicidio tipificado en el país distó de ser el correspondiente a esa fórmula general, por lo que se detecta un feminicidio social, que es sobre el cual se levantaron las estadísticas en el Observatorio de Criminalidad del Ministerio Público peruano, y un feminicidio jurídico, que es sobre el cual se ha legislado con la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal. En otra terminología, el feminicidio legislado en la primera reforma en mención corresponde a lo que el Observatorio en mención denomina "feminicidio íntimo", que es aquel que, por un lado, se da cuando la víctima mujer tenía, o había tenido, una relación de pareja con el homicida, que no se limita a las relaciones en las que existía un vínculo (1) Es bueno recordar que la dogmática viene a ser la disciplina jurídica que analiza el derecho positivo vigente, y la dogmática jurídico-penal no escapa de tal destino, por lo que las discrepancias respecto a la tipificación pasan a segundo plano; esto es, son de orden secundario. 298 matrimonial, al extenderse a los convivientes, novios, enamorados y parejas sentimentales. En este caso, esta forma de feminicidio es la que contempló en parte el tercer párrafo del artículo 107 del texto penal sustantivo, en el marco de la primera reforma. Pero también el feminicidio íntimo se manifiesta, por otro lado, en los casos de muerte de mujeres a manos de un miembro de la familia, como el padre, el padrastro, el hermano o el primo. Queda claro que esta forma de feminicidio no ha sido la adoptada en la Ley 29819, que reforma el artículo 107 del Código punitivo peruano en el mes de diciembre de 2011, al haberse contemplado el feminicidio íntimo o restringido en el sentido de encontrarse tipificado respecto a hechos en donde estaba de por medio una relación afectiva o vínculo matrimonial; esto es, en referencia a los delitos de conyugicidio, uxoriocidio y homicidio en agravio de concubino, incluidos en la versión original del referido artículo, que se regía por la permanencia o actualidad de los vínculos, por lo que, en el marco de la primera reforma del artículo en mención, la muerte provocada de mujeres a manos de un miembro de la familia, como el padre, será filicidio; y la muerte ocasionada por el padrastro, el hermano o el primo configurará un delito de homicidio simple o asesinato, dependiendo de las circunstancias de la comisión. El feminicidio, tal como estuvo regulado en el texto penal sustantivo patrio en su primera versión, fue una manera de entender el parricidio, desde el punto de vista del feminismo político, por cuanto fue el destacamiento de la víctima mujer, y no constituyó un nuevo tipo penal, sino un nuevo nomen iuris para designar a tal destacamiento, que se insertó dentro de la descripción típica del parricidio, a la vez que el tipo penal peruano de parricidio experimentó, en su autonomía, una ampliación de su tipo objetivo, al superarse el límite de la vigencia o permanencia del vínculo. Al margen de elucubraciones de índole política, el feminicidio restringido que adoptó el artículo 107 del Código Penal no fue gratuito, porque su existencia jurídica implicó la modificación rotunda de las bases del parricidio clásico, el cual se abrió al punto que se contempló dentro de la órbita del parricidio, al feminicidio concebido como homicidio en agravio de ex concubino impropio; es decir, homicidio en agravio de ex pareja convivencial con la cual había impedimento matrimonial, sin mencionar al homicidio en agravio de ex amante, que se admite dentro de una visión extensiva de la "relación análoga", en el contexto de la primera reforma. El feminicidio peruano tuvo como antecedentes los proyectos de Ley números 00350-11, 00008-11, 00224-11, en los cuales se buscaba la tipificación del feminicidio, ya sea bien en el artículo 108, en el artículo 107 del Código Penal o mediante la creación del artículo 107-A (Propuesta de la Congresista Condori); y el resultado final se cristalizó a nivel del artículo 107 del texto sustantivo, con el tenor previsto en la versión de la primera reforma, con la consiguiente ampliación de la base típica del parricidio. Tal ampliación fue considerada e impulsada por el Movimiento Manuela Ramos que presentó como sugerencia el incorporar al artículo 107 del Código Penal las relaciones afectivas, actuales y pasadas, que fueron más allá del matrimonio y la convivencia. Esta sugerencia hay que concordarla con la propuesta que consistía en: "El que mata a una mujer aprovechándose de su condición de pareja o ex pareja, o manteniendo o habiendo mantenido relaciones conyugales, de convivencia, de intimidad o noviazgo, será reprimido con pena privativa de libertad no menor de 15 años". El debate congresal se dio en el contexto de esas propuestas, zanjándose el tema de las relaciones que van más allá del matrimonio y la convivencia con el término "relación análoga". 299 Es de advertirse que el término "relación análoga" no ha sido considerado por la nueva reforma introducida con la Ley 30068, con lo que la base típica del delito de parricidio ahora solamente incluye a la relación conyugal y convivencial, vigente o pasada, descartando y superando el caso de la calificación de la muerte de la amante como parricidio. El concubinato en el delito de parricidio anterior a la primera reforma se interpretaba a la luz de la codificación civil; esto es, como convivencia regulada por el artículo 326 del Código Civil, como convivencia propia, cuestión que habría vuelto con la segunda reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal. Las propuestas legislativas en torno a la adición del artículo 107-A al Código punitivo giraron alrededor de la autonomía típica para el feminicidio, cuestión que se logró con la segunda reforma del mencionado artículo 107, en cuanto la exclusión del feminicidio del ámbito del parricidio y su traslado a artículo aparte (art. 108-B) con la autonomía formal del caso. Tal es así que la propuesta de la congresista Condori se constituyó como una de las más cercanas a dicha pretensión al considerar a la relación de parentesco por consanguinidad o afinidad dentro de la base típica del feminicidio, con lo cual iba más allá de las relaciones afectivas o de pareja, presentes o pasadas, aunque por otro lado consideraba al noviazgo o a cualquier otra relación de hecho o amistad dentro de la misma. Sin embargo, ya sea el matrimonio o la convivencia, o el parentesco por consanguinidad, los puntos de contacto con el parricidio clásico son más que evidentes, por lo que, en su primera fase, el feminicidio peruano se insertó dentro de los dominios del parricidio. El feminicidio nacional después se perfiló con la dación de la Ley 30068 típicamente como el homicidio contra la mujer por razones de género; vale decir, por el hecho de ser mujer, con el logro de la autonomía típica respecto al parricidio, legislándose en artículo aparte y con un tipo objetivo y subjetivo propio y distinto. En la primera reforma se incluyó un feminicidio respecto a los vínculos actuales o pasados de matrimonio o convivencia propia e impropia, sin tratamiento de los vínculos sanguíneos, hipertrofiándose el enfoque de la reforma en los problemas de parejas o ex parejas, dejándose de lado una buena oportunidad para abordar el tema de las hijas mujeres muertas en el interior del seno familiar por obra y/o decisión del padre progenitor por el solo hecho de ser mujeres o el tema de las hijas que, tras la muerte o separación de la madre, se convierten en convivientes de sus padres, al punto de tener hijos con ellos, hijos que son a la vez nietos del progenitor masculino. Respecto al primer rubro ignorado por la ley que reformó el artículo 107 del Código Penal en el mes de diciembre de 2011, es de destacarse que el feminicidio peruano se hubiese enriquecido con la inclusión dentro del mismo de los homicidios de las hijas a manos de sus padres por el mero hecho de ser mujeres; esto es, por razones de género, en el sentido que los progenitores no admitían ser afectados en modo alguno por cualquier acto de las mismas que, según limitados razonamientos, socavaban su autoridad, masculinidad, superioridad o algo por el estilo. Y tales razones de género también se pueden dar en el caso de los hermanos que dan muerte a sus hermanas, provenientes incluso del mismo seno familiar nuclear. De haberse legislado el feminicidio peruano con tales inclusiones, en el marco de la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal, la tipificación hubiese sido más consecuente con las bases y las raíces del feminicidio como homicidio contra la mujer por razones de género, al puntualizarse la cuestión de género por encima de cualquier contenido secundario, sea o no referido a relaciones familiares, situación que se dio con la Ley 30068 que autonomiza al delito de feminicidio. Del mismo modo, es de destacarse que el homicidio de la hija que se convierte en mujer del progenitor tiene interesantes aristas al formar parte de lo que el tercer párrafo del 300 artículo 107 del texto sustantivo, en el marco de la primera reforma del mismo, considera como homicidio cometido contra la pareja o ex pareja de una relación análoga a la convivencial, pues dogmáticamente se manifiesta como un filicidio, como modalidad de parricidio, o como un feminicidio restringido por relaciones afectivas, ya sea de índole pasional o no. Al no contemplarse en la primera reforma el delito de feminicidio dentro del seno familiar, respecto a los lazos de parentesco consanguíneo, cuando la víctima es mujer, fue imposible asimilar un filicidio dentro de las modalidades del feminicidio, por lo que la muerte intencional de la hija a manos del progenitor era interpretada necesariamente como un filicidio en agravio del descendiente femenino, aunque no sucedió lo mismo con el homicidio de la hija que es a la vez pareja de su padre, al haber el feminicidio peruano roto la permanencia o vigencia de los vínculos y al haberse ido más allá de la convivencia propia; es decir, de aquellas personas de sexos opuestos que conviven estando libres de impedimento matrimonial. A ello se agrega el hecho de la no tipificación del incesto como delito o hecho ilícito penal en general, por lo que en esa medida la muerte provocada de la hija conviviente de su padre a manos de éste será castigada como feminicidio. La hipertrofia del lado de los vínculos sentimentales tuvo como contraparte la hipotrofia del lado de los vínculos consanguíneos por la visión sesgada del feminismo político, en el marco de la primera reforma en mención. En consecuencia, bajo la vigencia de la Ley 29819, el feminicidio, como modalidad del delito de parricidio, reunió características impropias, en el sentido de no configurarse como una clase de homicidio de autor al nivel de los delitos de vínculo de sangre, como el matricidio, o de los delitos de vínculo legal, como el conyugicidio, sino como una forma terminológica para expresar parcialmente a esta última clase de delitos de parricidio, por el destacamiento del sujeto pasivo mujer. Otro aspecto a considerar fue que el feminicidio, como crimen contra la vida de una mujer en circunstancias de relaciones -actuales o pasadasde pareja, parece poner en serios aprietos a los casos de parricidio por emoción violenta, en supuestos en donde la víctima es una mujer, pues son situaciones marcadamente distintas el matar a la esposa y a la ex esposa. Asimismo, es de advertirse que tal como estuvo previsto el feminicidio peruano en la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código Penal; esto es, sin haberse añadido a la tipificación ningún elemento adicional en el ámbito del tipo subjetivo, referente a las razones de género que animan al sujeto activo, no se constituyó en realidad como una nueva modalidad del parricidio, expresando más bien una nueva terminología de designación para los supuestos de crímenes por relaciones afectivas o sentimentales vigentes o pasadas cuando el sujeto pasivo es una mujer. Con la Ley 30068, publicada en el mes de julio de 2013, el feminicidio peruano se desvinculó típicamente del delito de parricidio, obteniendo la independencia típica del caso, rescatando las raíces históricas del feminicidio, basadas en las razones de género, expresadas en lo que el actual artículo 108-B considera como el matar a una mujer por su condición de tal (2). (2) En nuestra obra "El Parricidio. Entre la Infracción del Deber y el Feminicidio" (1a e. IDEMSA. Lima-Perú. 2012. 377 pp) anotamos en la página 129, respecto a las razones de género que animan al feminicidio histórico: "Distinto hubiese sido que el feminicidio peruano se tipificase en la línea del homicidio cometido contra la mujer por razones de género, aunque ello quizás hubiese significado caer en el acto de 301 2.2.3 Modalidades: De acuerdo a la Ley 30068 que autonomiza formalmente al delito de feminicidio, hay una serie de subtipos que podemos clasificar en feminicidio básico, agravado y agravadísimo. a) Feminicidio básico.- Contempla el feminicidio cometido en el marco de violencia familiar, el feminicidio por constreñimiento que comprende a la conducta realizada por coacción, hostigamiento o acoso sexual, el feminicidio por dominio o influjo sobre la víctima, que se refiere al realizado por abuso de poder, confianza o de cualquier otra posición o relación que le confiera autoridad al agente; y el feminicidio por discriminación negativa, que abarca cualquier forma de discriminación contra la mujer, independientemente de que exista o haya existido una relación conyugal o de convivencia con el sujeto agente. a.1) Feminicidio por violencia familiar.En esta modalidad el feminicidio se encuentra restringido al núcleo familiar, compuesto tanto en lo que se refiere a la familia familial como a la familia conyugal. Para la comprensión y solución de esta modalidad de feminicidio básico es de aplicación la Ley No 26260 de Protección frente a la Violencia Familiar y sus modificatorias, en la cual se define a la violencia familiar como aquella acción u omisión –conductaque cause daño físico o psicológico, maltrato sin lesión, inclusive la amenaza o coacción graves y/o reiteradas, así como la violencia sexual, que se produzcan entre: Cónyuges, ex cónyuges, convivientes, ex convivientes, ascendientes, descendientes, parientes colaterales hasta el cuarto grado de consanguinidad y segundo de afinidad, los que habitan en el mismo hogar, siempre que no medien relaciones contractuales o laborales, los que hayan procreado hijos en común, independientemente que convivan o no, al momento de producirse la violencia; y uno de los convivientes y los parientes del otro hasta el cuarto grado de consanguinidad y segundo de afinidad, en el caso de las uniones de hecho. En este feminicidio se subsumen las conductas que estaban descritas en la primera fase de evolución del feminicidio peruano, en la medida en que cubre comportamientos referidos a crímenes contra la cónyuge o conviviente mujer, ex cónyuge o ex conviviente mujer; pero yendo más allá, por cuanto incluye a los homicidios cometidos en agravio de la hija o nieta, sobrina o sobrina nieta, en consideración de los alcances establecidos por la Ley de Protección frente a la Violencia Familiar. En consecuencia, en este rubro de conductas típicas advertimos la presencia de los delitos de filicidio en agravio de descendiente femenino, así como los comportamientos homicidas en agravio de ascendiente mujer, lo cual comprendería a los casos de matricidio en agravio de la madre o de la abuela, siempre y cuando la acción del hechor discriminación negativa mencionada ut supra, habida cuenta que considerar las razones de género dentro del ámbito subjetivo del parricidio tornaba demasiado complicada la estructura del tipo penal, caracterizado por excelencia, en su nivel subjetivo, por el dolo y el conocimiento de la existencia del vínculo. De haberse tipificado un feminicidio en ese sentido, su ubicación de técnica legislativa más le debería a los delitos contra la humanidad que a los delitos comunes contra la vida". Es de aclarar que la crítica data del año 2012, cuando el feminicidio peruano todavía formaba parte de la descripción típica del delito de parricidio, bajo la vigencia de la Ley 29819, en el marco de la primera reforma del artículo 107 del Código penal patrio. 302 esté movida por razones de género; esto es, matar a dichas mujeres por su condición de tales. a.2) Feminicidio por constreñimiento.En este bloque de conductas antijurídicas se incluye a los supuestos de coacción, hostigamiento o acoso sexual, que la norma ubica acertadamente como contextos, pues no se constituyen propiamente como medios de comisión. El feminicidio en el contexto de una coacción la interpretamos en concordancia con lo que el Código Penal en su artículo 151 considera como coacción; esto es, cuando el sujeto activo, mediante amenaza o violencia, obliga a otro a hacer lo que la ley no manda o le impide hacer lo que ella no prohíbe. Ciertamente que el medio de comisión no viene a ser la coacción, sino que ésta se presenta como estado previo del homicidio contra la mujer por razón de género. En ese sentido se puede presentar un concurso de delitos, pues hay una línea de continuidad entre la coacción y la muerte provocada de la mujer. Queda claro que tiene que haber en el sujeto agente el respectivo animus necandi; esto es, la intención de matar, de matar a una fémina por razones de género. El feminicidio en el contexto de hostigamiento si bien se puede semánticamente identificar con el realizado en medio de acoso sexual, detenta desde nuestro punto de vista características propias, pues el hostigamiento se puede interpretar como proveniente de un entorno no solamente interpersonal, sino también laboral. Sería el caso de una mujer que es muerta en circunstancias de un hostigamiento en el trabajo, al no soportar el sujeto agente la idea de una competencia laboral, o incluso de una superioridad laboral, por parte de la mujer. Y el feminicidio en el contexto de acoso sexual está referido al hecho del homicidio en agravio de la mujer, por razones de género, cuando el sujeto activo se encontraba acosando a la mujer, ya sea en un centro laboral o no, ejerciendo presión sobre la misma con la finalidad de acceder sexualmente a la misma. Es el caso del sujeto agente que, al no lograr que la mujer ceda a su acoso, la mata por no admitir la idea que una mujer le haga "tamaño desplante". a.3) Feminicidio por dominio o influjo sobre la víctima.- En este rubro de delitos de feminicidio, el sujeto activo comete el crimen aprovechando el poder, confianza, posición de dominio o relación subordinante que tiene respecto al sujeto pasivo mujer. En contraposición al feminicidio en el contexto de violencia familiar, en este caso la autoridad no proviene del seno filial, ya sea de familias sanguíneas o basadas en el vínculo por adopción, sino del ambiente externo a la familia, lo que nos lleva al ámbito laboral o grupal. El abuso de poder, de la confianza o de cualquier otra posición o relación que le confiera autoridad al sujeto agente sobre el sujeto pasivo tienen, desde nuestra óptica, elementos de índole no familiar, expresados por excelencia en el hecho de ejercicio arbitrario de ese poder, lo que podría presentarse en casos de una relación laboral, ya sea en el ámbito público o privado. Es el caso del funcionario de una empresa pública o privada, jefe de la víctima, que, sin mediar acoso sexual u hostigamiento, da muerte a su subordinada, por su condición de mujer. Es el caso del líder de un grupo social, pandilla o una comuna que causa intencionalmente la muerte de una mujer integrante de los mismos, aprovechando su situación de primacía, por razones de género. a.4) Feminicidio por discriminación negativa, independientemente de que exista o haya existido una relación conyugal o de convivencia con el sujeto agente.En este grupo de conductas se incluyen los diferentes supuestos 303 de discriminación negativa (3) que se pueden presentar contra una mujer. En este sentido, tiene cabida la discriminación por el hecho mismo de ser mujer, y que sustenta el núcleo duro del homicidio en agravio de la mujer por razones de género, que se constituye propiamente como el feminicidio histórico, reafirmado en el contexto de la segunda fase de desarrollo del feminicidio peruano. También tienen cabida supuestos puntuales de discriminación negativa, que abarca cualquier forma de discriminación injustificada contra la mujer, por motivos de índole racial, social, económica, política, ideológica, orientación sexual, etc. En consecuencia, un homicidio contra una mujer lesbiana por el hecho de ser "machona"; esto es, activa o que realiza el papel predominantemente masculino en una relación sentimental, sería un feminicidio por discriminación negativa, habiendo sido anteriormente un acto de esas características catalogado socialmente como "crimen de odio". La precisión de que la discriminación negativa se verifique con independencia que exista o haya existido una relación conyugal o de convivencia con el sujeto activo implica el reconocimiento expreso de la autonomía respecto al parricidio, del cual dependía típicamente en la primera fase de desarrollo del feminicidio nacional, en una cierta forma de declaración de principios y de rescate de las fuentes históricas del feminicidio. En este apartado es de destacar que, a diferencia de la versión actual del parricidio, que desestimaría la calificación del homicidio en agravio de la amante, de la novia o de la enamorada como parricidio, el feminicidio se abre lo suficientemente a los diversos supuestos fácticos que se pueden presentar, y que implique el hecho de matar a la mujer por el hecho de ser tal. b) Feminicidio agravado.Comprende los comportamientos agravados incluidos en el segundo párrafo del artículo 108-B del Código Penal, en calidad de agravantes típicas, como son la minoría de edad de la víctima, el estado de gestación de la víctima, el supuesto típico en donde la víctima se encuentra bajo cuidado o responsabilidad del sujeto agente, cuando la víctima fue sometida previamente a violación sexual o actos de mutilación, cuando al momento de cometerse el delito, la victima padeciera cualquier tipo de discapacidad; cuando la víctima fue sometida para fines de trata de personas, y cuando hubiera concurrido cualquiera de las circunstancias agravantes establecidas en el artículo 108 del texto penal sustantivo, referidas al homicidio calificado. (3) El significado semántico de discriminación viene a ser diferenciación o distinción, la cual es negativa cuando se distingue sin justificación alguna en una situación que no admite diferenciaciones, como es el caso, por ejemplo, de atribuir más derechos o dar mejor trato para ciertas personas o colectividades humanas en base a determinados elementos y razones no sustentados en criterios de justicia, sino en prejuicios, respecto al color de la piel, la condición social o económica, el biotipo, la orientación sexual, la situación cultural, la opción religiosa, política, ideológica o filosófica, el sexo asignado por la naturaleza, entre otros. En cambio, la discriminación positiva se delinea en un contexto de justificación y necesidad de compensación, por lo que el hacer una distinción o diferenciación resulta de la mayor importancia para disminuir las brechas existentes en determinados campos o aspectos de la realidad social, como es el caso, por ejemplo, de permitir dar un examen especial para concursantes a plazas públicas o puestos en el sector privado, que adolecen de específicas discapacidades, como ceguera, mudez, ciertas enfermedades somáticas y psicosomáticas, por ejemplo. En tal sentido, la discriminación a que hace referencia la norma jurídico-penal en comentario viene a ser solamente la negativa. 304 b.1) Por minoría de edad de la víctima.- En este supuesto agravado el sujeto activo realiza su acción criminal sobre una mujer menor de dieciocho (18) años de edad. No se admite una interpretación más allá del sentido lógicogramatical, por cuanto la norma no hace mención expresa al sujeto pasivo menor de catorce años de edad. El mayor reproche penal del injusto se basa precisamente en el hecho que se trata de una mujer en primeras etapas de desarrollo vital de la persona humana, la que es muerta intencionalmente por manos del sujeto agente varón. Si en una definición de la mujer como ser físicamente débil y desvalida concretamente frente al hombre, el feminicidio encuentra su último sustento de justificación, advirtiendo que el punto de referencia es la mujer adulta o ya formada, la imagen de la mujer menor de edad entraña mayor alarma social, al cancelarse un proyecto de vida humana que se encuentra en un incipiente estado de concretización. b.2) Por el estado de gestación de la víctima.- La agravante se refiere al hecho del homicidio contra la mujer por razones de género cuando ésta se encuentra embarazada; esto es, gestando la formación de un nuevo ser humano. El sujeto activo no quiere hacer abortar a la mujer, sino matar a la fémina. La mayor alarma social se presenta porque con su conducta el hechor está cegando no una, sino dos vidas humanas. Sin embargo, para poder imputar la agravante bajo análisis se exige que el sujeto agente tenga efectivamente conocimiento que la mujer se encuentra gestando una criatura humana, ya sea por la noticia certera que informa del embarazo o por constarle por una percepción corroborada con información complementaria, proveniente de terceros o de la propia víctima. Si el sujeto activo piensa erróneamente que la mujer se encuentra gestando por confundir un tumor abdominal con un embarazo, y le da muerte, "inspirado" por el hecho de convertirse en homicida de una mujer embarazada a manera del inicio de una "fama" de homicida en serie, no comete la agravante, sino la forma básica. En el campo subjetivo del sujeto agente debe de haber el conocimiento de que la mujer a la que se desea dar muerte se encuentra en estado de gestación, lo que quiere decir que si el hechor mata a una mujer que se encontraba en las primeras etapas del embarazo sin saber de la gestación, su conducta se subsumirá no en la agravante, sino en el tipo base de feminicidio. Asimismo, es de anotarse que la ley no exige un determinado tiempo en el proceso de gestación para que se presente la agravante, por lo que la concepción; esto es, la fecundación viene a ser el criterio determinante para saber cuándo nos encontramos ante la agravante típica in comento. b.3) Cuando la víctima se encuentra bajo cuidado o responsabilidad del sujeto agente.- En este supuesto agravado el sujeto agente detenta una cierta condición que hace que el sujeto pasivo mujer se encuentre bajo su cuidado y responsabilidad, sin que se presente necesariamente una relación familiar de ascendiente-descendiente, pues estos supuestos se encuentran cubiertos en parte por el feminicidio básico, en la modalidad del contexto de la violencia familiar. Pueden estar incluidos dentro de este grupo de conductas, el homicidio en agravio de la pupila, en el caso del sujeto activo que tiene la condición de tutor; esto es, cuando el agente ejerce la tutela sobre la víctima. También estimamos que estarían incluidos los casos del curador que da muerte intencionalmente a la mujer que se encuentra bajo su cuidado, en la figura de la curatela. Asimismo estaría incluida la figura de la tenencia, cuando la persona que detenta la tenencia da muerte intencionalmente a la mujer que está bajo su cuidado. Se presentarían también las conductas de muerte provocada de la hija que se encuentra bajo la patria potestad del padre o progenitor, siempre y cuando no se verifiquen circunstancias de violencia familiar; esto es, cuando no se ha presentado anteriormente una situación de violencia familiar, siendo por tanto el homicidio en agravio de la hija el único hecho antijurídico y el único acto en general cometido contra la vida e integridad de la 305 descendiente. Aquí se puede presentar un concurso con el supuesto agravado de la minoría de edad de la víctima. b.4) Cuando la víctima fue sometida previamente a violación sexual o actos de mutilación.En este caso la norma es lo suficientemente clara al incluir la comisión de actos previos de violación o lesión. Se entiende que el propósito del sujeto agente era no violar ni lesionar a la mujer, sino matarla, por lo que procesalmente esta modalidad agravada no subsumiría un hecho de violación o lesiones, sino que correría por su propio cauce, en el sentido que no sería un hecho de violación seguida de muerte, sino un hecho autónomo, lo que se refiere no a un concurso real ciertamente, sino a un concurso ideal que se resolvería mediante el principio de la absorción, pues el subtipo penal en comentario considera en parte de su descripción típica la conducta de violación sexual o lesiones, como referencia típica que sustenta la mayor alarma social del acto (4). b.5) Cuando al momento de cometerse el delito, la victima padeciera cualquier tipo de discapacidad.- En este rubro de conductas de feminicidio la mayor alarma social se presenta porque el sujeto activo se aprovecha que el sujeto pasivo mujer adolece de discapacidad, ya sea de carácter físico y/o mental, debiendo de conocer efectivamente el estado deficitario de la víctima, de lo que se infiere que la discapacidad debe ser constatable perceptivamente a través de los sentidos por el hechor o debe el mismo de conocer fehacientemente de tal incapacidad por otros modos, como pueden ser informes médicos especializados o pruebas o evidencias científicas al respecto. Si para la teoría del feminicidio la mujer es un ser que se encuentra en innegable desventaja frente al varón, un homicidio por razón de género en agravio de una mujer discapacitada es ya de por sí un hecho que reviste mayor gravedad. b.6) Cuando la víctima fue sometida para fines de trata de personas.Es el caso de crímenes contra la vida en agravio de mujeres que se cometen en circunstancias de trata de personas. En este rubro pueden estar incluidas conductas similares a las acontecidas en el caso González y otras – "Campo Algodonero"vs. México, teniendo en cuenta que la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos ha señalado que el feminicidio es el homicidio en agravio de mujeres por razones de género, a través de la Sentencia del 16 de noviembre de 2009 en el denominado caso de "Campo Algodonero", en lo específico de los párrafos 252, 253 y 258, que es el caso emblemático de la Ciudad Juárez, en donde se encontraron cadáveres solamente de mujeres. En este supuesto típico se comprenden conductas que reflejan una de las partes o aspectos más reprochables del feminicidio, en el sentido que el desprecio hacia la mujer, como característica central en el homicidio en agravio de la mujer por razones de género, alcanza uno de sus picos más altos. El haberse encontrado en una ciudad mexicana como Ciudad Juárez una fosa común compuesta enteramente por mujeres desechaba lógicamente la idea de un feminicidio restringido a los vínculos maritales o convivenciales, de crímenes cometidos por el ex esposo en agravio de la ex esposa o del ex conviviente varón en agravio de la ex conviviente mujer, dejando un mensaje lo suficientemente claro para entender la esencia del feminicidio histórico: la desconsideración absoluta hacia el género femenino. En tal caso de "Campo Algodonero", los tratantes de personas o de (4) Si bien podemos intentar interpretar en varios sentidos la solución a los hechos de violación sexual y muerte posterior del sujeto pasivo mujer, en la medida que reclamemos, por ejemplo, la aplicación del concurso aparente de leyes, el espíritu de la norma en comentario parece informar que lo que interesa es remarcar la mayor alarma social por la comisión de tales hechos, y en tal sentido el contenido de la agravación del injusto reprochado resulta siendo lo fundamental. 306 mujeres no habrían soportado la idea de una rebelión de féminas que quisieron liberarse de la opresión para luchar por su libertad como seres humanos libres. No habría en realidad mejor razón que explique a cabalidad un crimen de esas características. Los tratantes de personas o de mujeres no habrían admitido la idea de que las mujeres se liberen de su cautiverio al tener un concepto bajo o deficitario del género femenino, en el sentido que para una mentalidad de esas características la mujer está en el mundo para satisfacer el instinto sexual o las bajas pasiones del varón, así como hacer de servidora o esclava del hombre. Es de destacarse que el homicidio en agravio de las víctimas mujeres, en circunstancia de trata de personas, debe de estar inspirado o movido por razones de género, aunque asumimos que, ya de por sí la fosa común compuesta solamente de cadáveres de mujeres, informa sobre la existencia, en el obrar del hechor, de la razón de género; esto es, del desprecio o subestimación del género femenino. b.7) Cuando hubiera concurrido cualquiera de las circunstancias agravantes establecidas en el artículo 108 del Código Penal.En este grupo de conductas agravadas de feminicidio se comprende a casos que dogmáticamente vienen a configurar un concurso de delitos entre feminicidio y asesinato previsto en el artículo 108 del Código punitivo nacional; esto es, cuando el sujeto activo varón obra con por ferocidad, por lucro o por placer (inciso 1); para facilitar u ocultar otro delito (inciso 2), con gran crueldad o alevosía (inciso 3); por fuego, explosión, veneno o por cualquier otro medio capaz de poner en peligro la vida o salud de otras personas (inciso 4), de acuerdo a la versión vigente del mismo, después de su modificación por el artículo 2 de la Ley 30054, publicada en el Diario Oficial El Peruano con fecha 30 junio de 2013. Si el sujeto agente aprovecha su mayor corpulencia física, al pesar cien kilos contra los cincuenta kilos de una mujer, el caso será un feminicidio en circunstancias de alevosía, que, por modificación en las tipicidades, ya no es interpretado en el marco concursal del caso; esto es, como concurso ideal delictivo, sino como agravante a nivel del tipo penal, como agravante específica. Si el sujeto activo mata a la mujer, por haber sido contratado para ello por una tercera persona, se configura la agravante respectiva, por la presencia del lucro, en una acción realizada por razones de género. c) Feminicidio agravadísimo.Esta modalidad de feminicidio es agravadísimo por la concurrencia de dos o más circunstancias agravantes, previstas en el segundo párrafo del artículo 108-B, por la pena contemplada para el efecto, que viene a ser la cadena perpetua, desde la establecida en el inciso primero sobre el supuesto típico agravado de la víctima menor de edad, hasta la establecida en el inciso sétimo, que se refiere a la concurrencia de cualquiera de las circunstancias agravantes establecidas en el tipo penal de homicidio calificado. Entendemos que la norma se refiere a que la concurrencia es a nivel de las siete circunstancias agravantes previstas para el feminicidio agravado, regulado en el segundo párrafo del artículo en mención, por lo que la concurrencia de varias circunstancias agravantes del delito de asesinato indicará no la verificación del feminicidio agravadísimo, que castiga el hecho con pena privativa perpetua, sino la realización del feminicidio agravado, que reprime la conducta con pena privativa de la libertad no menor de veinticinco años. 3. TIPO SUBJETIVO: El feminicidio es un tipo necesariamente doloso, compuesto en su ámbito subjetivo por el conocimiento y la voluntad de estar realizando el tipo penal más las razones de género que mueven al sujeto activo a actuar en determinado sentido. Por la peculiaridad de la existencia de las razones de género, estimamos que no es posible hablar en el feminicidio de un dolo eventual, sino de un dolo directo. 307 En este apartado hay una similitud con lo que se presenta en el tipo subjetivo de las conductas del homicidio calificado-asesinato, pues, además de las razones de género que se constituyen en el centro neurálgico y en el núcleo fundante del delito de feminicidio, en el caso de la concurrencia de circunstancias de asesinato, difícilmente se apreciará un dolo eventual en el feminicidio por ferocidad, por lucro, por gran crueldad, alevosía, entre otras modalidades. Si no se detecta en el obrar del sujeto agente las razones de género, no habrá feminicidio, sino, por ejemplo, parricidio en la modalidad de filicidio, en el caso de la muerte de la hija por el padre, o parricidio en la modalidad de uxoricidio, en el caso de la muerte de la esposa por obra del esposo. Es de anotar que la interpretación del feminicidio como homicidio contra la mujer por razones de género; esto es, por su condición de tal, no resulta incompatible con criterios de interpretación peculiares como el llamado método jurídico de razonamiento práctico feminista, el cual implica que, al ser las mujeres más sensibles al contexto o a la situación concreta en la que se encuentran, se debería recurrir a un razonamiento en base a hechos individualizados, más que a criterios admitidos o estándares (que muchas veces no incluyen las experiencias propias de las mujeres), pues solo de esta manera se respeta en mayor medida las perspectivas de aquellas que ostentan menos poder. Este razonamiento, a diferencia del razonamiento práctico convencional, cuestiona y desafía la legitimidad de las normas de aquellos que aseveran hablar por la comunidad, y que expresan, precisamente, valoraciones muchas veces prejuiciosas o exclusivamente masculinas (5). 4. GRADOS DE DESARROLLO DEL DELITO: El delito de feminicidio se consuma con la muerte del sujeto pasivo mujer ocasionada por el sujeto activo varón. En el íter críminis correspondiente, se admite la tentativa, como realización imperfecta del delito, la cual resulta de fácil verificación, al tratarse de un delito de resultado, que se verifica a partir de la realización de determinada acción o conducta típica. En el camino del delito; esto es, en el íter críminis, a partir de una fase interna que comprende, a su vez, una ideación, deliberación y resolución criminal, hasta la fase externa, que comprende los actos preparatorios, de ejecución y la consumación propiamente dicha, se puede apreciar la tentativa en algunos de los casos supuestos de aberratio ictus, por desvío en el golpe o en la acción dirigida a la plasmación del resultado, cuando "se yerra en el disparo" y no se impacta al objetivo, y el sujeto agente no consigue lo que se propuso en su plan delictivo. Considerando que la fase interna es completamente impune, y que los actos preparatorios también lo son por regla general, en el homicidio en agravio de la mujer por razones de género, la problemática de los grados de desarrollo del delito se encuentra delimitada entre los actos de ejecución, propios de la tentativa, y la consumación del delito. En ese sentido, el feminicidio sigue la suerte de todos los delitos comunes contra la vida cometidos de modo intencional. 5. PENALIDAD: (5) MONTOYA VIVANCO, Yván. Derecho Penal y Métodos Feministas. A propósito de la actuación del Ministerio Público frente a las masivas esterilizaciones involuntarias de mujeres en el Perú. En "Métodos Feministas en el Derecho. Aproximaciones críticas a la jurisprudencia peruana". FERNANDEZ REVOREDO, Marisol y otro (Coordinadores). 1a e. Palestra Editores S.A.C. LimaPerú. 2011. p 149. 308 Se contemplan en la descripción típica del delito de feminicidio tres bloques de penalidad, que se encuentran en relación con el feminicidio básico, agravado y agravadísimo. En el primer bloque de penalidades, respecto al feminicidio básico -que incluye la realización de la acción en contextos de violencia familiar, coacción, hostigamiento o acoso sexual, abuso de poder, confianza o de cualquier otra posición o relación que le confiera autoridad al agente y cualquier forma de discriminación contra la mujer, independientemente de que exista o haya existido una relación conyugal o de convivencia con el agentese prevé como sanción para el sujeto agente una pena privativa de libertad no menor de quince años. En el segundo bloque de penalidades, referido al feminicidio agravado, que considera los supuestos típicos agravados de la minoría de edad de la víctima, el estado de gestación del sujeto pasivo mujer, el hecho que la víctima se encontraba bajo cuidado o responsabilidad del agente, el hecho del sometimiento previo de la víctima a actos de violación sexual o de mutilación, del padecimiento de cualquier tipo de discapacidad por parte de la víctima al momento de cometerse el delito, del sometimiento de la víctima para fines de trata de personas, y de la concurrencia de cualquiera de las circunstancias agravantes establecidas para el delito de asesinato, se establece una penalidad no menor de veinticinco años. En el tercer bloque de penalidades, relacionado con el feminicidio agravadísimo, por la concurrencia de dos o más circunstancias agravantes incluidas en el segundo párrafo del artículo bajo análisis, se tiene prevista la pena de cadena perpetua, la cual, dicho sea de paso, si bien es formalmente tolerada en un Estado Constitucional de Derecho, es sustancialmente criticada, como una institución que está fuera de lugar en tal forma de Estado. 6. NOTA CONCLUSIVA: El feminicidio como tipo penal en el Código Penal nacional ha experimentado una serie de cambios, tanto de índole cuantitativa como cualitativa, desde una primera fase de desarrollo anclado dentro de los ámbitos del parricidio hasta una segunda fase de desarrollo, en donde ha reclamado el signo de su origen histórico; esto es, el ser definido en la teoría y en la práctica como homicidio en agravio de la mujer por razones de género, ostentando en la actualidad una interesante taxonomía que se puede expresar genéricamente en un feminicidio básico, agravado y agravadísimo, al contemplarse en este último como pena abstracta la cadena perpetua. Sin embargo, es de reconocerse que el feminicidio peruano se encuentra en plena etapa de evolución y de replanteo de sus contenidos y características principales, en un derrotero que por el momento se encuentra afincado sustancialmente en las razones de género, con independencia de la existencia actual o pasada de una relación conyugal o convivencial. BIBLIOGRAFIA FERNANDEZ REVOREDO, Marisol y Félix Morales. (2011). Métodos Feministas en el Derecho. Aproximaciones críticas a la jurisprudencia peruana. 1a e. Palestra Editores S.A.C. Lima-Perú. 239 pp. GUEVARA VASQUEZ, Iván Pedro. (2012). El Parricidio. Entre la Infracción del Deber y el Feminicidio. 1a e. IDEMSA. Lima-Perú. 377 pp. 309 LAS AUDIENCIAS PÚBLICAS EN EL DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO DR. GASTÓN JORGE QUEVEDO PEREYRA72 Resumen: Las relaciones entre los administrados y la administración siempre han sido polémicas debido a la tradicional supremacía histórica y jurídica del Estado mediante sus diversos órganos, siendo tal la situación que los diversos conceptos e instituciones han sido evaluados y modificados conforme al devenir democrático en el cual la razón final resulta ser justamente el deseo de ser escuchados y atendidos desde el punto de vista del usuario. Palabras Claves: Toma de decisiones, derecho público, audiencias públicas. NOCIONES BÁSICAS DEL CONCEPTO Desde los inicios de la relación entre los administrados y la Administración, los primeros han sentado la noción de inconformidad con los actos, pareceres y opiniones de la Administración respeto de las decisiones y de la toma de decisiones producidas. Ello por el inmenso poder del Estado que ha trascendido los primero albores del derecho formal hasta los actuales tiempos de modernidad y de Globalización. Ello condice con los elementos básicos y principistas que muestra el Derecho Administrativo, llegando al concepto de derecho administrativo a través del concepto de Estado. El advenimiento del Estado de Derecho fue el resultado de la convergencia de ciertas circunstancias, entre las que se destacan las revoluciones inglesa (1688) y francesa (1789), la emancipación americana (1776) y las teorías políticas enunciadas por Montesquieu (división de poderes) y 72 El autor es Abogado, Doctor en Derecho, docente de la Escuela de Postgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, colaborador de Gaceta Jurídica, Derecho & Cambio Social, investigador, Árbitro y Conciliador Extrajudicial. E-mal: [email protected]. Teléfonos RPM # 975111306 – RPC 989843310. 310 Rousseau (la ley como expresión de la voluntad general). Allí el hombre transitó por las más variadas ideas, tanto las esgrimidas por Rousseau quien señalaba siempre que el hombre es bueno y es la sociedad quien lo corrompe, en el sentido de pulcritud de ideas, intenciones y los mejores buenos deseos; tal situación se vio harto complicada tras la posición asumida por Hobbes quien en si obra "El Leviatán" señalaba todo lo contrario: Que el hombre no es bueno, es malo y tiene tendencia a realizar el mal. Por ello el hombre agrupado, con poder y al mando de la suprema autoridad tendría una natural tendencia para abusar del poder, es decir partimos de la premisa de que el hombre corrompe y el poder absoluto corrompe en absoluto, entonces el Estado de Derecho que resulta ser una forma de Estado en que se reconocen y tutelan los derechos públicos subjetivos de los ciudadanos, mediante el sometimiento de la Administración a la ley podría no contemplarse como todos quisiéramos que opere se supone que en el Estado de Derecho se ubica a la Administración como esencialmente ejecutiva, encontrando en la ley su fundamento y el límite de su acción. Es una Administración sometida al Derecho y, aunque está habilitada para dictar reglas generales, éstas están subordinadas a la ley. Por ello de manera particular sostenemos que el Estado la organización jurídicopolítica más poderosa, dado que es el Estado mismo quien formula normas, reglas y demás al interior de una sociedad. Es un ente "que detenta un inmenso, un abusivo poder por encima de los gobernados" (Kresalja 2009: 12) aspecto que compartimos plenamente. Pero en defensa del propio Estado, el mismo puede y debe ser controlado. Por ello "el poder de imperium del Estado, también llamado poder público o poder estático, es uno y único. La división de poderes no es sino la distribución del poder estático entre distintos centro o complejos orgánicos para el ejercicio preferente, por parte de cada uno de ellos, de determinada función, todas ellas destinadas al cumplimiento de los cometidos estatales. Pero los que están separados o divididos son esos centros, no el poder (Ranelleti 2008: 26) postulado que compartimos en toda su extensión. 311 En el escenario contemporáneo, apreciamos diferentes tipos de Estado, así: 1.- .Unitario: Existe un solo ordenamiento jurídico. 2.- .Federal: Hay una coexistencia de ordenamientos jurídicos: 3.Federal o nacional. 4.Provincial o local: Las provincias ejercen el poder que no han delegado a la Nación; así pues, se reservan la facultad de dictar leyes de orden administrativo. El Derecho Público es la rama madre del derecho administrativo y aplicable a todas las relaciones humanas y sociales en las cuales el Estado entra en juego. El Derecho Administrativo es una rama del Derecho Público Interno (éste es público porque no existe lucro, e interno porque es diferente del internacional) y está compuesto por normas jurídicas que regulan la actividad administrativa del Poder Ejecutivo y la actividad materialmente administrativa del Poder Ejecutivo, el Poder Legislativo y de los entes públicos no estatales. Entonces el elemento lucro propio de la empresa o del sentir privado debe estar fuera de toda noción de servicio que caracteriza a la función pública hacia toda la población. CARACTERÍSTICAS ACTUALES DEL DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO Entonces las características del Derecho Administrativo pueden postularse de la siguiente manera 1.-Contralor: A partir de la Constitución de 1979 y con mayor incidencia en la actual Constitución de 1993 se han creado órganos que sólo tienen funciones de control, tales como la Contraloría General de la República, el Defensor del Pueblo, y modernamente las páginas web de Transparencia. etc. Otros organismos ejercen funciones de control, por delegación del poder estatal; estos organismos tienen poder de policía, que implica una función administrativa. 2.Común: Es un derecho que, al igual que el derecho civil, es común a todas las actividades (municipales, tributarias, etc.) y sus principios son aplicables a todas esas materias. 312 2.Autónomo: Es una rama autónoma del Derecho, tiene sus propios principios generales, se autoabastece; es decir es un sistema jurídico autónomo paralelo al derecho privado, ello en los Organismos Públicos como SUNASS, Ositran, etc. 2.Local: Es un derecho de naturaleza local porque tiene que ver con la organización política en nuestro país; es decir que habrá un derecho administrativo provincial y un derecho administrativo nacional. Ello en los denominados Textos Únicos de Procedimientos Administrativos o TUPAS que ostentan en la práctica carácter supra respecto de ordenamientos generales como la propia Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General. RELACIONES ACTUALES DEL DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO CON OTRAS RAMAS DEL DERECHO 1.Exorbitante: Excede la órbita del derecho privado, porque donde hay una organización estatal hay derecho administrativo. No hay plano de igualdad entre partes, ya que una de ellas es el Estado, que tiene facultades de poder público. Ya hemos sostenido que el omnímodo poder del Estado implica que el "pacta sunt servanda" es reservado al ámbito privado, dado que el propio Estado puede por ser tal las reglas de juego, apelando al interés general. 2.Naturaleza Constitucional: El derecho constitucional comprende las normas que regulan la estructura u organización jurídico-política del Estado. Las normas del derecho administrativo tratan de la actividad que se desarrolla dentro de los órganos del Estado; la normatividad de derecho administrativo es creada por el legislador dentro de los límites de la norma constitucional. 3.-Penal: Se relaciona con el derecho administrativo por el concepto de sanción, típico del derecho penal. Existe el derecho administrativo disciplinario que se aplica en lo interno de la Administración, puesto que son sanciones que el superior jerárquico impone al inferior por faltas disciplinarias. Por ello en épocas actuales se menciona la corriente de la "última ratio" como principio de aplicación recurrente sobre la cual los Estados prefieren una sanción si bien drástica, bastante ajena a la tradicional privación de libertad hacia los infractores. El ser 313 humano de seguro sentirá con mayor aflicción una sanción económica efectiva o una inhabilitación para su propia actividad, que penas en muchos casos leves o de corta duración y por ello de menor eficacia. 4.-Financiero: El derecho financiero regula la actividad financiera del Estado referente a la recaudación, gestión y disposición de los medios económicos necesarios para el cumplimiento de la misión de éste. Las relaciones entre el derecho administrativo y el financiero son inmediatas y contiguas. En el caso nacional el artículo 60 de la Constitución limita dicha actividad dado que: "Artículo 60.Pluralismo Económico El Estado reconoce el pluralismo económico. La economía nacional se sustenta en la coexistencia de diversas formas de propiedad y de empresa. Sólo autorizado por ley expresa, el Estado puede realizar subsidiariamente actividad empresarial, directa o indirecta, por razón de alto interés público o de manifiesta conveniencia nacional. La actividad empresarial, pública o no pública, recibe el mismo tratamiento legal". Entendemos diversos conceptos referidos a los caudales públicos que el propio Estado mediante las Audiencias Públicas persigue fiscalizar: El Pluralismo Económico.Es decir en épocas de globalización las formas económicas de inversión, financiamiento y disposición coexisten sin mayor dificultad. La intervención estatal sólo mediante ley expresa.Los constituyentes de la actual Carta se ocuparon de establecer una suerte de "candado" para que el propio Estado a diferencia de los años setenta y ochenta se inhiba de formar actividad empresarial bajo la premisa de que el Estado es "mal administrador", situación que a resultas de la crisis de empresas públicas, mal gestionadas, quebradas y con enormes visos de lamentable corrupción puedan repetirse. En el escenario local los actuales gobiernos muy difícilmente ostentarán mayorías en los parlamentos que les permitan crear empresas estatales. Los intentos de crear líneas aéreas nacionales o una línea aérea de "bandera" similar al caso de Aero Perú muy al margen de su viabilidad o no, resultan lejanas a concretarse. 314 LA PARTICIPACIÓN DE LOS ADMINISTRADOS Y LAS AUDIENCIAS PÚBLICAS Uno de los aspectos más democráticos en la Ley N° 27444, Ley del Procedimiento Administrativo General resulta ser la referida a la participación directa en la toma de decisiones como mecanismo de control de la población sobre el propio Estado, a tenor del siguiente artículo: Artículo 181.Administración abierta Además de los medios de acceso a la participación en los asuntos públicos Establecidos por otras normas, en la instrucción de los procedimientos administrativos las entidades se rigen por las disposiciones de este Capítulo sobre la audiencia a los administrados y el período de información pública. Dos son las instituciones jurídico-públicas de mayor de mayor relevancia a que hace referencia la ley: 1.Audiencia a los Administrados.De manera tradicional en épocas muy remotas los pobladores opinaban de manera franca y abierta, mediante consultas populares directas con la autoridad: En la Roma antigua los pretores mediante pregones hacían saber a los pobladores las decisiones a tomarse: construcciones de carreteras, puentes, etc. De manera extraña, la modernidad constriñó esa práctica, la misma que se restaura con esta norma; y 2.El período de información Pública.Concordante con el Principio de Publicidad, toda decisión que implique inversión de caudales públicos debe hacerse con conocimiento de la población. La antigua Inglaterra de Juan sin Tierra decidió en la Carta Magna que si los artesanos, obreros y todos aquellos que tributan a la Corona no sólo debían ser espectadores, sino actores de los principales actos de Gobierno. Dicha Carta con una data de más de mil años ya legislaba con sabiduría en un instrumento que lamentablemente no es utilizado con la prolijidad que debería darse. Pero la regulación siguiente cataloga los actos sobre los cuales el pronunciamiento de la población resulta fundamental: Artículo 182.Audiencia pública 315 182.1 Las normas administrativas prevén la convocatoria a una audiencia pública, como formalidad esencial para la participación efectiva de terceros, cuando el acto al que conduzca el procedimiento administrativo sea susceptible de afectar derechos o intereses cuya titularidad corresponda a personas indeterminadas, tales como en materia medio ambiental, ahorro público, valores culturales, históricos, derechos del consumidor, planeamiento urbano y zonificación; o cuando el pronunciamiento sobre autorizaciones, licencias o permisos que el acto habilite incida directamente sobre servicios públicos. Aquí esbozamos varios conceptos fundamentales: 1.Afectar a personas indeterminadas.La norma infiere entonces en beneficio de la población, el que toda la población se vería beneficiada con la institución de la denominada "escucha popular", resguardando el derecho constitucional de opinar, ser escuchado, participar en toda gestión que conlleve a los intereses de cualquier espacio habitable. 2.Materia medio ambiental.La norma es rica dada su amplitud. No señala ámbitos determinados ni excluyentes, tales como espacios radioeléctricos, contaminación por ondas electromagnéticas, desechos tóxicos en particular o similares, entendemos que toda alteración o afectación implica entonces un deber de conservación-defensa sobre la salud de la población. Lamentablemente no existen movimientos masivos como si se producen e interactúan en realidades geográficas muy cercanas en las cuales la población no sólo ostenta personería jurídica vecinal, sino y lo que es acaso más importante, ha tomado cabal conciencia de factores elementales como el reciclaje doméstico y masivo. 3.Ahorro Público.Las organizaciones de defensa del usuario financiero en el Perú no han mostrado a la fecha eficiencia cuando se han producido abusos o afectaciones al cliente financiero o al ahorrista; casos muy puntuales, tales como el cobro excesivo o irregular en el cobro de comisiones, tasas de interés elevadas sin sustento técnico jurídico que las sustente o cobros no pactados, resultan ser casos sobre los cuales la población ha mostrado manifiestos estados de indefensión y ha sido el propio Estado quien ha intervenido para evitar mayores irregularidades, cuando la corresponde al usuario organizado intervenir al amparo 316 de la normatividad en comentario que conforme apreciamos no ostenta mayor difusión y menos aún, aplicación. 4.Valores culturales históricos.Quizá aquí radique la mayor ausencia de pronunciamiento ciudadano organizado. Se estima que la población en épocas de consumismo no valora el pasado que le corresponde asumir y por ello no tiene una conciencia clara del futuro que por ello le corresponda asumir. Hace algunas décadas una marca conocida de cigarrillos extranjera argumentó que Machu Picchu implicaba "sabor nacional" refiriéndose a su propio país y el INDCOPI le dio la razón recogiendo el argumento de que el mundo de hoy es "globalizado" y que es bien de la humanidad. Lamentablemente el argumento era de la entidad extranjera, patrocinada por abogados peruanos. 5.Derechos del consumidor.El consumismo masivo hace que ingresen toda clase de productos sin mayor control sanitario, perjudicando a la población de manera especial a los sectores vulnerables a los medios de comunicación, que son receptores primarios de información, tales como la niñez y la adolescencia. Se ha llegado a establecer que no resultan suficientes las anotaciones marginales de pequeña e inteligible redacción con alertas sobre los efectos posteriores de consumo de los productos. 6.Planeamiento Urbano, zonificación y Licencias.Uno de los mayores desafíos que enfrenta la población resultan ser los referidos a los límites distritales, regionales y locales en general. Los casos de Moquegua-Tumbes, La LibertadSan Martin donde las Mesas de Diálogo y la Unidad de Prevención de Conflictos de la Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros no han podido tener la efectividad necesaria, implican espacios donde la población organizada bien puede aliviar labores donde el propio Estado se desprestigia cada vez más. En suma, existen y coexisten la normatividad aplicable y situaciones donde sugerimos: RECOMENDACIONES: 1.Las Audiencias Públicas son mecanismos de control premunidos de legalidad que deben ser impulsados por el propio Estado a través de los organismos 317 municipales, regionales y estatales en general, dado que la participación de la población con la anuencia de la autoridad genera vinculación y por ende compromiso vinculante con la inversión y pública pendiente. 2.Las sociedades emergentes al mostrar estos instrumentos generan confianza en el inversionista, por ello el Estado debe publicitar esta institución en todos los sectores y niveles de comunicación y educación posibles. 3.Se debe desterrar la noción que etiqueta a estos mecanismos en el sentido de que puestos en práctica resultan procesos y etapas dilatorias en todo proyecto u obra pública puesta en consulta. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS • KRESALJA, Baldo (2009) Derecho Constitucional Económico. PUCP. • RANELLETI, Giovanni (2008) Derecho Administrativo. UBA. 318 EL NUEVO RÉGIMEN DEL SERVICIO CIVIL: LA ADMINISTRACIÓN PÚBLICA Y LOS REGÍMENES LABORALES. ¿QUIÉNES GANAN, QUIENES PIERDEN? Dr. Julio E. Haro Carranza73 SUMARIO Introducción 2. La colisión doctrinaria. La posición estatutaria y la posición contractualista; 3. Diagnóstico de la situación del Empleo Público 4. Los derechos laborales individuales en el Servicio Civil 5. Los derechos laborales colectivos en la Ley 30057; 6. Los grupos ocupacionales y la carrera administrativa; 7. ¿Qué pasa con los trabajadores que no migran al régimen del servicio civil. 8. la evaluación del desempeño 9. Reflexiones finales. 10 Bibliografía. Abstrac El ensayo analiza la colisión doctrinaria y jurídica de la relación Estado Empleador y los servidores públicos, sobre los fundamentos en que se basa el punto de vista del Poder Ejecutivo y los legisladores oficialistas (posición estatutaria) y en los que se basan los congresistas de la oposición y los gremios sindicales (posición contractualista). De otra lado, se realiza un análisis crítico de la propuesta legislativa del Poder Ejecutivo y las mejoras realizadas en los debates parlamentarios; los puntos beneficiosos para la administración pública y los puntos críticos respecto al derecho laboral; los cambios drásticos en la carrera administrativa y la posición de la OIT respecto a temas importantes de dicha propuesta. Responderemos a la pregunta ¿Quiénes ganan y quiénes pierden con esta reforma? Finalmente realizaremos algunas reflexiones sobre el tema. Palabras clave: El Nuevo Régimen del Servicio Civil 1.-Introducción El proceso de reforma del empleo público hoy denominado servicio civil, y la Ley 30057, Ley del Servicio Civil, promulgada, el 4 de julio de 2013, en nuestra opinión, se inspira en el modelo abierto y en la concepción estatuaria de la función pública, en el cual resalta la hegemonía del Estado al establecer sus propias reglas favorables. De igual manera, esta 73 JULIO E. HARO CARRANZA; Abogado, Magíster en Administración del Trabajo y Relaciones Laborales, Doctor en Administración, Docente de Maestría en Derecho Administrativo y en Gestión Pública en la Escuela de Post-Grado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, respectivamente. Conferencista en el Centro de Altos Estudios NacionalesCAEN, Autor de diferentes obras especializadas sobre la materia. 319 reforma se enmarca dentro de la evolución del modelo burocrático weberiano (en nuestro caso régimen 276) al modelo neogerencial (iniciado en nuestro caso con el régimen de la gerencia pública) que se ha aplicado en muchos países desarrollados y en algunos países de América Latina, como Chile y Brasil. Este modelo se caracteriza por aplicar instrumentos de la administración privada a la administración pública, especialmente la gerencia por resultados, la racionalidad económica, la eficacia y la eficiencia, la flexibilidad laboral, y mejoras económicas sobre la base de la meritocracia, y no a través de la negociación colectiva, como lo observaremos en el desarrollo del ensayo. El debate y la aprobación de esta reforma se realizó dentro de un clima de violencia social propiciado por los gremios de servidores públicos que se oponen a dicha reforma alegando que afectan sus derechos laborales. El Poder Ejecutivo expresa que la Ley de Servicio Civil es una reforma necesaria que permitirá reordenar el aparato estatal y aplicar la meritocracia y la progresividad en el sector laboral en busca de una mayor eficacia y eficiencia. Consideramos que es importante una reforma de esta naturaleza, con las correcciones del caso, ya que ha habido experiencias frustradas en años anteriores siendo la última la de los años 2005-2006 en la que se pretendió hacer la reforma bajo las reglas de la Ley 28175, Ley Marco del Empleo Público que fracasó debido al cambio de criterio de los legisladores del partido que ganó las elecciones presidenciales en el 2006. La población consideró positiva la Ley, en términos generales. Una encuesta de Ipsos Perú74 reveló que el 91% está de acuerdo con que los servidores públicos asciendan según sus méritos y desempeño y un 74% está a favor de que puedan ser despedidos luego de desaprobar dos evaluaciones consecutivas. Si hacemos las mismas encuestas a los trabajadores involucrados seguramente que nos encontraremos con resultados inversos. 2. La colisión doctrinaria: La posición estatutaria y la posición contractualista La doctrina ha distinguido dos modelos clásicos de función pública: El modelo abierto, y El modelo cerrado. El modelo abierto, denominado spoil system o sistema de botín o patronazgo se estableció en Estados Unidos desde el inicio de la república. Este modelo no reconoce la existencia de una clase burocrática, es el gobierno de turno quien tiene las atribuciones 74 Véase Encuestas de Ipsos Perú del mes de julio 2013. 320 de elegir libremente al personal. Estudiosos del tema expresaron que "este sistema fue una perversión histórica o una especie de paréntesis de la razón, que llevaba dentro la semilla de su propia destrucción."(Prats Catalá1999). Actualmente, Estados Unidos ha virado a un sistema en el que aún se puede encontrar rasgos del sistema abierto, específicamente en el funcionariado superior. Las razones de este cambio se debieron principalmente al impacto social que originaban los ceses masivos por el cambio de gobierno y a la sofisticación de los servicios públicos que requerían un cuerpo permanente de servidores profesionales. De otro lado, el modelo cerrado o de carrera tuvo su origen en la Francia postrevolucionaria. Estudios al respecto expresan que "La idea de poner en pie instituciones estables, permanentes y duraderas, situadas al margen de las luchas políticas, por contraposición a las convulsiones del período revolucionario, es lo que sostiene esta concepción de la función pública que, por lo demás, enlaza con ideas y regulaciones ya presentes en el antiguo régimen y es perfectamente coherente con la nueva estratificación social y el predominio absoluto de la burguesía que surge de la revolución". (SANCHEZ MORÓN:1997). El sistema cerrado tiene como contenido característico que el ingreso deba realizarse mediante procesos de selección públicos en los que se evalúa el mérito y la capacidad, ingresando a un cuerpo o escala determinadas, divididas en categorías a las que se va ascendiendo, y garantizando una estabilidad laboral absoluta. En la actualidad, estos modelos no se presentan "químicamente puros" en un Estado, cada país refleja matices propios de su realidad. En los sistemas cerrados se observan dos vertientes teóricas: La estatutaria o administrativista y la contractualista o laboral. En la primera se faculta al Estado para imponer al funcionario vinculaciones jerárquicas y disciplinarias, necesarias para mantener la eficacia de la maquinaria administrativa. Pero no sólo eso, sino que lo coloca en un estado de libertad restringida, en virtud del cual una parte de sus derechos fundamentales quedan subordinados a las necesidades del servicio. En la segunda, reconoce que la relación Estado-servidor público es una relación de trabajo, sujeta a los derechos y obligaciones de la relación laboral común. El derecho laboral ha reclamado para sí la regulación del empleo público fundamentándose ello en que materialmente nada diferencia la relación de un trabajador 321 del sector privado con el sector público, mientras cierta doctrina administrativa propugna aún la vigencia de relaciones estatutarias. Otro autor ha sostenido que el modelo social y democrático del estado determina la superación absoluta del unilateralismo como técnica de gobierno de las relaciones laborales en la organización administrativa por lo basado en la gama de valores y principios previstos en el derecho laboral. Para este investigador la esencia del contrato laboral no se desvirtúa con la imposición del interés público la que se sólo adicionará algunas particularidades. (Balbín Torres 2005,14). 3.Diagnóstico de la situación del Empleo Público en el Perú El servicio civil o empleo público en el Perú presenta las siguientes características: a) En el Gobierno Central se observa un caos normativo, pues coexisten tres regímenes generales de contratación de personal: . El de los nombrados y contratados bajo el régimen laboral público (Decreto Ley 276). . Los del régimen laboral privado (Decreto Legislativo 728. . Los del Régimen de Contratación Administrativa de Servicios CAS (D. Leg. 1057). También coexisten ocho carreras especiales que se detallan en el cuadro N° 1. b) Las restricciones presupuestarias que durante décadas prohibieron la contratación y nombramiento de personal para tareas de naturaleza permanente, han dado lugar a falta de sinceramiento en los cuadros analíticos de personal (CAP) y consecuentemente en los cuadros de presupuesto analíticos de personal (PAP). Esto ha dado lugar al uso desmedido de la modalidad de los servicios no personales y el régimen CAS. c) Existe desorden en los niveles remunerativos del sector público debido a que dependen de la modalidad de contratación que se utiliza en cada entidad. d) Dentro del sistema remunerativo de los trabajadores contratados bajo el sistema del régimen laboral público existen distorsiones que niegan los reales ingresos de los servidores debidos, Existen cerca de 400 conceptos remunerativos que hacen muy compleja la planilla. e) No se aplica una adecuada carrera administrativa, ya que los principales lineamientos de la misma no se cumplen o han quedado sin vigencia, por el paso del tiempo, por lo que se hace necesario la revisión de toda la normativa del empleo público. De acuerdo a la SERVIR, la población laboral pública asciende aproximadamente a millón trescientos mil (1 300 000) empleados, distribuidos en los tres regímenes generales antes mencionados y en ocho carreras públicas especiales. De otro lado, la población que se 322 encontraría dentro del ámbito de la reforma ascendería a quinientos dos mil ciento treinta y cinco servidores públicos. tal como se grafica en el Cuadro N° 1 y 2 Cuadro N°1 SERVIDORES PUBLICOS POR REGIMEN EN EL ESTADO PERUANO (Incluye carreras especiales) Población laboral total estimada 1 300 000 Fuente: Servir Cuadro N° 2 Regímenes Laborales bajo el ámbito de la Ley 30075, Ley del Servicio Civil Régimen Laboral Servidores Públicos Porcentaje Decreto Legislativo 1057 218 066 43% Decreto Legislativo 276 198 273 39% Decreto Legislativo 728 85 796 17% 502 135 100% Fuente: Servir A lo antes mencionado se debe adicionar el Régimen de los Gerentes Públicos regulada por el Decreto Legislativo 1024, así como también a funcionarios que sin tener contrato de orden laboral prestan sus servicios al a través de contratos civiles como son los Convenios de Administración con PNUD y con el Fondo de Apoyo Gerencial, regulado por el Decreto CARRERAS ESPECIALES Dleg 276 Dleg 728 CAS Profesionales de la salud Asistencias de la salud Profesorado Magisterio 1 6 % 6 % 1 7 %5 % 5 % 2 3 % 8 % 2 % 1 % 0. 1 % 1 6 % 1 % 323 Legislativo 25650 de 1992, con lo que la administración pública peruana se convierte en un sistema complejo que debe ser ordenado y sistematizado. 4. Los derechos laborales individuales en el Nuevo Régimen del Servicio Civil: Entre los principales derechos laborales establecidos en la norma que merecen un comentario especial son los siguientes: a. Aguinaldo por fiestas patrias y navidad La propuesta del Poder Ejecutivo en su artículo 83 señalaba que los servidores públicos percibirían dos aguinaldos de media remuneración mensual cada una en los meses de julio y diciembre. Sin embargo, durante los debates, la Comisión de Presupuesto varió su propuesta y estableció en la Ley, en su artículo 31, que correspondía dos aguinaldos de una remuneración completa cada uno. También considera que estos aguinaldos están afectos a las cargas y aportaciones sociales. Cabe recordar que las gratificaciones y aguinaldos estaban exonerados por ley de pago de contribuciones y aportaciones en los últimos años. En este aspecto se benefician los servidores de los del régimen 276 y CAS. b. Derecho vacacional Este derecho no ha sufrido mayor variación, solo se ha eliminado el beneficio de la indemnización por el no goce del derecho vacacional que corresponde a los trabajadores del régimen del Decreto Legislativo 728. Consideramos que el no goce de las vacaciones en el año siguiente al haberlas adquirido sí debe generar el pago de la indemnización respectiva, además del goce del descanso físico aunque no sea en el tiempo oportuno. Así lo establece el régimen laboral de la actividad privada y sentencias de casación y del Tribunal Constitucional. No habría razón para tratar de manera distinta a los trabajadores del sector público; máxime si se trata de un derecho constitucional y consagrado en tratados internacionales (Convenio 52 de la OIT). c.Licencias de maternidad, paternidad y otros Respecto a la licencia de maternidad, que fue considerada como suspensión perfecta, hubo una gran preocupación sin justificación de los gremios sindicales y de algunos congresistas porque creían que no iban a ser pagadas. Se consideró como suspensión perfecta porque no existe contraprestación (remuneración) porque no hay prestación efectiva del servicio, lo que se otorga son subsidios a cargo de una entidad distinta del 324 Empleador como es EsSalud. La licencia por paternidad y otras licencias se encuentran reguladas en el artículo 47 de la Ley. d. Compensación por tiempo de servicios La propuesta del Ejecutivo establecía que la compensación por tiempo de servicios (CTS) equivale al 50% de la remuneración mensual. Después del debate, el Congreso aprobó que este beneficio se otorgue con el promedio de la suma de la valorización de la compensación principal y la ajustada pagada en los últimos treinta y seis meses tal como se encuentra establecida en el artículo 33 de la Ley. Lo antes mencionado beneficia a los servidores del Régimen CAS y 276 y perjudica a los trabajadores del Régimen del Decreto Legislativo 728, ya a estos últimos actualmente se calcula este beneficio con la última remuneración mensual. De otro lado, la norma también establece que "El pago de la CTS es cancelatorio y sólo se efectiviza a la culminación del vínculo del servidor con cada entidad". con ello la entidad se convierte en depositaria de la CTS, pagando un interés minúsculo si lo comparamos con los que pagan las entidades bancarias y financieras, así como las caja municipales de ahorro y crédito. Consideramos que para evitar algún tipo de discriminación respecto a los trabajadores del régimen laboral privado, las entidades deben depositar las CTS en las entidades bancarias y financieras designadas por los servidores públicos para que puedan ganar mayores intereses y se conviertan en sujetos de crédito, tal como lo dispuso SERVIR en un informe de carácter vinculante de acuerdo a Ley75. Este aspecto no favorece a los del régimen 728. e. Indemnización por cese injustificado La Ley 30057 en su artículo 36 establece que la indemnización por cese arbitrario sea establecida por norma reglamentaria, contraviniendo con lo propuesto por la Organización Internacional de Trabajo (OIT)76 que no se debe dejar que las normas reglamentarias desarrollen derechos importantes de los servidores públicos. 75 Véase el Informe del Consejo Directivo de SERVIR N° 109-2019SERVIR/GG-OAJ DEL M13 DE MAYO DE 2010, de carácter vinculante para toda las entidades públicas 76 Véase el Oficio de la OIT N° OA – 335/2013, del 13 de mayo de 2013 dirigido al Presidente de la Comisión de Trabajo del Congreso de la República. (numeral 13, de observaciones generales y numerales 11 literal de las observaciones específicas. 325 Considero que la indemnización por cese arbitrario debe ser el mismo que actualmente gozan los trabajadores del Régimen 728, es decir que debe ser equivalente a una y media remuneración mensual por cada año de servicios con un topo de doce remuneraciones. Este punto no favorece a los del régimen 728. f.Plazo de Prescripción La propuesta del Poder Ejecutivo establecía que la prescripción de la acción de cobro de los ingresos, beneficios sociales y otros derechos derivados de la compensación económica de los servidores civiles tiene plazo de dos (02) años y su cómputo se inicia al término de la relación con la entidad en la que se generó el derecho que se invoque. Después de amplios debates el Pleno del Congreso aprobó incrementar dicho lapso a cuatro (4) años, tal como está considerado en el artículo 37 de la Ley. En el caso de los servidores del régimen 276, al no estar considerado este derecho en su norma, se aplicaba lo establecido en el Código Civil, es decir 10 años. Este punto no favorece a los del régimen 276. g. Concurso público y periodo de prueba h. La Ley en el artículo 72 y otros, ha establecido que los servidores civiles que ingresen a la administración pública por concurso público se encuentran sometidos al periodo de prueba. Sin embargo la Cuarta disposición complementaria y transitoria ha exonerado del periodo de prueba a los servidores actuales de los regímenes 276, 728 y CAS. Consideramos que los servidores que ingresen a laborar a la administración pública deben estar exonerados del periodo de prueba tal como se encuentra normado en los artículos 32 y 34 del Reglamento del Decreto Legislativo 27677 para los servidores públicos. Este aspecto no beneficia a los del régimen 276. El cuadro N° 3 grafica claramente los derechos laborales de la propuesta legislativa comparándolas con los mismos beneficios que se otorgan en los regímenes laborales del Decreto Legislativo 276, 728 y CAS. 77 Decreto Supremo 005-90-PCM, Reglamento del Decreto Legislativo 276, "Art. 32. El ganador del concurso de ingreso es incorporado a la Administración Pública mediante resolución de nombramiento o contrato, en la que además se expresa el respectivo puesto de trabajo." "Art. 34. La estabilidad laboral se adquiere a partir del nombramiento. No existe periodo de prueba. 326 Cuadro N° 3 Comparación entre los regímenes generales existentes y la Ley 30057 Fuente: Ley 30057 y Decretos legislativos 276, 728 y 1057 5. Los derechos laborales colectivos en el la Ley 30057, Ley del Servicio Civil La Ley 30057 impacta negativamente en los derechos colectivos de los servidores públicos ya que, basándose en posiciones tradicionales estatutarias, ha establecido en los artículo del 41 hasta el 45 normas que constituyen un retroceso en el derecho colectivo y que pueden motivar acciones de impugnaciones de orden constitucional. Nos referiremos al derecho de la negociación colectiva y a la huelga. La norma establece que los acuerdos en materia laboral se sujetan a lo siguiente: CONCEPTOS RÉGIMEN LABORAL COMÚN D. LEGISLATIVO 728 RÉGIMEN LABORAL PÚBLICO D.Leg. 276 D. LEGISLATIVO 1057 (CAS)MODIFICADO POR LA LEY 29849 Ley 30057 Gratificaciones o Aguinaldos Dos gratificaciones: remuneración mensual en julio y diciembre Dos aguinaldos aprobados por el MEF (El 2012 fue de S/. 300.00) Dos aguinaldos aprobados por el MEF (Si hay presupuesto) Dos aguinaldos de una remuneración mensual en julio y diciembre (Art. 31.2) Descanso Vacacional 30 días x año 30 das x año 30 días x año 30 días x año (Art. 31.2) Licencias pagadas Maternidad, paternidad y otros Maternidad, paternidad y otros Maternidad, paternidad y otros Maternidad, paternidad y otros /Art. 47) CTS Una remuneración mensual x año sin tope Media remuneración mensual principal (R.P.) por los primeros 20 años y completa por los siguientes años. (La R.P. no considera todos los ingresos). No contempla Una remuneración promedio mensual de los últimos 36 meses (Art. 33) Indemnización por Despido Injustificado Una y media remuneración mensual por cada año de servicios No contempla Remuneraciones dejadas de percibir, Hasta tres retribuciones mensuales Se contempla Indemnización cuyo monto lo establecerá el reglamento. (Art. 36) Prescripción laboral Cuatro años después del cese No contempla (Se aplica CC) No contempla Dos años después del cese (Art. 37) CONCURSO PÚBLICO No contempla Concurso público, (Ganadores exonerado del periodo de prueba Concurso público (Ganadores no exonerados de periodo de prueba) Se exceptúan s servidores 276, 729 y CAS (Art. 72 y 3ra DCT) 327 "(...) b) La contrapropuesta o propuestas de la entidad relativas a compensaciones económicas son nulas de pleno derecho. (...) d) Los acuerdos suscritos entre los representantes de la entidad pública y de los servidores civiles tienen un plazo de vigencia no menor de dos (02) años y surten efecto obligatoriamente a partir del 1 de enero del ejercicio siguiente. Similar regla se aplica a los laudos arbitrales. e) Los acuerdos y los laudos arbitrales no son de aplicación a los funcionarios públicos, directivos públicos ni a los servidores de confianza. Es nulo e inaplicable todo pacto en contrario." (...) Como se observará, la Ley, además de prohibir la negociación colectiva en materia de remuneraciones, dispone que estas sólo se realicen cada dos años perjudicando a los diferentes gremios que negocian anualmente sus pliegos de reclamos. La doctrina internacional ha evolucionado desde posiciones tradicionales estatutarias hacia posiciones contractualistas o laborales en las relaciones Estado–servidores públicos, por lo que consideramos que corresponde el derecho de negociación colectiva a estos últimos con las peculiaridades que corresponden a la administración pública en especial la de provisión presupuestaria que también es una facultad constitucional. Si bien es cierto que el artículo 42 de la Constitución no ha considerado literalmente al derecho de negociación colectiva para los servidores públicos, no menos cierto es que la interpretación de la constitución debe considerar la Cuarta disposición final y transitoria de la Constitución, respecto a que los alcances de los derechos fundamentales deben interpretarse en atención a lo establecido en los tratados internacionales de derechos humanos ratificados por el Perú, por lo que debemos considerar lo establecido en los Convenios 87, 98 y 151 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo (OIT). En consecuencia, estos instrumentos internacionales consideran dentro de su ámbito a los trabajadores públicos y privados. En ese mismo sentido, se ha pronunciado el Tribunal Constitucional cuando sentenció: 328 "(...) en ese sentido, la Constitución reconoce en su artículo 42° el derecho de sindicación de los servidores públicos. Consecuentemente, las organizaciones sindicales de los servidores públicos serán titulares del derecho a la negociación colectiva, con las excepciones que establece el mismo artículo, a saber los funciones del Estado con poder de decisión, los que desempeñan cargos de confianza o de dirección, y los miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas y de la Policía Nacional." 78 Tal criterio es compartido por la Comisión de Expertos en Aplicación de Convenios y Recomendaciones de la OIT por cuanto considera que el derecho a la libertad sindical se encuentra integrado por una faceta orgánica, una faceta dinámica a la negociación colectiva y por cualquier otra actividad relacionada con la defensa de los intereses de sus miembros. (Organización Internacional del Trabajo 1994) Por ello, podemos concluir que aquellas personas que prestan servicios bajo una relación de subordinación y dependencia son titulares de todos los derechos constitucionales laborales, incluidos los de libertad sindical, negociación colectiva y huelga consagrados en el artículo 28° del referido cuerpo normativo 79, independientemente de la naturaleza pública o privada de sus empleadores. Es importante resaltar la declaración Pública denominada " "Ley de presupuesto: desconocimiento de derechos laborales y del fuero arbitral"80, suscrita por importantes laboralistas y docentes universitarios, entre las que destacan ex ministros de Trabajo y Promoción del Empleo. El derecho constitucional a la negociación colectiva debe interpretarse conforme a los Convenios 87 y 98 OIT según los cuales, el derecho de negociación colectiva debe ejercerse de modo libre, voluntario y de buena fe. Por lo que, una prohibición sobre cualquier parte del proceso de negociación, sea negociación directa o sea arbitraje, debe considerarse contraria a la Constitución y a los mencionados instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos. Este aspecto perjudica a los trabajadores del régimen 728 y CAS que no tenían restricciones en su legislación. Desde el punto de vista constitucional, perjudicaría a los tres regímenes generales. 78 Véase la Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, recaída en el Expediente No. 0008-2005-PI/TC. Proceso de Inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley Marco del Empleo Publico,. 79En el mismo sentido se pronuncia el Tribunal Constitucional en el Fundamento 50) de la Sentencia recaída en el Expediente No. 0008-2005-PI/TC 80 Véase la declaración pública publicada en diferentes medios de comunicación, entre ellos La República" del domingo 27 de enero de 2013. 329 El artículo 45.1 se refiere al derecho de huelga de la siguiente manera: 45.1 El derecho de huelga se ejerce una vez agotados los mecanismos de negociación o mediación. Para tal efecto, los representantes del personal deben notificar a la entidad sobre el ejercicio del citado derecho con una anticipación no menor a quince (15) días. Es ilegal el ejercicio del derecho de huelga que no haya cumplido con lo establecido en el presente artículo. 45.2 El ejercicio del derecho de huelga permite a la entidad pública la contratación temporal y directa del personal necesario para garantizar la prestación de los servicios mínimos de los servicios esenciales y mínimos de los servicios indispensables para el funcionamiento de la entidad, desde el inicio de la huelga y hasta su efectiva culminación. (Lo resaltado es nuestro) Como se observa la Ley establece que la huelga debe ser notificada al Empleador con una anticipación no menor de 15 días y de no cumplirse se declara ilegal. Ello constituye un lamentable retroceso ya que actualmente, en el sector público o privado se notifica con cinco días el inicio de esta medida de fuerza a menos que sea un servicio esencial. De otro lado, la Ley permite la contratación temporal y directa para garantizar la prestación de los servicios esenciales y para los servicios indispensables para el funcionamiento de la entidad, con lo cual el derecho de huelga devendría en un derecho sin ninguna fuerza. Pierde los tres regímenes ya que la legislación aplicable no considera estas restricciones. Las principales diferencias respecto al derecho colectivo de los servidores públicos lo podemos observar en el Cuadro N° 4. Cuadro N° 4 Derechos colectivos y SS. de los regímenes generales existentes y la Ley 30057 CONCEPTOS RÉGIMEN LABORAL COMÚN D. LEGISLATIVO 728 RÉGIMEN LABORAL PÚBLICO D.Leg. 276 D. LEGISLATIVO 1057 (CAS)MODIFICADO POR LA LEY 29849 Ley 30057 330 Fuente: Ley 30057 y Decretos Legislativos 276, 728 y 1057 6. Los grupos ocupacionales y la carrera administrativa La propuesta legislativa establece una variación en los grupos ocupacionales del nuevo régimen del servicio civil, pero tomando como base lo establecido en la Ley 28175, Ley Marco del Empleo Público. Observamos en el artículo 3 de la Ley que existen cambios importantes en los grupos ocupacionales que estaban establecidos tanto en la Ley Marco del Empleo Público (Ley 28175) como en la Ley de la carrera administrativa (Decreto Legislativo 276). Así se establecen los siguientes grupos ocupacionales: a) Funcionario Público. Es un representante político o posee un cargo público representativo, que ejerce funciones de gobierno en la organización del Estado. Dirige o interviene en la conducción de la entidad, así como aprueba políticas y normas. b) Directivo Público. Es el servidor civil que desarrolla funciones relativas a la organización, dirección o toma de decisiones de un órgano, unidad orgánica, programa o proyecto especial. También comprende a los vocales de los Tribunales Administrativos. Libertad sindical Si de acuerdo a la Ley de Relaciones Colectivas de Trabajo Si de acuerdo al Convenio 151 de la OIT Si de acuerdo a la LRCT Si de acuerdo al Convenio 151 de la OIT (Art. 41) Negociación Colectiva Si de acuerdo a la LRCT Negociación colectiva restringida (No permite negociar puntos económicos) No contempla (pero debe considerarse que forma parte de la libertad sindical) Negociación colectiva restringida. De acuerdo al Convenio 151 OIT. (No permite negociar puntos económicos) (Art. 42,43 y 44) Huelga Si acuerdo a la Ley de Relaciones Colectivas de trabajo Si acuerdo a la Ley de Relaciones Colectivas de trabajo No contempla (pero debe considerarse que forma parte de la libertad sindical) Si restringida: 15 dias preaviso y se permite contratación temporal. (Art. 45) Régimen Pensionario Obligatorio 100% de aportación a cargo de trabajador (11% SPP y 13% ONP) Obligatorio 100% de aportación a cargo de trabajador (11% SPP y 13% ONP). Algunos servidores todavía se encuentra en el régimen pensionario del D.L. 20530 Obligatorio100% de aportación a cargo de trabajador (11% SPP y 13% ONP) Obligatorio100% de aportación a cargo de trabajador (11% SPP y 13% ONP) Si contempla Régimen 20530 (Art. 35 literal h) 4ta y 11ma DCF. Régimen de Salud (ESSALUD) Obligatorio 9% de remuneración a cargo del Empleador sin tope Obligatorio 9% de remuneración a cargo de la entidad Obligatorio 9% de retribución con tope de 30% de UIT a cargo de la Entidad (Subsidios completos, pagándose la diferencia por la Entidad Obligatorio 9% de remuneración a cargo del Empleador sin tope. (Art. 35 literal h) 331 c) Servidor Civil de Carrera. Es el servidor civil que realiza funciones directamente vinculadas al cumplimiento de las funciones sustantivas y de administración interna de una entidad. d) Servidores de actividades complementarias. Es el servidor civil que realiza funciones indirectamente vinculadas al cumplimiento de las funciones sustantivas y de administración interna de una entidad. e) Servidor de Confianza. Es un servidor civil que forma parte del entorno directo e inmediato de los funcionarios públicos o directivos públicos y cuya permanencia en el Servicio Civil está determinada y supeditada a la confianza por parte de la persona que lo designó. Pueden formar parte de este grupo de directivos púbicos, servidor civil de carrera, o servidor de actividades complementarias. Ingresa sin concurso público de méritos, sobre la base del poder discrecional con que cuenta el funcionario que lo designa. No conforma un grupo y se sujeta a las reglas que corresponden al puesto que ocupa. Algunas de sus características lo podemos apreciar en el cuadro N° 5. Cuadro N° 5 Clasificación de los funcionarios públicos en el nuevo régimen del servicio civil Servidores civiles Funciones Características Directivo público Ejerce funciones de dirección, organización de recursos y toma de decisiones de un órgano, proyecto o programa Elegido por concurso público de méritos.  Pueden ser gerentes públicos  Director coordinador ejecutivo de un programa o proyecto  Vocales de tribunales administrativos Servidor de confianza Forma parte del entorno directo e inmediato de un funcionario público o un directivo público Ingresa sin concurso pero debe cumplir el perfil. No conforma un grupo ocupacional:  Asesor de ministro  Secretaria de ministro  Asistente o auxiliar Servidor de carrera Ejerce funciones de administración, supervisión y control, de gestión institucional Presta un servicio público. Se ingresa por concurso e implica una carrera con progresión y meritocracia. Servidor de actividades complementarias Realizan labores de soporte, complemento, manuales u operativas Se ingresa mediante concurso público de méritos. Pueden ser a plazo fijo o indeterminado. Estas 332 labores pueden ser tercerizadas:  Choferes  Auxiliares de oficina Fuente: Ley 30057 ¿Con esta nueva clasificación y características de los grupos ocupacionales se afecta a la carrera administrativa? La carrera administrativa, carrera pública o carrera de servicio civil, es una institución muy antigua porque lo podemos observar en las reformas estatales de la Francia napoleónica. Forma parte del modelo cerrado de la función pública en la que se admite la presencia de un cuerpo permanente de funcionarios y servidores públicos que ya no respondan a los gobiernos de turno o al monarca sino que respondan ante la ley y la ciudadanía; que garantice la neutralidad política del cuerpo técnico y que éste no responda a los "manoseos" políticos. Para otros especialistas la existencia de la carrera administrativa es tan importante que su ausencia afectaría la esencia de un estado democrático, porque garantizan un balance o equilibrio entre los que gobiernan y los que deben decidir sobre la aplicación de la ley y los procedimientos técnicos, de allí que se señale "Allí donde no exista carrera administrativa o se vulnere el contenido mínimo de sus derechos constitucionales estaremos ante un estado con rasgos totalitarios." (Miranda Hurtado 2004). De otro lado, el Decreto Legislativo 276, Ley de Bases de la Carrera Administrativa y de remuneraciones del sector público, además de desarrollar normativamente la carrera administrativa estableció en su tercer considerando lo siguiente: "Que la carrera administrativa es una institución social que permite a los ciudadanos ejercer los derechos y deber de brindar sus servicios a la nación, asegurando el desarrollo espiritual, moral, económico y material del servidor público a base de méritos y calificación del desempeño de sus funciones y logro de una estructura uniforme de grupos ocupacionales y de niveles". La Constitución Política de 1979, así como la de 1993, la han considerado en los capítulos referidos a la función pública. En esta última se observa que en el artículo 40 se establece lo siguiente: "La ley regula el ingreso a la carrera administrativa, y los derechos, deberes y responsabilidades de los servidores públicos. No están comprendidos en la carrera los funcionarios que desempeñan cargos políticos o de confianza. (...)". ¿En qué situación queda la carrera administrativa en la Ley 30057? 333 Desde el punto de vista la nueva clasificación de los grupos ocupacionales podemos observar que de los cuatro grupos sólo a uno de ellos le corresponde la carrera administrativa. Si lo comparamos con la Ley 28175, Ley Marco del Empleo Público, vemos que existe una diferencia negativa importante, ya que esta preveía que, de los cinco grupos ocupacionales, a cuatro de ellos les correspondía ejercer la carrera administrativa. Si lo comparamos con lo establecido en el Decreto Legislativo 276, podemos observar la misma diferencia negativa: de cuatro grupos ocupacionales, a tres le corresponde la carrera administrativa. Podemos concluir que la carrera ha sido minimizada y sólo estarán comprendidos un menor número de trabajadores. Una mejor forma de graficar esta disminución lo podemos observar en el Cuadro N° 6. Cuadro N° 6 Grupos ocupacionales y la carrera administrativa Fuente Ley 30057 y D.Ley 11377, Decretos Legislativos 276 y Ley 28175 7.- ¿Qué pasa con los trabajadores que no optan por el nuevo régimen del servicio civil? Si los trabajadores deciden no migrar al nuevo servicio civil, estos se mantendrán en sus respectivos regímenes. Se entiende que con sus beneficios laborales congelados y sin la posibilidad de acceder a la progresión y ascensos, pero eso no es todo. Se debe leer con atención la Novena disposición complementaria final: "NOVENA. Vigencia de la Ley D. LEY No 11377 Estatuto y Escalafón del Servicio Civil 1950 D. LEG. No 276 Ley de la Carrera Administrativa 1984 LEY No 28175 Ley marco del Empleo Público 2005 PROYECTO DE LEY 1846/2012-PE, Ley del Servicio Civil 2013 Cargos con poder de decisión y de confianza Funcionarios Funcionarios Funcionarios Públicos Empleado de carrera Profesionales Directores Superiores Directivos Públicos Empleado a contrata Técnicos Ejecutivos Servidores de carrera Empleados adscritos Auxiliares Especialistas Servidores de actividades complementaria Personal de servicio interno Personal de Apoyo 334 a).A partir del día siguiente de la publicación de la presente Ley, son de aplicación inmediata para los servidores civiles en los regímenes de los Decretos Legislativos 276 y 728, las disposiciones sobre el artículo III del Título Preliminar, referido a los principios del Servicio Civil, el Título II, referido a la Organización del Servicio Civil, y el Título V, referido al proceso administrativo sancionador; y los Capítulos V y VI del Título III, referido a los derechos y obligaciones del personal civil y los derechos colectivos. Las normas de esta Ley sobre el proceso administrativo sancionar, la capacitación y la evaluación desempeño, se aplican una vez que entren en vigencia las normas reglamentarias de dichas materias, con excepción de lo previsto en el artículo 17 de esta Ley, que se aplican una vez que se emita la resolución de inicio del proceso de implementación. (...)" Podemos concluir que a los trabajadores que no migren igual se les aplica gran parte de la Ley, en especial dos: las evaluaciones con la sanción de cese en caso de no aprobar estas en dos oportunidades y la negociación colectiva sin derecho a mejoras remunerativas y económicas, entre otras, por lo que nos preguntamos en la esencia de la propuesta legal ¿Es facultativo o no la migración?. La respuesta es obvia. 8. LA EVALUACIÓN DEL DESEMPEÑO El artículo 26 de la Ley señala que la evaluación califica a lo servidores como personal de rendimiento distinguido, de buen rendimiento, de rendimiento sujeto a observación, y; personal desaprobado. El artículo 25 prescribe que: "(...)El servidor puede solicitar documentadamente la confirmación de la calificación adjudicada ante un Comité –cuya conformación la establece el reglamentoque define la situación de modo irrecurrible; salvo la calificación como "personal de desaprobado" que lleva a la terminación del vínculo en aplicación del literal h) del artículo 49 de la presente ley, en cuyo caso, procede recurrir al Tribunal del Servicio Civil en vía de apelación." Ello ha producido cierta conmoción entre los servidores públicos y sus gremios sindicales quienes exigían que las evaluaciones no tengan como objetivo los ceses de trabajadores. Teniendo en cuenta que la Evaluación del personal de la Administración Pública siempre ha sido un tema sensible y polémico al haber sido utilizada en los últimos años como mecanismo encubierto para separar indiscriminadamente del empleo público a quienes se consideren excedentes, no puede olvidarse, sin embargo, que es parte de la moderna 335 Gestión de la Administración Pública la permanente evaluación del recurso humano a fin de identificar las necesidades de capacitación y de verificar y calificar los logros de modo individual y, cuando corresponda, los de modo grupal en función de las metas establecidas institucionalmente. Consideramos que la administración pública como todo sistema complejo tiene que premiar a sus mejores servidores y desvincular a los malos servidores después de desaprobar en dos evaluaciones previa capacitación sobre la materia. La administración pública no puede convertirse en un depósito ni en una guardería de personal ineficiente. Por esta consideración, más que descartar a la evaluación, esta debe ser realizada garantizándose la transparencia, imparcialidad y objetividad en las mismas. No debiera descartarse la posibilidad de integrar a las comisiones o comités evaluadores un representante de los evaluados en calidad de veedor para disminuir o eliminar la desconfianza. 9.REFLEXIONES FINALES A.Después de casi trece años, desde que se realizaron los primeros estudios tendientes a iniciar el proceso de la reforma del Estado a través de un reordenamiento normativo del empleo público, este ha concluido con una Ley que merece ser perfeccionada. Es necesario ordenar la administración pública aplicando las modernas técnicas de gestión para mejorar la eficiencia en los servicios públicos Es imperiosa la necesidad de acabar con el caos administrativo y reestructurar el régimen el empleo público, ya que así lo exige la necesidad de incrementar la calidad de los servicios a la ciudadanía. B.-. Consideramos que la Ley favorecería a la administración pública ya que ha incrementado el número de causales de ceses, ha minimizado la carrera administrativa con menor número de servidores públicos con estabilidad en el empleo, ha implementado las evaluación con ceses para los trabajadores desaprobados en dos oportunidades. Estas medidas permitirían dar un shock de responsabilidad y eficiencia a muchos servidores de la administración pública que equivocadamente han considerado a la estabilidad del empleo como un seguro de vida permanente y no han dado importancia a su capacitación, a su responsabilidad y a la eficiencia en el cumplimiento de sus labores C.Es necesario institucionalizar los derechos laborales racionales y equilibrados, propugnándose una profesionalización y calificación de los funcionarios y servidores del Estado. La reforma del régimen del empleo público es tal vez la primera columna de la 336 modernización de la gestión del Estado, para su adaptación hacia una administración pública moderna, eficiente y eficaz, por lo que se hace necesario respetar los derechos constitucionales, legales y los provenientes de los tratados internacionales suscritos por el Estado peruano en materia laboral. Es por ello importante compatibilizar y llegar a un punto de equilibrio entre los objetivos generales de la administración pública con los derechos laborales de sus servidores. D.De otro lado, no es posible obtener un buen rendimiento de las personas al servicio de una institución, sino se garantiza que quienes ingresan a su servicio reúnan las mejores condiciones personales, posean un alto grado de motivación y sean objeto de continuos procesos de perfeccionamiento. Todo lo cual no se consigue sino mediante el establecimiento de sistemas técnicos de selección, de la implementación de programas permanentes de adiestramiento y capacitación, y de convertir el trabajo en una fuente de satisfacción para los empleados, objetivos cuyo desarrollo y ejecución se compendian en el concepto de carrera administrativa. Consideramos necesario repotenciar la carrera para que se mantengan ciertas relaciones equilibradas entre el poder político y la gestión técnica administrativa. E.Es necesario revisar la normativa de la Ley respecto a los derechos colectivos de los servidores públicos dentro de un marco de diálogo con las organizaciones sindicales para realizar los cambios necesarios para evitar que puedan ser impugnados ante el Tribunal Constitucional o ante las cortes supranacionales. F.Respecto a la desconfianza mostrada por los servidores públicos sobre las evaluaciones propuestas en la Ley consideramos que debería evaluarse la posibilidad de considerar en los comités y consejos de evaluación un representante de los servidores públicos en calidad de veedor, como si lo consideraba la Ley Marco del Empleo Público. Lamentablemente, todavía se mantiene en la psiquis de los servidores las evaluaciones realizadas en los años 90 que originó los despidos colectivos y que en la actualidad han dado origen a las cuatro listas de servidores a quienes se les tienen que indemnizar. G.Finalmente consideramos que toda ley es perfectible por lo que invocamos el diálogo y las coordinaciones políticas para proponer mejoras en la Ley. 10.BIBLIOGRAFÍA  SANCHEZ MORON, Miguel (1997). "Derecho de la función pública". Segunda Edición. Editorial Tecnos. Mardrid. 337  BALBÍN TORRES, Edgardo (2005). "Unilateralismo y Negociación Colectiva en la Administración Pública" FondoEditorial de la PUCP, Lima.  MIRANDA HURTADO, Guillermo (2004). "Instituciones y perspectivas del derecho laboral público". En la revista Derecho y Sociedad. Año XV, N° 23-2004.  Prats I Catalá Joan (1999). "Servicio Civil y Gobernabilidad Democrática: Fundamentos institucionales del Sistema de mérito y régimen jurídico y gerenciales requeridos para su eficiencia" en "¿De Burócratas a Gerentes? Las ciencias de la gestión aplicadas a la administración del Estado" Washington D.C.  ORGANIZACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DEL TRABAJO (1994). "Libertad sindical y negociación colectiva", OIT, Ginebra,  Informe del Consejo Directivo de SERVIR N° 109-2019SERVIR/GG-OAJ del 13 de mayo de 2010, de carácter vinculante para toda las entidades públicas  Oficio de la OIT N° OA – 335/2013, del 13 de mayo de 2013 dirigido al Presidente de la Comisión de Trabajo del Congreso de la República.  Sentencia recaída en el Expediente No. 0008-2005-PI/TC. Proceso de Inconstitucionalidad contra la Ley Marco del Empleo Público.  Declaración pública de Catedráticos de Derecho denominada "Ley de presupuesto: desconocimiento de derechos laborales y del fuero arbitral "publicada en el diario "La República" del domingo 27 de enero de 2013.  Ley 30057, Ley del Nuevo Régimen del Servicio Civil, publicada en el Diario Oficial "El Peruano" del 4 de julio de 2013. ........................................ 338 APUNTES SOBRE LA CALIFICACIÓN REGISTRAL DE LA COMPRAVENTA DE TIERRAS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS Dr.Hugo Luis Sedano Núñez81 RESUMEN En el presente artículo, el autor expone los aspectos más relevantes de la calificación registral realizada por los registradores públicos de la Zona Registral N° IX y los vocales del Tribunal Registral de la Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Públicos (SUNARP), a raíz de un precedente de observancia obligatoria del Tribunal Registral, con relación al otorgamiento de poderes para la compraventa de tierras de las comunidades campesinas, y teniendo en consideración el boom inmobiliario que aún se vive en nuestro país, que alcanza a las tierras de las playas del sur de Lima, vendidas por comunidades campesinas de la costa. PALABRAS CLAVE 81 Abogado de la Universidad San Martín de Porres. Magister en Derecho Civil y Comercial y Doctor en Derecho de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Catedrático de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega en la Maestría de Derecho Notarial y Registral y de la Sección de Posgrado en Derecho de la Universidad San Martín de Porres en la Maestría de Derecho Registral y Notarial. Registrador Público del Registro de Predios de la Zona Registral N° IX Sede Lima. 339 Comunidad campesina, compra venta, calificación registral, jurisprudencia, seguridad jurídica. I. INTRODUCCIÓN No cabe duda el rol fundamental que el Registro Público como institución del Estado cumple en nuestro país, en un momento en el cual vivimos el denominado boom inmobiliario, donde a través de la calificación registral82 del Registrador Público en primera instancia y del Tribunal Registral en segunda y última instancia, se inscriben una serie de actos y derechos que los ciudadanos ya sea en forma individual o colectiva solicitan, para ser publicitados y así produzca efectos frente a terceros, obteniendo la anhelada seguridad jurídica que todos los ciudadanos reclaman. Sin embargo, no todo lo que brilla es oro, porque las leyes que existen, no siempre sirven para regular los diversos aspectos de la vida en relación de las personas y así lograr la ansiada paz social, sino al contrario pueden convertirse en instrumentos que mal aplicados, pueden traer una serie de consecuencias que atentan contra la seguridad jurídica, es decir hecha la ley, hecha la trampa. Es en ese escenario, y con relación al otorgamiento de poderes para la libre disposición (compraventa, gravamen, etc.) de las tierras de las comunidades campesinas y el papel que juega el Registro Público, desde la función calificadora ejercida por el Registrador Público y el Tribunal Registral, exponemos un caso, que dio mérito a una observación por el Registrador Público, la cual fue apelada y revocada por resolución del Tribunal Registral, sala del Tribunal que fue sancionada por la expedición de la indicada resolución por la Superintendencia Adjunta de la SUNARP de aquel entonces, y 82 La calificación registral es la evaluación integral de los títulos presentados al registro que tiene por objeto determinar la procedencia de su inscripción. Está a cargo del Registrador y Tribunal Registral, en primera y en segunda instancia respectivamente, de conformidad con el art. 31 del TUO del Reglamento General de los Registros Públicos (Resolución del Superintendente Nacional de los Registros Públicos N° 126-2012-SUNARP-SN publicado el 22/05/2012.) 340 que concluyó con la aprobación de un pleno de observancia obligatoria del Tribunal Registral sobre el referido tema. II. CONSIDERACIONES A TENER EN CUENTA SOBRE LA VENTA DE LAS TIERRAS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS: De conformidad con el Art. 89 de la Constitución Política de 1993: "Las Comunidades Campesinas y las Nativas tienen existencia legal y son personas jurídicas. Son autónomas en su organización, en el trabajo comunal y en el uso y la libre disposición de sus tierras así como en lo económico y administrativo, dentro del marco que la ley establece ..." Es decir las comunidades campesinas según nuestra actual Constitución, pueden entre otras cosas, disponer (vender) libremente sus tierras. Pero antes, de la Constitución de 1993, las comunidades campesinas, para vender sus tierras –lo cual era posible solo por excepciónnecesitaban que el acuerdo de la asamblea general de la comunidad, sea aprobada por Ley, de conformidad con lo señalado en el Art. 7 de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas N° 24656, publicada el 14 de abril de 1987: "Las tierras de las Comunidades Campesinas .... son inalienables. Por excepción podrán ser enajenadas, previo acuerdo de por lo menos dos tercios de los miembros calificados de la Comunidad, reunidos en Asamblea General convocada expresa y únicamente con tal finalidad. Dicho acuerdo deberá ser aprobado por ley fundada en el interés de la Comunidad ..." El artículo precitado, se entiende derogado tácitamente por lo dispuesto en el artículo 89 de la Constitución, ya que ahora las tierras de las comunidades campesinas ya no son 341 inalienables (que no se pueden vender) y no es necesario para la libre disposición (venta) de sus tierras de la aprobación por Ley del acuerdo de la asamblea general de la comunidad campesina. La Ley 26505 publicada el 18 de julio de 1995 – Ley de la Inversión Privada en el Desarrollo de Actividades Económicas en las Tierras del Territorio Nacional y de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas-, establece los requisitos de quórum83 y mayoría84 para que la comunidad ya sea de la costa, sierra o selva, a través de su asamblea general85, pueda acordar –entre otrosla adquisición en propiedad de sus miembros o de terceros o venta de sus tierras, señalando en su Art. 10, literal b) que: "Para la adquisición en propiedad por parte de miembros de la comunidad no posesionarios o de terceros así como para gravar, arrendar o ejercer cualquier otro acto de disposición sobre las tierras comunales de la Costa se requerirá el voto a favor de no menos del cincuenta por ciento de los miembros asistentes a la Asamblea instalada con el quórum correspondiente." Y según el Art. 11 de la misma Ley: "Para disponer, gravar, arrendar o ejercer cualquier otro acto sobre las tierras comunales de la Sierra o Selva, se requerirá del acuerdo de la Asamblea General con el voto conforme de no menos de los dos tercios de todos los miembros de la Comunidad." Como vemos, el indicado artículo 10 de la Ley 26505, establece una votación (mayoría) a favor de no menos del cincuenta por ciento de los comuneros concurrentes a la asamblea 83 Se entiende por quórum, el número mínimo de comuneros calificados, que se necesita para que la asamblea general de la comunidad campesina se instale válidamente. 84 La mayoría, es el número mínimo de votos a favor, que se requiere para que la asamblea general de la comunidad campesina tome acuerdos válidos. 85 La asamblea general, es es órgano supremo de la Comunidad, de conformidad con el art. 17 de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas (Ley 24656). 342 general que acuerda la adquisición en propiedad por sus miembros o terceros o la venta de tierras comunales de la Costa, votación a favor que se computa, del total de comuneros asistentes a la asamblea. Sin embargo, el artículo 11 de la misma Ley, precisa que cuando se trata de tierras comunales de la Sierra o de la Selva, se requiere el voto conforme (mayoría) de no menos de los dos tercios de todos los miembros de la comunidad (quórum), es decir para que se instale válidamente la asamblea (quórum), deben concurrir no menos de los dos tercios del total de comuneros calificados que figuran en el Padrón Comunal86; de lo que podemos deducir, que los acuerdos para la adquisición en propiedad o venta de tierras comunales de la costa, son menos rigurosos que los acuerdos de las comunidades de la sierra y de la selva. Asimismo, para la inscripción en el Registro de Predios87, de la compraventa de las tierras de las comunidades campesinas, hay que tener en consideración lo señalado en la Ley N° 29320 publicada el 11 de febrero de 2009, que establece: "Para la inscripción en el Registro de Predios de los actos de disposición efectuados por las Comunidades Campesinas que conlleve la independización del predio, los Registradores Públicos deben requerir que se acredite, mediante constancia expedida por el ente competente de la formalización de la propiedad informal, que dichos actos no comprenden tierras ocupadas por posesión informal alguna excluidas de su dominio de acuerdo a las Leyes números 24657, 26845, 27046 y 28685". 86 El Padrón Comunal, es el Registro de Comuneros que lleva la Comunidad, se actualizará cada dos años, y contendrá cuando menos la información siguiente: nombre, actividad, domicilio, fecha de admisión del comunero calificado, con indicación de los que ejerzan cargo directivo o representación., de conformidad con el art. 24 del Reglamento de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas (D.S. N° 008-91-TR.) 87 Registro de Predios que forma parte del Registro de Propiedad Inmueble, de conformidad con el literal c) del art. 2° de la Ley N° 26366 que crea el Sistema Nacional de los Registros Públicos y de la Superintendencia de los Registros Públicos. 343 III. EL REGISTRO PÚBLICO Y LA VENTA DE LAS TIERRAS DE LAS COMUNIDADES CAMPESINAS: Siendo el Registro Público, una entidad estatal, que a través de los registradores públicos en primera instancia y los vocales del Tribunal Registral en segunda y última instancia administrativa, en el ejercicio de su función calificadora como control de legalidad en la inscripción de los diversos actos y/o derechos que se presentan para su calificación, desde hace 125 años, ya que fue un 02 de enero de 1888 fecha en la cual se creó el Registro de la Propiedad Inmueble en el Perú, viene cumpliendo un papel fundamental como garante de la seguridad jurídica88 en nuestro país. Con relación a la calificación registral de la compraventa de tierras de las comunidades campesinas, es necesario precisar que primero deberá inscribirse en el Registro de Personas Jurídicas, los poderes acordados por la asamblea general y segundo la compraventa en sí, en el Registro de Predios, en base a los poderes otorgados. Es así, que en primera instancia, el Registrador Público del Registro de Personas Jurídicas de Cañete, observó -entre otros aspectosel acuerdo de la Asamblea General Extraordinaria del 12 de marzo de 2007 de la Comunidad Campesina de Asia, que otorgó poderes a dos personas en calidad de personas naturales y no como directivos, para la venta de algunos lotes de terrenos de la Comunidad, señalando el Registrador que dichos poderes debieron ser otorgados al Presidente y Tesorero de la Comunidad, quienes en forma conjunta debían ejecutar la venta acordada por la asamblea general, de conformidad con el artículo 60 numeral K del Decreto Supremo N° 08-91-TR, concordado con el art. 63 numeral i del Reglamento de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas. La indicada observación del Registrador fue materia de apelación ante el Tribunal Registral, el cual mediante Resolución N° 460-2007-SUNARP-TR-L del 13 de julio de 88 Con relación a la seguridad jurídica, según Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional, en el Expediente N° 0016-2002-AI/TEC, señala que: "Cuando se trata de vincular la seguridad jurídica al derecho de propiedad, tal como ocurre en el caso de autos, aquélla no sólo debe garantizar el mantenimiento del statu quo, de forma tal que al individuo se le asegure el mantenimiento de su situación jurídica en la medida en que no se presenten las condiciones que la ley haya previsto para su mutación, sino que el principio se convierte en requisito indispensable para el desarrollo de los pueblos, en tanto permite crear la certidumbre institucional que dota a los individuos de la iniciativa suficiente para, a partir de la titularidad del derecho de propiedad, dar lugar a la generación de riqueza. 344 2007, resolvió revocando la observación del Registrador y ordenó la inscripción de los poderes, señalando que: "El ejercicio del cargo directivo es independiente del poder que pueda otorgarse ya que, a menos que las normas legales o estatutarias así lo establezcan, el integrante del órgano directivo no ejerce de manera individual la representación de la persona jurídica, salvo que se le otorgue poder en dicho sentido e inversamente, no es necesario ser miembro de la directiva para ser designado representante de la persona jurídica". Sin embargo, el Superintendente Adjunto89 de la SUNARP (Superintendencia Nacional de los Registros Público) de aquel entonces, resolviendo una denuncia interpuesta contra los vocales del Tribunal Registral, mediante Resolución N° 014-2011-SUNARP/SA del 16 de abril de 2011, impone sanción disciplinaria a los tres vocales del Tribunal Registral, al determinarse la existencia de responsabilidad administrativa por haber emitido la Resolución N° 460-2007-SUNARP-TR-L del 13 de julio de 2007 –que revocó la observación del Registrador Público de Cañete y ordenó la inscripción del título apelado-, por considerar que se inobservó el Reglamento de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas, aprobado mediante D.S. N° 008-91-TR, en el artículo 47 literal a), que establece: "Es atribución del a asamblea general: Autorizar al Presidente de la Directiva Comunal que solicite la adjudicación de tierras a título oneroso", artículo 60 numeral k, que señala: "Que es una de las funciones de la directiva comunal: Solicitar a la asamblea general la autorización expresa y únicamente con tal finalidad" y artículo 63 numeral i), que regula como: "Funciones del Presidente de la directiva comunal: El presidente conjuntamente con el tesorero suscribe los contratos y demás instrumentos por lo que se obligue a la comunidad". 89 El Superintendente Adjunto es el funcionario de más alto nivel después del Superintendente Nacional, quien tiene como una de sus funciones, resolver las quejas formuladas contra los Vocales del Tribunal Registral o imponer, de oficio, las sanciones cuando corresponda, de conformidad con el literal f) del art. 13 del Estatuto de la SUNARP (Resolución Suprema N° 1352002-JUS). 345 Se menciona en los considerandos de la indicada Resolución del Superintendente Adjunto N° 014-2011-SUNARP/SA del 16 de abril de 2011:  "La Asamblea General otorgó un poder amplio para la disposición de los predios, sin especificar o señalar indicios de identidad de los bienes".  "El Reglamento de la Ley General de Comunidades Campesinas menciona que una de las funciones de la directiva comunal es solicitar a la Asamblea General la autorización expresa para disponer o gravar los bienes y rentas de la Comunidad. Por ello, se puede afirmar que no podía solicitarse la autorización de disposición de todos los "predios de la comunidad " sino que el bien debería ser perfectamente identificado y ello debería considerarse en el acuerdo".  "Resultaba indispensable especificar los alcances del poder en forma EXPRESA a efectos que los asociados tomen conocimiento exacto de la agenda a tratarse y sobre lo que se está enajenando, en salvaguarda de los fines de las comunidades campesinas".  "El Tribunal Registral debió interpretar el Código Civil de manera concordada con el Reglamento de la Ley ..., y con ello, evidenciar el exceso cometido en el acto de apoderamiento que se presentaba ante el Registro, se ha inobservado de manera expresa las normas glosadas". Ante tal hecho, mediante LXXV Pleno de Observancia Obligatoria del Tribunal Registral, realizado por sesión extraordinaria no presencial del día 14 de junio de 2011, publicado en el diario oficial "El Peruano" el 21 de julio de 2011, se aprobó el siguiente precedente, siendo su sumilla la siguiente: OTORGAMIENTO DE PODERES POR COMUNIDAD CAMPESINA: "Salvo disposición distinta del estatuto, la asamblea general de una comunidad campesina, cumpliendo el quórum y la mayoría para la disposición de tierras exigido por las normas legales aplicables, puede otorgar poder para la transferencia de tierras, ya sea a favor de integrantes de la directiva comunal o a favor de personas que no integran la directiva comunal. 346 Salvo disposición distinta del estatuto, en el poder para disposición de las tierras no se requiere describir cada uno de los predios que serán objeto de enajenación." Criterio adoptado en las resoluciones No 012-2000ORLC/TR del 24/1/2000, No 460-2007-SUNARP-TR-L del 13/7/2007, No 230-2008-SUNARP-TR-L del 29/2/2008, Res. 358-2011-SUNARP-TR-L y Res. 3772011-SUNARP-TR-L. Es decir, a través del indicado precedente de observancia obligatoria90 vigente, los vocales del Tribunal Registral, enmendando la plana a la Superintendencia Adjunta de la SUNARP de aquel entonces, fijaron un criterio interpretativo de observancia obligatoria para las instancias registrales, con relación a la calificación de los poderes de disposición de las tierras, que otorgan las comunidades campesinas, poderes que pueden otorgarse a directivos o no, y salvo disposición en contrario del Estatuto de la comunidad, tampoco es necesario que se describa cada uno de los predios materia de enajenación. IV. CONCLUSIONES 1. Es necesario remarcar la importancia que reviste el Registro Público en nuestra sociedad, que a través de la calificación registral brinda seguridad jurídica en nuestro país en el tráfico comercial e inmobiliario, la cual realizada por Registradores y vocales del Tribunal Registral idóneos, es fundamental para que nuestro país siga avanzando en el desarrollo pero con seguridad jurídica; y dicha calificación no puede realizarse mecánicamente, ni aplicando únicamente el método literal de interpretación de las normas (sean estas leyes, directivas o jurisprudencia), sino debe aplicarse en armonía con todo el sistema jurídico peruano, donde la Constitución como norma fundamental, prevalece sobre toda norma de inferior jerarquía, y no olvidando que el Registro Público, como institución del Estado, brinda un servicio a la ciudadanía, el cual debe 90 Constituyen precedentes de observancia obligatoria los acuerdos adoptados por el Tribunal Registral en los Plenos Registrales, que establecen criterios de interpretación de las normas que regulan los actos y derechos inscribibles, a ser seguidos de manera obligatoria por las instancias registrales, en el ámbito nacional, mientras no sean expresamente modificados o dejados sin efecto mediante otro acuerdo de Pleno Registral, por mandato judicial firme o norma modificatoria posterior, de conformidad con el art. 158 del TUO del Reglamento General de los Registros Públicos. 347 ser predictible para todos los ciudadanos que solicitan su servicio, el cual debe realizarse con el más alto compromiso, honestidad y capacidad posibles. 2. Cabría repensar las diversas normas que regulan a las comunidades campesinas, para luego de un debate nacional y propuestas de todos los sectores comprometidos (representantes de comunidades campesinas, Ministerio de Agricultura, organismos no gubernamentales vinculados a comunidades, universidades, registros públicos, etc.), se pueda proponer nuevas regulaciones tanto para la inscripción de los diversos actos en el Registro de Personas Jurídicas (desde su constitución, modificación estatutaria, elección de directivas comunales y otorgamiento de poderes) como para el Registro de Predios (actos de disposición o gravamen de sus tierras), más realistas y menos burocráticas pero seguras (no son inmobiliarias), sin olvidarse de su especial naturaleza y papel histórico que cumplen las comunidades campesinas en nuestro país, fomentando su promoción y desarrollo con inclusión social que tanto se pregona, ad portas del bicentenario de nuestra independencia a conmemorarse el año 2021; pero respetando y protegiendo sus tierras como herencia histórica, pero sobre todo respetando y reconociendo sus costumbres, idioma y la particular cosmovisión del mundo que tienen sus integrantes, fundamental en la construcción de nuestra identidad como nación, y que al igual que todos los peruanos, los integrantes de las comunidades, son ciudadanos libres y con los mismos derechos y oportunidades. 348 LA EXCLUSIÓN DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR Dr. Luis Fernando Pastor Salazar, correo electrónico Resumen El derecho a la defensa es un derecho irrestricto es un valor de rango constitucional, un atributo que tutela la dignidad de la persona humana sometida en un proceso penal, el derecho a la defensa es un derecho fundamental de mayor jerarquía a la norma sustantiva de la exclusión del abogado defensor por la inasistencia a una audiencia que no es de carácter inaplazable los señores jueces en aplicación al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal emiten resolución de exclusión del abogado defensor inasistente y ofician la designación de un abogado defensor designado por el Ministerio de Justicia, es el defensor que remplazará al abogado excluido de la defensa. El Nuevo Código Procesal Penal en el Titulo Preliminar el artículo IX. El Derecho a la Defensa. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho inviolable e irrestricto a que se le informe de sus derechos, a que se le comunique de inmediato y detalladamente la imputación formulada en su contra, y a ser asistido por un abogado de su libre elección o, en su caso, por un abogado de oficio, desde que es citado o detenido por la autoridad. También tiene derecho a que se le conceda un tiempo razonable para que prepare su defensa; a ejercer su autodefensa material; a intervenir, en plena igualdad, en la actividad probatoria; y en las condiciones previstas por la ley, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinente. PALABRAS CLAVES Abogado. Diligencia. Inaplazable. Inasistente. Exclusión. Derecho. Irrenunciabilidad. Imputado. 349 LA EXCLUSIÓN DEL ABOGADO DEFENSOR El Nuevo Código Procesal Penal ha incorporado el artículo 85. Remplazo del abogado defensor inasistente 1. Si el abogado defensor no concurre a la diligencia para la que es citado, y ésta es de carácter inaplazable será remplazado por otro que, en ese acto, designe el procesado o por uno de oficio, llevándose adelante la diligencia. 2. Si el Defensor no asiste injustificadamente a dos diligencias, el procesado será requerido para que en el término de veinticuatro horas designe al reemplazante. De no hacerlo se nombrará uno de oficio. El derecho a la defensa es un derecho irrestricto, es un valor de rango constitucional, es un atributo que tutela la dignidad de la persona humana sometida en un proceso penal, el derecho a la defensa es un derecho fundamental de mayor jerarquía a la norma sustantiva de la exclusión del abogado defensor por la inasistencia a una audiencia que no es de carácter inaplazable los señores jueces en aplicación al Nuevo Código Procesal Penal, emiten resolución de exclusión del abogado defensor y solicitan la designación de un abogado defensor designado por el Ministerio de Justicia quien remplazará al abogado excluido de la defensa. El Nuevo Código Procesal Penal en el Titulo Preliminar el artículo IX. El Derecho a la Defensa. 1. Toda persona tiene derecho inviolable e irrestricto a que se le informe de sus derechos, a que se le comunique de inmediato y detalladamente la imputación formulada en su contra, y a ser asistido por un abogado de su libre elección o, en su caso, por un abogado de oficio, desde que es citado o detenido por la autoridad. También tiene derecho a que se le conceda un tiempo razonable para que prepare su defensa; a ejercer su autodefensa material; a intervenir, en plena igualdad, en la actividad probatoria; y en las condiciones previstas por la ley, a utilizar los medios de prueba pertinente. El ejercicio del derecho de defensa se extiende a todo estado y grado del procedimiento, en la forma y oportunidad que la ley señala. Si la persona que es investigada o procesada penalmente por la presunta comisión de un delito o falta, 2. Ningún ciudadano puede ser obligado o inducido a declarar o a reconocer culpabilidad contra sí mismo, contra su cónyuge o sus parientes dentro del cuarto grado de consanguinidad o segundo de afinidad. 3. El proceso penal garantiza, también, el ejercicio de los derechos de información y de participación procesal a la persona agraviada o al procesado por un delito que se le imputa y goza del Principio de Presunción de inocencia. La Constitución Política del Estado garantiza a los ciudadanos que son procesados, que tienen el derecho a elegir libremente un abogado de su libre elección y el artículo 139 son Principios y derechos de la función jurisdiccional inciso 14 El principio de no ser privado del derecho de defensa en ningún estado del proceso. Toda persona será informada inmediatamente y por escrito de la causa o las razones de su detención. Tiene derecho a comunicarse personalmente con abogado defensor de su libre elección y a ser asesorado por éste desde que es citado o detenido por cualquier autoridad. 350 El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos el artículo 14.1. Todas las personas son iguales ante los tribunales y cortes de justicia. Toda persona tendrá derecho a ser oída públicamente y con las garantías por un tribunal competente independiente e imparcial, establecido por la ley, en la substanciación de cualquier acusación de carácter penal formulado contra ella o para la determinación de sus derechos u obligaciones de carácter civil. Durante el proceso, toda persona acusada de un delito tendrá derecho, en plena igualdad, a las siguientes garantías mínimas: a) A disponer del tiempo y de los medios adecuados para la preparación de su defensa y a comunicarse con un defensor de su elección; b) A hallarse presente en el proceso y a defenderse personalmente o ser asistida por un defensor de su elección; a ser informada, si no tuviera defensor, del derecho que le asiste a tenerlo, y siempre que el interés de la justicia lo exija, a que se le nombre defensor de oficio, gratuitamente, si careciere de medios suficientes para pagarlo; El primer extremo de la citada norma extiende la protección constitucional a cualquier procedimiento no sólo al penal y como tal, es reconocida como requisito esencial para la válida constitución de un proceso. Julio Maier aclara que este derecho no sólo limita la protección al imputado, pues también alcanza a otras personas que pueden intervenir en él, tales como el actor civil o el tercero civil responsable. Se trata de defender un derecho o interés legítimo frente a la expectativa de una decisión estatal sobre él, porque se pretende algo o porque, al contrario nos oponemos a esa pretensión, requiriendo que ella no prospere. El Ministerio Público, desde esta perspectiva de la defensa como limitación al poder estatal, no tiene derecho de defensa, sino un conjunto de facultades o armas para cumplir su función persecutoria. A hora bien, limitando el análisis al proceso penal y, concretamente al imputado, es del caso definir el derecho de defensa conjuntamente con Gimeno Sendra como el derecho público constitucional que asiste a toda persona física a quien se le puede atribuir la comisión de un hecho punible, mediante cuyo ejercicio se garantiza al imputado la asistencia técnica de un abogado defensor y se le concede a ambos la capacidad de postulación necesaria para oponerse eficazmente a la pretensión punitiva y poder hacer valer dentro del proceso el derecho constitucional a la libertad del ciudadano. Carocca Pérez advierte las dos dimensiones del derecho de defensa: a) como derecho subjetivo; y, b) como garantía del proceso. En lo que respeta a la primera dimensión, es visto como un derecho fundamental que pertenece a todas las partes en el proceso, cuyas notas características son su irrenunciabilidad (la parte no puede decidir que no se le conceda la oportunidad de defenderse) y su inalienabilidad (no puede ser dispuesta por su titular, ni su ejercicio puede serle substraído ni traspasado a terceros). En cuanto a su segunda dimensión, de carácter objetivo institucional, la defensa constituye un verdadero requisito para la validez del proceso, siempre necesaria, aun al margen o por sobre la voluntad de la parte, para la validez del juicio. 351 El derecho de defensa de toda persona nace, según el texto constitucional, desde que es citada o detenida por la autoridad. Ello significa que surge con la mera determinación del imputado: no hace falta que exista una decisión nominal o formal al respecto, basta que, de uno u otro modo, se le vincule con la comisión de un delito. Existiendo una imputación nace el derecho de defensa, lo que importa reconocer que el sujeto pasivo de la imputación tiene, en cuanta posibilidad procesal, el derecho de acceder al proceso o investigación preliminar, a ser oído por la autoridad en todas y cada una de las instancias en que la causa se desenvuelva. Al respecto, apunta BINDER, el ejercicio personal de defensa del imputado exige asumir que la declaración del imputado es la oportunidad que se le otorga para presentar su versión de los hechos, ofrecer su descargo, proponer pruebas y establecer un contacto directo con las personas que tienen a su cargo la preparación de la acusación o, directamente, el juicio. El imputado también tiene el derecho: a) a que se le dé el status de parte para poder contestar la pretensión punitiva, la cual debe preceder al acto de defensa y serle debidamente notificada; y, b) a la última palabra, en tanto derecho potestativo a que la sentencia se dicte luego de que se le dé la oportunidad de expresar lo que tiene que decir al finalizar la actividad procesal (arts. 279 del C de PP de 1940 y 301a del CPP de 1991, artículo IX Titulo Preliminar NCPP 2004. El derecho de defensa, según la Constitución, se integra con todo un catálogo de derechos también fundamentales, concretándose: a) en el derecho de designar un abogado de su elección o, en su defecto, a uno de oficio; b) en el derecho a comunicarse previamente con él para contestar la imputación o realizar algún acto procesal; y, c) en el derecho a conocer en su integridad los cargos y pruebas existentes en su contra. La ilustración de los cargos por la policía, fiscalía u órgano jurisdiccional, como deber correlativo al derecho de información del imputado, no sólo se circunscribe a la medida cautelar de detención, sino que se extiende, por imperio del art. 14.1 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, a cualquier acusación, sin interesar la medida cautelar dictada contra el imputado. Es de significar que el acceso a las pruebas sólo podrá denegarse cuando se haya declarado el secreto de las actuaciones de la instrucción, en las condiciones exigidas por el art. 73a del Código rituario de 1940, en cuyo caso debe ilustrársele de la resolución judicial en que se dispone la apertura de la instrucción. La defensa, en tanto derecho fundamental, es ejercitada tanto por el imputado cuanto por el abogado defensor, de ahí su carácter dual: privada o material y pública o formal, esta última informada por el derecho público y de carácter obligatorio. La defensa material comprende el derecho del imputado a hacer valer su propia defensa, ya sea contestando la imputación, negándola, guardando silencio, o bien conformándose con la pretensión del fiscal. En esta perspectiva, la defensa técnica se erige como un Servicio público imprescindible que se presta aún contra la voluntad del imputado y viene a completar o complementar la capacidad del imputado para estar en juicio penal, con lo que se busca garantizar el principio de igualdad de armas y resistir eficazmente la persecución penal. 352 En tanto la finalidad del derecho de defensa del imputado es hacer valer con eficacia el derecho a la libertad, la necesidad de contradicción efectiva exige reconocer un cuadro de garantías procesales que limiten la actividad de la acusación y del órgano jurisdiccional. Los artículos 14°.3 del Pacto y 8.2. De la Convención Americana reconocen los siguientes derechos, además del derecho a ser informado detalladamente de los cargos y de defenderse asistido por un defensor sea de elección o proporcionado por el Estado: a) de que se designe un intérprete en caso no se comprenda el idioma; y, b) de contar con el tiempo y los medios adecuados para la preparación de su defensa. Los demás derechos instrumentales glosados en dichos instrumentos internacionales guardan relación con el debido proceso derecho a ser juzgado sin dilaciones indebidas, a la no autoincriminación y a utilizar la prueba pertinente, en cuanta garantía genérica, y el derecho al recurso impugnatorio. Al respecto, el Tribunal Constitucional a establecido que: El ejercicio del Derecho de defensa, especial relevancia en el proceso penal, tiene una doble dimensión: una material, referida al derecho del imputado de ejercer su propia defensa desde el mismo instante en que toma conocimiento que se le atribuye la comisión de un determinado hecho delictivo, y otra formal, lo que supone el derecho a una defensa técnica esto es, al asesoramiento y patrocinio de un abogado defensor durante todo el tiempo que dura el proceso. Ambas dimensiones del derecho de defensa forma parte del contenido constitucionalmente protegido del derecho en referencia. En ambos casos, se garantiza el derecho a no ser postrado a un estado de indefensión" (STC, Exp. N° 1323-2002-HC/TC, Asunto Silvestre Espinoza, de 9 de julio de 2002 FJ2). El derecho de defensa incorpora dentro sí dos principios fundamentales del proceso penal el de contradicción, carácter estructural al igual que la igualdad y el acusatorio, vinculado al objeto del proceso al igual que los de legalidad de oportunidad. En los distritos judiciales en el Perú, que se ha implementado el Nuevo Código Procesal en el Perú, el abogado defensor que fue notificado para que asista a la audiencia del proceso, el A quo cumple con instalar la audiencia acredita a las partes asistentes y corre traslado al Ministerio Público y al amparo del artículo 85 de la norma procesal fundamenta la exclusión del abogado defensor y designa un abogado de la defensa pública y el abogado del actor civil también sustenta sobre la teoría de la exclusión de la defensa inasistente. El señor juez en audiencia verifica el expediente, advierte que el abogado defensor ha sido válidamente notificado en su domicilio procesal, en el acto emite Resolución de exclusión del abogado defensor inasistente él A quo ordena la designación de un letrado de la defensa pública y señala fecha y hora para la nueva audiencia y los sujetos procesales asistentes son notificadas en el acto oral, con la resolución de exclusión se notifica al abogado defensor, tiene el derecho a interponer recurso de apelación, donde el superior jerárquico en audiencia 353 escuchará al abogado defensor si está sustentado restituye la defensa y continua patrocinando al procesado durante el desarrollo del proceso. El problema que existente en la actualidad está referida a determinar si la audiencia de prisión preventiva, audiencia de control de acusación, inicio del juicio oral es de carácter inaplazable, a fin de disponer en ese mismo acto, la exclusión del abogado defensor inasistente, pues de situaciones como la descrita, los abogados defensores han fundamentado que esta audiencia no es de carácter inaplazable por lo tanto se debe esperar a que ocurran dos inasistencias a fin de poder expedir resolución de exclusión y nombrarse defensor de oficio. esto por cuanto es práctica de la defensoría de oficio por lo menos en los distritos judiciales que está vigente el Nuevo Código Penal, el abogado que no asiste a una diligencia el juez procede a expedir resolución de exclusión del abogado defensor inasistente. El remplazo del abogado defensor inasistente en el artículo 85 tiene dos controversias en la primera establece taxativamente si el abogado defensor no concurre a una diligencia de la que fue citado y es de carácter inaplazable, el juez procede a emitir resolución de exclusión del abogado defensor inasistente recortándole el derecho a la defensa, el debido proceso, si bien es cierto la norma procesal establece de una diligencia y no de una audiencia los operadores de justicia erróneamente por una mal interpretación del numeral uno excluyen al abogado defensor en la primera diligencia. En el segundo numeral establece lo contrario si el abogado defensor no asiste injustificadamente a dos diligencias, el procesado será requerido para que en el término de veinticuatro horas designe al reemplazante. De no hacerlo se nombrará uno de oficio. En los distritos judiciales donde se aplica el Nuevo Código Procesal Penal, él A quo en la primera inasistencia del abogado defensor emite resolución de exclusión y designa abogado defensor de oficio, se le impone un abogado defensor vulnerándose el derecho a la libertad de elección de un abogado de su confianza, resoluciones que son contrarias al numeral 14 del artículo 139 de la Constitución Política del Estado. REFERENCIA BIBLIGRAFICA Binder, Alberto: (1993) "Introducción al Derecho procesal penal", Buenos Aires p.153. Carocca Pérez, Alex. (1996) "Las garantía Constitucional de la defensa procesal", pp20-22. Gimeno Sendra, Vicente (1988) "Constitución y proceso Tecnos", Madrid pp. 89,92. Maier Julio B.J (1996) "Derecho procesal penal T.I, Editores Del Puerto, Buenos Aires, pp 543-544, 551. Pastor Salazar, Luis. (2013) "La exclusión del abogado defensor en el Nuevo Código Procesal Penal". Lima, Perú. Constitución Política de 1993 354 POSIBILIDAD DE LA INCORPORACION DEL VELO SOCIETARIO EN EL PERU Dra. Giovanna Vásquez-Caicedo Pérez ABSTRACT The theory piercing of the corporate veil has its origin in the AngloAmerican law, it has emerged as a solution to the judicial level against fraud committed by members having such coverage to legal persons. This theory of piercing of the corporate veil is exceptional and residual, for only operates when there is no other way to protect creditors. The assumptions of your application has a lot of scope as it covers a number of areas of law such as Civil, Commercial, Bankruptcy, Probate, Family, etc. Faced with this reality, we considered the possibility of incorporating the corporate veil in Peru, because of that this juridical figure has already been made by courts of countries other Romano-Germanic tradition, and national studies authors claim is legislatively regulate regulation. RESUMEN La teoría del levantamiento del velo societario tiene su Origen en el Derecho Angloamericano, la misma que ha surgido como solución a nivel judicial frente a los fraudes cometidos por los miembros teniendo como cobertura a las personas jurídicas. Esta teoría del levantamiento del velo societario es de carácter excepcional y residual, pues sólo opera cuando no hay otra forma de proteger a los acreedores. Los supuestos de su aplicación tiene mucha amplitud ya que abarca una serie de ramas del derecho tales como el Derecho Civil, Comercial, Concursal, Sucesiones, Familia, etc. Frente a esta realidad, nos planteamos la posibilidad de la incorporación del velo societario en el Perú, en razón de que esta figura juridical ya ha sido tomada por otros tribunales de países de tradición romano-germánica; y a los estudios de autores nacionales que reclaman se regule legislativamente regulación. I. LA PERSONA JURÍDICA. Fernández Sessarego realiza un estupendo análisis sobre el Concepto de Persona Jurídica dentro de la teoría tridimensional del derecho. Para el autor, sujeto de Derecho es 355 tanto el ser humano individualmente concebido como aquel que comprende una pluralidad de personas. La Persona Jurídica91 debe ser entendida como el resultado de la interacción dinámica de sus dimensiones sociológico-existencial, axiológico y formal normativo92 En sentido amplio, la persona jurídica no se reduce automáticamente ni se confunde, única y exclusivamente, con su dimensión formal como consecuencia de su inscripción registral o de su reconocimiento administrativo según lo dispongan los respectivos ordenamientos jurídicos. Ello, de ocurrir, supondría el absurdo de prescindir de los seres humanos que real y efectivamente actúan en la experiencia jurídica y que concretan en actos jurídicos los fines valiosos que se propusieron al instituirla. El invento de la persona jurídica, funciona sólo para la reducción a la unidad formal de una pluralidad de seres humanos actuantes pero no para que desaparezcan del mundo ni de la persona jurídica. La pretensión formalista de reducir a la persona jurídica a una simple unidad formal nos impide comprenderla en su totalidad existencial, tal como ella opera en la realidad. Es en la experiencia jurídica donde debemos aprehenderla para luego describirla con la máxima fidelidad, sin alterar ni suprimir ningún elemento de la realidad que integra su estructura global. Y, si seguimos este válido periplo para cualquier otra institución jurídica, no podremos reducirla tan sólo y exclusivamente a un dato formal, a un centro unitario ideal de imputación de situaciones jurídicas subjetivas. La persona jurídica, como cualquier institución del derecho, no se confunde únicamente con su expresión formal. La captación de esta vertiente ideal resulta del todo insuficiente para comprender que sea la persona jurídica y el sentido que ella tiene para la vida humana. La importancia de la dimensión formal de la persona jurídica, cumple tan sólo la importante función de facilitar el que las situaciones jurídicas subjetivas del grupo humano que existencialmente la constituye, no se imputen a cada uno ni a todos los miembros que la integran -a la manera de las tradicionales collegiasino que se atribuyan a un centro formal de referencia normativa al que se conoce e identifica a través de una determinada expresión linguística. En nuestro Código Civil existe una concreción sustantiva la teoría tridimensional de la persona juridical, así El Código Civil de 1984 se devela de la anotación de los artículos 78, 80, 99, 111 y 13493 de dicho Código en los que se describe o define cada una de las cuatro personas jurídicas que éste regula, como son la asociación, la fundación, el comité y la comunidad campesina y nativa. En el texto de tales numerales se alude tanto a la 91 Ver Fernández Sessarego, Carlos, La noción jurídica de persona, segunda edición, 1968, pág. 93 y ss. 92 Fernández Sessarego, Carlos, La Noción Jurídica de Persona, Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima. 1962. La segunda edición apareció en 1968. El tema sobre la naturaleza de la persona jurídica ha sido también tratado en Derecho de las personas. Exposición de Motivos y Comentarios al Libro Primero del Código civil peruano, cuya primera edición estuvo a cargo de la Editorial Studium en la ciudad de Lima en el año de 1986. Posteriormente han aparecido seis ediciones de la obra. Así mismo, el asunto ha sido abordado en el trabajo titulado Visión tridimensional de la persona jurídica, publicado en los Anales de la Academia Nacional de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales de Buenos Aires y en la "Revista Jurídica del Perú", Año XLV, No 4, octubrediciembre 1995, pág. 17 y sgts. 9393939393 Por la separación de los patrimonios tanto de la persona jurídica como la del miembro de la misma se le considera a la persona Jurídica como sujeto de derechos y obligaciones. Así se desprende de la lectura de los artículos 80°, 99° 111°, 134° del Código Civil peruano. 356 dimensión sociológica-existencial, es decir a aquella referida a las conductas humanas intersubjetivas, como a la dimensión axiologica. II. LA PERSONALIDAD JURÍDICA Los juristas usan variadamente los términos "persona jurídica" y "personalidad jurídica," pero debe advertirse que aunque los mismos guardan la estrechísima relación proveniente de designar un mismo ente, están separados por la diferente raíz ideológica de que provienen. Cuando hablamos de personalidad jurídica, hablamos de un ente cuya existencia extrajurídica afirmamos: Del hombre, que es material, decimos que tiene personalidad jurídica; de la asociación no reconocida, que es social, decimos que carece de personalidad jurídica; de la corporación municipal, que es político-social, decimos también que tiene personalidad jurídica; en otros términos, cada vez que hablamos de personalidad jurídica lo hacemos indicando que un ente de sustancia no jurídica (cualquiera: orgánica, inorgánica, social, psicológica, etc.) tiene además trascendencia jurídica, tiene una individualidad jurídica, una proyección, una "máscara" en el plano del orden jurídico que le permite actuar trabando relaciones jurídicas. la personalidad jurídica es, pues, parte de una noción más integral de cualquier ente, y sólo constituye un rasgo distintivo del mismo, no la sustancia principal. Otros juristas utilizan el término "personalidad"94 para hacer alusión a la aptitud que tiene la "persona" para adquirir derechos y obligaciones. Es decir una aptitud "abstracta" que no es otra cosa que lo que se conoce como "capacidad de goce o de derecho". A decir del renombrado jurista, el concepto "personalidad" no se puede sustituir por el de "capacidad", toda vez que si el concepto "personalidad" significa la "aptitud" para ser sujeto de derecho carece totalmente de sentido, pues el ser humano es el único ente capaz (en virtud a su libertad, es capaz de vivir esa libertad) de poseer deberes y derechos. En conclusión el término "personalidad" resulta jurídicamente inútil e innecesario pues el ente que es sujeto de derecho es el ser humano y por serlo tiene ontológicamente la capacidad de goce, por lo que no es un atributo del ordenamiento jurídico sino un elemento estructural del ser humano en cuanto ser libre y coexistencial. Así el término "personalidad" no se confunde ni con el de "persona" ni con el de "capacidad". La persona Jurídica desde esta perspectiva es un sujeto de derechos, que tiene una identidad colectiva con la que exteriormente se le puede captar, un centro de imputación de derechos y deberes, y que en su relación interna existe la distinción entre su subjetividad y la de los miembros organizados y que persigue fines valiosos. III. LA SOCIEDAD ANONIMA Las teorías que tratan de explicar la naturaleza jurídica de la Sociedad Anónima, dentro de ellas las teorías del Contrato, institución, acto complejo, etc. carecen de un análisis tridimensional que en su calidad de Persona Jurídica le correspondería, por lo tanto las consideramos incompletas. Estas teorías enfocan su estudio en un momento específico de la sociedad cual es el acto de constitución de la sociedad y no en el transcurrir de la misma: la "vida societaria", aquellas conductas humanas, en el afán de conseguir sus fines valiosos, dentro de un marco formal que es el que justamente lograra el efecto por el cual los actos jurídicos que 94 Fernández Sessarego, Carlos. "Persona, Personalidad, Capacidad, Sujeto de Derecho: Un reiterado y necesario deslinde conceptual en el umbral del siglo XXI". En Doctrina Contemporánea. Normas Legales, Trujillo, 2003, p. 3-26. 9 La confusión se ha trasladado también a la esfera normativa en donde por ejemplo se utiliza el término personalidad como sinónimo de persona Jurídica: Art. 6°, 36°, 333°, 394° L.G.S 357 realicen los socios no le sean imputados. Aunque parezca obvio, debemos enfocar a la Sociedad Anónima como persona Jurídica que es. Creemos que la Sociedad anónima cabe dentro de un concepto de persona jurídica, sujeto de derecho, en la teoría tridimensional, con características especificas de carácter ideológico, como es el de ser, manifestación del capitalismo y estar al servicio de sus intereses. La sociedad anónima95 es una sociedad de capitales, con responsabilidad limitada, en la que el capital social se encuentra representado por acciones, y en la que la propiedad de las acciones está separada de la gestión de la sociedad. Nace para una finalidad determinada. Los accionistas96 no tienen derecho sobre los bienes adquiridos, pero si sobre el capital y utilidades de la misma. Siendo sus principales rasgos: a) Sociedad de Capitales.Se forma gracias a los aportes de los socios, sin los cuales no podría existir la sociedad.
b) División de capital en títulos negociables denominados acciones.Las acciones representan una parte alícuota del capital y son negociables. La titularidad de las acciones de la sociedad confiere una serie de derechos indesligables, relacionados con la toma de decisiones en la sociedad y la participación en los rendimientos económicos de la misma. c) Responsabilidad Limitada.Los socios no responden personalmente por las deudas sociales.
d) Mecanismo Jurídico Particular.La propiedad y la gestión de la empresa se encuentran desligados. Se basa en la existencia de tres órganos de administración que deciden las labores de dirección y gestión de la empresa: la junta general de accionistas, el directorio, y la gerencia. La sociedad se disuelve por el vencimiento de su plazo de duración, conclusión de su objeto social, acuerdo adoptado con arreglo al estatuto, y otras formas previstas en la Ley. Modalidades de constitución.Se han previsto dos modalidades:
1°) Constitución Simultánea o Privada donde en un solo acto los socios fundadores, que son los que suscriben y pagan el capital, acuerdan los términos del pacto social y del estatuto, firman la minuta y otorgan la escritura pública de constitución de la nueva sociedad.
2°) Constitución por suscripción pública en forma sucesiva mediante oferta a terceros contenida en el programa de fundación otorgado por los socios fundadores, la cual esta reservada únicamente para la constitución de la Sociedad Anónima. Aquí existe un proceso previo, regulado por la Ley, que tiene por objeto reunir a los socios que suscriban y paguen las acciones de la nueva sociedad; sólo después de culminado el proceso se puede otorgar la minuta y la escritura pública de constitución. 95 De Solá Cañizares. Vid. DE SOLÁ CAÑIZARES, Felipe. Tratado de Derecho Comercial Comparado. T. III; Montaner y Simón S.A. Barcelona, 1963, p. 34 96 El artículo 1° de la Ley General de Sociedades (LGS) establece: "Quienes constituyen la sociedad convienen en aportar bienes o servicios para el ejercicio en común de actividades económicas". Según nuestra normatividad son presupuestos de la existencia de una sociedad: La Affectio societatis y La Organización y El Patrimonio actual o potencial y El Objeto social lícito y La Actividad económica siguiendo la terminología usada por la L.G.S en su art. 1° y no fin lucrativo. La Inscripción en el Registro Público que es el acto que determina la creación de la sociedad anónima y su consideración como persona Jurídica. Un dato importante a señalar es que el artículo 51° de la L.G.S. hace expresa mención a la responsabilidad limitada que gozan los accionistas de la sociedad anónima. En virtud al artículo 6° LGS, tiene las características de la misma, dentro de ellas: la responsabilidad limitada (artículo 78° C.C.). 358 IV. LA RESPONSABILIDAD LIMITADA Los socios no responden personalmente por las deudas de la sociedad, por lo que los acreedores deberán asegurarse que el crédito que otorgaran se encuentra suficientemente garantizado por el capital social, que se puede averiguar de lo que aparece en la partida registral.
Esta característica propia de la Sociedad Anónima como persona Jurídica es la que ha generado su éxito y arrolladora presencia en el mundo de los negocios, siendo pues una regla indiscutible, al tiempo que la sociedad en comandita va desapareciendo97. En las sociedades comerciales en las que la responsabilidad limitada no es "absoluta", nosh ace reflexionar a que éstas no tienen las una de las características esenciales de la persona jurídica98, Consideramos que esto demuestra la falta de fundamento históricojurídico de las sociedades ya que es inconcebible que las sociedades comerciales que recoge nuestra legislación no tengan caracteres jurídicos comunes. V. TEORIA DEL LEVANTAMIENTO DEL VELO SOCIETARIO Desde su importación jurídica a nuestro país, la Teoría del Velo Societario ha sido materia de discusión doctrinaria sobre su aplicación en el Perú; y es que la doctrina del levantamiento del velo societario no es una creación de nuestros legisladores o doctrinarios, sino que nace en el extranjero y es introducida en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico. Para algunos autores, comienza en Estados Unidos de Norte América, situándose en el caso Bank of The United States vs. Deveaux (189), en el que respecto al planteamiento de una competencia jurisdiccional, el Juez Marshall mantuvo la competencia del Tribunal Federal en el caso enjuiciado, proclamando que aunque una de las partes fuera una sociedad, se debía atender a la realidad de sus socios como personas individuales componentes de ésta y en ese sentido, concluyó que tratándose de socios pertenecientes a distintos Estados, el litigio correspondía ser enjuiciado por el Tribunal Federal saltándose así a la sociedad como ente autónomo e independiente y penetrando en la condición de sus componentes para decidir de acuerdo con ésta99. Para otros, esta doctrina aparece en los Estados Unidos así como en Europa como consecuencia de los problemas que se crearon con relación a la nacionalidad de las sociedades con ocasión de la Primera Guerra Mundial; en efecto, Francia y Alemania se encontraban en guerra, entonces se presenta el caso de una compañía constituida en Francia, que opera en Francia, pero que todos sus accionistas son alemanes. Adicionalmente, los accionistas apoyan abiertamente a la nación alemana, pero se defienden diciendo que la compañía es francesa100 De otro lado, Carmen Boldó Borda indica que si bien es cierto el tema de la nacionalidad fue el desencadenante en los Estados Unidos para la aplicación de ésta doctrina, cierto es también que se extendió a casos en los que se intentaba defraudar a los acreedores, 97 BEAUMONT CALLIRGOS, Ricardo. Comentarios a la nueva Ley General de Sociedades. Gaceta Jurídica Editores, 1era Edición, Lima, 1998, p. 158 98 DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Federico. La Persona Jurídica. 2da edición, Civitas, Madrid, 1991, p. 268-269 99 CASANOVA CLAROS, Mariela. A propósito del velo societario. En VOX JURIS 14 – Crónicas de la Facultad. Universidad de San Martín de Porres. Edición No 14, 2007. Pág. 129. 100 SEOANE, Mario. Capítulo XIII, La desestimación de la personalidad jurídica. En Personas Jurídicas, principios generales y su regulación en la legislación peruana. Editora Jurídica Grijley, Lima, 2005, Pág. 111. 359 evadir impuestos, actuar en fraude de ley, lograr monopolio o proteger delitos101. Como se aprecia, no existe un criterio unívoco respecto al momento en que aparece esta doctrina, no obstante ello, sí hay una acepción en común de esta teoría, la cual implica separar a la sociedad de su personalidad jurídica, es decir, desconocer la estructura externa de la sociedad, y mira al interior de ella para indagar sus verdaderas intenciones, como bien indica el maestro Ricardo de Ángel Yagüez: "desarrollar los razonamientos jurídicos como si no existiese la persona jurídica"102, claro está, sólo se aplicará dicha doctrina en aquellas situaciones que se considere que la sociedad se ha constituido únicamente para defraudar a la ley, abusar del derecho, o perjudicar a terceros. En ese mismo sentido, el Dr. Elías Laroza103 define la teoría del levantamiento societario como aquella práctica que implica desconocer la personalidad jurídica de una sociedad, en algunos casos para evitar la utilización indebida, abusiva o fraudulenta de las persona jurídicas, con el objeto de ocultar situaciones ilícitas o causar daño a terceros. El autor refiere que los jueces disponen el "levantamiento del velo societario" no tanto para dilucidar hechos cometidos u ocultados por la sociedad, sino por los socios. Dicho en otras palabras, sirve para evitar que, usando la cobertura formal de una sociedad, se cometan u oculten delitos o lesionen intereses de terceros. Al levantarse el velo se hace posible que el juez conozca la realidad de las operaciones realizadas por los socios bajo la pantalla de la sociedad. Creemos pertinente referirnos a la opinión de Gustavo Ruiz Torres, quien esbozando un ejemplo señala: "imaginemos a la dama "Sociedad" resguardando su rostro detrás de un fino tul para que ningún extraño pueda descubrir su identidad no saber cuáles son las intenciones de sus miradas o de sus gestos, sintiéndose irresponsable ante ellos por la forzada "ceguera" de quienes la admiran. Parangón muy cercano es el que puede describir al llamado "velo societario. Ese velo societario es creado por Ley a fin que los que integran la sociedad "cubran" lícitamente su identidad y desarrollen detrás de ese vallado los planes por los cuales germinó dicha persona jurídica, restringiendo la responsabilidad de ésta a sus contribuciones al capital social"104 De modo que, cuando se produce el abuso de las gracias de la personalidad jurídica, especialmente las recogidas en la responsabilidad limitada de los socios, es menester "tirar abajo" esa mantilla que cubre la ilicitud de los actos de la sociedad para identificar a los reales causantes del daño, conocer sus verdaderas intenciones y extender su responsabilidad ilimitada y personalmente a los socios105. VI. PRESUPUESTOS PARA LA APLICACION DEL VELO SOCIETARIO La mayoría de tratadistas afirman que deben respetarse tres condiciones básicas que 101 BOLDÓ BORDA, Carmen. El levantamiento del velo societario y la personalidad jurídica de las sociedades mercantiles. Editorial Tecnos S.A., 1997, Madrid. Pág 102 DE ÁNGEL YAGÜEZ, Ricardo: La Doctrina del Levantamiento del Velo de la Persona Jurídica". Editora Civitas. Madrid. 2da Edición. 103 ELIAS, Enrique. Derecho Societario Peruano – La Ley General de Sociedades. Editora Normas Legales S.A.C. Trujillo – Perú., 2001. Pág. 28. 104 RUIZ TORRES, Gustavo. El allanamiento de la personalidad jurídica (o el levantamiento del velo societario por abuso de la personalidad jurídica). En Revista Jurídica Magistri et Doctores No 3. UNMSM – Facultad de Derecho y Ciencia Política (Unidad de Post Grado), Año VII. Lima, diciembre 2006. Pág. 480 105 RUIZ TORRES. Ibídem Pág. 480 360 deben de converger para la aplicación de la doctrina del alzamiento del velo de la personalidad jurídia; así tenemos: (i) Situación de control, (ii) Situación de abuso o fraude de la personalidad jurídica y (iii) Respetar el principio de subsidiariedad (ultima ratio). (i) SITUACIÓN DE CONTROL También conocida como la "Vinculación Empresarial Subordinada"106, implica la existencia de al menos dos sujetos: el dominante y el dominado, los mismos que se encuentran en una situación de dominación-dependencia, la cual estará regida por la dirección unificada. Mientras que la relación de dominación-dependencia implica que la dominación intensa y duradera ejercida por un sujeto sobre una empresa genera, para el primero, el control y, para la segunda, la dependencia; por su parte, la dirección unificada107 es la capacidad del sujeto dominante para imponer sus decisiones a una empresa, es decir, en la relación existente entre dos empresas, una se encuentra sometida o subordinada a las órdenes de la otra, o en todo caso, un sujeto constituye una sociedad e imponiendo sus decisiones realiza determinados actos que como persona natural le están prohibidas. Boldó Roda108 indica que esta situación de control se manifiesta cuando se detecta un manejo defectuoso de la administración del ente social jurídico o si se detecta un control pleno de la sociedad por otra entidad, empresa o alguno de sus miembros, socios o titulares. A manera de ejemplo, tenemos a dos entes sociales, uno de los cuales está sujeto a la voluntad del otro y lo conduce, por lo tanto, su desenvolvimiento está en manos de otra sociedad y no se busca su interés social sino el del conductor, aplicando el ejemplo al caso peruano, tenemos que el inciso 7 del artículo 1366 del Código Civil prohíbe al albacea adquirir los bienes que administra. Se aplicaría en supuesto que el albacea de la sucesión testamentaria constituya una persona juridica109 y , a través de ésta, adquiera alguno de los bienes hereditarios. En el caso antes planteado, se ha utilizado la forma societaria para infingir la ley, pues el albacea ha utilizado la fachada de la sociedad a fin de monitorear los actos de la misma para adquirir bienes que por su condición de albacea le estaban prohibidas; entonces, si el Juez desconoce la forma jurídica entonces encontrará que la decisión de adquirir los bienes hereditarios fue adoptada en interés del albacea y no de la sociedad. Al respecto, el Dr. Echáiz Moreno110 plantea algunos mecanismos a través de los cuales se manifiesta la dominación, el autor distingue entre dominación interna (de derecho y de 106 HUNDSKOPF EXEBIO, Op. Cit. Pág. 163. 36 ECHAIZ MORENO, Daniel. Los grupos de empresas en el Perú. Análisis y propuestas para una legislación integral. En: Gaceta Jurídica. Lima, Gaceta Jurídica Editores, setiembre del 2000, Tomo 82-B, p. 34. 37 BOLDÓ BORDA, Op. Cit. 107 ECHAIZ MORENO, Daniel. Los grupos de empresas en el Perú. Análisis y propuestas para una legislación integral. En: Gaceta Jurídica. Lima, Gaceta Jurídica Editores, setiembre del 2000, Tomo 82-B, p. 34. 108 BOLDÓ BORDA, Op. Cit. 109 SEOANE, Op. Cit. Pág. 113 110 ECHAIZ MORENO, Daniel. Caracteristicas Estructurales de los Grupos de Empresas, En: Banco de Datos Legal Teleley. Lima, 11 de setiembre 2000. http://www.asesor.com.pe/teleley/tesisechaiz.htm. 361 hecho), la dominación externa (de derecho y de hecho) y la dominación directa e indirecta: a) LA DOMINACIÓN INTERNA DE HECHO.En el caso de la dominación interna de hecho, ésta se da a través de dos mecanismos: (i) la dominación relativa y (ii) la dominación administrativa, siendo muy común en las llamadas sociedades de accionariado difundido, es decir, en aquellas empresas que cuentan con un gran número de accionistas. Mientras que la dominación relativa se produce ante el fenómeno de ausentismo de las juntas, pues muchos de los socios de mando de tenencia minoritaria (pero que suelen asistir) adquirirán posición mayoritaria entre los votantes y, por ende, el dominio necesario. Por su parte, la dominación administrativa se refiere aquella que reposa en manos de los órganos encargados de la administración de la empresa, esto es, directores, gerentes y demás ejecutivos. b) LA DOMINACIÓN EXTERNA DE DERECHO Y DE HECHO.Indica el autor que este tipo de dominación externa de derecho surge de la celebración de un contrato cuya finalidad principal es la dominación, de modo que el vínculo contractual genera la relación de dominación-dependencia y conlleva al establecimiento, mediante cláusulas, de un comportamiento subordinado que la empresa dominada deberá observar y acatar a favor del sujeto dominante. Por el contrario, en el caso de dominación externa de hecho, nos encontramos ante un contrato donde la dominación no es su propósito principal, sino un efecto secundario y derivado que aparece en la relación entre las partes. Esto suele suceder en las figuras como el suministro, la concesión mercantil, la licencia de marca, la franquicia, la emisión de bonos, etc. Así, si el suministrante cuenta con un solo cliente, su permanencia en el mercado estará condicionada a la demanda, esto es, a los requerimientos del suministrado. Respecto a la licencia de marca, de acuerdo a nuestra Ley de Propiedad Industrial, el licenciante responde ante los consumidores por la calidad e idoneidad de los productos o servicios licenciados si fuese productos o prestador de estos, por lo tanto, es lógico pensar que aquel realizará una labor de control o monitoreo, de modo tal que el licenciatario debe acatar las instrucciones impartidas ya de los contrario pierde la licencia, quedando sus productos o servicios sin marca. c) LA DOMINACIÓN DIRECTA E INDIRECTA.La dominación directa e indirecta es aplicable a cada una de las situaciones antes planteadas, es decir, a la dominación interna de derecho, la dominación interna de hecho, la dominación externa de derecho y la dominación interna de hecho. Estos tipos de dominación – directa e indirecta – reflejan cómo se estructura la relación de dominacióndependencia respecto del sujeto dominante con las empresas dominadas111, es decir, si desde una sola cabeza se imparte la dirección unificada del grupo o si, por el contrario, hay desconcentración de funciones por niveles. El autor señala que en esta situación nos encontramos ante la dominación accionaria o participacional. Indica que este tipo de dominación implica la influencia dominante que se ejerce en razón de la titularidad de la empresa dominada. Se arriba a este tipo de dominación mediante tres vías: (i) dominación absoluta (cuando se posee el cien por ciento de las acciones o participaciones de la empresa dominada), (ii) dominación mayoritaria (cuando se posea más de cincuenta por ciento y menos del cien 111 Recordemos que la dirección unificada es la capacidad del sujeto dominante para imponer sus decisiones a una empresa 362 por ciento de las mismas) y (iii) dominación minoritaria (cuando se posea menos del cincuenta por ciento de las acciones o participaciones de una empresa y se celebre un pacto de sindicación que conlleve al dominio de ella). (ii) SITUACIÓN DE ABUSO O FRAUDE DE LA PERSONALIDAD JURÍDICA Otro de los presupuestos necesarios que debe concurrir a efectos de aplicar la teoría del levantamiento del velo societario, es la figura del abuso o fraude de la personalidad juridical: 2.1 EL ABUSO DE LA PERSONALIDAD JURÍDICA. En principio, debemos asimilar adecuadamente el concepto "abuso del derecho" a efectos de comprender mejor la noción "abuso de la personalidad jurídica"112. Para el reconocido jurista José León Barandiarán se incurre en abuso de derecho cuando, en el ejercicio de tal derecho, el titular se excede manifiestamente de los límites de la buena fe de modo que dicho ejercicio no se compatibiliza con la finalidad institucional y la función social en razón de las cuales se ha reconocido el respectivo derecho. Para la Dra. Boldó Roda113, el abuso del derecho supone una actuación contraria a la buena fe, la cual tiene como finalidad intentar obtener un resultado contrario al ordenamiento jurídico positivo que busca su apoyo en la norma de cobertura, es decir, a través de una conducta abusiva se realiza el ejercicio irregular de un derecho y con ello se transgrede de manera directa la buena fe o las buenas costumbres, agraviando con ello intereses de terceros. La teoría general del abuso del derecho es muy amplia, esbozar cada uno de los criterios que se han elaborado al respecto escapa al ámbito de este artículo, por ello únicamente nos centraremos en una de las subespecies de aquella, el "abuso de la personalidad jurídica". Al respecto, el reconocido jurista Fernández Sessarego114 indica que el abuso de la personalidad jurídica es aquella situación o circunstancia en la cual una organización de personas o ciertas personas de esta utilizan las ventajas que otorga la formalidad que se obtiene con la inscripción de dicha organización en el registro para obtener beneficios en su provecho o en el de terceros al margen de los propios intereses de la persona jurídica. Es decir, son los seres humanos integrantes de la organización los que emplean dicha ventajas en su favor o para cometer un fraude a la ley. Es decir, los miembros de la sociedad constituida, aprovechando la personalidad jurídica adquirida por ésta a partir de su inscripción en el registro, obtienen beneficios en su provecho o comenten ilícitos, perjudicando con ello a terceros. Concordamos con la opinion de la Dra. Guerra Cerrón115, cuando indica que al hablar del ejercicio abusivo del derecho a través del ente social – entiéndase la sociedad – es incuestionable que son los integrantes de la sociedad los que abusan del derecho de asociación y de las reglas que son aplicables para el ejercicio de este derecho. Evitando acciones irregulares, no sólo en el ámbito civil, sino en cualquier campo, con el objeto de 112 ESPINOZA ESPINOZA, Juan. Los Principios Contenidos en el Titulo Preliminar del Código Civil Peruano de 1984. PUCP, Lima, 2005, Pág. 94 113 BOLDÓ RODA, Op. Cit. Pág. 290, 291 114 FERNANDEZ SESSAREGO, Carlos. Apuntes sobre el Abuso de la Personalidad Jurídica. En Advocatus. No 4, Lima, 2001, Pág. 73. 115 GUERRA CERRON, Jesús María Elena. Levantamiento del Velo Societario y los Derechos, Deberes y Responsabilidades de la Sociedad Anónima. Tesis para optar el grado académico de Doctor en Derecho y Ciencia Política. Lima, Perú, 2007, Pág. 243 363 obtener resultados antijurídicos, se podrá controlar los actos dolosos o fraudulentos que comentan los miembros que componen la personalidad jurídica utilizándola para ello. 2.2 EL FRAUDE DE LA PERSONALIDAD JURÍDICA En el caso del abuso de la personalidad jurídica, resulta necesario fijar un concepto de "fraude a la ley" a efectos de comprender mejor la noción "fraude de la personalidad jurídica". En principio, por fraude a la ley116 se evade la aplicación de una ley (ley defraudada) amparándose en otra ley (ley de cobertura), que solo de modo aparente protege el acto realizado, caso en el cual debe aplicarse la ley que se ha tratado de eludir o, si ello no es posible, anular el acto, independientemente de que con este se haya o no causado daño117. El fraude a la ley se presenta en apariencia como un acto legítimamente realizado y bajo el amparo de normas legales expresas. Para que exista fraude a la ley deben presentarse dos Normas jurídicas, una que es la llamada "ley de cobertura" y la otra que es la "ley defraudada". La ley de cobertura es un dispositivo general que permita encubrir el acto malicioso y darle un tono aparente de legalidad; la ley defraudada, en cambio, no es un precepto específico para un caso determinado, lo que se atenta de esta forma es la finalidad por la cual fue creada, es decir, se ataca la razón, la ratio legis, que llevó al legislador a emitir dicho dispositivo. Aplicando este concepto, el alemán Rolf Serick, reconocido como una de los grandes propulsores de la Doctrina del Levantamiento del velo societario, indica que el fraude de la personalidad jurídica se produce: "cuando el resultado que la ley rechaza se obtiene por un camino que la ley no ha previsto y cuando la ratio legis de la norma era que tal resultado no se produzca118. En el caso de nuestra legislación, de acuerdo al artículo 78o de nuestro Código Civil, la persona jurídica tiene existencia distinta de sus miembros y ninguno de éstos ni todos ellos tiene derecho al patrimonio de ella ni están obligados a satisfacer sus deudas. Por ejemplo, El señor Rivas se encuentra impedido por ley en adquirir determinado bien, en virtud a ello, en colaboración con el Sr. Romero constituye una sociedad denominada Escorpión S.A., que conforme al artículo citado, es distinta del Sr. Rivas y del Sr. Romero, en consecuencia Escorpión S.A. adquiere el bien, así el Sr. Rivas ha defraudado a la ley a través de la persona jurídica constituida, pues amparándose en el articulado citado, consiguió adquirir el bien, que como persona natural le estaba prohibido. Obviamente, cuando el legislador estableció la posibilidad de que la persona jurídica tenga existencia distinta de sus miembros, no lo hizo con la finalidad de que se use la persona jurídica en perjuicio de terceros, sino, con el fin de realizar una operación de reducción de personas individuales, organizadas con un determinado fin, para construir un centro unitario de referencia normativa119, al cual se le pudiera imputar derechos y deberes. (iii) RESPETAR EL PRINCIPIO DE SUBSIDIARIEDAD En este presupuesto debemos resaltar que la teoría del levantamiento del velo societario tiene sus orígenes en fallos jurisprudenciales y en la doctrina, es decir, no suele basarse 116 GUERRA CERRÓN, Op. Cit. Pág. 245 117 TORRES VÁSQUEZ, Aníbal. Acto Jurídico. 2a Edición. Editorial Idemsa. Lima, 2001. Pág. 573. 118Citado por GUERRA CERRÓN, Ibídem. Pág. 241 119 Espinoza Juan, citado por GUERRA CERRON, Op. Cit. Pág. 46 364 en formas legales ni existen normas que establezcan de forma taxativa en qué casos debe recurrirse a ella, sino que se aplica y desarrolla de acuerdo al caso concreto, por ello desconocer la personalidad jurídica de una determinada sociedad, sin sustentarse en supuestos objetivos o normas legales y partiendo del análisis judicial de un caso determinado, coadyuva a la inseguridad jurídica120, por lo que en tan delicada operación, los magistrados deberán apelar a nociones genéricas como las de "abuso del derecho" o "fraude a la ley" Para el español Ricardo de Ángel Yagüez121: "no parece impertinente preguntarse si la doctrina del levantamiento del velo no es sino un exotismo innecesario, habida cuenta que la dogmática jurídica y los ordenamiento positivos europeos – occidentales brindan al juzgador, conceptos e instrumentos jurídicos bastantes para adoptar soluciones como las que el levantamiento del velo societario puede ofrecer. Nociones jurídicas básicas como son la del fraude a la ley, o la del fraude a acreedores, o la del abuso del derecho o la equidad, o en fin la buena fe, se presentan, en efecto, como resortes jurídicos adecuados para solventar muchos de los problemas que, quizás con una excesiva inclinación a lo nuevo, dicen resolverse mediante el recurso a la técnica del levantamiento del velo societario". Como apreciamos, los diversos autores establecen el carácter excepcional de la teoría del levantamiento del velo societario, y fijan la necesidad de acudir primero al repertorio legal existente y utilizar las figuras jurídicas tradicionales de abuso del derecho y fraude a la ley, antes de aplicar la doctrina estudiada; dichos alcances encierran lo que se entiende por el respeto al principio de subsidiariedad de dicha teoría. El principio de subsidiariedad implica que la teoría del allanamiento de la personalidad jurídica debe aplicarse como ultima ratio122, es decir, cuando el problema no pueda ser resuelto mediante el empleo de otros mecanismos que el propio Derecho Franquea. No quiere decir que nunca pueda levantarse el velo de la sociedad ni que el hacerlo sea ilegal123, lo que debe concluirse es que la aplicación de esta figura debe hacerse con especial cuidado y excepcionalmente. A MANERA DE CONCLUSION: 1. La Teoría del Levantamiento del Velo Societario no es una creación de nuestros legisladores o doctrinarios, sino que nace en el extranjero y es introducida en nuestro ordenamiento jurídico, como otras tantas doctrinas y teorías que hoy forman parte de nuestra tradición legal. En tal sentido, consideramos que esta figura no debe adherirse a nuestro ordenamiento jurídico por simple imitación, pues creemos necesaria una regulación de los supuestos "clásicos" de fraude de los socios, pero manteniendo la ideología de nuestro Código Civil. 2. La Teoría del Levantamiento del Velo Societario connota un conflicto entre la justicia y la seguridad jurídica, pues el hecho de desconocer la utilización de una persona jurídica como herramienta de sus miembros, para ejecutar actos abusivos o defraudadores en contra de acreedores o terceros, contravendría abiertamente el primero de tales principios. Del mismo modo, desconocer la personalidad jurídica de una determinada sociedad, sin sustentarse en supuestos objetivos o Normas legales y partiendo del análisis judicial de un caso determinado, coadyuva a la inseguridad 120 HUNDSKOPF EXEBIO, Op. Cit. Pág. 43. 121 De Ángel Yagüez. Op. Cit. Pág. 65. 122Boldo Roda, Op. Cit. Pág. 17. 123GUTIERREZ CAMACHO, Walter. El levantamiento del velo societario (I). En: Estudios societarios & Ley General de Sociedades. Lima, Gaceta Jurídica Editores, junio de 1999, p. 280 365 jurídica124. 3. Hacemos eco de la opinion vertida por el Dr. Mispireta125 cuando señala que es necesario implementar las normas legales que prevean expresamente la posibilidad de desestimar algunas características, no solo de las sociedades comerciales, sino también de cualquier tipo de persona jurídica cuando se haga un uso abusivo o fraudulento de las mismas, debiéndose tener en cuenta que esta introducción debe ir acompañada de una capacitación permanente y profunda de los jueces que aplicarán esta teoría. 4. Sabiamente el maestro griego Aristóteles indicaba: "cualquier arte y cualquier doctrina, y asimismo toda acción y elección, parece que a algún bien es enderezada", pues tratándose de sociedades mercantiles su actuar debe desarrollarse dentro de los márgenes de la ley, dado que es inusual que se constituya para violarla. REFERENCIA BIBLIOGRÁFICA: BEAUMONT CALLIRGOS, Ricardo. (1998). Comentarios a la nueva Ley General de Sociedades. Gaceta Jurídica Editores, 1era Edición, Lima, p. 158. BOLDÓ BORDA, Carmen. (1997). El levantamiento del velo societario y la personalidad jurídica de las sociedades mercantiles. Editorial Tecnos S.A., Madrid. CASANOVA CLAROS, Mariela. (2007). A propósito del velo societario. En VOX JURIS 14 – Crónicas de la Facultad. Universidad de San Martín de Porres. Edición No 14. Pág. 129. DE ÁNGEL YAGÜEZ, Ricardo (2005). La Doctrina del Levantamiento del Velo de la Persona Jurídica". Editora Civitas. Madrid. 2da Edición. DE CASTRO Y BRAVO, Federico. (1991). La Persona Jurídica. 2da edición, Civitas, Madrid, p. 268-269. DE SOLÁ CAÑIZARES, Felipe. (1963). Tratado de Derecho Comercial Comparado. T.III; Montaner y Simón S.A., Barcelona, p. 34. ESPINOZA ESPINOZA, Juan. (2005) Los principios contenidos en el Titulo Preliminar del Código Civil Peruano de 1984. PUCP, Lima. ESPINOZA ESPINOZA, Juan. (2006). Derecho de las Personas. 5o Edición, Editorial Rodhas. ECHAÍZ MORENO, DANIEL. (2001). Allanamiento de la Personalidad Jurídica y Vinculación Empresarial Subordinadas En Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia, Tomo 29. Gaceta Jurídica. ECHAIZ MORENO, Daniel. (2000). Los grupos de empresas en el Perú. Análisis y propuestas para una legislación integral. En: Gaceta Jurídica. Lima, Gaceta Jurídica Editores, Tomo 82-B. ELIAS, Enrique. (2001). Derecho Societario Peruano – La Ley General de Sociedades. Editora Normas Legales S.A.C. Trujillo – Perú. FERNADEZ SESSAREGO, Carlos. (2002). La mentira ¿es sujeto de derecho? En Revista Legal Express – Publicación Mensual de Gaceta Jurídica. Año 2, No 24. FERNANDEZ SESSAREGO, Carlos. (2001). Apuntes sobre el abuso de la personalidad jurídica. En Advocatus. No 4, Lima. GUERRA CERRÓN J. María Elena. (2010). La regulación de las personas jurídicas y la realidad económica-social. En Actualidad Jurídica – Información especializada para 124 Citado por CASANOVA CLAROS, Mariela. Op. Cit. Pág. 138 366 abogados y jueces. Tomo 200. Gaceta Jurídica. GUERRA CERRON, Jesús María Elena. (2007). Levantamiento del velo societario y los derechos, deberes y responsabilidades de la sociedad anónima. Tesis para optar el grado académico de Doctor en Derecho y Ciencia Política. Lima, Perú. GUTIERREZ CAMACHO, Walter. (1999). El levantamiento del velo societario (I). En: Estudios societarios & Ley General de Sociedades. Lima, Gaceta Jurídica Editores. HUNDSKOPF EXEBIO, Oswaldo. (2009). Manual de Derecho Societario. Editara Jurídica Grijley. Primera Edición. Lima. 2007. HUNDSKOPF EXEBIO, Oswaldo. (2009). Aplicación de la figura del levantamiento del velo societario. En Diálogo con la Jurisprudencia. Gaceta Jurídica. Vol. 14, No 126. MISPIRETA GALVEZ, Carlos A. (2001). Nuevas Tendencias en el Derecho Mercantil: Algunos Alcances Sobre la Doctrina del Levantamiento del Velo, De Iure, Año III, N° 3, Universidad de Lima, p. 194. RUIZ TORRES, Gustavo. (2006). El allanamiento de la personalidad jurídica (o el levantamiento del velo societario por abuso de la personalidad jurídica). En Revista Jurídica Magistri et Doctores No 3. UNMSM – Facultad de Derecho y Ciencia Política (Unidad de Post Grado), Año VII. Lima. SEOANE, Mario. (2005). Capítulo XIII, La desestimación de la personalidad jurídica. En Personas Jurídicas, principios generales y su regulación en la legislación peruana. Editora Jurídica Grijley, Lima. TORRES VÁSQUEZ, Aníbal. (2001). Acto Jurídico. 2a Edición. Editorial Idemsa. Lima. 367 EL CONTROL INTERNO. Juvenal Mariluz Veramendi, PRESENTACION El Control Interno es una expresión que se utiliza para describir todas las medidas adoptadas por la Gerencia de las empresas o negocios o por los administradores y funcionarios que permitan dirigir y controlar con eficiencia, eficacia, economía y transparencia las operaciones de las organizaciones. PALABRAS CLAVES Control Interno-Eficacia-Efectividad-Sistema de control interno .Confiabilidad El Control Interno es una expresión que se utiliza para describir todas las medidas adoptadas por la Gerencia de las empresas o negocios o por los administradores y funcionarios que permitan dirigir y controlar con eficiencia, eficacia, economía y transparencia las operaciones de las organizaciones. La implantación, el desarrollo y el fortalecimiento del Sistema de Control Interno en las Organizaciones es responsabilidad no solamente de las máximas autoridades sino de todo el conjunto de personas que dirigen, controlan y gestionan. Cada Entidad es responsable de establecer sus propias medidas que le ayuden al logro de operaciones eficientes, eficaces y económicas. Las administraciones a través de sus actuaciones, comprometen intereses y patrimonios que no son personales, sino que pertenece a las Organizaciones en las cuales prestan servicios y deben rendir cuenta. 368 El uso inadecuado del patrimonio público o privado no proviene sólo de la ilegalidad de la inversión, también se deriva de su inconveniencia en su adquisición. Así, la falta de una adecuada planeación o programación, en muchos casos produce gastos inútiles, aunque los procedimientos hayan sido sean legales. 1. DEFINICIONES DEL CONTROL INTERNO. "Es un proceso realizado por la junta de directores, los administradores y otro personal de la entidad, diseñado para proporcionar seguridad razonable respecto del logro de objetivos en las siguientes categorías: i) Efectividad y eficiencia de las operaciones, ii) Confiabilidad de la información financiera, y iii) Cumplimiento de las leyes y regulaciones aplicables. (Claros Cohaila 2012: 24-25). "Se entiende por Control Interno el conjunto de planes, métodos y procedimientos adoptados por una organización, con el fin de asegurar que los activos estén debidamente protegidos, que los registros contables son fidedignos y que la actividad de la entidad se desarrolla eficazmente de acuerdo con las políticas trazadas por la gerencia, en atención a las metas y objetivos previstos" (Cepeda 1997: 3-4) El control Interno es definido de maneras diferentes y por consiguiente aplicado en formas distintas. Ese es, posiblemente, su mayor dificultad inherente. Gest ión de clien tes Tien das Trad ionc ales Gran des Cad enas Can al Rest aura ción Can al Con veni enci a Qué ? esCONTROL INTERNO Gestión de Operaciones 369 En la búsqueda de soluciones a ello, se ha intentado recoger en una sola definición los distintos elementos comunes que permiten alcanzar consenso sobre el particular. De esos esfuerzos, el que más éxito y reconocimiento internacional ha tenido es COSO, si bien hay otras alternativas entre las cuales se destacan Turnbull (Reino Unido) y CoCo ( Canadá) Turnbull, se focaliza mas en el gobierno corporativo y en las estructuras duales de toma de decisiones que son propias del Reino Unido y de algunos otros países de la Unión Europea. CoCo, aborda el control en un sentido mas amplio y se centra en las personas, por lo cual enfatiza el auto-control y la auto-evaluación. (Mantilla 2011-3). Tienen en común que lo importante es asegurar, de manera razonable, el logro de los objetivos que la organización se propone cumplir Por lo anteriormente expuesto podemos definir que el Control Interno: Es el proceso integrado a las operaciones efectuado por la dirección y el personal de una entidad para proporcionar seguridad razonable y lograr confiabilidad de la información, eficiencia, eficacia, economía, transparencia en las operaciones y la calidad en los servicios, cumpliendo las leyes y reglamentos, así como las políticas establecidas en el control de los recursos a disposición de la entidad. 4 3 OPTIMO Efectividad del diseño y de la CONFIABLE operación 2 1 Insuficiente No confiable Extensión de documentación 370 2. Objetivos de Control Interno Gubernamental En 1992, el Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway CommissionCOSO publicó el Sistema Integrado de Control Interno, un informe que establece una definición común de control interno y proporciona un estándar mediante el cual las organizaciones pueden evaluar y mejorar sus sistemas de control Fue adoptado por el sector público y privado en USA, por el Banco Mundial y el BID, y se extiende rápidamente por todo Latino América. Estas directrices fueron instituidas con el propósito de fortalecer la gestión financiera en el sector público, mediante la implementación de controles internos efectivos. Hacia fines de Septiembre de 2004, como respuesta a una serie de escándalos, e irregularidades que provocaron pérdidas importante a inversionistas, empleados y otros grupos de interés, nuevamente el Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, publicó el Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework (COSO II) y sus aplicaciones técnicas asociadas, el cual amplía el concepto de control interno, con la mejora de la identificación, evaluación y gestión integral de riesgo. Según lo señalado en el Informe COSO, los principales objetivos del Control Interno son:  Eficacia y eficiencia de las operaciones.  Confiabilidad de la Información Financ iera.  Cumplimiento con Leyes y regulaciones Asimismo, la Ley No 28716 – Ley de Control Interno de las Entidades del Estado (Ley-2006) que se dio con el propósito de cautelar y fortalecer los sistemas administrativos y operativos con acciones y actividades de control previo, simultáneo y posterior en su artículo 4o señala que las entidades del Estado implantan obligatoriamente sistemas de control interno en sus procesos, actividades, recursos, operaciones y actos institucionales orientando su ejecución al cumplimiento de los objetivos siguientes:  Promover la eficiencia, eficacia, transparencia y economía en las operaciones, así como la calidad de los servicios públicos que presta. 371  Cuidar y resguardar los recursos y bienes del Estado contra cualquier forma de pérdida, deterioro, uso indebido y actos ilegales  Cumplir la normatividad aplicable a en la entidad  Garantizar la confiabilidad y oportunidad de la información.  Fomentar e impulsar la práctica de valores institucionales  Promover el cumplimiento de los funcionarios o servidores públicos de rendir cuentas por los fondos y bienes a su cargo. Las entidades públicas deben ser eficaces y eficientes. Esto quiere decir que ellas deben actuar y obtener resultados en un todo consistente con sus fines y objetivos y sus funciones y lograr el mayor desarrollo con la menor cantidad posible de recursos (humanos, tecnológicos, físicos y financieros) entendiendo que las entidades del Estado están obligadas a obtener la máxima productividad de los recursos que la Nación les ha confiado. 3. SISTEMA DE CONTROL INTERNO El sistema de control interno es ante todo un instrumento de gestión que contribuye al control de legalidad, de gestión y de resultados. El sistema de control interno funciona adecuadamente si provee razonable seguridad del logro de los objetivos institucionales de una organización. En particular referido a: 1. Eficiencia y Eficacia de las operaciones de la entidad; 2. Confiabilidad de la información financiera y de otro orden y 3. Cabal cumplimiento de las leyes, normas, estatutos y regulaciones que cobijan a la entidad en cuestión. El sistema de control interno forma parte de los sistemas financieros, presupuestarios, contables, administrativos y operativos del organismo o entidad y no puede vérsele como un área independiente o especializada. La máxima autoridad jerárquica de cada organismo o entidad debe establecer, mantener y perfeccionar el sistema de control interno, y en general vigilar su efectivo funcionamiento. 372 4. ESTRUCTURA DEL CONTROL INTERNO La estructura de Control Interno incluye cinco categorías de políticas y procedimientos que la dirección diseña e instrumenta para proporcionar garantías razonables que se alcanzarán los objetivos de control de la administración en la prevención o detección de errores importantes. El Informe COSO identifica cinco elementos de Control Interno, que se relacionan entre sí: 1. Ambiente de Control.Marca el comportamiento en una organización 2. Evaluación de Riesgos.Identifica y evalúa riesgos para alcanzar los objetivos de trabajo, 3. Actividades de Control Gerencial.Normas y Procedimientos que tiende a asegurar que se cumplan las directrices y políticas de la Dirección 4. Información y Comunicación.Sistemas que permiten que el personal de la entidad capte e intercambie la información requerida para desarrollar, gestionar y controlar sus operaciones 5. Supervisión.Evalúa la calidad del control interno en el tiempo 2. Evaluación de Riesgos 3. Act. De Control Gerencial 4 Información y Comunicación 5. Supervisión 1. Ambiente de Control 373 5. IMPLEMENTACIÓN DEL CONTROL INTERNO. El control interno es un proceso que se hace efectivo con la activa participación de todas las personas en la organización, incluida el Titular de la institución y/o el Directorio. Es también un mecanismo de apoyo gerencial, orientado hacia una meta o un fin, pero no es un objetivo o un fin en sí mismo. La dirección y el resto del personal serán los encargados de ejecutar el Control Interno; por lo que el máximo responsable del diseño del sistema es el director de la entidad y no otro directivo de menor jerarquía y son responsables de su implementación y supervisión todos los directivos a cualesquiera de los niveles según la estructura organizativa de la misma. Es indispensable que los trabajadores se sientan copartícipes del sistema que se diseñe y cada uno sepa cómo tributa al Control Interno mediante sus responsabilidades y los medios que posee para cumplirlas. Este objetivo se puede lograr a través de un eficiente programa de información y capacitación a todo el personal sobre la implementación del control interno en la Entidad. El control interno se diseña y establece institucionalmente teniendo en cuenta las responsabilidades de dirección, administración y supervisión de sus componentes funcionales para lo cual es su estructura se preverán niveles de control estratégico, operativos y de evaluación. 6. LIMITACIONES INHERENTES DEL CONTROL INTERNO. Una estructura de control interno no puede considerarse como totalmente eficaz, independiente del cuidado que se tenga en su diseño e instrumentación. Aun cuando la gerencia de las organizaciones desarrolla un sistema ideal, su eficacia depende de la competencia y confiabilidad de las personas que lo utilicen. Ejemplo: Se dispone el conteo del inventario y se requieren dos empleados para hacer el conteo cada uno por su lado. Si ninguno de los empelados entiende las 374 instrucciones o si ambos no tienen cuidado al hacer el conteo del inventario, probablemente estará equivocado. Podría darse el caso que la dirección instruya a un empleado para que aumente el conteo a fin de mejorar las ganancias reportadas. De igual forma, los empleados podrían decidir exagerar las cuentas en forma intencional a fin de cubrir una pérdida habida. Debido a estas limitaciones inherentes de los controles, los auditores no tienen una garantía razonable de su eficacia, siempre va existir cierto nivel de riesgo de control, lo cual debe tratarse de disminuir. Referencia Bibliográfica: 1. Claros Cohaila Roberto, León Llerena, Oscar (2012), "El Control Interno, como Herramienta de Gestión y Evaluación". Lima, Instituto Pacífico . 2. Cepeda Alonso, Alfonso (1997) "Auditoría y Control Interno" Santafé de Bogotá. McGRAW-HILL INTERAMERICANA S.A. 3. Mantilla Blanco, Samuel Alberto (2011) "Auditoria del Control Interno". Bogotá, ECOE. 4. Ley No 28716 – Ley de Control Interno de las Entidades del Estado, de fecha 17 de abril 2006. Docente: Juvenal Mariluz Veramendi, Contador Público Colegiado Mat. 9827, Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, con Grado Académico de Maestro en Contabilidad – Mención Auditoría. Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Actualmente Jefe del Organo de Control Institucional de la Empresa Municipal Inmobiliaria de Lima – EMILIMA S.A. [email protected] – Cel. 979598369. Agosto, 2013. 375 PROGRAMA JÓVENES LÍDERES HACIA UN FUTURO MEJOR DEL MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO REDUCCIÓN DE LA INSEGURIDAD CIUDADANA TRANSFORMANDO ADOLESCENTES Y JÓVENES INFRACTORES EN JÓVENES LÍDERES Dra. Lina Dorita Loayza Alfaro*126 1. RESUMEN: El Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor forma parte de la política de persecución estratégica e inteligente al delito que emprende el Ministerio Público, Fiscalía de la Nación del Perú. Acompaña en su proceso de cambio a adolescentes y jóvenes infractores o en inminente riesgo de comisión de ilícito penales judicializados o no así como integrantes de grupos de violencia juvenil, en un proceso que implica comprender las consecuencias de una conducta ilícita, reorientarse en valores, reparar el daño causado e insertarse positivamente en la sociedad. Mediante una atención integral, los participantes comprenden la necesidad de cambio. Reciben orientación en valores, asesoramiento legal y asistencia psicológica, facilitándoles también acceso a programas de reparación del daño, educación, y capacitación técnica. Este proceso articulado involucra la familia, vecinos y autoridades del lugar, quienes se convierten en actores estratégicos del cambio positivo. Este Programa se aplica en zonas de alta incidencia de inseguridad ciudadana del Perú identificados por el Ministerio Público, a la fecha lo conducen un promedio de 137 fiscales en las especialidades de familia y prevención del delito de diferentes distritos del país, de manera conjunta con un equipo multidisciplinario e intersectorial que contribuye a reducir los factores de riesgo. Ha logrado erradicar o minimizar la delincuencia juvenil y 126*Dra. en Derecho, docente de la Escuela de Post Grado de la UIGV, Fiscal Superior de Lima y Coordinadora Nacional del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor del Ministerio Público. Autora de El Derecho, la Prensa y las Comunicaciones em el Perú y Jóvenes líderes: una propuesta del Ministerio Público para la prevención de delitos entre otros libros y artículos.E-mail: [email protected] 376 pandillaje en cerca de 400 lugares de participación. Se inició el año 2008 con un piloto al sur de Lima, y a partir del 2010 se expandió al país. Logró la participación voluntaria de 10,162 integrantes en períodos de hasta dos años, de los cuales el 89.7% abandonó el actuar ilícito y adquirió habilidades técnicas para trabajar. Mediante esta práctica, el fiscal innovó su tradicional respuesta punitiva al delito, pasando de ser un mero inquisidor de gabinete procesal penal a aplicar además estrategias de prevención y participación comunitaria con organización multisectorial articulada. Esta práctica ha sido reconocida como una experiencia exitosa en materia de prevención del delito y la violencia juvenil, lo cual se refleja en haber sido seleccionado como finalista en concursos nacionales de Buenas Prácticas de Gobierno organizado por la Defensoría del Pueblo y la ONG Ciudadanos al Día, así como declaraciones de autoridades como el Presidente del Consejo de Ministros y la inclusión del Programa en el Plan de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia Social 2012 y en el Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana 2013-2018. En cuarto lugar, la metodología de intervención y sus principales resultados fueron recopilados en un libro publicado en el año 2012, mientras que su implementación fue difundida a través de artículos publicados en prensa escrita y de reportajes radiales y televisivos. Finalmente, los procesos documentados del Programa han sido digitalizados y se encuentran disponibles en su página web con la finalidad de que otras instituciones públicas y privadas repliquen la práctica. C. EXPLICACIÓN DE LA PRÁCTICA 11. PROBLEMÁTICA Y SITUACIÓN PREVIA. La elevada incidencia de infracciones a la ley penal y delitos cometidos por adolescentes y jóvenes constituye una preocupación importante de la población en materia de seguridad ciudadana. Del mismo modo, la seguridad de las personas se ve amenazada por los actos de violencia cometidos por las pandillas. Frente a esta situación, según investigaciones sostenidas, el sistema de justicia penal, aún en países avanzados, no necesariamente logra reducir el número de delitos e infracciones a la ley penal, ya que la aplicación de las penas no siempre consigue un efecto disuasorio respecto de la comisión de dichas conductas ilícitas. En lugar de ello, el número de delitos, faltas e infracciones a la ley penal puede reducirse logrando actitudes de responsabilidad en los adolescentes y jóvenes infractores y la reparación posible de los daños sufridos a través de programas y métodos distintos del proceso judicial de responsabilidad penal. En este sentido, la solución preventiva y restaurativa constituye una solución adecuada al caso concreto aunque no implique necesariamente la imposición de una sanción penal mediante un proceso judicial. Una característica esencial de una política integral de seguridad y convivencia ciudadana es aquella que comprenda un amplio espectro de acciones que va desde el nivel preventivo hasta los niveles legítimos de coerción de un Estado de Derecho, frente a hechos que afectan la convivencia y la seguridad de las personas. Este cambio de política pública no implica la aplicación exclusiva de un tipo de acción (prevención), sino que la prevención y el control se ubican en un continuo, donde el castigo efectivo (una solución dura) es sólo uno de los factores disuasivos de ciertos tipos de conducta violenta futura (combatir la impunidad como medio de prevención). Cabe destacar que una política integral de seguridad y convivencia ciudadana con énfasis en prevención, requiere un abordaje desde el ámbito local que identifique a nivel micro: (i) las causas 377 del problema, (ii) establezca una jerarquía de las intervenciones con claras responsabilidades entre los diferentes actores del proceso de cambio, (iii) señale los líderes comunitarios y (iv) defina las metas y resultados esperados. Conforme a evidencias en países industrializados, la prevención ofrece resultados inmediatos, no sólo en el largo plazo y resulta en ser más eficiente que las acciones de control127. En este propósito, el Ministerio Público peruano aplica el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor aun cuando ninguna institución pública había desarrollado iniciativas sostenibles, de alcance nacional y articuladas dirigidas a prevenir que los adolescentes y jóvenes realicen hechos ilícitos o violentos. Asimismo, existían muy pocos esfuerzos por parte de las instituciones públicas o privadas para apoyar la reinserción social de los adolescentes y jóvenes que ya habían cometido infracciones a la ley penal, faltas o delitos, judicializados o no. 12. EXPLICACIÓN DE LA PRÁCTICA a. DESCRIPCIÓN A través del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor, el Ministerio Público realiza un acercamiento a adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo inminente o que comete infracciones, faltas o delitos y se les invita a participar en actividades de sensibilización e integración, así como también a las de orientación en valores, formación personal e individual, educación, reparación del daño causado y capacitación técnica para su posterior inserción en el mercado ocupacional. Esto se realiza mediante una intervención articulada con otras instituciones del Estado involucradas en la atención integral del servicio. La aplicación de este Programa es concordante con el enfoque de persecución estratégica del delito del Ministerio Público. El Programa trabaja en un enfoque preventivo de tipo social, ya que busca disminuir el efecto de los factores de riesgo que influyen en la conducta de los adolescentes y jóvenes en las zonas de intervención (violencia familiar, descuido o abandono parental, violencia escolar, pandillaje, entre otros) para evitar que cometan delitos, faltas e infracciones a la ley penal, con lo cual se contribuye a mejorar el nivel de seguridad ciudadana en las zonas de intervención y se favorece la inclusión de los participantes. Durante un período máximo de 2 años, el Programa propicia en el participante la generación de un cambio actitudinal y el desarrollo de nuevos hábitos de respeto a las normas mediante su participación frecuente en actividades positivas programadas de manera semanal. El Programa ha determinado un cambio sustancial en el rol del fiscal peruano, quien supera su tradicional respuesta punitiva al delito, de mero inquisidor de gabinete, y ahora además aplica estrategias de prevención y participación comunitaria activa, coordina y supervisa la ejecución de las actividades realizadas en favor de los adolescentes y jóvenes que la provocan, así como fomenta la creación de alianzas con la comunidad y con otras instituciones para que los participantes cuenten con el apoyo que requieren en su proceso de desarrollo positivo. Asimismo, cabe resaltar que mediante esta práctica el Ministerio Público crea redes (alianzas interinstitucionales) con otras entidades públicas y privadas a fin de realizar acciones preventivas conjuntas frente a la violencia juvenil y la delincuencia, en el marco de la promoción de la seguridad ciudadana. b. OBJETIVOS 127 Greenwood, P. "Diverting Children from a Life of Crime: What are the Costs and Benefits". National Crime Prevention Council of Canada (1996). "Found Investment: Preventing Crime and Victimization. UK's Home Office (2000). "The Economic and Social Cost of Crime". Home Office Research Study 217. Foundation Docteur Philippe-Pinel (2004). "The Key to Safer Municipalities". BID. Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects. 2002 p 4 BID. 378 Objetivo general: Reducir la incidencia de infracciones a la ley penal, faltas y delitos por parte de adolescentes y jóvenes mediante la promoción de su desarrollo personal y social. Objetivos específicos: a) Promover la orientación de los adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo que les permita restablecer sus vínculos con la comunidad. b) Promover la formación y capacitación técnica de los adolescentes y jóvenes que les permita incorporarse a la sociedad como actores productivos. c) Fomentar el compromiso de las familias de los adolescentes y jóvenes en su proceso de desarrollo personal y social. d) Facilitar el acceso de los adolescentes y jóvenes a servicios públicos y privados que le permitan desarrollarse en el aspecto personal y social. c. GRUPO DE BENEFICIARIOS La práctica pretende beneficiar directamente a adolescentes y jóvenes (hombres y mujeres de 13 a 21 años de edad) en inminente riesgo o inicios de comisión de delitos, faltas e infracciones a la ley penal judicializados o no128 que viven en las zonas de intervención identificadas por el Ministerio Público o realizan sus actividades mayormente en ellas. Esta población presenta las siguientes características:  Cometen o han cometido delitos, faltas o infracciones a la ley penal de poca gravedad, ya sea que dichas conductas hayan sido judicializadas o no.  Integran pandillas o grupos violentos. También puede darse el caso que sus amigos o vecinos los integren.  Tienen adicciones o frecuentan amigos adictos.  Han abandonado los estudios.  Son derivados por fiscales penales o de familia (pueden o no calificar para la aplicación de la remisión fiscal).  Son derivados por los juzgados (para aplicación de medidas socioeducativas). Los beneficiarios directos de esta práctica pertenecen a una población vulnerable, no solamente debido a que viven en zonas en situación de pobreza y con alta incidencia delictiva, sino también debido a que un grupo importante de ellos (aquellos que tienen entre 13 y 17 años) son menores de edad. En tal sentido, la participación de los adolescentes y jóvenes en el Programa contribuye a su inserción en la comunidad con habilidades que les permiten convertirse en agentes productivos, lo cual es concordante con las políticas estatales de inclusión social. Los beneficiarios indirectos de Programa son los familiares responsables de los participantes, así como sus vecinos y amigos, toda vez que ellos se ven afectados por la violencia juvenil y el pandillaje en su comunidad. 128 Se realiza esta precisión debido a que no todas las conductas ilícitas cometidas llegan al conocimiento de las autoridades policiales y judiciales. 379 d. PLAZOS ETAPA MES Y AÑO 1) Diseño Plan piloto Agosto – Diciembre 2008 2) Implementación 2.1) Validación de la práctica Enero – Diciembre 2009 2.2) Institucionalización de la práctica 2.2.1) Procedimiento de intervención 2.2.2) Medidas adoptadas por la Fiscalía de la Nación para fortalecer el Programa 2.2.3) Medidas institucionales adoptadas para fortalecer al Programa Enero 2010 – a la fecha 2.3) Evaluación Año 2012 – a la fecha Duración de la práctica: La práctica tiene carácter permanente debido a que se encuentra integrada a la política institucional de persecución estratégica del delito del Ministerio Público. e. MEDIDAS ADOPTADAS 1) Diseño: Plan piloto En el segundo semestre de 2008 en el distrito de Villa El Salvador (distrito fiscal de Lima Sur) se realizaron charlas de orientación y talleres con las juntas vecinales de la zona, como parte de un plan piloto de prevención del delito. A través de estas actividades se recogió la preocupación de los pobladores respecto de la delincuencia juvenil y el enfrentamiento entre pandillas. Seguidamente se realizaron conversaciones con la Municipalidad del distrito y la comisaría para realizar una labor conjunta en materia de prevención de la violencia juvenil. Se dialogó con 40 líderes de las pandillas más violentas de la zona y se diseñó un programa con actividades de apoyo, reinserción social y capacitación para el trabajo. De esa manera se logró que los actos de violencia juvenil se redujeran de 45% a 15% en la zona, según el reporte de las denuncias registradas por la comisaría de Villa El Salvador. 2) Implementación: 2.1) Validación de la práctica A fines del año 2009 el Ministerio Público repitió la experiencia realizada en Villa el Salvador en los distritos de Villa María del Triunfo, Huaycán, San Juan de Miraflores y Rímac. En ese contexto se realizó, de manera conjunta con el Observatorio de Criminalidad del Ministerio Público, una encuesta a jóvenes de estos 4 distritos a fin de identificar los factores que inciden respecto del ingreso, permanencia y retiro de las pandillas. Al año siguiente se realizó un diagnóstico en estas mismas zonas, el cual tuvo como objetivo identificar los factores de riesgo que afectan a los adolescentes y jóvenes que viven en las zonas de intervención, para lo cual se empleó el denominado "Cuestionario E". 380 2.2) Institucionalización de la práctica 2.2.1) Procedimiento de intervención Sobre la base de la experiencia adquirida en las intervenciones realizadas en los años 2009 y 2010, el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor ha consolidado una metodología de trabajo que comprende la realización de las siguientes actividades durante los años 2011, 2012 y 2013: 1. Identificación de la zona: Se realiza un diagnóstico general para identificar una zona de intervención, para lo cual se obtiene información de diversas fuentes referida a los índices de inseguridad ciudadana y violencia juvenil. 2. Sensibilización a autoridades, vecinos y potenciales beneficiarios: Se realizan reuniones de sensibilización con los actores clave con la finalidad de sensibilizarlos y comprometer su participación en las actividades que se desarrollarán con los adolescentes y jóvenes. 3. Focalización de la intervención: Se elabora un informe multidisciplinario sobre las características específicas de la zona de intervención, teniendo en cuenta la incidencia de violencia juvenil y los grupos juveniles existentes en ella. Asimismo se contacta a las autoridades y actores clave para organizar la red de intervención en dicha zona. 4. Sensibilización y empadronamiento: Se convoca a los adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo de la zona, así como a sus familiares y amigos, a fin de sensibilizarlos respecto de la necesidad de orientar sus acciones hacia objetivos positivos que le permitan alcanzar una mejor calidad de vida. Seguidamente se empadrona a aquellos que cuentan con el perfil y desean incorporarse al Programa. 5. Actividades en favor de los participantes: Se elabora un plan de acción basado en sus carencias y necesidades, el cual contempla la realización de las siguientes actividades: 1. Consejería fiscal: Los fiscales brindan información a los participantes sobre los peligros y consecuencias legales de las conductas ilícitas. 2. Asistencia legal: Se contacta con abogados de oficio, quienes asesoran a los participantes respecto de procesos judiciales que hubiesen iniciado. 3. Talleres formativos: Se realizan talleres de formación en deberes y derechos, cultura de valores, habilidades manuales, esparcimiento, actividades deportivas y recreativas con el fin de contribuir al desarrollo personal y social de los participantes. También se realizan asistencias y orientaciones espirituales. 4. Asistencia psicológica: Se elaboran diagnósticos y evaluaciones para determinar el nivel de afectación psicológica y social de los beneficiarios. Sobre la base de esta información se realiza una intervención supervisada por especialistas con el objetivo de promover el desarrollo de habilidades y el liderazgo positivo. 5. Actividades de reparación y reconciliación con la comunidad: Se impulsa la participación de los beneficiarios en actividades orientadas a reparar los daños que ocasionaron a la comunidad con su conducta violenta (reforestación de parques y jardines, pintado de paredes, colaboración en albergues) y a la víctima en tanto sea posible. 6. Derivaciones, apoyo y seguimiento en la reinserción educativa y capacitación técnica: Se brindan facilidades al beneficiario para que se incorpore al sistema educativo escolarizado o no escolarizado (o para su reincorporación al mismo, en caso de haber abandonado sus estudios), así como a un sistema de capacitación técnica para el trabajo. 7. Taller de manualidades productivas: Los beneficiarios participan en talleres de terapia ocupacional, tales como pintura, bisutería o elaboración de productos con material de reciclaje, con la finalidad de promover el desarrollo de habilidades productivas para la generación de ingresos ilícitos. 8. Acceso a servicios públicos y privados: Se facilita el acceso de los beneficiarios a servicios que puedan fortalecer su desarrollo personal y social. Para ello se realizan acuerdos con instituciones públicas como RENIEC, ministerios, municipalidades, organizaciones no gubernamentales, iglesias, clubes deportivos y culturales. 6. Actividades en favor de los familiares de los beneficiarios 381 1. Acercamiento inicial a las familias de los beneficiarios: Se contacta a los familiares del beneficiario para que contribuyan con la sostenibilidad de las acciones del programa, salvo que su entorno familiar sea un factor adverso a su desarrollo, en cuyo caso se identifican otros actores sociales que puedan brindar el apoyo requerido. 2. Orientación y seguimiento familiar: Se brinda orientación especializada a los familiares más cercanos de cada beneficiario, empleando el módulo para el trabajo con las familias que forma parte de los instrumentos de gestión del Programa. 2.2.2) Medidas adoptadas por la Fiscalía de la Nación para fortalecer el programa  En el año 2010 la Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación N° 144-2010-MP-FN, (Anexo N° 29) estableció la persecución estratégica del delito como una política institucional del Ministerio Público, motivo por el cual la aplicación del Programa Jóvenes Líderes hacia un futuro mejor se extendió a nivel nacional y se designó a los fiscales de las especialidades de familia, prevención del delito y mixtos como responsables de implementar las actividades del Programa en los 32 distritos fiscales. Ese mismo año se aprobó la Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación N° 422-2010MP-FN, mediante la cual se designó a la Fiscal Superior Coordinadora del Programa.  En el año 2011 se aprobó la Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación N° 1978-2011-MP-FN, la cual aprueba la Directiva 006-2011-MP-FN que establece normas y mecanismos que permiten regular el uso e implementación de la Carpeta Fiscal del Programa, con la finalidad de contar con un registro general de las actuaciones fiscales en la persecución estratégica del delito en relación con los participantes.  Ese mismo año la Fiscalía de la Nación aprobó el documento denominado "Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor. Lineamientos para su aplicación", el cual incluye el marco lógico del Programa y lo vincula con políticas generales de gobierno referidas a la seguridad ciudadana y el bienestar de la adolescencia y juventud.  En el año 2012 se aprobó la Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación N° 2856-2012-MP-FN, la cual articula las acciones de prevención del delito del Ministerio Público – entre ellas el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor en los lugares donde se han realizado las jornadas de acercamiento a la población y la identificación de las zonas de mayor incidencia delictiva ("puntos calientes").  En el año 2013 se aprobó la Resolución de la Fiscalía de la Nación No 741-2013-MP-FN, la cual estableció la conformación de un equipo técnico encargado de estructurar la articulación de la estrategia de acción del Ministerio Público en materia de prevención del delito, con la finalidad de incorporar indicadores de eficacia que reflejen resultados concretos en la aplicación de las acciones directas de persecución estratégica del delito, entre ellas el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor. 2.2.3) Medidas institucionales para fortalecer el programa A partir del año 2010 el Ministerio Público ha incorporado una partida presupuestal en el sistema de Presupuesto por Resultados a fin de financiar las actividades realizadas en el marco del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor (Anexo N° 35). Asimismo, a partir del año 2011 se elaboraron los siguientes instrumentos de gestión del Programa:  Guía referencial de actividades: sirve para la elaboración de los planes a nivel de cada zona.  Guía para la intervención psicológica: sirve para que los fiscales puedan contar con la temática y el apoyo de especialistas en materia psicológica a fin de poner en práctica el enfoque de cambio de conducta de los adolescentes y jóvenes. 382  Guía referencial de actividades para la sede central: contiene actividades modelo que se realizan en la sede central del Ministerio Público y sirven de referencia para ser replicadas por los fiscales en cada zona de intervención a nivel nacional.  Guía de recursos y colaboradores: permite a los responsables del Programa conocer los recursos disponibles y los profesionales e instituciones con los que deben articular para ejecutar sus acciones de forma efectiva.  Módulo y guía referencial para el trabajo con familias: la aplicación de esta guía tiene la finalidad de garantizar un soporte familiar, fortaleciendo los vínculos de los adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo con sus familias. Contienen temas y estrategias de intervención.  Procedimiento para la elaboración de diagnósticos: este documento detalla los procesos para identificar la zona de intervención y recoger datos que permitan aplicar estrategias focalizadas conforme a la problemática de cada zona de intervención. 2.3) Evaluación En esta etapa se procede a verificar los resultados del programa, principalmente el alejamiento del riesgo infractor o delictivo respecto de los participantes, la mejora en su calidad de vida y la disminución de la inseguridad ciudadana en la zona. Ello se realiza a través de las siguientes formas: a) Aplicación de cuestionario de línea de base: se aplica al inicio de la intervención a cada uno de los adolescentes y jóvenes, y de manera complementaria a alguno de sus familiares, vecinos y actores clave de la comunidad, con la finalidad de recoger el estado inicial de los indicadores referidos al efecto e impacto del programa. b) Programación de actividades: Se emplea una ficha de planificación y monitoreo semanal con el fin de realizar el seguimiento a las acciones programadas por cada fiscalía que aplica el programa. c) Seguimiento y evaluación personalizada: Cada fiscalía mide trimestralmente el progreso de los participantes mediante un formato individual que es llenado con el apoyo de los especialistas. d) Informe trimestral: Las fiscalías que ejecutan el programa llenan trimestralmente un formato electrónico que contiene datos de todas las actividades y resultados del programa. e) Grupos focales: Se realizan con la participación de profesionales externos con la finalidad de obtener información cuantitativa y cualitativa de un grupo representativo de los participantes, elegidos de forma aleatoria. Los datos obtenidos sirven para la evaluación del programa. f) Recojo de testimonios por parte del Observatorio de Criminalidad del Ministerio Público: El Observatorio de Criminalidad ha realizado el mapeo de diversas zonas de alta incidencia de delitos y violencia a nivel nacional, con el fin de ejecutar en ellas las acciones de persecución estratégica del delito. En dichos lugares el equipo técnico del Observatorio de la Criminalidad recogió los testimonios de participantes del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor de cinco zonas, quienes ya no están involucrados en conductas ilícitas gracias al Programa. g) Informes de la Policía Nacional del Perú y gobiernos locales: A través de estos informes se corrobora que los participantes del programa no cometen infracciones a la ley penal ni participan en actos de violencia ni se registran antecedentes en su contra durante su período de participación en el Programa. 383 3. DIFICULTADES. Dificultades Internas Dificultades Externas  Insuficiente material y equipos para la realización de actividades. Acceso limitado a recursos logísticos, medios de transporte y comunicación.  Dificultad para desplazarse a ciertas zonas, principalmente aquellas zonas alejadas ubicadas en el interior del país.  Limitaciones en materia presupuestaria y dificultades en la ejecución del gasto.  Riesgo para los integrantes del Ministerio Público y la red de intervención en zonas de alta violencia y conflictividad social.  Insuficiente personal en el Ministerio Público para realizar óptimamente las acciones previstas en los lineamientos de trabajo.  Desconfianza inicial de los adolescentes y jóvenes a acogerse al programa.  Resistencia por parte de algunos fiscales a entrar en contacto directo con adolescentes infractores a la ley penal o jóvenes que delinquen.  Desarticulación y desorganización entre instituciones que trabajan con los jóvenes en riesgo.  En la fase inicial de implementación del Programa existía un insuficiente conocimiento de los fiscales respecto del tratamiento de los casos que involucran adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo.  Resistencia de ciertas instituciones y personas a realizar labores de apoyo social en favor de adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo.  Desconfianza de otras instituciones en el enfoque preventivo. 4. ALIADOS. Aliados Internos Aliados Externos Fiscalía de la Nación Gerencia General del Ministerio Público Observatorio de Criminalidad Presidentes de las Juntas de Fiscales Superiores de los 32 distritos judiciales Gerencia de Logística Gerencia de Proyectos y Cooperación Técnica Internacional Gerencia de Costos y Presupuesto por Resultados Oficina de Administración Instituto de Medicina Legal Unidad de Asistencia a Víctimas y Testigos Gerencia de Imagen Institucional Gerencia de Informática Públicos: 129 entidades, entre las cuales destacan:  Ministerio de Justicia  Ministerio de la Mujer  Ministerio de Educación  Ministerio de Trabajo  Ministerio de Agricultura  Ministerio de Salud  Ministerio de Educación  Ministerio de la Producción  Policía Nacional del Perú  Gobiernos regionales  Gobiernos locales  Universidades nacionales Privados: 53 asociaciones privadas y 50 personas a título particular  Organizaciones no gubernamentales  Empresas privadas  Iglesias cristianas  Juntas vecinales de las zonas de intervención  Comedores populares de las zonas de intervención  Academias e institutos técnicos en 384 provincias 5. RESULTADOS. a. RESULTADOS GENERALES  Incidencia en la seguridad ciudadana: El 100% de los vecinos que fueron entrevistados por el Programa durante el año 2012 indicaron que la violencia juvenil en la comunidad ha disminuido y que los adolescentes y jóvenes participantes del programa ya no están involucrados en estos actos. Algunos de sus testimonios se adjuntan al presente informe. Ello es corroborado por los informes remitidos por la Policía Nacional del Perú y gobiernos locales. A manera de ejemplo, el Mayor Comisario de la Comisaría PNP de El Porvenir (Trujillo) remitió un informe en el cual señaló que ninguno de los jóvenes que participan en el Programa registra nuevas denuncias o intervenciones policiales a la fecha.  Desarrollo de capacidades de población adolescente y juvenil en riesgo: Los participantes del Programa han adquirido conocimientos y habilidades que les han permitido generar cambios positivos en sus vidas, lo cual a la vez contribuye a su inclusión en sus comunidades como agentes de desarrollo. Los participantes se convierten en los principales difusores de la práctica, ya que mediante sus testimonios invitan a otros adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo a participar en el Programa. Los testimonios de los familiares de los participantes también resaltan el cambio positivo que han experimentado. Por ejemplo, en el distrito fiscal de Ucayali, 3 participantes ya no están en el programa desde diciembre de 2011 y durante los años 2012 y 2013 se mantuvieron alejados del riesgo ilícito y formaron sus propias actividades productivas sobre la base de la capacitación técnica recibida en el Programa. Dicha situación se observa en los diferentes lugares de intervención.  Ahorro de recursos públicos: Las actividades de carácter preventivo realizadas en el marco del Programa en favor de los participantes suponen un gasto mucho menor para el Estado que la aplicación de procesos judiciales y sanciones penales contra adolescentes o jóvenes que cometen delitos, faltas o infracciones a la ley penal. Según un estudio realizado por Terre des Hombres y Encuentros Casa de la Juventud, el Estado invierte un total de S/. 31,138.10 para imponer una medida socioeducativa a un adolescente infractor en un medio cerrado por un período de 2 años. Dichos costos incluyen los costos de atención al adolescente en los procesos previos al internamiento (costo de los recursos humanos, recursos administrativos y demás costos y gastos invertidos) más los costos y los gastos directos incurridos para cada adolescente por la entidad que lo atiende (durante la medida). En el caso del medio cerrado, estos costos y gastos están referidos a los costos de internación (que incluyen gastos de personal, alimentación, vestimenta, viáticos, materiales, inversiones en construcción, gastos de consultoría y servicios de terceros, luz, agua y comunicaciones, bienes de consumo, combustible y transporte, alquileres y arbitrios, medicamentos, entre otros)129 En contraste con ello, la inversión que se realiza para financiar la participación de cada adolescente o joven en el Programa es de aproximadamente S/. 790.00 nuevos soles anuales en un período máximo de 2 años. Se genera un menor costo debido a que se propicia la participación comunitaria, así como de instituciones públicas y privadas.  Institucionalización de la práctica: La Fiscalía de la Nación dispuso la aplicación de esta práctica a nivel nacional a partir del año 2010. Asimismo, las actividades del programa han sido incorporadas al Plan de Trabajo Institucional (PTI) del Ministerio Público correspondientes a los años 2012 y 2013 y la Oficina de Costos y Presupuesto por Resultados (PPR) ha previsto una 129 TERRE DES HOMMES y ENCUENTROS CASA DE LA JUVENTUD. Estudio y análisis sobre costo/beneficio económico y social de los modelos de justicia juvenil en el Perú. Pp. 52 53. 385 partida presupuestaria para su ejecución. Por su parte, el Fiscal de la Nación y otros representantes del Ministerio Público han destacado el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor en reuniones multisectoriales como una de las medidas más efectivas del Ministerio Público frente al pandillaje y la violencia juvenil.  Replicabilidad de la práctica: Los procesos documentados del Programa se encuentran disponibles en su página web: http://www.mpfn.gob.pe/joveneslideres/index.php con la finalidad de que otras instituciones públicas y privadas puedan replicar la práctica. Asimismo, existen otras instituciones públicas, tanto nacionales como extranjeras, que han manifestado su interés en implementar sus propios programas de apoyo a jóvenes en riesgo siguiendo el modelo del Ministerio Público. Respecto de las instituciones nacionales podemos mencionar a la Municipalidad Metropolitana de Lima, mientras que en el caso de las extranjeras, el Ministerio Público de Costa Rica está recogiendo información del Programa para aplicarlo a los adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo en su país. También se han recibido comunicaciones de organizaciones vecinales e instituciones de zonas distintas a las de intervención, quienes han tomado conocimiento del Programa y han solicitado que sea aplicado en sus distritos.  Fortalecimiento de capacidades de los integrantes del Ministerio Público: El Programa brindó capacitación a los fiscales y personal técnico del Ministerio Público y aliados con la finalidad de que cuenten con estrategias y herramientas para la prevención de la violencia juvenil, así como para que conozcan y apliquen la metodología del programa.  Incidencia en políticas interinstitucionales en materia de seguridad ciudadana: La ejecución del Programa ha sido asumida como un compromiso del Ministerio Público en el marco de los Planes Nacionales de Seguridad Ciudadana del año 2012 y del período 2013-2018. Asimismo, la Comisión Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana (CONASEC) ha solicitado a la Coordinación Nacional del Programa sugerencias respecto de los indicadores en materia de prevención de la violencia juvenil que serán empleados en la elaboración del Plan Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana 2013. Cabe destacar también que la Fiscal Superior Coordinadora del Programa es representante del Ministerio Público ante el CORESEG de Lima Metropolitana.  Creación de redes de cooperación interinstitucional: El Ministerio Público ha establecido vínculos de cooperación con 130 entidades públicas a nivel nacional (ministerios, gobiernos regionales y locales), 54 entidades privadas y 52 profesionales a fin de brindar acceso a los adolescentes y jóvenes a diversos servicios y contribuir a que su progreso se sostenga en el tiempo.  Participación de la población: Se crean redes comunitarias de soporte integradas por los familiares de los participantes y vecinos de la zona, quienes se convierten en actores clave de su proceso de mejora. Los vecinos brindan locales para la realización de las actividades, realizan la convocatoria de los participantes, entre otros. Sus testimonios demuestran que la ciudadanía se identifica y se involucra con el modelo.  Incremento de la confianza de la población en sus instituciones: La experiencia positiva de los beneficiarios en el programa, así como la participación de sus familiares y actores clave de la comunidad, han contribuido a incrementar la confianza de la ciudadanía en el Ministerio Público y las instituciones públicas y privadas que conforman la red de intervención entre la población de las zonas donde se aplica el programa.  Gestión del conocimiento sobre la práctica: A raíz de las postulaciones del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor al Premio "Buenas prácticas en gestión pública" en los años 2009 y 2011, se consideró importante sistematizar y plasmar por escrito la metodología y la experiencia adquirida en el trabajo con los adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo para facilitar su difusión y replicabilidad. Por tal motivo, en el año 2012 se publicó el libro "Jóvenes líderes hacia un 386 futuro mejor. Una propuesta del Ministerio Público para la prevención de delitos", el cual contiene la metodología de intervención del programa, las etapas de su implementación, las experiencias exitosas en el trabajo de los fiscales y sus principales resultados durante los años 2010, 2011 y parte del 2012. Este libro recoge también testimonios de los éxitos del Programa, relatados por los propios participantes, sus familiares y sus vecinos. b. RESULTADOS EXPRESADOS CON INDICADORES ESPECÍFICOS Desde el año 2008 a la fecha el Programa ha beneficiado a 10,162 adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo. En el año 2012, el Programa brindó atención a 3,142 participantes, respecto de las cuales se han obtenido los siguientes resultados específicos verificados mediante la aplicación de los instrumentos de monitoreo y evaluación: Variable Indicador 1. Prevención y reducción de actos ilícitos cometidos por adolescentes y jóvenes Indicador de impacto: El 100% de vecinos, personas claves y autoridades de la zona de intervención que fueron entrevistados durante el año 2012 indicaron que la violencia juvenil en la comunidad ha disminuido y que los adolescentes y jóvenes participantes del programa ya no están involucrados en estos actos Indicador de impacto: Se logró que el 87.4% de adolescentes y jóvenes ya no frecuente las pandillas o el entorno de violencia. Asimismo, respecto del grupo de adolescentes y jóvenes que reconoció haber cometido alguna infracción o delito, el 67.1% ya no lo cometen y el 20.3% lo cometen en menor proporción 2. Adaptación de los jóvenes a las normas sociales Indicador de efecto: El 87.4% de participantes muestra autocontrol de temperamento y comportamiento en valores, restableciendo así sus vínculos sociales. 3. Desarrollo de capacidades productivas y educativas en adolescentes y jóvenes Indicador de efecto: El 86% de adolescentes y jóvenes ha obtenido capacitación técnica para trabajar en oficios menores Indicador de efecto: El 68.4% de los adolescentes y jóvenes que habían abandonado los estudios de educación básica regular o educación no escolarizada retomaron dichos estudios 4. Participación de las familias en el desarrollo de los adolescentes y jóvenes Indicador de efecto: El 75% de familiares responsables de los participantes contactados se ha involucrado para mejorar el comportamiento de sus hijos, hermanos u otros 5. Acceso de los adolescentes y jóvenes a servicios para su desarrollo personal y social Indicador de efecto: El 96.7% de los participantes ha accedido a servicios públicos y participado en actividades de salud, identidad, educación, culturales, recreativas y deportivas 6. LECCIONES APRENDIDAS.  Respecto de la edad de los participantes, inicialmente se convocaba a adolescentes y jóvenes con edades comprendidas entre los 13 y 29 años de edad. Sin embargo, debido a la dificultad de trabajar de lograr el cambio en la conducta de los jóvenes de mayor edad, en el año 2013 se rebajó la edad máxima de los jóvenes participantes del programa a 21 años.  A inicios del año 2012 los cuestionarios empleados para obtener información de los 387 adolescentes y jóvenes fueron revisados y reformulados a fin de contar con instrumentos que permitan obtener información más precisa y datos cuantitativos.  Propiciar el contacto de los adolescentes y jóvenes con personas e instituciones ajenas al entorno de las pandillas contribuye a que se alejen de estos grupos de riesgo y desistan de realizar conductas violentas.  La coordinación entre los fiscales y el personal administrativo del Ministerio Público en cada zona de intervención ha permitido obtener resultados importantes en materia de prevención del delito y las infracciones a la ley penal por parte de adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo.  La realización de acciones conjuntas por el Ministerio Público y otras entidades públicas y privadas, así como organizaciones de la sociedad civil, permite obtener mejores resultados en materia de prevención del delito y la violencia juvenil que la ejecución de iniciativas aisladas de cada institución en esta materia.  La incorporación de indicadores cuantitativos en los Lineamientos para la aplicación del Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor facilita la medición y evaluación de los progresos alcanzados en relación con el cumplimiento de los objetivos del Programa.  El componente espiritual es transversal y muy importante en el proceso de cambio positivo de conductas, ya que permite comprender la utilidad de controlar los sentimientos y emociones, así como contar con herramientas para superar dificultades. 7. DIFUSIÓN DE LA PRÁCTICA. Se ha difundido la realización de esta práctica a través de los siguientes medios: a. Reportajes en emisoras radiales y televisivas locales regionales y nacionales, entre los cuales destaca el reportaje del programa "Chema a las 11" emitido por el canal RPP TV". b. Artículos publicados en diarios (Diario Oficial El Peruano), revistas jurídicas (revista de la Asamblea Nacional de Rectores) y libros sobre seguridad ciudadana. c. Declaraciones en reuniones interinstitucionales emitidas por el Fiscal de la Nación y por diversos fiscales a nivel nacional que participan en la implementación del Programa. d. Reportajes sobre las actividades del Programa y entrevistas a los responsables de su ejecución, los cuales fueron frecuentemente difundidos en el programa radial y televisivo "Los Fiscales" del Ministerio Público. e. Información publicada a través de medios informáticos, tales como la página web institucional: www.mpfn.gob.pe/joveneslideres, notas de prensa, avisos en Internet, correos electrónicos y Facebook. f. Libro "Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor. Una propuesta del Ministerio Público para la prevención de delitos" (2012). g. Libro "La Persecución estratégica del delito del Ministerio Público" (2012), en el cual se destaca el Programa Jóvenes líderes hacia un futuro mejor como una acción directa para la prevención de la inseguridad ciudadana en relación con adolescentes y jóvenes en riesgo. h. Artículos publicados en el Boletín del Observatorio de Criminalidad del Ministerio Público. i. Materiales publicitarios impresos, tales como brochures y volantes. 388 j. Actividades de presentación a la comunidad. 8. BIBLIOGRAFÍA 1. Béliz, Gustavo. "Una nueva generación de reformas en materia de seguridad ciudadana?". Banco 2. Interamericano de Desarrollo, Washington DC, 2007. 3. Enrique Peñaloza Quintero, Edna Sandoval Castaño, y Fabián González Sarmiento, "Descripción organizacional y procesos del Observatorio de la Violencia y la Delincuencia de Bogotá", Bogotá, octubre de 2003. Dicho informe forma parte de la evaluación de productos, efectos e impactos tempranos del Programa de Apoyo a la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana del BID. 4. Varios autores, Informe Internacional "Prevención de la Criminalidad y Seguridad Cotidiana: Tendencias y Perspectivas" (Centro Internacional de Prevención de la Criminalidad (ICPC), Canadá, 2008 5. Silvia Ramos, "Brazilian responses to violence and new forms of mediation: the case of the Grupo Cultural AfroReggae and the experience of the project "Youth and the Police", CESEC, Brasil, 2006, 6. Nathalie Alvarado y Beatriz Abizanda, "El Aporte del Enfoque de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana en los Programas de Mejoramiento de Barrios" en Eduardo Rojas, editor, "Integración Urbana: Desafíos y 7. Lecciones de los Programas de Mejoramiento de Barrios en América Latina", BID, Washington, DC, 2009. 389 "EL PRINCIPIO DE RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO POR LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA" Oscar Cubas Barrueto El artículo 139° numeral 7 de la Constitución Política del Perú regula el derecho a una indemnización, en la forma que determine la ley, por los errores judiciales en los procesos penales y por las detenciones arbitrarias, sin perjuicio de la responsabilidad a que hubiere, proclamando de ese modo el Principio de Responsabilidad del Estado por la Administración de Justicia. En el presente artículo se aborda este precepto constitucional desde un análisis comparativo con el modelo español, destacando la necesidad tanto de desarrollo legal y jurisprudencial y sobretodo la necesidad de ampliar los supuestos de responsabilidad. I. INTRODUCCION El principio de Responsabilidad de los poderes públicos consagrado en el artículo 9.3 de la Constitución Española de 1978 y en el artículo 44 de la Constitución Política del Perú, es sin duda uno de los pilares fundamentales dentro del Estado Constitucional de Derecho. En este sentido, como disgregado de éste, se puede afirmar que se encuentra también proclamado a nivel constitucional el Principio de Responsabilidad Patrimonial de la Administración de Justicia, independientemente de lo establecido en el artículo 139 numeral 7 de la Constitución Política del Perú. Se llega a esta afirmación dado que el mencionado artículo 44 consagra la obligación del Estado de garantizar la plena vigencia de los derechos humanos como deber primordial. En consecuencia, al formar parte del Estado, tanto el Ministerio Público, así como el Poder Judicial, ambos tienen la obligación de garantizar la plena vigencia de los derechos humanos, por lo que al actuar en el marco de sus competencias constitucionales y legales, deben hacer con responsabilidad. En el presente trabajo presenta un acercamiento al tema de la Responsabilidad del Estado por la Administración de Justicia, los supuestos regulados tanto en España como en Perú, destacando la necesidad del desarrollo legal en el país y la ampliación de los supuestos regulados. LA TUTELA JUDICIAL EFECTIVA COMO FUNDAMENTO DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD PATRIMONIAL DEL ESTADO Tanto la Constitución Española como la peruana prohíben la indefensión, es por eso que una de las garantías más importantes de la persona es el derecho a obtener una tutela judicial efectiva de los órganos de administración de justicia (artículo 24.1 de la Constitución Española de 1978, y 139° numeral 3 de la Constitución Política del Perú). Los órganos de administración de justicia al aplicar el derecho a un caso concreto son garantes de la legalidad. Las partes pueden defenderse de eventuales errores en el ejercicio de la Jurisdicción mediante los recursos que los ordenamientos procesales contemplen, los cuales son garantías procesales a favor del justiciable. Sin perjuicio de 390 ello, la regulación de La Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado por los "Errores Judiciales en los procesos penales y las detenciones arbitrarias", supone la aparición del Estado como garante de los daños que puedan producirse. El Tribunal Constitucional peruano ha señalado que la Norma Suprema, en su artículo 139°, establece los principios y derechos de la función jurisdiccional, consagrando en el inciso 3o la observancia del debido proceso y la tutela jurisdiccional. Es decir, garantiza al justiciable, ante su pedido de tutela, el deber del órgano jurisdiccional de observar el debido proceso y de impartir justicia dentro de los estándares mínimos establecidos por los instrumentos internacionales130. Asimismo, el artículo 4.° del Código Procesal Constitucional, define y dota de contenido a este derecho fundamental, al señalar: "se entiende por tutela procesal efectiva aquella situación jurídica de una persona en la que se respetan, de modo enunciativo, sus derechos de libre acceso al órgano jurisdiccional, a probar, de defensa, al contradictorio e igualdad sustancial en el proceso, a no ser desviado de la jurisdicción predeterminada ni sometido a procedimientos distintos de los previstos por la ley, a la obtención de una resolución fundada en derecho, a acceder a los medios impugnatorios regulados, a la imposibilidad de revivir procesos fenecidos, a la actuación adecuada y temporalmente oportuna de las resoluciones judiciales y a la observancia del principio de legalidad procesal penal". Asimismo, el concepto de Tutela Judicial Efectiva ha sido desarrollado por el Tribunal Constitucional Español a través de la delimitación del concepto de contenido esencial de dicho derecho fundamental. En un inicio, el Tribunal Constitucional enfocaba el derecho a la Tutela Judicial Efectiva mirando las garantías de tipo procesal en el orden jurisdiccional penal, sin embargo, de la lectura de las sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional Español sobre esta materia, se pone de relieve que la vulneración del artículo 24.1, de la Constitución, el cual regula el citado derecho fundamental, puede darse en cualquier orden jurisdiccional. Así, se tiene que la doctrina del Tribunal Constitucional sobre el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva es la siguiente: a) Que la invocación de un precepto constitucional como infringido, debe serlo en términos suficientemente expresivo para que el órgano jurisdiccional pueda valorar, en términos de Derecho, la cuestión planteada131. B) Que el artículo 24.1 de la Constitución es invocable en todo proceso, puesto que el mismo reconoce a todos, el derecho de acceder a la jurisdicción132, y la infracción del sistema de recursos implica vulneración de aquel precepto, ya que contiene el siguiente mandato imperativo: que no se produzca indefensión.133 C) Que el contenido del derecho fundamental a la Tutela Judicial Efectiva consiste en tener acceso al proceso con el fin de obtener una resolución fundada en Derecho, salvo que exista en la Ley causa impeditiva que no sea contraria al contenido esencial de dicho derecho fundamental134 D) Que las causas de inadmisión previstas en la Ley, deben ser interpretadas restrictivamente, para favorecer el ejercicio del derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva.135 De lo expuesto, se puede apreciar que el derecho a la Tutela Judicial Efectiva implica 130 Exp. N° 3390-2005-PHC/TC, f.j.8 131 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Español Nro. 11/1982, de 29 de marzo. 132 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Español Nro. 19/1981, de 8 de junio. 133 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Nro. 9/1981, de 31 de marzo. 134 Sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional Español, Nro. 68/1983, de 26 de julio; Nro. 104/1984, de 4 de noviembre, y la Nro. 99/1985, de 30 de septiembre. 135 Sentencia del Tribunal Constitucional Español Nro. 11/1988, del 2 de febrero, y Nro. 57/1988, de 5 de abril. 391 no sólo como el derecho de acceso al proceso, sino principalmente el derecho a obtener una resolución fundada en derecho, o dicho de otra forma, el derecho de acceso al proceso con la finalidad de obtener una resolución fundada en derecho. De lo expresado líneas arriba, podríamos señalar que es posible argumentar que el derecho a la tutela judicial efectiva fundamenta el Principio de Responsabilidad del Estado por la Administración de Justicia, siendo los procedimientos para hacerla exigible al Estado un complemento adecuado para que la tutela judicial sea realmente efectiva en términos de Derecho. Debemos partir por reconocer que la Administración de Justicia es un servicio público fundamental de toda comunidad organizada".136 Este servicio público en función de sus destinatarios, no puede estar en manos del Poder Ejecutivo o de la Administración, sino que es de exclusividad del Poder Judicial, por el principio constitucional de separación de poderes, el cual es contenido esencial del Estado Constitucional de Derecho, y por el principio de unidad y exclusividad de la función jurisdiccional, contemplado en el Artículo 139° numeral 1 de la Constitución, para así evitar excesos de alguno de éstos en la práctica. La Administración de Justicia es en términos de Reyes Monterreal una actividad específica y autónoma.137 Como se ha mencionado, esta actividad constituye un servicio público en función de sus destinatarios, actividad que solo puede recaer en manos del Poder Judicial, el cual tiene exclusividad sobre la gestión y organización del trabajo que se prestará. Es por esto que el artículo 121 de la Constitución Española considera la Administración de Justicia como actividad específica y autónoma para engendrar responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado.138 Debemos tener en cuenta que en el marco de un proceso penal caben restringir derechos fundamentales, tales como: la libertad personal, el secreto de las comunicaciones, la inviolabilidad de domicilio, entre otros, siendo que muchas veces los órganos de administración de justicia los restringen de forma desproporcionada, arbitraria, causando serios perjuicios para los justiciables Es decir, que en la medida en que hay determinados derechos fundamentales que se encuentran en riesgo mediante la Administración de la Justicia, sería el riesgo en la realización de esta actividad lo que justifica el fundamento de dicha responsabilidad. Por otro lado, Solchaga, citado por Reyes Monterreal, señala que el fundamento no es otro que "la garantía constitucional del patrimonio del sujeto dañado."139 No concordamos del todo con esta afirmación ya que, si bien se puede argumentar que, al administrar justicia se puede acarrear perjuicios de tipo económico, patrimonial para un determinado sujeto, muchas veces estos perjuicios no son solo de esta índole, sino que, como se mencionó líneas arriba, hay otros valores como la libertad, los que se encuentran en riesgo, y muchas veces el daño causado en un determinado proceso no puede ser valorado en términos económicos. Es lo que se conoce como el daño moral, el cual es difícilmente calculable económicamente debido a todas las consideraciones subjetivas que ésta puede comprender. Sin embargo, el daño que se produzca por esta actividad llevada a cabo por el Poder Judicial, tiene que ser resarcida de alguna manera, por lo que en ese orden de ideas, la reparación económica resulta la vía más adecuada, aunque muchas veces, otras medidas de reparación, como las disculpas públicas por ejemplo, son tan o más importantes que un simple cantidad de dinero. II. ÁMBITO NORMATIVO DEL PRINCIPIO DE RESPONSABILIDAD DEL ESTADO 136 REYES MONTERREAL, José María. La Responsabilidad del Estado por Error y Anormal Funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia. Editorial Colex, Madrid, 1987, pág. 11. 137 Ídem, pág. 13. 138 Ídem, pág. 13. 139 Ídem, pág. 15 392 POR LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DE JUSTICIA El principio de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado por la Administración de Justicia en el Perú se encuentra consagrado, tal como se ha señalado líneas arriba en el artículo 139° numeral 7 de la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993. Del mismo modo, es preciso señalar que asimismo la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos consagra este derecho de la siguiente manera: Artículo 10. Derecho a Indemnización "Toda persona tiene derecho a ser indemnizada conforme a la ley en caso de haber sido condenada en sentencia firme por error judicial". Asimismo, cabe indicar que el artículo 14° numeral 6 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos regula este principio de la siguiente manera: Artículo 14 6. Cuando una sentencia condenatoria firme haya sido ulteriormente revocada, o el condenado haya sido indultado por haberse producido o descubierto un hecho plenamente probatorio de la comisión de un error judicial, la persona que haya sufrido una pena como resultado de tal sentencia deberá ser indemnizada, conforme a la ley, a menos que se demuestre que le es imputable en todo o en parte el no haberse revelado oportunamente el hecho desconocido. Es preciso señalar que estas normas contenidas en tratados internacionales de derechos humanos tienen rango constitucional, de conformidad con la Cuarta Disposición Final y Transitoria de la Constitución, habiendo sido esto ratificado por el Tribunal Constitucional peruano en diversas sentencias, e inclusive establecido que no solo los tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos forman parte del ordenamiento jurídico interno, sino también las sentencias de los órganos internacionales de protección de derechos humanos, al ser éstas las que interpretan los diversos instrumentos internacionales dotándolos de contenido. Por otro lado, el artículo 121 de la Constitución Española regula el citado principio, al señalar: "Los daños causados por error judicial así como los que sean consecuencia del funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia, darán derecho a una indemnización a cargo del Estado, conforme a ley". Cabe señalar que la doctrina española concuerda en que este artículo representa una importante novedad, ya que consagra la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado en el ámbito de la Administración de Justicia, siendo acorde el principio constitucional de responsabilidad de los poderes públicos, el cual base constitucional y legal. Siguiendo a Martínez Rebollo, este artículo cumple tres funciones dentro del instituto de la responsabilidad. Primeramente, todo sistema de responsabilidad constituye un medio de reparación de un perjuicio indebidamente soportado, es decir, no hay responsabilidad sin perjuicio, o sin lesión. En segundo lugar, en el caso de la responsabilidad Estado Juez, esta institución significa un elemento de garantía de independencia del Juez, ya que si se equivoca, y como consecuencia de ello, se produce un funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia, en principio, no responde personalmente, sino que, es el Estado quien lo hace, independientemente de que éste repita contra el Juez, si ha mediado culpa o negligencia. En tercer lugar, la responsabilidad es un principio de orden de Estado, el cual actúa de hecho como un gran asegurador de riesgos colectivos, condicionando el funcionamiento cotidiano de los órganos o personas jurídico – públicas. Rebollo resalta el deber ser del funcionamiento de los poderes públicos, tanto de la Administración, así como del Poder Judicial, aduciendo que ambos deben apuntar a una 393 paulatina mejora del servicio o actividad de que se trate.140 Del mismo modo, López Muñoz señala que este precepto constituye una novedad en el ordenamiento jurídico español, el cual cierra la lista de los diferentes instrumentos protectores para reparar perjuicios causados a los particulares como consecuencia de la actuación del poder. Asimismo, manifiesta que este artículo supone una derivación de toda la normativa referente a la responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración, siendo a la vez, el complemento de la responsabilidad civil y penal de los Jueces y Magistrados, objeto de regulación desde finales del siglo XIX.141 III. SUPUESTOS DE RESPONSABILIDAD PATRIMONIAL DEL ESTADO EN ESPAÑA Y EN EL PERÚ. DISTINCION ENTRE ERROR JUDICIAL, ANORMAL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LA ADMINISTRACION DE JUSTICIA Y PRISIÓN PROVISIONAL INDEBIDA. En el caso español, el Principio de Responsabilidad Patrimonial del Estado por la Administración de Justicia contempla dos supuestos ampliamente diferenciados: el Error Judicial y el Anormal Funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia. A continuación, trataremos ambos supuestos desde el desarrollo legal que han tenido, y sobre todo, desde la doctrina. IV.1 El Error Judicial. Primeramente, es interesante resaltar que no existe una definición a nivel legal de error judicial ni en España ni en el Perú. Tampoco la doctrina ha elaborado definiciones de este concepto, limitándose a describir sus principales características. Sin perjuicio de ello, Hernández Martín Valeriano lo define como: "Un concepto auxiliar del principio indemnizatorio aplicado a la Administración judicial. Es error judicial toda equivocación de un Juez o Magistrado, cometida en el ejercicio de funciones jurisdiccionales, de la que se derive un daño".142 Sin embargo, señala este autor que su definición no refleja la doctrina jurisprudencial, la cual es mucho más restrictiva, por lo que da otra definición: "Es error judicial la equivocación crasa y palmaria cometida por un Juez, Magistrado o Sala de Magistrados en el ejercicio de sus funciones jurisdiccionales, siempre que dicha equivocación haya alcanzado firmeza, no sea debida a culpa del perjudicado y haya causado daños efectivos, evaluables e individualizados".143 Asimismo, como bien señala Martín Rebollo, el artículo 121 de la Constitución Española no distingue entre los diferentes tipos de errores plausibles de ser indemnizados, aunque tradicionalmente se apunte al error de hecho como único capaz de producir tal efecto. Se puede decir, que dentro de esta norma legal, cabe todo tipo de errores, en principio.144 Almagro, citado Reyes Monterreal también concuerda en que el error puede ser tanto de hecho como de derecho, ya que ambas modalidades son la resultante de una declaración de voluntad del Juez, a quien "no puede pedírsele que no se equivoque, sino que ponga toda la diligencia exigible según su oficio en no equivocarse".145 Es importante resaltar el hecho de que los errores materiales no pueden fundamentar una 140 MARTIN REBOLLO, Luis. Jueces y Responsabilidad del Estado. Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Madrid, 1983. pág. 138. 141 LOPEZ MUÑOZ, Riánsares. Ídem, pág. 67. 142 HERNANDEZ MARTIN, Valeriano. El Error Judicial. Procedimiento para su declaración e indemnización. Editorial Civitas, S.A. Madrid, 1994, pág. 81. 143 Ídem, pág. 81 144 MARTIN REBOLLO, Luis. Jueces y Responsabilidad del Estado, op. cit,. pág. 139. 145 ALMAGRO. El sistema español de Responsabilidad Judicial. Poder Judicial., 1983, pág. 459. En: REYES MONTERREAL, José María. La Responsabilidad del Estado por Error y Anormal Funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia. Colex, Madrid, 1987, pág. 17. 394 demanda por error judicial, ya que de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 267 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de España, éstos sólo pueden dar lugar a su correspondiente rectificación en cualquier momento. Por otro lado, para declarar la existencia de error judicial es indispensable que complementariamente se produzca un daño físico o moral evaluable económicamente y una relación de causalidad entre el error y el daño indemnizable, de conformidad con lo establecido en el artículo 293 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial Español. Asimismo, el artículo 295 del referido cuerpo legal excluye la exigencia de indemnización cuando el error tenga por causa la conducta dolosa o culposa del perjudicado. Esto tiene concordancia con lo establecido por el artículo 267 de la misma norma, la cual menciona que cuando el error se ha producido en el desarrollo de la actividad judicial, es obligatorio para cuantos intervienen en el proceso, procurar con lealtad procesal y con la buena fe exigible a todo litigante, ponerlo de relieve para su subsanación. De lo expresado líneas arriba, se deduce que no puede confundirse el error judicial con la causa o circunstancia que lo haya podido producir, por más que ésta se identifique con hechos o pruebas equivocados. Al respecto, Reyes Monterreal señala que el error comentado incide exclusivamente en la potestad jurisdiccional que se materializa en una sentencia o resolución, la cual es una auténtica declaración de voluntad del órgano que ostenta aquélla; siempre ha de consistir en aplicar la norma que a cada supuesto corresponde, por lo que el error ha de radicar en un equivocado enjuiciamiento o no aplicación de la solución únicamente querida por el legislador.146 En este mismo orden de ideas, señala Gorphe, citado por Reyes Monterreal, que partiendo de una concepción racional de la justicia y especialmente de las pruebas, el convencimiento que implica la decisión debe ser la resultante lógica de un examen analítico de los hechos y de una apreciación crítica de los elementos de prueba; el error no estará en los hechos o en las pruebas, en sí mismo considerados, sino en el modo de subsumirlos en el ordenamiento jurídico, cuya aplicación concreta en cada caso es obligada.147 Al respecto, se debe tener en cuenta que dentro del Estado Constitucional de Derecho, un juez independiente es el que está sometido única y exclusivamente a la Constitución. Sin perjuicio de lo expuesto, Montero Aroca señala que en torno al error judicial debe discutirse básicamente dos puntos: cómo puede cometerse y en qué puede consistir. Primeramente, se parte de afirmar que el error se comete siempre en la realización de un juicio, por tanto, para que haya error tiene que haber juicio; cuando éste es judicial puede aparecer el error de esta naturaleza. Entonces, como primera característica podemos afirmar que: a) El error se debe producir en una resolución: Siguiendo a Montero Aroca, el error judicial sólo puede producirse en la sentencia que ponga fin al proceso, después de agotar todos los recursos establecidos en la ley, es decir, sólo cabe hablar de error en la sentencia firme. Cabe resaltar que, todo el sistema de recursos que regulan las leyes parte de la posibilidad del error, y de ahí que exista la posibilidad de la revocación de las sentencias inferiores por las superiores. En este sentido, la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial de España señala en el artículo 292.3 que la mera revocación o anulación de las resoluciones judiciales no presupone por sí sola derecho a indemnización, y añade el artículo 293.1. f) que no procederá la declaración de error contra la resolución judicial a la que se impute mientras no se hubieren agotado previamente los recursos previstos en el ordenamiento. También, en los procesos ejecutivos, el error se producirá en la sólo en la 146 REYES MONTERREAL, José María. La Responsabilidad del Estado por Error y Anormal Funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia, op.cit., págs.45-46. 147 GORPHE, citado por: REYES MONTERREAL, José María, op. cit., pág. 20. 395 resolución firme. Sin embargo, cabe resaltar que en los procesos de ejecución no existen sentencias; normalmente cada resolución por sí produce un efecto y todas juntas conducen a un final que es, por ejemplo, en la ejecución ordinaria, el pago al acreedor después de la adjudicación a un tercero del bien embargado al ejecutado. El daño se producirá normalmente en los autos, aunque hasta el final de la ejecución no será definitivo, dada la posibilidad de la nulidad de las actuaciones. Otro supuesto es el de los procesos cautelares. Cabe resaltar que en el proceso civil, en general, las medidas cautelares se decretan a cuenta y riesgo del que lo pidiere, por lo que pueden dar lugar a una indemnización de daños y perjuicios a costa del demandante, en previsión de lo cual éste debe prestar fianza. Por otro lado, las leyes procesales suelen regular la oposición a las medidas, después de acordadas éstas, y aquí se llega a una resolución en la que puede incurrirse en error originador de daños. Señala Montero Aroca, que en estos casos habría que distinguir: Que pueden producirse daños por las medidas cautelares en cuanto su adopción esté basada en el error, aunque la resolución sea confirmada por el tribunal superior. Los daños pueden provenir de la resolución de primera instancia, aunque haya sido revocada por el Tribunal Superior; en estos casos los recursos se admiten siempre sin efecto suspensivo, con lo que la revocación de la resolución puede no ser bastante para evitar los daños.148 Cabe resaltar que en los procesos penales todas las medidas de coerción procesal reguladas en el ordenamiento procesal penal, así como las medidas limitativas pueden producir daños; no solo el supuesto de la prisión preventiva. b) El error puede ser de hecho y de derecho. El error de hecho se refiere al descubrimiento de nuevos hechos o a la posibilidad de utilizar nuevos medios de prueba, pero no a una valoración distinta de los medios de prueba ya utilizados para probar los hechos alegados. En nuestra opinión, si se pretendiera la modificación de la valoración de la prueba efectuada por el juez, se estaría desconociendo el principio de seguridad jurídica. Cabe resaltar que los únicos supuestos en los que podría hipotéticamente cuestionarse la valoración de la prueba del juzgador serían aquellos en los que bien no existió prueba alguna y sin embargo, el juez condenó al acusado, o bien el juez dictó sentencia en contra de la prueba producida en el juicio oral, teniendo éstos solución en el propio ordenamiento procesal penal, a través de la casación, regulada en el Nuevo Código Procesal Penal peruano en el artículo 427 y siguientes. En lo concerniente al error de derecho, Montero Aroca señala que existen dos supuestos en los que el error puede ser declarado: Desconocimiento absoluto de la existencia de la norma: esto es, cuando el error no ha sido corregido por la vía de los recursos ordinarios, lo que parece difícil de ocurrir. Tanto en la legislación española, así como la peruana existe el recurso de apelación, sin embargo, a pesar de ello, no se puede descartar que esta situación se pueda presentar. Desconocimiento absoluto de la existencia de jurisprudencia unánime en un sentido determinado. Montero Aroca señala que es difícil que este supuesto se llegue a dar, ya que los jueces y magistrados son independientes frente a los tribunales superiores, y ya que el único medio para avanzar la jurisprudencia es disentir de la ya establecida. Sin embargo, señala que en algún caso extraordinario podría admitirse. IV.2 El Funcionamiento Anormal de la Administración de Justicia. Como ya se ha mencionado, el funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia 148 MONTERO AROCA, Juan. La Responsabilidad Civil del Juez y del Estado por la Actuación del Poder Judicial, op. cit., pág. 119. 396 es otro título de imputación de responsabilidad del Estado en España, regulada por el artículo 121 de la Constitución Española, sin embargo, no está comprendido dentro de los supuestos contemplados en la Constitución Política del Perú de 1993. Sin perjuicio de ello, consideramos pertinente hacer mención a estos supuestos en la medida que contemplan supuestos que se pueden producir, y efectivamente se producen en la administración de justicia en el Perú, y toda vez que constituyen una forma de garantizar un mejor desempeño de los jueces y tutelar el derecho fundamental a la tutela judicial efectiva, por lo que debería contemplarse en una eventual reforma constitucional, o al menos en un desarrollo legal adecuado. Cabe resaltar en este supuesto que lo que permite la imputación del daño al Estado es la existencia de un mal funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia, que no se manifiesta a través de una decisión errónea, sino en la deficiente utilización de los medios para aplicar la justicia al caso concreto.149 En este sentido, García de Enterría, citado por López Muñoz, señala que se trata de un concepto jurídico indeterminado, el cual viene a trasponer al Derecho Administrativo el "standard" de diligencia media al Derecho común referido al "buen padre de familia", es decir se busca la estimación de los "standards" de actuación y rendimiento normalmente exigibles a los servicios públicos; en otras palabras, una estimación de la diligencia funcional media exigible al Estado en el ejercicio de sus funciones, pudiendo ésta variar en cada época, según el grado de sensibilidad social y desarrollo efectivo de los servicios públicos. Cabe resaltar que la ley excluye la necesidad de acreditar culpa o dolo como elemento subjetivo imputable al funcionario o agente o a la propia Administración. Si ocurriera un comportamiento culposo o doloso por parte del agente, será exigible de éste la correspondiente responsabilidad en vía de regreso frente al ente público que ha resarcido el daño, no siendo esta responsabilidad el elemento determinante de la anormalidad del servicio. Es decir, la anormalidad del servicio se configura con independencia de todo factor subjetivo, así como actuación objetivamente ilícita o ilegítima. Cabe indicar que los supuestos más frecuentes del funcionamiento anormal de la Administración de Justicia en España son: supuestos de ilegalidad, omisiones, falta de coordinación, error en la apreciación de los hechos y el retraso o dilación indebida. 1) Supuestos de ilegalidad: Este supuesto permite reforzar la estimación de anormalidad del funcionamiento del servicio. Esto se puede apreciar en los supuestos de delito cometidos por el juzgador, siempre que concurra nexo causal y los demás requisitos exigibles, e incluso en los casos en que el juzgador haya incurrido en ignorancia o negligencia inexcusables. La existencia de estas anormalidades se aprecia con claridad, en la hipótesis en que resulten lesionados los derechos fundamentales de la persona, constitucionalmente reconocidos y protegidos de modo directo. 2) Omisiones: La falta de vigilancia de los funcionarios encargados de la recepción de documentos, cantidades, etc. o la ausencia, en su momento, de las adecuadas medidas cautelares, da lugar a responsabilidad por este concepto cuando se materializa el daño, a través de los diversos resultados, por ejemplo, desaparición de objetos, de pruebas materiales, etc., en los Juzgados o Tribunales. Aunque la responsabilidad presenta carácter objetivo, no precisa de culpa de funcionario o agente; se suele detectar la anomalía a través de una irregular conducta del funcionario o persona integrada en el ámbito de la Administración Judicial.150 3) Falta de coordinación: Los supuestos más frecuentes de ésta se deben a las 149 LOPEZ MUÑOZ, Riánsares. Dilaciones Indebidas y Responsabilidad Patrimonial de la Administración de Justicia., op. cit., pág. 107. 150 Ídem, pág. 111. 397 deficiencias de la organización judicial, como por ejemplo: la defectuosa distribución de trabajo entre los distintos órganos jurisdiccionales, anticuada demarcación judicial, falta de medios materiales, etc. Estos, pueden no suponer conducta culposa del juzgador, ni infracción de la ley, pero sí, funcionamiento defectuoso, anormal de los órganos que integran el Poder Judicial, con posibles consecuencias lesivas. 4) Error en la apreciación de los hechos: Aquí se comprenden los errores de identificación personal en los procesos penales, con consecuencias gravemente dañosas de prisión preventiva o procesamiento, así como también la errónea apreciación de los datos personales o de bienes en actividades de ejecución, con embargos, subastas, etc. Cuando no sean reconducibles al supuesto de error judicial.151 En el Perú la Defensoría del Pueblo ha venido desempeñando un rol muy importante para superar este problema. 5) El retraso o dilación indebida: Este supuesto es, sin lugar a dudas, el más frecuente en la realidad judicial española y en la peruana. Cabe resaltar, que el referido supuesto se encuentra conectado con un derecho fundamental regulado en el artículo 24.2 de la Constitución Española: "el derecho a un proceso público sin dilaciones indebidas". Cabe resaltar que el Tribunal Constitucional Español ha insistido en que la dilación indebida no se produce por un mero incumplimiento de los plazos procesales establecidos por la ley, es decir que el 24.2 no ha constitucionalizado el derecho a los plazos, sino que dicho precepto se refiere al derecho de toda persona a que su caso se resuelva en un tiempo razonable. Del mismo modo, el Tribunal Constitucional Peruano ha expedido diversas sentencias consagrando en derecho ser juzgado en un plazo razonable, siguiendo los criterios establecidos por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. IV.3 La Prisión Provisional Indebida. Siguiendo a la doctrina, se puede entender a la Prisión Provisional o Prisión Preventiva como aquella privación de libertad, mediante encarcelamiento, ordenada por la Autoridad Judicial a un imputado, incurso, por tanto, en unas diligencias judiciales por delito, antes de que se haya dictado un fallo condenatorio que tenga una pena privativa de libertad, mientras el mismo no tenga el carácter de firme, con el fin de asegurar la presencia del imputado en el proceso para garantizar una ordenada investigación de los hechos, adoptada en atención a la futura y previsible pena a imponer en su momento, lo que implica necesariamente una anticipación, sin prejuzgarla, de los efectos de las sentencia condenatoria. El propio nombre provisional o preventiva denota que no constituye una situación definitiva del procedimiento, sino que puede reformarse durante el curso del proceso penal. Cabe resaltar que este supuesto puede colisionar con dos derechos fundamentales, consagrados tanto en la Constitución Española, así como en textos internacionales; estos son: la libertad deambulatorio (artículo 17 del la Constitución Española de 1978), y con el derecho a La Presunción de Inocencia (artículo 24.2 de la misma norma). Se reconoce que este es un instituto de difícil justificación, pero a la vez de absoluta necesidad.152 Este supuesto se encuentra en el medio de dos funciones estatales: la persecución del delito y la protección del ámbito de libertad del ciudadano. Si esta privación de libertad deviene en ilegítima (por no respetarse el cause legal adecuado) o si resulta innecesaria o injustificada (cuando se demuestra la inocencia de acusado), se vulneran derechos esenciales de la persona, causando daños que deben ser 151 Ídem, pág. 112. 152 MUÑOZ CONDE MORENO CATENA. En: GUZMAN FLUJA, Vicente. El derecho de indemnización por el funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia Tirant lo blanch, Valencia, 1994, pág. 258. 398 indemnizados por el Estado.153 Este supuesto se encuentra regulado en el artículo 294 de la Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial, estableciendo las siguientes circunstancias: Tendrán derecho a indemnización quienes, después de haber sufrido prisión preventiva, sean absueltos por inexistencia del hecho imputado o por esta misma causa haya sido dictado auto de sobreseimiento libre, siempre que se le hayan irrogado perjuicios. La cuantía de la indemnización se fijará en función del tiempo de privación de libertad y de las consecuencias personales y familiares que se hayan producido. La petición indemnizatoria se tramitará de acuerdo con lo establecido en el número 2 del artículo anterior. Al respecto, consideramos que este supuesto estaría cubierto en el ordenamiento constitucional peruano, toda vez que, tal como se ha mencionado, el artículo 139° numeral 7 de la Constitución regula el derecho a una indemnización no solo por los errores judiciales en los procesos penales, sino también por la detenciones arbitrarias, siendo que un supuesto de Prisión Provisional o Preventiva Indebida, es en efecto un supuesto de detención arbitraria. V.PROPUESTAS PARA ABORDAR EL TEMA EN EL PERÚ Como se ha señalado, la Constitución Peruana de 1993 establece en su artículo 139° numeral 7 la figura de la indemnización por detención arbitraria y por error judicial en los procesos penales, la cual fue desarrollada en cierta medida por la Ley Nro. 24973, promulgada en 1988 y aún vigente, la cual contemplaba la creación del Fondo Nacional Indemnizatorio para hacer frente al pago de las indemnizaciones producto de las afectaciones al referido precepto constitucional, sin embargo, esta institución no funciona ni recibe el presupuesto correspondiente, por lo que las personas afectadas por errores judiciales y por detenciones arbitrarias no son indemnizadas, es decir esta norma no es eficaz. Del mismo modo, debe tenerse en consideración que, tal como se ha señalado líneas arriba que el artículo 10 de la Convención Americana establece que "toda persona tiene derecho a ser indemnizada conforme a la ley en caso de haber sido condenada en sentencia firme por error judicial", habiendo establecido la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en diversos Informes que la administración de justicia constituye una prerrogativa del Estado y al mismo tiempo una obligación de éste, por lo que la actuación de los jueces, en tanto servidores públicos que actúan como agentes del Estado, puede generarle a éste responsabilidad internacional. Si bien existe eficacia directa de los derechos fundamentales reconocidos tanto en la Constitución, así como en tratados internacionales sobre derechos humanos suscritos y ratificados por el Perú, por lo que en principio se podría argumentar que no se requiere de un desarrollo legal para hacer efectivo este derecho, consideramos que sería importante la modificación de la Ley Nro. 24973 desarrollándola en mejor medida, estableciendo una vía rápida, efectiva y adecuada para hacer efectivo este derecho fundamental. Del mismo modo, consideramos pertinente ampliar los supuestos de responsabilidad del Estado por la Administración de Justicia, ya sea a través de una reforma constitucional, o a través de una ley que desarrolle de manera adecuada el precepto constitucional, contemplando otros supuestos de responsabilidad, como el Anormal Funcionamiento de la Administración de Justicia. 153 GUZMAN FLUJA, Vicente, Ídem, pág. 259. 399 Finalmente, es preciso señalar que si bien, hasta la fecha, no existe un desarrollo legal para este precepto constitucional, siempre está abierta la posibilidad de la Responsabilidad Extracontractual contemplada en el Código Civil de 1984. BIOGRAFIA Máster en Derechos Fundamentales por la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, España. Consultor del Viceministerio de Derechos Humanos y Acceso a la Justicia. Profesor de la Maestría en Derecho Procesal Penal con Mención en Técnicas y Destrezas de Litigación Oral de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega y de la Maestría en Derecho Constitucional y Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos 400 EL CUMPLIMIENTO DE LA LEY Y LA NECESIDAD DE ESTABLECER UN SISTEMA JURÍDICO Dr. Julio César Guzmán Galindo INDICE Introducción...................................................... 3 I. AL BORDE DE LA LEY................................ 6 II. IMPORTANCIA DEL SISTEMA JURIDICO....... 13 III. LA MODERNIZACION DEL DERECHO........... 24 Conclusión........................................................ 31 Bibliografía........................................................ INTRODUCCIÓN Uno de los problemas actuales que enfrenta el Derecho en nuestro país es su falta de eficacia, hecho que se evidencia en un frecuente incumplimiento de las leyes. A diario observamos que no se cumple la ley, desde la más simple hasta la más compleja, o en otro caso vemos que el orden jurídico no organiza adecuadamente los distintos ámbitos de la vida social y económica. Según las normas, luego que se aprueba una ley en el Congreso se comunica el texto al Presidente de la República, para que éste la promulgue con el dicho: "Por tanto: mando se publique y cumpla", sin embargo, en la realidad muchas leyes no llevan ese destino, pues no se cumplen como manda la Constitución. Varios hechos o situaciones vividas demuestran este desfase entre el Derecho y la realidad, verbigracia, el cambio de moneda extranjera se realiza en la calle (como en la Venecia de los mercaderes de la edad media); el servicio de transporte urbano e interprovincial es deficiente, suscitándose frecuentes y fatales accidentes; el servicio de taxis es inseguro; no se respetan la reglas de tránsito, la inseguridad es un problema constante en nuestras sociedad, entre otros hechos. En otro ámbitos de la vida cotidiana ocurren acontecimientos que igualmente tienen relación con la vigencia de las normas jurídicas, como es el caso de incendios en grandes áreas comerciales; existencia de mercados, almacenes y negocios al margen de las 401 normas; en el ámbito del Derecho penal, observamos recurrentemente a pobladores castigando físicamente a personas que han causado daño y cometidos delitos; en otros casos ejecuciones de personas con aplicación de "pena de muerte" en "asambleas populares". Esta observación alcanza finalmente al ámbito de la institucionalidad jurídica, en el cual, las entidades del Estado, por ejemplo, no pueden ejecutar el gasto público o no pueden adquirir bienes; en materia de educación el problema es trágico, pues tenemos los índices más bajos en calidad a nivel mundial. En general, se habla de una "falta de presencia del Estado", o de un problema de falta de institucionalidad. En el caso de la administración de justicia, que involucra, no sólo la actividad judicial, sino también la forense, la fiscal y policial, igualmente presenta recurrentes y diversos problemas. Todos esos ámbitos o sectores, en su conjunto, presentan deficiencias provocando un desprestigio de los jueces y abogados. Toda esta problemática, como se observa, tiene relación directa con la eficiencia de las normas y las instituciones jurídicas. Existen muchos diagnósticos, estudios, consultorías sobre esta problemática; este ensayo jurídico no pretende seguir "estudiando", pues ya sabemos que el problema existe. En ese sentido, el objeto de este estudio es explicar las posibles causas que tienen relación con el incumplimiento de la ley, para luego, destacar la importancia de concebir un SISTEMA JURIDICO, desde la perspectiva de la Ciencia Jurídica, para llevar a cabo la modernización del Derecho en nuestro país. La definición del Sistema Jurídico, en esa línea, resulta importante antes de abordar las reformas en el sistema político, instituciones jurídicas, gobierno y sistema judicial. En los últimos años se ha producido un debate acerca de estos temas en el terreno de la opinión pública, sin embargo, no han sido abordados por la dogmática jurídica, es decir, por la Ciencia Jurídica.154 El presente trabajo pretende analizar los términos de dicho debate a la luz de la Metodología Jurídica Escuela de Savignyy de la propuesta de aplicación de la Racionalidad al Derecho, de Jürgen Habermas. El objeto es reflexionar acerca del papel de la Ley en la sociedad moderna, en un mundo en el cual aún no han cesado los conflictos y en el que todavía vemos niños en las calles con hambre y sin esperanza. 154 La reflexión de los problemas jurídicos, lamentablemente no se lleva a cabo en el campo de la Ciencia Jurídica, menos de la Filosofía Jurídica. Los "juristas" han renunciado a la dogmática de su ciencia y antes de estudiarla, han recurrido a verter opiniones sobre los problemas jurídicos, a través de los medios de comunicación. 402 I. AL BORDE DE LA LEY El Derecho en nuestro país es "subdesarrollado", afirma el economista Hernando DE SOTO, precisa también que "el Derecho no funciona bien" y que hay una falta de vigencia del mismo. DE SOTO explica su óptica del problema del Derecho, en un artículo155 escrito en réplica a una afirmación del Profesor de Derecho Constitucional y ex Presidente de la República, ya fallecido, VALENTIN PANIAGUA, quien precisó frente a la hipótesis de DE SOTO, que el Derecho no fracasa, o que el problema no es el Derecho en sí, sino que a los peruanos nos falta "hombría de bien" para respetar la ley. DE SOTO contestó y planteó su discrepancia con esa opinión, en el sentido que el fracaso del Derecho no se debe a la desobediencia de los ciudadanos o su "falta de hombría", sino que la situación es en gran parte responsabilidad de los mismos juristas. De acuerdo a DE SOTO, la "falta de vigencia social del Derecho (...) es responsabilidad en gran parte de los juristas –políticos", al referir que, el desprestigio del Derecho en el país se debe a las omisiones de su establishment jurídico. Cuáles omisiones –se pregunta DE SOTO, y precisa que son aquellas que hacen que el Derecho se cumpla, por ejemplo, en los EE.UU y no en el Perú. También refiere que los juristas norteamericanos no se han limitado a redactar normas, sino que, también han creados "mecanismos" para que las leyes se cumplan. No deja de destacar que en EE.UU hubo un periodo de crisis jurídica, cuando en el siglo XIX la corrupción y la informalidad colocó a gran parte de la población en la "periferia de la Ley", sin embargo, los juristas de ese país emprendieron un gran esfuerzo para adecuar el Derecho heredado de Inglaterra a las condiciones sociales de los migrantes que poblaron los EE.UU. En esa época señala DE SOTO que el Presidente Jefferson trazó las políticas iniciales para que las normas se adaptasen a los nuevos "hábitos y costumbres" creados por la propia sociedad.156 En el debate acerca de la crisis o fracaso del Derecho en nuestro país también intervino el prestigioso abogado JORGE AVENDAÑO VALDEZ157, ex Decano del Colegio de Abogados de Lima, quien afirma, al contrario del economista DE SOTO, que no hay fracaso del Derecho y niega la existencia de un Derecho subdesarrollado. Nuestro Derecho no es mejor ni peor que el de otros países, incluidos los desarrollados, afirma AVENDAÑO, "lo que pasa que en estos la ley se cumple (...) la razón es que allá hay sanción (...) esto supone que haya verdaderas instituciones y autoridades". Con este razonamiento AVENDAÑO precisa que el problema no es del Derecho, sino que atañe 155 DE SOTO, Hernando, "¿Por qué no se cumple la ley en el Perú? Se equivoca usted presidente Paniagua", Diario El Comercio, página editorial, Lima 13 de febrero de 2002, p. A 15. 156 Con relación a esta óptica cabe destacar, igualmente, el artículo escrito por DAVID WESSEL, en el periódico The Wall Street Journal, en lo primeros días de setiembre de 2001, titulado "El gen de la buena economía". En este articulo, WESSEL explica que, en los países de Derecho civil – como el nuestrono hay confianza en los jueces, mientras que en los de Derecho consuetudinario, caso de EE.UU y los países de la Commonwealth, los veneran y les dan todo el poder. Precisa también que, los países de Derecho civil, sobrecargados de normas y reglas, no se adaptan al cambio. Concluye el autor que la diferencia entre EE.UU y Latinoamérica está en la ley, que el Derecho cuenta, y cuenta mucho. 157 AVENDAÑO VALDEZ Jorge, "¿Ha fracaso el derecho?, Diario El Comercio, Lima 08 de enero de 2002. 403 entonces a la Ciencia Política, a la educación y a la economía, en fin a la "pobreza generalizada" en nuestro país. Por otro lado afirma que el Derecho ha fracaso porque no ha logrado penetrar en la mente del ciudadano (...) en el fondo es el fracaso de la modernidad. Afirma igualmente que si el Derecho no ha calado en el peruano medio, no es por una deficiencia del Derecho mismo. Es en todo caso, responsabilidad de otros medios de control social, como la familia, la escuela y los medios de comunicación masiva. En esta problemática, también cabe destacar la investigación elaborada hace algunos años por el abogado y sociólogo LUIS PÁSARA, cuyos resultados se plasmaron en un informe titulado: "La enseñanza del Derecho en el Perú: sus consecuencias para la Administración de Justicia". En dicho informe PÁSARA plasma los resultados de una investigación a la situación de la enseñanza del Derecho en diversas universidades del país, y pone en evidencia un empobrecimiento en la formación jurídica. Refiere que se adoctrina en lo que dice la ley, que no se aprende a pensar y razonar jurídicamente. También precisa que, en la mayoría de facultades de Derecho, solo se repite lo que dice la ley y que existe una desatención a los problemas reales.158 El debate y la preocupación en torno a la crisis del Derecho en nuestro país se observa en un comentario editorial del Diario El Comercio159, titulado ¿Por qué la ley en el Perú esconde trampas? En este comentario se hace referencia a la "cultura del incumplimiento de la ley" a una situación de "desobediencia a la Ley" y a la responsabilidad de la autoridad encargada de su cumplimiento. En cuanto a la responsabilidad de los poderes encargados de hacer cumplir la ley, se precisa, que son los primeros en distorsionarla y violentarla. Como se observa se exponen distintos puntos de vista y respuestas para explicar la crisis del Derecho en nuestro país. En lo que si hay coincidencia es en el hecho que estamos ante una verdadera crisis, se ha llamado un "fracaso del Derecho" o una "falta de vigencia social del Derecho". Las exposiciones de reconocidos abogados como JORGE AVENDAÑO y VALENTIN PANIAGUA plantean que no es el Derecho el que ha fracasado, sino es la sociedad la que no ha asimilado la cultura jurídica, que la falta de cumplimiento de la ley es un problema de la educación, de la familia y de los medios de comunicación. En fin, se trata de sostener que los abogados no son responsables de la crisis del Derecho, sino la misma sociedad. Por otro lado, la opinión pública e investigadores, como DE SOTO y PÁSARA hacen fuertes críticas al Derecho, observando sus deficiencias y "subdesarrollo". Los mencionados investigadores, atribuyen esa situación, uno a los mismos juristas y en otro caso, a la formación jurídica que se imparte en las Facultades de Derecho del país. Pretender evadir el problema desde el ámbito de la comunidad jurídica (abogados, juristas y profesores de derecho) no es lo más acertado. Al contrario, las investigaciones jurídicas deben abordar y debatir la problemática, pues es evidente que quienes intervienen en la 158 Vid. PASARA PAZOS "La enseñanza del Derecho en el Perú: sus consecuencias para la Administración de Justicia". Informe elaborado para el Ministerio de Justicia, marzo de 2004. Publicado en el Diario El Peruano el 06 de julio de 2004. 159 Publicado el 06 de noviembre de 2007. 404 producción del Derecho (elaboración de leyes y reglamentos), siempre serán los abogados. Entonces, cabe un replanteamiento en la técnica y metodología jurídica desde la Ciencia Jurídica para reformar y modernizar el Derecho. No hay que echarle la culpa del incumplimiento de las leyes o de las deficiencias del Derecho a la sociedad, sostiene DE SOTO. Con ello parece decir, que los abogados ("juristas") asuman su responsabilidad y no le echen la culpa a los ciudadanos, profesores, periodistas o policías de la crisis del Derecho, porque ellos no diseñaron las instituciones jurídicas. En esa perspectiva, considero además que la crisis del Derecho en nuestro país, se debe al hecho que la elaboración histórica del ordenamiento jurídico no se ha producido con base en una adecuación del Derecho a la idiosincrasia de la sociedad peruana, es decir, no hemos construido un verdadero SISTEMA JURÍDICO. Las leyes y los códigos vigentes se han elaborado con frecuente utilización y aplicación de fuentes que corresponden a ordenamientos jurídicos extranjeros y culturas jurídicas que difieren de la nuestra. Esa es la técnica, aún vigente, pues tenemos la idea que las recientes doctrinas, leyes o códigos que se dan en otros países son "mejores" o "modernos" y por ello pueden aplicarse en nuestro país. Observamos que el mimetismo jurídico nos ha llevado al fracaso, pues no es una técnica adecuada para modernizar nuestra cultura jurídica, el Derecho y propulsar su eficacia y real vigencia. Entonces, debemos volver la mirada a nuestra realidad y posibilitar que el Derecho fluya de la misma. De esta observación podemos deducir, que en nuestro país no existe un SISTEMA JURÍDICO, pues se observa que muchos aspectos de la vida económica y social no están debidamente regulados, o lo están en forma deficiente, y que como se ha expuesto existe una grave crisis y fracaso del Derecho. Si el Derecho funcionara y sería eficaz en la regulación de la vida social, entonces existiría como SISTEMA, pero ello no sucede en la realidad. En ese sentido, a pesar que tenemos leyes, autoridades, jueces y policías, estos elementos no funcionan porque el Derecho aún no conforma un sistema, dado que está alejado de la realidad. Entonces si no hay sistema jurídico, ¿qué hay? La respuesta es que tenemos un simple ordenamiento jurídico que regula en forma determinada y limitada la vida de la sociedad y está aún pendiente de modernizar y desarrollar. Esta disfunción del Derecho con la realidad, ya fue percibida en su momento por el pensamiento de Rudolf Von IHERING, quien precisa claramente que "la función del Derecho en general consiste en su realización". Lo que no se realiza no es Derecho, y a la inversa, lo que desempeña esta función es Derecho. IHERING también afirma que la realidad es la que garantiza el texto de la ley.160 160 Vid. R.V. IHERING, El Espíritu del Derecho Romano en las diversas fases de su desarrollo, Versión por Principe y Satorres, Madrid, 1891,1892, Cit. Por Rodríguez Paniagua José María, Historia del Pensamiento Jurídico, Tomo II, Servicio de Publicaciones Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1993, p. 431. 405 Otra importante referencia respecto a la relación que debe existir entre el Derecho y la realidad social, es la dada por Friedrich STAHL, quien afirmó que el Derecho debe ser parte integrante de la "vida" de los hombres y que la norma jurídica sea naturalmente inmanente a sus condiciones de vida.161 II. IMPORTANCIA DEL SISTEMA JURÍDICO Desde el punto de vista de la Metodología Jurídica, los problemas acerca del Derecho, como son su desfase de la realidad y falta de cumplimiento de la ley, no se podrán resolver, si es que previamente no se aborda la idea de configurar un Sistema Jurídico. Se quiere decir con ello, que toda la problemática vinculada al Derecho, como es la Reforma o Modernización del Poder Judicial, la Reforma del Estado, institucionalidad, Gobierno, la seguridad interior, la superación de la informalidad de la economía y el desarrollo y sostenimiento del crecimiento económico de los últimos años, así como el desarrollo y bienestar del país, entre otros aspectos, no podrá ser abordada con éxito, si es que no se hace un análisis previo al conjunto del Derecho y del Sistema Jurídico en sí. Esa sería la línea de un primer objetivo que debe orientarse hacia la modernización de las instituciones jurídicas en nuestro país, pero no desde la enciclopedia o de la cultura de otros países, sino desde la idiosincrasia misma del ser peruano. Es el Sistema Jurídico, como idea, que permitiría plasmar la cultura y la realidad del país en las instituciones jurídicas, no al contrario, como se viene haciendo. Las leyes se vienen dando, para que los ciudadanos las adopten y cumplan reglas jurídicas que no corresponden a su forma de vida y que en muchos casos son normas de otras realidades jurídicas. La propuesta para renovar el Derecho consiste en comprender que constituye un todo orgánico y en constante desarrollo. Esta es una visión holística según la cual, la representación del Derecho se da en una estructura interna en la cual todas las reglas o normas jurídicas se unen con sentido (nexo sistemático) para su aplicación de forma útil (eficacia). La concepción sistemática del Derecho no es nueva, ya fue planteada por F. C. SAVIGNY162 en base a dos elementos, la RELACIÓN JURÍDICA y las 161 Esta idea es desarrollada por STAHL en su obra Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht, en 1833, Cit. por WILHELM Walter, La Metodología Jurídica en el Siglo XIX, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1980, Trad. Rolf Bethmann. P. 45. 162 Friedrich Carl Von SAVIGNY, Jurista alemán 1779-1861, en 1814 publicó su alegato contra la codificación del Derecho titulado De la vocación de nuestro siglo por la legislación y la ciencia del Derecho; en 1815 fundó la Revista para la ciencia del Derecho desde el punto de vista histórico. Entre 1815 y 1831 publicó los seis volúmenes de su Historia del Derecho Romano en la Edad Media. En 1845 comienza a escribir su Sistema de Derecho Romano Actual, cuyos 8 tomos fueron 406 INSTITUCIONES163. La estructura se configura del siguiente modo, el conjunto de relaciones jurídicas comprende una institución jurídica y el conjunto de instituciones se estructuran y forman parte del Sistema Jurídico. En otro sentido, el Sistema Jurídico viene a ser, el conjunto de instituciones jurídicas, que conforman un todo orgánico, y a su vez cada institución jurídica comprende un conjunto de relaciones jurídicas. Por último, cada relación jurídica recoge reglas o preceptos de conducta humana. Para SAVIGNY la totalidad del Derecho, la intima coherencia de todos los conceptos y reglas era el sistema. 164 En ese sentido, precisa que el método de aplicación, de interpretación y de perfeccionamiento del Derecho debía necesariamente corresponder a la concepción sistemática. 165 En base a dichos elementos, relación jurídica e institución jurídica se construye el Sistema Jurídico. Ahora debe determinarse como se configuran dichos elementos y como debe elaborarse los mismos. La relación jurídica está dada como resultado de la vida misma, que aparece en su compleja y concreta trama166. Esta idea implica observar la verdadera relación jurídica real. Ello tiene sentido, pues debemos observar en la realidad de la vida social del país, que los ciudadanos tienen modos o hábitos propios para mandar, u ordenarse, unos a otros, para comprar, vender, poseer y usar los bienes, si es que observamos las actividades patrimoniales. En otros aspectos, debemos observar que también tienen hábitos en la ropa que usan, en las comidas, en las relaciones de pareja, y para ir más allá podemos apreciar la música que escuchan o bailan, a que horas son sus comidas, como son sus festividades, entre otros aspectos de la vida en sociedad, en el Perú. Los referidos hechos dan lugar, dentro de las relaciones de vida, que unos adquieran Derechos y otros contraigan obligaciones, entonces, cada relación con trascendencia jurídica configura un conjunto de obligaciones y Derechos. Luego, el conjunto de relaciones estructura la institución jurídica, en ese sentido, si agrupamos las relaciones, por ejemplo, vinculadas al tráfico de los bienes, podemos comprender la institución jurídica del contrato; si las relaciones se refieren a la relación de dominio sobre las cosas, nos referiremos a la institución de la propiedad; si es el caso de las relaciones de pareja estas dan lugar a una institución jurídica que es la familia; si se publicados entre 1840 y 1849. Vid. Rodríguez Paniagua, Historia del Pensamiento Jurídico, op. cit. p. 417. 163 Los conceptos de relación jurídica e institución como elementos del sistema jurídico son atribuidos en la doctrina jurídica a Savigny, quien elaboró dicho esquema en un ensayo elaborado en 1836. También hay que destacar que esta idea tuvo como precedente la obra de otro jurista alemán F. STAHL que también había desarrollado la figura sistemática del Derecho, en el otoño de 1833, en un trabajo de filosofía jurídica. Vid. W WILHELM, op.cit. p. 43. 164 W. WILHELM. op.cit. p. 21. 165 W. WILHELM. op.cit. p. 57. 166 W. WILHELM, op. cit. p. 46. 407 trata de relaciones de mando u organización, estaremos refiriéndonos a la institución del poder, del gobierno, y también del Estado. Por último el conjunto de instituciones, debidamente articuladas y coligadas unas con otras da lugar al Sistema Jurídico. El objetivo de la sistemática del Derecho es conocer y representar el ligamen interno o la afinidad de las reglas jurídicas (relaciones) y de las instituciones comprendiéndolas en conjunto como una gran unidad. 167 El sistema de Derecho se basa sobre la realidad, no sobre abstracciones o teorías jurídicas; en ese sentido, la ordenación sistemática del Derecho se funda en las condiciones reales de la vida humana. La elaboración sistemática del Derecho, en la idea de Savigny consiste no una simple ordenación de aspectos formales –lógicos, sino más bien en la elaboración del conjunto de las instituciones jurídicas en una íntima concatenación con la esencia de la actividad humana en la cual se va insertar. 168 En esa estructura, la relación jurídica viene a ser la relación de hecho regulada por el Derecho. Por otro lado la relación de hecho se da entre personas singulares, al estar jurídicamente prescritas, dan lugar a las reglas de Derecho o normas jurídicas. 169 En ese sentido, las normas de Derecho (leyes) deben estar en inmediata conexión con las relaciones de hecho. De ese modo observamos que toda relación jurídica, para ser tal, debe tener dos elementos, uno material y otro formal, el primero referido a su vinculación con la realidad y el segundo a su determinación jurídica (texto legal). Las relaciones jurídicas contienen reglas y normas de Derecho, se estructuran a su vez en unidades sistemáticas superiores, como son las instituciones jurídicas. Estas a su vez representarían la esencia y el centro del sistema jurídico. Toda relación jurídica se encontraría bajo o dentro de una institución, por ejemplo, las diversas relaciones referidas a la unión de hombre y mujer, relaciones de matrimonio, relaciones paterno –filiales, patria potestad, alimentos, etc., están comprendidas dentro de una institución jurídica que llamamos "Familia" o "Derecho de Familia". El mismo esquema se plantearía para el Derecho del Contrato, el Derecho Patrimonial, o el Derecho de Personas, entre otras instituciones jurídicas. En esta perspectiva el Derecho no significaría sólo un conjunto conceptual de normas jurídicas, sino además y esencialmente una estructura de relaciones jurídicas realmente ordenadas en instituciones (Familia, Patrimonio, Contratos, Estado, etc.). El Derecho, entonces, conformaría un sistema jurídico y no un simple agrupamiento de leyes. El Derecho sería así un conjunto orgánico de relaciones e instituciones jurídicas. 170 167 W. Wilhelm, op.cit. p. 51. 168 W. Wilhelm, op.cit. p. 53. 169 Rechtssatz – máxima jurídica o Rechtsregel – regla jurídica. Vid. W. Wilhelm, op.cit. p. 42. 170 W. Wilhelm, op. cit. p. 44. En este aspecto, el jurista argentino Carlos COSSIO precisó que el mérito más destacable de Savigny es destacar que el jurista debe observar la experiencia jurídica, ello es el dato empírico o temporoespacial, para conocer el Derecho. Vid. La teoría egológica del Derecho, 2a Edic., editorial Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1964, Pág. 20. En igual forma, en su obra La valoración jurídica y la ciencia del derecho, EDICA. Arayu, Buenos Aires, 1954, p. 44. 408 Resulta pertinente la afirmación acerca del concepto de Derecho del Profesor español Angel LATORRE, quien precisa, el Derecho no existe para ser objeto de reflexiones y elaboraciones académicas, sino para ser aplicado.171 El grado de aplicación o su vigencia social depende del grado de compatibilidad de los preceptos contenidos en las normas jurídicas con las relaciones humanas de una comunidad. De acuerdo a ello – precisa LA TORREsi un sistema jurídico no logra en su conjunto ese grado razonable de eficacia no puede considerarse como verdadero Derecho positivo. Agrega, resulta inevitable, entonces, una referencia a la realidad dentro de una análisis de eficacia del Derecho, de lo contrario el Derecho se convertiría en una mera entelequia. 172 El Sistema Jurídico, de ese modo, debe respetar fielmente y en lo posible las relaciones jurídicas reales. La elaboración del sistema jurídico consistiría entonces, no en un ordenamiento racional del Derecho – en base a teorías o doctrinas jurídicas – sino en la reconstrucción de la realidad misma. El Derecho no es volviendo a Savigny producto exclusivo de la razón, en ese sentido, afirma que "el Derecho no se ha de entender como algo que surge racionalmente en las mentes de los juristas". Al contrario, el Derecho debe concebirse como el resultado de la situación, las necesidades y la conciencia o convicciones de la sociedad. 173 Las instituciones jurídicas, pues deben comprenderse en un sistema "natural" que debe desarrollarse en el tiempo. Conforme a ello, si las relaciones jurídicas reales se transforman entonces el Derecho debe transformarse y al mismo tiempo el sistema. En ese sentido, cada país debe tener su propia formación jurídica y su propio sistema jurídico.174 (W. 51) Consideraba Savigny que el Derecho de una nación debía ser como su arte, su literatura, y filosofía, reflejo inmediato de sus condiciones sociales y valores, producto de su espíritu. En tal sentido, entendemos que el Derecho no debe ser impuesto desde el exterior, pues ello implicaría una arbitraria interferencia en el desarrollo de una sociedad. A efecto de comprender el Derecho en su verdadera naturaleza, Savigny consideró necesario darle un tratamiento científico, como dijimos elaborando el concepto de "sistema". En ese contexto la visión de la realidad debe efectuarse desde un punto de vista histórico y otro sistemático, para ordenar las reglas e instituciones jurídicas. Esos elementos, son los dos presupuestos de una perspectiva científica del Derecho. La Ciencia Jurídica o Dogmática Jurídica tiene dos aspectos: una histórica y otra sistemática. Una doble sensibilidad es indispensable al jurista – plantea Savigny – la histórica para comprender plenamente lo peculiar de cada época y de cada forma jurídica y la sistemática para examinar cada concepto y cada máxima en un ligamen viviente y 171 Vid. ANGEL LATORRE, Introducción al Derecho, Edit. Ariel, Madrid 2002, p. 70. 172 A. Latorre, op. cit. p. 71. 173 Peter G. STEIN, El Derecho romano en la historia de Europa, Siglo XXI Editores, Madrid 2001, p. 163. 174 W. Wilhelm, op. cit. p. 51. 409 recíproco con el todo, esto es, en la relación que es la única verdadera y natural. 175 En dicha idea se observa también el propósito de una producción científica del Derecho, para superar sobre todo la naturaleza de un Derecho receptivo y mimético. La perspectiva sistemática del Derecho lleva también a concebir una transformación y modernización de la Dogmática jurídico científica. Esta es la observación también que se infiere de la investigación desarrollada por PÁSARA, quien precisa graves deficiencias en la enseñanza del Derecho en nuestro país. Al hablar de Ciencia Jurídica, nos referimos también a las líneas de su metodología, la cual en la práctica no se desarrolla. Ese es otro aspecto de nuestra cultura jurídica, el hecho que no hemos desarrollado una Ciencia Jurídica propia. El nivel del conocimiento sistemático del Derecho no alcanza ni el primer nivel de la Dogmática Jurídica, es decir, si bien existen algunos trabajos y obras jurídicas, éstas se limitan a describir las normas jurídicas, y en otros casos a elaborar criterios de interpretación y aplicación. No se han desarrollado trabajos que permitan SISTEMATIZAR el Derecho o los campos de la Ciencia Jurídica (Derecho Civil, Penal, Mercantil, entre otros), conforme a las relaciones de hecho que van surgiendo en la realidad y a las necesidades que esa realidad exige. El nivel máximo de la Ciencia Jurídica no se ha logrado, pues la evidencia es la crisis del Derecho. Ello demuestra que desde la Dogmática Jurídica no se han elaborado los criterios para la modernización de las instituciones jurídicas. Los procedimientos de aplicación, de interpretación y de perfeccionamiento del Derecho deben estar orientados por una concepción sistemática del Derecho. En esta idea están comprendidas las tres funciones o niveles de la ciencia jurídica, ellos son: i) establecer criterios para la interpretación y aplicación del Derecho; ii) elaborar esquemas conceptuales que permitan sistematizar el conocimiento del Derecho; iii) establecer criterios para la modernización y desarrollo del Derecho. En este aspecto ATIENZA176 precisa que la sistematización del Derecho constituye la función de la Ciencia Jurídica que ayuda a cumplir las otras funciones, antes descritas. En ese sentido, la finalidad de la Dogmática o Ciencia Jurídica es la de controlar – contribuir a controlarlos procesos de interpretación, aplicación, desarrollo y cambio del Derecho. A ese efecto el jurista deberá construir, formular conceptos, métodos y teorías, labores que se concretan en una sistematización y descripción del Derecho vigente. Precisa ATIENZA que en todo caso, no debe entenderse como objetivo último la transmisión de conocimientos y la descripción ordenada de un cierto sector del ordenamiento jurídico (simple enseñanza del Derecho). Serían actividades subordinadas pero no el objetivo final de una Ciencia Jurídica. El jurista, entonces, debe completar la labor con una sistematización del Derecho, pues su interpretación y aplicación es esencialmente la reconstrucción de un todo, partiendo de la vida real del país, para elaborar las reglas, las relaciones jurídicas, las instituciones jurídicas, para llegar al Sistema. 175 W. Wilhelm, op. cit. pp. 19, 20. 176 ATIENZA, Manuel, "Sobre la jurisprudencia como técnica social". Revista Doxa, No 3, Madrid, 1986, p. 305. Vid. Igualmente su libro Introducción al Derecho, Edit. Barcanova, Barcelona, 1985. 410 Por último, cabe destacar el concepto de "ciencia jurídica productiva" para evitar que el Derecho se desenvuelva sólo de modo receptivo (mimetismo jurídico). Decían los juristas alemanes "ahora somos solicitados y empujados además de a recibir a producir"177. (Subrayado nuestro). Entonces, se avanza de una jurisprudencia receptiva a una productiva, dinámica, que propugne el desarrollo y modernización del Derecho. Estaríamos hablando así de la función política jurídica de la Metodología y la Ciencia Jurídica, en vista a diseñar una "Política del Derecho" o "Política Jurídica". LA MODERNIZACIÓN DEL DERECHO La concepción sistemática del Derecho, conforme a las pautas explicadas en el punto anterior, requiere de una línea metodológica que permita concretar el fortalecimiento del Derecho en la sociedad contemporánea y de acuerdo a la dinámica social de cada país. De hecho, aún conservamos esquemas jurídicos del siglo XIX, tenemos el caso del Código de Comercio, que data de 1902 y es copia del Código de Comercio español de 1885. La cuestión es ¿cómo plasmar las relaciones humanas de la realidad, en relaciones jurídicas, preceptos, reglas, normas e instituciones y en un todo dentro del sistema jurídico? No es tan simple trasladar todo el conjunto de costumbres, hábitos, formas de vida, creencias, etc. al ordenamiento jurídico. Debemos descartar también los "malos hábitos". En primer lugar surge el dilema para escoger el patrón cultural, más aún que en nuestro país hay una diversidad cultural. A ello se añade que nuestra sociedad, como cualquier otra del mundo, enfrenta conflictos al momento de elaborar el Derecho. En la concepción sistemática del Derecho las relaciones de hecho (realidad social) deben reestructurarse como relaciones jurídicas. La teoría de la racionalidad jurídica de Jürgen HABERMAS, sin embargo178, observa que ese proceso de "legalización de las relaciones 177 IHERING (1857) y KUNTZE (1865). Vid. Wilhelm, op. cit. P. 82. DE SOTO, en el artículo reseñado anteriormente, decía, "¿Cuándo tendremos juristas –políticos de la talla de Von Stein o R.V. Ihering?, que le dieron a Alemania los primeros instrumentos para rejuvenecer el derecho romano de manera permanente y poniéndolo en contacto con la sociedad. 178 Jürgen HABERMAS (1929 - ) filósofo alemán contemporáneo, el pensador más importante de la segunda generación de la Escuela de Frankfurt, ha sido galardonado en Oviedo, España con el Premio Príncipe de Asturias de Ciencias Sociales 2003. Habermas está considerado como uno de los pensadores más importantes del mundo, su obra es muy extensa y diversa. Desde el ámbito de la filosofía Habermas ha influenciado en la teoría social, la lingüística, la educación, la psicología, la ética, y por cierto, en la teoría del Derecho, que ahora nos atañe. Su obra referida al Derecho es Facticidad y validez. Sobre el Derecho y el Estado democrático de Derecho en términos de teoría del discurso. Traducida al español y que lleva la 4ta Edic. por la Editorial Trotta, Madrid 2005. La obra fundamental de este autor es La teoría de la acción comunicativa, 2 Vols. 1984,1987. Vid. acerca de este filósofo J. Sitton, Habermas y la Sociedad Contemporánea, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2006. 411 sociales" no debe desplazar la "acción comunicativa", pues de lo contrario no lograría el entendimiento y el acuerdo entre los miembros de una sociedad o país, desde el Derecho. Esa observación es pertinente pues uno de los fines del Derecho es buscar la paz, la armonía y el orden social. HABERMAS efectúa una aplicación de su "teoría de la acción comunicativa" a la problemática jurídica y concretamente a la cuestión de la validez de las normas jurídicas. En ese sentido, la idea propuesta es que la validez de una norma en la realidad depende de su legitimidad o validez racional179. La función de integración social atribuida al Derecho solo es posible si las normas poseen un elemento de legitimidad que supera la simple imposición coactiva. Habermas habla de "sociedades complejas" o lo que podríamos decir sociedades del siglo XXI. En ese contexto, el Derecho del siglo XIX que rigió también en el siglo XX, estuvo fundamentado en la concepción del orden jurídico, la legitimidad del Estado y el respeto a la autoridad. El esquema jurídico de los siglos pasados consistía en el cumplimiento de las normas o en caso contrario en la aplicación de la coacción y sanción, sin embargo, esta estructura jurídica se ha debilitado a finales del siglo XX y hoy es deficiente, originando la crisis del Derecho. Entonces, lo que se pretende rediseñar es el concepto de la ley, en el sentido que, debe fundamentarse su legitimidad. La legitimidad de la norma jurídica es independiente de su imposición fáctica, depende del modo en que la norma jurídica es creada (nomogenésis jurídica). En ese sentido, y de acuerdo a Habermas, la norma jurídica es legítima cuando sus destinatarios participan como autores racionales de la misma, es decir, cuando el proceso de creación del Derecho recoge también el proceso de argumentación y del consenso, lo que se denominaría también como proceso democrático de producción de la ley sin distorsiones. Con esta propuesta de validez de la norma jurídica, la teoría de Habermas garantiza, por un lado la legalidad de la conducta regulada por la norma y por otro, la legitimidad de la norma misma. De acuerdo a ello, este esquema pretende lograr mayor eficacia del Derecho, esencialmente en lo que se refiere al cumplimiento de la ley, con base en el previo acuerdo y diálogo. Ello dependerá de que el proceso de formación de la ley sea más democrático, es decir, que los destinatarios de las normas se sientan autores o participes de las mismas. Con ello se superaría el esquema clásico, conforme al cual es la autoridad (órgano del Estado) o Poder Legislativo quien determina el contenido de la norma jurídica. En el esquema de Habermas son los destinatarios o interesados en una ley quienes determinarían su contenido. La autoridad o el Poder Legislativo se encargarían de garantizar que el "acuerdo", del modo más fidedigno posible se plasme en la ley, y una vez concretada la norma (promulgación) se encargarían de su cumplimiento. El proceso 179 GARCIA AMADO, Juan Antonio. "La Filosofía del Derecho de Jürgen Habermas", DOXA, Revista Electrónica de Filosofía del Derecho, N° 13, Madrid, 1993, pp. 235-258. 412 de participación de los destinatarios en la elaboración de la norma debe reunir las condiciones de debate, consenso y armonización de intereses. Considero que en este esquema no estarían comprendidos los procesos de consulta pública, cuya legitimidad a veces es cuestionada, dado que no constituyen un proceso jurídico puro de producción legal, sino que se presentan con mucha incidencia política.180 La tesis de Habermas demuestra que, en las sociedades del siglo XXI el Derecho positivo es insuficiente para fundamentar las normas jurídicas y lograr su eficacia social. En ese sentido, precisa como un proceso argumentativo (debate de intereses jurídicos) puede legitimar con más eficacia las bases del ordenamiento jurídico. El Derecho moderno, en ese sentido, debe ser racional y basarse en el debate, en la argumentación, en el intercambio de ideas y conjugación de intereses, en fin, en lo que Habermas denomina "la acción comunicativa". Esta propuesta moderna para lograr un procedimiento racional en la producción de la Ley tiene implicancias importantes en la "institucionalización" 181 de la sociedad desde el punto de vista jurídico. Una de las exigencias para la reforma y modernización del Estado viene del lado de la institucionalidad que, en nuestro país, distintos sectores (económico principalmente) vienen exigiendo para lograr o acelerar el desarrollo. Cabe destacar también la función que se le asigna a la autoridad (sea de gobierno – aparato administrativo del Estado o del legislativo) en este esquema de formación racional del Derecho. A ese efecto, para que la Ley sea aceptada racionalmente por todos, la autoridad, que ejerce el poder, tendría que aplicar un proceso, por el cual, el poder circule comunicativamente. Entonces, el Sistema Jurídico tendría que institucionalizar los medios y formas (canales) para que el procedimiento formación racional de la ley se logre. Dicho procedimiento involucra las entidades del aparato administrativo del Estado – entre sí – y como conjunto de Gobierno con otros poderes, los poderes entre sí, y el conjunto del Estado con los grupos, colectivos o personas que representan los intereses en la sociedad (asociaciones, clubes, organizaciones sociales, sindicatos, confederaciones, etc.). En otras palabras, las protestas en las calles serían el medio menos idóneo para hacer conocer las exigencias sociales o económicas de diversos sectores del país. En ese 180 Como refiere GARCIA AMADO, la aceptación o aquiescencia de los destinatarios (ciudadanos) a una norma para "sentirse" autores de las mismas puede inducirse con los medios y las técnicas del Estado Moderno. Precisa GARCIA AMADO, "...sabido es que los dictadores de toda laya suelen sancionar con plebiscitos triunfantes sus más ambiciosas iniciativas legales". op. cit. p. 237. De esto también habla Giovanni SARTORI en lo que se refiere a la influencia de los medios de comunicación, principalmente a la televisión en los procesos políticos, llámese a esto "video política" en el planteamiento del "hommo sapiens y hommo videns". Vid. de Giovanni SARTORI. Homo videns. La sociedad teledirigida, Madrid, Taurus, 1998. 3a edición, 2001. 181 Op. cit. GARCIA AMADO, p. 254. 413 contexto, debe fortalecerse el diálogo, el mismo que debe pasar a ser parte de la cultura del país. El dialogo en todo momento y a cada momento, y en todo nivel. En ese caso, no considero suficiente los procedimientos que ya se han implementado, y que no han dado resultado, como son las mesas de concertación o el llamado "Acuerdo Nacional". Lo que se necesita es que la sociedad respire la cultura del diálogo. La posibilidad del debate, la confrontación de ideas (discurso y argumentación racional) debe darse en forma natural, sin formalidades. Los grupos de interés deben estar en condición de armonizar sus pretensiones con otros grupos para lograr leyes de consenso. En esa línea convendría fortalecer las asociaciones182 y las organizaciones sociales. Finalmente, conviene destacar que el Derecho se fortalece, en el sentido que, se convertiría en el mejor instrumento, a través del cual el poder comunicativo (o el poder que ha circulado comunicativamente) se transmita al sistema administrativo. Ese sería el fundamento de la legitimidad del Derecho y de su prevalencia183 frente a otros poderes o intereses de grupos o personas, pues consagra el interés general. De ese modo, la Ley que surge de un previo acuerdo y armonización de intereses, tendría más eficacia y un mayor grado de aceptación social y cumplimiento. Así lograríamos elevar el nivel del Derecho, el prestigio de los abogados, de los jueces y rescatar el verdadero papel de la Ley en nuestra sociedad. CONCLUSIÓN La primacía del Derecho y la Ley son elementos fundamentales de la cultura jurídica de un país. Por ello, al observar que el Derecho en nuestro país se encuentra de espaldas a la realidad, cabe determinar la necesidad de una modernización jurídica. Es imperativo superar la idea de un "fracaso del Derecho" o de la "decadencia del Derecho". La sociedad tiene que volver a valorar el papel del Derecho y de la Ley, por ello los juristas tienen que perfilar la reforma del Derecho. La eficacia del Derecho o como se denomina "vigencia social", depende de la existencia del Sistema Jurídico. Nosotros, si bien contamos con un determinado ordenamiento jurídico, no tenemos las bases de un verdadero Sistema Jurídico. El Sistema Jurídico es importante, pues permite que las relaciones de hecho puedan ser reguladas por el Derecho, dando lugar a configurar las relaciones jurídicas y luego en base a estas, estructurar las instituciones jurídicas (familia, contratos, propiedad, gobierno, etc.). Todos estos elementos conforman un todo, una unidad que permite que el 182 En este aspecto, se observa que la regulación del Código Civil sobre las asociaciones es insuficiente, pues, no se logra en la práctica un proceso democrático y una verdadera representación de intereses. Sobre esta idea ver de CIEZA MORA, Jairo, "Las organizaciones sociales en el Perú", Revista CATHEDRA, Espíritu del Derecho, Revista de los Estudiantes de Derecho de la Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, Año VI, N° 10, Lima, 2003, pp. 321-333. Se destaca en este artículo la necesidad de una regulación sistemática de las asociaciones, en igual forma la implementación de un marco normativo aplicable a las organizaciones sociales. 183 Vid. GARCIA AMADO, op. cit. P. 245. 414 derecho "funcione" y funcione bien. El Sistema Jurídico permite que la cultura del país se plasme en el Derecho. El Derecho debe plasmar en forma armónica el conjunto de intereses de la sociedad, que provienen en función de su idiosincrasia, hábitos, costumbres, valores, etc. A ese efecto es importante destacar la "racionalidad aplicada al Derecho", de modo que, la ley debe ser producto de la argumentación, del debate producido por los mismos grupos de intereses. Los destinatarios de la norma jurídica deben sentirse autores de la misma. Este mecanismo permitiría lograr una mayor eficacia del Derecho y cumplimiento de la Ley. Sería conveniente plantear: i) Una "Política del Derecho" o "Política Jurídica" cuyas líneas y objetivos sean parte de una labor PERMANENTE de una "Comisión Legisladora" o "Comisión Jurídica". Ese cuerpo consultivo, ad honorem, debería estar conformado por representantes de los profesores de derecho y abogados DE TODO EL PAIS, por igual. Ello permitiría que las diversas materias jurídicas sean discutidas a partir de la realidad. Permitiría igualmente proyectar hacia futuro el ordenamiento jurídico que necesita el país. ii) La enseñanza jurídica debe reorientarse hacia los fundamentos de la Ciencia Jurídica y su metodología, y no limitarse a la acumulación memorística de textos, doctrinas, leyes y citas. Hay que elevar el nivel de la cultura jurídica y destacar la importancia de la Ciencia Jurídica para el desarrollo social. iii) "El poder debe circular comunicativamente". Con esta idea debe considerarse el diálogo como parte de la cultura diaria del país para hacer las leyes. La creación de la norma jurídica y su modificación debe ser fruto del debate permanente. iv) Las leyes deben ser publicadas conjuntamente con la exposición de motivos correspondiente, formando su texto parte de la ley. Ello permitiría que los ciudadanos conozcan las razones por las que se crea o modifica una norma legal y los fines que se pretende con ello en la realidad normada. BIBLIOGRAFIA ATIENZA Manuel, "Sobre la jurisprudencia como técnica social", Revista Doxa, No 3, Madrid, 1986, p. 305. ATIENZA Manuel, Introducción al Derecho, Edit. Barcanova, Barcelona, 1985. AVENDAÑO VALDEZ Jorge, "¿Ha fracaso el derecho?, Diario El Comercio, Lima 08 de enero de 2002 CIEZA MORA, Jairo, "Las organizaciones sociales en el Perú", Revista CATHEDRA, Espíritu del Derecho, Revista de los Estudiantes de Derecho de la Universidad Mayor de San Marcos, Año VI, N° 10, Lima, 2003. COSSIO Carlos, La teoría egológica del Derecho, 2a Edic., editorial Abeledo Perrot, Buenos Aires, 1964. COSSIO Carlos, La valoración jurídica y la ciencia del derecho, EDICA. Arayu, Buenos Aires, 1954. DAVID WESSEL, "El gen de la buena economía", The Wall Street Journal, setiembre de 2001. 415 DE SOTO, Hernando, "¿Por qué no se cumple la ley en el Perú? Se equivoca usted presidente Paniagua", Diario El Comercio, página editorial, Lima 13 de febrero de 2002, p. A 15. G. STEIN Peter, El Derecho romano en la historia de Europa, Siglo XXI Editores, Madrid 2001. GARCIA AMADO Juan Antonio, "La Filosofía del Derecho de Jürgen Habermas", DOXA, Revista Electrónica de Filosofía del Derecho, N° 13, Madrid, 1993 HABERMAS Jürgen, Facticidad y validez. Sobre el Derecho y el Estado democrático de Derecho en términos de teoría del discurso, 4ta Edic. Editorial Trotta, Madrid 2005. HABERMAS Jürgen, La teoría de la acción comunicativa, 2 Vols. 1984,1987. J. SITTON, Habermas y la Sociedad Contemporánea, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2006. LATORRE Angel, Introducción al Derecho, Edit. Ariel, Madrid 2002. PASARA PAZOS Luis, "La enseñanza del Derecho en el Perú: sus consecuencias para la Administración de Justicia". Informe elaborado para el Ministerio de Justicia, marzo de 2004, publicado en el Diario El Peruano el 06 de julio de 2004. RODRÍGUEZ PANIAGUA José María, Historia del Pensamiento Jurídico, Tomo II, Servicio de Publicaciones Facultad de Derecho, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1993. SARTORI Giovanni, Homo videns. La sociedad teledirigida, Madrid, Taurus, 1998. 3a edición, 2001. WILHELM Walter, La Metodología Jurídica en el Siglo XIX, Editorial Revista de Derecho Privado, Madrid, 1980, Trad. Rolf Bethmann. BIOGRAFIA Doctor en Derecho por la Universidad Complutense de Madrid – España, Abogado por la Universidad Católica de Santa María – Arequipa. 416 CAPITULO IV CIENCIAS DE LA SALUD Y MEDIO AMBIENTE 417 MANEJO DE HUMEDALES POR LAS COMUNIDADES EN LA COSTA DEL PERÚ: EL CASO DE EL BALSAR DE HUANCHACO Dr. Víctor Pulido * Resumen En la costa norte del Perú, en el Departamento de la Libertad, Provincia de Trujillo, Distrito de Huanchaco, a 50 m de la línea costera del Océano Pacífico se encuentra ubicado el Balsar de Huanchaco. Se han registrado 64 especies de plantas: 16 de Fanerógamas y 48 de algas. La vegetación es halófita, sumergida y anfibia. En relación a la fauna se han identificado 62 especies, 32 de invertebrados y 30 de aves acuáticas entre residentes y migratorias. El Balsar, un humedal único en la costa peruana, por su carácter artificial, tiene una superficie de 46.72 ha. Contiene 160 pozas, donde se cultiva la totora (Scirpus californicus), que en su mayor parte crece de manera vigorosa. De la totora los pescadores construyen el "caballito de totora", que les permite incursionar en el mar para el desarrollo de la pesca artesanal, la cual constituye una importante fuente de recursos económicos para su subsistencia. Palabras claves: Conservación, humedales, aves, migratorias, rutas de migración, América * Biólogo con mención en Zoología. Magister Scientiae en Conservación de Recursos Forestales en la Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina. Doctor en Ciencias Biológicas de la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos. Secretario Académico de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. 1. Introducción En la Costa Pacífica del Perú, la zona litoral que es árida intertropical, posee un clima cálido y seco debido al efecto de la Corriente marina fría de Humboldt, que fluye de sur a norte a lo largo de la costa. Las neblinas que se forman en el mar penetran algunos kilómetros tierra adentro pero no llegan a precipitar lluvias. Los valles costeros aparecen como "oasis fluviales" que están formados por suelos aluviales, depositados por los ríos. En esta región la vegetación es escasa y sólo en las orillas de los ríos y en ciertos lugares próximos al mar hay vegetación arbustiva permanente. En la costa norte del Perú, en el Departamento de la Libertad, Provincia de Trujillo, Distrito de Huanchaco, a 50 m de la línea costera del Océano Pacífico se encuentra ubicado el Balsar de Huanchaco. humedad relativa es de 82% y las precipitaciones son menores a 150 mm. Los suelos 418 superficiales son arenosos con limitado potencial para el uso agrícola y pecuario. El agua de las pozas de los totorales es salobre y de origen subterráneo; probablemente combinada con filtraciones de aguas marinas, dada su ubicación a menos de 100 m de la orilla del mar. Se han registrado 64 especies de plantas: 16 de Fanerógamas y 48 de algas. La vegetación es halófita, sumergida y anfibia. En relación a la fauna se han identificado 62 especies, 32 de invertebrados y 30 de aves acuáticas entre residentes y migratorias. El Balsar, un humedal único en la costa peruana, por su carácter artificial, tiene una superficie de 46.72 ha. Contiene 160 pozas, donde se cultiva la totora (Scirpus californicus), que en su mayor parte crece de manera vigorosa. De la totora los pescadores construyen el "caballito de totora", que les permite incursionar en el mar para el desarrollo de la pesca artesanal, la cual constituye una importante fuente de recursos económicos para su subsistencia. Estos humedales usando el Sistema de Clasificación para Tipos de Humedales de la Convención Ramsar, están bajo la categoría de Humedales Hechos por el Hombre, debido a que están constituidos por pozas artificiales. 2. Aspectos legales, de política y contexto gubernamental El 23 de enero de 1992, la Asamblea Regional del Gobierno de la Libertad, mediante -92-AR-LL-VRHT, declaró Area Regional Protegida, en la categoría de Reserva Extractiva, sobre una superficie de 46.72 ha, "El Balsar de Huanchaco". La Resolución, prohíbe dentro de los límites de la Reserva, realizar construcciones de vivienda, pozas artesanales, infraestructura vial para el tráfico pesado, apertura de canteras, arrojo de desmonte y cualquier otra actividad que impacte negativamente sobre los recursos naturales ubicados en la Reserva. Los integrantes de la Asociación de Pescadores del Balsar de Huanchaco, son los posesionarios de la tierra y quienes conducen las acciones de manejo de manera sostenible. Las únicas prácticas de manejo adyacentes del uso de la tierra son las de utilizar las playas para fines de esparcimiento que no afectan directamente al humedal; porque tanto el límite norte como el este, son áreas desérticas. El sistema político que impera a través del gobierno local que es el municipal en el Distrito de Huanchaco es la democracia con particular énfasis en la participación ciudadana. El Alcalde es la máxima autoridad del Distrito y su cuerpo directivo está conformado por Regidores; todos son elegidos por el voto popular. La sociedad local es relativamente abierta y pluralista aunque la gente es usualmente poco expresiva en sus opiniones. El apoyo que brindan las autoridades locales es incierto y ello depende mucho de la administración de turno. Algunos alcaldes han favorecido la ampliación de la frontera urbana hasta los límites del Balsar y otros como el actual Alcalde están tratando de revertir esta situación que atenta contra la integridad del balsar. Actualmente la actitud del Concejo Provincial de Trujillo y del Distrito de Huanchaco en relación a la participación de la gente en el manejo de los recursos es positiva. 3. Las Poblaciones locales 419 El Distrito de Huanchaco está conformado por zonas urbanas y rurales. En la zona urbana se encuentra la infraestructura administrativa conformada por la Municipalidad Distrital de Huanchaco y de servicios públicos médico, policial, postal, religioso, etc. En el sector privado existe una fuerte proporción de servicios en hoteles y restaurantes, ventas de adornos en base a totora y conchas de gasterópodos, lo que constituye la mayor fuente de ingresos para la población urbana local. En el ámbito rural la población conformada por los pescadores desarrollan la pesca artesanal y el cultivo de los totorales, como medio básico de subsistencia. En algunos casos complementan estas actividades con trabajos de carpintería y albañilería. Los pescadores en general presentan buen estado de salud, dado que utilizan los recursos del mar para su alimentación y viven en un ambiente saludable. La mayoría de los pescadores dada su fortaleza física llegan a superar los 70 años de vida, edad a la cual se retiran de la actividad pesquera artesanal. En relación a la educación, los pescadores solo tienen los primeros grados de instrucción. Pero la mayoría de sus hijos tienen educación primaria y secundaria completa; incluso algunos de ellos con formación universitaria. Los pescadores incluyendo a sus familias llegan aproximadamente a 500 personas. El número promedio de personas por familia es de seis, padre madre y cuatro hijos. La emigración por lo general no supera el 10%; y la realizan los hijos de los pescadores que llegan a tener altos niveles de educación, quienes se integran al mercado de trabajo de la ciudad de Trujillo. La mayor parte de la población vive en estado de pobreza; aunque su calidad de vida es buena. Ello se debe a que la pesca artesanal es una actividad fluctuante. Algunas veces la pesca solo les permite satisfacer sus necesidades básicas de subsistencia. La mayoría poseen casa propia con servicios de agua potable y alcantarillado, al haberse integrado al entorno urbano del Distrito de Huanchaco. Este aspecto favorece a que no haya mayormente proliferado enfermedades de carácter infeccioso. Incluso la epidemia del cólera que afectó al Perú en 1990, no tuvo efectos en la población por las medidas sanitarias preventivas que se adoptaron. Los pescadores son descendientes directos de las culturas preincas Moche-Chimú, con 2,000 años de historia. La Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco que maneja los humedales son ocupantes históricos y poseen la legal jurisdicción sobre la tierra y el uso de los recursos. El mayor valor de los humedales para los pescadores constituye la totora de donde fabrican los caballitos de totora y para las otras poblaciones asentadas en el Distrito de Huanchaco es el turismo tanto nacional como internacional. En general toda la población que reside en Huanchaco se beneficia directa o indirectamente de la existencia del Balsar. Las ventajas económicas son varias. Los pescadores que desarrollan la pesca artesanal como una de sus principales actividades productivas, construyen los caballitos de la totora para la navegación, lo que les permite prescindir de embarcaciones como botes a motor con el consiguiente ahorro de combustible. El caballito de totora es una de las más importantes atracciones en Huanchaco, donde cada año se realizan competencias internacionales. Es utilizado para correr olas de forma parecida a la "tabla hawaiana". En 420 las competencias internacionales existe una considerable incremento del turismo y los hoteles y restaurantes se ven favorecidos. Los pescadores están organizados a través de la Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco que es una organización legalmente constituida e integrada solo por pescadores artesanales residentes en el área a la cual acceden también los hijos de los pescadores cuando ellos llegan a la edad adulta y adoptan como medio de vida la pesca. La Asociación tiene una Junta Directiva que es dirigida por un Presidente y está conformada por un Secretario, un Tesorero. Los cargos para la Junta Directiva son elegidos democráticamente por un período de dos años por los integrantes de la Asociación. El resto de la población de Huanchaco no tiene un modo de organización directamente relacionado con la existencia del Balsar. Ellos están organizados en relación a las actividades que desarrollan, como las agencias de turismo, restaurantes, venta de adornos en las ferias artesanales, etc. El único aglutinador de todos los usuarios es el gobierno local representado por el Municipio de Huanchaco. El mayor conflicto en el área se debe al uso de la tierra. Huanchaco es el balneario a donde acude la población de Trujillo en la época de verano. La población de Trujillo cada año tiene mayores requerimientos de casas de verano en Huanchaco; de tal modo que la ampliación de la frontera urbana actualmente ha llegado a los límites del Balsar. Estas iniciativas de desarrollo urbano para satisfacer los requerimientos del crecimiento poblacional temporal (época de verano) constituyen la principal amenaza sobre el Balsar. 4. Conservación y valor del Balsar El Balsar por su cercanía al mar, está fuertemente influenciado por la Corriente Fría del Mar Peruano, lo que le confiere particulares valores paisajísticos, climáticos y biológicos. Dada su categoría de protección regional, no se encuentra considerada dentro del Sistema Nacional de Areas Protegidas por el Estado. El valor del balsar reside en la alta productividad primaria de la totora. Las parcelas de Huanchaco tienen una productividad en biomasa seca de 29.6 TM/ha/año. Considerando que se trata de un sistema que requiere de un mínimo de mano de obra, la inversión es pequeña. Probablemente puede ser considerado entre los sistemas no fertilizados más bioproductivos del planeta. Aunque su diversidad biológica es baja comparada con otros humedales costeros, las playas de Huanchaco sirven tanto de apostadero como de lugar de paso de aves migratorias, en su ruta de migración a lo largo de la costa Pacífica de América del Sur (Pulido et al., 1996). El estado de conservación de los humedales del Balsar de Huanchaco es bueno. Ello se basa fundamentalmente en los beneficios que brinda a la población local. Entre los beneficios directos más resaltantes se tiene la producción artesanal de totora, en la cual se rescatan tecnologías de uso tradicional; la pesca de especies para consumo humano que se convierte en una fuente importante de proteína animal; y el turismo. Y entre los beneficios indirectos se tiene el mantenimiento de las capas freáticas para la agricultura, el almacenamiento de agua, el control de las inundaciones, la estabilización de la línea costera y la absorción de contaminantes. 421 El "El Balsar" es un humedal único en la costa peruana, por su carácter artificial, donde se cultiva la totora y se maneja racional y sostenidamente. Esta actividad, que favorece el desarrollo de la pesca artesanal para los pescadores de la región, constituye una importante fuente de recursos económicos para la subsistencia de los pobladores de Huanchaco. Uno de los aspectos más importantes del balsar es que se hizo a iniciativa de los pescadores y sus excelentes resultados no le deben nada a la dirección técnica externa. Por su fácil acceso, a sólo 15 minutos en auto desde Trujillo (Capital del Departamento de La Libertad), es visitado por turistas nacionales y extranjeros y por la población urbana, que buscan esparcimiento así como entrar en contacto con la naturaleza. En la mayoría de los casos, los impactos y las amenazas que existen sobre el humedal pueden ser controlados debido a que su magnitud no es muy grande. Los balsares son ecosistemas muy frágiles, cualquier uso intensivo del agua al interior de los valles cercanos, repercutirá en el nivel del agua subterránea. Se estima que el descenso de 15 cm en el nivel del agua de los balsares, puede causar la mortandad de la mayor parte de los totorales, lo cual dejaría sin este recurso básico indispensable a los pescadores de Huanchaco. El Balsar se encuentra amenazado por efecto de la ampliación de la frontera urbana y la contaminación producida por los desagües urbanos que son arrojados en los alrededores. Como el balsar colinda con el balneario de Huanchaco, se ve frecuentemente amenazado y esta situación deviene en conflictos por el uso del área. Una amenaza potencial es que el litoral costero adyacente al Balsar es utilizado principalmente en verano como lugar de esparcimiento por la población urbana de Trujillo, situada a aproximadamente 20 km de la zona urbana. De no ser regulada esta actividad, el exceso de visitantes podría alterar el ecosistema por efecto de la contaminación urbana y sobrepasar la capacidad de carga del área. Por ello es inaceptable cualquier acción que reduzca la ya disminuida área de los balsares. En realidad los totorales de Huanchaco constituyen la auténtica expresión del manejo de un recurso natural renovable orientado al desarrollo sustentable. 5. Historia y prácticas de manejo del balsar Desde antes de las culturas Preincas, aproximadamente 2,000 años AC, la población rural ha utilizado los humedales para su supervivencia. En la costa peruana, los valles de los ríos y las llanuras han sido las áreas de concentración de las poblaciones humanas (Castro et al., 1996). Aunque la contribución de los humedales a la economía ha sido mayormente ignorada, un sector de la población rural depende de ellos, como único medio para satisfacer sus necesidades básicas de subsistencia (Pulido et al., 1992, Castro et al., 1990). Según Franco (1995), los antiguos pobladores le llamaban "wachaque" a las pozas donde crecen los totorales. Por lo que es probable que de esta palabra provenga el nombre de Huanchaco. En la ciudadela de Chan Chan, de más de 2000 años de antigüedad, todavía se pueden observar restos de "wachaques". En Chan Chan estaban situados los totorales más grandes y antiguos, pero con el posterior desarrollo de la agricultura fueron drenados y la totora empezó a secarse. Al desaparecer los antiguos balsares de Chan Chan, los pescadores transplantaron la totora a Huanchaco y alrededores. 422 Los caballitos navegaban por las costas desde antes de los Mochicas. Pero en los tiempos antiguos también se conocieron embarcaciones mayores de totora como los "patachos". Cuenta la leyenda que de uno de ellos bajó su Santa Patrona la Virgen del Socorro. Son embarcaciones que se han perdido en el tiempo al igual que la pesca colectiva. La historia figura en innumerables muestras cerámicas. En ellos se ve como provistos de grandes redes, los caballitos se hacían a la mar, tendían la red entre ellos y la recogían por los cabos. La pesca era tan grande como la fiesta que después celebraban. De tal modo que el caballito está al final de una familia de embarcaciones prehispánicas las cuales se deben conservar. El caballito es más que una figura romántica a la que se aferran quienes añoran un pasado prehispánico; en realidad responde a las necesidades de una economía pesquera de pequeña escala como es Huanchaco, donde abundan los peñascos cerca a la orilla y no hace falta ir mar afuera. Cuando un pescador tiene que decidir entre el uso de un bote y un caballito se decide por el caballito. Los pescadores que han tenido botes con motor dicen que su mantenimiento es muy costoso; y si el bote es con remo tiene que remar solo y pesa demasiado; se tiene que salir mar afuera y esperar la tranquilidad de las olas; además los pescadores que siempre han seguido con el caballito les sacaban ventaja rápidamente. El caballito es más liviano y dúctil porque le permite desplazarse por la orilla esquivando las olas. La construcción del "caballito de totora" puede durar a veces entre tres y cuatro semanas, dependiendo del tiempo disponible de los pescadores. Pero la vida útil de los "caballitos de totora" es corta. Pueden navegar sobre el mar, de acuerdo a la intensidad de uso, de uno a dos meses. Cuando la pesca es abundante los pescadores construyen dos y hasta tres caballitos a la vez y los utilizan interdiario. El manejo del Balsar por parte de los pescadores es una actividad eminentemente comunitaria. El hecho de estar agrupados en una Asociación les ha traído una serie de beneficios pero también les impone deberes y responsabilidades. En su condición de Asociación de Pescadores Artesanales de Huanchaco, se les entregó la conducción del Balsar, mediante Resolución Legislativa Regional de 1992, lo cual les confiere un control absoluto sobre la propiedad de la tierra y el uso de los recursos que en ella se producen. Asimismo se prohíbe cualquier actividad que impacte negativamente sobre los recursos ubicados en la Reserva. Este aspecto les ha conferido seguridad para cualquier acción de manejo sostenible en el tiempo. El manejo del Balsar permite el mantenimiento del humedal con fines productivos y la protección de la diversidad biológica. Dado su carácter artificial permanentemente se realizan trabajos de rehabilitación de las pozas causada por los ocasionales derrumbes de arena dentro de las mismas. En algunos casos excepcionales con la subida de la marea, las pozas se inundan de agua y arena y se pierde la producción de totora ese año, hasta que sean restauradas. Los pasos seguidos por los pescadores para el manejo de las pozas son los siguientes: Características de las pozas. El tamaño promedio de las pozas es de 120 m2, las dimensiones son de 20 x 6 m y la profundidad varia entre 130 y 150 cm, determinada por el nivel del agua. El cavado de una poza es difícil porque se hace con lampa y la arena removida se acumula en los bordes. Los pescadores remueven un m3 de arena en 3 horas y para abrir una poza de 20 m demoran 10 días. 423 Siembra. De pozas adyacentes se extraen las raíces de totora que se cortan de 20 a 40 cm y se le elimina las espigas, para que cuando se planten sobresalgan del agua. Las raíces son enterradas bajo el agua a una distancia de 50 cm. Altura. Las pozas de mejor producción tienen totoras de 375 cm de altura. Desraizado. Se realiza cada 4 a 8 años, cuando las raíces plantadas superan el nivel del agua y la producción baja drásticamente. Se trata de cortar trozos de raíces y evacuarlas de la poza, para después profundizar más el nivel del agua y plantar nuevas raíces. Muros de contención. Los muros de protección se construyen con totora descartada y evitan que la acción del viento tumbe la totora tierna y que se quemen las puntas de las espigas con el aire. Mantenimiento de los bordes y quema de grama. El mantenimiento de los bordes de las pozas se realiza durante el desraizado. La quema de la grama salada se hace para evitar que invada los bordes de las pozas. Cosecha: Se realiza en función al tamaño y la densidad de las plantas. El tiempo promedio para la cosecha es de 12 meses y dura entre uno y tres días. Corte de totora. La realiza una persona y consiste en el corte de la totora a 2 cm por encima del espejo de agua. Cuando la poza está seca se corta a 20 cm de la raíz. Los cortes son limpios para impedir que el agua entre en el parénquima central y se pudra el tallo y la raíz. Una vez fuera, la totora es parada al borde de la poza durante dos días, después se traslada a un sitio descampado y se esparce en el suelo para el secado. Aquí se da la primera selección de la totora, la segunda selección se produce cuando se confecciona el caballito, esteras, canastas etc. El manejo del Balsar y la participación comunitaria de los pescadores se enmarca en el camino del uso sabio de los humedales propugnada por la Convención Ramsar. 6. Participación de los pescadores, otros actores y convenios en el manejo del Balsar Los únicos que tienen un rol activo en el manejo del Balsar son los pescadores agrupados en la Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco. Esto se debe a que el Balsar es un humedal artificial construido por los pescadores para la producción de totora con el objeto de satisfacer los requerimientos de materia prima de este recurso para la construcción del caballito de totora. Los pescadores tienen derecho a tener de dos a tres pozas. El sistema no es necesariamente hereditario y parece no regirse por reglas estrictas. Las mujeres generalmente no poseen pozas, pero realizan trabajos como la selección de la totora, el tendido para el secado y el tejido de esteras. Aunque existe una tendencia de los jóvenes a dedicarse a otras actividades, se pueden encontrar pescadores de menos de 20 años poseedores de pozas, lo que indica que esta práctica tiene futuro. El manejo del área, control y vigilancia es realizado por la Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco. El Balsar cuenta con un Plan de Manejo, que ha sido elaborado, mediante un 424 proceso participativo. Para la elaboración del Plan se efectuaron las siguientes acciones: recopilación de información sobre el área en recursos biológicos, hídricos, edáficos, climáticos, turísticos, sociales y otros; concertación con las organizaciones, locales, regionales y nacionales, involucradas en la conservación del Balsar; organización de talleres participativos y validación de los acuerdos; redacción del Plan de Manejo y aprobación del Plan de Manejo por la Autoridad Municipal. Se conformó un Comité de Seguimiento integrado por las organizaciones locales más representativas relacionadas con la conservación y manejo del Balsar, el cual supervisó, coordinó y adoptó las medidas necesarias para que el Equipo de Planificación desarrolle la elaboración del Plan de Manejo en concordancia con los fines para los cuales fue establecido el Balsar de Huanchaco. Se conformó un Equipo de Planificación multidisciplinario que tuvo a su cargo la elaboración del Plan de Manejo, mediante un proceso participativo. El Equipo de Planificación trabajó de manera coordinada bajo la dirección del Jefe del Equipo de Planificación y ha informado periódicamente al Comité de Seguimiento de los avances en el desarrollo del Plan. Estuvo conformado por un consultor en recursos biológicos (Jefe del Equipo), un consultor en aspectos Socioeconómicos, uno en Planificación, uno en Agronomía y Forestales, uno en Turismo, Arqueología e Historia y uno en Derecho Ambiental. Los criterios para la elaboración del Plan de Manejo incluyen una visión integral; es decir el ámbito de acción del Plan tiene en consideración las áreas adyacentes y en lo posible se ha orientado hacia un Plan de ordenamiento marino costero, en concordancia con la planificación establecida por el Concejo Provincial, para el desarrollo de la Provincia de Trujillo. La elaboración del Plan de Manejo se basó en los lineamientos establecidos por la autoridad nacional competente que es la organización responsable para la conservación de áreas protegidas y los recursos biológicos así como la Autoridad Representativa ante la Convención Ramsar. 7. Evaluación crítica y lecciones aprendidas El factor crucial que promueve el involucramiento de los pescadores directamente en el manejo del humedal así como de la población local se basa en los beneficios económicos que les reporta. El Balsar es el elemento fundamental en la zona. Si el Balsar no existiera, Huanchaco dejaría de ser para los pescadores una zona productiva y económicamente activa durante todo el año, con mayor incidencia durante los fines de semana, días en los cuales el pescado es comercializado más intensamente. Solamente tendría actividad de enero a marzo que es la época en la que es visitada como lugar de veraneo. La elaboración del Plan de Manejo del Balsar ha sido prioritaria, ya que permitió compatibilizar intereses así como involucrar a la población en el proceso de planificación. El éxito obtenido, se debe a que se dirigió un esfuerzo considerable al fortalecimiento de las relaciones entre los diferentes actores. La coordinación entre las organizaciones es fundamental debido a los diferentes fines y ámbitos de competencia de cada una de ellas. La estrategia estuvo basada en la ejecución de actividades orientadas hacia objetivos comunes que garantizan el manejo del área y a la vez permitan asegurar su desarrollo 425 sustentable. Este proceso de integración ha partido de un diagnóstico participativo y una base social dispuesta a asumir el proceso en beneficio mutuo. Y ha sido conducido partiendo de la integración de las necesidades e intereses de los pobladores locales y los conductores del balsar. Para ello, los lugareños han recibido información adecuada sobre los elementos que convierten al balsar en una zona de importancia especial y al mismo tiempo se les ha proveído de los elementos técnicos necesarios para mejorar su calidad de vida. Paralelamente se ha trabajado en la búsqueda del soporte político y técnico, que brindan las organizaciones regionales y nacionales. Aunque las organizaciones no gubernamentales locales han intentado focalizar parte de sus esfuerzos en el fortalecimiento del manejo del Balsar los resultados han sido infructuosos, debido a que no han tenido capacidad para conseguir financiamiento y también a que no se han organizado apropiadamente. El Programa de Humedales, ha ejecutado diversas acciones en el Balsar, conjuntamente con la Asociación de Pescadores Artesanales de Huanchaco. Estas acciones que se han ejecutado con la participación de la población han generado una serie de beneficios, entre los cuales tenemos: Demarcación del área. Construcción de letreros de señalización, donde se efectuaron inscripciones alusivas a la conservación del Balsar y se establecieron hitos de delimitación en los sectores norte y sur del Balsar para evitar la invasión de la población urbana aledaña. Productividad del Balsar. Se realizó un estudio sobre la productividad primaria del Balsar que muestra las primeras pruebas de la alta productividad de este ecosistema. Plantaciones Forestales. El manejo de plantaciones forestales se ha orientado a fortalecer la participación comunal de los pescadores en la protección y producción de totora, elevar el ingreso de los pescadores y sus familias y contribuir a mejorar las condiciones ecológicas de la zona. En la forestación del área perimétrica del balsar se han utilizado especies forestales nativas, de probada adaptabilidad a las condiciones ecológicas del lugar. El trasplante y mantenimiento de 250 plantones en terreno, todavía en fase experimental, ha brindado resultados satisfactorios: 80% de éxito en la adaptación de plantones al terreno. En las plantaciones forestales se prevé implementar un apiario (crianza de abejas); lo que permitirá la explotación de miel de abeja, con los altos beneficios alimenticios y económicos, que ello otorga al productor. Todas estas actividades han generado un mayor entusiasmo y atención tanto de los pescadores como de las autoridades locales, principalmente el Concejo Provincial de Trujillo y el Municipio Distrital de Huanchaco así como de los propietarios de restaurantes y hoteles de la zona, porque se ven como señales de mejoras ambientales. 8. Perspectivas para el Balsar Los pescadores dependen fundamentalmente de la totora para construir los caballitos de totora que les permite desarrollar la pesca artesanal, actividad básica para su 426 subsistencia. El principal apoyo que se les debe proporcionar es el asesoramiento técnico para optimizar las técnicas de manejo para incrementar la producción y la productividad del Balsar, así como implementar proyectos de desarrollo alternativos como plantaciones forestales, y herramientas de trabajo. Para asegurar el desarrollo sustentable del Balsar es necesario fortalecer la participación de todas las personas e instituciones, que tienen interés en su conservación. Por ello la planificación participativa es el mecanismo que permite promover la gestión, investigación y manejo sustentable del balsar. Complemento importante es el desarrollo de investigaciones con especial énfasis en la productividad del área, a través de la realización de tesis de grado por parte de estudiantes de ciencias biológicas y sociales, así como proyectos de investigación ejecutados por investigadores independientes y de organizaciones locales. Otro aspecto resaltante es que esta experiencia puede ser replicada por otras comunidades locales u organizaciones dedicadas a la conservación de recursos naturales, en cualquier lugar de la costa peruana dada su facilidad para implementarla, su bajo costo así como por su estructura participativa. El éxito del manejo del Balsar estará asegurado en la medida que los pescadores sigan siendo los manejadores del recurso y se respeten sus decisiones. 9. Recomendaciones a. Promulgar normas legales destinadas a fortalecer la base jurídica para la protección de áreas de manejo de humedales. b. Reconocer que la importancia del Balsar está relacionada directamente con la subsistencia de los pescadores así como con otros valores ecológicos, económicos y sociales para la Región. c. Promover la recuperación de las técnicas tradicionales de manejo de humedales que no producen mayor impacto en el ambiente. d. Replicar la experiencia de manejo del Balsar en áreas vecinas de la costa que presentan condiciones ecológicas similares. e. Fortalecer la organización de la Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco. f. Fortalecer el reconocimiento de la necesidad de consulta a las poblaciones para que los responsables de la administración de los recursos tengan en cuenta sus intereses. g. Promover la participación de los usuarios en la toma de decisiones a nivel de la Región, mediante el establecimiento de Comités de Gestión que permitan el involucramiento de la sociedad civil h. Favorecer la participación de la Asociación de Pescadores de Huanchaco en el Comité Nacional Ramsar, actualmente a cargo del Programa de Humedales Perú. i. Promover entre la ciudadanía los valores del Balsar de Huanchaco como ejemplo de uso sabio. j. Establecer en lo posible Cartas de Entendimiento formales entre los usuarios, como entre los usuarios y las organizaciones cooperantes. k. Promover el respaldo a las acciones de gestión y manejo por parte de los Gobiernos locales y de la Autoridad Nacional ante la Convención Ramsar. l. Favorecer la creación de una cultura de respeto a los usos por parte de las poblaciones locales en el manejo de los humedales. 427 V. Literatura Citada Castro, G., E. Ortiz, y L. Bertochi. 1990. Importancia biológica y conservación de la laguna El Paraíso. Boletín de Lima, Lima. (71): 47-55. Castro, G., V. Pulido, T. Valqui, J. Chávez y B. Alva. 1996. The Huanchaco Extractive Reserve: Integrating Environmental Conservation and Sustanaible Development in Peru A Report. Ethnobiology in Human Welfare, New Delhi. 239-242. Franco, O. 1995. Totorales, los últimos caballitos de Huanchaco. Rev. Somos, El Comercio. (442): 24-28. V. Pulido. Conservación de las aves migratorias, Rutas de migración en las Américas. Exégesis. Revista de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Año 1, Febrero 2008. (1): 62-67 pp. V. Pulido. Análisis Histórico de la pérdida de hábitats en la conservación de las aves de los Pantanos de Villa. Universidad. Edición 2008. N° 11. Asamblea Nacional de Rectores. Lima. 247-306. pp. V. Pulido. El camino sin retorno: la extinción de las especies de fauna silvestre en el Perú. Universidad. Edición 2009. N° 15. Asamblea Nacional de Rectores. Lima. 173-215. pp. V. Pulido. Aves peruanas amenazadas y en peligro de extinción: propuestas para su conservación. Exégesis. Revista de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Año 2. 2009. I (2): 62-67 pp. V. Pulido. Documento Base para la Elaboración de una Estrategia de Conservación de los Humedales de la Costa Peruana. PRONATURALEZA-Conservación Internacional. Convención Ramsar. 2010. V. Pulido. Conservación de Humedales y Aves Acuáticas en la Costa Peruana. Exégesis. Revista de la Escuela de Posgrado de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Año 3. 2010. I (3): 77-86 pp. Pulido, V., G. Castro, M. Ríos, G. Suárez de Freitas y J. Ugaz. 1992. Bases para el Establecimiento del Programa de Conservación y Desarrollo Sostenido de Humedales Perú. DGFF-INIAA-UNALM-FPCN-RHRAP, Lima. 39 pp. 428 POLÍTICA Y NORMATIVIDAD AMBIENTAL DE LA CONTAMINACIÓN Dr. Pedro Antonio Martínez Letona Introducción La política ambiental es el conjunto de los esfuerzos políticos para conservar las bases naturales de la vida humana y conseguir un desarrollo sustentable184. Se inserta dentro de las políticas públicas, que constituyen declaraciones o interpretaciones generales que guían o encauzan el pensamiento de los actores para la toma de decisiones; definen áreas dentro de las cuales se puede tomar decisiones y aseguran que éstas sean congruentes con un objetivo y contribuyan a alcanzarlo185. Durante los últimos decenios hemos aprendido que no es posible continuar ignorando el creciente impacto de las actividades humanas sobre el ambiente biofísico del cual somos parte. La calidad ambiental ha sido afectada por el desarrollo de actividades extractivas, productivas y de servicios sin medidas adecuadas de manejo ambiental, una limitada ciudadanía ambiental y otras acciones que se reflejan en la contaminación del agua, del aire y del suelo. El deterioro de la calidad del agua es uno de los problemas más graves del país. Entre sus principales causas están los vertimientos industriales y domésticos sin tratamiento (el 70% de los vertimientos domésticos no son tratados y sólo en Lima se vierten al menos 400 millones de m3/anuales de aguas servidas al mar)186, así como el uso indiscriminado de agroquímicos, el de insumos químicos en la producción de drogas ilegales y en la minería informal. La contaminación del aire también presenta retos importantes, sobre todo en los lugares con alta concentración intradomiciliaria, sobre todo por las prácticas inadecuadas en el uso de la leña, la bosta y otros combustibles. Se estima que el 81% de residuos sólidos no son conducidos a rellenos sanitarios. En Lima se cuenta con 5 rellenos sanitarios y 6 en el resto del país, además de numerosos botaderos informales187. Otros problemas relevantes, son el inadecuado manejo de los residuos peligrosos industriales y urbanos y la existencia de un gran número de pasivos ambientales. 184ALAY RAMOS, Oswaldo. Política Ambiental y Desarrollo Sostenible en el Perú y la región Arequipa. En: http://paradigmasambientales.wordpress.com/legislacion-ambiental/ 185 BÉJAR, Héctor. Política Social, justicia social, CEDEP, Lima 2001, p. 14. 186POLÍTICA NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE. Decreto Supremo No 012-2009-MINAM de 23 de Mayo de 2009. Ministerio del Ambiente – MINAM, p.5. 187 POLÍTICA NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE. Decreto Supremo No 012-2009-MINAM de 23 de Mayo de 2009. Ministerio del Ambiente – MINAM, p.5. 429 Ante estos peligros eminentes, las consideraciones ambientales han pasado a ocupar un lugar prominente en las estrategias y políticas de desarrollo en prácticamente todos los países del mundo. 1 Contenido 1.1. LA POLÍTICA NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE La Constitución Política del Perú dispone en su artículo 67 que el Estado determina la política nacional del ambiente. Es en cumplimiento de este mandato que el MINAM aprobó por decreto supremo 012-2009-MINAM de mayo del año 2009 la política nacional del ambiente, cuyo objetivo es mejorar la calidad de vida de las personas, garantizando la existencia de ecosistemas saludables, viables y funcionales a largo plazo y el desarrollo sostenible del país, bajo el principio de respeto de los derechos fundamentales de la persona. Y es que, habiendo la Constitución reconocido a la persona como fin supremo de la sociedad y del Estado, se privilegia en este ámbito el derecho fundamental a gozar de un ambiente equilibrado y adecuado al desarrollo de la vida188. La Política Ambiental Nacional, constituye el conjunto de lineamientos, objetivos, estrategias, metas, programas e instrumentos de carácter público, que tiene como propósito definir y orientar el accionar de las entidades del Gobierno Nacional, Regional y Local, y del sector privado y sociedad civil, en materia ambiental189. Está formulada a partir de los lineamientos de Política de Estado sobre Desarrollo Sostenible y Gestión Ambiental y los establecidos en la Ley General del Ambiente y la consideración de la situación ambiental del país. 1.2. EJES TEMÁTICOS DE GESTIÓN AMBIENTAL a. Eje de Política 1: Conservación y aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales y de la diversidad biológica: Este eje tiene como objetivo el conservar y aprovechar sosteniblemente la diversidad biológica, los recursos naturales renovables y no renovables del país. Asimismo, busca establecer condiciones de acceso controlado y aprovechamiento de los recursos genéticos, así como la distribución justa y equitativa de sus beneficios. En esta misma línea, se busca asegurar mecanismos para el uso responsable y seguro de la biotecnología y sus productos derivados, así como garantizar la protección de la salud humana, el ambiente y, la diversidad biológica durante el desarrollo, uso y aplicación de bienes y servicios de la biotecnología moderna en el Perú. 188CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ DE 1993. Artículo 2 inc.) 22. 189ANDALUZ WESTREICHER, Carlos. Manual de Derecho Ambiental. PROTERRA, Lima 2006, p.390. 430 b. Eje de Política 2: Gestión Integral de la calidad ambiental: El objetivo de este eje es lograr una gestión sostenible de las actividades productivas, extractivas, de transformación, comerciales y de servicios, para asegurar una adecuada calidad ambiental en el país, desarrollando y consolidando mecanismos de carácter técnico, normativo, económico y financiero, para la prevención y control de los impactos ambientales negativos significativos de las actividades de origen natural y antrópico. Esto debe materializarse logrando el control eficaz de las fuentes de contaminación y de los responsables de su generación, estableciendo instrumentos y mecanismos para la vigilancia, supervisión, evaluación y fiscalización ambiental, así como incorporando criterios de ecoeficiencia y control de riesgos ambientales y de la salud en las acciones de los sectores público y privado. c. Eje de Política 3: Gobernanza ambiental: Este eje busca posicionar el tema ambiental en las decisiones de Estado, articulando las capacidades nacionales, creando sinergias y promoviendo una activa participación ciudadana. Igualmente, se busca lograr que el Sistema Nacional de Gestión Ambiental ejerza, de manera eficiente y eficaz, sus funciones en los tres niveles de gobierno, bajo la rectoría del MINAM. Asimismo, se busca construir nuevos modos de producción y vida basados en los principios de la sostenibilidad, la ética, la inclusión social y la justicia ambiental. d. Eje de Política 4: Compromisos y oportunidades internacionales: Este eje busca asegurar que las posiciones nacionales en materia ambiental presentadas en los foros internacionales y en acuerdos multilaterales y bilaterales, estén articuladas y reflejen los intereses nacionales, contribuyendo a orientar las decisiones de dichos foros y acuerdos. Con esto podrá lograr que el cumplimiento de los acuerdos internacionales suscritos y ratificados por el Perú contribuya eficientemente al aprovechamiento sostenible de los recursos naturales renovables y al uso racional y responsable de los no renovables. Además, se busca conseguir que en los procesos de integración comercial, se homogenicen los criterios y estándares ambientales con las políticas nacionales en materia de comercio exterior, para mejorar la gestión ambiental, la competitividad, la protección de los recursos naturales y la calidad de vida de la población. e. 1.3. NORMATIVIDAD AMBIENTAL PERUANA LEY GENERAL DEL AMBIENTE (LEY No 28611): La Ley General del Ambiente vigente recoge los principios internacionales en materia de protección y conservación del ambiente, los recursos naturales, el daño ambiental, entre otros. Asimismo, ha confirmado el carácter transectorial de la gestión ambiental en el país, ahora coordinado a nivel nacional a través del Ministerio del Ambiente. Si bien el derecho a un ambiente adecuado y equilibrado para el desarrollo de la vida se encuentra recogido como un derecho fundamental en el numeral 22o del Artículo 2o de la Constitución Política; el primer artículo del Título Preliminar de a 431 Ley General del Ambiente califica a este derecho como irrenunciable y señala que viene aparejado con el deber de conservar el ambiente. Dos conceptos importantes, sobresalen en esta ley190:  Estándar de Calidad Ambiental (ECA) es la medida que establece el nivel de contración o del grado de elementos, sustancias o parámetros físicos, químicos o biológicos, presentes en el aire, agua o suelo, en su condición de cuerpo receptor, que no representa significativo para la salud de las personas ni al ambiente191. Entre los Estándares de Calidad Ambiental tenemos por ejemplo:  Decreto Supremo N° 003-2008 MINAM. Aprueban Estándares Nacionales de Calidad Ambiental para Aire (21 de agosto de 2008).  Decreto Supremo N° 002-2008 MINAM. Aprueban Estándares Nacionales de Calidad Ambiental para Agua. (31 de julio de 2008).  Límites Máximos Permisibles (LMP) son definidos por la legislación ambiental peruana como "la concentración o grado de elementos, sustancias o parámetros físicos, químicos y biológicos que caracterizan a un efluente o a una emisión, que al ser excedido puede causar daños a la salud, bienestar humano y al ambiente"192. La característica más importante de los LMP, es que su cumplimiento es exigible legalmente; es decir, el titular de la actividad productiva que no cumpla con los mismos puede ser pasible de sanción. Entre los Límites Máximos Permisibles tenemos:  Resolución Ministerial N° 011-96-EM. Aprueban los niveles máximos permisibles para efluentes líquidos para las actividades minero-metalúrgicas. (13 de enero de 1996).  Resolución Ministerial N° 315-96-EM/VMM. Aprueba niveles máximos permisibles de elementos y compuestos presentes en emisiones gaseosas provenientes de las unidades minero-metalúrgicas. (19 de julio de 1996). Es responsabilidad del Ministerio del Ambiente dirigir el proceso de elaboración y revisión de los ECA y LMP y, en coordinación con los sectores correspondientes, elaborar o encargar las propuestas de ECA y LMP para su aprobación, mediante Decreto Supremo. En otros, el MINAM deberá tomar en cuenta, para la elaboración de los ECA y LMP, las normas establecidas en la materia por la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS) o de las entidades de nivel internacional especializada en temas ambientales. LEY DEL SISTEMA NACIONAL DE EVALUACIÓN DEL IMPACTO AMBIENTAL (LEY No27446): Constituye un sistema único y coordinado de identificación, prevención, supervisión, control y corrección anticipada de los impactos 190MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE. "Calidad del Ambiente". En: Compendio de la Legislación Ambiental Peruana. Volumen V. Gráfica Técnica, Lima 2011, p.3. 191Numeral 31.1 del artículo 31o de la Ley General del Ambiente. 192Debemos precisar que todo el marco legal relacionado con LMP y ECA presenta esta definición. 432 ambientales negativos derivados de las acciones humanas expresadas por medio de los proyectos de inversión, sean públicos o privados, y que procura establecer mecanismos que aseguren la participación ciudadana193. La Ley General del Ambiente establece que toda actividad humana que implique construcciones, obras, servicios y otras actividades, así como las políticas, planes y programas públicos susceptibles de causar impactos ambientales de carácter significativo, está sujeta, de acuerdo a ley, al SEIA. En ese sentido, la Ley No 27446 señala que ningún privado podrá dar inicio a ninguna actividad, ni autoridad alguna de los tres niveles de gobierno podrá autorizarla, si es que esta no cuenta con la certificación ambiental, expedida por la autoridad correspondiente. Además, la norma establece la categorización de proyectos de acuerdo a su impacto ambiental. Debemos indicar que la certificación ambiental, es la resolución, emitida por autoridad competente, que aprueba o desaprueba un instrumento ambiental (ya sea EIA, PAMA, EIA detallado, etc.) indicando las consideraciones técnicas y legales que apoyan la decisión, así como las condiciones adicionales surgidas de la revisión del instrumento ambiental, si las hubiera, autorizando la ejecución de la acción o proyecto propuesto194. LEY GENERAL DE RESIDUOS SOLIDOS (LEY No27314): El manejo adecuado de los residuos peligrosos no solo es una preocupación ambiental sino que está íntimamente relacionada con la salud de la población195. En consecuencia es importante la priorización de que tiendan a reducir la generación de residuos sólidos peligrosos en la producción y consumo, son indispensables para preservar la salud de las personas y del ambiente. La gestión y manejo de residuos sólidos debe integrar e involucrar los niveles de gobierno local, regional y central, en forma coordinada permite una mejor aplicación y sostenibilidad de los planes y acciones ambientales. 2.4. POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES EN EL MUNDO 2. 4.1. POLÍTICA AMBIENTAL DE EE.UU.196 La política ambiental de Estados Unidos es relevante para el mundo entero, tanto por el impacto ecológico que produce una economía de esa magnitud y nivel de consumo, como por el protagonismo internacional de esa nación. Su Gobierno ha suscrito menos instrumentos jurídicos internacionales que cualquier otro, y no es parte de instrumentos de alto perfil, como el Protocolo de Kyoto sobre el Cambio Climático (1997), el Convenio sobre Diversidad Biológica y su Protocolo sobre Bioseguridad (1992), el Convenio de Basilea sobre Movimientos Transfronterizos de Desechos Peligrosos y su Eliminación (1989), la Convención de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Derecho del Mar (1982), el 193ANDALUZ WESTREICHER, Carlos. Manual de Derecho Ambiental. PROTERRA, Lima 2006, p.442. 194 MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE. "Calidad del Ambiente". En: Compendio de la Legislación Ambiental Peruana. Volumen V. Gráfica Técnica, Lima 2011, p.4. 195Ibidem, p.75. 196FERNÁNDEZ-RUBIO LEGRÁ, Ángel.Doctor en Ciencias Jurídicas Profesor Titular del Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales y de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de la Habana."El Derecho Ambiental en EE.UU".http://www.cubasolar.cu/biblioteca/energia/Energia43/HTML/Articulo10.htm 433 Convenio sobre la Conservación de Especies Migratorias de Animales Silvestres (1979); y el Protocolo sobre la Protección de Bienes Culturales en caso de Conflicto Armado (1986), entre otros que aunque los ha ratificado o se ha adherido a ellos, los viola regularmente. Otro aspecto a resaltar, es que la Constitución de EE.UU. no recoge una mención explícita al derecho de los ciudadanos a gozar de un medio ambiente adecuado o sustentable, como aparece hoy día en la gran mayoría de las constituciones de América Latina y el Caribe. Con el fin de resolver esta situación, algunos Estados incluyeron una cláusula en sus respectivas constituciones, reconociendo la protección ambiental como derecho consagrado a escala constitucional. Esta situación existe en la Constitución del Estado de Pennsylvania (Artículos 1 y 27), de Rhode Island (Artículos 1 y 17) y de Illinois (Artículo XI.2).  La Ley Nacional de Política Ambiental: El origen de esta norma, TheNationalEnvironmentProtecciónAct (NEPA), se encuentra en la última década de los años sesenta, y sus aspectos más relevantes se encuentran en la Sección 2 de la Ley, en donde se afirma que el propósito de esta Ley es: «Declarar una política nacional que estimule la armonía productiva y agradable entre el hombre y su ambiente: para promover esfuerzos que eviten o mitiguen daños en el ambiente y la biósfera, promuevan la salud y el bienestar del hombre; para enriquecer la valoración de los ecosistemas y los recursos naturales importantes para la nación, y establecer un Consejo de Calidad Ambiental».  La Agencia de Protección Ambiental: La EnvironmentalProtection Agency (EPA) es una Agencia dependiente directamente de la Oficina Ejecutiva del Presidente de EE.UU., con una estructura bastante compleja. La Agencia Federal tiene su sede central en Washington. La EPA es el resultado de la agrupación de áreas o campos de acción de hasta diez Agencias independientes precedentes en el tiempo y en las que se encuentran, entre otras, la División de Regulación de Pesticidas, en el Departamento de Agricultura; la Administración Federal de Calidad del Agua, y la Oficina de Salud Radiológica, en el Departamento de Salud, Educación y Bienestar. 2.4.2. POLÍTICA AMBIENTAL EN BRASIL197 En los estándares latinoamericanos, la legislación ambiental brasileña es considerada como una de las mejores. La Amazonía constituye el marco de referencia más fuerte de la política ambiental, fuertemente ligado a los recursos naturales de Brasil. De ahí que aquellos aspectos vinculados a los recursos de sus cuencas hidrográficas, su impacto y estrategias de protección, ocupan un lugar predominante a la hora de legislar y aplicar políticas ambientales. Por ello, Brasil cuenta con una Secretaría de Recursos Hídricos, la cual forma parte de la estructura del Ministerio de Medio Ambiente y del Sistema Nacional de Administración de los Recursos Hídricos, estando entre sus principales atribuciones la formulación de la Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos, y la colaboración administrativa, técnica y financiera al Consejo Nacional de Recursos Hídricos. La construcción de hidroeléctricas, tema en el que Brasil es pionero en Sudamérica, ha cobrado mayor importancia en las ultimas décadas dada la crisis mundial energética, y el innegable crecimiento industrial brasileño. Las hidroeléctricas, son planteadas como una alternativa a la provisión energética, dada la evidente necesidad de generar fuentes 197"Políticas para un desarrollo sustentable en Brasil". En: http://www.mma.gov.br. 434 menos contaminantes de energía en un contexto de crisis climática global. Una muestra de este desarrollo sostenible a nivel de Recursos Hídricos es la Represa de Itaipú la cual detallamos a continuación.  La Represa de Itaipú:La Represa Hidroeléctrica de Itaipú (del guaraní, "piedra que suena"), la primera en tamaño en operación del mundo, es un emprendimiento binacional entre Paraguay y Brasil. Está ubicada sobre el río Paraná en la frontera entre estos dos países, en la ciudad de Hernandarias, a 14 km al norte del Puente de la Amistad. El área implicada en el proyecto se extiende desde Foz do Iguaçu, en el Brasil, y Ciudad del Este, en el Paraguay, al sur, hasta Guaíra (Brasil) y Salto del Guairá (Paraguay), al norte. Considerada además como la Represa más grande del mundo el cual no pudo ser superada por la Presa de las Tres Gargantas, en China.La ventaja que posee Itaipú sobre las Tres Gargantas es la situación del agua: el Río Paraná, donde se encuentra la Itaipú, tiene un gran volumen de agua todo el año. La importancia de Itaipú radica en la gran magnitud de energía eléctrica que produce, la cual en promedio llega a 90 millones de megavatios-hora (MWh) por año, aunque con el aumento de la capacidad y en condiciones favorables del río Paraná se puede llegar a incrementar esa cantidad. En 2008, la represa de Itaipú alcanzó un nuevo récord histórico de producción de energía, con la generación de 94 684 781 MWh. El récord anterior era en el 2000, cuando Itaipú generó 93 427 598 MWh. La energía producida por Itaipú en el 2008 sería suficiente para abastecer el consumo de electricidad de todo el mundo durante dos días; o para satisfacer por un año un país como la Argentina, y a Paraguay para abastecerlo durante once años. Por otra parte, durante un año podría satisfacer el consumo de electricidad de veintitrés ciudades del tamaño de Curitiba. La represa de Itaipú es el resultado de intensas negociaciones entre los dos países durante la década del 1960. El 22 de junio de 1966, el ministro de Relaciones Exteriores del Brasil y el de Paraguay, firmaron el "Acta de Iguazú", una declaración conjunta que manifiesta la predisposición para estudiar el aprovechamiento de los recursos hídricos pertenecientes a los dos países, en el trecho del Río Paraná "desde e inclusive el Salto de Sete Quedas hasta el estuario del Río Iguazú". Una de las cláusulas del proyecto firmado por ambos países prevé que el excedente de energía que no es utilizado por uno de los países será vendida en exclusividad al otro país participante del proyecto. En 1970 el consorcio formado por las empresas Industrial Electric Company (IECO) de los Estados Unidos y ELC ElectroconsultS.p.A. de Italia ganaron el concurso internacional para la realización de los estudios de probabilidades y para la elaboración del proyecto de la obra. El inicio del trabajo se dio en febrero de 1971. El 26 de abril de 1973, Brasil y Paraguay firmaron el Tratado de Itaipú, instrumento legal para el aprovechamiento hidroeléctrico del río Paraná por los dos países, siendo el 17 de mayo de 1974, creada la entidad binacional Itaipú para la administración de la construcción de la represa. 3. Conclusiones y Recomendaciones Como hemos podido observar, las políticas ambientales establecen los cursos de acción que emprenderá el Estado para asegurar un ambiente sano y el desarrollo sostenible, comprende por tanto la consagración normativa de tal intención mediante lineamiento 435 establecidos en su ordenamiento jurídico, también la planificación de actividades en el corto, mediano y largo plazo, la definición de estrategias y planes de acción sectoriales, los actos de gobierno y, desde luego, la asignación de recursos en el Presupuesto General de la República para que todo esto se materialice. Para ello, una adecuada gestión ambiental se deberá apoyar necesariamente en el desarrollo de conciencia ambiental, el manejo de información y el fortalecimiento de capacidades en la población, tanto a escala escolar como familiar, esenciales para la formación de una ciudadanía ambiental y la participación ciudadana y de las organizaciones privadas, como ejes básicos. Las políticas ambientales deben interactuar fuertemente con las otras políticas de desarrollo, y en especial con las políticas económicas, y es que buscar el crecimiento económico primero, para luego añadir medidas que mitiguen su impacto negativo sobre el medio ambiente no es eficaz ni eficiente, particularmente desde el punto de vista de la relación entre el costo de las medidas paliativas y sus resultados. Una concepción más adecuada del desarrollo debe llevar hacia medidas que promuevan en forma simultánea el crecimiento económico, la reducción de la pobreza y mejoras en el medio ambiente, es decir el desarrollo humano sustentable. Bibliografía o ALAY RAMOS, Oswaldo. Política Ambiental y Desarrollo Sostenible en el Perú y la región Arequipa. En: http://paradigmasambientales.wordpress.com/legislacion-ambiental/ o BÉJAR, Héctor. Política Social, justicia social, CEDEP, Lima 200. o POLÍTICA NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE. Decreto Supremo No 012-2009-MINAM de 23 de Mayo de 2009. Ministerio del Ambiente – MINAM. o CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL PERÚ DE 1993. o ANDALUZ WESTREICHER, Carlos. Manual de Derecho Ambiental. PROTERRA, Lima 2006. o MINISTERIO DEL AMBIENTE. "Calidad del Ambiente". En: Compendio de la Legislación Ambiental Peruana. Volumen V. Gráfica Técnica, Lima 2011. o FERNÁNDEZ-RUBIO LEGRÁ, Ángel. Doctor en Ciencias Jurídicas Profesor Titular del Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales y de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad de la Habana. "El Derecho Ambiental en EE.UU". http://www.cubasolar.cu/biblioteca/energia/Energia43/HTML/Articulo10.htm. o "Políticas para un desarrollo sustentable en Brasil". En: http://www.mma.gov.br. 436 LA UBICACIÓN SISTEMATICA DE LOS DELITOS AMBIENTALES DR. Alberto Orlando Rossel Alvarado RESUMEN El presente artículo, se aborda diversos problemas (de política criminal, dogmática y criminológica) en torno a los delitos contra el medio ambiente, con especial referencia a su objeto de protección jurídico-penal y al delito de contaminación previsto en el artículo 304 del CP. Teniendo en consideración que uno de los aspectos donde se evidencia la insuficiente regulación del delito ecológico, es en lo relativo al bien jurídico que trata de proteger, resultando por consiguiente mencionar que el Derecho Penal se basa en la protección de bienes jurídicos, tanto así que acepta la vigencia del principio "nullum penum sine injuria" (todo delito debe comportar un daño, ofensa, lesión o puesta en peligro de un bien jurídico protegido). Siendo por consiguiente este aspecto entre otros los que vamos a tratar.- Palabras Claves: política criminal, control social formal, política social, medio ambiente, contaminación. LA UBICACIÓN SISTEMATICA DE LOS DELITOS AMBIENTALES198 Sabido es que cuando los conflictos intersubjetivos comportan una mayor gravedad y no pueden ser solucionados por los mecanismos del control social informal (familia, disciplina social, educación, normas sociales, mecanismos masivos de comunicación, religión, etc.), entrará en funcionamiento el denominado "control social formal", que instaurado por el Estado, tiene como expresión máxima al "sistema penal", el cual está conformado por varias agencias de control y medios normativos que pretenden garantizar el mantenimiento de una mínima convivencia social. Villavicencio define de la siguiente forma al sistema penal: "Se trata del control social punitivo institucionalizado (...). Para el funcionamiento de este sistema penal, el Estado organiza agencias de control penal, v. gr. policía, jueces, fiscales, procuradores, sistemas penitenciarios; y las delimita con medios normativos (Código Penal, Código de Procedimientos Penales, Código de Ejecución Penal, Leyes normativos para regular y 198 Alberto Orlando Rossel Alvarado. Abogado titulado de la Universidad Nacional Federico Villarreal. Magister en Derecho Penal. Doctor en Derecho. Profesor de Derecho Penal de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Actualmente ocupa el cargo de Presidente de la Junta de Fiscales Superiores del Distrito Fiscal de Lima Norte. [email protected]. 437 controlar la problemática social e interindividual de naturaleza conflictiva penal (...). Lo ideal es que la política criminal a la vez que orienta a la ciencia penal o dogmática penal (es decir, a las conceptualizaciones de alto nivel y rigurosidad), se base en ella para el logro de sus diseños normativos".199 En suma, el sistema penal comprende al conjunto de instituciones y a sus actividades, que intervienen en la creación y aplicación de normas penales. Ante lo señalado, el sistema penal (por ende, el Derecho Penal) debe basarse en principios teleológicos-racionales (instrumentales y valorativos), los cuales inciden en la creación y aplicación de las normas jurídico-penales. Estos principios son señalados en la política criminal; sobre ésta Fidel Rojas señala: "La política penal o peyorativamente denominada "criminal" es parte de la política general del Estado, y constituye una práctica al servicio de la seguridad jurídica, que tienen como objeto la ordenación y orientación legislativa, proporcionando diseños normativos para regular y controlar la problemática social e interindividual de naturaleza conflictiva penal (...). Lo ideal es que la política criminal a la vez que orienta a la ciencia penal o dogmática (es decir, a las conceptualizaciones de alto nivel y rigurosidad), se basa en ella para el logro de sus diseños normativos".200 La política general del Estado debe orientarse, entre otros puntos, a la lucha contra el delito como tarea político-social. Al respecto, Maurach comenta: "En muchos campos de la política social puede establecerse una relación directa o indirecta con la criminalidad (...), la política social guarda una estrecha relación con la política criminal (...). Es indudable que una adecuada política social constituye la mejor condición previa de una política criminal fructífera (...). Para la legislación, la política criminal adquiere relevancia por medio del establecimiento de principios básicos sobre la configuración del Derecho Penal. En especial, cabe mencionar aquí la orientación del Derecho Penal en su conjunto hacia los modelos constitucionales de los principios del Estado de derecho y del estado social".201 I. Interés protegido y problemas sistemáticos. La ubicación sistemática de los delitos Ambientales entre los de riesgo en general no es pacífica en la doctrina, y ello en función de las diversas posiciones sustentadas en torno al bien jurídico protegido, que pueden sintetizarse en tres: En primer término, quienes consideran que, desde una concepción ciertamente amplia de la salud pública, el actual epígrafe delito Ambiental no indicaría más que la protección de la salud del conjunto de los ciudadanos. En cualquier caso, incluso autores que proponen la autonomía sistemática de este delito no ven inconveniente en que en el futuro se estructure un título de "delitos contra la calidad de vida" que integre estos delitos y aquellos otros que afecten a los consumidores (así, de la Cuesta). En segundo lugar, habría que tomar en consideración a quienes estiman que el bien jurídico es esencialmente socio-económico, y encuadran sistemáticamente estos delitos entre los contrarios al orden socioeconómico (Bustos: "El medio ambiente constituye un 199 VILLAVICENCIO TERREROS, Felipe. Lecciones de Derecho Penal. Pp. 23 200 ROJAS VARGAS, Fidel. Los delitos contra la Administración Pública. Pp. 42. 201 MAURACH, Reinhart. Tratado de Derecho Penal. Parte General. Pp 43 y 52. 438 bien jurídico que abarca todas las condiciones necesarias para el desarrollo de la persona en sus aspectos sociales y económicos"). En tercer lugar, cabe la tesis mayoritaria, que pretende dotar de autonomía sistemática a los delitos ambientales y, por ende, de sustantividad propia al mismo en cuanto interés jurídico protegible (así, por todos, Rodríguez Ramos y Peris). La configuración del "medio ambiente" o del "ambiente", como bien jurídico autónomo y, en consecuencia, diferenciable de la salud pública y del orden socioeconómico, requiere dotarle de significación propia, de sustantividad. Para ello, se acude a criterios de carácter ontològico, o más precisamente de cariz jurídico-constitucional. Prats ha concluido que cabe inferir cuatro notas características del bien jurídico: utilización racional de todos los recursos naturales, protección y mejora de la calidad de vida, defensa y restauración del medio ambiente y promoción de la solidaridad colectiva en la materia. De los citados parámetros constitucionales, se ha pretendido críticamente deducir una concepción antropocéntrica del interés jurídico medio ambiente (igual que de su actual regulación junto a la salud pública), lo que desde luego debe entenderse solo con cierta laxitud (así Peris), por más que no debe olvidarse el sentido instrumental de la protección del medio ambiente. Sin embargo, nos encontramos, en suma, ante el problema de delimitar, del modo más acabado posible, el objeto protegido. Como característica del mismo debe señalarse que, evidentemente, afecta a la colectividad, siendo prototipo de lo que han venido en denominarse intereses difusos, como aquellos que se hallan presentes de "modo informal y propagado a nivel de masa en ciertos sectores de la sociedad" (Peris). Con esa pretensión delimitadora, Rodríguez Ramos señala que "cabe conformar el medio ambiente en cuanto bien jurídico-interés o valor jurídico como el consistente en garantizar y, en su caso, restaurar las condiciones básicas necesarias para el mantenimiento y desarrollo de la vida en general y de la humana en particular, con la calidad correspondiente al estadio del desarrollo económico y cultural presente, entendiendo por calidad de vida, tanto el nivel de renta, como también y especialmente el acceso al disfrute de los recursos naturales en su conjunto y aisladamente considerados". Desde esta abstracción debe concretarse más el objeto jurídico, si bien desde la perspectiva natural ahora analizada. En ese sentido, es asumible el aportado por Peris: "Mantenimiento de las propiedades del suelo, el aire y el agua, así como de la fauna y la flora y las condiciones ambientales de desarrollo de estas especies, de tal forma que el sistema ecológico se mantenga con sus sistemas subordinados y no sufra alteraciones perjudiciales". En materia de medio ambiente se cuestiona constantemente el sistema de protección jurídica a articular y, en concreto, se cuestiona la eficacia de los mecanismos de represión penal sin una adecuada estructuración de dicho sistema. Estamos ante una problemática común a las diversas conductas que se encuadran en el ámbito de protección de los llamados intereses difusos y, por ende, también del medio ambiente (De la Cuesta). La necesidad de relacionar debidamente la esfera de protección administrativa y la jurídicopenal, la gran dispersión normativa, tanto administrativa como penal, en leyes especiales (una extensa relación, en Rodríguez Ramos), que sistematice, armonice y adapte la dispersa normativa existente, otorgando una completa protección al medio ambiente en todas sus dimensiones, y permita ser eficaz a la norma penal. 439 Consecuencia de la situación antes descrita son los efectos disfuncionales que pueden producirse per ser de la vigencia del principio non bis in idem, que esencialmente supone la prohibición de la doble sanción (también la administrativa y penal) y la prioritaria actuación judicial si los hechos pudieren revestir caracteres de delito. Llama la atención que en no pocas ocasiones el alcance intimidatorio de la norma penal, sea menor que el de las sanciones administrativas, que paradójicamente inciden de un modo ciertamente más contundente mediante sanciones pecuniarias más elevadas. Debe destacarse que el papel de la Administración en materia medioambiental es determinante, por cuanto incide esencialmente en la dimensión preventiva del problema, que de otra parte es la única que puede ser realmente eficaz. Desde esta perspectiva, debe de potenciarse la labor de la Administración y tutelarse en el ámbito sancionador, así como deben de exigirse las correspondientes responsabilidades, de la índole que sea procedente, a quienes actúan incorrectamente en nombre de la Administración. Dado que el Derecho Penal suele intervenir generalmente una vez producido el daño, el papel de la Administración es crucial en esta materia. La eficacia de la Administración podrá evitar la producción de tales daños, no perdiendo contenido el instrumento jurídicopenal.- II. Naturaleza del delito: peligro concreto y resultado Ante las dudas suscitadas por algún sector doctrinal (así, Rodríguez Ramos) respecto de la naturaleza del elemento típico configurador del peligro que debe producirse, en el sentido de considerarlo condición objetiva de punibilidad o resultado del delito (con las dispares consecuencias dogmáticas y prácticas que ello supone), debe señalarse que el precepto legal (artículo 304 del CP) tan solo posibilita la tesis del resultado. En efecto, la producción del peligro lo es como consecuencia de la emisión o vertido, realizado o provocado. Dicho peligro no está concebido en el tipo legal como un hecho independiente del actuar del sujeto activo. Antes, al contrario, como se ha dicho, depende de aquel y su producción deberá estar causalmente relacionada con la conducta y comprendida por la voluntad y conocimiento del agente, en caso de realizarse dolosamente. El peligro, que tiene lugar como resultado del delito, es concreto. Criterio legislativo que supone dotar de mayor contenido garantista al precepto, por más que ello suponga restarle eficacia; materia en la que determinados autores (como Rodríguez Devesa) han estimado preferible la estructura de peligro abstracto (conforme considera Bacigalupo). La distinta formulación típica del peligro según se trate de la salud de las personas ("pongan en peligro grave") o de las condiciones de la vida animal, bosques, espacios naturales o plantaciones útiles ("puedan perjudicar gravemente") no incide en una diferente naturaleza del peligro. En ambos casos se trata de peligro concreto, sin que sea deseable adelantar la barrera de protección al peligro abstracto, como aisladamente se ha venido proponiendo. Para consumar un delito se requiere o bien que se haya destruido o menoscabado el bien jurídico protegido (delitos de lesión), o bien se haya puesto en una situación de riesgo (delitos de peligro). Entre esas dos opciones, se entiende que protege de modo más eficaz el medio ambiente su configuración como delito de peligro, pues un tipo de daño en materia medioambiental 440 no tendría otra función preventiva que la representada por el temor a la pena, la cual intervendría una vez que el daño ya se hubiera producido. Por el contrario, una norma que anticipa la sanción a la sola puesta en peligro del bien jurídico medio ambiente, esto es, un momento anterior al daño real, tiene una función preventiva respecto a las conductas que ocasionan dicho daño. Dentro de los delitos de peligro, se sub distinguen delitos de peligro abstracto y delitos de peligro concreto. Los primeros son los que tienen al peligro como razón de s incriminación y eximen al juzgador de la necesidad de comprobar si se pone en peligro un bien concreto, solo deberá comprobar que se ha realizado la conducta que el legislador considera peligrosa. Los segundos son los que tienen al peligro como elemento del tipo, imponiendo al juzgador la necesidad de verificar si esa conducta ha puesto en peligro a algún bien determinado.- Son varias las razones que podrían aconsejar el empleo de la técnica del peligro abstracto para tipificar el denominado delito ecológico: i) reducir la arbitrariedad judicial para determinar si, en concreto, se ha puesto en una situación de riesgo a algún concreto bien; ii) facilitar la labor del juzgador en la aplicación de la norma no requiriéndose conocimientos técnicos para comprobar la creación de peligro, bastará comprobar que se ha producido la situación de peligro descrita en la norma; iii) se elimina el factor azar en el nacimiento de la responsabilidad penal, pues no depende de que se haya puesto en peligro o no un determinado bien, sino que basta que se haya causado la situación peligrosa que se prevé en la norma; iv) es preferible en aquellas conductas que afectan a intereses colectivos y que se reiteran o repiten siendo imposible la individualización de las actuaciones que lo lesionan; v) permite superar el escollo de la prueba del nexo causal entre la conducta y la situación de peligro concreto. No obstante, esa preferencia que la mayor parte de la doctrina tiene por la técnica del delito de peligro abstracto para configurar el delito ecológico, los artículos 304 y 305 del CP optan claramente por la técnica del delito de peligro concreto, al exigirse en ellos que la acción ponga en peligro grave la salud de las personas, o pueda perjudicar gravemente las condiciones de la vida animal, bosques, espacios naturales o plantaciones útiles. Como se ha indicado, el resultado se formula alternativamente: ponga en peligro grave la salud de las personas o puedan perjudicar gravemente las condiciones de la vida animal, bosques, espacios naturales o plantaciones útiles. Respecto al primero de ellos, debe ponerse de manifiesto: i)Que el efectivo peligro debe ser grave. No basta, pues, cualquier peligro, sino que debe ser de tal entidad que merezca dicho calificativo. Con ello no se ha aclarado en realidad gran cosa, dado que estamos ante un elemento valorativo más, que defiere a los tribunales la labor de concreción típica que corresponde al legislativo. Crítica de indefinición, de la que hace eso eco De la Cuesta, que debe soslayarse en una próxima reforma. No obstante, debe de tenerse en cuenta que la gravedad va referida únicamente al peligro concreto que como resultado se genera. Por lo tanto, solo se podrán tomar en consideración aquellos factores que claramente incidan en la calificación del peligro, y no otras circunstancias que afectan exclusivamente a la actividad y comportamiento del infractor en relación con la Administración. 441 ii) La referencia a la salud de las personas, con empleo del plural, debe entenderse, al decir de Rodríguez Devesa, en sentido colectivo y, por lo tanto, desde sus dimensiones física y síquica, esto es, salud de la colectividad como integrante del concepto de salud pública. Semejante previsión legal no deja de ser un refrendo a lo que se ha llamado visión antropocéntrica del concepto de medio ambiente y, en todo caso, dota de sentido al medio ambiente como bien jurídico propio, si bien justificado por su función instrumental y no per se. Bustos ha criticado esta inclusión de la salud de las personas (en el párrafo primero del artículo 347 bis del CP español) y estima que la conducta debería ser punible aun no dándose tal peligro, bastando con que se produjera deterioro del medio ambiente. De producirse afección a la salud de las personas, continúa dicho autor, debería agravarse la conducta, de haberse concebido el tipo básico como antes se ha señalado. iii) La equiparación, a efectos de pena, entre los dos supuestos, según la afección del peligro producido, resulta criticable. Bustos abunda en esta crítica, lo que es lógico desde su propia perspectiva, antes referida. Propone la estructuración de un delito contra el medio ambiente, en el que baste la producción de lesión a este, y agravaciones en función de peligros o lesiones a otros bienes concretos. En cuanto al segundo de los resultados, debemos señalar: 13. Persiste la utilización del término "gravemente", por lo que reproducimos las críticas antes vertidas. 14. Es también un supuesto de peligro concreto, aunque se emplea una formula algo dispar al supuesto anterior "puedan perjudicar". Si bien, como afirma Rodríguez Devesa, el perjuicio requiere ya un daño, debe tenerse en cuenta que este no es preciso que se ocasione, dado que solo se requiere que la conducta contaminante pueda ocasionarlo. 15. En cualquier caso, el peligro se produce, en este caso, sobre esferas del medio ambiente, o sobre las condiciones, entendemos de subsistencia y desarrollo, de vida animal. La equiparación con el anterior supuesto ha provocado la crítica de Bustos, y la distinta formulación del peligro concreto, si bien a nuestro entender es solo de matiz, provoca la "perplejidad" de De la Cuesta y de Tiedemann, quien llega a entrever una protección privilegiada de la vida animal o de esferas del medio ambiente, sobre la salud de las personas. En todo caso, estamos, una vez más, ante deficiencias del precepto legal, que se exasperan por la ya aludida confusión del propio legislador sobre el alcance del bien jurídico protegido.- El delito se consuma, en definitiva, con la producción del resultado, no siendo necesario, en consecuencia, que tenga lugar perjuicio real alguno o lesión de clase alguna; basta, como se ha dicho, el mero peligro, al tratarse de un delito de peligro concreto. III. Bien Jurídico Protegido Uno de los espacios donde de modo más evidente se muestra la insuficiente regulación del delito ecológico es en lo relativo al bien jurídico que se trata de proteger. Por lo tanto, las sanciones penales, en principio, deberían aplicarse a los que violen la utilización racional de los recursos naturales. El uso racional de los recursos naturales abarca una doble vertiente: su explotación prudente y la evitación de las acciones contaminantes sobre los diversos sectores medioambientales. Sin embargo, el legislador ignora, en el momento de tipificar el delito ecológico, el perjuicio que se causa al medio 442 ambiente a través del abusivo uso o extracción de recursos que puedan causar un grave perjuicio al equilibrio ecológico, como pudieran ser la tala indiscriminada de árboles, la caza de animales en vías de extinción, las construcciones en la zona marítimo-terrestre, o la explotación ilegal de una cantera, que lo único que podrían merecer sería una sanción administrativa o, a lo sumo, una sanción penal por la infracción criminal de daños. También se ha planteado en cuanto a la identificación del bien jurídico protegido que este pudiera referirse a las facultades de la administración en la ordenación y tutela de los bienes medioambientales, de tal manera que nos encontraríamos ante un delito de lesión de la propia reglamentación administrativa. Sin embargo, las reglamentaciones administrativas no pueden considerarse como un fin en sí mismas, sino como un instrumento, el primero y más importante de salvaguarda del equilibrio ecológico, por lo que, en conclusión, debe establecerse que el delito ecológico no es un delito de lesión de la normativa reglamentista, sino un delito de peligro en el que el equilibrio medioambiental es el valor amenazado. IV. Sujetos del Delito Partiendo de la idea de que es sujeto pasivo el titular del bien jurídico que se lesiona o pone en peligro, en el caso que nos ocupa, el bien jurídico medio ambiente no pertenece exclusivamente a una persona determinada, sino que es toda la colectividad, la que se ve perjudicada por la depredación ambiental. En cuanto al sujeto activo del tipo básico del art. 304 del CP, puede ser cualquier ser humano. Sin embargo, en el agravante se toma en cuenta la calidad de funcionario público. V. La remisión del tipo a la normativa administrativa. En la lucha contra la degradación ambiental debe partirse de la primacía del Derecho Administrativo quien deberá determinar cualitativa y cuantitativamente cuáles son los límites permitidos en actividades que puedan suponer un peligro para el medio ambiente. El instrumento con que cuenta la Administración es el acto administrativo de autorización y de control preventivo, así como la actividad de policía con el fin de velar por el cumplimiento de la normativa y controlar que se mantengan las actividades dentro de los límites permitidos y, en caso de infracción, imponer la sanción correspondiente. Junto a la primacía de la normativa y actuación administrativas, el papel del Derecho Penal es auxiliar en la función de reforzar el cumplimiento de las normas administrativas, sancionando los atentados más graves contra el medio ambiente. El instrumento a través del cual se puede articular ese carácter auxiliar del Derecho Penal respecto del Derecho Administrativo es la técnica de la norma penal en blanco que significa que el tipo no cumple íntegramente la esencial función de definir los comportamientos que se reputan contrarios a la norma penal, sino que, mediante una fórmula de reenvío, se remite a una disposición diferente de la penal, en este caso, a la normativa administrativa. Por lo que se refiere al principio de seguridad, el temor reside en el riesgo de que sea el Poder Ejecutivo a través de los reglamentos quien determine la conducta delictiva. Mientras algunos autores (Cobo del Rosal, Boix Reig, Peris Riera) manifiestan su rechazo a las normas penales en blanco porque son una clara vulneración al principio de seguridad jurídica, ya que siempre sería el ejecutivo el que determinaría el ámbito de la prohibición penal; otros autores (Rodríguez Ramos, Bustos Ramírez) entienden que si la 443 remisión a la norma extrapenal es correcta por que se deja al reglamento un papel exclusivamente técnica, la certeza y descripción pueden incluso superar a otras normas penales en que no existen elementos normativos y que, al carecer de determinación, se prestan a arbitrariedades. También atenta al principio de seguridad jurídica la utilización de conceptos tan excesivamente amplios o indeterminados, cuya concreción deba realizarse por el juzgador. Todos estos problemas, no solamente inciden en el aspecto dogmático in comento, sino que afectan la validez de los principios políticocriminales analizados en el anterior punto; por lo que, al igual que en las otras áreas de protección al medio ambiente, en la normativa penal se enraiza serios problemas de seguridad jurídica ante la utilización de leyes penales en blanco que exigen un alto grado de diligencia por parte del juzgador y una armonización funcional, de las leyes administrativas (que paradójicamente están dispersadas y sujetas a constantes cambios legislativos). VI. Aspectos Criminológicos Solís Espinoza define la Criminología de la siguiente manera: "Es la ciencia interdisciplinaria que estudia las características y las causas de los fenómenos delictivo y antisocial, así como, a los autores de dichos fenómenos para su prevención y control adecuado" 202. Entendida esta rama jurídica, señalamos que, a fin de establecer el qué y quién de la delincuencia medioambiental, analizaremos lo referente a la criminalidad económica y criminalidad empresarial. La criminalidad económica, que se desenvuelve en los ámbitos de la economía, también es denominada como "delincuencia comercial". Es aquella que incide en la vida del comercio con ocasión de las operaciones tratadas por las empresas industriales, comerciales y asimiladas. Asimismo, en este tipo de criminalidad aparece la denominada "criminalidad de cuello blanco" (white-collar-criminality). Este tipo de criminalidad es aquella que describe la delincuencia que se realiza en los sectores económicos más poderosos al amparo del poder y de las relaciones que ello supone. El análisis de la criminalidad de cuello blanco fue iniciada en 1907 a través de los estudios de E. A. Ross, quien analizó los delitos y delincuentes "del mundo superior" (of the upper world). Morris se refiere a ellos como quienes, a causa de su posición social, su inteligencia y técnica del crimen, están en condiciones de moverse entre los demás ciudadanos, siendo virtualmente inmunes a toda consideración o condena de ser criminales (criminals of the upperworld). Sin embargo, fue Edwin H. Sutherland quien en 1940 definió a esta criminalidad como "criminalidad de cuello blanco", estudiando los delitos de aquellos que se cuentan entre la "gente fina", es decir, pertenecientes a las clases socioeconómicas más altas. La teoría de Sutherland parte de su concepción de los contactos diferenciales, "La hipótesis aquí sugerida en sustitución de las teorías convencionales es que la delincuencia de cuello blanco, como propiamente toda otra forma de delincuencia sistemática, es aprendida; que es aprendida en asociación directa o indirecta con quienes ya practican un 202 SOLIS ESPINOZA, Alejandro. Criminología. Pp. 32 444 comportamiento criminal, y que aquellos que aprenden este comportamiento criminal no tienen contactos frecuentes y estrechos con el comportamiento conforme a la ley".203 No obstante, en este tipo de criminalidad se deben de tener en cuenta los factores: i) clase dominante y ii) cifra negra y dorada. En lo que respecta a la clase dominante, esta se define, en palabras de Lamas Puccio como: "Aquella que posee y controla los medios de producción, y que está en condiciones, por resultado del poder económico que ello le confiere, de usar el Estado como instrumento de dominación de la sociedad" 204. Esta clase hace uso de todo tipo de tecnología u otros medios que permitan el progreso de sus actividades económicas, por lo que, según estadística criminal comparada, emplean, en un porcentaje no despreciable, mecanismos indebidos para el logro de sus fines. La intervención penal debe incidir en la criminalidad de esta clase dominante; sin embargo, en la actualidad, ocurre todo lo contrario. En efecto, es opinión casi unánime, que el número de procesos penales abiertos (y la correspondiente sanción penal) a personas de clase alta es insignificante, si se le compara con el número de los hechos delictuosos (realizados por estos) no denunciados; estos conforman la denominada "cifra negra u oculta": hay un sector de la criminalidad que permanece ignorado o que no es denunciado y que las estadísticas oficiales no revelan el cuadro real de las infracciones. Asimismo, se tiene la "cifra dorada", la cual consiste en que hay criminales que detentan el poder político y que lo ejercen impunemente perjudicando a los ciudadanos y a la colectividad en beneficio de su oligarquía, o que disponen de un poder económico que se desarrolla en perjuicio de la sociedad en su conjunto. Sin embargo, la extensión de los daños, el potencial de abusos, la participación de los miembros de la clase alta (incluso de la clase media) y la amplia victimización, no deben originar una indulgencia puesto que se estaría premiando a los delincuentes que con su conducta antisocial afectan valores normativos protegidos constitucionalmente. Para concluir el análisis de este tipo de criminalidad, señalare la apreciación de Kaiser: "La importancia de la criminalidad económica se manifiesta ante todo en la cuantía destacada de los daños, el considerable número de los casos singulares y de perjudicados registrados en un círculo de autores relativamente pequeño, así como en la criminalidad asociada (...) La praxis, en especial, considera las lagunas legales existentes como causa de nuevas formas de criminalidad económica (...). Con razón se ha alegado "que la credibilidad de la Administración de Justicia podría verse perjudicada por el hecho de que los delitos de escasa importancia son castigados sin demora, mientras que los grandes delitos económicos y fiscales no son ya combatidos y perseguidos por las fiscalías del Estado y los tribunales, sino solo pueden ser administrados (...) Aunque no cabe desconocer la importancia del necesario robustecimiento de la conciencia jurídica de la opinión pública y el mejoramiento de los preceptos civiles, administrativos y fiscales, el peso principal de la lucha contra la criminalidad económica grave descansa, antes como ahora, en el Derecho Penal"205. 203 BARATTA, Alessandro. Criminología crítica y crítica del Derecho Penal. Pp.69. 204 LAMAS PUCCIO, Luis. Derecho Penal Económico. Pp. 30. 205 KAISER, Gunther. Introducción a la Criminología. Pp.375 y 377. 445 En lo que respecta a la criminalidad empresarial o de empresa, esta consiste en los delitos que se cometen a partir de una empresa o a través de entidades colectivas. Sobre este punto Silvina Bacigalupo comenta lo siguiente: "Con el concepto de criminalidad de empresa se designa, pues, todo el ámbito de los delitos económicos en los que por medio de la actuación para la empresa se lesionan bienes jurídicos e intereses externos, incluidos los bienes jurídicos e intereses propios de los colaboradores de la empresa".206 Este tipo de criminalidad va apareciendo con cada vez más fuerza, puesto que las empresas no son instrumentos para cometer el delito (tal situación permitiría equiparar a las personas jurídicas como el arma que se sirvió al homicida para matar a su víctima o como el transporte que contiene la droga, etc.). Más bien, son realidades que originan actos jurídicos, ya sean lícitos (por ejemplo, firman contratos, son objeto de crédito, son los principales titulares en las actividades económicas, son obligados tributarios, etc.) o ilícitos (por ejemplo, son las organizaciones que reciben, en virtud de un contrato, el secreto de empresa y, no obstante, lo transfieren indebidamente a terceros). Por lo tanto, el Derecho no debe ser ajeno a los actos que las personas colectivas realizan; especialmente, el Derecho Penal no debe desatender las actividades ilícitas de las empresas, máxime, si estas pueden consistir en delitos (específicamente delitos contra el medio ambiente). BIBLIOGRAFÍA Villavicencio Terreros, Felipe. (1990) "Lecciones de Derecho Penal". Lima. Cultural Cuzco Editores. pp. 23. Rojas Vargas, Fidel. (2002) "Delitos contra la Administración Pública". Lima. Editorial Grijley. pp. 42. Maurach, Reinhart. (1962) "Tratado de Derecho Penal. Parte General". Barcelona. Editorial Ariel. pp. 43 y 52. Solis Espinoza, Alejandro. (1997) "Criminología". Lima. Editorial Imprenta Intercopy. pp.32. Baratta, Alessandro. (2004) "Criminología crítica y crítica del derecho penal: introducción a la sociología jurídico penal". BuenoAires. Siglo XXI Editores Argentina. pp.69. Lamas Puccio, Luis. (1996) "Derecho Penal Económico". Lima. Editorial Librería y Ediciones Jurídicas. pp. 30. Kaiser,Günther. (1988) "Introducción a la Criminología". Madrid. Editorial Dykinson. pp.375 y 377. Bacigalupo, Silvina. (2001) "Responsabilidad penal de las personas jurídicas". Buenos Aires. Editorial Hammurabi SRL. pp.27. 206 BACIGALUPO, Silvina. La responsabilidad de las personas jurídicas. Pp.27. 446 LA PROTECCIÓN JURÍDICA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE DR. CLUBER FERNANDO ALIAGA LODTMANN NOCIONES BÁSICAS DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL Dejando en claro que el Derecho es uno solo, pero que por su complejidad y orientación al regular aspectos específicos se la estudia por ramas. Que el Derecho, es el conjunto de normas jurídicas dotadas de coercibilidad institucionalizada, que regula la conducta del hombre en sociedad, bajo una concepción de valores. Que, todas las ramas del derecho y de las normas jurídicas en particular, están inspiradas en valores jurídicos, que se pretende implantar, privilegiar, proteger, garantizar, etc. podemos señalar que el Derecho Ambiental, es la parte del Derecho en general, que contiene las normas jurídicas que regulan la conducta humana procurando el equilibrio entre la acción del hombre y la naturaleza, a fin de asegurar un ambiente adecuado para la supervivencia del mismo hombre. Que, el equilibrio ambiental al que nos referimos, se refiere a un equilibrio dinámico (de manera semejante a los procesos ecológicos), ya que la satisfacción de las múltiples necesidades humanas requiere del empleo de recursos naturales y de elementos culturales y tecnológicos creados por los seres humanos. En ese sentido, las reglas de conducta deben orientarse a la preservación de un equilibrio entre la acción del hombre y la naturaleza, de manera que se eviten daños graves o irreversibles que puedan desembocar en un ambiente insano o en provocar catástrofes ambientales. Por otro lado, la noción de ambiente se debe entender como el conjunto de elementos sociales, culturales, bióticos y abióticos que interactúan entre sí. Desde este punto de vista, el ambiente, comprende la naturaleza no humana y lo artificial (creado por el hombre). El concepto de desarrollo sostenible, a tenor de lo expresado en el Informe "Nuestro Futuro Común", formulado por la Comisión Brundtland, "es el desarrollo que satisface las necesidades del presente sin comprometer la capacidad de las generaciones futuras de satisfacer las suyas". Tal concepto implica la capacidad de la biósfera de absorber los efectos de las actividades humanas, y buscar un equilibrio entre lo humano y la naturaleza no humana. WALSH, refiere que "la sustentabilidad exige una integración sistémica de las consideraciones económicas, sociales y ambientales, al momento de adoptar decisiones o definir políticas públicas o privadas, sean estas de la naturaleza que sean". Esto implica, una integración armónica entre los aspectos sociales, económicos y ambientales, partiendo de la premisa que entre éstas existen 447 complejas relaciones de interdependencia o, dicho de otro modo, desde la perspectiva de que "todo se relaciona con todo". Por otro lado, por Legislación Ambiental, debemos entender que es el Derecho escrito vigente en materia ambiental en nuestro país. Por lo tanto, la legislación ambiental peruana, estará conformada por las normas jurídicas del Derecho Internacional Ambiental y el Derecho Nacional Ambiental, siendo por ende, abundante, lamentablemente dispersa y de muy bajo nivel de cumplimiento. La Política Nacional del Ambiente, es el conjunto de medidas, estrategias y acciones establecidas por el Estado con participación de la sociedad civil, que orientan, condicionan y determinan el comportamiento del sector público y privado, de los agentes económicos y de la población en general, en cuanto a la conservación, uso, manejo y aprovechamiento del ambiente y de los recursos naturales. El Sistema Nacional de Gestión Ambiental se constituye sobre la base de las instituciones estatales, órganos y oficinas de los distintos ministerios, organismos públicos descentralizados e instituciones públicas a nivel nacional, regional y local, que ejerzan competencias y funciones sobre el ambiente y los recursos naturales; así como por los Sistemas Regionales y Locales de Gestión Ambiental, contando con la participación del sector privado y la sociedad civil El Sistema Regional de Gestión Ambiental, se constituye sobre la base de las instituciones estatales, órganos y oficinas de las distintas instituciones públicas de nivel o importancia regional que ejerzan competencias y funciones sobre el ambiente y los recursos naturales, contando con la participación del sector privado y la sociedad civil. El Sistema Local de Gestión Ambiental, se constituye sobre la base de las instituciones estatales, organos y oficinas de las distintas instituciones públicas de nivel o importancia regional que ejerzan competencias y funciones sobre el ambiente y los recursos naturales, contando con la participación del sector privado y la sociedad civl. LOS PRINCIPALES PROBLEMAS AMBIENTALES GLOBALES: a. La amenaza nuclear: Representada por las bombas atómicas fabricadas, empleadas o poseídas, por muchos países hoy en día. (Estados Unidos, Unión Soviética, China, Francia, Irán, Argentina, Brasil, Pakistán, La India) b. El calentamiento global y el efecto invernadero: Representado por la contaminación del aire, los gases de efecto invernadero que conjuntamente con otros factores vienen generando el cambio climático. c. La destrucción de la capa de ozono: Representado por el riesgo de afectar la vida humana con el cáncer de piel fundamentalmente y de otras especies animales y de plantas. d. La contaminación de los mares y océanos: Representado por la pérdida de espacios de vida en los bordes costeros altamente contaminados. e. La chatarra espacial: Generada por el empleo desmedido del espacio ultraterrestre y la órbita geostacionaria, por los satélites artificiales. f. El excesivo crecimiento poblacional: Con más de 7 mil millones de personas, cifra que según algunos investigadores supera largamente la cifra ideal de mil quinientos millones de personas. 448 g. La extinción de especies: Producto de la explotación desmedida para el consumo de una creciente número de seres humanos. h. La deposición ácida: Representado por la contaminación del aire por agentes físicos y químicos principalmente, que afectan principalmente la calidad de las tierras aptas para la agricultura. CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL El Derecho Ambiental, como disciplina jurídica autónoma, posee características propias que la diferencian de otras ramas del Derecho, entre estas mencionamos las siguientes: a. Énfasis en lo Preventivo: Las normas jurídicas ambientales, están dirigidas fundamentalmente a impedir que se produzcan daños ambientales graves, ya que estos muchas veces son irreversibles, por lo tanto, lo que se busca es evitar que ocurran. b. Sustento Ecológico: Las normas del Derecho Ambiental, tienen como base o sustento, los datos de la realidad, que son proporcionados por las ciencias naturales y sociales, en especial la Ecología, con la finalidad de evitar que la acción humana afecte todas las formas de vida. c. Normas de Orden Público: Las normas del Derecho Ambiental, son de carácter imperativo y para el provecho común de la generación presente y futura; por lo tanto, no admiten su elusión por acuerdos entre particulares, ni entre éstos y el Estado. La Ley General del Ambiente, establece de manera específica que las normas ambientales, incluyendo las normas en materia de salud ambiental y de conservación de la diversidad biológica y los demás recursos naturales, son de orden público. Es nulo todo pacto en contra de lo establecido en dichas normas legales (artículo7.1). d. Multidisciplinario: El estudio del ambiente y sus problemas requiere el concurso de varias ciencias, motivo por el cual el Derecho Ambiental se nutre y desarrolla sobre la base de los conocimientos que le aportan las diferentes áreas del conocimiento humano. La elaboración y aplicación de sus normas exige el concurso de equipos multidisciplinarios que abarquen otras ciencias además del Derecho. e. Connotación Transgeneracional: Las normas del Derecho Ambiental, buscan proteger el derecho a un ambiente sano y al desarrollo sostenible de las actuales y futuras generaciones; protegiendo también el legado cultural, tangible e intangible, dejado por las generaciones pasadas. OBJETO DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL El objeto del Derecho Ambiental, es regular las conductas humanas para lograr una armónica interacción del hombre con el ambiente, a efectos de que las complejas manifestaciones sociales, económicas y culturales mantengan condiciones de equilibrio con los procesos naturales. PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL 449 Según el jurista Marcial Rubio: "Los principios generales del Derecho son conceptos o proposiciones de naturaleza axiológica o técnica, que informan la estructura, la forma de operación y el contenido mismo de las normas y del propio Derecho como totalidad. Pueden estar recogidos o no en la legislación, pero el que no lo estén no es óbice para su existencia y funcionamiento". Para el autor del presente artículo, los principios del derecho, son proposiciones que gozan del respaldo y aceptación general o por lo menos mayoritaria de la sociedad; constituyéndose en verdades de razón, que inspiran la generación de las normas jurídicas particulares y a la vez, sirven como criterio unificador e integrador de la interpretación jurídica. Jaquenod, afirma que: "se trata de postulados fundamentales y universales que la razón especula y que generaliza mediante la abstracción", las soluciones particulares que se obtienen partiendo de la justicia y de la equidad social, atendiendo a la naturaleza de las cosas positivas. Los considera principios rectores generales en razón de su naturaleza y subsidiarios por su función, pues llegan a suplir las lagunas de las fuentes formales del Derecho, en esta materia particular. Concluye que, de desaparecer el Derecho Ambiental como disciplina, sus principios formarían parte del ordenamiento jurídico general. Como tal, sirven de inspiración al legislador, para la interpretación normativa aclarando el sentido de la ley o imputándole contenido valorativo ante una laguna jurídica. En tal sentido, los principios del Derecho Ambiental, son enunciados orientadores de la Política, el Derecho y la Administración ambientales. Deben entonces estar implícitos en el diseño y ejecución de planes, programas, estrategias, en los actos de gobierno y en el ejercicio de la función pública. Obviamente, inspiran la generación de la normativa ambiental y sirven para interpretar las normas o aplicar el Derecho de manera correcta. La Ley General del Ambiente (Ley N° 28611 del 25 de octubre del 2005), recoge en sus artículos V al XI expresamente los siguientes principios: a. Sostenibilidad: La gestión del ambiente, así como el ejercicio y la protección de los derechos a un ambiente sano y al desarrollo sostenible, se sustentan en la integración equilibrada de los aspectos sociales, ambientales y económicos del desarrollo nacional; así como, en la satisfacción de las necesidades de las actuales y futuras generaciones. b. Prevención: La gestión ambiental tiene como objetivos prioritarios prevenir, vigilar y evitar la degradación ambiental. Cuando no sea posible eliminar las causas que la generan, se adoptan las medidas de mitigación, recuperación, restauración o eventual compensación. c. Precautorio: Cuando haya indicios razonables de riesgo de daño grave o irreversible a la salud o al ambiente, la falta de certeza absoluta no debe utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces y eficientes para impedir la degradación del ambiente. d. Internalización de Costos: Toda persona debe asumir el posible riesgo o daños que genere sobre el ambiente. El costo de las acciones de prevención, vigilancia, restauración, rehabilitación, reparación y la eventual compensación relacionadas con la protección del ambiente y de sus componentes de los impactos negativos de las actividades humanas, debe ser asumidos por los causantes de dichos impactos. e. Responsabilidad Ambiental: El causante de la degradación del ambiente y de sus componentes, sea una persona natural o jurídica, está obligado a adoptar inexcusablemente las medidas para su restauración, rehabilitación o reparación según corresponda o, cuando lo anterior 450 no fuera posible, a compensar en términos ambientales los daños generados sin perjuicio de otras responsabilidades administrativas, civiles o penales a que hubiera lugar. f. Equidad: El diseño y la aplicación de las políticas públicas ambientales deben contribuir a erradicar la pobreza y reducir las inequidades sociales y económicas existentes y al desarrollo sostenible de las poblaciones menos favorecidas. En tal sentido, el Estado podrá adoptar políticas o programas de acción afirmativa, entendida como el conjunto coherente de medidas de carácter temporal dirigidas a corregir la situación de los miembros del grupo al que están destinadas, en un aspecto o varios de su vida social o económica, a fin de alcanzar la equidad efectiva. g. Gobernanza Ambiental: El diseño y aplicación de las políticas públicas ambientales se rige por el principio de gobernanza ambiental, que conduce a la armonización de las políticas, instituciones, normas, procedimientos, herramientas e información de manera tal que sea posible la participación efectiva e integrada de los actores públicos y privados en la toma de decisiones, manejo de conflictos y construcción de consensos, sobre la base de responsabilidades claramente definidas, seguridad jurídica y transparencia. h. Principio de Prevención: Los daños infringidos al ambiente no siempre pueden ser materia de restauración, por lo que la regla de reponer las cosas al estado anterior de la afectaciónque subyace a la obligación de reparación por dañosen estos casos no resulta útil; máxime si tales daños son graves o irreversibles, como puede ser la contaminación o depredación ambiental que conlleven la alteración de un proceso ecológico esencial, la extinción de hábitats, ecosistemas o especies; es decir, cualquier cosa que afecte el derecho humano de habitar en un ambiente sano o que ponga en riesgo el desarrollo sostenible. Por ello, cuando existe certeza de que una actividad puede provocar daño ambiental, deberán adoptarse las medidas para prevenir, vigilar y evitar que éste se produzca. i. Principio de Interdependencia o de Transversalidad de la Legislación Ambiental: En el planeta nada existe en aislamiento total, sino que los distintos niveles de organización de la vida (célula, especie, poblaciones, comunidades, ecosistemas, biorregiones, biósfera) mantienen complejas relaciones entre sí y con sus respectivos medios abióticos (agua, atmósfera, tierra, clima, luz, etc.); a ello Debemos agregar la intervención humana que está regida en los Estados modernos por reglas de conducta que pueden ser acatados por la fuerza; estas reglas abarcan todas las esferas de las actividades humanas, las mismas que, de una u otra manera, tienen incidencia en el mantenimiento del equilibrio ecológico necesario para un ambiente sano y un desarrollo sostenible. j. Principio de Incorporación de los Valores Ambientales: Consecuente con lo expresado acerca del enfoque sistémico en materias ambientales, este principio nos informa acerca de la necesidad de incorporar la variable ambiental al quehacer humano en general, ya que lo ambiental no constituye un sector más de la realidad sino que es la realidad integrada sistémicamente. En este orden de ideas, los sectores públicos y privados, por igual, deben incorporar a sus actividades la variable ambiental. Así lo recoge el Principio 4 de la Declaración de Río: "A fin de alcanzar el desarrollo sostenible, la protección del medio ambiente deberá constituir parte integrante del proceso de desarrollo y no podrá considerarse en forma aislada". k. Principio de Iniciativa Institucional: Desde que el Derecho Ambiental es parte del Derecho Público, cabe al Estado un rol proactivo en el cumplimiento de sus fines, ellos no pueden depender sólo de la libre iniciativa de los particulares, por mejores que sean sus propósitos de protección 451 ambiental, de hecho hay muchos ejemplos de catástrofes ambientales provocadas de buena fe, como las causadas por la introducción de especies exóticas invasoras. l. Principio de Participación Ciudadana: Son los actos de la ciudadanía y del Estado los que provocan la ruptura del equilibrio ambiental necesario para gozar de un ambiente sano y del desarrollo sostenible. Es obligación del Estado garantizar este derecho para los ciudadanos pero, correlativamente, todos los ciudadanos tienen el deber de colaborar con estos propósitos; porque el ser humano es la única especie que tiene capacidad de discernimiento, es la única que conscientemente puede llevar a la destrucción de la biósfera o a su mantenimiento acorde con un ambiente sano y propicio para el desarrollo sostenible. En atención a ello, le corresponde un rol tutelar del ambiente, no sólo a través del Estado, sino de manera individual u organizada. El Principio 2 de la Declaración de Dublín sobre el Agua y el Desarrollo Sostenible dispone: "El aprovechamiento y la gestión del agua debe inspirarse en un planteamiento basado en la participación de los usuarios, los planificadores y los responsables de las decisiones a todos los niveles". El planteamiento basado en la participación implica que los responsables de las políticas y el público en general adquieran mayor conciencia de la importancia del agua. Este planteamiento entraña que las decisiones habrían de adoptarse al nivel más elemental apropiado, con la realización de consultas públicas y la participación de los usuarios en la planificación y ejecución de los proyectos sobre el agua. m. Principio de Internalización de Costos o Contaminador Pagador: Este principio, a despecho de lo que opina cierto sector de la doctrina, no tiene como fin principal perseguir la reparación de los daños ambientales por el agente contaminador o depredador-sino que se incorpore a la estructura de costos del bien o servicio-lo necesario para la prevención de los posibles daños que en el proceso de producción pudieran acaecer, es decir, evitar la externalización de los costos de prevención, que "ocurre cuando las acciones de un agente económico afectan a otro por un mecanismo diferente del sistema de precios". En otros términos, consiste en evitar la externalidad, entendida como "un costo de una actividad productiva que no es tomado en cuenta por el sujeto que efectúa decisiones económicas, desde que éste no se hace cargo de los mismos, ya que los transfiere a otras personas o a la sociedad como un todo. Las externalidades pueden afectar bienes públicos, bienes comunes o bienes privados". El Principio 16 de la Declaración de Río establece que: "Las autoridades nacionales deberían procurar fomentar la internalización de los costos ambientales y el uso de instrumentos económicos teniendo en cuenta el criterio de que quien contamina debe, en principio, cargar con los costos de la contaminación, teniendo debidamente en cuenta el interés público y sin distorsionar el comercio ni las inversiones internacionales". n. Principio Precautorio: Es universalmente aceptado en el Derecho Internacional y también en los respectivos derechos internos, que ante un riesgo de daño al ambiente-científicamente comprobado-deben tomarse las medidas necesarias para conjurarlo. A esto se ha denominado Principio de Prevención, pilar que sostiene toda la normativa ambiental en el entendido que las afectaciones graves al ambiente, en muchos casos, tienen consecuencias irreversibles; por eso sus normas tienen un énfasis preventivo antes que reparador. Sin embargo, las intervenciones humanas en el ambiente, como producto de los grandes adelantos producidos principalmente a partir de 1950, entrañan una complejidad tal que, en muchos casos, no resulta posible tener certeza científica acerca de los riesgos o probables daños al ambiente que dichas actividades provocarían. La respuesta jurídica a estas situaciones es el Principio Precautorio, según el cual cuando haya peligro de daño grave o irreversible al ambiente, la falta de certeza científica no podrá 452 utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces que impidan la degradación del ambiente. Pero el primer instrumento de Derecho Internacional de alcance mundial que lo recoge explícitamente es la Declaración de Río sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo (1992), cuyo Principio 15 señala: "Con el fin de proteger el medio ambiente, los Estados deberán aplicar ampliamente el criterio de precaución conforme a sus capacidades. Cuando haya peligro de daño grave o irreversible, la falta de certeza científica absoluta no deberá utilizarse como razón para postergar la adopción de medidas eficaces en función de los costos para impedir la degradación del medio ambiente". NORMAS CONSTITUCIONALES DE DERECHO AMBIENTAL La Constitución Política del Perú de 1993, regula en el inciso 22 del artículo 2° del Capítulo I Derechos Fundamentales de la persona y el Titulo I De la persona y de la sociedad, lo siguiente: "inciso 22.- "Toda persona tiene derecho a gozar de un ambiente equilibrado y adecuado al desarrollo de su vida". Asimismo, en los artículos 66° al 69° del Capítulo II Del ambiente y los recursos naturales, establece lo siguiente: "Artículo 66.Los recursos naturales renovables y no renovables son patrimonio de la Nación. El Estado es soberano en su aprovechamiento. Por ley orgánica se fijan las condiciones de su utilización y de su otorgamiento a particulares. La concesión otorga a su titular un derecho real sujeto a dicha norma legal. Artículo 67.El Estado determina la política nacional del ambiente. Promueve el uso sostenible de sus recursos naturales. Artículo 68.El Estado está obligado a promover la conservación de la diversidad biológica y de las áreas naturales protegidas. Artículo 69.El Estado promueve el desarrollo sostenible de la Amazonía con una legislación adecuada." EVOLUCIÓN DEL DERECHO AMBIENTAL Debemos partir de la premisa de que el Derecho Ambiental surge propiamente en el Derecho Internacional, tomando la denominación de Derecho Internacional Ambiental (DIA), y que es desde allí, que se ha venido incorporando progresivamente a nuestra legislación nacional, formando lo que podemos denominar Derecho Ambiental Nacional. Entre los principales antecedentes que marcan el surgimiento y desarrollo del Derecho Ambiental, podemos mencionar los siguientes acontecimientos y eventos internacionales: a. La Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Humano, desarrollada en Estocolmo, entre el 05 y 16 de Junio de 1972, que planteó el tema de la integración de la variable del medio ambiente en los planes de desarrollo de las naciones. b. El Establecimiento de la Comisión Mundial sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo, por las Naciones Unidas en 1983, que tuvo como presidenta a la Doctora Gro Harlem Brundtland (ex primera ministra de Noruega), y estuvo integrada por un grupo internacional e interdisciplinario de personas, las que presentaron en abril de 1987, el Informe denominado "Nuestro Futuro Común", conocido también como el Informe Brundtland. 453 c. Como consecuencia del Informe "Nuestro Futuro Común", la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas convocó la Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre el Medio Ambiente y el Desarrollo (CNUMAD), que se desarrolló en Río de Janeiro, entre el 03 y 14 de Junio de 1992, conocida a su vez como la II Cumbre Ambiental Mundial. d. La Cumbre Mundial sobre el Desarrollo Sostenible, desarrollado en JohannesburgoSudáfrica , entre el 26 de agosto al 04 de setiembre de 2002; evento en el que se constató el agravamiento de los problemas sociales y ambientales y la pobreza extrema de 800 millones de personas. e. El Protocolo de Cartagena sobre Biodiversidad, desarrollado en MontrealCanadá, donde se aprobó el Protocolo de Biodiversidad, que permite a los países importadores de alimentos transgénicos, regular su entrada de acuerdo al principio de precaución. f. El Protocolo de Kyoto, aprobado en Kyoto-Japón en 1997, que regula la obligación de los 39 países más industrializados a reducir sus emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero como el CO, CH, NO, los compuestos perflurocarbonados (PFC), Hidrofluorocarbonados (HFC) y Hexafluoruro de azufre. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS 1. RUBIO CORREA, Marcial. El Sistema Jurídico. Introducción al Derecho. p. 307. 2. JAQUENOD DE ZSÓGON, Silvia: "El Derecho Ambiental y sus principios rectores", p. 121. 454 SOSTENIBILIDAD AMBIENTAL EN EL USO DE LOS RECURSOS NATURALES DE LA AMAZONÍA PERUANA Vicenta Irene Tafur Anzualdo RESUMEN El presente artículo analiza aspectos del documento Amazonía peruana en 2021, publicado por la Fundación Peruana para la Conservación de la Naturaleza en el 2009, poniendo especial atención en los aspectos de transparencia a través de una participación pública efectiva en la toma de decisiones con implicaciones ambientales, el cumplimiento de los mandatos constitucionales y del Convenio 169 de la OIT, y las dimensiones económicas, sociales y ambientales de la sostenibilidad de los recursos amazónicos. Palabras claves: Desarrollo sostenible, Sostenibilidad de la Amazonía, Ambiente y desarrollo El desarrollo sostenible toma en cuenta los valores del ámbito espacial, su estado de conservación, las actividades que soportan y los factores de riesgos que deben evaluarse para amenguarlos. La estrategia fundamental para este logro es mantener el capital natural minimizando o compensando los cambios ambientales irreversibles para lo cual es imprescindible asegurar que las actividades no sobrepasen las capacidades asimilativas o regenerativas del medio. En la Amazonía, poblada por ecosistemas complejos y frágiles categorizados como bosques húmedos tropicales, las actividades humanas pueden causar impactos negativos considerables por su naturaleza misma (extensos bosques naturales, extensas zonas de fragilidad ambiental, paisajes, biodiversidad de flora y fauna, ríos y lagunas, diversidad cultural) agravados por la manifiesta debilidad institucional relacionada con la gestión ambiental (tala ilegal, minería aurífera informal, superposición de concesiones forestales y 455 mineras, concesiones mineras sobre áreas naturales que protege el Estado otorgadas por el propio Estado, la poca o nula presencia del Estado en amplias zonas del ámbito). Se suma a ello, la pobreza estructural de las poblaciones del ámbito rural andino en particular y su tendencia hacia la emigración a la selva en busca de nuevas oportunidades para la subsistencia y el progreso. El presente artículo tiene la intención de analizar, dentro del marco de sostenibilidad, algunos aspectos del documento: Amazonía peruana en 2021207, estructurado sobre el estudio de los 52 proyectos de generación hidroeléctrica previstos a ejecutarse entre el 2010 y 2021; la búsqueda de hidrocarburos sobre el 70 % del área de la selva; la actividad minera sobre 10 millones de hectáreas otorgadas mediante derechos titulados; la construcción de 880 kilómetros de carreteras nuevas, el asfaltado de 2,089 kilómetros y el mejoramiento de 1,517 kilómetros sin incluir las carreteras interoceánicas sur y norte y; el establecimiento de cerca de 500 mil hectáreas de plantaciones para biocombustibles y el aprovechamiento forestal de 7.7 millones de hectáreas que ya están concedidas. TRANSPARENCIA Los autores del citado documento afirman que "el número grande y creciente de propuestas y decisiones sobre infraestructuras públicas y uso de recursos naturales en la Amazonía del Perú no guarda relación con la poca información de que dispone la sociedad" y por lo mismo realizaron esfuerzos para recopilar la información dispersa sobre lo que se proyecta ejecutar en la región durante el período antes señalado. Una gestión ambiental moderna y eficiente debe también ser transparente para garantizar el cumplimiento de los mandatos constitucionales referidos a que toda persona tiene derecho a "gozar de un ambiente equilibrado y adecuado al desarrollo de la vida" (Art. 2, 22); que "el Estado determina la política nacional del ambiente. Promueve el uso sostenible de sus recursos naturales" (Art. 67); que "el Estado está obligado a promover la conservación de la 207 Dourojeanni, M; Barandiarán A. y Dourojeanni D. 2009. Amazonía peruana en 2021. Fundación Peruana para la Conservación de la Naturaleza. Lima. 144 p. 456 diversidad biológica y de las áreas naturales protegidas" (Art. 68); y que "el Estado promueve el desarrollo sostenible de la Amazonía con una legislación adecuada" (Art. 69). La transparencia en la toma de decisiones con implicaciones ambientales se da cuando se cuenta con niveles de participación pública efectiva. Sin duda, la participación pública es un elemento fundamental de la política y de la transparencia y por ello se debe facilitar las posibilidades de acceso de la población a la información ambiental para que las decisiones de la sociedad civil puedan tener efectos directos o indirectos sobre el medio ambiente. La participación de las poblaciones involucradas genera un proceso sistemático de identificación de problemas y planteamiento e implementación de soluciones. Este proceso puede tornarse complejo o conflictivo al permitir expresar las opiniones y preocupaciones de los interesados que reflejan sus prioridades, más si se trata de bienes considerados básicos que se ven amenazados o afectados. Específicamente, en cuanto a participación, se deberá cumplir el Convenio 169 de la OIT, por que los proyectos hidroenérgéticos, los de hidrocarburos y las concesiones mineras y forestales que se otorgan, están comprometiendo los territorios de las comunidades locales, en especial indígenas, y afectando sus recursos. Asimismo, las obras de infraestructura de carreteras en la cuenca amazónica, según Castro, SM M. (2009)208, es un tema prioritario por sus impactos indirectos y directos en comunidades locales y ecosistemas, debido a que pueden causar considerables daños ambientales y sociales como destrucción de bosques y otros hábitats naturales, pérdida de biodiversidad, propagación de enfermedades humanas, migración de comunidades locales, indígenas o no y concentración de tierras. SOSTENIBILIDAD Los autores del libro en análisis consideran, que la magnitud de lo proyectado no ha tomado en cuenta las consecuencias sociales ni ambientales y que las económicas, son vistas 208 Castro, SM M. 2009. Evaluaciones ambientales estratégicas. Iniciativas para la Conservación en la Amazonía Andina – ICAA. 8 p. 457 únicamente desde el ángulo de la ganancia. Es decir, que el desarrollo planteado es insostenible. La sostenibilidad ambiental en la Amazonía será posible si las actividades se desarrollan en un marco de protección de los recursos naturales y la diversidad de habitas y especies, si se corrigen dinámicas regresivas o de deterioro de los recursos naturales (tala ilegal, minería informal, asentamientos poblacionales no planificados y otros), si se interconectan las zonas valiosas y vulnerables formando una red de espacios naturales protegidos, si se fomenta el conocimiento de los recursos y de las posibilidades de estos para el desarrollo y si se promueve la participación de la sociedad civil organizada en las decisiones sobre el desarrollo. La región amazónica es un ámbito sumamente complejo en los aspectos económico, social y ambiental, con bolsones de pobreza y pobreza extrema y fragilidades ecológicas, al lado de recursos potencialmente atractivos para el crecimiento económico si se adoptan modelos tecnológicos probados que podrían adaptarse en términos de sostenibilidad a las condiciones de aprovechamiento de los recursos existentes, o de lo contrario, con la amenaza de tornar inviable el desarrollo desde la perspectiva socio ambiental. Para que el desarrollo sea sostenible, debe ser capaz de satisfacer las necesidades actuales sin comprometer la capacidad de las futuras generaciones para satisfacer las suyas propias209. Debe mejorar la calidad de vida humana dentro del mantenimiento de la capacidad de carga de los ecosistemas210. Y debe integrar el crecimiento económico con la protección ambiental para satisfacer las necesidades del presente sin comprometer el bienestar de las generaciones futuras211. Quiere decir que el desarrollo tiene que ver con la sostenibilidad social, basada en el mantenimiento de la coherencia social y de su habilidad para trabajar en la persecución de objetivos comunes; con la sostenibilidad ambiental, que requiere que el capital natural permanezca intacto, evitando la degradación de las funciones fuente y sumidero del medio ambiente y; con la sostenibilidad económica, que ocurre 209 Informe Brutland, CMMAD, 1988. 210 Informe Cuidar la Tierra, IUCN-UNP-WWF, 1991. 211 Consejo de Negocios Mundial sobre Desarrollo Sostenible, WBCSD, 1992. 458 cuando el crecimiento que se mueve hacia la sostenibilidad ambiental y social es financieramente posible y rentable. Después de lo explicado, ¿cómo podremos decir que las inversiones proyectadas para la región amazónica en los próximos años se ajustan a estas consideraciones si hasta la fecha, únicamente la Región Madre de Dios cuenta con el estudio de Ordenamiento Territorial que le permitirá, de aquí para adelante, planear su desarrollo en función a una zonificación ecológica y económica basada en el uso ordenado de los recursos? SOSTENIBILIDAD SOCIAL Según datos del informe de la CEPAL (1995), casi el 42% de la población total del Perú pertenece a la población indígena. El mismo informe indica que 80% del total de la población indígena se encuentra en pobreza y pobreza extrema La mayoría no cuenta con el acceso suficiente a los servicios públicos, dispone de una formación escolar deficiente o incluso ninguna y por consiguiente, sus posibilidades de integración al mercado laboral formal son limitadas. En la Amazonía peruana son altos los niveles de pobreza en el área rural, asociada a problemas de inequidad y exclusión social, problemas que a su vez están vinculados a inequidades de acceso a los servicios sociales por razones geográficas, económicas y educativas. Dicho ámbito es también muy heterogéneo culturalmente. La sostenibilidad requiere del análisis del entorno social para prevenir los impactos potenciales de la ocupación desordenada del suelo y el cambio de uso de la tierra, cuyos efectos son elevados sobre la biodiversidad; para explicar la extracción irracional de los recursos como es el caso de la tala ilegal y la minería aurífera informal que no adoptan instrumentos que garanticen la sostenibilidad y; para prevenir los impactos de efectos globales significativos derivados de las actividades económicas que contribuyen a agravar problemas de intensificación del efecto invernadero, de crisis de la biodiversidad, de abuso en la explotación de los recursos naturales y de contaminación del agua y suelo. De allí la 459 importancia de una política participativa que preste atención a la voz de las comunidades nativas y campesinas en defensa de sus territorios y los recursos naturales que estos comprenden. SOSTENIBILIDAD AMBIENTAL Las inversiones planeadas en el período 2010 – 2021 para la región amazónica, no han tomado en cuenta el "principio de precaución", cuyo objetivo general es mantener el capital natural minimizando o compensando los cambios ambientales irreversibles o inaceptables. Este principio incluye el análisis de los cambios de uso del suelo previsibles con el desarrollo evaluado para prevenir potenciales pérdidas y deterioros acumulativos e; incluye el análisis del costo de oportunidad que toma en cuenta el valor de los usos alternativos y el valor de no hacer cambios de uso. En consecuencia, los riesgos podrían ser los siguientes: Uso en agricultura de tierras no aptas para este fin que es causa de la pérdida de los suelos por erosión. Deforestación por el cambio de uso de los bosques por agricultura o ganadería y la tala ilegal de maderas finas. En la vertiente oriental andina, deterioro de las cabeceras de las cuencas hidrográficas por agricultura migratoria a partir de las carreteras proyectadas, lo que en la estación de verano de lluvias intensas producirían deslizamientos e inundaciones con altos costos para las actividades productivas y la infraestructura. Deterioro creciente de la calidad del agua a partir de la minería aurífera, por la informalidad en la que se desenvuelve y por la ausencia del Estado para su control y organización productiva. 460 Pérdida de la diversidad biológica, uno de los recursos de mayor importancia en este ámbito, a partir de embalses o desviaciones de los cauces con fines hidroeléctricos o por agricultura migratoria en áreas de ecosistemas frágiles, por la tala de bosques en Ceja de selva y selva y por la degradación de los ecosistemas acuáticos por sedimentos y sustancias tóxicas provenientes de la minería informal y formal. Tala ilegal generalizada de maderas con impactos en la fauna silvestre y con amenazas que incluso afectarán a grupos indígenas que viven en aislamiento voluntario. La minería informal es generadora de conflictos ambientales y sociales y es a la vez, la que menor atención tiene por parte del Estado que no muestra estrategias para fomentar una minería responsable social y ambientalmente. RECOMENDACIONES Teniendo en cuenta que el manejo de bosques es la única forma de competir en el mercado internacional de las maderas tropicales, es recomendable controlar la tala ilegal permitiendo únicamente la extracción planificada de acuerdo con los planes de manejo aprobados por la autoridad competente. Debe controlarse la quema de bosques y vegetación natural. El problema de calentamiento global ofrece a este ámbito la oportunidad de atraer capitales con fines de reforestación para captura del carbono. Otra oportunidad es el ecoturismo sustentado en la existencia de extensas áreas de bosques, la gran diversidad biológica y la presencia de pueblos aborígenes Las Áreas Naturales Protegidas representan actualmente oportunidades económicas importantes para el desarrollo regional, en particular para el mejoramiento de la calidad de vida de las poblaciones indígenas organizadas en comunidades nativas y porque cumplen funciones de protección de cuencas, producción de agua, conservación de la biodiversidad y por constituir atractivo para fomentar el turismo. 461 Ni los concesionarios de denuncios mineros ni el estado están comprometidos en fomentar una minería responsable, siendo urgente diseñar y aplicar las formas de intervención para controlar y sancionar la informalidad. Se recomienda que las dependencias nacional o regionales procedan de manera prioritaria a culminar el saneamiento físico legal y resolución de conflictos de las sobre posiciones con otros derechos de uso existentes sobre las área naturales protegidas, territorios de Comunidades Nativas y áreas de concesiones forestales. Otra prioridad es la declaratoria como bosques de protección intangibles de extensas áreas de la parte oriental andina que bajan hacia la selva, para prevenir desastres ecológicos de importancia internacional. La acuicultura con especies nativas amazónicas es una oportunidad que deberá tenerse en cuenta, debido a que se cuenta con la tecnología para la producción y con centros de capacitación en la región amazónica. Bibliografía: 1. CASTRO, SM M. 2009. Evaluaciones ambientales estratégicas. Iniciativas para la Conservación en la Amazonía Andina – ICAA. 8 p. 2. Comisión Mundial del Medio Ambiente y DesarrolloCMMAD, 1988. Informe Brutland. 3. DOUROJEANNI, M; BARANDIARAN A. y DOUROJEANNI D. 2009. Amazonía peruana en 2021. Fundación Peruana para la Conservación de la Naturaleza. Lima. 144 p. 4. IUCN-UNP-WWF, 1991. Informe Cuidar la Tierra. 5. PERÚ 1993. Congreso Constituyente Democrático. Constitución Política del Perú. 6. PERÚ, 1993. Resolución Legislativa N° 26253 que ratifica el Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo. . 7. WBCSD, 1992. Consejo de Negocios Mundial sobre Desarrollo Sostenible. http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consejo_Empresarial_Mundial_para_el_Desarrollo_Sostenible Autor Vicenta Irene Tafur Anzualdo, es economista, con experiencia profesional y académica. Efectuó sus estudios de Maestría en Economía Agrícola en el Colegio de Postgraduados de México. Sus estudios de Doctorado en Economía los realizo en la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, además efectuó sus estudios de Doctorado en Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible. Así mismo, ha desempeñado cargos directivos en la Dirección General Forestal y de Fauna del Sector Agrario. En la actualidad se desempeña como profesor Universitario en Maestría y Doctorado. 462 CAPITULO V INVESTIGACIÓN 463 IDENTIFICACION DE VARIABLES PARA INICIAR EL PROCESO DE INVESTIGACIÓN Dra. María Isabel Vigil Cornejo RESUMEN El tema que se aborda nace de un conjunto de observaciones realizadas con los participantes de diversas maestrías y doctorados quienes en el afán de iniciar los procesos de investigación conducentes a la obtención de los grados respectivos tratan de identificar un conjunto de características de diferentes contextos educativos, sociales,psicológicos, legales, administrativos o de otra índole para desarrollar trabajos de investigación buscando la solución de problemas o alternativas de mejora para los mismos. Cuando el investigador logra identificar plenamente las variables sin duda puede emprender el estudio buscando información en las bibliotecas de diversas universidades nacionales y dentro de bases de datos y bibliotecas virtuales nacionales y extranjeras para elaborar la base de toda la investigación es decir los fundamentos teóricos. Es así que, con toda esta información se ubican los aspectos generales de las variables para luego precisar elementos de medición que hacen posible que las investigaciones se cristalicen, nos referimos a los indicadores. PALABRAS CLAVE Variables, investigación, problemas, definición constitutiva, definición operacional, indicadores. El tema de investigación surge muchas veces por las dudas o cuestionamientos que realiza el investigador sobre hechos o fenómenos que no son sencillos de comprender y para lo cual se requiere de información actualizada, válida y confiable para su descripción o explicación. Las variables de investigación pueden ser definidas como características de los sujetos u objetos de investigación susceptibles de ser medibles y que como lo señala Alarcón 464 (2008) en rigor, una variable poseer mínimo dos valores a lo que se denomina dicotómicos, obviamente, la ausencia de variación de un fenómeno dejaría de ser variable haciéndolo invariable o constante. Es así que si no tiene en claro la definición del concepto variable suele haber dificultades en todo el proceso de la investigación científica, ya que, recordemos, las variables se encuentran presentes en el título del trabajo de investigación, en la definición del problema, en la formulación de hipótesis, en el método que se selecciona, en la elaboración del marco teórico, en la elaboración de los instrumentos, es decir en los aspectos más relevantes del trabajo. La variable como tal debe ser entendida e identificada en toda su concepción y magnitud. Ayudan a este proceso la definición constitutiva y la definición operacional de las variables. (Kerlinger, 2000) La primera suele ser el significado global que tenemos de esta característica cualidad o atributo y cuya información se encuentra dentro de los fundamentos teóricos como aspectos o dimensiones de las variables a ser estudiadas. La segunda es concebida como la descomposición de las variables en indicadores suceptibles también de ser medidos pues constituyen datos o información que harán posible la medición total de la variable. El éxito de la investigación radica entonces en identificar variables como características medibles y existentes en un contexto determinado. Los estudios se pueden realizar en poblaciones de sujetos o de objetos cuyas características sean medibles. Mientras se cuente con información más actualizada se pueden ubicar mucho mejor los indicadores como elementos de medición y seguir un determinado enfoque, corriente o escuela del pensamiento que constituye la base teórica del estudio, de allí se desprende la gran importancia de la tecnología actual con las bases de datos y bibliotecas virtuales de universidades nacionales y extranjeras que cuentan con gran cantidad de información que sirve de sustento a la investigación y sobre la cual se construye el conocimiento. Cuando los profesionales médicos, abogados, educadores, psicólogos, economistas, ingenieros, administradores, entre otros señalan las propiedades de lo que desean investigar están refiriéndose a las variables de diversos fenómenos, que pueden tomar la clasificación de cualitativas o cuantitativas. La primera clasificación responde a cualidades o atributos que son medibles y la segunda se refiere a propiedades expresadas numéricamente que también son medibles. Pero también es oportuno expresar que, toda variable cualitativa podría convertirse en cuantitativa y ser medida por valores cuantitativos si establecemos para ella una escala de medición con sus respectivos rangos y toda variable cuantitativa podría ser modificada 465 para ser medida también en forma cualitativa si asignamos categorías a los valores; por ejemplo cuando trabajamos con rendimiento académico la naturaleza misma de la variable es cuantitativa y asignamos valores o rangos para su interpretación pero si anteponemos a la variable el término "nivel" la estamos modificando en su concepción y haciendo variar en forma cualitativa siendo los rangos probables bajo, medio y alto que finalmente se medirán cuantitativamente. Otra clasificación existente para estudios en el campo explicativo sostienen que las variables pueden ser clasificadas como independientes y dependientes, siendo las primeras las posibles causas o factores causales de la segunda conocida como efecto o consecuencia. Se conocen por lo menos dos clasificaciones de las variables de estudio, una denominada constitutiva y otra llamada operacional (kerlinger,2000). En lo que respecta a la definición constitutiva de variables es necesario realizar la misma ya que nos permite identificar los conceptos o constructos sobre los que gira la característica que se desea medir en función de determinada corriente o doctrina. Además permite otorgar el significado de la variable en toda su esencia. En cuanto a la definición operacional es preciso aclarar que los indicadores que se precisan en ella son el reflejo de los términos hallados dentro del marco teórico de la investigación y solo en la medida que logren identificarse con exactitud todos los datos que la componen se podrán elaborar los instrumentos de recolección de información para la etapa de la comprobación o docimasia de hipótesis. El tema de identificación de variables resulta importante si analizamos en profundidad queen la educación superior de nuestro país existe una gran desproporción entre la cantidad de egresados y el número de tesis sustentadas para la obtención de los grados académicos tanto en el pregrado como en el postgrado de nuestras universidades nacionales y particulares, más aún, cuando se evidencia que las tesis que han sido desarrolladas y luego publicadas tienen serias limitaciones que se inician desde la definición del problema. Es labor docente encaminar las investigaciones haciendo un seguimiento de los estudios percatándose de que en realidad las características de los fenómenos que se desean investigar se puedan medir, contrastar en la realidad y que además constituyan aporte a la sociedad. La tarea es cada vez más difícil ya que existe una gran discusión entre los diversos autores de libros de metodología de la investigación Kerlinger (2000); Hernández Sampieri (2006); Alarcón (2008), sin embargo, constituye un reto profesional encaminar dichos estudios a nivel de pregrado y posgrado. El hecho es que cuando el investigador no logra identificar las variables suele plantear problemas que en realidad no lo son y muchas veces realiza una narración de hechos que suceden en su entorno laboral pero que no constituyen temas de investigación científica. 466 No se trata de dar respuestas a una serie de situaciones problemáticas que requieren de una apreciación profesional sino más bien de investigar hechos que si bien ocurren en la realidad requieren ser descritos o explicados para buscar alternativas de cambio o solución. Finalmente, la investigación no debe concebirse como un proceso complicado y poco realizable sino más bien un proceso que implica rigor y que trae consigo el conocimiento científico para las diversas profesiones si queremos dar solución a los problemas educativos, psicológicos, de salud, sociales, administrativos y legales que tanto requiere nuestra sociedad para vivir en una mayor armonía con nuestro medio y lograr estabilidad y bienestar integral. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS  ALARCÓN, Reynaldo (2008) Métodos y Diseños de Investigación del Comportamiento. Universidad Ricardo Palma. Lima.  American Psychological Association (APA) (2001). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association. 5a. ed. Washington, D.C.  BERNAL, César Augusto (2006) Metodología de la Investigación. Prentice Hall. México.  BUNGE, Mario (2009) Estrategias de la Investigación Científica. Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega. Lima  KERLINGER, Fred N. (2000) Investigación del Comportamiento. Técnicas y Metodología. Interamericana. S.A. México  HERNÁNDEZ SAMPIERI, Roberto;FERNÁNDEZ COLLADO, Carlos y BAPTISTA LUCIO, Pilar (2006) Metodología de la Investigación. McGraw-Hill Interamericana. México, D. F.Cuarta edición 467 LA INVESTIGACIÓN CIENTÍFICA DOCUMENTAL Dr. Julio Jaimes Ascencio Introduccion El propósito del artículo es definir la importancia del documento en la investigación científica. Destaca la incorporación de los principales elementos de la nueva sociedad virtual a la tradicional documentación como parte del quehacer académico. Además, examina el documento del punto de vista externo e internoe incluye recomendaciones generales y específicas en su manejo. Palabras clave: documento, sociedad virtual, fuente primaria, fuente secundaria. La Investigación científica documental. Investigación documental es un procedimiento científicoen el que se emplea diversos procesos de indagación, recolección, organización, análisis e interpretación de información en un determinado tema. El constante avance de la sociedad del conocimiento se encuentra directamente relacionado con los progresos científicos y tecnológicos y que solo a través de este tipo de procedimiento se puede hacer un correcto análisis sobre una determinada cuestión con el propósito de establecer relaciones, diferencias, etapas, posiciones o estado actual del conocimiento respecto al tema objeto de estudio. Etimológicamente el término documento es una versión del latín documentum, y éste a su vez se deriva del verbo codere, que significa enseñar, instruir. Por tanto, el documento enseña o instruye sobre algo, en forma inde-pendiente del material en que se confeccionó e incluso del medio que se empleó para dar enseñanza o instrucción. En sentido amplio, se puede decir, que documento es todo aquello que puede servir para suministrar o conservar una información. En este sentido, son documentos la naturaleza, las transformaciones e improntas que el hombre ha realizado mediante su trabajo; libros, enciclo-pedias, diccionarios; artículos, revistas, tesis, informes técnicos, manuscritos, opúsculos, monografías; publicaciones periódicas de la especialidad, folletos, programas de 468 estudio, programas de investigación, catálogos, índices, guías bibliográficas, boletines informativos, reseñas, ensayos; centro de trabajo, seminarios, conferencias, congresos, mesas redondas, discusiones acadé-micas, clases, consulta a especialistas en la materia que interesa estudiar; películas, discos, diapositivas. Estos y otros medios permiten describir, conocer, predecir y controlar los fenómenos que se presentan en la realidad circundante de la humanidad.(Galán 2011: 1) La investigación documental es una investigación científica porque da comienzo a una nueva información con la indagación de un nuevo autor. Al igual que la investigación científica desarrolla un trabajo sistemático y objetivo producto de la síntesis y análisis de la pesquisa producida por otros. "El objetivo de la investigación documental es elaborar un marco teórico conceptual para formar un cuerpo de ideas sobre el objeto de estudio y descubrir respuestas a determinados interrogantes a través de la aplicación de procedimientos documentales." (Galán 2011: 1). Estos procedimientos son desarrollados con el objeto de aumentar el grado de certeza de que la infor-mación reunida es de interés para el investigador y además, reúne las condiciones de fiabilidad y objetividad documental. Técnica documental que permite la recopilación de información para enunciar las teorías que sustentan el estudio de los fenómenos y procesos. Incluye el uso de instrumentos defi-nidos según la fuente documental a que hacen referencia, todo esto para dar respuesta y/o explicación a una realidad que se desconocía a través de una construcción de un proceso de conocimientos. En la investigación científica documental, la incontenible expansión de la comunicaciónen red ha creado una nueva sociedad virtual al lado de la sociedad real. Su enorme territorio es el ciberespacio. Se trata de un fenómeno sociológico, cuyas características son poco conocidos porque esta sociedad está en pleno despliegue. Es una sociedad que no podría existir al margen de la sociedad real, que es su soporte material. Estudiosos y académicos emplean plenamente como fuente de información en su quehacer cotidiano la Webgrafía,que es un listado, referencia o directorio a modo de bibliografía de sitios webs, blogs o portales de internet donde se puede seleccionar una categoría y explorar sus diferentes recursos. Actualmente se cuenta con recursos distribuidos en categorías, tales comoRedes, Oficina, Multimedia, Desarrollo, Matemáticas, Juegos, Técnicas, Gráficos, Educación, Ciencia, Ingeniería, Bases de datos, Sistemas operativos, Escritorio, Seguridad, Utilidades yotrosrecursos: Programas, Documentos.Enlaces. (Rodríguez 2012: 2). Estos nuevos recursos tecnológicoshan generadouna diferente actitud en los investigadores que orientan su labor para la obtención de conocimientos y tratar de dar respuestas a sus interrogantes científicas Reconstruyendo la información en forma versátil,que es producto de muchos autores y generados en latitudes disimiles. Con la incorporación de estos nuevos elementos a los tradicionales, hace que la investigación científica documental sea dinámica, cambiante y evolutiva porque el 469 conocimiento se construye a partir del análisis y síntesis de documentos de diversas procedencias. En este tipo labor científica, la docu-mental es a partir de un aspecto de la realidad, la cual se analiza, sintetiza, formula hipótesis, para fundamentar nuevas teorías o explicar la problemática y establecer el estado de la cuestión, que permitan proporcionar referentes para pensar planteamientos conceptuales, metodológicos y técnicos que orienten la delimitación, el planteamiento del problema y el proyecto de investigación en general. (Hernández, et al 1997: 18 – 22). También permiten conocer los principales hallazgos acerca del tema, resultados contradictorios y lagunas de conocimiento; del mismo modo, brinda un panorama vivencial de las situaciones en las que se desenvuelve el posible tema de sus respectivas investigaciones. Todo esto con el propósito de producir conocimientos y teorías aplicables a casos prácticos que busca el progreso científico y la aplicación de la investigación a problemas concretos. En la investigación documental es importante tener en cuenta los diferentes tipos de fuente de información porque a partir de su adecuado empleo se formula el marco teórico, sustento teórico del estudio, a partir de la revisión de los antecedentes de cómo han sido planteados los problemas de estudio, las variables, las dimensiones ylos indicadores. Por otro lado, permite centrar el trabajo de estudio evitando alguna posible desviación del planteo original. También porque facilitan la elaboración de las hipótesis que con los datos recogidos se validarán, asimismo el tipo de fuente de información proveerá un maro de referencia para la interpretación posterior de los resultados del estudio. En este sentido, las fuentes que el investigador científico emplea en su labor son básicamente dos tipos: primarias o directas, secundarias o procesadas. De acuerdo al planteamiento de Hernández, et al (1997), las fuentes primarias (directas): "Constituyenelobjetivodelainvestigaciónbibliográficaorevisióndelaliteraturayproporci onandatosdeprimeramano(Dankhe,1986).Unejemplode estas sonloslibros,antologías,artículosdepublica-cionesperiódicas, monografías,tesisydisertaciones,documentosoficiales,reportesdeasociaciones,trab ajospresentadosenconferenciasoseminarios,artículosperiodísticos,testimoniosdeexpertos,películas,docume ntalesyvideocintas." (p. 28-29). Los mismos autores al referirse a las fuentes secundarias, indican que: "Consisten en compilaciones, resúmenes y listados de referencias publicadas en un área reconocimiento en particular (son listados de fuentes primarias). Es decir, reprocesan información de primera mano." (p. 29). Tanto los documentos primarios como secundarios deben pasar por un examen minucioso por parte de investigador con el propósito de verificar la autenticidad de los mismos. En este sentido, el experto metodólogo Mario Tamayo (1999), indica la pertinencia de que: 470 "LAS FUENTES DEBEN SOMETERSE A DOS TIPOS DE CRÍTICA: CRÍTICA EXTERNA,QUE DETERMINA LA AUTENTICIDAD DEL DOCUMENTO; Y LA CRÍTICA INTERNA, QUEEXAMINA LOS POSIBLES MOTIVOS, PREJUICIOS Y LIMITACIONES DEL AUTOR DELDOCUMENTO QUE POSIBLEMENTE LO HAYAN DETERMINADO A EXAGERAR, DISTORSIONAR U OMITIR INFORMACIÓN." (P. 43). EN EFECTO, LA CRÍTICA EXTERNAESTABLECE CUÁN AUTÉNTICO O GENUINOS SON LOS DATOS. RESPUESTA A LA PREGUNTAS ¿ES AUTÉNTICA ESTA FUENTE? ¿ES FIABLE EL DOCUMENTO? PARA ESTE PROPÓSITO SE TIENE DETERMINAR LA ÉPOCA DEL DOCUMENTO Y SU AUTENTICIDAD HACIENDO USO DE DIVERSOS MEDIOS SEGÚN EL TIPO Y CARACTERÍSTICA DE LA FUENTE. SEA PRUEBAS DE FIRMA, ESCRITURA, REDACCIÓN, ALFABETO, ORTOGRAFÍA, LENGUAJE CARACTERÍSTICO DE LA ÉPOCA, DOCUMENTACIÓN, CONOCIMIENTOS QUE SE DISPONÍAN EN LA ÉPOCA Y ADECUACIÓN CONSISTENTE CON LO QUE AHORA SE CONOCE. EN CASOS CRÍTICOS O DE ALGUNA SOSPECHA SE DEBE INCLUIR ANÁLISIS Y PRUEBAS FÍSICAS Y QUÍMICAS DE TINTA, PAPEL O DEL SOPORTE DOCUMENTAL. ÚNICAMENTE CUANDO EL INVESTIGADOR DETERMINA LA PLENA AUTENTICIDAD DE LA FUENTE PROCEDE A LA CRÍTICA INTERNA,LA CUAL TRATA DE DETERMINAR LOS POSIBLES MOTIVOS, PREJUICIOS Y LIMITACIONES DEL AUTOR DEL DOCUMENTO QUE POSIBLEMENTE LO HAYAN DETERMINADO A EXAGERAR, DISTORSIONAR U OMITIR INFORMACIÓN, ES DECIR, QUE EL DOCUMENTO TENGA EL GRADO DE EXACTITUD Y MÉRITO, ES DECIR, QUE CARACTERIZA EL DATO O INFORMACIÓN QUE SE UTILIZARÁ COMO MEDIO PROBATORIO QUE SEGÚN PAÚL PALACIOS (2005), VIENE A SER: "LA MANIFESTACIÓN FORMAL DEL HECHO A PROBAR, ES LA DESCRIPCIÓN, DESIGNACIÓN O REPRESENTACIÓN DE UN HECHO" (P. 180), O BIEN UN MEDIO ARGUMENTATIVO, QUE INTENTA CONVENCER, MODIFICAR O, EN OCASIONES, REFORZAR LA OPINIÓN DEL RECEPTOR, DEL DESTINATARIO DEL TEXTO, MEDIANTE RAZONES QUE SEAN ACEPTABLES, FUERTES Y CAPACES DE RESISTIR LAS RAZONES EN CONTRA (CONTRAARGUMENTOS). UNA FUENTE AUTÉNTICA NO GARANTIZA QUE SU INFORMACIÓN SEA RELEVANTE Y NECESARIA, ES DECIR, AQUELLA PERTINENTE A NUESTROS PROPÓSITOS. SIEMPRE HAY LA POSIBILIDAD DE CONTRASTAR CON DOCUMENTOS ANÁLOGOS U OBTENER LA OPINIÓN DE UN EXPERTO, PARA ALCANZAR LA CERTIDUMBRE PLENA DEL DOCUMENTO PARA INCLUIR EN LA INVESTIGACIÓN CIENTÍFICA. BIBLIOGRAFÍA 471 GALÁN, MANUEL (2011) "METODOLOGÍA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN" (TOMADO EL 02 DE AGOSTO DE 2013). HTTP://MANUELGALAN.BLOGSPOT.COM/2011/09/LA-INVESTGA-CIONDOCUMENTAL_1557.HTM. HERNÁNDEZ, ROBERTO, CARLOS FERNÁNDEZ, PILAR BAPTISTA, & MA DE LA LUZ CASAS (1997). METODOLOGÍA DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN. COLOMBIA. PANAMERICANA FORMAS E IMPRESOS S.A. PAREDES, PAUL(2005) LAS PRESUNCIONES COMO SUCEDÁNEOS de los medios probatorios. En Aportes para la reforma del proceso laboral peruano. Lima. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho del Trabajo y de la Seguridad Social – SPTSS. Rodríguez, Yaddy (2012) "Webgrafía" (Tomado el 02 de agosto de 2013). samiyayita.-samiyayita.blogspot.com/. Tamayo, Mario (1999) La investigación. Serie Aprender a Investigar. Instituto Colombiano para el Fomento de la Educación Superior, IBFES. Subdirección General Técnica y de Fomento3a edición: (corregida y aumentada). Santa Fe de Bogotá, D. C. ARFO EditoresLtda. 472 BREVES APUNTES PARA REALIZAR UNA TESIS EN EL CAMPO JURÍDICO Dr.Robert Ramón Zapata Villar(*) Introducción La Universidad es una de las instituciones con más antigüedad y sin duda es la única que durante siglos ha perdurado a lo largo de la historia. Es en los principios de la Edad Media cuando el saber y la educación se encontraban relegados a las escuelas existentes en los monasterios y catedrales (Bolonia, Paris, Salerno, San Millan, Córdova, etc). Algunas de estas escuelas alcanzan el grado de Studium Generale, porque recibían alumnos de fuera de sus diócesis y concedía títulos que tenían validez fuera de ellas; contaban con estatutos y privilegios otorgados, primero por el poder civil y posteriormente ampliados por el papado. De aquí surgieron las universidades. Por otro lado, desde los albores de los tiempos, los hombres se han preocupado siempre por el conocimiento formulándose preguntas como ¿qué es lo que se puede conocer? ¿cómo se debe conocer? y ¿qué conocimiento es válido?; inquietudes y preocupaciones que se trasladaron, como era obvio, a los claustros universitarios, a fin de encontrar respuestas y propuestas, y en esa línea las universidad se convertían, a través de la historia, en centros de reflexión del pensamiento humano. En la Edad Media, las Universidades cobraron impulso en su crecimiento, por el influjo de la doctrina de la Iglesia Católica como una necesidad de su propia difusión, así pues se gestó la universidad como centro de búsqueda de respuestas al requerimiento. El conocimiento bíblico y su enseñanza que, hasta ese entonces, había quedado reservado a los miembros jerárquicos de la orden, iban a ser más difundidas. En ese sentido, surgieron (*) Abogado por la Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos y Magister por la misma casa de estudios. Diploma de Segunda Especialidad en Formación Magisterial por la Facultad de Educación de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Profesor en Posgrado de las Universidades Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, San Martin de Porres y San Marcos. la orden de los dominicos, con influencia aristotélica, y la de los franciscanos seguidores de Platón, adoptando como método de estudio el escolástico que consistía en tomar las afirmaciones bíblicas, y tratar de demostrarlas de manera racional, con el apoyo en el argumento de autoridad. Cuando se aplica? 473 El término universitas aludía a cualquier comunidad organizada con cualquier fin. Pero es a partir del siglo XII cuando los profesores empiezan a agruparse en defensas de la disciplina escolar, preocupados por la calidad de la enseñanza; del mismo modo, los alumnos comienzan a crear comunidades para protegerse del profesorado, acciones que no hicieron más que determinar la evolución de las universidades De lo anterior debemos entender y siguiendo a Catenacci 212que la Universidad es una comunidad estructurada para la búsqueda del saber, la investigación y la trasmisión de conocimientos. Comunidad porque son el resultado de las corporaciones de alumnos que se organizan para atraer a los profesores a fin de que establezcan su cátedra en la ciudad, o de maestros que se unen para generar un foro académico. Búsqueda del saber porque nacen como espacios de investigación, labor docente y búsqueda e integración de conocimientos. Transmisión de conocimientos porque se constituye en un fin esencial de la universidad y que su reglamentación implicó el oficio del intelectual y es Investigación porque las universidades deben considerar a la ciencia como un objeto de incesante investigación. Es bajo esos parámetros que durante la historia y en cuanto se refiere a la educación superior que se vislumbra cuatro grandes modelos del sistema educativo; a) el sistema napoleónico o de la universidad profesional; b) el sistema alemán o de la universidad científico-educativo; c) el sistema británico o de la universidad educativa; y d) el sistema norteamericano o de la universidad-organización. De todo lo anterior podemos concluir que la Universidad desde una perspectiva histórica por un lado y la investigación científica por otro, guardaron una estrecha y única relación, esto es, se constituyeron en fuente y actividad intelectual respectivamente, las cuales deben converger a fin de lograr un propósito último: buscar el desarrollo y bienestar general de la sociedad. Por lo que el nivel de desarrollo de una sociedad estará en función de la existencia o inexistencia de investigaciones científicas, en nuestro caso en materia jurídica. Es precisamente sobre este último punto en que en nuestro medio encontramos aún debates en torno a los contenidos metodológicos para realizar investigaciones científicas, y esto se agrava en lo referente a las investigaciones en el campo jurídico en razón de su objeto y metodologías propias que lo caracterizan, falencias que pueden explicarse en sus consecuencias, esto es, en el bajo porcentaje de investigaciones de corte jurídico existentes en las escuelas de posgrado de las Universidades, por lo que el presente trabajo tiene como propósito perfilar conceptos básicos para diseñar y/o estructurar investigaciones en el campo jurídico y que se constituyan en un propuesta para el investigador en derecho y enfrentar así un trabajo con rigor científico. Demos pues inicio a la agenda planteada. CUESTIONES PREVIAS 212 Catenacci, Imerio Jorge. Introducción al derecho; Buenos Aires, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma, 2001, p. 48 474 Por qué y para qué investigamos? En Derecho, el interés por conocer y comprender la realidad jurídica como fuente de problemas da origen a la investigación jurídica. Por lo tanto, el punto de partida de la investigación, es la existencia de un problema susceptible de ser estudiado y frente al cual investigamos para buscar la comprensión y explicación de esa situación problemática o para hallar posibles soluciones, más o menos adecuadas213. Así, el esquema que podría graficar lo expresado, sería: INVESTIGACIÓN PROBLEMA Así pues la investigación se constituye en una necesidad para el hombre a fin de que pueda comprender su entorno social, económico, cultural y jurídico en el que se desenvuelve. En el ámbito normativo existe también una exigencia legal para realizar investigaciones en cuanto se constituye en el fin último de las Universidades. En efecto, la Constitución Política del Estado peruano en su artículo 18 establece como fines de la Educación Universitaria la formación profesional, la difusión cultural, la creación intelectual, artística, y la investigación científica y tecnológica, y en esa dirección también la Ley Universitaria vigente214 precisa que uno de los fines de las Universidades es realizar investigaciones en humanidades, ciencia y tecnologías, así como fomentar la creación intelectual y artística. A esto debemos añadir que la importancia y necesidad de la investigación científica no se limita al plano local o nacional, sino también a las organizaciones internacionales, como es la Organización de las Naciones 213 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Métodos y técnicas de investigación educativa: Diploma de Segunda Especialidad en Formación Magisterial, Undécima edición, 2008, p.15 214 Ley No 23733. RESUMEN La Universidad desde sus orígenes ha sido centro natural de reflexión filosófica y de la investigación científica, constituye el fin último de aquella, pero a la vez es también una exigencia legal, debiendo propender al desarrollo de la sociedad; en esa línea, existe aún debate en cuanto a los contenidos metodológico s para realizar una investigación, en especial en materia jurídica por sus propias características , resultando necesario perfilar conceptos básicos sobre investigación, método y describir el contenido de una tesis en materia jurídica. Palabras clave: Studium Quién aplica? ¿PARA QUÉ? 475 Unidas para la Educación -UNESCOdonde en una Conferencia mundial realizada entre los días 5 y 9 de octubre de 1998 en su sede Paris Francia en la Declaración Mundial sobre la Educación Superior en el Siglo XXI: Visión y Misión ha señalado que una de las misiones de la educación superior es promover, generar y difundir conocimientos por medio de la investigación, reafirmando así la necesidad de preservar, reforzar y fomentar la misión de contribuir al desarrollo sostenible y mejoramiento del conjunto de la sociedad215. Qué es la investigación? El término investigar proviene de las palabras griegas: in=adentrarse, ir en busca, y vestigium=huella, antecedentes. También del latín in=en, y vestigare=hallar, indagar, seguir vestigios. Genéricamente, significa indagar, descubrir, buscar algo. En ese orden de ideas, Woods216 indica que la investigación es una indagación, una búsqueda de nuevos conocimientos y de nueva comprensión, para lo cual, se ha de ser curioso, se ha de saber algo nuevo, se ha de tener espíritu de aventura, pero a la vez también significa tomar conciencia que el conocimiento que se posee es imperfecto e incompleto. En el campo práctico y siguiendo a Aranzamendi podemos decir que la investigación contiene dos elementos fundamentales: de fondo (proceso), que se aboca al análisis crítico de su proceso y de forma (formalidades), que se pondera mediante la comunicación escrita a la sociedad académica de sus resultados217. La tesis es la única forma de realizar trabajos de investigación? La tesis no es la única forma de realizar trabajos de investigación existen otras con el que se puede iniciar labores académicas investigativas. Ramos Núñez218 nos indica que tenemos la Monografía sobre cuyo significado existe dos vertientes, una de tipo formal, donde monografía es un trabajo por encima de las 30 páginas, que no aparece en una revista convencional pero tampoco como libro sino publicadas en revistas especializadas o trabajos independientes bajo el nombre de cuadernos de investigación, contienen un rico aparato crítico y abundantes notas bibliográficas, dotada de un texto central y otra de notas bibliográficas, por lo general a pie de página que sirven para colocar referencias bibliográficas o documentales; y la segunda de orientación o tendencia latina, que considera que la monografía es un trabajo descriptivo sobre un tema y carece de hipótesis general o particular, no interesa su extensión, sólo describe figuras o instituciones pero que no propone hipótesis; dato que precisamente lo diferencia, entre otros aspectos, de las tesis; así, las monografías son genéricas mientras que las tesis son específicas al plantear un problema concreto, las primeras divulgan y narra mientras que la segunda intenta demostrar hipótesis; 215 Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Educación-UNESCO (1998) "La Educación Superior en el Siglo XXI: Visión Y Acción". (Tomado el 18 de mayo de 2010). http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/wche/declaracion_spa.htm 216 Woods, Peter. La escuela por dentro: La etnografía en la investigación educativa; Barcelona, Paidós/MEC, 1989, p. 2 217 Aranzamendi Ninacondor, Lino. La investigación Jurídica Diseño del Proyecto de Investigación Estructura y redacción de la tesis; Lima, Grijley, 2010, p.48 218 Ramos Núñez, Carlos. Cómo hacer una tesis de Derecho y no envejecer en el intento; Lima, Gaceta Jurídica, 4ta edición revisada y aumentada, 2010 p.84 476 el objeto de la monografía puede ser cualquier evento, mientras que la tesis contiene una proposición que afirma o niega algo; y por último, las monografías, a diferencia de la tesis, puede o no tener conclusiones, debiendo rescatar sin embargo que las monografías vendrían a ser productos preliminares con proyección a constituir un trabajo de mayor aliento. También se tiene al Informe que es una breve descripción objetiva y honesta de algún tema o preocupación, donde se señala los problemas que faltan terminar, los métodos utilizados, los resultados concretos de la investigación y las conclusiones, documento que en el trabajo científico, en especial para los profesores, resulta un herramienta de comprobación de los avances del trabajo y para los estudiantes es un mecanismo de autovigilancia. Otra herramienta es La Reseña o recensión que es el resumen y comentario más o menos exhaustivo y crítico de un libro o de una monografía científica, publicadas comúnmente en la sección bibliográfica de revistas especializadas. La reseña es, o debe ser, una narración sucinta, objetiva y crítica sobre el contenido de la obra, pudiendo (aun cuando no es deseable) alcanzar también a su autor pero en forma comedida y no brutal, tampoco encomiástica; constituye en sí una herramienta para el inicio y madurez de trabajos de investigación. Por último, se tiene al Ensayo que es un comentario libre en torno a un tema, sea científico, literario o informativo, que encierra una gran libertad de enfoque del autor, no siendo necesario nutrirlo de notas bibliográficas, caracterizándose por tener una extensión breve, con un fondo expositivo de análisis y comentario y con presencia de juicios valorativos sin apoyo en evidencias. Cuáles son los componentes básicos de toda investigación Si consideramos la investigación como un proceso, podemos identificar cuatro elementos básicos de toda investigación: el problema, los objetivos, las hipótesis y las variables219. En el siguiente grafico, se presenta los elementos básicos del proceso de investigación El problema de investigación es el punto de partida de toda investigación, es el porqué de dicha actividad. En el lenguaje común el problema es entendido como dificultad, pero en sentido estricto de la investigación científica viene a ser una dificultad para la que no existe medio de solución conocido y esto puede ser porque no existe información o existiendo no está bien verificada. Por lo tanto el problema se puede definir como dificultad cuya solución requiere de una investigación conceptual o empírica. 219 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. Op.cit. p. 21 C O M PR E N D E R/ E XP LI C A R U N A SI ¿POR QUÉ? 477 Las fuentes donde podemos encontrar problemas es en la observación acuciosa y crítica de la realidad jurídica; en el campo teórico y estudio crítico de las ramas del Derecho; en los cambios tecnológicos y desarrollo de diversos medios; y, la permanente actualización académico-profesional. En la formulación del problema debe observarse tres condiciones: expresar la relación entre dos o más variables; enunciarse en forma clara, precisa y univoca y en lo posible en forma de pregunta a fin de que la solución admita respuestas precisas; y, ser susceptible de verificación empírica. El problema debe evaluarse en base a la originalidad en la forma de enfoque del tratamiento del problema; debe ser significativo para la comunidad jurídica; pertinente y viable en asumir dicho trabajo en tanto se cuenta con acceso de información y recursos financieros. Algo importante que no debemos dejar pasar al momento de plantear el problema es que el investigador debe encontrarse provisto de conocimientos previos. Mejía nos grafica con un ejemplo poniendo el caso de Heredoto, griego y padre de la Historia, quien en sus múltiples viajes por el mundo antiguo, habría tenido la experiencia de conocer muchos ríos y cada vez que veía un nuevo río, la evidencia de los hechos correspondían con la idea que él se había formado de un río: torrente de agua que fluye siempre por el mismo cauce. Y así, cada vez que visitaba un nuevo país o una nueva región, encontraba que todos los ríos eran torrentes de agua que fluían siempre por el mismo cauce, es decir, la realidad coincidía con los conocimientos previos que Heredoto poseía de los ríos. Sin embargo cuando Heredoto llegó a Egipto de las faraones observó que el río Nilo se comportaba de manera atípica con respecto al comportamiento de los demás ríos que él ha tenido oportunidad de conocer previamente, hecho que le llamó la atención, por lo que comenzó a indagar acerca de las causas que podría explicar este comportamiento atípico. Los egipcios, naturales del país, como no habían vivido la experiencia de Heredoto de conocer otros ríos, le decían que lo que estaba viendo era un río y que a ellos no les llamaba la atención que Nilo se desbordaba de sus cauces por temporadas y, en otras, volviera a su cauce normal. En este ejemplo se observa que es Heredoto, por poseer ciertos conocimientos previos acerca de otros ríos, quien identifica y encuentra problemas de investigación. Aquí se observa por qué los egipcios, que nunca habían transpuesto las fronteras de su país, al no poseer conocimientos previos del modo cómo se comportan otros ríos, ni siquiera se imaginaban que constituía problema de investigación el comportamiento atípico del río Nilo. Por eso es absolutamente necesario poseer conocimientos previos, sin la ayuda de los cuales sería imposible trata de identificar, mucho menos, formular problemas de investigación220. La hipótesis implica que luego de preguntarnos qué investigar, ahora debemos inquirir cuál es la solución o soluciones probables a la cuestión planteada. Las hipótesis vienen a ser una proposición que expresa una conjetura acerca de cuál es la solución de un problema científico dado. Al ser una respuesta anticipada propuesta por el investigador deberá ser sometida a comprobación con los datos que se recoja; de allí que la hipótesis posee carácter 220 Mejía Mejía, Elías J. La investigación científica en Educación; Lima, Facultad de Educación Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, 2008, p.16. 478 provisional. Para su formulación se requiere contar con un bagaje teórico conceptual del tema a investigar. Las variables implica que cuando el investigador se ha preguntado qué quiere investigar y ha formulado tentativas conjeturas acerca de la solución a dicha problema, es decir hipótesis, ha identificado y reconocido las variables que entran en el estudio. Las variables son aquellas dimensiones o aspectos del fenómeno en cuestión susceptibles de ser indagadas a través de métodos de investigación pertinentes. Estas se extraen de un sistema conceptual, de una construcción hipotética y del problema que vamos a investigar. Las variables tiene dos características principales: por un lado debe poseer una referencia conceptual; y, por otro, debe ser evaluable. Los objetivos de la investigación son aquellos logros previstos y precisos que el investigador se propone alcanzar al finalizar el estudio. Los objetivos responde al para qué de la investigación que vamos a realizar. Los objetivos se plantean a partir de las hipótesis y, a grandes rasgos, podemos encontrar tres clases de objetivos según se refieran a: el avance en el conocimiento de un hecho; la descripción de las características de los hechos; o, el descubrimiento de las relaciones causales entre los hechos. NOTAS ESPECÍFICAS PARA PERFILAR UNA TESIS DE DERECHO Qué es una tesis? Conceptualmente la tesis (thesis=posición) es una proposición que se mantiene con razonamientos o mejor, una disertación escrita221, mediante la cual el postulante a un grado académico examina un problema teórico o práctico de la disciplina en que piensa graduarse, hasta llegar, a través del razonamiento y la lógica, a aquellas conclusiones que son el resultado de una creación académica, debiéndolas defender o sustentar ante un jurado222. Consideramos que en lo sustantivo y siguiendo a Piscoya la tesis viene a ser una hipótesis o enunciado que se sostiene sobre la base de argumentos racionales, aunque no necesariamente apoyados en los hechos223. Cabe la precisión que hace Ramos Núñez cuando señala que una cosa es el tema y otra la tesis. El tema puede ser objeto de un libro de carácter descriptivo, por ejemplo el delito de robo. Un estudioso puede escribir un manual sobre esta figura delictiva, señalando cual es su naturaleza jurídica, sus modalidades varias, su origen histórico, su tratamiento en el derecho comparado, etc. Tal como está planteado el trabajo no estamos ante una tesis. Recién se convertirá en tesis cuando adquiera un perfil problemático, es decir, discutible o polémico, por ejemplo si se prepara un trabajo que lleva como título Necesaria reforma del 221 Witker, Jorge. Como elaborar una tesis en Derecho Pautas metodológicas y técnicas para el estudiante o investigador del Derecho; Madrid, Civitas, primera edición, 1986, reimpresión 1991, p.18 222 Ramos Núñez, Carlos. Op. cit. p.65 223 Piscoya Hermoza, Luis. El proceso de la investigación científica un caso y glosarios; Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, 2007, p.200. 479 delito de robo en la legislación peruana. No serían nunca tesis los trabajos que lleven los siguientes títulos: El tratamiento de las sociedades anónimas abiertas en la nueva ley general de sociedades, El divorcio en el código civil, Los delitos contra la vida en el Código Penal, Regulación legislativa del impuesto a la renta, Todo sobre los ADRs. Por tanto, técnicamente hablamos de tesis cuando ellas contienen una hipótesis, vale decir, un problema. Al mencionar el término thesis hablamos de posición, de la postura que alguien asume sobre determinado problema, sea a favor o en contra224. Es también importante considerar que la tesis al ser investigación científica requiere que el problema o la idea sea demostrable, tener naturaleza problemática en base a un tema original, no del tema, sino de perspectiva ya que puede ser incluso un tema manido o recorrido, y por último tener profundidad, o sea buscar penetrar en la sustancia misma de la proposición. Humberto Eco recomienda observar seis reglas para hacer una tesis, y estas son: (1) localizar un tema concreto; (2) recopilar documentos sobre dicho tema; (3) poner en orden dichos documentos; (4) volver a examinar el tema partiendo de cero a la luz de los documentos recogidos; (5) dar una forma orgánica a todas las reflexiones precedentes; y (6) hacerlo de modo que quien la lea comprenda lo que se quiera decir y pueda, si así lo desea, acudir a los mismos documentos para reconsiderar el tema por su cuenta225. En la tarea de hacer una tesis jurídica qué pasos se debe seguir? En principio, Umberto Eco recomienda cuatro reglas para elegir un tema de investigación y estas son: Que el tema corresponda a los intereses del estudiante, o sea, que esté relacionado con el tipo de examen o cursos seguidos y que sea de su mundo cultural, político o religioso; que las fuentes a que se recurra sean asequibles, es decir, al alcance físico del estudiante; que las fuentes a que se recurra sean manejables, es decir, al alcance cultural del estudiante; y, que el cuadro metodológico de la investigación esté al alcance de la experiencia del estudiante226. Para el campo específico del Derecho Witker señala que la tesis como trabajo intelectual es una forma de investigación, esto es, un proceso sistemático de ejercicios analíticos o sintéticos, que se dan entre un sujeto (doctorando o maestrista) y un objeto (material o espiritual) en cuya relación se busca alcanzar un producto científico nuevo o diferente, y es en esa dinámica que se presentan pasos a seguir. Primero Curiosidad es el primer momento en la relación sujeto-objeto y que opera en el área cognoscitiva del sujeto cuando entra en contacto con los diversos objetos jurídicos de conocimiento. La curiosidad es una luz que surge en el estudiante y que lo predispone para fijar su mente en algún atributo, característica o institución de un objeto determinado. La curiosidad, es consecuencia de varios factores, generalmente, derivados del medio socio-cultural del estudiante y del contacto positivo y orientador de maestros que innatamente trasmiten entusiasmo y 224 Ramos Núñez, Carlos. Op. cit. p.50 225 Eco, Umberto. Como se hace una tesis técnicas y procedimientos de investigación, estudio y escritura; Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa, 6ta edición, 3ra reimpresión, México, 1986 p.23 226 Eco, Umberto. Ob. cit. p. 25 480 creatividad en los grupos. Segundo La observación es la etapa siguiente y supone una revisión general de la bibliografía sobre el objeto curioso a disposición del estudiante y discusiones preliminares con maestros especializados en el tema, con lo cual vamos, lentamente sometiendo a nuestra fijación mental el objeto posible, siempre que se inscriba en campos temáticos que gusten y denotan cierta cultura general al respecto. Tercero La abstracción es la etapa clave de toda tesis, pues en ella el estudiante, conocedor de los principales aspectos del objeto observado, comienza a dialogar en voz alta, a plantearse interrogantes, a elaborar técnicamente hipótesis de trabajo, es decir, a proyectar senderos posibles, variables a comprobar, pistas de acercamiento que serán la base de toda investigación y sus posibles productos o metas científicas. En esta etapa, el director de la tesis debe jugar un rol sustancial, pues su experiencia y conocimiento en el tema, será la mejor ayuda al estudiante que se inicia en la dura tarea de saber elaborar técnicamente las hipótesis, pues de ellas depende el resultado final de la tesis. Cuarto La comprobación denominada la parte artesanal de la tesis, supone el someter a comprobación o descarte los elementos o variables contemplados en la o las hipótesis de trabajo. Aquí vamos de lleno a trabajar con las técnicas de investigación (documental o de campo) opción ésta, que estará determinada por la composición y estructura de las hipótesis o preguntas que nos hemos hecho en la etapa anterior. El estudiante debe en esta etapa, saber recolectar la información pertinente para validar las conjeturas que se planteo en relación con el objeto, materia de su investigación. Y quinto La tesis o producto científico es la estación de destino al que debemos arribar en la aventura del trabajo intelectual de una investigación227. Qué particularidades presenta el Derecho como objeto de investigación? El objeto del conocimiento científico lo constituye toda la realidad, tanto material como ideal y social, las cuales son objetos a su vez de estudios de cada ciencia particular, el cual sin embargo no nos debe hacer perder de vista que la teoría, el sistema de conocimientos y las leyes científicas de una ciencia particular, están referidos a un nivel o porción de la realidad y que es importante comprender la relación entre esa parcela y la realidad total. Debemos indicar como lo hace Solis Espinoza228 que la realidad es única, y que entre sus diversos niveles o aspectos que la conforman, existe mutua interinfluencia. Por ello, si graficamos a la realidad como círculo, y dentro del mismo a las diversas parcelas que vendrían a ser los variados campos de estudio especializados podemos inferir (ver gráfico), 227 Witker, Jorge. Ob. cit. p.17 228 Solís Espinoza, Alejandro. Metodología de la investigación jurídica social; Lima, Ediciones FECAT. E.I.R.L, 2008, p.45 481 que la ciencia divide gnoseológicamente esta realidad para estudiarla en profundidad, para aprehenderla con mayor facilidad. Sin embargo, y para efectos de la investigación en el campo jurídico, es necesario tener presente lo señalado por Kelsen en el sentido que si bien tanto el principio de causalidad como el de imputación se presentan bajo la forma de juicios hipotéticos donde se establece una relación de condición a consecuencia, sin embargo la naturaleza de esta relación no es la misma en los dos casos, y lo explicita en los siguientes términos: "Indiquemos ante todo la fórmula del principio de causalidad: "Si la condición A se realiza, la consecuencia B se producirá" o para tomar un ejemplo concreto: "Si un metal es calentado se dilatara". El principio de imputación se formula de modo diferente: "Si la condición A se realiza, la consecuencia B debe producirse". He aquí algunos ejemplos extraídos del dominio de las leyes morales, religiosas o jurídicas:"Si alguien os presta un servicio debéis agradecérselo"; "si alguien da su vida por la patria, su memoria debe ser honrada"; "el ladrón debe ser encarcelado"229, por lo que siendo así ha Aranzamendi siguiendo a Moisset De Espanés le hace decir que cuando encontramos realidades con contenidos jurídicos y cuenta con datos múltiples, de tipo repetitivo y estructurado, se impone un trabajo cuantitativo o conocida también como investigación socio-jurídica. Pero si los datos no tienen esas características se 229 Kelsen, Hans. Teoría Pura del Derecho Introducción a la Ciencia del Derecho; Lima, Ediciones Wisla, 1987, p.20 HIPÓTESIS: Probables soluciones al problema basados en el conocimiento históricamente acumulado. VARIABLES: Dimensiones o aspectos de un fenómeno. OBJETIVOS: Precisa el alcance de la investigación. 482 impone un tratamiento cualitativo basado esencialmente en razonamientos de tipo argumentativo, debido a que, como dijimos, las ciencias físico-naturales se orientan por leyes del ser donde dada una causa debe producirse forzosamente un efecto, dinámica que no se presenta necesariamente en el Derecho donde se explica, más bien, por el principio de imputación del debe ser donde dada una causa debería darse cierta conducta, teniendo en cuenta ciertos valores que señala el camino correcto pero que no significa obviamente que cada individuo frente a una causa vaya a responder con la conducta debida, por cuanto la libertad de los hombres en los objetos o ciencias culturales como es el Derecho es un valor preciado, casi sagrado, que debe respetarse siempre y constituye una malla insalvable para obtener reacciones que se desean estudiar230, fundamentos por los cuales en el Derecho puede construirse tesis de tipo teórico-jurídico o denominados en la metodología diseños de investigación cualitativos, sustentados básicamente en la argumentación bajo los criterios y métodos de interpretación jurídica. Por último, no debemos olvidar que finalmente el Derecho como ciencia y cuyo objeto según Fix-Zamudio es el ordenamiento jurídico231 está constituido por: a) normas legales, jurisprudenciales, consuetudinarias y contractuales; b) por la interpretación de dichas normas por parte de los jueces, legisladores, abogados, juristas y litigantes; c) por la aplicación efectiva de esas normas o, también, por la falta de eficacia para su cumplimiento; y, d) por la representación colectiva o individual, buena o mala, que sobre las normas, su interpretación o aplicación tienen los letrados o los legos232, aspectos que debe tomarse en cuenta para realizar una investigación porque el Derecho, al final, es formulación, interpretación, aplicación e imagen, y sobre cada uno de estos componentes perfectamente puede realizarse una tesis. Qué tipos de investigación se puede realizar en el campo jurídico? Como hemos señalado epistemológicamente las tesis pueden ser de tipo teórico-jurídico o socio-jurídico, a parte de ellos sin embargo se han construido también otros tipos de investigación en el ámbito jurídico propiamente dicho. Tesis Histórico-Jurídica. Se trata de una investigación que hace un seguimiento de una institución jurídica desde sus orígenes hasta el presente, para lo cual rastrea en legislaciones históricas, ya sean nacionales o extranjeros. Ejemplos en el medio nacional tenemos la de Fernando De Trazegnies Ciriaco Urtecho, un litigante por amor, o la Idea del Derecho en el Perú republicano, entre otros, también la de Armando Guevara Gil sobre Propiedad agraria y Derecho colonial. Los documentos de la Hacienda Santotis, o la de Carlos Ramos Núñez Toribio Pacheco, jurista peruano del siglo XX, entre otros. Tesis Jurídico-Comparativa que busca identificar las similitudes y diferencias que puedan encontrarse en normas jurídicas o instituciones formales en dos o más sistemas jurídicos 230 Aranzamendi Ninacondor, Lino. Ob. Cit. p.106 231 Fix-Zamudio, Héctor. Metodología, Docencia e Investigación Jurídicas; México, Editorial Porrúa, 2000, p.16 232 Ramos Núñez, Carlos. Ob. cit. p.53 483 vigentes en el ámbito de los sistemas jurídicos universalmente conocidos (RomanoGermánico, Common Law, Chino, Canónico, Socialistas, etc). Jurídico-Descriptiva utilizando el método del análisis es posible descomponer un problema jurídico en sus diversos aspectos, estableciendo relaciones y niveles que ofrecen una imagen de funcionamiento de una norma o institución jurídica. Jurídico-Exploratoria se trata de dar pasos preliminares frente a un problema jurídico, resaltando sus principales facetas, pero sin penetrar en las raíces explicatorias del asunto. Generalmente, estas tesis abren el camino para otras investigaciones más profundas. Jurídico-Proyectiva este tipo de tesis hace en cierta forma una suerte de futurología de funcionamiento de una institución jurídica, partiendo de premisas actualmente vigentes. Jurídico-Propositiva se trata de cuestionar una ley o institución jurídica vigente para luego de evaluar sus fallos, proponer cambios o reformas legislativas en concreto. Generalmente estas tesis culminan con una proposición de reforma o nueva ley sobre la materia. Qué orientaciones teóricas y metódicas se utiliza en la investigación jurídica? En principio tenemos a los enfoques metodológicos, los cuales en el Derecho resultan de suma importancia por cuanto la investigación jurídica siempre estará dirigida a desentrañar estructuras dinámicas o sistemas que no se componen necesariamente de elementos homogéneos o que no son unánimes en sus resultados ni en su aplicación. En ese sentido tenemos a los enfoques exegético, dogmático, funcionalista, dialéctico materialista, del análisis económico del derecho, el iusnaturalismo y el histórico. Asimismo, en necesario tener presente lo expuesto por Rubio Correa233 respecto a los componentes de la interpretación jurídica dentro de los cuales se encuentran los criterios generales de interpretación (criterio tecnicista, axiológico, teleológico, sociolgico), así como también los métodos de interpretación que busca desentrañar el qué quiere decir de la norma (literal, ratio legis, sistemático por comparación con otras normas, sistemático por ubicación de la norma, histórico, sociológico) y los apotemas jurídicos, no debiendo restarle el rol que cumplen también el tema de la integración jurídica comprendida por las lagunas de derecho, la analogías y su formas en que se configuran, así como los principios generales del derecho. Por otro lado, si tenemos en cuenta que el producto de la actividad científica del Derecho normalmente están plasmadas en documentos (artículos académicos, informes, reportes, ponencias, ensayos, monografías, tesis, etc) entonces será a través de la argumentación como técnica o método que se buscara persuadir racionalmente a otro de la validez de determinada conclusión, argumentación científica que debe reposar en dos únicos 233 Rubio Correa, Marcial. El Sistema Jurídico. Introducción al Derecho; Lima, Fondo Editorial de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; novena edición, 2007, p.203-274. 484 fundamentos: una lógica impecable y una permanente fidelidad a los hechos empíricamente observables234. No debemos perder de vista tampoco los aportes que nos ofrece el enfoque fenomenológico que otorga primacía a la experiencia subjetiva e inmediata como base de conocimiento, así como también el enfoque etnográfico que estudia descriptivamente los hechos que tienen lugar en la vida de grupo en atención a las estructuras sociales y conductas de los sujetos que lo integran. Por último debemos tener presente también los métodos generales como el método inductivo, deductivo, análisis y de síntesis. Cuál es el contenido de la tesis teórico-jurídica? Si tenemos en cuenta que el Derecho está constituido por fuentes formales, llámese ley, costumbre, principios generales del derecho, jurisprudencia, doctrina, las investigaciones jurídicas serán aquellas que conciban el problema jurídico desde una perspectiva estrictamente formalista, sin desdeñar obviamente la importancia que tiene el Derecho Natural anterior y superior al hombre en la medida que ésta es aceptada por el Derecho Positivo. En ese sentido y siguiendo a Witker el objeto de estudio de este tipo de investigaciones será pues a la luz de las fuentes formales del Derecho, por ser las únicas dotadas de eficacia para resolver las interrogantes que una tesis de derecho de tipo teórico presenta. En ese entendido, la dogmática jurídica en general se convierte en el ámbito de pensamiento que ubica al Derecho como una ciencia o técnica formal y, por consiguiente, como una variable independiente de la sociedad dotada de autosuficiencia metodológica y técnica235. Para nutrir de contenido a este tipo de tesis el investigador debe preguntarse ¿Cuáles son los datos del problema?, ¿qué se ha dicho del problema?, identificar relaciones entre los distintos aspectos del problema, así como ¿está suficientemente definido el problema? y por último ¿qué soluciones busca la tesis respecto al problema planteado?. Cuál es el contenido de la tesis socio-jurídico? Las tesis jurídicas-realistas o socio-jurídicas asumen que el Derecho no sólo está conformado por fuentes formales del Derecho, sino que ésta es una disciplina reguladora de las conductas que conduce a los hombres hacia determinados fines de progreso, paz armonía individual y colectiva. Para este tipo de investigaciones el Derecho es una variable dependiente de la sociedad y sus expresiones normativas son los "datos" recogidos por el legislador, pero, en todo momento, reflejan relaciones sociales entre individuos y grupos sociales, esto es, las normas jurídicas no son "entes" muertos que se separan de la vida social para ser analizados y descritos autónomamente. La finalidad de este tipo de investigaciones es evaluar la finalidad y funcionamiento del Derecho, por lo que la secuencia 234 Aranzamendi Ninacondor, Lino. Op. cit. 187. 235 Witker, Jorge. Op. cit. p.86 485 metodológica y la técnica a utilizar es diferente a las planteadas por las tesis dogmáticas o formales. Una tesis empírico-social tendrá como objeto de estudio las normas jurídicas y los hechos económicos, sociales y políticos que concurren en su nacimiento, vigencia y eficacia, considerado multidisciplinariamente a un sector de la realidad impetrada y el comportamiento de sus destinatarios y aplicadores. Como señala Witker en este tipo de investigaciones se pondrá el acento en la eficacia de la norma ante el hecho, problema o personas regulados y buscará determinar si se cumple o no con las finalidades sociales de duración que el legislador aseguró a la institución o norma jurídica en cuestión. Para medir la distancia que hay entre el discurso normativo y el hecho regulado el investigador deberá utilizar el método empírico-experimental, propio del científico social236. Debemos aclarar sin embargo que una tesis de Derecho no tiene que ser necesariamente verificable a través de la experimentación. Pero tiene la obligación de ser convincente y que disponga de información empírica suficiente. Podría apoyarse en la observación, pero no siempre en la experimentación, por cuanto lo más probable es que sus resultados sean inconstantes237. Una tesis empírico-social, tendrá como datos del problema dos áreas: la realidad social y el análisis de su regulación jurídica. Deberá escudriñar aspectos principales del problema, esto es, qué se ha dicho del problema, explicitar las relaciones o aspectos del problema, o cuestiones conexas al mismo, así como si está debidamente definido el problema. Las hipótesis debe concentrar la atención y esfuerzo del investigador en la obtención de datos o hechos de la realidad. Será el momento de acudir a las técnicas e instrumentos de investigación, como la observación, la encuesta, la entrevista, etc. La muestra o población y las reglas de su recojo o acopio deben estar bien definidas, así como en cuanto a su cotejo o contrastación debe servirse de las estadísticas para éstos propósitos. REFERENCIA BIBLIOGRÁFICA 1. ARANZAMENDI NINICONDOR, Lino (2010) La investigación Jurídica Diseño del Proyecto de Investigación Estructura y redacción de la tesis; Lima, Grijley. 2. CATENACCI, Imerio Jorge (2001) Introducción al derecho; Buenos Aires, Editorial Astrea de Alfredo y Ricardo Depalma. 3. ECO, Umberto (1986) Como se hace una tesis técnicas y procedimientos de investigación, estudio y escritura; 6ta edición, 3ra reimpresión, Barcelona, Editorial Gedisa. 4. FIX-ZAMUDIO, Héctor (2000) Metodología, Docencia e Investigación Jurídicas; México, Editorial Porrúa. 6. KELSEN, Hans (1987) Teoría Pura del Derecho Introducción a la Ciencia del Derecho; Lima, Ediciones Wisla. 7. Ley No 23733. 236 Witker, Jorge. Op. Cit. p.98 237 Ramos Núñez, Carlos. Op. Cit. p. 68. 486 8. MEJIA MEJIA, Elías J. (2008) La investigación científica en Educación; Facultad de Educación Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima. 9. ORGANIZACIÓN DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LA EDUCACIÓN -UNESCO (1998) "La Educación Superior en el Siglo XXI: Visión Y Acción" (Tomado el 18 de mayo de 2010) http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/wche/declaracion spa.htm 10. PISCOYA HERMOZA, Luis (2007) El proceso de la investigación científica un caso y glosarios; Lima, Fondo Editorial de la UIGV. 11. PONTIFICA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DEL PERÚ (2008) Métodos y técnicas de investigación educativa: Diploma de Segunda Especialidad en Formación Magisterial, Undécima edición, 2008, Lima. 12. RAMOS NÚÑEZ, Carlos (2010) Cómo hacer una tesis de Derecho y no envejecer en el intento; 4ta edición revisada y aumentada, Lima, Gaceta Jurídica. 13. RUBIO CORREA, Marcial (2007) El sistema jurídico. Introducción al Derecho. Novena edición, Lima, Fondo Editorial Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. 14. SOLÍS ESPINOZA, Alejandro (2008) Metodología de la investigación jurídica social; Lima, Ediciones FECAT. E.I.R.L. 15. WITKER, Jorge (1991) Como elaborar una tesis en Derecho Pautas metodológicas y técnicas para el estudiante o investigador del Derecho; primera edición 1986, Madrid Civitas. 16. WOODS, Peter (1989) La escuela por dentro: La etnografía en la investigación educativa; Barcelona, Paidós/MEC. 487 EL ESTADO DE LA SITUACIÓN DE LA NIÑEZ TRABAJADORA EN EL PERÚ – 2010238 JORGE GARCÍA ESCOBAR RESUMEN El presente texto integra las principales constataciones de un estudio encaminado a determinar las características del trabajo infantil en el Perú, es un intento por dar razón de sus tendencias históricas y actuales. Se ha elaborado teniendo en cuenta las fuentes de información estatal que sistemáticamente van arrojando información que sirven de base para la planificación del desarrollo que implementan las organizaciones con tienen como foco de interés el trabajo infantil. Se busca presentar una visión integral, no prejuiciada, imparcial de la realidad, en la medida que es necesario analizar los fenómenos sociales objetivamente para no caer en errores de interpretación que luego conduzcan a prácticas sociales inadecuadas y a la dilapidación de los fondos de la inversión social. PALABRAS CLAVE Niñez trabajadora / políticas sociales / paradigmas de infancia / derechos humanos / gestión social INTRODUCCIÓN Distintas razones indican la necesidad de llevar a cabo un estudio que explore el "Estado de la situación de la niñez trabajadora". Es necesario reconocer en qué situación se encuentra la niñez trabajadora, su composición demográfica, las actividades laborales a las que se dedican, las características de sus ocupaciones, el estado de la educación escolarizada y no escolarizada, la situación y atención de la salud, la participación y organización en movimientos sociales. Así mismo, es necesario reconocer la situación e impacto de los planes públicos de acción por la niñez trabajadora, el impacto de la cooperación internacional y de las Naciones Unidas respecto a la situación y efecto de los planes civiles llevados a cabo por los organismos no gubernamentales y la cooperación técnica económica internacional, el estado nacional e internacional sobre las normas jurídicas del sector. Falta conocer realmente como vive y que aporta la niñez trabajadora, alejarnos un poco del mandato y de la obediencia cerrada de los mandatos internacionales, es por ello que se pensó en un estudio de carácter exploratorio en el sentido que pretendía actualizar el conocimiento procurando ser lo más prolijo que se pueda pero que simultáneamente sabrá reconocer las limitaciones a las que se expone, teniendo en cuenta las limitaciones de las fuentes de información en general sobre infancia y adolescencia en el Perú. La presente investigación giro en torno al "Estado de la situación de la niñez trabajadora en el Perú al 2010", se trata pues de un esfuerzo de panorámica social más cercano a investigación diagnóstica, que como tal busca encontrar necesidades, demandas pero también potencialidades y capacidades en las personas, para el caso en las niñas y niños trabajadores. 238 El presente trabajo es una síntesis de la investigación que lleva el mismo nombre, realizada con el auspicio de Save the Children Canadá, coordinada por el autor del presente artículo, y que contó con el apoyo de Giuliano Príncipe Barrios en el proceso de recolección y procesamiento de la data. 488 METODOLOGIA El presente estudio se orientó metodológicamente del modo siguiente: Al inicio, recoge, sistematiza e interpreta información oficial de entes públicos, privados, y sociales, nacionales e internacionales sobre niñez trabajadora. Luego, identifica y explica los hallazgos principales. Seguidamente, plantea conclusiones y recomendaciones, e inmediatamente después, plantea las lecciones aprendidas y las relevantes buenas prácticas. El proyecto de investigación, en toda su cobertura, tuvo el mismo enfoque metodológico atendiendo a las interrogantes planteadas en la problematización, recurriendo a las mismas fuentes básicas de consulta Las variables previstas por el estudio fueron: Población, actividad laboral / ocupaciones, educación, salud, organización, participación, prioridad de Estado, políticas y planes de organismos y organizaciones internacionales, normativa internacional y nacional, planes públicos de acción por la infancia, planes civiles de acción por la infancia, informes de Naciones Unidas. El desarrollo del estudio ha seguido dos etapas: una etapa preparatoria y una etapa de trabajo de campo e interpretación. En sí, se trata de dos momentos en los cuales se han ido develando los datos expuestos en el presente artículo. La etapa preparatoria fue enfocada en la definición del diseño del estudio. En ese sentido el objetivo quedó señalado de la siguiente manera: "Conocer el estado actual de la niñez trabajadora en sus variables: demográfica, laboral, educativa, salud, organización y participación, el estado actual y los efectos de las políticas, planes y programas públicos y privados, nacionales e internacionales, respecto a la niñez trabajadora". En síntesis tenemos que el esfuerzo investigativo fue de tipo descriptivo, basado en información consignada en los sistemas de información y de estadísticas del Estado peruano, aunque también contemplo entrevistas a profundidad con actores claves: niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores organizados, especialistas en el campo de la infancia y funcionarios de alto nivel del Estado y entidades privadas con responsabilidad de cara al bienestar de este sector de población. RESULTADOS Según el Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y Adolescencia 2002 – 2010 el número de niñas y niños trabajadores ascendía en 2002 a dos millones, para complementar esto, el estudio "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008" plantea que entre 2002 y 2008 la magnitud de la niñez trabajadora peruana parece haberse estancado en dos millones (INEI 2009, 22), lo cual es estadísticamente improbable y sociológicamente insostenible, la presunción de inamovilidad de la realidad numérica de la niñez trabajadora rompe con toda idea de dinámica y cambio constante de la sociedad, por demás omite la constatación empírica de la cotidianeidad en Lima que nos confronta con cada vez más niñas y niños trabajadores en calles, plazas, locales, ferias, etc. Una entrada un poco más realista y dinámica, es la que propone el CAD – "Ciudadanos al Día" que plantea un crecimiento sostenido de la niñez trabajadora entre 2001 y 2008, esta constatación se hace a partir de los datos proveídos por la "Encuesta Nacional de Hogares – ENAHO" del 2008. Según el CAD en el lapso de tiempo entre el 2001 y el 2008, el número de niños y adolescentes que trabajan habría crecido en 6%, pasando de 1,987,200 a 2,115,400. Esta entidad rompiendo el pensamiento de estática numérica de las entidades estatales comunica cifras diferentes para los diferentes años de la primera década del siglo XXI. Desde otra mirada el estudio desarrollado por Rodríguez y Vargas denominado "Trabajo infantil en el Perú" basándose en los datos conseguidos por la "Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil" del año 2007 estima la "Población Económicamente Activa" total entre los 5 y 17 años en 3,38 millones de personas. Un dato interesante proveído por el estudio en referencia es que la tasa de actividad laboral de niños asciende al 42,5% en comparación con el total de población infantil en ese rango de edad, según este planteamiento tenemos que en el rango de edad referido uno de cada dos niños trabaja (Rodríguez y Vargas 2009, 39). 489 Esquema N°1: Cantidad de niños trabajadores entre 2001y 2008 Fuente: Elaboración propia sobre la base de los datos expuestos en el Boletín CAD N°107 "Trabajo infantil y adolescente", y que se basan en la Encuesta Nacional de Hogares del INEI del 2008. La niñez trabajadora es principalmente población masculina, por ejemplo Rodríguez y Vargas informan que la tasa de actividad laboral de niños a nivel nacional asciende a 45,6% en comparación con el caso de las niñas que representa el 39,2%, es así como en términos comparativos de la "Población Económicamente Activa" total entre los 5 y 17 años tenemos que el 55% (1,163,470) es masculina y el 45% (951,930) femenina (Rodríguez y Vargas, 2009; CAD, 2010). La población de niños trabajadores hombres es mayor en sectores como agricultura, ganadería, caza y silvicultura, en industrias manufactureras y en el comercio por menor, sin embargo las niñas son mayoritarias en el servicio doméstico, en hogares de terceros exactamente representan el 91,8% del total (INEI 2009, 36). Si bien las niñas son la minoría en el total de niñez trabajadora, si son la amplia mayoría de niñez en el trabajo doméstico. Al respecto el trabajo doméstico en hogares de terceros es conocido como uno de los espacios laborales en el que puede darse un mayor riesgo de abuso y explotación, al carecer las jóvenes (en su mayoría del interior del país) del soporte familiar, por ejemplo el estudio "Situación de la trabajadora del hogar en el Perú" desarrollado por la "Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar" en el año 2006, a través de un levantamiento de información a nivel nacional mostraba que un 5% de la muestra informaban haber sido violentadas sexualmente dentro del hogar donde trabajaban y un 22% haber sido víctimas de maltrato físico y psicológico (Red TH 2006, 30). El trabajo de niños, niñas y adolescentes está concentrado en diversas actividades, que son desarrolladas dependiendo del contexto social y geográfico en el que se realizan. De acuerdo a los Censos Nacionales 2007, XI de Población y VI de Vivienda, se dedica a la agricultura, ganadería, caza y silvicultura el 38.6%, un 48.3% la población comprendida entre 6 a 13 años de edad, mientras que en los adolescentes entre 14 y 17 años de edad representan el 36% (INEI 2007, 39). En cuanto a la actividad de comercio al por menor, se ubica una proporción importante de niños, de manera primordial los niños comprendidos entre los 6 y 13 años de edad que representan el 21.0%, en tanto que los adolescentes se constituyen en el 14.9% del total de trabajadores dedicados a esta actividad (INEI 2007, 39). El documento citado añade que un 30.8% de niños y niñas que trabajan estaba dedicado a realizar actividades en hogares privados con servicio doméstico, industrias manufactureras, hoteles y restaurantes, transportes, almacenamiento y comunicaciones. Asimismo, los niños y niñas que realizan actividades de servicios comunales, sociales y personales, así como los que trabajan en construcción, actividades inmobiliarias, empresas, comercio por mayor, pesca y otras tareas relacionadas a servicios públicos, intermediación financiera, explotación PROBLEMA 490 de minas, venta, mantenimiento y reparación de vehículos, entre otras actividades no especificadas, se constituyen en el 14.4%. Dependiendo de cada actividad, los porcentajes varían en cuanto a los niños y niñas entre los 6 – 13 años y adolescentes entre 14 – 17 años de edad. Por ejemplo, para las actividades de servicio doméstico la proporción de adolescentes entre los 14 y 17 años representa el 10.4% frente a los niños entre 6-13 años que ascienden a un 4,9% (INEI 2007, 39). La Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008 señala que el 79.9% de niños en el país se dedica a ayudar en la chacra o pastoreo de animales, principalmente en el área rural en una representación del 91.3%, esto evidenciaría que el trabajo infantil es fundamentalmente rural y se da en actividades agropecuarias y en economías familiares campesinas. En contraparte, en las áreas urbanas, dicha actividad es realizada por un 24.8% de niños entre 6 a 13 años de edad, probablemente en contextos semi urbanos, según se indica (INEI 2008, 41). Mientras que los que ayudan en el negocio de la casa o de un familiar, 14.7% del total, se ubican primordialmente en las zonas urbanas (56.9%) en contraste con la zona rural (5.9%). La misma Encuesta referida indica que la población ocupada de 14 a 17 años de edad se desempeñan principalmente como peones de labranza (47.3%), en un porcentaje de 75.2% en el área rural y 10.0% en el área urbana, esta descripción significaría que la mayoría de los adolescentes han dejado de trabajar en la chacra de sus padres y venden su fuerza de trabajo a otros. La Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007 detalla que la mitad de sus entrevistados (45.7%) tiene por centro de trabajo la chacra, en tanto que un gran grupo (17.3%) labora dentro de su vivienda. Se indica que es razonable que en zonas rurales los niños y niñas que se desempeñan en la chacra asciendan a 79.9%, mientras que en las ciudades trabajan principalmente en sus hogares (27.5%). Así también, se sugiere que al pasar de la adolescencia los jóvenes de las ciudades pueden diversificar sus centros de trabajo (11.4%), en tanto que los jóvenes rurales continuando teniendo en la chacra el eje central de su trabajo (INEI 2007, 39). En general se concluye que en la calle se ubicaría sólo el 13.4% del total del trabajo infantil y adolescente urbano, lo cual va en contrasentido con la representación del trabajo de los niños y niñas que es difundido por los medios de comunicación que muestra en la medida de lo posible los escenarios más marginalizados de la explotación infantil en el trabajo en la áreas urbanas y en un sentido fácilmente generalizador, del mismo modo se deduce que las normas sobre trabajo de niños tendría que enfocarse en el mundo rural y no tanto en el limeñismo de las llamadas peores formas. Las condiciones laborales de la niñez trabajadora peruana se caracteriza por una total laxitud producto de los limitados esfuerzos estatales para conocer como, donde y cuanto tiempo están los niños y niñas en el trabajo, al tratarse de un grupo social ampliamente ubicado en el sector informal de la economía nacional la posibilidad de mantener algún tipo de información más o menos real en torno a las condiciones del desempeño laboral es muy lejana, y esto pese al esfuerzo de señalar en el Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N° 26102 del año 1992 que los gobiernos locales debían de tener un registro de la niñez trabajadora en la informalidad. Una primera dimensión de la condición laboral estaría relacionada con las horas del trabajo que despliegan los niños y niñas, un dato inicial proveído por las fuentes de Estado para el caso la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del año 2007 da a conocer que los niños, niñas y adolescentes desde su perspectiva estarían trabajando 21 horas a la semana (en un cálculo simple por cinco días laborables estaría representando un mínimo de 4 horas por día de trabajo). A manera de comparación o grupo de control esta misma encuesta integra la opinión de los padres y madres de familia que al contrario de lo que exponen sus hijos e hijas reconocen que los niños y niñas en promedio estarían trabajando 24 horas a la semana (INEI 2007, 42). Para el caso de los adolescentes entre 15 y 17 años el desempeño temporal en el trabajo es mayor pues supone en el cálculo básico entregar 6 horas de labor por día en función a lo que indican los padres. Es sorprendente corroborar la diferencia de datos que presentan padres y niños trabajadores en todos los casos quienes informan un mayor lapso de desempeño laboral son los padres, esto se podría deber a la inhibición de los niños ante la pregunta proveniente de un adulto a informar con claridad y certidumbre cuando tiempo trabaja por día. 491 Otro aspecto a tener en cuenta de cara a los datos expuestos es la búsqueda de exactitud para un trabajo de niños que se desarrolla más según la información en el área rural y que por lo tanto esta mas permeada por la vida cotidiana, la realidad del contexto rural es uno en el cual la familia culturalmente sigue funcionando como una unidad económica básica bajo parámetros mentales valoradores del trabajo, en ese sentido es de esperar que cálculos sobre el tiempo desplegado por el desempeño laboral de los niños y niñas sea inexacta. Sobre la posibilidad de riesgos, la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del 2007 da a conocer que los niños y niñas consideran como el principal riesgo a la salud el vinculado con la exposición climática, es decir con la humedad, frio o calor extremo en el cual se encuentren laborando (60.3%), al respecto llama la atención que para el caso de las niñas informantes este porcentaje representa el 73.7%239. Teniendo en cuenta que mayoritariamente se mencionan las condiciones climáticas en las cuales se desarrolla el trabajo como el principal riesgo a la salud no es de sorprender que las principales enfermedades que afectan a los niños y niñas trabajadoras según la Encuesta de Trabajo Infantil del año 2007 sean los problemas respiratorios (41%) y en un segundo lugar los dolores de cabeza, barriga y musculares (38.1%) que en buena medida también pueden tener como parte de la causa aspectos vinculados con los extremos climáticos en los cuales se desarrolla el trabajo (INEI 2007, 42). Sobre la posibilidad de ocurrencia de accidentes laborales el 46.9% de los niños y niñas informantes vez habían sufrido de accidentes en el trabajo, mientras que un 21% lleva carga pesada durante su desempeño laboral (INEI 2007: 42). El boletín CAD N°107 "Trabajo infantil y adolescente" teniendo como base los datos expuestos en la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil del 2007 del INEI, plantea que el ingreso promedio de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores por mes asciende a S/. 162.00 (CAD 2010), lo que vendría a representar el 22% del presupuesto del hogar (de un ingreso familiar que llega a S/. 746.00 por mes). Lo que no se logra dilucidar con el indicador planteado es si esto se refiere al aporte total por cantidad de hijos pues por lógica se entendería que en un hogar donde se cuenta con tres o cuatro hijos trabajadores el ingreso total seria mayor, y por ende sería mayor la representatividad en la economía familiar. El aporte de los niños es ascendente, es decir mientras menor edad tiene el niño o niña más bajo será su ingreso económico mientras que a mayor edad el ingreso será mayor, así por ejemplo se indica que el adolescente entre 16 y 17 años logra en promedio de ingresos al mes S/. 269.00, cantidad que puede llegar a representar el 30% del ingreso familiar (INEI 2008). La gran debilidad del dato presentado nuevamente radica en su relatividad frente al trabajo desempeñado por los niños y adolescentes en las áreas rurales, donde en definitiva los ingresos son menores (en comparación con las zonas urbanas). De otro lado, si los montos refieren a ingresos que se obtienen en zonas rurales sean estos S/. 162.00 ó S/.269.00, el valor real del ingreso en significativo para cualquier familia rural, inclusive superan el monto brindado por "JUNTOS" como apoyo complementario consistente en transferencia de dinero a familias de bajos ingresos a cambio de ciertos compromisos de asistencia a servicios sociales. Bajo este nuevo parámetro o dimensionamiento del aporte proveniente del trabajo infantil y adolescente, puede deducirse que inclusive estos ingresos siguen siendo sumamente significativos para la satisfacción de las necesidades de los hogares de los sectores populares, superan largamente en promedio la asignación económica que viene ejecutando el Estado peruano en su intento por simplemente "aliviar" la pobreza. Algún dato adicional a tener en cuenta es que los niños y niñas más pequeños entre 6 y 9 años, y que según las normas preparadas por el Estado peruano en consonancia con los dictados de Naciones Unidas no estarían ni deberían estar trabajando, también brindan su aporte a la economía familiar y por ese medio a las economías comunitarias vinculadas con la sobrevivencia cotidiana, 239 Dato del texto del INEI "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008". 492 ellos y ellas según la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil aportan en promedio mensual un monto ascendente a S/. 41.00, el mismo que representa el 7% del presupuesto del hogar (CAD 2010). Sobre educación de la niñez trabajadora, según la Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008 la población que solo trabaja y no se encuentra en la Institución Educativa más cercana asciende al 6,1% mientras que tenemos un grupo de jóvenes que ni estudian ni trabajan que representan 5,0% (INEI 2008)., es decir tenemos promedios muy cercanos que nos vienen demostrando que la propuesta educativa peruana viene siendo incapaz de integrar a un grupo de población en su mayoría adolescente, quienes no la ven como el mejor proyecto de desarrollo a futuro. Los niños trabajadores optan por la búsqueda de compatibilizar o equilibrar horarios de estudio con su trabajo lo que no logra plenamente la propuesta formativa regular, tal como lo muestra el texto del INEI "Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008", de cada cinco niños que asisten a la educación uno además de estudiar también trabaja (INEI 2009). En términos generales cuantos niños trabajan y a la vez estudian seguirá siendo una tarea de determinación aproximativa. En términos de la situación de la escolaridad de los niñas y niños trabajadores las Encuestas Nacionales de Hogares realizadas entre los años 2001 a 2008, mencionan que en el 2001, el 21,0% de la población de niños y niñas trabajadores entre 6 y 17 años de edad trabajaba y estudiaba, mientras que en el 2007 eran el 20.4% y en el año 2008 eran el 21,1%; en tanto que la población de niños, niñas y adolescentes que sólo trabajaba era de 5;4%, 6,3% y 6,1% en los años 2001, 2007 y 2008 respectivamente (INEI 2009: 57). Mientras que, en el año 2001, se hablaba de un 69,5% de la población entre 6 y 17 años que sólo estudiaba, esta cifra disminuye en el 2007 a un 68,2% y en 2008 al 67.8%. Para mayor detalle, la Encuesta de Trabajo Infantil de 2007 señala que sólo el 13,2% de los niños y niñas que trabaja no asisten al centro educativo, en tanto que el Censo Nacional del mismo año indica que es el 51,0% de niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores que no asiste, en contraparte la ENAHO del 2007 refiere que el 24,4% de los niños y niñas que trabajan no asisten a la escuela (INEI 2009: 59). Respecto al atraso escolar, la Encuesta Nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007 manifiesta que el 0,59% de los niños y niñas que trabajan entre los 6 a 17 años tiene atraso escolar, mientras que la ENAHO 2008, dice que es el 0,56%. El tema de experiencias de niños y niñas se ve reflejado en el surgimiento de los Movimientos de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores en América Latina en los años setenta. Como organización pionera, surge el movimiento de adolescentes y niños trabajadores hijos de obreros cristianos, MANTHOC en el año de 1976. El Perú sufría una aguda crisis económica, alza de precios, cierre de fábricas, despidos masivos, contexto en el que gobernaba una dictadura militar; en tales circunstancias los trabajadores comenzaron a perder su estabilidad laboral. Frente a tal situación se llevó a cabo el Consejo Nacional de la JOC, Juventud Obrera Cristiana, en donde se reflexionó en torno a la realidad de los niños y adolescentes trabajadores, y se le dio a un grupo de miembros la responsabilidad de iniciar una experiencia de promoción de y con los niños y niñas trabajadores. Esta experiencia inicial tuvo algunas dificultades, pues era la primera vez que se organizaban a los niños y niñas trabajadores, tanto en Perú como en América Latina. Después de 3 años de compromiso, en el verano de 1979 varias comunidades (grupos) se reunieron en el balneario de Pucusana, al sur de Lima, y decidieron que su organización se denomine MANTHOC: Movimiento de Adolescentes y Niños Trabajadores Hijos de Obreros Cristianos, porque la mayoría de los niños y niñas eran hijos de obreros cristianos despedidos. La experiencia va tomando forma y cada vez son más los niños que se reúnen con su equipo de trabajo, donde confluían otros niños provenientes de la plaza de mercado o de la economía informal: vendedores de dulces, cigarrillos, lustrabotas, entre otros. Más adelante surge la iniciativa de crear un Movimiento más grande a nivel nacional que luche no solo por los derechos de los niños y niñas trabajadores sino también por los derechos de toda la infancia en general, recogiendo las experiencias del MANTHOC, como movimiento pionero, creándose de esta manera el Movimiento Nacional de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes Trabajadores Organizados del Perú MNNATSOP, el cual "recoge y expresa la lucha histórica de casi 30 años por 493 la dignidad de los niños, niñas y adolescentes trabajadores", del hogar, de la calle, del campo y la ciudad, así como la lucha por los derechos de aquellos niños y adolescentes que se encuentran en Explotación Sexual infantil, los discapacitados, los chicos en situación de calle. A su vez, el MNNATSOP forma parte de otros colectivos como la Red Nacional de Niñas, Niños y adolescentes del Perú, También integran La Conferencia Nacional sobre Desarrollo Social (CONADES), mientras que a nivel internacional integran el Movimiento Latinoamericano y del Caribe de Niños y Adolescentes Trabajadores – MOLACNATs, así como el Movimiento Mundial de Niños, niñas y Adolescentes Trabajadores (MMNATS) y participan del Foro Social Mundial. Entre sus aliados se encuentran fundamentalmente instituciones de la sociedad civil y de derechos humanos a nivel nacional e internacional, construyendo la posibilidad de un "movimiento social de infancia en el Perú. Tales organizaciones, a través de sus representantes y colaboradores han contribuido a la elaboración del Código de los Niños y Adolescentes del Perú y a sus revisiones para el goce y ejercicio de los derechos de toda la infancia. Saben por propia experiencia lo que se sufre en las condiciones en las que la mayoría de niños y niñas tienen que trabajar. En la actualidad, reclaman el reconocimiento de su condición como niños y niñas trabajadores, el valor del trabajo para sus vidas y la lucha por la sobrevivencia, rechazan la explotación, el maltrato y el abuso. El movimiento de niños y niñas trabajadores comparte sus experiencias a nivel nacional y son reconocidos a nivel internacional, lo cual permite el poder compartir sus vivencias con otros niños y adolescentes trabajadores y no trabajadores de otros países, que se encuentran en la misma situación. De acuerdo a la Convención Internacional de los derechos del Niño, todos los niños, niñas y adolescentes son sujetos de derechos, por tanto se les confiere el derecho de participar en todo aquello que les concierne desde las políticas públicas, desde la normatividad hasta los planes, programas o acciones destinadas para ellos. Sin embargo, estos derechos no considerados en la toma de decisiones que, desde el Estado y desde los organismos internacionales se imponen de manera vertical a todos los niños y niñas de nuestro país, principalmente a los niños y niñas trabajadores, cuya situación se agudiza frente a instrumentos jurídicos dirigidos por organismos internacionales como la Organización Internacional del Trabajo – OIT, y suscritos por el estado peruano; entelequias que tratan de abolir y erradicar la posibilidad del trabajo infantil como estrategia de sobrevivencia, excluyéndolo de decisiones que implican su quehacer y su práctica social. La participación en la definición de políticas de Estado requiere de una inicial partición en dos de la sociedad civil convocada a la lucha por los derechos de la infancia, por un lado el movimiento por la infancia y por otro el movimiento de infancia que para el caso de la infancia trabajadora podemos denotar como movimiento de niños trabajadores, digamos que en términos de escucha activa por parte del Estado de la agenda de la sociedad civil en el tiempo y especialmente en los últimas dos décadas se ha venido pasando de la primacía de los movimientos por la infancia a los movimientos de los niños trabajadores, es decir la tradición de la incidencia política de la sociedad civil hacia el Estado la ha venido copando los adultos sensibilizados. Aún en estos tiempos la puesta en consulta de los instrumentos de política social hacia la infancia pasa por la exposición a dos grupos: los niños y los adultos, pero para el caso de los niños trabajadores es más complejo pues la idea ha sido más bien recurrir a la infancia no trabajadora o a un porcentaje mayor de niños trabajadores para que limiten o superen en cantidad a los niños trabajadores. Finalmente otras de las estrategias recurridas por los representantes del Estado para esquivar u obviar el punto de vista de la niñez trabajadora en la formulación de políticas han sido la desvalorización de la niñez trabajadora organizada acusándoles de ser maniatados por adultos o simplemente la consulta falaz, es decir escucharlos pero no tener en cuenta para nada su punto de vista el menos en lo referente al trato que merece la niñez y adolescencia trabajadora. De aquí a pensar que los niños trabajadores organizados se encuentran aún con la única alternativa para incidir en las políticas hacia ellos de poner en marcha las estrategias de presión social, pues 494 pese a las tres décadas de experiencias como movimiento la omisión del Estado es evidente, y para verificar ello solo habría que revisar el contenido por ejemplo del Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010, texto abierta y directamente abolicionista en cuya consulta se supone la participación de los niños trabajadores pero que en el contenido expresa una apuesta que la niñez trabajadora no suscribe. Una segunda opción en el intento de incidir en las políticas sociales desde el movimiento de infancia trabajadora se viene dando a través de la participación en las mesas y redes interinstitucionales que para la promoción y defensa de los derechos de la niñez se han venido organizando, por ejemplo los "Comités Municipales por los Derechos del Niño – COMUDENA" se vienen constituyendo en espacios de este tipo, teniendo en cuenta que estos entes se vienen constituyendo en los impulsores de la formulación de los planes regionales y locales de acción por la infancia. En el plano de los derechos humanos y exclusivamente de los instrumentos internacionales y nacionales de derechos humanos sigue una senda similar a lo que ocurre con los instrumentos de políticas, el Estado peruano es un modelo de formulación y/o aprobación normativa, reconoce desde 1992 con la dación del Decreto Ley N° 26102 "Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes" un conjunto de programas y servicios dirigidos a la niñez trabajadora de los cuales solo se ha concretado algunos pocos y en precarias condiciones, consolidándose con ello como un Estado que incumple flagrantemente los derechos de la niñez en general y de la trabajadora en especifico. Los derechos de la niñez trabajadora en el Perú pueden encontrarse expuestos desde que en 1918 se aprobará la Ley N°2851 que reglamentaba el trabajo de las mujeres y de los niños, y que fue formulada y mejorada desde 1904 por José Matías Manzanilla y que realiza una clara distinción entre el trabajo entendido como venta de fuerza de trabajo a terceros (sobre el cual gira la Norma) y el que se desarrolla en la agricultura, así como el trabajo familiar no remunerado (formas de trabajo que quedan excluidas de la Norma). Puede decirse que desde entonces la atención legal de la niñez trabajadora va a ser inconstante en términos de elaboración y actualización pero carente de cumplimiento efectivo. La niñez trabajadora junto con toda la niñez se encuentra con el escenario de derechos humanos reconocidos pero difícilmente cumplidos, esta realidad es ampliable al conjunto de sectores sociales considerados como vulnerables en la sociedad peruana. Los derechos ciudadanos, sociales, y culturales de la niñez están plenamente comprendidos en la legislación peruana sin embargo para el caso de la niñez trabajadora se opta por una relativización de sus derechos económicos y por supuesto políticos al negársele el estatus de sociedad civil organizada y portadora de una agenda social autentica y digna de ser valorada – reconocida. En términos de alineamiento al consenso internacional en tiempos neoliberales habría que finalizar indicando que el Estado peruano ha aprobado los diversos instrumentos de derechos humanos sancionados en el marco del consenso mundial de las Naciones Unidas. Por ejemplo, la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño fue aprobada y ratificada en el derecho peruano en el año 1990, al año siguiente de su dictado a nivel internacional. Parte de la estrategia de integración en el mercado mundial además de la eliminación a las barreras impositivas para la inversión extranjera y la provisión de una mano de obra barata, es la consonancia con los mandatos internacionales de derechos humanos que se evidencia en la aprobación plena de los diversos instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos, justamente en el esfuerzo de aprobación al garete y sin atenuantes durante esta década el Estado peruano también ha aprobado los Convenios de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo – OIT relativos al trabajo como el Convenio 138° y el 182°. Sin embargo, cuelga sobre el propio Estado peruano la responsabilidad que supone ser un frágil garante de derechos humanos, que difícilmente puede lograr cumplir con los compromisos y responsabilidades que contrae con el tiempo en términos de derechos humanos. El Estado peruano asume la labor de planificación de instrumentos de política social direccionados al sector social infancia y adolescencia recién desde la década de los años 90s, previamente la 495 acción estatal orientada a la niñez se concretaba en función a una lógica fragmentada por áreas sociales, es decir se sobre entendía que la infancia se encontraba en la educación, en la salud, en la seguridad social, en la nutrición, esta etapa mucho más larga de planificación y ejecución de políticas de Estado se orienta y al mismo tiempo no a la infancia, es indirecta, descentrada en términos de sujeto integral con necesidades y demandas diversas e interrelacionadas. En los tiempos de la fragmentación de las políticas sociales los niños y adolescentes trabajadores emergen como un grupo vulnerable, con necesidades a nivel de cada una de las áreas sociales, como uno de los grupos con mayor cantidad de demandas y necesidades, cuando no se les vincula con los grupos de niños abandonados y en situación de calle, en ese sentido la lógica de la atención del Estado hacia la niñez se proyecta hacia su ubicación en hogares, en centros de cuarentena social donde se les pueda controlar, vigilar, disciplinar, formar, en la ausencia de una familia que no se muestre expulsora. La condición de trabajador de un niño pasa desapercibida hasta bien entrado el siglo XX, pues solo existen dos tipos de niños al menos en la primera mitad del siglo pasado: el bueno que está en su hogar y el malo que se encuentra en el espacio adulto de la calle, en ese sentido lo que correspondía era encerrar o caso contrario entregar a alguna persona o familia para la adecuada formación, respecto a esto último por ejemplo el Código Penal peruano Ley N. 4868 del 11 de enero de 1924 denominado también Código Maurtúa240 establecía que los niños menores de 13 años en abandono material y peligro moral debían de ser puestos al cuidado de una familia digna de confianza y los menores entre 13 y 18 años que cometieran alguna infracción deberían de ir a una escuela correccional, escuela de artes u oficios o granja escuela. Desde la perspectiva del Código Penal peruano de 1924 el trabajo emerge como la forma para recuperar a los niños en la calle ya sea como trabajador doméstico en hogares de terceros como eventualmente terminarían los niños de la primera categoría: menores de 13 años en abandono material y peligro moral en familias receptoras (Artículo 138°) o en los centros cerrados para quienes estén entre 13 y 18 años (Artículo 142°), en los cuales la perspectiva sería volverlos personas de bien a través del trabajo, en la formación y ejercicio de un oficio que les permita ir generando fondos y con ello ir cimentando su futuro laboral. Este Código elaborado muchas décadas antes de que existan Códigos específicos para la infancia y adolescencia peruana muestra de alguna forma en comparación con tiempos actuales como ha ido cambiando la manera de percibir y valorar desde el Estado el trabajo de los niños y niñas, la comprensión se ha ido moviendo en décadas recientes en orientaciones contrarias al paradigma subyacente en el Código Maúrtua y ello se va ir expresando en el devenir también en los instrumentos de política para la niñez en primer lugar y en los específicos de niñez trabajadora. Como se había venido anticipando los primeros instrumentos de políticas que como tales deberían de orientar, direccionar, proyectar los horizontes de nación respecto a la niñez y adolescencia comienzan a formularse en los noventas a través de la preparación y aprobación de dos planes nacionales de carácter quinquenal es decir de corto plazo, se trató del "Plan de acción por la infancia 1992 – 1995" y el "Plan de acción por la infancia 1996 – 2000", ambos surgidos en la coyuntura del gobierno de dictadura cívico militar de Fujimori, de alguna forma intentos primales pero muy básicos y que por demás no llegan a ser conocidos y mucho menos valorados en el escenario social peruano. El instrumento de política social que iniciaría en términos políticos una mayor visibilidad del sector social niñez y adolescencia trabajadora dentro de la estructura estatal va a ser al Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y la Adolescencia PNAIA 2002-2010241, promulgado por el Estado peruano con dos años de retraso242, fue el primer esfuerzo de carácter decenal y por incorporar a la infancia y 240 En honor a su creador el Dr. Víctor Manuel Maúrtua. 241 En adelante al referirnos a este Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y la Adolescencia PNAIA 2002-2010, vamos a utilizar en el documento solamente las siglas "PNAIA 2002-2010". 242 Del 2000 al 2002 el Estado peruano no contó con lineamientos de política para la infancia y adolescencia. 496 adolescencia dentro de las prioridades políticas de Estado, el mismo documento menciona en sus primeras páginas sobre la relación existente entre inversión social en la niñez y lucha contra la pobreza. El PNAIA 2002-2010 se estructura desde la orientación y enfoque de derechos consignados en la Convención sobre los derechos del Niño, a la vez incorpora el enfoque denominado evolutivo o de ciclo de vida lo que revierte en la definición de un contenido diagnóstico y propositivo por etapas de vida, es así que seleccionan tres etapas claves: inicio de vida, infancia y adolescencia243. El contenido en su totalidad va a ser definido en razón a estas tres etapas esto favorece en el texto un mayor detenimiento en las condición y propuestas por un lado hacia la niñez trabajadora y por otro lado hacia la adolescencia trabajadora, razón por la cual además este instrumento incluye dos resultados esperados hacia este sector social. El orden de estructuración del 2002-2010 está establecidos en razón a los ciclos que formalmente van a ser expuestos en su parte propositiva de la siguiente forma: 5. Asegurar una vida sana para niños y niñas de 0 5 años. 6. Ofrecer una educación básica de calidad para todos los niños y niñas de 6 a 11 años de edad. 7. Crear espacios de participación para los y las adolescentes de 12 a 17 años de edad y promover su desarrollo pleno. 8. Instituir un sistema de garantías para la protección de los derechos del niño (0-17 años de edad). De los veintidós resultados esperados que configuran la propuesta transformadora del PNAIA 20022010, dos se centran en el tema del niño y adolescente trabajando, el primero es el Resultado 9 "Las peores formas de trabajo infantil son erradicadas y se promueven alternativas educativas al mismo" y se encuentra ubicado dentro del grupo de resultados que persiguen en conjunto aportar al logro del segundo objetivo estratégico244. Este primer resultado esperado se proponía al 2010245 erradicar lo que la Organización Internacional del Trabajo ha definido como las peores formas de trabajo infantil cabe añadir que esto no se ha evidenciado en la realidad peruana, diversas formas de explotación de la niñez en el trabajo persisten pese al título optimista de este noveno resultado. El paradigma complejo que define ¿qué es?, y ¿qué no es trabajo infantil?, se expresa en las metas que integran este noveno resultado del PNAIA 2002-2010 donde se habla indistintamente de peores formas de trabajo infantil pero también de mendicidad infantil, las metas señaladas a nivel de este resultado al termino de la primera década del siglo XXI son cuatro: 5. Se habrá erradicado el trabajo infantil en sus peores formas y disminuido la mendicidad infantil. 6. Se habrá reducido en un 50% el trabajo infantil. 7. El 75% de los operadores de justicia intervendrá oportunamente en casos de explotación económica, denunciarán y sancionarán según competencia, a quienes vulneran derechos de niños y niñas. 243 Un cuarto objetivo estratégico del PNAIA 2002-2010 va girar alrededor de las necesidades y propuestas abarcadoras para toda la infancia y adolescencia por ello en el texto se va a encontrar un cuarto grupo a manera de una cuarta etapa que en realidad cobertura a todas las infancias. 244 "Ofrecer una educación básica de calidad para todos los niños y niñas de 6 a 11 años de edad". 245 El 2010 es el año de elaboración del presente informe, justamente año de cierre de la vigencia del PNAIA 2002-2010. 497 8. Se habrán implementado mecanismos para retener en el sistema educativo a los niños y niñas que estén trabajando y reducir su deserción escolar. En consonancia con lo alcanzado para el resultado noveno del PNAIA 2002-2010 todas las metas comentadas están a la espera de su materialización pues hasta el momento siguen como pendientes, solamente bastaría con comparar la segunda meta expuesta con las cifras en torno a la cantidad de niños y niñas que trabajan en el Perú para mostrar el fracaso de la apuesta a todas luces abolicionista que encamina el Estado peruano. Los logros se alejan de lo pensado o anticipado sin duda expresión de una planeación equivoca o inconsistente. La última de las metas señaladas referida a que las Instituciones Educativas y el sector Educación en su conjunto van a volverse atractivas para los niños y niñas trabajadoras tal vez sea lo que más se ha avanzado sin embargo ello también podría definirse con un pendiente no solo para la niñez trabajadora sino también para la niñez en general que aún muestra indicadores alarmantes de deserción escolar en el país. El segundo resultado sobre niñez trabajadora expuesto en el PNAIA 2002-2010 es el resultado esperado 13 que se denomina "Mecanismos de control que aseguran condiciones adecuadas de trabajo a los adolescentes por encima de la edad mínima requerida" y que forma parte del conjunto de resultados esperados del tercer objetivo estratégico del Plan, este segundo objetivo referido a niñez trabajadora es menos abolicionista sino más bien se enmarca en la normatividad peruana que facultad en casos de necesidad que las y los adolescentes puedan trabajar en condiciones optimas para su bienestar y desarrollo integral. Al respecto se podría añadir que el Estado peruano ha mostrado un poco más de acción a este nivel desde el Ministerio de Trabajo aunque solamente cubra al grupo de adolescentes laborando en el sector formal de nuestra economía, la acción referida sigue siendo muy tímida sin mayor impacto. Las metas planeadas como parte de la profundización del resultado esperado 13 son de dos tipos: el primer grupo que va de la meta uno a la cinco se trata de apuestas básicamente de registro y retención de los adolescentes trabajadores en las Instituciones Educativas en un intento nuevamente por hacer más atractiva, motivadora y respetuosa a la entidad de formación. El segundo grupo de metas conformado por la 6 y la 7 tienen que ver con la erradicación del trabajo adolescente y especialmente de las denominadas peores formas de trabajo infantil: 8. El 100% de adolescentes trabajadores, estarán registrados e inscritos en programas especiales orientados a su promoción integral. 9. El 70% de los centros educativos contará con proyectos educativos institucionales que favorezcan la difusión de los derechos de los y las adolescentes que están trabajando y promoverá el desarrollo de iniciativas productivas acordes a su edad. 10. Se habrán implementado mecanismos para retener en el sistema educativo a los y las adolescentes que estén trabajando y reducir su deserción escolar. 11. Adecuar el currículo escolar a la realidad de los adolescentes que estén trabajando, en el marco de la legislación nacional sobre trabajo infantil. 12. Garantizar en los centros educativos el fortalecimiento de los niveles de aprendizaje de los adolescentes que estén trabajando, de modo que se cumpla lo establecido en la legislación. 13. Disminuir al menos en un 50% el número de adolescentes trabajadores por debajo de la edad mínima requerida para el trabajo. 14. Se habrá erradicado el trabajo adolescente en sus peores formas. 498 En relación al nivel de logro de estas metas en términos generales este ha sido mínimo, el mayor avance se ha dado al nivel de las metas del primer grupo sin ser grandes transformaciones y llevar a los servicios educativos a todos los adolescentes, las metas abolicionistas al término de la década si han representado un error al verificar que mas que disminuir ha crecido el número de adolescentes trabajadores en el Perú. Los limitados logros alcanzados por el PNAIA 2002-2010 si es que se puede aseverar algún nivel de logro no solo se dan en el plano de la niñez trabajadora sino en términos de la niñez en general, expresan una apuesta muy empeñosa en términos de cambios radicales pero que no se condice con los diagnósticos de la realidad de las infancia en el Perú ni con la prioridad política y presupuestal mostrada por el Estado peruano de cara a las necesidades de la infancia y adolescencia. Lo que si seria nuevo para esta década en plena profundización de la orientación abolicionista del trabajo infantil del Estado peruano, sería la generación de un instrumento de política específico para afianzar la lucha contra la niñez trabajadora, es así que en el año 2005 se aprobó el "Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010"246. Se trata del único esfuerzo de atención a través de un instrumento de política de un grupo de infancia específico dentro del espectro de diversos grupos de niños y niñas con más o menos urgencias y demandas presentes en nuestra realidad nacional y este trato preferencial devino en la infancia y adolescencia trabajadora. La definición de importancia se vuelve controversial al constatar la preocupación existente por ejemplo por parte del Sistema de Naciones Unidas frente a la situación de la infancia y adolescencia victima de explotación sexual comercial infantil y que se expresa en la recomendación al tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" para la formulación e implementación de un Plan de lucha contra la explotación sexual comercial infantil, recomendación que hasta ahora no se toma en cuenta247. La preparación del PNPETI 2005 – 2010 se enmarca dentro de la priorización del Estado peruano inducida por la presión de Naciones Unidas a través de la Organización Internacional del Trabajo y del conjunto de entidades nacionales y extranjeras que apuntan con su discurso y acción a la abolición del trabajo infantil en el país, se trata pues de la concreción de un horizonte compartido por un conjunto de entidades que asumen un discurso pre diseñado y exportado para su trato y valoración de la infancia y adolescencia trabajadora248. El Plan se encuentra planteado desde un enfoque de planeación tradicional, es decir cuenta con enfoques (derechos, enfoque de igualdad de oportunidades con equidad entre hombres y mujeres, desarrollo humano, de participación y corresponsabilidad social), principios, objetivos, componentes, áreas estratégicas, gestión del plan, metodología, etc.). El PNPETI 2005 – 2010 parte por la definición de lo que sus promotores entienden por el trabajo infantil que buscan enfrentar:  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas y niños por debajo de 14 años de edad que, tanto a corto o largo plazo, puedan poner en riesgo su bienestar.  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas, niños y adolescentes menores de 18 años de edad que, sea por su naturaleza o condiciones en que se desarrollan, sean peligrosas para la salud física y mental, seguridad o moralidad. 246 En adelante y a lo largo del texto al referirnos al "Plan Nacional de Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil 2005 – 2010" estaremos utilizando las siglas "PNPETI 2005 – 2010". 247 El tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la "Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño" fue presentado en el año 2004 ante el Comité de Naciones Unidas CRC. 248 Colectivo que formalmente ha asumido la denominación de CPETI – "Comité Directivo Nacional para la Prevención y Erradicación del Trabajo Infantil" fue creado en el año 2003 y se encuentra conformado por los diversos Sectores del Estado peruano (Ministerios), la Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Poder Judicial, Gobiernos Regionales, Instituto de Estadística e Informática, Asociación de Municipalidades del Perú, Representantes de los Empleadores, Representantes de los trabajadores, ONGs abolicionistas y las redes de las ONGs abolicionistas, Organizaciones Internacionales (UNICEF, JICA, COSUDE, etc.), etc. 499  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan niñas, niños y adolescentes menores de 18 años de edad en actividades ilícitas o formas de trabajo forzoso.  Aquellas ocupaciones que realizan adolescentes entre 14 hasta antes de cumplir los 18 años Una rápida mirada por estos criterios clasificadores del trabajo infantil que para el Estado no se quiere contar en el país pondría la cuota de selectividad en el proceso de determinar que trabajo puede ser bueno que desarrollen los niños y cual no, y por ende en la definición de prioridades, sin embargo el texto más específicamente en su contenido propositivo muestra una orientación estigmatizadora y por ende de erradicación de todo tipo de trabajo que pueda y/o quiera desempeñar la niñez pobre de nuestra nación. El ánimo de selectividad se pierde ante un discurso totalitario que cita constantemente que el trabajo infantil es malo y que por ende tiene que erradicarse y ello es evidente en el contenido PNPETI 2005 – 2010, buscando un poco más de precisión teórica en su inicio el Plan también integra lo que se denomina principios orientadores:  El trabajo, cuando pone en riesgo el bienestar y oportunidades sociales e individuales de niños y niñas, es una actividad negativa para los menores de edad.  Todos y todas los niños y niñas tienen los mismos derechos al bienestar y desarrollo integral, independiente de su condición laboral.  Las políticas públicas sobre el trabajo infantil tienen un sentido propositivo de transformación de la realidad vigente, apuntando a promover el bienestar de todos los niños y niñas.  La familia y la escuela son los espacios de socialización fundamentales para el desarrollo y bienestar de los niños y niñas. Los objetivos que se propone alcanzar el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 son muy parecidos a los que en su momento se planteaba José Matías Manzanilla en la primera década del siglo XX dado que se dividen en el trabajo erradicado por debajo de los 14 años y el controlado o bajo parámetros para los adolescentes ubicados entre los 14 y 18 años, con la salvedad de que este Plan no cae en la precisión realizada por Manzanilla hace casi cien años de diferenciar y no tomar en cuenta en un mismo instrumento condiciones como las de trabajador familiar no remunerado o trabajo de características campesinas, los objetivos del PNPETI 2005 – 2010 son directos, previsibles pero al mismo tiempo confusos por la diversidad de formas de trabajo que se hallan expuestos en la realidad peruana: • Prevenir y erradicar el trabajo infantil bajo los 14 años de edad, • Prevenir y erradicar las peores formas de trabajo infantil de menores de 18 años, • Proteger el bienestar y derechos de los adolescentes trabajadores entre 14 a 18 años. Para el logro de los objetivos propuestos en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 se proponen a diferencia de otros planes como el PNAIA 2002 – 2010 el desarrollo de componentes, estos componentes vienen a representar en la matriz de este plan las tres partes del contenido propositivo de este instrumento, algo así como las tres grandes brechas para transitar hacia un país sin trabajo de niños, estos componentes son: • Componente de prevención del trabajo infantil 500 • Componente de restitución de derechos de niñas, niños y adolescentes que trabajan • Componente de protección y formación del adolescente trabajador El desarrollo de las propuestas en razón al componente en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 tendrían que implementarse y llevarse a la práctica en razón a unos criterios de priorización que en buena medida persiguen proteger al niño y adolescente, esto criterios son: Desde el punto de vista de la edad del trabajador, desde el punto de vista del tipo de trabajo, desde el punto de vista del área geográfica, desde el punto de vista del tipo de intervención. El PNPETI 2005 – 2010 también logra pautear las áreas estratégicas de la inversión social y praxis del Estado para su finalidad de erradicación, estas serían las entradas específicas al tema en consonancia como los componentes previamente señalados. Las áreas estratégicas en el Plan son: sensibilización y comunicación, legislación, estadística e investigación, políticas sociales y derechos, y capacitación y fortalecimiento institucional. De esta manera el PNPETI 2005 – 2010 exhibe sus resultados esperados en una matriz de componentes por áreas estratégicas de acción que puede ser valorada como novedosa en la particular configuración de los instrumentos de política social del Estado peruano. El total de resultados esperados presentados en el Plan han contado con un relativo seguimiento, este por el contrario es conocido como uno de los instrumentos menos conocidos y valorados en la década inicial del siglo XXI, su cumplimiento también ha sido mínimo, en la medida que ni siquiera ha logrado en el área estratégica de estadísticas e investigación arribar con datos fiables sobre el trabajo de los niños y adolescentes al final de su vigencia que es el 2010. Manera de collage de los resultados tal vez más sorprendentes planteados en el PNPETI 2005 – 2010, de su orientación descalificadora del trabajo de los niños y niñas, a continuación se expone un pequeño listado sin orden ni la precisión de su matriz de origen de algunos resultados esperados: • Niñas, niños y adolescentes informados y sensibilizados sobre los riesgos del trabajo infantil • Ciudadanía identifica al trabajo infantil como problema sustancial del país • Familias sensibilizadas para superar situaciones críticas a través del diálogo y el respeto a niños y niñas • Conocimiento sistematizado sobre motivaciones y estrategias eficientes para prevenir el trabajo infantil • Padres de niños y niñas que trabajan crean un entorno de protección al niño o niña frente a los riesgos del trabajo infantil • Se ha armonizado la normativa internacional sobre trabajo infantil en función a los acuerdos y convenios internacionales • Se han realizado estudios cuantitativos y cualitativos sobre el trabajo infantil • Empoderar a los niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan • Los Comités Regionales de Prevención y Erradicación de Trabajo infantil están funcionando en todas las regiones del país 501 DISCUSIÓN Desde la academia la condición de la niñez trabajadora ha seguido una senda de prejuicios y sobre entendidos hechos sin mayor base, se ha asentado en apreciaciones realizadas desde el claro oscuro de la ausencia de indicadores fiables, veraces y actualizados. La responsabilidad directa del Estado como generador de datos constantes, sistemáticos como condición previa para la planificación de acciones de desarrollo especialmente dirigidas hacia los grupos de población considerada en alto riesgo tiene un severo revés en el análisis de la condición y posición de un grupo de población como el de los niños y niñas que trabajan. Tenemos que el número de niños y niñas que trabajan en el Perú ha mostrado un crecimiento constante en las últimas tres décadas, en términos objetivos se tiene un crecimiento sostenido, y cada vez tenemos más niños y niñas en diversos trabajos en las áreas rurales y urbanas. La explicación oficial frente a este fenómeno sostenido de crecimiento ha sido la comparación con el crecimiento proporcional del total de la población peruana, es decir bajo esta lógica somos cada vez más peruanos y peruana, y por ende cada vez tenemos más niños y niñas que en proporción reducida optan por el trabajo. Revisando los datos brindados por una u otra fuente, del Estado peruano o producto de una reinterpretación privada o de alguna entidad de Naciones Unidas se pueden inferir algunas ideas en razón a la cantidad de niños y niñas trabajando en el Perú: Se tiene un crecimiento sostenido de la población de niños, niñas y adolescentes en el país, salvo pequeñas oscilaciones tenemos que la realidad peruana incluye dentro de sus fenómenos sociales en crecimiento la niñez trabajadora, los procesos de la realidad: crisis económicas, vastos grupos de población en exclusión, centralismo de las industrias, crecimiento sin equidad, etc., son factores que han venido a aportar a la ampliación y a complejizar la situación de la población infantil trabajadora. El trabajo doméstico en hogares de terceros de la niña trabajadora debe de sumarse al trabajo doméstico en el propio hogar, que es impago y que se mimetiza bajo el supuesto de apoyo familiar, el hogar como espacio de riesgo emerge como el escenario preferido para la incidencia de las diversas formas de maltrato y abuso, para el caso de las niñas este riesgo se amplía inclusive a nivel de la indemnidad sexual, una lectura desde el enfoque de género podría posibilitar el reconocimiento de situaciones de riesgo a los cuales se haya expuesta la niña y adolescente trabajadora y que son específicos a su condición de mujer. Al respecto, el Estado peruano no cuenta ni con esa lectura ni con acciones integrales de carácter resolutivo de cara a la situación de la niña trabajadora. Los niños hacen lo posible por asistir a la escuela y trabajar, para los adolescentes esto es más difícil, se dice que es en función a una mayor exigencia del trabajo pero también tendrían que estar en el análisis la búsqueda adolescente de proyectos no gaseosos y especulativos, la necesidad de realismos y no espejismo en las propuestas que llegan a ellos, y el carácter cuestionador de este grupo de infancia, los adolescentes observan, evalúan, arriesgan y deciden, la metáfora aquella del economicismo académico en razón a la cual a menos educación menos ingreso a futuro no está llegando al debate de los adolescentes o a alguna porción de ellos. REFERENCIAS BIBLIOGRAFICAS CAD (2010). Trabajo infantil y adolescente. Lima: Boletín CAD N°107. Estado Peruano (1992). Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N°26102. Lima: Estado Peruano. Estado Peruano (2000). Nuevo Código de los Niños y Adolescentes Ley N°27337. Lima: Estado Peruano. Estado Peruano (1924). Código Penal del Estado peruano de 1924. Lima: Estado Peruano. 502 Fernández, Carlos (2004). Elites políticas y pobreza en el Perú republicano: una visión panorámica. En: Perú, política, reducción de la pobreza. Lima. NDI. INEI (2009). Perú: niños, niñas y adolescentes que trabajan 1993 – 2008. Lima: INEI. INEI (2001). Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2001. Lima: INEI. INEI (2008). Encuesta Nacional de Hogares 2008. Lima: INEI. INEI. Encuesta nacional de Trabajo Infantil 2007. Lima: INEI. MIMDES (2007). Informe anual 2007 de cumplimiento del PNAIA 2002 – 2010. En sitio web www.mimdes.gob.pe. MIMDES (2002). Plan Nacional de Acción por la Infancia y Adolescencia 2002 – 2010. Lima: MIMDES. MIMDES (2004). Tercer informe peruano de cumplimiento de la Convención sobre los Derechos del Niño. Lima: MIMDES. MINSA (2008). Plan de Acción de Prevención y Erradicación del trabajo Infantil con enfoque del Sector Salud 2007-2008. Lima: Documento del MINSA. MNNATSOP (2008). Memoria del Décimo Encuentro Nacional. Lima: Documento del MNNATSOP. OIT (2008). Trabajo Infantil: Causa y Efecto de la Perpetuación de la Pobreza. Lima: IPEC-OIT. Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar – Red TH (2006). Situación de la trabajadora del hogar en el Perú. Lima: Red de Organizaciones Autónomas de Trabajadoras del Hogar. Rodríguez, José y Vargas, Silvana (2009). Trabajo infantil en el Perú: Magnitud y perfiles vulnerables. Informe Nacional 2007 – 2008. Lima: IPEC – OIT. UNICEF (2010). Situación de la niñez – Perú. Lima: UNICEF. 503 PRUEBAS DE SIGNIFICANCIA ESTADISTICA APLICADAS A LA INVESTIGACION A NIVEL DE POSGRADO Mg. Jorge Luis Medina Gutiérrez Docente Universitario PRESENTACION En los últimos años han aparecidos diversas de programas estadísticos como herramientas complementarias de la enseñanza de la estadística a nivel de pre-grado y pos-grado, tenemos el caso de SPSS, STATA, MINITAB, SAS Y LISREL. Sin embargo, debemos tener cuidado sobre el uso adecuado de dichos programas si la intención es publicar un reporte de investigación en una revista internacional. El programa estadístico SPSS se recomienda cuando se trata de un investigación en el campo social: psicología, educación, sociología, derecho, negocios y salud pública. De hecho, es una mejores herramienta para la enseñanza de la estadística a nivel universitario, ya que el alumno puede obtener con relativa facilidad medidas descriptivas, tablas univariadas, bivariadas y multivariadas. También podemos enseñar diferencias de medias de grupos independientes y relacionados utilizando la prueba t de Student relacionadas y de independencia. Podemos analizar medidas predictivas como la regresión lineal simple y múltiple, regresión logística y análisis discriminante. El programa se puede emplear para analizar la fiabilidad de los ítems y del instrumento. Por último, podemos enseñar a los alumnos estadística no paramétrica analizando las pruebas U de Mann Whitney y T de Wilcoxon. El programa STATA es una herramienta útil en la investigación biomédica especialmente en la investigación clínica, se recomienda en la investigación epidemiológica para analizar prevalencia, incidencias y medidas de riesgo en diseños casoscontroles y de cohortes. En el caso del programa SAS de hecho es tiene la mejor seguridad informática, se recomienda para trabajar como modelos matemáticos y estadística. Se usa generalmente en el campo de la ingeniería. Tiene mucha utilizar para realizar análisis estadístico a gran escala como la prevalencias de enfermedad en estudios multicéntricos. Por último, tenemos el programa LISREL desarrollado en Europa para analizar modelos de ecuaciones estructurales donde se puede trabajar a la vez con k variables dependientes. Es muy útil, para validar de instrumentos de medición a través del análisis factorial confirmatorio. 504 De hecho es indispensable tener información sobre la utilidad de las pruebas estadística aplicadas en la investigación. A continuación presento una sumilla de las pruebas que generalmente se usan en la investigación a nivel de posgrado. 1. CHI-CUADRADO Es una prueba que se aplica generalmente para relacionar dos variables cualitativas en una muestra de estudio. Cada variable puede tener dos o más categorías. Generalmente el cruce de las dos variables nos da como resultado una tabla de contingencia donde en cada celda se van a ubicar las frecuencias observadas (número de observaciones). En el análisis estadístico se compara las frecuencias observadas y esperadas. Se recomienda que al menos el 80% de las celdas deben tener frecuencias esperadas de 5 o más. a) Presentación de resultados : MODELO DE TABLA Género Satisfacción Laboral Total Alta Baja M F Total X2= g.l= p= b) Interpretación de Resultados: En base al resultado que proporciona la calculadora estadística se analiza el valor p en base a la siguiente regla: p > 0.05 Resultado no significativo, lo que nos indica que no hay relación entre las variables (son independientes). p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativa. 2. CORRELACIÓN DE PEARSON a) Sumilla: Es una prueba paramétrica que se aplica para relacionar dos variables numéricas en una muestra de estudio. Lo que interesa es analizar los valores de la variable y no la frecuencia. Debe tenerse en cuenta que el valor de coeficiente de correlación oscila entre –1 y 1. El signo determina la dirección de la relación. Es decir, si el coeficiente es positivo (+) nos indica posible relación positiva, y si el coeficiente es negativo (-) posible relación inversa entre variables. b) Presentación de Resultados : Realidad y Ciencias 505 MODELO DE GRÁFICA c) Interpretación de Resultados: En base al resultado que proporciona la calculadora estadística se determina la magnitud de la relación en base a las siguientes reglas: Luego evaluamos la significancia estadística en base al valor de la probabilidad, teniendo en cuenta la siguiente regla: p > 0.05 Resultado no significativo, lo que nos indica que no hay relación entre las variables (son independientes). p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativa. Por último, es recomendable analizar en cuanto varía la relación entre las dos variables en base al coeficiente de determinación. Por ello el valor del coeficiente de correlación se eleva al cuadrado y luego se multiplica por 100. Por ejemplo, si dos variables correlacionan r = 0.20 el coeficiente de determinación es igual al 4%, lo que se puede interpretar que la variabilidad es muy baja. 3. REGRESIÓN MÚLTIPLE 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 0 5 10 15 puntaje optimismo r= n= p= Nos indica que hay una relación entre las variables de estudio. 506 a) Sumilla: Se usa para explorar la relación entre una variable dependiente continua y un número de variable independiente (usualmente continuas). La regresión múltiple está basada en una interrelación entre una serie de variables. Hoy en día es una de las pruebas que tiene mayor uso dado que el enfoque de las investigaciones es multivariado. b) Presentación de Resultados : MODELO DE TABLA DISEÑO: ___________________ VARIABLE DEPENDIENTE: ___________________ c) Interpretación de Resultados: De acuerdo a los resultados del programa estadístico se analiza el valor de la probabilidad en base a la siguiente regla: p > 0.05 Resultado no significativo, nos indica que la variable independiente no es predictor a la variable dependiente. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativa. 4. PRUEBA "t" DE INDEPENDENCIA a) Sumilla: Se usa para comparar puntajes promedio, dado que son variables numéricas en dos grupos diferentes. Se recomienda analizar si la variable dependiente tiene una distribución normal, y las muestras son representativas de la población de estudio. Variable B SEB t p r = .10 a .29 ó r = -.10 a -.29 pequeña r = .30 a .49 ó r = -.30 a -.49 mediana r = .50 a .1.0 ó r = -.50 a -1.0 grande Nos indica que hay una relación entre las variables de estudio. 507 b) Presentación de Resultados: MODELO DE TABLA MODELO DE GRÁFICA c) Interpretación de Resultados: El resultado estadístico que nos brinda el programa se analiza en base a la siguiente regla: p > 0.05 Resultado no significativo, nos indica que los promedios son homogéneos entre los grupos de estudio. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativo. 5. PRUEBA "t" PAREADA a)Sumilla: Se usa cuando se trabaja con un solo grupo de personas y se recolecta datos en dos diferentes ocasiones. Los diseños PRE y POST es un ejemplo de este tipo de situación. Se evalúa cada persona en base a una medición continua en dos tiempos. Es importante analizar que la variable dependiente tenga distribución normal proveniente de una muestra representativa. Grupo N X __  S t p 1 2 0 10 20 30 40 1 2 Promedio Grupo ANOVA Fc = p = R2 = Nos indica que la variable es un buen predictor de la variable dependiente. 508 b) Presentación de Resultados: MODELO DE TABLA MODELO DE GRÁFICA c) Interpretación de Resultados: Teniendo en consideración los resultados estadísticos, se analiza la probabilidad en base a la siguiente regla: p > 0.05 Resultado no significativo, nos indica que hubo cambio significativo en los tiempos 1 y 2. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativa. 6. ANÁLISIS DE VARIANZA DE UNA VÍA a) Sumilla: Se aplica para comparar puntajes promedios en más de dos grupos independientes. La característica de la prueba es que se trabaja con una variable dependiente de tipo continua y una variable independiente categórica. En el proceso estadístico se compara la variabilidad de los puntajes entre diferentes grupos y la variabilidad dentro de cada grupo, comparando estos resultados se va obtener de la "F" calculada. b)Presentación de Resultados: Medición n X __  S t p Antes Después 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Promedio Tiempo "t" Independencia DESPUESNTES "t" Parea da Nos indica que hay diferenci as en los promedi os entre grupos de estudio. 509 MODELO DE TABLA MODELO DE GRÁFICA c) Interpretación de Resultados: Los programas estadísticos nos presentan una tabla de resumen donde aparecen información de la variabilidad entre grupos y dentro de los grupos, "F" calculado y el valor "p". En este caso nos interesa interpretar la probabilidad teniendo la siguiente regla. p > 0.05 Nos indica que los resultados de la comparación de promedios entre grupos son no significativos. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativa. 7. CORRELACIÓN DE SPEARMAN Grupo n X __  S F p 1 2 3 : : : k 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 1 2 ........ K Promedio Grupos ANTES Nos indica que hubo cambio significativo en los promedios de los tiempos ANTES y DESPUES 510 a)Sumilla: Es un equivalente no paramétrico de la correlación de Pearson. Se aplica cuando las variables de estudio no tienen distribución normal o se trabaja con muestras de estudio no representativas. La característica de esta prueba es que no se trabaja con los puntajes directos sino que se asignan rangos a los puntajes. b)Presentación de Resultados: En este caso se recomienda presentar los resultados en base a una tabla. c) Interpretación de Resultados: En base al valor de la probabilidad que nos brinda el programa estadístico podemos concluir lo siguiente. p > 0.05 No hay relación significativa entre la variables. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativo. 8.PRUEBA "U" DE MANN-WHITNEY a)Sumilla: Es una alternativa no paramétrica de la prueba "t" de grupos independientes. Se aplica cuando se trabaja con muestras no representativas o cuando la variable principal de estudio no tiene distribución normal. b)Presentación de Resultados: MODELO DE TABLA Aplicando la prueba "U": Leyenda: Me = Mediana DC = Desviación Cuartil. Variable 2 Variable 1 rs = p = Grupo n Me  DC Z p 1 2 ANOVA 1 vía 511 MODELO DE GRÁFICA c) Interpretación de Resultado: En base al valor de la probabilidad que nos brinda el programa estadístico podemos concluir lo siguiente. p > 0.05 El resultado es no significativo, lo que nos indica que los grupos no difieren según la variable de interés. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativo. 9. PRUEBA "T" DE Wilcoxon a) Sumilla: Es una alternativa no paramétrica de la prueba "t" pareada de dos muestras relacionadas. Se utiliza cuando se trabaja con muestras no repetitivas de la población de estudio o cuando la variable no presenta distribución normal. b) Presentación de Resultados: MODELO DE TABLA MODELO DE GRAFICA Tiempo n Me  DC Z p Antes Después Q3 Me Q1 H ub o un a rel ac ió n en tr e la s do s va ria bl es de es tu di o. Se con cluy e que al men os dos pro med i difie ren en for ma sign ifica tiva. Q3 Me Q1 512 c) Interpretación de Resultados: En base al valor de la probabilidad que nos brinda el programa estadístico, podemos concluir lo siguiente. p > 0.05 Se concluye que no hubo cambio significativo de la variable de interés en Antes y Después. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativo. 10. PRUEBA DE KRUSKAL-WALLIS a) Sumilla: Es una alternativa no paramétrica del análisis de varianza de una vía: se aplica para comparar una variable dependiente continua en más de dos grupos independientes. Se aplica cuando trabajamos con muestras no representativas o cuando la variable de interés no tiene distribución normal. b) Presentación de Resultados: MODELO DE TABLA Grupo n Me  DC X2 p 1 2 3 : : k Grupo 1 Grupo 2 Se concluye que hay diferencias entre los grupos de estudio según la variable de interés. 513 MODELO DE GRÁFICA C) Interpretación de Resultados: Se determina en base al valor de la probabilidad que nos brinda el cálculo o programa estadístico podemos concluir lo siguiente. p > 0.05 Se observa que los resultados son no significativos, con lo cual se concluye que no hay diferencias en los promedios según el grupo de estudio. p < 0.05 Resultado significativo. p < 0.01 Resultado muy significativo. p < 0.001 Resultado altamente significativo. Referencias bibliográficas: Lizaraso, Frank; Medina, Jorge (2013). Fundamentos de Estadística Médica. Fondo Editorial USMP. DIAGRAMA CAJAS Tiempo 1 Tiempo 2 Se concluye que hubo un cambio de la variable de interés Antes y Después por efecto de la intervención. DIAGRAMA CAJAS Grupo 1 Grupo 2 Grupo 3 Grupo k 514 RENUNCIA DEL PERSONAL DE PILOTOS DE LA FUERZA AÉREA DEL PERÚ JACKELINE ROXANA HUAMAN FERNANDEZ ÍNDICE Párrafo Página 1. Resumen 3 2. Abstrac 4 3. Introducción 5 4. Situación actual del éxodo del personal de pilotos FAP 6 5. Costos de formación y especialización. 8 6. Estructura remunerativa del piloto militar en relación con remuneración de un piloto del ámbito civil. 12 7. Situación de personal de pilotos que salieron de la FAP en los últimos cinco años 13 8. Situación de otras Fuerzas Aéreas 14 9. Causas o razones del porqué, "conllevan a los Oficiales Pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú a emigrar a compañías aerocomerciales 18 10. Conclusiones 20 11. Recomendaciones 22 12. Bibliografía 24 515 RESUMEN El presente trabajo está orientado a realizar un Estudio de la renuncia del personal de pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú en los últimos años, trabajo que comprende un análisis profundo de las diversas situaciones y causales operativas, de instrucción, de factores externos e internos en lo referente al personal de la institución cuyo propósito final permita dilucidar y determinar posibles medidas correctivas, para evitar la migración de las tripulaciones aéreas. Tiene como objetivo determinar las razones, causas o motivaciones que conllevan a los Oficiales Pilotos de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú a emigrar a compañías aerocomerciales, información obtenida a través de un estudio de campo y muestreo sobre la base de encuestas psicosociales que descubran indicadores de motivación y frustración en las tripulaciones aéreas de la FAP. Asimismo, tiene como fin lograr que el Ministerio de Defensa tome conocimiento de la Problemática del éxodo de pilotos en la Fuerza Aérea y mejorar las capacidades operativas de la misma. Para ello se proponen algunas recomendaciones respecto a cómo debe ser el proceso de preservación de los tripulantes aéreos en la FAP como alternativas u acciones de mejora. INTRODUCCIÓN El presente artículo trata sobre la renuncia de los pilotos militares hacia la aviación privada, ya que no es un problema solo en la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, sino también de muchas Fuerzas Aéreas del mundo. Actualmente el éxodo del personal de pilotos militares de la FAP produce al Estado Nacional una significativa pérdida en materia de formación y capacitación profesional que se traslada al sector privado. Esta migración de pilotos militares FAP hacia la actividad de la aviación civil, está acompañado por un nivel importante de salida del personal que, no siendo de la especialidad de Armas Comando y Combate (pilotos), son poseedores de especialidades altamente calificadas combinando una valiosa experiencia profesional acumulada y un significativo lapso de vida útil a futuro. Asimismo, el número de renuncias producidas en el periodo en los últimos años se debió básicamente a una baja actividad aérea en la institución y a la 516 importante necesidad de pilotos por parte de la actividad aérea civil, factores que acompañados por una oferta salarial, del ámbito privado en general, superaba con creces los ya disminuidos haberes militares. Por lo mencionado el presente artículo adquiere una de vital importancia ya que analizará los diversos factores externos e internos que generan la renuncia del personal de oficiales pilotos FAP, cuyo propósito final permitirá dilucidar y determinar las posibles medidas correctivas y propuestas que contribuirán con la preservación de las tripulaciones aéreas, con la operatividad aérea del sistema de operaciones de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, que redundará en bien de la seguridad y defensa nacional. 1. SITUACIÓN ACTUAL DEL ÉXODO O SALIDA DEL PERSONAL DE PILOTOS FAP La Concepción Institucional de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, contempla que debe estar conformada por profesionales altamente capacitados, con elevados valores, virtudes morales y militares, espíritu aeronáutico y mística institucional, para así garantizar el cumplimiento del deber, sustentado en sólidos principios doctrinarios y en profundos sentimientos patrióticos. (Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú DL.439). Una de las grandes interrogantes de la actualidad es la referida a si son o no son importantes las Fuerzas Armadas en los estados o países en vías de desarrollo, en los cuales los indicadores económicos y sociales son cada día más desalentadores, dependiendo de la existencia o no de dichos institutos. Los partidarios de esta posición consideran que es necesario redefinir el concepto de seguridad nacional, pues argumentan que son las propias Fuerzas Armadas, en particular las latinoamericanas, las que han promovido conceptualizaciones en las que la seguridad viene a ser en conjunción de la defensa y el desarrollo. En este contexto, el concepto de seguridad para unos estados puede constituirse en inseguridad para otros, no es acaso inseguridad la renuncia de Oficiales pilotos con alta formación y experiencia que están siendo reclutados por compañías de aviación privadas y particularmente las aerocomercial, en vista al importante crecimiento de estas empresas tanto a nivel nacional como 517 internacional, siendo esto un factor negativo que afecta a la Fuerza Aérea del Perú como institución, desde hace muchos años, incrementándose alarmantemente(Oswaldo de Rivero: 2010) Con relación al contexto de seguridad y defensa referido anteriormente, el Gobierno Peruano ha iniciado un proceso de modernización y desarrollo del Estado, que incluye la reestructuración y modernización de las Fuerzas Armadas. Sin embargo, actualmente la Fuerza Aérea del Perú, como componente de las Fuerzas Armadas, se encuentra atravesando un estado de retraso tecnológico, obsolescencia técnica, operativa y administrativa, por lo cual se requiere implementar, desarrollar e institucionalizar programas que permitan alcanzar un grado de eficiencia sostenible en el tiempo que garantice el cumplimiento de la misión. Asimismo las Capacidades Operacionales que la FAP ha adquirido o renovado en el tiempo han sufrido degradación permanente debido a la falta de entrenamiento de las tripulaciones, la falta de presupuesto para el mantenimiento de la operatividad de los sistemas de armas y de los dispositivos de operación y a la obsolescencia y carencia de un plan de renovación del material. En los últimos años, la Fuerza Aérea del Perú se ha visto afectado por la disminución de personal de tripulantes aéreos, tanto pilotos como de especialistas por diferentes causales como son las más relevantes: a su solicitud, medida disciplinaria, límite de permanencia en situación de disponibilidad, etcétera, la baja operatividad de las aeronaves que limita el óptimo entrenamiento de las Tripulaciones Aéreas, y por otro lado las tentadoras posibilidades de mejoras económicas en el ámbito civil, estas son algunas de las posibles causas que se podrían atribuirse al éxodo de los Pilotos. La renuncia del personal militar produce al Estado Nacional una significativa perdida en materia de formación y capacitación profesional que se traslada sin costo alguno al sector privado. Un determinante ejemplo resulta en una pérdida onerosa de miles de dólares que se invirtieron en preparar a un piloto siendo, lo más valioso la experiencia operativa, el tiempo perdido en su formación que difícilmente se recuperará y la imposibilidad de transferencia de conocimientos 518 a las nuevas tripulaciones. Si se cuantifica el valor de cada piloto de la FAP, para integrarse a compañías aerocomerciales, el Estado cede millones de dólares. Según William H. McNeill: 2007 la migración de pilotos militares hacia la actividad de la aviación civil, está acompañado por un importante éxodo de personal que, no siendo de la especialidad de Armas Comando y Combate, era poseedor de especialidades altamente calificadas combinando una valiosa experiencia profesional acumulada y un significativo lapso de vida útil a futuro. Es necesario abordar este problema del Éxodo de Pilotos y propuestas de solución, el cual nos permitirá determinar cuáles son las diferentes motivaciones y causas que llevan a las tripulaciones aéreas de la Fuerza Aérea del Perú a emigrar a compañías de aviación comercial, con la finalidad de formular propuestas que minimicen la pérdida de la capacidad operativa poniendo en riesgo el cumplimiento de la misión institucional. 2. COSTOS DE FORMACIÓN Y ESPECIALIZACIÓN. Según el Informe No59 –diagnóstico operativo EMGRA-FAP 2011, hace referencia a los costos de formación de los cadetes en la Escuela de Oficiales de la FAP y el correspondiente al Curso básico y avanzado de Piloto Militar en el Grupo Aéreo No 51. Pero la inversión del Estado en ningún modo alguno termina aquí. El oficial piloto sigue especializándose, capacitándose y entrenándose en distintos tipos de aviones según la especialidad a la cual ha sido asignado. 1) COSTOS DE FORMACIÓN DE LOS PILOTOS EN GENERAL: CUADRO No 1 FORMACIÓN CADETE GRADUADO Instrucción 5.042,47 Material de instrucción 2.155,45 Docencia 2.391,20 Mantto y reparac equipos 3.170,69 Personal administrat. 2.366,42 Serv. Públicos 4.095,40 Formación académica 6.410,50 519 Cursos milit. (esmar i-año) 1.855,90 Cursos milit. (essel ii-año) 800,00 Cursos milit. (paracaidismo iii-año) 1.500,18 Cursos milit. (evación y .escape iv-año) 6.514,89 TOTAL 36.303,10 FUENTE: Comando de Personal de la FAP (2013) CUADRO No 2 ALIMENTACIÓN CADETE OFICIAL 11.315,00 TOTAL 11.315,00 - SALUD CADETE OFICIAL 662,10 TOTAL 662,10 - EQUIPAMIENTO CADETE OFICIAL VESTUARIO 11.185,25 EQUIP . VUELO (ASPIRANTE) 1.146,66 EQUIP . VUELO (ALFEREZ) 1.146,66 TOTAL 12.331,91 1.146,66 INCENTIVOS ECON. CADETE OFICIAL PROPINA 10.428,00 REMUNERACION 53.758,92 TOTAL 10.428,00 53.758,92 FUENTE: Comando de Personal de la FAP (2013) Pero la inversión del Estado en ningún modo alguno termina aquí. El oficial piloto sigue capacitándose en distintos tipos de aviones según la especialidad a la cual ha sido asignado. Posteriormente es cambiado a las unidades operativas donde completará su capacitación para alcanzar la condición de piloto operativo en aviones de combate, transporte o helicópteros. 2) Costo de formación y entrenamiento de un Piloto de Caza CUADRO No 3 520 P IL O T O D E C A Z A RESUMEN TOTAL CADETE OFICIAL TOTAL FORMACION 36.303,10 36.303,10 ENTRENAMIENTO 4.680,00 1.453.747,80 1.458.427,80 ALIMENTACION 11.315,00 11.315,00 SALUD 662,10 662,10 EQUIPAMIENTO 12.331,91 1.146,66 13.478,57 INCENTIVOS ECONOMICOS 10.428,00 53.758,92 64.186,92 TOTAL 75.720,11 1.508.653,38 S/1.584.373,49 FUENTE: Comando de Personal de la FAP (2013) 3) Costos de formación de un Piloto de Transporte: CUADRO No 4 P IL O T O D E T R A N S P O R T E RESUMEN TOTAL CADETE OFICIAL TOTAL FORMACION 36.303,10 36.303,10 ENTRENAMIENTO 4.680,00 675.705,00 680.385,00 ALIMENTACION 11.315,00 11.315,00 SALUD 662,10 662,10 EQUIPAMIENTO 12.331,91 1.146,66 13.478,57 INCENTIVOS ECONOMICOS 10.428,00 53.758,92 64.186,92 TOTAL 75.720,11 730.610,58 S/806.330,69 FUENTE: Comando de Personal de la FAP (2013 4) Costos de formación de un Piloto de Helicóptero: 521 GRADO MONTO ANUAL EN NS MONTO MENSUAL EN NS TTG 97,315.60 8,109.63 MAG 95,235.52 7,936.29 COR 79,002.88 6,583.57 COM 34,507.26 2,875.60 MAY 26,862.76 2,238.56 CAP 22,751.08 1,895.92 TEN 18,453.40 1,537.78 ALF 17,919.64 1,493.30 CUADRO No 5 P IL O T O D E H E L IC Ó P T E R O RESUMEN TOTAL CADETE OFICIAL TOTAL FORMACION 36.303,10 36.303,10 ENTRENAMIENTO 4.680,00 204.930,00 209.610,00 ALIMENTACION 11.315,00 11.315,00 SALUD 662,10 662,10 EQUIPAMIENTO 12.331,91 1.146,66 13.478,57 INCENTIVOS ECONOMICOS 10.428,00 53.758,92 64.186,92 TOTAL 75.720,11 259.835,58 S/ 335.555,69 FUENTE: Comando de Personal de la FAP (201 3. ESTRUCTURA REMUNERATIVA DEL PILOTO MILITAR EN RELACIÓN CON REMUNERACIÓN DE UN PILOTO DEL AMBITO CIVIL. El actual sistema remunerativo en la Fuerza Aérea del Perú contempla la siguiente escala remunerativa: CUADRO No 6 Fuente: Cuadro de remuneraciones del personal militar FAP-2012. 522 En el ámbito civil aeronáutico la remuneración promedio de un piloto está entre S/. 18,000.00 y S/. 10,000.00 nuevos soles de acuerdo a la función como tripulante, en vuelos regulares, nacionales e internacionales (cuadro de remuneraciones de tripulante civilCORPAC2011). Cabe señalar que sólo se ha considerado el correspondiente a las horas de vuelo, haciéndose abstracción de lo que pudieran significar otros gastos tales como simuladores de vuelo en el extranjero, viáticos y pasajes pertinentes, provisión de equipos y documentación, consumo de armamento aéreo, tanto de práctica como de guerra, capacitación afines con la actividad del piloto como son los cursos de supervivencia en distintas áreas del país, operaciones conjuntas y combinadas, etc. Ciertamente que la inclusión de tales erogaciones en el costo total significaría una inversión, por hombre, mucho mayor, la misma que hemos representado mediante cuadros cuya fuente nos proporcionó el Comando de Personal de la FAP. 4. SITUACIÓN DE PERSONAL DE PILOTOS QUE SALIERON DE LA FAP EN LOS ÚLTIMOS CINCO AÑOS 1) Personal Superior Para el presente tema se ha tomado la información proporcionada por el COPER sobre el personal Superior de la especialidad de Pilotaje, que han salido de la institución por diversas causales: a) Pilotos que pidieron su pase a la situación de retiro a su solicitud por Grados en los últimos cinco años: La variable "a su solicitud" es una de las más importantes de analizar, para identificar cuáles han sido los motivos más importantes que han originado esta decisión, a fin de determinar con exactitud estos factores, el presente cuadro muestra la cantidad exacta del personal que pasó a la situación de retiro a su solicitud: 523 GRD 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL TTG 1 2 2 5 MAG 1 1 2 2 6 COR 2 2 4 4 12 COM 1 3 4 7 6 21 MAY 4 3 4 18 8 37 CAP 5 7 6 10 9 41 TEN 1 1 1 3 ALF 0 TOTAL 10 16 17 44 32 125 b) Pilotos que pidieron su pase a la situación de retiro a su solicitud por Especialidades entre los últimos cinco años: ESPECIALIDAD 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 TOTAL DE CAZA 3 4 0 12 4 23 TRANSPORTE 7 4 7 12 5 35 HELICOPTERO 3 4 0 9 4 20 RECONOCIMIENTO 0 0 0 0 0 0 BOMBARDEO 0 0 0 0 0 0 TOTAL 13 12 7 33 13 78 5. SITUACIÓN DE OTRAS FUERZAS AÉREAS a. Una importante cantidad de indicios está señalando que, en gran parte del mundo e incluso desde hace largo tiempo, se está manifestando un significativo traspaso de Pilotos militares hacia actividades ligadas con la aviación civil, particularmente la aerocomercial. b. Por ejemplo en el caso de la Fuerza Aérea de Chile, en marzo del año 2010, se evidencia de la misma situación respecto por la fuga de personal de pilotos hacia el sector privado. Se Afirma que "en el mundo competitivo actual el mercado capta fácilmente las capacidades de los pilotos que tanto ha costado formar y busca atraerlos con ofertas que en ocasiones son difíciles de rechazar". Asimismo se pretende buscar la fórmula para retener inteligentemente a este personal en razón del costo que le ocasiona al Estado su instrucción y que "no hacer nada es simplemente tratar de tapar el sol con un dedo y exponernos a seguir perdiendo el valioso recurso humano en el que Chile tanto ha invertido". En tal sentido también se admite "que el estado invierte millonarios recursos en la preparación de un Piloto de combate y que finalmente termina emigrando por los bajos sueldos en comparación del mercado" (Infodefensa No 198: 2011). c. Así como sucede en la región, también en otros ámbitos se han registrado hechos como los expuestos. Bajo el título "Pilotos de la RAF se retiran a 524 aerolíneas comerciales" el periódico "The Times" ya señalaba en su edición del 31 de agosto del 2010 que "a pesar que el Ejército y la Armada pudieron mejorar los niveles de retención de personal, la RAF sigue perdiendo 4771 personas al año", agregando al respecto que "principalmente el éxodo de la RAF se debe a las competencias de las aerolíneas comerciales, que ofrecen salarios muy altos y salarios básicos al menos de 50.000 libras esterlinas anuales para ingresar a los Pilotos entrenados". d. Las Fuerzas Armadas de España igualmente se han visto afectadas, en varias ocasiones, por pérdidas significativas en sus dotaciones de pilotos. "Hacia fines de 2008, un total de 299 pilotos, en su mayoría del Ejército del Aire, habían abandonado las FFAA para trabajar en empresas privadas, donde percibían un salario tres y hasta cuatro veces superior al que reciben del Estado". Nueve años después parece repetirse el fenómeno. El Ministerio de Defensa en el año 2000 afirmo "que quería terminar con la fuga de Pilotos militares, motivo por el que se realizó un estudio para entregar una serie de incentivos, que iría en la línea de garantizarles un premio si se quedan en el Ejército y que perderían en caso de marcharse" Barranquero Texeira, Encarnación y Prieto Borrego, Lucía: 2010). e. En el caso de la Fuerza Aérea de Portugal, cerca 60 por ciento, pretende abandonar su carrera militar en los próximos tres años. Las Fuerzas Armadas, con un universo de cerca de 300 pilotos, corre asimismo el riesgo de perder más de 180 profesionales, a una altura en que ya se enfrenta un déficit de cerca de 100 pilotos. La alerta fue lanzada en el 2006 por el propio ex Jefe de Estado-Mayor de la Fuerza Aérea (CEMFA), General Taveira Martins: 2010 La Fuerza Aérea Portuguesa pierde diez pilotos por año, los cuales continúan sus carreras en la aviación civil, donde las remuneraciones son más elevadas. Para impedir la salida de los Pilotos, el Gobierno aumento los salarios de estos profesionales. Solo entre 2008 al 2010, el Estado pago cerca de 21 millones de euros para formar y calificar pilotos de F-16 en los Estados Unidos. A un costo que no se gastaría, según un estudio si "los pilotos más experimentados no abandonasen prematuramente la institución militar". El General Taveira Martins, afirmó que "cada nuevo piloto operacional tiene un costo de dos millones de euros". f. En el caso de la Aeronáutica Militar Italiana (AMI), la cuestión es objeto de atención desde hace largo tiempo y siempre ha tenido como causa principal la oferta de mejores ingresos desde las compañías aéreas civiles. El fuerte crecimiento de la aviación comercial al final de los años 90 originó una significativa demanda de pilotos desde ese sector. Como consecuencia de ello 525 se produjo un importante éxodo de la AMI. Entre 1997 y 2008 el promedio anual de tal migración estuvo en el orden de 110 pilotos militares.( Italian military aviation OrBat:2010) Esa situación impulsó a la AMI a buscar soluciones acordes con una problemática que la obligó a considerar que los costos en formación y adiestramiento debían ser contemplados como un real patrimonio de inversión que el Estado debe valorizar y proteger y, consecuentemente, tratar de mantener el fenómeno de la migración en niveles razonables para que su capacidad operativa no se vea afectada significativamente. En tal sentido, en febrero del 2011, en el ministerio de defensa se promulgó una norma legislativa conocida como "Disposiciones para desincentivar el éxodo de pilotos militares". La citada disposición estuvo orientada a otorgar compensaciones al personal que hubiera cumplido el tiempo de permanecía obligatorio y no hubiera superado cierta edad. También se otorgaron compensaciones a aquellos oficiales con cargos directivos con el fin de neutralizar el éxodo de personal con responsabilidades en esos niveles. La aplicación de tal disposición pareciera haber dado resultado si se advierte que la migración entre los años 2000 y 2008 decreció a un promedio anual de 50 pilotos en tanto que, entre los años 2008 y 2011, ha fluctuado entre un mínimo de 8 y un máximo de 35 pilotos. g. En el caso de la Fuerza Aérea de Venezuela, diversas son las conjeturas que se hacen, para tratar de explicar el actual éxodo de sus Pilotos Aviadores Militares, hacia los campos de la Aeronáutica Civil. Se especula que en lo que va del 2010; reposan sobre el escritorio del G/D (AV) Luis Berroterán Acosta, Comandante General de la Aviación Militar; un aproximado de noventa solicitudes de cese de funciones. La disidencia actual incluye pilotos de las unidades de aviones Broncos, Helicópteros, Trasporte Táctico, Administrativo, Presidencial y hasta aviadores de los SUKHOI-30. 526 6. CAUSAS O RAZONES DEL PORQUÉ, "CONLLEVAN A LOS OFICIALES PILOTOS DE LA FUERZA AÉREA DEL PERÚ A EMIGRAR A COMPAÑÍAS AEROCOMERCIALES". a. Problemas económicos. b. Sueldos bajos que tienen una gran diferencia con el que ofrece la actividad privada. c. Falta de una política de incentivo (beneficios por parte del Estado). d. La presión económica de la familia y el ambiente. e. Buscar mejores oportunidades económicas. f. Desmotivación. g. Entrenamiento pobre por falta de Aeronaves y las que existen están fatigadas, solo vuelan los mas antiguos. h. Lograr una mejor calidad de vida para si mismo y la familia. i. Trato marginal del Gobierno. j. Infraestructura operativa y logística sin presupuesto. k. Falta de visión de futuro. l. Divorcio del Estado con la FAP. m. La frustración de no volar por falta de aeronaves y no realizarse plenamente como profesionales. n. Poner al piloto en labores administrativas mientras espera turno para volar. o. La débil identificación del oficial piloto con la FAP, desde la escuela. p. Crear falsas expectativas al oficial FAP, desde la escuela que posteriormente no se da. q. Bajo nivel de vida, sin contar con una política de incentivos tanto de carácter económico, de reconocimiento profesional o contar con horas de vuelo para el entrenamiento. r. Sentimiento de indiferencia por parte de la Superioridad al observar la situación actual de las FF.AA y tener una actitud complacida. s. Bajo sueldos, recorte de comisiones. t. Condiciones en las que se vuelan no son óptimas, por el estado de las aeronaves y falta de combustible. u. Pasar mucho tiempo sin volar. v. Falta de entrenamiento. w. Aeronaves muy antiguas que no dan seguridad al vuelo. x. Desprestigio de las FF.AA en general. y. La FAP ya no representa un medio de lograr aspiraciones profesionales. z. Falta de liderazgo para manejar la crisis. 527 CONCLUSIONES a. La renuncia de los pilotos militares hacia la actividad aérea privada, particularmente la aerocomercial, es un fenómeno que desde hace tiempo se está manifestando en el orden mundial. b. El significativo traspaso de Pilotos Militares hacia actividades ligadas con la aviación civil, debido a que las compañías de aviación comercial se encuentran en un exponencial crecimiento lo cual le permite ofrecer puestos de trabajo con onerosos sueldos siendo fácilmente captados los Pilotos Militares debido a la experiencia operativa, estando calificados muy por encima de los Pilotos civiles recién graduados. c. Debido a esta migración se viene enfrentando un déficit de Pilotos, la Fuerza Aérea del Perú debe de crear mecanismos para frenar la fuga de Pilotos, lo cual está deteriorando la capacidad operativa y por ende creando un problema de relevancia para la seguridad nacional. d. La Escuela de Aviación Civil no cuenta con incentivos de apoyo para costear los altos costos que demanda la instrucción aérea en esta carrera. Al contar con un presupuesto especial de apoyo producirían una mayor cantidad de Pilotos civiles que cubrirían en un gran porcentaje la necesidad del mercado. Por lo tanto no cubre la demanda de instrucción de Pilotos civiles e. Se puede determinar que las principales variables que producen la migración de Pilotos militares a otras empresas comerciales de aviación son los bajos salarios, la falta de reconocimiento social para la profesión militar, una fuerte demanda de las empresas aéreas comerciales, una oferta salarial muy por encima de la que ofrece el Estado, una decreciente actividad operativa de la Fuerza Aérea, problemas económicos familiares, la búsqueda de una mejor condición de bienestar, las reducidas horas de vuelos en los planes de entrenamientos (PDE). f. La renuncia del personal militar de pilotos produce al Estado Nacional un significativo traspaso en materia de formación y capacitación profesional que se traslada, sin costo alguno, al sector privado. En tal sentido el estado pierde millonarios recursos al dejar se incorporen los Pilotos militares a las empresas de aviación comercial. g. Ante tal escenario, el desafío del Estado Nacional es adoptar decisiones que, al menos, amortigüen tal fenómeno fundamentalmente para preservar la inversión en formación y capacitación de sus pilotos militares y no degradar la Capacidad Operativa del Poder Aéreo Militar por falta de personal competente para ejercer sus funciones. h. La Fuerza Aérea del Perú por sí sola no puede mejorar el actual sistema remunerativo, la situación actual de las remuneraciones de la Fuerza Aérea debe ser un tema de prioridad permanente. 528 RECOMENDACIONES a. Establecer políticas institucionales claras con relación a la reasignación de especialidades al personal de Pilotos que por algún motivo no concluyan su instrucción en vuelos. b. Establecer un convenio entre la Fuerza Aérea del Perú y las compañías privadas de aviación que permita realizar actividades aéreas a los pilotos de la institución, a fin de incrementar su experiencia profesional y mejorar sus expectativas económicas. c. Desarrollar un proyecto de ley que incorpore una escala de penalidades en caso de solicitudes de baja, que desaliente a las tripulaciones aéreas a abandonar la carrera militar. d. Implementar un sistema legal que permitirá otorgar un incentivo al personal que pertenece a las especialidades críticas para la Institución, tanto del punto de vista económico como profesional. e. Retener al personal con talento, es vital para la gestión de los recursos humanos, ya que estos empleados representan el talento interno, debiendo la institución crear mecanismos para su retención tales como beneficios adicionales, reconocimientos, recompensas, programas de sucesión, capacitación en el exterior, etc. Que contribuyan significativamente a garantizar que este personal clave permanezca en la institución. f. Resolver en el más corto plazo las necesidades de adquisición, modernización y mantenimiento de aeronaves y sistemas de acuerdo a la Estructura Operativa de la Fuerza Aérea. g. Realizar coordinaciones con las empresas de aviación comercial para que estas eviten contratar Pilotos militares en especial a los Oficiales con menos de 20 años de servicios a la institución. h. Modificar la normatividad legal vigente para evitar que el Estado pierda millones de soles invertidos, al dejar que se incorporen los Pilotos militares formados a las empresas de aviación comercial y en caso de producirse esta, se prevea un mecanismo de reintegrar al Estado todos los gastos generados durante el proceso de formación e instrucción. i. Solicitar incentivos y apoyo por parte del Estado para costear las demandas de la Instrucción Aérea en la Escuela de Aviación Civil, y así lograr una mayor cantidad de Pilotos civiles que cubran en un gran porcentaje la necesidad del mercado, contrarrestando la demanda existente de Pilotos militares. j. Exponer la presente situación al Sector Defensa, por ser una variable que atenta contra la Seguridad Nacional. 529 BIBLIOGRAFÍA 1. Oswaldo de Rivero. 2009. El Mito del desarrollo: Los países inviables en el siglo XXI. 2. William H. McNeill 1989 "La búsqueda del poder: Tecnología, Fuerza Armada y Sociedad. 3. Barranquero Texeira, Encarnación y Prieto Borrego, Lucía. 2010. Población y guerra civil en Málaga: Caída, éxodo y refugio, Málaga, Diputación de Málaga. 4. Bernales Ballesteros, Enrique "Papel de las Fuerzas Armadas en Los Estados Democráticos", por Editorial Constitución y Sociedades Lima 1997. 5. Congreso de la República Constitución Política del Perú, Diciembre de 1993. 6. Comando Conjunto de las FF.AA. Ley Orgánica del Comando Conjunto de las Fuerzas Armadas, DL No 440. (Modificado parcial por D.L No 743). 7. ESFAP Manual "Operaciones Aéreas", 2011. 8. Garcia Belaunde, Domingo "Defensa nacional y Constitución", por Editorial Eddile Lima 1999. 9. Ministerio de Defensa Ley No 28478 del Sistema de Seguridad y Defensa Nacional, Marzo 2010.

ARTICLE NANCY 2011 Quelques remarques sur une extension abusive du concept de causalité en cosmologie. RESUME "L'énigme majeure est la cause efficace" insiste Jean Largeault (1985). En effet, la physique contemporaine géométrise les phénomènes de la nature en transformant les causes efficientes en causalité formelle. Cependant elle nous invite aussi à accorder le structurel et le physique, le formel et le dynamique. Il convient donc de s'interroger sur le fondement du pouvoir créateur des mathématiques ou de leur caractère générateur en physique. Selon Charles de Koninck, la fécondité des mathématiques parait comme une intériorisation de la figure philosophique de l'ange dans le cadre du projet d'une métamathématique comme angélologie thomiste. La raison poursuit un moyen de connaitre qui serait universel in repraesentando, par opposition à l'universel in praedicando. Cette tendance est essentielle à ce que l'on appelle le "mode platonicien". L'une des idées centrales de cet article consiste à établir une connexion profonde entre la notion de causalité en physique et cette manière platonicienne de connaitre. Plus précisément, l'idéalisation de la causalité efficace en physique mathématique est-il autre chose que ce mode dialectique de connaître abusivement porté à sa limite ? 2 PRE-REMARQUE A remark to the historical development. Hume saw clearly that certain concepts, as for example that of causality, cannot be deduced from the material of experience by logical methods. Kant, thoroughly convinced of the indispensability of certain concepts, took them-just as they are selected-to be the necessary premises of every kind of thinking and differentiated them from concepts of empirical origin. I am convinced, however, that this differentiation is erroneous, i.e., that it does not do justice to the problem in a natural way. All concepts, even those which are closest to experience, are from the point of view of logic freely chosen conventions, just as in the case with the concept of causality, with which this problematic concerned itself in the first instance. Albert Einstein 1949 Selon l'acception commune, une relation causale est définie entre deux événements de telle sorte que la production du second par le premier implique un ordre temporel déterminé. Nous ordonnons habituellement des faits quelconques dans un ordre causal qui est aussi l'ordre chronologique de leur succession. Cet usage commun rappelle l'effort humien de réduction de la relation causale à une simple succession temporelle d'événements empiriques. Follon (1988) rapporte une synthèse pertinente de l'histoire de la causalité à travers ses différentes conceptions et ses grands débats (pythagoriciens, Platon, Aristote, Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume...). Des travaux récents sur la causalité (Salmon 1970, 1984) et Suppes (1970), par exemple) poursuivent la perspective empiriste de Hume, mais dans un cadre logique où l'ordre causal est réductible à l'ordre temporel ; d'autres, au contraire, suite à la relativité de l'ordre temporel depuis la découverte de la loi régissant la propagation de la lumière, cherchent comme Robb (1914), Carnap (1925) et Reichenbach (1922), ou plus récemment Papineau (1985, 1986, 1989, 1991, 1993) à construire par voie axiomatique l'ordre temporel par l'ordre causal ; enfin, certains travaux argumentent en faveur de l'irréductibilité de la relation causale à l'asymétrie temporelle (Cartwright 1979, 1983, 1989; Miller 1987; Kistler 1999; Woodward 1992). Aussi, Michael Heller (2003), dans son essai sur la science et la religion : Creative Tension, argumente en faveur d'une généralisation de la causalité physique à une causalité atemporelle et globale. Le modèle mathématique de la causalité non commutative falsifie l'idée commune chez les philosophes que le temps est une condition nécessaire au mouvement. Il ajoute que la généralisation de la causalité physique permettrait ainsi de penser la notion théologique de création de l'univers comme acte atemporel et non spatial. Nous nous proposons dans cet article de commenter sous la forme de trois remarques l'argument de Michael Heller au fil de la critique de Charles de Koninck contre Maritain dans sa thèse sur la philosophie de Sir Arthur Eddington de 1934. 3 Those who make causality one of the original uralt elements in the universe or one of the fundamental categories of thought 3⁄4 of whom you will find that I am not one 3⁄4 have one very awkward fact to explain away. It is that men's conceptions of a cause are in different stages of scientific culture entirely different and inconsistent. The great principle of causation which, we are told, it is absolutely impossible not to believe, has been one proposition at one period in history and an entirely disparate one at another is still a third one for the modern physicist. The only thing about it which has stood... is the name of it. Charles Sanders Peirce, Reasoning and the Logic of Things The attempt to "analyse" causation seems to have reached an impasse; the proposals on hand seem so widely divergent that one wonders whether they are all analyses of one and the same concept. But each of them seems to address some important aspect of the variegated notion that we express by the term 'cause', and it may be doubted whether there is a unitary concept of causation that can be captured in an enlightening philosophical analysis. Kim, 1995 "Causation." In: Robert Audi (ed.). The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. 110-12. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. "Il titolo di questo libro richiama una nozione, 'causa,' che suggerisce al lettore contemporaneo contenuti concettuali per qualche aspetto sostanzialmente diversi da quelli che evocava nel lettore medievale. Difatti per i contemporanei il termine 'causa' indica per lo più la sola idea di consequenzialità necessaria... Per il lettore medievale, invece, accanto all'idea di una connessione di fatto, il concetto di 'causa' trasmette quella di un ordinamento metafisico. ... La causa, in questo modo, è superiore all'effetto; e poiché è principio della sua sussistenza in essere, è principio anche della sua intelligibilità." Cristina D'Ancona Costa, "Introduzione," in Tommaso D'Aquino, Commento al Libro delle Cause, Milano: Rusconi, 1986, 7. 1. REMARQUE SUR LA GENERALISATION DE LA CAUSALITE EN PHYSIQUE L'évolution de l'idée de causalité en physique est l'histoire de son dépouillement conceptuel le plus extrême comme une tendance à remplacer le concept de causalité par le concept de fonction mathématique. La notion de causalité se réduit ainsi à des complexes de relations mathématiques au fur et à mesure de la formalisation progressive de la physique. Ainsi, pour Maurice Gagnon (1975)1 : Nous nous trouvons ici devant un exemple de ce que Bachelard appelle la coupure épistémologique entre la connaissance du sens commun et la connaissance scientifique. Suite à une analyse plus circonstanciée et plus raffinée des phénomènes, le scientifique en arrive à des synthèses totalement différentes de celles du sens commun, qui sont basées sur une analyse trop limitée. Si le scientifique, dans la formulation de sa synthèse, utilise le même vocabulaire que le sens commun, alors les mêmes mots y ont une signification différente parce qu'utilisés dans des contextes différents ; et ces diverses significations n'ont que très peu, voire même pas du tout, de rapports entre eux. Bachelard s'est d'ailleurs moqué du « choquisme » de ceux qui prétendaient transposer au niveau des particules subatomiques les lois causales de la mécanique classique. Bachelard a fait le «profil épistémologique» de deux idées fondamentales en physique : masse et énergie. Dans les deux cas, il y a fractionnement en cinq notions différentes, correspondant à cinq étapes du progrès de la pensée : la notion du sens commun y est suivie de celle de l'empirisme positiviste, puis viennent ensuite successivement celles de la physique newtonienne, de la physique relativiste et de la physique de Dirac. On obtient ainsi une série de notions de plus en plus abstraites, chacune assignant des limites aux précédentes, chacune ayant son champ d'application particulier. Il serait intéressant de tenter aussi le profil épistémologique de la notion de causalité. On y 1 Maurice Gagnon, « Une analyse sémantique du concept de causalité est-elle possible? », Philosophiques, vol. 2, n° 2, 1975, p. 187-205. 4 retrouverait certainement, dans un ordre d'abstraction croissante, la causalité-production du sens commun, et la relation de conjonction asymétrique décrite plus haut. Le profil épistémologique de la notion de causalité en physique mathématisée est caractérisé par trois périodes de tribulations (ou de métamorphoses) associées à la signification différentielle de la grandeur temps et à l'idée de déterminisme : la causalité différentielle, la causalité spatio-temporelle et une rupture avec l'idéal déterministe en physique quantique. Première période. La causalité physique classique (ou pré-relativiste) est différentielle et temporelle2. La causalité est exprimée par une équation différentielle en fonction du temps qui rattache, à un événement produit au temps t donné, l'événement produit à un temps t' quelconque, dont l'archétype est la loi de Newton de la gravitation. Au contraire, le déterminisme ajoute à la causalité différentielle la considération des conditions initiales, c'est-à-dire, le point de vue de l'enchaînement causal selon le temps étendu à l'ensemble de tous les corps de l'Univers. La réunion 3 de ces deux aspects (causalité différentielle et déterminisme) définit le déterminisme laplacien, préfiguré par d'Alembert dans un article de l'Encyclopédie : Nous devons envisager l'état de l'Univers comme l'effet de son état antérieur et la cause de ce qui va suivre. Une intelligence qui pour un instant donné connaîtrait toutes les forces dont la nature est animée et la situation respective des êtres qui la composent, si d'ailleurs elle était assez vaste pour soumettre ces données à l'analyse, embrasserait dans la même formule le mouvement des plus grands corps de l'Univers et ceux du plus léger atome : rien ne serait incertain pour elle, l'avenir comme le passé serait présent à ses yeux. (Laplace 1814). Précisons encore. Le déterminisme mécaniste, ou laplacien, n'est plus, à la suite de Poincaré et de la théorie du chaos déterministe, l'essence de la causalité physique : l'asymétrie de la causalité est en physique classique une contrainte d'antériorité4 non nécessairement prédictible. Autrement dit, ces systèmes physiques, dits « déterministes », sont des systèmes dynamiques non-linéaires, où le déterminisme mécaniste est dépassé par la structuration causale issue du système non-intégrable de leurs équations différentielles. Ainsi, selon Paty (2003) : L'étude de tels systèmes peut, en vérité, apporter des connaissances bien plus riches si l'on ne se laisse pas enfermer dans les limitations d'une pensée du déterminisme, et si l'on pense plus largement les prédictions d'une autre nature permises par les relations causales. Par exemple, comme Poincaré en eut l'idée le premier, en s'intéressant au comportement général (« qualitatif ») des solutions, ou au comportement de familles de trajectoires au lieu d'une seule, ou encore, comme les connaissances plus récentes l'ont fait voir, aux « 2 Au soubassement philosophique de cette notion se tiennent les idées de relation d'ordre et de succession temporelle. (Debru, 2003). 3 « L'idée du déterminisme laplacien se fonde donc sur celle de causalité physique, qu'elle se propose d'étendre et de systématiser en une connaissance globale et absolue à laquelle rien n'échapperait de ce qui existe dans l'univers matériel. » (Paty, 2003). 4 "The asymmetry is clearly an integral part of our intuitive idea that causes 'bring about' or 'produce' their effects, and also of Weyl's notion of the reason for something, but it is also an integral part of less metaphysically 'weighty' notions of cause. As the identification of the causal future with the future lightcone in relativity theory attests, the causal asymmetry is intimately related to a temporal asymmetry, even though what precisely the relation is, is somewhat of a delicate issue. On some accounts of causation, such as Humean regularity accounts, it is a conceptual truth that effects do not precede their causes, but even those accounts that allow for the conceptual possibility of backward causation would presumably maintain that causation in our world (or at least in the spatiotemporal region of the universe accessible to us) is forward directed, and hence, causal constraints are often taken to imply time-asymmetric constraints." Frisch (2008). 5 attracteurs étranges » qui signent les propriétés structurelles de tels systèmes physiques dans le cas des systèmes dissipatifs. Deuxième période. La causalité physique différentielle devient à la suite, notamment de la connaissance des actions physiques retardées et non plus instantanées, causalité relativiste ou spatio-temporelle 5 , comportant des contraintes sur les possibilités des rapports spatio-temporels pour des événements physiques. La causalité physique, selon Paty (2003) se voyait par là transformée, de causalité temporelle (non relativiste) en causalité spatio-temporelle (relativiste), soumise à la structure de l'espace-temps par une condition sur la distance spatio-temporelle de deux pointsévénements susceptibles d'être liés causalement : leur quadri-distance doit être négative (∆x2-c2∆t2≤0). En effet, leur rapport peut être causal s'ils sont séparés par une distance x2≤c2t2, et il est nécessairement non causal pour x2>c2t2. Autrement dit, les actions causales d'un point (quadri-dimensionnel) d'espace-temps à un autre sont telles que le quadri-vecteur joignant ces points soit intérieur au « cône de lumière», défini par l'équation x2 = c2t2. La région externe du cône de lumière, qui exclut des actions causales, est non physique. Cette propriété relationnelle du temps, qui inclut sa direction, était intégrée dans le concept de temps physique, et non plus laissée à l'observation ou à un choix de convention. Notons, pourtant, que l'asymétrie temporelle ne semble pas être constitutive de la relation causale 6 . En effet, le concept d'une causalité symétrique n'est pas contradictoire (cf. aussi Grünbaum, 1973) si la relation causale est considérée comme transfert d'une quantité d'une grandeur conservée (par exemple une certaine quantité d'énergie). Mais, comme le souligne l'auteur, il s'agit ici d'une possibilité seulement conceptuelle, c'est-à-dire compatible avec le concept de causalité physique ; la causalité dans le monde réel serait, de fait, caractérisée par son asymétrie temporelle. En outre, comme Erik Curiel (2000) 7 l'a montré, les implications de plus en plus contraignantes avec la relativité générale sur les possibilités des rapports spatio-temporels pour des événements physiques, remette en question toute idée de transfert : General relativity does not by itself suggest entities or quantities that one will want to characterize `propagating', no matter how one defines it. The very different structure of spacetime in the theory from that of spacetime in classical physics and in special relativity does not naturally suggest any sort of transfer account of causality, nor does it easily admit one. The only reason I can imagine for trying to force one to fit into the framework of general relativity is because one approached the theory in the first place already with a set of classical notions and questions to address, and did not rather ask general relativity what the important notions and questions ought to be in its new framework. If one renounces transfer accounts of causality, as I see it there remain only two general sorts of accounts of causality that could be grounded in physical theory. One may postulate an account in which one or more discrete, localized entities that are spatiotemporally separated from each other `cause' a distinct entity, the `effect', itself spatiotemporally separated from all the `causes'. Just as with any attempt to hold on to propagation, however, such an account would in no way arise from the structure of general relativity itself, but would rather have to be forcibly superimposed on its structure, under the guidance I suppose of purely 5 "The fact remains that the principle of causality, even freed of the notion of cause, has enabled the development of modern physics' theories, and deeply structures those currently being elaborated, such as superstring theory. It sets an absolute and compulsory order between several types of phenomena, even if none can be presented as the cause of another, and thus imposes a direction to time. In short, the principle is reduced to a classification method for events that fall under its influence, a rule that organizes them according to a systematically constraining order. In practice, the different formalisms of physics adapt the principle of causality to themselves by giving it a form that depends on how events and phenomena are represented. Its consequences are always constraining." (Klein 2010) 6 Voir Kistler 1999. Par opposition à Hume ; ce qui signifie que l'asymétrie est sans explication. 7 The Constraints General Relativity Places on Physicalist Accounts of Causality, in Theoria 2000, 15(1):115- 160. Voir aussi notre travail Bois (2006). 6 metaphysical urges. Otherwise, there is the initial value formulation of mathematical physics, my preference for the best one can do in representing causality in general relativity. Toutefois, la notion de causalité relativiste est plus souple que celle de temps. En effet les relations causales ne dépendent que de la structure conforme de la métrique de l'espace-temps. Troisième période. L'élaboration de la physique quantique et la question de ses interprétations diverses, a remis radicalement en question le déterminisme causal. En effet, l'équation d'onde de la théorie est bien différentielle et causale, mais elle porte sur des opérateurs, et non plus sur de simples fonctions à valeurs numériques. Le principe de causalité locale (John Bell, 1987) généralise la causalité einsteinienne au cas des théories probabilistes. Mais la détermination physique du système au moment de son observation n'est pas causale (problème de la mesure ou de la réduction du paquet d'onde) bien qu'asymétrique. De plus, l'expérience EPR (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen) montre qu'en mécanique quantique certaines séquences d'événements ne s'expliquent pas comme des causes et des effets au sens commun du terme sans contredire l'asymétrie temporelle. Dans le cas de systèmes corrélés, les corrélations sont indépendantes de la distance spatiale ou spatiotemporelle entre les systèmes. Cependant ces corrélations ne sont pas des interactions. L'intrication quantique n'est pas une relation causale. L'argument EPR met en évidence la non-séparabilité locale des sous-systèmes quantiques corrélés à distance. Finalement, et selon Maurice Gagnon (1975)8, si l'on continue à parler de causalité en physique, c'est en un sens presqu'entièrement nouveau, car il semble n'avoir qu'un seul point commun avec le sens préscientifique : l'asymétrie. Mais réduire la causalité à sa plus simple expression n'est-ce pas renoncer à définir la causalité comme telle : elle est une notion primitive et irréductible9, et prendre alors le risque de la rendre superflue comme le pensait Russel (1912)10 ? Toutefois, au lieu de chercher ce que serait le seul point commun de la causalité physique avec le sens préscientifique ou intuitif, au risque de l'éliminer en physique, il serait aussi possible de tenter d' élargir et de raffiner encore notre concept de causalité comme le propose Einstein (1932)11 ou Heller (2003). 8 « Une analyse sémantique du concept de causalité est-elle possible? », Philosophiques, vol. 2, n° 2, 1975, p. 187-205. 9 Voir G.E.M. Anscombe, "Causality and Determination", dans E. Sosa et M. Tooley (éd.), Causation, Oxford University Press, 1993 et Michael Tooley, Causation : A Realist Approach, Clarendon Press, 1987. 10 Bertrand Russell, "On the Notion of Cause" (1912). Pour Russel, le concept de causalité, s'il a sa place dans le schème conceptuel superficiel du sens commun, doit être banni d'une conception du monde qui se veut respectueuse des connaissances scientifiques. 11 Einstein, « Epilogue : a socratic dialogue », op. cit. (Einstein & Murphy [1932] Planck conclut ce dialogue en disant : "Where the discrepancy comes in to-day is not between nature and the principle of causality, but rather between the picture which we have made of nature and the realities in nature itself. Our picture is not in perfect accord with our observational results; and, as I have pointed out over and over again, it is the advancing business of science to bring about a finer accord here. I am convinced that the bringing about of that accord must take place, not in the rejection of causality, but in a greater enlargement of the formula and a refinement of it, so as to meet modern discoveries." 7 Lors d'un entretien avec Robert Murphy, Einstein indique que le concept de causalité en physique est encore trop rudimentaire en regard de la complexité des événements qui se produisent dans la nature : When Aristotle and the scholastics defined what they meant by a cause, the idea of objective experiment in the scientific sense had not yet arisen. Therefore they were content with defining the metaphysical concept of cause. And the same is true of Kant. Newton himself seems to have realized that this pre-scientific formulation of the causal principle would prove insufficient for modern physics. And Newton was content to describe the regular order in which events happen in nature and to construct his synthesis on the basis of mathematical laws. Now I believe that events in nature are controlled by a much stricter and more closely binding law than we suspect today, when we speak of one event being the cause of another. Our concept here is confined to one happening within one time-section. It is dissected from the whole process. Our present rough way of applying the causal principle is quite superficial. We are like a child who judges a poem by the rhyme and knows nothing of the rhythmic pattern. Or we are like a juvenile learner at the piano, just relating one note to that which immediately precedes or follows. To an extent this may be very well when one is dealing with very simple and primitive compositions; but it will not do for the interpretation of a Bach Fugue. Quantum physics has presented us with very complex processes and to meet them we must further enlarge and refine our concept of causality. (Einstein, 1932) Mais dans quelle direction ? Celle d'un déterminisme plus fort : les constantes de la nature ne sont pas arbitraires, comme le soutient Einstein12 ; l'indéterminisme est illogique13 ? Mais l'indéterminisme physique est un fait établi et les probabilités de la physique quantique sont irréductibles. Le déterminisme 14 exige plus qu'il n'est nécessaire pour expliquer les phénomènes connus et connaissables : 12 « Imaginons que cela ait été réalisé; alors n'apparaissent plus, dans les équations fondamentales de la physique que des constantes 'sans dimensions'. Au sujet de ces dernières, j'aimerais énoncer un principe qui, provisoirement, ne peut être fondé sur rien d'autre que sur ma confiance en la simplicité, ou plutôt l'intelligibilité, de la nature: il n'existe pas de constantes arbitraires de ce type. Autrement dit: la nature est ainsi faite qu'il est logiquement possible d'établir des lois si fortement définies que seules des constantes susceptibles d'une détermination rationnelle complète apparaissent dans ces lois (il n'y a donc pas de constantes dont les valeurs numériques puissent être modifiées sans que la théorie soit détruite). » (Einstein, 1980). 13 Dans Einstein (1932): "Indeterminism is quite an illogical concept. What do they mean by indeterminism? Now if I say that the average life-span of a radioactive atom is such and such, that is a statement which expresses a certain order, Gesetzlichkeit. But this idea does not of itself involve the idea of causation. We call it the law of averages; but not every such law need have a causal significance. At the same time if I say that the average life-span of such an atom is indetermined in the sense of being not caused, then I am talking nonsense. I can say that I shall meet you to-morrow at some indetermined time. But this does not mean that time is not determined. Whether I come or not the time will come. Here there is question of confounding the subjective with the objective world. The indeterminism which belongs to quantum physics is a subjective indeterminism. It must be related to something, else indeterminism has no meaning, and here it is related to our own inability to follow the course of individual atoms and forecast their activities. To say that the arrival of a train in Berlin is in determined is to talk nonsense unless you say in regard to what it is indetermined. If it arrives at all it is determined by something. And the same is true of the course of atoms." 14 Ajoutons qu'un rapprochement est pensable entre un déterminisme et l'imprévisibilité possible. En effet l'imprévisibilité peut ne pas être une indétermination en tant qu'elle est due au caractère absolu du déterminisme. « Le battement d'ailes imperceptible, qui nous échappe, engendre des effets qui seront perçus quelque temps plus tard, très loin de là, en raison de la solidarité des causalités. Cependant, puisque ce sont les conditions initiales qui ne nous sont, en fin de compte, pas exactement connues, nous n'étions pas dans une situation de déterminisme au sens propre. Ce que la très grande généralité de situations d'amplification arbitraire de très petites variations des conditions initiales indique, en réalité, c'est le caractère généralement inopérant de l'idéal déterministe. De tels systèmes restent cependant gouvernés par l'enchaînement des causalités, qui est pris souvent, mais à tort, pour le déterminisme. » (Paty 2003) Voir aussi les arguments de Karl Popper dans son ouvrage L'Univers irrésolu. Plaidoyer pour l'indéterminisme (Popper 1982, rédigé en 1956). 8 The burden is on the determinists at least to indicate the direction in which the old formulation of causality will have to be revised in order to meet the needs of modern science. (Einstein 1932) Ou comme Heller (2003), chercher une meilleure physique en quantifiant la gravitation par la géométrie non commutative ? Heller, en effet, soutient qu'il est possible de généraliser le concept de causalité en physique dans le cadre de la physique non commutative : When we change to a non-commutative setting, the causal structure drastically alters. First, space-time, as a set of well-localized points and their neighborhoods, disappears, and we are left with a "global" entity that can be in various states. In Connes' approach, so far one has been unable to define a Lorentz metric, only a Riemann metric. The latter opens up light-cones in such a way that there is no limiting velocity imposed on physical signal propagation; everything in space-time can be causally connected with everything. However, by using the Riemann metric, one can define the distance between various states. It seems, therefore, that there are states that can be causally connected. In our approach, one can define a Lorentz metric that, however, is totally nonlocal, in the sense that it does not define local light-cones but specifies which vector fields (regarded as global objects) can influence each other. Let us remember that derivations of a given algebra are non-commutative counterparts of vector fields, and, in our model, they are responsible for the dynamics of the system. Therefore, we are entitled to say that, in this model, causality is incorporated into its non-commutative dynamics. The general conclusion of this subsection is that it is possible to generalize the concept of causality so as to free it from the involvement in time and locality. What remains still deserves the name of (generalized) causality because it gives rise to the dynamics of the system. It seems that the essence of causality is a dynamical nexus rather than the distinctness of the cause and its effect, and their temporal order. "This terminological decision is justified by the fact that noncommutative causal structure (in the mathematical sense) is a legitimate generalization of the usual causal structure of space-time studied in general relativity. In the light of the above analysis, we should take into account the possibility that the concept of causality does not necessarily presuppose a local interaction between the cause and its effect (global aspect of causality), and that it does not necessarily include a temporal order (atemporal aspect of causality)." Ainsi, la géométrie non commutative permet de généraliser la structure causale de l'espace-temps de la relativité générale et donc de penser une notion de causalité globale et sans asymétrie temporelle comme connexion/interdépendance dynamique15. Mais, comment le physicien peut-il conclure à une relation causale dynamique sans finalement risquer de réduire encore la causalité à sa plus simple expression16 et donc de l'éliminer de la physique. Car, peut-il différencier la cause dynamique de la nécessité fonctionnelle17 ? En effet, argumente Hulswit (2002) : 15 "In our time, quantum mechanics has virtually put an end to mechanistic and deterministic interpretations of the causal nexus, but some other forms of causality are in circulation. So-called "bottom-up" causation exhibits a strong reductionist flavor, at least if the reductionism is understood in Steven Weinberg's sense of "petty reductionism," when a whole system, its structure and functioning, is regarded as arising from the sum of its constituent units, their properties, and their behavior. This type of causation is often correlated with (not necessarily opposed to) "top-down" causation. The latter was first recognized in nonlinear dissipative systems in which the changes at the microlevel, that of the constituent units, are what they are because of their incorporation into the system as a whole, which is exerting specific constraints on its units, making them behave otherwise than they would in isolation. It was soon extended beyond its original domain to denote something "more open and more non-local than that." It might seem that the causality encountered in noncommutative models (as it was discussed in subsection 7.1) is a kind of "top-down" causality. However, if we take into account the fact that, according to these models, this type of causality operates at the most fundamental level, it could almost equally well be called "bottom-up" causality. I think that its distinctive feature is not its "vertical" operation mode, but rather its atemporal and nonlocal behavior." (Heller 2003) 16 Selon Curiel (2000) : "Whatever sort of account one will give looks to come perilously close merely to saying that one thing follows upon another". 17 Dans How Causal is Downward Causation? Hulswit (2005) montre l'ambigüité du mot causalité. 9 Probably the most radical change in the meaning of cause happened during the seventeenth century, in which there emerged a strong tendency to understand causal relations as instances of deterministic laws. Causes were no longer seen as the active initiators of a change, but as inactive nodes in a law-like implication chain. The dismissal of explanations by final and formal causation by Descartes, Francis Bacon and Galileo brought about the rejection of the Aristotelian-scholastic doctrine of active qualities and substantial forms as causal factors in natural processes. The Aristotelian idea that a substantial form be transmitted from a cause to its effect had no basis whatever in our experience of things. However, paradoxical as it may seem, it was precisely this concept of formal cause that came to play an important role in the development of the new conception of efficient cause, according to which efficient causes were simply instances of general laws, which in turn were general, mathematical principles. But, to a large extent, the concept of law of nature was the inheritor of the concept of formal cause: both concepts were meant to explain the stability of the world. The main difference is that, whereas the formal cause was thought to explain the stability of the world by explaining the structure of things, the laws of nature were thought to explain the stability of the world by explaining the relations between things. An important characteristic of the modern conception of cause was that causation and determinism became virtually equivalent.18 Le sens pré-humien de la causalité motrice issu d'Aristote n'est pas l'efficience des modernes19. L'efficience des modernes repose sur une conception sérielle de la causalité 20 . Or, la relation causale est chez Aristote non-symétrique (non asymétrique) au sens où « être la cause de » n'est pas identique à « être l'effet de ». Et, elle peut être en même temps réflexive, dans le cas des essences. Quant à la transitivité, la relation causale est transitive dans le cas restreint de la causalité nécessaire scientifique et intransitive lorsqu'il s'agit d'une cause accidentelle (A est cause de B par accident et B est cause de C, A n'est pas réellement cause de C), elle n'est donc pas transitive. Ainsi, la causalité aristotélicienne ne peut pas définir une série ordonnée strictement, car elle devrait pour cela être une relation d'ordre irréflexive, asymétrique et transitive (à l'image de la série des entiers naturels qui est ordonnée par la relation « successeur de »). Les néoplatoniciens ont, pour la première fois, conçu une cause productrice de l'être et donc plus fondamentale que celle des causes naturelles des anciens (la théorie des quatre causes d'Aristote et sa conception de l'agent naturel). Plotin présente le lien qui unit l'Un aux réalités qui en découle comme relavant de la causalité, bien qu'il ne s'agisse pas d'un engendrement dans le temps21, et il lui associe l'image de l'émanation, qui sera ensuite attachée à la cause efficiente des médiévaux. La cause efficiente est un concept métaphysique. Ainsi, avec le Livre des causes de Proclus, la cause efficiente ne prend pas encore la forme d'une série causale homogène, mais se structure comme une hiérarchie décroissante et essentiellement ordonnées de puissances productrices qui se condensent, de proche en proche, dans une physis définie par une forme. Avec Ockham seuls existent les individus et seuls ceux-ci peuvent produire quelque chose. Il peut être regardé comme le véritable inventeur des séries modernes de 18 Menno Hulswit 2002, From Cause to Causation. A Peircean Perspective. Dordrecht, Kluwer Publishers, 2002. 19 Voir le travail de Olive 2009, L'efficience de la cause, le concept d'efficience naturelle dans la physique antique et classique, 2009. 20 La conception sérielle de la causalité des modernes repose sur la primauté de l'art sur la science et résulte de l'oubli de l'analogie. 21 « Quand nous parlons des réalités éternelles, il nous est interdit de parler de venue à l'existence dans le temps ; mais quand dans le discours nous attribuons une venue à l'existence de ces réalités, nous leur assignons une place dans une relation de causalité. » 10 (V, 1), 3, 19 sq., trad. F. Fronterotta, G-F Flammarion, 2003. 10 causes et d'effets. Les penseurs du début du XVIIème siècle tentent de reconstruire tout l'ordre du savoir physique sur le modèle de la causalité efficiente comprise comme une relation entre deux existants, extérieure aux termes qu'elle relie. De cette façon, de la causalité des anciens, il ne reste que des séries homogènes de causes et d'effets. Le tournant décisif n'est donc pas entre une conception préhumienne issue d'Aristote de la causalité et la conception néo-humienne de la causalité comme fonction ou comme le retrait/rejet de la causalité (cf. Mach). Mais, l'homogénéité22 des séries causales permet de composer mathématiquement tous les mouvements, en une somme des mouvements élémentaires qui en sont la cause efficiente et, de cette façon, de faire entrer toutes les formes prises par la matière, tous les êtres naturels, dans une chaîne de déductions évidentes. Descartes écrit : Sachez donc que par la nature, je n'entends point ici quelque déesse, ou quelque sorte de puissance imaginaire, mais que je me sers de ce mot pour signifier la matière même, en tant que je la considère avec toutes les qualités que je lui ai attribuées, comprises toutes ensemble, et sous la condition que Dieu continue de la conserver de la même façon qu'il l'a créée. Car de cela seul qu'il continue ainsi de la conserver, il suit de nécessité qu'il doit y avoir plusieurs changements en ses parties, lesquelles ne pouvant, ce me semble, être proprement attribués à l'action de Dieu, parce qu'elle ne change point, je les attribue à la nature ; et les règles suivant lesquelles se font ces changements, je les nomme lois de la nature. » Le Monde, VII, AT IX, p. 36-37. Revenons à Heller. Les processus de généralisation conceptuelle sont variés. Principalement deux types sont à distinguer (cf. Lambert 1996). La généralisation libre par extension d'un concept (les tenseurs généralisent les vecteurs), et la généralisation qui s'impose par nécessité interne (les entiers relatifs généralisent les naturels). Heller généralise par extension la causalité différentielle à l'interaction dynamique globale et atemporelle en la libérant de la double restriction de localité spatiale et d'antériorité temporelle. It seems obvious that causation presupposes a separation in space and temporal order. If A causes B then A and B are distinct; otherwise we would have a self-causation. If A causes B then A precedes B; otherwise, B could be the cause of A. However, the separation in space and a temporal order do not form a sufficient condition for causality. For two events to remain in a causal nexus, a certain dynamical interaction must exist between them. There are good reasons to think that if we liberate causality from its involvement in separability in space and ordering in time, it is exactly this dynamical interaction that remains, and this seems enough for justifiably speaking about causal dependence. (Heller 2003, p.265) En fait, le concept de causalité suit la généralisation du concept de dynamique par l'emploi de la dérivation, généralisation non commutative de la notion de vecteur23. Dans la théorie générale des espaces non-commutatifs, la notion de point est remplacée par celle " d'état " du système : les notions classiques d'espace et de temps perdent alors leur sens. Mais, une interaction dynamique n'est pas identique à 22 L'homogénéité des causes et des effets permet de penser le principe selon lequel « l'effet est toujours proportionnel à l'action qui est nécessaire pour le produire ». C'est ce principe selon Wallis qui permet de passer des mathématiques à la physique : « Universalem hanc Propositionem praemittendam etiam duxi, quoniam viam aperit qua, ex pura Mathematica speculatione, ad Physicam transeatur ; seu potius hanc et illam connectit. » Mechanica, sive de Motu Tractatus geometricus, I, prop. VI, cité par M. Fichant, « Les concepts fondamentaux de la mécanique selon Leibniz en 1676 », in Leibniz à Paris, 1672-1676, Studia leibnitiana supplementa, 17, Wiesbaden, 1978, t. I, p. 229. 23 Dans le cadre de la géométrie différentielle de la théorie quantique des champs, la notion de connexion généralise la causalité spatio-temporelle. 11 une relation fonctionnelle24. Une relation fonctionnelle est plus une explication ou détermination qu'une causalité motrice25. Comme l'écrit Paty (2003) : Nous avons vu la causalité physique se proposer pour accompagner et justifier le point de vue des concepts appropriés aux phénomènes de mouvement et de changement : toute la physique s'est constituée sur la base de cette notion, en choisissant en référence à elle les principes et les concepts propres à sa mathématisation, et cette notion elle-même s'est, en retour, adaptée à ces nouvelles exigences. A y regarder de près, la physique quantique a poursuivi sur cette lancée, en faisant passer la causalité du côté de ses grandeurs structurelles (fonctions d'état et opérateurs), qui portent le contenu physique fondamental, celui qui fait la spécificité des phénomènes et des systèmes quantiques. Cette causalité élargie s'exprime dans les relations entre les grandeurs dynamiques, qui peuvent être temporelles (on parlera de causalité proprement dite), ou être indépendantes du temps comme variable explicite, par exemple dans les relations d'invariance ou de symétrie (on parlera alors plutôt de relation fonctionnelle ou structurelle) : mais on ne voit pas de différence de nature entre les deux. La causalité au sens de l'évolution avec le temps des grandeurs de la physique classique apparaît comme un cas particulier de la seconde, toujours utile dans les situations traditionnelles (trajectoires simples, etc.). Finalement, l'interdépendance formelle semble être le sens de l'extension de la causalité en physique. Mais l'éloignement du formalisme de la physique moderne hors du sens commun est tel que la causalité élargie ne peut être que difficilement réinvestie par lui sans risquer de tomber dans ce que Whitehead (1968) nomme « the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness ». La montée en puissance du formalisme mathématique de la notion de causalité s'est accompagnée d'une évanescence de son aspect causal au sens pré-humien. C'est pourquoi, en un certain sens, pour la physique moderne : « l''énigme majeure est la cause efficace26 » Largeault (1985). 24 Emmeche and colleagues (2000: 17) substitute a new notion of causality, 'functional causality', for the original meaning of the Aristotelian 'final causality', describing it as amounting to the role played by a part in an integrated processual whole, or the purpose of a behavior as seen from the perspective of a system's chance of remaining stable over time. Aristotle characterized the final causal mode as a way of specifying the cause "in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done [...]. The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end [...]" (Physics II.3, 194b32-35. Aristotle 1995: 332-333). Given the ongoing debates concerning the relations between the concepts of 'function', 'teleology', and 'finality', and their explicit intention of reinterpreting Aristotle's causal modes in the light of contemporary theoretical frameworks, it is understandable that Emmeche and colleagues preferred to avoid either identifying 'function' with the Aristotelian 'final cause' or using the notion of finality at all. 25 Menno Hulswit (2005). How Causal is Downward Causation? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):261 287. 26 En ce sens la causalité de la physique moderne a toujours été du côté de la forme même si le cadre conceptuel est celui de l'efficience comme l'écrit M. Bunge : "The Aristotelian teaching of causes lasted in the official Western culture until the Renaissance. When modern science was born, formal and final causes were left aside as standing beyond the reach of experiment; and material causes were taken for granted in connection with all natural happenings... Hence, of the four Aristotelian causes only the efficient cause was regarded as worthy of scientific research." Mario Bunge, Causality and Modern Science (New York: Dover, 1979), 32. 12 2. REMARQUE SUR LE PECHE D'ANGELISME EN PHYSIQUE. Dans une lettre (datée de 1938) adressée au philosophe M. Adler, Charles De Koninck fait une remarque décisive concernant la distinction entre la philosophie de la nature et les sciences expérimentales : There is indeed some analogy between the general problem of the middle ages-philosophy-theology-, and that of our day -philosophy-science27. But I consider it a very weak one. The ratio deitatis of catholic theology, and the ratio entis of natural thought are both complete in their own right. This is not the case of philosophy and science which communicate in the same light of reason. The various degrees of natural knowledge are not radically distinct like natural and supernatural. The difference is like that between war and revolution. The formality studied by experimental science is already a contraction, and if we must start therefrom, we can never get beyond this contraction. This means impossibility of communication. Puis, il argumente : The Summa contra Gentes was written for persons who accept either metaphysics or revelation. If they accept metaphysics, they know that God is known only "sub ratione entis", and thereby acknowledge a hidden supernatural order which might reveal itself. There is here no fundamental conflict. If they accept revelation without being fideists, they must accept metaphysics. Hence there is a certain coextension between philosophy and theology. The mind of the metaphysicist is naturally open to the supernatural order. (Contra Gentes, III, ch. 25 and 50) This is not the case in philosophy and science: the relation, relative to the ratio entis, is one of the part to the whole. If a scientist is not already somehow a philosopher, he shall never be able to join it. There was common ground between philosophy and theology, because they are at the same time radically distinct and at the same time, somehow coextensive. If we assimilate this distinction to that of philosophy and science, we are really throwing out either philosophy or science. The philosopher and the theologian can converse together. If philosophy and science were distinct in the same manner, communication would be absolutely impossible. (De Koninck 1938) Or, l'on constate une tendance à distinguer radicalement la science de la philosophie comme l'on sépare la philosophie de la théologie, afin de mieux les unir en dialogue. Le passage du scientifique au philosophique ne peut s'effectuer de l'intérieur de l'ordre scientifique même ; il est impossible. La philosophie n'attend donc pas son objet de la science. Toutefois, le philosophe, à moins d'être dogmatique, doit s'ouvrir à la science. Et, le scientifique marquant lui-même les limites de sa connaissance, reconnaît ainsi un au-delà de la mesure ; les théories scientifiques ne peuvent pas rendre compte de la réalité ultime des phénomènes de la nature. Si la philosophie et les sciences de la nature diffèrent l'une de l'autre secundum genus, il n'existe pas de continuité28, mais elles sont coextensives l'une à l'autre. Le rapport entre philosophie et science est clairement un rapport de « contraintes mutuelles », excluant toute 27 L'on peut trouver chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, dans son article premier sur la nécessité de la doctrine sacrée (in Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 1 ad 2.) une référence à cette faible analogie : Une diversité de " raisons ", ou de points de vue, dans ce que l'on connaît, détermine une diversité de sciences. Ainsi est-ce bien une même conclusion que démontrent l'astronome et le physicien, par exemple, que la terre est ronde ; mais le premier utilise à cette fin un moyen terme mathématique, c'est-à-dire abstrait de la matière, tandis que le second en emploie un qui s'y trouve impliqué. Rien n'empêche donc que les objets mêmes dont traitent les sciences philosophiques, selon qu'ils sont connaissables par la lumière de la raison naturelle, puissent encore être envisagés dans une autre science, selon qu'ils sont connus par la lumière de la révélation divine. La théologie qui relève de la doctrine sacrée est donc d'un autre genre que celle qui est encore une partie de la philosophie. 28 Si ce n'est secondairement quant à l'imagerie « s'il est vrai qu'il convienne à la philosophie de la nature d'ajouter au savoir philosophique proprement dit, qu'elle requiert en vertu de son essence propre, une région de mythes philosophiques destinés à l'accorder elle-même aux mythes bien fondés engagés dans les théories physico-mathématiques, et à compléter ainsi son union avec le corps expérimental que les sciences lui composent. » (Maritain 1935, p. 362) 13 absorption de l'une par l'autre. Il faut s'attacher alors à leur articulation, refusant tant l'absorption de l'ontologique dans le métrique que le maintien d'un gouffre de l'un à l'autre, d'une absence d'articulation radical du métrique à l'ontologique. On pourra, avec Maritain (1935), résumer les choses ainsi : La première analyse est une analyse non ontologique, une analyse empiriologique du réel : c'est le domaine de la connaissance scientifique. La seconde analyse est une analyse ontologique du réel : c'est le domaine de la connaissance philosophique. Toutefois, Charles de Koninck voit 29 en Jacques Maritain celui qui a su bien distinguer les sciences expérimentales de la philosophie de la nature. Il résiste à la double tentation soit, d'une part, de diviser la philosophie de la nature en deux parties séparées : l'une va à la métaphysique, l'autre, aux sciences expérimentales (ou d'interpréter de façon philosophique les résultats des sciences positives de la nature30) ; soit, d'autre part, tout en distinguant la philosophie de la nature de la métaphysique, de faire appel aux théories scientifiques pour prouver des thèses proprement philosophiques31. Il ne reste plus alors qu'à avouer que la théorie [d'Einstein], si l'on donnait une signification ontologiquement réelle aux entités qu'elle met en jeu, comporterait des absurdités; entièrement logique et cohérente comme système hypothético-déductif et synthèse mathématique des phénomènes, elle n'est pas, malgré les prétentions de ses partisans, une philosophie de la nature, parce que le principe de la constance de la vitesse de la lumière, sur lequel elle s'appuie, ne peut pas être ontologiquement vrai. C'est le même réel sensible qui peut être l'objet d'une analyse ontologique (orientée vers l'intelligible) ou empiriologique (orientée vers l'observable et le mesurable). Les sciences positives de la nature diffèrent32 spécifiquement de la philosophie, bien que, par ailleurs, elles se trouvent toutes deux au même premier degré d'abstraction (par opposition, notamment au degré propre à la métaphysique). Cette dualité des conceptions au coeur d'un même ordre d'abstraction assure leur coextensibilité : l'une sans l'autre ne peut constituer un savoir complet ; elles demandent à se compléter mutuellement. Mais pourquoi Maritain rendrait-il alors toute véritable communication impossible entre la philosophie et les sciences modernes s'il a su bien les distinguer comme l'écrit Charles de Koninck ? A vouloir distinguer les sciences positives de la philosophie on tend comme à surnaturaliser, à la façon des Eléates33, la physique. Mais, selon Charles de Koninck, 29 De Koninck, Cours de biologie philosophique, 1936. 30 « L'erreur philosophique des relativistes est de prendre un certain art scientifique de manier les mesures pour une philosophie de la nature. » (Maritain 1935, p.250) 31 « On affirme que s'il est impossible et absurde qu'un effet précède sa cause, c'est parce qu'il est impossible et absurde qu'aucune particule matérielle ou aucun signal aille plus vite que la lumière, ce qui fait dépendre une nécessité métaphysique et première du principe de causalité d'une nécessité d'ordre physique, qui, si absolue qu'on la fasse, reste de soi secondaire et dérivée . » (Maritain 1935, p. 254) 32 Dès lors, un même mot peut être employé dans un cas et dans l'autre avec des significations tout à fait diverses. Comme le mot de cause : il n'y a presque aucune communauté entre les deux mots ; ils deviennent presque équivoques. 33 Pierre Pellegrin dans Aristote et la Physique Eléate parle de cette tendance à spiritualiser les étants physiques Aristote et la physique éléate , in Passion des Formes. Dynamique qualitative, sémiophysique et intelligibilité. A René Thom, Fontenay-Saint Cloud ENS, 1994. 14 cela va contre l'ordre de détermination34 de la science naturelle, et rend, finalement, impossible toute forme de dialogue. En effet, la distinction de Maritain a l'inconvénient d'ôter à la science moderne sa charge ontologique. Maritain chasse le physico-mathématique dans les nuages de l'être de raison mathématique (ens rationis fondés in re) et résout le problème de l'étonnante efficacité des mathématiques en physique du seul point de vue logique : faux implique vrai est vrai35. Charles de Koninck argumente contre Maritain en deux points essentiellement : 1. Selon Maritain, le rapport de l'être mesurable au réel sensible est oblique. Mais il identifie la quantité à la simple extériorité de l'être sensible. L'être physique est un être matériel. 2. Quelle est cette intuition spéciale réservée à la philosophe de la nature qui, finalement, faire entrer la figure de l'ange (connaissance des absolus physiques) dans les sciences de la nature ? Reprenons chacun des deux points. Selon Maritain (1935) la science moderne étudie l'être sensible en tant qu'il est mesurable/observable, mais il n'y a d'ontologie qu'indirectement et obliquement : L'ontologique n'est jamais là dégagé pour lui-même, il n'est là qu'à titre de fondement de représentations et définitions empiriques ou d'entités physico-mathématiques. [...] En ce sens et pour abréger le langage on peut dire que l'explication empiriologique n'a pas de valeur ontologique, c'est-à-dire directement ontologique ; elle n'atteint l'être des choses qu'obliquement et comme fondement indirect, sans le faire connaître en lui-même. Elle travaille sur les natures ou essences du monde corporel, celles-ci ne sont pas comme telles son objet propre. La géométrisation de la physique progresse en s'écartant de l'ontologique. Il en résulte une purification du lexique notionnel des sciences positives de la nature se constituant dans une autonomie de plus en plus parfaite à l'égard du lexique ontologique de la philosophie. Par exemple, la notion empiriologique de causalité différentielle comme pure co-détermination phénoménale a évacué toute référence à la notion philosophique de cause comme activité productrice d'être. Mais elle reste néanmoins et nécessairement rivée à la notion ontologique de cause « d'une manière implicite, obscure, ingrate et inavouée » en tant que d'une part elle présuppose une philosophie sous-jacente (la philosophie inchoative du scientifique), et d'autre part, en tant qu'elle se réfère obliquement à l'être des choses comme fondement des représentations explicatives. Ce qui assure une telle relation des êtres de raison de la science moderne à l'être réel matériel considéré comme fondement est la quantité : peut être considérée ontologiquement comme le premier accident des substances matérielles, et peut être encore considérée quantitativement ou au point de vue des relations d'ordre et de mesure. Maritain (1935) écrit : 34 De Koninck 1941. 35 « Une théorie physique est avant tout un système hypothético-déductif édifié a priori selon les convenances artistiques de la formulation algébrique, et qu'on essaye après coup, vêtement tout fait, sur les phénomènes ; pour qu'il y ait coïncidence entre le donné physique et les conclusions algébriques, il n'est nullement nécessaire que les principes de la théorie soient vrais : comme l'enseigne en effet la logique formelle, si du vrai ne peut jamais suivre le faux, du faux par contre peut suivre le vrai. » (Maritain, 1935 p.242) 15 A considérer les choses au point de vue, non du physicien, mais du philosophe, et à s'exprimer dans son langage, la quantité, c'est-à-dire l'extension de la substance et de son unité métaphysique en parties diverses selon la position, est une propriété réelle des corps, il y a, dans la nature, des dimensions, des nombres, des mesures réelles, un espace réel, un temps réel, et c'est sous les conditions et les modalités de cette quantité réelle, c'est quantitativement mesurées et réglées que les causes en interaction dans la nature développent leurs activités qualitatives. (p. 276) Charles De Koninck, commentant ce passage, souligne l'identification ainsi faite entre la notion de quantité à celle d'étendue (extraneitas). Or, cela est une confusion. Si la quantité est ce qui est connu par la mesure, l'étendue en tant que telle n'a pas de mesures. L'étendue, comme donnée immédiate, est pure extériorité, réelle et homogène, soit de l'espace, soit du temps. Sans dimension aucune. Prenons comme exemple d'extériorité réelle continue la relation entre deux points quelconques ou deux instants quelconques. Les deux points (ou les deux instants) sont continument liés. Ce continu comme extériorité n'est pas une grandeur « quae mensura cognoscitur ». Pour pouvoir parler de distance qui sépare les deux points (ou les deux instants), il faudra introduire un troisième point (ou instant) qui établira dans cette extériorité une différenciation qualitative, une mensurabilité. Le philosophe en tant que philosophe ne peut donc pas parler de structure métrique de l'espace réel36. Cependant, Maritain soutient que nous avons une connaissance des dimensions de l'espace réel. Maritain affirme que l'espace réel physique possède les trois dimensions de l'espace géométrique euclidien. Pourquoi ? Il suppose que l'espace réel est accessible à une intuition imaginative, intuition du sens interne, qui présuppose la perception externe des êtres sensibles. Ce rôle de l'imagination s'explique pour nous parce que la quantité, étant le premier accident de la substance corporelle, précède (d'une priorité de nature) tout l'ordre qualitatif (énergétique et physique) et donc de l'ordre sensible, et cependant elle est elle-même connue du sens par le moyen des qualités sensibles, non sans, du reste, toute une éducation synergique de la perception (elle est un sensible commun) : l'imagination au service de l'intelligence peut donc pénétrer dans le monde de la quantité pure (...) Et ce rôle de l'imagination, s'il ne dispense en rien de la stricte et minutieuse rationalité des vérifications logiques, comme les intuitionnistes ont trop souvent semblé le croire, est cependant indispensable, parce que l'objet n'est pas ici, comme en métaphysique, purement intelligible : il faut que la constructibilité dans l'intuition imaginative manifeste ad sensum la possibilité intrinsèque des entités considérées par l'esprit, avant tout, et nous assure ainsi que loin d'envelopper quelque incompossibilité secrète ce sont de véritables essences (sur le fondement desquelles des êtres de raison capables d'existence idéale pourront d'ailleurs être édifiés à leur tour. (Maritain 1935) Dès lors ce qui distingue l'espace réel (sens philosophique) de l'espace comme être de raison est la seule constructibilité directe dans l'intuition imaginative. Autrement dit, la condition de l'existence hors de l'esprit, ou de l'être réel, c'est d'exister d'une existence sensible (Maritain 1935, p. 330). Seul l'espace euclidien est directement constructible dans l'intuition ; donc il est réel. Or, la contre, tout être matériel n'est pas nécessairement sensible : To elevate sensibility into a criterion of material unity is a restriction of it to what can be imaginatively represented. A quantum is a phenomena which absolutely surpasses our representative capacities and which has 36 De Koninck imagine un dialogue entre un physicien et Maritain sur le caractère euclidien ou non de l'espace : "As a philosopher he can say nothing of the metric structure of space. That is for physicist. And he replies that there is curved space. M. Maritain answers : that is impossible. The physicist asks why. M. Maritain : because it does not agree with the metrics of my space. The physicist : and which is that ?" (De Koninck, 2008, p.149) 16 no representative sense. Yet it is quite real. It is not in any way reducible to a representation, and that by definition. (De Koninck, 2008, p. 148) Maritain parle de grandeurs physiques absolues, de dimensions absolues, de temps absolu, de simultanéité absolue et même de causalité stricte. Il les connaît donc puisqu'il en aurait une connaissance intuitive dans l'imagination. Mais il justifie son propos en faisant entrée les esprits purs37. Le philosophe sait que les corps ont des dimensions absolues, qu'il y a dans le monde des mouvements absolus, un temps absolu, des simultanéités absolues pour des événements aussi éloignés qu'on voudra dans l'espace : absolu signifie ici entièrement déterminé en soi-même, indépendamment de tout observateur ; de savoir quels ils sont, de discerner ces dimensions, ces mouvements, ce temps, ces simultanéités (à distance) absolues à l'aide de nos moyens d'observation et de mesure, le philosophe y renonce, il accordera volontiers que cela n'est pas possible ; il lui suffit qu'ils soient discernables à des esprits purs, qui connaissent sans observer d'un point de l'espace et d'un moment du temps. (Maritain 1935, pp. 308-309) Or, le physicien rejette ces grandeurs absolues parce qu'elles sont inconnaissables pour lui (il doit mesurer) et pour le philosophe aussi. Maritain oublie que les nombresmesures sont des ombres38 de la réalité physique non pas parce qu'elles seraient des abstractions logiques, des êtres de raison, mais en tant que coupures métriques des choses physiques : ils n'expriment pas le tout de l'expérience, mais en tant que coupures physiques ils nous donnent quelque chose du réel lui-même39. Certes, des coupures métriques ne sont pas des coupures ontologiques : Des coupures métriques on ne peut conclure à des coupures ontologiques. Le soleil et la lune ne sont pas deux êtres substantiels parce que distants et séparés par un certain vide. Les entités fondamentales de la physique ne sont que des coupures dans l'aspect métrique des choses, choses dont le physicien fait d'ailleurs totalement abstraction. Il est absurde de considérer un atome comme une chose. Ces entités ne sont réelles qu'à la façon d'un sourire. (De Koninck, Réflexions sur le problème de l'indéterminisme, Revue Thomiste, 1937.) Il ne nous reste qu'un sourire : le chat de Cheshire a quitté la scène. Mais ce sourire a une structure, et cela est bien quelque chose : c'est le vide du monde creux de la physique (« the hollow of the hollow world of physics ») . (De Koninck, 2009) Ce vide, ce creux, est une ouverture non à la philosophie de la nature, mais à la métaphysique. Au fond, le philosophe de la nature n'a pas accès à ce qui est caché 37 Ce même esprit qui « connaîtrait sans moyens matériels (et donc sans le moyen non plus de concepts empiriologiques), le comportement de ce corpuscule à chaque instant, il verrait alors le principe de causalité s'appliquer strictement et dans son plein sens ontologique. Cette hypothèse est sans signification pour le physicien ; mais si elle n'avait pas de signification pour le métaphysicien, c'est qu'il n'y aurait pas de métaphysique. » (Maritain, 1935 p. 378) 38 "It is difficult to school ourselves to treat the physical world as purely symbolic. We are always relapsing and mixing with the symbols incongruous conceptions taken from the world of consciousness. Untaught by long experience we stretch a hand to grasp the shadow, instead of accepting its shadowy nature. Indeed, unless we confine ourselves altogether to mathematical symbolism it is hard to avoid dressing our symbols in deceitful clothing. When I think of an electron there rises to my mind a hard, red, tiny ball; the proton similarly is neutral grey. Of course the colour is absurd perhaps not more absurd than the rest of the conception but I am incorrigible." (Eddington 1942) 39 "On the contrary, it is M. Maritain who seems to forget that measurement give us something of the real when he assimilates physics à l'excès with pure mathematics. Physical magnitudes are not "cuts mathematically effected", but physically effected, which is quite another thing. Physical magnitudes are not merely beings of reason cum fundamento in re. Insofar as knowledge of them is solidly established, they express reality. They do not express the whole of reality. Insofar as a theory is experimentally verified, it is really true." (De Koninck 2008 p. 153). 17 au physicien. Toute connaissance de la nature des choses physiques est une série inférée de symboles. Ce qui est important est que nous ne pouvons pas la connaître en elle-même, car elle nous est cachée. Nous n'avons que son aspect métrique. Mais nous ne disons pas que la chose est identique à son symbole. Pour autant le symbole n'est pas différent de ce à quoi il fait référence. Cette toile de fond qui est cachée est cette étoffe d'esprit40 (« mind-stuff ») qui possède un aspect métrique que nous nous représentons à l'aide d'un symbole. L'approche épistémologique que fait sienne De Koninck contre Maritain est celle de Sir Arthur Eddington. Il en résulte un désaccord immédiat dès le commencement sur le mode de définir. Or, il nous faut en accepter toutes les conséquences : le symbolisme mathématique, le principe méthodologique de relativité einsteinienne comme l'indéterminisme causal. De Koninck (2008) fait la remarque suivante : The physicist does not cut the world into ontologically defined entities, and he does not envisage his entities as being. The entities dealt with in physics are cuts physically effected. These cuts are not made arbitrarily. There are cuts in the world external to us independent of us. The discontinuity of matter imposes itself. Substances and accidents do not correspond to these discontinuous entities defined by the physical limits of these entities, and this, not because we do not have sufficient means to know them, but because it makes absolutely no sense. Ne pas les accepter c'est faire de la métaphysique en physique, élever la physique au niveau ontologique41. Il n'est pas question de causalité ontologique en physique et non pas pour la raison que donne Maritain : une connaissance incomplète. La causalité ontologique n'a pas de sens physique42 : Causality in philosophy and causality in physics are of a profoundly different nature, as has been sufficiently shown by Prof. Renoirte. Physical causality merely expresses the metrical coherence of phenomena. It is more, I should say, of the nature of formal causality43". (De Koninck, " Thomism and Scientific Indeterminism", ACPA., 1937.) 40 "To put the conclusion crudely the stuff of the world is mind-stuff. As is often the way with crude statements, I shall have to explain that by "mind" I do not here exactly mean mind and by "stuff" I do not at all mean stuff. Still this is about as near as we can get to the idea in a simple phrase. The mind-stuff of the world is, of course, something more general than our individual conscious minds; but we may think of its nature as not altogether foreign to the feelings in our consciousness." (Eddington 1942) 41 "One elevates physics to ontology" (De Koninck, 2008, p.205) 42 Charles de Koninck est on ne peut plus catégorique : "Some scholastics have allied themselves with Einstein and Planck because they think that Eddington's opinion calls into question the metaphysical principle of causality. There is no question of the latter in physics. Once more, this causality is not envisaged in physics, not because our knowledge of phenomena is incomplete, but because it makes no sense there. This is not to say that there is no causality in the world but only that the physicist does not furnish entities that the metaphysician can handle, the latter does not find there matter which would allow him to find in it the relation of causality. The causality of which the physicist speaks is an expression which does not at bottom designate only determinability. The determination it envisages is not necessarily absolute. It is what he finds there". p. 161. 43 Ce rapport à la causalité formelle ne signifie que la mathématisation (dans les formes, les rapports et les proportions) et non une quelconque cause formelle au sens ontologique comme on le trouve, par exemple chez M. Espinoza : « L'idée que j'essaie de rendre plausible est que la cause formelle est celle qui est le mieux renouvelée et mise en valeur par la physique relativiste. Et quel est l'intérêt philosophique de cette thèse ? Il est de montrer que l'interprétation positiviste, phénoméniste ou instrumentaliste de la physique ne s'impose pas, qu'il existe une autre vision de la science et du monde, plus sensible à la valeur explicative de la forme et à la portée ontologique des mathématiques. » (Espinoza 2006) Dans The Problem of determinism , De Koninck écrit : « De la manière dont nous l' avons décrit dans sa formule et dans ses conséquences, il ressort 18 Si la causalité s'applique aux entités physiques dans son sens ontologique, il n'y a pas de métaphysique. Mais parler de physique mathématique c'est reconnaître qu'elle n'est pas métaphysique. La distinction des science de la nature (philosophie et sciences expérimentales de la nature) n'est pas seulement due à notre intelligence ; elle se trouve d'abord du côté des choses mêmes. La physique est nécessairement mathématique. Les entités de la physique ne sont pas des choses (res) mais des aspects du réel ; elles sont un réel aspect métrique d'un monde réel. L'être de raison c'est l'électron chose, mais un électron-aspect-métrique est un aspect réel d'un être réel. Finalement, ce n'est pas la causalité différentielle et spatiotemporelle qui est généralisée, mais la causalité proprement ontologique qui est élargie au domaine physique des réalités spatio-temporelles. Aristote reproche aux platoniciens l'usage abusif de la dialectique dans l'étude du monde physique et l'insuffisance de l'expérience. Le dialecticien définit les choses naturelles par la forme seule ; le philosophe de la nature, par la matière et la forme. Considérons maintenant ce passage d' Eddington (1929) : The relativity theory of physics reduces everything to relations ; that is to say, it is structure, not material, which counts. The structure cannot be built up without material ; but the nature of the material is of no importance. (...) And yet, in regard to the nature of things, this knowledge is only an empty shell-a form of symbols. It is knowledge of structural form, and not knowledge of content. All through the physical world runs that unknown content, which must surely be the stuff of our consciousness. Here is a hint of aspects deep within the world of physics, and yet unattainable by the methods of physics. And, moreover, we have found that where science has progressed the farthest, the mind has but regained from nature that which the mind has put into nature. We have found a strange foot-print on the shores of the unknown. We have devised profound theories, one after another, to account for its origin. At last, we have succeeded in reconstructing the creature that made the foot-print. And Lo! it is our own. (Eddington Space, Time, and Gravitation, Cambridge, 1929, p. 197; pp. 200-201) Assurément, la physique contemporaine et la philosophie se cherchent. Dans "Physics Meets Philosophy at the Planck Scale: Contemporary Theories in Quantum Gravity" (2001), Jeremy Butterfield and Christopher Isham insistent sur l'importance pour le physicien de partir des concepts les plus communs, à savoir l'espace, le temps et la matière : More generally, we are inclined to think that in the search for a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity, a fundamental reappraisal of our standard concepts of space, time, and matter may well be a necessary preliminary. Thus we are skeptical of the widespread idea that at the present stage of quantum gravity research, it is better to try first to construct an internally consistent mathematical model and only then to worry about what it 'means'. But such a reappraisal is fiercely hard to undertake. suffisamment que le principe de causalité physique est loin d'être synonyme de la causalité telle que nous en parlons en philosophie. Il me semble que la causalité dont on pourrait parler à propos des sciences expérimentales en philosophie des sciences ressemble uniquement à la causalité formelle que nous retrouvons d'ailleurs à un état plus pur en mathématiques. Elle n'exprime que la cohérence métrique des phénomènes. Dans l'indéterminisme, cette cohérence n'est pas rigoureuse ; elle tend vers la rigueur et la symétrie d'espacetemps. Non seulement le déterministe la conçoit comme rigoureuse et mathématique, mais encore il la convertit en une espèce de causalité efficiente ; il la substitue à cette causalité qui d'ailleurs ne peut avoir de sens en science expérimentale, pas plus que la causalité finale. » (2009, p. 314) La notion de cause ontologique sans déterminisme n'est pas équivalente à la notion d'un déterminisme causal affranchi de la contrainte de prédictibilité (voir Bois 2010). L'irréversibilité qu'introduit la non-prédictibilité n'a rien à voir avec la causalité ontologique sans déterminisme (contingence de la forme dans la matière). 19 Commencer l'étude de la nature par le mouvement local, par exemple, c'est prendre le risque d'ignorer ce qui est commun à tous les mouvements et d'être conduit à nier leur différences44. De plus, la philosophie de la nature doit aller plus loin dans le sens de la concrétion comme le dit Charles de Koninck : Il suffit d'avoir indiqué que c'est un même élan qui porte le philosophe de la nature, depuis le premier livre des Physiques jusqu'au fait et au pourquoi de la trompe de l'éléphant. Son but ultime n'est-il pas d'aller aux principes et aux causes les plus universels dans l'ordre de la concrétion ? Les théories physiques ne seront qu'une tentative de rejoindre cette fin dans l'ordre de la concrétion. Soit, Ce n'est qu'à travers celles-ci que nous pourrions atteindre la cause dernière en elle-même absolument. (de Koninck 1941) Mais, il y aurait abus de la symbolisation mathématique si la physique était entièrement soustraite à la philosophie de la nature45 ; si la grandeur physique était séparée de (ou confondue avec) l'extériorité homogène. Certes, il est possible de construire des définitions qui ne seraient plus de l'ordre métrique, de déduire tout l'ordre métrique que l'on constate expérimentalement de symboles purement mathématiques (De Koninck cite la théorie de l'électron de Dirac et l'utilisation de la théorie des groupes en physique). Toutefois, la construction symbolique de la nature ne doit pas nous faire oublier, comme le note Eddington (in De Koninck 2009) qu'en vérité : [... ] toutes les recherches scientifiques ont pour point de départ le monde familier et, à la fin, doivent y retourner ; mais la partie du voyage pendant laquelle le physicien en a la charge se trouve en territoire étranger... Malgré nos efforts pour bien prendre notre départ en rejetant les interprétations instinctives ou traditionnelles de l'expérience et en n'admettant que la connaissance qui peut être déduite par des méthodes strictement scientifiques, nous ne pouvons pas rompre complètement avec le conteur familier. Nous posons en principe qu'il faut toujours s'en méfier ; mais nous ne pouvons pas nous passer de lui dans la science. Voici ce que je veux dire : nous équipons quelque expérience délicate de physique avec des galvanomètres, des micromètres, etc., choisis spécialement pour éliminer la faillibilité des perceptions humaines ; mais en fin de compte, c'est à nos perceptions que nous devrons demander le résultat de l' expérience. Même si l' appareil est enregistreur, nous devrons utiliser nos sens pour déchiffrer l'enregistrement. C'est pourquoi, lorsque Heller (2003) fait la remarque suivante46 : "This conclusion is consonant with the traditional pre-Humean notion of causality as linked primarily to agency and not to time-order." 44 "For example, the denial of these differences is implicit in thinkers who believe that the ultimate explanation of whatever there is to be explained in nature will be a mathematical-physical one." (De Koninck 1961, The Unity and Diversity of Natural Science.) 45 Il faudrait ici citer tout l'ouvrage de De Koninck The Hollow Universe (Oxford University Press, London, 1960) XII, 127 pp ; ainsi que son article Random Reflections Random Reflections on Science and Calculation, Laval Théologique et Philosophique 12 (1956) 84-119. 46 Il précise d'ailleurs : "It is truly worthwhile to read old masters from the perspective of the most recent scientific theories! The point is, however, that one should not repeat their doctrines blindly but look at them with an eye sharpened by the enlargements of imagination prompted by the achievements of modern science." 20 il prête à la cosmologie une signification ontologique à laquelle elle ne peut prétendre47. Cette algébrisation de la cosmologie est comme une surnaturalisation de la physique qui ne permet pas d'accorder ensemble philosophie de la nature et cosmologie, causalité ontologique et causalité physique48. Les symboles deviennent des ombres exactement comme dans le conte d'Andersen où le scientifique et son ombre intervertissent leurs rôles. Notre intelligence désire naturellement connaître le fond des choses. Mais, nous cherchons dans la nature physique une intelligibilité qui ne s'y trouve pas. Et ce que l'intelligence ne peut atteindre elle l'objective comme un arrière-fond réel. Ainsi, nous posons dans la nature physique la causalité. Mais, pour pouvoir parler d'un réel physique comme réel causé, il faut dépasser le monde physique en tant que physique et le considérer en tant que réel, c'est-à-dire du point de vue philosophique ou ontologique. Toutefois, ce réel trouvé ne peut être traduit en termes métriques ou physiques. Par conséquent la causalité ontologique doit être exclue de la physique si l'on veut sauvegarder le principe ontologique de causalité. Et celui qui voit dans la causalité physique même généralisée une causalité véritable nie implicitement le principe ontologique de causalité. A moins que cet emploi ne repose sur un usage métaphorique du mot « cause » en science. 47 «L' on pense que les explications scientifiques remplacent la philosophie de la nature et l' on ne s'attache qu'aux notions directement utilisables en théologie. Or, si en astronomie la répulsion cosmique explique suffisamment l'expansion de l' univers, et si la théorie des gênes nous met sur la voie de l' explication des mutations – et il serait ridicule de les dire insuffisantes au point de vue scientifique qui constitue à sa façon un domaine ferme – rien de tout cela ne peut expliquer le simple déplacement d'un point matériel au point de vue ontologique. Et pour ce faire, l' on ne peut pas avoir recours directement aux notions générales de la métaphysique – nous devons trouver des causes appropriées ». (De Koninck, " Le Cosmos", 1936 in De Koninck 2009). 48 Le cosmologue qui se couperait de la connaissance confuse (ce que nous connaissons de la causalité selon l'universel confus) et donc de l'extériorité homogène, parlerait de causalité comme l' aveugle qui croirait connaitre les couleurs parce qu'il sait comment on les mesure. « Celui-ci pourrait sans doute comprendre l'optique qui définit les couleurs par leur angle de réfraction dans un prisme, mais le sensible propre, la couleur qui fait l' objet de la vue, lui serait inconnu. Il connaîtrait un mode quantitatif de la couleur, un sensible commun ; mais la couleur qui fait l' objet propre de la vue n'est pas son mode quantitatif. » (De Koninck, 2009.) 21 3. REMARQUE SUR L'ANGELOLOGIE THOMISTE COMME META-MATHEMATIQUES. Si nous adoptons la position d'Aristote selon laquelle toutes les constructions symboliques sont suffisamment expliquées – si une explication est requise – par la faculté de l' esprit de se considérer lui-même (et je ne vois pas comment cela diffère de l' esprit de Poincaré), nous pouvons nous demander comment tant peut être accompli avec si peu. Cela est encore plus surprenant si nous considérons que les fictions et les constructions sont si pertinentes par rapport à la nature que le professeur Einstein, dans sa Herbert Spencer Lecture, a pu dire : « C'est ma conviction que les pures constructions mathématiques nous permettent de découvrir les concepts, et les lois qui les unifient, qui nous donnent la clef de la compréhension des phénomènes naturels. L' expérience peut bien sur guider nos choix vers des concepts mathématiques plus pratiques ; mais elle ne peut aucunement être leur source ; l'expérience demeure évidemment le seul critère de la légitimité d'une construction mathématique pour la physique, mais le véritable principe créatif se trouve dans les mathématiques ». A quel point Einstein avait raison a été démontré à nouveau par l'utilisation de la théorie des groupes en physique quantique. Voila qui étonne. Qu'est-ce que nos constructions, mentales ou physiques, ont à voir avec les choses naturelles ? Se pourrait-il qu'à la fois nos oeuvres mentales et manuelles et les oeuvres de la Nature aient toutes deux la Raison comme fondement ? (De Koninck, 2009) Cependant, nous ne devons pas non plus oublier l'avertissement d'Einstein, que les constructions mathématiques pures ne peuvent rien nous apprendre du monde de l'expérience ; toute connaissance à propos de la réalité commence par l'expérience et se termine en elle. Les conclusions obtenues par des processus rationnels sont, du moins en ce qui concerne la réalité, entièrement vides. Et c'est aussi ce vide des pures constructions mathématiques qui en fait des outils si efficaces en physique, mais seulement dans la mesure où le monde de la nature peut être appréhendé par ce que de Koninck nomme le « filtre sélectif des constructions symboliques ». Il doit donc être refait à leur propre image49. Comme l'a remarqué Eddington (in De Koninck 2009): Nous avons trouvé une étrange trace de pas sur les rivages de l' inconnu. Nous avons conçu des théories profondes, les unes après les autres, pour expliquer son origine. Enfin, nous avons réussi à reconstruire la créature qui a laisse cette trace. Et voilà !, c'est la notre. Or, si d'une part une physique véritable est nécessairement mathématique, et d'autre part, si la physique mathématique ne divise pas la science naturelle50 , alors la 49 Comme le note De Koninck, l'objet connu par les sciences de la nature est une « réalité cuite », fabriquée. Le physicien manufacture son objet. 50 "Nature is a heterogeneous whole, in the exploring of which various methods must be used. Dissect it as we may, the subject under investigation somehow persists in remaining one. Take, for example, Democritus' 'small world' that is a man: he can be cooked down to his molecules, and even to less, to sheer radiation. But what is the effect of this rendering process? Does it enable us to pronounce that now at last we have got hold of what a man is? It is familiar knowledge that a house is composed of brick, cement, boards, plaster, nails, wire and 22 symbolisation mathématique de la physique, le vide de ses constructions symboliques, ne la soustrait pas de la philosophie de la nature. Nous touchons ici à la question de la portée ontologique des mathématiques contemporaines et aux fondements de leur applicabilité à la nature. La construction symbolique de la nature n'est pas un simple jeu : faudrait-il à la suite de Dedekind, Cantor, Hilbert et Lautman accorder une portée ontologique à la liberté créative en mathématiques ? En effet, selon De Koninck, suivant en cela Poincaré51, le noyau de cette liberté est la capacité réflexive de l'esprit : « la représentation ne l'épuise point »52. Thomas d'Aquin l'explique dans son commentaire sur ce même passage de la Physique : L' intellect peut toujours ajouter à n'importe quelle chose finie... La suite des nombres apparaît comme étant infinie, car l' intellect, en ajoutant une unité à n'importe quel nombre, produit une autre espèce. Et pour la même raison il semble que les grandeurs mathématiques, qui existent dans l' imagination, sont infinies, car peu importe quelle grandeur est donnée, nous pouvons toujours en imaginer une plus grande. Pour la même raison, tous ont tendance à croire que l' espace au-delà des cieux est infini. La représentation ne l'épuise point ; l'esprit est ouvert sur des possibilité infinies qu'il déploie par itération. De Koninck montre dans deux articles53 l'excellence de cette méthode, voire même sa nécessité. Notre connaissance intellectuelle des êtres matérielles est limitée car elle est abstractive ; elle est originativement et résolutivement empirique. Mais, l'intelligence est naturellement habitée par une tendance à voir les natures comme limites les unes des autres. Par exemple, en mathématiques, elle cherche à définir le point, la ligne, la surface, le volume, comme limites de telle sorte que nous procédons comme si ces éléments s'engendraient les uns des autres. pipe. But does this knowledge ever impel us to think or state that a house simply is brick, cement, boards, plaster, and so forth? The difference between a heap of building materials and a house is plain enough. Surely there is an even greater difference between a heap of molecules or atoms and a man. The truth is that, by the sciences of nature, we should not mean physics and biology (including psychology) only, as these are now understood. Professor Pascual Jordan seems aware of this when (in Physics of the 20th Century) he regrets that 'The increasing independence of natural scientific branches from philosophy from Aristotle's time to the present has simultaneously also emptied philosophy of its original content and problems.' For whatever may be the tactics of this or that science of nature, it remains true that all should converge upon the single, though infinitely varied, whole which is their subject. Now, to hold this general objective steadily in view, and in its light, to pass judgment on the conclusions of specialized branches of research, is the business of natural philosophy which should be the concern of each and every scientist. The fatal consequences of abandoning all thought of the subject as a whole, to become absorbed and lost in independent investigation of single aspects of it, is illustrated everywhere. The absence of coordination between the sciences, the failure of each to reflect constantly upon the scope and significance of the others, have brought all to a state of hollowness and shapelessness like the grin without the cat or the cat without an outline." (De Koninck 1960 , in The Hollow Universe) 51 Poincaré dans La science et l'hypothèse écrit : « Pourquoi donc ce jugement s'impose-t-il à nous avec une irrésistible évidence ? C'est qu'il n'est que l' affirmation de la puissance de l' esprit qui se sait capable de concevoir la répétition indéfinie d'un même acte dès que cet acte est une fois possible. L' esprit a de cette puissance une intuition directe et l' expérience ne peut être pour lui qu'une occasion de s'en servir et par là d'en prendre conscience. » 52 Aristote, Physic., III, 4, 203b15-25, trad. Française H. Carteron, Belles Lettres, Paris, 1973, p. 97. 53 A savoir : La dialectique des limites comme critique de la raison, en 1945 et l'article Concept, Process and Reality, en 1946. 23 Nous définissons le cercle comme la limite d'un polygone régulier inscrit dont les côtés croissent indéfiniment en nombre. Nous tentons ainsi de voir le cercle, quant à cela même qui le distingue du polygone, par le moyen de la similitude intelligible du polygone. (De Koninck, 1945) Elle cherche ainsi à contourner sa structure divisive ; à surmonter la multiplicité de ses moyens de connaître54. S' il faut distinguer entre la définition ou l'interprétation d'un mot et la définition de ce que le mot signifie distinctement (au sens où, par exemple, connaître ce que le mot « cause » signifie ne demande pas de pouvoir définir distinctement ce qu'est une cause), c'est en raison des limitations provenant de notre manière à nous de connaître. La science naturelle suit un certain ordre de détermination : La marche naturelle, c'est d'aller des choses les plus connaissables pour nous et les plus claires pour nous à celles qui sont plus claires en soi et plus connaissables ; car ce ne sont pas les mêmes choses qui sont connaissables pour nous et absolument. C'est pourquoi il faut procéder ainsi : partir des choses moins claires en soi, plus claires pour nous, pour aller vers les choses plus claires en soi et plus connaissables. Or, ce qui, pour nous, est d'abord manifeste et clair, ce sont les ensembles les plus mêlés ; c'est seulement ensuite que, de cette indistinction, les éléments et les principes se dégagent et se font connaître par voie d'analyse. C'est pourquoi il faut aller des choses générales aux particulières ; car le tout est plus connaissable selon la sensation, et le général est une sorte de tout : il enferme une pluralité qui constitue comme ses parties. (Aristote, II Physic., c. 1, 184a1525. Cité par De Koninck 2009) Cet ordre de détermination ou processus in determinando55 assure l'unité56 de la science naturelle qui se divise et s'ordonne en ses divers modes de définir et moyens 54 On trouve chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin l'idée selon laquelle la science n'est pas strictement identique à son mode de définir. « Ad secundum dicendum, quod modus iste cognoscendi non est essentialis scientiae ex parte sui, sed ex parte subiecti, cui secundum statum viae talis modus intelligendi competit. Hoc autem per se solum essentiale est scientiae secundum seipsam, ut per eam scibilia cognoscantur. Et ideo quando variatur status subiecti, variatur modus intelligendi, non tamen habitus scientiae ». Thomas d'Aquin, De veritate, q. 20 a. 3 ad 2. 55 « Le processus in determinando, c'est l' ordre que nous suivons dans la considération des différents sujets et principes d'une science selon qu'ils sont plus connus de nous. Or, ce qui est le plus connu de nous et plus certain, c'est le confus. C'est ainsi qu'on s'aperçoit d'abord que cet objet est une figure, qu'il est une courbe fermée, et enfin qu'il est une ellipse. De même, l'homme est connu d'abord comme animal. Nous trouvons cet ordre, tant dans la connaissance intellectuelle que dans la connaissance sensible. Tant que nous connaissons l' ellipse seulement comme figure ou comme courbe fermée, nous ne la distinguons pas des autres espèces de figures, ou de courbes fermées ; tant que l'homme n'est pas connu dans ce qui le distingue de la brute, notre connaissance est confuse. Or, ce confus est aussi plus commun, plus universel : car le polygone est également une figure, le cercle une courbe fermée, et le cheval un animal. Aussi, dans la science, nous considérons les choses suivant ce qui, en elles, est d'abord plus connu, pour aller ainsi par degrés vers ce qui est plus connaissable en soi ; car, manifestement, homme est plus connaissable en soi qu'animal ; étant animal et raisonnable, il est plus distinct, plus en acte et partant plus connaissable en soi. Nous avançons donc de sujet en sujet suivant cet ordre de communauté. » (De Koninck, 2009, pp. 176-177) 56 « L' unité de cette fin ne sera pas rompue par la diversité des moyens à employer, c'est au contraire une même fin qui les commande, pourvu qu'ils permettent de mieux connaître. Même l' usage d mathématiques dans lequel le physicien se subalterne au mathématicien afin de connaître les choses dans leur aspect quantitatif et au moyen de cet aspect qui se présente d'abord dans les sensibles communs – nombre, grandeur, figure, mouvement, temps, situs, lieu, lesquels se ramènent tous à la quantité – ne divise radicalement la doctrine naturelle. Car, bien que le sujet des sciences physico-mathématiques – tel le composé de ligne et de sensible – soit un selon la raison seulement, bien que ces sciences soient formellement mathématiques en tant qu'elles empruntent leurs principes propres aux mathématiques, et que par conséquent leurs raisonnements soient à la fois hypothétiques et procèdent par la seule forme, ces sciences principalement naturelles puisqu'elles se terminent aux choses naturelles qu'elles ont pour but de faire mieux connaître. » (De Koninck, 24 de connaître selon que nous allons par degrés vers la spécificité des objets, vers leur distinction ultime, leur concrétion 57 . L'intelligence cherche ainsi à se libérer de l'indétermination de l'universel ; de cette connaissance vague et confuse, de ce qui est le plus connu de nous pour aller vers le plus connaissable en soi. Voici donc un premier aspect de l'unité. La physique-mathématique, bien qu'elle soit formellement mathématique, n'est qu'une extension de la philosophie de la nature a) en tant qu'elle répond au même désir de connaître les êtres naturels, b) en tant qu'elle reste matériellement et principalement naturelle, c) en tant que la philosophie de la nature est comme une sagesse par rapport à ces connaissances. Mais, l'intelligence ne peut-elle pas aussi tenter de surmonter la multiplicité de ses moyens de connaître par l'usage de l'infini purement rationnel de la méthode des limites58 ? Autrement dit, l'intelligence va s'efforcer de réduire à l'unité la diversité des objets qui diffèrent par définition, de telle sorte que l'ontologique et le physique convergent. C'est ainsi que nous pourrions en quelque sorte faire surgir le physique d'une dégradation d'ontologique ou convertir le physique à l'ontologique. Comment l'interpolation de l'infini peut elle servir la raison dans sa tendance vers une plus parfaite rationalisation – vers l'intellectus ? C'est que la raison peut en user pour essayer de remplir les écarts, de faire dense la distance qui sépare les concepts. Grâce à cette densité (qui n'est jamais donnée qu'en puissance, qui n'est jamais actuelle) l'intelligence tente de passer d'un objet à l'autre sans changer de concept ; elle essaie de voir le divers dans le même. Elle s'efforce de passer de un à deux en interpolant toutes les séries convergentes qu'elle y peut concevoir ; elle tend ainsi vers une parfaite continuité de un à deux, vers ce « continuum cujus partes ad unum terminum communem copulantur ». Mais, si cette tentative pouvait aboutir, l'intelligence se heurterait à la contradiction : à l'identité de un et de deux ; ou encore, elle aurait converti l'hétérogénéité rationnelle des natures à l'homogénéité irrationnelle du continu. (De Koninck, 1945) Il faut chercher le sens de cette tentative non dans son aboutissement (impossible, car il y aurait contradiction, purement et simplement ; le mode dialectique ne sort pas des limites de l'objet physique) mais dans son échec même : dans son mouvement vers une limite, notre intelligence tend vers l'universalité des intelligences séparées. Elle s'efforce de se rendre semblable, autant que possible, à l'intellect déiforme de la substance séparée, voire, d'imiter à sa façon la Sagesse suprême qui, dans une espèce intelligible unique, contient la plénitude de toute connaissance intellectuelle. (de Koninck, 1945) La tendance à connaître, autant qu'il est humainement possible, la Sagesse première, oblige le physicien à faire usage de ce mode dialectique, platonicien de connaître. La méthode de M. Heller (2003) qui consiste à élever la causalité physique in Les sciences expérimentales sont-elles distinctes de la philosophie de la nature ?, Culture, vol. 2, no 4, 1941, p. 465-476.) 57 « Dans les choses naturelles, dit saint Thomas, rien n'est parfait aussi longtemps qu'il est en puissance ; une chose est absolument parfaite quand elle est en acte ultime ; dans l'état intermédiaire entre la puissance pure et l' acte pur, elle n'est pas absolument parfaite, mais relativement. Il en va de même pour la science. Or, la science que l' on a d'une chose en général seulement n'est pas une science complète selon l' acte ultime ; elle est quelque chose d'intermédiaire entre la puissance pure et l' acte ultime. Car celui qui sait une chose en général connaît d'une manière actuelle quelque chose de ce qui est la raison propre de cette chose, mais le reste, il ne le connaît qu'en puissance. Ainsi, celui qui ne connaît l'homme que selon qu'il est animal ne connaît en acte qu'une partie de sa définition, savoir le genre ; les différences constitutives de l' espèce, il ne les connaît pas encore en acte, mais seulement en puissance. D'où il suit manifestement que la science complète exige qu'on ne s'arrête pas aux généralités, mais qu'on procède jusqu'aux espèces... » Thomas d'Aquin, Comm. in I Meteorologicorum, lect. 1, n. 1. 58 De Koninck utilise l'expression de mode platonicien de connaître (De Koninck 1945). 25 en cosmologie à son niveau ontologique, est-elle, finalement, autre chose que ce mode dialectique, platonicien de connaître, « abusivement porté à sa limite » ? Par conséquent, l'étonnante fécondité des mathématiques en physique n'est pas tant à justifier du côté de la causalité formelle : les mathématiques comme formes constitutives 59 , mais dans ce processus rationnel 60 , ce mode platonicien quasi intellectualiter 61 de connaître. La raison de cette efficacité est donc d'ordre métaphysique. Tout cela ne vaut pas dire qu'il faut faire de la Métaphysique en Philosophie de la Nature. La Nature dans une certaine mesure, est explicatrice d'elle-même ; mais c'est pour expliquer son ensemble qu'on fait appel à la Métaphysique. La Philosophie de la Nature peut expliquer elle-même ce dont il s'agit dans la Philosophie de la Nature, mais elle ne peut expliquer elle-même dans son ensemble.62 De Koninck (1936) suggère de considérer les anges comme penchés sur le Cosmos, comme s'amusant avec les nébuleuses.63 Autrement dit, il propose de déduire le monde cosmologique du monde métaphysique. Cette déduction est certes purement théorique car elle consiste à lier ensemble, et après coup, ces deux mondes déjà connus. Elle repose sur un double courant, à la fois ascendant et descendant, à savoir le premier qui est dû à notre structure logique et le second qui est dans les choses. La nature pose l'Absolu dont dépend la nature. La thèse de De Koninck est que l'intelligibilité des mathématiques comporte une référence oblique, toujours positive, à un univers réel transcendant le cosmos ; l'univers des substances séparées64.  Les mathématiques sont dérivées par rapport aux esprits purs, qui constituent un système métamathématique qui nous fait songer aux archétypes de Platon, non en tant que nombre cependant ;  Les mathématiques pures reconstruisent de l'unité, tandis que l'unité des esprits purs est achevé. Les esprits purs réalisent de façon transcendante l'idéal du mathématicien. Et dans la mesure où les mathématiques reconstruisent de l'unité, dans cette mesure les esprits purs réalisent l'idéal des mathématiques. C'est en cela qu'il faut voir la tendance réaliste des mathématiques et leur supériorité vis-à-vis de la cosmologie. 59 Les sciences physico-mathématiques démontrent par la seule cause : « De la manière dont nous l' avons décrit dans sa formule et dans ses conséquences, il ressort suffisamment que le principe de causalité physique est loin d'être synonyme de la causalité telle que nous en parlons en philosophie. Il me semble que la causalité dont on pourrait parler à propos des sciences expérimentales en philosophie des sciences ressemble uniquement à la causalité formelle que nous retrouvons d'ailleurs à un état plus pur en mathématiques. Elle n'exprime que la cohérence métrique des phénomènes. » De Koninck 1937 « Le problème de l' indéterminisme » Rapport de la sixième session de l'académie canadienne Saint-Thomas-d'Aquin 1935, L' action sociale catholique, 1937, p. 65-159. Il renvoie à Thomas d'Aquin Comm. in I Post. Anal., lect. 25, n. 4. 60 Selon A. N. Whitehead, la physique moderne a substitué la notion de « forms of process » à la notion aristotélicienne de « procession of forms ». D'où la Remarque : « The fashionable notion that the new physics has reduced all physical laws to the statement of geometrical relations is quite ridiculous". Alfred North Whitehead. "Forms of Process." Lecture Five in Modes of Thought. New York: Macmillan (1938): 117142. 61 Par mode intellectualiter, il faut entendre le mode de procéder de la métaphysique tel que Thomas d'Aquin l'expose dans son commentaire Super Boetium de Trinitate, q. VI, a. 1) 62 De Koninck, Biologie Philosophique, notes de cours de Eugène Badin, 1935-1936 63 De Koninck, Biologie Philosophique, notes de cours de Eugène Badin, 1935-1936 64 Voir le travail de Tiziana Suarez-Nani sur la fonction cosmologique des substances séparées à la fin du XIII e siècle, Les anges et la philosophie, Vrin, 2002. 26  Elles sont d'un ordre de logique pure qui se tient du côté du préter-naturel. Les spéculations dans ce domaine, i.e. sur la structure de l'univers spirituel, pourront nous faire mieux comprendre la fécondité des mathématiques en sciences expérimentales65. Ainsi, les substances séparées agissent dans le monde cosmologique. Or les mathématiques dérivent des substances séparées. D'où leur étonnante fécondité en physique. Concluons avec De Koninck (1935): Le conflit autour de la relativité renferme une morale et pour le philosophe et pour le physicien. Il a montré combien il est difficile de bien savoir de quoi l'on parle. Que le premier aussi bien que le second ne présume pas savoir tout ce qu'ils prétendent savoir. Cette théorie a également démontré que notre connaissance de l'univers est beaucoup moins pénétrante que nous ne le pensions ou encore que l'univers est beaucoup plus profond que nous ne le pensions. Nous érigeons si facilement les évidences sensibles en évidences intelligibles. La connaissance scientifique constitue avant tout une précision de notre ignorance. C'est par la conscience vécue de notre insondable ignorance – car Dieu seul sait combien nous ne savons pas – que nous participons au règne des intelligences.66 65 De Koninck, Biologie Philosophique, notes de cours de Eugène Badin, 1935-1936 66 De Koninck, Conférence manuscrite sur la relativité einsteinienne, 1935 27 POST-REMARQUE Il faut souligner qu'il existe, selon Thomas d'Aquin 67 , une toute première connaissance de Dieu, une connaissance confuse, à laquelle tout homme peut facilement parvenir sans avoir nullement besoin du recours de la science et de la philosophie : L'homme peut d'emblée (statim) parvenir par la raison naturelle à une certaine connaissance de Dieu. Voyant que le cours des choses naturelles obéit à un certain ordre déterminé, et que tout ordre présuppose un certain ordonnateur, les hommes, en général, perçoivent qu'il existe un certain ordonnateur au principe des choses qu'ils voient. C'est donc la saisie de l'ordre de l'univers par l'expérience la plus commune et familière qui sert de principe et de fondement permanent à toute connaissance de Dieu. Le mot « Dieu » peut servir de principe à connaissance naturelle de Dieu pour autant qu'il se trouve lui-même antérieurement connu par la raison. Le mot « Dieu » pris en sa signification commune se trouve cependant formé à partir de cette première connaissance que nous avons de l'ordre manifeste des choses sensibles. Il en est de même pour le mot « cause ». Et, le point crucial est que le sens technique ne devrait jamais être séparé de sa conception commune, ni lui être substitué. 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*Forthcoming in the Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, Ed. D. Brown & F. Macpherson, London: Routledge* Cognitive penetration and the perception of colour Dustin Stokes University of Utah [email protected] Consider two observations. First, we see-visually experience-colours. Second, our thoughts influence how we perceive the world. At face value, it may seem that there is little to resist here; both observations seem to capture intuitive features of human mental life. But face value has little purchase in all but a few quarters of philosophical theorizing. The first observation, once disambiguated and made precise, engages more or less immediately, controversy concerning the reality of colours, the (non-)relational nature of perceptual experience, and perceptual phenomenology, among many other topics discussed in this very volume. And if 'perceive' in the second observation is disambiguated so as to concern conscious perceptual experience (in this case, visual appearances), then once again, controversy abounds. Indeed, one standard line in cognitive scientific and philosophical theorizing has it that one's beliefs, desires, intentions and so on are certainly influenced by visual experience, but they do not influence visual experience itself. At the very least, there is a live debate concerning this possible phenomenon or phenomena. That debate concerns whether visual experience, and perceptual experience more generally, is cognitively penetrable. This chapter focuses on this possible phenomenon, with an emphasis on visual experience of colour, thus offering an analysis that brings together the two observations above. §I offers a brief introduction to the notion of cognitive penetrability. §II focuses on relevant empirical research and its interpretation. §III further identifies the special importance of alleged cases of the cognitive penetration of colour vision. I. Cognitive penetration and its general importance 1 The term 'cognitively penetrable' originated with the work of Zenon Pylyshyn (1980; 1984; 1999). Pylyshyn works from within a computationalist framework of the mind, and so was motivated to distinguish parts of mental life that require, for their explanation, the attribution of rules and representation from those that do not. Pylyshyn argues that things like beliefs and inferences fall in the former category, and perceptual processes in the latter. Much debate has ensued, however, on how 'cognitive penetrability' should be defined so as to secure the distinction Pylyshyn and other computationalists have sought. Pylyshyn ultimately settled on the characterization found in the now often-cited passage, "[I]f a system is cognitively penetrable, then the function it computes is sensitive, in a semantically coherent way, to the organism's goals and beliefs, that is, it can be altered in a way that bears some logical relation to what the person knows" (Pylyshyn 1999: 343). Although this falls short of a definition (providing only a necessary condition for a state or process being cognitively penetrable), one can glean from it important lessons. First, the importance of a 'semantic criterion' is that it ensures that cognitive penetration is no mere causal relation running from, say, a belief to perception. Instead, it is a causal relation where, on one interpretation, the content of the penetrating cognitive state stands in an inferencesupporting relation with the content of the resultant perceptual state. Compare: if we simply said that cognitive penetration is any instance where one's cognitive states causally influence one's perceptual states, then any time my beliefs, say, direct where I look, or what I listen to or touch, then my visual or auditory or tactile experiences are thereby cognitively penetrated. This would render cognitive penetration a trivially common phenomenon. 1 Others have attempted to capture the non-trivial nature of the possible phenomenon, but without any commitment to a semantic or inference-supporting relation. For example, Siegel (2012) characterizes the phenomenon in terms of contrasting perceivers: Macpherson 2012 makes clear this virtue of Pylyshyn's semantic criterion. 1 2 Cognitive Penetrability (second pass): If visual experience is cognitively penetrable, then it is nomologically possible for two subjects (or for one subject in different counterfactual circumstances, or at different times) to have visual experiences with different contents while seeing and attending to the same distal stimuli under the same external conditions, as a result of differences in other cognitive (including affective) states. (Siegel 2012: 205-6). This shares the motivation for the semantic criterion but without commitment to that very criterion: cognitive penetration of vision is a phenomenon where, as Macpherson 2012 puts it, holding fixed the viewing conditions, attentional focus, and sensory organs, two subjects have distinct perceptual experiences. Another similarly motivated definition maintains that instances of cognitively 2 penetrated experience are ones where the causal link between background cognitive state and resultant experience is "internal and mental" (Stokes 2013; see also 2012). All of these characterizations share the motivation that cognitive penetration is a non-trivial phenomenon, and not one that results (in any straightforward way) from change in environmental circumstances, or simple bodily actions, or shifts in attention (looking or listening in the ways that one wants, believes relevant, and so on). So while Pylyshyn is right to distinguish cognitive penetrability as a non-trivial cognitive-perceptual relation, the need for the semantic criterion remains a point of debate. Another clarification is gleaned from comparing Pylyshyn's characterization from those offered just above. Pylyshyn's emphasis is, usually explicitly, on whether goals, beliefs, and other cognitive processes can influence perceptual processing. This comports with the research agenda of other computationalists like Jerry Fodor, who maintain that some parts of mental architecture are modular, operating independently of beliefs, goals, and so on (Fodor 1983). Modularists of this strength maintain that modular systems-Fodor takes visual "input systems" to be of this sort-are therefore informationally encapsulated with respect to cognitive processes. By contrast, one might note that all the theorists in the previous paragraph emphasize cognitive effects on perceptual experience. There are good reason for this. First, a philosophy of perception concerns, first and foremost, Distinct in some type: in content, in qualitative character, or both. And to be clear, Macpherson 2012 does seem to 2 endorse Pylyshyn's semantic criterion, in spite of being presented here alongside theorists who do not. 3 person-level conscious perceptual experiences, not the mere computational mechanisms that cause or subvene those experiences. Second, and related, a central area of concern for philosophers of perception is epistemological, most basically, whether and how perception provides knowledge about one's environment. And, by the standards of just about any epistemological theory, the perceptual things that do (or do not) provide knowledge or epistemic warrant or reason for belief, are person-level experiences: what the subject sees, hears, and otherwise experiences in a first-person accessible way. 3 It is worth noting that although the modularists focus on processing, they too are interested in person-level experiences, and for the reasons just given. Part of Fodor's motivation for positing informationally encapsulated (and thus cognitively impenetrable) visual input systems is that those systems should (and apparently do) provide fast and objective information about the creature's environment, such that the creature "can detect what is right here, right now-what is available, for example, for eating or being eaten by" (Fodor 1985: 4). Now of course for some very simple creatures, this kind of detection could be entirely automatic and dumb, with nothing answering to "personal" or "conscious". But Fodor is perfectly clear that at least for creatures like us, perception must function less like a true reflex and more like a filter. This is due to the remarkable variability in proximal stimuli-in vision, the array of light wave reception on the retina-by contrast to the largely stable distal stimuli-the object/s or event/s reflecting those light waves. And what an organism needs so that it doesn't get eaten, as Fodor is fond of putting it, is to know what of the variability in proximal stimulus accurately corresponds to variation (or stability) in the distal environment. After all, tigers can eat you, rod and cone stimulation cannot. Thus "the function of perception...is to propose to thought a representation of the world from which such irrelevant There are of course tricky cases, like those involving agnosic patients who can successfully manipulate objects in the 3 visual environment, but who appear unable to report visually detectable features of those same objects (their shapes, colours, or kind). Such patients act upon these objects reliably and so, some epistemic externalists might say, know that the object is in such-and-such position, or in motion, and so on. Other theorists, for example mentalistic internalists, might deny the knowledge attribution since the agnosic cannot report on those features (even if some of those features are clearly represented somewhere in the sub-personal cognitive system). But this case is non-standard. 4 variability has been effectively filtered" (4). Accordingly, perception here is understood at the level of experience: the kinds of states that are "proposed" to higher level-thought for consideration and further decision making. Accordingly, 'perception' will be assumed to denote perceptual experience in the remainder of this chapter. It should by now be clear that much of the cognitive penetration debate concerns just what such a phenomenon is or would be. Accordingly, there are reasons to be cautious about committing to any extant definition here. Instead, the following rough characterization will do. Cognitive penetration of perception involves, at least, a cognitive effect on conscious perceptual experience, where this effect is non-trivially direct, and the effect on perception involves a phenomenal difference (put in Siegel's counterfactual terms, a difference that would not be there absent the relevant background cognitive state). This (relevant) effect is not one on post-perceptual judgment or memory, and is not the result of active bodily movements or acts of attention. 4 Finally, it should be emphasized that the question about cognitive penetration of perception is an empirical one. Theorists are asking whether, in human beings, cognition penetrates perceptual experience and, if so, with what frequency. The consequences that would follow are then theoreticalscientific and epistemological. There is little interesting metaphysics to be done here. There are possible worlds where creatures much like us engage in rampant wishful seeing, or regularly perceive in ways infected by their theories. Put another way, there seems to be nothing in the concept of sense perception that precludes its compatibility with cognitive penetration. Accordingly, the discussion that follows concerns relevant empirical research on colour perception (§II), followed by an emphasis on the epistemic importance of this research (§III). Stokes (2016) argues that securing a definition for a (single) phenomenon called 'cognitive penetration' is less 4 important, theoretically, than its supposed consequences. An alternative methodological approach is then to characterize the phenomenon in terms of the consequences that were and are of interest to parties on both sides of the debate. The three standard consequences concern: modularity theories of mind, the theory-ladenness of scientific observation, and the knowledge-providing role of perception. These are discussed in §III. 5 II. Alleged cases of cognitive penetration of colour perception Like many other organisms, human visual systems acquire information about the light reflectance wavelengths given by their environments. Processing of this information gives rise to (or just is) conscious colour experience (this is true whether one is a colour realist or sceptic). And further, we abstract information on the basis of that and related experience. We learn that certain kinds of natural and artefactual things are typically coloured in one way or another. So, we acquire colour concepts, and explanation of this acquisition may take many forms. Perhaps we first learn to group a kind of thing-say tomatoes-and then abstract a feature that they all share-being red. Or perhaps we first learn to distinguish red things from non-red things by simple identification of sameness and difference relations, and then identify the distinctive kinds among them-this red thing is a tomato, this red thing is a stop sign, and so on. In any case, at some point we learn what redness is and this learning has a perceptual basis. We also form beliefs, a type of thought of which concepts are constituents (or so many theorists think anyway). So we have beliefs-evidenced by dispositions to act in certain ways and make particular verbal reports about what is true-that tomatoes and stop signs are red, bananas are yellow, and so on. Thus we have (constituents of) cognitive states concerning visibly perceptible features of the world. A number of experiments, both old and recent, exploit the relation between colour-related cognitive representations and colour experience. II.1 Some cases A case recently revived in philosophical discussion is Delk and Fillenbaum's 1965 study involving (in the experimental condition) items of characteristic colours and (in the control condition) items of a kind that have no characteristic colour. In both conditions, the task was an online matching task (this term is clarified below), where subjects were instructed to colour-match cutouts of various shapes, all of them cut from a uniformly orange piece of paper (e.g. a love-heart shape, which is characteristically red, or an oval which has no characteristic colour), to a background 6 that could be adjusted from various shades from yellow to orange to red. In the experimental conditions, subjects matched the cutout shape (when of a characteristically red item like a loveheart) to a significantly more red background than in the control condition (where the control condition cutouts, again, were of kinds not characteristically one colour or other). On the face of it, and so Macpherson 2012 argues, this is an instance where beliefs about red-coloured kinds (loveheart shapes, apples, human lip shapes) influence visual experience such that the relevant perceptual stimuli are experienced as more red than they in fact are. It is a plausible case where beliefs about kinds or kind-concepts influence, in a non-trivial and relatively direct way, phenomenal colour experience. If this is its proper explanation, it would be a case of cognitively penetrated colour perception. But as Macpherson notes, the results of this experiment underdetermine the choice of explanation: it may be cognitive penetration, or it may be a case where repeated exposure to a kind results in heightened visual sensitivity, that is, a case of perceptual learning. 5 In a much more recent series of studies, experimenters again explored the way that cognitive representations of objects with "high colour diagnosticity" may influence current perceptual colour experience. In Hansen et al 2006, subjects were presented, on a computer monitor, with digital images of fruits/vegetables, in their typical colour. The task was to adjust the image, in real-time, to (subject-specific) achromatic grey. For these images, by contrast with the control task involving 6 uniformly coloured discs, subjects adjust the image past achromatic grey and into the opponent hue range while reporting that it is grey (e.g. adjusting a banana image into the opponent blue range). By hypothesis, the subjects must then make a typically yellow object more blue (objectively) in order to see it as achromatic grey. As the researchers quantify it, this "memory colour effect" ranges from 3 to 5 times the threshold for discrimination. In the first followup study, Olkonnen et al 2008 found Macpherson goes on to argue that the Levin and Banaji (2006) studies, discussed below, provide better candidate 5 evidence for genuine cognitive penetration. There are individual differences in how people see (or judge) perfectly achromatic grey. Accordingly, in a preliminary 6 norming study, experimenters determine the "perfect grey" for each participating subject. 7 the effect more pronounced for images natural in appearance (with texture, appearance of depth, etc) and statistically weak for mere fruit/vegetable outlines (more on the importance of this difference below). In the most recent followup study, Witzel et al 2011 performed roughly the same set of procedures, but this time with images of human-made objects of high colour diagnosticity. The results were similar: they found memory colour effects for images of the Red Coca-Cola icon, the blue Smurf, green ping-pong table, and several others. In controls, no effects were found for images of colour-variant kinds (e.g. socks) or typically achromatic kinds (e.g. golf balls). In each of 7 these experiments, the subjects made online adjustments, attempting to make a match between the target object and background. So, although there are reasons for doubt, these effects are plausibly explained as instances of cognitive penetration: background cognitive states (say beliefs about the colours of natural and artefactual kinds) influence perceptual experience such that, in these cases, subjects are making errors. One final study that has received philosophical discussion is Levin and Banaji 2006. In this study, researchers explored the way that race categories (or, if one likes, beliefs about features of race) might influence perception. Here again there are numerous iterations and complexities of the research, but the basic thrust can be captured by a brief description of what Levin and Banaji call Experiment 2. All conditions involve presentation of realistic, 2D male human face images, presented in precisely the same shade of grey. Here researchers first create a racially ambiguous face by morphing the image of a prototypical black male face with an image of a prototypical white male face; they then confirm the racial ambiguity with a preliminary controlled experiment. Subjects are then presented with an instruction screen involving both the racially ambiguous face and an unambiguously black face or an unambiguously white face, where the latter would be labelled This is only a rough summary, skirting over the many complexities of details of each of these experiments. For detailed 7 analysis of the Delk and Fillenbaum, see Macpherson 2012 and Zeimbekis 2013. For detailed discussion of the Hansen et al 2006 and the Witzel et al 2011, see Stokes and Bergeron (2015). And for discussion of Olkennen et al 2008, see Deroy 2013. 8 accurately as 'BLACK' or 'WHITE' respectively, and the former labeled oppositely (thus for example: the ambiguous face would be labeled 'BLACK' and an unambiguous face white face would be labeled 'WHITE'). A subject is then then presented with one of the same instruction phase faces adjacent to an adjustable greyscale rectangle. The task is to adjust the rectangle to match the target face in luminance. In all conditions, the reports co-vary significantly with the semantic label given on the instruction screen. Perhaps the most striking result is this: the very same ambiguous face results in an adjustment that is .465 levels darker (than the objective luminance of the face) when labelled 'BLACK' and 15.95 levels lighter when labelled 'WHITE'. A change in label appears to affect racial 8 classification (a cognitive process) which in turn affects basic lightness perception. This looks like a plausible instance where higher-level mental states (beliefs or concepts about race) directly influence visual experience. And in this case, there could be consequences for moral philosophy and psychology. 9 Differences aside, there are important features common to all of these studies. First, the task performance is "online", where subjects are asked to make a report on the basis of current perceptual experience (by contrast to post-perceptual memory reports). Second, the report method is non-verbal, typically involving some kind of matching task. Finally, colour is a basic phenomenal feature of visual perception if any feature is (by contrast to the high-level contents that some argue are admissible contents of experience). These features prove important for the theorist of cognitive penetration in defending against the critical, alternative explanations discussed below. II.2 Critics and discussion Because cognitive penetration is supposed to be a two-part relation between cognition and perception, challenges to any alleged case may take three basic forms: one for each relatum and one Levin and Banaji used a computer monitor with 265 greyscale measures8 See Siegel 2012; Macpherson 2012; Stokes and Bergeron (2015) for discussion. See Firestone and Scholl 2016 for 9 criticism. See Payne (2001) and Payne et al. (2005) for related work on race and shape perception and kind-identification. 9 for the relation itself. First, one may argue that the penetrating state or process is not in fact cognitive (or that there is no relevant antecedent relatum). Second, one may argue that the apparent effect is not in fact one on perceptual experience. Finally, one may argue that the relation between cognition and perception is mediated such that the phenomenon is not of the type of interest. All forms of challenge to alleged cases have been made in extant literature but have a harder time sticking to cases involving colour perception. The most common example of the third type of challenge is what has been dubbed the attention-shift interpretation (see Macpherson 2012; Stokes 2012). Fodor articulates this reply to alleged cases in a number of places. In reply to theorists like Hanson (1958; 1969) and Churchland (1979; 1988), Fodor argues that some perceptual stimuli can be changed, so to speak, by the subject depending upon her beliefs and goals. So for example, once one "knows the trick", one can shift one's focus of attention from certain parts of the ambiguous duck-rabbit image to other parts and thereby "flip" from seeing the image as a duck to seeing it as a rabbit. This flipping may well be a 10 change in visual phenomenology, and one dependent upon knowledge and goals concerning the duck-rabbit image, but it is mediated by an agent-driven act of attention. Accordingly, Fodor suggests, if this is supposed to be cognitive penetration, then the phenomenon is relevantly trivial. 11 Suppose Fodor is right about this kind of case. Notice, however, that it involves not just basic shape perception, but visually perceiving an image as falling under one category or other. The 12 colour cases discussed in II.1 are importantly different, involving more basic colour perception. In these cases, there is no obvious place where active shifts in attention would affect changes in colour See http://www.illusionsindex.org/i/duck-rabbit 10 Trivial how? Well, for example, these common phenomena would not impugn the modularity of perception nor its role 11 in providing knowledge. The attention-shift interpretation has been recently challenged by Mole 2016; Wu 2017; Stokes, forthcoming. As discussed below, philosophers debate whether this kind of seeing as (or, related but distinct, seeing that) is after all a 12 perceptual phenomenon rather than a post-perceptual judgment or belief. Put in related terms, philosophers debate whether perception can represent a high-level property like 'being a rabbit' at all. But ignore this complication for the present discussion. 10 perception, and for at least two reasons. Looking harder or more carefully at some sub-section of the visual field (say at the right side of Delk and Fillenbaum's love-heart cutout) will not yield the result that that portion (or the entire field) looks differently coloured, say more red. Second, and related, there is no compelling reason to think that the experimental procedures would encourage this shift in attention. Here the contrast with the duck-rabbit is apt: one way to teach a newcomer to "see" the rabbit and then "see" the duck is to direct her attention to specific parts of the image. Likewise for the Necker Cube and other familiar ambiguous figures. By contrast, what cognitive state would drive a subject to attend differently to some part of a heart-shape cutout or a greyscale racially ambiguous face? At bottom, then, application of the attention-shift interpretation to these colour cases simply looks unprincipled. 13 A memory interpretation alleges of a case that an apparent effect is one on memory rather than perceptual experience. This kind of explanation is most plausible when the target stimulus is removed from view and the subject then must make some kind of report based on the now past perceptual experience. For example, food deprived experimental subjects might be shown ambiguous inkblot images and then asked, once the images are removed, whether they perceived images of food or not. The memory interpretation has very little plausibility, however, for any of the above experiments since, as stressed above, each experiment is online, involving a report simultaneous with perceptual experience of the target stimulus. Similarly, a judgment interpretation claims that an alleged effect is only one on postperceptual judgment, maintaining that perceptual experience is not penetrated. Here the interpretation is applied by simply maintaining that colour experiences are veridical (and thus Of course there may be other colour perception phenomena where attentional shifts are relevant. For example, one 13 can willfully undo colour constancy effects by attending more carefully to, for example, a patch of green in the shade and then comparing it to a patch of green in direct sunlight (where both patches are in the same visual field). But there is no reason to think that the above experiments involve constancy mechanisms. And one might worry, with respect to the Levin and Banaji 2006 studies specifically, that contours of typical black faces versus typical white faces are different in such a way that attention is drawn differently to more/less luminant parts of the face. However, Levin and Banaji devised an additional study that used either white line or black line drawings, with no additional shading or contour, and the same results are obtained. This discounts the contour/attention-shift interpretation. 11 invariant across experimental manipulations where the target stimulus is unchanged, as in Experiment 2 of Levin and Banaji 2006). The reports of experimental subjects (that the extra-red background matches the orange love-heart cutout, that the greyscale 'WHITE' labelled face matches an objectively much lighter grey rectangle, and so on) are then explained by errors in judgment, not perception. So, subjects enjoy veridical visual perception, on the basis of which they make errors in judgment. One might resist this interpretation as follows. In many of these experiments, there is some kind of error made as evidenced by the report data. Thus subjects report a match between cutout and background when the second is objectively more red than the first; they report that a banana image is perfect grey when in fact it is noticeably tinged with blue; they match a greyscale face to a noticeably lighter or darker shade. An explanation must then account for the error. The judgment interpretation makes this a person-level error, where subjects enjoy veridical experience but then make judgments that are inconsistent with that experience even while on the basis of that experience. The "on the basis" of qualification here is key: these experiments all involve online methodologies, where subjects are encouraged to use what they see to make a report. This requires consistent mistakes about what one is seeing: somehow, while seeing the target accurately, the experimental subject makes a judgment and accordant report that mischaracterizes that very seen target. Introspection is notoriously fallible, but it may seem implausible that subjects could be so badly mistaken in judgments about their own current experience. Subjects are not being asked to perform any complex judgment or report; they are only asked to make colour matches or simple colour adjustments. In this light, the judgment interpretation may look even less plausible. 14 Alternatively, a cognitive penetration interpretation explains the error as a perceptual one: subjects See Macpherson 2012 for a defense of this sort against the judgment interpretation. See Stokes 2012 for a similar 14 defense against the judgment interpretation when applied to experiments on the visual perception of size. 12 make the reports they do because they are not enjoying veridical colour experience, where this is a consequence of background cognitive states. Here it is worth saying a bit more about the basic-ness of colour perception, and how this figures into possible interpretations of the relevant experimental data. There is a long philosophical tradition of taking colour perception to be a basic form of visual experience. Aristotle took colour to be the proper sensible of vision; colour is represented only by vision, by contrast to shape, a sensible feature common to vision and touch. Berkeley took colour to be an essential feature of visual experience, and indeed famously used this observation to argue against Locke's primary/ secondary quality distinction. Early sense datum theorists maintained that colours are among the features given by experience, either as bound with other features like shape and size (as in, plausibly, Price 1932) or as unbound features out of which objects are constructed by cognition (as in Russell 1910). The same is true today: theorists of varied commitments maintain that as far as conscious visual experience goes, colour is foundational or "bedrock". Accordingly, enjoying visual experience of colour requires much less cognitive sophistication than, by contrast, seeing something as being of a kind (supposing for the moment that the latter is a possible kind of visual experience). One way to articulate a relevant point here is in terms of Fred Dretske's distinction between nonepistemic seeing vs. epistemic seeing. As Dretske illustrates: 15 The first time I became aware of an armadillo (I saw it on a Texas road), I did not know what it was. I did not even know what armadillos were, much less what they looked like. My ignorance did not impair my eyesight, of course. I saw the animal. I was aware of it ahead of me on the road. That is why I swerved. Ignorance of what armadillos are or how they look can prevent someone from being conscious of certain facts (that the object crossing the road is an armadillo) without impairing in the slightest one's awareness of the thingsthe armadillos crossing roads-that (so to speak) constitute these facts (Dretske 1993: 266). Dretske saw, as in visually identified and then avoided, a moving object with armadillo-like features, but without identifying that they were armadillo-like features, or seeing that the object with those Dretske uses a number of pairs of terms, in a number of places, to mark the same distinction: seeing vs. seeing that; 15 thing-perception vs. fact-perception; awareness of things vs. awareness of facts. See Dretske 1969, 1979, 1993. Hanson 1969 marks a very similar distinction. 13 features was an armadillo. Achieving the latter requires the deployment of the concept ARMADILLO which, as the story goes, Dretske lacks at the time. As he suggests, one can be aware of, can have a conscious visual experience of, complex things like armadillos without being aware of the fact that the thing seen is an armadillo. To do the latter, one must apply the concept to what is seen (see Dretske 1993: 265). A couple points to note: first, theorists debate whether the second kind of seeing- epistemic seeing-is really a kind of seeing at all. Indeed, most of what Dretske says characterizes epistemic seeing as a kind of belief, where the basic contents of the relevant perceptual experience (say, as of an armadillo) are the same for the case when one just sees an F and the case when one sees that x is an F. What's different is that only in the second case has one formed a belief about a fact involving Fs. Epistemic seeing is then, on this line, really perceptually based belief or judgment, where seeing only provides access to basic features like colour and shape. The second point 16 follows from here. Focus just on nonepistemic seeing for a moment. Note how seeing a thing-an armadillo crossing the road-is already a fairly complex visual achievement. It requires seeing colours, shapes with varying size, all bound together and in motion. Even if one lacks the concept ARMADILLO, any reports made on the basis of this visual experience may be rather sophisticated. One could make errors about a variety of features in addition to colour: size, shape, texture, speed, how the creature moves, and so on. So it is an experience that encourages a variety of judgments, it encourages the formation of numerous beliefs). So even if one lacks the concept ARMADILLO, one probably has a variety of other relevant concepts and so may judge that (see that) there is an animal crossing the road, or that the thing crossing the road is low to the ground or oddly shaped or frightened. Contrast that with the kinds of visual experience had by subjects in the above experiments. In those experiments, the stimuli are dramatically simpler, lacking motion and presented only on a computer monitor or paper. And importantly the experimental tasks only The related topic of the admissible contents of experience is taken up in III.1 below. 16 14 require attention to the most basic feature of the scene, namely, colour. To perform these colour matching tasks, one need no sophisticated concepts (of colours or otherwise); one only need to understand basic sameness and difference relations. It is in this light that the experiments on colour perception look well interpreted as involving cognitive penetration and, comparatively, much less plausibly interpreted as errors in post-perceptual judgment. Making a colour match is not like seeing an Armadillo (let alone seeing that there is an Armadillo). It lacks substantial complexity, requires no sophisticated concepts, and does not encourage a variety of perceptual beliefs in the way that seeing an animal scurrying across the road would. So it is plausible that the subjects' errors are explained not by post-perceptual deployment of concepts but instead by pre-perceptual cognitive effects on perceptual processing (concepts or beliefs about natural and artefactual kinds, for instance). This again highlights why colour cases are especially important for the cognitive penetrability debate. A fourth alternative interpretation claims of a case that there is no relevant cognitive relatum and instead that the apparent effects are instead some kind of intra-perceptual adjustment, where sensory systems become more sensitive to patterns, in a way that is partially hardwired while partially plastic. One way to describe this is in terms of perceptual learning, on many models of which sensory changes are not ones brought by higher-level or semantic learning, and are not under the control of the agent. Fodor invokes this kind of interpretation in his debate with Churchland (1988), arguing that adaptation to inverting goggles does not involve cognitive penetration. Instead, he claims "For there are, after all, good ecological reasons why you might expect plasticity of this sort.... what needs to be kept open for re-calibration is whatever mechanisms compute the appropriate motor commands for getting to (or pointing to, or grasping) a visible object on the basis of its perceived location. Adaptation to inverted (and otherwise spatially distorting) lenses is plausibly an extreme case of this sort of recalibration" (Fodor 1988: 193). One might think that this kind of interpretation similarly applies to some of the colour cases discussed above. So, for example, the initial Hansen et al 2006 studies were performed with realistic, textured images of fruits and 15 vegetables, while the Olkonnen et al 2008 studies suggested that the relevant memory colour effects were pronounced only for those realistic images but not for mere outline shapes of fruits and vegetables. One possible explanation is that creatures like us are naturally cued to quickly distinguish food that is safe to eat (ripe yellow bananas for example), and that this sensitivity is enhanced as we mature but not in a way influenced by thoughts or high-level concepts about food. Accordingly, this sensitivity is triggered by realistic looking fruit images (in such a way that perhaps we experience their relevant colours in more pronounced ways, enjoying a kind of pop-out effect), but not for mere outline shapes of those same fruits. Deroy 2013 suggests this kind of explanation, where the results in these particular studies may involve purely perceptual changes that co-vary with other available sensory features, in this case, shape, volume, and texture. For all that has been said here, the intra-perceptual interpretation may be the most plausible alternative explanation of apparent cases of cognitive penetration of colour. Again, these cases all involve fairly simple colour matching tasks, and so an explanation involving a genuine perceptual effect (by contrast to mere post-perceptual judgment) and little special activity on the part of the subjects (by contrast to agent driven shifts in attention) seems most attractive. The Witzel et al 2011 studies do seem to provide additional leverage for the cognitive penetration interpretation, since here the images used are human-made (smurfs; ping-pong tables; the Pink Panther) and culturallysensitive (the experimental subjects were German, and so for them items like the UHU glue tube and Nivea tin are highly colour-diagnostic; these same images would not be highly colour diagnostic for most American subjects). Subjects in these studies reported the same memory colour effects, and by the same method of report (though, it is worth noting, with some possibly confounding differences between colours). It is much harder to make the case that there are "good ecological reasons" for this kind of (culturally-sensitive) plasticity. And the same might be said for the cutout shapes of artificial images (love-hearts) in the Delk and Fillenbaum studies, and for semantically primed faces in the Levin and Banaji studies. In any case, colour perception cases provide an 16 especially interesting testbed for comparing cognitive penetration explanations with intra-perceptual types of explanations. This is a fruitful area for future research. 17 III. The importance of colour perception research and the cognitive penetrability debate The above cases and their interpretation may have implications for standard metaphysical questions in philosophy of colour and perception-say about the objectivity of colour or debates concerning phenomenal character versus representational content-but the central emphasis in this final section, like much of the literature concerning cognitive penetration, is on epistemological concerns. The general implication involves concerns about the epistemic status of perception; if perception is cognitively penetrable, does this somehow threaten, or at least force revised epistemologies about, the supposed rational and knowledge providing roles of perception? As discussed in II.2 above, colour is among the basic features represented by vision, the others are typically supposed to be shape, size, depth, and motion. Recently, some philosophers have argued that in addition to these low-level properties, visual experience may represent high-level properties. Typically included among the latter are emotional properties, causal properties, kind/ categorical properties, and agential properties. Siegel (2006; 2010) argues for high-level admissible contents by appeal to phenomenology. Plausibly, overall experience had in the presence of pine trees or Cyrillic text is different before versus after acquiring a capacity to recognize pine trees or Cyrillic text as such. This contrast, Siegel argues, is best explained as a difference in perceptual content, where after acquiring the recognitional capacity one perceptually represents as instantiated the property of being a pine tree or being a word in Cyrillic text. This explanation, however, is highly 18 contested. A plausible reply, and one that Siegel attempts to rebut, is that the phenomenal sensory experience of, say, pine trees is the same before and after. What's different is that in the after-case For related philosophical discussion, see Connolly (2014). For the psychology of perceptual learning, see Gibson 1963 17 and Goldstone 1998. For a cross-section of papers on the topic, see Hawley and Macpherson 2011.18 17 one judges that the object is a pine tree, where this may come with a feeling of familiarity that explains the phenomenal contrast. This position has tradition on its side, according to which perception represents basic properties of colour, shape, size and motion. Being of a kind or being a cause or being an instance of someone trying to perform an action are recognized but at the level of cognition. We make judgments that such properties are instantiated, but this is not something that perception "picks up". Notice how this debate connects nicely with the above discussion of the judgment interpretation of alleged cases of cognitive penetration. In that context, like Siegel's pine tree and comparable cases, it is natural to claim that the apparent change (in perceptual report or introspected phenomenology) is one in how the subject makes judgments about the perceived scene. This is plausible if the task involves, for example, identifying objects of a kind. But as suggested above, it is much less plausible for the cases involving mere colour matching. As Macpherson puts the point, "[C]olour is a low-level property – it is a property that all people agree is represented by visual experience – as opposed to a high-level property, like a natural kind property. Therefore a common strategy that is employed by low-level theorists to maintain that two experiences are the same and that they represent the same properties cannot be employed here. The strategy is to claim that any evidence that the experiences are different is really evidence that the contents of judgments formed on the basis of those experiences are different, for it is claimed that experiences cannot represent the properties in question, as they are high-level properties. But this strategy can't be applied to this case for the properties at issue – colour properties – are low-level properties" (Macpherson 2012: 42). So the judgment interpretation seems less apt in two related ways. First, one cannot deploy, as Macpherson notes, a high-level property judgment interpretation since colour is, by all theorists' lights, a low-level property. And second, and for that very reason, these cases less plausibly involve a judgment, let alone one that deviates from current experience. (Recall from II.2 that this is what the judgment interpretation would require: repeated erroneous judgment on the basis of current colour experience). So while alleged cases of cognitive penetration of high-level perceptual content may be 18 live only for certain theorists, apparent cases of cognitive penetration of colour perception are live for low-level and high-level theorists alike. In some respects, this renders the epistemological consequences of cognitive penetration (supposing it occurs) more striking. The relevant consequences all concern the normativity of perception, should it be cognitively penetrable. And they all start with the assumption that in an important, foundational sense, experience is first. Experience is what we first...experience. And it is the feature of mental life that receives final appeal when justifying one's beliefs, theories, and decisions. We can then distinguish three questions, each of them prefixed with the antecedent condition: If perception is cognitively penetrated-What does this imply for perception's role in providing justified belief ? What does this imply for perception's role in providing true belief or knowledge? Is there some special set of worries that attach to cases involving vision? The first possible consequence concerns the rational role of perception, should it be penetrated by background cognitive states. The structure of the challenge is one familiar in contemporary philosophy of science. If one's perceptual observations are already infected with one's theoretical beliefs, then the former observations cannot provide a neutral arbiter for theory choice or support. Siegel 2012 puts this general epistemic worry in terms of circularity. If I believe, 19 before meeting her, that my friend is angry, and then upon meeting and because of that background belief I have a visual experience as of my friend being angry, the penetrated experience seems undermined as support for the consequent belief that my friend is angry. Lyons (2011) rejects the suggestion that the relevant epistemic consequence concerns circularity, arguing instead that the issue is reliability. He suggests further that it shouldn't be assumed without argument that the consequence is epistemically pernicious (see also Vance (2015)). Instead, it depends upon the particular process of belief formation, rather than the penetrating state. In some cases the process will be of an unreliable type and, accordingly, the resultant belief unjustified; other instances will For the now classic discussions of theory-ladenness of observation, see Hanson 1958, 1969; Kuhn 1962.19 19 involve a boost of reliability (where beliefs formed via a process of that type are more likely to be true) and the belief is accordingly justified. So if my beliefs regarding morel mushrooms prime my visual system such that I form more true beliefs about the presence of morel mushrooms (more than I would absent that background belief) then this is arguably a good example of penetration. Finally, Siegel (2013a,b) argues that some cases of cognitive penetration are such that when beliefs are formed on their basis, experience is "downgraded" in its justificatory role. Her argument is that when the structure of the etiologies of experience mirrors an epistemically problematic etiology of belief (for example, where one "jumps to conclusions"), then in neither case are the resultant beliefs epistemically justified; in neither case does experience or belief rationally serve what she calls the "endorsement role" (where one rationally endorses the content of the mental state). Siegel attempts to show that this downgrade principle applies widely to epistemologies ranging from process reliabilism to dogmatism to mentalistic internalism. Some of the latter theorists will naturally resist 20 this claim, arguing instead that endorsing the content of the (unknowingly) penetrated experience, absent defeating evidence, is precisely the rational thing to do. As one commentator puts it, "What am I supposed to think?" (McGrath 2013; see also Huemer 2013, Fumerton 2013). So it is very much debated whether this challenge takes such broad scope, and the points of debate pivot around independent commitments regarding epistemic justification. What's important to note is that, here again, the colour cases could prove extremely important. Colour perception is taken by all of these epistemologists to be basic, in at least two senses. Colours are an admissible content of visual experience; all parties agree that we have colour experiences while all parties do not agree that we have visual experiences as of, say, pine trees. And a perceptual belief about the colour of an object is an uncontroversial candidate for a non-inferential belief Put in Fodorian terms of modularity, colour processing is part of the visual "input system" that is supposed to be informationally encapsulated and, thus, impenetrable by higher-level cognition, and with important The details of some of these theories are discussed below. See also Tucker 2014; Vance 2014. 20 20 stakes for the objectivity of perception (Fodor 1983). So if the colour cases are best interpreted as bona fide cases of cognitive penetration, then each of these epistemologies will have to wrestle with their respective consequences, good or bad. The second consequence is related, concerning not whether penetrated experience can provide a rational or justified basis for belief, but instead whether these cases are such that they undermine knowledge. This point requires marking the difference between a truth condition for knowledge and a non-redundant justification or warrant condition. The latter is the relevant condition for the first consequence discussed above. But one can imagine some of these cases described in the following ways. According to the seemings internalist, absent any knowledge about the problematic etiology, one should take one's colour experience at face value and relevant beliefs formed on that basis will be (prima facie) justified. Generally, the view claims that how things seem to the subject-thus a state internal and cognitively accessible to the subject-provide the subject with defeasible evidence about how things are. But in the alleged examples of cognitive penetration discussed above, it often seems that the etiology undermines the accuracy of the colour experience (the experience is non-veridical) and the resultant belief is thereby false (for example, one believes that the image is perfect grey when in fact it is bluish). This is still a rationally held belief, but it is not knowledge. For an externalism like process reliabilism, a belief is justified just in case it results from a type of belief forming process that produces true beliefs with sufficiently high frequency. A 21 traditionally important question for this epistemology is how belief-forming processes should be typed, that is, by what criteria and to what specificity should the distinct types of processes that cause beliefs be distinguished. Thus from coarse to more fine, one might think that perception is a beliefforming process type, or that vision is, or that colour vision is, and so on. Now if belief-forming processes are typed coarsely enough, the etiology involved in alleged cases of cognitive penetration Goldman 1979 is the classic source.21 21 of colour perception might be generally reliable and the resultant belief thereby justified. But here again, the etiology may be problematic vis-a-vis knowledge insofar as it undermines the truthtracking role of experience and, accordingly, resultant belief. So the second lesson is one familiar in contemporary epistemology, beliefs may be justified but false. Most recent attention has been paid to the question concerning justification, but this simple exercise concerning colour cases reveals another simple way that cognitive penetration may be problematic: it may simply undermine our capacity to access the truth about our immediate environments. The third and final consequence focuses on the epistemic importance of vision by contrast to other sense modalities. It is common to describe humans as "visual creatures", and vision has most certainly dominated the psychological and philosophical research on perception. One might ask why vision is dominant in this way. One plausible answer points to the kind of information that vision provides, and arguably more efficiently than all other sense modalities. Healthy human vision provides, all-at-once, rich spatial information, enabling recognition of allocentric, macrospatial properties like shape, size, and orientation (Stokes and Biggs 2014). Upon entering a room, say a movie theater, vision will rapidly provide a perceiver with information about the broad spatial layout of the room, how certain objects are organized into rows (chairs), and set at distinctive distances from a much larger rectangular object (the screen), differences in illumination and colour in various locations in the room, objects (movie goers) moving in between the rows, and so on. For most perceivers, vision will also enable identification of objects at the level of kind: chairs, a screen, lights, people. No other modality can provide this richness of spatial information. For humans, only touch is relevant, but it would require, by contrast, laboriously extensive haptic exploration (and even then one could not acquire, by touch alone, all of the same information, say about lighting conditions or colour). 22 Stokes and Biggs argue that the distinctively rich spatial nature of the visual explains why visual perception (and visual imagery) dominates human perception in all sense modalities. And, they argue further, this is epistemically virtuous: insofar as one is performing perceptual tasks where rich spatial information is needed, it is good that vision will dominate the judgments made on the basis of sensory experience and, as evidenced in a variety of recent empirical studies, sometimes dominate experience in those modalities. The lesson here is that the platitude that we are visual 22 creatures is tracking something: vision is the most important means by which humans acquire rich spatial information about the immediate environmental space. The rich spatial information vision provides includes experience of edges and shapes, depth, motion, and of course, colour. All of this further highlights the epistemic importance of the (possible) cognitive penetrability of colour perception. Visual perception, including visual perception of colour, is generally (which is not to say always) the epistemically best source we have for information about the immediate environmental space, what's "here and now". The cases discussed in §II suggest that, in some instances, visual processing and thus visual experience may be sensitive to more (or less) than the colours (or light reflectance properties) that are here and now. In these cases perception is plausibly causally dependent on what has been learned or cognized independent of the current environmental space, for example the characteristic colours of natural and artificial categories of object, or the lightness/darkness of faces of distinct racial categories. If some theorists are correct, this could be of double (or at least exacerbated) epistemic consequence: since not only does vision dominantly affect the vision-based judgments one makes about rich spatial features, it also appears to dominate (for rich spatial tasks) judgments made on the basis of the non-visual sense modalities. For visual perceptual dominance over touch, see Rock and Victor 1964, Power and Graham 1976, Power 1980, Ernst 22 and Banks 2002. For visual imagery dominance over touch, see Sathian et al. 1997, Zangaladze et al. 1999, Zhang et al. 2004. Visual dominance over audition, see McGurk and MacDonald 1976 and Rosenblum et al. 1997. Visual dominance over proprioception, see Botnivick and Cohen 1998. Visual dominance over olfaction, see Royet et al. 1999, Sakai et al. 2005. Visual dominance over flavour experience, see Johnson and Clydesdale 1982; Morrot et al. 2001; Spence 2010. 23 Therefore if basic colour perception is cognitively penetrated, then non-visual perception (or belief) may thereby be cognitively penetrated. Conclusion Here is a prediction by way of conclusion. The prediction is ambitious in scope, but safely supported by the above discussions. Possible cases of the cognitive penetration of colour perception will continue to be an important testbed for a variety of empirical, epistemological, and metaphysical questions. These questions concern cognitive architecture and how colour perception fits in the best model of the mind, the epistemic role of vision and perception, and even the reality of colours. 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Penultimate draft. Published in The Journal of Philosophy (2013), 110(6):331-351 If you do not have access to the final version feel free to ask me for a copy [email protected] AGAINST THE NEW RACIAL NATURALISM* Adam Hochman The idea that there are human races makes a claim about human biological diversity. The nature of this claim, however, is a matter of longstanding dispute. Scientists have presumed it to involve the taxonomic division of the human species into subspecies, understanding "subspecies" as the biological synonym of "race." Since the early fifties there has been growing scientific agreement-largely due to the UNESCO Statements on Race1 and an influential paper by Richard Lewontin2-that there are no human subspecies, and hence that "race" is not a scientifically respectable category. Almost lost in the tide of support for Lewontin was a critique by Jeffry Mitton,3 which demonstrated that Lewontin's statistical methods were insensitive to the correlation structure of the genetic data-structure that Mitton argued could be used to group people into traditional racial categories. Mitton's criticism of Lewontin's work had gone relatively unnoticed until recently. Testament to this is an article by A. W. F. Edwards,4 published in 2003, which makes the same argument that Mitton had made more than two decades earlier, but with no reference to Mitton.5 The timing was not coincidental. In 2002 Rosenberg et al.,6 using newly available data from the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel, identified six genetic clusters, five of * I would like to give special thanks to Paul Griffiths for his helpful and encouraging comments on several drafts. I am also grateful to Pierrick Bourrat, David Braddon-Mitchell, Zvi Hochman, Frances Olive, Maureen O'Malley, Kristie Miller, Karl Rollings, Luke Russell, Karola Stotz and John Wilkins for their valued feedback. Thanks to an audience at the 2011 Sydney-ANU philosophy of biology workshop, and especially to Kim Sterelny for a particularly helpful question. This research was supported under Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme DP0878650 and an Australian Postgraduate Award through the University of Sydney. 2 which roughly correspond to major geographic regions. This study confirmed Lewontin's finding that racial classification accounts for very little (around 5%) of the overall human genetic diversity, while appearing to offer some support to the view that when the correlation structure of genetic data is analyzed, clusters emerge which (at least roughly) correspond to a traditional racial taxonomy. How to best interpret these findings is still being debated. The Mitton/Edwards critique of Lewontin has gained support from Neven Sesardic7 in his recent attempt to revive race as a legitimate scientific category. He argues that philosophers, most of whom are social constructionists about race, attend insufficiently to the science on the topic. Yet, according to Sesardic, we can no more trust the words of scientists, whom he believes self-censor on this politically sensitive issue. "A poll about views of race," he quotes Henry Harpending as saying, "would be like a poll about Marxism in East Germany in 1980. Everyone would lie."8 Philosophers tell, but do not know. Scientists know, but will not tell. Against this mood of extreme skepticism, and against racial naturalism, I will argue that the science, when properly understood, actually supports social constructionism about race. My critique is based on two main arguments. The first is that the criteria race naturalists apply to humans are not consistent with those applied to define subspecies in nonhuman animals, and that no rationale has been given for this differential treatment. The second is that the continental clusters appealed to by race naturalists are biologically superficial groupings that should not be elevated to subspecies status. Race naturalists have been too hasty in their racial interpretation of genetic clusters. The science has moved on since the early seventies, but it has vindicated, rather than contradicted the view that there are no human subspecies. 3 I. RACIAL NATURALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM ABOUT RACE Racial naturalism is the view that humans can be divided into subspecies, and that "race" is therefore a valid scientific category. In this paper I focus on genetic naturalism about race. There are other naturalistic accounts of race: Robin Andreasen's9 cladistic approach, Philip Kitcher's10 definition of races as reproductively isolated populations, and Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan's11 "ecotype" account. Genetic naturalism about race diverges from these accounts in three important respects, aside from its genetic focus. First, genetic naturalism about race is usually supposed to vindicate a traditional racial taxonomy, rather than to redefine racial categories based on new theories and new findings. Second, genetic naturalism about race has a phenetic, rather than a cladistic approach to taxonomy. In other words, it focuses on genetic (and supposedly genetically determined phenotypic) differences between populations, rather than on genetically inferred evolutionary relationships between populations. Third, this is the account of race that is mobilized to support racial claims of intellectual, cultural, and moral superiority (this is sometimes referred to as "ogre naturalism").12 Henceforth, "racial naturalism" will be used to refer specifically to genetic naturalism about race. Racial naturalism depends not only on the validity of human subspecies classification, but also more generally on the taxonomic validity of the "subspecies" category itself. It is important to note that the subspecies concept has been the focus of considerable debate over the last century. In 1953 Edward Wilson and William Brown argued that "the subspecies concept is the most critical and disorderly area of modern systematic theory."13 This view is still commonly held. Robert Zink, for instance, found that "Mitochondrial DNA sequence data reveal that 97% of continentally distributed avian subspecies lack the population genetic structure 4 indicative of a distinct evolutionary unit."14 Phenetics, in particular, has attracted strong criticism.15 Daniel Mulcahy describes a recent trend in eliminating subspecies altogether: "Discrete, diagnosable lineages are elevated to specific [species] status, while those that show clinal [gradual] variation and/or appear to represent ecological pattern classes are placed in synonymy with the parent species and the subspecific epithets are disregarded."16 The debate surrounding racial naturalism does not take place against anything like a stable scientific backdrop. For the purposes of this paper it will be useful to temporarily "black box" the question about the general validity of taxonomic divisions below the species level. We can proceed under the provisional assumption that "subspecies" is an orderly scientific category, and that for racial naturalism to be defensible "race" must offer a nonarbitrary and nonvague representation of human genetic diversity and population structure, and, as a result, lead us towards achieving farranging explanatory goals (for example, in biomedicine). Since biology's "modern synthesis" and the demise of species essentialism, there is no imperative to be essentialist about subspecies. However, as Guido Barbujani argues, "no classification is useful if the classification units are vague or controversial."17 "Races" would have to be robust, biological kinds. Social constructionism about race is the view that our racial categories are predominantly determined by social factors, even though some of their inclusion criteria will be biological. The title "social constructionism" has an unfortunate implication: that race, as a social construction, has no biological correlate. This is how race naturalists tend to interpret social constructionism.18 Yet this is a straw-man characterization of the constructionist position. Lisa Gannett writes that for the constructionist, "race is socially constructed by enlisting biological differences and investing these with socio-cultural meanings."19 Gannett's definition discounts 5 an interpretation of social constructionism which would suggest that racialized groups have no biological correlates, while leaving open the possibility that "race" is correlated with only the most superficial (if sometimes medically and forensically useful) biological features. The danger is to present the debate as a simple dichotomy, with social constructionists arguing that "race" is merely human projection (and prejudice) and race naturalists arguing that it is a biological fact, imposed on us by the world. A continuum is more reflective of the positions that are actually held, with "pure social construction" on one end, "exemplar natural kind" on the other, and everyone in the debate placed somewhere along the continuum. Yet even this is misleading, for two reasons. Firstly, the "no biological correlate" end of the continuum is not an extreme version of social constructionism, but a different view altogether. To hold this view one would have to argue that skin color, a prototypically biological feature, is not correlated with racialized groups. As social constructionists often point out, skin color and "race" do come apart, but nobody argues that people racialized as "white" have, on average, darker complexions than people racialized as "black," or that skin color varies randomly. Secondly, a continuum from "pure social construction" to "natural kind" is misleading because it is unidimensional. It would suggest that there is one way of "carving the world at its joints" and that a racial taxonomy, at one extreme, fails to even scratch nature's joints, and, at the other extreme, represents deep cuts in nature. This is metaphysically dubious. As Kitcher argues in his useful discussion on the future of "race," "there is a nondenumerable infinity of possible accurate maps we could draw for our planet," and there is "no feasible project of inquiry (singular) that aims at a complete account of our world, but rather many inquiries driven by specific questions we find it important to answer."20 6 The metaphysical problem is best illustrated by its practical counterpart. Racial labels may be more or less useful proxies for biological variation in different scientific disciplines, and each discipline may support racial naturalism or social constructionism to a greater or lesser extent. It is crucial that these points be separated. For instance, forensic anthropologists are able to allocate skulls, with fairly high accuracy, to the racialized group with which the deceased would have been identified. Does this show that racial labels are useful proxies for biological variation in physical forensic anthropology? Yes. Does this support racial naturalism? No. Why? Because forensic anthropologists translate trait measurements to the "racial" taxonomies societies use, or would have used, to describe missing persons; they do not generally ask whether those taxonomies are scientifically valid. When they do it is in a research context, and their answer is firmly negative.21 Forensic anthropologists are also able to allocate skulls to groups that are separated culturally, linguistically, politically, and historically, and at a finer grain than a racial taxonomy offers. "Race" latches on to human morphological variation, but in a crude way. Forensic anthropologists use racial classification, but this is because we, the public, classify our missing persons racially, not because it is a precise or privileged representation of human morphological diversity. The debate between race naturalists and social constructionists is best framed not as a dichotomy, nor a continuum, but as a discussion worth having in various scientific, philosophical, and political contexts. This discussion may one day end in eliminativism about race. In the meantime, the social constructionist will expect correlations between racialized groups and various traits. Yet she will, in Gannett's words, expect such correlations to be "statistical not universal, local not global, contingent not necessary, and accidental not lawful, and expect their corresponding cuts in nature to be interest-relative not mind-independent, 7 dynamic not static, indeterminate not determinate, many not few, overlapping not nonoverlapping, and superficial not deep."22 Having framed the debate along these lines, let us consider the arguments for racial naturalism. II. THE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS FOR RACIAL NATURALISM In his 1972 article "The Apportionment of Human Diversity" Lewontin demonstrated that, on a locus-by-locus basis, around 85.4% of the overall human genetic diversity resides within any given continental population, so roughly within the traditional "racial" groups. Another 8.3% of our genetic diversity, he showed, is accounted for by genetic variation within racialized groups. The remaining 6.3% of the total human genetic diversity is specific to racialized groups. "Racial classification," Lewontin concludes, "is now seen to be of virtually no genetic or taxonomic significance."23 Lewontin's analysis of the apportionment of human genetic diversity has been confirmed by numerous studies.24 However, his conclusion regarding racial classification has been the subject of some debate. The arguments against Lewontin's conclusion have two sources. One is practical, and derives from genetic-clustering studies; the other is theoretical, and challenges his statistical methods. I shall outline these arguments in turn. The practical argument for racial naturalism claims that genetic-clustering studies empirically confirm the presence of human subspecies. According to Risch et al., "these population genetic studies have recapitulated the classical definition of races based on continental ancestry."25 Indeed, genetic-clustering studies have shown that despite the small proportion of genetic variation separating continental populations, it is possible to assign some (geographically separated and not recently admixed) individuals to their (or their ancestors') 8 continents of origin based on genetic data alone. Whether this indeed vindicates racial naturalism, or only supports a weaker notion of "biogeographical ancestry," is another matter (to which we shall return). The most influential of the genetic-clustering studies is Rosenberg et al.'s 2002 investigation of the genetic structure of worldwide populations.26 Using the statistical program STRUCTURE, Rosenberg and his team, having access to samples from 52 populations, attempted to infer worldwide population structure at five different grains of analysis. The 52 populations were divided into seven regions: Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Central/South Asia, East Asia, Oceania, and America. At the roughest grain of analysis, where the program was set to distinguish two groups, the clusters were anchored by Africa and America. When the program was set to distinguish five groups, genotypes from Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia were clustered together, and those from the other four regions were clustered separately. At the finest grain of analysis the Kalash of northwest Pakistan were added as a sixth distinct cluster, which the investigators attributed to their suggested European or Middle Eastern origins. Although these clusters do not correspond to any previously proposed racial taxonomy,27 and many of the individuals sampled have substantially mixed cluster membership, this study is considered by race naturalists as strong evidence for the practical argument for racial naturalism. The theoretical argument for racial naturalism was first proposed by Mitton and then later, independently, by Edwards. They argue that Lewontin analyzed the genetic data under the false assumption that a locus-by-locus analysis was sufficient to reveal all of the information necessary for racial classification. Edwards calls this "Lewontin's fallacy." Lewontin's reasoning was fallacious, according to Edwards, because a single-locus analysis is insensitive to 9 correlations amongst loci-correlations which he believes can be used to group people into traditional racial categories, irrespective of low between-population differences on a locus-bylocus basis. To illustrate how correlation structure can be useful for classificatory purposes I have constructed three figures, using mostly made-up data about maize and wheat yields (real data would be similar but messier). Figure 1 shows that when the weights of the maize and wheat yields are compared (in tons per hectare) they largely overlap. Figure 2 shows even greater overlap when comparing the rainfall that the maize and wheat yields received during the season in which they grew. Figure 3 shows that, despite these overlaps, when the measures are correlated the maize and wheat yields are clustered apart. The race naturalist believes that clustering studies are analogous: that while "races" overlap genetically, they can be clustered by analyzing the correlation data. It is the particular correlation structure of mainly species-wide alleles, claims the race naturalist, which causes "race." Figure 1 10 Figure 2 Figure 3 Before proceeding further, it will be useful to review the relevant statistics. The most common single-locus statistic used to measure genetic diversity or variation within a species is Wright's Fixation Index, or FST. It compares the amount of genetic variation within one or more subpopulations to that found in all populations combined (the total population). FST = (T–S)/T, where T represents the average difference between allele pairs selected randomly from the total 11 population and S represents the average difference between allele pairs selected randomly from within a subpopulation. If mating in the total population is random, T and S will have equal values, and the FST estimate will be 0. In this case, the population has no genetic subpopulations. If there is some nonrandom mating (which there will be if individuals are geographically distant, for instance) the FST estimate will rise. The standard criterion for subspecies division is an FST estimate of or over 0.25.28 This criterion is, of course, subjective. Conservation biologists sometimes take a lower FST estimate to be significant, in order to protect endangered species. Nevertheless, the standard criterion appears to be agreed upon in the human case (race naturalists do not argue that the cutoff should be lowered, but that FST is the wrong statistic altogether). Human FST estimates are around 0.05 to 0.15, indicating that humans, under the standard genetic criterion, cannot be divided into subspecies.29 According to the new race naturalists FST is the wrong statistic for human subspecies classification. They appeal, instead, to the multilocus technique of genetic clustering. The most popular clustering program is STRUCTURE. This was the software used by Rosenberg and colleagues in their analysis of the genetic structure of human populations. The underlying methodology was first described in 2000 by Jonathan Pritchard, Matthew Stephens, and Peter Donnelly.30 STRUCTURE allocates individuals to K populations, or clusters, where K is chosen in advance. Clusters are defined by their allele frequency correlation structures, and individuals are probabilistically allocated to one or more clusters. Joint cluster allocation indicates admixture (mixed population membership). Unlike with FST there is no standard criterion for delineating subspecies when clustering. STRUCTURE is understood to reveal "population structure." The inference from "population" to "subspecies" is made by race naturalists. 12 To prevent confusion, I will use the terms "diversity" and "variation" when referring to the results of single-locus studies, and "population structure" when referring to those of clustering studies. While this terminological distinction is already in common usage, it is not always adhered to. This may make it appear as though the same thing is being measured in the two kinds of studies. As I have explained, this is not the case.31 III. IS 'LEWONTIN'S FALLACY' A FALLACY? There is agreement with Lewontin, on both sides of the debate, that the proportion of genes that are unique to any given racialized group is very small. The arguments for racial naturalism target the conclusion Lewontin draws from this: that racial classification has no taxonomic significance. Contrary to Lewontin, Edwards argues that "The 'taxonomic significance' of genetic data in fact often arises from correlations amongst the different loci, for it is these that may contain the information which enables a stable classification to be uncovered."32 To draw conclusions about racial classification based on data that have not been correlated is to commit "Lewontin's fallacy." "There is nothing wrong with Lewontin's statistical analysis of variation," argues Edwards, "only with the belief that it is relevant to classification."33 Notice that this claim about relevance begs the question. Edwards believes that single-locus statistics are not relevant to racial classification because they do not support racial classification. The question of relevance remains unanswered. If single-locus studies had found that populations were genetically distinct it seems as though Edwards would consider them relevant to classification. Edwards needs to fault the relevance of Lewontin's analysis of variation, where "relevance" pertains to the validity of the analysis, not to the contents of its results. 13 "Lewontin's fallacy" is not a genuine fallacy. Mitton and Edwards are correct that Lewontin's analysis of genetic variation was blind to correlation data that could potentially be used for classificatory purposes. Whether this correlation data would support human subspecies classification is another question. Edwards argues that Lewontin "used his analysis of variation to mount an unjustified assault on classification, which he deplored for social reasons."34 What Edwards seems to overlook is the fact that subspecies classification is a special case of classification in general. A classification scheme can reliably pick out kinds that are relatively superficial. Think, for instance, of amateur ornithology. Human subspecies, or "races," are putative biological kinds. They cannot, by definition, be superficial. To show that a fallacy has been committed there would need to be a forceful argument for using genetic clustering, and against using single-locus statistics, for subspecies classification. The fact that Lewontin's analysis of human genetic diversity does not furnish us with a racial taxonomy is not reason to reject it. No argument has been given against the use of single-locus statistics beyond the suggestion that they are not powerful enough to provide evidence for racial naturalism. Moreover, no argument has been offered in support of the claim that genetic clusters distinguish subspecies, rather than a modicum of population structure, which of course can be present in the absence of subspecies. I do not wish to be interpreted as arguing for the taxonomic validity of divisions below the species level, and even less for endorsing gene-centric biology. However, under the conventional population-genetics conception of subspecies, FST is more appropriate than clustering as a statistical tool for identifying subspecies divisions. The population-genetics approach to subspecies focuses on isolation and genetic differentiation. Genetic differences between groups develop under isolation because lost alleles are not reintroduced and new 14 mutations are not spread. Under such conditions, the kinds of genetic discontinuities develop that lead biologists to apply the subspecies concept. These genetic discontinuities are represented by high FST values. However, when migration is high, species-wide genetic variation tends to be clinal, or gradual. Clinal variation indicates that gene flow, rather than isolation, has been the main evolutionary force shaping genetic diversity. This has certainly been the case for our species,35 which explains our low FST values. The fact that FST measures genetic differentiation caused by reproductive isolation, while clustering finds cryptic genetic structure without lengthy periods of reproductive isolation, suggests that FST is the more appropriate statistic for delineating subspecies according to the population-genetic conception of subspecies that race naturalists champion. Perhaps the most obvious objection to the idea of "Lewontin's fallacy," however, is that in nonhuman biology single-locus statistics are the standard tools used for subspecies classification. All Lewontin did was to shift the focus to humans. Surprisingly, Edwards does not foresee this objection to the idea of "Lewontin's fallacy." This may be because he has a weak notion of race, where a resemblance between racialized groups and clusters (when the clustering software is set to the right grain of analysis) is all that is needed to confirm a racial taxonomy. Edwards does not endorse racial naturalism as I have described it, because he does not argue that "races" constitute subspecies, only that they can be clustered. Edwards is no social constructionist, but his argument does not actually contradict social constructionism. Social constructionists expect some correlations between genes and racialized groups, just as they expect skin color and "race" to be roughly correlated. The real question is whether a traditional racial taxonomy picks out subspecies. Edwards has not answered this question. The fact that individuals from geographically distant and not recently admixed populations can be 15 clustered according to their continental origins does not, on its own, constitute an argument for human subspecies division. While Edwards is not, according to my definition, a fully fledged race naturalist, Sesardic has adopted his work to make a case for racial naturalism. Sesardic also avoids the above objection to the idea of "Lewontin's fallacy," but by claiming that multilocus statistical techniques (such as clustering) are used to define subspecies in nonhuman animals: In biology, the concept of "race" is often regarded as synonymous with "subspecies". Subspecies are populations of organisms that, despite belonging to the same species, differ among themselves with respect to frequencies of alternative alleles at a number of loci....Research has shown that, indeed, groups of people of significantly different geographical ancestries do differ from one another genetically: when compared on many genetic loci these groups have different frequencies of different alleles.36 Sesardic claims that he is simply applying the subspecies concept from nonhuman to human biology. However, this passage suggests that multilocus, rather than single-locus statistics are used to determine whether nonhuman species are divisible into subspecies. This is misleading, as the new multilocus clustering methods have not, to my knowledge, been used to redefine subspecies in nonhuman animals. Sesardic implies that humans should not be treated as a special case-that what applies to nonhuman animals applies to humans, and vice versa.37 Yet his characterization of nonhuman taxonomy is misleading, as clustering methods are not used to define subspecies in nonhuman biology. If we agree with his parity argument there is no "Lewontin's fallacy." There is either a "subspecies fallacy," and we need to disregard all subspecies divisions defined using singlelocus statistics and begin again-this time with multilocus statistics-or there is no fallacy to 16 speak of, in which case we should continue using single-locus statistics and abandon the idea of human racial classification. Race naturalists might prefer the former approach, but the fact that humans have no subspecies according to the standard genetic criterion seems a very bad reason to revolutionize taxonomy. "Lewontin's fallacy" is about human subspecies classification. However, the inference from "genetic cluster" to "subspecies," fundamental to racial naturalism, stands unsupported. Correlation structure can indeed be useful for classification, but only when we have a clear interpretation of what is being classified. To illustrate this point let us return to the maizeand wheat-yield example. This example showed that the correlation data enabled crop classification. Race naturalists believe that subspecies classification is analogous. They argue that the genetic data need to be correlated for human subspecies classification, and that it is the correlation structure amongst mainly common genes which causes "race." The analogy does not bear scrutiny, however, because nobody thinks that what makes maize maize or wheat wheat is a joint probability based on yield weight and the amount of rainfall received! We can verify these crop clusters against the scientific definitions of maize and wheat. But what are we comparing genetic clusters to? We compare them to a folk racial taxonomy. As it happens, the "yield weight" to "in season rainfall" relationship is a fairly reliable differentiator between wheat and maize crops.38 But genetic clusters, derived from gene correlation data, may not serve as proxies for "race." Genetic clusters may represent something entirely different. In the following section, this is what I argue. 17 IV. ARE THERE HUMAN SUBSPECIES? Rosenberg and colleagues have dismissed racial interpretations of their work. "Our evidence for clustering," they insist, "should not be taken as evidence of our support of any particular concept of 'biological race'." They continue, "The arguments about the existence or nonexistence of 'biological races' in the absence of a specific context are largely orthogonal to the question of scientific utility."39 Sesardic attributes such reticence in accepting racial naturalism to "reasons of the heart."40 However, what Rosenberg and colleagues offer is a testable scientific hypothesis: that the scientific utility of genetic-cluster studies is context dependent. Continentbased clusters do not provide the predictive power, it is implied, which we can expect from biological kinds. Genetic-clustering studies may inform research on human migratory history, but offer poor guides to the biological diversity relevant to biomedicine, for instance. If this is true-and at a continental grain of analysis it is certainly true41-it would be wrong to interpret genetic clusters racially, as picking out phenetic subspecies. In their worldwide cluster analysis, Rosenberg and colleagues identify six genetic clusters. However, in their analysis of the genetic structure of continental populations, they find substantial within-continent structure. Structure that is hidden at a rough grain of analysis is revealed at a finer grain. One of the key problems for racial naturalism, as identified by Kitcher,42 is that it suffers from a grain-of-resolution problem. The race naturalist cannot defer to clustering studies to number and name the races. The appropriate grain of analysis is unclear. Is there one American race, as suggested by a racial reading of the worldwide analysis, or five, the number of clusters identified in the within-continent analysis? The first suggestion confers an arbitrary privilege to a rough grain of analysis. The second suggestion could not be correct, as the individuals sampled were Colombian, Maya, Karitiana, Surui, and Pima-hardly a 18 comprehensive sample of the numerous indigenous and meztizo peoples of the Americas. The Americas have hundreds of potentially genetically distinguishable populations. The second suggestion leads to a reductio ad absurdum, as the race naturalist would have to concede that we have hundreds, even thousands of "races." If we want to be consistent across species, similar extravagances would extend to the rest of the animal kingdom. One prominent race naturalist, Armand Leroi, is willing to accept such a proliferation of races: there is nothing very fundamental about the major continental races; they're just the easiest way to divide things up. Study enough genes in enough people and one could sort the world's population into 10, 100, perhaps 1000 groups, each located somewhere on the map.43 Leroi, like Edwards, presents himself as a race naturalist. However, neither author appears to make a strong case for racial naturalism. Edwards fails to tell us what is fundamental about the major continental "races." Leroi tells us that they are not fundamental after all. If each possible cluster is a "race," and we could indeed distinguish thousands, the concept is virtually meaningless. Why continue to use it, especially given the devastating history of racial classification? Leroi contends that "no other noun seems to do the job,"44 although he uses "groups" as a synonym in the quote above. Seeing as there is "nothing very fundamental about the major continental races," it would be more accurate to refer to them as "racialized groups," rather than "racial groups" or "races." We all have ancestries, but we do not-as I will continue to argue-belong to biological races. The relatively small sample size of the Rosenberg et al. study points to another problem for racial naturalism. The idea that there are human races suggests that human biological (in this 19 context genetic) diversity is best represented as clustered, or as forming discreet groups. As David Serre and Svante Pääbo45 point out, a very bad way to test this hypothesis would be to sample from sites that are themselves clustered (geographically distant) and then ask if our genetic structure is best represented as clustered. This is just the criticism Serre and Pääbo leveled against Rosenberg and colleagues. To test the validity of clustered representations individuals would have to be sampled continuously from region to region. Such a sampling scheme would allow an alternative hypothesis-that the genetic structure of worldwide populations is clinal, or gradual, rather than clustered-to be evaluated. If our genetic structure is clinal, racial naturalism would be refuted. It is impossible to "carve nature at its joints" if it does not have any. In response to Serre and Pääbo, Rosenberg et al.46 provided evidence in support of a synthetic model of the genetic structure of human populations, integrating clinal and clustered representations. They showed, in favor of a clinal model, that "allele frequency differences generally increase gradually with geographic distance."47 What role, then, do clusters play? Rosenberg et al. explain that it is "small discontinuous jumps in genetic distance-across oceans, the Himalayas, and the Sahara-that provide the basis for the ability of STRUCTURE to identify clusters that correspond to geographic regions."48 This is fatal to racial naturalism. The genetic structure of human populations is almost entirely clinal. Clusters reflect slight discontinuities in the genetic structure of populations between geographical barriers to human dispersal. But why, then, do the clusters in Rosenberg and colleagues' study roughly resemble traditional "racial" groupings? The answer is simple: because we have roughly separated "racial" groups around these geographical barriers. 20 When using FST we can defer to a standard criterion in response to the subspecies question. The same cannot be said for the new genetic-clustering methods, as no such criterion has been formulated. We can, however, stipulate some conditions that would need to hold before seriously asking whether clusters represent meaningful biological units, such as subspecies. I will suggest four such conditions (they are not presumed to be comprehensive). First, the range of allele frequency differences between clusters would have to be relatively uniform. There should not be more difference in genetic diversity and structure within one cluster than between that cluster and another. The second condition is that the number of clusters should not be arbitrary. As a third condition, the allele frequencies within a cluster should be relatively homogenous (not too clinal). The fourth condition is that there should be a large jump in genetic difference between clusters. If the first and second conditions are met, but not the third, clusters might still be meaningful biological units when there is a large jump in genetic distance between them (when the fourth condition is met). Alternatively, if all of the conditions but the fourth are met, the clusters may still be meaningful biological units. That is, a small jump in genetic distance might separate meaningful biological units when those units are internally homogenous, are nonarbitrary in their number, and do not vary greatly in the amount of genetic diversity and structure that they house. None of the above conditions hold in the human case. Let us begin with the first condition. Because clustering is a product of discontinuities in population structure it is blind to smooth, clinal changes in the structure of populations. As a result, varying amounts of population structure (and genetic diversity) can reside within any one low-resolution cluster. This creates a dilemma for the new race naturalists, who interpret continental clusters racially. For the race naturalist, two within-continent "sub-clusters" should not be more different than 21 their primary "racial" cluster and another "racial" cluster; this would be grounds for further subspecies division. Yet this is just what we find with Africa, for instance. Africa houses the most genetic diversity of any continent, and cluster analysis yields high within-continent structure.49 As Yu et al.50 have shown, there is a larger genetic difference among Africans than between Africans and Eurasians. The first condition fails in the human case. The second condition stipulates that the number of clusters should be nonarbitrary. There needs to be a principled reason for deciding on an appropriate number of clusters. In the human case, for instance, the chosen number should not simply reflect the folk assumption that there are only a handful of races. As I have argued, racial naturalism is faced with a serious grain-ofresolution problem. It is unclear whether there would be five or five hundred races, according to a racial interpretation of clustering studies. The roughly continent-based clusters that race naturalists appeal to disappear when more genotypes are added and a finer grain of analysis is attempted. For example, Sarah Tishkoff and colleagues,51 using worldwide samples from the HGDP-CEPH Human Genome Diversity Cell Line Panel and adding extra genotypes from other populations (mainly African and Indian), set STRUCTURE to find 14 clusters. More than half of them were found within Africa. The second condition fails in the human case. Now to the third condition-that clusters should not be too clinal. It is important to note that clustered and clinal representations are not mutually exclusive.52 Indeed, we should expect some discontinuities to arise from barriers to dispersal, such as oceans, mountains, and deserts. Yet such discontinuities are slight, and should not be overemphasized. As Handley et al. show, >75% of the total variance of pairwise FST can be captured by geographic distance alone. Adding information on genetic clusters to this model captures only an extra ~2% of the variance.53 22 Human genetic diversity and population structure is predominantly clinal. The third condition fails in the human case. The fourth condition, recall, is that there should be a large jump of genetic difference between clusters. As I have already quoted Rosenberg and colleagues stating, the clusters they found were formed by "small discontinuous jumps in genetic distance."54 What separates continental groups is not a large genetic leap, but a small jump, caused by geographical barriers to dispersal, long since crossed. The fourth condition fails in the human case. There is nothing about clustering studies which suggests that clustering (discreet grouping) is itself appropriate as a general representation of the genetic structure of human populations. These studies, when properly understood, do not pose any threat to social constructionism about race. The clusters race naturalists appeal to do not represent subspecies. Traditional racial categories reflect human history and human prejudice more than they reflect human genetics. V. CONCLUSION If there is to be a productive debate between social constructionists and race naturalists, their respective positions will need to be clearly defined. I have stressed that social constructionism is not the view that racialized groups have no biological correlates. The point of social constructionism, it seems needless to say, is not that we all have the same skin color, the same shaped noses, and exactly the same genetic composition. It is that there are socio-cultural and historical reasons for our racial categories, and that our biological differences map poorly onto so-called "racial" groups. 23 It is less clear how to charitably characterize the claims of the new race naturalists. Is it their view that "race" has some genetic correlate, or do they defend a stronger claim? If racial naturalism is to challenge social constructionism, the latter needs to be true. However, it is not clear that this is the case. For Edwards, racial naturalism stands or falls on the issue of "stable classification."55 But amateur ornithologists make stable classifications between birds which taxonomists do not separate into subspecies. Race naturalists need to tell us why "racial" classifications pick out subspecies, rather than more superficial groupings. Even Sesardic, who makes the strongest claims amongst the race naturalists I have discussed, seems at times to endorse a rather weak view. For example, when referring to a clustering study by Tang et al.56 he writes, Questions can be (and have been) raised about whether the same outcome would be obtained for other racial categories, or with a sample of people with more mixed ancestries, or on a more fine-grained scale, etc. My point is merely that in view of these new studies it becomes harder to accept the widespread but often unsubstantiated claim about the biological meaninglessness of race.57 The problems Sesardic points to here seriously undermine racial naturalism. He states that his aim is merely to show that race is not "biologically meaningless," but it is unclear what his target is-the idea that "race" has no biological correlate? No significant contributor to the debate defends this view. Sesardic attributes the claim that race is "biologically meaningless" to Robert Schwartz,58 who indeed uses this phrase. The article Sesardic cites, however, is full of examples of how geographical ancestry is medically relevant. Schwartz argues that race is biologically meaningless only in the sense that it is too imprecise as a medical category, and he makes a convincing case against naïve racial profiling in medical research.59 24 We can see that race naturalists and social constructionists are talking past each other. When social constructionists say that race is "biologically meaningless," they mean that race is not a valid biological category. Race naturalists, however, interpret such phrases to mean that "race" has no biological correlate, a position which is clearly mistaken. As this is a mischaracterization of social constructionism, and one that can be easily avoided, the debate can move forward. The argument that "race" is not biologically meaningless-in that it has some biological correlate-misses its target, because social constructionists take this as a given. Race naturalists need to support a stronger position. Racial naturalism is not the view that racialized groups can be clustered genetically; it is the view that humans can be nonarbitrarily divided into subspecies. Race naturalists should either make the case for this view or abandon it. Clustering studies, when properly understood, are entirely consistent with social constructionism. The continental clusters that race naturalists appeal to do not represent subspecies, in that they (a) vary greatly in the amount of genetic diversity and structure that they house, (b) are arbitrary in their number, (c) are not internally homogenous but clinal, and (d) are separated by only small jumps in genetic distance. When genetic diversity and population structure within a species are clinal, subspecies divisions are necessarily arbitrary. Human genetic diversity and population structure are almost entirely clinal, but there are some shallow cuts that allow clusters to be formed. These "scratches," which are located between geographic barriers that have slowed human migration, do not make human subspecies divisions any less arbitrary, because they are themselves arbitrarily located with regards to our genetic diversity and population structure. These clusters have more of a geographic significance than they have a biological significance. The fact that genetic clusters have been interpreted racially only 25 supports social constructionism, in that it shows how readily we invest superficial biological difference with racial meaning. Adam Hochman University of Sydney 1 The UNESCO Statements had this effect despite the fact that they rejected racist science, but not the concept of race, which was reconceptualized in population genetic terms. For both the 1950 and 1951 statements, see The Race Concept: Results of an Inquiry (Paris: UNESCO, 1952). 2 Richard Lewontin, "The Apportionment of Human Diversity," in Theodosius Dobzhansky, Max K. Hecht, and William C. Steere, eds., Evolutionary Biology, Volume 6 (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1972), pp. 381–98. 3 Jeffry B. Mitton, "Genetic Differentiation of Races of Man as Judged by Single-Locus and Multilocus Analyses," The American Naturalist, CXI, 978 (March–April 1977): 203–12. 4 A. W. F. Edwards, "Human Genetic Diversity: Lewontin's Fallacy," Bioessays, XXV, 8 (August 2003): 798–801. 5 This was pointed out by Neven Sesardic in his "Race: A Social Destruction of a Biological Concept," Biology and Philosophy, XXV, 2 (March 2010): 143–62. 6 Noah A. Rosenberg et al., "Genetic Structure of Human Populations," Science, CCXCVIII, 5602 (Dec. 20, 2002): 2381–85. 7 Sesardic, op. cit. 8 Henry Harpending, review of Taboo: Why Black Athletes Dominate Sports and Why We're Afraid to Talk About It, by Jon Entine, Population and Environment, XXII, 1 (September 2000): 83–89. 26 9 Robin O. Andreasen, "The Cladistic Race Concept: A Defense," Biology and Philosophy, XIX, 3 (June 2004): 425–42. 10 Philip Kitcher, "Race, Ethnicity, Biology, Culture," in Leonard Harris, ed., Racism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1999), pp. 87–117. Kitcher now rejects this account of race in favor of a pragmatist approach. See his "Does 'Race' Have a Future?" Philosophy and Public Affairs, XXXV, 4 (Autumn 2007): 293–317. 11 Massimo Pigliucci and Jonathan Kaplan, "On the Concept of Biological Race and Its Applicability to Humans," Philosophy of Science, LXX, 5 (December 2003): 1161–72. 12 Coined by Ian Hacking in "Why Race Still Matters," Daedalus, CXXXIV, 1 (Winter 2005): 102– 16. 13 Edward O. Wilson and William L. Brown, Jr., "The Subspecies Concept and Its Taxonomic Application," Systematic Zoology, II, 3 (September 1953): 97–111, at p. 100. 14 Robert M. Zink, "The Role of Subspecies in Obscuring Avian Biological Diversity and Misleading Conservation Policy," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, CCLXXI, 1539 (Mar. 22, 2004): 561–64, at p. 561. 15 See, for example, Kevin de Queiroz and David A. Good, "Phenetic Clustering in Biology: A Critique," The Quarterly Review of Biology, LXXII, 1 (March 1997): 3–30. 16 Daniel G. Mulcahy, "Phylogeography and Species Boundaries of the Western North American Nightsnake (Hypsiglena Torquata): Revisiting the Subspecies Concept," Molecular Phylogenetics and Evolution, XLVI, 3 (March 2008): 1095–115, at p. 1095. 17 Guido Barbujani, "Human Races: Classifying People vs Understanding Diversity," Current Genomics, VI, 4 (June 2005): 215–26, at p. 215. 18 Sesardic (op. cit.), for instance, criticizes "pure" social constructionism. 27 19 Lisa Gannett, "Questions Asked and Unasked: How by Worrying Less About the 'Really Real' Philosophers of Science Might Better Contribute to Debates about Genetics and Race," Synthese, CLXXVII, 3 (December 2010): 363–85, at p. 375. 20 Kitcher, "Does 'Race' Have a Future?" p. 299. 21 See Stephen Ousley, Richard Jantz, and Donna Freid, "Understanding Race and Human Variation: Why Forensic Anthropologists Are Good at Identifying Race," American Journal of Physical Anthropology, CXXXIX, 1 (May 2009): 68–76. 22 Gannett, op. cit., pp. 382–83. 23 Lewontin, op. cit., p. 397. 24 See Barbujani et al., "An Apportionment of Human DNA Diversity," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, XCIV, 9 (April 1997): 4516–19; L. B. Jorde et al., "The Distribution of Human Genetic Diversity: A Comparison Of Mitochondrial, Autosomal, and Y-Chromosome Data," The American Journal of Human Genetics, LXVI, 3 (March 2000): 979–88; Rosenberg et al., op. cit. 25 See Neil Risch et al., "Categorization of Humans in Biomedical Research: Genes, Race and Disease," Genome Biology, III, 7 (2002): 1–12, at p. 3. 26 Rosenberg et al., op. cit. 27 See Barbujani, "Human Races: Classifying People vs Understanding Diversity." 28 See Sewall Wright, Evolution and the Genetics of Populations, Volume 4: Variability within and among Natural Populations (Chicago: University Press, 1984); Alan R. Templeton, "Human Races: A Genetic and Evolutionary Perspective," American Anthropologist, C, 3 (September 1998): 632–50; Rick A. Kittles and Kenneth M. Weiss, "Race, Ancestry, and Genes: 28 Implications for Defining Disease Risk," Annual Review of Genomics and Human Genetics, IV, 1 (September 2003): 33–67. 29 See Templeton, op. cit., and Kittles and Weiss, op. cit. 30 Jonathan K. Pritchard, Matthew Stephens, and Peter Donnelly, "Inference of Population Structure Using Multilocus Genotype Data," Genetics, CLV, 2 (June 2000): 945–59. 31 See also Jorde and Stephen P. Wooding, "Genetic Variation, Classification and 'Race'," Nature Genetics, XXXVI, 11S (November 2004): S28–S33. 32 Edwards, op. cit., p. 799. 33 Ibid., p. 800. 34 Ibid., p. 801. 35 See Rosenberg et al., "Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure," PLoS Genetics, I, 6 (December 2005): 660–71; Lori J. Lawson Handley et al., "Going the Distance: Human Population Genetics in a Clinal World," TRENDS in Genetics, XXIII, 9 (September 2007): 432–39. 36 Sesardic, op. cit., p. 148. 37 See Gannett, op. cit., and Kitcher, "Does 'Race' Have a Future?" for arguments against this view. 38 This is because transpiration of water is necessary for photosynthesis and these crops have different photosynthetic pathways. 39 Rosenberg et al., "Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure," p. 669. 40 Sesardic, op. cit., p. 156. 29 41 For example, lactose intolerance affects Europeans and Africans; the missing CCR5 allele that confers HIV resistance protects Asians as well as Europeans; and the hemoglobin S allele that confers malaria resistance is present in sub-Saharan Africans, southern Europeans, Indians, and peoples from the Middle East. 42 Kitcher, "Does 'Race' Have a Future?" 43 Armand Marie Leroi, "A Family Tree in Every Gene," Journal of Genetics, LXXXIV, 1 (April 2005): 3–6. 44 Ibid., p. 5. 45 David Serre and Svante Pääbo, "Evidence for Gradients of Human Genetic Diversity Within and Among Continents," Genome Research, XIV, 9 (September 2004): 1679–85. 46 Rosenberg et al., "Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure." 47 Ibid., p. 661. 48 Ibid., p. 668. 49 See Sarah A. Tishkoff and Scott M. Williams, "Genetic Analysis of African Populations: Human Evolution and Complex Disease," Nature Reviews Genetics, III, 8 (August 2002): 611– 21. 50 Ning Yu et al., "Larger Genetic Differences Within Africans Than Between Africans and Eurasians," Genetics, CLXI, 1 (May 2002): 269–74. 51 Tishkoff et al., "The Genetic Structure and History of Africans and African Americans," Science, CCCXXIV, 5930 (May 22, 2009): 1035–44. 52 See Handley et al., op. cit. 53 Ibid., p. 435. 30 54 Rosenberg et al., "Clines, Clusters, and the Effect of Study Design on the Inference of Human Population Structure," p. 668. 55 Edwards, op. cit., p. 799. 56 Hua Tang et al., "Genetic Structure, Self-Identified Race/Ethnicity, and Confounding in CaseControl Association Studies," The American Journal of Human Genetics, LXXVI, 2 (February 2005): 268–75. 57 Sesardic, op. cit., p. 154. 58 Robert S. Schwartz, "Racial Profiling in Medical Research," New England Journal of Medicine, CCCXLIV, 18 (May 3, 2001): 1392–93. 59 For a detailed response to Sesardic's attempt to revive naturalism see Adam Hochman, "Racial Discrimination: How Not to Do It," Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2013) http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.003.

SIEGEL'S CONTENTS !e principal interest of Susanna Siegel's book, !e Contents of Visual Experience, for its intended audience will be, I expect, its case for the Rich Content View, according to which the contents of visual experience are richly complex, so are not limited to color, shape, and other properties standardly taken to be represented by visual experience. (7) For example (she suggests) someone's visual experience might represent it as so (to him) that John Malkovich is walking by holding a small dog. To her credit, though, Siegel is among the few who actually bother to argue that perceptual experience does have representational content-in this case, that it is truth-evaluable-liable to be true or false. Before you can defend the rich content view, she recognises, you need to defend the 'content überhaupt view'. More o"en, for reasons which escape me, that view is merely taken to be obvious. And, I think, as opposed to some others, by 'perceptual experience' she really does mean perceptual experience, notably, an experience of perceiving (e.g., seeing) such-and-such, and not just some internal (presumably neural) state. If I had to take sides in this dispute, I might well feel a pull towards Siegel's view-if such distant counterfactuals are evaluable at all. But I debark from this boat a few ports sooner. !ese early legs of the journey will concern me here. 1. Perception's Objects: In introducing the Rich Content View Siegel puts things in what I think is a very revealing way: Is it already part of your visual experience that John Malkovich is walking by, carrying a dog? Or do you just visually experience an array of colored shapes bouncing slightly at regular intervals, and subsequently judge that it is John Malkovich carrying a dog? More generally, we can ask: do you just visually experience arrays of colored shapes, variously illuminated, and sometimes moving? Or does visual experience involve more complex features, such as personal identity, causation, and kinds such as bicycle, keys, and cars? (p. 3) Just this choice is o#ered repeatedly. (E.g., p. 78.) Already there are two telltale signs. One is the intrusion of 'that' into her $rst try at her preferred alternative: 'that John Malkovich is walking by'. Back to that in a moment. !e other is the alternative she o#ers. Either perceptual experience has representational content, and moreover rich content in her sense; or what we experience is merely shapes, colours, movements (etc.). Whether perceptual experience has representational content or not, and if so, whether rich or not, is, from the start, a matter of what its objects are-whether, e.g., John Malkovich or not. Or thus acccording to Siegel. !ere is no room from her perspective for a view on which what one sees if John Malkovich walks by holding a dog is: John Malkovich walking by holding a dog (unless one's attention was diverted at the crucial moment, or all went blurry, or there was excess of glare, or etc.); but representational content belongs only to the attitudes one forms in response to this. So, at least, for seeing (hallucinations being a di#erent story). What I want to consider in this section is what might be wrong with a perspective that does not allow such things-one on which, inter alia, if Rich Content were wrong, then what one saw would so-wie-so be di#erent than what we all know it to be. !at tell-tale 'that' makes a good beginning. It is a 'that' on which Frege commented at least twice. I cite: But then do I not see that this %ower has $ve petals? One can say that, but then does not use the word 'see' in the sense of mere lightperception, but means by this a thought or judgement connected with it. (1897: 149) But do we not see that the sun has set? And do we not also see thereby that this is true? !at the sun has set is no visible thing like the sun itself. !at the sun has set is recognised as true on the basis of sense impressions. (1918: 61) If 'see' starts life as a verb of perception, like related words it, seemingly ineluctably, acquires uses in recording thought, as in 'I see your point.' One sees (where this is something visual) what is apt for forming images, what is historical-datable, spatially locatable; for example, John before one, John walking, John's walking. !e sun set over the Douro's foz. !at it set is neither there nor on the sandbar separating sea from river (nor under the table on which I write this). It is not the sort of thing to form images. If Pia saw that John was walking, 'see' no longer speaks of the visual. It is what Pia might also have done in John's absence, noting the mud he tracked on her white rug. To deny that that John was walking is a visual phenomenon is thus not to deny that what Pia saw was John, walking (and thus, of course, his walking). It is not as though once we subtract that John was walking from the objects of perception proper, what is le" is just some congeries of colours and shapes. What one sees is what was there: John, walking (etc.). !is comes out also in the fact that what Pia saw may be John walking whether she realises this or not. All could have been a %eeting blur to her. Unknowingly seeing John walking, she may fail to see that John was walking. (Or again, failed to appreciate it as walking: 'You call that walking?') So at the very least denying perceptual experience representational content is not endorsing that all we see are congeries of shapes and colours, or that what we see is anything other than what is there-such things as John and his walking. Siegel presents us with a false choice. In the fourth of his 17 Kernsätze zur Logik Frege suggests the framework into which to $t this point: A thought always contains something which reaches beyond the particular case, by means of which it presents this to consciousness as falling under some given generality. ((unknown): Kernsatz 4) Two pieces are in play here: a thought; and a particular case. A thought represents the particular case as bearing a certain relation to a certain generality. If it represents correctly, the particular case does bear that relation to that generality. !e idea of a thought (in Frege's sense) can be parsed as follows: the thought is of some particular way for things to be, which it presents as being a way things are. It is of, e.g., things being such that John is walking, and presents this as one way things are. !at generality intrinsic to all thoughts, its 'reaching beyond the particular case', is found in this way for things to be, and its way of reaching beyond the particular case. In brief, if things are such that John is walking, they could have been that way had Pia been in Cleveland at the time instead of Boston, or if John had been wearing %ip-%ops instead of brogans-and so on ad inf. For the way for things in question to be the one it is is for it to reach as it thus does. Something about it thus determines when a particular case would fall under its generality-would bear that indicated relation to it. What is the the particular case? What is things being such that John is walking? !e simplest answer, and that which I will adopt here, is: it is things being as they are. !ings being as they are is things being such that John is walking. It achieves this in one of the inde$nitely many ways such might be achieved. (Cf. %ip-%ops.) I will say that it instances this way for things to be-my name for that relation of which I $rst spoke. What stands on one side of it-what has that generality intrinsic to any thought, what gets instanced-I will call '(the) conceptual'. What stands on the other side-what does the instancing-I will call '(the) nonconceptual'. Frege's point now becomes: the objects of perception belong to the nonconceptual. One sees, e.g., John's being as he is. Seeing-that, on the other hand, is a relation to some bit of the conceptual. One bears it in recognising that bit as instanced-e.g., the way things are being a case of John walking. Perceptual experience, at least where it is perceiving, is experiencing (witnessing) something nonconceptual (things being as they then are, or as much of that as one has in sight from his current perspective on the world). Why might one want to deny that that has (a) representational content? Consider words. Suppose Pia says, 'John is walking.' She might thus express some thought. For convenience, call it 'the thought that John is walking'. Her act of saying this-an act of speaking some words-thus has a representational content in the meaning of the act. Such sounds could be, might have been, produced in expressing some other thought, or none at all. Something in her way of doing what she did selects this one, as opposed to the others, as the one expressed. For perceptual experience to have no representational content is just for it to lack the means for e#ecting the selecting of this sort that would need doing for it to have one. What matters so far is just that one can perfectly well hold this without commitment to anything about the so-called (perceptual) 'phenomenology' of experience. Such phenomenology lies in what one witnesses, or might, thus in the nonconceptual. If what was witnessed is (instances), say, things being such that John is walking the dog, then one witnesses no less than John walking the dog, which (normally) looks as John walking the dog would look. So it is if John is walking the dog. But suppose one is illuded or hallucinating. Suppose it is for Pia just as though John were walking, though he is not. !en things look to her just as they thus would. (Watch John walk to see how this is.) Insofar as the illusion is visual, things look that way. !ey do not look to be that way. Vision takes no stands on whether that is how things are. Suppose that it is for Pia just as though John were walking, though he nor anyone is there at all. !en, perhaps, its being like this for her is itself no visual phenomenon, but a phenomenon of thought: it may lie in her taking John to be before her, walking, or in her taking just this to be the way things look. Now there is representing with truth-evaluable content. But the representer is her. She so represents things to herself. Still no signs of content of her (e.g., visual) experience. !e point here is grammatical, not phenomenological. !ere is an unbreachable divide between generalities, which are instanced, and history, which does the instancing. If perception lacks representational content, that is because generalities are thought's objects, while perception's are historical. 2. Accuracy: On Siegel's view, a perceptual experience represents things to be so-e.g., that there are peaches on the table. It is correct or incorrect according to whether things are as thus represented. She calls this '!e Content View'. She does not just assume this, but argues it. She o#ers two arguments. !e $rst, the 'argument from accuracy', involves these steps: 1. Perceptual experiences can be more or less accurate. 2. So they have accuracy conditions. 3. !ese attach to them as a truth condition would. 4. So an experience has a condition on truth: that things be thus and so. So it so represents things. Siegel stresses that such representing, if it exists, must be accessible to the perceiver. I agree-if it exists. She does not actually think that this 'argument from accuracy' works. !is leaves its purpose somewhat unclear. Still, it merits some comment. First, 'represent' may stand for many notions. Here two are notable. One is of a twoterm relation, the other of a three-term one. !e two term relation is between historical episodes or circumstances. !ose bags under Pia's eyes represent years of living with Sid's snoring. On this notion a bit of history represents whatever is to blame for it. !at club need be neither exclusive nor $xed univocally. !ose bags may represent the snoring, but also a youthful coup de foudre gone all wrong. Call such a link within the historical 'e#ect (or e-) representing. Generalisations may be licensed. Teetering rocks e-represent wind erosion (as a rule, except, e.g., in theme parks, where they do not). !e three-term relation, representing-as, involves a representer, that which is represented as such-and-such, and what it is represented as being. In familiar cases an author $ts into the $rst place. So might his vehicle-that by which he makes his representing recognisable (some words, say). In general, the second place is occupied by what Frege calls 'the particular case'- things being as they are. It may also be occupied by an object (or sequence of them) whose being as it is is represented as a case of a thing being thus and so. !e problem for representing-as, not arising for e-representing, is selecting an item to occupy this third place. !is is what is $t to be the truth-evaluable content of a representing. So representing-as is what must concern Siegel. While causal relations will do to identify the represented in erepresenting, the sorts of things which $ll the third place here, as Frege notes, do not participate in causal relations at all. !ey are the wrong sort for that. What identi$es the represented in e-representing thus does not so much as begin on that task for representing-as. Siegel's problem is thus to identify some way that perceptual experience may stand towards such things by which it does approach this. Now for Siegel's $rst step. Her aim here is to show that, in general, perceptual experiences are, or are liable to be, more or less accurate. !e next step will be: there are conditions on such accuracy. Preparatory to the step following, these conditions are going to be that what is experienced be thus and so. So, the idea is, these will be conditions on the experience's accuracy of what it is of. So, to continue, if the experience represented what it was of as such-and-such, they could be, and naturally would be, conditions on its accuracy, in such representing, of what it represented (as something). Now the last idea can be: since the experience is anyway held accountable for what it would be if it represented, we can forget the conditional If it walks like a duck and talks like a duck, ... . So it does represent. !ere are various notions of accuracy. Some are obviously of no use in this sort of case. Others may seem more promising. So it is strange that Siegel approaches her $rst step as she does. Her method is: she gives (roughly) three examples of (pairs of) perceptual experiences, asks us to admit that we have intuitions as to these being more, or less, accurate relative to each other, and then asks us, using our intuitions, to go on in the same way. !us is her notion of accuracy $xed. It is hard to see how such methodology could work. Suppose we do have the intuitions she asks us to have about her examples (as I do not). About what notion of accuracy would they be intuitions? So when we got to a novel case of a perceptual experience (as we do as we start every day), what should we look for to judge its accuracy? Here are three notions of accuracy not to her purpose. First, one historical circumstance (or type) may be a more or less accurate indicator of another. !e millesime of the banker's champagne may be a more or less accurate indicator of how good his day was. !e relative popularity of duvet ratings may be a more or less accurate indicator of energy prices. !e level of popcorn consumption at midweek movies may be a more or less accurate indicator of unemployment rates. Second, one thing or another may give a more or less accurate impression of something. !ose photos Sid shot of the service entrance of the Grand Krasnapolsky may give an inaccurate impression of the hotel. Pia's description of Sid as blonde and tanned may give an inaccurate impression of him if it is only his two remaining hairs that are blond, and his tan covers wrinkles and a paunch. Vic's hemming and hawing may give the (false) impression that there is something he is reluctant to disclose, where, in fact, he is only trying to remember where he is and why. !ird, a lens, or an ampli$er, and so on, may be more or less accurate transmitters or reproducers. Perhaps some of these notions $t some perceptual experiences. But none suit Siegel's purpose. !e accuracy of A as an indicator of B depends on the reliability and $neness of grain of their co-occurrence, or co-variation. !e level of mercury in a tube, for example, may indicate, more or less accurately, that the temperature is 20°, if it means that, and (more or less) exactly that. It can just as well indicate that the temperature is 7° if it means (more or less) exactly that. It might just as well indicate that the average piglet litter in Zafra is 6 if it reliably co-occurs with that. And if this mercury is now at this height in this tube and it is not 20°, then this does not so indicate, though perhaps things of its type as a rule do. What we have here is e#ect-representing, with that question about truth-evaluable representing which it leaves unaddressed: what way is that which is represented represented as being? What is the third term in the relation? As for giving accurate impressions, if what did this-Vic's hemming and hawing, e.g.-determined just what impression it, per se, gave-just how things were according to it-then perhaps we could get started. But the impression Vic gives you all depends on what you know of him, what you have in mind at the moment, and so on. !ere is no de$nite way for things to be-again the third term in that relation-determined by Vic's doings as such. As for lenses and ampli$ers, for them to be accurate in the sense they are is for them not to distort, in some sense of distortion proper to them. If it is the ampli"er which is to be accurate, there is no saying how the world must be for it to be this. Input has a role. And if it fails to reproduce Hendrix accurately-that is, distorts him-it as not as though it presents him as having done other than he did. It is just does not reproduce sound very well. Other notions of accuracy may $t some cases of perceiving. Perspective can make it hard, or impossible, to see-tell-accurately the relative height of tall buildings in a cityscape. In one or another sense of 'look', things may look other than they are. If one building looked taller than another only when it was, that might count as seeing accurately. But does any notion $t which meets Siegel's (or her argument's) needs? Here is a reason to think not. For a perceptual experience to have a truth condition would be for a third term to be provided, for it, for that relation, representing-as, discussed above, to which something-the experience, the 'perceptual system' which generated it, or something else in the experience-may stand as a $rst term. It would be for a generality-some item within the conceptual-to be selected as the one under which that experience presents (or brings) the particular case-the nonconceptual, here what is seen-as falling. But perception's role is o#ering awareness of the nonconceptual-a role it may $ll, or (sometimes) fail at. Perceptual awareness is of (or, where all goes wrong, as though of) just this. It is not awareness of relations between the conceptual and the nonconceptual, so not of instancing. As Frege noted more than once, such awareness is to be sought in another place. So nothing in perceptual experience so much as begins on selecting some item from the conceptual to be the way in it things are represented being. Here, perceptual experience and e-representing stand on equal footing. Which is instanced, for example, in the fact that if, as in one of Siegel's examples, the $sh in the $shbowl looks as though to the right of the castle, while in fact directly over it, there is nothing to decide whether this is to be a case of things being other than as the experience represents them. A"er all, the way things are, in this case, is precisely such as so to look when so viewed. Why is this not a case of things falling under that generality to whose falling under that experience commits? A $nal note on intuition. Of course, neither $shbowls, nor their appearance, represent. Nor does Siegel think so. What is to represent, on her view, is my experience, or experiencing, of them. Not how things look, but how they look to me, is what is meant to matter. Which is a di#erence which is meant to matter. I have just o#ered a reason to think it does not. I will return to this at the end. It is perhaps with such things in mind that Siegel chooses as a substantial portion of her limited collection of examples cases of illusion. For example, Pia hallucinates an airport (or Logan). In one case she does this in the airport, in another at home. We are asked to share the intuition that in the $rst case the hallucination is more accurate than in the last. If intuition is what matters here, this suggestion strikes me as bizarre. Waiting, bored, in the bar for Pia, Sid doodles on cocktail napkins. He draws a picture of a tall man in a top hat, carrying a tomcat under his arm. Amazingly, just then a tall man in a top hat, etc., walks by. He looks exactly like the drawing. !e drawing certainly does not depict that man accurately. It does not depict him at all. Time passes. One mezcal too many, Sid begins to hallucinate: a horned toad jumping onto his knee. By coincidence, a horned toad does then so jump. !is is not for the hallucination to be accurate. It is of a horned toad jumping, true enough. But it is not of, does not depict, that bit of history, the surroundings of Sid's knee being as they then were. In a di#erent use of 'representation', the hallucination makes no representations in that regard. It is on a par here with Sid's cocktail napkin. In the hallucination, no particular case is brought under any generality. Such is another face of failure to e#ect representing-as. 3. !e Import of Appearing: In the end Siegel agrees (I think) that the facts about accuracy do not quite show what she wants. So she o#ers a second argument, an 'Argument from Appearing'. It begins with this premise: All visual perceptual experiences present clusters of properties as being instantiated. (p. 45) It ends with this conclusion: All visual perceptual experiences have content. (Ibid) !e $ller may make for a sort of validity. But this $rst premise clearly will not do. !e point of section 1 returns here. Visual experiences, at least where they are seeing, are awareness (so far as it extends) of the nonconceptual, things being as they are-that which instances generalities, and is not itself a generality to be instanced. Such is the function of perception, more generally of perceptual (e.g., visual) capacities. Its evolutionary value, such as it is lies here. !ings being as they are instances, is a case of, all sorts of generalities-of something, or some things, having whatever properties it, or they, have. !ings being as they visibly are is (inter alia) their instancing whatever such generalities are visibly instanced by their being as they are. !e function of perception is to allow the perceiver, by drawing on his conceptual capacities, to recognise such instancing where it occurs, so far as these capacities extend. Experiencing things being as they are is, ipso facto, experiencing their having whatever properties their being as they are is a case of having. It is thus to experience the historical instantiating of whatever properties are thus instantiated. Whether there is some determinate cluster of such properties is an issue we can leave aside. We can say, if we like, that experience presents (better confronts) us with particular instantiatings of properties, if this just means that it consists in witnessing some bits of history which are such instantiatings. It does not present us with those properties as instantiated, at least if that means presenting (identifying) them as (among) those which are instantiated by things being as they are. It does not present what does the instancing as that which would instance this or that such generality. It merely presents what does the instancing. It makes no representations, nor presentations, as to what would instance what. Siegel moves from her $rst premise to the conclusion that, for an experience E, there is a cluster of properties, F, such that "Necessarily: things are the way E presents them only if property cluster F is instantiated." But, in the case of perception, things are as an experience presents them just in case they are as they are (or, again, visibly are). For any cluster F, this requires F to be instantiated only if things are as they are only if F, and F being instantiated ensures that things are as presented only if for F to be instantiated is for things to be as they are. But we cannot suppose (nor would Siegel, for that matter) that, while perception has representational content, the way it represents things as being is always (no other than) just the way things are (or visibly are). We may leave the second argument at this point. 4. Illusions: Siegel thus leaves us with the usual question about the 'content view'. Why would anyone ever think such a thing? Ignoring the distinction between generalities and what instances them, or between representing-as and e-representing, perhaps. Or perhaps just in catching something going around. If, like Locke, one thought that perception was never of things in our surrounding, he might then, with Locke, posit sensed objects which represent these. But such brings us only to e-representing. And, in any case, presumably Siegel does not mean to be like Locke in these respects. Still, unworldly objects, Lockean or not, have some role to play in Siegel's story. No one thinks a gold$sh, or its bowl, represents anything as so. Nor does refraction. Nor does the bowl's appearance. Representing-as enters the picture, if at all, in the experiencing of such things. So there must be something in the experiencing, other than those things themselves, which makes this representing recognisable. Such an ingredient shows up, for Siegel, where what we experience is not what surrounds us, or its looks, but merely how things look to us- e.g. (as she conceives things) in hallucinations, or in experiencing other phenomena, such as phosphenes, or, perhaps, a"erimages. (Cf. p. 62) Such things might serve as vehicles of representing-as, were there but some representer whose vehicle they might be. But why think they do bring with them representing-as? Well, in one class of cases we speak of hallucinations as of such-and-such-e.g, of an empregada bearing a pastrami sandwich. Since it is an hallucination, there is no pastrami-bearing empregada for it to be of. So how could it be of such a thing? Compare pictures (of the wallhanging sort). Frege asked whether a picture, as bare visible object, could be true, and a leaf or a stone not true. (See 1918: ??.) His answer was: a picture could be true only if an intention attached to it. 'Intention' is, perhaps, not quite le mot juste. But there is what an intention might accomplish: to make the picture bear a certain understanding; be to be understood as relating to a certain way there is for things to be-e.g., such that Cologne Cathedral has three %ying buttresses. !e picture would relate to that way for things to be in this way: it would depict things as being that way (what it would be for things so to be). Here, then, we would $nd representing-as (though this need not be representing truly or falsely-representing the cathedral to be a certain way-and if it were, that it depicted the cathedral as with three %ying buttresses would not yet decide how things must be for it to have depicted truly. (It might, e.g., just depict a proposed change.) One might see some hallucinations as following pictures here. !e hallucination would be of a pastrami-bearing empragada in relating to a way for things to be-such that an emprageda is bearing pastrami. And it would do that, in the absence of any such empregada, in things being represented being that way in the relevant experiencing, whether by its object, or, perhaps, by its su#erer). As with pictures, this would not per se involve hallucinations in being true or false, accurate, or not. I have already given reasons not to see them so involved. If experiences are involved in such a way with ways for things to be, then just possibly some representing-a is going on. It would not follow automatically that it is the experience that is doing the representing; nor that its su#erer is being represented to. !ere are other candidates. But such issues I will not pursue further here. Perhaps some hallucinations do work like that. If so, one might point out, with the disjunctivist, that what relates experience to a way for things to be where, as in such cases, things are not that way (or their being so is not experienced) is not needed for so relating them where things are that way; so that, in such cases-ones of perception-there is no reason to take it to be present. But disjunctivism is, I think, a view with which Siegel has little sympathy. Charles Travis 2012 Bibliography: Frege, Gottlob, (unknown): "17 Kernsätze zur Logik", in Nachgelassene Schri#en (see below), pp. 189-190. _____ 1897: "Logik", Nachgelassene Schrifen, 2!" edition, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1983, pp. 137-163. _____, 1918: "Der Gedanke", Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, V. 1, n. 2, 1918, pp. 58-77. Siegel, Susanna, !e Contents of Visual Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Clean people, unclean people: the essentialisation of 'slaves' among the southern Betsileo of Madagascar In this article I argue that among the southern Betsileo slave descendants are essentialised by free descendants. After explaining how this striking case of psychological essentialism manifests in the local context, I provide experimental evidence for it and discuss the results of three cognitive tasks that I ran in the field. I then suggest that slaves were not essentialised in the pre-colonial era and contend that the essentialist construal only became entrenched in the aftermath of the 1896 abolition of slavery, which paradoxically triggered the historical process of essentialisation. Key words psychological essentialism, slavery, uncleanliness, cognition, abolition, Madagascar I n t r o duc t i o n In the southern Betsileo highlands of Madagascar, a sharp distinction is drawn between clean and unclean people. The expression 'clean people' (olo madio) refers to persons who are said to have free ancestry, whereas 'unclean people' (olo tsy madio) is used to label those who are considered to have slave forebears. This distinction pervades southern Betsileo social life and is far from being benign: on the grounds of their alleged uncleanliness and inferior status, slave descendants are discriminated 'in a thousand encounters in everyday life' (Kottak 1980: 104), despite the fact that free and slave descendants often perform the same activities, live in the same villages, go to the same schools and churches, and sometimes have excellent relationships with each other. During the two-year fieldwork I conducted in Beparasy, a rural area of the southern Betsileo region, I dedicated a large amount of time to understanding the condition of slave descendants. My approach to the problem was of course much influenced by the specific situation I discovered in the field. Soon after my arrival in Beparasy, I became acquainted with members of a local descent group called the Berosaiña.1 Initially, I did not know that they had a reputation of slave descent, but as time went on I discovered that the Berosaiña were considered to be unclean people, even though they were a well-established group owning land, cattle and ancestral tombs. I found the situation of the Berosaiña striking since my readings of the ethnographic literature had given me the idea that Betsileo slave descendants lived a rather miserable life, either in poor satellite hamlets where they sharecropped the land of their former masters – as in the cases described by Kottak (1980) and Freeman (2013) – or in migrant villages where they were harshly treated and exploited because they were not able to prove a clean ancestry – as reported by Evers (2002). In comparison, the 1 Beparasy and Berosaiña are fictitious names that I use to preserve the anonymity of my informants. 152 Social Anthropology/Anthropologie Sociale (2015) 23, 2 152–168. © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. doi:10.1111/1469-8676.12107 DENIS REGNIER Berosaiña were well integrated in the local peasant community and, to a certain extent, treated as equals. I eventually found out that this relative integration was in most part due to the fact that one of their ancestors was among the first settlers of Beparasy. I therefore wondered: if their social and economic condition is rather fortunate compared with that of other slave descendants in the region, why have the Berosaiña remained locked in such an unclean and low status? The short answer is that the Berosaiña are stuck in this situation because free descendants strictly refuse to marry them. The Berosaiña, in consequence, have no other option than marrying other slave descendants, and these alliances with people who are themselves considered unclean further strengthen the prejudice of free descendants against them. This answer, however correct, begs the question: why do free descendants refuse so strictly to marry slave descendants? Elsewhere I have provided an account of the different reasons for the marriage avoidance, highlighting in particular status-isogamous marriage rules, the vigilant memory of 'origins' and a principle of hypodescent applied in case of mixed marriages (Regnier 2014b). To account for the way free descent people think of the Berosaiña, I also suggested that they strongly essentialise slave descendants, using the term 'essentialise' in the specific sense of psychological essentialism. To put it simply, I argued that free descendants think of slave descendants as having an inner essence that makes them what they are and that cannot be changed. My goal in this article is to examine more closely the essentialist construal of 'slaves' (andevo) among the southern Betsileo by combining ethnographic observations, cognitive experiments and historical analysis. In the first part, I will explain why I think that slave descendants are essentialised. To this aim, I will provide ethnographic details on how free descendants think of the Berosaiña in Beparasy and discuss the results of an experimental study I conducted in the field. In the second part, I will argue that 'slaves' in pre-abolition times were probably not essentialised as they are today, and suggest a speculative account of the historical events that led to the essentialism that now prevails. 'S l aves ' ( a n devo ) among t he sou t he r n Be t s i l e o Most of the southern Betsileo are rice-growing and cattle-raising peasants who live in rural villages and hamlets close to their rice fields, in the meridional part of the central highlands of Madagascar. The basic units of their social organisation are the tombcentred, named local descent groups (foko; firazanana). Membership of these groups is cognatic, optative and non-exclusive, but shows a strong patrilineal bias since most people prefer viri-patrilocal post-marital residence and they are most often buried in their father's tomb (Kottak 1980), even though they have the right to be buried in any of the tombs of the descent groups to which they belong. Ancient southern Betsileo society was very hierarchical and made up of three endogamous status groups: 'nobles' (hova), 'commoners' (olompotsy, sometimes also called vohitse) and 'slaves' (andevo). This division of all southern Betsileo into three categories continues to be relevant up to this date. The relevance of these caste-like status groups, called raza, is particularly obvious when it comes to understanding the situation of the 'slaves' (andevo) today.2 In 2 Among the southern Betsileo 'slave' (andevo) is used as shorthand for 'slave descendant' (taranak'andevo or dorian'andevo). It does not refer to contemporary forms of slavery, which to my knowledge do not exist in the usual sense of the term in the region. CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 153 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Beparasy I was frequently told by the olompotsy, who represent the vast majority of the southern Betsileo population, 'nowadays everyone is like everyone else' (efa mitovy aby am'izao). This statement was meant to stress the equality of (economic) conditions between the olompotsy and the andevo who live among them.3 Yet, the olompotsy were also quick to clarify that it is strictly forbidden for them to marry the andevo. The issue of marriage, my informants often added, is their only problem with the andevo. A number of sociological and historical reasons account for the olompotsy's reluctance to marry slave descendants but one of the most striking aspects of the problem is the fact that the olompotsy call them olo tsy madio ('unclean people', or olo maloto, 'dirty people') and consider their uncleanliness to be polluting. A number of euphemisms are also used to refer to slave descendants but olo tsy madio and olo maloto are by far the most commonly employed terms. Whereas a minority of my olompotsy informants explained they would be polluted (and could become sick) if they shared a plate or a glass with an andevo, most of them considered that it is only through intimate and regular contacts that this can happen. People often illustrated the issue of pollution by referring to the case of 'mixed' unions, i.e. olompotsy–andevo couples setting up a 'hearth in a house' (tokantrano) together in spite of the prohibition. It must be clear that the prohibition only comes from the side of the olompotsy, because andevo families never prevent their members from marrying olompotsy. Actual cases of 'mixed' unions are not very frequent but during my fieldwork I encountered three (Regnier 2012: chapter 5). In such cases, olomposty families repudiate their members who have breached the prohibition and exclude them from the ancestral tomb. This exclusion is arguably the most serious social sanction for the southern Betsileo. Moreover, to the eyes of their olompotsy relatives, the excluded members have become unclean through the sexual contacts with their andevo partner. Consequently, if they want to be buried in the ancestral tomb – for example, if their union breaks up and they go back to their family asking for forgiveness – they will have to be cleansed through a costly ritual involving the killing of an ox. The problem becomes even more sensitive if the mixed couple produce children. In that case, the couple's children are also considered to be unclean by the olompotsy side, but unlike their olompotsy parent the children cannot be cleansed through a ritual because their olompotsy relatives view them as irredeemably unclean. From the olompotsy's point of view, therefore, the couple's unclean children can only be buried in andevo tombs or, alternatively, in a separate tomb that the olompotsy build for them.4 The olompotsy thus seem to think that andevo parents inevitably transmit their uncleanliness to their children.5 When I asked my olompotsy informants why the andevo were unclean, they explained that slaves in the past had to deal with 'dirt' (ny maloto) all the time. When asked what kind of dirt, they almost unanimously stressed the daily handling of 3 Kottak, who carried out research in the 1960s, estimated the proportion of people called 'slaves' (andevo) in the southern Betsileo population varied between 5% and 15% (1980: 105). This estimate is consistent with my own observations. It is important to note, however, that many andevo live in mixed villages (i.e. with olompotsy and sometimes hova families). 4 The building of a new, separate tomb to solve the problem of unclean children was often mentioned to me as the only acceptable solution, because olompotsy are very reluctant to 'abandon' the children to the andevo and their tombs. In practice, however, such a solution is costly and generates further problems in the olompotsy descent group, in particular because it damages its reputation. 5 This is a case of hypodescent (Harris and Kottak 1963) because the children are automatically ascribed the status of the 'inferior' parent. 154 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. excrements (tay) and other soiling tasks such as cleaning the cattle pen. Some explained that the blood (rà) of slave descendants had become unclean through their frequent contact with dirt.6 My olompotsy informants thus seemed to consider that andevo have something that cannot be observed directly, but that makes them intrinsically unclean and permanently bestows on them the identity of unclean people.7 Their uncleanliness – conceptualised either vaguely or somewhat more precisely in terms of unclean blood – seems to be conceived by the olompotsy as if it were lodged 'deep inside' them. Moreover, as I have already explained, the olompotsy hold that the uncleanliness transmitted by the andevo parent to the children of mixed unions is impossible to cleanse. All this seems to bear a clear signature of psychological essentialism. According to Medin, who first coined the term, psychological essentialism refers to the tendency to 'act as if things (...) have essences (...) that make them the things they are' (1989: 1476). A growing body of research has provided evidence of its pervasiveness as a cognitive bias, including in very young infants (Gelman 2003) and across cultures (e.g. Atran 1998; Mahalingam 1998; Astuti et al. 2004). Yet not all 'things' are essentialised and scholars are still debating why some are more readily essentialised than others. Since psychological essentialism appears to be particularly frequent in social categorisation it has attracted the attention of social psychologists (see in particular the contributions in Yzerbyt et al. 2004) and, more rarely, anthropologists. In social psychology it has been investigated in a variety of domains including gender, religion, sexual orientation and political groups (Prentice and Miller 2007), while in anthropology it has been notably discussed in relation to racism (Hirschfeld 1996), ethnicity (Gil-White 2001) and language (McIntosh 2005). In a seminal article, Rothbart and Taylor suggested that 'whereas social categories are in reality more like human artifacts than natural kinds, they are often perceived as more like natural kinds than human artifacts' (1992: 12) and like natural kinds they are often assumed to have an underlying essence. This line of research linking essentialism and natural kind-ness has been widely followed in social psychology, whereas others (e.g. Yzerbyt et al. 2001) have examined the relations between essentialism and entitativity (i.e. the perception of a strong degree of similarity and organisation among the members of a group). More recently, however, some scholars have argued that essentialism about social categories should be strictly differentiated from natural kind-ness and entitativity, and restricted to the attribution of an underlying essence to social groups (Demoulin et al. 2006). For these authors, what matters is whether groups are perceived as 'forced social categories', i.e. categories whose membership is imposed on people, or 'chosen social categories', i.e. categories whose membership is dependent on group members' personal choice. According to them, both categories can be equally essentialised, but forced social categories are essentialised because they are perceived as highly 'natural' groups, whereas chosen social categories are essentialised because they are perceived as highly entitative. 6 Evers also reports that her informants viewed the uncleanliness of slave descendants as an uncleanliness of blood (2002: 70). 7 In other regions of Madagascar, such as in Imerina, slave ancestry is often suspected or ascribed on the basis of phenotype (Razafindralambo 2014). This is not the case among the southern Betsileo. CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 155 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Slave descendants in the southern Betsileo region are clearly perceived as a forced social category by the olompotsy, who are very well aware that this inferior status is not the slave descendants' choice and that this identity is imposed on them. Moreover the slave descendants' forced endogamy – a consequence of the fact the olompotsy strictly refuse to marry them – strengthens the perception that they are 'a different kind of people' (karaza olo hafa) and a 'natural' category. Has t h i s pe r s o n become c l ean? A sho r t expe r imen t a l s t u d y In order to explore the issue of whether olompotsy essentialise slave descendants, I conducted a field experiment in Beparasy from September to October 2012 and in April 2013. It consisted in telling people three stories about an adoption, a cleansing ritual and a blood transfusion that focused on either an unclean or a clean fictional character (see annexes). These stories were followed by the following question: 'In your opinion, has this person become clean [or unclean] or has s/he remained unclean [clean]?' The tasks were designed in such a way that the stories sound familiar, and the question seems relevant and easily understandable. The question was followed by an open conversation during which I asked people to explain their answer.8 Each of the tasks found their rationale in issues that arose from my long-term participant observation fieldwork in Beparasy. The idea of using an adoption task came to my mind while I was in the field, after I had heard about a kind of 'natural experiment' bearing much resemblance with adoption stories used in cognitive psychology. It concerned two villagers who had arrived in Beparasy as babies in the 1960s. As I was told, a man from the eastern coast had proposed the babies for adoption because they were twins. Twins are thought to bring bad luck among some populations of the east coast of Madagascar and are therefore often abandoned by their parents. A childless couple of Beparasy decided to take these two babies to raise them as their children. In 2008–10, the twins were about 50 years old. A member of the local descent group of the twins' adoptive father told me that there had been on-going discussions within his family about whether the twins could be buried in the ancestral tomb. When I first heard the story, I thought that these difficulties had to do with the reputation of bad luck attached to twins, but I was told that the Betsileo do not believe that twins bring bad luck. The problem was of a different nature: at stake was the fact that nobody knew the origins (fiavy) of the twins and what their status group (raza) might be. The fear, I was told, was that they might be unclean persons, i.e. 'slaves'. The matter was not yet settled at the time of my last visit – indeed, it will be definitely settled only at the time of the twins' death – but in the family the prevailing opinion was that the twins, as well as their children, should be buried outside of the ancestral tomb as a precaution. Adoption and fosterage are very frequent practices in Madagascar, which reflect the 'fluidity' and 'optativity' often attributed to Malagasy kinship in general (Southall 8 Unfortunately, due to a lack of space I cannot do justice to the ethnographic richness of these conversations, which were remarkably open in comparison with more ordinary contexts where a 'silence' on slavery is usually observed (Somda 2009; Freeman 2013). Retrospectively, running the three tasks proved a very effective way to circumvent the southern Betsileo reticence to talk about slavery and slave descent. 156 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. 1986; Kottak 1986). A person's affiliation with a particular kin group and social identity is not fixed at birth but changes throughout life; it is only fixed at the time of death, when this person is placed in an ancestral tomb (Bloch 1993). Adoption and switchedat-birth tasks have already been used in Madagascar to explore issues of biological inheritance among Zafimaniry (Bloch et al. 2001) and Vezo adults and children (Astuti et al. 2004). My aim was to use an adoption scenario to explore essentialism since I thought that if olompotsy had an essentialist view they would hold, contrary to ideas of fluid social identity, that a baby of slave descent adopted and raised by a free descent family would not become a clean person in adulthood. On the basis of the real-life story about the twins, I expected that a number of olompotsy would provide such a negative answer, although the fact that there was an on-going discussion within the twins' adoptive family indicated some degree of disagreement. The adoption task's main goal was thus to get an idea of the proportion of respondents who would hold an essentialist view. The cleansing ritual task had a similar goal. As I have explained above, the children of mixed olompotsy–andevo couples are considered by the olompotsy side to be irredeemably unclean; for this reason, they cannot be buried in their tombs. My olompotsy informants insisted on the impossibility of cleansing these children. I found this particularly striking because the southern Betsileo make frequent use of rituals to remove various kinds of pollution. Moreover, southern Betsileo rituals for cleansing slaves after manumission are attested in oral histories and archival sources. I was thus interested in knowing whether contemporary southern Betsileo would think that, under some specific conditions, a ritual could cleanse a slave descendant. I made up a story where a young man of slave descent is in love with a free descent girl. Since they cannot marry, the young man decides to ask a ritual specialist to perform a cleansing ritual so that he becomes a clean person. I have already mentioned the alleged uncleanliness of the slave descendants' blood. I chose to use a blood transfusion story because I knew that when olompotsy create fictive kinship links with slave descendants through a ritual called vakirà they do not drink their blood – as it normally should be for this ritual – but replace it with rum, out of fear of being polluted. Among the southern Betsileo, like in many other cultural contexts (see Carsten 2011), blood (rà) is an important symbol. During ceremonies the blood of slaughtered cattle is ritually used to bless, cleanse and protect people as well as material things such as houses. The goal of the blood transfusion task was therefore different from the previous ones since it examined the possibility, for a clean person, to become 'deeply' unclean after receiving blood from an unclean person. In other words, the issue I wanted to explore with this task was one of extremely serious pollution through blood mixing.9 Each task had two slightly different versions: the second version (which I call task #2) was identical to the first version (task #1) except for one sentence added at the end of the story, which mentioned that local people had reached a consensus with regards to the question under consideration (see the additional sentences in annex IV). This consensus consisted in the view opposite to the one articulated by the majority of respondents in task #1. The goal was therefore to see whether respondents to task #2 9 I am grateful to Jonathan Parry for bringing to my attention the issues of blood and uncleanliness in medical contexts. CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 157 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. would be sensitive to the consensus and significantly change their answers in comparison with the results of task #1.10 All the interviews took place in people's houses. Together with Ramose Martin, a friend who helped me with the implementation of the tasks, we tried to avoid bias in the selection of respondents by choosing randomly a direction everyday (e.g. south) and by walking in this direction from one hamlet to another in search of potential participants. The age of respondents varied from about 20 to about 70 and for each task we kept a balance across gender. All the participants were olompotsy. The results of the adoption task are given in Figure 1.11 The responses to the first version of the task show that a large proportion (75%) of the participants judged that an unclean baby raised by a clean couple does not become a clean adult person. In other words, a significant majority thought that the baby could not become clean through adoption by clean parents and long-term affiliation with a free descent group in a free descent village. In the discussion many stressed that 'nothing could be done' for the unclean child. I take this as evidence that most olompotsy essentialise andevo. Some of the respondents who judged that the baby has become a clean adult justified their choice by explaining that the child 'follows the ancestral history (tantarandraza) of his/her [adoptive] parents'. I understand this as meaning that these olompotsy overrode the essentialist construal of 'slaves' that prevailed among their peers and gave more weight to their 'fluid' conceptions of kinship and identity. Others justified their answer by referring to Christian beliefs and stressing that there were no such differences between people. 10 Ideally I should also have run a third version of the task with a consensus that referred to the view of the majority of respondents (i.e. the view opposed to the consensus expressed in the second version of the task), but this was not possible due to time constraints and to the difficulty in finding respondents. 11 All the results are presented in rounded percentages for comparative purposes. For the adoption task we had 24 respondents for the first version (Adoption #1) and 18 for the second version with the consensus (Adoption #2). Figure 1 Adoption task 158 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Interestingly, the results show that the mention of a consensus on the view that the adopted baby has become a clean adult person has no significant effect on the pattern of the responses.12 This apparently suggests that essentialist thinking might be quite impervious to what other people in the village would think. Moreover the similarity with the results obtained with the first version of the task seems to indicate that olompotsy consistently essentialise the andevo. The cleansing ritual task provided very similar responses and thus also showed that a large proportion of olompotsy essentialise slave descendants (see Figure 2).13 A large majority of respondents holds that the most powerful cleansing ritual one can think of in the southern Betsileo context (and which was used in the past for cleansing slaves) cannot cleanse present-day slave descendants. Interestingly, during the discussions people stressed that such a cleansing could not be performed successfully today because, they explained, the hova have lost the power they had in the past. The two reasons they gave for this loss was French colonisation, which put the hova's role as rulers to an end, and the hova's intermarriages with olompotsy, which resulted in corrupting 'what makes them hova' (ny maha-hova). These comments were made even though I had anticipated the second reason and mentioned in the script that the ritual specialist was a hova tena hova (hova mbola tsy nanambady vohitse), i.e. a 'noble really noble (nobles who have not yet married commoners)'.14 12 For the adoption task, χ2(1) = .04 and p = .84. The p-value being greater than .05, we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 13 We had 18 respondents for Cleansing ritual #1 and 24 for Cleansing ritual #2. 14 Among the southern Betsileo, healers-diviners (ombiasa), heads of families and hova can perform cleansing rituals. The most powerful ones are believed to be those of hova (provided they have not intermarried with olompotsy), followed by heads of families and then ombiasa. In an early version of the task I made the mistake of using an ombiasa in the story, but my informants advised me to refer to a hova instead, to make sure that the story seemed credible. Figure 2 Cleansing ritual task CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 159 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Moreover, like in the previous task, the mention of a consensus did not seem to have any significant effect.15 The results for the first version of the blood transfusion task (Figure 3) do not show a clear preference for one response over the other and their interpretation is thus less straightforward.16 The running of the two versions of the task and the discussions that followed provided interesting insights nonetheless. First, it should be noted that, unlike the other tasks, the blood transfusion story seemed a bit unfamiliar to the participants. They clearly knew about the medical act of transfusing blood, but because the region is far away from the closest hospital and most people in Beparasy have never been hospitalised, the question sounded less familiar than those about adoption, marriage or cleansing ritual. Whereas people understood the other stories as a real possibility and could answer the question quickly, during this task they expressed surprise at the question and took some time before giving their judgement. Moreover, during the discussions it became clear that their responses depended on their interpretation of the task's question. Most of them answered that Rakoto, the character who received blood, has become unclean if they interpreted the question to be about the kind of 'superficial' pollution that I have already mentioned in case of mixed couples and which can be cleansed through a ritual. The other half answered that Rakoto had not become unclean if they interpreted the question to be about Rakoto's transformation into a slave descendant. Therefore, once the answers are put in the context of the discussions that followed the task, it becomes apparent that only a handful of respondents thought that Rakoto had become as unclean as an andevo. Most of them judged instead that Rakoto was only superficially polluted after receiving the unclean blood. They explained that he could be cleansed by a ritual and buried in an ancestral tomb. Unlike the previous tasks, the mention of a consensus on the view that Rakoto is still clean after the transfusion seemed to have a significant effect.17 As I have just 15 For the cleansing ritual task, χ2(1) = .04 and p = .51. Here again the p-value is greater than .05 so we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 16 We had 24 respondents for Blood transfusion #1 and 18 for Blood transfusion #2. 17 For the blood transfusion task, χ2 (1) = 4.36 and p = .04. The p-value is less than .05 so we can take the decision to reject the null hypothesis. Figure 3 Blood transfusion task 160 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. explained, the words 'become unclean' in the task's question could mean either 'become superficially polluted' or 'become deeply polluted' (i.e. become an andevo). I would therefore argue that the difference of results between the two versions of the task means that the respondents were somewhat perplexed about how to interpret my question and therefore most of them followed the consensus mentioned in the second version, while in the first version indecision was predominant. Overall, the results of the tasks suggest that for most respondents receiving unclean blood from a slave descendant does not cause a deep and irreparable pollution. I interpret this as meaning that, in spite of what olompotsy sometimes told me, they do not perceive the alleged unclean blood of slave descendants as the causal factor for their uncleanliness. I would rather argue that the olompotsy tend to conceptualise the 'inner essence' of slave descendants in terms of blood because it is a bodily substance that is particularly 'good to think', to use Lévi-Strauss' famous phrase. As Medin and Ortony argued (1989: 184–5), psychological essentialism is a placeholder notion: one can believe that a category has an essence without knowing exactly what the essence is. Were s l ave s a l r e ad y es sen t i a l i s e d be f o r e abo l i t i o n? The data obtained with the field experiment confirmed what I had inferred frommy ethnographic observations, namely that present-day olompotsy essentialise slave descendants. One of the main points that emerged is the extent to which people hold that the slave descendants' unclean status is irredeemable. The conversations with respondents also comforted my intuition that the essentialist construal of andevo needs to be understood in a historical perspective (Regnier 2012: chapter 7). In this section, I would like to argue that before abolition slaves must have been differently conceptualised to how their descendants are today, and to suggest that after abolition a subtle but important conceptual change occurred in the way southern Betsileo olompotsy think of the andevo. As far as we know, slavery is probably a very ancient institution in Madagascar. It increased in scale, however, with the arrival of Europeans and their need for slave labour in the Indian Ocean (Allen 2014), as well as with the rise of the Merina empire in Madagascar (Campbell 2005). From the end of the 18th century and during most of the 19th century, enslavement became so widespread in the Malagasy highlands that everyone was continuously at risk of being enslaved (Larson 2000). Virtually every individual, noble or commoner, rich or poor, man or woman, adult or child, could be captured and sold, being the victim of a local war, of a raid operated by the bands of 'men's thieves' (mpangalatr'olo) that plagued the highlands until the end of the 19th century, or of ill-intentioned neighbours who wanted to make some money. According to Larson, 'By 1820, perhaps as many as 70 percent of highland Malagasy households experienced the loss of a member to the export slave trade' (1999: 341). At the same time, in the pre-abolition era, slaves could be freed through a legal process and could rid themselves of the unclean status associated with enslavement through ritual cleansing. Slaves could work in addition to their duties, save money and buy themselves back from their masters (Rakoto 1997). The ubiquity, frequency and the very possibility of these changes of status make it very likely that free people regarded slave status as a contingent rather than a fixed status. People must have conceived enslavement as a shameful yet reversible condition, the uncleanliness of which could be removed if one could do the necessary ritual. In other words, the CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 161 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. uncleanliness of slaves was probably not viewed as immutable and irredeemable. Furthermore, in pre-abolition times the category of andevo was not necessarily perceived as a 'forced social category'. Oral histories attest that it was frequent to see poor olompotsy propose their own enslavement to the hova because their slaves had better living conditions than the poorest segments of the free peasantry. It is therefore likely that the category andevo was, in pre-abolition times, not perceived as a natural kind as it is today. The category of slaves was probably not perceived as highly entitative either: given the precariousness of their condition and the diversity of their trajectories, andevo were probably viewed more as a collection of individuals than as a coherent group. I find historical evidence supporting my argument in a document that was only recently discovered in the archives of a Norwegian missionary (Razafindralambo 2008) and translated and published by Gueunier et al. (2005). The published material consists of three texts. In the first, a southern Betsileo man named Isambo of noble origin explains how he was kidnapped as a child in Betsileo country, brought to Antananarivo to be sold on the slave market and then finally bought by Lutherian missionaries who freed him. Isambo became a primary school teacher in Fianarantsoa. In the second text, Isambo tells the story of how, after many difficulties, he managed to contact his relatives in the southern Betsileo region of Ikalamavony, ten years after having been kidnapped. The third part of the document is a manuscript entitled 'The customs to accomplish to "wash the tongue", or to give the blessing to a child who has been rejected but will become a child again' (literal translation of Ny fomba fanao raha manoza lela na hanao tsiodrano zaza nariana ka haverina ho zanaka indray). According to the editors, although the manuscript is not signed, it is very likely to have been written by Isambo, as indicated by the resemblance of the handwriting with Isambo's autobiographical accounts mentioned earlier, and by the use of Betsileo dialect in parts of the description (Gueunier et al. 2005: 72–3). Isambo wrote his account shortly before the abolition of slavery. The ritual of 'washing the tongue' (manoza lela) – a variant of the 'scratching of the tongue' (mikao-dela) that was described to me in Beparasy – is presented as a ritual that could be performed with two different aims: to reintegrate people who had been freed from slavery, or to reintegrate children who had been previously repudiated by their parents. Thus, in both cases, the cleansing ritual serves the purpose of reintegrating an individual into a local descent group and, consequently, into a wider local community of kinsmen. Isambo's account provides evidence that slaves were indeed considered as dirty and extremely diminished persons (see also Regnier 2014a), because of the inferior tasks they had to perform for their owners, because they had to forgo their own ancestral taboos and because they had to serve other people who should have been their equals or their inferiors. Yet Isambo's detailed description of the ritual also shows beyond doubt that it was always possible to ritually remove the deep uncleanliness associated with enslavement. Indeed, it seems to indicate that, at that time, people thought that these cleansing rituals were all-powerful. As the speech reported by Isambo states, 'there is nothing dirty that [sacred] water cannot remove' (tsy misy maloto tsy ho afaky ny rano). In the description, when the ritual performer put sacred water on the head of the person who needs to be cleansed, he says: Although you served others who were people like you, although you did what your ancestors did not, although you were subject everyday to the imprecations 162 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. of yourmaster, we cleanse youwith this water. However youwere soiled, may the misfortune not follow you, may the fault not follow you. We pray for you with this water (...) so that you become 'nicely accomplished' (vita soa), so that you become 'well accomplished' (vita tsara). (Gueunier et al. 2005: 167–8, my translation) At the end of his account, Isambo comments: It is when all this has been accomplished that his/her family can count him/her again as one of its members, and that it is allowed to bury him/her in the ancestral tomb. Because as long as this ceremony of 'washing the tongue' has not been performed he/she is not allowed to be buried in the ancestral tomb and he/she cannot marry someone of the same 'kind' (karazana) in the local community. (Gueunier et al. 2005: 168–9, my translation) Isambo's description of the ritual of manoza lela shows that free southern Betsileo did not think of slaves as people who could not fully regain their free and clean status once they had lost it. To my knowledge, there is no historical evidence that a strong stigma or taint comparable to that of today's slave descendants was attached to having been a slave during part of one's life or to having ancestors who had been enslaved. As indicated by Isambo, former slaves were considered as suitable marriage partners by the 'clean' local community as soon as they had performed the cleansing ritual and had been reintegrated into their descent group. I would therefore assume that provided they went through the appropriate ritual any kind of formerly enslaved persons were completely redeemed, did not suffer from any prejudice and discrimination because of their personal history and did not 'transmit' any uncleanliness to their children. If so, this means that the crucial features of the essentialism observed today were absent. Essen t i a l i sm as a consequence o f t h e co l o n i a l a b o l i t i o n If I am right, the essentialist construal became entrenched only after the colonial abolition of slavery. An important shift seems to have taken place – but why? I suggest that the explanation for such a shift is to be found in the context of the abolition. To understand why this event might have significantly modified the way southern Betsileo people think about slaves, former slaves and their descendants, it is necessary to go back to its circumstances and most immediate consequences. On 30 September 1895, a French expeditionary force entered Antananarivo. The military takeover was soon followed by the annexation of Madagascar on 6 August 1896. On 27 September 1896, only one year after the French troops had reached Antananarivo, slavery was abolished and hundreds of thousands of slaves – perhaps as many as 500,000 according to some authors –were set free in a total population of about three million Malagasy (Campbell 2005: 136). The resident governor Laroche had decreed the abolition just before leaving his office to his successor General Gallieni, 'in a fit of pique' (Randrianja and Ellis 2009: 157). The question of whether the French administration should immediately emancipate the slaves or adopt a more careful approach, abolishing slavery step by step, had been discussed in the French parliament in June 1896. The context was particularly difficult, since the French occupiers faced an anticolonial rebellion. Opponents to an immediate abolition feared an increase in social disorder that could damage French CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 163 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. interests in Madagascar (Jacob 1997: 262). In spite of these concerns, the parliament unanimously voted in favour of an immediate abolition. Up to this point, resident governor Laroche had worked on a plan to abolish slavery progressively over the course of ten years, but when the minister of the colonies asked him to examine how to execute the will of the parliament, he replied: 'I am ready to abolish slavery whenever you want.' A few days later, he added: 'The best would be to rush the decision. We should not fear troubling what is already troubled. Abolition will pass unnoticed (or less noticed) during the insurrection' (quoted in Jacob 1997: 265, my translation). Laroche then convened a committee in Antananarivo to work on a draft of the decree. In this committee, anxious voices were again heard about the unpredictable consequences of an immediate abolition. Yet, once again, the vote decided on immediate abolition. On 26 September, Laroche received a message from the Ministère des Colonies requesting that he follow the decision of the committee and that he abolish slavery immediately. He signed the decree on the same day and published it in the Journal Officiel de Madagascar the day after. On 28 September, Laroche handed over his power to Gallieni. To the satisfaction of many, including that of Gallieni – who was opposed to the immediate abolition – the emancipation of slaves in 1896 did not lead to a social disorder prejudicial to French interests. But what was the effect of the abolition on Malagasy society? Did it provoke a social change of great magnitude? Three years later, Jean Carol, a French official, wrote that it 'hasn't changed anything to the customs of the Malagasy so far' (Carol 1898: 30, my translation). Scholars have tended to endorse this view, stressing in particular that traditional hierarchy and the rules governing relations between status groups, including those related to marriages, have continued to be observed as if nothing happened (e.g. Rantoandro 1997: 283). Unlike these authors, I want to argue that, for the southern Betsileo at least, the abolition caused an important change in the way people conceived of slaves and their descendants. After abolition, those who had been recently enslaved went back to their region. We can assume that most were welcomed by their kinsmen and ritually cleansed by their elders in the way described by Isambo. They could resume the life of a free man or woman, and most probably did not suffer from stigmatisation because of their former enslavement. They were able to find a 'clean' spouse and to have offspring who found their place in the ancestral tombs. However, a large number of slaves whose forebears had been born into slavery for several generations had been severed from the links with their descent groups and after their liberation they were unable to go back to a region where they could be reintegrated into a kin group.18 In the aftermath of the abolition, there must have been a large number former slaves moving around, who could not identify with a tanindrazana (ancestral land) other than that of their former masters. But if they did not want to stay on their former masters' estates on a sharecropping arrangement they had no place to establish themselves. Some, like the Berosaiña in Beparasy, found free land to cultivate in remote places, but because their liberation was decided and imposed by the illegitimate power of French colonisers, southern Betsileo olompotsy continued to perceive them as people 18 It should be noted that my account is mainly concerned with the case of 'internal' slaves (i.e. 'indigenous' slaves), as opposed to that of slaves who were acquired in continental Africa and are called Makoa in several parts of the island (see Boyer-Rossol 2013). To my knowledge there are no Makoa in the southern Betsileo region, where people think that the andevo are all of Malagasy origin. 164 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. who had not been properly freed according to custom and had remained unclean. As explained above, before abolition it was crucial for the southern Betsileo to ritually cleanse former slaves so that they could reintegrate into their kin group and, through it, into local society as a whole. The 1896 French decree, by contrast, did not meet the minimal conditions to be considered by the southern Betsileo as a proper cleansing. In other words, slaves were liberated by a colonial authority that had nothing of the traditional powers that could have freed them through an appropriate administrative procedure and cleansed them through an appropriate ritual. Among the southern Betsileo, the local conception of enslavement as a deeply polluting condition led people to think that the former slaves who had not been reintegrated into one of their descent groups were still 'unclean people'. It is therefore in light of the sudden liberation, by the colonial government, of a large number of slaves who could not be properly cleansed that the essentialisation of the andevo must be understood. In the introduction I mentioned the 'vicious circle' in which the Berosaiña of Beparasy are stuck: since olompotsy strictly avoid marrying them they have no other choice than marrying other unclean people, and by so doing they reinforce the olompotsy's prejudice against them. Such a circular process of marriage avoidance and prejudice reinforcement must have been going on since the aftermath of the abolition and played a leading role in driving and fuelling the essentialisation of slave descendants as a natural kind. Given that the southern Betsileo have a strict rule of status isogamy – one should only marry people of equal status – after abolition the olompotsy families became extremely vigilant and put much effort into avoiding any marriage with people they regarded as unclean. These efforts included carefully checking the 'origins' of their marriage partners and imposing strong social sanctions against the group members who breached the prohibition (Regnier 2014b). Conc l u s i o n In this article I have sought to combine ethnographic, cognitive and historical perspectives to provide an account of the essentialisation of 'slaves'. If my account is right, then it is the acute problem posed by the uncleanliness of freed slaves in the aftermath of the abolition that triggered the historical process of essentialisation. Among the southern Betsileo, this process led to the binary distinction between unclean and clean people that has now supplanted, in importance, the old division in three status groups, although the distinction between raza still remains meaningful. My views on this matter sharply contrast with the idea, commonly accepted, that the contemporary discrimination against the andevo is 'simply' a legacy of the ancient hierarchical system. This does not seem to be the case and it is a strange paradox that the colonial abolition of 1896 might be partly the cause of the awkward predicament in which southern Betsileo slave descendants find themselves today. Acknow l edgemen t s The initial fieldwork in highland Madagascar (2008–2010) was conducted for my PhD at the London School of Economics (LSE), with funding from the LSE, the University of London and the Wenner-Gren Foundation. I designed the cognitive tasks, implemented them in Madagascar and wrote this article while I was a CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 165 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Postdoctoral Research Fellow on the ERC-funded project DIVIDNORM (ERC 269616) at the École Normale Supérieure (Institut Jean Nicod) in Paris, and a Scientific Collaborator at the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie des Mondes Contemporains (Université Libre de Bruxelles). At different stages of my research I greatly benefited from discussions with Rita Astuti, Maurice Bloch, Fabrice Clément, Michael Lambek, Laurent Licata, Jonathan Parry and Dominique Somda. Two anonymous reviewers provided insightful comments on the manuscript. I am deeply grateful to all these institutions and persons. I am also indebted to Ramose Martin for his help and to all the villagers in Beparasy for allowing me to take part in their lives. Denis Regnier Laboratoire d'Anthropologie des Mondes Contemporains (LAMC) Institut de Sociologie – Université Libre de Bruxelles Avenue Jeanne 44, 1050 Bruxelles Belgium [email protected] References Allen, R. 2014. European slave trading in the Indian Ocean, 1500–1850. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Astuti, R., G. Solomon and S. Carey 2004. 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CLEAN PEOPLE, UNCLEAN PEOPLE 167 © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists. Annexes Annex I . Adop t i o n s t o r y Marcel and Hanitra are Betsileo. They come from a clean family. They have been married for a long time but they did not conceive children. One day, Marcel found a baby abandoned in the forest. Marcel and Hanitra were happy to adopt the baby and they raised it until adulthood. The truth, however, is that the baby is the child of unclean people who abandoned it in the forest because of poverty. Question: In your opinion, when it reaches adulthood, is the child still an unclean person or has it become a clean person? Annex I I . C l e ans i ng r i t u a l Mamy and Vao are Betsileo and live in the same village. They love each other but cannot marry because Mamy comes from an unclean family and Vao from a clean family. Mamy goes to see a noble 'really noble' (i.e. nobles who have not yet married commoners) and he asks him to perform a cleansing ritual so that he becomes a clean person and can marry Vao. The noble accepts. Mamy is bathed with water that contains silver and hazomanga [i.e. sacred wood], a zebu is slaughtered, its blood is put on Mamy's forehead and the traditional speeches are made. Question: In your opinion, after the cleansing, is Mamy still an unclean person or has he become a clean person? Annex I I I . B l o od t r a n s f u s i o n Rakoto is Betsileo. He comes from a clean family that lives close to Fianarantsoa. One day he takes a bush-taxi to go to the city. An accident occurs on the road and he is seriously injured. He is brought to the hospital of Tambohobe [i.e. the hospital in Fianarantsoa]. He needs a blood transfusion since he has lost too much blood. For this transfusion, the doctors use the blood of Ralaza, a man from an unclean family. Question: In your opinion, after the transfusion, is Rakoto still clean or has he become unclean? Annex IV. Add i t i o n a l s en t ence s w i t h r e f e r e nce t o a consensu s At the end of the adoption story: All the villagers agree that the baby has become a clean person because it was raised by clean parents. At the end of the cleansing ritual story: All the villagers agree that Mamy has become a clean person because he was cleansed by a hova tena hova. At the end of the blood transfusion story: All the villagers have learnt that Rakoto has received the blood of a slave descendant but they all agree that he is still a clean person. 168 DENIS REGNIER © 2015 European Association of Social Anthropologists.

Donación de órganos: casos relevantes en materia constitucional Iván Vargas-Chaves Mónica Pérez-Trujillo Sebastián Cabrera-Monguí Tatiana González-Mendoza Alexandra Cumbe-Figueroa Donación de órganos: casos relevantes en materia constitucional Iván Vargas Chaves Mónica Pérez Trujillo Sebastián Cabrera Monguí Tatiana González Mendoza Alexandra Cumbe Figueroa 2020 Este libro es resultado de investigación, evaluado bajo el sistema doble ciego por pares académicos. Corporación Universitaria del Caribe – CECAR Rector Noel Morales Tuesca Vicerrector Académico Alfredo Flórez Gutiérrez Vicerrector de Ciencia Tecnología e Innovación Jhon Víctor Vidal Directora de Investigaciones Luty Gomezcáceres Decano Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Políticas María Eugenia Vides Argel Coordinador Editorial CECAR Jorge Luis Barboza © 2020, Donación de órganos: casos relevantes en materia constitucional. Iván Vargas Chaves, Mónica Pérez Trujillo, Sebastián Cabrera Monguí, Tatiana González Mendoza, Alexandra Cumbe Figueroa, autores. ISBN: 978-958-5547-27-8 (impreso) ISBN: 978-958-5547-63-6 (digital) DOI: 10.21892/978-958-5547-63-6 Sincelejo, Sucre, Colombia Donación de órganos: casos relevantes en materia constitucional / Iván Vargas Chavez...[et al.]. – Sincelejo : Editorial CECAR, 2020. 132 páginas : ilustraciones, gráficas, tablas ; 23 cm. Incluye referencias bibliográficas al final del libro. ISBN: 978-958-5547-27-8. (impreso) ISBN: 978-958-5547-63-6 (digital) 1. Trasplante de órganos 2. Procedimiento penal 3. Familia-Derecho I. Vargas Chaves, Iván II. Pérez Trujillo, Mónica III. Cabrera Monguí, Sebastián IV. González Mendoza, Tatiana V. Cumbe Figueroa, Alexandra VI. Título. 344.041 D674d 2020 CDD 21 ed. CEP – Corporación Universitaria del Caribe, CECAR. Biblioteca Central – COSiCUC 5 Tabla de Contenido Introducción ............................................................................................ 7 Capítulo 1 .................................................................................... 13 La Donación de Órganos y sus Antecedentes Capítulo 2 .................................................................................... 31 Tratamiento Normativo Capítulo 3 .................................................................................... 37 La Donación de Órganos y el Rol de los Familiares Capítulo 4 .................................................................................... 71 La Donación de Órganos y la Dignidad Capítulo 5 .................................................................................. 103 La Donación de Órganos y la Igualdad de Trato de Extranjeros

Hobbes on the Signification of Moral Language Stewart Duncan Draft of June 2016 1. Introduction Signification is the central semantic notion in Hobbes's philosophy of language, but discussions of language and signification are not merely technical for Hobbes. He prominently and repeatedly criticizes others for linguistic errors. Sometimes he says they use terms that are "insignificant", lacking signification.1 Elsewhere he rejects various claims as "absurd", a criticism that is related to Hobbes's views about truth.2 Both sorts of criticism tend to focus on what we might call metaphysical views, views about incorporeal substances or essences or universals. Does what Hobbes says about language and its signification also have implications in the moral realm? There's a straightforward sense in which it must do, for several of the 'metaphysical' claims and arguments Hobbes criticizes in these ways are connected to moral and political claims. Discussions of incorporeal substances are closely tied to discussions of religion, and 'free will' is among the names criticized as insignificant. There are also more direct connections though. In this paper I consider ways in which the notion of signification is at work in Hobbes's philosophy of moral language. This can help illuminate what Hobbes thinks about such language: both what he thinks about its general character, and also what he thinks about some particular bits of language, such as 'good' and 'evil'.3 1 On Hobbes on signification, see among others Abizadeh (2015), Duncan (2011), Hungerland and Vick (1973), Martin (1953), and Pécharman (2004). 2 On Hobbes on absurdity, see among others Duncan (2016), Engel (1961), and Martinich (1981: 404-11). 3 Thus my approach to Hobbes's theorizing about moral language is quite different from that of, say, Holden (2016), who discusses Hobbes's work in terms of more recent notions such as error theory and prescriptivism. 2 First, however, I want to argue for the more modest claim that, for Hobbes, the philosophy of moral language is part of the general philosophy of language.4 It might seem that Hobbes's discussion of moral language is just a separate thing from his other discussions of language. Those general discussions tend to focus on descriptive assertions, rather than any features of language we might distinctively associate with normativity. Moreover, the best-known discussions of moral language are not in the chapters discussing the philosophy of language – for example a well-known discussion of 'good' and 'evil' appears in chapter 6 of Leviathan on the passions, not chapter 4 on language. However, the technical terminology of Hobbes's philosophy of language, in particular the notion of signification, still occurs throughout his particular discussions of moral language. We can moreover find Hobbes treating moral language in a way that suggests it is straightforwardly part of his more general philosophy of language. We see this fairly clearly in the 1641 Elements of Law. Chapter 5 of that work is where Hobbes gives his basic account of language, and there he uses "injustice" as an example of a name that signifies a privation (EL 5.3) – i.e. the lack of justice – and uses 'charity' and 'virtue' in giving examples of when one name comprehends another (EL 5.10). In the discussion of passions that begins in chapter 7, there is repeated mention of signifying, of what is a name of what, and of what is called what.5 Moving towards more political concerns, we can find Hobbes 4 This might sound obvious. But one can easily find discussions of Hobbes's views about moral language that make no reference to his more general views about the workings of language. Though one might find some acknowledgement that Hobbes, say, tended to talk about signification rather than meaning, it is less common to find acknowledgment of a Hobbesian theory of signification – or at least to find acknowledgment that it is particularly relevant to what is said about moral language. Thus, for example, Darwall (2000) uses 'signify' in a relevant sense only once outside quotations – and in that case it is not treated as something that Hobbes theorized about in any notable way, but instead glossed as "enter into an account for" (Darwall 2000, 330). 5 These different terms all appear, in this case, to be different ways of talking about the same relation. 3 talking about the signification of 'aristocracy' and 'oligarchy' (EL 20.3). So it appears that what Hobbes says about signification applies across the range of moral and political terms.6 Though Hobbes may have extra things to say about the functioning of moral language, he does so in the context of his more general theorizing about language. The main discussion of the paper begins in section 2, which I look at Hobbes's argument, towards the end of chapter 4 of Leviathan, that much moral language has an inconstant signification. After advancing my own reading of that passage, I then in section 3 consider two alternative readings. In section 4 I turn to the earlier Elements of Law. We can find several key elements of Hobbes's theory of inconstant signification in that earlier text – it is not just an idiosyncratic feature of one passage in Leviathan. Section 5 then looks at a well-known passage in Leviathan on 'good' and 'evil'. This passage mirrors an earlier discussion in the Elements of Law, and I argue that it should be understood in the light of the inconstant signification theory. Finally, section 6 discusses various strategies Hobbes suggests for avoiding the problem of the inconstant signification of moral language. 2. Leviathan 4 and inconstant signification Consider first the final paragraph of chapter 4 of Leviathan, the chapter on language. The names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us, because all men be not alike affected with the same thing, nor the same man at all times, are in the common discourses of men, of inconstant signification. For seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when 6 There are also relevant texts in De Cive. See De Cive 1.7 on the signification of 'right', De Cive 14.16 the signification of 'sin', and De Cive 15.16 on signs of honour. Perhaps such examples – where moral terms are used in examples of some general feature of language – become less frequent in Hobbes's later work, but they do not disappear entirely. "Who is a good man?" is used as an example of a question in De Corpore 3.1. 4 we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them. For though the nature of that we conceive, be the same; yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different constitutions of body, and prejudices of opinion, gives every thing a tincture of our different passions. And therefore in reasoning, a man must take heed of words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of Vertues, and Vices; For one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare; and one cruelty, what another justice; one prodigality, what another magnanimity; and one gravity, what another stupidity, &c. And therefore such names can never be true grounds of any ratiocination. No more can Metaphors, and Tropes of speech: but these are less dangerous, because they profess their inconstancy; which the other do not (L 4.24).7 This passage suggests a host of questions. To help me address them, let me first say something about Hobbes's theory of the signification of names. I am interested here in the signification of names, rather than sentences, utterances, or any larger unit. Hobbes's notion of a name is quite wide-ranging: 'just' is a name, as is 'justice', as is 'Thomas Hobbes', as is 'incorporeal substance'. In trying to understand what Hobbes thinks names signify, we find two main candidates: names might signify the objects named, or they might signify some related mental thing (an idea, a conception, a phantasm, or something of the sort). On the first theory, 'Hobbes' would signify Hobbes himself, while on the second, 'Hobbes' would signify the speaker's idea of Hobbes. In effect, Hobbes 7 Whelan (1981), arguing for the importance of the role of language in Hobbes's account of conflict, draws attention to the inconstant signification passage, saying that it "concerns a generally unconscious phenomenon" (62), and suggesting that equivocation is "perhaps more sinister" (62). Whelan is surely right that inconstant signification is just one among several problems of language use that Hobbes points out. But I suggest it deserves more attention than he gives it. 5 equivocates between the two theories. In places where he states his theory of the signification of names, he says he holds the second theory, the idea theory. But in almost all the other places where he talks about what a name signifies, he talks as if he held the other theory, on which a name signifies the object that it names.8 So we should expect talk of signification in the above passage to be about a relation between a name and the thing it names. And we do see, in the passage, that one of the things signified by a name is the thing that is called by that name. In this passage, Hobbes discusses the signification of a particular group of names. These are described at first as "names of such things as affect us, that is, which please, and displease us". Later, the names of virtues and vices are given as examples. There is thus a question about just how much of our language Hobbes takes himself to be describing here. I will largely stick, in this paper, to the discussion of names of virtues and vices. However, the issue of the scope of this criticism will recur in the final section. One thing to notice is that there appear to be two different views about the signification of those names in the passage. At first their signification is said to be "inconstant", suggesting it is shifting, changing, and unreliable. At least, it is said to be such "in the common discourses of men", suggesting that perhaps this inconstancy can be eliminated. Later in the passage, however, a more detailed theory is sketched, on which such names have a double signification: they "besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker". 8 Here I follow and rely upon the arguments of Duncan (2011). One notable exception to the general pattern described is the argument of L 5.19 that some names are insignificant because there is no possible conception associated with them: e.g., one cannot conceive of a round quadrangle, so 'round quadrangle' is insignificant. For a different recent reading, see Abizadeh (2015). 6 Inconstant signification and double signification are not the same thing. A word might have a single signification but also an inconstant one – say, it signifies one external object any time it is used, but the same speaker uses it to signify different objects at different times. And a word might have a double signification, but in a constant and reliable way. For example, 'virtuous' might (though Hobbes denies this) both reliably signify a certain group of actions, and also reliably signify the speaker's positive feelings about those actions. Hobbes, I take it, is arguing that the names of virtues and vices have significations that are both double and inconstant. He starts with the thought they are inconstant, gives us a short argument, then presents the double signification view, then returns to the characterization as "inconstant". What then is the double signification? That is, what is the first signification, what is the second, and how do they relate? We are dealing with "words; which besides the signification of what we imagine of their nature, have a signification also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker; such as are the names of virtues, and vices". Roughly then, the first signification is about the thing, and the second signification is about the speaker. Suppose we consider one of Hobbes's examples – "one man calleth Wisdome, what another calleth feare". The two speakers are describing, I take it, something that could be described in either way. Perhaps they are describing someone's motives for action, in avoiding a confrontation. The first speaker says the retreat was done from wisdom, the second that it was done from fear. So 'wisdom' in the mouth of the first speaker signifies this motive (and similar motives in other cases in which the speaker applies the same name). This is the first signification: it is the thing named by the term. 'Wisdom' also signifies the speaker's "nature, disposition, and interest". The relatively more cautious speaker calls this wisdom, while the less cautious one 7 calls it fear, and their uses of 'wisdom' and 'fear' are signs of their differing mindsets.9 Moreover, the two significations have a further relation, in that differences in the "nature, disposition, and interest" of the two speakers are an important part of why they disagree about whether to describe the particular case using 'wisdom' or 'fear'. Here is one reason to call the significations inconstant – they are inconstant between speakers, because of their different mindsets.10 Perhaps a similar theme, although the details are not easy to follow, is present in this argument from the passage: "seeing all names are imposed to signifie our conceptions; and all our affections are but conceptions; when we conceive the same things differently, we can hardly avoyd different naming of them". Here, it would appear, Hobbes begins from his explicit theory of signification, that names signify conceptions. Part of the story, which fits well with the story about double signification, is that we name things differently because we conceive them differently – one observer reacts positively to an action and calls it brave, another reacts negatively and calls it foolhardy. Hobbes also says that our names are imposed to signify our conceptions, and that our affections are conceptions. Does this all fit together into an argument that much moral language, such as the names of virtues and vices, must have double and inconstant significations? It seems not. Even if all names signify conceptions, and affections are conceptions, that does not guarantee that all names signify (or have anything else to do with) affections. Perhaps though, Hobbes's aim is simply to remind us that conceptions (affections included) play a role in the process of naming. The imposition of names on objects depends on our conceptions (including our affections), and 9 It is hard to describe the speakers' differences without using language that is subject to the same phenomenon. 10 Hobbes says we are "not like affected" by the same things. They affect us in different ways, and we have different affects in response to them. 8 thus acts as a sign of (signifies) what they are. Thus as people's conceptions differ, so to do their practices of naming. In response to Hobbes's story about double and inconstant signification, someone might reply that all is nevertheless well. Granted, some people might use the terms with inconstant or unusual significations, influenced by their emotional attitudes. But people use words in odd ways all the time, and we do not usually take this to undermine the use of those words. If I confused 'continent' and 'compliment' and announced that Antarctica was a compliment, this might cause some small confusion or amusement, but would not cause widespread problems. Hobbes clearly thinks that something different is going on with talk of virtues and vices though. Why? One difference would lie in the double and inconstant signification happening all, or almost all, the time. That would cause far more confusion. It might indeed happen inevitably, as the internal differences between us cause us inevitably to use the external language differently. Perhaps Hobbes also suggests that there is just not – or usually not, or at least not always – a correct signification against which to judge the various uses – there is just the variety. How one gets from speaker signification to expression signification in Hobbes's system – from what some individual speaker signifies by using a word to what the word signifies – is itself worth asking. Indeed it is somewhat puzzling how that happens.11 But however Hobbes does think this process works, surely it is not helped by all the speakers doing different things. So we might think that this is really where the problem arises: that the differences between speakers mean we cannot have constant expression signification. 11 On this connection see Abidazeh (2015, 12-4) and Hungerland and Vick (1973; 1981). 9 That said, though it seems most natural to talk about third-person cases of the phenomenon Hobbes is discussing, there seem also to be first-person cases. Thus I might be unsure whether a term for a virtue or a vice is the best description of my own motives – say, whether my action was done from sensible caution or excessive timidity – and apply different descriptions to the same action at different times, depending on my current mood. In this way even one speaker's use of these words may be inconstant in the way seen in the initial example above.12 So the problem is not simply that of getting from speaker signification to expression signification, though that is surely a key part of what is going on here. All of this is subject, of course, to the qualification that Hobbes is talking about what usually happens, what goes on "in the common discourses of men". That suggests – though it does no more than that – that there is a possibility of something different going on in other discourses. I return to that issue in section 6 below. For now, I turn to look at two alternative explanations of what Hobbes is doing here. 3. Two alternative readings 3.1 Pettit on indexicals Phillip Pettit discuses this sort of Hobbesian text in his book Made with Words (Pettit 2008, 51-2 and 85-7). The phenomenon Hobbes points to, Pettit describes in terms of indexicality, saying that one "source of equivocation to which Hobbes gives importance, though not under any single name, might be described as evaluative indexicality" (Pettit 2008, 51). However, though the double signification theory we have seen makes the signification of a 12 Here compare Irwin: "If Hobbes is right about the connexion between judgments of goodness and apparent pleasure, judgments about goodness vary not only among different people, but also within a single person at different times" (Irwin 2008, 115). 10 moral term depend in a way on the speaker, it is not exactly an indexical theory. For one thing, a Hobbesian theorist about language does not need to think that an indexical has a double signification, rather than a single signification that depends in some way on the speaker. When I use 'I', it appears to exactly signify one thing, me. One might perhaps say that the signification of 'I' is inconstant, in that I use it to signify myself and you use it to signify yourself. But it is not double and inconstant – it does not, in Hobbes's picture, work in the same way that the names of virtues and vices work.13 So I conclude that Hobbes does not think these names are indexical terms, though they have something in common with them.14 3.2 Alexandra on double signification Andrew Alexandra (1989) offers a different account of what Hobbes means by saying some terms have inconstant signification: "Following Frege, we could say that they have a sense, they are meaningful, but that their reference changes according to the identity of the utterer and his time of utterance" (Alexandra 1989, 38). Thus, I take it, the sense of good would be expressed by a phrase such as "the object of my appetite", and this would determine its reference in particular uses. But that theory, although trying to capture the same phenomenon as Hobbes was, is doing so in a rather different way. Hobbes talks of two significations, but they do not stand in the relation of sense and reference, or description and 13 Perhaps one could concoct a 'Hobbesian' theory of indexicals on which they have a double and inconstant signification. But I do not see that Hobbes did so, or that this is how a Hobbesian theory must go. 14 Moreover, as Pettit himself notes, it is not immediately clear why there should be any conflict between users of these terms, if they are indexical. Apparently conflicting uses of indexicals are often not actually in conflict. So if I say "I am in Malmesbury" and you say "I am in Cape Town", there is no conflict between our statements. See Pettit (2008, 52). 11 thing that satisfies it. The two significations are both of the same semantic type – they are both significations – unlike sense and reference, which have different roles. The relation between Hobbes's two significations seems better described as causal, than as the relation between sense and reference. The speaker's mindset, which is one of the things signified by the term, is one of the causes of their applying the term to the thing they name with it, which is the other signification. That said, and though Hobbes makes no difference of semantic type between the two significations, they do appear to play different roles. Most centrally, it appears that the external signification of the names enters into the determination of the truth conditions of the sentences, but the internal one does not.15 Hobbes's account of truth is extensional. In the basic model, a sentence 'S is P' is true if and only if the things signified by S are all among the things signified by P.16 Applying this model to what Hobbes says about names of virtues and vices, we might seem to have a choice of which signification to use. If I say, for example, "That action was brave", 'brave' signifies two things. First, it signifies various actions in the world, which are similar to each other and to which I apply this name.17 Secondly, it signifies something about my state of mind, which causes me to group this with the other actions I call 'brave', rather than, for example, with the actions I call 'foolhardy'. It must be the first of these significations that enters into the evaluation of the truth conditions for the sentence. The relevant question is whether that action is among the brave actions, not whether that action is among the states of my mind that lead me to call certain actions brave. Thus, the two significations play different roles in this case. 15 For the avoidance of confusion – one should not think of the two things signified as the descriptive and normative components of the signification. 16 [Removed for review] 17 [Removed for review] 12 4. Good, evil, and double signification in the Elements of Law I turn now to one of Hobbes's earlier works, the Elements of Law. First, consider a discussion of "good" and "evil" there. Every man, for his own part, calleth that which pleaseth, and is delightful to himself, GOOD; and that EVIL which displeaseth him: insomuch that while every man differeth from other in constitution, they differ also one from another concerning the common distinction of good and evil. Nor is there any such thing as agathon haplos, that is to say, simply good. For even the goodness which we attribute to God Almighty, is his goodness to us. And as we call good and evil the things that please and displease; so call we goodness and badness, the qualities or powers whereby they do it. And the signs of that goodness are called by the Latins in one word PULCHRITUDO, and the signs of evil, TURPITUDO; to which we have no words precisely answerable (EL 7.3). The terminology here is of calling things something. But despite Hobbes's using that terminology, rather than talking about signification, we see here much the same basic picture we saw at the end of Leviathan 4. Two central points from that discussion are present here. The first is that the word-thing relation is inconstant, and the second is that this results from some other difference between the speakers, here described as a difference in their "constitution". The notion of a double signification seems to be absent. Despite that, what is said here appears to address Hobbes's main aims in introducing the double signification view: to acknowledge the ways in which people use very different moral language about the same thing, and to show the reasons for those differences. 13 The notion that some moral or political terms might have a sort of double signification is again present elsewhere in the Elements of Law, when Hobbes discusses the terms "oligarchy" and "aristocracy": If the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the particulars, then they are said to be an OLIGARCHY, or ARISTOCRACY; which two words signify the same thing, together with the divers passion of those that use them; for when the men that be in that office please, they are called an aristocracy, otherwise an oligarchy (EL 20.3).18 In this case, Hobbes clearly states that each of the terms has two significations. Both "aristocracy" and "oligarchy" signify some group of men. Each also signifies the attitude of the speaker towards that group, be it positive or negative. Then, again without the explicit talk of double signification, but with the central theme of inconstant signification that results from a difference in the nature or attitudes of the speakers, we find this in chapter 27: It remaineth therefore, that they [the authors of sedition] be such, as name things not according to their true and generally agreed-upon names; but call right and wrong, good and bad, according to their passions, or according to the authorities of such as they admire, as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others of like authority, who have given the names of right and wrong, as their passions have dictated; or have followed the authority of other men, as we do theirs. It is required therefore in an author of sedition, that he think right, that which is wrong; and profitable, that which is pernicious; and consequently that there be in him sapientiae parum, little wisdom (EL 27.13). 18 Compare L 19.2. 14 Aspects of this passage echo other passages we have seen. But elsewhere one might get the impression that people talk in all sorts of ways, and there is no right answer. Here there is a right answer, which the seditious have missed, led astray by their passions or their reading. That rightness arises, Hobbes says just above, from "general agreement".19 Taken together, these passages show that the double and inconstant signification theory, or at least all the parts of it, are in the Elements of Law as well as in chapter 4 of Leviathan. That was not a theory that Hobbes idiosyncratically advanced in one passage. Rather, he seems to have held it for some time. 5. Good and evil in Leviathan In chapter 6 of Leviathan, we find a passage that seems to be a direct successor of the one from EL 7.3 quoted above. But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; And of his Contempt, Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof (L 6.7). Not only is this a successor of the EL 7.3 passage, it also comes only a few pages after the double and inconstant signification passage at the end of Leviathan 4. So it seems reasonable 19 On this and other Hobbesian views of how and when we can avoid inconstant signification, see section 6. 15 to suspect that some version of that story might be at work here. Though Hobbes does not talk here of a double signification, notice how two central elements of that story are present here: there is variation in the way words are used, and that variation is caused by differences in the natures of the speakers. We can trace these two ideas through a variety of passages in Hobbes's work. This prominent passage is no different in that regard.20 Someone might suggest, however, that the passages from chapters 4 and 6 of Leviathan are actually working in rather different ways.21 The former appears to describe a situation we might find ourselves in, using words in inconstant ways. The latter seems to contain a very strong denial of objective good ("There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill"). Given this difference, should we not think of the arguments of the two passages as working in fundamentally different ways? I think the passages are working in a more similar way than that suggests. Granted, there are differences. For instance, Hobbes moves from using examples of thick terms in chapter 4 to thinner ones of chapter 6. That in itself does not change the argument though. In addition, in chapter 6 (and indeed in EL 7.3) Hobbes mentions a possible objection to his double and inconstant signification view. This is the objection of someone who suggests there is an object in the world that solves the problem: something that is simply good, or a "common rule" of good and evil. The idea would be, perhaps, that all uses of "good" would 20 Lloyd (2013, 133) argues that one should not take L 6.7 to show Hobbes was a "value subjectivist", for doing so "mistakes Hobbes's critical observation on what he regards as a misuse of language for a normative endorsement". See also Lloyd (1992, 255-60), where she argues that "the misuse of words to stand for our appetites (especially this misuse of evaluative terms) is ... an important cause of disorder" (260). She points also to the way Hobbes criticizes Aristotle and others for "their error in measuring good and evil by their own liking and disliking" (133). However, in that criticism Hobbes says that to "define good and evil by the appetite of men" is done "well enough, as long as we consider them governed every one by his own law" (L 46.32). That suggests the relevant Aristotelian use of language is less like a misuse, and more like an accurate description of one state we might be in. 21 [Removed for review] 16 signify this object, removing inconstancy and ambiguity.22 Thus, the notion of objective goodness is itself brought in to the discussion as a possible way to resolve the problem about signification. Hobbes, of course, denies that there is any such object, and thus does not take this strategy to be a serious contender. 6. Strategies for avoiding these problems Appeal to such an object, the thing that is simply and absolutely good, is one of a series of strategies Hobbes considers for resolving the problem of the inconstant signification of moral terms. In looking at such strategies, we can distinguish two sorts. Some strategies offer principled solutions, on which the inconstant signification will be removed. Others offer practical solutions, on which the inconstancy might still in principle continue, but is suppressed or managed in practice. In this section, I consider six strategies – most of them suggested by Hobbes himself – for addressing the problem of inconstant signification. Strategy 1 is the one mentioned above: appeal to something that is simply good, or a "common rule" of good or evil. The idea is that there is something independent of human decisions, desires, and practices that can be used to fix the signification of moral terms. There are no doubt various ways in which one might work out the details of such a view, but Hobbes does not consider them, as he is convinced there is no such thing in the world. Strategy 2 is a second principled solution. This is the strategy of resolving the problem about language by finding clarification in the realm of ideas. Compare Hobbes here to Spinoza. He too acknowledges that there are conflicts arising from the use of language, saying indeed that "most errors consist only in our not rightly applying names to things" (Ethics 2p47s). But Spinoza also sees a straightforward way out of such problems – for on his 22 Alternatively, they might all be guided by the common rule. 17 view, people have the ideas right, and apply the words wrongly to them. Hobbes doesn't see this solution as available. Indeed probably he could not, given how little of our mental life he thinks can be explained by ideas alone, in the absence of language.23 Strategy 3. General agreement. As I noted above, Hobbes says in EL 27.13 that things have "true and generally agreed-upon names". This remark suggests a further strategy for dealing with some cases of inconstant signification: relying upon general agreement. The seditious authors Hobbes discusses there have gone wrong, in part, because they have failed to use words in the ways generally agreed upon, which (implicitly) is something we ought to do, unless we aim to introduce confusion (which itself is something we ought not to do). Why, however, should general agreement have any authority here? We might think it has a sort of practical authority, such that if there is a general agreement, we ought to stick with it, to avoid confusion. But suppose I think that people generally misname a certain case: say, they call it "treason", when I think it ought to be called "whistleblowing". I might have a reason for my disagreement (that is not the desire to cause confusion), for I might think that the case is more relevantly similar to the other cases called "whistleblowing" than to the others called "treason". And if I have this reason, I have a good reason to name the case differently.24 Probably it is a good idea, other things being equal, to use words in the ways generally agreed upon. But many of the difficult cases just are those in which people do not think that other things are equal. So this potential practical strategy has limited application. These difficulties might indeed be, I speculate, the reason why this suggestion seems not to appear in Leviathan. Nevertheless, we find at least three other suggestions there. 23 Most notably, for Hobbes it is language that enables universal thought. 24 If I do not, I still have a good reason to say that although the claims usually made about treasonous acts apply to all the other cases, they do not apply to this one, which is itself a potentially confusing situation. 18 Strategy 4. Use Hobbes's definitions. Perhaps we could all speak in a more constant way if, say, we all began from and stuck to some agreed definitions. Maybe that is what some of Hobbes's own definitions, such as the definitions of names for the passions in chapter 6 of Leviathan, are supposed to help us achieve.25 It is not always clear that this is how the definitions are intended. Consider though, as an example, the discussion at the beginning of chapter 25 of Leviathan. "How fallacious it is", Hobbes says there, "to judge of the nature of things, by the ordinary and inconstant use of words". Those problems are to be avoided by accepting some Hobbesian definitions of key notions: in this case, of 'command' and 'counsel', 'exhortation' and 'dehortation'.26 As a strategy for getting everyone to use words in the same way, this has a certain obvious problem. Why, someone might well ask, should I use words in the way Hobbes says I ought to? Just because Hobbes says so? That seems hardly enough reason. Moreover, Hobbes himself denies there is some objective standard he has access to, which is driving these new definitions.27 That is, here too we appear not to have the possibility of any principled solution. And Hobbes did not have the political power 25 Early on, we see Hobbes introduce a linguistic dimension to his discussion of the passions. The very title of L 6 tells us that it is about the passions "and the speeches by which they are expressed". There are several other examples scattered throughout the chapter. The common description is in terms of calling and being called. The language of signification is not entirely absent though. Thus towards the end of the chapter Hobbes says: "These formes of Speech, I say, are expressions, or voluntary significations of our Passions: but certain signes they be not; because they may be used arbitrarily, whether they that use them, have such Passions or not" (L 6.56). These are names that signify things, where those things are passions. And to 'express' a passion appears to be to voluntarily signify it. Thus, for example, weeping may be a sign of (thus, signify) sudden dejection, and in some sense expresses it, but "sudden dejection" is the name that signifies (and in this sense expresses) sudden dejection. 26 This is related to Hobbes's frequent strategy of using terms that were familiar from previous debates, but redefined, often somewhat radically, in his own way. Hobbes's use of the language of natural law provides one example. 27 Someone might suggest that other parts of Hobbes's account, his laws of nature, determine the signification of moral language. But what the laws determine is not what the moral words signify, but what the moral rules are. That determination actually depends on the stability of the language used to express the laws. So the laws are not the right kind of thing to provide a principled solution of the problem of inconstant signification. Moreover, even if they did so, they would only solve the problem for a limited group of terms. 19 to produce a practical solution by simply making others use words as he does. So though the strategy of 'use words as Hobbes does' might solve the problem if everyone did so, there seems no reason to expect people to do so, and indeed no reason to say they are wrong in failing to so do. Strategy 5. Use a specially appointed judge. Consider again something Hobbes says in L 6.7: these words of Good, Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common Rule of Good and Evill, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the Person of the man (where there is no Common-wealth;) or, (in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it; or from an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof (L 6.7). Here Hobbes describes two ways to do things differently. One of those is to have the use of words governed by "an Arbitrator or Judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the Rule thereof". That is, two or more people might agree that some one person should judge which way to use a word, and agree to use the word as that judge decides. This strategy, though it might have its difficulties of implementation, would surely work in some cases. But it is also limited, for it is only a strategy for some cases. There is no reason given to think that people would or should always appoint a judge in this way. So although this is a useful practical strategy, it could not eliminate the inconstant signification with which Hobbes is concerned.28 And if we suspect that Hobbes would have been 28 Peters also focuses on L 6.7. He notes that on Hobbes's view, "good" "implies a relation to the emotions, desires, or interests of the person who uses it (1979, 161-2), but also implies that there are features in the object in virtue of which the application of 'good' is 20 particularly concerned about cases of inconstant signification that gave rise to dispute and conflict, the limits of this strategy seem even greater. For those seem to be exactly the cases in which disputants will be less likely to seek a judge, to agree on who the judge should be, or to follow the judge's ruling. Strategy 6. Rely on the sovereign. This is the other strategy described in L 6.7. The rule of how to use the words is to be taken "(in a Common-wealth,) from the Person that representeth it". So the sovereign, or their appointed representative, could resolve disputes. This resembles the previous strategy, but with additional authority behind the judge, and with the possibility for the judge (the sovereign) to insist on a resolution, even though the speakers do not seek out someone to resolve the situation of inconstant signification. In this way Watkins (1989, 109-11) focuses on the contrast between language use in the state of nature and in a Hobbesian commonwealth, relying heavily but not solely on L 6.7. The use of moral language in the state of nature involves "merely pretentious projections" of the speakers' appetites (Watkins 1989, 109). The messy linguistic state is resolved, on Watkins's reading, by the presence of a sovereign, who will "allocate the names 'good', 'evil', 'right', wrong', etc., to specified classes of actions" (Watkins 1989, 111). Watkins apparently takes all moral language to be so regulated, which I suggest is more than Hobbes envisions, and more than is perhaps possible. Recall again that the class of terms that have double and inconstant signification is a broad one, including not just all the names of virtues and vices, but also all "names of such things as affect us" (L 4.24). Comprehensive legislation here would require legislating about, at least, all the terms that Hobbes defines in Leviathan, and probably many "appropriate" (162). That is, Peters sees that there is a dual aspect to this account of how 'good' works, though he does not describe it in terms of double signification. 21 more. Those definitions would have authority behind them.29 But we might wonder, simply practically, whether any actual sovereign could legislate about all the cases, and enforce that legislation. None of the strategies discussed in this section seems to be enough on its own to solve the problem of the double and inconstant signification of moral language. Perhaps, of course, no one strategy was meant to work on its own. Rather, the idea might be that the combination of them solves the problem, say with a sensible adherence to generally agreed uses solving many problems, and the sovereign intervening in particularly problematic, potentially seditious cases. One does wonder, however, whether such a combined strategy would actually cover all the cases. Perhaps Hobbes just needs it to be practically likely that it would. That would leave him, perhaps, with a practical solution, but no principled one.30 7. Persistent problems There seems then to be no principled solution, in Hobbes's system, to the problem of the double and inconstant signification of the names of virtues and vices. Hobbes thinks that, outside of a properly constituted commonwealth, moral and political discourse is a treacherous, shifting, unreliable thing, and that this can have dangerous political consequences, as the seditious use language to their own ends. If there were a principled solution within the Hobbesian commonwealth, that danger would largely have gone away. But if there is no principled solution, merely a series of incomplete practical ones, the picture 29 Strictly speaking, they need not all be definitions. There might also be, say, injunctions to stop reading a particular text in a particular way. Cf. the discussion in L 39 of how to understand scriptural uses of 'church', an issue that had clear political consequences. 30 The idea that Hobbes's philosophy of language yields a system that is, in principle and always, unstable and problematic, has been widespread ever since the seventeenth century. However, those criticisms have usually been based on the notion that Hobbes's nominalism goes too far. [Removed for review.] 22 seems rather to be one of a structure that is always in danger of collapsing, as the shifting sands it was built on are always in danger of moving, the building being shored up in a piecemeal way as problems emerge. Hobbes does seems to have worried a little himself about problems of this sort persisting, even in a properly constituted Hobbesian commonwealth. We see examples of this in chapter 26 of Leviathan, on civil laws. Noting the need for all laws to be interpreted, Hobbes draws particular attention to problems arising from the "divers significations of words" (L 26.21, and see L 26.26). Hobbes does argue that the sovereign can ultimately solve all such problems in the law, if only "by the legislative power" (L 26.21). This suggests a confidence that the sovereign can solve any such problem if need be – including perhaps the more general problem, not just the problem in the law. Notice, however, what would be happening in this case. The sovereign, seeing problems in the interpretation of legislation, would be introducing more legislation to provide clarification. Much as this might help at the time, it would ultimately just provide more legislation, which would have its own problems of interpretation. It would not be written in a magical new language that lacked those problems. No doubt the sovereign could legislate again if that happened. But still we are in the realm of practical solutions, not principled ones. Nothing the sovereign does using the legislative power can make the problem disappear completely.31 Hobbes's position is presumably then not that all such problems are always absent in a commonwealth, but that they can be resolved if it becomes necessary to do so. And presumably he also thinks that this resolution by the sovereign can happen quickly, efficiently, and (of course) be enforced powerfully enough to prevent the disruptive 31 See L 30.22 on the ambiguities of laws. 23 consequences of inconstant signification. Thus, what begins as an issue of language use becomes a question of power, its extent, and the possibilities of its imposition. 24 References Abizadeh, Arash. 2015. "The Absence of Reference in Hobbes' Philosophy of Language'. Philosophers' Imprint 15(22), 1-17. Alexandra, Andrew. 1989. "'All Men Agree on This...' Hobbes on the Fear of Death and the Way to Peace". History of Philosophy Quarterly 6:1, 37-55. Aristotle.1984. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Darwall, Stephen. "Normativity and Projection in Hobbes's Leviathan". Philosophical Review 109:3, 313-47. Duncan, Stewart. 2011. "Hobbes, Signification, and Insignificant Names". Hobbes Studies 24, 158-78. -----. 2016. "Hobbes on Language: Propositions, Truth, and Absurdity". In A.P. Martinich and Kinch Hoekstra (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Hobbes (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 57-72. Engel, S.M. 1961. "Hobbes's Table of Absurdity" Philosophical Review, 70, 533-43. Hampton, Jean. 1986. Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hobbes, Thomas. 1981. Part I of De Corpore, translated by A.P. Martinich. New York: Abaris Books. -----. 1994. Elements of Law. Edited by J.C.A. Gaskin. Oxford: Oxford University Press. -----. 2000. De Cive. Past Masters edition. Charlottesville: InteLex Corporation. -----. 2012. Leviathan. Edited by Noel Malcolm. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Holden, Thomas. 2016. "Hobbes on the Function of Evaluative Speech". Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(1), 123-44. 25 Hungerland, I.C. and G.R. Vick. 1973. "Hobbes's Theory of Signification". Journal of the History of Philosophy 11, 459-82. -----. 1981. "Hobbes's Theory of Language, Speech, and Reasoning" in Hobbes (1981), 9169. Irwin, Terence. 2008. The Development of Ethics: A Historical and Critical Study. Volume II: From Suarez to Rousseau. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lloyd, S.A. 1992. Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. -----. 2013. "Good and Evil". In S.A. Lloyd (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Hobbes (London: Bloomsbury) 132-3. Martin, R.M. 1953. "On the Semantics of Hobbes" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 14 (1953), 205-11. Martinich, A.P. 1981. "Translator's Commentary", in Hobbes (1981). Pécharman, Martine. 2004. "Sémantique et doctrine de la proposition: Hobbes inconciliable avec la tradition terministe?" in R.L. Friedman and S. Ebbesen (ed.), John Buridan and Beyond: Topics in the Language Sciences, 1300-1700 (Copenhagen: Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, 2004) 203-36. Peters, Richard. 1979. Hobbes. Westport: Greenwood Press. Reprint of 1956 book. Pettit, Philip. 2008. Made with Words. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Skorupski, John. 2013. "Analytic Philosophy, the Analytic School, and British Philosophy". In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 298-317. Spinoza, Benedict. 1985. The Collected Works of Spinoza. Volume 1. Edited and translated by Edwin Curley. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 26 Watkins, John. 1989. Hobbes's System of Ideas. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company. Reprint of the 1973 second edition. Whelan, Frederick G. 1981. "Language and its Abuses in Hobbes' Political Philosophy". The American Political Science Review 75:1, 59-75.

HYLOMORPHISM AND DESIGN: A RECONSIDERATION OF AQUINAS'S FIFTH WAY John Kronen and Sandra Menssen Abstract: Aquinas's Fifth Way is usually taken to be an adumbration of Paley-like design arguments. Paley-like design arguments have fallen on hard times over the past few centuries, and most contemporary defenders of design arguments in support of theism favor some version of the fine-tuning argument. But fine-tuning design arguments, like Paley's design argument, are consistent with atomism. And all such arguments are vulnerable to the objection that, given a long enough stretch of time and a sufficient number of universes, there would be no need to posit a designer. In this paper we argue that a deep understanding of Aquinas's Fifth Way depends upon understanding his hylomorphic account of the nature of composite substance, an account that is inconsistent with atomism. We argue that if one grants hylomorphism, Aquinas's Fifth Way is difficult to resist. And we defend Aquinas's hylomorphism against several common objections. A common story about what is called the "design" (or "teleological") argument for God's existence is that a brief version of it was given by Aquinas in his Fifth Way, that Paley greatly improved on this in his Natural Theology, presenting a new version more clearly focused on the internal teleology of living organisms, and that this version of the design argument was gravely wounded by Hume and Kant, and killed by Darwin. However (so this story goes), a new version of the argument has arisen in the past 30 years or so that assumes Darwinian evolution, but argues that the probability of a universe fine-tuned enough to allow for the evolution of rational animals without supposing it was designed for that purpose is so vanishingly small that denying the existence of God (or of a being possessed of several important "divine making" properties) is similar to believing that an unloaded six-sided die randomly thrown 1,000 times could come up on its sixth side each time. The fine-tuning design argument (or, rather, family of arguments) is undoubtedly different from Paley's. It shares with Paley's this feature, however: the fine-tuning argument (broadly conceived) is consistent with atomism AUTHOR'S PROOF 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 The Modern Schoolman, Vol. 89, No. 3–4, July and October 2012, pp. 155–180 © John Kronen and Sandra Menssen • © The Modern Schoolman AUTHOR'S PROOF (broadly conceived).1 But Aquinas's Fifth Way can be understood or read in such a way that it does not adumbrate Paley or contemporary fine tuning arguments in this regard, but rather points to a distinct sort of design argument. Because the hylomorphic reading of the Fifth Way that we'll propose is inconsistent with atomism, Aquinas's design argument can be seen as precluding a particular objection-one that is both common and troubling-to fine-tuning design arguments. In this paper we will argue that an adequate appreciation of the Fifth Way requires an understanding of Aquinas's doctrine that composite substances are made of substantial form and prime matter, and that if his hylomorphic doctrine is correct, Aquinas's argument for God in the Fifth Way is difficult to resist. In attempting to achieve what we take to be a correct and deep understanding of the Fifth Way, we will begin by offering in Section I a preliminary statement of its argument (or one important aspect of its argument) and examining two metaphysical principles Aquinas relies on in that argument. In Section II we will discuss an apparent inconsistency between these principles. In Section III we will explicate Aquinas's hylomorphic ontology of material substances, and then in Section IV use that ontology to offer an essentially hylomorphic interpretation of the Fifth Way, showing in the process that the metaphysical principles that initially appeared inconsistent are, in fact, not. In Section V we will consider and respond to several objections to the metaphysics that underlies the Fifth Way. And in Section VI we will offer some concluding remarks. 1 Preliminary Statement of the Argument of the Fifth Way As is well known, the so-called "Fifth Way" is the last of the brief arguments Aquinas presented in the Summa Theologiae for supposing the existence of some being "whom all call God." Any careful student of these proofs knows that Aquinas does not think that any one of these Ways-or indeed the set of them-establishes the existence of a being with a full complement of divine-making properties. What he does think is that each of them makes it reasonable to believe that there is some being (not necessarily the same being) that possesses one or more divine-making properties. It is only later in the Summa that, subtly building on these proofs, Aquinas concludes he has established by reason alone that there is one, immaterial, uncreated, omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being who created and sustains the world. Each of the Five Ways concludes only that there is some being who 156 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 1 By "atomism broadly conceived" we mean to refer to any mereology which takes it that macroobjects (e.g. plants, animals, crystals) are made of, or constituted by, smaller (or at least more basic) material substances, whether or not such a mereology supposes that smallest material substances exist or posits the existence of elemental substances which are infinitely divisible but denies there are, or could be, any smallest material substances. Although fine-tuning design arguments are in broad outline consistent with atomism, it might be possible to develop a detailed version of the fine-tuning argument that incorporates hylomorphism and hence rejects atomism. But if (as we argue) hylomorphism entails an intelligent designer, there might not be much motivation for developing a fine-tuning argument of this sort. AUTHOR'S PROOF has one or more properties Aquinas held to be divine. The first three Ways focus on metaphysical divine-making properties (being an unmoved mover, a first cause, and a necessary being), while the last two focus on moral and personal properties (being maximally good and intelligent). Of these, the Fifth Way is arguably the most important for piety, since only it explicitly attributes to the cause of the world action on purpose for the good of the beings it creates. It goes as follows: The Fifth Way is taken from the governance of the world. For we see that some things that lack cognition, namely natural bodies, operate for the sake of an end: which is apparent from this, that they always or frequently operate in the same way so that that which is best follows; hence it is clear that it is not by accident, but from some intention, that they arrive at their end. Those things, however, that do not have cognition do not tend towards an end unless directed by something with cognition and intelligence, as the arrow [is shot] by the archer. Therefore, there is some intelligent being by whom all natural things are ordered to their end: and this [intelligent being] we call God. (ST, I, q. 2, a. 3)2 It should be noted that this argument does not explicitly address the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic teleology, where intrinsic teleology has to do with the way things act "always or frequently" in such a way that the best consequence results for them, and extrinsic teleology has to do with the way things act as parts of the cosmos taken as a quasi-whole, in such a way as to contribute to the good of the cosmos. We agree with the interpretation of several commentators that Aquinas had both sorts of teleology in mind here (in other places he focuses more particularly either on internal or external teleology). But since we think that the argument with respect to internal teleology is seriously neglected despite having great power, in this paper we will focus on considerations regarding internal teleology. We will propose what we think is a hitherto unremarked understanding of internal teleology (the picture with regard to teleology is more complicated than might be suggested by the simple distinction typically adverted to between internal and external teleology). Garrigou-Lagrange, who to the best of our knowledge has discussed and defended the argument of the Fifth Way at greater length than any other commentator, summarizes its main premises as follows: "things which lack intelligence act for an end" and "things which lack intelligence cannot tend towards an end, unless they are directed by an intelligent being which knows this end" (Garrigou-Lagrange 1934, 374). Though we find this helpful, it obviously leaves some important questions open. For one thing the quantification of the premises is not specified. This no doubt reflects Aquinas's text. He begins by Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 157 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 2 References to the Summa Theologiae are to Aquinas (1888–1906) and are abbreviated as "ST," followed by the part, question, and article numbers of the relevant passage, and on occasion followed by the number of a reply within the article. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Latin are our own. AUTHOR'S PROOF speaking of "some things" but concludes by asserting that "all natural things" are guided to certain ends by a ruling intelligence. Presumably, though Aquinas did hold that all natural things are directed to certain ends by a ruling intelligence, he began discussing "some things" because he thought that it is more apparent that certain sorts of natural bodies (such as plants and animals) always, or frequently, act in the same way leading to the best possible result. However, we will side-step these matters at present and give a preliminary statement of the argument that rests on premises Aquinas clearly held to be true. (1) All material substances lacking cognition of ends (i.e. natural bodies) are substances that act for the sake of certain ends. (2) No substance lacking cognition of ends acts for the sake of certain ends unless directed by an intelligence that knows the ends for the sake of which it acts. (3) So, all material substances lacking cognition of ends are directed by an intelligence that knows the ends for the sake of which they act. As we will see later, this is not the deepest statement one can give of the underlying argument of the Fifth Way; but we will begin with it. 2 An Apparent Inconsistency in the Fifth Way Aquinas, following Aristotle, held that material substances (cats, trees, molecules, etc.) are form/matter composites, "hylomorphic composites," that have an intrinsic directedness towards certain sorts of activities, towards being in certain states, and towards standing in certain relations. In short, they have a nature that roots in them active and passive powers-for example the power of water to cool, of fire to burn, of cats to see, of stones to be moved, and so forth. No doubt Aquinas's examples are quaint to contemporary ears, but that does not affect Aquinas's main point so long as one holds that macro-entities3 such as water molecules do exist and further that, for instance, water has the power to put out fires. Whatever the explanation for this power, it does not seem that the passage of years has shown it to be false that water has it; nor, perhaps more importantly for present purposes, has it been shown to be false that people need water to survive. We might rephrase Aquinas's view with reference to natural laws. His understanding of natural laws is that they describe the ways things of a certain sort will act or react in certain situations, and that the basis for these laws (what makes them true, so to speak) is that things possess natures that root in them active and passive powers.4 This might be thought to make more sense than supposing that natural laws are ghostly things hovering above material substances, constraining them in some way. 158 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 3 We're using "macro-entity" here to mean an entity in some way divisible into atoms. 4 See Aquinas 1884, 56–57 (In Physicorum, Liber II, Lect. I). AUTHOR'S PROOF Garrigou-Lagrange has emphasized that for Aquinas, final causality, every bit as much as efficient causality, is bound up with the principle of sufficient reason. He wrote: The . . . principle of finality can be defended by showing that it refers back to the principle of sufficient reason, so that to deny the former would lead to a denial of the latter. St. Thomas briefly points this out when he says that "Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing rather than another would not follow from the action of the agent." If every agent produces, not any sort of effect indifferently, but a determinate and suitable effect, and this without tending towards this effect, without being ordained towards this effect rather than towards another; if the acorn produces the oak and not the ash, without its having a definite tendency for the one rather than for the other; if the eye sees instead of hearing, without being meant for seeing rather than hearing-it follows that the non-accidental determination and appropriateness of the effect are without a raison d'etre, that determination comes from indetermination, that order arises from lack of order, that the perfect originates from the imperfect, the greater from the less-all of which statements are absurd. The determination and the perfection of the effect could not have been realized in it, unless they were in a certain manner contained in the efficient cause. Now, for the effect not to be contained in the cause actually, but only virtually, could not be unless the efficient cause tended towards this effect rather than another, unless it were directed towards this effect. (Garrigou-Lagrange 1934, 362–363) This is a powerful argument. And notice that it is an a priori argument independent of observed regularities in the world. No doubt since we do not know the essences of things from "the inside out" (according to Aquinas), only experience can reveal to us, in a round-about way, something of the nature of a thing and hence of its determination with respect to final causality: but this is consistent with supposing that the principle of final causality, namely that things are determined by their nature to act in specific ways, can be known a priori. And, indeed, Laurence Bonjour has powerfully argued for this position in his book In Defense of Pure Reason, showing that without an a priori grasp of something like the principle of finality it is simply impossible to provide a solution to the problem of induction.5 There is another important aspect of Aquinas's doctrine of intrinsic teleology we have not yet mentioned: Aquinas's way of opposing hedonism with respect to what is good for things is based on the notion that what is good for a thing is rooted in its nature. Things are not only by nature wound up to act in certain ways; further, their natures ground the fact that being in certain states, performing certain activities, and having certain relations complete or Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 159 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 5 Bonjour 1998, 212. AUTHOR'S PROOF perfect them in various way. Hence, for instance, Aquinas would argue it is good for plants to grow, cats to see, and humans to know because their natures root in them a kind of "directedness towards" these things (ST I, q. 5, a. 1, a. 5; I–II, q. 94, a. 2). Some contemporary philosophers find this idea of Aquinas's incoherent. But it is not as far removed from common sense as it might at first seem. We do say such things as "it is good for plants to be watered and to receive sunlight." And certainly plants cannot experience pleasure or pain, so if we mean what we say here it appears we don't accept a purely hedonistic doctrine of what is good for things. Furthermore, it seems that we agree, essentially, with Aquinas's view about the nature of things determining what is good for them, since when we say, for instance, "water is good for plants" that must mean that water is necessary for them to grow, nourish themselves, and in general achieve completion as being the sorts of things they are. Of course one might here object that we also say such things as "it is good for a car to get its oil changed," even though we know that it is quite silly to suppose that the car benefits from having its oil changed. In fact, we clearly don't really mean that it is good for the car to have its oil changed-rather what we mean is that it is good for us that the car have its oil changed, since the car's having its oil changed will allow it to perform the function we built it to perform in order to benefit us. It is interesting to note in this regard that Aquinas would agree that such statements as "it is good for the car to have its oil changed" are not literally true, and would also insist that anyone who thinks clearly about the matter wouldn't think such statements are literally true even when uttering them. But none of this would weaken Aquinas's conviction that statements like "it is good for plants to be watered" are literally true and also that we typically believe them to be so (unless we are misled by bad metaphysics). In the next section we will say more about why Aquinas held that cars cannot be benefited but plants can, and will here note only that, according to Aquinas, cars, unlike plants, do not rigorously speaking exist, and since a necessary condition for benefiting something is that it exist, it is impossible that cars could be benefitted by having their oil changed.6 That there is a tension in the argument of the Fifth Way should now be clear. If unintelligent material substances (plants and brute animals) are by their natures ordered to act in certain definite ways, and if their acting in those ways is intrinsically good for them, not only does there seem to be no reason to suppose that a governing mind is necessary for them to act for the sake of certain ends-it seems that such a mind could no more make this be the case than it could make it be the case that modus ponens is valid. All of this suggests that Aquinas's Fifth Way, understood in light of his 160 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 6 Artifacts do not rigorously speaking exist because they are accidental unities produced by human art and no accidental unities, strictly speaking, exist. See Aquinas 1959, 59–60 (In De Anima, Liber II, Lect. I, para. 218); see also Aquinas 1961, 466–467 (Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Vol. II, Book VI, L. II). AUTHOR'S PROOF teleological doctrine, embodies a conceptual mistake of mind-numbing grossness. But, as William Rowe noted when discussing a common objection to the Third Way (namely that it commits the fallacy of composition), one should be leery of accusing a philosopher of Aquinas's stature of errors of mind-numbing grossness. In the next section we will lay the groundwork for an essentially hylomorphic interpretation of the Fifth Way, an interpretation that we will set out in Section IV. And in the course of this we will answer the inconsistency objection. 3 Aquinas's Ontology of Material Substances Aquinas's hylomorphic account of material substances is brilliant and complex, and was peculiar even in its medieval period. In particular, the majority of great medieval scholastics did not agree with his view of the purely potential nature of prime matter. But there can be little doubt that whatever problems beset Aquinas's doctrine, it is one of the great attempts to account for the substantial unity of material substances in a way that also respects their composite nature. Following Aristotle, Aquinas analyzed what philosophers now typically call "natural objects," but which he called material substances, into two ultimate principles: prime mater and substantial form.7 For Aquinas, substance is the fundamental category of being and it transcends the physical realm.8 According to Aquinas a substance is an essence to which it is due not to exist in a subject-that is, if it exists, it doesn't exist as a state or feature of something else.9 This description of the nature of substance involves the prior, and strictly speaking indefinable, concept "essence." According to Aquinas the essence of a thing is what-it-is, or, alternately, that which corresponds to correct conceptions and definitions of it.10 One is perhaps helped to grasp Aquinas's notion of essence by observing that he insists that there is no such thing as "being as such." Every being has an essence, which means every being is an individual being of a certain sort.11 To be is to be an x that is an F (an individual cat, horse, color, thought, shape, and so on). Some essences, Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 161 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 7 Aquinas argues for this in many places, most tersely in 1965, 7–14 (The Principles of Nature, Chapters I–II). 8 See Aquinas 1965, 36 (On Being and Essence, Chapter I). 9 See Aquinas 1934, 27 (Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput XXV). 10 See Aquinas 1965, 34–36 (On Being and Essence). 11 It might be objected to this that Aquinas often calls God "subsistent being itself" and also that he holds that designated matter is the principle of individuation. But Aquinas is quite clear that when he says God is subsistent being itself he does not mean that God is the universal "existence"-rather he means God is pure act, possessing every absolute perfection of being to an infinite degree. See 1965, 58–59 (On Being and Essence, Chapter V) and ST I, q. 4, a. 2. And Aquinas is also clear that universals exist only "in the mind" (i.e. as objects of thought), not in reality. See 1965, 48–49 (On Being and Essence, Chapter III). Hence, his holding that designated matter is the principle of individuation should not be taken to imply he thought that the angels or God are not particulars-all it should be taken to imply is that he thought there cannot be many angels that are the same in species (i.e. each angel is the sole possible member of its angelic species), nor many divine beings. See 1965, 54 (On Being and Essence, Chapter IV). AUTHOR'S PROOF if they exist, cannot exist as states or features of other essences. These essences are substantial essences. Non-substantial essences, that is, essences such that if they exist they do exist as states or features of something else, were called by Aquinas "accidents." Substantial essences, according to Aquinas, are per se unities, not accidental unities. For Aquinas an accidental unity consists either of a number of substances related to each other in a certain way, such as a number of pearls on a string (ST III, q. 2, a. 1), or of a substance with one or more of its accidents (e.g. a pale man).12 An interesting aspect of this doctrine is that it entails that no artifact is a per se unity, and hence that no artifact is a substance. An artifact is either a number of substances put together according to a certain relational structure (e.g. a watch) or a substance with a certain accidental form (usually a shape) imposed on it (e.g. a marble statue).13 Another interesting aspect of this doctrine is that artifacts have only extrinsic final causes. And this is another way of saying something we noted in the preceding section, namely, that we cannot sensibly say that it is literally true that it is good for a car to have its oil changed. But, or so Aquinas thought, true material substances do have intrinsic final causes. So we can sensibly say that it is literally true, for instance, that sunlight is good for plants. And Aquinas's way of affirming this was to say that plants, and other material substances, have intrinsic final causes. This, of course, requires that plants are per se unities, and so possess a greater unity than that of any artifact; indeed it requires that plants possess the sort of unity characteristic of single substances. One way to support Aquinas's idea that plants have a per se unity is by looking to their activities, and above all to growth. Growth is what Aquinas called an immanent act, that is, an act that in part involves a substance producing some new accident in itself, as occurs with sensation and homeostasis. Aquinas denied that growth is mere accretion.14 When a plant (or an animal) grows it transforms the matter of something else into itself, thereby augmenting its own quantity. The plant, in Aquinas's eyes, in growing is biggified-it, the plant itself, becomes larger than it was before. This is an extremely odd notion from a modern point of view, but then, again, it is scarcely noticed that the modern view, resting as it does on a doctrine of the nature of material substances that is, with respect to the most essential philosophical points, the same as that of the ancient Greek atomists, doesn't really allow for anything to grow. Atoms certainly don't and can't grow, nor can the aggregates they make up do so-all that can happen to them is that more atoms, or aggregates of atoms, become conjoined with them (like snow flakes attaching to a snow ball) or that the atoms "constituting" them move away from each other (as occurs when steam is produced). But neither of these processes can in any way be thought to be instances of growth. Let us suppose that Aquinas is right about growth and other immanent 162 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 12 Aquinas 1965, 8–9 (The Principles of Nature, Chapter I). 13 Aquinas 1884, 59–60 (In Physicorum, Liber II, Lect. II). 14 Aquinas 1959, 89 (In De Anima, Liber II, Lect. IX, paras. 341–342). AUTHOR'S PROOF actions. If he is right, then living beings, at any rate, do exhibit a unity missing from a piece of cloth or even a watch. But there is this problem: living beings, even if they are per se unities, have what the Schoolmen called integral parts, such as the leaves, branches, trunk, and roots of a tree. These are not only locally distinct from each other; they differ structurally and functionally and at least in some sense can be separated from the whole they are parts of (though Aquinas would say that a leaf severed from a tree is a leaf only metaphorically). Put another way, living beings do not have the unity of Leibniz's monads or even of Newtonian space, the "parts" of which are not qualitatively different from each other and which cannot be separated from each other (in the sense of being divided by cutting). This presents a deep metaphysical problem according to Aquinas, one he thought that the hylomorphic theory alone could solve. Using this problem as a springboard, we can reconstruct one of Aquinas's arguments for hylomorphism15 (call it AFM, the "argument for form and matter"): (1) There are substances characterized by integral parts. (2) All substances characterized by integral parts are composite substances (i.e. substances in some way made out of, or constituted by, more than one distinct entity). (3) Either (A) all composite substances have another substance as a proper part, or (B) all composite substances are made exclusively out of accidents, or (C) all composite substances are made exclusively out of substantial principles. (4) ~A (5) ~B (6) If all composite substances are made exclusively out of substantial principles, then they are made of substantial form and prime matter. (7) So, if there are substances characterized by integral parts, then they are made of substantial form and prime matter. (8) So, there are substances made of substantial form and prime matter. Taking (1) and (2) to be fairly obvious from what we have said, we wish to say something about how the remaining premises follow from the tenets of Aquinas's system. Premise (3) exhausts the possibilities within Aquinas's system. In support of (4), Aquinas would insist that a number of substances, no matter how intimately related, are just that, a number of substances intimately related (ST I, q. 76, a. 4, ad. 4). And, if one supposes this isn't the case, and yet believes that composite substances exist, it seems one must Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 163 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 15 Aquinas's main argument for hylomorphism was an argument from substantial change, but the argument we give here is certainly in accord with his fundamental principles and implicit in many passages in his work (see, e.g., ST I, q. 72, a. 4). AUTHOR'S PROOF suppose that a true composite substance is an emergent entity that depends on the smaller substances it inheres in. But this would make a composite substance a state or feature of a number of other substances, something that is a flat contradiction if we accept Aquinas's definition of substance as that to which it is due not to exist in a subject (or subjects). Premise (5) of AFM should, we think, be fairly evident-given Aquinas's overall system. Accidents are parasitic on substances-they are, as the Schoolmen said, "beings of beings," and so they could not possibly constitute a substance. To suppose that material objects are made up of accidents (or things in some way analogous to them) would, in fact, be to abandon substantivalism for the view that material objects are bundles of property tropes. But even if one grants all this, one could take it to entail there can be no composite substances. In fact, many great metaphysicians have held exactly this, whether they endorsed some form of spiritualistic monadism, or physicalistic monadism, or a mixture, or monism. But Aquinas was convinced, above all by the activities of living beings, that there are true composite substances and that they are made out of two substantial principles, prime matter and substantial form. Before turning to premise (6) we need to explain why Aquinas had this conviction. For Aquinas a principle is "that from which something, in some way, proceeds" (ST I, q. 33, a. 1). This of course is not very precise, but even the greatest metaphysicians must stammer when it comes to explicating the primitive concepts of their systems. At any rate, we can say that, for Aquinas, a principle of a thing is essential to the thing's origin, whether extrinsically (as the sun is the principle of its rays), or intrinsically (as form and matter are with respect to material substances). Both form and matter, for Aquinas, are analogous notions: they don't apply to the things they do apply to either univocally or equivocally, but in partially the same, partially a different way. Matter, in general, is any determinable insofar as it is determinable, that is, capable of further determination, while form is any intrinsic determination of a determinable. In this broad sense, every finite substance is matter (or, the material cause) of its accidents. Baby Sue, being human, is a determinable entity, capable, for instance, of acquiring the ability to speak. Once she does she will be determined by that ability, and the ability will be a determination of her, hence a form, more specifically an accidental form (all accidents are forms for Aquinas, though some of them are also, relatively, matter, if they are capable of further determination). Prime matter and substantial form are radically material and formal- they are, as it were, the ultimate instances of the analogous concepts form and matter. We can give the following necessary and sufficient conditions for them: 164 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF Something is prime matter if and only if it is a pure determinable lacking in quality, quantity, and active power, such that, if informed by any one of a range of substantial forms, it will be one of the two essential constituents of a complete substance. Something is a substantial form if and only if it is a determination of prime matter, which with it constitutes a composite substance with certain sorts of active and passive powers, capable of further accidental determinations with respect to those powers. We can say a little more to shed light on the notions of form and matter by noting that though neither the matter nor the form alone is wholly responsible for any feature of a composite substance (since if one of them were, it would itself be a complete substance, not a substantial principle16), matter is more responsible for those features of composite substances that (1) are common to all of them (we might speak of these as features that physics studies) and (2) are more passive (quantity, inertia, divisibility). Form is more responsible for those features of composite substances that (1) distinguish them from each other (thus it is the form of a lion that distinguishes it from a man) and (2) are more active (the power of a plant to grow or a man to see). Finally, matter is the principle of distinction within a species. Two lions are fundamentally distinguished from each other by the different bits of matter that their forms inform.17 Having explicated the notions of form and matter, we can now turn to premise (6) of AFM, the claim that if composite substances are made of substantial principles, then they are made of substantial form and prime matter. Why think premise (6) is true? To begin with, the only philosophical tradition that has worked out any intelligible account of substantial principles is the hylomorphic one. And besides, it seems the principles need to be interpreted relationally, so, assuming there are two, one unifies and determines, and the other is unified and determined. In other words, unless (6) is true it is impossible for there to be a composite, whether substantial or accidental. Without a formal principle the composite will lack determination, actuality, and unity. A number of boards (the material principle of a wooden house), for example, existing without the proper relational structure (the formal principle of a house) will not constitute a wooden house (an accidental composite). Without a material principle, one will have only a pure or separated form-such a form will be intrinsically determinate, actual and one, but, since it will not inform anything, it will "constitute" a simple being (e.g. an angel), not a composite one. One can put the point tersely this way: without Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 165 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 16 Besides that, even if we suppose, contra Aquinas, that natural substances, like artifacts, are made up of other substances, it seems clear that very few, if any, of their attributes could be explained by reference to the attributes of just one of the substances constituting them. The attributes would instead be explained by a kind of relational blending of all, or of several, of those substances' attributes. 17 See Aquinas 1965, 64–65 (On Being and Essence, Chapter VI). AUTHOR'S PROOF form a composite won't exist, and without matter, a composite won't. 4 A Revised Statement of the Intrinsic Teleological Argument of the Fifth Way Bearing in mind all we have said in the last section about the hylomorphic constitution of material substances and about the natures of form and matter, we can now return to the Fifth Way informed by aspects of Aquinas's metaphysics that are necessary both to answer the inconsistency objection to his teleological argument, the objection we described in Section II, and to grasp the bearing of that argument on the intrinsic teleology of material substances. In the Treatise on Divine Government in the Summa, Aquinas himself raises the inconsistency objection. His response to it is as follows: . . . the natural necessity inhering in things that are, without exception, determined in the way they act is a certain impression from God directing them to their end, just as the necessity by which the arrow is driven so that it tends to a certain mark is an impression from the archer and is not of the arrow. But in this they differ, because that which creatures receive from God is their nature, but that which is imprinted on natural things by humans is outside of their nature and extends even to violent motion. Hence, just as the necessity of the impetus in the motion of the arrow demonstrates the direction of the archer, so the natural necessity of the creature demonstrates the government of divine providence. (ST I, q. 103, a. 1, ad. 3. We should note that we take "impression" here most especially to refer to the substantial form of material substances.) In this passage Aquinas responds to the inconsistency objection by insisting that the natures of all things other than God were impressed upon them by God.18 One might wonder what non-question-begging reason Aquinas had for thinking this is so. In fact he had several. But here we want to focus on a line of reasoning grounded in his hylomorphic doctrine, since the Fifth Way clearly focuses on material substances that lack intelligence-"natural bodies," as Aquinas calls them. Here, then, is the revised version of the argument in the Fifth Way (construed as focusing on a special sort of intrinsic teleology): (1) There are material substances. (2) Every material substance depends for its existence on unification of the principles of form and matter. 166 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 18 One can say that for Aquinas God creates the natures of finite substances but does not create their intrinsic possibility-that is rooted in God's essence. That is, God's essence is imitable in an infinity of ways, and the ultimate ground of the intrinsic possibility of created natures is in this infinite imitability of God (ST I, q. 44, a. 3). 19 Speaking more precisely, it should be said that God creates composite substances and in so doing co-creates matter and form, since matter and form don't so much exist as they are intrinsic principles by which material substances exist (ST I, q. 45, a. 4). AUTHOR'S PROOF (3) If 1) and 2), then there is some intelligent substance that creates the matter and form of every material substance.19 (4) So, there is some intelligent substance that creates the matter and form of every material substance. Let us call this argument AHD (for the "argument from hylomorphic design"). Aquinas would say that premise (1) is in some way evident to the senses, and would also argue that the integral parts of living beings evince their being material-no immaterial substance has integral parts. Premise (2) is supported by AFM and also by arguments Aquinas gave based on substantial change. This leaves premise (3). Let us begin here by returning to Aquinas's distinction between form and matter, and making a point about that distinction that is surely implicit in Aquinas20-but made explicit by Suarez. It is that form and matter are intrinsically partial entities. This does not mean that they are, so to speak, half-way between existence and non-existence; it means that they are, by their nature, directed towards constituting a composite substance, and could not naturally exist separately from each other.21 Suarez puts the point this way: ... there are certain things that are wholly absolute [i.e. are not relations] which are said to take their species through an aptitude to something to which they are ordained, not as to a terminus, but as to an intrinsic end on account of which they were made. This order is not a relation because it does not posit in such a thing formal dependence on that to which it is ordained, as is obvious, since the [rational] soul is able to endure although the body has been corrupted. [The same occurs with] a power although its object has been destroyed, and with knowledge although nothing knowable exists. Such an ordination pertains to the essence of a thing because by its nature this thing receives a determinate essence, so that, through it, it is apt towards some end. This aptitude is absolute and intrinsic to the thing itself.22 Suarez goes on to use artifacts to give some explanation for this. A drinking glass, if we consider it (wrongly, according to Suarez) to be a substance, is such that by its very nature it can hold water, even if it is currently not doing so. Thus, in virtue of certain non-relational properties it has, a glass is capable of having a "holding relation" to water. But, Suarez insists, the capacity of the glass to have such a relation, is, as it were, accidental to it-in fact, for Suarez, being-a-drinking-glass is what we might call an imposed property, a way in which we think about it. So too, stones that might be used to build a house, Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 167 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 20 See ST I, q. 76, a. 1, ad. 6. 21 The sole exception to this rule is the human soul, which according to Aquinas is subsistent and so able to exist in separation from matter. 22 Suarez 1978, 104 (In De Anima, Disputation I, q. 3, sec. 12). AUTHOR'S PROOF though their intrinsic nature makes them suitable for such a use, are not by nature ordered to constituting a house-it is accidental to them, in other words, that they can be used this way.23 In contrast, it is not accidental to the natures of form and matter that they can constitute a composite substance- it is a deep aspect of what they are. Thus Suarez can say the following about form and matter: . . . just as matter is not something other in its essence than an entity apt to receive a form, and thus potency for receiving form is the very being of mater, so form in its essence is not anything other than an entity apt for informing matter, and that aptitude is not something accidental to the form, but is itself the essential difference of the form.24 This point about form and matter, namely that they are by their natures ordered to constitute a composite substance, rather than being, by their natures, suited to form some sort of aggregate that might be useful for human purposes, provides the key for understanding premise (3) of AHD. Matter and form are not the sorts of things that can bump into each other, the way atoms careening around space can. They aren't available to be randomized,25 because they are intrinsically partial: they are at the very roots of their being ordered to constituting a composite substance rather than being already existing substances extrinsically formed or shaped (in the way one might sharpen a stone and attach it to a shaved stick to form a spear) so as to be able to be joined with other extrinsically formed substances in order that all these substances could act in concert to produce certain desired effects. How do these intrinsically partial principles of form and matter come into proximity with one another? For form and matter to be instantiated in a particular material substance they must have an intended proximity. And that can occur only in a designing mind. It might be thought that the principles of form and matter could simply be abstracted from material substances once they are in existence, so there need be no question about how they came together to form a substance. But while there is a sense in which we infer the principles from material substances that already exist (namely, we observe the substances and argue to the existence of the principles), for the principles to have the explanatory force that hylomorphism assigns them they must be ontologically prior to the material substance and generative. And that means the principles must have an intended proximity from a designing mind. To appreciate the point that form and matter are by their natures ordered to constitute a composite substance, it is important to distinguish between (1) its being the case that "formness" and "matterness" (so to speak) are by natured ordered to each other to constitute a substance, and (2) its being the case that form, matter, and composites made of them exist. No intelligent being 168 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 23 Cf. ST III, q. 2, a. 1. 24 Suarez 1978, 92 (In De Anima, Disputation 1, q. 3, sec. 4). 25 We thank James Madden for this felicitous turn of phrase. AUTHOR'S PROOF is necessary for (1), just as no intelligent being is necessary to make it be the case that roses are flowers. Indeed it seems incoherent to suppose that an intelligent being could, by any purposeful action, causally contribute to the state of affairs (1) describes. But this doesn't make it unreasonable to think that an intelligent being is necessary to bring about the state of affairs (2) describes. The fact that complete substances are not by their nature ordered to composing artifacts, but merely have such accidental properties as to make them suitable to uniting with other substances to form a relatively stable aggregate that may be of use to humans or other animals, is at the very root of the most powerful sort of objection to a Palely-like design argument. The great 19thcentury philosopher Hermann Lotze's objection to any design argument clearly assumes what we have called atomism in the broad sense: If we take for granted that an indefinite multitude of different elements act upon one another entirely in accordance with mechanical laws, and that they were aboriginally in reciprocal motions which were not regulated by any design, then there might issue from such conditions innumerable possible consequences. The forms possessed of an immanent conformity to an end would represent only a very insignificant number among these possible consequences; and therefore they would have very little probability of coming into existence . . . But with reference to the past we are at liberty to assume, that at the first an innumerable multitude of inharmonious forms, intrinsically hostile to any end, actually emerged from the reciprocal impact of blind elements; that these forms, however, were not able to maintain themselves in the course of nature, as against the constant assaults from without; that, on the contrary, only those few forms held out which had chanced to be the more fortunate; that then these fortunate ones exerted more and more a determining influence upon the rest; and thus that gradually it has come to pass, that nature runs its course, not indeed in complete perfection and conformity to an end, but after all to such an extent that there still remain but few disturbances or interferences by which the development and perpetuation of the structures that are conformable to an end, is endangered. In this way, therefore, it would not be unthinkable that an original chaos gradually shaped itself into a nature that is arranged in conformity to ends.26 In essence the atomists' objection to the need for a governing intelligence in order to explain the coming to be of stable aggregates of micro-entities (which aggregates we call "natural bodies" or "macro-entities" or even "material substances") always boils down to the line of reasoning Lotze here sets forth. But if one focuses on a design argument emphasizing the special sort of intrinsic teleology we've here called attention to, then the objection Lotze articHylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 169 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 26 Lotze 1886, 19–20. AUTHOR'S PROOF ulates cannot get off the ground. We can flesh this point out a little by returning to a comment we made at the beginning of this paper, when we suggested that the picture with regard to internal and external teleology is more complicated than might be suggested by the simple distinction standardly drawn between internal and external teleology. There are at least two sorts of internal teleology: (1) matter and form are joined to constitute a substance, and thereby act for the good of that substance since it's good for it to exist and have a nature; (2) the substance acts for its own good, and is able to do so because it has a particular nature-for example, the cat drinks water, extending its life. Our focus here is on the first of these sorts of internal teleology. (We might add that the picture is further complicated by the fact that internal and external teleologies are interrelated: when a substance acts for its own good it is also acting for the good of the whole-for example, the cat uses oxygen by breathing and gives off carbon dioxide, and the tree uses carbon dioxide and gives off oxygen. And there are structural parallels among the sorts of teleologies: matter and form fit or complement each other; similarly, plants and animals fit or complement each other.) The first sort of internal teleology might be called constitutive intrinsic teleology. The intrinsic teleology of the essential parts of a hylomorphic composite, namely form and matter, is to constitute a composite that is per se one in the substantial order. We might then speak of non-constitutive intrinsic teleology to refer to the teleology of the composite substance itself (i.e. its being by nature ordered to being in certain states, having certain relations, and performing certain activities). Most contemporary discussions of Aquinas's teleological doctrine focus either on his view of extrinsic teleology or-more often-on his view of what we have called non-constitutive intrinsic teleology. But Aquinas himself frequently discusses constitutive intrinsic teleology and when he does so at any length he links it to non-constitutive intrinsic teleology.27 This makes sense since the constitutive parts of a hylomorphic composite, by fulfilling their intrinsic teleology, complete an essence that roots in the substance whose essence it is a directedness towards being in certain states, having certain relations, and performing certain activities. But though constitutive and non-constitutive intrinsic teleology are intrinsically linked, it is a mistake, we think, to fail to distinguish them. The failure to distinguish them obscures the true force of the Fifth Way.28 Contemporary fine-tuning design arguments, which focus either exclusively on external teleology or on external teleology together with internal teleology of the second sort, are vulnerable to the type of objection Lotze articulates. But AHD, which focuses on the first sort of internal teleology, is not vulnerable to Lotze's sort of objection. Before we move on to the next section of this paper we want briefly to 170 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 27 See, for example, ST I, q. 65, a. 2. 28 For an extremely careful discussion of the difference between constitutive and non-constitutive intrinsic teleology as well as their essential relation to each other, see Suarez 1978, 106–132 (In De Anima, Disputation I, q. 4). AUTHOR'S PROOF address two objections to AHD that grant the truth of hylomorphism. (In the next section we will take up objections to hylomorphism itself.) The first objection is that even if we are right that it is impossible to create hylomorphic substances without purposely creating their matter and form, it does not follow that the hylomorphic substance is purposely created. The most important thing to say here is that getting the conclusion that matter and form were purposely created is good enough if one's interested in arguing for purposeful creation-for a designing mind. But another point may be added. If one is justified in thinking that a watch on a heath was made on purpose for a reason by some rational substance (something not even Hume called into question), then surely one is also justified in supposing that any substance responsible for the existence of hylomorphic composites acted on purpose, for a reason, in producing such substances. It seems virtually impossible to doubt that any substance that is responsible for there being hylomorphic substances created (or concreated) the partial substances (form and matter) in order that they constitute some composite substances. Presumably this could not be the end of the matter (further purposes, it seems, must be involved in the creating of composite substances via the creating of partial substances), but we need not have a clear grasp of these further purposes,29 nor need we even speculate about them, in order to have good reason to think that premise (3) of AHD is true. The second objection runs as follows: even granted that hylomorphism is true, it seems possible that the world has always existed with hylomorphic composites in place, and hence possible that in order to understand the coming to be of any one of them it would be sufficient to appeal to the action of earlier hylomorphic composites that, in virtue of their forms, are capable of educing new substantial forms in matter. This objection is similar, of course, to a standard objection to Aquinas's Second and Third Ways. Here we can only gesture towards what Aquinas's deepest answer to this objection would be: contingent beings need to be sustained in being here and now by a non-contingent being, that is by a being that is pure act, existing in virtue of its unlimited essence. For Aquinas, contingent being participates in being in something like the way that Platonic particulars participate in their forms; and just as for Plato it is impossible that a particular continue to exist without participating in its form (ST I, q. 44, a. 1), so for Aquinas it is impossible for a contingent being to exist or continue to exist without being sustained in being by a being that has its being from itself (ST I, q. 104, a. 1). Contingent beings don't cause the very being of anything; else they could ground their own being (ST I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1). They either cause the becoming of something by introducing a new accidental or substantial form into a subject, or they complete an essence (as form completes the essence of matter) that is intrinsically able to exist (in the way form and matter alone aren't) but needs to acquire the act of existing from the being that, as subsistent being, is Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 171 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 29 For a concise account of Aquinas's teleological doctrine with respect to both intrinsic and extrinsic teleology see ST I, q. 65, a. 2. AUTHOR'S PROOF its own existence (ST I, q. 44, a. 2). Aquinas points to many aspects of things in the world that he thinks show they are contingent and hence participate in being-they change, they are generable and corruptible, they are able not to be, they are imperfect, and, finally, they are made of form and matter. Their being made of form and matter indicates first, that they are contingent and hence participate in being, and second that the being upon which they depend for their existence is intelligent, since contingent entities such as form and matter, which have an intrinsic directedness towards each other and the composite they together constitute, could not have been created by a being that did not act on purpose and for a reason (i.e., that did not have the intrinsic teleology of their natures in mind when it created them). This understanding of contingent being is, no doubt, far from evident to most contemporaries and a defense of it would involve a defense of Aquinas's difficult doctrine of the real distinction between essence and existence in contingent beings. But there is another way to defend Aquinas against the objection at issue. We may simply point out that, according to the most generally accepted current cosmology, the material world didn't always exist. Assuming then that hylomorphism is true, the simplest of material substances (whatever they turn out to be) are themselves hylomorphic composites. And they could not have come to be by generation (i.e. by the eduction of a new form in some matter previously existing under another form); they could only have come to be by creation (i.e. from nothing as from a terminus a quo), their form and matter being concreated with them, since matter, being pure potency, cannot exist without form, and since form is not itself a being but a being by which something else has being (ST I, q. 45, a. 4). 5 Hylomorphism in Question It should be clear by now why we said in the introduction that Aquinas's Fifth Way is hard to reject if one grants his hylomorphism. We realize most today will not only not grant it, but think it about as worthy of consideration as geocentrism or the doctrine of the four elements. Hence they will think that however powerful the intrinsic teleological argument of the Fifth Way might be if taken on its own terms, it is actually less powerful even than Paley's argument since Paley, at least, shared the atomistic assumptions of modernity. A critic would do well, however, to pause before so summarily rejecting Aquinas's hylomorphism. The existence of a Thomistic school stretching back from Hervaeus Natalis (1250–1323) and John Capreoulus (1380–1444), through Cajetan (1468–1534), John of Saint Thomas (1589–1644), Jean Gonet (1616–1681), Tommaso Zigliara (1835–1893), and Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) up to John Wild, Elizabeth Anscombe, Peter Geach, Eleonore Stump, and other 20th and 21st-century thinkers not steeped in scholasticism is a witness to the power of Aquinas's system. Nor ought it be thought that Aquinas's endurance should be credited to the universal acclamation of Roman Catholic authorities, because the acclamation hasn't been universal. Indeed, the condemnations of the archbishop of Paris in 1277 reportedly took place 172 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF at the behest of Pope John XXI. But Thomism's intrinsic strength was such that it survived these condemnations. And it did not wither under the powerful philosophical arguments of the medieval followers of Scotus and Occam, or the mighty theological attacks of Martin Luther. Indeed the integrity of Aquinas's system endeared it to Phillip Melanchthon, Luther's co-reformer, and the final version of his celebrated Loci Communes, the first Protestant systematic theology, shows a marked Thomistic influence. And after John Gerhard, the greatest Lutheran theologian of the 17th century, wrote his magisterial Loci Theologici (a work that refers often and usually with approval to Aquinas), Aquinas attained a virtually unassailable stature as a Church teacher for Protestant theologians. Nor has Aquinas's thought exercised an influence only on Christians. Mortimer Adler, a man raised by secular Jews, became an admirer and defender of Aquinas's thought in the 1920s, even while remaining for decades an agnostic (with theistic leanings). Truly, in the entire history of Western thought, Aquinas must rank behind only Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine for his influence through the centuries, with Descartes, Locke, and Kant a considerable distance further back. We cannot here give a complete defense of Aquinas's hylomorphism, but we do wish to answer several of the most powerful objections to it. Our hope is that by doing so we will pave the way for more serious consideration of Aquinas's peculiar kind of design argument in future discussions. Objection 1: Aquinas's view that an organism is not made of other substances is false, because: (a) we can actually perceive these other substances in organisms, and (b) structural explanations of what organisms can do imply that they are made of other substances. According to Aquinas's hylomorphism, no substance is made of other substances. As we have seen, this principle of the hylomorphic doctrine is a corollary of Aquinas's definition of substance. It might be objected (in the first instance) that hylomorphism must be false, because we can actually perceive other substances in organisms. On this line of thinking, perception, the naked eye augmented by microscopes, shows that objects Aquinas held to be composite substances, such as plants, are made up of other substances, such as water molecules. Though one might respond to this by denying that water molecules are substances, it seems one could simply modify the objection by insisting that even if water molecules are not substances, they are surely not, on Aquinas's theory, bundles of property tropes (what he called "accidents"), and hence are aggregates of smaller substances. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that water molecules are substances. Supposing that they are, we can immediately detect the weakness of the objection. One cannot perceive substances directly; one can only perceive what the Schoolmen called their accidents. This is in line with Hume's philosophy, for if one can perceive substances then Hume's phenomenalism is refuted by perception. But surely, whatever the weaknesses of Hume's thought (and there are many, in our opinion), he was correct to suppose that neither substances Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 173 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF nor causal powers are able to be directly perceived by the senses. Thus, if we only sense accidents and not substances, Aquinas can argue (e.g.) that living beings have water-like accidents in certain parts of their extension, but that this fact does not by itself show that any living substance is literally composed of water molecules. The objector might respond-this is part (b) of the objection-that structural explanations of what organisms can do imply that they are made of other substances. The great modern philosophers are thought to have paved the way for many of the most powerful explanations of the powers and properties of macroentities by abandoning the hylomorphism of the medievals and adopting what they called a "mechanical" view of nature that saw even living bodies as natural machines, the properties of which can be explained by an account of the properties of the smaller substances making them up and the way those smaller substances are related. Of course, as we have seen, Aquinas insists that no machine is, in fact, one thing-it is a number of things related in certain ways such that they may, by their joint action, produce certain effects (like a number of persons rowing a boat). But even if Aquinas was correct on that point (and it is a point that Leibniz agreed with), it is not enough to dispatch with the mechanistic case against hylomorphism since it does certainly seem that, for instance, William's health depends on his liver functioning properly and that that depends on the parts his liver is made of (molecules, atoms, etc.), their properties, and the way they are related. In short the atomist might agree that Aquinas is correct in thinking that a number of substances, no matter how closely they are related, do not a substance make, but deny that living beings are single substances. In order to answer this objection to hylomorphism, it is important to note that Aquinas never denied that certain accidents in the matter of a substance are required for a certain form's informing (or more perfectly informing) that matter. Thus a human body-abstracting from its form, the soul-can be considered to be a certain matter informed by a host of accidental qualities that make it the fit receptacle for the human soul. The human soul has need of a brain in order to inform a body, and the brain, for Aquinas, being an integral part of one substance, cannot be a number of distinct substances related in various ways-rather, it must be matter, with a range of exquisite accidental dispositions necessary for the information, in it, of a rational soul. Summarizing all this, we can see there is a similarity to the Thomistic replies to parts (a) and (b) of this objection in that both stress the reality of accidents and their ontological importance as being bound up with the very nature of various substances. The first response stresses that true chemical compounds have present in them accidental qualities like the qualities of the elements from which the compound was formed, while the second stresses that certain accidents are necessary in the matter in order for particular forms to inform the matter at all, as well as to most perfectly inform it. Thus certain dispositions are necessary in the matter of a substance for a sensitive soul to emanate in it 174 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF the power of vision, and if these accidents are diminished the composite made up of the appropriately disposed matter and the sensitive soul will either be unable to see as well as it otherwise would have been able to, or will not be able to see at all. Finally, some dispositions in matter are necessary for the soul to inform the matter, period. In a human and an animal these are particularly clear with respect to those accidents that "constitute" the brain.30 All this shows that a hylomorphist can accept the existence and importance of structural explanations, but will see these not as implying that a composite is made up of a number of substances related in certain ways (since such an explanation will make the existence of the composite impossible) but rather as implying that the matter of a body has resident in it certain kinds of accidents in certain of its integral parts, accidents that dispose the matter for the information of a certain sort of substantial form or for the information, in certain of the integral parts of a composite substance, of powers that have their root in that substance's substantial form. Objection 2: Aquinas's hylomorphism makes substantial change impossible. According to Aquinas prime matter is unable to exist without being informed by some substantial form, and not even God, who is capable of actualizing every absolutely possible state of affairs, could conserve prime matter stripped of all form (ST I, q. 66, a. 1). Thus for Aquinas the scholastic axiom forma dat esse (form gives being) should be taken in the most radical sense- not that form gives proximate being to the composite taken as the sort of composite it is (e.g. human) but that it gives being simpliciter (simply, or without qualification) in the order of formal causality such that without it matter would of necessity lapse into non-being. But if substantial form gives being so radically to matter that matter cannot exist without form, then it seems that substantial change is impossible: it is impossible that the matter that was actualized by the form of an acorn come to be actualized by the form of an oak, since with the loss of its acorn-form the matter in the acorn would cease to exist and so could not be transformed into the body of an oak. This entailment of Aquinas's theory (if it is an entailment) not only seems to go against science but to flout common sense. For surely common sense does hold that all oak trees come from acorns precisely in this sense, that acorns are changed into oaks (or, to be more precise, that some thing or things constituting acorns come to constitute oaks). Furthermore, that substantial changes occur is an integral part of Aquinas's own ontology-indeed his most prominent argument for hylomorphism presupposes that they occur. We think, however, that Aquinas's theory does not entail there are no substantial changes. This is because it does not follow from its being a necessary condition of matter's existence that it be actualized by some substantial form, that it cannot change substantial forms, so long at least as the change is instantaneous. Consider this analogy: a lump of clay, it seems, cannot exist unless it Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 175 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 30 See Aquinas 1961, 562–563 (Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Vol. II, Book VII). AUTHOR'S PROOF is characterized by some shape (though that shape need not be a regular or recognizable one for which we have a name), but it doesn't follow from that that the clay cannot change shape, so long as at the very moment it loses one it gains another. Of course, the shape of a piece of clay is an accidental form that doesn't make the clay to be simpliciter, but to be such and such. We grant this, which is why the clay example is an analogy. But what we want to insist on is this: if substances are such that they cannot exist unless characterized by one of a number of contingent accidents and yet can maintain their identity "underneath" such accidental changes, there seems no good reason to suppose that matter (1) cannot exist without being actualized by one of a number of substantial forms and yet (2) can be such that it can endure and maintain its identity underneath these substantial changes. No doubt this way of understanding the issue may be somewhat at odds with Aquinas's own metaphysics since he often talks as if matter has no intrinsic being distinct from the being form conveys upon it. And if forms give matter its intrinsic being, it does not seem matter could change form, since identity and intrinsic being go together. As we understand it though, matter does have some intrinsic being of its own not conferred by form. But we think that this is consistent with supposing that matter needs to be actualized by some form simply to exist, and that being informed is such a necessary condition for matter's existing that not even God could conserve it in being while stripping it of all substantial form (much in the same way, or so it seems to us, that not even God could conserve a lump of clay stripped of every accidental shape). Understanding the relation between form and matter in this way seems to allow one to fashion a "middle way" between Aquinas's doctrine of prime matter and Suarez's, and this via media will make Aquinas's own teaching internally consistent without entailing that matter has so much intrinsic being that it becomes a sort of diminished substance. Before continuing, we wish to note that this modification of Aquinas's hylomorphism will allow us to solve a difficulty in Aquinas's teaching bearing on the disposing accidents we mentioned in the last section. According to Aquinas's own teaching, when a substantial change occurs all the accidents of the old substance are destroyed along with that substance, since with the destruction of the substance accidents lose their sustaining substratum. But this seems to make it impossible for matter to be gradually disposed to receive a new form. If fire indisposes the matter in some wood for the form of the wood while simultaneously disposing it to receive the form of ash, then it seems that the "ash-disposing accidents" must be present in the matter at the moment the substantial form of ash is educed in the matter. If, however, all the accidents of the old substance cease with the corruption of that substance, even those accidents introduced by the fire into the matter of the wood, then accidents making it indisposed to the form of the wood and disposing it for the form of ash must simply vanish with the destruction of the wood-hence they will be unable to dispose the matter that was in the wood for information by the ash form. 176 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF But on the view here propounded this difficulty vanishes. If prime matter, though requiring to be informed by some substantial form to exist, nevertheless has enough intrinsic being to retain its identity during a substantial change, it seems it has enough to retain certain accidents while undergoing the change and hence to provide the incoming substantial form with the material dispositions necessary for that form's eduction, so long, that is, as there is no time lag between the corruption of the old form and the introduction of the new form. To return to our clay analogy, the clay may retain the same color or texture even while losing and gaining new shapes. Even granting all this, however, one might suppose that the modification of Aquinas's hylomorphism we are suggesting still suffers from positing circular causality, since it still holds that matter cannot exist without being informed by some substantial form and that a substantial form cannot exist without informing matter. Aquinas himself has considered this objection in many places, and his response is that causes of different kinds may each be prior to the other with respect to different kinds of causal dependency. He thinks this is true both for the efficient and the final cause, and the formal and the material cause. Thus, in his commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics he wrote: The efficient cause is the cause of the final cause inasmuch as it makes the final cause be, because by causing motion the efficient cause brings about the final cause. But the final cause is the cause of the efficient cause, not in the sense that it makes it be, but inasmuch as it is the reason for the causality of the efficient cause. For an efficient cause is a cause inasmuch as it acts, and it acts only because of the final cause. Hence the efficient cause derives its causality from the final cause. And form and matter are mutual causes of being: form is a cause of matter inasmuch as it gives actual being to matter [i.e., it gives it the substantial determination necessary to exist], and matter is a cause of form inasmuch as it supports form in being [i.e., provides it with a substrate]. (Aquinas 1961, 308 [Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Vol. I, Book V, L. II]) Objection 3: Aquinas's hylomorphism violates the principle of the excluded middle. To see the force of this objection recall that, according to Aquinas, a composite substance can be made neither of other substances nor of accidents. But since for Aquinas a substance is that which if it exists, does not exist in another, and an accident is that which if it exists, does exist in another, it should immediately be apparent that Aquinas's prime matter is an entity which, if it exists, neither exists in another nor not in another. And that is a problem. One might defend Aquinas here by biting the bullet, so to speak-other thinkers than Aquinas, including some contemporary physicists, have held that certain realities violate the principle of the excluded middle. But we confess we find the a priori appeal of the principle of the excluded Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 177 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF middle to be very strong and so we prefer to make a further modification of Aquinas's hylomorphism to make it consistent with that principle. This can best be achieved by drawing a distinction between a subject and a substance. Earlier we said that Aquinas defined a substance as an essence such that if it exists, it cannot exist as a state of another. But let us now take this as defining a subject, and modify Aquinas's description of a substance as follows: Something is a is a substance iff it (1) is a subject and (2) has active powers (i.e. powers to produce new accidents in itself or new forms in another subject). Notice that this definition entails that all substances are subjects, but does not entail that all subjects are substances. Having distinguished subjects from substances we can modify Aquinas's hylomorphism by holding that prime matter is a non-substantial subject and that a substantial form is a form that inheres in such a subject while an accidental form is a form that inheres only in a subject that is a substance. So modified, Aquinas's hylomorphism does not violate the principle of the excluded middle. 6 Conclusion We have just posed and replied to three specific objections against hylomorphism. But even if our brief defense of a modified Thomistic hylomorphism convinces some that hylomophism might be able to be made internally coherent and consistent with science, most even of those readers will think we are reviving a battle decided in the 17th century. In response we wish to say two things. First, Aquinas's argument for hylomorphism is metaphysical and rests on powerful principles concerning the conditions necessary for change and for a substance to be one thing, and he was driven by these arguments to disagree with those medieval thinkers who held that the elements are actually or really present in compounds (e.g. there is earth, air, fire, and water in humans). According to Aquinas they can only be present in such compounds virtually; that is, "elemental accidents" are present in compounds but not the elements themselves. We have seen why he held this-any combination of actually existing substances can, at most, only produce a particularly tight union of a number of substances, not something per se one. Replacing the ancient elements with the micro-particles (or strings!) of contemporary physics doesn't appear to us to weaken whatever force Aquinas's arguments have always had-one might as well refute Berkeley by kicking a rock! If it makes sense to say the four elements remain only virtually in compounds, why doesn't it make sense to say that micro-particles do? Indeed the very odd and unstable nature of contemporary micro-particles might make them better candidates for virtual presence in compounds (i.e. macro-objects) than the rather more solid ancient elements. 178 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 AUTHOR'S PROOF Secondly, it just isn't the case that the physics that arose in the 16th and 17th centuries, or the philosophy that was inspired by it in England and France, ever really solved the problems hylomorphism was meant to solve. What happened, in general, was that scientists and philosophers forgot about those problems (along with others-for example the problem of universals). This forgetfulness didn't occur as quickly in Germany where the influence of Leibniz, the most scholastic of the early modern philosophers, continued to be felt for decades. But after Kant, many came to believe that the critical philosophy didn't so much solve these "hylomorphic problems" as it dissolved them. And in the early 20th century Kantianism and positivism united in their opposition to classical metaphysical problems. But the time is long past when one can dismiss classical metaphysical problems with a wave of the Kantian-positivist wand. Since the 1950s the older problems of metaphysics have arisen again and robust theories of universals, possible worlds, trans-world identity without or without individual essences, and states of affairs have been fashioned. And more recently metaphysicians have started to grapple again with hard questions concerning the nature of substantial vs. accidental change and the unity of material substances (the problem of "material constitution" as it is now called). Since hylomorphism was fashioned to address these questions, it is not surprising that admittedly neo-Aristotelian theories have been created to answer them. So far, the contemporary neo-Aristotelians have not been so intrepid as to re-introduce prime matter or substantial form. But robust analytic metaphysics is still in its youth and David Wiggins, the most prominent of the current crop of neo-Aristotelians, has acknowledged that the problem of the continuant in substantial change is a real and deep one and that his own neo-Aristotelian theory offers no answer to it.31 The time may come when analytic metaphysicians take hylomorphism seriously again.32 John Kronen Department of Philosophy, JRC 241 University of St. Thomas 2115 Summit Ave. St. Paul, MN 55105 USA E-mail: [email protected] Sandra Menssen Department of Philosophy, JRC 241 University of St. Thomas 2115 Summit Ave. St. Paul, MN 55105 USA E-mail: [email protected] Hylomorphism and Design: A Reconsideration of Aquinas's Fifth Way 179 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 31 Wiggins, 2001, 67–68, note 8. 32 We would like to thank James Madden and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. AUTHOR'S PROOF References Aquinas, Thomas. 1884. Commentaria in Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis. In Opera Omnia. Leonine edition. Tomus Secundus. Edited by Tommaso Zigliara, et al. Rome: De Propoganda Fide. ___________ . 1888–1906. Summa Theologiae, in Opera Omnia. Leonine edition. Tomus Quartus-Tomus Duodecimus. Edited by Tommaso Zigliara, et al. Rome: De Propaganda Fide. ___________ . 1934. Summa Contra Gentiles. Turin: Marietti. ___________ . 1959. In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium. Edited by Angeli Pirotta. Turin: Marietti. _______. 1961. Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle. Two Volumes. Translated by John Rowan. Chicago: Henry Regnery. _______. 1965. The Principles of Nature and On Being and Essence. In Selected Writings of Aquinas. Translated by Robert Goodwin. Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill Bonjour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press. Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald. 1934. God: His Existence and His Nature. Volume I. Translated by Dom Bede Rose. St. Louis: B. Herder. Lotze, Hermann. 1886. Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion. Translated by George T. Ladd. Boston: Ginn & Company. Suarez, Francisco. 1978. Commentaria una cum Quaestionibus in Libros Aristotelis de Anima. Volume I. Edited by Salvador Castellote. Madrid: Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones. Wiggins, David. 2001. Sameness and Substance Renewed. New York: Cambridge University Press 180 John Kronen and Sandra Menssen 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

An Argument for the Many Penultimate Draft.∗ by J.R.G. Williams (September 29, 2005) Abstract If one believes that vagueness is an exclusively representational phenomenon, one faces the problem of the many. In the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, there are many many 'mountain candidates' all, apparently, with more-or-less equal claim to be mountains. David Lewis has defended a radical claim: that all the billions of mountain candidates are mountains. This paper argues that the supervaluationist about vagueness should adopt Lewis' proposal, on pain of losing their best explanation of the seductiveness of the sorites. Before me, there is a mountain. But is there, in front of me, something which is definitely a mountain? A popular approach to the philosophy of vagueness is in danger of implying that the answer is 'no'. But we can independently argue that the answer should be 'yes'. There is a reconciliation in view: but it says strange things about the number of mountains I'm about to climb. I Many philosophers want to construe vagueness as a product of linguistic or representational indeterminacy. My focus here is on the most popular way of cashing this out: the 'standard' form of supervaluationism that is developed in Fine (1975) and recently defended by Keefe (2000). A standard supervaluationist approach to vague language envisages a range of ways of making our vague language precise. A sentence will count as true simpliciter (or ∗Forthcoming in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. References should be to the published version. Some text may differ. 1 'supertrue') if it is true on every such precisification. (The metalinguistic notion of supertruth is reflected, in the object-language, by a 'Definitely' operator. We can characterize this, initially, in the following way: 'Definitely S' is true at a precisification p if and only if 'S' is true on all precisifications.)1 One of the main selling points of the standard form of supervaluationism is that we can retain the simple, familiar and powerful classical logic in the context of vagueness. We need not worry that the tautologies that we learn in first year logic courses will be rendered invalid when we move to consider a vague language.2 But just this commitment to classical logic is the source of a range of objections to supervaluationism. We can illustrate the problems by running through a version of the notorious sorites reasoning. Suppose we are contemplating a range of emanations: mounds, hills, mountains, and the like. Suppose this range of emanations includes some which are clearly mountains (Kilimanjaro), and also contains emanations of intermediate heights, decreasing at small intervals, until ultimately we reach something which is clearly not a mountain (say, Glastonbury Tor). We shall suppose that, for any emanation in the series, there is a smaller one whose height is within 10 metres of it. For the sake of exposition, we imagine we are in a possible world where these emanations are arranged in order of decreasing height. Now restrict the domain of quantification to this (finite) range, and let x′ be a way of referring to the tallest emanation that is shorter than x, i.e. the next emanation in the range. Under relatively uncontroversial assumptions, classical logic will deliver: (1) ∃x(x is a mountain ∧¬x′ is a mountain) This, however, sounds like we are asserting the existence of a sharp cut-off between those emanations that are mountains and those which are not mountains. But surely there is no sharp cut-off between mountains and non-mountains: a difference in height of only 10 metres cannot make the difference between mountainhood and non-mountainhood.3 Since the supervaluationist buys into classical logic, she is committed to endorsing (1). This leads to the following puzzle: why do our intuitions repel us from (1), given that (according to the supervaluationist) it is both supertrue and a clear consequence of the uncontroversial premisses such as 'Glastonbury Tor is not a mountain' and 'Kilimanjaro is a mountain'? What explains the repugnance of the existential claim (1)? Correlatively, what explains the seductiveness of the negation of (1), assent to which will generate the sorites paradox? Here is how one supervaluationist responds: 1The definition can be generalized to allow 'definitely' to be applied to an open sentence. This is discussed below. 2The situation is actually more subtle than this might make it seem. See Williamson (1994, ch.5.). 3Perhaps government agencies might impose some precise conditions on what height of emananation should count as a mountain. But I suppose such facts to be incidental to the point at issue here-we can easily imagine a situation where no such stipulative definitions have been put forward. 2 Our belief that there is no true instance of the quantification gets confused with a belief that the quantified statement is not true. The more theoretical description of the lack of a true instance needs to be expressed using either the [Definitely] operator or the truth predicate. . . (Keefe, 2000, p.185) The confusion hypothesis which Keefe here endorses contends that our intuitions against statements such as (1) are rooted in a confusion between two related claims (here stated in the material mode): (2) Definitely[∃x(x is a mountain ∧ x′ is not mountain)] (3) ∃x(Definitely[x is mountain∧ x′ is not mountain]) Keefe continues: The confusion . . . is a confusion of scope, according to whether the truth predicate [or 'Definitely'-operator] appears inside or outside the existential quantifier. It is thus like a confusion between saying that it is true that someone ought to do X and saying that it is true of someone that they ought to do X: that latter may be false while the former is true. (ibid) The suggestion is that, generally, we are apt to confuse an utterance of "There is something which is F" with "There is something which is definitely F": our intuitions about the former track the truth-values of the latter. But the two can come apart in truth-value, as is the case in the crucial sorites premiss. Accordingly, Keefe's suggestion is that an assertion of "there is a mountain next to a non-mountain" is heard as committing one to (3), rather than (2). If so, no wonder that we reject it out of hand. Proposals of this kind can be presented in a theory-neutral way, and can be motivated independently of the point at issue. The need to explain the seductiveness of the sorites is incumbent on all non-logically revisionary treatments of vague language; and the confusion hypothesis requires only that one's favoured treatment allows the construction of the notion 'Definitely'. So, for example, Greenough (2003) defends an epistemic version of the confusion hypothesis;4 and Edgington (1997) appeals to the same moves in the context of a degree theoretic account. So when supervaluationists such as Fine (1975) and Keefe (2000) postulate confusion to explain the sorites, it is 4Indeed, the term 'confusion hypothesis' is due to Greenough. 3 no idiosyncratic idea. As regards independent motivation, one would hope that the alleged confusion involved in the case of sorites can be accounted for within systematic pragmatics for vague language. Weatherson (2002) argues persuasively that such an extension gives a range of powerful, surprising and accurate predications of intuitions about the acceptability of statements involving vague vocabulary. I do not claim that appealing to confusion hypotheses of this kind is the only possible way for a supervaluationist to account for the seductiveness of the sorites. But it is something that prominent supervaluationists do endorse, and I am happy to think that of the extant options, it is the one they should endorse. II Mountains, we think, do not have precise boundaries-there isn't any convention over where precisely the base of Kilimanjaro finishes and the surrounding plains begin; or over which clods of earth at its base are part of the mountain. For one who thinks that vagueness is an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, there are no 'vague objects' in the vicinity of Kilimanjaro, and no vagueness in what parts a given object has. Rather, what exists is an array of mountainy agglomorations of land and rock: the 'Kilimanjaro candidates'. There is Kilimanjaro-generously-construed, which includes all the pieces of land that one might count as part of Kilimanjaro under the most generous interpretation; there is Kilimanjaro-meanly-construed, where the only stretches of land counted as parts of Kilimanjaro are those that are clearly part of the main body of the peak itself. Two questions present themselves, either of which might deserve the name 'the problem of the many'.5 The first asks which of the mountain candidates is Kilimanjaro: which is the referent of 'Kilimanjaro'? The second asks which mountain candidates (if any) are mountains: which fall under the predicate 'is a mountain'? We here focus on the second question. There are two salient ways that a supervaluationist might handle this 'problem of the many', if they want to remain true to the idea of vagueness as an exclusively linguistic phenomena.6 The first, sane, option, is to hold that on every way of making the language precise, exactly one of the mountain-candidates will count as a mountain-different candidates on different precisifications. Overall, then, it will be supertrue that there is a mountain; but it will be indeterminate which object is a mountain. The second, 5See Unger (1980) for an early presentation of this problem. Weatherson (2004) surveys various approaches. 6I count among the 'ontological' options being discounted here, the view that there is a 'mountain' existing over and above the various mountain-candidates, in the manner that the statue is said to be a distinct object, though co-located with, the clay. The reason for this is that it looks like the relation of constitution supposedly holding between the mountain candidates and the floating mountain will be a vague one. Appeal to this solution therefore seems unavailable to one who believes that vagueness is an exclusively linguistic matter. Thanks to Carrie Jenkins for pressing me on this point. 4 insane, option, is to hold that on every way of making the language precise, all of the mountain-candidates will count as mountains. Overall, then, it will be supertrue that there is a mountain standing in front of me; further, strictly speaking it will be supertrue that there are many mountains in front of me, even when (as we would usually describe it) there is only Kilimanjaro around. For on this proposal each one of the mountain candidates will be a numerically distinct mountain. The 'insane' option is commended by Lewis (1993) in "Many, but almost one". He does much there to rehabilitate the option, to show how it can give an account of why we say the things that we do. For example, to the objection that his theory amounts to a massive error theory of ordinary practice of counting and discriminating between mountains, Lewis replies by distinguishing 'almost identity' from identity proper. Objects x and y are almost-identical if they share almost all their parts. So, though the many mountain candidates are not identical in the strictest sense, they are 'almost identical'. Suppose we say that there are just two mountains in a range. We can take this to express the following: there are x and y which are mountains, and every mountain in the range is such that it is almost-identical to either x or to y. If 'identity' as used by English speakers, typically expresses almost-identity, then truisms such as "there are less than a million mountains in Scotland" will come out true, where on the strict reading of they come out false. By systematically reinterpreting the apparatus of individuation for natural languages in this way, Lewis makes tenable the initially incredible thesis that strictly speaking, there are billions of mountains in Scotland.7 III Whether or not we continue to regard the 'many' thesis endorsed by Lewis as insane, if we want to maintain the confusion hypothesis discussed above, we need to buy into it. For on the rival view, on each precisification, only one of the Kilimanjaro candidates falls within the predicate "is a mountain". Hence there is no object in the relevant range which falls under the predicate "is a mountain" on every precisification. But, on the natural treatment of 'Definitely', this means that the following will be false:8 7Note that the semantic hypothesis about the meanings of English words that Lewis explores does not require any objectionable metaphysical thesis about the nature of identity itself. Nor does it mean that we cannot create contexts-such as that of the philosophy classroom-where 'identity' will unambiguously express strict identity. 8What I refer to as the 'standard' treatment of 'Definitely' takes it that for an object to satisfy 'Definitely φ' is for those objects to satisfy φ on each admissible precisification. This is the natural generalization of 'Definitely' as requiring truth on every precisification, as described, for example, in McGee (1997). If one handles 'Definitely' analogously to a modal operator (with 'precisifications' replacing 'worlds' on the model of Lewis (1970)), then the above is simply the extension of the standard semantic treatment of quantification into modal contexts. 5 (4) ∃x Definitely[x is a mountain] This result, if sustained, completely undermines the confusion hypothesis outlined earlier. An immediate problem is that a range of false predictions flowing from the generalized form of the confusion hypothesis: our intuitions about the acceptability of asserting "there are mountains" are supposed to track the truth value of "there are definite mountains". The latter, on this view, is false-but obviously the former is perfectly assertible, contrary to the predictions of the confusion hypothesis. An even more serious consequence of the 'sane' view is that the ability of the confusion hypothesis to explain intuitions about the sorites premiss is undermined. To illustrate this, let us put the explanatory challenge in the following contrastive form. In the original case presented above, where we have a range of emanations from Kilimanjaro to Glastonbury Tor, decreasing in height by millimetres from one to the next, we have strong 'no cut off' intuitions. Consider a new range, consisting only of Kilimanjaro next to Glastonbury Tor. With respect to this scenario, we have strong intuitions that there is a cut-off, a mountain standing next to a non-mountain. We have, that is, contrasting intuitions in the two cases. But the status of (3) is the same in the two cases, for its falsity rests on the non-existence of any definite mountains. The problem, of course, is that the status of (3) is now totally insensitive to the heights of the mountains and hills we have in our range, for its falsity is secured purely by the presence of many mountain-candidates, given the 'sane' resolution of the problem of the many. It remains to be shown that adopting Lewis' 'many mountains' resolution of the problem of the many avoids these problems. Recall that on this view, on every precisification of the language, all the Kilimanjaro candidates will fall under the predicate "mountain". It follows that every Kilimanjaro candidate will be a definite mountain; a fortiori "there is something which is definitely a mountain", will be true; and no false predications about our intuitions concerning "there are mountains" arise. And similarly, whether or not (3) is true or false will depend, as it should, on the height and distribution of the emanations in the range that we are considering. The tension between supervaluationism and the confusion hypothesis can be removed, therefore, by adopting Lewis' proposals. The confusion hypothesis plays a vital theoretical role within supervaluationism: without it we have no good way to explain the seductiveness of the sorites. So we have a strong reason to look favourably on the 'many mountains' proposal. By contrast, what reason have we for rejecting it? At first glance such a view looks ontologically excessive-billions of mountains where ordinary folk say there is just one. But there is no distinguishing the Lewis 'many' resolution and its rival on these grounds. They agree about what there is: billions of mountainy agglomorations of rock. The disagreement is simply about how these entities should be labelled in order to explain our language use. The intuitions of ordinary speakers do speak against the Lewisian resolution. But there is a familiar tactic available: explain away such recalcitrant data pragmatically. 6 The discussion in Lewis (1993), briefly described above, can be taken in this spirit. Given the strong theoretical grounds in favour, and the fragility of the case against, supervaluationists should adopt Lewis' 'many mountains' resolution of the problem of the many. The thing I am climbing is definitely a mountain. So, there are many, many mountains beneath my feet.9 School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Woodhouse Lane, Leeds, UK. and Arché AHRC Centre for the Philosophy of Logic, Language, Mathematics and Mind. School of Philosophical and Anthropological Studies. University of St Andrews. [email protected] References Edgington, D. (1997). 'Vagueness by degrees'. In R. Keefe and P. Smith, editors, Vagueness: A reader. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Fine, K. (1975). 'Vagueness, truth and logic'. Synthese, 30, 265–300. Reprinted with corrections in Keefe and Smith (eds) Vagueness: A reader (MIT Press, Cambridge MA: 1997) pp.119-150. Greenough, P. (2003). 'Vagueness: A minimal theory'. Mind, 112(446). Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Lewis, D. K. (1970). 'General semantics'. Synthese, 22, 18–67. Reprinted with postscript in Lewis, Philosophical Papers I (Oxford University Press, 1983) 189– 229. Lewis, D. K. (1993). 'Many, but almost one'. In K. Campbell, J. Bacon, and L. Reinhardt, editors, Ontology, Causality and Mind: Essays on the philosophy of D. M. Armstrong. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Reprinted in Lewis, Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1999) 164-82. 9Versions of this paper were presented to the Arché AHRC Research Centre, to the School of Philosophy at the University of Leeds, and in the Graduate Sessions at the Joint Session of the Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society. I also benefitted from discussions in two electronic forums: the Arché Discussion Boards; and Brian Weatherson's weblog Thoughts, Arguments and Rants (http://tar.weatherson.net/archives/004165.html) I am grateful to everyone who has discussed this material with me in these and other contexts, for much useful criticism and advice. In preparing this work I have benefitted from an AHRC studentship (doctoral award), and from support by the departments of philosophy at the University of St Andrews. 7 McGee, V. (1997). "Kilimanjaro". Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume: 'Meaning and Reference', 3, 141–196. McGee, V. and McLaughlin, B. (1994). 'Distinctions without a difference'. Southern Journal of Philosophy, supp XXXII, 203–251. Unger, P. (1980). 'The problem of the many'. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 411–67. Weatherson, B. (2004). 'The problem of the many'. Fall 2004 edition edition. http: //plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2004/entries/problem-of-many/. Weatherson, B. (Draft 2002). 'Vagueness and pragmatics'. Available at http://brian. weatherson.net/Ch_8.pdf. Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. Routledge, London.

CREXELLS, D'ORS I EL PRAGMATISME1 JAUME NUBIOLA Universitat de Navarra El meu interès per Crexells es remunta al 1993, fa ja vint anys, quan vaig estudiar amb detall les circumstàncies del curs que Bertrand Russell va impartir a Barcelona el 1920. La meva dedicació professional a la filosofia angloamericana del segle xx, unida a la meva condició barcelonina i a una permanent aspiració de trobar l'articulació entre el pensament i la vida, em van moure a investigar aquella visita de Bertrand Russell a la nostra ciutat. En el meu estudi vaig arribar a la conclusió que el curs impartit aleshores per Russell tingué poca ressonància a Catalunya. En canvi, el meu descobriment, arran d'aquelles investigacions, fou la gran personalitat de Joan Crexells, el qual, juntament amb Eugeni d'Ors, fou el principal responsable d'aquell esdeveniment.2 Vaig quedar veritablement enlluernat pels textos de Crexells: de la seva excel*lent formació filosòfica, del seu rigorós tarannà científic, del seu enginy lluminós i espurnejant, i també de la seva rica i, alhora, breu biografia. En començar a llegir els seus escrits em vaig adonar que amb ell -com es diu popularment- «hi havia química», que ell i jo parlàvem el mateix llenguatge, que teníem una formació força semblant i que opinàvem el mateix de gairebé totes les coses. 1 Agraeixo a la prof. Teresa Vallès l'acurada revisió del text, i a Jacin Luna i al Servei de Préstec Interbibliotecari de la Universitat de Navarra l'ajuda amb la documentació. 2 Els resultats d'aquella investigació es publicaran a l'article NUBIOLA, J. «Russell, Crexells and d'Ors: Barcelona, 1920», dins: Russell: The Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives. 14. Hamilton: McMaster University Library Press, 1995, p. 155‐161, i en català a la Revista de Catalunya. 106. Barcelona: 1996, p. 50‐56. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament48 Pocs mesos després del meu descobriment, rastrejant els papers que testimonien les relacions entre Crexells i Russell, vaig anar a visitar la seva filla Eugènia i també en vaig quedar encisat, de la seva rica personalitat. Ella em va permetre revisar -i ho vaig fer amb forta emoció- els llibres de la biblioteca del seu pare, que es salvaren del bombardeig del 1938 de la seva casa a la Rambla de les Flors, i que ara es conserven a l'Ateneu.3 Per tot això, va ser una gran satisfacció poder intervenir en la presentació en aquest mateix espai, al novembre del 1996, del primer volum de l'Obra Completa de Joan Crexells, publicada per Edicions de la Magrana. Conservo en el record d'aquella memorable nit la cordialitat d'Heribert Barrera i la brillant erudició de Norbert Bilbeny.4 En aquests anys he dirigit la meva recerca acadèmica vers el pragmatisme nord‐americà de Charles S. Peirce, William James i John Dewey i, de manera particular, vers la seva recepció a Europa durant les primeres dècades del segle xx. Un assumpte que em va interessar especialment va ser la connexió d'Eugeni d'Ors amb el pragmatisme, que es va revelar molt productiva per interpretar l'evolució del seu pensament.5 En la meva ponència vull fer una avaluació sumària de la connexió entre Crexells i Eugeni d'Ors i de la de tots dos amb el pragmatisme. L'organitzaré en tres parts, després d'aquesta introducció: 1. En primer lloc, la formació filosòfica de Crexells i la seva relació amb d'Ors; 2. Eugeni d'Ors i el pragmatisme, i 3. Joan Crexells i el pragmatisme. 3 BILBENY, N. Joan Crexells en la filosofia del Noucents. Barcelona: Dopesa, 1979, p. 163. L'autor inclou una llista de la biblioteca. 4 NUBIOLA, J. «En el centenari de Joan Crexells». Ateneu. Revista de Cultura. 24. Malgrat de Mar: març 1997, p. 10‐11. 5 NUBIOLA, J. «Eugenio d'Ors: Una concepción pragmatista del lenguaje». Revista de Filosofía. VIII, 13. Madrid: 1995, p. 49‐56; NUBIOLA, J., TORREGROSA, M. «Altre cop el pragmatisme: Ferrater Mora i Eugeni d'Ors». Dins: TERRICABRAS, J.‐M. (ed.). El pensament d'Eugeni d'Ors. Girona: Publicacions de la Càtedra Ferrater Mora, 2010, p. 247‐256. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 49 1. La formació filosòfica de Crexells i la seva relació amb d'Ors «La seva vocació era la filosofia. El cridava irresistiblement. Ell havia d'ésser estudiant tota la vida», escriu Melcior Font.6 Em sembla que un testimoni formidable per introduir‐nos en la formació filosòfica es troba en l'obituari de Crexells que amb el títol «La vocació filosòfica d'en Crexells» va publicar el seu professor d'Història de la Filosofia, Jaume Serra i Húnter, a La Nova Revista: En Crexells començà els estudis de Filosofia i Lletres l'any 1913 quan tenia disset anys. El seu expedient acadèmic no pot ésser més brillant i la seva conducta escolar fou sempre discreta i respectuosa. Ell no es trobava malament amb la disciplina universitària, perquè sabia prendre'n o deixar‐ne allò que li convenia. L'any que va cursar la meva assignatura va ésser un any de greus conflictes escolars; les classes, durant l'època habitualment crítica de les vacances de Nadal, varen ésser suspeses per ordre de les autoritats universitàries. Molts companys continuàvem en altres llocs les nostres reunions i converses amb els alumnes. En Crexells concorria amb diligencia expressant la seva voluntat de no perdre res que pogués ésser útil per a la seva formació espiritual. No era la seva actitud la de l'estudiant diletant que cerca un títol més per a sumar‐lo al d'altres facultats.7 Les paraules de Serra i Húnter, escrites només dos mesos després de la mort de Crexells, reflecteixen l'admiració que sent pel seu deixeble. Crexells féu els seus estudis de filosofia a la Universitat de Barcelona entre els anys 1913 i 1918 i, llicenciat ja, de tant en tant, tornava a les classes de Serra i Húnter. Es quedaven xerrant al final i en el diàleg -anota Serra- «jo podia sempre constatar dues coses igualment significatives per a la seva vocació: els seus avenços en la formació intel*lectual i la desaparició gradual de certs extremismes encomanats per una visió massa ràpida dels sistemes».8 Com descriu Norbert Bilbeny, Crexells aprengué de Serra, especialment, l'abast de l'obra de Leibniz i la teoria del coneixement. Juntament amb els seus estudis 6 FONT, M. «Joan Crexells (Dades per a una biografia)». Revista de Catalunya. VI, 4, 32. Barcelona: febrer 1927, p. 161. 7 SERRA I HÚNTER, J. «La vocació filosòfica d'en Crexells». La Nova Revista. 2. Barcelona: febrer 1927, p. 115. 8 Ibid., p. 114. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament50 dels clàssics de la filosofia grega i la seva estada a Berlín el 1920 amb el neokantià Alois Riehl (1844‐1924),9 la teoria del coneixement i la lògica matemàtica constitueixen una part molt essencial de la seva formació filosòfica.10 Bilbeny considera Crexells un introductor de la filosofia de l'anàlisi a Espanya com mostra el seu brillant article sobre Bertrand Russell (1919) i la tesi doctoral entorn de Las verdades absolutas. Ensayo sobre los principios de su lógica y de su conocimiento (1920).11 Estic d'acord amb aquesta caracterització, però dissenteixo, en canvi, de Bilbeny quan afirma que «el postulat analític feia Crexells incompatible amb la filosofia "sistemàtica" d'Ors».12 Com és ben comprensible, una afirmació tan general com aquesta és sempre discutible. Només aportaré com a defensa de la meva observació l'elogi que Crexells fa d'Eugeni d'Ors el 1918 com a mostra de l'aportació de la filosofia catalana al pensament universal: [...] Creiem en l'aportació feta per Catalunya al pensament universal, de certes característiques filosòfiques que han d'operar fonda transformació en la filosofia. Però aquestes característiques creiem trobar‐les més aviat en certs caires de l'obra d'Eugeni d'Ors, com en l'elevació a categories filosòfiques de les nocions de Seny i Ironia, que ell ha dut a cap.13 És cert que aquesta afirmació una mica ampul*losa és anterior a la marxa d'Eugeni d'Ors de Catalunya el 1921, però val la pena tenir present que -com afirma Bilbeny mateix- Crexells és probablement el millor deixeble d'Ors (encara que potser -també segons Bilbeny- sigui el que menys se li assembli).14 9 Podeu llegir amb aprofitament l'article del mateix autor: CREXELLS, J. «Alois Reihl». Dins Obra completa I. De Plató a Carles Riba. Barcelona: Ediciona de La Magrana, 1996, p. 245‐249. 10 BILBENY, N. Joan Crexells en la filosofia del Noucents. Op. cit., p. 23. 11 Confronteu BILBENY, N. Joan Crexells en la filosofia del Noucents. Op. cit., p. 321. Podeu llegir els dos textos de Crexells a Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 270‐296 i p. 311‐440, respectivament. 12 BILBENY, N. Joan Crexells en la filosofia del Noucents. Op. cit., p. 323. 13 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 57‐58. 14 BILBENY, N. «Pròleg». Dins CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa II. Cròniques europees Berlín‐Londres, 1920‐1926. Barcelona: Edicions de La Magrana, 1997, p. 10 i 20. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 51 Crexells va ser alumne del Seminari de Filosofia regentat per Eugeni d'Ors i allí va fer la seva primera actuació com a professor -nomenat per d'Ors en qualitat d'assistent- impartint un curset d'epistemologia.15 En acabar la llicenciatura el 1918 va ser nomenat professor de les Escoles Normals. Conservem el meravellós record d'un assistent a les seves classes, Pere Vergés (1896‐1970).16 No he trobat gaires dades de la relació personal entre d'Ors i Crexells. Recentment, Carles‐Jordi Guardiola ha publicat una carta d'Eugeni d'Ors a Crexells, datada per ell el 5 de desembre de 1919, que es conserva al llegat Crexells d'aquest Ateneu i que suggereix una estreta relació entre tots dos.17 Seria molt interessant explorar més a fons els rastres documentals d'aquesta relació. Melcior Font afirma que Crexells «mai no va sentir per Eugeni d'Ors una adhesió absoluta. I, en molts d'aspectes, mostrava notablement la discrepància». Una de les raons, segons Font, era la diferència de temperaments; una altra, que «Joan Crexells va saber descobrir aviat en Xènius la lluita, hàbilment, elegantment dissimulada, entre la serietat i la simulació».18 En la comunicació de Crexells del 1911 als Estudis Universitaris Catalans posa «el conjunt del Glosari de Xènius» com un exemple de «les obres, els assaigs publicats, [que] sovint fan professió de seguir una tradició genuïnament catalana».19 Altres referències són l'elegància literària d'Eugeni d'Ors,20 la seva influència en Carles Riba,21 i la seva desaparició de l'escena literària catalana.22 L'únic comentari incidental que podria ser interpretat com una crítica a d'Ors és el que formula l'octubre del 1924 a «Sobre contingut i forma»: 15 FONT, M. «Joan Crexells (Dades per a una biografia)». Op. cit., p. 163. 16 SALADRIGAS, R. L'Escola del Mar i la renovació pedagògica a Catalunya. Converses amb Pere Vergés. Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1973, p. 124‐125. 17 GUARDIOLA, C.‐J. «Una carta d'Eugeni d'Ors a Joan Crexells». Serra d'Or. 613. Barcelona: gener 2011, p. 22‐23. 18 FONT, M. «Joan Crexells (Dades per a una biografia)» Op. cit., p. 163. Vegeu també: JARDÍ, E. Eugeni d'Ors. Obra i vida. Barcelona: Quaderns Crema, 1990, p. 348‐349. 19 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa. Op. cit., p. 53. 20 Ibid., p. 86, 486, 493. 21 Ibid., p. 490‐491. 22 Ibid., p. 212‐213. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament52 ... el més perillós és el de donar a totes les coses una significació "sota espècie d'eternitat", perquè es corre el perill de desencaminar completament els sentits del públic. Aquest procediment fou molt seguit a Catalunya en temps de Xènius. Recordareu que en tot fet divers, en tota banalitat, hom tractava de cercar els caràcters eterns de la història.23 Pla -deixeble també d'Ors- descriu la relació de Crexells amb el mestre comú: «era potser l'element de la generació que havia absorbit amb més profit el que el noucentisme tenia de més positiu i el que mantingué aquestes idees durant més temps».24 2. Eugeni d'Ors i el pragmatisme25 En la formació d'Eugeni d'Ors, hi va tenir un paper decisiu la seva estada a París entre el 1906 i el 1910. A París, hi descobreix les ciències experimentals, la biologia, la psicologia experimental, assisteix a classes d'Émile Boutroux i arriba a conèixer, fins i tot, William James.26 En aquells anys -escriu Jardí- d'Ors «va experimentar la seducció de les doctrines dels pragmatistes nord‐americans Peirce i James».27 El desembre del 1907, en una glosa titulada «Pragmatisme», Xènius es defineix a si mateix com un pragmatista, mogut pels mateixos afanys dels pensadors nord‐americans, que aspira a superar mitjançant el reconeixement d'una dimensió estètica de l'acció humana no reductible a la merament utilitària.28 Per exemple, el seu deixeble Josep Maria Capdevila, en intentar descriure la naturalesa de la poderosa influència d'Eugeni d'Ors en la joventut catalana de les dues primeres dècades del segle xx, 23 CREXELLS, J. «Sobre contingut i forma». Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 544. 24 PLA, J. «Joan Crexells vist per Josep Pla». Dins CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 26. 25 En aquesta secció utilitzo alguns paràgrafs del treball amb Marta Torregrosa: NUBIOLA, J., TORREGROSA, M. «Altre cop el pragmatisme: Ferrater Mora i Eugeni d'Ors». Op. cit. 26 Sobre la trobada de d'Ors amb James a casa de Boutroux, podeu llegir el meu treball amb A. González: GONZÁLEZ, A., NUBIOLA, J. «William James en Eugenio d'Ors». Anuario Filosófico. XL, 2. Navarra: Universidad de Navarra, 2007, p. 413‐433. 27 JARDÍ, E. Eugeni d'Ors. Obra i vida. Op. cit., p. 333. 28 D'ORS, E. «Pragmatisme». Glosari 1906‐1907. Barcelona: Quaderns Crema, 1996 [20/XII/1907], p. 730. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 53 escriu «seguia un corrent del temps» i entre les confluències d'aquest corrent esmenta expressament «el pragmatisme de William James, la confiança en si mateix d'Emerson i l'imperalisme britànic».29 De fet, els Quaderns d'Estudi són un bon testimoni de l'apreciació i àmplia recepció dels pragmatistes i el pragmatisme a Catalunya, amb abundants referències a James, Dewey i d'altres. En particular, resulta simpàtica la breu biografia de William James que va publicar Consol Pastor (1887‐1973), alumna llavors de l'Escola Superior de Bibliotecàries que d'Ors havia organitzat, dins la sèrie «Set iniciadors de la psicologia actual».30 Ferrater afirma en les tres primeres edicions del Diccionario de filosofía que Eugeni d'Ors «se inclinó en sus primeros tiempos al pragmatismo».31 No obstant això, en la quarta edició (1958) matisa aquesta idea i afirma que la primera contribución filosófica importante d'Ors consistió en un intento de superación del pragmatismo que le condujo pronto a la afirmación de un intelectualismo de nuevo cuño en el cual veía la característica principal de todo e1 movimiento que con frecuencia llamó el novecentismo.32 L'intel*lectualisme orsià supera el pragmatisme perquè reconeix la dimensió utilitària de la raó i aposta per incorporar l'acció en el coneixement, però encara afegeix quelcom més. Amb aquesta superació, d'Ors sobrepassa el límit que marca l'acció utilitària com a mesura única per al coneixement, ja que a l'altre costat d'aquest límit 29 CAPDEVILA, J. M. Eugeni d'Ors. Etapa barcelonina (1906‐1920). Barcelona: Barcino, 1965, p. 7 i 52. 30 PASTOR, C. «William James». Quaderns d'Estudi. III, 1. Barcelona: II/1917, p. 82‐84. Els altres iniciadors són Lotze, Fechner, Helmholtz, Hartman, Wundt i Ribot. 31 FERRATER MORA, J. Diccionario de filosofía. México: Atlante, 1941, p. 403. Ferrater dóna compte de les seves raons per a la filiació pragmatista de d'Ors a l'article «Eugeni d'Ors o esquema d'una filosofia». Germanor. 503. Santiago de Xile: gener 1946, p. 24‐27; i 504, febrer 1946, p. 24‐27. Fou recollit amb el títol «Eugeni d'Ors: Sentit d'una filosofia», dins: El llibre del sentit. Santiago de Xile: Pi de les Tres Branques, 1948, p. 71‐89, i en les edicions segona i tercera de Les formes de la vida catalana. Barcelona: Selecta, p. 195‐209 i p. 175‐185, respectivament. 32 J. Ferrater Mora. Diccionario de filosofía. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1958, p. 1.010. E1 subratllat és meu. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament54 hi ha un àmbit per a un altre tipus d'acció de naturalesa estètica.33 D'Ors entén que la posició pragmàtica davant el coneixement és incapaç de comprendre la vida, en el sentit d'allò que la vida té de novetat per sobre de les necessitats. La superació del pragmatisme porta al descobriment del residu de naturalesa estètica. I és en aquest intent de superar una visió del coneixement exclusivament utilitarista en què d'Ors troba necessari deixar un espai per a la bellesa. Els aspectes estètics dels treballs filosòfics d'Eugeni d'Ors s'han d'entendre en aquest sentit: són el resultat de reconèixer que la necessitat no explica tota la realitat i que junt amb aquesta existeix una dimensió lúdica, luxosa, resultat d'un sobrant de forces. En última instància, és aquesta superació del pragmatisme la que portarà d'Ors a ocupar‐se de l'art com a contrapunt de la ciència. Encara que d'Ors no va voler que l'anomenessin pragmatista -perquè ho entenia com un corrent antiintel*lectualista-, penso que la seva superació no abandona el pragmatisme o, almenys, no abandona els elements centrals del pragmatisme original de Charles Peirce i William James. Em sembla que en l'horitzó del pragmatisme és possible entendre millor Eugeni d'Ors, tant el seu pensament en l'etapa catalana, com durant els anys més tardans de dedicació preferent a l'estètica. En l'horitzó del pragmatisme, l'estètica es converteix en una tasca genuïnament filosòfica. Aquesta afirmació del caràcter pragmatista de l'estètica orsiana ressona particularment bé en les nostres orelles en paraules de Norbert Bilbeny, en el seu excel*lent pròleg al segon volum: «Proposo, doncs, ara més que mai, amb aquest segon volum de l'Obra Completa a la mà, que comencem a descobrir la unitat d'intenció de la variadíssima obra d'aquest autor [Crexells] a la llum del seu permanent servei a l'estètica».34 33 Vegeu TORREGROSA, M. «Eugenio d'Ors y la superación del pragmatismo». Dins ARDAVÍN, C. X., MERINO, E. E. i PLA, X. (ed.). Oceanografía de Xenius. Estudios críticos en torno a Eugenio d'Ors. Kassel: Universitat de Girona‐Richenberger, 2005, p. 89‐98. 34 BILBENY, N. «Pròleg». Dins CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa II. Op. cit., p. 10‐11. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 55 3. Joan Crexells i el pragmatisme En els escrits de Joan Crexells apareix només una vegada el nom del fundador del pragmatisme Charles S. Peirce (1839‐1914). Es tracta d'una simple menció, al costat de Schroeder, d'abordar la teoria de les relacions en el seu magnífic treball del 1919 sobre Betrand Russell.35 És veritat que, fins molt entrat el segle xx, la importància de Peirce i el seu coneixement no s'han generalitzat. En canvi, Crexells tracta amb atenció tant William James (1842‐1910), el gran difusor de Peirce i el pragmatisme, com sobretot el seu portaveu a Anglaterra, el discutit -i avui dia justament oblidat- F. C. S. Schiller (1864‐1937). El treball de Crexells «William James. La Filosofia moderna i el Pragmatisme» es va publicar a Quaderns d'Estudi el 1918 a partir de la traducció que havia fet Josep Farran i Mayoral (1883‐1955) del treball de James «El sentiment de racionalitat»,36 publicat originalment a la revista Mind el 1879 -gairebé quaranta anys abans- i compilat a The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.37 Crexells comença així el seu treball: La publicació d'una excel*lent traducció catalana de The sentiment of Rationality, de W. James, ens ofereix una ocasió per a revenir sobre el Pragmatisme i la transcendència del Pragmatisme dintre la Filosofia moderna. Evidentment, el rol d'aquesta escola i la importància de la suposada transformació que ha operat, han estat extraordinàriament sobreestimats a Catalunya. S'ha arribat a veure en el Pragmatisme una revolució gairebé única en la història del pensament. En realitat, però, el Pragmatisme no és altra cosa que la darrera evolució de l'empirisme, reposa en els seus mateixos postulats i no agreuja la irracionalitat del món que fonamentalment accepta aquella tendència.38 35 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 287. 36 Va aparèixer en quatre parts: Quaderns d'Estudi, III, I/2, novembre 1917, p. 118‐128; III, I/3, desembre 1917, p. 189‐198; III, I/4, gener 1918, p. 260‐275; III, II, p. 21‐27, 1918. El primer lliurament s'interrompé per donar pas a «El meu credo pedagògic», de John Dewey. Es publicà després com un volum conjunt de 46 pàgines, imprès al Taller d'Arts Gràfiques, Barcelona, 1918. 37 JAMES, W. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Nova York: Longmans, Green, and co., 1897. Curiosament tampoc no s'havia traduït al castellà: la primera traducció és la de Santos Rubiano a La voluntad de creer y otros ensayos de filosofía popular. Madrid: Daniel Jorro, 1922, p. 67‐111. 38 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 296. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament56 El primer que crida l'atenció, sens dubte, és la discussió de la importància atribuïda al pragmatisme a Catalunya. Crexells considera que ha estat sobreestimat -no diu per qui, però molt probablement està al*ludint a Eugeni d'Ors-, que el seu aire revolucionari ha estat sobrevalorat. En un altre text de pocs mesos després, Crexells recorda també: En la Filosofia, una invasió de pragmatisme d'importació americana penetrà fa vint anys sorollosament a Europa. [...] Un moment semblà com si tot allò que en la Filosofia té un sentit clàssic hagués de travessar una profunda crisi. Però immediatament una veu de sirena recordava dolçament les mil coses delicioses que una especulació de dos mil cinc‐cents anys havia creat.39 El segon aspecte que crida l'atenció és la reducció del pragmatisme a un empirisme en última instància escèptic: «l'empirisme dels pragmatistes tant com qualsevol altre porta a la negació de la Ciència».40 Unes pàgines més endavant explicarà aquesta idea: El Renaixement kantià mateix fou al començament tarat de psicologia. D'aquesta tendència dominant sorgí el Pragmatisme, que en la seva crítica de la Ciència ha complert la mateixa posició que Hume. El Pragmatisme ha fet respecte del Positivisme i de la general tendència empiriopsicologista del segle, el mateix que el seu temps Hume féu amb Bacon: descobrir en els seus postulats la negació de la Ciència.41 Al lector d'avui li impressiona la força i seguretat amb què Crexells es mou per la història de la filosofia. Potser és una mostra d'aquell tret juvenil que Serra i Húnter detectava en la formació filosòfica del jove Crexells, que es movia entre «extremismes encomanats per una visió massa ràpida dels sistemes». La lectura del treball mostra que, tot i que aparegui el nom de William James en el títol i que la seva ocasió sigui la traducció de Farran i Mayoral, el seu contingut no està centrat en James, sinó en la discussió de l'humanisme de Schiller -«la direcció anglesa del pragmatisme 39 Ibid., p. 262. 40 Ibid., p. 298. 41 Ibid., p. 300. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 57 (molt més interessant, per cert, que la nord‐americana)»-42 en el marc de la filosofia moderna d'encuny kantià. Malauradament, la posició de Schiller és -en expressió de Susan Haack-43 un pragmatisme vulgar, un relativisme humanista, oposat del tot al genuí pragmatisme de C. S. Peirce. Quan Crexells sosté que el pragmatisme de Schiller va en contra de la ciència, està expressant la mateixa objecció de Peirce al famós professor d'Oxford.44 Molt probablement, una part important de la difícil recepció del pragmatisme nord‐americà a Europa és que el seu principal valedor -amic personal de James, d'altra banda- mai va entendre realment l'abast del pragmatisme. Segons el parer de Haack, les seves vulgaritzacions del pragmatisme són les que van encendre les reaccions hostils al pragmatisme de Russell i Moore.45 En aquest sentit, es pot dir que el genuí pragmatisme de Peirce està més a prop de la posició de Crexells (que defensa la ciència, la lògica i la racionalitat clàssica) que del pragmatisme relativista i vulgar que Crexells ataca. En el fons -crec-, és aquesta la mateixa discrepància d'Ors amb el pragmatisme al qual considerava antiintel*lectualista. Com a mostra, una última referència d'aquest mateix article: Concedim, doncs, a Schiller, que Humisme no és Humanisme; afirmem tot seguit que per a nosaltres, defensors de la Filosofia en el seu sentit clàssic, les diferencies que entre ells hi ha, no ens importen, per tal com és en llur comú punt de partida on fem constar la nostra protesta. La posició de la filosofia classicista enfront del Pragmatisme o Humanisme no és altra que la que Kant adopta enfront del Humisme: prendre com a postulat fonamental el valor de les ciències essencialment lògiques: Matemàtiques, Físicomatemàtiques, i mesurar les altres en elles, és a dir, el contrari del que fa la tendència psicologista pretenent mesurar el valor de les hipòtesis i explicar‐les en funció de Psicologia.46 42 Ibid., p. 302. 43 HAACK, S. (ed.). Pragmatism, Old and New. Selected Writings. Nova York: Prometheus Books, 2006, p. 45. 44 Com va anotar Peirce al costat de la veu pragmatist en el seu exemplar del Century Dictionary (1902): «Schiller of Oxford, author of Riddles of the Sphinx, is a pragmatist, although he does not very thoroughly understand the nature of pragmatism». 45 HAACK, S. «Introduction». Pragmatism, Old and New. Selected Writings. Op. cit., p. 43. 46 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., 300‐301. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament58 Per comprendre millor aquesta interpretació m'ha semblat convenient explorar breument les altres mencions de William James i de F. C. S. Schiller que es troben disperses per l'obra de Crexells ara reunida en el volum I de les Obres Completes. En aquesta exploració té particular importància el treball dedicat específicament a Schiller publicat a Quaderns d'Estudi el 1919,47 en què precisament Crexells considera Schiller com el millor exponent de l'esperit especulatiu europeu en el si d'una filosofia pràctica com el pragmatisme nord‐americà.48 Pel que fa a William James, a part de dues mencions incidentals49 i de la seva aparició en el treball sobre Schiller, tenim dos passatges de certa importància de la seva tesi doctoral del 1919 (escrita en castellà): el primer té com a títol «Crítica de la ciencia: el pragmatismo»50 i el segon «La evolución de la teoría pragmatista del conocimiento».51 La lectura del primer passatge confirma la interpretació escèptica que fa Crexells del pragmatisme. Si es considera la ciència un producte del pensament, és a dir, un producte humà, està determinada no per una «desinteressada representació de la realitat», sinó pels interessos biològics dels individus i de l'espècie humana. Crexells conclou: Fácil es ver, pues, que la aplicación universal, y por lo tanto a la ciencia misma, de métodos positivos conduce al escepticismo, a la consideración de la ciencia como una de tantas manifestaciones de la defensa del individuo ante el medio que le rodea. De aquí parten las tesis pragmatistas, el titular verdadero todo aquello que aumenta las posibilidades y la eficacia de la acción, y falso todo lo que es obstáculo, freno a la expansión de la vida.52 En defensa del pragmatisme, m'agradaria dir que no és la ciència un procés de recerca de fonaments, sinó més aviat de resolució raonable de problemes amb dades i teories disponibles en cada moment. Les nostres teories, com els artefactes que fabriquem, són construïdes per nosaltres, però això no significa que siguin arbitràries o que no 47 Ibid., p. 260‐270. 48 Cf. Ibid., p. 262. 49 Ibid., p. 147 i 567. 50 Ibid., p. 319‐320. 51 Ibid., p. 354‐359. 52 Ibid., p. 319. Crexells, d'Ors i el pragmatisme 59 puguin ser millors o pitjors. Al contrari, que les nostres teories siguin creacions humanes significa que poden ser reemplaçades, corregides i millorades, que poden fer descobrir versions millors o més refinades: en això consisteix bona part del progrés científic.53 En el segon passatge de la tesi doctoral, Crexells exposa l'evolució de la teoria del coneixement de James a Schiller i hi afegeix una descripció sumària de l'empirisme radical de James i del desenvolupament posterior del new realism del seu deixeble Ralph Barton Perry, editor dels Essays in Radical Empiricism de William James. Impressiona el bon coneixement que té Crexells d'aquestes fonts originals i de les cites literals que reprodueix en anglès i que són un bon testimoni de la seva serietat acadèmica. Pel que fa a Schiller, és rellevant destacar que, a diferència de William James que havia mort el 1911, Crexells va tenir alguna correspondència amb Schiller, almenys per preparar el treball monogràfic que publicà a Quaderns al febrer del 1919, que inclou una foto seva amb vestes acadèmiques d'Oxford: La vida de l'home eminent, a l'obra del qual dedicarem algunes pàgines, no és pas abundant en esdeveniments de transcendència sorollosa. Les dates importants d'ella corresponen simplement a promocions acadèmiques o a publicació de llibres. «No hi ha certament gaires coses a dir respecte a mi personalment», ens escrivia fa poc, en demanar‐li nosaltres algunes dades biogràfiques.54 Al lector actual li impressiona de nou la solidesa acadèmica de l'anàlisi detallada que Crexells fa de les obres i els articles de la dilatada vida acadèmica de Schiller, els quals mostren «els trets fonamentals de l'obra d'aquest filòsof, el més interessant i el més sistemàtic, creiem, del pragmatisme».55 En particular, Crexells descriu amb atenció l'evolució del seu pensament i la seva àmplia afinitat amb Hegel. A més, Crexells admira la capacitat literària de Schiller: Els articles de Schiller són veritablement models del gènere. Clars, precisos, meravellosament estructurats i d'un estil transparent i sovint deliciosament irònic. Aquests articles es refereixen, en 53 PUTNAM, H. Las mil caras del realismo. Barcelona: Paidós, 1994, p. 149. 54 CREXELLS, J. Obra Completa I. Op. cit., p. 260. 55 Ibid., p. 270. Joan Crexells, obra i pensament60 general, a temes d'actualitat suggerits per la publicació d'un llibre, la discussió d'un tema en una societat de Filosofia, comentaris sobre èpoques històriques o filòsofs particulars relacionats amb els estudis pragmatistes, i sobretot a aplicacions del mètode humanista a dominis particulars de la ciència o de la realitat. Alguns d'aquests articles estan escrits en forma de diàleg d'un gran valor literari, entre personatges de la Historia, de la Filosofia, de la Mitologia grega, etc. [...] són admirables exemples de serietat i alhora d'habilitat i de gràcia en l'exposició i defensa de les tesis pragmatistes. La descripció que Crexells fa de l'estil literari de F. C. S. Schiller suggereix que, per a ell, és un model per imitar, encara que dissenteixi d'alguns elements centrals del seu pensament. 4. Conclusió He de concloure ja aquesta exploració temptativa de la connexió entre Crexells i el pragmatisme, mitjançada per Eugeni d'Ors. Aquest estudi ha estat un veritable descobriment del paper decisiu de F.C.S. Schiller en la recepció del pragmatisme a Catalunya. Com he dit, Schiller no va comprendre en absolut el pragmatisme de C. S. Peirce i va desenvolupar una versió del pragmatisme que el convertia en un moviment negador de la ciència. Res més allunyat del pensament original de C. S. Peirce, que va aspirar sempre a desenvolupar una filosofia científica. Per això, el rebuig del pragmatisme per part de Crexells o la superació per part d'Ors els acosta al pensament original del fundador d'aquesta tradició. Això mereix una ulterior exploració.

Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Philosophy Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning J. Adam Carter (University of Glasgow) & Robin McKenna (University of Liverpool) Abstract Empirical work on motivated reasoning suggests that our judgments are influenced to a surprising extent by our wants, desires and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). How should we evaluate the epistemic status of beliefs formed through motivated reasoning? For example, are such beliefs epistemically justified? Are they candidates for knowledge? In liberal democracies, these questions are increasingly controversial as well as politically timely (Beebe et al. 2018; Lynch forthcoming, 2018; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). And yet, the epistemological significance of motivated reasoning has been almost entirely ignored by those working in mainstream epistemology. We aim to rectify this oversight. Using politically motivated reasoning as a case study, we show how motivated reasoning gives rise to three distinct kinds of skeptical challenges. We conclude by showing how the skeptical import of motivated reasoning has some important ramifications for how we should think about the demands of intellectual humility. §1. Empirical work on motivated reasoning suggests that our judgments are influenced to a surprising extent by our wants, desires and preferences (Kahan 2016; Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979; Molden and Higgins 2012; Taber and Lodge 2006). In this article we address the import of motivated reasoning for the epistemic statuses of beliefs that are impacted by it. Our central questions are: are such beliefs epistemically justified? Are they candidates for knowledge? In liberal democracies, these questions are increasingly controversial as well as politically timely (Beebe et al. 2018; Lynch forthcoming, 2018; Slothuus and de Vreese 2010). 2 And yet, the epistemological significance of motivated reasoning has been almost1 entirely ignored by those working in mainstream epistemology. We aim to rectify this oversight. Our general aim is to provide some reasons for thinking that politically motivated reasoning has negative import for the epistemic statuses of beliefs formed in part through such reasoning. We submit that there is some initial pressure to think that beliefs formed through politically motivated reasoning are (epistemically) unjustified. If our assessments of arguments and evidence is partly dictated by our political convictions, then how could these assessments be epistemically justified? Our aim in this paper is to make this initial thought more precise, and to argue that it is more than just initially plausible. In fact, as we'll show, the widespread presence of motivated reasoning in the political domain should lead us to be much less confident in our political beliefs, and for reasons that have not been adequately appreciated by epistemologists. Of course, one very natural strategy would be to look at whether politically motivated reasoning is a reliable way of going about forming beliefs. There is empirical evidence which suggests that it isn't, in that it leads many of us to form beliefs about scientific topics that conflict with the scientific consensus (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011). If this is right, then empirical work on politically motivated reasoning poses a direct skeptical challenge: knowledge requires reliable belief formation, so if beliefs formed via politically motivated reasoning are unreliable, they can't be known.2 While this line of argument represents one straightforward way in which politically motivated reasoning might give us pause, we want to explore another way in which 1 Exceptions include Avnur and Scott-Kakures (2015), Kelly (2008), Huemer (2016) and Kornblith (1999). Interestingly, in Huemer's case, many cases of politically motivated reasoning can be assimilated to political irrationality. Huemer reaches this conclusion in the service of attempting to explain widespread, strong and persistent disagreements in politics. Huemer's position is that irrationality better explains such disagreements than other candidate explanations, such as miscalculation, ignorance and divergent values. 2 For a distinct though related challenge, see Carter and Pritchard (2016). 3 politically motivated reasoning should give us pause even if it doesn't lead us astray, but rather fortuitously "guides" us toward the truth. Maybe some beliefs formed through politically motivated reasoning are unjustified, even if they generally tend to be true. We are going to argue that we should take this possibility seriously.3 We will start with an overview of work on motivated reasoning. We will then develop three skeptical challenges that this work poses for certain of our beliefs. Finally, we will finish by taxonomizing these skeptical challenges according to their "level" of skeptical power, and by showing how motivated reasoning has some important ramifications for the way we think about the demands of intellectual humility. §2. Manifestations of motivated reasoning can be distinguished in terms of the motivations they serve (Molden and Higgins 2012). There is a large body of work that documents the ways in which our desire to maintain a positive self-conception leads us to give more credence to information that confirms our perception of ourselves as kind, competent and healthy than to information that challenges these perceptions. For example, Kunda (1987) reports a study in which subjects read an article which stated that caffeine consumption causes serious health problems in women but not in men. Women who were heavy caffeine consumers found the article less convincing than women who were light caffeine consumers.4 We are here particularly interested in the impact that our political beliefs and convictions have on our assessment of arguments that pertain to those beliefs and convictions. Call this politically motivated reasoning. For example, Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979) report a study in which subjects were given the same set of arguments for and against capital punishment, but 3 This kind of possibility space has been explored, in the context of the metaethical debate between realists and anti-realists about value, by Street (2006) (specifically as the second horn of her "Darwinian dilemma"). Thanks to an anonymous referee at the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for drawing this paper to our attention. 4 For similar results see Bradley (1978); Ditto et al. (1998); Kunda (1990). 4 their assessments of the strength of these arguments correlated with their existing views about the rights and wrongs of capital punishment. Put simply, subjects who were predisposed to object to capital punishment found anti-capital punishment arguments more convincing, whereas those who were predisposed to accept it found pro-capital punishment arguments more convincing. Dan Kahan and his collaborators present a series of studies which show that our political beliefs also impact on our assessment of arguments and evidence that pertain to scientific issues with clear political relevance, such as global warming and the safety of nuclear power (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011; Kahan 2016, 2014).5 Three aspects of work on politically motivated reasoning are worth emphasizing from the outset. First, while we have been talking of politically motivated reasoning in terms of the influence of our background political beliefs on our cognitive processes, it is important to note that the operative notion of "political belief" is very broad indeed. This is perhaps clearest in Dan Kahan and his collaborators' work on cultural cognition. Kahan calls attention to the fact that politically motivated reasoning is as much driven by our broader cultural backgrounds as our political beliefs, narrowly construed. The thought is that the motivation or goal that is served by politically motivated reasoning is, broadly speaking, the goal of identity protection, that is, the goal of forming beliefs that protect and maintain our status within a group that defines our identity and whose members are united by a shared set of values. As Kahan puts it: When positions on some risk or other policy relevant fact have come to assume a widely recognised social meaning as a marker of membership within identity-defining groups, members of those groups can be expected to conform their assessment of all manner of information-from persuasive advocacy to reports of expert opinion; from empirical data 5 For similar results see Bullock, Gerber, and Hill (2015); Jost, Hennes, and Lavine (2013); Redlawsk (2002). For related discussion, see D. Greco (forthcoming). 5 to their own brute sense impressions-to the position associated with the respective groups (2016, 1). While it will do no real harm to simplify things and talk in more narrowly political terms ("right wing" vs. "left wing"), it should be borne in mind that this is a simplification. Second, the empirical evidence does not suggest that politically motivated reasoning is less prevalent in "politically sophisticated subjects". In fact, it is more like the opposite. Taber and Lodge (2006) found that, the more politically sophisticated a subject was6, the more likely they were to conform their assessment of the quality of the arguments and information they consider to their political beliefs. Taber and Lodge hypothesize that this is because politically motivated reasoning involves two biases. We tend to spend more time and resources finding flaws with arguments that challenge deeply-held political beliefs than we do on finding flaws with arguments that support these beliefs, and, when we are free to choose which information to expose ourselves to, we tend to seek out arguments that will confirm deeplyheld political beliefs rather than arguments that will challenge these convictions. Put simply, politically sophisticated subjects have more information at their disposal, and the more information you have at your disposal, the better you will be at finding flaws in arguments with conclusions you don't like, and the better you will be at seeking out information that confirms rather than challenges your existing views.7 6 Note that by political sophistication Taber and Lodge mean 'knowledgeableness', where this is, for the purposes of their study, a function of the proportion of correct answers provided on a survey test (2006, 760). 7 See also Burnstein and Vinokur (1977) and Brown (1986) for related discussion of how exposure to more arguments that support an antecedently held position can contribute to polarization within a group, by causing individuals to embrace more extreme versions of positions previously held. Related points have been registered by Huemer (2016) and also Kahan (2013). In Kahan's study, it was shown that polarization increased as people got more 'numerate'. 6 Third, politically motivated reasoning is something that many of us engage in, at least some of the time.8 This is particularly clear in Kahan and his collaborators' work. They look at the impact of our political beliefs on the following topics, among others: • Attitudes about global warming. • Attitudes about the safety of "burying" nuclear waste underground. • Attitudes about the efficacy of "concealed carry" laws. One would expect laypersons to look for the existence of scientific consensus on these sorts of topics. Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman (2011) report the following findings: • 78% of those on the "political left" think that most scientists agree that global temperatures are rising, whereas only 19% of those on the "political right" think that most scientists agree. (56% of those on the right think that most scientists are divided, and 25% think that most disagree). • 68% of those on the left think that most scientists agree that humans are causing global warming, whereas only 12% of those on the right think that most scientists agree. (55% of those on the right think that most scientists are divided, and 32% think that most disagree). • 37% of those on the right think that most scientists agree that there are safe methods of geologically isolating ("burying") nuclear waste, whereas only 20% of those on the left think that most scientists agree. (35% of those on the left think that most scientists disagree, and 45% on both sides of the political spectrum think that scientists are divided). • 47% of those on the right think that most scientists agree that permitting adults without criminal records or histories of mental illness to carry concealed handguns in 8 That said, there is some evidence that financial incentives can minimize the impact of motivated reasoning (Bullock, Gerber, and Hill 2015; Prior, Sood, and Khanna 2015), and that it doesn't impact on experts' assessments of arguments and evidence that pertain directly to their fields of expertise (Kahan et al. 2016). 7 public decreases violent crime, whereas only 10% of those on the left think that most scientists disagree. (47% of those on the left think that most scientists disagree, and much the same percentage on both sides of the political spectrum think that scientists are divided). What does this tell us? We want to highlight one crucial point. It is often claimed that there are important cognitive asymmetries between "liberals" (in the US sense) and "conservatives" (Hodson and Busseri 2012; Kanazawa 2010). It may well be that there are some asymmetries. But these findings suggest that there are also some important symmetries.9 Both those on the right and those on the left form beliefs about scientific topics in ways that accord with their political convictions. In doing so, they end up at odds with expert scientific opinion, at least as it is represented in "expert consensus reports" from the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS has issued reports with the following conclusions: • There is scientific consensus that global warming is real, and human activity is a central cause of it (National Research Council Committee on Analysis of Global Change Assessments 2007). • There is scientific consensus that there are safe methods of geologically isolating (or "burying") nuclear waste (National Research Council Board on Radioactive Waste Management 1990). • The available evidence does not permit forming a conclusion on the efficacy of concealed carry laws (National Research Council Committee to Improve Research Information and Data on Firearms 2004). 9 One interesting such symmetry is registered in a recent study by Gampa et al. (Forthcoming). This study found that ideological beliefs (on both sides) impaired people's ability to do two things that are central to basic political reasoning: (i) recognize logical validity in arguments that oppose their own political beliefs; and (ii) recognize the lack of logical validity in arguments that support their own political beliefs. 8 This suggests that those on the right are out of step with the scientific consensus on global warming, whereas those on the left aren't. But those on the left are out of step with the scientific consensus on the safety of nuclear waste disposal. And both sides overestimate the extent to which the evidence supports their preferred position on concealed carry laws. Now, it may be claimed that these findings still support the conclusion that those on the right are more out of step with the scientific consensus than those on the left. That is, politically motivated reasoning is more pronounced (or at least more damaging) amongst those on the right than amongst those on the left. This might be true, but it hardly shows that those on the left don't also engage in politically motivated reasoning, or that, in doing so, they don't regularly end up at odds with expert scientific opinion.10 This completes our brief overview of work on politically motivated reasoning. We will now turn to its epistemological implications, and in particular, its skeptical import. §3. Politically motivated reasoning is reasoning that serves a motive other than a desire to arrive at true beliefs (Kahan 2016). If a subject engages in politically motivated reasoning when assessing some evidence or argument, their assessment of that evidence or argument is nontrivially influenced by their background political beliefs.11 If the evidence or argument causes trouble for those beliefs, they try to reject it, explain it away, or minimize its importance; if the evidence or argument supports those beliefs, they enthusiastically endorse it, and exaggerate its importance. The evidence outlined above suggests that, when subjects engage in politically motivated reasoning, they are often led astray: they end up forming false beliefs. Consider, for instance, the attitude of many people on the political right toward global warming. Sometimes, though, cultural cognition does not lead us astray, but rather fortuitously 10 For relevant discussion, see Ditto et al. (2019) and Baron and Jost (2019). 11 Note that, at this juncture, we are merely describing politically motivated reasoning. 9 "guides" us toward the truth. In such cases, are our beliefs thereby in the clear, epistemically speaking? Perhaps not.12 Consider the following pair of cases: NAÏVE STUDENT-1: Tim is an impressionable student, one who is inclined to blindly trust socially approved opinions with little to no critical scrutiny. Fortunately for Tim, he is raised in a household where exposure to (and social praise of) sound climate science is abundant, and climate change "denial" is discussed only in a negative light. Tim (like most around him) believes that global temperatures are rising, and that human activity is the cause. NAÏVE STUDENT-2: Tim* is an impressionable student, one who is inclined to blindly trust socially approved opinions with little to no critical scrutiny. Unfortunately for Tim*, he is raised in a household where exposure to (and social praise of) sound climate science is rare, and "climate change" is discussed only in a negative light. Tim* (like most around him) believes that it's not the case that global temperatures are rising. With the literature on politically motivated reasoning in hand, we can give a plausible psychological explanation of what is going in in both these cases. Both Tim and Tim* assess any information they receive pertaining to climate science in light of their background political beliefs and broader cultural backgrounds.13 But, at least in part because these background beliefs are very different, these assessments lead them in opposite directions. 12 The reader might already be wondering how our argument will relate to the literature on epistemically irrelevant influences on belief (Avnur and Scott‐Kakures 2015; Cohen 2001; DiPaolo and Simpson 2016; Mogensen 2016; Schoenfield 2013; Sher 2001; Srinivasan 2015; Vavova 2018; White 2010). We address this in §6. 13 Granted, a full specification of their psychological profiles would include not just beliefs, but also desires (e.g., to fit in, or to be seen in a certain way). We abstract away from these complications here. 10 Tim ends up believing that global temperatures are rising, and that human activity is the cause. Tim* ends up denying this. We would submit that neither Tim nor Tim* are particularly unusual. While our descriptions of both are undeniably simplistic, many (though of course not all) individuals are, in most essential respects, like Tim or Tim*. Tim*'s belief in NAÏVE STUDENT-2 is clearly epistemically defective.14 But what about Tim's belief? Interestingly, it might be argued that there is also something amiss with Tim's belief, and this is so even though (i) the target belief is true and (ii) Tim possesses excellent evidence for his belief (i.e., the evidence that we may suppose he is exposed to, and which is socially approved in his epistemically friendly environment). We can start with the distinction, familiar in mainstream epistemology, between propositional and doxastic justification. Roughly, this is the distinction between having good reasons for one's belief (propositional justification) and properly basing one's belief on the good reasons one possesses (doxastic justification).15 In NAÏVE-STUDENT 1, Tim has good reasons for his belief, but it is not at all clear that he is properly basing his belief on the good reasons that he has. Rather, it seems that, to the extent that he is basing his beliefs on the good reasons he has, he is doing this only because these beliefs and reasons have the epistemically irrelevant property of being socially approved. And if that's right, then-as this line of thought goes-Tim, despite possessing propositional justification for his belief that global temperatures are rising, lacks doxastic justification (and ipso facto propositional knowledge) for believing that global temperatures are rising.16 14 For one thing, these beliefs are false. For another, they are plausibly unjustified – or, at least, as unjustified as the beliefs of Goldman's (1988) 'benighted cognizer'. For discussion, see Simion (2019). 15 For representative statements of this relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, see Alston (1985); Korcz (2000); Kvanvig (2003); Pollock and Cruz (1999, 35– 36); Turri (2010). 16 See Davis (2009) for related discussion. 11 If the above line of thought is correct, then an interesting and rather troubling result is that politically motivated reasoning can have epistemically deleterious effects even when it guides one toward the truth-and thus, regardless of whether politically motivated reasoning is reliable.17 But is it correct? In the next two sections we consider two objections to it. §4. We have argued that Tim's belief that global temperatures are rising is (doxastically) unjustified because, to the extent that he bases this belief on the good reasons he has, he does this because those reasons have the epistemically irrelevant property of being socially approved. That is, he believes on the basis of these reasons because those around him regard these reasons as being good reasons. One might object that this property is not epistemically irrelevant at all. Tim is utilizing a generally effective strategy for deciding what to believe (and why to believe it): defer to socially recognized authorities. Deferring to recognized authorities is not a bad epistemic strategy. It isn't going to work in all environments, of course-recognized authorities can be wrong (see Tim*)-but this is just an instance of the more general point that good inferential strategies won't work well in all possible environments (see Gigerenzer 2000). We agree that there need not be anything wrong with deferring to recognized authorities, and that good inferential strategies need not work well in all possible environments. But we don't think this spells trouble for our argument. Let's start with the first concession (that there need not be anything wrong with deferring to recognized authorities). The crucial question is: what is this deference based on? It is one thing to defer to recognized authorities because you have reason to think they are likely to have the right answers (or, at least, more likely than you). It is another to defer to them because you recognise that you share certain 17 The above diagnosis of NAÏVE STUDENT-1 also makes mischief for those (like Kallestrup and Pritchard 2014, 2012 and Lackey 2009, 2007b) who hold that, in "friendly" epistemic environment knowledge acquisition may require very little by way of cognitive effort and skill on the part of the knowledge recipient, and far less than it would involve in less friendly environments. 12 core values or belong to the same social group. We would submit that, while the former makes perfect sense from the epistemic point of view, the latter is problematic. The mere fact that you share certain core values with someone surely can't be a good reason to defer to them, at least on factual matters like global warming.18 The literature on politically motivated reasoning suggests that, when we engage in it, our patterns of deference are best explained in terms of a preference for listening to those with whom we share certain core values. (Kahan, Jenkins-Smith, and Braman 2011) look at what drives subjects' assessments of the expertise of (fictional) putative authorities on issues like global warming. They find that these assessments are driven by fit between the views of a putative authority and one's ideological predispositions. Thus, many conservatives will regard scientists who accept global warming as less authoritative than scientists who deny it, and liberals will regard scientists who accept that there are safe nuclear waste disposal methods as less authoritative than scientists who deny this. What about the second concession (that good inferential strategies need not work well in all environments)? The problem with the strategy of deferring to those with whom you share certain core values isn't that there are possible environments in which it isn't very effective in producing true beliefs. The problem is rather that, at least for most of us, it isn't very effective in the world in which we find ourselves. There may of course be people for whom it is effective. But work on politically motivated reasoning suggests that there are a lot of people for whom it isn't. Take, again, Dan Kahan's work on cultural cognition (discussed above). He finds that, while liberals tend to have views about global warming that align with the scientific consensus, they also tend to have views about the safety of nuclear power that 18 It is worth noting that there is some dissent on this in the literature (e.g. Rini 2017). But we are inclined to agree with (Worsnip 2018), who argues that the strategy of deferring to those in one's social group may be rational from a prudential point of view, but isn't from an epistemic point of view. 13 don't. This, we think, demonstrates the shortcomings of the strategy of deferring to those with whom you share core values. §5. The second objection is as follows: In NAÏVE-STUDENT 1 Tim does properly (enough) base his belief on the reasons he has. To see why, compare Tim with an individual who clearly does not properly base his belief on the reasons he has, Jennifer Lackey's "racist juror": RACIST JUROR: Martin is a racist juror. Martin receives, over the course of the trial, compelling testimony that the defendant is guilty. Martin however bases his belief that the accused is guilty not on the good reasons he has for thinking so, but on his racist belief that individuals of the ethnicity of the defendant are likely to commit criminal acts.19 Both Tim and Martin are propositionally justified in their respective beliefs: there are good reasons for them to believe the relevant propositions. But, so far as doxastic justification is concerned, there seems to be a crucial difference between Tim and Martin. First, while Tim bases his belief that scientists agree that global temperatures are rising on the good reasons that he has, Martin bases his belief that the defendant is guilty on bad, racist reasons. Granted, Tim bases his belief on these good reasons because they are socially approved in his environment. But, nonetheless, he still based his belief on these reasons. So, a fortiori, we should maintain that, unlike Martin in RACIST JUROR, Tim in NAÏVE STUDENT-1 is not only propositionally justified but also doxastically justified. We think this objection fails for two principal reasons. The first is a general reason about the relationship, thus far not made explicit, between basing and doxastic justification. If basing suffices for doxastic justification in the sense that, if a subject S bases her belief that proposition p on a reason, R, and R is a good reason for believing p, then S is doxastically 19 This is a variation on Lackey's (2007a, 598) original case. 14 justified in believing that p, then we concede that it follows that Tim's situation in NAÏVE STUDENT-1 wouldn't be defective in the way we've indicated. But, crucially, basing is not sufficient for doxastic justification in this way, even if basing is necessary for doxastic justification. This point does not rely on a commitment to any particular substantive view of basing. For example, on a doxastic account of the basing relation (e.g., Audi 1982; Ginet 1985), basing a belief on a reason is a matter of possessing a meta-belief to the effect that that reason is a good reason to hold that belief. If that meta-belief is itself a matter of, say, wishful thinking, the target belief is surely not doxastically justified even if (on the doxastic theory) it counts as being based on a good reason; otherwise, wishful thinking could convert an unjustified belief into a justified belief. The same point can be made on an inferential account of basing (e.g., Bondy and Carter 2020) according to which inference from believed premises to a believed conclusion is sufficient for basing belief in the conclusion on belief in the premises. Ordinarily, on an inferential account of basing, basing will issue in doxastically justified belief. However, inference (like any mental activity) itself can-as Ryle (1945) famously noted-be competent or incompetent. Incompetent inference (e.g., one that transitions through a bad step) can result in basing, on an inferential account of basing, even if it does not result in a doxastically justified belief. Finally, consider a causal account of basing. On such a view basing is a matter of causation in the sense that a subject S's belief that p is based on R iff S's belief that p is causally sustained by R.20 Even if we assume R is a good reason for P, it is a mistake to think that the mere presence of such a causation relation will suffice for S's belief that p to be doxastically justified. Here it is important to distinguish causation simpliciter from competent causation, 20 For some notable defences of this kind of position, see for example Harman (1970), Swain (1981), Moser (1989), Turri (2011), and McCain (2012). 15 where the latter requires not just that R cause p non-deviantly (see, e.g., Plantinga 1993, 69 fn. 8) but also that R cause p via the exercise of a reliably truth-conducive disposition of the subject. In short, the idea is that doxastic justification requires not just basing as such, but good or proper basing-where proper basing requires having a good reason as one's basis, but is not secured by simply having a good reason as one's basis. Here is not the place to offer a full account of proper basing (though offering such an account remains a live project in contemporary epistemology21). Rather, we want to emphasize that cases like that of NAÏVE-STUDENT 1 aren't going to be insulated from the kind of criticism we raise simply because basing on a good reason is present in a way that it is not in cases like, e.g., RACIST JUROR. Of course-and this bring us to the second line of resistance to the anticipated reply-it doesn't follow from the fact that basing on a good reason doesn't suffice for doxastic justification that Tim's belief is not in fact both based on a good reason and, additionally, doxastically justified. Why, exactly, should we think that features of Tim's situation should lead us to deny that his belief is doxastically justified even though it is ex hypothesi based on a good reason? The answer, in short, has to do with an epistemically problematic feature of the way in which the target belief is based. To sharpen what's concerning about the way Tim bases his belief in NAÏVE-STUDENT-1, consider now the following case: FRANCOPHILE CARTOGRAPHER: Rae (irrationally) believes that French cartographers are the only reliable sources of cartographical information. Rae's Francophilia so strongly influences her assessment of the reliability of maps that she distrusts all information written by non-French authors. Rae stumbles upon several 21 See, for example, essays in Carter and Bondy (eds.) (2020). 16 pieces of evidence (E1, E2 and E3) for believing cartographical claim X. But, simply because E1, E2 and E3 were written by Italian cartographer Giacomo Gastaldi, Rae disregards this evidence and so does not come to believe claim X on the basis of it. Later that day, Rae encounters the very same pieces of evidence (E1, E2 and E3) for cartographical claim X, but this time they were written by French cartographer Pierre Desceliers. Because-and only because-Desceliers is French, she accepts this evidence, and comes to believe X on the basis of it. In FRANCOPHILE CARTOGRAPHER, although Rae bases her belief on what we may assume are the good reasons she has for believing claim X-viz., E1, E2 and E3-she does not properly base her belief on these reasons, viz., in a way that would plausibly be required for doxastic justification. When Rae encounters these pieces of evidence in the work of Gastaldi, she disregards them; when she encounters them in the work of Desceliers, she accepts them. Rae's belief isn't properly based on these pieces of evidence if whether she believes on the basis of them depends primarily on the nationality of the putative expert (an epistemically irrelevant feature). She is basing her belief on good reasons, but not because they are good reasons, but rather, primarily because of something epistemically irrelevant. And a result is that the process by which she is basing her belief on a good reason is problematic as a candidate for issuing doxastic justification on any of the three accounts of basing considered. With reference to the causal and inferential accounts, it's worth noting that Rae's basing process is an incompetent one, even when it reliably issues in a good reason as a basis.22 (After all, the disposition manifested here is a generally unreliable one, even if all the French 22 By way of comparison: consider an analogy with testimony more generally. The process of trusting whatever any speaker says, and with no sensitivity to potential defeaters, is not a process that issues in doxastic justification via testimony. And this is the case even if one happens to be in a friendly environment. This is a point that both reductionists and nonreductionists about testimony can agree about. For discussion, see, for example, the debate between Lackey (2009, 2007b) and Greco (2010) regarding Lackey's CHICAGO VISITOR case. 17 communicators Rae is in contact happen to speak truthfully.)23 Because incompetent basing is justification-undermining on a causal account as well as on an inferential account, Rae's belief, based on a good reason, falls short of doxastic justification despite being based on a good reason with reference to either of these accounts. Likewise, with reference to the doxastic account, it should be noted that, while Rae we may grant has a meta-belief to the effect that E1, E2 and E3 are good reasons for believing X (and so bases her belief that X on these good reasons), this meta-belief is itself unjustified-viz., it is a result of irrational prejudice. Given that irrational prejudice surely can't convert an otherwise doxastically unjustified belief into a doxastically justified belief, it follows that Rae's belief, based on a good reason, falls short of doxastic justification on a doxastic account of basing despite being based on a good reason. But notice that, once we accept this line of thinking in FRANCOPHILE CARTOGRAPHER, then by parity of reasoning we should also accept that Tim in NAÏVE STUDENT-1 isn't doxastically justified in believing that global temperatures are rising. Both cases are structurally on a par; in both cases, the subject bases her belief on good reasons, but not because they are good reasons, but rather, primarily because of something epistemically irrelevant. And, a result in both cases is that the process by which the subject is basing her belief on a good reason is problematic as a candidate for issuing doxastic justification, regardless of what view of basing one subscribes to. So our argument is as follows. There are (at least) two ways in which one's belief can fail to be doxastically justified. One may be like Martin in RACIST JUROR, and believe some 23 This raises a well-known data point in debates about the generality problem for reliabilism. Fine-grained reliability lacks epistemic relevance. (Example: guessing is reliable whenever the environment is structured so that the guess is correct). The kind of reliability that is of importance epistemically is general, or normal, reliability---viz., where the relevant reference class includes normal environments. For different ways of unpacking the kind of reference class that is pertinent to reliability assessments, see Graham (2012) for an etiological functionalist account and Sosa (2015) for a virtue-theoretic account. See also Lyons (forthcoming) for a recent proposed solution to the generality problem. 18 proposition for which there are good reasons, but not on the basis of those good reasons. Or one may be like Tim in NAÏVE STUDENT-1 or Rae in FRANCOPHILE CARTOGRAPHER. That is, one might believe some proposition for which there are good reasons on the basis of those good reasons, but not because they are good reasons, but for some other epistemically irrelevant (or plain bad) reason, so as to render the basing epistemically incompetent or otherwise defective. If this is right, then our skeptical worry remains: politically motivated reasoning can have epistemically deleterious effects even when it guides one toward the truth. As we have already indicated, we think that Tim is not particularly unusual. So what we say about Tim's belief that global temperatures are rising is going to hold for many people who believe that global temperatures are rising. In what follows we will do two things. First, as promised (fn. 9), we will indicate how our argument relates to the literature on irrelevant influences on belief. Second, we will explore a further skeptical worry that we think might arise in even the "best" sort of case.24 §6. We have been looking at one way in which our beliefs can be influenced by factors that have nothing to do with the truth of their contents: they can be formed via politically motivated reasoning. Such factors are called "epistemically irrelevant" because they are irrelevant to the truth of the beliefs in question. The literature on epistemically irrelevant influences on belief looks at the general question of what to say about beliefs that are influenced by epistemically irrelevant factors.25 While we are primarily concerned with politically motivated reasoning in particular, rather than irrelevant factors in general, the reader might want to know how our argument relates to this literature. 24 Thanks to a referee at the Canadian Journal of Philosophy for suggesting many helpful changes to this section. 25 Henceforth we drop the qualifier "epistemically". 19 There are two (related) respects in which the argument above differs from much of the literature on epistemically irrelevant influences. First, there is a divide between those who think that irrelevant factors pose a problem for (some) of our beliefs (e.g. Avnur and Scott‐ Kakures 2015; Vavova 2018), and those who are more skeptical (e.g. Mogensen 2016; Srinivasan 2015; White 2010). Those who think that irrelevant factors can pose a problem tend to focus on the idea that learning your belief(s) have been influenced by irrelevant factors gives you a defeater for your belief(s). For instance, Katia Vavova defends this principle: Good Independent Reason Principle: To the extent that you have good independent reason to think that you are mistaken with respect to p, you must revise your confidence in p accordingly-insofar as you can (Vavova 2018, 145). Imagine that my political beliefs have been shaped by my upbringing, and I come to recognise this. Vavova's thought is that this would occasion a sceptical worry about my political beliefs if it gave me good reason to think my political beliefs might be mistaken. Setting aside the implications of Vavova's proposal, the important point for our purposes is that, for Vavova, irrelevant factors are important insofar as being aware of them may gave us reasons to think certain beliefs are mistaken.26 The idea is that recognizing the influence of irrelevant factors on our beliefs may give us a defeater for these beliefs. Our argument above was that politically motivated reasoning constitutes a problem for some of our beliefs because beliefs formed through politically motivated reasoning are not held on the right sort of basis (or not held on the right basis in the right way). Our argument therefore differs from Vavova's in that we are interested in the consequences of politically motivated reasoning for the grounds on which our beliefs are held, rather than in whether the recognition that our beliefs have been influenced by irrelevant factors can yield a defeater for our beliefs. 26 Much the same applies to Avnur and Scott-Kakures (2015), who focus on what they call "debunkers". 20 This difference is the consequence of a second and more fundamental difference. Vavova, like many of the authors who've written on irrelevant influences, is primarily interested in the consequences of the recognition that our beliefs have been influenced by irrelevant factors for the epistemic statuses of our beliefs. Her question is: under what conditions should this recognition lead us to revise our confidence? But our argument has not focused on the consequences of the recognition that some of our beliefs have been influenced by politically motivated reasoning. Rather, we have focused on the epistemic status of beliefs formed through politically motivated reasoning, whether the subjects are aware of the origins of their beliefs or not. In our discussions of Tim (and Rae) above we didn't specify whether Tim (or Rae) are aware of how they formed their respective beliefs. This doesn't preclude us from thinking of the issue in terms of defeaters. One might think there are defeaters for one's beliefs of which one is not aware, and that the existence of such defeaters has consequences for the epistemic statuses of one's beliefs. So we are interested in a different issue than Vavova and others, though there may be some interesting connections between our projects. §7. We have shown that our argument is importantly distinct from Vavova's (and much of the literature on irrelevant influences on belief) because it doesn't focus on the consequences of recognizing that our beliefs have (or might have been) influenced by irrelevant factors. That said, we want to finish by describing a case in which a subject does suspect that their beliefs have been influenced by politically motivated reasoning: ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART I): Diane is like Tim in the following respects: (i) Diane is raised in a household where exposure to (and praise of) sound climate science is abundant, and climate change "denial" is discussed only in a negative light (ii) Diane (like most around her) believes that scientists agree that global temperatures are rising. Diane is unlike Tim in the following respects: (iii) Diane is not influenced or impressed by (as Tim is) which opinions are the socially approved ones; the matter of whether a given opinion is socially approved (or disapproved) has a negligible effect on whether Diane accepts it, even though Diane ends up accepting many claims (including the claim that <scientists agree that global 21 temperatures are rising>) that are the accepted ones in her epistemically friendly environment. It seems clear that Diane in ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART 1) is not just propositionally justified but also doxastically justified in believing that global temperatures are rising, and that human activity is the cause. Unlike Tim, Diane seems to properly base this belief on the good reasons that she has for holding it. She doesn't believe on the basis of these reasons because they are socially approved, but rather because they strike her as good reasons. We take this to show that there is nothing wrong with Diane so far as doxastic justification and the basis of her beliefs is concerned. But even Diane may face some trouble. Imagine ENLIGHTENED STUDENT continues: ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART II): Diane starts to get interested in empirical research on the social causes of belief-formation. She reads the literature cited in this paper, paying special attention to Kahan's work on politically motivated reasoning. She realizes that politically motivated reasoning is ubiquitous, and even sophisticated subjects like her are susceptible to it. Now, when she thinks about the reasons for which she holds her beliefs about things like climate change, it doesn't seem to her like she believes on the basis of these reasons because they happen to vindicate her broader political and cultural beliefs. But she has also read the literature on the (un)reliability of introspection27 and "hindsight bias"28: she recognizes that she is not necessarily a good judge of why she thinks as she does, and that, like all of us, she tends to engage in a lot of ex post facto rationalization. She therefore regards it as very possible-if not likely-that she believes on the basis of the reasons she does not because they strike her as good reasons, but because they fit with her broader political and cultural beliefs. 27 For references and philosophical discussion see Schwitzgebel (2011). 28 The classic study is Fischhoff and Beyth (1975). 22 What are we to say about Diane in ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART II)? There is an error-possibility that she regards as "live", and it is such that, were it to obtain, she would (we have argued in §§3-4) not be doxastically justified in her belief that global temperatures are rising. We can view Diane's unease as (albeit unconsciously) a response to this situation. But is there any problem with Diane's epistemic situation? While we wouldn't want to say for sure that there is, it is worth noting that there are some influential views in contemporary epistemology on which Diane's belief may well be unjustified. Take, for instance, Michael Bergmann's (2006) influential account of epistemic defeat, on which (put roughly) it is necessary and sufficient for some condition to defeat S's belief that S take it that the condition defeat their belief (e.g., by counting against the truth of the belief or against the reliability of its formation). On this account, if Diane takes it that her inability to rule out this error-possibility constitutes a defeater for her belief that global temperatures are rising, then her belief is defeated, and she is no longer justified in believing that global temperatures are rising. So, if you are attracted to a Bergmann-style account of epistemic defeat, there is room for a worry about whether Diane's belief is justified. A similar point can made with reference to Lewis's (1996) account of relevant alternatives and their relationship to knowledge attributions. For Lewis, whether it is true to say that some S knows that some p is true depends on whether S can rule out all relevant alternatives, and various things can lead an alternative to be relevant in some conversational context. One thing that is sufficient (but not necessary) for an alternative to be relevant in a context is that it be taken seriously in the context. So, for instance, if a Cartesian skeptical scenario is taken seriously in some context, then it is relevant in that context. A Lewisian contextualist may hold that, as Diane moves from ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART I) to ENGLIGHTENED STUDENT (PART 2) the possibility that she has been engaging in motivated reasoning becomes relevant, and because she can't rule it out, she can no longer truly say that she knows that global temperatures are rising. It is of course a further step to hold that she can no longer truly say that she is justified in believing that global temperatures 23 are rising. But perhaps this further step can be made, and in any case, it would be unsettling enough if Diane couldn't truly say that she knows global temperatures are rising.29 §8. So what is the skeptical import of motivated reasoning? We want to finish by clarifying what we have been trying to do in this paper, and by commenting on what all this might teach us about intellectual virtue. With reference to the preceding discussion, three ascending levels of skeptical import can be identified: LEVEL TYPE OF CASE CONCESSION TO SKEPTIC 1 NAÏVE STUDENT 2 (i.e., motivated reasoning leads us astray). Minimal; the concession to the skeptic does not go beyond those beliefs that we'd already be inclined to regard as unjustified. 2 NAÏVE STUDENT 1 (i.e., motivated reasoning nudges us in the right direction). Substantial; the concession to the skeptic includes some beliefs that we'd be inclined to regard as justified. Crucially, this includes cases where one bases (true) beliefs on good reasons. 3 ENLIGHTENED STUDENT (PARTS 1 AND 2) (i.e., one does not believe via motivated Critical: the concession to the sceptic includes some beliefs that we'd be inclined to regard as epistemically impeccable. Crucially, this 29 Another way of approaching this case would be via considerations about higher-order evidence. We could say that, due to her research about the prevalence of bias, Diane ends up with misleading evidence that there is something wrong with the evidential basis of her firstorder belief. Whether this has any implications for the justificatory status of Diane's belief depends on one's views about higher-order evidence, and we lack the space to address this issue here. But we think this would be an interesting topic for future work. Thanks to a referee for suggesting this angle. 24 reasoning, but reflects on the empirical literature and cannot rule out that one did reason this way). includes cases where the subject doesn't actually engage in motivated reasoning. Level 3 is serious indeed. As the ENGLIGHTENED STUDENT pair of cases indicates, the kind of skeptical threat generated by the prevalence of motivated reasoning might plausibly imperil the epistemic status of our beliefs even when these beliefs are not formed through such reasoning at all. And in this respect, even what look like perfectly "good cases" might be ones where we turn out to be much worse off epistemically than it would initially seem. This should certainly give the epistemologist cause for concern. To be clear, the above table distinguishes levels of skeptical import-not skeptical conclusions. Compare: it is uncontentious that the skeptical import of Descartes' arguments in Meditation 1 included at least all empirical propositions. And yet, almost no one accepts the corresponding conclusions of these arguments. Of course, any skeptical argument-no matter the scope of skepticism threatened-might be defused by a suitable anti-skeptical response. In the present case, there is, as we see it, no suitable response to the kind of (minimal) skeptical import raised at Level 1; after all, these are beliefs that we would normally take to be unjustified. What about Levels 2 and 3? There are two forms of anti-skeptical response one might try. The first form would be to try and find a weakness in the details of the skeptical arguments. So far as the Level 2 argument is concerned, one could challenge the empirical data from §2, or the epistemological assumptions about propositional and doxastic justification relied on in §§3-4. As for the Level 3 argument, one could challenge either of these things, or the Bergmann-style account of defeat (or the Lewisian semantics for knowledge attributions) from §7. 25 The second form would be to target our overall strategy in this paper.30 We have argued for skeptical conclusions about a class of our beliefs (beliefs in scientific issues that have become politically contentious, like global warming) on the basis of highly simplified toy cases (NAÏVE STUDENT and ENLIGHTENED STUDENT). We supposed that the causes of Tim's and Diane's beliefs can be captured in very simple terms (they defer to people recognized as experts in their community), and we have said very little about the reasons underlying these patterns of deference. One might argue that the causes and reasons underlying the beliefs that actual people have about issues like global warming are far more complex than this, and due to these complexities the skeptical conclusions we have derived about Tim and Diane may not transfer over to our own beliefs about these issues. We grant this point, but our aim has not been to argue conclusively for either a Level 2 or 3 skeptical conclusion. More modestly, we hope to have shown that the phenomenon of motivated reasoning raises insidious skeptical problems-and accordingly that the epistemological ramifications of motivated reasoning are much more serious than one may initially think (see e.g. Kelly 2008). We want to conclude by noting how the above ascending cascade of skeptical threats posed by motivated reasoning might teach us something instructive about intellectual virtue. One of the most popular mantras in contemporary social epistemology is that intellectual humility is valuable to its possessors as well as valuable more broadly in liberal democracies predicated upon a toleration of differing viewpoints.31 One prominent account of the nature of intellectual humility, defended by Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr and Daniel Howard-Snyder (2017) maintains that the virtue centrally involves an owning of our 30 We would like to thank a referee for pushing us to consider this response. 31 For an overview of this literature, see Gunn, Johnson, Lynch and Sheff (2017). For recent work on the importance of intellectual humility in education, see the articles in Carter et al. (2016). Cf. Gordon (forthcoming) for discussion of the epistemic value of humility in counselling. 26 epistemic limitations.32 Intellectual humility, so understood, is characterized by a dispositional profile that includes cognitive, behavioral, motivational, and affective responses to the various ways in which individuals are epistemically limited. But what are these limitations, exactly? As Whitcomb et al. write: We're all familiar with what we gather under the rubric of "intellectual limitations": gaps in knowledge (e.g. ignorance of current affairs), cognitive mistakes (e.g. forgetting an appointment), unreliable processes (e.g. bad vision or memory), deficits in learnable skills (e.g. being bad at math), intellectual character flaws (e.g. a tendency to draw hasty inferences) ... (2017, 516).33 One feature that unifies the examples that Whitcomb et al. point to is that they are all, in an important respect, individual-level limitations. Individual-level limitations, however, should only be part of the story. Some of our intellectual limitations arise simply in virtue of our social situatedness-viz., our membership in epistemic communities that antecedently value the things that they do. This at any rate seems to be an important moral to draw from §§2-7, and this is especially so for those who join us in taking seriously the idea that the skeptical import of the kind of motivated reasoning that features in cultural cognition rises to (at least) Level 2. One lesson to draw from canvassing the skeptical import of motivated reasoning is that there is a distinctively social way that the virtuously intellectually humble person may own her epistemic limitations, apart from the more traditional ways of owning individual-level limitations (e.g., owning knowledge gaps, skills deficits, etc.)34 That is, she may own the kinds of epistemic limitations one inherits specifically by embedding oneself in (and reaping other 32 For some additional accounts of intellectual humility, see Church and Samuelson (2017), Church (2017), Kidd (2016), Kallestrup and Pritchard (2016) and Tanesini (2018). 33 In offering these examples, Whitcomb et al. are to some extent borrowing from a passage they cite earlier in the paper from June Tangney (2009). 34 It's worth noting that this line of thinking gains support from views that emphasise the social dimension of reasoning; see, e.g., Mercier and Sperber (2017). 27 epistemic benefits from) a social community, limitations that-if our argument is sound- stand to threaten us epistemically on potentially three levels of ascending epistemic concern. 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UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SÃO PAULO ESCOLA DE FILOSOFIA, LETRAS E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM FILOSOFIA FELIPE DE SOUZA ANTONIO DUNS SCOTUS E O PRINCÍPIO "TUDO QUE SE MOVE É MOVIDO POR OUTRO" Guarulhos 2013 UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE SÃO PAULO ESCOLA DE FILOSOFIA, LETRAS E CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM FILOSOFIA FELIPE DE SOUZA ANTONIO DUNS SCOTUS E O PRINCÍPIO "TUDO QUE SE MOVE É MOVIDO POR OUTRO" Dissertação apresentada ao Programa de PósGraduação em Filosofia da Universidade Federal de São Paulo como requisito parcial para a obtenção do título de Mestre em Filosofia. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Cesar Ribas Cezar Guarulhos 2013 FICHA CATALOGRÁFICA Antonio, Felipe de Souza Duns Scotus e o princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro" / Felipe de Souza Antonio. – Guarulhos : [s.n.], 2013. 96 f. Orientador: Cesar Ribas Cezar Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal de São Paulo, Escola de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas, Guarulhos, 2013. Título em inglês: Duns Scotus and the principle "everything which is in motion is moved by another". 1. Automovimento 2. Movimento 3. Natureza 4. Contingência 5. Mudança I. Título FELIPE DE SOUZA ANTONIO DUNS SCOTUS E O PRINCÍPIO "TUDO QUE SE MOVE É MOVIDO POR OUTRO" Guarulhos, 14 de fevereiro de 2013 __________________________________________________ Prof. Dr. Cesar Ribas Cezar Orientador Universidade Federal de São Paulo __________________________________________________ Prof. Dr. Juvenal Savian Filho Universidade Federal de São Paulo ________________________________________________ Prof. Dr. Djalma Medeiros Faculdade de São Bento Dedico este Mestrado aos meus pais, Urandi e Terezinha, que, inspirados no amor de Deus pelos homens, tanto se sacrificaram para que eu pudesse chegar até aqui. Maria, Sede da Sabedoria, rogai por nós. AGRADECIMENTOS Agradeço especialmente ao Professor Dr. Cesar Ribas Cezar que, com boa vontade, dedicação, serenidade e clareza, orientou-me na compreensão e desenvolvimento de árduas passagens da obra de Scotus e dos demais pensadores envolvidos nesta pesquisa. Ao Professor Dr. Juvenal Savian Filho pelas observações e indicações bibliográficas apresentadas no exame de qualificação. Ao Professor Dr. Djalma Medeiros pelas considerações feitas no exame de qualificação e, principalmente, por ter me ajudado a compreender passagens cruciais da Física de Aristóteles em seu grupo de estudos da Faculdade de São Bento. Ao colega Paulo Oliveira Nishihara que pacientemente leu e revisou o texto. A minha esposa, Anette, pela paciência e colaboração na formatação do texto. A todos os funcionários da UNIFESP Guarulhos que indiretamente colaboraram com esta pesquisa. RESUMO Tendo como referência os escritos da Física de Aristóteles, o movimento, para os pensadores do século XIII, não somente diz respeito ao movimento local, mas também às mudanças quantitativa e qualitativa dos entes. A fim de justificar o movimento das coisas, isto é, a passagem da potência ao ato, grande parte dos escolásticos recorreu ao princípio aristotélico que diz: "tudo que se move é movido por outro". Ademais, para alguns desses pensadores, até mesmo as alterações cognitivas e apetitivas que ocorrem nas potências da alma submetem-se a esse princípio. Às vésperas do século XIV, Duns Scotus rejeita a universalização do princípio aristotélico do movimento e sistematiza uma filosofia em favor do automovimento. Por conseguinte, o propósito desta dissertação é apresentar por que Scotus sustenta que não se pode afirmar a priori, isto é, por meio de princípios de validade universal e independentes da experiência, que toda e qualquer mudança é causada por outro. Tomando por referência as Questões sobre os livros da Metafísica de Aristóteles IX, q. 14, exponho o pensamento de Scotus, o qual diz que o automovimento não só é possível, mas também é a melhor explicação para muitos fatos empíricos: os acidentes simultâneos e não simultâneos; o movimento dos leves e graves; o movimento dos animais; bem como as alterações qualitativa, quantitativa, cognitiva e apetitiva que outrora eram exclusivamente explicadas pelo princípio aristotélico do movimento. Por fim, na conclusão, teço algumas considerações sobre a questão do automovimento e também apresento sucintamente o pensamento de Scotus sobre o automovimento da vontade. Palavras-chave: automovimento, movimento, natureza, contingência, mudança. ABSTRACT For the 13 th century thinkers the study of motion was plainly founded on the writings of Aristotle‟s physics which does not constrain the meaning of motion exclusively to local motion, but it also includes to its meaning the qualitative and quantitative changes of things. In order to explain the movement or changes of things, namely the passage from potency to act, the majority of the scholastic philosophers counted on the aristotelian cinesiological principle that says: "everything which is in motion is moved by another". Moreover, for some scholastic philosophers even the changes regarding the powers of the soul, that is, alteration in the intellect and in the will, must undergo the cinesiological principle. On the eve of the fourteenth century, Duns Scotus rejects the aristotelian principle and systematizes a philosophy in favor of self-motion. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is to present why Scotus sustains we can not state a priori, i.e, through principles of universal scope and independent of experience, that self-motion is impossible; in other words, we can not say that any change is caused by another. Taking as reference the Questions on the metaphysics of Aristotle's IX, q.14 by John Duns Scotus, I explain the thought of Scotus to whom selfmotion is not only possible, but it is also the best explanation to many empirical facts like: coeval and non coeval accidents; the motion of heavy and light things; animals‟ motion, as well as qualitative, quantitative, cognitive and appetitive changes that once were exclusively explained by the aristotelian principle of motion. Finally, in the conclusion, I make some comments about the self-motion issue and also introduce briefly Scotus‟ thought regarding self-motion in volition. Key words: motion, self-motion, nature, contingency, change. SUMÁRIO 1 INTRODUÇÃO................................................................................................................ 9 1.1 O problema do movimento................................................................................................ 9 1.2 Notas históricas introdutórias........................................................................................... 11 2 ARGUMENTOS INICIAIS.......................................................................................... 15 3 EXPOSIÇÃO DA OPINIÃO GERAL...................................................................... 19 3.1 Opinião geral e sua justificação......................................................................................... 19 3.2 Explicação dos casos concretos segundo a opinião geral................................................ 23 3.2.1 Sobre os acidentes simultâneos.......................................................................................... 23 3.2.2 Acidentes não simultâneos................................................................................................. 24 3.2.2.1 Acerca do movimento nos corpos leves e graves........................................................... 25 3.2.2.2 Sobre os animais moventes............................................................................................. 27 3.2.2.3 Mudança quantitativa...................................................................................................... 31 3.2.2.4 Mudança qualitativa........................................................................................................ 33 3.2.2.5 Mudança cognitiva.......................................................................................................... 34 3.2.2.6 Mudança apetitiva........................................................................................................... 35 4 POSIÇÃO DE SCOTUS SOBRE O PRINCÍPIO GERAL............................... 37 4.1 Posição de Scotus e sua justificação.................................................................................. 37 4.2 Explicação dos casos concretos segundo a opinião de Scotus......................................... 42 4.2.1 Explicação do acidente simultâneo.................................................................................... 42 4.2.2 Explicação do acidente não simultâneo............................................................................. 47 4.2.2.1 Explicação sobre os corpos leves e graves..................................................................... 48 4.2.2.2 Explicação sobre os animais moventes........................................................................... 54 4.2.2.3 Explicação sobre a mudança quantitativa....................................................................... 56 4.2.2.4 Explicação sobre a mudança qualitativa......................................................................... 57 4.2.2.5 Explicação sobre a mudança cognitiva........................................................................... 59 4.2.2.6 Explicação sobre a mudança apetitiva............................................................................ 62 4.3 Conclusão geral da posição de Scotus e resposta a algumas objeções........................... 64 5 RESPOSTA DE SCOTUS AOS ARGUMENTOS EM FAVOR DA OPINIÃO COMUM............................................................................................................ 66 5.1 Resposta ao primeiro argumento...................................................................................... 66 5.2 Resposta ao segundo argumento....................................................................................... 69 5.2.1 Solução de Scotus sobre a incompatibilidade da potencialidade e atualidade simultânea 72 5.2.2 Objeções à resposta de Duns Scotus.................................................................................. 77 5.2.3 Resposta às objeções.......................................................................................................... 78 5.3 Resposta ao terceiro argumento........................................................................................ 80 6 RESPOSTA AOS ARGUMENTOS INICIAIS..................................................... 82 7 CONCLUSÃO................................................................................................................... 84 REFERÊNCIAS................................................................................................................... 91 9 1 INTRODUÇÃO 1.1 O problema do movimento A célebre distinção aristotélica entre ato e potência decorre do exame acerca do que é o movimento. Em filosofia, o termo movimento não é algo que se restringe ao movimento local, pois também diz respeito a qualquer tipo de mudança ou alteração. O movimento, em todos os seus sentidos, diz respeito ao processo de atualização de algo que se encontra em potência de recebê-la. Desse modo, se existe algo que é atualmente A e potencialmente B, o movimento é esta atualização ou da qualidade ou da quantidade ou do lugar B. 1 Uma vez definido o que é movimento, torna-se possível apresentar a questão central desta pesquisa: se algo pode mover-se por si mesmo. A resposta a essa questão é dada à luz do pensamento de Duns Scotus e de outros pensadores do século XIII citados pelo próprio Doutor Sutil. Os predecessores de Scotus, dentre eles Tomás de Aquino e Boaventura, alicerçados na filosofia de Aristóteles, negam que algo possa passar da potência ao ato por si mesmo, ou seja, para eles, a atualização de algo não se dá sem o concurso de outro. Nesse sentido, defendem as seguintes teses: [1] o automovimento é algo impossível no mundo físico; [2] se o automovimento for possível, somente poderá ser admitido onde não houver causas físicas, tal como no livre-arbítrio; [3] todos os casos que aparentam automovimento no mundo físico, na realidade, são uma série de interações entre agentes e pacientes distintos. 2 Ao longo desta pesquisa serão analisados tanto os argumentos contrários à posição de Scotus, ou seja, aqueles em favor do princípio que diz: tudo que se move é movido por outro, quanto os argumentos de Scotus em defesa do automovimento. Dado que Aristóteles é a autoridade na qual repousa a resposta negativa à questão proposta, convém sucintamente apresentar o problema nas palavras do próprio Filósofo. No início do livro VII de sua Física, Aristóteles diz: Tudo o que está em movimento deve ser movido por algo, pois se [algo] não possui a fonte de seu movimento em si mesmo, é evidente que é movido por outra coisa distinta, porquanto o que move terá que ser outra coisa [distinta daquilo que é movido]. 3 1 ROSS, Sir David. Aristóteles. 1. ed. Lisboa: D. Quixote, 1987. p. 89, 91. 2 Cf. KING, Peter. Duns Scotus on the reality of self change. In: Self-Motion from Aristotle to Newton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. Disponível em: <http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/articles/Scotus_on_Self-Change.pdf.>. Acesso em: 9 nov. 2012. 3 ARISTÓTELES. Física VII, 241b 35-36. Tradução minha a partir da versão em inglês de J. Barnes (The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation. 6. ed. vol. 1. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995.) 10 Para Aristóteles, a enunciação na forma passiva é clara: como o ato é sempre anterior à potência, aquilo que se encontra em potência para o movimento requer que algo em ato atualize sua potencialidade para o movimento. Em outras palavras, aquilo que se encontra em potência para o movimento exige uma causa. Ademais, a causa deve estar em contato permanente com aquilo que é movido, e não apenas no momento inicial. Os antagonistas do automovimento têm como pressuposto o princípio aristotélico que diz que tudo que se move é movido por outro. Por isso, uma coisa que está em movimento deve necessariamente ser movida por outra coisa distinta dela mesma. O ponto cardeal da doutrina aristotélica do movimento é precisamente a distinção entre movente e movido. O princípio que distingue o movente do movido é também conhecido como princípio cinesiológico. Ainda definindo alguns termos, Scotus denomina opinião comum ou opinião geral o ponto de vista de todos aqueles que defendem o princípio cinesiológico e, por conseguinte, se opõem à tese do automovimento. Convém salientar que o princípio cinesiológico não requer que movente e movido sejam necessariamente encontrados em duas substâncias distintas porquanto os seres vivos, cujo automovimento é notório, são substâncias singulares. Se considerarmos o movimento de um animal, o movente não é necessariamente algo extrínseco ao todo movido, no entanto, a distinção entre parte movente e parte movida é mantida. Embora seja provável que o princípio cinesiológico tenha sido colocado em dúvida por pensadores anteriores a Scotus, o Doutor Sutil foi o primeiro a refutá-lo de forma explícita e sistemática. Aliás, o princípio cinesiológico é refutado não somente com argumentos a priori, mas também com argumentos a posteriori. É exatamente na argumentação a posteriori que repousa o caráter decisivo da crítica escotista, pois, para Scotus, um princípio genuinamente metafísico, isto é, de validade universal, jamais é negado pela experiência. Se porventura a experiência contradisser algum suposto princípio metafísico, logo tal princípio é falso. 4 Em linhas gerais, sustento nesta pesquisa que o Doutor Sutil defende o automovimento em duas instâncias: [a] nos entes físicos; [b] nas potências imateriais da alma, ou seja, no intelecto e na vontade. A constatação do automovimento nas potências da alma, especialmente na vontade, permite que Scotus salvaguarde a liberdade humana; pois, se universalizássemos o princípio cinesiológico, isso equivaleria a dizer que tudo o que ocorre no mundo, tanto no aspecto físico quanto no aspecto psicológico, seria determinado e regido 4 GARCIA, Antonio (org.). Estudos de filosofia medieval: a obra de Raimundo Vier. 2. ed. Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes; São Paulo: USF; Curitiba: Editora da UFPR, 2000. p. 225. 11 por ele. Se assim fosse, viveríamos num universo semelhante a um relógio, no qual cada parte é necessariamente movida por outra. Convém ressaltar que o princípio do movimento aristotélico, ou seja, o princípio: tudo que se move é movido por outro, não se restringe ao movimento local, mas antes abarca a totalidade dos processos intramundanos, sejam eles quantitativos ou qualitativos, sejam eles antropológicos ou psíquicos. Por isso, se levarmos a cabo o princípio cinesiológico, a vontade humana, enquanto simples potencialidade, jamais seria atualizada sem ser posta em ação por algo outro. 5 Enfim, o escopo da pesquisa é esclarecer por que a posição escotista alega que não se pode afirmar a priori que tudo que se move é movido por outro. Para tal, será mantida a estrutura original da obra do Doutor Sutil, a qual pode ser assim resumida: [1] argumentos iniciais contra e a favor do automovimento, todos eles alicerçados em Aristóteles; [2] posição da opinião geral e sua justificação contrária à tese do automovimento; [3] aplicação do princípio cinesiológico nos casos concretos segundo a opinião geral; [4] posição de Scotus contrária à opinião geral; [5] explicação da tese do automovimento nos casos particulares; [6] conclusão geral da posição de Scotus e respostas a algumas objeções; [7] resposta de Scotus aos argumentos em favor da opinião geral. Antes de apresentar o ensinamento de Scotus acerca do princípio: omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, 6 convém apresentar algumas notas históricas que abordam de maneira bem geral como alguns filósofos anteriores a Scotus trataram a questão do movimento. 1.2 Notas históricas introdutórias Averróis é um dos pensadores que aceitam o princípio do movimento de Aristóteles. Para ele, a causa ativa e o sujeito passivo do movimento devem ser necessariamente distintos. 7 Tomás de Aquino e Boaventura também negaram a possibilidade de automovimento ao defenderem o princípio: tudo que se move é movido por outro. Todavia, Boaventura abre 5 GARCIA, 2000, p. 228. 6 Tudo o que se move é movido por outro. 7 EFFLER, Roy R. John Duns Scotus and the principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. New York: The Franciscan Institute S. Bonaventure, 1962. p. 5. 12 uma exceção ao alegar que o automovimento só é possível de ser admitido no caso de causas não físicas. Para Boaventura, as coisas revestidas de matéria não possuem a capacidade de refletir seu poder sobre si mesmas. Mas, segundo ele, isso não se aplica à vontade, a qual é um instrumento automovente, pois o poder que se encontra numa substância espiritual é capaz de ser refletido em sua própria substância. Por isso, considerando-se a vontade, diz-se que o movente é o mesmo que o movível. 8 Em Tomás de Aquino a questão de um possível automovimento no mundo físico já é mais delicada, haja vista que os estudiosos do Aquinate chegam a interpretações distintas sobre sua posição acerca desse problema. Uma das passagens dos escritos de Tomás de Aquino que propicia grande discussão é esta: "É impossível que sob o mesmo aspecto e do mesmo modo algo seja motor e movido, ou que mova a si próprio". 9 Será que sob aspectos e modos diversos o Doutor Angélico admitiria o automovimento? De qualquer forma, muitas passagens de Tomás de Aquino afirmam que o agente do movimento e o paciente devem ser sujeitos distintos. 10 Étienne Gilson, ao comentar a noção de causalidade em Tomás de Aquino, escreve: "Para que haja causalidade, no senso estrito do termo, é preciso haver dois seres e que algo do ser da causa passe ao ser do que sofre o efeito desta". 11 Para Henrique de Gand, o princípio cinesiológico defende uma distinção real entre a causa ativa do movimento e o receptor do movimento. Não obstante, isso deve restringir-se ao movimento de seres materiais. O princípio cinesiológico, por exemplo, aplica-se ao movimento local dos animais, bem como ao movimento natural dos corpos leves e graves. Contudo, com relação à atividade da faculdade espiritual, tal como a vontade, não pode haver uma distinção real entre movente e movido, visto que a faculdade espiritual é uma natureza simples. Para Henrique de Gand, a distinção entre a parte ativa e a parte passiva da vontade é meramente intencional. 12 Godofredo de Fontaines defende o princípio aristotélico de uma maneira mais radical, pois ele se aplica em todos os casos sem nenhuma exceção. Para ele, em todos os casos de movimento e mudança o agente e o paciente são sempre coisas distintas; além disso, em plena consonância com o pensamento de Aristóteles, tanto o princípio ativo quanto o princípio passivo devem ocupar lugares distintos. Godofredo de Fontaines também estende o princípio cinesiológico para as atividades espirituais do intelecto e da vontade. Desse modo, 8 Cf. KING, 1994, p. 1. 9 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 3, a. 1. São Paulo: Loyola, 2003. 10 EFFLER, 1962, p. 12. 11 GILSON, Étienne. O espírito da filosofia medieval. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006. p. 116, grifo meu. 12 EFFLER, op. cit., p. 15. 13 ambas as faculdades são absolutamente passivas no que diz respeito aos seus respectivos atos. 13 Dentre os pensadores mencionados acima, chamo a atenção do leitor para as posições de Godofredo de Fontaines e Henrique de Gand, pois esta pesquisa é basicamente o resultado do confronto entre os argumentos desses dois pensadores e os argumentos de Scotus. No entanto, antes de passar diretamente para a análise do próprio texto do Doutor Sutil, encerro esta parte histórica com a breve perspectiva de um autor posterior ao Doutor Sutil, mas que foi influenciado por ele. Para o pensador do século XVI Francisco Suárez, o princípio do movimento não parece ser válido para todos os tipos de movimentos. Desse modo, em sintonia com Scotus, a explicação do movimento não requer que o agente e o paciente da mudança sejam sujeitos necessariamente distintos. Suárez deixa em aberto a possibilidade de que pelo menos algumas coisas sejam capazes de mover-se a si mesmas e tal possibilidade permanece aberta na esfera dos seres materiais e imateriais. Todavia, no que diz respeito à dificuldade de explicar o movimento natural dos corpos leves e graves, Suárez rompe com o pensamento escotista e retoma o princípio do movimento aristotélico. 14 O próprio Aristóteles também teve muita dificuldade para chegar a uma conclusão acerca do movimento dos leves e graves. O Estagirita diz que há dois estágios de causação no movimento natural dos leves e graves. No primeiro estágio, a causa de tal movimento é atribuída ao agente gerador desses corpos. O agente gerador dos corpos leves tornou-os leves ao aplicar calor sobre eles; já o agente gerador dos corpos graves tornou-os pesados por ter aplicado neles o frio. Esse primeiro estágio de transição é algo análogo à transição à qual um aluno se submete quando seu professor o coloca na posse do conhecimento. Todavia, quando uma substância torna-se leve ou pesada, sua natureza não está completamente atualizada. Para que isso aconteça, os obstáculos que impedem o movimento natural ascendente ou descendente devem ser removidos. Desse modo, aquilo que remove os obstáculos dos leves e graves é considerado o agente no segundo estágio de transição. Mas se levarmos em consideração esses dois estágios, qual deles pode ser considerado a causa do movimento natural desses corpos em sentido pleno? Tanto o agente que remove os obstáculos quanto o agente gerador dos leves e graves são causas sucessivamente necessárias. Não obstante, a 13 EFFLER, 1962, p. 16. 14 Ibid., p. 22,23. 14 divisão de função entre esses agentes resulta em nossa inabilidade de apontar para a efetiva causa do movimento. O mesmo é dito acerca das mudanças qualitativas e quantitativas. 15 Pois bem, ao longo desta pesquisa veremos que Scotus é um divisor de águas, pois, com sólidos argumentos, o Doutor Sutil defende que a causa do movimento natural não é nem o agente gerador nem o agente removedor de obstáculos, mas o próprio ente leve ou grave. Infelizmente, não é possível traçar aqui um panorama histórico completo acerca do princípio cinesiológico, visto que isso demandaria muito tempo e, com certeza, vários volumes de dimensões consideráveis. Todavia, acredito que esse breve panorama histórico seja suficiente para ajudar o leitor a localizar-se na questão abordada. 15 ROSS, Sir David. Aristotle's phyisics: a revised text with introduction and commentary by W.D. Ross. London: Oxford University Press, 1936. p. 88. 15 2 ARGUMENTOS INICIAIS O princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro" é explicitamente tratado por Duns Scotus na questão XIV do comentário ao livro IX da Metafísica. Lá ele coloca a seguinte questão: algo pode mover-se por si mesmo? 16 De início, são apresentados quatro argumentos; os três primeiros negam que algo possa mover-se por si mesmo; o quarto, em sentido contrário, aponta para uma resposta afirmativa à questão proposta. Os três primeiros argumentos contra a tese de que algo pode mover-se por si mesmo repousam na autoridade de Aristóteles. Os argumentos encontram-se na seguinte ordem: [1] "[...] na medida em que é por natureza unido, o mesmo não sofre nada de si mesmo; com efeito, é um e não outro"; 17 [2] a própria noção primária de potência ativa refere-se a um princípio de mudança em outra coisa ou na própria coisa enquanto outra; 18 [3] caso algo pudesse mover-se por si mesmo, "algo assim sempre agiria, se fosse agente natural, pois aquela ação não dependeria de algo exterior; pelo fato de que o mesmo é agente e passivo. A consequência é patentemente falsa". 19 Parece que, se assim fosse, os sentidos, por exemplo, ativar-se-iam espontaneamente, ou seja, sem a necessidade de um agente que tenha o poder de ativá-los. Da mesma maneira, aquilo que é combustível entraria em combustão por si mesmo e não necessitaria da atualidade do fogo para eclodir em chamas. 20 Quanto ao argumento em sentido contrário, Scotus também remete à autoridade de Aristóteles. Segundo o Filósofo, seja com respeito ao lugar, ao crescimento ou diminuição, ou 16 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14. In: SCOTUS E A LIBERDADE: textos escolhidos sobre a vontade, a felicidade e a lei natural. Tradução e introdução: Cesar R. Cezar. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010. p. 94. Gostaria de ressaltar que a discussão gira principalmente em torno da causa eficiente. As causas formal, material e final, embora apareçam no texto, não são discutidas diretamente. 17 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IX, 1046a 28-30 apud DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 1. Para manter o caráter original da obra de Scotus, as citações de Aristóteles serão feitas a partir do texto do próprio Scotus. Será indicada, porém, a paginação da edição Bekker para aqueles que desejarem confrontar os excertos de Aristóteles citados por Scotus com as edições modernas. Na edição de J. Barnes (The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation), lê-se: "[...] na medida em que algo é uma unidade orgânica, não pode ser atualizada [modificada] por si mesma, pois é uma coisa só e não duas coisas diferentes" (tradução minha). 18 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 1. Cf. ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IX, 1046a 1216, onde se lê: "Mas todas as potências que se conformam ao mesmo tipo são princípios originadores de uma espécie ou de outra, e assim são chamadas em referência a uma espécie primeira de potência, que é um princípio originador de mudança em outra coisa, ou na mesma coisa enquanto outra" (ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica. Trad. Leonel Vallandro. Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1969, grifo meu). 19 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 3. Cf. ARISTÓTELES. Da alma II, 417a 2-8, b 1621. 20 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma II, 417a 2-10. 16 a qualquer modo de alteração, aquilo que é natural possui dentro de si mesmo um princípio de movimento e repouso. 21 Assim, algo poderia causar mudança em si mesmo. Para entender o primeiro argumento, devemos estar cientes de que em uma unidade natural (unidade orgânica), como a madeira, o oleoso, a água etc., não é possível fazer uma distinção entre parte paciente e parte agente. Em outras palavras, as coisas que constituem uma unidade natural possuem necessariamente ou um princípio ativo ou um princípio passivo, não, porém, os dois ao mesmo tempo e sob o mesmo aspecto. Da mesma maneira que o oleoso, por si, não pode exercer a atividade de queimar, pois requer algo que ative tal potencialidade, é impossível concebermos que um pedaço de madeira tenha o princípio ativo de por si mesmo ativar-se em uma cadeira. De maneira análoga, a água é passiva em suas afecções, pois se torna gelo por meio do frio ou ferve em virtude do calor. Portanto, não é possível afirmar-se que as coisas que constituem uma unidade natural sejam simultaneamente agentes e pacientes de suas afecções. O segundo argumento contra o automovimento é extraído da própria definição de potência ativa, "pois é princípio de mudança de outro". 22 Assim, não parece possível uma potência ativa agindo sobre si mesma, pois ou ela age em algo outro distinto de si, ou age em si mesma enquanto outra. Agir em si mesmo enquanto outro significa que uma parte localmente distinta X age sobre outra parte localmente distinta Y de um todo constituído de partes X e Y. Nesse sentido, o Filósofo escreve: "Denominamos capacidade a fonte do movimento ou mudança, a qual está em outra coisa ou na mesma coisa enquanto outra [...]". 23 O terceiro argumento contra o automovimento sustenta que, se o mesmo sofresse algo de si mesmo, as coisas exteriores que causam o movimento ou a mudança seriam dispensáveis. Além disso, algo assim sempre agiria. Se assim fosse, a visão, bem como qualquer um dos outros sentidos, seria ativada sem o concurso de fontes externas. Ora, é patente que nós não percebemos nossos próprios sentidos, ou seja, a visão não vê a visão, o ouvido não ouve a audição etc., e que, sem o estímulo de algo externo, não é possível perceber nada. O mesmo se dá com o combustível, pois nenhum combustível vem a inflamarse por si mesmo. Tanto a alma sensível quanto o combustível possuem em comum a potencialidade. Por outros termos, é preciso que algo em ato ative tanto a alma sensível quanto o combustível. 24 Dado que nesses casos é necessário que algo em ato ative a 21 ARISTÓTELES. Física II, 192b 13-16. 22 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 2. 23 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica V, 1019a 15-16. 24 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma II, 417a 2-10. 17 potencialidade da alma sensível e do combustível, então parece ser impossível que o mesmo sofra algo de si mesmo. O argumento em sentido contrário, por sua vez, afirma: "o que é natural tem em si o princípio de movimento e de repouso". 25 Além disso, também na Física II, o Filósofo diz: "[...] pois a natureza é um certo princípio e causa pelo qual aquilo em que primeiramente se encontra move-se ou repousa por si mesmo e não segundo concomitância [...]". 26 Ao recorrermos à Metafísica, é possível compreender de uma forma mais adequada esta posição contrária. Dentre os significados de natureza dados por Aristóteles, por ora, interessam-nos apenas dois: [1] natureza significa o princípio originário e imanente, do qual se desenvolve o processo de crescimento da coisa que cresce; [2] [...] natureza significa o princípio do primeiro movimento que se encontra em cada um dos seres naturais e que existe em cada um deles, justamente enquanto é ser natural. 27 Essas definições de natureza sugerem que as coisas naturais podem mover-se por si mesmas. As coisas constituídas por natureza diferem das coisas constituídas por outras causas em virtude de as coisas naturais possuírem em si mesmas o princípio de movimento e de repouso. Não obstante, quando falamos em movimento, não podemos nos limitar aos movimentos que dizem respeito ao deslocamento de lugar, pois movimento pode dizer respeito também ao crescimento e à diminuição, bem como a qualquer outro modo de alteração. Os animais e suas partes, as plantas e demais corpos simples (terra, fogo, ar e água) existem por natureza. Logo, estas coisas naturais possuem em si mesmas o princípio de seu movimento. Por outro lado, é impossível que uma cama, um casaco etc., assim como qualquer outro produto artificial derivado da técnica, tenha um princípio inato para mudança. Porém, na medida em que tais coisas são compostas de matéria natural, pode-se dizer que tais coisas, por terem uma natureza como substrato, possuem em si mesmas algum princípio de mudança. Portanto, parece que natureza é um princípio que pertence especialmente às coisas naturais. Desse modo, tanto o movimento (no sentido lato) das coisas naturais quanto o repouso ocorrem em virtude do princípio inerente à própria natureza, e não acidentalmente. 28 A melhor maneira de compreendermos natureza enquanto princípio ativo exige que recorramos ao concurso do conceito de forma. Quanto ao último, Scotus diz: 25 ARISTÓTELES. Física II, 192b 13-16 apud DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 4. 26 ARISTÓTELES. Física II, 192b 20-23. Utilizo aqui a tradução de Lucas Angioni. (Aristóteles. Física I-II. In: Clássicos da filosofia: Cadernos de tradução n 1. Campinas, SP: Unicamp, 2002). 27 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica V, 1014b 18-20. 28 ARISTÓTELES. Física II, 192b 10-22. 18 [...] a forma é mais verdadeiramente natureza do que a matéria, portanto participa mais verdadeiramente da definição de natureza, isto é, que é princípio de movimento – a forma não parece ser um princípio passivo [...] 29 Enfim, por ser um princípio, a natureza (forma) é aquilo por força do qual um ente natural não pode ser diferente do que é. Uma vez que os entes naturais possuem um princípio, isto é, uma forma, segue-se que "natural é qualquer movido por um princípio nele próprio [...] o princípio a partir do qual é o eficiente". 30 Depois deste panorama dos principais argumentos contra e a favor do automovimento, Scotus passa a expor a opinião comum que defende o princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro". 29 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 4. 30 ARISTÓTELES. Física II, 193b 3-4. apud DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 4. 19 3 EXPOSIÇÃO DA OPINIÃO GERAL Scotus apresenta o princípio, segundo ele "universal", que afirma: "nada se move a não ser talvez em partes, isto é, que uma parte move outra, e esta não é uma parte essencial movendo outra, mas uma parte quantitativa movendo outra distinta segundo o lugar". 31 Em linhas gerais, podemos dizer que a opinião comum vê uma conexão necessária entre o todo seja de um ente, seja do universo e suas partes em todas as espécies de movimento e ação. Isso é afirmado porque as partes quantitativas de um todo são divisíveis em partes determinadas, as quais são distintas entre si e se encontram também em lugares distintos. Essa relação de interdependência entre as partes de um todo com vistas ao movimento é também denominada de princípio cinesiológico. Assim, em favor deste princípio, são apresentadas três razões alicerçadas na autoridade de Aristóteles. 3.1 Opinião geral e sua justificação A primeira razão é tirada da Física VII. 32 Lá Aristóteles diz que tudo que está em movimento tem que ser movido por algo. Porque se não tem em si mesmo o princípio de seu movimento, é evidente que é movido por outra coisa, portanto o que move terá que ser outra coisa. A fim de compreendermos esta passagem da Física, faz-se necessário considerar que o todo de algo é constituído por partes. Se algo, efetivamente, pudesse mover-se por si em primeiro lugar, isso evidenciaria a inutilidade das partes. Além disso, seríamos obrigados a admitir que, se todas as partes de um todo estivessem em repouso, o movimento do todo poderia não cessar. A título ilustrativo, podemos pensar num leão em movimento, correndo atrás de sua presa. Se admitirmos que o todo é capaz de mover-se por si em primeiro lugar, o leão (como um todo) deveria continuar em movimento, ainda que suas quatro patas parassem de agir. Se, porém, admitirmos que uma das partes do leão é capaz de causar o repouso do todo, isso significa que o todo não cessa seu movimento em função de seu todo, mas em função de uma de suas partes. Assim, a fim de que o leão retome o movimento, é necessário que uma das partes, por exemplo, uma das patas, cause o movimento do todo. Em outras palavras, para os 31 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 5. 32 ARISTÓTELES. Física VII, 241b 34-36. 20 antagonistas do automovimento, o todo de algo é necessariamente divisível em partes; se eu aceitar que todas as partes estão em repouso, logo o todo deve estar em repouso. A fim de que o todo seja movido, é necessário que pelo menos uma das partes ative o movimento do todo. Portanto, o mesmo não pode mover-se por si mesmo, mas é necessariamente movido por outro, ainda que este outro seja parte do mesmo. Enfim, podemos dizer que um dos motivos mais fortes pelo qual os adversários de Scotus recusam o automovimento encontra-se na seguinte contradição trazida em seu bojo: [a] é verdade que o todo de algo (o todo movido por si em primeiro lugar) repousa quando suas partes (as partes do todo) estão em repouso; [b] é verdade que o todo de algo não repousa (o todo movido por si em primeiro lugar) quando suas partes estão em repouso. Do mesmo modo que um número não pode ser simultaneamente par e ímpar, um ente também não pode simultaneamente repousar e não repousar com o repouso de suas partes. A segunda razão que sustenta a necessidade de uma parte que move outra, ou seja, o princípio que sustenta o movimento de algo a partir de outro, ainda que este outro seja uma parte quantitativa do mesmo, encontra-se na Física III, assim citada por Scotus: "o movente é sempre pensado como uma forma, assim como é o homem em ato que faz um homem a partir de uma potência". 33 Ora, para que o movente mova um movível, é necessário que o primeiro esteja em ato e o segundo em potência. O movente atualizado, isto é, em ato, sempre transmitirá algo de sua forma ao movível. Portanto, uma vez que um movível em potência não se atualiza por si mesmo, a relação entre ato e potência aponta para a impossibilidade de afirmarmos que algo pode mover-se por si mesmo. Se assim fosse, concluiríamos, de maneira absurda, que um homem em potência pode tornar-se ato de maneira espontânea e independente de outro homem em ato. Em outras palavras, um homem poderia nascer sem que necessariamente os pais o engendrassem. Ao mover o movível, o movente sempre transmitirá ao último algo de sua própria forma, por isso aquilo que a forma transmite ao movível é princípio e causa de movimento naquilo que é movido. Assim, o homem em ato (composto de matéria e forma) faz um homem a partir do que é potencialmente homem. A partir disso, podemos concluir que, se algo pudesse mover-se por si mesmo, ou seja, atualizar-se sem necessitar da comunicação de outro ente em ato, então, a distinção entre potência e ato seria inútil, visto que aquilo que se move por si mesmo estaria sempre em ato e nunca em potência. Tal posição soa de maneira um 33 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 7. Cf. ARISTÓTELES. Física III, 202a 9-12. Na edição de Barnes lê-se: "O movente sempre transmitirá uma forma [...] a qual será princípio e causa do movimento, por exemplo, um homem em ato engendra um homem a partir daquilo que é potencialmente homem" (tradução minha). 21 tanto absurda, pois isso seria o mesmo que dizer que a água em ato já é simultaneamente aquilo que ela é em potência, por exemplo: gelo ou vapor. Como é possível que algo já seja aquilo que ainda não é? Parece ser de comum acordo que a simples potencialidade de padecer uma mudança não significa que a mudança ocorra necessariamente. Para que uma mudança ocorra, é necessário que algo em ato atualize a potencialidade do movível. Assim, os movimentos de transladação, crescimento e diminuição, bem como os demais modos de alteração dependem necessariamente de algo em ato que os atualize. Em suma, se prescindirmos da comunicação de algo em ato, a passagem da potência ao ato torna-se impossível. A relação ato e potência, sob a ótica da posição comum, é assim sintetizada por Ribas Cezar: Ora, é impossível que o mesmo ente seja em ato e em potência simultaneamente, sob o mesmo aspecto, pois se ele é só potencialmente algo não pode ser atualmente a mesma coisa, e vice-versa. Logo, um ente não pode ser causa da mudança em si mesmo. 34 Como foi denotado, as noções de ato e potência sustentam a necessidade do movimento de algo a partir de outro. Desse modo, o movente move apenas na medida em que está em ato, ao passo que o movível é movido na medida em que está em potência. Por isso, tudo aquilo que está em ato só o está porque já esteve em potência a ser atualizada, com exceção de Deus. Todo corpo que se move, até mesmo o agente que executa o movimento, é movido por algo. Ora, tudo aquilo que está em potência de ser movido só pode ser movido por algo em ato. Portanto, o primeiro ente (Deus) deve estar necessariamente em ato, pois nada é levado da potência ao ato sem o concurso de um ente em ato. Em relação à atualidade absoluta do primeiro ente, é próprio este excerto de Tomás de Aquino: "[...] é impossível [...] a existência em Deus de algo em potência". 35 Quanto à relação ato e potência, os adversários de Scotus dizem: "Ora, é impossível que o mesmo seja simultaneamente em ato e potência segundo o mesmo". 36 Se admitíssemos que algo pudesse estar simultaneamente e sob o mesmo aspecto em ato e potência, o princípio de contradição seria ferido. Em outras palavras, incorreríamos em absurdos nos quais a negação e afirmação seriam simultâneas. Poderíamos dizer, por exemplo, que esta água é quente e ao mesmo tempo não é quente; que a semente de girassol é semente e não é semente, ou seja, que a semente de girassol é semente e girassol em ato. Portanto, devido a esta 34 RIBAS CEZAR, Cesar. SCOTUS E A LIBERDADE: textos escolhidos sobre a vontade, a felicidade e a lei natural. São Paulo: Loyola, 2010. p. 20. 35 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 3, a.1. São Paulo: Loyola, 2003. 36 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 7. 22 impossibilidade de se considerar que algo possa estar simultaneamente e sob o mesmo aspecto em ato e em potência, a tese em favor do automovimento não pode ser admitida. Além disso, a distinção entre agente e paciente corrobora a distinção das noções de ato e potência. Nesse sentido, apontando para um dos argumentos da opinião comum, escreve Scotus: "Isto se confirma, pois agente e paciente são contrários segundo o Da geração e corrupção I e o Da alma II". 37 Conforme a opinião comum, agente e paciente são contrários porque nenhum paciente pode mover-se por si mesmo. Desse modo, para que o paciente seja movido, é preciso que a atualidade do agente atualize a potência do paciente. Por exemplo, o oleoso, por si, não pode exercer a atividade de queimar sem que um agente ative esta potencialidade do óleo. Desse modo, é necessário que um agente como o calor ou o fogo ative a potencialidade de queimar daquilo que é oleoso. Por conseguinte, a distinção entre agente e paciente parece corroborar o princípio que diz que nada se move por si mesmo. A terceira razão que sustenta o princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro" fundamenta-se nas relações entre ativo e passivo. A relação entre ativo e passivo ou entre movente e móvel é uma relação real, pois o ativo se refere realmente ao passivo e o movente ao móvel. Para que a relação entre ativo e passivo seja real, não podemos prescindir de duas coisas realmente distintas. Ora, se o movente e o movível são realmente distintos, então precisam ser separados quanto ao lugar, visto que a parte movente de um todo, bem como sua parte movível, não podem ocupar o mesmo lugar. Portanto, considerando-se que o ativo e o passivo são distintos, por exemplo, o quente é uma coisa e qualquer aquecível relativo é outra, conclui-se que não há automovimento. Segundo Aristóteles, há uma relação real entre a potência ativa e a potência passiva. Nesse sentido, o Estagirita escreve: "[...] o que pode aquecer está em relação ao que pode ser aquecido segundo a potência, enquanto o que aquece está em relação ao que é aquecido e o que corta está em relação ao que é cortado segundo o ato". 38 A relação é real, pois a mudança é real. Ela ocorre na própria coisa e não só no intelecto que a percebe. Se a mudança é real, então a relação entre o que é ativo e o que é passivo na mudança também é real. Mas parece que só pode haver uma relação real entre duas coisas realmente distintas. Parece, portanto, que o ativo e o passivo são realmente distintos e que o mesmo não se move. Exceto nas relações reais em Deus. Lá o gerador (Pai) e o gerado (Filho), por exemplo, são o mesmo realmente, o que se explica pela infinidade. Nesse sentido, Scotus assim expressa a opinião comum: 37 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 8. 38 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica V, 1021a 15-18, tradução minha. 23 Ora, não parece que relações reais opostas possam estar fundamentadas em um único fundamento limitado. Com efeito, isto é atribuído à essência divina, pois, sendo ilimitada, pode ser fundamento de relações opostas; por isso etc. 39 3.2 Explicação dos casos concretos segundo a opinião geral Depois de expor a opinião comum e os argumentos em seu favor, Scotus passa a expor o ponto de vista da opinião comum acerca de vários tipos de movimentos. 3.2.1 Sobre os acidentes simultâneos É dito de modo universal que nada é efetivo de seu acidente, ainda que este acidente seja simultâneo. Desse modo, "[...] um sujeito não possui causalidade eficiente a respeito de sua afecção própria [...]". 40 Nota-se que, segundo a opinião comum, um supósito não pode produzir seu próprio acidente, pois a causa eficiente de seu acidente, ainda que este lhe seja simultâneo, deve ser encontrada em outra coisa distinta do próprio supósito. Dado que o pai, por exemplo, é a causa eficiente do filho, então todos os acidentes simultâneos do filho são produzidos pelo pai. Desse modo, a risibilidade, isto é, a capacidade de rir, a qual é um acidente concomitante ao sujeito que a possui, é engendrada no filho pelo pai; o último é a causa eficiente da risibilidade no filho. Para entender esta posição, Tomás de Aquino é exemplo. Segundo o Aquinate, existem três gêneros de acidentes: [a] os causados pelos princípios da espécie, ou seja, os acidentes tidos como próprios, por exemplo, a risibilidade é um acidente próprio do homem; [b] acidentes causados pelos princípios individuais, os quais se subdividem em duas classes: [1] aqueles que atuam como causa permanente em seus respectivos sujeitos, por exemplo, masculino e feminino – esses acidentes são inseparáveis do sujeito; [2] acidentes que não exercem uma causalidade permanente em seus sujeitos, por exemplo, sentar e andar – esses acidentes são separáveis do sujeito. 41 Outro exemplo de acidente simultâneo é a extensão do 39 DUNS SCOTUS, Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 9. 40 Ibid., § 10. 41 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Questões disputadas Sobre a alma. a. 12, § 7 (answers to objections). Tradução: John P. Rowan. St. Louis & London: B. Herder Book Co., 1949. Disponível em: < http://www.josephkenny.joyeurs.com/CDtexts/QDdeAnima.htm#12 > Acesso: em 01 março, 2012. 24 corpo. Portanto, no que diz respeito ao primeiro gênero de acidente acima explicado por Tomás de Aquino, da mesma maneira que o homem não é a causa eficiente da risibilidade, o corpo também não é a causa eficiente de sua extensão. Da mesma maneira que a risibilidade é concomitante ao homem, o intelecto e a vontade também são concomitantes à alma. Desse modo, quando a alma é criada, seus acidentes próprios ou simultâneos são necessariamente criados junto com a alma, pois a alma não pode existir sem essas faculdades. 42 Assim, podemos compreender que, enquanto a substância de algo finito existir, seu respectivo acidente próprio necessariamente coexistirá com a substância. Depois de expor a opinião comum acerca dos acidentes simultâneos, Scotus passa a tratar dos acidentes não simultâneos à luz da mesma opinião. 3.2.2 Acidentes não simultâneos O acidente não simultâneo é aquele que às vezes está presente, às vezes não. Este tipo de acidente pode aplicar-se tanto ao movimento como à mudança. Existem apenas três espécies de movimento: os que dizem respeito à qualidade, quantidade e lugar, os quais serão detalhados mais adiante. Um tipo de acidente não simultâneo é o induzido pelo ato apetitivo e cognitivo. 43 Assim, quando passo a conhecer algo que antes não conhecia, há mudança no intelecto, o que denota que o conhecimento adquirido é um acidente não simultâneo. O mesmo ocorre com a mudança apetitiva, ou seja, quando passo a querer algo que outrora não queria. A mudança de lugar é também um acidente não simultâneo, pois a própria definição de lugar diz que o lugar é "o limite do corpo continente, terminus corporis continentis: tal limite aparece, com efeito, como um invólucro independente do corpo e que, não sendo uma simples abstração, poderá entretanto ser dotada de propriedades reais". 44 Uma das propriedades reais do lugar é a de ser imóvel. Assim, quando um corpo muda de lugar, o lugar em que antes se encontrava não é transportado junto com o corpo para o outro lugar no qual o 42 EFFLER, 1962, p. 98, 99. 43 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 11. 44 GARDEIL, H. D. Iniciação à Filosofia de S. Tomás de Aquino. Segunda parte: Cosmologia. Versão em pdf disponível em: <www.dcoi.org/03d/sinedata,_Gardeil._HD,_Iniciacao_A_Filosofia_de_S._Tomas_de_Aquino,_PT.pdf>. Acesso em 12 out. 2012. p. 479. 25 corpo agora se encontra. Desse modo, o "onde", ou seja, o lugar, sempre será um acidente não simultâneo no que diz respeito ao movimento de algo. Enfim, os acidentes não simultâneos são separáveis do sujeito porquanto não exercem uma causalidade permanente em seus respectivos sujeitos. Diz-se, por exemplo, que o estar sentado ou levantado, ou, então, o ser músico são acidentes não simultâneos ao homem. Depois de abordar sucintamente a posição da opinião comum acerca dos acidentes não simultâneos, Scotus passa a tratar dos acidentes não simultâneos em particular; primeiramente, o movimento dos corpos leves e graves à luz da mesma opinião. 3.2.2.1 Acerca do movimento nos corpos leves e graves Segundo Aristóteles, nada pode ter a fonte de seu movimento em si mesmo, pois aquilo que se encontra em movimento deve necessariamente ser movido por algo outro distinto de si. Por isso, a distinção entre movente e movido sempre será feita. Em outras palavras, sempre que um ser particular estiver em movimento, esse movimento deve ser continuamente causado por outro. 45 Considerando-se os corpos leves e graves, pode-se dizer que há movimentos violentos e naturais. O movimento natural de um corpo grave é descendente e o movimento natural de um corpo leve é ascendente. O inverso do movimento natural é o movimento violento, por exemplo, quando arremessamos uma pedra para o alto. É patente que o movimento violento de um grave requer uma causa externa, visto que é impossível dizer que o movimento ascendente de uma pedra é causado por ela mesma. No entanto, considerando-se o movimento natural dos leves e graves, o próprio Aristóteles reconhece que há uma dificuldade em se estabelecer a origem do movimento natural, pois diz: [...] quando em movimento para seus lugares próprios – o leve para cima e o pesado para baixo – o movimento é natural; mas de onde o movimento natural é derivado não é tão evidente quanto o movimento não natural. É impossível dizer que o movimento dos leves e dos graves deriva deles próprios, visto que isso é uma característica peculiar das coisas vivas. 46 Convém lembrarmo-nos de que na filosofia aristotélica as coisas movem-se em busca de seu fim último, em outras palavras, as coisas "possuem um terminus ad quem para o qual 45 EFFLER, 1969, p. 2. 46 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 255a 4-7, tradução minha. 26 naturalmente dirigem-se para repousar". 47 Assim, o movimento ascendente e descendente dos elementos terrestres e de seus compostos, bem como a mudança qualitativa e quantitativa dos animais e plantas, são movimentos que se dão em virtude de seus respectivos fins. De certa forma, esses movimentos e mudanças iniciam-se pelo interior dos mesmos. Todavia, quando se analisa o movimento dessas coisas, observa-se que a impulsão aparente do movimento não é um impulso real, ou seja, um impulso que efetivamente se origina a partir do interior das coisas. O impulso que origina o movimento não se dá a partir do interior dos entes por dois motivos: [1] o movimento local dos animais pode ser justificado por causa do apetite sensível, desse modo, o animal se move por causa de agentes externos que produzem sensações e desejos em suas almas, por exemplo, a comida; [2] os movimentos naturais dos corpos inanimados são iniciados por si próprios, no entanto, isso se dá acidentalmente em virtude de algo que remove algum tipo de obstáculo que impedia seu respectivo movimento. Além disso, uma vez removido o impedimento, a causa de seu movimento é atribuída ao próprio agente gerador do corpo. Presume-se que a causa geradora dos corpos leves e graves são os contrários primordiais: quente e frio, "os quais são os princípios operativos na produção de corpos leves a partir dos pesados, ou de pesados a partir dos leves". 48 Portanto, é dito que os corpos inanimados "possuem em si próprios um princípio de ser movido, mas não um princípio de motricidade". 49 O princípio cinesiológico diz que o movimento de algo é sempre derivado a partir de outro, ainda que esse outro seja parte do mesmo. Desse modo, para que ocorra o movimento, o agente deve necessariamente estar em contato com o paciente. Pode-se dizer que algo está em contato quando as extremidades de duas partes distintas estão no mesmo lugar imediato. 50 Nesse sentido, para Aristóteles, o que explica a continuação do movimento ascendente de um projétil lançado para o alto é o meio no qual esse o projétil se encontra. Desse modo, o movente original não apenas transmite movimento ao projétil, mas também transmite esse poder de mover ao meio. Assim, enquanto o projétil ascende, a força aplicada é continuamente retransmitida às mais altas camadas de ar, permanecendo o agente em contato com o paciente. Se isso de fato ocorrer, o princípio do movimento é preservado e nenhum movimento intrínseco é atribuído ao projétil. 51 47 ROSS, Sir David. Aristóteles. Lisboa: D. Quixote, 1987, p. 75. 48 Ibid., p. 76. 49 Ibid., p. 76. Aquilo que possui o princípio de motricidade é efetivamente capaz de iniciar o movimento. 50 Sobre as noções de contato, continuidade, contiguidade e sucessão, ver: ARISTÓTELES. Física V 226b 20227b 1. 51 EFFLER, 1962, p. 3. 27 Se o movimento dos corpos leves e graves fosse derivado deles próprios, então eles próprios poderiam também interromper o movimento. Desse modo, se o movimento ascendente do fogo não fosse causado por algo distinto dele mesmo, então ele próprio poderia subir ou descer. Além disso, se as coisas se movessem por si mesmas, seria um tanto estranho supor que o movimento derivado delas mesmas restringir-se-ia a apenas um tipo de movimento. Como é possível que algo absolutamente contínuo e unificado como uma pedra possa mover a si mesmo? Somente das coisas que são divididas em partes é possível dizer que uma parte é por natureza ativa e a outra é passiva. Dado que os leves e graves são indivisíveis, logo é impossível dizer que há neles uma parte ativa. Portanto, nem o leve, nem o grave podem se mover por si mesmos. 52 Quanto a isso, o Filósofo escreve: "Portanto, nenhumas dessas coisas se movem por si mesmas (porque são naturalmente unificadas) [...], em cada caso, o movente deve ser separado [distinguido] do movido, como é o caso das coisas inanimadas quando movidas por seres animados". 53 Após expor a posição comum acerca do movimento dos corpos leves e graves, Scotus passa a expor a mesma opinião no que diz respeito aos animais moventes. 3.2.2.2 Sobre os animais moventes Antes de aprofundar a explicação de Aristóteles sobre o movimento dos animais, citada por Scotus, convém esclarecer que o princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro" não é contraditório, embora à primeira vista pareça ser, quando analisamos o movimento dos animais. O automovimento dos animais é um fato incontestável da experiência. Testemunhamos na natureza instâncias de coisas que parecem ter em si mesmas o princípio do movimento: o crescimento das plantas e animais, bem como o contínuo deslocamento de lugar para lugar dos últimos. Convém, porém, salientar que os próprios oponentes da tese do automovimento, defendida por Scotus, não negam que no âmbito da experiência ordinária muitas coisas são capazes de se mover por elas mesmas. Tomás de Aquino, por exemplo, define a vida em termos de automovimento, pois diz: 52 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 255a 7-15. 53 Ibid., 255a 15-18. 28 Com efeito, dizemos que, por primeiro, um animal vive, quando começa a mover-se por si próprio, e julgamos que vive tanto tempo quanto o movimento nele aparece. Quando, pelo contrário, já não tem por si mesmo movimento algum, mas é apenas movido por outro, dizemos que está morto, por falta de vida. 54 Para o Doutor Angélico, porém, o automovimento que conhecemos por meio da experiência comum, se considerado em seu nível mais elementar, leva-nos fundamentalmente a uma divisão de partes, isto é, a uma parte movente e outra parte movida. Desse modo, a alma é a parte movente da parte cujo movimento se dá passivamente, ou seja, do corpo. Quanto a isso, escreve o Aquinate: "Assim, por essa força motora, a alma é a parte que move, e o corpo animado é a parte que é movida". 55 Aristóteles indica, também, que aquilo que produz o movimento do corpo encontra-se separado do corpo, pois diz: 56 Poderia parecer que nos animais, assim como nas embarcações e coisas constituídas de modo não natural, aquilo que causa o movimento é separado daquilo que padece o movimento, e que só nesse sentido o animal como um todo causa seu próprio movimento. Apesar de não negar o automovimento dos animais no campo da experiência comum, o Doutor Angélico sustenta, no âmbito metafísico, que o automovimento dos animais que percebemos na experiência cotidiana divide-se fundamentalmente em duas partes: [a] parte movente; [b] parte movida. Na primeira via da prova da existência de Deus, Tomás de Aquino também expressa sua posição no que concerne à questão do movimento, pois o Aquinate escreve: Nossos sentidos atestam, com toda certeza, que neste mundo algumas coisas se movem. Ora, tudo o que se move é movido por outro. Nada se move que não esteja em potência em relação ao termo de seu movimento; ao contrário, o que move o faz enquanto se encontra em ato. Mover nada mais é, portanto, do que levar algo da potência ao ato, e nada pode ser levado ao ato senão por um ente em ato. Como algo quente em ato, por exemplo o fogo, torna a madeira que está em potência para o calor, quente em ato, e assim a move e altera. Ora, não é possível que a mesma coisa, considerada sob o mesmo aspecto, esteja simultaneamente em ato e em potência, a não ser sob aspectos diversos: por exemplo, o que está quente em ato não pode estar simultaneamente quente em potência, mas está frio em potência. É impossível que sob o mesmo aspecto e do mesmo modo algo seja motor e movido, ou que mova a si próprio. É preciso que tudo o que se move seja movido por outro. Assim, se o que se move é também movido, o é necessariamente por outro, e este por outro ainda. 57 Podemos entender o excerto acima, quando Tomás de Aquino diz: "é impossível que sob o mesmo aspecto e do mesmo modo algo seja motor e movido, ou que mova a si próprio", 54 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 18, a. 1, Respondeo. São Paulo: Loyola, 2003. 55 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 76, a. 4, Ad Secundum. São Paulo: Loyola, 2005. 56 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 254b 29-31. 57 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 2, a. 3, grifo meu. 29 à luz de Aristóteles. Em sua Física VIII, 58 Aristóteles diz que, em comparação com as coisas que estão em movimento contra a natureza, por exemplo o grave que ascende, fica mais claro observar que as coisas que estão em movimento segundo a natureza movem-se por si mesmas, como é o caso dos animais. No entanto, nas coisas que se movem segundo a natureza não há dúvida de que esse movimento é derivado de algo. A dificuldade, porém, se dá em distinguirmos qual parte é movente e qual parte é movida. Por isso, é impossível que a parte movente, a qual se encontra num lugar distinto da parte movida, seja simultaneamente e sob o mesmo aspecto aquilo que ela não é, ou seja, a parte movida e vice-versa. Na primeira via da prova da existência de Deus acima mencionada, nota-se que Tomás de Aquino aponta para a impossibilidade de que algo, considerado sob o mesmo aspecto e do mesmo modo, seja motor e movido. No entanto, Tomás de Aquino não parece negar uma espécie de automovimento quando o mesmo se move segundo aspectos e modos diversos. O Aquinate diz, por exemplo, que uma mesma coisa, sob aspectos distintos, pode ser causa e causada em relação a si mesma: a saúde é a causa do caminhar (causa final) e ao mesmo tempo é causada pelo próprio caminhar (causa eficiente). Desse modo, a saúde é simultaneamente causa final e causa eficiente. Ao comentar sobre as relações entre as causas entre si, Tomás de Aquino escreve: [...] não é impossível que uma mesma coisa seja causa e causada, com relação a si mesma, embora segundo modos distintos: o caminhar, enquanto tal, é causa eficiente da saúde, mas, a saúde, enquanto tal, é causa final do caminhar: com efeito, o caminhar é, de algum modo, por causa da saúde. 59 Uma vez dado este breve panorama acerca da posição geral sobre o movimento, convém analisarmos as obras de Aristóteles que Scotus aborda nas Questões sobre a metafísica. O Doutor Sutil indica que, para a opinião comum: "[...] os animais se movem progressivamente somente porque uma parte move outra [...]". 60 Nesse sentido, Scotus remete a uma passagem da Físíca VIII 61 , na qual entende-se que os animais, diferentemente das coisas contínuas e homogêneas, são constituídos por partes heterogêneas. Segundo Aristóteles, "[...] é somente na medida em que algo é dividido em partes que uma parte é por natureza ativa e a outra passiva". 62 58 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 254b 25-29. 59 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Os princípios da natureza. cap. IV, § 3. In: Opúsculos filosóficos. v. 1. Tradução de: Paulo Faitanin. São Paulo: Sita, 2009. p. 109. 60 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 14. 61 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 255a 1-15. 62 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 255a 14-15. 30 Além da divisão em partes, o movimento dos animais também se justifica por diversas causas exteriores. Segundo o Filósofo, os animais movem a si próprios no que diz respeito a um único modo de movimento, o qual não é rigorosamente originado por eles. Além dos movimentos vegetativos dos quais os animais não são a causa, há também os movimentos causados pelo meio no qual os animais se encontram. Ademais, os alimentos que nutrem e possibilitam todos os movimentos vitais dos animais são oriundos da exterioridade, ou seja, de outro. 63 Uma vez que o movimento local dos animais é causado por seus respectivos objetos, isto é, bens do conhecimento sensível ou bens dos apetites, logo esse tipo de movimento é o último que ocorre nas coisas que vêm a ser. Desse modo, pode-se dizer que uma criatura viva é movida por alguma espécie de desejo ou propósito. Portanto, ao considerarmos a série causal, o movimento local é a última etapa a ser considerada. 64 Quanto a isso, escreve Aristóteles: Eu quero beber, diz o apetite; isto é bebida, diz ou o sentido; ou a imaginação; ou o pensamento: imediatamente bebo. É dessa maneira que as criaturas são impelidas para mover e agir. O desejo é a última causa do movimento, pois surge ou por meio da percepção; ou da imaginação ou do pensamento. 65 Enfim, quanto ao movimento local dos animais, podemos dizer que a posição geral sustenta que esse movimento é necessariamente subdividido em duas partes, ou seja, uma parte que move de modo ativo e outra parte que é movida de modo passivo. Uma vez que os animais são compostos de partes heterogêneas, logo, é impossível que o todo do animal se mova por si mesmo enquanto suas partes não se movem. Vale lembrar aqui que, segundo os antagonistas de Scotus, se não admitirmos a divisão do movimento dos animais em parte ativa e parte passiva, teremos a seguinte contradição: [a] é verdade que o cavalo (o todo movido por si em primeiro lugar) repousa quando suas partes, por exemplo as patas, estão em repouso; [b] é verdade que o cavalo não repousa (o todo movido por si em primeiro lugar) quando suas partes, por exemplo as patas, estão em repouso. Considerando-se o salto de um sapo, podemos dizer que o pulo consiste em dois movimentos: [a] o movimento que empurra o todo a partir das patas, ou seja, o impulso das partes inferiores do sapo; [b] o movimento da parte empurrada que puxa para cima as partes inferiores do sapo. De certa forma, a parte inferior do animal empurra ou exerce uma força contra a parte superior e move o sapo. Por outro lado, a parte superior puxa a parte inferior 63 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 259b 5-10. 64 ARISTÓTELES. O movimento dos animais, 700b 23 701a 5. 65 Ibid., 701a 33-35, tradução minha. 31 junto com ela. Esse contínuo processo de empurrar a parte superior e puxar a parte inferior é o que denota o salto. Uma serpente que rasteja no chão nos dá um exemplo evidente de partes distintas que continuamente empurram e puxam. Portanto, evoca-se, em geral, a distinção entre as partes que empurram e puxam para explicar o movimento local dos animais. 66 Após tratar sobre o movimento dos animais moventes à luz da opinião geral, Scotus passa a apresentar a mudança quantitativa à luz da mesma opinião. 3.2.2.3 Mudança quantitativa Segundo a opinião comum, nenhum corpo vivo é capaz de aumentar sua massa ou tamanho por si mesmo. Para que o aumento de tamanho ocorra num corpo vivo, é necessário que ocorra a ingestão de outro corpo. Em outras palavras, ao prescindir do alimento, nenhum corpo vivo é capaz de aumentar sua massa. Ao digerir seu alimento, o boi cresce e fica mais forte. Por isso, temos a impressão de que todas as partes do animal foram ativas em seu desenvolvimento. Contudo, segundo Godofredo de Fontaines, conferir a atividade de crescimento exclusivamente ao boi como um todo é algo típico da experiência ordinária. Para ele, tanto a nutrição quanto o crescimento dos animais dissolve-se em duas partes, as quais são ocultas aos nossos sentidos. 67 É de comum acordo que, se um animal comesse pedras, as partes do animal que são responsáveis por obter o nutriente dos alimentos nada produziriam. Se assim fosse, o animal seria absolutamente ativo em sua nutrição. Porém, o que distingue o alimento de outras coisas é o fato de que o alimento tem uma capacidade de alimentar substâncias animadas. Desse modo, apenas algumas coisas são consideradas comida em virtude de sua capacidade de nutrição. Ora, se apenas aquilo que é comestível tem a capacidade de nutrir, logo a relação do alimento com o animal não é acidental, mas antes se trata de uma relação causal. 68 Conforme Aristóteles, a comida possui dois poderes distintos: [a] o poder de aumentar a massa de um corpo animado; [b] o poder de preservar a substância, ou seja, o poder de nutrição. Além disso, ao tratar da alimentação do corpo animado, a voz passiva predomina no que diz respeito ao corpo, pois assim o Filósofo escreve: 66 EFFLER, 1962, p. 129. 67 Ibid., p.134. 68 EVERSON, Stephen. "Psychology." In: The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle. Editado por Jonathan Barnes. Cambridge University Press: New York, 1995. p. 176. 32 Uma vez que nada exceto o que é vivo pode ser alimentado, o que é alimentado é o corpo animado e somente porque ele tem uma alma. Portanto, a comida está essencialmente relacionada com aquilo que tem alma. A comida tem um poder, o qual é distinto do poder de aumentar a massa do que é alimentado por ela, pois na medida em que algo animado tem tamanho, a comida pode aumentar sua quantidade, mas somente na medida em que aquilo que tem alma é algo particular ou uma substância é que a comida age enquanto comida; nesse caso ela mantém o ser daquilo que é alimentado, e o último continua a ser aquilo que é, apenas se o processo de nutrição continuar. Além disso, [a comida] é o agente na geração, isto é, não da geração do indivíduo nutrido, [...], [pois] a substância do indivíduo nutrido já existe; nada gera a si próprio, mas apenas se mantém. 69 Dessa forma, podemos dizer que o crescimento é o movimento que ocorre na categoria da quantidade; a nutrição, porém, é o movimento que ocorre na categoria da substância. 70 No que diz respeito à nutrição, há fatores que apontam para uma interdependência de causas que parecem realizar a mesma finalidade por meio de uma coadjuvação recíproca. Após os vários processos de purificação do alimento, passagens pelos vasos sanguíneos etc., podemos dizer que os nutrientes estão contíguos à parte do corpo que requer nutrição. Em seguida, a parte do corpo que está carente de algo converte a comida em carne viva, em outras palavras, o nutriente e a parte nutrida tornam-se uma unidade. No entanto, a parte carente só poderá agir se todas as outras partes estiverem funcionando harmonicamente. Nesse sentido, há uma interdependência entre as partes do corpo. Se afirmo que as partes do corpo não são interdependentes, então, os rins de um corpo continuariam agindo, ainda que todo o resto do corpo esteja morto. Portanto, ainda que eu admita que um órgão seja ativo em sua nutrição, tal atividade depende da relação da causalidade com as outras partes. Segundo Aristóteles, o processo de nutrição envolve três fatores: [a] aquilo que é alimentado; [b] aquilo por meio do qual algo é alimentado; [c] aquilo que é a causa eficiente da alimentação, ou seja, a alma vegetativa. Dentre esses, aquilo que alimenta é a alma vegetativa; o que é alimentado é o corpo que tem uma alma; e aquilo por meio do qual o corpo é alimentado é a comida. De qualquer forma, Aristóteles reconhece uma ambiguidade na expressão "aquilo por meio do qual algo é alimentado", pois o meio pelo qual algo pode ser alimentado pode ser tanto o alimento quanto aquilo que age sobre o alimento. 71 Uma vez que a nutrição envolve três fatores, parece que não podemos afirmar que algo seja o eficiente 69 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma II, 416b 10-15, tradução minha. 70 GERSON, Lloyd P. Aristotle Critical Assessments. v. 1. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 1999, p. 366. Disponível em: < http://books.google.com.br/books?id=FgG4MQEACAAJ&dq=aristotle+critical+assessment&hl=ptBR&sa=X&ei=2GrYUKLXMdDI0AGd_4CIDQ&ved=0CEIQ6AEwA >. Acesso em: 11 mar. 2012. 71 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma II, 416b 20-30. 33 absoluto de sua nutrição, pois, se assim fosse, os corpos vivos se nutririam sem a necessidade do alimento. Outro argumento que sustenta a passividade do aumento quantitativo repousa na autoridade de Aristóteles. Fundamentando-se no Da alma II, os protagonistas do princípio do movimento dizem: "[...] o alimento nutre enquanto potência substancial, mas aumenta enquanto potência quantitativa; logo, o que aumenta é aumentado pela quantidade de alimento". 72 Depois de estabelecer o pensamento da opinião geral acerca da mudança quantitativa, Scotus passa a abordar, sob a ótica da mesma opinião, a mudança qualitativa. 3.2.2.4 Mudança qualitativa O primeiro exemplo de mudança qualitativa ilustrada por Scotus diz respeito às qualidades quente e frio. Ao referir-se à posição comum, escreve ele: "[...] que nem a água quente se torna fria efetivamente [...]". É importante ressaltarmos que a noção de quente e frio dos antigos e dos medievais é distinta da concepção moderna de temperatura, na qual o frio é privação de calor e vice-versa. Para Aristóteles, por exemplo, as qualidades quente e frio eram qualidades sensíveis reais. Por isso, o conjunto dos dados qualitativos, tais como são percebidos pelos sentidos, tinha uma realidade objetiva. 73 Dado que o quente e o frio possuíam realidades objetivas, então uma qualidade agia sobre outra e por meio dessa ação ocorria a mudança qualitativa. Quando a água quente, por exemplo, esfriava, isso era justificado em virtude da ação de outra qualidade que era o seu oposto, o frio. Do mesmo modo, quando algo que estava frio esquentava, isso era justificado por meio da ação de uma realidade qualitativamente oposta ao frio, o quente. Entrando no campo da geração dos seres vivos, os adversários de Scotus consideram uma evidente relação causal entre as sementes. Tanto a semente do macho quanto a da fêmea nada produzem isoladamente, pois, assim como o artífice age sobre a madeira, é necessário que uma semente aja sobre outra. 74 Segundo Aristóteles, o sangue menstrual é uma espécie de 72 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 57. 73 GARDEIL, H. D. Iniciação à Filosofia de S. Tomás de Aquino. Segunda parte: Cosmologia. Versão em pdf disponível em: <www.dcoi.org/03d/sinedata,_Gardeil._HD,_Iniciacao_A_Filosofia_de_S._Tomas_de_Aquino,_PT.pdf>. p. 406. 74 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 16. 34 sêmen, mas não se trata de um sêmen puro, pois o sangue menstrual só produz a geração por meio de sua mistura com o sêmen do macho. 75 Por outro lado, no caso das plantas, não há duas sementes que agem entre si. No entanto, atribui-se à semente duas partes distintas quanto ao lugar. Desse modo, a parte ativa da semente é distinta da parte passiva, visto que ambas as partes da semente ocupam lugares diferentes. Além disso, há uma relação da semente com o lugar no qual ela se encontra. Se a semente encontrar-se em solo fértil, tanto o solo agirá sobre a semente quanto a semente sobre o solo. Contudo, sem estar justaposta ao solo, a semente de uma planta por si mesma é estéril. Considerando-se tanto a mudança qualitativa quanto a quantitativa, nota-se necessariamente uma relação de interdependência entre duas ou mais partes distintas. Portanto, parece que nada é capaz de mover-se por si mesmo. Logo, depois de sucintamente apresentar a posição geral acerca das mudanças qualitativas, o Doutor Sutil passa expor o pensamento da posição comum sobre a mudança cognitiva. 3.2.2.5 Mudança cognitiva Segundo esta opinião, assim como os sentidos são passivos diante de seus objetos, o intelecto também é uma potência passiva. 76 A parte pensante da alma, ou seja, o intelecto deve ser capaz de receber a forma de um objeto à qual corresponda o ser do próprio objeto. 77 Nesse sentido, o intelecto é uma potência de receber formas. Por isso, no que diz respeito à cognição, os adversários de Scotus sustentam que nela não há nenhum princípio ativo, pois as afecções cognitivas se dão, ao menos para alguns, por meio de objetos externos. Na esfera da cognição, vemos que a relação entre agente e paciente permanece. Quanto a isso, assim Scotus reporta a opinião comum: "[...] o conhecimento se dá por assemelhação do cognoscente ao conhecido. Logo, neste caso, o agente é aquilo em relação ao qual se dá a assemelhação, pois o agente assemelha a si o passivo [...]". 78 Tal afirmação que sustenta que o agente torna o paciente semelhante a si está calcada na Geração e Corrupção I, 79 onde o Estagirita escreve: "Nós podemos entender, agora, por que o fogo aquece e a coisa gelada esfria, e em geral por que o agente torna semelhante a si o paciente". O ponto de vista 75 ARISTÓTELES. Geração dos animais I, 728a 25-30. 76 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, §§ 17, 18. 77 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma, III 429a 13-15. 78 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 19. 79 ARISTÓTELES. Sobre a geração e corrupção I, 324a 10-11. 35 aristotélico expressa que, quando o agente age no paciente, o primeiro de alguma forma torna o último semelhante a ele. Quando o fogo (agente), por exemplo, age sobre a madeira (paciente), o fogo torna a madeira semelhante a ele. Da mesma maneira, o objeto conhecido torna o intelecto do cognoscente semelhante ao objeto conhecido. Podemos dizer, por exemplo, que a cognição intuitiva é a apreensão de um objeto em sua existência concreta e atual. De fato, os objetos sensíveis são imaterialmente e imediatamente apreendidos pelo intelecto. 80 Contudo, podemos nos indagar: o intelecto é ativo ou passivo no processo cognitivo? Pois bem, segundo Aristóteles, "a alma é de certo modo todas as coisas". 81 Se isso for considerado literalmente, é necessário que a alma sejam as próprias coisas, sejam elas sensíveis ou inteligíveis. Ora, é impossível que a alma seja o próprio objeto intuído, pois, ao intuirmos uma pedra, é evidente que este objeto não se encontra dentro de nós. Portanto, "não é a pedra que está presente na alma, mas a sua forma". 82 Uma vez que os sentidos encontram-se em potência para receber as espécies sensíveis, o intelecto também se encontra em potência para receber as espécies inteligíveis, logo, tanto os sentidos quanto o intelecto são passivos em seus respectivos atos. Isso parece ficar mais claro ao considerarmos as palavras de Tomás de Aquino: Deve-se dizer que Aristóteles não afirmou, como os antigos naturalistas, que a alma fosse atualmente composta de todas as coisas, mas disse: „A alma é de certa maneira todas as coisas, enquanto está em potência para conhecê-las todas‟. As coisas sensíveis pelos sentidos, as inteligíveis pelo intelecto. 83 Após apresentar a posição geral sobre a mudança cognitiva, Scotus passa a tratar da mudança apetitiva sob a ótica da opinião comum. 3.2.2.6 Mudança apetitiva Em seu comentário sobre o banho, Averróis sustenta que a forma do banho que está na mente daquele que deseja banhar-se é a causa eficiente. Em outras palavras, é a presença desta forma na mente que faz com que o banhista vá banhar-se. Por outro lado, o banho em si 80 EFFLER, 1962, p. 147. 81 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma III, 431b 20. 82 Ibid., 431b 29. 83 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica Ia, q. 84, a. 2. Ad secundum. 36 mesmo é a causa final. 84 Desse modo, podemos inferir que a causa final, ou seja, o banho em si mesmo é o bem imóvel. Já a causa eficiente, isto é, a forma do banho na mente do banhista, simultaneamente move e é movida pela causa final. Assim, o que verdadeiramente produz o movimento é a causa final. Todo movimento envolve três fatores: [a] aquilo que origina o movimento; [b] aquilo por meio do qual o movimento é originado; [c] aquilo que é movido. A sentença "aquilo que origina o movimento" é ambígua porque ou remete a um objeto que em si mesmo é imóvel, por exemplo, uma maçã, ou remete a algo que simultaneamente move e é movido, por exemplo, um homem que busca a maçã. A faculdade que move e simultaneamente é movida denomina-se apetite, o qual é movido na medida em que deseja. 85 Portanto, o bem atual é considerado movente imóvel, mas o apetite é ao mesmo tempo movente e movido. Por fim, tendo como referência a opinião geral, podemos dizer que, se o conhecimento fosse produzido pelo próprio intelecto e a volição fosse produzida pela própria vontade, ou seja, o primeiro sem o concurso do cognoscível e o segundo sem o concurso do apetecível, então o intelecto e a vontade sempre produziriam conhecimento e volição por si mesmos, isto é, sem a necessidade de outro. Portanto, conhecer e apetecer são acidentes não simultâneos do intelecto e da vontade. Por conseguinte, é dito que "em relação a tais acidentes não parece que o sujeito por si esteja determinado e, assim, não parece ser causa suficiente deles". 86 Depois de expor a opinião comum acerca dos diversos movimentos, Scotus passa a expor a sua posição sobre o princípio geral. 84 MARENBON. John. Medieval Philosopy An historical and philosophical introduction. New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2007, p. 184. Disponível em: < http://books.google.com.br/books?id=o9dOkxxZFowC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Medieval+Philosophy+An+hi storical+and+philosophical+introduction&hl=pt-BR# >. Acesso em: 20 mar. 2012. 85 ARISTÓTELES. Da alma III, 433b 12-15. 86 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 20. 37 4 POSIÇÃO DE SCOTUS SOBRE O PRINCÍPIO GERAL Depois de expor a opinião comum e suas explicações, Scotus passa a expor a posição contrária àquela tese universal negativa, isto é, a de que nada se move por si mesmo. O Doutor Sutil afirma que, em geral, não é contraditório pensar que algo possa agir em si. Por isso, a partir de agora, mostrar-se-á em geral que algo pode agir em si, o que é o contraditório daquela tese universal. Em seguida, mostrar-se-á em quais casos especiais a tese defendida por Scotus, ou seja, a tese particular em favor do automovimento, é verdadeira. 4.1 Posição de Scotus e sua justificação Um dos problemas de se afirmar que tudo que se move é movido por outro repousa na necessidade de distinção entre ativo e passivo. Aparentemente, segundo esse critério, nada pode ser simultaneamente ativo e passivo em relação ao próprio ato. Desse modo, infere-se que o ativo é uma coisa e o passivo é outra coisa. Mas se a coisa ativa nada padece, ou seja, se é exclusivamente ativa, então não é verdade que a coisa pode se mover, visto que o ativo apenas age e não padece o movimento. Scotus mostra que é possível uma mesma coisa ser ativa e passiva em relação ao mesmo. Ele afirma que um ativo qualquer pode ativar uma gama de passivos, ou seja, um ativo qualquer não se restringe a um único passivo. Do mesmo modo, um passivo pode ser determinado por uma gama de agentes e não exclusivamente por um. 87 Por exemplo, uma fogueira, enquanto agente, pode aquecer uma pessoa, esquentar o chá, assar um pedaço de carne etc. Uma pessoa, bem como o chá e a carne assada, enquanto pacientes, podem padecer o aquecimento por meio de diversos ativos. Ora, se um aquecedor, como a fogueira, pode aquecer vários passivos, não parece ser contraditório que o aquecedor seja ele mesmo seu próprio passivo particular. Em outras palavras, não é contraditório pensar que um aquecedor seja ativo e passivo em relação a ele mesmo. Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: "Logo, ele enquanto ativo tem a si mesmo como objeto enquanto passivo do mesmo modo que qualquer outro; logo, pode agir em si, como em outro". 88 87 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 24. 88 Ibid., § 24. 38 Convém ressaltar que Scotus não está defendendo que as coisas possam ser ativas e passivas em relação a sua própria existência. Em outras palavras, Scotus não admite que um cavalo possa surgir do nada. Todavia, Scotus sustenta que as noções de ativo e passivo não devem ser necessariamente atribuídas a duas coisas distintas. Em outras palavras, não há nada que possa nos impedir de pensar que uma única coisa possa ser ativa e passiva em relação a sua própria perfeição. Aliás, aquilo que é simultaneamente agente e paciente, ou seja, aquilo que é, ao mesmo tempo, causa e efeito, não se restringe ao campo do pensamento, podendo ser real. A possibilidade de automovimento pode ser mostrada em alguns fatos da experiência. O fogo, por exemplo, sempre apresenta o movimento ascendente. Essa tendência que o fogo tem para subir é conhecida como leveza, cuja forma é inerente ao próprio fogo. A permanência constante dessa forma inerente ao próprio fogo justifica seu invariável movimento ascendente. Uma vez que o fogo não pode surgir do nada, é necessário admitir uma causa geradora do fogo a qual possui a forma da leveza e, a partir do momento em que a forma da leveza é recebida pelo fogo, o próprio fogo é causa de seu movimento ascendente. No entanto, sob a ótica do Doutor Sutil, admitir uma causa geradora do fogo não implica admitir que a mesma causa geradora produza algo além do próprio fogo, isto é, a leveza. Por outros termos, Scotus está querendo dizer que não podemos afirmar a priori que a leveza do fogo é produzida pelo seu agente gerador, pois é possível pensar que, a partir do momento em que a forma do fogo é recebida, o próprio fogo seja causa eficiente de seu movimento ascendente, e não seu agente gerador, cuja ação limitar-se-ia à produção da forma fogo, e não da leveza. Por isso, é dito que não há nenhuma causa oculta além do próprio fogo que faça com que o fogo seja leve e ascenda. Enfim, podemos dizer que o fogo é em si mesmo ativo e passivo de seu movimento ascendente porque o próprio fogo produz a leveza e ele mesmo sofre o efeito dessa leveza produzida de maneira simultânea. Portanto, o fogo se move por si mesmo. 89 O automovimento exige que o mesmo seja ativo e passivo em referência à própria perfeição. As coisas capazes de movimento eficiente devem ser dotadas de um poder ativo que seja capaz de causar alguma perfeição que elas próprias sejam capazes de receber. Quando privada de sua fonte de aquecimento, a água aquecida, por exemplo, é simultaneamente agente e paciente de seu resfriamento, pois, enquanto agente, não há nada além da própria água que provoque seu resfriamento. Portanto, a água é capaz de esfriar-se 89 EFFLER, 1962, p. 40. 39 por si mesma porque é simultaneamente princípio ativo e passivo de sua alteração. 90 Cabe ressaltar aqui que na física medieval a frieza é uma qualidade intrínseca da água. Uma das objeções com relação ao automovimento eficiente, levantada por Godofredo de Fontaines, é assim expressa por Scotus: "[...] o agente deve ser aproximado ao passivo e, portanto, ser distinto quanto à posição; logo, algo não pode se referir a si mesmo desta maneira". 91 Apoiando-se na autoridade de Aristóteles, Godofredo de Fontaines sustenta que o princípio ativo deve estar suficientemente próximo ao princípio passivo sobre o qual ele atuará. Em outras palavras, é necessário que o agente esteja em contato com o paciente a fim de que ocorra alguma atualização do paciente. Nesse sentido, é dado o exemplo de que um escultor jamais transformaria um mármore em estátua sem que tocasse no mármore com seus instrumentos. Essa exigência da proximidade ou do contato entre agente e paciente implica que agente e paciente, quer sejam materiais ou imateriais, sejam necessariamente entidades distintas localmente. 92 A condição de proximidade entre agente e paciente, estabelecida por Godofredo de Fontaines, acaba corroborando a posição de Scotus. Ora, se agente e paciente constituem uma espécie de unidade, então não é possível conceber proximidade maior. Por outros termos, se a proximidade é o que permite a atualização das afecções, então essa atualização parece se dar de maneira mais perfeita quando não há nenhuma distância entre agente e paciente, isto é, quando agente e paciente são o mesmo. Quanto a isso, é próprio o seguinte excerto: Se o passivo estivesse com <o agente>, não seria ele atingido pela virtude do agente de modo mais perfeito? Supondo isto, argumenta-se além: se algo é mais verdadeiramente presente a si mesmo – se é ativo e passivo sob o mesmo aspecto – do que outro poderia ser, então se preenche aquela condição mais verdadeiramente, por causa da qual a proximidade é requerida, quando não pode haver uma presença maior; logo, há mais verdadeiramente ação. 93 Contrariamente ao pensamento de Godofredo de Fontaines, Scotus sustenta que não se pode dizer a priori que tudo o que se move é movido por outro, pois não há nada que nos impossibilite pensar que um objeto particular seja tanto ativo quanto passivo em relação a um único e mesmo ato particular. A vontade, por exemplo, é, ao mesmo tempo, agente e paciente. Enquanto agente, a vontade é princípio ativo dos atos de vontade, mas, por outro lado, a vontade é paciente porque ela própria é o sujeito natural de seus atos. 94 Em outra parte desta pesquisa será apresentada a posição escotista acerca do automovimento da vontade de uma 90 EFFLER, 1962, p. 38. 91 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 25. 92 EFFLER, 1962, p. 42. 93 DUNS SCOTUS, op. cit., § 29. 94 EFFLER, 1962, p. 38. 40 forma um pouco mais detalhada. Por ora, será dada ênfase ao possível automovimento da physis. Continuando o tratamento da questão acerca da proximidade entre agente e paciente, quando o mesmo ente é agente e paciente, o objeto passivo desse ente encontra-se mais disponível e mais presente para o agente do que em objetos distintos. Quando os dois princípios encontram-se na mesma coisa ou na mesma faculdade, o agente parece atingir o paciente de uma maneira mais perfeita. Portanto, não há nenhuma contradição ao afirmar-se que uma coisa possa ser agente e paciente em relação ao mesmo ato. Os antagonistas de Scotus não admitem o automovimento eficiente em virtude de uma analogia com o princípio de causalidade substancial. Mas Scotus diz que os dois princípios não são a mesma coisa. 95 No que diz respeito à causalidade substancial, Scotus admite a impossibilidade de que algo seja causa de sua própria substância, pois isso nos forçaria a admitir que algo é capaz de surgir do nada. Além disso, uma substância não é capaz de alterar sua própria substância. Por exemplo, um verme, por si mesmo, não é capaz de se transformar num mamífero. Por isso, o princípio de causalidade não admite que aquilo que é menos tenha a capacidade de produzir uma substância de perfeição maior. Por outro lado, o princípio de causalidade em geral 96 não é ferido quando se admite que um substância é ativa em relação aos seus acidentes, por exemplo, mudanças espaciais, qualitativas etc. Quando se afirma que uma substância é capaz de elicitar mudanças acidentais, o que está em questão é a atividade da substância no que diz respeito à causalidade equívoca, ou seja, aquilo que é menos perfeito não pode ser o ativo daquilo que é mais perfeito, mas aquilo que é mais perfeito pode ser o elicitivo daquilo que é menos perfeito. 97 Um agente equívoco, 98 por meio de sua natureza (forma), é capaz de causar um ato particular. Enquanto causalidade equívoca, um agente só pode causar outra forma distinta de sua própria natureza. Por exemplo, o fogo é agente da leveza, a qual é distinta da própria natureza do fogo. Contudo, Scotus não diz que o fogo surge do nada, pois reconhece a necessidade de uma causa da substância fogo. Na realidade, Scotus apenas sustenta que entre o calor do fogo e a forma equívoca da leveza não há nenhum agente intermediário, ou seja, é o próprio fogo que produz a leveza. Da mesma maneira, a vontade, por exemplo, não é a causa de sua própria substância, desse modo, o princípio de causalidade é preservado. Por 95 EFFLER, 1962, p. 43,44. 96 Entendo o princípio de causalidade em geral no sentido de: do nada, nada pode surgir. 97 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 22, 23. 98 Por causa ou agente equívoco entende-se que a forma da causa é distinta da forma do efeito, ou seja, o oposto da causa unívoca, na qual o efeito tem a mesma forma da causa. 41 outro lado, não há nenhuma contradição em afirmarmos que a vontade, assim como o fogo que produz a forma equívoca da leveza, é o eficiente de seus próprios acidentes, isto é, de seus atos de vontade. Portanto, a vontade parece ser capaz de agir em si mesma por meio de uma ação equívoca. Como dito anteriormente, a questão da causalidade eficiente da vontade será abordada mais adiante. Por ora, interessa-nos saber que Scotus estabeleceu duas condições simultâneas para se afirmar universalmente que algo pode agir em si mesmo: [1] o agente deve possuir uma forma que é princípio de agir equivocamente; [2] o próprio agente deve ser capaz de receber o termo da ação. 99 Com relação à causalidade unívoca, Scotus escreve: "nada age por si mesmo por qualquer ação unívoca, pois neste caso o que é causa do agir e o termo da ação seriam da mesma espécie, diferindo quanto ao número". 100 Uma causa unívoca, de acordo com Scotus, produz no paciente uma forma que é da mesma natureza do agente, por exemplo, um pai que gera o filho. De fato, um homem (pai) só produz outro homem (filho) e, embora possuam a mesma natureza (forma) específica, ambos são numericamente distintos. Portanto, a distinção numérica da causalidade unívoca impossibilita o automovimento, visto que um homem pode gerar outro homem numericamente distinto, mas não pode, porém, gerar-se a si mesmo. Caso fosse possível admitir que um homem gera-se a si mesmo, então o automovimento seria admitido, também, na esfera da causalidade unívoca. Além disso, o automovimento eficiente unívoco requer que o mesmo sujeito simultaneamente possua e não possua uma única forma de mesma natureza. 101 Em outras palavras, na relação unívoca entre pai e filho não há nenhuma forma além da natureza humana. Por outro lado, o fogo – enquanto causalidade equívoca da leveza – é causa de uma forma diferente dele mesmo. Tanto o crescimento quanto o movimento local encontram-se, também, na esfera da atividade equívoca. O aumento de quantidade de uma substância é uma modificação passiva, ou seja, aquilo que é acrescentado padece a ação da substância. Contudo, num único ente, a natureza acidental do que é acrescentado é diferente da natureza substancial que produz o acréscimo. Da mesma maneira, o movimento local também é um exemplo de atividade equívoca, visto que o acidente do lugar (o onde) não é uma forma ativa. Em linhas gerais, Scotus está dizendo que não é contraditório pensar que uma substância possa causar em si uma qualidade, uma quantidade e uma localidade. Todavia, para que isso ocorra, não se pode 99 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 31. 100 Ibid., § 33. 101 EFFLER, 1962, p. 37, 38. 42 prescindir das seguintes condições: [a] o agente deve ter a capacidade de elicitar tal movimento eficiente e deve ter a capacidade de receber a própria perfeição que ele mesmo causa ativamente; [b] o agente deve possuir uma forma a qual é princípio de agir equivocamente. Se essas duas condições ocorrerem simultaneamente, a substância causará: "ou algo simultâneo a si, e, portanto, sem mudança, ou não simultâneo a si, e portanto através de um movimento ou mudança". 102 4.2 Explicação dos casos concretos segundo a opinião de Scotus Depois de expor e justificar o princípio geral em favor do automovimento, Scotus passa a mostrar a aplicação desse princípio nos mesmos casos concretos que anteriormente foram apresentados sob a ótica da opinião comum. Portanto, Scotus passará a aplicar a tese em favor do automovimento nos seguintes casos: [a] acidentes simultâneos; [b] acidentes não simultâneos; [c] movimento dos leves e graves; [d] movimento dos animais; [e] mudança quantitativa; [f] mudança qualitativa; [g] mudança cognitiva; e finalmente [i] mudança apetitiva. 4.2.1 Explicação do acidente simultâneo Os acidentes simultâneos são concomitantes com o sujeito que os possui. Assim, em virtude da simultaneidade temporal entre sujeito e acidente, parece ser impossível conceber que um sujeito seja o eficiente de seu acidente simultâneo. A risibilidade, por exemplo, é um acidente simultâneo do homem, e a causa deste acidente não parece ser o próprio homem, mas o gerador do homem. De alguma forma, o acidente simultâneo de um sujeito está necessariamente vinculado à causação do gerador. Em outras palavras, parece ser impossível concebermos que um sujeito gerado por um gerador seja, ao mesmo tempo, cocriador daquilo que lhe é inerente, isto é, o acidente simultâneo. Em sentido contrário, Scotus sustenta que não é contraditório pensarmos que um sujeito é o eficiente de seu acidente simultâneo. A luz, por exemplo, é o gerador da 102 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 34. 43 luminosidade a qual é gerada pela própria luz, e não pela fonte de luz. Ademais, este exemplo de acidente simultâneo não requer anterioridade no tempo entre substância e acidente, 103 pois se pode pensar que, a partir do momento em que a luz é originada pela sua fonte, a própria luz, e não a causa da luz, produz diretamente a luminosidade. O sol é seguramente uma fonte de luz e esta difunde-se por si em todas as direções. É patente que a luz é imediatamente gerada a partir do sol, mas o que dizer da luminosidade? O que nos impede de pensar que a luminosidade da luz seja um acidente simultâneo produzido exclusivamente pela própria luz, e não pela sua fonte geradora? Por outros termos, podemos dizer que o sol é causa direta da espécie a qual é sensível à visão humana, isto é, da luz. Por outro lado, podemos afirmar que o sol não é a causa direta da luminosidade, pois, segundo Scotus, a última – enquanto acidente simultâneo – é elicitada pela própria luz. Portanto, o acidente simultâneo da luz preenche o critério outrora estabelecido: [a] a luz tem a capacidade de receber a própria perfeição, que ela simultaneamente produz de maneira ativa, isto é, a luminosidade; [b] embora produzida simultaneamente, a luminosidade é um efeito equívoco da luz. Por ora, constatamos que para Scotus a ideia de que uma substância cause em si uma qualidade, ainda que seja simultânea com a origem de sua substância, não é uma ideia contraditória. Conforme a visão aristotélica medieval, a água é fria por sua própria natureza. Desse modo, a partir do momento em que a água é criada, ela é concebida como detentora da qualidade da frieza. Quando aquecida, a água tem sua natureza alterada por algum agente extrínseco, ou seja, por algum tipo de aquecedor. Contudo, quando o aquecedor é removido, a água por si mesma readquire a qualidade da frieza. De acordo com Scotus, a frieza da água é mais uma instância de acidente simultâneo, visto que não é necessário pensarmos que a frieza da água é necessariamente causada pela própria fonte geradora da água. Desse modo, podemos conceber que a fonte geradora da água limitou-se a produzir exclusivamente a água, e não sua frieza. Portanto, a partir do momento em que a água é gerada, seu respectivo acidente simultâneo, ou seja, a qualidade da frieza, é produzida pela própria água, e não pelo agente gerador da água. 104 Tanto a frieza da água quanto a luminosidade da luz implicam a noção de acidente simultâneo. Porém, é importante ressaltar que o acidente simultâneo não envolve a noção de mudança. Desse modo, se as duas condições dadas anteriormente 105 forem devidamente 103 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 36. 104 EFFLER, 1962, p. 102, 103. 105 São essas as condições: [a] o agente deve ter a capacidade de elicitar o movimento eficiente e deve ter a capacidade de receber a própria perfeição que ele mesmo causa ativamente; [b] o agente deve possuir uma forma a qual é princípio de agir equivocamente. 44 preenchidas, podemos dizer que uma substância pode ser o eficiente de algo simultâneo a si, e isso não implica nenhuma mudança nela mesma, bem como pode ser o eficiente de algo não simultâneo a si, o que denota movimento e mudança. A respeito dos acidentes não concomitantes com seu sujeito, trataremos mais adiante. Por ora, abordaremos a noção de quantidade enquanto acidente simultâneo e não simultâneo. É impossível concebermos uma quantidade sem um corpo e vice-versa. Ora, se há quantidade, necessariamente deve haver uma substância corpórea a partir da qual simultaneamente advém a quantidade. Por outro lado, se há um corpo, necessariamente há uma quantidade que o delimita. A quantidade que advém de uma substância corpórea gerada não é forma ativa, pois, se assim fosse, poderíamos nos deparar com corpos de quantidade ilimitada. Além disso, a quantidade, enquanto acidente de um corpo, pode ser considerada de duas maneiras: [a] quantidade como acidente simultâneo; [b] quantidade como acidente não simultâneo. Com relação ao último, é possível pensar num corpo enquanto causa eficiente de sua quantidade. Se considerarmos o processo de nutrição e crescimento dos seres vivos, seguramente encontraremos casos em que os seres vivos não são absolutamente passivos no seu aumento quantitativo. Ademais, qualquer aparente aumento quantitativo do tamanho de um animal não pode ser efetivamente causado por um agente absolutamente externo. Um fazendeiro, por exemplo, não pode simplesmente aplicar camadas de algum tipo de material externo sobre seu gado a fim de aumentar seu tamanho e peso. Portanto, o gado deve crescer a partir de dentro, ou seja, por meio de seu intrínseco poder vegetativo o boi é capaz de executar um papel ativo no seu crescimento. 106 Agora, interessa-nos analisar um pouco mais detalhadamente a questão do acidente simultâneo à luz da causalidade eficiente. Por ora, temos a seguinte questão: é possível concebermos que um corpo seja o ativo de sua quantidade simultânea? Uma vez que identificamos a relação necessária entre corpo e quantidade, parece ser impossível que uma substância corpórea produza ativamente sua quantidade no mesmo momento em que a própria substância é gerada. Apoiando-se em Aristóteles, Scotus sustenta a possibilidade de considerarmos a quantidade local de um corpo como seu acidente simultâneo. Contudo, faz-se necessário compreendermos o que Aristóteles entende como lugar. Segundo Aristóteles, o lugar de uma coisa é o mais íntimo limite imóvel daquilo que a contém. 107 Desse modo, ocorre uma espécie 106 EFFLER, 1962, p. 134. 107 ARISTÓTELES. Física IV, 212a 20. 45 de associação íntima das partes de um corpo com as partes do lugar que as contém. Parece que essa associação íntima entre o corpo e seu lugar denota uma espécie de expansão ou prolongamento acidental da quantidade do corpo em relação ao seu lugar. Entretanto, é bom salientar que Aristóteles não está dizendo que o lugar de um corpo torna-se uma parte substancial do corpo, mas apenas o contém. O lugar de um corpo não deve ser nem maior nem menor do que o corpo contido, além do mais deve ser separável do corpo contido. 108 Se dissermos que algo está no ar, não queremos dizer que esse algo encontra-se em todas as partes do ar, mas, se algo está no ar, é porque a superfície do ar circunda este algo. Se todo o ar fosse considerado o lugar de algo que está no ar, evidentemente, o lugar de tal coisa não seria igual à própria coisa. Portanto, o lugar que contém um corpo, ou seja, que não é nem maior nem menor que o corpo, é o primeiro lugar no qual a coisa está. Em outras palavras, o primeiro lugar que sempre está em torno de algo encontra-se em continuidade com esse algo, desse modo, torna-se parte em um todo. 109 Se considerarmos o curso comum da natureza, toda substância corpórea possui certa quantidade local. Ainda que a posição espacial dos corpos possa mudar, nenhum corpo estará privado de certa quantidade local. Nesse sentido, uma quantidade particular – o lugar – pode ser um acidente simultâneo com seu sujeito, ou seja, algo que a partir do exato momento da geração do sujeito é gerado juntamente com ele. Logo que um sujeito vem à existência, sua quantidade local é um acidente simultâneo que o sujeito pode reter durante um período indefinido de tempo. No entanto, ainda temos a seguinte questão: qual é a causa ativa da quantidade local? Será que o próprio corpo gerado pode ser o ativo de sua quantidade, ou será que tal quantidade é gerada pelo próprio gerador? O ponto de vista defendido por Scotus é o de que o corpo gerado é a causa eficiente de sua própria quantidade local. 110 Como dito anteriormente, a quantidade não é uma forma ativa. Por isso, seu princípio eficiente deve necessariamente ser uma causa equívoca, a qual é uma das condições do automovimento. Se considerarmos, como Aristóteles, que o espaço é também uma espécie de corpo constituído por partes, talvez fique um pouco mais fácil compreendermos que um corpo possa ser o ativo constante de sua quantidade local. Na Física IV, 111 Aristóteles considera que a distância que separa dois barcos, isto é, o pleno, também é um lugar. Desse modo, não são apenas os limites de um barco que parecem ser um lugar, mas também o pleno que está entre 108 LEWIS, Neil. Space and time. In: The Cambridge Companion to DUNS SCOTUS. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 93, nota 5. 109 Cf. ARISTÓTELES, Física IV, 211a 25-30. 110 EFFLER, 1962, p. 101. 111 ARISTÓTELES. Física IV, 212a 10-20. 46 dois barcos. No fundo, o que diferencia um barco de um lugar é o fato de que, para Aristóteles, o barco é um lugar transportável enquanto o lugar do barco é algo não transportável, ou seja, imóvel. Se considerarmos, por exemplo, um barco num rio, tudo aquilo que está dentro do barco é movido e muda. Desse modo, o barco é o lugar que contém as coisas. Por outro lado, o rio é o lugar do barco, visto que o todo do rio é imóvel. Portanto, para Aristóteles, parece que o lugar é um corpo análogo a uma embarcação, ou seja, constituído por partes. Um corpo possui uma posição desde que cada uma das partes de sua superfície corresponda à superfície do corpo continente. Por outros termos, em virtude de seu volume, cada corpo deve existir neste ou naquele lugar particular e, em contrapartida, o lugar deve ser igual ao tamanho do objeto. No curso ordinário da natureza percebemos que os corpos, cada qual segundo uma especificação variante, mudam de lugar. Ora se o lugar é algo divisível em partes e cada lugar se encontra em outro lugar, com exceção da última esfera celeste, 112 então, o lugar no qual me encontro parece ser sempre um acidente simultâneo. Ainda que me mova para vários lugares, sempre serei o eficiente de minha quantidade local. Dado que inevitavelmente sempre estarei causando minha quantidade local, não faz sentido falar em prioridade temporal deste acidente. Enfim, a quantidade local é um efeito equívoco do corpo, porém é um efeito equívoco simultâneo ao corpo. Portanto, a passagem que se dá a partir do corpo para a quantidade local é imediata. No fundo, Scotus está tentando dizer que não é necessário apelarmos para o agente gerador de um corpo a fim de explicar sua quantidade local. Além disso, enquanto substância corpórea, o corpo é naturalmente anterior, mas não temporalmente anterior, a sua quantidade local e por isso pode causá-la. 113 Diferentemente de Aristóteles, Scotus não rejeita a ideia de que um corpo possa existir sem um lugar. Ora, se a esfera mais distante é contida por nenhum corpo, não há nenhuma contradição em pensarmos num corpo que exista sem que outro corpo (lugar) o contenha. Assim, não é contraditório pensar que um absoluto permaneça na existência sem a necessidade de relação com aquilo que é posterior a ele. Em outras palavras, da mesma maneira que não é necessário pensarmos que um corpo tenha uma cor, também não é necessário pensarmos que um corpo necessariamente tenha um lugar. Todavia, Scotus admite que um corpo – se não necessariamente num lugar – é, por meio de sua corporeidade, 112 LEWIS, 2003, p. 70, 71. Apenas a mais distante esfera celeste não necessita de um lugar, pois não é contida por nenhum corpo. Portanto não tem um lugar no sentido estrito. 113 EFFLER, 1962, p. 102. 47 necessariamente capaz de estar num lugar. 114 Portanto, se um corpo não carece necessariamente de um lugar, logo pode causar sua quantidade local por meio de sua corporeidade e, ao que parece, independentemente do agente. Em linhas gerais, parece que Scotus está dizendo que Deus não criou diretamente um lugar para os corpos. Mas, ao criar os corpos, a quantidade local na qual eles se encontram intimamente inseridos foi imediatamente produzida pelos próprios corpos. Por isso, se diz que não é necessário estabelecer uma anterioridade temporal entre corpo e lugar, pois, assim que o corpo foi gerado, sua quantidade local também foi simultaneamente gerada pelo próprio corpo. Dado que os corpos produzem sua quantidade simultânea e tal quantidade é considerada um acidente simultâneo, isso não implica nenhuma mudança do sujeito, pois não há nenhuma privação de termos opostos. Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: "[...] a mudança requer termos opostos e, assim, que a privação preceda a forma. A privação precede a forma só quando um sujeito suscetível precede a forma; isto não ocorre aqui". 115 Depois de justificar sua posição em favor do automovimento que um sujeito é capaz de produzir em relação ao seu acidente simultâneo, Scotus passa a aplicar a tese do automovimento nos acidentes não simultâneos. 4.2.2 Explicação do acidente não simultâneo Os acidentes não simultâneos implicam a noção de que uma forma privada de um termo só é apta para ser tal termo se, e somente se, o termo oposto a preceder. Desse modo, as noções de precedência e privação parecem qualificar os acidentes não simultâneos. As mudanças dos atos de vontade em referência à vontade, bem como as mudanças cognitivas referentes ao intelecto, são apenas alguns exemplos de acidentes não simultâneos. Aliás, mais adiante veremos que é justamente na esfera das atividades volitivas e cognitivas que Scotus fundamenta o automovimento de maneira significativa. 116 Dizemos, de modo geral, que uma causa natural (ainda que seja determinada ao efeito) em virtude de algum agente extrínseco pode ser impedida de produzir tal efeito. Entretanto, uma vez removido aquilo que impede a ação da causa, a causa agirá de maneira 114 LEWIS, 2003, p. 71. 115 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 36. 116 EFFLER, 1962, p. 98. 48 imediata e produzirá seu efeito. 117 Todavia, considerando-se os acidentes não simultâneos, temos o seguinte dilema: ou a mudança não simultânea deve ser exclusivamente justificada em virtude de algo outro para o qual se destina a mudança, como, por exemplo, um determinado fim movente, ou, então, a mudança não simultânea também pode ser justificada independentemente de um fim movente, o que implicaria o automovimento. Pois bem, passando do geral ao particular, consideraremos primeiramente o movimento dos corpos leves e graves. 4.2.2.1 Explicação sobre os corpos leves e graves Considerando-se o movimento ascendente dos corpos leves, assim como o movimento descendente dos graves, pergunta-se: qual é a causa dessas afecções não simultâneas? Uma possível resposta a esta questão está baseada na ação física de algum agente externo capaz de produzir o movimento desses corpos, ainda que seja à distância. Os escolásticos em geral negam a possibilidade da ação de uma causa distante. Como vimos anteriormente, Godofredo de Fontaines insiste na necessidade da proximidade ou contato entre movente e movível. No mesmo sentido, Tomás de Aquino escreve: "deve-se dizer que a ação de um agente, por mais poderoso que seja, não se estende ao que é distante dele a não ser por intermediários. Pertence ao poder absoluto de Deus agir em todas as coisas sem intermediário". 118 Contrariamente à maioria dos pensadores escolásticos, Scotus admite a possibilidade de uma ação física à distância, entretanto, a fim de explicar o movimento dos leves e dos graves, Scotus não recorre a uma causa externa, visto que, para ele, não há contradição em pensar que os corpos leves e graves movem-se por si mesmos. Pois bem, parece ser de comum acordo que, quando um efeito está sendo efetivamente causado, não podemos prescindir da causa que está atualizando este efeito. Assim, é necessário admitir uma simultaneidade entre causa e efeito. Por isso, quando um corpo grave encontra-se em queda, devemos admitir uma causa que esteja produzindo o movimento descendente do corpo. Muitos escolásticos, apoiando-se na Física de Aristóteles, sustentam que o grave e o leve são movidos: ou pela causa geradora de sua própria existência, ou pela causa removedora de 117 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 44. 118 TOMÁS DE AQUINO. Suma Teológica, Ia, q. 8, a.1 Ad Tertium. 49 algum tipo de obstáculo que impeça o movimento natural dos leves e graves. 119 Essa dupla possibilidade causal aponta para uma dificuldade de se encontrar a causa real do movimento natural do leve e do grave. Para Scotus, a causa que remove o impedimento da queda livre do grave é suficiente para explicar apenas o início do movimento. Contudo, uma vez que a causa removedora do impedimento da queda não se encontra presente durante todo o processo contínuo de queda, a causa inicial não é suficiente para explicar o porquê da queda como um todo. Em outras palavras, se apenas afasto aquilo que impede o movimento descendente de uma pedra, por qual razão posso me considerar como agente de todo seu movimento descendente? Ademais, aquilo que impede a queda do grave parece ser mera causa acidental de seu repouso, pois, uma vez removido o obstáculo, manifesta-se o movimento de algo que se move sem a necessidade de nenhuma outra causa extrínseca. Desse modo, podemos dizer que remover um obstáculo é uma coisa e que o movimento gerado é outra coisa. A fim de refutar o automovimento dos leves e graves, Averróis transfere a continuação da causa inicial da queda do grave para o meio no qual ele se encontra. No caso de queda de um corpo, Averróis sustenta que o corpo em queda repele o ar que se encontra ao seu redor e, uma vez repelido o ar, o movimento do corpo segue-se necessariamente, pois, se as várias camadas de ar, obstáculos por meio dos quais o corpo em queda perpassa, não fossem removidas, deveríamos admitir que o meio onde o corpo encontra-se em queda é vácuo. Portanto, segundo Averróis, nenhum grave é movido por si mesmo, antes é movido por contínuas remoções de camadas de ar. 120 Para Scotus, ainda que concedêssemos razão a Averróis, o automovimento não seria completamente refutado. Se admitíssemos que as camadas de ar removidas causassem a queda dos corpos, ainda teríamos a seguinte questão: o que é que repele as camadas de ar? Ora, uma vez que o termo repelir implica impelir para longe ou para fora, então, o movimento eficiente não seria o descendente, antes seria o de repelir. Se assim fosse, admitiríamos que os graves não tendem para baixo por si mesmos, mas repelem o ar por si mesmos. Não obstante, o ar repelido é mero efeito do primeiro movimento, isto é, o movimento local. Nesse sentido, escreve Scotus: "É evidente, com efeito, que o que está em repouso localmente não expulsa o 119 EFFLER, 1962, p. 104. 120 Ibid., p. 105. 50 ar contíguo". 121 Além disso, se o meio exerce influência no movimento dos leves e graves: de que modo o mesmo meio, isto é, o ar abaixa o grave e eleva o leve? 122 Em linhas gerais, pode-se dizer que, para Averróis, o corpo em movimento repele o ar do lugar no qual ele está prestes a entrar e, uma vez repelido o ar desse lugar, um suposto vácuo é formado para receber imediatamente o corpo em queda que preenche aquele vácuo. Scotus, porém, argumenta que outro ar próximo poderia muito bem preencher a área do ar removido. Por conseguinte, se um outro ar entra no lugar do ar expulso, por que a pedra entrará? 123 Segundo Scotus, é manifesto que o grave, não impedido por nenhum agente extrínseco, move-se por si mesmo. A tentativa averroísta de negar o movimento eficiente implica, segundo Scotus, caminhos bizarros os quais tentam explicar o ponto de partida do movimento. Enfim, a doutrina averroísta da influência do meio no movimento dos corpos encontra pouca aceitação de pensadores subsequentes. Contudo, sua doutrina reaparece de maneira modificada em pensadores como Roger Bacon. 124 Outro argumento que sustenta o movimento dos graves repousa na noção de tração, ou seja, o centro da Terra atrai para si o grave. Entretanto, se o centro da Terra atrai o grave, será que esta tração é produzida univocamente a partir do centro, ou também deve ser considerada uma alteração do próprio grave? Parece que Scotus considera os dois aspectos, pois afirma que "[...] a mudança, ainda que tenha referência mais essencial para o termo final „para o qual‟ do que para o termo „a partir do qual‟, tomada estritamente não pode ser entendida sem um deles". 125 Muitos pensadores medievais sustentam que o lugar a ser ocupado por um grave exerce tração sobre o corpo movido em direção àquele lugar. Assim, o ensino escolástico afirma, em linhas gerais, que o lugar exerce tração sobre o corpo em termos de causalidade eficiente. Mas, pergunta Scotus: o centro da Terra é o que eficientemente produz o movimento dos corpos? Ora, se a terra inteira fosse removida de seu lugar, o centro da terra permaneceria apenas enquanto lugar ideal, ou seja, enquanto lugar geométrico. Assim, ainda que a Terra fosse deslocada, os corpos continuariam a tender para seu centro. Não obstante, o Doutor Sutil não tem dúvida alguma de que não é o centro, ao menos enquanto lugar 121 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 49. 122 Ibid., § 48. 123 Ibid., § 49. 124 EFFLER, 1962, p. 106. 125 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 41. 51 geométrico, que exerce tração sobre o corpo, pois uma entidade ideal não pode exercer o papel de causalidade eficiente. 126 Guardadas as devidas proporções, Tomás de Aquino e Godofredo de Fontaines atribuem ao gerador do grave um papel dominante em seu movimento. Tomás de Aquino, por exemplo, ensina que os graves e os leves possuem neles mesmos o princípio do movimento descendente e ascendente. Todavia, esse princípio de movimento dos leves e graves é algo acidental. O Doutor Angélico não nega que esses acidentes resultam da própria forma substancial do corpo. Por isso, pode ser dito que a própria forma substancial, a qual prescinde de seu acidente, é a causa eficiente de seus próprios acidentes. Além disso, nem mesmo as formas acidentais podem ser consideradas como princípio ativo, pois o verdadeiro princípio ativo do movimento dos leves e dos graves é o seu respectivo gerador, que transmite ao gerado tanto sua forma substancial quanto sua forma acidental. 127 A exposição de Godofredo de Fontaines não diverge muito da posição do Aquinate. No entanto, a diferença entre ambos repousa no fato de que Godofredo de Fontaines admite o estatuto de causalidade eficiente dos acidentes na medida em que essa força ativa é imediatamente derivada do agente gerador da substância, e não da própria forma substancial do corpo. 128 Scotus então pergunta: se o gerador movesse diretamente os acidentes do gerado, como explicar o efeito em ato sem a causa em ato? Em outras palavras, o gerador pode até transmitir certa virtude ao gerado, mas como pode o gerador continuar transmitindo tal virtude a partir do momento em que ele deixa de existir? Quanto a isso, Scotus diz: "É verdade: gerou e, quando gerou, era. <Mas> agora não é; como ele move agora, se o gerado por ele, permanecendo, não move? Isto é o que pergunto". 129 Como exposto anteriormente, Scotus não nega o fato de que um corpo receba sua forma substancial juntamente com suas propriedades essenciais de um agente gerador extrínseco. Mas a tese que afirma que o agente gerador de um corpo é a causa constante da queda livre do mesmo implica uma causalidade muito remota em termos de tempo e espaço. Ademais, a causalidade remota do gerador não justifica qual é a causa da constante atualização do movimento eficiente de um corpo pesado cujo movimento é descendente. Contrariamente à constante presença do gerador, a queda livre de um corpo ocorre justamente quando o contato entre o corpo e seu gerador é absolutamente interrompido. Desse modo, 126 EFFLER, 1962. p. 106. 127 Ibid., p. 107, 108. 128 Ibid., p. 108. 129 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 51. 52 pergunta-se: como o gerador pode ser constantemente o eficiente do movimento daquilo que em todos os sentidos encontra-se cada vez mais distante? 130 A queda de um grave parecia ser um acidente não simultâneo, pois num momento o grave encontra-se em repouso e em outro, em queda. Desse modo, a relação de causa e efeito parece ocorrer em tempos distintos e por agentes distintos. Scotus, porém, identifica uma relação de simultaneidade de causa e efeito na queda dos corpos pesados. Uma vez que nem o meio, nem o lugar geométrico, nem o gerador que trouxe o corpo à existência, nem o agente que simplesmente remove os impedimentos da queda justificam a constante atualidade do movimento descendente, então, resta-nos procurar a causa eficiente da queda do grave nele próprio. Ora, se considerarmos que não há nada que impeça o movimento do grave, por que não podemos pensar que o próprio grave tenha a capacidade de produzir o movimento descendente (causa) e de simultaneamente recebê-lo (efeito)? Além disso, o corpo grave pode também ser considerado enquanto fonte de causalidade equívoca e simultânea ao efeito, pois o movimento descendente, embora produzido pelo próprio grave, é algo distinto de um corpo pesado. Assim, respeita-se o princípio que diz que nada, em referência a si próprio, pode ser considerado a causa unívoca de uma perfeição que já possui. Segundo Aristóteles, 131 o menosprezo intencional de sensações clarividentes em prol de teorias que sustentam que todas as coisas estão em repouso é um indício de fraqueza intelectual. Por conseguinte, Scotus diz: "[...] o grave é movido por si mesmo, o que concorda com a sensação [...]". 132 É patente que algumas vezes uma causa particular é capaz de gerar movimento em outra coisa desde que a causa em questão seja primeiramente movida por uma causa anterior. Por exemplo, uma bola amarela é capaz de mover uma bola vermelha desde que a primeira seja primeiramente movida por um bastão. Nesse caso, a bola amarela é movente e movida, pois depende de uma causa anterior. Agora, se um objeto leve estiver ligado a um objeto grave, o último pode mover o primeiro em virtude de sua própria condição natural, pois basta remover aquilo que o impede de se mover. O objeto grave é movente e movido, mas diferentemente do caso da bola amarela, prescinde de uma causa anterior extrínseca a ele próprio. Portanto, "não se pode afirmar a priori que toda e qualquer mudança é causada por outro". 133 Outra prova de que o grave move-se por si mesmo repousa na gravidade intrínseca ao objeto grave. Assim, a gravidade inerente ao próprio objeto grave é a causa de sua própria 130 EFFLER, 1962, p. 109. 131 ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 253a 33-35. 132 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 52. 133 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 22. 53 condição de se mover para baixo. Além disso, um objeto grave pode ser temporariamente impedido de cair em virtude de outro corpo que lhe ofereça resistência. Porém, observamos que em muitos casos a gravidade do objeto supera o corpo resistente e acaba transpassando-o. É evidente que o corpo que foi transpassado requer uma causa extrínseca para ser transpassado. Não é evidente, porém, que o corpo grave requer outra causa além dele mesmo a fim de transpassar aquilo que lhe oferece resistência. Por isso, aquilo que transpassou o corpo que oferecia resistência e aquilo que causou o movimento para baixo são a mesma coisa, ou seja, o próprio objeto grave. Só desse modo parece ser respondida a seguinte questão: "Além disso, o que efetivamente rompe a trave, cuja virtude de resistir é menor do que a virtude do grave?". 134 Alguns estudiosos discutem uma possível conexão entre a rejeição de Scotus do princípio "tudo que se move é movido por outro" e o conceito moderno de inércia. 135 Considerando-se a mecânica moderna, a lei de inércia substituiu o princípio do movimento aristotélico, o qual diz que tudo o que se move é movido por outro, bem como sua doutrina do lugar natural. Uma vez que Scotus rejeita explicitamente o princípio aristotélico do movimento, questiona-se se Scotus, ao menos de alguma maneira, aproximou-se da primeira lei de Newton, a qual diz: "todo corpo permanece em seu estado de repouso ou de movimento uniforme em linha reta, a menos que seja forçado a mudar seu estado por forças impressas nele". 136 Um dos exemplos de conflito entre o princípio aristotélico do movimento e a lei de inércia pode ser identificado numa estrela que livremente se move no espaço interestelar. Considerando-se a astronomia moderna, parece ser de comum acordo que uma estrela encontra-se continuamente mudando de lugar. Nesse caso não há nenhum movente que a desloca, pois a estrela encontra-se muito distante de qualquer outro corpo celeste capaz de influenciar seu movimento. Os aristotélicos tardios tentam resolver esse problema pelo concurso da teoria do impetus. Assim, a teoria do impetus sugere que o movimento estelar é causado em virtude de algum agente externo que aplicou alguma força ou energia capaz de movê-la. Essa força aplicada na estrela é algo absolutamente distinto da própria estrela movida. Portanto, tal força é uma espécie de instrumento do agente externo original, o qual originou o movimento na estrela. 137 134 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 52. 135 EFFLER, 1962, p. 126. 136 NEWTON, Sir Isaac. Princípios matemáticos da filosofia natural. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Os Pensadores), p. 20. 137 EFFLER, 1962, p. 127. 54 Segundo Whittaker, 138 a solução dada pela teoria do impetus é inaceitável, visto que ele não vê por que o impulso tem de ser necessariamente algo distinto da estrela. Ora, não poderia ser o impulso algo imanente à própria estrela? Como vimos anteriormente, o ponto essencial da teoria do movimento dos graves defendida por Scotus é semelhante à teoria do movimento estelar de Whittaker. Ao explicar o movimento de queda do grave, Scotus argumenta contra qualquer tipo de causalidade que produza o movimento do grave e que dele seja distinta. Seja como for, vimos que, para Scotus, o movimento de um grave não requer necessariamente uma causa externa ou distinta do próprio corpo em movimento, pois o próprio corpo grave é a causa de seu movimento descendente. Embora Scotus tenha em grande parte rompido com a ciência aristotélica, o Doutor Sutil ainda permanece na órbita da ciência antiga porque aceita a doutrina do lugar natural, o qual não é agente, bem como a necessidade de uma causa, ainda que o próprio objeto seja causa de seu movimento na medida em que o movimento existe. Desse modo, notamos que ele não abre mão do conceito de causa eficiente. 139 Talvez, a teoria do movente e movido enquanto um e mesmo ser constituiu uma espécie de antecâmara da doutrina moderna de inércia. 140 Após expor sua posição acerca do movimento dos leves e graves, Scotus passa a expor seu pensamento sobre o movimento dos animais. 4.2.2.2 Explicação sobre os animais moventes Em relação ao movimento dos animais, Scotus sustenta que o movimento de empurrar e puxar não é algo absolutamente contínuo, pois, após o impulso do salto, interrompe-se o movimento das partes até o retorno do animal ao solo. Desse modo, ao menos enquanto o animal está no ar, o animal se move como um todo. Apoiando-se em Aristóteles, Scotus afirma que: "é preciso que todo movimento se apoie em algo imóvel, cuja imobilidade seja maior do que a mobilidade do movido". 141 Nesse sentido, da mesma maneira que um projétil lançado para cima não necessita da contínua presença da causa que o lançou para 138 WHITTAKER, Sir Edmund. Space and Spirit. Hinsdale, Illinois, 1948 apud EFFLER, 1962, p. 127. 139 Para Newton, apenas a mudança de estado requer uma causa. Assim, o movimento retilíneo e uniforme não necessita de causa alguma. Por outro lado, Scotus não abre mão da noção de causa até mesmo para o movimento uniforme. 140 EFFLER, 1962, p. 128. 141 ARISTÓTELES. Do movimento dos animais, 699a 6-11 apud DUNS SCOTUS, Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 54. 55 executar o movimento ascendente, também o animal que ascende após o salto não necessita nem da contínua presença do solo nem do contínuo movimento de suas partes. Em outras palavras, o movimento de empurrar e puxar só é possível de ser executado em algo cuja imobilidade seja maior do que a mobilidade do movido, como, por exemplo, o solo para os ambulantes e o ar para os voadores. Entretanto, considerando-se o salto de um animal, como é possível explicar seu movimento, uma vez que suas partes, ao menos temporariamente, estão absolutamente afastadas de um lugar imóvel? Ora, se não há nenhum lugar imóvel no qual o animal possa continuar o movimento de empurrar e puxar, logo, ao menos durante o salto pode-se excluir a contínua série de empurra e puxa entre as partes. 142 Apesar de sustentar o não movimento das partes no momento em que um animal permanece no ar após o salto, Scotus admite que o movimento das partes de um animal, ao menos na grande maioria dos casos, é algo manifesto e evidente. 143 Contudo, não seria adequado explicar o movimento dos animais se apenas considerássemos duas partes. Ao interpretar o De anima, Scotus sugere que Aristóteles possa ter explicado que uma parte não move efetivamente a outra em sentido estrito. Assim, considerando-se todas as partes do corpo, inclusive as mais remotas, pode-se dizer que uma parte particular do corpo tem maior aptidão para ser movida e, uma vez movida, acaba movendo outra parte mais remota e assim sucessivamente. Mas a primeira parte particular movida é movida por outra parte ainda mais remota, ou seja, pelas faculdades cognitivas ou apetitivas da alma. Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: E talvez <as afirmações> de Aristóteles sobre as duas partes, nas quais o animal que se move pode ser dividido, possam ser explicadas assim: uma parte não move efetivamente a outra em sentido estrito, mas uma delas é mais apta a ser movida, e assim recebe em primeiro lugar o movimento, talvez da <potência> cognitiva ou da apetitiva ou de outra, que move efetivamente quanto ao lugar, mediante alguma alteração, pois segundo Aristóteles, „a representação é quase uma coisa‟. 144 Segundo Scotus, a alma não pode mover as partes mais remotas do corpo sem a mediação de órgãos intermediários porque no estado atual, ou seja, antes de passarmos para a Pátria celeste, encontra-se impedida de fazê-lo. Por isso, o coração, por exemplo, é a parte mais apta a receber o movimento da alma e transmiti-lo às demais partes remotas do corpo. Embora Scotus admita um sistema orgânico de partes, tal sistema de mediação entre a alma e as demais partes do corpo não é algo absolutamente necessário, pois a faculdade de mover o corpo sem o concurso dos órgãos ou das demais partes encontra-se enraizada na alma. 142 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 54. 143 EFFLER, 1962, p. 130. 144 DUNS SCOTUS, op. cit., § 55. 56 Todavia, o movimento imediato do corpo por meio da alma, isto é, o movimento sem a mediação das partes só é possível de ocorrer após a ressurreição. Uma vez que Scotus admite uma longa série causal entre a alma e as partes mais remotas do corpo, será que podemos considerar que o automovimento está excluído da esfera do movimento local dos animais? Será que, no fim das contas, nenhuma das partes é incondicionada em relação ao seu próprio movimento? 145 A resposta a essas questões será dada quando tratarmos mais detalhadamente da questão da mudança nas potências apetitivas e cognitivas. Veremos que, pelo menos no homem, essas potências são ativas no sentido estrito. Além de serem automoventes, essas potências são capazes de determinar várias atividades corpóreas, tais como o movimento local dos animais. Após tratar da questão do movimento dos animais, o Doutor Sutil passa a abordar a mudança quantitativa. 4.2.2.3 Explicação sobre a mudança quantitativa Scotus afirma que os animais são ativos em seu processo de crescimento e nutrição, pois quando o alimento é ingerido pelo animal, a quantidade de alimento em ato não é princípio de nenhuma mudança imediata. Ora, se em ato o alimento nada altera quantitativamente, muito menos o fará em potência. Por outros termos, se o alimento ingerido em ato nada altera, muito menos o fará quando for destruído. Como é possível que aquilo que é destruído, e que portanto não é, pode ser o ativo do aumento quantitativo? Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: Ora, o alimento é destruído antes – no tempo ou, pelo menos, em natureza – que ocorra o movimento de crescimento, pois a nutrição, na qual o alimento é destruído, precede, desta ou daquela maneira, o crescimento. Como o não-ente moverá? 146 Embora o alimento seja algo externo ao animal, isso não significa que o animal, o qual também é dotado de potência vegetativa, seja absolutamente passivo em seu processo de crescimento e nutrição. Além disso, o caráter imanente de crescimento e nutrição é algo manifesto aos sentidos, visto que qualquer aparente aumento de tamanho do animal procede de dentro para fora. Por outros termos, não é possível aplicarmos uma espécie de argamassa 145 EFFLER, 1962, p.131. 146 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14. § 58. 57 num animal e falarmos que ele teve um aumento quantitativo. Portanto, "basta agora dizer que no alimento não está a causa efetiva do crescimento, mas no corpo animado que o converte". 147 Para Scotus, o processo de nutrição implica a aquisição de uma nova parte que substitui a parte perdida. Nesse processo, o alimento ingerido passa por várias purificações e é transmitido pelas veias até os poros ou demais lugares onde houve perda de tecido. Quando o alimento modificado por todo esse processo encontra-se contíguo à parte carente de tecido, a última age sobre o alimento processado e o transforma em carne viva. Assim, a atividade eficiente das diminutas partes homogêneas que constituem um tecido preexistente transforma aquilo que não preexistia, ou seja, a forma do alimento nele mesmo. Portanto, a parte ativa de um tecido se aperfeiçoa ao restabelecer aquilo que foi perdido. 148 É importante ressaltar, porém, que Scotus não está afirmando que todas as partes homogêneas de um corpo possuem a capacidade de gerar novas partes. Algumas partes do corpo são muito fracas ou até mesmo impuras para realizar essa atividade hercúlea. 149 Após brevemente tratar sobre a mudança quantitativa, o Doutor Sutil passa a expor a sua posição sobre a mudança qualitativa. 4.2.2.4 Explicação sobre a mudança qualitativa Segundo Scotus, uma substância pode produzir ativamente sua mudança qualitativa. Certos fatos empíricos demonstrariam que alguns agentes naturais, quando não impedidos, podem mudar a si mesmos qualitativamente. Por exemplo, a água que esfria por si mesma. A questão da causalidade eficiente da água já foi tratada no item que versa sobre os acidentes não simultâneos. Resta-nos agora analisar o que Scotus diz acerca da mudança qualitativa da semente. S. Boaventura, enquanto defensor da teoria das razões seminais agostiniana, advoga que toda matéria possui uma forma latente. Essas formas que se encontram em estado germinal desenvolvem-se por meio de sua própria atividade, bem como pela influência de agentes externos. Desse modo, uma bela flor desabrochada, embora de maneira latente, já está contida no broto. Para Scotus, porém, não é toda matéria que possui essas sementes ou formas 147 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 59. 148 EFFLER, 1962, p. 136. 149 Ibid., p.136. 58 potenciais. A oposição de Scotus se dá em virtude de que os argumentos que estendem a teoria da razão seminal para toda a matéria não são universais e necessários. Além disso, se admitíssemos razões seminais em todas as instâncias, teríamos que admitir o contrário daquilo que a experiência nos proporciona. 150 Scotus concede que a experiência nos apresenta alguns exemplos de seres capazes de produzir seus respectivos semelhantes por meio de uma semente. Um touro, por exemplo, produz o bezerro em virtude de sua semente, a qual é dotada de uma forma latente; a última, para Scotus, é a razão seminal. Embora os termos semente e razão seminal pareçam ser sinônimos, é necessário fazer uma distinção entre ambos. Uma semente é um corpo, já a razão seminal não é um corpo em virtude de que a última encontra-se em potência. A forma latente na semente não se move para o próprio bem da semente. Antes, a forma que se encontra em potência na semente move-se para o bem de outro, isto é, o ser que está para ser gerado a partir da semente, o qual é semelhante ao ser que originalmente gerou a semente. Outra importante diferença entre a semente e a razão seminal se dá no âmbito hierárquico, visto que a semente é mais imperfeita do que aquilo para o qual (razão seminal) ela se destina a ser. 151 Considerando-se tanto a semente de uma planta quanto a de um animal, a semente, uma vez gerada, não necessita de seu gerador para se desenvolver. Portanto, independentemente do agente externo, a semente de um animal, por exemplo, move-se por si mesma e atualiza a forma seminal do sangue, em seguida atualiza a forma seminal do embrião e finalmente atualiza-se numa forma mais perfeita. De uma maneira bem grosseira, a razão seminal mapeia o caminho que a semente deve percorrer para alcançar sua perfeição última. Entretanto, isso não significa que a razão seminal seja a causa ativa dos passos dados pela semente, pois aquilo que se encontra em potência não é, logo não pode ser o eficiente. 152 Ora, se a razão seminal não é eficiente por encontrar-se em potência, o que pode ser dito acerca da noção de ato virtual? Podemos dizer que uma semente de jabuticaba se torna uma jabuticabeira, e não uma amoreira, em virtude de algo inerente à própria semente de jabuticaba, e não por causa de fatores externos como a terra, a qualidade do solo, a umidade, a luminosidade etc. Por isso, de certo modo, a jabuticabeira encontra-se de maneira latente na semente. É evidente que a presença latente da árvore na semente não é o ato formal da árvore. Mas também isso não quer dizer que a presença latente da árvore na semente seja mera capacidade passiva de 150 EFFLER, 1962, p. 136. 151 Ibid., p. 141. 152 Ibid., p. 142. 59 tornar-se árvore, ou seja, tal presença latente não é só potência formal. Por isso, a presença da árvore na semente é o que Scotus denomina ato virtual. 153 Foi dito que uma rosa desabrochada é a razão seminal do broto de rosa, entretanto, se a razão seminal não estiver presente em ato no broto de rosa, como ela pode vir a ser uma rosa se a própria razão seminal sempre estiver em potência? Portanto, ainda que seja de maneira virtual, é necessário que a razão seminal esteja presente em ato. A noção de ato virtual sustenta que a jabuticabeira é distinta da amoreira porque em suas respectivas sementes estavam presentes atos virtuais ou razões seminais distintas. Se em ambas as sementes houvesse apenas pura potencialidade passiva e nada em ato virtual, só nos restaria atribuir ao meio no qual elas se encontram as razões seminais de seus respectivos atos formais. Isso, porém, seria absurdo, pois por qual motivo duas sementes, absolutamente passivas aos meios externos, se distinguiriam, sendo que foram plantadas em solo idêntico e sob idênticas condições? Pois bem, anteriormente dissemos que a razão seminal, por estar em potência numa semente, não poderia ser o eficiente em virtude de que aquilo que está em potência não é, e o que não é não pode agir. Deve ser notado, porém, que, no Comentário sobre a Metafísica de Aristóteles, Scotus não menciona que a razão seminal é um elemento de causalidade eficiente. Entretanto, no Opus Oxoniense II, é atribuída à razão seminal o estatuto de causalidade eficiente 154 e isso parece concordar com a noção de ato virtual. Portanto, uma vez que o ato virtual de uma semente é de fato um ato real, e não mera potencialidade virtual, a semente é imanentemente capaz de desenvolver o ato virtual que ela contém. Depois de discorrer sobre a mudança qualitativa, passaremos a analisar a mudança cognitiva à luz da perspectiva de Scotus. 4.2.2.5 Explicação sobre a mudança cognitiva Uma das questões muito discutidas pelos escolásticos diz respeito à atividade e à passividade do intelecto em relação ao conhecimento. A discussão desse problema inevitavelmente nos remete para uma breve análise da célebre distinção que Scotus fez entre conhecimento abstrativo e conhecimento intuitivo. Para ele, o conhecimento intuitivo refere- 153 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 24. 154 EFFLER, 1962, p. 145. 60 se ao conhecimento ou apreensão de um objeto em sua existência atual e concreta. Todos os atos próprios da mente, como pensamentos, volições, emoções, bem como a presença de objetos sensíveis, são imediatamente apreendidos pelo intelecto. Todavia, o conhecimento intuitivo não é integralmente causado por determinado objeto, pois nesse conhecimento há uma parte ativa do intelecto. Por isso, o objeto e o intelecto são causas parciais desse ato cognitivo, visto que a causa total do conhecimento intuitivo se dá em virtude de ambas as partes. Portanto, o intelecto não é absolutamente passivo no ato de cognição. 155 O conhecimento abstrativo independe da presença real e concreta de seu objeto. Por exemplo, os múltiplos e variados conceitos que atribuímos às coisas. Sobre o conhecimento abstrativo, Ribas Cezar escreve: "É um conhecimento indiferente à existência atual do conhecido. [...], por exemplo, quando imaginamos uma cor, pois podemos imaginá-la tanto quando ela existe quando ela não existe". 156 Neste tipo de conhecimento há uma "espécie" independente do objeto existente. Assim, sem o concurso do intelecto ou da imaginação não é possível haver conhecimento abstrativo. Quando inteligimos o calor, não é possível concedermos que somos absolutamente passivos em relação ao seu conhecimento, pois a fonte geradora do calor produz calor de maneira unívoca, e não de maneira equívoca. Em outras palavras, a fonte de calor só produz calor, e não conhecimento. Desse modo, a intelecção do calor é um efeito equívoco. A intelecção do calor é pura e simplesmente mais perfeita do que qualquer calor gerado. Se admitíssemos que a intelecção do calor fosse absolutamente produzida pelo próprio calor, teríamos que admitir que a intelecção enquanto efeito equívoco é mais perfeita do que o próprio calor enquanto efeito unívoco. Todavia, "é impossível que o efeito equívoco de um agente seja mais nobre do que o efeito unívoco do mesmo modo, pois seria mais nobre que o agente". 157 A atualidade de uma intelecção é algo transitório, pois num momento temos a intelecção de X e no outro não. Mas, qual é a causa eficiente da intelecção de X, Y, Z etc.? É importante observarmos que Scotus não descreve uma intelecção como um ato experimentado conscientemente. Scotus simplesmente afirma que a intelecção é um ato em nós (in nobis). Isso significa que o princípio ativo da intelecção é intrínseco ao homem. O fato de que muitas vezes podemos compreender algo quando queremos atesta que possuímos tal princípio 155 EFFLER, 1962, p.147. 156 RIBAS CEZAR, Cesar. O conhecimento abstrativo em Duns Escoto. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1996. 157 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 61. 61 ativo. 158 Por outro lado, o objeto conhecido também possui um fator eficiente em nosso conhecimento. De qualquer forma, o cognoscente não é meramente passivo no conhecimento das coisas. Nesse sentido, Scotus cita Agostinho: "do cognoscente e do conhecido nasce o conhecimento". 159 O intelecto e o objeto são causas parciais que concorrem para a produção de atos intelectivos. Mas será que ambos contribuem igualmente para que o ato cognitivo se consolide? Se admitirmos que sim, então o intelecto e o objeto são causas análogas a dois cavalos que conjuntamente produzem o mesmo efeito de puxar a carruagem. Desse modo, se um cavalo interromper sua atividade, a tração (efeito) não ocorrerá plenamente. Todavia, o princípio ativo de um cavalo não depende do princípio ativo do outro cavalo, pois, se assim fosse, ambos os cavalos possuiriam uma causalidade imperfeita. Da mesma maneira, o intelecto e o objeto são neutros entre si, pois o intelecto não fornece para a espécie ou objeto nenhum tipo de poder que possibilite a eles exercerem sua causalidade, nem o objeto dá ao intelecto alguma espécie de poder que possibilite a ele exercer sua atividade. 160 Alguns escolásticos vislumbravam a causalidade ativa do intelecto apenas no processo abstrativo, pois, diante de um objeto real, o conhecimento intuitivo era considerado algo meramente passivo. Para Scotus, porém, até mesmo no conhecimento intuitivo o intelecto é uma fonte independente de causalidade, pois é capaz de exercer seu poder de causalidade por si mesmo, ou seja, o intelecto prescinde de qualquer outra fonte geradora que o ative. Embora a causa total do ato intelectivo deva ser atribuída à unidade resultante do objeto e do intelecto, não podemos negar absolutamente que o intelecto tenha um poder ativo dentro de si. Portanto, a fim de consolidar a intelecção como um todo, o intelecto é uma potência absolutamente capaz de mover-se por si mesma. 161 A fim de compreender um pouco melhor a atividade do intelecto, analisaremos alguns pormenores acerca da produção da espécie 162 inteligível. Para Scotus, a espécie inteligível não é algo que o intelecto extrai do objeto singular, pois o objeto singular nada contém de universal em ato. Portanto, a espécie inteligível deve ser produzida. Por outro lado, a imagem também possui uma função na produção da espécie inteligível, por conseguinte, o 158 EFFLER, 1962, p. 149. 159 AGOSTINHO. Sobre a trindade. IX, c. 12, n. 18 (PL, 42, 970; CCL 50, 3090) apud DUNS SCOTUS, op. cit., § 61. 160 EFFLER, op. cit., p. 158. 161 Ibid., p. 159. 162 Convém entendermos espécie no sentido epistemológico, e não no seu sentido lógico (gênero e espécie). Desse modo, o termo diz respeito a uma semelhança ou representação da coisa. 62 intelecto também produz a espécie inteligível a partir da imagem. 163 Desse modo, pergunta-se: "qual é o papel do intelecto e qual o papel do objeto singular na produção da espécie inteligível? O intelecto exerce toda atividade nesta produção? Ou ele é meramente passivo e toda atividade está do lado do objeto singular?". 164 Para Scotus, há uma dupla causalidade na intelecção. Com efeito, nem o objeto, nem a espécie sensível fornecem ao intelecto algum tipo de poder para que este venha a exercer sua causalidade. Por outros termos, nem a espécie sensível, nem o objeto são capazes de causar algo mais perfeito do que eles mesmos, ou seja, uma intelecção. Por outro lado, o intelecto também não oferece poder algum para que o objeto ou a espécie sensível exerçam sua causalidade, visto que o objeto é causa parcial da intelecção em virtude de sua própria natureza, e não por algo recebido do intelecto. De fato, a capacidade de produzir uma intelecção, ou seja, a capacidade do intelecto, é mais perfeita do que a capacidade de ser causa parcial da intelecção por sua própria natureza. Por isso, é dito que uma causalidade é mais perfeita que a outra. Não obstante, cada causa é perfeita em sua própria causalidade, no sentido de que nenhuma causalidade recebe o seu poder de causar da outra. 165 Gilson 166 elabora uma síntese acerca da dupla causalidade do intelecto e do objeto/espécie. Segundo ele, o intelecto é de fato causa ativa da intelecção; a espécie, porém, determina qual é a intelecção do intelecto. Assim, enquanto a espécie determina o conteúdo da intelecção, o intelecto age sobre a espécie para que a intelecção se consolide. Para Scotus, portanto, o intelecto não é totalmente passivo na sua ação. Depois desta breve exposição sobre a dupla causalidade na intelecção, Scotus passa a apresentar sua posição sobre a mudança apetitiva. 4.2.2.6 Explicação sobre a mudança apetitiva Para alguns pensadores, a mudança apetitiva ocorre na vontade de maneira absolutamente passiva. O homem não é livre, pois, assim como o calor necessariamente aquece, a vontade é também necessariamente movida por seu objeto conhecido. Além disso, "dizem que não está em nosso poder fazer as <coisas> que devem ser conhecidas se 163 RIBAS CEZAR, 1996, p. 57. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid., p. 59. 166 GILSON, Étienne. Jean Duns Scot – Introduction a sés positiones fondamentales. Paris, Vrin, 1927, p. 532 apud RIBAS CEZAR, Cesar, 1996, p. 60. 63 apresentarem a nós pela primeira vez". 167 Se a vontade é totalmente passiva, movida pelo objeto conhecido, e o primeiro conhecimento do objeto não está em nosso poder, então não há uma vontade realmente livre, o que contradiz nossa própria experiência. Portanto a vontade deve ser ativa em relação ao seu ato e capaz de automovimento. Quando tratamos da mudança apetitiva no homem, deparamo-nos com a questão da cocausalidade entre intelecto e vontade. Nas Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, Scotus não aprofunda o tema da mudança apetitiva. No entanto, creio ser conveniente traçar aqui um breve panorama sobre algumas mudanças que ocorrem na vontade. Há uma oposição essencial entre natureza e liberdade e, segundo o Doutor Sutil, todo o princípio de ação é natural ou livre. Quanto a isso, ele escreve: Ora, genericamente só pode haver dois modos de elicitar a operação própria: ou a potência é de si determinada a agir, de modo que, no que depende de si, não pode não agir, quando não é impedida por algo extrínseco; ou não é de si determinada, mas pode agir <elicitando> este ato ou o ato oposto, também <pode> agir ou não agir. A primeira potência é comumente chamada "natureza", a segunda é chamada "vontade". 168 Há uma nítida delimitação entre natureza como representante da esfera do determinismo e a vontade como representante da esfera do indeterminismo ou da liberdade. O intelecto, embora tenhamos visto que ele é ativo na constituição das espécies inteligíveis, opera segundo o modo da natureza, isto é, necessariamente. "Aliás, o axioma que rege a atividade natural se aplica não só ao intelecto, mas a toda e qualquer modalidade de conhecimento." 169 As faculdades do conhecimento sensível e do conhecimento intelectivo, quando não impedidas, agem necessariamente. A vista, por exemplo, diante de um objeto colorido devidamente iluminado, opera necessariamente. Por isso, é dito que a vista se submete à ação causal de um objeto. Desse modo, o ato de visão é um ato natural, ou seja, necessário. Da mesma maneira o intelecto e o entendimento não são livres para não aderir a um axioma do tipo: o triângulo é uma figura de três lados. Portanto, a operação natural, isto é, necessária, do ato cognoscitivo não depende da vontade, mas a operação livre da vontade é absolutamente dependente do conhecimento prévio do objeto do seu querer. Em suma, o conhecimento de algo é uma condição sine qua non para que a vontade possa querer ou não querer esse algo. Aliás, essa regra vale para todas as vontades, inclusive a vontade divina. 170 167 DUNS SCOTUS, Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 62. 168 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 15, § 22. 169 GARCIA, 2000, p. 23. 170 Ibid., p. 24. 64 A vontade enquanto princípio de operação livre distingue-se do intelecto enquanto princípio de operação natural, visto que a vontade, embora jamais possa ser um agente absolutamente primeiro, não está determinada para o ato X ou para o seu oposto. Em outras palavras, embora o intelecto apresente algum bem para a vontade, a vontade é absolutamente indeterminada a aderir a esse bem ou não. Assim, "[...] a vontade é um princípio ativo essencialmente autodeterminativo em relação ao seu obrar [...]". 171 A autodeterminação da vontade equivale ao automovimento. Portanto, quando a mudança ocorre na vontade, tal mudança é justificada porque a vontade determina a si mesma. Uma vez dado este breve panorama sobre a mudança apetitiva, passaremos a analisar a conclusão geral da posição de Scotus. 4.3 Conclusão geral da posição de Scotus e resposta a algumas objeções Assim, Scotus mostrou que o automovimento não só é possível, mas também é a melhor explicação para muitos fatos empíricos. Surge, entretanto, uma dúvida: o mundo não seria mais perfeito sem este automovimento? Parece, pois, que o mundo seria mais perfeito se todos os entes fossem criados com todas as suas perfeições. Assim, não seria necessário o movimento dos entes em direção às suas perfeições, e muito menos o automovimento. Scotus responde que, no mundo no qual os entes fossem criados com todas as perfeições, estes seriam totalmente dependentes da causa primeira; ora, a dependência é uma imperfeição. Logo, este mundo não seria mais perfeito do que o mundo no qual os entes têm alguma atividade própria, isto é, alguma independência. 172 O pensamento de Scotus sobre a perfeição da atividade do ente em detrimento da imperfeição da passividade pode ser assim expresso: Logo, é melhor um mundo no qual os entes, na medida do possível, são ativos em relação à própria perfeição do que um mundo no qual eles não o são. Assim também, seria menos perfeito um mundo no qual os entes fossem gerados já possuindo todas as perfeições que lhe são possíveis do que este mundo, no qual os entes são gerados carentes de algumas perfeições que lhe são possíveis, pois neste mundo os entes são ativos em relação a estas perfeições e naquele mundo tal atividade não seria possível. Com efeito, é mais perfeito o ente que pode causar algo ativamente do que o ente que não possui este poder. 173 171 GARCIA, 2000, p. 25. 172 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, §§ 63, 64, 67. 173 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 25. 65 Contra esta posição, é feita a seguinte objeção: o mundo é mais perfeito na medida em que suas partes estão interconectadas harmonicamente, de modo que uma parte depende das outras para se tornarem perfeitas. 174 Scotus responde dizendo que esta concepção é errada. Para ele, é mais perfeito o mundo no qual as partes são independentes umas das outras. Surge uma última objeção, se é mais perfeito o mundo no qual as partes não dependem umas das outras, então por que o mundo criado não é totalmente composto de entes independentes? Constatamos empiricamente que há dependência neste mundo. 175 Scotus responde que o mundo composto de seres totalmente independentes seria mais perfeito, mas este mundo não é possível. Não é possível dar aos entes criados todas as causalidades necessárias para que eles produzam sozinhos suas perfeições. Exemplo: um touro, para criar, precisa de sua causalidade (o sêmen) e da causalidade do sol (energia); estas duas causalidades não podem estar "unitivamente" no mesmo sujeito sem contradição. Portanto, não é possível um mundo de entes totalmente independentes. 176 Para Scotus, o mundo criado é o mais perfeito, porque nele há tanta independência e automovimento quanto possível. 174 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 65. 175 Ibid., § 66. 176 Ibid., § 73. 66 5 RESPOSTA DE SCOTUS AOS ARGUMENTOS EM FAVOR DA OPINIÃO COMUM Aqui o Doutor Sutil passa a responder aos três primeiros argumentos contra o automovimento. 5.1 Resposta ao primeiro argumento Podemos dizer, sucintamente, que o primeiro argumento divide o todo de algo em partes. Desse modo, uma parte quantitativamente distinta move outra parte quantitativamente distinta segundo o lugar. Além disso, se o todo de algo se move em primeiro lugar, isto é, independentemente de suas partes, então esse algo pode repousar quando suas partes estão em repouso e pode também se mover com o repouso das mesmas. Segundo Scotus, não é contraditório dizer que uma afecção homogênea, tal como o movimento local, esteja presente em primeiro lugar num todo integral ou quantitativo. 177 A fim de justificar sua posição, o Doutor Sutil também recorre à autoridade de Aristóteles, pois em sua Física V, 178 o Filósofo diz que há casos em que aquilo que está em movimento não se move nem acidentalmente nem por meio de uma parte integrante da própria coisa, mas em virtude de si mesmo. Scotus defende que o automovimento de um todo cujas partes não se movem não é, de forma alguma, contraditório. Segundo o Doutor Sutil, é possível identificarmos, em algumas relações entre sujeito e atributo, sujeitos que, independentemente de suas partes, possuem em si mesmos o primeiro movimento fundante, ou seja, o movimento primário ou originário. O homem, por exemplo, é a fonte primária da risibilidade, pois a risibilidade não é dita ser uma parte do homem. Por conseguinte, o homem é capaz de produzir a risibilidade ainda que todas as suas outras partes estejam em repouso. Em linhas gerais, pode-se dizer que, embora o homem seja um ser constituído de partes heterogêneas, ainda que tais partes estejam em repouso, ele não é impedido de causar a risibilidade. 177 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 74. 178 ARISTÓTELES. Física V, 224a 21-29. 67 Da mesma maneira que a risibilidade é produzida pelo homem, o atributo "dois ângulos retos" é algo produzido pelo próprio triângulo enquanto um universal. Do mesmo modo, os atributos ponto e reta pertencem à linha enquanto universal. Esses atributos, embora sejam partes que constituem o triângulo e a linha, são posteriores aos seus respectivos sujeitos universais. 179 De certa maneira, podemos dizer que há uma espécie de relação de paternidade e filiação entre o universal e seu atributo essencial. O triângulo é anterior ao seu atributo de ser uma figura de dois ângulos retos. Desse modo, podemos pensar que o triângulo está continuamente causando seu atributo. Portanto, o triângulo primitivo, como um todo, produz seu atributo "dois ângulos retos" primariamente, isto é, sem o concurso do movimento de nenhuma de suas partes. Um dos problemas de se afirmar que nada é movido por si em primeiro lugar encontra-se no movimento de substâncias homogêneas. Se considerarmos as substâncias homogêneas em partes, chegaríamos ao absurdo de afirmar que, se uma das partes do fogo não estiver ativa, então o fogo não será quente. Agora, se considerarmos o todo do fogo como causa efetiva do próprio calor, ou seja, como o todo movido por si em primeiro lugar, então podemos afirmar que o fogo é quente, ainda que hipoteticamente alguma de suas partes homogêneas não seja quente. Portanto, o primeiro argumento da opinião comum, ou seja, que nada se move a não ser talvez em partes, isto é, que uma parte move outra, quando aplicado no movimento do fogo, implica uma contradição, isto é, que o fogo "[...] não será quente se a parte dele não for quente e que é quente se a parte dele não é quente". 180 Se um objeto homogêneo encontra-se em repouso ou movimento, suas respectivas partes homogêneas, inevitavelmente, acompanharão o todo. Agora, se considerarmos o movimento primário de causalidade, não é contraditório pensar que um todo possa ativar-se sem o concurso das partes e sem o concurso de outro. Quando um grave, por exemplo, movese para baixo, é evidente que o todo de tal corpo também se move. Entretanto, de acordo com Scotus, o próprio grave é a causa ativa de seu movimento para baixo. Desse modo, assim como a propriedade flui continuamente da essência, o movimento descendente flui da natureza de um grave. Por isso, diz-se que a relação entre um objeto grave e seu movimento para baixo é a mesma relação que se dá entre um homem e a risibilidade. 181 A relação que se estabelece entre um homem e a risibilidade denota o movimento primário de causalidade, isto é, o homem ativa a risibilidade sem o concurso de suas partes e 179 ARISTÓTELES. Segundos analíticos I, 73b 30-74a 1. 180 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 74. 181 EFFLER, 1962, p. 59. 68 sem o concurso de um eficiente externo. No entanto, como é possível admitir o movimento primário de causalidade num corpo homogêneo? A princípio, o movimento primário de causalidade de um grave não pode ser admitido porque, se o fizermos, deveremos admitir que um corpo grave é capaz de se mover, ainda que uma de suas partes permaneça em repouso. Em outras palavras, se negarmos o movimento de uma parte do corpo grave, obviamente, o movimento do todo também deve ser negado. Portanto, um corpo pesado não pode mover-se por si em primeiro lugar sem que uma de suas partes se mova. 182 Em relação a essa objeção, devemos estar cientes de que estamos tratando de sujeitos homogêneos dotados de propriedades homogêneas. O total movimento de um corpo homogêneo pressupõe e depende do movimento das partes homogêneas; da mesma maneira, a totalidade em si mesma homogênea depende de suas partes homogêneas. Se prescindirmos das partes, não há totalidade; sem o movimento das partes, não há movimento do todo. Agora, se admitirmos as partes, e se admitirmos também que todas as partes estão em movimento, então o todo de um corpo grave move-se por si mesmo em primeiro lugar, porquanto cada uma das partes move-se por si mesma. Ora, se cada parte grave é a causa de seu próprio movimento, qual é a causa do movimento do todo senão as próprias partes consideradas de maneira cumulativa? Todas as partes, porém, constituem o todo do corpo. 183 Em linhas gerais, pode-se perguntar: se as partes homogêneas causam elas mesmas o seu próprio movimento, por que o todo homogêneo, o qual é idêntico às partes, não pode causar seu próprio movimento independente das partes? Desse modo, enquanto o corpo grave é o sujeito, o movimento descendente é seu atributo; da mesma maneira que o homem é sujeito ativo do atributo risibilidade, o grave é o ativo do atributo movimento descendente. Scotus alerta para o fato de que a opinião comum não admite que algo singular possa ser o sujeito primeiro de uma afecção própria, pois, dado que todos os singulares estão abarcados dentro de um universal, então o que "move em primeiro lugar" é a forma abstraída de toda quantidade. 184 O Doutor Sutil não nega o fato de que todo singular pertença a um universal, porém, no que diz respeito a algo que se move "em primeiro lugar", admite uma equivocação. Em outras palavras, o movimento "em primeiro lugar" de um todo pode ser explicado recorrendo-se à sua forma, bem como à unidade e identidade intrínseca entre movido e movente; no primeiro caso é dito que algo é movido por outro; no segundo caso é dito que algo se move por si mesmo. 182 EFFLER, 1962, p. 61. 183 Ibid., p. 61. 184 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 75. 69 Após expor por que não concorda com a universalização do princípio cinesiológico, Scotus passa a responder ao segundo argumento. 5.2 Resposta ao segundo argumento O segundo argumento apresentado pela opinião geral fundamenta-se na relação ato e potência. Não se admite que algo possa estar, ao mesmo tempo e sob o mesmo aspecto, em ato e em potência. Segundo essa opinião, se algo pode mover-se por si mesmo, ou seja, atualizar-se sem a necessidade de comunicação de outro ente em ato, então esse algo já é aquilo que ainda não é. Acerca da relação ato e potência, Henrique de Gand 185 diz que "[...] por vezes há no automovente muitos <elementos> intencionalmente distintos, e que move segundo um deles e é movido segundo o outro". Por elementos intencionalmente distintos deve-se entender que tal distinção é feita pelo intelecto. Segundo essa posição, a distinção intencional entre parte ativa e parte passiva denota que não é o mesmo que se move primeiramente, além disso, nem está em ato e potência segundo o mesmo. Henrique de Gand utiliza como exemplo a vontade para explicar a distinção intencional. Segundo ele, a vontade é um apetite e é livre. Enquanto livre, a vontade é uma forma, um ato, é algo ativo e movente; enquanto um apetite, ela é um princípio material ou potencial, algo passivo e movido, o receptor do movimento. Da mesma maneira que a matéria padece a ação da forma, a vontade, tomada como apetite, é o elemento potencial e receptivo; por outro lado, se considerada como uma faculdade livre, a vontade é ativa, assim como a forma é ativa em relação à matéria. 186 Observa-se que, para Henrique de Gand, a distinção entre a parte ativa e a parte passiva da vontade é meramente conceitual. Assim, a vontade é uma só potência, seja ela considerada enquanto apetite, seja ela também considerada enquanto uma potência livre. É por essa razão que se diz que ela move-se por si mesma. Por isso, a vontade como um todo é movente e movível. Uma vez que a vontade ora é apetite (potência), ora é livre (ato), isso significa que a vontade, ao mesmo tempo e segundo o mesmo aspecto, não pode estar em ato e em potência. Portanto, a concessão do automovimento da vontade, de nenhuma maneira, 185 HENRIQUE DE GAND. Quodlibet IX, q. 5, ad arg. In opp.; Quodlibet X, q. 9 in corp apud DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 76. 186 EFFLER, 1962, p. 63, 64. 70 viola o princípio que diz: algo não pode estar simultaneamente em potência e em ato segundo o mesmo aspecto. 187 Ao admitir que a vontade movente é de algum modo distinta da vontade movida, Scotus, até certo ponto, concorda com Henrique de Gand. Também para Scotus, a vontade é ativa na medida em que ela é uma potência capaz de produzir um ato de vontade; a vontade é passiva quando é privada de um ato de vontade, porquanto ela é receptora do ato. No entanto, para Scotus, a distinção entre a parte ativa e a parte passiva da vontade não é meramente conceitual, antes é real. Isso é afirmado porque um efeito real, isto é, a passagem da potência ao ato não depende de um ato de razão para que a mudança ocorra. Nesse sentido, Scotus escreve: "Ora, se é requerida alguma diferença em algo para que se mova e este efeito é real, então é preciso que aquela diferença seja real, pois um efeito real não depende de um ato de razão". 188 Além disso, sabe-se que qualquer espécie possui um gênero e uma diferença específica. O homem, por exemplo, pertence ao gênero animal e sua diferença específica é a racionalidade. A animalidade enquanto gênero é algo indeterminado, pois tanto a forma da racionalidade quanto a forma de um felino podem ativar a potencialidade do gênero animal. Segundo a posição de Henrique de Gand, a distinção entre gênero e diferença específica também é meramente conceitual. Desse modo, somente pela intenção, ou seja, pela distinção conceitual "[...] qualquer espécie poderia mover segundo a forma da diferença e ser movida segundo a forma do gênero". 189 Para Scotus, a forma da diferença é uma realidade que atualiza outra realidade, no caso a forma da animalidade. No entanto, embora a forma possa atualizar a matéria e até mesmo outra forma, isso não implica que as mudanças da matéria sejam necessariamente causadas pela forma. Scotus sustenta que num todo essencial há uma real distinção entre as partes essenciais. Todavia, nesse todo essencial, a forma nunca move a matéria. 190 Por isso, diz-se que a água aquecida, por exemplo, torna-se fria por si mesma, pois, ao resfriar-se, a forma da água não atua sobre a matéria. Desse modo, a água não é uma substância meramente passiva. O Doutor Sutil alega que um sujeito em ato recebe seu atributo próprio por meio de sua diferença específica própria, e não pela forma do gênero ou de seu agente gerador. Caso isso ocorresse, ou seja, caso o sujeito fosse absolutamente passivo na atualização de sua diferença específica própria, teríamos os seguintes problemas: [a] caso o atributo estivesse 187 EFFLER, 1962, p. 64. 188 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 77, grifo meu. 189 Ibid., § 78. 190 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 79. 71 presente no sujeito somente por causa de algumas características mais gerais, as quais foram inseridas no sujeito no momento em que foi concebido, o atributo não seria (primeiramente) parte natural do sujeito. Ademais, lê-se na obra do Estagirita que, de fato, não é o homem que vive primeiramente "[...], pois a alma, na qual a vida reside diretamente, é uma parte do homem [...]", 191 no entanto, "[...] o homem vive em virtude de si mesmo [...]"; 192 e não porque seu agente gerador permanece atualizando seu ato de viver; [b] se o atributo próprio de um sujeito já estivesse presente na forma do gênero, logo não haveria atributo próprio, pois todos seriam idênticos. 193 Portanto, a forma da diferença parece ser produzida pelo próprio sujeito, isto é, sem nenhuma conexão necessária com seu agente gerador e até mesmo com a forma de seu gênero. A distinção da vontade em parte movente e parte movida é algo que Scotus admite no âmbito da diferenciação formal, 194 no entanto, o argumento da incompatibilidade entre potência e ato, de nenhuma maneira, ameaça a tese do automovimento, visto que o Doutor Sutil apoia-se em importantes distinções acerca das noções de potência e ato. Ao analisar os significados equívocos da noção de "potência", Scotus aponta para três relevantes sentidos. Trataremos, primeiramente, da noção de potência modal, a qual pode ser considerada como modo e como princípio. 195 A potência considerada como modo diz respeito ao estado ou determinação do ser e é por essa razão que é chamada de potência metafísica. Todavia, a potência modal ou potência metafísica abarca três significados diferentes. Em primeiro lugar, potência metafísica pode denotar mera possibilidade de existência; nessa acepção, o ser potencial, ou, antes, o ser possível, é aquele para o qual a existência não é contraditória. A compatibilidade com a existência expressa a natureza do ser possível, o qual é denominado ser transcendental na metafísica escotista. Segundo Scotus, tudo aquilo que pode ser pensado sem contradição é um ser possível. Por isso, esse ser possível (ser transcendental) é coextensivo com todo ser. Contudo, o ser possível é diretamente oposto ao ser impossível; um círculo quadrado, por exemplo, não é um ente possível, visto que não pode ser pensado sem contradição. 196 Em segundo lugar, considera-se que o ser potencial é oposto ao ser necessário. Conforme a concepção aviceniana de mundo, o ser possível não é necessário em si mesmo, mas apenas em sua causa; por isso, o ser contingente deve ser diferenciado do ser necessário, 191 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica V, 1022a 33. 192 Ibid., 1022a 31-32. 193 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 80. 194 Cabe ressaltar aqui que, para Scotus, a distinção formal é uma distinção real. 195 EFFLER, 1962, p. 67-68. 196 Ibid., p. 68. 72 o qual existe necessariamente. Enquanto o ser do ente necessário é indefectível, o ser do ente contingente é defectível. Quanto ao terceiro sentido de potência metafísica, diz-se que potência é aquilo que é simultaneamente incompatível com seu ato correspondente. Em outras palavras, um mesmo ente não pode estar simultaneamente em ato e potência sob o mesmo aspecto. Desse modo, o ato de uma coisa é aquilo por força do qual a coisa é quando não mais está em potência. 197 Essa última acepção de potência metafísica é, sem dúvida, uma das mais difíceis de ser explicada, pois, em geral, admite-se que algo em potência padece mudança desde que algo em ato atualize a mudança, visto que a mera passividade de algo não é suficiente para que a mudança ocorra. Assim, esse terceiro sentido de potência parece colocar a tese do automovimento em cheque. Tal posição de Henrique de Gand é assim expressa: "Assim, para que um ente cause mudança em si mesmo é preciso que seja simultaneamente em ato e em potência, em relação ao mesmo, o que parece ser impossível". 198 5.2.1 Solução de Scotus sobre a incompatibilidade da potencialidade e atualidade simultânea A noção de potência tomada estritamente no terceiro sentido é, certamente, oposta ao ato. Por isso, Scotus concede que, se a atualidade e a potencialidade de algo forem consideradas sob o seu modo de ser, então, de fato, a mesma coisa não pode estar simultaneamente em ato e potência segundo o mesmo aspecto. A água, por exemplo, quando é quente em ato, não é fria em ato, mas só em potência. 199 Entretanto, se tomarmos o ato e a potência sob aspectos diversos, é possível admitir a potencialidade e a atualidade simultânea de algo, por exemplo, a mesma água quente em ato está simultaneamente fria em potência. Ainda que a água quente produza sua própria mudança qualitativa, isto é, o seu resfriamento, em virtude de seu poder de se resfriar, o qual se encontra nela em ato, ao mesmo tempo que ela é quente em ato, o princípio de incompatibilidade do ato e potência não é violado, visto 197 EFFLER, 1962, p. 69. 198 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p.23. 199 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 82. 73 que a água, a qual é ativa em sua mudança qualitativa, de nenhuma maneira, encontra-se em ato e potência segundo o mesmo aspecto. 200 Ato e potência tomados em seu sentido modal referem-se a diferenças primárias do modo de ser de algo. Todavia, a potência referente ao modo de ser e a potência enquanto princípio são duas coisas distintas: no primeiro caso, há de fato uma incompatibilidade de simultaneidade, porquanto uma e mesma coisa não pode estar num estado no qual está para adquirir certa perfeição que já possui; no segundo caso, nada impede que a simultaneidade do ato e potência esteja presente no mesmo. A potência é oposta ao ato quando ela implica uma negação do ato. Quando digo, por exemplo, que esta cadeira é potencialmente verde, a relação de oposição entre ato e potência é algo evidente. Da mesma maneira, quando digo: esta cadeira é verde, a atualidade do verde implica a negação da potencialidade do verde. A relação de oposição entre ato e potência não é mútua, visto que aquilo que está absolutamente em ato não necessita de nenhuma relação de potencialidade para ser aquilo que já é. Por outro lado, aquilo que está em potência sempre estará relacionado com o seu termo, isto é, o ato. Todavia, é bom salientar que, para Scotus, o ato é por natureza anterior à potência; agora, se considerarmos o âmbito temporal, a potência é anterior ao ato. 201 A noção de potência e ato tomada como princípio opõe-se à noção de potência e ato tomada enquanto modo de ser do ente. Enquanto modo de ser do ente, uma forma está algumas vezes em potência e algumas vezes em ato. Numa semente de girassol, por exemplo, a forma do girassol encontra-se em potência e a forma da semente encontra-se em ato. Desse modo, no que diz respeito ao modo de ser, ou temos uma semente de girassol atualizada ou temos um girassol atualizado, pois não é possível que a semente, em seu modo de ser, seja simultaneamente girassol e semente, e vice-versa. Por outro lado, se potência e ato forem considerados como princípio, então uma forma nunca está em potência, mas sempre em ato; ainda que seu modo seja potencial. Portanto, a forma do girassol contida na semente (potência enquanto princípio) encontra-se formalmente em ato naquilo que também está em ato segundo o modo de ser, isto é, a semente. Desse modo, a lei do ato e potência, a qual diz que uma e mesma coisa não pode estar simultaneamente em potência e em ato segundo o mesmo aspecto, deve restringir-se apenas ao modo de ser do ente. 202 200 EFFLER, 1962, p. 76-77. 201 Ibid., p. 71. 202 Ibid., p. 76. 74 Por ora, foi visto que potência e ato são simultaneamente incompatíveis quanto ao aspecto modal do mesmo ser, mas será que o mesmo pode ser dito se tomarmos potência e ato como princípio de um e mesmo ser? Pois bem, potência ou é uma causa material ou é uma causa eficiente. Ambas, porém, sugerem uma relação com um efeito, o qual é chamado de ato, e o último diz respeito ao estado de algo que não mais se encontra no modo de potência. Um ato de vontade, por exemplo, não pode ser simultaneamente uma potência da vontade em relação ao mesmo: se a vontade quer água em ato, ela não pode simultaneamente estar querendo água em potência. Entretanto, um e mesmo supósito pode ter duas naturezas, das quais uma é princípio ativo, enquanto a outra é princípio passivo. A potência, por exemplo, pode ser atribuída ao homem em virtude de algum princípio ativo, tal como a vontade. Ao mesmo tempo, o ato também é algo próprio ao homem em virtude de um ato de vontade particular. Portanto, tanto a potência (causa eficiente) quanto o ato (efeito ou forma) são simultaneamente verificados num único supósito, embora ambos compreendam duas entidades realmente distintas. 203 Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: 204 Se se refere ao principiado, concedo, enquanto este for chamado ato, pois nada essencialmente o mesmo é potência e ato, pois nenhuma essência una se principia efetivamente em sentido próprio, nem em qualquer outro gênero de princípio. Mas o mesmo supósito pode ter duas naturezas, uma das quais é princípio ativo e outra principiado, e assim está em potência – é "potente" pelo princípio ativo – e em ato, ou é ato, pelo principiado. Na ordem temporal a potência é anterior ao ato, mas isso não impede que o ato e a potência sejam simultaneamente verificados no mesmo supósito. Um supósito é simultaneamente composto de um princípio potencial em referência a outro princípio que é ato. Se isso não fosse possível, nenhum supósito poderia ser o sujeito de determinações acidentais. Em outras palavras, tudo permaneceria inalterável: a semente sempre seria semente, o intelecto do homem não poderia atualizar nenhum conhecimento possível etc. "Assumir", escreve Scotus, "que ambos não podem estar no mesmo supósito é assumir que nenhum supósito pode ser principiado deste modo. Assim, nenhum supósito seria composto de um princípio potencial e do princípio que é dito ato, o que é falso". 205 Além da lei que expressa incompatibilidade entre potência e ato, há também outro princípio que diz: ninguém dá aquilo que não tem. Com esse princípio em mente, pergunta-se: como pode a mesma coisa ser tanto ativa quanto passiva em relação à própria perfeição que ainda não possui? Ora, se algo possui em si mesmo o princípio ativo da própria perfeição, isso 203 EFFLER, 1962, p. 78. 204 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 84. 205 Ibid., § 85. 75 significa que esse algo já possui tal perfeição, mas, se esse algo já possui tal perfeição, então o princípio ativo não pode ativar-se naquilo que já é. Essa objeção diz respeito à noção escotista de ato virtual. Scotus admite que algo não pode estar simultaneamente em ato e potência em relação ao mesmo modo de ser. É impossível que a semente de uma árvore, por exemplo, esteja simultaneamente em ato e potência em relação ao modo de ser semente, visto que, se é semente em ato, logo não é semente em potência. Mas será que é possível que a semente já possua, ao menos de algum modo, a árvore em ato? Se sim, então uma mesma coisa pode estar simultaneamente em ato e potência em relação a aspectos diversos. Ora, se uma mesma coisa pode estar simultaneamente em ato e potência sob aspectos diversos, então parece que aquilo que atualiza para o termo da mudança não precisa ser necessariamente outro. Para que um ente produza algum tipo de mudança em si mesmo, ele precisa estar formalmente em potência para o termo da mudança, pois não pode ser em ato aquilo para o qual tende, caso contrário não ocorreria a mudança. Como vimos anteriormente, seria contraditório dizer que a semente em ato é simultaneamente, no que diz respeito ao seu modo de ser, semente em potência. Entretanto, o mesmo ente pode possuir a sua forma final de modo virtual. Em outras palavras, o termo da mudança da semente de um girassol é o próprio girassol, o qual está contido em ato virtual na semente. Desse modo, não há nenhuma contradição em dizer que o mesmo ente encontra-se simultaneamente em ato e potência, visto que "[...] o ente pode ser virtualmente em ato o termo da mudança ao mesmo tempo em que está formalmente em potência para este termo. Não há contradição, pois o ente está simultaneamente em ato e em potência [...] sob aspectos diversos". 206 Um dos fatores que nos leva a admitir que uma semente tenha em si mesma o princípio ativo da mudança (o ato virtual de seu termo) repousa na experiência. Em primeiro lugar, uma semente de girassol, por exemplo, se torna um girassol, e não uma orquídea, em virtude de algo intrínseco à semente, e não em decorrência de fatores externos. Se na semente de girassol não houvesse nada em ato, então deveríamos dizer que aquilo que produziu o girassol foi a qualidade do solo, seus nutrientes, a água etc. Todavia, ao plantarmos duas sementes distintas sob os mesmos fatores externos, por que uma delas transforma-se em girassol e a outra em orquídea? Portanto, parece que aquilo que provoca a mudança na semente encontra-se virtualmente em ato na própria semente, ao mesmo tempo que a semente encontra-se formalmente em ato. 206 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 23. 76 De fato, não há nenhuma contradição em admitir-se que o mesmo encontra-se simultaneamente virtualmente em ato e formalmente em potência. Contudo, aquilo que se encontra em ato virtual é o mesmo ou é outro? Por outros termos, a árvore virtualmente contida na semente é algo distinto da semente ou forma com ela uma espécie de todo homogêneo? Se a árvore contida na semente em ato virtual formar uma unidade homogênea com a semente, então o automovimento é preservado. Agora, se for outra coisa distinta da semente, parece, então, que a semente é movida por outro. Em linhas gerais, pode-se dizer que, se um princípio ativo particular pode causar alguma perfeição, então esse princípio já deve possuir, ao menos de algum modo, tal perfeição. Mas como esse princípio ativo possui tal perfeição? Conforme Scotus, no caso de uma causa unívoca, o princípio ativo deve possuir a perfeição formalmente, isto é, a perfeição deve estar em ato formal. Porém, no caso de uma causa equívoca, a perfeição é possuída virtualmente. Desse modo, a perfeição está em ato, não porém em ato formal, mas em ato virtual. Isso significa que o agente equívoco possui o poder de causar uma perfeição a qual existe em ato virtual nele próprio. 207 Em linhas gerais, pode-se dizer que no pensamento escotista a causa eficiente (agente) e a causa material (paciente) podem, em alguns casos, repousar no mesmo ente, apesar de serem contrárias. Assim, não parece ser contraditório dizer que alguma coisa seja capaz de agir em si mesma em virtude do princípio que diz: ninguém dá aquilo que não tem. A árvore, por exemplo, contida na semente de uma laranjeira encontra-se simultaneamente em ato virtual, o qual é real, e em potência formal em relação ao termo de sua perfeição. Entretanto, para que essa potência formal seja atualizada, é preciso o concurso do ato virtual, sem o qual a potência formal não poderia padecer a mudança. Com relação à contrariedade entre agente e paciente presentes no mesmo ente, Scotus diz que a forma do ato virtual está em ato, portanto, se é em ato, é algo real e contrário à potência formal. Desse modo, a semente não possui a mera potência formal e, por isso, a semente pode dar aquilo que tem, ou seja, seu ato virtual. Nesse sentido, Scotus escreve: "[...] o agente no início é contrário ao passivo virtualmente, na medida em que possui virtualmente a forma formalmente contrária à forma do passivo. Tal contrariedade é suficiente para a ação". 208 Portanto, a contrariedade entre ato virtual e potência formal simultâneos não é um obstáculo para a conjunção simultânea do agente e do paciente no mesmo objeto. 209 207 EFFLER, 1962, p. 81. 208 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 87. 209 EFFLER, op. cit., p. 80. 77 Após apresentar sua solução sobre a incompatibilidade da potencialidade e atualidade simultânea, o Doutor Sutil recebe algumas objeções. 5.2.2 Objeções à resposta de Duns Scotus Objeta-se que um ente em ato, mesmo que só virtualmente, não pode estar ao mesmo tempo em potência formal em relação àquilo que já é. Com efeito, a atualidade, seja ela virtual, seja ela formal, já é uma perfeição. Ora, se o ato virtual já possui a perfeição de seu termo, isto é, o ato formal, então qual é o sentido de produzir uma perfeição já possuída? Além disso, diz-se que o ato virtual é mais perfeito que o ato formal, pois o ato formal de algo só o é em virtude do primeiro. Desse modo, tanto o ato virtual quanto o ato formal parecem eliminar a aquisição de qualquer perfeição possível. Portanto, parece que a perfeição do ato formal, a qual já era possuída virtualmente, é produzida em vão, visto que aquilo que recebe a perfeição do ato virtual não se torna mais perfeito do que antes por meio do ato virtual. 210 Outro argumento contra a afirmação de que algo possa estar em ato virtual e ao mesmo tempo em potência formal para a atualização daquela mesma perfeição já contida no ato virtual diz respeito à presença de atos virtuais em Deus. Deus possui todas as perfeições formais e virtuais das criaturas. Ele possui, por exemplo, a perfeição da inteligência formalmente, isto é, em ato formal. No entanto, a perfeição da corporeidade nele está contida apenas de maneira virtual. Se Deus criou os corpos que nele estavam contidos em atos virtuais, então parece que essa mudança do ato virtual para o ato formal o torna mais perfeito, o que é absurdo para um ser que é ato puro. 211 A mesma coisa ocorreria com o sol, pois a noção de ato virtual no sol tornaria este corpo celeste, considerado incorruptível, corruptível. Na visão medieval, o calor é uma qualidade própria de corpos corruptíveis, porém o sol, bem como os demais corpos celestes, são incorruptíveis. Desse modo, se o sol possuísse o calor em ato virtual, aquilo que é incorruptível tornar-se-ia corruptível. Em outras palavras, o sol, o qual é incorruptível, não pode possuir em ato a imperfeição de seus efeitos, isto é, o calor. Estar em potência passiva para as formas do que pode ser gerado implicaria dizer que, no sol, a corruptibilidade do calor enquanto ato virtual poderia atualizar-se em ato formal naquilo que é considerado um corpo 210 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, §§ 90-91. 211 Ibid., § 92. 78 incorruptível. Portanto, a noção de ato virtual parece apontar para uma imperfeição divina, bem como para a corruptibilidade de coisas consideradas incorruptíveis. 5.2.3 Resposta às objeções Scotus concede que o ato virtual, o qual reside num ente em ato formal, é mais perfeito que o próprio ato formal. Contudo, se o ente onde se encontra o ato virtual é limitado, então este ente não é tão perfeito a ponto de excluir do sujeito toda potencialidade em relação ao ato formal, pois a potência formal, enquanto distinta do ato virtual, é considerada uma perfeição que pode ser acrescentada ao sujeito. É dito, por isso, que um sujeito seria menos perfeito caso não atualizasse seu ato virtual em ato formal. Desse modo, um sujeito que possui uma forma em ato virtual está em potência formal para adquirir uma perfeição em maior grau. 212 Quanto ao argumento que sustenta que a perfeição formal, já produzida virtualmente, é produzida em vão, Scotus afirma que uma perfeição menor não ocorre em vão em algo que já possui uma perfeição maior. Por outro lado, se o ato virtual reunisse todo grau de perfeição que o sujeito pode possuir, aí sim poderia ser dito que a perfeição formal seria produzida em vão. No entanto, dado que a perfeição maior (ato virtual) é limitada, logo tal perfeição é menor que ela mesma junto com outra. Por outros termos, a perfeição de um sujeito limitado, não importando quão grande tal perfeição possa ser, sempre poderá ser aumentada pela adição de uma perfeição menor. Desta maneira, o sujeito privado de uma perfeição, a qual poderia nele ser acrescentada, é menos perfeito que o sujeito que não foi privado de tal perfeição. 213 O argumento anterior traça um paralelo com a relação substância e acidente. É de comum acordo que a substância é mais perfeita que seu acidente. A substância homem, por exemplo, é mais perfeita que seu acidente "conhecer algo". Todavia, a perfeição excedente da substância não a destitui da potencialidade para com seus acidentes. Assim, a perfeição acidental não parece ser algo supérfluo para a substância, porquanto a perfeição acidental adicionada à perfeição substancial, evidentemente, constitui algo maior que a substância tomada sem seus respectivos acidentes. 214 212 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 100. 213 Ibid., § 101. 214 Ibid., § 102. 79 Quanto ao argumento que sugere a imperfeição de Deus e a corruptibilidade do sol por causa do ato virtual presente neles, Scotus assim responde: 215 [...] com efeito, em Deus o ato virtual é infinito. Assim, se – assumindo o impossível – houvesse nele um ato formal, ele não seria mais perfeito, pois o infinito com o finito não é nada maior que o infinito só. Para o Doutor Sutil, a perfeição infinita de Deus impede que haja nele qualquer potencialidade que possa aumentar a sua perfeição. A adição de uma nova perfeição introduziria uma composição em Deus, mas a composição é incompatível com sua infinitude absoluta. Não obstante, se admitirmos o impossível, isto é, se uma perfeição, a qual a essência divina contém virtualmente, fosse recebida (atualizada em ato formal) pela própria perfeição divina, a última, de nenhuma maneira, seria aumentada, pois a perfeição infinita acrescida de uma perfeição finita não constitui algo maior que a perfeição infinita nela mesma. 216 O ato virtual e o ato formal, como ensina Scotus, não sugerem nenhuma contraditoriedade de um para com o outro, e é por isso que eles podem ser simultaneamente admitidos num sujeito singular. Em alguns casos, porém, a simultaneidade do ato virtual e do ato formal num mesmo supósito pode vir a ser algo impossível; tal impossibilidade, contudo, não é oriunda da natureza do ato virtual nem do ato formal, mas, se porventura ocorrer, então tal impossibilidade provém de alguma outra causa. Quanto a isso, escreve Scotus: Com efeito, onde quer um desses atos esteja presente e o outro não possa estar, a presença do outro não é a causa desta impossibilidade, mas outra causa especial, a qual se estivesse presente sem o outro ato continuaria a ser causa desta impossibilidade. 217 Quanto ao sol, é dito que este não pode estar em potência formal em relação a vários tipos de perfeição, por exemplo, o calor. Esta impossibilidade não ocorre porque o sol possua virtualmente esta qualidade, mas porque o calor, na visão dos medievais, é uma qualidade própria de corpos corruptíveis. Por conseguinte, a inerência de calor no sol é impossível por causa de sua incorruptibilidade. Assim, a incorruptibilidade dos corpos celestes justifica por que o sol não pode estar em potência em relação às várias formas que são geradas sob sua influência. 218 A principal objeção contra o automovimento diz que a mesma coisa não pode estar simultaneamente em ato e em potência em relação a uma perfeição. Por ora, diante das justificativas escotistas, vimos que essa asserção não pode ser sustentada, pois, ao analisarmos 215 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 103. 216 EFFLER, 1962, p. 84. 217 DUNS SCOTUS, op. cit., § 103. 218 EFFLER, op. cit., p. 85. 80 o exemplo da árvore, a qual se encontra simultaneamente em ato virtual e em potência formal na semente, nota-se que o ato virtual e a potência formal são simultaneamente compatíveis num único supósito. Desse modo, conclui-se que um ente meramente dotado de potência passiva não pode atualizar-se por si mesmo, a não ser que ele possua algo em ato, ou seja, o ato virtual, o qual é capaz de produzir a mudança. Alegar que a madeira, por exemplo, não é capaz de se inflamar sem a ação de um agente externo, o fogo, é uma verdade empírica. No entanto, isso não parece ser um princípio metafísico. Por outros termos, é possível pensar que a madeira possua em ato virtual o fogo e seja em potência formal o fogo. Se dizemos que a madeira só se inflama devido a um agente externo, esta afirmação está baseada na experiência, e não no princípio metafísico a priori. Portanto, para Scotus, o mesmo sujeito pode, ao mesmo tempo, ser o agente e o paciente da mudança. Após responder às objeções, Scotus passa a responder ao terceiro argumento. 5.3 Resposta ao terceiro argumento Convém lembrar que o terceiro argumento contra a tese do automovimento repousa na autoridade de Aristóteles. Segundo o Filósofo, há uma relação real entre a potência ativa e a potência passiva. Nesse sentido, o Estagirita escreve: "[...] o que pode aquecer está em relação ao que pode ser aquecido segundo a potência, enquanto o que aquece está em relação ao que é aquecido e o que corta está em relação ao que é cortado segundo o ato". 219 Scotus distingue dois tipos de relações opostas: [1] a do produtor com o produzido; [2] a do princípio ativo com o princípio passivo. De fato, é impossível que a primeira relação esteja no mesmo supósito, pois nada gera a si mesmo. Se isso fosse possível, então algo seria quando não era. Ademais, um produtor de natureza una limitada não é capaz de se comunicar inteiramente. Um pai, por exemplo, não se comunica todo ao filho, antes comunica apenas algo de si. Se um pai se comunicasse todo ao filho, deixaria de ser ele mesmo e passaria a ser o filho. Por outro lado, nada impede que a segunda relação (do princípio ativo com o princípio passivo) possa às vezes estar num único supósito. Nesse caso, os princípios relacionados não dependem essencialmente um do outro, porque a dependência entre ambos é acidental, ou seja, enquanto um faz, o outro recebe algo dele, não, porém, o ser. O fogo, por exemplo, é o 219 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica V, 1021a 15-18. 81 princípio ativo do quente e ao mesmo tempo é o princípio passivo da leveza, pois, ao produzir o quente, o próprio fogo recebe o efeito por ele mesmo produzido, a leveza. Sobre os dois tipos de relações opostas, Scotus escreve: Na primeira relação, o produzido depende do produtor, na medida em que isto diz respeito às criaturas. É impossível que a mesma natureza dependa essencialmente de si; mas não é impossível que o mesmo dependa de si quanto a alguma perfeição acidental ou sob certo aspecto. 220 Por ora, vimos que o produtor e o produzido são opostos cuja presença é incompatível na natureza finita e no mesmo supósito. Movente e movível, por outro lado, são opostos compatíveis no mesmo supósito; isso significa que uma única coisa pode ser tanto ativa quanto passiva em relação a uma perfeição acidental. Essa condição não implica de maneira alguma que algo cause a si mesmo ou que seja dependente de si mesmo em relação à sua própria existência. Desse modo, a vontade não depende de si mesma para existir. Por outro lado, a vontade não depende de nada além dela mesma para produzir um ato de vontade particular, visto que ela é simultaneamente agente e paciente (movente e movível) de seus atos. Contra isto se argumenta que os atos virtuais de querer e não querer, presentes no mesmo sujeito, são opostos e por isso são contraditórios. Parece ser um absurdo uma vontade que possua atos virtuais contraditórios, os quais manifestam a seguinte contradição: [a] é verdade que quero A, B, C, D etc., e simultaneamente; [b] é verdade que não quero A, B, C, D etc. Scotus responde a essa objeção dizendo que a presença de opostos relativos no mesmo sujeito não implica nenhuma incompatibilidade, pois naquilo que é distinto dos contraditórios só há oposição formal no abstrato. Além disso, escreve Scotus: "[...] não é contraditório que os contrários sejam simultaneamente, como alguns dizem". 221 Pode ser dito, por exemplo, que o tom de cinza A é claro em relação ao tom de cinza B e que o tom de cinza A é escuro em relação ao tom de cinza C. Nesse caso, portanto, pode ser dito sem nenhuma contradição que o tom de cinza A é simultaneamente claro e escuro. Depois de responder aos argumentos da opinião geral, Scotus passa a responder aos argumentos iniciais. 220 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 107. 221 Ibid., § 113. 82 6 RESPOSTA AOS ARGUMENTOS INICIAIS Lembremo-nos de que o primeiro argumento contra a tese do automovimento repousa na autoridade de Aristóteles, o qual diz: "Por isso, na medida em que algo é uma unidade natural, não pode padecer nada por obra de si mesmo, pois é uma e não duas coisas diferentes". 222 Quanto a essa citação de Aristóteles, Scotus alega que o Estagirita não disse em absoluto que nada move a si mesmo, pois é apenas na medida em que algo é uma unidade natural que o mesmo não pode padecer nada por obra de si. Desse modo, a expressão na medida em que parece impossibilitar a aplicação universal do princípio cinesiológico. 223 Como vimos anteriormente, as coisas que constituem uma unidade natural possuem ou um princípio ativo ou um princípio passivo. Nesse sentido, parece que Aristóteles atribui uma incompatibilidade de automovimento apenas às coisas que constituem uma unidade natural, como a madeira, que, por exemplo, é incapaz de entrar em combustão por si mesma. No entanto, o Filósofo não diz que todas as coisas que existem são unidades naturais, logo não é contraditório pensarmos que, em relação a uma perfeição adquirida, a causa eficiente de um acidente possa estar contida no próprio sujeito que produziu esta perfeição. Em outras palavras, podemos admitir que a causa eficiente esteja dentro da causa material de uma coisa singular. Logo, é possível admitir o automovimento, pois, nesse caso, não é necessário recorrermos a nenhum agente externo. O segundo argumento inicial diz que se algo é simultaneamente agente e paciente, então esse mesmo algo sempre agiria, pois aquela ação não dependeria de algo exterior; precisamente pelo fato de que o mesmo é agente e passivo. Mas, para Scotus, a razão pela qual um movente capaz de automovimento não se move ininterruptamente pode ser qualquer uma destas: [1] aquilo que é simultaneamente agente e paciente não possui uma ação ilimitada, visto que quando o termo final é atingido o agente cessa sua ação, por exemplo: o grave no centro; [2] o agente não age quando é impedido por algo que possui uma virtude contrária mais forte, por exemplo: a presença contínua do fogo a qual impede o resfriamento da água; [3] se o agente de algum efeito não for causa ativa total, também não age se prescindir de outro agente que com ele produza tal efeito, por exemplo: no conhecimento onde tanto o objeto quanto a potência cognitiva agem; [4] se o agente não tiver sobre o que exercer sua ação, também não age, por exemplo: quem nada conhece nada quer, em geral; [5] 222 ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica IX, 1046a 28-30, grifo meu. 223 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 125. 83 se o agente também pressupõe uma ação que não ocorre, também não age; [6] finalmente, se é livre, pode de si não agir, por exemplo: quando o intelecto mostra algo, a vontade é livre para não querer este algo. Assim, é evidente que aquilo que se move por si mesmo não age ininterruptamente. 224 224 DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, § 126. 84 7 Conclusão Uma das principais dificuldades de se aceitar a tese escotista em favor do automovimento repousa na indução. Se no lado escuro da lua fosse encontrado algo análogo às esculturas dos presidentes americanos no Monte Rushmore, a última das conjecturas possíveis seria a de que a escultura lunar é efeito do próprio monte lunar no qual ela se encontra. Mas por qual razão essa seria a mais remota possibilidade? Porque os conhecimentos obtidos por meio da experiência, ou seja, pela indução, nos levam a sustentar o seguinte raciocínio indutivo: todas as esculturas que possuem um grau complexo de perfeição, por exemplo as esculturas de Rodin, são produzidas por uma causa eficiente absolutamente distinta da causa material. No caso das esculturas de Rodin esse princípio é verdadeiro, mas o que dizer do hipotético Monte Rushmore lunar? Para Scotus, os princípios obtidos pela indução não são princípios genuínos, pois, para que um princípio seja genuíno, é necessário que ele seja autoevidente. Desse modo, um princípio genuíno deve ser um primeiro princípio. Utilizando uma terminologia anacrônica, um primeiro princípio é para Scotus um juízo analítico. Os primeiros princípios são proposições evidentes por si mesmas, por exemplo: "[1] o todo é maior que suas partes [...]; [2] todo ente que não existe por si mesmo precisa de uma causa para existir". 225 Como podemos observar, a negação de um primeiro princípio gera necessariamente uma contradição. Se alguém, por exemplo, negasse o primeiro princípio "o verde é distinto do azul", necessariamente entraria em contradição, pois estaria dizendo que o conteúdo intencional do verde e o conteúdo intencional do azul são absolutamente o mesmo. 226 Embora os primeiros princípios sejam o alicerce da indução, pois o próprio princípio primeiro de causalidade fundamenta os raciocínios indutivos, isso não quer dizer que a negação dos raciocínios indutivos gere algum tipo de repugnância ao entendimento. A observação empírica nos dá indícios de que as esculturas com certo grau de complexidade são efeitos de causas eficientes absolutamente distintas das causas materiais. Scotus, porém, é ciente de que "o homem não possui pro statu isto uma visão das potencialidades ocultas das coisas". 227 Desse modo, para Scotus, o hipotético Monte Rushmore lunar poderia sim ter sido um efeito produzido por uma causa eficiente já contida na própria pedra lunar. Em outras 225 RIBAS CEZAR, Cesar. Indução e causalidade em Duns Escoto. In: Cognitio: revista de filosofia. Vol. 8, n. 2. São Paulo: Educ, 2007. p. 301, 303. 226 Ibid., p. 301. 227 Ibid., p. 305. 85 palavras, não há nenhuma contradição em pensar que a causa eficiente e a causa material da escultura sejam o próprio monte lunar. Se observarmos atentamente os flocos de neve, podemos constatar a presença de formas geométricas impressas em cada um dos flocos. 228 Quem é que esculpiu aquelas formas geométricas com alto grau de complexidade em cada floco de neve? A princípio ninguém. Neste caso particular não temos somente um exemplo de automovimento hipotético como o suposto Monte Rushmore lunar, mas temos agora um fato observável concreto. Portanto, é possível ao menos conjecturar que a causa eficiente das complexas figuras geométricas e a causa material são o mesmo ente. Assim, não parece ser verdadeiro o princípio que diz: "tudo o que se move é movido por outro". Diferentemente de Hume, Scotus não sustenta que a indução é um processo irracional ou um condicionamento meramente consolidado pelo hábito. Para Scotus, a indução é sim um processo racional, mas, se comparada ao conhecimento autoevidente dos primeiros princípios, a indução pode nos induzir a erros. Através da indução "[...] não chegamos a uma certeza absoluta, pois não é possível excluir totalmente a possibilidade de erro, mas isso não quer dizer que tais conhecimentos sejam totalmente infundados". 229 Segundo o Doutor Sutil, é possível pensar sem contradição que a madeira possua em ato virtual o fogo e seja em potência formal o fogo. Se dissermos que a madeira só se inflama devido a um agente externo, esta afirmação está baseada na experiência, e não num princípio metafísico a priori, ou seja, num primeiro princípio. Portanto, nenhum primeiro princípio é ferido ao pensarmos numa madeira que entre em combustão sem o concurso de um agente externo. Aliás, pode-se erroneamente pensar que Scotus abre mão do princípio de causalidade. Isso não é verdade, pois, se a madeira passou por alguma mudança, tal mudança obviamente precisa de uma causa, mas, para Scotus, o agente não precisa ser algo necessariamente distinto do paciente. Em suas Questões sobre a metafísica IX, q. 14, Scotus, infelizmente, não define o que é um ato virtual. No entanto, o termo virtual, na linguagem escolástica, "[...] opõe-se a formal; marca o que uma coisa é em essência ou em potência, ainda que não seja assim formaliter ou in actu". 230 Considerando o ensinamento de Scotus, é dito que numa semente encontram-se dois atos: [a] o ato virtual ou potência formal; [b] o ato formal. O ato virtual da semente não parece 228 As figuras e imagens das formas "esculpidas" em flocos de neve encontram-se disponíveis em: <http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro:SnowflakesWilsonBentley.jpg>. Acesso em: 13 nov. 2012. 229 RIBAS CEZAR, 2007, p. 311. 230 LALANDE, André. Vocabulário técnico e crítico da filosofia. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. p. 1217. 86 ser uma mera distinção conceitual, pois, se assim fosse, não seria denominado "ato". Assim, ainda que seja algo virtual, tal ato tem que ter algum tipo de ser. A meu ver, o problema se dá justamente no processo de mudança da forma semente para a forma árvore. Se tanto o ato virtual quanto o formal possuem um estatuto ontológico, ou seja, um ser, então, pergunta-se: quem é que age sobre quem? Se a semente perder seu ato formal (ser semente), porque o ato virtual (ser árvore) nela contida age sobre a semente, então o princípio cinesiológico permanece verdadeiro nesse caso, pois a mudança do ser semente para o ser árvore foi produzida por outro. Agora, se o ato virtual (ser árvore), ainda que seja alguma espécie de energia, somente for capaz de modificar o ato formal da semente porque a última primeiramente se move para que o ato virtual a modifique, então ao menos o automovimento parcial da semente é preservado. Por outro lado, é possível pensar que quem age sobre o ato virtual é o ato formal, ou seja, a forma da semente almeja atingir a forma nela virtualmente contida, mas, nesse caso, a forma em ato virtual funcionaria como uma causa final. Portanto, ainda que considerássemos a atividade automovente da semente que se move para adquirir a forma de seu ato virtual, isso implicaria dizer que o ato formal (ser semente) foi movido pelo seu telos nela contida em ato virtual. A presença de dois atos no mesmo ente, o virtual e o formal, estabelece uma divisão de funções entre eles que aponta para nossa incapacidade de chegar a uma efetiva conclusão acerca da causa do movimento. Por isso, sem uma pesquisa mais aprofundada sobre a noção de ato virtual em Scotus, não é possível dizer se no caso da mudança na semente o princípio cinesiológico permanece verdadeiro ou não. De qualquer forma, a experiência nos mostra que, dentre uma gama de sementes cultivadas sob as mesmas condições, algumas se desenvolvem, outras não. Há também figueiras que dão frutos e outras não. A efetiva causa do processo de mudança na semente e nos demais corpos não é tão autoevidente quanto um axioma, por conseguinte, Scotus alerta para o fato de que não é prudente afirmar a priori que tudo que se move é movido por outro. Ao romper com o princípio do movimento aristotélico, Scotus sustenta que ao menos alguns entes podem mover-se por si mesmos. Algumas coisas podem mover-se localmente, qualitativamente e localmente. Ainda que em alguns casos o automovimento seja parcial ou cocausal, como ocorre na cocausalidade entre intelecto e vontade, a distinção entre movente e movido não pode se sustentar como um princípio universalmente válido, pois na própria mudança cocausal não é negado o automovimento das partes. Ao longo desta pesquisa, vimos que o Doutor Sutil não admite a absoluta passividade nem da matéria nem das potências da alma. Para Scotus, não há nenhum problema em admitir 87 que Deus criou seres capazes de se moverem por si mesmos. Por isso, após serem criadas, as criaturas não necessitam de um impulso inicial da parte de Deus. Portanto, para Scotus, Deus constituiu um universo no qual pelo menos algumas coisas, tomadas em seu todo e em suas partes, não necessariamente precisam de outro para atingir seus respectivos termos. Após comentar a questão do automovimento na esfera material, passo agora a tecer algumas considerações finais sobre o automovimento na vontade. Existe uma opinião corrente que alega que objeto conhecido move a vontade como causa final. Na concepção de Scotus, o objeto não é a causa total da volição. Nem o objeto nem a imagem (fantasma) podem ser a causa total da volição, porque, enquanto agentes naturais (não livres), eles não poderiam causar atos contrários num único e mesmo sujeito, isto é, na vontade. Por outro lado, a vontade é capaz de atos contrários em referência a um único e mesmo objeto. A vontade é capaz de aceitar ou rejeitar um objeto particular. É manifesto que tanto a capacidade de aceitar quanto a de rejeitar da vontade não é produzida nem pelo objeto nem pela imagem, visto que os últimos agem de maneira exclusivamente determinada. O Doutor Sutil também defende que, se o objeto conhecido fosse causa total da volição, então o ato de vontade não estaria sob o poder da vontade. Desse modo, a própria liberdade da vontade seria aniquilada. Na realidade, essa é a consequência mais séria da negação da autodeterminação da vontade. Por isso, Scotus também se opõe ao princípio cinesiológico na determinação da vontade. 231 Se apenas a imagem fosse causa total da volição, então a própria imagem seria algo mais nobre que a volição, porquanto a imagem seria uma causa equívoca, a qual é necessariamente mais nobre que seu efeito. Assim, a imagem poderia causar ou não causar o ato de vontade. Todavia, à luz da filosofia escotista, a prioridade excessiva da imagem sobre o ato de vontade não pode ser concedida. Contrariamente ao pensamento de Scotus, Godofredo de Fontaines opôs-se não somente ao caráter ativo do intelecto em referência à intelecção, mas também a qualquer possibilidade de considerar a vontade como um princípio de volição. Para ele, o movente e o movido devem ser distintos quanto aos seus sujeitos. Uma vez que a vontade confunde-se com o sujeito da alma racional, a causa ativa da volição deve ser procurada fora da própria alma racional. Desse modo, haverá uma distinção de sujeitos da mesma maneira como ocorre na intelecção, pois a causa da intelecção não é o próprio intelecto, mas o fantasma. Portanto, a 231 EFFLER, 1962, p. 161. 88 posição de Godofredo de Fontaines não abre mão da aplicação do princípio do movimento sobre a causalidade na volição. 232 Para Scotus, o intelecto funciona como causa parcial dos atos de vontade. Ao defender sua posição, o Doutor Sutil aponta para o fato de que a vontade ama um bem presente de maneira mais intensa que um bem ausente ou obscuramente conhecido. O que explica a presença da intensidade no primeiro caso e a sua ausência no segundo? Uma explicação pode ser dada se admitirmos que o objeto conhecido exerce uma real influência causal no ato de vontade. Agora, se a cognição do objeto não é causa, mas apenas uma condição sine qua non, então parece que a última palavra é da vontade. Ao apelar para a autoridade de S. Agostinho, Scotus admite que, se a escolha livre não fosse parcialmente causada pelo intelecto, então tal escolha seria uma espécie de ato cego e sem propósito. Portanto, se considerarmos os atos de vontade em sua totalidade, a vontade não pode prescindir do intelecto para determinar-se, mas cabe aqui ressaltarmos que o intelecto é apenas uma causa parcial dos atos de vontade. Tanto a vontade quanto o objeto conhecido pelo intelecto funcionam como cocausas e até certo ponto trabalham juntos na produção do ato de vontade. Não obstante, cada faculdade funciona de acordo com seu próprio poder, desse modo, nenhuma delas recebe seu poder causativo da outra. Por isso, ambas as causas agem conforme seu modo próprio de atividade. O intelecto e o objeto funcionam como causas naturais (determinadas), ao passo que a vontade é sempre livre. Sobre o poder da vontade repousa o poder de agir ou não agir. Embora uma causa parcial não possa agir sem o concurso de outra, ainda assim a vontade é a principal causa e exerce um papel especial, pois ela tanto pode se utilizar como pode não se utilizar da outra causa parcial. Desse modo, tendo como baliza a determinação ativa da vontade, o ato de volição é um ato totalmente livre. 233 Uma ação contingente é tal que no exato momento em que ela realmente ocorre é possível que ela não ocorra. Em outras palavras, uma ação contingente é indeterminada em referência a dois opostos. Assim, se a causa X é determinada pela causa Y, então X agirá necessariamente e inevitavelmente; se isso ocorrer, a ação contingente é negada. Agora, se a causa Y não determinar a causa X para uma ação particular e se X pode determinar-se ou não por Y, então a ação contingente de X é preservada. As fontes de causalidade natural, quando não impedidas, produzem seu efeito necessariamente. Portanto, a vontade não pode ser considerada uma causa natural, pois não podemos negar que, ao mesmo tempo que queremos 232 EFFLER, 1962. p. 162. 233 Ibid., p. 163. 89 algo, temos a liberdade de não querer esse algo, ou seja, a vontade é capaz de agir contingentemente, e não necessariamente. 234 Diferentemente da vontade, o intelecto não é capaz de se autodeterminar. Por outros termos, o intelecto não tem a opção de compreender ou não compreender que o triângulo é uma figura de três lados. Assim, o intelecto compreende verdades inteligíveis, tal como os axiomas, de maneira necessária e não contingente. Ademais, para compreender coisas mais complexas, o intelecto depende da vontade, pois a vontade, antes do ato cognoscitivo, quer que o intelecto conheça. Nesse sentido, o intelecto é uma causa natural, seu papel é formar conceitos e pensar. Uma atividade natural é sempre uma atividade necessária. Portanto, se dependêssemos apenas do intelecto, não haveria nenhuma atividade contingente nesse mundo. 235 A vontade é uma potência absolutamente ativa porque é uma potência livre. Sua liberdade não é uma consequência de seu caráter imaterial, tampouco está alicerçada no intelecto. A vontade é livre porque é absolutamente indeterminada, ou seja, a vontade pode se autodeterminar tanto para um ato quanto para seu oposto. Ela também pode agir ou não agir, e isso denota que a vontade é um princípio de ação contingente. Como dissemos, uma ação contingente é tal que, no exato momento em que ela ocorre em ato, percebemos em nós mesmos que ela pode não ocorrer. Contudo, uma questão final permanece: como sabemos que a vontade é uma faculdade livre? Pois bem, Scotus evita considerações a priori e simplesmente recorre à experiência. Quem quer que queira algo, no exato momento em que quer esse algo, sabe que poderia não querê-lo e sabe também que poderia querer outra coisa ao invés daquela. Por isso, a proposição "a vontade está querendo" é uma proposição contingente. Ademais, é uma proposição imediatamente evidente, a qual está simplesmente expressando um dado da experiência. 236 Scotus não vê necessidade alguma em recorrer ao concurso da argumentação a priori da natureza da vontade para provar sua indeterminação, pois a radicalidade da contingência dos nossos atos de vontade é algo que experimentamos em nós mesmos de maneira tão autoevidente quanto um axioma. Como dito anteriormente, a vontade não pode produzir seu ato se ela carecer do ato do intelecto, por outros termos, não é possível querer aquilo que não se conhece. Por isso, a vontade pode ser impedida de se atualizar em virtude de fatores externos a ela, por exemplo, 234 EFFLER, 1962, p. 164. 235 Ibid., p. 164, 165. 236 Ibid., p. 165, 166. 90 quando o conhecimento não está presente. Embora alguns fatores externos possam impedir a volição, isso não significa que tais fatores sejam os agentes do próprio ato de vontade. Em outras palavras, a mera presença destes fatores externos não determina o ato de vontade. 237 A contingência dos atos de vontade também pode ser expressa da seguinte forma: num momento (t1), no qual todas as condições externas favorecem o ato X, a vontade pode não produzir o ato X, no entanto, no momento (t2), no qual as condições externas são absolutamente idênticas a (t1), a vontade pode produzir o ato X. Ora, se a vontade fosse determinada por algo externo, ela não seria capaz de romper a série causal. Logo, só poderia produzir necessariamente o mesmo ato X em (t1), (t2), (t3) etc. Contudo, podemos indagar: "por que ela produziu o ato em (t2), e não em (t1)? Porque ela quis. Não há nenhuma causa do ato de vontade além da própria vontade". 238 Nota-se, portanto, que Scotus, de nenhuma maneira, abre mão da noção de causa. Por fim, a autodeterminação da vontade não é algo contraditório. Aquele que nega tal contingência ou não está falando seriamente e, por isso, não é digno de resposta, ou "ele é de uma espécie animal diferente da minha, pois não tem as mesmas capacidades que percebo em mim". 239 Por isso, na doutrina escotista da vontade, nós testemunhamos a refutação da universalização do princípio cinesiológico e, ao mesmo tempo, a mais franca exposição que resgata as noções de culpa e mérito dos atos humanos. Enfim, por meio do concurso da experiência, Scotus oferece argumentos muito plausíveis que possibilitam defender a dignidade e a liberdade humana. Numa época em que vivemos sob a influência de filosofias materialistas e deterministas, creio que é muito importante recuperarmos certas noções as quais reconstituem a imputabilidade de nossos atos. 237 RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 27. 238 Ibid., 2010, p. 28. 239 DUNS SCOTUS. Ordinatio IV apud RIBAS CEZAR, 2010, p. 15. 91 REFERÊNCIAS I Fontes ARISTÓTELES: BARNES, J. (org.) The complete works of Aristotle: the revised Oxford translation. 6. ed. Princeton: Princeton University, 1995. 2 v. _____________. Física I-II. In: Clássicos da filosofia: Cadernos de tradução n 1. Tradução revisada e notas: Lucas Angioni. Campinas, SP: Unicamp, 2002. _____________. Metafísica. Tradução: Leonel Vallandro. Porto Alegre: Editora Globo, 1969. DUNS SCOTUS. Questões sobre os livros da metafísica de Aristóteles. Livro IX Questão 14. Tradução: Cesar Ribas Cezar. 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London: Oxford University Press, 1936. ______________. Aristóteles. 1. ed. Lisboa: D. Quixote, 1987. SYLWANOWICZ, Michael. Contingent causality and the foundations of Duns Scotus'metaphysics. Leiden; New York, Köln: Brill, 1996. Disponível em: <http://books.google.com.br/books?id=VCQQeSplWmQC&printsec=frontcover&hl=ptBR&source=gbs_ge_summary_r&cad=0#v=onepage&q&f=false>. Acesso: em 02 fev. 2012. 95 WOLTER, Allan B. Duns Scotus on the will & morality: selected & translated with an introduction by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Edited by William A. Frank. O.F.M. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997. WILLIAMS, Thomas. The cambridge companion to Duns Scotus. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 96 III Dicionários ABBAGNANO, Nicola. Dicionário de Filosofia. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007. FLOCOS de neve. Disponível em: <http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ficheiro:SnowflakesWilsonBentley.jpg>. Acesso em: 13 nov. 2012. HOUAISS, Antonio; VILLAR, Mauro de Sales. Dicionário Houaiss da língua portuguesa. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva, 2004. LALANDE, André. Vocabulário técnico e crítico da filosofia. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. TURNBULL, Joanna et al. Oxford advanced learner's dicitionary. 8 ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Sethi, J 2020 'For Me, In My Present State': Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity. Journal of Modern Philosophy, 2(1): 9, pp. 1–20. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32881/jomp.86 RESEARCH 'For Me, In My Present State': Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Janum Sethi University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, US [email protected] Few of Kant's distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant's account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according to which judgments of perception are merely subjectively valid because they are made without sufficient investigation. In its place, I argue that for Kant, judgments of perception are merely subjectively valid because they merely report sequences of perceptions had by a subject without claiming that what is represented by the perceptions is connected in the objects the perceptions are of. Whereas the interpretation I criticize undercuts Kant's strategy in the Deduction, I argue, my interpretation illuminates it. Keywords: Kant; Prolegomena; judgments of perception; subjective validity; imagination; Hume Few of Kant's distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism1 as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between what he calls judgments of experience (henceforth, JOEs)-which he identifies as 'objectively and universally valid'-and judgments of perception (henceforth, JOPs)-which he says are 'merely subjectively valid' (Pr., 4:299). According to a prominent interpretive narrative,2 the notion of a JOP is short-lived: although it figures centrally in the 1783 Prolegomena, Kant soon comes to see that the possibility of merely subjectively valid judgments is incompatible with his other commitments, and thus omits any mention of them in the 1787 B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. However, a number of factors tell against this narrative. First, the difference between objective and merely subjective validity-which forms the basis of the Prolegomena's distinction-remains central to Kant's account of experience and continues to play a key role in the argument that is its centerpiece: namely, the Transcendental Deduction of the categories (e.g., B139–43). Second, Kant continues to refer to JOPs as such even after 1787.3 Third, he explicitly allows for merely subjectively valid judgments in the 1790 Critique of Judgment.4 Finally, he himself addresses the change in his terminology in the B-Deduction and insists that it does not reflect any substantive change in his argument, which he says 'is already stated correctly' in the Prolegomena (MF 4:476). 1 Norman Kemp Smith, for example, declares that 'the illegitimacy and the thoroughly misleading character of this distinction hardly require to be pointed out' (1918: 288). Paul Guyer (1987: 101) insists that the notion of a judgment of perception 'cannot be reconciled' with Kant's argument in the B-deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason, and argues that its seeming appearance in that section betrays Kant's 'continuing confusion' about his own argumentative strategy. Kotzin and Baumgärtner argue that Kant's remarks about JOPs are 'un-Critical' and 'fail to conform to some central teachings of the Critique of Pure Reason' (1990: 402). 2 See Kemp Smith (1918: 289), Cassirer (1923: 245–46), Beck (1978: 50), Guyer (1987: 101–2), Kotzin and Baumgärtner (1990: 407), Pollok (2008: 335–36), Sassen (2008: 271–72, 281). 3 R3145–46, 16:678–79, between 1790–1804; DWL 24:767, transcript of lectures given in the 1790s; JL 9:114, published in 1800. 4 Namely, judgments of the agreeable. See CJ 5:212; 5:214, 5:217. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 2 of 20 These factors suggest that the distinction between JOPs and JOEs continues to be significant for Kant. Indeed, in this paper, I argue for a novel interpretation of the distinction which reveals that it is coherent, is compatible with Kant's other commitments, and remains consistent across his works. Even more importantly, I will argue that it is crucial for understanding the role played by the categories in generating objectively valid judgments, and thus, for understanding Kant's argument in the Deduction itself. My argument proceeds through the following stages. In §1, I begin by considering and rejecting a standard strategy for making sense of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs. According to this strategy, when Kant claims that JOPs are merely subjectively valid, he has in mind judgments that are about perceived objects but that cannot be said to hold for all subjects: perhaps because they are made without sufficient investigation or because they merely assert how things seem to the subject making the judgment. Any reading of this sort, as I see it, overlooks a criterial feature of JOPs: namely, that such judgments do not have 'relation to the object' (4:300). In other words, as I will argue, Kant makes clear that judgments of perception are not about the objects of perception, but rather, about perceptions themselves. In §2, I propose my own interpretation, according to which JOPs should be not be understood as insufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects, but rather, as judgments about perceptions that do not represent what the perceptions are of as an object independent of the perceptions. After developing the details of my account, I show that it can make sense of Kant's seemingly disparate examples. With the positive account on the table, I am in a position to respond more fully to the objection that Kant no longer allows for JOPs by the time he writes the B-deduction. I do so in §2.1. Next, in §3, I respond to four objections to my proposal, each of which argues on different grounds that the kinds of judgments I identify as JOPs are not in fact merely subjectively valid. Finally, in §4, I discuss the key role Kant's distinction between JOPs and JOEs plays in the Transcendental Deduction. Kant signals that one of his primary goals in the Deduction is to respond to a Humean skeptic who objects that we are not justified in applying a priori categories in experience. I argue that whereas the standard reading of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs undercuts Kant's response to Humean skepticism, my account can help illuminate it. 1. In the Prolegomena, Kant distinguishes between judgments that claim to be 'only subjectively valid' [nur subjektiv gültig]-that is, 'valid' only for the subject making them-and judgments that claim to be 'objectively' and 'universally valid' [objektiv und allgemein gültig]-that is, valid 'at all times ... and for everyone' (4: 298). In the case of the former, he says: I do not at all require that I should find it so at every time, or that everyone else should find it just as I do; they express only a relation of two sensations to the same subject, namely myself, and this only in my present state of perception, and are therefore not expected to be valid for the object: these I call judgments of perception [Wahrnehmungsurteile] (4:299). As for 'judgments of experience [Erfahrungsurteile],' he continues, 'the case is completely different': 'What experience teaches me under certain circumstances, it must teach me at every time and teach everyone else as well, and its validity is not limited to the subject or its state at that time. Therefore I express all such judgments as objectively valid ...' (4:299). 1.1. The interpretive strategy I will criticize reads passages like this one as claiming that JOPs are judgments that are about objects, but that, for one reason or another, cannot be said to hold for all subjects.5 I begin by considering Beatrice Longuenesse's account. On Longuenesse's reading, all judgments are governed by a norm of universal validity for Kant-all judgments, in other words, aim to be valid at all times and for all subjects (1998: 186). Nevertheless, she says, individual judgments can 'remain "subjective" to a greater or lesser degree' (1998: 83) depending on the extent to which they 'rely uncritically' on a subject's particular circumstances. Longuenesse's discussion of one of Kant's examples clarifies what she thinks is required to make fully objective JOEs. In §20 of the Prolegomena, Kant offers as an example of a JOP, 'When the sun shines on the 5 In addition to Longuenesse and Allison, whose views I discuss below, versions of this strategy can be found in Friedman (2012), Wolff (2012), and Beizaei (2017). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 3 of 20 stone, it becomes warm.'6 He contrasts that judgment with 'The sun warms the stone,' which he identifies as a JOE (4:301n*). As Longuenesse reads Kant's example, the former expresses an observed correlation between the sun shining and the stone growing warm. But merely observing a possibly contingent correlation is not sufficient to warrant the judgment that the observed events are actually connected in a manner that holds at all times and for all subjects: this is why, according to Longuenesse, the judgment in question remains merely subjective.7 Converting such a JOP into a JOE that asserts an objective connection between the observed events, she argues, requires: confronting the correlations already obtained with many more, while perhaps also using the resources of mathematical construction to anticipate and test further possible empirical correlations. Only after such a method has been systematically applied can a causal connection be asserted: 'the sun warms the stone' (Longuenesse 1998: 179). In Kant's Transcendental Deduction, Henry Allison presents a similar account of JOPs. According to Allison, JOPs 'express how things seem to a subject under certain conditions and, as such, make no claim to universalizability' (2015: 299; see also 2004: 180). On Allison's view, then, JOPs are a species of what Kant calls 'provisional judgments' (see VL 24:861–62): 'initial assessments' which 'precede investigation' and are 'subject to revision' (2015: 305). Since such judgments are only made provisionally, Allison explains, they do not claim to hold at all times and for all perceivers and so are merely subjectively valid. Like Longuenesse, however, Allison believes that an objectively valid JOE only 'emerges as the result of [an] investigation in which the weight of the reasons for and against the initial assessment has been determined' (2015: 305). 1.2. Both Allison and Longuenesse take JOPs to be judgments that are about perceived objects, but do not hold for all subjects, either because they are made uncritically (Longuenesse) or provisionally (Allison). Though an analysis of this sort may indeed seem to be called for by the example discussed above, I will now argue that it conflicts with key features of Kant's description of JOPs. For one, Kant says explicitly in the Prolegomena that when a subject makes a JOP, what she expresses is 'merely a connection of perceptions within [her] mental state, without relation to the object [ohne Beziehung auf den Gegenstand].'8 Now, in his discussions elsewhere of types of representation, as well as of the stepby-step progression [Stufenleiter] between them, Kant defines a perception [Wahrnehmung] as 'a representation with consciousness.'9 He makes clear that by itself, a perception does not yet amount to cognition of an object. As he puts it in a Reflexion dated to around the same time as the publication of the Prolegomena, consciousness of perceptions alone 'relates all representation only to our self as modifications of our condition; they are in this case ... especially not cognitions of any things and are related to no object' (R5923, 18:386, 1783–84, my emphasis). As I understand it, Kant's position is that in being conscious of her perceptions alone, a subject is merely conscious of her own subjective states. Such consciousness lacks 'relation to an object' in the sense that the subject does not yet think of what her perceptions are of as an object independent of her perceptions. This is the sense in which consciousness of perceptions does not yet amount to cognition of an object.10 It also explains why Kant says that JOPs do not have 'relation to the object.' Since JOPs 6 I have modified the translation of 'wenn' from 'if' to 'when' here. Whereas the German 'wenn' is ambiguous between 'if' and 'when' in English, I think the latter better conveys the feature of JOPs that Kant emphasizes: namely, that they merely report what is the case in 'my present state of perception' (4:299, my emphasis). Cf. Longuenesse (1998: 178n26). 7 Longuenesse (1998: 177–79). The view that JOPs express empirically observed correlations of events and/or inductive generalizations based on such observations is shared by Friedman (2012: 247, 250), Wolff (2012: 132–35), and Beizaei (2017: 363–64). 8 4:300, my emphasis. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant says the object of representations should be understood as that which makes 'one way of combining the manifold necessary' (A191/B236). What this means, as I understand it, is that representations come to have 'relation to an object' insofar as the subject takes a certain combination of them to be necessary (i.e., correct) in virtue of corresponding to the way the object is. See also A104–5. 9 A320/B376–77. See also JL 9:64–65. 'Perception' should be understood broadly here so as to include representations recalled by the imagination in the absence of the object. I explain this further in §2. 10 For a detailed and very helpful account of the difference between perception and cognition in Kant that I take my discussion here to align with, see Tolley (2017). See also Watkins and Willaschek (2017: 84–87, 101–2). I should note that I take the claim that perceptions lack 'relation to an object' in this sense to be compatible with their being related to objects in less cognitively demanding senses: for example, as being causally related to objects or being that in virtue of which particulars are presented. See Allais (2009: 403–5), and, for a discussion of some other less cognitively demanding senses of objectivity, see McLear (2020). In §3.1, I will in effect argue that JOPs do have what McLear calls 'representational objectivity,' since they can be assessed for truth. But this does not mean that they have the kind of 'relation to an object' that I take to be at issue here, since they are about perceptions, rather Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 4 of 20 express what the subject is conscious of merely in being conscious of her perceptions, JOPs are not about the objects represented by her perceptions, but rather, about her perceptions themselves. In contrast, Kant says, a JOE expresses not the 'relation of a perception to a subject,' but, rather, 'a property of an object' (4:298). In other words, whenever the subject thinks of what her perceptions are of as an object, she makes a JOE. For ease of expression, I will henceforth refer to a judgment that has 'relation to an object' in the above sense as a 'judgment about objects', and to a judgment about perceptions that lacks 'relation to an object' as a 'judgment about perceptions'. In short, then, Kant makes clear in the Prolegomena that a JOE is a 'judgment about objects', and a JOP is a 'judgment about perceptions'.11 This key feature disqualifies the kinds of judgments that Allison and Longuenesse count as JOPs. Consider the following judgments, for example: (1) 'When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm,' understood as expressing an observed correlation between external events.12 (2) 'The sun warms the stone,' asserted either uncritically or provisionally. Both (1) and (2) are quite obviously about the objects of a subject's perceptions, rather than about the perceptions themselves. (1) expresses a perceived correlation between the sun shining and the stone becoming warm; (2), whether it is made uncritically or merely provisionally, is about the perceived effect of the sun on the stone. Both judgments have the 'relation to objects' that JOPs are said to lack. As such, they cannot be JOPs by Kant's lights. To put the point generally: uncritical or provisional judgments about objects are still judgments about objects, and this entails that they are JOEs on Kant's view, not JOPs. Second, while Longuenesse and Allison claim that what is required to convert JOPs into JOEs is further empirical investigation and the weighing of reasons, Kant in fact says that what must be added to a JOP is 'beyond the empirical and in general beyond what is given in sensory intuition.' The only element missing from a JOP, he is clear, is a priori- 'special concepts originally generated in the understanding'-in other words, the categories (4:297–98).13 But (1) and (2) above are not missing the application of a category: in particular, the connection that these judgments assert between the sun shining and the stone growing warm has already been subsumed under the category of cause. This is obviously true of (2), which claims (albeit uncritically or provisionally) that the sunshine causes the stone to become warm. But it is also true of (1), since per Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, even representing an objective temporal succession of events-such as the stone's growing warm after the sun shines on it-requires application of the category of cause.14 In sum, since both (1) and (2) are fully determined by the categories, it would be incorrect to count them as JOPs, as Allison and Longuenesse do. Third, it follows from Allison's and especially from Longuenesse's view that many of our ordinary judgments should turn out to be JOPs, since it is unlikely that such judgments are made with the systematic than about the objects represented by those perceptions. In contrast, it is clear that judgments like (1) and (2) above-which Allison and Longuenesse count as JOPs-are 'related to objects' in precisely the cognitively demanding sense of being about the objects represented by perceptions. 11 It might be objected here that JOPs must take perceptions themselves-or alternatively, the subject who has them-as objects. As I will discuss, however, to represent something 'as an object' in the relevant sense for Kant is to represent it as fully determined in accordance with the categories (especially the relational categories). And, as I will argue below, JOPs do not represent perceptions-or the subject who has them-as an object in this sense. In order to do so, the subject must think of perceptions themselves as governed by causal laws. When she does this, however, she makes a JOE rather than a JOP. The latter type of JOE complicates my shorthand above, since it amounts to a 'judgment about objects' that is about perceptions. Since this complication does not bear on the bulk of my discussion, however, I retain the shorthand and clarify when necessary. None of Kant's examples consist in judgments of this sort, nor do the commentators I criticize discuss them. I say more about such judgments in §3.4 and notes 54 and 55. 12 Kant indeed offers this very judgment as an example of a JOP in the Prolegomena, but I will argue below that, as such, it should be understood as referring to the subject's perceptions of the sun shining and the stone becoming warm, rather than to the corresponding external events. As I will explain, I believe Kant struggles to identify the correct way to formulate his examples so that they exhibit the features he ascribes to JOPs in the Prolegomena. His later examples go some distance towards rectifying this. 13 I discuss Kant's claim at length in §3.2 below. There, I argue that converting JOPs to JOEs specifically requires the addition of one of the relational categories. 14 A189/B232–A211/B257. Interpreting Kant as allowing that we can represent temporal successions of events and express inductive generalizations on this basis without applying the category of cause conflicts with the Second Analogy, and-as I will discuss in §4-undercuts Kant's argument against Hume. This point of criticism also applies to the accounts of JOPs defended in Friedman (2012), Wolff (2012), and Beizaei (2017). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 5 of 20 scrutiny and investigation that they believe is required for making JOEs. However, in an important Reflexion (which is repeated in the Jäsche Logic), Kant makes clear that, on his view, most of our judgments are, in fact, JOEs: a JOP, he says, 'is really not possible, except insofar as I express my representation as a perception' (R3145, 16:678; JL, 9:114, my emphasis). What is not possible, as I understand it, is making a JOP about objects-and, of course, that is what the majority of our judgments are about. JOPs, as Kant says, are only possible insofar as they refer to perceptions. This lack of fit between Kant's text and the views under consideration obtains, I believe, because they conflate what may be necessary to fully justify a JOE with what is necessary simply to make such a judgment, whether justifiably or not. While systematic investigation and the weighing of evidence may be necessary to fully justify the claim that one's judgment holds for all subjects, it is not necessary simply for making such a claim in the first place. For example, a subject quite obviously need not go through the procedure Longuenesse describes-viz., 'confronting the correlations already obtained with many more, while perhaps also using the resources of mathematical construction'-simply in order to claim that the sun warms a stone.15 For Kant, any judgment that so much as claims universal validity-whether it does so hastily or provisionally-is by that token a JOE. This is reflected in his language throughout the discussion in the Prolegomena: in order to make a JOE, he says, the subject need only 'regard' [ansehen], 'deem' [halten], 'express' [aussprechen], 'want' or 'intend' [wollen] her judgment to be universally valid (4:298–99). Moreover, he makes clear that a subject expresses the claim that her judgment is universally valid simply in virtue of making a judgment that is about objects rather than about her own perceptions. For, as he says, when we make a judgment about an object, we thereby: intend [wollen] that the judgment should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone else; for if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another, and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience signifies nothing other than its necessary universal validity (4:298).16 When a subject makes a judgment about an object, in other words, she 'intends' or claims that the object is the way she represents it to be. This amounts to claiming that her judgment is objectively valid. And in virtue of claiming that the object is the way she represents it to be, she in effect claims that others ought to represent it that way as well-she claims, in other words, that her judgment is universally valid.17 Now, it is perfectly possible-and indeed, common-for subjects to make such claims without sufficient investigation. But insufficiently justified judgments about objects are still judgments about objects and so, are not JOPs by Kant's lights. On my view, then, the interpretations I have been considering set too high a bar on JOEs and in so doing, wrongly count too many judgments as JOPs. I have argued that any judgment that makes a claim about objects claims objective validity and is by that token a JOE. Correspondingly, only judgments that are not about the objects of perception but rather about perceptions themselves count as JOPs for Kant. In the next section, I turn my attention to the latter. 15 Friedman recognizes that this is also a possible problem for his view, according to which only 'well-established laws of empirical natural science' count as genuinely objective JOEs (2012: 261). As Friedman worries, this appears to entail that there was 'no genuinely objective experience before Newton established the law of universal gravitation in the Principia ...' (2012: 262–63). He responds to this worry by clarifying his account, such that objectively valid judgments need not be explicitly incorporated into scientific theory, but need only be 'capable of such incorporation' (2012: 263). Of course, the merely inductive generalizations that Friedman takes to be expressed by JOPs are typically capable of incorporation into scientific theory; as a result, Friedman is forced to conclude that JOPs are themselves objectively valid (2012: 264), and thus to deny the very feature that Kant takes to be criterial of them. 16 The 'necessity' here should be understood as normative necessity, since Kant's claim applies equally to contingent judgments as he makes clear at 4:305n*. See Allison (2015: 294–95). 17 This is also true for the provisional judgments about objects described by Allison. When a subject makes a provisional judgment, she claims that it is the correct judgment to make given her evidence, even though she recognizes the insufficiency of her evidence. This amounts to claiming that any subject judging on the basis of the same evidence ought to make the same provisional judgment. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 6 of 20 2. I have been arguing that JOPs are correctly understood as judgments about a subject's perceptions rather than the objects of her perception.18 More specifically, as I will now argue, JOPs report sequences of perceptions that a subject finds herself having as a result of her reproductive imagination. In the Transcendental Deduction, Kant identifies the imagination as 'the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition' (B151). He describes the role played by the reproductive imagination in particular as follows. First, it is only in virtue of the reproductive imagination that a subject can be aware of a 'series of perceptions,' for it is what allows her to reproduce 'a perception, from which the mind has passed on to another' (A121).19 As she scans the façade of a house, for example, it is the reproductive imagination that allows her to recall and thus to keep in mind the door as she moves on to perceiving the windows. Second, the reproductive imagination is also responsible for calling representations to mind on the basis of psychological associations that a subject has acquired as a result of her past experiences (A121). As she looks at the façade of a house, for example, associations with other houses she has previously experienced might make it the case that she expects this house to also have side and back walls, even though she cannot currently see them (see Strawson 1970: esp. 39–41). These examples demonstrate why Kant takes the reproductive imagination to 'be a necessary ingredient of perception itself' (A120n*). Without it, he says, the subject could only be aware, at any moment, of the individual, isolated perception she was having at that very moment (A120). It is the reproductive imagination that allows her to bring to mind perceptions other than the one she is currently aware of, and thus, to be aware of the kind of sequence of perceptions that go into, for example, the complex representation of a house (A121). Now, Kant frequently explains the distinction between representations that are combined objectively as opposed to merely subjectively in terms of whether the representations are related by the understanding or merely by the reproductive imagination, respectively. In §18 of the B-deduction, for example, Kant distinguishes between what he calls the 'objective' and the 'subjective' 'unity of consciousness.' Whereas 'subjective unity' has 'merely subjective validity' and occurs 'through association of the representations' (B140), 'objective unity' results when representations are 'united in a concept of the object' (B139). In §19, Kant again differentiates a relation between representations that counts as an 'objective unity' and 'belong[s] to the understanding' from a relation that obtains 'in accordance with the laws of reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity)' (B141). Kant's point in these passages, as I understand it, is as follows. On his view, a subject's reproductive imagination can make it the case that a representation RB is called up for her while she has representation RA in mind: either because RB preceded RA and is recalled by the imagination, or because of an association the subject has between As and Bs. When this occurs, the subject passively finds herself thinking the sequence of representations <RA, RB>. Now, such passive awareness by itself does not involve any claim about the correctness or incorrectness of these representations being combined as they are-that is, about whether the objects A and B that the representations are of are actually related. Rather, the subject is simply aware of what Kant calls the 'subjective unity' of RA and RB. In contrast, the subject can actively relate RA and RB through her understanding. That is, she can judge that the objects A and B are actually related, and so, in effect, that RA 18 On this point, my account is closest to the extended account of judgments of perception developed in Prauss (1971). However, I diverge from Prauss on a number of key points. Prauss claims that Kant fails to identify a formulation of JOPs on which they genuinely refer to perceptions rather than objects (1971: 175). According to Prauss, this is the case for all of Kant's examples, such as 'When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm,' or even 'Sugar is sweet.' The former, he argues, must be reading as expressing an objective succession of events, and the latter as ascribing a certain (secondary) property to an object (i.e., sugar) (1971: 180, 185–88). In place of Kant's formulations, Prauss argues that it is 'It seems ...'-judgments ('Es scheint ...'-Urteile) that genuinely satisfy the conditions that must be met by JOPs since, according to him, such judgments express the subject's perceptions and make no claim about the objects of those perceptions (1971: 224–53). Thus, according to Prauss, the judgment 'It seems that the sun warms the stone,' for example, counts as a genuine JOP (1971: 234). Even though that judgment obviously involves the category of cause, Prauss argues that it merely involves a use (Gebrauch) of it, not an application (Anwendung) (1971: 251–53, 272–92). As will become clear, I disagree with Prauss that Kant's examples must be understood to refer to objects rather than perceptions. In this section, I will argue that they should instead be understood as expressing a subjective temporal sequence of perceptions, rather than a succession of objective events. In §3.2, I will argue that this is the case despite Prauss's worry that such judgments employ objective concepts, such as 'sun,' 'stone' or 'sugar'. Moreover, Prauss's proposed formulation conflicts with Kant's claim that it is precisely by adding a missing (relational) category-not by subtracting an 'It seems' from a judgment that already contains the category-that we transform a JOP into a JOE. As such, I believe he also fails to correctly capture the role Kant's distinction plays in his deduction of the categories. I discuss this role in §4. 19 More specifically, the reproductive imagination is necessary for the subject to be aware of a series of perceptions as a series. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 7 of 20 and RB are correctly combined and the sequence <RA, RB> is universally valid. This is what Kant calls awareness of the 'objective unity' of RA and RB. This analysis of §§18 and 19 maps onto my preliminary discussion of Kant's distinction between JOPs and JOEs in §1 above. In the Prolegomena, as we saw, Kant says that JOPs are merely subjectively valid because they express 'merely a connection of perceptions within my mental state without relation to the object' (4:300). What Kant adds in the Critique (and elsewhere20) is that the 'connection of perceptions' that are expressed by merely subjectively valid JOPs are due to the reproductive imagination;21 in contrast, the connections expressed by objectively valid JOEs are due to the understanding.22 In what follows, I will argue that we can make good sense of the various examples of JOPs Kant offers in these terms.23 First, however, it will be useful to introduce an example of the kind of circumstance in which it might strike us as more appropriate to make a JOP rather than a JOE.24 Consider the following circumstance. Say that in my childhood, my mother frequently made coffee while the neighbor's rooster crowed, and so the sound of a rooster crowing has become associated with the smell of coffee for me. Visiting a farm one day, I hear a rooster crow and find myself imagining the smell of coffee. Now let's assume that I am aware of my association and realize that there is no coffee being made nearby. As a result, I do not judge that the sequence (<RROOSTER, RCOFFEE>) corresponds to an objective connection between the rooster crowing and coffee, or that any other subject hearing the rooster ought to represent coffee as well. Rather, I merely report the subjective order of my representations through the following judgment: (3')25 'My representation of the rooster crowing is followed by my representation of the smell of coffee.' Or, equivalently, and far more colloquially: (3) 'When I hear(d) the rooster crow, I imagine(d) the smell of coffee.' Neither (3) nor (3') assert an objective connection between roosters and coffee; rather, they are about a sequence in my representations that is due to my imaginative associations. As such, I argue, they are genuine JOPs by Kant's lights. I believe that we should read Kant's various examples of JOPs in the same way. In §19, Kant offers the following as an example of a judgment that has 'only subjective validity': 20 See also R3051: 'The representation of the way in which different concepts ... belong to one consciousness ... is the judgment. They belong to one consciousness partly in accordance with laws of the imagination, thus subjectively, or of the understanding, i.e., objectively valid for every being that has understanding' (16:633, my emphasis). 21 I should note here that I do not take the imagination's reproduction of representations to itself be an act of judgment. Neither do I think that being conscious of such reproduced representations requires making a JOP. My claim is only that it is possible for a subject to make a judgment that merely reports a series of representations she finds herself having due to her reproductive imagination. When she does so, on my view, she makes a JOP. 22 Thus, I agree with Brigitte Sassen that the Prolegomena's JOPs reappear in the first Critique as expressions of 'unities of consciousness based merely on principles of association' (2008: 269). Sassen also notes that JOPs are meant to lack the relation to objects that is secured by the categories (2008: 272, 276); however, she does not appear to understand this in the way I do here, since what it turns out she takes these judgments to be lacking (like Longuenesse and Allison) is knowledge (2008: 278) or certainty (2008: 284) that the connections between objects that they express actually obtain. 23 Cf. Bird (1962: 142), Beck (1978: 51–52), Kotzin and Baumgärtner (1990), Sassen (2008: 275, 284), Prauss (1971: 176–93). 24 Kant himself attempts to provide examples of judgments which 'could [n]ever become judgments of experience' in the Prolegomena: 'that the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant' (4:299). Unfortunately, however, these examples have been the cause of more confusion than clarity. One source of confusion is that these examples rely on the view-which Kant holds in the Prolegomena-that sensations of warmth and sweetness make a subject aware of secondary qualities, and secondary qualities cannot (at least correctly) be ascribed to objects. But Kant does not consistently treat sensations corresponding to secondary qualities in this way (for example, he calls such sensations 'objective' at CJ 5:206). The example I offer above sidesteps these worries. I discuss Kant's examples involving secondary qualities further in note 34. Pollok (2008: 338–39) takes Kant's apparent change of heart about secondary qualities in the CJ to entail that at least by this point, he only counts judgments that articulate feelings as JOPs. As I discuss above, I agree that Kant's later examples of JOPs better illustrate that he does not intend such judgments to ascribe any qualities to objects. This does not entail, however, that such judgments only express feelings; rather, as I argue, they express mere connections of perceptions (including, but not limited to, feelings) that are not determined to correspond to objects. 25 In my subsequent discussion of Kant's examples, I will use (n') to number the JOPs that refer explicitly to representations and (n) for the corresponding colloquial judgments. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 8 of 20 (4) 'When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.'26 He contrasts this with the 'objectively valid' judgment: (5) 'It, the body, is heavy.' (B142) Kant characterizes the sequence of representations expressed by (4) as occurring 'in accordance with the laws of association'; in contrast, he says, (5) does not claim that the relevant representations are merely 'found together in perception' but rather that they are 'are combined in the object.' We can flesh out this discussion in a manner similar to my example of the rooster above. Say that because of her previous experiences with bodies, a subject has acquired an association between bodies and weight; this association makes it the case that when she now lifts a body, she finds herself imaginatively anticipating a feeling of weight. As a result, she has the sequence of representations <RBODY, RWEIGHT>, which she reports through (4) 'When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.' Here, just as in the example of the rooster above, (4) should be understood as describing a sequence of perceptions had by the subject: as reporting, that is, that her perceptions of carrying a body are followed by her anticipating the feeling of weight. In other words, it should be read as equivalent to: (4') 'My representation of carrying a body is followed my representation of weight.' Just like (3) and (3') above, neither (4) nor (4') claim that the sequence of representations had by the subject corresponds to an objective connection between bodies and weight.27 Rather, they express 'only a relation of two sensations to the same subject ... and this only in [her] present state of perception' (4: 299). As such, they are merely subjectively valid. In order to make a judgment about the object her perceptions are of, it is not sufficient that the subject merely report a sequence of representations that she finds herself having as a result of her reproductive imagination. Rather, she must actively relate those representations through an act of the understanding in accordance with a category. She must judge, in other words, that RBODY and RWEIGHT are correctly combined because bodies and weight are objectively connected. What is required in order to express such a judgment-as we have seen Kant argue in the Prolegomena-is the addition of a category.28 In this case, the subject subsumes the represented relation under the category of substance-inherence, thereby judging that bodies are related to weight as subject to property. In other words, as Kant says, she judges that (5) 'Bodies are heavy.' Of course, it is hard to hear (4') as a judgment one might naturally make upon carrying a body and feeling its weight. Note, however, that this is in contrast with my example of the rooster above, in which it was the JOP (3) 'When I hear a rooster crow, I imagine the smell of coffee' that seemed more natural than any JOE that would assert an objective connection between roosters and coffee (such as the false judgment that a rooster's crowing causes the smell of coffee). In that case, since there is no objective connection between roosters and the smell of coffee, we know that the connection between the subject's representations is a merely subjective one. In contrast, since there obviously does exist an objective connection between bodies and weight, the corresponding JOE in (5) strikes us as far more natural. Despite this, however, it is genuinely possible to make the relatively unnatural judgment in each case: that is, to make a judgment about the representations of bodies and weight in the former case, and a judgment that asserts an objective connection between roosters and coffee in the latter. On my view, it is these two possibilities-and how one moves from the former to the latter by the addition of a category-that Kant has in mind in each of his examples. Correspondingly, I believe we should analyze the example discussed above from the Prolegomena in the same way: (1) 'When the sun shines on the stone, it becomes warm.' Though (1) seems to report a correlation observed between perceived events (indeed, this is precisely why Longuenesse and others29 read it as they do), I think Kant simply fails to make explicit in his examples the 26 Once again, I have modified the translation of 'wenn' from 'if' to 'when.' See note 6 above. 27 Another way to put this is that the truth conditions for the judgment are set by my representations, not by the objects represented. See §3.1 below. 28 Specifically, a relational category. See §3.2 below. 29 Longuenesse (1998: 177–79). See also Friedman (2012: 246–47, 261–62), Wolff (2012: 134–45n16). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 9 of 20 very feature he stresses in his description of JOPs in the Prolegomena-namely, that such judgments are about perceptions rather than objects. Interestingly, in the passage from the Jäsche Logic I cited above, Kant gives another example of a JOP that involves warm stones, in which he is clearer. 'In touching the stone I sense warmth,' he says, 'is a judgment of perception but on the other hand, The stone is warm, is a judgment of experience.'30 This indicates, I think, how we are meant to read Kant's example in the Prolegomena. Once again, it should be read as expressing a sequence of representations (<RSUN SHINING, RSTONE BECOMING WARM>): (1') 'My representation of the sun shining on the stone is followed by my representation of the stone becoming warm.'31 Reading (1') for (1) differentiates it from a judgment in which the represented relation has already been subsumed under a category. The latter is the case for judgment (2) 'The sun warms the stone,' and indeed, as I argued above, for (1) itself if it is understood as referring to an objective succession of external events, since both presuppose the application of the category of cause. Now, one might worry here that I am not entitled to reinterpret (1) as a judgment about perceptions, since it clearly seems to refer to external events. If Kant really meant to refer to perceptions of the sun and the stone in his example, in other words, why does he not say so? To respond to this concern, I want to briefly discuss another of Kant's examples from the Prolegomena: (6) 'Air is elastic.' Interestingly, Kant says that (6) can express either a JOP or a JOE, depending on whether it refers merely to a relation between the subject's perceptions or to objects (4: 299–300). In the former case, as I understand it, (6) should be understood as referring to a subject's perceptions of what amounts to the air's elasticity: for example, to the fact that her perception of heating air (say, the air in a closed container) is followed by her perception of it expanding (say, when the container explodes).32 In contrast, for (6) to count as a JOE, Kant says, the perception of air has to have been 'subsumed under a concept of the understanding.' 'For example,' he continues, one might judge that 'the air belongs under the concept of cause, which determines the judgment about the air as hypothetical with respect to expansion.' In other words, one might judge that heating air causes it to expand. Thus, in Kant's example, the judgment (6) 'Air is elastic' could be understood as equivalent to: (6') 'My representation of heating air is followed by my representation of air expanding.' (JOP) or (7) 'Heating air causes it to expand.' (JOE)33 This shows that, in the Prolegomena, Kant clearly does allow a judgment like (6) that seemingly refers to objects to be disambiguated such that it is understood to refer instead to perceptions. I argue that this licenses us to apply the same procedure when interpreting his example of the sun shining on the stone, as I do above.34 30 JL 9:114. See also R3145–46, where Kant also provides the example, 'I sense warmth in touching the oven,' as contrasted to 'The oven is warm' (16: 678–79). 31 Or more colloquially, 'When I see the sun shining on the stone, I feel it becoming warm.' 32 For a different analysis of this example, cf. Longuenesse (1998: 176–77), Allison (2015: 301–3), Wolff (2012: 132–35), Beizaei (2017: 359). 33 Or one might just as well judge that (8) 'When air is heated, it expands.' As I discussed in §1 above, if (8) is understood to refer to a sequence of objective events, then per Kant's argument in the Second Analogy, it presupposes that that sequence is taken to be causally determined. As such, it is a JOE that involves the application of the category of cause just as much as (7) does. 34 The same goes for the examples I mentioned in note 24 above: 'that the room is warm, the sugar sweet, the wormwood repugnant' (4: 299). On my view, these judgments should also be understood as expressing sequences in a subject's representations, while leaving undetermined whether or not objects really are the way they are represented as being. Just as above, then, I believe these judgments should be disambiguated as follows: a) 'My perception of the room is combined with a perception of warmth,' or more colloquially, 'When I am in the room, I feel warm'; b) 'My perception of sugar is combined with a perception of sweetness' or 'When I taste sugar, I taste sweetness'; c) 'My perception of wormwood is combined with a feeling of displeasure' or 'When I taste wormwood, I feel displeasure.' My translation of this set of examples is similar to Prauss's; however, Prauss (1971: 185–88) argues that stated as such, they fail to adequately exemplify what makes JOPs subjectively valid in general and so, are abandoned by Kant. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 10 of 20 Of course, Kant does not help his case by making his examples so open to misinterpretation. In the Prolegomena, as I mentioned, I believe he is still struggling to find the right way to articulate examples of the kind of judgment he has in mind so that it is clear that they refer to perceptions rather than objects (as his own definitions there require). As we have seen, he is already (somewhat) clearer in the example he provides in the B-deduction, and declares in so many words in the Jäsche Logic that a JOP is only possible if it refers to perceptions. The example offered in the Jäsche Logic does finally make fully explicit that a JOP is meant to be about the subject's perceptions: 'I, who perceive a tower, perceive in it the red color,' as distinguished from the JOE, 'It [the tower] is red' (9: 114). On my view, then, we can give a consistent account of JOPs that makes sense of Kant's examples while avoiding the criticisms I raised for the standard interpretive strategy in §1. For as I have argued we should understand them, Kant's examples of JOPs: (i) Are about perceptions rather than objects, and so, do not violate Kant's claim that JOPs lack 'relation to the object.' (ii) Only require the addition of a category to be converted into JOEs. (iii) Are not common, since most of our judgments are not about sequences in our own perceptions, but rather about objects. This is in line with Kant's prediction in the Jäsche Logic that JOPs 'are really not possible' unless they refer to perceptions. Let me sum up the account I am proposing here by returning to the key terms under discussion. I have been arguing that a sequence of perceptions is objectively valid if and only if what the perceptions represent is thought to be combined in the objects the perceptions are of. Correspondingly, a JOE is a judgment that claims that what is represented by a certain sequence of perceptions is combined in the objects the perceptions are of. In order to do this, the JOE must represent what the perceptions are of as an object, which, as we have seen amounts to subsuming it under the categories. In contrast, a sequence of perceptions is merely subjectively valid if and only if what the perceptions represent is not thought to be combined in the objects the perceptions are of. Correspondingly, a JOP is a judgment that claims merely that a certain sequence of perceptions is had by a subject and does not claim that what is represented by the perceptions is combined in the objects the perceptions are of.35 2.1. In §2, I argued that Kant's distinction between JOPs and JOEs can be fleshed out by appealing to his discussion of the difference between merely subjective and objective validity in the first Critique. Let me pause here to consider the important question of whether Kant continues to allow for the possibility of JOPs by the time he writes the B-deduction. If he does not, then not only am I not entitled to map the Prolegomena's distinction between JOPs and JOEs onto the B-Deduction's distinction between subjective and objective validity, but it would also be textually inaccurate and misleading to suggest-as I will go on to do-that the former distinction continues to play an important role in the argument of the B-deduction. The worry is as follows: in §19 of the B-deduction, Kant explicitly defines judgment as a way of combining representations so that they are objectively valid (B141). And this seems to entail that he has changed his mind and no longer allows for the merely subjectively valid JOPs discussed in the Prolegomena.36 I think this is the wrong conclusion to reach, however. Though Kant does indeed present a new definition of judgment in §19, there are a number of reasons not to read this as signaling that there has been a substantive change in his position between the publication of the Prolegomena in 1783 and the B-Deduction in 1787.37 For one, just a few lines after stating his new definition in §19, he offers an example of something a subject 'could ... say' that, as I have already discussed, shares all the features of the Prolegomena's JOPs: namely, (4) 'When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight.' Just like in the Prolegomena, as we have seen, Kant characterizes (4) as having 'only subjective validity,' and proceeds to contrast it with the 'objec35 As we can see from my discussion above, I take JOPs to refer to perceptions by specifying their content, where this content does not include a characterization of what is represented as an object (i.e., a fully categorially determined object). I remain neutral here about whether perceptions count as having content independently of thought about them, and also whether perception in Kant should be understood in relationalist or representationalist terms. See McLear (2016) for a discussion of these issues. 36 See Kemp Smith (1918: 289), Beck (1978: 50), Guyer (1987: 101–2), Kotzin and Baumgärtner (1990: 407), Pollok (2008: 335–36), Sassen (2008: 271–72, 281). 37 See Longuenesse (1998: 82–84, 186), Prauss (1971: 168–72). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 11 of 20 tively valid' judgment (5) 'It, the body is heavy,' arguing once again that it is the addition of a category that distinguishes the latter judgment from the former (B142). This indicates, I believe, that the Prolegomena's distinction continues to be central to Kant's purposes in the B-deduction, even if he has decided there to reserve the term 'judgment' for the Prolegomena's JOEs. Further evidence that Kant continues to allow that JOPs are possible is also to be found in the fact that he returns to referring to them by that name in Reflexionen dated to the period after the publication of the B-edition.38 Additionally, in the Critique of Judgment-published in 1790-Kant explicitly allows for judgments of the agreeable, which he describes as merely subjectively valid judgments, thus demonstrating that he continues to allow for a more capacious use of the term 'judgment' that applies to merely subjectively valid judgments (see, e.g., CJ 5:212; 5:214, 5:217). Keeping this in mind, I suggest that the apparent conflict between the B-deduction and Kant's other writings can be resolved as follows. We can grant that within the context of the B-deduction, Kant opts to use the term 'judgment' in a narrow sense so that it applies only to cases in which representations are actively combined by the understanding.39 Indeed, Kant signals as much in a note added to the preface of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (published in 1786, between the Prolegomena and the B-edition). In the note, Kant explains that 'as [he] now understand[s] it,' the Deduction's justification of the categories 'can almost be accomplished through a single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general (an action through which given representations first become cognitions of an object)' (MF 4:475–76, my emphasis). Understood in this way, of course, the term 'judgment' becomes synonymous with the Prolegomena's 'judgments of experience,' as I have argued we should understand the latter term. Using the term in its restricted sense lends rhetorical strength to Kant's argument in the B-Deduction, since it allows him to claim that the Categories are necessary conditions on judgment in general.40 This change does not mean, however, that Kant no longer allows that representations can be merely passively combined by the reproductive imagination, and indeed, that we can be conscious of and report these passive and merely subjective combinations: as we have seen, he describes the contrast between objective and subjective unity in these very terms in §§18 and 19 of the B-deduction itself. As Kant is quick to point out in the note in the Metaphysical Foundations, his more 'precisely determined definition' only improves the 'manner of presentation,' not 'the ground of explanation,' which, he insists 'is already stated correctly' in his previous discussions.41 Now, we could easily abide by Kant's terminology in the B-deduction by expressing the distinction we have been discussing as holding, for example, between the objectively valid judgments that are a result of the activity of the understanding and merely subjectively valid reports about representations that are passively combined due to the reproductive imagination. This would be a merely semantic choice, however, and would not alter the content or relevance of the distinction at hand.42 Since the Prolegomena's terminology is both better known and more widely used by Kant, I have chosen to express the distinction as holding between JOEs and JOPs in this paper. And, more substantively, I have argued that it is the very same distinc38 See R3145–46, dated between 1790–1804 (16: 678–79). 39 As an anonymous referee suggests, another way to put this is that in the B-Deduction, Kant is specifically interested in the class of judgments that constitute cognition of an object. 40 We can find historical motivations for Kant's rhetorical shift. In the note included in the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant is responding to a review by Johann Schultz of Johann August Heinrich Ulrich's Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysicae, which was published in 1785. As part of his review of Ulrich's discussion of Kant's Critique in that work, Schultz complains that the A-edition of the Critique seems to entail that the categories are conditions even for what the Prolegomena would count as a JOP. With respect to the argument of the Second Analogy, for example, Schultz points out that one would have to 'know that the sunlight is the cause of the warmth of the stone in order to be able to say: when the sun shines, the stone grows warm' (translated in Sassen 2000: 213). (Note that Schultz's complaint is valid if we understand Kant's example in the Prolegomena in the way that Longuenesse does, but not if we understand it as I suggest we should in (1') above.) As part of his response, as we have seen, Kant opts to restrict the term 'judgment' to acts of the understanding for the sake of clarity, since it allows him to state unequivocally that the categories are conditions only of the latter. As I argue above, however, this does not mean that he no longer believes that combinations of representations that are due to the reproductive imagination are possible, and moreover, that we can be conscious of and report such representations. In fact, as we have seen, he provides an example of just such a combination in §19, which does not suffer from the ambiguity of his examples in the Prolegomena that engenders Schultz's complaint. For further discussion of the Second Analogy and its relation to Kant's distinction, see §3.3 below. For an extended discussion of Schultz's review and Kant's reception of it, see Allison (2015: 306–15). 41 MF 4:476. Since Pollok takes Kant to have substantively revised his view between the Prolegomena and the B-Deduction, he must treat Kant's insistence that the change merely concerns the 'manner of presentation' as a significant mischaracterization (Pollok 2008, 342). 42 On this point, I agree with Friedman (2012: 262) and Allison (2015: 369). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 12 of 20 tion that continues to play an essential role in both the Prolegomena and the Critique and so, that Kant's discussion in the former can fruitfully be brought to bear on his discussion in the latter, and vice versa. 3. In this section, I respond to four objections, each of which argues in a different way that the kinds of judgments about perceptions that I have been treating as JOPs are not in fact merely subjectively valid. 3.1. Judgments about sequences in a subject's perceptions have a truth value. They are true just in case the subject really does have the sequence of perceptions they report her to have. According to the first objection I will consider, the fact that judgments about perceptions have a truth value entails that they are not merely subjectively valid. In his well-known paper, "Did the Sage of Königsberg Have No Dreams," for example, Beck argues for this point as follows. Judgments 'about associations of ideas,' he says, 'if correct ... are correct for everyone.' Such a judgment, he continues, 'is valid (true) for me in the sense that it is claimed to be true of me. Yet this judgment is objectively valid, for it ... is a judgment of experience about which others can have evidence and on which they must agree if it is true.'43 To put the point succinctly: if a judgment about my perceptions is true, then it is true for all subjects. But this just means that it is not merely subjectively valid, but, rather, universally and objectively valid. Though the objection is an initially compelling one, I think it goes wrong in equating the objective validity of a judgment with its having a truth value.44 Though every judgment that has objective validity has a truth value, not every judgment that has a truth value is objectively valid. I have argued that a judgment claims objective validity if and only if it claims that what is represented by a certain sequence of perceptions is combined in the objects the perceptions are of. But a JOP does not do this. Rather, it merely reports a sequence of perceptions the subject finds herself with, without claiming that what is represented by the perceptions is combined in the objects the perceptions are of. It is for this reason, on my view, that JOPs remain merely subjectively valid. Now, as I said above, a JOP is true if the subject really had the sequence of perceptions it reports her as having. And others can and typically should accept the truth of such a judgment on the basis of the subject's testimony about her own perceptual states. Thus, a true JOP is indeed true for all subjects.45 But this is compatible with its lacking objective validity, since it makes no claim about the objects the perceptions are of. In sum, both objectively valid and merely subjectively valid judgments have a truth value. An objectively valid JOE is true if the objects represented by a sequence of perceptions really are the way it claims they are, and false if they are not. A subjectively valid JOP is true if the sequence of perceptions really are the way it claims they are, and false if they are not.46 3.2. The next objection I will consider points out that all the JOPs I have discussed already involve the application of objective concepts and indeed, the categories, since the representations they refer to are already determined to be representations of extensive magnitudes (such as weight), intensive magnitudes (such as warmth or the smell of coffee), substances (such as the sun or bodies) and events (such as the sun shining on a stone or a rooster crowing). How can I maintain, then, that these judgments are not about objects and remain merely subjectively valid?47 We can begin to respond to the objection by pointing out that Kant does not need his examples to consist in perceptions that have not been subsumed under any categories whatsoever. Rather, it is sufficient for the purposes of his argument to focus in on an element in a sequence of otherwise conceptually-and indeed, categorially-determined representations, where that element has itself not been (fully) determined by the 43 Beck (1978: 53). See also Bird (1962: 145), Kotzin and Baumgärtner (1990: 410). 44 This identification can also be found in Allison (2015: 366–67) and Vanzo (2012: 120). 45 Vanzo argues that JOPs are not 'truth-apt' for Kant on the basis of his claim in the Doctrine of Method that truth 'rests upon agreement with the object' (A820/B848). Since he agrees that JOPs are not about objects, Vanzo concludes that they cannot be true (2012: 120). What this overlooks, however, is that Kant makes this claim as part of his discussion of the type of holding-for-true [fürwahrhalten] he calls 'persuasion': an attitude by which the subject takes something to be true of the objects of her perception, albeit on insufficient grounds (see also 9:73 and Chignell 2007). On my view, Kant is describing the truth-conditions of JOEs here, not denying that JOPs can be true. 46 Thus, I agree with Prauss that JOPs can be true; however, I disagree with his claim that they cannot possibly be false (1971: 238–43). 47 See Prauss (1971: 188), Beck (1978: 51–52), Pollok (2008: 338–39). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 13 of 20 categories. If he can demonstrate that it is only when the element in question is determined by a category that it secures 'relation to the object,' then his example will be adequate to its function. In (1), for example, the subject's representation of the sun shining on the stone is presumably already determined as a representation of an event, and the representation of the stone's warmth is determined as a representation of an intensive magnitude. What remains undetermined, however, is the relation between these two representations. Before that relation is subsumed under the categories, as we have seen, all the subject can report is that former representation is succeeded by the latter-that is, she can only report the temporal succession of these representations that obtains as a result of her reproductive imagination. Once she actively subsumes this relation under the category of cause-and-effect, however, she can now claim that the event of the sun shining is objectively connected to the stone's warmth as cause to effect. Kant's example shows how the addition of a category converts the awareness of a merely temporal relation between two individual (but otherwise conceptually determined) representations into a judgment about an actual connection between the objects those representations are of. This is sufficient for his purposes, since it serves as an instance that illustrates the general role the categories are meant to play in relating representations to objects and thus, in building up a subject's complex objective representation of the world. A complete response to the objection under consideration, however, will require a further clarification. Kant indicates in the Critique that in order for a temporal sequence of perceptions to even be consciously apprehended and represented as a temporal sequence, it must already at least be determined by the categories of quantity, since these are required to represent time itself as a unified extensive magnitude (B161). As such, it is not quite accurate to say even that the relation between perceptions reported by a JOP is entirely categorially undetermined. Rather, the relation remains undetermined in particular by what Kant calls the relational categories-substance-inherence, cause-effect, and community-the application of which, as we have seen, is required in order to convert a subject's awareness of a mere temporal sequence in her representations into a judgment that those representations are correctly combined, or, equivalently, that the objects they represent are actually connected.48 In the "System of Principles", Kant distinguishes between two kinds of combination. The first, which he calls 'composition' [Zusammensetzung or compositio], consists in a synthesis that is governed merely by the mathematical categories of 'what does not necessarily belong to each other.' The second, which he calls 'connection' [Verknüpfung or nexus], is the 'synthesis of that which is manifold insofar as they necessarily belong to one another, as e.g., an accident belongs to some substance, or the effect to the cause' (B201n*)-in other words, a combination in accordance with one of the relational categories. On the interpretation I have defended here, JOPs report merely that one representation follows another in time, without determining whether these representations are correctly combined. Borrowing Kant's language from the Analytic, then, the sequence of representations reported by such a judgment is a mere 'composition' of two representations that are not claimed to 'belong to each other'. In contrast, JOEs express what Kant calls a 'connection' between perceptions: by subsuming the relation between the representations under the relational categories, such judgments involve the claim that the representations 'belong to one another'-that is, that they are correctly combined because they correspond to a connection in the objects represented.49 It follows, then, that it is specifically the addition of a relational category that allows for a JOP to be 'converted' into a JOE.50 This is certainly the case with Kant's own examples, which, as we have seen, involve 48 This is in line with Kant's claim at A664/B692 that while the mathematical categories of quantity and quality are constitutive of intuition, the dynamical categories of relation and modality are constitutive of experience. The dynamical categories also include the categories of modality. I focus on the relational categories in my discussion since, as Kant notes, the dynamical categories do not add any content to what is thought about the object. Rather, they merely express whether the object is possible, actual or necessary in light of the necessary conditions of experience that are due to the understanding, judgment and reason. Thus, the role of the categories of modality, Kant says, is to 'restric[t]' the other categories 'to merely empirical use' (A219/B266). 49 The contrast is not referred to using these terms in the Prolegomena: there, Kant says that both JOEs and JOPs express 'connections' (e.g., at 4: 300). However, he repeatedly distinguishes between two kinds of connection in the Prolegomena: on the one hand, a 'necessary' or 'synthetic connection' (4: 305) of perceptions that accords with 'the rules that determine the connection of representations in the concept of an object'(4: 290), and, on the other hand, a 'logical connection' (4: 298, 4: 304) or 'mere aggregate' of perceptions (4: 310) that merely reflects how they are 'given in sensory intuition' (4: 304). It is the latter, on my view, that comes to be called a mere 'composition' in the note added to the B-edition that I cite above. Kant also claims that it is the 'composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition' that enables consciousness of mere perceptions at B160 (my emphasis). However, he is not always consistent in his usage, sometimes continuing to refer to combinations due merely to the imagination as 'connections' (e.g., at B164; B233). Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this. 50 This has already been noted by a number of other interpreters. See Prauss (1971: 163–64), Beck (1978: 52), Sassen (2008: 277), Pollok (2008: 337–38), Friedman (2012: 258), Allison (2015: 300–303), Beizaei (2017: 348, 351–61). Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 14 of 20 adding the category of substance-inherence or the category of cause-and-effect. It also maps nicely onto his discussion in the Analogies of Experience, which specifically treat the relational categories. The general principle of the Analogies, Kant says, is that 'Experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions' (A176/B218, my emphasis). Subsuming perceptions that are merely 'juxtaposed' (zusammengestellt) in time under relational categories involves claiming that these perceptions are 'necessarily'-that is, objectively-combined (A176/B219). This is how, on Kant's view, perception gives rise to experience. And correspondingly, it is the addition of a relational category that allows the conversion of a judgment of perception into a judgment of experience. I should clarify here that I am not claiming that a JOP cannot employ any relational categories at all.51 Rather, as I have already discussed, it is sufficient that some relation between the objects represented remains undetermined by a relational category. Thus, although in Kant's example, the representation of the sun shining is presumably already thought to be a representation of an event and, as such, has already been subsumed under the category of cause, it is its connection with the representation of the stone's warmth that has not been determined by a relational category.52 3.3. Another objection that denies that judgments that are about sequences in a subject's perceptions are merely subjectively valid does so on the grounds of Kant's argument in the Second Analogy. There, as I have already discussed, Kant argues that the application of the category of cause-and-effect is necessary for representing an objective sequence of events. The objection claims that this point should apply to any sequence of events, including sequences in one's representations. This would then entail that applying the category of causeand-effect is a necessary condition even on representing a sequence in one's perceptions, and it should follow from this that judgments about such sequences are already determined by a relational category and, thus, objectively valid. What this objection overlooks, however, is that Kant's concern in the Second Analogy is precisely to distinguish a subjective sequence in one's representations from an objective sequence in events, and to argue that application of the category of cause-and-effect is a necessary condition only on representing the latter. Indeed, Kant argues that we must apply the category of cause-and-effect in order to judge whether or not a subjective sequence of representations corresponds to an objective sequence of events. As for the subjective sequence, Kant says: I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another remains undetermined (B233–34). In order to judge whether the subjective sequence of perceptions I have due to my reproductive imagination corresponds to an objective sequence of events, Kant continues: the relation between the two states must be thought in such a way that it is thereby necessarily determined which of them must be placed before and which after rather than vice versa. The concept, however, that carries a necessity ... with it can only be a pure concept of understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the relation of cause and effect ... (B234) 51 Compare Sassen (2008: 278), Beizaei (2017: 360). 52 This is important for my response to a possible objection. I have argued that judgments like (3) When I hear a rooster crow, I imagine the smell of coffee, and (4) When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight, are JOPs. However, the subject of these judgments is the 'I' which, as such, is presumably thought of as a substance (though this will need to be qualified: see note 55 below). Moreover, if this is the standard format of all JOPs, then all JOPs already employ the relational category of substance. On my view, however, this is compatible with their status as JOPs, since I do not claim that JOPs cannot employ any relational categories at all. Rather, as I explain above, their status as JOPs derives from the fact that they report a merely temporal relation between perceptions, where that relation in particular has not been subsumed under a relational category, and as such, is not taken to correspond to a connection between the objects the perceptions are of. It is only by judging that the objects the perceptions are of are connected as substance to accident, cause to effect, or as mutually interacting members of a community that a JOP is converted to a JOE. See note 55 for further discussion. I thank Colin McLear as well as an anonymous referee for raising this worry. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 15 of 20 In other words, Kant does not argue in the Second Analogy that application of the category of cause-andeffect is a necessary condition on representing even a subjective sequence in one's representations. Rather, and in line with my discussion so far, his point is that applying the category is necessary in order to make a judgment that refers such a sequence of representations to objects-that is, that claims of the events the representations are of that one actually succeeds the other in time. 3.4. The last objection I will consider claims that, on Kant's view, a subject's consciousness of her own perceptions in time amounts to inner experience. Given this, judgments that express temporal sequences of perceptions-which I have here identified as JOPs-should actually be thought of as judgments of (inner) experience. As such, they cannot be merely subjectively valid and, like all JOEs, require application of relational categories (in particular, the category of cause). My response to this objection is to deny that consciousness of the temporal sequence of one's perceptions alone amounts to inner experience. As we saw in §3.3, Kant indicates in the Second Analogy that a subject can be aware of the order in which her imagination calls up perceptions without yet subsuming them under the category of cause (B233–34). It is this immediate awareness of the subjective temporal order of her perceptions that I take JOPs to express. In order for this awareness to amount to any kind of experience of an objective order of events, application of the category of cause is necessary. The subject has outer experience, as we have seen, when she takes her sequence of perceptions to correspond to a causally determined sequence of outer events. She has inner experience, on my view, when she takes the sequence of her representations to itself be causally determined, that is, when she applies the category of cause to her own representations.53 In doing so, she takes the temporal order of her representations to be determined by (psychological) causal laws and goes beyond the immediate awareness of that order which, I have argued, is expressed by a JOP.54 Kant explicitly distinguishes between the mere awareness of one's perceptions and inner experience along these very lines in the Anthropology. 'Perception,' he says, 'could be called merely appearance of inner sense. However, in order for it to become inner experience the law must be known which determines the form of this connection ...' (7: 144n28, my emphases). '[I]t is ... necessary,' he repeats, 'to begin with observed appearances in oneself, and then to progress above all to the assertion of certain propositions that concern human nature; that is, to inner experience' (7: 143, my emphases). In these passages, Kant clearly distinguishes between mere awareness of perceptions on the one hand, and inner experience on the other. The latter, he says, involves asserting 'certain propositions that concern human nature.' Though a full discussion of this is beyond the scope of this paper, I take the 'propositions' concerning human nature that Kant has in mind here to be the natural, psychological laws that humans are subject to. These laws-which Kant identifies as laws of association (A100; 7: 176)-govern the reproduction of representations through the imagination. Kant's point in these passages, as I see it, then, is that inner experience requires taking one's representations to be causally determined by laws that govern human psychology. Most importantly for my purposes in this paper, Kant makes clear that a subject can have mere awareness of her perceptions in time, where this awareness does not yet amount to causally determined inner experience. Judgments that merely express the former awareness are not JOEs, on my view, and do not presuppose that my representations have been subsumed under the category of cause.55 Rather, as I have argued, they are merely subjectively valid JOPs. 53 Indeed, though I cannot defend this claim in this paper, this is another way in which JOPs turn out to be crucial for Kant's account of experience, namely, in virtue of expressing the kind of empirical apperception that forms the basis for inner experience and knowledge of ones' own psychology. I develop an account of this elsewhere. 54 Judgments that subsume representations themselves under the category of cause count as JOEs in a derivative sense. They do not- as per my definition in §2-claim that what is represented by a sequence of perceptions is combined in the independent object the perceptions are of. Rather, they treat the perceptions themselves as states of an inner object, in virtue of claiming that their succession in time is causally determined. 55 We might question why the subject needs to bring her representations under the category of cause in particular in order to count as making an (inner) JOE. Why is it not sufficient that she think of herself as the subject of her perceptions-as she does in the judgments I have identified as JOPs-and so, as a substance? In response, it should be noted that Kant makes clear in the Paralogisms that in thinking of oneself merely as the subject of one's thoughts, one does not in fact use the schematized category of substance, and so, succeed in thinking of oneself as a substantial object (A348–51; B410–11, see also Kraus 2019). Merely thinking of oneself as the subject of one's thoughts does not amount to intuiting oneself as persisting in time; the latter is required, however, for application of the schematized category of substance. On my view, it is only by thinking of the sequence of one's representations in time as causally determined that one succeeds in cognizing oneself as an (inner) object. I develop this claim elsewhere. Thanks Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 16 of 20 4. In this final section, I argue that a key advantage of my reading of the distinction between objective and merely subjective validity is that it can explain why this distinction appears so centrally in Kant's deduction of the categories, both in the Prolegomena and in the B-edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. In contrast, as I will explain, the reading I criticized in §1 obscures Kant's argumentative strategy in the Deduction. In the Prolegomena, Kant claims that he takes his arguments to provide a 'complete solution of the Humean problem' (4: 313). The 'Humean problem,' as Kant understands it, is a version of the 'skeptical doubts' concerning the idea of a necessary connection that Hume presents in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, generalized so as to apply to other concepts and principles that Kant believes are not derived from experience.56 Now, there are a number of difficult questions concerning Kant's reading of Hume, as well as the various dimensions along which he might be thought to have offered a response to him.57 For the purposes of this paper, I hope to sidestep most of these questions. First, I will only be concerned with how Kant himself understands the so-called 'Humean problem,' setting aside the question of whether he is right to read Hume as he does.58 Second, I will only focus on one aspect of the problem: the question of how we can be rationally entitled to apply concepts that have not been derived from experience to the objects of experience. Since Kant himself describes the main goal of the Transcendental Deduction as consisting in answering how we are entitled to apply the a priori categories to the objects of experience (A85/B117), I take it to be relatively uncontroversial to assume that he aims to respond to this question. Third, we should note that Kant takes the relational categories to be especially central to the 'Humean problem.' As he argues in §27 of the Prolegomena, Hume's doubts about the concept of necessary connection are automatically applicable not only to the concept of a causal connection but also to concepts of the kinds of connection covered by the other two relational categories: namely, a connection between a substance and its accidents, as well as between mutually dependent objects in a community (4: 310). For the purposes of this paper, then, I will focus in on a 'Humean skeptic' who denies in particular that we are rationally entitled to apply the relational categories to the objects of experience, and consider that component of Kant's argument in the Deduction that could be said to respond to such a skeptic by invoking the distinction between objective and merely subjective validity. We can express Kant's argumentative strategy against such a skeptic in the terms of the Prolegomena as follows: we are rationally entitled to apply the relational categories because they are necessary conditions on making JOEs. In other words, the application of a relational category is necessary in order to transform a JOP into a JOE, and so, if we were unable to apply the relational categories, we would be limited to making mere JOPs (See 4: 311). But if the relational categories are necessary conditions on making JOEs, the Humean skeptic cannot deny that we are entitled to use them in such judgments. Now, a full defense of Kant's transcendental argument is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I want to focus in on the following question: why should Kant think his argument has any force against the Humean skeptic? That is, does Kant have reason to think that such a skeptic will grant that it must be possible to make JOEs, such that his argument, if sound, could move the skeptic to accept the legitimacy of the relational categories? If we understand the distinction between JOPs and JOEs in accordance with the standard reading that I criticized in §1, it is hard to see why this should be the case. For recall that, on that reading, a JOP is a judgment about the objects of perception that cannot be said to hold for all subjects because it to an anonymous referee for pressing this point. 56 Hume, Enquiry, §4. Some of the concepts that Kant extends the 'Humean problem' to-such as the concept of substance-were considered by Hume himself in the Treatise of Human Nature, which predates the Enquiry by ten years. However, while a German translation of the Enquiry was published in 1755 and was owned by Kant, the Treatise was not fully translated into German until the 1790s, after the publication of the Prolegomena and both editions of the Critique. On this point, see Kuehn (1983: 179), and for an extended discussion, Guyer (2008: Introduction and Chs. 1–2). 57 Stephen Engstrom argues that the Deduction 'does not aim at a refutation of skepticism' (1994: 359), either of the Cartesian or the Humean variety. Considering Humean skepticism in particular, however, Engstrom's main point is that Kant does not seek to refute Hume's skepticism, but rather to 'remove' its source by showing that the categories do not have an empirical origin (1994: 375). As Engstrom notes, Kant's full response to Hume involves answering the 'question of our right to employ' the categories (1994: 376). It is the latter that I will be concerned with here, and I take my construal of it to be compatible with Engstrom's characterization of Kant's task. See also Ameriks (2000: 43; 2003: esp. 51, 65–66), Hatfield (2001), Watkins (2004: 381–90) and Dyck (2011: esp. 495–96) for other versions of the claim that Kant does not seek to refute Hume. For responses to the concerns of many of these interpreters that I am in broad agreement with see Guyer (2008: esp. Introduction, Chs. 1–2); see also Forster (2008: 20–32, 40–43). 58 Kant clearly does read Hume as denying that we are rationally entitled to apply the category of cause to the objects of experience and sees himself as responding to this kind of skepticism. For a particularly vivid statement of this, see CPrR, 5: 51–53. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity Art. 9, page 17 of 20 is insufficiently justified; a JOE, in contrast, is a judgment that has undergone the systematic investigation necessary to justify the claim that it holds for all subjects. Plugging this reading of the distinction into Kant's transcendental argument, it amounts to the claim that the relational categories are necessary conditions on making sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects: if we could not apply these categories, on this reading, we would be limited to making insufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects. Even if this were true, however, why should it move the Humean skeptic to accept the legitimacy of the relational categories? For he is by no means committed to the possibility of our making sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects: indeed, since he denies that we are entitled to apply relational categories like substance or cause, he has already concluded that any judgments that employ such concepts are insufficiently justified.59 On my interpretation, in contrast, any judgment that so much as makes a claim about the objects of perception claims objective validity, and is, therefore, a JOE; JOPs, in contrast, are judgments about the subject's perceptions rather than about the objects of perception. This allows us to translate Kant's argument as follows: the application of the relational categories is a necessary condition on making judgments that so much as make a claim about objects; not applying these categories, then, is tantamount to being limited to making judgments about one's own perceptions rather than about the objects of perception. On this translation of it, I think we can see why Kant could expect his transcendental argument to have force against the Humean skeptic. For, if sound, his argument establishes that if we could not apply the relational categories, then we could not so much as represent the objects of our perception as being a certain way, whether justifiably or not. And Kant could quite plausibly claim that the Humean skeptic he is responding to does not intend his skepticism to go so far as to deny that we are capable of so much as representing the objects of our perception as being a certain way.60 The 'Humean doubt' that Kant takes himself to be responding to has to do in particular with whether we are entitled to apply concepts not derived from experience to the objects of experience. It does not call into question whether we are entitled to apply concepts that are derived from experience to the objects of experience, nor, importantly, whether we can so much as take our experience to represent objects in the first place.61 Kant's claim against this skeptic is that his discussion of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs has shown that even this minimal achievement-relation to the object-requires the application of the a priori relational categories. In a nutshell, since the categories are a necessary condition of making JOEs that so much as represent objects, Kant concludes, the Humean skeptic cannot deny our entitlement to use them in such judgments.62 The same transcendental argument recurs centrally in §19 of the B-Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason. Though Kant does not there put the argument in terms of the distinction between JOPs and JOEs, as we have seen, he does argue that the addition of a category is necessary to convert a merely subjectively valid report about one's representations into an objectively valid judgment about the objects represented. Only by relating our representations 'in accordance with principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them' (i.e., the categories), Kant argues, 'does there arise': 59 For the Humean skeptic, this is not (merely) because of a lack of empirical evidence, but rather, because such judgments employ concepts that have not been derived from experience. Nevertheless, the point stands that Kant cannot hope to get very far with the Humean skeptic if his transcendental argument requires the skeptic to grant that we can make sufficiently justified judgments about perceived objects. Indeed, some interpreters end up concluding that Kant could not even have intended for this stretch of argument to have any force against Humean skepticism. See, for example, Wolff (2012: 131), Allison (2015: 293). This conclusion, however, is at odds with Kant's claim in the Prolegomena that through his arguments there, he has 'thoroughly dispose[d] of the Humean doubt' (4: 310). 60 Of course, a more radical skeptic might deny this, but I do not think that Kant's argument is meant to respond to this kind of skeptic. See Guyer (2008: 112–13). 61 Hume himself arguably describes us as representing objects as actually being some way or other. 'When we look about us towards external objects,' he says in the Enquiry, for example, we 'find ... that the one [event] does actually, in fact, follow the other.' When we find that one event 'actually, in fact' follows another, we make a claim about objects, rather than about our own perceptions. 62 Thus, Kant argues in the Prolegomena that the solution to the 'Humean problem' lies in seeing that the relational categories are not derived from experience, but rather that 'experience is derived from them,' which he says is a 'completely reversed type of connection that never occurred to Hume' (4: 313). Now, Kant makes clear that by 'experience' here, he means 'a synthetic unification of perceptions' (4: 312) and one might question why we should think he takes the latter to involve any claim to objective validity-that is, to representing what the perceptions are of as an object. However, this is precisely how Kant understands synthetic unity: as he says in the Deduction, it is their synthetic unity that 'constitutes the relation of representations to an object, thus their objective validity, and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions ...' (B137–38, see also B218). I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to further clarify this point. Sethi: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective ValidityArt. 9, page 18 of 20 a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association. In accordance with the latter I could only say 'When I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight,' but not 'It, the body, is heavy,' which would be to say that these two representations are combined in the object, i.e., regardless of any difference in the condition of the subject, and are not merely found together in perception ... (B142) In this section, too, I believe, Kant's primary target is the kind of Humean skeptic I described above. Kant's argument against the Humean skeptic, again, is that if we were not able to apply the relational categories, we would only ever be able to describe the 'condition of the subject'-that is, the combination of representations the subject finds herself with-rather than so much as represent (justifiably or unjustifiably) how things are 'combined in the object'. In sum, I believe that it is only when the distinction between JOPs and JOEs is understood as I do here that we can correctly understand Kant's argument against the Humean skeptic. When interpreters read Kant as claiming in §§18–19 of the B-deduction that imaginative associations are insufficient grounds for judgments about objects, they mistake what is meant to be a response to such a skeptic for a statement of agreement with him.63 Now, of course, Kant does agree with Hume on some crucial points. He agrees, for example, that the concept of cause is not derived from our experience of events. And he agrees that our reproductive imagination is governed by laws of association that make it the case that we habitually connect representations that frequently go together. His point against the Humean skeptic, however, is that with these resources alone, our mental lives would be far more impoverished than he anticipates. For even simply to take our imaginative associations as grounds for judging that objects are a certain way requires that our judgments have the categorial form that is necessary in order for them to be about objects. Since our mental lives are not so impoverished, Kant argues, we are committed to the possibility of doing just that. Acknowledgements For very helpful comments, discussion or advice, I am grateful to Richard Booth, Sarah Buss, Hannah Ginsborg, Colin McLear, Tyke Nunez, Laura Ruetsche, Tad Schmaltz, Umrao Sethi, Daniel Warren, Jessica Williams, participants at the 2019 Eastern Study Group of the North American Kant Society, the 2019 Kant Congress, the Faculty Working Group at the University of Michigan department of philosophy, audience members at the University of South Florida, as well as an anonymous referee for this journal. Competing Interests The author has no competing interests to declare. References Primary Sources Unless indicated otherwise, translations of Kant's text are from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (ed. by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–). 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DOI: https://doi.org/10.32881/jomp.86 Submitted: 30 October 2019 Accepted: 04 June 2020 Published: 21 August 2020 Copyright: © 2020 The Author(s). This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited. See http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. Journal of Modern Philosophy is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by Virginia University Press. OPEN ACCESS

Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction Willard Van Orman Quine was one of the most well-known American "analytic" philosophers of the twentieth century. He made significant contributions to many areas of philosophy, including philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind/psychology (behaviorism). However, he is best known for his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. Technically, this is the distinction between statements true in virtue of the meanings of their terms (like "a bachelor is an unmarried man") and statements whose truth is a function not simply of the meanings of terms, but of the way the world is (such as, "That bachelor is wearing a grey suit"). Although a contentious thesis, analyticity has been a popular explanation, especially among empiricists, both for the necessity of necessary truths and for the a priori knowability of some truths. Thus, in some contexts "analytic truth," "necessary truth," and "a priori truth" have been used interchangeably, and the analytic/synthetic distinction has been treated as equivalent to the distinctions between necessary and contingent truths, and between a priori and a posteriori (or empirical) truths. Empirical truths can be known only by empirical verification, rather than by "unpacking" the meanings of the terms involved, and are usually thought to be contingent. Quine wrestled with the analytic/synthetic distinction for years, but he did not make his thoughts public until 1950, when he delivered his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" at a meeting of the American Philosophical Association. In this paper, Quine argues that all attempts to define and understand analyticity are circular. Therefore, the notion of analyticity should be rejected (along with, of course, the spurious distinction in which it features). This rejection has inspired debates and discussions for decades. For one thing, if Quine is right, and there are no truly necessary truths (that is, analytic truths), metaphysics, which traffics in such truths, is effectively dead. Quine is generally classified as an analytic philosopher (where this sense of "analytic" has little to do with the analytic/synthetic distinction) because of the attention he pays to language and logic. He also employed a "naturalistic" method, which generally speaking, is an empirical, scientific method. A metaphysical approach was not an option for Quine, primarily because of his thoughts on analyticity. Both because of the influence of "The Two Dogmas of Empircism" in analytic circles, and because its perspective on analyticity is foundational to every other aspect of Quine's thought-to his philosophies of language and logic, to his naturalistic epistemology, and to his anti-metaphysical stance-a survey of Quine's thought on analyticity is perhaps the best introduction to his thought as a whole. Table of Contents 1. Life and Influences 2. The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: A Focus on Analyticity 3. Metaphysics: Some Implications 4. References and Further Reading 1. Life and Influences Willard Van Orman Quine was born on June 25, 1908 in Akron Ohio. As a teenager, he was an avid stamp collector and a budding cartographer. One of his first publications was a free-hand map of the Portage Lakes of Ohio, which he sold for pennies to lakefront stores. When he was sixteen, Quine wrote the first edition of O.K. Stamp News, which was distributed to stamp collectors and dealers. Quine went on to write and distribute six more editions of the philatelic newspaper before moving on to new interests. One of these interests included active participation in the lighthearted "Greeter Club," where members were required to call each other by their middle names (and engage in other sorts of playful word games). At this point, Quine became known as "Van" to his friends, a moniker that stuck with him for the rest of his life. Quine received his undergraduate degree from OberlinCollege, in Oberlin, Ohio. He majored in mathematics with honors in mathematical philosophy and mathematical logic. During his college years, along with cultivating his interest in mathematics, mathematical logic, linguistics and philosophy, Quine began his secondary career as an intrepid traveler. He hitchhiked to, at least, Virginia, Kentucky, Canada and Michigan. In 1928, he made his way to Denver and back with a few friends, hopping freight trains, hitchhiking, and riding on running boards. Lodging often included jail houses (where one could sleep for free in relative safety), park benches and the ground. At the end of his junior year, he traveled to Europe. Quine writes in his autobiography, The Time of My Life: "An interest in foreign languages, like an interest in stamps, accorded with my taste for geography. Grammar, moreover, appeals to the same sense that is gratified by mathematics, or by the structure of boundaries and road networks" (Quine, 1987: 38). During his junior year at Oberlin, Quine became immersed in Whitehead and Russell's Principia Mathematica. Whitehead was a member of Harvard's Philosophy Department, so Quine decided to apply to their doctoral program in philosophy. Graduating from Oberlin with an Aaverage, he was accepted, and received his Ph.D. in 2 years, at age twenty-three. Broadly speaking, his thesis sought to extensionalize the properties that populated the Principia. For our purposes, we may understand an extensional definition as a set of particular things. For instance, the extensional definition of a cat would consist of the set of all cats and the extensional definition of the property orange would consist of the set of all orange things (which could include things that are only partly orange). In Quine's dissertation, we see his first concerted effort to do away with definitions that are not extensional, that is, with intensional definitions. Intensional definitions are, broadly speaking, generalizations, where particular things (for example, particular cats) are not employed in the definition. For instance, the intensional definition of a cat might be something like "four-legged feline mammal," and likewise, the intensional definition of the property "orange" might be "a color that is the combination of yellow and red." To some degree, Quine's distaste for intensional definitions is rooted in Berkeley and Hume; also see the article on "the Classical theory of Concepts," section 2 ). Generally speaking, Quine thought that intensional definitions, and likewise, "meanings" were vague, mentalistic entities; out of touch with the concrete particulars that comprise extensional definitions. Quine's use/mention distinction also first saw the light of day in his dissertation. This distinction underlines the difference between objects and names of objects. For instance, an actual cat, say Hercules the cat, is to be distinguished from the name 'Hercules'. Quine uses single quotation marks to denote a name. Thus, Hercules the cat is orange and white, but the name 'Hercules' is not. Rather, the name 'Hercules' has other properties, for example, it begins with the letter 'H'. An actual object (for example, Hercules the cat) is mentioned, and we use a name (that is, 'Hercules') to do so. After completing his dissertation in 1932, Quine was awarded a Sheldon Traveling Fellowship by Harvard. Taking the advice of Hebert Feigl and John Cooley, Quine, along with his first wife Naomi Clayton, set off for Europe to study with Rudolf Carnap. This would prove to be a momentous trip; Carnap had a singular and lasting influence on Quine. For although he initially agreed with much of what Carnap had to say, a number of Quine's most distinctive ideas emerged as a result of rejecting some of Carnap's more fundamental positions. Of particular importance is Quine's rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. Although the analytic/synthetic distinction had been a staple of the empiricist tradition since at least Hume, Quine was especially concerned with Carnap's formulation of it. 2. The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: A Focus on Analyticity As Quine understood it (via Carnap), analytic truths are true as a result of their meaning. For instance, the statement "All bachelors are unmarried men" is true because being a "bachelor" means being an "unmarried man." "Synthetic" claims on the other hand, are not true merely because of the meaning of the words used in the statement. Rather, the truth of these statements turns on facts. For instance, the claim "David is a bachelor" is only true if, in fact, David is a bachelor. But before rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine delivered three papers on Carnap to Harvard's Society of Fellows in 1934, where he seemed to defend the distinction. They were titled: "The a priori," "Syntax," and "Philosophy as Syntax." Eager to get Carnap's work on the English-speaking philosophical stage, Quine delivered these lectures not only to give a clear and careful exposition of Carnap's new book, The Logical Syntax of Language, but to help convince the Harvard University that it needed Carnap (Carnap served as a visiting Professor at Harvard in 1940-41, but otherwise remained at the University of Chicago from 1936-1952.) Not only was Quine reading Carnap's work at this time, but Carnap was reading Quine's recent book, A System of Logistic, the published rewrite of his dissertation (Creath 1990: 149 – 160, # 15-17). Quine's respect for Carnap at this time is indisputable; a rapport had grown between the two such that they could easily exchange ideas and, for the most part, understand each other. Yet some sixty years after he gave the 1934 Harvard lectures, Quine confesses that they were rather servile reconstructions of Carnap's thoughts, or as Quine puts it, they were "abjectly sequacious" (Quine, 1991: 266). For as early as 1933-a year before the Harvard lectures were delivered-Quine was having serious doubts about the analytic/synthetic distinction, doubts that he privately expressed to Carnap. For instance, on March 31, 1933, Carnap observes that "He [Quine] says after some reading of my "Syntax" MS [that is, the manuscript of Carnap's The Logical Syntax of Language]: Is there a difference between logical axioms and empirical sentences? He thinks not. Perhaps I seek a distinction just for its utility, but it seems he is right: gradual difference: they are sentences we want to hold fast" (Quine, 1991: 267). Here, in the course of reading a draft of Carnap's book in 1933, Quine questions the distinction between "logical axioms" and "empirical axioms," where, generally speaking, "analytic" propositions entail logical axioms. Almost twenty years later, Quine defended a variant of this position in his now famous paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism." Here, he claims that there is no sharp distinction between claims that are true in virtue of their meaning (analytic claims) and empirical claims (claims that may be verified by facts). In December 1950, Quine presented "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" to the philosophers gathered at the annual meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA). This marked his public rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. But as we saw above, Quine had been brooding over the matter since at least 1933. Not only did his qualms about this distinction surface in his discussions and correspondence with Carnap but also in conversation with other prominent philosophers and logicians, for example, Alfred Tarski, Nelson Goodman, and Morton White (Quine, 1987: 226). Stimulated by these conversations, White wrote his often overlooked paper, "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," which was published before Quine presented the "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" at the 1950 APA meeting (Quine footnotes this paper at the end of the published version "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism"). Quine begins "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" by defining an analytic proposition as one that is "true by virtue of meanings" (Quine, 1980: 21). The problem with this characterization, he explains, is that the nature of meanings is obscure; Quine reminds the reader of what he takes to be one of Carnap's biggest mistakes in semantics-meaning is not to be confused with naming. For instance, the clause "The Morning Star" has a different meaning than the clause "The Evening Star" but both name the same object (the planet Venus), and thus, both have the same reference. Similarly, Quine explains that one mustn't confuse the meaning, that is, the "intension," of a general term with its extension, that is, the class of particular things to which the term applies. For instance, he points out, the two general terms "creature with a heart" and "creature with a kidney" both have the same extension because every creature with a heart has a kidney, and likewise. But these two statements clearly don't have the same meaning. Thus, for Quine there is a clear distinction between intensions and extensions, which reflects an equally clear distinction between meanings and references. Quine then briefly explains the notion of what a word might mean, as opposed to what essential qualities an object denoted by that word might be said to have. For instance, the object man might be said to be essentially rational, while being, say, "two-legged" is an accidental property-there are plenty of humans who only have one leg, or who have no legs at all. As a result, the word 'man' must mean, at least "a rational being," but it does not necessarily mean "two-legged." Thus, Quine concludes, there seems to be some kind of parallel between the essential properties of an object and the meaning of the word that denotes that object. Or as Quine puts it: "meaning is what essence becomes when it is divorced from the object of reference and wedded to the word" (Quine, 1980: 22). But does this imply that meanings are some kind of "objects?" This can't be the case, Quine concludes, because he just showed that meanings must not be confused with objects, that is, meanings must not be confused with references (for example, we must not confuse the meaning of the phrase "morning star" with what the phrase names, that is, the object Venus). Instead, it seems we should focus on grasping what is happening when two words are "synonymous," that is, what seems to be happening when two words are "analytically" related. For instance, the two words 'bachelor' and 'unmarried' seem to be synonymous, and thus, the proposition, "All bachelors are unmarried men" seems to be an analytic statement. And thus Quine writes: "The problem of analyticity confronts us anew" (Quine, 1980: 22). To tackle the notion of analyticity, Quine makes a distinction between two kinds of analytic claims, those comprised of logical truths and those comprised of synonymous terms. Logical truths, Quine explains, are any statements that remain true no matter how we interpret the non-logical particles in the statement. Logical particles are logical operators, for example, not, if then, or, all, no, some, and so forth. For instance, the statement "No not-X is X" will remain true no matter how we interpret X, for example, "No not-cat is a cat," or "No not-bicycle is a bicycle." An example of the second kind of analytic statement would be, Quine explains, "No bachelor is married," where the meaning of the word 'bachelor' is synonymous with the meaning of the word 'unmarried.' However, we can make this kind of analytic claim into a logical truth (as defined above) by replacing 'bachelor' with its synonym, that is, 'unmarried man,' to get "No unmarried man is married," which is an instance of No not-X is X. However, to make this substitution, we had to have some idea of what is meant by the word 'synonymy,' but this is problematical, so the notion of synonymy is the focus of the remainder of his discussion of analyticity. Quine suggests that one might, as is often done, appeal to definitions to explain the notion of synonymy. For instance, we might say that "bachelor" is the definition of an "unmarried man," and thus, synonymy turns on definitions. However, Quine attests, in order to define "bachelor" as unmarried, the definer must possess some notion of synonymy to begin with. In fact, Quine writes, the only kind of definition that does not presuppose the notion of synonymy, is the act of ascribing an abbreviation purely conventionally. For instance, let's say that I create a new word, 'Archon.' I can arbitrarily say that its abbreviation is "Ba2." In the course of doing so, I did not have to presuppose that these two notions are "synonymous;" I merely abbreviated 'Archon' by convention, by stipulation. However, when I normally attempt to define a notion, for example, "bachelor," I must think to myself something like, "Well, what does it mean to be a bachelor, particularly, what words have the same meaning as the word 'bachelor?'" that is, what meanings are synonymouswith the meaning of the word 'bachelor?' And thus, Quine complains: "would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible [as those created purely by convention]. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it" (Quine, 1980: 26). Perhaps then, Quine suggests, one could define synonymy in terms of "interchangability." Two words are synonymous if they are "[interchangeable] in all contexts without change of truth value" (Quine, 1980: 27)\. However, this is problematic as well. Consider, Quine explains, the sentence "'Bachelor' has less than ten letters." If we simply exchange the word 'bachelor' with the words 'unmarried man' we have created a false statement, that is, "'Unmarried man' has less than ten letters." We also have problems if we try to replace the word 'bachelor' with 'unmarried man' in phrases like 'bachelor of arts,' or 'bachelor's buttons.' But, Quine explains, we can get around the latter problem if we say that 'bachelor of arts' is a complete word, and thus, the 'bachelor' part of this word is merely a wordfragment, which cannot be interchanged with a complete word, for example, 'bachelor' when not understood as part of a phrase. Regardless of this quick fix, what we are really after is "cognitive synonymy," which is to be distinguished from the word-play discussed above. However, Quine is not quite sure what cognitive synonymy entails. But, he reminds us, we do know that "the sort of synonymy needed ... [is] merely such that any analytic statement [can] be turned into a logical truth by putting synonyms for synonyms." (Quine, 1980: 22). Recall, for instance, our example regarding "No not-X is an X." In this case, we saw that for example, "No bachelor is married" is in fact, an instance of the logical truth, No not-X is an X, particularly, "No unmarried man is a married man," if, in fact, the words 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are synonymous. Thus, what we are looking for is this kind of synonymy; this is "cognitive synonymy." However, in order to explain "cognitive synonymy"-as we just did-we had to assume that we knew what analyticity meant. In particular, we had to assume the meanings of the two kinds of analyticity explained above, that is, analyticity qua logical axioms and analyticity qua synonymy. And thus, Quine writes: "What we need is an account of cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity." (Quine, 1980: 29). So, the question is, can we give an account of cognitive synonymy by appealing to interchangeability (recall that this is the task at hand) without presupposing any definition of analyticity? Yes, initially it seems that one could, if our language contained the word "necessarily." However, it turns out that the kind of "necessary" we have to assume may only apply to analytic statements, and thus, we once again presuppose a notion of analyticity to explain cognitive synonymy. Generally speaking, this plays out as follows: Assume that (1) "Necessarily all and only bachelors are bachelors." (Quine, 1980: 29). That is, the word 'necessary' implies that this claim is logically true, and thus, it is analytic. Thus, if we assume that the words 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' are interchangeable (in regard to meaning, not letters), then (2) "Necessarily all and only bachelors are unmarried men" is true, where once, again, the word 'necessary' seems to make this logically, that is, analytically true. And thus, once again, we needed to presuppose a notion of analyticity to define cognitive synonymy; "To suppose that ['necessary' makes sense] is to suppose that we have already made satisfactory sense of 'analytic'" (Quine, 1980: 30). Quine's final proposal to define analyticity without an appeal to meaning-and thus without appeal to synonymy or definitions as follows: We can try to assimilate a natural language to a formal language by appealing to the semantical rules developed by Carnap (see the article on Rudolf Carnap, sections 3-6). However, Quine finds the same kind of circularity here that he has found elsewhere. To show why, Quine reconstructs a general Carnapian paradigm regarding artificial languages and semantical rules, that, broadly speaking, proceeds as follows: [1] Assume there is an artificial language L0. Its semantical rules explicitly specify which statements are analytic in L0. [2] A problem immediately surfaces: To extensionally define what is analytic in L0, the intensional meaning of 'analytic' is presupposed in the rules, simply because "the rules contain the word 'analytic' which we don't understand!" (Quine, 1980: 33) Although we have an extensional definition of 'analytic,' we do not have an intensional definition, that is, we do not understand what analyticity means, regardless if we have a list of particular expressions that are allegedly analytic. For instance, if I asked you to compile a list of things that are "smargon," and you did, but you had no idea what the word 'smargon' means, you'd be in trouble-how could you even compile your list without knowing what 'smargon' means? [3] Perhaps though, one could understand the term 'analytic for L0' simply as a convention, calling it 'K' so it looks like the intensional meaning of the word 'analytic'- that is, a well-defined intensional account of analytic-is not at work anywhere. But, Quine asks, why the specific class K, and not some other arbitrary class, for example, LZ? (Quine, 1980: 33) For instance, let's say that I wanted to arbitrarily give a list of all things that are smargon, but I don't know what the word 'smargon' means. So I create a list of things that just so happen to be green. But why did I pick just green things? Why not orange things, or things that had no particular color at all? [4] Let it be supposed instead then, that there is a kind of semantical rule that does not specify which statements are analytic, but simply those that are true. But not all truths, just a certain set of truths. Thus, one may then define "analytic truths" as those that belong to this set. And so, "A statement is analytic if it is (not merely true but) true according to the semantical rule" (Quine, 1980: 34). However (generally speaking), the same problem surfaces in terms of "semantical rule-" how does it specify which statements are to be included in the class of truths without in some sense presupposing the intensional meaning of the word 'analytic?' The circle is pervasive, and so: "we might just stop tugging at our bootstraps altogether" (Quine, 1980: 36). And thus, in 1950, Quine is confident that, perhaps once and for all, after nearly twenty years of intermittent discussion of the matter with Carnap and others, he should reject the notion of "analyticity." 3. Metaphysics: Some Implications Quine's rejection of analyticity has many implications, particularly for the field of metaphysics. According to the main camp of metaphysicians, metaphysics, generally speaking, employs a method where deductive logical laws are applied to a set of axioms that are necessarily true. The propositions produced by such a method are, as a result, necessarily true as well (think, for instance of Descartes' method /descarte/#H3 or Leibniz's). For the most part, these truths, the axioms that they are derived from, and the logical laws that are used to derive them, are thought to reflect the necessary and eternal nature of the universe. However, if there are, as Quine claims, no such things as necessary truths, that is, analytic truths, then this main camp of metaphysics is essentially eviscerated. It is, at best, a field where clever people play still cleverer games, manipulating allegedly "necessary" truths with allegedly "necessary" laws. This attack on metaphysics by Quine has spawned new camps of metaphysics which do not rely in this way on deductive methods. What method then, did Quine use? The empirical method. In this respect, Quine was a scientific philosopher, that is, what is often called a naturalistic philosopher. Like Hume, he believed that philosophical conclusions were not necessarily true-they did not reflect or capture the essential nature of humanity, let alone the nature of the universe. Rather, they were testable, and potentially could be rejected. 4. References and Further Reading  Carnap, R. The Logical Structure of the World; Psuedo problems in Philosophy, Second Edition. Translated by R.A. George, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967 [Original publication date 1928]  Carnap, R. The Logical Syntax of Language. Translated by A. Smeaton. London: Routledge, 1959.  Carnap, R. Meaning and Necessity. Second edition with supplements. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1947.  Creath, R. Dear Carnap, Dear Van: The Quine-Carnap Correspondence and Related Work. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.  Davidson, D. and Hintikka, J. eds. Words and Objections, Essays on the Work of W.V. Quine. Synthese Library 21. Revised ed. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969.  Dreben, Burton. "In Medius Rebus." Inquiry, 37 (1995): pp. 441-7.  Dreben, Burton. "Putnam, Quine-and the Facts." Philosophical Topics, 20 (1992): pp. 293-315.  Fara, R. Director: "In Conversation: W.V. Quine." A Philosophy International Production, London: Philosophy International, London School of Economics, 1994: tapes 1-8.  Fogelin, R. "Aspects of Quine's Naturalized Epistemology." The Cambridge Companion to Quine, ed. R.F. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004  Gibson, R.F., ed., The Cambridge Companion to Quine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004  Hintikka, J. "Three Dogmas of Quine's Empiricism," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 51 (1997): pp. 457477  Hookway, C. Quine: Language, Experience and Reality. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988.  Leonardi, P. and Santambrogio, M. On Quine, New Essays. Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1995.  Pakaluk, M. "Quine's 1946 Lectures on Hume." Journal of the History of Philosophy, 27 (1989): pp. 445-459  Quine, W.V. A System of Logistic, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934.  Quine, W.V. "Carnap" Yale Review 76 (1987): pp. 226-230.  Quine, W.V. From Stimulus to Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1995.  Quine, W.V. "In Praise of Observation Sentences." Journal of Philosophy, XC, #3 (1993): pp. 107-116.  Quine, W.V. Methods of Logic, fourth edition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982 [Original edition, 1950].  Quine, W.V. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World." Erkenntnis 9, 3 (1975): 313-28.  Quine, W.V. "On Philosophers' Concern with Language." 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London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961.  Schilpp, P.A. ed, The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap: Library of Living Philosophers, II. La Salles, Illinois: Open Court, 1963  Schilpp, P.A. and Edwin L., eds. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine: Library of Living Philosophers, XVII, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986.  Schilpp, P.A. and Edwin L., eds. The Philosophy of W.V. Quine: Library of Living Philosophers, XVII, Expanded Edition, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1998.  Shahan, R.W. and Swoyer, C. eds. Essays on the Philosophy of W.V. Quine, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979  Tooke, J.H., The Divisions of Purley, vol. 1, London, 1786, Boston, 1806.  White, M. "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," John Dewey: Philosopher of Science and Freedom, ed. S. Hook. New York: Dial, 1950.  Whitehead, A.N. and Bertrand Russell. Principia Mathematica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910. Author Information Stefanie Rocknak Email: [email protected] Hartwick College U. S. A.

Review of 'Philosophy in a New Century' by John Searle (2008) (review revised 2019) Michael Starks ABSTRACT Before commenting on the book, I offer comments on Wittgenstein and Searle and the logical structure of rationality. The essays here are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. Just a few examples: on p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in 'On Certainty' that there is no possibility of doubting the true-only axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of 'certainty', which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the "battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language" which W demonstrated over and over again. One wordtwo (or many) distinct uses. His last chapter "The Unity of the Proposition" (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S's taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it "A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. 2 Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S's half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W's perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). " But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false." Wittgenstein OC 94 "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) "Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 "Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might give the name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 "What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; however, but rather observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 "The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which 3 corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 "Could a machine process cause a thought process? The answer is: yes. Indeed, only a machine process can cause a thought process, and 'computation' does not name a machine process; it names a process that can be, and typically is, implemented on a machine." Searle PNC p73 "...the characterization of a process as computational is a characterization of a physical system from outside; and the identification of the process as computational does not identify an intrinsic feature of the physics, it is essentially an observer relative characterization." Searle PNC p95 "The Chinese Room Argument showed that semantics is not intrinsic to syntax. I am now making the separate and different point that syntax is not intrinsic to physics." Searle PNC p94 "The attempt to eliminate the homunculus fallacy through recursive decomposition fails, because the only way to get the syntax intrinsic to the physics is to put a homunculus in the physics." Searle PNC p97 "But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a pattern which it shares with its computational simulation, because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually works as a physical system. ...In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of cognition... There is just a physical mechanism, the brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description." Searle PNC p101-103 "In short, the sense of 'information processing' that is used in cognitive science is at much too high a level of abstraction to capture the concrete biological reality of intrinsic intentionality...We are blinded to this difference by the fact that the same sentence 'I see a car coming toward me,' can be used to record both the visual intentionality and the output of the computational model of vision...in the sense of 'information' used in cognitive science, it is simply false to say that the brain is an information processing device." Searle PNC p104-105 4 "Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the nature of the fact reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent's desires, values, attitudes and evaluations? ...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume's guillotine, the rigid factvalue distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction." Searle PNC p165-171 "...all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, are created by speech acts that have the logical form of Declarations...the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably matters of deontic powers...to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to recognize a reason for action...these deontic structures make possible desireindependent reasons for action...The general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action." Searle PNC p34-49 "Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because they have no immediate phenomenological reality... Because the creation of meaningfulness out of meaninglessness is not consciously experienced...it does not exist...This is... the phenomenological illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 "Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes...and consciousness has no causal powers of its own in addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology...But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological reducibility...consciousness only exists as experienced...and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a third person ontology, something that exists independently of experiences." Searle PNC 155-6 "...the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction. And a proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions." Searle PNC p193 Before commenting in detail on Philosophy in a New Century (PNC) I will first offer some comments on philosophy (descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place Searle or any 5 commentator on behavior, in proper perspective. Though S does not say and seems to be largely unaware, the bulk of his work follows directly from that of W, even though he often criticizes him. To say that Searle has carried on W's work is not to say that it is a direct result of W study, but rather that because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), that anyone accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W said (as they must if they are both giving correct descriptions of behavior). I find most of S foreshadowed in W, including versions of the famous Chinese room argument against Strong AI and related issues which are the subjects of Chaps 3-5. Incidentally, if the Chinese Room interests you then you should read Victor Rodych's xlnt, but virtually unknown, supplement on the CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych has also written a series of superb papers on W's philosophy of mathematics --i.e., the EP (Evolutionary Psychology) of the axiomatic System 1 ability of counting up to 3, as extended into the endless System 2 SLG's (Secondary Language Games) of math. W's insights into the psychology of math provide an excellent entry into intentionality. I will also note that nobody who promotes Strong AI, the multifarious versions of behaviorism, computer functionalism, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) and Dynamic Systems Theory (DST), seems to be aware that W's Tractatus can be viewed as the most striking and powerful statement of their viewpoint ever penned (i.e., behavior (thinking) as the logical processing of facts--i.e., information processing). Of course, later (but before the digital computer was a gleam in Turing's eye) W described in great detail why these were incoherent descriptions of mind that must be replaced by psychology (or you can say this is all he did for the rest of his life). S however makes little reference to W's prescient statement of mind as mechanism, and his destruction of it in his later work. Since W, S has become the principal deconstructor of these mechanical views of behavior, and the most important descriptive psychologist (philosopher), but does not realize how completely W anticipated him nor, by and large, do others (but see the many papers and books of Proudfoot and Copeland on W, Turing and AI). S's work is vastly easier to follow than W's, and though there is some jargon, it is mostly spectacularly clear if you approach it from the right direction. See my reviews of W and other books for more details. Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His work as a whole shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (System 2) (S2) emerges from unconscious 6 machinations (System 1) (S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). Arguably, all of W's and S's work is a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, which underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order behavior as an effort to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositionsS1 and S2--see below), but nature and nurture. What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique textbook of descriptive psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less understood him, have not realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc., -see below). Searle's work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of the recent evolution of genes for dispositional psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. I suggest the key to W is to regard his corpus as the pioneering effort in deciphering our EP, seeing that he was describing the two selves of S1 and S2 and the multifarious language games of fast and slow thinking, and by starting from his 3rd period works and reading backwards to the Proto-Tractatus. It should also be clear 7 that insofar as they are coherent and correct, all accounts of behavior are describing the same phenomena and ought to translate easily into one another. Thus, the recently fashionable themes of "Embodied Mind" and "Radical Enactivism" should flow directly from and into W's work (and they do). However, almost nobody is able to follow his example of avoiding jargon and sticking to perspicuous examples, so even the redoubtable Searle has to be filtered and translated to see that this is true, and even he does not get how completely W has anticipated the latest work in fast and slow, two-self embodied thinking (writing, speaking, acting). W can also be regarded as a pioneer in evolutionary cognitive linguistics-which can be regarded as the Top Down analysis of the mind and its evolution via the careful analysis of examples of language use in context. He exposes the many varieties of language games and the relationships between the primary games of the true-only unconscious, pre or protolinguistic axiomatic fast thinking of perception, memory and reflexive thinking, emotions and acts (often described as the subcortical and primitive cortical reptilian brain first-self, mirror neuron functions), and the later evolved higher cortical dispositional linguistic conscious abilities of believing, knowing, thinking etc. that constitute the true or false propositional secondary language games of slow thinking that are the network of cognitive illusions that constitute the second-self personality of which we are so enamored. W dissects hundreds of language games showing how the true-only perceptions, memories and reflexive actions of S1 grade into the thinking, remembering, and understanding of S2 dispositions, and many of his examples also address the nature/nurture issue explicitly. With this evolutionary perspective, his later works are a breathtaking revelation of human nature that is entirely current and has never been equaled. Many perspectives have heuristic value, but I find that this evolutionary two systems perspective illuminates all higher behavior. Dobzhansky famously commented: "Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution." And nothing in philosophy makes sense except in the light of evolutionary psychology. The common ideas (e.g., the subtitle of one of Pinker's books "The Stuff of Thought: language as a window into human nature") that language is a window on or some sort of translation of our thinking or even (Fodor) that there must be some other "Language of Thought" of which it is a translation, were rejected by W (and likewise by S), who tried to show, with hundreds of continually reanalyzed perspicacious examples of language in action, that language is the best picture we can ever get of thinking, the mind and human nature, and W's whole corpus can be regarded as the development of this idea. Long before Searle, he rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology and computation 8 (e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, Dynamic Systems Theory, Computational Theory of Mind, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted are to understand what is always in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls 'the phenomenological illusion') and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing vagueness" LPP1, 347). And so, speech (i.e., oral muscle contractions, the principal way we interact) is not a window into the mind but is the mind itself, which is expressed by acoustic blasts about past, present and future acts (i.e., our speech using the later evolved Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Second Self--the dispositions --imagining, knowing, meaning, believing, intending etc.). As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W's comment that even if God could look into our mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive thinking, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only potentially CMS. This is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters here because he refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that the language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions-again not a theory but a description about how language (thinking) works. This brings up another point that is prominent in W but denied by S, that all we can do is give descriptions and not a theory. S insists he is providing theories but of course "theory" and "description" are language games too and it seems to me S's theory is usually W's description-a rose by any other name.... W's point was that by sticking to perspicacious examples that we all know to be true accounts of our behavior, we avoid the quicksand of theories that try to account for ALL behavior (ALL language games), while S wants to generalize and inevitably goes astray (he gives several examples of his own mistakes in PNC). As S and others endlessly modify their theories to account for the multifarious language games they get closer and closer to describing behavior by way of numerous examples as did W. Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but interdigitating) LG's of fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-'Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner' on how confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and psychology), the 9 impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like 'thinking', 'seeing' first described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of inner resulting from e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain. The PLG's are utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, nonpropositional, mental statesour perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths and UA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UA2 and Emotions2joyfulness, loving, hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle for good disquisitions on this). It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that as an apple because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated repeatedly it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense in the future-- `Nothing is hidden'--they make sense now or never--(e.g., "The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459). A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that `Nothing is Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just have to stop trying to look deeper. Once we understand W, we realize the absurdity of regarding "language philosophy" as a separate study apart from other areas of behavior, since language is just another name for the mind. And, when W says that understanding behavior is in no way dependent on the progress of psychology (e.g., his oft-quoted assertion "The confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a `young science' --but cf. another comment that I have never seen quoted-- "Is scientific progress useful to philosophy? Certainly. The realities that are discovered 10 lighten the philosophers task. Imagining possibilities." (LWPP1,807). So, he is not legislating the boundaries of science but pointing out that our behavior (mostly speech) is the clearest picture possible of our psychology and that all discussions of higher order behavior are plagued by conceptual confusions. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, computational analogs, AI and all the rest are fascinating and powerful ways to extend our innate axiomatic psychology, to provide the physical basis for our behavior and facilitate our analysis of language games which nevertheless remain unexplainable--EP just is this way-and unchanged. The trueonly axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later Searle's) "bedrock" or "background" i.e., evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather than explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one person's description is another's explanation. Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only understandings ("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. This dramatically changes one's view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of trueonly Understandings of Agency (UA a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and worms if UA is suitably defined) have, and which subsequently evolved greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions (language games)-the fast unconscious UA1 and the Slow conscious UA2 and of course these are heuristics for multifaceted phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1- higher cortical feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many of W's examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and 'seeing as' in Johnston). The "Theory" of Evolution ceased to be a theory for any normal, rational, intelligent person before the end of the 19th century and for Darwin at least half a century earlier. One cannot help but incorporate Tyrannosaurus rex and all that is relevant 11 to it into our true only background via the inexorable workings of EP. Once one gets the logical (psychological) necessity of this, it is truly stupefying that even the brightest and the best seem not to grasp this most basic fact of human life (with a tip of the hat to Kant, Searle and a few others) which was laid out in great detail in "On Certainty". Incidentally, the equation of logic and our axiomatic psychology is essential to understanding W and human nature (as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), but afaik nobody else, points out). So, most of our shared public experience (culture) becomes a true-only extension of our axiomatic EP and cannot be found mistaken without threatening our sanity. Football or Britney Spears cannot just vanish from my or our memory and vocabulary as these concepts, ideas, events, developed out of and are tied to countless others in the true only network that begins with birth and extends in all directions to encompass much of our awareness and memory. A corollary, nicely explained by DMS and elucidated in his own unique manner by Searle, is that the skeptical view of the world and other minds (and a mountain of other nonsense including the Blank Slate) cannot really get a foothold, as "reality" is the result of involuntary fast thinking axioms and not testable true or false propositions. I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in OC (his last work On Certainty'), are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research (e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception (including UOA1) and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless examples. One might call these "intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or duration. But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) exemplified by Moore (whose papers inspired W to write OC), which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be acted out, 12 and which can become true or false (`I know my way home'). The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", "intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call our EP). One of W's recurring themes was what is now called Theory of Mind (TOM), or as I prefer Understanding of Agency (UA), but of course he did not use these terms, which is the subject of major research efforts now. I recommend consulting the work of Ian Apperly, who is carefully dissecting UA1 and 2 and who has recently become aware of one of the leading Wittgensteinian philosophers Daniel Hutto, since Hutto has now characterized UA1 as a fantasy (or rather insists that there is no `Theory' nor representation involved in UA1--that being reserved for UA2). However, like other psychologists, Apperly has no idea W laid the groundwork for this between 60 and 80 years ago. Another point made countless times by W was that our conscious mental life is epiphenomenal in the sense that it does not accurately describe nor determine how we act-now a pillar of the behavioral sciences. See 'The Phenomenological Illusion' in PNC for a grand example from philosophy. It is an obvious corollary of W's and S's descriptive psychology that it is the unconscious automatisms of System 1 that dominate and describe behavior and that the later evolved conscious dispositions (thinking, remembering, loving, desiring, regretting etc.) are mere icing on the cake. This is most strikingly borne out by the latest experimental psychology, some of which is nicely summarized by Kahneman in the book cited (see e.g., the chapter `Two Selves', but of course there is a huge volume of recent work he does not cite and an endless stream of pop and pro books issuing). It is an easily defensible view that most of the burgeoning literature on cognitive illusions, automatisms and higher order thought is wholly compatible with and straightforwardly deducible from W. Regarding my view of W as the major pioneer in EP, it seems nobody has noticed that he very clearly explained several times specifically and many times in passing, 13 the psychology behind what later became known as the Wason Test--long a mainstay of EP research. Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in Peter Hacker's 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many (perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness. The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated "Rules" R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative "Rules" R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 14 I suggest we can describe behavior more clearly by changing Searle's "impose conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction" to "relate mental states to the world by moving muscles"-i.e., talking, writing and doing, and his "mind to world direction of fit" and "world to mind direction of fit" by "cause originates in the mind" and "cause originates in the world" S1 is only upwardly causal (world to mind) and contentless (lacking representations or information) while S2 has content and is downwardly causal (mind to world). I have adopted my terminology in this table. I have made a detailed explanation of this table in my other writings. 15 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ Word Cause Originates From**** World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind Causes Changes In***** None Mind Mind Mind None World World World Causally Self Reflexive****** No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes True or False (Testable) Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes Public Conditions of Satisfaction Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/No Yes No Yes Describe A Mental State No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Cognitive System ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Time, Place (H+N, T+T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 16 FROM DECISION RESEARCH Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/ Word Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No Associative/ Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Context Dependent/ Abstract A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S Heuristic/ Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A Needs Working Memory Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes General Intelligence Dependent Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Cognitive Loading Inhibits Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Arousal Facilitates or Inhibits I F/I F F I I I I Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). * Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. ** Searle's Prior Intentions *** Searle's Intention In Action **** Searle's Direction of Fit ***** Searle's Direction of Causation ****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally selfreferential. ******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. ******** Here and Now or There and Then 17 One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein's discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. It is critical to note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker's recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one. Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 2nd ed(2019). Now for some comments on Searle's PNC. The essays in PNC are mostly already published during the last decade (though some have been updated), along with one unpublished item, and nothing here will come as a surprise to those who have kept up with his work. Like W, he is regarded by many as the best standup philosopher of his time and his written work is solid as a rock and groundbreaking throughout. However, his failure to take the later W seriously enough leads to some mistakes and confusions. On p7 he twice notes that our certainty about basic facts is due to the overwhelming weight of reason supporting our claims, but W showed definitively in 'On Certainty' that there is no possibility of doubting the trueonly axiomatic structure of our System 1 perceptions, memories and thoughts, since it is itself the basis for judgment and cannot itself be judged. In the first sentence on p8 he tells us that certainty is revisable, but this kind of 'certainty', which we might call Certainty2, is the result of extending our axiomatic and nonrevisable certainty (Certainty1) via experience and is utterly different as it is propositional (true or false). This is of course a classic example of the "battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by language" which W demonstrated over and over again. One wordtwo (or many) distinct uses. On p10 he chastises W for his antipathy to theorizing but as I noted above, 'theorizing' is another language game (LG) and there is a vast gulf between a general description of behavior with few well worked out examples and one that emerges from a large number of such that is not subject to many counterexamples. Evolution in its early days was a theory with limited clear examples but soon 18 became just a summary of a vast body of examples and a theory in a quite different sense. Likewise, with a theory one might make as a summary of a thousand pages of W's examples and one resulting from ten pages. Again, on p12, 'consciousness' is the result of automated System 1 functioning that is 'subjective' in several quite different senses, and not, in the normal case, a matter of evidence but a true-only understanding in our own case and a true-only perception in the case of others. As I read p13 I thought: "Can I be feeling excruciating pain and go on as if nothing is wrong?" No! -this would not be 'pain' in the same sense. "The inner experience stands in need of outer criteria" (W), and Searle seems to miss this. See W or Johnston. As I read the next few pages, I felt that W has a much better grasp of the mind/language connection, as he regards them as synonymous in many contexts, and his work is a brilliant exposition of mind as exemplified in numerous perspicacious examples of language use. As quoted above, "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." And as explained above I feel the questions with which S ends section 3 are largely answered by considering W's OC from the standpoint of the two systems. Likewise, for section 6 on the philosophy of science. Rodych has done an article on Popper vs W which I thought superb at the time, but I will have to reread it to make sure. Finally, on p25, one can deny that any revision of our concepts (language games) of causation or free will are necessary or even possible. You can read just about any page of W for the reasons. It's one thing to say bizarre things about the world using examples from quantum mechanics, uncertainty etc., but it is another to say anything relevant to our normal use of words. On p31, 36 etc., we again encounter the incessant problems (in philosophy and life) of identical words glossing over the huge differences in LG's of 'belief', 'seeing' etc., as applied to S1 which is composed of mental states in the present only, and S2 which is not. The rest of the chapter summarizes his work on 'social glue' which, from an EP, Wittgensteinian perspective, is the automatic fast actions of S1 producing the slow dispositions of S2 which are inexorably and universally expanded during personal development into a wide array of automatic unconscious deontic relationships with others, and arbitrarily into cultural variations on them. Chapters 3 to 5 contain his well-known arguments against the mechanical view of mind which seem to me definitive. I have read whole books of responses to them 19 and I agree with S that they all miss the very simple logical (psychological) points he makes (and which, by and large, W made half a century earlier before there were computers). To put it in my terms, S1 is composed of unconscious, fast, physical, causal, automatic, nonpropositional, true only mental states, while slow S2 can only coherently be described in terms of reasons for actions that are more or less conscious dispositions to behavior (potential actions) that are or can become propositional (T or F). Computers and the rest of nature have only derived intentionality that is dependent on our perspective while higher animals have primary intentionality that is independent of perspective. As S and W appreciate, the great irony is that these materialistic or mechanical reductions of psychology masquerade as cutting edge science, but in fact they are utterly anti-scientific. Philosophy (descriptive psychology) and cognitive psychology (freed of superstition) are becoming hand in glove and it is Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc., who are left out in the cold. Page 62 nicely summarizes one of his arguments but p63 shows that he has still not quite let go of the blank slate as he tries to explain trends in society in terms of the cultural extensions of S2. As he does in many other places in his writings, he gives cultural, historical reasons for behaviorism, but it seems quite obvious to me (as it was to W) that the mechanical view of mind exists for the same reason as nearly all behavior-it is the default operation of our EP which seeks explanations in terms of what we can deliberately think through slowly, rather than in the automated S1, of which we mostly remain oblivious (i.e., an instance of what Searle has name "The Phenomenological Illusion). Again, on p65 I find W's description of our axiomatic inherited psychology and its extensions in his OC and other works to be deeper than S's (or anyone's), and so we are NOT 'confident' that dogs are conscious, but rather it is not clear what doubting it means (what COS are there that can make it false?). Chapter 5 nicely demolishes CTM, LOT etc., noting that 'computation', 'information', 'syntax', 'algorithm', 'logic', 'program', etc., are observer relative (i.e., psychological) terms and have no physical or mathematical meaning in this psychological sense, but of course there are other senses they have been given recently as science has developed. Again, people are bewitched by the use of the same word into ignoring that vast difference in its use (meaning). All extensions of classic Wittgenstein, and I recommend Hutto's papers too. Chapter 6 "The Phenomenological Illusion" (TPI) is by far my favorite, and, while demolishing phenomenology, it shows both his supreme logical abilities and his failure to grasp the full power of both the later W, and the great heuristic value of 20 recent psychological research on the two selves. It is clear as crystal that TPI is due to obliviousness to the automatisms of S1 and to taking the slow conscious thinking of S2 as not only primary but as all there is. This is classic Blank Slate blindness. It is also clear that W showed this some 60 years earlier and also gave the reason for it in the primacy of the true-only unconscious automatic axiomatic network of our innate System 1. Like so many others, Searle dances all around it but never quite gets there. Very roughly, regarding 'observer independent' features of the world as S1 and 'observer dependent' features as S2 should prove very revealing. As S notes, Heidegger and the others have the ontology exactly backwards, but of course so does almost everyone due to the defaults of their EP. But the really important thing is that S does not take the next step to realizing that TPI is not just a failing of a few philosophers, but a universal blindness to our EP that is itself built into EP. He actually states this in almost these words at one point, but if he really got it how could he fail to point out its immense implications for the world. With rare exceptions (e.g., the Jaina Tirthankaras going back over 5000 years to the beginnings of the Indus civilization and most recently and remarkably Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc., we are all meat puppets stumbling through life on our genetically programmed mission to destroy the earth. Our almost total preoccupation with using the second self S2 personality to indulge the infantile gratifications of S1 is creating Hell On Earth. As with all organisms, it's only about reproduction and accumulating resources therefor. Yes, much noise about Global Warming and the imminent collapse of industrial civilization in the next century, but nothing is likely to stop it. S1 writes the play and S2 acts it out. Dick and Jane just want to play house-this is mommy and this is daddy and this and this and this is baby. Perhaps one could say that TPI is that we are humans and not just another primate. Chapter 7 on the nature of the self is good but nothing really struck me as new. Chapter 8 on property dualism is much more interesting even though mostly a rehash of his previous work. The last of his opening quotes above sums this up, and of course the insistence on the critical nature of first person ontology is totally Wittgensteinian. The only big blunder I see is his blank slate or (cultural) type of explanation on p 158 for the errors of dualism, when in my view, it is clearly another instance of TPI-a mistake which he (and nearly everyone else) has made many times, and repeats on p177 etc., in the otherwise superb Chapter 9. The genes program S1 which (mostly) pulls the strings (contracts the muscles) of the meat puppets via S2. End of story. Again, he needs to read my comments on W's OC so 21 he changes the "good reason to believe" at the bottom of p171 and the top of p172 to "knows" (in the true-only sense i.e., K1). A critical point is made again on p169. "Thus, saying something and meaning it involves two conditions of satisfaction. First, the condition of satisfaction that the utterance will be produced, and second, that the utterance itself shall have conditions of satisfaction." One way of regarding this is that the unconscious automatic System 1 activates the higher cortical conscious personality of System 2, bringing about throat muscle contractions which inform others that it sees the world in certain ways, which commit it to potential actions. A huge advance over prelinguistic or protolinguistic interactions in which only gross muscle movements were able to convey very limited information about intentions and S makes a similar point in Chapter 10. His last chapter "The Unity of the Proposition" (previously unpublished) would also benefit greatly from reading W's "On Certainty" or DMS's two books on OC (see my reviews) as they make clear the difference between true only sentences describing S1 and true or false propositions describing S2. This strikes me as a far superior approach to S's taking S1 perceptions as propositional since they only become T or F after one begins thinking about them in S2. However, his point that propositions permit statements of actual or potential truth and falsity, of past and future and fantasy, and thus provide a huge advance over pre or protolinguistic society, is cogent. As he states it "A proposition is anything at all that can determine a condition of satisfaction...and a condition of satisfaction... is that such and such is the case." Or, one needs to add, that might be or might have been or might be imagined to be the case. Overall, PNC is a good summary of the many substantial advances over Wittgenstein resulting from S's half century of work, but in my view, W still is unequaled once you grasp what he is saying. Ideally, they should be read together: Searle for the clear coherent prose and generalizations, illustrated with W's perspicacious examples and brilliant aphorisms. If I were much younger I would write a book doing exactly that.

Paul Raymont ([email protected] or [email protected]) Published in "On Causal Relevance: A Reply to Sullivan", Dialogue (Canadian Philosophical Review), XLIII (2004): 367-76. On Causal Relevance: A Reply to Sullivan Paul Raymont carleton university I want to thank Arthur Sullivan for his response (this issue) to my article, "Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?" (Raymont 2001). In that article, I argued that much of the recent debate about epiphenomenalism invokes a confused notion of causal relevance. While Sullivan also finds fault with this debate, he does so for different reasons, and is not convinced by my critique to abandon the notion of causal relevance. My response is complicated by the fact that I now believe that there is a notion of causal relevance that is not threatened by the argument that I offered in the final section of my (2001). I there argued that a prevalent notion of causal relevance is confused because it encapsulates mutually incompatible causal and explanatory requirements. Sullivan finds this critique convincing (Sullivan 2004, p. 5), but believes that the notion of causal relevance can be recuperated by purging it of any explanatory requirement. 1 I have recently moved in a different direction (Raymont 2003), aiming to salvage a notion of causal relevance by weakening the explanatory requirement to which it is subject (and arguing that on this weaker reading there is no reason to doubt the causal relevance of mental properties). Nevertheless, even though I no longer impose the stronger explanatory requirement on causal relevance, I will argue that Sullivan's case against that requirement is flawed. I will also argue that part of Sullivan's critique is in fact directed against the weaker explanatory requirement on causal relevance, one that should be preserved. 2 The notion of causal relevance, as it has evolved in the literature, carries an explanatory requirement according to which something is causally relevant to another thing only if the former explains the latter. For instance, the loudness of the gun's firing is not causally relevant to the fatality because the loudness does not explain the fatality; and the redness of the brick is not causally relevant to the window's breaking because it does not explain that event. In such cases, we refer to the cause in a way that does not explain the effect. We explain the effect only when we consider the cause under the right description. I argued (Raymont 2001, pp. 520-23) that it is this possibility for unexplanatory citation of the cause that led to the introduction of the notion of causal relevance. But if it is thus an epistemological notion, the idea of causal relevance is also supposed to be metaphysical, since a causally relevant item is supposed to be a mindindependent, causally efficacious entity that plays a role in producing the effect. Thus conceived, the idea of causal relevance encapsulates mutually incompatible causal and explanatory requirements; the very notion represents a misguided attempt to reify the conception under which the cause is explanatory, projecting it as an entity in the cause that makes the cause produce its effect. In short, what people are after when they talk about causal relevance is at once a cause and an explaining of the effect, an efficacious item such that merely to introduce it is thereby to explain (Raymont 2001, p. 522). But there can be no such thing, for no degree of ontological augmentation in the cause will get us all the way to an explanation. Sullivan presents the explanatory requirement as follows: "(An instance of) a property F cannot be causally relevant to (an instance of) a property G unless the presence of the instance of F explains the presence of the instance of G" (Sullivan 2004, 3 p. 4). Here, causal relevance is a relation between property instances, but, despite appearances, explanation is not. In an endnote, Sullivan says that explanation is a relation between "conceptions of properties" (2004, p. 9, n. 6). This qualification brings to the fore the epistemological nature of the explanatory requirement. Sullivan goes further, rendering explanation too subjective. He says, "Explanation is thoroughly knowledgeand interest-relative, and thus too amorphous to be criterial in deciding causal relevance" (2004, p. 6; emphasis added). In developing this claim, he ends up at the view that whether something really is an explanation is a function of whether someone 'finds', 2 or believes, it to be such. This is evident from his example of the Medieval astronomers, who "saw" 3 in their antiquated models "all manner of explanatory connections among the motions of celestial bodies" (Sullivan 2004, p. 6). Sullivan uses this example to argue that an explanatory connection between properties F and G is not sufficient for F's being causally relevant to G. But this only follows if his example of the Medieval astronomers is one in which there really is an explanatory connection. So Sullivan is here relying on the principle that there is an explanatory connection (among the properties so conceived) if someone believes there to be such a connection, or, in his terms, if someone 'finds' the connection to be explanatory (2004, pp. 6, 7 and 8). But this is false. As Sullivan notes (2004, p. 8) someone can go wrong (as the Medieval astronomers did) in 'finding' something to be explanatory; but then whether something is explanatory must be independent of whether people 'find' it to be explanatory-otherwise, there would be no possibility of being wrong in what one takes to be explanatory. If you are wrong in what you take to be explanatory, that can only be 4 because what you found to be explanatory isn't. So explanation is not subjective in the way that Sullivan suggests. 4 In my critique of causal relevance, the explanatory requirement should be interpreted in this less subjective way: when I said that a causally relevant item is supposed to be explanatory in the strong sense that merely to cite it is thereby to explain, 'explain' means really explain, not just be thought to explain. Real explanation is what people aim at when they seek a causally relevant item. 5 And yet, as I argued (2001, pp. 520-23), nothing can be both a real explanation and an efficacious entity in the cause. In an endnote, Sullivan challenges the requirement that causally relevant items should really be explanatory, and thus be what people ought to find explanatory (2004, p. 10 n. 8). I am not sure I understand his concern. He says that the requirement would "lack any real bite" (ibid.) since it would be too difficult to establish a real explanatory connection, for it would be too difficult "to rule out the possibility that we are mistaken" (ibid.). Granted, our judgments about what really is explanatory are fallible, but then so too are our judgments about what really is causally relevant. Indeed, in the sense in which the notion of causal relevance is used in the literature, it seems that to the extent that our judgments of what is explanatory are fallible, to precisely that extent our judgments about what is causally relevant are fallible; and this is because evidence that something is causally relevant just is evidence that it is a good explanation-at least, I do not see what other reason there could be for taking something to be causally relevant. This is all in keeping with the explanatory requirement, according to which something is causally relevant to an effect only if it is explanatory of it. In short, the mere fact that people can go wrong in their judgments about whether something is a good explanation in no way 5 impugns the idea that what they aim for when they seek a causally relevant item is a good explanation. Finally, if Sullivan aims at a notion of causal relevance that is not subject to an explanatory requirement, then he must show why that notion is not just that of causation with fine-grained relata (e.g., property instances). 6 Again, I now think it possible to define a notion of causal relevance that is subject to a weaker explanatory requirement than the one that I considered in my (2001). I there claimed that the proponents of causal relevance seek something the mere description of which is guaranteed to explain. I said this based on the examples that are typically used to introduce the notion. For instance, in referring to the gunshot as a loud sound, I refer to the cause, but not in a way that accounts for the ensuing fatality. I inferred from such cases that what the proponents of causal relevance must be after is something that (unlike the cause) is guaranteed to do this explaining whenever we introduce it into our discourse, but that is also an entity in the cause that makes it produce the effect. It is clear that no entity can meet this demanding explanatory requirement, since anything we talk about can be talked about in an unexplanatory way (e.g., as the event referred to on p. 5 of a book). I inferred that to introduce the notion of causal relevance is to make no advance beyond those who, following Donald Davidson (1993), eschew causal relevance, 7 preferring instead to speak simply of the cause (a dated particular that produces the effect) and explanations that refer to the cause. Causal relevance need not be subjected to the demanding explanatory requirement with which I burdened it (of being guaranteed to explain once referred to). Causes cause what they do because of the way they are, that is, because of the properties they have, and 6 this is all that is required by the notion that some properties of the cause are causally relevant. One may object that this simple, intuitive dictum involves a mistaken view of what does the causing; for it really is the event, not its properties or states of affairs involving them, that is the cause. This seems to be why Davidson (1993) denied that events cause their effects in virtue of their properties (which are then said to be 'causally relevant'). However, as Tim Crane has argued, this is unsatisfactory since it leaves us "unable to answer the question of why certain explanations are better than others by invoking the efficacious features of reality" (Crane 1995, p. 227; emphasis in the original). For example, the reason why we can explain the window's breaking by appealing to just some of the properties of its cause (e.g., its being a striking of the window by a brick with a given mass) is that those are the features of the cause in virtue of which it made the window break. Notice that in saying that it is because of some of its properties that the event produced the effect it is still the event that is being said to have caused the effect. So, contrary to Davidson's objection, we can allow for the idea of causally relevant properties without abandoning the view that events are the causal relata. 8 Moreover, the state of affairs (viz., the cause's having that mass), while it is not itself the cause of the window's breaking, is explanatory of this explanandum. And this is so even if we can appeal to this explanatory state of affairs without ourselves thereby explaining the effect of which it is explanatory. So the state of affairs and the property involved in it remain explanatory even though they can be cited in unexplanatory ways, that is, even though they do not meet the impossibly strong explanatory standard that I adopted in my (2001). Something is causally relevant only if it is explanatory in this weaker sense. 7 This makes causal relevance metaphysical in the sense that it requires a mindindependent explanatory relation. This sounds similar to the idea of causal relevance that Sullivan endorses (2004, p. 5). However, while the causal relevance relation that I have sketched is not subject to the strong explanatory requirement (on which reference to causally relevant items is guaranteed to explain), it is still subject to a weaker one. The weaker requirement is this: property F is causally relevant to property G only if event c's having property F is explanatory of event e's having G, in the sense that under some description of c's having F one can explain e's having G. So, where there is causal relevance there is something that, suitably described, supplies an explanation of the effect. Sullivan's notion of causal relevance does not carry this weaker explanatory requirement. This is evident from his quantum mechanics example, which is supposed to show that explanatory connections are not necessary for causal relevance (2004, p. 6). There would be no need to resort to such exotic quantum cases if one intended to undermine just the strong explanatory requirement, for that requirement can be challenged well enough by means of a simpler, mundane case like the one involving the brick's breaking the window. To wit, the event in which the brick strikes the window causes the window's breaking, and it does so in virtue of some of its properties (e.g., the brick's mass) and not in virtue of some others (e.g., the brick's colour); 9 the causally relevant properties account for the cause's production of its effect even though the way in which one refers to them (e.g., as Ed's favourite properties) is not guaranteed to explain the outcome. In fact, nothing about the person who tries to explain the outcome (e.g., how 8 she refers to something) has any bearing on whether one state of affairs is in fact explanatory of the other. Rather than make his point by means of some such ordinary case, Sullivan uses a more complicated illustration from quantum mechanics, the 'two-slit' case (Sullivan 2004, p. 6). Here, he says, I judge that some features of the initial conditions are causally relevant to what follows based on my knowledge of the data, which establish the requisite correlation. So there is causal relevance here. Nevertheless, I "lack something that is required to find these relations explanatory" (ibid.). Notice, though, that in his example it is not just that one does lack something required for finding the connection explanatory. If that were the point, then any old case in which one lacks an appropriate characterization of the causally relevant features, because (e.g.) one knows of them only as Ed's favourite features, would suffice. Instead, the point of the quantum example seems to be that one does not find the current characterization of things to be explanatory, and that there is no other way in which to characterize matters that would enable one to find the connection explanatory (assuming there are no hidden variables). There is nothing further in the case that, suitably described, would give us the explanation that we feel to be missing. So this example seems to be directed at the weaker explanatory requirement, for it is supposed to be a case in which there is causal relevance in the absence of any factors that, suitably described, would supply an explanation of the effect. That is, we seem to have a case in which the features that are causally relevant to the effect are so without being explanatory of it in even the weaker sense. The example does not succeed in prising apart being causally relevant to something from being explanatory of it. After all, no causally explanatory connection 9 will dispel the appearance of contingency in the relation between cause and effect, for no such explanatory link will give their relation the status of being knowable a priori. There will thus always remain the appearance of contingency in the link. In this way, as Hume said, causal explanation "only staves off our ignorance a little longer" about why it is that one sort of cause issues in a given type of effect (Hume [1748] 1977, IV.1, p. 19). One can agree without subscribing to Hume's treatment of the causal relation as a mere 'constant conjunction'. Make the causal relation modally stronger; it will still be true that one cannot discover what sort of effect will be produced by reflecting on the nature of the cause. There is no a priori link between the two. In that sense, there will always be a mystery concerning why one sort of thing should produce another (even if this is driven from our attention by the sense of familiarity that results from frequent experience of the relation). This is part of the mystery that is felt in the double-slit case. That case seems even more problematic because it violates Hume's 'spatial contiguity' condition for causation; but given enough familiarity with causal transactions that do not meet this condition, it should cease to exert such a strong influence on our intuitions concerning whether we have in fact got a causal explanation. To the extent that one does feel that something explanatory is missing in the double-slit case, to that extent one will feel that something causally relevant is missing, or that there is a gap in the list of causally relevant features. To feel an explanatory gap is to feel a gap in causally relevant properties, features of the cause that would explain its production of the effect in the sense of being that 'in virtue of which' the cause gave rise to the effect. 10 What we feel to be missing, then, are causally relevant features that would supply a fuller explanation, the absence of which leaves us so puzzled. Another way to 10 see this is to ask what people do when they try to remedy the felt gap in explanation. They typically do so by postulating 'hidden variables', unobserved features that purport to explain the passage from the initial conditions to the observed effect; that is, they conjecture that there are more causally relevant factors on hand, items that, suitably described, would account for the effect. The search for hidden variables, then, is a search for features that are causally relevant to, and that therefore explain, the effect. If one sees no gap in the explanatory framework that needs filling by 'hidden variables', that is because one has come to believe that the already identified causally relevant properties supply a complete explanation of the effect. That is, to the extent that one is satisfied that these are all the causally relevant features required for the cause's production of the effect, to that extent one will feel that they are a full explanation of it. So I do not agree with Sullivan's description of the 'double-slit' case as one in which we are entitled to recognize a complete set of causally relevant features as such while not finding them to be explanatory. 11 Either one really does see them as a complete set of causally relevant features, in which case one sees them as supplying a complete explanation, or one regards them as offering only a partial explanation and therefore as only an incomplete set of causally relevant features. With this brief sketch of causal relevance before us, it is unclear why it should be thought to sustain doubts about the causal relevance of mental features. Indeed, contrary to what Sullivan suggests (2004, pp. 7-9), their relevance is compatible with the principle of the completeness of physics, even if that principle is formulated in terms of causal relevance. In its most plausible version, this principle amounts to the claim that every physical effect has a physical cause, the physical features of which are causally relevant 11 to (hence explanatory of) its production of that effect; and the set of physical features is 'complete' in the sense that it does not require supplementation by non-physical properties in order to yield an account, without gaps, of why the cause produced that effect. Unlike the completeness principle that Sullivan considers (2004, p. 7), this does not mean that the physical features of the cause are its only causally relevant features. All that is required is that those physical features suffice for an explanation, and this does not rule out the possibility that other, higher-level features might also be causally relevant. In order to rule out this possibility one must show that this superabundance of causally relevant features involves an unacceptable overdetermination. The prospects for doing so are dim. When one says that properties are causally relevant, one means that the cause produces its effect in virtue of those properties. The phrase 'in virtue of' introduces factors that figure in an explanation of the cause's production of its effect. So used, there is little reason to regard 'in virtue of' as introducing genuinely efficacious things. After all, a cause acts as it does in virtue of its time and place, but that is hardly a reason to treat places and times as being efficacious. So we do not multiply causes by multiplying causally relevant factors. There is still just the one event that is the cause. All that has been multiplied are ways of explaining why that single cause produced its effect. But if the context, 'in virtue of . . .', does not here introduce efficacious things (e.g., property instances or 'tropes'), then intuitions about causation-notably, about causal overdetermination-should not be transferred to the supposedly distinct relation of causal relevance. To summarize, while it seems undeniable that an effect is produced by an event in virtue of its properties, it is unclear just what relation between the event and its properties is signified by 'in virtue of'. Whatever it is, it isn't a causal relation; a property 12 does not cause the event that has it to cause an effect. Hence it is unclear why the causal relevance of properties should be thought to be a competitive relation, such that if we can account for the cause's efficacy by appeal to one of its properties, then no other feature of the cause can be causally relevant to the same outcome. One might object that once we have explained something once, physically, there is no reason to explain it in a different way, by appeal to mental features. After all, what explanatory work is left for the mental to do? However, this is, at best, a point about the pragmatics of our speech acts of explaining. Having uncovered the full physical story about why a cause produced some behaviour, we may feel no need to explain it again. But that will not cause the explanatory connections between mental and behavioural features to dissolve, for surely those are objectively real (nomic or counterfactual) connections. Whether an explanatory connection obtains between features should not depend on whether we find it useful to consider it or refer to it in our speech acts of explaining. If one is still troubled by the profligacy of causally relevant features, that is likely because one thinks it a puzzling coincidence that so many different features of the cause should be relevant to its efficacy. However, as long as there is some systematic dependence or supervenience of mental upon physical features, their co-instantiation in advance of the same sorts of effect should seem less puzzling. 12 In view of these considerations, the onus is on those who doubt the causal relevance of the mental to define a conception of causal relevance on which the causal relevance of the physical can be seen to jeopardize that of the mental. 13 Notes 13 1 "[T]he explanatory requirement has to go" (Sullivan 2004, p. 5). 2 In this context, talk of 'finding' something to be explanatory is misleading if one treats 'finds' as a success verb, such that one can find x to be F only if x really is F. As Sullivan notes (2004, p. 8), one can go wrong in 'finding' something to be explanatory. So I will continue to use quotes around 'finds', and will treat the locution 'finding' something to be explanatory as synonymous with believing (or taking) it to be explanatory. 3 Since it too may be interpreted as a success verb, 'saw' also is misleading since one can be wrong in what one takes to be explanatory. 4 Sullivan might distinguish between two ways in which one can go wrong in finding something to be explanatory. First, we may say that one set of statements explains an explanandum if the set bears the right inferential or supporting relation to the explanandum. In this sense, there may be several sets of statements that 'explain' the explanandum; for example, if we adopt the deductive-nomological model of explanation, there may be different (and even mutually incompatible) sets of statements, each one including a statement of a law and of initial conditions, and such that each one of these sets entails the explanandum. One can then go wrong in finding some set of statements to be explanatory by taking it to entail the explanandum when in fact it does not. This is the first way in which one can be wrong. (A similar point can be made in terms of other models of explanation, so the deductive-nomological model is not essential to my case.) I take it the Medieval astronomers have not made this sort of mistake. The statements that they take to be explanatory really are explanatory in this sense. However, among the many competing sets of statements that are explanatory in this sense, only one of them really is explanatory in the sense of reflecting the actual mechanisms 'out there in the 14 world' that generate the effect that we are trying to explain. One can go astray by believing a proposed explanans to reflect these actual mechanisms when in fact it does not. This is the second way in which one can be mistaken in 'finding' something to be explanatory. It is presumably in this sense that Sullivan says the astronomers were wrong (2004, p. 8). This does not affect the point that we have a notion of something's really being explanatory of something else, which cannot be analyzed in terms of what one 'finds' to be explanatory. 5 Sullivan says, "The quest for understanding some phenomena is a quest for identifying a minimal set of causally relevant properties" (2004, p. 6). But how could we hope to meet our aim of 'understanding' (i.e., explaining) something by identifying features that are causally relevant to it unless it were true that to identify the causally relevant features is thereby to explain the phenomenon under investigation? But to admit this much is to subscribe to an explanatory requirement on causal relevance. 6 Cf. my 2001, pp. 515-17. 7 Contrary to what Sullivan suggests (2004, p. 3), Davidson rejected any notion of causal relevance on which causes are thought to produce their effects in virtue of their properties. 8 My thinking here is influenced by McLaughlin (1993), esp. pp. 30-32. 9 Strictly speaking, the mass and colour are properties of the brick, but the event has properties corresponding to them (e.g., being a striking of a window by something with that mass). 15 10 This phrase, 'that in virtue of which', is often used to introduce the notion of causally relevant properties. I can see no way to interpret the phrase except as introducing an explanation. 11 Where finding something to be explanatory does not remove the Humean sense of contingency. 12 Cf. Block 1990. 13 Thanks to Arthur Sullivan and to the anonymous referees for their comments. Support from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Postdoctoral Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. References Block, Ned 1990 "Can the Mind Change the World?" In Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Edited by George Boolos. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Crane, Tim 1995 "The Mental Causation Debate." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Suppl.), 69: 211-36. Davidson, Donald 1993 "Thinking Causes." In Mental Causation. Edited by John Heil and Alfred Mele. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 3-17. Hume, David [1748] 1977 An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Eric Steinberg. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. McLaughlin, Brian P. 1993 "On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism." In Mental Causation. Edited by John Heil and Alfred Mele. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 27-40. Raymont, Paul 2001 "Are Mental Properties Causally Relevant?" Dialogue, 40: 509-28. 16 2003 "Kim on Closure, Exclusion and Nonreductive Physicalism." In Physicalism and Mental Causation. Edited by Sven Walter and HeinzDieter Heckmann. Exeter, UK: Imprint Academic, pp. 225-42. Sullivan, Arthur 2004 "On Causal Relevance: a Reply to Raymont." Dialogue, ??.

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 36: 153–175, 2002.  2002 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. Quantum mereotopology Barry Smith a and Berit Brogaard b a Department of Philosophy, Center for Cognitive Science and NCGIA, University at Buffalo, NY 14260, USA E-mail: [email protected] b Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville, IL 62026, USA E-mail: [email protected] While mereotopology – the theory of boundaries, contact and separation built up on a mereological foundation – has found fruitful applications in the realm of qualitative spatial reasoning, it faces problems when its methods are extended to deal with those varieties of spatial and non-spatial reasoning which involve a factor of granularity. This is because granularity cannot easily be represented within a mereology-based framework. We sketch how this problem can be solved by means of a theory of granular partitions, a theory general enough to comprehend not only the familiar sorts of spatial partitions but also a range of coarse-grained partitions of other, non-spatial sorts. We then show how these same methods can be extended to apply to finite sequences of granular partitions evolving over time, or to what we shall call coarseand fine-grained histories. Keywords: mereology, granularity, ontology, consistent histories, interpretation of quantum mechanics 1. Introduction As a result of a series of important contributions by Bittner, Cohn, Galton, Stell, Worboys, Casati and Varzi, and others in recent years, it has become clear that many features of common-sense reasoning can be fruitfully handled within a framework of mereology conjoined with topological concepts such as boundary, contact, separation, connection, interior and exterior. The fruitfulness of this approach rests not least on the fact that mereological topology is region-based, and thus it yields a more realistic representation of the qualitative space of common sense than does standard point-set topology. Recent work (e.g., [8]) has concentrated on adding the factors of vagueness, imprecision and uncertainty to standard mereotopological approaches, and on finding ways to bridge the qualitative-quantitative divide, so that algorithms can be found for moving back and forth between the qualitative spatial representations of common sense and the discrete, digital representations used in applications [11,26,27]. Mereotopology resists a similarly realistic extension to a theory of granularity however. This is because such a theory would presuppose a means of talking about objects (at given resolutions) without at the same time talking about all the parts of those objects (at all finer resolutions). In mereology, however, if an object falls within the range over which you quantify, then so also do 154 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology all the object's parts. Set theory can block this automatic recognition of an object's parts (in effect by wrapping the object in a set-theoretic coating), but only, as we shall argue, at too high a sacrifice in realism. Here we show how the problems caused for a theory of granularity within the mereological framework can be solved by adding to mereology a theory of what we shall call granular partitions. The term 'partition' is here used in a way that is only distantly related to the more familiar usage which defines a partition in terms of equivalence classes. The problem with the latter notion is that it presupposes that the domain to which an equivalence relation is applied has already been divided up into units (the elements of the set with which we begin), and it is this very notion of division into units (portions, segments, items) which our present theory is designed to illuminate. The theory is based on the one hand on the theories of discrete multi-resolution spatial knowledge advanced by Stell and Worboys in their papers listed below. It bears comparison also with the work on manipulating spatial partitions of [9] and with the conception of geographic information systems as mediators between users and the world developed in [10]. On the other hand, however, it generalizes from these to comprehend not only spatial but also certain types of non-spatial partitions. In this it exploits ideas deriving from a somewhat unusual source, namely from the theory of multi-resolution partitions put forward by [20,21], a theory which was developed as the basis of the so-called 'consistent histories' interpretation of quantum mechanics. Our title alludes to this quantum-mechanical background, and more specifically to the fact that the approach here advanced seeks to do justice to the way in which cognition induces a certain sort of quantization (or granularization) on objects in space and time. 2. Better than sets Just as mereotopology can be seen as an extension of mereology through the addition of some topological primitive such as connection or interior part, so also set theory can be seen as an extension of mereology through the addition of the primitive settheoretic notion of singleton. David Lewis [17] has shown how, with the help of this one single notion, all the standard axioms of set theory can be derived within a mereological framework. Lewis first of all defines the notion of what he calls a class, which is a set in whose content the empty set plays no role. He then shows how the theory of classes so conceived can be formally identified with the theory of mereological sums (or 'fusions') of singletons. At the same time, however, Lewis is forced to concede that the relation between an element and its singleton is itself enveloped in mystery. As he himself puts it: since all classes are fusions of singletons, and nothing over and above the singletons they're made of, our utter ignorance about the nature of the singletons amounts to utter ignorance about the nature of classes generally. . . . What do we know about singletons when we know only that they are atoms, and wholly distinct from the familiar individuals? What do we know about other classes, when we know only that they are composed of these atoms about which we know next to nothing [17, p. 31]? B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 155 The mystery arises, we suggest, because the relation between element and singleton (or between element and set) involves a spurious running together (and concomitant idealization) of a plurality of distinct relations each one of which is independently well understood. The relation between an object and its location is one such, and so also are the relations between an object and a concept under which it falls or between an object and a kind or category to which it belongs. Others include the various relations which an object may bear to intervals on quantitative and qualitative scales (for example relations between an object and its tax bracket, temperature-band, spin, quantum number, examination grade, golf handicap, Erdös number, and so on). Yet others include the relation between an object and its role or function or office or niche, or the relation between an object and the corresponding entry in a list or record in a database. For Cantor himself [6] the pertinent relation is that between an object (or what he calls a 'well-defined object of our thought') and the result of some 'collecting together into a whole'. Set theory idealizes some of the features manifested by each of these relations, but it rides roughshod over the differences between them. Hence, if we are to do justice to the relations in question, then a more subtle framework is needed. We offer the beginnings of such a framework here: a general theory of relations of the mentioned type, each of which we shall come to recognize as involving the imposition by some cognitive agent of an appropriate sort of granular partition upon some associated portion of reality. Because the framework we propose is so general, and is designed to comprehend not only the (comparatively well-understood) partitions of the spatial realm but also a wide range of granular partitions of a non-spatial sort, it can be developed only in outline here. We believe, however, that we have shown how it might be possible to develop on a mereotopological basis an instrument that is able to capture the relations listed, which would be comparable with set theory in the range of types of real-world objects with which it can deal. 3. What is a granular partition? Just as sets are to all intents and purposes the mereological sums (or 'fusions') of their singletons, so granular partitions as we here conceive them are the mereological sums of their constituent cells. We shall accordingly develop our formal account of granular partitions in two stages: 1. In terms of a theory of the relations between cells and partitions. 2. In terms of a theory of the relations between cells and objects in reality. (The counterpart of stage 1 in a set-theoretical context would be the study of the relations between sets and their subsets; the counterpart of stage 2 the study of relations between sets and their elements.) We are to think of a granular partition – sometimes referred to simply as a 'partition' in what follows – as a grid of cells laid between ourselves and reality (or between ourselves and whatever is the relevant object domain) in such a way that its cells are 156 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology . . . rook bishop pawn knight . . . . . . up down charm strange . . . John George Paul Ringo Figure 1. transparent. These cells allow the objects in the domain over which the partition is laid to show through in undistorted fashion. Consider the way in which in constructing weather maps we may project a grid of political divisions onto satellite images. Or consider the examples of fragments of partitions provided in figure 1, above. A partition can be compared to a map. Indeed our present project may itself be conceived as an attempt to generalize set theory by conceiving sets as built up out of the different sorts of labeled cell-like components which we find on maps (representing counties, postal districts, census tracts) and which are themselves, in different ways, directed outwards towards objects in reality. Figure 2. Alberti's grid. A granular partition can be compared also to the drawing machines (for example Alberti's latticed grid: see figure 2) once sometimes supposed to have been used by artists as an aid to painting. (Imagine the use of such a device for tracking birds, from moment to moment, as they fly across the sky.) B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 157 Something like a grid placed over reality is involved, too, in familiar maps of brain regions or of the structure of chromosomes. Such maps are essentially spatial representations of the underlying reality. But granular partitions are involved also in representations of non-spatial knowledge – for example of the sort we find in component catalogues, or in the grid-like representations of the Periodic Table in chemical textbooks. Each of the examples listed is in our terms transparent to an associated portion of reality. Each picks out certain parts or features of this reality, while tracing over others. A granular partition is a way of dividing up the world, or some portion of the world, by means of cells. Thus the verb 'to partition' is understood here as being what philosophers call a success verb. In this it is comparable with verbs like 'to know' or 'to see' or 'to find'. (If A knows p, then p is true. If A sees or finds x, then x exists.) This means that even though granular partitions are cognitive creations, and in this sense subjective, their relation to a reality beyond is a fully objective matter. Thus when once a given partition exists, then it is, for each cell in the partition and for each object in reality, an objective matter whether or not that object is located in that cell. (In this sense, too, granular partitions are analogous to sets.) 4. Set theory, mereology, and time Both set theory and mereology have shared origins in explorations in the foundations of mathematics in the decades before and after the turn of the last century. The two theories were thus formulated in such a way as to relate to a static universe, a universe conceived in abstraction from time and change. A set exists outside space and time: it is determined exclusively by the (atemporally conceived) list of its elements. If the entities stipulated as the elements of a set undergo change, even change of such a sort that one or more of these entities themselves should cease to exist, then the set itself is unaffected thereby. It is for this reason that ontological commitment to sets has been characterized by philosophers as a form of Platonism. The framework of mereology, in contrast, is non-Platonistic, which means that it is closer to the changing world of flesh-and-blood reality (and the relation of part to whole is correspondingly less mysterious). This is because, if the parts of a whole cease to exist, then so also does the whole. If you burn down the parts of a forest, then you will have burned down the whole forest, too. Yet still: mereology has resisted coherent extension of a sort which would comprehend in realistic fashion not only spatial but also temporal features of the objects in its domain. This is because mereology has been conceived in such a way as to allow unrestricted summation even in relation to objects which exist at different times. Thus it can give no satisfactory answer to the question when such objects (for example the fusion of Napoleon and your left foot) should properly be said to exist. Mereotopology increases the resources available to mereology in countering the effects of unrestricted summation in regard to spatial wholes. For example it allows us to formulate what it means for a whole to be connected. The theory of granular partitions will enable us to push the mereotopological approach still further, by making it possible for us to take account of time and change. 158 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 5. Sets and granular partitions Where the elements of a set exist within the set without order or location – they can be permuted at will and the set remains identical – our granular partitions typically come with a specific order and arrangement of their constituent cells. The latter are determined in part by their position within the partition, which we can think of as being fitted out with an address or coordinate system, and with a scaffolding which holds the cells together in a certain arrangement. One consequence of this is that a partition may include empty cells – indeed it may include a plurality of distinct empty cells. When you use a transparent grid for tracking birds as they move across the sky, it may well be the case that all the cells in your partition are, at any given moment, empty. Objects as they exist in nature may stand to each other in various relations; they may have hooks of various sorts which link them together. These include common boundaries (for example as between France and Germany, or between Tibbles and her tail), and they include also relations of dependence and of functional or causal association. Mereological fusion preserves these inter-object relations, and it thus preserves the order and location of objects which fall within its grasp: if two objects are linked together in nature, then they are linked together also within their mereological fusion. In this sense mereology leaves everything as it is. If the parts of a whole are permuted in reality, then the whole, too, is thereby changed. A set is a mereological fusion of singletons, and mereological fusion preserves order and location. How can it be, then, that the elements within a set can be permuted at will and the set be unaffected thereby? The answer is that the set is built up mereologically not out of its elements but out of its singletons, and the singleton operator has the effect of stripping away the various sorts of linkages which obtain between the objects to which it is applied as these exist in nature. It sets them apart from their surroundings and seals them off from each other and from all effects of time and change. 6. From cells to objects The version of the theory of granular partitions presented here will mimic set theory in this respect, that if an object is located in the cell of a partition, then the whole object is located entirely within the cell, and this in completely determinate fashion. The relation between an object and its cell is modeled on the relation between an element and its singleton. Even in the simplest version of the theory, however, granular partitions are distinguished from sets in the following respect: that where an object can be an element of a set (or singleton) in only one way, an object can be located in a cell within a partition in any number of ways. Certainly some objects are exactly located in the corresponding cells [7]. Exact location is illustrated for example by the relation between a concrete parcel of land and the corresponding cell in a cadastre, or (again), in set theory, by the relation of an element to its singleton. It is illustrated also by the relation between an object and its place (if, with Aristotle, we conceive the latter as the innermost boundary B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 159 of the body of air or water by which an object is surrounded). Customers are exactly located in the cells which result when we conceive of a customer database as a partition of the corresponding population. Here we are interested in a relation more general than that of exact location, however, a relation which holds whenever an object is entirely or completely located in a given cell even if it falls short of being exactly located therein. This relation is instantiated wherever objects are assigned (large enough) regions of space (compare an object in a cell to a guest in a hotel room). Partitions in our sense arise also when we make certain sorts of observations or experiments or whenever we sort things into categories (compare an object in a cell to a bacterium in a petri dish or to an envelope in a pigeonhole). The requirement that an object must fit entirely within its corresponding cell can of course be generalized still further. Bittner and Stell [4] offer an approach to spatial partitions otherwise similar to the one advanced here but within which the restriction on cell-object fit is relaxed through the notion of 'rough' location. Smith and Brogaard [25] argue that the theory of granular partitions can serve, alternatively, as a framework for a new type of supervaluationist approach to the problem of vagueness. To see how this works, we note first of all that human beings and similar objects always have questionable parts (the bacteria in John's ear, the half-digested food in his stomach, the loosened molecules of skin on his back). There exists, then, a family of alternative ways of picking out a precise portion of reality which we may then choose to identify as John in a given context. Whichever such precisification we choose, however, it will still remain the case on our present theory that John is located in the John cell in our partition of human beings. This is because the John cell includes a certain amount of slack, which can be taken up in different ways by different precisifications. But only one precisification fits into a cell at any given time, just as the relation between the singleton and its element is of necessity one-to-one. In a more general theory however the relation between a cell and its occupant may be taken as one-to-many as a means of doing justice to the vagueness that is involved wherever we have a family of such alternative precisifications. A cell is an artifact of our theoretical activity: it reflects a possible way of dividing up the world into parts and of grouping the parts together into unities of different sorts. A set is an abstract structure; its elements, in contrast (in the cases relevant to our deliberations here), are parts of concrete reality. Partitions, similarly, belong to the realm of abstracta (or better: they belong to the realm of our theoretical representations), over against the concrete realm of represented objects. Each partition brings about a demarcation of the domain upon which it is projected, a demarcation analogous to the results of drawing lines on a map. Some cells in the partition will then correspond to bona fide objects in the reality beyond, as for example in the case of the cells labeled Guadalupe and Corsica in a map of the Departments of France. Some cells will refer to fiat objects in reality, as for example in the case of cells projected onto postal districts or census tracts or other products of arbitrary legal-administrative demarcation in the spatial realm [24]. Concrete objects in the physical world are bona fide entities. A planet or tennis ball is what and where it is independently of any acts of human fiat and independently of our efforts to understand it theoretically. Granularity, we can now 160 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology assert, and the associated 'discrete spaces' and 'multi-resolution spaces', are properly at home only in the fiat realm: they pertain not to the objects themselves on the side of reality, but rather to the ways we partition these objects in our activities of theorizing, classifying and mapping. If this is right, then the theory here presented can provide the basis for a mereotopological account of granularity of a truly realistic sort – where mereotopological theories of granularity have hitherto needed to rely on one or other idealizing assumption (such as is employed by Galton [11]) of discreteness on the side of the objects in the world. And if granular partitions are indeed inserted into reality by our cognitive activities, then the resultant theory – as contrasted with a theory of granularity based on a hypothesis of ultimate object-discreteness – is a theory of granularity at arbitrary resolutions. 7. Granular partitions as cognitive artifacts Partitions as we are conceiving them here are distinct from both sets and mereological fusions in that they are not constituted out of the objects that are located in their cells at all. For partitions belong, not to the domain of objects, but rather to the domain of our theorizing and classifying and mapping activity. Partitions are grid-like representations. They project outwards towards those objects in reality which are located in their cells. They are thus many-rayed counterparts of concepts as conceived by Millikan [19]: The membership of the category "cat", like that of "Mama", is a natural unit in nature, to which the concept cat does something like pointing, and continues to point despite large changes in the properties the thinker represents the unit as having. For example, large changes can occur in the way a child identifies cats and the things it is willing to call "cat" without affecting the extension of its word "cat". The difficulty is to cash in the metaphor of "pointing" in this context. Since some varieties of partition may exist as systems of labeled cells even independently of any objects which may at any given time be located in those cells, such partitions may remain the same – think of the transparent grid we are using to plot birds moving across the sky – even where the corresponding population of objects changes entirely. As we have stressed, however, it is at any given time a determinate matter for a given partition which objects are located in its cells. Moreover, the assignment of objects to the cells of a partition may remain the same even though the objects towards which it is directed are subject to change. This will hold provided only that the change in question occurs beneath the threshold of what the partition recognizes. Thus the partition with just one cell labeled Bill Clinton picks out the same object from one day to the next even while this object gains and loses molecules. The object located in the cell labeled cat in your partition of biological reality is at any given time the mereological fusion of all whole, live cats. As seen through the lens of your partition, however, this total fusion is parceled out in coarse-grained fashion into individual cats (and not for example into cat-molecules or cat-organs). This parceling out is at the same time effected in such a way that the partition (or its user) B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 161 does not know (or care) how many cats there are or where these cats are located. The partition traces over all the individual differences between all the different cats which fall within its scope. In this way it is able to capture all the cats in the world as forming a whole (species) and this in such a way that the latter is grasped as identical from one moment to the next even in spite of the fact that individual cats are born and die. 8. Granular partitions and relations Some partitions are like sets in that they will apprehend the objects which are located in their respective cells independently of order or arrangement or linkage or time. Others, however, will inherit from mereology the ability to comprehend their objects in ways which map different kinds of relations that obtain among them. The cells in such partitions project their objects not in isolation, but rather in tandem with other objects located in related cells within the same partition. We can imagine, for example, twocelled partitions which capture the relations between a part and its whole or between a substance and its accident. Such partitions apply to pairs of entities in reflection of specific relations in which the latter stand to each other. John and Mary, before they wed are not, but after marriage they are, recognized by a two-celled partition of the type: married pair. Yet other two-celled partitions, for example the partition captured by our use of paired demonstratives such as this and that, here and there, left and right, or first and second, apply to pairs of objects only in reflection of our ways of relating to them intentionally. These are two-celled counterparts of the one-celled partitions involved in our uses of proper names or in our acts of attending cognitively to single objects. We can imagine also three-celled partitions, which might be employed for example to capture the way in which, in an action of kissing or shaking hands or congratulating, two objects become bound together by a third object – a relational event – in which the one occurs as agent, the other as patient. Partitions can manifest the feature of multi-dimensionality also in other sorts of ways. A map of the zoo, for example, might indicate not only the places where animals are located but also the sorts and sizes and proper names of the animals which are located in those places. 9. Granularity When you think of John cooking his dinner in the kitchen, then you do not think of all the parts of John or of his surroundings. You do not think of the follicles in his arm or the freckles on his cheek. You do not think of the fly next to his ear or the neutrinos that pass through his body. Rather, you set John into relief in a highly specific way in relation to the rest of the world. You impose, in this case, a one-celled partition upon reality which induces a fiat separation between what is focused upon and what is ignored. You effect a more complex many-celled partition when you focus on a map of France depicting its 91 départements or its 311 arrondissements. And as this last example makes clear, partitions may have different resolutions. But they must have cells 162 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology of finite size. The division of the line into real or rational numbers does not define a partition, and neither does the (whole) system of lines of latitude and longitude on the surface of the globe. A partition is, intuitively, the result of applying some sort of grid to a certain portion of reality. For such a partition to do its work, its cells need to be large enough to contain the objects that are of interest in the portion of reality which concerns the user. At the same time these cells must be not too large, in the sense that they must allow the user to factor out those details which are not of concern. A granular partition is thus an instrument for focusing upon and also for ignoring things – for placing certain parts and moments of reality into the foreground of our attentions in such a way that other parts and moments are traced over in the background. (Compare Bittner [2].) A granular partition is, we said, a labeled system of cells. The latter are then projected by the user of the partition onto the corresponding domain of reality. The cell-boundaries thereby serve to parcel out in more or less fine-grained fashion this concrete portion of the world. The cells of a partition may be purely spatial, as in a map which effects a two-dimensional partition of a certain portion of the surface of the globe. But partitions may be constructed also in such a way as to involve demarcations of a non-spatial sort. Examples are: taxonomical partitions in biology, component catalogs, customer databases. Some partitions are very simple: for example the Spinoza partition, which comprehends the whole universe in a single cell. We can analogously define for each given object x what we might call the object partition for x, consisting of one single cell in which x and x alone is located. A closely related partition has two cells, called foreground and background, one containing, precisely, x; the other containing x's complement (the mereological sum of all the objects disjoint from x). There is in addition a large family of simple partitions of reality corresponding to sequences of objects labeled by natural numbers – artifacts of that sort of cognitive act we call counting. There are partitions including empty cells (for example, the guest-list of a hotel with rooms some of which, on any given night, are unoccupied; a chessboard, some of whose squares are at any given stage in the game empty of pieces). And there are hierarchical partitions which involve cells comprehending successively more comprehensive groups of objects (species, genera, orders, classes, phyla, kingdoms, and so on) on successfully higher levels. Dodo is an empty cell in one standard partition of the animal kingdom. 10. Cells in granular partitions Let variables z, z′, z1, . . . range over cells (Zellen, in German), and A, A′, A1, . . . over granular partitions (German: Aufteilungen). The cells in a granular partition may have subcells. Thus for example the cell Florida is a subcell of the cell United States in the standard geopolitical partition G of the surface of the globe. The cell rabbit is a subcell of the cell vertebrate in a partition of the animal kingdom, and the latter is in turn a subcell within the larger subcells mammal, chordata, and so forth. There will in general be far fewer subcells in a typical partition than there are subsets in a typical set (since the subcells are restricted, in a typical partition, to those groups of smaller cells which manifest a certain sort of naturalness or rounded-offness). This is not least B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 163 because natural partitions will exclude double counting on any given level of a hierarchy of cells and subcells. We write: z ⊆A z′ as an abbreviation for: z is a subcell of the cell z′ in the partition A. ⊆A is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. It defines a partial order on the totality of cells in the partition A, by analogy with the usual set-theoretic subset relation. We stipulate further that it satisfies a finite chain condition to the effect that if * * * ⊆A zi ⊆A zi−1 ⊆A * * * , then there is some n such that zn = zn+1 = * * * and some m such that zm = zm−1 = * * * (so that there are minimal and maximal cells at the end of each chain). An example of such a finite chain is your address (The Oval Office, The White House, 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20500, USA). We can define the property of being a minimal cell within a partition in the obvious way as follows. MinA(z) := A(z) ∧ ¬∃z′ ( z′ ⊆A z ∧ z′ = z ) , (1) where 'A(z)' signifies: z is a cell in the partition A. (The property of being a maximal cell can be defined similarly. In many partitions the maximal cell will coincide, in its domain of objects, with the partition considered as a whole.) The finite chain condition tells us that every partition is in a certain sense built out of minimal cells. But consider the partition defined as follows: Germans, Kant, Wagner. The latter has minimal cells, but the partition as a whole can nonetheless not be identified with the mereological fusion of its minimal cells. Indeed the closest counterparts of sets within our present framework will turn out to be just those special sorts of partitions which can be identified as the sums of their minimal cells in this way. The latter then play the role played by singletons in Lewis' Parts of Classes. The minimal cells of the corresponding partitions represent a jointly exhaustive and pairwise disjoint tiling of the pertinent domain of objects, and every cell z in such a partition A satisfies the following: ∃z1 . . . ∃zn ( MinA(z1) ∧ * * * ∧ MinA(zn) ∧ z = z1 ∪A * * * ∪A zn ) , (2) where '∪A' symbolizes the mereological fusion of cells within a partition A. We might say that the minimal cells then form a basis for the partition as a whole. The possibility of decomposition into minimal cells does not hold of partitions in general. This is because partitions are artifacts of our cognition, and our cognition may be incomplete. Decomposable partitions represent a certain kind of cognitive completeness on the side of the responsible cognitive agent. Suppose you are in a crowded room and you know (who) all the people in the room (are). The maximal cell of your partition people in this room is then decomposable into a basis of minimal cells labeled Jack, Jim, John, Joe, and so on. Suppose, on the other hand, that your partition contains on the level of single persons only two cells, labeled Jim and John, since these are the only two people you recognize. Then such decomposition will not be possible. We can imagine similarly a partition of the animal kingdom containing one large cell labeled mammal 164 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology comprehending other smaller cells labeled rabbit, dog, and so on, but where the latter are not such as to represent a complete accounting of all the species of mammal which exist. Partitions of this non-decomposable sort will be needed to capture our hierarchically organized knowledge in regard to almost all complex domains of real-world objects. 11. Union, intersection and complement of cells We can define partition-theoretic union z ∪A z′ of two cells in a partition A as a ⊆A-minimal cell satisfying the condition that it contains both z and z′. Such a union is not in general defined. (Consider our geopolitical partition G of the land surface of the globe, and take z = Florida, z′ = Zambia.) And even where it is defined it is not in general unique. (As applied to Cyprus and Malta, for example, it currently yields the unique output: British Commonwealth; both Cyprus and Malta are however candidates for membership of the European Union.) Partition-theoretic union is commutative, but it is not associative. That is to say (z ∪A z′)∪A z′′, even where it is uniquely defined, is not in every case identical to z ∪A(z′ ∪A z′′). To see why not, consider a partition P with cells exactly as follows: {a}, {b}, {c}, {d}, {e}, {a, b, d}, {b, c, e}, {a, b, c, d}, {a, b, c, d, e} (presented also in figure 3). If we now set z = a, z′ = b, z′′ = c, then we have (z ∪A z′)∪A z′′ = (a ∪A b)∪A c = {a, b, d} ∪A c = {a, b, c, d}. On the other hand, however, z ∪A(z′ ∪A z′′) = a ∪A(b ∪A c) = a ∪A{b, c, e} = {a, b, c, d, e}. We do however have the familiar equivalence of z ⊆A z′ and z ∪A z′ = z′. (See [23] for a detailed theory of such restricted union operators.) Regarding partition-theoretic intersection, we first of all define what it is for two cells of a partition A to overlap in A, as follows: z1 oA z2 := ∃z(z ⊆A z1 ∧ z ⊆A z2). (3) The partition-theoretic intersection of two overlapping cells in A is then defined as any ⊆A-maximal cell which is included as subcell within them both. Partition-theoretic inFigure 3. B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 165 tersection as thus defined is commutative, but it is not in general unique or associative. Thus for example there are two intersections of {b, c, e} and {a, b, c, d} in P , namely {b} and {c}, respectively. Regarding partition-theoretic complement, we set –Az to be a ⊆A-maximal cell which does not overlap with z. The partition-theoretic complement of a cell, too, is not in general defined, and even where it is defined it is not in general unique. To see this, it is sufficient to consider once again our partition P , where the complements of {c} are {a, b, d} and {e}, respectively. Similarly many political entities recognized by the partition G do not have unique complements. What, for example, would be the unique ⊆G-maximal political entity which does not contain Florida as part? That the partition-theoretic complement of a cell is not in general defined goes hand in hand with the fact that there is no analogue of the empty set in the theory of partitions. That is to say, there is no cell which is empty per se. This holds even for what we might call the Spinoza partition, which has a unique and maximal cell. There is no complement of this maximal cell within that partition. As we have noted, however, many partitions will contain empty cells, but these are cells which are empty per accidens. Granular partitions of many specific types will of course be rather well-behaved when it comes to the taking of unions, intersections and complements. This is true of the closest approximation, within partition theory, of sets, which turn out to be those special types of partitions which have a basis in minimal cells, at most one empty cell, and which are such that every non-empty minimal cell is occupied by exactly one object. Another important family of granular partitions is made up of those partitions which capture the sort of hierarchical knowledge of reality which is illustrated by taxonomies, partonomies, contour maps, and a range of associated systems for encoding knowledge which have in common that they can be represented in the form of trees [3,16]. In partitions of this sort there is in every case a maximal cell, which coincides with the partition as a whole and which corresponds to the root of the associated tree. This ensures that the partition-theoretic union of two cells is always defined and it is always unique. (It is the cell associated with the vertex at which the branches emanating upwards from the vertices associated with the two cells join.) If two cells intersect, then only because one is a subcell of the other. Cells on the same level within the hierarchy do not intersect at all. Here, too, partition-theoretic complements are not in general defined. A unique complement of a cell associated with a given level in the tree will exist only where the tree has exactly two vertices on that level. We can go back and forth between trees and partitions of the given sort in virtue of a standard graph-theoretical result [18] to the effect that there is a one-to-one correspondence between families of non-intersecting, possibly nested regions in the plain and trees in which each vertex represents a region in the array and each link in the tree represents a relation of immediate containment between two nested regions. 166 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 12. The location of objects in cells Let variables x, x′, x1, y, . . . range over objects. We write: LA(x, z) for 'object x is located in cell z in partition A'. Exact location can then be defined as follows: L∗A(x, z) := LA(x, z) ∧ ∀x′ ( LA ( x′, z ) ⇒ x′ ≤ x), (4) which means that an object x is exactly located in a cell z if and only if x is a maximal occupant of z. (Here and in what follows '≤' abbreviates: 'is a proper or improper part of' understood according to the usual axioms of classical extensional mereology [22].) Given the presence of empty cells, it is necessary to distinguish in our theory between partition-theoretic intersection in the general sense discussed above and that specific sort of intersection of cells which turns upon a sharing of objects. The following then appears to be an attractive axiom governing overlap for L: LA(x, z) ∧ LA ( x, z′ ) ⇒ z oA z′. (5) It tells us that, if an object is located in two cells (which means: fully located, located in its entirety, in both of these cells), then the latter overlap. (Here 'p ⇒ q' is strict implication. It abbreviates: it is not possible for p to be true and q false.) Familiar object-based mereological intersection entails partition-theoretic intersection (but not, in general, vice versa). It follows from the Overlap Axiom that if an object is in two distinct cells within a partition, then these cells are not both minimal, and they possess an intersection-cell. 13. Granular partitions and mereology We can address the relation between granular partitions and the underlying mereology on the side of objects by isolating the special class of what we shall call distributive partitions. A partition is distributive if it satisfies a condition to the effect that if object x is part of object y, and if y is located in a cell z, then x is also located in the cell z: dist(A) := ∀x∀y∀z(x ≤ y ∧ LA(y, z) ⇒ LA(x, z) ) . (6) For distributive partitions, the Overlap Axiom can be proved. Spatial partitions are always distributive in the sense specified. If John is in Salzburg, then so are all his bodily parts. Closely related to distributivity is the property of some partitions expressed by: LA(x, z) ∧ LA(y, z) ⇒ LA(x +A y, z) (7) (we might call it Weak Antidistributivity) to the effect that if two objects are located in a given cell of a partition, then their sum, too, is located in that cell. Again, spatial parB. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 167 titions trivially satisfy this requirement: if John is in Salzburg and Mary is in Salzburg, then their sum is in Salzburg, too. A set is a simple example of a non-distributive partition, and the same applies also to a partition generated by kinds or concepts. A partition recognizing cats does not ipso facto recognize parts of cats. We note also that if Bruno is a cat and Tibbles is a cat, and Tibbles and Bruno are not identical and do not overlap, then the sum of Bruno and Tibbles is not itself a cat (and nor need this sum be included in any cell of a taxonomical partition of which cat is a subcell). It seems reasonable to insist, however, that all partitions satisfy a restricted version of the principle of distributivity which can be specified as follows. We first of all introduce formally the notion of recognition (a notion which has been used informally already above). To say that an object x is recognized by a partition A (symbolized: x ∈ A), is to say that x is located in some cell z in A, or in other words: x ∈ A := ∃z(LA(x, z) ) . (8) The restricted axiom of weak distributivity can now be formulated for all partitions A as follows: LA(x, z) ∧ y ≤ x ∧ y ∈ A ⇒ LA(y, z). (9) We can also define 'minimal object' relative to a partition A in the obvious way: MA(x) := x ∈ A ∧ ¬∃y(y < x ∧ y ∈ A). (10) When you see John cooking his dinner in the kitchen, then the partition effected by your act of visual perception recognizes John, but it does not recognize all the parts of John or of his surroundings. Thus it does not recognize the cells in his lungs or the bacteria crawling in his ear or the half-digested food passing through his alimentary tract. Again, your partition induces a fiat separation of the relevant portion of reality, drawing a line between what is focused upon and what is ignored. Note, though, that this partition cannot be understood in any simple topological or geometrical terms (by analogy with the relation between Beverly Hills and the surrounding territory of Los Angeles). For while John himself is recognized by your partition, there are many interior parts of John which your partition does not recognize. 14. Relations between granular partitions We shall say that one partition is extended by another partition if all of the cells in the former are also cells in the latter. We write 'A ≤ A′' to signify: A is extended by A′, which we define, simply enough, as follows: A ≤ A′ := ∀z(A(z) ⇒ A′(z)). (11) A partition may be extended either by enlargement or by refinement. If a partition is enlarged, then more cells are added at its outer border. If a partition is refined, then 168 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology more cells are included in its interior. This can occur either via imposition of a finer grain in the existing dimensions of the partition, or through combination of partitions. The latter can itself occur either through amalgamation along the lines set out in [28], or through a partition-theoretic analogue of Cartesian products. Consider what happens, for example, when a map of the spatial layout of the cages in your local zoo is supplemented by information as to the sorts and sizes and proper names of the animals located in those cages. We can now assert as axiom governing extensions: A ≤ A′ ⇒ ∀x∀z(LA(x, z) ⇒ LA′(x, z) ) . (12) If A is extended by A′, then all object-cell relations true in A are also true in A′. To see why the converse does not hold, we need only consider the special role of empty cells within the theory of partitions. These ensure that the otherwise intuitively attractive definition of z ⊆A z′ in terms of ∀x(LA(x, z) ⇒ LA(x, z′)) here fails. Two otherwise identical partitions of the mammals, one with and one without a cell labeled Dodo, will at all future times have exactly the same population of objects located in exactly the same way within their respective systems of cells. The two partitions are nonetheless distinct. We can define 'consistency' of partitions as follows: AA′ := ∃A′′(A ≤ A′′ ∧ A′ ≤ A′′). (13) Two partitions are called mutually consistent when there is some third partition which extends them both. All the partitions with which we have had to deal here are consistent in a trivial sense. This holds even of those partitions which cut through reality in ways that are skew to each other. One partition may, for example, divide the territory of a state into its separate counties, and a second partition may divide this same territory according to varieties of land use or soil type. We can still create a single partition which extends them both, however, again by a process of amalgamation [28]. Other partitions may relate to portions of reality which are entirely disjoint: for example the partition of the United States into states and of Canada into provinces. Here again we can create a single partition which extends them both, in this case via a process of topological gluing. 15. Histories as sequences of granular partitions Consider a chess game. This can be conceived in terms of the theory of partitions as follows. The game determines a partition having 768 minimal cells (for the 64 squares × 6 different types of pieces × 2 different colors). At most 32 of these cells have objects located within them at any given time. The minimal objects relative to this partition are then the 32 separate pieces (and not, for example, the molecules of wood and paint from out of which these pieces are formed). Clearly, however, we need here to take into account not just one partition but rather an entire sequence of partitions, corresponding to the successive positions in the game. B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 169 We shall call such a sequence of partitions a history. A single partition stands to a history as an instantaneous snapshot stands to the sequence of successive frames within a film. A history may correspond, for example, to a sequence of successive observations made in the course of a physical experiment, or to a sequence of states in the execution of a computer program. A history can be described by means of a conjunction of sentences of the form: LAi (x, z) to be read as: the individual x is located at time i in the cell z of partition A. Here i is an index for the successive reference times on the basis of which a given history is constructed. We have great flexibility in the choice of reference times. Thus there is no requirement that the times referred to by i be absolute smallest time-units or time-points. Reference intervals (of phonemeor word-length) would be required, for example, in order to exploit the machinery of partitions and histories for purposes of linguistics. Indeed we can utilize in this respect the full generality of the approach to time granularity proposed in [1], where all that is required is (a) that the set of index times be a discrete linearly ordered set isomorphic to a subset of the integers with the usual order relation, and (b) that there be some order-preserving mapping μ from this set to the set of absolute times which is such that, if two indices are assigned a value under μ, then so also is every index which falls between them. A partition is more or less coarse-grained according to the number of cells we use in its construction. A history may be more or less coarse-grained according to the granularity of its associated partitions but also according to the number of index-times employed in its construction (and in principle also according to the type of the mapping μ and of the choice of absolute time set). Suppose John's travel agent issues him with a flight itinerary indicating his location at three successive (clock-) times. The rest of the world at the three times is ignored, as are all matters pertaining to the world at all other times. Suppose John's locations (cells) at these three times are successively: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and Abu Dhabi airports. The itinerary then describes John's movements in terms of a three-cell partition and three reference-times. It is not concerned with how he gets to the airport from his home, or with the other people at the airport, or with the locations during flight of the successive planes John takes, or with the food he eats on the journey. These things, whatever they are, could have varied without affecting any detail of the given history. We can, however, create a finer-grained history by constructing partitions that contain either more details about John and the places at which he is located, or by taking more and finer-grained reference times. We use 'H ' as a variable ranging over histories (finite sequences of partitions) and we write Aεi H for: A is a partition in history H at index-time i. A history H is extended by another history H ′ if and only if, at each index-time, all partitions in H are extended by partitions in H ′: H ≤ H ′ := ∀A∀i(Aεi H ⇒ ∃A′ ( A′ εi H ′ ∧ A ≤ A′ )) . (14) Whatever holds (eventuates) in a history H holds (eventuates) in all extensions of H . 170 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 16. Libraries as complete families of histories There are alternatives to any given coarse-grained history H . John might fly to Abu Dhabi via London instead of via Paris. The coin, which landed on its head, might have landed on its tail. A coarse-grained history H ′ that is an alternative to H employs the same reference-times, but the objects are distributed differently across the cells of the underlying partitions. When we move, in this fashion, to consider not only what is but also what might have been, then the predicate L is not a location (or instantiation or occupation) predicate simpliciter. Rather it is a predicate affirming location with respect to a given history H . Suppose your entire knowledge of John's trip to Abu Dhabi is encapsulated by the given coarse-grained history. There are then many finer-grained histories all of which are consistent with your knowledge (though of course not all of these need correspond to what in fact eventuates). Each coarse-grained history can be identified with a certain class of fine-grained histories, namely the class of fine-grained histories that vary in respect of the details ignored in the given coarse-grained history. We shall say that two fine-grained histories H ′ and H ′′ are equivalent with respect to a coarse-grained history H if they satisfy: H ′ ≈H H ′′ := H ≤ H ′ ∧ H ≤ H ′′. (15) In this way we can extend to histories the tools for refinement and coarsening of graphs developed in [26]. Each relatively coarse-grained history can be associated with an equivalence class of alternative fine-grained histories, all of which agree regarding some features while other features are allowed to vary. It is such equivalence classes, which trace over insignificant details, which serve as the basis for all planning and decision-making. The class of alternative histories, for each given level of granularity, can now be conceived as a more homely analogue of the set of possible worlds of the modal realists. To see how this works, consider a sequence of three successive tosses of a single coin. Here it is very easy to construct a complete family of alternative histories modulo a certain granularity determined, in this case, by a certain two-celled partition (with cells labeled heads and tails), and an index set consisting of three reference times. When all other features of the system in hand are traced over, then the complete family of alternative histories can be represented as in figure 4. We could similarly, though with more difficulty, construct a complete family of alternative histories over John's behavior from the beginning to the end of his journey to histories: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 H T H T H T H T H T H T H T H T time 1 x x x x x x x x time 2 x x x x x x x x time 3 x x x x x x x x Figure 4. Histories (H = heads, T = tails). B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 171 Abu Dhabi, where the pertinent granular partition might be determined, for example, by the network of intervening airports. (There are only finitely many ways to fly from New York to Abu Dhabi.) We shall call such a maximal family of consistent coarse-grained histories a library. A library specifies all possible ways in which, considered at a given level of granularity and in relation to a given set of reference times, a given system of objects may behave. The concept hereby defined is highly general. A library is determined by how the objects are distributed over given granular partitions associated with given reference-times, but there is no requirement that the same partitions should be employed at each of the successive times involved. The reader will have recognized already from inspection of figure 4 above that a library is analogous to a truth-table. Omnès [20] calls a library a 'logic', and his work shows how the concept of truth-table and the framework of classical logic which it represents can be generalized in such a way that it can be applied to all coarse-grained histories of the sort described above. The resultant truth-tables are, as we might say, n-valued, where n is the number of cells in the partition associated with a given timeindex. But they are nonetheless fully comparable to the truth-tables of classical logic (thus they have nothing in common with the many-valued truth-tables developed for the purposes of representing for example non-classical logics of vagueness). Partitiontheoretic truth-tables allow us to define analogues of all the classical logical constants (conjunction, disjunction, inference, negation, etc.), which behave exactly as within the two-valued framework. (Omnès, op. cit.) And just as only one assignment of truthvalues to a proposition will correspond to reality in the framework of classical logic, so only one of the alternative histories within any given library will, in fact, be actualized. The coarse-grained history in which John goes via Orly, and the alternative history in which he goes via Heathrow, are mutually exclusive. That is, there is no larger history that contains them both. We write 'HξL' for: H is a history in library L. We can then define an equivalence relation on fine-grained histories, relative to a given library of coarse-grained histories, as follows: H ′ ≈L H ′′ := ∃HξL ( H ≤ H ′ ∧ H ≤ H ′′). (16) Two histories are equivalent relative to a library L if and only if there is some history in L which both extend. Each library is maximal relative to some given granularity of cells and referencetimes and relative to a given domain of constituent partitions. However, a library can itself be extended by increasing the number of reference times or by imposing an extended partition for cells. We write L ≤ L′ as an abbreviation for: library L′ is an extension of library L. Two libraries L and L′ are then called mutually consistent when there is a larger library of histories extending them both: LL′ := ∃L′′(L ≤ L′′ ∧ L′ ≤ L′′). (17) Otherwise the libraries L and L′ are called complementary. 172 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 17. Coda on quantum mechanics If granular partitions and histories are employed for purposes of representing classical physical phenomena, then the corresponding libraries are in every case consistent. The same applies in relation to all transparent partitions and histories constructed in relation to that medium-sized world of what happens and is the case in relation to which we humans act. When we use partitions and histories to represent quantum physical systems, however, then complementarity arises. The distinction between the quantum and the classical world (and it is a deep distinction) lies precisely in the fact that, to do justice to the evolution of even a single physical system within the quantum world, we typically need to employ not one but a plurality of libraries which are complementary in the sense defined. There can, accordingly, be no single aggregate library which would represent all phenomena in the quantum world. The theory of consistent histories and of probability assignments to histories within libraries was originally developed by Griffiths in [14,15] and also by Gell-Mann, Hartle, and Omnès as the basis for a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which has since established itself under the label 'consistent histories'. It now forms part of the New Decoherentist Orthodoxy in interpretation theory [5]. Experiments, from this perspective, are courses of events like any other. Thus they, too, are apprehended within consistent histories (and thus within encompassing libraries) of appropriate type. There is therefore no analogue within the consistent histories approach of any 'collapse of the wave function' arising as a result of some special role of observers or of consciousness. Observations may, certainly, disturb the systems towards which they are directed; but then the total physical system compounded out of the observation event and of the system observed is itself susceptible to treatment within the consistent histories approach just like any other physical system. Complementarity arises in virtue of the fact that in the quantum world there are sets of properties which conflict with each other in the sense that they cannot be used simultaneously without limitations. The characteristics of a particle may for example be described by giving either the position or the momentum of the particle as a function of time; a photon may be regarded either as a particle or as a wave. To represent such a state of affairs in coherent fashion, the consistent historians hold, it is necessary for physicists to embrace different and mutually incompatible libraries in relation to one and the same physical system. All reasoning about that system must then take place exclusively within some one of these selected libraries. If reasoning takes place across libraries, then inconsistency will result. Suppose physicists A and B have each made calculations with respect to the behavior of photons within some given apparatus involving, say, a photon source, a screen with right and left slits, and a detector. They each are allowed to set up experiments to measure the location of photons in order to test the accuracy of their calculations. A, working within one library and its associated repertoire of experiments, conceives the photon as a particle and constructs appropriate types of experiments designed to detect whether the photon goes through either the right or the left slit in the apparatus. B, working within B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 173 a complementary library and repertoire of experiments, conceives the photon as a wave and constructs experiments designed to measure interference effects as the wave passes through both slits. Both libraries give rise to predictions of astonishing accuracy, which are repeatedly confirmed in successive experiments. A's and B's predictions are, to be sure, inconsistent with each other. But such inconsistency can never be detected in relation to any given system of photons, since it is impossible for A and B to carry out the necessary experiments simultaneously, since each would need a quite different sort of apparatus. Each experiment carried out by A corresponds to one library (to one family of coarse-grained histories in our terminology above), each experiment carried out by B corresponds to another library. The two libraries are inconsistent with each other, but they each give rise to equally good predictions. Provided that a history is a member of a consistent family of histories, it can be assigned a probability [14,15], and within a given consistent family the probabilities function in the same way as do those of a classical stochastic theory: one and only one history occurs, just as, when we are tossing coins, one and only one succession of heads and tails in fact corresponds to reality. But histories can be assigned probabilities only if they are of sufficiently coarse grain [12,13]. The importance of the work of Omnès and of the other consistent historians turns on the fact that it shows how the theory of consistent histories can be used to derive in rigorous fashion a theory of the 'quasi-classical' physics governing the macroscopic phenomena of our everyday reality. This is done effectively by showing how, as more coarse-grained partitions are substituted for the finer-grained partitions employed at quantum levels, superposition phenomena 'decohere' (which means: they become negligible). This implies that we can understand why from a physical point of view macroscopic objects are so astonishingly well-behaved even in spite of the fact that the quantum phenomena from out of which they are constructed involve logically and ontologically monstrous superpositions. Niels Bohr believed that complementarity is a concept of wide application. He held, for example, that when we describe living things as biological and as physical systems, then we are employing complementary descriptions which cannot be used simultaneously without limitations. Our remarks on the quantum-mechanical background of the theory of granular partitions suggest that it may be time to look again at such ideas. The hitherto unnoticed commonality between the approach to partitions at multiple resolutions developed in the study of macro-level spatial reasoning and the theory of granular partitions as a means of representing physical phenomena in the quantum realm may then prove to be of quite general ontological significance. Acknowledgements An early version of this paper was presented at the AAAI-2000 Workshop on Spatial and Temporal Granularity. Thanks are due to the participants at that meeting, and especially to Thomas Bittner, for helpful comments. Thanks are due also to Eero By174 B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology ckling, Achille Varzi and to Ulrich Steinvorth, Carola Eschenbach and their colleagues in Hamburg. Support from the NCGIA (Buffalo), from the American Philosophical Society, and from the NSF (Research Grant BCS-9975557: "Geographic Categories: An Ontological Investigation") is gratefully acknowledged. References [1] C. Bettini, X.S. Wang and S. Jajodia, A general framework for time granularity and its application to temporal reasoning, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 22(1/2) (1998) 29–58. [2] T. Bittner, A qualitative coordinate language of location of figures within the ground, in: Spatial Information Theory – A Theoretical Basis for GIS, COSIT'97, Laurel Highlands, PA, eds. S. Hirtle and A.U. Frank, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 2205 (Springer, Berlin/New York, 1997) pp. 223–240. [3] T. Bittner and B. Smith, A taxonomy of granular partitions, in: Spatial Information Theory, COSIT '01, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/New, 2001). [4] T. Bittner and J.G. Stell, A boundary-sensitive approach to qualitative location, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 24 (1998) 93–114. [5] J. Bub, Interpreting the Quantum World (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000). [6] G. Cantor, Beiträge zur Begründung der transfiniten Mengenlehre, Mathematische Annalen 47 (1895) 481–512; 49 (1897) 207–246. [7] R. Casati and A.C. Varzi, Parts and Places (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1999). [8] A.G. Cohn and M. Gotts, N. The 'egg-yolk' representation of regions with indeterminate boundaries, in: Geographic Objects with Indeterminate Boundaries, eds. P. Burrough and A.U. Frank, GISDATA Series II (Taylor and Francis, London, 1996). [9] M. Erwig and M. Schneider, The honeycomb model of spatio-temporal partitions, in: Proceedings of the International Workshop on Spatio-Temporal Database Management, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1678 (Springer, Berlin, 1999). [10] C. Freksa and T. Barkowsky, On the relation between spatial concepts and geographic objects, in: Geographic Objects with Indeterminate Boundaries, eds. P. Burrough and A.U. Frank (Taylor and Francis, 1994). [11] A. Galton, The mereotopology of discrete space, in: Spatial Information Theory: Cognitive and Computational Foundations of Geographic Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1661 (Springer, Berlin/New York, 1999) pp. 251–266. [12] M. Gell-Mann and J.B. Hartle, Quantum mechanics in the light of quantum cosmology, in: Proceedings of the 3rd International Symposium on the Foundations of Quantum Mechanics in the Light of New Technology, eds. S. Kobayashi et al. (Physical Society of Japan, Tokyo, 1991). [13] M. Gell-Mann and J.B. Hartle, Classical equations for quantum systems, Physical Review A (1993). [14] R. Griffiths, Consistent histories and the interpretation of quantum mechanics, Journal of Statistical Physics 36 (1984) 219–272. [15] R. Griffiths, The consistency of consistent histories, Foundations of Physics 23 (1993) 1601–1610. [16] N. Guarino and C. Welty, Ontological analysis of taxonomic relationships, in: Proceedings of ER2000: The 19th International Conference on Conceptual Modeling, eds. A. Laender and V. Storey, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, Berlin/New York, 2000). [17] D. Lewis, Parts of Classes (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991). [18] D.M. Mark, Topological properties of geographic surfaces: applications in computer cartography, in: Harvard Papers on Geographic Information Systems, Vol. 5, Laboratory for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 1978). [19] R.G. Millikan, A common structure for concepts of individuals, stuffs, and real kinds: more mama, more milk, and more mouse, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9(1) (1998) 55–100. B. Smith, B. Brogaard / Quantum mereotopology 175 [20] R. Omnès, The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994). [21] R. Omnès, Understanding Quantum Mechanics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999). [22] P. Simons, Parts, a Study in Ontology (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1987). [23] B. Smith, Relevance, relatedness and restricted set theory, in: Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner, eds. G. Schurz and G.J.W. Dorn (Rodopi, Amsterdam/Atlanta, 1991) pp. 45–56. [24] B. Smith, Fiat objects, Topoi 20(2) (2001). [25] B. Smith and B. Brogaard, A unified theory of truth and reference, Logique et Analyse, forthcoming. [26] J.G. Stell, Granulation for graphs, in: Spatial Information Theory. Cognitive and Computational Foundations of Geographic Information Science, eds. C. Freksa and D.M. Mark, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1661 (Springer, Berlin/New York, 1999) pp. 417–432. [27] J.G. Stell, The representation of discrete multi-resolution spatial knowledge, in: Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference (KR2000), eds. A.G. Cohn, F. Giunchiglia and B. Selman (Morgan-Kaufmann, San Mateo, CA, 2000) pp. 38–49. [28] J.G. Stell and M.F. Worboys, Generalizing graphs using amalgamation and selection, in: Advances in Spatial Databases, Proceedings, eds. D. Papadial et al., Lecture Notes in Computer Science,Vol. 1651 (Springer, Berlin/New York, 1999) pp. 19–32.

Antologia de Textos Filosóficos • Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná • Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná • Secretaria de Estado da Governo do Estado do Paraná Roberto Requião Secretaria de Estado da Educação Yvelise Freitas de Souza Arco-Verde Diretoria Geral Ricardo Fernandes Bezerra Superintendência da Educação Alayde Maria Pinto Digiovanni Departamento de Educação Básica Mary Lane Hutner Organização da Antologia Jairo Marçal de Textos Filosóficos Catalogação na Fonte – CEDITEC-SEED-PR SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DA EDUCAÇÃO DO PARANÁ Departamento de Educação Básica Avenida Água Verde, 2140 Telefone: (xx41) 3340-1500 CEP 80240-900 CURITIBA – PARANÁ – BRASIL Marçal, Jairo (org.) Antologia de Textos Filosóficos / Jairo Marçal, organizador. – Curitiba: SEED – Pr., 2009. 736 p. – ISBN: 978-85-85380-89-2 1. Filosofia. 2. História da filosofia. 3. Ética. 4. Estética. 5. Filosofia da ciência. 6. Filosofia política. 7. Teoria do Conhecimento. I. Paraná. Secretaria de Estado da Educação. Superintendência da Educação. Departamento da Educação Básica. II. Título CDD 100 CDU 1 Índices para catálogo sistemático: 1.Filosofia Este é um livro público, razão pela qual é permitida a sua reprodução total ou parcial, desde que citada a fonte. É proibida qualquer forma de comercialização desse material. Impresso no Brasil Distribuição gratuita Coordenação Pedagógica do Departamento de Educação Básica Equipe de Filosofia do Departamento de Educação Básica Revisão das Normas Técnicas Ilustrações e capa Projeto Gráfico Editoração Eletrônica Jairo Marçal Marcelo Cabarrão Maria Eneida Fantin Bernardo Kestring Eloi Corrêa dos Santos Jairo Marçal Juliano Orlandi Wilson José Vieira Andréa Roloff Gladys Mariotto Ceolin & Lima Serviços Ltda Ceolin & Lima Serviços Ltda Apresentação I Essa produção sintetiza uma postura de políticas públicas de educação em prol de uma escola de qualidade. Uma escola que tem no conhecimento, a base da ação pedagógica; no trabalho coletivo, a possibilidade de avanços científicos, culturais, tecnológicos e artísticos; na reflexão crítica, o rompimento de concepções pragmáticas e utilitaristas do mundo contemporâneo do mercado; na valorização dos profissionais da educação, a crença na viabilidade de construção de um projeto de mundo, que alicerça a democracia entre os homens. Um trabalho filosófico, desta natureza, pressupõe que a formação de cidadãos constitui um desafio que se projeta para além da perspectiva da intitulação de direitos. Trata-se de um processo formativo no qual, por meio dos saberes socializados, o cidadão reúne as condições necessárias para se tornar forte individualmente, consciente da sua subjetividade e, ao mesmo tempo, capaz de se compreender como parte integrante da sociedade, com a virtude de pensar e agir politicamente e com autonomia. A Secretaria de Estado de Educação do Paraná, consciente desse desafio, reconhece e assume sua responsabilidade nesse projeto de democracia, orientando suas ações pelos princípios da educação como direito de todos os cidadãos, da valorização dos profissionais da educação, da garantia de escola pública, gratuita e de qualidade, do atendimento à diversidade cultural, da gestão democrática, participativa e colegiada. No contexto das ações implementadas, o Estado do Paraná destaca-se, no cenário nacional, através das políticas adotadas para o restabelecimento da disciplina de Filosofia, com ênfase na obrigatoriedade de sua oferta no ensino médio, concursos públicos para professores habilitados, formação continuada para docentes, recursos didáticos e pedagógicos, com aquisição de obras literárias pertinentes à Filosofia, adquiridas para a biblioteca do professor e com ampla divulgação nos textos que compõem o Livro Didático Público. O ensino da Filosofia se configura em fonte inspiradora de uma nova maneira de se pensar. Desta forma, e com o desejo de que o saber filosófico possa contribuir para o aprimoramento da democracia, da educação e formação do ser humano, nós, plenos de satisfação, apresentamos aos professores e estudantes essa Antologia de Textos Filosóficos. Yvelise Freitas de Souza Arco-Verde Secretária de Estado da Educação do Paraná II O Departamento de Educação Básica, visando atender os anseios dos sujeitos do processo ensino-aprendizagem e melhorar as condições de trabalho no cotidiano escolar, em relação aos recursos materiais pedagógicos e didáticos, desenvolve suas políticas educacionais por meio dos seguintes Programas: Formação Continuada dos Profissionais, Melhoria dos Espaços Escolares e Pesquisa e Produção. Dentre os materiais didáticos pedagógicos já produzidos no Programa Pesquisa e Produção, a Antologia de Textos Filosóficos pode ser considerada como uma das mais importantes, fruto de um trabalho minucioso, complexo e, sobretudo, representativo da seriedade e compromisso deste Departamento com a gestão da educação pública. A produção da Antologia contou com o apoio de profissionais comprometidos com a Escola Pública que vislumbraram, desde o início do projeto, a importância dessa obra para os estudantes e professores de Filosofia de nosso Ensino Médio da rede pública estadual. Entre esses profissionais, ressalte-se o incentivo e apoio integral do então Secretário Mauricio Requião de Mello e Silva e da atual Secretária de Estado da Educação Yvelise Freitas de Souza Arco-Verde. Agradecimentos a todos que acreditaram nessa ação e proporcionaram as condições necessárias para que o Departamento de Educação Básica pudesse organizar, produzir e disponibilizar, para todos os estabelecimentos de ensino, esta significativa obra. Hoje, é com satisfação que apresento esta obra como mais uma ação concluída pelo Departamento de Educação Básica. A Antologia de Textos Filosóficos, articulada com as demais políticas educacionais desenvolvidas nos Programas de Formação Continuada e Melhoria dos Espaços Escolares, representa mais um passo para a consolidação da Filosofia como disciplina de tradição curricular da Educação Básica no Estado do Paraná. Mary Lane Hutner Chefe do Departamento de Educação Básica III A razão de ser dessa Antologia de Textos Filosóficos é proporcionar aos estudantes do ensino médio o contato com os textos dos filósofos, precisamente porque é esse o lugar onde se encontra a Filosofia. Mas qual seria a Filosofia a ser ensinada no ensino médio? Dizer que a Filosofia tem sua origem fortemente marcada pela fundação da pólis e pela invenção da democracia, é fazer jus à sua própria história, mas é também fazer a escolha de um significado que gera expectativas, abre caminhos e perspectivas. Assim concebida, a Filosofia assume uma dimensão política, criativa, proponente e realizadora, sem abrir mão da sua identidade enquanto pensamento racional, sistemático, analítico e crítico. Essa é a concepção que inspira as Diretrizes de Filosofia da Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná. Diretrizes que apresentam a Filosofia na dimensão própria e complexa do pensamento e também na dimensão política de sua inserção nas sociedades humanas. O retorno da Filosofia ao ensino médio significa um importante reconhecimento dessa disciplina pela sociedade, e isso se dá pela tradição dos seus conteúdos e pelo seu estilo de pensamento. O reconhecimento da sociedade e a própria história da filosofia demandam, necessariamente, uma grande responsabilidade daqueles que promovem o seu ensino. Por isso, a Filosofia precisa de diretrizes, de material bibliográfico específico e, não pode ser entregue nas mãos de pessoas despreparadas, que se valendo de um espontaneísmo didático possam cair em equívocos que comprometam o sentido da disciplina. As Diretrizes de Filosofia do Paraná estabelecem como conteúdos estruturantes1 para o ensino de Filosofia: Mito e Filosofia; Teoria do Conhecimento; Ética; Filosofia Política; Filosofia da Ciência e Estética. Desses conteúdos estruturantes derivam conteúdos básicos2, que constituem um corpus mínimum a ser ensinado aos estudantes. Os textos dessa Antologia, somados aos materiais já existentes, constituem um importante suporte para o aprofundamento do ensino e refinamento da aprendizagem da Filosofia. 1 Disponível em: http://www.diaadiaeducacao.pr.gov.br/diaadia/diadia/arquivos/ File/diretrizes_2009/out_2009/filosofia.pdf (p. 54-59) 2 Disponível em: http://www.diaadiaeducacao.pr.gov.br/diaadia/diadia/arquivos/ File/diretrizes_2009/out_2009/filosofia.pdf. anexo: Conteúdos Básicos da Disciplina de Filosofia. No âmbito metodológico, é desejável que as aulas de Filosofia proporcionem ao estudante a prática da leitura e da análise de textos filosóficos, da escrita, da argumentação, do debate, da problematização da realidade e da criação de conceitos3. A Antologia é composta de vinte e dois textos ou excertos de textos de filósofos clássicos e um texto de filósofo brasileiro, escolhidos por sua relevância para os estudantes do nível médio. Os textos selecionados são precedidos por introduções redigidas por professores universitários especialistas nos filósofos escolhidos. Essas introduções apresentam três componentes. O primeiro componente traz conteúdos de cunho biográfico, histórico e bibliográfico dos filósofos. O segundo trata das possibilidades de interpretação e problematização dos textos, em função das exigências e expectativas do ensino de Filosofia no nível médio. O terceiro apresenta indicações de leituras das principais obras dos filósofos, traduzidas para a língua portuguesa, bem como os principais comentadores e eventuais sites qualificados. A Antologia também disponibiliza aos leitores um índice remissivo com os principais conceitos, filósofos, termos e correntes filosóficas. Essa Antologia de Textos Filosóficos integra um conjunto de ações do Departamento de Educação Básica (DEB) da Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná (SEED-PR), planejadas e desenvolvidas para o retorno da disciplina de Filosofia. Dentre as diversas políticas desenvolvidas e executadas destacam-se os concursos públicos para contratação de professores de Filosofia4, a Diretriz Curricular para o Ensino de Filosofia5, a aquisição da Biblioteca do Professor6 3 A criação de conceitos só é possível na Filosofia quando os problemas para os quais eles são as respostas são considerados ruins ou mal elaborados. (...) Essa ideia de criação de conceitos como resultado da atividade filosófica no Ensino Médio não deve ser confundida com a perspectiva acadêmica de alta especialização, ou seja, o que se pretende é o trabalho com o conceito na dimensão pedagógica. in; Diretrizes Curriculares de Filosofia, p. 52. Disponível em: http://www.diaadiaeducacao.pr.gov.br/diaadia/ diadia/arquivos/File/diretrizes_2009/out_2009/filosofia.pdf 4 Concursos realizados pela Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná em 2004 e 2007. 5 Entre 2003 e 2008 a Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná promoveu o processo de construção coletiva das Diretrizes Curriculares da Educação Básica, com ampla participação dos professores da Rede Estadual de Ensino e a consultoria de professores do Ensino Superior. As Diretrizes foram publicadas em 2009. A Diretriz de Filosofia está disponível em: http://www.diaadiaeducacao.pr.gov.br/diaadia/diadia/arquivos/ File/diretrizes_2009/out_2009/filosofia.pdf 6 Em 2005, o Departamento de Educação Básica da Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná, com o objetivo de ampliar os acervos já existentes nas escolas do Estado e por meio de consulta aos professores, adquiriu o acervo denominado Biblioteca do Professor I. A 2a etapa desse processo, denominada Biblioteca do Professor II, está em fase com títulos específicos e atualizados de Filosofia, o Programa de Formação Continuada dos Profissionais da Educação7, do qual faz parte o Projeto Folhas8, o Livro Didático Público de Filosofia9 e a Antologia de Textos Filosóficos, que além dos objetivos preconizados no projeto, concretizou uma articulação promissora entre o ensino médio e o ensino superior. O desejo é que esse livro desafie professores e estudantes ao filosofar, às leituras e releituras, ao saudável confronto das posições e ideias, aos debates racionais e bem fundamentados, afinal, um texto é clássico somente enquanto permanece vivo e instigante, enquanto nos convida à interlocução e pode ser reinterpretado. Jairo Marçal (organizador) Bernardo Kestring Eloi Corrêa dos Santos Juliano Orlandi Wilson José Vieira Equipe de Filosofia do Departamento de Educação Básica de conclusão. Disponível em: http://www.diaadia.pr.gov.br/deb/modules/conteudo/conteudo.php?conteudo=79 7 O Programa de Formação Continuada da Secretaria de Estado da Educação do Paraná desenvolve o Projeto Folhas, Grupos de Estudo, Simpósios, Semanas Pedagógicas, DEB Itinerante, NRE Itinerante, Professor Itinerante, Sala de Apoio, OAC. Ver: http:// www.diaadia.pr.gov.br/deb/modules/conteudo/conteudo.php?conteudo=79 8 O Projeto Folhas, que integra o Programa de Formação Continuada dos Profissionais da Educação, propõe uma metodologia específica de produção colaborativa de material didático, caracterizada pela pesquisa como princípio educativo. Para conhecer o projeto na íntegra consulte: http://www.diaadia.pr.gov.br/projetofolhas/modules/conteudo/conteudo. php?conteudo=3 9 Os Livros Didáticos Públicos são produzidos por professores da rede pública do Estado do Paraná com a metodologia do Projeto Folhas e distribuídos gratuitamente aos estudantes do ensino médio. Os livros também estão disponíveis em meio eletrônico. O Livro Didático Público de Filosofia encontra-se disponível em: http://www.diaadiaeducacao.pr.gov.br/diaadia/diadia/arquivos/File/livro_e_diretrizes/livro/ filosofia/seed_filo_e_book.pdf Prefácio Marilena Chaui I. É conhecido o famoso adágio: "a filosofia é uma ciência com a qual e sem a qual o mundo permanece tal e qual". Ou seja, a filosofia é perfeitamente inútil. Teria sido este o motivo para sua exclusão no Ensino Médio? Não foi o caso. A filosofia foi excluída do currículo do Ensino Médio no período da ditadura, portanto, entre 1964 e 1980. De 1964 a 1968, não houve grandes mudanças na grade curricular. As sucessivas reformas da educação se iniciaram a partir de 1969, após a promulgação do Ato Institucional no.5 (em dezembro de 1968), que suspendeu direitos civis e políticos dos cidadãos em nome da segurança nacional. O primeiro momento da reforma do Ensino Médio deu-se sob a vigência do AI-5 e da Lei de Segurança Nacional. Apesar do adágio sobre sua aparente inutilidade, a filosofia foi excluída da grade curricular por ser considerada perigosa para segurança nacional, ou como se dizia na época, "subversiva". Foi substituída por uma disciplina denominada Educação Moral e Cívica, que supostamente deveria doutrinar os jovens para a afirmação patriótica e a recusa da subversão da ordem vigente. Como se sabe, no início, essa disciplina foi lecionada por militares, o que a tornou suspeita aos olhos dos demais professores e raramente foi levada a sério pelos alunos. O sucesso da reforma estava noutro lugar. Com efeito, a reforma deu ênfase aos conhecimentos técnico-científicos e manifestou desinteresse pelas humanidades, consideradas pouco significativas para o chamado "milagre brasileiro". Essa primeira reforma, que seria sucedida por várias outras, instituiu o modelo educacional que vigorou pelos quase 50 anos seguintes: o Ensino Médio passou a ser visto de maneira puramente instrumental (e não mais como um período formador), isto é, como etapa preparatória para a universidade e esta, como gaPrefácio rantia de ascensão social para uma classe média que, desprovida de poder econômico e político, dava sustentação ideológica à ditadura e precisava ser recompensada. Para isso, teve início o ensino de massa, sob a alegação de democratizar a escola. O modelo educacional submeteu o ensino às condições do mercado, isto é, tomou a educação como mercadoria, seja ao estimular a privatização do ensino e minimizar a presença do Estado do campo da educação, tornando precária e insignificante a escola pública e fomentando a exclusão social; seja ao adequar o ensino às exigências do mercado de trabalho, que passou a determinar a própria grade curricular, de tal maneira que cada reforma pode ser perfeitamente compreendida à luz das condições desse mercado em cada momento econômico e social do país; seja, enfim, ao conferir pouca importância à formação dos professores, como atesta a introdução da chamada Licenciatura Curta, e ao não lhes assegurar condições de trabalho dignas. Evidentemente, houve resistência e luta contra o modelo educacional implantado pelas sucessivas reformas. Desde os meados dos anos 1970, associações docentes e estudantis de todo o país lutaram pela revalorização das humanidades no Ensino Médio e, entre eles, estiveram os grupos que se empenharam pelo retorno do ensino obrigatório da filosofia. Assim, a volta da filosofia ao Ensino Médio tem, hoje, um significado simbólico de extrema relevância ao assinalar a presença da idéia da educação como formação, isto é, como interesse pelo trabalho do pensamento e da sensibilidade, como desenvolvimento da reflexão para compreender o presente e o passado, e como estímulo à curiosidade e à admiração, que levam à descoberta do novo. Por isso mesmo, é grande a responsabilidade dos professores universitários de filosofia, pois lhes cabe a tarefa de preparar os docentes do Ensino Médio, por meio de formação filosófica sólida, formação pedagógica segura e recursos bibliográficos amplos e adequados. Além de, juntamente com eles, exigir condições de trabalho dignas (desde o salário, o número de horas de aula, o tamanho das classes até a garantia de que, sejam quais forem as condições sócio-econômicas dos alunos, a escola lhes assegure o acesso aos recursos educativos). II. Retomemos o adágio que afirma a inutilidade da filosofia. Essa imagem encontra-se presente entre os alunos do Ensino Médio, que ainda estão marcados pelo modelo instrumental do ensino e pela figura dos exames vestibulares como fim último da existência escolar. Para muitos deles, a filosofia é um conjunto de termos abstratos, genéricos, na maioria das vezes incompreensíveis, palavrório que, no final das contas, se refere a coisa nenhuma. Curiosamente, porém, eles também costumam considerar a filosofia um conjunto de opiniões e valores pessoais, que orientam a conduta, o julgamento e o pensamento de alguém, variando de indivíduo para indivíduo – cada um tem "a sua filosofia". Como quebrar essas imagens? Ou melhor, como fazer com que os alunos percebam que essas imagens não são absurdas, mas que seu sentido não é exatamente aquele com que se acostumaram? Como mostrarlhes que a filosofia é uma forma determinada de saber e não um conjunto fragmentado de opiniões, uma coleção de "eu acho que"? Como fazê-los compreender que esse saber é reflexivo e crítico (simultaneamente ruptura com o senso-comum e compreensão do sentido desse senso-comum)? Como levá-los a perceber que a filosofia possui uma história que lhe é imanente, mas que também a transcende, pois ela está na história? Como fazêlos ver que um filósofo interroga as questões de seu tempo para apreender o sentido da experiência vivida por ele e por seus contemporâneos e que, assim procedendo, nos ensina a interrogar nosso próprio presente? Certamente, procedendo como o patrono da filosofia, Sócrates, convidando-os a interrogar o que são e de onde nascem suas crenças tácitas e suas opiniões explícitas. Essa interrogação, sabemos, levou Sócrates perante a Assembléia de Atenas, que o condenou como perigoso para a juventude. Essa interrogação levou à exclusão da filosofia no Ensino Médio, considerada subversiva pela Lei de Segurança Nacional. O convite a Prefácio indagar sobre a origem e o sentido de nossas idéias, sentimentos e ações é, sem dúvida, um bom começo para a iniciação à filosofia. Que caminho melhor para isso do que familiarizar os alunos com aquilo que é o cerne e o coração da filosofia, o discurso filosófico? Experiência da razão e da linguagem, a filosofia é a peculiar atividade reflexiva em que, na procura do sentido do mundo e dos humanos, o pensamento busca pensar-se a si mesmo, a linguagem busca falar de si mesma e os valores (o bem, o verdadeiro, o belo, o justo) buscam a origem e a finalidade da própria ação valorativa. Essa experiência, concretizada no e pelo trabalho de cada filósofo, constitui o discurso filosófico. Por que a filosofia é um discurso dotado de características próprias, a iniciação a ela encontra um caminho seguro no ensino da leitura dessa modalidade de discurso, a fim de que os alunos aprendam a descobrir, no movimento e na ordenação das idéias de um texto, a lógica que sustenta a palavra filosófica para que possam analisá-la e comentá-la, primeiro, e interpretá-la, depois. III. O que é ler? Começo distraidamente a ler um livro. Contribuo com alguns pensamentos, julgo entender o que está escrito porque conheço a língua e as coisas indicadas pelas palavras, assim como sei identificar as experiências ali relatadas. Escritor e leitor possuem o mesmo repertório disponível de Prefácio palavras, coisas, fatos, experiências, depositados pela cultura instituída e sedimentados no mundo de ambos. De repente, porém, algumas palavras me "pegam". Insensivelmente, o escritor as desviou de seu sentido comum e costumeiro e elas me arrastam, como num turbilhão, para um sentido novo, que alcanço apenas graças a elas. O escritor me invade, passo a pensar de dentro dele e não apenas com ele, ele se pensa em mim ao falar em mim com palavras cujo sentido ele fez mudar. O livro que eu parecia dominar soberanamente apossa-se de mim, interpela-me, arrasta-me para o que eu não sabia, para o novo. O escritor não convida quem o lê a reencontrar o que já sabia, mas toca nas significações existentes para torná-las destoantes, estranhas, e para conquistar, por virtude dessa estranheza, uma nova harmonia que se aposse do leitor. Ler, escreve Merleau-Ponty, é fazer a experiência da "retomada do pensamento de outrem através de sua palavra", é uma reflexão em outrem, que enriquece nossos próprios pensamentos. Por isso, prossegue MerleauPonty, "começo a compreender uma filosofia deslizando para dentro dela, na maneira de existir de seu pensamento", isto é, em seu discurso. Prefácio Sumário Apresentação I ..................................................................................................................... 4 Apresentação II .................................................................................................................... 5 Apresentação III ................................................................................................................... 8 Prefácio ................................................................................................................................. 9 Agostinho de Hipona ...................................................................................................... 18 Agostinho: a razão em progresso permanente – Cristiane Abbud Ayoub Moacyr Novaes ..................................................................... 19 Confissões – (excertos) Livro XI ........................................................................................ 26 Aristóteles ........................................................................................................................ 58 Aristóteles e a superação do paradigma da Academia – José Veríssimo Teixeira da Mata ............................................. 59 Política excertos: (1252 a – 1253 b; livro III: 1274 b 30 a 1276 a) – sobre o cidadão e a cidadania ....................................................................................................................... 70 Avicena ............................................................................................................................. 80 Avicena, o grande mestre da filosofia árabe-muçulmana – Jamil I. Iskandar .................................................................. 81 Epístolas ............................................................................................................................. 88 Berkeley .......................................................................................................................... 100 George Berkeley e a Terra Incógnita da Filosofia: Percepção, Linguagem, Ilusão – Everaldo Skrock ........................................... 101 Ensaio para uma nova teoria da visão .............................................................................. 108 Teoria da visão defendida e explicada .............................................................................. 117 Bornheim ........................................................................................................................ 122 Bornheim: Estética e Crítica – Roberto Figurelli ............................................................. 123 Gênese e metamorfose da crítica....................................................................................... 130 Descartes ........................................................................................................................ 142 Meditando com Descartes: da dúvida ao fundamento – César Augusto Battisti ........................................................ 143 Meditações – excertos das Meditações 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a, 5a e 6a ....................................................................................... 153 Espinosa ......................................................................................................................... 190 Espinosa: Considerações sobre o Tratado Breve – Paulo Vieira Neto ............................ 191 Tratado breve (2a parte) ................................................................................................... 206 Foucault .......................................................................................................................... 218 Foucault: um pensador da nossa época, para a nossa época – Inês Lacerda Araújo ........ 219 Poder e saber (entrevista a S. Hasumi) ............................................................................ 230 O poder, um magnífico animal (entrevista a M. Osório) .................................................................................................. 247 Gramsci .......................................................................................................................... 258 Antonio Gramsci Filosofia, História e Política – Anita Helena Schlesener .................. 259 A indiferença .................................................................................................................... 268 A história ......................................................................................................................... 270 Cadáveres e idiotas ........................................................................................................... 272 Rabiscos ............................................................................................................................ 274 O progresso no índice de ruas da cidade .......................................................................... 276 Filantropia, boa vontade e organização ............................................................................ 278 A sua herança ................................................................................................................... 281 Os jornais e os operários .................................................................................................. 286 A luz que se apagou ......................................................................................................... 289 Crônicas de L'Ordine Nuovo – IX ................................................................................... 293 Crônicas de L'Ordine Nuovo – XXX .............................................................................. 296 Hegel ................................................................................................................................ 298 Hegel e o caráter ético-político da idéia de liberdade – Cesar Augusto Ramos ................................................................. 299 Excertos e parágrafos traduzidos ..................................................................................... 312 Hobbes ............................................................................................................................ 338 Hobbes e o Estado – Maria Isabel Limongi ...................................................................... 339 Leviatã cap. XIII e XVII .................................................................................................. 346 Hume ............................................................................................................................... 368 Relação causal e a vontade como um evento natural em Hume – Maria Isabel Limongi ........................................................... 369 Uma investigação sobre o entendimento humano (seção 8) ...................................................................................... 376 Sumário Kant ................................................................................................................................. 398 Kant e a liberdade de pensar publicamente – Vinicius de Figueiredo ............................. 399 Resposta à questão – o que é esclarecimento? .................................................................. 406 Maquiavel ...................................................................................................................... 416 Liberdade e república no pensamento de Maquiavel – Carlo Gabriel Kszan Pancera ........................................ 417 Discursos sobre a 1a década de Tito Lívio ........................................................................ 426 O príncipe ........................................................................................................................ 451 Marx ................................................................................................................................ 460 Marx e a Filosofia como emancipação – Jairo Marçal ..................................................... 461 Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel – Introdução ..................................................................................... 474 Merleau-Ponty .............................................................................................................. 490 Merleau-Ponty: Entre o corpo e a alma – Luiz Damon Moutinho .................................. 491 Conversas 1a, 2a e 5a ........................................................................................................ 498 Nietzsche ........................................................................................................................ 516 Entre a verdade e o impulso à verdade: apresentação ao ensaio de Nietzsche "Sobre verdade e mentira o sentido extra-moral" – Antonio Edmilson Paschoal ........... 517 "Sobre a verdade e a mentira no sentido extra-moral" ................................................................................................... 530 Platão ............................................................................................................................. 542 Platão e os primórdios da Estética – Roberto Figurelli .................................................... 543 Excerto do diálogo Hípias Maior ..................................................................................... 548 Excerto de A república (livro X) ...................................................................................... 552 Rousseau ........................................................................................................................ 564 Rousseau contra o seu tempo – Rodrigo Brandão ............................................................ 565 Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes (excertos 1a e 2a parte) ......................................... 578 Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens (excertos – Prefácio; Discurso; 1a parte e 2a parte. ............................... 582 Contrato Social (excertos – Livro I: capítulos 1; 3; 4; 6; 7; 8) ........................................ 600 Sartre ............................................................................................................................... 608 A liberdade é a moral da história: Sartre, vida e obra – Luiz Damon Moutinho ................................................................... 609 O existencialismo é um humanismo ................................................................................ 616 Schiller ............................................................................................................................ 640 O homem estético na visão de Schiller – Roberto Figurelli ............................................. 641 Cartas XII; XIV e XV ...................................................................................................... 648 Tomás de Aquino .......................................................................................................... 658 Tomás de Aquino e o pensamento político medieval – Alfredo Storck ................................................................................... 659 A realeza ........................................................................................................................... 666 Voltaire ........................................................................................................................... 692 Voltaire: filosofia, literatura e história – Rodrigo Brandão ............................................. 693 Mulheres, sujeitai-vos aos vossos maridos ....................................................................... 702 Providência ...................................................................................................................... 707 O século de Luiz XIV ....................................................................................................... 709 Idéias republicanas por um membro do corpo .................................................................. 711 Índice remissivo. .............................................................................................................. 716 18 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná Agostinho: A rAzão em progresso permAnente18 1919 AGOSTINhO nasceu no dia 13 de novembro de 354, em Tagasta, na atual Argélia, norte da África. Seu contato com a filosofia começou pela literatura e pela oratória. O interesse pela literatura clássica latina foi decisivo para sua vida filosófica. O estudo de Cícero e de Vergílio propiciou um conhecimento elevado tanto dos recursos da linguagem, como de conceitos e problemas filosóficos. Até mesmo sua rejeição inicial pelo texto bíblico deve-se ao gosto desenvolvido nesse padrão literário: Agostinho inicialmente julgava que o Velho e o Novo Testamentos não estavam à altura dos grandes autores, nem pela forma nem pelo conteúdo. Dotado de boa formação literária, o jovem Agostinho inclinou-se também para o maniqueísmo. É importante entender em que se baseava seu interesse. O maniqueísmo procurava responder perguntas capitais para a filosofia, e prometia faze-lo com integral apoio na razão, isto é, rejeitando todo argumento de autoridade. Além dessa generosa promessa de racionalidade, o dualismo maniqueu procurava explicar a existência do mal no mundo como consequência de alguma coisa própria ao homem, e não a Deus, princípio do bem. Essas duas promessas atraíram Agostinho, que estudou com atenção as respostas maniqueístas AGOSTINHO: A RAZÃO EM PROGRESSO PERMANENTE 20 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná Agostinho: A rAzão em progresso permAnente20 a diversas questões, na expectativa de encontrar explicações racionais para tudo. Em linhas gerais, o maniqueísmo pretendia que nosso mundo seria resultado de um embate entre dois princípios – ou dois príncipes, se quisermos uma linguagem alegórica. De um lado, o princípio do bem (ou Príncipe da luz), e de outro o princípio do mal (ou Príncipe das trevas). Um dos resultados desse combate seria justamente o homem: com uma parte luminosa, a alma, e outra parte tenebrosa, o corpo. Assim, o mal seria consequência dessa nossa parte de origem e natureza malignas, o corpo. Na sua teoria do conhecimento, o maniqueísmo julgava que para ser inteiramente racional, só poderia aceitar como verdadeiro aquilo que estivesse imediatamente presente. Isto é, só poderíamos dar assentimento àquilo que nossos sentidos captam, aqui e agora, ou àquilo que intuímos prontamente com o intelecto, como as verdades da matemática. Mas Agostinho decepcionou-se com o dualismo maniqueu. As promessas não foram cumpridas. Seu contato com os grandes mestres dessa corrente doutrinária não o satisfez intelectualmente. Quando pôde debater com eles, considerou que as explicações não eram suficientes. Devemos notar, porém, que Agostinho não abandonou aquelas duas exigências: explicação racional e responsabilidade humana pelo mal. A solução maniqueísta não o contentava, mas os valores da razão e da responsabilidade moral restavam intactos para ele. Mais tarde, na vida madura, a filosofia agostiniana afirmará que a racionalidade não exclui a autoridade, e que a responsabilidade humana pode ser pensada em outros termos. A decepção com o maniqueísmo e a ambição de viver de seu talento como orador o levam a Roma, onde se torna professor. Sua vida profissional não é bem sucedida naquela que seria a Cidade Eterna, a capital do poderoso Império Romano. Mas do ponto de vista intelectual, Agostinho distancia-se do maniqueísmo e tem importante contato com o ceticismo acadêmico. Se o diálogo Hortensius, hoje perdido, exerceu uma influência já nos primeiros anos, ainda na África, outras obras de Cícero, 2121 como De natura deorum ou Academica, o levam a compreender melhor as dificuldades da razão humana para atingir a verdade. Nem os sentidos nem o mero modelo matemático seriam suficientes para encontrar todas as respostas. Embora também não se torne um cético, Agostinho vai levar consigo, para toda a vida, a noção da falibilidade da razão humana, e da necessidade de uma procura para além do que está imediatamente presente. É nesse contexto que o contato com o platonismo mostra-se frutífero. Depois de deixar Roma, por ter obtido um elevado posto em Milão, na corte do Imperador, Agostinho tem a oportunidade de contato com o platonismo, em especial com o pensamento de Plotino. Embora tenha mudado para a Milão em busca de sucesso profissional, as consequências desse novo passo foram inteiramente outras. A vida na corte propiciará o encontro com Ambrósio, e a revolução que daí resulta levará Agostinho a abandonar o cargo e os projetos de vida a ele associados. Ambrósio era o bispo de Milão. Agostinho, em princípio, não confiaria num bispo, seja porque exigia uma fé que o maniqueísmo ensinara a desprezar, seja porque valorizava a Bíblia, um livro aparentemente mal escrito. Mas Ambrósio era um sofisticado estudioso do platonismo, e interpretava a Bíblia à luz das Enéadas de Plotino. Com o platonismo, Agostinho foi encontrando outro modo de resgatar a razão, e explicar o mal. A lição platônica que Agostinho reteve pode ser assim resumida. Ao desconfiar do que se apresenta aos sentidos e ao intelecto, não devemos desesperar do acesso racional à verdade. Devemos apostar que a verdade está mais além, que a verdade será encontrada somente depois de um esforço racional que nega as verdades aparentes, em proveito de uma verdade que transcende a aparência. O trabalho da filosofia é um longo e penoso estudo de depuração, para que nossa razão encontre as condições adequadas de conhecimento da verdade. Ao mesmo tempo em que valorizava a razão, com o imperativo de uma depuração crítica de suas condições, o platonismo apresenta para Agostinho outra maneira de entender o mal. Enquanto o maniqueísmo considerava que o corpo era naturalmente mau, Agostinho encontra no 22 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná Agostinho: A rAzão em progresso permAnente22 platonismo elementos para uma explicação diversa. O mal deve ser investigado na vontade humana. A responsabilidade humana não está na sua natureza, no seu corpo. Na verdade, Agostinho insistirá que a causa do mal deve ser procurada na alma, isto é, no livre-arbítrio da vontade. Podemos dizer que a partir desse momento sua vida foi uma permanente investigação desse problema. Até a idade mais avançada, já de volta à África, já como bispo de Hipona, essas concepções de vontade e liberdade estarão em permanente elaboração. Milão já não mais retinha Agostinho. Em licença do cargo, retirase em Cassicíaco, ainda no norte da Itália, com um grupo de familiares e amigos, onde conduz discussões filosóficas que se tornaram célebres. Essas conversas foram anotadas e depois publicadas por ele na forma de diálogos, como o Contra Acadêmicos, a Ordem e a Vida feliz. De volta de Cassicíaco, Agostinho deixa definitivamente seu cargo na corte imperial, e volta para a África, com o projeto de fundar uma comunidade filosófica, longe das ambições do mundo. A vida na África tampouco será como o planejado. Após um curto período de elaboração e redação de textos iniciados em Cassicíaco e em Roma (no caminho de volta à África), logo Agostinho se vê ordenado sacerdote da igreja católica e, não muito depois, Bispo da importante cidade de Hipona. Embora dedicado também às funções pastorais, Agostinho não abandonará a filosofia, e continuará pensando, escrevendo e polemizando. Exatamente por ser Bispo de Hipona caberá a ele enfrentar polêmicas com o donatismo e o pelagianismo, e grandes desafios teóricos, como a trindade divina, justamente na obra A Trindade, e a interpretação da significação do sítio e do saque de Roma, por Alarico, em 24 de agosto de 410, na célebre Cidade de Deus. Agostinho morreu em 28 de agosto de 430, quando as consequências materiais e militares da queda de Roma já eram sentidas em toda a África do Norte, e estavam às portas de Hipona. 2323 As confissões, e seu famoso livro xi Retornemos agora aos primeiros anos de Agostinho como bispo, quando escreveu suas Confissões, para com isso retomarmos a linha de amadurecimento de sua filosofia. A interpretação do cristianismo como a verdadeira filosofia exigia ainda a crítica do platonismo. Podemos dizer que essa crítica concentrase na questão das condições da reconciliação entre o homem e Deus. Se for correto dizer que o platonismo propunha um esforço ascendente, em que a inteligência humana por suas próprias forças alcançaria a contemplação da verdade, Agostinho entende que a filosofia deve ser atenta à necessidade de uma mediação estabelecida "de cima para baixo". Isso quer dizer que a promoção das condições para o contato entre o homem e a verdade suprema será da iniciativa divina, e não apenas do esforço humano (ainda assim, indispensável). As Confissões, escritas aproximadamente entre 397 e 401, são um monumento filosófico. Investigam a condição humana e, em particular, a inteligência e a vontade na busca de Deus. Em especial, o Livro XI permite estudar de que modo Agostinho manejou a matriz filosófica platônica, para explorar seus limites e exibir a necessidade de ir além dela. Considerado um estudo dos conceitos de eternidade e tempo, o Livro XI das Confissões deve ser lido como parte de um projeto geral. O leitor deve levar em conta o 'fracasso' enunciado ao final do Livro X, para entender o papel dos livros XI-XIII, que totalizam a obra. Em resumo, podemos dizer que o Livro X encerra as narrativas baseadas na vida de Agostinho. Depois de apresentar sua primeira infância no Livro I, as Confissões acompanham a vida do 'narrador' até o seu momento presente. Se nos primeiros livros o autor, que é também narrador, fala de um Agostinho distante, primeiro criança, depois adolescente etc., seria de se esperar que as narrativas finalmente encontrassem o presente do narrador. E isso acontece e não acontece. É claro que os Livros I-IX versam sobre o passado de Agostinho, e o Livro X versa sobre seu presente. No entanto, paradoxalmente, o Livro 24 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná Agostinho: A rAzão em progresso permAnente24 X exibe o desencontro profundo de Agostinho consigo mesmo. Quando o leitor esperava encontro, depara com abismo. O final do Livro X é uma apresentação meticulosa da distância que um homem tem de si mesmo. Com isso, esgota-se uma estratégia narrativa. Narrar a própria vida não propiciou uma reconciliação. O narrador foi descobrindo a distância que tinha não apenas de Deus, mas também de si mesmo. Ora, nesse contexto teórico, o Livro XI tem a tarefa de examinar outra e mais importante narrativa: a narrativa baseada na palavra divina, a narrativa da criação, segundo o livro do Gênesis: "No princípio Deus fez o céu e a terra." Daí se compreende que o Livro XI seja marcado pela afirmação da iniciativa divina, e pelo imperativo de que mesmo assim a razão humana se aplique. Seja como vontade, seja como inteligência, cabe à razão o esforço de secundar a ajuda divina. O leitor terá proveito em estudar o Livro XI à luz do platonismo, no contraste entre o eterno e o temporal, como no uso das estratégias de depuração, da abordagem negativa etc. Mas também deverá ser atento à reformulação da solução platônica pela necessidade de amoldamento humano à mediação promovida pelo Deus absoluto. A investigação da palavra divina, pela palavra humana, será uma procura de comunicação entre os dois pólos. Será igualmente proveitoso estudar como o texto vai marcando o papel da vontade, mediante metáforas como o espírito que arde, ou o fogo do amor, ao mesmo tempo em que a afirmação da vontade depende da sua assimilação ao amor divino: "faço isto por amor ao teu amor" (Confissões XI, 1,1). Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de agostinho traduzidas Para o Português AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA. A Cidade de Deus: contra os pagãos (livros I-X). 3. ed. Tradução de Oscar Paes Leme. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1991. v. 1. AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA. A Cidade de Deus: contra os pagãos (livros XI-XXII). 2. ed. Tradução de Oscar Paes Leme. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1990. v. 2. AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA. A Trindade. Tradução de frei Agustino Belmonte. São Paulo: Paulus, 1995. 2525 AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA. Confissões. 6. ed. Tradução de Maria Luiza Jardim Amarante. São Paulo: Paulus, 1995. AGOSTINHO DE HIPONA. De Magistro. Tradução, introdução e comentários de Bento Silva Santos. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2009. obras sobre agostinho (em Português) BROWN, P. Santo Agostinho: uma biografia. Tradução de Vera Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2005. GILSON, E. Introdução ao estudo de santo Agostinho. São Paulo: Discurso, Paulus, 2006. NOVAES, M. A Razão em exercício: estudos sobre a filosofia de Agostinho. São Paulo: Discurso, 2007. PALACIOS, P. M. (Org.). Tempo e Razão: 1600 anos das Confissões. São Paulo: Loyola, 2002. POSSÍDIO. Vida de santo Agostinho. Tradução das Monjas Beneditinas de Caxambú/MG. São Paulo: Paulus, 1997. RAMOS, F. M. T. A Ideia de Estado na doutrina ético-política de Santo Agostinho: um estudo do Epistolário comparado com o 'De Civitate Dei'. São Paulo: Loyola, 1984. 26 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 26 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi CONFISSÕES, LIVRO XI1 Capítulo 1, § 1. Porventura2, Senhor3, sendo tua a eternidade4, ignoras o que te 1 AUGUSTINUS S. AURELIUS. Confessionum Libri XIII (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana). Edição de Martin Skutella (1934), corrigida por H. Juergens e W. Schaub. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1981. 2 O tema do livro é enunciado na primeira frase: um estudo dos conceitos de eternidade e tempo. Trata-se de interrogar os dois conceitos, segundo sua contraposição e segundo a articulação possível entre eles. Agostinho examina um tema fundamental na história da filosofia, levando em conta o que já fora feito por grandes filósofos como Platão, Aristóteles e Plotino. Além disso, aprofunda a investigação e transforma os termos do problema, à luz de novas exigências. Mas o Livro XI das Confissões é importante na história da filosofia também porque abriu linhas de investigação que perduram até a filosofia contemporânea, em particular com Husserl e Heidegger. 3 A forma de tratamento, Senhor, pode ser analisada sob dois pontos de vista: seja como índice da necessidade de subordinação, tese que será desenvolvida no conjunto das Confissões e, particularmente, neste livro XI; seja como índice de que a linguagem aqui será menos descritiva do que dialogal. O decorrer do livro vai mostrar que o desafio de Agostinho é encontrar palavras para dialogar com o verbo divino, e não para descrever o verbo divino. A linguagem temporal deverá dirigir-se e amoldar-se ao Princípio eterno, e não tentar explicá-lo. 4 O vínculo entre os dois termos, eternidade "e" tempo, é um problema por si mesmo. Com efeito, o exame dos dois conceitos deve mostrar, primeiro, que eles são heterogêneos. A eternidade não será a infinidade dos tempos. Ao contrário, o que é eterno está fora do tempo, é atemporal. E o tempo não é uma parcela da eternidade, ele é condição de multiplicidade e dispersão, em contraste com a unidade do que é eterno. Por isso, a 2727 digo, ou vês com o tempo o que se passa no tempo? Então por que disponho para ti narrações de tantas coisas5? Não é, claro, para que venhas a sabê-las por mim, mas excito meu afeto em tua direção e também os afetos daqueles que as leem, para que digamos todos: Tu és grande, Senhor, e infinitamente louvável i. Já disse e direi: faço isto por amor ao teu amor. Com efeito, também oramos, e todavia a verdade diz: vosso pai sabe o que vos é necessário, antes de pedirdes a ele ii. Por isso, te expomos nosso afeto ao confessar a ti as nossas misérias e as tuas misericórdias por sobre nós iii, para nos libertares totalmente, pois que tu o começaste6, para deixarmos de ser miseráveis em nós e nos tornarmos felizes em ti; pois que nos chamaste, para sermos pobres de espírito e mansos e chorosos e aflitos e termos tanto fome como sede de justiça e sermos misericordiosos e puros de coração e pacíficos4. Foi assim que narrei muitas coisas para ti, as que pude e as que quis, pois tu quiseste primeiro, Senhor meu Deus, que eu te confessasse que és bom, que a tua misericórdia é para sempre5. 7 Capítulo 2, § 2. Quando conseguirei com a língua do lápis enunciar todas as tuas exortações, e todos os teus terrores, e consolações e comandos, pelos quais me conduziste a pregar tua palavra e a dispensar teu sacramento ao teu povo? E se eu conseguir enunciar com ordem, serão caras a mim as gotas dificuldade já começa com a ideia mesma de reunir conceitos díspares. Como veremos, a dificuldade terá de ser examinada gradativamente. 5 Narrativa e onisciência divina. O problema do vínculo é ainda maior. Ele concerne à própria pretensão contida nas narrativas das Confissões. Como Deus é eterno, isso deve excluir duas coisas: que Deus ignore alguma coisa – no caso, aquilo que Agostinho quer confessar – e que Deus conheça as coisas temporais à medida que o tempo passa. Então, por que narrar para Deus, aquilo que ele já sabe? E por que narrar, temporalmente, para uma inteligência eterna, atemporal? 6 A afirmação da iniciativa divina será desenvolvida neste livro. Ao estudar a eternidade e o tempo, Agostinho terá ocasião de exibir a dependência humana com respeito à iniciativa e à atividade de Deus. Mas também não abrirá mão do livre-arbítrio, do papel da vontade, de sorte que haverá sempre tensão entre a dependência e a vontade humanas. 7 O problema aprofunda-se. É preciso ainda levar em conta que o homem, o filósofo narrador, é parte do problema. O filósofo não apenas descreve uma questão, ele próprio é parte dela, porque ele próprio está submetido ao tempo. Seu pensamento e sua linguagem são temporais. Sua natureza humana e sua miséria como herdeiro do pecado fazem com que sua própria posição mereça distanciamento crítico. 28 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 28 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi dos tempos. E há muito ardo por meditar na tua lei e nela confessar-te minha ciência e minha imperícia, os elementos primordiais da tua iluminação e os restos das minhas trevas, até que a fraqueza seja devorada pela fortaleza. E não quero que se dispersem em outra coisa as horas que tenho livres das necessidades de refazer o corpo e a intensão do espírito8, e do serviço que devemos aos homens e do que não devemos e mesmo assim prestamos. Capítulo 2, § 3. Senhor meu Deus, dá atenção à minha oraçãovi, e que tua misericórdia ouça meu desejo, porque ele não arde somente por mim, mas quer ser útil à caridade fraterna; e tu vês no meu coração que assim é. Que eu sacrifique a ti a escravidão do pensamento e da minha língua. Tu, dá o que te oferecereivii, pois sou indigente e pobreviii, tu és rico para todos os que invocam a tiix, e isento de cuidados cuidas de nós9. Circuncida meus lábios de toda temeridade e de toda mentira interior e exterior. Sejam castas delícias minhas as tuas escrituras, e que eu não seja enganado com elas nem engane sobre elas. Senhor, atendeX e tem misericórdia, SenhorXI meu Deus, luz dos cegos e vigor dos fracos, assim como luz dos que veem e vigor dos fortes, presta atenção e ouve minha alma que clama das profundezas. Pois a não ser que teus ouvidos estejam também nas profundezas, de onde iremos? De onde clamaremos? Teu é o dia e tua é a noiteXII: a um aceno teu os momentos passam voando. Concede espaço10, então, para nossas me8 Essa intensão do espírito é uma expressão quase materialista, a ser tomada criticamente. O espírito tem certo tônus, tensão interna, que precisa ser bem entendido. Isso requer uma análise introspectiva que denuncie a confusão entre espaço e tempo. A intensão e o âmbito interno da alma são incorporais e temporais, não espaciais. Para tanto, Agostinho deverá examinar a distensão do espírito, ela também temporal, e mediante a sua crítica chegar à importância de o espírito estender-se à eternidade (§39). Note-se que o Autor vai explorar, no mesmo campo semântico, termos como atenção, atender (§3) e atentar (§§ 34 e 37). 9 A alteza divina não é somente distância. De algum modo, a ser investigado ainda, ela é também voltada para o que é inferior, finito e miserável. Com isso, as antíteses entre o divino e o humano – presentes em todo o livro – serão examinadas para além de um quadro conceitual platônico. O final do livro virá a explicitar a mediação descendente, isto é, por iniciativa divina. 10 O uso da palavra "espaço" é estratégico. A palavra latina (spatium) é ambivalente, porque tanto pode significar uma distância local como uma distância temporal. Aqui 2929 ditações sobre os esconderijos da tua lei e não a feches contra os que batem à porta, pois não foi em vão que, por tua vontade, foram escritos os segredos opacos de tantas páginas. Ou será que aquelas selvas não têm seus cervos, que nelas se restabelecem e se recuperam, nelas passeiam e pastam, deitam e ruminam? Senhor, perfaz-mexiii e revela tais coisas a mim. Eis que tua voz é minha alegria, tua voz acima da afluência das volúpias. Dá o que amo, pois amo. E tu deste isso. E não abandones os teus dons nem desprezes tua erva sedenta. Quero confessar-te o que vier a encontrar em teus livros e ouvir a voz do louvorxiv e te beber e considerar as maravilhas da tua leixv desde o princípio em que fizeste o céu e a terraxvi, até o reinoxvii perpétuo contigo da tua cidade santaxviii. 11 Capítulo 2, § 4. Senhor, tem misericórdia de mim e escutaxix meu desejo12. Pois penso que não é desejo de terra, nem de ouro nem prata nem pedras, ou de roupas luxuosas ou de honras e poderes e volúpias da carne, nem de coisas necessárias ao corpo e a esta nossa vida de peregrinação, que serão Agostinho refere-se ao espaço temporal, ao tempo necessário para meditar. Mas o decorrer do livro cuidará de denunciar a confusão conceitual entre o "espaço" local e o "espaço" temporal. Consultem-se especialmente os capítulos 26 e 27 (§§33-36). 11 O projeto de Agostinho pode ser traduzido na superposição de dois planos: a) do "princípio" ao "reino perpétuo" indica o estudo do conjunto das Escrituras, do Livro do Gênesis ao Livro do Apocalipse, isto é, a Bíblia do começo ao fim; b) e também a atenção a todo o transcurso real da criação do mundo ao juízo final. Mas o leitor deve levar em conta que os Livros XI-XIII das Confissões levam a cabo o projeto, ao examinar o que seria a epítome do conjunto da Bíblia, isto é, o trecho que vai de Gênesis 1, 1 a Gênesis 2, 2. 12 O leitor encontrará referências bíblicas nas notas assinaladas com números romanos, apresentadas no fim do livro. Os títulos do Antigo Testamento estão em letras normais; grafamos em itálico os títulos do Novo Testamento. O uso abundante de tais referências por Agostinho é importante por dois motivos. Primeiro, porque exprime a humildade (exigência que Agostinho tratará de exibir no conjunto das Confissões) ao procurar apoio para as próprias palavras nas palavras sagradas. Sendo assim, o reconhecimento da dificuldade do tema e dos embaraços do verbo humano, ao procurar o verbo divino, é coerente com o recurso às Escrituras. Em segundo lugar, porque Agostinho tem o propósito polêmico de mostrar a conciliação entre a antiga lei judaica, expressa no Velho Testamento, e o Evangelho, presente no Novo Testamento. Contra o maniqueísmo, tratava-se de aproximar o Princípio do livro do Gênesis ao Princípio que era Verbo, no Evangelho segundo João. Veja-se a inversão realizada no final desta alínea 4: a autoridade de Cristo – a Verdade legitima as palavras de Moisés. 30 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 30 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi todas acrescentadas a nós que procuramos o teu reino e a tua justiçaxx. Vê, meu Deus, de onde vem meu desejo13. Os injustos me narraram deleites, mas não segundo a tua lei, Senhorxxi. Eis de onde vem meu desejo. Vê, Pai, olha e vê e aprova. E que agrade aos olhosxxii da tua misericórdia que eu encontre graça diante de ti, para que os interiores de tuas palavras se abram quando eu bater à porta. Rogo pelo nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo, teu filho, à tua direita, filho do homem, que confirmastexxiii junto a ti, mediador entre ti e nós, por quem nos procuraste, nós que não te procurávamos, mas procuraste para que te procurássemos, procurássemos tua palavra, pela qual fizeste tudo, inclusive a mim, procurássemos o teu único filho, pela qual chamaste à adoção o povo dos crentes, inclusive a mim. Rogo a ti através dele, que senta à tua direitaxxiv e te interpela para nósxxv, no qual estão escondidos todos os tesouros da sabedoria e da ciênciaxxvi. São estes que eu procuro nos teus livros. Moisés escreveu sobre ele: ele mesmo o afirma, a Verdade o afirma.14 Capítulo 3, § 5. Que eu ouça e entenda15 de que modo no princípio fizeste o céu e a terraxxvii. Moisés o escreveu, escreveu e se foi, passou daqui contigo para junto a ti, e agora não está diante de mim. Pois se estivesse, eu o pararia e o interrogaria, e suplicaria por ti, para que desvendasse essas coisas a mim, e abriria bem os ouvidos do meu corpo aos sons que irrompessem 13 As antíteses (eternidade e tempo, luz e trevas, fraqueza infirmeza etc.) significam mais do que contrastes. Elas são indício da necessidade de uma transformação, de uma depuração, para que a vontade humana corresponda adequadamente à iniciativa divina. A depuração será necessária já para abordar o problema (cf. §§11 -15, §36, §40). 14 Note-se a inversão operada pelo Autor. No texto bíblico evocado nesta frase, Jesus recorrera à autoridade de Moisés, reconhecida pelos judeus. "Se crêsseis em Moisés, haveríeis de crer em mim, porque foi a meu respeito que ele escreveu." (João 5, 46). Agora, Agostinho faz uma inversão, ao tomar a palavra do evangelho como autorização do texto de Moisés, por Jesus , "a Verdade". 15 O problema geral é traduzido num problema específico, isto é, como interpretar o primeiro versículo da Bíblia: No Princípio Deus fez o céu e a terra (Gênesis 1, 1). Esta sentença resume a questão, porque o Princípio é eterno, mas foi "nele" que Deus fez o tempo e o que pertence ao tempo. Além disso, logo descobriremos que este princípio é o Verbo, a palavra divina (§§7-ss.), inicialmente expressa nas palavras escritas, por Moisés, no livro do Gênesis, e por João no seu evangelho; tais palavras, por sua vez, devem ser discutidas pela linguagem humana e entendidas pelo verbo interior. 3131 de sua boca. E se falasse hebraico, em vão atingiria meus sentidos e, por isso, nada tocaria minha mente. Mas se falasse latim, eu saberia o que ele diria. Porém, de onde eu saberia se diria o que é verdadeiro? Se soubesse também isso, acaso saberia por ele? Com efeito, dentro de mim, dentro no domicílio do pensamento, a verdade (nem hebraica nem grega nem latina nem bárbara) diria sem os órgãos da boca e da língua, sem o estrépito de sílabas, "ele diz o verdadeiro" e eu de pronto, certo e confiante, diria àquele teu homem: "dizes o verdadeiro". Então, embora eu não possa interrogá-lo, rogo a ti, Verdade, da qual está pleno aquele que disse coisas verdadeiras, rogo a ti, meu Deus, perdoa meus pecadosxxviii, e assim como deste ao teu servo dizê-las, dá também a mim entendê-las16. Capítulo 4, § 6. Eis que o céu e a terra existem e proclamam que foram feitos, porque mudam e variam. Ora, naquilo que não foi feito e contudo existe, não existe algo que não existia antes – o que seria mudar e variar17. Proclamam também que não fizeram a si mesmos: "Existimos porque fomos feitos; portanto, não existíamos antes de existir para que pudéssemos ser feitos por nós". E a voz dos que dizem é a própria evidência disso. Portanto Tu, Senhor, fizeste-os. Tu que és belo, pois eles são belos; tu és bom, pois eles são bons; tu existes, pois eles existem18. E eles não são belos, nem bons e nem existem tal como tu, o criador deles, comparados a quem não são belos, nem bons nem existem. Sabemos isso, graças te sejam dadas, e nossa ciência, comparada à tua ciência, é ignorância. 16 A estrutura geral do Livro XI. Estas alíneas iniciais (§§ 1-5) configuram uma introdução do livro. O seu desenvolvimento ocorrerá em duas partes. A primeira parte (§§ 6-16) estudará o que é a eternidade divina. A segunda parte (§§ 17-38) interrogará o que é o tempo. O desfecho (§§ 39-41) retomará o par de eternidade e tempo. 17 Em face das dificuldades, Agostinho adota uma estratégia tradicional: a primeira abordagem será negativa, como já atesta a sucessão de negações dessa frase, bem como dessa e das alíneas seguintes (§§ 6-16). Se não sei o que é a eternidade, posso ao menos investigar o que ela não é. Não sei de que modo Deus criou o mundo, mas posso dizer como não foi. Trata-se da estratégia negativa ou apofática, que marcará esta investigação, até a §16. Agostinho examinará a eternidade excluindo coisas, numa sucessão de negações. Mas essa estratégia tem limites, que serão explorados a partir da §17. 18 Essa frase deve ser lida com cautela, a luz de um procedimento ascendente, de aproximação de Deus mediante o estudo das suas criaturas. 32 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 32 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi Capítulo 5, § 7. Mas de que modo fizeste o céu e a terra e qual a máquina para tua tamanha operação? Com efeito, não foi como um artífice humano que forma um corpo de outro corpo, segundo o arbitramento da alma que pode impor alguma forma, forma que vê em si mesma por um olho interno. E de onde teria esse poder, senão porque tu a fizeste? E a alma impõe forma a algo que já está disponível e tem existência, tal como a terra, ou a pedra, ou a madeira, ou o ouro, ou qualquer gênero de coisas. E de onde essas coisas existiriam, se tu não as tivesses constituído? Tu fizeste o corpo para o artesão, fizeste o espírito que impera sobre os membros, fizeste a matéria, de onde ele faz algo, fizeste o engenho pelo qual capta a arte e vê dentro o que faz fora, fizeste os sentidos do corpo, intérpretes pelos quais transfere o que faz do espírito para a matéria e retransmite ao espírito o que foi feito, a fim de que este consulte dentro a verdade que nele preside, para saber se foi bem feito. Todas estas coisas louvam-te como o criador de todas. Mas de que modo tu as fazes? Deus, de que modo fizeste o céu e a terra? Certamente, não fizeste o céu e a terra no céu nem na terra; nem no ar ou nas águas, porque estes também pertencem ao céu e à terra. Nem fizeste o universo no universo, pois não existia onde fosse feito, antes de ter sido feito para existir. E não tinhas algo à mão, de onde fizesses o céu e a terra: pois de onde tu obterias isso que tu não fizeras e do qual farias algo? Com efeito, o que existe senão porque tu existes? Portanto, disseste e foram feitosxxix, e os fizeste na tua palavra. Capítulo 6, § 8. Mas de que modo disseste?19 Porventura do modo como foi feita uma voz, que disse da nuvem: "Este é meu Filho amado" xxx? Pois essa voz soou e passou, começou e terminou. As sílabas soaram e passaram, a segunda 19 O exame da linguagem tem um papel fundamental neste livro, como já fora apontado nas primeiras alíneas ("narrações" §1, "língua" §2, entre outros). O tema da contraposição e vínculo entre eternidade e tempo será comentado mediante a análise tanto da palavra divina, o verbo (logos criador), como da palavra humana, a linguagem do tempo no tempo. Agostinho, com sua confissão, procura corresponder às diversas dimensões em que o verbo divino proporciona uma reaproximação entre a eternidade e o tempo decaído. 3333 após a primeira, a terceira após a segunda, e assim por diante em ordem até a última, depois das demais, e o silêncio, depois da última. Donde fica claro e evidente que um movimento da criatura expressou essa voz, servo temporal de tua vontade eterna. E estas tuas palavras, feitas com o tempo, o ouvido exterior anunciou-as à mente prudente, cujo ouvido interior está direcionado para tua palavra eterna. Mas a mente prudente comparou essas palavras temporalmente sonoras com tua palavra eterna em silêncio, e disse: "É outra coisa, de longe; de longe, é outra coisa. Estas estão longe, abaixo de mim, e sequer existem, pois fogem e passam; mas a palavra do meu Deus permanece acima de mim no eternoxxxi." Portanto, se disseste com palavras sonoras e passageiras que fossem feitos o céu e a terra, e assim fizeste o céu e a terra, já existiria uma criatura corporal antes do céu e da terra, por cujos movimentos temporais aquela voz temporalmente transcorreria. Mas não existia nenhum corpo antes do céu e da terra, ou, se existisse, o terias feito certamente sem uma voz transitória, de onde farias a voz transitória pela qual dirias que se fizessem o céu e a terra. Com efeito, o que quer que fosse aquilo de onde tal voz fosse feita, se não fosse feito a partir de ti, de todo não existiria. Logo, com que palavra foi dito por ti que fosse feito o corpo de onde se fariam essas palavras? Capítulo 7, § 9. Assim, chamas-nos para entender a palavra, Deus junto a Deusxxxii, que sempiternamente é dita, e por ela sempiternamente são ditas todas as coisas. Pois não findou o que era dito e disse outra coisa para que tudo pudesse ser dito, mas disse tudo simultânea e sempiternamente; de outra maneira, já haveria tempo e mudança, e não a verdadeira eternidade nem a verdadeira imortalidade. Sei disso, meu Deus, e dou graçasxxxiii. Sei, confesso-te, Senhor, e comigo sabe e te bendiz todo aquele que não é ingrato para com a verdade certa. Sabemos, Senhor, sabemos que cada coisa morre e nasce na medida em que não é o que era, e é o que não era. Portanto, na tua palavra nada passa nem sucede, porque é verdadeiramente imortal e eterna. E por isso, com palavra coeterna contigo, simultânea e sempiternamente dizes tudo que dizes e é feito tudo aquilo 34 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 34 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi que dizes que se faça; e não fazes senão dizendo; entretanto, não se fazem simultânea e eternamente todas as coisas que fazes dizendo. Capítulo 8, § 10. Por que, pergunto, Senhor meu Deus?20 De alguma maneira vejo, mas não sei como enunciá-lo21, senão que tudo que começa a existir e acaba de existir, começa e acaba de existir quando é conhecido na razão eterna (onde nada começa nem acaba) que deve começar ou acabar. Esta é tua palavra, que é também princípio, pois também fala conosco. Assim, no Evangelho ela disse pela carne, e isso soou de fora nos ouvidos dos homens, a fim de que nela se acreditasse, e fosse procurada dentro e encontrada na verdade eterna, onde o mestre bom e único ensina todos os discípulos22. Ali ouço tua voz, Senhor, dizendo para mim, porque fala para nós aquele que nos ensina, mas quem não nos ensina, mesmo que fale, não fala conosco. Quem mais nos ensina senão a verdade estável? Pois também quando somos admoestados pela criatura mutável, somos conduzidos para a verdade estável, onde verdadeiramente aprendemos, quando permanecemos, e o ouvimos e alegramo-nos de alegria devido à voz do esposoxxxiv, regressando para de onde somos. E por isto é princípio, pois se não permanecer quando errarmos, não existirá ao que retornarmos. Quando regressamos de um erro, é em todo caso conhecendo que regressamos. Ora, para que conheçamos, ele nos ensina, pois é o princípio e fala conosco.xxxv 20 Nesta alínea Agostinho indica múltiplos sentidos do Princípio e do verbo divino. Deus cria pela palavra, guia pelas palavras, salva pela palavra. Em contrapartida, o homem fala, confessa, canta. 21 Dissociação entre saber e dizer, que Agostinho saberá explorar para investigar a interioridade. Na Trindade, isso será comentado como a distância entre notitia e cogitatio, uma noção já presente mas perturbada por um pensamento ainda a ser depurado. 22 O diálogo Sobre o mestre (de magistro) será dedicado a investigar as palavras e sua presumida capacidade de ensinar, a partir do tema do mestre interior único. A crítica da linguagem é importante para que o texto confessional não pretenda descrever a eternidade, mas sim fazer com que os afetos da alma temporal se voltem para o verbo eterno. 3535 Capítulo 9, § 11. Neste princípio, Deus, fizeste o céu e a terraxxxvi: na tua palavra, no teu Filho, na tua virtude, na tua sabedoria, na tua verdade. De modo admirável diz e de modo admirável faz. Quem compreenderá? Quem explicará? O que é isso que luze intermitentemente para mim e percute meu coração sem ferimento? Estremeço e inflamo-me: estremeço, devido a quanto sou dessemelhante; inflamo-me, devido a quanto sou semelhante. É a sabedoria, a própria sabedoria, que luze intermitentemente para mim ao dissipar a minha nuvem, nuvem que me cobre novamente quando abandono a sabedoria devido à caligem e ao entulho das minhas penas. Pois, como meu vigor se enfraquece na indigênciaxxxvii, não suporto o meu bem, até que tu, Senhor, que foste propício em face de todas as minhas iniquidades, sares também todas as minhas debilidades, porque redimirás a minha vida da corrupção, e me coroarás na miseração e na misericórdia, e saciarás meu desejo com bens, pois minha juventude será renovada como a da águiaxxxviii. Pela esperança fomos salvos e expectamos com paciênciaxxxix as tuas promessas. Quem puder que te ouça conversando no interior. Eu confiantemente clamarei a partir de teu oráculo: Quão magníficas são tuas obras, Senhor, todas fizeste na sabedoria!xl E ela é o princípio e nesse princípio fizeste o céu e a terra. Capítulo 10, § 12. Não estão repletos de uma velhice sua os que nos dizem: "o que fazia Deus, antes que fizesse o céu e a terra?23 Pois se vagava – dizem – e nada operava, então por que não sempre assim e sucessivamente, do mesmo modo como outrora deixou de operarxli? Pois se surgiram em Deus um movimento novo e uma vontade nova de fazer uma criatura que nunca fizera antes, de que modo já seria a verdadeira eternidade onde nasce uma vontade que não existia? Porque a vontade de Deus não é criatura, mas anterior à criatura, pois nada teria sido criado se a vontade 23 Ao dar a palavra a interlocutores reais ou fictícios, Agostinho consegue trazer à tona dificuldades conceituais envolvidas na interpretação do texto e no entendimento do princípio eterno. Fazer a crítica das "más" perguntas é parte importante de um procedimento de depuração. A "velhice" a ser criticada é a dificuldade de subtrair-se às condições temporais, a dificuldade de pensar a eternidade do princípio em termos atemporais. 36 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 36 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi do criador não precedesse. Portanto, a vontade de Deus concerne à sua própria substância. Se algo que não existia antes brotou na substância de Deus, esta substância não é verdadeiramente dita eterna. Mas se era sempiterna a vontade de Deus de que existisse criatura, por que a criatura também não seria sempiterna?" Capítulo 11, § 13. Os que dizem essas coisas, ainda não te entendem, ó sabedoria de Deusxlii, luz das mentes. Ainda não entendem de que modo são feitas as coisas que por ti e em ti são feitas, e tentam saber as coisas eternas, mas o coração deles ainda esvoaça nos movimentos passados e futuros das coisas e ainda é vãoxliii. Quem o deterá e o fixará, para que fique um pouco estável, e arrebate um pouco o esplendor da eternidade sempre estável, e compare-o com as coisas temporais, nunca estáveis, e veja que é incomparável, e veja que também o tempo longo não pode ser longo, se não for feito de múltiplas mórulas passantes, que não podem ser estendidas simultaneamente, e veja que o que é no eterno não passa, mas é todo presente, ao passo que nenhum tempo é todo presente, e veja que todo passado é propelido desde o futuro, e todo futuro segue o passado e todo passado e todo futuro são criados e decorrem daquele que sempre é presente? Quem deterá o coração do homem para que fique estável e veja de que modo a estável eternidade, que não é futura nem passada, dita os tempos futuros e passados? Porventura minha mão pode fazer issoxliv, ou a mão da minha boca faz algo tão grande com locuções? Capítulo 12, § 14. Eis que respondo a quem diz: "O que fazia Deus antes de fazer o céu e a terra?" Respondo não aquilo que alguém teria respondido, eludindo jocosamente a força da questão: "Preparava o inferno para quem espiasse as coisas elevadas". Uma coisa é ver, outra é rir. Não respondo assim. Eu responderia "não sei aquilo que não sei", de preferência a algo que ridiculariza quem perguntou uma coisa elevada e louva quem responde coisas falsas. Mas digo-te, nosso Deus, criador de todas as cria3737 turas: e se pelo nome de céu e terra for entendida toda criatura, ousadamente digo, "antes de Deus ter feito o céu e a terra, não fazia algo". Pois, se fazia algo, o que fazia senão uma criatura? E quisera eu saber tudo que com utilidade desejo saber, assim como sei que não se fazia nenhuma criatura, antes que se fizesse alguma criatura. Capítulo 13, § 15. Mas se o senso volátil de alguém vagar por imagens de tempos retrógrados, e ficar admirado de que tu - Deus que tudo podes, que tudo crias e que tudo possuis, artífice do céu e da terra - tenhas deixado uma obraxlv tamanha por inumeráveis séculos, antes que a fizesses, que esse alguém desperte e preste atenção, pois fica admirado com falsidades. Pois de onde poderiam passar inúmeros séculos, os quais tu próprio não terias feito, uma vez que tu és autor e criador de todos os séculos? Ou que tempos existiriam que não fossem criados por ti? Ou de que modo passariam se nunca tivessem existido? Portanto, uma vez que és tu quem opera todos os tempos, se existisse algum tempo antes que fizesses o céu e a terra, por que é dito que deixaste de operarxlvi? Pois tu terias feito o próprio tempo, e os tempos não poderiam passar antes que tivesses feito os tempos. Ora, se antes do céu e da terra não existia nenhum tempo, por que perguntar o que fazias então? Pois não existia "então", onde não existia tempo. Capítulo 13, § 16. E tu não precedes os tempos pelo tempo: se não fosse assim, não precederias todos os tempos. Mas tu precedes todos os tempos passados pela alteza da eternidade sempre presente e superas todos os tempos futuros, pois eles são futuros, e quando vierem, serão tempos passados; mas tu és idêntico a ti mesmo, e teus anos não se apagamxlvii. Os teus anos nem vão nem vêm; esses nossos vão e vêm, para que todos venham. Os teus anos permanecem todos simultaneamente, porque permanecem, e os que vão não são excluídos pelos que vêm, pois não transitam; mas esses nossos anos todos existirão quando todos não existirem. Os teus anos são 38 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 38 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi um único diaxlviii, e o teu dia não existe dia após dia, mas hoje, pois o teu hoje não cede lugar para o amanhã; pois ele tampouco sucede o ontem. O teu hoje é a eternidade; por isso geraste coeterno aquele a quem disseste: "Eu hoje te gerei" xlix. Tu fizeste todos os tempos e tu existes antes de todos os tempos, e não foi em algum tempo que não existiu o tempo.24 Capítulo 14, § 17. Não foi, portanto, no tempo que não tinhas feito coisa alguma, pois tu fizeste o próprio tempo. E tempos nenhuns são coeternos a ti, pois tu permaneces, e eles se permanecessem não seriam tempos. O que é afinal o tempo? Quem o explicaria fácil e brevemente? Quem o captaria, ao menos apenas no pensamento, para proferir uma palavra sobre ele? Mas, ao falar, o que mencionamos que seja mais familiar e conhecido do que o tempo? E de algum modo entendemos quando falamos do tempo, e também entendemos quando ouvimos outra pessoa falar dele. O que é portanto o tempo? Se ninguém me pergunta, sei; se quiser explicar a quem pergunta, não sei. Também digo confiantemente saber que, se nada passasse, não existiria o tempo passado, e se nada adviesse, não existiria o tempo futuro, e se nada existisse não existiria o tempo presente. Portanto, esses dois tempos, passado e futuro, de que modo existem, uma vez que o passado já não existe e o futuro ainda não existe? E o presente, se sempre fosse presente, e não transitasse para o passado, já não seria tempo, mas sim eternidade. Portanto se o presente, para que seja tempo, precisa transitar para o passado, de que modo dizemos que também o tempo existe, ele cuja causa de existir é que não existirá? Ou seja, não dizemos que o tempo verdadeiramente existe somente porque tende a não existir? 25 24 Esse capítulo 13 parece levar ao paroxismo as estratégias negativas. A eternidade do princípio só poderia ser entendida como o avesso do tempo. É preciso negar tudo o que diz respeito ao tempo, para dizer algo menos impróprio com relação ao que é eterno. Além disso, todavia, as negativas sugerem que o tempo sim é conhecido afirmativamente. Se a eternidade é o negativo de tempo, e não consigo apreender a eternidade positivamente, então devo investigar o que é o tempo. Porém, como se verá, as dificuldades não serão menores. 25 O problema vem formulado com estreito vínculo com a linguagem. Agostinho investiga a linguagem temporal com atenção dupla. De uma parte, vai exibindo as difi3939 Capítulo 15, § 18. E mesmo assim dizemos "tempo distante" (longus)26 e "tempo próximo" (breuis), e não o dizemos a não ser sobre o passado ou sobre o futuro. Dizemos um tempo distante passado, por exemplo, "cem anos atrás", e futuro similarmente distante "daqui a cem anos". E o passado próximo, como quando dizemos "há dez dias", e um futuro próximo "daqui a dez dias". Mas como pode ser distante ou próximo aquilo que não existe? Pois o passado já não existe e o futuro ainda não existe. Então não digamos "é distante", mas digamos do passado "foi distante", e do futuro "será distante". Meu Senhor, minha luzl, também aqui a tua verdade rirá do homem? Pois o tempo passado que foi distante, foi distante quando já tinha passado, ou até quando ainda era presente? Poderia ser distante no momento em que existia o que seria distante; mas ainda não havia passado. Donde tampouco poderia ser distante aquilo que de todo não existia. Portanto, não digamos "o tempo passado foi distante" – pois nem encontraremos o que terá sido distante no momento em que não existe, uma vez que é passado –, mas digamos "foi distante aquele tempo presente", porque enquanto era presente, era distante (longus). Pois ainda não tinha passado, de forma que não existisse, e por isso existia o que podia ser distante; contudo depois que passou, simultaneamente deixou também de ser distante o que deixou de existir. Capítulo 15, § 19. Vejamos, portanto, alma humana, se o tempo presente poderia ser longo (longus). Pois a ti é dado sentir as demoras e medir27. O que me resculdades conceituais escondidas sob as palavras. Mas de outra parte recorre à força da linguagem como testemunho de algum entendimento a ser recuperado. Assim, o que dizemos no tempo, e sobre o tempo, é tanto objeto de investigação crítica, como ponto de apoio para aprofundar a investigação (veja-se, por exemplo, a alínea 32). 26 A exploração da linguagem temporal envolve a polissemia de termos como longus, que quer dizer tanto um tempo distante (daqui a cem anos), como um tempo extenso (um século). O mesmo pode ser dito de brevis. 27 A ambivalência do termo longus permite introduzir uma segunda questão. Além do problema da existência do tempo (no caso, os tempos passados e futuros), é preciso também esclarecer o que é um tempo longo quando presente. Um tempo presente pode ser longo, extenso? Mais adiante Agostinho interrogará como medir a extensão do tempo. 40 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 40 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi ponderás? Que cem anos presentes são um tempo longo? Vê primeiro, se cem anos podem ser presentes. Pois caso se trate do primeiro destes anos, este é presente, mas noventa e nove são futuros, e por isso não existem. Mas caso se trate do segundo ano, um já é passado, outro é presente e os demais, futuros. Assim, para qualquer dos anos intermediários daquele século que declararmos presente, os anteriores a ele serão anos passados, os posteriores a ele, futuros. Por conseguinte, cem anos não poderão ser presentes. Vê o que se passa se ao menos um único ano for presente. Pois caso se trate do primeiro mês desse ano, os demais são futuros. Caso se trate do segundo, o primeiro já passou e os restantes ainda não existem. Portanto, nem esse ano é todo presente, e se não é todo presente, o ano não é presente. Pois um ano tem doze meses, um dos quais é presente, mas os demais são passados ou futuros. Todavia nem esse mês é presente, mas um único dia. Se o primeiro, os demais são futuros; se o último, os demais são passados; se algum dia intermediário, está entre passados e futuros. Capítulo 15, § 20. Eis que o tempo presente, que descobrimos ser o único que pode ser chamado de longo, já está contraído, quando muito, ao espaço de um único dia. Mas examinemos também esse, pois nem um único dia é todo presente. Pois ele desdobra-se ao todo em vinte e quatro horas noturnas e diurnas, a primeira delas tem as demais como futuras, a última as tem como passadas, e qualquer uma delas tem horas passadas antes e futuras depois. E essa mesma hora consiste de partículas fugidias: algo dela esvoaça, é passado, e algo lhe resta, é futuro. Se se conceber um tempo que não possa ser dividido em nenhuma parte de momento, por mínima que seja, somente a isso chamar-se-á de presente; o qual todavia transvoa tão célere do futuro para o passado, que não se estende em mórula alguma. Pois, caso se estendesse, seria dividido em passado e futuro; mas o presente não tem nenhum espaço. Portanto, onde28 está o tempo que di28 A pergunta "onde?" indica a investigação de uma nova ontologia. Como situar um ser que não ocupa lugar no espaço? A procura do ser do tempo (e das condições de medida do tempo) vai exigir que o tempo tenha um 'lugar' que não é espacial. Essa investigação levará a uma concepção de interioridade que também não é espacial. 4141 zemos distante? No futuro? Não dizemos "é distante" porque ainda não existe o que seria distante, mas dizemos "será distante". Então, quando será? Pois se até aquele momento for futuro, não será distante, porque o que seria distante ainda não existiria. Mas se for distante no momento em que, a partir do futuro que ainda não existe, começar a existir e tornar-se presente, para que possa existir o que seria distante (longus), pelas palavras acima o tempo presente clama que não pode ser longo (longus). Capítulo 16, § 21. E mesmo assim, Senhor, sentimos os intervalos dos tempos e os comparamos entre si e dizemos que uns são mais longos e outros mais breves. Medimos também o quanto um tempo é mais longo ou mais breve do que outro, e respondemos que um é o dobro ou o triplo, e outro é simples ou tão longo quanto este. Mas medimos os tempos enquanto passam, uma vez que medimos ao sentir; mas os tempos passados, que já não existem, ou os futuros, que ainda não existem, quem pode medir? A não ser que alguém ouse dizer que pode medir o que não existe. Portanto, quando o tempo passa, pode ser sentido e medido, mas quando tiver passado, não pode porque não existe. Capítulo 17, § 22. Pergunto, Pai, não afirmo. Meu Deus, preside-me e dirige-meli. Quem me dirá não existirem três tempos, como aprendemos quando meninos e ensinamos aos meninos, o passado, o presente e o futuro, mas somente o presente, porque os outros dois não existem? Ou será que esses também existem, mas o presente procede de algo oculto, quando se torna presente a partir do futuro, e se recolhe em algo oculto, quando do presente se torna passado? Pois onde viram as coisas futuras, aqueles que as cantaram, se ainda não existiam? Porque o que não existe nem pode ser visto, e os que narram coisas passadas, não narrariam coisas de certo modo verdadeiras, se não as enxergassem no espírito: se nada fossem, de modo nenhum poderiam ser enxergadas. Portanto, existem coisas futuras e coisas passadas. 42 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 42 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi Capítulo 18, § 23. Permite, Senhor, minha esperançalii, que eu pergunte mais; que minha intensão não seja conturbada. Pois se as coisas futuras e passadas existem, quero saber onde estão. Se ainda não posso sabê-lo, sei ao menos que, onde quer que estejam, ali não são futuras nem passadas, mas presentes. Pois se também ali forem futuras, ali ainda não estão, e se ali forem passadas, ali já não estão. Portanto, onde quer que estejam, o que quer que sejam, não são senão presentes. Embora coisas verdadeiras sejam passadas quando são narradas, a partir da memória não são proferidas as coisas mesmas, que passaram, mas palavras concebidas a partir das imagens daquelas que, ao passar, se fixaram no espírito através dos sentidos, tal como pegadas. Pois minha infância, que já não existe, está no tempo passado, que já não existe; porém a imagem dela, quando a recordo e narro, vejo no tempo presente, porque está na minha memória até agora. Se também a causa das predições de coisas futuras é semelhante, de sorte que sejam pressentidas imagens já disponíveis de coisas que ainda não existem, confesso, meu Deus, não sei. Sei, sim, que nós muitas vezes premeditamos nossas ações futuras e que essa premeditação é presente; mas a ação que premeditamos ainda não existe pois é futura; e quando chegarmos a ela e começarmos a fazer o que premeditávamos, naquele momento aquela ação existirá, porque naquele momento será não futura, mas presente. Capítulo 18, § 24. Assim, seja como for o oculto pressentimento dos futuros, somente se pode ver o que existe. O que já existe, não é futuro mas presente. Portanto, quando se diz que se veem coisas futuras, são vistas não as próprias coisas, que ainda não existem, isto é, as que são futuras, mas talvez as suas causas ou sinais, que já existem. Por isso, já estão concebidas no espírito dos videntes não as coisas futuras, mas coisas presentes a partir das quais são preditas coisas futuras. Tais concepções, por sua vez, já existem, e quem prediz aquelas coisas futuras as enxerga presentes em si mesmo. Que tamanha multiplicidade de coisas me sugira algum exem4343 plo. Avisto a aurora: prenuncio que o sol está para nascer. O que avisto é presente; o que prenuncio, futuro. Não o sol futuro, que já existe, mas o seu nascimento, que ainda não existe. Todavia também não poderei predizer o próprio nascer do sol, se não imaginá-lo no espírito, tal como quando falo dele. Mas nem a aurora que vejo no céu é o nascer do sol, embora o preceda, nem a imaginação no meu espírito. Essas duas são divisadas como coisas presentes, para que aquele futuro seja dito antecipadamente. Portanto, as coisas futuras ainda não existem, e se ainda não existem, não existem, e se não existem, não podem ser vistas de modo algum; mas podem ser preditas a partir de coisas presentes que já existem e são vistas. Capítulo 19, § 25. E assim, tu, regente de tua criatura, de que modo ensinas coisas futuras às almas? Pois ensinaste aos teus profetas. Que modo é aquele pelo qual ensinas coisas futuras, tu para quem não há futuro? Ou melhor, ensinas coisas presentes acerca de coisas futuras? Porque o que não existe, tampouco pode ser ensinado. Esse modo está demasiado longe de minha acuidade; está além das minhas forças; por mim mesmo não podereiliii atingi-lo, mas poderei por ti, quando tu o concederes, doce luzliv de meus olhoslv ocultos. Capítulo 20, § 26. Isto agora é límpido e claro: nem as coisas futuras existem, nem as coisas passadas, nem dizemos apropriadamente "existem três tempos: o passado, o presente e o futuro". Mas talvez pudéssemos dizer apropriadamente "existem três tempos: o presente das coisas passadas, o presente das coisas presentes, o presente das coisas futuras". Pois os três estão de alguma maneira na alma e eu não os vejo em outro lugar: o presente das coisas passadas é a memória, o presente das coisas presentes é o olhar, o presente das coisas futuras é a expectativa. Se nos é permitido dizer tais coisas, vejo três tempos e afirmo que os três existem. Que se diga também, "existem três tempos, o passado, o presente e o futuro", como 44 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 44 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi se diz por abuso de costume. Diga-se. Não me importo, nem resisto nem repreendo, desde que todavia se entenda o que se diz, e também que nem o que é futuro já existe, e que tampouco o que é passado existe. Pois poucas são as coisas que falamos apropriadamente, muitas falamos não apropriadamente, mas se reconhece o que queremos. Capítulo 21, § 27. Eu disse há pouco, portanto, que medimos os tempos enquanto passam, para que possamos dizer que este tempo é o dobro daquele outro, ou que é simples, ou que é tanto quanto aquele outro, e o que mais possamos enunciar sobre partes de tempos ao medir. Por isso, como eu dizia, medimos os tempos enquanto passam, e se alguém me disser, "de onde sabes?", responderei, "sei porque medimos, e não podemos medir coisas que não existem, e não existem coisas passadas ou futuras". Mas de que modo medimos o tempo presente, já que ele não tem espaço? Medimos, portanto, quando passa, mas não medimos quando tiver passado, pois o que tiver sido medido não existirá. Mas de onde e por onde e para onde passa, quando é medido? De onde, senão do futuro? Por onde, senão através do presente? E para onde, senão para o passado? Portanto, daquilo que ainda não existe, através daquilo que carece de espaço, para aquilo que já não existe. Mas o que medimos, senão o tempo em algum espaço? Pois não dizemos simples ou duplos ou triplos ou iguais, e assim por diante, em tempo, senão os espaços de tempo. Portanto, em que espaço medimos o tempo que passa29? Será que no futuro, de onde passa? Mas não medimos o que ainda não existe. Será que no presente, pelo qual passa? Mas não medimos um espaço nulo. Será que no passado, para o qual passa? Mas não medimos o que já não existe. Capítulo 22, § 28. Meu espírito está em chamas por conhecer esse enigma complicadíssimo. Não feches, Senhor meu Deus, Pai bom, rogo por Cristo, não 29 O leitor deve ter em mente a ambivalência da palavra spatium em latim. Tanto serve para o que chamamos de espaço, spatium locale, como para o tempo, spatium temporale. 4545 feches ao meu desejo essas coisas tanto usuais como escondidas, até que ele as penetre e reluzam à luz de tua misericórdia, Senhor30. A quem indagarei sobre elas? E para quem confessarei com maior proveito minha imperícia, senão para ti, a quem não molestam meus esforços inflamados por tuas escrituras? Dá o que amo, pois amo, e tu o deste. Dá, Pai, que sabes verdadeiramente dar bons dons aos teus filhoslvi, dá, pois tratei de conhecer e o trabalho está diante de mimlvii, até que abras. Rogo por Cristo; em seu nome, santo dos santos, ninguém poderá me azoar31. E eu acreditei, e por issolviii também falo. Esta é minha esperança, para ela vivo, a esperança de contemplar o deleite do Senhorlix. Meus dias fizeste velhos lx e eles se vão, e não sei de que modo. E dizemos "tempo" e "tempo", "tempos" e "tempos"; dizemos "por quanto tempo fulano disse isso", "por quanto tempo sicrano fez aquilo", "há muito tempo não vejo beltrano", e "esta sílaba tem um tempo duplo em relação àquela sílaba simples breve". Dizemos estas coisas e ouvimos estas coisas, e somos entendidos e entendemos. São muito manifestas e usuais, e as mesmas coisas ao contrário se escondem demais e a sua descoberta é novidade. Capítulo 23, § 29. Ouvi de um homem douto que os movimentos do sol, da lua e das estrelas são tempos, e não anuí32. Com efeito, então por que não seriam tempos os movimentos de todos os corpos? Na verdade, se desaparecerem os luzeiros do céu e a roda de um oleiro se mover, acaso não existirá o tempo pelo qual mediremos os giros e diremos que se trata de mórulas iguais, ou – caso ora se mova mais lentamente, ora mais velozmente – que uns são mais demorados e outros menos? Ou quando dissermos estas coisas, não falaremos também no tempo? Ou não existirão 30 Há um conflito entre as palavras habituais e os conceitos. As palavras sugerem que a medição do tempo é semelhante à medição do espaço (spatium local). Mas as condições de medida para cada caso são diferentes, e até mesmo contrárias. 31 Trata-se de depurar de todo ruído a comunicação entre o verbo divino e o verbo humano. 32 Agostinho examina, e recusa, a hipótese de o tempo ser identificado com o movimento dos corpos celestes. Essa hipótese pretenderia explicar igualmente a existência e a medida do tempo. O leitor pesquisará com proveito a teoria do Grande Ano, para melhor compreensão da hipótese rejeitada por Agostinho 46 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 46 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi em nossas palavras algumas sílabas longas, outras breves, senão porque aquelas soaram por um tempo mais longo e estas por um tempo mais breve? Deus, dá aos homens verem no que é pequeno as noções comuns às coisas pequenas e grandes. As estrelas e os luzeiros do céu são como signos de tempos, de dias e de anoslxi. São, é verdade. Mas nem eu direi que o circuito daquela rodinha de madeira é o dia, nem por isso aquele homem dirá que não existiu tempo. Capítulo 23, § 30. Eu desejo saber a força e a natureza do tempo, pelo qual medimos os movimentos dos corpos e dizemos que um movimento é, por exemplo, duplamente mais demorado no tempo do que outro33. Pergunto então, uma vez que se diz dia não somente a demora do sol sobre a terra – nesse caso o dia é outra coisa do que a noite – mas também todo o seu circuito de um nascer do sol até outro nascer do sol, nesse caso dizemos que tantos dias se passaram (pois se dizem tantos dias com suas noites, e não se excluem os espaços das noites), uma vez então que o dia se consuma com o movimento do sol e com o circuito de um nascer a outro, pergunto se o próprio movimento é o dia, ou o tamanho da demora para se completar, ou se ambos. Pois se o primeiro for o dia, então será um dia, mesmo que o sol complete o seu curso em tanto espaço de tempo quanto o de uma única hora. Se o segundo, então não será dia, se de um nascer do sol até o nascer seguinte a demora for tão breve quanto a de uma única hora, e o sol teria de fazer vinte e quatro circuitos para completar um dia. Se ambos, nem se chamará dia se o sol circular todo seu giro no espaço da hora, nem se o sol parar e passar tanto tempo quanto o sol costuma para completar todo o caminho entre uma manhã e outra. Assim, não pergunto agora o que se chama de dia, mas sim o que é o tempo pelo qual, ao medir o circuito do sol, diremos que ele o completou na metade do espaço de tempo do que costuma, se tiver completado em tanto espaço de tempo quanto se completam doze horas, e se ao 33 Esse difícil parágrafo solicitará toda atenção do leitor. O exame de diferentes hipóteses será um verdadeiro exercício filosófico, de sorte a evocar uma noção de tempo que subjaz ainda mal compreendida. 4747 compararmos os tempos dissermos que este é simples, aquele é duplo, ainda que o sol circule de um nascer a outro, ora com o tempo simples, ora com o tempo duplo. Portanto, ninguém me diga que os movimentos dos corpos celestes são tempos, porque também quando, a pedido de alguém, o sol parou para que um combate vitorioso se completasse, o sol ficou parado mas o tempo prosseguiulxii. Com efeito, através do espaço de tempo que lhe bastou, aquela batalha ocorreu e acabou. Vejo então que o tempo é certa distensão. Mas vejo? Ou parece-me que vejo? Tu demonstrarás, luz, verdade. Capítulo 24, § 31. Ordenas que eu aprove quem disser que o tempo é o movimento de um corpo?34 Não ordenas, pois ouço que nenhum corpo se move a não ser no tempo. Tu dizes. Não ouço que o próprio tempo seja o movimento de um corpo. Tu não dizes, pois quando um corpo se move, meço com o tempo o quanto se moveu, desde que começou a se mover até que pare. E se não vi de onde partiu, e ele continuar a se mover de modo que eu não veja quando parar, não posso medir, a não ser talvez a partir de onde começo a ver, até que eu pare. Se vejo prolongadamente, afirmo apenas que é um tempo longo, mas não o quão longo, porque também quando dizemos quanto, dizemos por comparação: "tanto este quanto aquele", ou "este é o dobro daquele", e assim por diante. Mas se pudermos notar os espaços locais35, de onde e para onde vem um corpo que se move, ou partes dele caso se mova em torno de um eixo, podemos dizer em quanto tempo foi realizado o movimento do corpo ou de sua parte, desde tal lugar até tal outro lugar. Assim, uma vez que uma coisa é o movimento do corpo, outra coisa aquilo pelo qual medimos o quanto existiu, quem não percebe qual destas devemos dizer que é o tempo? Pois, se o corpo às vezes se move variadamente e às vezes fica estacionado, não medimos pelo tempo apenas o movimento dele, mas também a estação, e dizemos: "fi34 Trata-se agora não mais do movimento privilegiado dos corpos celestes, mas do movimento de todo e qualquer corpo. 35 Agostinho procura explicitar a diferença entre espaços locais e espaços temporais, a ser estudada a partir do capítulo 26. 48 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 48 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi cou estacionado tanto quanto se moveu", ou "ficou estacionado o dobro ou o triplo de quanto se moveu", ou qualquer outra relação que nossa mensuração abarcar ou estimar, como se diz, mais ou menos. Portanto, o tempo não é o movimento de um corpo. Capítulo 25, § 32. E confesso-te, Senhor lxiii, ignorar até agora o que é tempo, e contudo confesso-te, Senhor, saber que digo essas coisas no tempo, e que há muito já falo do tempo, e o próprio "há muito" não é "há muito" senão por uma demora de tempo. De que modo então sei isso, quando não sei o que é o tempo? Ou talvez não saiba de que modo dizer o que sei? Ai de mim, que não sei nem ao menos o que não sei! Eis-me, meu Deus, diante de ti, porque não minto lxiv: falo tal como está meu coração. Tu iluminarás minha lâmpada, Senhor meu Deus, iluminarás minhas trevas.lxv Capítulo 26, § 33. A minha alma não te confessa em confissão verídica que eu meço os tempos? Assim, meu Deus, meço e não sei o que meço. Meço o movimento do corpo com o tempo. E o próprio tempo, acaso não meço? Acaso eu mediria o movimento do corpo – quanto durou e quanto levou para passar daqui para ali – se não medisse o tempo em que se moveu? Portanto, o próprio tempo, de onde meço? Será que medimos um tempo mais longo com um tempo mais breve, tal como o espaço de uma viga com o espaço de um cúbito36? Pois assim parece que medimos o espaço de uma sílaba longa com o espaço de uma sílaba breve, e dizemos que é duplo37. Assim medimos os espaços dos poemas com os espaços dos versos, e os espaços dos versos com os espaços dos pés, e os espaços dos pés com os espaços das sílabas, e os espaços das longas com os espaços das breves, não em folhas – pois desse modo medimos lugares, e não tempos – mas sim quando as notas transitam ao serem pronunciadas e dizemos: "é um 36 Aqui começa a crítica da espacialização do tempo e de sua medida. 37 O leitor deverá ter elementos gramaticais de métrica para bem acompanhar o raciocínio de Agostinho. 4949 poema longo, pois é composto de tantos versos; são versos longos, pois contêm tantos pés; são pés longos, pois se estendem por tantas sílabas; é uma sílaba longa, pois é o dobro de uma breve". Mas tampouco é assim que se compreende a medição certa do tempo, uma vez que pode acontecer de o verso mais breve ressoar por um espaço de tempo mais amplo, se pronunciado mais lentamente, do que o verso mais longo, se pronunciado mais rapidamente. E assim também o poema, o pé, a sílaba. Donde, parece-me que o tempo não é senão uma distensão, mas não sei de que coisa, e me admiraria, se não fosse do próprio espírito38. Com efeito, o que meço, imploro, meu Deus, e digo ou indefinidamente "este tempo é mais longo do que aquele", ou definidamente, "este é o dobro daquele"? Meço o tempo, sei. Mas não meço o futuro, porque ainda não existe; não meço o presente, porque não se estende por espaço algum; não meço o passado, porque já não existe. O que meço, portanto? Os tempos enquanto passam, não passados? De fato, isso eu já havia dito.39 Capítulo 27, § 34. Insiste, meu espírito, e atenta com firmeza: Deus é nosso socorro lxvi, ele nos fez, e não nós lxvii. Atenta onde alvorece a verdade. Admitamos que a voz de um corpo comece a soar, e soa, e soa ainda, e então para, já é silêncio, e aquela voz passou e já não é voz. Ela era futura antes de soar, e não podia ser medida porque ainda não existia, e agora não pode porque já não existe. Portanto podia no momento em que soava, porque naquele momento existia o que podia ser medido. Mas também naquele momento não ficou parada, pois seguiu e passou. E seria por isso mais mensurável? Pois o que passava se estendia por algum espaço de tempo, no qual 38 A definição do tempo como distensão do espírito parece retomar uma fórmula de Plotino, que caracterizara o tempo como distensão da vida da alma cósmica. É importante assinalar que Agostinho não se contentará com essa fórmula. A distensão do espírito será ainda duplamente superada, na intensão e na extensão do espírito, isto é, na busca da unidade consigo mesmo e na busca da unidade com o princípio eterno (v. § 39). 39 Reencontramos as negativas, que marcaram a análise inicial da eternidade do princípio. O tempo, que aparentemente seria um conceito mais acessível do que a eternidade, vai aparecendo como um enigma ainda mais intrincado. 50 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 50 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi podia ser medido, porque o presente não tem espaço algum. Portanto, se podia naquele momento, admitamos que outra voz comece a soar, e soa até agora continuamente sem interrupção alguma. Meçamo-la, enquanto soa. Pois quando tiver parado de soar, já será passada e não existirá o que possa ser medido. Meçamos bem e digamos sua quantidade. Mas soa até agora, e não pode ser medida a não ser desde o início em que começou a soar, até o fim, no qual parar. Com efeito, medimos um intervalo do início até o fim. Por isso, a voz que ainda não acabou não pode ser medida, para que se diga o quão longa ou breve ela é; nem se pode dizer se é igual a outra ou simples, ou dupla ou o que quer que seja. Mas quando tiver acabado, já não existirá. Como então poderá ser medida? E medimos todavia os tempos, não os que ainda não existem, nem os que já não existem, nem os que não se estendem em demora alguma, nem os que não têm extremos. Portanto, não medimos nem tempos futuros, nem passados, nem presentes, nem enquanto passam, e mesmo assim medimos os tempos. Capítulo 27, § 35. Deus criador de todas as coisas lxviii: esse verso de oito sílabas alterna sílabas breves e longas40. Assim, as quatro breves (a primeira, a terceira, a quinta e a sétima) são simples com relação às quatro longas (a segunda, a quarta, a sexta e a oitava). Estas têm o dobro do tempo daquelas. Pronuncio e repito, e assim é, tanto quanto se pode perceber por uma sensação clara. Tanto quanto a sensação é clara, meço a sílaba longa com a breve, e sinto que ela é o dobro em quantidade. Mas uma vez que uma soa após a outra, se a anterior é breve e a posterior é longa, de que modo reterei a breve e de que modo a aplicarei à longa ao medir, para descobrir que tem o dobro em quantidade, uma vez que a longa não começa a soar se a breve não tiver deixado de soar? E a própria longa, acaso meço como presente, quando não a meço senão terminada? E o seu término é ter passado. O que é, portanto, que meço? Onde está a breve pela qual meço? Onde está a longa que meço? Ambas soaram, voaram, passaram, já não existem. E eu meço e confiantemente respondo, o quanto podemos nos 40 dě-ūs crě-ā-tŏr ō-mnĭ-ūm. Esse verso bíblico já aparecera no livro IX das Confissões. Aqui, trata-se de explorar suas virtudes métricas, a alternância de sílabas breves (dě, crě etc.) e sílabas longas (ūs, ā etc.). 5151 fiar no exercício da sensação, que uma é simples, a outra é dupla, a saber, no espaço de tempo. E não posso fazer isso, a não ser que tenham passado e terminado41. Portanto, não meço a elas próprias que já não existem, mas sim algo na minha memória, que permanece nela fixado. Capítulo 27, § 36. Em ti, meu espírito, meço os tempos42. Não venham me azoar, isto é, não venham te azoar as turbulências das tuas afecções. Em ti, digo, meço os tempos. O que meço presente é a afecção que as coisas fazem em ti ao passar e que permanece, quando elas tiverem passado, e não aquelas que passaram para fazê-la. É ela que meço quando meço tempos. Portanto ou as afecções são os tempos, ou não meço os tempos. Quando medimos silêncios e dizemos que tal silêncio durou tanto tempo quanto durou tal voz, acaso não estendemos o pensamento para medir a voz, como se ele soasse, para podermos enunciar algo sobre os intervalos dos silêncios no espaço de tempo? Pois com a voz e com a boca paradas percorremos, em pensamento, poemas, versos e algum discurso, e enunciamos quaisquer medidas de movimentos ou de espaços de tempo, o quanto este com relação àquele outro, não de outro modo do que se os disséssemos com sons. Digamos que alguém quis emitir uma nota um pouco mais longa, e que estabeleceu premeditando quão longa viria a ser; de algum modo produz este espaço de tempo em silêncio e, confiando-o à memória, começa a emitir aquela nota, que soa até que atinja o término preestabelecido. Ou melhor, soou e soará, pois o que já foi realizado, de algum modo soou, e o que resta, soará e assim se completará, enquanto a intensão presente trará o futuro para o passado, com diminuição do futuro e crescimento do passado, até que pelo esgotamento do futuro tudo seja passado. 41 A análise mostra que não posso aplicar as mesmas condições para medir o espaço e o tempo. Nas medidas espaciais, os extremos do intervalo a ser medido têm de ser simultâneos; nas medidas temporais, os extremos não podem ser simultâneos. 42 A resposta àquela pergunta, onde?, remete ao espírito, à interioridade, cujo estudo requer depuração das condições corporais e espaciais. Tal depuração será, na verdade, um exercício para uma depuração mais difícil e mais importante. Nesta nova depuração serão criticadas as condições temporais. Além de descobrir um tempo não espacial, será preciso que a alma descubra uma eternidade não temporal. 52 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 52 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi Capítulo 28, § 37. Mas de que modo o futuro diminui ou desaparece, futuro que ainda não existe, ou de que modo cresce o passado, que já não existe, senão porque no espírito, que o faz, existem três coisas? Pois ele expecta, atenta e lembra, de sorte que aquilo que expecta passe através do que atenta em direção daquilo que lembra. Quem então nega que as coisas futuras ainda não existam? Contudo já existe no espírito uma expectativa de coisas futuras. E quem nega que coisas passadas já não existam? Contudo existe no espírito uma memória das coisas passadas. E quem nega que o tempo presente careça de espaço, porque num instante passa? Contudo a atenção perdura, através da qual o que vinha a existir passa a não existir. Então, não é longo o tempo futuro, que não existe, mas o longo futuro é a longa expectativa do futuro; nem é longo o tempo passado, que não existe, mas o longo passado é a longa memória do passado. Capítulo 28, § 38. Vou entoar uma canção que sei. Antes de iniciar, minha expectativa se estende totalmente, mas quando começar, tanto quanto eu tiver tirado da expectativa, também minha memória se estende, e a vida desta minha ação se distende43 na memória (em razão do que cantei) e na expectativa (em razão do que cantarei). Minha atenção também está ali, presente, pela qual o que era futuro é arrastado para tornar-se passado. E quanto mais isso acontecer e acontecer, a expectativa será abreviada e a memória será prolongada, até que toda a expectativa seja consumida, quando toda a ação terminada houver transitado para a memória. E o que ocorre na canção toda, também ocorre nas suas partículas singulares, e o que ocorre nas partículas singulares, também ocorre na ação mais longa, da qual talvez aquela canção seja uma partícula, e o mesmo em 43 A noção de distensão já havia sido utilizada. Mas agora adquire contornos precisos, com base na gramática. Distensão quer dizer precisamente a tensão em duas direções opostas. Nesse caso, distensão da alma para o futuro e para o passado. Mas logo se verá que isso não é propriamente uma solução. Agostinho encontra uma caracterização do que é a tempo na alma, uma distensão, mas isso mesmo já é um problema, porque a dispersão ainda está muito aquém da intensão necessária à unidade e ao reencontro com a eternidade. 5353 toda a vida do homem, das quais são partes todas as ações do homem, e o mesmo em todo o século dos filhos dos homens lxix, das quais são partes todas as vidas dos homens. Capítulo 29, § 39.44 Mas porque tua misericórdia é melhor do que as vidas lxx, minha vida é distensão, e tua direita me sustevelxxi no meu Senhor, mediador filho do homemlxxii, entre ti, que és único, e nós que somos múltiplos em muitas coisas por muitas coisas, para que por ele eu apreenda, no qual eu também sou apreendidolxxiii, e me recomponha dos velhos dias ao seguir o único, esquecido das coisas passadas, não na direção daquelas que são futuras e transitórias, mas na direção daquelas que são anterioreslxxiv; não distendido, mas estendidolxxv; não segundo a distensão, mas segundo a intensão sigo para a palma do chamado superiorlxxvi, onde ouça a voz do louvorlxxvii e contemple teu deleitelxxviii que nem vem nem passa. Agora, porém, meus anos são gemidoslxxix, e tu és meu conforto, Senhor, és meu Pai eterno. E eu dispersei-me nos tempos cuja ordem desconheço, e em variedades tumultuadas dilaceram-se meus pensamentos, vísceras íntimas de minha alma, até que eu conflua para ti, purificado e liquefeito no fogo de teu amor. Capítulo 30, § 40. 45 E me erguerei e solidificarei em ti, na minha forma46, na tua verda44 Retomada do problema inicial. Agora Agostinho reúne dois planos de análise. Em primeiro lugar, com o aprofundamento do enigma do tempo, o Autor retoma o tema da iniciativa divina (e da submissão humana), presente desde o primeiro capítulo do livro. A mediação entre a eternidade e o tempo não é conseguida pelo mero esforço humano, mas depende do socorro divino. Em segundo lugar, a distensão deve resolver-se em intensão, recolhimento do espírito, e como extensão, isto é, projeção na direção do socorro divino. A fórmula de Plotino (veja-se nota 37 à § 33) é inteiramente transformada e subordinada aos termos da Carta aos Filipenses 3, 12-14. 45 As questões dos homens velhos (§ 12) devem agora ser reexaminadas. O esgotamento da análise do tempo permite que o modelo da eternidade se imponha. O tempo mostrase incognoscível na mera dispersão temporal. Somente um ponto de vista subtraído à temporalidade pode alcançar algum entendimento do tempo. Donde o amoldamento aqui anunciado. 46 Agostinho caracteriza o amoldamento mediante a metáfora da fusão e da nova fôrma. O tema do fogo, das chamas e labaredas, que assinalava a vontade humana, é aqui re54 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 54 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi de, e não sofrerei com as questões de homens que, punidos com uma doença47, têm mais sede do que são capazes de beber e dizem: "o que fazia Deus, antes de fazer o céu e a terra?" Ou: "o que lhe veio à mente, para que fizesse algo, embora nunca antes tivesse feito coisa alguma?" Concede a eles, Senhor, bem pensar o que dizem e descobrir que não se diz "nunca" onde não existe tempo. Portanto, se disserem que alguém nunca fez, o que dirão senão que fez em tempo nenhum? Vejam então que nenhum tempo pode existir sem criatura e deixem de falar essas vacuidades. Que também se estendam às coisas que são anterioreslxxx, e entendam que és o criador eterno de todos os tempos, anterior48 a todos os tempos, e que tempos nenhuns são coeternos a ti, e nenhuma criatura, ainda que exista alguma acima do tempo49. Capítulo 31, § 41. Senhor meu Deus, o que é aquele seio de teu alto segredo, e quão longe dali me projetaram as consequências dos meus delitos? Sara meus olhos, e me alegrarei de tua luz. Certamente, se existe um espírito com poder para tão grande ciência e presciência, pelo qual todas as coisas passadas e futuras são conhecidas, tal como uma única canção é por mim conhecidíssima, esse espírito é demasiado admirável e formidavelmente estupendo50. Pois a ele não se esconde o que quer que tenha acabado e o que quer que tenha restado dos séculos, do modo como a mim não se escondem, ao cantar aquela canção, o que e quanto dela havia passado cuperado para indicar a necessidade de uma transformação do espírito. O fogo divino liquefaz e purifica (§39). Mas é preciso retomar a solidez, em nova e estável forma. Afinal, esse era o propósito das narrações, transformar os afetos na direção da eternidade (§1). 47 Agostinho assinala que as dificuldades decorrem não apenas da natureza finita da inteligência humana, mas também da condição decaída, punida por causa do pecado original. 48 Depois de criticar o erro categorial dos que dizem 'nunca' a respeito do que é atemporal, Agostinho agora assinala o sentido atemporal da anterioridade divina. 49 Seria talvez o caso das criaturas angélicas. 50 A confissão de louvor, já praticada no primeiro capítulo, é formulada ainda uma vez em termos da distância desproporcional. E será inevitável recorrer, na sequência, às formulas negativas e antitéticas. Mas agora sem a ilusão de que o tempo ofereceria uma alternativa afirmativa. 5555 desde o início, e o que e quanto restava para o final. Mas não é assim, criador do universo, criador das almas e dos corpos, não é assim que tu conheces todas as coisas futuras e passadas. De longe, de longe mais maravilhosamente e de longe mais secretamente tu conheces. Pois os conhecimentos de quem canta, ou a canção conhecida para quem ouve, na expectativa de notas futuras e na memória de notas passadas, variam a sensibilidade e distendem a sensação; não é assim que algo acontece para ti imutavelmente eterno, isto é, para o verdadeiramente eterno criador das mentes. Portanto, assim como conheceste no princípio o céu e a terralxxxi sem variação de teu conhecimento, assim também fizeste no princípio o céu e a terra sem distensão da tua ação. Quem entender, confesse a ti, e quem não entender, confesse a ti. Ó quão excelso tu és, e os humildes de coração são tua casa! Pois tu erguerás os que tombaremlxxxii e não caem aqueles para quem tu és a alteza. 56 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 56 Agostinho de hiponA • Confissões, Livro Xi (endnotes) i Salmos 48 (47), 1; 96 (95), 4 e 145 (144), 3. ii Mateus 6, 8. iii Salmo 33 (32), 22. iv Mateus 5, 1-12 e Lucas 6, 20-23. v Salmo 118 (117), 1. vi Salmo 61 (60),2. vii Salmo 66 (65),15. viii Salmo 86 (85),1. ix Romanos 10, 12 x Jeremias 18,19. xi Salmos 27 (26), 7 e 86 (85), 3. xii Salmo 74 (73), 16. xiii Salmo 17 (16), 5. xiv Salmo 26 (25), 7. xv Salmo 119 (118), 18. xvi Gênesis 1, 1. xvii Apocalipse 5, 10. xviii Apocalipse 21, 10 xix Salmo 27 (26), 7. xx Mateus 6, 33. xxi Salmo 119 (118), 85. xxii Salmo 19 (18), 15. xxiii Salmo 80 (79), 18. xxiv Salmo 80 (79),18. xxv Romanos 8, 34. xxvi Colossenses 2, 3. xxvii Gênesis 1, 1. xxviii Jó 14, 16. xxix Salmo 33 (32), 9. xxx Mateus 3, 17 e 17, 5. xxxi Isaías 40, 8. xxxii João 1, 1. xxxiii 1 Coríntios 1, 4. xxxiv João 3, 29. xxxv João 8, 25. xxxvi Gênesis 1, 1. xxxvii Salmo 31 (30), 11. xxxviii Salmo 103 (102), 3-5 xxxix Romanos 8, 24-25. xl Salmo 104 (103), 24. xli Gênesis 2, 3. xlii Efésios 3, 10. xliii Salmo 5, 10. xliv Gênesis 31, 29. xlv Gênesis 2, 3. xlvi Idem. xlvii Salmo 102 (101), 28; Hebreus 1, 12. xlviii 2 Pedro 3, 8. xlix Salmo 2, 7; Atos 13, 33; Hebreus 1, 5 e 5, 5. l Miquéias 7, 8. li Salmo 28 (27), 9. lii Salmo 72 (71), 5. liii Salmo 139 (138), 6. liv Eclesiastes 11, 7. lv Salmo 38 (37), 11. lvi Mateus 7, 11. lvii Salmo 73 (72), 16. lviii Salmo 116 (115), 10. lix Salmo 27 (26), 4. lx Salmo 39 (38), 6. lxi Gênesis 1, 14. lxii cf. Josué 10, 12. lxiii Salmo 9, 2. lxiv Gálatas 1, 20. lxv Salmo 18 (17), 29. lxvi Salmo 62 (61), 9. lxvii Salmo 100 (99), 3. lxviii 2 Macabeus 1, 24. lxix Salmo 31 (30), 20. lxx Salmo 63 (62), 4. lxxi Salmos 18 (17), 36 e 63 (62), 9. lxxii Salmo 80 (79), 18. lxxiii Filipenses 3, 12-14. lxxiv idem. lxxv idem. lxxvi idem. lxxvii Salmo 26 (25), 7. lxxviii Salmo 27 (26), 4. lxxix Salmo 31 (30), 11. lxxx Filipenses 3, 13. lxxxi Gênesis 1, 1. lxxxii Salmos 145 (144), 14 e 146 (145), 8. 5757 Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA58 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 58 5959 ARISTóTElES Nasceu no ano 384 antes de Cristo, na cidade de Estagira, em uma família rica e faleceu em 322, em Cálcis, na Eubéia, ilha do Mar Egeu. Chega jovem a Atenas, provavelmente tinha dezoito anos quando entra o centro do mundo grego. Ingressa na Academia de Platão, depois de ter passado breve tempo na escola de Isócrates. Nesse momento dirigia a Academia interinamente Eudoxo de Cnido, matemático, uma vez que o Mestre se encontrava em Siracusa, em excursão de natureza política. Um ano após o ingresso de Aristóteles na Academia, Platão voltava ao seu posto. O jovem que chegava a Atenas exibia uma gagueira moderada, anéis nos dedos e o cabelo e a barba bem curtos. Barnes1 chega a lhe conferir o epíteto de dandy da época. O pai de Aristóteles, Nicômaco, era médico, e, como se sabe, era tradição de muitas regiões o ensino da medicina de pai para filho, como testemunha o juramento de Hipócrates. Aristóteles muito provavelmente vinha sendo preparado para seguir essa carreira. O certo é que ele já 1 BARNES, J. Aristóteles. Madrid: Cátedra,1987. p. 11. ARIStóteLeS e A SupeRAçãO dO PARAdIGMA dA AcAdEMIA Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA60 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 60 chegou à Academia com uma inclinação forte para o estudo dos animais e plantas. Ingressava, assim, na escola de Platão, dominada pelo paradigma da matemática, a qual frequentara por vinte anos, um jovem estudante com clara tendência para o observação empírica, a classificação dos conceitos e a sua hierarquização. Sustenta-se que, após a morte de Platão, por se sentir preterido pela escolha de Espeusipo para suceder ao mestre, Aristóteles, vai para Assos, onde Hérmias, que estudara com Platão e fora escravo, se tornara arconte. Ainda que se aceite essa eventual diferença entre os dois, a verdade é que havia afinidade entre o pensamento do estagirita e o de Espeusipo. Espeusipo, sobrinho de Platão e que vai sucedê-lo à frente da Academia, também já mostrara pendor para estudo do empírico e para as classificações, de tal sorte que Theodor Gomperz o coloca como um precursor de Aristóteles. Todavia, há que se ver entre eles mais contemporaneidade do que propriamente antecedência do primeiro em relação a Aristóteles. De todo modo, quando se consideram os dez livros de Espeusipo2, que receberam o nome de Homóia (as coisas similares), o que se pode concluir é que, no interior da escola de Platão estava em gestação uma nova escola filosófica que se oporia ao modelo matemático e geométrico que iluminou o genial sucessor de Sócrates. O mundo das ideias, das formas incorruptíveis recebia nos seu coração, a Academia, aqueles que seriam os seus mais ferrenhos opositores. Não é difícil concluir que Aristóteles, depois de tanto tempo estudando na escola de Platão, tivesse chamado a atenção do seu mestre. Platão dera-lhe o epíteto de "leitor" e aqui há que registrar a revolução que essa simples designação parece signficar. Até o estagirita, o grego que se dedicava aos estudos não lia os textos, mas se reclinava "3 passivamente para saborear, como uma representação teatral, as frases que um 2 GOMPERZ, T. Pensadores Griegos. Buenos Aires: Editorial Guarania, 1955.v. 3, p. 12. 3 MESQUITA, A. P. Aristóteles: Introdução Geral. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 2005. p. 76-77. 6161 servo educado recitava. A novidade introduzida por Aristóteles foi a de acumular numa só pessoa a dupla função de recitador e de ouvinte, fazendo assim evoluir a noção arcaica de leitor como aquele que lê alto para outrem e fundando a partir dela a noção moderna de leitor como aquele que lê baixo, ou em pensamento, para si mesmo.4" Pode-se reconhecer que essa atitude ativa, que Aristóteles demonstrou com sua relação com a leitura, fosse também uma qualidade necessária para as monumentais pesquisas empíricas, tanto no campo dos animais e quanto das plantas, que empreendeu. Em tais pesquisas, ele não apenas recolhia os dados, mas os "lia". Ao colocar a mão na massa, ao valorizar os dados concretos, recolhidos pela experiência, Aristóteles em seu desejo de saber, despojou-se de muitos preconceitos aristocráticos que permeiam as sociedades escravagistas. O distanciamento de Aristóteles de Platão aconteceu, portanto, ainda na Academia5. Das obras que nos chegaram, as Categorias constituem um exemplo de antiplatonismo militante, onde o estagirita enceta decididamente os seus passos na construção de seu universo próprio universo filosófico. Demais, esse texto é a porta para a lógica, a ciência e a metafísica em Aristóteles. Nele, o ser é apresentado segundo o esquema categorial, onde essas representariam o ser objetivo, distinto do ser pensado. Aqui aparecem a substância, a espécie, o gênero e a sua estrutura de predicados (qualidade, quantidade, relação, quando, onde, ter, fazer, sofrer, estar-em-uma-posição). A tábua das categorias será imprescindível para a implantação e explicitação dos outros lugares fundamentais de sua filosofia: o ser segundo a falsidade e verdade (De Interpretatione e Metafísica), essencial ao desenvolvimento da lógica; o ser segundo a potência e o ato (De Interpretatione e Metafísica); e o ser segundo a essência e o acidente (Metafísica), onde as coisas e os fenômenos são sempre identificados sob a ótica do que lhes pertence como essência e do lhes pertence como acidente. 4 É de se supor que os ex-escravos que frequentavam a Academia não tenham tido o servo-leitor. No caso de Aristóteles, isso foi uma escolha intelectual. 5 MAGALHÃES-VILHENA, V. O Problema de Sócrates. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 1952. p. 413-414. Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA62 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 62 Aristóteles deixou marcas profundas na história do pensamento. Organizou de forma sistemática a lógica da antiguidade, fundamentou e desenvolveu a teoria das proposições e dos silogismos, introduziu o uso de letras para representação das proposições, enunciou o princípio da não-contradição, criou a lógica modal, a biologia, fundamentou teoricamente a troca de trabalhos distintos (teoria do valor), explicou o sentido do dinheiro (Livro V da Ética a Nicômaco), fez a primeira história constitucional, em seu livro A Constituição de Atenas, e fundou uma das escolas filosóficas mais importantes do pensamento da antiguidade, ao lado da platônica e da filosofia de Epicuro. Legou noções importantes à filosofia e marcou profundamente o léxico filosófico. Sua filosofia constitui um diálogo com as outras filosofias de Grécia antiga, mas principalmente com a grande filosofia de Platão. A esse propósito, vale ouvir o condensado comentário de Magalhães-Vilhena, esse notável historiador do pensamento que Portugal nos deu: "(...) toda a sua concepção da ciência e do espírito do investigador o opõe à do seu mestre." Considerando o "ser" como distinto do "ser pensado", compreende o conhecimento como uma apreensão das "essências" que as qualidades empíricas das coisas cercam com um invólucro". Subordinando as ideias à linguagem, ao passo que Platão subordinava o mundo às ideias (como diz Bacon), Aristóteles edifica sobre as bases da representação sensível (...) e da linguagem(...) uma lógica, uma metafísica, uma ciência: uma lógica do discurso na qual as operações do intelecto consistem em classificar e hierarquizar conceitos, em debater-se com uma pirâmide de vocábulos de extensão decrescente", em atribuir predicados a sujeitos, em ordenar as qualidades em cascatas de silogismos; uma metafísica na qual se explica o real pelas qualidades das substâncias; uma ciência do universo que consiste em hierarquizar e ordenar as qualidades." Poucos pensadores terão influenciado a história do pensamento como o estagirita. Seu pensamento fascinou muçulmanos e cristãos, como Averróis ou São Tomás de Aquino, idealistas ou materialistas, como Hegel ou Marx. Uma das linhas mais contínuas em sua obra vasta é a tentativa de dar conta do real, admitindo que esse em seu trânsito para corruptibilidade, em seu movimento incessante, possui estados de relativa 6363 permanência que permitem o pensar e a racionalidade, por oposição a seu mestre Platão, que separa o mundo corruptível do mundo das ideias. Em Aristóteles, o pensamento, os enunciados, ainda que constituam uma ordem própria, podem dizer como as coisas são de fato. Dar conta do sensível é a divisa permanente de seu esforço gigante para explicar o mundo. Corpus Aristotelicum A obra de Aristóteles é vastíssima e teria cerca de cento e cinquenta títulos. Aristóteles escreveu até diálogos, embora os livros que nos chegaram sejam somente os tratados destinados aos seus alunos, os textos acroamáticos. Destacam-se os escritos lógicos, que formam o órganon, onde se encontram as Categorias, o De Interpretação, os Primeiros Analíticos, os Segundos Analíticos, os Argumentos Sofísticos e os Tópicos; a Retórica e a Poética; a Metafísica; os tratados acerca da estrutura do mundo físico que compreedem a Física, De Coelo (Sobre o Céu), Da Geração e Corrupção; De Anima (Da Alma), que condensa a psicologia aristotélica; os tratados biológicos, como História dos Animais e Das Plantas. Vale atentar para o grande interesse da biologia em Aristóteles, onde diversos autores sustentam estar muito do seu pensamento mais interessante e original6. Lembremos que Aristóteles deu bases tanto à botânica quanto à zoologia. A chamada filosofia prática, ainda que subestimada por autores importantes como Burnet e Taylor, resiste à ação do tempo com obras clássicas como a Política, a Ética a Nicômaco, os Econômicos, a Ética a Eudemo e a Magna Moralia, a Constituição de Atenas, tratado que inaugura a história das constituições e que foi descoberto apenas no século XIX77. Atualmente há grande esforço em traduzir para o português todos os títulos das obras de Aristóteles que nos chegaram. Trata-se do projeto intitulado Obras Completas de Aristóteles, conduzido pelo professor Antonio Pedro Mesquita, da Uiniversidade de Lisboa. A coleção das publicações se inicia com a Introdução Geral ( 2005), onde o professor Mesquita traz o repertório bibliográfico sobre Aristóteles, aborda algu6 BURNET, J. Platonism. Berkeley: University of Califórnia, 1928. p. 100; TAYLOR, A. Critical Notice: "Platonism" by John Burnet. Mind, v. 38, n.113, 1929, p.387-388. 7 GOMPERZ, op. cit., p. 38. Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA64 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 64 mas das questões mais candentes no tratamento da obra do estagirita e particularmente de seu vocabulário filosófico. Na sequência, vão sendo editadas as traduções, das quais diversos títulos já vieram à luz. O estudante poderá pesquisar os lançamentos e mesmo aceder aos textos em <www.obrasdearistoteles.net>. Os livros são editados pelo Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa e pela Casa da Moeda de Portugal. Breve comentário aos excertos traduzidos I) 1252 a 1253 b Os escritos políticos de Aristóteles, a par da sua genialidade, acuidade e honestidade intelectual, revelam o pendor para descrever a realidade em seus aspectos substanciais, em seus momentos determinantes. Nesse primeiro excerto, vale atentar para a noção de bem na definição de cidade-estado, a qual Aristóteles definiu como comunidade que visa o maior de todos os bens. O bem é a causa final. Vale lembrar que Aristóteles trabalhava com quatro tipos e causa: a material, a formal, a eficiente e a final. As funções de político, rei, intendente e senhor de escravos não se diferenciariam pelos números de subordinados que comandam, mas pela qualidade distinta de suas respectivas naturezas. Nesse trecho, Aristóteles chama o leitor a ver as coisas no seu desenvolvimento, segundo o modelo da biologia. É por isso que dirá que aquele que vê a coisa desde o seu início, quando nasce, e observa como ela se desenvolve verá melhor. Conhecer a coisa em seu desenvolvimento, desde o princípio, seria conhecer a sua natureza (physis), conceito fundamental da filosofia aristotélica. O homem é comparado com outros animais gregários, onde se sobressai a abelha, e aparece como o mais político (social) de todos os animais. A razão é a palavra. Naturalmente, a abelha e os outros animais gregários constituem o limite mais próximo da animalidade em relação ao homem. Fora esses casos extremos, diante dos quais o Aristóteles biólogo deve ter se desconcertado, uma vez que não havia elementos para 6565 a correta compreensão da sociedade das abelhas naquela época, o que se pode afirmar é que o viver politicamente distingue o homem"(...) negativamente dos deuses e das bestas, mas também positivamente: o homem se situa entre as duas naturezas porque a vida política se situa entre os dois tipos de vida, mais que a vida animal e menos que a vida divina8." Munido da palavra, do pensamento, o homem acede às "sensações" do bem e do mal, do justo e do injusto, essenciais à constituição da comunidade política. O uso da palavra "aisthésis", sensação, ato de sentir, permite constatar que o pensamento perpassa o sentir no caso desses conceitos fundamentais à esfera política. A própria eleição da palavra "aisthésis" expressa a militância antiplatônica do estagirita, no esforço de se afastar as ideias puras de Platão. 2) No excerto do livro III (1274 b 30 a 1276 a ) da Política, o aluno poderá acompanhar o pensamento de Aristóteles no seu esforço de definir o que é a cidade e o que é o cidadão. A pergunta "o que é?" é sempre feita por Aristóteles (tís estin?) quando põe questões essenciais, capazes de perguntar sobre o que de fato define a coisa em exame. A despeito de a pólis, que traduzi por cidade-estado, possuir categorias próprias que não se confundem com as que fundam a nossa sociedade, elementos essenciais da natureza da política descritos por Aristóteles persistem mesmo em nossas formações sociais9. O cidadão, definido no texto, é essencialmente o que participa ou que pode participar das funções de poder da cidade-estado, seja da assembleia seja dos grandes tribunais da democracia ateniense. Sua conceituação, todavia, sofre modificações, de acordo com a natureza da constituição onde ele aparece. Esse procedimento de identificação das ocorrências de um conceito, nos vários contextos em que se manifesta, é uma das marcas da investigação teórica de Aristóteles. No caso, se perguntará o que é ser 8 WOLFF, F. L'être, l'homme, le disciple. Paris: PUF, 2000. p. 142. 9 A questão de se saber o que persiste da antiguidade entre nós e o que se supera pode, porém, sempre ser problematizada, como mostra o belo ensaio do helenista norte-americano FINLEY, M. Generalizações em história antiga. In:_____. Uso e Abuso da História. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1989. p. 57-p. 73. Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA66 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 66 cidadão em Atenas, em Esparta ou em Cartago, em cada uma das distintas constituições que conformam os diferentes regimes dessas cidadesestado. Mas outra marca do pensamento e do método investigativo de Aristóteles, que aparece no excerto traduzido, é a fuga permanente do relativismo: a busca do momento determinante. Demais, ainda que haja diversas definições de cidadão, uma delas poderá ser mais que as outras, explicitar mais a natureza do conceito. Cabe notar também o uso da análise, da divisão do todo em suas partes, e a identificação do papel de cada uma dessas na constituição do todo. Esse trabalho de análise, seja dos componentes da coisa (por exemplo, a cidade-estado), seja dos elementos do discurso, torna Aristóteles uma das fontes principais da chamada filosofia analítica. O lugar da precedência do todo em face das partes é elemento de que a investigação de Aristóteles frequentemente se socorre. obras citadas: ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica, Z, 10, 1035b, 24. BARNES, J. Aristóteles. Madrid: Cátedra, 1987. BURNET, J. Platonism. Berkeley: University of Califórnia, 1928. FINLEY, M. Uso e Abuso da História. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1989. GOMPERZ, T. Pensadores Griegos. Buenos Aires: Editorial Guarania, 1955. MAGALHÃES-VILHENA, V. O Problema de Sócrates. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 1952. MESQUITA, A. P. Aristóteles: Introdução Geral. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 2005. MILLER, F. D. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. WOLFF, F. L'être, l'homme, le disciple. Paris: PUF, 2000. 6767 Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de aristóteles traduzidas Para o Português órganon ARISTÓTELES. Categorias. Tradução, introdução, notas e comentários de José Veríssimo Teixeira da Mata. Goiânia: UFG & Alternativa, 2005. ARISTÓTELES. Da interpretação. Tradução de Pinharanda Gomes. Lisboa: Guimarães, 1985. ARISTÓTELES. Analíticos primeiros (Analíticos Anteriores). Tradução de Pinharanda Gomes. Lisboa: Guimarães, 1987. ARISTÓTELES. Analíticos posteriores. Tradução de Edson Bini. Bauru: Edipro, 2005. ARISTÓTELES. Tópicos .Tradução de José Segurado e Campos. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional & Casa da Moeda, 2007. ARISTÓTELES. Elencos sofísticos ou Refutações sofísticas. Tradução de Gerd Borheim e Leonel Vallandro. São Paulo: Abril, 1978. ARISTÓTELES. Os Económicos. Tradução de Delfim Ferreira Leão. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional & Casa da Moeda, 2004. ARISTÓTELES. De anima. Tradução de Maria Cecílica Gomes dos Reis. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2006. ARISTÓTELES. História dos Animais I e II. Tradução de Maria de Fátima Souza e Silva. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional & Casa da Moeda, 2006. ARISTÓTELES. Ethica Nicomachea. Tradução de Marcos Zingano. São Paulo: Odysseus, 2008. ARISTÓTELES. Política. Tradução António Campelo Amaral e Carlos Carvalho Gomes. Lisboa: Vega, 1998. ARISTÓTELES. Retórica. Tradução de Manuel Alexandre, Abel Pena e Paulo Alberto. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional & Casa da Moeda, 2005. ARISTÓTELES. A Constituição dos Atenienses. Tradução de Delfim Ferreira Leão. Lisboa: Calouste Gulbenkian, 2003. ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica. Tradução de Leonel Vallandro. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1969. Aristóteles e A superAção do pArAdigmA dA AcAdemiA68 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 68 obras sobre aristóteles (em Português) ANGIONI, L. As Noções Aristotélicas de Substância e Essência: o Livro VII da Metafísica de Aristóteles. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2008. ANGIONI, L. Introdução à Teoria Aristotélica da Predicação. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2006. LEAR, J. Aristóteles: o desejo de entender. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2006. MESQUITA, A. P. Introdução Geral. Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda, 2005. PEREIRA, O. P. Ciência e Dialética em Aristóteles. São Paulo: UNESP, 2001. WOLFF, F. Aristóteles e a Política. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 1999. ZINGANO, M. Estudos de Ética Antiga. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2007. ZINGANO, M. Sobre a Metafísica de Aristóteles. São Paulo: Odysseus, 1999. 6969 70 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 70 AristóteLes • poLítiCA pOLÍtICA 1 excertos 1252 a –1253 b Uma vez que vemos ser toda a cidade-estado uma certa comunidade e que toda a comunidade é constituída em razão de um bem (com efeito, todos agem sempre em vista do que lhes parecer ser o bem), é evidente que todas as cidades-estados anelam um bem, sobretudo, a comunidade suprema e que contém as restantes visa ao supremo bem. É esta comunidade que se chama cidade-estado, e é ela a comunidade política. Todos quantos julgam que o político2, o rei, o intendente e o senhor de escravos são o mesmo não estão certos (Com efeito, julgam que diferem pelo grande ou pequeno número [de subordinados], e não que cada uma dessas funções difere pela espécie. Assim, se há poucos [subordinados], a função é de senhor de escravos, se há um pouco mais, é o intendente, se há ainda mais, é o político ou o rei, como se em nada diferissem uma pequena cidade-estado e uma grande casa. 1 Tradução do Original: ARISTOTELIS. Opera. Berlin: Bekkeri, 1831. 2 O que governa, que exerce o função de poder em uma democracia. 7171 Quanto ao político e ao rei, cabe dizer o seguinte: se é a própria fonte do mando, é o rei; se governa e é governado, conforme as regras da ciência e como parte da cidade-estado, é o político. Porém, essas observações não são verdadeiras. Isso tornará claro o que se disse aos que examinarem a questão conforme o método já empregado. Com efeito, como em outras disciplinas é necessário analisar o composto até os elementos indecomponíveis (esses, com efeito, são as partes menores do todo). Também desse modo conheceremos a cidadeestado, ao examinar as partes de que se compõe, e mais saberemos delas: por que diferem entre si, e se é possível compreender a respeito de cada uma das coisas já referidas o que é próprio de cada função. Se alguém vir as coisas que nascem e se desenvolvem3, desde o princípio, como em outros casos, observará melhor assim o que aqui se passa. Primeiro, é necessário que os que não podem existir, uns sem os outros, passem a viver conjuntamente, por exemplo o macho e a fêmea para a produção de descendência (e isso não depende de um projeto, mas como em todos os animais e plantas é natural a reprodução para que possam se perpetuarem), e é necessário que um comande por natureza4 e o outro seja comandado para que [ambos os dois] se salvem. O que pode, com efeito, pelo pensamento fazer previsões por natureza é o que comanda, e, por natureza, é senhor dos escravos. Por sua vez, o que pode com o corpo suportar fadigas é o comandado e, por natureza, esse é o escravo. Por essa razão, o escravo5 e a o senhor formam um mesmo. Por sua respectiva natureza, distinguem-se então a fêmea e o escravo (a natureza não faz nada igual aos ferreiros de Delfos, que fazem as suas facas de modo falho, mas a cada coisa reserva uma única função6. Com efeito, assim cada um dos instrumentos melhor cumpriria seu fim, se destinasse não a muitas funções, mas apenas a uma). 3 O verbo phyein significa nascer e se desenvolver em grego clássico, dele deriva o substantivo phýsis. 4 Phýsis – uma inclinação da coisa, que se revela em seu desenvolvimento. 5 O escravo, leia-se a função de escravo; o senhor, leia-se a função de senhor. 6 A especialização identificada na natureza é transferida para a sociedade. 72 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 72 AristóteLes • poLítiCA Entre os bárbaros, porém, a varoa e o escravo têm o mesmo nível. A causa disso é que eles não têm o que por natureza comanda, mas a comunidade deles passa a ser de escrava e de escravo. Por isso dizem os poetas "É razoável que os gregos dominem os bárbaros, porque por natureza o bárbaro e o escravo são iguais". Dessas duas comunidades, a primeira [a surgir] é a família, e Hesíodo disse corretamente, quando compôs o verso "A casa primeiro, depois a mulher e o boi para arar." Com efeito, o boi é o agregado dos necessitados." A casa é, portanto, a comunidade composta segundo a natureza para o dia a dia, e os seus membros Carondas chama de "companheiros do celeiro"; Epimênides de Creta chama de companheiros da manjedoura". A vila é a primeira das comunidades formadas por muitas famílias para fazer face às necessidades não cotidianas. A vila parece ser, sobretudo, uma extensão da família, alguns chamam seus membros de filhos do mesmo leite e filhos dos filhos. Por isso primeiro as cidades-estados foram comandadas por reis, e ainda hoje são comandadas por eles as tribos. Com efeito, cidadesestados e tribos se formaram pelo fato de terem sido comandadas por reis. Com efeito, toda a família se submete ao comando do mais idoso, como a colônia ou extensão das famílias, pelo parentesco de seus membros. E é isto o que disse Homero "Cada um institui a lei aos seus filhos e esposas7, pois dispersos viviam nos tempos de outrora." Por isso todos os homens (uma vez que uma parte deles ainda hoje tem um rei, qual tinham antigamente) dizem também serem os deuses comandados por um rei, pois tornamos semelhantes às nossas próprias vidas as vidas dos deuses da mesma forma que fazemos as suas formas semelhantes a nós mesmos. A cidade-estado é a comunidade completa, oriunda de muitas vilas, a qual, por assim dizer, alcança o limite máximo do autoprovimento digno de suas próprias necessidades, vindo à luz para o viver, e existindo para o bem-viver. É por isso que cada cidade-estado existe por natureza, se também assim eram as vilas que a formaram. E ela [a cidade-estado] é o fim dessas. Com efeito, cada coisa é depois que sua origem se comple7 Para fundar as colônias se transferiam famílias muita vez ligadas por laços de sangue. 7373 tou; dizemos ser esta a natureza de cada uma das coisas, quer do cavalo, quer do homem ou da família. Demais, a causa final e o fim é o supremo bem. Também o autoprovimento com dignidade de si mesmo8 é tanto o fim quanto o supremo bem. Pelo que foi exposto, torna-se evidente que a cidade pertence às coisas que são por natureza e que o homem, por natureza, é um animal político. Também o que por natureza ou por acaso não tem a sua cidade-estado é inferior ou superior ao homem, como aquele que Homero injuriou: "Sem família, sem lei e sem morada". Com efeito, o que por natureza é isto também deseja a guerra, como peça desgarrada no jogo. É evidente por que razão o homem é animal político mais do que toda a abelha ou mais do que todo o animal gregário. Com efeito, como dizemos, a natureza não faz nada em vão. E dos animais somente o homem tem a palavra. A voz é sinal de prazer ou de pena, por isso subsiste também em outros animais (com efeito, a natureza deles alcança até a sensação de pena ou de prazer e as reconhece, separando-as, uma da outra). O discurso é para tornar claro o que convém e que é prejudicial, como também o que é justo e o que é injusto. Ao comparar os homens aos outros animais, vê-se que isso lhes é próprio: ter a sensação do bem e do mal, do justo e do injusto, e de outras. O conjunto dessas sensações (aisthéseis) é que faz a família e a cidade-estado. Também a cidade-estado é anterior por natureza à família e a cada um de nós mesmos. É necessário, com efeito, que o todo seja anterior à parte9. Com efeito, tendo sido destruído o corpo10, não haverá nem pé nem mão, a não ser homonimamente, como se alguém se referisse a uma mão de pedra (com efeito, aquela mão estará morta). Todas as coisas se 8 O autoprovimento com dignidade de si mesmo é enunciado em Aristóteles pela palavra autarquia. 9 É a visão da totalidade que deve orientar a identificação da posição da parte. 10 A função é essencial na caracterização do organismo, sem realizar essa função ou sem poder realizá-la ele já não é. ARISTÓTELES. Metafísica, Z, 10, 1035b, 24. 74 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 74 AristóteLes • poLítiCA definem por sua função e por sua potência11, por conseguinte quando já não são não se deve dizer que são, mas que são homônimas. É evidente, portanto, que a cidade-estado por natureza é anterior a cada um dos cidadãos. Se, com efeito, o cidadão não pode se prover de modo suficiente12, de modo igual às outras partes estará diante do todo, e o que não pode participar ou que de nada necessita, por se bastar a si mesmo, não será parte de nenhuma cidade-estado, por conseguinte será ou um animal feroz ou um deus. Por conseguinte, há em todos os homens o impulso para tal comunidade. E o que primeiro que a instituiu foi causa dos maiores bens. Com efeito, como o homem, depois de ter alcançado o pleno desenvolvimento, é o melhor dos animais, do mesmo modo, separado da lei e da justiça, será o pior. Com efeito, a injustiça com armas é a pior. O homem, para cultivar a ponderação e a virtude, naturalmente se desenvolve possuindo armas, das quais é possível se servir com vistas a fins contrários àquelas virtudes. Por isso o homem sem virtude é o mais sacrílego e selvagem, e o mais servil aos prazeres do sexo e da gula. O senso de justiça é próprio da cidade-estado. A justiça é a ordem da comunidade dos cidadãos, e o sentido de justiça a capacidade de julgar o que é justo. 1274 b 30 a 1276 a Trecho do livro III da Política, que define o que é o cidadão: Ao se indagar, em se tratando de Constituição13, o que é cada uma e o que lhe é característico, talvez a primeira reflexão seja saber o que é a cidade-estado14. 11 Dýnamis capacidade, outro conceito axial em Aristóteles, expressa o fato de a coisa carregar consigo mesma a possibilidade de realizar as funções que lhe são próprias. 12 As carências de cada um é que fundamentam a formação da comunidade e tornam o homem um animal político. Na comunidade política, o homem deixa para trás definitivamente a animalidade, ao se organizar em função de um bem (WOLFF, F. L'être, l'homme, le disciple. Paris: PUF, 2000. p.142). 13 Politeia, constituição, cidadania. 14 Pólis cidade-estado. 7575 Com efeito, agora discutem sobre isso. Uns dizem que a cidadeestado praticara tal ato, outros dizem que não foi a cidade-estado, mas a oligarquia ou o tirano15. Vemos que toda a atividade do político ou do legislador diz respeito à cidade-estado. A constituição é uma forma de organização dos que habitam a cidade-estado. Uma vez que a cidade-estado pertence às coisas compostas, como qualquer outra de todas as que são constituídas de muitas partes, é evidente que se deve buscar primeiramente conhecer o cidadão. Com efeito, a cidade-estado é uma grande quantidade de cidadãos. Por conseguinte, cabe examinar quem se deve chamar cidadão e o que é cidadão. Com efeito, muitas vezes se discute sobre o cidadão. Com efeito, nem todos estão de acordo sobre o que é ser cidadão. Com efeito, aquele que é cidadão na democracia, muitas vezes estando em uma oligarquia, não é cidadão. Deve-se deixar de lado os que recebem essa denominação por um outro motivo, como os cidadãos naturalizados. O cidadão não é cidadão por habitar algum lugar (e, com efeito, metecos16 e escravos habitam um lugar na cidade-estado), nem o é apenas porque participa das causas judiciais, como os que acusam e se defendem (com efeito, os estrangeiros podem fazê-lo segundo acordo17). Em muitos lugares nem sequer os metecos gozam desses direitos de modo completo, mas lhes é necessário eleger um representante dentre os cidadãos, por conseguinte, de alguma maneira, participam de uma tal comunidade de modo incompleto. Devem ser ditos de alguma maneira cidadãos, mas não de modo absoluto, como as crianças que ainda não têm a idade para gozarem a plena cidadania, ou os anciãos, que já se retiraram da vida cívica, pois chamamos uns [cidadãos] incompletos e os outros [cidadãos] já fora de funções ou alguma outra denominação (com efeito, isso em nada importa, pois está claro o que se disse). Procuramos definir, com efeito, o cidadão, no sentido pleno, se esse não sofre restrição dessa natureza em seus direi15 Aristóteles se refere ao fato de as ações de uma pessoa, fração serem atribuídas ao todo, como se esse não encerrasse diferença essencial em relação às partes. 16 Metecos não cidadão livres, segundo FINLEY, M. Uso e Abuso da História. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1989. p. 60. 17 Por acordo, estrangeiros, comerciantes, adquiriam o direito de defender suas causas nos tribunais atenienses. 76 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 76 AristóteLes • poLítiCA tos políticos18 que necessite de correção. Tanto é possível passar por tais dificuldades quanto resolvê-las, quer em relação aos que perderam sua cidadania, quer aos que foram exilados19. Em nada se define mais o cidadão, em sentido pleno, do que no participar das decisões judiciais e dos cargos de governo. Desses, uns são limitados no tempo, de modo a não ser possível jamais a um cidadão exercer duas vezes seguidas o mesmo cargo, mas apenas depois de um intervalo definido20. E não tem restrição de tempo, por exemplo, a função de juiz e a de membro da assembleia. Poderia talvez parecer a alguém que os juízes e os membros da assembleia nem são governantes nem participam do governo [da cidade-estado]. Porém, seria ridículo excluir do governo da cidade-estado aqueles que mais autoridade têm. Mas não vale se ocupar disso, pois é problema concernente ao nome e ao discurso. Com efeito, aquilo que é comum ao juiz e ao membro da assembléia não tem nome. Por que denominação se deve designar as atividades comuns a ambos? Seja isso, por definição, função de governo indefinida. Consideramos cidadão o que assim pode participar, como membro, [quer da assembleia quer da judicatura]. Talvez a definição que mais se aplica a todos os que são ditos cidadãos seja essa. E ainda não se deve deixar escapar que não há absolutamente nada em comum entre aquelas coisas cujos fundamentos diferem na espécie (daqueles, um é primeiro, outro segundo e assim segue), ou que há muito pouco em comum entre elas, por apresentarem tais diferenças. Vemos que as constituições diferem entre si segundo a espécie e que umas são inferiores e outras superiores. Com efeito, é necessário que as constituições defeituosas e as degeneradas sejam consideradas inferiores às que são sem falhas (posteriormente, ficará evidente como identificamos as degeneradas). Por con18 As restrições nos direitos políticos incidem diretamente sobre a extensão da cidadania. 19 A Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil, em seu art. 5o, XLVII, proíbe o exílio de cidadãos. 20 Como hoje entre nós os prefeitos, após o segundo mandato consecutivo, devem esperar quatro anos para voltarem a se candidatar ao mesmo cargo. 7777 seguinte, também é necessário que seja diferente o cidadão, conforme cada constituição. Por isso é sobretudo cidadão o que dizemos ser cidadão em uma democracia. Em outras constituições é possível [essa definição de cidadão] mas não necessariamente. E em algumas cidades-estados nem é o povo [que governa], nem há lei que obriga à existência de assembleias regulares, mas apenas à existência de conselhos extraordinários e as causas judiciais são julgadas por magistrados especializados, como acontece em Esparta. Nessa cidade-estado, diferentes juízes julgam diferentes processos, por exemplo, os éforos os contratos, os gerontes os homicídios, e da mesma maneira uma outra judicatura julga causas diversas. De modo semelhante, as coisas se passam em Cartago. Com efeito, alguns juízes julgam todas as causas21. Porém, a definição de cidadão está sujeita a distinções. Com efeito, nessas outras constituições [não democráticas], o membro da assembleia ou da judicatura não é um cidadão que possa exercer ambas essas funções, mas alguém que se limita estritamente ao exercício de sua competência especializada. Com efeito, ou se atribui o deliberar e o julgar sobre todas as causas ou sobre algumas a todos esses governantes ou a apenas alguns. O que é, afinal, o cidadão? Isso fica claro se considera o que expusemos aqui. Dizemos, com efeito, ser [alguém] cidadão por ter a possibilidade de participar do poder de deliberar ou de julgar da cidade-estado. E, para dizer de maneira absoluta, chamamos cidade-estado o conjunto desses cidadãos que seja suficiente para viver de modo que tenda ao autoprovimento de suas necessidades fundamentais de maneira digna.22 21 A expressão "de modo semelhante" apenas indica aqui que a função judicante em Cartago é uma especialização, sendo restrita a poucos, e não como em Atenas, na democracia, acessível ao cidadão em geral, ainda que os juízes cartagineses sejam generalistas. Sobre os direitos judiciários dos cidadãos consultar MILLER, F. D. Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 22 O termo grego autarquia, como assinala Francis Wolff, vai além das meras satisfações das necessidades físicas, pois encerra a vida ética e política: "a política significa também a superioridade do homem sobre o animal .Com efeito, a comunidade política não satisfaz somente, na condição de comunidade autárquica, (WOLFF, F. Op. cit., p. 143) sua necessidade de coisas, sem as quais o homem não pode viver, mas ela preenche sobretudo, como comunidade perfeita, sua carência dos outros, sem os quais ele não 78 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 78 AristóteLes • poLítiCA É costume definir cidadão aquele que provém de ambos genitores cidadãos, e não de somente um deles, como do pai ou da mãe; outros avançam ainda mais, de modo a exigir a cidadania de duas, três ou mais gerações de ancestrais. Quando assim se define grosso modo e segundo o direito político, [a cidadania], alguns têm dúvida de como será cidadão alguém nascido na terceira ou quarta geração. Por sua vez, Górgias de Leontinos, talvez experimentando essas dificuldades, mas ironizando, disse: "Como os vasos são feitos pelos produtores de vasos, assim também são feitos os cidadãos laríssios pelos magistrados de Larissa"23. Com efeito, alguns deles são produtores de cidadãos laríssios. E o problema é simples. Se, segundo a definição já enunciada de cidadania, participavam [das decisões judiciais ou dos cargos de governo], seriam cidadãos. Com efeito, não é possível aplicar a definição de cidadania, como o que nasce de pai cidadão ou e de mãe cidadã, ao que tivesse pertencido aos primeiros moradores ou construtores da cidade-estado. Talvez essa agora seja a maior dificuldade. É o caso de todos os que vieram a participar da cidadania por ter sobrevindo uma revolução, por exemplo na Atenas de Clístenes. Depois da expulsão dos tiranos, ele concedeu a cidadania a muitos estrangeiros, pois fez membros das tribos tanto escravos [quanto] metecos. A dúvida relativa a estes não é saber quem é o cidadão, mas antes se o é de forma injusta ou justa. Em verdade, alguém ainda poderia colocar a seguinte dificuldade: se não é de forma justa cidadão, não é cidadão, uma vez que o injusto e o falso são o mesmo. Se vemos que alguns exercem o poder injustamente, os quais dizemos exercer o poder, mas não justamente, e o cidadão é definido pelo exercício de uma função do poder (com efeito, o que participa de tal função é cidadão, como dizíamos), é evidente que esses também devem ser ditos cidadãos. pode viver bem: o homem é tal que vive melhor com os outros, mesmo se ele não tem necessidade deles (nem necessidade sexual, nem necessidade econômica." 23 Há um jogo de palavra no grego nesse trecho, onde a palavra demiurgo é tanto o artesão (no caso, produtores de vasos) quanto o nome pelo qual eram designados magistrados na cidade de Larissa. 7979 AviCenA, o grAnde mestre dA fiLosofiA árAbe-muçuLmAnA80 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 80 8181 AvICENA é o nome latinizado de Abu Ali al-Hussein Ibn Abd Allah Ibn al-Hassan Ibn Ali Ibn Sina, ou simplesmente Ibn Sina. Ele nasceu no ano de 980 em Afshana, na antiga Pérsia, lugarejo hoje situado no Uzbequistão. Sem dúvida, este filósofo1 e médico pode ser considerado como um dos gênios da humanidade. Sua capacidade intelectual precoce foi evidenciada quando ele tinha apenas 10 anos de idade, pois nesta fase de sua vida já havia decorado todo o Alcorão, o Livro Sagrado dos muçulmanos. Há até um nome próprio em árabe – Háfiz – que designa de modo muito especial uma pessoa que tem o Alcorão memorizado2. São aproximadamente 76.000 palavras, 114 capítulos (suwar) e cerca de 6.220 versículos (ayát). No contexto islâmico, esta atitude é uma proeza relevante porque é normal as pessoas se utilizarem de passagens do 1 Sobre a biografia de Avicena pode-se consultar o livro de GOHLMAN, W. E. The life os Ibn Sina. New York: State University of New York Press, 1974. Esta biografia foi baseada no que o próprio Avicena ditou a Juzjání , seu discípulo por 25 anos, acrescida de informações do próprio Juzjání. 2 Algumas pessoas que sabiam o Alcorão de cor exerceram um papel importante quando foi estabelecida o primeiro volume único e definitivo deste livro. AVICeNA, O GRANDe MeStRe DA FILOSOFIA ÁRABe-MuçuLMANA AviCenA, o grAnde mestre dA fiLosofiA árAbe-muçuLmAnA82 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 82 Alcorão tanto no âmbito da vida acadêmica como em questões simples para dar mais credibilidade ao que se quer dizer. Ademais, a filosofia em terras do Islã surgiu impulsionada pela hermenêutica alcorânica. O desejo de conciliar razão e fé criou entre os muçulmanos um extraordinário movimento para explicação e interpretação do conteúdo do Livro Sagrado (o Alcorão). Se no Ocidente há separação entre ciência e religião, razão e fé, no Islã praticamente é inexistente este dualismo e, segundo Avicena, não há nada na filosofia que seja contrário à lei religiosa do Islã. Com menos de 18 anos de idade, Avicena, o Sumo Sheik ou o Grande Mestre (Al-Shaikh Al-Raís) como ficou conhecido no mundo árabe, já era médico e dominava conhecimentos amplos de filosofia, matemática, lógica, jurisprudência, teologia, entre outros. Produziu mais de duzentas obras. Merecem ênfase duas muito conhecidas: O Cânon de Medicina (Kitáb Al-Qanún fi al-Tib) e AlShifá' (a Cura). O Cânon foi traduzido para o latim por Gerardo de Cremona no final do século XII, tendo sido utilizado como base para os estudos de medicina nas universidades europeias até o século XVII. Pode-se dizer que Avicena foi personagem louvável na união entre um conhecimento prático (a Medicina) e outro especulativo (a Filosofia), utilizando-se dos dois para ampliar os horizontes do conhecimento sobre o ser humano. Al-Shifá', obra enciclopédica composta de 18 volumes que abrange Metafísica, psicologia, física, matemática, astronomia e lógica, é dividida em quatro sumas da seguinte forma: metafísica, física, matemática e lógica. Cada suma é dividida em livros e cada livro é dividido em seções e as seções em capítulos. O próprio Avicena deixou claro o seu objetivo com esta obra. Ele afirmou: Nossa intenção é pôr neste livro o fruto das ciências dos antigos que pudemos verificar; ciências baseadas numa dedução firme ou numa indução aceita pelos pensadores que buscam a verdade há muito tempo. Esforceime por incluir na obra a maior parte da filosofia. Não há nada de importante nos livros dos antigos que não figure nesta obra. Se algum elemento 8383 não for encontrado em seu contexto habitual, é porque o coloquei em outro lugar que considero mais conveniente3. Al-Shifá' influenciou a elaboração do pensamento ocidental a partir do séc. XII, tendo em vista que algumas partes, como a metafísica e a psicologia foram traduzidas para o latim. O pensamento filosófico de Avicena foi influenciado por filósofos da Grécia Antiga, particularmente pelas filosofias de Aristóteles, Platão (refuta, porém, a pré-existência das ideias ao modo platônico) e pelo neoplatonismo, mas não se pode dizer que Ibn Sina foi fiel seguidor de alguma delas. Dos filósofos árabes foi influenciado, particularmente, por seu predecessor Al-Farabi, ao qual posteriormente ofuscou com a distinção que o conhecimento filosófico de Avicena recebeu. Por outro lado, influenciou de modo significativo o pensamento da Escolástica cristã na Idade Média em figuras como Tomás de Aquino, São Boa Ventura, Alexandre de Hales, João Duns Escoto, entre outros. Na sua monumental obra "Suma Teológica" (ou Suma de Teologia), Tomás de Aquino cita Avicena mais de 250 vezes, tanto para aceitar como para reelaborar o pensamento deste. Não há dúvida de que é o sábio muçulmano mais conhecido e o que mais projetou a filosofia escrita em árabe no Oriente e no Ocidente. A considerar suas atitudes, me atrevo a dizer que Avicena foi um homem religioso. Tudo indica que cultivava sua religião, o Islã, de modo sincero. Suas obras estão repletas de palavras de louvor a Deus e de exaltação do Profeta do Islã, Muhammad, e sua linhagem. Ninguém faz isto gratuitamente! Quando estava em dificuldade, procurava a mesquita como refúgio. Aí fazia suas preces e, muito provavelmente, sentia-se reconfortado espiritual e intelectualmente. Quem conhece o ambiente muçulmano sabe que esta prática é comum entre pessoas consideradas religiosas. 3 MADKUR, I. B. Al-Shifa: O universo em um livro. O Correio da Unesco, Rio de Janeiro, a. 8, n. 12, 1980, p.15. AviCenA, o grAnde mestre dA fiLosofiA árAbe-muçuLmAnA84 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 84 Ibn Sina, ou Avicena, morreu no mês de Ramadã do ano de 428 da Hégira4, correspondente ao mês de junho de 1037 d.C., próximo à cidade de Hamadan, na Pérsia. Nesta cidade, que conserva o mesmo nome, Avicena está sepultado num mausoléu e é motivo de orgulho para seus habitantes e para todos os iranianos5. Junto ao mausoléu há várias dependências incluindo uma biblioteca. Hoje o local recebe muitas visitas de caráter turístico e acadêmico. Sua biografia nos foi passada por seu discípulo Abu Ubaid al-Juzjání que o acompanhou por 25 anos6. A exemplo de muitos filósofos medievais, Avicena, também, não se preocupou muito com a beleza literária de seus escritos para privilegiar o entendimento. Daí o porquê de algumas passagens dos textos traduzidos neste trabalho serem repetitivas. Como poderá ser verificado nos capítulos a seguir, também é corriqueira a estratégia de redução ao absurdo nos argumentos apresentados, quer para defender ou refutar algo. Quanto à filosofia e sua divisão, o nosso filósofo divide a filosofia em especulativa e prática. Afirma, ainda, que "a filosofia é o aperfeiçoamento da alma humana". Isto aplica-se tanto para o aperfeiçoamento relativo à razão, ao intelecto, pela apreensão de conceitos pertinentes às coisas e o assentimento das verdades relativas a estas, como para a filosofia prática, isto é, o agir humano. O poder de apreensão intelectual do ser humano é função exclusiva da alma humana. Esta alma é isenta de matéria e até mesmo de associação à matéria, afirma Ibn Sina. Para ele, a verdadeira noção de ser humano é aquela que inclui o que é essencial à essência deste ser humano e não apenas os elementos relativos às coisas percebidas pelos sentidos. A física aviceniana conserva os quatro elementos dos antigos 4 Hégira: é o nome relativo ao calendário islâmico. A palavra hégira (do árabe Hijra), designa a emigração de Muhammad (Profeta do Islã) de Meca para Medina. Isto correu em 622 da Era Cristã e corresponde ao ano 1 do calendário islâmico. 5 A antiga Pérsia hoje chama-se República Islâmica do Irã. 6 Cf. GOHLMANN, W. E. The life os Ibn Sina: A critical edition and annotated translation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974; CRUZ HERNANDEZ, M. La vida de Avicena. Salamanca : Anthema Ediciones, 1997. 8585 (água, ar, terra e fogo) e divide os corpos em simples e compostos, sendo os primeiros indivisíveis em corpos de naturezas diferentes porém, os corpos compostos podem dividir-se em corpos de formas diferentes. No âmbito da metafísica, ou filosofia primeira, Avicena sustenta que qualquer essência que não subsiste num sujeito é uma substância, e a essência que subsiste num sujeito é um acidente. Há que se destacar que nesta temática houve uma importante contribuição aviceniana para a época quando ele propôs a distinção real entre essência e existência, negando que a existência seja um simples acidente da essência. A existência é algo concreto, a essência é absolutamente abstrata. O elemento fundamental da metafísica aviceniana é a divisão do ser7. Há duas classes de ser: o ser necessário e o ser possível. O ser necessário é aquele que, quando suposto inexistente, decorre disto um absurdo. O ser possível é o que quando suposto inexistente ou existente, não decorre daí absurdo algum. O ser necessário é necessário. O ser possível não é necessário, tanto no ser (no existir) como no não-ser (não existência). O ser necessário pode, ainda, sê-lo por si mesmo ou não por si mesmo. O ser necessário por si mesmo é o que é para si, não para outra coisa, seja o que for; torna-se absurdo não supô-lo. E o ser necessário não por si é aquilo que, quando se supõe alguma coisa que não seja ele, torna-se ser necessário; como o número quatro é necessário não por si mas quando se supõe dois mais dois. A combustão e a queima não são necessárias por si mesmas, mas quando se pressupõe o concurso da potência agente por natureza com a potência passiva por natureza, quero dizer, o que faz queimar e o que é queimado8. Como se pode constatar, estes argumentos têm como base a lógica modal de Aristóteles9. A exposição de Avicena sobre estas classes de ser tem como finalidade a prova da existência de apenas um ser necessário 7 A este respeito pode-se consultar o livro a Origem e o Retorno citado a seguir. Nesta obra Avicena expõe amplamente o conceito de ser necessário e ser possível. 8 Esta parte é tradução integral do primeiro capítulo do livro a Origem e o Retorno. 9 Pode-se conferir em Peri Hermineias, cap. XII, 21a ss. AviCenA, o grAnde mestre dA fiLosofiA árAbe-muçuLmAnA86 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 86 por si mesmo; por sua essência. Todos os demais seres dependem deste ser necessário. Nos capítulos que seguem, independentes um do outro, há uma hierarquia conceitual natural na apresentação dos mesmos de acordo com a evolução, também natural, do intelecto humano, ou seja: Conceito e divisão da filosofia, o ser humano e sua capacidade de abstração, sobre a composição dos corpos e, por último, elementos de metafísica. Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de avicena traduzidas Para o Português: AVICENA. A Origem e o Retorno: Tratado I – Tradução do árabe por Jamil Ibrahim Iskandar. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 1999. AVICENA. A Origem e o Retorno: Tratados I, II e III. Tradução comentada do árabe e aparelho crítico por Jamil Ibrahim Iskandar. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005. indicações de leitura em Português ATTIE FILHO, M. Falsafa: a filosofia entre os árabes. São Paulo: Palas Athena, 2002. ATTIE FILHO, M. O intelecto em Ibn Sina (Avicena). São Paulo: Ateliê Editorial, 2007. ISKANDAR, J. I. A origem e o retorno. Avicena. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005. ISKANDAR, J. I. A Cura do medo da morte. In: PEREZ, D. O. (Org.). Filósofos e terapeutas: em torno da questão da cura São Paulo: Escuta, 2007. PEREIRA. R. H. de S. Avicena: a viagem da alma. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2002. indicações de leitura em línguas estrangeiras em espanhol CRUZ HERNANDEZ, M. História Del pensamiento islâmico. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1996. v. 1. RAMÓN GUERRERO, R. Avicena. Madrid: Ediciones Del Orto, 1994. 8787 sites de referência www.ucm.es www.siepm.uni.freiburg.de/ Procurar com a palavra Ibn Sina, Avicenne e Avicenna. 88 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 88 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão A FILOSOFIA e SuA DIVISãO 1 A filosofia é o aperfeiçoamento da alma humana através da apreensão das coisas e a confirmação das verdades especulativas e práticas, de acordo com a capacidade humana. A filosofia relativa às coisas especulativas, as quais devemos conhecer mas que não precisamos praticar, é chamada filosofia especulativa. A filosofia relativa às coisas práticas as quais devemos conhecer e praticar, chama-se filosofia prática. Cada uma destas duas filosofias divide-se em três partes. As partes da filosofia prática são: filosofia política, filosofia econômica e ética. O princípio destas três partes beneficia-se da Lei Divina e, também, o aperfeiçoamento de suas definições aclara-se através da Lei Divina. A faculdade humana especulativa age de acordo com as leis práticas e pela utilização destas leis em particularidades2. 1 A tradução teve com referência principal as seguintes obras: IBN SINA [AVICENA]. Al-Shifá' [A Cura]. [Edição em árabe do milenário de Avicena]. Cairo, 1980. v. 1; IBN SINA [AVICENA].Ilahiyyát [metafísica], [Edição em árabe do milenário de Avicena]. Cairo, 1980. v. 1; IBN SINA [AVICENA]. Al-Tabi'iyyát: Al-Samá' al-Tabi'í-[ A Física: Audição Natural]. [Edição em árabe do milenário de Avicena]. Cairo, 1983; GOHLMAN, W. E. The Life of Ibn Sina: A critical edition and annotated translation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1974. 2 Particularidades: o mesmo que questões particulares. 8989 A filosofia política: seu benefício é ensinar o modo de associação que ocorre entre pessoas para que possam auxiliar-se nas vantagens no que diz respeito aos corpos e os proveitos que auxiliam na permanência3 da espécie humana. A filosofia econômica: seu benefício é ensinar o modo de associação que deve haver entre as pessoas de uma casa com o objetivo de ordenar os interesses da casa. A associação na casa ocorre entre marido e mulher, entre pai e filho e entre patrão e escravo. Quanto à ética, seu benefício é ensinar as virtudes e o como adquiri-las para que, por intermédio delas, a alma possa purificar-se; para conhecer o vil e saber como este ocorre a fim de que a alma possa purificarse do mesmo. Quanto à filosofia especulativa, divide-se em três partes, ou seja: a) filosofia relativa ao movimento e à mudança4, chamada filosofia natural. b) filosofia relativa ao que o espírito abstrai da mudança mesmo que sua existência seja mesclada para a mudança. Esta filosofia chama-se filosofia da matemática. c) filosofia relativa àquilo cuja existência prescinde da mescla para mudança; a princípio, não se mescla com a mudança e, se mesclar, será por acidente e não porque sua essência necessita (da mescla) para concretização da existência. Esta filosofia é a filosofia primeira. A Filosofia Divina5 é parte desta e é o conhecimento da teologia. Os princípios destas partes da filosofia especulativa beneficiam-se dos conhecedores da religião divina por meio de advertência6. A escolha para sua consecução por completo através do poder do intelecto ocorre pela via da argumentação. Quem obtiver o aperfeiçoamento de sua alma por meio destas duas filosofia e se esforçar para apegar-se às duas, obterá muitos bens7. 3 Permanência da espécie humana: preservação da espécie humana. 4 Mudança: entenda-se com o significado de transformação, modificação. 5 Filosofia Divina: é uma alusão à metafísica. 6 Por meio de advertência: por esclarecimento. 7 Bens. É uma referência aos bens no âmbito da ética. 90 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 90 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão Sobre o ser Humano O homem pertence aos animais. Lhe é própria, porém, uma alma humana denominada alma racional, sendo a racionalidade a mais célebre de suas ações e o seu primeiro vestígio peculiar. Com a expressão deles8 alma racional, não significa que ela é apenas o princípio da Lógica, mas esta expressão tornou-se um cognome para a sua essência9. Ademais, a alma tem certas propriedades10: algumas destas propriedades lhe pertencem pela via da percepção, outras pela via da ação e outras pela via da passividade. Quanto às que lhe pertencem pela via da ação no corpo e da passividade, é uma ação que não procede da abstração (feita) por sua essência. Porém, quanto à percepção que lhe é própria, é uma ação que procede da abstração (feita) por sua essência; não necessita do corpo. Expliquemos cada uma delas11. Quanto às ações que procedem dela com associação do corpo e das potências corporais tem-se a intelecção e a reflexão sobre as coisas particulares concernentes ao que deve ser feito e ao que não deve ser feito, de acordo com a opção (que se faz). Pertence a esta parte a descoberta das artes práticas e a execução das mesmas como, por exemplo, a navegação, a agricultura, a tinturaria e a carpintaria. Quanto às passividades, são disposições que seguem as aptidões que se apresentam ao corpo com associação da alma racional como, por exemplo, a aptidão para o riso, para o choro, para a vergonha, para o pudor, para a clemência, para a compaixão, para o orgulho e para outras coisas. Todavia, quanto àquilo que lhe é próprio – ou seja, a apreensão – é a concepção dos conceitos gerais. Temos a necessidade de ilustrar para você como se dá esta percepção. Dizemos: cada pessoa é, por exemplo, 8 Deles: é uma referência aos que de modo geral se utilizam deste nome. 9 Para a sua essência: para a essência da alma. 10 Propriedades: entenda-se no sentido de características próprias da alma. 11 Delas: relativo às propriedades mencionadas no parágrafo anterior. 9191 um ser humano, porém, há coisas que não lhe pertencem como ser humano. Contudo, não se isenta delas na existência como, por exemplo, a definição de suas medidas, sua cor, sua aparência e aquilo que é notório nele e outras coisas deste tipo. Todas estas coisas, mesmo sendo humanas, não são condições para que ele seja humano, caso contrário, todas as pessoas seriam iguais neste âmbito. Apesar disso, inteligimos12 que há algo, ou seja: o ser humano. Que pobre é o discurso daquele que afirma o seguinte: o ser humano é esta totalidade percebida (pelos sentidos)! Você não encontra duas totalidades numa única situação. Estas situações estranhas acompanham a natureza pelo aspecto da aceitação por sua matéria e por sua forma: cada pessoa tem a combinação de uma matéria de acordo com uma mescla e aptidão próprias. Combina, também, (para cada pessoa) um momento e um tempo e outras causas auxiliares afim de alcançar estas situações para as quididades13 pelo aspecto de suas matérias. E em relação aos sentidos: se o ser humano inteligir (pelos sentidos) imprime-se nele uma forma (sensível) qualquer do ser humano porque esta forma está associada a estes acidentes e situações do corpo. Não há outro caminho para a forma a não ser a impressão nela da abstração da quididade de um ser humano para que haja algo nela que se assemelhe a esta própria quididade. E isto se evidencia com o mínimo de observação. É como se os sentidos abstraíssem esta forma da matéria e tomarem-na para si, mas é uma abstração de modo que se a matéria se ausentar, ausenta-se a abstração, pois houve abstração com vínculos acidentais materiais. Portanto, não há refúgio para os sentidos a não ser a abstração da forma. 12 Opta-se pela utilização da palavra inteligimos, bem como das outras variações que se apresentam nas páginas subsequentes , ainda que a forma conjugada não exista na Língua Portuguesa. Justifica-se essa escolha para não comprometer o sentido conceitual do texto, pois não há outro termo que substitua o seu equivalente em árabe. 13 Quididades. A expressão quididade foi introduzido no vocabulário filosófico a partir das traduções latinas do árabe. Significa essência necessária. 92 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 92 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão Porém, a imaginação abstrai a forma de modo mais acentuado do que este. Por este motivo, preserva a forma mesmo que a matéria se ausentar, no entanto, aquilo que é visto pela imaginação a partir da forma extraída do ser humano, por exemplo, não está abstraído dos vínculos materiais. A imaginação não imagina uma forma a não ser por um certo modo que o sentido pode fazer chegar a este modo. Quanto à (faculdade) estimativa, caso certifique-se de uma noção que não seja pelos sentidos, não a abstrairá a não ser como criada a partir de uma forma imaginativa. Deste modo, não há, então, caminho para estas faculdades conceberem a quididade de alguma coisa abstraída dos vínculos com a matéria e seus acréscimos, exceto a alma humana. Ela é a que concebe cada coisa por sua própria definição tal como a coisa é, sem os vínculos materiais; e esta é a noção que deve ocorrer a muitos, como o ser humano, enquanto é apenas ser humano. Portanto, a concepção destas noções leva a concepções que serão produzidas por adequação com a via do enunciado decisivo14. A coisa do ser humano a partir do qual procedem estas ações chama-se alma racional; e esta tem duas faculdades: uma delas está preparada para o aspecto prático e direciona-se ao corpo. Por intermédio dela distingue-se entre o que deve-se fazer e o que não se deve fazer e o que pode ser embelezado15 ou detestado nas coisas particulares. Isto chamase intelecto prático. Ele se aperfeiçoa nas pessoas através da experiência e dos costumes16. A outra, é uma faculdade que está preparada para a especulação17 e para o intelecto próprio da alma e dirige-se para o que é superior. Por intermédio dela alcança-se a Emanação Divina. Esta faculdade, às vezes, 14 Enunciado decisivo: Tradução de "qawl jázim". Na lógica, o enunciado decisivo designa uma proposição. De acordo com Ibn Sina, "o enunciado decisivo é o que é possível que seja crível ou que seja falso, e isto chama-se proposição (qadiya). Cf. Mawsu'át Mustalahát Ibn Sina (GIHAMY, G. Encyclopedia of Ibn sin'as – Avicennas –terminology. Beirut: Librairie du Liban Publishers, 2004, p. 902.). 15 Embelezado: no sentido de que pode ser considerado bom. É comum na língua árabe o uso da palavra belo com o sentido de bom. 16 Costumes: utilizada com o sentido de hábito. 17 Especulação. Relativo à faculdade especulativa. 9393 pode estar em potência, não praticando nenhuma ação nem percebe18 mas, tem aptidão para inteligir os inteligíveis. Isto é denominado intelecto em potência e intelecto material. Há uma outra faculdade pela qual se vai ao ato afim de que ocorram à alma os primeiros inteligíveis pelo modo (da ocorrência) que estamos mencionando. Isto chama-se intelecto em hábito. Há um terceiro grau, qual seja, que ocorram à alma os inteligíveis adquiridos e, assim, a alma torna-se intelecto em ato; e estes próprios inteligíveis chamam-se intelecto adquirido pois, tudo que sai19 da potência ao ato certamente sai por intermédio de algo que lhe faz adquirir aquela forma. Portanto, o intelecto em potência, certamente, torna-se intelecto em ato por uma causa que lhe faz receber os inteligíveis e cuja influência tem continuidade nele. Esta coisa é aquela que faz o intelecto ser agente em nós. Não há nada nos corpos com estes atributos. Então, esta coisa é intelecto em ato e agente em nós e recebe o nome de intelecto agente. Comparativamente aos nossos intelectos, é como comparar (a luz) do sol para nossas visões. Tal como (a luz) do sol ilumina nossas vistas e as faz chegar à visão, assim também é a influência do intelecto agente; ilumina nossas imaginações20 e abstraindo os acidentes da matéria, converte-as em inteligíveis e os transmite à nossa alma. Sendo assim, dizemos: a percepção dos inteligíveis é algo próprio da alma, sem (intermediação) de um órgão porque você soube como devem ser as ações que ocorrem por intermédio do órgão, e percebemos que as ações da alma são contrariantes a estas ações. Se (os inteligíveis) fossem inteligidos por um órgão, o órgão inteligiria sempre pois, é imprescindível: ou o órgão intelige com a concretização da forma pelo órgão ou com a concretização de uma outra forma. É impossível que alguma coisa seja inteligida pela forma de uma outra coisa, é necessário que concretize sua própria forma. E a concretização de sua forma não se isenta 18 Perceber: tradução da palavra tasawur isto é, perceber pelo intelecto. 19 Sai: literalmente passar, que passa de um situação à outra. 20 Imaginações: é uma referência à faculdade imaginativa. 94 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 94 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão de certos aspectos: ou a forma se concretiza na própria alma divergindo do órgão, ou a forma concretiza-se no próprio órgão, ou, ainda, a forma concretiza-se nos dois juntos. Se a forma se concretizar na alma estando a alma divergente, então, a alma tem uma ação própria porque aceitou esta forma sem que se instalasse junto com ela no órgão. Se a concretização da forma ocorrer no órgão, é necessário, então, que a ciência21 se dê sempre por intermédio do órgão; e, então, a concretização da ciência dá-se por intermédio da concretização da forma no órgão. Se a concretização ocorrer nos dois22 isto se dará sob dois aspectos: um destes aspectos é que, caso concretize-se num deles, concretizará-se no outro, em função da junção das duas essência. Se a forma estiver no órgão, é necessário que esteja também na alma, caso (a forma) concretizar-se em função da junção das duas essências. Deste modo, portanto, é necessário que a ciência seja permanente ou ela necessita da concretização de uma outra forma proveniente da principal e, assim, haverá no órgão duas formas duas vezes. É impossível a multiplicidade da forma a não ser que seja através de suas matérias e seus acidentes. Caso a matéria seja única e os acidentes únicos, não haverá duas formas, mas uma única forma. Além disso, se houver duas formas não haverá diferença entre ambas sob nenhum dos aspectos e não será necessário que uma delas seja inteligida sem a outra. Se perdoarmos23 dizendo que a forma não está preparada para ser inteligida sozinha quando não houver outra forma, é imprescindível dizermos que cada uma das duas formas será inteligida. Portanto, só é possível ao órgão inteligir duas vezes; não é possível que intelija apenas uma vez. Se a condição da concretização das duas formas neles24 não ocorre pela via da associação, mas pela via da concretização em cada um deles de uma forma que não é igual quanto ao número a que está no outro, então o discurso é retomado no sentido de que a alma, em função de seu isolamento25, tem uma determinada forma 21 Ciência: sinônimo de conhecimento. 22 Nos dois: na alma e no órgão. 23 Perdoarmos: no sentido de "se concordamos". 24 neles: no órgão e na alma. 25 Isolamento: que está separada. 9595 e uma determinada faculdade. Ficou, portanto, evidenciado do que foi exposto que a alma tem ações próprias e aceitação da forma inteligida, cuja forma não cessa no corpo. A substância, em função de seu isolamento, é, então, o lugar desta forma. E o que esclarece isto, é que a forma inteligida, caso ocupe um corpo ou uma faculdade num corpo, comportaria a divisão e, assim, uma coisa isolada não seria inteligida. Não se conclui disto que uma coisa composta não deva ser inteligida pelo que é indivisível porque a unidade do sujeito não proíbe a multiplicidade dos predicados nele, mas a multiplicidade do sujeito atrai a multiplicidade do predicado. Por outro lado, a noção que em si mesma já é dividida, ao instalarse num corpo e o sujeitar à divisão, é imprescindível que esta divisão conduza, ou não, estas noções à diferença. Se conduzir, resultam daí algumas impossibilidades; entre as quais tem-se: que independentemente da situação26 da divisão, o (corpo) exija necessariamente a mudança da situação da noção nele próprio. Que seja provável que a noção seja dividida em princípios inteligíveis infinitos. Que não seja inteligida por ser única porque enquanto única não é divisível. A unidade não se completa pela união das partes da definição mas por uma unidade necessária, natureza única, e enquanto é um, é inteligido e, em função disto, o um é inteligido e em função disto o um não é divisível; então, em função de tudo isto, ela27 não é divisível e enquanto instalada num corpo é divisível. Portanto, a noção não é assim porque foi inteligida no corpo, absolutamente, mas porque a quididade comum às pessoas é abstraída do sujeito e dos concomitantes ou foi abstraída da situação pela existência (de algo) de fora ou na presença do intelecto ou pelos dois (casos), ou, ainda, em nenhum dos dois (casos). Se (a noção) existe na situação dos dois (casos), então, não é abstraída desta situação, em absoluto. Me refiro à situação particular, porém, foi suposto que (a noção) pode ser abstraída porque tem (algo) de 26 Situação: entenda-se o predicamento situação. 27 Ela: a noção. 96 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 96 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão comum com a situação particular. Ou, ainda, (a noção) não existe em nenhum (dos casos) – e isto é falso porque (a noção) tem situação nas essências concretas ou tem uma situação no intelecto e não tem situação fora (do intelecto) – e isto também é falso. Resta que não tenha situação no inteligível e tenha situação fora. Caso o corpo a conceber no inteligível, terá, também, uma situação no inteligível – e isto é impossível. Não há uma faculdade nos corpos que exija ou execute coisas infinitas. Os inteligíveis que o intelecto intelige por intermédio delas, como, por exemplo, as formas numéricas, o formato, e outras coisas sem fim. Assim sendo, esta faculdade não está num corpo porque há para cada corpo uma faculdade ativa finita; não me refiro (à faculdade) passiva. Se é assim, não se proíbe. Com efeito, ficou evidenciado para você que quem percebe os inteligíveis, e neste caso é a alma humana, é uma substância que não se associa à matéria; é isenta de corpos, sua essência é isolada pela subsistência e pelo intelecto. Sobre as questões do céu e do mundo Os corpos ou são simples ou são compostos. Os simples são os que não se dividem em corpos de naturezas distintas como, por exemplo, os céus e a terra; a água, o ar e o fogo. Os corpos compostos são os que se decompõem em corpos de formas distintas a partir dos quais se formaram como, por exemplo, o vegetal e o animal. Os corpos simples são anteriores aos compostos. Estes corpos simples podem ser necessários para a formação de corpos compostos por seu intermédio, ou não são necessários para isto. Todo corpo que aceita a composição a partir dele mesmo, é necessário que se separe de sua posição natural violentamente28. É correto afirmar que todo corpo que tem esta qualidade possui um princípio de movimento retilíneo. Toda coisa que não tem um princípio de movimento retilíneo, ela não é um princípio para que haja composição a partir dela. 28 Violentamente: uma vez que o corpo já tem uma posição natural então, não se afasta desta posição naturalmente porque a tendência dele é permanecer em seu lugar natural. Daí o motivo do uso da expressão "violentamente". 9797 Os elementos29 são os corpos pesados e leves e estão associados aos primeiros sensíveis30 relativos às qualidades. Os primeiros sensíveis são os relativos ao tato. Por isto, não há na esfera dos corpos de movimento retilíneo um corpo que não tenha uma qualidade tátil, mas está isento das qualidades relativas à alimentação, ao paladar e ao olfato. Os primeiros táteis são o calor e o frio, o úmido e o seco. Porém, o equivale a estes: ou é formado a partir deles ou é seu concomitante31. Quanto ao que é formado: é o exemplo da viscosidade que se forma em função da acentuada união do úmido e do seco. Quanto ao concomitante, é como a debilidade natural; segue o calor. O que é liso de modo natural segue a umidade. Os corpos simples são quentes e frios; úmidos e secos. Se se misturarem, resulta disso calor seco e este é o fogo; especialmente o puro, que é parte da chama. A outra parte é a fumaça. Resulta também, calor úmido que é o ar. Se (o ar) não fosse quente, não se agitaria deslizando na água, e (resulta) o frio que está na parte baixa em função da mistura com o vapor da água que o domina próximo à terra e é mais potente, pois, é (onde) acabam os raios do sol que são refletidos da terra, que dizer, em primeiro lugar aquilo que aquece a terra ( solo). E, segundo; o que está próximo: se cessar (aquilo que aquece) haverá vapor frio e, em seguida, ar quente puro. Porém, sua umidade existe porque acercou-se dos corpos e os abandonou por ambiguidade e submeteu-se (aos corpos) na separação e na continuidade. Há ainda o frio úmido, ou seja, a água. Não há dúvida quanto a ela. Há também o frio e seco, que é a terra; não há algo mais seco do que a terra, mas o frio da terra é friccionado pela densidade e pelo peso da mesma. O lugar do que é quente está acima do lugar daquilo que tem menos frio. Nos dois casos, o mais seco tem excesso mais acentuado, quero dizer, o frio e o seco são mais pesados; o quente seco é mais leve. 29 Elementos. Tradução da palavra árabe 'ustuqusát, plural de 'ustuqus, isto é, elemento. A noção de elemento aqui refere-se especificamente ao elemento que entra como parte num corpo composto. 30 Os primeiros sensíveis. É uma menção aos sentidos. 31 Concomitante: o mesmo que consequente. 98 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 98 AviCenA • A fiLosofiA e suA divisão Metafísica (ilahiyát) Em nome de Deus o clemente, o misericordioso32 O ser pode ser qualificado como sendo uno ou múltiplo; como total ou parcial ou, ainda, como estando em ato ou em potência. Pode, ainda, ser qualificado como equivalente à alguma coisa e, também, pode ser qualificado como estando em movimento, ou como ser humano ou outra coisa. Todavia, não é possível que seja qualificado como equivalente a algo a não ser que se torne quantidade. E não é possível que seja qualificado como estando em movimento ou em repouso, ou ser humano, a menos que se torne um corpo natural. Assim sendo, aquilo que não se mantém matematicamente33 não pode ser qualificado pela mesma via que seguem aqueles que recebem estes atributos. Ademais, algo que não se sustenta naturalmente34 não pode ser qualificado pela mesma via que outros (que se mantêm naturalmente) seguem. Porém, para ser uno ou múltiplo, não há necessidade de converter-se em matemática ou naturalmente. Todavia, sendo um ser geral, lhe é apropriado que seja qualificado pela unidade ou pela multiplicidade e o que se menciona com elas35. Portanto, a unidade e a multiplicidade são acidentes essenciais36 presentes no ser e se lhe apresentam enquanto ser. Se não fosse isto, o ser único não seria senão matemática ou naturalmente. Assim, portanto, o ser enquanto ser, tem acidentes essenciais e o 32 É comum os muçulmanos começaram suas atividades com esta frase de louvor a Deus e Avicena sempre primou por este costume. 33 Matematicamente: esta palavra é utilizada aqui com o sentido de quantidade. Então, um tradução alternativa seria: "aquilo que não se mantém quantitativamente". Optouse pela palavra matematicamente por uma questão de fidelidade à palavra riyádiyan utilizada no texto. 34 Naturalmente: é uma referência àquilo que não se mantém por si mesmo, por sua natureza, por sua essência. 35 O que se menciona com elas. É uma menção às coisas que podem ser acrescidas ao ser e que por sua própria natureza não o acompanham. 36 Essenciais: relativos à essência. 9999 sujeito da filosofia primeira é o ser enquanto ser e sua questão37 são os acidentes essenciais do ser enquanto ser como, por exemplo, a unidade, a multiplicidade, a causalidade e outras coisas. É provável que o ser esteja presente para que transforme alguma coisas em ato mas, apenas como algo que ocorre em função de sua presença nesta coisa como, por exemplo, a brancura da roupa e a natureza do fogo no fogo; de modo que sua essência ocorra à uma outra essência que lhe é receptiva totalmente e estabelecida nele, não, porém, como (é estabelecida) uma estaca numa parede mas, ele (o ser) tem independência de essência isenta dela38. Mas, há coisas que não são assim. Então, diz-se quanto às (coisas) que não são (assim): há algo que advém à uma essência após sua concretização em ato por sua própria essência ou pelo que a concretiza, e isto chama-se acidente. Há algo cuja união à outra essência é uma união caracterizada em ato. E isto chama-se forma; e diz-se dos dois unidos receptáculo. O primeiro dos dois tem sujeito e o segundo matéria primeira (hayúla) e matéria segunda. Tudo que não está num sujeito – estando ou não numa matéria primeira e matéria (segunda) – chama-se substância (jawhar). As substâncias são quatro: substância, mesmo não estando num sujeito e numa matéria e substância que está numa matéria. A primeira parte divide-se em três: ou esta substância é matéria ou possui matéria, ou não é matéria nem possui matéria. O que não possui matéria e não está nela, então, pertence a ela. Toda coisa que pertence à matéria, mas não está na matéria, necessita de acréscimo à matéria. Este (acréscimo) é a forma, e esta é a substância composta. E as substâncias são quatro: quididade (máhiya) sem matéria, matéria sem forma, forma numa matéria e substância composta de matéria e forma. 37 Sua questão: o mesmo que "o que lhe diz respeito". 38 Dela: da coisa. berkeLey e A terra incognita dA fiLosofiA: perCepção, LinguAgem, iLusão100 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 100 101101 george BERkElEy nasce em 1684 na Irlanda, filho de pais luteranos. Faz seus estudos no Trinity College em Dublin e publica duas de suas mais importantes obras com apenas 25 e 26 anos de idade: o Ensaio Para uma Nova Teoria da Visão, em 1709, e o Princípios do Conhecimento Humano, em 1710. Berkeley faz várias viagens pela Europa como tutor de filhos de aristocratas ingleses. Recebendo uma inesperada herança, planeja a fundação de um colégio missionário nas ilhas Bermudas. Em 1728, após receber do governo inglês a promessa de uma soma complementar para a realização de seu projeto, Berkeley parte para os Estados Unidos, onde reside por três anos em Newport, Rhode Island. Não recebendo o financiamento prometido, Berkeley volta à Inglaterra e a partir de 1732 passa a exercer funções de prelado Luterano na cidade de Cloyne, Irlanda, até sua morte em 1753. Outras obras importantes de Berkeley: Sobre o Movimento (1721); Alcyphron (1732); Teoria da Visão Defendida e Explicada (1733); O Analista (1734); Siris (1744). Introdução As obras mais conhecidas de Berkeley são o "Princípios do ConheGeorge Berkeley e a Terra Incognita da Filosofia: percepção, Linguagem, Ilusão berkeLey e A terra incognita dA fiLosofiA: perCepção, LinguAgem, iLusão102 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 102 cimento Humano" e o "Três Diálogos entre Hilas e Philonous", não por acaso as mais traduzidas e publicadas. A primeira, inacabada, é mais sistemática e caracterizada por uma cerrada disputa acadêmica. A segunda, na tradição dos diálogos, que atravessa toda a história da filosofia desde Platão, é um livro de divulgação, destinado a um público amplo. Já o "Ensaio para uma Nova Teoria da Visão" é eminentemente crítico e propedêutico. Apesar da grande aceitação que obteve na época de sua publicação, com o tempo foi sendo obscurecido pela grande repercussão provocada pela tese defendida no Princípios: a substâncis espiritual e a substância infinita de Descartes podem ser unificadas na substância espiritual. Tomando esta obra como referência, a história da filosofia até muito recentemente apresentou Berkeley como um idealista excêntrico que nega a existência da matéria fora do espírito. Porém o Ensaio revela uma outra face de Berkeley. Ali a palavra "substância" sequer é mencionada. O que salta aos olhos, por outro lado, é o quanto Berkeley prenuncia uma estratégia que se tornará central à filosofia do século XX: a busca de causas ocultas dos problemas filosóficos aparentemente insolúveis. É este aspecto de seu pensamento que privilegiamos na escolha dos excertos traduzidos para esta antologia. Na época do assim chamado grande racionalismo (século XVII) ocorre uma proliferação de filosofias que pode ser vista como sintoma de um descompasso entre o evidente aumento do poder explicativo da ciência moderna e o anseio da filosofia em desvendar os fundamentos últimos dos processos que tornam possível o conhecimento e por conseguinte este progresso. É exemplar, neste sentido, a grande quantidade de sofisticadas respostas à questão tida por todos como fundamental neste momento: como se dá a relação entre matéria e espírito? Apesar de possuírem naturezas evidentemente distintas estas duas realidades devem poder se comunicar, caso contrário não haveria passagem possível da percepção das coisas materiais para a enunciação de discursos científicos sobre a realidade e nem desta para a produção das tecnologias que a transforma e domina. No entanto, esta rica multiplicidade dos sistemas pode também ser visto como um sintoma de fraqueza. Na introdução ao 103103 Princípios, Berkeley lamenta: como garantir a credibilidade da filosofia se, ao invés de responder a esta demanda por fundamentos e satisfazer nossos anseios de paz de espírito, ela nos inunda com uma multiplicidade teorias que geram disputas e dúvidas e sem fim? Depois de fazer levantar uma espessa poeira de palavras, a própria filosofia reclama por não conseguir mais ver com clareza aquilo que aparece como claro e sem problemas ao homem comum ... Nunca é demais enfatizar a importância do tema da ambivalência do discurso verbal na filosofia de Berkeley. Sem palavras não é possível a teoria mas elas se constituem, por outro lado, numa espécie de véu que recobre as aparências imediatas das coisas, evidentes antes de serem feitas objeto de ciência e de filosofia. A estratégia de Berkeley na Nova Teoria da Visão consiste, pois, em colocar em questão o próprio sentido da pergunta que gera tantas respostas inconciliáveis entre si. Se compararmos esta análise com uma investigação de tipo terapêutica, onde a cura depende de uma busca prévia das causas de um distúrbio, as múltiplas teorias que tentam resolver a questão aparecem como remédios paliativos que oferecem alívio apenas momentâneo. O diagnóstico mais profundo procurado por Berkeley visa a identificação das causas primeiras de certas ilusões que geram na filosofia a aparente necessidade de se procurar por um fundamento metafísico da realidade percebida. Em outras palavras, trata-se de esclarecer como e por que certas condições inerentes à condição humana em seus diversos aspectos – percepção, ação, comunicação – não só determinam a visão comum de mundo mais apropriada a sobrevivência como também podem gerar questões metafísicas carentes de sentido e portanto sem solução possível. Em Descartes o mundo material é regido por uma regularidade causal inexorável. A relação entre os objetos materiais e sua representação espiritual se funda nesta relação causal e também num mecanismo de correspondência entre ideias e coisas que se funda, se não numa semelhança pura e simples, pelo menos numa correspondência estrutural e constante. As coisas materiais são desta forma representadas no espírito. A distinção entre qualidades primeiras e segunda, por sua vez, berkeLey e A terra incognita dA fiLosofiA: perCepção, LinguAgem, iLusão104 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 104 tenta resolver a aparente contradição entre a infinita variabilidade das sensações e a estabilidade sem a qual a realidade material não poderia ser objeto de conhecimento. A cor ou o som, infinitamente variáveis, acidentais, são exemplos de qualidades segundas. A extensão e o número, expressões da própria essência da substância material, necessários, são exemplos de qualidades primeiras. Berkeley transfere o foco de supostas relações entre ideias-representações e coisas-originais para as relações que as ideias mantêm entre si. Os vários sentidos (visão, audição, tato etc.) passam a ser considerados como as classes mais fundamentais nas quais as ideias estão organizadas. A relação entre ideias pertencentes a duas classes distintas será caracterizada como sendo de significação1 e não de representação. Ao contrário da relação representativa, a significação não precisa ser fundada em causalidade ou semelhança. É uma relação convencional, contingente e portanto não requer justificação em termos de relação necessária. O problema que resta é o da justificação da regularidade destas relações contingentes, pois obviamente não seria possível a ciência e nem a ação humana mais simples sem um mínimo de estabilidade na relação entre ideias. Em Descartes Deus (substância infinita) garante a necessária correspondência entre as representações e as coisas (substância espiritual e substância material). Para Berkeley as aparências sensíveis constituem uma linguagem divina. Por ser uma linguagem, torna-se obsoleto o problema da justificação de uma relação necessária entre as ideias e as coisas. Por ser divina fica garantida a regularidade das relações significante, sem a qual a realidade seria tanto inabitável quanto ininteligível. O mundo material continua sendo tão real quanto em Descartes mas desaparece a necessidade de se supor algo para além de sua aparência sensível. Trata-se evidentemente de uma ontologia mais econômica: a quantidade de substâncias é reduzida ao mínimo, a realidade é simplificada, o problema da correspondência entre substâncias é dissolvido e mesmo problemas ópticos resistentes à explicação pela óptica geomética recebem soluções satisfatórias. 1 Significação entendida como "substituição", "estar no lugar de". Associada ao hábito e à memória, pode também pode ser entendida como "antecipação": se percebo regularmente ideias de um sentido associadas à ideias de outro sentido, a cada vez que percebo as primeira antecipo a percepção das segundas. 105105 Mas por que o modelo cartesiano parece mais "natural"? Esta é a questão fundamental que Berkeley quer esclarecer nos fragmentos da Nova Teoria da Visão que aqui apresentamos. A eficácia da ação necessária à sobrevivência (obtenção de alimentos, fuga, acasalamento etc.) depende de um poder de previsão cuja diferença em relação ao poder de antecipação da razão é apenas de grau. O espaço visual é constituído por um conjunto de índices que evocam o tempo necessário para que o corpo entre em contato direto (tátil) com as coisas. As coisas percebidas ganham unidade e individualidade por serem objetos da ação humana, antes de serem objeto do pensamento ou da linguagem. Apesar de parecer evidente que as ideias dos diversos sentidos são diversos aspectos de uma mesma coisa, uma análise crítica mostra que isto; mais uma crença do que uma necessidade lógica. Ideias auditivas, visuais e táteis são todas signos enquanto cumprem esta função antecipadora, mas heterogêneas entre si se consideradas nelas mesmas. Mas por que, então, a concepção comum de mundo transmuta-se no problema metafísico da justificação de uma realidade transcendente à percepção? Porque a esta imagem "natural" do mundo – que em cada espécie animal varia de acordo com o aparato biológico que possui2 – vem se sobrepor, no caso humano, a linguagem das palavras, sobretudo em sua função básica de nomeação. Aristóteles já afirmava que as coisas são infinitas, enquanto que as palavras são em número limitado3. A linguagem só pode funcionar, pois, se uma palavra puder significar várias coisas ao mesmo tempo. O problema é que ela pode nomear coisas pertencentes a gêneros distintos. Com isso o que era uma relação puramente analógica passa a ser considerada, como resultado do uso reiterado da linguagem, uma relação natural e necessária. Dito de outra maneira, o que era metáfora passa a receber um sentido literal que vai sendo cristalizado com uso. No próprio processo de significação, entre ideias de diversos sentidos ou entre palavras e ideias, o significante e o significado recebem um mesmo nome. Daí nossa tendência natural, diz Berkeley, 2 UEXKÜLL, J. Von. Mondes Animaux et Monde Humain, Tradução do original alemão de Georges Kriszat. Paris: Danöel, 1965. 3 ARISTÓTELES, Refutações Sofísticas, 1,165,a,16. berkeLey e A terra incognita dA fiLosofiA: perCepção, LinguAgem, iLusão106 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 106 em considerar como sendo de mesma natureza ideias tão heterogênas quanto as da visão e as do tato. A palavra "mesa", enquanto significante, é uma marca sensível, possui uma realidade própria, revelada por qualidades particulares (determinada cor, tamanho etc.) e portanto poderia receber um nome próprio. Mas não damos a ela um nome específico porque o que nos interessa é sobretudo o que é significado (a mesa "real" com a qual interagimos). Do mesmo modo, uma ideia visual tampouco recebe um nome distinto da ideia tátil que ela substitui e antecipa. Desde que começamos a exercer a faculdade perceptiva na primeira infância, a conexão entre imagem visual e imagem tátil é tão constante e regular que sua identidade, de tão óbvia, jamais é questionada. E porque os mesmos signos visuais representam as mesmas ideias táteis para todos os homens e em todos os lugares, seu caráter convencional deixa de ser reconhecido como tal. Desde que começamos a dominar a linguagem, a palavra "mesa" significa tanto a mesa visual quanto a mesa tátil. Muito dificilmente podemos deixar de assim considerá-la, da mesma forma como é praticamente impossível ver ou ouvir o nome de uma pessoa sem que sua fisionomia nos venha imediatamente à memória. Esta relação analógica entre ideias de diversos sentidos, reforçada pelas palavras que as nomeiam, adquire uma aparência de literalidade que, útil e necessária na vida prática, é geradora de falsos problemas quando se torna objeto de uma filosofia obcecada por fundamentos metafísicos. "Se um cego de nascença passasse a ver e a ele fosse apresentado um cubo e uma esfera que ele anteriormente conhecera apenas com o tato, seria ele capaz de dizer qual é o cubo e qual é a esfera utilizando-se apenas da visão?" Esta é a formulação clássica do famoso "problema de Molyneux", que instigou não só Berkeley como vários pensadores de sua época. Esta questão fascinava tanto porque acreditava-se que sua solução resolveria questões filosóficas importantes, como o problema da existência das ideias inatas. Berkeley a retoma porque acredita ver ali a possibilidade de uma prova empírica adicional da tese da heterogeneidade essencial entre as ideias de diferentes sentidos. A resposta que ele sugere é decididamente negativa: o cego que recobrasse a visão não poderia perceber imediatamente o mundo visual tal como nós estamos acostumados a fazê-lo. Seria necessário um tempo de aprendizado para que pudesse "ler" as informações 107107 trazidas pela luz e pelas cores aos seus olhos, ou seja, para que pudesse relacionar ideias visuais com sensações táteis, tivesse uma noção exata dos objetos como coisas separadas do todo, concebesse as ideia de figura e fundo, distância, tamanho, posição etc. O fato é que esta experiência de pensamento acabou se tornando uma experiência real com a realização da primeira operação de cataratas pelo cirurgião inglês William Cheselden em 1728. Apesar de Berkeley apresentar o resultado da operação do cego como favorável a si, o desdobramento futuro da questão4 mostra que todos foram vítimas da ilusão de que uma questão metafísica pudesse ser resolvida por experimentos empíricos: jamais se chegou a uma conclusão definitiva porque, ironicamente, nunca se alcançou consenso sobre a interpretação a ser dada ao relato que o cego operado faz de sua experiência subjetiva! Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de berkeley traduzidas Para o Português BERKELEY, G. Tratado sobre os princípios do conhecimento humano e Três diálogos entre Hilas e Filonous. Tradução de Antonio Sergio. São Paulo: Abril Cultura,1980. (Coleção Os Pensadores). BERKELEY, G. Um Ensaio para uma Nova Teoria da Visão e A Teoria da Visão Confirmada e Explicada, in Cadernos de História e Filosofia da Ciência, Campinas: C.L.E. Unicamp, Série 3, v. 18, no 2, págs. 447-584, julho-dezembro/2008. Trad. de José Oscar de Almeida Marques. obras sobre berkeley BERMAN, D. Filosofia experimental de Berkeley. São Paulo: Unesp, 2000. STRATHERN, P. Berkeley em 90 minutos. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2003. audiovisuais À PRIMEIRA vista. Direção de Irwin Winkler. Estados Unidos: Fox/Videolar, 1998. 1 DVD, (126 min.): son., col., NTSC. JANELA da Alma. Direção de Walter Carvalho e João Jardim. Brasil: Europa Filmes, 2002. 1 DVD, (73 min.): son., col., NTSC. 4 PROUST, J. (Org.). Perception et Intermodalité: Approches actuelles de la question de Molyneux. Paris: PUF, 1997. 108 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 108 berkeLey • ensAio pArA umA novA teoriA dA visão eNSAIO pARA uMA NOVA teORIA DA VISãO 1 1. Meu objetivo é mostrar o modo como percebemos pela visão a distância, o tamanho e posição dos objetos. E também considerar a diferença existente entre as ideias da visão e do tato e se há alguma ideia comum a estes dois sentidos. 2. E penso que seja por todos aceito que a distância, imediatamente e em si mesma, não pode ser percebida. Pois sendo a distância uma linha que vai diretamente ao fundo do olho, ela projeta apenas um ponto no fundo do mesmo, ponto este que permanece invariavelmente o mesmo, sejam as distâncias mais longas ou mais curtas. 41. [...] um homem nascido cego, passando a ver, não teria inicialmente ideia de distância pela visão; o sol e as estrelas, os mais remotos objetos, assim como os mais próximos, a ele pareceriam estar todos em seu olho, ou melhor dizendo, em sua mente. Os objetos introduzidos pela visão lhe pareceriam ser (como o são na verdade) nada mais do que um novo conjunto de pensamentos ou sensações, cada um deles sentido como estando tão próximo quanto as percepções de dor ou prazer, ou as paixões mais íntimas de sua alma. Pois nosso julgamento de objetos 1 BERKELEY, G. Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision. In:_____. The Works of George Berkeley. Edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop. Edinburgo: Thomas Nelson and Sons,1948. v.1. 109109 percebidos pela visão como estando à distância, ou fora da mente, devese inteiramente ao efeito da experiência, que ainda não poderia ter sido adquirida alguém nestas circunstâncias. 42. As coisas se passariam de outra forma se, de acordo com a suposição mais aceita, o homem julga a distância pelo ângulo dos eixos ópticos, exatamente como alguém no escuro ou um homem cego o faria a partir do ângulo formado por dois bastões que segurasse, um em cada mão. Pois se isto fosse verdade, seguir-se-ia que alguém cego desde o nascimento e que recebesse a visão não precisaria de nenhuma nova experiência para perceber a distância com a vista. [...] 43. Talvez após um uma investigação rigorosa cheguemos à conclusão de que mesmo aqueles que, tendo desde seu nascimento crescido no hábito contínuo de ver, estejam irremediavelmente afetados pelo prejuízo inverso, ou seja, pensando que o que veem está à distância deles. Pois neste momento parece ser em geral aceito por todos aqueles que pensaram sobre o assunto, que as cores, que são os objetos próprios e imediatos da visão, não estão fora da mente. Mas então – dirá alguém – pela visão temos também as ideias de extensão, figura e movimento, podendo todas elas ser consideradas como estando fora e à alguma distância da mente, ao contrário da cor. Em resposta a isto eu apelo à experiência de qualquer homem e pergunto se a extensão visível de qualquer objeto não aparece tão próximo deles quanto a cor daquele objeto e, além disso, se não parecem estar eles ambos no mesmo lugar. Não é a extensão que vemos colorida? É possível para nós, ainda que em pensamento, separar e abstrair a cor da extensão? Ora, onde quer que esteja a extensão, certamente ali estará também a figura e o movimento. [...] 44. Mas para uma explicação mais completa deste ponto, e para mostrar que os objetos imediatos da visão não são como ideias ou semelhanças de coisas situadas à distância, é preciso que olhemos mais de perto o problema e observemos cuidadosamente o que se quer significar, no discurso comum, quando se diz que o que se vê está à distância. Suponha, por exemplo, que olhando para a lua eu diga que ela está distante de mim cinquenta ou sessenta semidiâmetros da terra. Vejamos de que lua se está falando. Ora, é claro que não pode ser da lua visível, nem de qualquer coi110 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 110 berkeLey • ensAio pArA umA novA teoriA dA visão sa semelhante à lua visível ou àquilo que eu vejo, que é apenas um plano luminoso e redondo de aproximadamente trinta pontos visíveis de diâmetro. Pois no caso de eu ser transportado, do lugar onde eu estou diretamente em direção à lua, evidentemente o objeto vai variar continuamente enquanto ou avanço, e quando eu tiver avançado cinquenta ou sessenta semidiâmetros da terra, de modo algum perceberei algo que se assemelhe a uma superfície redonda, pequena e luminosa. O objeto simplesmente terá desaparecido e se eu quisesse recobrá-lo, deveria voltar para a terra, de onde partira. Ou ainda, suponha que eu perceba pela visão uma obscura e indistinta ideia de algo que eu não tenho certeza tratar-se de um homem, uma árvore ou uma torre, mas que julgo estar a uma distância de aproximadamente uma milha. Evidentemente eu não posso querer dizer que o que vejo está distante uma milha ou que aquilo é a imagem ou semelhança de qualquer coisa que está distante uma milha, já que a cada passo que eu der na sua direção sua aparência se alterará e, de obscura, pequena e fraca, tornar-se-á clara, grande e vigorosa. E quando eu chegar ao final da milha, o que eu vi inicialmente estará totalmente perdido e nem encontrarei qualquer coisa que a ele se assemelhe. 45. Neste e em outros caso a verdade é que, tendo por muito tempo experimentado certas ideias percebidas pelo tato, como distância, figura tangível e solidez, serem conectadas com certas ideias da visão, ao perceber estas ideias da visão eu imediatamente concluo quais são as ideias que, pelo habitual curso ordinário da Natureza devem seguirse. Olhando para um objeto eu percebo uma certa figura visível e cores, com algum grau de obscuridade e outras circunstâncias que, pelo que eu tinha anteriormente observado, determinam-me a pensar que, se eu avançar um certo número de passos ou milhas, serei afetado por tais e tais ideias do tato. De forma que, na verdade e rigorosamente falando, eu não percebo nem a distância nela mesma nem qualquer coisa que eu considere estar à distância. Ou seja, nem a distância e nem coisas situadas à distância são, elas próprias ou suas ideias, verdadeiramente percebidas pela visão. Disto estou convencido no que diz respeito a mim mesmo e acredito que quem quer que observe com cuidado seus próprios pensamentos e examine o que quer significar ao dizer que vê esta ou aquela 111111 coisa à distância, concordará comigo que o que ele vê apenas sugere ao seu entendimento que após percorrer determinada distância, a ser medida pela ação de seu corpo – percebido pelo tato – irá perceber tais e tais ideias tangíveis que têm sido regularmente conectadas com tais e tais ideias visíveis. Mas para sermos convencidos de que podemos ser enganados por estas sugestões dos sentidos e que não há uma conexão necessária entre ideias visíveis e ideias táteis por elas sugeridas, basta observarmos um espelho ou quadro. Note que, quando eu falo de ideias tangíveis, eu uso a palavra ideia para significar, no sentido amplo em que tem sido usado pelos modernos, qualquer objeto imediato dos sentidos ou do entendimento. 46. Do que foi dito resulta como consequência evidente que as ideias de espaço, exterioridade e coisas colocadas à distância não constituem, estritamente falando, o objeto da visão. Elas não são percebidas mais pelo olho do que pelo ouvido. Sentado em meu escritório ouço um coche rodar pela rua; olho através do janela e vejo-o; saio e nele entro. O discurso comum poderia levar-me a pensar que eu ouvi, vi e toquei a mesma coisa, ou seja, o coche. No entanto, é certo que as ideias recebidas por cada sentido são largamente diferentes e distintas umas das outras. Por serem constantemente observadas juntas, a elas nos referimos como se fossem uma e mesma coisa. Pela variação do ruído eu percebo as diferentes as distâncias em que se encontra o coche e sei, antes de olhar para fora, que ele se aproxima. Pelos ouvidos eu percebo a distância, portanto, exatamente da mesma forma como o faço com os olhos. 47. No entanto, eu não digo que ouço a distância da mesma maneira como digo que a vejo, pois as ideias da audição não estão tão sujeitas a serem confundidas com as ideias do tato quanto as da visão. Pois se uma pessoa pode facilmente ser convencido de que o objeto próprio da audição são não os objetos e coisas externas e sim os sons, mediante os quais a ideia deste ou daquele corpo, ou de distância, são sugeridas aos seus pensamentos, dificuldade maior encontramos, para discernir a diferença existente entre ideias da visão e ideias do tato, ainda que seja evidente que um homem não vê e sente a mesma coisa tanto quanto não a ouve e sente. 112 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 112 berkeLey • ensAio pArA umA novA teoriA dA visão 48. Uma das razões disso me parece ser o seguinte: acredita-se que é um grande absurdo imaginar que uma e mesma coisa possa ter mais do que uma extensão ou uma figura. Mas a extensão e a figura de um corpo, sendo introduzidos na mente de duas maneiras e indiferentemente, pela visão ou pelo tato, parece seguir-se que vemos a mesma extensão e a mesma figura que tocamos. 49. Mas se considerarmos as coisas cuidadosamente e mais de perto e, seremos obrigados a reconhecer que nunca vemos e tocamos um único e mesmo objeto. O que é visto é uma coisa e o que é tocado é outra. Se a figura e a extensão visíveis não são o mesmo que as extensões e figuras tangíveis, então não precisamos inferir que uma e mesma coisa tem diversas extensões. A verdadeira consequência é que o objeto da visão e o objeto do tato são duas coisas distintas. Talvez seja necessária alguma reflexão para se conceber corretamente esta distinção. E a dificuldade parece ter aumentado consideravelmente, pois a combinação de ideias visíveis recebe constantemente o mesmo nome da combinação de ideias táteis com as quais ela está conectada, o que resulta necessariamente do uso e fim da linguagem. 50. Para tratar da visão clara e minuciosamente precisamos, portanto, ter em mente que há dois tipos de objetos apreendidos pelo olho: um que é apreendido primária e imediatamente e outro que o é secundariamente e através da intervenção do primeiro. Aqueles do primeiro tipo não são nem parecem estar fora da mente, ou à qualquer distância. Eles podem certamente ficar maiores ou menores, mais confusos, mais claros ou mais obscuros, mas eles não podem se aproximar nem se distanciar de nós. Sempre que dizemos que um objeto está distante, sempre que dizemos que ele se aproxima ou se afasta, devemos sempre significar um objeto do primeiro tipo, que pertence propriamente ao tato e que não é propriamente percebido e sim sugerido pelo olho, da mesma forma como os pensamentos são sugeridos pelo ouvido. 51. Tão logo ouvimos as palavras de uma linguagem familiar ser pronunciada em nossos ouvidos e as ideias a elas correspondentes se apresentam em nossas mentes. O som e o significado penetram no entendimento exatamente no mesmo instante, pois estão tão estreitamente 113113 unidos que está além do nosso poder manter afastado um sem a concomitante exclusão do outro. Na verdade agimos, em todas as situações, como se ouvíssemos os próprios pensamentos. Da mesma forma os objetos secundários, ou seja, aqueles que são apenas sugeridos pela visão, normalmente afetam-nos mais fortemente e são mais considerados do que os objetos próprios daquele sentido, pois entram juntos na mente e mantêm entre si uma conexão muito mais estrita do que aquela entre as ideias e as palavras. É por isso que julgamos ser tão difícil discernir entre os objetos mediatos e os objetos imediatos da visão e é por isso que somos tão inclinados a atribuir ao primeiro o que pertence apenas ao segundo. Eles estão, por assim dizer, intimamente entrelaçados, misturados e fundidos entre si. E o preconceito é reforçado e fixado em nossos pensamentos por uma longa duração, pelo uso da linguagem e pela falta de reflexão. Acredito, no entanto, que qualquer um que considere atentivamente o que já dissemos e o que ainda diremos antes de terminar (especialmente se o acompanhar com seu próprio pensamento) será capaz de livrar-se deste preconceito. Estou certo de que isto merece alguma atenção de todos que queiram compreender a verdadeira natureza da visão. 132. Uma confirmação adicional da nossa tese pode ser obtida da solução do problema do Sr. Molyneux, publicado pelo Sr. Locke em seu Ensaio e que eu quero apresentar aqui tal como ele aparece naquela obra, juntamente com a opinião do Sr. Locke sobre ele: "Imagine um homem nascido cego e que, agora adulto, aprendeu a distinguir pelo tato entre um cubo e uma esfera feitas do mesmo material e aproximadamente do mesmo tamanho, de modo a poder dizer, ao tocar um e outro, qual é o cubo e qual é a esfera. Suponha então que o cubo e a esfera sejam colocados sobre uma mesa, e que o homem cego passe a ver. Pergunta-se: poderia ele distinguir e dizer, fazendo uso da visão, antes de tê-los tocado, qual é a esfera e qual é o cubo?" Ao que o arguto e judicioso proponente responde: "Não. Pois ainda que ele tenha obtido a experiência de como uma esfera e de como um cubo afetam o tato, ele não obteve ainda a experiência de que o que afeta seu tato de tal ou tal maneira deve afetar sua visão de tal ou tal maneira; ou que um ângulo protuberante que pressionou sua mão no cubo de modo desigual deve aparecer aos seus olhos tal como no cubo." Eu concordo com a resposta dada a este problema por este sagaz cavalheiro, que tenho o orgulho de chamar de meu amigo, e sou da opinião de que o 114 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 114 berkeLey • ensAio pArA umA novA teoriA dA visão homem cego não seria capaz, à primeira vista, de dizer qual seria a esfera e qual seria o cubo, enquanto apenas os estivesse vendo." (Ensaio sobre o Entendimento Humano, Bii.C.9.S.8.). 135. Ficou devidamente evidenciado que um homem cego desde o seu nascimento não denominaria nenhuma coisa que visse pela primeira vez com os nomes que estava acostumado a relacionar às ideias do tato. Ele saberia que "cubo", "esfera", "mesa", eram palavras atribuídas a coisas percebidas pelo tato, mas não a coisas perfeitamente intangíveis às quais ele nunca viu serem aplicadas. Em seu uso costumeiro, aquelas palavras sempre representaram, para sua mente, corpos ou coisas sólidas que eram percebidas pela resistência que ofereciam. Mas não há solidez, nem resistência ou protuberância percebidos pela vista. Em suma, as ideias da visão são percepções inteiramente novas às quais não há nenhum nome associado em sua mente. Ele não pode, portanto, entender o que lhe é dito a seu respeito e a pergunta sobre qual é o cubo e qual é a esfera, a respeito dos dois corpos ele viu colocado sobre a mesa, seria para ele uma questão absolutamente cômica e ininteligível, pois nada do que ele vê poderia sugerir aos seus pensamentos a ideia de corpo, distância, ou, em geral, qualquer coisa que ele tenha já conhecido. 139. [...] como as extensões visíveis e as figuras vieram a ser chamadas pelo mesmo nome das extensões e figuras táteis, se não pertencem à mesma espécie destas? Deve ser algo mais do que um estado de ânimo ou um acidente o que gerou um costume tão constante e universal como este, que prevaleceu em todos os tempos e nações do mundo e entre todo tipo de homens, tanto eruditos quanto iletrados. 140. Ao que eu respondo: não podemos argumentar que um quadrado tangível e um quadrado visível sejam da mesma espécie porque são chamados pelo mesmo nome tanto quanto não podemos argumentar que o trissílabo formado por oito letras através do qual é marcado seja da mesma espécie que ele pelo fato de serem ambos chamados pelo mesmo nome. É comum chamar as palavras escritas e as coisas que elas significam pelo mesmo nome, pois não sendo as palavras vistas em sua própria natureza e em nenhum outro aspecto senão como marcas das 115115 coisas, seria supérfluo e fora dos propósitos da linguagem dar a elas outros nomes distintos daqueles das coisas que são por elas marcadas. A mesma razão é, também aqui, válida. As figuras visíveis são marcas das figuras tangíveis e é evidente [...] que elas recebem pouca atenção por elas mesmas ou à qualquer outro título que não sua conexão com figuras tangíveis que, por natureza, estão destinadas a significar. E é porque esta linguagem da natureza não deve variar em diferentes épocas ou nações, que em todo tempo e lugar as figuras visíveis são chamadas pelo mesmo nome das respectivas figuras tangíveis por elas sugeridas e não porque sejam semelhante ou porque pertençam a uma mesma espécie. 144. Precisamos admitir que não estamos tão sujeitos a confundir outros signos com as coisas por eles significadas ou a pensar que sejam da mesma espécie, como o estamos em relação às ideias táteis e as ideias visuais. Uma breve consideração nos mostrará, porém, como isto é possível, sem que tenhamos que supor serem elas de uma mesma natureza. Estes signos são constantes e universais, sua conexão com ideias tangíveis foram aprendidas desde nossa chegada ao mundo e, desde então, em quase todos os momentos de nossas vidas ele ocorre em nossos pensamentos, fixa-se e penetra cada vez mais profundamente nossa mente. Quando observamos que os signos são variáveis e produto de instituição humana; quando lembramos que houve um tempo em que eles não estavam conectadas, em nossas mentes, com aquelas coisas que agora tão prontamente sugerem mas que, pelo contrário, sua significação foi aprendida durante os lentos passos da experiência, tudo isso nos previne de confundi-las. Mas quando encontramos os mesmos signos sugerindo as mesmas coisas no mundo inteiro e pensamos que eles não são produto de uma convenção humana; quando não conseguimos lembrar que um dia aprendemos sua significação e acreditamos que, pelo contrário, à primeira vista eles nos teriam sugerido as mesmas coisas que nos sugerem agora; tudo isto nos persuade que eles são da mesma espécie das coisas que cada um representa e que é por semelhança natural que eles as sugerem às nossas mentes. 145. Acrescente-se a isto o fato de que sempre que consideramos detidamente um objeto, dirigindo sucessivamente o eixo óptico para 116 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 116 berkeLey • ensAio pArA umA novA teoriA dA visão cada um de seus pontos, há certas linhas e figuras descritas pelo movimento da cabeça ou do olho que, sendo na verdade percebidos pelo tato, misturam-se tão completamente com as ideias da visão que dificilmente conseguimos pensar que não pertencem a este sentido. Além disso, as ideias da visão adentram a mente várias ao mesmo tempo, de forma mais distinta e menos separada do que ocorre normalmente nos outros sentidos, com exceção do tato. Sons, por exemplo, percebidos no mesmo instante, tendem a fundir-se, por assim dizer, em um único som. Porém podemos perceber ao mesmo tempo uma grande variedade de objetos visíveis, muito separada e distintamente uns dos outros. Já os objetos táteis são constituídos de várias e distintas partes coexistentes, o que pode nos fornecer mais uma razão para nossa tendência a imaginar uma semelhança ou uma analogia entre eles e os objetos imediatos da visão. Mas nada, certamente, contribui mais para misturá-los e confundi-los numa coisa só do que a conexão íntima e estrita que elas mantém entre si. Não conseguimos abrir nossos olhos sem que as ideias de distância, corpos e figuras tangíveis sejam por eles sugeridos. Tão rápida, repentina e despercebida é a passagem das ideias visíveis para as ideias tangíveis, que dificilmente podemos deixar de considera-las como sendo igualmente o objeto imediato da visão. 147. Em suma, penso ser justo concluirmos que os objetos próprios da visão constituem uma linguagem universal do Autor2 da Natureza, através da qual somos instruídos sobre como regular nossas ações de modo a alcançar aquelas coisas que são necessárias para a preservação e bem estar de nossos corpos, como também para evitar tudo que possa ser a ele prejudicial e destrutivo. É principalmente através da informação que eles nos fornecem que somos guiados em todos os assuntos e cuidados da vida. E o modo pelo qual eles significam e nos indicam os objetos que estão à distância é igual ao da linguagem e dos signos nascidos de convenção humana, que não sugerem as coisas significadas por qualquer semelhança ou identidade de natureza e sim apenas pela habitual conexão que a experiência nos ensinou a observar entre eles. 2 Na primeira e segunda edições: "uma linguagem universal da Natureza". 117117 teORIA DA VISãO DeFeNDIDA e eXpLICADA 3 35. [...] Houve uma longa e íntima associação em nossas mentes entre as ideias da visão e do tato. É por isso que elas são consideradas como uma única coisa. Tal preconceito foi muito adequado aos propósitos da vida e a linguagem adequou-se a ele. A obra da ciência e da especulação é desfazer nossos preconceitos e enganos, deslindando as conexões mais intrincadas, distinguindo as coisas que são diferentes e fazendo com que deixem de ser confusas e obscuras, proporcionando-nos visões distintas, corrigindo gradualmente nosso julgamento e conduzindo-o a uma exatidão filosófica. [...] 36. No dispositivo da visão, assim como em outros casos, a providência divina parece ter consultado antes a operação do que a teoria dos homens. As coisas são admiravelmente adaptadas à primeira mas é exatamente por esta razão que a segunda frequentemente torna-se confusa. Pois tanto quanto estas sugestões imediatas e conexões constantes são úteis para o direcionamento de nossas ações, igualmente necessário 3 BERKELEY, G. Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained. In:_____. The Works of George Berkeley. I. Edited by A.A. Luce e T.E Jessop. Edinburgo: Thomas Nelson and Sons,1948.v. 1. 118 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 118 berkeLey • teoriA dA visão defendidA e eXpLiCAdA para a especulação e para o conhecimento da verdade é nosso distinguir entre coisas confundidas e separar coisas misturadas e como que fundidas umas nas outras. 43. Explicar como a mente ou a alma do homem simplesmente vê é uma coisa, e pertence à filosofia. Considerar partículas enquanto movendo-se em certas linhas, raios de luz enquanto refratados ou refletidos, ou cruzando-se, ou incluindo ângulos, é coisa bem distinta e pertence à geometria. Explicar o sentido da visão pelo mecanismo do olho é uma terceira coisa, que pertence à anatomia e aos experimentos. As duas últimas especulações são úteis na prática para corrigir os defeitos e remediar as desordens da visão, em concordância com as leis naturais vigentes neste sistema mundano. Mas a primeira teoria é que nos faz entender a verdadeira natureza da visão, considerada como uma faculdade da alma. Tal teoria, como já afirmei, pode ser reduzida a esta simples questão: "como é que um conjunto de ideias totalmente diferentes de ideias tangíveis pode, apesar disso, no-las sugerir, não havendo conexão necessária entre elas?". Ao que a resposta adequada é: "Isto se dá em virtude de uma conexão arbitrária, instituída pelo Autor da natureza". 44. O objeto próprio e imediato da visão é a luz, em todos seus modos e variações, cores que variam em espécie, em grau, em quantidade; algumas vivas, outras mais obscuras; mais de algumas e menos de outras; diversas em seus contornos ou limites; variadas em sua ordem e disposição. Um homem cego, ao ver pela primeira vez, poderia perceber estes objetos, nos quais há infinita variedade; porém ele não poderia nem perceber nem imaginar qualquer semelhança ou conexão entre estes objetos visíveis e aqueles percebidos pelo tato. Luz e sombra, juntamente com as cores, nada lhe sugeririam sobre os corpos, se macios ou sólidos, lisos ou ásperos. Nem poderiam suas quantidades, limites ou ordem lhe sugerir figuras geométricas, extensão ou situação, o que pelas suposições recebidas da tradição, isto é, de que estes objetos são comuns à visão e ao tato, deveriam fazê-lo. 45. Todos os vários tipos, combinações, quantidades, graus e disposições da luz e das cores seriam considerados, em sua primeira per119119 cepção, como sendo apenas um novo conjunto de sensações ou ideias. Como seriam inteiramente novas e desconhecidas, um homem nascido cego não daria a elas, ao vê-las pela primeira vez, os nomes das coisas anteriormente conhecidas e percebidas pelo seu tato. Mas, após alguma experiência, ele perceberia suas conexões com as coisas tangíveis e as consideraria então como signos, e a elas daria (como ocorre em outros casos) o mesmo nome das coisas significadas. 46. Mais e menos, maior e menor, dimensão, proporção, intervalo, são encontradas no tempo e no espaço mas daí não segue-se, necessariamente, que estas quantidades sejam homogêneas. Tampouco seguir-se-á, da atribuição de nomes comuns, que ideias visíveis sejam homogêneas àquelas do tato. É verdade que os termos utilizados para denotar extensão, figura, localização e movimento táteis, entre outros, são também empregados para denotar quantidade, relação e ordem dos objetos ou ideias propriamente visíveis da visão. Mas isto procede apenas da experiência e de analogia. Há um mais alto e um mais baixo nas notas musicais. Fala-se de tons mais altos e mais baixos. E isto, obviamente, nada mais é do que metáfora ou analogia. Assim também, para expressar a ordem das ideias visíveis, faz-se uso das palavras posição, alto e baixo, acima e abaixo, e seu sentido, quando assim utilizadas, é analógico. 47. Mas, no caso da visão, vamos além de uma suposta analogia entre naturezas diferentes e heterogêneas. Supomos haver uma identidade de natureza ou um e mesmo objeto comum a ambos os sentidos. E a este erro fomos induzidos: assim como os vários movimentos da cabeça, para cima e para baixo, para a direita e para a esquerda, são acompanhados de uma variação nas ideias visuais, igualmente passamos a considerar que aqueles movimentos e posições da cabeça, que na verdade são tangíveis, transferem seus atributos e denominações às ideias visíveis com as quais estão conectadas e que, deste modo, passam a ser chamadas de "alto" e "baixo" ou "direita" e "esquerda", e a serem marcadas por outros nomes indicando modos da posição que, antes de tal experiência, não teriam sido a ele atribuídos ou pelo menos não em sentido primário e literal. 71. Antes de concluir, não seria inútil acrescentar o seguinte ex120 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 120 berkeLey • teoriA dA visão defendidA e eXpLiCAdA trato do Philosophical Transactions, sobre uma pessoa cega desde seus infância que recobrou a visão muito mais tarde: "Quando viu pela primeira vez, era-lhe tão difícil fazer qualquer julgamento sobre distâncias que pensou que todos e quaisquer objetos que tocavam seus olhos (segundo suas palavras) o faziam tal como os objetos tocavam sua pele. E pensava que nenhum objeto era tão agradável quanto aqueles que eram lisos e regulares, ainda que não conseguisse formar nenhum julgamento de sua forma nem identificar o que é que, em cada objeto, o agradava. Ele não conhecia a forma de nada e nem sabia distinguir nenhuma coisa de outra, por mais diferente que fossem em forma e tamanho. Porém depois que lhe era dito que coisas correspondiam àquelas cujas formas ele já conhecia através do tato, ele dizia que poderia conhecê-las novamente. Mas se tivesse muitos objetos para aprender ao mesmo tempo, ele esquecia muitos deles. E (dizia ele), inicialmente aprendia e esquecia novamente milhares de coisas num único dia. Várias semanas depois de ter sido operado, ao ser iludido por imagens, ele perguntou qual era o sentido mentiroso: o tato ou a visão? Ele nunca foi capaz de imaginar qualquer linha além dos limites do que via. Ele sabia, disse ele, que o quarto em que estava não era senão uma parte da casa mas não conseguia conceber o fato de que a casa inteira pudesse parecer maior. Ele disse que cada novo objeto era uma novo deleite e que o prazer era tão grande que lhe faltavam palavras para expressá-lo". Portanto, aqueles pontos da teoria que pareciam os mais distantes da apreensão comum foram notavelmente confirmados por fato e experimento, anos depois de eu ter sido levado à sua descoberta pelo uso da razão. 121121 bornheim: estétiCA e CrítiCA122 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 122 123123 gerd alberto BORNhEIm nasceu em Caxias do Sul, RS, no dia 19 de novembro de 1929. Bacharelou-se em Filosofia pela PUC de Porto Alegre, em 1951. Viajou para Paris como bolsista da Aliança Francesa. Frequentou cursos na Sorbonne e nas universidades de Oxford (Inglaterra) e Freiburg (Alemanha). Foi professor dos cursos de Filosofia da PUC, Porto Alegre, e da Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras Cristo Rei, em São Leopoldo, embrião da Unisinos. Em 1963, na Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, defendeu a tese Motivação Básica e Atitude Originante do Filosofar em concurso de livre-docência. O texto de sua tese, com algumas modificações, foi publicado pela Editora Globo, de Porto Alegre, sob o título de Introdução ao Filosofar. O pensamento filosófico em bases existenciais. Na UFRGS, lecionou Introdução à Filosofia e Filosofia Geral. Ministrou aulas de Língua e Literatura Alemã na Faculdade de Letras e foi Diretor do Curso de Arte Dramática, da Faculdade de Filosofia, e responsável pela disciplina Teoria Geral do Teatro. No dia 29 de agosto de 1969, o Professor Gerd Bornheim foi cassado pelo regime militar e proibido de lecionar em qualquer outra univerBORNHeIM: eStÉtICA e CRÍtICA bornheim: estétiCA e CrítiCA124 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 124 sidade brasileira. Com a anistia, ingressou na Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, onde trabalhou até a aposentadoria. Na última etapa de sua carreira, lecionou na Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. No dia 06 de setembro de 2002, faleceu, aos 72 anos, no Rio de Janeiro. Como professor, Gerd Bornheim impressionava pela sólida formação humanística, vasta cultura e apurada sensibilidade estética. Não se restringia à obra e doutrina dos grandes pensadores, mas descortinava novos horizontes construindo pontes com a literatura, a música, a pintura, o cinema e, sobretudo, o teatro. Em suas aulas de Introdução à Filosofia, nas décadas de 1950 e 60, sabia, como poucos, despertar o interesse dos alunos para o estudo da Fenomenologia, Husserl à frente, e dos filósofos da existência, particularmente Heidegger e Sartre. Aliás, ele foi uma das maiores autoridades em Sartre, no Brasil. O livro Sartre. Metafísica e Existencialismo, de 1971, continua indispensável para quem quiser se aventurar na obra do existencialista francês. Sobre o Gerd conferencista e ensaísta, vem a pêlo o testemunho do Professor Ernildo Stein, seu aluno no Curso de Filosofia: "Era essa seriedade que o filósofo transmitia em suas análises detalhadas que o transformou num dos grandes conferencistas-filósofos solicitado pelos centros culturais do país. Dessa maneira foi-se difundindo um estilo próprio que se objetivou em sua importante obra escrita. Os livros de Bornheim permanecerão, por isso, uma continuação essencial de sua atividade"1. Merece citada e enaltecida sua contribuição ao teatro. Além do livro Brecht: a Estética do Teatro, seus artigos foram reunidos nas coletâneas O sentido e a máscara, Teatro: a Cena Dividida, e Páginas de filosofia da arte. 1 STEIN, E. Bornheim, um intelectual entre a filosofia e a cultura. Zero Hora, Porto Alegre, 14 set. 2002, Cultura, p. 8. 125125 "Gênese e Metamorfose da Crítica" No Colóquio "Morte da Arte, hoje", realizado na Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, de 15 a 18 de abril de 1993, o Prof. Gerd Bornheim proferiu a conferência "Gênese e Metamorfose da Crítica", cujo texto foi incluído na coletânea Páginas de filosofia da arte, de 19982. Filósofo, esteta e crítico, munido de consistente aparato teórico, Bornheim tinha todos os requisitos para discorrer sobre o tema escolhido. O ponto de partida é a distinção entre crítica em sentido amplo, que "acompanha a própria condição humana", e crítica em sentido restrito, como "comentário a propósito das letras e das artes"3. No que diz respeito ao Ocidente, as origens da crítica remontam a Platão e Aristóteles. Aliás, Platão, "o primeiro grande esteta do Ocidente" é a figura dominante da palestra. A metamorfose do título é anunciada por meio de algumas perguntas. Por exemplo: "a partir de que lugar passou a constituir-se essa nova Crítica?" Note-se que nova crítica não tem nada a ver com o movimento americano de crítica literária, das décadas de 1930, 40 e 50, conhecido como New Criticism. Pois a nova crítica sucedeu à antiga, chamada às vezes de crítica aristotélico-horaciana, devido à relevância histórica da Poética, de Aristóteles, e da Arte Poética, de Horácio. O fulcro da argumentação é o conceito de imitação. Após ter comentado o passo célebre do Livro X, de A República (a produção da cama), Bornheim estabelece um paralelo entre o conceito de imitação e o de verdade. Embora Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) não tenha sido citado, sua presença se faz sentir, pois se deve a ele a descoberta da noção original de verdade: "o que para a fenomenologia dos atos conscientes se realiza como o automostrar-se dos fenômenos é pensado mais originariamente por Aristóteles e por todo o pensamento e existência dos gregos como Alétheia, como o desvelamento do que se pre-senta, 2 BORNHEIM, G. Gênese e Metamorfose da Crítica. In:_____. Páginas de filosofia da arte. Rio de Janeiro: UAPÊ, 1998. p. 117-130. 3 Ibidem, p. 117. bornheim: estétiCA e CrítiCA126 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 126 seu desocultamento e seu mostrar-se".4 A verdade, como adequação, designa uma conformidade entre o intelecto e o ser (adaequatio intellectus et rei). Em suma: "a fundamentação teológica da imitação corre paralela à transmutação da essência da verdade consumada por Platão e depois reiterada à sua maneira por Aristóteles"5. Em mais de um momento de sua conferência, Bornheim refere-se à crise da Metafísica. Poder-se-ia dizer que a crise é o pano de fundo de sua argumentação. Costuma-se falar também em fim, destruição e superação da Metafísica. Não está em jogo, aqui, a disciplina metafísica (ou ontologia) dos cursos de Filosofia. Na perspectiva da História da Filosofia, ela abrange toda a tradição filosófica do Ocidente, desde Platão até Hegel e Nietzsche. Da análise de Heidegger em Ser e Tempo (primeiro capítulo), elejo o tão comentado esquecimento do ser. Ora, para isso se faz mister ter em mente a diferença ontológica, vale dizer, a distinção entre ser e ente. Trata-se, portanto, do pensamento que se ocupa com o ente e esquece a questão do ser. Para expressar o impacto da Revolução Francesa, Bornheim recorre à arquitetura e lança a metáfora: "o edifício da imitação põe-se a desabar"6. Um dos pontos fortes de Gerd Bornheim, como professor e conferencista, era sua capacidade de ilustrar a argumentação com exemplos que pareciam brotar espontaneamente de sua rica cultura artística. No caso em foco, após a metáfora do edifício e a referência "à derrocada do esplendor do barroco", ele surpreendeu a plateia com a música de Beethoven: "Realmente, abandonada a imitação, Beethoven compõe as bases artísticas de duas estéticas: uma, dominada pela categoria do objeto, e a outra, pela do sujeito"7. Sentença esta, de tal relevância, que encontra sua complementação um pouco mais adiante: "Pois é neste entrevero de configurações, neste cruzamento de diretivas que vai aparecer, pela primeira vez, não apenas a figura intermetida do crítico, como também a 4 HEIDEGGER, M. Meu caminho para a fenomenologia. In:_____. Conferências e escritos filosóficos. Tradução e notas de E. Stein. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1979. p. 300. 5 BORNHEIM, Gênese..., p. 121. 6 Ibidem, p. 123. 7 Ibidem, p. 124. 127127 própria necessidade de seu olhar"8. Na linha da periodização estilística da História da Arte, foi no Romantismo que o conceito de imitação se exauriu numa crise fatal. Se conferirmos a cronologia dos séculos XVIII e XIX, veremos que nas três últimas décadas do Setecentos coexistem Neoclassicismo e (Pré-)Romantismo. Coexistência, nem sempre pacífica, que avançará pelo Oitocentos. Em vista disso, sou de parecer que é preferível remontar a 1770, como faz o historiador e crítico italiano Giulio Carlo Argan, para assinalar o início da Arte Moderna. Pois foi durante a revolução da arte moderna que ocorreu a derrocada da imitação. Na conferência de Belo Horizonte, a tese foi enunciada nos seguintes termos: "Com o colapso da imitação é o velho conceito de cópia, tomado exatamente na acepção platônica, que, de negativo que era, consegue sobreerguer-se e ocupar os primeiros planos"9. Tese polêmica e, como tal, sujeita a discussões. Causou surpresa, entre os participantes do Colóquio, o fato de o Prof. Gerd não ter incluído em sua conferência uma abordagem do tema da morte da arte. Restringiu-se à seguinte alusão no início de palestra: "A partir de então desenvolve-se um novo tipo de Crítica, arvorada agora até mesmo em ciência. Em verdade, esta suposta maioridade talvez não passe de ser expressão de uma crise maior, talvez se limite às andanças dessa mesma crise, e talvez componha apenas o epitáfio daquilo que Hegel chamou de 'morte da arte'"10. A bem da verdade, seja dito que as expressões "morte da arte" e "fim da arte" não são da autoria de G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Mas, ao ouvi-las, logo nos vem à mente a célebre página da "Introdução" das Lições sobre a Estética, que corresponde ao curso, ministrado por ele, no semestre de inverno de 1828-29, em Berlim: "Os belos dias da arte grega assim como a época de ouro da Idade Média tardia passaram". E, um pouco mais adiante: "Em todas estas relações a arte é e permanecerá para 8 Ibidem, p. 125. 9 Ibidem, p. 123. 10Ibidem, p. 118. bornheim: estétiCA e CrítiCA128 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 128 nós, do ponto de vista de sua destinação suprema, algo do passado".11 É evidente que as duas asserções não podem ser desvinculadas do contexto, ou seja, da orientação que rege a estética hegeliana. Hegel está na origem de um dos mais fecundos debates que tem atraído a atenção de filósofos, estetas, críticos e artistas de diversas partes do mundo. No Brasil, ao lado de Benedito Nunes, Gerd Bornheim deu importante contribuição, como se infere do texto "Uma Temática Hegeliana: a Morte da Arte", de l994, incluído na coletânea Páginas de filosofia da arte12.Para ele, a tese se situa na linha do pensamento hegeliano. Além do mais, "a tese da morte da arte é totalmente verdadeira, desde que se acrescente que a sua verdade se restringe à arte do passado de todo o passado, de modo radical. O que Hegel afirma atinge em cheio os pressupostos de sua própria Estética, a começar pelo mais importante deles todos, que é o conceito de imitação e os seus vínculos com a determinação metafísico-teológica dos universais concretos, ou seja, com o que Hegel chama de Ideia, objeto exclusivo, segundo ele, da arte"13. Muito se tem falado de falência da crítica, de outono (ou inverno?) da crítica, de morte da crítica. Apesar de tantos prognósticos sombrios, estará a crítica fadada a desaparecer? Na coletânea Páginas de filosofia da arte, além da conferência de 1993, foi incluído um breve texto sem data, intitulado Da Crítica14. Com base na leitura de ambos, vê-se que Gerd Bornheim estava convencido da necessidade da crítica: "a questão que deve ser pensada é que a crítica se tornou necessária por uma imposição interior à própria natureza da arte contemporânea – é a arte que exige a crítica, que requer a hermenêutica"15. Reconhecida a necessidade, talvez seja oportuno perguntar: qual é a fun11 HEGEL, G. W. F. Lições sobre a Estética. Tradução de M. A. Werle. São Paulo: EDUSP, 1997. p. 24-25. 12 BORNHEIM, G. Uma Temática Hegeliana: a Morte da Arte. In:_____. Páginas de filosofia da arte. Rio de Janeiro: UAPÊ, 1998. p. 13-24. 13 Ibidem, p. 26. 14 BORNHEIM, G. Da Crítica. In:_____. Páginas de filosofia da arte. Rio de Janeiro: UAPÊ, 1998. p. 131-139. 15 Ibidem, p. 132. 129129 ção da crítica? "A necessidade da crítica nasce do fato de que a mediação entre arte e público já não se dá mais de modo espontâneo e 'natural'. Impõe-se, por isso, a função mediadora da crítica"16. Sugestões de Leitura: obras de bornheim BORNHEIM, G. Filosofia do Romantismo In: GUINSBURG, J. (Org.) O Romantismo. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1979. p. 75-111. BORNHEIM, G. O Sentido e a máscara. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1969. BORNHEIM, G. Sartre: Metafísica e existencialismo. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1971. BORNHEIM, G. Metafísica e finitude. Porto Alegre: Movimento, 1972. BORNHEIM, G. Introdução ao Filosofar: O pensamento filosófico em bases existenciais. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1973. BORNHEIM, G. Dialética: teoria, práxis. Ensaio para uma crítica da fundamentação ontológica da Dialética. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1977. BORNHEIM, G. Ontológica da dialética. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1977. BORNHEIM, G. O Idiota e o espírito objetivo. Porto Alegre: Globo, 1980. BORNHEIM, G. Teatro: a Cena dividida. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 1983. BORNHEIM, G. Brecht: A Estética do teatro. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1992. BORNHEIM, G. O Conceito do descobrimento. Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ, 1998. BORNHEIM, G. Páginas de filosofia da arte. Rio de Janeiro: UAPÊ, 1998. 16 Ibidem, p. 138. 130 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 130 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA GÊNESE E METAMORFOSE DA CRÍtICA 1 Interessa-me aqui tão somente tentar uma delimitação do conceito de Crítica. Tomada a palavra numa acepção bastante ampla, a crítica, ou o espírito crítico, acompanha, digamos, a própria condição humana. Mas não há nenhum exagero em afirmar que foi no Mundo Ocidental, afeito às coisas da Filosofia, que a crítica desenvolveu-se com o vigor que se sabe; assim, por exemplo, e já no ponto de partida da invenção das lides filosóficas, topa-se com a veemente condenação do mundo dogmático das opiniões, a começar pelas de natureza religiosa, a favor da instauração da Ciência, sempre atenta à inteireza da ordem das razões. E se tomarmos a crítica em sentido restrito, como comentário a propósito das letras e das artes, os gregos não se fazem de rogados; baste folhear a Poética de Aristóteles, e, já antes do Estagirita, constatar a surpreendente e severa frequência com que Platão discute a arte e as suas funções ao longo de não poucos de seus diálogos, mormente em relação às dimensões pedagógicas da arte. Se tomarmos, portanto, a crítica nessa acepção restrita, ela conta já com uma história bastante rica e variegada, consistindo sempre na 1 BORNHEIM, G. Gênese e Metamorfose da Crítica. In:_____. Páginas de filosofia da arte. Rio de Janeiro: UAPÊ, 1998. p. 117-130. 131131 tomada de certa distância em face dos fenômenos artísticos, com o fito de examinar-lhes a natureza ou algumas de suas implicações. E é por certo neste sentido que a atividade crítica ainda hoje vem sendo exercida. Entretanto, nosso tema começou a complicar-se no correr do século passado, emprestando a esse modo de debruçar-se sobre determinados produtos da atividade humana um estatuto novo, uma nova modalidade de competência. A partir de então desenvolve-se um novo tipo de Crítica, arvorada agora até mesmo em ciência. Em verdade, esta suposta maioridade talvez não passe de ser expressão de uma crise maior, talvez se limite às andanças dessa mesma crise, e talvez componha apenas o epitáfio daquilo que Hegel chamou de "morte da arte". A nossa questão deve ser formulada assim: a partir de que lugar passou a constituir-se essa nova Crítica? Que tipo de problemática ensejou a própria possibilidade para o surgimento de novos critérios na avaliação da obra de arte? Tudo aqui permanece imbricado nas idas e vindas de um cenário maior, o da Revolução Burguesa. Mas antes de entrar no assunto, reporto-me por alguns momentos a um conceito que, a partir da Renascença, dá progressivas mostras de estiolamento até alcançar o seu desgaste total: é justamente a perda de vigência desse conceito que determinará os rumos da nova Crítica. Refiro-me ao conceito de imitação. Talvez a primeira característica que salta aos olhos quando se observa o panorama das artes seja o contraste de sua diversidade e a considerável gama de níveis e modos de expressão que elas exibem. Já por isso, não deixa de ser estranho o fato de que os antigos gregos não tenham forjado um vocábulo para designar aquilo que a tradição batizou de Belas-artes. Não que eles desconhecessem a distinção entre arte e artesanato, ou a hierarquia entre artes superiores e inferiores, ou mesmo a diferença entre obras bem sucedidas e outras nem tanto. Mas, em Platão, por exemplo, o tema não é abordado de modo direto; o tema é analisado muito mais quando as chamadas Belas-artes aparecem vinculadas a outros valores, como, por exemplo, e precipuamente, às exigências pedagógicas na formação geral do futuro cidadão. No entanto, nem é preciso ser um leitor muito atento para topar, 132 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 132 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA nos diálogos platônicos, as ironias, as condenações, os elogios, a presença da sempre momentosa inspiração em certas obras – e todos os epítetos de que o primeiro grande esteta do Ocidente lança mão nos seus comentários sobre as artes e suas obras. E, claro está, nisto tudo percebe-se logo como pressuposto fundamental a presença, ainda que nunca analisada frontalmente, de uma hierarquia obediente a critérios bem precisos. Assim é que, a menor altura se encontra nas obras afeitas à frequentação das sensações, como é o caso de certas músicas que podem mesmo ser prejudiciais à educação do jovem. Um pouco mais de consideração merece a destreza artesanal da reprodução de um objeto, como o de um bem pintado cacho de bagos de uva; mas aqui também a ironia se faz presente: afinal, tais representações não educam em nada. O respeito faz-se sentir de modo já acentuado em face da tradição da grande arte grega: os templos, as estátuas dos deuses, a tragédia e seu teatro, os versos do grande educador Homero. Entende-se: são os deuses que nestas obras se fazem presentes e postulam os princípios da grande educação helênica. Mas, também aqui a distância crítica se exerce na confessada preferência platônica pelo hieratismo estático da estatuária egípcia, longe da nefasta concessão ao movimento sensível que parece anunciar-se, talvez inadvertidamente, no leve avanço de um pé sobre o outro e que definia os adiantamentos da escultura grega. E a distância crítica insiste: como pode o cego poeta exaltar a coragem de Ulisses, já há séculos persuasiva, se o pobre Homero não teve a chance de dedicar-se aos estudos de filosofia e perguntar de vez o que é a coragem, a ética. Claro que a esta altura – mas nem tanto quanto possa parecer – o feitiço já virou contra o feiticeiro. Não importa: o filósofo prossegue na sua afanosa perscrutação do mundo das Ideias. E realmente, de súbito, numa viagem à Sicília, manifesta-se a luz: veja-se o esplendor da música pitagórica, ela consegue combinar a perfeição matematicamente harmônica dos sons com a presentificação da linguagem absoluta dos movimentos dos astros eternos. Tirando-se disso o absoluto, tudo aqui é novidade: a episteme põe-se enfim a funcionar. Mas o denodo do nosso filósofo continua. Acontece que a filosofia não consiste em simples processo de conhecimento, desinteressado e inútil, 133133 satisfeito com sua própria arquitetura formal; longe disso, o conhecimento é presidido por uma impaciente urgência, já que a contemplação da Ideia converte-se em soteria, em salvação. Parece que, chegado a essa altura, Platão abandona o plano da arte – ou será que se pode dizer que o filósofo, aleitado agora pela luz divina, transmuda-se a si próprio em obra de arte? Parece mais que a esfera específica da arte seja restrita demais para dar conta de todo o alcance dos processos imitativos. Pois Platão vai ainda mais longe: a sua República, a república dos filósofos, nada tem a ver com a utopia por tantos pretendida; trata-se muito mais de um bem elaborado plano de reforma política, em tudo prática e cônscia de seus limites: aqui estaria o processo da imitação levado ao seu máximo de possibilidade. Por três vezes tentada, três vezes a iniciativa da reforma fracassou. Mas seja como for, a realização da república platônica seria a arte levada às dimensões da cidade. Todas estas formas aventadas de representação ou de produção embasam-se no conceito de imitação, excluindo-se, assim, qualquer pretensão de reservá-la às artes mais nobres ou mais diretamente compromissadas com a pedagogia. Mesmo as formas mais simples do artesanato encontram o seu fundamento na dimensão teológica das Ideias divinas; um exemplo famoso disso aparece no Livro X da República, a propósito da produção de uma cama, Platão gosta de reportar-se a exemplos tirados das lides de carpintaria. A busca da perfeição, presente já no simples ato comparativo, torna patente o modo como o fundamento se faz atuante. Dir-se-á que tal tipo de interpretação caracteriza justamente o platonismo, e que não caberia estendê-lo a toda tradição de sentido metafísico da produção ocidental. Sem dúvida. E a razão para entendê-lo é muito simples: é que a fundamentação teológica oferece um leque bastante variado de elucidações – mas sempre ostenta teor teológico. Neste sentido, pode-se generalizar. A mesma observação pode ser feita a propósito da forte hierarquização platônica acima resumida; se é até necessário que seus momentos sejam discutidos, ampliados ou cerceados, tudo isso não consegue obliterar a forte insistência no que é, digamos, superior e inferior: a tragédia, por exemplo, dispondo sobre a cena entidades divinas e a alta aristocracia impõe-se com toda evidência 134 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 134 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA como superior à simples comédia, afeita à galeria de figuras humanas de estatuto menor, sem nunca transgredir os limites da ridicularia de um bourgeois gentilhomme qualquer. Note-se, para melhor aceder ao entendimento do problema, que compete estabelecer um forçoso paralelo entre o conceito de imitação e o de verdade. Realmente, ambos se apresentam, em sua essência, como triádicos. É importante observar que a fundamentação teológica da imitação corre paralela à transmutação da essência da verdade, consumada por Platão e depois reiterada à sua maneira por Aristóteles. De fato, a compreensão mais anterior da verdade, entendida como desvelamento, cede o seu lugar, como se sabe, a esta outra, que a interpreta como adequação; e se se passa a emprestar então uma certa hegemonia ao sujeito e ao objeto, se Aristóteles pode afiançar, pela primeira vez, que o lugar da verdade é o pensamento, tal realce atribuído à dicotomia sujeito-objeto não busca, evidentemente, preterir a base fundante e, portanto, a função possibilitadora da presença de Deus em todo o processo da verdade; sem o mundo das essências estáveis abandona-se a dicotomia às errâncias inconsequentes da opinião: a episteme encontra o seu espaço possibilitador na tríade que estabelece o comércio entre sujeito, objeto e divindade. Sem Deus, não há conhecimento. E sem Deus, não há imitação. Avancemos, pois, que a adequação está para a verdade assim como a imitação está para a arte. E que essa maneira outra de fundamentar a verdade e a arte encontra o seu primeiro intérprete em Platão está longe de ser uma mera coincidência. Insisto um pouco mais no tema. A co-naturalidade verificável entre a arte imitativa e o saber por adequação apóia-se por inteiro no conceito do universal, com a óbvia diferença de que, no saber, o universal se faz abstrato, objeto que é da definição: a ciência arregimenta tais conceitos universais. Já no caso da arte, o universal se pretende concreto, por veicular os modelos que incorporam em si os valores de base de determinada coletividade, os pólos norteadores de determinada cultura. Na sua excelência, a imitação cuida da frequentação de deuses e deusas, de reis e heróis, de santos e mártires – de tudo aquilo que oferece caráter paradigmático e que se impõe universalmente a certa comunidade. O universal, 135135 qualquer seja ele, alicerça toda pedagogia, a educação é sempre e necessariamente educação para o universal. Pois a arte imitativa oferece os universais concretos que servem de exemplo para a edificação da vida. Essa arte sempre é uma forma de introdução à vida devota, ou heróica; Ulisses, como já bem disse Hegel, encarna os ideais da nacionalidade, e faz-se princípio unificante e exemplar. Com a crise da Metafísica e os inusitados abalos provocados pela Revolução Burguesa todo o edifício da imitação põe-se a desabar, e isso a partir do comprometimento de seus próprios alicerces. São aqueles universais que começam a desfalecer, depauperados em suas bases metafísicas. Digamos que o nominalismo, tomada a palavra na acepção o mais ampla possível, invade todos os cenários: o político, o religioso, o filosófico, o científico e, como não poderia deixar de ser, também o artístico. Passa-se a perceber, por exemplo, que a fórmula científica que serve para designar a água não passa de uma construção completamente vazia, que não existe e nem pode existir, e não acoberta nenhum tipo de realidade, a começar pelas supostamente divinas – o próprio divino, aliás, se torna suspeito. As coisas se passam de modo até mesmo abrupto. Na arte, em data quase precisa, assiste-se à derrocada do barroco, última manifestação de arte religiosa na acepção hegeliana de "substância objetiva". O mínimo que se pode dizer é que aqueles universais concretos passam a sofrer uma transmutação radical em sua própria natureza. Com o colapso da imitação é o velho conceito de cópia, tomado exatamente na acepção platônica, que, de negativo que era, consegue sobreerguer-se e ocupar os primeiros planos. Claro que a paisagem da arte se faz complexa, prenhe de conflitos, mas, ao que tudo indica, os carrilhões do tempo tudo empurram, fazendo acotovelar-se os processos de desmantelamento e a constituição de novas definições. As coisas começam já no seio da Renascença, com pequenos detalhes, de significado praticamente imperceptível, e rapidamente tomam vulto, num itinerário que se precipita, e que, de certo modo, pode ser dado por concluído já em fins do século passado. E a grande palavra, então, é justamente esta: a cópia. 136 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 136 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA A inédita riqueza do tema força-me a restringir a análise a um exemplo que, parece, consegue sintetizar toda esta tão diversificada problemática de modo altamente elucidativo – penso, aqui, no caso da música de Beethoven. Limito-me tão só a lembrar os inícios mozartianos de sua música. Deparamo-nos com uma música, por consequência, que sorve a sua gramática compositiva da limpidez barroca; ainda estamos, por isso, no reinado da imitação. Mas muito cedo verificou-se a ruptura, e Beethoven esquece aqueles "exercícios aritméticos", para embrenharse por vias tão inéditas quanto possível para a época. De fato, nosso compositor avizinha-se resoluto do grande afresco histórico, como na 3a Sinfonia, ou pinta com lances dramáticos a paisagem de um temporal seguido de sua bonança como na 6a; ou ainda, perscruta a sua própria alma, debruça-se sobre os seus sentimentos interiores, como nas tantas sonatas, ou na música de câmara. Logo se vê: Beethoven constrói dois novos caminhos com a sua música, e cabe resumir estes caminhos em dois títulos gerais e que vão inaugurar as estéticas possíveis sob a égide da cópia. Realmente, abandonada a imitação, Beethoven compõe as bases artísticas de duas estéticas: uma, dominada pela categoria do objeto, e a outra, pela do sujeito. Na primeira, encontram-se as diversas formas, digamos, de realismo, que encontram a sua manifestação mais acabada no naturalismo, já por reduzir, como se sabe, a própria realidade humana à condição de objeto. Já na outra, desenrola-se o que logo passou a ser designado de estética da expressão, toda voltada para os meandros da subjetividade humana; seu primeiro grande momento de crise exacerbase no movimento expressionista. Percebe-se logo que essas duas categorias – sujeito e objeto – assentam as bases de copiosas e variegadas manifestações de arte, não ficando excluída nem mesmo a experiência de sua transfusão de uma categoria na outra: antropomorfisa-se o objeto, e este chega por vezes a invadir os confins da subjetividade humana. Pois é neste entrevero de configurações, neste cruzamento de diretivas que vai aparecer, pela primeira vez, não apenas a figura intermetida do crítico, como também a própria necessidade de seu olhar. O pressuposto por assim dizer negativo e que levaria ao surgimen137137 to da crítica deixa-se elucidar a partir da crise da comunicação. A arte anterior, calcada na imitação, era comunicativa em sua própria essência, a comunicação lhe pertencia de modo por assim dizer co-extensivo. Sua dimensão pedagógica veiculava os valores fundamentais da sociedade – justamente aqueles valores nos quais a experiência humana permanecia imperturbavelmente mergulhada: o homem era tais valores, e a arte que os expressava preenchia uma função consequente, como se tudo se apoiasse num mundo simplesmente inato, ou que era vivido como tal. A essência comunicativa da arte abrangia por inteiro o próprio sentido da existência humana, a começar, e mesmo principalmente, a do mistério insondável das raízes divinas do homem; quando um crente medieval participava do culto em uma catedral gótica, ele como que entrava no fundamento, no ser que emprestava um sentido à sua vida, na frequentação da presença viva do mistério. E com a crise da imitação entra em colapso precisamente esse fundo ontológico possibilitador da comunicação. Ora, num primeiro momento, a hegemonia da cópia parece facilitar enormemente as coisas: o mistério não desaparece? Que dificuldade de comunicação pode oferecer uma natureza morta? Essa nova arte já nem apresenta os pesados encargos de qualquer dimensão pedagógica. Nesse sentido, verifica-se até mesmo um processo de banalização do elemento comunicativo. Quando Santo Tomás define a beleza como "esplendor da verdade", observe-se que essa Verdade ostenta grandeza ontológica, o esplendor está na presença do próprio Cristo. E onde encontrar ainda que apenas os vestígios daquele esplendor em uma natureza morta, ou na reprodução de uma cena da vida cotidiana? Tal aplanamento apenas parece facilitar enormemente as coisas. Mas é de dentro dessa superficialidade que brota a inquietação: afinal, para que serve agora a arte, qual a sua verdade? Seja como for, bem cedo o panorama começa a complicar-se. Porque nem tudo é assim tão achatado, nem tudo se deixa resolver em nome da minoridade decorativa. Mais uma vez, é Beethoven que surpreende. Penso aqui na famosa fuga que arremata o Quarteto op. 130. Na sua estreia vienense, essa peça simplesmente não foi compreendida, e o compositor, bem ou mal aconselhado, escreveu um novo e alegre sexto movimento. 138 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 138 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA O que foi que aconteceu com a fuga? Houve uma espécie de curto-circuito, a comunicação musical viu-se subitamente interrompida. Terá sido esta a primeira vez que tal tipo de experiência afetou o comportamento do público? Nem importa tanto: o fato é que esse tipo de pane já vai se tornando constitutivo da atmosfera geral em que a arte se desenvolve. Digamos, então, que o Absoluto, ou a garantia absoluta da comunicação perde vigência, acoimada que é pela presença avassaladora da cópia. Observe-se que a cópia conserva as características a ela atribuídas por Platão – suspende-se tão somente o desprezo que lhe votava o filósofo grego. Mas, neste caso, será que toda essa problemática da cópia e de seus dissabores não estaria pré-configurada por determinações últimas de ordem metafísica, exatamente por estar a Metafísica em crise? Será que não se está presenciando a uma espécie de inversão platônica do platonismo? Ou seja: de onde vem a determinação última do que seja a cópia? Tais questões e outras mais estão longe de constituírem exclusividade da arte e de sua estética. Uma breve alusão filosófica sobre a situação da dicotomia sujeitoobjeto talvez ajude a melhor entender os dados do problema. Afirmei acima que a imitação está para a arte assim como a adequação está para a verdade, ambas encontrando a sua fundamentação no elemento teológico metafisicamente interpretado; a adequação e a imitação descobrem no Absoluto a sua própria fonte possibilitadora. Acontece que, a partir do momento em que o divino for destituído dessa sua função legiferante, a dicotomia sujeito-objeto fica como que abandonada às suas próprias aporias. Veja-se que, longe de serem entidades fixas e inamovíveis, o sujeito e o objeto são o resultado de um longo processo histórico, de sentido metafísico. Cabe mesmo dizer que sujeito e objeto são agora aquilo que a tradição metafísica fez de um e outro. Desabonada a sua base metafísica, o próprio relacionamento entre sujeito e objeto passa por vicissitudes as mais inéditas. Assim, por exemplo, no plano do conhecimento, coloca-se o chamado problema crítico fundamental, ou seja, há quem passe a questionar a própria possibilidade do conhecimento – questão que para um Kant nem poderia oferecer sentido: em si mesma, a adequação sequer é questionada pelo filósofo. Com a chamada morte de Deus, os caminhos 139139 se fazem complicados, por vezes intransitáveis, e, pela primeira vez, a comunicação em si mesma se transforma num problema. E como seria de esperar, a arte constitui-se no lugar em que a crise da comunicação eclode com a maior violência. Já na virada do século, passa-se a preterir até mesmo aquela hegemonia da dicotomia sujeito-objeto enquanto categorias embasadoras dos tipos de estética. Entende-se, por aí, que todo o ensaísmo devesse passar por um processo de transformação em nada secundário. Já a hermenêutica, à maneira de um Schleiermacher, sorve na crise a sua própria razão de ser; pois, para ele, a arte teria sido arrancada de seu elemento originário, e caberia à hermenêutica elaborar a reconstrução daquilo que se perdeu. Inútil: tudo permanece mergulhado numa teologia do sentimento que já não consegue ser teologia: a preeminência do sujeito ocupa já os espaços. Claro que o nascimento da nova crítica não pode ser explicado tão somente por essa nostálgica perda da verdade originária. Ela nasce muito mais do fato de que tal sentido originário, sempre impregnado de teologismo, simplesmente se torna caduco. O espaço recém-conquistado da crítica situa sua atividade no espaço que se estende entre o sujeito e o objeto, é de dentro desse relacionamento que brota a necessidade da crítica. É como se não houvesse mais os fios mediadores, e tal ausência é que deve ser substituída pela função da crítica. Ou melhor: não é que os fios mediadores não existam. É que por vezes eles se fazem invisíveis, decorrência possível de um feito maior: os fios que mantêm a comunicação mudaram de natureza. E o crítico encontra a sua razão de ser no reconhecimento dessa mudança. Mas limito-me aqui a sublinhar esse acontecimento possibilitador da crítica tal como ela é usualmente vista em nosso tempo: o que está em jogo entende-se a partir da revolução introduzida na questão mesma do fundamento. Que isto se faça pela dicotomia sujeito-objeto, erigida em referência estética principal, ou que, no século XX, sujeito e objeto sejam deslocados para um segundo plano, isso tudo faz parte de um mesmo processo de base, através do qual a arte não cansa de buscar o entendimento dela mesma. O que está em causa, portanto, está no tipo de vigência do fundamento. Aqui, tudo é matéria hoje de discussão; se o fundamento reside 140 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 140 bornheim • gênese e metAmorfose dA CrítiCA no trabalho, ou nos valores vitais, ou no corpo, ou na história, ou no mundo – tudo são problemas. Já por aí se entende que a permanência da crítica não possa ser considerada um avanço definitivo. Talvez se deva dizer o contrário, que a crítica não vai além de expressão da derrocada da Metafísica, e a palma final deva ser dada a Schleiermacher, com a sua poderosa nostalgia. Nietzsche certamente veria isso com bons olhos. Entretanto, a própria situação da crítica viria a complicar-se. Até certa altura dos acontecimentos, o crítico ainda podia identificar os seus critérios de julgamento em alguma estética então vigente, fosse ela calcada nos valores do sujeito ou nos do objeto. Pois a estética ainda podia oferecer o conforto mínimo de pôr à disposição da crítica as regras norteadoras para o juízo crítico. Ou então, no caso dessa estética revelar-se claudicante, havia uma certa prática artística que estabelecia certos caminhos, ou explorava um certo campo de possibilidades que funcionavam à maneira de normas práticas para o crítico. Acontece que o conceito de norma só pertence de modo até mesmo essencial à estética da imitação. As Poéticas tradicionais, por exemplo, estipulavam a existência de uma Natureza, de essências ou de Ideias paradigmáticas, afirmavam a possibilidade de imitá-las e forneciam as regras para executar a imitação. Mas a principal consequência da crise da estética da imitação está no fato de que é precisamente essa segurança da norma que começa a perder os seus esteios, a ponto de ter tornado inexequível, em nossos dias, a elaboração de uma estética normativa; tal normatividade simplesmente perderia qualquer possibilidade de vigência. E quando se pretende impor de algum modo, por razões, por exemplo, de ordem política, algum tipo de normatividade, os resultados acabam se mostrando necessariamente desastrosos. Cabe afirmar que nunca a pesquisa e a elaboração estéticas foram tão intensas quanto em nosso tempo, e nunca também a preocupação com a normatividade se fez tão ausente. A razão mais palpável para explicar tal situação parece uma decorrência do seguinte. É que a estética passa a integrar de modo completamente novo o ato criador do artista. No passado, a estética preexistia à ação criadora e impunha-se a ela, ao passo que agora as inquietações estéticas são por assim dizer compostas juntamente com a elaboração da obra, e isto não apenas para escapar das 141141 ciladas do autoplágio, que quase fatalmente leva o artista aos impasses da repetição esterilizante. Digamos, pois, que a temática de uma determinada obra nasce como que de dentro da criação da própria estética, como se o pintor, ao compor um quadro, devesse pintar concomitantemente a estética correspondente a este quadro determinado. A linguagem geral da arte, aderida aí à criação da estética, renova-se à maneira de um composto único, o que torna as coisas muito mais difíceis para o artista. É neste sentido preciso que T. S. Eliot acaba tendo razão quando afirma que nunca tanto talento foi gasto inutilmente quanto em nosso tempo. O abismo que se verifica hoje, por exemplo, entre a atividade artesanal e a arte passou a apresentar uma radicalidade inédita. De certo modo poder-se-ia afirmar que a atividade do crítico transfere-se para o próprio artista. Passa-se, em consequência, a acompanhar um processo de profunda transformação da própria natureza da crítica. Dizer, simplesmente, que a crítica tem por objetivo a elucidação de determinada obra já não leva muito longe, e joga a atividade crítica numa marginalidade que a torna cada vez mais prescindível. As mudanças que afligem a crítica decorrem basicamente da necessidade de transferir os processos criativos também para o trabalho da crítica, como se ela devesse desenvolver um estatuto específico, enquanto obra de arte. O tema aqui seria: o ensaio como obra de arte. Rompe-se, por aí, uma certa assimetria que preside toda atividade crítica à maneira, digamos, mais tradicional: o crítico instala-se em face da obra a partir de uma suposta superioridade sua, que torna os seus procedimentos extremamente frágeis. Ao contrário disso, na crítica artística tratar-se-ia muito mais de um caminhar junto à obra comentada – procedimento este que, de resto, já conta com uma bela tradição. meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento142 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 142 143143 Vida e Obra rené DESCARTES,1 muitas vezes chamado de "pai da filosofia moderna", é considerado, ainda hoje, o maior filósofo francês de todos os tempos e um dos mais importantes do pensamento e da cultura ocidental. Descartes nasceu no dia 31 de março de 1596 em La Haye (hoje, Descartes), Touraine, França. Em 1606 ou 1607, foi enviado ao Colégio Royal de La Flèche, onde permaneceu até 1615. Nesse colégio jesuíta, recebeu toda sua educação escolar, marcada pela combinação da escolástica tradicional e do saber emergente. Encontramos, no Discurso do método (Parte I), uma avaliação crítica à educação dos Jesuítas, embora Descartes tenha tido, em outras ocasiões, como diz Garber2, uma apreciação positiva de seus professores e do ensinamento rigoroso recebido. 1 Encontramos variações no nome do filósofo: René Des-Cartes (em francês), Renatus Des-Cartes ou, muito raramente, Renatus Cartesius (em latim). Fica clara a derivação do termo "cartesiano" e de cognatos de seu sobrenome. 2 GARBER, D. Descartes' metaphysical physics. Chicago: University Chicago, 1992. p. 9. MEdITANdO cOM dEScARTES: DA DÚVIDA AO FuNDAMeNtO meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento144 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 144 Em 1618, viaja para a Holanda e se alista como voluntário no exército do príncipe Maurício de Nassau. Em novembro desse ano, conhece Isaac Beeckman, e esse encontro marca profundamente sua carreira. Os dois jovens se encontram por quase dois meses para discutir questões científicas: sobre física, matemática, medicina e música. No final de 1619 e no início de 1620, estando na Alemanha, ocorrem-lhe duas das ideiaschave de seu pensamento: a da interconexão e união de todas as ciências, e da necessidade de um método único para garantir essa unidade. Contase que, na noite do dia 10 ou 11 de novembro de 1619, teria tido três sonhos, cuja significação principal seria exatamente a de que a ele caberia a tarefa de executar tal projeto de unificação do saber. Nos anos seguintes, essa ideia inicial se transformará em um programa de pesquisa. Nos anos seguintes, viaja pela Europa e abandona de vez sua pretensão a uma carreira militar. Em 1625, se encontra em Paris, onde permanecerá até os primeiros meses de 1629. Nesse período, sua pesquisa avança rapidamente. Liga-se ao Pe. Mersenne e ao grupo de pensadores que o circundam, estudiosos do mecanicismo e do anti-aristotelismo. São dessa época as Regras para a direção do espírito, embora as primeiras regras possam ter sido redigidas no período que se seguiu ao dos sonhos: a primeira regra trata exatamente da unidade da ciência e a quarta discute a necessidade e a unidade do método. As Regras são abandonadas em 1628 e publicadas apenas postumamente. Elas apresentam a reflexão mais detalhada e completa de seu método e de questões relacionadas à produção do conhecimento. A partir de 1628 ou 1629, Descartes começa a investigar questões metafísicas e os fundamentos da física. Em busca de tranquilidade, deixa Paris e vai para a Holanda. No final de 1629 e início de 1630, elabora as suas primeiras meditações, mas cujo manuscrito não sobreviveu: elas atestam a ligação da metafísica com a física. Nesse mesmo período, pesquisa problemas de física (ótica e fenômenos luminosos, teoria do movimento, explicação mecânica dos corpos, explicação de fenômenos atmosféricos), bem como começa a estudar anatomia e medicina. Dessas pesquisas nasce o projeto do Mundo, no qual trabalha até meados de 1633. No mês de novembro, fica sabendo da condenação de Galileu e renuncia 145145 à publicação desse tratado. Desse projeto original, surgiram várias obras. O Mundo ou Tratado da luz e o Homem correspondem a suas partes centrais, ambos publicados postumamente. O primeiro apresenta seu sistema de física, conservado, em boa parte, nos Princípios; o segundo expõe sua teoria do corpo humano enquanto máquina e explica a digestão, a circulação, as operações dos sentidos etc., sempre de um ponto de vista mecânico. Os ensaios físicos, que serão publicados junto com o Discurso, também são dessa época. Em 1637, Descartes publica sua primeira obra: o Discurso do método e os três ensaios ilustrativos do método: a Dióptrica, os Meteoros e a Geometria. Tais ensaios reúnem investigações feitas nos últimos oito anos, embora reestruturados. A Geometria contém, dentre outras coisas, os fundamentos do que virá a ser a Geometria Analítica, o uso das coordenadas (não exatamente como o nosso), equações da linha reta e de diferentes curvas etc. A Dióptrica trata da reflexão e da refração, do olho e sua estrutura, dos sentidos em geral e, em especial, da visão, e da confecção de lentes para melhorá-la. Os Meteoros propõem uma explicação mecânica de fenômenos sublunares ou meteorológicos: nuvens, tempestades, raios, arco-íris, neve etc. O Discurso do método, por sua vez, se torna rapidamente famoso, embora seja apenas um prefácio aos outros três textos. Em suas seis partes, apresenta, dentre outras coisas, uma reflexão sobre a razão e sobre a educação que recebera (1), um esboço de seu método, por meio das suas famosas quatro regras (2), uma moral provisória (3), um esboço de sua metafísica (4) e um resumo do Mundo e do Homem (5 e 6). No final da década, Descartes começa a trabalhar nas Meditações, que foram publicadas em 1641, com seis Objeções e respostas, a sétima sendo incluída na edição de 1642. Em 1644, publica os Princípios da filosofia, obra cujas quatro partes apresentam sua metafísica, os princípios gerais da física e explicações de fenômenos astronômicos e físicos. É a expressão final de seu programa de filosofia natural. Em 1643, se corresponde com a Princesa Elisabeth da Boêmia, com a qual discute questões como a da união entre alma e corpo, sua interação, fenômenos psicofísicos e temas morais. Dessa discussão nascem meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento146 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 146 as Paixões da alma, publicadas em 1649. Antes disso, são publicados as Meditações e os Princípios, ambos em francês, em 1647. No início de 1649, Descartes viaja para a Suécia a pedido da Rainha Christina. O clima e o rigor da vida na corte contribuem para que adoeça no começo de fevereiro do ano seguinte. Morre de pneumonia, em Estocolmo, no dia 11 de fevereiro de 1650. As Meditações As Meditações são a principal obra filosófica de Descartes e uma das mais importantes da Filosofia. Redigidas do final da década de 1630 até o início de 1640, foram publicadas, em latim, em 1641 e em 1642, e, em francês, em 1647. Ao lado de obras como o Discurso do método (1637), os Princípios da filosofia (1644) e as Objeções e respostas (1641) e as Paixões da alma (1649), formam o conjunto dos textos centrais da filosofia cartesiana. As Meditações têm um estilo literário marcante. O título já denuncia o modo pelo qual Descartes propõe sua atividade filosófica: filosofia é reflexão e introspecção à semelhança do religioso que, para meditar, se isola do mundo e volta-se para si mesmo. Por isso, engana-se quem pretende lê-las apressadamente ou uma única vez: tal como a religiosa, a atividade filosófica tem seu tempo e precisa ser revisitada. Mas as Meditações não são apenas Meditação. Elas incorporam o rigor, a capacidade demonstrativa e resolutiva presentes na matemática. Descartes se inspira nessa ciência não para imitá-la (pelo cálculo), mas porque ela denuncia o nosso próprio modo de conhecer: pela natureza de seus objetos (puros e simples) e relações (encadeamento rigoroso), bem como pela sua capacidade de propor e de resolver problemas, a matemática é expressão do modo de agir da racionalidade humana. Mas, afinal, do que tratam as Meditações? Se olharmos para o seu título, veremos que elas apresentam a ontologia cartesiana, uma teoria sobre os diferentes seres existentes: o ser infinito e sumamente perfeito (Deus); os seres pensantes finitos (nós enquanto seres espirituais); as entidades materiais. A questão central de Descartes, entretanto, é que não se 147147 poderá tratar dessas coisas diretamente. Com efeito, não sabemos se elas existem e constituem o real. Outros filósofos pensaram de modo diverso; nossa percepção e nossas crenças dizem outra coisa. Em razão disso, a ontologia cartesiana não pôde ser elaborada diretamente nem abstraída do próprio mundo. Ela nasceu em meio à pergunta sobre o que podemos conhecer com absoluta certeza, no caso de podermos conhecer. Por esse motivo, dizemos que as Meditações são um tratado epistemológico ou de teoria do conhecimento, tratado no interior do qual aparece, como parte da reflexão, a metafísica ou ontologia cartesiana. Descartes se pergunta pela base firme e indestrutível das ciências, pelos fundamentos do conhecimento. E, ao se perguntar de forma tão radical, ele não pode simplesmente apontá-los nem procurá-los diretamente. Por isso, procede por via negativa: toda via positiva pode chegar a determinados resultados, mas dificilmente poderá garantir que tais resultados sejam os únicos possíveis e que sejam definitivos. A via negativa tem essa vantagem, embora corra o risco de trazer uma resposta cética e absolutamente destrutiva. O procedimento da dúvida terá essa função no sistema filosófico de Descartes. Resultante de uma decisão, ela é pensada como estratégia (método), cujos riscos ele aceita correr; e, como tal, ela precisa ser cada vez mais radical, universal e exagerada, diferentemente da dúvida que naturalmente nos ocorre. E os resultados começam a aparecer no segundo dia. Na Primeira Meditação, por meio dos três graus da dúvida, temos provisoriamente um resultado cético. Na Segunda, nos damos conta de que, por mais que duvidemos de tudo, é certo que duvidamos. E, como duvidar é um modo de pensar, é absolutamente certo que pensamos. Finalmente, como pensar é um ato, é preciso que haja um sujeito desse ato: o sujeito que pensa existe. Mais uma coisa: quando o sujeito pensa (dúvida), ele necessariamente sabe que pensa; e, ao saber que pensa, se dá conta de que é ele que pensa, e não outro ser. Disso nasce a noção de "eu" e a de consciência: quando penso, tenho consciência imediata de que sou eu que penso. E, assim, pelo ato de pensar, o sujeito se denuncia a si mesmo (daí nasce o meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento148 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 148 tema moderno da subjetividade). Mas o que posso saber, além disso, sobre mim mesmo? Ora, apenas que penso: sou uma coisa que pensa e que pensa de vários modos. Mesmo o sentir, embora o que eu sinta possa ser uma ilusão, por se denunciar à consciência (por ser uma forma de pensar), é indubitável: não o que sinto, mas o sentir em si. E, assim, não há nada mais imediato que o conhecimento de mim mesmo e de meus atos. A Terceira Meditação resolve o problema que emerge da oscilação entre a possibilidade da existência de um Deus enganador e a certeza de minha existência (uma exceção ao engano universal). É, portanto, preciso investigar se Deus existe e se ele é enganador. Descartes fornece, aqui, duas provas, chamadas provas pelos efeitos ou a posteriori, porque partem de um efeito de Deus registrado em nós: a sua ideia. A primeira prova afirma que, como a causa não pode ser inferior ao efeito, deve haver um ser que seja tão grande quanto o conteúdo da nossa ideia de Deus. Ora, como essa ideia representa o infinito, ela só pode ter sido causada pelo ser infinito, isto é, Deus. Logo, ele existe. A segunda prova (não conservada no texto traduzido) faz uma reflexão semelhante, só que desta vez em relação a cada um de nós, na medida em que temos a ideia de Deus. A resposta cartesiana consistirá em dizer que ninguém poderia ter nos criado e, ao mesmo tempo, posto a ideia de Deus em nós (cujo conteúdo é infinito) senão o próprio Deus infinito: a ideia que temos de Deus exige que tenhamos sido criados pelo próprio Deus. Novamente, a causa deve ser pelo menos tão grande quanto o efeito. Portanto, Deus existe. E, como ele é bom, veraz e perfeito, não pode ser enganador. A Quarta Meditação resolve o problema entre o fato de que erramos e a necessidade de inocentar a Deus do erro, uma vez que não é possível conciliar sua perfeição e bondade infinitas com o engano. Embora ele nos tenha criado como seres limitados, ele nos criou perfeitos, tal como uma calculadora que, por mais simples que seja, efetua corretamente todas as funções que seu fabricante lhe atribuiu. Por outro lado, nós erramos com frequência quando buscamos a verdade. O erro está no modo como operamos com nossas faculdades, a exemplo de uma calcu149149 ladora mal-utilizada. Mais precisamente, o erro acontece quando nossa vontade extrapola os limites de nosso entendimento e afirma algo que não é claro e distinto. Com efeito, com a prova da existência de um Deus não enganador, passa a valer a regra de que tudo o que é claro e distinto é verdadeiro. Nesse sentido, a vontade deve se restringir a afirmar o que é claro e distinto. E, assim, explicado o erro e compreendida a forma de evitá-lo, Deus é inocentado e as condições da busca pela verdade ficam estabelecidas. A Quinta Meditação começa a reconstrução do edifício do conhecimento. As verdades matemáticas são imediatamente readmitidas, elas que só foram colocadas em dúvida pela hipótese de um Deus enganador. Descartes mostra também que elas correspondem às essências das coisas materiais: os corpos, se existirem, terão apenas propriedades geométricas. Em seguida, Descartes apresenta sua terceira prova da existência de Deus, a chamada prova ontológica ou a priori. Ela consiste na afirmação de que a existência é uma propriedade necessária a Deus, do mesmo modo que uma determinada propriedade geométrica é necessária ao respectivo objeto geométrico. Contrariamente às outras coisas, cuja existência é apenas possível, Deus precisa existir necessariamente, uma vez que a existência é uma perfeição. Logo, Deus existe. A Sexta Meditação, embora apresente um conjunto bastante complexo de reflexões e conclusões, tem como núcleo a exposição das teses da distinção real entre alma e corpo, da existência dos corpos e da união entre nosso corpo e nossa alma. Uma vez admitida a possibilidade da existência das coisas materiais na Meditação anterior (por meio das ideias claras e distintas do entendimento), Descartes afirma que nossa imaginação nos dará sua probabilidade e nossas ideias sensíveis, sua certeza. A distinção real entre alma e corpo é efetuada a partir do princípio de que toda coisa concebida clara e distintamente como diferente e independente de outra é absolutamente distinta dessa outra. Ora, não há nada de comum entre alma e corpo, a alma sendo uma substância pensante e imaterial, o corpo sendo pura extensão material e não pensante (se vier a existir). Tais entidades são, portanto, absolutamente distintas e meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento150 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 150 incomensuráveis, de modo que tampouco comungam algum atributo ou propriedade. A prova da existência dos corpos se dá a partir do exame das sensações ou ideias sensíveis. Como as ideias sensíveis se impõem a nós contra nossa vontade, essa passividade que sentimos denuncia uma atividade externa. E, embora tais ideias sejam obscuras e confusas, a causalidade externa é percebida clara e distintamente. Ora, possuímos uma inclinação natural a crer que são os corpos que as causam. E, como não possuímos nenhuma capacidade, dada por Deus, que fosse corretiva dessa inclinação, sua incorrigibilidade é sinal de verdade. Portanto, os corpos existem. A prova da união se dá pela análise de outro componente das sensações: a sua natureza própria. A sensação de dor, por exemplo, não denuncia à mente o ferimento ou o mal estar do corpo: a mente sente dor junto com o corpo. Isoladamente o corpo não sentiria dor alguma, mas apenas um "desajuste" físico; faltar-lhe-ia a consciência e o sentir propriamente dito. A alma não poderia ser provocada a ter sensações senão por meio do corpo a ela conjugado. Por isso, as sensações (e as paixões) denunciam a união (e não justaposição) entre alma e corpo, de modo que dela surge uma nova natureza, a natureza humana, inexistente na alma e no corpo isolados. As sensações e as paixões são a manifestação mais profunda dessa humanidade originada por composição. Essas são, em grandes linhas, algumas das etapas fundamentais desse texto que, agora, oferecemos à leitura e à reflexão. Tais etapas só servem de guia e não substituem a reflexão, a leitura e o debate da obra. Uma advertência, para terminar. Descartes produziu um sistema do saber influente e com muita força racional. Ele é o principal personagem do Racionalismo moderno e um dos responsáveis, ao lado de Galileu e de Newton, pela Revolução Científica do século XVII. Talvez em razão disso, seja rotulado, às vezes, como dedutivista extremado e lógico excessivamente rígido e formal. Estranha denominação para quem, como ele, não atribuía grande importância à lógica, se opunha ao formalismo e ao sistema axiomático euclidiano e priorizava a intuição à dedução: como 151151 grande matemático, Descartes preferia a resolução de problemas à pura dedutibilidade, como ilustram as Meditações. Em segundo lugar, por vezes tem-se pretendido culpar Descartes por problemas atuais, como os ecológicos, em razão de afirmações suas sobre o poder que o conhecimento tem de "nos tornar como que senhores e possuidores da natureza"3. Isso tampouco parece justo. Com efeito, ninguém acusará a Deus, por nossos problemas de degradação da natureza e de miséria humana, por ter ele, conforme diz o livro do Gênesis, determinado ao homem e à mulher que se multiplicassem, reinassem sobre a terra, submetessem as outras coisas a si e dominassem animais e plantas, tendo ainda avaliado tudo isso como bom. Algumas Indicações Bibliográficas O texto apresentado a seguir é uma seleção das principais partes das Meditações. Traduzido do francês (conforme consta nas Obras completas de Descartes, v. 9), ele corresponde a quase a metade do texto completo. As supressões são indicadas, seja pelo uso de reticências, quando ocorreram no interior de um parágrafo, seja pela falta de sequência na numeração dos parágrafos, quando algum deles foi eliminado. A bibliografia sobre Descartes e seu pensamento é imensa. Citaremos apenas as obras principais de referências e alguns textos da literatura secundária. É possível encontrar em língua portuguesa todas as obras filosóficas do autor. Muitos artigos e trabalhos estão disponíveis em revistas brasileiras de filosofia on-line; dissertações e teses defendidas encontram-se no Banco de Teses da Capes; outros artigos nacionais e internacionais podem ser procurados nos Portais de Periódicos da Capes. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de descartes traduzidas Para o Português DESCARTES, R. Discurso do método; Meditações; Objeções e respostas; As paixões da alma; Cartas. 3. ed. Tradução de J. Guinsburg e Bento Prado Júnior São Pau3 DESCARTES, R. Discurso do método; Meditações; Objeções e respostas; As paixões da alma; Cartas. 3. ed. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1983. p. 63. meditAndo com desCArtes: dA dúvidA Ao fundAmento152 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 152 lo: Abril Cultural, 1983. (Coleção Os pensadores). Textos de referência no Brasil, juntamente com os textos introdutórios e notas. DESCARTES, R. Meditações sobre filosofia primeira. Tradução de Fausto Castilho. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2004. Edição bilíngue (latim – português) DESCARTES, R. Regras para a direcção do espírito. Tradução de João Gama. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1989. Tradução do texto latino. DESCARTES, R. Princípios da filosofia. Tradução e organização de Guido A. de Almeida. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da UFRJ, 2002. Edição bilíngue (latim – português) da Parte 1 e artigos iniciais da Parte 2. DESCARTES, R. O Mundo ou Tratado da luz; O homem. Tradução de César Augusto Battisti e Marisa Carneiro de Oliveira Franco Donatelli. Campinas: Editora da Unicamp, 2009. Edição bilíngue (francês – português). obras sobre descartes ALQUIÉ, F. A Filosofia de Descartes. Lisboa: Presença, 1980. BATTISTI, C. A. O Método de análise em Descartes: da resolução de problemas à constituição do sistema do conhecimento. Cascavel: Edunioeste, 2002. COTTINGHAM, J. A Filosofia de Descartes. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1989. COTTINGHAM, J. Dicionário Descartes. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002. FORLIN, E. A Teoria cartesiana da verdade. São Paulo: Humanitas, 2005. FORLIN, E. O Papel da dúvida metódica no processo de constituição do cogito. São Paulo: Humanitas, 2004. GAUKROGER, S. Descartes: uma biografia intelectual. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2002. LANDIM FILHO, R. Evidência e verdade no sistema cartesiano. São Paulo: Loyola, 1992. LEOPOLDO E SILVA, F. Descartes: a metafísica da modernidade. São Paulo: Moderna, 1994. RODIS-LEWIS, G. Descartes: uma biografia. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1996. 153153 MeDItAçÕeS SOBRe A FILOSOFIA pRIMeIRA NAS QuAIS SãO DeMONStRADAS A eXIStÊNCIA De DeuS e A DIStINçãO ReAL eNtRe A ALMA e O CORpO DO HOMeM1 primeira Meditação Das coisas que podem ser postas em dúvida2 1. Há já algum tempo dei-me conta de que, desde meus primeiros anos, recebera muitas falsas opiniões por verdadeiras e de que aquilo que depois eu fundei sobre princípios tão mal assegurados devia ser apenas muito duvidoso e incerto; de modo que era preciso tentar seriamente, uma vez em minha vida, desfazer-me de todas as opiniões que recebera até então em minha crença e começar tudo novamente desde os fundamentos, se eu quisesse estabelecer alguma coisa de firme e de constante nas ciências. Parecendo-me, porém, ser esse empreendimento muito grande, aguardei que atingisse uma idade que fosse tão madura 1 DESCARTES, R. Méditations touchant la première philosophie dans lesquelles l existence de Dieu et la distinction réelle entre l ame et le corps de l homme sont démonstrées. In: _____. OEuvres de Descartes. Publiées par Charles Adam e Paul Tannery (AT). Paris: Vrin, 1996. v. 9, p. 13-72. 2 A Primeira Meditação pode ser dividida em duas grandes partes: a primeira (§§ 1-2) apresenta o problema, objetivos e estratégias da Meditação; a segunda (§§ 3-13) expõe os três graus da dúvida, cada qual com sua abrangência e limites. 154 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 154 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA que não pudesse esperar outra depois dela, a qual me fosse mais própria para executá-lo; isso me fez adiá-lo por tanto tempo que, de agora em diante, acreditaria cometer um erro, se empregasse ainda em deliberar o tempo que me resta para agir. 2. Agora, pois, que meu espírito está livre de todas as preocupações e que obtive um repouso seguro numa solidão tranquila, aplicarme-ei seriamente e com liberdade a destruir em geral todas as minhas antigas opiniões. Ora, não será necessário, para atingir esse propósito, provar que elas todas são falsas, o que talvez jamais realizasse até o fim; mas, visto que a razão já me persuade de que não devo menos cuidadosamente impedir-me de acreditar nas coisas que não são inteiramente certas e indubitáveis do que nas que nos parecem ser manifestamente falsas, a menor razão de duvidar que eu nelas encontrar será suficiente para me fazer rejeitá-las todas.3 E, para isso, não é necessário que eu examine cada uma em particular, o que seria um trabalho infinito; mas, como a ruína dos fundamentos traz necessariamente consigo todo o resto do edifício, atacarei inicialmente os princípios sobre os quais todas as minhas antigas opiniões estavam apoiadas.4 3. Tudo o que recebi até o presente como o mais verdadeiro e seguro, eu o aprendi dos sentidos ou pelos sentidos; ora, algumas vezes experimentei que esses sentidos eram enganosos, e é de prudência jamais se fiar inteiramente em quem nos enganou uma vez.5 3 Duvidar de uma afirmação ou ideia não é considerá-la falsa. Para duvidar, basta ter uma boa razão de duvidar, uma razão que nos conduza à desconfiança. A falsidade exige, ao contrário, uma certeza (tal como a verdade). Imaginemos que tenhamos que atravessar uma velha ponte: a menor suspeita de que ela possa desabar nos detém, embora não possamos ter certeza de que ela não resistiria a nossa passagem. 4 Descartes põe à prova todo o conhecimento que se apresente. A dúvida se aplicará aos fundamentos – não a cada conhecimento em particular – e se tornará cada vez mais radical e mais universal. Ela é um procedimento com características destrutivas, cuja radicalidade permitirá ou que se encontre algo que lhe resista definitivamente ou que todo o edifício do saber caia por terra. Suponhamos que queiramos testar o sistema imunológico do corpo humano. Experiências bem-sucedidas não nos dão certeza de que, no futuro, não seremos atacados por uma nova doença. Agora, se produzirmos em laboratório um agente causador da doença mais devastadora que possa algum dia existir, o teste será definitivo: ou ela nos destruirá, ou nós a destruiremos (e, com ela, a todas as demais). 5 Aqui começa o argumento dos erros dos sentidos, o primeiro grau da dúvida. 155155 4. Ocorre, contudo, que, embora os sentidos nos enganem às vezes acerca das coisas pouco sensíveis e muito distantes, encontram-se talvez muitas outras das quais não se possa razoavelmente duvidar, ainda que as conhecêssemos por meio deles: por exemplo, que eu esteja aqui, sentado perto do fogo, vestido com um roupão, tendo este papel entre as mãos e outras coisas dessa natureza. E como eu poderia negar que estas mãos e este corpo sejam meus? A menos, talvez, que eu me compare a esses insensatos, cujo cérebro está de tal modo perturbado e ofuscado pelos negros vapores da bílis, que constantemente asseguram ser reis quando são muito pobres, estar vestidos de ouro e de púrpura quando estão totalmente nus; ou imaginam ser cântaros ou ter um corpo de vidro. Mas o quê? São loucos, e eu não seria menos extravagante se me guiasse por seus exemplos. 5. Devo, contudo, aqui considerar que sou homem e que, por isso, tenho o costume de dormir e de representar em meus sonhos as mesmas coisas, ou outras por vezes menos verossímeis, que esses insensatos quando acordados.6 Quantas vezes ocorreu-me sonhar, à noite, que estava neste lugar, que estava vestido, que estava perto do fogo, embora estivesse inteiramente nu em minha cama? Parece-me que, nesse momento, não é com olhos adormecidos que observo este papel; que esta cabeça que mexo não está dormente; que é com intenção e propósito deliberado que estendo esta mão e que a sinto: o que acontece no sonho não parece ser tão claro nem tão distinto quanto tudo isso. Pensando nisso cuidadosamente, lembro-me, porém, de ter sido frequentemente enganado, quando dormia, por semelhantes ilusões. E, detendo-me neste pensamento, vejo tão manifestamente que não há indício concludente algum nem marcas suficientemente certas por cujo meio se possa distinguir nitidamente a vigília do sono que me sinto inteiramente espantado; e meu espanto é tal que ele é quase capaz de me persuadir de que estou dormindo. 6. Suponhamos, agora, pois, que estamos adormecidos e que todas essas particularidades – a saber, que abrimos os olhos, que mexemos a cabeça, que estendemos as mãos, e coisas semelhantes – são apenas fal6 Aqui começa o argumento do sonho, o segundo grau da dúvida. 156 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 156 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA sas ilusões; e pensemos que talvez nossas mãos ou nosso corpo todo não são tais como os vemos. Entretanto, é preciso ao menos confessar que as coisas que nos são representadas durante o sono são como quadros e pinturas, que não podem ser formados senão à semelhança de algo real e verdadeiro; e que assim, pelo menos, essas coisas gerais, a saber, olhos, cabeça, mãos e todo o resto do corpo, não são coisas imaginárias, mas verdadeiras e existentes. Na verdade, mesmo os pintores, quando se esforçam com o maior artifício em representar sereias e sátiros por formas bizarras e extraordinárias, não lhes podem, contudo, atribuir formas e naturezas inteiramente novas, mas fazem apenas certa mistura e composição dos membros de diversos animais; ou então, se talvez sua imaginação for suficientemente extravagante para inventar algo de tão novo que jamais tenhamos visto coisa semelhante – e que, assim, sua obra nos represente uma coisa puramente fictícia e absolutamente falsa –, certamente pelo menos as cores com que eles a compõem devem ser verdadeiras. 7. E, pela mesma razão, embora essas coisas gerais, a saber, olhos, cabeça, mãos e outras semelhantes, possam ser imaginárias, é preciso confessar, entretanto, que há coisas ainda mais simples e mais universais que são verdadeiras e existentes, de cuja mistura, nem mais nem menos que daquela de algumas cores verdadeiras, são formadas todas essas imagens das coisas que residem em nosso pensamento, quer verdadeiras e reais, quer fictícias e fantásticas. Desse gênero de coisas é a natureza corpórea em geral e sua extensão, também a figura das coisas extensas, sua quantidade ou grandeza e seu número, como também o lugar onde estão, o tempo que mede sua duração, e outras coisas semelhantes. 8. É por isso que, talvez, daí não concluamos mal se dissermos que a Física, a Astronomia, a Medicina e todas as outras ciências dependentes da consideração das coisas compostas são muito duvidosas e incertas, mas que a Aritmética, a Geometria e as outras ciências dessa natureza, que não tratam senão de coisas muito simples e muito gerais sem muito se inquietarem sobre se elas existem na natureza ou não existem, contêm alguma coisa de certo e indubitável. Com efeito, quer eu esteja acordado, quer esteja dormindo, dois e três somados formarão sempre o número cinco e o quadrado nunca terá mais que quatro lados; e não parece pos157157 sível que verdades tão manifestas possam ser suspeitas de alguma falsidade ou incerteza. 9. Há muito tempo, entretanto, que tenho em meu espírito certa opinião de que há um Deus que pode tudo e por quem fui criado e produzido tal como sou.7 Ora, quem me poderá assegurar que esse Deus não tenha feito que não haja nenhuma terra, nenhum céu, nenhum corpo extenso, nenhuma figura, nenhuma grandeza, nenhum lugar, e que, não obstante, eu tenha os sentimentos de todas essas coisas e que tudo isso não me pareça existir de modo diferente daquele que vejo? E, mesmo, como por vezes julgo que os outros se enganam até nas coisas que pensam saber com a maior certeza, pode ocorrer que ele tenha desejado que eu me engane todas as vezes em que faço a adição de dois e três, ou em que conto os lados de um quadrado, ou em que julgo alguma coisa ainda mais fácil, se é que se pode imaginar algo mais fácil que isso. Pode até ser que Deus não tenha querido que eu seja decepcionado desta maneira, pois ele é considerado soberanamente bom; todavia, se repugnasse a sua bondade ter-me feito tal que eu me enganasse sempre, pareceria também ser-lhe absolutamente contrário permitir que eu me engane algumas vezes; e, no entanto, não posso duvidar de que ele não o permita. 10. Haverá talvez, aqui, pessoas que preferirão negar a existência de um Deus tão poderoso a acreditar que todas as outras coisas sejam incertas. Não lhes resistamos no momento e suponhamos, em seu favor, que tudo o que é dito aqui de um Deus seja uma fábula. Entretanto, de qualquer forma que suponham que eu tenha chegado ao estado e ao ser que possuo, quer o atribuam a algum destino ou fatalidade, quer o refiram ao acaso, quer queiram que isso seja por uma contínua série e ligação entre coisas, é certo que, visto que falhar e enganar-se é uma espécie de imperfeição, quanto menos poderoso for o autor a que atribuírem minha origem tanto mais será provável que eu seja de tal modo imperfeito que me engane sempre. A tais razões nada tenho, por certo, a responder, mas 7 Aqui começa o argumento do Deus enganador, o terceiro grau da dúvida. Ele tem por fundamento o desconhecimento de nossa origem. Diferente dos graus anteriores, sugeridos por erros e fatos que nos ocorrem naturalmente, este exige um esforço maior para sua elaboração: por isso a dúvida, aqui, é chamada de dúvida metafísica, em contraposição à natural. 158 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 158 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA sou forçado a confessar que, de todas as opiniões que no passado recebera em minha crença por verdadeiras, não há sequer uma da qual não possa agora duvidar, não por alguma desconsideração ou leviandade, mas por razões muito fortes e maduramente consideradas; de sorte que é necessário que eu interrompa e suspenda daqui para frente meu juízo sobre tais pensamentos e que não lhes dê mais crédito do que daria às coisas que me parecem evidentemente falsas, se desejo encontrar algo de constante e de seguro nas ciências.8 11. Não é, porém, suficiente ter feito tais considerações; é preciso, ainda, que eu cuide de lembrar-me delas; pois essas opiniões antigas e ordinárias ainda retornam com frequência a meu pensamento: a longa e familiar convivência que tiveram comigo deu-lhes o direito de ocuparem meu espírito contra meu desejo e de se tornarem quase que senhoras de minha crença. E jamais me desacostumarei de concordar com isso e de confiar nelas, enquanto as considerar tais como são efetivamente – a saber, como duvidosas de alguma maneira, como acabamos de mostrar, e igualmente muito prováveis –, de modo que se tem muito mais razão em acreditar nelas que em negá-las. Eis por que penso que me utilizarei delas mais prudentemente se, tomando partido contrário, empregar todos os meus cuidados em enganar-me a mim mesmo, fingindo que todos esses pensamentos sejam falsos e imaginários, até que, tendo equilibrado meus prejuízos de tal modo que não possam fazer pender minha opinião mais para um lado que para o outro, meu juízo não seja mais, daí por diante, dominado por maus usos e desviado do reto caminho que pode conduzi-lo ao conhecimento da verdade. Estou seguro, mesmo assim, de que não pode haver perigo nem erro nesta via e de que eu não poderia hoje aceder em demasia a minha desconfiança, visto que não se trata, no momento, de agir, mas somente de meditar e de conhecer. 12. Suporei, pois, que há não um verdadeiro Deus, que é a soberana fonte da verdade, mas certo gênio maligno, não menos ardiloso e 8 O Deus enganador poderia ser comparado a um poderoso vírus de computador que, por ter penetrado durante a instalação do sistema operacional, pareceu pertencer ao conjunto dos programas do sistema. Por isso, jamais foi detectado, e seus efeitos sempre foram considerados pertencerem ao funcionamento normal do computador. Quem sabe o ser que nos criou não faz algo semelhante com nossa capacidade de conhecer? 159159 enganador que poderoso, que empregou toda a sua destreza em enganar-me.9 Pensarei que o céu, o ar, a terra, as cores, as figuras, os sons e todas as coisas exteriores que vemos não passam de ilusões e enganos de que ele se serve para surpreender minha credulidade. Considerar-me-ei a mim mesmo como não tendo mãos, olhos, carne ou sangue, como não tendo sentido algum, mas acreditando falsamente ter todas essas coisas. Permanecerei obstinadamente apegado a esse pensamento; e se, por esse meio, não estiver em meu poder chegar ao conhecimento de alguma verdade, ao menos está a meu alcance suspender meu juízo. Eis por que prestarei atenção cuidadosamente para não receber em minha crença nenhuma falsidade, e prepararei tão bem meu espírito contra todas as armadilhas desse grande enganador que, por poderoso e ardiloso que seja, não poderá jamais impor-me nada. 13. Ocorre que esse projeto é penoso e trabalhoso, e certa preguiça me empurra impiedosamente para o ritmo de minha vida ordinária. E, tal como um escravo que desfrutava, durante o sono, de uma liberdade imaginária, tão logo comece a suspeitar de que sua liberdade seja apenas um sonho, teme ser despertado e conspira com essas ilusões agradáveis para ser mais longamente enganado, assim eu reincido insensivelmente por mim mesmo em minhas antigas opiniões e receio despertar dessa sonolência, de medo de que as vigílias laboriosas que se sucederiam à tranquilidade desse repouso, em vez de me trazerem alguma claridade ou alguma luz no conhecimento da verdade, não fossem suficientes para aclarar todas as trevas das dificuldades que acabam de ser levantadas.10 9 A função do Gênio Maligno é a mesmo da do Deus enganador, sob o aspecto da abrangência da dúvida. Entretanto, o Gênio Maligno tem um papel psicológico fundamental: ele permite que consideremos os pensamentos postos em dúvida como se fossem falsos, para que, assim, deixemos de acreditar neles. Por mais duvidosas que sejam as afirmações matemáticas, por exemplo, elas fazem-nos voltar a crer nelas: elas são duvidosas e prováveis ao mesmo tempo. Por isso, precisamos de um artifício para que desacreditemos nelas de vez, tal como a raposa, em uma das Fábulas de Esopo (A raposa e as uvas), por não conseguir alcançar as uvas no alto da videira, consola a si mesma dizendo que elas estão verdes. Este auto engano acalmou a vontade da raposa e serve, aqui, para frear nossa crença sobre a verdade. 10 A Primeira Meditação tem como resultado a suspensão de todo juízo ou afirmação. Como tal, apresenta um resultado negativo ou cético (mas provisório, como veremos a seguir). 160 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 160 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA Segunda Meditação Da natureza do espírito humano; e que ele é mais fácil de conhecer que o corpo11 1. A Meditação que fiz ontem encheu-me o espírito de tantas dúvidas que, de agora em diante, não está mais em meu poder esquecê-las. E, no entanto, não vejo de que forma poderia resolvê-las (...). Esforçarme-ei, não obstante, e seguirei mais uma vez a mesma via que percorri ontem, afastando-me de tudo aquilo em que eu puder imaginar a menor dúvida, tal como se soubesse que isso fosse absolutamente falso; e continuarei sempre por esse caminho até que tenha encontrado algo de certo ou, pelo menos, se outra coisa não for possível, até que tenha aprendido certamente que não há nada de certo no mundo. 2. Arquimedes, para tirar o globo terrestre de sua posição e transportá-lo para outro local, nada pedia senão um ponto que fosse fixo e seguro. Assim, terei o direito de conceber altas esperanças, se for feliz o bastante para encontrar somente uma coisa que seja certa e indubitável. 3. Suponho, então, que todas as coisas que vejo são falsas (...). O que, portanto, poderá ser considerado verdadeiro? Talvez nenhuma outra coisa, a não ser que não há nada de certo no mundo. 4. Diante disso, como é que sei se não há alguma outra coisa diferente das que acabo de julgar incertas, da qual não se possa ter a menor dúvida? Não há algum Deus, ou alguma outra potência, que me ponha no espírito esses pensamentos? Isso não é necessário; pois talvez eu seja capaz de produzi-los por mim mesmo. Eu, então, pelo menos, não sou algo? Ocorre que já neguei que eu tivesse algum sentido ou algum corpo. Hesito, no entanto, pois o que se segue disso? Sou de tal modo dependente do corpo e dos sentidos que não possa existir sem eles? Eu já me persuadira, contudo, de que não havia nada no mundo, de que não havia céu algum, terra alguma, espíritos alguns, nem corpos alguns; não me 11 A Segunda Meditação tem três grandes etapas: a primeira (§§ 1-4) apresenta a conquista da primeira verdade, a minha existência; a segunda (§§ 5-9) faz uma reflexão sobre essa verdade e estabelece a natureza do ser existente; a terceira (§§ 10-18) pretende mostrar que o espírito humano é mais fácil de ser conhecido do que o corpo. 161161 persuadi, então, de que eu tampouco existia? Com certeza, não; eu existia sem dúvida, se me persuadi de algo ou se apenas pensei algo. Há, porém, algum não sei qual enganador muito poderoso e muito ardiloso que emprega toda a sua destreza em enganar-me sempre. Não há, pois, dúvida alguma de que sou, se ele me engana; e, que ele me engane quanto quiser, não poderá jamais fazer que eu nada seja, enquanto eu pensar ser alguma coisa. Desse modo, após ter pensado bem nisso e ter examinado cuidadosamente todas as coisas, é preciso, enfim, concluir e ter por constante que esta proposição, Eu sou, eu existo, é necessariamente verdadeira todas as vezes que a pronuncio ou que a concebo em meu espírito.12 5. Não conheço, porém, ainda bastante claramente o que sou, eu que estou certo de que sou. Por isso, daqui para frente é preciso que eu atente com todo cuidado para não tomar imprudentemente alguma outra coisa por mim e, assim, não me equivocar sobre este conhecimento que sustento ser mais certo e mais evidente que todos os que tive até então.13 7. Ora, o que sou eu, eu que agora suponho que há alguém que é extremamente poderoso e, se ouso dizê-lo, malicioso e ardiloso, que emprega todas as suas forças e toda a sua destreza em enganar-me? Posso estar seguro de possuir a menor de todas as coisas que acima atribuí à natureza corpórea? Detenho-me a pensar nisso com atenção, passo e repasso todas essas coisas em meu espírito, e não encontro nenhuma que eu possa dizer estar em mim. Não é necessário que me detenha a enumerá-las. Passemos, então, aos atributos da alma, e vejamos se há alguns que existam em mim. Os primeiros são alimentar-me e andar; mas, se é verdade que não tenho corpo, é verdade também que não posso andar nem me alimentar. Um outro é sentir; mas tampouco se pode sentir sem o corpo; além disso, pensei sentir em outros tempos várias coisas durante o sono, as quais reconheci, ao despertar, não ter sentido 12 Eis a primeira verdade encontrada por Descartes. Em outros textos, como na Quarta Parte do Discurso do método (DESCARTES, R. Discurso do método; Meditações; Objeções e respostas; As paixões da alma; Cartas. 3. ed. Tradução de J. Guinsburg e Bento Prado Júnior São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1983.(Coleção Os Pensadores). p. 46), ela aparece na forma que se tornou canônica: "penso, logo existo". É importante atentar para o fato de que ela só é verdadeira no instante em que é concebida. 13 Estando certo de que sou, posso me perguntar agora o que sou, não enquanto ser humano ou em razão do que acreditava ser, mas a partir, apenas, da primeira verdade. 162 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 162 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA de fato. Um outro é pensar; e noto aqui que o pensamento é um atributo que me pertence: só ele não pode ser separado de mim. Eu sou, eu existo: isso é certo; mas por quanto tempo? A saber, por todo o tempo em que eu penso; pois talvez poderia ocorrer que, se eu cessasse de pensar, cessaria ao mesmo tempo de ser ou de existir. Eu nada admito agora que não seja necessariamente verdadeiro: não sou, então, falando com precisão, senão uma coisa que pensa, isto é, um espírito, um entendimento ou uma razão, que são termos cuja significação me era anteriormente desconhecida. Ora, eu sou uma coisa verdadeira e verdadeiramente existente; mas que coisa? Já o disse: uma coisa que pensa.14 E que mais? Excitarei ainda minha imaginação para procurar saber se não sou algo mais. Eu não sou essa reunião de membros a que chamam corpo humano; não sou um ar sutil e penetrante, disseminado por todos esses membros; não sou um vento, um sopro, um vapor, nem algo que posso fingir e imaginar, já que supus que tudo isso não era nada e que, sem mudar essa suposição, noto que não deixo de estar certo de que sou alguma coisa. 8. Também pode acontecer que essas mesmas coisas, que suponho não existirem, porque me são desconhecidas, não sejam de fato diferentes de mim, que eu conheço? Nada sei sobre isso; não discuto isso agora; não posso dar meu juízo senão a coisas que me são conhecidas: reconheci que eu era, e procuro o que sou, eu que reconheci ser. Ora, é muito certo que essa noção e conhecimento de mim mesmo, assim precisamente tomados, não dependem das coisas cuja existência não me é ainda conhecida; nem, consequentemente, e com uma razão mais forte, de nenhuma daquelas que são fingidas e inventadas pela imaginação. E mesmo esses termos fingir e imaginar advertem-me de meu erro; pois eu fingiria, de fato, se imaginasse ser alguma coisa, visto que imaginar nada mais é que contemplar a figura ou a imagem de uma coisa corporal. Ora, com certeza já sei que sou, e que, ao mesmo tempo, pode ocorrer que todas essas imagens e, em geral, todas as coisas que se relacionam com a natureza do corpo sejam apenas sonhos ou quimeras. Em sequência a isso, vejo claramente que teria tão pouca razão ao dizer: excitarei minha imagina14 Esta é a segunda verdade conquistada. Ela determina a essência ou natureza do ser pensante. 163163 ção para conhecer mais distintamente o que sou, como se dissesse: estou agora acordado e percebo algo de real e verdadeiro; mas, como não o percebo ainda bastante nitidamente, adormecerei de propósito para que meus sonhos me representem isso com mais verdade e evidência. E, assim, reconheço certamente que nada, de tudo o que posso compreender por meio da imaginação, pertence a este conhecimento que tenho de mim mesmo, e que é necessário lembrar e desviar o espírito dessa forma de conceber, a fim de que ele próprio possa reconhecer bem distintamente sua natureza. 9. O que sou eu então? Sou uma coisa que pensa. O que é uma coisa que pensa? É uma coisa que duvida, que concebe, que afirma, que nega, que quer, que não quer, que imagina também e que sente.15 Por certo não é pouco se todas essas coisas pertencem a minha natureza. Por que não lhe pertenceriam, então? Não sou ainda eu esse mesmo que duvida de quase tudo, que, no entanto, entende e concebe certas coisas, que assegura e afirma serem só essas verdadeiras, que nega todas as demais, que quer e deseja conhecê-las ainda mais, que não quer ser enganado, que imagina muitas coisas, por vezes até a despeito de querer, e que sente também muitas delas como que por intermédio dos órgãos do corpo? Há algo nisso tudo que não seja tão verdadeiro quanto é certo que sou e que existo, ainda que dormisse sempre e que aquele que me deu o ser se servisse de todas as suas forças para iludir-me? Há, também, algum desses atributos que possa ser distinguido de meu pensamento, ou que se possa dizer que existe separado de mim mesmo? É por si tão evidente que sou eu quem duvida, entende e deseja que não é necessário nada acrescentar aqui para explicá-lo. E tenho também certamente o poder de imaginar; pois, ainda que possa ocorrer (como supus anteriormente) que as coisas que imagino não sejam verdadeiras, este poder de imaginar não deixa, no entanto, de estar realmente em mim e de fazer parte de meu pensamento. Enfim, sou o mesmo que sente, isto é, que recebe e conhece as coisas como que pelos órgãos dos sentidos, visto que de fato vejo a luz, ouço o ruído, sinto o calor. Dir-me-ão que essas aparências são falsas e 15 Todos os modos de pensar ou faculdades, mesmo não puramente intelectuais, são integrados à segunda verdade. 164 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 164 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA que eu durmo! Que assim seja; todavia, ao menos é muito certo que me parece que vejo, que ouço e que me aqueço; e é isso propriamente que em mim se chama sentir, o que, tomado assim precisamente, não é outra coisa senão pensar. A partir daí, começo a conhecer o que sou com um pouco mais de luz e distinção do que antes. 16. Enfim, o que direi desse espírito, isto é, de mim mesmo? Ora, até aqui, não admito em mim nada senão um espírito. Que declararei, digo eu, sobre mim que pareço conceber com tanta nitidez e distinção esse pedaço de cera?16 Não conheço a mim mesmo não só com muito mais verdade e certeza, mas ainda com muito maior distinção e nitidez? Com efeito, se julgo que a cera é ou existe pelo fato de eu a ver, por certo se segue bem mais evidentemente que eu próprio sou, ou que eu existo, pelo fato de eu a ver; pois pode ocorrer que o que vejo não seja, de fato, cera; pode ocorrer também que eu nem sequer tenha olhos para ver coisa alguma; mas não pode ocorrer, quando vejo ou (o que não mais distingo) quando penso ver, que eu, que penso, não seja alguma coisa. Do mesmo modo, se julgo que a cera existe, pelo fato de que a toco, segue-se ainda a mesma coisa, a saber, que eu sou; e, se o julgo pelo fato de que minha imaginação me persuade disso, ou por qualquer outra causa que seja, concluirei sempre a mesma coisa. E o que observei aqui a respeito da cera pode aplicar-se a todas as outras coisas que me são exteriores e que se encontram fora de mim. 17. Ora, se a noção ou conhecimento da cera parece ser mais nítido e mais distinto depois que ela foi descoberta não somente pela visão ou pelo tato, mas ainda por muitas outras causas, com quanto mais evidência, distinção e nitidez não devo conhecer a mim mesmo, visto que todas as razões que servem para conhecer e conceber a natureza da cera, ou de qualquer outro corpo, provam muito mais facilmente e mais evidentemente a natureza de meu espírito? E encontram-se ainda tantas outras coisas no próprio espírito que podem contribuir para o esclarecimento de sua natureza que aquelas que dependem do corpo, como esta, quase não 16 Descartes acaba de examinar um pedaço de cera para mostrar que, para o conhecimento de um corpo, caso exista, é o espírito que o conhece e, portanto, é anterior e condição para seu conhecimento. 165165 merecem ser enumeradas. 18. Enfim, eis-me insensivelmente de volta onde queria; pois, já que é uma coisa presentemente conhecida por mim que, propriamente falando, só conhecemos os corpos pela faculdade de entender existente em nós, e não pela imaginação nem pelos sentidos, e que não os conhecemos pelo fato de vê-los ou de tocá-los, mas apenas porque os concebemos pelo pensamento, reconheço evidentemente que não há nada que me seja mais fácil de conhecer do que meu espírito (...).17 terceira Meditação De Deus; que ele existe18 2. Agora considerarei mais exatamente se não se encontram talvez em mim outros conhecimentos que eu não tenha ainda percebido. Estou certo de que sou uma coisa que pensa; mas então não sei também o que é requerido para me tornar certo de alguma coisa? Nesse primeiro conhecimento não se encontra nada além de uma clara e distinta percepção daquilo que conheço; a qual, na verdade, não seria suficiente para me assegurar de que é verdadeira, se algum dia pudesse ocorrer que uma coisa que eu concebesse assim clara e distintamente se mostrasse falsa. E, portanto, parece-me que já posso estabelecer como regra geral que todas as coisas que concebemos muito clara e muito distintamente são todas verdadeiras. 5. E, por certo, já que não tenho nenhuma razão de crer que haja algum Deus que seja enganador, e mesmo que eu não tenha considerado ainda as que provam que há um Deus, a razão de duvidar que depende somente dessa opinião é bem frágil e, por assim dizer, metafísica. Agora, 17 A Segunda Meditação tem seu âmbito circunscrito ao horizonte do ser pensante. Nada é dito, portanto, fora dele. 18 A Terceira Meditação enfrenta o problema da existência de Deus e se ele é enganador. Ela pode ser dividida em quatro partes: a primeira (§§ 1-9) apresenta o problema e discrimina os dados a partir dos quais será alcançada a solução; a segunda (§§ 1014) examina uma primeira solução, que será descartada; a terceira (§§ 15-29) expõe a primeira prova da existência de Deus; a quarta (§§ 29-42) expõe a segunda prova (não conservada aqui) e as conclusões gerais. 166 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 166 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA para poder suprimi-la inteiramente, devo examinar se há um Deus, tão logo se apresente a ocasião; e, se achar que há um, devo também examinar se ele pode ser enganador: pois, sem o conhecimento dessas duas verdades, não vejo como possa jamais estar certo de alguma coisa.19 E, a fim de que eu possa ter a ocasião de examinar isso sem interromper a ordem de meditar que me propus, que é de passar por graus das noções que encontrar primeiro em meu espírito para aquelas que nele poderei encontrar depois, é preciso que aqui eu divida todos os meus pensamentos em certos gêneros e considere em quais desses gêneros há propriamente verdade ou erro. 6. Entre meus pensamentos, alguns são como as imagens das coisas, e é apenas a estes que convém propriamente o nome de ideia: como quando me represento um homem, uma quimera, o céu, um anjo ou mesmo Deus.20 Outros, além disso, têm algumas outras formas: como, quando quero, temo, afirmo ou nego, concebo então efetivamente uma coisa como o sujeito da ação de meu espírito, mas acrescento também alguma outra coisa, por essa ação, à ideia que tenho daquela coisa; e, desse gênero de pensamentos, uns são chamados vontades ou afecções e os outros, juízos. 7. Agora, no que concerne às ideias, se as considerarmos apenas nelas mesmas e se não as relacionarmos a alguma outra coisa, elas não podem, para falar propriamente, ser falsas; pois, quer eu imagine uma cabra ou uma quimera, não é menos verdadeiro que eu imagine tanto uma quanto a outra.21 9. Assim, não restam senão os juízos, em relação aos quais devo 19 Não há como conhecer mais coisas sem resolver esse problema: o ser pensante ficaria restrito às verdades adquiridas sobre si mesmo. 20 Essa definição de ideia, como imagem, não pode ser associada à noção de imagem sensível, mas à de representação, isto é, à capacidade da ideia de figurar algo e nos enviar a algo. Ela, contudo, não implica esse algo. Tal como pode ocorrer com uma fotografia, é possível inventar uma ideia: por isso, uma "cópia" não exige necessariamente um original. 21 Depois de ter apresentado, mais acima, o problema (se há um Deus e se ele é enganador), Descartes examina, aqui, os tipos de pensamentos e quais nos conduzem ao erro e à falsidade. 167167 prestar atenção cuidadosamente para não me enganar. Ora, o principal erro e mais comum que se pode encontrar consiste em que eu julgue que as ideias que estão em mim são semelhantes ou conformes às coisas que estão fora de mim; pois, certamente, se eu considerasse as ideias apenas como modos ou formas de meu pensamento, sem querer relacioná-las a algo de exterior, mal poderiam elas dar-me a ocasião de falhar. 15. Há, porém, ainda uma outra via para investigar se, entre as coisas das quais tenho ideias em mim, há algumas que existem fora de mim. A saber, caso tais ideias sejam tomadas somente na medida em que são certas formas de pensar, não reconheço entre elas nenhuma diferença ou desigualdade, e todas parecem provir de mim de uma mesma maneira;22 mas, considerando-as como imagens, das quais algumas representam uma coisa e as outras uma outra, é evidente que elas são bastante diferentes entre si. Com efeito, aquelas que me representam substâncias são, sem dúvida, algo mais e contêm em si (por assim falar) mais realidade objetiva, isto é, participam por representação em mais graus de ser ou de perfeição do que as que me representam apenas modos ou acidentes. Ademais, aquela pela qual concebo um Deus soberano, eterno, infinito, imutável, onisciente, onipotente e criador universal de todas as coisas que estão fora dele, aquela, digo eu, tem certamente em si mais realidade objetiva que aquelas pelas quais as substâncias finitas me são representadas. 16. Agora, é coisa manifesta pela luz natural que deve haver pelo menos tanta realidade na causa eficiente e total quanto em seu efeito; pois, de onde é que o efeito pode tirar sua realidade senão de sua causa? E como essa causa poder-lhe-ia comunicá-la se não a tivesse em si mesma?23 22 As ideias, enquanto formas de pensar, não se diferenciam entre si. Do ponto de vista do conteúdo, ao contrário, elas se distinguem exatamente porque representam coisas distintas. Ideias podem ser comparadas a fotografias: quanto ao material utilizado e ao processo de revelação, fotografias são todas iguais (feitas de papel, com determinado tamanho etc.); quanto ao que querem representar (conteúdo), elas são distintas (trazem a imagem de um amigo, de uma festa etc.). As ideias também têm essas duas dimensões ou realidades: fabricadas pelo ser pensante, são todas iguais (sua realidade formal); por representarem coisas diferentes, são todas distintas (sua realidade objetiva). Lembremo-nos, porém, de que, mesmo que queiram representar algo, as ideias podem ter sido inventadas ou fabricadas ficticiamente. 23 O princípio de causalidade é assegurado pela luz natural. 168 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 168 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA 17. Daí resulta não somente que o nada não poderia produzir coisa alguma, mas também que o que é mais perfeito, isto é, o que contém em si mais realidade, não pode ser uma decorrência e uma dependência do menos perfeito. E esta verdade não é apenas clara e evidente nos efeitos que possuem essa realidade que os filósofos chamam de atual ou formal, mas também nas ideias em que se considera apenas a realidade que eles nomeiam objetiva. Por exemplo, a pedra que ainda não existiu não somente não pode agora começar a existir, se não for produzida por uma coisa que possua em si formalmente, ou eminentemente, tudo o que entra na composição da pedra, ou seja, que contenha em si as mesmas coisas ou outras mais excelentes que aquelas que se encontram na pedra; e o calor não pode ser produzido em um objeto que dele era privado anteriormente, se não for por uma coisa que seja de uma ordem, de um grau ou de um gênero ao menos tão perfeito quanto o calor, e assim com os outros. Mas ainda, além disso, a ideia do calor, ou da pedra, não pode estar em mim, se não tiver sido posta aí por alguma causa que contenha em si pelo menos tanta realidade quanto a que concebo no calor ou na pedra. Embora essa causa não transmita a minha ideia nada de sua realidade atual ou formal, nem por isso se deve imaginar que essa causa deva ser menos real; mas deve-se saber que, sendo toda ideia uma obra do espírito, sua natureza é tal que não exige em si nenhuma outra realidade formal além da que recebe e toma de empréstimo do pensamento ou do espírito, do qual ela é apenas um modo, isto é, uma maneira ou forma de pensar.24 Ora, a fim de que uma ideia contenha certa realidade objetiva e não outra, ela o deve, sem dúvida, a alguma causa, na qual se encontra ao menos tanta realidade formal quanto esta ideia contém de realidade objetiva.25 Com efeito, se supusermos que há algo na ideia que não se encontra em sua causa, é preciso então que ela tenha isso do nada; mas, por imperfeita que seja essa forma de ser, pela qual uma coisa está, por sua ideia, objetivamente ou por representação no entendimento, por certo não se pode dizer, no entanto, que essa maneira ou essa forma não seja 24 Do ponto de vista da realidade formal, a causa das ideias é o próprio ser pensante: é ele que produz as ideias. 25 Do ponto de vista da realidade objetiva, entretanto, as ideias exigem causas que deem conta da sua diversidade e da "quantidade" de seu conteúdo. 169169 nada, nem, por conseguinte, que essa ideia tire sua origem do nada. Tampouco devo duvidar de que seja necessário que a realidade esteja formalmente nas causas de minhas ideias, embora a realidade que considero nessas ideias seja somente objetiva, nem pensar que baste que essa realidade se encontre objetivamente em suas causas; pois, assim como essa maneira de ser objetivamente pertence às ideias pela própria natureza delas, assim também a maneira ou forma de ser formalmente pertence às causas dessas ideias (ao menos às primeiras e principais) pela própria natureza delas. E, ainda que possa ocorrer que uma ideia dê origem a uma outra ideia, isso, contudo, não pode estender-se ao infinito, mas é preciso ao fim chegar a uma primeira ideia, cuja causa seja como um padrão ou original, na qual toda a realidade ou perfeição esteja contida formal e efetivamente, a qual só se encontre objetivamente ou por representação nessas ideias. Desse modo, a luz natural me faz conhecer evidentemente que as ideias estão em mim como quadros, ou imagens, que podem, na verdade, facilmente não conservar a perfeição das coisas das quais foram tiradas, mas que jamais podem conter algo de maior ou mais perfeito. 18. E, quanto mais longa e cuidadosamente examino todas essas coisas, tanto mais clara e distintamente reconheço que elas são verdadeiras, Enfim, o que concluirei de tudo isso? A saber, que, se a realidade objetiva de alguma de minhas ideias é tal que eu reconheça claramente que ela não está em mim nem formal nem eminentemente e que, por conseguinte, eu mesmo não posso ser-lhe a causa, daí se segue, necessariamente, que não estou sozinho no mundo, mas que há ainda alguma outra coisa que existe e que é a causa dessa ideia; ao passo que, se tal ideia não se encontra em mim, não terei nenhum argumento que me possa convencer e me tornar certo da existência de alguma outra coisa além de mim mesmo; pois os investiguei a todos cuidadosamente, e não pude encontrar nenhum até o presente. 19. Ora, entre essas ideias, além da que me representa a mim mesmo, sobre a qual não pode haver aqui nenhuma dificuldade, há uma outra que me representa um Deus, outras, coisas corporais e inanimadas, outras, anjos, outras, animais, e outras, enfim, que me representam homens semelhantes a mim (...). 170 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 170 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA 22. Resta, portanto, tão-somente a ideia de Deus, na qual é preciso considerar se há algo que não possa ter provindo de mim mesmo. Pelo nome de Deus entendo uma substância infinita, eterna, imutável, independente, onisciente, onipotente e pela qual eu próprio e todas as outras coisas que existem (se é verdade que há coisas que existem) foram criadas e produzidas. Ora, essas vantagens são tão grandes e tão eminentes que, quanto mais atentamente as considero, menos me persuado de que a ideia que dele tenho possa tirar sua origem só de mim. E, por conseguinte, é preciso necessariamente concluir, de tudo o que eu disse antes, que Deus existe; pois, ainda que a ideia da substância esteja em mim pelo próprio fato de eu ser uma substância, eu não teria, contudo, a ideia de uma substância infinita, eu que sou um ser finito, se ela não tivesse sido colocada em mim por alguma substância que fosse verdadeiramente infinita.26 23. E não devo imaginar que não concebo o infinito por uma verdadeira ideia, mas somente pela negação do que é finito, do mesmo modo que compreendo o repouso e as trevas pela negação do movimento e da luz; já que, ao contrário, vejo manifestamente que se encontra mais realidade na substância infinita que na substância finita e, portanto, que tenho em mim, de alguma forma, a noção do infinito anteriormente à do finito, isto é, de Deus antes que de mim mesmo.27 Caso contrário, como seria possível que eu pudesse conhecer que duvido e que desejo, isto é, que me falta algo e que não sou inteiramente perfeito, se não tivesse em mim nenhuma ideia de um ser mais perfeito que o meu, em comparação ao qual eu conheceria as carências de minha natureza? 25. A ideia, digo eu, desse ser soberanamente perfeito e infinito é inteiramente verdadeira; pois, ainda que talvez se possa fingir que tal ser não existe, não se pode fingir, contudo, que sua ideia não me representa nada de real, como disse há pouco da ideia do frio. 26 Conclusão da primeira prova: Deus existe como causa de sua ideia: dado o conteúdo infinito da ideia de Deus (sua realidade objetiva), só pode ter sido causada pelo próprio ser infinito. 27 A noção de infinito é anterior à de finito. O infinito não pode ser composto pela soma ou por ampliação do finito: como na matemática, a soma de grandezas finitas gera sempre grandezas finitas. 171171 26. Esta mesma ideia é também muito clara e distinta, porquanto tudo o que meu espírito concebe clara e distintamente de real e de verdadeiro, e que contém em si alguma perfeição, está contido e encerrado por inteiro nessa ideia. 39. E, por certo, não se deve achar estranho que Deus, ao me criar, tenha posto em mim essa ideia para ser como que a marca do operário impressa em sua obra; e tampouco é necessário que essa marca seja algo diferente dessa mesma obra. Ao contrário, pelo simples fato de que Deus me criou, é muito crível que ele, de algum modo, me tenha produzido a sua imagem e semelhança, e que eu conceba essa semelhança (na qual a ideia de Deus se acha contida) pela mesma faculdade pela qual me concebo a mim mesmo; isso quer dizer que, quando reflito sobre mim, não só conheço que sou uma coisa imperfeita, incompleta e dependente de outrem, que tende e aspira incessantemente a algo de melhor e de maior do que sou, mas também conheço, ao mesmo tempo, que aquele de quem dependo possui em si todas essas grandes coisas a que aspiro e cujas ideias encontro em mim, não indefinidamente e só em potência, mas que ele as desfruta de fato, atual e infinitamente, e assim que ele é Deus. E toda a força do argumento de que aqui me servi para provar a existência de Deus consiste em que reconheço que seria impossível que minha natureza fosse tal como é, ou seja, que eu tivesse em mim a ideia de um Deus, se Deus não existisse verdadeiramente; esse mesmo Deus, digo eu, cuja ideia está em mim, isto é, que possui todas essas altas perfeições de que nosso espírito bem pode ter alguma ideia, sem, no entanto, compreendê-las a todas, que não é sujeito a carência alguma e que nada tem de todas as coisas que assinalam alguma imperfeição. 40. Daí é bastante evidente que ele não pode ser enganador, já que a luz natural nos ensina que o engano depende necessariamente de alguma carência.28 28 Está resolvido, portanto, o problema central, exposto no início: Deus existe e não é enganador. 172 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 172 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA Quarta Meditação Do verdadeiro e do falso29 2. (...) E já me parece que descubro um caminho que nos conduzirá dessa contemplação do verdadeiro Deus (no qual todos os tesouros da ciência e da sabedoria estão encerrados) ao conhecimento das outras coisas do Universo. 3. Primeiramente reconheço que é impossível que alguma vez ele me engane, visto que em toda fraude e engano se encontra algum modo de imperfeição. E, embora pareça que poder enganar seja um sinal de sutileza ou de poder, entretanto, querer enganar testemunha, sem dúvida, fraqueza ou malícia. E, portanto, isso não se pode encontrar em Deus. 4. Depois, experimento em mim mesmo certa capacidade de julgar, a qual recebi indubitavelmente de Deus, do mesmo modo que todo o resto das coisas que possuo; e, como ele não quereria iludir-me, é certo que ma deu tal que jamais poderei falhar, quando a usar como é preciso (...). 5. Assim, conheço que o erro, enquanto tal, não é algo de real que dependa de Deus, mas que é somente uma carência; e, portanto, que não tenho necessidade, para falhar, de algum poder que me tenha sido dado por Deus, particularmente para esse efeito (...).30 6. Entretanto, isso ainda não me satisfaz totalmente; pois o erro não é uma pura negação, ou seja, não é a simples carência ou falta de alguma perfeição que não me é devida, mas, antes, é uma privação de algum conhecimento que parece que eu deveria possuir.31 E, considerando 29 A Quarta Meditação enfrenta o problema de como conciliar o fato de que erramos com a tese de que nosso criador (Deus veraz e perfeito) não pode ser responsável pelo erro. Ela tem duas grandes partes: a primeira (§§ 1-8) apresenta o problema e oferece algumas soluções, cada qual sendo rejeitada em seguida; a segunda (§§ 9-17) expõe a solução definitiva, inocenta Deus do erro e valida a regra da clareza e distinção como regra da verdade. 30 Do ponto de vista de Deus, o erro não é real e denuncia apenas nossa finitude ou limitação: ele é pura negação. Somos como um computador que efetua todas as operações ou tarefas que lhe foram atribuídas. Outras, ele não as faz e não pode fazê-las; e não é cobrado por isso: ele tem seus limites. 31 Do ponto de vista do ser pensante, por outro lado, o erro é uma privação: acusa a ausência de algo que parece que o ser pensante deveria ter. Não consigo distinguir meus 173173 a natureza de Deus, não me parece possível que me tenha dado alguma faculdade que seja imperfeita em seu gênero, isto é, à qual falte alguma perfeição que lhe seja devida (...). 9. Em seguida, olhando-me de mais perto e considerando quais são meus erros (que apenas testemunham haver imperfeição em mim), vejo que dependem do concurso de duas causas, a saber, do poder de conhecer que existe em mim e do poder de escolher, ou seja, de meu livre arbítrio; isto é, de meu entendimento e conjuntamente de minha vontade.32 Com efeito, só pelo entendimento, não asseguro nem nego coisa alguma, mas apenas concebo as ideias das coisas que posso assegurar ou negar. Ora, considerando-o assim precisamente, pode-se dizer que nele jamais se encontra erro algum, desde que se tome a palavra erro em sua significação própria. E, ainda que haja talvez uma infinidade de coisas no mundo das quais não tenho a menor ideia em meu entendimento, não se pode por isso dizer que ele seja privado dessas ideias, como de algo que seja devido a sua natureza, mas somente que não as tem; porque, com efeito, não há razão alguma capaz de provar que Deus deveria ter-me dado uma faculdade de conhecer maior e mais ampla do que a que me deu; e, por hábil e sábio operário que eu mo represente, não devo por isso pensar que ele deveria ter posto em cada uma de suas obras todas as perfeições que pôde pôr em algumas. Não posso tampouco me queixar de que Deus não me tenha dado um livre arbítrio ou uma vontade bastante ampla e perfeita, visto que, com efeito, eu a experimento tão vaga e tão extensa que ela não está encerrada em nenhum limite. E o que me parece muito notável nesse ponto é que, de todas as outras coisas que estão em mim, não há nenhuma tão perfeita e tão extensa que eu não reconheça efetivamente que ela poderia ser ainda maior e mais perfeita. Por exemplo, se considero a faculdade de conceber que há em mim, vejo que ela é de uma extensão muito pequena e grandemente limitada, e, ao mesmo tempo, me represento a ideia de uma outra faculdade muito mais ampla e mesmo infinita; e, pelo simples fato de que me posso reerros de meus limites: o que chamo "erro" é resultante de uma falha de "fabricação" de minha "máquina pensante" ou, apenas, de um mau uso dela? 32 Localização da origem do erro: ele provém do modo como atuam em conjunto o entendimento e a vontade. 174 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 174 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA presentar sua ideia, conheço sem dificuldade que ela pertence à natureza de Deus. Do mesmo modo, se examino a memória ou a imaginação, ou qualquer outra capacidade, não encontro nenhuma que não seja em mim muito pequena e limitada, e que em Deus não seja imensa e infinita. Resta unicamente a vontade, que eu experimento ser em mim tão grande que não concebo absolutamente a ideia de nenhuma outra mais ampla e mais extensa, de sorte que é principalmente ela que me faz conhecer que eu trago a imagem e a semelhança de Deus. É certo que, ainda que seja incomparavelmente maior em Deus que em mim – seja por causa do conhecimento e do poder que, nele se encontrando juntos, a tornam mais firme e mais eficaz, seja por causa do objeto, na medida em que ela se dirige e se estende infinitamente a mais coisas –, ela não me parece maior, contudo, se eu a considero formal e precisamente em si mesma. Com efeito, ela consiste somente em que podemos fazer uma coisa ou deixar de fazê-la (isto é, afirmar ou negar, perseguir ou fugir), ou, antes, somente em que, para afirmar ou negar, perseguir algo ou fugir às coisas que o entendimento nos propõe, agimos de tal modo que não sentimos que nenhuma força exterior nos obrigue a isso. Cabe entender que, para que eu seja livre, não é necessário que eu seja indiferente na escolha de um ou de outro dos dois contrários; mas, antes, quanto mais eu pender para um, seja porque eu conheça evidentemente que nele se encontram o bom e o verdadeiro, seja porque Deus disponha assim o interior do meu pensamento, tanto mais livremente faço a escolha dele e o abraço. E, por certo, a graça divina e o conhecimento natural, longe de diminuírem minha liberdade, antes a aumentam e a fortalecem. Desse modo, essa indiferença que sinto, quando não sou absolutamente impelido mais para um lado que para um outro pelo peso de alguma razão, é o mais baixo grau da liberdade, e mais faz parecer uma carência no conhecimento que uma perfeição na vontade; pois, se conhecesse sempre claramente o que é verdadeiro e o que é bom, eu jamais teria dificuldade para deliberar qual juízo ou qual escolha deveria fazer; e, assim, seria inteiramente livre, sem nunca ser indiferente. 10. Por tudo isso reconheço que nem o poder da vontade, o qual recebi de Deus, é em si mesmo a causa de meus erros, pois é muito amplo e 175175 muito perfeito em sua espécie; tampouco o poder de entender ou de conceber, pois, nada concebendo senão por meio deste poder que Deus me conferiu para conceber, sem dúvida tudo que concebo concebo-o como é preciso, e não é possível que nisso me engane. De onde então nascem meus erros? A saber, apenas do fato de que, sendo a vontade muito mais ampla e mais extensa que o entendimento, eu não a contenho nos mesmos limites, mas a estendo também às coisas que não entendo; sendo por si indiferente a elas, ela se perde muito facilmente e escolhe o mal pelo bem ou falso pelo verdadeiro. Isso faz que eu me engane e peque.33 13. Ora, se me abstenho de dar meu juízo sobre uma coisa, quando não a conheço com suficiente clareza e distinção, é evidente que o utilizo muito bem e que não sou enganado; mas, se me determino a negá-la ou a assegurá-la, então já não me sirvo como devo de meu livre arbítrio; e, se asseguro o que não é verdadeiro, é evidente que me engano; e, até mesmo que eu julgue segundo a verdade, isso só ocorre por acaso, e eu não deixo de falhar e de utilizar mal meu livre arbítrio; pois a luz natural nos ensina que o conhecimento do entendimento deve sempre preceder a determinação da vontade. E é nesse mau uso do livre arbítrio que se encontra a privação que constitui a forma do erro. A privação, digo eu, encontra-se na operação, na medida em que procede de mim; mas ela não se acha no poder que recebi de Deus nem mesmo na operação, na medida em que depende dele (...).34 14. Com efeito, não é uma imperfeição em Deus o fato de ele me ter concedido a liberdade de dar meu juízo, ou de não o dar, sobre certas coisas cujo conhecimento claro e distinto não pôs em meu entendimento; mas, sem dúvida, é em mim uma imperfeição o fato de eu não a usar bem e de dar temerariamente meu juízo sobre coisas que concebo apenas com obscuridade e confusão. 33 Explicação do erro: a vontade extrapola os limites do entendimento e julga para além do claro e distinto. O erro não decorre de uma falha de fabricação, mas do mau uso das faculdades envolvidas. 34 Todo juízo (ou afirmação) é composto de uma ideia, fornecida pelo entendimento, e de um ato da vontade, que afirma ou nega essa ideia. Agora sei como se originam os juízos bemfeitos e os malfeitos. 176 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 176 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA 16. E, por certo, não pode haver outra causa além da que expliquei; pois, em todas as vezes que retenho minha vontade de tal modo nos limites de meu conhecimento que ela não formule juízo algum a não ser sobre coisas que lhe são clara e distintamente representadas pelo entendimento, não pode ocorrer que me engane; porque toda concepção clara e distinta é, sem dúvida, algo de real e de positivo, e, portanto, não pode tirar sua origem do nada, mas deve ter necessariamente Deus como seu autor, Deus, digo eu, que, sendo soberanamente perfeito, não pode ser causa de erro algum; e, por conseguinte, é preciso concluir que uma tal concepção ou um tal juízo é verdadeiro. Quinta Meditação Da essência das coisas materiais; e, mais uma vez, de deus, que ele existe35 1. (...) Agora (após ter notado o que é preciso fazer ou evitar para chegar ao conhecimento da verdade), o que tenho principalmente a fazer é tentar sair e desvencilhar-me de todas as dúvidas em que caí nesses dias passados e ver se não é possível conhecer nada de certo no tocante às coisas materiais. 2. Antes, porém, de examinar se há tais coisas que existem fora de mim, devo considerar suas ideias na medida em que estão em meu pensamento e ver quais as que são distintas e quais são confusas. 3. Em primeiro lugar, imagino distintamente esta quantidade que os filósofos chamam vulgarmente de quantidade contínua, ou então a extensão em comprimento, largura e profundidade que há nessa quantidade ou, antes, na coisa à qual ela é atribuída. Ademais, nela posso enumerar muitas partes diversas e atribuir a cada uma dessas partes toda sorte de grandezas, de figuras, de situações e de movimentos; e, enfim, posso assinalar a cada um desses movimentos toda espécie de duração. 35 A Quinta Meditação, de posse do critério da verdade, reabilita as verdades matemáticas, em razão de sua clareza e distinção. Paralelamente, nos oferece a terceira prova da existência de Deus. Ela tem duas grandes partes: a primeira (§§ 1-6) apresenta a validação das verdades matemáticas ou, o que é o mesmo, da essência das coisas materiais; a segunda (§§ 7-15) expõe a terceira prova da existência de Deus, sua função e importância. 177177 4. E não só conheço estas coisas com distinção quando as considero em geral; mas também, por pouco que eu lhes aplique minha atenção, concebo uma infinidade de particularidades relativas aos números, às figuras, aos movimentos e a outras coisas semelhantes, cuja verdade se revela com tanta evidência e concorda tão bem com minha natureza que, quando começo a descobri-las, não me parece que aprenda algo de novo, mas, ao contrário, que me lembro de algo que já sabia anteriormente, isto é, que percebo coisas que já estavam em meu espírito, embora ainda não tivesse voltado meu pensamento para elas.36 5. E o que avalio aqui como mais considerável é que encontro em mim uma infinidade de ideias de certas coisas que não podem ser consideradas um puro nada, embora, talvez, elas não tenham nenhuma existência fora de meu pensamento, e que não são fingidas por mim, se bem que esteja em minha liberdade pensá-las ou não as pensar; mas elas possuem suas naturezas verdadeiras e imutáveis. Como, por exemplo, quando imagino um triângulo, ainda que talvez não haja em nenhum lugar do mundo fora de meu pensamento tal figura, e que jamais tenha havido, não deixa, contudo, de haver certa natureza ou forma, ou essência determinada, dessa figura, a qual é imutável e eterna, que eu não inventei e que não depende, de maneira alguma, de meu espírito; como parece, pelo fato de que se podem demonstrar diversas propriedades desse triângulo, a saber, que seus três ângulos são iguais a dois retos, que o maior ângulo é oposto ao maior lado e outras semelhantes, as quais agora, quer eu queira ou não, reconheço muito claramente e muito evidentemente estarem nele, ainda que eu não tenha, de modo algum, pensado nisso antes, quando imaginei pela primeira vez um triângulo; e, portanto, não se pode dizer que eu as tenha fingido e inventado.37 6. (...) E, portanto, elas são alguma coisa, e não um puro nada; pois é muito evidente que tudo o que é verdadeiro é alguma coisa, e já de36 Admissão da matemática como ciência clara e distinta e, portanto, verdadeira. Isso vale tanto para as entidades matemáticas, quanto para suas propriedades essenciais. 37 Não posso fingir que a matemática tenha sido inventada por mim e tampouco que seja proveniente de fora, por meio de meus sentidos. Ela é verdadeira antes mesmo de eu saber se o mundo material existe e se poderei confiar, em alguma medida, em meus sentidos. 178 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 178 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA monstrei amplamente acima que todas as coisas que conheço clara e distintamente são verdadeiras. E, ainda que não o tivesse demonstrado, a natureza de meu espírito, entretanto, é tal que não me poderia impedir de considerá-las verdadeiras enquanto as concebo clara e distintamente (...). 7. Agora, se do simples fato de que posso tirar de meu pensamento a ideia de alguma coisa, segue-se que tudo o que reconheço pertencer clara e distintamente a essa coisa pertence-lhe de fato, não posso tirar disso um argumento e uma prova demonstrativa da existência de Deus? É certo que não encontro menos em mim sua ideia, ou seja, a ideia de um ser soberanamente perfeito, que a de qualquer figura ou de qualquer número que seja. E não conheço menos clara e distintamente que uma existência atual e eterna pertence a sua natureza do que conheço que tudo o que posso demonstrar de qualquer figura ou de qualquer número pertence verdadeiramente à natureza dessa figura ou desse número. E, portanto, ainda que tudo o que concluí nas Meditações precedentes não fosse verdadeiro, a existência de Deus deve se apresentar em meu espírito ao menos como tão certa quanto considerei até agora todas as verdades das Matemáticas, que se referem apenas aos números e às figuras,38 embora, na verdade, isso não pareça de início inteiramente manifesto, mas se afigure ter alguma aparência de sofisma. Com efeito, tendo-me habituado em todas as outras coisas a fazer distinção entre a existência e a essência, persuado-me facilmente de que a existência pode ser separada da essência de Deus e de que, assim, é possível conceber a Deus como não existindo atualmente. Não obstante, quando penso com mais atenção, vejo manifestamente que a existência não pode ser mais separada da essência de Deus do que, da essência de um triângulo retilíneo, a grandeza de seus três ângulos iguais a dois retos ou, então, da ideia de uma montanha, a ideia de um vale, de sorte que não há menos contradição em conceber um Deus (isto é, um ser soberanamente perfeito) a quem falte existência (isto é, ao qual falte alguma perfeição) do que em conceber uma montanha que não tenha vale.39 38 A existência de Deus é, aqui, tão certa quanto uma verdade matemática: ambas são do mesmo tipo. 39 Há, portanto, uma relação necessária nos três casos: entre uma propriedade essencial do objeto matemático e o próprio objeto; entre a compreensão do que seja uma monta179179 8. Agora, ainda que efetivamente eu não possa conceber um Deus sem existência, tanto quanto uma montanha sem vale, mesmo assim, como do simples fato de eu conceber uma montanha com vale não se segue que haja alguma montanha no mundo, da mesma forma, embora eu conceba Deus com existência, parece não se seguir disso que haja algum que exista; pois meu pensamento não impõe nenhuma necessidade às coisas; e, como só de mim depende imaginar um cavalo alado, ainda que não haja nenhum que tenha asas, assim eu poderia, talvez, atribuir existência a Deus, embora não houvesse Deus algum existente.40 Muito pelo contrário, é aqui que há um sofisma oculto sob a aparência dessa objeção; pois, pelo fato de que não posso conceber uma montanha sem vale, não se segue que haja no mundo montanha alguma ou vale algum, mas somente que a montanha e o vale, quer existam quer não, não podem de forma alguma se separar um do outro; ao passo que, do simples fato de eu não poder conceber Deus sem existência, segue-se que a existência lhe é inseparável e, portanto, que existe verdadeiramente:41 não que meu pensamento possa fazer que isso seja assim, e que imponha alguma necessidade às coisas, mas, ao contrário, porque a necessidade da própria coisa, a saber, da existência de Deus, determina meu pensamento a concebê-lo dessa forma. Com efeito, não está em minha liberdade conceber um Deus sem existência (isto é, um ser soberanamente perfeito sem uma soberana perfeição), como tenho a liberdade de imaginar um cavalo sem asas ou com asas. 9. (...) Pois, ainda que não seja necessário que eu incida jamais em algum pensamento sobre Deus, no entanto, todas as vezes que me ocorrer pensar em um ser primeiro e soberano, e tirar, por assim dizer, sua ideia do tesouro de meu espírito, é necessário que eu lhe atribua todas as espécies de perfeição, embora eu não chegue a enumerá-las todas e a aplicar minha atenção a cada uma delas em particular. E essa necessidade é suficiente para me fazer concluir (depois que reconheci ser a existência nha e a do que seja um vale; entre a existência (uma perfeição) e a essência de Deus. 40 Quando pensamos em qualquer coisa, desde que não contraditória (um triângulo, uma montanha, um cavalo alado), nosso pensamento inclui a existência como possível. No caso de Deus, pensá-lo significa pensá-lo como existindo necessariamente. 41 A montanha e o vale não têm necessidade de existir, ao contrário de Deus. 180 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 180 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA uma perfeição) que esse ser primeiro e soberano existe verdadeiramente, da mesma forma que não é necessário que eu imagine jamais algum triângulo, mas, todas as vezes que eu quiser considerar uma figura retilínea composta de apenas três ângulos, é absolutamente necessário que eu lhe atribua todas as coisas que servem para concluir que seus três ângulos não são maiores que dois retos, ainda que talvez eu não considere então isso em particular (...). 11. De resto, de qualquer prova e argumento que eu me sirva, sempre é preciso voltar a este ponto: são somente as coisas que concebo clara e distintamente que têm a força de me persuadir inteiramente (...). Com efeito, há algo por si mais claro e mais manifesto do que pensar que há um Deus, isto é, um ser soberano e perfeito, o único em cuja ideia a existência necessária ou eterna está compreendida e, por conseguinte, que existe? 12. E, embora, para conceber bem essa verdade, eu tivesse necessitado de grande aplicação de espírito, todavia, no presente não somente estou tão seguro dela quanto de tudo que me parece o mais certo, mas, além disso, noto que a certeza de todas as outras coisas depende tão absolutamente dela que, sem esse conhecimento, é impossível em tempo algum poder saber algo perfeitamente. 15. (...) E, assim, reconheço muito claramente que a certeza e a verdade de toda ciência dependem unicamente do conhecimento do verdadeiro Deus, de modo que, antes de o conhecer, eu não podia saber perfeitamente nenhuma outra coisa. E, agora que o conheço, tenho o meio de adquirir uma ciência perfeita no tocante a uma infinidade de coisas (...). Sexta Meditação Da existência das coisas materiais e da distinção real. Entre a alma e o corpo do homem42 42 A Sexta Meditação examina o problema da existência dos corpos. Essa Meditação tem três grandes partes: a primeira (§§ 1-16) apresenta a possibilidade e a probabilidade da existência dos corpos; depois, faz um exame das sensações e mostra as razões pelas quais até este momento não foi possível estabelecer o que podemos conhecer através 181181 1. Agora, resta-me somente examinar se existem coisas materiais; e, com certeza, ao menos já sei que as pode haver, na medida em que são consideradas como objeto das demonstrações de Geometria, visto que, dessa forma, eu as concebo muito clara e distintamente. Com efeito, não há dúvida de que Deus tem o poder de produzir todas as coisas que sou capaz de conceber com distinção; e nunca julguei que lhe fosse impossível fazer algo, a não ser que eu encontrasse contradição em poder concebê-lo bem.43 Ademais, a faculdade de imaginar que está em mim, e da qual vejo por experiência que me sirvo quando me aplico à consideração das coisas materiais, é capaz de me persuadir da existência delas; pois, quando considero atentamente o que é a imaginação, vejo que ela nada mais é que certa aplicação da faculdade cognoscitiva ao corpo que lhe está intimamente presente e, portanto, é existente.44 2. E, para tornar isso muito manifesto, assinalo primeiramente a diferença que há entre a imaginação e a pura intelecção. Por exemplo, quando imagino um triângulo, não o concebo apenas como uma figura composta e compreendida por três linhas, mas, além disso, considero essas três linhas como presentes pela força e pela aplicação interior de meu espírito; e é propriamente isso que chamo imaginar. Quando quero pensar em um quiliógono, concebo na verdade que é uma figura composta de mil lados tão facilmente quanto concebo que um triângulo é uma figura composta de apenas três lados; mas não posso imaginar os mil lados de um quiliógono como faço com os três lados de um triângulo, nem, por assim dizer, vê-los como presentes com os olhos de meu espírito. E embora, segundo o costume que tenho de me servir sempre de minha imaginação quando penso nas coisas corpóreas, aconteça que, delas; a segunda (§§ 17-29), correspondente ao núcleo da Meditação, apresenta as provas da distinção real entre alma e corpo, a da existência dos corpos e a da união entre alma e corpo; a terceira (§§ 30-43) faz uma reflexão sobre os limites do conhecimento sensível e discute em que medida a natureza humana é intrinsecamente falível. 43 Descartes reconhece, aqui, a possibilidade da existência dos corpos a partir do que a Meditação anterior afirmou sobre as ideias claras e distintas que o entendimento nos dá a respeito da essência deles. Em seguida, reconhecerá sua probabilidade, em razão do exame das ideias da imaginação. 44 Ao contrário do que parece, Descartes não afirma, aqui, que os corpos existem, mas que a imaginação aponta para sua existência. Daí que eles são prováveis. 182 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 182 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA concebendo um quiliógono, eu me represente confusamente alguma figura, é muito evidente, todavia, que essa figura não é um quiliógono, uma vez que em nada difere daquela que me representaria se pensasse em um miriágono, ou em qualquer outra figura de muitos lados; e que ela não serve, de modo algum, para descobrir as propriedades que fazem a diferença entre o quiliógono e os demais polígonos. 3. Quando se trata de considerar um pentágono, é bem verdade que posso conceber sua figura, tal como a do quiliógono, sem o auxílio da imaginação; mas posso também imaginá-la aplicando a atenção de meu espírito a cada um de seus cinco lados e, ao mesmo tempo, à área ou ao espaço que eles encerram. Assim, conheço claramente que tenho necessidade de uma particular contenção e espírito para imaginar, da qual não me sirvo absolutamente para conceber; e essa particular contenção de espírito mostra, evidentemente, a diferença que há entre a imaginação e a intelecção ou concepção pura. 4. Observo, além disso, que essa virtude de imaginar que existe em mim, na medida em que difere do poder de conceber, não é, de modo algum, necessária a minha natureza ou a minha essência, isto é, à essência de meu espírito; pois, ainda que não a tivesse, está fora de dúvida que eu permaneceria o mesmo que sou agora: daí parece que se pode concluir que ela depende de algo que difere de meu espírito. E concebo facilmente que, se existe algum corpo ao qual meu espírito esteja conjugado e unido de tal maneira que ele se possa aplicar a considerá-lo quando lhe apraz, pode acontecer que, por esse meio, ele imagine as coisas corpóreas; de sorte que essa forma de pensar difere somente da pura intelecção no fato de que o espírito, concebendo, volta-se de alguma forma para si mesmo e considera algumas das ideias que ele tem em si; mas, imaginando, ele se volta para o corpo e nele considera algo de conforme à ideia que formou de si mesmo ou que recebeu pelos sentidos. Concebo, digo eu, facilmente que a imaginação pode se dar dessa maneira, se é verdade que há corpos; e, porque não posso encontrar nenhuma outra via para mostrar como ela se realiza, conjeturo daí, provavelmente, que os há; mas é apenas provavelmente, e, embora examine cuidadosamente todas as coisas, não vejo, no entanto, que, dessa ideia distinta da natureza corporal que tenho em 183183 minha imaginação, possa eu tirar algum argumento que conclua necessariamente a existência de algum corpo. 16. Agora, contudo, que começo a melhor conhecer-me a mim mesmo e a descobrir mais claramente o autor de minha origem, não penso, na verdade, que deva temerariamente admitir todas as coisas que os sentidos parecem ensinar-nos, mas não penso tampouco que deva em geral colocá-las todas em dúvida.45 17. E, primeiramente, porque sei que todas as coisas que concebo clara e distintamente podem ser produzidas por Deus tais como as concebo, basta que eu possa conceber clara e distintamente uma coisa sem uma outra para estar certo de que uma é distinta ou diferente da outra, visto que podem ser postas separadamente, ao menos pela onipotência de Deus; e não importa por qual potência se faça essa separação, para obrigar-me a julgá-las diferentes. E, portanto, pelo próprio fato de que conheço com certeza que existo, e que, no entanto, não noto que alguma outra coisa pertença necessariamente a minha natureza ou a minha essência, a não ser que sou uma coisa que pensa, concluo efetivamente que minha essência consiste somente em que sou uma coisa que pensa ou uma substância cuja essência toda ou natureza não é senão pensar. E, embora talvez (ou, antes, certamente, como direi logo mais) eu tenha um corpo ao qual estou muito estreitamente conjugado, todavia, já que, de um lado, tenho uma ideia clara e distinta de mim mesmo, na medida em que sou apenas uma coisa pensante e não extensa, e que, do outro, tenho uma ideia distinta do corpo, na medida em que é apenas uma coisa extensa e que não pensa, é certo que este eu, isto é, minha alma, pela qual eu sou o que sou, é inteira e verdadeiramente distinta de meu corpo e que ela pode ser ou existir sem ele.46 18. Além disso, encontro em mim faculdades de pensar totalmen45 O que podemos saber, agora, tendo em conta os resultados obtidos até aqui? É preciso depurar o que há de confiável nos dados sensíveis em geral, tendo em conta a veracidade divina. 46 Portanto, a alma e o corpo são realmente distintos. Há uma distinção real e completa entre eles. Entretanto, não sabemos ainda se os corpos existem: se existirem, nada terão de comum com a alma. 184 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 184 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA te particulares e distintas de mim, a saber, as faculdades de imaginar e de sentir, sem as quais posso de fato conceber-me clara e distintamente por inteiro, mas não elas sem mim, isto é, sem uma substância inteligente à qual estejam ligadas. Na noção que temos dessas faculdades, ou (para servir-me dos termos da Escola) em seu conceito formal, elas encerram algum tipo de intelecção; donde concebo que são distintas de mim, como as figuras, os movimentos e os outros modos ou acidentes dos corpos o são dos próprios corpos que os sustentam. 19. Reconheço em mim também algumas outras faculdades, como as de mudar de lugar, de colocar-me em diferentes posturas e outras semelhantes, que não podem ser concebidas, tal como as precedentes, sem alguma substância a que estejam ligadas, nem, por conseguinte, existir sem ela; mas é muito evidente que tais faculdades, se é verdade que existem, devem estar ligadas a alguma substância corpórea ou extensa, e não a uma substância inteligente, já que, em seu conceito claro e distinto, há de fato algum tipo de extensão que se encontra contido, mas de modo nenhum alguma inteligência. Ademais, encontra-se em mim certa faculdade passiva de sentir, isto é, de receber e de conhecer as ideias das coisas sensíveis; mas ela me seria inútil, e dela não me poderia servir de forma alguma, se não houvesse em mim, ou em outrem, uma outra faculdade ativa, capaz de formar e de produzir essas ideias. Ora, essa faculdade ativa não pode existir em mim enquanto sou apenas uma coisa que pensa, visto que ela não pressupõe meu pensamento, e, também, enquanto essas ideias me são frequentemente representadas sem que eu em nada contribua para isso e mesmo, com frequência, contra meu desejo; é preciso, então, necessariamente, que ela exista em alguma substância diferente de mim, na qual toda a realidade, que está objetivamente nas ideias que por ela são produzidas, esteja contida formal ou eminentemente (como assinalei antes). E esta substância é ou um corpo, isto é, uma natureza corpórea, na qual esteja contido formal e efetivamente tudo o que existe objetivamente e por representação nas ideias; ou então é o próprio Deus, ou alguma outra criatura mais nobre que o corpo, na qual isso mesmo esteja contido eminentemente. 20. Ora, não sendo Deus enganador, é muito manifesto que ele não 185185 me envia essas ideias imediatamente por si mesmo, tampouco por intermédio de alguma criatura, na qual a realidade delas não esteja contida formalmente, mas apenas eminentemente; pois, não tendo dado a mim nenhuma faculdade para conhecer que isso seja assim, mas, ao contrário, uma fortíssima inclinação para crer que elas me são enviadas pelas coisas corporais ou partem destas, não vejo como se poderia desculpá-lo de engano se de fato tais ideias partissem de outras causas ou fossem produzidas por outras causas que não coisas corpóreas. E, portanto, é preciso confessar que há coisas corpóreas que existem.47 21. Todavia, talvez elas não sejam inteiramente tais como as percebemos pelos sentidos, pois essa percepção dos sentidos é muito obscura e confusa em muitas coisas; mas, ao menos, é preciso confessar que todas as coisas que, nelas, concebo clara e distintamente, isto é, todas as coisas que, falando em geral, são compreendidas no objeto da Geometria especulativa, nelas se encontram verdadeiramente. No que, porém, se refere às outras coisas, as quais ou são apenas particulares – por exemplo, que o Sol seja de tal grandeza e de tal figura etc. – ou são concebidas menos claramente e menos distintamente – como a luz, o som, a dor e outras semelhantes –, é certo que, embora sejam muito duvidosas e incertas, mesmo assim, só pelo fato de Deus não ser enganador e, por conseguinte, não permitir que pudesse haver alguma falsidade em minhas opiniões sem que não me tivesse dado também alguma faculdade capaz de corrigi-la, posso concluir seguramente que tenho em mim os meios de conhecê-las com certeza. 22. E, primeiramente, não há dúvida de que tudo o que a natureza me ensina contém alguma verdade. Com efeito, por natureza, considerada em geral, não entendo agora outra coisa senão o próprio Deus, ou a ordem e a disposição que Deus estabeleceu nas coisas criadas. E, por minha natureza, em particular, não entendo outra coisa senão a complexão ou o conjunto de todas as coisas que Deus me deu. 23. Ora, não há nada que essa natureza me ensine mais expressa47 Os corpos, portanto, existem. A passividade de nossas sensações nos conduz a sua causa possível. A inclinação natural a crer na existência dos corpos, garantida como incorrigível por Deus, nos dá certeza da existência. 186 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 186 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA mente nem mais sensivelmente do que o fato de que tenho um corpo, que está mal disposto quando sinto dor, que tem necessidade de comer ou de beber quando nutro os sentimentos de fome ou de sede etc. E, portanto, não devo, de modo algum, duvidar que haja nisso alguma verdade. 24. A natureza me ensina também, por esses sentimentos de dor, fome, sede etc., que não estou somente alojado em meu corpo, como um piloto em seu navio, mas, além disso, que lhe estou muito estreitamente conjugado e de tal modo confundido e misturado que componho com ele como que um único todo.48 Assim não fosse, quando meu corpo é ferido, não sentiria por isso dor alguma, eu que não sou senão uma coisa pensante, mas perceberia esse ferimento apenas pelo entendimento, como o piloto percebe pela vista se algo se rompe em seu navio; e, quando meu corpo tem necessidade de beber ou de comer, simplesmente conheceria isso mesmo, sem disso ser avisado por sentimentos confusos de fome e de sede. De fato, todos esses sentimentos de fome, de sede, de dor etc. nada mais são senão certas formas confusas de pensar que provêm e dependem da união e como que da mistura do espírito com o corpo. 25. Além disso, a natureza me ensina que existem vários outros corpos ao redor do meu, entre os quais devo procurar uns e fugir de outros. E, por certo, por eu sentir diferentes tipos de cores, de odores, de sabores, de sons, de calor e de dureza etc., concluo corretamente que há, nos corpos, de onde procedem todas essas diversas percepções dos sentidos, algumas variedades que lhes correspondem, embora essas variedades talvez não lhes sejam efetivamente semelhantes.49 E, também, do fato de que, entre essas diversas percepções dos sentidos, umas me são agradáveis e outras desagradáveis, posso tirar uma consequência completamente certa: que meu corpo (ou, antes, eu mesmo por inteiro, na medida em que sou composto do corpo e da alma) pode receber diversas comodidades ou incomodidades dos outros corpos que o rodeiam. 48 Embora distintos, corpo e alma formam um composto, a partir do qual emerge uma nova natureza, a natureza humana propriamente dita. A união não é mera justaposição, mas composição de naturezas distintas cujo resultado é um "novo ser", uma "nova natureza". 49 A diversidade das ideias sensíveis denuncia a variedade dos corpos, sua multiplicidade. 187187 27. Então, a fim de que nada haja nisso que eu não conceba distintamente, devo definir com precisão o que propriamente entendo quando digo que a natureza me ensina algo. Tomo aqui a natureza numa significação mais limitada do que quando a denomino conjunto ou complexão de todas as coisas que Deus me deu; (...) mas somente das coisas que Deus me deu, como sendo composto de espírito e de corpo. Ora, essa natureza me ensina realmente a fugir das coisas que causam em mim o sentimento da dor e a dirigir-me para as que me comunicam algum sentimento de prazer; mas não vejo que, além disso, ela me ensine que, dessas diversas percepções dos sentidos, alguma vez devêssemos concluir algo a respeito das coisas que existem fora de nós, sem que o espírito as tenha examinado cuidadosa e maduramente. É, ao que me parece, somente ao espírito, e não ao composto de espírito e corpo, que compete conhecer a verdade dessas coisas. 28. Assim, ainda que uma estrela não cause em meus olhos mais impressão do que o fogo de uma pequena vela, não há em mim, entretanto, nenhuma faculdade real ou natural que me leve a crer que ela não é maior do que esse fogo, mas assim o julguei desde meus primeiros anos sem nenhum fundamento razoável. E, embora ao me aproximar do fogo eu sinta calor e, mesmo, ao me aproximar um pouco demais eu sofra dor, não há, todavia, nenhuma razão que me possa persuadir de que haja no fogo alguma coisa de semelhante a esse calor ou então a essa dor; mas tenho somente razão para crer que há alguma coisa nele, seja o que for, que provoca em mim esses sentimentos de calor ou de dor. 29. Do mesmo modo, também, embora haja espaços nos quais não encontro nada que provoque e que mova meus sentidos, não devo concluir daí que esses espaços não contêm em si nenhum corpo; mas vejo que, tanto nisso como em várias outras coisas semelhantes, acostumeime a perverter e a confundir a ordem da natureza, porque, tendo tais sentimentos ou percepções dos sentidos sido postos em mim apenas para significar a meu espírito quais coisas são convenientes ou nocivas ao composto de que é parte – e sendo até aí bastante claros e bastante distintos –, sirvo-me deles, no entanto, como se fossem regras muito certas, pelas quais possa conhecer imediatamente a essência e a natureza dos corpos 188 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 188 desCArtes • meditAções sobre A fiLosofiA primeirA que estão fora de mim, das quais, todavia, eles nada me podem ensinar senão algo muito confuso e obscuro. 42. E, por certo, essa consideração me serve muito não somente para reconhecer todos os erros a que minha natureza está sujeita, mas também para evitá-los ou para corrigi-los mais facilmente; pois, sabendo que todos os meus sentidos me informam mais comumente o verdadeiro que o falso no tocante às coisas que se referem às comodidades ou incomodidades do corpo, e podendo quase sempre me servir de vários dentre eles para examinar uma mesma coisa, e podendo, além disso, usar minha memória, para ligar e juntar os conhecimentos presentes aos passados, e meu entendimento, que já descobriu todas as causas de meus erros, não devo temer, de agora em diante, que se encontre falsidade nas coisas que me são o mais comumente representadas por meus sentidos. E devo rejeitar todas as dúvidas desses dias passados como hiperbólicas e ridículas, particularmente esta incerteza tão geral no que diz respeito ao sono, que eu não podia distinguir da vigília; pois agora encontro uma diferença muito notável no fato de que nossa memória não pode jamais ligar e juntar nossos sonhos uns com os outros e com toda a sequência de nossa vida, assim como costuma juntar as coisas que nos acontecem quando despertos (...). E não devo de maneira alguma duvidar da verdade dessas coisas, se, depois de haver convocado todos os meus sentidos, minha memória e meu entendimento para examiná-las, nada me for apresentado por algum deles que esteja em oposição com o que me foi apresentado pelos outros. Ocorre que, do fato de Deus não ser enganador, segue-se necessariamente que nisso não sou enganado. 43. Como, porém, a necessidade dos afazeres nos obriga com frequência a nos determinar antes que tenhamos tido tempo de examiná-las tão cuidadosamente, cumpre confessar que a vida do homem está sujeita a falhar muito frequentemente nas coisas particulares; e, enfim, cumpre reconhecer a debilidade e a fraqueza de nossa natureza.50 50 Fim das Meditações: foram resolvidos todos os problemas colocados e apresentados os fundamentos e limites conhecimento certo e indubitável. 189189 espinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve190 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 190 191191 A biografia de um autor de época quase sempre envolve investigação, e pode ser considerada como objeto de pesquisa tanto quanto as obras desse autor. ESPINOSA confirma essa regra. Adiantaremos nesse esboço biográfico apenas alguns fatos já estabelecidos, deixando de lado os claros que cobrem a história da vida desse autor. A família de Espinosa era de confissão hebraica e, portanto, fazia parte de uma população que se movia por várias nações da Europa. No caso específico, a família de Espinosa se move da Espanha – onde ainda há a cidade que deu origem ao sobrenome – para Portugal, depois para a França e finalmente para a Holanda. Essas mudanças devem ter sido motivadas por razões econômicas, religiosas e políticas. Tanto as restrições de caráter religioso aos judeus da península ibérica quanto as facilidades que o livre comércio, adotado na Holanda do século XVII, podem ter levado a família de Espinosa a mover-se para Amsterdã. Provavelmente ambas as razões fizeram com que a família de pequenos comerciantes de especiarias se mudassem definitivamente para a Holanda, comercialmente mais aberta e religiosamente mais tolerante. É lá que, em 24 de Novembro de 1632, nasce Baruch (nome hebraieSpINOSA: CONSIDeRAçÕeS SOBRe O tRAtADO BReVe espinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve192 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 192 co para Bento ou Benedito) Espinosa. É bem provável – embora haja controvérsia entre os estudiosos da biografia de Espinosa – que tenha sido educado com uma formação no mínimo compatível com a de um rabino, portanto, com um conhecimento de línguas e da Bíblia bastante presente. Espinosa compreendia o hebraico, o latim, o espanhol o holandês, talvez o português, o grego, o italiano e certamente o francês. Podemos inferir isso, pelo menos, da lista de livros que constavam em sua biblioteca. De fato, no entanto, desde cedo Espinosa manifesta uma atitude bastante livre com relação à interpretação da bíblia e das doutrinas religiosas hebraicas. Isso lhe vale, aos vinte e quatro anos, em 1656, sua excomunhão da sinagoga, o famoso herém (termo usado para a excomunhão) expedido em 27 de Julho. Desse período em diante Espinosa começa nitidamente a participar dos círculos intelectuais holandeses, estuda e comenta Descartes, participa da vida política da Holanda, próximo ao partido de Johannes de Witt, e dos Calvinistas Libertinos do Colegii Prophetica. Tratava-se de um período extremamente vivo da cultura e da política holandesa que começará a fechar-se depois do assassinato de de Witt e o retorno da dinastia Orange (à qual pertencia, por exemplo, Maurício de Nassau, na época das invasões holandesas às costas brasileiras). A saúde de Espinosa sempre foi fraca, ele enfrentou durante duas décadas uma tuberculose que, provavelmente, foi a causa de sua morte em 21 de Fevereiro de 1677. Espinosa publica apenas duas obras em vida: o Tratado Teológico-Político (escrito por volta de 1665, publicado em 1670), que gera uma grande polêmica no momento de sua publicação e em sua posteridade, e os Princípios da Filosofia Cartesiana (escrito por volta de 1663). Apenas a última obra é assinada pelo autor. Além dessas obras, Espinosa escreve desde 1660, provavelmente, o Tratado Breve – cujo excerto traduzido veremos adiante –, em 1661 começa a redigir a Ética, termina sua redação em 1675. No início desse período parece estar redigindo também, o Tratado da emenda do Intelecto. Escreve também um Compêndio de Gramática da Língua Hebraica, Um opúsculo sobre o arco íris e uma série de cartas das quais 193193 nos restaram apenas 84 e que cobrem um período de 1661 a 1676. Por fim a derradeira obra, inacabada, é o Tratado Político redigido por volta de 1676. Excetuado o Tratado Breve, o Tratado Político e os Princípios da Filosofia Cartesiana o restante de sua obra foi publicado postumamente por seus amigos Lodewijk Meijer, Georg Hermann Schuller e Jarig Jelles em 1677. O tratado Breve Essa obra de Espinosa, embora, como dissemos, tivesse sido escrita por volta de 1660, foi encontrada tardiamente. Aliás, foi encontrada duas vezes, primeiro foi revelado um manuscrito em 1703 e depois outro em 1851. Até 1899 ela permaneceu inédita. Houve ao longo de todo esse período uma discussão sobre a autoria e a datação da obra, que hoje em dia é atribuída diretamente a Espinosa por praticamente todos seus leitores. Na verdade o interesse da obra para os leitores de Espinosa é muito grande, seja porque ela representa alguns pontos de partida de sua filosofia posterior, seja porque apresenta os temas da Ética na forma de um Tratado, escrito sem o recurso à maneira geométrica de exposição com efeito, a Ética se organiza como um livro de geometria, com teoremas demonstrações, definições e assim por diante, mas o Tratado Breve é escrito numa prosa comum como veremos adiante. O título do Tratado, provavelmente atribuído a ele por seus editores é "Tratado Breve sobre Deus, o Homem e sua Felicidade". Sendo ou não da autoria de Espinosa o título, no entanto adiante claramente o conteúdo da obra. Ela consiste em um texto com duas partes. A primeira versa sobre a ordem total da Natureza e sobre Deus, mostrando em linhas gerais como o real se configura numa ordem tal que não se pensar em Deus separado do mundo. A segunda trata da posição do homem nessa ordem e, na medida em que se compreende as implicações disso, cuida também da felicidade humana. Já estão presentes no Tratado Breve os temas fundamentais da filosofia de Espinosa. Podemos esboçá-los nesses termos: 1) A filosofia procura explicar tanto a ordem do real como a posiespinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve194 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 194 ção do homem nessa ordem (o que para nós é o bem e o mal) sem o recurso a nenhum mistério e nenhuma arbitrariedade. Isso significa encontrar o porquê do real, do bem e do mal sem ter que apelar par a opinião dos outros, à própria opinião ou mesmo à própria experiência, se elas forem insuficientes para mostrar as razões de aceitarmos nossos julgamentos. Apenas serão aceitos como filosóficos os julgamentos fundados na experiência suficiente para demonstrarmos o que julgamos, na razão ou, enfim, na compreensão intelectual daquilo que julgamos. 2) Isso significa que cada um, por si mesmo, deve ser capaz de alcançar racionalmente ou intelectualmente, e portanto livremente, os motivos pelos quais acredita em alguma coisa, sem apelo a qualquer constrangimento externo. 3) O esforço em fazer isso, esforço a que se chama propriamente filosofia, é uma explicação do real que não admite nenhuma forma de arbitrariedade, e termina por consistir em um esclarecimento sobre as condições sob as quais podemos nos dizer livres e podemos também buscar o que melhor para nós, individualmente e coletivamente (a filosofia também implica uma política que defende explicitamente essa liberdade). 4) O tema da filosofia, então, gira em torno da estrutura do real e da nossa posição nessa estrutura, a liberdade e a felicidade que são explicadas por ela são a liberdade e a felicidade humanas, que cobram de nós uma ação real, no mundo, para alcançá-las na medida em que nos for permitido. 5) O que não cumpre esse programa corre o risco de se tornar superstição e servidão, assim, a postulação de mistérios, de algo para além do mundo real, de verdades escondidas de nós definitivamente devem ser finalmente desmistificadas pelo filósofo. O excerto traduzido Os capítulos que traduzimos adiante tratam justamente de um momento decisivo nessa estratégia geral da filosofia de Espinosa. Neles Espinosa explica o que, para ele, são a opinião, a convicção (conhecimento racional) e o que é conhecimento intelectual, quais seus limites, e como eles 195195 produzem, queiramos nós ou não, certas relações nossas com o mundo real a que chamamos de afetos (entre eles as paixões da alma, como por exemplo: a admiração o desprezo, o ódio, o amor e assim por diante). Espinosa não parte do princípio de que as paixões da alma são inexplicáveis – que, no final das contas não há um porque para o medo a esperança, a alegria a tristeza e todos os outros afetos que somo capazes de manifestar. Pelo contrário, temos várias maneiras de nos relacionar com o mundo (conhecendo o mundo ou já agindo sobre ele) segundo as quais esses afetos se manifestam com uma lógica rigorosa. Assim, as opiniões que temos já são afetos, e as convicções também podem exprimir certos afetos que obedecem a uma lógica própria. A intenção de Espinosa, nos textos abaixo traduzidos, é a de explicar quais são esses modos de conhecimento e como eles se relacionam com os afetos. Além disso, ele considera como mudando as maneiras de se relacionar com o mundo através de seu conhecimento também mudam nossos afetos, como nossa experiência do mundo pode nos levar a conhecer melhor, e também manifestar mais claramente nossa liberdade e nossa felicidade. Por isso mesmo, o Tratado Breve já é uma ética. É de se notar que essa classificação da manerias de conhecer atravessa a filosofia de Espinosa do Tratado Breve até a Ética, passando pelo pelo Tratado da Emenda do Entendimento. Portanto, é um dos temas centrais e mais característicos de sua filosofia. Da mesma forma essa classificação é um pressuposto de sua teoria dos afetos e essa, por sua vez, serve de explicação para sua política e sua ética. É de fundamental importância, para um leitor de Espinosa, compreender os princípios dessa classificação dos modos de conhecer, que relações com o mundo elas implicam, qual a relação delas com nossos afetos, com nossa liberdade e com nossa felicidade. Traduziremos o trecho da obra no qual Espinosa apresenta essa classificação e comentaremos com notas, tentando explicitar a ordem da argumentação do texto e, ao mesmo tempo esclarecendo alguns termos e algumas expressões que Espinosa usa de forma mais técnica. Observe-se, no entanto, o caráter evidentemente didático, direto e claro do texto do Tratado Breve. Nele Espinosa oferece vários exemplos espinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve196 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 196 do que está dizendo. Além disso, o texto é coloquial e direto, parece dirigir-se a qualquer leitor que queira lê-lo com atenção e interesse. Somese a isso que o tema do trecho consiste em atitudes e afetos que nos são muito próximos e comuns, qualquer um pode buscar em si mesmo um exemplo concreto e direto do que Espinosa está mostrando. Todas essas características tornam esse trecho especialmente interessante para quem quer começar uma leitura direta de sua filosofia, a partir do texto ele mesmo. Trata-se, para seguir as indicações do próprio autor, de conhecer sua filosofia pela convicção e pelo intelecto, sem apelar ao conhecimento de segunda mão, ou o conhecimento por ouvir dizer. explicação do Capítulo I: Nesse capítulo Espinosa indica que não conhecemos as coisas sempre da mesma maneira. Mais que isso, fornece exemplos para mostrar que não há uma única, mas várias maneiras de conhecer. Pode ser um hábito pensarmos que sempre se conhece da mesma forma, e que as pessoas conhecem mais ou menos, melhor ou pior, mas sempre do mesmo jeito. Observem-se, entretanto, os exemplos que Espinosa fornece no texto. Podemos dizer que uma pessoa qualquer resolve um problema como o da terceira proporcional (a/b = c/X, qual o valor de X?) toda vez que ela é capaz de apontar o valor correto de X. Assim, se nosso exemplo fosse 4/2 = 6/X, qual o valor de X? Resolveria o problema todo aquele que respondesse X = 3. Diríamos então que esse alguém conhece a solução. Entretanto, é perfeitamente possível dar a resposta correta de várias formas bem diferentes. Digamos que alguém, tendo lido a nota 6 da nossa tradução acreditasse nisso e, ao ser perguntado pelo valor de X respondesse: "3". Esse alguém saberia a resposta por ouvir dizer (por acreditar no que eu disse). De fato, conhecemos muitas coisas apenas por ouvir dizer, o que não precisa constituir-se em algum problema. Por exemplo, sabemos a data de nosso nascimento (uma vez que não poderíamos nos lembrar disso) por ouvir dizer. A rigor, tudo aquilo que lemos (quando acreditamos apenas por estar escrito) conhecemos por ouvir dizer, assim como podemos conhecer por ouvir dizer qual é o temperamento ou o 197197 gosto de pessoas que ainda não conhecemos, ou podemos conhecer por ouvir dizer como são certos lugares que não visitamos de fato e assim por diante. O importante do conhecimento por ouvir dizer consiste em que, nele, conhecemos por testemunho indireto, alguém ou algo que não somos nós ou não está sob nossa responsabilidade nos indicou algo em que acreditamos. Conhecemos por ouvir dizer lendas ou coisas que foram de verdade, não é porque alguém ouviu dizer a solução da terceira proporcional era 3 que sua resposta foi errada. A dificuldade toda está em que alguém que conhece assim não é responsável por seu conhecimento e não sabe assegurar necessariamente que sabe a verdade, ainda que muita gente diga que é assim e não diferente. A mesma coisa acontece com a experiência vaga. Alguém pode saber que a água do mar é salgada por ouvir dizer (sem jamais ter visto o mar) ou por ter experimentado o gosto da água do mar algumas vezes. Todavia, nem por isso será capaz de provar que a água do mar sempre é salgada (embora isso possa ser verdade). A experiência vaga nunca é suficiente para provar que as coisas que experimentamos são assim sempre, quando fazemos isso, na verdade realizamos aquilo que se chama de experimento. O experimento funciona de uma forma tal que ele mostra a necessidade do que está sendo conhecido, portanto, é bem raro podemos fazer verdadeiros experimentos, embora possamos ter muitas experiências. Agora, essas duas maneiras de conhecer uma coisa não garantem que eu estou conhecendo a verdade, embora eu possa mesmo conhecer a verdade por meio delas. Nesses termos não posso justificar para outro alguém porque julgo as coisas da forma que as julgo, portanto, não posso exigir de ninguém que aceite o que eu estou dizendo com mais segurança do aquela que eu mesmo posso ter. Esses tipos de julgamentos os fazemos dizendo "eu acho que ..." e chamamos todos eles de opiniões. A opinião nesse sentido é uma maneira de conhecer. Depois Espinosa apresenta a convicção verdadeira. Ela já vem dotada de uma justificativa. Dizemos: "a resposta para o exemplo da terceiespinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve198 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 198 ra proporcional é 3 porque X = 6*2/4", fazendo um cálculo. As operações de um cálculo não podem variar, por força disso seu resultado também não varia. O cálculo e a razão ligam as coisas de uma forma tal que elas não podem mais variar. Isso permite a quem conhece por convicção verdadeira mostrar para alguém que não conhece assim que não poderia ser diferente. Nesse caso não temos mais uma opinião e conhecemos a mesma coisa, mas agora de uma forma diferente. Todavia, o que é típico da filosofia de Espinosa e bem mais surpreendente do que vimos até aqui, é que existe ainda um terceiro saber (o conhecimento intelectual) que é visão imediata da coisa como ela é. Não precisamos supor que isso acontece ou deve acontecer sempre. Por exemplo, seria difícil mostrar como seríamos capazes de conhecer intelectualmente a data de nosso nascimento (teríamos que conhecer intelectualmente, ponto a ponto, todos os eventos que culminaram no nosso nascimento naquele dia e não em outro qualquer). Não é esse o ponto de Espinosa no texto: basta que tenhamos algum conhecimento intelectual para sabermos o que ele significa. Digamos que alguém propõe um problema matemático muito simples como por exemplo "2/1 = 4/X, qual o valor de X?" e alguém sem fazer nenhuma conta saiba que X = 2 – entenda-se bem: não porque sabe fazer contas fáceis rapidamente, mas porque reconhece de imediato na relação 2/1 a ideia de que "o de cima é o dobro do de baixo", ou melhor, porque vê a proporção concretamente em seu intelecto. O capítulo cumpre sua tarefa se pudermos justificar, a partir de nossas considerações que se as coisas forem assim então conhecer por opinião é algo diferente de conhecer por convicção verdadeira, que por sua vez é diferente de saber. Além disso, que é possível pessoas diferentes saberem a mesma coisa de maneiras diferentes, ou que a mesma pessoa, em momentos distintos de sua vida pode saber a mesma coisa de formas diferentes, segundo ultrapasse a opinião e possa alcançar alguma convicção verdadeira ou ainda o saber. explicação do Capítulo II: O capítulo II é curto, mas de fundamental importância porque indica o caminho segundo o qual Espinosa irá construir o percurso de sua 199199 argumentação no trecho que traduzimos. Na verdade, o segundo capítulo resume em títulos gerais as maneiras de conhecer apresentadas no primeiro e adianta (sem demonstrar) o que resultará disso para a relação entre as maneiras de conhecer nossos afetos. Dessa maneira, podemos antecipar os seguintes resultados, que o restante do texto precisa encaminhar ou finalmente justificar: 1) Os afetos originados da opinião podem ser contrários à reta razão. Isso não significa, como veremos adiante que esses afetos são eles mesmos irracionais. Como eles podem ser explicados, têm também razões para que sejam como são, e possuem sua justificativa. Todavia, isso não significa que eles concordem com nossa natureza completamente ou que sejam necessariamente algo que aponte para o que é útil para nós. Assim como a opinião pode ser falsa, o afeto ligado a ela pode ser nocivo a nós. 2) Os afetos originados da convicção são imediatamente racionais, o que significa que a razão também se exprime por afetos e é causa de afetos. Ora, uma vez que a razão não pode estar vinculada ao erro, os afetos racionais não podem prejudicar nossa natureza. Por força disso Espinosa os chama de apetites sãos: afetos que confirmam nossa natureza e o que é útil para nós, individualmente e coletivamente. 3) O afeto originado do saber ele mesmo é uma forma de amor (isso é: saber implica amar). Espinosa não adianta aqui quais os efeitos desse amor, mas serão justamente eles que constituirão o núcleo de nossa felicidade e de nossa liberdade. Além disso, o segundo capítulo adianta uma premissa importante para o restante do texto. Há uma cumplicidade importante entre conhecimentos e afetos que irá atravessar toda a obra de Espinosa. Essa premissa é fundamental porque a partir dela Espinosa pretende afastar a ideia de que o conhecimento seja diferente da ação ou da passividade diante do mundo real. Isso que dizer que conhecer ou é uma intervenção nossa no mundo ou é uma intervenção do mundo em nós. No ato de conhecer já estamos, sabendo ou não disso, intervindo no mundo. Espinosa tenta desmistificar a separação entre uma vida contemplativa e uma vida ativa, a primeira simplesmente não é possível. Isso vai contra um hábito espinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve200 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 200 comum de imaginar que existe em nós uma componente completamente extática, separada do mundo que é pura espectadora do mundo e que apenas conhece. Esse tema aparece em Espinosa, provavelmente, como uma interpretação bastante forte de um lema de outro filósofo: Francis Bacon (1561-1626). Segundo o lema de Bacon saber é fazer. A interpretação de Espinosa pode ser posta nos seguintes termos: saber é agir ou ser coagido pelo mundo. Assim cada ato de conhecimento, seja uma opinião, uma convicção ou o próprio saber implica um afeto, e, com ele, uma ação determinada sobre o mundo ou uma ação do mundo sobre nós. Se o conhecimento pudesse em algum momento ser considerado como pura contemplação, estaríamos separados do mundo de uma forma tal que o ato de conhecer ele mesmo perderia seu sentido. Daí a urgência em entender corretamente os modos de conhecimento. Uma vez feito isso podemos esclarecer, para nós mesmos e para os outros, qual o sentido de nossa ação, ou, se simplesmente estamos sendo passivos diante do mundo. O conhecimento racional e o saber em especial, como não são sujeitos a o erro e à falsidade, implicam sempre a ações que apontam para o que útil para nós e, no final das contas, chamaremos de bem para os homens. Observe-se, enfim, que assim como sabemos uma coisa de várias formas podemos ter o mesmo afeto de várias formas. É perfeitamente possível amar pela opinião, pela convicção ou pelo saber. Da mesma maneira, ainda que possamos conhecer uma mesma coisa de várias maneiras distintas também algo muda de uma maneira de conhecer para outra. Por exemplo, a opinião pode conter um erro, a convicção e o saber não. Assim também, alguns afetos não são mais possíveis na convicção e no saber: especialmente aqueles que são contrários à reta razão, isto é, prejudiciais a nós e contrários à nossa utilidade (contrários inclusive ao que é útil a todos nós, e, portanto, coletivamente). O restante dos capítulos irá descrever passo a passo cada um desses tipos de afetos, como ele se gera como efeito de um determinado modo de conhecimento. 201201 explicação do Capítulo III O capítulo III apresenta quatro afetos fundamentais, na forma como eles se originam da opinião. Uma primeira observação que deve ser feita a respeito disso concerne ao esforço em nomear os afetos. Dar um nome a um afeto significa ao mesmo tempo saber reconhecê-lo e saber explicá-lo para alguém. Que os afetos possam ser contrários à razão, para Espinosa, não significa que eles sejam em si mesmos irracionais. Portanto, na mesma medida em que Espinosa partia do princípio de que o mundo era compreensível, as pessoas também são compreensíveis, o que implica a capacidade de exprimir seus afetos de uma forma pode perfeitamente ser compreendida por outra pessoa. Assim como não há, para Espinosa, a possibilidade de recorrer a algum mistério para realmente explicar o mundo, também as pessoas não são coisas misteriosas, cujos afetos e disposições não tenham já uma explicação correta, ainda que seus afetos desafiem a reta razão. Portanto, é perfeitamente possível compreender quando e porque alguém sente ódio ou amor por força de uma opinião, e é lícito definir o ódio e o amor segundo a forma deles serem produzidos pelas opiniões. Cabe então, ao filósofo, o esforço de definir o mais corretamente possível, a forma das pessoas em geral manifestarem seus afetos e dar os nomes corretos a cada afeto. Isso ajuda quem conhece essas definições a compreender a si mesmo e aos outros, a dar conta de seus próprios afetos e os dos outros. Os afetos que Espinosa apresenta no capítulo são quatro: 1) A admiração, que desafia uma opinião e mostra seus limites. De fato, ficamos admirados quando uma coisa supera nossa opinião. Essa admiração faz com que julguemos o objeto que se mostra assim seja considerado especial, e prende nossa atenção ao objeto. Isso interfere com os outros afetos: quando algo que admiramos nos causa amor o amor é maior, quando algo que admiramos nos causa ódio, o ódio é mais intenso e assim por diante. O sinal mais claro da admiração é que o admirável prende nossa atenção e fica gravado em nossa memória com uma intenespinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve202 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 202 sidade especial. O que não é assim é cada vez menos admirável, e o que não se prende de forma nenhuma em nossa memória é desprezível (o contrário do admirável). 2) O amor, afeto pelo qual afirmamos uma coisa e estamos dispostos a fazer algo para mantê-la como ela é. 3) O ódio, afeto pelo qual repudiamos uma coisa e estamos dispostos a suprimi-la ou mudá-la. 4) O desejo, afeto pelo qual nos inclinamos a nos juntarmos a alguma coisa. Observe-se que amor apenas afirma a coisa, o desejo nos inclina a ela. Em sua obra posterior, na Ética, Espinosa irá ainda fazer uma diferença entre o apetite que é a inclinação a alguma coisa e o desejo propriamente dito que é uma inclinação a alguma seguida da consciência disso. explicação Do Capítulo IV: O quarto capítulo indica diferença entre o conhecimento pela razão e o conhecimento intelectual, marcando o caráter superior deste último. Não se trata de dizer que a razão é dispensável, muito pelo contrário, ela é via para o conhecimento intelectual. Da mesma forma é necessário perceber o porque da superioridade desse último. É isso que a razão sabe indicar, por si mesma. Quando usamos a razão lidamos com instrumentos que permitem instituir, para nós, coletivamente, o que é parte de nossa felicidade e de nossa liberdade. Assim instituímos o bem, o mal, a finalidade, a utilidade e a ideia de homem perfeito. Isso ainda não é o conhecimento de algo real, mas uma série de instrumentos que vão nos permitir chegar a isso. Daí a utilização dos entes de razão, que servem para nos orientar na tarefa de resolver o problema posto pela ética: qual nossa posição na ordem total da Natureza, quais as instituições políticas e pessoais corretas e assim por diante. O passo que o quarto capítulo dá, na argumentação geral do Tratado Breve, é muito semelhante àquele que dará o Tratado da Emenda do Intelecto, outra obra de Espinosa. 203203 A importância disso está em não deixar que possamos confundir as construções da razão com coisas reais. Isso é claro, não que dizer que a razão seja sujeita a algum erro ou institua alguma coisa arbitrária, indica apenas que a razão ainda é uma forma abstrata de lidar com as coisas. Ainda assim, a razão é indispensável porque sem ela não teríamos como chegar ao conhecimento intelectual que ela nos indica e recomenda. A razão, portanto, não pode ser desconsiderada, e suas instituições são necessárias para nós. Além disso, o quarto capítulo adianta que o conhecimento intelectual deve tomas como tema aquilo que é mais perfeito segundo a razão, isso é: Deus. Ainda que mais tarde, no próprio Tratado Breve, essas instituições da razão sejam emendadas em novos termos, conhecer pela razão é um requisito que nos torna capazes, por nós mesmos, de aperfeiçoar os instrumentos pelos quais chegamos a isso. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de esPinosa traduzidas Para o Português ESPINOSA, B. de. Pensamentos metafísicos; Tratado da correção do intelecto; Tratado Político; Correspondência. Tradução Marilena Chauí, Carlos Lopes de Mattos, Manuel de Castro. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1989. (Coleção Os Pensadores, v. 1) ESPINOSA, B. de. Ética: demonstrada à maneira dos geômetras. Tradução e notas Joaquim de Carvalho. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1989. (Coleção Os Pensadores, v. 2) ESPINOSA, B. de. Tratado Político. São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2009. ESPINOSA, B. de. Tratado Teológico-Político. Tradução, introdução e notas de Diogo Pires Aurélio. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003. SPINOZA, B. de. Ética. Tradução Tomaz Tadeu. São Paulo: Autêntica, 2009. obras sobre esPinosa (em Português) CHAUI, M. A nervura do real: imanência e liberdade em Espinosa. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1999. CHAUI, M. Espinosa: uma filosofia da liberdade. São Paulo: Moderna, 1995. espinosA: ConsiderAções sobre o trAtAdo breve204 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 204 CHAUI, M. Política em Espinosa. São Paulo: Companhia da Letras, 2003. DELBOS, V. O Espinosismo. São Paulo: Discurso, 2002. DELEUZE, G. Espinosa: filosofia prática. Tradução Daniel Lins e Fabien Pascal Lins. São Paulo: Escuta, 2002. FRAGOSO, E. A. R. (Org.) Spinoza: cinco ensaios por Renan, Delbos, Chartier, Brunschwicg, Boutroux. Londrina: Eduel, 2004. GLEIZER, M. A. Verdade e certeza em Espinosa. Porto Alegre: LPM, 1999. LEVY, L. O Autômato espiritual. Porto Alegre: LPM, 1998. NEGRI, A. A anomalia selvagem: poder e potência em Spinoza. Tradução Raquel Ramalhete. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. 34, 1993. 205205 206 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 206 espinosA • trAtAdo breve "tRAtADO BReVe" 1 Capítulo I Opinião, Convicção, Saber2 Para começar a dizer algo sobre os modos3 dos quais constitui-se o homem indicaremos*: (1) o que são; (2) seus efeitos e, enfim, (3) sua causa. 1 Duas Versões da obra original foram usadas nessa tradução: GEBHARDT, C. Spinoza Opera. Heidelbergl: Carl Winters, 1972, v. 1, p. 1-121 e MIGNINI, F. Spinoza Korte Verhandeling / Breve Trattato. L'Aquila: Japare, 1986. O estabelecimento de texto de Mignini foi preferido, sua tradução para o italiano foi consultada com as seguintes traduções do Tratado Breve: Francesa: APPUHN, C. Spinoza: Oeuvres. Paris: Garnier, 1965, v. 1; Inglesa: CURLEY, E. The collected works of Spinoza. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985 e Espanhola: DOMINGUEZ, A. Spinoza: Tratado Breve. Madrid: Alianza, 1990. 2 No Tratado Breve são três as maneiras de conhecer. A primeira, a opinião é variável segundo aquele que conhece e as condições de seu conhecimento, e frequentemente acontece que alguém tenha uma opinião sem saber completamente o porque disso. Na convicção, diferentemente, temos a consciência clara e completa da necessidade daquilo que afirmamos, sabemos dizer e mostrar o porquê, sem ainda ter o saber propriamente dito. Nesse último, e apenas nele, temos acesso direto àquilo que conhecemos, concretamente, não há dúvidas sobre o que julgamos e somos capazes livremente de afirmar nosso conhecimento por nós mesmos. 3 Modo é um termo técnico da filosofia de Espinosa. Aqui ele pode significar, e efetivamente significa, duas coisas. Modo, aqui significa maneira, jeito, estilo. Igualmente modo significa uma coisa que depende de outras, que não é autônoma, e que tem uma explicação em outra coisa da qual ela deriva. 207207 No que diz respeito ao primeiro ponto, comecemos pelo que pode ser conhecido em primeiro lugar, ou, nominalmente, por alguns conceitos ou consciências4 do conhecimento de nós mesmos e das coisas que são para além de nós. Estes conceitos expomos assim**: (1) os que exprimem pura opinião, cuja crença surge de uma experiência ou do ouvir dizer5; (2) os que, diferentemente, são convicção verdadeira6 e (3) os que advêm de por conhecimento claro e distinto. Os primeiros são comumente sujeitos ao erro. Os segundos e os terceiros, embora distintos um do outro, não podem errar. Então, para entender isso tudo mais claramente indicamos um exemplo tomado da Regra de Três7. Alguém ouviu dizer que, na regra de três, se multiplica o segundo número pelo terceiro, e então se divide pelo primeiro, obtendo assim um quarto número, que guarda com o terceiro a mesma proporção que o segundo número guardava com o primeiro. Esse alguém, ainda que quem tivesse lhe dito isso houvesse mentido, conformou a isso, todavia, suas operações, sem ter alcançado um conhecimento da regra de três que fosse maior que aquele que um cego tem das cores. Assim, de tudo que pudesse dizer sobre isso, falaria como um papagaio faz com 4 Para estudar os modos de conhecer devemos ter consciência de nossa forma de nos relacionarmos com o mundo. Elas são inúmeras. Espinosa, no entanto, irá resumi-las em três tipos gerais que servirão para classificarmos e tentarmos compreender, em cada caso em que isso aconteça, o que está sendo cada um dos nossos conhecimentos. 5 O primeiro modo de conhecimento ou a primeira maneira de conhecer, à qual chamamos de opinião, envolve dois tipos: o conhecimento por ouvir dizer (o conhecimento indireto pelo testemunho de alguém ou de um texto escrito) ou a experiência vaga (o conhecimento pela memória sem nenhuma garantia suficiente de que aquilo que nos lembramos seja assim ou não). 6 A convicção verdadeira não é mais uma simples opinião, que pode mudar a qualquer momento ou que não tem justificativa. Por ser justificada, a convicção verdadeira será chamada de razão. Nesse caso sabemos indicar algo que exige que a coisa que conhecemos seja assim, sem variação possível. 7 A regra de três é um exemplo matemático simples. Podemos por o problema em um caso particular nos seguintes termos: 4 dividido por 2, dá o mesmo resultado que seis dividido por X – qual o valor de X? Em fórmulas 4/2 = 6/X; X=? Hoje chamamos a esse tipo de problemas matemáticos de problemas com proporções. A solução que Espinosa está descrevendo, segundo nosso exemplo particular, é a seguinte em fórmulas: X= (2*6)/4 = 3. 208 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 208 espinosA • trAtAdo breve aquilo que alguém lhe ensina8. Uma segunda pessoa, de conceitos mais agudos e que não se deixa levar pelo que dizem, mas procura provas para alguns cálculos particulares, quando verifica que a fórmula dada convém com a solução da regra de três, crê nela. Todavia, dizíamos corretamente que ainda assim estávamos sujeitos ao erro: como poderia ser que a experiência de algo em particular valesse para tudo mais?9 Uma terceira pessoa não contente com o ouvir dizer, porque poderia ser enganada com isso, nem com a experiência particular, porque ela não pode constituir-se em regra10, busca a solução na verdadeira razão que, bem utilizada não enganou jamais. Essa última indica que através da propriedade da proporção entre aqueles números, a regra tinha que ser assim e não poderia jamais vir a ser outra11. Uma quarta pessoa, então, tendo um conhecimento claríssimo não tem necessidade nem do ouvir dizer, nem da experiência, nem dos artifícios da razão porque tal pessoa se depara em um único golpe com a proporção e todos seus cálculos12. Notas do Autor: *Os modos que constituem o homem são conceitos classificados 8 É possível perfeitamente saber resolver o problema matemático que vimos na nota anterior decorando a fórmula, sem saber porque ela é dessa maneira. O problema está em que quem decorou não sabe ainda alguma justificativa para as coisas serem desse jeito e não de outro qualquer e, portanto, ainda não sabe verdadeiramente. Daí a comparação com um papagaio que fala por imitação, sem conhecer o significado das palavras. 9 Alguém pode resolver o mesmo problema por se lembrar de que ele já foi alguma vez resolvido assim, sem, no entanto, ter certeza de que ele sempre possa ser resolvido da mesma maneira, e, portanto, sem uma justificativa definitiva. 10 A experiência vaga é tal que nunca nos indica que sempre será conforme o que nos lembramos dela. 11 A convicção justifica isso da seguinte maneira: (1) a/b =c/X, (2) (X*a)/b = c, (3) X*a =c*b, (4) X = c*b /a quem sabe explicar como se passa das formulas (1) para as seguintes, até a fórmula (4) sabe produzir a fórmula que resolve o problema ( que responde X= ...) a partir do problema dado (a/b=c/X, qual o valor de X?). O valor de X sempre pode ser produzido assim. Logo, quem sabe esse raciocínio produz necessariamente, e por conta do raciocínio, a solução do problema e pode então justificar sua convicção. 12 O saber é uma visão direta e imediata da coisa sem cálculos ou operações. 209209 em opinião, convicção e conhecimento claro e distinto, causado por objetos segundo sua própria natureza. **Os conceitos deste gênero já foram expostos em páginas anteriores e lá, como também aqui foram chamados de opiniões, como efetivamente o são. Capítulo II O que são opinião, convicção e conhecimento claro. Devemos agora tratar dos efeitos dos diferentes conhecimentos que indicamos no capítulo anterior e, como de passagem, retomaremos o que são a opinião, convicção e conhecimento claro. A primeira será denominada opinião; a segunda convicção, a terceira, enfim, chamaremos de verdadeiro conhecimento claro. Denominamos a primeira de opinião porque está sujeita a erro e porque não diz respeito ao que estejamos seguros, mas corresponde ao que podemos presumir e asseverar13. Chamamos a segunda de convicção, porém, porque as coisas que alcançamos apenas pela razão não são vistas por nós, mas são encontradas pela convicção intelectual de que seja assim e não possa ser de outro jeito14. Enfim, chamamos de conhecimento claro aquilo que não vem da razão, mas do senso da coisa mesma, que supera em muito os outros conhecimentos15. 13 A opinião pode varias, e sujeita ao certo e ao errado. Isso porque só podemos admitir o falso como resultado de uma opinião. Isso não significa que toda opinião está errada, significa apenas que não justificamos a opinião pela opinião. Entenda-se: apenas com opiniões não temos segurança nem de encontrar para nós nem de exigir para os outros, o que seja realmente certo ou errado. 14 Quando isso acontece de verdade, não estamos mais sujeitos ao erro. Assim, a razão não erra, e, quando erramos dizemos que não houve razão e tínhamos permanecido na mera opinião. 15 O conhecimento intelectual supera os outros em um sentido muito especial: ele permite que tenhamos em concreto aquilo que conhecemos. 210 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 210 espinosA • trAtAdo breve Isso posto, passemos a seus efeitos. Logo, dizemos que do primeiro advém todas paixões contrárias à reta razão; do segundo os apetites sãos e, do terceiro, o verdadeiro amor com todos seus efeitos. Assim, colocamos no conhecimento a causa próxima de todas paixões. De fato, temos como impossível que alguém que não conceba nem conheça pelos fundamentos precedentes, ainda assim, possa ser movido de apetite, amor ou qualquer outro modo de querer16. Capítulo III Origem das paixões; Paixão da opinião. De acordo com o que indicamos, mostraremos agora no que consistem os afetos passionais17. E para fazê-lo de forma proveitosa e inteligível tomaremos como exemplar alguma paixão singular dentre estes afetos e nele demonstraremos o que afirmamos. Que seja primeira a admiração, a qual tem lugar naquele que conhece a coisa pelo primeiro modo. Ela aparece porque esse alguém tira uma conclusão geral* de um particular e, depois, fica surpreso quando encontra algo contrário a isso. Assim, aquele que nunca viu uma ovelha de cauda curta fica surpreso diante de uma ovelha do Marrocos, que a têm longa. Da mesma forma se conta a história de um camponês que tinha a opinião de que, para além de seu campo, não havia nenhum outro, mas, fugida uma vaca, e devendo seguir sua trilha para buscá-la, ficou muito admirado de que, fora de seu campo houvesse ainda tal quantidade de outros campos. 16 É uma doutrina típica de Espinosa a que reduz o conceito comum de vontade ao conhecimento. Espinosa concebe o conhecimento como algo imediatamente compatível com a ação, ele é uma relação concreta com o mundo, e também reconhece a vontade como aquilo que, em cada ato de conhecimento, afirmamos ou negamos. Assim, não é possível separar o querer do conhecer. 17 Os afetos podem ser classificados em: 1) ações, quando somos responsáveis e causa adequada e principal daquilo que fazemos ou sentimos; 2) paixões, quando somos apenas uma causa acessória ou quando somos levados a fazer alguma coisa pela força superior de outra que nos constrange. 211211 Seguramente, é o que deve ocorrer para muitos filósofos, os quais (por não terem visto nada diverso) são convencidos de que não há nenhum outro mundo para além do pequeno campo que é esse globo terrestre no qual estão. Isso quanto a esta primeira. Em segundo lugar está o amor: este nasce de verdadeiros conceitos ou de opiniões ou, enfim, de ouvir dizer. Antes veremos como irá nascer da opinião e do ouvir dizer, mais tarde como nasce do conceito: no primeiro caso nos inclina à nossa ruína, no segundo à nossa suprema salvação18. Inicialmente vejamos o amor que nasce da opinião. Esse é tal que cada vez que alguém depara com um bem, ou crê deparar-se, é sempre inclinado a unir-se com ele e pelo bem que nota nele o prefere como ótimo não notando, além disso, nada melhor ou mais atraente. Até que aconteça (como nesses casos é costume) ter conhecido algo melhor do que até então conhece, e então move todo seu amor do primeiro ao segundo, o que deverá ficar bem mais esclarecido quando lidarmos com a liberdade humana19. Não é o lugar, aqui, de falar do amor que nasce de verdadeiros conceitos. Falaremos, enfim, apenas daquele que nasce do ouvir dizer. Esse, observamos comumente nas crianças em relação a seus pais, quando elas, por ouvirem seus pais dizer que isto ou aquilo é bom, inclinamse a essas coisas sem ter que conhecer, sobre tais coisas, mais que isso. Isso, observamos também naqueles que perdem sua vida por amor à pátria e também naqueles que se enamoram de alguém, por força de algo que ouviram dizer20. 18 Espinosa aponta, aqui, para a diferença entre o amor que nasce da opinião e o que nasce do saber. O primeiro pode ser o amor de algo que vai contra nossa natureza, o segundo necessariamente é amor de algo que confirma, individual e coletivamente, nossa natureza. 19 Assim, o amor que nasce da opinião aparece ao lado da crença (não assegurada) de que algo é um bem para nós. Mas podemos apenas estar imaginando que essa coisa é boa ou útil. Portanto, o amor que nasce da opinião envolve um perigo significativo, uma vez que, ao amar, afirmamos e buscamos aquilo que é objeto de nosso amor, sem saber direito se esse objeto realmente é bom para nós. 20 O amor por ouvir dizer é um afeto que inclina as pessoas a aceitarem certas coisas e a afirmarem essas coisas com a mesma força de seu afeto. Assim, alguém pode amar a 212 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 212 espinosA • trAtAdo breve O ódio, o contrário direto do amor, nasce de um engano que deriva da opinião21. Então, se alguém causa dano a uma coisa que outro alguém achava bom, este último irá odiar quem fez isso. Tal ódio, no entanto, jamais teria lugar para quem conhecesse o verdadeiro bem, como mostraremos adiante. Uma vez que tudo o que é ou é pensado, em comparação com o verdadeiro bem, não é passa de algo mesquinho, não seria alguém tão mesquinho mais digno de compaixão que de ódio? O ódio, enfim, pode provir apenas do ouvir dizer, como vemos nos turcos que odeiam cristãos e hebreus, nos cristãos que odeiam turcos e hebreus, ou nos hebreus que odeiam turcos e cristãos etc.22 O quanto a massa desconhece o costume e a religião dos outros! Do desejo: que o desejo consista no apetite, como querem alguns, ou no ardor de conseguir algo que se precisa, ou ainda, como querem outros**, em conservar o que já fruímos é certo que ele não pode vir a ser para ninguém, se não sob a aparência de um bem. Assim também é claro que o desejo, como amor disso que foi dito acima, deriva do primeiro modo de conhecer. Quando alguém usufrui de uma coisa que é boa, toma ardor por ela, tal qual um doente, ao ouvir dizer de um doutor, que este ou aquele remédio é bom para sua doença imediatamente passa a ser atraído por isso. O desejo advém também da prática, como se vê no exercício dos médicos, os quais, certificados de que um remédio tenha sido bom uma pátria por ouvir dizer, e a tal ponto que é capaz de arriscar sua vida por força disso. 21 Os afetos admitem contrários. Como todo conhecimento envolve uma afirmação (Do tipo "Isso é assim") ou uma negação ("Isso não é assim"), os afetos envolvem uma possível afirmação ou uma repulsa com relação a seu objeto. Nesse sentido, o ódio é o contrário do amor, porque o amor afirma o que é conhecido pela opinião e o ódio nega o objeto da opinião. Mas a opinião está igualmente por trás do ódio e do amor, nesses dois casos, como a causa está pressuposta pelo efeito. 22 Espinosa está afirmando que os povos reunidos sob essa três nações se odiavam, no período histórico em questão, sem se conhecer exatamente. Esse ódio pode ter tido sua origem em uma série de conhecimentos por ouvir dizer, em histórias e tradições que alimentavam a disputa entre esses povos. A rigor, esse tipo de aversão é contrário a à razão. Entretanto, o exemplo alerta para o fato de que os afetos podem ser pensados em uma coletividade (no caso nas nações), momento em que pode adquirir valor político. Portanto, é preciso uma crítica muito precisa dos afetos, e, sobretudo é preciso denunciar muito claramente os afetos que são injustos e nascem apenas da opinião errônea. 213213 vez costumam considerá-lo como uma coisa infalível. Tudo isso que dissemos desses afetos podemos dizer das outras paixões, como é claro para qualquer um. E, como iremos em seguida investigar quais delas são para nós conformes à razão e quais não, não devemos dizer mais nada sobre isso deixando as coisas como estão até aqui. Notas do autor: *Não se deve concluir que um raciocínio formal sempre precede a admiração. Essa se dá, vez ou outra, sem aquele porque, quando nos calamos pressupomos que as coisas são como nos habituamos a vê-las, a lidar com elas ou a entendê-las, e jamais de outra maneira. Assim, por exemplo, se Aristóteles diz "O cão é um animal que ladra", conclui que "tudo que ladra é cão", todavia, quando um camponês pensa "um cão", está pensando silenciosamente o exato mesmo que Aristóteles pensava em sua definição. Logo, ao ouvir um latido o camponês diz: "Um cão". Daí que, ao ouvissem outro animal latir, Aristóteles, que tirava a conclusão, e o camponês que não a tirava, ficariam igualmente admirados. Além disso, quando nos damos conta de algo que jamais havíamos pensado antes isso não quer dizer que nunca havíamos visto algo semelhante no todo ou parcialmente, que isso que vimos não era constituído de semelhante maneira ou que não tínhamos sido afetados da mesma maneira e assim por diante. **A Primeira definição é mais adequada porque, usufruída a coisa termina o desejo, por causa disso a disposição que há em nós a conservar a coisa que desejamos não é desejo mas medo de perder a coisa amada. Capítulo IV Que coisa deriva da convicção, do bem e do mal do homem. Uma vez que, no capítulo anterior, estabelecemos como as paixões nascem de um engano de opinião, seja visto agora, então, o efeito das 214 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 214 espinosA • trAtAdo breve duas outras maneiras de conhecer. Enfim, vejamos em primeiro lugar o efeito daquilo que foi chamado de convicção*. Esta última mostra o que a coisa deve ser, mas não o que em verdade é23. Tal é a razão pela qual não pode nos unir aos fatos que acreditamos. Eu disse que ela nos ensina apenas o que o fato deve ser não o que é, e há uma grande diferença entre essas duas coisas24. Assim, como nós dissemos em nosso exemplo da regra de três, se alguém pode, através de uma igualdade, encontrar um quarto valor que tem com o terceiro, proporção igual à que o segundo tem com o primeiro, agora ele (tendo operado a multiplicação e a divisão) pode indicar que os quatro números constroem entre si uma relação que é proporcional. Mesmo sendo assim, este alguém não fala menos de um fato que é externo a ele25. Todavia, se ele intui a igualdade em acordo com o que nos mostramos em nosso quarto exemplo, assim então ele mostra em verdade que o fato é tal como está nele, por não ser fora dele. Isso quanto ao primeiro efeito26. O segundo efeito da convicção é que nos conduz a uma clara intelecção, através da qual amamos a Deus e dessa forma também nos faz perceber intelectualmente as coisas fora de nós como estando em nós27. O terceiro efeito é que oferece o conhecimento do bem e do mal e nos torna cientes de todas paixões que devem ser negadas. E na medida em que indicamos anteriormente que as paixões que advém da opinião são tais que podem trazer em si um grande mal, também agora vale o trabalho de indicar como as mesmas saem dessa segunda maneira de 23 A razão ainda é um conhecimento abstrato, embora seja já necessário e não implique algum erro. Ela é ainda insuficiente do ponto de vista de uma filosofia que procura compreender a liberdade e a felicidade humanas. Todavia ela é necessária como via até o conhecimento intelectual, e, portanto, ela é indispensável. 24 Por ser abstrata, a razão não nos une, não permite a fruição daquilo que ela conhece e não implica necessariamente uma ação concreta e real que lhe seja correspondente. 25 A regra é externa a ele porque aparece como uma necessidade imposta pela coisa. 26 O conhecimento intelectual une aquele que assim conhece com o objeto assim conhecido de tal forma que desaparece a distância entre quem conhece e o que é conhecido. 27 A razão permite que possamos alcançar a partir dela esse conhecimento intelectual. 215215 conhecer, e ainda o que é o bem ele mesmo e o que é o mal28. Para fazer isso com propriedade, usemos a mesma maneira que a anterior, mostrando cada uma delas, para que nós possamos saber são para elegermos quais são para abandonarmos. Antes disso, no entanto, indiquemos brevemente o que são esse bem esse mal do homem. Nós estabelecemos anteriormente que todas as coisas são determinadas e que na Natureza não há bem nem mal29. Assim, tudo o que quisemos precisar do homem deve ser tomado do gênero humano ele mesmo, o que não é nada mais que um ente de razão30. E então, quando fazemos a ideia de um homem perfeito em nosso intelecto isso poderia ser a causa de revelarmos em nós – como se examinássemos a nós mesmos – um meio de chegar a tal perfeição31. Diante disso denominaremos de bem tudo aquilo que nos aproxima dessa perfeição e de mal tudo aquilo que é obstrução a isso, ou não leva a isso. Eu faço isso, digo, concebo um homem perfeito, na medida em que quero sustentar alguma coisa sobre o bem e o mal do homem. É assim porque, eu, querendo, por exemplo, lidar com o bem e o mal de Adão confundiria um ente real com um ente de razão, o que deve ser cuidadosamente evitado por um filósofo rigoroso, por razões que exporemos 28 A razão, por fim institui o bem e o mal para o homem não absolutamente, mas para nós. Assim é da condição propriamente humana pensar segundo a utilidade, a finalidade, o bem e o mal. Segundo Espinosa, no entanto, isso não suficiente para atribuirmos essas coisas ao mundo, mas apenas a nós e à nossa razão, como veremos adiante. 29 O bem e o mal são instituições humanas, o que não os torna menos importantes. Uma vez que temos a natureza humana, instituímos o bem e o mal e agimos de acordo com essas instituições, mas a Natureza as desconhece. 30 Chamaremos de ente de razão, junto com Espinosa, a uma construção do nosso pensamento que fazemos para explicar em termos gerais a realidade do mundo. Os entes de razão são instrumentos para classificarmos e pensarmos o mundo em termos reais, mas não são coisas realmente existentes no mundo. 31 O homem perfeito é, portanto, uma construção que a razão faz para medir o que ela irá instituir como correto ou incorreto, bom ou mau. Ele não existe na realidade, e não pode existir. Deve, portanto, ser entendido apenas como um instrumento de medida, utilizado pela razão para indicar que afetos podemos aceitar e quais devemos rejeitar. 216 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 216 espinosA • trAtAdo breve agora e em outras ocasiões32. Além disso, porque a finalidade de Adão ou de outra coisa particular não aparece para nós se não pelos acontecimentos**, também aquilo que podemos indicar sobre as finalidades dos homens devemos fundar sobre o conceito de um homem perfeito em nosso intelecto. Tal fim, sendo apenas um ente de razão, podemos conhecer melhor e, como foi dito, podemos de tal forma conhecer melhor seu bem e seu mal que são apenas entes de razão33. Para alcançar a questão mostramos até aqui como do conceito surgia um movimento, consistente em uma ação ou paixão da alma e distinguimos esse conceito em quatro modos: ouvir dizer, experiência vaga, convicção e conhecimento claro. E como indicamos efeitos de todos eles, fica patente que o quarto, a saber, o conhecimento claro, é o mais perfeito de todos. Isso porque a opinião permite o erro, a convicção é boa porque é a via para o conhecimento claro conduzindo às coisas que verdadeiramente são para ser amadas. É assim que nosso último fim e o mais nobre que sabemos é o verdadeiro conhecimento34. Todavia, também esse verdadeiro conhecimento tem diferenças que advém do que ele conhece. Tal conhecimento é tanto melhor quanto é melhor aquilo a que ele se une. Por força disso o homem mais perfeito é o que se une a Deus (o que há de mais perfeito) e dele pode fruir35. 32 O perigo envolvido nessa operação da razão consiste em passarmos a acreditar em um homem perfeito, como se ele fosse mais que um instrumento de medida. Seria um engano semelhante ao de quem acredita que a terra é realmente dividida em duas metades por um equador, ou ainda que exista um norte e um sul reais, como existem montanhas, mares e lagos. Cabe ao filósofo rigoroso evitar essas confusões e denunciar quando elas acontecem. 33 A finalidade também não se encontra nas coisas, mas indica um instrumento pelo qual as pensamos. Ela também não é real e deve ser entendida apenas como instrumento de raciocínio. 34 O conhecimento intelectual é o melhor para quem quer entender a liberdade e a felicidade humanas é o melhor filosoficamente. As outras formas de conhecer permanecem importantes para outras tarefas de nossa vida e não devem ser desprezadas porque a forma intelectual é que melhor responde às exigências da filosofia. 35 Fica estabelecido aqui o programa da investigação de Espinosa tentar conhecer Deus como objeto de conhecimento intelectual de tal forma que nosso conhecimento nos uma com o máximo de perfeição. Do ponto de vista da razão, esse é programa correto. Do 217217 Para estabelecer o bom e o mau nas afecções ou paixões consideraremos isso particularmente como foi dito. Antes de tudo trataremos da admiração. Esta nascendo da ignorância ou do preconceito é uma imperfeição no homem que manifesta tal perturbação. Digo imperfeição porque a admiração, em si mesma, não conduz a nenhum mal36. Notas do Autor: *A convicção é uma forte persuasão da razão, pela qual me convenço em meu intelecto de que a coisa fora dele existe verdadeiramente como esta convicção que dela tenho em meu intelecto. Digo "uma forte persuasão da razão" para distingui-la seja da opinião, sempre volúvel e sujeita ao engano, seja da ciência, que não consiste em uma convicção da razão mas em uma união coma a coisa ela mesma. Disse ainda que a coisa existe "verdadeiramente como" e "fora" de meu intelecto: verdadeiramente porque a razão não pode enganar-me nisso, e de outra forma não se distinguiria da opinião; como porque a convicção só pode mostrar como a coisa cabe ser , mas nada do efetivamente é, de outro modo não se distinguiria do saber; fora porque na convicção a coisa não é entendida estando em nós mas como além de nós. **De fato não se pode tirar uma ideia perfeita de nenhuma coisa particular porque a perfeição mesma dessa coisa, seja ela ou não verdadeiramente perfeita, não se pode deduzir senão de um ente de razão ou de uma ideia universal perfeita. ponto de vista do conhecimento intelectual ele mesmo as coisas seriam formuladas de outra maneira. Todavia, como a razão fornece a via para o conhecimento intelectual, então o filósofo pode partir dessa exigência da razão para tentar emendá-la intelectualmente quando for possível. 36 Seguirão agora os capítulos em que Espinosa retoma e define as principais afecções. fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA218 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 218 219219 FOuCAulT concedeu inúmeras entrevistas em que expõe de modo claro seu pensamento, seus conceitos, a evolução de suas ideias. Na primeira entrevista desta antologia (1977) ele explica que as escolas filosóficas predominantes na França entre 1950 e 1960, abordavam o sujeito como sujeito de conhecimento, como tendo uma consciência pensante. Esse tipo de abordagem, porém, não dá conta de como nasceu um saber acerca dos homens, de sua vida, de sua linguagem, de sua produção; um saber acerca de sua sanidade mental (psiquiatria), acerca de sua vida sexual. Para nenhuma dessas questões importa o sujeito enquanto mente que conhece e sim como os indivíduos são tomados por ciências diferentes, em épocas diferentes. E também como esses saberes têm efeitos concretos, por exemplo, a loucura, quando é investida pelo olhar do médico que a classifica como doença mental, o médico tem o poder de enquadrála, internar, prescrever. Outra situação: quando, a partir do avanço do capitalismo, há necessidade de tomar o corpo como parte de um aparelho produtivo, corpo treinado, disciplinado, útil, surge outro tipo de poder, o poder disciplinar, de vigiar, de punir, de adestrar, que é perfeitamente ajustável aos mecanismos econômicos do capitalismo. Na segunda entrevista (1977), ele exemplifica seu pensamento FOuCAuLt: uM peNSADOR DA NOSSA ÉpOCA, pARA A NOSSA ÉpOCA fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA220 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 220 com a temática da medicalização, mostra que o capitalismo exige mecanismos disciplinares para que haja governo; a normalização dos indivíduos separa os que são aptos para o trabalho, para o tipo de trabalho que a indústria requer. Este poder funciona de modo eficaz se forem usados recursos que escolas, prisões, quartéis, fábricas e hospitais têm de separar, escalonar o tempo através de atividades, moldar e capacitar crianças para os exercícios escolares, treinar operários e soldados, vigiar prisioneiros. Tudo isso através de controle e de exames que permitem detectar quem é o normal, quem é o anormal. Este tipo de poder difere do poder jurídico e do poder do estado, seus efeitos são muito diferentes da dominação de classe, que é econômica. E, finalmente diz que em História da Sexualidade – A Vontade de Saber (1976) fez uma história dos procedimentos de subjetivação, isto é, através de que regimes de verdade o sujeito é analisado, como a confissão que acabou por se transformar em instrumento para a constituição de um sujeito de desejo, dentro do dispositivo de sexualidade, que substituiu estilos de vida prazerosos. Michel Foucault foi, e provavelmente ainda é um filósofo que provoca polêmica, por vezes rejeição. Ele põe em xeque conceitos e categorias que aceitamos sem exame crítico, como poder, verdade, saber, sujeito, conhecimento. Foucault nasceu em Poitiers (França) em 1926. Seu pai foi cirurgião bastante prestigiado, deu a seus três filhos uma educação rigorosa. Apesar da insistência do pai para que ele seguisse o curso de medicina, Foucault preferiu as humanidades, história e filosofia. Ele se preparou para ingressar na Escola Normal Superior em Paris, mas como os tempos eram de guerra, fez seus estudos em Poitiers, a contragosto. Em 1945 vai para Paris onde se prepara com excelentes professores para o difícil exame de ingresso na Escola Norma. Um desses professores era Jean Hyppolite, o maior especialista em Hegel. Estudar Hegel leva Foucault a compreender a importância da história para a filosofia e desta para aquela. Outra influência no pensamento de Foucault foi G. Canguilhem, que seria seu orientador na tese de doutoramento, a famosa obra História da Loucura (1961). Para Canguilhem o estatuto científico das ciências biológicas e da medicina depende de fatores estruturais, históricos. Ele 221221 criticou as chamadas filosofias da consciência ou do sujeito próprias da fenomenologia e do existencialismo, o que influenciará Foucault. Michel Foucault se formou em filosofia pela Sorbonne em 1948, e ainda enquanto estudante de filosofia interessou-se pela psicologia, curso no qual se formou em 1949 pelo Instituto de Psicologia de Paris. Foi professor em Lille entre 1951 até 1955, depois deu aulas de literatura em Uppsala (Suécia) onde durante três anos redigiu sua tese sobre a história da loucura. Morou também algum tempo na África (Tunísia), esteve em Varsóvia (1958), Hamburgo (1959-1960). Em 1960 estabeleceuse em Paris e começa a lecionar psicologia na universidade de ClermontFerrand, e mais tarde filosofia; nestas aulas apresenta os esboços de As Palavras e as Coisas, e se revela um professor fascinante. Entre 1970 até sua morte, em 1984, foi professor no Collège de France. Os cursos estão sendo publicados, e podem ser considerados como uma fonte importante para compreender o pensamento do autor. Todas as entrevistas, publicações na imprensa, artigos, foram reunidos em quatro volumes, agrupados mais tarde em dois volumes, totalizando mais de duas mil páginas (Ditos e Escritos). Nos últimos anos de sua vida, já bastante famoso, deu cursos em Berkeley (Califórnia) e também no Brasil. O primeiro texto de Foucault foi o longo prefácio que fez à tradução de O Sonho e Existência de Binswanger, famoso psiquiatra criador da análise existencial. Nesse prefácio estão algumas das questões que o levaram a filosofar. Binswanger critica a fenomenologia (para a qual o sujeito tem uma consciência que é intencional) e também Freud. O que levou Foucault a considerar que para compreender o sonho a visão dos chamados poetas malditos, R. Char, Blanchot e Bataille é mais reveladora. A loucura e as paixões abrem para o estranho, para a necessidade de romper com uma visão única do homem como racional, como consciência plena de si, como sujeito pensante. O inconsciente, a realidade brutal da loucura, os sonhos, a morte, são experiências limite, cruciais. Foucault não acredita ser possível uma teoria geral dos seres humanos. Ele aprendeu mais sobre psicologia e a loucura como estagiário no hospital Sainte-Anne, e também como voluntário, numa prisão do fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA222 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 222 que com as teorias apresentadas nas aulas. Fazer testes psicológicos, preencher fichas, examinar os doentes no hospital e os detentos nas prisões, mudaram sua visão do que é o homem e de como conhecê-lo. A leitura de Nietzsche já na década de 50 o levaria a romper com a fenomenologia de Husserl e com a tradição marxista, como ele deixa claro na primeira entrevista. Valores e conceitos nascem de necessidades humanas. A filosofia deve se debruçar sobre a história dos acontecimentos, do concreto, do saber de certa época que produz práticas com efeitos de poder. A intenção é sempre de compreender melhor o nosso presente e para tal de nada adiantam as análises da existência ou dos dados da consciência. Foi muito importante para Foucault o movimento estruturalista francês (ver nota 2 do texto traduzido), a ponto de ele ser considerado como um estruturalista, o que ele negou. Ele não desmereceu o valor do estruturalismo para as ciências culturais, como a etnologia. Mas não se cansou de dizer, seu problema é político, importam mais as lutas políticas, os enfrentamentos, as batalhas, do que a fria análise estrutural. Em História da Loucura mostra como o modo de ver a loucura mudou ao longo da história. Ela só é tratada (nos dois sentidos) como doença no século 19, quando é internada em uma instituição nova, o asilo. Nele o olhar do médico se apropria do louco como doente mental. Nas obras As Palavras e as Coisas (1966) e Arqueologia do Saber (1969), o autor indaga sobre as mudanças históricas em práticas discursivas e em saberes, em especial nas ciências humanas, que objetivaram o homem. O arqueólogo do saber analisa os saberes de cada época que mudam em função de necessidades e dificuldades a serem resolvidas. Assim, os objetos de saber não se encontram nunca prontos na realidade, eles são constituídos numa trama de relações chamadas de "formações discursivas". Cada época "diz" as coisas e as relaciona de modo diverso. Os acontecimentos na ordem do saber são, por exemplo, os enunciados dos psiquiatras sobre doença mental que constituem o objeto médico chamado loucura, os enunciados sobre produção e trabalho que constituem o domínio do discurso da economia, os enunciados sobre a organização dos seres vivos, 223223 que permitem o surgimento do objeto de saber da biologia. No curso que deu no Brasil, A Verdade e as Formas Jurídicas na PUC do Rio de Janeiro (1973), seu pensamento começa a passar por importantes mudanças, como ele indica no início da primeira conferência: Meu propósito é lhes mostrar como as práticas sociais podem vir a engendrar domínios de saber que não apenas fazem aparecer novos objetos, novos conceitos, novas técnicas, mas também produzem formas totalmente novas de sujeitos e de sujeitos de conhecimento. O sujeito de conhecimento tem, ele próprio, uma história, a relação do sujeito com o objeto, ou, mais claramente, a própria verdade tem uma história. Assim, gostaria especialmente de mostrar como se pôde formar, no século 19, certo saber do homem, da individualidade, do indivíduo normal ou anormal, dentro ou fora da regra, um saber que, em verdade, nasceu de práticas sociais de controle e de vigilância. E como, de certo modo, esse saber não se impôs a um sujeito de conhecimento, não foi proposto a ele, nem nele foi impresso, mas produziu um tipo absolutamente novo de sujeito de conhecimento. Um primeiro eixo da pesquisa que eu proponho é o da história dos domínios de saber em sua relação com as práticas sociais, o que exclui o primado de um sujeito de conhecimento dado de uma vez por todas. O segundo eixo de pesquisa é um eixo metodológico, que se poderia chamar de análise dos discursos. [...] O discurso é este conjunto regular de fatos linguísticos em certo nível, e de fatos polêmicos e estratégicos em outro nível. Essa análise do discurso como jogo estratégico e polêmico é, a meu ver, um segundo eixo de pesquisa.1 A genealogia é um modo de analisar que usa a história para situar saberes e práticas que têm efeitos de poder na medida em que servem para adestrar, controlar, examinar, produzir comportamentos. O discurso carrega saber e poder, a verdade é produzida historicamente e o sujeito é sujeitado por práticas de vigilância e punição que permitem 1 FOUCAULT, M. Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 1994. v. 2. p. 538-539. fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA224 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 224 excluir e controlar, elas dividem o sujeito humano em normal e anormal, disciplinam, e também permitem conhecê-lo. Essa sociedade disciplinar é analisada em Vigiar e Punir (1975). Controlar os indivíduos e manter a população ativa e saudável foi fundamental para o avanço do capitalismo (ver entrevistas). Foucault não oferece uma teoria do poder. Ao questionar por que em nossa sociedade prevaleceu o modo de punir pela prisão, mostra que uma das razões foi o surgimento, no século 18, de um novo tipo de poder muito mais eficaz do que o do poder de reprimir ou subjugar como faz o estado ou o poder econômico. É um poder microfísico, feito de relações concretas, mais discretas e que permeiam toda a teia social, como ele explica nas entrevistas. O efeito é o indivíduo examinado, disciplinado, adaptado aos aparelhos de produção, de cura, de instrução. Juntamente com esse tipo de poder, surge outro, o biopoder com seus mecanismos de regulação, controle e segurança das populações, através de políticas de saúde, estatísticas sobre natalidade, mortalidade, uma nova economia política liberal que transformam a sociedade em uma eficiente máquina de produção. Além disso, há práticas de subjetivação, que levam à constituição de um "eu", uma subjetividade forjada por mudanças no modo como lidamos com a sexualidade, desde a antiguidade clássica até a nossa época. Nos três volumes de História da sexualidade: A Vontade de Saber (1976), O Uso dos Prazeres, O Cuidado de Si (1984), Foucault critica a hipótese de que a sexualidade é tão somente reprimida; ela é também produzida por discursos e práticas que a tomam sob o prisma científico. Foucault contrapõe a essa cultura da vontade de verdade, uma ética do cuidado de si como prática da liberdade. Em lugar da pretensão ao conhecimento decifrador de uma verdade depositada no sexo, ele propõe uma estilística da existência, em certa medida inspirado no modo de viver dos gregos e os latinos. Não há regras rígidas, cada tem seu modo próprio de moderar e modular o uso dos prazeres e fazer de sua existência, uma bela existência. O pensamento de Foucault gira em torno dos temas do sujeito, 225225 verdade, saber e poder. É um pensamento que leva à crítica de nossa sociedade, à reflexão sobre a condição humana, mostra que a violência e o poder não são imediatamente visíveis, mas também não são escamoteados ou escondidos como as ideologias. Pelo contrário, são práticas que regulam o que alguém diz e a quem diz, em que circunstâncias. Não há verdades evidentes, todo saber foi produzido em algum lugar, com algum propósito. Por isso mesmo pode ser criticado, transformado, e, até mesmo destruído. Foucault considera que a filosofia pode mudar alguma coisa no espírito das pessoas. Sendo um crítico de nossa situação, Foucault apresenta também a possibilidade de rejeitar o que a própria humanidade produziu. Assim ele renova a filosofia ao analisar temas inéditos e de um modo inédito. Seu pensamento vem sempre engajado em uma tarefa política ao evidenciar novos objetos de análise, com os quais os filósofos nunca haviam se preocupado. Entre eles se destacam: o nascimento do hospital; as mudanças no espaço arquitetural que servem para punir, vigiar, separar; o uso da estatística para que governos controlem a população; a constituição de uma nova subjetividade pela psicologia e pela psicanálise; como e por que a sexualidade passa a ser alvo de preocupação médica e sanitária; como governar significa gerenciar a vida (biopoder) desde o nascimento até a morte, e tornar todos os indivíduos mais produtivos, sadios, governáveis. Em todas essas práticas há relações de poder e de saber, com força política e que, ao mesmo tempo, produzem verdade sobre o indivíduo, seu corpo, sua saúde, seu íntimo, sua sexualidade. Como se vê, uma preocupação muito diferente da tradição filosófica. A verdade é produzida, o sujeito é constituído por práticas e acontecimentos históricos. Não há uma essência última da verdade, nem do homem, nem da história. Foucault acredita que assim é que se pode fazer uma crítica de nossa época, sua análise nunca é inocente, é sempre para denunciar algo, por exemplo, a sujeição dos indivíduos a aparelhos que extraem suas forças corporais, que o treinam a exaustão; a redução de desejos e prazeres a uma escala que divide o normal do anormal por uma suspeita análise fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA226 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 226 científica. Por isso Foucault propõe políticas de resistência, resistir e denunciar todo tipo de violência, inclusive as menos perceptíveis, como a violência de discursos que, sob o pretexto de conhecer a sexualidade, reduzem-na a um problema psicológico ou médico-psiquiátrico; as punições pela violação de normas disciplinares, muitas vezes excessivas. Não é possível ir contra as relações de poder, somos fruto delas, não se pode sair da teia social. O que se pode é recusar o tipo de saber e as práticas que excluem o diferente, que não deixam opção para o que ele chamou de atos concretos de liberdade. Foucault não acha que é possível uma revolução social ou econômica. Mas ele considera que é possível e desejável revolucionar com atitudes novas, com novos conceitos e modos de ver a nós mesmos, pensar diferente. Se nós produzimos regras para filtrar discursos (aceitar apenas os que vêm com o carimbo "científico"), para produzir o normal, para tornar a todos governáveis, cabe também a nós modificar, abolir ou reinventar tais regras, tais práticas, tais discursos, sempre que eles resultarem em violência, sofrimento, humilhação. Sugestões de Leitura: obras de foucault Principais Obras de Foucault Traduzidas para o Português (em ordem cronológica de publicação original) FOUCAULT, M. História da loucura. 8. ed. Tradução de José Teixeira Coelho Neto. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2005. FOUCAULT, M. Nascimento da clínica. 5. ed. Tradução de Roberto Machado. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2001. FOUCAULT, M. As Palavras e as coisas. 8. ed. Tradução de Salma T. Muchail. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1999. FOUCAULT, M. Arqueologia do saber. 6. ed. Tradução de Luiz Felipe Baeta Neves. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2000. FOUCAULT, M. A Verdade e as formas jurídicas. Tradução de Roberto Cabral de Mello Machado et al. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Nau, 2002. FOUCAULT, M. Vigiar e punir. 34. ed. Tradução de Lígia M. Pondé Vassallo. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2007. 227227 FOUCAULT, M. História da sexualidade. A vontade de saber. 19. ed. Tradução de Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2009. v. 1. FOUCAULT, M. História da sexualidade. O uso dos prazeres. 17. ed. Tradução de Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007. v. 2. FOUCAULT, M. História da sexualidade. O cuidado de si. 15. ed. Tradução de Maria Thereza da Costa Albuquerque. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 2007. v. 3. organização de Ditos e escritos: FOUCAULT, M.; MOTTA, M. B. de. Ditos e escritos I: Problematização do sujeito: psicologia, psiquiatria e psicanálise. Tradução de Vera Lúcia Avellar Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2002. FOUCAULT, M.; MOTTA, M. B. de. Ditos e escritos II: Arqueologia das ciências e história dos sistemas de pensamento. Tradução de Vera Lúcia Avellar Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2005. FOUCAULT, M.; MOTTA, M. B. de. Ditos e escritos III: Problematização do sujeito. Tradução de Vera Lúcia Avellar Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2006. FOUCAULT, M.; MOTTA, M. B. de. Ditos e escritos IV: Estratégia, poder-saber. Tradução de Vera Lúcia Avellar Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2006. cursos do collège de france: FOUCAULT, M. O Poder psiquiátrico. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006. FOUCAULT, M. Os anormais. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005. FOUCAULT, M. Em defesa da sociedade. Tradução de Maria Ermantina Galvão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000. FOUCAULT, M. Segurança, território, população. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008. FOUCAULT, M. Nascimento da biopolítica. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2008. FOUCAULT, M. Hermenêutica do sujeito. Tradução de Márcio Alves da Fonseca e Salma Tannus Muchail. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006. obras sobre foucault (em Português) ARAUJO, I. L. Foucault e a crítica do sujeito. 2. ed. Curitiba: Editora da UFPR, 2008. fouCAuLt: um pensAdor dA nossA époCA, pArA A nossA époCA228 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 228 DREYFUS, H.; RABINOW, P. Michel Foucault, uma trajetória filosófica: para além do estruturalismo e da hermenêutica. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 1995. ERIBON, D. Michel Foucault: 1926-1984. Tradução de Hildegard Feist. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1990. MACHADO, R. Ciência e saber: a trajetória da arqueologia de Michel Foucault. Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1988. MUCHAIL, S. T. Foucault, simplesmente: textos reunidos. São Paulo: Loyola, 2004. VEIGA-NETO, A. Foucault & a Educação. Belo Horizonte: Autêntica, 2005. sites de referência www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/Foucault http://users.sfo.com/~rathbone/foucaul10htm 229229 230 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 230 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber poder e Saber1 – O interesse do público por suas obras aumentou consideravelmente no Japão nos últimos anos, pois, em seguida à tradução tão aguardada de As Palavras e as Coisas, saiu Vigiar e Punir, publicada há dois anos, e uma parte de A Vontade de Saber, que acaba de ser traduzida. Entretanto, há no meio intelectual japonês, mitos com relação ao autor que impossibilitam uma leitura objetiva de sua obra. Estes mitos veiculam três imagens falsas de sua personalidade, mas geralmente aceitas como verossímeis. 1 Entrevista com S. Hasumi gravada em Paris em 13 de outubro de 1977, publicada na revista UMI, em dezembro de 1977, p. 240-256. In: FOUCAULT, M. Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 1994. v. 3, p. 399-414. Foucault concedeu inúmeras entrevistas, mais de uma centena, ao longo de toda sua vida. Elas mostram um pensador versátil e brilhante, interessado em divulgar suas ideias, paciente com o entrevistador mesmo quando as questões eram simplórias ou óbvias. Neste diálogo com um professor universitário japonês, Foucault é claro, às vezes até didático ao expor conceitos básicos de seu pensamento, a um público mais geral. Ele explica sua trajetória, como seu interesse pela questão do poder surgiu. No contexto histórico em que as análises marxistas eram predominantes, seu problema é ver a história enquanto concreta, com seus dispositivos de saber e com relações reais de poder. Esse poder não é o mesmo que o da superestrutura econômica sobre todas as relações sociais, mas um poder que, sem negar a força do Estado e de seus aparelhos, conduz a dominação estatal para a menor das relações individuais. Nada se pode contra essas relações de poder, elas não podem ser destruídas, mas se podem criar meios de resistir a elas, de transgredi-las. Há ainda o tema tão comentado do corte epistemológico, que cabe apenas para as ciências de tipo empírico, as ciências que pesquisam a natureza. Outro ponto a destacar é o tema da verdade extraída pela confissão, de História da Sexualidade – A Vontade de Saber, recém publicada (1976). No ano desta entrevista, 1977, Foucault já havia preparado seu curso no Collège de France, Segurança, Território, População, no qual expõe suas ideias sobre a formação do Estado moderno. (N. da T.) 231231 O primeiro mito é o de um Foucault estruturalista, massacrando a história e o homem, sobre o qual lhe falei na entrevista anterior. O segundo é o de um Foucault como homem de método, mito que se espalhou no Japão após a tradução de A Arqueologia do Saber. É devido a esse livro que o acolhemos como uma espécie de criança prodígio da filosofia, que, depois de ter passeado pelo domínio suspeito da literatura, retornava a uma reflexão séria sobre o método. O terceiro mito é o de um Foucault contestador. As pessoas o têm como contestador devido ao fato de o senhor falar da prisão e dos presidiários. Espera-se então, igualmente, que a sua História da Sexualidade seja um livro de contestação... Estes mitos existem também na França? – Eles se espalharam na França, eles se espalharam também nos Estados Unidos. Eu recebi há dois dias um artigo, aliás, muito bem feito, de alguém que retomava sucessivamente meus diferentes livros em ordem cronológica e que os apresentava a meu ver com bastante objetividade, desde a "História da Loucura" até a "História da Sexualidade". A imagem de cada um dos livros não era falsa, mas assim mesmo fiquei completamente pasmo, quando ao fim dessa apresentação o autor dizia: "Assim, vejam vocês, Foucault é um aluno de Lévi-Strauss, é um estruturalista2, e seu método é inteiramente anti-histórico ou a-histórico!" Ora, apresentar a "História da Loucura", apresentar "Nascimento da Clínica", a "História da Sexualidade", "Vigiar e Punir" como livros não históri2 Havia muita controvérsia com relação a Foucault ser ou não um estruturalista. Nas décadas de 50, 60 até meados dos anos 70, o movimento estruturalista na França propõe estudar aspectos universais das culturas e das sociedades, tais como linguagem, mitos, sistemas simbólicos, relações de parentesco, o inconsciente como estruturante do psiquismo. Foucault se interessou por essas ideias, mas nunca seguiu o método proposto por Lévi-Strauss, por Lacan, por R. Barthes. Para estes pensadores estruturalistas, importa chegar às estruturas que revelam os invariantes antropológicos, eles pré-formam as relações que podem ser estudadas com um método científico, aplicável às ciências culturais: conhecer a estrutura é conhecer o que torna inteligível o objeto de investigação do antropólogo, do psicólogo, do linguista. Por isso se diz que o estruturalismo negligenciou o sujeito e a história. Na verdade, trata-se de outro tipo de enfoque, não o de uma história progressiva e dialética (visão marxista da luta de classes como motor da história), mas uma visão de recortes mais longos e que considera importante o dizível, isto é, o que em uma cultura caracteriza certas interrelações de troca culturais, a comunicação simbólica, enfim, relações significantes. E Foucault tem como foco o discurso, as práticas de saber, com uma noção de verdade como relacionada ao saber e ao poder, ele não aborda as estruturas significantes. Seu problema são as lutas, os enfrentamentos, o modo como a verdade sobre o sujeito o sujeita. Questão política, como ele diz, e não linguística e nem estrutural. Ver resposta de Foucault nesta mesma entrevista, logo adiante. (N. da T) 232 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 232 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber cos, eu não compreendo. Eu acrescentaria simplesmente que não houve sequer um comentador, nenhum, que notasse que, em "As Palavras e as Coisas"3, que é tido como meu livro estruturalista, a palavra "estrutura" fosse usada pelo menos uma vez. Se ela é mencionada como citação, não é usada nenhuma vez por mim, nem mesmo o termo "estrutura" ou qualquer das noções que os estruturalistas empregam para definir seu método. É então um preconceito bastante espalhado. O mal entendido está em vias de se dissipar na França, mas diria honestamente que ele tem, apesar de tudo, suas razões de ser, porque muitas coisas que eu fazia não estavam, durante muito tempo, completamente claras para mim mesmo. É verdade eu procurei meu caminho em direções um pouco diferentes. Poder-se-ia, é claro, retraçar uma espécie de fio condutor. Meu primeiro livro era a história da loucura, quer dizer, um problema ao mesmo tempo de história do saber médico, de história das instituições médicas e psiquiátricas. Disso passei a uma análise da medicina em geral, em seguida ao estudo das ciências empíricas como a história natural, a economia política, a gramática. Tudo isso é uma espécie não digo de lógica, mas de progressão, por justaposição; entretanto, sob este desenvolvimento livre, mas apesar de tudo verossímil, havia algo que eu próprio não compreendia muito bem, que era no fundo: qual era a questão, como se diz em francês, que me perseguia. Durante muito tempo acreditei que eu era perseguido por um tipo de análise dos saberes e dos conhecimentos tais como eles podem existir em uma sociedade como a nossa: o que se sabe acerca da loucura, acerca da doença, o que se sabe do mundo, da vida? Ora, creio que esse não era meu problema. Meu verdadeiro problema é aquele que é, aliás, um pro3 Nesta obra o autor mostra o solo de constituição das ciências humanas cujo objeto de análise, o homem, foi constituído não diretamente por elas, mas por mutações na ordem do saber, que remontam ao século 15. Houve a ordem das coisas percebidas no mundo através da analogia, depois as palavras e as coisas se separam na época moderna, por exemplo, o método de ordenação e classificação geral de Descartes e, finalmente, em fins do século 18, se inicia a nossa época em que o homem surge como aquele que vive, trabalha e fala. Essas são as condições para que o homem nasça para o saber, ser percebido pelas ciências da vida, pela economia política como alguém que produz e pelas ciências da linguagem como falante. Tendo nascido para o saber através dessas formas finitas nessa nova disposição na ordem do saber, foi isso que possibilitou o nascimento das ciências humanas. (N. da T) 233233 blema atualmente de todo mundo, o do poder. Eu creio que é preciso se voltar ao que acontecia naquele momento, digamos, em 1955, pois foi por volta de 1955 que eu comecei a trabalhar. No fundo, havia duas grandes heranças históricas no século 20 que não haviam sido assimiladas, e para as quais não tínhamos instrumentos de análise. Estas duas heranças negras eram o fascismo e o stalinismo. Com efeito, o século 19 tinha encontrado como grande problema, o da miséria, o da exploração econômica, o da formação de uma riqueza, a do capital, a partir da miséria daqueles mesmos que a produziam. Este escândalo formidável havia suscitado a reflexão dos economistas, dos historiadores que tinham tentado resolvêlo, justificá-lo como podiam e, no centro de tudo isso estava o marxismo. Eu creio que, no século 20, pelo menos na Europa ocidental – talvez também no Japão – isto é, nos países desenvolvidos industrialmente, não é tanto o problema da miséria que se colocava, e sim o problema do excesso de poder. Tivemos regimes sejam capitalistas, como era o caso do fascismo, sejam regimes socialistas ou que se diziam socialistas, que era o caso do stalinismo, no qual o excesso de poder do aparelho do Estado e da burocracia, mas eu diria também dos indivíduos uns sobre outros, constituía algo absolutamente revoltante, tão revoltante quanto fora a miséria no século 19. Os campos de concentração que havia nesses países foram para o século 20 o que as famosas cidades operárias, o que as famosas barracas que abrigavam trabalhadores, o que a famosa mortalidade dos trabalhadores fora para os contemporâneos de Marx. Ora, nada nestes instrumentos conceptuais e teóricos que tínhamos em nossa cabeça nos permitia apreender bem este problema do poder, pois o século 19, que nos legara tais instrumentos, percebera estes problemas apenas através de esquemas econômicos. O século 19 nos havia prometido que no dia em que os problemas econômicos fossem resolvidos, todos os efeitos de poder suplementar excessivo seriam resolvidos. Por volta de 1955, o problema do poder começava a aparecer claramente. Eu diria que até aí, tinha sido possível considerar – e é justamente o que diziam os marxistas – que se o fascismo e seus excessos de poder tinham se produzido e até, em última análise, se os excessos do stalinismo tinham podido se produzir, era devido a dificuldades econômicas pelas quais havia passado o capitalismo em 1929, que haviam atravessado a 234 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 234 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber União Soviética durante o período de dificuldades dos anos 1920-1940. Ora, em 1956 ocorre algo que eu creio ser de suma importância: o fascismo havia desaparecido em suas formas institucionais na Europa, Stalin estava morto e o stalinismo tendo sido liquidado ou pretensamente liquidado por Krutschev em 1956, os húngaros se revoltam em Budapeste, os russos intervêm e o poder soviético, que, entretanto, não deveria mais ser pressionado pelas urgências econômicas, reagiu como se viu. Na mesma época, tinha-se na França, e isso é muito importante, a guerra da Argélia, da colonização argelina, lidava-se com mecanismos de poder que se fechavam em si mesmos, para além das urgências econômicas fundamentais. Havia necessidade de pensar este problema do poder e havia a falta de instrumentos conceptuais para pensá-lo. Creio que no fundo, de um modo um tanto inconsciente, todas as pessoas de minha geração, e eu sou apenas uma delas, finalmente tentaram apreender esse fenômeno do poder. Agora, eu reconstituirei retrospectivamente o trabalho que fiz fundamentalmente em função dessa questão. Em História da Loucura, do que se tratava? Tentar localizar qual é não tanto o tipo de conhecimento que se pôde formar sobre a doença mental, mas qual tipo de poder que a razão não cessou de querer exercer sobre a loucura desde o século 17 até nossa época. No trabalho que fiz sobre o Nascimento da Clínica foi também esse o problema. Como é que o fenômeno da doença constituiu, para a sociedade, para o Estado, para as instituições do capitalismo em vias de desenvolvimento, uma espécie de desafio ao qual ele teve que responder pelos meios de institucionalização da medicina, dos hospitais? Qual status se deu às doenças? Foi também o que pretendi fazer com relação à prisão. Portanto, toda uma série de análises do poder. Eu diria que As Palavras e as Coisas, sob seu aspecto literário, como se queira, puramente especulativo, é igualmente um pouco sobre isso, a localização de mecanismos de poder no interior dos próprios discursos científicos: a qual regra se é obrigado a obedecer em certa época, quando se quer obter um discurso científico sobre a vida, sobre a história natural, sobre a economia política? Ao que é preciso obedecer, a que restrição se está limitado, e como de um discurso a outro, de um modelo a outro se produzem efeitos de poder? Então, é toda essa ligação do saber e do poder, mas tomando como ponto central os 235235 mecanismos de poder, é isso, no fundo, que constitui o essencial do que pretendi fazer, isto é, isso não tem nada a ver com estruturalismo e que se trata justamente de uma história – bem sucedida ou não, não me cabe julgar, – de uma história dos mecanismos de poder e do modo como eles se entrelaçaram. É certo que eu não tenho, tampouco, aliás, as pessoas de minha geração, instrumentos prontos para construir isso. Eu tento construir a partir de pesquisas empíricas precisas sobre tal ou tal ponto, sobre tal ou tal setor muito preciso. Eu não tenho uma concepção global e geral do poder. Pode ser que venha alguém depois de mim e a construirá. Eu não faço isso. – Então o problema essencial para você desde seu primeiro livro, a História da Loucura, é sempre o problema de poder... – Isso mesmo. – Entretanto você nunca ou muito raramente falou daquilo que se chama luta de classes ou sobre a infraestrutura para abordar esse problema. Então, desde o começo, você viu claramente que a análise de inspiração marxista não funcionava para este tipo de problema. – Tomemos o caso de a História da Loucura, domínio ao qual me referi naquele momento. Duas coisas eram certas: de um lado, os loucos não constituíam uma classe e as pessoas razoáveis não constituíam outra classe. Não se pode superpor à série de enfrentamentos que podem se produzir entre uns e outros a linha que é ocupada pela razão e pela não razão (déraison). É evidente, sem comentários. Ainda é preciso dizer isso4. De outro lado, é certo que a institucionalização de certas formas de práticas como o internamento, a organização dos hospitais psiquiátricos, a diferença que há entre, por exemplo, o internamento em um hospital e os cuidados dados a um cliente em uma clínica, todas essas diferenças não 4 Apesar de Foucault expor suas ideias a esse respeito, ainda não se compreendia bem suas críticas; seu problema não era o das lutas de classe, nem lutas entre ideologias, qual dominava sobre quem, e sim as práticas médicas de internamento, as práticas asilares, o poder do saber médico sobre o louco considerado doente mental, os procedimentos de cura, muitas vezes violentos. (N. da T.) 236 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 236 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber são talvez estranhas à existência de classes no sentido marxista do termo, mas a maneira como este confronto de classes se manifesta nos domínios que eu estudei é extremamente complicada. É através de vários caminhos muito diferentes, bastante entrelaçados, bastante embaralhados que se pode reencontrar o laço efetivo que há entre as relações de classes, as dobras de uma instituição como a do internamento do hospital geral, do hospital psiquiátrico. Simplificando, mais claramente: no centro dos mecanismos de internamento que foram desenvolvidos no século 16, sobretudo no século 17, em toda a Europa, se encontra o problema do desemprego, das pessoas que não conseguem trabalho, que emigram de um país a outro, que circulam através de todo o espaço social. Estas pessoas que foram soltas com o fim das guerras religiosas, e depois com o fim das guerras dos 30 anos, os camponeses empobrecidos, tudo isso constituía uma população flutuante, que preocupava e contra a qual se tentou reagir pela internação geral, sendo que os próprios loucos também foram pegos. Tudo isso é muito complicado, mas não creio que seja fecundo, que seja operacional dizer que a psiquiatria é uma psiquiatria de classe, que a medicina é de classe e que os médicos e os psiquiatras sejam representantes dos interesses de classe. Não se chega a nada quando se faz isso, o que não significa que não se deva recolocar a complexidade desses fenômenos no interior de processos históricos, que são econômicos etc. – Sobre a História da Loucura, eu me lembro que no começo dos anos 60, os pesquisadores japoneses de literatura francesa falavam de seu livro tal como [...] um tipo de estudo monotemático sobre a loucura. Não se previu o alcance que este livro teria dez anos depois. No Japão não se compreendeu exatamente, naquele momento, mesmo tento lido o capítulo sobre o grande internamento, porque era importante. Não se tinha apreendido seu pensamento, sempre dirigido para o mesmo sentido, mas sem ter fixado método algum, o que é essencial em você e que fez com que surgissem tantos mal entendidos. Por exemplo, depois da publicação de A Arqueologia do Saber falou-se muito de método de Foucault, mas, justamente, você nunca fixou método algum... – Não. A Arqueologia do Saber não é um livro metodológico. Não tenho um método que aplicaria do mesmo modo em domínios diferentes. 237237 Pelo contrário, eu diria que é um mesmo campo de objetos, um domínio de objetos que eu tento isolar usando instrumentos que eu encontro ou forjo no momento em que faço a pesquisa, mas sem privilegiar absolutamente o problema do método. Nesta mesma medida é que não sou absolutamente um estruturalista, pois os estruturalistas dos anos 50, 60, tinham por objetivo principal definir um método que fosse, senão universalmente válido, pelo menos geralmente válido para toda uma série de objetos diferentes: a linguagem, os discursos literários, as narrativas míticas, a iconografia, a arquitetura ... Esse não é, de modo algum, meu problema: eu tento fazer aparecer esta espécie de camada, eu ia dizer esta interface como dizem os técnicos modernos, a interface do saber e do poder, da verdade e do poder. É isso, esse é meu problema. Há efeitos de verdade que uma sociedade como a sociedade ocidental, e agora se pode dizer que a sociedade mundial produz a cada instante. Produz-se verdade. Estas produções de verdade não podem ser dissociadas do poder e dos mecanismos de poder, ao mesmo tempo porque estes mecanismos de poder tornam possíveis essas produções de verdade, as induzem; e elas próprias são efeitos de poder que nos ligam, nos conectam. São essas relações de verdade/poder, saber/poder que me preocupam. Então, esta camada de objetos, ou melhor, esta camada de relações, é difícil de ser apreendida; e como não há uma teoria geral para apreendê-las, eu sou, por assim dizer, um empirista cego5, quer dizer que eu estou na pior das situações. Não tenho teoria geral e nem mesmo um instrumento seguro. Eu tateio, eu fabrico como posso os instrumentos que são destinados a fazer surgir objetos. Os objetos são em certa medida determinados pelos instrumentos bons ou ruins que eu fabrico. Eles são fal5 O empirismo é uma corrente filosófica do século 17 para a qual todo conhecimento tem origem na experiência com os fatos, que são percebidos pelas sensações. Kant, mais tarde, dirá que o empirismo, sem os instrumentos da faculdade da razão, sem as formas do entendimento (tempo, espaço, causalidade, substância etc.) é cego. Foucault alude a essa formulação de Kant e afirma que para ele, Foucault, basta trazer para a análise as formações empíricas do saber, os objetos que se encontram dispostos pelas transformações históricas, e o modo como emergem para o saber, em feixes de relações, como acontecimentos. E todo esse material é encontrado nos arquivos históricos, tal como as práticas médicas, os discursos que se materializam em domínios de saber, tal como o da psicopedagogia sobre o comportamento infantil. Todos eles têm efeitos de poder. (N. da T.) 238 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 238 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber sos se meus instrumentos são falsos... Eu tento corrigir meus instrumentos pelos objetos que acredito descobrir e neste exato momento o instrumento corrigido faz aparecer que o objeto que eu tinha definido não era de modo algum aquele, é assim que eu hesito ou titubeio de livro em livro. – O senhor acaba de pronunciar uma expressão muito significativa para definir sua atitude de pesquisa: "empirismo cego". Justamente, acerca de A Arqueologia do Saber, escrevi um artigo em que afirmo: "o mais belo momento nos discursos de M. Foucault é quando ele se encontra em um lugar de não saber e que ele confessa sua impotência face às relações complexas das ideias e dos acontecimentos..." Este lugar de não saber não é uma falta que o desencoraja e sim uma necessidade quase existencial que o impulsiona a pensar e que o incita a estabelecer uma relação criadora para com a linguagem. É esta relação com o pensamento e a linguagem, muito particular, que provoca tanto mal entendido. Normalmente se estabelece de início um método que permite analisar algo desconhecido. O senhor não aceita esta relação conhecido/desconhecido... – Isso mesmo. Quer dizer que em geral ou se tem um método fechado para um objeto que não se conhece, ou o objeto pré-existe, sabese que ele está aqui, mas se considera que ele não foi analisado como deveria e se fabrica um método para analisar este objeto pré-existente já conhecido. Estas são as duas únicas maneiras razoáveis de se conduzir. Eu, de minha parte, me conduzo de um modo totalmente não razoável e pretensioso, fora das fronteiras da modéstia, mas o que é mesmo pretensioso é a presunção, delírio de presunção quase no sentido hegeliano6 de querer falar de um objeto desconhecido com um método não definido. Assim eu assumo, sou desse jeito... – Então, em seu livro sobre a sexualidade ... – Eu gostaria de dizer ainda uma palavra. Depois do que eu disse, poderão me perguntar: "Por que você fala, você tem ou não um fio condutor?" Eu retomo o que dizia há pouco sobre o stalinismo. Há atu6 Hegel (1770-1831) vê a história como realização dos projetos humanos, em direção a um constante aperfeiçoamento por etapas nas quais o espírito se realiza, até culminar no espírito absoluto. É a isso que Foucault chama de "pretensão" e a dele é poder falar acerca de objetos que surgem em dada época conforme os discursos se apropriam deles. Se o objeto a ser analisado é diverso, muda, varia também o modo de analisar. (N. da T.) 239239 almente – e é nisso que a política intervém – em nossas sociedades, certo número de questões, de problemas, de feridas, de inquietudes, de angústias que são o verdadeiro motor da escolha que eu faço e dos alvos que tento analisar, dos objetos que tento analisar e da maneira como eu os analiso. É o que nós somos – os conflitos, as tensões, as angústias que nos atravessam – que são afinal o solo, não ouso dizer sólido, pois por definição ele está minado, ele é perigoso, o solo sobre o qual me desloco. – Aliás, é por isso que o senhor fala do poder quando faz a História da Sexualidade. Mas ali também eu creio que pode haver mal entendido, pois o termo "poder" sempre foi associado e é ainda associado à noção de soberania estatal, enquanto que o senhor procurou definir "poder" em seu livro como não sendo nem uma instituição, nem uma estrutura, nem um poder estatal, mas um lugar estratégico em que se encontram todas as relações de forças do tipo poder/saber. Tenho a impressão de que o senhor falava de algo diferente de poder, que o senhor falava acerca daquilo que chama a verdade, não a verdade que a sociedade atual produz em toda parte, mas a verdade que o senhor deve atingir pela ficção de seu trabalho. Eu me engano, talvez, mas sua definição não se aplica melhor ao que o senhor chama de verdade? – Não, o senhor não se engana. Eu creio que posso dizer a mesma coisa de modo um pouco diferente. Na França se entende também em geral por poder os efeitos de dominação que estão ligados à existência de um Estado e ao funcionamento dos aparelhos de Estado. O poder: imediatamente o que vem à mente das pessoas, é o exército, a polícia, a justiça. Para falar de sexualidade, antes se condenava os adultérios, se condenava os incestos; agora se condenam os homossexuais, os estupradores. Ora, quando se tem essa concepção de poder, creio que as pessoas o localizam somente nos aparelhos de Estado, ao passo que as relações de poder existem; mas isso, apesar de ser conhecido por muitos, nem sempre se tiram as consequências, passa-se por cima disso. As relações de poder existem entre um homem e uma mulher, entre o que sabe e o que não sabe, entre pais e filhos, na família. Na sociedade há milhares, milhares de relações de poder, e, por conseguinte, relações de forças, e assim, pequenos enfrentamentos, micro lutas por assim dizer. Se é verdade que estas pequenas relações de poder são com muita frequência 240 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 240 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber comandadas, induzidas do alto pelos grandes poderes do Estado ou das grandes dominações de classe, ainda é preciso dizer que num sentido inverso uma dominação de classe ou uma estrutura de Estado não podem funcionar bem se não houver na base, estas pequenas relações de poder. O que seria o poder de Estado, aquele que obriga, por exemplo, ao serviço militar, se não houvesse, em torno de cada indivíduo, todo um feixe de relações de poder que o liga a seus pais, a seu patrão, a seu mestre – àquele que sabe, àquele que meteu na sua cabeça tal ou tal ideia? A estrutura do Estado, no que ela tem de geral, de abstrato, e mesmo de violento, não chegaria a reter assim, continuamente e de modo suave, todos os indivíduos, se ela não se enraizasse, se ela não utilizasse, como uma espécie de grande estratégia, todas as pequenas táticas locais e individuais que encerram cada de nós. É um pouco esse fundo de relações de poder que eu gostaria de fazer aparecer. Isso responde a sua pergunta sobre o Estado7. Além disso, gostaria de ressaltar também que estas relações de poder utilizam métodos e técnicas muito, muito diferentes umas das outras, conforme as épocas e conforme os níveis. Por exemplo, a polícia tem, certamente, seus métodos, nós os conhecemos, mas há também outro método, toda uma série de procedimentos pelos quais se exerce o poder do pai sobre os filhos, toda uma série de procedimentos pelos quais, em uma família, se vê tecer relações de poder, dos pais sobre os filhos, mas também dos filhos sobre os pais, do homem sobre a mulher, mas também da mulher sobre o homem, sobre as crianças. Todos eles têm seus métodos e sua própria tecnologia. Enfim, é preciso dizer que não se podem conceber essas relações de poder como uma espécie de dominação brutal com a forma: "Faça isso ou eu te mato!". Não são situações extremas de poder. De fato, as relações de poder são relações de força, de enfrentamentos, então, sempre são reversíveis. Não há relações de poder que sejam completamente triunfantes e cuja dominação seja incontornável. Tem-se dito muito (os críticos me acusam disso) que, 7 O próprio Estado se modifica em função do tipo de governo, de racionalidade governamental, como explica Foucault nos cursos de 1977 a 1978. Para governar, o Estado precisa, na época moderna, de técnicas desenvolvidas pela economia política, ou seja, técnicas que visam o mercado e que exigem, para seu melhor funcionamento, mecanismos de segurança. Ele é muito criticado por não analisar o poder do Estado, o que não é verdade, como se pode constatar nesta resposta. (N. da T.) 241241 para mim, ao pôr o poder em toda parte, eu exclua toda possibilidade de resistência. Mas é o contrário! Eu quero dizer que as relações de poder suscitam necessariamente, chamam a todo instante, abrem a possibilidade de uma resistência, e isso porque há a possibilidade de resistência real, que o poder daquele que domina tenta manter-se com tanta força quanto possível, quanto maior a astúcia, maior a resistência. De modo que é muito mais a luta perpétua e multiforme que eu tento mostrar do que a dominação morna e estável de um aparelho uniformizador. Em todo lugar se está em luta – há a cada instante, a revolta da criança que põe o dedo no nariz à mesa para provocar seus pais, isso, pode-se dizer que é uma rebelião. É toda essa agitação perpétua que eu gostaria de poder mostrar. Eu não sei se respondi exatamente a sua questão. Havia a questão da verdade. Pode-se dizer, com efeito, que por verdade eu não entendo uma norma geral, uma série de proposições8. Eu entendo por verdade o conjunto dos procedimentos que permitem, a cada instante e a cada um, de pronunciar enunciados que serão considerados como verdadeiros. Não há absolutamente nenhuma instância suprema. Há regiões nas quais os efeitos de verdade estão perfeitamente codificados, nas quais os procedimentos pelos quais se pode chegar a enunciar verdades são previamente conhecidos, codificados. São em geral os domínios científicos. No caso das matemáticas, é exatamente assim. No caso das ciências, digamos empíricas é mais flexível. E depois, fora das ciências, se têm também efeitos de verdade que estão ligados ao sistema de informações: quando alguém, um falante no rádio ou na TV, anuncia algo, você pode crer ou não, mas isso passa a funcionar na cabeça de milhares de pessoas como verdade, apenas porque é pronunciado 8 Verdade não depende de lógica, de conhecimento, de um sujeito que pensa algo que corresponde à sua ideia. Seguindo Nietzsche, verdade é produzida, é fabricada em situações históricas, ela não serve para dissipar ideologias. As práticas humanas (médicas, pedagógicas, governamentais, disciplinares) são coordenadas por regimes de verdade, que funcionam em discursos (não entendidos como algo linguístico ou retórico). Através dos discursos se produz um regime de verdade que diz quais práticas valem, funcionam, podem ser consideradas verdadeiras ou falsas. Tais práticas formam um dispositivo de saber/poder. Não há saber que não tenha o poder de pôr sob um regime de verdade tal indivíduo, por exemplo, o que foge da norma, será doente, delinquente, anormal, conforme o regime de verdade foi o médico, o judiciário, o psiquiátrico. (N. da T.) 242 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 242 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber de certo modo, com certo tom, por certa pessoa, em certo momento. Eu não fui o primeiro, longe disso, a pôr a questão do poder de que eu falei ainda há pouco. Houve um grupo de pessoas bem interessantes que o estudaram, e bem antes de 1956. Foram aqueles que, a partir de um ponto de vista marxista tentaram estudar o que eles chamavam de fenômeno burocrático, enfim, a burocratização do Partido. Isso se fez logo após os anos 30 nos círculos trotskistas ou derivados do trotskismo. Fizeram um trabalho considerável. Mostraram várias coisas importantes, mas é absolutamente verdadeiro que a maneira como eu ponho o problema é diferente, pois eu não tento ver qual é a aberração que se produziu nos aparelhos de Estado e que levaram a este suplemento de poder. Eu tento, pelo contrário, ver como, na vida cotidiana, nas relações que são aquelas entre os sexos, nas famílias, entre os doentes mentais e as pessoas razoáveis, entre os doentes e os médicos, enfim, em tudo isso há inflações de poder. Dito de outro modo, a inflação de poder, em uma sociedade como a nossa não tem uma única origem que seria o Estado e a burocracia do Estado. Como há uma inflação perpétua, uma inflação galopante como diriam os economistas, que nasce a cada instante, quase a cada passo, pode-se perguntar: "Mas por que, aqui, eu exerço poder? Não somente com que direito, mas para que serve isso?" Considere-se, por exemplo, o que aconteceu com as doenças mentais. Durante séculos a ideia era que, se eles não fossem isolados, primeiramente isso seria perigoso para a sociedade, em segundo, seria perigoso também para eles mesmos. Ora, hoje se assiste a uma espécie de abertura geral dos hospitais psiquiátricos, não sei no Japão, mas sim na Europa, e se percebe que isso não aumenta de forma alguma a taxa de perigo para as pessoas razoáveis. Certamente, pode-se citar o caso de pessoas que foram liberadas de um hospital psiquiátrico e que mataram alguém, mas considerando as estatísticas, em comparação com o que acontecia antes, isso não ocorre, eu diria que há até menos que à época em que se tentava fechar todos eles e, além das evasões, havia muita gente que nunca foi internado... – Voltando à noção de história, gostaria de saber se o senhor pensa em Gaston Bachelard quando emprega as palavras "corte" ou "ruptura" epistemológicos? 243243 – Em certo sentido, sim. De fato eu parti, aqui também, de uma constatação empírica. Não creio que empreguei o termo ruptura em a História da Loucura. Eu empreguei, certamente, ou noções análogas, em Nascimento da Clínica e em As Palavras e as Coisas porque, com efeito, nestes domínios, que são domínios científicos, e somente neles, se assiste e se assistiu, pelo menos entre o século 16 e o 19, a toda uma quantidade de mudanças bruscas que são da ordem dos fatos de observação. Desafio qualquer um que olhe os livros de medicina, por exemplo, do período que vai de 1750 a 1829, a não ver, em um dado momento e um espaço de tempo, um espaço de tempo extraordinariamente restrito de quinze ou vinte anos, uma mudança, não só nas teorias, não só nos conceitos, não só nas palavras, o vocabulário, mas nos objetos de que se fala – na relação com as coisas – uma mudança que é radical; quando se lê um livro de medicina, de um bom médico dos anos 1820-1830, com seu saber médico de hoje você sabe perfeitamente de que ele falava e isso é uma prova de reconhecimento epistemológico que não engana. Você diz: "Ah! Ele se enganou sobre as causas. Ah! Aqui ele não viu tal ou tal engano. Ah!, aqui, logo em seguida a microbiologia trouxe tal ou tal noção." Mas, você sabe do que ele fala. Quando você lê um livro de medicina, mesmo o de um grande médico anterior aos anos 1750, de cada duas vezes, uma vez você é obrigado a dizer: "Mas de que doença ele fala? O que é isso? A que isso corresponde?" Diante de descrições de epidemias que são muito bem feitas, com muita precisão, que datam do início do século 18, se é obrigado a dizer: "Bem, esta devia ser tal doença, mas não se tem certeza", o que prova que o olhar, a relação com as coisas mudaram. Ainda uma vez, isso se dá sob a forma do corte. Quando você lê a História Natural de Buffon9, você sabe muito bem do que ele fala. Entretanto, a maneira que ele tem de tratar as coisas e de colocar os problemas será inteiramente modificada a partir, grosso modo, de Cuvier, isto é, quarenta anos após, quando com a Anatomia Comparada10 , Cuvier poderá fazer um exame das estruturas, das aproximações, das classificações, das organizações, de tipo diferente. Aqui 9 BUFFON [G. L. LECLERC, conde de. História Natural Geral e Particular, com a descrição do gabinete do Rei. Paris, 1749-1803. 10 CUVIER [G.]. Lições de Anatomia Comparada, Paris, a. 3, 2 v. 244 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 244 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber também, o corte aparece imediatamente. Quando eu falo de corte, não é por que estou fazendo disso um princípio de explicação; pelo contrário, eu tento colocar o problema e tento dizer: tomemos a medida de todas as diferenças, sem tentar escamoteá-las dizendo: "Houve continuidade". Pelo contrário, tomemos a medida de todas as diferenças, somemo-las, sem pôr um preço nas diferenças existentes e procuremos saber o que se passou de uma situação do discurso científico à outra. Mas tudo isso vale para os discursos científicos e é somente com relação a eles que isso se dá. É específico da história do discurso científico ter estas mutações bruscas. Por exemplo, para a História da Sexualidade eu estou no momento olhando todos os textos da pastoral cristã e da direção de consciência no cristianismo: eu lhes asseguro que, desde São Bento, desde São Jerônimo, sobretudo desde os Padres gregos e os monges da Síria e do Egito, até o século 17, há uma continuidade absolutamente extraordinária, notável, com, é claro, tanto acelerações como desacelerações, desestabilizações, como um todo vivo, mas quanto a rupturas, nenhuma. A ruptura não é para mim uma noção fundamental, é, antes, um fato de constatação. Aliás, eu notei que as pessoas que conhecem a literatura científica não ficaram nem um pouco chocadas quando eu falei de ruptura. Um historiador da medicina não nega este corte. – Quando você fala de corte, isso choca os historiadores de inspiração marxista, pois você não fala da Revolução Francesa... – Eles são engraçados... É absolutamente certo que eu não falo a esse respeito quando trato da anatomia comparada; claro, pode-se encontrar certo número de efeitos da Revolução Francesa sobre a carreira de tal ou tal professor no Museu11, ou coisas como essa, mas esse não é o 11 Provavelmente Foucault se refere ao Museu fundado na época da Revolução Francesa que pretendia apresentar a história da nação através de monumentos. Ora, para Foucault interessa outro tipo de história, a dos acontecimentos, a das práticas discursivas que mostram os saberes de uma época como a história natural, a medicina social, a psicopedagogia, por exemplo; e também a das práticas de poder ou as tecnologias de poder, como a das prisões, a dos hospitais psiquiátricos. Enfim, Foucault não esqueceu a história. Mas, para ele, a história tradicional, que é global, passa a contar só quando faz sentido se referir a ela; o que ele faz é outro tipo de história, a das práticas discursivas, as das práticas disciplinares, a da racionalidade dos modos de governar e a das políticas de verdade. (N. da T.) 245245 verdadeiro problema. Em compensação, eu falei da Revolução Francesa, e era obrigado a falar, não teria sentido não falar, quando abordei as instituições psiquiátricas, pois a estrutura do internamento e a instituição do internamento foram inteiramente subvertidas durante a Revolução Francesa. Os historiadores marxistas esquecem sempre de dizer que eu falei da Revolução Francesa quanto a esse tema. Eles esquecem também de dizer que eu falei dela quando abordei a medicina, porque, na medicina, Deus sabe se isso foi importante; a desestruturação das estruturas corporativas do corpo médico no momento mesmo da Revolução, todos os projetos que houve para um tipo de medicina geral, de higiene, medicina da saúde mais que da doença, nos anos 1790-1793, e a importância que tiveram as guerras revolucionárias e napoleônicas para a formação de um novo corpo médico, de tudo isso, eu falei. Infelizmente os marxistas não falam do fato de que falei disso. Em compensação, quando sobre a anatomia patológica eu não menciono a Revolução Francesa – o que me parece mesmo assim uma violação extraordinária do direito das pessoas – se diz: "Ah! Veja, ele nunca fala da Revolução Francesa." – Sobre a História da Sexualidade, o senhor faz uma análise bastante aprofundada sobre o papel da confissão no Ocidente. O senhor acha que, num mundo onde não houvesse esta ciência da sexualidade, a confissão ainda teria um papel? – Teria que se ver. No budismo há procedimentos de confissão que são definidos, codificados de modo bastante rigoroso (de um modo monacal) para os monges. O budismo tem então estruturas de confissão. Ele não a propaga em uma escala tão grande como no Ocidente cristão, no qual todo mundo foi submetido ao procedimento da confissão, no qual todo mundo era instado a confessar seus pecados e milhares de pessoas, centenas de milhões de pessoas foram efetivamente obrigadas a confessar seus pecados. Formalmente, quando se olha as regras do regime monacal budista e as regras da confissão cristã, entre elas há muitas analogias, mas na realidade, isso não funcionou da mesma forma. – A confissão tomou sempre a forma de uma narração em torno da verdade, de um crime ou de um pecado. Isto poderia ter, por conseguinte, relações formais com outras formas de narrativas: por exemplo, narrativas de aventuras, 246 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 246 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber de conquistas etc. Segundo seu modo de ver, haveria uma narrativa específica da confissão na sociedade moderna? – O cristianismo, se não inventou, pelo menos pôs em funcionamento um procedimento de confissão singular na história das civilizações, obrigação que durou séculos e séculos. A partir da Reforma, o discurso da confissão, em vez de ficar restrito ao ritual da penitência, de alguma forma explodiu; ele se tornou um comportamento que poderia ter funções, digamos, simplesmente psicológicas, de conhecer melhor a si mesmo, de ter um melhor domínio sobre si mesmo, de trazer a tona suas próprias tendências, a possibilidade de gerir sua própria vida, que são práticas de exame de consciência que o protestantismo estimulou bastante mesmo fora da penitência e da confissão, e da confissão ao pastor. Vêse também, neste momento, desenvolver-se esta literatura na primeira pessoa, as pessoas têm seu diário, dizem o que fizeram, contam seu dia, prática que se desenvolveu, sobretudo, nos países protestantes, apesar de haver exemplos também em países católicos. Em seguida veio o tipo de literatura no qual a confissão tem crucial importância – A Princesa de Clèves 12, na França, e nessa literatura se conta sob uma forma mal disfarçada, ligeiramente romanesca, suas próprias aventuras. Houve uma formidável difusão do mecanismo da confissão que chega a sessões que se tem na França (suponho que vocês têm algo parecido no Japão), estas sessões de rádio, e que logo chegaram à televisão nas quais as pessoas vêm e dizem: "Bem, eu, veja, não me entendo mais com minha mulher, eu não posso mais fazer amor com ela, eu não tenho mais capacidade de fazer amor, eu ando muito preocupado, o que devo fazer?..." A história da confissão não termina aí, haverá outras peripécias... Tudo isso é um fenômeno muito importante e característico, em sua origem, do Ocidente cristão. No Japão, há atualmente esse fenômeno, mas ele veio do Ocidente. Na civilização japonesa tradicional, não havia esta necessidade de confissões, esta exigência de confissões que foram tão fortemente marcadas pelo cristianismo na alma ocidental. E isso é algo a ser estudado13. 12 LA FAYETT [M.-M. Pioche de La Vergne, condessa de]. A Princesa de Clèves. Paris, 1678. 13 A entrevista termina com comentários sobre o tipo de literatura confessional que surgiu no Japão no início do século 20. Na entrevista seguinte a questão da sexualidade é abordada com mais detalhes. (N. da T.) 247247 O poder, um magnífico animal14 – Como o senhor preparou seu primeiro livro? A partir de quais experiências? – Eu me formei filosoficamente numa atmosfera que era a da fenomenologia e a do existencialismo. Quer dizer, formas de reflexão que estavam ligadas, imediatamente às experiências vividas, eram alimentadas e nutridas por elas. E era no fundo, a elucidação desta experiência vivida o que constituía a filosofia, o discurso filosófico. Ora, sem que eu saiba ainda muito bem por que, se produziu naqueles anos, os anos 50, 60, 70, uma mudança apesar de tudo importante na reflexão teórica, tal como se desenvolvia na França, em particular: uma importância cada vez maior ligada à experiência imediata, vivida, íntima dos indivíduos. Em troca, uma importância crescente dada à relação das coisas entre si, em culturas diferentes das nossas, aos fenômenos históricos, aos fenômenos econômicos. Vejam como Lévi-Strauss foi importante, pelo menos na cultura francesa. Ora, se alguém está longe da experiência vivida, é justamente Lévi-Strauss, cujo objeto era precisamente a cultura o mais estranha possível da nossa. O mesmo com a importância da psicanálise, sobretudo a de tipo lacaniano, na França, que começou nessa mesma época. A que ela se deveu, senão justamente ao fato de que, nesta psicanálise, não era a experiência vivida que importava, não era isso que se tinha que elucidar, mas as estruturas do inconsciente, não da consciência. Então, eu me interessei por razões pessoais, biográficas, por este problema da loucura, e também eu não fiquei tentado em buscar elucidar no interior de minha consciência qual poderia ser a relação que eu tinha com a loucura ou com minha loucura, mas, pelo contrário, eu me apaixonei pelo problema do 14 Entrevista com M. Osorio, publicada em Quadernos para el dialogo, no. 238, Novembro de 1977. In: FOUCAULT, M. Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 1994. v. 3.p. 368-382. Nesta entrevista Foucault expõe o ambiente intelectual francês na época em que começa seus trabalhos; aborda a temática da medicalização, mostra que o capitalismo exige mecanismos disciplinares para que haja governo, como funciona a normalização dos indivíduos na sociedade disciplinar que dispõe de mecanismos de poder diversos daqueles do direito e do poder econômico de dominação de classe. E, finalmente mostra que em História da Sexualidade – A Vontade de Saber (1976), analisou os procedimentos de subjetivação, isto é, através de que regimes de verdade o sujeito pode se autoexaminar (papel da confissão na constituição do dispositivo histórico da sexualidade). 248 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 248 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber estatuto histórico, social, político da loucura em uma sociedade como a nossa. E isso de tal modo que fui imediatamente conduzido a utilizar o material histórico e, em vez de fazer introspecção, análise de mim mesmo, a análise de minha experiência vivida, me lancei de corpo e alma na poeira dos arquivos, tentei encontrar documentos, textos, testemunhos concernentes ao status da loucura. – O senhor fala deste status da loucura no plano político, social, histórico. Como o senhor o percorreu na trajetória de sua pesquisa? – A loucura foi cada vez mais medicalizada15 através de toda a história do Ocidente. Na Idade Média, certamente, se considerava certos indivíduos doentes do espírito ou da cabeça ou do cérebro. Mas era algo absolutamente excepcional. Em geral, o louco, o desviante, o irregular, o que não se comportava ou não falava como todo mundo, não era percebido como um doente. Foi aos poucos que se começou a ligar à medicina o fenômeno da loucura, a considerar que a loucura era uma forma de doença, no limite, que todo indivíduo, mesmo normal, era talvez doente na medida em que poderia ser louco. Essa medicalização é na realidade, um aspecto de um fenômeno mais amplo que é a medicalização geral da existência. Eu diria, muito esquematicamente, que o grande problema das sociedades ocidentais desde a Idade Média até o século 18 tem sido o direito, a lei, a legitimidade, a legalidade, e que com muito custo se conquistou uma sociedade de direito, o direito dos indivíduos, após todas as lutas políticas que sacudiram a Europa até o século 19; e justamente no momento em que se acreditava ou que os revolucionários franceses acreditavam ter atingido uma sociedade de direito, eis que algo ocorreu que eu justamente tento analisar, algo que fez com que entrássemos na sociedade da norma, da saúde, da medicina, da normalização que é nosso modo essencial de funcionamento agora. Veja o que se passa atualmente na justiça penal da maioria dos países europeus. Quando se precisa lidar com um criminoso, a questão é logo saber se ele não é louco, quais são os motivos psicológicos que o 15 Isto é, dominada e percebida apenas sob o enfoque médico, cujo saber significa também um tipo de poder; ao objetivar a loucura o médico, o psiquiatra a põe sob seu domínio. 249249 levaram a cometer seu crime, os problemas que teve na infância, as perturbações de seu meio familiar... Psicologiza-se também as coisas; psicologizá-las quer dizer medicalizá-las. – O senhor fala da medicalização, não somente da loucura. – Sim, e dos indivíduos em geral, da existência em geral. Veja, por exemplo, o que ocorreu com as crianças. No século 18, se começou a se preocupar de modo intenso com a saúde das crianças, e é graças, aliás, a essa preocupação que os níveis de mortalidade infantil se reduziram consideravelmente. A mortalidade infantil era enorme ainda no fim do século 18, mas essa medicalização não parou de aumentar e acelerar, e agora os pais estão com relação aos filhos numa posição que é quase sempre medicalizadora, psicologizante, psiquiatrizante. Diante da menor angústia da criança, a menor raiva ou o menor medo: o que está acontecendo, o que aconteceu, será que foi desmamado cedo, ele está em crise edipiana? Todas as relações são parasitadas pelo pensamento médico, pelo cuidado médico... – O que é o pensamento médico? Em que sentido o senhor utiliza o termo? – Por pensamento médico entendo uma maneira de perceber as coisas que se organiza em torno da norma, isto é, que tenta separar o que é normal do que é anormal, uma separação que não é exatamente a mesma que entre lícito e ilícito; o pensamento jurídico distingue o lícito do ilícito, o pensamento médico distingue o normal do anormal; ele se dá, ele procura também se dar meios de correção que não são exatamente os meios de punição, mas meios de transformação do indivíduo, toda uma tecnologia do comportamento do ser humano que está ligada a isso... – E como se opera a formação de tudo isso no movimento histórico? – Tudo isso está profundamente ligado ao desenvolvimento do capitalismo, quer dizer, não seria possível o capitalismo funcionar com um sistema de poder político que fosse de algum modo indiferente aos indivíduos. O poder político numa sociedade de tipo feudal se caracterizava essencialmente pelo pagamento dos pobres com sua renda ao senhor ou 250 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 250 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber quem já fosse rico, que eles fornecessem também o serviço das armas. Mas o que faziam os indivíduos, não havia tanto essa preocupação, o poder político era em suma indiferente. O que existia aos olhos de um senhor, era sua terra, sua cidade, os habitantes, no limite, as famílias, mas os indivíduos, concretamente, não ficavam sob o olho do poder. Surgiu um momento em que foi preciso que cada um fosse efetivamente visto pelo olho do poder16, para que uma sociedade de tipo capitalista funcionasse, quer dizer, com uma produção tornada a mais intensa possível, a mais eficaz possível; quando houve necessidade, na divisão do trabalho, de pessoas capazes umas de fazer isto, outras aquilo, quando se teve medo também que os movimentos populares de resistência, ou inércia, ou de revolta viessem a subverter toda essa ordem capitalista em vias de nascer, então foi preciso uma vigilância eficaz e concreta sobre todos os indivíduos, e eu creio que a medicalização de que eu falei está ligada a isso. – Como o senhor faz a ligação? – Com a medicalização, a normalização, é possível chegar a uma espécie de hierarquia de indivíduos capazes ou menos capazes, aquele que obedece a certa norma, aquele que desvia dela, aquele que se pode corrigir, aquele que não se pode corrigir, aquele que se pode corrigir com tal meio, aquele no qual é preciso empregar outros meios. Tudo isso, esta espécie de tomada em consideração dos indivíduos em função de sua normalidade que é eu creio, um dos grandes instrumentos de poder na sociedade contemporânea. [...] O senhor disse que a relação que há entre a medicalização e a necessidade de certa eficácia social se estabeleceu no momento do capitalismo. [...] E como de poderia descrever este momento? – É um fenômeno que durou longo tempo, que passou por mil vias diferentes. Ele se encontra, por exemplo, na ordem religiosa antes mesmo da Reforma, quando se começam a desenvolver práticas de devoção, de confissão, de direção de consciência, de exame de consciência, mostram 16 Ver a esse respeito a 3a. parte de Vigiar e Punir, sobretudo o mecanismo panóptico de vigilância completa, permanente e de baixo custo para o poder na sociedade disciplinar. 251251 como a igreja católica se interessa de perto pelos indivíduos e não simplesmente seus pecados, não simplesmente com relação a uma espécie de comportamento legal ou ilegal, não; o que se quer verdadeiramente saber é como isso se passa na cabeça e no coração das pessoas. É um fenômeno que apareceu muito cedo, perto do século 15 e começo do século 16. É a partir desse momento que se vê o Ocidente começar a se preocupar muito com a educação, não somente a educação do clero, mas também a educação das pessoas que serão os futuros mercadores, comerciantes, homens da lei. As crianças são formadas desde cedo. Essa educação que é ainda burguesa se tornará popular em seguida. E mesmo no exército: há estes fenômenos de disciplinarização que aparecem nos séculos 16 e 17. É então um fenômeno múltiplo, que se pode situar de modo geral sob o signo do desenvolvimento do capitalismo, mas de fato, quando se vê as coisas mais de perto, se percebe que é um processo que teve origens múltiplas e que finalmente, pouco a pouco, organizou-se em feixes. – Que se inserem em uma trajetória histórica... – É isso. – O senhor dizia que esta preocupação que se pode chamar da elite da burguesia se tornou uma preocupação popular. – Eu creio que uma das coisas importantes é que justamente todas essas preocupações concernem o corpo, a saúde, a normalidade, primeiro a burguesia se preocupou consigo mesmo, sua descendência, suas crianças, com as pessoas que faziam parte desse grupo, e aos poucos os processos de normalização foram aplicados a outras camadas sociais, em especial o proletariado. [...] Seu trabalho é, sobretudo, de pesquisa histórica e política. O que me diz disso? – A análise política nos últimos cem anos aproximadamente sempre foi comandada seja por teorias econômicas, seja por uma filosofia da história, ou digamos, por edifícios teóricos importantes e um tanto solenes, como o marxismo. Ora, eu creio que a experiência que fizemos nos últimos vinte ou trinta anos, com o stalinismo, por exemplo, e também 252 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 252 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber a China, tornou inutilizável, pelo menos em muitos aspectos, as análises tradicionais do marxismo. Nesta medida, creio que seja preciso não abandonar completamente o marxismo como uma espécie de velho capricho que se poderia ridicularizar, mas sim ser muito menos fiel do que antes se pretendia à teoria em sua literalidade e tentar recolocar as análises políticas que se pode fazer sobre a sociedade atual não tanto no quadro de uma teoria coerente, mas sobre o fundo de uma história real17. Creio que foi o malogro dos grandes sistemas teóricos usados para analisar a política atual que nos remetem agora a uma espécie de empirismo, que talvez não seja tão glorioso, o empirismo dos historiadores. – Como o seu trabalho de historiador se situa com relação a isso? – É essencialmente um trabalho a partir de uma interrogação política, política no sentido amplo: quais são as relações de poder que atuam em uma sociedade como a nossa? Poder da razão sobre a loucura [História da Loucura], poder dos médicos sobre os doentes, que é um livro que escrevi sobra a clínica, poder do aparelho judiciário sobre os delinquentes, poder sobre a sexualidade dos indivíduos... São os alfarrábios que comecei recentemente a publicar. No fundo é a análise das relações de poder em nossa sociedade. – E o que é a relação de poder? – Creio que tradicionalmente se considerava suficiente, para analisar o poder, estudar as formas jurídicas que regiam o que era permitido e o que era proibido. [...] O direito que reparte o permitido e o proibido não é de fato senão um instrumento de poder, em última análise, bastante inadequado, bastante irreal e abstrato. Que, concretamente, as relações de poder são muito mais complexas, e justamente todo isso que é extrajurídico, todas essas restrições extrajurídicas é o que pesa sobre os indivíduos e atravessa o corpo social; é isso que tento analisar. – O que é o extrajurídico? – Tome um exemplo muito simples. Quando um médico psiquia17 Analisar a história em seus aspectos concretos, como ela de fato se dá, e não vê-la através da teoria, ou seja, não impor à realidade dos acontecimentos até a atualidade, a teoria marxista; assim poderemos compreender melhor nossa situação. 253253 tra impõe a um individuo um internamento, um tratamento, um status, quando ele o põe num status que não é mais o do cidadão completo, ele sai do direito, mesmo se alguns dos atos médicos sejam protegidos pelo direito. Inversamente, quando um aparelho judiciário, como um tribunal penal, diante de um criminoso, diz que não sabe o que fazer com ele, quando se dirige a um psiquiatra para lhe pedir uma opinião técnica dizendo se tal indivíduo é normal ou anormal, se sai do direito. A questão do direito é: ele fez mesmo isso, foi ele que fez, há circunstâncias atenuantes, como puni-lo? Só isso. Com a pergunta: ele é normal, anormal, tem impulsos agressivos? Por aí se vê o jurídico que sai do jurídico e penetra no setor médico. São todos esses fenômenos que me interessam. – É isso que o senhor chama de poder. – Sim. Acho que os mecanismos de poder são muito mais amplos que o simples aparelho jurídico, legal, e que o poder se exerce através de procedimentos de dominação que são muitos numerosos. – O senhor disse que há um poder jurídico e um extrajurídico onde se opera também um poder. E a relação de tudo isso seria o poder? – Sim, são as relações de poder. Você sabe, as relações de poder são aquelas que os aparelhos de Estado exercem sobre os indivíduos, mas é também a que o pai de família exerce sobre sua mulher e seus filhos, o poder que o médico exerce, o poder que o notável exerce, é o poder que o patrão exerce nas fábricas sobre os operários. – Se compreendi bem, antes que um poder há relações complexas do poder... – É isso. – Como o senhor concebeu a gênese destes poderes, como eles são difundidos hoje, a partir de que? – Estas relações de poder, apesar de sua complexidade e diversidade, conseguem se organizar em uma espécie de figura global. Poderse-ia dizer que é a dominação da classe burguesa ou de certos elementos dela sobre o corpo social. Mas não acho que isso venha da classe burguesa ou de tais elementos da burguesia que se impõem ao conjunto destas 254 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 254 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber relações de poder. Digamos que ela se aproveita delas, que ela as utiliza, que elas as manobra, que ela tenta intensificar certas dessas relações de poder ou que ela tenta, ao contrário, atenuar outras. Não há, portanto, um lugar único de onde sairiam como por emanação todas essas relações de poder que, afinal, tornam possível a dominação de uma classe sobre a outra, de um grupo sobre outro18. – É uma espécie de lugar onde historicamente se colocou uma classe como a burguesia que, num nível histórico, toma uma espécie de poder desenvolvido em um nível histórico também. – É isso, sim. – Ela se aproveita dele conscientemente e inconscientemente. – Perfeitamente. – O senhor disse que a loucura não era loucura até o momento em que aparece uma sociedade que a cria... – Eu não quero dizer que a loucura não existia. Eu acho que a categoria de doença mental recobrindo um número considerável de indivíduos e de condutas diferentes é algo de relativamente novo. Ainda mais uma vez, os gregos, os romanos, os árabes, as pessoas na Idade Média reconheciam bem que certos indivíduos estavam doentes do cérebro, como eles diziam ou da cabeça ou do espírito, mas eram apenas alguns que a conheciam desse modo. Quanto a todo o resto, se era muito tolerante. Veja, por exemplo, em árabe o uso do termo meznoun: é alguém que é mais ou menos assim, que é talvez um pouco parecido com o diabo; de qualquer modo, não é um doente mental proveniente da intervenção de um médico e de uma empreitada terapêutica. – Agora, se o senhor me permitir, gostaria que falássemos de seu último livro, um grande projeto... gostaria que o senhor me dissesse qual é a concepção do projeto. 18 Em primeiro lugar funcionam na sociedade moderna, múltiplas relações de poder, localizadas em instituições, em práticas, em estratégias governamentais, em discursos; a burguesia pode ou não se utilizar deles em seu proveito e em detrimento de outros grupos ou classes. Sua hegemonia é um efeito das relações de poder e não a causa de uma dominação de classe exclusivamente econômica. 255255 – A concepção do projeto é ao mesmo tempo simples e ao mesmo tempo requer cuidado para explicar. Para dizer a verdade, em francês não temos a palavra, não sei se há em outras línguas, para designar exatamente o que eu gostaria de fazer, aquilo de que gostaria de falar. Eu não quero falar de sexualidade enquanto organização fisiológica do corpo nem mesmo da sexualidade enquanto comportamento. O que me interessa é saber, é fazer a história da maneira como, nos discursos religiosos, científicos, morais, políticos, econômicos também, se colocou a questão da sexualidade, qual forma de interesse se teve pela sexualidade, desde a Idade Média. Pois me parece que, se é verdade que a sexualidade foi fortemente enquadrada pelos sistemas de proibições em nossa sociedade, há também um fenômeno importante sobre o qual talvez não se tenha insistido bastante, que nossas sociedades tiveram um interesse cada vez maior e cada vez mais intenso pela sexualidade. Pouco a pouco se chegou a considerar que era a coisa mais importante para a existência humana. Chegou-se a dizer que se as pessoas compreendessem a sexualidade de um indivíduo, de modo geral, se teria compreendido o essencial do que ele é, do que é sua vida, sua existência, seu destino19. Trata-se então da história do interesse que as sociedades ocidentais tiveram com relação à sexualidade. Eu não tenho a intenção de retraçar essa história nem parcialmente nem inteiramente, eu não pretendo fazer uma história simplesmente completa, eu tomarei apenas certos pontos. Estudarei no próximo volume, a concepção cristã da carne, depois a Idade Média até o século 17, em seguida estudarei a maneira como se problematizou a sexualidade das crianças, depois a das mulheres, depois a dos perversos... [...] – Voltemos a A Vontade de Saber. Há ali coisas que me parecem muito interessantes. A relação que o senhor estabelece entre algo de que se fala de modo muito geral, a relação entre o modo de viver a sexualidade no Oriente com ... – A arte erótica... No Ocidente o interesse que se teve pela sexualidade foi essencialmente ligado ao desejo de constituir sobre ela um 19 Foucault critica nossa época, que põe a sexualidade sob o crivo do conhecimento de alguém que supostamente a decifra; há uma obrigação de dizer, de pôr a sexualidade em discurso de tipo médico, psiquiátrico, psicanalítico, psicológico, sempre científico; só assim o próprio sujeito saberá quem ele é; ou seja, estamos como que submetidos a um dispositivo de sexualidade, que nos sujeita a um tipo de verdade. 256 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 256 fouCAuLt • poder e sAber discurso científico que permite ao mesmo tempo analisá-la, controlá-la, normalizá-la. Ao passo que nas outras sociedades, orientais ou não, aliás, as sociedades não ocidentais, a preocupação com a sexualidade existiu também, mais em geral, me parece, se deu como perspectivas de cultivar a sexualidade, de torná-la o mais intensa possível, de levar o prazer ao máximo, de fazer com que ele servisse à vida espiritual. Parece-se que temos aí dois tipos de relação com a sexualidade. – O que isso produziu em termos da vida cotidiana? – Produz isso: de um lado, tem-se essa valorização geral da sexualidade, essa consciência pela qual cada um de nós é inculcado de que a sexualidade é o problema mais importante para si e que, se ele quiser se conhecer a si mesmo é à sua sexualidade que ele deve interrogar. Isso tem também como consequência que a sexualidade se torna um objeto medicalizável a que todos se referem sempre que têm um problema ou um aborrecimento, ao psiquiatra, ao psicanalista, ao psicólogo, ao sexólogo, ao terapeuta. – Essa vontade de saber, o senhor a define como a busca da autoconsciência... – No Ocidente, a sexualidade foi essencialmente um objeto de saber. Este saber não data de pouco tempo, não foi com Freud que se começou simplesmente a se dizer que o segredo do homem estava em sua sexualidade, antes dele isso foi dito, os psiquiatras e os médicos do século 19 e também o pensamento cristão, a teologia cristã, a pastoral cristã também disseram20. – O senhor diz também em seu livro que esta espécie de vontade de saber é contraditória. – Não, em que sentido? – No sentido de que a partir do século 19, eu creio, há uma super abundância de discurso sobre a sexualidade, mas este discurso somente por contradição se tornou vontade de saber, pois sua primeira vontade era esconder. 20 Sobre estes temas, ver os cursos Os Anormais e O Poder Psiquiátrico. 257257 – Sim, enfim, não estou certo de que tenha sido desde o começo a vontade de esconder, pois de fato, certamente se proibiu certo número de coisas, se proibiu de falar, de mostrar certas coisas, mas, ao mesmo tempo, sempre se procurou saber o que acontecia e como tudo isso se fazia. Veja o que ocorreu Idade Média, nos séculos 16 e no século 17. As regras de decência se tornaram cada vez mais estritas, mas ao mesmo tempo a indiscrição dos confessores se tornou cada vez maior. E se proibia sim que as pessoas dissessem publicamente certas coisas, mas pense nos detalhes que se pedia na confissão e, sobretudo em toda a atenção que as pessoas eram obrigadas a ter com relação ao que se passava em seu coração e em seu corpo. A intensificação dessa relação indica no fundo uma curiosidade profunda por detrás do silêncio que era imposto. – Quais são as perspectivas dessa vontade de saber e quais serão as perspectivas desta vontade de gozar, por assim dizer, da sexualidade não ocidental? – Para as sociedades não ocidentais, eu não poderia dizer nada. Eu creio que essa vontade de saber ocidental produziu fenômenos muito curiosos, pois é esta mesma vontade de saber que fez com que as pessoas tomassem consciência de que sua sexualidade não era livre. Por conseguinte, os movimentos de liberação sexual que se desenvolveram no ocidente nasceram em parte dos próprios mecanismos pelos quais se tentava sujeitar. É aqui que o avanço do poder provoca em contrapartida um movimento de resistência. – Quais são as consequências disso? – Hoje se está numa situação que é relativamente perigosa, no sentido de que um interesse muito forte, demasiado médico pela sexualidade, que arrisca de sujeitar a sexualidade a um poder normalizador. Em troca, eu creio que, nos movimentos de liberação que aconteceram recentemente, que ainda poderão acontecer, há a reivindicação de uma sexualidade livre21... 21 Foucault não está conclamando ao sexo livre e sim a resistir contra a imposição do modelo médico/científico; ele não prescreve nada, apenas faz ver que somos mais livres do que suspeitamos. Antonio grAmsCi: fiLosofiA, históriA e poLítiCA258 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 258 259259 antonio GRAmSCI não foi um filósofo no sentido tradicional do termo, mas foi um político que, no início do século XX, dedicou sua vida a organizar o movimento operário para a revolução socialista na Itália; por esse motivo, enfrentou o fascismo e foi confinado por 11 anos nos cárceres italianos. Gramsci nasceu na Sardenha em 22 de janeiro de 1891 sendo o quarto filho de uma família de sete irmãos. A mãe, mesmo com muitas dificuldades financeiras, sempre cultivou nos filhos o hábito da leitura, tanto que formou uma pequena biblioteca; com 20 anos (1911) Antonio transferiu-se para Turim a fim de cursar a Universidade. A partir de 1916 aderiu ao movimento socialista italiano, tornando-se um político muito ativo; passou a escrever para os jornais operários como o Avanti! e o Grido del Popolo; em 1919 fundou com outros companheiros o jornal L'Ordine Nuovo, que se tornou um dos principais meios de formação dos operários que se organizaram, entre 1919 e 1920, nos Conselhos de Fábrica. Além de militante político, foi um grande crítico literário e suas críticas teatrais eram esperadas com respeito por atores e diretores, principalmente porque, conforme acentua Fiori, sua avaliação era criteriosa e ANTONIO GRAMScI: FILOSOFIA, HIStóRIA e pOLÍtICA Antonio grAmsCi: fiLosofiA, históriA e poLítiCA260 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 260 o "resultado de uma extrema aversão à hipocrisia".1 Seu trabalho inseria-se no debate político da época, marcado pelo embate entre ideologias contrárias que se organizaram na Itália a partir da crise econômica e social iniciada por volta de 1913, crise que teve seu ápice entre 1920-22 e colocou em discussão a estrutura do Estado italiano; desse embate ascenderam dois movimentos radicalmente diversos: o movimento operário, que se organizou nas fábricas e se propunha encaminhar a revolução socialista e o movimento fascista, que se organizou em grupos de reação ao socialismo emergente. Na leitura de Gramsci, com a Guerra Mundial a Itália, exaurida em suas riquezas naturais pela exploração capitalista e empobrecida pela evasão de capital, precisou enfrentar a fome e o desemprego gerados pela guerra; a burguesia enfraquecida e submetida ao jogo econômico e político internacional, não apresentava soluções efetivas; enquanto as classes trabalhadoras se organizavam para resistir à crise e gerar as condições políticas de instauração de uma nova ordem social, instaurou-se um processo reacionário que conseguiu mobilizar a parcela da sociedade que não se identificava com o socialismo e que sofria as consequências da guerra. Nesse contexto, Gramsci participou, em 1921, da fundação do Partido Comunista Italiano, tornando-se um dos principais dirigentes do Partido a partir de 1924; nesse ano também foi eleito deputado, participando do embate político contra o fascismo no Parlamento. No período seguinte (1924-26) a classe operária, já vencida na tentativa revolucionária de 1920, foi derrotada pela repressão oficial e pelo terror fascista que se disseminava pelo país. A crise econômica e política confluiu no golpe de Estado fascista em 1926, com a prisão da maioria dos dirigentes do movimento operário italiano. Confinado inicialmente na ilha de Ustica e, depois, em outros cárceres da Itália, Gramsci passou onze anos na prisão, falecendo em 27 de abril de 1937, aos 46 anos de idade. É importante dizer que Gramsci tinha clareza de sua situação e a enfrentou com coragem, conforme se entende 1 FIORI, G. A Vida de Antonio Gramsci. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1979, p. 147. 261261 da carta que escreveu à sua mãe em 1928: "gostaria que você compreendesse bem, também com o sentimento, que eu sou um preso político e serei um condenado político, que não tenho e nunca terei porque envergonhar-me dessa situação". E acrescenta algo que permite inferir sua coerência e seu caráter: "no fundo, de certo modo fui eu mesmo quem quis a detenção e a condenação, pois nunca pensei em mudar as minhas opiniões, pelas quais estaria disposto a dar a vida".2 Sua obra é extensa: constitui-se de inúmeros artigos escritos em jornais operários entre 1915 e 1926, reunidos em cinco volumes de cerca de 500 páginas cada um, publicados pela Editora Einaudi de Turim. Preso em 1926, Gramsci conseguiu autorização para escrever a partir de 1929 e, até 1935, produziu mais de 2000 páginas, apresentadas em 33 cadernos sendo quatro de traduções. Além desse material, foram publicadas as Cartas do Cárcere, reconhecidas como obra literária com o prêmio Viareggio, dado à primeira edição em 1947. Das cartas afloram tanto a sensibilidade estética quanto a percepção crítica de Gramsci, tanto a clareza dos limites carcerários quanto a coragem de expor sentimentos sem deixar de lado a coerência política. Seus escritos são fragmentados, primeiro porque resultam da militância política junto à classe operária italiana; segundo, porque a prisão em 1926 e as condições carcerárias impossibilitaram o acesso a uma bibliografia específica. O próprio Gramsci acentua que suas notas "precisam ser minuciosamente revistas e controladas" porque podem conter "inexatidões, falsas aproximações, anacronismos". Escritas sem a consulta necessária, acentua o autor, "é possível que depois da revisão devam ser radicalmente corrigidas porque o verdadeiro pode ser exatamente o contrário do que se afirma".3 A clareza do caráter provisório de seus escritos e o fato de admitir a possibilidade de erros, exigindo uma pesquisa mais aprofundada das referências bibliográficas, a qual poderia levar a uma mudança radical nas afirmações, nos convida a um cuidado com a leitura e a interpretação de seus escritos. 2 GRAMSCI, A. Lettere dal Cárcere. (10/05/1928) Torino: Einaudi, 1975, p. 211. 3 GRAMSCI, A. Quaderni del Cárcere. Torino: Einaudi, 1977, p. 1365. Antonio grAmsCi: fiLosofiA, históriA e poLítiCA262 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 262 Por outro lado, um trabalho inacabado pode possuir um grande valor crítico precisamente por não se construir de forma sistemática, porém, abre a possibilidade de múltiplas e variadas interpretações. Outra dificuldade que se coloca à nossa interpretação é o estilo de escrita, que polemiza com autores da época, bem como o fato de seus fragmentos serem contextualizados e trazerem elementos da realidade italiana muitas vezes por nós desconhecidos, isto é, a problemática e o horizonte de discussão delimitam-se por uma determinada situação histórica cujo desconhecimento dificulta a interpretação. Identificar as várias polêmicas que Gramsci enfrenta a cada novo fragmento é fundamental para a compreensão de seu texto. Nos Cadernos do Cárcere encontra-se uma definição de filosofia que pode orientar a leitura: "Tudo é política, também a filosofia ou as filosofias e a única 'filosofia' é a história em ato, isto é, é a própria vida; neste sentido se pode interpretar a tese do proletariado alemão como herdeiro da filosofia clássica alemã".4 Essa interpretação de Marx e da filosofia da práxis, que Gramsci entendia como uma filosofia integral e original, questiona o caráter abstrato da filosofia sistemática e a identifica com a história para acentuar a inovação de um pensamento que supera (e, superando, integra em si os seus elementos vitais) tanto o idealismo quanto o materialismo tradicionais. O histórico designa o movimento de construção da vida no qual a força motriz é o trabalho, cujo desenvolvimento gera os modos de produção e de troca, a divisão da sociedade em classes sociais antagônicas e a luta de classes. O objeto da filosofia se constitui pelos problemas do presente e a história da filosofia só é importante à medida que pode contribuir para identificar como se construíram as relações presentes e quais os problemas deixados sem solução. A filosofia da práxis, além de uma teoria política revolucionária, também se apresenta como um método de abordagem do real, que possibilita entender que fazemos parte de um conjunto de estruturas que se articulam, muitas vezes de modo contraditório, gerando as condições materiais de existência, novas formas de vida e de 4 Ibidem, p. 886. 263263 modos de pensar que se produzem e reproduzem continuamente. O percurso aqui proposto a partir da seleção de artigos inéditos visa a esclarecer os limites da democracia liberal e da representação política no contexto de uma sociedade de classes, bem como a explicitação de conceitos como história, liberdade e cultura. Os artigos aqui apresentados foram publicados em três jornais operários: o Il Grido del Popolo um artigo de 1915, o Avanti!, artigos publicados entre 1916 e 1920, e o L'Ordine Nuovo, artigos apresentados em 1919 e 1921. Foram escolhidos artigos que podem sugerir reflexões filosóficas, embora todos eles tenham sido publicados com objetivo político de formação das classes trabalhadoras, tanto que, embora escritos como breves notas produzidas na urgência da publicação, delineiam uma estratégia educativa na repetição do argumento. O primeiro, intitulado A indiferença, aborda um tema que é bastante atual e retorna nos Cadernos do Cárcere na consideração dos processos de padronização dos comportamentos e do modo de pensar na sociedade moderna, que tomaram outras proporções nos tempos atuais a partir do desenvolvimento tecnológico aplicado aos meios de comunicação. De certo modo, serve para refletir sobre a pretensa neutralidade política do pensamento moderno e o compromisso de todos com a vida da sociedade, mesmo quando o indivíduo se isenta de toda ação política. Pode-se abrir o debate sobre os limites da representação política no contexto da democracia burguesa, ou ainda sobre a falta de transparência política ou de mecanismos efetivos de participação dos indivíduos. O artigo A História confronta dois conceitos de filosofia: o metafísico, com o argumento na segunda pessoa do plural, e o histórico, que identifica filosofia e história, expresso na primeira pessoa do plural. Gramsci antecipa um tema que aprofundou nos Cadernos do Cárcere e que se apresenta na defesa do historicismo. A este se segue o artigo intitulado Cadáveres e idiotas que, a partir de uma análise filológica, que não deixa de ser irônica, contrapõe o pensamento autônomo à atitude dogmática, isto é, recoloca em discussão as duas concepções de filosofia apresentadas no escrito anterior. A defesa da autonomia como o exercício da diferença torna o texto bastante atual. A crítica ao elitismo dos intelectuais retorna Antonio grAmsCi: fiLosofiA, históriA e poLítiCA264 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 264 nos Cadernos do Cárcere. O artigo Rabiscos refere-se a uma situação comum para as esquerdas italianas já antes do fascismo: a censura num Estado cujas raízes não foram populares, mas mantiveram antigas relações de autoridade e dominação. Foi escrito em 1917 e mostra ao público as dificuldades que enfrentavam os jornalistas para publicar suas opiniões. Já O progresso no índice de ruas da cidade confronta a vida comunitária medieval com a vida urbana moderna para mostrar como esta destrói os elementos culturais da vida coletiva para instaurar em seu lugar o modo de vida burguês. Filantropia, boa vontade e organização é um artigo que defende a necessidade de a classe trabalhadora organizar-se em associações de cultura, mas não nos moldes das instituições burguesas de filantropia contrapondo, assim, dois conceitos de cultura. A ideia de filantropia é retomada nos Cadernos do Cárcere na análise das atividades do Rotary Club. O artigo A sua Herança publicado em 1918, reflete sobre a noção de liberdade e seus limites no contexto da sociedade capitalista, na qual a liberdade é determinada pela propriedade privada. Como o artigo anterior, acentua a necessidade de as classes trabalhadoras criarem as condições de vida coletiva a partir da organização em instituições políticas e culturais. Os jornais e os operários mostra que toda imprensa expressa algum interesse econômico ou político e que a escolha de um jornal é também ela um momento da luta de classes. Pode-se abrir um debate e esclarecer a partir do texto a questão da ideologia. O artigo seguinte intitulado A luz que se apagou é um artigo que faz uma homenagem ao mestre, identificado em Renato Serra, professor morto na guerra. A experiência do rapaz que não sabia os 84 artigos da Constituição foi vivida pelo próprio Gramsci, como ele esclarece nas Cartas do Cárcere. As duas Crônicas de L'Ordine Nuovo são como editoriais que apresentavam o conteúdo do jornal e foram selecionadas aqui porque explicitam a noção de cultura e permitem constatar que, por meio do Jornal, Gramsci pretendia possibilitar aos trabalhadores o acesso ao conhecimento historicamente produzido, a fim de ser reinterpretado de acordo com suas necessidades culturais e de organização política. O jornal L'Ordine 265265 Nuovo poderia instaurar, assim, as bases da nova escola socialista. Em linhas gerais, os textos permitem debater conceitos como: história, filosofia, liberdade, cultura, ideologia, organização política e educação. Seguem-se as traduções selecionadas, apresentadas por ordem cronológica e de título de Jornal: Avanti!, Il Grido del Popolo e L'Ordine Nuovo. No final de cada artigo, apresentam-se os dados da primeira publicação (nome do jornal e data) e, em seguida, os dados da publicação italiana na qual se encontra o artigo aqui traduzido. Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de gramsci traduzidas Para o Português GRAMSCI, A. Escritos políticos. Lisboa: Seara Nova, l976. 4 v. Antologia de artigos escritos até l926, incluindo alguns temas da Questão Meridional e a situação italiana e as tarefas do PCI. GRAMSCI, A. Obras Escolhidas. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1978. GRAMSCI, A.; BORDIGA, A. Conselhos de Fábrica. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981. Texto produzido com o título: Dibattito sui Consigli di Fabbrica. GRAMSCI, A. Concepção Dialética da História. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. GRAMSCI, A. Maquiavel: a política e o Estado Moderno. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. GRAMSCI, A. Os intelectuais e a Organização da Cultura. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. GRAMSCI, A. Literatura e Vida Nacional. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. GRAMSCI, A. Cartas do Cárcere. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1978. GRAMSCI, A. Novas Cartas de Gramsci: e algumas cartas de Piero Sraffa. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987. GRAMSCI, A. A Questão Meridional. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1987. GRAMSCI, A. Cadernos do Cárcere. Tradução de Carlos Nelson Coutinho, Marco Aurélio Nogueira e Luiz Sérgio Henriques. 2. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001. 5 v. Antonio grAmsCi: fiLosofiA, históriA e poLítiCA266 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 266 GRAMSCI, A. Escritos Políticos. Edição de Carlos Nelson Coutinho. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2004. v. 1 e 2. obras sobre gramsci (em Português) BADALONI, N. (ed.) Gramsci e a América Latina. Organizado por Carlos N. Coutinho e Marco Aurélio Nogueira. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, l988. COUTINHO, C. N. A Democracia como valor Universal. São Paulo: Ciências Humanas, 1980. COUTINHO, C. N. Gramsci. Porto Alegre: L & PM, 1981. DEBRUM, M. Gramsci: filosofia, política e bom senso. São Paulo: Editora da Unicamp, 2001. DEL ROIO, M. Os Prismas de Gramsci. São Paulo: Xamã, 2005. DIAS, E. F. Gramsci em Turim: a construção do conceito de hegemonia. São Paulo: Xamã, 2000. DIAS, E. F. Política Brasileira: embate de projetos hegemônicos. São Paulo: J. L. R. Sundermann, 2006. NOSELLA, P. A Escola de Gramsci. Porto Alegre: Artes Médicas Sul, l992. NOSELLA, P. A Escola de Gramsci. 3. ed. São Paulo: Cortez, 2004. RAGAZZINI, D. Teoria da Personalidade na sociedade de massa: a contribuição de Gramsci. São Paulo: Autores Associados, 2005. RUIZ, E. A. Freud no "divã" do cárcere: Gramsci analisa a psicanálise. Campinas : Autores Associados, 1998. SANTOS, J. A. O Princípio da hegemonia em Gramsci. Lisboa: Vega, 1987. SCHLESENER, A. H. Hegemonia e Cultura: Gramsci. 3. ed. Curitiba: Ed. da UFPR, 2007. SCHLESENER, A. H. Revolução e Cultura em Gramsci. Curitiba: Ed. da UFPR, 2001. SCHLESENER, A. H. Antonio Gramsci e a política italiana: Pensamento, polêmicas, interpretação. Curitiba: UTP, 2005. SCHLESENER, A. H. A Escola de Leonardo: Política e educação nos escritos de Gramsci. Brasília: Liberlivro, 2009. 267267 SECCO, L. Gramsci e o Brasil: recepção e difusão de suas ideias. São Paulo: Cortez, 2002. SEMERARO, G. Gramsci e a sociedade Civil. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1999. SIMIONATTO, I. Gramsci: sua teoria, incidência no Brasil, influência no Serviço Social. São Paulo: Cortez, 1995. sites de referência http://www.acessa.com/gramsci/# http://www.artnet.com.br/gramsci/textos.htm http://www.fondazionegramsci.org/settantesimo_ag_conv.htm http://www.fondazionegramsci.org/ http://www.gramscitorino.it/hp.asp http://www.iger.org/pubblicazioni-d-19.html http://www.victoryiscertain.com/gramsci/ http://www.theory.org.uk/ctr-gram.htm#bibl http://www.gramscitoscano.org/public/cms 268 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 268 grAmsci: A indiFerençA A INDIFeReNçA 1 É certamente a mola mais forte da história, mas ao contrário. Aquilo que acontece, o mal que se abate sobre todos, o possível bem que um ato de valor geral pode criar, não se deve completamente à iniciativa dos poucos que agem, quanto à indiferença, ao desinteresse de muitos. O que acontece não acontece tanto porque alguns querem que aconteça quanto porque a massa dos cidadãos abdica de sua vontade e deixa fazer, deixa agrupar os nós que depois somente a espada poderá cortar, deixa subir ao poder os homens que depois somente uma rebelião pode modificar. A fatalidade que parece dominar a história é precisamente a aparência ilusória dessa indiferença, desse desinteresse. Os fatos amadurecem na sombra porque mãos não vigiadas por controle algum tecem a teia da vida coletiva e a massa ignora. Os destinos de uma época são manipulados conforme visões restritas e objetivos imediatos de pequenos grupos ativos e a massa dos cidadãos ignora. Mas os fatos que amadureceram acabam por aflorar; a teia tecida na sombra chega a se cumprir e, então, parece que é a fatalidade a arrastar tudo e todos, parece que a história não é mais que um enorme fenômeno natural, uma erupção, um terremoto do qual todos restam vítimas, quem quis e quem não quis, quem sabia e quem não sabia, quem foi ativo e quem foi indiferente. E este último se irrita, gostaria de subtrair-se às consequências, gostaria que se 1 GRAMSCI, A. Sotto la Mole (1916-1920). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 228-229. 269269 tornasse claro que ele não o quis e que não é responsável. Alguns choramingam piedosamente, outros blasfemam obscenamente, mas nenhum, ou poucos, se perguntam: se também eu tivesse feito o meu dever de homem, se tivesse procurado fazer valer a minha voz, a minha opinião, a minha vontade, teria acontecido o que aconteceu? Nenhum, ou poucos, fazem uma autocrítica da sua indiferença, do seu ceticismo, de não haver dado o seu apoio moral e material àqueles grupos políticos e econômicos que, precisamente para evitar esse mal, combatiam (com o objetivo) de conquistar o bem que se propunham. Os indiferentes, ao invés, preferem falar de falência das ideias, dos programas definitivamente desmoronados e outros gracejos semelhantes. Continuam na sua indiferença, no seu ceticismo. Amanhã recomeçarão na sua vida de absenteísmo de toda responsabilidade direta ou indireta. E não se pode dizer que não vejam claro nas coisas, que não sejam capazes de apresentar belíssimas soluções para problemas mais atualmente urgentes ou para os que requerem mais ampla preparação e mais tempo e são igualmente urgentes. Mas estas soluções permanecem belissimamente infecundas, pois esta contribuição à vida coletiva não é movida por alguma luz moral, é consequência de uma curiosidade intelectual, não de pungente sentido de responsabilidade histórica, que requer toda atividade na vida, na ação e não admite agnosticismos e indiferenças de nenhum gênero. É necessário, por isso, educar esta nova sensibilidade, é preciso terminar com as lamúrias inconcludentes dos eternos inocentes. É necessário pedir contas a cada um de como desenvolveu a tarefa que a vida lhe atribuiu e lhe atribui cotidianamente, daquilo que fez e, especialmente, daquilo que não fez. É necessário que a corrente social não pese somente sobre poucos, mas que cada coisa que aconteça não pareça devida ao acaso, à fatalidade, mas seja obra inteligente dos homens. E para isso é necessário que desapareçam os indiferentes, os céticos, aqueles que usufruem do pouco bem que a atividade de poucos alcança e não querem tomar a si a responsabilidade do muito mal que a sua ausência da luta deixa preparar e acontecer. ( "Avanti!", 26/08/1916) 270 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 270 grAmsCi • A históriA A HISTÓRIA 2 Deem à vida toda a vossa atividade, toda a vossa fé, todo o abandono sincero e desinteressado das vossas melhores energias. Criaturas vivas, mergulhem no vivo e palpitante devir humano, até vos sentirem em uníssono com ele, até recebê-lo todo em vós próprios e sentir a vossa personalidade átomo de um corpo, vibrante partícula de um todo, corda sonora que recebe e reecoa todas as sinfonias da história que assim, sentis de contribuir a criar. Apesar desse abandono completo à realidade ambiente, este vincular o vosso individual ao jogo complicado de causas e efeitos universais, sentis ao improviso o significado de alguma coisa que vos falta, necessidades vagas e dificilmente determináveis, aquelas necessidades que Schopenhauer chamava metafísicas. Estais no mundo, mas não sabeis por quê. Atuais, mas não sabeis por quê. Sentis o vazio e desejaríeis justificações ao vosso ser, ao vosso agir e vos parece que as razões humanas não vos bastam, que refazendo o caminho de causa em causa chegais a um ponto que, para coordenar e regular o movimento, há necessidade de uma razão suprema, fora do conhecido e do conhecível, para ser explicada. Precisamente como alguém que, olhando o céu e reconstruindo de degrau em degrau o espaço que a ciência mensurou, sente sempre maior dificuldade no seu fantástico 2 GRAMSCI, A. Sotto la Mole (1916-1920). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 230-231. 271271 vagabundear no infinito, chega ao vazio e não pode conceber este vazio absoluto e, então, inconscientemente o povoa de criaturas divinas, de entidades sobrenaturais que coordenam o movimento vertiginoso e, logicamente, o universo. O sentimento religioso é todo fundado no princípio material dessas aspirações vagas, dessas racionalizações instintivas e interiores sem saída. E em todos permanece no sangue algum rastro, algum frêmito, também àqueles que mais fortemente conseguiram dominar essas manifestações inferiores, porque instintivas, impulsivas, do próprio eu. Mas é a própria vida que o vence, é a atividade histórica que o cancela. Produzidos pela tradição, depósitos instintivos de épocas milenares de terror e de ignorância da realidade circundante, procura-se descobrir a sua origem. Explicá-las quer dizer, superá-las. Torná-las objeto de história quer dizer reconhecer a sua vacuidade. E, então, retorna-se à vida ativa, sente-se mais plasticamente a realidade da história. Reconduzindo à história não somente o fato, mas também o sentimento, termina-se por reconhecer que somente nela está a explicação de nossa existência. Tudo o que é historicizável não pode ser sobrenatural, não pode ser resíduo de uma revelação divina. Se alguma coisa é ainda inexplicável, isso se deve unicamente à nossa incompletude cognoscitiva, à ainda não alcançada perfeição intelectual. E isto pode nos tornar mais humildes, mais modestos, sem jogar-nos nos braços da religião. A nossa religião volta a ser a história, a nossa fé volta a ser o homem e a sua vontade e atividade. Sentimos este enorme e irresistível impulso que nos vem do passado, no bem que nos prenuncia, dando-nos a enérgica segurança de que aquilo que foi possível o será ainda e com maior probabilidade, visto que nos tornamos mais experientes pelas experiências dos outros. E a sentimos no mal, nesses resíduos inorgânicos de estados de espírito superados. Assim é que nos sentimos inevitavelmente em antítese ao catolicismo e nos chamamos modernos. Porque sentimos que o passado vivifica a nossa luta, mas domado, servo e não patrão, iluminador e não obscurecedor. ("Avanti!", 29/08/1916) 272 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 272 grAmsCi • CAdáveres e idiotAs CADÁVeReS e IDIOtAS 3 É voz corrente – e é certamente um gracejo malicioso, mas um gracejo significativo – que a Seção turinense do partido tenha estabelecido, nos dias passados, não admitir, de agora em diante, sócios que tenham superado nos seus estudos a terceira elementar. O "Corriere della Sera" se diverte em entrecruzar com esta citação as frases espirituosas habituais que agradam tanto aos seus leitores, até quando são repetidas pela centésima vez. Socialistas: idiotas e nefandos; socialistas: proletários da inteligência; socialistas: protozoários que se revoltam contra as espécies superiores dos mamíferos; socialismo: manuais contra intelectuais; socialismo: analfabetos de todo o mundo uni-vos, perinde ac idiotus (como um só idiota, tradução para uso dos nossos sócios). Pesemos as palavras. Idiota: palavra nobilíssima de origem grega. Idiota significa, antes de tudo, soldado raso, soldado que não tem nenhum galão. Significa em seguida: quem pensa com a própria cabeça, quem é si próprio, quem ainda não está submetido à disciplina social vigente. Quando esta falta de disciplina à ordenação social torna-se uma culpa, a palavra começa a assumir um significado ofensivo. Mas em si e por si não encerra nenhuma ofensa. Tem um significado social, não individual. Idiota é quem é diferente, quem pensa e fala diversamente da maioria. Idiotismo é a palavra ou o modo de dizer próprio de uma região e não usado na língua literária ou nacional. Idiota, enfim, corresponde a refratário, pelo que diz respeito às relações sociais. Nefando: palavra igualmente 3 GRAMSCI, A. Sotto la Mole. Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 281-282. 273273 nobre, de origem latina. Significa: quem fala como a divindade proibiu de falar, quem faz afirmações proibidas pela lei. Duas palavras que adquiriram um valor verdadeiramente democrático do ponto de vista social. Duas palavras que adquiriram valor ofensivo quando a sociedade, a lei, a disciplina social, fundavam-se no princípio divino, sobre uma concepção mística do destino que preside o acontecimento dos fatos humanos. Idiotas e nefandos eram, portanto aqueles que não acreditavam na eficácia taumatúrgica das frases feitas, do "Deus disse", do "a Pátria quer", do "as leis imperscrutáveis que guiam a humanidade o dizem" etc. e, portanto, agiam e falavam com a própria cabeça, sem dúvida errando às vezes, mas prontos a reconhecer o erro e a corrigi-lo, contentes se conseguiam atingir um fim ainda que minúsculo, conquanto que, mesmo na sua pequenez, fosse alcançado com seus próprios meios, fosse filho de suas ações e não da sua excessiva obediência à vontade dos outros. Idiotas e nefandos: palavras clássicas que expressam a independência de um pequeno grupo ante a coletividade, de um indivíduo em relação ao ambiente no qual vive. Que se contrapõem ao cadáver dos jesuítas, ao "creio, conquanto seja absurdo, pelo contrário, exatamente porque absurdo", ao ipse dixit (disse... e basta, tradução para os nossos sócios) e a todas as outras fórmulas da submissão redil à verdade revelada, à lei, à voz de Deus, ao Estado, disciplina mística para a realização da vontade de Deus sobre a terra. Intelectuais, sim, quando intelectual quer dizer inteligente, e não tirano pela graça do título dos estudos; seguir os intelectuais, sim, quando seguí-los quer dizer encontrar neles maior clareza, logicamente mais construídos aqueles conceitos e aquelas verdades que cada um sente em si, ainda que indistintos. Mas não se quer sacrificar a inteligência ao intelecto, a inteligência e a liberdade próprias ao intelecto dos outros. Quando se provar que não ter títulos de estudos quer dizer ser estúpidos, que não ser conformadamente escravos quer dizer ser delinquentes, então nos cobriremos os cabelos de cinzas e bateremos o peito. Até agora estamos persuadidos que estúpidos e cretinos são somente aqueles que dão às palavras aquele significado que elas teriam se se referissem a eles próprios. Nós somos mais clássicos que vocês, e nos encontramos bem. (Cadaveri e idioti, 17/01/1917) 274 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 274 grAmsCi • rAbisCos RABIScOS 4 Uma vez, duas vezes, três vezes... Escreves e riscam, escreves e riscam... Molhas a caneta, a mão abandonada a meia altura, titubeante. O cérebro manietado não transmite à mão, aos dedos, o impulso para se moverem. A mão desce sobre o papel e a ponta de aço passeia sobre a brancura descrevendo complicadíssimos rabiscos, labirintos sem saída. Procura-se fatigosamente a saída. O pensamento aguça-se na angústia, choca-se contra as paredes para ver se elas se abrem numa passagem possível. Começa-se. Apaga-se. Recomeça-se. A expressão flui, o trabalho de aglutinação das frases e dos períodos repousa, afrouxa o esforço inicial. Convencemo-nos de ter encontrado o equilíbrio necessário entre as necessidades da própria sinceridade e as agressões irracionais da censura. Aguardamos vacilantes. Claro, vacilantes, porque amamos tudo o que nos exigiu um esforço para nascer, para exteriorizar-se. Sentimos as mesmas impressões de outrora, diante dos professores, com esta diferença: com os professores estávamos convencidos de estar diante de indivíduos absolutamente superiores que tinham verdadeiramente a capacidade de julgar nossos esforços, os nossos méritos. Agora sentimos, pelo contrário, a incapacidade absoluta, o despreparo absoluto em quem, 4 GRAMSCI, A. Sotto la Mole (1916-1920). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 340-342. 275275 armado de lápis, como então, julga e ordena. Mas há uma igualdade entre uns e outros, sentimos que uma igualdade existe. Encontramo-nos agora, como então, diante de italianos, de velhos italianos (ainda quando jovens em idade), que não dão nenhuma importância aos outros, ao trabalho, ao esforço dos outros, à personalidade moral dos outros. Detentores, por um momento, de um poder (embora pequeno), querem deixar um vestígio dele, um vestígio o maior possível. O velho italiano não está habituado à liberdade: e não se fala de liberdade com L maiúsculo, abstração ideológica, mas da pequena, concreta liberdade, que se exprime no respeito aos outros, ao trabalho, aos esforços, à personalidade e às necessidades morais dos outros; que vence as pequenas, exasperantes, inúteis irritações; que impõe a quem tem o poder (mesmo que seja um pequeno poder) o ato de evitar até a aparência de uma injustiça, de um abuso. Que tem confiança nas boas energias dos homens e não ceifa um campo de trigo para destruir quatro papoulas e meia dúzia de tenras hastes de joio. Que acredita, antes, natural que assim seja, que ao trigo se misture joio e papoulas, porque uma vida coletiva só é saudável quando há luta, atrito, choque de sentimentos e paixões, e só na luta se revelam os fortes, os indispensáveis, os homens de fé e de ação, que tapam a boca à crítica agindo fortemente. Mas o velho italiano não compreende um poder sem repressões: se na Itália houvesse a pena de morte e ninguém sofresse esta sanção, o carrasco, para não estar sem fazer nada, tornarse-ia mandatário de assassínio e de estupros, para poder trabalhar os seus cúmplices. Assim como acontece em muitos vilarejos da Itália meridional, onde os guardas rurais danificam, eles próprios, a propriedade privada, para fazer sentir que são indispensáveis. Assim também o censor, para fazer sentir quanto é fatigante e árduo o seu ofício, apaga, anula, risca tudo, tudo, tudo, trigo e papoulas, trabalho e tédio, bem e mal. E a caneta continua a traçar rabiscos, esperando, porque sente que esta barbárie (a confusão nos critérios, o arbítrio e o abuso são barbáries), se esgotará na própria raiva. ("Avanti!", 14/11/1917) 276 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 276 grAmsCi • o progresso no índiCe de ruAs dA CidAde O pROGReSSO NO ÍNDICe De RuAS 5 dA cIdAdE 6 A comissão municipal para a denominação das ruas colocou-se no caminho do progresso. Armados de enciclopédia e de machados procedem à demolição da velha Turim. Caem os velhos nomes, os nomes tradicionais da Turim popular, que recordam a vida fervilhante da antiga cidade medieval, a fantasia exuberante e original dos artesãos do Renascimento, menos enciclopédicos e mais práticos e de bom gosto que os mercadores hodiernos. Substituem-se os nomes medalha. O índice de ruas torna-se um medalheiro. Toda a pacotilha de baixa erudição se transfere para as ruas. Os nomes são sons inertes que não despertam alguma imagem de vida, que tombam no fundo da consciência material, morta, que não ligam ao passado e rompem, com um ato violentamente ilógico, os elos tradicionais entre o homem e a rua. O índice de ruas se torna um museu, um cemitério de ilustres desconhecidos, pobre ossuário mofo e embranquecido pelo oportuno esquecimento, porque melhor se distingue quem verdadeiramente agiu na história. A burguesia comerciante não sabe substituir nada de original à intensa vida espiritual do passado. A sua vida é medalha e decoração; estímulo e enciclopédia; mé5 Stradario é a lista alfabética dos nomes das ruas e praças de uma cidade, traduzido aqui por índice de ruas. 6 GRAMSCI, A. Sotto la Mole (1916-1920). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 318-319. 277277 todo, o igualamento e o nivelamento dos valores. A cidade dos artesãos era toda impregnada de vida artesanal, em todos os seus aspectos, em todas as suas manifestações e, por isso, também no nome das ruas. Cada nome era um pedaço de vida, era a recordação de um momento de vida coletiva. Os caminhos eram como um patrimônio comum de lembranças, de afetos, que uniam mais estreitamente os indivíduos com os vínculos da solidariedade da recordação. A burguesia comerciante destruiu esse patrimônio, sem conseguir substituí-lo por algo igualmente vivo. A adulação solene ou a vaidade vazia tomaram o lugar da fantasia recriadora. Todos os príncipes, reinantes, ministros e generais da casa de Savoia tiveram o seu nicho, foram impostos à atenção dos cidadãos, cuja recordação desejaria preencher de sujeitos mais dignos. A enciclopédia forneceu o resto. A cidade burguesa é Cosmópolis, isto é, uma falsa internacional, uma falsa universalidade: confusão de valores, reino do indistinto, caos desordenado e anti-histórico. Michele Lessona é distinto e genial como Leonardo da Vinci. Elvio Pertinace parece mais digno de memória que a arte dos Carroceiros; um imbecil qualquer da história romana parece mais representativo de uma forma de vida social que transformou a história. Desaparecem as ruas popularíssimas de Zecca, do Hospital, do Depósito, dos Carroceiros, dos Bairros, (substituídos) por nomes desconhecidos da convencionalidade monumento-maníaca ou para recordar Quinto Agrícola ou Elvio Pertinace. O grotesco da cultura comerciante sufoca as pulsações que sobreviveram da vida do passado. O burguês comerciante armado de machados e dicionários prossegue nos caminhos do progresso. A Cosmópolis incolor e sem sabor triunfa. ("Avanti!", Il progresso nello stradario, 01/06/1917) 278 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 278 grAmsCi • fiLAntropiA, boA vontAde e orgAnizAção FILANtROpIA, BOA VONtADe e ORGANIZAçãO 7 Esta resposta ao artigo do Humilíssimo Entre a cultura e a ignorância8 pretende ser uma exemplificação prática de um dos maiores objetivos que a proposta de uma associação de cultura deveria apresentar. O Humilíssimo é um organizador. Penso que como tal ele deveria ter critérios exatos e precisos sobre organização. Ele, mais que qualquer outro militante no movimento socialista, porque se é verdade que o conceito de organização é central no pensamento socialista, é também verdade que a profissão, a atividade específica, leva consigo uma maior soma de responsabilidade. Digo isso porque o Humilíssimo escreve e se exprime como poderia fazê-lo um "desorganizado". Ou seja, não consegue transportar para uma outra atividade os conceitos que compõe a sua atividade específica. Nem se preocupa em refletir se as suas objeções podem voltar-se sobre sua atividade. Nem se preocupa em refletir se os organizados de sua federação, refletindo sobre o que ele escreveu, generalizem aquilo que ele escreveu e dissolvam a organização porque a fábrica basta para 7 GRAMSCI, A. Scritti Giovanil (l9l4-l9l8).Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 145-147. 8 Artigo publicado no Jornal "Avanti!" em 20/12/1917, que se declarava contrário à criação de uma Associação Socialista de Cultura com objetivos e limites de classe, não entendendo a difusão da cultura como útil ao movimento. 279279 criar a alma proletária, assim como a possibilidade de comprar livros e revistas basta a quem deseja tornar-se "culto"; porque a sociedade capitalista suscita naturalmente a luta de classes, assim como naturalmente desperta o pensamento de classe e o embate dos dois pensamentos, das duas idealidades. Mas pela sua atividade o Humilíssimo persuadiu-se que a fábrica não basta e que a solidariedade de classe, para que ativamente se manifeste e se afirme vitoriosa, deve organizar-se, disciplinar-se, limitar-se. Ele se convenceu que a natureza e a necessidade só é tal enquanto se transforma, por meio do pensamento, em consciência exata dos fins e dos meios e, por isso, divulga que é necessário criar órgãos específicos de luta econômica que elaborem a necessidade, que a purifiquem de toda intromissão sentimental e particularista e formem os "proletários" em sentido socialista. Por que não transporta esses conceitos para a atividade cultural? Porque ao Humilíssimo, como a muitos em nosso beato país, falta o hábito de generalização, de síntese, que é, todavia, necessário se se quer homens completos e não homens de caso a caso, do te vejo e não te vejo, do amanhã sim e hoje não, do mas, do se etc. O Humilíssimo tem um conceito de cultura que é, também ele, impreciso. Ele acredita: cultura é igual saber um pouco de tudo, isto é, igual Universidade Popular.9 Eu dou à cultura o seguinte significado: exercício do pensamento, aquisição de ideias gerais, hábito de conectar causa e efeito. Para mim, todos já são cultos porque todos pensam, todos conectam causas e efeitos. Mas o são empiricamente, primordialmente, não organicamente. Portanto, oscilam, dispersam-se, abrandam-se ou se tornam violentos, intolerantes, briguentos, ao sabor dos acasos e das contingências. Para que se entenda melhor, tenho um conceito socrático de cultura: creio que seja um pensar bem, qualquer coisa que se pense e, portanto, executar bem, qualquer coisa que se faça. E, assim como sei que a cultura é, também ela, um conceito básico do socialismo, porque integra e con9 A Universidade Popular foi uma experiência criada pelo Partido Socialista e criticada por Gramsci porque não propunha um novo modelo de Universidade, mas repetia as práticas e a estrutura da Universidade em geral. 280 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 280 grAmsCi • fiLAntropiA, boA vontAde e orgAnizAção cretiza o vago conceito de liberdade de pensamento, assim gostaria que ele fosse vivificado por outro, pelo conceito de organização. Organizamos a cultura assim como procuramos organizar toda atividade prática. Os burgueses filantropicamente pensaram em oferecer ao proletariado a Universidade Popular. Contraponhamos a solidariedade e a organização à filantropia. Damos os meios à boa vontade, sem os quais a boa vontade permanece sempre estéril e infecunda. Não é a conferência que nos deve importar, mas o trabalho miúdo de discussão e de investigação dos problemas, da qual todos participam, todos dão uma contribuição e na qual todos são simultaneamente mestres e discípulos. Naturalmente, para que seja organização e não um amontoado de pessoas, ela deve expressar uma necessidade. Tal necessidade é difundida ou é de poucos? Começam os poucos: nada é mais pedagogicamente eficaz que o exemplo ativo a revelar aos outros as necessidades e a fazêlos senti-las pungentemente. Poder-se-á dispensar o buffet para os poucos e amanhã se poderá dispensá-lo para muitos. A cultura entendida no sentido humanístico é também ela uma joia e satisfaz por si mesma. Os círculos, os grupos, não podem bastar: apresentam necessidades práticas, são tomados também eles no redemoinho da atualidade. E, depois, existe uma outra razão: além da deficiência da faculdade generalizadora, muitos italianos tem uma outra deficiência, que é fruto histórico da ausência de qualquer tradição de vida democrática em nosso país; não conseguem ocupar-se no mesmo local de mais atividades: a maioria são homens de uma só atividade. O afastamento exterior das organizações servirá para melhor desenvolver as faculdades particulares para uma síntese mais ampla e perfeita. E os problemas a discutir não faltarão, dado ainda que os problemas não devem tanto importar em si e por si quanto pelo modo como venham a ser tratados. Mas disso se poderá falar se entre os companheiros a proposição tiver verdadeiramente despertado um eco ou se a proclamada necessidade de associação não seja mais que uma veleidade de qualquer um. ("Avanti!", 24/12/1917) 281281 A SuA HeRANçA 10 A sociedade contemporânea: um mercado rumoroso, de homens em delírio; no centro do mercado, um carrossel que gira em turbilhão, impetuosamente. Cada um dos presentes deseja saltar na garupa de um luzente e bem arreado cavalinho, de uma sereia de olhos lânguidos; querem acomodar-se nas macias almofadas de uma carruagem. É um precipitar-se desordenado e caótico da multidão em tumulto, uma obscena acrobacia das artes simiescas. Dez mil caem por terra depois de terem quebrado os membros, um em dez mil atravessa, ergue-se sobre estes inúmeros corpos, separa o salto adequado e voa no turbilhão infernal. Você quer participar da competição. Você também tem probabilidade de sorte. Chegar significa tornar-se rico, ser senhor da vida, conquistar a própria liberdade. Aqui está: a liberdade. Detenhamo-nos. Certamente a riqueza não é um fim; se se torna fim chama-se avidez (avareza). É meio para um fim: a liberdade. Um vintém que você possua, é um vintém de liberdade à sua disposição, é um vintém de livre escolha. A propriedade é a garantia de que esta liberdade será contínua. A propriedade de uma parte de riqueza (instrumento de trabalho) é a possibilidade de ampliar ainda mais o domínio da liberdade pessoal. O direito de herança é a garantia de que 10 GRAMSCI, A. Scritti Giovanili (l9l4-l9l8). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 214-217. 282 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 282 grAmsCi • A suA herAnçA a sua liberdade pessoal será também de seus filhos, dos seus entes queridos. Uma vez que o seu fim não é um fato material circunscrito, uma vez que você não é um ávido de bem estar mecânico, mas de liberdade, resulta que o seu objetivo não é individual, mas é a imortalidade. Você sente que os seus filhos o continuarão como você continua seus pais e quer ver garantida a liberdade do seu espírito imortal. Esta imortalidade é admitida pelos leigos e filósofos: ela é precisamente chamada de Espírito pelos filósofos e vem a coincidir com a História, porque inteiramente humana, porque nada tem a dividir com o espírito (alma) transcendente, ultraterreno, das religiões. É pura atividade: você é ativo, trabalha, participa da imortalidade do trabalho, mas quer ver exteriormente esta perenidade do seu eu: você a procura nos seus descendentes, nas garantias de liberdade que lhes assegura. Todos os homens têm esta aspiração, todos os homens querem tornar-se proprietários de liberdade, de liberdade garantida, de liberdade transmissível. Se ela é o sumo bem, é natural que dela se procure fazer participantes os próprios entes queridos, é natural que se aceite o sacrifício para criar esta liberdade, ainda que certos de não aproveitá-la para si próprios, só para assegurá-la aos entes queridos. A preocupação torna-se, em alguns casos, tão pungente a ponto de impelir ao delito, à perversão e ao suicídio. Mães se prostituem para juntar um pecúlio de liberdade aos filhos; pais se matam com a aparência de desgraça, para que os filhos usufruam prontamente o seguro da liberdade. A liberdade é somente um privilégio: eis porque se manifestam estas perversões. A sociedade é um mercado: a sorte é um jogo. A maioria deve necessariamente fracassar na feroz competição. A maioria é, pois, não-espírito, não participa da imortalidade da história? Existe a imortalidade sem a continuidade exterior? Certamente não. Existindo, transforma o mundo; suscita, pois, formas exteriores. Então, também você, que não é rico, que não é um capitalista, que não garante à sua imortalidade nenhuma continuação exterior de liberdade, herda e deixa uma herança. De outra forma, você não seria homem, não seria espírito, não seria História. É necessário que você tenha consci283283 ência desta verdade, que aprofunde em si esta consciência e a transmita aos outros. Ela é a sua força, é a chave do seu destino e do destino dos seus entes queridos. A propriedade é a relação jurídica existente entre um cidadão e um bem. Ela é, portanto, um valor social, inteiramente contingente; é garantida por todos, que a garantem somente enquanto esperam, cada um singularmente, chegar a gozá-la. Os poucos são livres na posse dos bens, e transmitem esta liberdade a outros poucos, porque os muitos esperam, tem a pretensão de serem livres, não tem a vontade. A vontade é adequação dos meios ao fim, portanto é especialmente procura de meios apropriados. O privilégio da liberdade subsiste porque a sociedade é um mercado, porque é uma desordem perene. A esperança que você tem de saltar imediatamente na garupa de um cavalinho do carrossel o faz elemento da desordem, da eterna feira: você é uma rodelinha da máquina infernal que faz rodar o carrossel; se você falhar na disputa você será a causa do seu fracasso, se você se quebra os ossos, você é um suicida. De elemento de desordem você deve se tornar um elemento de ordem. Ao ser imediatamente (vaga esperança, mínima probabilidade), você deve preferir a certeza, ainda que não imediata, a certeza para os seus filhos. O fim permanece idêntico, os meios para alcançá-lo são os únicos meios apropriados à sua disposição: a associação, a organização. Se a propriedade é somente um valor social, o simples fato de que existe um organismo-força que se propõe torná-la bem comum, garantia de liberdade para todos, a transforma e a torna aleatória enquanto privilégio, isto é, já a diminui em prol da coletividade e faz participar dela, já agora, a coletividade. Esta diminuição, esta participação potencial é uma herança que você transmite. Claro que é mais evidente e mais palpável a herança dos capitalistas; mas, se você refletir, também a sua não é coisa negligenciável. Você também tem uma herança: os seus ascendentes, que fizeram a revolução contra o feudalismo, lhe deixaram em herança o direito à 284 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 284 grAmsCi • A suA herAnçA vida (você não pode ser morto arbitrariamente: parece-lhe pouca coisa?), a liberdade individual (para o encarcerarem você deve ser julgado culpado de um crime), o direito de locomoção para trabalhar em uma terra antes que em outra, à sua escolha, conforme a sua utilidade. Você usufrui de uma herança mais recente: a liberdade de fazer greve, a liberdade de associar-se com outros para discutir os seus interesses imediatos e para propor-se, em comunhão com outros, o fim maior de sua vida: a liberdade para si ou, ao menos, para seus descendentes. Parecem-lhe pequenas essas heranças? Elas têm diminuído notavelmente o privilégio dos poucos. Por que você não se propõe a ampliálas e, consequentemente, diminuir ainda mais o privilégio? Essas heranças são o fruto do trabalho de muitos, não somente do seu pai, avô ou bisavô. São fruto inconsciente, por isso, pequeno. Torne-se você consciente, difunda a sua consciência: que herança superior àquelas do passado você não transmitirá ao futuro? Que certeza mais concreta de liberdade para os seus filhos, para a imortalidade do seu espírito? Ao invés de uma propriedade individual, preocupe-se em deixar maiores possibilidades para o advento da propriedade coletiva, da liberdade para todos, porque todos são iguais diante do trabalho, do instrumento de trabalho. Esta sua herança tem, também ela, uma forma exterior: a associação. Quanto mais forte é a associação, tanto mais próxima está a hora de bater à porta da História. Quem o fará? Você próprio, talvez, pela sua participação. Trabalhe como se o fim fosse imediato, mas não descuide, por isso, de criar meios mais potentes, no caso de não ser imediato; sacrifique-se, porque você pensa em seus filhos, em seus entes queridos. Reforce as associações que tenham esse fim: libertar a coletividade, dando-lhe a propriedade da riqueza. A associação econômica lhe garante a cobrança cotidiana dos benefícios produzidos pela herança que lhe deixaram seus pobres antepassados; reforce-a com a sua adesão; desta forma, você aumentará a herança de seus filhos. A associação política, o Partido socialista, é órgão de educação, de elevação; por ele você sentirá a coletividade; você se despojará de seus egoísmos pessoais, aprenderá a trabalhar desinteressadamente pelo fu285285 turo que é de todos, portanto também seu e dos seus. Por ele você acrescentará o seu sacrifício e o seu trabalho ao dos outros, multiplicando o seu valor pelo valor do sacrifício comum. A Associação de cultura o tornará mais digno de sua tarefa social, o educará a pensar bem, melhorará o seu espírito: por ela você participará do patrimônio do pensamento, das experiências espirituais, da inteligência, da beleza do passado e do presente. Divulgue esta pequena verdade: na sociedade atual, que é mercado, que é jogo, todos singularmente podem tornar-se ricos (livres), mas necessariamente, somente poucos o alcançam; a busca da propriedade, da herança individual, há um que consegue, para dez mil fracassados. Por outro lado, os dez mil não fracassarão na procura da herança social; que se associem, que de elementos de desordem tornem-se elemento de ordem e terão se aproximado de dez mil probabilidades a obtenção do próprio fim. Enquanto isso faça o seu dever: dê a sua parte de atividade, de espiritualidade, ao patrimônio social comum atual; trabalhe para que seja transmitido, melhorado e ampliado aos seus descendentes; cuide de sua herança, cuide da única herança que você tem certeza de poder deixar. ("Avanti!", La tua eredità, 01/05/1918) 286 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 286 grAmsCi • os jornAis e os operários OS JORNAIS e OS OpeRÁRIOS 11 É a época da publicidade para as assinaturas. Os diretores e os administradores dos jornais burgueses arrumam as suas vitrines, passam uma mão de verniz sobre seu título e chamam a atenção do passante (isto é, do leitor) para a sua mercadoria. A mercadoria é aquela folha de quatro ou seis páginas que todas as manhãs ou todas as tardes vai injetar no espírito do leitor os modos de sentir e de julgar os fatos da atualidade política que mais convém aos produtores e vendedores de papel impresso. Estamos dispostos a discorrer, com os operários especialmente, sobre a importância e a gravidade desse ato aparentemente tão inocente que consiste em escolher o jornal que se pretende assinar. É uma escolha cheia de insídias e de perigos que deveria ser feita com consciência, com critério e depois de amadurecida reflexão. Antes de tudo, o operário deve negar decididamente qualquer solidariedade com o jornal burguês. Deveria recordar-se sempre, sempre, sempre, que o jornal burguês (qualquer que seja a sua cor) é um instrumento de luta movido por ideias e interesses que estão em contraste com os seus. Tudo o que publica é constantemente influenciado por uma ideia: servir a classe dominante, o que se traduz sem dúvida num fato, combater a classe trabalhadora. E, de fato, da primeira à última linha, o jornal burguês sente e revela essa preocupação. Mas o belo, isto é o pior está em que: ao invés de pedir 11 GRAMSCI, A. Scritti Giovanili (l9l4-l9l8). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 53-55. 287287 dinheiro à classe burguesa para ser mantido na obra de defesa exposta em seu favor, o jornal burguês consegue fazer-se pagar... pela própria classe trabalhadora que ele combate sempre. E a classe trabalhadora paga, pontualmente, generosamente. Centenas de milhares de operários contribuem regularmente todos os dias com o seu dinheiro para o jornal burguês, contribuindo assim para aumentar a sua potência. Por que? Se perguntarem ao primeiro operário que encontrarem no trem ou na rua com a folha burguesa desdobrada à sua frente, ouvirão esta resposta: "Porque tenho necessidade de saber o que há de novo." E sequer lhe passa pela cabeça que as notícias e os ingredientes com os quais são cozidas podem ser expostos com uma arte que dirija o seu pensamento e influa no seu espírito em determinado sentido. E, no entanto, ele sabe que tal jornal é conservador, que outro é interesseiro, que o terceiro, o quarto e o quinto estão ligados a grupos políticos que têm interesses diametralmente opostos aos seus. Todos os dias, pois, sucede a esse mesmo operário poder constatar pessoalmente que os jornais burgueses apresentam os fatos, mesmo os mais simples, de modo a favorecer a classe burguesa e a política burguesa em prejuízo da política e da classe operária. Irrompe uma greve? Para o jornal burguês os operários nunca têm razão. Acontece uma manifestação? Os manifestantes, apenas porque são operários, são sempre turbulentos, facciosos, malfeitores... O governo aprova uma lei? É sempre boa, útil e justa mesmo se... é o contrário. Desenvolve-se uma campanha eleitoral, política ou administrativa? Os melhores candidatos e programas são sempre os dos partidos burgueses. E não falemos de todos os fatos em que o jornal burguês ou cala, ou deturpa, ou falsifica para enganar, iludir e manter na ignorância o público dos trabalhadores. Apesar disso, a aquiescência culpável do operário em relação ao jornal burguês é sem limites. É necessário reagir contra ela e despertar o operário para a exata avaliação da realidade. É preciso dizer e repetir que aquela moeda atirada distraidamente para a mão do vendedor ambulante é um projétil oferecido ao jornal burguês que o arremessará depois, no momento oportuno, contra a massa operária. 288 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 288 grAmsCi • os jornAis e os operários Se os operários se persuadissem desta verdade elementar aprenderiam a boicotar a imprensa burguesa com aquela mesma coesão e disciplina com a qual a burguesia boicota os jornais dos operários, isto é, a imprensa socialista. Não contribuam com dinheiro para a imprensa burguesa que é vossa adversária: eis qual deve ser o nosso grito de guerra neste momento, que é caracterizado pela campanha de assinaturas feita por todos os jornais burgueses. Boicotem, boicotem, boicotem! ("Avanti!", 22/12/1916) 289289 A LuZ Que Se ApAGOu 12 Recordo um pobre rapaz que não pôde frequentar os cultos bancos das escolas de sua cidade por ser doente e se preparou sozinho para o exame, ai de mim que modesto, de liberação de uma obrigação moral. Mas quando, insignificante, se apresentou ao mestre, ao representante da ciência oficial, para lhe entregar o pedido sublinhado, para impressionar, na mais bela caligrafia; aquele, olhando através de seus óculos científicos, perguntou carrancudo: "Sim, está bem, mas acreditas que seja assim fácil o exame? Conheces, por exemplo, os 84 artigos da Constituição?" E o pobre rapaz, esmagado por aquela pergunta, se pôs a tremer, chorando desconsoladamente voltou para casa e naquele momento não quis fazer o exame. Por que me aparece na memória esta anedota no momento em que gostaria de recordar para os leitores do "Grido" a figura de Renato Serra?13 Porque muitos mestres me parece são como aquele que recordei acima e, a eles, Serra deu uma lição de humanidade; nisso ele verdadeiramente continuou Francesco De sanctis, o maior crítico que a Europa jamais teve. Pensem naquilo que na Idade Média representa o movimento 12 GRAMSCI, A. Scritti Giovanili (l9l4-l9l8). Torino: Einaudi, 1975. p. 10-12. 13 Morto a 2o de julho de 1915. 290 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 290 grAmsCi • A Luz que se ApAgou franciscano diante do teologismo doutrinário da Escolástica. A teologia era pão dos anjos, não dos míseros mortais; e não apenas tinha invadido todas as manifestações religiosas, mas também a pregação ao povo: Deus desaparecia por trás dos silogismos, resplandecia distante ou pesava sobre as consciências como alguma coisa de gigantesco, de esmagador. O intelecto havia matado o sentimento, a reflexão cuidadosa tinha estrangulado o ímpeto da fé. Veio São Francisco, alma humilde, descuidada, Espírito simples, soprou todos os invólucros de papel, pergaminhos que haviam distanciado Deus dos homens e fez renascer em cada alma a divina embriaguez. Assim fizeram De Sanctis e Serra com a poesia. A poesia tinha se tornado privativa dos professores: Dante, por exemplo, foi aquele que superou os limites humanos ou os seus livros se apresentavam circundados de tramas rígidas de espinhos eruditos e de sentinelas que gritavam o "quem vem lá?" a cada profano que ousasse aproximarse muito; assim se formou na maioria a convicção que Dante seja como uma torre impenetrável aos não iniciados. De Sanctis não é desses: não pergunta a um que tem a boa vontade se conhece os 84 artigos da Constituição, ao contrário, se vê uma face mirrada, se vê um humilde voltar atrás quase espantado de tanto ousar o aproxima, diria que quase o toma pelo braço, com uma expressão toda napolitana, o guia e lhe diz: "Veja, aquilo que acreditavas difícil não o é ou não vale a pena ser lido; salte estes obstáculos, deixe que outros maxilares se façam sangrar as gengivas a roer esses cardos". Renato Serra mostra que os professores, os críticos de profissão, tomaram por arte aquilo que era pura e simples tapeçaria. Esses dois homens foram verdadeiramente mestres, como entendiam os gregos, isto é, mistagogos14, que iniciaram aos mistérios mostrando que esses mistérios são construções vazias dos literatos e que tudo é claro e límpido para quem tem os olhos puros e vê a luz como cor e não como vibração de ions e elétrons. Tais mestres são colaboradores da poesia, leitores da poesia. Cada um de seus ensaios é uma nova luz que se acende para nós. Sentimos-nos como absorvidos em um encanto. O mundo que nos circunda não chega mais aos nossos sentidos, não os estimula a reagir. Não existe outra obra de arte que esta: nós e o mestre que nos 14 Na Grécia antiga, eram os sacerdotes encarregados de dar a instrução preliminar aos que deviam ser iniciados aos ritos dos mistérios. 291291 guia. A nossa humanidade está toda tensa ao belo e somente a este sente. A tomada de posse é rápida, imediata. É um homem que se aproxima de um outro homem e o sente reviver em si como tal e depois como criador de beleza. A palavra não é mais elemento gramatical a dividir em regras e em esquemas livrescos; é um som, é uma nota de um período musical que se solta, se recupera, se amplia em leves espirais, árias que nos conquistam o espírito e o fazem vibrar em uníssono com o espírito do autor. As imagens vivem uma vida própria, estimulam as nossas faculdades criativas, agitam todo o mundo das nossas experiências, despertam ecos distantes de coisas passadas que se renovam e se afirmam vigorosas no ato de nossa leitura. Nós vibramos em todas as fibras do nosso ser, nos sentimos purificados por esta fusão com um outro ser que nos sacudiu e nos fez participar de sua vida, que nos deu a ilusão de sermos nós os criadores daquelas harmonias, tanto que as sentimos nossas e sentimos que jamais cessarão de fazer parte do nosso espírito. Depois de uma dessas lições nos sentimos cansados, quase saciados de beleza. Mas o mago nos retoma nas suas redes. Um seu novo escrito nos renova e nos libera de qualquer recordação do passado, nos reconduz puros a uma outra nascente e se repete em nós, já espertos, a nova experiência. O nosso gosto se refina e parece que os nossos nervos se aguçam para colher também as mínimas vibrações. Sentimos que também sozinhos, sem o mestre, podemos aproximar-nos da obra de arte com mais frescor, com mais sinceridade. Quantos véus caídos, quantos ídolos quebrados, quantos valores invertidos. Verdades que antes não conseguíamos compreender agora, sem nos apercebermos, nos sobem espontaneamente aos lábios. Recordamos os ensinamentos de Leonardo aos seus discípulos: "que observassem também as manchas e os mofos dos muros porque neles poderia haver combinações de cores e de luz mais perfeitas do que aquelas que o próprio homem pode criar" e nos parece dizer coisas que antes não ouvíamos. Cessa a nossa adoração pelas obras engenhosas, arquitetonicamente complexas, e cuidamos mais às ligações sonoras que existem entre palavra e palavra, entre período e período. A exclamação de um carroceiro reveste-se então, para nós, de tanta poesia quanto um verso de Dante. Não caímos no exagero ridículo 292 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 292 grAmsCi • A Luz que se ApAgou de afirmar que o carroceiro é tão poeta quanto Dante, mas estamos contentes em sentir em nós a possibilidade de ouvir a beleza onde quer que ela esteja e sentir-nos liberados das proibições e preconceitos escolásticos que nos faziam medir a poesia a metro cúbico e a quilogramas de papel impresso. Mas agora não podemos esperar mais nada de Renato Serra. A guerra o esmagou, a guerra sobre a qual ele havia escrito com palavras tão puras, com conceitos tão ricos de visões novas e de sensações novas. Uma nova humanidade vibrava nele; era o homem novo dos nossos tempos, que tanto ainda teria podido dizer-nos e ensinar-nos. Mas a sua luz se apagou e nós não vemos ainda quem, para nós, poderá substituí-la. (La luce che si è spenta, 20/11/1915) 293293 cRÔNIcAS dE L'ORDINe NuOVO IX 15 Iniciamos neste número a publicação de um breve estudo do companheiro Aldo Oberdorfer, de Trieste, sobre Leonardo da Vinci, escrito por ocasião do quarto centenário vinciano, que acontece este ano. Estamos certos que os nossos leitores e amigos não se admirarão deste fato, que não representa uma exceção ao nosso programa, mas a realização de uma parte do mesmo, que desde o princípio estava clara em nossas intenções. Em outras ocasiões já havíamos acentuado o modo como acreditamos que um jornal deveria ser elaborado, principalmente uma resenha de cultura comunista. Um jornal deve tender a tornar-se, nos seus limites, uma coisa completa: se não consegue satisfazer todas as necessidades intelectuais do núcleo de homens que não somente o leem, mas o mantém com o seu consenso e vivem à sua volta e lhe comunicam um pouco de sua vida, deve procurar que nas suas páginas todos encontrem aquilo que lhes interessa e apaixona, aquilo que os libera do peso do trabalho cotidiano, da luta econômica, da discussão política. O jornal deveria ao menos incitar a um desenvolvimento completo das próprias faculdades 15 GRAMSCI, A. L'Ordine Nuovo (l9l9-l920).Torino: Einaudi, l975. p. 451453. 294 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 294 grAmsCi • CrôniCAs de L'ordine nuovo iX mentais, a uma vida mais elevada e completa, mais rica de motivos ideais e de harmonia, o estímulo ao enriquecimento da própria personalidade. Por que não podemos começar, com nossas modestas forças, em meio àquele grupo de jovens que nos seguem com confiança e com expectativa, a obra que será da escola, da nossa escola de amanhã? Porque a escola socialista, quando surgir, surgirá necessariamente como uma escola completa, tenderá a abraçar imediatamente todos os ramos do saber humano. Esta será uma necessidade prática e uma exigência ideal. Já existem agora operários, aos quais a luta de classes deu um significado novo de dignidade e de liberdade que, quando leem os cantos dos poetas ou ouvem os nomes dos artistas e dos pensadores, se perguntam com mágoa: "Por que a escola não ensinou essas coisas também a nós?" Mas se consolem: a escola, como se apresentou nos últimos dez anos, como é feita agora pela classe dirigente, não ensina mais nada a ninguém, ou bem pouco. A tarefa educativa tende agora a realizar-se por outros caminhos, livremente, por meio de associações espontâneas de homens motivados pelo desejo comum de melhorarem a si mesmos. Por que um jornal não poderia tornar-se o centro de um desses grupos? Também neste campo o Estado dos burgueses está por falir. De suas mãos enrugadas pelo único esforço de acumular riquezas, a chama da ciência caiu, como caiu também a sagrada lâmpada da vida. A nós cabe recolhêla e fazê-la brilhar com uma nova luz. Na realidade existem, no conjunto de noções transmitidas por um milenário trabalho do pensamento, elementos que possuem um valor eterno, que não podem e não devem perecer. Um dos mais graves sinais da degradação a qual nos levou o regime burguês está no fato que se perde a consciência desses valores; tudo se torna objeto de comércio e instrumento de guerra. O proletariado, conquistado o poder social, deverá pôr-se em ação para reconquistar, para restabelecer na sua integridade, para si e para a humanidade, o reino devastado do espírito. É isso que estão fazendo hoje, guiados por Massimo Gorki, os operários da Rússia; isso se deve 295295 começar a fazer em todo lugar onde o proletariado esteja próximo de alcançar a maturidade que é necessária para a transformação social. Aquilo que decaiu do alto deve ressurgir mais forte de baixo. (L'Ordine Nuovo, 23/08/1919) 296 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 296 grAmsCi • XXX XXX 16 A proposta do companheiro Galetto17, que noticiamos há dois números, encontrou até agora um discreto apoio no público de nossos amigos. Até agora são cerca de uma dezena aqueles que disseram que estão dispostos a assumir um compromisso continuado com o nosso jornal, na medida indicada. Também tivemos a adesão de um grupo do círculo dos estudantes comunistas de Turim, que se comprometeram a uma contribuição mensal de 25 liras. Trata-se até agora, porém, unicamente de amigos pessoais que, por isso mesmo, sentem-se pessoalmente interessados na vitalidade de nossa obra que é, no fundo, também a sua. Mas destas adesões individuais esperamos recolher outras mais numerosas à medida que conseguirmos dar uma forma e constituir regularmente os "grupos" de nossos amigos. Para esta ação pedimos, agora, a ajuda de quem quiser nos apoiar, em Turim e fora. Acreditamos, ainda, de pedir que se trabalhe por coisas que não tem valor somente como uma ajuda dada a nós. Não impomos nenhum programa: a palavra "cultura" tem um significado bastante amplo, tanto que pode justificar toda liberdade de espírito, mas tem, por outro lado, um conteúdo preciso, no qual não pode caber senão uma atividade que 16 GRAMSCI, A. L'Ordine Nuovo (l9l9-l920).Torino: Einaudi, l975. p. 481-482. 17 Leo Galetto havia proposto organizar um grupo de amigos do jornal "Ordine Nuovo", que se comprometessem a contribuir com uma cota mensal para o jornal. 297297 tenha em si a capacidade de dar-se uma disciplina. Do objetivo de cultura nós nunca nos separamos, não obstante o persegui-lo nos levou a desenvolver um programa preciso. Cultura quer dizer para nós seriedade de posições mentais e de vida e os nossos "amigos" encontrarão seguramente nesses poucos conceitos uma base adequada para a constituição de núcleos homogêneos. Nisso há alguma coisa a menos, mas infinitamente maior que um programa. E assim os nossos grupos, muito diversamente de uma associação política, terão em si uma capacidade mais modesta, porém nova: aquela de ser, num momento no qual todo vínculo desinteressado parece dissolver-se e desaparecer, pequenos centros em torno aos quais se reúnam os jovens, pessoas que ainda saibam o que é o desinteresse, que ainda deem valor àquilo que não dá nenhum prêmio, nem um pagamento, nem uma posição. Quem disse que a renovação proletária do mundo não deve coincidir com um retorno às virtudes individuais, as quais não se preparam e se não se refinam senão no contato imediato, contínuo, fraterno, de quem acredita em um princípio e encontra nele o que pode guiá-lo também a melhorar a si próprio? Talvez confiemos e esperemos muito desses nossos "grupos"... bem não: se fossem reunidos em torno a nós somente algumas dezenas de bons companheiros e do hábito de vida comum nós tivéssemos obtido somente coisas que nos tornam um pouco melhores, disso seríamos pagos. Apenas de uma coisa cuidamos: que se alguma coisa se poderá conquistar que aconteça o máximo que seja possível mediante uma organização, por meio de um procedimento que seja capaz de permanecer. Isso nos tornará (e a nossos amigos) seguros de haver trabalhado não para nós somente, mas por alguma coisa que possa permanecer e dar frutos também para além de nossas pessoas. (L'Ordine Nuovo, 17/07/1920) hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde298 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 298 299299 georg Wilhelm friedrich hEGEl nasceu em Stuttgart (Alemanha), em 1770, e morreu em Berlin, aos 61 anos em 1831. Estudou teologia e filosofia (1788-1793) no seminário da igreja protestante em Wurttemberg (Tubinger Stift), mas desistiu de ser pastor, e dedicou-se à filosofia. Nessa época, em Tubingen, conheceu o poeta Hölderlin e o estudante de filosofia Schelling. Ainda jovem, nutriu grande admiração pela Revolução Francesa (1789) Depois de deixar o seminário, o jovem Hegel trabalhou como preceptor de filhos de famílias ilustres da época, e depois como professor de filosofia em um Ginásio em Nuremberg, do qual foi diretor em 1808. Em 1816 foi nomeado para a cátedra de Filosofia da Universidade de Heidelberg, e, em 1818, ingressou na Universidade de Berlin, nela permanecendo até a sua morte, vítima de cólera. Pouco antes, em 1829, tinha assumido o cargo de reitor desta mesma Universidade. Em 1801 publicou seu primeiro livro: Diferença entre os sistemas filosóficos de Fichte e Schelling. Em 1807 surgiu a Fenomenologia do espírito. No período de 1812, 1813 e 1816 publicou a Ciência da lógica, em três volumes. Em 1817 escreveu a Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas, uma expoHeGeL e O CARÁteR ÉtICO-pOLÍtICO DA IDeIA De LIBeRDADe hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde300 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 300 sição em compêndio sobre todo o seu sistema filosófico, com reedições ampliadas em 1827 e 1830. No período em que esteve na Universidade de Berlin, publicou as Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito (1820), um texto, também em compêndio, sobre ética, filosofia política e direito, o qual foi objeto de sucessivas lições nas suas aulas na Universidade, em 1818/19, 1819/20, 1821/22, 1822/23, 1824/25. Nesse mesmo tempo, além destes cursos, proferiu lições sobre filosofia da arte, história da filosofia, filosofia da história e filosofia da religião. Após a morte de Hegel, os discípulos editaram e publicaram os apontamentos do mestre sobre as lições, complementados com as anotações dos próprios alunos. Esse material foi conhecido como Filosofia da história, Estética, Filosofia da Religião e História da filosofia. São textos de grande serventia didática para um estudo introdutório ao pensamento hegeliano. 1 Hegel foi considerado como o último grande pensador que escreveu um sistema filosófico. De fato, as suas ideias versam sobre um vasto campo, abrangendo os mais diversos aspectos da filosofia: lógica, teoria do conhecimento, ética, filosofia política e do direito, filosofia da história, da arte, da religião e outros. A exposição das suas ideias, escritas numa linguagem de compreensão nem sempre fácil, está enfeixada segundo um encadeamento metodológico sistemático. São ideias que revelam a intenção do autor em compreender a riqueza das determinações da realidade que se apresentam para o conhecimento filosófico. O hegelianismo se propõe ao desafio de ser um discurso filosófico sobre a totalidade. Isso porque o conhecimento da realidade – multifacetária e contraditória – para se constituir em saber verdadeiro, deve ser ri1 Após a sua morte, a influência do hegelianismo foi significativa, sobretudo, nas áreas da filosofia política e do direito. Na Alemanha, logo após a sua morte, presença do pensamento hegeliano ocorreu sob a forma de duas correntes, cada qual disputando a herança hegeliana – os "hegelianos de direita" (Davi Strauss, Kuno Fischer, Karl Rosenkranz) – na perspectiva de um pensamento conservador e religioso; e os "hegelianos de esquerda" (Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, Arnold Ruge, Max Stirner e Karl Marx), seguindo uma leitura revolucionária e crítica da realidade social, e para a qual o arcabouço teórico da filosofia de Hegel era extremamente útil. Mas a influência de Hegel, ainda que díspar e controversa, se estende à filosofia do século XX, nas aproximações possíveis que ela permite na filosofia marxista, nos filósofos da teoria crítica da Escola de Frankfurt e em alguns pensadores, chamados comunitaristas, como C. Taylor e outros nos nossos dias. 301301 goroso, sistemático e racional, o que configura, no vocabulário de Hegel, uma "ciência do absoluto". Esta é a pretensão de uma filosofia especulativa que tem por objeto uma análise exaustiva e "omnicompreensiva" (A Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas retrata essa pretensão) de tudo aquilo que pode se apresentar e se realizar como ideia: do ponto de vista "da Ideia em si e para si" – objeto da Lógica; da ideia "em seu ser-outro" – a Filosofia da Natureza; e da ideia que "em seu ser-outro retorna a si mesma", o domínio da Filosofia do Espírito.2 No que diz respeito à Filosofia do Espírito3, um conceito é fundamental na organização do pensamento de Hegel – a liberdade. A dinâmica de efetivação da sua realidade consiste num processo (histórico) que retrata o desenvolvimento progressivo do espírito objetivo segundo uma lógica (movimento dialético) que lhe é imanente. Nesse sentido, ele tem a sua objetivação – é espírito objetivo – que supera e, ao mesmo tempo, conserva a sua diferença – o espírito subjetivo. É no âmbito do espírito objetivo que ocorre a investigação filosófica hegeliana no campo do direito, da política e da moral, objeto, sobretudo, da obra Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito. Nesta obra, encontra-se uma discussão detalhada da Ideia de liberdade, a qual é vista como princípio do agir humano seja de ordem subjetiva, seja de ordem objetiva, institucional (social, jurídico e político). O tema da liberdade constitui um dos aspectos essenciais da filoso2 HEGEL, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, Werke 8, § 18. 3 O conceito de espírito apresenta uma diversidade de sentido filosófico, psicológico e religioso na tradição da história das ideias. Na filosofia hegeliana, espírito (Geist) denota um significado fundamental no sistema filosófico de Hegel. Do ponto de vista da divisão deste sistema, o espírito é a Ideia na forma de um retorno de um outro da Ideia lógica – a natureza. Se a Filosofia da Natureza tem por objeto a Ideia na forma de um outro que lhe é exterior – aquilo que é finito e contingente –, a Filosofia do Espírito analisa a Ideia que retorna a si, como liberação da natureza, e permanece junto de si, no seu próprio elemento. Esta Filosofia pode ser do espírito subjetivo, objetivo e absoluto. O espírito subjetivo refere-se às manifestações interiores da alma (Antropologia), aos fenômenos da consciência (Psicologia). O espírito objetivo de um modo geral diz respeito à mente humana e às formas espirituais da sua realização como produtos ou objetivações da atividade espiritual, em oposição à natureza, como mundo da liberdade realizada. O espírito absoluto significa um processo de totalização ou de plenitude que compreende a arte, a religião e a filosofia, formas da sua realização, nas quais ele tem a si mesmo por objeto. hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde302 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 302 fia moderna, presente no Jusnaturalismo e, sobretudo, no Idealismo Alemão em filósofos como Kant, Fichte e Schelling. Hegel reconhece o mérito destes pensadores, pois, erigiram a liberdade como princípio subjetivo do agir e, também, como fundamento da vida política. Contudo, critica-os pelo caráter limitante que a liberdade possui: o seu sentido e alcance se restringe ao indivíduo e à sua associação com os demais, sem compreender o valor intrínseco da universalidade da liberdade na forma da sua realização objetiva e concreta na vida social e política dos homens. Hegel pretende aprofundar o potencial especulativo do conceito de liberdade compreendendo-a, ainda na trilha do Idealismo Alemão, como Ideia. Mas, trata-se de um conceito que se desenvolve em duas dimensões ou sentidos que se interpenetram: o lógico-conceitual e o histórico-institucional. Dimensões estas que podem, ainda, ser retratadas pelo aspecto subjetivo e objetivo da liberdade. 4 Do ponto de vista lógico-conceitual, a liberdade se traduz pela estrutura autorreferente da lógica do conceito.5 Livre é quem permanece no 4 Para esclarecer sua posição quanto à ideia e ao seu idealismo, Hegel retoma a discussão entre Platão e Aristóteles no que diz respeito ao significado que tem a ideia nesses filósofos, tomando o partido de Aristóteles. Defende a tese de que ideia constitui um princípio ativo, aquilo que é verdadeiro: uma efetividade que não se separa de um conteúdo (real) do qual constitui a sua forma, o eidos, a Ideia e no qual se objetiva. Quando Hegel afirma que a Ideia é "a unidade do ideal (Ideellen) e do real (Reellen), do finito e do infinito, da alma e do corpo", quer apontar, precisamente, para os dois aspectos solidários da ideia e da idealidade do conceito. O momento do conceito se apresenta como aquele em que o ideal, o infinito é a ideia enquanto forma conceitual; e o seu aspecto real, se configura como o finito, o corpo: o Dasein do conceito, enquanto idealidade que possui uma existência empírica, um conteúdo objetivado. O conceito encerra em si, portanto, um ideal que demanda ser efetivado, e a realização efetiva desse ideal é a ideia, a idealidade concreta, o momento superior da unidade da identidade (da identidade do conceito) e da sua diferença (a finitude). A idealidade, enquanto qualidade da ideia, consiste no entrelaçamento da finitização do ideal (conceitual) e da elevação do real em ideal. Por isso, nada mais estranho a Hegel do que conceber a separação e o isolamento desses dois momentos. Nada mais falso do que a representação de um ideal divorciado do real ou de um real apartado do ideal seja no idealismo transcendente de Platão, seja no idealismo transcendental de Kant. 5 A Ciência da lógica, dividida em dois momentos: a lógica objetiva e a subjetiva, trata de três estruturas lógicas: o ser, a essência e o conceito. Este último diz respeito às determinações que não são deduzidas de um estado cognitivo de quem representa conceitualmente pelo pensamento um objeto, mas determinações conceituais autoproduzidas segundo um desenvolvimento imanente de um sujeito (não empírico ou gramatical) ontológico que abarca ou "compreende" o enunciado e a enunciação, o objeto e a sua apreensão racional, a objetividade e a subjetividade. A lógica do conceito exprime de 303303 seu próprio elemento, que está "em casa", junto a si. O aspecto essencial dessa liberdade é a autosuficiência, ou seja, algo (um sujeito lógico) é livre quando permanece nele mesmo, transita no seu próprio âmbito e tem em si mesmo a razão de ser da sua identidade autônoma e não depende de nada senão de si mesmo como algo que espontaneamente se põe como entidade autorreferente, contemplando, assim, o estatuto lógico daquilo que é em-si e para-si. Esse é o sentido da liberdade enquanto realidade conceitual. Nessa medida, ela representa a mais absoluta autorreferencialidade de algo que está junto de si (Beisichselbstsein). Esta é a característica essencial da liberdade que é, também, atribuída ao espírito, uma vez que ela constitui a própria essência do espírito e a sua efetividade (Wirklichkeit)6 – diz Hegel, ao defini-lo como uma singularidade que se manifesta numa relação idêntica a si e, por isso mesmo, livre, tal como é, de forma análoga, aquilo que se define como subjetividade. Esse caráter autorreferencial da liberdade como estar junto de si pode, também, de forma, isomórfica, ser atribuído à liberdade subjetiva dos indivíduos. Desse ponto de vista, o indivíduo para ser livre deve ter nele mesmo a fonte e a razão de ser de seus atos, o que inclui o domínio racional do sujeito como agente consciente de si e de sua ação, que dirige as suas escolhas e que encontra satisfação no seu agir como expressão da sua subjetividade. Ou seja, a presença da liberdade supõe uma condição lógica: a autoposição do sujeito como senhor de si mesmo. Este aspecto da liberdade constitui um pressuposto necessário para que as ações de interferências não sejam invasivas à liberdade do sujeito, tornando-o suscetível a toda sorte de dominação por forças estranhas à sua autonomia. Hegel se refere ao termo liberdade subjetiva (subjektive Freiheit) em vários sentidos, todos eles indicando a realização da particularidade de um sujeito. A liberdade subjetiva refere-se a um tipo de ação conscienmodo mais incisivo a noção conceitual da ideia, cuja dinâmica se manifesta pela articulação dialética dos seus três momentos: universalidade, particularidade e singularidade. Quando Hegel diz que "no conceito se abriu, por conseguinte, o reino da liberdade" (Wissenschaft der logik, II, Werke 6, p. 125) quer retratar o elemento autorreferente do conceito, assimilando-o ao caráter definidor daquilo que é livre: o estar consigo mesmo ou junto a si. 6 Sobre o termo efetividade (Wirklichkeit) ver nota 15. hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde304 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 304 temente escolhida pela livre vontade do indivíduo. Diz respeito à subjetividade da vontade como determinação moral, o que implica a não-dominação daquelas ações que os sujeitos livremente escolhem, opondo-se, assim, às práticas não desejadas que provêm da coerção e da autoridade de terceiros. Diz respeito, ainda, às pretensões pessoais que visam satisfazer os interesses e as necessidades do indivíduo quanto à sua felicidade e aos seus direitos. Mas, a liberdade subjetiva indica, também, aquelas ações que demonstram arbítrio e têm o sentido depreciativo de idiossincrasias contingentes de um sujeito. Na diversidade do seu significado, essa liberdade constitui um fato histórico do mundo moderno. Compreendê-la e assegurá-la significa reconhecê-la como o grande princípio da modernidade, o qual surge como elemento histórico distintivo em relação aos tempos antigos. Além do caráter autorreferencial, e que envolve a subjetividade do indivíduo, a liberdade compreende, também, o elemento objetivo da sua manifestação. Nessa medida, ela se apresenta como ser-aí (Dasein) ou exteriorização da sua identidade autorreferencial, e que pode ser compreendido como o seu outro. Assim, o desenvolvimento do espírito é o próprio movimento de sua realização, ou seja, da liberdade, cujo registro não é outra coisa senão a objetividade histórica das intervenções humanas. O aspecto histórico-institucional representa, portanto, o processo histórico (e objetivo) de efetivação da ideia de liberdade. Por isso, Hegel afirma que "a história universal representa a marcha gradual do princípio cujo conteúdo e a consciência da liberdade."7 Paralelamente, esse processo revela-se como a "exposição" do espírito que alcança, nos tempos modernos, a sua constituição, representada pela realidade institucional do Estado. Nessa medida, Hegel pretende compreender a liberdade não mais como limite ou restrição, confinada à subjetividade das liberdades individuais (livre-arbítrio) conflitantes entre si, mas como o processo de sua plena efetivação como Ideia que abarca o momento subjetivo autorreferente e o objetivo de sua manifestação. Constitui-se, desse modo, a segunda dimensão da liberdade – o aspecto histórico-institucional – que 7 HEGEL, Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke 12. p. 77 305305 retrata, numa relação de alteridade, o outro da identidade conceitual, precisamente de um outro que lhe é adequado, próprio – o seu outro. Para não cair na vacuidade de uma vontade que se reflete a si mesma, a liberdade necessita de um ser-aí, de uma referência que, a despeito de ser externa a si, não lhe é estranha. O homem só pode estar consigo mesmo na objetivação de suas ações e junto com os outros em relações de intersubjetividade. A liberdade do indivíduo retrata (e repõe) a liberdade espiritual do estar junto de si no seu outro, mediante o qual ele permanece em si mesmo; mas, ao mesmo tempo, ele deve efetivar a sua liberdade neste outro que ele reconhece como o seu outro – o aspecto objetivo da liberdade. Mas, qual é o elemento que permite a passagem do caráter autorreferencial da liberdade (a face subjetiva) para a sua objetivação? O mecanismo que vai permitir que a liberdade possa transitar no seu próprio elemento sem depender de um outro e, ao mesmo tempo, ter para si um conteúdo ou uma referência por uma "outridade", abandonando, assim, a vacuidade da sua condição abstrata e formal é, justamente, a dialética do reconhecimento. Para que as relações comunitárias possam desempenhar o papel do mútuo reconhecimento, elas necessitam dispor de instituições ético-políticas que possibilitam a mediação de formas positivas de reconhecimento. A família, a sociedade civil-burguesa e o Estado são instituições políticas e sociais – daquilo que Hegel chamou de eticidade ou vida ética (Sittlichkeit).8 É a eticidade que cumpre esse papel, permitindo que a liberdade subjetiva alcance uma realização efetiva, nelas se reconhecendo como o seu outro, uma realidade que não é estranha ao 8 A tradução de Sittlichkeit por "eticidade", "vida ética" ou "moralidade objetiva" não dá conta do significado amplo e profundo que Hegel atribui a esse vocábulo. Esta forma de moralidade social, comunitária, objetiva distingue-se da moral individual, interior e subjetiva, chamada de moralidade (Moralität), objeto da segunda parte das Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito. Na figura da pessoa do direito abstrato, e que Hegel desenvolve na primeira parte desta obra, a liberdade se apresentou como ser-aí imediato da liberdade. Na moralidade, ela se determinou como bem de uma subjetividade ou como "reflexão da autoconsciência". Essa universalidade interiorizada do bem não deve permanecer abstratamente encerrada em-si, mas se efetivar na realidade objetiva. Configura-se, então, o terceiro momento da Ideia de liberdade que possui tanto a determinação da totalidade substancial, como a da subjetividade singular, o qual será desenvolvido na terceira parte da Filosofia do Direito, denominada de eticidade. hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde306 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 306 indivíduo e à sua liberdade. O direito, as instituições políticas e sociais da eticidade são realizações comunitárias que trazem o sinal da sua própria razão de ser: instaurar e assegurar a liberdade que não se reduz à sua dimensão meramente individual e subjetiva A novidade que Hegel apresenta à filosofia social (ético-política) do seu tempo consiste em compreender a sociedade moderna na articulação de três esferas no processo de efetivação da Ideia de liberdade: a) a esfera da família, lugar da intimidade efetiva da vida imediata privada dos indivíduos; b) um segundo momento, ainda privado, a esfera da liberdade subjetiva da particularidade, da vida econômica e do trabalho dos indivíduos (burgueses) na sociedade civil; e c) a esfera superior da universalidade do Estado que encerra em si o monopólio político da vida pública dos cidadãos, momento não só distinto e superior aos dois primeiros, como também, fim último e razão de ser deles. São estas instituições que efetivam a Ideia de liberdade, dandolhe a dimensão de uma realidade objetiva. Por isso, Hegel identifica a liberdade nessa esfera como o "reino da liberdade efetivada, o mundo do espírito produzido a partir do próprio espírito como uma segunda natureza."9 O lado objetivo diz respeito ao mundo social destas instituições e das práticas sociais e intersubjetivas que operam no sentido de desenvolver e manter a liberdade subjetiva, a qual só adquire sentido e estabilidade na objetivação da liberdade, cuja consistência, por sua vez, depende da ação (política e moral) dos sujeitos. Uma ordem social livre é suficientemente forte e estável para assegurar e ampliar a liberdade subjetiva apenas se os cidadãos são membros de instituições que os amparam com objetivos, valores e convicções éticas e políticas. A família constitui o agrupamento social imediato que inaugura a arquitetônica da vida ética da Filosofia do Direito. Nela, os indivíduos demonstram uma forma de reconhecimento segundo a unidade ética da 9 HEGEL, G.W.F. Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, [Lineamentos da Filosofia do Direito ou Direito Natural e Ciência do Estado em Compêndio] Werke 7, eds. E. Moldenhauer e K. M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1975, § 4. Desse ponto de vista, é possível compreender a tese hegeliana de que a "Ideia do direito é a liberdade e para apreendê-la verdadeiramente é preciso conhecê-la no seu conceito e no seu ser-aí (Dasein)" (idem, § 1, adendo). 307307 intimidade familiar, na qual os membros participam de um agrupamento imediato, íntimo, próprio da identidade afetiva, e mediante a qual indivíduos se reconhecem vinculados pelo sentimento e pelo amor. O elemento autorreferencial da liberdade desloca-se para a intimidade da comunidade da família, onde o indivíduo está efetivamente no seu próprio elemento, permanecendo em si mesmo na privacidade do grupo familiar. A sociedade civil (burgerliche Gesellschaft)10 representa o momento em que o princípio da liberdade subjetiva e o interesse da particularidade se manifestam. Os indivíduos estão unidos segundo uma universalidade formal que revela a integração recíproca dos seus interesses e necessidades mediada pelas relações dos indivíduos uns com os outros. São relações sociais (civis) porque vinculam os homens numa sociabilidade interdependente, marcada pelas necessidades recíprocas que o trabalho de todos pretende suprir. Mas, eles não estão isolados, pois, satisfazem as suas necessidades em relações sociais que eles mantém entre si. Cada um reconhece no outro um meio para a realização das necessidades individuais e comunitárias. São relações sociais que retratam uma forma de reconhecimento social, ainda que permeada pela disputa, pelo conflito e pela mútua-dependência. Mas, é uma forma de reconhecimento que revela o jogo das necessidades recíprocas que os sujeitos necessitam e manifestam. Para Hegel, a sociedade civil não possui a medida da universalidade, apesar dela demonstrar a dinâmica da liberdade individual no âmbito de relações sociais intersubjetivas. Submetida às regras de uma lógica da particularidade, ela se repõe a si própria num processo de constante reposição (a "má infinitude") que pode desencadear, se abandonada a 10 A sociedade civil em Hegel indica não apenas o caráter civil do segundo momento da eticidade. Significa, também, o caráter burguês dessa sociedade segundo a sua forma de organização social e econômica. O termo alemão Burger denota tanto o civil como o burguês, mas Hegel consagra essa expressão para o membro da sociedade civil (bourgeois), e não para o citoyen membro da sociedade política. Hegel se afasta da tradição da filosofia política do jusnaturalismo e passa dispensar atenção à economia política inglesa, à revolução econômica industrial e à valorização da categoria do trabalho. A sociedade civil deixa de ser a comunidade política (societas civilis) e passa a ser o lócus da sociabilidade dos indivíduos burgueses associados segundo interesses particulares, mediados pelo princípio da liberdade subjetiva. hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde308 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 308 si própria, a sua autodestruição. Urge, então, realizar uma forma superior de eticidade para amparar e efetivar a própria liberdade subjetiva. Para além da esfera da particularidade, Hegel reivindica o espaço éticopolítico do Estado para superar as contradições e limitações da sociedade civil. Nele, o mútuo reconhecimento de seus membros é realizado sob a forma da autoconsciência coletiva que retrata uma sociabilidade comunitária mais elevada e superior, momento em que a liberdade se efetiva objetivamente. A Filosofia do Direito define o Estado como a "efetividade (Wirklichkeit) da liberdade concreta"11, a etapa derradeira no desenvolvimento progressivo da Ideia de liberdade.12 Sem o Estado, o indivíduo, meramente determinado na sua particularidade como membro da sociedade civil, se dissipa no arbítrio do princípio autorreferente da liberdade subjetiva. O Estado constitui uma forma mais plena de reconhecimento que solidifica o senso de união comunitária de participação, e de autoidentidade compartilhada, fundamento da vida política. Concluindo, pode-se dizer que a filosofia política hegeliana admite o princípio liberal da liberdade dos indivíduos, denominada por Hegel 11 HEGEL, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, op. cit., § 260. 12 O hegelianismo político foi interpretado como a filosofia que diviniza, em diversos matizes, o Estado: ora como glorificação do regime político prussiano (H. Heller, F. Rosenzweig, T. Litt, J. Dewey, L.T. Hobhouse, S. Hook, J. Plamenatz), ora como ideólogo do Estado fechado e totalitário inimigo da sociedade aberta das democracias ocidentais (K. Popper), ora como inspirador da ideologia de um poder mistificador e salvador (E. Topitsch), ora como mentor do mito do Estado forte (E. Cassirer). Apesar da suspeita que estes críticos levantam contra o hegelianismo político, a filosofia política de Hegel não faz a apologia do estatismo, negando a liberdade dos indivíduos, mesmo quando enfatiza o caráter da necessidade racional do Estado na constituição das formas modernas de uma sociabilidade ético-política. A reação contra essa interpretação ocorreu precisamente a partir do resgate do princípio da liberdade individual na filosofia hegeliana como expressão da modernidade O filósofo passou a ser visto como pensador da moderna sociedade politicamente organizada segundo os elementos do Estado de direito, e próximo de algumas teses do liberalismo. Estudos mais recentes da obra de Hegel demonstraram a improcedência das acusações de que o filósofo nega a liberdade individual e os direitos da pessoa. Essa interpretação manifestou-se na França (E. Weil, E. Fleischmann, J. D'Hondt, F. Grégoire, J-C. Pinson, G. Planty-Bonjour H. Denis, B. Bourgeois J-F Kervégan), na Inglaterra e nos Estados Unidos da América (T.M. Knox, J.N. Findlay, W. Kaufmann, Z. Pelczynski, S. Avineri, C. Taylor, S. Smith, A. Wood, A. Patten. R. Williams, R. Pippin, M. Forster, T. Pinkard,), na Itália (D. Losurdo), na Alemanha (J. Ritter, G. Rohrmoser. R. Maurer, O. Marquard, K-H Ilting, A. Honneth, H. Lubbe, D. Henrich e H-F. Fulda, M. Theunissen). 309309 de liberdade subjetiva, a qual opera como um dos elementos essenciais do Estado moderno, sobretudo, na esfera da sociedade civil. Contudo, à pretensão da ideia liberal de ênfase ao exclusivismo autorreferente da liberdade subjetiva, e, consequentemente, a instrumentalização do Estado aos interesses e direitos individuais, Hegel retoma na modernidade o conceito aristotélico da prioridade do Estado, da supremacia do bem comum como uma exigência teórica e prática, apreendida na noção irrenunciável e evidente de que os fins da comunidade são superiores aos fins dos membros individualmente considerados.13 A filosofia de Hegel constitui, assim, exemplo de um grandioso e radical investimento especulativo, qualificado como Ideia de liberdade. Ao mesmo tempo em que tem a pretensão de analisar a liberdade segundo um modo conceitual (lógico-ontológico) quer, também, compreendê-la como uma forma histórica de sua manifestação. Ou, dito de outro modo, sem abandonar o seu caráter autorreferencial (subjetivo), o filósofo pretende efetivá-la na sua necessária forma institucional (objetiva). Com essa dupla tarefa, Hegel se afasta do caráter autorreferente e limitativo da liberdade, incorporando-a num processo coletivo ou universal da sua realização que supera e, ao mesmo tempo, conserva14 os fins privados da liberdade individual de uma forma mais efetiva e consistente. Se a liberdade subjetiva não alcançar essa dimensão, e se circunscrever no âmbito dos interesses e desejos particulares dos indivíduos nas suas relações privadas, o próprio princípio da liberdade se vê ameaçado. A sustentação dessa liberdade é possível apenas numa lógica de mediação social em que a liberdade se realiza pela dialética do reconhecimento. 13 A intenção especulativa de Hegel, presente nos seus escritos da maturidade, não induz ao abandono do antigo princípio da Polis grega da prevalência da totalidade ética que o Estado representa. Significa, antes, uma tentativa de conciliação deste princípio com o da liberdade subjetiva da modernidade. 14 Superação e conservação no sentido em que, hegelianamente, é empregado o termo Aufhebung (cf. nota n. 17 ) hegeL e o CAráter étiCo-poLítiCo dA idéiA de LiberdAde310 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 310 Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de hegel Publicadas em língua Portuguesa HEGEL, G. W. F. Fenomenologia do espírito. Tradução de Paulo Meneses. Petrópolis, Vozes, 2002. HEGEL, G. W. F. A fenomenologia do espírito. Tradução de Henrique C. de Lima Vaz. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). Indicação principalmente do Prefácio, introdução e do primeiro e segundo capítulos. HEGEL, G. W. F. Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas em compêndio: A ciência da lógica. Tradução de Paulo Meneses com a colaboração de José Machado. São Paulo: Loyola, 1995-1997. v.1. HEGEL, G. W. F. Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas em compêndio: Filosofia da natureza. Tradução de Paulo Meneses com a colaboração de José Machado. São Paulo: Loyola, 1995-1997. v.2. HEGEL, G. W. F. Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas em compêndio: Filosofia do espírito. Tradução de Paulo Meneses com a colaboração de José Machado. São Paulo: Loyola, 1995-1997. v.3. HEGEL, G. W. F. Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas em epítome. Tradução de Artur Morão, Lisboa: Edições 70, 1989. HEGEL, G. W. F. Princípios da filosofia do direito. Tradução de Orlando Vitorino. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000. HEGEL, G. W. F. Princípios da filosofia do direito. Tradução de Norberto de Paula Lima. São Paulo: Ícone, 1997. HEGEL, G. W. F. Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito ou direito natural e ciência do estado no traçado fundamental. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Inédito. HEGEL, G. W. f. O Direito Abstrato. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Clássicos da filosofia: Cadernos de Tradução [IFCH/UNICAMP], Campinas, n. 5, set. 2003. HEGEL, G. W. F. Introdução à Filosofia do Direito. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Clássicos da filosofia: cadernos de Tradução [IFCH/UNICAMP], Campinas, n. 10, ago. 2005. HEGEL, G. W. F. Estética. O Ideia e o ideal, O belo artístico e o ideal. Tradução de Orlando Vitorino. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). HEGEL, G. W. F. História da filosofia: Introdução. Tradução de Antônio Pinto de Carvalho. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). HEGEL, G. W. F. Cursos de estética. Tradução de Marco Aurélio Werle e Oliver Tolle. São Paulo: Edusp, 1999-2000. 2 v. 311311 HEGEL, G. W. F. A Razão na história: introdução à filosofia da história universal. Tradução de Artur Mourão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1995. HEGEL, G. W. F. O Sistema da vida ética. Tradução de Artur Mourão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1991. HEGEL, G. W. F. Propedêutica filosófica. Tradução de Artur Mourão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1989. HEGEL, G. W. F. Filosofia da história. Tradução de Maria Rodrigues e Hans Harden, Brasília: UNB, 1995. obras sobre hegel ARANTES, P. Hegel: a ordem do tempo. São Paulo: Polis, 1981. BOBBIO, N. Estudos sobre Hegel. São Paulo: Unesp, 1989. HÖSLE, V. O Sistema de Hegel. São Paulo: Loyola, 2007. INWOOD, M. Dicionário Hegel. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1997. KERVÉGAN, J-F. Hegel e o hegelianismo, São Paulo: Loyola, 2008. PLANT, R. Hegel. São Paulo: Unesp, 2000. RAMOS, C. A. Liberdade subjetiva e estado na filosofia política de Hegel. Curitiba: Editora da UFPR, 2000. ROSENFIELD, D. Hegel. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002. ROSENFIELD, D. (Org.) Hegel, a moralidade e a religião. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002. ROSENZWEIG, F. Hegel e o Estado. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2008. SINGER, P. Hegel. São Paulo: Loyola, 2003. TAYLOR, C. Hegel e a sociedade moderna. São Paulo: Loyola, 2005. WEBER, T. Hegel: liberdade, Estado e história. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1993. 312 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 312 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos eXCeRtOS e pARÁGRAFOS tRADuZIDOS 1 << O sentido especulativo da Ideia como princípio para o idealismo filosófico e a sua conexão com o conceito dinâmico de totalidade>> "Quando se fala de ideia, não se quer representar com isso algo de distante e situado num além. A Ideia é, antes, aquilo que está absolutamente presente" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, Werke 8, § 213, ad.). 1 A tradução dos parágrafos, anotações e adendos das Linhas fundamentais de filosofia do direito é de Marcos Lutz MULLER, extraída das seguintes partes já publicadas: HEGEL, G. W. f. O Direito Abstrato. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Clássicos da filosofia: Cadernos de Tradução [IFCH/UNICAMP], Campinas, n. 5, set. 2003; HEGEL, G. W. F. Introdução à Filosofia do Direito. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Clássicos da filosofia: cadernos de tradução[IFCH/UNICAMP], Campinas, n. 10, ago. 2005; HEGEL, G. W. F. A Sociedade Civil. Tradução de Marcos Lutz Muller. Clássicos da filosofia: cadernos de tradução[IFCH/UNICAMP],Campinas, n. 10, ago. 2005. Também foi utilizada a versão on line da tradução das Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito, disponibilizada pelo tradutor. Nos demais parágrafos e excertos das outras obras, a tradução é de nossa autoria com base nas obras completas: HEGEL, G. W. F. Werke in zwangig Bänden. edição de Eva Moldenhauer e Karl M. Michel, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970-1986. 20 v. Os subtítulos intercalados nos textos traduzidos não constam do original. São informações que têm por objetivo sugerir ao leitor o sentido geral das passagens citadas. 313313 "Essa idealidade do finito é a proposição capital da filosofia, e toda verdadeira filosofia é, por esta razão, um idealismo" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, Werke 8, § 95, adendo). "A ideia é o verdadeiro em-si e para-si, a unidade absoluta do conceito e da objetividade. Seu conteúdo ideal (ideeler Inhalt) não é outra coisa senão o conceito em suas determinações; seu conteúdo real é apenas a exposição do conceito que ele se dá na forma de um ser-aí (Dasein) exterior, e esta figura (Gestalt) está incluída na sua idealidade, em seu poder, e, desse modo, o conceito se conserva na ideia" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, Werke 8, § 213). "É preciso, com efeito, não conceber o idealismo de Platão como um idealismo subjetivo, como aquele mau idealismo que, sem dúvida, se apresenta nos tempos modernos, como se o homem não fosse capaz de aprender nada nem fosse determinado exteriormente, e que todas as representações são emanadas do sujeito. Afirma-se com frequência que o idealismo consiste em que o indivíduo estabeleça a partir de si mesmo todas as suas representações, inclusive as mais imediatas. Porém isto é uma noção anti-histórica e completamente falsa; se esta tosca representação define o idealismo, podemos dizer que nenhum filósofo foi, em verdade, idealista, e tampouco o idealismo platônico tem a ver com esta forma" (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, II, Werke 19, p. 54-55). "É justamente nesta posição da filosofia em relação à efetividade que se encontram mal-entendidos [...] O que é racional, é efetivo; E o que é efetivo, é racional. Nesta convicção está toda consciência desprevenida, bem como a filosofia, e é daqui que esta parte para a consideração tanto do universo espiritual quanto do natural. Se a reflexão, o sentimento ou seja qual for a figura que a consciência subjetiva tenha, olha para o presente como uma coisa vã, se está além dele e sabe tudo melhor, então ela encontra-se no que é vão, e porque só tem efetividade no presente, ela mesma é, assim, somente vaidade. Se, ao invés, a ideia é tida por aquilo que, assim, é só 314 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 314 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos uma ideia, uma representação num opinar, a filosofia, ao contrário, garante a intelecção de que nada é efetivo a não ser a Ideia. O que então importa, então, é reconhecer na aparência do temporal e do transitório a substância que é imanente, e o eterno que é presente. Com efeito, o racional, que é sinônimo da ideia, quando ele entra em sua efetividade simultaneamente na existência externa, emerge numa riqueza infinita de formas, fenômenos e configurações, e reveste o seu núcleo com uma casca multicolor, na qual a consciência inicialmente se instala, e que só o conceito transpassa, para encontrar o pulso interno e sentir igualmente o seu batimento nas configurações externas" (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, prefácio, p. 24, 25). "É tarefa da filosofia conceber o que é, pois, aquilo que é é a razão. No que concerne ao indivíduo, cada um é, de todo modo, um filho do seu tempo; do mesmo modo que a filosofia é seu tempo apreendido em pensamentos." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, prefácio, p. 26). "Os membros de um organismo têm, de igual modo, realidade exterior, mas o conceito é a sua própria essência inerente, o qual não lhe imprime exteriormente uma forma unificadora, mas constitui, por si só, sua existência. Por isso, os membros de um organismo possuem uma realidade que não é aquela das pedras de um edifício ou das plantas, das luas, ou dos cometas no sistema planetário, mas uma existência interna do organismo idealmente posta pela ideia, inerente ao organismo, e desvinculada de toda a realidade. Uma mão amputada, por exemplo, perde sua existência independente, ela não mantém mais, como no organismo, sua vivacidade, seus movimentos, seu aspecto, sua forma etc., mudam; ela sofre até mesmo a decomposição e toda sua existência se desvanece. Ela só pode existir como membro do organismo, ela só é real quando está integrada na unidade posta pela Ideia" (Vorlesungen uber die Äslhetik, I, Werke 13, Enter Teil, p. 163-164). "O verdadeiro é o todo. Mas o todo é somente a essência que alcança a sua completude mediante o seu desenvolvimento. Sobre o absoluto deve-se dizer que ele é essencialmente resultado; que somente no fim ele é o que é em verdade; e é nisto que consiste propriamente a sua 315315 natureza, de ser efetividade, sujeito ou desenvolvimento de si mesmo." (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, prefácio, p. 24). "Segundo o meu modo de ver – que será justificada apenas na apresentação [Darstellung] do próprio sistema –, tudo depende disso: apreender e exprimir o verdadeiro não como substância, mas também, precisamente, como sujeito." (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, prefácio, p. 2223). "O princípio motor do conceito, enquanto ele não só dissolve as particularizações do universal, mas, também, enquanto as produz, eu chamo de dialética, – dialética, portanto, não no sentido de que ela dissolve, confunde e conduz daqui para lá e de lá para cá um ob-jeto, uma proposição, dados ao sentimento, à consciência imediata em geral, e só tem a ver com a derivação do seu contrário – uma modalidade negativa de dialética, tal como ela frequentemente aparece também em Platão... A dialética superior do conceito não consiste em produzir e apreender a determinação meramente como barreira e como contrário, mas, sim, em produzir e apreender a partir dela o conteúdo e o resultado positivos, enquanto por essa via, unicamente, a dialética é desenvolvimento e progredir imanente. Esta dialética não é, pois, um fazer externo de um pensar subjetivo, mas a alma própria do conteúdo, que organicamente faz brotar os seus ramos e os seus frutos. Para este desenvolvimento da ideia, enquanto atividade própria da sua razão, o pensar enquanto subjetivo apenas olha, sem adicionar ingrediente algum de sua parte. Considerar algo racionalmente não significa acrescentar de fora uma razão ao ob-jeto e, por este intermédio, elaborá-lo, senão que o ob-jeto é por si racional; aqui é o espírito na sua liberdade, o ápice da razão autoconsciente, que se dá efetividade e se gera como mundo existente; a ciência tem somente a tarefa de trazer à consciência esse trabalho próprio da razão da coisa." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7 § 31, anotação). <<A liberdade como essência do espírito e a estrutura autorreferencial da liberdade como estar junto a si>> 316 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 316 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos "Como a substância da matéria é o peso, assim devemos dizer que a liberdade é a substância, a essência do espírito. Qualquer um tem um conhecimento imediato de que a liberdade, dentre outras características, pertence ao espírito. A filosofia, no entanto, nos ensina que todas as características do espírito só existem por meio da liberdade, todas elas são apenas meios para a liberdade, todas a procuram e a produzem. Que a liberdade seja a única verdade do espírito, isso é um conhecimento da filosofia especulativa... A matéria tem a sua substância fora de si, o espírito é o estar junto de si mesmo (Bei-sich-selbst-Sein). E isso é, precisamente, a liberdade, pois, quando sou dependente, então relaciono-me com um outro que não sou eu; eu não posso ser sem um exterior; eu sou livre quando estou junto a mim. Este estar junto de si mesmo do espírito é autoconsciência, a consciência de si próprio." (Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke 12, p. 30). "Formalmente, a essência do Espírito é, por conseguinte, a liberdade, a absoluta negatividade do conceito enquanto identidade consigo mesmo. Segundo essa determinação formal, ele pode abstrair-se de toda exterioridade e de sua própria exterioridade, do seu próprio ser-aí (Dasein), pode suportar a negação de sua imediatidade individual, sua dor infinita; isto é, nessa negatividade pode manter-se afirmativo e ser idêntico a si mesmo. Essa possibilidade é sua universalidade abstrata em si, sendo para si mesmo" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 382). "A substância do espírito é a liberdade, isto é, não ser dependente de um outro, e referir-se a si mesmo. O espírito é ser para si, tem a si mesmo por ob-jeto (Gegenstand) como conceito efetivamente realizado. Nessa unidade, presente nele, do conceito e da objetividade consiste, ao mesmo tempo, sua verdade e sua liberdade." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 382, adendo). "Somente nessa liberdade a vontade está pura e simplesmente junto de si, porque ela não se relaciona a nada que não seja ela mesma, com o que, assim, desaparece dela toda relação de dependência de alguma outra coisa. Ela é verdadeira, ou melhor, ela é a própria verdade, porque seu 317317 determinar consiste em que ela seja no seu ser-aí, isto é, enquanto estando defronte a si mesma, aquilo que o seu conceito é, ou, noutros termos, porque o puro conceito tem a intuição de si mesmo por seu fim e por sua realidade." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 23). "A liberdade está apenas lá onde não há para mim nenhum outro que não seja eu mesmo. O homem natural, determinado apenas por suas pulsões, não está junto de si: por mais caprichoso que seja, o conteúdo do seu querer e da sua intenção não é, contudo, seu próprio conteúdo, e a sua liberdade é apenas formal" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, Werke 8, § 23, adendo 2). << A estrutura autorreferencial da liberdade como estar junto a si no seu outro>> "A liberdade do espírito, porém, não é simplesmente estar fora do outro, mas uma independência do outro conquistada junto com o outro, não chega à efetividade (Wirklichkeit)2 pela fuga perante o outro, mas pelo predomínio sobre ele. O espírito pode sair de sua universalidade abstrata que é para si, de sua relação simples para consigo mesmo; pode pôr em si mesmo uma diferença efetiva determinada, um outro como é o eu simples, portanto, um negativo: e essa relação com o outro não é simplesmente possível para o espírito, mas necessária, porque ele, mediante o outro e mediante a suspensão (Aufhebung)3 deste, chega a 2 A expressão Wirklichkeit, que Hegel emprega frequentemente nos seus escritos, é traduzida por "efetividade", e está ligada ao verbo wirken que significa ser ativo, efetivar. A efetividade se distingue daquilo que simplesmente existe como mera realidade (Realität) contingente, que está aí, e que depende de outras categorias lógicas para afirmação da sua consistência ontológica. Já a efetividade tem poder de autoefetivação em direção à sua idealidade, momento em que algo torna-se efetivo segundo um conjunto de determinações que constituem a sua realidade (efetiva) de forma plena e acabada. 3 O substantivo Aufhebung e o verbo aufheben, amplamente empregados na filosofia hegeliana, têm um significado filosófico próprio. Na ausência de vocábulos na língua portuguesa que possam dar conta do sentido que estas expressões têm na língua alemã, e que são utilizados de uma forma original por Hegel nos seus textos, os tradutores optam por termos linguísticos alternativos nem sempre fiéis ao vocábulo original. Assim, Aufhebung é traduzido ora por "supressão", ora por "superação", ora por "suprassunção" e outros. Optamos pela solução proposta por Marcos L. Muller, na sua tradução para o português das Linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito. Segundo Muller, Aufheben é um 318 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 318 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos se afirmar como aquilo que deve ser de fato segundo o seu conceito, a saber, a idealidade do exterior, a ideia que a si retorna em seu ser-outro, ou, exprimindo de modo mais abstrato, o universal que se diferencia a si mesmo, e, na sua diferença existe em si e para si. O outro, o negativo, a contradição, a cisão pertencem assim à natureza do espírito. Nessa cisão reside a possibilidade da dor... Mesmo nessa sua cisão extrema, nesse arrancar-se pela raiz de sua natureza ética que é em si, nessa mais completa contradição consigo mesmo, o espírito permanece, pois, idêntico a si mesmo e, portanto, livre" (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 382, adendo). "Assim, o espírito está inteiramente junto de si e, portanto, livre, pois a liberdade consiste justamente em estar junto de si mesmo no seu outro, em depender de si, em ser a atividade determinante de si mesmo. Em todas as pulsões eu parto de um outro, de algo que é para mim exterior. Aqui, nós falamos então de dependência." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I, Werke 8, § 23, adendo 2). "Somente assim se realiza a verdadeira liberdade; pois, uma vez que ela consiste na minha identidade com o outro, então, eu somente sou verdadeiramente livre quando o outro é, também, livre e é reconhecido por mim como livre." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 431, adendo). termo polissêmico e tem três sentidos principais: 1) elevar; levantar(-se), erguer(-se); 2) suprimir, pôr fim, anular, abolir, abrogar, revogar, cancelar; compensar-se; 3) guardar, conservar, guardar e entregar em custódia.. Ainda segundo Muller, "dentro do espírito hegeliano de encontrar nos termos da linguagem corrente o seu potencial semântico especulativo..., a palavra da língua portuguesa usual que, analogamente, melhor reproduz o tríplice sentido especulativo do auheben é suspender. Além do significado de pendurar, aqui não pertinente, suspender adquire em alguns contextos o significado de erguer, levantar, noutros, o de cancelar, anular, fazer cessar, e no sentido químico, remete também ao significado de conservar, como no caso de uma mistura líquida de dois elementos de densidade diferente e que se repelem, em que o menos denso se separa e flutua na solução líquida, dizendo-se que ele se suspende. A suspensão do azeite na água, por exemplo, remete, no caso, tanto à elevação quanto à conservação do elemento denso menos composto... Como em muitos contextos de ocorrência de aufheben o sentido negativo é o predominante, senão, às vezes, o exclusivo, utilizar-se-á, neste caso, suprimir, e nos contextos em que a plena polissemia é evocada, suspender." (MULLER, M.L. Introdução à Filosofia do Direito. Clássicos da Filosofia: Cadernos de Tradução[IFCH/UNICAMP], Campinas, n. 9, 2003, nota 25, p. 89-90). 319319 "[...] a comunidade da pessoa com o outro deve essencialmente ser considerada não como uma limitação da verdadeira liberdade do indivíduo, mas como o seu prolongamento [...] Se a comunidade dos seres racionais fosse essencialmente a limitação da verdadeira liberdade, ela seria em si e para si a suprema tirania." (Differenz des Fichteschen und Schllingschen Systems der Philosophie – 1801. In: Hegel Jenaer Schriften. 1801-1807, Werke 2, p. 82). "O universal é, por conseguinte, a potência livre (freie Macht); ele é ele mesmo e sobre-agarra (greift uber) seu outro, não como algo de violento, mas antes, nesse mesmo "outro", está em repouso e no seu próprio elemento" (Wissenschaft der Logik, Werke 6, p. 277). << A liberdade da vontade, os seus elementos conceituais (universalidade, particularidade e singularidade) e a liberdade subjetiva>> "A melhor maneira de explicar-se a liberdade da vontade é por uma referência à natureza física. É que a liberdade é uma determinação fundamental da vontade, do mesmo modo como o ser-pesado o é dos corpos. Quando se diz que a matéria é pesada, poder-se-ia crer que esse predicado seja apenas acidental; ele, porém, não o é, pois a matéria nada é sem peso; esta é, antes, o próprio ser-pesado. O ser-pesado constitui e corpo e é o corpo. O mesmo se passa com a liberdade e com a vontade, pois o [ser] livre é a vontade. Vontade sem liberdade é uma palavra vazia, assim como a liberdade só é efetiva enquanto vontade, enquanto sujeito." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 4, adendo). "O que chamamos propriamente de vontade contém os dois momentos precedentes [universalidade abstrata e particularidade] dentro de si. O eu é, enquanto tal, antes de tudo, atividade pura, o universal que está junto de si (bei sich); mas este universal determina-se e, nesta medida ele não está mais junto de si, mas põe-se como um outro e cessa de ser universal. O terceiro momento consiste em que o eu na sua restrição, nesse outro, está junto de si mesmo, e, ao se determinar, permanece junto 320 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 320 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos de si e não cessa de reter firmemente o universal: este é, então, o conceito concreto da liberdade, ao passo que os dois momentos precedentes foram havidos como abstratos e unilaterais. Já temos esta liberdade na forma do sentimento, por exemplo, na amizade e no amor. Neles não se está mais unilateralmente dentro de si, mas cada um [dos relatos] se restringe, de bom grado, em relação a um outro e sabe-se como si mesmo nessa restrição. Na determinidade o homem não deve sentir-se determinado, mas ao considerar o outro enquanto outro, ele somente nisso tem o sentimento próprio de si. A liberdade não reside, portanto, nem na indeterminidade, nem na determinidade, senão que ela é ambas. A vontade que se restringe apenas a um isto é própria do teimoso, que presume não ser livre se ele não tem esta vontade. A vontade, contudo, não está ligada a um conteúdo restrito, mas tem de ir mais além, pois a natureza da vontade não é esta unilateralidade e esta vinculação, ao contrário, a liberdade consiste em querer algo determinado, porém, nessa determinidade, em estar junto de si e retornar novamente ao universal." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 7, adendo). "O fato de que este momento da particularidade do agente está contido e seja plenamente realizado na ação constitui a liberdade subjetiva em sua determinação mais concreta, o direito do sujeito de encontrar sua satisfação na ação." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 121). "A pergunta pela autodeterminação da vontade, bem como seus móbeis e seus propósitos, sobrevém no campo moral. O valor do homem é apreciado pela sua ação interior; o ponto de vista moral é, portanto, a liberdade sendo para si." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 106, adendo). "A vontade, que é vontade apenas segundo o conceito, é livre em si, mas também, ao mesmo tempo, não-livre, pois ela só seria verdadeiramente livre enquanto conteúdo verdadeiramente determinado; então ela é livre para si, tem a liberdade por objeto, é a liberdade. O que é somente segundo o seu conceito, o que é meramente em si, é só imediato, só natural. Isso é também notório na representação. A criança é homem em si, tem a razão só em si, é só possibilidade de razão e da liberdade, e, assim, 321321 é livre somente segundo o conceito. Mas o que é somente em si, não está em sua efetividade. O homem que é racional em si tem que, pela produção de si mesmo, trabalhar-se plenamente saindo de si, mas, igualmente, cultivando-se interiormente, a fim de que ele seja racional também para si." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 10, adendo). "Como ser vivo o homem pode certamente ser subjugado, isto é, o seu lado físico e qualquer lado exterior seu pode ser submetido à violência de outros, porém a vontade livre não pode, em si e por si, ser coagida (§ 5), a não ser na medida em que ela não se retira a si mesma da exterioridade na qual ela é retida, ou da representação desta (§ 7). Somente pode ser coagido a algo aquele que quer se deixar coagir." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 91). << A liberdade subjetiva como princípio do mundo moderno e a sua presença na sociedade civil >> "Constitui uma grande obstinação que honra ao homem, a de não querer reconhecer na sua disposição de ânimo nada que não tenha sido justificado pelo pensamento. Esta obstinação constitui o traço característico dos Novos Tempos e, ademais, o princípio próprio do protestantismo." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, prefácio, p. 27 ). "Kant foi quem começou a fundar o direito sobre a liberdade. Também Fichte faz da liberdade princípio no seu direito natural; porém, é a liberdade sob a forma do indivíduo singular, como em Rousseau" (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, III, Werke 20, p. 413). "Essa liberdade subjetiva ou moral é, principalmente, aquela se chama de liberdade, no sentido europeu. Em virtude do direito dessa liberdade, o homem deve possuir, propriamente, um conhecimento da diferença entre o bem e o mal em geral; as determinações éticas bem como as religiosas, não devem ser seguidas por ele apenas como leis e prescrições exteriores de uma autoridade, mas devem, também, ter em seu coração disposição, consciência, discernimento etc., o seu consentimento, reconhecimento ou mesmo sua fundamentação. A subjetividade 322 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 322 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos da vontade tem nela mesma seu próprio fim, momento absolutamente essencial." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 503, anotação). "Este princípio de liberdade subjetiva surge posteriormente; é o princípio da época moderna desenvolvida, que aparece também no mundo grego, mas como princípio de corrupção do Estado grego... Nos estados modernos rege a liberdade de consciência que cada indivíduo pode exigir para poder dedicar-se aos seus interesses." (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie II, Werke 19, p. 114). "O direito da particularidade do sujeito de encontrar sua satisfação ou, o que é o mesmo, o direito da liberdade subjetiva constitui o ponto de inflexão e central na diferença entre a Antiguidade e a época moderna." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7 § 124, anotação). "Já faz bem um milênio e meio que a liberdade da pessoa começou a florescer graças ao cristianismo e se tornou princípio universal entre uma parte, de resto pequena, do gênero humano. Mas só ontem, por assim dizer, a liberdade da propriedade foi reconhecida como princípio, aqui e ali." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7 § 62, anotação). "O desenvolvimento subsistente por si da particularidade (cf. § 124 Anot.) mostra-se, nos Estado antigos, como o momento em que irrompe a corrupção dos costumes e como o fundamento último do declínio destes. Esses Estados, construídos seja sobre o princípio patriarcal e religioso, seja sobre o princípio de uma eticidade mais espiritual, porém mais simples, – em geral sobre uma intuição natural originária, – não podiam suportar dentro de si a cisão dessa intuição e a reflexão infinita da autoconsciência dentro de si, e assim,] sucumbiram a essa reflexão quando ela começou a se salientar, primeiro na disposição de ânimo e, depois, na realidade efetiva, porque faltava ao princípio ainda simples desses Estados a força verdadeiramente infinita, que reside unicamente naquela unidade que deixa a oposição da razão divergir em todo o seu vigor e que a dominou, unidade que, portanto, se mantém nessa oposição e a mantém coesa dentro de si.... O princípio da personalidade infinita dentro de si, subsistente por si, do singular, o princípio da liberdade subjetiva, que despontou interiormente 323323 na religião cristã, e exteriormente, ligado por conseguinte à universalidade abstrata, no mundo romano, não acede ao seu direito nessa forma somente substancial do espírito real efetivo. Esse princípio é historicamente posterior ao mundo grego, e a reflexão filosófica, que desce até esta profundidade, é igualmente posterior à ideia substancial da filosofia grega." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 185, anotação). "O momento particularmente essencial de nossa época é aquele, no qual os homens não são mais conduzidos a algo pela autoridade e pela confiança; mas apenas pelo próprio entendimento, mas eles desejam consagrar e engajar a sua atividade em uma coisa apenas pelo seu próprio entendimento, convicção e opinião independentes." (Vorlesungen uber die Philosophie der Geschichte, Werke 12, p. 30). "O princípio do mundo moderno em geral é a liberdade da subjetividade, ele está em que todos os lados essenciais que existem na totalidade espiritual, em chegando ao seu direito, se desenvolvam. Partindo desse ponto de vista, mal se pode levantar a questão ociosa de saber qual forma seja a melhor, se a monarquia ou a democracia. Só é legítimo dizer que as formas de todas as constituições políticas que não conseguem suportar dentro de si o princípio da livre subjetividade e que não sabem corresponder à razão plenamente formada são unilaterais." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 273, adendo). "A liberdade civil [burguesa – burgerlich] é, com efeito, a privação do universal, princípio do isolamento. Mas esta liberdade (para bourgeois e citoyen não temos duas palavras) constitui um momento necessário que os antigos estados não conheciam e nem mesmo esta completa independência das partes, mas tinham, justamente, uma maior independência do todo a vida orgânica superior." (Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, II, Werke 19, p. 228). << A mediação do reconhecimento na reciprocidade das autoconsciências na constituição da autoconsciência universal da eticidade>> "A autoconsciência alcança sua satisfação somente em outra autoconsciên324 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 324 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos cia." (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, p. 144). "A autoconsciência é em si e para si quando e porque é em si e para si para uma outra consciência de si; quer dizer, ela só é enquanto um ser reconhecido." (Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke 3, p. 145). "A autoconsciência universal é o saber afirmativo de si mesmo em um outro si mesmo, cada um deles, como individualidade livre, tem absoluta independência; porém, em virtude da negação da sua imediatidade ou apetite, um não se distingue do outro; é [autoconsciência] universal e objetiva e tem, assim, a real universalidade como reciprocidade; de modo que se sabe reconhecido em um outro indivíduo livre, e o sabe enquanto reconhece o outro e o sabe livre. Este reaparecer universal da autoconsciência, o conceito que se sabe em sua objetividade como subjetividade idêntica consigo e, portanto, universal, é a forma de consciência própria à substância de toda espiritualidade essencial da família, da pátria, do Estado, como de todas as virtudes do amor, da amizade, do valor, da honra, da glória." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 436). << A crítica ao jusnaturalismo >> "A expressão direito natural, que chegou a ser costumeira na doutrina filosófica do direito, contém o ambiguidade se o direito existe de modo natural imediato ou se ele se determina pela natureza da coisa, isto é, pelo conceito. O primeiro sentido é aquele que foi visto outrora: do mesmo modo que, ao mesmo tempo, foi inventado um estado de natureza, no qual devia valer o direito natural, e diante do qual a condição da sociedade e do Estado parecia exigir e levar consigo uma limitação da liberdade e um sacrifício dos direitos naturais. Porém, em realidade, o direito e todas as suas determinações fundam-se somente na livre personalidade: uma autodeterminação que é o contrário da determinação natural. O direito da natureza é, portanto, o ser-aí da força, a prevalência da violência; e um estado de natureza é um estado da brutalidade e da injustiça, do qual nada mais verdadeiro se pode dizer que é preciso sair dele. A sociedade, ao contrário, 325325 é, antes, a condição na qual o direito tem somente a sua realidade efetiva; o que é preciso limitar e sacrificar é, justamente, o arbítrio e a violência do estado de natureza." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 502, anotação) << O desenvolvimento tripartite da Ideia da vontade livre como base para a divisão da obra linhas fundamentais da filosofia do direito >> "Segundo o andamento gradual do desenvolvimento da ideia da vontade livre em si e para si, a vontade é: A. imediata; seu conceito [é], por isso, abstrato, a personalidade, e o seu ser-aí [é] uma coisa exterior imediata; – a esfera do direito abstrato ou formal; B. a vontade refletida (a)dentro de si a partir do ser-aí externo, determinada como singularidade subjetiva em face do universal; – este [sendo] em parte como algo interno, o bem, em parte como algo externo, um mundo aí-presente, e esses dois lados da ideia [sendo] somente enquanto mediados um pelo outro; a ideia na sua cisão ou na sua existência particular, o direito da vontade subjetiva em relação ao direito do mundo e ao direito da Ideia, mas da ideia sendo somente em si, a esfera da moralidade; C. a unidade e a verdade desses dois momentos abstratos, – a ideia pensada do bem, realizada na vontade refletida (a) dentro de si e no mundo exterior; de sorte que a liberdade, enquanto substância, existe tanto como efetividade e necessidade quanto como vontade subjetiva, – a ideia na sua existência universal em si e para si; a eticidade." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 33). "Ao falarmos, aqui, do Direito não aludimos meramente ao direito civil, ao que se entende usualmente por direito, mas à moralidade e à eticidade, e à história do mundo, que igualmente pertencem a essa esfera, porque o conceito reúne os pensamentos segundo a verdade. A vontade livre, para não permanecer abstrata, tem de, primeiramente, dar-se um 326 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 326 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos ser-aí, e o primeiro material sensível desse ser-aí são as Coisas, isto é, as coisas externas. Este primeiro modo da liberdade é o modo que devemos conhecer como propriedade, a esfera do direito formal e abstrato, à qual não pertence menos a propriedade na sua figura mediada, enquanto contrato, do que o direito em sua lesão enquanto crime e pena. A liberdade que temos aqui é o que denominamos pessoa, quer dizer, o sujeito que é livre para si, e que se dá um ser-aí nas Coisas. Esta mera imediatez do ser-aí, porém, não é adequada à liberdade, e a negação dessa determinação é a esfera da moralidade. Eu sou livre não mais simplesmente nesta Coisa imediata, mas o sou, também, na imediatez suspensa, quer dizer, eu sou em si mesmo, no [que] é subjetivo. Nesta esfera o que importa é o meu discernimento e a minha intenção, e o meu fim, ao passo que a exterioridade é posta como indiferente. O bem, que é aqui o fim universal, não deve entretanto permanecer meramente no meu interior, mas deve realizar-se. Pois a vontade subjetiva exige que o seu interior, isto é, o seu fim, receba um ser-aí externo, que, portanto, o bem deva ser consumado na existência exterior. A moralidade, tal como momento anterior do direito formal, uma e o outro são abstrações, cuja verdade é somente a eticidade. A eticidade é, assim, a unidade da vontade no seu conceito e da vontade do singular, quer dizer, do sujeito. Seu primeiro ser-aí, novamente, é algo natural, na forma do amor e do sentimento: a família; o indivíduo suspendeu aí a sua rigidez de personalidade e encontra-se com a sua consciência num todo. Mas no degrau ou estágio seguinte, vê-se a perda da eticidade propriamente dita e da unidade substancial: a família desagrega-se, e os seus membros relacionam-se uns com os outros enquanto subsistentes por si, visto que somente o vínculo da carência recíproca os entrelaça. Este estágio, o da sociedade civil, foi frequentemente encarado como sendo o Estado. Mas o Estado é só o terceiro, a eticidade e o espírito, no qual ocorre a prodigiosa união da subsistência por si da individualidade e da substancialidade universal. O direito do Estado é, por isso, superior ao [direito] dos outros degraus ou estágios: ele é a liberdade em sua configuração mais concreta, que só se subordina, ainda, à suprema verdade absoluta do espírito do mundo." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 33, adendo). 327327 "O solo do Direito é, em geral, o [elemento] espiritual e o seu lugar mais próximo e ponto de partida [é] a vontade que é livre, assim que a liberdade constitui a sua substância e a sua destinação, e que o sistema do direito é o reino da liberdade efetivada (verwirklichten Freiheit), o mundo do espírito produzido a partir do próprio espírito como uma segunda natureza." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 4). << A articulação da liberdade subjetiva na objetividade da vontade universal da eticidade >> "A unilateralidade do espírito subjetivo é a determinação de si próprio – de modo igualmente abstrato – em oposição ao universal, em sua singularidade interior. Superadas essas unilateralidades, a liberdade subjetiva é, assim, como vontade universal racional em si e para si, a qual tem na consciência da subjetividade singular seu saber de si e sua disposição (Gesinnung) subjetiva, bem como ela tem, ao mesmo tempo, sua atuação e sua realidade efetiva universal imediata como costume (Sitte), a liberdade autoconsciente tornada natureza." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 513). "A eticidade (Sittlichkeit) é a consumação do espírito objetivo, a verdade do próprio espírito objetivo e subjetivo. A unilateralidade do espírito objetivo é ter, em parte, a sua liberdade [de forma] imediata na realidade, portanto, na exterioridade – a coisa; em parte, no bem como uma universalidade abstrata. A unilateralidade do espírito subjetivo consiste na autodeterminação interior, de igual modo abstrata, em oposição à universalidade da sua individualidade. Uma vez superadas essas unilateralidades, a liberdade subjetiva é, assim, como vontade universal racional em si e para si, a qual tem na consciência da subjetividade singular seu saber de si e sua disposição (Gesinnung) subjetiva, assim como ela tem, ao mesmo tempo, sua atuação e sua efetividade universal imediata como costume (Sitte), a liberdade autoconsciente que se tornou natureza." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 513). "A eticidade é a ideia da liberdade enquanto [sendo] o bem vivo, 328 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 328 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos o qual tem na autoconsciência o seu saber e o seu querer, e, mediante o seu agir, a sua realidade efetiva, assim como este agir tem no ser ético a sua base sendo em si e para si e o seu fim motor, – o conceito de liberdade tornado mundo existente e natureza da autoconsciência" (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 142). "Moralidade e eticidade, que habitualmente quase se equivalem como sinônimos, são tomados, aqui, em sentido essencialmente diverso. Entrementes, mesmo a representação parece distingui-los; a linguagem kantiana serve-se, de preferência, da expressão moralidade, pois os princípios práticos desta filosofia restringem-se inteiramente a esse conceito, tornam, até, impossível o ponto de vista da eticidade, e, mesmo, expressamente a aniquilam e lhe resistem. Mesmo que moralidade e eticidade fossem, segundo a sua etimologia, sinônimos, isto não obstaria a que se usasse essas palavras, uma vez que diversas, para conceitos diversos." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7 § 33, anotação). << O indivíduo na esfera da família e a sua subsunção na sociedade civil >> "Num primeiro momento a família é o todo substancial ao qual compete a prevenção deste lado particular do indivíduo, tanto no que diz respeito aos meios e habilidades para poder adquirir para si [algo] da riqueza patrimonial universal, como também no que diz respeito à sua subsistência e ao seu provimento no caso de incapacidade interveniente. A sociedade civil arranca, porém, o indivíduo desse laço familiar, torna os membros da família estranhos uns aos outros e os reconhece como pessoas subsistentes por si; além disso, ela substitui a natureza orgânica externa e o solo paterno, no qual o singular tinha a sua subsistência, pelo seu [próprio] solo e submete o subsistir de toda a família à dependência da sociedade, à contingência. Assim, o indivíduo tornou-se filho da sociedade civil, que tanto tem pretensões em relação a ela, quanto ele tem direitos em relação a ela." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 238). 329329 "A família, enquanto substancialidade imediata do espírito, tem como sua determinação a unidade sob a forma do sentimento (empfindende Einheit), o amor, de sorte que a disposição de ânimo (Gesinnung) é de ter a autoconsciência de sua individualidade nesta unidade, enquanto essencialidade em si e para si, a fim de existir nela como membro e não como uma pessoa para si." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 158) << O significado da sociedade civil – da particularidade e da liberdade subjetiva nesta sociedade – e as suas limitações e contradições >> "A sociedade civil é a diferença que intervém entre a família e o Estado, embora a sua formação plena ocorra mais tarde do que a do Estado, pois, como diferença, ela pressupõe o Estado, que ela, para existir, tem de ter diante de si como algo subsistente por si. A criação da sociedade civil pertence, de resto, ao mundo moderno, que, pela primeira vez, faz justiça a todas as determinações da Ideia. Se o Estado é representado como uma unidade de pessoas diversas, como uma unidade que é somente serem-comum, então só se visa com isso a determinação da sociedade civil. Muitos teóricos modernos do Estado não puderam alcançar nenhuma outra maneira de ver o Estado. Na sociedade civil cada um é fim para si, e tudo o mais nada é para ele. Mas sem relação aos outros ele não pode atingir a amplitude dos seus fins; esses outros são, por isso, meios para o fim do particular. Porém, pela sua relação aos outros, o fim particular se dá a forma da universalidade e se satisfaz enquanto, ao mesmo tempo, satisfaz conjuntamente o bem-próprio de outrem." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 182, adendo). "A pessoa concreta, que como particular é fim para si, enquanto ela é um todo de carências e uma mistura de necessidade natural e de arbítrio, é um princípio da sociedade civil, – mas a pessoa particular, enquanto ela está essencialmente em relação a outra tal particularidade, assim que cada uma se faça valer e se satisfaça mediada pela outra e, ao mesmo tempo, pura e simplesmente só enquanto mediada pela forma da universalidade, é o outro princípio." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 330 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 330 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos Werke 7, § 182). "Mantida, porém, pela ordem objetiva, em conformidade com ela e, ao mesmo tempo, no seu direito, a particularidade subjetiva torna-se o princípio de toda a animação da sociedade civil-burguesa, do desenvolvimento da atividade pensante, do mérito e da honra. O reconhecimento e o direito de que aquilo que na sociedade-civil e no Estado é necessário pela razão simultaneamente aconteça pela mediação do arbítrio é uma determinação mais precisa daquilo que, nomeadamente na representação geral, chama-se liberdade (§ 121)." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, §206, anotação). "No direito o objeto é a pessoa, no ponto de vista moral é o sujeito, na família é o membro da família, na sociedade civil em geral é o cidadão (como bourgeois) – aqui, do ponto de vista das carências (cf. § 123 Anot.), é o concreto da representação, o que se chama homem; portanto, é pela primeira vez aqui e só aqui que se fala do homem nesse sentido." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 190, anotação). "Tal como na sociedade civil o direito em si se torna lei, assim também o ser-aí imediato e abstrato do meu direito singular passa à significação do ser-reconhecido enquanto um ser-aí [baseado] no saber e no querer universais existentes. Por isso, as aquisições e as ações relativas à propriedade tem de ser empreendidas e revestidas com a forma que lhes dá esse ser-aí. Agora, [na sociedade civil] a propriedade repousa sobre o contrato e sobre as formalidades que a tornam suscetível de prova e lhe dão força jurídica." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 217). "A particularidade para si, enquanto ela é, por um lado, a satisfação, se expandindo para todos os lados, das suas carências, do arbítrio contingente e do capricho subjetivo, destrói nas suas fruições a si mesma e o seu conceito substancial; por outro lado, enquanto infinitamente excitada e em completa dependência da contingência externa e do arbítrio, assim como restringida pelo poder da universalidade, a satisfação da carência, seja ela necessária, seja ela contingente, é [ela própria] contingente. A sociedade civil oferece, nestas oposições e no seu emaranhamento, o espetáculo simultâneo da extravagância, da miséria e da corrupção física 331331 e moral comum a ambas." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 185). << A conciliação entre a liberdade subjetiva e a liberdade objetiva no valor ético-político superior do Estado >> "O homem tem uma existência conforme a razão somente no Estado. O fim de toda educação é a de que o indivíduo não permaneça como um ser subjetivo, mas que ele se torne objetivo no Estado. Um indivíduo pode muito bem fazer do Estado um meio para alcançar isto ou aquilo. Mas o verdadeiro é que cada um queira a coisa mesma e elimine o que é inessencial. Tudo o que o homem é ele o deve ao Estado; é somente nele que o homem tem a sua essência. Todo o valor que o homem possui, toda efetividade espiritual, ele somente as possui pelo Estado... Somente assim ele é consciência, somente assim ele está no costume ético; da vida jurídica e ética do Estado. Porque o verdadeiro é a unidade da vontade universal e da vontade subjetiva, e o universal está no Estado, nas leis, nas determinações universais e racionais... O Estado é a vida ética efetiva e existente, pois ele é a unidade do querer universal e essencial e do querer subjetivo, e esta unidade constitui a vida ética. O indivíduo que vive numa tal unidade tem uma vida ética e um valor que consiste apenas nesta substancialidade." (Die Vernunft in der Geschichte. Ed. J. Hoffmeister, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955, p. 111-112) "O Estado é a substância ética autoconsciente, a união do princípio da família e da sociedade civil-burguesa; a mesma unidade, que na família é como sentimento do amor, constitui a sua essência, a qual, porém, ao mesmo tempo, mediante o segundo princípio do querer que sabe e é ativo a partir de si, recebe a forma da universalidade que se sabe. Esta unidade tem (...) por conteúdo e fim absoluto a subjetividade ciente de si, isto é, que quer para si este racional." (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, Werke 10, § 535). "Se o Estado é confundido com a sociedade civil e se a sua determinação é posta na segurança e na proteção da propriedade e da liberda332 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 332 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos de pessoal, então o interesse dos singulares enquanto tais é o último fim em vista do qual eles estão unidos, e daí segue-se, igualmente, que depende do bel-prazer ser membro do Estado. – Mas o Estado tem uma relação inteiramente diferente ao indivíduo; como o Estado é espírito objetivo, o indivíduo só tem objetividade, verdade e eticidade enquanto ele é membro do Estado. A união como tal, ela própria, é o verdadeiro conteúdo e fim, e a destinação dos indivíduos é levar uma vida universal; a sua ulterior satisfação particular, a sua atividade e as suas modalidades de comportamento têm esse [elemento] substancial e universalmente válido por ponto de partida e por resultado. – Considerada abstratamente, a racionalidade consiste, em geral, na unidade em que se interpenetram a universalidade e a singularidade e aqui, concretamente, segundo o conteúdo, na unidade da liberdade objetiva, isto é, da vontade substancial universal, e da liberdade subjetiva enquanto liberdade do saber individual e da vontade que busca os seus fins particulares – e, por isso, segundo a forma, [consiste] num agir que se determina segundo leis e princípios pensados, isto é, universais." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 258, anotação.) "No Estado tudo depende da unidade da universalidade e da particularidade. Nos Estados antigos o fim subjetivo era absolutamente uma coisa só com o querer do Estado; nos Tempos Modernos, ao contrário, exigimos uma maneira de ver própria, um querer e uma consciência moral que nos sejam próprios. Os antigos, neste sentido, não tinham nada disto; a vontade do Estado era para eles a última instância... O Estado confere às determinações da vontade individual um ser-aí objetivo e só por meio dele elas alcançam a sua verdade e a sua realização efetiva. O Estado é a condição única da consecução do fim e do bem-próprio particulares." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 261, adendo). "O Estado é a efetividade da liberdade concreta; ora a liberdade concreta consiste em que a singularidade pessoal e os seus interesses particulares tanto tenham o seu desenvolvimento completo e o reconhecimento do seu direito para si (no sistema da família e da sociedade civil), quanto, em parte passem por si mesmos ao interesse do universal, em parte reconheçam-no, com saber e vontade, como o seu espírito substancial, e sejam 333333 ativos a favor do universal como seu fim-último, e isso de tal maneira que nem o universal valha e possa ser consumado sem o interesse, o saber e o querer particulares, nem os indivíduos vivam apenas para estes como pessoas privadas, sem querê-los, simultaneamente, no universal e para o universal e sem que tenham uma atuação consciente desse fim. O princípio dos Estados modernos tem este vigor e esta profundidade prodigiosos de deixar o princípio da subjetividade plenificar-se até o extremo subsistente por si da particularidade pessoal e, ao mesmo tempo, de reconduzi-lo à unidade substancial, e, assim, de manter essa unidade substancial nesse próprio princípio da subjetividade." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 260). "O Estado é a efetividade da ideia ética, – o espírito ético enquanto vontade substancial, clara a si mesma, manifesta, que se pensa e se sabe e realiza plenamente o que ela sabe e na medida em que o sabe. No costume ele tem a sua existência imediata e na autoconsciência do singular, no saber e na atividade do mesmo, a sua existência mediada, assim como essa autoconsciência do singular, através da [sua] disposição de ânimo, tem no Estado, como sua essência, fim e produto da sua atividade, a sua liberdade substancial." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 257). "O Estado, enquanto efetividade da vontade substancial, efetividade que ela tem na autoconsciência particular erguida à universalidade do Estado, é o racional em si e por si. Esta unidade substancial é auto-fim imoto, absoluto, no qual a liberdade chega ao seu supremo direito, assim como este fim-último tem o direito supremo em face dos singulares, cujo dever supremo é o de ser membro do Estado." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 258). "O Estado, enquanto [elemento] ético, enquanto interpenetração do substancial e do particular, implica que a minha obrigação para com o substancial seja, simultaneamente, o ser-aí da minha liberdade particular, isto é, que, nele, obrigação e direito estejam unidos numa e mesma relação." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 261, anotação). "No Estado tudo depende da unidade da universalidade e da particularidade. Nos Estados antigos o fim subjetivo era absolutamente uma 334 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 334 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos só coisa com o querer do Estado; nos Tempos Modernos, ao contrário, exigimos uma maneira de ver própria, um querer e uma consciência moral que nos sejam próprios. Os antigos, neste sentido, não tinham nada disso; a vontade do Estado era para eles a última instância. Enquanto que nos despotismos asiáticos o indivíduo não tem nenhuma interioridade e nenhuma legitimação em si mesmo, o homem moderno quer ser respeitado na sua interioridade. A ligação entre dever e direito tem esta dupla face, de sorte que o que o Estado exige como dever é, também, imediatamente, o direito da individualidade, visto que eles nada são senão a organização do conceito de liberdade. O Estado confere às determinações da vontade individual um ser-aí objetivo e só por meio dele elas alcançam a sua verdade e a sua efetivação. O Estado é a condição única da consecução do fim e do bem-próprio particulares." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 261, adendo). "O Estado é efetivo e a sua efetividade consiste em que o interesse do todo se realize nos fins particulares. Efetividade é, sempre, a unidade da universalidade e da particularidade, a explicação e desdobramento (Auseinandergelegtsein) do universal na particularidade, que aparece como uma particularidade subsistente por si, embora ela seja somente enquanto sustentada pelo todo e nele mantida. Enquanto essa unidade não estiver presente, algo não é efetivo, ainda que seja legítimo supor a [sua] existência. Um mau Estado é um Estado que meramente existe; um corpo doente também existe, mas ele não tem nenhuma realidade verdadeira. Uma mão que está decepada também parece ainda com uma mão e existe, sem ser, contudo, efetiva: o que é efetivo é em si mesmo necessário. A necessidade consiste em que o todo esteja dividido nas diferenças do conceito e que esse momento dividido forneça uma determinidade sólida e duradoura, que não é rígida como a morte, mas que se engendra continuamente na [sua] dissolução. Ao Estado acabado pertence essencialmente a consciência, o pensamento; o Estado sabe por isso o que ele quer, e o sabe enquanto algo pensado." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 270, adendo). "Uma vez que o espírito só é efetivo enquanto aquilo que ele sabe de si, e o Estado, enquanto espírito de um povo, é simultaneamente a lei 335335 que penetra e perpassa todas as situações desse povo, os costumes e a consciência dos seus indivíduos, segue-se que a constituição de um povo determinado depende, em geral, da maneira de ser e da formação da autoconsciência do mesmo; nesta autoconsciência reside a liberdade subjetiva desse povo e, portanto, a efetividade da constituição." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 274). "A essência do Estado moderno está em que o universal esteja ligado com a plena liberdade da particularidade e com a prosperidade dos indivíduos, em que, portanto, o interesse da família e da sociedade civil tem de se concentrar e convergir para o Estado, mas em que [também] a universalidade do fim não pode progredir sem o saber e o querer próprios da particularidade, que deve reter o seu direito. O universal, por conseguinte, tem de ser ativado, mas, por outro lado, a subjetividade tem de ser inteiramente e vivamente desenvolvida. Somente pelo fato de que ambos momentos subsistem no seu vigor é que o Estado pode ser encarado como um Estado articulado e verdadeiramente organizado." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 260, adendo). "Em face das esferas do direito privado e do bem-próprio privado, da família e da sociedade civil, o Estado é, por um lado, uma necessidade exterior e a potência superior a elas, a cuja natureza estão subordinadas as leis bem como os interesses dessas esferas e de cuja natureza dependem; mas, por outro lado, ele é o fim imanente dessas esferas, e tem o seu vigor na unidade do seu fim-último universal e do interesse particular dos indivíduos, em que os indivíduos têm deveres para com ele na medida em que, ao mesmo tempo, têm direitos em face dele." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 261). "Visto que o espírito só é efetivamente real enquanto é aquilo que ele sabe de si, e o Estado, como espírito de um povo, é simultaneamente a lei que penetra e perpassa todas as relações desse povo, os costumes e a consciência dos indivíduos, segue-se que a constituição de um povo determinado depende, em geral, da maneira de ser e da formação da autoconsciência do mesmo; nesta autoconsciência reside a liberdade subjetiva desse povo e, portanto, a realidade efetiva da constituição." (Grundlinien der 336 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 336 hegeL • eXCertos e pArágrAfos trAduzidos Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 274). "O Estado não é, de maneira nenhuma, um contrato (veja-se § 75), nem a sua essência substancial é tão incondicionadamente a proteção e a garantia da vida e da propriedade dos indivíduos enquanto singulares, ao contrário, ele é uma instância superior, que reclama essa vida e essa propriedade, e exige o seu sacrifício." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 100, anotação). "O direito dos indivíduos à sua destinação subjetiva para a liberdade tem o seu cumprimento no fato de que eles pertencem à efetividade ética, enquanto a certeza da sua liberdade tem a sua verdade em tal objetividade e enquanto eles efetivamente possuem no elemento ético a sua própria essência, a sua universalidade interna." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 153). "Faz parte da formação, do pensar enquanto consciência do singular na forma da universalidade, que eu seja apreendido como pessoa universal, no que todos são idênticos. O homem vale, portanto, porque ele é homem, e não porque seja judeu, católico, protestante, alemão, italiano etc. Essa consciência, para a qual o pensamento vale, é de uma importância infinita, – ela só é defeituosa, quando, por exemplo, no sentido do cosmopolitismo, ela se fixa em defrontar com a vida concreta do Estado." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 209, anotação). "A essencial disposição de espírito dos cidadãos em relação ao Estado e ao seu governo não é nem de obediência cega às suas ordens, nem de um assentimento individual que cada um deveria dar às disposições e regras instituídas no seio do estado, mas uma confiança e uma obediência esclarecida." (Nurnberger und Heidelberger Schriften. 1808-1817, Werke 4, Propädeutik, § 196). "A opinião pública é o modo inorgânico como se dá a conhecer aquilo que um povo quer e opina. O que efetivamente se faz valer no Estado tem de sem dúvida tornar-se ativo de um modo orgânico, e isso ocorre na constituição. Mas, em todos os tempos, a opinião pública foi um grande poder e o é particularmente no nosso tempo, em que o prin337337 cípio da liberdade subjetiva tem esta importância e esta significação. O que atualmente deve valer, não vale mais pela força, menos pelo hábito e pelo costume, mas sim pelo discernimento e por razões." (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, § 316, adendo). hobbes e o estAdo338 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 338 339339 O que aconteceria se não estivéssemos de algum modo obrigados a respeitar as leis civis, se cada um pudesse agir como bem entendesse, conforme apenas a própria vontade e segundo o próprio juízo? E, havendo leis, será que seriam respeitadas se não houvesse um poder coercitivo, tal como o do Estado, nos forçando a obedecê-las? Pois, quando percebemos que os outros não respeitam as leis, não nos sentimos justificados para também infringi-las, de modo que, na falta de um poder que as faça respeitar por todos, deixamos de reconhecer leis comuns e pautar nossa conduta por elas? O que aconteceria, enfim, se não houvesse um poder coercitivo, impondo leis aos homens e fazendo com que sejam respeitadas por todos? A essas perguntas thomas hOBBES respondeu que, na falta desse poder, não haveria leis comuns, e, na falta delas, os homens se encontrariam numa condição de guerra de todos contra todos, numa situação em que não haveria lugar para a indústria, nem para a agricultura ou para a navegação, como também não para as ciências e as letras, e nem mesmo para a sociedade. Pior que isso, acrescenta ele: viveríamos num constante temor uns dos outros, com medo da morte violenta. E a vida HOBBES E O ESTAdO hobbes e o estAdo340 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 340 seria "solitária, pobre, sórdida, embrutecida e curta." (Leviatã, cap. XIII) Dessa suposição, Hobbes retira a conclusão de que temos boas razões para vivermos sob o jugo das leis instituídas e impostas pelo Estado, um bom motivo para nos submetermos a um determinado poder político, a um homem ou conjunto de homens com poder de fazer leis e governar. É o que temos que fazer para escapar daquela situação de miséria. E é para nos convencer disso que Hobbes escreveu o Leviatã, como um convite à obediência civil. Desde o tempo em que o Leviatã foi publicado, uma certa desconfiança pesou sobre esse raciocínio. Os homens seriam então tão maus a ponto de não conseguirem se pôr de acordo e desenvolver atividades cooperativas e, pior ainda, a ponto de constituírem uma ameaça constante uns para os outros, na ausência de um poder que os governe? Não haveria um certo exagero nisso? Então os homens não seriam capazes de reconhecer leis reguladoras da convivência e de se respeitarem mutuamente, se não forem forçados a isso? Tendo em vista que Hobbes estabelece uma relação direta entre as misérias da guerra e a necessidade da obediência civil, pode-se suspeitar que ele teria carregado as tintas na descrição das desgraças que assolariam os homens na ausência de um poder comum, como um modo de nos tornar obedientes, quer dizer, obediente demais, como se os nossos intuitos rebeldes e contestadores fossem sempre injustificados e nos levassem sempre à desordem e à confusão. E, de fato, no período em que Hobbes escreveu os seus escritos políticos – os Elementos da Lei (1640), o Do Cidadão (1642) e o Leviatã (1651), hoje a sua obra mais conhecida e a versão mais madura de seu pensamento político –, a Inglaterra passava por um momento de grande conturbação política. Em 1642, teve início uma guerra civil, que culminou, em 1649, na execução do rei Carlos I, quando então se instaurou um regime republicano, que durou até a restauração da monarquia em 1660. Hobbes havia sido preceptor do rei deposto e, entre 1640 e 1652, esteve refugiado na França, juntamente com diversos outros membros da corte inglesa. Hobbes escreve assim sob o impacto e os efeitos da guerra. E é ele mesmo quem relata, no prefácio ao Do Cidadão, que deixou tempora341341 riamente de lado seus outros interesses teóricos, pela ótica, pela física e pela lógica, para escrever sobre a política, tendo em vista a urgência de contribuir para a estabilização da vida política inglesa. Ora, a experiência da guerra civil e o desejo de restaurar a ordem não teriam levado Hobbes a uma descrição excessivamente pessimista do homem, como um modo de combater o espírito revolucionário que tomava conta da Inglaterra do seu tempo e que ele declaradamente via com maus olhos? Antes de nos apressarmos a tirar essa conclusão, vamos olhar de perto para o que Hobbes escreve. Vejamos como ele procurou sustentar a sua tese de que a condição natural do homem é um situação de guerra e miséria no capítulo XIII do Leviatã. Observemos o primeiro parágrafo do texto: "a natureza fez os homens tão iguais, quanto às faculdades de corpo e de espírito, que (...) a diferença entre um e outro homem não é suficientemente considerável para que qualquer um possa com base nela reclamar qualquer benefício a que o outro não possa também aspirar, tal como ele." O ponto de partida do raciocínio é, assim, a ideia de igualdade – mais precisamente a ideia de uma igualdade de poder entre os homens, entendendo por poder a capacidade que cada um tem, os meios de que dispõe para realizar o que deseja.1 Seu ponto é: os homens são iguais, logo, se um homem possuir algo que um outro deseja ou se houver alguma controvérsia entre eles, não há porque um aceite, sem contestar, a vontade do outro, já que ambos dispõem de poderes iguais para atingirem seus fins. Pode então haver uma disputa entre eles, sem nenhuma garantia de que este ou aquele saia vencedor. Note-se a forma condicional de sua formulação: "se dois homens desejam a mesma coisa, ao mesmo tempo em que é impossível ela ser gozada por ambos, eles tornam-se inimigos". Dessa simples possibilidade Hobbes deriva a tese de que tendemos para a guerra. Se uma situação de disputa é possível, é natural que os homens se precavejam, acumulando poder em garantia contra a eventualidade do outro fazer obstáculo à realização dos seus desejos. Ou seja, porque uma situação 1 Ver sobre isso o capítulo X do Leviatã. hobbes e o estAdo342 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 342 de disputa é sempre possível, os homens acabam se antecipando a ela e criando efetivamente um clima de disputa. Pois, esclarece Hobbes, "tal como a natureza do mau tempo não consiste em dois ou três chuviscos, mas numa tendência para chover que dura vários dias seguidos, assim também a natureza da guerra não consiste na luta real, mas na conhecida disposição para tal, durante todo o tempo em que não há garantia do contrário". Assim posta, a premissa do raciocínio político de Hobbes talvez nos pareça menos exagerada e mais aceitável. Hobbes não está dizendo que os homens têm uma índole competitiva, que sempre procuram tirar proveito uns dos outros ou algo assim. O que ele diz é que, ali onde os homens contam apenas com o próprio poder para fazer valer sua vontade, na eventualidade de entrarem em conflito com os outros, a tendência é que suas relações se degradem numa relação de guerra generalizada, numa condição de disputa pelo poder. Mesmo assim, talvez não fiquemos convencidos com a tese de que tendemos para a guerra. Por que razão o conflito estaria sempre no horizonte das relações humanas, que seja como uma eventualidade? Então os homens não estariam naturalmente restringidos por certos deveres recíprocos e não seriam capazes de empregar o seu poder levando em conta o limite imposto pelos direitos dos outros, de modo que não se prejudiquem uns aos outros e não se metam em brigas? Tocamos aqui no coração do argumento de Hobbes. Concordemos ou não, é isso o que ele quer sustentar, a saber, que efetivamente não há nenhuma restrição natural à nossa liberdade de usar nosso poder como bem entendermos, mesmo quando entendemos que, em certas circunstâncias, ele deve ser empregado contra outro homem. Não há nada que nos proíba de fazê-lo, quando julgamos que isso é necessário à preservação da nossa existência. É essa ideia que Hobbes quer passar com a sua definição do "direito natural (Leviatã, cap. XIV): "o direito de natureza, a que os autores chamam jus naturale, é a liberdade que cada homem possui de usar o seu próprio poder, da maneira que quiser, para a preservação de sua própria natureza, ou seja, de sua vida; e consequentemente de fazer tudo o que 343343 seu próprio julgamento e razão lhe indicarem como meios adequados a esse fim." O direito é uma liberdade – a liberdade de fazer ou empregar o nosso poder da maneira que julgamos necessário à preservação da própria vida. Nada restringe essa liberdade, pois, o único dever que temos por natureza, isto é, a única lei natural que restringiria o nosso direito é a de fazer tudo o que pensamos ser necessário à preservação da vida. Ou seja, o único dever que temos não restringe, mas afirma o nosso direito ou a nossa liberdade de usar o poder da maneira que bem entendermos, mesmo quando essa maneira entra em conflito com os outros, se (e essa é a única restrição da nossa liberdade natural) entendermos que isso é necessário à nossa sobrevivência. Mas, enquanto cada homem for o único juiz do que entender ser necessário à própria sobrevivência, não sabemos que comportamento esperar dos outros, e isso, como vimos, nos engaja num clima de desconfiança e guerra. Segue-se daí que, se queremos escapar à guerra e às suas misérias, temos que de algum modo restringir o nosso direito natural. Como não há nada na natureza que o restrinja, temos que fazê-lo arficialmente. Esse é o papel dos contratos. Nós homens podemos instituir, criar voluntariamente obrigações recíprocas por meio de contratos. Basta para isso que utilizemos da fala para prometer fazer isso em troca daquilo. Mais especificamente, por meio da fala podemos fazer contratos pelos quais nos comprometemos uns com os outros a não usar o nosso poder de uma certa maneira que não convenha ao outro, em troca de que ele faça o mesmo por nós. Hobbes define o contrato como uma transferência mútua de direitos. Trata-se, na verdade, da criação de deveres recíprocos por meio dos quais se limita o direito natural. Mas, bastaria isso para criar uma obrigação? Basta falar "eu prometo isso e aquilo" para que eu esteja obrigado a fazê-lo? Em certo sentido sim, explica Hobbes, pois prometer e não cumprir é como se contradizer, é uma incoerência. Há aí, como ele diz, um certo "vínculo de palavras", na medida em que dizer algo coerentemente é levar em conta as consequências e implicações das coisas que dizemos. Mas esses vínculos de coerência são, é claro, muito frágeis. Passa-se facilmente por cima deles. E, por isso, eles pouco servem na ausência de alguma garantia de hobbes e o estAdo344 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 344 que sejam respeitados. É essa garantia que procuramos ao instituir o Estado. O Estado é ele mesmo instituído por contrato. É como se cada um dissesse "cedo e transfiro meu direito de governar-me a mim mesmo a este homem, ou a esta assembleia de homens, com a condição de transferires a ele teu direito, autorizando de maneira semelhante todas as suas ações" (Leviatã, cap. XVII). Por meio dessa declaração, institui-se o Estado, isto é, um poder soberano, um poder que está acima de todos os outros e que não é senão a soma do poder dos indivíduos que, por meio desse contrato, unem suas vontades numa só. Esse poder é garantia do cumprimento do próprio contrato civil, isto é, do contrato instituinte do Estado e de todos os outros que foram feito(s) a partir dele e sob a sua guarda. Esse poder garante, então, que possamos regular nossas relações recíprocas por obrigações que nós mesmos criamos, mediante as quais construímos o caminho da paz. Sugestões para leitura: PrinciPais obras de hOBBES traduzidas Para o Português: HOBBES, T. Leviatã: ou matéria, forma e poder de uma república eclesiástica e civil. Tradução de João Paulo Monteiro, Maria Beatriz Nizza da Silva. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003. HOBBES, T. Os Elementos da lei natural e política. Tradução de Fernando Dias Andrade. São Paulo: Ícone, 2002. HOBBES, T. Do Cidadão. Tradução, apresentação e notas de Renato Janine Ribeiro. 3. ed. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002. HOBBES, T. Behemoth. Tradução de Eunice Ostrensky. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 2001. HOBBES, T. Um Diálogo entre um filósofo e um jurista. Tradução de M. Cristina Guimarães Cupertino, São Paulo: Landy, 2001. HOBBES, T. Do Corpo: 1° parte. Tradução Maria Isabel Limongi e Vivianne Castilho de Moreira. São Paulo: Editora da Unicamp, 2009 [no prelo]. 345345 obras sobre hobbes: BERNARDES, J. Hobbes e a liberdade. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002. (Coleção Passo a Passo) FRATESCHI, Y. A Física da política. São Paulo: Editora da Unicamp, 2008. LIMONGI, M. I. Hobbes. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 2002. (Coleção Passo a Passo) LIMONGI, M. I. O homem excêntrico: paixões e virtudes em Thomas Hobbes. São Paulo: Loyola, 2009. RIBEIRO, R. J. Ao Leitor sem medo. Belo Horizonte: Editora da UFMG, 1999. 346 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 346 hobbes • LeviAtã LeVIAtã 1 Parte 1 Do Homem Capítulo XIII2 Da CONDIÇÃO NATuRAl da humanidade relativamente à sua Felicidade e miséria. A natureza fez os homens tão iguais, quanto às faculdades do corpo e do espírito, que, embora por vezes se encontre um homem manifestamente mais forte de corpo, ou de espírito mais vivo do que outro, mesmo assim, quando se considera tudo isto em conjunto, a diferença entre um e outro homem não é suficientemente considerável para que um deles possa com base nela reclamar algum benefício a que outro não possa igualmente aspirar. Porque quanto à força corporal o mais fraco 1 Título original inglês: Leviathan. Esta tradução baseia-se na edição de Leviathan publicada na coleção Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Tought, por Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, Copyright Cambridge University Press, 1996, para tradução e a edição. Para a presente edição: Copyright 2003, Livraria Martins Fontes Editora, São Paulo. (HOBBES, T. Leviatã. Organizado por Richard Tuck. Tradução de João Paulo Monteiro, Maria Betariz Nizza da Silva; revisão da tradução Eunice Ostrensky. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003.) 2 Na íntegra. 347347 tem força suficiente para matar o mais forte, quer por secreta maquinação, quer aliando-se com outros que se encontrem ameaçado pelo mesmo perigo. Quanto às faculdades do espírito (pondo de lado as artes que dependem das palavras, e especialmente aquela capacidade para proceder de acordo com regras gerais e infalíveis a que se chama ciência, que pouquíssimos têm, e apenas numas poucas coisas, não sendo uma faculdade inata, nascida conosco, nem alcançada – como a prudência – enquanto cuidamos de alguma outra coisa), encontro entre os homens uma igualdade ainda maior do que a de força. Porque a prudência nada mais é do que experiência, que um tempo igual concede igualmente a todos os homens, naquelas coisas a que igualmente se dedicam. O que talvez possa tornar inacreditável essa igualdade é simplesmente a presunção vaidosa da própria sabedoria, a qual quase todos os homens supõem possuir em maior grau do que o vulgo; quer dizer, em maior grau do que todos menos eles próprios, e alguns outros que, ou devido à fama ou por concordarem com eles, merecem a sua aprovação. Pois a natureza dos homens é tal que, embora sejam capazes de reconhecer em muitos outros maior sagacidade, maior eloquência ou maior saber, dificilmente acreditam que haja muitos tão sábios como eles próprios, porque vêem a própria sagacidade bem de perto, e a dos outros homens à distância. Ora, isto prova que os homens são iguais quanto a esse ponto, e não que sejam desiguais. Pois geralmente não há sinal mais claro de uma distribuição equitativa de alguma coisa do que o fato de todos estarem contentes com a parte que lhes coube3. Desta igualdade quanto à capacidade deriva a igualdade quanto à esperança de atingirmos os nossos fins. Portanto, se dois homens desejam a mesma coisa, ao mesmo tempo que é impossível ela ser gozada por ambos, eles tornam-se inimigos. E no caminho para o seu fim (que é principalmente a sua própria conservação, e às vezes apenas o seu delei3 Até aqui, ficou estabelecido que os homens são iguais quanto às faculdades do corpo e do espírito, embora relutem em aceitar isso. Trata-se de uma igualdade natural de poder, definido no capítulo X como os meios de que se dispõe para se atingir fins. Dessa igualdade Hobbes deriva, a partir do próximo parágrafo, as causas da guerra, na qual consiste, segundo ele, a condição natural da humanidade. 348 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 348 hobbes • LeviAtã te) esforçam-se por se destruir ou subjugar um ao outro. E disto se segue que, quando um invasor nada mais tem a recear do que o poder de um único outro homem, se alguém planta, semeia, constrói ou possui um lugar cômodo, espera-se que provavelmente outros venham preparados com forças conjugadas, para o desapossar e privar, não apenas do fruto do seu trabalho, mas também da sua vida ou da sua liberdade. Por sua vez, o invasor ficará no mesmo perigo em relação aos outros. E por causa desta desconfiança de uns em relação aos outros nenhuma maneira de se garantir é tão razoável como a antecipação, isto é, pela força ou pela astúcia subjugar as pessoas de todos os homens que puder, durante o tempo necessário para chegar ao momento em que não veja nenhum outro poder suficientemente grande o ameaçar. E isto não é mais do que a sua própria conservação exige, e geralmente se aceita. E porque alguns se comprazem em contemplar o próprio poder em atos de conquista levados muito além do que a sua segurança exige, outros que, em circunstâncias distintas, se contentariam em se manter tranquilamente dentro de modestos limites, caso não aumentassem o seu poder por meio de invasões, não seriam capazes de subsistir durante muito tempo, se apenas se pusessem em atitude de defesa. Consequentemente, devese conceder a todos esse aumento do domínio sobre os homens pois é necessário para a conservação de cada um4. Além disso, os homens não tiram prazer algum da companhia uns dos outros (e sim, pelo contrário, um enorme desprazer), quando não existe um poder capaz de intimidar a todos. Porque cada um pretende que o seu companheiro lhe atribua o mesmo valor que ele se atribui a si próprio e, na presença de todos os sinais de desprezo ou de subestimação, naturalmente se esforça, na medida em que a tal se atreve (o que, 4 Tratou-se até aqui das duas primeiras causas da guerra: a competição e a desconfiança. A competição tem origem na igualdade: porque os homens são iguais, são estimulados a competir pelo que desejam, quando desejam a mesma coisa. A desconfiança, por sua vez, segue-se da competição: porque uma situação de competição está sempre no horizonte, como uma possibilidade, os homens temem uns aos outros, temem que os outros possam lhes privar do que conquistaram, como meios para a satisfação dos seus desejos. As duas causas levam à antecipação, isto é, à busca por poder e mais poder como uma forma de garantia contra o uso do poder dos outros contra si, o que é uma situação de guerra ou de disputa permanente pelo poder. 349349 entre os que não têm um poder comum capaz de manter a todos em respeito, vai suficientemente longe para levá-Ios a se destruírem uns aos outros), por arrancar dos seus contendores a atribuição de maior valor, causando-Ihes dano, e de outros também, pelo exemplo5. De modo que na natureza do homem encontramos três causas principais de discórdia. Primeiro, a competição; segundo, a desconfiança; e terceiro, a glória. A primeira leva os homens a atacar os outros tendo em vista o lucro; a segunda, a segurança; e a terceira, a reputação. Os primeiros usam a violência para se tornarem senhores das pessoas, mulheres, filhos e rebanhos dos outros homens; os segundos, para defenderem-nos; e os terceiros, por ninharias, como uma palavra, um sorriso, uma opinião diferente, e qualquer outro sinal de desprezo, quer seja diretamente dirigido às suas pessoas, quer indiretamente aos seus parentes, amigos, nação, profissão ou ao seu nome. Com isto torna-se manifesto que, durante o tempo em que os homens vivem sem um poder comum capaz de mantê-Ios todos em temor respeitoso, eles se encontram naquela condição a que se chama guerra; e uma guerra que é de todos os homens contra todos os homens. Pois a GUERRA não consiste apenas na batalha ou no ato de lutar, mas naquele lapso de tempo durante o qual a vontade de travar batalha é suficientemente conhecida. Portanto, a noção de tempo deve ser levada em conta na natureza da guerra, do mesmo modo que na natureza do clima. Porque tal como a natureza do mau tempo não consiste em dois ou três chuviscos, mas numa tendência para chover durante vários dias seguidos, também a natureza da guerra não consiste na luta real, mas na conhecida disposição para tal, durante todo o tempo em que não há garantia do 5 Hobbes define o valor de um homem como sendo o "seu preço, isto é, tanto quanto seria dado pelo uso do seu poder" (Leviatã, cap. X). Os homens se esforçam para que os outros lhes atribuam um alto valor porque, com isso, se asseguram do próprio poder relativamente ao dos outros, o que é importante numa situação de disputa pelo poder, na qual se encontram em virtude da atuação das duas primeiras causas da guerra, a competição e a desconfiança. A questão da busca do valor ou da busca da glória e da reputação é um tema recorrente ao longo do Leviatã. A ideia de Hobbes é que a disputa pelo poder se dá menos na forma da luta efetiva e mais da forma da busca pelo valor. 350 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 350 hobbes • LeviAtã contrário. Todo o tempo restante é de PAZ. Portanto, tudo aquilo que se infere de um tempo de guerra, em que todo homem é inimigo de todo homem, infere-se também do tempo durante o qual os homens vivem sem outra segurança senão a que lhes pode ser oferecida pela sua própria força e pela sua própria invenção. Numa tal condição não há lugar para o trabalho, pois o seu fruto é incerto; consequentemente, não há cultivo da terra, nem navegação, nem uso das mercadorias que podem ser importadas pelo mar; não há construções confortáveis, nem instrumentos para mover e remover as coisas que precisam de grande força; não há conhecimento da face da Terra, nem cômputo do tempo, nem artes, nem letras; não há sociedade; e o que é pior do que tudo, um medo contínuo e perigo de morte violenta. E a vida do homem é solitária, miserável, sórdida, brutal e curta6. Poderá parecer estranho a alguém que não tenha medido bem estas coisas que a natureza tenha assim dissociado os homens, tornando-os capazes de se atacarem e destruírem uns aos outros. E poderá portanto talvez desejar, não confiando nesta inferência feita das paixões, que ela seja confirmada pela experiência. Que seja portanto ele a considerar-se a si mesmo, que quando empreende uma viagem se arma e procura ir bem acompanhado; quando vai dormir fecha as suas portas; mesmo quando está em casa tranca os seus cofres, embora saiba que existem leis e servidores públicos armados, prontos a vingar qualquer dano que lhe possa ser feito. Que opinião tem ele dos seus compatriotas, ao viajar armado; dos seus concidadãos, ao fechar as suas portas; e dos seus filhos e criados, quando tranca os seus cofres? Não significa isso acusar tanto a humanidade com os seus atos como eu o faço com as minhas palavras? Mas nenhum de nós acusa com isso a natureza humana. Os desejos e outras paixões do homem não são em si mesmos um pecado. Tampouco o são as ações que derivam dessas paixões, até o momento em que se tome conhecimento de uma lei que as proíba, o que será impossível até o 6 Conclui-se aqui o raciocínio segundo o qual a condição natural dos homens é uma condição de guerra. Nos três próximos parágrafos Hobbes procura confirmar seu raciocínio apelando à experiência: a experiência da competitividade e desconfiança dos homens uns em relação aos outros, mesmo quando vivem sob a proteção do Estado, a experiência dos povos selvagens e da relação dos Estados entre si. 351351 momento em que sejam feitas as leis, e nenhuma lei pode ser feita antes de se ter concordado quanto à pessoa que deverá fazê-Ia. Poderá porventura pensar-se que nunca existiu um tal tempo, nem uma condição de guerra como esta, e acredito que jamais tenha sido geralmente assim, no mundo inteiro; mas há muitos lugares onde atualmente se vive assim, porque os povos selvagens de muitos lugares da América, com exceção do governo de pequenas famílias, cuja concórdia depende da concupiscência natural, não possuem nenhuma espécie de governo, e vivem nos nossos dias daquela maneira brutal que antes referi. Seja como for, é fácil conceber qual era o gênero de vida quando não havia poder comum a temer, pelo gênero de vida em que os homens que anteriormente viveram sob um governo pacífico costumam deixarse cair numa guerra civil. Mas mesmo que jamais tivesse havido um tempo em que os indivíduos se encontrassem numa condição de guerra de todos contra todos, em todos os tempos os reis e as pessoas dotadas de autoridade soberana, por causa da sua independência, vivem em constante rivalidade e na condição e atitude dos gladiadores, com as armas assestadas, cada um de olhos fixos nos outros; isto é, os seus fortes, guarnições e canhões guardando as fronteiras dos seus reinos, e constantemente com espiões no território dos seus vizinhos, o que constitui uma atitude de guerra. Mas como desse modo protegem o trabalho dos seus súditos, disso não se segue como consequência a desgraça associada à liberdade dos indivíduos isolados. Desta guerra de todos os homens contra todos os homens também isto é consequência: que nada pode ser injusto. As noções de certo e de errado, de justiça e injustiça, não podem aí ter lugar. Onde não há poder comum não há lei, e onde não há lei não há injustiça. Na guerra, a força e a fraude são as duas virtudes cardeais. A justiça e a injustiça não fazem parte das faculdades do corpo ou do espírito. Se assim fosse, poderiam existir num homem que estivesse sozinho no mundo, do mesmo modo que os seus sentidos e paixões. São qualidades que pertencem aos homens em sociedade, não na solidão. Outra consequência da mesma con352 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 352 hobbes • LeviAtã dição é que não há propriedade, nem domínio, nem distinção entre o meu e o teu; só pertence a cada homem aquilo que ele é capaz de conseguir, e apenas enquanto for capaz de o conservar. É pois nesta miserável condição que o homem realmente se encontra, por obra da simples natureza, embora com uma possibilidade de escapar a ela, que em parte reside nas paixões e em parte na sua razão. As paixões que fazem os homens tender para a paz são o medo da morte, o desejo daquelas coisas que são necessárias para uma vida confortável e a esperança de as conseguir por meio do trabalho. E a razão sugere adequadas normas de paz, em torno das quais os homens podem chegar a um acordo. Essas normas são aquelas a que em outras situações se chamam leis da natureza, das quais falarei mais particularmente nos dois capítulos seguintes7. Capítulo XIV8 Da primeira e segunda leis Naturais e dos Contratos. O direito dA nAturezA, a que os autores geralmente chamam Jus Naturale, é a liberdade que cada homem possui de usar o seu próprio poder, da maneira que quiser, para a preservação da sua própria natureza, ou seja, da sua vida; e consequentemente de fazer tudo aquilo que o seu próprio julgamento e razão lhe indiquem como meios mais adequados a esse fim. Por LiberdAde entende-se, conforme a significação própria da palavra, a ausência de impedimentos externos, impedimentos que muitas vezes tiram parte do poder que cada um tem de fazer o que quer, mas não podem obstar a que use o poder que lhe resta, conforme o que o seu 7 O capítulo se fecha com duas observações que preparam o capítulo seguinte: (1) numa condição de guerra não há lugar para a distinção entre o justo e o injusto e (2) dispomos das motivações e dos instrumentos necessários para transformar essa condição. Como se verá, a forma de escapar à condição de guerra é criar artificialmente a distinção entre o justo e o injusto, sem lugar em nossa condição natural. 8 Reproduzido parcialmente. 353353 julgamento e razão lhe ditarem. Uma lei de nAturezA (Lex Naturalis) é um preceito ou regra geral, estabelecido pela razão, mediante o qual se proíbe a um homem fazer tudo o que possa destruir a sua vida ou privá-lo dos meios necessários para a preservar, ou omitir aquilo que pense melhor contribuir para a preservar. Porque, embora os que têm tratado deste assunto costumem confundir Jus e Lex, o direito e a lei, é necessário distingui-los um do outro. Pois o Direito consiste na liberdade de fazer ou de omitir, ao passo que a lei determina ou obriga a uma dessas duas coisas. De modo que a lei e o direito se distinguem tanto como a obrigação e a liberdade, as quais são incompatíveis quando se referem à mesma questão9. E dado que a condição do homem (conforme foi declarado no capítulo anterior) é uma condição de guerra de todos contra todos, sendo neste caso cada um governado pela sua própria razão, e nada havendo de que possa lançar mão que não lhe ajude na preservação da sua vida contra os seus inimigos, segue-se que numa tal condição todo homem tem direito a todas as coisas, até mesmo aos corpos uns dos outros. Portanto, enquanto perdurar este direito natural de cada homem a todas as coisas, não poderá haver para nenhum homem (por mais forte e sábio que seja) a segurança de viver todo o tempo que geralmente a natureza permite aos homens viver. Consequentemente, é um preceito ou regra geral da razão: Que todo homem deve se esforçar pela paz, na medida em que tenha esperança de a conseguir, e caso não a consiga pode procurar e usar todas as ajudas e vantagens da guerra. A primeira parte desta regra encerra a primeira e fundamental lei de natureza, isto é, procurar a paz, e segui-la. A segunda encerra a súmula do direito de natureza, isto é, por todos os meios que pudermos, defendermo-nos a nós mesmos. Desta lei fundamental de natureza, mediante a qual se ordena a todos os homens que se esforcem para conseguir a paz, deriva esta segunda 9 A lei restringe um direito, obriga a fazer algo ali onde o direito permite fazer ou não fazer. No entanto, a lei natural, que nos obriga a fazer o que pensamos ser necessário à preservação da vida, não restringe propriamente, mas reafirma o direito natural de fazer o que acharmos necessário à preservação da vida. Ela obriga a exercermos esse direito, a não abdicarmos dele. Daí porque esse direito não seja naturalmente restringido. 354 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 354 hobbes • LeviAtã lei: Que um homem concorde, quando outros também o façam, e na medida em que tal considere necessário para a paz e para a defesa de si mesmo, em resignar ao seu direito a todas as coisas, contentando-se, em relação aos outros homens, com a mesma liberdade que aos outros homens permite em relação a si mesmo. Porque enquanto cada homem detiver o seu direito de fazer tudo quanto queira todos os homens se encontrarão numa condição de guerra. Mas se os outros homens não resignarem ao seu direito, assim como ele próprio, não há razão para que alguém se prive do seu, pois isso equivaleria a oferecerse como presa (coisa a que ninguém é obrigado), e não a dispor-se para a paz. É esta a lei do Evangelho: Faz aos outros o que queres que te façam a ti. E esta é a lei de todos os homens: Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris10. Resignar a um direito a alguma coisa é o mesmo que privar-se da liberdade de impedir outro de beneficiar-se do seu próprio direito à mesma coisa. Pois quem renuncia ou resigna ao seu direito não dá a nenhum outro homem um direito que este já não tivesse antes, porque não há nada a que um homem não tenha direito por natureza; neste caso, apenas se afasta do caminho do outro, para que ele possa gozar do seu direito original, sem que haja obstáculos da sua parte, mas não sem que haja obstáculos da parte dos outros. De modo que o efeito redundante a um homem da desistência de outro ao seu direito é simplesmente uma diminuição equivalente dos impedimentos ao uso do seu próprio direito original. Resigna-se a um direito simplesmente renunciando a ele, ou transferindo-o para outrem. Simplesmente renunciAndo, quando não importa em favor de quem irá redundar o respectivo benefício. trAnsferindo-o, 10 "quod tibi fieri non vis, alteris ne faceris". "Não faças aos outros o que não queres que se faça contigo". Assim como a primeira lei de natureza obriga a que se busque a paz, sob a condição de que os outros também a busquem, a segunda lei obriga a que se faça contratos, sob a condição de que os outros também os façam. As leis de natureza obrigam sob a condição da reciprocidade. Ora, numa condição de guerra, falta justamente a garantia da reciprocidade. Logo, numa condição de guerra, as leis de natureza não são suficientes para regular as relações recíprocas entre os homens. Daí porque Hobbes diga adiante (final do capítulo XV) que elas obrigam apenas em foro interno, impondo o desejo de que sejam cumpridas, mas não obrigam a que sejam postas em prática. É apenas com o Estado (Commonwealth), sob a forma da lei civil, que elas serão postas em prática. Pois, o Estado oferece a garantia de reciprocidade necessária para que elas obriguem também em foro externo. Nos parágrafos seguintes, até o fim do capítulo XIV, Hobbes interrompe a enumeração das leis de natureza para expor a sua teoria da obrigação contratual, na qual define o que é um contrato e as condições em que este obriga. 355355 quando com isso se pretende beneficiar uma determinada pessoa ou pessoas. Quando de qualquer destas maneiras alguém abandonou ou adjudicou o seu direito, diz-se que fica obrigAdo ou ForçAdo a não impedir àqueles a quem esse direito foi abandonado ou adjudicado o respectivo benefício, e que deve, e é seu dever, não tornar nulo esse seu próprio ato voluntário; e que tal impedimento é injustiçA e dAno dado que é sine jure, pois se transferiu ou se renunciou ao direito. De modo que dano ou injustiça, nas controvérsias do mundo, é de certo modo semelhante àquilo que nas disputas dos escolásticos se chama absurdo. Porque tal como nestas últimas se considera absurdo contradizer aquilo que inicialmente se sustentou, assim também no mundo se chama injustiça e dano desfazer voluntariamente aquilo que inicialmente se tinha voluntariamente feito. O modo pelo qual um homem simplesmente renuncia ou transfere o seu direito é uma declaração ou expressão, mediante um sinal ou sinais voluntários e suficientes, de que assim renuncia ou transfere, ou de que assim renunciou ou transferiu esse direito àquele que o aceitou. Estes sinais podem ser apenas palavras ou apenas ações, ou então (conforme acontece na maior parte dos casos) tanto palavras como ações. E estas são os vínCuLos mediante os quais os homens ficam atados e obrigados, vínculos que não recebem a sua força da sua própria natureza (pois nada se rompe mais facilmente do que a palavra de um homem), mas do medo de alguma má consequência resultante da ruptura11. Quando alguém transfere o seu direito, ou a ele renuncia, o faz em consideração a outro direito que reciprocamente lhe foi transferido, ou a qualquer outro bem que dai espera. Pois é um ato voluntário, e o objetivo de todos os atos voluntários dos homens é algum bem para si mesmos12. Portanto, há alguns direitos que é impossível admitir que algum homem, 11 O fundamento da obrigação contratual está no vínculo interno entre os significantes da vontade. Obrigar-se por meio de um contrato é comprometer-se a usar desses signos de maneira coerente. No entanto, esses vínculos precisam ser reforçados pelo medo das más consequências que advenham da sua ruptura. Isso porque os vínculos de palavras não garantem o que o medo é capaz de garantir, a saber, a reciprocidade contratual, condição para que os contratos obriguem. 12 Esclarece-se com isso porque a reciprocidade é condição da obrigação contratual. Desse esclarecimento Hobbes retira em seguida a consequência de que alguns direitos são inalienáveis. 356 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 356 hobbes • LeviAtã por quaisquer palavras ou outros sinais, possa abandonar ou transferir. Em primeiro lugar, ninguém pode renunciar ao direito de resistir a quem o ataque pela força para lhe tirar a vida, pois é impossível admitir que com isso vise algum benefício próprio. O mesmo se pode dizer dos ferimentos, das cadeias e do cárcere, tanto porque desta resignação não pode resultar benefício – como há quando se resigna a permitir que outro seja ferido ou encarcerado –, mas também porque é impossível saber, quando alguém lança mão da violência, se com ela pretende ou não provocar a morte. Por último, o motivo e fim devido ao qual se introduz esta renúncia e transferência do direito não é mais do que a segurança da pessoa de cada um, quanto à sua vida e quanto aos meios de a preservar de maneira tal que não acabe por dela se cansar. Portanto, se por palavras ou outros sinais um homem parecer despojar-se do fim para que esses sinais foram criados, não se deve entender que é isso que ele quer dizer, ou que é essa a sua vontade, mas que ele ignorava a maneira como essas palavras e ações iriam ser interpretadas. A transferência mútua de direitos é aquilo a que se chama contrAto. (...) Quando se faz um pacto em que ninguém cumpre imediatamente a sua parte, e uns confiam nos outros, na condição de simples natureza (que é uma condição de guerra de todos os homens contra todos os homens), a menor suspeita razoável torna nulo esse pacto. Mas se houver um poder comum situado acima dos contratantes, com direito e força suficiente para impor o seu cumprimento, ele não é nulo. Pois aquele que cumpre primeiro não tem nenhuma garantia de que o outro também cumprirá depois, porque os vínculos das palavras são demasiado fracos para refrear a ambição, a avareza, a cólera e outras paixões dos homens, se não houver o medo de algum poder coercitivo – coisa impossível de supor na condição de simples natureza, em que os homens são todos 357357 iguais, e juízes do acerto dos seus próprios temores. Portanto, aquele que cumpre primeiro não faz mais do que entregar-se ao seu inimigo, contrariamente ao direito (que jamais pode abandonar) de defender a sua vida e os seus meios de sobrevivência. Mas numa república13 civil, em que foi instituído um poder para coagir aqueles que do contrário violariam a sua fé, esse temor deixa de ser razoável. Por esse motivo, aquele que mediante o pacto deve cumprir primeiro a sua parte é obrigado a fazê-lo. (...) Capítulo XV14 De outras leis de Natureza. Daquela lei de natureza pela qual somos obrigados a transferir aos outros direitos que, se forem conservados, impedem a paz da humanidade, segue-se uma terceira: Que os homens cumpram os pactos que celebrarem. Sem esta lei os pactos seriam vãos, e não passariam de palavras vazias; com o direito de todos os homens a todas as coisas ainda em vigor, per13 Commonwealth. Na presente tradução, o termo Commonwealth é sistematicamente traduzido por República. Na introdução que a precede e nas notas, porém, emprega-se o termo Estado em referência ao que Hobbes denomina Commonwealth. Há portanto uma divergência quanto à melhor tradução para o termo. Com efeito, Commonwealth pode significar República, entendida como uma forma de governo distinta da Monarquia, tal como Harrington emprega o termo em The Commonwealth of Oceana, obra contemporânea ao Leviatã, como pode também significar o Estado, entendido enquanto um corpo político, seja qual for sua forma de governo, sentido que nos parece lhe dar Hobbes no Leviatã. Daí porque tenhamos empregado o termo Estado para traduzir Commonwealth na introdução e nas notas. Essa opção, na medida em que diverge da dos tradutores da edição do Leviatã aqui utilizada, pode causar certa confusão, mas serve para chamar atenção para os problemas de tradução que um texto comporta. A tradução de Commonwealth por Estado tem a vantagem de lembrar que a Commonwealth de Hobbes não é uma forma de governo, podendo assumir a forma de uma monarquia. A tradução por República tem a vantagem de guardar a remissão ao latim respublica, cujo sentido literal é o mesmo do inglês Commonwealth: a coisa pública. Provavelmente, ao escolher o termo Commonwealth, Hobbes sabia que o empregava de modo polêmico. 14 Reproduzido parcialmente. 358 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 358 hobbes • LeviAtã manecemos na condição de guerra. Nesta lei da natureza reside a fonte e a origem da justiçA. Porque sem um pacto anterior não há transferência de direito, e todo homem tem direito a todas as coisas; consequentemente nenhuma ação pode ser injusta. Mas, depois de celebrado um pacto, rompê-lo é injusto. E a definição da injustiçA não é outra senão o não-cumprimento de um pacto. E tudo o que não é injusto é justo. Ora, como os pactos de confiança mútua são inválidos sempre que de qualquer dos lados existe receio de não-cumprimento (conforme se disse no capítulo anterior), embora a origem da justiça seja a celebração dos pactos, não pode haver realmente injustiça antes de ser removida a causa desse medo; o que não pode ser feito enquanto os homens se encontram na condição natural de guerra. Portanto, para que as palavras "justo" e "injusto" possam ter lugar, é necessária alguma espécie de poder coercitivo, capaz de obrigar igualmente os homens ao cumprimento dos seus pactos, mediante o terror de algum castigo que seja superior ao benefício que esperam tirar do rompimento do pacto, e capaz de confirmar propriedade que os homens adquirem por contrato mútuo, como recompensa do direito universal a que renunciaram. E não pode haver tal poder antes de se erigir uma república15. Também a definição comum de justiça fornecida pelos escolásticos permite deduzir o mesmo, na medida em que afirmam que a justiça é a vontade constante de dar a cada um o que é seu. Portanto, onde não há o seu, isto é, não há propriedade, não pode haver injustiça, e onde não foi estabelecido um poder coercitivo, isto é, onde não há república16, não há propriedade, pois todos os homens têm direito a todas as coisas. Portanto, onde não há república17 nada é injusto. De modo que a natureza da justiça consiste no cumprimento dos pactos válidos, mas a validade dos pactos só começa com a constituição de um poder civil suficiente para obrigar os homens a cumpri-los, e é também só aí que começa a haver propriedade. 15 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 16 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 17 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 359359 (...) As leis de natureza obrigam in foro interno, quer dizer, tornam impositivo o desejo de que sejam cumpridas; mas in foro externo, isto é, tornando impositivo o desejo de as colocar em prática, nem sempre obrigam18. Pois aquele que fosse modesto e tratável, e cumprisse todas as suas promessas numa época e num lugar em que mais ninguém assim fizesse, tornar-se-ia presa fácil para os outros, e inevitavelmente provocaria a sua própria ruína, contrariamente ao fundamento de todas as leis de natureza, que tendem para a preservação de natureza. Mais ainda, aquele que, embora possua garantia suficiente de que os outros observarão para com ele as mesmas leis, mesmo assim não as observa, não procura a paz, mas a guerra, e consequentemente a destruição da sua natureza pela violência. Todas as leis que obrigam in foro interno podem ser violadas, não apenas por um fato contrário à lei, mas também por um fato conforme a ela, no caso de o seu autor o considerar contrário. Pois, embora neste caso a sua ação seja conforme à lei, a sua intenção é contrária à lei, que constitui uma violação quando a obrigação é in foro interno. As leis de natureza são imutáveis e eternas, pois a injustiça, a ingratidão, a arrogância, o orgulho, a iniquidade, a acepção de pessoas etc. jamais podem ser tornados legítimos. Pois nunca poderá ocorrer que a guerra preserve a vida e a paz a destrua. Essas leis, na medida em que obrigam apenas a um desejo e a um esforço, isto é, um esforço não fingido e constante, são fáceis de obedecer. Pois, na medida em que exigem apenas esforço, aquele que se esforça por as cumprir está-Ihes a obedecer. E aquele que obedece à lei é justo. E a ciência dessas leis é a verdadeira e única filosofia moral. Porque a filosofia moral não é mais do que a ciência do que é bom e mau, no convívio e na sociedade humana. O bem e o mal são nomes que significam os nossos apetites e aversões, os quais são diferentes conforme os 18 Ver nota 10. 360 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 360 hobbes • LeviAtã diferentes temperamentos, costumes e doutrinas dos homens. E homens diversos não divergem apenas, no seu julgamento, quanto às sensações do que é agradável ou desagradável ao gosto, ao olfato, ao ouvido, ao tato e à vista; divergem também quanto ao que é conforme ou repulsivo à razão, nas ações da vida cotidiana. Mais, o mesmo homem, em momentos diferentes, diverge de si mesmo, às vezes louvando, isto é, chamando bom aquilo mesmo que outras vezes despreza e a que chama mau. Daqui procedem disputas, controvérsias e, finalmente, a guerra. Portanto, enquanto os homens se encontram na condição de simples natureza (que é uma condição de guerra), o apetite pessoal é a medida do bem e do mal. Por conseguinte, todos os homens concordam que a paz é uma boa coisa, e portanto que também são bons o caminho ou meios da paz, os quais (conforme mostrei) são a justiça, a gratidão, a modéstia, a equidade, a misericórdia e o restante das leis de natureza; quer dizer, as virtudes morais; e que os seus vícios contrários são maus. Ora, a ciência da virtude e do vício é a filosofia moral, portanto a verdadeira doutrina das leis de natureza é a verdadeira filosofia moral. Mas os autores de filosofia moral, embora reconheçam as mesmas virtudes e vícios, não sabem ver em que consiste a sua excelência, não sabem ver que elas são louvadas como meios para uma vida pacífica, sociável e confortável, e fazem-nas consistir numa mediocridade das paixões. Como se não fosse na causa, e sim no grau de intrepidez, que consiste a força; ou como se não fosse na causa, e sim na quantidade de uma dádiva, que consiste a liberalidade. A estes ditames da razão os homens costumam dar o nome de leis, mas impropriamente. Pois eles são apenas conclusões ou teoremas relativos ao que contribui para a conservação e defesa de cada um, enquanto a lei, em sentido próprio, é a palavra daquele que tem direito de mando sobre outros. No entanto, se considerarmos os mesmos teoremas como transmitidos pela palavra de Deus, que tem direito de mando sobre todas as coisas, nesse caso serão propriamente chamados leis. Parte 2 – Da República19 19 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 361361 Capítulo XVII20 Das Causas, Geração e Definição de uma REPÚBlICA.21 A causa final, finalidade e desígnio dos homens (que amam naturalmente a liberdade e o domínio sobre outros), ao introduzir aquela restrição sobre si mesmos sob a qual os vemos viver em repúblicas22, é a precaução com a sua própria conservação e com uma vida mais satisfeita. Quer dizer, o desejo de sair daquela mísera condição de guerra, que é a consequência necessária (conforme se mostrou) das paixões naturais dos homens, quando não há um poder visível capaz de os manter em respeito e os forçar, por medo do castigo, ao cumprimento dos seus pactos e à observância das leis de natureza que foram expostas nos capítulos XIV e XV. Porque as leis de natureza (como a justiça, a equidade, a modéstia, a piedade, ou em resumo, fazer aos outros o que queremos que nos façam) por si mesmas, na ausência do temor de algum poder que as faça ser respeitadas, são contrárias às nossas paixões naturais, as quais nos fazem tender para a parcialidade, o orgulho, a vingança e coisas semelhantes. E os pactos sem a espada não passam de palavras, sem força para dar segurança a ninguém. Portanto, apesar das leis de natureza (que cada um respeita quando tem vontade de as respeitar e quando o poder fazer com segurança), se não for instituído um poder suficientemente grande para a nossa segurança, cada um confiará, e poderá legitimamente confiar, apenas na sua própria força e capacidade, como proteção contra todos os outros. Em todos os lugares onde os homens viviam em pequenas famílias, roubar-se e espoliar-se uns aos outros sempre foi um comércio, e tão longe de ser considerado contrária à lei de natureza que quanto maior era a espoliação conseguida maior era a honra adquirida. Nesse tempo os homens tinham como únicas leis as da honra, ou seja, evitar a crueldade, isto é, deixar aos outros as suas vidas e os seus instrumentos de trabalho. Tal como então faziam as pequenas famílias, também hoje as 20 Na íntegra. 21 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 22 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 362 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 362 hobbes • LeviAtã cidades e os rei nos, que não são mais do que famílias maiores (para sua própria segurança) ampliam os seus domínios e, sob qualquer pretexto de perigo, de medo de invasão ou de assistência que possa ser prestada aos invasores, com toda a justiça se esforçam o mais possível para subjugar ou enfraquecer os seus vizinhos, por meio da força ostensiva e de artifícios secretos, por falta de qualquer outra segurança; e em épocas futuras esses feitos são evocados com honra23. Não é a união de um pequeno número de homens que é capaz de oferecer essa segurança, porque quando os números são pequenos basta um pequeno aumento de um ou outro lado para tornar a vantagem da força suficientemente grande para garantir a vitória, constituindo portanto tal aumento um incentivo à invasão. A multidão que pode ser considerada suficiente para garantir a nossa segurança não pode ser definida por um número exato, mas apenas por comparação com o inimigo que tememos, e é suficiente quando a superioridade do inimigo não é de importância tão visível e manifesta que baste para determinar o desfecho da guerra, incitando-o ao ataque. Mesmo que haja uma grande multidão, se as ações de cada um dos que a compõem forem determinadas pelo julgamento e pelos apetites individuais de cada um, não se poderá esperar que ela seja capaz de dar defesa e proteção a ninguém, seja contra o inimigo comum, seja contra os danos causados uns aos outros. Pois, se suas opiniões divergem quanto ao melhor uso e aplicação da sua força, em vez de se ajudarem só se atrapalham uns aos outros, e essa oposição mútua faz reduzir a nada a sua força. Assim, não apenas facilmente serão subjugados por uns poucos que tenham entrado em acordo, mas além disso, mesmo sem haver inimigo comum, facilmente farão guerra uns contra os outros, por causa dos seus interesses particulares. Pois se conseguíssemos imaginar uma grande multidão capaz de consentir na observância da justiça e das 23 Uma vez estabelecido qual o fim visado pelos homens na instituição do Estado (Commonwealth) (parágrafo 1) e as razões pelas quais esse fim só pode ser atingido com a instituição do Estado (parágrafo 2), Hobbes passa a descrever formas de associação em que o Estado não consiste: a multidão (parágrafos 3 a 5) e as associações naturais, como a das abelhas e das formigas (parágrafos 6 a 12). Isso lhe serve de contraponto para definir, enfim, o que o Estado é (parágrafo 13). 363363 outras leis de natureza, sem um poder comum que mantivesse a todos em respeito, igualmente conseguiríamos imaginar a humanidade inteira capaz de fazer o mesmo. Nesse caso não haveria, nem seria necessário, nenhum governo civil ou república24, pois haveria paz sem sujeição. Tampouco basta para garantir aquela segurança que os homens desejariam durasse todo o tempo das suas vidas, que eles sejam governados e dirigidos por um julgamento único apenas durante um período limitado, como é o caso numa batalha ou numa guerra. Porque mesmo que o seu esforço unânime lhes permita obter uma vitória contra um inimigo estrangeiro, depois disso, quando ou não terão mais um inimigo comum, ou aquele que por alguns é tido por inimigo é por outros tido como amigo, é inevitável que as diferenças entre os seus interesses os levem a desunir-se, voltando a cair em guerra uns contra os outros. É certo que há algumas criaturas vivas, como as abelhas e as formigas, que vivem socialmente umas com as outras (e por isso são incluídas por Aristóteles entre as criaturas políticas), sem outra orientação a não ser os julgamentos e apetites particulares, nem linguagem por meio da qual possam indicar umas às outras o que consideram adequado para o benefício comum. Assim, talvez haja alguém interessado em saber por que a hu manidade não pode fazer o mesmo. A isso tenho a responder o seguinte. Primeiro, os homens estão constantemente envolvidos numa competição pela honra e pela dignidade, o que não ocorre no caso dessas criaturas. E é devido a isso que surgem entre os homens a inveja e o ódio, e finalmente a guerra, ao passo que entre aquelas criaturas tal não acontece. Segundo, entre essas criaturas não há diferença entre o bem comum e o bem individual e, como por natureza tendem para o benefício individual, acabam por promover o benefício comum. Mas o homem, cuja alegria consiste em se comparar, só encontra felicidade na comparação com os outros homens, só pode apreciar o que é eminente. 24 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 364 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 364 hobbes • LeviAtã Terceiro, como essas criaturas não possuem (ao contrário do homem) o uso da razão, elas não veem nem julgam ver nenhuma falha na administração de suas atividades em comum. Ao passo que entre os homens são muitos os que se julgam mais sábios e mais capacitados do que os outros para o exercício do poder público. E esses esforçam-se por empreender reformas e inovações, uns de uma maneira e outros doutra, acabando assim por levar o país à perturbação e à guerra civil. Quarto, essas criaturas, embora façam certo uso da voz para dar a conhecer umas às outras os seus desejos e outras inclinações, carecem daquela arte das palavras mediante a qual alguns homens são capazes de descrever aos outros o que é bom sob a aparência do mal, e o que é mau sob a aparência do bem; e aumentar ou diminuir a manifesta grandeza do bem ou do mal, semeando o descontentamento entre os homens e perturbando a seu bel-prazer a paz em que os outros vivem. Quinto, as criaturas irracionais são incapazes de distinguir entre dano e prejuízo, e consequentemente basta que estejam satisfeitas para nunca se ofenderem com os seus semelhantes. O homem, por sua vez, é tanto mais implicativo quanto mais satisfeito se sente, pois é neste caso que tende mais para exibir a sua sabedoria e para controlar as ações dos que governam a república. Por último, o acordo vigente entre essas criaturas é natural; o dos homens se dá apenas através de um pacto, que é artificial. Portanto, não é de admirar que seja necessária alguma coisa mais, além de um pacto, para tornar constante e duradouro o seu acordo; ou seja, um poder comum que os mantenha em respeito, e que dirija as suas ações para o benefício comum. A única maneira de instituir um tal poder comum, capaz de os defender das invasões dos estrangeiros e dos danos uns dos outros, garantindo-Ihes assim uma segurança suficiente para que, mediante o seu próprio labor e graças aos frutos da terra, possam alimentar-se e viver satisfeitos, é conferir toda a sua força e poder a um homem, ou a uma assembleia de homens, que possa reduzir todas as suas vontades, por pluralidade de votos, a uma só vontade. Isso equivale a dizer: designar 365365 um homem ou uma assembléia de homens como portador de suas pessoas, admitindo-se e reconhecendo-se cada um como autor de todos os atos que aquele que assim é portador de sua pessoa praticar ou levar a praticar, em tudo o que disser respeito à paz e à segurança comuns; todos submetendo desse modo as suas vontades à vontade dele, e as suas decisões à sua decisão. Isto é mais do que consentimento ou concórdia, é uma verdadeira unidade de todos eles, numa só e mesma pessoa, realizada por um pacto de cada homem com todos os homens, de um modo que é como se cada homem dissesse a cada homem: Autorizo e transfiro o meu direito de me governar a mim mesmo a este homem, ou a esta assembléia de homens, com a condição de transferires para ele o teu direito, autorizando de uma maneira semelhante todas as suas ações. Feito isto, à multidão assim unida numa só pessoa chama-se repúbLiCA25, em latim CivitAs. É esta a geração daquele grande LeviAtã, ou antes (para falar em termos mais reverentes) daquele Deus mortal, ao qual devemos, abaixo do Deus imortal, a nossa paz e defesa. Pois, graças a esta autoridade que lhe é dada por cada indivíduo na república, é-lhe conferido o uso de tamanho poder e força que o terror assim inspirado o torna capaz de conformar as vontades de todos eles, no sentido da paz no seu próprio país, e da ajuda mútua contra os inimigos estrangeiros. É nele que consiste a essência da república26, a qual pode ser assim definida: uma pessoa de cujos atos uma grande multidão, mediante pactos recíprocos uns com os outros, foi instituída por todos como autora, de modo que ela pode usar a força e os recursos de todos, da maneira que considerar conveniente, para assegurar a paz e a defesa comuns27. Àquele que é portador dessa pessoa chama-se soberAno, e dele se diz que possui poder soberano. Todos os demais são súditos28. 25 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 26 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 27 O Estado (Commonwealth) é, assim, a união das vontades numa só pessoa (donde a diferença com a multidão, na qual não há união das vontades), mediante um pacto (donde a diferença com as associações naturais, que prescindem de pacto). 28 Os conceitos fundamentais ligados ao conceito do Estado (Commonwealth), tal como Hobbes o definiu, e que continuam até hoje ligados a ele, são os de representação e o de soberania. O Estado é uma instância de representação das diversas vontades individuais que autorizam suas ações. O ato de autorização institui a representação e consiste no reconhecimento por parte de cada cidadão das ações do Estado como se fossem suas. 366 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 366 hobbes • LeviAtã Este poder soberano pode ser adquirido de duas maneiras. Uma delas é a força natural, como quando um homem obriga os seus filhos a submeterem-se e a submeterem os seus próprios filhos à sua autoridade, na medida em que é capaz de os destruir em caso de recusa. Ou como quando um homem sujeita através da guerra os seus inimigos à sua vontade, concedendo-Ihes a vida com essa condição. A outra é quando os homens concordam entre si em se submeterem a um homem, ou a uma assembleia de homens, voluntariamente, confiando que serão protegidos por ele contra os outros. Esta última pode ser chamada uma república29 política, ou por instituição. À primeira pode chamar-se uma república30 por aquisição. Vou em primeiro lugar referir-me à república31 por instituição32. Por meio desse ato, os homens unem suas forças em torno do Estado, isto é, colocam seus poderes a serviço do Estado, fazendo dele um poder soberano, isto é, um poder acima do qual não há nenhum outro na terra e que, por isso, é capaz de valer suas decisões. Assim, a pessoa representante das diversas vontades individuais (que pode ser um homem, nas monarquias, ou uma assembléia de homens, nas Repúblicas) detém o poder soberano. 29 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 30 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 31 Commonwealth (ver nota 13). 32 Hobbes tratará nos capítulos seguintes desses dois tipos de Estado (Commonwealth), o Estado por aquisição (em que o poder soberano é conquistado por alguém a partir de um diferencial de poder que ele possui) e o Estado por instituição (em que o poder soberano é cedido a alguém por meio de um contrato). É importante observar que, segundo Hobbes, mesmo o Estado por aquisição é formado a partir de um contrato, um contrato entre o mais forte e o mais fraco, ao passo que no Estado por instituição o contrato se dá entre iguais em força e poder. Nos dois casos, o contrato (e não a pura força) é o princípio de instituição do Estado e da obrigação civil. 367367 reLAção CAusAL e A vontAde Como um evento nAturAL em hume368 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 368 369369 Somos agentes livres? A resposta a essa pergunta requer que antes precisemos o que exatamente queremos dizer com "ser livre". Podemos estar nos perguntando pelo menos duas coisas diferentes, a depender do sentido que damos a essa noção. Podemos estar querendo saber se nossa vontade é livre, isto é, se somos livres para querer isso ou aquilo; ou podemos estar nos perguntando se nossas ações são livres, isto é, se somos livres para fazer isso ou aquilo que queremos. Admitir que somos livres num desses sentidos não implica admitir que somos livres no outro. No primeiro caso, estamos nos perguntando pela liberdade da vontade, isto é, se nossa vontade depende inteiramente de nós ou se, em vez disso, somos determinados por causas independentes e externas a nós a querer o que queremos. Tomemos por exemplo, a ação de não mentir. Podemos supor que recai inteiramente sobre nós a escolha ou decisão de dizer a verdade, quando nos encontramos diante da alternativa de dizê-la ou não. Sendo assim, apenas a nossa vontade determinaria a nossa escolha, sem que fosse determinada por nada a não ser ela mesma e o ato de sua decisão. Ou então podemos supor que, ao escolhermos dizer a verdade ReLAçãO CAuSAL e A VONtADe COMO uM eVeNtO NAtuRAL eM HuMe reLAção CAusAL e A vontAde Como um evento nAturAL em hume370 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 370 numa certa ocasião, somos determinados por uma série de causas que ultrapassam o ato da escolha, tais como hábitos adquiridos desde a tenra infância, inculcados pela educação e pelo exemplo, e disposições de caráter formadas a partir de uma longa experiência acerca do modo como as coisas nos afetam. Por exemplo: todas as vezes que menti, me dei mal, fui punido ou censurado e a partir daí fui determinado por causas externas a mim a não querer mentir. Sendo assim, não se diria da minha vontade que ela é livre, visto que não depende inteiramente de mim ou de um ato de escolha meu querer o que quero. Esta é a alternativa diante da qual nos colocamos quando nos perguntamos se somos livres, querendo com isso saber se nossa vontade ou escolha é livre. Mas, quando nos perguntamos pela liberdade da ação, se somos ou não livres para fazer o que queremos, já não está em questão se nossa vontade é ou não livre. Parte-se agora do fato de que se trata da nossa vontade, do que queremos no momento da ação, ainda que possamos ter sido levados a querer o que queremos por razões que nos ultrapassam. Resta então saber se somos livres no sentido de poder agir conforme a nossa vontade, já que podemos ser constrangidos a agir contra a vontade (por exemplo, quando passo meu dinheiro ao assaltante que me aponta uma arma) ou sermos impedidos de fazer o que queremos (quando estou encarcerado ou, ainda, quando me vejo impedido de fumar por questões de saúde ou por ser proibido). Nesse sentido, diríamos que em algumas ocasiões somos livres, isto é, fazemos o que queremos, em outras não. Segundo David Hume, no texto reproduzido a seguir, a pergunta sobre se somos livres só faz sentido como uma pergunta acerca da liberdade da ação e não da vontade. Hume inicia sua discussão sobre esse assunto referindo-se a uma longa e infindável discussão sobre a questão da liberdade que, segundo ele, "tem sido extensamente investigada por todo mundo" e "conduzido os filósofos" a um "labirinto de sofismas". De fato, Hume escreve em meados do século XVIII sob o impacto de uma acirrada discussão que há pelo menos um século agitava os ânimos, em torno da noção agostiniana de livre arbítrio, isto é, da liberdade da von371371 tade, tal como caracterizada acima.1 Vários filósofos antes de Hume, como Hobbes e Espinosa, argumentaram que essa noção não fazia sentido. Pois como poderia um evento no mundo, como é um ato da nossa vontade, não ter causa? Seria como dizer: tal coisa aconteceu porque aconteceu, ou quero isso porque quero, sem que se dê para esse evento – no caso, o meu querer – uma explicação, um por quê, uma razão. Ora, tudo no mundo tem uma explicação, um por quê, uma razão – numa palavra: uma causa – ainda que desconhecida. Ou, pelo menos, diria Hume, em complemento aos argumentos de seus antecessores, assim nós supomos. Tanto é que, quando alguma coisa nos parece acontecer por acaso, isto é, não ter uma causa, inquerimos a experiência até que alguma explicação plausível se apresente. Eis o que faz o relojoeiro diante de um relógio que às vezes funciona, às vezes não. Não contente com a "não explicação" desse comportamento irregular, o relojoeiro abre o relógio em busca de uma explicação, supondo assim, com sua atitude inquisitória, que há de haver uma causa para aquela ocorrência. O sucesso de sua investigação, quando enfim consegue identificar o que estava impedindo o bom funcionamento do relógio, reforça a sua adesão à suposição de que toda ocorrência tem uma causa, suposição que lhe serve de guia em sua prática de relojoeiro. Assim procedemos, argumenta Hume, em nossa experiência comum, e também com relação ao comportamento humano. Supomos o tempo todo, em nossas práticas cotidianas, que os homens se comportarão dessa ou daquela maneira em determinadas circunstâncias. Sabemos, por exemplo, que se deixarmos uma bolsa cheia de dinheiro em uma praça pública (Hume dá o exemplo do Charing Cross, movimentada avenida londrina) dificilmente a encontraremos uma hora depois. E qual a diferença entre esse raciocínio e aquele que nos faz esperar que os ponteiros do relógio se movam quando lhe damos corda? Nenhuma, diz Hume. Em ambos os casos, supomos que certos eventos operam como causas determinantes de outros: tomamos certas disposições de caráter e motivações humanas como fatores determinantes das ações e compor1 Ver AGOSTINHO. O livre-arbítrio. São Paulo: Paulus, 1995. reLAção CAusAL e A vontAde Como um evento nAturAL em hume372 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 372 tamentos dos homens, assim como tomamos a corda do relógio como causa do movimento dos seus ponteiros. Em ambos os casos, da percepção das causas supomos que um determinado efeito necessariamente se produzirá. Isso quer dizer que, de fato, de acordo com esse nosso modo comum de raciocinar, não nos supomos livres. Esperamos regularidade dos comportamentos. Ou seja, não acreditamos que nossas escolhas poderiam ser diferentes daquelas que normalmente são e que poderíamos agir de um modo muito diferente do modo como normalmente agimos. Não tomamos, portanto, nossas escolhas como um ato a cada vez novo e inaugural, mas como o efeito de uma disposição permanente e regular que as determina e explica. E se reconhecemos que essa disposição é regular é porque entendemos que ela foi formada segundos causas elas também regulares. Assim, nossas práticas cotidianas, como a de não deixar uma bolsa de dinheiro em praça pública, atestam que supomos que o comportamento humano é determinado por uma cadeia causal, assim como qualquer outro evento no mundo. Se tivermos isso claro, já não faz mais sentido nos perguntarmos se somos livres no sentido de ter uma vontade livre. Nós simplesmente não acreditamos nisso. Hume que, muito cedo, com apenas 28 anos, publicou a sua principal obra – o Tratado da Natureza Humana – onde já estão presentes as principais ideias de sua filosofia, reapresentadas mais tarde na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano e na Investigação sobre os Princípios da Moral –, e que nos deixou, além disso, uma série de ensaios sobre moral, política e arte, bem como alguns volumes sobre a história da Inglaterra, foi celebrizado e é hoje conhecido sobretudo por sua teoria da causalidade. Hume modificou radicalmente o modo como se compreendia a natureza dessa relação. No que consiste precisamente o raciocínio por meio do qual estabelecemos uma relação causal entre dois eventos, tomando um como causa e outro como efeito? Antes de Hume, costumava-se pensar que esse raciocínio consistia numa inspeção do objeto ou do evento que chamamos causa (por exemplo, o fogo) por meio da qual chegaríamos a re373373 conhecer nele a qualidade ou o poder que ele tem de produzir determinados efeitos (como a queimadura), de modo que, do conhecimento adequado da causa, nós então deduziríamos, como estando implicados nela, os seus efeitos. Hume, porém, concebe de outro modo o raciocínio causal. Eis, em suas próprias palavras, um resumo da sua concepção: "nossa ideia de necessidade e causação provém inteiramente da uniformidade observada nas operações da natureza, nas quais objetos semelhantes estão constantemente conjugados, e a mente é determinada pelo hábito a inferir um deles a partir do aparecimento do outro. Essas duas circunstâncias compõem toda a necessidade que atribuímos à matéria. Para além da conjunção constante de objetos similares, e da consequente inferência de um ao outro, não temos nenhuma ideia de qualquer necessidade ou conexão" (p. 378-9) Ou seja, segundo ele, identificar a causa de um efeito não envolve um conhecimento interno da causa, de suas qualidades e poderes não imediatamente visíveis, nos quais o efeito estaria implicado. Estabelecemos uma relação causal, por um conhecimento externo da causa, simplesmente observando que o evento que chamamos causa normalmente vem acompanhado do evento que chamamos efeito. Não conhecemos aquilo que na causa implica de maneira necessária o efeito; não conhecemos aquilo que viria ser o seu poder de produzir o efeito. Percebemos, isto sim, uma relação uniforme e regular entre o que chamamos causa e o que chamamos efeito, uma conjunção constante entre ambos. Colocase a mão no fogo e forma-se uma queimadura. E isto sempre, de forma regular, da modo que já não mais precisamos repetir a experiência para esperar que uma queimadura se forme ao colocarmos a mão no fogo. É dessa regularidade que se origina, segundo Hume, a nossa ideia de que há uma relação necessária, indissolúvel, entre o fogo e a queimadura. Essa ideia corresponde à facilidade com que passamos de uma ideia à outra – do fogo à queimadura – a partir da experiência de uma relação regular entre esses eventos. Hume aplica esse seu modo de conceber a causalidade à questão reLAção CAusAL e A vontAde Como um evento nAturAL em hume374 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 374 da liberdade e da necessidade que apresentamos acima. Segundo ele, se compreendermos a relação causal do modo como ele nos convida a compreendê-la, fica então evidente que pensamos o comportamento humano a partir de relações causais, exatamente do mesmo modo, sem tirar nem pôr, como pensamos o movimento dos corpos ou da matéria a partir de relações causais. O mesmíssimo raciocínio que nos leva a esperar que nos queimaremos ao botar a mão no fogo, nos leva a prever o comportamento dos homens a partir de disposições de caráter conhecidas. Como vimos, autores como Hobbes e Espinosa também pensaram que o comportamento humano estava submetido ao mesmo regime de necessidade que o movimento dos corpos. Não foi preciso esperar que Hume reformulasse a noção de causalidade para que ela se fizesse aplicar à conduta humana. O que esse novo modo de conceber a relação causal traz de novo para a questão da liberdade, segundo o próprio Hume, é que ele evidencia melhor o que esses autores antes dele já procuraram mostrar, a saber, que a nossa vontade é um evento natural como outro qualquer. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de hume traduzidas Para o Português: HUME, D. Tratado da Natureza Humana. Tradução de Déborah Danowski. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2002. HUME, D. Uma investigação sobre o entendimento humano. In: _____. Investigações sobre o entendimento humano e sobre os princípios da moral. Tradução de José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2003. HUME, D. Uma investigação sobre os princípios da moral. In: _____.Investigações sobre o entendimento humano e sobre os princípios da moral. Tradução de José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2003. HUME, D. Ensaios Morais, políticos e literários. Tradução de Luciano Trigo. Rio de Janeiro: Top Books, 2004. HUME, D. História natural da religião. Tradução de Jaimir Conte. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2005. HUME, D. Diálogos sobre a religião natural. Tradução de José Oscar de Almeida Marques. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1992. 375375 obras sobre hume (em Português) DELEUZE, G. Empirismo e Subjetividade: ensaio sobre a natureza humana segundo Hume. Tradução de Luiz B. L. Orlandi. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2001. MONTEIRO, J. P. Novos estudos humeanos, São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2003. SMITH, P. O Ceticismo de Hume. São Paulo: Loyola, 1995. 376 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 376 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno UMA INVESTIGAÇÃO SOBRE O ENTENDIMENTO HUMANO 1 Seção 8 Da liberdade e necessidade Parte 1 1 Poder-se-ia razoavelmente esperar, em questões que têm sido examinadas e discutidas com grande vivacidade desde as primeiras origens da ciência e da filosofia, que todos os debatedores já tivessem chegado a um acordo ao menos quanto ao significado de todos os termos, e que nossas investigações, no curso de dois mil anos, tivessem sido capazes ir além das palavras, até chegar ao verdadeiro e real assunto da controvérsia. Pois não parece bastante simples oferecer definições exatas dos termos empregados no raciocínio, e fazer dessas definições, e não do mero som das palavras, o objeto de futuras análises e exames? Mas, se considerarmos o assunto mais de perto, estaremos inclinados a extrair uma conclusão oposta. Do simples fato de que uma controvérsia tenha se estendido por tanto tempo e ainda permaneça sem solução, podemos presumir que há nela alguma ambiguidade de expressão, e que os debatedores associam diferentes ideias aos termos empregados na controvérsia. 1 HUME, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp Oxford: Oxford University, 1999. 377377 Pois como se supõe que as faculdades da mente são naturalmente iguais em todos os indivíduos – e se assim não fosse, nada poderia ser mais infrutífero que argumentarmos ou debatermos uns com os outros –, seria impossível, se as pessoas associassem as mesmas ideias a seus termos, que pudessem durante tanto tempo formar diferentes opiniões sobre o mesmo assunto, especialmente quando comunicam suas opiniões, e cada uma das partes volta-se para todos os lados em busca de argumentos que possam dar-lhes a vitória sobre seus antagonistas. É verdade que, se os homens tentam discutir questões que estão inteiramente fora do alcance das faculdades humanas, tais como as que concernem a origem dos mundos, ou a organização do sistema intelectual ou da região dos espíritos, eles podem ficar longo tempo golpeando o vazio em suas infrutíferas contendas, sem nunca chegar a qualquer conclusão determinada. Mas se a questão diz respeito a algum assunto da vida e da experiência cotidianas, julgaríamos que nada poderia preservar a disputa indecidida por tanto tempo exceto algumas expressões ambíguas que mantêm os antagonistas imóveis à distância e os impedem de atracar-se um ao outro. 2 Isso tem sido o caso na questão longamente debatida acerca da liberdade e da necessidade, e em um grau tão notável que, se não estou muito enganado, descobriremos que todos os homens, tanto os sábios como os ignorantes, sempre tiveram a mesma opinião sobre esse assunto, e que umas poucas definições inteligíveis teriam imediatamente posto um fim a toda a controvérsia. Confesso que essa disputa tem sido tão extensamente investigada de todos os lados, e tem conduzido os filósofos a um tal labirinto de sofismas obscuros que não é de admirar que um leitor sensato leve sua comodidade a ponto de recusar-se a dar ouvidos a uma questão da qual não pode esperar nem instrução nem entretenimento. Mas a forma aqui proposta do argumento pode, talvez, servir para renovar sua atenção, já que apresenta mais novidade, promete ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia e não perturbará muito seu conforto com raciocínios intricados e obscuros.2 3 Espero, portanto, mostrar que todos os homens sempre concor2 Hume entende a filosofia como uma reflexão sobre o nosso modo comum de pensar. Nesse sentido, a filosofia não deve ser obscura e complicada, como se nos apresentasse um outro modo de pensar que não o ordinário. 378 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 378 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno daram quanto às doutrinas tanto da necessidade quanto da liberdade, em qualquer sentido razoável que se possa dar a esses termos, e que toda a controvérsia girou até agora meramente em torno de palavras. Começaremos por examinar a doutrina da necessidade.3 4 É universalmente admitido que a matéria, em todas as suas operações, sofre a atuação de uma força necessária, e que todo efeito natural está tão precisamente determinado pela energia de sua causa que nenhum outro efeito, naquelas circunstâncias particulares, poderia ter resultado dela. A magnitude e a direção de cada movimento estão prescritas com tal exatidão pelas leis da natureza que, do choque de dois corpos, seria tão plausível surgir uma criatura viva quanto um movimento de magnitude ou direção diferentes do que efetivamente se produziu. Se quisermos, portanto, formar uma ideia justa e precisa de necessidade, deveremos considerar de onde surge essa ideia, quando a aplicamos à operação dos corpos. 5 Parece evidente que, se todas as cenas da natureza fossem continuamente alteradas de tal maneira que jamais dois acontecimentos tivessem qualquer semelhança um com o outro mas cada objeto fosse sempre inteiramente novo, sem nenhuma semelhança com qualquer coisa que se tivesse visto antes, jamais teríamos, nesse caso, alcançado a mais tênue ideia de necessidade ou de uma conexão entre esses objetos. Poderíamos dizer, sob essa suposição, que um objeto ou acontecimento seguiu-se a outro, mas não que um foi produzido pelo outro. Nesse caso, a relação de causa e efeito deveria ser absolutamente desconhecida pela humanidade, e a inferência e o raciocínio relativos às operações da natureza chegariam a um fim, restando a memória e os sentidos como os únicos canais pelos quais o conhecimento de qualquer existência real poderia ter acesso à mente. Nossa ideia de necessidade e causação surge, portanto, inteiramente da uniformidade observada nas operações da natureza, nas quais objetos semelhantes estão constantemente conjugados, e a mente é 3 Nos dois parágrafos seguintes Hume resume a sua concepção da relação causal, pela qual é hoje conhecido e reconhecido como grande filósofo. Trata-se, em seguida (parágrafos 6 a 20), de mostrar que compreendemos o comportamento humano a partir de relações causais, o que quer dizer, segundo sua concepção da causalidade, que costumamos inferir as ações dos homens de seus motivos e inclinações, a partir da percepção de relações regulares de contiguidade e sucessão entre eles. 379379 determinada pelo hábito a inferir um deles a partir do aparecimento do outro. Essas duas circunstâncias compõem toda a necessidade que atribuímos à matéria. Para além da conjunção constante de objetos similares, e da consequente inferência de um ao outro, não temos nenhuma ideia de qualquer necessidade ou conexão. 6 Se ficar claro, portanto, que toda a humanidade sempre reconheceu, sem nenhuma dúvida ou hesitação, que essas duas circunstâncias têm lugar nas ações voluntárias dos homens e nas operações da mente, deve seguir-se que toda a humanidade sempre concordou com doutrina da necessidade, e se polemizaram até agora, é meramente por não se entenderem uns aos outros. 7 Quanto à primeira circunstância, a saber, a conjunção constante e regular de eventos semelhantes, é possível que fiquemos satisfeitos com as seguintes considerações. É universalmente admitido que há uma grande uniformidade nas ações dos homens em todas as nações e épocas, e que a natureza humana ainda continua a mesma em seus princípios e operações. Os mesmos motivos sempre produzem as mesmas ações; os mesmos eventos seguem-se das mesmas causas. Ambição, avareza, interesse próprio, vaidade, amizade, generosidade, espírito público, essas paixões, mescladas em graus variados e distribuídas por toda a sociedade, têm sido desde o início do mundo, e ainda são, a fonte de todas as ações e empreendimentos que já foram observados entre a humanidade. Quer conhecer os sentimentos, inclinações e modo de vida dos gregos e romanos? Estude bem o temperamento e as ações dos franceses e ingleses; você não pode estar muito enganado ao transferir para os primeiros a maioria das observações que fez sobre os segundos. A humanidade é tão semelhante em todas as épocas e lugares que a história não nos revela nada novo ou estranho nesse aspecto. Sua principal utilidade é apenas revelar os princípios constantes e universais da natureza humana, mostrando os homens em todas as variedades de circunstâncias e situações, e fornecendo materiais a partir dos quais podemos ordenar nossas observações e familiarizar-nos com os motivos regulares da ação e do comportamento humanos. Esses registros de guerras, intrigas, sedições e revoltas são outras tantas coleções de experimentos pelos quais o político ou filósofo da moral fixa os princípios de sua ciência, da mesma manei380 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 380 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno ra que o físico ou filósofo da natureza familiariza-se com a natureza de plantas, minerais e outros objetos externos por meio dos experimentos que realiza sobre eles. E a terra, água, e outros elementos examinados por Aristóteles e Hipócrates assemelham-se aos que estão presentemente dados a nossa observação tanto quanto os homens descritos por Políbio e Tácito assemelham-se aos que agora governam o mundo. 8 Se um viajante, retornando de um país distante, traz-nos um relato de homens completamente diferentes de todos os que já conhecemos, homens inteiramente privados de avareza, ambição ou vingança, que não sentissem outros prazeres senão os da amizade, generosidade e espírito público, deveríamos imediatamente, por essas circunstâncias, detectar a falsidade e apontá-lo como mentiroso, com tanta certeza como se ele tivesse recheado sua narrativa com histórias de centauros e dragões, milagres e prodígios. E, se quisermos destruir qualquer falsificação em história, não há argumento mais convincente do que provar que as ações atribuídas a uma pessoa qualquer são diretamente contrárias ao curso da natureza, e que nenhuma motivação humana, em tais circunstâncias, jamais poderia induzi-la a tal conduta. A veracidade de Quinto Cúrcio é tão suspeita quando descreve a coragem sobrenatural de Alexandre, que o levava a atacar sozinho multidões, como quando descreve sua força e atividade sobrenaturais, que lhe permitiam enfrentar essas multidões. Reconhecemos uma uniformidade nos motivos e ações humanas de forma tão pronta e universal quanto nas operações dos corpos. 9 Daí igualmente o valor da experiência adquirida por uma longa vida e uma multiplicidade de ocupações e convivências para instruir-nos quanto aos princípios da natureza humana e regular tanto nossa conduta futura quanto nossa especulação. Por meio desse guia, ascendemos ao conhecimento das inclinações e motivações dos homens a partir de suas ações, expressões e, até mesmo, seus gestos; e, reciprocamente, descendemos à interpretação de suas ações a partir do conhecimento que temos de seus motivos e inclinações. As observações gerais, acumuladas no curso da experiência dão-nos a chave da natureza humana e ensinamnos a deslindar todas as suas complexidades. Pretextos e aparências não mais nos enganam, e declarações públicas são tomadas como o disfarce plausível de um certo interesse. E embora se conceda à virtude e à hon381381 ra seu apropriado peso e autoridade, esse perfeito desinteresse, tantas vezes alegado, jamais é esperado nas multidões e facções, raramente em seus líderes, e ainda mais raramente em indivíduos de qualquer categoria ou posição. Mas, se não houvesse uniformidade nas ações humanas, e se todo experimento realizado nesse campo fornecesse resultados irregulares e anômalos, seria impossível coletar quaisquer observações gerais acerca da humanidade, e nenhuma experiência, por mais acuradamente digerida pela reflexão, poderia servir a qualquer propósito. Por que o velho lavrador seria mais habilidoso em seu ofício que o jovem principiante, a não ser porque há uma certa uniformidade na operação do sol, da chuva e da terra no que se refere à produção de vegetais, e porque a experiência ensina ao velho praticante as regras pelas quais essa operação é governada e dirigida? 10 Não devemos, contudo, esperar que essa uniformidade das ações humanas chegue ao ponto de que todos os homens, nas mesmas circunstâncias, venham sempre a agir precisamente da mesma maneira, sem levar minimamente em consideração a diversidade dos caracteres, predisposições e opiniões. Uma uniformidade desse tipo, em todos os detalhes, não se encontra em parte alguma da natureza. Ao contrário, ao observar a diversidade de condutas em diferentes homens, tornamo-nos capazes de moldar uma maior variedade de máximas, que continuam pressupondo algum grau de uniformidade e regularidade. 11 Se os costumes dos homens diferem em diferentes épocas e países, isso nos instrui sobre a grande força do hábito e da educação, que moldam a mente humana desde sua infância e dão-lhe um caráter fixo e determinado. Se os modos e a conduta de um dos sexos são bem diferentes dos de outro, isso nos familiariza com os diferentes caracteres que a natureza estampou sobre eles, e que ela preserva com constância e regularidade. Se as ações de uma mesma pessoa mostram-se muito distintas nos diversos períodos de sua vida, da infância à velhice, isso abre espaço para muitas observações gerais relativas à mudança gradual de nossos sentimentos e inclinações, e as diferentes máximas que prevalecem nas diferentes idades das criaturas humanas. Mesmo os caracteres, que são peculiares a cada indivíduo, exibem uma uniformidade em sua influência, caso contrário nossa familiaridade com as pessoas, e nossas observa382 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 382 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno ções de sua conduta, não poderiam jamais ensinar-nos sobre suas disposições, ou servir para dirigir nosso comportamento em relação a elas. 12 Concedo que seja possível descobrir algumas ações que não parecem ter nenhuma conexão regular com quaisquer motivos conhecidos, e que são exceções a todos os padrões de conduta já estabelecidos para a direção dos homens. Mas, se quisermos saber quais julgamentos devem ser feitos sobre essas ações irregulares e extraordinárias, será útil considerar as opiniões comumente mantidas sobre os acontecimentos irregulares que surgem no curso da natureza e nas operações dos objetos externos. Nem todas as causas estão conjugadas com a mesma uniformidade a seus efeitos costumeiros. Um artífice que manipula apenas matéria inanimada pode ter seus objetivos frustrados tanto quanto um político que dirige a conduta de agentes razoáveis e inteligentes. 13 O vulgo, que toma as coisas tal como lhe aparecem à primeira vista, atribui a incerteza dos resultados a uma incerteza nas causas, que as priva frequentemente de sua influência habitual, embora não sofram impedimentos em sua operação. Mas os filósofos – ao observar que em quase todas as partes da natureza está presente uma grande variedade de motivos e princípios que, por serem muito remotos ou diminutos, estão necessariamente ocultos – descobrem que é pelo menos possível que essa disparidade dos resultados proceda, não de alguma contingência na causa, mas da operação secreta de causas contrárias. Essa possibilidade se converte em certeza quando, após um exame rigoroso, observações adicionais mostram que uma disparidade nos resultados revela sempre uma disparidade nas causas, e decorre de sua mútua oposição. Um camponês não pode dar melhor explicação de por que um relógio pára senão dizendo que ele não costuma funcionar bem; mas um artífice facilmente percebe que uma mesma força na mola ou no pêndulo tem sempre a mesma influência sobre as engrenagens, embora possa falhar em produzir seu efeito costumeiro em razão, talvez, de um grão de poeira que interrompe todo o movimento. Da observação de diversos casos paralelos, os filósofos extraem a máxima de que a conexão entre todas as causas e efeitos é uniformemente necessária, e que sua aparente incerteza em alguns casos deriva da secreta oposição de causas contrárias. 383383 14 Assim, por exemplo, no corpo humano, quando os sintomas usuais de saúde ou doença frustram nossas expectativas, quando os remédios não operam com a eficácia costumeira, quando resultados irregulares decorrem de alguma causa particular, o filósofo e o médico não se surpreendem com isso nem jamais são tentados a negar a necessidade e uniformidade gerais desses princípios que dirigem a organização animal. Eles sabem que um corpo humano é uma máquina imensamente complicada, que nele se ocultam muitos poderes secretos situados totalmente além de nossa compreensão, que ele frequentemente nos parecerá muito incerto em suas operações, e que, portanto, os resultados irregulares que se manifestam exteriormente não provam que as leis da natureza não estejam sendo obedecidas com a máxima regularidade em suas operações e determinações internas. 15 O filósofo, para ser consistente, deve aplicar o mesmo raciocínio às ações e volições de agentes dotados de inteligência. As resoluções mais irregulares e inesperadas dos seres humanos podem frequentemente ser explicadas por aqueles que conhecem cada detalhe particular de seu caráter e situação. Uma pessoa de gênio amável dá uma resposta irritada: mas é que ela tem dor de dente, ou não almoçou. Um tipo vagaroso exibe uma vivacidade incomum em suas maneiras: é que um golpe de sorte subitamente o favoreceu. Ou mesmo quando uma ação, como algumas vezes ocorre, não pode ser particularmente explicada nem pela própria pessoa nem por outras, sabemos, em geral, que os caracteres dos homens apresentam um determinado grau de inconstância e irregularidade. Este, de certo modo, é o caráter constante da natureza humana, embora seja mais particularmente aplicável a algumas pessoas que não têm nenhuma regra fixa de conduta, mas procedem em um contínuo fluxo de capricho e inconstância. Os princípios e motivos internos podem operar de maneira uniforme apesar dessas aparentes irregularidades, assim como se supõe que os ventos, chuvas, nuvens e outras variáveis do clima são governados por princípios estáveis, embora não facilmente discerníveis pela sagacidade e a investigação humanas.4 4 A regularidade, com base na qual estabelecemos relações causais, nem sempre é observada na natureza, que, em muitos casos, nos aparece de maneira irregular. No entanto, diante dessas irregularidades nossa tendência é a de adotar uma atitude que a filo384 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 384 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno 16 Parece, então, não apenas que a conjunção entre motivos e ações voluntárias é tão regular e uniforme como a que existe entre a causa e o efeito em qualquer parte da natureza, mas também que essa conjunção regular tem sido universalmente reconhecida pela humanidade, e nunca foi objeto de disputa, seja na filosofia, seja na vida ordinária. Ora, como é da experiência passada que extraímos todas as inferências referentes ao futuro, e como concluímos que os objetos que sempre observamos conjugados continuarão conjugados para sempre, pode parecer supérfluo provar que essa uniformidade experimentada nas ações humanas é uma fonte a partir da qual fazemos inferências sobre elas. Mas a fim de lançar o argumento em uma maior variedade de perspectivas, vamos também insistir, embora brevemente, neste último tópico.5 17 A dependência mútua dos homens é tão grande em todas as sociedades que dificilmente qualquer ação humana está inteiramente completa em si mesma, ou é realizada sem alguma referência às ações de outros que são requeridas para fazê-la corresponder plenamente à intenção do agente. Mesmo o mais pobre artesão, ao trabalhar sozinho, espera pelo menos que a proteção do magistrado lhe garanta o gozo dos frutos de seu trabalho. Também espera que, ao levar seus produtos ao mercado e oferecê-los a um preço razoável, encontrará compradores e será capaz, com o dinheiro que obtém, de conseguir que outros lhe forneçam os artigos necessários à sua sobrevivência. À proporção que os homens ampliam suas transações e tornam mais complicadas suas interações com outros, seus esquemas de vida abrangem uma variedade cada vez maior de ações voluntárias que eles esperam, pelos motivos apropriados, que colaborem com as suas próprias ações. Em todas essas conclusões, é da experiência passada que eles extraem seus padrões, assim como o fazem em seus raciocínios sobre objetos externos, acreditando firmemente que os homens, assim como todos os elementos, devem continuar agir, em sofia, a ciência e a reflexão acabam por fortalecer, a saber, a de atribuir a irregularidade ao desconhecimento das causas. Esse modo de pensar impulsiona o desenvolvimento da razão no sentido da busca das causas ocultas e não imediatamente evidentes. É isso o que Hume procura fazer na sua filosofia, que se pretende uma ciência da natureza humana. 5 Até aqui (parágrafos 6 a 16) Hume mostrou que tomamos o comportamento como regular. Trata-se agora de mostrar que, com base nessa regularidade, inferimos ações e comportamentos a partir de motivações. 385385 suas operações, do modo que sempre se observou. Para a execução de uma tarefa qualquer, o proprietário de uma manufatura conta com o trabalho de seus empregados tanto quanto conta com as ferramentas que emprega, e ficaria igualmente surpreso se suas expectativas se frustrassem em qualquer um dos casos. Em suma, essa inferência e raciocínio experimentais acerca das ações de outros está tão presente na vida humana que ninguém que esteja desperto deixa de efetuá-los sequer por um momento. Não temos, portanto, razão em afirmar que toda a humanidade sempre concordou com a doutrina da necessidade, segundo a definição e explicação precedentes? 18 Tampouco os filósofos mantiveram, neste assunto, uma opinião diferente da do povo. Pois, para não mencionar que quase todas as ações de suas vidas pressupõem essa opinião, há igualmente poucas partes do saber especulativo para as quais ela não é essencial. Que aconteceria à história se não tivéssemos confiança na veracidade do historiador, de acordo a experiência que tivemos da humanidade? Como poderia a política ser uma ciência se as leis e as formas de governo não tivessem uma influência uniforme sobre a sociedade? Onde estaria a fundação da moral se caracteres particulares não tivessem nenhum poder certo e determinado de produzir sentimentos particulares, e se esses sentimentos não operassem de forma constante sobre as ações? E sob que alegação poderíamos dirigir nossa crítica a um poeta ou beletrista se não pudéssemos declarar que a conduta e os sentimentos de seus personagens eram ou não naturais em vista de seus caracteres e das circunstâncias? Parece quase impossível, portanto, envolvermo-nos com qualquer tipo de ciência ou ação sem reconhecer a doutrina da necessidade, e essa inferência das ações voluntárias a partir dos motivos; da conduta a partir dos caracteres.6 19 E, na verdade, quando consideramos quão adequadamente se ligam as evidências natural e moral, formando uma única cadeia de argumentos, não hesitaremos em admitir que elas são da mesma natureza, e derivam-se dos mesmos princípios. Um prisioneiro que não tem dinheiro nem rendimentos descobre a impossibilidade de sua fuga tanto ao considerar a obstinação do carcereiro quanto ao observar as paredes 6 Levando em conta essa doutrina da necessidade, Hume se dedicou a desenvolver em sua obra as ciências que acaba de enumerar: a história, a política, a moral e a crítica. 386 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 386 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno e grades que o cercam; e, em todas as tentativas de ganhar a liberdade, escolhe antes laborar sobre a pedra e o ferro destas últimas do que sobre a natureza inflexível do primeiro. O mesmo prisioneiro, quando levado ao cadafalso, prevê sua morte com tanta certeza a partir da constância e fidelidade de seus guardas quanto da operação do machado ou da roda. Sua mente percorre uma determinada sequência de ideias: a recusa dos soldados em permitir sua fuga, a ação do carrasco, a separação da cabeça e do corpo, a perda de sangue, os movimentos convulsivos e a morte. Eis aqui uma cadeia que entrelaça tanto causas naturais como ações voluntárias, mas a mente não sente nenhuma diferença entre elas ao passar de um elo para outro, nem está menos certa do resultado futuro do que estaria se ele se conectasse a objetos presentes a sua memória ou sentidos por uma sequência de causas cimentadas pelo que nos apraz chamar uma necessidade física. A experiência da mesma conjunção tem um mesmo efeito sobre a mente, quer os objetos conjugados sejam motivos, volições e ações, ou forma e movimento. Podemos mudar os nomes das coisas, mas sua natureza e sua operação sobre o entendimento nunca mudam. 20 Se um homem, que sei ser honesto e opulento, e com quem vivo em íntima amizade, vier à minha casa, onde estou rodeado por meus empregados, fico seguro de que ele não irá apunhalar-me pelas costas antes de partir para roubar meu porta-tinteiro de prata, e não espero esse evento mais do que esperaria o desabamento da própria casa, que é nova e solidamente construída e alicerçada. "Mas ele pode ser tomado de um delírio súbito desconhecido". Ora, do mesmo modo um súbito terremoto pode abalar minha casa e fazê-la desabar sobre minha cabeça. Vou, portanto, mudar as suposições e dizer que sei com certeza que ele não vai pôr sua mão sobre o fogo e mantê-la ali até ser consumida. E penso que posso prever esse acontecimento com a mesma segurança com que posso prever que, se ele se atirasse pela janela e não encontrasse nenhum obstáculo, não permaneceria suspenso no ar por um momento sequer. Nenhuma suspeita de um delírio desconhecido pode tornar minimamente possível aquele primeiro acontecimento, tão contrário a todos os princípios conhecidos da natureza humana. Um homem que ao meio-dia deixe sua bolsa recheada de ouro na calçada de Charing Cross pode tão bem esperar que ela voará para longe como uma pena como que a encontrará 387387 intacta uma hora mais tarde. Mais da metade dos raciocínios humanos contêm inferências de natureza semelhante, acompanhadas de maiores ou menores graus de certeza, proporcionais à experiência que temos da conduta usual dos homens nessas situações particulares.7 21 Tenho frequentemente considerado qual poderia ser a razão pela qual toda a humanidade, embora sempre admitindo sem hesitar a doutrina da necessidade em todos seus atos e raciocínios, revele, contudo, tanta relutância a admiti-la em palavras, e se mostre, em todas as épocas inclinada, a defender a opinião contrária. Penso que se pode explicar isso da seguinte maneira. Se examinarmos as operações dos corpos e a produção de efeitos a partir de suas causas, descobriremos que todas nossas faculdades jamais podem fazer-nos avançar, em nosso conhecimento dessa relação, para além da simples observação de que objetos particulares estão constantemente conjugados uns aos outros, e que a mente, por uma transição costumeira, é levada, quando do aparecimento de um desses objetos, à crença no outro. Mas embora essa conclusão referente à ignorância humana seja o resultado de um exame muito cuidadoso do assunto, as pessoas ainda têm uma forte propensão a acreditar que penetram mais profundamente nos poderes da natureza e percebem algo como uma conexão necessária entre a causa e o efeito. Quando, porém, dirigem em seguida suas reflexões para as operações de suas próprias mentes, e não sentem uma conexão desse tipo entre o motivo e a ação, elas tendem, com base nisso, a supor que há uma diferença entre os efeitos que resultam de uma força material e os que provêm do pensamento e da inteligência. Mas, logo que nos convencermos de que tudo o que sabemos acerca de qualquer tipo de causação é simplesmente a conjunção constante de objetos e a consequente inferência de um ao outro realizada pela mente, e descobrirmos que todos admitem universalmente que essas duas condições ocorrem nas ações voluntárias, reconheceremos talvez mais facilmente que essa mesma necessidade é comum a todas as causas. E, embora este raciocínio, ao atribuir necessidade às determinações da vontade, possa 7 Tendo mostrado que, de fato, em nossos raciocínios ordinários, estabelecemos relações causais concernentes à conduta humana, cabe agora investigar as razões que teriam levado alguns a negar a necessidade e a determinação do nosso comportamento. Tais razões consistem numa concepção errônea da causalidade, notadamente, na concepção clássica da causalidade, que foi objeto da crítica de Hume. 388 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 388 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno contradizer os sistemas de muitos filósofos, descobriremos, após refletir, que esses filósofos discordam dele apenas verbalmente, não em sua real opinião. A necessidade, no sentido em que a tomamos aqui, nunca foi – nem pode ser, acredito –, rejeitada por nenhum filósofo. Pode-se, talvez, apenas alegar que a mente é capaz de perceber, nas operações da matéria, alguma conexão adicional entre a causa e o efeito, uma conexão que não ocorre nas ações voluntárias de seres inteligentes. Ora, se isso é ou não verdade, só pode ficar claro após um exame, e cabe a esses filósofos tornar válida sua asserção, definindo ou descrevendo essa necessidade e mostrando-nos sua presença nas operações das causas materiais. 22 Pareceria, na verdade, que os homens começam pelo lado errado dessa questão sobre liberdade e necessidade ao abordá-la examinando as faculdades da alma, a influência do entendimento e as operações da vontade. Que eles discutam, primeiramente, uma questão mais simples, a saber, as operações dos corpos e da matéria bruta desprovida de inteligência, e experimentem se podem formar, aí, qualquer ideia de causação e necessidade exceto a de uma conjunção constante de objetos e a subsequente inferência feita pela mente ao passar de um ao outro. Se essas circunstâncias constituem, efetivamente, toda a necessidade que concebemos na matéria, e se há um reconhecimento universal de que essas circunstâncias também ocorrem nas operações da mente, a disputa está concluída, ou, ao menos, tem de ser reconhecida, daqui em diante, como sendo meramente verbal. Mas enquanto supusermos irrefletidamente que temos alguma ideia adicional de necessidade e causação nas operações dos objetos externos, e, ao mesmo tempo, que não conseguimos descobrir algo semelhante nas ações voluntárias da mente, será impossível, perseverando em uma suposição tão errônea, chegar a uma conclusão determinada sobre a questão. O único método que pode nos abrir os olhos é ascender ainda mais e examinar o limitado alcance da ciência quando aplicada às causas materiais, convencendo-nos de que tudo o que conhecemos destas são a conjunção constante e a inferência acima mencionadas. Podemos, talvez, achar difícil que se concorde em fixar limites tão estreitos ao entendimento humano, mas não teremos, em seguida, dificuldades quando viermos a aplicar essa doutrina às ações da vontade. Pois, como é evidente que estas apresentam uma conjunção regular com 389389 motivos, circunstâncias e caracteres, e como sempre fazemos inferências destes para aquelas, devemos estar obrigados a reconhecer verbalmente essa necessidade que já admitimos em todas as deliberações de nossas vidas e em todos os passos de nossa conduta e procedimento.8 23 Prosseguindo, contudo, neste projeto de reconciliação concernente à questão da liberdade e da necessidade – a mais controversa questão da metafísica, ela própria a mais controversa das ciências –, não se requer muitas palavras para provar que toda a humanidade sempre esteve de acordo quanto à doutrina da liberdade, assim como quanto à da necessidade, e que toda a disputa, também nesse aspecto, tem sido até agora meramente verbal. Pois o que se entende por liberdade quando esse termo é aplicado a ações voluntárias?9 Com certeza não estamos 8 A prevalência da doutrina da liberdade pode ser explicada a partir de outra causa, a saber, uma falsa sensação ou aparente experiência de liberdade ou indiferença que temos ou podemos ter em muitas de nossas ações. A necessidade de qualquer ação, seja da matéria ou da mente, não é uma qualidade que esteja propriamente no agente, mas em qualquer ser dotado de pensamento e intelecto que esteja observando a ação; e consiste principalmente na determinação de seus pensamentos a inferir a ocorrência dessa ação a partir de alguns objetos precedentes; assim como a liberdade, quando oposta à necessidade, não é nada mais que a falta dessa determinação, e uma certa frouxidão ou indiferença que sentimos ao passar, ou não passar, da ideia de um objeto à de algum outro que o suceda. Mas embora possamos observar que, ao refletir sobre as ações humanas, raramente sentimos essa frouxidão ou indiferença, sendo comumente capazes de inferi-las com grande certeza a partir de seus motivos e das disposições do agente, ocorre frequentemente que, ao realizar essas ações, temos esse tipo de sensação. E como todos os objetos semelhantes são prontamente tomados uns pelos outros, isto tem sido empregado como uma prova demonstrativa ou mesmo intuitiva da liberdade humana. Sentimos que nossas ações estão sujeitas à nossa vontade na maioria das ocasiões, e imaginamos que sentimos que a própria vontade não está submetida a nada, porque, quando uma negação dessa suposição nos desafia a fazer uma tentativa, sentimos que a vontade se move facilmente em todas as direções e produz uma imagem de si própria (ou uma veleidade, como se diz nas escolas) mesmo naquele lado no qual não veio a se fixar. Persuadimo-nos de que essa imagem, ou tênue movimento, poderia, naquele momento, ter-se completado e chegado à própria ação, porque, se isso for negado, descobrimos, numa segunda tentativa, que ela é agora capaz disso. Mas aqui estamos desconsiderando que o caprichoso desejo de demonstrar a liberdade é, agora, o motivo de nossas ações. E parece certo que, por mais que possamos imaginar que sentimos uma liberdade dentro de nós, um espectador pode comumente inferir nossas ações a partir de nossos motivos e de nosso caráter, e, mesmo quando não o pode, conclui em geral que poderia fazê-lo se estivesse perfeitamente familiarizado com todas as circunstâncias de nossa situação e temperamento, e com os móveis mais secretos de nossa natureza e disposição. Mas isto é a própria essência da necessidade, de acordo com a doutrina precedente. (N.A.) 9 Tendo se mostrado que, de fato, tomamos o comportamento humano como necessário, cabe agora retomar a questão da liberdade das ações voluntárias da qual se partiu, 390 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 390 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno querendo dizer que as ações tenham tão pouca conexão com motivos, inclinações e circunstâncias que não se sigam deles com um certo grau de uniformidade, e que estes não apóiem nenhuma inferência que nos permita concluir a ocorrência daquelas, pois tais fatos são simples e bem conhecidos. Por liberdade, então, só podemos entender um poder de agir ou não agir de acordo com as determinações da vontade; ou seja, se escolhermos ficar parados, podemos ficar assim, e se escolhermos nos mover, também podemos fazê-lo. Ora, essa liberdade hipotética é universalmente admitida como pertencente a todo aquele que não esteja preso e acorrentado. Não há aqui, portanto, matéria para disputas. 24 Qualquer que seja a definição que se dê de liberdade, devemos ter o cuidado de observar duas condições necessárias: primeiro, que essa definição seja consistente com os simples fatos; segundo, que seja consistente consigo mesma. Se observarmos essas condições e tornarmos nossa definição inteligível, estou convencido de que toda a humanidade terá uma opinião unânime a seu respeito. 25 Reconhece-se universalmente que nada existe sem uma causa de sua existência e que acaso, quando bem examinada, é uma palavra meramente negativa, que não significa nenhum poder real que exista em alguma parte da natureza. Pretende-se, porém, que algumas causas sejam necessárias e outras não. Eis aqui, então, a vantagem das definições. Basta que alguém defina uma causa sem incluir, como parte da definição, uma conexão necessária com seu efeito, e que mostre precisamente a origem da ideia expressa pela definição, para que eu abandone de imediato toda a controvérsia, mas isto é completamente impossível se aceitarmos a explicação precedente do assunto. Se objetos não apresentassem uma conjunção regular uns com os outros, jamais chegaríamos a conceber qualquer noção de causa e efeito, e é essa conjunção regular que produz aquela inferência do entendimento que é a única conexão da qual podemos ter alguma compreensão. Quem quer que tente dar uma definição de causa que exclua esses aspectos estará obrigado a empregar ou termos ininteligíveis, ou termos que são sinônimos do termo que pretende defipara definir qual sentido podemos atribuir, de maneira coerente, à noção de liberdade. Exerce-se aqui uma função essencial da atividade filosófica, a de zelar pela coerência dos nossos discursos. 391391 nir.10 E se for aceita a definição acima mencionada, a liberdade, enquanto oposta à necessidade, não à coerção, é o mesmo que o acaso, que é universalmente considerado como desprovido de existência. Parte 211 26 Não há método de raciocínio mais comum e não obstante mais censurável que o de esforçar-se, nas disputas filosóficas, para refutar uma hipótese a pretexto de suas perigosas consequências para a religião e a moralidade. Uma opinião que conduz a absurdos é certamente falsa, mas não é certo que uma opinião seja falsa porque tenha consequências perigosas. Esses argumentos, portanto, deveriam ser inteiramente abandonados, pois não contribuem em nada para a descoberta da verdade, mas apenas tornam odiosa a figura do contendor. Faço esta observação a título geral, sem pretender tirar nenhuma vantagem dela. Submeto-me abertamente a um exame desse tipo e arrisco-me a afirmar que tanto a doutrina da necessidade como a da liberdade, tais como acima explicadas, não apenas são consistentes com a moralidade, mas absolutamente essenciais para lhe dar suporte. 27 A necessidade pode ser definida de duas maneiras, de acordo com as duas definições de causa, da qual forma uma parte essencial. Ela consiste ou na conjunção constante de objetos semelhantes, ou na inferência do entendimento que passa de um objeto para outro. Ora, a necessidade, em ambos os sentidos (que, no fundo, são de fato o mesmo), tem sido universalmente reconhecida, ainda que de forma tácita, nas escolas, no púlpito e na vida ordinária, como participando da vontade humana; e ninguém jamais pretendeu negar que podemos fazer inferências acerca de ações humanas, e que essas inferências fundam-se na conjunção experimenta10 Assim, se uma causa for definida como aquilo que produz alguma coisa, é fácil observar que produzir é sinônimo de causar. Do mesmo modo, se uma causa for definida como aquilo por meio de que alguma coisa existe, isto estará sujeito à mesma objeção, pois o que significam palavras como por meio de que? Se se dissesse que uma causa é aquilo após o que alguma coisa constantemente existe, teríamos entendido os termos, pois isso, na verdade, é tudo que sabemos do assunto. E essa constância forma a própria essência da necessidade, e dela não temos nenhuma outra ideia.(N.A.) 11 Na parte 2, Hume considera certas objeções que poderiam ser feitas à tese sustentada por ele na parte 1. Hume retoma aqui certos argumentos que foram mobilizados no debate em torno da liberdade e da necessidade, mencionado no início do texto, por parte dos defensores do livre-arbítrio. 392 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 392 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno da de ações semelhantes com motivos, inclinações e circunstâncias semelhantes. A única forma pela qual alguém pode discordar seria recusandose, talvez, a chamar de necessidade essa propriedade das ações humanas – mas se o significado está entendido, não se espera que a palavra possa trazer problemas –, ou então, afirmando que é possível descobrir algum fator adicional nas operações da matéria; mas isto, deve-se reconhecer, não pode ter relevância para a moralidade ou a religião, quaisquer que sejam as consequências que traga para a filosofia natural ou a metafísica. Podemos estar enganados, aqui, ao declarar que não há nenhuma ideia de qualquer outra espécie de necessidade ou conexão nas ações dos corpos, mas, quanto às ações da mente, certamente não lhes atribuímos nada a não ser o que todos atribuem e devem prontamente conceder. Não alteramos nenhuma circunstância no sistema ortodoxo aceito referente à vontade, mas apenas no sistema referente aos objetos e causas materiais. Nada, portanto, pode ser mais inocente do que esta doutrina. 28 Como todas as leis se fundam em recompensas e punições, admite-se como um princípio fundamental que esses motivos têm uma influência regular e uniforme sobre a mente, e são capazes tanto de produzir as boas ações como de evitar as más. Podemos dar a essa influência o nome que quisermos, mas, como ela está usualmente conjugada à ação, deve ser considerada uma causa, e tomada como um exemplo da necessidade que queremos aqui estabelecer. 29 O único objeto apropriado de ódio ou vingança é uma pessoa ou criatura dotada de pensamento e consciência; e quando algumas ações criminosas ou prejudiciais excitam essa paixão, é apenas por sua relação com a pessoa, ou sua conexão com ela. Ações, por sua própria natureza, são temporárias e perecíveis, e nos casos em que não procedem de alguma causa no caráter e disposição da pessoa que as realizou, não podem nem redundar em sua honra, se forem boas ações, nem em sua infâmia, se forem más. As ações, elas próprias, podem ser repreensíveis, podem ser contrárias a todas as regras da moralidade e da religião, mas a pessoa não será responsável por elas, e, como não procedem de nada que seja durável e constante no agente, e não deixam nada desse tipo atrás de si, é impossível que essa pessoa possa, por causa delas, tornar-se objeto de 393393 punição ou vingança. Portanto, de acordo com o princípio que nega a necessidade e, consequentemente, as causas, um homem, após ter cometido o crime mais horrendo, está tão puro e sem mácula como no instante de seu nascimento, e seu caráter não está de nenhum modo envolvido em suas ações, dado que não é dele que elas derivam, e a perversidade destas últimas não pode jamais ser apresentada como uma prova da depravação do primeiro. 30 Os homens não são censurados pelas ações que realizam por ignorância e de forma casual, quaisquer que possam ser suas consequências. Qual é a razão disso, a não ser o fato de que os princípios dessas ações são apenas momentâneos, e esgotam-se com as próprias ações? Por que os homens são menos censurados pelas ações que realizam de forma abrupta e sem premeditação do que por aquelas que procedem da deliberação, a não ser porque um temperamento precipitado, embora seja uma causa ou princípio constante na mente, opera apenas por intervalos e não contamina o caráter como um todo? Além disso, o arrependimento apaga todos os crimes, se for acompanhado por uma reforma da vida e dos hábitos. Como explicar isso, a não ser declarando que as ações tornam uma pessoa criminosa meramente por provarem a existência de princípios criminosos na mente; e se, por uma alteração desses princípios, elas deixam de ser provas legítimas, deixariam igualmente de ser criminosas? Mas, a menos que se admita a doutrina da necessidade, elas nunca teriam sido provas legítimas, e, consequentemente, nunca teriam sido criminosas.12 31 Será igualmente fácil provar, a partir dos mesmos argumentos, que a liberdade, de acordo com a definição dada acima, com a qual todos estão de acordo, também é essencial para a moralidade, e que nenhuma ação humana da qual esteja ausente é suscetível de quaisquer qualidades morais, ou pode ser objeto de aprovação ou desagrado. Pois, como as ações são objetos de nossos sentimentos morais apenas à medida que são indicações de caráter, paixões e afecções interiores, é impossível que pos12 Os homens são louvados ou censurados, ou seja, responsabilizados moralmente, pelas ações que se seguem de suas disposições de caráter permanentes. A responsabilização moral supõe a doutrina da necessidade. Com isso, Hume inverte um dos argumentos levantados contra essa doutrina, a saber, que é apenas na medida em que nossa escolha é livre (no sentido de um ato inaugural da vontade) que podemos, com justiça, ser responsabilizados por ela, posto que só assim a escolha depende inteiramente de nós. 394 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 394 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno sam dar origem quer a louvores quer a censuras se não procedem desses princípios mas decorrem totalmente da coação exterior. Não pretendo ter esclarecido ou removido todas as objeções a essa teoria, no que se refere à liberdade e à necessidade. Posso antever outras objeções, derivadas de tópicos que não foram tratados aqui. É possível dizer, por exemplo, que, se as ações voluntárias estiverem submetidas às mesmas leis de necessidade que as operações da matéria, haverá uma cadeia contínua de causas necessárias, preordenadas e predeterminadas, estendendo-se da causa original de tudo até cada uma das volições particulares de cada criatura humana. Não haveria nenhuma contingência em parte alguma do universo, nenhuma indeterminação, nenhuma liberdade. Ao atuarmos, sofremos ao mesmo tempo uma atuação. O Autor último de todas as nossas volições é o Criador do mundo, que primeiramente imprimiu movimento a essa imensa máquina e situou todos os seres na posição particular da qual, por uma necessidade inelutável, cada acontecimento subsequente deve resultar. As ações humanas, portanto, ou não podem conter nenhuma maldade moral, dado que procedem de tão boa causa; ou, se contêm alguma maldade, terão de comprometer nosso Criador na mesma culpa, dado que se reconhece que é ele a causa originária e o autor último dessas ações. Pois, do mesmo modo que o homem que detonou um explosivo é responsável por todas as consequências, quer tenha empregado um rastilho longo ou curto, assim, em todos os casos em que se estabeleceu uma cadeia contínua de causas necessárias, aquele Ser, finito ou infinito, que produz a primeira é, do mesmo modo, autor de todo o resto, e deve tanto sofrer a censura como receber o louvor que cabem a elas. Sempre que examinamos as consequências de qualquer ação humana, nossas ideias claras e inalteráveis de moralidade estabelecem essa regra com base em razões inquestionáveis, e essas razões devem ter ainda mais força quando aplicadas à intenções e volições de um Ser infinitamente sábio e poderoso. Pode-se alegar ignorância ou impotência para desculpar uma criatura tão limitada como o homem, mas essas imperfeições não têm lugar em nosso Criador. Ele previu, decidiu, tencionou todas aquelas ações dos homens que nós tão precipitadamente declaramos criminosas. E devemos concluir, portanto, ou que elas não são criminosas, ou que a Divindade, e não o homem, é responsável por 395395 elas. Mas como cada uma dessas posições é absurda e ímpia, segue-se que a doutrina da qual são deduzidas não pode ser verdadeira, por estar sujeita às mesmas objeções. Se uma consequência absurda se mostra necessária, isso prova que a doutrina original é absurda, do mesmo modo que ações criminosas tornam criminosa a causa original, se a conexão entre elas é necessária e inevitável. 33 Esta objeção consiste de duas partes, que examinaremos separadamente. Primeiro, que, se ações humanas puderem ser reportadas à Divindade por meio de uma cadeia necessária, elas nunca poderão ser criminosas, devido à infinita perfeição do Ser do qual derivam, que só pode tencionar o que é completamente bom e louvável. Ou, segundo, se forem criminosas, devemos retirar o atributo de perfeição que atribuímos à Divindade e devemos reconhecê-lo como o autor último da culpa e da torpeza moral em todas as suas criaturas.13 34 A resposta à primeira objeção parece óbvia e convincente. Há muitos filósofos que, após um exame rigoroso de todos os fenômenos da natureza, concluem que o Todo, considerado como um sistema único, está, a cada período de sua existência, ordenado com perfeita benevolência, e que a máxima felicidade possível resultará, ao final, para todas as criaturas, sem a menor mistura de mal ou miséria no sentido positivo ou absoluto. Todo mal físico, dizem, é parte essencial desse sistema benevolente, e não poderia ser removido nem mesmo pela própria Divindade, considerada como um agente sábio, sem introduzir um mal maior, ou excluir um bem maior, que dele resultaria. Dessa teoria, alguns filósofos, entre eles os antigos estóicos, derivaram um motivo de consolação em meio a todas as aflições, ao ensinarem a seus discípulos que os males dos quais padeciam eram, na realidade, bens para o universo, e que, visto de 13 A segunda objeção é de natureza teológica: o determinismo implica a responsabilização de Deus por nossas ações. Nesse caso, ou nenhuma de nossas ações pode ser dita criminosa, ou, Deus, que seria em última instância responsável por elas, não pode ser pensado como sumamente bom e perfeito. Com efeito, Santo Agostinho chega à noção de livre-arbítrio ou de uma vontade indeterminada como uma forma de responder à dificuldade de pensar a presença do mal no mundo sem imputá-lo a Deus. Como podemos fazer o mal se fomos criados, de acordo com a doutrina cristã, por um Deus sumamente bom, do qual só o bem pode se seguir? Segundo Agostinho, Deus nos deu uma vontade livre, que é em si mesma boa, e somos nós, e apenas nós, os responsáveis pelo mau uso que fazemos dela. 396 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 396 hume • umA investigAção sobre o entendimento humAno uma perspectiva mais abrangente, capaz de abarcar o sistema da natureza como um todo, cada acontecimento se tornaria motivo de alegria e exultação. Mas essa consideração, embora seja razoável e sublime, logo se mostrou fraca e ineficaz na prática. Certamente não iríamos apaziguar, mas sim irritar um homem que sofre as dores torturantes da gota se louvássemos a exatidão das leis gerais que produziram os humores malignos em seu corpo e os conduziram, através dos canais apropriados, aos tendões e nervos onde agora provocam aqueles agudos tormentos. Essas perspectivas amplas podem, por um momento, agradar a imaginação de um homem de índole especulativa que esteja em situação confortável e segura, mas não podem habitar de forma constante sua mente, mesmo quando ele não está perturbado pelas agitações da dor ou da paixão; e menos ainda preservar-se quando atacadas por esses poderosos antagonistas. As afecções apreendem seus objetos de uma maneira mais circunscrita e mais natural, e, por estarem organizadas de uma forma mais adequada à fraqueza das mentes humanas, consideram apenas os seres ao nosso redor, e são influenciadas pelos acontecimentos conforme estes pareçam bons ou maus para o sistema privado. 35 O mesmo que vale para o mal moral, vale também para o mal físico. Não se pode razoavelmente supor que aquelas remotas considerações que se revelaram tão pouco eficazes em um caso venham a ter uma influência mais poderosa no outro. A mente humana foi moldada pela natureza de tal forma que, tão logo certos caracteres, disposições e ações façam seu aparecimento, ela experimenta de imediato o sentimento de aprovação ou de condenação, e não há emoções que sejam mais essenciais que estas para sua estrutura e constituição. Os caracteres que granjeiam nossa aprovação são, sobretudo, aqueles que contribuem para a paz e segurança da sociedade humana, ao passo que os que provocam a condenação são principalmente aqueles que trazem prejuízo e perturbação públicos. Disso se pode razoavelmente presumir que os sentimentos morais surgem direta ou indiretamente de uma reflexão sobre esses interesses opostos. Que acontece, então, se as meditações filosóficas estabelecerem uma diferente opinião ou conjetura: a de que tudo está correto com referência ao Todo, e que as qualidades que perturbam a sociedade são, em geral, tão benéficas e adequadas às intenções originais da natu397397 reza quanto aquelas que promovem de modo mais direto sua felicidade e bem estar? Seriam essas especulações incertas e remotas capazes de contrabalançar os sentimentos que brotam da consideração imediata e natural dos objetos? Um homem de quem se roubou uma soma considerável encontraria, porventura, algum atenuante para seu desgosto pela perda nessas sublimes reflexões? Por que supor, então, que seu ressentimento moral contra o crime seja incompatível com elas? Ou por que o reconhecimento de uma distinção real entre vício e virtude não seria conciliável com todos os sistemas especulativos de filosofia, assim como o de uma distinção real entre a beleza e a fealdade pessoal? Ambas essas distinções estão fundadas nos sentimentos naturais da mente humana, e esses sentimentos não podem ser controlados ou alterados por nenhuma espécie de teoria ou especulação filosóficas. 36 A segunda objeção não admite uma resposta tão fácil e satisfatória, e nem é possível explicar precisamente como a Divindade pode ser a causa mediata de todas as ações dos homens sem ser autora do pecado e da maldade moral. Esses são mistérios que a simples razão natural desassistida não está minimamente preparada para examinar, e, qualquer que seja o sistema que adote, encontrar-se-á envolvida em insolúveis dificuldades, e mesmo em contradições, a cada passo que der em tais assuntos. Reconciliar a indeterminação e contingência das ações humanas com a presciência ou defender decretos absolutos ao mesmo tempo em que se absolve a Divindade da autoria do pecado tem-se mostrado até agora um problema que ultrapassa todo o poder da filosofia. Feliz desta se, a partir disso, tornar-se consciente de quão temerário é espreitar mistérios tão sublimes, e, abandonando um cenário tão cheio de obscuridades e complicações, retornar com a devida modéstia a sua província própria e genuína, o exame da vida ordinária, em que encontrará dificuldades suficientes com que se ocupar em suas investigações, sem mergulhar na imensidão de um oceano de dúvidas, incertezas e contradições!14 14 Hume recorre mais uma vez ao nosso modo ordinário de julgar para responder às dificuldades que brotam do campo da teologia: nosso modo comum de pensar implica a doutrina da necessidade e essa é uma razão suficiente para abraçá-la. kAnt e A LiberdAde de pensAr pubLiCAmente398 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 398 399399 immanuel kANT (1724-1804) é um dos filósofos mais lidos e discutidos nos dias de hoje. Suas contribuições abrangem todos os campos do saber, estendo-se da epistemologia à moral, passando pelo pensamento jurídico-político, estético e antropológico. Dedicou-se a praticamente todos os assuntos em voga em sua época – uma época que ele mesmo definiu como a do Esclarecimento, e da qual somos em grande medida ainda tributários. Daí por que tomar conhecimento da filosofia kantiana e de sua articulação com o seu tempo constitua uma oportunidade para seguirmos de perto a formação de concepções que orientam nosso próprio modo de compreender a realidade e agir sobre ela. Em suma, voltar a Kant é uma maneira de compreender melhor as ideias e princípios que nos fazem pensar como pensamos. Kant nasceu em Königsberg, cidade portuária da Prússia oriental e que hoje se chama Kaliningrado e pertence a Rússia. Kant jamais foi rico: perdeu a mãe cedo, teve uma infância modesta e, para concluir seus estudos universitários, foi trabalhar como preceptor. Tornou-se, em seguida docente privado, até que, em 1770, assumiu o cargo de professor KANt e A LIBeRDADe De peNSAR puBLICAMeNte kAnt e A LiberdAde de pensAr pubLiCAmente400 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 400 catedrático na Universidade de Königsberg, onde lecionou até quase o fim de sua vida. Teve, portanto, uma vida marcada por muito trabalho e pouco divertimento. Ao menos este foi o retrato que, de seus contemporâneos aos dias de hoje, se fez de Kant. Conta-se que nosso filósofo era tão sistemático quanto sua própria filosofia, a ponto de os habitantes da vizinhança onde morava acertarem o relógio quando o viam fazer sua caminhada vespertina, que se repetiu exatamente no mesmo horário no curso de vários anos. Esta impressão que associa rigor e idiossincrasia tem sido questionada por estudos biográficos mais recentes, que, sem recusar a relação entre vida e obra, têm procurado assinalar que Kant também foi um homem de seu tempo, dado aos prazeres da mesa e da conversação com amigos. Em suma, um sujeito privilegiado, capaz de fazer sistema sem, por isso, deixar de ser mundano. Kant publicou inúmeros escritos, que são classificados pelos estudiosos em duas grandes fases: a dos textos "pré-críticos" e a dos textos "críticos", nestes últimos residindo a grande novidade de seu pensamento. Além de operar como adjetivo que marca a reflexão mais original de Kant para a história da filosofia, o termo "crítica" figura como substantivo que abre o título de suas três principais obras: Crítica da razão pura (1781), Crítica da razão prática (1788) e Crítica da faculdade-de-julgar (1790). Daí por que o exame do significado de "crítica" constitua um ótimo expediente para realizarmos uma breve aproximação ao centro do pensamento filosófico de Kant. Antes de voltarmos a Kant, entretanto, recordemos o que, em linhas gerais, significa "crítica". Segundo o Dicionário Caldas Aulete, crítica é, em primeiro lugar, a "arte ou faculdade de julgar o mérito das obras literárias e artísticas". Esta acepção encontra eco no Dicionário Houaiss: crítica equivale à "habilidade ou arte de julgar a obra de um autor". Mas este não é o único significado do termo. Na relação de suas acepções, há uma especialmente relevante para nós: crítica = "discernimento, capacidade, competência para criticar; juízo crítico; critério" (Caldas Aulete) ou = "atividade de examinar e avaliar minuciosamente tanto uma produção artística ou científica quanto um costume, um comportamento; análise, apreciação, exame, julgamento, juízo" (Houaiss). Crítica, conclui-se daí, é 401401 uma atividade intelectual que consiste em julgar uma obra, um costume ou um comportamento com base em critérios que pretendem ser razoáveis. Quando julgo uma obra de arte como bela, por exemplo, reúno motivos que me fazem concluir pela sua beleza. O mesmo vale para um comportamento ou um costume; se procuro examiná-los criticamente, devo mobilizar razões para justificar meu parecer, favorável ou não. A pretensão de ser razoável e a ideia de fornecer razões da própria convicção possui por implicação o fato de que a atividade crítica requer a presença de outros homens, igualmente aptos para compreender e posicionar-se em relação ao tema proposto. Só há crítica no horizonte de um debate público, por referência ao qual cada um de nós enuncia seus juízos, corrigindo-os através da comparação com o juízo alheio. Pode-se dizer que, menos que a verdade, a crítica busca prevenir equívocos e formar consensos. Ela atualiza a virtual convergência entre eu e meu semelhante, o que representa uma condição do discurso e da compreensão sobre o mundo que partilhamos em comum. Ao contrário do que alguém poderia pensar à primeira vista, portanto, é exatamente ali onde não dispomos de um critério último e definitivo sobre o assunto em pauta que se exerce a atividade e o juízo críticos. É o que ilustra o caso da apreciação de obras artísticas ou literárias, cujo valor é frequentemente revisto, conforme a perspectiva crítica em voga na época destaque aspectos até ali negligenciados ou reinterprete a compreensão precedente formada acerca do objeto em debate. O mesmo vale para políticas públicas, costumes, legislação. O fato de que nossos juízos possam modificar-se, assim, não representa uma prova de que tenham sido formulados sem crítica. Ao contrário, enquanto atividade reflexiva, a crítica traz consigo a necessidade de sua revisão a partir de novas razões que emergem a cada consideração que se faz do assunto em pauta. Não fosse assim, a crítica tornar-se-ia em seu contrário; ela resultaria naquilo cuja verdade se espera que as pessoas aceitem sem questionar, isto é, em um dogma. Tal significado do termo crítica está presente na filosofia de Kant, juntamente com uma acepção específica, que passaremos a examinar agora. Na Crítica da razão pura, "crítica" define-se em relação ao que Kant kAnt e A LiberdAde de pensAr pubLiCAmente402 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 402 denomina a tradição dogmática em filosofia – designação sob a qual, grosso modo, Kant inclui quase todos os seus predecessores. Pode-se advinhar o que Kant compreende por isso: "dogmatismo" é uma atitude filosófica caracterizada pela ausência da crítica em relação ao que podemos conhecer através da razão. Em filosofia, o dogmatismo corresponde ao intuito de apresentar verdades últimas sobre as questões mais essenciais ao homem, tais como a imortalidade da alma, a origem do mundo (incluindo nisto o tema da liberdade) e a existência de Deus, sem, todavia, indagar-se preliminarmente se, de fato, podemos avançar enunciados teórico-especulativos sobre esses objetos. É isto o que a crítica cuida de examinar, ao instituir o que está a nosso alcance conhecer. Ao fim deste exame, Kant conclui pela ilegitimidade dos enunciados dogmáticos acerca do que se encontra para além da experiência, isto é, o suprassensível. A resposta negativa de Kant representa o fim da metafísica tradicional: ao contrário do que haviam pretendido os filósofos dogmáticos, não há como fornecer, com base apenas na razão, um conhecimento de matiz teórico sobre a alma, a liberdade e Deus. Por outro lado, isso não significa que a razão não possa pensar tais "objetos". Ao contrário, Kant, especialmente na Crítica da razão prática, mostra que esses temas são imprescindíveis para nossa razão em sua dimensão prática e moral. Crítica, aqui, significa correção de rumo, sem a qual os princípios que pautam nossa ação prática permaneceriam reféns de um pseudo saber teórico, cujo acesso seria privilégio de poucos. Este acerto de contas com a filosofia dogmática é parte de um projeto mais amplo, que, conforme o que é anunciado no Prefácio da Crítica da razão pura, anima não apenas os demais escritos de nosso autor, como também o movimento cultural em que o próprio Kant cuidou de inserir sua filosofia. Pois o que, no nível do conhecimento, resulta na crítica do dogmatismo, encontra paralelo, no campo das instituições religiosas e da política, na recusa de princípios cuja enunciação queira isentar-se do livre e público exame da razão. Recordemos que Kant testemunhou a passagem do Antigo Regime ao mundo burguês, cujo ideário foi elaborado pelos assim chamados partidários do Esclarecimento. Sua divisa corresponde à conclamação de que façamos uso do nosso próprio entendimen403403 to, sem subordinar nossa razão à orientação de um entendimento alheio. Nada mais consoante com a transição a que aludimos acima: se, como diz Kant, sua época não era ainda esclarecida, mas de esclarecimento, é porque, no momento em que escrevia, a formação de um público leitor apto a formular juízos sobre toda sorte de assuntos ainda era muito recente. O elogio feito no texto abaixo traduzido a Frederico II (1712-1786), déspota esclarecido da Prússia, explica-se pela convicção de que cabe ao governante administrar com firmeza seu Estado sem, todavia, dirigir a consciência de seus súditos. Kant defende que o governante só tem a ganhar, quando permite que seus atos sejam objeto de uma avaliação crítica da parte de seus súditos, desde que estes enunciem seus juízos mobilizando sua razão, não seus interesses particulares. É a ideia de esfera pública o que ressalta de nosso texto – ideia cuja articulação com o princípio geral da crítica, caro ao pensamento de Kant, confirma que este último é expressão do ideal de emancipação que animou a cultura do século XVIII. Munidos destas indicações, podemos abrir uma ampla frente de problemas que concernem desde questões sobre a filosofia e a época de Kant, até o significado que a aposta efetuada por ele e os partidários do Esclarecimento na esfera pública como instância crítica possui para os dias de hoje. Eis uma relação, nada exaustiva: 1) Em que medida podemos falar de um "dogmatismo político", assim como, na Crítica da razão pura, Kant nos fala do dogmatismo filosófico? 2) Quais condições que Kant institui para o uso público da razão, que, segundo o texto abaixo, torna o Esclarecimento "quase inevitável"? 3) Conforme o mesmo texto, a liberdade de usar publicamente a razão parece depender da existência de um governante como Frederico II; isso, todavia, não subordina a perspectiva de emancipação enunciada por Kant ao acaso de sermos súditos de um déspota esclarecido? 4) com base em que argumentos a esfera pública e a liberdade de opinião que ela implica podem ser defendidas como um elemento indispensável para as democracias contemporâneas? 5) A ideia de um público universal, apresentada por Kant, resiste à constatação de que a opinião pública muitas vezes veicula interesses particulares? Noutros termos, a esfera pública, nos dias de hoje, responde aos ideais de emancipação que Kant e o Esclarecimento viram nela? kAnt e A LiberdAde de pensAr pubLiCAmente404 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 404 Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de kant traduzidas Para o Português KANT, I. Kants Werke, Ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902. KANT, I. Crítica da faculdade do juízo. Tradução de V. Rohden e A. Marques. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 1993. KANT, I, Crítica da razão prática. Tradução de V. Rohden. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2003. KANT, I. Crítica da razão pura. Tradução de Valério Rohden e Udo Moosburguer.. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1980. (Coleção Os Pensadores) KANT, I. Crítica da razão pura. Tradução de M. P. dos Santos e A. F. Mourão. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2008. KANT, I. Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita. Tradução de R. Terra & R. Naves. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984. obras sobre kant (em Português) CRAMPE-CASNABET, M. Kant: uma revolução filosófica. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2000. FIGUEIREDO, V. Kant & a Crítica da razão pura. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2005. HÖFFE, O. Imanuel Kant. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2005. PASCAL, G. O Pensamento de Kant. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2001. REGO, P. C. Kant: a revolução copernicana na filosofia. In: FIGUEIREDO, V. (Org.) Seis filósofos na sala de aula. São Paulo: Berlendis, 2006. p. 149-191. WOOD, A. Kant. Porto Alegre: Artmed, 2008. A Sociedade Kant Brasileira (SKB) possui uma publicação semestral intitulada "Studia Kantiana", em que o leitor encontrará inúmeros artigos sobre diversos aspectos da filosofia kantiana. O site da SKB, no qual se encontram informações sobre o andamento das pesquisas sobre Kant é: http://www.ufrgs.br/kantcongress/sociedadekant/ 405405 406 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 406 kAnt • respostA à questão: o que é esCLAreCimento? ReSpOStA À QueStãO: O Que É eSCLAReCIMeNtO?1 1 O opúsculo traduzido foi publicado originariamente em dezembro de 1784, com o título original Beantwortung zu der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, no Mensário Berlinense. O periódico, dirigido entre 1783 e 1796 por J. E. Biester (1749-1816) e F. Gedike (17541803), contava com vários colaboradores ligados ao Esclarecimento – dentre os quais, além do próprio Kant, Humboldt, Benjamin Franklin e Thomas Jefferson. O texto de Kant que serviu de base para a presente tradução encontra-se no volume VIII da edição das obras completas de Kant pela Academia Real de Ciências de Berlim: KANT, I. Kants Werke, Berlin: Ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Georg Reimer, 1902 em diante <Akademie Text-Ausgabe, Berlin, Walter de Gruyter & Co.>. p. 33-42. No corpo de nossa tradução, assinalamos a paginação da edição da Academia entre colchetes com a abreviação [AK]. Nas notas, as demais obras de Kant também são reportadas à edição da Academia, exceção feita à obra Crítica da razão pura, cuja paginação corresponde à edição de 1781 [A]. Dispomos, em português, de duas outras traduções do opúsculo kantiano: KANT, I. Resposta à pergunta: que é Esclarecimento? In: Textos seletos. Ed. bilíngue. Tradução de Floriano de Souza Fernandes. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1974. p. 100-1167; KANT, I. Resposta à pergunta: que é Esclarecimento? Tradução de Luiz Paulo Rouanet. Brasília: Casa das Musas, 2008. Para a elaboração de parte das notas da presente tradução, foram consultadas as seguintes obras: KANT, I. Réponse à la question: Qu est-ce que le lumières? In: _____. Oeuvres philosophiques. traduction et notes par Heinz Wissmann Paris: Gallimard, 1985; MAESTRE, A. Estudio Preliminar. In: ERHARD, J. B. et al. Que é Ilustración? Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1993. p. XI-L. No seu artigo, Kant faz referência a dois textos de época, ambos publicados no Mensário Berlinense. Uma dessas referências figura na primeira nota do ensaio: o escrito de J. F. Zöllner. A segunda figura na última nota: o escrito de M. Mendelssohn. Indicamos, abaixo, a referência completa de ambos: ZÖLLNER, J. F. (1783) "Ist es rathsam, das Ehebundnis nicht ferner durch die Religion zu sanktionieren?" <"É aconselhável, daqui em diante, deixar de sancionar o matrimonio pela religião?">, in: Berlinische Monatsschrift, III, p. 107-116; M. MENDELSSOHN (1784), "Uber die Frage: was heisst Aufklärung?" <"Sobre a pergunta: O que é Esclarecimento?">, in: Berlinische Monatsschrift, IV, pp. 193-200. 407407 [AK 35] Esclarecimento é a saída do homem da menoridade pela qual é o próprio culpado2. Menoridade é a incapacidade de servir-se do próprio entendimento sem direção alheia. O homem é o próprio culpado por esta incapacidade, quando sua causa reside na falta, não de entendimento, mas de resolução e coragem de fazer uso dele sem a direção de outra pessoa. Sapere aude! Ousa fazer uso de teu próprio entendimento! Eis o lema do Esclarecimento. Inércia e covardia são as causas de que uma tão grande maioria dos homens, mesmo depois de a natureza há muito tê-los libertado de uma direção alheia (naturaliter maiorennes3), de bom grado permaneça toda vida na menoridade, e porque seja tão fácil a outros apresentaremse como seus tutores. É tão cômodo ser menor. Possuo um livro que faz as vezes de meu entendimento; um guru espiritual, que faz às vezes de minha consciência; um médico, que decide por mim a dieta etc.; assim não preciso eu mesmo dispender nenhum esforço. Não preciso necessariamente pensar, se posso apenas pagar; outros se incumbirão por mim desta aborrecida ocupação. Que, junto à grande maioria dos homens (incluindo aí o inteiro belo sexo) o passo rumo à maioridade, já em si custoso, também seja considerado muito perigoso, para isso ocupam-se cada um dos tutores, que de bom grado tomaram para si a direção sobre eles. Após terem emburrecido seu gado doméstico e cuidadosamente impedido que essas dóceis criaturas pudessem dar um único passo fora do andador, mostram-lhes em seguida o perigo que paira sobre elas, caso procurem andar por própria conta e risco. Ora, este perigo nem é tão 2 Nota do Tradutor: A razão por que o artigo de Kant inicie pela definição de Esclarecimento explica também seu título, a data a que este título faz referência e o contexto que lhe deu origem. Em setembro de 1783, J. E. Biester publicou sob pseudônimo um artigo no Mensário Berlinense, do qual era o editor, em que propunha abolir a exigência de que os matrimônios fossem sancionados pela Igreja. O argumento de Biester era simples: homens ilustrados poderiam perfeitamente dispensar o cerimonial religioso. Em artigo publicado no mesmo periódico em 5 de dezembro de 1783, J. F. Zöllner responde a Biester, pedindo cautela no assunto; afinal, dizia ele na conclusão do texto, nem se sabe ainda ao certo o que é Esclarecimento. Kant, dentre outros, decide entrar no debate com este texto, publicado em dezembro de 1784, juntamente com a resposta de outro célebre intelectual do período, M. Mendelssohn, que é mencionado em nota ao fim de nosso opúsculo. Para as referências aos textos relacionados nesta nota, ver bibliografia. 3 Nota do Tradutor "Naturalmente maiores". 408 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 408 kAnt • respostA à questão: o que é esCLAreCimento? grande, pois através [AK 36] de algumas quedas finalmente aprenderiam a andar; mas um exemplo assim dá medo e geralmente intimida contra toda nova tentativa. É portanto difícil para cada homem isoladamente livrar-se da menoridade que nele se tornou quase uma natureza. Até afeiçoou-se a ela e por ora permanece realmente incapaz de servir-se de seu próprio entendimento, pois nunca se deixou que ensaiasse fazê-lo. Preceitos e fórmulas, esses instrumentos mecânicos de um uso, antes, de um mau uso racional de suas aptidões naturais, são os entraves de uma permanente menoridade. Também quem deles se livrasse, faria apenas um salto inseguro sobre o fosso mais estreito, visto não estar habituado a uma liberdade de movimento desta espécie. Por isso são poucos os que conseguiram, através do exercício individual de seu espírito, desembaraçar-se de sua menoridade e, assim, tomar um caminho seguro. Que um público se esclareça a si mesmo, porém, é bem possível; e isso é até quase inevitável, se lhe for concedida liberdade. Pois, mesmo dentre os tutores estabelecidos do vulgo, sempre se encontrarão alguns livre pensadores <Selbstdenkende>, os quais, após terem sacudido de si o jugo da menoridade, difundirão à volta de si o espírito de uma avaliação racional do próprio valor e a vocação de cada um de pensar por si mesmo. Há, nisto, uma peculiaridade: o público, que antes se encontrava submetido por eles a este jugo, em seguida obriga-os a permanecer sob ele, quando incitado por aqueles dentre seus tutores que são incapazes de todo esclarecimento. Tão prejudicial é cultivar preconceitos, pois terminam voltando-se contra aqueles que foram seus autores, quer tenham sido eles próprios, quer seus antecessores. Por isso um público pode chegar ao esclarecimento apenas lentamente. Uma revolução pode, talvez, produzir a queda do despotismo pessoal e da opressão ávida e ambiciosa, mas jamais uma reforma verdadeira do modo de pensar; antes, novos preconceitos servirão, assim como os antigos, como amarras à grande multidão destituída de pensamento. Para este esclarecimento, não é exigido nada mais senão liberdade; e, aliás, a mais inofensiva de todas as espécies, a saber, aquela de fazer em 409409 todas as circunstâncias uso público da sua razão. Só que ouço clamarem de todos os lados: não raciocineis! [Ak 37] O oficial diz: não raciocineis, mas exercitai! O conselheiro fiscal diz: não raciocineis, mas pagai! O sacerdote: não raciocineis, mas crede! (Somente um único senhor no mundo diz: raciocinai tanto quanto quiserdes, e sobre o que quiserdes; mas obedecei!)4 Por toda parte, o que se vê é limitação da liberdade. Porém, qual limitação à liberdade é contrária ao esclarecimento? Qual não o é, sendo-lhe, antes, favorável? – Respondo: o uso público de sua razão deve sempre ser livre, e ele apenas pode difundir o esclarecimento entre os homens; o uso privado da mesma pode, contudo, ser estreitamente limitado, sem todavia por isso prejudicar sensivelmente o progresso do esclarecimento. Compreendo, porém, sob o uso público de sua própria razão aquele que alguém faz dela como instruído5 diante do inteiro público do mundo letrado. Denomino uso privado aquele que ele pode fazer de sua razão em determinado posto ou encargo público a ele confiado. Ora, em alguns ofícios, que concernem ao interesse da coisa pública6, um determinado mecanismo faz-se necessário, através do qual alguns membros da república precisam comportarse de modo puramente passivo, para que, através de uma unanimidade artificial, sejam orientados pelo governo a fins públicos, ou ao menos para impedirem a destruição destes fins. Aqui, evidentemente, não é permitido raciocinar; antes, deve-se obedecer. Porém, tão logo esta parte da máquina se considera como membro de uma inteira república, sim, até mesmo 4 Nota do Tradutor: O "senhor" a que se faz alusão neste passo é Frederico II (17121786), rei da Prússia de 1740 até sua morte, nomeado e enaltecido por Kant na conclusão do texto. O elogio deve-se a que Frederico, próximo dos partidários do Esclarecimento, foi um "déspota esclarecido". Após sua morte, a ascenção ao trono de Frederico Guilherme (1744-1797) representou um recrudescimento significativo na liberdade de opinião, atingindo o próprio Kant, advertido que foi pela publicação de A religião nos simples limites da razão (1793). 5 Nota do Tradutor: O termo alemão utilizado por Kant, e que vertemos por "instruído", é Gelehrter. Para Kant e seus contemporâneos, este termo também abrigava outras acepções, tais como "sábio", "erudito", "douto". Nossa opção por "instruído" baseia-se em que, neste texto, Kant não designa, com Gelehrter, uma classe específica de homens, singularizados por um saber ou competência especial. Ao contrário: Gelehter é todo homem que, sabendo ler e escrever, está apto a inscrever-se em um debate público. 6 Nota do Tradutor: Vertemos aqui por "coisa pública" e, logo abaixo, por "república" a expressão gemeines Wesen, seguindo a opção adotada para ela por R. Terra e R. Naves na tradução brasileira de Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita (ver biblio.). 410 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 410 kAnt • respostA à questão: o que é esCLAreCimento? da sociedade civil universal7, portanto, na qualidade de alguém instruído, que se dirige por meio de escritos a um público em sentido próprio, pode naturalmente raciocinar, sem que, por isso, prejudique os ofícios a que em parte está ligado como membro passivo8. Asssim, seria muito prejudicial, se um oficial, que recebesse alguma ordem de seus superiores, quisesse abertamente raciocinar em serviço sobre a conformidade ou o benefício desse comando; ele deve obedecer. Mas não se pode recusar-lhe devidamente que faça observações sobre os erros no serviço militar e as exponha à apreciação de seu público. O cidadão não pode recusar-se a arcar com os impostos que lhe são cobrados; uma censura impertinente de tais taxas, na ocasião em que deve pagá-las, pode até mesmo ser punida como um escândalo (que poderia ocasionar insubordinações generalizadas). Apesar disso, o mesmo indivíduo não age contra o dever de um cidadão, quando, na condição de instruído, exprime publicamente seus pensamentos contra a impropriedade [AK 38] ou mesmo injustiça de tais imposições. Do mesmo modo, um sacerdote está obrigado a professar seu sermão para seus catecúmenos ou para a comunidade conforme o credo da igreja a que serve, pois foi sob essa condição que aí foi admitido. Entretanto, na condição de instruído, possui completa liberdade, antes possui a missão de 7 Nota do Tradutor: A "sociedade civil universal" <Weltburgergesellschaft> exprime um ideal cosmopolita, por referência ao qual o agente se considera a si mesmo e aos demais na condição de seres racionais e, por isso, capazes de enunciar juízos sem, ao fazê-lo, restringir-se às circunstâncias e interesses particulares que singularizam sua inscrição concreta. Em Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita, publicada quase contemporaneamente a "O que é o Esclarecimento?", o cosmopolitismo é apresentado como a perspectiva normativa sob a qual os acontecimentos humanos devem ser perfilados em uma história (cf. Ideia, Ak, vol. VIII, 31, trad. p. 24). Em outro escrito, publicado em 1792 e intitulado Sobre o dito: o que vale em teoria não vale na prática, Kant auxilia a compreender melhor tal conceito, ao afirmar que há três perspectivas sob as quais se considerar um assunto: 1) como homem privado; 2) como homem político <Staatsmann>; 3) como homem do mundo ou cidadão do mundo em geral <Weltburger uberhaupt> (I. Kant, Theorie und Praxis, Ak, vol. VIII, p 277; ver biblio.) 8 Nota do Tradutor: O Esclarecimento, como diz Kant no início deste parágrafo, depende da liberdade de usarmos publicamente a razão. Compreender no que consiste este uso, assim, é capital para compreender todo o argumento de Kant neste texto. Kant explica o que seja o uso público, opondo-o ao uso privado da razão: cada um deles remente a âmbitos diferentes. Quando o agente se reporta à sociedade civil universal, formada por todos os homens na condição de seres racionais, enuncia seus juízos sob uma perspectiva universal (ver nota precedente); quando se considera parte do mecanismo, usa sua razão privadamente. Uso público da razão e cosmopolitismo figuram, desse modo, interligados. 411411 compartilhar com o público todos os seus pensamentos cuidadosamente refletidos e bem intencionados sobre as imperfeições neste credo e as propostas voltadas para uma melhor orientação da religião e da Igreja. Nisto não há nada que pudesse ser reprovado a sua consciência. Pois o que ele ensina por conta de sua função enquanto dignatário da Igreja, isso ele expõe como algo em vista do que não possui livre poder para ensinar conforme bem entender, mas tem de fazê-lo segundo a instrução e em nome de um outro. Dirá: nossa igreja ensina isto e aquilo, e eis os argumentos de que se serve. Em seguida, junto a sua paróquia, irá extrair todos os benefícios práticos de preceitos que ele mesmo não subscreveria com inteira convicção, preceitos, porém, que pode empenhar-se em expor, pois não é inteiramente impossível haver alguma verdade envolta neles – desde que, porém, não se depare com nada que colida com sua religião interior. Pois, caso concluísse estar diante de uma contradição deste tipo, não poderia exercer com boa consciência sua função; teria de renunciar a ela. Logo, o uso que um ministro encarregado do ensino faz de sua razão junto a sua paróquia é tão-somente um uso privado: porque, por maior que possa ser, esta é apenas uma reunião doméstica, em relação à qual ele, enquanto sacerdote, não é livre, nem pode sê-lo, pois se encarrega de uma tarefa alheia. Em contrapartida, enquanto homem instruído que fala através de escritos para o público propriamente dito, isto é, o mundo, o eclesiástico usufrui no uso público de sua razão de uma liberdade ilimitada de servirse de sua própria razão e em seu próprio nome. Pois que os tutores do povo (em coisas espirituais) devam ser eles mesmos também menores é um absurdo, que favorece a perpetuação dos absurdos. Mas não deveria ser justificado a uma sociedade de eclesiásticos, algo como um sínodo, ou uma alta "classe" (como a si mesma se intitula entre os holandeses), obrigar-se uns para com os outros quanto a um credo, de modo a conduzir e perpetuar uma tutoria superior sobre cada um de seus membros e, através deles, sobre o [AK 39] povo? Afirmo que isto é inteiramente impossível. Um tal contrato, que seria concluído para afastar definitivamente do gênero humano todo novo esclarecimento, é absolutamente nulo e sem validade, e isso, mesmo se fosse homologado pelo poder supremo, pelos parlamentos e pelos mais solenes tratados 412 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 412 kAnt • respostA à questão: o que é esCLAreCimento? de paz. Uma época não pode aliar-se e conjurar para impor a época seguinte um estado no qual lhe seja impossível alargar seus conhecimentos (principalmente conhecimentos tão caros a si), purificar-se dos erros e, de modo geral, prosseguir no esclarecimento. Isso seria um crime contra a natureza humana, cuja determinação originária reside exatamente nesta progressão; e os descendentes estão, portanto, completamente justificados a rejeitar aquelas resoluções como absurdas e injuriosas. A medida de tudo o que pode ser decidido como lei para um povo reside na pergunta: pode um povo impor a si mesmo uma tal lei?9 Sim, isso seria possível por um período determinado e breve, na expectativa de uma lei melhor, a fim de introduzir uma certa ordem; período em que se deixaria livre cada cidadão, especialmente o sacerdote, na qualidade de homem instruído, para fazer publicamente, isto é, através de escritos, suas considerações sobre as imperfeições da instituição vigente. A ordem estabelecida, porém, permaneceria em curso, até que a compreensão da natureza dessas questões tivesse se estendido e se consolidado publicamente, a ponto de a unificação de suas vozes (ainda que não de todas) pudesse levar ao trono uma proposta em defesa daquelas paróquias que, a partir de um exame aprofundado, concordassem em torno de uma reorientação religiosa, sem, todavia, obstar àquelas que se contentassem com o estado de coisas precedente. Mas é absolutamente ilícito firmar um acordo em torno de uma constituição religiosa permanente, que se pretendesse publicamente inquestionável por todos, mesmo durante o curso da vida de um homem e, desse modo, por assim dizer aniquilar uma época na marcha da humanidade rumo ao melhor e torná-la estéril, prejudicando desta maneira a posteridade. Um homem na verdade pode, no que concerne a sua pessoa – e mesmo assim, somente por algum tempo –, adiar o esclarecimento quanto ao saber que lhe incumbe; 9 Nota do Tradutor: A ideia de que só é legítima uma lei que o povo poderia outorgar a si mesmo revela a proximidade (embora também existam diferenças) que a concepção política de Kant das formulações apresentadas por J.-J. Rousseau em Do contrato social. Kant foi leitor de Rousseau desde a década de 1760, apoiando-se nele para formular o princípio da autonomia moral, exposto na Crítica da razão prática (ver biblio.). Em nosso opúsculo, tanto quanto em textos ulteriores de Kant, como a Doutrina do Direito (1797), assistimos à transposição deste princípio da autonomia individual para o âmbito da política, concebida sob o signo da progressão da espécie humana rumo à realização de suas disposições morais mais elevadas. 413413 mas renunciar a ele, seja no que concerne a sua pessoa, seja tanto mais no que concerne à posteridade, significa lesar os veneráveis direitos da humanidade e deitá-los abaixo. Mas o que nem um povo pode decidir sobre si mesmo [AK 40], menos ainda um monarca pode decidir sobre o povo; pois sua autoridade legislativa reside exatamente no fato de que ele unifica em sua vontade a a inteira vontade do povo. Caso se contente em cuidar para que toda melhoria, presumida ou verdadeira, concorde com a ordem pública, pode deixar, no resto, que seus súditos façam por si mesmos o que acharem necessário para a salvação de suas almas; sua incumbência não é esta, mas sim a de evitar que eles, pela violência, se impeçam uns aos outros de trabalhar por sua determinação e promoção segundo todas as suas capacidades. Faz mesmo prejuízo a sua majestade ele imiscuir-se nisto, quando submete à vigilância de seu governo os escritos por meio dos quais seus súditos procuram purificar suas ideias, quer o faça a partir de sua própria compreensão superior – no que se expõe à objeção: Caesar non est supra grammaticos10 – quer, e em maior grau, quando rebaixa seu poder supremo, a ponto de sustentar em seu Estado o despotismo espiritual de alguns tiranos sobre o resto de seus súditos. Se, então, for perguntado: vivemos agora em uma época esclarecida? A resposta será: não, mas em uma época de esclarecimento. No atual estado de coisas, falta ainda muito para que os homens, tomados em seu conjunto, estejam em condições, ou possam vir a dispor de condições, de servirem-se de seu próprio entendimento sem a direção alheia de modo seguro e desejável em matéria de religião. Mas dispomos de sinais claros de que agora se encontra aberto para eles o campo em que podem trabalhar nisto livremente e de que diminuem paulatinamente os obstáculos do esclarecimento geral ou da saída da menoridade pela qual eles próprios são culpados. Desse ponto de vista, esta época é a época do esclarecimento, ou o século de Frederico. Um príncipe, que não considera indigno de si dizer que possui o dever de nada prescrever aos homens em matéria de religião, mas de deixá-los em total liberdade a este respeito, que, portanto, recusa que 10 Nota do Tradutor: "César não está acima dos gramáticos". 414 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 414 kAnt • respostA à questão: o que é esCLAreCimento? lhe associem o soberbo nome da tolerância, é ele mesmo esclarecido e merece ser louvado pelo mundo e pela posteridade em reconhecimento, como aquele que primeiro livrou o gênero humano da menoridade – ao menos por parte do governo – e fez cada um livre para servir-se de sua própria razão em tudo o que concerne à consciência. Sob ele veneráveis eclesiásticos podem, na qualidade de homens instruídos e sem dano a seu dever funcional, submeter livre e publicamente à prova seus juízos e ponderações, num ou noutro ponto distantes do credo estabelecido; o que vale com mais forte razão para quem não estiver limitado por um dever funcional. Este espírito de liberdade expande-se também ao exterior, mesmo lá onde tem de lutar com obstáculos externos de um governo que não se compreende a si mesmo. Pois esse último defronta-se com um exemplo de que, em regime de liberdade, não há o mínimo a temer no que respeita à paz pública e a unidade da república. Pouco a pouco, os homens se desembaraçam de sua brutalidade; basta cessar a arte de mantê-los intencionalmente nela. Tratei do principal ponto do esclarecimento, isto é, da saída dos homens da menoridade da qual são os próprios culpados, principalmente em matéria de religião; pois no que concerne às artes e ciências nossos senhores não possuem interesse de exercer a tutela sobre seus súditos. Além disso, aquela menoridade é dentre todas a mais prejudicial, como também a mais desonrosa. Mas o modo de pensar de um chefe de Estado, que favorece o esclarecimento em matéria religiosa vai além e percebe que, mesmo em relação a sua legislação, não há perigo em admitir que seus súditos façam uso público de sua própria razão e que apresentem ao mundo seus pensamentos sobre como tornar melhor sua redação, mesmo se isso for acompanhado de uma crítica franca da legislação estabelecida; temos disso um exemplo ilustre, que faz com que nenhum monarca preceda aquele que reverenciamos11. 11 Nota do Tradutor: Conforme a nota do Prefácio da Crítica da razão pura (I. Kant, Crítica da razão pura, A XII) o exame crítico da razão concerne não apenas aos enunciados da metafísica, mas também àqueles da religião e da legislação. A rigor, portanto, todo enunciado que possua uma pretensão normativa tem de submeter-se ao tribunal da crítica, caso pretenda obter o respeito de nossa razão. Mas o que concluir, caso o monarca não deseje ver as razões de sua política discutidas publicamente? Percebe-se, assim, um aparente círculo no argumento de Kant: embora o Esclarecimento represente um 415415 Mas também somente aquele que, ele mesmo esclarecido, não teme as sombras, mas possui à disposição um numeroso e bem disciplinado exército para assegurar a ordem pública, pode dizer o que um estado não monarquico não pode se permitir: raciocinai quanto quiserdes e sobre o que quiserdes; apenas obedecei!12 Aqui as coisas humanas revelam um curso estranho e não esperado, como também, quando o consideramos em larga escala, quase tudo nele é paradoxal. Um grau maior de liberdade civil parece vantajoso à liberdade de espírito do povo, e lhe coloca, entretanto, barreiras <Schranken> instransponíveis; um grau menor da mesma, em contrapartida, proporciona a este o espaço para expandirse conforme todas as suas capacidades. Logo, se a natureza desenvolveu sob este duro invólucro o germe de que cuida tão delicadamente, isto é, o pendor e a vocação ao pensamento livre, este paulatinamente reincide sobre o modo de sentir do povo (o que pouco a pouco torna este mais apto a agir livremente) e finalmente também até sobre os princípios do governo, o qual descobre ser propício para si mesmo [AK 42] tratar o homem, que é mais que uma máquina, conforme sua dignidade13. Königsberg, Prússia 30 de setembro de 1784 passo indispensável para a moralidade dos homens (afinal, "determinação originária" da humanidade reside nesta progressão moral, diz Kant um pouco acima), o processo histórico em que ele se realiza se vê subordinado ao aparecimento circunstancial de um governante esclarecido. Kant apresenta uma solução para esta dificuldade no outro texto a que já fizemos alusão, intitulado Ideia de uma história universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita. A relação entre necessidade, contingência e finalidade também será objeto da Crítica da faculdade-de-julgar, de 1790. (Ver bibliografia). 12 Nota do Tradutor: "Raciocinai quanto quiserdes e sobre o que quiserdes; apenas obedecei!" – O lema que Kant associa a Frederico II traz à luz uma dificuldade que foi recorrentemente discutida pelos intérpretes, a saber: até que ponto o Esclarecimento, no qual Kant lança suas fichas, não se vê, na prática, limitado pelos interesses do monarca? Nessa direção, vários estudos historiográficos (dentre outros, E. J. Hobsbawn; ver bibliografia) salientam o caráter conservador da modernização conduzida por déspotas esclarecidos como Frederico II e Catarina da Rússia (1729-1796). Sem desmerecer tais análises, podese interpretar o passo em pauta como a simples observação de que a liberdade de usar publicamente a razão não traz riscos à tranquilidade civil. 13 Nota do Autor: Nas Notícias hebdomadárias de Busching de 13 de setembro, leio hoje, dia 30 do mesmo mês, o anúncio do Mensário Berlinense deste mês, no qual foi incluída a resposta do Sr. Mendelssohn à mesma pergunta. Ela ainda não chegou às minhas mãos; tivesse chegado, eu teria retido a presente resposta, que agora só pode figurar aqui como ensaio sobre até que ponto o acaso pode trazer o acordo de pensamentos. LiberdAde e repúbLiCA no pensAmento de mAquiAveL416 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 416 417417 Quando nicolau mAQuIAvEl nasceu, em 3 de maio de 1469, Florença vivia sob um regime principesco travestido de feições republicanas. Governava a cidade Piero de Médici, membro da família que a dominava desde o ano de 1434 e cujo regime duraria até 1494. Assim, no momento em que Maquiavel se candidata ao cargo de secretário da segunda chancelaria de Florença, no ano de 1498, já havia quase quatro anos que o regime republicano tinha sido reinstaurado sob a liderança do frei Jerônimo Savonarola. Depois de seu ingresso no corpo de funcionários da república, Maquiavel engaja-se firmemente em suas atribuições de secretário da república florentina. Tanto que a sua produção intelectual deste período esteve voltada, sobretudo, para questões de ordem prática. A sua obra constitui-se, então, principalmente de cartas, legações e de um certo número de breves escritos, dentre os quais podemos mencionar o Retrato sobre as coisas da França e o Retrato das coisas da Alemanha, ambos resultantes das observações feitas por ele no período em que esteve em missão diplomáticas nos referidos países. Somente após o retorno do regime dos Médici em 1512 e de sua LIBeRDADe e RepÚBLICA NO peNSAMeNtO De MAQuIAVeL LiberdAde e repúbLiCA no pensAmento de mAquiAveL418 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 418 exoneração do cargo que exercia é que passa a ocupar-se de questões de natureza política de uma perspectiva prevalentemente teórica, valendo-se então de sua longa experiência e contínua lição nas coisas do mundo (Discursos, dedicatória). É do ano de 1513 que data O Príncipe, anunciado em carta a Francesco Vettori e dedicado ao então senhor de Florença, Lorenzo de Médici, no intuito de reaver a posição perdida, sem, porém, obter sucesso. A partir de 1516 passa a frequentar os jardins Orti Oricellari, em Florença, lugar no qual se reunia um grupo de jovens aristocratas para discutir questões políticas. Estimulado por tais interlocutores, Maquiavel termina, em 1517, os Discursos sobre a primeira década de Tito Lívio, obra em que se dedica a examinar uma série de questões relativas ao governo republicano. A estas obras seguem-se outras, como o Discurso sobre as formas de governo de Florença, de 1519, A arte da guerra e A vida de Castruccio Castracani, ambas de aproximadamente 1520, a História de Florença, de 1525. Isso sem falar na produção propriamente literária de Maquiavel, que envolve peças teatrais, como, por exemplo, A Madrágora, obra prima do teatro italiano, a novela Belfagor, além das Decenais e de alguns poemas. Melancólico, Maquiavel falece, em 21 de junho de 1527, sem ter conseguido recuperar o seu antigo prestígio político junto ao regime republicano que se instaurara neste mesmo ano após uma nova queda dos Médici. O termo maquiavélico tem, sem nenhuma dúvida, sua origem no nome de Maquiavel. Por meio dele designamos tudo aquilo que é pérfido e aquelas pessoas astuciosas, velhacas e ardilosas. Enfim, tudo aquilo que é imoral. No entanto, cabe perguntar se tal qualificativo pode ser aplicado à pessoa e à obra do secretário florentino. Assim, seria possível dizer de Maquiavel que ele é maquiavélico ou esse termo, apesar da referência a seu nome, tem sentido próprio? Ora, para respondermos a tais questões, será preciso verificar com mais cuidado o que está na base desta afirmação. Certamente, existem elementos de ordem histórica, mas precisamos verificar a sua pertinência filosófica. 419419 Historicamente, o termo parece estar ligado à fortuna que teve a obra do secretário florentino. Polêmica desde o início, jamais cessou de provocar a imaginação das pessoas e de produzir os mais diversos juízos a seu respeito. Mas a aversão ao nome de Maquiavel e aos seus escritos somente ganhou um caráter sistemático com a reação da Igreja, que, na segunda metade do século XVI, os incluiu na sua lista dos livros proibidos – o Index. Porém, também esta condenação, feita muitas vezes por pessoas que conheciam sua obra de segunda mão, fundamentava-se numa leitura maquiavélica de seus escritos. Fato é que, a partir de então, esta perspectiva nunca deixou de se fazer presente e de alimentar uma determinada opinião sobre Maquiavel, designando tudo o que é imoral. Se considerarmos o universo da política, que é o universo de Maquiavel, podemos ir adiante e dizer, então, que a política vista de tal perspectiva é uma atividade humana que se encontra livre de qualquer preocupação ética. Esta é uma percepção do comum das pessoas e que acaba por ser sintetizada no termo maquiavélico. Contudo, interessa-nos tratar aqui, não da maneira como Maquiavel é representado no imaginário das pessoas, mas de entender em que medida esta percepção tem fundamentos em sua obra. Ora, para tanto, nada melhor do que passarmos em revista determinadas leituras que partiram do mesmo pressuposto presente no imaginário comum, qual seja, o de que a obra maquiaveliana, como reflexo de uma compreensão realista da política, encontra-se esvaziada de qualquer conteúdo moral. São basicamente duas as leituras possíveis. De um lado, vamos encontrar a obra de Maquiavel sendo lida como um manual de técnicas para a conquista e a manutenção do poder, assemelhando-se, pela sua objetividade e caráter descritivo, à ideia de ciência moderna. Da mesma forma, teríamos uma outra que veria no autor um teórico da razão de estado, doutrina que coloca em relevo certos elementos que contribuiriam para fazer do secretário florentino um teórico da força. Em qualquer uma dessas interpretações, a obra desse autor é apresentada como uma filosofia política completamente despida de valoração moral, dando origem a uma concepção política absolutamente alheia às inquietações do gênero. Em que medida, porém, poderíamos aceitar tais leituras? Ora, LiberdAde e repúbLiCA no pensAmento de mAquiAveL420 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 420 essas leituras tendem a deixar de lado, por exemplo, a crítica de Maquiavel ao seu próprio tempo, tempo este que, por causa do desprezo pela vida ativa, daria menos importância à liberdade civil, típica de um regime republicano. Em contrapartida, estaria mais suscetível à servidão dos príncipes e principados1. Pode-se perceber, com esta indicação, que o secretário florentino não se exime de enfrentar a questão ético-política, elaborando ele próprio uma crítica aos valores então vigentes. Vale ainda chamar atenção para um aspecto de não pouca importância sobre as leituras acima, a saber, ambas tomam como referência principal a obra O Príncipe. É certo que esta obra se prestou também a leituras oblíquas, das quais a mais conhecida, mas não a única nem a primeira, é a de Gramsci. Sustentava-se, nesse caso, a hipótese de que Maquiavel não estaria realmente preocupado em mostrar a um príncipe quais vias deveria seguir para conquistar e conservar um estado, mas, antes, deveria ser encarada como uma denúncia, um veículo para explicitar os mecanismos de poder sobre os quais se assentava um estado principesco. Neste sentido, seria uma obra revolucionária. Porém, mesmo essas leituras oblíquas tendem a ver a teoria maquiaveliana despida de valores, embora os seus intérpretes, no intuito de salvá-la, busquem atribuir-lhe um valor positivo, a ser buscado fora da própria obra. O fato é que, mesmo sob esta perspectiva, dá-se primazia a O Príncipe em detrimento dos Discursos e, com isso, obscurece-se ou não se dá a devida relevância aos aspectos propriamente republicanos nela contidos. Inversamente, certas interpretações que exploram os aspectos republicanos da obra do autor tendem, por sua vez, a dar primazia aos Discursos. A obra O Príncipe, muitas vezes, desqualificada como se fosse uma obra de ocasião, quer porque teria sido escrita num momento em que somente se apresentava como possível o estabelecimento de um principado na Itália, quer porque fora dedicada ao então senhor de Florença no claro intuito de poder retornar ao exercício de funções públicas. Para escapar a esta dicotomia, no entanto, não há outro remédio que o de enfrentar uma questão recorrente na história da fortuna crítica de Ma1 Cf. Discursos, II, 2. 421421 quiavel. Trata-se de, novamente, colocar em foco o problema da unidade de sua obra. Dito de outro modo, é preciso verificar se e em que medida O Príncipe e os Discursos estão em contradição. É, em parte, esta preocupação que determinou a escolha dos fragmentos aqui traduzidos. Mas também, em parte, a escolha é orientada pela tentativa de circunscrever um conjunto de valores que norteiam seu pensamento e que, ao mesmo tempo, se apresentam como uma crítica aos valores então vigentes, conforme já notamos acima. Apresentaremos, a seguir, uma proposta de leitura2, seguida de um mapa das tendências interpretativas contemporâneas da obra do autor. Toda e qualquer sociedade política, diz Maquiavel, encontra-se estruturada numa relação de domínio (P, I), em que, de um lado, estão os que desejam governar e, de outro, os que simplesmente desejam não ser oprimidos (P, IX; D, I, 4). Esta cisão de desejos é constitutiva das sociedades políticas, sendo este um dos elementos que aponta para a unidade da obra maquiaveliana. Dos diferentes arranjos que estas forças assumem no jogo político é que teremos como efeito uma república, um principado ou a licença, que é a ausência de qualquer ordem (P, IX). Ora, em O Príncipe, Maquiavel diz ocupar-se apenas dos principados, visto que, em outra ocasião, tratara das repúblicas (P, II). De fato, não sabemos se, naquele momento, ele já tinha escrito os Discursos ou não. Seja como for, é esse o seu objeto nessa obra. Se, neste caso, a república é o seu objeto privilegiado, não é, contudo, o seu objeto exclusivo, de modo que, em suas páginas, encontramos também um exame dos principados (D,I, 9, 10, 16 e 55; D, II, 2). Este fato tem um interesse particular, pois nos fornece pontos de passagem de uma obra a outra. O tratamento que o secretario florentino dispensa aos principados ajuda-nos a dissolver as rígidas fronteiras que aparentemente separavam os objetos de ambas as obras. O exame da forma de governo principesca no bojo de uma obra cujo objeto maior é outra forma 2 Nesta apresentação, para fazermos referência a O Príncipe, usaremos a inicial P seguida do capítulo do capítulo da obra a que nos reportamos. No mesmo sentido, os Discursos serão indicados pela inicial D, seguida respectivamente do livro e do capítulo. No geral, serão indicados os fragmentos aqui traduzidos. LiberdAde e repúbLiCA no pensAmento de mAquiAveL422 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 422 de governo tem a vantagem adicional de fazer-nos compreendê-la mais claramente a partir de uma perspectiva histórica. Por exemplo, a fundação de Roma se deu na forma de um principado, e somente mais tarde é que veio a tornar-se a república poderosa que foi (D, I, 2, 9, 10). Isso não significa dizer que as obras não tenham suas especificidades. Ao contrário, quando voltamos nossa atenção a elas, compreendemos por quais vias elas se diferenciam. É a partir da consideração da divisão de desejos constituinte das sociedades políticas que Maquiavel vai pensar o principado (P, IX). Este regime se estabelece, de modo geral, por meio de relações de servidão. Isto quer dizer que, diferentemente de uma república, aqui as relações, no geral, não são mediadas pela lei, lei esta que deveria ser o resultado da participação de todos os cidadãos, mas sim por relações de ordem pessoal e direta entre o príncipe e os súditos, nas quais predomina a vontade de um senhor (P, III). Por serem relações precárias é que se faz necessário examinar com mais cuidado os mecanismos que estão na base deste tipo de regime (P, III) É por isso que o secretário florentino vai se ocupar em discutir com maior minúcia o modo como o príncipe deve se comportar com seus súditos e aliados (P, XV), tocando em temas caros a muitas interpretações de seu pensamento, como, por exemplo, a importância da aparência no jogo político (P, XVIII), e, ainda, a relação entre ética e política (P, XV a XVIII), cuja desatenção por parte do príncipe conduz a uma tirania. É também em função da precariedade deste momento, no qual se busca instituir um novo estado, que se faz necessário dedicar mais atenção à virtù (P, VI e XXV). Neste caso, é de suma relevância para a conservação de um principado novo que o seu príncipe esteja dotado desta qualidade especial. Nos Discursos, Maquiavel trata da república e, portanto, de um governo livre, liberdade essa que envolve tanto a igualdade de todos perante as leis, quanto a possibilidade de participação dos cidadãos na determinação dos rumos do estado. Decorre daí a necessidade de pôr-se em debate a melhor forma de organizar este gênero de estado (D, I, 2 e 6). Diante desta problemática é que o secretário florentino passa em re423423 vista, não só os modelos de república, como também indica quais são as suas instituições fundamentais (D, I, 5). De modo geral, elas devem ser ordenadas de maneira a dar uma resposta adequada à cisão fundamental de desejos constitutiva de uma sociedade política (D, I, 4 e 6), tornando a república mais forte e coesa e, por isso, mais livre (D, I, 6). A liberdade é assim um valor fundamental no republicanismo de Maquiavel. Aliás, atentas a este conceito, as leituras republicanas da obra do secretário florentino foram ganhando fôlego, a partir da década de 60, e consolidaram-se na década seguinte. Atualmente, porém, tais leituras passam por um processo de revisão e crítica, reafirmando, por vezes, esta perspectiva, mas colocando-as diante de novas questões. Ao lado desta, encontram-se outras tendências interpretativas, que buscam, por exemplo, explorar os aspectos retóricos do pensamento de Maquiavel ou mesmo de reposicioná-lo diante da modernidade ou ainda pensar os Discursos à luz de O Príncipe. Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de maquiavel traduzidas Para o Português MAQUIAVEL, N. O Príncipe. Tradução de Lívio Xavier. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1979. MAQUIAVEL, N. O Príncipe. Tradução de José Antônio Martins. São Paulo: Hedra, 2007. MAQUIAVEL, N. O Príncipe. Tradução de Maria Júlia Goldwasser. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004. MAQUIAVEL, N. A Arte da guerra. Tradução de M. F. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2006. MAQUIAVEL, N. Discursos sobre a primeira década de Tito Lívio. Tradução de M. F. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007. MAQUIAVEL, N. História de Florença. Tradução de M. F. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007. MAQUIAVEL, N. Histórias de Florença. Tradução de Nelson Canabarro. São Paulo: Musa, 1998. 424 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 424 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio obras sobre maquiavel (em Português) ADVERSE, H. Maquiavel: Política e Retórica. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 2009. AMES, J. L. A Lógica da ação política. Toledo: Edunioeste, 2002. ARANOVICH, P. F. História e política em Maquiavel. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2007. BIGNOTTO, N. Maquiavel republicano. São Paulo: Loyola, 1991. BIGNOTTO, N. Maquiavel. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2003. GRAZIA, S. de. Maquiavel no inferno. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1993. LEFORT, C. Sobre a lógica da força. In: QUIRINO, C. SADEK, M. T. (Orgs.). O Pensamento político clássico. São Paulo: T.A. Queiroz, 1980. PINZANI, A. Maquiavel & O Príncipe. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2004. RIDOLFI, R. Biografia de Maquiavel. São Paulo: Musa, 2003. SKINNER, Q. As Fundações do pensamento político moderno. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996. VIROLI, M. O Sorriso de Nicolau. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2002. 425425 426 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 426 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio DISCuRSOS SOBRe A PRIMEIRA dÉcAdA De tItO LÍVIO 1 Nicolau Maquiavel saúda a Zanobi Buondelmonti e Cosimo Rucellai 1. Eu vos mando um presente que, se não corresponde às obrigações que tenho convosco, é sem dúvida o que de melhor pôde Nicolau Maquiavel enviar. Isto porque nele eu expressei aquilo que sei e aquilo que aprendi com uma longa experiência e contínua lição nas coisas do mundo. Como nem vós nem outros podem esperar nada de mim além disso, não podeis vos queixar se eu não vos dei mais. Podeis, contudo, vos aborrecer pela pobreza do meu engenho, quando forem estas minhas narrativas pobres, e pela falácia de meu juízo, quando eu em muitas partes discorrendo me enganar. (...) Livro I – proêmio 1. Ainda que, por causa da inveja natural dos homens, tenha sido 1 A tradução foi realizada a partir da edição dos Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, estabelecida por VIVANTI, C. Opere. Torino: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997. 427427 sempre mais perigoso buscar novos modos2 e novas ordenações3 do que mares e terras desconhecidas, por estarem os homens mais dispostos a censurar do que a louvar as ações dos outros, mesmo assim, eu, movido pelo natural desejo que sempre me fez perseguir, sem nenhum temor, aquelas coisas que acredito poderem trazer um maior benefício comum, decidi tomar uma via ainda não trilhada por ninguém. Esta via pode me trazer incômodos e dificuldades, mas poderá também trazer-me recompensas, fruto do reconhecimento daqueles que considerarem humanamente a finalidade destes meus esforços. Se o engenho pobre, a pouca experiência das coisas presentes e os parcos conhecimentos das antigas tornarem este meu esforço defeituoso e de não muita utilidade, ao menos isso abrirá a via para alguém que, com mais virtù4, mais eloquência e mais juízo, possa realizar esta minha intenção. Portanto, se o que fizer não me trouxer louvor, não deverá, porém, suscitar censuras. 2. Considerando, então, quanta honra se atribui à antiguidade e como – para não mencionar infinitos outros exemplos – um fragmento de uma antiga estátua é comprado, muitas vezes, por um alto preço, apenas para tê-lo junto de si, honrar a sua casa e para ser imitado por aqueles que se deleitam com tal arte; considerando ainda que estes se esforçam com toda indústria para representá-la em todas as suas obras, e vendo, de outro lado, as virtuosíssimas ações que as histórias nos mostram terem sido realizadas pelos reinos e repúblicas antigas, pelos reis, capitães, cidadãos, legisladores e outros que trabalharam duramente por suas pátrias, serem mais prontamente admirados do que imitados5; ven2 De modo geral, o termo refere-se a hábitos e instituições. 3 O ordem ou ordenação (ordine) e refere-se aqui à organização político-institucional de um estado, às suas instituições e, com as devidas ressalvas, à sua constituição. Na tradução, ora mantivemos o termo como referido acima, ora o substituímos, quando possível, por instituições. Ver a respeito, glossário organizado por P. ARANOVICH, para as traduções das obras de Maquiavel publicadas pela editora Martins Fontes. 4 Não encontramos na obra maquiaveliana uma definição precisa de virtù. Trata-se de um termo polissêmico, cujo sentido deve ser buscado sempre no contexto no qual é empregado. A virtù não se confunde, porém, com as virtudes tradicionais nem tem a sua fixidez. De um modo geral, está associada à capacidade de ação dos atores políticos, seja num principado, seja numa república, e pode ter características diversas conforme os tempos e os lugares. 5 Trata-se de um conceito importante no pensamento maquiaveliano, que tem como pressuposto a ideia, enunciada ainda no Proêmio, de que o mundo e os homens são sem428 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 428 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio do, por fim, que tais ações são evitadas por todos em cada mínima coisa, não restando nenhum sinal daquela antiga virtù, não posso deixar de surpreender-me e também de lamentar-me. Tanto mais porque eu vejo, nas querelas civis que nascem entre os cidadãos ou nas doenças que acometem os homens, estes recorrem sempre aos juízos ou aos remédios que foram pronunciados ou estabelecidos pelos antigos. Pois, as leis civis nada mais são do que sentenças pronunciadas pelos antigos jurisconsultos, as quais, transformadas em instituições, ensinam aos nossos atuais jurisconsultos como julgar. Nem a medicina é outra coisa que experiências realizadas pelos antigos médicos sobre as quais os médicos atuais se embasam e fundamentam os seus juízos. Contundo, na ordenação das repúblicas, na manutenção dos estados6, no governo dos reinos, na ordenação da milícia e administração da guerra, no julgamento dos súditos, na expansão do império, não se encontra príncipe nem república que recorra ao exemplo dos antigos. Creio que isso tenha se originado não tanto da fraqueza a que a presente religião conduziu o mundo, ou daquele mal que o ambicioso ócio fez a muitas províncias e cidades cristãs, quanto de não se ter um verdadeiro conhecimento das histórias, por não se retirar de sua leitura o seu sentido nem apreciar o seu sabor. Donde decorre que muitos que as leem sentem prazer em ouvir a enorme variedade de acontecimentos que contém, sem, contudo, pensar em imitá-las, julgando a sua imitação, não só difícil, mas impossível. É como se o céu, o sol, os elementos e os homens tivessem mudado o movimento, a ordem e a potência relativamente àquilo que eram antigamente. Desejando, portanto, livrar os homens deste erro, julguei necessário escrever sobre todos aqueles livros de Tito Lívio que a malignidade dos tempos não nos subtraiu, aquilo que, segundo o meu conhecimento das coisas antigas e das modernas, julguei ser necessário para sua maior compreensão, a fim de que aqueles que venham a ler estes meus discursos possam mais facilmente retirar lições úteis, razão pela qual se busca conhecer as histórias. pre os mesmos. Isso permite retirar da história lições para ação. A imitação, no entanto, não é mera reprodução, mas é dinâmica, pois impele o ator político agir resoluta e decididamente em defesa da liberdade do estado. Ver também O Príncipe, capítulo VI. 6 O termo estado é utilizado poucas vezes por Maquiavel no sentido moderno. Tampouco tem um único significado, podendo ser traduzido por governo, por regime político ou ainda forma de governo. Quando isso ocorrer, aparecerá escrito em itálico. 429429 Ainda que esta empresa seja difícil, ajudado, contudo, por aqueles que me têm confortado ao assumir tal fardo, creio poder suportá-lo de modo que a um outro reste um caminho breve para chegar ao destino. 1. Quais as origens das cidades em geral e qual foi a de Roma 1. Aquele que ler a história da origem da cidade de Roma, de quais foram seus fundadores e de como foi ordenada, não se espantará que tanta virtù tenha se mantido por tantos séculos em tal cidade e que depois tamanho império tenha sido alcançado por tal república. (...) 6. Como as coisas realizadas pela república romana, e que foram celebradas por Tito Lívio, aconteceram ou por deliberação pública ou por deliberação privada, dentro ou fora da cidade, eu começarei a discorrer sobre as coisas que, acontecidas no seu interior e por deliberação pública, são a meu ver mais dignas consideração. Acrescentarei então os efeitos por elas produzidos. Com estes Discursos, terminarei este primeiro livro, ou melhor, esta primeira parte. 2. De quantas espécies são as repúblicas e de qual espécie foi a república romana 7. Mas consideremos Roma. Apesar de não ter tido um legislador como Licurgo que, desde o princípio, ordenasse a república de tal modo que pudesse viver por longo tempo livre, foram tantos os acidentes que nela surgiram por causa da desunião que havia entre a plebe e o senado que aquilo que não fez um ordenador foi feito pelo acaso. Se Roma não teve a primeira fortuna, teve a segunda, porque, se as suas primeiras ordenações foram defeituosas, não a desviaram, contudo, da via justa que pudesse conduzi-la à perfeição. Rômulo e todos os outros reis fizeram muitas e boas leis, conformes também à vida livre7, mas como o objetivo deles era o de fundar um reino e não uma república, quando de fato a cidade se tornaria livre, faltavam-lhe muitas coisas necessárias de serem 7 Vida livre ou vida civil é aquela vida vivida sob um regime de leis, característica principal de um regime republicano. 430 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 430 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio instituídas em favor da liberdade e que não tinham sido estabelecidas por aqueles reis. Ocorre que, se os seus reis perderam seu poder pelas razões e modos expostos, aqueles que os cassaram instituíram imediatamente dois cônsules que os substituíram em seu papel e, assim, cassaram de Roma o nome mas não o poder régio. De modo que, havendo em tal república os cônsules e o senado, somente se tornava mista de duas das três qualidades acima descritas, isto é, do principado e do regime otimate8. Faltava-lhe apenas dar lugar ao governo popular. E, visto que a nobreza romana tornou-se insolente, pelas razões que abaixo exporemos, o povo se levantou contra ela, de modo que, para não perder tudo, foi obrigada a conceder ao povo a sua parte e, em contrapartida, o senado e os cônsules ficaram com tanta autoridade que puderam conservar naquela república as suas funções. Assim, deu-se a criação dos tribunos da plebe, depois da qual o governo daquela república tornou-se mais estável, por terem todas as três formas de governo a sua parte. E foi-lhe tão favorável a fortuna que, ainda que se passasse do governo dos reis e dos otimates ao do povo, por aqueles mesmos estágios e por aquelas mesmas razões que acima foram apresentadas, nunca se tolheu toda a autoridade do governo régio para dá-la toda aos otimates, nem se retirou toda a autoridade dos otimates para dá-la ao povo. Mas, permanecendo mista, tornou-se uma república perfeita, perfeição a que se chegou pela desunião entre a plebe e o senado, como nos próximos dois capítulos será longamente demonstrado. 3. Quais foram os acidentes que criaram em Roma os tribunos da plebe, instituição que fez dela a mais perfeita república 1. Como demonstram todos aqueles que discorrem sobre a vida civil e do que são plenas de exemplos todas as histórias, é necessário, para quem estabelece uma república e cria leis, pressupor que todos os homens são maus e que usarão da maldade de seu ânimo sempre que tiverem uma livre ocasião para tanto. Quando alguma maldade permanece oculta por certo tempo, isso procede de alguma razão escusa, que não é conhecida por não ter existido evidência do contrário. Mas o tempo, que 8 Regime aristocrata. 431431 dizem ser o pai de toda verdade, traz às claras esta razão. 2. Depois de cassados os Tarquínios, parecia haver em Roma uma grande união entre a plebe e o Senado. Aparentemente os nobres tinham deposto a sua soberba e mostravam-se de índole mais popular, podendo ser suportados por qualquer um, ainda que de ínfima condição. Enquanto os Tarquínios viveram, este engano esteve oculto e não se viam as suas razões. A nobreza os temia e tinha medo de que a plebe, caso fosse maltratada, deles se aproximasse e, assim, tratava-a humanamente. Mas, logo que os Tarquínios morreram, o medo dos nobres desapareceu e estes começaram a cuspir sobre a plebe aquele veneno que tinham no peito, ofendendo-a de todos os modos que podiam. Esse fato serve de testemunho àquilo que afirmei acima, ou seja, que os homens nunca fazem nenhum bem a não ser por necessidade. Pois, onde há muitas escolhas possíveis e onde se pode usar de licença, surgem logo inúmeras confusões e desordens. Por isso é que se diz que a fome e a pobreza fazem os homens industriosos e as leis os tornam bons. A lei não é necessária quando uma coisa funciona bem por si mesma, mas quando este bom costume está ausente, a lei é imprescindível. Assim, faltando os Tarquínios, que infligiam medo à nobreza, impondo-lhe freios, tornou-se necessário pensar em uma nova ordenação que produzisse o mesmo efeito produzido pelos Tarquínos enquanto estavam vivos. Deste modo, depois de muitas confusões, rumores e perigos de escândalo, que surgiram entre a plebe e a nobreza, chegou-se, para a segurança da plebe, à criação dos Tribunos, os quais foram instituídos com tanta preeminência e reputação que, a partir de então, puderam sempre estar entre a plebe e o senado, obviando à insolência dos nobres. 4. A desunião entre a plebe e o senado fez livre e poderosa a república romana9 1. Eu não quero deixar de discorrer sobre os tumultos ocorridos em Roma entre a morte dos Tarquínios e a criação dos Tribunos e depois quero falar de algumas coisas contrárias à opinião de muitos que dizem 9 Este é um pressuposto da teoria política maquiaveliana que também é afirmado no capítulo IX, de O Príncipe. 432 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 432 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio ter sido Roma uma república tumultuária e cheia de tanta confusão que, se a boa fortuna e a virtù militar não tivessem suprido os seus defeitos, teria sido inferior a qualquer outra república. Eu não posso negar que a fortuna e a milícia não tenham sido razões do império romano, mas me parece claro que aqueles que afirmam tais coisas não veem que, onde há boa milícia, convém que haja boas ordenações e raras vezes ocorre também que não haja aí boa fortuna. Cuidemos, porém, dos detalhes daquela cidade. Eu digo que aqueles que condenam os tumultos entre os nobres e a plebe parecem reprovar aquelas coisas que foram a causa primeira da liberdade de Roma. Consideram mais os rumores e os gritos que nasciam de tais tumultos que os bons efeitos que eles provocavam e não veem que há em toda república dois humores diversos, quais sejam, aquele do povo e aquele dos grandes, nem também que todas as leis que são feitas em favor da liberdade nascem desta desunião. É o que facilmente se vê ter ocorrido em Roma, porque ali, dos Tarquínios aos Gracos, durante mais de trezentos anos, os tumultos raras vezes provocaram exílios e raríssimas vezes derramamento de sangue. Não se pode, portanto, afirmar que estes tumultos foram nocivos nem que tal república estivesse dividida, república essa que, durante tanto tempo e apesar de suas lutas internas, não mandou ao exílio mais do que oito ou dez cidadãos, em que poucos foram assassinados e na qual não muitos foram condenados ao pagamento de penas pecuniárias. Também não se pode com alguma razão chamar esta república de desordenada quando nela existem tantos exemplos de virtù, porque os bons exemplos nascem da boa educação, a boa educação das boas leis e as boas leis daqueles tumultos que muitos condenam inadvertidamente. Quem examinar bem o resultado destes tumultos não encontrará caso algum em que tenham provocado exílio ou violência em desfavor do bem comum, mas sim leis e instituições em benefício da liberdade pública. E se alguém dissesse: os modos eram extraordinários10, quase selvagens, ver o povo junto gritar contra o senado, o senado contra o povo, ver este correr tumultuariamente pelas ruas, fechando o comércio, e ver ainda a plebe toda deixar Roma, coisas que causam espanto em quem as lê e nem poderia ser diferente, digo que 10 Modos extraordinários designam o recurso aos meios que fogem ao comum, podendo, por vezes, serem ditos ilegais ou ilegítimos. 433433 toda cidade deve ter modos próprios por meio dos quais o povo possa desafogar a sua ambição, principalmente naquelas cidades em que se quer usar o povo nas coisas importantes. Entre estas estava a cidade de Roma que tinha este modo, conforme o qual, quando o povo queria obter uma lei, ou ele fazia uma das coisas acima ditas, ou não se arrolava para ir à guerra, de modo que, para aplacá-lo, precisava em parte satisfazêlo. E os desejos dos povos livres raras vezes são perniciosos à liberdade, porque eles nascem ou de serem oprimidos, ou da suspeita de vir a sê-lo. Quando a sua opinião for falsa, há o remédio das assembleias, nas quais pode surgir algum homem de bem, que, discursando, lhes demonstre como se enganam. E os povos, como diz Túlio, mesmo sendo ignorantes, são capazes de compreender a verdade e facilmente acedem quando a verdade lhes é dita por um homem digno de fé. 2. Deve-se, então, minimizar as críticas ao governo romano e considerar que tantos bons efeitos quantos surgiram daquela república não eram causados senão por ótimas razões. Se os tumultos foram a razão da criação dos Tribunos, merecem sumo louvor, porque, além de dar uma parte de administração da república romana ao povo, tais tribunos foram constituídos em favor da guarda da liberdade romana, como no capítulo seguinte será mostrado. 5. A quem se entrega com mais segurança a defesa da liberdade: ao povo ou aos grandes; quem tem mais razões para provocar tumultos: aqueles que querem conquistar ou aqueles que querem conservar 1. Dentre as coisas mais necessárias ordenadas por aqueles que prudentemente instituíram uma república está o estabelecimento de uma guarda da liberdade11 e, conforme esta for bem ou mal instituída, a vida livre dura mais ou menos. Como em toda república existem homens grandes e populares, é difícil saber nas mãos de quem é melhor que ela seja colocada. Junto aos lacedemônios e, em nosso tempo, junto aos venezianos, 11 Guardar a liberdade equivale a preservar as leis de uma república. Neste sentido, as magistraturas encarregadas de tal função exerciam o papel de defensoras do regime político-jurídico. Consequentemente, o povo fica a salvo dos desmandos dos poderosos. 434 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 434 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio ela foi posta nas mãos dos nobres, mas, junto aos romanos, foi posta nas mãos da plebe. 2. É necessário examinar qual dessas repúblicas fez melhor escolha. Se cuidássemos das razões, encontraríamos favoráveis a ambas as partes (...). De fato, quem examinasse atentamente o argumento de uma e de outra ficaria em dúvida relativamente a qual delas deveria eleger para a guarda da liberdade se não soubesse que espécie de homens é mais nociva a uma república: se aquele que deseja manter a honra já adquirida ou se aquele que deseja adquirir aquilo que não possui. 3. Enfim, quem examinar tudo sutilmente chegará à conclusão de que, ou tu pensas em uma república que quer constituir um império, como Roma, ou em uma república à qual seja suficiente se manter. No primeiro caso, é necessário fazer tudo como Roma; no segundo, pode-se imitar Veneza e Esparta, por aquelas razões e no modo como no capítulo seguinte se exporá. 4. Mas, para voltar a falar dos homens que em uma república são mais nocivos, se são aqueles que desejam conquistar, ou aqueles que temem perder o que foi conquistado (...). Facilmente, um e outro apetite pode ser a causa de tumultos grandíssimos. Todavia, o mais das vezes ele é causado por quem mais possui, porque o medo de perder engendra as mesmas vontades que existem naqueles que desejam adquirir, pois, não parece aos homens possuir seguramente aquilo que têm se não adquirem novamente mais. Além disso, possuindo muito, podem com maior força e maior violência provocar mudanças. Ainda por cima, o comportamento desonesto e ambicioso destes homens acende no peito de quem não possui a vontade de possuir, seja para vingar-se deles, espoliando-os, seja para eles próprios poderem possuir riquezas e outras honras que veem ser mal usadas pelos outros. 6. Se em Roma poderia ser ordenado um estado que eliminasse as inimizades entre o povo e o senado 435435 1. Falamos acima dos efeitos que produziam as controvérsias entre o povo e o senado. Ora, tendo essas controvérsias prosseguido até o tempo dos Gracos, quando estes causaram a ruína da vida livre, alguns poderiam desejar que Roma tivesse produzido os grandes efeitos que produziu sem que nela existissem tais inimizades. Assim, me pareceu coisa digna de consideração verificar se em Roma teria sido possível ordenar um regime que acabasse com tais controvérsias. Para considerar isso, é necessário recorrer às repúblicas que, sem tantas inimizades e tumultos, foram livres por um longo tempo, examinando qual regime havia nelas e também se seria possível instituí-lo em Roma. Um exemplo entre os antigos é o de Esparta e, entre os modernos, o de Veneza, por mim acima indicados. (...) 3. Considerando, então, tudo isso, vê-se que era necessário aos legisladores de Roma fazer uma das duas coisas, se quisessem que Roma ficasse tranquila como as repúblicas acima mencionadas, ou não utilizar a plebe na guerra, como os venezianos, ou não abrir as portas para os estrangeiros, como os espartanos. Mas ela fez uma e outra coisa, o que deu à plebe força, número e infinitas ocasiões para causar tumultos. Mas, se o regime romano se tornasse mais tranquilo, disso resultaria o inconveniente de se tornar também mais fraco, porque estaria interditada a via para poder chegar à grandeza a que chegou. De modo que, se Roma quisesse remover as causas dos tumultos, removeria também as causas de sua ampliação. Quem examinar bem verá que em todas as coisas humanas jamais se pode cancelar um inconveniente sem que surja um outro. Portanto, se tu queres ter um povo numeroso e armado para poder fazer um grande império, terás de fazê-lo de uma maneira que não poderás depois manejá-lo a teu modo. Se tu o conservas reduzido ou desarmado para poder manejá-lo e conquistas novos domínios, não os poderás conservar, ou eles estarão tão fracos que serás presa de qualquer um que te atacar. Assim, deve-se considerar em nossas deliberações onde existem menos inconvenientes e tomar a melhor decisão, porque não se encontra jamais algo totalmente transparente e insuspeito. Poderia, então, Roma, à semelhança de Esparta, estabelecer um príncipe vitalício, instituir um pequeno senado, mas não poderia, como ela, deixar de aumentar o número de 436 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 436 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio seus cidadãos, se quisesse fazer um grande império, o que faria com que o rei vitalício e o senado relativamente pouco numeroso tivessem pouca serventia. 4. Se alguém quisesse, portanto, ordenar novamente uma república, teria de examinar se desejaria que ela se ampliasse em domínio e potência como Roma, ou que ficasse dentro de limites estreitos. No primeiro caso, é necessário ordená-la como Roma e dar lugar aos tumultos e às dissensões universais do melhor modo possível, porque, sem este grande número de homens bem armados, jamais uma república poderá crescer, ou não poderá se manter, se vier a crescer. No segundo caso, poderá ordená-la como Esparta ou Veneza, mas, como a expansão é o veneno de semelhantes repúblicas, quem a ordena deve proibir-lhe as conquistas de todos os modos possíveis, porque tais conquistas, fundadas sobre uma república fraca, são a causa de sua completa ruína. (...). Acredito, sem dúvida, que se fosse possível conservar tudo equilibrado deste modo, ter-se-ia uma verdadeira vida política e uma verdadeira tranquilidade na cidade. Mas, como todas as coisas humanas estão em constante movimento e não podem ficar estáveis, é necessário que ascendam ou declinem. E a muitas coisas que a razão não te induz, te induz a necessidade, de maneira que, ao ordenar uma república apta para se conservar, sem se ampliar, e a necessidade a obrigar a tanto, isso destruiria os seus fundamentos e provocaria sua ruína mais rapidamente. Mesmo quando, por outro lado, os céus fossem com ela tão benevolentes que não a levassem a fazer guerra, daí decorreria que o ócio a tornaria efeminada ou dividida, coisas estas que, juntas ou cada uma por si, seriam a razão de sua ruína. Portanto, como não acredito ser possível equilibrar tais coisas, nem trilhar adequadamente a via intermediária, é necessário na ordenação de uma república pensar na parte mais honrosa e ordená-la de modo que, mesmo quando a necessidade a levasse a ampliar-se, ela pudesse conservar o que foi conquistado. Para retornar ao primeiro tema, creio ser necessário seguir a ordenação romana e não a das outras repúblicas, porque não acredito ser possível encontrar um modo intermediário entre uma e outra. Deve-se, ainda, tolerar as inimizades que nascem entre o povo e o senado, tomando-as como um inconveniente necessário para se 437437 alcançar a grandeza romana. Pois, além das razões alegadas, quando se demonstrou ter sido necessária a autoridade dos tribunos para a guarda da liberdade, pode-se facilmente aferir o beneficio que trouxe às repúblicas o instituto da acusação, que era, entre outras funções, atribuída aos Tribunos, conforme discorreremos no capítulo seguinte. 7. O quanto são necessárias as acusações para conservar uma república livre 1. Não me parece que numa cidade se pode dar autoridade mais útil e necessária a quem tem a função de guarda de sua liberdade do que a de poder acusar perante o povo, perante um magistrado ou mesmo perante um conselho, os cidadãos que praticarem algum ato contra o estado livre12. Esta instituição produz dois efeitos muito úteis em uma república. O primeiro é que os cidadãos, por medo de serem acusados, não atentam contra as coisas do estado, e, atentando, são reprimidos rapidamente e sem nenhuma consideração. O outro é que se institui um lugar para o desafogo daqueles humores que crescem nas cidades contra qualquer cidadão. Quando estes humores não têm onde se desafogar ordinariamente, buscam modos extraordinários, os quais arruínam toda uma república. Assim, não há nada que faça tão estável e firme uma república quanto ordená-la de modo que a alteração daqueles humores que a agitam encontre uma via para se desafogar ordenada pelas leis. (...) 2. Se um cidadão é punido por modos ordinários, ainda que injustamente, segue-se pouca ou nenhuma desordem na república, porque a execução se faz sem forças privadas ou estrangeiras, que são as que arruínam uma vida livre, mas sim com forças e instituições públicas, dentro dos próprios termos, sem ultrapassar os limites além dos quais se arruína a república. Para confirmar esta minha opinião, é suficiente tomar dentre os exemplos dos antigos o de Coriolano, em relação ao qual cada um deve considerar quantos males teriam resultado para a república romana se ele tivesse sido morto tumulturiamente. Disso nasceria a ofensa de um cidadão privado a outro, ofensa esta que geraria medo, medo que busca 12 Trata-se de submeter a um julgamento público aqueles que eventualmente venham infringir as leis e ameaçar as instituições, colocando em risco a liberdade do estado. 438 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 438 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio defesa, defesa para a qual se buscam partidários, destes partidários nascem as facções nas cidades, das facções a sua ruína. Mas, como a coisa foi conduzida por quem tinha autoridade para tanto, evitaram-se todos os males que nela nasceriam se fosse conduzida por uma autoridade privada. 3. (...) 9. De como é necessário estar só para novamente ordenar uma república ou para reformá-la com modos completamente diferentes dos antigos 1. Talvez pareça a alguns que eu avancei muito da história romana sem antes ter feito alguma menção aos fundadores daquela república nem às instituições relativas à religião ou à milícia. Como não quero mais deixar em suspenso a expectativa daqueles que queiram ouvir alguma coisa sobre esta matéria, digo que muitos julgarão um péssimo exemplo o fato de que o fundador de uma vida civil, como foi Rômulo, tenha primeiro morto o seu irmão e depois consentido na morte do sabino Tito Tácio, escolhido por ele para seu companheiro no reino, ao julgar, com isso, que aqueles cidadãos, por ambição e desejo de comandar, pudessem, recorrendo à autoridade de seu príncipe, ofender àqueles que se opusessem à autoridade. Esta opinião seria verdadeira se não se considerasse o fim que o levara a praticar tal homicídio. 2. Deve-se tomar como uma regra geral que jamais ou raras vezes ocorre que alguma república ou reino seja ordenado bem desde seu princípio, ou em tudo novamente reformado com instituições diversas das antigas, se não for ordenada apenas por um homem. Antes, é necessário que um homem esteja só para estabelecer novos modos e que dependa unicamente de sua mente qualquer uma das instituições. Assim, um prudente ordenador de uma república que tenha a vontade de servir não a si mesmo, mas ao bem comum, não aos seus descendentes, mas à pátria comum, deve conservar-se sozinho no poder. Nenhum homem sábio reprovará alguém por alguma ação extraordinária que tiver sido feita para instituir um reino ou uma república. É preciso, então, que, acusando-o o 439439 fato, o efeito o escuse. E quando este for bom, como aquele de Rômulo, sempre o escusará, porque se deve condenar quem é violento para destruir, e não quem o é para reformar. Deve-se, porém, ser tão prudente e virtuoso que a autoridade que foi tomada não fique como herança para outro, pois, estando os homens mais inclinados para o mal do que para o bem, poderia seu sucessor usar ambiciosamente aquilo que por ele tivesse sido usado virtuosamente. Além disso, mesmo que alguém seja capaz de ordenar, a coisa ordenada não estará ordenada para ser durável enquanto permanecer sobre os ombros de um único homem, mas, sim, quando estiver sob os cuidados de muitos aos quais caiba a sua conservação. Pois, assim como muitos não se encontram aptos para ordenar algo por não saberem qual o seu bem devido às diversas Opiniões existentes entre eles, mesmo que o conhecessem, não se conformariam em deixá-lo. Que Rômulo fosse daqueles homens que merecia escusa pela morte do irmão e do companheiro e que tivesse agido pelo bem comum e não por ambição própria, demonstra-o o fato de ter imediatamente estabelecido um senado, com o qual ele pudesse aconselhar-se e, segundo a sua opinião, deliberar. E quem considerar bem a autoridade que Rômulo manteve para si verá não ter mantido nenhuma outra que a de comandar os exércitos quando fosse declarada guerra e a de convocar o senado. Isso se viu depois quando Roma tornou-se livre com a cassação dos Tarquínios, momento em que nenhuma das antigas instituições foi renovada pelos romanos, a não ser pelo fato de o rei perpétuo ter sido substituído por dois cônsules anuais, o que prova que todas as instituições iniciais daquela cidade foram mais conforme a uma vida civil e livre do que a um regime absoluto e tirânico. 3. (...) 10. São tão louváveis os fundadores de uma república ou de um reino quanto são vituperáveis aqueles de uma tirania 1. Entre todos os homens louváveis os mais louváveis são aqueles que foram cabeças e ordenadores de religiões. Logo depois estão aque440 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 440 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio les que fundaram ou repúblicas ou reinos. Seguindo estes são célebres aqueles que, comandando os exércitos, ampliaram o seu reino ou o domínio da pátria. A estes se juntam os homens de letras, que, como são de muitas espécies, são celebrados cada qual segundo o seu mérito. A todos os outros homens, cujo número é infinito, é atribuída uma parte de louvor conforme a sua arte e o seu exercício. São, ao contrário, infames e detestáveis os homens destruidores das religiões, dissipadores de reinos e de repúblicas, inimigos da virtù, das letras e de toda outra arte útil e honrosa para a humanidade, como são os ímpios, os violentos, os ignorantes, os ineptos, os ociosos, os vis. Ninguém jamais será tão louco ou tão sábio, tão mal ou tão bom, que, tendo de escolher entre as duas qualidades de homens, não louve aquela que deve ser louvada e reprove aquela que deve ser reprovada. Apesar disso, logo depois, quase todos, enganados por um falso bem ou por uma falsa glória, acabam por seguir, voluntária ou ignorantemente, os caminhos daqueles que merecem mais reprovação do que louvor. Isto porque, mesmo podendo instituir, para a sua perpétua honra, uma república ou um reino, voltam-se para a tirania. Não se apercebem quanta fama, quanta glória, quanta honra, segurança e tranquilidade, para a satisfação de seu próprio ânimo, eles perdem ao tomarem tal decisão, e em quanta infâmia, vitupério, reprovação, perigo e inquietude eles incorrem. (...) 6. E, sem dúvida, se for homem se surpreenderá com toda imitação dos tempos maus e se inflamará por um imenso desejo de seguir os bons. Em verdade, um príncipe que procura a glória do mundo deveria desejar possuir uma cidade corrupta, não para destruí-la completamente como César, mas para reordená-la como Rômulo. De fato, os céus não podem dar aos homens maior ocasião de glória, nem os homens podem desejar glória maior. E se, para bem ordenar uma cidade, fosse preciso depor o principado, mereceria alguma escusa aquele que a ordenasse de modo a evitar tal declínio, mas, podendo conservar o principado e reordená-lo, não mereceria escusa alguma. Em suma, aqueles a quem os céus dão tal ocasião devem considerar que têm presentes duas vias: uma que os faz viver seguros e depois de sua morte torna-os gloriosos, a outra 441441 os faz viver em contínuas angústias e, depois da morte, deixa de si uma eterna infâmia. 11. Da religião dos romanos 1. Ainda que Roma tivesse em Rômulo seu primeiro ordenador, e que a ele tenha de atribuir, como filha, o seu nascimento e a sua educação, os céus julgaram, contudo, que suas instituições não eram suficientes para tanto império e inspiraram no peito do senado romano a escolha de Numa Pompílio como sucessor de Rômulo, para que fossem ordenadas por ele aquelas coisas que tinham ficado incompletas. Este, vendo-se diante de um povo ferocíssimo e querendo reduzi-lo à obediência civil com a arte da paz, voltou-se para a religião como coisa absolutamente necessária para quem deseja manter a vida civil e constituiu-a de tal modo que, por muitos séculos, não houve nunca tanto temor a Deus quanto naquela república, o que facilitou qualquer empreendimento que o senado ou os grandes homens romanos desejassem realizar. E, quem examinar as infinitas ações de todo o povo de Roma reunido e de muitos romanos sozinhos, verá como aqueles cidadãos temiam muito mais romper um juramento do que as leis, e como eles estimavam mais o poder de Deus que o dos homens, como se vê manifestamente nos exemplos de Cipião e Manlio Torquato. (...). Assim, aqueles cidadãos que não eram contidos na Itália pelo amor à pátria nem por suas leis, foram contidos por um juramento que foram forçados a fazer. E aquele tribuno deixou de lado o ódio que tinha ao pai, a injúria que lhe fizera o filho e a sua honra, para obedecer ao juramento feito. Isso não teve outra origem que aquela religião que Numa introduzira naquela cidade. 2. Quem considera bem as histórias romanas vê o quanto servia a religião para comandar o exército, para encorajar a plebe a conservar os homens bons e envergonhar os maus. De modo que, caso fosse preciso debater para saber a qual príncipe Roma estava mais obrigada, se a Rômulo ou a Numa, creio que Numa obteria o primeiro lugar mais frequentemente, porque facilmente se pode introduzir armas onde há religião, mas onde existem armas e não religião, com muita dificuldade aquelas 442 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 442 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio podem ser introduzidas. Vê-se que Rômulo, para ordenar o senado e instituir determinadas ordenações civis e militares, não teve necessidade de recorrer à autoridade de Deus, mas Numa sim, tanto que simulou falar com uma Ninfa que o aconselhava sobre aquilo que deveria aconselhar ao povo. Isso tudo acontecia porque queria estabelecer novas e inusitadas instituições naquela cidade e duvidava que a sua autoridade fosse o bastante. 3. Jamais houve algum ordenador de leis extraordinárias em povo algum que não recorresse a Deus, porque, de outro modo, não teriam sido aceitas. Pois, são muitos os bens conhecidos por um homem prudente que não têm em si razões tão evidentes para serem aceitos pelos demais. Assim, os homens sábios, que queiram contornar esta dificuldade, recorrem a Deus. Assim fez Licurgo, assim, Sólon, assim, muitos outros que tinham os mesmo objetivos. (...) 4. Considerando tudo, concluo que a religião introduzida por Numa estava entre as razões da felicidade daquela cidade, porque ela deu origem a boas ordenações, as boas ordenações fizeram boa a fortuna, e da boa fortuna nasceram os felizes êxitos das empresas romanas. E, assim como a observância do culto divino é razão da grandeza das repúblicas, o seu desprezo é a razão de sua ruína. Pois, onde falta o temor de Deus, é necessário que o reino se arruíne, ou que tenha de ser sustentado pelo temor de um príncipe, que supra os defeitos da religião. Mas, como os príncipes têm vida curta, convém que tal reino se arruíne logo que a virtù deste vier a faltar. Disto decorre que os reinos que dependem da virtù de um único homem são pouco duráveis, porque aquela virtù falta com a morte deste, e, raras vezes, acontece que seja recuperada pelo seu sucessor (...). 5. Portanto, não é sinal da saúde de uma república ou de um reino ter um príncipe que governe prudentemente enquanto vive, mas sim ter um que a ordene de tal modo que, mesmo depois de sua morte, ela se mantenha. (...) 443443 16. um povo acostumado a viver submetido a um príncipe, ao tornar-se livre por qualquer acidente, com dificuldade mantém a sua liberdade 1. Infinitos exemplos lidos nas memórias das histórias antigas demonstram quanta dificuldade um povo acostumado a viver submetido a um príncipe tem para conservar a liberdade que, por alguma acidente conquista, como foi aquela conquistada por Roma depois da cassação dos Tarquínios. Tal dificuldade tem explicação, porque esse povo não é diferente de um animal bruto que, mesmo de natureza feroz e selvagem, foi sempre alimentado no cárcere e em servidão. Deixado, depois, livre e à sua própria sorte num campo, sem estar acostumado a buscar alimento e sem saber onde se refugiar, torna-se presa do primeiro que queira submetê-lo. 2. O mesmo acontece a um povo que, habituado a viver sob o governo de outros, não sabe nada sobre as disputas públicas, não conhece os príncipes nem é por eles conhecido, e, assim, retorna logo ao jugo, que, na maioria das vezes, é mais pesado do que aquele que pouco antes tinha tirado de seus ombros. Um povo encontra-se sempre nesta dificuldade, a menos que não esteja corrompido. Isso porque um povo do qual a corrupção tomou conta não pode de modo nenhum viver livre, mesmo por um curto tempo, como abaixo se dirá. Assim, a nossa reflexão diz respeito aos povos entre os quais a corrupção não se estendeu muito, existindo ainda mais matéria boa que corrupta. 3. Acrescenta-se à dificuldade acima descrita uma outra, a saber, que o estado que se torna livre cria partidários inimigos e não partidários amigos. Tornam-se partidários inimigos todos aqueles que tinham primazia no regime tirânico, alimentando-se da riqueza do príncipe. Tolhendo-lhes a possibilidade de se aproveitarem, não podem viver satisfeitos e cada um deles se vê forçado a tentar restabelecer a tirania para retomar a sua autoridade. Não se conquista, como disse, partidários amigos, porque a verdadeira vida civil pressupõe honras e prêmios motivados por alguma razão honesta e determinada e, fora disso, não premia nem honra ninguém. Quando alguém possui honras e aqueles benefícios que 444 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 444 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio lhe parece merecer, não reconhece nenhuma obrigação para com aqueles que as concedem. Além disto, aquela utilidade comum que vem do viver livre, ninguém a aprecia enquanto a possui, e tal utilidade consiste em gozar livremente e sem nenhuma suspeita das suas coisas, em não duvidar da honra das mulheres, daquela dos filhos e em não temer por si próprio. Por isso, ninguém jamais dirá ter alguma obrigação por alguém que não o ofenda. 4. Assim, conforme foi dito acima, o regime livre e instituído novamente tem partidários inimigos e não partidários amigos. (...). Em verdade, eu julgo infelizes aqueles príncipes que, por terem como inimigo a multidão, recorrem a vias extraordinárias para assegurarem o seu regime, porque aquele que tem como inimigos os poucos assegura-se mais facilmente e sem muito escândalo. Mas quem tem por inimigo todo o povo não se assegura jamais, e, quanto mais crueldade usa, tanto mais fraco torna-se o seu principado. De modo que o melhor remédio a usar é procurar fazer o povo tornar-se seu aliado13. 55. Como é fácil conduzir as coisas nas cidades onde a multidão não está corrompida; onde existe igualdade, não se pode instituir um principado, e onde não existe, não se pode instituir uma república 1. Ainda que acima se tenha examinado suficientemente aquilo que se deve temer ou esperar das cidades corrompidas, não me parece fora de propósito considerar uma decisão do senado sobre a promessa que Camilo tinha feito de dar a Apolo a décima parte do saque dos veienses. Tendo este saque chegado às mãos da plebe romana e não sendo possível saber a sua soma total, o senado publicou um édito no qual cada um deveria apresentar em público a décima parte daquilo que tinha apanhado. Embora esta deliberação não tivesse sido levada a efeito, uma vez que o senado tomou depois outra medida e por uma via diversa satisfez Apolo, para contentamento da plebe, vê-se por meio de tal deliberação o quanto o senado confiava na bondade da plebe e como julgava que ninguém deixaria de apresentar tudo aquilo que por tal édito era exigido. De 13 Encontramos aqui uma ponte para o capítulo IX, de O Príncipe. 445445 outra parte, vê-se como a plebe não pensou em fraudar nenhuma parte do édito dando menos do que devia, mas de liberar-se de tal exigência demonstrando abertamente sua indignação. Este exemplo, como muitos outros acima aduzidos, mostra quanta bondade e quanta religiosidade havia naquele povo e quanto bem se poderia dele esperar. E, em verdade, onde esta bondade não se encontra presente, não se pode espera nada de bom, como não se pode esperar nada das províncias que nesta época se encontram corrompidas, como a Itália, acima de todas as outras, e também a França e a Espanha, que detêm parte desta corrupção. Se em tais províncias não se veem tantas desordens quanto as que nascem na Itália todos os dias, isso decorre não tanto da bondade dos povos, que está em boa parte ausente, mas do fato de terem um rei que os mantêm unidos, não apenas por sua virtù, mas pelas ordenações de tais reinos que ainda não foram corrompidas. Vê-se bem que esta bondade e esta religiosidade são ainda grandes nos povos da província da Alemanha, o que faz com que ali muitas repúblicas vivam livres e observem de tal modo as suas leis que ninguém de fora ou de dentro ousa ocupá-las. Eu quero dar prova de que é verdade que nelas reina boa parte da antiga bondade valendo-me de um exemplo similar ao acima referido sobre o senado e a plebe romana. Naquelas repúblicas, quando precisam gastar algum dinheiro público, os magistrados ou conselhos que têm autoridade para tanto impõem a todos os habitantes da cidade uma taxa de um ou dois por cento daquilo que cada um tem de renda. Tomada tal deliberação segundo as instituições locais, cada um se apresenta diante dos coletores de tais taxas e, uma vez feito o juramento de pagar a soma exigida, lança em uma caixa indicada para tanto aquilo que a sua consciência diz que deve pagar, ato do qual não há nenhuma testemunha a não ser aquele que paga. Disso se pode inferir quanta bondade e quanta religiosidade há ainda naqueles homens. Deve-se supor que cada um pague a soma devida, porque, se não pagasse, a arrecadação não reuniria a quantidade que fora determinada de acordo com o que era usual receber antigamente. E, se não chegasse a tal montante, a fraude seria descoberta, e, uma vez descoberta, ter-se-ia encontrado um modo diverso de arrecadação. Essa bondade é tanto mais admirável nestes tempos quanto mais ela é rara. Antes, vê-se ter restado só naquela província. 446 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 446 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio 2. Isso nasce de duas coisas, a saber: uma, de não ter tido muitas relações com os vizinhos, porque nem estes foram à casa daqueles, nem aqueles vieram à casa destes, e assim continuaram satisfeitos com seus bens, em viver daquela sua comida, vestir da lã produzida por eles próprios. Assim, foi interditada a possibilidade de qualquer relação e, em consequência, o princípio de toda corrupção, porque não puderam aprender os costumes franceses, nem espanhóis, nem italianos, nações essas que juntas reúnem toda a corrupção do mundo. A outra razão é que as repúblicas nas quais se preservou a vida política incorrupta não suportam que alguns de seus cidadãos sejam ou vivam como gentis-homens. Antes, mantém entre si uma plena igualdade e são inimicíssimos daqueles senhores e gentis-homens que existem na província. Se porventura algum lhes chega às mãos, matam-no, porque são princípio de corrupção e razão de todo tipo de escândalo. Para esclarecer o que significa o nome de gentil-homem, digo que gentis-homens são chamados os que vivem ociosos das rendas de suas muitas posses, sem ter nenhuma preocupação com o cultivo ou com outro esforço necessário para se viver. Estes tais são perniciosos em qualquer república e em qualquer província, mas mais perniciosos ainda são aqueles que, além da acima mencionada fortuna, comandam castelos e têm súditos que os obedecem. Desta espécie de homens está cheia o reino de Nápoles, a Terra de Roma, a Romanha e a Lombardia, razão pela qual nestas províncias jamais surgiu nenhuma república nem qualquer vida política, porque tais tipos de homens são totalmente inimigos de toda forma de vida civil. Não seria possível tentar introduzir uma república nas províncias constituídas deste modo. Para reordená-las, caso coubesse a alguém esta decisão, não haveria outra via que a de ali estabelecer um reino. A razão é que, onde a matéria é tão corrupta que as leis não bastam para freá-la, é necessário que juntamente com as leis seja instituída uma força maior, a saber: uma mão régia que, com poder absoluto e extraordinário, coloque freios à excessiva ambição e à corrupção dos poderosos. Prova-se este argumento com o exemplo da Toscana, onde se vê terem existido longamente num pequeno espaço geográfico três repúblicas: Florença, Siena e Luca. As demais cidades desta província são servas, mas de tal modo que, na sua disposição e nas suas ordenações, se vê que mantém ou que gostariam de manter a sua liberda447447 de. Isso tudo ocorre por não haver em tal província nenhum senhor de castelo e também nenhum ou pouquíssimos gentis-homens, e por existir aí tanta igualdade que um homem prudente que conhecesse as antigas cidades facilmente introduziria uma vida civil. Mas o seu infortúnio foi tanto que até hoje não teve a sorte de encontrar algum homem que tenha podido ou sabido fazê-lo. 3. Por este discurso chega-se à seguinte conclusão: aquele que quiser instituir uma república onde existam muitos gentis-homens não pode fazê-lo sem antes eliminá-los todos, e aquele que quiser instituir um reino ou um principado onde há bastante igualdade não poderá fazê-lo se não se retira desta igualdade muitos de ânimo ambicioso e inquieto e os transforma em gentis-homens, não apenas de nome, mas de fato, doando-lhes castelos e posses e também beneficiando-os com bens e homens, para que, colocados entre os demais, por meio deles o príncipe conserve o seu poder, e tais homens, por meio do príncipe, a sua ambição. Os outros serão obrigados a suportar o jugo que a força, e nada mais, pode fazê-los suportar. Havendo, por esta via, equilíbrio entre quem força e quem é forçado, os homens todos permanecem acomodados às suas próprias ordenações. E, como instituir numa província apta a ser reino uma república, e numa apta a ser república um reino, é matéria para um homem raro por sua inteligência e autoridade, existiram muitos que quiseram fazê-lo, mas poucos os que souberam realizá-lo. Pois, a grandeza da tarefa, em parte amedronta os homens, em parte os confunde, levando-os a errar logo no início. 4. (...) Discursos, livro II, cap. 2.Contra quais povos os romanos tiveram de combater e como eles defendiam obstinadamente a sua liberdade 1. Nada tornou mais trabalhoso aos romanos a superação dos povos ao seu redor e de parte das regiões distantes do que o amor que naqueles tempos muitos povos tinham pela liberdade e que defendiam tão obstinadamente que jamais, a não ser por uma virtù extraordinária, 448 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 448 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio seriam subjugados. Muitos exemplos mostram quais perigos enfrentaram para manter ou para recuperar a sua liberdade e quais vinganças eles praticaram contra aqueles que os privaram dela. Sabe-se ainda pelas lições da história quais danos os povos e as cidades sofreram com a servidão. Se em nossos tempos há apenas uma província que se possa dizer que tenha cidades livres, nos tempos antigos existiam em todas as províncias muitos povos completamente livres. (...). É fácil descobrir de onde vem este apego dos povos à vida livre, porque a experiência mostra que as cidades jamais teriam se ampliado, nem em domínios, nem em riquezas, a não ser enquanto estiveram livres. É algo surpreendente considerar quanta grandeza alcançou Atenas no espaço de cem anos depois de ter se libertado da tirania de Pisístrato. Mas é, sobretudo, surpreendente considerar quanta grandeza alcançou Roma depois que se libertou de seus reis. É fácil compreender a razão, porque aquilo que dá grandeza às cidades não é o bem particular, mas o bem comum. E, sem dúvida, este bem comum não é observado senão nas repúblicas, porque tudo o que é realizado, é feito em seu propósito e, ainda que cause dano a este ou àquele cidadão privado, são tantos os que são beneficiados que se pode executá-lo contra a disposição de poucos que por ela tenham sido prejudicados. Ocorre o contrário quando se tem um príncipe, pois na maioria das vezes o que ele faz para si próprio prejudica a cidade e aquilo que faz para a cidade prejudica a si próprio. De modo que logo que se impõe uma tirania sobre uma cidade de vida livre o menor mal que disso resulta à cidade é deixar de progredir, de crescer em poder ou em riquezas. Mas, acontece, na maioria das vezes, ou melhor, sempre, que regridam. (...). Não é de surpreender, então, que os povos antigos perseguissem com tanto ódio os tiranos, amassem o viver livre e estimassem tanto a palavra liberdade, (...). 2. Examinando, então, o que fez com que naqueles tempos antigos os povos fossem mais amantes da liberdade do que em nossos tempos, creio que isso tenha origem na mesma razão que ora torna os homens menos fortes, a saber, a diversidade entre a nossa educação e a antiga, fundada na diversidade entre a nossa religião e a antiga. Pois, a nossa religião, por mostrar a verdade e o caminho verdadeiro, faz-nos estimar 449449 menos as honras do mundo, razão pela qual os gentios, que as estimavam mais e por terem nelas colocado o sumo bem, eram mais impetuosos em suas ações. Pode-se ver isso por muitas de suas instituições, começando pela magnificência de seus sacrifícios relativamente à humildade dos nossos, caso em que há alguma pompa mais delicada que magnífica, mas nenhuma ação feroz ou vigorosa. (...). A religião antiga, além disso, não beatificava homens a não ser aqueles plenos de glórias mundanas, como eram os capitães dos exércitos e governantes das repúblicas. A nossa religião glorifica mais os homens humildes e contemplativos do que os ativos. Além disso, coloca o sumo bem na humildade, no aviltamento e no desprezo das coisas humanas; aquela outra o colocava na grandeza de ânimo, na fortaleza do corpo e em todas as outras coisas aptas a tornarem os homens fortes. Se a nossa religião exige que tu sejas forte, é para que tu estejas mais apto a sofrer do que a realizar algo grandioso. Este modo de viver parece, então, ter tornado o mundo fraco, dando-o como presa a homens celerados, os quais podem manipulá-lo com segurança, uma vez que veem que o comum dos homens, para alcançar o paraíso, pensa mais em suportar os seus golpes que a vingá-los. Ainda que pareça que o mundo tenha se efeminado e o céu se desarmado, isso tem origem sem dúvida na vileza dos homens que interpretaram a nossa religião segundo o ócio e não segundo a virtù. Pois, se considerassem como ela torna possível a exaltação e a defesa da pátria, veriam como ela quer que a amemos e a honremos, preparando-nos de tal modo que a possamos defender. Resulta desta educação e de tão falsas interpretações que no mundo não mais se encontram tantas repúblicas quantas se encontravam antigamente, nem, por conseguinte, se encontra nos povos tanto amor à liberdade quanto havia então. No entanto, parece-me que a razão disso reside mais no fato de o Império Romano, com as suas armas e sua grandeza, ter extinguido todas as repúblicas e toda vida civil. Embora tal império tenha depois desaparecido, as cidades não conseguiram ainda se reunir nem reordenar uma vida civil, a não ser em poucos lugares do antigo Império. Seja como for, os romanos encontraram em cada mínima parte do mundo uma conjuração de repúblicas armadíssimas e obstinadíssimas na defesa da sua própria liberdade. Isso demonstra que o povo romano, sem uma rara e extrema virtù, jamais teria podido vencê-las. 450 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 450 mAquiAveL • disCursos sobre A primeirA déCAdA de tito Lívio 3. (...) É fácil ver de onde vinha aquela ordem e de onde provém esta desordem, pois tudo procede de se viver livre então e de agora se viver em servidão. Pois, todas as terras e províncias que vivem livres em qualquer lugar que seja, como acima foi dito, alcançam grandíssimas vantagens. Pois, lá se encontram povos mais numerosos, por serem os casamentos mais livres e mais desejáveis pelos homens, porque todos têm de boa vontade aqueles filhos que creem poder nutrir, seguros de que o patrimônio não lhes será tomado; além disso, sabem que não apenas nascem livres e não escravos, como também podem, mediante a sua própria virtù, tornarem-se governantes. Vê-se a riqueza se multiplicar em maior número, tanto a que provém do cultivo, quanto a que advém das artes. Pois, todos multiplicam de bom grado aquelas coisas e procuram adquirir os bens que acreditam poder gozar. Por isso, os homens disputam pelas vantagens privadas e públicas e, assim, uma e outra crescem maravilhosamente. O contrário de tudo isso acontece naqueles lugares que vivem na servidão; tanto mais lhes faltam os bens habituais, quanto mais lhes é dura a servidão. Dentre as duras servidões, a que é pior é aquela submissão a uma república. Primeiro, porque ela é mais durável e se pode ter menos esperança de livrar-se dela, depois, porque o fim da república é enervar e enfraquecer todos os outros corpos para ampliar o seu. Isso não será feito por um príncipe que te submete, se este príncipe não for algum príncipe bárbaro, destruidor de cidades e dissipador de toda a civilidade dos homens, como o são os príncipes orientais. Mas, se ele tiver modos humanos e ordinários, o mais das vezes ama igualmente as cidades submetidas e deixa intocadas todas as artes e quase todas as antigas instituições, de modo que, se não crescem livres, não se arruínam como escravas (...). 451451 O pRÍNCIpe 14 I De quais gêneros são os principados e como são conquistados 1. Todos os estados e todos os regimes que tiveram e têm poder <império> sobre homens foram e são repúblicas ou principados. Os principados ou são hereditários, quando a estirpe de seu senhor vem governando por longo tempo, ou são novos. Os novos ou são totalmente novos, como foi Milão para Francesco Sforza, ou são membros anexados ao estado hereditário de um príncipe que os conquista, como é o reino de Nápoles para o rei da Espanha. Os domínios assim conquistados ou estão acostumados a viver sob um príncipe ou habituados a serem livres, ou foram conquistados com armas de outrem ou com armas próprias, ou por fortuna ou por virtù. III Dos principados mistos 1. Mas é no principado novo que residem as dificuldades. Primeiramente, se não é um principado totalmente novo, mas membro anexado 14 A tradução foi realizada a partir da edição de Il Príncipe, estabelecida por VIVANTI, C. Opere. Torino: Einaudi-Gallimard, 1997. 452 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 452 mAquiAveL • o prínCipe a outro, que no conjunto pode ser chamado de quase misto, as suas variações nascem principalmente de uma dificuldade natural comum a todos os principados novos, a saber: que os homens trocam de senhor de bom grado acreditando melhorar e esta crença os faz pegar em armas contra o atual senhor. Mas se enganam, porque depois percebem pela própria experiência que pioraram. Isso decorre de uma outra necessidade natural e ordinária, que faz com que seja inevitável ofender aqueles de quem se torna príncipe novo, com exércitos e com outras infinitas injúrias que se seguem à nova conquista. De modo que tu tens por inimigo todos aqueles que ofendestes ao ocupar o principado. Além disso, não podes ter por amigos aqueles que ali te colocaram, por não seres capaz de satisfazê-los da maneira como esperavam e por não poderes usar contra eles remédios fortes, pois lhes deve obrigações. (...) VI Dos principados novos que são conquistados com virtù e armas próprias 1. Que ninguém se espante se, para falar dos principados completamente novos, relativamente ao príncipe e ao estado, eu me valha de exemplos eminentes. Como os homens percorrem vias já trilhadas por outros e os imitam em suas ações, mas sem poder conservar totalmente os mesmos caminhos, nem alcançar a virtù daquele que tu imitas, deve um homem prudente seguir as vias abertas pelos grandes homens e imitar aqueles que foram excelentes, para que, se sua virtù não se igualar à deles, ao menos tenha algum de seus traços. Deve-se fazer como os arqueiros prudentes que, por julgarem estar demasiado longe do lugar que desejam acertar, colocam a mira muito mais alta do que o lugar destinado, para poder, com o uso de tal artifício, alcançar o seu próprio desígnio. 2. Digo então que os principados completamente novos, onde há um novo príncipe, encontram mais ou menos dificuldades para serem mantidos, segundo é mais ou menos virtuoso aquele que os conquistam. E como a passagem de cidadão privado a príncipe pressupõe ou virtù ou fortuna, parece que uma dessas duas coisas mitiga em parte as dificuldades. Contudo, o príncipe que depende menos da fortuna é mais capaz de conservar-se. (...) 453453 3. Mas, para considerar os que, pela própria virtù, e não pela fortuna, tornaram-se príncipes, digo que os mais excelentes foram Moisés, Ciro, Rômulo, Teseu e outros similares. Ainda que não se deva discorrer sobre Moisés, por ter sido ele mero executor das coisas que lhe eram ordenadas por Deus, ele deve também ser admirado pela graça que o tornava digno de falar com Deus. Mas, se considerarmos Ciro e os outros que conquistaram ou fundaram reinos, tu acharias a todos admiráveis. Se considerássemos ainda as suas ações e ordenações particulares, elas não parecerão discrepantes daquelas de Moisés, que teve tão grande preceptor. Vê-se, examinando as suas ações e suas vidas, que não receberam da fortuna nada mais que a ocasião que lhes deu a matéria sobre a qual poderiam introduzir a forma que desejavam. Sem aquela ocasião, a virtù de seu ânimo teria sido perdida, e, sem aquela virtù, a ocasião teria vindo em vão. 4. (...) Tais ocasiões, portanto, fizeram estes homens felizes e a sua virtù excelente fez a ocasião ser reconhecida, do que fez com que a pátria deles fosse enobrecida e se tornasse felicíssima. 5. Aqueles que, por vias virtuosas, semelhantes àquelas dos homens excelentes, tornam-se príncipes, conquistam o principado com dificuldade, mas com facilidade o conservam. As dificuldades que enfrentam depois de conquistar o principado têm origem, em parte, nos novos modos e ordens que são forçados a introduzir para fundar o seu regime e para garantir a sua segurança. Deve-se convir que não há coisa mais difícil de tratar, mais duvidosa de se conseguir, mais perigosa de se manejar, que se fazer senhor instituindo novas ordenações, porque o seu instituidor tem por inimigos todos aqueles que se beneficiavam das velhas ordenações e tem tépidos defensores entre aqueles que as novas ordenações beneficiariam. Esta tepidez nasce em parte do medo aos adversários, que têm as leis ao seu lado, e, em parte da incredulidade dos homens, que não creem verdadeiramente nas coisas novas se não as veem comprovadas por uma sólida experiência. Disso resulta que toda vez que aqueles que são inimigos têm ocasião de atacá-lo fazem-no ferozmente e aqueles outros defendam-no tepidamente. De modo que, ao lado destes últimos, corre-se perigo. 454 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 454 mAquiAveL • o prínCipe 6. Para bem discorrer sobre este tema, é necessário examinar se estes inovadores dependem de si mesmos ou de outros, isto é, se, para levar adiante as suas obras, é preciso que peçam ou se verdadeiramente podem se impor. No primeiro caso vai-se sempre mal e não se chega a lugar nenhum, mas quando dependem apenas de si e podem se impor, raras vezes correm riscos. Donde resulta que todos os profetas armados vencem e os desarmados se arruínam. Pois, além das coisas ditas, a natureza dos povos é inconstante, de modo que é fácil persuadi-los de algo, mas é difícil firma-los na crença. É necessário, portanto, que o estado esteja ordenado de tal modo que, quando não acreditarem mais, se possa fazê-los crer à força. Moisés, Ciro, Teseu e Rômulo não teriam garantido a observância de suas constituições se estivessem desarmados, como, em nosso tempo, ocorreu ao frei Jerônimo Savonarola, o qual teve arruinadas suas novas ordenações quando a multidão deixou de acreditar e ele não dispunha de modos nem para conservar inalteráveis aqueles que nele tinham acreditado nem para fazer os incrédulos acreditarem. 7. (...) IX Do principado civil 1. Mas consideremos outro caso, em que um cidadão privado, não por crueldade ou outra violência intolerável, mas pelo favor de seus concidadãos, torna-se príncipe da sua pátria. Este pode ser chamado de principado civil. Para se chegar a ele, não é necessário nem toda virtù nem toda fortuna, mas sim uma astúcia afortunada. Digo que se ascende a este principado ou com o favor do povo ou com aquele dos grandes. Como em toda cidade se encontram estes dois diferentes humores, disso decorre que o povo não deseja ser comandado nem oprimido e que os grandes desejam comandar e oprimir o povo. Destes dois apetites diversos nasce um dos três efeitos: ou um principado, ou uma república, ou a licença. O principado é engendrado ou pelo povo ou pelos grandes, conforme a ocasião favorecer uma ou outra parte. Os grandes, ao notarem que não podem resistir ao povo, começam a favorecer a reputação de um dentre eles, para transformá-lo em príncipe e poderem, sob sua sombra, desa455455 fogar o seu apetite. O povo, por não poder resistir aos grandes, também favorece a reputação de um cidadão e o faz príncipe para ser protegido pela sua autoridade. 2. Aquele que chega ao principado com a ajuda dos grandes se mantém com mais dificuldade do que aquele que se torna príncipe com a ajuda do povo, porque tem ao seu redor muitos cidadãos que pensam ser seus iguais, e, por isso, não os pode comandar nem governar a seu modo. Mas aquele que chega ao principado com o favor popular, se encontra sozinho e tem em torno de si ninguém ou pouquíssimos que não estejam prontos a obedecer. Além disso, não se pode honestamente satisfazer aos grandes sem injuriar os demais, mas ao povo sim é possível satisfazer, porque suas aspirações são mais honestas do que a dos grandes, uma vez que estes querem oprimir e aqueles não serem oprimidos. Ademais, um príncipe não pode jamais se defender do povo inimigo, por serem muitos, ao passo que, dos grandes é possível sim se defender, por serem poucos. O pior que pode esperar um príncipe do povo inimigo é ser abandonado por ele. Mas, dos grandes inimigos, não apenas se deve temer ser abandonado como também que eles o ataquem, porque, tendo eles mais visão e astúcia, sempre se previnem em tempo de se salvar e procuram os favores daqueles que esperam que prevaleça. É necessário ainda que o príncipe viva sempre com o mesmo povo, mas pode sim prescindir dos grandes, podendo fazê-los e desfazê-los todos os dias e tirar-lhes e conceder-lhes autoridade como bem queira. 4. Portanto, quem se torna príncipe pelo favor do povo deve mantê-lo amigo, o que é tarefa fácil, visto que apenas pede não ser oprimido. Mas, quem se torna príncipe com o favor dos grandes, e contra o povo, deve, antes de mais nada, procurar conquistá-lo, o que é fácil quando o coloca sob sua proteção. Pois, os homens, quando recebem o bem de quem esperavam o mal, vinculam-se mais rapidamente ao seu beneficiário, tornando-se ainda mais benevolentes do que se o tivessem conduzido ao principado com o seu próprio apoio. (...). Concluirei dizendo apenas que a um príncipe é necessário ter o povo como amigo, pois, de outro modo, não terá remédio na adversidade. (...). 456 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 456 mAquiAveL • o prínCipe XV – Das coisas pelas quais os homens, e especialmente os príncipes, são louvados ou vituperados 1. Resta agora examinar os modos e os comportamentos de um príncipe em relação aos súditos e aos amigos. Como eu sei que muitos escreveram sobre a questão, duvido que não seja tomado por presunçoso ao reexaminá-la, principalmente por partir, na discussão sobre esta matéria, de argumentos já apresentado por outros. Mas, como minha intenção foi a de escrever algo de útil a quem quiser ouvir, pareceu-me mais conveniente buscar a verdade efetiva15 das coisas do que aquilo que delas se imaginou. E muitos imaginaram repúblicas e principados que jamais foram vistos e que nem existiram de fato. Pois, é tão distante o modo como se vive do modo como se deveria viver que aquele que deixa aquilo que se faz por aquilo que se deveria fazer conhece antes a sua ruína do que a sua conservação, porque um homem que queira fazer profissão de bom é provável que se arruíne entre tantos que não são bons. Donde é necessário a um príncipe que queira se conservar aprender a não ser bom e disso se valer segundo a necessidade. 2. Deixando de lado, portanto, as coisas que sobre um príncipe foram imaginadas e discorrendo sobre aquelas que são verdadeiras, digo a este respeito que todos os homens, e principalmente os príncipes, por ocuparem as mais altas funções, são vistos por meio de certas qualidades, que lhe trazem desaprovação ou louvor. Isto é, alguns são tidos por liberais, outros por miseráveis (para usar um termo toscano, porque avaro em nossa língua é ainda aquele que por rapina deseja ter; nós usamos miserável em nossa língua para designar aquele que muito se abstém de usar as suas próprias coisas); alguns são tidos por pródigos, outros, por rapaces; alguns, por cruéis, outros, por piedosos; um, traidor, outro, fiel; um efeminado e pusilânime, outro feroz e animoso; um, humano, outro, soberbo; um, lascivo, outro, casto; um íntegro, outro, astuto; um, severo, outro, condescendente; um, grave, outro, fútil; um, religioso, ou15 Aqui está em questão um recurso metodológico de Maquiavel. Este recurso permite dar um uso ao pensamento diverso do tradicional e mais adequado aos problemas de ordem política. Valendo-se de tal instrumental, o autor estabelece uma reflexão que consegue retirar lições das circunstâncias e casos analisados, encontrando os seus elementos estruturantes. 457457 tro incrédulo; e assim por diante. Eu sei que muitos confessarão que seria algo bastante louvável a um príncipe ter, dentre todas as qualidades mencionadas, aquelas que são tidas como boas. Mas, como não é possível tê-las todas nem observá-las inteiramente, porque a condição humana não o permite, é necessário que saiba ser tão prudente de modo a evitar a infâmia dos vícios que o fariam perder o estado e guardar-se dos que não o levassem a perdê-lo, se lhe for possível. Se não, pode-se sem muita preocupação deixar-se levar. Não se preocupe também em incorrer na infâmia dos vícios sem os quais não se pode facilmente salvar o regime, porque, se tudo for bem considerado, encontraremos certas qualidades que parecem virtudes, mas que provocariam a sua ruína, se fossem observadas, ao passo que outras que pareciam vícios, mas, ao serem observadas, geram a sua segurança e o seu bem estar. XVIII – De que modo o príncipe deve observar a fé na palavra dada 1. Todos compreendem o quanto seja louvável a um príncipe manter a palavra dada e viver com integridade e não com astúcia. Contudo, pela experiência de nossos tempos, vê-se que certos príncipes realizaram coisas notáveis, mas tiveram em pouca conta a fé dada e souberam com astúcia manejar a cabeça dos homens. Superaram, enfim, aqueles que se apoiaram na sinceridade. 2. Deveis saber que existem dois gêneros de combate, quais sejam: um, com as leis, outro, com a força. Aquele primeiro é próprio do homem, o segundo, das bestas. Mas, como o primeiro muitas vezes não basta, convém recorrer ao segundo. Portanto, a um príncipe é necessário saber usar bem a besta e o homem. Os escritores antigos ensinaram veladamente esta matéria aos príncipes quando mostraram como Aquiles e muitos outros dos príncipes antigos ficaram aos cuidados do centauro Quíron, que os educava sob sua disciplina. Ter um preceptor meio homem meio besta não quer dizer nada mais senão que é necessário a um príncipe saber usar ambas as naturezas, pois, uma sem a outra não é durável. 3. Portanto, é necessário a um príncipe saber usar bem da besta, 458 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 458 mAquiAveL • o prínCipe levando em consideração a raposa e o leão, porque o leão não é capaz de se defender dos laços e a raposa não sabe se defender dos lobos. É necessário ser raposa para conhecer os laços e leão para amedrontar os lobos. Aqueles que se preocuparem apenas com a natureza do leão não compreenderão que um senhor prudente não pode nem deve observar a palavra dada quando esta voltar-se contra ele e quando as razões que o fizeram prometer desaparecerem. Se os homens fossem todos bons, este preceito não seria necessário. Como, porém, eles são maus e por isso não observarão a palavra dada em relação a ti, tu também não deves observar a palavra dada a eles. Ainda mais porque a um príncipe jamais faltaram razões legítimas para justificar a sua inobservância. (...). Mas é necessário saber bem colorir esta natureza e ser grande simulador e dissimulador, pois, os homens são tão simples e tanto obedecem às necessidades presentes que aquele que engana encontrará sempre quem se deixa enganar. 5. A um príncipe, portanto, não é necessário ter de fato todas as supramencionadas qualidades, mas é necessário parecer tê-las. Antes, ousarei dizer que tê-las todas e observá-las sempre é danoso, mas, aparentar tê-las é útil, como, por exemplo, parecer piedoso, fiel, humano, íntegro, religioso, e sê-lo, mas estar de tal modo predisposto que, precisando não sê-lo, possas e saibas se transformar no oposto. Deve-se compreender que um príncipe e sobretudo um príncipe novo não pode observar todas aquelas qualidades pelas quais os homens são chamados de bons, por frequentemente necessitar, para manter o estado, agir contra a fé, contra a caridade, contra a humanidade, contra a religião. É preciso, porém, que tenha um ânimo predisposto a mudar conforme os ventos da fortuna e as variações das coisas exigirem. E, como se disse acima, caso seja possível, não deve se afastar do bem, mas, se for necessário, deve saber praticar o mal. 6. Deve, então, um príncipe ter cuidado para jamais deixar escapar de sua boca coisas que não estejam plenas das sobreditas cinco qualidades (...). Pois, os homens em geral julgam mais com os olhos que com as mãos. Todos veem aquilo que tu aparentas, poucos sentem aquilo que tu és, e estes poucos não ousam se opor à opinião de muitos que têm o poder do regime para defendê-los. Nas ações de todos os homens, e prin459459 cipalmente na dos príncipes, por não haver juiz a quem recorrer, leva-se em conta o resultado final. 7. Um príncipe deve portanto conquistar e manter o estado. Os meios serão sempre julgados honrados e por todos serão louvados, porque o vulgo está atento às aparências e ao resultado final da ação. E no mundo não há senão o vulgo, e a minoria não terá lugar onde a maioria tem onde se apoiar. (...) XXV O quanto pode a fortuna nas coisas humanas e de que modo se lhe deve resistir 1. Não desconheço que muitos foram e são de opinião de que as coisas do mundo são de tal modo governadas pela fortuna e por Deus que os homens não podem corrigi-las com a sua prudência; dizem, além do mais, não haver nenhum remédio contra elas. Por isso, julgam que não se deve empenhar muito em tais coisas, mas deixar-se governar pela sorte. (...). Contudo, para que o nosso livre arbítrio não seja eliminado, parece ser verdade que a fortuna seja árbitra de metade de nossas ações, mas também que ela deixa a outra metade, ou quase, ser governada por nós. (...). De modo semelhante intervém a fortuna que mostra o seu poder onde não está ordenada nenhuma virtù que possa resistir-lhe. Então, volta seu ímpeto para onde sabe que não foram construídos diques nem defesas para contê-la. Se vós considerais a Itália, que é o lugar destas variações e a que lhes deu movimento, vereis ser um campo sem diques e sem defesas (...) mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção460 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 460 461461 A Alemanha do início do século XIX vivia um lento processo de transição do feudalismo para o capitalismo. Enquanto contemplava o desenvolvimento dos seus vizinhos, França e Inglaterra, que já haviam realizado suas revoluções burguesas, iniciado o processo de industrialização capitalista e, inclusive a crítica política a ele correspondente, a Alemanha não havia promovido sequer a sua unificação nacional. Dentre os diversos Estados que formavam a Alemanha, a Prússia era o mais influente e a Renânia, província que tinha como capital a cidade de Trier, era a mais avançada política e economicamente e, influenciada por um liberalismo de inspiração francesa fazia forte oposição ao regime monárquico vigente. karl heinrich mARx nasceu nesse contexto, em Trier, no dia 05 de Maio de 1818, filho de uma família judaica de classe média. Sua mãe chamava-se Enriqueta Pressburg e seu pai Hirschel Marx. Em 1824, por razões políticas, seu pai converteu-se ao cristianismo e mudou o nome para Heinrich. É provável que a decisão de abandonar o judaísmo tenha sido causada pelo preconceito contra os judeus na Alemanha e pelas consequentes dificuldades de empregabilidade, particularmente em cargos MARX e A FILOSOFIA COMO eMANCIpAçãO mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção462 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 462 públicos. Após a conversão, Heinrich Marx trabalhou como advogado e conselheiro de justiça. Marx tinha dezessete anos quando, por orientação do pai, foi estudar direito na Universidade de Bonn. Esse período foi marcado mais pelo romantismo e pela vida boêmia do que propriamente pelos estudos. Em 1836, o jovem Marx matricula-se na Universidade de Berlim, onde por quatro anos se dedicaria ao estudo da Filosofia e faria os primeiros contatos com o hegelianismo. Em abril de 1841, na Universidade de Iena, defende sua tese de doutorado, intitulada Sobre a diferença entre as filosofias da natureza de Demócrito e Epicuro. Nesse período, o posicionamento político e as críticas religiosas de Marx e dos jovens hegelianos1 não passavam despercebidos pelo governo prussiano. Bruno Bauer, filósofo promissor e amigo de Marx, foi acusado de ateísmo, perdeu a cátedra e a licença para lecionar na Universidade de Bonn. Esse episódio frustrou as expectativas de Marx em abraçar a carreira acadêmica. Como alternativa, o filósofo encontrou no jornalismo uma forma de expressão e resistência2. Durante toda a sua vida Marx conciliaria a produção filosófica com a atividade jornalística e a incansável militância política. Em 1843, casa-se com Jenny Von Westphalen, a bela jovem de origem aristocrática a quem Marx dedicara seus poemas juvenis e com quem viveria uma história de amor que superaria toda sorte de adversidades no âmbito pessoal, profissional e político. O casal teve seis filhos, dos quais três morreram prematuramente. As consequências dos enfrentamentos políticos marcaram de forma indelével a vida de Marx. Sua passagem pela direção da Gazeta 1 Termo que denomina o movimento dos jovens filósofos, discípulos de Hegel, que escreveram entre as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Os principais elementos constitutivos desse movimento foram o humanismo radical, a crítica à religião como fator de alienação e a crítica ao idealismo alemão. Seus principais nomes: Arnold Huge, Bruno Bauer, David Strauss, Karl Marx, Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx Stirner e Moses Hess. 2 Marx foi editor da Gazeta Renana, um jornal liberal de oposição ao regime prussiano. Fundado em 1841 por industriais de Colônia, o jornal foi fechado pelo governo em 1843. 463463 Renana e o teor dos seus artigos, despertaram a ira da monarquia. Perseguido pelo regime, deixa a Alemanha e segue rumo a Paris, onde dirige os Anais franco-alemães3. É expulso da França, a pedido do governo prussiano. Muda-se para Bruxelas, onde escreve as Teses contra Feuerbach e, com Engels escreve a Ideologia Alemã, organiza e participa de diversas associações políticas4. Expulso da Bélgica exila-se em Londres onde, apesar das dificuldades financeiras e problemas de saúde, continuaria a pesquisar, escrever5 e participar ativamente da vida política. Karl Marx morreu em Londres em 14 de Março de 1883. Seu amigo Engels, no discurso de despedida, proferido para as poucas pessoas presentes no cemitério de Highgate, anteciparia a história com a frase: Seu nome atravessará os séculos, bem como sua obra! Quando o jovem Marx escreveu seus primeiros textos, o pensamento de Hegel era o mais poderoso sistema filosófico da Alemanha, uma espécie de pensamento oficial e, particularmente em Berlim, diversas correntes disputavam a sua melhor interpretação. Não é exagero afirmar que, no campo da política, a filosofia de Hegel sustentava tanto as concepções de conservadores – a chamada direita hegeliana, como de progressistas – a chamada esquerda hegeliana. Para a direita hegeliana, a monarquia de Frederico Guilherme III e posteriormente do seu filho, Guilherme IV, representava o verdadeiro Estado hegeliano, e embora reconhecendo o caráter retrógrado que os mantinha, de certa forma, atrelados à Idade Média, valorizava sua capacidade de harmonizar as partes (interesses dos cidadãos) com a totalidade (princípios do Estado), garantindo dessa forma, a manutenção dos seus interesses. 3 Publicado em parceria com Arnold Ruge em fevereiro de 1844. Neste volume Marx publicou dois artigos: A questão Judaica e Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel – Introdução (publicado nesta Antologia). 4 Comitê de Correspondência da Liga dos Justos (rede internacional de correspondentes comunistas); Liga dos Justos; Associação Democrática. 5 Entre outras obras – O Dezoito Brumário de Luís Bonaparte; Os Grundrisse; Contribuição à Crítica da Economia Política; O Capital; A Guerra Civil na França; Crítica ao programa de Gotha. mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção464 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 464 Por sua vez, os jovens intelectuais da esquerda hegeliana, dentre os quais figurava Marx, reconheciam um princípio revolucionário na matriz historicista do pensamento político de Hegel, mas dele faziam uma leitura iluminista à francesa, inspirados basicamente no socialismo utópico de Saint-Simon. Os jovens filósofos consideravam que um Estado (hegeliano) que se pretendia racional e absoluto, não poderia permanecer na perspectiva do idealismo e tampouco admitir em seu fundamento a religião, interpretada por eles como fator de alienação, dominação e estagnação, o que só favorecia aos interesses do governo prussiano. Decepcionados também com a tendência conservadora e repressora, confirmada pelo novo governo de Guilherme IV, os jovens hegelianos de esquerda6, imbuídos de ideais revolucionários e de certa maneira, próximos das teses centrais do republicanismo7, assumem a tarefa de radicalizar a oposição política ao Estado monárquico e fazer oposição filosófica ao idealismo alemão. Eles deixaram um legado de contribuições muito significativas 6 Julgamos importante compreender, ainda que de forma introdutória, as relações intelectuais e esfera de influências do jovem Marx. Por isso, apresentamos um breve panorama da produção intelectual do círculo dos jovens hegelianos de esquerda, com a finalidade de mostrar a tendência de crítica com pretensões revolucionárias à época: Arnold Huge dirigia um periódico de oposição aos hegelianos conservadores Anais de Halle; Bruno Bauer publicou A trombeta do juízo final, uma ironia à fé cristã; David Strauss escreveu A vida de Jesus, uma biografia de características antropológicas que visava a desmistificação da vida de Jesus; Moses Hess que foi o primeiro a postular uma filosofia da práxis e a discutir a questão da propriedade, escreveu A história sagrada da humanidade e A essência do dinheiro; Ludwig Feuerbach, professor na Universidade de Berlim, escreveu A essência do Cristianismo, uma obra de grande impacto que exerceu grande influência sobre o círculo dos jovens hegelianos de esquerda e particularmente sobre Karl Marx. 7 Daniel Brudney (in: BRUDNEY, D. Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998.) escreve que a temática comum aos jovens hegelianos de esquerda é o reconhecimento da existência de instituições incompatíveis com o bem comum, e que, portanto, precisam ser mudadas dentre elas, as filosofias de matrizes cartesianas, que para Feuerbach e Marx produzem questões por demais abstratas e inúteis; outra instituição criticada por Feuerbach, Bauer e Marx é a religião. Warren Breckman (in: BRECKMAN, W. Marx, the young Hegelians, and the origins of radical social theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999.) se propôs investigar um comunismo espinosista presente em Moses Hess, um saint-simonismo em Feuerbach, a democracia radical de Ruge e um certo republicanismo de Marx. 465465 para as discussões contemporâneas da filosofia política e, apesar de trajetórias intelectuais consideravelmente diferentes, tinham em comum os eixos balizadores do seu pensamento: a crítica à teologia, ao idealismo e à filosofia especulativa, à ideia de soberania transcendental como mistificadora da política; o repúdio ao liberalismo e à acomodação dos hegelianos de direita face à monarquia absolutista. Os textos filosófico-jornalísticos de 1842 apresentam uma espécie de utopia do Estado racional hegeliano, e Marx se vale da imprensa − entendida por ele naquele momento, como sendo potencialmente uma espécie de ágora8 da modernidade − para criticar a monarquia prussiana, com o objetivo de promover transformações estruturais no papel do Estado, reorientando-o para se configurar como a instituição promotora da emancipação política e da emancipação humana, contra as arbitrariedades governamentais e contra a dominação exercida pela teologia-política. A ideia hegeliana de liberdade, traduzida como a esfera dos interesses públicos, enraizada na consciência subjetiva e na ação dos cidadãos, por meio das instituições e estruturas políticas, é muito forte no pensamento de Marx nesse período. Em 1843 Marx vivencia a chamada crise de Kreuznach9, quando desiludido com a censura e perseguição promovida pelo governo prussiano, percebe que a emancipação humana não poderia se realizar por meio do Estado, pois este teria sido concebido a partir de uma espécie de mistificação teológica, que acabava por acomodar os graves problemas sociais provocados pelo capitalismo, e que inviabilizavam a cidadania e o desenvolvimento de projetos políticos voltados ao bem comum, na medida em que os interesses privados constituíam o fundamento das instituições políticas. 8 Lugar de reunião; praça pública; espaço onde aconteciam assembleias populares. Em Atenas era também o espaço onde estavam localizadas as instituições políticas. 9 O jovem Marx passa sua lua de mel na cidade de Kreuznach, onde faz uma profunda reflexão que o levaria ao abandono da utopia jovem-hegeliana da emancipação política pela via da construção do Estado racional, de origem burguesa. Marx reorienta e amplia o seu conceito para uma emancipação humana universal, com base em uma democracia radical, também chamada por ele de verdadeira democracia e que teria em sua base o proletariado. mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção466 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 466 Nessa época, Marx defende a democracia radical10 e inicia um processo ruptura com a filosofia política hegeliana. Marx compreende que o hegelianismo político promove uma importante crítica ao individualismo egoísta e ao liberalismo vicejantes nas sociedades europeias modernas. O jovem filósofo aproxima-se da tese hegeliana da conciliação entre os interesses privados e os interesses públicos. Porém, se para Hegel essa conciliação só seria possível pela mediação coativa do Estado, para o jovem Marx, adepto da democracia radical, o espaço da cidadania ativa seria imprescindível. Marx e Hegel têm em comum a crítica à exacerbação do individualismo egoísta moderno, bem como das suas consequências, porém discordam quanto às possibilidades de solução da questão. Um dos elementos fundamentais desse debate é a questão da soberania política. Para Hegel − a soberania do Estado, para Marx − a soberania do povo. No famoso texto denominado Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia de Hegel Introdução11, Marx atribui à filosofia um papel de crítica ao Estado não democrático e à religião, concebidos por ele como fontes de alienação e argumenta que a tarefa da filosofia12 seria fundamentar uma prática 10 Fases do pensamento do jovem Marx: I) Democracia radical – basicamente através de intervenções jornalísticas de cunho teórico e político, Marx se insurge contra a monarquia prussiana e trabalha pela construção de um Estado de direito na Prússia, defendendo a ampliação do direito de participação popular – uma espécie de democracia radical, cuja origem se fundamenta numa concepção jusnaturalista que situa a origem da liberdade de consciência, de pensamento e de ação na experiência da razão, que seria anterior a qualquer ordenação jurídica. II) Humanismo feuerbachiano, alienação e emancipação humana – já iniciada a sua parceria com Engels, Marxs não apenas rompe com o idealismo dos jovens hegelianos de esquerda, mas passa a criticá-lo de forma implacável e, sob a influência feuerbachiana utiliza a ideia de alienação religiosa estendendo-a aos domínios e às questões econômico-sociais, esse caminho o conduziria à "descoberta do proletariado como agente da emancipação humana". III) Materialismo histórico e comunismo – Marx se distancia do humanismo feuerbachiano e passa a investigar as ideias de ideologia, de trabalho alienado e das forças produtivas do capital como determinantes do processo histórico concebendo a supressão da propriedade privada como fundamento necessário para a verdadeira emancipação humana. 11 Texto publicado em 1844 nos Anais franco-alemães. Selecionado e traduzido especialmente para esta edição. 12 "É tarefa primeira da Filosofia, que se coloca a serviço da história, desmascarar a autoalienação humana nas suas formas não sagradas, agora que ela já foi desmascarada 467467 emancipadora contra todas as formas de dominação. Segundo Marx, a sociedade moderna, sob o domínio das forças cegas da religião, da economia e da política, move-se pela roda da fortuna, escapando do controle e da intervenção virtuosa do homem. Esse processo tem seu fundamento na alienação do homem em relação a si mesmo, em relação ao seu trabalho e por meio dele, bem como em relação à vida política. A influência da teoria da alienação desenvolvida por Feuerbach13 foi determinante no pensamento de Marx, ainda que esta estivesse muito mais vinculada a uma filosofia da religião do que propriamente a uma filosofia política. Marx compreendeu o valor e o alcance das ideias de Feuerbach, mas também criticou seus limites14, de forma que incorporou sua crítica religiosa, reinterpretando-a no âmbito mais amplo da dimensão política. Na famosa passagem "A miséria religiosa é, em si, a expressão da miséria real e, também, o protesto contra a miséria real. A religião é o suspiro da criatura oprimida, o ânimo de um mundo desumano, assim como ela é o espírito de situações desalmadas. Ela é o ópio do povo."15, em sua forma sagrada. A crítica dos céus se transformou, com isso, na crítica da terra, a crítica da Religião na crítica do Direito, a crítica da Teologia na crítica da Política".(MARX, K. Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel – Introdução. Ver tradução nesta edição. p. 475. ) 13 Para Feuerbach, o verdadeiro fundamento do homem é tão-somente ele mesmo. Assim, o único fundamento absoluto de todo o pensamento humano é o homem como razão, como vontade, como coração. Neste sentido, ele argumenta que Deus é o homem que alienou a sua consciência e, portanto, a superação dessa condição de dominação tem como pressuposto a tomada de consciência da sua própria condição humana. A essência de Deus é, portanto, o próprio homem. Logo, se Deus é a divindade e a essência da liberdade absoluta, só o é porque o homem também é divino e livre, ou porque pretende sê-lo. Alienado e enfraquecido o homem, a religião se constitui num meio, através do qual ele pode projetar a realização dos seus sonhos de liberdade na totalidade absoluta de Deus. Como diz Feuerbach em a Essência do Cristianismo - "na religião, o homem quer satisfazer-se em Deus." No entanto, o preço dessa conquista se revela na cisão entre o homem e a sua consciência de si, a alienação da sua essência humana. 14 Para aprofundamento da filosofia de Feuerbach, consultar: FEUERBACH, L. A essência do cristianismo. Apresentação e tradução de Adriana Veríssimo Serrão. 2 ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2002; FEUERBACH, L. Teses provisórias para a reforma da filosofia. In: _____. Princípios da Filosofia do Futuro e outros escritos. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 2002. 15 MARX, K. Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel – Introdução. Ver tradução nesta edição. p. 475. mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção468 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 468 Marx deixa bem claro que sua crítica à religião tem como fundamento a questão social e política. Para o filósofo, a religião só pode ser o ópio do povo numa sociedade opressora e desprovida da alma cidadã. Marx reconhece a pretensão feuerbachiana de superação do idealismo alemão, particularmente do hegelianismo, no entanto, denuncia que Feuerbach permaneceu preso à especulação teórica e, portanto, distante da dimensão da práxis. Para Marx, Feuerbach parece não se dar conta de que ao elevar o homem à condição de fundamento do Estado, precisaria desenvolver outros aspectos conceituais, muitos dos quais o próprio Hegel já havia abordado, e que também haviam sido tratados pela tradição humanista e republicana. A crítica de Marx ao Estado se dirige, sobretudo, ao formalismo jurídico que transfigura o próprio papel do Estado, de espaço da promoção do bem público em instrumento de garantia de interesses privados. A sua objeção é que esse formalismo estatal que se apresenta, aliás, como meio de emancipação política, não passa de uma ilusão, porque mantém o indivíduo alienado e não promove a esfera pública e a cidadania. A partir de 1844 as questões econômicas ganham força e importância na filosofia política de Marx. A economia é compreendida como um meio e jamais como um fim e, portanto, suas demandas devem ser superadas através do trabalho humano, e mais, que o reino da necessidade econômica deve estar subordinado ao reino da liberdade (vida política), porque este sim, por ser capaz de oferecer as condições para a criação de uma existência humana digna e livre, deve ser considerado como uma finalidade. Marx sabe que somente pela subordinação da economia − espaço dos interesses privados − à política – espaço dos interesses comuns − é que os homens criariam as condições para o exercício da verdadeira política e para a consequente emancipação humana. Na medida em que a sociedade burguesa inverte essas funções, atrelando a política à economia, subordinando o reino da liberdade ao reino da necessidade, acaba por anular a força emancipadora da política. 469469 Considerando as formas de alienação e dominação religiosa, política e econômica, pode-se dizer que a questão nuclear da filosofia política do jovem Marx é a emancipação humana, e que a consolidação dessa matriz do seu pensamento apresenta como novidade radical a exigência de que tal busca aconteça, concomitantemente, no plano das criações conceituais e da ação política transformadora. Essa perspectiva radical se evidencia quando Marx escreve que "não se pode superar a filosofia sem realizá-la".16 Ora, não se trata de apenas fazer a crítica à filosofia especulativa, como haviam feito os jovens hegelianos, ou mesmo de desprezar a importância da teoria, mas sim de propor uma filosofia da imanência, comprometida com a história e que esteja ao alcance do proletariado, como uma possibilidade básica e determinante da emancipação humana. Nas palavras do próprio Marx, "a cabeça dessa emancipação é a filosofia, seu coração o proletariado. A filosofia não pode se realizar sem a ascensão do proletariado, o proletariado não pode se elevar sem a realização da filosofia."17 A liberdade humana, tal qual propõe Marx, incorpora o pensamento, a ação e a produção. É a liberdade que, compreendendo o indivíduo enquanto ser-comunitário (gattungswesen), se efetiva na comunidade política mediante a luta contra os mecanismos de dominação e alienação da liberdade humana, aderente à condição do indivíduo como ser social. A restrição que Marx faz ao Estado de direito burguês, enquanto abstração da condição básica da sociabilidade humana atrelada à imediatidade do viver-junto dos homens, é que este Estado acaba, por força da sua estrutura burocratizante e do seu páthos18 jurídico, representando os interesses de uma parcela da sociedade e, nessa medida, é impotente para garantir as finalidades maiores e universais da coletividade. Pelo 16 MARX, K. Sobre a Crítica da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel – Introdução. Ver tradução nesta edição. p. 481. 17 Ibidem, p. 489. 18 Acontecimento, experiência, sofrimento, emoção, atributo. In: PETERS, F.E. Termos Filosóficos Gregos.Um léxico histórico. Tradução de Beatriz Rodrigues Barbosa. 4. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1974. mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção470 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 470 contrário, ele se constitui em fator de alienação e de dominação, mediante a "astúcia" política da representação ideológica de interesses particulares. Ora, é este Estado que se extinguiria face à democracia radical (na crítica de 1843) e depois face ao comunismo (a partir dos textos de 1844), cuja implementação só se daria a partir de uma ruptura com as formas materiais e econômicas da forma capitalista de produção, mediante uma revolução social. A existência efetiva da res publica19 no pensamento político de Marx, pressupõe como condição para a vida ética a superação da cisão entre o indivíduo e a espécie, entre o bourgeois e o citoyen20. Tal divisão, segundo Marx, favorece e até determina a dominação das forças egoístas, provenientes ou dos interesses puramente privados da sociedade civil que alienam os indivíduos da sua essência comunitária, ou a partir da dominação que se efetiva através da ação do Estado abstrato21. Para Marx, não há liberdade sob a dominação das forças egoístas da sociedade civil, ou do Estado que incorpora simbolicamente os indivíduos, mas que na verdade os exclui da vida política subtraindo-lhes a soberania. É 19 Coisa pública. 20 Os termos franceses bourgeois e citoyen são utilizados por Marx em A questão judaica (texto escrito no outono de 1843 e publicado em 1844, nos Anais franco-alemães), na passagem em que trata da diferença entre direitos do homem e direitos do cidadão, entre sociedade civil e comunidade política. Bourgeois é o homem egoísta, confinado a si próprio e separado da vida em comunidade, mero membro da sociedade civil, voltado exclusivamente aos interesses privados e caprichos pessoais. "O homem está longe de ser considerado, nos direitos do homem como ser genérico; pelo contrário, a própria vida genérica – a sociedade – surge como sistema que é externo ao indivíduo, como limitação da sua independência original. O único laço que os une é a necessidade natural, a carência e o interesse privado, a preservação da sua propriedade e das suas pessoas egoístas". MARX, K. A questão Judaica. In: _____. Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1993. p. 58. Citoyen é o homem pleno, o homem verdadeiro e autêntico, é o homem que constitui sua identidade e fortalece sua subjetividade enquanto membro da comunidade política; é o cidadão que transcende o indivíduo. "A emancipação humana só será plena quando o homem real e individual tiver em si o cidadão abstrato; quando como homem individual, na sua vida empírica, no trabalho e nas relações individuais, se tiver tornado um ser genérico; e quando tiver reconhecido e organizado as suas próprias forças (forces propres) como forças sociais, de maneira a nunca mais separar de si esta força social como força política." MARX, K. A questão Judaica. In: _____. Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos.Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1993. p. 63. 21 O Estado moderno, como uma exterioridade que está para além da sociedade, e que se afirma de forma coercitiva sobre ela, para legitimá-la e controlá-la. 471471 justamente a superação dessa condição de perda da liberdade pela dominação que Marx chama de emancipação humana. Se considerarmos que a sociedade contemporânea encontra-se muito distante dos ideais de liberdade individual e política, que se propagam quase que tão somente por meio de discursos edificantes que não encontram correspondência na realidade, justamente porque tal sociedade permanece submetida às estruturas de dominação do capitalismo e do formalismo arbitrário do estado de direito burguês, podemos concluir que, a filosofia de Marx, tanto nos textos da juventude como nos da maturidade, se interpretada de forma crítica e, portanto, não dogmática, pode oferecer alternativas profícuas à filosofia política. Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de marx (textos da juventude), traduzidos Para o Português MARX, C. Obras Fundamentales: Escritos de Juventude. Traducción de Wenceslau Roces. México: Fondo de Cultura Econômica, 1982. v.1. MARX, K. A Liberdade de imprensa. Tradução de Claudia Schilling e José Fonseca. Porto Alegre: L&PM, 2001. MARX, K. A questão Judaica. In: _____. Manuscritos econômico-filosóficos. Tradução de Artur Morão. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1993. MARX, K. Crítica de Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Tradução de Rubens Enderle e Leonardo de Deus; supervisão e notas Marcelo Backes. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2005. MARX, K. Manuscritos econômicos-filosóficos. Tradução e notas de Jesus Ranieri. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2004. MARX, K. Teses sobre Feuerbach. In:_____. A Ideologia Alemã. Supervisão editorial de Leandro Konder. Tradução de Rubens Ederle, Nélio Schneider, Luciano Cavini Martorano. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007. PrinciPais obras de marx e engels traduzidas Para o Português MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. A Ideologia Alemã. Supervisão Editorial de Leandro Konder. Tradução de Rubens Ederle, Nélio Schneider, Luciano Cavini Martorano. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2007. mArx e A FilosoFiA como emAncipAção472 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 472 MARX, K.; ENGEL, F. A Sagrada família. Tradução de Marcelo Backes. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2003. MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. Manisfesto Comunista. Tradução de Álvaro Pina. São Paulo: Boitempo, 1998. MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. Obras Escolhidas, São Paulo: Alfa-omega, 1985. 3 v. obras sobre marx ABENSOUR, M. A Democracia contra o Estado: Marx e o momento Maquiaveliano. Tradução de Cleonice P. B. Mourão; Consuelo F. Santiago; Eunice D. Galèry. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 1998. ARON, R. O Marxismo de Marx. Tradução de Jorge Bastos. São Paulo: Arx, 2003. BICCA, L. Marxismo e Liberdade. São Paulo: Loyola, 1987. BRECKMAN, W. Marx, the young Hegelians, and the origins of radical social theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1999. BRUDNEY, D. Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998. BOTTOMORE, T. (ed.) Dicionário do pensamento marxista. Tradução de Waltensir Dutra. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1988. EAGLETON, T. Marx e a liberdade. Tradução de Marcos B. de Oliveira. São Paulo: UNESP, 1999. FAUSTO, R. Marx: Lógica e Política. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1983. t. 1. ___. Lógica e Política: Investigações para uma reconstituição do sentido da dialética. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987. t. 2. ___. Marx: Lógica e Política: Investigações para uma reconstituição do sentido da dialética. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2002. t. 3. GIANOTTI, J. A. Marx: vida & obra. Porto Alegre: L& PM, 2001. KONDER, L. Marx: vida e obra. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1999. LOSURDO, D. Hegel, Marx e a tradição liberal: Liberdade, igualdade e Estado. Tradução de Carlos A. F. N. Dastoli; revisão técnica Marco Aurélio Nogueira. São Paulo: UNESP, 1998. KONDER, L; CERQUEIRA FILHO, G.; FIGUEIREDO, E. de L. (Orgs.). Por que Marx? Rio de Janeiro: Graal, 1983. 473473 RANIEIRI, J. A Câmara escura: Alienação e estranhamento em Marx. São Paulo: Boitempo, 2001. WHEEN, F. Karl Marx. Tradução de Vera Ribeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001. sites de referência: http://www.marxists.org/portugues/marx/index.htm http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ 474 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 474 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel SOBRe A CRÍtICA DA FILOSOFIA DO DIReItO De HeGeL. INtRODuçãO. 1 Na Alemanha, está praticamente encerrada a crítica da religião, e a crítica da religião é o pressuposto de toda crítica. A existência profana do erro está comprometida após ter sido contestada sua oratio pro aris et focis divina2. O homem que procurou na fantástica realidade dos céus um super-homem e encontrou somente o reflexo de si mesmo, não tenderá mais a encontrar somente a sua própria aparência, somente o não humano, onde ele procura e deve procurar sua realidade. O fundamento da crítica não religiosa é: o homem faz a religião, a religião não faz o homem. Embora a religião seja a autoconsciência e o autossentimento do humano ainda não conquistado ou que já foi perdido, o homem não é um ser abstrato, acocorado fora do mundo. O homem, este é o mundo do homem, o Estado, a Sociedade. Esse Estado, essa sociedade produzem a religião, uma consciência invertida do mundo, porque eles são um mundo invertido. A religião é a teoria geral desse mundo, seu com1 O texto Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosofie. Einleitung foi escrito por Karl Marx em fins de 1843 e Janeiro de 1844 e publicado no Deutsch-Französische Jahrbucher, Paris, 1844. O texto foi traduzido a partir do original alemão publicado em MARX, Karl; ENGELS, Friedrich. Werke. Berlim Oriental: (Karl) Dietz, 1976.v. 1, p. 378-391. 2 Oração para altar e fogão. 475475 pêndio enciclopédico, sua lógica na forma popular, seu point-d'honneur3 espiritualista, seu entusiasmo, sua sanção moral, seu complemento festivo, seu fundamento geral de consolação e justificação. Ela é a realização fantástica do ser humano, porque o ser humano não possui uma realidade autêntica. A luta contra a religião é, portanto, indiretamente a luta contra esse mundo cujo aroma espiritual é a religião. A miséria religiosa é, em si, a expressão da miséria real e, também, o protesto contra a miséria real. A religião é o suspiro da criatura oprimida, o ânimo de um mundo desumano, assim como ela é o espírito de situações desalmadas. Ela é o ópio do povo. A abolição da religião enquanto felicidade ilusória do povo é a exigência de sua real felicidade. A exigência de abandonar as ilusões sobre uma situação é a exigência de abandonar uma situação que necessita de ilusões. A crítica da religião é, portanto, no cerne a crítica do vale de lágrimas que a religião envolve numa auréola de santidade. A crítica desfolhou as flores imaginárias dos grilhões, não para que o homem os suporte sem qualquer fantasias ou consolo, mas para que se liberte deles e apanhe a flor viva. A crítica da religião liberta o homem da ilusão para que ele pense, aja e configure sua realidade como alguém que reconquistou a razão e se movimenta em torno de si mesmo e de seu verdadeiro sol. A religião é somente o sol ilusório que se move em torno do homem enquanto ele não se movimenta em torno de si mesmo. Após, portanto, o desaparecimento da crença no além da verdade (Jenseits der Wahrheit), é tarefa da história estabelecer a verdade daquilo que nos circunda (die Wahrheit des Dieseits). É tarefa primeira da Filosofia, que se coloca a serviço da história, desmascarar a autoalienação humana nas suas formas não sagradas, agora que ela já foi desmascarada em sua forma sagrada. A crítica dos céus se transformou, com isso, na crítica da terra, a crítica da Religião na crítica do Direito, a crítica da Teologia na crítica da Política. A exposição seguinte – uma contribuição a semelhante empreendimento – não se prende diretamente ao original, senão a uma cópia des3 Ponto de honra. 476 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 476 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel te, à filosofia alemã do Estado e do Direito, pelo simples fato de se ater à Alemanha. Se nós quiséssemos nos ater ao status quo alemão, mesmo que de forma singularmente mais adequada, ou seja, negativa, o resultado sempre permaneceria um anacronismo. A própria negação de nossa atualidade política já é um fato empoeirado na despensa histórica dos povos modernos. Ainda que nos recusemos a recolher estes materiais empoeirados, continuaremos conservando os materiais sem poeira. Ao negar a situação alemã de 1843, apenas nos situaremos, segundo a cronologia francesa, no ano de 1789, e ainda menos no foco da atualidade. A história alemã, de fato, orgulha-se de um movimento que nenhum outro povo anteriormente realizou ou virá a realizar. Compartilhamos as restaurações dos povos modernos sem compartilhar suas revoluções. Fomos restaurados, primeiramente, porque outros povos ousaram uma revolução, e segundo, porque outros povos sofreram uma contrarrevolução. Uma vez porque nossos líderes tiveram medo, e a outra, porque nossos líderes não tiveram medo. Tendo à frente nossos pastores, nos encontramos somente uma vez na sociedade da liberdade, no dia de seu sepultamento. Uma escola que legitima a infâmia de hoje com a infâmia de ontem; uma escola que declara como rebelde cada grito do servo contra o castigo (Knut), desde que este seja venerável pela idade, seja ancestral e histórico; uma escola que mostra a história a posteriori, assim como o Deus de Israel a mostrou ao seu servo Moisés; a Escola Histórica do Direito teria inventado a história alemã se não fosse, ela mesma, uma invenção dessa própria história. Um Shylock, mas um Shylock servil, que para cada libra de carne cortada dos corações do povo, jura por sua escritura, por seus títulos históricos, por seus títulos cristão-germânicos. Por outro lado, entusiastas benevolentes, germânicos de sangue e liberais por reflexão, procuram nossa história de liberdade além de nossa história, nas florestas virgens teutônicas. Mas em que se distingue nossa história de liberdade da história de liberdade do javali, se ela só pode ser encontrada nas florestas? Como se sabe, à medida que se adentra a mata, 477477 esta ecoa para fora. Portanto, paz às matas virgens teutônicas! Guerra às condições sociais alemãs! Por todos os meios! Elas se colocam abaixo do nível da história, estão abaixo de qualquer crítica, mas permanecem objeto da crítica, como o criminoso que se coloca abaixo do nível da humanidade e permanece um objeto do carrasco. Na luta contra esta situação, a crítica não é paixão da cabeça, mas a cabeça da paixão. Ela não é uma faca anatômica, mas uma arma. Seu objeto é seu inimigo, que ela não quer refutar, mas destruir, pois o espírito daquelas condições já foi refutado. Não constitui em si e por si um objeto digno do nosso pensamento; é uma existência tão desprezível como desprezada. A crítica em si não necessita do autoentendimento desse objeto, pois ela já o resolveu. A crítica não se coloca mais como fim em si mesma, mas somente como meio. Seu páthos4 essencial é a indignação, sua tarefa principal a denúncia. Vale a descrição de uma sufocante pressão recíproca de todas as esferas sociais umas sobre as outras, de uma dissonância geral, imprudente, de uma limitação tanto reconhecida como desconhecida, inserida no âmbito de um sistema de governo que, vivendo da conservação de toda mesquinhez, nada mais é do que a mesquinhez no governo. Que cenário! A contínua e eterna divisão da sociedade nas mais diferenciadas raças, que se confrontam umas às outras com pequenas antipatias, más intenções e brutal mediocridade; que precisamente em razão da posição recíproca ambígua e desconfiada, são tratadas sem distinção, ainda que com diferentes formalidades, como existências outorgadas por seus senhores. E mesmo isso, o fato de serem dominadas, governadas e possuídas, elas têm que reconhecer e professar como concessão dos céus! Por outro lado, aqueles próprios governantes, cuja grandeza se coloca em relação inversa ao seu número! A crítica que se ocupa desse conteúdo é a crítica na peleja, e na peleja não se trata de o opositor ser um opositor nobre, de igual valor e interessante, trata-se de atingi-lo. Trata-se de não conceder ao alemão 4 Acontecimento, experiência, sofrimento, emoção, atributo. In: PETERS, F.E. Termos Filosóficos Gregos: Um léxico histórico. Tradução de Beatriz Rodrigues Barbosa. 4. ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1974. 478 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 478 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel qualquer momento de autoilusão e de resignação. Há que se tornar a pressão real ainda mais premente ao acrescer-lhe a consciência dessa pressão, tornar a vergonha ainda mais vergonhosa tornando-a pública. Há que se representar cada esfera da sociedade alemã como a partie honteuse5 da sociedade alemã, há que obrigar essas relações petrificadas à dança cantando-lhes sua própria melodia! Há que se ensinar o povo a assombrar-se diante de si mesmo para lhe dar courage. Assim se preenche uma necessidade imperiosa do povo alemão, e as necessidades dos povos são, na própria pessoa, os últimos fundamentos de sua libertação. E mesmo para os povos modernos essa luta contra o conteúdo limitado do status quo alemão não pode ser sem interesse, pois o status quo alemão é a completude sincera do ancien régime6, e o ancien régime é a debilidade oculta do Estado moderno. A luta contra a atualidade política alemã é a luta contra o passado dos povos modernos, que ainda se veem incomodados pelas reminiscências desse passado. Para eles é instrutivo ver o ancien régime, que na história representou uma tragédia, desempenhar um papel cômico como fantasma alemão. Trágica foi sua história enquanto poder pré-existente do mundo; a liberdade, ao contrário, foi uma ideia pessoal, a bem dizer, enquanto acreditou ou tinha que acreditar na sua justificativa. Enquanto o ancien régime, como ordem mundial existente, lutava contra um mundo que se formava a partir de então, ao seu lado havia um engano histórico mundial, mas não pessoal. Razão pela qual seu declínio foi trágico. O regime alemão atual, ao contrário, um anacronismo, uma contradição flagrante contra os axiomas geralmente reconhecidos, a nulidade do ancien régime exposta ao mundo, somente imagina crer em si mesmo e exige do mundo a mesma ilusão. Acreditando no seu próprio ser, iria o mesmo se esconder sob a aparência de um ser estranho e procurar sua salvação na hipocrisia e no sofisma? O ancien régime moderno é somente o comediante de uma ordem mundial cujos reais heróis já faleceram. A história é fundamental e passa por várias fases ao levar ao túmulo uma 5 A mácula. 6 Termo francês que designa o antigo o regime aristocrático estabelecido entre os séculos XIV e XVIII. 479479 velha imagem. A última fase de uma imagem histórica mundial é sua comédia. Os deuses da Grécia, que já uma vez estavam, de forma trágica, feridos mortalmente no Prometeu agrilhoado de Ésquilo, tiveram que morrer mais uma vez comicamente nos diálogos de Luciano. Por que esse rumo da história? Para que a humanidade se despeça hilariamente de seu passado. Reivindicamos dos poderes políticos da Alemanha essa hilária determinação histórica. Entretanto, logo que a própria realidade político-social moderna se submeteu à crítica, portanto, logo que a crítica ascendeu a problemas verdadeiramente humanos, ela se coloca além do status quo alemão, do contrário ela apanharia seu objeto abaixo de seu objeto. Um exemplo! A relação da indústria, o mundo da riqueza em geral, com o mundo político é um dos problemas cruciais da era moderna. Sob que forma esse problema começa a ocupar os alemães? Sob a forma do protecionismo alfandegário, do sistema proibitivo, da economia nacional. O germanismo partiu do homem para entrar na matéria, e assim, numa manhã, nossos cavaleiros algodoeiros e heróis férreos se viram transformados em patriotas. Começa-se então a reconhecer internamente, na Alemanha, a soberania do monopólio conferindo-lhe, externamente, a soberania. Começa-se, portanto, na Alemanha, aquilo que na França e na Inglaterra já se está prestes a terminar. A ordem antiga e indolente, contra a qual esses países teoricamente se revoltam e que apenas suportam como se suportam grilhões, é saudada na Alemanha como a aurora de um futuro glorioso que, até agora, a muito custo ousa mover-se de uma teoria astuta (Listig)7 para uma prática implacável. Enquanto na França e na Inglaterra o problema é: Economia política ou domínio da sociedade sobre a riqueza, na Alemanha se tem: Economia nacional ou domínio da propriedade privada sobre a nacionalidade. Na França e na Inglaterra há, portanto, que se abandonar o monopólio até suas últimas consequências; na Alemanha há que se prosseguir com eles até as últimas consequências. Lá se trata da solução, e aqui, de própria contradição. A partir disso tem-se exemplo suficiente de como se apresentam os problemas modernos na forma alemã, de como a nossa 7 Marx realiza aqui um jogo de palavras com o nome do economista alemão Georg Friedrich List (1789-1846), teórico do protecionismo econômico em nome dos interesses nacionais. 480 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 480 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel história, semelhante a um recruta desastrado, não faz outra coisa senão repetir exercícios já realizados. Se todo o desenvolvimento alemão não fosse além do desenvolvimento político alemão um cidadão alemão poderia, no máximo, participar dos problemas da atualidade, assim como um russo pode participar. Se o indivíduo isolado não está vinculado aos limites da nação, toda a nação está ainda menos liberta por meio da libertação do indivíduo. Os citas8 não deram nenhum passo adiante em direção à cultura grega pelo fato de a Grécia incluir um cita entre seus filósofos. Por sorte nós alemães não somos citas. Assim como os antigos povos vivenciaram sua pré-história na imaginação, na mitologia, nós alemães vivenciamos nossa pós-história no pensamento, na filosofia. Somos contemporâneos filosóficos da atualidade sem sermos seus contemporâneos históricos. A filosofia alemã é o prolongamento ideal da história alemã. Se, em vez de criticarmos as oevres incomplètes de nossa história real, criticamos as oevres posthumes de nossa história ideal, a filosofia, nossa crítica se coloca entre as questões sobre as quais a atualidade diz: That is the question. O que nos povos avançados é declínio prático das condições estatais modernas, na Alemanha, onde essas mesmas condições ainda não existem, é, primeiramente, declínio crítico do reflexo filosófico dessas condições. A filosofia alemã do Direito e do Estado é a única história alemã que se encontra al pari com a atualidade oficial moderna. Razão pela qual o povo alemão deve superar essa sua história onírica com suas condições existentes (bestehende Zustände)9 e submeter à crítica não somente essas 8 Povo nômade, notável na arte e na Guerra, desaparecido por volta do Séc. II a. C., e que entre os Sécs. V e II a. C. habitou a Cítia, denominação dada pelos antigos gregos a regiões próximas ao mar negro e ao mar Cáspio. Cf. FERREIRA, Aurélio Buarque de Holanda. Novo Dicionário Aurélio de Lingua portuguesa. 3. ed. Curitiba: Positivo, 2004, p.477. 9 Na versão em língua portuguesa da tradução francesa de Aron, bestehende Zustände é traduzida como "ordem social do momento" (p.81). Em outro momento, escreve Aron que "Stand é a palavra alemã que corresponde mais ou menos a 'ordem' ou a 'estado', no sentido em que se fala de Terceiro Estado ou terceira ordem". ARON, Raymond. O Marxismo de Marx. Tradução de Jorge Bastos. 3. ed. São Paulo: ARX, 2005. 481481 condições existentes, bem como também sua continuação abstrata. O futuro desse povo não pode se limitar à negação direta de suas reais condições jurídicas e estatais, nem à realização direta dessas condições ideais, visto que ele possui a negação direta de suas condições reais nas suas condições ideais, e a realização direta de suas condições ideais já quase ultrapassada na concepção dos povos vizinhos. Com razão o partido político prático na Alemanha exige a negação da filosofia. Seu erro (Unrecht) não consiste na exigência, e sim, em persistir na exigência, que ele não realiza nem pode seriamente realizar. Ele crê poder realizar essa negação ao dar as costas à filosofia e, desviando a face – balbuciar algumas frases irritantes e banais sobre ela. A filosofia não considera a limitação de seu horizonte no Bering10 da realidade alemã nem mesmo a presume na práxis11 alemã ou nas teorias a ela subservientes. Exige-se uma vinculação aos reais germens vitais, mas esquece-se que o real germe vital do povo alemão somente brotou, até agora, em seu cérebro. Em uma palavra: Não se pode superar a filosofia sem realizá-la. O mesmo erro (Unrecht), mas com fatores invertidos, inicia o partido político teórico, datado a partir da filosofia. Esse partido avista na atual luta somente a luta crítica da filosofia com o mundo alemão, não considerando que a própria filosofia desde então pertence a esse mundo e é seu complemento, mesmo que ideal. Comportando-se criticamente contra sua oposição, manteve-se acrítico em relação a si mesmo ao partir dos pressupostos da filosofia, não permanecendo nos seus resultados alcançados ou, por outro lado, apresentando exigências 10 Estreito de Bering,que liga o Mar Chukchi (parte do Oceano Ártico), no norte, com o Mar de Bering (parte do Oceano Pacífico), no sul. Seu nome é uma homenagem ao explorador dinamarquês de nacionalidade russa Vitus Jonassen Bering, que o atravessou em 1728. 11 Para Marx, em termos gerais, práxis significa a união entre a teoria e a prática, mais especificamente, a "atividade livre, universal, criativa e autocriativa, por meio da qual o homem cria (faz, produz), e transforma (conforma) seu mundo humano e histórico e a si mesmo; atividade específica que o torna basicamente diferente de todos os outros seres. Nesse sentido, o homem pode ser considerado como um ser da práxis, entendida a expressão como o conceito central do marxismo, e este como a 'filosofia' (ou melhor, o 'pensamento') da 'práxis'." In: BOTTOMORE, T. (ed.) Dicionário do pensamento marxista. Tradução de Waltensir Dutra. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1988. 482 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 482 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel e resultados buscados como exigências e resultados diretos da filosofia, apesar de os mesmos – pressupondo-se sua justificativa – só poderem ser mantidos, ao contrário, através da negação da filosofia desde então, da filosofia como filosofia. Reservamo-nos uma apresentação mais detalhada desse partido. Seu defeito fundamental pode ser assim resumido: Acreditou poder realizar a filosofia sem superá-la. A crítica da Filosofia do Direito e do Estado alemão que, através de Hegel, alcançou sua expressão máxima, é tanto a análise crítica do Estado moderno e da realidade a ele relacionada, como, também, a decisiva negação de toda forma, até então, de consciência do Direito e da Política alemã, cuja expressão mais distinta, universal, elevada à ciência é a própria Filosofia especulativa do Direito. A Filosofia especulativa do Direito, esse pensamento efusivo abstrato do Estado moderno, somente foi possível na Alemanha em razão da realidade permanecer no além, ainda que esse além estivesse tão somente além do Reno: da mesma forma, ao contrário, a imagem alemã abstraída da pessoa real do Estado moderno somente foi possível porque e até o ponto em que o próprio Estado moderno abstrai da pessoa real ou satisfaz a pessoa no seu todo somente de forma imaginária. Na política, os alemães pensaram o que os outros povos efetivaram. A Alemanha foi sua consciência teórica. A abstração e a presunção de seu pensamento sempre mantiveram o mesmo passo com a unilateralidade e inferioridade de sua realidade. Quando, portanto, o status quo estatal alemão expressa a perfeição do ancien régime, o espinho na carne do Estado moderno, o status quo da ciência estatal alemã expressa a imperfeição do Estado moderno, a deterioração de sua própria carne. Como oposição decisiva à forma atual da consciência política alemã, a Crítica da Filosofia especulativa do Direito não se dispersa em si mesma, e sim, em tarefas para cujas soluções há somente um meio: a prática. Pergunta-se: Pode a Alemanha alcançar uma práxis à la hauteur des principes12, ou seja, uma revolução que se eleve não somente ao nível oficial dos povos modernos, e sim, à altura humana que será o futuro imediato desses povos? 12 que se eleve à altura dos princípios. 483483 A arma da Crítica não pode, entretanto, substituir a Crítica das armas, o poder material deve ser derrubado pelo poder material; mesmo a teoria se torna poder material logo que atinge as massas. A teoria é capaz de atingir as massas tão logo demonstre ad hominem13 e ela demonstra ad hominem quando se torna radical. Ser radical é tocar a questão na raiz. Para os homens a raiz é o próprio homem. A prova evidente para o radicalismo da teoria alemã, portanto, para sua energia prática é partir da decidida superação positiva da religião. A crítica à religião termina com a doutrina de que o homem seria o ser supremo para os homens, portanto, o imperativo categórico modificativo de todas as relações em que a pessoa é um ser rebaixado, subserviente, abandonado, desprezível. Relações que não se pode descrever melhor do que por meio da exclamação de um francês no caso de um projeto de imposto sobre cães: Pobres cães! Quer-se tratálos como homens! Mesmo historicamente a emancipação teórica tem um significado especificamente prático para a Alemanha. O passado revolucionário da Alemanha é, portanto, teórico, é a Reforma. Como na época foi o monge, agora é o filósofo em cujo cérebro se inicia a revolução. Lutero certamente venceu a servidão por devoção porque colocou a servidão por convicção em seu lugar. Ele rompeu com a fé na autoridade porque restaurou a autoridade da fé. Ele transformou os padrecos em laicos porque transformou os laicos em padrecos. Ele libertou os homens da religiosidade exterior porque fez da religiosidade a essência mais íntima do homem. Ele emancipou o corpo dos grilhões porque aprisionou o coração neles. Mas se o protestantismo não foi a real solução, ele representou a real colocação do problema. Não valia mais a luta do leigo contra os padrecos fora dele, valia a luta contra seus próprios padrecos internos, com sua natureza fradesca. E se a transformação protestante dos leigos alemães em padrecos emancipa os papas leigos, os príncipes juntamente com seu clérigo, seus privilégios e os filisteus, a transformação filosófica dos clérigos alemães em homens emancipa o povo. Assim como não se cessou a 13 no homem. 484 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 484 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel emancipação dos príncipes, tampouco cessará a secularização dos bens no despojo da igreja que colocou em curso, sobretudo, a Prússia hipócrita. Na época, a guerra dos camponeses, o fato mais radical da história alemã, fracassou por causa da teologia. Hoje, onde a própria teologia fracassou, a fato mais aprisionado da história alemã, nosso status quo será abalado pela filosofia. No dia anterior ao da Reforma, a Alemanha oficial era a serva incondicional de Roma. No dia anterior ao de sua revolução, ela era a serva incondicional de algo menor que Roma, da Prússia e da Áustria, de fidalgotes e filisteus. Parece que uma dificuldade principal se opõe à revolução radical alemã. As revoluções necessitam de um elemento passivo, de um fundamento material. A teoria se realiza num povo somente até o ponto em que ela é a realização das necessidades deste. Ao enorme abismo entre as exigências do pensamento alemão e as respostas da realidade alemã corresponde o abismo da sociedade burguesa com o Estado e consigo mesma? Seriam as necessidades teóricas diretamente necessidades práticas? Não é suficiente que o pensamento estimule a realização, é necessário que esta mesma realidade estimule o pensamento. Todavia, a Alemanha não galgou simultaneamente com os povos modernos as fases intermediárias da emancipação política. Mesmo as fases que, teoricamente, já superara, ainda não as alcançara praticamente. Como poderia, com um salto mortal, não somente suplantar seus próprios limites, mas, também, os limites dos povos modernos, limites que deve, na realidade, entender e almejar como libertação de seus próprios? Uma revolução radical somente pode ser uma revolução de necessidades radicais, cujas premissas e lugares de origem parecem faltar completamente. Se a Alemanha acompanhou o desenvolvimento dos povos modernos apenas por meio da atividade abstrata do pensamento, sem tomar parte ativa nas lutas reais desse desenvolvimento, por outro lado ela participou dos sofrimentos desse desenvolvimento sem, entretanto, participar de seus deleites e satisfações parciais. À atividade abstrata, por um lado, corresponde o sofrimento abstrato, por outro. Por isso, a Alemanha 485485 irá encontrar-se, um dia, ao nível do declíneo europeu antes de ter-se colocado uma vez ao nível da emancipação europeia. Será comparada a um servo da idolatria que definha nas doenças do Cristianismo. Observando primeiramente os governos alemães, encontramo-los impulsionados pelas condições temporais, pela situação da Alemanha, pelo ponto de vista da educação alemã, finalmente pelo próprio instinto afortunado, combinando as deficiências civilizadas do mundo moderno, cujas vantagens não possuímos, com as deficiências bárbaras do ancien régime do qual nos alegramos plenamente, de forma que a Alemanha sempre deve participar se não no entendimento, pelo menos no desentendimento também das formações estatais que vão além de seu status quo. Há, por exemplo, um país no mundo que participe tão ingenuamente de todas as instituições do Estado constitucional sem participar de suas realidades como a chamada Alemanha constitucional? Ou não foi necessário coligar uma ideia alemã de governo, os tormentos da censura com os tormentos das leis de setembro francesas, que pressupunham a liberdade de imprensa! Assim como no panteão romano se encontravam os deuses de todas as nações, iremos encontrar no sacro império romano germânico os pecados de todas as formas estatais. Que esse ecletismo irá alcançar uma dimensão até então não prevista, isso garante nomeadamente a Gourmanderie14 político-estético de um rei alemão que pensa assumir todos os papéis do império, tanto feudal como burocrático, absoluto como constitucional, autocrático como democrático, se não através da pessoa do povo, então na própria pessoa, se não pelo povo então obviamente por si mesmo. A Alemanha como uma deficiência da atualidade política, constituída em um mundo próprio, não irá derrubar as barreiras especificamente alemãs sem derrubar as barreiras gerais da atualidade política. O sonho utópico da Alemanha não é a revolução radical, a emancipação humana universal, mas a revolução parcial, meramente política, a revolução que deixa em pé os pilares da casa. Em que se embasa uma revolução parcial, somente política? Uma parte da sociedade burguesa se emancipa e alcança um poder universal, uma determinada classe empre14 Glutonaria. 486 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 486 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel ende, a partir de sua situação especial, a emancipação geral da sociedade. Essa classe liberta toda a sociedade, mas somente desde que toda a sociedade se encontre na mesma situação dessa classe, portanto, por exemplo, que possua dinheiro e formação ou possa conquistá-los à vontade. Nenhuma classe da sociedade burguesa pode exercer esse papel sem provocar um momento de entusiasmo em si mesma e nas massas, um momento em que ela confraternize e celebre em geral com a sociedade, confunda-se com ela e seja reconhecida e entendida como seu representante universal; um momento em que suas prerrogativas e direitos sejam, na verdade, as próprias prerrogativas e direitos da sociedade, em que ela realmente seja a cabeça social e o coração social. Somente em nome dos direitos universais da sociedade uma classe especial pode reinvindicar para si o poder universal. Energia revolucionária e senso intelectual próprio não são suficientes para a conquista dessa posição emancipadora da própria esfera. Para que a revolução de um povo e a emancipação de uma classe especial da sociedade burguesa coincidam, para que uma posição (Stand) possa valer para a posição de toda a sociedade, todos os defeitos da sociedade devem, ao contrário, concentrar-se numa outra classe, uma certa posição deve ser a posição da repulsa geral, a incorporação dos limites gerais; uma posição social especial deve valer para o ilícito notório de toda a sociedade de forma que a libertação dessa esfera pareça com a autolibertação geral. Para que a posição da libertação seja a posição par excellence, uma outra posição deve ser a posição revelada da subjugação. A importância negativa geral da nobreza francesa e o clero francês condicionaram a importância positiva geral da classe, a princípio, limitante e oposta da Bourgeoisie15. Mas a toda classe especial na Alemanha falta não somente a consequência, o rigor, a coragem, a desconsideração que poderiam carimbálas como representantes negativos da sociedade. A toda posição falta, da mesma forma, aquela amplitude da alma que se identifica, mesmo que somente momentaneamente, com a alma do povo, aquela genialidade que empolga o poder material para o poder político, aquela audácia 15 Burguesia. 487487 revolucionária que arremessa ao opositor o lema obstinado: Eu não sou nada, e teria que ser tudo. Aquele egoísmo modesto, que valida sua limitação e a faz valer contra si forma o fundamento da moral e honestidade alemãs, não somente dos indivíduos, mas, também, das classes. Por isso, a relação das diversas esferas da sociedade alemã não é dramática, e sim, épica. Cada uma delas começa a ter consciência de si e, com suas prerrogativas especiais, a se posicionar ao lado das outras, não logo que seja pressionada, mas logo que, sem sua contribuição, as condições temporais criem uma base social sobre a qual ela pode, por seu turno, exercer pressão. Até mesmo o autossenso moral da classe média alemã repousa somente sobre a consciência de ser a representante geral da mediocridade filisteia de todas as demais classes. Razão pela qual não são somente os reis alemães que, mal-à-propos16, chegaram ao trono, é toda esfera da sociedades burguesa, que vivencia sua derrota antes de comemorar sua vitória, que desenvolve seus próprios limites antes de superar os limites que se lhe opõem, que dá validade ao seu ser mesquinho antes que possa fazer valer seu ser generoso, de forma que até mesmo a oportunidade de um grande papel é sempre passageira antes mesmo de se apresentar, assim que toda classe, logo que inicie a luta com a classe sobre ela dominante, envolve-se na luta com a classe logo abaixo de si. Razão pela qual o principado se encontra no embate contra o império, o burocrata na luta contra o nobre, a burguesia na luta contra esses todos, enquanto o proletariado já começa a se encontrar na luta contra a burguesia. A classe média mal ousa compreender, a partir de sua posição, o pensamento de emancipação, e já declara o desenvolvimento das condições sociais, assim como o avanço da teoria política declara esse próprio ponto de vista como antiquado ou, pelo menos, problemático. Na França é suficiente que alguém seja alguma coisa para que comece a querer ser tudo. Na Alemanha, ninguém pode ser nada se não renunciar a tudo. Na França, a emancipação parcial é o fundamento da universal. Na Alemanha, a emancipação universal é conditio sine qua non de toda emancipação parcial. Na França é a realidade, na Alemanha é a impossibilidade da libertação paulatina que deve gerar toda a liberdade. 16 Inoportunamente. 488 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 488 mArX • sobre A CrítiCA dA fiLosofiA do direito de hegel Na França toda a classe do povo é um idealista político e se entende, a princípio, não como classe especial, e sim, sobretudo como representante das necessidades sociais. O papel do emancipador vai, portanto, na sequência em movimento dramático passando pelas diversas classes do povo francês, até chegar a uma classe que realize a liberdade social não mais sob o pressuposto de certas condições externas ao homem, criadas, no entanto, pela sociedade humana, mas organizando todas as condições da existência humana sob o pressuposto da liberdade social. Na Alemanha, ao contrário, onde a vida prática é tão insípida, assim como a vida intelectual é pouco prática, nenhuma classe da sociedade burguesa tem a necessidade e a capacidade de emancipação geral antes de não ser forçada a isso por sua condição direta, sua necessidade material, por seus próprios grilhões. Onde está, portanto, a possibilidade positiva da emancipação alemã? Resposta: Na formação de uma classe com grilhões radicais, de uma classe da sociedade burguesa que não seja uma classe da sociedade burguesa, de uma situação que seja a dissolução de todas as situações, de uma esfera que possua um caráter universal por meio de seus sofrimentos universais e que não exija um direito especial, porque nenhum injusto especial, mas o injusto puro e simples foi praticado contra ela, que não pode apelar tendo em vista um título histórico, e sim, somente um título humano, que não se coloca em oposição às consequências, e sim, em uma oposição universal aos pressupostos do Estado alemão, enfim, de uma esfera que não se possa emancipar sem se emancipar de todas as demais esferas da sociedade e, com isso, emancipar todas as demais esferas da sociedade, que, resumindo, seja a perda total do homem, portanto, que possa ganhar a si mesma somente por meio da total reconquista do homem. Essa dissolução da sociedade como situação especial é o proletariado. Na Alemanha, o proletariado está apenas começando a se formar como resultado do movimento industrial, pois ele não é a pobreza naturalmente existente, mas a pobreza produzida artificialmente, não é a massa humana oprimida mecanicamente pelo peso da sociedade, mas aquela que provém da dissolução aguda desta, preferencialmente da dissolução 489489 da classe média, apesar de obviamente também a pobreza natural e a servidão germânico-cristã irem aos poucos se alinhando. Se o proletariado anuncia a dissolução da ordem mundial presente, somente expressa o segredo de sua própria existência, pois é a dissolução fática dessa ordem mundial. Se o proletariado exige a negação da propriedade privada, eleva somente ao princípio da sociedade o que a sociedade elevou como princípio daquele, o que já está nele incorporado sem sua intervenção, como resultado negativo da sociedade. O proletário se encontra, em relação ao mundo que se forma, no mesmo direito no qual o rei alemão se encontra no mundo já existente ao chamar o povo de seu povo, assim como chama o cavalo de seu cavalo. O rei, ao declarar o povo como sua propriedade privada, expressa somente que o proprietário privado é rei. Assim, como a filosofia encontra no proletariado suas armas materiais, o proletariado encontra na filosofia suas armas intelectuais, e logo que o relâmpago do pensamento tenha atingido essa ingênua seara popular, ocorrerá a emancipação dos alemães como homens. Resumamos o resultado: A única libertação praticamente possível da Alemanha é a libertação do ponto de vista da teoria, que declara o homem como o ser humano supremo. Na Alemanha, a emancipação da Idade Média somente é possível como emancipação simultânea das superações parciais da Idade Média. Na Alemanha não pode ser rompida nenhuma forma de sujeição, sem que seja rompida toda forma de sujeição. A Alemanha fundamental não pode revolucionar sem revolucionar a partir da base. A emancipação do alemão é a emancipação do homem. A cabeça dessa emancipação é a filosofia, seu coração o proletariado. A filosofia não pode se realizar sem a ascensão do proletariado, o proletariado não pode se elevar sem a realização da filosofia. Preenchendo-se todas as condições internas, o canto do galo gaulês anunciará o dia da ascensão alemã. entre o corpo e A AlmA490 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 490 491491 Vida e Obra Há bem menos a dizer sobre a vida de um filósofo do que sobre a sua obra. E não é diferente no caso de Maurice mERlEAu-PONTy, morto, aliás, muito jovem, aos 53 anos de idade, num momento de grande fecundidade. Ao que indica a enorme quantidade de rascunhos em sua mesa de trabalho, ele preparava uma obra de fôlego. Esses rascunhos foram publicados postumamente por seu aluno e filósofo, Claude Lefort, com o título O visível e o invisível. Merleau-Ponty nasceu em 1908, em uma pequena cidade do litoral francês chamada Rochefort-sur-Mer, e morreu em Paris, em 1961. Frequentou a École Normale Supérieure da rue d'Ulm, a mais prestigiada escola francesa da área de literatura e filosofia, de onde saiu em 1931. Um pouco mais jovem que Sartre, foi seu colega normaliano. E como todos os jovens saídos da École, seu caminho foi lecionar em Liceus. Depois disso, lecionou na própria École, entre 1935 e 1939. Foi então recrutado para lutar na Segunda Guerra Mundial, o que fez como oficial do exército francês. De volta a Paris, foi membro da ReMeRLeAu-pONtY: eNtRe O CORpO e A ALMA entre o corpo e A AlmA492 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 492 sistência francesa contra a ocupação nazista. Em 1945, assumiu uma cadeira na Universidade de Lyon e, em 1949, na universidade parisiense Sorbonne. Em 1952, foi eleito para um posto no Collège de France, o mais alto da hierarquia francesa, onde permaneceu até sua morte. Com Sartre e Simone de Beauvoir, fundou, no pós-guerra, a revista Les temps modernes, que marcou época a partir dos anos 40. A revista publicou alguns dos melhores autores da segunda metade do século XX, textos sobre filosofia, política, artes, sociologia, história etc. Ela foi um veículo pelo qual Merleau-Ponty tomou parte na vida intelectual francesa, com textos de intervenção sobre assuntos públicos, como a disputa entre o bloco socialista e o bloco capitalista, a Guerra da Coréia, a política francesa etc. Fez parte da "geração existencialista", embora menos conhecido do grande público do que Sartre. Morreu em sua mesa de trabalho – ao que dão notícia, lendo Descartes – fulminado por um ataque cardíaco. Merleau-Ponty publicou seu primeiro livro, A estrutura do comportamento, em 1938. Ali, ele já anuncia o projeto que, com variações ao longo dos anos, será sempre o seu. Pode-se enunciá-lo assim: trata-se de compreender as relações entre a consciência e a natureza, entre o sujeito e o objeto, entre o homem e o mundo. Esse enunciado é muito genérico, certamente, e, por isso mesmo, deixa de fora muitas outras questões: por exemplo, as relações intersubjetivas, não apenas aquelas entre mim e outrem, mas a dimensão social de minha vida, dimensão que envolve uma pluralidade de sujeitos. No entanto, apesar de ser um enunciado genérico, comecemos por ele, pois, a partir desse fio, muitos outros virão, inclusive esse da intersubjetividade, e o projeto merleau-pontiano se tornará mais consistente aos nossos olhos. Tornou-se uma praxe dizer que a filosofia moderna vive sob o signo do dualismo, o dualismo do sujeito e do objeto – ou, em termos clássicos (refiro-me aqui à filosofia dos séculos XVII e XVIII), o dualismo entre a alma e o corpo. Mais ainda: tornou-se corrente dizer (e Merleau-Ponty contribuiu decisivamente para que isso acontecesse) que o sujeito é uma descoberta da filosofia clássica datada do período galilaico-cartesiano, e 493493 que antigos e medievais sequer o conheciam. Ora, certamente é extravagante dizer que gregos e latinos desconheciam o homem. Não foi Protágoras quem disse: "o homem é a medida de todas as coisas"? Como então dizer que eles ignoravam o sujeito? Isso exige que se explique o que são sujeito e objeto nesse sentido novo, pois é a eles que se refere Merleau-Ponty. Foi a partir de Galileu que a ciência ganhou forte impulso, a ponto de, já em Galileu, mas, mais fortemente, em Descartes, fundar uma noção renovada de objeto. O que permitiu essa fundação foi a matematização da natureza. Nessa perspectiva, a natureza sensível pode ser comparada ao mostrador de um grande relógio, que nos mostra as horas, mas esconde por detrás todo o complexo e rigoroso sistema dos mecanismos que se chocam em invariável relação de causa e efeito. Assim é a verdadeira natureza, isto é, a essência da natureza, essa que se esconde por trás da aparência sensível: um enorme mecanismo rigorosamente determinista, no qual cada movimento é efeito de um choque, e esse de um outro, e a totalidade das relações de causa e efeito é finalmente passível de ser expressa matematicamente. Ora, isso significa – o que bem mostra Merleau-Ponty ao discutir, na primeira Conversa a seguir, a célebre experiência cartesiana do pedaço de cera (essa experiência é discutida por Descartes na segunda das Meditações Metafísicas) –, isso significa que a totalidade das manifestações sensíveis é excluída do "objeto verdadeiro", aquele que a ciência deve enfim conhecer e que é a essência da natureza. Excluída, isso quer dizer: essas aparências sensíveis não são nada de objetivo no mundo, relegadas, por isso mesmo, ao domínio do sujeito. E isso em sentido especial, pois, se uma manifestação de cor, por exemplo, é no "mundo verdadeiro" apenas um certo movimento de partículas, elas mesmas incolores, então essa sensação de vermelho que experimento é apenas um evento que acontece em mim, não fora, mas dentro de mim, não no mundo, mas na minha mente (Descartes dizia: na minha alma). O objeto exterior, real, verdadeiro é apenas um pedaço de extensão em movimento, que ocupa um certo lugar no espaço e é desprovido de todos esses predicados sensíveis que meu corpo encontra nele, predicados que são, por isso mesentre o corpo e A AlmA494 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 494 mo, apenas projeções no exterior daquilo que acontece na minha alma. O objeto vai se definindo então como uma exterioridade radicalmente não subjetiva, como um absoluto não relativo a minha apreensão dele, e o sujeito como uma mente, um interior dotado de representações, ideias, sensações (como essa de vermelho). É esse o dualismo moderno, desconhecido por antigos e medievais: o dualismo do sujeito e do objeto, da alma e do corpo, seja o meu corpo, sejam os corpos dos outros, sejam os corpos de que trata a física. Corpo, enfim, é tudo aquilo que é extenso e ocupa lugar no espaço, e a alma, por sua vez, não ocupa lugar no espaço, ela é inextensa. A alma não é o cérebro, não são as terminações nervosas; a alma é esse Eu que se alcança imediatamente, por reflexão, esse interior que se sabe a si mesmo a todo instante: se ergo o braço para apanhar um copo, sei bem que realizo esse movimento, e esse saber não é o mesmo que o movimento do braço. Ele está "unido" ao movimento do braço, evidentemente, mas é "distinto" dele... O leitor verá a seguir a minuciosa discussão feita por MerleauPonty da distinção cartesiana (e clássica!) entre o corpo e a alma. Discussão pela qual ele vai mostrando como o pensamento moderno, não por objeção frontal, mas pelo desenvolvimento mesmo do saber, leva a uma revisão das categorias clássicas, a uma reforma dessa ontologia clássica do sujeito e do objeto. Merleau-Ponty trata nas Conversas das ciências e das artes, notadamente da pintura (as artes são, para MerleauPonty, não um produto da cultura destinado ao prazer, ao divertimento, ao passatempo, mas uma expressão de nós mesmos e do mundo que nenhuma ciência lograria alcançar; elas são, a seu modo, também conhecimento). O núcleo desse desenvolvimento – que deve levar, por sua vez, a uma nova filosofia – consiste na descoberta de que a situação, seja do "objeto", seja do "sujeito", não é mais passível de exclusão da trama do conhecimento. Dito de outra forma: o objeto "verdadeiro", aquele de que a ciência trata, não é mais aquele objeto absoluto de que falavam os clássicos, mas se torna, intrinsecamente, relativo. Relativo seja à circunstância de tempo e lugar na qual ele se encontra (Merleau-Ponty dá o exemplo, na segunda Conversa, do objeto que muda de peso quando é transportado do pólo para o equador), seja ao sistema de referências pelo qual 495495 ele é apreendido pelo observador (na primeira Conversa, Merleau-Ponty nota que para a física da relatividade toda observação é inseparável da situação do observador). Em suma, não há mais um objeto puro, em si, um objeto tal como o próprio Deus (isto é, um observador absoluto) o veria. Também não há mais esse sujeito absoluto, aquele que começava por afastar toda manifestação sensível, isto é, que começava por afastar, correlativamente, seu próprio corpo para colocar-se como puro espírito. Nem objeto puro, nem sujeito puro. Nem um saber exaustivo, que não deixe nada mais por conhecer, que, portanto, esgote o objeto, nem espírito absoluto, alma pura que está num corpo como o piloto no navio, isto é, substancialmente distinta dele. São essas imagens clássicas que o pensamento moderno põe em questão e é isso que a filosofia deve pensar. A ciência perdeu a ilusão do saber absoluto, o conhecimento do mundo é agora uma tarefa interminável, o que significa dizer que o objeto não perde jamais sua opacidade, sua transcendência, seu mistério. E o sujeito já não é um puro entendimento, já não alça à condição de puro observador, pois toda observação é situada. Isso quer dizer: o sujeito é sensível, não espírito e um corpo, diz Merleau-Ponty na segunda Conversa, mas espírito com um corpo, um espírito inteiramente encarnado. O sujeito é sensível, o objeto é sensível, o sujeito ocupa uma posição, o objeto é esse fato bruto diversamente perspectivado: é a isso que Merleau-Ponty denomina sujeito de percepção e objeto percebido. Percepção indica aqui a totalidade das condições sensíveis sempre implicadas em todo sujeito, em todo objeto. Vale o mesmo para a alteridade, para esse alter ego diante de mim, tema da quinta Conversa. Conheço outrem por meio de seu corpo, isto é, de sua fala, de seus gestos, de seus olhares, sua maneira de andar, sua entonação de voz. Mas daí não se segue que outrem seja para mim apenas um corpo. Também não posso dizer que seja espírito. Merleau-Ponty dá um exemplo esclarecedor: outrem se dirige a mim bastante irritado, com gestos bruscos, com gritos, com palavras violentas. Posso dizer que essa irritação está em seu espírito? O exemplo é esclarecedor porque, nesse caso, o corpo, mais do que na calma, por exemplo, se faz mais... evidente: eu não posso separar a irritação de meu interlocutor dessas contrações entre o corpo e A AlmA496 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 496 de rosto, desses gritos... A irritação é inseparável do corpo. Portanto, outrem está e não está no corpo, outrem está ali, mas não se reduz ao corpo. Também aqui Merleau-Ponty vai explorar mesmo modelo: outrem é não um espírito montado em um corpo mecânico, mas um sujeito sensível que, aliás, ao aparecer, põe em questão toda aquela harmonia que já começava a se desenhar na descrição da relação entre sujeito e objeto. Outrem, por exemplo, pode contestar minhas perspectivas sobre o objeto, pode tornar esse mundo que julgo perceber (sem esgotá-lo) uma pura ilusão, um mundo privado não partilhável por outros. Talvez mesmo eu deva inverter o ponto de partida e mostrar que antes de estar no mundo natural, estou no mundo humano, e que o mundo intersubjetivo precede o mundo natural, que eu percebo outrem antes de perceber-me a mim mesmo. Enfim, a questão se complica, se expande, implica novas dimensões, e são elas que Merleau-Ponty se dá a tarefa de pensar, pois a filosofia não tem outra tarefa senão pensar o nosso tempo, aquilo que a cultura prepara e aquilo que, implicado por ela, permanece na sombra. O texto a seguir foi escrito por Merleau-Ponty em 1948 para ser apresentado em um programa de rádio. Daí o tom coloquial, didático, próximo do interlocutor, tom de quem efetivamente conversa com os ouvintes. O material foi reunido a partir de um texto datilografado e conservado entre os inéditos de Merleau-Ponty, estabelecido em sua versão final pela pesquisadora Stéphanie Ménasé, sob o título Causeries 1948, e publicado por Éditions du Seuil, de Paris, em 2002. São sete conversas. Publicamos aqui a primeira, a segunda e a quinta. Essa seleção procurou atender ao critério de, no espaço aqui disponível, compor um microcosmo no interior das sete conversas. O microcosmo em questão é o sistema eu/mundo/outrem – ou, pelo menos, entre as sete conversas, aquelas que melhor ressaltassem esse sistema. Durante a apresentação do programa, Merleau-Ponty pouco mudou em relação ao texto escrito. As notas de rodapé apontam algumas dessas alterações, tal como são apontadas na edição de Stéphanie Ménasé. 497497 Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de merleau-Ponty traduzidas Para o Português MERLEAU-PONTY, M. Fenomenologia da percepção. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1994. MERLEAU-PONTY, M. O olho e o espírito. Tradução de Paulo Neves e Maria Hermantina Pereira. São Paulo: Cosac&Naify, 2004. MERLEAU-PONTY, M. Conversas. Tradução de Fábio Landa e Eva Landa. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004. MERLEAU-PONTY, M. Signos. Tradução de Maria Ermantina Galvão Gomes Pereira. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1991. MERLEAU-PONTY, M. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1987.(Coleção Os Pensadores) obras sobre merleau-Ponty FERRAZ, M. S.A. Fenomenologia e ontologia em Merleau-Ponty. Campinas: Papirus, 2009. MOURA, C. A. R. Racionalidade e crise. Curitiba: Edufpr, 2002. MOUTINHO, L. D. S. Razão e experiência: Ensaio sobre Merleau-Ponty. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2006. MULLER, M. J. Merleau-Ponty: acerca da expressão. Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2001. 498 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 498 merLeAu-ponty • primeirA ConversA: o mundo perCebido e o mundo dA CiênCiA pRIMeIRA CONVeRSA: O MuNDO peRCeBIDO e O MuNDO DA CIÊNCIA 1 O mundo da percepção, isto é, o mundo que nos é revelado por nossos sentidos e pela prática da vida, parece à primeira vista aquele que melhor conhecemos, pois não são necessários nem instrumentos, nem cálculos, para alcançá-lo, bastando a nós, aparentemente, abrir os olhos e deixar-nos viver para nele penetrar. Entretanto, isso é apenas uma falsa aparência. Eu gostaria de mostrar nessas conversas que ele é, em uma larga medida, ignorado por nós enquanto permanecermos na atitude prática ou utilitária, que foi preciso muito tempo, esforços e cultura desnudálo, e que um dos méritos da arte e do pensamento modernos (entendo por isso a arte e o pensamento a partir dos últimos 50 ou 70 anos) é nos fazer redescobrir esse mundo em que vivemos, mas que somos sempre tentados a esquecer. Isto é particularmente verdadeiro na França. É um traço não apenas das filosofias francesas, mas ainda daquilo que se chama um pouco vagamente o espírito francês, reconhecer à ciência e aos conhecimentos científicos um valor tal que toda nossa experiência vivida do mundo se vê imediatamente desvalorizada. Se eu quero saber o que é a luz não é ao físico que eu devo me dirigir? Não é ele que me dirá se a luz é, como 1 MERLEAU-PONTY, M. Causeries 1948. Paris: Seuil, 2002. 499499 se pensou durante algum tempo, um bombardeio de projéteis incandescentes2, ou, como também se acreditou, uma vibração do éter, ou enfim, como admite uma teoria mais recente, um fenômeno assimilável às oscilações eletromagnéticas? De que serviria consultar nossos sentidos, determo-nos naquilo que nossa percepção nos ensina sobre as cores, os reflexos e as coisas que os trazem, pois, evidentemente, isso são apenas aparências e tão somente o saber metódico do cientista, suas medidas, suas experiências podem nos fazer sair das ilusões em que vivem nossos sentidos e fazer-nos alcançar a verdadeira natureza das coisas? O progresso do saber não consistiu em esquecer o que nos dizem os sentidos ingenuamente consultados, e que não têm vez em um quadro verdadeiro do mundo senão como uma particularidade de nossa organização humana que a ciência fisiológica explicará um dia, como ela explica as ilusões do míope ou do presbita3? O mundo verdadeiro não são essas luzes, essas cores, esse espetáculo de carne que meus olhos me oferecem, são as ondas e os corpúsculos de que a ciência me fala e que ela reencontra por trás desses fantasmas sensíveis. Descartes dizia até que, apenas pelo exame das coisas sensíveis e sem recorrer aos resultados das pesquisas científicas, eu posso descobrir a impostura de meus sentidos e aprender a confiar apenas na inteligência4. Digo que vejo um pedaço de cera. Mas que é exatamente essa cera? Seguramente, não é nem a cor esbranquiçada, nem o odor de flor que talvez ainda guarde, nem essa moleza que meu dedo sente, nem esse barulho surdo que faz quando eu a deixo cair. Nada disso é constitutivo da cera, pois ela pode perder todas essas qualidades sem deixar de existir, por exemplo, quando eu a derreto e ela se transforma em um líquido incolor, sem odor apreciável e que não resiste mais a meu dedo. Digo, entretanto, que é a mesma cera que ainda está aí. Como é preciso entender isso? Aquilo que permanece apesar da mudança de estado é apenas um 2 Segundo a gravação: "bombardeio de partículas incandescentes". 3 Durante a gravação, o segmento de frase "senão como uma particularidade [...]" foi suprimido. 4 Segundo a gravação: "Descartes dizia até que apenas o exame das coisas sensíveis, e sem recorrer aos resultados das pesquisas cientificas, me permite descobrir a impostura de meus sentidos e me ensina a confiar apenas na inteligência." 500 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 500 merLeAu-ponty • primeirA ConversA: o mundo perCebido e o mundo dA CiênCiA fragmento de matéria sem qualidades e, no limite, uma certa potência de ocupar espaço, de receber diferentes formas, sem que nem o espaço ocupado nem a forma recebida, sejam de modo algum determinados. Eis o núcleo real e permanente da cera. Ora, é manifesto que essa realidade da cera não se revela aos sentidos sozinhos, pois eles me oferecem sempre objetos de uma grandeza e forma determinadas. A verdadeira cera, portanto, não é vista com os olhos5. Podemos concebê-la apenas pela inteligência. Quando eu acredito ver a cera com os meus olhos, eu apenas penso, por meio das qualidades que meus sentidos apreendem, a cera pura e sem qualidades que é a fonte comum delas. Para Descartes, portanto, e essa ideia permaneceu dominante por muito tempo na tradição filosófica da França6, a percepção é apenas um começo de ciência ainda confusa. A relação entre a percepção e a ciência é a relação entre a aparência e a realidade. Nossa dignidade consiste em nos remetermos à inteligência porque apenas ela nos descobrirá a verdade do mundo. Quando eu disse agora há pouco que o pensamento e a arte moderna reabilitam a percepção e o mundo percebido, naturalmente eu não quis dizer que eles negam o valor da ciência, seja como instrumento do desenvolvimento técnico, seja como escola de exatidão e de verdade. A ciência foi e continua sendo o domínio no qual é preciso aprender o que é uma verificação, o que é uma pesquisa escrupulosa, o que é a crítica de si mesmo e dos prejuízos próprios. Foi bom que se esperasse tudo dela em um tempo em que ela não existia ainda. Mas a questão que o pensamento moderno põe sobre ela não é destinada a contestar-lhe a existência ou a proibir-lhe algum domínio. Trata-se de saber se a ciência oferece ou oferecerá uma representação do mundo que seja completa, que se baste, que se feche de algum modo sobre ela mesma de tal forma7 que não tenhamos mais nenhuma questão válida a nos colocar para além dela. Não se trata de negar ou de limitar a ciência; trata-se de saber se ela tem o direito de negar ou de excluir como ilusórias todas as pesquisas que não procedem, como ela, por medidas, comparações e não se concluam por 5 Segundo a gravação: "A verdadeira cera, diz Descartes, não é vista com os olhos." 6 Segundo a gravação: "tradição filosófica francesa." 7 Segundo a gravação: "de tal maneira." 501501 leis tais como as da física clássica, encadeando tais consequências a tais condições. Não somente essa questão não marca nenhuma hostilidade contra a ciência, mas ainda é a própria ciência, em seus desenvolvimentos mais recentes, que nos obriga a colocá-la e nos convida a responder a ela negativamente. Pois, desde o fim do século XIX, os cientistas se habituaram a considerar suas leis e teorias não mais como a imagem exata do que se passa na Natureza, mas como esquemas sempre mais simples que o evento natural, destinados a ser corrigidos por uma pesquisa mais precisa, em uma palavra, como conhecimentos aproximados. Os fatos que a experiência nos propõe são submetidos pela ciência a uma análise da qual não se pode esperar que seja jamais acabada, pois não há limites para a observação, pois se pode sempre imaginá-la mais completa ou exata do que ela é em um momento dado. O concreto, o sensível indicam para a ciência a tarefa de uma elucidação interminável, e resulta disso que não se pode considerá-lo, à maneira clássica, como uma simples aparência destinada a ser superada pela inteligência científica. O fato percebido e, de uma maneira geral, os eventos da história do mundo não podem ser deduzidos de um certo número de leis que comporiam a face permanente do universo; é a lei, inversamente, que é uma expressão aproximada do evento físico e deixa subsistir sua opacidade. O cientista de hoje não tem mais, como o cientista do período clássico, a ilusão de alcançar o coração das coisas, o objeto mesmo. Sobre esse ponto, a física da relatividade confirma que a objetividade absoluta e última é um sonho, mostrando-nos8 cada observação estritamente ligada à posição do observador, inseparável de sua situação, e rejeitando9 a ideia de um observador absoluto. Não podemos nos gabar, na ciência, de chegar, pelo exercício de uma inteligência pura e não situada, a um objeto puro de toda marca humana e tal como Deus o veria. Isso não suprime nada à necessidade da pesquisa científica e combate apenas o dogmatismo de uma ciência que se tomaria por saber absoluto e total. Isso simplesmente faz justiça a todos os elementos da experiência humana e, em particular, a nossa 8 Segundo a gravação: "Ela nos mostra [...]". 9 Segundo a gravação: "e ela rejeita". 502 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 502 merLeAu-ponty • primeirA ConversA: o mundo perCebido e o mundo dA CiênCiA experiência sensível. Enquanto a ciência e a filosofia das ciências abriam assim a porta a uma exploração do mundo percebido, a pintura, a poesia e a filosofia entravam10 resolutamente no domínio que lhes era assim reconhecido e nos davam das coisas, do espaço, dos animais e até do homem visto de fora tal como ele aparece no campo de nossa percepção, uma visão nova e bastante característica de nosso tempo. Em nossas próximas conversas, gostaríamos de descrever algumas das aquisições desta pesquisa. 10 Segundo a gravação: "Enquanto a ciência e a filosofia das ciências abriam assim a porta a uma exploração do mundo percebido, acontece que a pintura, a poesia e a filosofia entravam [...]". 503503 SeGuNDA CONVeRSA: eXpLORAçãO DO MuNDO peRCeBIDO: O eSpAçO Observou-se com frequência que o pensamento e a arte moderna são difíceis: é mais difícil compreender e gostar de Picasso que de Poussin ou Chardin, Giraudoux ou Malraux que Marivaux ou Stendhal. Concluiu-se disso, algumas vezes (como Benda em A França bizantina), que os escritores modernos eram bizantinos, difíceis somente porque não tinham nada a dizer e substituíam a arte pela sutileza. Não há juízo mais cego do que este. O pensamento moderno é difícil, ele inverte o senso comum porque tem o cuidado da verdade e a experiência não lhe permite mais, honestamente, ater-se a ideias claras ou simples às quais o senso comum é ligado porque elas lhe dão tranquilidade. Deste obscurecimento das noções mais simples, desta revisão dos conceitos clássicos buscada pelo pensamento moderno em nome da experiência, eu gostaria de mostrar hoje um exemplo com a ideia que, de inicio, parece a mais clara de todas: a ideia de espaço. A ciência clássica é fundada em uma distinção clara entre o espaço e o mundo físico. O espaço é o meio homogêneo no qual as coisas estão distribuídas segundo as três dimensões, e no qual elas conservam sua identidade apesar de todas as mudanças de lugar. Há muitos casos em que, por ter deslocado um objeto, vemos suas propriedades mudarem, como, por exemplo, o peso, caso transportemos o objeto do pólo ao equador, ou mesmo a for504 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 504 merLeAu-ponty • segundA ConversA: eXpLorAção do mundo perCebido: o espAço ma, caso o aumento de temperatura deforme o sólido. Mas precisamente essas mudanças de propriedades não são imputáveis ao próprio deslocamento, o espaço é o mesmo no pólo e no equador, são as condições físicas de temperatura que variam aqui e lá, o domínio da geometria permanece rigorosamente distinto do da física, a forma e o conteúdo do mundo não se misturam. As propriedades geométricas do objeto permaneceriam as mesmas no curso de seu deslocamento, não fossem as condições físicas variáveis às quais ele se encontra submetido. Era esse o pressuposto da ciência clássica. Tudo muda com as geometrias não euclidianas, quando passamos a conceber como que uma curvatura própria ao espaço, uma alteração das coisas apenas por causa do seu deslocamento, uma heterogeneidade das partes do espaço e de suas dimensões que não são mais intercambiáveis e afetam os corpos que nele se deslocam com algumas transformações. Em vez de um mundo em que a parte do idêntico e a parte da transformação são estritamente delimitadas e relacionadas a princípios diferentes, temos um mundo em que os objetos não poderiam estar consigo mesmos em uma identidade absoluta, em que forma e conteúdo são como que embaralhados e misturados e que, enfim, não oferece mais essa armadura rígida que lhe fornecia o espaço homogêneo de Euclides. Torna-se impossível distinguir rigorosamente o espaço e as coisas no espaço, a pura ideia do espaço e o espetáculo concreto que nos dão nossos sentidos. As pesquisas da pintura moderna concordam curiosamente com as da ciência. O ensinamento clássico distingue o desenho da cor11: desenha-se o esquema espacial do objeto, depois ele é preenchido por cores. Cézanne diz, ao contrário: "à medida em que se pinta, se desenha" – querendo dizer que nem no mundo percebido, nem sobre o quadro12 que o exprime, o contorno e a forma do objeto são estritamente distintos da terminação ou da alteração das cores, da modulação colorida que deve tudo conter: forma, cor própria, fisionomia do objeto, relação entre o objeto e os objetos vizinhos. Cézanne quer engendrar o contorno e a forma dos objetos como a natureza os engendra sob nossos olhos: pelo arranjo das 11 Segundo a gravação: "O ensino clássico, em pintura, distingue o desenho da cor ...". 12 Segundo a gravação: "no quadro". 505505 cores. E vem daí que a maçã que ele pinta, estudada com uma paciência infinita em sua textura colorida, acaba por se inflar, por vazar os limites que o sábio desenho lhe imporia. Nesse esforço por reencontrar o mundo tal como o apreendemos na experiência vivida, todas as precauções da arte clássica voam em pedaços. O ensinamento clássico da pintura é fundado sobre a perspectiva – ou seja, o pintor, em presença de uma paisagem, por exemplo, decidia trazer para a tela apenas uma representação bastante convencional do que ele vê. Ele vê a árvore perto dele, depois ele fixa seu olhar mais adiante, na estrada, depois enfim ele o leva ao horizonte e, conforme o ponto que ele fixa, as dimensões aparentes dos outros objetos são a cada vez modificadas. Na tela, ele ordenará para fazer figurar apenas um compromisso entre essas diversas visões, ele se esforçará para encontrar um denominador comum para todas essas percepções, atribuindo a cada objeto não o tamanho e as cores e o aspecto que ele apresenta quando o pintor o fixa, mas um tamanho e um aspecto convencionais, aqueles que se ofereceriam a um olhar fixado na linha do horizonte, em um certo ponto de fuga para o qual se orientam doravante todas as linhas da paisagem que vão do pintor para o horizonte. As paisagens assim pintadas têm, pois, um aspecto pacífico, decente, respeitoso, devido ao fato de que são dominadas por um olhar fixado no infinito. Elas estão à distância, o espectador não está comprometido com elas, elas são tranquilas13, e o olhar atravessa facilmente uma paisagem sem asperezas que nada opõe a sua comodidade soberana. Mas não é assim que o mundo se apresenta a nós no contato com ele dado pela percepção. A cada momento, enquanto nosso olhar vagueia através do espetáculo, somos submetidos a um certo ponto de vista, e esses instantâneos sucessivos, para uma dada parte da paisagem, não são passíveis de sobreposição. O pintor só consegue dominar essa série de visões e tirar delas uma única paisagem eterna com a condição de interromper o modo natural de visão: frequentemente, ele fecha um olho, mede com seu lápis o tamanho aparente de um detalhe, que ele modifica por esse procedimento, e, submetendo todos eles a essa visão analítica, constrói assim sobre sua tela uma representação da paisa13 Segundo a gravação: "elas são, poder-se-ia dizer, tranquilas". 506 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 506 merLeAu-ponty • segundA ConversA: eXpLorAção do mundo perCebido: o espAço gem que não corresponde a nenhuma das visões livres, domina o desenvolvimento movimentado dela, mas também suprime sua vibração e sua vida. Se muitos pintores, depois de Cézanne, se recusaram a dobrar-se à lei da perspectiva geométrica, é porque eles queriam retomar e trazer o próprio nascimento da paisagem sob nossos olhos, é porque eles não se contentavam com um balanço analítico e queriam alcançar o próprio estilo da experiência perceptiva. As diferentes partes de seu quadro são portanto vistas de pontos de vista diferentes, dando ao espectador desatento a impressão de "erros de perspectiva", mas oferecendo àqueles que olham atentamente o sentimento de um mundo em que jamais dois objetos são vistos simultaneamente, em que, entre as partes do espaço, se interpõe sempre a duração necessária para levar nosso olhar de uma a outra, em que o ser não é portanto dado, mas aparece ou transparece através do tempo. O espaço não é mais esse meio das coisas simultâneas que um observador absoluto poderia dominar, igualmente próximo de todas elas, sem ponto de vista, sem corpo, sem situação espacial, em suma, pura inteligência – o espaço da pintura moderna, dizia ultimamente Jean Paulhan, é o "espaço sensível ao coração", em que nós também estamos situados, próximos de nós, organicamente ligados a nós. "Pode acontecer que um tempo consagrado à medida técnica, e como que devorado por quantidade, acrescentava Paulhan, o pintor cubista celebre, à sua maneira, em um espaço ligado menos à nossa inteligência do que ao nosso coração, algum casamento velado e uma reconciliação do mundo com o homem". Depois da ciência e da pintura, também a filosofia e, sobretudo, a psicologia parecem atentar para o fato de que nossas relações com o espaço não são as relações de um puro sujeito desencarnado com um objeto longínquo, mas as de um habitante do espaço com seu meio familiar. Que se busque compreender, por exemplo, esta famosa ilusão de ótica, estudada já por Malebranche, e que faz que a lua, ao nascer, quando ainda está no horizonte, nos pareça muito maior do que quando atinge o zênite. Malebranche supunha que a percepção humana, por uma espécie de raciocínio, superestima a grandeza do astro. Se, com efeito, nós o 507507 olharmos através de um tubo de papelão ou de uma caixa de fósforos, a ilusão desaparece. Ela é devida, portanto, ao fato de que, ao nascer, a lua se apresente a nós para além dos campos, dos muros, das árvores, de que esse grande número de objetos interpostos nos torna sensível sua grande distância, de onde concluímos que, para conservar a grandeza aparente que ela guarda, estando contudo tão afastada, é preciso que a lua seja muito grande. O sujeito que percebe seria comparável ao cientista que julga, estima, conclui, e a grandeza percebida seria, em realidade, julgada. Não é assim que a maior parte dos psicólogos de hoje compreendem a ilusão da lua no horizonte. Eles descobriram, por experiências sistemáticas, que é uma propriedade geral de nosso campo de percepção comportar uma notável constância das grandezas aparentes no plano horizontal, enquanto, ao contrário, elas diminuem muito rapidamente com a distância em um plano vertical, e isso sem dúvida porque o plano horizontal para nós, seres terrestres, é aquele em que se fazem os deslocamentos vitais, no qual se desenvolve nossa atividade. Assim, aquilo que Malebranche interpretava pela atividade de uma pura inteligência, os psicólogos desta escola relacionam a uma propriedade natural de nosso campo de percepção, a nós, seres encarnados e obrigados a nos movermos sobre a terra. Em psicologia como em geometria, a ideia de um espaço homogêneo, oferecido inteirinho a uma inteligência sem corpo, é substituída pela ideia de um espaço heterogêneo, com direções privilegiadas, que estão em relação com nossas particularidades corporais e com nossa situação de seres lançados no mundo. Reencontramos aqui, pela primeira vez, esta ideia de que o homem não é um espírito e um corpo, mas um espírito com um corpo, e que ele só alcança a verdade das coisas porque seu corpo está como que atado a elas. (...) 508 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 508 merLeAu-ponty • quintA ConversA: o homem visto de forA QuINtA CONVeRSA: O HOMeM VIStO De FORA Até aqui, tentamos observar, com os olhos da percepção, o espaço, as coisas e os seres vivos que habitam esse mundo, esquecendo aquilo que uma longuíssima familiaridade com eles nos leva a achar "totalmente natural", tomando-os tais como eles se oferecem a uma experiência ingênua. Agora, a propósito do próprio homem, seria preciso recomeçar a mesma tentativa. Pois, certamente, há trinta séculos, ou mais, se diz muitas coisas sobre o homem, mas era frequentemente por reflexão que elas tinham sido descobertas. Quero dizer que, tentando saber o que é o homem, um filósofo como Descartes submetia as ideias que se apresentavam a ele a um exame crítico – por exemplo, a ideia de espírito e de corpo. Ele as purificava, afastava delas toda espécie de obscuridade ou confusão. Enquanto a maioria dos homens entende por espírito alguma coisa como uma matéria muito sutil, ou uma fumaça, ou um sopro – seguindo nisso o exemplo dos primitivos –, Descartes mostrava notavelmente que o espírito não é nada disso, que ele é de uma natureza totalmente diferente, pois fumaça e sopro são, a seu modo, coisas, ainda que muito sutis, enquanto o espírito não é de modo algum uma coisa, não reside no espaço, nem está disperso sobre uma certa extensão como todas as coisas, mas é, ao contrário, todo concentrado, indiviso, e é apenas, enfim, um ser que se recolhe e se reúne invencivelmente, que se 509509 conhece14. Chegava-se assim a uma noção pura do espírito e a uma noção pura da matéria ou das coisas. Mas é claro que eu encontro e, por assim dizer, toco esse espírito completamente puro apenas em mim mesmo. Os outros homens não são jamais para mim espírito puro: eu só os conheço através de seus olhares, seus gestos, suas falas, em uma palavra, através de seu corpo. Certamente, um outro está bem longe de reduzir-se para mim a seu corpo, ele é esse corpo animado de todos os tipos de intenções, sujeito de muitas ações ou de propósitos de que eu me lembro e que contribuem para esboçar para mim sua figura moral. Enfim, eu não poderia dissociar alguém de sua silhueta, de seu estilo, de sua entonação. Vendo-o por um minuto, eu o reencontro de imediato, bem melhor do que eu posso fazer enumerando tudo o que sei dele por experiência e por ouvir dizer. Os outros são para nós espíritos que habitam um corpo e, na aparência total desse corpo, parece-nos que está contido todo um conjunto de possibilidades do qual o corpo é a própria presença15. Assim, considerando o homem de fora, isto é, em outrem, é provável que eu seja levado a reexaminar certas distinções que, entretanto, parecem se impor, tais como a do espírito e do corpo. Vejamos, portanto, o que é essa distinção e raciocinemos a partir de um exemplo16. Suponhamos que eu esteja em presença de alguém que, por uma razão qualquer, esteja violentamente irritado comigo. Meu interlocutor se irrita, e eu digo que ele exprime sua raiva por palavras violentas, gestos, gritos... Mas, onde está a raiva? Alguém pode responder: ela está no espírito de meu interlocutor. Isso não é muito claro. Pois, enfim, essa dureza, essa crueldade que eu leio nos olhares de meu adversário, eu não posso imaginá-las separadas de seus gestos, de suas pala14 O texto que vai de "Quero dizer que, tentando saber o que é o homem" a "e é apenas, enfim, um ser que se recolhe e se reúne invencivelmente, que se conhece" foi suprimido durante a gravação. Merleau-Ponty continua: "Descartes, por exemplo, desvia-se do exterior e só chega a definir-se claramente quando descobre em si mesmo um espírito, isto é, um gênero de ser que não ocupa nenhum espaço, que não se espalha entre as coisas e não é nada mais que o puro conhecimento de si mesmo", depois ele retoma a leitura. 15 A passagem de "Certamente, um outro" a "do qual o corpo é a própria presença" foi suprimida durante a gravação. Merleau-Ponty conserva apenas: "eu não poderia dissociar alguém de sua silhueta, de seu estilo, de sua entonação". A leitura recomeça daqui. 16 Essa frase foi suprimida durante a gravação. 510 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 510 merLeAu-ponty • quintA ConversA: o homem visto de forA vras, de seu corpo. Tudo isso não se passa fora do mundo, e como que em um santuário recuado para além do corpo17 do homem irritado. Está bem aqui, nesse lugar, é aqui que a raiva explode, é no espaço entre mim e ele que ela ocorre. Concedo que a irritação de meu adversário não está no seu rosto, no mesmo sentido em que daqui a pouco, talvez, lágrimas vão correr de seus olhos, uma contração vai aparecer em sua boca18. Mas, enfim, a raiva o habita, e ela aflora na superfície dessas faces pálidas ou violáceas, desses olhos avermelhados, dessa voz aguda... E se, por um instante, eu deixar meu ponto de vista de observador exterior da raiva, se eu tentar me lembrar como ela me aparece a mim mesmo quando eu estou com raiva, sou obrigado a confessar que ela não ocorre de outro modo: a reflexão sobre minha própria raiva não me mostra nada que seja separável ou que possa, por assim dizer, ser descolada do meu corpo. Quando me lembro de minha raiva de Paulo, eu a encontro não em meu espírito ou em meu pensamento, mas inteirinha entre mim que vociferava e esse detestável Paulo que estava tranquilamente sentado e me ouvia com ironia. Minha raiva não era outra coisa que uma tentativa de destruição de Paulo, que permanece verbal, se eu sou pacífico, e mesmo civilizada, se eu sou educado, mas que enfim se passava no espaço comum em que trocávamos argumentos em vez de golpes, e não em mim. É só depois, refletindo sobre o que é a raiva, e notando que ela encerra uma certa avaliação (negativa) do outro, que eu concluo: no final das contas, a raiva é um pensamento, estar com raiva é pensar que outrem é detestável, e esse pensamento, como todos os outros, assim como Descartes mostrou, não pode residir em nenhum fragmento de matéria. Ela é, portanto, espírito. Posso muito bem refletir assim, mas quando me volto para a própria experiência da raiva19 que motiva minha reflexão, devo confessar que ela não estava fora do meu corpo, mas estava inexplicavelmente nele. Encontramos tudo em Descartes, como em todos os grandes filósofos, e daí porque ele, que havia distinguido rigorosamente o espírito 17 Segundo a gravação: "um santuário recuado por trás do corpo". 18 Esta frase foi suprimida durante a gravação. Merleau-Ponty recomeça em: "A raiva o habita, e ela aflora [...]". 19 Segundo a gravação: "a raiva". 511511 do corpo, chegou a dizer que a alma não era somente, tal como o piloto em seu navio, o chefe e o comandante do corpo, mas que ela estava tão estreitamente unida a ele que ela sofre nele, como vemos bem quando dizemos que sentimos dor de dente. No entanto, segundo Descartes, quase não podemos falar da união entre a alma e o corpo, podemos apenas experimentá-la pela prática da vida; para ele, qualquer que seja nossa condição de fato, e até mesmo se de fato vivemos, segundo seus próprios termos, uma verdadeira "mistura" do espírito e do corpo, isso não nos tira o direito de distinguir absolutamente o que está unido em nossa experiência, de manter de direito a separação radical entre o espírito e o corpo, negada por sua união de fato, e, enfim, de definir o homem sem nos preocuparmos com sua estrutura imediata e tal como ele aparece a si mesmo na reflexão: como um pensamento estranhamente unido a um aparelho corporal, sem que a mecânica do corpo ou a transparência do pensamento sejam comprometidas por sua mistura. Podemos dizer que, depois de Descartes, mesmo aqueles que mais fielmente seguiram seu ensinamento, não deixaram de se perguntar precisamente como pode nossa reflexão, que é reflexão sobre determinado homem, livrar-se das condições às quais este aparece submetido em sua situação inicial20. Descrevendo esta situação, os psicólogos de hoje insistem no fato21 de que não vivemos, de início, na consciência de nós mesmos – nem, aliás, na consciência das coisas – mas na experiência de outrem. Só nos sentimos existir depois de já termos tido contato com os outros, e nossa reflexão é sempre uma volta a nós mesmos, que deve então muito a nossa experiência de outrem. Um bebê de alguns meses já é hábil o bas20 Durante a gravação esse parágrafo foi modificado: "No entanto, se podemos viver essa união entre a alma e o corpo, quase não podemos falar dela, e qualquer que seja nossa condição de fato, e até mesmo se de fato vivemos uma verdadeira "mistura" do espírito e do corpo, isso não nos tira o direito de distinguir absolutamente o que está unido em nossa experiência, de manter de direito a separação radical entre o espírito e o corpo, que é negada por sua união de fato. Os sucessores de Descartes deviam justamente pôr em dúvida que se pudesse, assim, colocar à parte o que é de fato e o que é de direito. Eles denunciaram esse tipo de compromisso". A leitura recomeça aqui. 21 Segundo a gravação: "Descrevendo, pois, nossa condição de fato, os psicólogos de hoje insistem em que [...]". 512 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 512 merLeAu-ponty • quintA ConversA: o homem visto de forA tante para distinguir a simpatia, a raiva, o medo no rosto de outrem, em um momento em que ele não poderia ter aprendido, pelo exame de seu próprio corpo, os signos físicos dessas emoções. Logo, é porque o corpo de outrem aparece de imediato a ele investido, em suas diversas gesticulações, de uma significação emocional, é porque ele aprende a conhecer o espírito tanto como comportamento visível quanto na intimidade de seu próprio espírito. E também22 o adulto descobre em sua própria vida o que sua cultura, a educação, os livros, a tradição lhe ensinaram a ver nela. Nosso contato com nós mesmos sempre se faz através de uma cultura, ao menos através de uma linguagem que nós recebemos de fora23 e que nos orienta no conhecimento de nós mesmos. De tal modo que o puro si-mesmo, o espírito, sem instrumentos e sem história, só se realiza em liberdade efetiva, se de fato ele é como que uma instância crítica que opomos à pura e simples intrusão das ideias que nos são sugeridas pelo meio, por meio da linguagem e participando da vida do mundo24. Resulta disso uma imagem do homem e da humanidade que é bem diferente daquela de que nós partimos. A humanidade não é uma soma de indivíduos, uma comunidade de pensadores na qual cada um, em sua solidão, esteja assegurado antecipadamente de se entender com os outros porque eles participariam todos da mesma essência pensante. Ela também não é, evidentemente, um único Ser25 no qual a pluralidade dos indivíduos estaria dissolvida e destinada a se desfazer. Ela é por princípio instável: cada um só pode crer no que reconhece interiormente por verdadeiro – e, ao mesmo tempo, cada um só pensa e decide depois de já ter sido tomado em certas relações com outrem, que orientam de preferência para tais tipos de opiniões. Cada um é sozinho e ninguém pode passar sem os outros, não somente para sua utilidade – que não está em questão aqui – mas para sua felicidade. Não há vida em comum 22 Segundo a gravação: "por sua vez". 23 Durante a gravação o fim da frase foi suprimido. 24 Segundo a gravação: "De tal modo que o puro si-mesmo, o espírito sem corpo, sem instrumentos e sem história, se de fato ele é como que uma instância crítica que opomos à pura e simples intrusão das ideias que nos são sugeridas pelo meio, só se realiza por meio da linguagem e participando da vida do mundo". 25 Segundo a gravação: "um grande Ser". 513513 que nos livre do peso de nós mesmos e nos dispense de ter uma opinião; não há vida "interior" que não seja como um primeiro ensaio de nossas relações com outrem. Nesta situação ambígua em que somos lançados porque temos um corpo e uma história pessoal e coletiva, não podemos encontrar repouso absoluto, precisamos trabalhar incessantemente para reduzir nossas divergências, para explicar nossas palavras mal compreendidas, para manifestar o que em nós é escondido, para perceber outrem. A razão e o acordo entre os espíritos não estão por trás de nós, eles estão presuntivamente diante de nós, e nós somos tão incapazes de atingi-los definitivamente quanto de renunciar a eles26. Compreende-se que nossa espécie, engajada assim em uma tarefa que nunca é concluída, nem poderia sê-lo, e que tampouco é necessariamente destinada a conseguir terminá-la, mesmo relativamente, encontre nessa situação ao mesmo tempo um motivo de inquietude e um motivo de coragem. Ambos, para dizer a verdade, são um só. Pois a inquietude é vigilância, é a vontade de julgar, de saber o que fazemos e o que nos propomos. Se não existe fatalidade boa, também não existe fatalidade má e a coragem está em relacionar-se a si e aos outros na medida em que, através de todas as diferenças entre as situações físicas e sociais, todos deixem transparecer em sua própria conduta e em suas relações a mesma chama que faz com que nós os reconheçamos, que tenhamos necessidade de seu assentimento ou de sua crítica, que tenhamos um destino comum27. Esse humanismo dos modernos não tem mais, simplesmente, o tom peremptório dos séculos precedentes. Não nos vangloriemos mais de sermos uma comunidade de puros espíritos, vejamos o que são realmente as relações entre uns e outros em nossas sociedades: a maior parte do tempo, relações de senhor a escravo. Não nos desculpemos por nossas boas intenções, vejamos o que elas se tornam quando saem de nós28. 26 Segundo a gravação: "e nós somos tão incapazes de renunciar a eles quanto de possuílos definitivamente". 27 Durante a gravação, esse parágrafo, a partir de "Compreende-se que nossa espécie [...]" foi suprimido. A leitura recomeça aqui: "O humanismo dos modernos [...]". 28 Segundo a gravação: "Não nos vangloriemos mais de sermos uma comunidade de puros espíritos, observemos atentamente que as boas intenções de cada um (proletário, capitalista, francês, alemão), vistas de fora e pelos outros, têm às vezes um aspecto horrível". A leitura recomeça aqui. 514 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 514 merLeAu-ponty • quintA ConversA: o homem visto de forA Existe alguma coisa de sadio nesse olhar exterior com que nos propomos considerar nossa espécie29. Outrora, em Micrômegas, Voltaire imaginou um gigante de um outro planeta confrontado com nossos costumes, que só podiam aparecer irrisórios a uma inteligência mais elevada do que a nossa. Ao nosso tempo, foi reservado julgar-se a si mesmo não do alto, o que é amargo e maldoso, mas, de alguma maneira, de baixo30. Kafka imagina um homem metamorfoseado em barata e que vê a família com um olhar de barata. Ele imagina as investigações de um cão que se depara com o mundo humano. Descreve sociedades encerradas na concha dos costumes que adotaram, e hoje Maurice Blanchot descreve uma sociedade fixada na evidência de sua lei, da qual todos participam tão estreitamente que não experimentam mais nem mesmo sua própria diferença, nem a dos outros. Ver o homem de fora é a crítica e é a saúde do espírito. Mas não, como Voltaire, para sugerir que tudo é absurdo. Ao contrário, para sugerir, como Kafka, que a vida humana está sempre ameaçada, e para preparar, pelo humor, os momentos raros e preciosos em que acontece aos homens de se reconhecerem e se encontrarem31. 29 Segundo a gravação: "olhar exterior com que consideramos assim nossa espécie". 30 Durante a gravação, Merleau-Ponty diz no lugar dessa frase: "Existe nisso amargura, maldade. Os modernos têm mais humor de verdade. Eles tomam por testemunho daquilo que há de contingente nas sociedades humanas não uma inteligência superior a nossa, simplesmente uma inteligência diferente." 31 Durante a gravação, Merleau-Ponty modifica o fim, desde "Descreve sociedades", e o substitui por: "Ou, finalmente, ele imagina um personagem simples, de boa fé, pronto para se reconhecer culpado e que se defronta com uma lei estranha, com um poder incompreensível, com a coletividade, com o Estado. Kafka não evoca a loucura dos homens com os argumentos de Micrômegas. Ele não acredita que exista Micrômegas. Não espera por nenhum no futuro. Menos otimista, mas também menos maldoso para com seu tempo do que Voltaire, ele prepara, pelo humor, os momentos raros e preciosos em que acontece aos homens de se reconhecerem e se encontrarem". 515515 entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".516 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 516 517517 "O que é a verdade?" Esta é a famosa pergunta feita por Pilatos a Jesus.1 (João, 18, 38) Uma pergunta que insiste em incomodar o homem, exigindo soluções que, quando surgem, parecem sempre insatisfatórias e acabam trazendo à luz outras questões, tais como: qual o alcance do intelecto humano no que se refere ao conhecimento das coisas? Que segurança ele pode nos dar? Dúvidas que se estendem também às relações entre os homens: como saber se aquilo que alguém nos fala é verdade? Como ter certeza de que as teorias que os cientistas nos apresentam são verdadeiras? Afinal, por que confiar nas pessoas se elas muitas vezes já mentiram para nós, e por que confiar nos homens da ciência se eles nem ficam ruborizados ao terem de reconhecer que as verdades aceitas e reverenciadas até certo momento por eles são negadas veementemente em seguida pela própria ciência? O fato é que essas indagações – se existem verdades e se o nosso intelecto pode chegar a elas – apresentam-se como um enigma a ser desvendado por alguém que pretenda conhecer um pouco melhor o homem, e esse enigma parece tornar-se ainda mais interessante quando se acres1 A Bíblia de Jerusalém. São Paulo: Paulinas, 1981. p. 1410 (João, 18, 38). eNtRe A VeRDADe e O IMpuLSO À VeRDADe: ApReSeNtAçãO AO eNSAIO De NIetZSCHe "SOBRe VeRDADe e MeNtIRA O SeNtIDO eXtRA-MORAL" entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".518 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 518 centa mais uma pergunta: por que o homem possui essa necessidade de acreditar em verdades e de aceitar certas coisas como verdadeiras? O que caracteriza no homem esse "impulso à verdade"? Tais questões, mas especialmente a última, parecem ter sido o ponto de partida para o pensador alemão Friedrich Nietzsche escrever o pequeno ensaio, sobre o qual hoje nos debruçamos, intitulado "Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extra-moral". Nele o filósofo se pergunta pelo papel do intelecto, pela forma como o homem inventa a linguagem e especialmente por um fenômeno curioso que pode ser chamado de "impulso à verdade" ou então de "vontade de verdade", expressão que traduz aquela necessidade que o homem demonstra de acreditar em certas coisas como sendo verdadeiras. Eis o ponto de partida para uma reflexão extremamente interessante de um dos filósofos mais provocadores da nossa cultura, cujos passos pretendemos acompanhar para entender sua preocupação pelo valor da verdade. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche nasceu no dia 15 de outubro de 1844, numa pequena localidade, próxima à cidade de Leipzig, chamada Röcken, onde seu pai, Carl Ludwig Nietzsche, seguindo o legado de sua família, exercia a função de pastor da Igreja Luterana local. Sua mãe Franzisca Oehler Nietzsche, também descendente de uma família de longa tradição religiosa, via no pequeno Friedrich um futuro pastor e pensava em educá-lo para essa finalidade. Filho mais velho do casal, o filósofo teve dois irmãos: uma menina chamada Elisabeth e um menino, Joseph, que faleceu prematuramente, em 1849. Também nesse mesmo ano morreu o pai de Nietzsche, fato que forçou a mãe a mudar-se com outros parentes para Naumburg, onde ele estudou primeiramente no Naumburger Domgymasium (ginásio da catedral de Naumburg) e depois numa escola famosa da região chamada Landesschule Pforta (Escola regional de Pforta), que frequentou de 1858 a 1864, graças à condição de aluno bolsista.2 No segundo semestre de 1884, Nietzsche ingressou na Universi2 Para as informações sobre a vida de Nietzsche utilizamos especialmente: JANZ, C. P. Friedrich Nietzsche. Munchen: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1993. 3 v. 519519 dade de Bonn, no curso de Teologia. Entretanto, pouco tempo depois ele abandonou os projetos de sua família de tornar-se pastor e optou, então, por cursar Filologia, dedicando-se em especial ao estudo dos gregos. Em 1885 acompanhou seu professor, Ritschl, mudando-se para Leipzig, onde concluiu seus estudos. Foi em Leipzig que o jovem filólogo entrou em contato com o pensamento de Arthur Schopenhauer, ao descobrir num antiquário a obra O mundo como vontade e representação. A leitura desse livro colocou-o diante do mestre que buscava e com o qual debaterá durante o resto de sua vida. Em Leipzig também Nietzsche entrou em contato com o compositor alemão Richard Wagner, que exerceu uma grande influência sobre seu pensamento, marcadamente sobre seus primeiros escritos. De fato, nessa época Nietzsche colocava na filosofia de Schopenhauer e na música de Wagner as suas esperanças de uma redenção da cultura alemã do que ele denominava "filisteus da cultura".3 Em 1869, ainda muito jovem, Nietzsche foi recomendado para a cátedra de Filologia da Universidade de Basileia, na Suíça. No período em que foi professor, de 1869 a 1878, ele publicou seus primeiros livros. Entre eles destacam-se O nascimento da tragédia, em que apresenta uma interpretação da tragédia grega e o que pode ser chamado de uma metafísica de artista,4 e suas Considerações extemporâneas, voltadas especialmente para a crítica à cultura de sua época, que era marcada, segundo ele, por um enciclopedismo desvinculado da vida, além de outros ensaios mantidos inéditos. É no conjunto desses ensaios que encontramos o texto traduzido nesta coletânea: "Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extra-moral", que foi escrito em 1873. Embora os cursos oferecidos pelo jovem professor fossem bastan3 Esta expressão aparece no primeiro livro da série de Considerações Extemporâneas, intitulado David Strauss, o confessor e o escritor, de 1873. Volker Gerhardt define "o caricaturizado filisteu da cultura" como "um homem que acredita na ciência, no contínuo progresso da sociedade e na bondade no ser humano, um homem que renega a trágica contradição no ser dos indivíduos – se em todo caso ele a conhece – e não coloca a questão pelo sentido de sua vida". (GERHARDT, V. Friedrich Nietzsche. Munchen: Beck, 1995, p. 39). 4 Publicamos um artigo sobre esse tema em uma revista eletrônica chamada Adverbum. Cf.: PASCHOAL, A. E. Neuroses de Sanidade. Disponível em: http://www.psicanaliseefilosofia.com.br/adverbum/Vol1_1/neuroses_sanidade.pdf. Acesso em: nov. 2008. entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".520 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 520 te frequentados num primeiro momento, sua carreira acadêmica não foi muito promissora. Contribuiu para isso, alem de seu posicionamento crítico em relação ao meio acadêmico, também a sua debilidade física e particularmente os problemas com os olhos, que comprometiam ao extremo a sua capacidade visual e o impediam de realizar suas atividades docentes. A título de exemplo, pode-se mencionar que o ensaio "Sobre verdade e mentira", assim como a Primeira Extemporânea intitulada David Strauss o confessor e o escritor, não foram propriamente escritos pelo filósofo, mas ditados a um amigo, Carl von Gersdorff, que atuou como um secretário de Nietzsche nos períodos em que seus problemas relacionados à visão chegavam a impedi-lo de ler e escrever. O declínio de sua carreira, contudo, deveu-se também a outros fatores como as críticas que sofreu por causa de sua interpretação da tragédia grega, publicada em seu primeiro livro. Uma crítica vinda não somente de opositores, mas também de aliados como, por exemplo, Ritschl, seu antigo professor. Grosso modo, as críticas se dirigiam ao fato de que Nietzsche teria optado por uma sobrevalorização da intuição e da arte, especialmente da música em detrimento de uma leitura dogmática da ciência filológica. Especialmente pela direção peculiar que imprimia à sua obra no decorrer dos anos 70, Nietzsche foi se afastando também de boa parte de seus antigos amigos, em especial de Wagner, e, ao mesmo tempo, da filosofia de Schopenhauer. Esse afastamento torna-se decisivo, porém, quando ele publica, em 1878, um livro intitulado Humano, demasiado humano. De fato, a partir do lançamento desse livro ocorre um rompimento definitivo com antigos círculos de amizade intelectual. Amigos que se sentiam igualmente "traídos" graças à nova orientação "científica" de Nietzsche. Nessa mesma época, Nietzsche se desligou em definitivo de suas obrigações como professor por meio de um pedido de aposentadoria dirigido à Universidade onde trabalhava. Tal pedido foi aceito em função de suas constantes crises de saúde, encerrando, assim, uma rotina universitária muito difícil para o jovem professor que sempre interrompia seus cursos por motivos de saúde e que já estava desde 1876 de licença para tratamento médico. 521521 A sua nova condição, contudo, não foi recebida com amargor pelo filósofo, que passou a ter uma vida errante aos moldes do que entendia como um "espírito livre", podendo dedicar mais tempo às suas atividades de pensador sem as antigas obrigações acadêmicas. Assim, num período especialmente delicado para a sua saúde, em que é abandonado por alguns de seus antigos aliados, mas não por aqueles amigos que se manteram sempre ligados a ele, como Gersdorff e Overbeck, por exemplo, Nietzsche assume um estilo de vida mais solitário, viajando de uma região para outra em busca de um clima ideal para a sua saúde e hospedando-se em pensões de Veneza, Gênova, Sils-Maria, Turin etc. No período que teve início com a publicação de Humano, demasiado humano e que se desenvolve com outros livros como Aurora e A gaia ciência, a crítica de Nietzsche à cultura ganhou novos contornos. Ela se volta especialmente contra a metafísica e a moral que, segundo o filósofo, não veiculam coisas, teses ou juízos de valor universal e nem devem ser tomadas como princípios inquestionáveis a partir dos quais se definiria o que é certo e o que é errado no agir humano, ou para corrigir este mundo. Segundo ele, diferentemente do que muitos pensadores acreditavam, os juízos de valor moral e os preceitos metafísicos não são verdades estabelecidas desde sempre e independentes da ação do homem. Ao contrário, trata-se de invenções do próprio homem, pertencendo, de resto, ao cômpito das coisas humanas, muito humanas. Para assegurar os novos contornos de sua crítica, nesses livros o filósofo passou a valorizar a ciência, assumindo algumas posições relativamente próximas do cientificismo que caracterizou o século XIX, em especial a ideia de dissipar as trevas da ignorância e da superstição que impedem a elevação moral da humanidade. Uma nova mudança na filosofia de Nietzsche pode ser verificada a partir de 1883, especialmente com o seu livro Assim falou Zaratustra. Nesse caso, contudo, a mudança não será de estilo de vida ou, de forma tão acentuada, em relação aos temas trabalhados . Trata-se, mais, do recurso a algumas teses, já preparadas anteriormente e que são explicitadas a parentre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".522 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 522 tir de então.5 Tais teses, que constituiram o que o filósofo chamou de uma "linguagem própria para tratar de coisas próprias" 6 são: as doutrinas do eterno retorno do mesmo e da vontade de poder, a ideia de um além-dohomem, bem com a noção de niilismo associada à proposição da morte de Deus. Essas doutrinas se encontram em parte nos textos publicados e em parte nos textos inéditos, que foram posteriormente explorados como importantes fontes de estudos por pesquisadores ocupados com a filosofia de Nietzsche. Entre os livros escritos após o Zaratustra, destacam-se Além de bem e mal, Para a genealogia da moral, O crepúsculo dos Ídolos e O Anticristo. Neles, aquelas doutrinas aparecem como uma espécie de pressuposto teórico que permitem à sua crítica à moral ganhar novos contornos e relevância. O tom polêmico que Nietzsche imprime aos seus livros levou algumas pessoas a questionaram a qualidade dos mesmos, especialmente dos últimos, alegando que teriam sido compostos num momento em que sua mente já estaria sob os efeitos da doença e da loucura. O fato, contudo, é que tais suspeitas não possuem amparo científico, além de desconsiderarem que o tom polêmico faz parte do estilo de Nietzsche desde sua primeira Consideração extemporânea, em 1873. De fato, a doença irá interromper sua produção filosófica, porém, bruscamente, a partir de um colapso psíquico ocorrido no início de janeiro de 1889. Desde então, o ex-professor, em estado vegetativo, ficou sob os cuidados de amigos e da família até 25 de agosto de 1900, ano de sua morte na cidade de Weimar. A maior controvérsia, contudo, em torno dos livros de Nietzsche não decorre do fato de eles terem ou não sido produzidos sob efeitos da doença ou eventuais remédios tomados pelo filósofo em sua convalescença, mas da manipulação sofrida por seus manuscritos após a sua morte, especialmente pela irmã Elizabeth, que em 1893 assumiu o espólio do filósofo já doente. 5 Exploramos esta questão, anteriormente, em: PASCHOAL, A. E. A genealogia de Nietzsche. 2. ed. Curitiba: Champagnat, 2005. p. 44-48. 6 NIETZSCHE, F. Genealogia da moral. Tradução de Paulo César de Souza. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2008. p. 10. 523523 Movida por interesses financeiros e sem os devidos cuidados com o pensamento do irmão, Elizabeth Förster-Nietzsche passou a comercializar seus livros, chegando ao ponto de descontextualizar e deturpar alguns fragmentos que foram levados a público como obras inéditas do filósofo. Este é o caso do livro intitulado Vontade de poder, o qual, de fato, o filósofo nunca escreveu.7 Outro livro comercializado a partir de então é o chamado O livro do filósofo, que apresenta uma coletânea de textos de Nietzsche sobre o tema do conhecimento, incluindo as duas partes do ensaio que hoje temos em mãos: "Sobre verdade e mentira". Tais coletâneas que, via de regra, não respeitam a cronologia dos manuscritos e os diferentes contextos em que foram redigidos, e que em alguns casos chegam ao limite da adulteração de fragmentos, não podem ser considerados como obras de Nietzsche. Os livros de Nietzsche são apresentados hoje em várias edições. Porém, a única considerada pelos estudiosos do filósofo como um trabalho realmente sério é a dos italianos Giorgio Colli e Mazino Montinari, que se ocuparam de publicá-los mantendo o status de fragmento para o que é fragmento e de obra acabada apenas para o que foi designado pelo filósofo como tal. Atualmente, o trabalho iniciado pelos italianos vem sendo completado por uma equipe coordenada por Marie-Luize Haase, que está levando a público alguns manuscritos tendo o cuidado de reproduzir inclusive as rasuras próprias a textos não preparados para publicação, mas para uso pessoal do filósofo. Esse material é de enorme importância, tendo em vista que o pensamento de Nietzsche, em grande parte encontra-se nesses fragmentos e não obra publicada. O que vimos até este ponto, uma visão panorâmica da vida e da obra de Nietzsche, permite localizar o ensaio que estamos estudando como parte do primeiro empreendimento crítico do filósofo dirigido à cultura de sua época. Um ensaio que integra os textos escritos por ele no período em que foi professor na Universidade de Basileia, mais precisamente no ano de 1873, e mantido inédito. Além dessa visão panorâmica, 7 Conferir a respeito, a resenha feita do livro Vontade de poder por Ernani Chaves e publicada em: Revista de Filosofia – Aurora, v. 21, n. 27, p. 449-452, ago./set. 2008. Disponível em http://www2.pucpr.br/reol/index.php/RF?dd99=atual. Acesso: nov. 2008. entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".524 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 524 contudo, interessa expor nesta apresentação alguns traços daquilo que entendemos como o contexto no qual o ensaio é produzido, mostrar sua organização e o modo como em "Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extra-moral" explicitam-se alguns aspectos singulares do pensamento do Nietzsche. O contexto no qual esse ensaio se insere é o do questionamento acerca do papel e dos limites da razão, debate marcante no final do século XVIII e no decorrer do XIX. Um questionamento que coloca em dúvida especialmente o papel do intelecto como produtor de verdades últimas como, por exemplo, a coisa em si. Tal dúvida em relação ao papel do intelecto tem lugar especial no pensamento de dois filósofos, Kant e Schopenhauer, com contornos próprios em cada um deles. Kant, em sua Crítica à razão pura apresenta uma preocupação quanto ao campo de atuação do intelecto. Tendo em vista especialmente a aparelhagem cognitiva que o homem dispõe para a apreensão da realidade, ele estabelece os limites da ação da razão e separa desse campo aquilo que o homem não está apto a conhecer. Para Kant o conhecimento que temos das coisas não inclui alguma forma de apreensão da essência última desse mundo nem a possibilidade de respostas a questões como, por exemplo, se ele teve princípio, se é eterno etc. Podemos conhecer apenas aquilo que pode ser representado para nós meio das formas da sensibilidade e das categorias do intelecto humano. Tais são os limites para a atuação da razão segundo Kant: não conhecemos o mundo propriamente como ele é, mas como se apresenta para nós a partir das peculiaridades de nosso aparelho cognitivo e das ferramentas que ele dispõe para conhecer. Schopenhauer, num desdobramento da filosofia kantiana, amplia a ideia de uma crítica às pretensões do intelecto, dando lugar ao que pode ser chamado de um projeto de despotencialização da razão. Na filosofia de Schopenhauer a razão deixa de ocupar o lugar central na definição do homem, sendo substituída pela Vontade, que é a principal força motriz da ação humana e também o que se encontra por trás do devir das coisas no mundo. Ela corresponde, assim, segundo Schopenhauer, ao ser em si 525525 do mundo, à explicação última da realidade, em relação à qual a razão tem pouco a falar, limitando-se a fazer uma representação do mundo. A proximidade de Nietzsche em relação a essa tradição kantiana, contudo, como se pode notar, não é incondicional, pois ele mantém certas peculiaridades, especialmente no texto que estamos estudando. Em relação a Kant, deve-se observar que Nietzsche não se restringe a uma preocupação com os limites da razão humana, embora essa questão esteja colocada no início do ensaio que temos em mãos. Além do que, a própria preocupação de Kant em assegurar um solo seguro para os conhecimentos dentro daquele limite do intelecto, recebe de Nietzsche a dura crítica de que também o filósofo de Königsberg atuaria a partir do mesmo impulso à verdade que caracteriza os filósofos em geral.8 Nietzsche também se afasta definitivamente de Schopenhauer nesse ensaio sobre a verdade e a mentira, pois embora admita o papel da intuição e valorize o homem que se deixa guiar por ela, não a apresenta como capaz de dizer o que é a essência do mundo. Mesmo metaforicamente. Em sua apreensão por Nietzsche, o projeto crítico é levado a outro patamar, especialmente porque o filósofo aponta uma correlação entre as pretensões do intelecto e as necessidades do homem. Para ele, mais do que a pergunta pela verdade, interessa o questionamento sobre o motivo pelo qual existe, no homem, aquele "impulso à verdade". No que se refere à organização do texto de "Sobre verdade e mentira", cabe ressaltar que o pequeno livro tem as características de uma obra inacabada, da qual apenas duas partes foram escritas, melhor, ditadas ao amigo Gersdorff. Na primeira parte do ensaio, Nietzsche apresenta um questionamento quanto aos limites do intelecto humano no que tange o conhecimento e denuncia alguns abusos ocorridos nesse campo. Tal é o que se observa no início do texto, com a apresentação de uma fábula que "alguém" poderia ter contado: "em algum remoto rincão do universo cintilante que se derrama em um sem-número de sistemas solares, havia uma vez um astro, em que animais inteligentes inventaram o 8 NIETZSCHE, F. Obras incompletas. Tradução de Rubens R. Torres Filho. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1991. (Coleção Os Pensadores), p. 111-113. entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".526 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 526 conhecimento. Foi o minuto mais soberbo e mais mentiroso da 'história universal': mas também foi somente um minuto. Passados poucos fôlegos da natureza congelou-se o astro, e os animais inteligentes tiveram de morrer."9 Por meio dessa fábula ele busca ilustrar o "quão lamentável, quão fantasmagórico e fugaz, quão sem finalidade e gratuito fica o intelecto humano dentro da natureza", uma vez que "houve eternidades, em que ele [o intelecto] não estava; quando de novo ele tiver passado, nada terá acontecido". Pois, segundo o filósofo, "não há para aquele intelecto nenhuma missão mais vasta, que conduzisse além da vida humana".10 Essa dura crítica ao intelecto, no entanto, não possui a intenção de negar a sua importância para o homem, mas de estabelecer seus limites. Segundo o filósofo o intelecto e, por conseguinte, o conhecimento abstrato que é o seu modo de operar, possui apenas uma função instrumental: ele é um meio usado para a sobrevivência do animal homem, do mesmo modo como outros animais usam garras, chifres e presas. Por este motivo, não se pode esperar do intelecto e do conhecimento abstrato, qualquer desvelamento do mundo que apresente sua essência última, a coisa em si. Para Nietzsche qualquer pretensão acerca do intelecto que o lance para além dessa sua capacidade só pode ocorrer por uma ilusão produzida pelo próprio intelecto, e qualquer sentido que ele encontre por trás da vida, só poderá fazê-lo porque foi ele mesmo que o colocou ali. Segundo Nietzsche, conforme se pode verificar no pequeno ensaio, a ilusão e a dissimulação, que são as formas como o intelecto atua para a conservação dos indivíduos, é que os levou àquela sobrevalorização da razão. Para o filósofo também, a opção do homem pela verdade, procurando conferir a ela bases seguras de sustentação por meio do intelecto, não se dá por um valor epistemológico que a diference da mentira, até porque as verdades se mostram um tanto quanto provisórias, mas por motivos fisiológicos. É por necessidade de segurança, de um homem 9 NIETZSCHE, F. Sobre verdade e mentira no sentido extra-moral. In: _____. Obras incompletas. Tradução de Rubens Rodrigues Torres Filho. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1991. (Coleção Os Pensadores), v. 1, p. 31. 10 Idem. 527527 que optou por viver em comunidade, que a verdade ganhou preferência sobre a mentira, pois o homem, segundo ele, ambiciona as consequências agradáveis da verdade e não ela mesma. Acreditar na verdade, assim como acreditar que os conceitos são fórmulas fixas para exprimir uma suposta realidade e que eles podem ser avaliados por sua equivalência com as coisas ou com as ideias, oferece uma segurança maior para o homem do que o seu contrário. A verdade mesma (pergunta de Pilatos), contudo, segundo Nietzsche, é apenas uma ilusão que se produz por meio do uso da linguagem e do esquecimento, ela é um produto da capacidade de dissimulação do intelecto. "As verdades são ilusões, das quais se esqueceu que o são, metáforas que se tornaram gastas e sem força sensível, moedas que perderam sua efígie e agora só entram em consideração como metal, não mais como moedas".11 Produtos que ganharam adornos, que foram enfeitados e que, com o uso prolongado, foram parecendo sólidos e seguros para um determinado povo. De fato, o que o intelecto produz são metáforas utilizadas para dizer as coisas. Com o passar do tempo, porém, o homem se esquece dessa característica metafórica daquilo que usa na linguagem e confere às metáforas iniciais o status de conceitos, que não são mais apresentados como afirmações provisórias, mas com a função de dizerem o que as coisas são de fato. Mais adiante o homem passa a acreditar que está designando as coisas mesmas por meio das palavras e, no extremo desse movimento, passa a falar na verdade em si (o que é "a" verdade?). Tal movimento, no entanto, curiosamente acompanha a própria função ilusionista do intelecto. Inicialmente, ao produzir representações para algo, ilusões, disfarces e, depois, ao levar o homem a acreditar que isto seja uma representação da coisa mesma. Nova ilusão. Na segunda parte do ensaio, além do caráter de utilidade do intelecto, o filósofo coloca em relevo a capacidade do intelecto como ilusionista, de atuar como um artista que produz ilusões. Ele destaca que a ilusão maior é a de levar o homem a acreditar que tais ilusões são verdades, apontando, assim, como problema, o fato de o homem acreditar no produto do intelecto como verdade, na ficção como realidade. Algo que 11 Ibidem, p. 34. entre A verdAde e o impuLso à verdAde: ApresentAção Ao ensAio de nietzsche "sobre verdAde e mentirA o sentido eXtrA-morAL".528 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 528 não é difícil de ocorrer, pois o homem tem uma propensão a se deixar enganar. Em contraposição ao conhecimento abstrato e à sobrevalorização do papel conferido aos conceitos, o filósofo aponta o conhecimento intuitivo e a sua forma de dizer o mundo como o faz o artista. E, completando essa contraposição ele opõe ao homem racional, que se deixa guiar pelo conhecimento abstrato, o homem intuitivo, que se faz conduzir por intuições. A diferença? Este último sabe que está lidando com disfarces, com máscaras e, diversamente daquele que precisa de uma tábua de segurança, uma verdade, para se agarrar, este último, obra prima do disfarce, segue pela vida sem querer que ela lhe ofereça mais do que é próprio a ela. Por fim, cabe ressaltar que o tema desse pequeno ensaio não será mais retomado da mesma forma pelo filósofo, embora reapareça em algumas passagens de textos posteriores, como é o caso, por exemplo, do aforismo 24 de Além de Bem e Mal 12 e do parágrafo 3 do Prefácio de Aurora 13. Contudo, ele se mantém como uma preocupação e uma presença constante nos escritos do filósofo até o final de sua vida. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de nietzsche traduzidas Para o Português NIETZSCHE, F. Obras incompletas. Tradução de Rubens Rodrigues Torres Filho. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1991. (Coleção Os Pensadores) _____. Genealogia da moral. Tradução de Paulo César de Souza. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1987. obras sobre nietzsche (em Português) GIACOIA JÚNIOR, O. Nietzsche. São Paulo: Publifolha, 2000. MACHADO, R. Nietzsche e a verdade. Rio de Janeiro: Rocco, 1985. 12 NIETZSCHE, F. Além do bem e do mal. Tradução de Paulo César de Souza. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1992. p. 31. 13 NIETZSCHE, F. Obras incompletas, p. 111-113. 529529 MARTON, S. Nietzsche: a transvaloração dos valores. São Paulo: Moderna, 1993. PASCHOAL, A. E. Nietzsche e a auto-superação da moral. Ijuí: UNIJUÍ, 2009. sites de referência http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/gen/cn/edicoes.html http://www.estudiosnietzsche.org/seden/ http://www.hypernietzsche.org/doc/presentation/po/index.html http://www.mundodosfilosofos.com.br/nietzsche.htm 530 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 530 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL SOBRe VeRDADe e MeNtIRA NO SeNtIDO eXtRA-MORAL 1 (1873) §1 Em algum remoto rincão do universo cintilante que se derrama em um sem número de sistemas solares, havia uma vez um astro, em que animais inteligentes inventaram o conhecimento. Foi o minuto mais soberbo e mais mentiroso da "história universal": mas também foi somente um minuto. Passados poucos fôlegos da natureza congelou-se o astro, e os animais inteligentes tiveram de morrer. – Assim poderia alguém inventar uma fábula e nem por isso teria ilustrado suficientemente quão lamentável, quão fantasmagórico e fugaz, quão sem finalidade e gratuito fica o intelecto humano dentro da natureza. Houve eternidades, em que ele não estava: quando de novo ele tiver passado, nada terá acontecido. Pois não há para aquele intelecto nenhuma missão mais vasta, que con1 O texto original chama-se: Uber Wahrheit und Luge in aussenmoralischen Sinne. A tradução, como é antiga, assim, toma uma edição também antiga na Alemanha e colocada sob suspeita hoje, a qual seria: NIETZSCHE, F. Werke. Herausgegeben von Nietzsche-Archiv. Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1901-1913. Porém, como se trata de um texto completo, e sem variações nas várias edições feitas da obra de Nietzsche, creio que podemos indicar a edição mais usada hoje na Alemanha que é: NIETZSCHE, F. Kritische Studienausgabe. (KSA 1–15). Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: W de Gruyter, 1988. 531531 duzisse além da vida humana. Ao contrário, ele é humano, e somente seu possuidor e genitor o toma tão pateticamente, como se os gonzos do mundo girassem nele. Mas se pudéssemos entender-nos com a mosca, perceberíamos então que também ela bóia no ar com esse páthos e sente em si o centro voante deste mundo. Não há nada tão desprezível e mesquinho na natureza que, com um pequeno sopro daquela força do conhecimento, não transbordasse logo como um odre; e como todo transportador de carga quer seu admirador, mesmo o mais orgulhoso dos homens, o filósofo, pensa ver por todos os lados os olhos do universo telescopicamente em mira sobre seu agir e pensar. É notável que o intelecto seja capaz disso, justamente ele, que foi concedido apenas como meio auxiliar aos mais infelizes, delicados e perecíveis dos seres, para firmá-los um minuto na existência, da qual, sem essa concessão, eles teriam toda razão para fugir tão rapidamente quanto o filho de Lessing. Aquela altivez associada ao conhecer e sentir, nuvem de cegueira pousada sobre os olhos e sentidos dos homens, engana-os pois sobre o valor da existência, ao trazer em si a mais lisonjeira das estimativas de valor sobre o próprio conhecer. Seu efeito mais geral é engano – mas mesmo os efeitos mais particulares trazem em si algo do mesmo caráter. O intelecto, como um meio para a conservação do indivíduo, desdobra suas forças mestras no disfarce; pois este é o meio pelo qual os indivíduos mais fracos, menos robustos, se conservam, aqueles aos quais está vedado travar uma luta pela existência com chifres ou presas aguçadas. No homem essa arte do disfarce chega a seu ápice; aqui o engano, o lisonjear, mentir e ludibriar, o falar-por-trás-das costas, o representar, o viver em glória de empréstimo, o mascarar-se, a convenção dissimulante, o jogo teatral diante de outros e diante de si mesmo, em suma, o constante bater de asas em torno dessa única chama que é a vaidade, é a tal ponto a regra e a lei que quase nada é mais inconcebível do que como pôde aparecer entre os homens um honesto e puro impulso à verdade. Eles estão profundamente imersos em ilusões e imagens de sonho, seu olho apenas resvala às tontas pela superfície das coisas e vê "formas", sua sensação não conduz em parte alguma a verdade, mas contenta-se em receber es532 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 532 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL tímulos e como que dedilhara um teclado às costas das coisas. Por isso o homem, à noite, através da vida, deixa que o sonho lhe minta, sem que seu sentimento moral jamais tentasse impedi-lo; no entanto, deve haver homens que pela força de vontade deixaram o hábito de roncar. O que sabe propriamente o homem sobre si mesmo! Sim, seria ele sequer capaz de alguma vez perceber-se completamente, como se estivesse em uma vitrina iluminada? Não lhe cala a natureza quase tudo, mesmo sobre seu corpo, para mantê-Io à parte das circunvoluções dos intestinos, do fluxo rápido das correntes sanguíneas, das intrincadas vibrações das fibras, exilado e trancado em uma consciência orgulhosa, charlatã! Ela atirou fora a chave: e ai da fatal curiosidade que através de uma fresta foi capaz de sair uma vez do cubículo da consciência e olhar para baixo, e agora pressentiu que sobre o implacável, o ávido, o insaciável, o assassino, repousa o homem, na indiferença de seu não-saber, e como que pendente em sonhos sobre o dorso de um tigre. De onde neste mundo viria, nessa constelação, o impulso à verdade! Enquanto o indivíduo, em contraposição a outros indivíduos, quer conservar-se, ele usa o intelecto, em um estado natural das coisas, no mais das vezes somente para a representação: mas, porque o homem, ao mesmo tempo por necessidade e tédio, quer existir socialmente e em rebanho, ele precisa de um acordo de paz e se esforça para que pelo menos a máxima bellum omnium contra omnes2 desapareça de seu mundo. Esse tratado de paz traz consigo algo que parece ser o primeiro passo para alcançar aquele enigmático impulso à verdade. Agora, com efeito, é fixado aquilo que doravante deve ser "verdade", isto é, descoberta uma designação o uniformemente válida e obrigatória das coisas, e a legislação da linguagem dá também as primeiras leis da verdade: pois surge aqui pela primeira vez o contraste entre verdade e mentira. O mentiroso usa as designações válidas, as palavras, para fazer aparecer o não-efetivo como efetivo; ele diz, por exemplo: "sou rico", quando para seu estado seda precisamente "pobre" a designação correta. Ele faz mau uso das firmes convenções por meio de trocas arbitrárias ou mesmo inversões dos nomes. Se ele o faz de maneira egoísta e de resto prejudicial, a socie2 Guerra de todos contra todos. (N. do E.) 533533 dade não confiará mais nele e com isso o excluirá de si. Os homens, nisso, não procuram tanto evitar serem enganados, quanto serem prejudicados pelo engano: o que odeiam, mesmo nesse nível no fundo não é a ilusão, mas as consequências nocivas, hostis, de certas espécies de ilusões. É também em um sentido restrito semelhante que o homem quer somente a verdade: deseja as consequências da verdade que são agradáveis e conservam a vida; diante do conhecimento puro sem consequências ele é indiferente, diante das verdades talvez perniciosas e destrutivas ele tem disposição até mesmo hostil. E além disso: o que se passa com aquelas convenções da linguagem? São talvez frutos do conhecimento, do senso de verdade: as designações e as coisas se recobrem? É a linguagem a expressão adequada de todas as realidades? Somente por esquecimento pode o homem alguma vez chegar a supor que possui uma "verdade" no grau acima designado. Se ele não quiser contentar-se com a verdade na forma da tautologia, isto é, com os estojos vazios, comprará eternamente ilusões por verdades. O que é uma palavra? A figuração de um estímulo nervoso em sons. Mas concluir do estímulo nervoso uma causa fora de nós já é resultado de uma aplicação falsa e ilegítima do princípio da razão. Como poderíamos nós, se somente a verdade fosse decisiva na gênese da linguagem, se somente o ponto de vista da certeza fosse decisivo nas designações, como poderíamos no entanto dizer: a pedra é dura: como se para nós esse "dura" fosse conhecido ainda de outro modo, e não somente como uma estimulação inteiramente subjetiva! Dividimos as coisas por gêneros, designamos a árvore como feminina, o vegetal, como masculino: que transposições arbitrárias! A que distância voamos além do cânone da certeza! Falamos de uma Schlange (cobra): a designação não se refere a nada mais do que o enrodilhar-se, e portanto poderia também caber ao verme.3 Que delimitações arbitrárias, que preferências unilaterais, ora por esta, ora por aquela propriedade de uma coisa! As diferentes línguas, coladas lado a lado, 3 A palavra Schlange é diretamente derivada, por apofonia, do verbo schlingen ,(torcer, enroscar), no sentido específico da forma proposicional sich schlingen, que equivale ao de sich winden (enrodilhar-se). Em português a ligação entre a palavra cobra e o verbo colear, é bem mais remota; mais próxima, talvez;, seria a relação entre serpente e serpear. Preferimos, em todo, caso, manter o exemplo original do texto. (N. do T.) som. (N. do T.) 534 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 534 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL mostram que nas palavras nunca importa a verdade, nunca uma expressão adequada: pois senão não haveria tantas línguas. A "coisa em si" (tal seria justamente a verdade pura sem consequências) é também para o formador da linguagem, inteiramente incaptável e nem sequer algo que vale a pena. Ele designa apenas as relações das coisas aos homens e toma em auxílio para exprimi-Ias as mais audaciosas metáforas. Um estímulo nervoso, primeiramente transposto em uma imagem! Primeira metáfora. A imagem, por sua vez, modelada em um som! Segunda metáfora. E a cada vez completa mudança de esfera, passagem para uma esfera inteiramente outra e nova. Pode-se pensar em um homem, que seja totalmente surdo e nunca tenha tido uma sensação do som e da música: do mesmo modo que este, porventura, vê com espanto as figuras sonoras de Chladni4 desenhadas na areia, encontra suas causas na vibração das cordas e jurará agora que há de saber o que os homens denominam o "som", assim também acontece a todos nós com a linguagem. Acreditamos saber algo das coisas mesmas, se falamos de árvores, cores, neve e flores, e no entanto não possuímos nada mais do que metáforas das coisas, que de nenhum modo correspondem às entidades de origem. Assim como o som convertido em figura na areia, assim se comporta o enigmático X da coisa em si, uma vez como estímulo nervoso, em seguida como imagem, enfim como som. Em todo caso, portanto, não é logicamente que ocorre a gênese da linguagem, e o material inteiro, no qual e com o qual mais tarde o homem da verdade, o pesquisador, o filósofo, trabalha e constrói, provém, se não de Cucolândia das Nuvens, em todo caso não da essência das coisas. Pensemos ainda, em particular, na formação dos conceitos. Toda palavra torna-se logo conceito justamente quando não deve servir, como recordação, para a vivência primitiva, completamente individualizada e única, à qual deve seu surgimento, mas ao mesmo tempo tem de convir a um sem-número de casos, mais ou menos semelhantes, isto é, tomados rigorosamente, nunca iguais, portanto, a casos claramente desiguais. Todo conceito nasce por igualação do não-igual. Assim como é certo que nunca 4 Chladni, Ernst Friedrich físico alemão (1756-1826); ceIebrizou-se por suas engenhosas experiências sobre a teoria do som. (N. do T.) 535535 uma folha é inteiramente igual a uma outra, é certo que o conceito de folha é formado por arbitrário abandono dessas diferenças individuais, por um esquecer-se do que é distintivo, e desperta então a representação, como se na natureza além das folhas houvesse algo, que fosse "folha", uma espécie de folha primordial, segundo a qual todas as folhas fossem tecidas, desenhadas, recortadas, coloridas, frisadas, pintadas, mas por mãos inábeis, de tal modo que nenhum exemplar tivesse saído correto e fidedigno como cópia fiel da forma primordial. Denominamos um homem "honesto"; por que ele agiu hoje tão honestamente? – perguntamos. Nossa resposta costuma ser: por causa de sua honestidade. A honestidade! Isto quer dizer, mais uma vez: a folha é a causa das folhas. O certo é que não sabemos nada de uma qualidade essencial, que se chamasse "a honestidade", mas sabemos, isso sim, de numerosas ações individualizadas, portanto desiguais, que igualamos pelo abandono do desigual e designamos, agora, como ações honestas; por fim, formulamos a partir delas uma qualitas occulta com o nome: "a honestidade". A desconsideração do individual e efetivo nos dá o conceito, assim como nos dá também a forma, enquanto que a natureza não conhece formas nem conceitos, portanto também não conhece espécies, mas somente um X, para nós inacessível e indefinível. Pois mesmo nossa oposição entre indivíduo e espécie é antropomórfica e não provém da essência das coisas, mesmo se não ousamos dizer que não lhe corresponde: isto seria, com efeito, uma afirmação dogmática e como tal tão indemonstrável quanto seu contrário. O que é a verdade, portanto? Um batalhão móvel de metáforas, metonímias, antropomorfismos, enfim, uma soma de relações humanas, que foram enfatizadas poética e retoricamente, transpostas, enfeitadas, e que, após longo uso, parecem a um povo sólidas, canônicas e obrigatórias: as verdades são ilusões, das quais se esqueceu que o são, metáforas que se tomaram gastas e sem força sensível, moedas que perderam sua efígie e agora só entram em consideração como metal, não mais como moedas. Continuamos ainda sem saber de onde provém o impulso à verdade: pois até agora só ouvimos falar dá obrigação que a sociedade, para existir, estabelece: de dizer a verdade, isto é, de usar as metáforas usuais, 536 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 536 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL portanto, expresso moralmente: da obrigação de mentir segundo uma convenção sólida, mentir em rebanho, em um estilo obrigatório para todos. Ora, o homem esquece sem dúvida que é assim que se passa com ele: mente, pois, da maneira designada, inconscientemente e segundo hábitos seculares e justamente por essa inconsciência, justamente por esse esquecimento, chega ao sentimento da verdade. No sentimento de estar obrigado a designar uma coisa como "vermelha", outra como "fria", uma terceira como "muda", desperta uma emoção que se refere moralmente à verdade: a partir da oposição ao mentiroso, em quem ninguém confia, que todos excluem, o homem demonstra a si mesmo o que há de honrado, digno de confiança e útil na verdade. Coloca agora seu agir como ser "racional" sob a regência das abstrações: não suporta mais ser arrastado pelas impressões súbitas, pelas intuições, universaliza antes todas essas impressões em conceitos mais descoloridos, mais frios, para atrelar a eles o carro de seu viver e agir. Tudo o que destaca o homem do animal depende dessa aptidão de liquefazer a metáfora intuitiva em um esquema de dissolver uma imagem em um conceito. Ou seja, no reino daqueles esquemas, é possível algo que nunca poderia ter êxito sob o efeito das primeiras impressões intuitivas: edificar uma ordenação piramidal por castas e graus, criar um novo mundo de leis, privilégios, subordinações, demarcações de limites, que ora se defronta ao outro mundo intuitivo das primeiras impressões como o mais sólido, o mais universal, o mais conhecido, o mais humano e, por isso, como regulador e imperativo. Enquanto cada metáfora intuitiva é individual e sem igual e, por isso, sabe escapar a toda rubricação, o grande edifício dos conceitos ostenta a regularidade rígida de um columbário romano e respira na lógica aquele rigor e frieza, que são da própria matemática. Quem é bafejado por essa frieza dificilmente acreditará que até mesmo o conceito, ósseo e octogonal como um dado e tão fácil de deslocar quanto este, é somente o resíduo de uma metáfora, e que a ilusão da transposição artificial de um estímulo nervoso em imagens, se não é a mãe, é pelo menos a avó de todo e qualquer conceito. No interior desse jogo de dados do conceito, porém, chama-se "verdade" usar cada dado assim como ele e designado, contar exatamente seus pontos, formar rubricas corretas e nunca pecar contra a ordenação de castas e a sequência das classes hierárquicas. Assim como 537537 os romanos e etruscos retalhavam o céu com rígidas linhas matemáticas e em um espaço assim delimitado confirmavam um deus, como em um templo, assim cada povo tem sobre si um tal céu conceitual matematicamente repartido e entende agora por exigência de verdade que cada deus conceitual seja procurado somente em sua esfera. Pode-se muito bem, aqui, admirar o homem como um poderoso gênio construtivo, que consegue erigir sobre fundamentos móveis e como que sobre água corrente um domo conceitual infinitamente complicado: – sem dúvida, para encontrar apoio sobre tais fundamentos, tem de ser uma construção como que de fios de aranha, tão tênue a ponto de ser carregada pelas ondas, tão firme a ponto de não ser espedaçada pelo sopro de cada vento. Como gênio construtivo o homem se eleva, nessa medida, muito acima da abelha: esta constrói com cera, que recolhe da natureza, ele com a matéria muito mais tênue dos conceitos, que antes tem de fabricar a partir de si mesmo. Ele é, aqui, muito admirável – mas só que não por seu impulso à verdade, ao conhecimento puro das coisas. Quando alguém esconde uma coisa atrás de um arbusto, vai procurá-la ali mesmo e a encontra, não há muito que gabar nesse procurar e encontrar: e é assim: que se passa com o procurar e encontrar da "verdade" no interior do distrito da razão. Se forjo a definição de animal mamífero e em seguida declaro, depois de inspecionar um camelo: "Vejam, um animal mamífero", com isso decerto uma verdade é trazida à luz, mas ela é de valor limitado, quero dizer, é cabalmente antropomórfica e não contém um único ponto que seja "verdadeiro em si", efetivo e universalmente válido, sem levar em conta o homem. O pesquisador dessas verdades procura, no fundo, apenas a metamorfose do mundo em homem, luta por um entendimento do mundo como uma coisa à semelhança do homem e conquista, no melhor dos casos, o sentimento, de uma assimilação. Semelhante ao astrólogo que observava as estrelas a serviço do homem e em função de sua sorte e sofrimento, assim um tal pesquisador observa o mundo inteiro como ligado ao homem, como a repercussão infinitamente refratada de um som primordial, do homem, como a imagem multiplicada de uma imagem primordial, do homem. Seu procedimento consiste em tomar o homem por medida de todas as coisas: no que, porém, parte do erro de acreditar que tem essas coisas imediatamente, como objetos puros diante 538 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 538 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL de si. Esquece, pois, as metáforas intuitivas de origem, como metáforas, e as toma pelas coisas, mesmas. (...) §2 (...) Esse impulso à formação de metáforas, esse impulso fundamental do homem, que não se pode deixar de levar em conta nem por um instante, porque com isso o homem mesmo não seria levado em conta, quando se constrói para ele, a partir de suas criaturas liquefeitas, os conceitos, um novo mundo regular e rígido como uma praça forte, nem por isso, na verdade, ele é subjugado e mal é refreado. Ele procura um novo território para sua atuação e um outro leito de rio, e o encontra no mito e, em geral, na arte. Constantemente ele embaralha as rubricas e compartimentos dos conceitos, propondo novas transposições, metáforas, metonímias, constantemente ele mostra o desejo de dar ao mundo de que dispõe o homem acordado uma forma tão cromaticamente irregular, inconsequentemente incoerente, estimulante e eternamente nova como a do mundo do sonho. É verdade que somente pela teia rígida e regular do conceito o homem acordado tem certeza clara de estar acordado, e justamente por isso chega às vezes à crença de que sonha, se alguma vez aquela teia conceitual é rasgada pela arte. Pascal tem razão quando afirma que, se todas as noites nos viesse o mesmo sonho, ficaríamos tão ocupados com ele como com as coisas que vemos cada dia: "Se um trabalhador manual tivesse certeza de sonhar cada noite, doze horas a fio, que é rei, acredito", diz Pascal, "que seria tão feliz quanto um rei que todas as noites durante doze horas sonhasse que é um trabalhador manual". O dia de vigília de um povo de emoções míticas, por exemplo os gregos antigos, é de fato, pelo milagre constantemente atuante, que o mito aceita, mais semelhante ao sonho do que o dia do pensador que chegou à sobriedade da ciência. Se uma vez cada árvore pode falar como ninfa ou sob o invólucro de um touro um deus pode sequestrar donzelas, se mesmo a deusa Atena pode subitamente ser vista quando, com sua bela parelha, no séquito de Pisístrato, 539539 passa pelas praças de Atenas – e nisso acredita o ateniense honrado –, então a cada instante, como no sonho, tudo é possível, e a natureza inteira esvoaça em torno do homem como se fosse apenas uma mascarada dos deuses, para os quais seria apenas uma diversão enganar os homens em todas as formas. O próprio homem, porém, tem uma propensão invencível a deixarse enganar e fica como que enfeitiçado de felicidade quando o rapsodo lhe narra contos épicos como verdadeiros, ou o ator, no teatro, representa o rei ainda mais regiamente do que o mostra a efetividade. O intelecto, esse mestre do disfarce, está livre e dispensado de seu serviço de escravo, enquanto pode enganar sem causar dano, e celebra então suas Saturnais. Nunca 'ele é mais exuberante, mais rico, mais orgulhoso, mais hábil e mais temerário: com prazer criador ele entrecruza as metáforas e desloca as pedras-limites das abstrações, de tal moda que, por exemplo, designa o rio como caminho em movimento que transporta o homem para onde ele, do contrário, teria de ir a pé. Agora ele afastou de si o estigma da servilidade: antes empenhado em atribulada ocupação de mostrar a um pobre indivíduo, cobiçoso de existência, o caminho e os instrumentos e, como um servo, roubando e saqueando para seu senhor, ele agora se tornou senhor e pode limpar de seu rosto a expressão da indigência. O que quer que ele faça agora, tudo traz em si, em comparação com sua atividade anterior, o disfarce, assim como a anterior trazia em si a distorção. Ele copia a vida humana, mas a toma como uma boa coisa e parece dar-se por bem satisfeito com ela. Aquele descomunal arcabouço e travejamento dos conceitos, ao qual o homem indigente se agarra, salvando-se assim ao longo da vida, é para o intelecto que se tornou livre somente um andaime e um joguete para seus mais audazes artifícios: e quando ele o desmantela, entrecruza, recompõe ironicamente, emparelhando o mais alheio e separando o mais próximo, ele revela que não precisa daquela tábua de salvação da indigência e que agora não é guiado por conceitos, mas por intuições. Dessas intuições nenhum caminho regular leva à terra dos esquemas fantasmagóricos, das abstrações: para elas não foi feita a palavra, o homem emudece quando as vê, ou fala puramente em metáforas proibidas e em arranjos inéditos de conceitos, para pelo menos 540 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 540 nietzsChe • sobre verdAde e mentirA no sentido eXtrA-morAL através da demolição e escarnecimento dos antigos limites conceituais corresponder criadoramente à impressão de poderosa intuição presente. Há épocas em que o homem racional e o homem intuitivo ficam lado a lado, um com medo da intuição, o outro escarnecendo da abstração; este último é tão irracional quanto o primeiro é inartístico. Ambos desejam ter domínio sobre a vida: este sabendo, através de cuidado prévio, prudência, regularidade, enfrentar as principais necessidades, aquele, como "herói eufórico", não vendo aquelas necessidades e tomando somente a vida disfarçada em aparência e em beleza como real. Onde alguma vez o homem intuitivo, digamos como na Grécia antiga, conduz suas armas mais poderosamente e mais vitoriosamente do que seu reverso, pode configurar-se, em caso favorável, uma civilização e fundar-se o domínio da arte sobre a vida: aquele disfarce, aquela recusa da indigência, aquele esplendor das intuições metafóricas e em geral aquela imediatez da ilusão acompanham todas as manifestações de tal vida. Nem a casa, nem o andar, nem a indumentária, nem o cântaro de barro denunciam que a necessidade os inventou: parece como se em todos eles fosse enunciada uma sublime felicidade e uma olímpica ausência ele nuvens e como que um jogo com a seriedade. Enquanto o homem guiado por conceitos e abstrações, através destes, apenas se defende da infelicidade, sem conquistar das abstrações uma felicidade para si mesmo, enquanto ele luta para libertar-se o mais possível da dor, o homem intuitivo, em meio a uma civilização, colhe desde logo, já de suas intuições, fora a defesa contra o mal, um constante e torrencial contentamento, entusiasmo, redenção. Sem dúvida, ele sofre com mais veemência, quando sofre: e até mesmo sofre com mais frequência, pois não sabe aprender da experiência e sempre torna a cair no mesmo buraco em que caiu uma. vez. No sofrimento, então, é tão irracional quanto na felicidade, grita alto e nada o consola. Como é diferente, sob o mesmo infortúnio, o homem estóico instruído pela experiência e que se governa por conceitos! Ele, que de resto só procura retidão, verdade, imunidade a ilusões, proteção contra as tentações de fascinação, desempenha agora, na infelicidade, a obraprima do disfarce, como aquele na felicidade; não traz um rosto humano, palpitante e móvel, mas como que uma máscara com digno equilíbrio de 541541 traços, não grita e nem sequer altera a voz: se uma boa nuvem de chuva se derrama sobre ele, ele se envolve em seu manto e parte a passos lentos, debaixo dela. pLAtão e os primórdios dA estétiCA542 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 542 543543 Nascido no seio de antiga família nobre, em 428-7 a.C., PlATÃO viveu no período que sucede à morte de Péricles (429 a.C.), usufruindo dos benefícios da estabilidade política e do esplendor cultural de Atenas. Na juventude, acalentou o desejo de ingressar na vida pública. O encontro com Sócrates, do qual se tornou discípulo, e o impacto do julgamento e condenação à morte do mestre (399 a.C.) foram decisivos na opção pela Filosofia. Em 387 a.C., fundou a Academia e, em várias décadas de exercício do magistério e do ofício de escritor, Platão assegurou lugar de relevo na História da Filosofia e da Literatura. Faleceu em 347 a.C. Embora o termo estética tenha sido cunhado e lançado ao público só no século XVIII por Alexander G. Baumgarten (1714-1762), com a obra Aesthetica (1750/58), a reflexão filosófica sobre o belo e a arte tem uma longa história. Quanto às origens, no que concerne ao Ocidente, perfilho a tese daqueles que remontam às experiências dos pitagóricos – séculos V e IV a.C. – no campo da acústica. Baseando-se na observação do fato de as cordas de instrumentos vibrarem harmonicamente de acordo com o seu comprimento, eles descobriram a presença de uma ordem matemática na acústica. Os pitagóricos explicavam o fenômeno da harmonia em pLAtãO e OS PRIMÓRdIOS dA ESTÉTIcA pLAtão e os primórdios dA estétiCA544 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 544 termos de proporção, medida e número, considerando-a fundada numa relação matemática das partes. Neste perspectiva, é legítimo falar em estética pitagórica. E Platão? Sabe-se, pela História da Filosofia, que Platão foi influenciado pela doutrina dos pitagóricos. E, em alguns diálogos, é possível detectar a profundidade das relações entre platonismo e pitagorismo. Platão não redigiu nenhum Tratado de Estética, no sentido moderno da expressão. Mas coube a ele o mérito de ter escrito o primeiro texto completo da História da Estética: o Hípias Maior, diálogo da mocidade, sobre o belo. E, se percorrermos a vasta obra de Platão, veremos que questões estéticas são discutidas em alguns dos mais conhecidos e importantes diálogos. Assim, no Banquete, o elogio entusiástico do amor e da beleza. A República, da maturidade, nos Livros II, III e X, também é leitura obrigatória. E mesmo nas Leis, obra da velhice, foram deixados traços da doutrina pitagórica acerca da medida e da proporção. Essas indicações, arroladas como exemplos, e muitas outras passagens têm sido sistematizadas por especialistas de sorte a apresentar o que se convencionou chamar de a estética de Platão. Para a finalidade desta Antologia, selecionei dois textos do filósofo: I. um excerto do Hípias Maior; II. a primeira parte do Livro X de A República. Hípias Maior Hípias de Élide, viajante infatigável, grandíloquo orador e experto em todas as artes, forma com Protágoras de Abdera e Górgias de Leontinos o trio de sofistas que foi imortalizado com títulos de diálogos de Platão. Pois Sócrates se encontra com Hípias, em Atenas, e no decorrer da conversação pergunta-lhe: "Vejamos, poderás dizer-me o que seja o belo?" (286d) Diante da dificuldade do sofista, pouco propenso a definir, Sócrates insiste: "que é esse belo?" (287d) Eis aí a pergunta crucial do diálogo e da problemática filosófica da beleza. Na sequência, são aventadas três definições: o conveniente; o útil, reforçado pelo vantajoso; e "o que nos proporciona prazer, isto é, não 545545 toda espécie de prazer, mas apenas os que alcançamos pela vista e pelo ouvido". (298a) Apesar de todas serem refutadas – não esqueçamos que o Hípias Maior é um diálogo dito socrático – Platão aproveita para discutir ideias que circulavam na sociedade ateniense de sua época. Aliás, elas podem ser reduzidas a duas vertentes, a saber: 1. o belo como adequação à finalidade; 2. o belo como prazer para a vista e para o ouvido. Ambas resistiram à passagem do tempo, foram retomadas e explicitadas no Medievo e chegaram até os nossos dias. A propósito da primeira, Umberto Eco lembra a importância do "princípio da adequação ao escopo a que cada coisa é destinada" no pensamento medieval.1 Princípio cuja atualidade é indiscutível na apreciação da beleza do corpo humano e na reflexão dos teóricos do Design. Quanto ao prazer visual, já o poeta lírico Píndaro (518-438 a. C.) escrevera: "O que se contempla com prazer, deleita ao olho, se expõe para ser admirado". E, na Filosofia Escolástica, coube a Santo Tomás de Aquino (1225?-1274) a autoria da definição: "belas, com efeito, são chamadas as coisas que despertam prazer". (S. th. I, 5) A República A propósito de A República, Werner Jaeger escreveu em Paideia: " A formação da alma é a alavanca com a qual ele faz o seu Sócrates mover todo o Estado".2 A República é uma obra tão rica que costuma ser lida e discutida sobretudo nas aulas de Filosofia Política, Pedagogia e Estética. A escolha da primeira parte do Livro X deve-se à abordagem da imitação (mímesis) na pintura com a consequente crítica aos poetas trágicos e a Homero. Mas, para sua compreensão, é mister retomar o Livro II (a partir de 376e) e o Livro III (386a-403c), onde Sócrates expõe o seu programa educativo, no concernente às narrativas e à música, para a formação dos futuros guardiães. Quando se fala em imitação da natureza, no contexto artístico, logo nos vêm à mente os seis primeiros capítulos da Poética de Aristóteles 1 ECO, U. (Org.). História da beleza. Tradução de Eliana Aguiar. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2004. p.88. 2 JAEGER, W. Paideia: A Formação do Homem Grego. Tradução de Artur M. Parreira. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1979. p. 701. pLAtão e os primórdios dA estétiCA546 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 546 (1447-1450b). Observe-se, porém, que a expressão que resume a Teoria da Mimese provém de uma sentença da Física: "Em resumo, a arte ou completa o processo que a natureza é incapaz de fazer inteiramente ou imita a natureza". (199a) Para Platão, o que importa é o modelo a ser imitado. Isso aparece claramente no diálogo, que abre o Livro X, entre Sócrates e Glauco. Dentre os objetos de uso, Sócrates elege o leito e a mesa. Se um carpinteiro aceitar a encomenda de determinado leito, trabalhará para fabricá-lo segundo a ideia do móvel, cujo criador só pode ter sido Deus. E se um pintor for chamado para a pintura de um leito, qual será o modelo para o quadro? Se ele escolher a "ideia única do leito", fará obra original. Mas se imitar o leito fabricado pelo carpinteiro, não passará de "imitador daquilo que os outros são os obreiros". (597e) Em suma, como assinalou Benedito Nunes: "Se as coisas naturais refletem os modelos eternos a que estão subsumidas – modelos que só da verdade dependem – a téchne, a arte, consegue apenas, imitando aquilo que já é imitação, produzir cópia de cópias. A mímesis aumentaria ainda mais a distância do suprassensível ao sensível".3 Os argumentos apresentados servem de base para o julgamento e condenação de Homero e dos poetas trágicos: "Sendo assim, firmemos desde logo este ponto: todos os poetas, a começar por Homero, não passam de imitadores de simulacros da virtude e de tudo o que mais constitui objeto de suas composições, sem nunca atingirem a verdade ..." (600e) Platão nos alvores da Crítica de Arte, vislumbrou a possibilidade de uma crítica fundada na Filosofia e nisso ele foi coerente. Mas suas concepções filosóficas tiveram alcance limitado na sociedade pluralista da época. Seu discípulo Aristóteles, por exemplo, não aderiu à Teoria das Ideias e, quanto à mimese, acentuou a analogia entre a atividade artística e a atividade da natureza. E foi a versão aristotélica que prevaleceu na Estética e na Arte do Ocidente. Para Pierre-Maxime Schuhl: "O sentimento que Platão tinha da 3 NUNES, B. Introdução. In: PLATÃO. A República. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. 3. ed. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. p. 27. 547547 ação profunda que a arte exerce sobre os espíritos explica sua atitude severa diante dos artistas".4 Embora concorde com o autor, não posso ignorar que o moralismo estético de Platão suscita inequívoco mal estar entre seus leitores e admiradores. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de Platão traduzidas Para o Português PLATÃO. A República. 3. ed. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Introdução: Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. p. 1-45. PLATÃO. Critão,Menão, Hípias Maior e outros. 2. ed. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2007. obras sobre Platão BAYER, R. História da Estética. Tradução de José Saramago. Lisboa: Estampa, 1978. ECO, U. (Org.) História da beleza. Tradução de Eliana Aguiar. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2004. JAEGER, W. Paideia: A Formação do Homem Grego.Tradução de Artur M. Parreira. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1979. NUNES, B. Introdução. In: PLATÃO. A República. 3. ed. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. p. 1-45. NUNES, C. A. Introdução. In: PLATÃO. Critão,Menão, Hípias Maior e outros. 2. ed. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2007. PAVIANI, J. Filosofia e método em Platão. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2001. PAVIANI, J. Platão & A República. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar., 2003. SCHUHL, P-M. Platon et l'Art de son temps. 2. ed. Paris: PUF, 1952. SOCRATES. Direção de Roberto Rossellini. Itália: Versátil Home Video, 1971. 1 DVD (120 min.): son., col. NTSC. 4 SCHUHL, P-M. Platon et l'Art de son temps. 2. ed. Paris: PUF, 1952. p. XXI. 548 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 548 pLAtão • hípiAs mAior pLAtãO 1 VII Sócrates – É verdade. Esqueci-me de que conheces a mnemônica. Compreendo que os lacedemônios gostem de ouvir-te, pois não há o que não saibas; valem-se de ti como fazem as crianças com as velhas, para que lhes contem histórias interessantes. Hípias – É isso mesmo, Sócrates, por Zeus. Ainda recentemente, falei-lhes com grande êxito a respeito das belas ocupações a que os moços devem aplicar-se, acerca do que escrevi um discurso admirável sob muitos aspectos, mas, principalmente, pela escolha dos vocábulos. O tema geral e o começo do discurso é mais ou menos o seguinte: Depois da tomada de Troia, conta-se na minha história que Neoptólemo perguntou a Nestor quais seriam as ocupações mais indicadas para o jovem que almejasse alcançar fama. A seguir, Nestor respondendo lhe dá as mais variadas e acertadas indicações. Foi essa oração que lhes apresentei e que pretendo repetir aqui depois de amanhã na escola de Fidóstrato, além de muitas outras composições dignas de se ouvir. Fui convidado por Éudi1 A tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes tomou por base textos credenciados do original grego, como as edições de Burnett (Platonis Opera, Oxford, 1892-1906), de Friderici Hermann (Platonis Dialogi, Lipsia, Teubner, 1921-1936), de Hirschigii Platonis Opera, Firmin Didot, 1891) e da Société de Belles Lettres (Paris, 1920 e sgs). O Diálogo Hípias Maior (281a 304e), na edição da EDUFPA estende-se da p. 367 à 403. Ver: PLATÃO. Critão, Menão, Hípias Maior e outros. 2. ed. Tradução e introdução de Carlos Alberto Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2007. p. 367-403. 549549 co, filho de Apemanto. Vê se compareces também, e leve outras pessoas capazes de julgar o que ouvem. VIII Sócrates – Farei assim mesmo, Hípias, se Deus quiser. Porém agora responde a uma perguntinha sobre isso mesmo, que em boa hora me fizeste lembrar. Recentemente, meu caro, alguém me pôs em grande apuro, numa discussão em que eu rejeitava determinadas coisas como feias e elogiava outras por serem belas, havendo me perguntado em tom sarcástico, o interlocutor: Qual é o critério, Sócrates, para reconheceres o que é belo e o que é feio? Vejamos, poderás dizer-me o que seja o belo? – Com a ignorância que me é própria, fiquei atrapalhado e não pude encontrar resposta satisfatória. Ao retirar-me da reunião, sentime irritado e formulei censuras contra mim mesmo, tendo firmado propósito de, na primeira oportunidade, quando encontrasse um dos vossos sábios, ouvi-lo e instruir-me, e depois de bem estudado o assunto, voltar a procurar o meu interlocutor para reiniciarmos nosso debate. E eis que chegaste na hora certa, como já disse. Explica-me com precisão o que é o belo e esforça-te por dar-me resposta tão exata quanto possível, para que eu não me cubra de ridículo com outra derrota. É fora de dúvida que conheces isso muito bem, matéria, aliás, de pequena relevância entre os inúmeros conhecimentos de que dispões. Hípias – Sim, muito pequena, Sócrates, por Zeus, e carecente de valor, por assim dizer. Sócrates – Tanto mais facilmente apanharei o assunto, sem que daqui por diante alguém possa contradizer-me. Hípias – Ninguém o fará; ou teria de ser vulgar e carecente de valor a minha profissão. Sócrates – Por Hera! Belas palavras, Hípias, no caso de virmos a vencer o homem. Creio que não haverá inconveniente em imitá-lo, para com tuas respostas, preparar minha argumentação e, assim, exercitar-me contigo do melhor modo possível. Tenho alguma prática de formular objeções. Se não te fizer diferença, eu mesmo as apresentarei, para ficar mais firme na matéria. 550 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 550 pLAtão • hípiAs mAior Hípias – Podes formulá-las. Como já te disse, a questão é muito simples; vou deixar-te em condições de responder a perguntas muito mais difíceis, de forma que ninguém te possa contradizer. IX Sócrates – Oh! Isso é que é falar bem! Então, principiemos. Já que o mandas, vou colocar-me no lugar do outro, do melhor jeito que puder, e procurar interrogar-te. Se lhe repetisses aquele discurso a que te referiste há pouco, a respeito das belas ocupações, logo que acabasses de falar, antes de mais nada, como é seu costume, ele te interrogaria sobre o belo, mais ou menos nestes termos: Forasteiro de Élide, não é pela justiça que os justos são justos? – Responde, Hípias, como se fosse ele que te interrogasse. Hípias – Diria que é pela justiça. Sócrates – Então, a justiça é algo real? Hípias – Perfeitamente. Sócrates – Assim, pela sabedoria é que os sábios são sábios, como é também pelo bem que todos os bens são bens. Hípias – Como não? Sócrates – Logo, todas essas coisas são reais, sem que possam absolutamente deixar de sê-lo. Hípias – São reais, sem dúvida. Sócrates – E as coisas belas, não o são apenas por efeito da beleza? Hípias – Sim, da beleza. Sócrates – Beleza essa que também existe? Hípias – Sem dúvida. Mas, afinal, que é o que ele quer? Sócrates – Então, explica-me, forasteiro, voltaria a falar: que é esse belo? Hípias – Como assim, Sócrates? O autor dessa pergunta deseja saber o que é belo? 551551 Sócrates – Penso que não, Hípias; porém o que seja o belo. Hípias – E em que consiste a diferença? Sócrates – Achas que não há diferença? Hípias – Nenhuma. Sócrates – É certeza saberes melhor. Mas presta atenção, amigo. Ele não te perguntou o que é belo, porém o que é o belo. Hípias – Compreendo, bom homem, e vou responder a ele o que seja o belo, de forma que não possa refutar-me. Fica, então, sabendo, Sócrates, para dizer-te toda a verdade, que o belo é uma bela jovem. Sócrates – Ótimo, Hípias, pelo cão! Respondeste admiravelmente. Sendo assim, no caso de eu lhe falar dessa maneira, terei dado resposta certa à pergunta apresentada, sem que ninguém me possa contraditar? Hípias – Como poderiam contraditar-te, Sócrates, se não há quem não pense desse modo e todos os que te ouvirem confirmarão que a resposta está certa? Sócrates – Pois que seja. Mas permite, Hípias, que chame a mim o que acabas de dizer. Meu interlocutor argumentaria mais ou menos nestes termos: Vamos, Sócrates, responde-me: Se existe o belo em si, todas as coisas que denominas belas serão belas por esse fato? Eu, de meu lado, diria que uma bela jovem é bela por efeito do que deixa belas todas as coisas. Hípias – E acreditas mesmo que ele se atreveria a negar que o belo não é o que disseste, ou que não cairia no ridículo se tentasse fazê-lo? 552 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 552 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X LIVRO X 2 I O certo, lhe falei, é que também sob muitos aspectos a cidade por nós fundada é a melhor possível, o que afirmo com vistas, principalmente, ao que dissemos a respeito da poesia. – Que foi? perguntou. Não aceitar, de maneira alguma, quanto nela for imitação, o que se nos tornou mais do que manifesto, quero crer, depois que distinguimos as diferentes faculdades da alma. – Como assim? Para falar-vos à puridade, pois decerto não ireis denunciar-me aos poetas trágicos e aos demais cultivadores da poesia imitativa, o que me parece é que todas essas composições corrompem o claro entendimento dos ouvintes, a menos que estes disponham do antídoto adequado: o conhecimento de sua verdadeira natureza. – Que queres dizer com isso? Vou explicar-vos, lhes falei, apesar de opor-se a esse propósito velha afeição a Homero e a reverência que lhe dedico desde criança. O que 2 Ver: PLATÃO. A República. 3. ed. Tradução de Carlos Alberto Nunes e Introdução de Benedito Nunes. Belém: EDUFPA, 2000. p. 433444. 553553 parece é que foi ele o primeiro mestre e o guia de todos esses belos poetas trágicos. Porém não devemos pôr o homem acima da verdade; por isso, vou dizer-vos o que penso. – Muito bem, arrematou. – Então, ouve, ou melhor, responde. – Podes perguntar. – Imitação, de modo geral, poderás dizer-me o que seja? Eu próprio não faço ideia muito clara do fim a que ela tende. – E eu é que terei de saber isso? – Não seria nada de mais, lhe falei; por vezes, pessoas de vista fraca percebem as coisas mais depressa do que as de vista penetrante. – É certo, respondeu; mas na tua frente não me atreveria a dizer nada, ainda que algo me ocorresse. Vê tu mesmo. – Não queres que principiemos a investigação seguindo o nosso método? Costumávamos admitir uma ideia única que abrange as diferentes pluralidades a que damos o mesmo nome. Será que me compreendes? – Compreendo. – Então, tomemos dessas pluralidades a que quiseres; a seguinte, por exemplo, se estiveres de acordo: leitos há muitos, e também mesas. – Como não? – Porém para todos esses móveis só há duas ideias: a ideia do leito e a ideia da mesa. – Certo. – Costumamos, também, dizer que os obreiros desses móveis têm em mira a ideia segundo a qual um deles apronta leitos e outros as mesas de que nos servimos, e assim para tudo o mais. Porém a ideia em si mesma, o obreiro não fabrica. Como o poderia? 554 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 554 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X – Não há jeito. – E agora: dás também o nome de mestre ao seguinte artesão? – Qual? – O que pode fazer tudo quanto faz particularmente cada obreiro. – Falas de um homem extraordinário e miraculoso! – Ainda é cedo; daqui a pouco dirás que ele é muito maior. Pois esse mesmo obreiro não é apenas capaz de aprontar todos os móveis, como faz tudo o que nasce da terra, dá forma a todos os seres vivos, a ele próprio e ao que mais houver, além de ser o autor da terra, do céu e dos deuses, e de quanto existe no céu e embaixo da terra, no Hades. – Referes-te a um sofista admirável, me falou. – Não acreditas? Perguntei; então, me dize: achas mesmo que não pode haver um artista nessas condições? E em que circunstância tudo isso poderia ser fabricado, e em quais não poderia? Não percebes que tu próprio, de certo modo, serias capaz de criar tudo isso? – De que jeito? perguntou. – Não é difícil, lhe falei: a prova pode ser feita a qualquer hora e em pouco tempo, porém muito mais depressa se te resolveres a tomar de um espelho e o levares contigo por toda parte: num abrir e fechar de olhos farás o sol e tudo o que há no céu; num segundo, a terra; rapidamente farás a ti mesmo e os outros animais, os móveis, as plantas e tudo o mais que enumeramos há pouco. – Não há dúvida, me disse; porém tudo isso não passa de aparência; carece de existência real. – Ótimo! lhe falei; bateste no que eu queria; mas entre esses obreiros, quero crer, há de estar também incluído o pintor. – Como não? – Porém decerto dirás, segundo creio, que ele não faz de verdade tudo o que faz. Mas de certo modo o pintor também faz alguma espécie 555555 de leito. Ou não fará? – Sim, falou; um leito aparente, ele também. II E o carpinteiro? Não afirmaste agora mesmo que ele não constrói a ideia do que dissemos ser o leito, mas apenas um determinado leito? – Disse, realmente. – Ora, se ele não faz o que é, não poderá fazer o que tem existência real, senão apenas o que parece existir, sem de fato, existir. E se alguém se abalançasse a afirmar que o trabalho do carpinteiro ou de qualquer outro artesão tem existência, de maravilha estaria falando verdade. – Sem dúvida, respondeu; pelo menos, de acordo com o modo de pensar dos que se ocupam com essas questões. – Não é, por conseguinte, de admirar que sua obra se torne obscura em confronto com a verdade. – Não, realmente. – E não queres, perguntei, estudar comigo esses casos, para procurarmos o imitador e dizer em que consiste a imitação? Se isso for do teu agrado, respondeu. – Assim, tais leitos se nos apresentam sob três formas: uma, que se encontra na natureza, obra, segundo penso, de Deus. De quem mais poderia ser? – De ninguém, creio. – Outra, feita pelo carpinteiro. – Perfeitamente, respondeu. – E outra mais, a do pintor, não é isso mesmo? – Que seja. – Logo, pintor, carpinteiro, Deus: aí temos os três mestres das três espécies de leito. 556 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 556 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X – Sim, três. – Deus, por conseguinte, ou fosse por não querer, ou porque alguma necessidade o compelisse a não criar mais do que um leito na natureza, fez este único que é o leito essencial; dois leitos dessa espécie, ou mais de dois, foi o que Deus nunca produziu nem nunca virá a produzir. – Por quê? perguntou. – É o seguinte: se ele houvesse feito dois leitos, de pronto surgiria um terceiro, em cuja ideia os dois primeiros teriam de incluir-se, passando este outro a ser o leito essencial, não os dois primeiros. – Certíssimo, observou. – Deus tinha perfeita consciência disso, é o que eu penso; desejando ser o verdadeiro criador do verdadeiro leito, não de um determinado leito e, principalmente, por não querer ser carpinteiro, criou a ideia única do leito. – É evidente. – Aceitas que o designemos pelo nome de criador ou coisa parecida? – Fora justo, observou, por haver originalmente criado isso como tudo o mais. – E o carpinteiro? Dar-lhe-emos o nome de fabricante do leito? – Sem dúvida. – Bem; e o pintor, será também obreiro e fabricante desse mesmo objeto? – De forma alguma. Então, como designarás sua relação com o leito? – Quer parecer-me, disse, que a designação mais acertada seria a de imitador daquilo que os outros são os obreiros. 557557 – Que seja, lhe disse. Dás, assim, o nome de imitador ao que produz o que se acha três pontos afastado da natureza. – Perfeitamente, respondeu. – Ora, exatamente como ele, encontra-se o poeta trágico, por estar, como imitador, três graus abaixo do rei e da verdade, o que, aliás, se dá com todos os imitadores. – É possível, respondeu. – Ora, bem; a respeito do imitador já nos declaramos de acordo; porém quanto ao pintor, responde mais à seguinte pergunta: és de parecer que o que ele se propõe a imitar é aquele conceito único da natureza ou as obras dos artistas? – As obras dos artistas, respondeu. – Como realmente são, ou como parecem ser? Terás de esclarecer esse ponto. – Que queres dizer com isso? perguntou. – É o seguinte: um leito, quando o contemplas de lado ou de frente, ou como quer que seja, ficará diferente de si mesmo, ou não difere nada, parecendo apenas que difere? E com tudo o mais da mesma forma? – Isso mesmo, respondeu: parece diferir, porém de fato não difere. – Considera agora o seguinte: a que fim se propõe o pintor em cada caso particular: imitar as coisas como são em si mesmas, ou sua aparência, o que se lhe afigura? Trata-se de imitação da aparência ou da realidade? – Da aparência. – Logo, a arte de imitar está muito afastada da verdade, sendo que por isso mesmo dá a impressão de poder fazer tudo, por só atingir parte mínima de cada coisa, simples simulacro. O pintor, digamos, é capaz de pintar um sapateiro, um carpinteiro ou qualquer outro artesão, sem conhecer absolutamente nada das respectivas profissões. No entanto, se for bom pintor, com o retrato de um carpinteiro, mostrado de longe, 558 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 558 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X conseguirá enganar pelo menos crianças ou pessoas simples e levá-las a imaginar que se trata de um carpinteiro de verdade. – Como não? – Mas a meu ver, amigo, o que devemos pensar dessa gente é o seguinte: quando alguém nos anuncia que encontrou um indivíduo conhecedor de todas as profissões e de tudo o que se pode saber, e isso com a proficiência dos maiores especialistas, seremos levados a suspeitar que falamos com um tipo ingênuo e vítima, sem dúvida, de algum charlatão e imitador, e que se o tomou por sábio universal foi apenas pelo fato de ser incapaz de fazer a distinção entre o conhecimento, a ignorância e a imitação. – É muito certo, observou. III – Depois disso, continuei, precisamos estudar os trágicos e seu principal guia, Homero, visto dizer-nos muita gente que eles conhecem todas as artes e todas as coisas humanas em suas relações com a virtude e o vício, e também as divinas. Porque um bom poeta, para desenvolver a contento qualquer assunto terá forçosamente de conhecê-lo a fundo, ou não será poeta coisa nenhuma. O que precisamos, por conseguinte, verificar é se esses tais não se deixaram enganar por imitadores, por não perceberem como suas obras estão distanciadas três graus da realidade, sendo que todas elas são muito fáceis de fazer, por isso mesmo que seus autores não conhecem a verdade. Só criam fantasmas, não o verdadeiro ser; e também se o que dizem tem alguma substância e se os bons poetas conhecem, de fato, as coisas a respeito das quais o povo acha que eles falam bem. – Perfeitamente, disse; examinemos esse ponto. – Pois achas mesmo que se alguém fosse capaz de fazer as duas coisas: o objeto a imitar e o seu simulacro, aplicar-se-ia com afinco na confecção de simples imagens, vendo nisso o fim precípuo de sua atividade e o que de mais elevado poderia alcançar? – Acho que não. 559559 – Se possuísse, de fato, o conhecimento daquilo que ele imita, poria muito mais empenho na criação das próprias coisas do que na sua imitação, e se esforçaria por deixar um mundo de obras maravilhosas, outros tantos monumentos de sua glória, como preferiria ser elogiado, a fazer o elogio do que quer que fosse. – Sem dúvida, observou; a honra e as vantagens não estão no mesmo nível. – A respeito de muitas questões, não chamaremos Homero a juízo, nem qualquer outro poeta, para perguntar, por exemplo, se algum deles foi médico, ou apenas imitador da linguagem dos médicos; qual a cura que possa ser atribuída a algum dos poetas antigos ou modernos, como de Asclépio se conhece, ou que discípulo médico nos deixou, como fez o outro com seus descendentes. Acerca das demais artes não os interroguemos; demos-lhe tudo isso de barato. Porém no que concerne aos mais belos e importantes temas a que Homero se abalança: guerra, tática militar, administração de cidades, educação do homem, temos o direito, sem dúvida nenhuma, de procurá-lo para dizer-lhe: Meu caro Homero, se no que respeita à virtude não te encontras, realmente, três graus afastado da verdade e não passas de um mero criador de imagens, o que definimos como imitador, e se, pelo contrário, te achas no segundo grau e és capaz de conhecer que atividades deixam os homens melhores ou piores, tanto na vida pública como na particular, declara-nos que cidade ganhou por teu intermédio uma constituição melhor, como é o caso da Lacedemônia com relação a Licurgo e de muitas outras cidades, grandes ou pequenas, com seus legisladores? Onde está o burgo que se orgulha da ótima legislação que lhe deixaste? Que lucraram contigo seus moradores? A Itália e a Sicília tiveram o seu Carondas; nós outros, Solão. E tu, que cidade te elogia? Achas que ele poderia indicar-nos alguma? – Acho que não, respondeu Glauco; sobre isso os próprios Homéridas não se manifestam. – Mas decerto falam de alguma guerra do tempo de Homero que ele dirigiu ou que, por seus conselhos, houvesse terminado com a vitória? 560 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 560 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X – De nenhuma. – Ou se referem a ele como a pessoa de grande habilidade e citam invenções engenhosas de sua autoria, no domínio das artes ou de outras atividades, como acontece com Tales de Mileto ou Anacársis da Cítia? – Sobre isso também ninguém diz nada. – Porém, se de público Homero não se sobressaiu, sem dúvida no trato particular dirigiu a educação de uns poucos que se compraziam com sua companhia e que, por esse fato, transmitiram à posteridade uma espécie de norma homérica de vida, tal como se conta de Pitágoras, que por essa mesma razão foi altamente estimado, sendo certo que até hoje seus adeptos seguem um regime diferente, que denominam pitagórico e que passa por ser superior a todos os outros? – A esse respeito também, me falou, nada consta; pois Creófilo, discípulo de Homero, Sócrates, é talvez mais ridículo pela educação do que pelo nome, a ser verdade o que se diz do seu comportamento com relação a Homero. Falam que ele descurou muito do mestre, enquanto o teve em sua companhia. IV – Sim, dizem isso mesmo. Mas acreditas, Glauco, que se, de fato, Homero fosse capaz de formar homens e deixá-los melhor, não como imitador mas como quem tivesse conhecimento de causa, não congregaria numerosos discípulos, que o teriam amado e reverenciado? Ora! Um Protágoras de Abdera, um Pródico de Céus e tantos outros, no trato particular com seus contemporâneos, conseguiram convencê-los de que todos eles não seriam capazes de administrar nem a casa nem a própria cidade, se não se submetessem ao seu regime pedagógico, e a tal ponto são estimados por sua grande sabedoria, que pouco falta para seus admiradores os carregarem em triunfo por toda parte. E Homero, se, de fato, pudesse tornar os homens mais virtuosos – como também Hesíodo – seus contemporâneos os deixariam vaguear de um lugar para outro como cantores ambulantes, em vez de se agarrarem a eles com mais empenho do que fazem com o ouro e de obrigá-los a morar no meio deles, ou, no caso de não convencê-los nesse sentido, não os teriam acompanhado por toda parte, para se aproveitarem ao máximo de seus ensinamentos? 561561 – Quer parecer-me, Sócrates, que te assiste inteira razão. – Sendo assim, firmemos desde logo este ponto: todos os poetas, a começar por Homero, não passam de imitadores de simulacros da virtude e de tudo o mais que constitui o objeto de suas composições, sem nunca atingirem a verdade, o que também se dá com o pintor, a que já nos referimos, o qual, sem nada entender da arte de fazer sapatos, é capaz de pintar um sapateiro que lhe pareça bom e a quantos desconheçam essa profissão e só percebam as cores e o desenho. – Perfeitamente. – A mesma coisa, creio, podemos afirmar do poeta que com palavras e frases reveste as diferentes artes das cores que lhes são próprias, sem entender nada mais além da imitação. Como consequência, os ouvintes, que apreciam os assuntos apenas pelo efeito das palavras, ficam convencidos de que ele fala com muita propriedade, quer o ouçam discorrer com metro, ritmo e harmonia acerca da arte de fazer sapatos, quer sobre a estratégia militar ou o tema que for, tal o natural fascínio que exerce com seus recursos. Porém, se despirmos as criações dos poetas desse colorido musical e as apresentarmos em expressões comuns, bem sabes, tenho certeza, a que ficam reduzidas. – Sem dúvida. – Não é verdade, perguntei, que se parecem com esses rostos jovens, porém sem beleza, quando vistos depois de perdido o frescor original. – Perfeitamente, respondeu. – Muito bem; considera agora o seguinte: esse fabricante de simulacros, esse imitador, dizíamos, nada entende do que realmente existe, mas apenas de aparências, não é isso mesmo? – Certo. – Não deixemos esse argumento por acabar; examinemo-lo até o fim. 562 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 562 pLAtão • A repúbLiCA – Livro X – Podes falar, me disse. – O pintor, digamos, pode pintar rédeas ou freios? – Sem dúvida. – Porém o seleiro e o ferreiro é que são fabricantes desses instrumentos? – Perfeitamente. – E saberá porventura o pintor como a rédea e o freio devem ser feitos? Ou nem mesmo o saberão aqueles fabricantes, o ferreiro e o seleiro, senão apenas quem souber usá-los, isto é, o cavaleiro? – É muito certo. – E não será também certo afirmar isso mesmo de todas as coisas? – Como assim? – É que para cada coisa correspondem três artes: a que se serve delas, a que a fabrica e a que a imita. – Muito bem. – Mas, a que tendem as propriedades, a beleza e a perfeição de um móvel ou de um ser vivo ou de qualquer ação, se não for ao uso em vista do qual todos foram feitos, quer o tenham sido pelo homem, quer pela natureza? – Certo. – Logo, é de necessidade absoluta que o usuário de cada coisa seja o mais experimentado e mostre ao respectivo fabricante os defeitos ou excelências desse objeto, revelado pelo uso. Assim, o tocador de flauta apresentará ao fabricante de flautas os espécimes que provaram bem na prática, explicando-lhe como deve prepará-las, indicações que o fabricante precisará aceitar. – Sem dúvida. – Desse modo, é o perito na matéria quem se manifesta acerca das qualidades e defeitos das flautas, dando-lhe o outro inteiro crédito, 563563 quando se dispõe a fabricá-las. – Certo. – Vemos, assim, que a respeito de um mesmo objeto o fabricante só forma opinião verdadeira sobre sua excelência ou seus defeitos por privar com quem sabe e ser obrigado a acatar-lhe a opinião, porém a ciência desse objeto só a possui quem faz uso dele. – Perfeitamente. – E o imitador? Adquirirá pela simples prática o conhecimento do que ele pinta, se é belo e está certo, ou formará opinião justa pela convivência forçosa com o entendido na matéria, que lhe daria instruções de como deva proceder? – Nem uma coisa, nem outra. – Nesse caso, o imitador não disporá nem do conhecimento, nem da opinião certa com respeito à beleza ou à utilidade daquilo que ele imita? – Parece que não. – Quão extraordinária, nesse caso, deve ser a sabedoria do imitador sobre os temas de sua composição! – Não é das maiores, realmente. – De qualquer forma, continuará a imitar, muito embora não saiba a razão de ser útil ou imprestável alguma coisa. Ao que tudo indica, o que parece belo às multidões que nada entendem de coisa nenhuma, isso é o que ele imita. – Nem poderá ser de outra maneira. – Então, como parece, ficamos mais ou menos de acordo que não é digno de referência o que o imitador conhece daquilo que ele imita, e que a imitação não é coisa séria, mas simples brincadeira, e também que as pessoas que se ocupam com a poesia trágica em versos épicos ou iâmbicos, sem exceção, são imitadores por excelência. Perfeitamente. rousseAu contrA o seu tempo564 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 564 565565 jean-jacques ROuSSEAu nasceu em Genebra, Suíça, em 1712, segundo filho de um relojoeiro chamado Isaac Rousseau e de Suzanne Bernard, que morreu em consequência do parto de Jean-Jacques. Aos dez anos foi para Bossey como pensionista do pastor Lambercier. Em 1724, volta a Genebra e lá permanece até 1728, tornando-se aprendiz de um mestre gravador. Em 1728, deixa Genebra e se torna um protegido da Mme de Warrens, convertendo-se logo em seguida ao catolicismo, sob influência de sua protetora, ela própria uma protestante convertida ao catolicismo. Até 1740, Rousseau permanecerá ao lado de Mme de Warrens, deixando-a apenas para fazer algumas viagens, como a Paris, em 1731, e a Besançon, em 1734, quando estuda música. Em 1740, vai para Lyon como preceptor. Em 1742, parte para Paris e dá aulas de música para sobreviver. A música lhe garantirá para o resto da vida a sobrevivência, pois, além das aulas, Rousseau foi copista de partituras musicais. Em 1745, conhece Thérèse Levasseur, com quem viverá de 1749 até o fim da vida e terá cinco filhos, todos abandonados em orfanatos. Em 1749, Rousseau faz algumas visitas a Diderot que estava preso num castelo devido à publicação da obra Carta sobre os cegos. ROuSSeAu CONtRA O Seu teMpO (1712-1778) rousseAu contrA o seu tempo566 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 566 Em uma dessas visitas, Rousseau lê num jornal a questão proposta pela Academia de Dijon para o prêmio do ano seguinte. É assim que surge a ocasião da redação do Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes. Rousseau ganha o prêmio e a fama da noite para o dia. Após a redação de suas críticas às ciências e às artes, Rousseau compõe uma ópera chamada o Adivinho da Aldeia, representada em 1752 perante o rei Luís XV. Em 1753, também a partir de uma questão proposta pela Academia de Dijon, Rousseau redige o Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens. Desta vez Rousseau não ganha o prêmio, apesar de ter elaborado uma obra mais profunda e rigorosa do que a primeira. A partir de 1756, Rousseau passa por uma série de desentendimentos com seus colegas filósofos. Nesse ano, ataca o Poema sobre o desastre de Lisboa de Voltaire em uma carta que mais tarde será publicada como Carta sobre a Providência. Em 1757, entra noutra disputa acerca do valor moral e político do teatro, que culmina na redação da Carta a D'Alembert sobre os espetáculos. No texto ele defende a lei genebrina que proibia os espetáculos e critica o teatro francês. Em 1761, publica o romance a Nova Heloísa e imprime o Contrato Social e o Emílio ou da educação. Em 1762, o Contrato Social é proibido na França e queimado juntamente com o Emílio em Genebra. Em 1764, Voltaire publica um panfleto anônimo intitulado Sentimento dos cidadãos, em que denuncia Rousseau pelo abandono de suas crianças. Depois de ser expulso dos lugares nos quais se refugiara, Rousseau decide partir para a Inglaterra. Lá é recebido pelo importante filósofo escocês David Hume, que lhe consegue uma pensão. Logo rompe com Hume, que, a pedido dos filósofos franceses, torna pública sua ruptura com o genebrino. Rousseau volta à França em 1767 com um pseudônimo, retomando seu nome somente em 1770. Nos anos seguintes se dedica à música e à botânica e escreve um diálogo chamado Rousseau juiz de Jean-Jacques, em que visa expor o "complô" dos filósofos contra ele. Morre em 2 de julho de 1778, aproximadamente um mês após a morte de Voltaire, seu grande rival. Rousseau e seu tempo Como vimos, a vida de Rousseau foi bem conturbada, com mui567567 tas perseguições, algumas reais, outras imaginárias. Seus livros foram proibidos por protestantes e católicos. Mas não foi só entre os religiosos e devotos que Rousseau criou inimigos. Para o partido dos filósofos, Rousseau se tornou uma espécie de pária, de exilado, em grande parte devido ao seu comportamento pouco sociável e à sua mania de perseguição. Entretanto, o interessante da discórdia em relação aos filósofos de seu tempo não está aí, nas anedotas de sua vida, mas sim na diferença entre suas ideias e aquelas de seus contemporâneos. Seus escritos estavam recheados de críticas a opiniões caras aos seus amigos enciclopedistas e a célebres autores como Voltaire, e sua obra antecipa muitas das críticas ao Iluminismo.1 Já no seu primeiro livro, o Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes, que ficará conhecido entre os especialistas como o primeiro Discurso, Rousseau surpreende ao afirmar que o desenvolvimento das ciências e das artes contribuiu para a corrupção do homem e não para o seu aperfeiçoamento moral. O livro, como vimos acima, surgiu de um concurso promovido pela Academia de Dijon no ano de 1749, cuja questão era "Se o restabelecimento das ciências e das artes contribuiu para aprimorar os costumes". Exigia-se antes de mais nada uma avaliação do significado da retomada das ciências e das artes a partir do Renascimento. Ao que tudo indica, a resposta esperada deveria ser um elogio das ciências e das artes, mostrando a importância de sua retomada e sua contribuição para o refinamento dos costumes e para o progresso moral. Para compreender a força e o sentido do texto de Rousseau é preciso considerar que o século XVIII gozava dos avanços que haviam sido realizados nas ciências no século anterior, como a descoberta da lei da atração universal por Newton, bem como da proliferação das artes, do teatro e da literatura. O próprio trabalho do historiador já começava a ressaltar a importância 1 Além do termo Iluminismo, costuma-se usar também os termos Ilustração e Luzes. Os dois últimos são considerados por alguns termos mais precisos, pois a Ilustração ou as Luzes não compõem um grupo de doutrinas específicas que poderia justificar o uso do sufixo –ismo, já que no Iluminismo há pensadores que defendem o ateísmo, outros o deísmo (crença na existência de um Deus), como há materialismo (tudo é matéria) e espiritualismo (tudo é espírito). O que unifica essas diferentes doutrinas, para além de elementos circunstanciais, é a tentativa de afastar da filosofia qualquer aspecto que não se sustente somente pelo uso da luzes naturais, ou seja, da razão. rousseAu contrA o seu tempo568 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 568 dessas atividades espirituais do homem para a tomada de consciência sobre seu tempo; a história começava a deixar de ser apenas o relato de guerras e de elogios de reis e heróis.2 Face a isso tudo, o que se esperava de um concurso como aquele era um elogio das ciências e das artes e das nações em que elas se desenvolviam. Mas a resposta de Rousseau à pergunta do concurso de Dijon foi negativa. As ciências e as artes não contribuíram para o progresso da moral, ao contrário, elas contribuíram para a decadência e corrupção do homem. O que Rousseau quer dizer ao condenar assim as ciências e as artes? A primeira coisa que devemos notar é que Rousseau dissocia as ciências e as artes da virtude. O fato de um país produzir artes e ciências não significa que ele seja um país de pessoas mais virtuosas do que outro mais rústico, não significa que neles haja menos crimes e seus habitantes sejam mais felizes. Isso fica claro no elogio que Rousseau faz a Esparta em oposição a Atenas. Segundo ele, a comparação entre as duas cidades gregas mostra como as ciências e as artes contribuem, na verdade, para que os homens se tornem ociosos – sendo que elas próprias nascem do ócio –, fracos e menos interessados nos assuntos públicos. O artista está mais preocupado em desenvolver seu talento, ser reconhecido e agradar do que em ser virtuoso e fazer o bem aos seus concidadãos, dirá Rousseau. A crítica ganha ainda mais sentido quando levamos em conta a época em que Rousseau escreve. O século XVIII, o século das Luzes, das ciências e das artes, é também o tempo do Antigo Regime, uma sociedade toda hierarquizada em que os nobres desfrutam das artes sem trabalhar, enquanto a imensa maioria da população vivia em condições horríveis. Os teatros, as óperas, as sociedades científicas e os salões, lugares da arte e da ciência, eram na maioria das vezes dependentes da aristocracia. Além disso, os costumes no século XVIII eram pautados pelo decoro e pela etiqueta. Hoje em dia achamos que etiqueta é saber apenas usar um garfo corretamente, mas no século XVIII a etiqueta tinha uma importân2 Voltaire, por exemplo, será um autor importante para pensar o que mais tarde será chamado de progresso do espírito humano, uma noção importante para o pensamento da história nas Luzes, que sublinhava a centralidade das ciências e das artes na história de um tempo ou de um povo. 569569 cia social e política que desconhecemos. 3Todas as relações sociais eram pautadas por aquilo que Rousseau chamava de urbanidade, o cuidado com os gestos, as palavras, o vestir, ou seja, a aparência de modo geral.4 O que Rousseau faz é mostrar como esse refinamento, essa pompa que acompanha os nobres, refinamento e pompa estreitamente ligados à arte, apenas encobrem os estados verdadeiros do coração. Este é um ponto importante da filosofia de Rousseau: a transparência. O desenvolvimento das ciências e das artes fez como que o homem ficasse mais artificioso, seus modos não são mais espontâneos, ele, para seguir as regras da sociedade, acaba encobrindo, disfarçando o que realmente pensa. Isto não é apenas algo feito conscientemente, com o grande desenvolvimento das ciências e das artes, as maneiras se pautam por moldes, e, como diz Rousseau, ninguém ousa mais parecer o que realmente é, seus verdadeiros sentimentos são abafados pela necessidade de agradar. Rousseau opõe ao nobre que se amontoa de roupas e ornamentos os trajes do trabalhador, afirmando que o que um ganha em polidez e refinamento o outro tem em sinceridade. É como se nunca tivéssemos acesso aos verdadeiros estados do coração do homem refinado, enquanto as maneiras simples do rústico deixariam ver melhor seu coração. O primeiro Discurso tem também uma importante crítica ao luxo. No século XVIII, enfrentando o conservadorismo da tradição religiosa, filósofos, como Voltaire, por exemplo, fizeram a apologia do luxo, e mostraram que aquilo que era condenado por muitos era, na verdade, responsável pela riqueza das grandes nações europeias. Retomando algu3 Sobre isto ver o livro de RIBEIRO, R. J. A Etiqueta no Antigo Regime: do Sangue à Doce Vida. 4. ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 1999. Ainda sobre a sociedade do antigo regime ver o livro de ELIAS, N. A Sociedade de corte. Tradução de Pedro Sussekind. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 2001. 4 Um exemplo disso pode ser visto num belo filme chamado Caindo no Ridículo (RIDICULE. Direção de Patrice Leconte. França: Miramax Home, 1996. 1 DVD, (103 min.): son., col., NTSC.). Neste filme, um engenheiro tem um plano para drenar um pântano que causa muitas doenças e mortes. Ele então tenta se dirigir ao rei e à burocracia do Antigo Regime para se fazer ouvir, confiante nos méritos de seu projeto. No entanto, ele descobre que antes de chegar ao rei ele tem de passar pelos salões. Toda a sua boa intenção depende da sua capacidade de se destacar nos salões e nos jogos de sociedade: ele tem de falar bem, se vestir bem, fazer poemas e tiradas inteligentes, enfim, ele tem de ter espírito, como se dizia, para se fazer notado e galgar lentamente os degraus da sociedade que o conduziriam até o rei. rousseAu contrA o seu tempo570 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 570 mas ideias que podem ser encontradas em Bernard Mandeville5, Voltaire se dedicava a mostrar as vantagens de uma sociedade em que os modos são refinados e de uma vida que se tornou mais confortável com os artigos de luxo.6 Rousseau, ao contrário, vê no luxo um possível signo de riqueza, mas não de virtude. Mais do que isso, o luxo é resultado de uma sociedade desigual fundada na ociosidade e no desejo de se distinguir. Para compreender melhor as afirmações acima, que aparecem todas no primeiro Discurso mas não são desenvolvidas, é preciso prestar atenção ao segundo Discurso, o Discurso sobre a Origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens, que de acordo com o próprio Rousseau desenvolve os princípios que já se encontravam atuantes no primeiro. Natureza e sociedade O segundo Discurso foi também resultado de um concurso promovido pela academia de Dijon, cujo questão era: "Qual é a origem de desigualdade entre os homens e se ele é autorizada pela lei natural?" Desta feita Rousseau não levou o prêmio, mas escreveu uma obra muito superior ao primeiro Discurso e na qual desenvolveu aquilo que lá aparecia sem muitas explicações. Mais uma vez Rousseau surpreende com suas teses. Em primeiro lugar, cumpre distinguir dois tipos de desigualdade: a natural ou física e a moral ou política. A primeira é aquela que se refere às diferenças das qualidades corporais e espirituais: a força, a agilidade, a altura e as capacidades mentais. A outra é aquela que vemos na sociedade, a diferença entre o rico e pobre, entre o poderoso e o oprimido. Alguns defendiam, no entanto, que a desigualdade política está 5 Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733) foi um médico e filósofo holandês que passou a maior parte de sua vida na Inglaterra e fez do inglês a língua principal de seus escritos. Sua principal obra é a Fábula das abelhas, ou vícios privados, benefícios públicos. Sobre suas ideias é possível consultar a tese de doutorado BRITO, A. R. T. As abelhas egoístas: vício e virtude na obra de Bernard Mandeville.[USP-2007]. Disponível em: http://www.fflch.usp. br/df/site/posgraduacao/2007_mes/diss_ari.pdf 6 Sobre a posição de Voltaire sobre o luxo ver o verbete "Luxo" do Dicionário Filosófico e o poema Le Mondain (O mundano), ambos podem ser encontrados em francês no sítio: http://www.voltaire-integral.com/Html/20/luxe.htm. Sobre o debate em torno do luxo, do prazer e do desejo ver o livro de MONZANI, L. R. Desejo e Prazer na Idade Moderna. Campinas: Ed. Unicamp, 1995. 571571 fundada sobre a desigualdade natural, que certos homens nasceram para comandar e outros para obedecer, por exemplo. O livro de Rousseau visa mostrar precisamente o contrário: a desigualdade política não se funda na natureza, mas na corrupção dela que acompanha a formação e desenvolvimento da sociedade. O par natureza e sociedade será então usado por Rousseau para pensar o homem. No entanto, Rousseau não foi o único a se valer desse par para compreender o homem e a política, autores como Hobbes e Locke já se valiam dele. O que faz, então, a perspectiva de Rousseau diferente? Ora, quando se quer conhecer o homem é preciso, pensaria Rousseau, distinguir o que é natural do que é adquirido, aquilo com que a espécie humana já nasce e aquilo que advém com a sociedade. O erro dos seus antecessores, diria Rousseau, está justamente em confundir o homem em sociedade com o homem natural. Eles queriam falar e pensavam falar sobre o homem natural -quando Hobbes considera que ele é o lobo do homem, por exemplo, ou Locke quando afirma a propriedade como natural -, mas na verdade estavam projetando qualidades do homem civil sobre o homem natural, tomando qualidades adquiridas por qualidades naturais. Então, Rousseau empreendeu a tarefa de compreender o homem assim como ele saiu da natureza, considerando suas características físicas, metafísicas (espirituais) e morais (que o relacionam aos outros homens). No que se refere às qualidades físicas do homem natural, ele seria, segundo Rousseau, mais forte e mais hábil do que o homem em sociedade, isolado, sem linguagem, se esforçando pouco para conseguir os alimentos que a natureza lhe ofertava em abundância, com algumas qualidades superiores e outras inferiores a outros animais, mas no conjunto uma condição que lhe era favorável. Quanto às características espirituais, Rousseau identifica duas anteriores à razão, a saber: a liberdade e a perfectibilidade. Segundo a tradição, o que distingue os homens dos animais é sua razão. Entretanto, para Rousseau, a razão está apenas virtualmente presente no homem natural, precisando de um longo tempo para que se desenvolva. De acordo com rousseAu contrA o seu tempo572 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 572 ele, o que distingue o homem dos animais são sua liberdade e sua capacidade de se aperfeiçoar e de se adaptar às circunstâncias. Já no que se refere às qualidades morais, Rousseau distinguiu outras duas: o amor de si e a piedade. O amor de si é o instinto de preservação de cada animal, e a piedade é o sentimento irrefletido de repugnância perante o sofrimento de outro ser sensível e principalmente de um semelhante. O comportamento do homem é então pautado por um jogo entre o amor de si e a piedade, sendo que numa ocasião em que a preservação de si mesmo não é ameaçada, o homem não cometeria uma violência contra o seu semelhante. De acordo com Rousseau, o homem no estado de natureza era um ser isolado, que se encontrava com outros apenas esporadicamente. Com o passar do tempo, os homens começaram a se reunir para enfrentar as dificuldades naturais. Mas esses grupos não formavam propriamente uma sociedade, eram apenas aglomerações que não duravam muito tempo. Entre o estado de natureza e a sociedade há diversos estágios por que passa o homem. Dentre eles há um especial, aquele considerado o mais feliz, quando o homem já deixou o isolamento do estado de natureza e passou a viver em grupos maiores em cabanas, desenvolvendo laços de amor e respeito entre pais e filhos. Esse estágio seria próximo daquele em que se encontravam a maioria dos selvagens, já reunidos, com habilidades e técnicas desenvolvidas, mas antes do estabelecimento da propriedade. É precisamente com a instauração da propriedade que surge a sociedade, segundo Rousseau. No início, a propriedade aparece como um engodo, um ato realizado por alguém esperto que toma para si o que era de todos, ou de ninguém. Este estado de coisas, em que o meu e o teu se estabelecem pela força, começa a gerar conflitos entre os homens, conflitos que se estenderão a tal ponto que será necessário um acordo, um pacto que faça surgir leis para arbitrar os conflitos. A proposta de um pacto que enseja o surgimento das leis é, segundo Rousseau, um segundo engodo, pois ele é proposto pelo rico com o intuito de se proteger contra àqueles que nada têm, mas que podem arrancar-lhe o que possui 573573 a qualquer momento, posto que ele mesmo não tem direito algum ao que possui. A propriedade se transforma então em direito e os homens que aceitaram o pacto se tornam escravos, mas aceitaram que assim fosse porque a situação conflituosa em que se encontravam era insustentável. O contrato O pacto acima mencionado não pode ser confundido com o contrato social sobre o qual fala a obra Do contrato social, publicada em 1762. Enquanto aquele pacto enganoso que beneficia o rico está mais próximo de como as coisas aconteceram historicamente, o contrato proposto na obra de 1762 é do âmbito do dever ser, isto é, ele se refere a como as coisas podem e deveriam ser feitas para que os problemas advindos da corrupção humana com o advento da sociedade fossem minimizados. A noção de contrato social não é algo criado por Rousseau. Outros filósofos como Hobbes e Locke se valeram da mesma noção para pensar o corpo político, e todos eles a conceberam como a transferência do direito de natureza que o homem possui sobre todas as coisas para o soberano em troca da proteção de sua vida (Hobbes) e de seus bens (Locke). Qual é, portanto, a novidade do contrato proposto por Rousseau? Uma dessas novidades é a exigência da liberdade dentro da comunidade política. O que permite a Rousseau pensar a liberdade na sociedade é o fato de seu contrato não ser feito entre os indivíduos particulares. No caso de Rousseau, o contrato se dá entre o indivíduo e o soberano, sendo que o soberano é o povo, do qual ele próprio faz parte. Desse modo, dirá Rousseau, o contrato é do indivíduo, como particular, consigo mesmo, enquanto membro do soberano. É neste sentido que a liberdade se mantém, pois submeter-se a leis que se dá a si mesmo é ser livre, é este o sentido da autonomia. Contudo, não se deve confundir a liberdade civil, aquela advinda depois do contrato, com a liberdade natural, aquela que o homem tinha no estado de natureza. O objetivo do contrato é justamente acabar com a liberdade natural e instaurar a liberdade civil, pois a permanência da liberdade natural dentro do estado civil é uma das causas dos males políticos, já que um particular colocaria em risco a sociedade ao querer se rousseAu contrA o seu tempo574 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 574 comportar como o homem no estado de natureza, tendo direito a tudo e nenhum dever. A liberdade natural não tinha nenhum limite a não ser as forças do homem natural, enquanto a liberdade civil encontra seu limite na vontade geral. A vontade geral, por sua vez, não deve ser entendida com a soma das vontades particulares. Ela é, na verdade, aquilo que pode ser generalizado em cada vontade particular, na medida em que considera os objetos que interessam a todos os cidadãos. Para esclarecer os pontos de que tratamos acima, deixemos o próprio autor falar. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de rousseau traduzidas Para o Português Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes (1750) Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens (1754) Do contrato social (1762) As três obras acima têm diversas traduções em língua portuguesa. Recomenda-se as traduções da coleção Os Pensadores da editora Nova Cultural, realizadas por Lourdes Santos Machado com introdução e notas de Paul Arbousse Bastide e Lourival Gomes Machado, e as traduções da editora Martins Fontes. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Emílio ou Da educação. Tradução de Roberto Leal Ferreira; introdução de Michel Launay. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1995. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Carta a Christophe de Beaumont. In:_____. Carta a Christophe de Beaumont e outros escritos sobre a religião e a moral. Tradução de José Oscar de Almeida Marques, Maria Cecília Queiroz de Moraes Pinto, Ana Luiza Camarani e Adalberto Luiz Vicente. São Paulo: Estação Liberdade, 2005. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Cartas escritas da montanha. Tradução de Maria Constança Peres Pissarra e Maria das Graças de Souza. São Paulo: Ed. Unesp; 2006. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Considerações sobre o governo da Polônia e sua reforma projetada. Tradução, introdução e notas de Luiz Roberto Salinas Fortes. São 575575 Paulo: Brasiliense, 1982. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas. Tradução de Fulvia Maria Luiza Moretto; apresentação de Bento Prado Jr. Campinas: Ed. Unicamp, 1998. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Os devaneios do caminhante solitário. Tradução, introdução e notas de Fulvia Maria Luiza Moretto. Brasília: Ed. UnB, 1986. ROUSSEAU, J-J. Confissões. Tradução de Rachel de Queiroz (Livros I a X) e José Benedicto Pinto (Livros XI e XII). São Paulo: Edipro, 2008. Muitas das obras de Rousseau podem ser encontradas na versão original em francês ou em traduções para outras línguas no sítio: www. dominiopublico.gov.br/ obras sobra rousseau (em Português) FORTES, L. R. S. O Iluminismo e os reis filósofos. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981. FORTES, L. R. S. Paradoxo do espetáculo: política e poética em Rousseau. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 1997. FORTES, L. R. S. Rousseau: da teoria à prática. São Paulo: Ática, 1976. FORTES, L. R. S. Rousseau: o bom selvagem. 2. ed. Prefácio de Milton Meira do Nascimento. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2007. MARQUES, J. O. de A. (Org.). Verdades e mentiras: 30 ensaios em torno de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Ijuí: Unijuí, 2005. MARUYAMA, N. A Contradição entre o homem e o cidadão: consciência e política segundo J.-J. Rousseau. São Paulo: Humanitas, 2001. NASCIMENTO, M. M. do. Reivindicar direitos segundo Rousseau. In: QUIRINO, C. N. G.; VOUGA, C. J. T.; BRANDÃO, G. M. (Org.). Clássicos do pensamento político. São Paulo: Edusp, 1998. p. 121-134. NASCIMENTO, M. M. do. Rousseau: da servidão à liberdade. In: WEFFORT, F.C. (Org.). Clássicos da Política. São Paulo: Ática, 1989. v. 1, p. 187-200. rousseAu contrA o seu tempo576 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 576 NASCIMENTO, M. M. do; NASCIMENTO, M. das G. de S. Iluminismo: a revolução das luzes. São Paulo: Ática, 1998. PISSARRA, M. C. P. Rousseau: a política como exercício pedagógico. São Paulo: Moderna, 2003. PRADO JÚNIOR, B. A Retórica de Rousseau e outros ensaios. Organização e apresentação de Franklin de Mattos. São Paulo: Cosac Naify, 2008. PRADO, R. de A. A Jornada e a clausura: figuras do indivíduo no romance filosófico. São Paulo: Ateliê Editorial, 2003. STAROBINSKI, J. A Transparência e o obstáculo. Tradução de Maria Clara Machado. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1991. 577577 578 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 578 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) Discurso sobre as ciências e as artes (1750)1 Primeira parte (...) O espírito tem suas necessidades, assim como o corpo. Estas são os fundamentos da sociedade, e aquelas são seu divertimento. Assim como o governo e as leis encaminham à segurança e ao bem estar dos homens reunidos, as ciências, as letras e as artes, menos despóticas e talvez mais poderosas, estendem guirlandas de flores sobre as correntes de ferro com as quais estão acorrentados, abafando o sentimento de liberdade original para o qual parecem ter nascido, fazem-nos amar sua escravidão e formam aquilo a que chamamos de povos policiados.2 A necessidade elevou os tronos; as ciências e as artes os fortaleceram. Potências da terra, amai os talentos, e protegei aqueles que os cultivam. Povos policiados, cultivai-os: felizes escravos, vós lhes deveis esse gosto delicado e fino com os quais vos excitais; essa doçura de caráter e essa urbanidade dos modos que torna o comércio entre vós tão suave e tão fácil; em uma pa1 ROUSSEAU, J-J. Oeuvres completes. Édition publiée sours la direction Bernard Gagnebin e Marcel Raymond. Paris: Gallimard, 1959-1995.(Collection Bibliothèque de la Pléiade). 2 Note-se aqui a primeira manifestação de um termo recorrente nas obras de Rousseau, os ferros, os grilhões, as correntes. A mesma expressão aparecerá no segundo Discurso e no Contrato Social, evidenciando a relação que Rousseau estabelecia entre civilização e escravidão, entendida como a dependência dos homens entre si e das novas necessidades criadas com a sociedade. 579579 lavra, as aparências de todas as virtudes sem ter nenhuma. (...) Seria doce viver entre nós se o aspecto exterior fosse sempre a imagem das disposições do coração3; se a decência fosse a virtude; se nossas máximas nos servissem de regras; se a verdadeira filosofia fosse inseparável do título de filósofo! Mas tantas qualidades raramente vão juntas, e a virtude não anda em tão grande pompa. A riqueza dos ornamentos pode denunciar um homem opulento, e sua elegância um homem de gosto; o homem são e robusto se reconhece por outras marcas: é sob os trajes rústicos de um trabalhador, e não sob os dourados de um cortesão, que se encontra a força e o vigor do corpo.4 (...) Antes de a arte moldar nossas maneiras e ensinar as nossas paixões a falar uma linguagem polida, nossos costumes eram rústicos, mas naturais; e a diferença do proceder anunciava ao primeiro olhar aquela dos caracteres. A natureza humana, no fundo, não era melhor; mas os homens encontravam sua segurança na facilidade de se penetrar reciprocamente, e essa vantagem, da qual não sentimos mais o valor, poupavalhes muitos vícios.5 Hoje, que buscas mais sutis e um gosto mais refinado reduziram a arte de agradar a princípios, reina nos nossos costumes uma vil e enganosa uniformidade, e todos os espíritos parecem ter saído do mesmo molde: sem cessar a polidez exige, a decência ordena, sem cessar seguimos os usos, jamais seu próprio gênio. Não se ousa mais parecer o que se é; e nessa coerção perpétua, os homens que formam esse rebanho que chamamos sociedade, colocados na mesmas circunstâncias, farão todos as mesmas coisas se motivos mais fortes não os desviarem. 6 3 Já aparece aqui um tema caro a Rousseau: a transparência e a sinceridade. 4 Rousseau opondo o trabalhador ao nobre quer denunciar a separação que há entre ser e parecer. 5 O desenvolvimento dos costumes tornou os homens mais artificiosos, de modo a multiplicar os obstáculos à transparência dos corações. 6 Note-se a atualidade da crítica que sublinha como os constrangimentos da sociedade padronizam o comportamento humano. 580 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 580 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) Segunda parte (...) O abuso do tempo é um grande mal. Outros males ainda piores decorrem das letras e das artes. Assim é o luxo, nascido como elas da ociosidade e da vaidade dos homens. O luxo raramente anda sem as ciências e as artes, e estas nunca andam sem ele. Eu sei que nossa filosofia, sempre fecunda em máximas singulares, pretende, contra a experiência de todos os séculos, que o luxo faz o esplendor dos Estados; 7 (...) Que o luxo seja um signo certo de riquezas; que ele sirva mesmo se assim se quiser para multiplicá-las: o que se deve concluir desse paradoxo tão digno de nascer em nossos dias; o que se passará com a virtude, quando se deve enriquecer a qualquer preço? Os antigos políticos falavam sempre de costumes e de virtude. Os nossos só falam de comércio e de dinheiro.8 (...) Eles avaliam os homens como gado. De acordo com eles, um homem só vale ao Estado aquilo que consome. (...) De onde vêm todos esses abusos, se não é da desigualdade funesta introduzida entre os homens pela distinção dos talentos e pelo aviltamento das virtudes? Eis o efeito mais evidente de todos os nossos estudos, e a mais perigosa de todas as suas consequências. Não se exige mais de um homem que ele tenha probidade, mas que tenha talentos; nem de um livro seja útil, mas que seja bem escrito. As recompensas são prodigalizadas ao belo espírito, e a virtude permanece sem honras.9 7 Esta era a opinião de Mandeville e de Voltaire. 8 Rousseau afirma que talvez seja possível dizer mesmo que o luxo contribui para a riqueza das nações, mas, continua ele, isto não significa que elas sejam melhores do que aquelas mais rústicas e mais pobres. Ele identifica uma importante mudança na política de seu tempo, que parece abandonar os temas clássicos das virtudes cívicas e do bem comum e substituí-los por temas econômicos. É como se Rousseau identificasse uma mudança em seu tempo que acarretava a supremacia do econômico sobre o político, isto ficará ainda mais claro na sequência do texto. Seria interessante contrastar com a posição de Voltaire, que fazia o elogio do comércio e do desenvolvimento econômico das grandes nações europeias. 9 Enfim, agradar e divertir se torna mais importante do que ser útil ou virtuoso. 581581 (...) Nós temos físicos, geômetras, químicos, astrônomos, poetas, músicos, pintores. Não temos mais cidadãos, ou se ainda os restam, dispersos em nossos campos abandonados, eles perecem indigentes e desprezados. Este é o estado a que foram reduzidos, estes são os sentimentos que recebem de nós aqueles que nos fornecem o pão e que dão o leite a nossas crianças.10 10 Não se tem mais cidadãos no sentido de que não há mais preocupação com a coisa pública, mas somente com as distinções dentro de uma sociedade pautada pelas aparências. Ao contrário dos artistas e cientistas, os trabalhadores, que parecem aqui figurar pela primeira vez nos textos de filosofia, contribuem com seu trabalho ao bem comum. Cuidado, porém, para não sermos levados a um desprezo dos artistas e dos cientistas, não é isto que quer Rousseau, ele mesmo foi músico, redigiu peças de teatro e compôs óperas. O que ele quer dizer está ligado ao desenvolvimento da sociedade e ao afastamento da natureza, que não pode ser mais recuperada, não nos esqueçamos. Além disso, para Rousseau, o remédio está sempre no próprio mal, de sorte que se as ciências e as artes são perniciosas, é delas que se deve tirar proveito para amenizar os males da sociedade. Da mesma forma, a crítica à sociedade não significa a volta à natureza, que está irremediavelmente perdida, mas sim que devemos buscar na própria sociedade o antídoto para seus males, daí a importância do pacto social. 582 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 582 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens (1754) Prefácio O mais útil e o menos avançado de todos os conhecimentos humanos me parece ser aquele do homem, e ouso dizer que a simples inscrição do templo de Delfos11 continha um preceito mais importante e mais difícil que todos os grossos livros dos moralistas.12 Assim eu considero o assunto deste Discurso como uma das questões mais interessantes que a filosofia pode propor, e infelizmente para nós como uma das mais espinhosas que os filósofos podem deliberar. Pois como conhecer a fonte da desigualdade entre os homens, se não se começa por conhecer eles próprios? E como o homem chegará ao ponto de se ver como a natureza o formou, através de todas as mudanças que a sucessão do tempo e das coisas deve ter produzido em sua constituição original, e de distinguir aquilo que ele tem em seu próprio fundo daquilo que as circunstâncias e seus progressos adicionaram ou mudaram em seu estado primitivo. Semelhante à estátua de Glauco que o tempo, o mar e as ondas tinham desfigurado tanto que ele parecia menos a um deus do que a uma besta 11 "Conheça-te a ti mesmo". 12 O termo "moralistas" se refere àqueles autores que lidavam com as paixões, os vícios e as virtudes humanas. Trata-se de escritores do século XVII como La Rochefoucauld e La Bruyère. 583583 feroz, a alma humana alterada no seio da sociedade por mil causas sempre renascentes, pela aquisição de uma multidão de conhecimentos e de erros, pelas mudanças ocorridas à constituição do corpo, e pelo choque contínuo das paixões, mudou por assim dizer a aparência a ponto de ser quase irreconhecível. (...) Com efeito, não é concebível que essas primeiras mudanças, por qualquer meio que tenham ocorrido, tenham alterado de uma vez e da mesma maneira todos os indivíduos da espécie; mas alguns se aperfeiçoaram ou deterioraram, e adquiriram diversas qualidades boas ou más que não eram inerentes à sua natureza, enquanto outros permaneceram por mais tempo em seu estado original; e tal foi entre os homens a primeira fonte de desigualdade, que é mais fácil de demonstrar assim em geral do que assinalar com precisão suas verdadeiras causas.13 Que meus leitores não imaginem então que ouso me vangloriar de ter visto aquilo que me parece tão difícil de ver. Comecei alguns raciocínios, lancei algumas conjecturas, menos na esperança de resolver a questão do que com a intenção de esclarecê-la e de reduzi-la a seu verdadeiro estado. Outros poderão facilmente ir mais longe no mesmo caminho, sem que seja fácil chegar ao seu fim. Pois não é uma empresa simples distinguir aquilo que há de originário daquilo que é artificial na natureza atual do homem, e de conhecer bem uma condição que não existe mais, que talvez nunca tenha existido, que provavelmente jamais existirá, e da qual é no entanto necessário ter noções justas para bem julgar o nosso estado presente.14 (...) 13 Isto significa dizer que o processo que Rousseau descreverá não foi uniforme, o que permite compreender os diferentes graus dos povos existentes, uns mais distantes do que os outros do estado de natureza, e por isso mais degenerados. 14 Este trecho é importante para sublinhar a tarefa de Rousseau e mostrar que ele não concebia o estado de natureza como um estado real, histórico, mas sim como uma conjectura, uma suposição que serve para explicar as mudanças por que passou o homem. A tarefa do autor é separar no homem aquilo que é natural daquilo que é artificial, daí se recorrer a hipótese do estado de natureza, que por talvez nunca ter existido factualmente não pode ser algo a que se possa retornar. 584 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 584 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) Deixemos então todos os livros científicos que só nos ensinam a ver os homens tal como eles já estão constituídos, e mediante as primeiras e mais simples operações da alma humana, creio ver nela dois princípios anteriores à razão, dos quais um nos faz interessar-nos pelo nosso bem estar e pela conservação de nós mesmos, e o outro nos inspira uma repugnância natural ao ver morrer ou sofrer todo ser sensível e principalmente nossos semelhantes.15 É do concurso e da combinação que nosso espírito esteja em condição de fazer desses dois princípios, sem que seja necessário fazer entrar aquele da sociabilidade, que me parece decorrer todas as regras do direito natural; regras que a razão é em seguida forçada a restabelecer sobre outros fundamentos, quando por seus desenvolvimentos sucessivos chega ao ponto de abafar a natureza.16 Dessa maneira, não sé é obrigado a fazer do homem um filósofo antes de fazê-lo um homem; seus deveres em relação ao outro não lhes são ditados unicamente pelas tardias lições da sabedoria; e enquanto resistir ao impulso interior da comiseração, ele nunca fará mal a um outro homem nem mesmo a um ser sensível, excetuando o caso legítimo em que sua conservação se encontre concernida, ele é obrigado a dar preferência a si mesmo.17 (...) 15 Trata-se do amor de si e da piedade. Note-se que Rousseau afasta-se dos livros científicos, pois estes falam do homem atual, e Rousseau visa o homem anterior ao homem, o homem anterior àquele que conhecemos na sociedade. 16 No estado de natureza amor de si e piedade pautam as atitudes dos homens, mas em sociedade, como estes princípios são abafados, é preciso instituir novos princípios que guiarão a conduta dos homens. 17 Rousseau quer dizer que não é preciso conceber um homem natural inteligente e sábio como o homem na sociedade para fazer com que ele se relacione com os seus semelhantes. Isto é também uma crítica aos outros autores que quiseram falar do homem natural e projetaram sobre ele qualidades do homem civil. 585585 Discurso (...) Concebo na espécie humana dois tipos de desigualdade, uma que chamo de natural ou física, pois ela é estabelecida pela natureza, e que consiste na diferença de idades, de saúde, de força corporal, e de qualidades do espírito, ou da alma, e a outra que podemos chamar de desigualdade moral, ou política, porque ela depende de um tipo de convenção, e é estabelecida ou ao menos autorizada pelo consentimento dos homens. Esta consiste na diferença de privilégios, do quais alguns gozam em prejuízo de outros, como ser mais rico, mais honrado, mais poderoso que eles, ou mesmo o de se fazer obedecer. (...) Do que se trata, então, precisamente neste Discurso? De marcar no progresso das coisas o momento em que o direito sucedendo à violência, a natureza foi submetida à lei; de explicar por que encadeamento de prodígios o forte pode resolver servir o fraco, e o povo comprar um repouso fantasioso pelo preço de uma felicidade real. Os filósofos que examinaram os fundamentos da sociedade sentiram todos a necessidade de remontar até o estado de natureza, mas nenhum deles chegou lá. Uns não hesitaram em supor no homem nesse 586 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 586 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) estado a noção do justo e do injusto, sem se preocupar em mostrar que ele deveria ter essa noção, nem mesmo que ela lhe fosse útil. Outros falaram do direito natural que cada um tem de conservar aquilo que lhe pertence, sem explicar o que entendiam por pertencer. Outros davam ao mais forte a autoridade sobre o mais fraco, fizeram logo nascer o governo, sem imaginar o tempo que deveria decorrer antes que o sentido das palavras de autoridade e governo pudessem existir entre os homens. Enfim, todos, falando sem parar de necessidade, de avidez, de opressão, de desejos e de orgulho, transportaram ao estado de natureza ideias que tomaram na sociedade. (...) Comecemos, então, por afastar todos os fatos, pois eles não se ligam à questão. Não é preciso considerar as pesquisas nas quais se pode entrar neste assunto por verdades históricas, mas somente por raciocínios hipotéticos e condicionais, mais adequados para esclarecer a natureza das coisas do que mostrar sua verdadeira origem, e semelhantes àqueles que fazem todos os dias nossos físicos sobre a formação do mundo.18 (...) Ó homem, em qualquer canto do mundo em que você estiver, quaisquer que forem suas opiniões, escuta. Eis tua história tal qual acreditei lê-la não nos livros de teus semelhantes que são mentirosos, mas na natureza que não mente jamais.19(...) Primeira parte 18 Eis aqui o método do autor. Rousseau não quer fazer história, relato de como as coisas realmente se passaram. Ele compara seu trabalho ao dos físicos: uma hipótese da qual se lança mão para explicar certos fenômenos e cujo valor se mede pela sua capacidade de explicação. Sobre isto ver GOLDSCHMIDT, V. Les principes du système de Rousseau: Anthropologie et politique. Paris: J. Vrin, 1974. Ver também o artigo de MARTIN-HAAG, E. Le discours généalogique et le problème de son statut. In: Rousseau et la philosophie. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2004. 19 Mais uma vez a distinção entre o trabalho do filósofo, que se baseia em raciocínios e na natureza humana, e a do historiador, que se funda sobre relatos. 587587 (...) Considerei até aqui o homem físico. Tratemos agora de vê-lo pelo lado metafísico e moral. Vejo em todo animal apenas uma máquina engenhosa, a quem a natureza deu sentidos para se recompor por si mesma, e para se garantir, até certo ponto, de tudo que tende a lhe destruir ou a lhe desregular. Percebo precisamente as mesmas coisas na máquina humana, com a diferença de que a natureza sozinha faz tudo nas operações das bestas, ao passo que os homens concorrem para com as suas como agentes livres. Um escolhe ou rejeita por instinto, e o outro por um ato de liberdade; o que faz com que a besta não possa escapar da regra que lhe é prescrita, mesmo quando lhe seria vantajoso o fazer, e o homem escapa frequentemente em seu prejuízo.20 É assim que um pombo morreria de fome perante uma bacia repleta das melhores carnes, e um gato perante uma de frutas ou grãos, (...) Todos os animais têm ideias porque têm sentidos, chegam mesmo a combinar suas ideias até certo ponto, e o homem só difere da besta neste aspecto como o mais do menos.21 Alguns filósofos chegaram mesmo a avançar que há mais diferença entre um homem e outro do que entre um homem e uma besta; não é, portanto, o entendimento que faz entre os animais a distinção específica do homem, mas sim sua qualidade de 20 Uma das qualidades que diferencia o homem dos animais para Rousseau é a liberdade, não a razão. Poderíamos definir a liberdade como a capacidade de dizer não à natureza. Todos os animais seguem aquilo que seu instinto de natureza lhes dita, eles nunca se desviam daquilo que sua natureza estipula, enquanto no caso dos homens nem todas as suas ações são reações automáticas de preceitos naturais, o homem é capaz, para o bem e para o mal, de se desviar daquilo que a natureza dita. O animal sempre se comporta de uma maneira determinada pela natureza, um carnívoro morrerá de fome perante um prato de cereais. Já o homem pode ou não obedecer aquilo que a natureza diz, ele não age sempre por instinto como os animais. 21 Como a maioria dos filósofos de seu tempo, Rousseau aqui se faz discípulo do empirismo de John Locke (1632-1704), segundo o qual todas as nossas ideias nos vêm pelos sentidos. Cabe dizer que os animais também têm ideias, posto que têm sentidos, e que têm também certo entendimento, pois parecem poder combinar certas ideias. Desse modo, o que distingue o homem do animal não pode ser o entendimento, mas outra coisa, que Rousseau pensará ser a liberdade e a perfectibilidade. 588 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 588 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) agente livre. A natureza obriga a todo animal, e a besta obedece. O homem prova a mesma impressão, mas ele se reconhece livre para aquiescer ou resistir; e é sobretudo na consciência dessa liberdade que se mostra a espiritualidade de sua alma: pois a física explica de alguma forma o mecanismo dos sentidos e a formação das ideias, mas no poder de querer, ou antes no de escolher, e no sentimento deste poder, se encontram atos puramente espirituais, que não se explicam por leis da mecânica. (...) há uma outra qualidade muito específica que os distingue, e sobre a qual não pode haver contestação, é a faculdade de se aperfeiçoar, faculdade que, com a ajuda das circunstâncias, desenvolve sucessivamente todas as outras, e reside entre nós tanto na espécie quanto nos indivíduos, enquanto que o animal é, no final de alguns meses, aquilo que ele será toda a sua vida, e sua espécie, ao fim de mil anos, aquilo que ela era no primeiro ano desses mil anos.22 (...) Seria triste para nós sermos forçados a convir que essa faculdade distintiva e quase ilimitada é a fonte de todas as infelicidades do homem. Que é ela que o retira com o tempo dessa condição originária, na qual ele passaria dias tranquilos e inocentes, que é ela que faz florescer com os séculos suas luzes e seus erros, seus vícios e suas virtudes, o torna com o tempo o tirano de si mesmo e da natureza. (...) Apesar do que dizem os moralistas, o entendimento humano deve muito às paixões, que, reconhecidamente, lhes devem muito também: é por sua atividade que nossa razão de aperfeiçoa; não procuramos conhecer senão porque desejamos gozar, e não é possível conceber porque aquele que não tem nem desejos nem temores se daria o trabalho de ra22 Junto da liberdade, há outra qualidade que distingue o homem do animal: a perfectibilidade, entendida como a capacidade de mudar e de se adaptar. Não devemos pensar que a perfectibilidade significa tender à perfeição, não se trata disso. A perfectibilidade é tão somente a capacidade de mudar, de atualizar potencialidades humanas. A perfectibilidade não tem vetor predeterminado, ela, como a liberdade, pode conduzir ao bem ou ao mal, na verdade, ela conduziu às luzes e aos erros, aos vícios e as virtudes, como diz a sequência do texto de Rousseau. 589589 ciocinar.23 As paixões, por sua vez, têm suas origens em nossas necessidades, e seus progressos em nossos conhecimentos, pois não podemos desejar ou temer as coisas a não ser devido às ideias que podemos ter delas, ou pelo simples impulso da natureza, e o homem selvagem, privado de toda sorte de luzes, não prova senão as paixões da ultima espécie; seus desejos não ultrapassam suas necessidades físicas, os únicos bens que ele conhece no universo são a nutrição, uma fêmea e o repouso, os únicos males que teme são a dor e a fome, digo a dor e não a morte. Pois jamais o animal saberia o que é morrer, e o conhecimento da morte, e de seus terrores, é uma das primeiras aquisições que o homem fez, ao se distanciar da condição animal.24 (...) A primeira linguagem do homem, a linguagem mais universal, mais enérgica e a única de que teve necessidade antes que fosse preciso persuadir homens reunidos, foi o grito da natureza. Como esse grito só era arrancado por uma espécie de instinto nas ocasiões prementes, para implorar socorro nos grandes perigos, ou alívio nos males violentos, não era de grande uso no curso ordinário da vida, em que reinam sentimentos mais moderados. Quando as ideias dos homens começaram a se estender e a se multiplicar, e se estabeleceu entre eles uma comunicação mais estreita, procuraram sinais mais numerosos e uma linguagem mais extensa; multiplicaram as inflexões da voz e lhe juntaram os gestos, que, por natureza, são mais expressivos, dependendo menos o seu sentido de uma determinação anterior.25 (...) 23 Os moralistas costumavam opor as paixões ao entendimento. O que Rousseau mostra é que a própria razão depende das paixões e vice versa. O homem só quer conhecer e pensar porque deseja, porque é tomado por paixões. Por outro lado, o progresso dos conhecimentos humanos multiplica as paixões. Neste sentindo, o homem mais próximo da natureza, tendo menos conhecimentos, tem menos paixões. 24 Saber que é mortal não é algo natural ao homem, segundo Rousseau, mas sim uma aquisição do processo de afastamento da natureza. 25 Eis aqui algumas considerações sobre a linguagem e as línguas que Rousseau desenvolverá mais tarde em sua obra Ensaio sobre a origem das línguas, publicada postumamente em 1781. 590 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 590 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) Parece, à primeira vista, que os homens nesse estado, não tendo entre eles nenhuma espécie de relação moral nem de deveres conhecidos, não podiam ser bons nem maus, nem tinham vícios nem virtudes, a menos que, tomando essas palavras em um sentido físico, se chamem vícios, no indivíduo, as qualidades que podem prejudicar a sua própria conservação, e virtudes as que podem contribuir para essa conservação; (...) Não vamos sobretudo concluir com Hobbes que, por não ter nenhuma ideia de bondade, o homem seja naturalmente mau; que seja vicioso, porque não conhece a virtude; que recuse sempre aos seus semelhantes serviços que não acredita serem do seu dever, ou que, em virtude do direito que se atribui com razão às coisas de que tem necessidade, imagine loucamente ser o único proprietário de todo o universo. Hobbes viu muito bem o defeito de todas as definições modernas do direito natural: mas, as consequências que tira da sua mostram que a toma em um sentido que não é menos falso. Raciocinando sobre os princípios que estabelece, esse autor deveria dizer que, sendo o estado de natureza aquele em que o cuidado de nossa conservação é menos prejudicial à dos outros, esse estado era, por conseguinte, o mais próprio à paz e o mais conveniente ao gênero humano. Ele diz precisamente o contrário, por ter feito entrar, fora de propósito, no cuidado da conservação do homem selvagem, a necessidade de satisfazer uma multidão de paixões que são obra da sociedade, e que tornaram necessárias as leis. O mau, diz ele, é uma criança robusta. Resta saber se o selvagem é uma criança robusta. (...) Hobbes não viu que a mesma causa que impede os selvagens de usar sua razão, como o pretendem os nossos jurisconsultos, impede-os também de abusar das suas faculdades, como ele próprio o pretende; de sorte que se poderia dizer que os selvagens não são maus precisamente porque não sabem o que é ser bom. (...) Há ainda outro princípio que Hobbes não percebeu e que, tendo sido dado ao homem para suavizar em certas ocasiões a ferocidade de seu amor-próprio, ou o desejo de se conservar antes do nascimento desse amor, tempera o ardor que ele tem por seu bem estar com uma repugnância inata de ver sofrer seu semelhante. (...) Refiro-me à piedade, disposição conveniente a seres tão fracos e sujeitos a tantos males como nós; virtude tanto mais universal quan591591 to mais útil ao homem que precede nele ao uso de toda reflexão, e tão natural que as próprias bestas dão, às vezes, sinais sensíveis dela. Sem falar da ternura das mães pelos filhos e dos perigos que afrontam para defendê-los, observamos todos os dias a repugnância que têm os cavalos em pisar um corpo vivo.26 (...) É, pois, certo que a piedade é um sentimento natural, que, moderando em cada indivíduo a atividade do amor de si mesmo, concorre para a conservação mútua de toda a espécie. 27 É ela que nos leva sem reflexão ao socorro daqueles que vemos sofrer; é ela que, no estado de natureza, faz o papel das leis, dos costumes e da virtude, com a vantagem de que ninguém é tentado a desobedecer à sua doce voz (...) Em uma palavra, é nesse sentimento natural, mais do que em argumentos sutis, que é preciso buscar a causa da repugnância que todo homem provaria em fazer mal, mesmo independentemente das máximas da educação. 28 (...) Sem prolongar inutilmente esses detalhes, cada qual deve ver que, sendo os laços da servidão formados exclusivamente da dependência mútua dos homens e das necessidades recíprocas que os unem, é impossível sujeitar um homem sem o pôr antes na situação de não poder 26 Rousseau critica aqui a posição de Hobbes segundo a qual o homem é mau por natureza. De acordo com o genebrino, são dois os motivos do homem não ser mau no estado de natureza: em primeiro lugar, sendo isolado e não tendo as paixões do homem civil, o homem natural não ataca, não se vinga, não mata como quer o filósofo inglês. Além disso, de acordo com Rousseau, há no homem natural a piedade, que serve para moderar a sua ferocidade. Dessa maneira, quando o homem é o lobo do homem é porque ele já está afastado do estado de natureza, agora com paixões e interesses que não lhes são naturais, mas adquiridos. 27 O homem natural tem então duas características morais: amor de si e piedade. É preciso cuidar para não confundir o amor de si com o amor próprio. O primeiro se refere ao homem natural, é tão somente seu instinto de conservação, o segundo se refere ao homem civil, ele é a corrupção do primeiro, do instinto natural de conservação, que na vida em sociedade se torna egoísmo, conduzindo o homem a sempre preferir a si mesmo em prejuízo dos outros. 28 É interessante notar que o amor de si contribui para a conservação do indivíduo, um instinto que entra em funcionamento toda vez que o homem natural se sente ameaçado. Já a piedade parece funcionar como um princípio de conservação da espécie, pois impede que os homens matem uns aos outros. 592 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 592 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) passar sem outro homem; situação que, não existindo no estado de natureza, deixa cada um livre do jugo e torna vã a lei do mais forte. (...) Segunda parte O primeiro que, tendo cercado um terreno, se lembrou de dizer: Isto é meu, e encontrou pessoas bastantes simples para acreditá-lo, foi o verdadeiro fundador da sociedade civil. Quantos crimes, guerras, assassinatos, misérias e horrores não teria poupado ao gênero humano aquele que, arrancando as estacas ou tapando o fosso, tivesse gritado aos seus semelhantes: "Não escutais esse impostor; estareis perdidos se esquecerdes que o frutos são de todos, e a terra de ninguém!". Parece, porém, que as coisas já tinham chegado ao ponto de não mais poder ficar como estavam: porque essa ideia de propriedade, dependendo muito de ideias anteriores que só puderam nascer sucessivamente, não se formou de repente no espírito humano: foi preciso fazer muitos progressos, adquirir muita indústria e luzes, transmiti-las e aumentá-las de geração para geração, antes de chegar a esse último termo do estado de natureza. Retomemos, pois, as coisas de mais alto, e tratemos de reunir sob um só ponto de vista essa lenta sucessão de acontecimentos e de conhecimentos na sua ordem mais natural.29 (...) Quanto mais o espírito se esclarecia, mais a indústria se aperfeiçoava. Logo, deixando de adormecer na primeira árvore, ou de se retirar nas cavernas, encontraram-se certas espécies de machados de pedras duras e afiadas que serviram para cortar a madeira, cavar a terra e fazer cabanas com galhos, que ocorreu, em seguida, endurecer com argila e barro. Foi a época de uma primeira revolução que formou o estabelecimento e a distinção das famílias e que introduziu uma espécie de propriedade, de 29 A sociedade civil não foi criada de uma só vez. Para que o cercamento de terra que deu origem a ela pudesse ter ocorrido, os homens já tinham que estar agrupados, além de ser necessário o desenvolvimento de certas técnicas que conferiam importância à terra. É isto que a sequência do texto tentará mostrar: os sucessivos desenvolvimentos necessários para que se chegasse ao estágio em que o cercamento de terras dá origem à sociedade. 593593 onde já nasceram, talvez, muitas rixas e combates. (...) Os primeiros desenvolvimentos do coração foram o efeito de uma situação nova que reunia numa habitação comum os maridos e as mulheres, os pais e os filhos; o hábito de viver coletivamente nascer os mais doces sentimentos conhecidos dos homens: o amor conjugal e o amor paternal. Cada família se tornou uma pequena sociedade tanto mais unida quanto o apego recíproco e a liberdade eram seus únicos laços; e foi então que se estabeleceu a primeira diferença na maneira de viver dos dois sexos que até então só tinham tido uma. As mulheres tornaram-se mais sedentárias e se acostumaram a guardar a cabana e os filhos, enquanto o homem ia procurar a subsistência comum. (...) Tudo começa a mudar de face. Os homens, até então errantes nos bosques, tendo agora situação mais fixa, aproximando-se lentamente, reúnem-se em diversos grupos e formam, enfim, em cada região, uma nação particular, unida pelos costumes e pelos caracteres, não pelos regulamentos e pelas leis, mas pelo mesmo gênero de vida e pelos alimentos, e pela influência comum do clima. Uma vizinhança permanente não pode deixar de engendrar, enfim, alguma ligação entre diversas famílias. Jovens de diferentes sexos habitam cabanas vizinhas; o comércio passageiro que a natureza exige logo conduz a outro não menos doce e mais permanente pela mútua frequentação. Adquire-se o hábito de considerar diferentes objetos e compará-los; adquirem-se, insensivelmente, ideias de mérito e de beleza, que produzem sentimentos de preferência. À força de se ver, não se pode mais passar sem se ver. (...) À medida que as ideias e os sentimentos se sucedem, que o espírito e o coração se exercem, o gênero humano continua a se domesticar, as ligações se estendem e os laços se apertam. Adquire-se o hábito de se reunir diante das cabanas ou em torno de uma grande árvore: o canto e a dança, verdadeiros filhos do amor e do lazer, tornam-se a distração, ou 594 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 594 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) antes, a ocupação dos homens e das mulheres ociosos e agrupados. Cada um começa a olhar os outros e a querer ser olhado, e a estima pública tem um preço. Aquele que canta ou dança melhor, o mais belo, o mais forte, o mais destro ou o mais eloquente, torna-se o mais considerado. E foi esse o primeiro passo para a desigualdade e para o vício, ao mesmo tempo: dessas primeiras preferências nasceram, de um lado, a vaidade e o desprezo e, de outro, a vergonha e a inveja; e a fermentação causada por esses novos levedos produziu, enfim, compostos funestos à felicidade e à inocência.30 (...) Enquanto os homens se contentaram com as suas cabanas rústicas, enquanto se limitaram a costurar suas roupas de peles com espinhos ou gravetos, a se enfeitarem com plumas e conchas, a pintar o corpo de diversas cores, a aperfeiçoar ou embelezar os seus arcos e flechas, a talhar com pedras cortantes algumas canoas de pesca ou grosseiros instrumentos de música; em uma palavra, enquanto se aplicaram apenas a obras que um só podia fazer, e a artes que não necessitavam do concurso de muitas mãos, viveram livres, sãos, bons e felizes tanto quanto podiam ser pela sua natureza, e continuaram a gozar entre si das doçuras de uma convivência independente: mas, desde o instante que um homem teve necessidade do socorro de outro; desde que perceberam que era útil a um só ter provisões para dois, a igualdade desapareceu, a propriedade se introduziu, o trabalho tornou-se necessário e as vastas florestas se transformaram em campos agradáveis que foi preciso regar com o suor dos homens, e nos quais, em breve, se viram a escravidão e a miséria germinarem e crescerem com as colheitas. 31 (...) Da cultura das terras resulta necessariamente a sua partilha, e da propriedade uma vez reconhecida as primeiras regras de justiça: porque, para dar a cada um o seu, é preciso que cada um possa ter alguma coisa; 30 O homem começa agora a se medir pelo olhar do outro. 31 Este ponto é bastante interessante. A grande mudança se dá com a divisão do trabalho, é aí que a dependência mútua se amplia. 595595 de resto, como os homens começavam a dirigir suas vistas ao futuro e vendo todos que tinham alguns bens a perder, não houve nenhum que não receasse para si a represália dos males que pudesse causar a outrem. Essa origem é tanto mais natural quanto é impossível conceber a ideia da propriedade surgindo fora da mão de obra; porque não se vê o que, para se apropriar das coisas que não fez, possa o homem acrescentar-lhe além do seu trabalho. Só o trabalho, dando direito ao cultivador sobre o produto da terra que trabalhou lhe dá por conseguinte sobre a terra, pelo menos até à colheita, e assim todos os anos; e isso, constituindo uma posse contínua, transforma-se facilmente em propriedade. (...) Foi assim que os mais poderosos ou os mais miseráveis, fazendo de suas forças ou de suas necessidades uma espécie de direito ao bem do outro, equivalente, segundo eles, ao da propriedade, a igualdade rompida foi seguida da mais horrível desordem: e assim que as usurpações dos ricos, o banditismo dos pobres, as paixões desenfreadas de todos, abafando a piedade natural e a voz ainda mais fraca da justiça, tornaram os homens avarentos, ambiciosos e maus. Levantava-se entre o direito do mais forte e o direito do primeiro ocupante um conflito perpétuo que só terminava por meio de combates e assassinatos. A sociedade nascente deu lugar ao mais horrível estado de guerra: o gênero humano, aviltado e desolado, não podendo mais voltar atrás, nem renunciar às infelizes aquisições já realizadas, e não trabalhando senão para a sua vergonha, pelo abuso das faculdades que o honram, se colocou também na véspera de sua ruína.32 (...) Não é possível que os homens não tenham feito, afinal, reflexões sobre uma situação tão miserável e sobre as calamidades que os afligiam. Os ricos, principalmente, logo devem ter sentido como lhes era desvantajosa uma guerra perpétua cujas despesas só eles pagavam, e na qual o 32 Eis um estado de guerra, mas que já está distante do estado de natureza. Aqui é como se Rousseau mais uma vez corrigisse Hobbes: há sim um estado de guerra, mas ele não é natural, mas sim algo que surgiu com os progressos realizados pelo homem. 596 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 596 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) risco de vida era comum, assim como o dos bens particulares. Aliás, se algum sentido podiam dar às suas usurpações, sabiam que eram estabelecidas apenas sobre um direito precário e abusivo, e que, só tendo sido adquiridas pela força, a força as poderia arrancar sem que tivessem razão de se lamentar. Aqueles mesmos que só a indústria havia enriquecido, não podiam fundar sua propriedade sobre melhores títulos. Bem podiam dizer: "Fui eu quem construiu este muro; ganhei este terreno com o meu trabalho." – "E quem vos deu as demarcações? – poder-se-ia responderlhes – e em virtude de que pretendeis ser pagos à nossa custa por um trabalho que não vos impusemos? Ignorais que uma multidão de vossos irmãos perece ou sofre da necessidade daquilo que tendes demais, e que precisaríeis de um consentimento expresso e unânime do gênero humano para vos apropriásseis de tudo que na subsistência comum vai além da vossa?" Destituído de razões válidas para se justificar e de forças suficientes para se defender; esmagando facilmente um particular, mas esmagado ele mesmo por tropas de bandidos; só contra todos, e não podendo, por causa das rivalidades mútuas, unir-se com seus iguais contra inimigos unidos pela esperança comum da pilhagem, o rico, forçado pela necessidade, concebeu enfim, o projeto mais refletido que jamais entrou no espírito humano: o de empregar em seu favor as próprias forças daqueles que o atacavam, de fazer de seus adversários seus defensores, de lhes inspirar outras máximas e de lhes dar outras instituições que lhe fossem tão favoráveis quanto lhe era contrário o direito natural. 33 Tendo isso em vista, depois de expor aos seus vizinhos o horror de uma situação que os armava a todos uns contra os outros, que lhes tornava as paixões tão onerosas quanto as suas necessidades, e na qual ninguém se sentia em segurança nem na pobreza nem na riqueza, inventou facilmente razões especiosas para conduzi-los ao seu objetivo. "Unamos-nos, – lhes disse, – para livrar da opressão os fracos, conter os ambiciosos e assegurar a cada um a posse do que lhe pertence. Instituamos regras de justiça e de paz às quais todos sejam obrigados a se conformar, que não façam acepção de pessoas e que de certo modo reparem 33 Como nada garantia a posse daqueles que cercaram os terrenos, pois ela se baseava na força ou no direito do primeiro ocupante, o rico achou necessário um segundo engodo, estabelecendo as regras do direito para proteger a si e a seus bens. 597597 os caprichos da fortuna, submetendo igualmente o poderoso e o fraco a deveres mútuos. Em uma palavra, em vez de voltar nossas forças contra nós mesmos, reunamo-las em um poder supremo que nos governe segundo leis sábias, que proteja e defenda todos os membros da associação, repila os inimigos comuns e nos mantenha em uma concórdia eterna." Foi preciso muito menos que o equivalente desse discurso para arrastar homens grosseiros, fáceis de seduzir, que aliás tinham muitos negócios que resolver entre si para poder passar sem árbitros, e muita avareza e ambição para poder passar muito tempo sem senhores. Todos correram ao encontro de seus grilhões, acreditando assegurar a própria liberdade; pois, com bastante razão para sentir as vantagens de um estabelecimento político, não tinham bastante experiência para prever os perigos; os mais capazes de pressentir os abusos eram precisamente aqueles que contavam tirar vantagem deles, e mesmos os sábios perceberam ser preciso decidir sacrificar uma parte de sua liberdade para a conservação da outra, como um ferido se faz cortar um braço para salvar o resto do corpo. Tal foi ou deve ter sido a origem da sociedade e das leis, que deram novos entraves ao fraco e novas forças ao rico, destruíram sem remédio a liberdade natural, fixaram para sempre a lei da propriedade e da desigualdade, de uma hábil usurpação fizeram um direito irrevogável, e para proveito de alguns ambiciosos sujeitaram daí em diante todo o gênero humano ao trabalho, à servidão e à miséria. (...) Se seguirmos o progresso da desigualdade nessas diferentes revoluções, veremos que o estabelecimento da lei e do direito de propriedade foi seu primeiro termo, a instituição da magistratura o segundo, e que o terceiro e último foi a mudança do poder legítimo em poder arbitrário; de sorte que a condição de rico e de pobre foi autorizada pela primeira época, a de poderoso e de fraco pela segunda, e pela terceira a de senhor e de escravo, que é o último grau de desigualdade, o termo ao qual chegam finalmente todos os outros, até que novas revoluções dissolvam completamente o governo, ou o aproximem da instituição legítima. 598 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 598 rousseAu • eXCertos • disCurso sobre As CiênCiAs e As Artes (1750) (...) Da extrema desigualdade das condições e das fortunas, da diversidade das paixões e dos talentos, das artes inúteis, das artes perniciosas, das ciências frívolas, saíram multidões de preconceitos igualmente contrários à razão, à felicidade e à virtude.34 Ver-se-ia fomentar pelos chefes tudo o que pode enfraquecer homens reunidos desunindo-os, tudo o que pode dar à sociedade um ar de concórdia aparente e nela semear um germe de divisão real, tudo o que pode inspirar às diferentes ordens uma desconfiança e um ódio mútuo pela oposição dos seus direitos e dos seus interesses, e fortificar, por conseguinte, o poder que os contém a todos. É do seio dessa desordem e dessas revoluções que o despotismo, levantando gradativamente a cabeça hedionda, e devorando tudo o que teria percebido de bom e de são em todas as partes do Estado, conseguiria finalmente esmagar as leis e o povo, e se estabelecer sobre as ruínas da república. (...) Aqui está o último termo da desigualdade, e o ponto extremo que fecha o círculo e toca no ponto de onde partimos. É aqui que todos os particulares voltam a ser iguais porque nada são, e os súditos não tendo mais outra lei senão a vontade do senhor, nem o senhor outra regra senão as suas paixões, as noções do bem e os princípios da justiça desaparecem de agora em diante. É aqui que tudo se reduz exclusivamente à lei do mais forte, e, por conseguinte, a um novo estado de natureza diferente daquele pelo qual começamos, sendo que um era o estado de natureza na sua pureza, e este último é o fruto de um excesso de corrupção. Há tão pouca diferença, aliás, entre esses dois estados, e o contrato de governo é de tal modo dissolvido pelo despotismo, que o déspota não é senhor senão durante o tempo em que é o mais forte; e, tão logo possam expulsá-lo, não tem o que reclamar contra a violência. A rebelião que acaba por estrangular ou destronar um sultão é um ato tão jurídico 34 Seguem-se agora uma crítica ao despotismo e certas considerações que parecem prenunciar os eventos que acontecerão pouco menos de quarenta anos depois com a Revolução Francesa (1789). 599599 como aqueles pelos quais ele dispunha até então das vidas e dos bens de seus súditos. Só a força o mantinha, só a força o derruba; todas as coisas se passam assim, segundo a ordem natural; e, qualquer que possa ser o advento dessas curtas e frequentes revoluções, ninguém se pode queixar das injustiças de outrem, mas somente da sua própria imprudência ou da sua desgraça. (...) 600 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 600 rousseAu • do ContrAto soCiAL Do Contrato social (1762) livro I Desejo investigar se, na ordem civil, pode haver qualquer regra da administração legítima e segura, tomando os homens tais como eles são, e as leis tais como elas podem ser. 35(...) Entro na matéria sem provar a importância de meu assunto. Indagar-me-ão se sou príncipe ou legislador para escrever sobre política. Respondo que não, e que é por isso mesmo que escrevo sobre a política. 36 Se eu fosse príncipe ou legislador, não perderia meu tempo dizendo o que se deve fazer, eu o faria, ou me calaria. (...) 35 Rousseau diz que considerará os homens como são e as leis como devem ser. O que isto significa? Ora, ele quer dizer que falará do homem atual, não daquele do estado de natureza, e não tomará as leis como elas são, imperfeitas e legitimadoras da desigualdade, mas como elas devem ser, equânimes e criadas a partir de uma situação que não seja desvantajosa para nenhum dos contratantes envolvidos no pacto. Por isso o pacto que tratará nesta obra não pode ser confundido com o pacto proposto pelo rico para proteger sua pessoa e seus bens que se encontra no Discurso sobre a origem da desigualdade entre os homens. 36 Sobre a importância do escritor político ver: NASCIMENTO, M. M. do. O legislador e o escritor político: duas formas de aproximação da opinião pública em Rousseau. Kriterion, Belo Horizonte, v. 38, n. 96, p. 94-103, 1998. 601601 Capítulo 1 O homem nasceu livre e se encontra a ferros por toda parte, aquele se crê senhor dos outros, e não deixa de ser mais escravo do que eles. Como essa mudança ocorreu? Eu ignoro. O que pode torná-la legítima? Eu creio poder resolver esta questão. (...) Mas a ordem social é um direito sagrado que serve de base a todos os outros. No entanto, esse direito não vem da natureza; ele é, portanto, fundado sobre convenções. Trata-se de saber quais são essas convenções. Antes disso, devo estabelecer o que acabo de afirmar. Capítulo 3 Do direito do mais forte O mais forte não é nunca forte o suficiente para ser sempre o senhor, se não transforma sua força em direito, e a obediência em dever. Daí o direto do mais forte, direito tomado ironicamente na aparência, e realmente estabelecido em princípio. Mas nunca teremos uma explicação dessa palavra? A força é um poder físico; não vejo que moralidade pode resultar de seus efeitos. Ceder à força é um ato de necessidade, não de vontade, é no máximo um ato de prudência. Em que sentido poderá ser um dever?37 (...) Obedecei às potências. Se isso quer dizer: cedei à força, o preceito é bom, mas supérfluo; digo que ele nunca será violado. Toda potência vem de Deus, eu reconheço, mas toda doença também: isto quer dizer que não se deve chamar o médico? Quando um bandido me surpreende num canto da floresta, não somente é preciso por força entregar-lhe a bolsa, mas quando pudesse retomá-la estaria eu, em consciência, obrigado a entregá-la? Pois, enfim, a pistola que carrega também é uma potência. Convenhamos, portanto, que a força não constitui direito, e que 37 A força não constitui direito, de sorte que é preciso encontrar um outro fundamento para o direito dentro do estado político, que será, para Rousseau, o pacto social. 602 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 602 rousseAu • do ContrAto soCiAL não se é obrigado a obedecer a não ser às potências legítimas. Assim, minha questão primitiva se mantém. Capítulo 4 Da escravidão Já que nem um homem tem uma autoridade natural sobre seu semelhante, e já que a força não produz direito, restam portanto as convenções como base de toda autoridade legítima entre os homens. (...) Renunciar à sua liberdade é renunciar à sua qualidade de homem, aos direitos da humanidade e mesmo aos seus deveres. Não há recompensa possível para quem renuncia a tudo. Tal renúncia é incompatível com a natureza do homem; e excluir toda a liberdade de sua vontade é excluir toda a moralidade de seus atos. Enfim, é uma convenção vã e contraditória estipular de uma parte uma autoridade absoluta, e de outra uma obediência sem limites. Não é claro que não se está comprometido com nada em relação àquele que se tem o direito de tudo exigir? E somente esta condição, sem equivalente, sem troca, não acarreta a nulidade do ato? Pois, qual direito meu escravo teria contra mim, já que tudo o que tem me pertence, seu direito sendo meu, esse direito meu contra mim mesmo é uma palavra sem sentido? Capítulo 6 Do pacto social Suponho os homens chegados ao ponto em que os obstáculos prejudiciais à sua conservação no estado natural os arrastam, por sua resistência, sobre as forças que cada indivíduo pode empregar para se manter em tal estado. Então esse estado primitivo não pode mais subsistir, e o gênero humano pereceria se não mudasse sua maneira de ser. Ora, como é impossível aos homens engendrar novas forças, mas apenas unir e diri603603 gir as existentes, não lhes resta outro meio para se conservarem senão formar, por agregação, uma soma de forças que possa vencer a resistência, pô-los em movimento por um único móbil e fazê-los agir em concerto. Essa soma de forças só pode nascer do concurso de muitos; mas, sendo a força e a liberdade de cada homem os primeiros instrumentos de sua conservação, como as empregará sem se prejudicar, sem negligenciar os cuidados que se deve? Esta dificuldade, reconduzida ao meu assunto, pode ser enunciada nos seguintes termos. "Encontrar uma forma de associação que defenda e proteja com toda a força comum a pessoa e os bens de cada associado, e pela qual, cada um, unindo-se a todos, obedeça portanto apenas a si mesmo, e permaneça tão livre como anteriormente." Tal é o problema fundamental cuja solução é dada pelo contrato social. As cláusulas deste contrato são de tal modo determinadas pela natureza do ato, que a menor modificação as tornaria vãs e de nenhum efeito; de sorte que, embora jamais tenham sido formalmente enunciadas, são as mesmas em toda parte, em toda a parte tacitamente admitidas e reconhecidas, até que, o pacto social sendo violado, cada qual reentra em seus primeiros direitos e retoma a liberdade natural, perdendo a liberdade convencional pela qual enunciou a outra. Todas essas cláusulas, bem compreendidas, se reduzem a uma única, a saber, a alienação total de cada associado com todos os seus direitos a toda a comunidade: pois, primeiramente, cada qual se entregando por completo e sendo a condição igual para todos, a ninguém interessa torná-la onerosa para os outros. Além disso, realizando-se a alienação sem reserva, a união é tão perfeita quanto o pode ser, e nenhum associado tem mais nada a reclamar: pois, se aos particulares restassem alguns direitos, como não haveria nenhum superior comum que pudesse decidir entre eles e o público, cada qual, sendo até certo ponto o seu próprio juiz, pretenderia em breve sê-lo em tudo; o estado natural subsistiria, e a associação se tornaria necessariamente tirânica ou inútil. 604 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 604 rousseAu • do ContrAto soCiAL Enfim, cada qual, dando-se a todos, não se dá a ninguém, e, como não existe um associado sobre quem não se adquira o mesmo direito que lhe foi cedido, ganha-se o equivalente de tudo o que se perde e maior força para conservar o que se tem. Portanto, se afastarmos do pacto social o que não é de sua essência, descobriremos que ele se reduz aos seguintes termos: "Cada um de nós põe em comum sua pessoa e toda a sua potência sob a suprema direção da vontade geral, e recebemos em conjunto cada membro como parte indivisível do todo." Imediatamente, ao invés da pessoa particular de cada contratante, esse ato de associação produz um corpo moral e coletivo, composto de tantos membros quanto são as vozes da assembléia, o qual recebe desse mesmo ato sua unidade, seu eu comum, sua vida e sua vontade.38 Esta pessoa pública, formada assim pela união de todas as outras, tinha outrora o nome de cidade, e tem hoje o de república ou corpo político, o qual é chamado por seus membros: Estado quando passivo; soberano quando ativo; potência quando comparado a seus semelhantes. No que concerne aos associados, adquirem coletivamente o nome de povo, e se chamam particularmente cidadãos, como participantes da autoridade soberana, e súditos enquanto submetidos às leis do Estado. 39Mas esses termos frequentemente se confundem e são tomados um pelo outro; basta saber distingui-los quando empregados em toda a sua precisão. Capítulo 7 VII – Do soberano. Vê-se, por esta fórmula, que o ato de associação encerra um compromisso recíproco do público com os particulares, e que cada indivíduo, contratando por assim dizer consigo mesmo, se acha comprometido sob 38 Desaparece o indivíduo natural para dar lugar à pessoa moral do Estado. 39 Agora os homens que compõem o novo corpo coletivo não são mais os homens do estado de natureza, são súditos, quando obedecem, e cidadãos, como membros ativos da soberania. 605605 uma dupla relação, a saber: como membro do soberano em relação os particulares, e como membro do Estado em relação ao soberano. Mas não se pode aqui aplicar a máxima do direito civil, segundo a qual ninguém está obrigado aos acordos tomados consigo mesmo; porque há grande diferença entre obrigar-se consigo mesmo ou com um todo de que se faz parte. É necessário notar ainda que a deliberação pública, que pode obrigar todos os súditos em relação ao soberano, em virtude das diferentes relações sob as quais cada um deles é considerado, não pode, pela razão contrária, obrigar o soberano consigo mesmo e que, por consequência, é contra a natureza do corpo político o soberano impor-se uma lei que não possa infringir. Não podendo se considerar a não ser por uma só e mesma relação, encontra-se ele no caso de um particular contratante consigo mesmo; por onde se observa que não há nem pode haver nenhuma espécie de lei fundamental obrigatória para o corpo do povo, nem mesmo o contrato social. O que não significa que esse corpo não possa obrigar-se com outrem, naquilo que de modo algum derrogue esse contrato; porque, no tocante ao estrangeiro, ele se torna um simples ser, um indivíduo. Mas o corpo político ou o soberano, extraindo sua existência apenas da integridade40 do contrato, não pode jamais obrigar-se, mesmo para com outrem, a nada que derrogue esse ato primitivo, como alienar qualquer porção de si mesmo, ou submeter-se a outro soberano. Violar o ato pelo qual existe seria aniquilar-se, e o que nada é nada produz. 41 Tão logo se encontre a multidão reunida num corpo, não se pode ofender um dos membros sem atacar o corpo, menos ainda ofender o corpo sem que os membros disso se ressintam. Assim, o dever e o interesse obrigam igualmente as duas partes contratantes a se auxiliarem mutuamente, e os próprios homens devem procurar reunir, sob essa dupla relação, todas as vantagens que dela dependem. Ora, o soberano sendo formado apenas por particulares que o 40 O termo francês é sainteté, que significa também santidade. 41 Os dois parágrafos acima mostram que (1) o soberano (o povo) nunca está submetido a uma lei que ele mesmo não possa suspender e (2) ele pode ter obrigações quando se relaciona com outro povo, mas nunca pode fazer desta relação algo que prejudique o próprio contrato, pois só se constituiu em povo devido ao contrato. 606 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 606 rousseAu • do ContrAto soCiAL compõem, não há nem pode haver interesse contrário ao seu; por conseguinte, não necessita a autoridade soberana de garantia em relação aos súditos, por ser impossível que o corpo queira prejudicar todos os membros, e, como logo veremos, não lhe é possível que ele prejudique nenhum em particular. O soberano, somente pelo que é, é sempre tudo o que deve ser. Mas o mesmo não acontece com os súditos em relação ao soberano, ao qual, apesar do interesse comum, não responderia por suas obrigações, se ele não encontrasse os meios de assegurar sua fidelidade. Com efeito, cada indivíduo pode, como homem, ter uma vontade particular contrária ou distinta da vontade geral que possui como cidadão; seu interesse particular pode falar-lhe de maneira totalmente diversa da que lhe fala o interesse comum; sua existência absoluta, e naturalmente independente, pode fazê-lo encarar o que deve à causa comum como uma contribuição gratuita, cuja perda será menos prejudicial aos outros que o pagamento oneroso para si; e olhando a pessoa moral que constitui o Estado como um ser de razão, pois não se trata de um homem, ele desfrutará dos direitos do cidadão, sem querer cumprir os deveres de súdito: injustiça cujo progresso causaria a ruína do corpo político. A fim de não constituir, então, um formulário inútil, o pacto social contém tacitamente este compromisso, o único que poderá dar forças aos outros, que aquele que se recusar a obedecer à vontade geral, a isto será constrangido por todo o corpo; o que significa apenas que será forçado a ser livre, pois tal é a condição que, oferecendo cada cidadão à pátria, protege-o de toda dependência pessoal, condição que faz o artifício e o jogo da máquina política, e que sozinha torna legítimas as obrigações civis, as quais, sem isso, seriam absurdas, tirânicas e sujeitas aos maiores abusos. Capítulo 8 Do estado civil A passagem do estado natural ao estado civil produz no homem 607607 uma mudança notável, substituindo em sua conduta o instinto pela justiça, e conferindo às suas ações a moralidade que anteriormente lhes faltava. É somente então que a voz do dever sucedendo ao impulso físico e o direito ao apetite, o homem, que até esse momento só tinha olhado para si mesmo, se visse forçado a agir por outros princípios e consultar a razão antes de ouvir seus pendores.42 Apesar de se privar, nesse estado, de diversas vantagens recebidas da natureza, ganha outras tão grandes, suas faculdades se exercitam e se desenvolvem, suas ideias se ampliam, seus sentimentos se enobrecem, sua alma como um todo se eleva a tal ponto que, se os abusos dessa nova condição não o degradassem com frequência a uma condição inferior àquela de que saiu, deveria abençoar incessantemente o ditoso momento em que foi dali tirado para sempre e que transformou um animal estúpido e limitado num ser inteligente e num homem.43 Reduzamos todo este balanço a termos fáceis de comparar; o que o homem perde pelo contrato social é a liberdade natural e um direito ilimitado a tudo que o tenta e pode alcançar; o que ganha é a liberdade civil e a propriedade de tudo o que possui. Para não se enganar nessas compensações, é necessário distinguir a liberdade natural, limitada apenas pelas forças do indivíduo, da liberdade civil, que é limitada pela vontade geral, e a posse, que não é senão o efeito da força ou do direito do primeiro ocupante, da propriedade, que só pode ser fundada num título positivo. Poder-se-ia, sobre o que precede, acrescentar à aquisição do estado civil a liberdade moral, a única que torna o homem verdadeiramente senhor de si mesmo, pois o impulso do apetite é escravidão, e a obediência à lei que se prescreve a si mesmo é liberdade. 42 O contrato deve extinguir o homem natural e substituí-lo pelo homem civil. 43 Eis aqui uma passagem que relativiza a imagem de um Rousseau sempre a louvar o estado de natureza. A LiberdAde é A morAL dA históriA608 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 608 609609 jean-Paul SARTRE foi o mais célebre representante do movimento que se tornou conhecido como o existencialismo. Estranho movimento, já que nunca se apresentou como tal, à maneira de artistas que se agrupam e lançam um manifesto, e também porque essa etiqueta, "existencialismo", tampouco foi sugerida por Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Camus ou Simone de Beauvoir, os mais conhecidos entre eles. Foi um nome que veio de fora – até onde se sabe, partiu da imprensa –, mas do qual Sartre terminou por se apropriar. A conferência traduzida a seguir foi o momento dessa apropriação. Nela, Sartre se propõe a esclarecer a sua própria filosofia em face de alguns equívocos que vieram com a etiqueta e a popularidade repentina. Sartre contava então quarenta anos de idade. Já publicara alguns textos de diferentes estilos: filosofia, romance, conto, ensaio, peças de teatro, artigos de jornal etc. Acabara de abandonar a carreira de professor de Liceu, iniciada ainda nos anos 30, logo depois de sua formação na prestigiada École Normale Supérieure. Esse gesto era uma aposta na sua futura carreira de escritor de múltiplos talentos. Corria o ano de 1945, a Segunda Guerra acabara e a Europa estava diante da enorme tarefa de A LIBeRDADe É A MORAL DA HIStóRIA: SARtRe, VIDA e OBRA A LiberdAde é A morAL dA históriA610 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 610 reconstrução, vendo o mundo ser dividido, à sua revelia, em dois grandes blocos. Essa experiência da guerra, da qual Sartre participara como mobilizado, será para ele a experiência radical, aquela que, segundo suas próprias palavras, vai marcar uma compreensão da História que ele absolutamente não tinha. A conferência foi proferida em outubro de 1945, no imediato pósguerra. Não é exagero dizer que a "febre" do existencialismo começou ali, preparada, é certo, pelo volume de textos que Sartre já publicara, pelo prêmio que ganhara como romancista, pelas peças de teatro que já levara ao palco, pela publicação, dois anos antes, de O ser e o nada, um livro que propunha uma nova doutrina filosófica, pela série de reportagens (sobretudo aquelas sobre a liberação de Paris e sobre os Estados Unidos) publicadas em Combat, jornal dirigido por Camus. Isso já dera margem a uma série de mal entendidos, já despertara bastante a curiosidade do público, mas foi a partir dali que o existencialismo se consolidou diante de um público mais vasto. Antes de tratarmos da conferência propriamente, convém dizer algumas palavras sobre o pensamento sartriano. Sartre foi um leitor apaixonado de Husserl, o filósofo alemão criador da Fenomenologia, e de Heidegger, aluno de Husserl que, como é de hábito na História da Filosofia, cometera o parricídio e levara a Fenomenologia a uma direção que Sartre vai assimilar em larga medida: na direção de uma analítica da existência, trazendo para a Filosofia um conjunto de questões que vão muito além daquela que mais interessava a Husserl e à tradição, a questão do conhecimento. A analítica do existente humano vai se tornar para Sartre a tarefa mais elevada da Filosofia. Mas de um modo muito peculiar, segundo um método inédito, que é propriamente o que vai torná-la Filosofia e distingui-la de tantas outras abordagens, como a da psicologia, da psicanálise, da sociologia, da antropologia, da fisiologia, da anatomia, da medicina etc. Pode-se dizer que o núcleo dessa especificidade da Filosofia consiste em partir do homem não como "animal racional", não como "bípede falante e implume" etc, mas como ser-no-mundo. Esse ponto de partida 611611 é filosófico, não científico. Onde está a diferença? É que não se parte aqui de uma definição do que é o homem (se se preferir, não se busca definir o que é o homem). Essa estratégia tem uma pré-condição que a Filosofia rejeita: ela objetiva o homem, ela o torna objeto. Uma vez tornado objeto, o homem se torna um suporte de predicados, e posso dizer então que ele é racional, bípede, falante e uma infinidade de outros predicados. A Filosofia, por sua vez, deve tomar o homem como sujeito. Pode-se tornar isso mais claro pelo exemplo da atividade visual ou tátil: posso ver meus olhos no espelho, posso mesmo imaginar um mecanismo (como câmeras de televisão) que os flagre, às escondidas, em atividade, mas, nesses casos, meus olhos serão para mim objetos, eu não os verei enquanto eles veem, eu não coincidirei com eles enquanto são essa atividade que desvela o mundo, durante a atividade de olhar, isto é, enquanto eles forem sujeitos de visão. Como evitar a objetivação, como apreender-me enquanto sujeito? Pela reflexão, que é o método por excelência da Filosofia. Mas, se é assim, então é preciso dizer que esse ponto de partida também distancia Sartre de Heidegger, pois o que Sartre recupera com essa noção de sujeito é o cogito cartesiano. Que é esse cogito? Ele foi enunciado por Descartes na célebre afirmação "penso, logo existo" (cogito, ergo sum), ou, em outra afirmação mais precisa "eu penso, eu sou". Nessa conferência, Sartre interpreta o cogito como uma "verdade absoluta, (...) simples, fácil de alcançar, (...) ao alcance de todo mundo", e que consiste no fato, diz ele, de que cada um pode se apreender "sem intermediário". Nesse caso, eu não me descubro por meio de uma teoria como "animal racional", ou por meio de outra que me diz que minha infraestrutura corpórea e sensível alcança a razão e que, portanto, o meu ser não é puramente racional, ou por meio de outra ainda que diga que os animais possuem uma linguagem e, à sua maneira, falam, e que, portanto, o homem não se singulariza pela condição de falante. Em suma, trata-se aqui sempre de conhecimento e o conhecimento, por maior que seja a probabilidade, é apenas e sempre provável, enquanto a apreensão de mim por mim é uma "verdade absoluta". E é assim porque ela é feita "sem intermediário", quer dizer, porque ela é imediata, porque ela não é conclusão de um raciocínio, que envolve, por sua vez, mediação (por isso, a formulação do "eu penso, eu sou" é mais precisa que a outra, "penso, logo existo" A LiberdAde é A morAL dA históriA612 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 612 porque o "logo" dá margem a se pensar que se trata de uma conclusão). Não há um único de nossos atos que não envolva, ao mesmo tempo, um "saber" imediato de si mesmo, uma certeza de si mesmo, sem que isso possa ser tomado como conhecimento, como uma construção racional. Não é preciso pensar, raciocinar para ter certeza imediata de si mesmo; isso significa que cada ato implica, no seu próprio modo de ser, em uma referência a si, em uma relação a si, em uma certeza de si: cada ato tem a si mesmo por testemunho. É isso que Sartre designa por consciência, esse ser que envolve algo como uma reflexividade interna, que tem essa reflexividade como modo de ser. E isso também o diferencia de Descartes, cujo cogito é resultado de uma laboriosa reflexão que reconhece apenas o pensamento como via de acesso ao eu, como a essência do eu. Em Sartre, ao contrário, esse "eu", esse sujeito, é uma existência concreta no mundo e, portanto, a certeza que ele tem de si mesmo é anterior ao pensamento e implicada em todo ato. Ora, o que se abre então, a partir daqui, é uma via para uma filosofia que, embora parta do cogito, não se confunde mais com o racionalismo cartesiano. E a conferência a seguir é um bom exemplo disso. O tema da conferência é antes de mais nada o existencialismo. Mas em um aspecto que desde cedo tornou esse texto célebre, o da ética. Para ilustrá-lo, destaco dois temas cruciais da conferência: o do primado da existência e o da universalidade do valor. Quanto ao primeiro, trata-se para Sartre de partir desse existente concreto, em ação no mundo, na lida cotidiana. Existente que implica relação a si, relação que justamente o distingue dos objetos. Ora, é desse existente que a filosofia deve se ocupar, e se ela pode fazê-lo sem convertê-lo em objeto é precisamente porque a filosofia é reflexiva e porque ele envolve essa relação a si: dessa relação deriva toda uma estrutura complexa que O ser e o nada explicita, tudo isso no nível desse existente sujeito, não convertido em objeto. Ora, vem daí a intuição de que nenhum ato se funda em uma essência, qualquer que seja ela – por exemplo, a de homem racional, a de homem naturalmente bom, a de homem governado pelas pulsões etc –, de que todo ato se "funda" apenas em si mesmo, de que são os atos que fazem a essência do homem. A essência, portanto, é singular, 613613 é a essência de cada homem, e ela está sempre em suspenso, sempre por fazer: o homem se faz a si mesmo em cada ato, continuadamente. E se o ato se funda a si mesmo, se ele encontra em si mesmo sua razão de ser, então ele é livre. Daí a inversão que Sartre impõe ao senso comum: não é porque se é covarde que se age covardemente; é porque age covardemente que um homem se faz covarde: a ação é livre. Livre mesmo por relação aos sentimentos: não é o amor (paixão que eu sofreria passivamente) que me leva a praticar atos amorosos, é o inverso disso: são atos amorosos que fazem o amor. O exemplo dado por Sartre na conferência – o de um aluno que veio a ele para aconselhar-se – ilustra bem isso: o de um homem que faz a descoberta angustiada (e que procura se livrar dela) de sua própria liberdade, de sua liberdade da qual não pode escapar. Quanto ao segundo tema – o da universalidade do valor –, ele ocupa boa parte da conferência. Sartre busca deixar claro aos seus auditores que a consequência de seu ponto de partida não é um individualismo exacerbado, um relativismo de todos os valores. A objeção a mais geral seria mais ou menos essa: se não há uma regra prévia ao ato (do tipo, "é certo fazer isso", "é errado fazer aquilo"), então não há como determinar a moralidade do ato. Se não há regra comum a todos, se cada ato encontra apenas em si mesmo seu "valor", então não há vida comum possível, cada um pode fazer o que quiser e, fazendo o que quer, pode dizer que aquilo que faz é que é moral. Sartre se defende da acusação de que sua doutrina seja individualista, relativista, de que não haja universalidade. E, para mostrá-lo, ele compara a moral com a arte. Elas são comparáveis porque, em ambos os casos, há criação: criação da obra e criação de si mesmo. São também comparáveis porque o "valor" de uma obra tem mesmo sentido de universalidade que o de um ato moral. Recusamos que o valor de uma obra de arte nos seja imposto: não dizemos todos que gosto não se discute? A estética rejeita a prescrição, isto é, aquilo que diz como deve ser uma obra de arte. Do mesmo modo, Sartre rejeita a moral do dever, do comando, que, analogamente, se imponha ao ato. Mas, por outro lado, quando julgamos uma obra bela, pretendemos que ela valha para todos, isto é, que ela tenha um valor intrínseco, uma beleza que é dela, que não está "nos meus olhos", que não é só pra mim: se essa A LiberdAde é A morAL dA históriA614 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 614 beleza não se impõe a todos, ela, por outro lado, é como um apelo, uma solicitação de universalidade, isto porque o valor da beleza é da própria obra. Analogamente, a moralidade do ato não advém de um valor externo que se imponha a ele, mas isso não significa que ele seja sem valor: ele carrega um valor intrínseco, como que sua beleza intrínseca, e por isso ele é apelo a que esse valor valha universalmente. É por isso que Sartre diz que o ato de casar implica em apelo universal à monogamia. Não é o valor da monogamia que confere moralidade ao ato de casamento; se fosse assim, não casar seria imoral. Ao contrário, é o ato que é apelo à monogamia. Ora, que há no ato que o faz ser esse apelo, qual a beleza do ato? Simplesmente, o fato de ele ser livre: é a liberdade o fundamento do valor, de todos os valores. Por trás do apelo à monogamia, ou a qualquer outro valor, todo ato afirma a liberdade como fundamento, e por isso a moral sartriana só se consuma na ideia de que todo homem assuma responsavelmente a liberdade de seus atos, pois o que ela diz a cada homem é que cada um se faz a si mesmo e, portanto, cada um é responsável por aquilo que é. Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de sartre traduzidas Para o Português SARTRE, Jean-Paul. O existencialismo é um humanismo; A Imaginação; Questão de método.3 ed. São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1987. (Os Pensadores) SARTRE, Jean-Paul. Sartre no Brasil. A Conferência de Araraquara. São Paulo: Ed. Unesp, 2005. SARTRE, Jean-Paul. O ser e o nada. Ensaio de ontologia fenomenológica. São Paulo: Vozes, 2005. obras sobre sartre (em Português) BORNHEIM, G. Sartre. São Paulo: 1984 MOUTINHO, L. D. S. Existencialismo e liberdade. São Paulo: Moderna, 1995. SILVA, F. L. e. Ética e literatura em Sartre. São Paulo: Edunesp, 2003. 615615 sites de referência: www.existencialismo.uerj.br www.ges-sartre.fr www.jpsartre.org 616 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 616 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo O eXISteNCIALISMO É uM HuMANISMO 1 Eu gostaria aqui de defender o existencialismo de um certo número de objeções que lhe foram dirigidas. De início, reprovaram-no por convidar as pessoas a permanecer em um quietismo do desespero, uma vez que, se todas as soluções estão fechadas, seria preciso considerar que a ação nesse mundo é totalmente impossível, e chegar assim a uma filosofia contemplativa, o que aliás nos reconduz a uma filosofia burguesa, pois a contemplação é um luxo. Essas são sobretudo as objeções dos comunistas. De outro lado, reprovaram-nos por sublinhar a ignomínia humana, por mostrar em toda parte o sórdido, o suspeito, o viscoso, por negligenciar um certo número de belezas cintilantes, o lado luminoso da natureza humana; por exemplo, de acordo com a senhorita Mercier, crítica católica, por ter esquecido o sorriso da criança. Uns e outros nos reprovam por ter negligenciado a natureza humana, por considerar que o homem está isolado, em grande parte, aliás, porque nós partimos, dizem os comunistas, da pura subjetividade, ou seja, do eu penso cartesiano, ou ainda, do momento em que o homem alcança a si mesmo em sua solidão, o que nos 1 SARTRE, J-P. L'existentialisme est un humanisme. Paris: Nagel, 1952. 617617 tornaria incapazes, consequentemente, de voltar à solidariedade com os homens que estão fora de mim e que eu não posso alcançar no cogito. E, do lado cristão, reprovam-nos por negar a realidade e a seriedade dos empreendimentos humanos, pois, se nós suprimirmos os mandamentos de Deus e os valores inscritos na eternidade, resta apenas a estrita gratuidade, cada um podendo fazer o que quiser, e sendo incapaz, de seu ponto de vista, de condenar os pontos de vista e os atos dos outros. Procuro responder hoje a essas diferentes objeções; eis porque intitulei essa pequena conferência : O existencialismo é um humanismo. Muitos poderão se espantar de que falemos aqui em humanismo. Tentaremos mostrar em que sentido entendemos assim. Em todo caso, o que nós podemos dizer desde o início é que entendemos por existencialismo uma doutrina que torna a vida humana possível e que, por outro lado, declara que toda verdade e toda ação implicam um meio e uma subjetividade humana. Sabemos que a objeção essencial que nos fazem é por colocar a ênfase no lado mau da vida humana. Falaram-me recentemente de uma senhora que, num momento de nervosismo, deixou escapar uma palavra vulgar, e declarou, desculpando-se: "Creio que estou me tornando existencialista". Consequentemente, assimilam feiúra ao existencialismo; eis porque declaram que somos naturalistas; e se somos naturalistas, espanta que assustemos e escandalizemos muito mais do que o naturalismo propriamente dito assusta ou escandaliza hoje em dia. Fulano que compra perfeitamente um romance de Zola, como A terra, fica enojado quando lê um romance existencialista; Cicrano, que se serve da sabedoria dos povos – o que é muito triste – nos acha mais tristes ainda. Entretanto, que pode haver de mais lamentável que dizer "a caridade bem organizada começa por si mesmo" ou ainda "agrade teu serviçal, ele te apunhala, castigue teu serviçal, ele te ama". Conhecemos os lugares comuns que podemos utilizar a esse respeito e que mostram sempre a mesma coisa: não se deve lutar contra os poderes estabelecidos, não se deve lutar contra a força, não se deve dar um passo maior que a perna, toda ação que não se insere em uma tradição é um romantismo, toda tentativa que não se apóia em uma experiência já feita é condenada ao fracasso; e a experiência mostra que os homens sempre decaem, que é preciso firmeza 618 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 618 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo para detê-los, senão é a anarquia. Todavia, são as mesmas pessoas que repetem esses tristes provérbios que dizem: "como é humano", cada vez que se mostra a elas um ato mais ou menos repugnante, são elas que se deleitam com canções realistas, são essas pessoas que acusam o existencialismo de ser muito sombrio, a tal ponto que me pergunto se elas não o censuram não por seu pessimismo, mas, muito ao contrário, pelo seu otimismo. No fundo, o que assusta, na doutrina que vou lhes expor, não seria o fato de que ela deixa para o homem uma possibilidade de escolha? Para sabê-lo, é preciso colocar novamente a questão em um plano estritamente filosófico. Que é que denominam existencialismo? A maioria das pessoas que utiliza essa palavra ficaria bem embaraçada em justificá-la, pois se declara facilmente, hoje que ela se tornou uma moda, que um músico ou um pintor é existencialista. Um cronista de Clartés assina O existencialista; no fundo, a palavra tomou hoje uma tal amplitude e uma tal extensão que ela não significa mais nada. Parece que, na falta de uma doutrina de vanguarda análoga ao surrealismo, as pessoas ávidas por escândalo e agitação se voltam para esta filosofia, que, aliás, nisso em nada pode ajudá-las; na realidade, é a doutrina menos escandalosa, mais austera; ela é estritamente destinada aos especialistas e aos filósofos. Entretanto, ela pode ser facilmente definida. O que torna as coisas complicadas é que há dois tipos de existencialistas: os primeiros são cristãos, e entre eles eu colocaria Jaspers e Gabriel Marcel, de confissão católica; e, de outro lado, os existencialistas ateus, entre os quais é preciso colocar Heidegger e também os existencialistas franceses, e eu próprio. O que eles têm em comum é simplesmente o fato de que consideram que a existência precede a essência, ou, se se quiser, que é preciso partir da subjetividade. Que se deve entender por isso? Consideremos um objeto fabricado, como, por exemplo, um livro ou um corta-papel. Esse objeto foi fabricado por um artesão, que se inspirou em um conceito; ele se referiu ao conceito de corta-papel, e igualmente a uma técnica prévia de produção, que faz parte do conceito, e que é no fundo uma receita. Assim, o corta-papel é ao mesmo tempo um objeto que se produz de uma certa maneira e que, de outro lado, tem uma utilidade definida, e não se pode supor um homem que produzisse um corta-papel sem saber para que tal 619619 objeto serviria. Diremos, portanto, que, no caso do corta-papel, a essência – isto é, o conjunto das receitas e das qualidades que permitem produzi-lo e defini-lo – precede a existência. Assim, a presença diante de mim de tal corta-papel ou de tal livro é determinada. Temos aqui uma visão técnica do mundo, na qual se pode dizer que a produção precede a existência. Ao concebermos um Deus criador, esse Deus é identificado, na maioria das vezes, a um artesão superior; e qualquer que seja a doutrina que consideremos, quer se trate de uma doutrina como a de Descartes, quer se trate de uma doutrina como a de Leibniz, nós admitimos sempre que a vontade segue mais ou menos o entendimento ou, pelo menos, o acompanha, e que Deus, quando cria, sabe precisamente o que cria. Assim, o conceito de homem, no espírito de Deus, é assimilável ao conceito de corta-papel, no espírito do artesão; e Deus produz o homem segundo técnicas e uma concepção, exatamente como o artesão fabrica um cortapapel segundo uma definição e uma técnica. Assim, o homem individual realiza um certo conceito que está no entendimento divino. No século XVIII, o ateísmo dos filósofos suprime a noção de Deus; no entanto, não suprime a ideia de que a essência preceda a existência. Nós encontramos essa ideia um pouco em toda parte: nós a encontramos em Diderot, em Voltaire, e mesmo em Kant. O homem possui uma natureza humana; essa natureza humana, que é o conceito humano, é encontrada em todos os homens, o que significa dizer que cada homem é um exemplo particular de um conceito universal, o homem. Em Kant, resulta dessa universalidade que o homem das florestas, o homem da natureza, tal como os burgueses, estão limitados à mesma definição e possuem as mesmas qualidades de base. Assim, mesmo aí, a essência do homem precede essa existência histórica que reencontramos na natureza. O existencialismo ateu que eu represento é mais coerente. Ele declara que, se Deus não existe, há pelo menos um ser em quem a existência precede a essência, um ser que existe antes de poder ser definido por algum conceito, e que este ser é o homem, ou, como diz Heidegger, a realidade humana. Que significa dizer que a existência precede a essência? Significa que o homem primeiro existe, se encontra, surge no mundo, e que se define depois. O homem, tal como o existencialista o concebe, se 620 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 620 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo não é definível, é porque de início ele não é nada. Ele só será em seguida, e será como se tiver feito. Assim, não há natureza humana, pois não há Deus para concebê-la. O homem é não apenas tal como ele se concebe, mas como ele se quer, e como ele se concebe depois da existência, como ele se quer depois desse impulso para a existência, o homem nada mais é do que aquilo que ele faz de si mesmo. Tal é o primeiro princípio do existencialismo. É também o que se chama a subjetividade, e que nos reprovam sob esse mesmo nome. Mas, que queremos dizer com isso, senão que o homem tem mais dignidade que a pedra ou que a mesa? Pois nós queremos dizer que o homem primeiro existe, isto é, que ele é de início aquele que se lança para um porvir, e que é consciente de se lançar no porvir. O homem é de início um projeto que se vive subjetivamente, ao invés de ser um musgo, uma podridão, um couve-flor; nada existe antes desse projeto; nada está no céu inteligível, e o homem será aquilo que ele tiver projetado ser. Não o que ele quiser ser. Pois o que entendemos vulgarmente por querer é uma decisão consciente e que é para a maior parte de nós posterior àquilo que fizemos de nós mesmos. Posso querer aderir a um partido, escrever um livro, casar-me, tudo isso é uma manifestação de uma escolha mais original, mais espontânea do que aquilo que chamamos vontade. Mas se verdadeiramente a existência precede a essência, o homem é responsável por aquilo que ele é. Assim, o primeiro passo do existencialismo é colocar todo homem de posse daquilo que ele é e fazer cair sobre ele a responsabilidade total por sua existência. E, quando nós dizemos que o homem é responsável por si mesmo, não queremos dizer que o homem é responsável por sua estrita individualidade, mas que ele é responsável por todos os homens. Há dois sentidos para a palavra subjetivismo e nossos adversários jogam com esses dois sentidos. Subjetivismo quer dizer, por um lado, escolha do sujeito individual por si mesmo, e, por outro, impossibilidade para o homem de ultrapassar a subjetividade humana. É esse segundo o sentido profundo do existencialismo. Quando afirmamos que o homem se escolhe a si mesmo, entendemos que cada um de nós se escolhe, mas queremos dizer também que, escolhendo-se, ele escolhe todos os homens. De fato, não há um só de nossos atos que, criando o homem que queremos ser, não crie ao mesmo tempo uma imagem do homem tal como estimamos que ele deva ser. Escolher ser isto ou 621621 aquilo é afirmar ao mesmo tempo o valor daquilo que nós escolhemos, pois não podemos nunca escolher o mal; aquilo que escolhemos é sempre o bem, e nada pode ser bom para nós sem sê-lo para todos. Se, por outro lado, a existência precede a essência e se nós queremos existir, ao mesmo tempo que moldamos nossa imagem, essa imagem é válida para todos e para toda nossa época. Assim, nossa responsabilidade é muito maior do que poderíamos supor, pois ela engaja a humanidade inteira. Se eu sou um operário e se escolho aderir a um sindicato cristão ao invés de ser comunista, se, por esta adesão, eu quero indicar que a resignação é no fundo a solução que convém ao homem, que o reino do homem não é sobre a terra, eu não estou engajando apenas a mim mesmo: eu quero ser resignado por todos, por consequência minha decisão engaja toda a humanidade. E se eu quiser, fato mais individual ainda, casar-me, ter filhos, ainda que esse casamento dependa unicamente de minha situação, ou de minha paixão, ou de meu desejo, com ele eu engajo não apenas a mim mesmo, mas toda a humanidade no caminho da monogamia. Assim, eu sou responsável por mim mesmo e por todos, e eu crio uma certa imagem do homem que eu escolhi; escolhendo-me, eu escolho o homem. Isto nos permite compreender o que recobrem palavras um pouco grandiloquentes como angústia, desamparo, desespero. Como vocês poderão ver, é extremamente simples. De início, que se entende por angústia? O existencialista declara frequentemente que o homem é angústia. Isto significa o seguinte: o homem que se engaja e que se dá conta de que ele é não apenas aquele que ele escolheu ser, mas ainda um legislador que escolhe, ao mesmo tempo que ele mesmo, toda a humanidade, não poderia escapar ao sentimento de sua total e profunda responsabilidade. Evidentemente, muitas pessoas não são ansiosas; mas nós acreditamos que elas mascaram sua angústia, que elas fogem dela; certamente, muitas pessoas creem que, agindo, engajam apenas a si mesmas, e quando perguntamos a elas: "Mas, e se todos fizessem da mesma maneira?", elas dão de ombros e respondem: "Nem todos fazem o mesmo". No entanto, na verdade, devemos sempre nos perguntar: o que aconteceria se todos fizessem do mesmo modo? Não escapamos a esse pensamento inquietante a não ser por uma espécie de má-fé. Aquele que mente e se desculpa, declarando: "todo mundo faz assim", é alguém que não está em paz 622 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 622 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo com sua consciência, pois o fato de mentir implica um valor universal atribuído à mentira. Mesmo quando a consciência se disfarça a angústia aparece. Pois é esta angústia que Kierkegaard chamava a angústia de Abraão. Vocês conhecem a história: um anjo ordenou a Abraão sacrificar seu filho. Tudo bem se foi verdadeiramente um anjo que veio e disse: tu és Abraão, tu sacrificarás teu filho. Mas, para começar, cada um pode se perguntar: é mesmo um anjo, eu sou mesmo Abraão? Que me prova? Havia uma louca que tinha alucinações de que alguém lhe falava por telefone e lhe dava ordens. O médico perguntou a ela: "Mas, quem é que fala com você?" Ela respondeu: "Ele diz que é Deus." E que provava a ela, de fato, que era Deus? Se um anjo vem a mim, que me prova que é um anjo? E se eu ouço vozes, que me prova que elas vêm do céu e não do inferno, ou de um subconsciente, ou de um estado patológico? Quem prova que elas se dirigem a mim? Quem prova que eu sou mesmo escolhido para para impor minha concepção de homem e minha escolha à humanidade? Jamais encontrarei qualquer prova, qualquer signo para me convencer disso. Se uma voz se dirige a mim, serei sempre eu que vou decidir que esta voz é a voz de um anjo; se eu considero que tal ato é bom, sou eu que escolherei dizer que este ato é bom e não mau. Nada me designa ser Abraão, e no entanto eu sou obrigado a cada instante a praticar atos exemplares. Tudo se passa como se, para todo homem, a humanidade inteira tivesse os olhos fixados sobre o que ele faz e se regulasse por aquilo que ele faz. E cada homem deve dizer a si mesmo: tenho eu o direito de agir de tal modo que a humanidade se regule pelos meus atos? E se ele não diz isso a si mesmo, é porque ele mascara sua angústia dele mesmo. Não se trata de uma angústia que levaria ao quietismo, à inação. Trata-se de uma angústia simples, conhecida por todos aqueles que tiveram responsabilidades. Quando, por exemplo, um chefe militar assume a responsabilidade de um ataque e manda um certo número de homens para a morte, ele escolheu fazê-lo, e no fundo ele escolheu sozinho. Sem dúvida, há ordens que vêm de cima, mas elas são muito amplas e uma interpretação se impõe, que vem dele, e dessa interpretação depende a vida de dez ou quatorze ou vinte homens. Ele não pode não ter, na decisão que toma, uma certa angústia. Todos os chefes conhecem esta angústia. Isto não os impede de agir, ao contrário, é a condição mesma de sua 623623 ação; pois isso supõe que eles visam uma pluralidade de possibilidades, e quando escolhem uma, eles se dão conta de que ela só tem valor porque foi escolhida. E esse tipo de angústia, que é aquela que o existencialismo descreve, veremos que ela se explica, além disso, por uma responsabilidade direta diante dos outros homens implicados por ela. Ela não é uma cortina que nos separaria da ação, mas ela faz parte da própria ação. E quando falamos de desamparo, expressão cara a Heidegger, queremos dizer somente que Deus não existe, e que é preciso tirar, até o fim, todas as consequências disso. O existencialista se opõe firmemente a um certo tipo de moral laica que gostaria de suprimir Deus com o menor custo possível. Quando, por volta de 1880, professores franceses tentaram constituir uma moral laica, eles disseram mais ou menos isso: Deus é uma hipótese inútil e custosa, vamos suprimi-la, mas é necessário entretanto, para que haja uma moral, uma sociedade, um mundo policiado, que certos valores sejam levados a sério e considerados como existentes a priori; é preciso que seja obrigatório a priori ser honesto, não mentir, não bater em sua mulher, gerar filhos etc. Vamos, portanto, fazer um pequeno exercício que permita mostrar que esses valores existem, apesar disso, inscritos em um céu inteligível, ainda que, por outro lado, Deus não exista. Dito de outro modo, e é, eu creio, a tendência de tudo o que na França se chama o radicalismo, nada muda se Deus não existir; reencontraremos as mesmas normas de honestidade, de progresso, de humanismo, e teremos feito de Deus uma hipótese envelhecida que morrerá tranquilamente por si mesma. O existencialista, ao contrário, pensa que é muito incômodo que Deus não exista, pois com ele desaparece toda possibilidade de encontrar valores em um céu inteligível; não pode mais haver bem a priori, pois não há consciência infinita e perfeita para pensá-lo; não está escrito em nenhuma parte que o bem exista, que é preciso ser honesto, que não se deve mentir, pois, precisamente estamos em um plano em que existem apenas homens. Dostoievski escreveu: "Se Deus não existisse, tudo seria permitido". Eis o ponto de partida do existencialismo. De fato, tudo é permitido se Deus não existe, e por consequência o homem está desamparado, pois não encontra nele, nem fora dele, nenhuma possibilidade a que se agarrar. Não encontra desculpas, para começar. Se, de fato, a existência precede a essência, não se poderá jamais explicar nada 624 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 624 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo por referência a uma natureza humana dada e imobilizada; dito de outro modo, não há determinismo, o homem é livre, o homem é liberdade. Se, por outro lado, Deus não existe, não encontramos diante de nós valores ou ordens que legitimarão nossa conduta. Assim, no reino luminoso dos valores, não temos justificativas ou desculpas nem por trás de nós, nem diante de nós. Estamos sós, sem desculpas. Eu exprimiria isso dizendo que o homem está condenado a ser livre. Condenado porque ele não se criou a si mesmo, e, entretanto, por outro lado, livre, pois, uma vez lançado no mundo, ele é responsável por tudo o que faz. O existencialista não crê no poder da paixão. Ele jamais pensará que uma bela paixão é uma corrente devastadora que fatalmente conduz o homem a certos atos, e que, por consequência, é uma desculpa. Ele pensa que o homem é responsável por sua paixão. O existencialista não pensará, tampouco, que o homem possa encontrar socorro em um determinado signo sobre a terra que o oriente; pois ele pensa que o próprio homem decifra o signo como lhe agradar. Ele pensa portanto que o homem, sem apoio e sem socorro, está condenado a cada instante a inventar o homem. Em um belo artigo, Ponge disse: "O homem é o futuro do homem". É perfeitamente exato. Mas, se se entender por isso que este futuro está inscrito no céu, que Deus o vê, então é falso, pois não seria nem mesmo um futuro. Se se entender que, qualquer que seja o homem que apareça, há um futuro a fazer, um futuro virgem que o espera, então essa frase é correta. Mas, então, estamos desamparados. Para lhes dar um exemplo que permita compreender melhor o desamparo, citarei o caso de um de meus alunos que veio me procurar nas seguintes circunstâncias: seu pai estava brigado com sua mãe, e tinha tendências colaboracionistas, seu irmão mais velho tinha sido assassinado na ofensiva alemã de 1940, e esse jovem homem, com sentimentos um pouco primitivos, mas generosos, desejava vingá-lo. Sua mãe vivia sozinha com ele, muito perturbada pela semitraição de seu pai e pela morte de seu filho mais velho, e só nele encontrava consolo. Esse rapaz tinha, naquele momento, a seguinte escolha: partir para a Inglaterra e alistar-se nas Forças Francesas Livres, isto é, abandonar sua mãe, ou permanecer com ela e ajudá-la a viver. Ele se dava conta perfeitamente de que esta mulher vivia apenas por ele e que sua partida – e talvez sua morte – a mergulharia no desespero. Ele também se dava 625625 conta de que, no fundo, concretamente, cada ato dele em relação a ela teria resposta, no sentido em que ele a ajudaria a viver, enquanto cada ato dele para partir e combater seria um ato ambíguo que poderia se perder na areia e não servir para nada: por exemplo, partindo para a Inglaterra, ele poderia permanecer indefinidamente em um campo espanhol ao passar pela Espanha; ele poderia chegar na Inglaterra ou em Argel e ser posto em um escritório para preencher papéis. Consequentemente, ele se encontrava em face de dois tipos de ação muito diferentes: uma concreta, imediata, mas voltada a apenas um indivíduo, ou uma ação voltada a um conjunto infinitamente mais vasto, uma coletividade nacional, mas, por isso mesmo, ambígua, e que poderia ser interrompida no meio do caminho. E, ao mesmo tempo, ele hesitava entre dois tipos de moral. De um lado, uma moral da simpatia, do devotamento individual; e, de outro lado, uma moral mais larga, mas de uma eficácia mais contestavel. Ele precisava escolher entre as duas. Quem poderia ajudá-lo a escolher? A doutrina cristã? Não. A doutrina crista diz: sede caridosos, amai o próximo, sacrificai-vos por vosso semelhante, escolhei o caminho mais difícil etc. Mas qual é o caminho mais difícil? Quem ele deve amar como próximo, o combatente ou a mãe? Qual a maior utilidade, aquela, vaga, de combater em um grupo, ou aquela, precisa, de ajudar um determinado ser a viver? Quem pode decidir a priori? Ninguém. Nenhuma moral definida pode dizê-lo. A moral kantiana diz: nao trate jamais os outros como meio, mas como fim. Muito bem. Se eu permanecer junto de minha mãe, eu a tratarei como fim e não como meio, mas, por isso mesmo, arrisco tratar como meio aqueles que combatem em torno de mim. E reciprocamente: se eu me reunir àqueles que combatem, eu os tratarei como fim, e, por isso mesmo, arrisco tratar minha mãe como meio. Se os valores são vagos, e se são muito vastos para o caso preciso e concreto que nós consideramos, resta-nos apenas confiar em nossos instintos. Foi o que esse rapaz tentou fazer. E, quando eu o vi, ele dizia: no fundo, é o sentimento que conta; eu deveria escolher o que me impelia verdadeiramente para uma determinada direção. Se eu sentir que amo bastante minha mãe para sacrificar por ela todo o resto – meu desejo de vingança, meu desejo de ação, meu desejo de aventuras –, então eu fico com ela. Se, ao contrário, eu sentir que meu amor por minha mãe não é 626 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 626 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo suficiente, eu parto. Mas como determinar o valor de um sentimento? Que determinava o valor do seu sentimento por sua mãe? Justamente o fato de que ele ficava com ela. Eu posso dizer: amo bastante tal amigo para sacrificar por ele tal soma de dinheiro. Eu só posso dizer isso se eu o fizer. Eu poderei dizer que amo bastante minha mãe para ficar com ela se eu ficar com ela. Só posso determinar o valor desta afeição se, precisamente, eu fizer um ato que a confirme e a defina. Ora, mas como eu peço a essa afeição para justificar meu ato, eu me vejo então envolvido em um círculo vicioso. Por outro lado, Gide disse muito bem que um sentimento que se representa ou um sentimento que se vive são duas coisas quase indiscerníveis: decidir que amo minha mãe ficando com ela, ou representar uma comédia que me fará ficar por minha mãe, é mais ou menos a mesma coisa. Dito de outro modo, o sentimento se constrói pelos atos que se pratica; eu não posso consultá-lo para me guiar por ele. O que significa dizer que eu não posso nem procurar em mim o estado autêntico que me levará a agir, nem buscar em uma moral os conceitos que me permitirão agir. Pelo menos, dirá você, ele foi ver um professor para pedir-lhe conselho. Mas, se você procurar conselho com um padre, por exemplo, você escolheu esse padre, você já sabe, no fundo, mais ou menos, o que ele irá aconselhá-lo. Por outras palavras, buscar o conselheiro é ainda engajarse a si mesmo. A prova é que, se você é cristão, você dirá: consulte um padre. Mas há padres colaboracionistas, padres oportunistas, padres resistentes. Qual deles escolher? E se o rapaz escolher um padre resistente, ou um padre colaboracionista, ele já decidiu o tipo de conselho que vai receber. Assim, vindo me procurar, ele já sabia a resposta que eu daria, e eu só tinha uma a dar: você é livre, escolha, isto é, invente. Nenhuma moral geral pode dizer-lhe o que fazer; não há sinais no mundo. Os católicos responderão: sim, há sinais. Admitamos que sim. Em todo caso, serei eu mesmo quem vai escolher o sentido que eles têm. Enquanto estava preso, conheci um homem bastante notável que era jesuíta. Ele havia entrado na ordem dos jesuítas do seguinte modo: ele tinha sofrido uma série de fracassos bastante dolorosos; seu pai havia morrido quando ele era criança, deixando-o pobre; ele havia sido bolsista em uma instituição religiosa onde lhe faziam constantemente sentir que ele só era aceito por 627627 caridade; em seguida, ele perdera diversas distinções honoríficas que agradam às crianças; depois, por volta dos dezoito anos, ele fracassara em uma aventura sentimental; enfim, aos vinte e dois anos, coisa bastante pueril, mas que foi a gota d'água que fez transbordar o copo, ele falhara em sua preparação militar. Esse rapaz podia, portanto, considerar que ele fracassara em tudo; era um sinal, mas um sinal de quê? Ele poderia se refugiar na amargura ou no desespero. Mas ele julgou, muito habilmente para ele, que era o sinal de que ele não era feito para triunfos seculares, e que só os triunfos da religião, da santidade, da fé, lhe eram acessíveis. Ele viu nisso a vontade de Deus e entrou na ordem. Quem não vê que a decisão do sentido do sinal foi tomada por ele, e por ele apenas? Poder-se-ia concluir outra coisa dessa série de fracassos: por exemplo, que mais valeria ser carpinteiro ou revolucionário. Ele carrega, portanto, a total responsabilidade pela decifração. O desamparo implica que escolhemos nós mesmos nosso ser. O desamparo caminha junto com a angústia. Quanto ao desespero, essa expressão tem um sentido extremamente simples. Ela quer dizer que nós só podemos contar com o que depende de nossa vontade, ou com o conjunto das probabilidades que tornam possível nossa ação. Quando se quer alguma coisa, há sempre elementos prováveis. Posso contar com a vinda de um amigo. Este amigo vem de trem ou de bonde; isso supõe que o trem chegará na hora certa ou que o bonde não vai descarrilar. Permaneço no domínio das possibilidades. Mas só contamos com os possíveis na medida exata em que nossa ação comporta o conjunto desses possíveis. A partir do momento em que as possibilidades que eu considero não estão rigorosamente envolvidas em minha ação, eu devo me desinteressar delas, pois nenhum Deus, nenhum desígnio pode adaptar o mundo e seus possíveis a minha vontade. No fundo, quando Descartes dizia: "Vencer-se a si mesmo antes que ao mundo", ele queria dizer a mesma coisa: agir sem esperança. Os marxistas com quem eu falei me respondem: "Em sua ação, que será, evidentemente, limitada por sua morte, você pode contar com o apoio dos outros. Isso significa contar ao mesmo tempo com o que os outros farão em outros lugares, na China, na Rússia, para ajudar você, e também com o que eles farão mais tarde, depois de sua morte, para retomar a ação e conduzi-la a sua realização, que será a Revolução. Você deve mesmo contar com isso, senão 628 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 628 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo você não é moral". Para começar, eu respondo que contarei sempre com meus camaradas de luta na medida em que esses camaradas estiverem engajados comigo em uma luta concreta e comum, na unidade de um partido ou de um grupo que eu possa mais ou menos controlar, isto é, do qual eu faça parte como militante e do qual eu conheça a cada instante os movimentos. Nesse momento, contar com a unidade e a vontade desse partido, é exatamente contar com o fato de que o bonde vai chegar na hora certa ou que o trem não vai descarrilar. Mas eu não posso contar com homens que eu não conheço baseando-me na bondade humana, ou no interesse do homem pelo bem da sociedade, uma vez que o homem é livre, e que não existe nenhuma natureza humana na qual eu possa me basear. Eu não sei o que se tornará a revolução russa; eu posso admirá-la e fazer dela um exemplo na medida em que me provarem que o proletariado desempenha hoje na Rússia um papel que ele não desempenha em nenhuma outra nação. Mas eu não posso afirmar que isso vai conduzir forçosamente a um triunfo do proletariado; eu devo me limitar àquilo que vejo; eu não posso estar seguro de que meus camaradas de luta retomarão meu trabalho depois de minha morte para levá-la a um máximo de perfeição, uma vez que eles são livres e livremente decidirão, amanhã, aquilo que será o homem. Amanhã, depois de minha morte, homens podem decidir estabelecer o fascismo, e os outros podem ser bastante covardes e fracos para permitir que o façam; nesse momento, o fascismo será a verdade humana, e tanto pior para nós; na realidade, as coisas serão tais como o homem tiver decidido que sejam. Isso significa que eu deva me abandonar ao quietismo? Não. Primeiro, eu devo me engajar. Depois, agir segundo a velha fórmula: "não se deve esperar para agir". Isso não significa que eu não deva pertencer a um partido, mas que eu não terei ilusões e que farei o que puder. Por exemplo, se eu perguntar a mim mesmo: a coletivização, enquanto tal, acontecerá um dia? Nada sei, sei apenas que tudo o que estiver em meu poder para fazê-la acontecer, eu farei; fora isso, eu não posso contar com nada. O quietismo é a atitude daqueles que dizem: os outros podem fazer o que eu não posso fazer. A doutrina que eu apresento a vocês é justamente o oposto do quietismo, pois ela declara: só há realidade na ação; ela vai mais longe, aliás, pois ela acrescenta: o homem não é outra coisa que seu projeto, ele só existe na 629629 medida em que se realiza, ele não é outra coisa que o conjunto de seus atos, nada mais que sua vida. De acordo com isso, nós podemos compreender porque nossa doutrina horroriza certas pessoas. Pois, normalmente, elas têm apenas uma maneira de suportar sua miséria, e é pensar: "As circunstâncias foram contra mim, eu valia muito mais do que aquilo que fui; sim, eu não tive um grande amor, ou uma grande amizade, mas foi porque não encontrei um homem ou uma mulher dignos deles, eu não escrevi bons livros porque eu não tive tempo para fazê-lo; eu não tive filhos aos quais me dedicar porque eu não encontrei o homem com o qual eu poderia construir minha vida. Permaneceram, pois, em mim, inutilizadas e inteiramente viáveis uma enorme quantidade de disposições, de inclinações, de possibilidades que me dão um valor que a simples série de meus atos não permite inferir." Na verdade, para o existencialista, não há outro amor senão aquele que se constrói, não há possibilidade de amor a não ser aquela que se manifesta em um amor; não há outro gênio senão aquele que se exprime em obras de arte: o gênio de Proust é a totalidade das obras de Proust; o gênio de Racine é a série de suas tragédias; fora disso, não há nada. Por que atribuir a Racine a possibilidade de escrever uma nova tragédia se, precisamente, ele não a escreveu? Um homem se engaja em sua vida, desenha seu rosto e fora desse rosto não há nada. Evidentemente, este pensamento pode parecer duro a alguém que não teve êxito na vida. Mas, de outro lado, ele dispõe as pessoas a compreender que só a realidade conta, que os sonhos, as esperas, as esperanças permitem apenas definir um homem como sonho não realizado, como esperanças abortadas, como esperas inúteis, que isso os define em negativo e não em positivo. Entretanto, quando se diz "tu não és nada mais que a tua vida" isto não implica que o artista será julgado unicamente por suas obras de arte; mil outras coisas contribuem igualmente para defini-lo. O que queremos dizer é que um homem não é outra coisa que uma série de empreendimentos, que ele é a soma, a organização, o conjunto das relações que constituem esses empreendimentos. Nestas condições, o que nos objetam não é no fundo nosso pessimismo, mas um duro otimismo. Se as pessoas nos objetam que em nossos romances descrevemos seres indolentes, fracos, covardes e algumas 630 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 630 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo vezes francamente maus não é unicamente porque esses seres são indolentes, fracos, covardes ou maus. Pois, se, como Zola, declarássemos que eles são assim por causa da hereditariedade, por causa da ação do meio, da sociedade, por causa de um determinismo orgânico ou psicológico, essas pessoas ficariam tranquilas, elas diriam: pois é, somos assim, ninguém pode fazer nada. Mas o existencialista, quando descreve um covarde, diz que esse covarde é responsável por sua covardia. Ele não é assim porque tem um coração, um pulmão ou um cérebro covarde, ele não é assim a partir de uma organização fisiológica, mas porque se construiu covarde por seus atos. Não há temperamento covarde; existem temperamentos que são nervosos, existe sangue fraco, como diz o povo, ou temperamentos ricos. Mas o homem que tem um sangue fraco não é covarde por isso, pois o que faz a covardia é o ato de renunciar ou ceder, um temperamento não é um ato; o covarde é definido pelo ato que pratica. O que as pessoas sentem obscuramente e que lhes causa pavor, é que o covarde que nós apresentamos é culpado por sua covardia. O que as pessoas desejam é que se nasça covarde ou herói. Uma das objeções que se faz frequentemente aos Caminhos da liberdade se formula assim: "mas enfim, essas pessoas que são tão indolentes como você fará delas heróis?" Esta objeção se presta ao riso, pois ela supõe que as pessoas nasçam heróis. E, no fundo, é isso que elas desejam pensar: se você nasce covarde, você pode ficar tranquilo, você nada pode fazer, você será covarde a vida toda, o que quer que faça; se você nasce herói, você pode ficar tranquilo, você será herói a vida toda, você vai beber como um herói, vai comer como um herói. O que o existencialista diz é que o covarde se faz covarde, que o herói se faz herói. Sempre existe uma possibilidade para o covarde não ser mais covarde, e para o herói deixar de ser herói. O que conta é o engajamento total, e não é um caso particular, uma ação particular que engaja você totalmente. Creio que respondemos, assim, a um certo número de objeções feitas ao existencialismo. Veja que ele não pode ser considerado como uma filosofia do quietismo, pois ele define o homem pela ação, nem como uma descrição pessimista do homem: não há doutrina mais otimista, pois o destino do homem está nele mesmo; nem como uma tentativa para desencorajar o homem de agir pois ela lhe diz que só existe espe631631 rança em sua ação, e que a única coisa que permite ao homem viver é o ato. Nesse plano, portanto, temos uma moral da ação e do engajamento. Entrentanto, objetam-nos ainda, a partir de alguns dados, de aprisionar o homem em sua subjetividade individual. Também nesse caso compreendem-nos muito mal. Nosso ponto de partida, de fato, é a subjetividade do indivíduo, e isso por razões estritamente filosóficas. Não porque sejamos burgueses, mas porque queremos uma doutrina baseada na verdade, e não um conjunto de belas teorias, plenas de esperança mas sem fundamentos reais. Não pode haver outra verdade, no ponto de partida, senão este: eu penso, logo eu sou, eis aí a verdade absoluta da consciência que se apreende a si mesma. Qualquer teoria que tome o homem fora desse momento em que ele se apreende a si mesmo é, para começar, uma teoria que suprime a verdade, pois, fora desse cogito cartesiano, todos os objetos são apenas prováveis, e uma doutrina das probabilidades, que não está assentada em uma verdade, se desmorona no nada. Para definir o provável, é preciso possuir o verdadeiro. Portanto, para que haja uma verdade qualquer, é preciso uma verdade absoluta, e esta é simples, fácil de alcançar, ela está ao alcance de todo mundo; ela consiste em se apreender sem intermediário. Em segundo lugar, esta é a única teoria que confere uma dignidade ao homem, é a única que não faz dele um objeto. Todo materialismo nos leva a tratar todos os homens, inclusive nós mesmos, como objetos, isto é, como um conjunto de reações determinadas que em nada se distingue do conjunto das qualidades e dos fenômenos que constituem uma mesa ou uma cadeira ou uma pedra. Nós queremos constituir o reino humano precisamente como um conjunto de valores distintos do reino material. Mas a subjetividade que nós apreendemos a título de verdade não é uma subjetividade rigorosamente individual, pois nós demonstramos que no cogito não me descubro apenas a mim mesmo, mas também os outros. Pelo eu penso, contrariamente à filosofia de Descartes, contrariamente à filosofia de Kant, nós apreendemos a nós mesmos diante do outro, e o outro é tão certo para nós quanto nós mesmos. Assim, o homem que se apreende diretamente pelo cogito descobre também todos os outros, e ele os descobre como a condição de sua existência. Ele se dá conta de que não pode ser nada (no sentido em que se diz que se é espirituoso, ou que se é 632 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 632 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo canalha, ou que se é ciumento) exceto se os outros o reconhecerem como tal. Para obter uma verdade qualquer sobre mim mesmo, é preciso que eu passe pelo outro. O outro é indispensável a minha existência, tanto quanto, aliás, ao conhecimento que eu tenho de mim mesmo. Nestas condições, a descoberta de minha intimidade descobre para mim ao mesmo tempo o outro como uma liberdade colocada diante de mim, que só pensa e só quer a favor ou contra mim. Assim, descobrimos imediatamente um mundo que chamaremos a intersubjetividade, e é neste mundo que o homem decide o que ele é e o que são os outros. Além disso, se é impossível encontrar em cada homem uma essência universal que seria a natureza humana, existe, entretanto, uma universalidade humana de condição. Não é por acaso que os pensadores de hoje falam mais frequentemente da condição do homem do que de sua natureza. Por condição eles entendem, com mais ou menos clareza, o conjunto dos limites a priori que esboçam sua situação fundamental no universo. As situações históricas variam: o homem pode nascer escravo em uma sociedade pagã ou senhor feudal ou proletário. O que não varia é a necessidade para ele de ser no mundo, no trabalho, em meio aos outros e de ser mortal. Os limites não são nem subjetivos, nem objetivos, ou antes, eles têm uma face objetiva e uma face subjetiva. São objetivos porque se encontram em toda parte e em toda parte são reconhecidos; são subjetivos porque são vividos e nada são se o homem não os vive, isto é, se ele não se determina livremente em sua existência em relação a eles. E, embora os projetos possam ser diferentes, pelo menos nenhum deles permanece completamente estranho para mim, pois todos eles se apresentam como uma tentativa para superar os limites, ou para afastá-los, ou para negá-los, ou para acomodar-se a eles. Consequentemente, qualquer projeto, por mais individual que seja, tem um valor universal. Todo projeto, mesmo o do chinês, do indiano ou do negro, pode ser compreendido por um europeu. Ele pode ser compreendido, isto quer dizer que o europeu de 1945 pode lançar-se da mesma maneira, a partir de uma situação concebida por ele, em direção aos seus limites, e que ele pode refazer nele o projeto do chinês, do indiano ou do africano. Há universalidade de todo projeto no sentido em que todo projeto é compreensível para qualquer homem. O que não significa de modo algum que esse projeto defina o 633633 homem para sempre, mas que ele pode ser reencontrado. Existe sempre uma maneira de compreender o idiota, a criança, o primitivo ou o estrangeiro, desde que se tenha as informações suficientes. Neste sentido, podemos dizer que há uma universalidade do homem, mas ela não é dada, ela é perpetuamente construída. Eu construo o universal escolhendo-me; eu o construo compreendendo o projeto de qualquer outro homem, de qualquer época que seja. Este absoluto da escolha não suprime a relatividade de cada época. O que o existencialismo faz questão de mostrar é a ligação entre o caráter absoluto do engajamento livre, pelo qual cada homem se realiza, realizando um tipo de humanidade – engajamento sempre compreensível a qualquer época e por qualquer um –, e a relatividade do conjunto cultural que pode resultar de semelhante escolha. É preciso ressaltar ao mesmo tempo a relatividade do cartesianismo e o caráter absoluto do engajamento cartesiano. Neste sentido, pode-se dizer, se se quiser, que cada um de nós faz o absoluto respirando, comendo, dormindo ou agindo de um modo qualquer. Não há nenhuma diferença entre ser livremente, ser como projeto, como existência que escolhe sua essência, e ser absoluto. Não há nenhuma diferença entre ser um absoluto temporalmente localizado, isto é, que se localizou na história, e ser compreensível universalmente. Isso não responde inteiramente a objeção de subjetivismo. De fato, tal objeção toma ainda muitas formas. A primeira é a seguinte: dizem-nos que "cada um pode então fazer não importa o quê"; essa objeção se exprime de diversas maneiras. De início, acusam-nos de anarquia; em seguida, declaram: "vocês não podem julgar os outros, pois não há razão para preferir um projeto a um outro"; por fim, podem nos dizer: "tudo é gratuito no que vocês escolherem, vocês dão com uma mão o que fingem receber com a outra". Estas três objeções não são muito sérias. De início, a primeira objeção: "você pode escolher não importa o quê" não é exata. A escolha é possível em um sentido, mas o que não é possível é não escolher. Posso sempre escolher, mas devo saber que se eu não escolher, eu escolho ainda. Isto, ainda que pareça estritamente formal, tem uma grande importância para limitar a fantasia e o capricho. Assim, se, diante de uma situação – por exemplo, a situação que faz que eu seja um ser sexuado que pode ter relações com ser de um outro sexo, que pode ter filhos –, sou obrigado a 634 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 634 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo escolher uma atitude, e, de qualquer modo, eu carrego a responsabilidade por uma escolha que, me engajando, engaja também a humanidade inteira, mesmo enfim que nenhum valor a priori determine minha escolha, esta não tem nada a ver com o capricho. E, se se crê encontrar aqui a teoria gidiana do ato gratuito, é que não se vê a enorme diferença entre esta doutrina e a de Gide. Gide não sabe o que é uma situação. Ele age por simples capricho. Para nós, ao contrário, o homem se encontra em uma situação organizada, na qual está engajado; por sua escolha, ele engaja a humanidade inteira, e não pode evitar escolher: ou ele permanecerá casto, ou se casará sem ter filhos, ou ainda se casará e terá filhos. De qualquer modo, é impossível que ele não tenha uma total responsabilidade diante desse problema. Sem dúvida, ele escolheu sem se referir a valores preestabelecidos, mas é injusto taxar isso de capricho. Digamos antes que é preciso comparar a escolha moral com a construção de uma obra de arte. E, aqui, é preciso fazer logo uma pausa para frisar bem que não se trata de uma moral estética, pois nossos adversários são de uma tal má-fé que até disso nos acusam. O exemplo que eu escolhi é apenas uma comparação. Dito isso, alguma vez já se reprovou a um artista que faz um quadro por não ter se inspirado em regras estabelecidas a priori? Alguém, alguma vez, já lhe disse que quadro deve fazer? Claro que não existe nenhum quadro definido que deve ser feito, que o artista se engaja na construção de seu quadro e que o quadro que ele fará é precisamente o quadro que ele tiver feito. É claro que não existem valores estéticos a priori, mas existem valores que se veem depois na coerência do quadro, nas relações que há entre a vontade de criação e o resultado. Ninguém pode dizer o que será a pintura de amanhã. Só se pode julgar a pintura depois que ela tiver sido feita. Que relação isso tem com a moral? Estamos na mesma situação criadora. Não falamos jamais da gratuidade de uma obra de arte. Quando falamos de uma tela de Picasso, nunca dizemos que ela é gratuita. Compreendemos muito bem que ele se construiu tal como ele é ao mesmo tempo que pintava, que o conjunto de sua obra se incorpora a sua vida. É a mesma coisa no plano moral. O que há em comum entre a arte e a moral é que, nos dois casos, nós temos criação e invenção. Nós não podemos decidir a priori o que devemos fazer. Acredito ter deixado bastante claro ao contar o caso do aluno que veio me procurar e que poderia 635635 ter recorrido a qualquer moral, kantiana ou qualquer outra, sem encontrar nelas nenhuma indicação. Ele foi obrigado a inventar sua própria lei. Não diremos jamais que este homem – quer tenha escolhido ficar com a mãe, tomando como base moral os sentimentos, a ação individual e a caridade concreta, quer tenha escolhido ir para Inglaterra, preferindo o sacrifício – fez uma escolha gratuita. O homem se faz, ele não está feito já de início, ele se faz escolhendo sua moral, e a pressão das circunstâncias é tal que ele não pode não escolher uma moral. Definimos o homem apenas por relação a um engajamento. É portanto absurdo objetar-nos a gratuidade da escolha. Em segundo lugar, dizem-nos: "você não pode julgar os outros". Isso é verdadeiro por um lado, e falso, por outro. É verdadeiro no sentido em que, toda vez que o homem escolhe seu engajamento e seu projeto com toda sinceridade e lucidez, qualquer que seja, aliás, esse projeto, é impossível a ele preferir um outro. É verdadeiro no sentido em que não acreditamos no progresso; o progresso é um melhoramento; o homem é sempre o mesmo em face de uma situação que varia e a escolha permanece sempre uma escolha em uma situação. O problema moral não mudou desde a época em que se podia escolher entre os escravagistas e os não-escravagistas, por exemplo, no momento da guerra da Secessão, e a época atual, na qual se pode optar pelo MRP ou pelos comunistas. Entretanto, podemos julgar, sim, pois, como já lhes disse, cada um escolhe diante dos outros, e cada um se escolhe diante dos outros. Podemos julgar, de início (e isso talvez não seja um juízo de valor, mas um juízo lógico), que certas escolhas estejam fundadas no erro, e outras, na verdade. Podemos julgar um homem ao dizer que ele é de má-fé. Como definimos a situação do homem como uma escolha livre, sem desculpas e sem apoio, todo homem que se refugia por trás da desculpa de suas paixões, todo homem que inventa um determinismo é um homem de má-fé. Poder-se-ia objetar-nos: "mas por que ele não poderia se escolher como de má-fé?" Respondo que não tenho que julgá-lo moralmente, mas eu defino sua má-fé como um erro. Aqui, não podemos escapar a um juízo de verdade. A má-fé é evidentemente uma mentira, pois ela dissimula a total liberdade do engajamento. No mesmo plano, eu direi que há também má-fé se eu escolher declarar que certos valores existem antes de mim; eu estou em contradição comigo mesmo se eu quiser esses valores 636 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 636 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo e, ao mesmo tempo, declarar que eles se impõem a mim. Se me disserem: "e se eu quiser ser de má-fé?" Eu responderei: não há nenhuma razão para que você não o seja, mas eu declaro que você o é, e que a atitude de estrita coerência é a atitude de boa fé. Além disso, eu posso fazer um juízo moral. Quando declaro que a liberdade, através de cada circunstância concreta, só pode ter como alvo querer-se a si mesma, então, se o homem reconhecer que, em seu desamparo, é ele que estabelece valores, ele não poderá mais querer senão uma coisa, a liberdade como fundamento de todos os valores. Isto não significa que ele a queira abstratamente. Isto quer dizer simplesmente que os atos dos homens de boa fé têm como última significação a busca da liberdade enquanto tal. Um homem que adere a tal sindicato, comunista ou revolucionário, quer objetivos concretos. Estes objetivos implicam uma vontade abstrata de liberdade, mas esta liberdade se quer concretamente. Queremos a liberdade pela liberdade e através de cada circunstância particular. E, querendo a liberdade, descobrimos que ela depende inteiramente da liberdade dos outros, e que a liberdade dos outros depende da nossa. Claro, a liberdade como definição do homem não depende de outrem, mas, uma vez que existe engajamento, sou obrigado a querer minha liberdade ao mesmo tempo que a liberdade dos outros; eu só posso tomar minha liberdade como alvo se, do mesmo modo, eu tomar a liberdade dos outros como alvo. Consequentemente, quando, no plano da autenticidade total, reconheço que o homem é um ser em que a essência é precedida pela existência, que ele é um ser livre que só pode querer, em quaisquer circunstâncias, sua liberdade, reconheço ao mesmo tempo que só posso querer a liberdade dos outros. Assim, em nome dessa vontade de liberdade, implicada pela própria liberdade, posso formar juízos sobre aqueles que procuram esconder de si mesmos a total gratuidade de sua existência e sua total liberdade. Chamarei de covardes aqueles que ocultarem a si mesmos, por espírito de seriedade ou por desculpas deterministas, sua total liberdade. Chamarei de safados aqueles que tentarem mostrar que sua existência é necessária, quando ela é a contingência mesma da aparição do homem na terra. Porém, covardes ou safados só podem ser julgados no plano da estrita autenticidade. Assim, ainda que o conteúdo da moral seja variável, uma certa forma desta moral é universal. Kant declara que a liber637637 dade quer a si mesma e a liberdade dos outros. Estou de acordo, mas ele estima que o formal e o universal bastam para constituir uma moral. Nós pensamos, ao contrário, que princípios muito abstratos fracassam em definir a ação. Ainda uma vez, tomemos o caso deste aluno. Em nome de quê, em nome de que grande máxima moral pensa você que ele teria podido decidir, tranquilamente, abandonar sua mãe ou permanecer com ela? Não há nenhum meio de julgar. O conteúdo é sempre concreto e, por consequência, imprevisível. Sempre há invenção. A única coisa que conta é saber se a invenção que se faz, se faz em nome da liberdade. Examinemos, por exemplo, os dois casos seguintes. Vocês verão em que medida eles se assemelham e se diferenciam. Tomemos O moinho à beira do rio. Nele encontramos uma certa jovem, Maggie Tulliver, que encarna o valor da paixão e que é consciente disso. Ela está apaixonada por um jovem, Stephen, noivo de uma garota insignificante. Esta Maggie Tulliver, ao invés de preferir, imprudentemente, sua própria felicidade, escolheu se sacrificar, em nome da solidariedade humana, e renunciar ao homem que ela ama. Ao contrário, a Sanseverina, em A cartuxa de Parma, acreditando que a paixão faz o verdadeiro valor do homem, declara que um grande amor merece sacrifícios, que é preciso preferi-lo à banalidade de um amor conjugal que uniria Stephen e a garota tola com quem ele deveria se casar. Ela escolheria sacrificar esta última e realizar sua felicidade; e, como mostra Stendhal, ela se sacrificaria a si mesma por paixão se a vida assim o exigisse. Estamos aqui diante de duas morais estritamente opostas. Penso que elas são equivalentes: nos dois casos, a liberdade foi colocada como alvo. E vocês podem imaginar duas atitudes rigorosamente semelhantes quanto aos efeitos: uma jovem, por resignação, prefere renunciar ao amor; a outra, por apetite sexual, prefere desconhecer as relações anteriores do homem que ela ama. Essas duas ações se assemelham exteriormente àquelas outras que descrevemos há pouco. Contudo, elas são ligeiramente diferentes. A atitude de Sanseverina é muito mais próxima da de Maggie Tulliver do que de uma avidez descuidada. Vocês veem, portanto, que essa segunda objeção é ao mesmo tempo verdadeira e falsa. Desde que seja no plano do engajamento livre, nós podemos escolher qualquer coisa. 638 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 638 sArtre • o eXistenCiALismo é um humAnismo A terceira objeção é a seguinte: "vocês dão com uma mão o que fingem receber com a outra, ou seja, no fundo os valores não são sérios, já que vocês os escolhem". A isso, eu respondo que lamento muito que assim seja, mas, se eu suprimi Deus Nosso Senhor, é preciso alguém para inventar os valores. É preciso encarar as coisas como elas são. E, aliás, dizer que nós inventamos os valores significa apenas que a vida não tem sentido a priori. Antes de vivê-la, a vida, em si mesma, não é nada, é você que lhe dá um sentido, e o valor é apenas este sentido que você escolheu. Reparem que assim há possibilidade de criar uma comunidade humana. Reprovaram-me por perguntar se o existencialismo é um humanismo. Disseram-me: mas você escreveu em A Náusea que os humanistas estavam errados, você zomba de um certo tipo de humanismo, por que voltar atrás agora? Na realidade, a palavra humanismo tem dois significados muito diferentes. Por humanismo, pode-se entender uma teoria que toma o homem como fim e como valor superior. Neste sentido, há humanismo em Cocteau, por exemplo, quando, em sua narrativa A volta ao mundo em 80 horas, um personagem declara, ao sobrevoar as montanhas de avião: o homem é admirável. Isso significa que eu, pessoalmente, que não construí aviões, me beneficiarei destas invenções particulares e poderei, pessoalmente, enquanto homem, considerar-me como responsável e honrado por atos particulares de alguns homens. Isto supõe que possamos conferir um valor ao homem segundo os mais elevados atos de alguns homens. Este humanismo é absurdo, pois só o cão ou o cavalo poderiam fazer um juízo de conjunto sobre o homem e declarar que o homem é admirável, coisa que eles não têm intenção de fazer, até onde eu saiba, pelo menos. Mas não se pode admitir que um homem possa julgar o homem. O existencialismo dispensa-o de qualquer juízo desse gênero; o existencialista jamais tomará o homem fim, pois ele está sempre por fazer. E não devemos crer que haja uma humanidade a qual possamos render um culto, à maneira de Auguste Comte. O culto à humanidade conduz ao humanismo fechado sobre si, como o de Comte, e, é preciso dizer, ao fascismo. É um humanismo que recusamos. Mas há um outro sentido para o humanismo, que, no fundo, significa o seguinte: o homem está constantemente fora de si mesmo, é proje639639 tando-se e perdendo-se fora de si mesmo que ele faz existir o homem; e, de outro lado, é buscando alvos transcendentes que ele pode existir; sendo o homem esta superação e apreendendo os objetos apenas em relação a ela, ele está no coração, no centro dessa superação. Não há outro universo senão o universo humano, o universo da subjetividade humana. Esta ligação entre a transcendência, como constitutiva do homem – não no sentido em que Deus é transcendente, mas no sentido da superação –, e a subjetividade, no sentido em que o homem não está fechado em si mesmo, mas presente sempre em um universo humano, é o que nós chamamos o humanismo existencialista. Humanismo porque nós lembramos ao homem que não existe outro legislador a não ser ele mesmo, e que é no desamparo que ele decidirá sobre si mesmo; e porque nós mostramos que não é voltando-se para si mesmo, mas sempre procurando um alvo fora dele – que é determinada libertação, determinada realização particular – que o homem se realizará precisamente como humano. De acordo com essas reflexões, vemos que nada é mais injusto do que as objeções que nos fazem. O existencialismo não é outra coisa senão um esforço para tirar todas as consequências de uma posição atéia coerente. Ele não busca de modo algum mergulhar o homem no desespero. Mas se se chama desespero, como o fazem os cristãos, a toda atitude de descrença, então ele parte do desespero original. O existencialismo não é modo algum um ateísmo no sentido em que se esforçaria em demonstrar que Deus não existe. Ele declara antes: mesmo se Deus existisse, nada mudaria; eis nosso ponto de vista. Não que acreditemos que Deus exista, mas pensamos que o problema não é o de sua existência; é preciso que o homem se reencontre a si mesmo e se convença de que nada pode salválo dele próprio, nem que seja uma prova válida da existência de Deus. Neste sentido, o existencialismo é um otimismo, uma doutrina da ação, e é somente por má-fé que os cristãos, confundindo o seu próprio desespero com o nosso, podem chamar-nos de desesperados. o homem estétiCo nA visão de sChiLLer640 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 640 641641 friedrich SChIllER (1759-1805) pertence à estirpe de Platão: poeta, dramaturgo, filósofo e esteta, além de médico, historiador e romancista. Pelas datas de sua curta existência e pelo que a História nos conservou da segunda metade do século XVIII e início do século XIX, sabemos que Schiller viveu num período de extraordinária fecundidade literária e filosófica da Alemanha. Como situá-lo? Entre o classicismo de Weimar, cidade onde entabulou amizade com Goethe, e o romantismo de Friedrich Schlegel e Novalis? Ou como elemento de ligação entre Kant e Hegel? Em 2005, por ocasião dos 200 anos de sua morte, a Alemanha descobriu a extraordinária modernidade do pensamento e do estilo de vida de Schiller. Apesar dos problemas crônicos de saúde e das dificuldades financeiras, Schiller foi um dramaturgo assaz produtivo. Em 1781, estreou com o drama de crítica social Os Salteadores, que costuma ser vinculado ao Sturm und Drang (Tempestade e Ímpeto), ou seja, ao PréRomantismo. Intriga e Amor, Don Carlos, a trilogia Wallenstein, Maria Stuart e Guilherme Tell – alçaram Schiller ao posto de dramaturgo favorito do povo alemão por mais de um século. Como poeta lírico, sobressaiu O HOMEM ESTÉTIcO NA VISãO De SCHILLeR o homem estétiCo nA visão de sChiLLer642 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 642 com Hino à Alegria. Dentre seus ensaios de Estética, os mais conhecidos são: Poesia Ingênua e Sentimental, Teoria da tragédia e Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. Com a publicação, em 1790, da Crítica da faculdade do juízo, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) concluiu o seu sistema. Não sem motivo é chamada de terceira Crítica. Entre o entendimento (faculdade de conhecimento) e a razão (faculdade de desejar) situa-se o juízo ou faculdade de julgar (Urteilskraft). Para Luigi Pareyson, "A Crítica da faculdade do juízo ocupa uma posição central na História da Estética: nela conflui o Iluminismo e dela parte o Romantismo".1 Não admira, pois, que Schiller já em 1791 tenha tomado a decisão de estudar a fundo a obra de Kant. No mesmo ano, recebeu do príncipe dinamarquês Frederico Cristiano de Augustenburg uma pensão anual de mil táleres, com duração estipulada em três anos. Digno de nota é o fato de o exemplar da Crítica da faculdade do juízo, que pertenceu a Schiller, ter sido legado à posteridade. Encontrase no Arquivo de Literatura Alemã, em Marbach am Neckar, sua cidade natal. Dos trechos sublinhados e das anotações à margem das páginas, é possível detectar os passos que mais chamaram a atenção do leitor. No semestre de inverno de 1792-93, Schiller ministrou um curso de Estética na Universidade de Iena. Graças à solicitude de Christian Friedrich Michaelis, que fizera anotações durante as aulas, foi publicado o opúsculo Fragmentos das preleções sobre estética do semestre de inverno de 179293. Convém lembrar que Schiller, na preparação das aulas, não se limitou ao estudo da obra de Kant. Dos britânicos, leu David Hume, Edmund Burke e Henry Home. Dos alemães, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, Johann J. Winckelmann, Lessing, Johann G. Sulzer e Carl Philipp Moritz. Da França, Charles Batteux e Diderot. À época, a atividade epistolar mais do que praxe era uma necessidade. Assim, a correspondência entre Schiller e Christian G. Körner (janeiro-fevereiro de 1793) – Kallias ou sobre a beleza – é indispensável não só para suprir algumas lacunas das notas de Michaelis como também para a compreensão das Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. 1 PAREYSON, Luigi. L'Estetica di Kant. Milano: Mursia, 1968. p. 9. 643643 Que Kant tenha exercido notável influência sobre Schiller, é um dado incontestável. Creio que é suficiente, nos limites desta Apresentação, deixar claro que Schiller, como artista e esteta, desenvolveu e enriqueceu várias ideias de Kant. No diálogo entre os dois, há pontos de convergência e divergência. Não raro, Schiller avança "com e contra Kant", consoante a expressão usada pelos comentadores. Destarte, na carta a Körner, de 25 de janeiro de 1793, Schiller reconhece "uma dificuldade quase ilimitada" para assentar objetivamente um conceito de beleza. Para ele, há três explicações possíveis acerca do belo, a saber: de modo subjetivo sensível (Burke); subjetivo racional (Kant); objetivo racional (Baumgarten, Mendelsohn e os "homens da perfeição"). Visto que nenhuma das três lhe satisfaz plenamente, Schiller propõe sua teoria como "uma quarta forma possível de explicar o belo", vale dizer, "de modo objetivo sensível".2 Mas é na carta de 08 de fevereiro de 1793 que o leitor encontrará a formulação que resume seu pensamento: "A beleza não é pois outra coisa senão liberdade no fenômeno".3 Não há dúvida de que, na concepção schilleriana da beleza, há uma tensão entre objetivismo e subjetivismo. Segundo Pareyson, Kant está na origem da tendência, desenvolvida por Schiller, que insiste na interiorização da contemplação estética e no seu caráter moral. É nessa linha que devem ser lidas as Cartas bem como algumas sentenças dos Fragmentos. Por exemplo: "O gosto promove não apenas nossa felicidade, como também nos civiliza e cultiva".4 A educação estética da humanidade Em reconhecimento ao príncipe Frederico de Augustenburg pela pensão recebida, Schiller iniciou, em 1791, a redação de vinte e sete cartas endereçadas ao seu benfeitor, mas já com a intenção de publicá-las mais 2 SCHILLER, Friedrich. Kallias ou sobre a beleza. A correspondência entre Schiller e Körner, janeiro-fevereiro de 1793. Tradução e introdução de Ricardo Barbosa. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2002. p. 42. 3 Ib. , p. 60. 4 SCHILLER, Friedrich. Fragmentos das preleções sobre estética do semestre de inverno de 1792-93: recolhidos por Christian Friedrich Michaelis/Friedrich Schiller. Tradução e introdução: Ricardo Barbosa. Belo Horizonte: Ed. UFMG, 2003. p. 34. o homem estétiCo nA visão de sChiLLer644 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 644 tarde. Em 1794, um incêndio destruiu o castelo de Copenhague, no qual estavam as cartas originais. Schiller, então, assumiu a tarefa de reescrevêlas com o auxílio de cópias achadas. São as Cartas a Augustenburg (Augustenburger Briefe) que, ao lado das cartas a Körner, formam o rascunho das pesquisas que resultaram na obra Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade (Uber die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen). A publicação efetuou-se em três etapas na revista Horen, editada por Schiller: N. 1, N. 2 e N. 6, no ano de 1795. No Brasil, a Editora Herder lançou, em 1963, Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade, na tradução de Roberto Schwarz, com Introdução e notas de Anatol Rosenfeld. Em 1990, veio a público a tradução realizada por Márcio Suzuki, com base na anterior, de Roberto Schwarz, sob o título de A educação estética do homem. Numa série de cartas, pela Iluminuras. O tradutor encarregou-se da Introdução e das notas no final do livro.5 Em 1991, foi reeditada pela Editora Pedagógica e Universitária a tradução de Roberto Schwarz, de 1963, com Introdução e notas de Anatol Rosenfeld. As três cartas selecionadas para a Antologia de Textos Filosóficos – XII, XIV e XV -, foram extraídas da 2a. edição da E.P.U., 1a. reimpressão, 2009.6 Seja dito logo que Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade não é um livro de fácil leitura. Justifica-se, portanto, a advertência de Anatol Rosenfeld: "Talvez se deva ler este ensaio com certa disposição estética, um pouco como os diálogos de Platão: como obra dramática a que, neste particular, não falta o cunho da grande comédia; o destino do homem, herói falho e ambíguo, passa, depois de várias peripécias, do infortúnio à felicidade".7 O leitor, ao abrir a Carta I, depara com a frase: "Permitireis que vos exponha numa série de cartas os resultados de minhas investigações sobre o Belo e a Arte". (p. 35) E, na Carta II, que fecha a Introdução, o autor 5 SCHILLER, Friedrich. A educação estética do homem. Numa série de cartas. Tradução: Roberto Schwarz e Márcio Suzuki. Introdução: Márcio Suzuki. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 1990. 6 SCHILLER, Friedrich. Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. Tradução: Roberto Schwarz. Introdução e notas: Anatol Rosenfeld. 2a. ed. São Paulo: E.P.U., 2009. 7 Ib., p. 27. 645645 descortina amplos horizontes para a reflexão: "Cheios de expectativa, os olhares do filósofo e do homem do mundo voltam-se para a arena política, onde, supõem, é jogado o destino da humanidade". (p. 38) A indagação filosófica a respeito da estrutura da alma humana, na Carta XI, abre caminho para a apresentação da teoria dos três impulsos: o sensível e o formal, na Carta XII, e o lúdico, na Carta XIV. A Carta XV prolonga as duas anteriores e se eleva a um patamar que arrebata o leitor a uma altura quiçá inimaginável. Como ponto de partida, o esquema proposto logo no início: objeto do impulso sensível – vida objeto do impulso formal – forma objeto do impulso lúdico – forma viva O conceito de forma viva é lançado como definição de beleza. Ao analisá-la, o autor chega à identificação entre o impulso lúdico ideal e a humanidade plena. Num segundo momento, a análise do conceito de jogo. Movimentando-se com grande desenvoltura entre algumas obras de arte da Grécia Clássica, o autor culmina numa das mais felizes formulações das Cartas: "Pois, para tudo sintetizarmos, o homem joga somente quando é homem no pleno sentido da palavra, e somente é homem pleno quando joga". (p. 92) Vem a propósito outra observação de Rosenfeld: "Todavia, o que no nexo da filosofia estética de Schiller importa mais é verificar que no decurso do próprio trabalho a posição do autor se modifica. Se no início o estado estético (lúdico) é apenas um recurso e meio para possibilitar a passagem do caráter físico ao moral, pouco a pouco o meio se torna fim último até que surja, como ideal absoluto, o "homem estético", o estado lúdico, único em que o homem é integralmente homem". (p. 24) Dito isto, urge voltar à Carta II, onde Schiller se dirige ao príncipe Augustenburg com as seguintes palavras: "Espero convencer-vos de que esta matéria é menos estranha à necessidade que ao gosto de nosso tempo, e mostrarei que para resolver na prática o problema político é o homem estétiCo nA visão de sChiLLer646 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 646 necessário caminhar através do estético, pois é pela beleza que se vai à liberdade". (p. 39) A seguir, nas Cartas III, IV e V, o autor esboça uma Filosofia do Estado. Visto que Schiller, na Carta V, pinta um quadro sombrio da arena política nos estertores do século XVIII, recorro à edição da Iluminuras para pinçar, no fim do livro, a nota 17, redigida por Márcio Suzuki, a qual confirma ser de fato a Revolução Francesa o alvo da crítica. O dramaturgo Friedrich Schiller escrevera peças de engajamento político. Por exemplo: Os Salteadores e Intriga e amor são peças, respectivamente, em defesa dos pobres da sociedade e contra a corrupção nas cortes das autocracias germânicas. Sua atuação despertou tanto entusiasmo na França que, no dia 26 de agosto de 1792, foi homenageado com o título de citoyen français pelos membros da Assembleia Legislativa Nacional. Face ao Terror que se alastrava na França, porém, Schiller não hesitou em repudiar a solução revolucionária. Nas Cartas a Augustenburg, de acordo com a citação de Márcio Suzuki, lê-se: "O momento era o mais propício, mas encontrou uma geração corrompida, que não estava à altura dele, e não soube dignificá-lo nem aproveitá-lo".8 Em suma, o Estado ideal passa a ser um problema de educação. O homem lúdico, na visão de Schiller, é o homem em sentido pleno. Caberá a ele criar o Estado moral, e não ao Estado, imposto pela Revolução, criar a nova humanidade. Sugestões de leitura: PrinciPais obras de schiller traduzidas Para o Português SCHILLER, Friedrich. A educação estética do homem. Numa série de cartas. Tradução: Roberto Schwarz e Márcio Suzuki. Introdução: Márcio Suzuki. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 1990. ____. Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. Tradução: Roberto Schwarz. Introdução e notas: Anatol Rosenfeld. São Paulo: Herder, 1963. ____. Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. Tradução: Roberto Schwarz. Introdução e notas: Anatol Rosenfeld. 2a. ed. São Paulo: E. P. U., 2009. 8 SCHILLER, Friedrich. A educação estética do homem. Numa série de cartas. p. 151, nota 17. 647647 ____. Kallias ou sobre a beleza. A correspondência entre Schiller e Körner, janeirofevereiro de 1793. Tradução e introdução: Ricardo Barbosa. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2002. ____. Poesia Ingênua e Sentimental.Tradução e introdução: Márcio Suzuki. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 1991. ____. Teoria da tragédia.Tradução: Flávio Meurer. Introdução e notas: Anatol Rosenfeld. São Paulo: Herder, 1964. Reed.: São Paulo: EPU, 1992. ____. Fragmentos das preleções sobre estética do semestre de inverno de 179293: recolhidos por Christian Friedrich Michaelis / Friedrich Schiller. Tradução e introdução: Ricardo Barbosa. Belo Horizonte: Editora UFMG, 2003. ____. Sobre graça e dignidade. Tradução: Ana Resende. Porto Alegre: Movimento, 2008. ii – outras obras: BAYER, Raymond. História da Estética.Tradução: José Saramago. Lisboa: Ed. Estampa, 1978. KANT, Immanuel. Crítica da faculdade do juízo. Tradução: Valerio Rohden e António Marques. Rio de Janeiro: Forense Universitária, 1993. SAFRANSKI, Rudiger. Schiller oder Die Erfindung des Deutschen Idealismus. Munchen: Hanser, 2005. 648 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 648 sChiLLer • CArtAs sobre A eduCAção estétiCA dA humAnidAde CARtAS SOBRe A eDuCAçãO eStÉtICA DA HuMANIDADe 1 Carta XII O cumprimento dessa dupla tarefa, de dar realidade ao necessário que está em nós e de submeter a realidade fora de nós à lei da necessidade, nos é proposto por duas forças opostas, que nos impulsionam para a realização de seus objetos e que poderíamos chamar impulsos. O primeiro destes impulsos, que chamarei sensível, parte da existência física do homem ou de sua natureza sensível, e está empenhado em submetê-lo às limitações do tempo, em torná-lo matéria: não quer dar-lhe matéria, pois para isto já seria necessária uma livre atividade da pessoa que a recebe e distingue da própria identidade. Matéria não significa, aqui, mais que modificação ou realidade, que preencha o tempo; este impulso exige, portanto, que haja modificação, que o tempo tenha um conteúdo. Este estado de tempo meramente preenchido chama-se sensação, e é somente através dele que se manifesta a existência física. 1 Uber die Ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen. Texto já publicado em SCHILLER, F. Cartas sobre a educação estética da humanidade. Tradução de Roberto Schwarz, do original alemâo: Uber die Ästhetische Erziehung des Meschen. Introdução e notas de Anatol Rosenfeld. São Paulo: EPU, 2009. As notas com asterisco (*) são do próprio F. Schiller. As notas numeradas são de A. Rosenfeld. 649649 Por ser em sequência tudo o que é no tempo, alguma coisa, por ser, exclui tudo o mais. Quando produzimos um som, este será o único real entre todos os que o instrumento possivelmente é capaz de produzir; enquanto o homem experimenta o presente, toda a infinita possibilidade de suas determinações fica limitada a esta única espécie de ser. Quando, portanto, este instinto age exclusivo, existe necessariamente a máxima limitação; o homem neste estado nada mais é que uma unidade quantitativa, um momento de tempo preenchido – ou melhor, ele não é, pois sua personalidade fica negada enquanto é dominado pela sensibilidade e arrastado pelo tempo.2* O domínio deste instinto é a finitude do homem; como toda a forma aparece somente através da matéria, como todo o absoluto necessita a mediação dos limites, torna-se evidente que toda a aparição da humanidade está presa ao impulso sensível. Embora seja somente ele que desperta e desdobra as disposições da humanidade, é também ele que torna impossível sua perfeição. Acorrenta por vínculos insuperáveis o espírito ascensional ao mundo sensível e faz voltar aos limites do presente a abstração que marchava livremente para o infinito. O pensamento, entretanto, pode fugir-lhe por momentos, e a vontade firme contrapõe-se vitoriosa às suas exigências; cedo, porém, a natureza subjugada reafirma seus direitos e exige realidade dos objetos, conteúdo para nossos conhecimentos e finalidade em nossos atos. O segundo impulso poderíamos chamar de formal; tem ponto de partida no ser absoluto do homem ou na sua natureza racional e visa libertá-Io, harmonizar a diversidade de suas aparências e afirmar sua pessoa contra toda variação em seu estado. Por não poder a pessoa, enquanto unidade absoluta e indivisível, estar em contradição consigo 2 *A linguagem possui uma expressão certeira para este estado de dispersão, sob o domínio das sensações: estar fora de si, isto é, estar fora de seu eu. Embora esta expressão idiomática valha apenas quando a sensação se torna em afeto perceptível por sua duração, é verdade que, enquanto apenas sente, o homem está fora de si. O regresso deste estado para o juízo tem também um nome acertado: mergulhar em si, isto é, retornar a seu eu, reconstituir sua pessoa. De alguém que esteja desmaiado não se diz estar fora de si, mas sim estar inconsciente, isto é, estar roubado a seu eu, enquanto aquele apenas deixa de estar nele. Daí estar consciente quem volta de um desmaio, o que pode muito bem coexistir com o estar fora-de-si. 650 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 650 sChiLLer • CArtAs sobre A eduCAção estétiCA dA humAnidAde mesma, por sermos nós nós-mesmos em toda a eternidade, aquele impulso que visa afirmar a personalidade não pode exigir nada diverso daquilo que exige por toda a eternidade; decide, portanto, para sempre como decide para agora, e manda agora o mesmo que manda para sempre. Compreende, pois, toda a sequência do tempo, vale dizer: nega o tempo e a modificação; quer que o real seja eterno e necessário, e que o eterno e o necessário sejam reais; com outras palavras: visa a verdade e a justiça. Enquanto o primeiro constitui apenas casos, o segundo fornece leis – leis para todos os juízos no que se refere a conhecimentos, para todas as vontades no que se refere aos fatos. Suponha-se que conhecemos um objeto, que atribuímos validez objetiva a um estado de nosso sujeito, ou que agimos fundados em conhecimento, e fazemos do objetivo a determinação de nosso estado subjetivo – em ambos os casos arrancamos esse estado à jurisdição do tempo e damo-lhe realidade para todos os homens e todos os tempos, isto é, universalidade e necessidade3. O sentimento pode apenas dizer: isto é verdade para este sujeito e neste momento, um outro momento e outro sujeito podem vir que retirem o que afirma a presente sensação. Quando o pensamento, entretanto, afirma: isto é, ele decidiu para sempre e eternamente, e a validez de seu juízo é penhorada pela própria personalidade que resiste a toda transformação. A inclinação pode apenas dizer: isto é bom para o teu indivíduo e para a tua necessidade atual, mas teu indivíduo e tua necessidade atual serão carregados pela modificação e o que agora desejas com ardor será depois objeto de tua repugnância. Quando, por outro lado, o sentimento moral diz: isto deve ser, sua decisão é para sempre eterna – quando reconheces a verdade por ser verdadeira, e exerces a justiça por ser justa, terás feito de um caso singular a lei de todos os casos, terás tratado como eterno um momento de tua vida. A máxima ampliação do ser, portanto, é realizada quando o impulso formal domina e faz agir em nós o sujeito puro; as limitações 3 Mais uma vez Schiller interpreta apenas pensamentos kantianos. Na medida em que fala de leis para a vontade, que dão às nossas ações universalidade e necessidade morais (isto é, validade para todos os homens), Schiller reformula o imperativo categórico. 651651 desaparecem e o homem se transforma de unidade quantitativa, a que se vira restrito pelos sentidos carentes, em unidade ideal, que compreende todo o reino das aparências. Não mais estamos no tempo durante esta operação, mas é o tempo que está em nós com toda a sua sequência infinita. Não somos indivíduos, mas espécie; o juízo de todos os espíritos é pronunciado através do nosso, a escolha de todos os corações está representada em nossa ação. Carta XIV Chegamos agora ao conceito da ação recíproca dos dois impulsos, em que a eficácia de cada qual ao mesmo tempo funda e limita a do outro; em que cada um encontra sua máxima manifestação justamente pela atividade do outro. Esta relação de reciprocidade entre os dois impulsos é uma tarefa da razão, que o homem só pode realizar plenamente na perfeição de sua existência. É a ideia de sua humanidade, no sentido mais autêntico da palavra, um infinito, portanto, do qual pode aproximar-se mais e mais no curso do tempo sem jamais alcançá-Io. "Ele não deve aspirar à forma à custa de sua realidade, nem à realidade à custa da forma; deve, antes, procurar o ser absoluto pelo determinado e o determinado pelo absoluto. Deve contrapor-se um mundo por ser pessoa, e ser pessoa por se lhe contrapor um mundo. Deve sentir por ser consciente e ser consciente por sentir". – O homem não pode experimentar a sua concordância com esta ideia, sua humanidade no sentido mais pleno, enquanto satisfizer exclusivamente um destes impulsos ou os dois sucessivamente: pois, enquanto apenas sente, fica-lhe oculta a sua pessoa, sua existência absoluta, e, enquanto apenas pensa, vela-se a sua existência no tempo, seu estado. Existissem casos em que ele fizesse a um só tempo esta dupla experiência, em que fosse consciente de sua liberdade e sentisse a sua existência, em que se percebesse como matéria e se conhecesse como espírito, nestes casos e só nestes ele teria uma intuição plena de sua humanidade, e o objeto que lhe proporcionasse esta intuição viria a ser um símbolo da sua meta explicitada (visto que esta é apenas alcançável na totalidade do tempo) e, assim, uma representação do infinito. 652 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 652 sChiLLer • CArtAs sobre A eduCAção estétiCA dA humAnidAde Pressuposto que tais casos sejam possíveis na experiência, despertariam nele um novo impulso, chamado novo com justiça, pois que, incluindo a harmonia dos dois interiores, é diverso de cada qual tomado isoladamente. O impulso sensível quer que haja modificação, que o tempo tenha conteúdo; o impulso formal quer o tempo negado, para que não haja modificação. O impulso em que os dois se conjugam (seja me permitido chamá-lo impulso lúdico até que justifique a denominação), o impulso lúdico, portanto, aspira a superar o tempo no tempo e combinar ao ser absoluto o devir, a modificação à identidade. O impulso sensível quer ser determinado, quer receber o seu objeto; o impulso formal quer determinar, quer engendrar o seu objeto; o impulso lúdico, então, aspira a receber assim como teria engendrado e engendrar assim como o sentido aspira a receber. O impulso sensível exclui de seu sujeito qualquer espontaneidade e liberdade; o impulso formal exclui do seu toda dependência e passividade. A exclusão da liberdade é necessidade física, a da passividade é necessidade moral. Os dois impulsos impõem necessidade ao espírito: aquele por leis físicas, este por leis da razão. O impulso lúdico, entretanto, em que os dois se conjugam, irá regrar o espírito física e moralmente a um só tempo; pela superação da contingência ele irá superar, portanto, qualquer necessidade, libertando o homem tanto moral como fisicamente. Quando cercamos de paixão quem mereça nosso desprezo, sentimos penosamente a necessidade natural. Quando somos hostis a quem mereça nosso respeito, experimentamos penosamente a necessidade da razão. Tão logo, entretanto, ele interessa à nossa inclinação e conquista o nosso respeito, desaparecem tanto a coação do sentimento quanto a da razão e começamos a amá-lo, isto é, jogamos a um tempo com nossa inclinação e o nosso respeito. Enquanto o impulso sensível nos coage fisicamente e o formal moralmente, aquele deixa contingente a nossa disposição formal como este deixa a sensível; isto quer dizer que será casual a concordância entre nossa felicidade e a perfeição, ou a desta com aquela. O impulso lúdico, portanto, no qual ambas se conjugam, tornará contingentes tanto nossa disposição formal quanto a material, tanto nossa perfeição quanto nossa 653653 felicidade; justamente porque as faz contingentes e porque a contingência também desaparece com a necessidade, o impulso lúdico passará a superar a contingência nas duas, dando forma à matéria, e realidade à forma. Na mesma medida em que toma às sensações e aos afetos a influência dinâmica, fará que se ajustem às ideias da razão, e na medida em que despe as leis da razão de sua imposição moral, irá conciliá-Ias ao interesse dos sentidos. Carta XV Aproximo-me cada vez mais do alvo a que vos conduzo por trilhas pouco animadoras. Permiti que eu siga por mais alguns passos, a fim de que a vista de um horizonte mais livre possa, talvez, compensar as penas da caminhada. O objeto do impulso sensível, expresso num conceito geral, chamase vida em seu significado mais amplo; um conceito que significa todo o ser material e toda a presença imediata nos sentidos. O objeto do impulso formal, expresso por um conceito geral, é a forma (figura), tanto em seu significado próprio como metafórico; um conceito que compreende todas as disposições formais dos objetos e todas as suas relações com as forças do pensamento. O objeto do impulso lúdico, representado num esquema geral, é a forma (figura) viva; um conceito que denomina todas as disposições dos fenômenos, tudo que entendemos no mais amplo sentido por beleza4. 4 O termo alemão aqui traduzido por forma (ou figura) é "Gestalt", hoje internacionalmente conhecido em virtude da psicologia estrutural ou "gestáltica" (Wertheimer, Koehler, Koffka), muitas vezes traduzido por estrutura ou configuração. Empregado na linguagem corrente principalmente para denotar formas, estruturas ou figuras espaciais, é aplicado na psicologia moderna também a estruturas musicais e pela sociologia e antropologia a configurações sociais ou culturais. Geralmente designa formas cujas partes são determinadas pelo todo, sistemas cujas qualidades essenciais não podem ser concebidas como a soma de partes e sim como totalidade, visto que, além das partes, exercem função importante as relações dinâmicas entre as partes (qualidades "gestálticas"). As partes, portanto, são entendíveis somente a partir do todo. Assim, uma melodia não é a soma dos vários sons e sim um todo unido que permanece o mesmo quando a melodia é transposta para outra altura de som e tocada por outros instrumentos: neste caso, nenhum dos sons individuais é o mesmo; contudo, desde que as relações entre os sons não tenham passado por modificações, podemos dizer que se trata da mesma melodia. 654 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 654 sChiLLer • CArtAs sobre A eduCAção estétiCA dA humAnidAde Esta explicação, caso o fosse, não estenderia a beleza por sobre todo o domínio do que é vivo nem a prenderia nele. Um bloco de mármore, embora inerte, mesmo assim pode tornar-se forma viva através do arquiteto e do escultor; um homem, conquanto viva e tenha forma, nem por isso é uma forma viva. Para isto seria necessário que sua figura fosse vida e sua vida fosse figura. Enquanto apenas pensamos sua figura, ela é inerte, mera abstração; enquanto apenas sentimos sua vida, ela é informe, simples impressão. Somente quando sua forma vive em nossa sensação e sua vida se forma em nosso entendimento ele é configuração viva, e isto será sempre o caso quando o julgarmos belo. Embora saibamos apontar as partes de cuja união nasce a beleza, a gênese desta ainda não está explicada; pois seria necessário, para isto, compreender a própria unificação, a qual é indevassável para nós como toda a reciprocidade entre o finito e o infinito. A razão, por motivos transcendentais, coloca a exigência: é necessário que haja uma comunidade entre impulso formal e material, isto é, um impulso lúdico, pois que apenas a união de realidade e forma, de contingência e necessidade, de passividade e liberdade, completa o conceito de humanidade. Ela põe necessariamente esta exigência, pois que é razão; pois que aspira, conforme a sua essência, à perfeição e à supressão de todos os limites, enquanto que a atividade exclusiva de um ou outro impulso deixa imperfeita a natureza humana, fundando nela mesma uma limitação. Logo, pois, que pronuncia: deve existir uma humanidade, ela põe, por este ato mesmo, uma lei: deve existir uma beleza. A experiência pode responder-nos se existe uma beleza, e saberemos isso, tão logo ela nos ensine se existe uma humanidade. Como, entretanto, a beleza pode ser e como é possível uma humanidade, isto nem razão nem experiência podem ensinar-nos. O homem, sabemos, não é exclusivamente matéria nem apenas espírito. A beleza, portanto, consumação de sua humanidade, não pode ser exclusiva e meramente vida, como quiseram observadores argutos que se ativeram com excesso ao testemunho da experiência, solicitados pelo gosto do tempo: nem pode ser mera figura, como julgaram sábios especulativos, demasiado distantes da experiência, e artistas filósofos, que se deixaram conduzir em excesso pelas exigências da arte para explicá655655 Ia:5* ela é o objeto comum de ambos os impulsos, e, portanto, do impulso lúdico. Este nome é plenamente justificado pela linguagem corrente, que costuma chamar de jogo tudo aquilo que, não sendo subjetiva nem objetivamente contingente, ainda assim não tem necessidade interior nem exterior. Se o espírito encontra, ao intuir o belo, um feliz compromisso entre a lei e a necessidade, é por repartir-se entre os dois, furtando-se ao império de um e de outro. As reivindicações do impulso material como as do impulso formal têm validez e seriedade plenas, pois que, no conhecimento, um se refere à realidade das coisas e o outro, à sua necessidade; pois que, na ação, o primeiro visa a manutenção da vida e o segundo, a da dignidade, visando os dois, portanto, a verdade e a perfeição. A vida, porém, torna-se menos importante quando interfere a dignidade, e o dever deixa de ser forçoso quando auxiliado pela inclinação; também o espírito aceita com mais liberdade e calma a realidade das coisas, a verdade material, tão logo esta se aproxime da verdade formal, da lei da necessidade; distende a abstração logo que esta pode ser acompanhada pela intuição imediata. Em poucas palavras: quando entra em comunhão com as ideias, o real perde a seriedade por tornar-se pequeno, assim como a lei perde a sua, por tornar-se leve, ao coincidir com a sensação. Contudo, não será rebaixado o belo – estareis tentado já de há muito a retrucar-me – quando é tornado em mero jogo, não será igualado aos frívolos objetos que sempre estiveram de posse deste nome? Reduzir a mero jogo a beleza, quando a vemos como instrumento de cultura, não será contradizer-lhe o conceito racional e a dignidade – e não será contraditório reduzir à beleza o jogo, do qual a experiência nos ensina que pode subsistir com exclusão de todo o gosto? O que significa, entretanto, dizer "mero jogo", quando sabemos que é o jogo e somente ele, dentre os vários estados do homem que permite o desdobramento simultâneo e completo da dupla natureza humana? O 5 * Burke, em suas "Investigações Filosóficas sobre a Origem de Nossos Conceitos do Sublime e do Belo", faz da beleza mera vida. Fazem dela mera figura, na medida em que os conheço, todos os adeptos do sistema dogmático que já se tenham manifestado sobre o assunto: entre os artistas, para não citar muitos, lembro apenas Raphael Mengs, em suas reflexões sobre o gosto na pintura. Como em todo o mais, também aqui a filosofia crítica abriu caminho para fazer que a empírica repouse em princípios e a especulação na experiência. 656 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 656 sChiLLer • CArtAs sobre A eduCAção estétiCA dA humAnidAde que chamais limitação de acordo com vossa maneira de ver o problema, segundo a minha, que justifiquei por provas, chamo enriquecimento. Eu diria, pois, o inverso: o agradável, o bem, a perfeição, o homem os encara apenas com seriedade; com a beleza, entretanto, ele joga. Não devemos, é óbvio, lembrar os jogos da vida real, geralmente voltados para objetos muito materiais; na vida real, entretanto, procuraríamos também em vão a beleza de que falamos aqui. A beleza realmente existente é digna do impulso lúdico real; pelo ideal de beleza, todavia, que a razão postula, é dado também um ideal de impulso lúdico, o qual o homem deve ter presente em todos os seus jogos. Não erra quem busca o ideal de beleza do homem no caminho em que ele costuma satisfazer o impulso lúdico. Quando os gregos, em seus jogos de Olímpia, apreciam os combates sem sangue da força, da velocidade, da flexibilidade, as disputas entre nobres talentos, e quando o povo romano goza a agonia mortal do gladiador vencido ou de seu adversário líbio, torna-se evidente, nestes mesmos traços, por que se encontram na Grécia e não em Roma as figuras ideais de Vênus, Juno ou ApoIo.6* A razão, entretanto, diz: o belo não deve ser mera vida ou mera figura, mas figura viva, isto é, deve ser beleza na medida em que dita ao homem a dupla lei da formalidade e realidade absolutas. Implícita está a afirmação de que o homem deve somente jogar com a beleza, e de que somente com a beleza ele deve jogar. Pois, para tudo sintetizarmos, o homem joga somente quando é homem no pleno sentido da palavra, e somente é homem pleno quando joga.7 Esta afirmação, que há de parecer 6 * Quando comparamos (para ficar no mundo recente) as corridas londrinas, as touradas madrilenas, os espetáculos na Paris de outrora, as corridas de gôndola em Veneza, as caçadas em Viena e a bela vida alegre no corso em Roma, não poderá ser difícil distinguir o gosto desses povos modernos. Entre os jogos populares desses diversos países, porém, a uniformidade é muito menor que a reinante no grande mundo, o que é fácil de explicar. 7 Esta frase é uma das mais conhecidas de toda a obra de Schiller. Ela proclama que só no estado estético o homem atinge sua plenitude, a integração de todas as suas virtualidades. É no estado lúdico, no estado "desinteressado" ou "desinteresseiro" (isto é, sem interesse na existência material do objeto), segundo a expressão de Kant, que o homem supera as dilacerações da vida interessada. Tal tese baseia-se na teoria de Kant de que o prazer estético se baseia no livre jogo das nossas funções mentais, em face do objeto belo, e na harmonia lúdica das nossas capacidades de imaginação e entendimento. 657657 paradoxal neste momento, irá ganhar um grande e profundo significado quando chegarmos a relacioná-Ia à dupla seriedade do dever e do destino; suportará, prometo-vos, o edifício inteiro da arte estética e da bem mais dificultosa arte de viver. Esta afirmação, contudo, é inesperada somente na ciência; já que há muito vivia e atuava na arte e no sentimento de seus maiores mestres, os gregos; estes, porém, transpunham para o Olimpo o que deveria ser realizado na terra. Conduzidos pela verdade desta afirmação, fizeram que desaparecesse da fronte dos deuses tanto a seriedade e o trabalho que vincam a face dos mortais quanto o gozo iníquo que lhes alisa a face vazia; libertaram os perenemente satisfeitos das peias de qualquer finalidade, dever ou preocupação, mostrando no ócio e na serenidade o invejável destino do estamento divino: um nome apenas mais humano para a existência mais livre e mais sublime. Tanto a coação material das leis naturais quanto o imperativo espiritual da lei moral perdiam-se em seu conceito mais alto da necessidade, que abraça os dois mundos a um só tempo; da união daquelas duas necessidades nascia-lhes a verdadeira liberdade. Animados por esse espírito, fizeram desaparecer juntamente com os desejos as marcas da vontade, ou melhor, tornaram irreconhecíveis os dois na face de seu ideal, pois que souberam ligá-Ios na mais íntima união. Não é graça nem dignidade o que nos sugere a soberba face de uma Juno Ludovisi; nenhum dos dois por ser os dois ao mesmo tempo. Embora a divindade mulheril exija nossa adoração, a mulher divina incendeia nosso amor; e na medida em que nos rendemos à candura celestial, somos também repelidos por sua suficiência inatingível. A figura repousa e habita em si mesma, criação integralmente cerrada, não cede nem resiste, como se estivesse para além do espaço. Não há força, aí, que lute contra forças, nem carência em que pudesse irromper o tempo. Irresistivelmente seduzidos por um, mantidos à distância por outro, encontramo-nos em estado simultâneo de repouso e movimento máximos, surgindo aquela maravilhosa comoção para a qual o entendimento não tem conceito e a linguagem não tem nome.8 8 Schiller revela aqui uma profunda intuição da essência do estado estético: intensa empatia com o objeto estético e, ao mesmo tempo, a manutenção da distância em face dele. Esta atitude ao mesmo tempo emotiva e contemplativa, de entrega e de retrocesso, na apreciação da obra de arte, é confirmada pela atual pesquisa fenomenológica. tomás de Aquino e o pensAmento poLítiCo medievAL658 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 658 659659 A vida O mundo medieval era formado por três tipos de pessoas: os nobres, que dedicavam suas vidas aos combates, os servos, que trabalhavam a terra, e os religiosos, que se dedicavam à vida espiritual. TOmáS DE AQuINO é certamente um homem desse tempo. Nasceu por volta do ano 1225 na cidade de Aquino, Itália. Filho de nobres, aos cinco anos foi mandado pelo pai para servir a ordem religiosa dos beneditinos em Monte Cassino, pois seu pai tinha a expectativa de vê-lo abade. Mas esses planos foram frustrados quando Tomás, estudante na Universidade de Nápoles, ingressa na ordem dos dominicanos. Para fazê-lo mudar de ideia, sua família raptou-o, prendendo-o durante um ano. Conta-se que uma prostituta foi contratada para fazer com que o jovem quebrasse seus votos de castidade, mas Tomás teria-a expulsado e permanecido fiel à fé. A família acabou por permitir que ele seguisse seu caminho. Voltando aos dominicanos, foi estudar junto a Alberto Magno em Paris e Colônia. Em 1256, recebeu o título de Mestre da Universidade de Paris e tornouse professor. Lecionou em Paris, Nápoles, Orvieto, Roma e Viterbo. Em 1273, sofreu um ataque que o impediu de continuar a escrever. Poucos tOMÁS De AQuINO e O peNSAMeNtO pOLÍtICO MeDIeVAL tomás de Aquino e o pensAmento poLítiCo medievAL660 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 660 meses depois, em 7 de março de 1274, morre a caminho do Consílio de Lyon, provavelmente como resultado da doença ou de uma queda do cavalo em que viajava (sinal já de fraqueza, pois os dominicanos eram normalmente proibidos de viajar a cavalo) após ter batido a cabeça em um galho de árvore. Em virtude de seu processo de canonização, chegaram-nos diversas histórias a seu respeito. Por exemplo, conta-se que Tomás era um homem muito grande e belo a tal ponto que, quando viajava a pé entre as diversas cidades em que morou, a população dos campos corria para admirá-lo. Por seu tamanho e por ser uma pessoa quieta, foi apelidado por seus colegas de "boi mudo da Sicília". Tomás teve cinco irmãs. A primeira tornou-se abadessa. As outras três casaram-se com nobres. A quinta morreu bastante nova, fulminada por um raio enquanto dormia. Diz-se que Tomás estava dormindo a seu lado, mas escapou ileso. A reputação de Tomás não causou sempre unanimidade. Suas teses foram atacadas e parece inclusive que um processo de condenação de suas teorias teria sido iniciado em 1277, mas interrompido em virtude da eleição de um novo papa e da forte reação política de seus confrades e alunos. Em 1323, foi considerado Santo pela Igreja Católica e, a partir de 1557, passou a ser designado Doutor Angélico e considerado a maior autoridade da teologia católica. A obra A obra de Tomás de Aquino é típica de um professor universitário medieval. Portanto, antes de abordá-la, lembremos alguns aspectos dessa instituição surgida durante a Idade Média. De início, por volta de 1150, a universidade consistia em um conjunto de colégios, normalmente fundados por professores que detinham autoridade sobre eles. Em alguns casos, eram os alunos que se reuniam, formavam o colégio e contratavam os professores. Em sua acepção original, o termo latino universitas significa a "corporação ou associação" de colégios. No início do século XIII, diversos conflitos surgem e levam o papa Gregório IX, em 1231, a estabelecer regras para o funcionamento das universidades, como alguns privilégios para os estudantes, mas também a obrigatoriedade de não portarem armas. As universidades medievais não eram apenas estabele661661 cimentos de ensino superior, podendo às vezes incluir o ensino primário e secundário. A duração variava, mas normalmente era necessário, em um primeiro momento, cursar a Faculdade de Artes (dos 14 aos 20 anos de idade). O percurso terminava em um dos três ramos: medicina, direito e teologia. As principais universidades do século XIII são Montpellier (medicina), Bolonha (direito) e Paris e Oxford (teologia). Durante seu percurso na Faculdade de Artes, o aluno estudava basicamente as ciências de origem greco-árabe, como as matemáticas, a física e a lógica. As obras de Aristóteles, redescobertas e traduzidas do grego desde a segunda metade do século XII, eram o núcleo desses estudos, a despeito de terem sido diversas vezes proibidas, sem que professores e alunos levassem as interdições muito a sério. Na Faculdade de Teologia, na qual Tomás completou sua formação, os estudos centravamse no comentário da Bíblia, obra sagrada que continha uma explicação para origem do mundo e diversas regras morais que os cristãos deveriam obedecer para alcançarem a salvação. Se olharmos para os escritos de Tomás de Aquino, veremos que eles se dividem em vários grupos. Comentários, ou explicações linha a linha das obras de Aristóteles (Física, Metafísica, obras lógicas etc.), comentários aos livros da Bíblia e opúsculos. Assim, as obras do primeiro grupo ligavam-se a temas tratados na Faculdade de Artes, as do segundo pertenciam à Faculdade de Teologia, enquanto as do terceiro eram escritos polêmicos ou destinados a um público específico. O texto que iremos ler é precisamente um excerto de um opúsculo dedicado ao Rei da ilha de Chipre. Durante a terceira cruzada, o rei inglês Ricardo Coração de Leão conquistou a ilha e a entregou a ordem dos Templários que a vendeu. Em 1247, o papa concede dignidade especial ao reino de Chipre. Seu rei, Henrique I, morre em 1253, sendo sucedido por seu filho, Hugo II, morto em 1267. A obra é provavelmente dedicada ao jovem Hugo II. Todavia, a morte prematura do novo rei faz com que Tomás interrompa o escrito sem nunca o completar, pois esse parece ter perdido seu principal destinatário. As principais teses Durante a Idade Média, eram comuns obras que se intitulavam tomás de Aquino e o pensAmento poLítiCo medievAL662 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 662 "Espelhos dos Príncipes", ou seja, que continham conselhos e preceitos morais destinados a mostrar o caminho a ser seguindo por um rei para bem governar. Como o nome indica, a obra era um espelho no qual se achava refletida a imagem de um rei perfeito. O opúsculo A realeza de Tomás de Aquino pode ser colocado nessa tradição literária que surge no mundo antigo e que perdurará até o período moderno. O escrito de Tomás é, portanto, uma obra pedagógica de cunho moral cuja função é servir de auxílio à educação de um novo rei. Mas para que o rei entenda como deve ser a sua formação, ele precisa compreender, primeiramente, por que ele reina e quais são os deveres que ele possui. Em outras palavras, como o próprio Tomás faz questão de sublinhar, o rei deve entender "a origem da realeza e as coisas que pertencem ao ofício do rei". Para explicá-las, Tomás empregará três tipos de argumentos, citando constantemente "a autoridade da divina Escritura, os ensinamentos dos filósofos e os exemplos dos príncipes mais dignos de louvor". É fácil entender por que Tomás age assim. Em primeiro lugar, dada a imensa força da religião cristã durante a Idade Média, fazia todo sentido justificar a origem da autoridade entre os homens como baseada na Bíblia e nos ensinamentos cristãos. O rei que pensasse ter sido o seu poder conferido por Deus, certamente acrediaria também que ele deve governar como um bom servidor de Cristo. Por essa razão, encontraremos no opúsculo diversas citações da Bíblia que iremos identificar. Em segundo lugar, Tomás faz referência aos filósofos, sobretudo a Aristóteles. De fato, as obras do filósofo grego, acompanhadas de seus intérpretes árabes e judeus, continham as bases de todo conhecimento científico da época. Apelar a Aristóteles significava, portanto, justificar racionalmente a autoridade do rei e apresentar as razões pelas quais é necessário que o rei governe de um certo modo e não de outro. Em terceiro lugar, Tomás faz referência aos príncipes mais dignos de louvor. Isso aparece no opúsculo quando o autor cita eventos da história de Roma, o que é perfeitamente explicável pela grandeza memorável do Império Romano, mas também pelo fato desse mesmo império ter-se esfacelado em virtude de não ter, segundo acreditavam os medievais, respeitado certas regras morais de conduta, justamente as regras que o bom rei cristão deveria obedecer. As citações de eventos da história romana são também um traço constante no pensamento político medieval que perdurará até o período moderno. 663663 As perguntas filosóficas que Tomás de Aquino pretende responder nesse opúsculo são as seguintes: 1) qual a origem da autoridade entre os seres humanos? e 2) como ela deve ser exercida por aquele que a detém? A primeira pergunta indaga se nós, enquanto seres humanos, precisamos de alguém que nos governe. Trata-se de saber, portanto, se não poderíamos viver isoladamente sem reconhecer a autoridade e o poder de ninguém superior a nós. A segunda pergunta é posterior à primeira uma vez que, supondo a demonstração prévia da necessidade da autoridade, questiona os limites de seu poder e formas para o seu correto exercício. A resposta à primeira questão tem por ponto de partida uma análise da condição natural humana. Tomás aceita que somos seres que, como todos os animais, necessitam de coisas ou bens para viver. O que nos diferencia dos demais animais é o fato de usarmos a racionalidade para a obtenção desses bens. Agimos guiados pela razão, ou seja, criamos planos e projetos para alcançar o que buscamos e os realizamos ao longo de nossas vidas. Mesmo assim, afirma Tomás, há um limite para o que podemos isoladamente alcançar. Se agirmos apenas de maneira solitária, os bens que produziremos não serão suficientes para vivermos. Necessitamos, portanto, de outras pessoas para viver, pois é com o auxílio delas que obtemos o que precisamos para bem viver. Observe-se que não se trata apenas de viver no sentido de sobreviver. O importante é o bem viver, ou seja, o desesenvolvimento de nossos talentos e capacidades pessoais pelos quais nos realizamos e alcançamos nossa felicidade. Para Tomás, o fato de que somos seres que falam é uma evidência do caráter social humano. Através do uso da linguagem, transmitimos aos demais informações sobre nós mesmos, sobre nossos sentimentos e necessidades, descrevemos como o mundo é e elaboramos, trocando informações, projetos comuns que podem ser executados em grupo. A linguagem é o meio de comunicação que nos permite agir coletivamente e, assim, alcançar o que não teríamos sozinhos. Dito de outro modo, a cooperação é um traço fundamental para o ser humano que o leva a viver em coletividade. A sociedade é um complexo sistema de cooperação no qual o trabalho de cada um poderá reverter para o bem de todos. Tomás exprime essa tese ao afirmar que somos naturalmente animais sociais e políticos. Somos, por natureza, seres que vivem em grupo e cooperam, tomás de Aquino e o pensAmento poLítiCo medievAL664 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 664 precisando, para isso, de regras que regulem a vida social. Toda cooperação exige regras, pois, para que ela funcione, é preciso que a tarefa que cada um executa seja bem definida. Mas quem estabelece essas regras? Justamente a figura da autoridade. A autoridade surge como a instância de regulação da cooperação social. Ela estabelecerá as regras do convívio e atuará de modo a que o resultado da cooperação seja a possibilidade de que cada um alcance o bem que busca, ou seja, a boa vida ou a felicidade. E assim como o indivíduo age em busca de um fim, o seu próprio bem, também a sociedade trabalha para a obtenção de um fim, o bem comum. Em suma, a autoridade surge para regrar a cooperação social, proporcionar que a sociedade funcione corretamente, produzindo o bem comum, e abrir a possibilidade da realização pessoal. Ao falarmos de cooperação, convém deixar claro que Tomás não desconhece o fenômeno da violência ou de que alguns seres humanos procuram tirar vantagem dos outros. Ao contrário, a violência, segundo ele, existe e deve ser controlada, pois é o principal fator de desregramento social. A violência afasta as pessoas e gera facções que competem e não mais cooperam. A violência é, portanto, uma das principais causas de esfacelamento dos laços sociais de tal modo que um dos principais objetivos da autoridade deve ser a sua eliminação e a busca da paz social. A resposta à segunda questão levantada acima depende de que reconheçamos que uma sociedade (no caso medieval, uma cidade ou reino) tem por objetivo o bem comum, alcançado pela cooperação e convivência pacífica dos seus membros. Ora, o fundamental é que o bem comum seja desfrutado por todos. Sendo assim, é possível conceber dois tipos de regimes ou modos de exercício da autoridade: aqueles regimes que se preocupam em efetivamente realizar o bem comum e aqueles em que os governantes desviam para si o bem comum, tomando para si o produto da cooperação social. Os regimes do primeiro tipo serão considerados boas formas de governo. Os do segundo, formas corrompidas. Podemos ainda supor que a autoridade (tanto a boa quanto a corrompida) seja exercida por uma pessoa, por poucas ou por muitas. O resultado são seis formas de governo que Aristóteles, em sua Política, classificou do seguinte modo: realeza, aristocracia, politia, democracia, plutocracia e tirania. Segundo Tomás, a realeza é a concentração da autoridade nas mãos de 665665 um só, mas de modo que o bem comum seja alcançado. Essa seria, como vemos ao ler o opúsculo, a melhor forma de governo, opondo-se diretamente à pior, ou seja à tirania. Assim, o objetivo da obra será ensinar ao rei como ele deve agir para, buscando o bem comum, evitar tornar-se um tirano. Todavia, caso isso ocorra, é possível destituí-lo do poder. Para Tomás, essa seria uma tarefa a ser executada não por uma única pessoa, mas pela coletividade, pois é ela que está na origem do surgimento da autoridade. O bom rei, ou o bom governante, é, portanto, aquele que age procurando o bem comum da coletividade e fazendo com que seus membros cooperem. Como já dissemos, Tomás de Aquino não terminou o opúsculo. Ele foi completado por seus discípulos. Leremos abaixo apenas partes do Livro I e o início do Livro II, escritos pelo próprio Tomás. Sugestões de Leitura: PrinciPais obras de tomás de aquino traduzidas Para o Português AQUINO, Tomás de. O ente e a essência; Questões discutidas sobre a verdade; Súmula conbtra os gentios; Compêndio de Teologia; Súmula Teológica (seleção). São Paulo: Nova Cultural, 1988. obra sobre tomás de aquino (em Português) TORRELL, J-P. Iniciação a Santo Tomás de Aquino: Sua pessoa e obra. 2. ed. São Paulo: Loyola, 2004. Para uma introdução geral à filosofia medieval: DE LIBERA, A. A Filosofia Medieval. São Paulo: Loyola, 2004. DE LIBERA, A. Pensar a Idade Média. São Paulo: Editora 34, 1999. site: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ Este site contém todas as obras de Tomás de Aquino em suas principais edições. http://www.abelard.paris-sorbonne.fr/ Site de referência com diversos links para obras e pensadores medievais, eventos internacionais e ampla bibliografia. 666 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 666 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre A ReALeZA: DeDICADO AO REI dE cHIPRE 1 prólogo Pensando em que poderia oferecer que fosse digno de vossa Alteza Real e condizente com minha profissão e ofício, pareceu-me que o mais apropriado que eu poderia oferecer a um rei seria escrever-lhe um livro no qual apresentasse cuidadosamente a origem da realeza e as coisas que pertencem ao ofício de rei, segundo a autoridade da divina Escritura, os ensinamentos dos filósofos e os exemplos dos príncipes mais dignos de louvor, valendo-me de minha inteligência e confiando, para o início, o progresso e a execução dessa obra, naquele que é o Rei dos reis, Senhor dos senhores e pelo qual os reis governam: Deus, grande Senhor e Rei supremo de todos os reis. 1 A tradução foi feita a partir do texto latino: Sancti Thomae de Aquino, De regno ad regem Cypri. Disponível em: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/. Este site contém todas as obras de Tomás de Aquino em suas principais edições. Para a tradução inglesa do De Regno, consulte-se: AQUINAS, T. On kingship, to the King of Cyprus. Translation by Gerald B. Phelan. Rev. with introd. and notes by I. Th. Eschmann. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949. 667667 Livro I Capítulo 1: O significado da palavra rei Começemos nosso propósito apresentando o que se deve entender pela palavra rei. Com efeito, em todas as coisas que se ordenam a um fim que pode ser alcançado de diversos modos, faz-se necessário algum dirigente para que se possa alcançar o fim do modo mais direto. Por exemplo, um navio, que se move em diversas direções pelo impulso de ventos opostos, não chegará ao seu fim de destino se não for dirigido ao porto pela habilidade do comandante. Ora, o ser humano possui um fim para o qual estão ordenadas toda a sua vida e ações, pois ele age pelo intelecto o qual opera manifestamente em busca de um fim. Os seres humanos usam, contudo, diversos modos para alcançar um fim proposto, como o mostra a diversidade das ações e propósitos humanos. Sendo assim, eles precisam de um dirigente que os guie para o fim. Todo ser humano possui naturalmente em si a luz da razão que o dirige em suas ações para um fim. Assim, se ele pudesse viver solitariamente, como ocorre com muitos animais, não precisaria de um dirigente que o guiasse. Cada um seria um rei para si mesmo, abaixo de Deus, Rei supremo, uma vez que dirigiria a si mesmo em seus atos através da luz da razão que lhe foi concedida pela divindade. Todavia, mais do que para qualquer outro animal, é natural para o ser humano ser um animal social e político, ou seja, viver junto a muitos, como o demonstra a necessidade natural. Com efeito, no caso dos demais animais, a natureza preparou-lhes a comida; como vestimento, proveu-os de pelos; para sua defesa, doutou-os de dentes, chifres, unhas ou ao menos de velocidade para fuga. Mas a natureza não doutou o ser humano dessas coisas. Ao invés disso, foi-lhe dada a razão que o habilita a preparar tudo isso com suas mãos. Porém, como um único ser humano não é suficiente para fazer todas essas coisas, então um ser humano sozinho não pode levar, de maneira suficiente, sua vida. Logo, é natural ao ser humano que ele viva em sociedade junto a muitos. Além disso, os demais animais possuem de forma inata a capacidade para discernir naturalmente o que lhes é útil ou nocivo, tal como 668 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 668 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre a ovelha considera naturalmente que o lobo é um inimigo. Alguns animais conhecem, por uma capacidade natural, certas ervas medicinais e outras coisas necessárias a suas vidas. Já o ser humano possui apenas um conhecimento natural e geral das coisas necessárias a sua vida, na medida em que pode alcançar o conhecimento das coisas singulares raciocinando a partir de princípios naturais. Não é possível, porém, que um único ser humano alcance, por meio de sua razão, o conhecimento de tudo isso. Faz-se, portanto, necessário que ele viva junto a outros e que se ajudem mutuamente, alguns ocupando-se da descoberta de certas coisas e outros de outras. Por exemplo, alguns devem dedicar-se à medicina, outros à alguma outra disciplina e assim por diante. Isso torna-se ainda mais evidente por ser próprio ao ser humano o uso da linguagem pela qual alguém pode comunicar completamente suas concepções a outrem. Já os demais animais exprimem seus sentimentos aos outros apenas de modo geral, como o cachorro exprime sua ira latindo e outros animais o fazem ainda de diversos modos. O ser humano é o mais comunicativo dos animais que vivem em grupo, como o grou, a formiga e a abelha. Foi considerando isso que Salomão afirmou: "É melhor ser dois que um, pois possuem assim a vantagem da mútua companhia" 2. Se é, portanto, natural ao ser humano viver em sociedade junto a muitos, é necessário haver entre eles alguém pelo qual a coletividade seja governada. Com efeito, se houvesse uma coletividade de seres humanos, cada qual preocupado com seu próprio interessse, essa coletividade dispersar-se-ia em diversas partes, a não ser que houvesse alguém preocupado com aquilo que pertence ao bem dela. Da mesma maneira, o corpo do ser humano ou de qualquer outro animal desmembrar-se-ia caso não houvesse uma força retora comum presente nele e que rege o bem comum dos membros. Ao considerar isso, Salomão afirmou: "Onde não há governante, o povo dissipa-se" 3. De fato, é razoável que isso ocorra, pois, o que é próprio a um, não é o mesmo que aquilo que é comum a muitos. Quanto ao que é próprio, as coisas são separadas, mas quanto ao que é comum, elas são unidas. E 2 Eclesiastes IV, 9. 3 Provérbios IV, 14. 669669 como a efeitos diferentes correspodem causas diferentes, além daquilo que move para o bem próprio de cada um, deve existir algo que mova para o bem comum da coletividade. Ora, em todas as coisas que são ordenadas para um fim, há algo outro que as direciona para o fim. Isso ocorre no universo dos corpos onde o primeiro, a saber, o corpo celeste, dirige os demais por ordem da Providência divina e todos os corpos são dirigidos pela criatura racional. No caso do ser humano, a alma dirige o corpo e, entre as partes da alma, a irascível e a concupiscível são dirigidas pela razão. O mesmo ocorre entre os membros do corpo: um é sempre o principal e dirige a todos, como o coração ou a cabeça. Em toda coletividade, deve haver, portanto, algo que é dirigente. Nas coisas que são ordenadas a um fim, pode ocorrer que algumas sejam de modo correto e outras não. Portanto, também no governo da coletividade, pode ocorrer o correto e o incorreto. Algo é dirigido corretamente quando está ordenado ao fim que lhe é apropriado e incorretamente quando dirigido ao fim que não lhe é apropriado. Ora, um é o fim apropriado à coletividade de homens livres, outro à de escravos, pois o livre existe para si mesmo enquanto o escravo existe para outro. Assim, se a multidão de homens livres é ordenada por um governante para o seu bem comum, o regime será correto e justo, conforme convém aos livres. Mas se o governo for ordenado não para o bem comum da coletividade e sim para o bem privado do governante, o regime será injusto e perverso. Por isso, o Senhor ameaça a tais governantes através de Ezequiel dizendo: "Ai dos pastores que alimentam a si mesmos (como que procurando apenas os seus interesses): acaso não devem ser os rebanhos alimentados pelos pastores?" 4 Os pastores devem buscar o bem do rebanho e os governantes o bem da coletividade sujeita a eles. Se o regime injusto possui um só governante que governa para seus próprios interesses e não em função do bem da coletividade, dá-selhe o nome de tirano, palavra derivada de "força"5, porque ele oprime 4 Ezequiel XXXIV, 2. 5 Tomás segue Isidoro de Sevilha (560-636 d.C.) que, em suas Etimologias (Livro IX, 3, 19), explica que, de início, não havia na Grécia antiga distinção entre tirania e realeza. Posteriormente, os gregos começam a denominar tiranos os reis que exerciam o poder pela força. 670 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 670 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre pela força em vez de governar pela justiça. Daí serem, entre os antigos, todos os homens com poder chamados de tiranos. Todavia, se o regime injusto não possuir apenas um governante, mas vários, ainda que poucos, chama-se oligarquia, ou seja, o principado de poucos, já que esses poucos, em virtude de suas riquezas, oprimem o povo e diferem do tirano apenas quanto ao número. Contudo, se o regime iníquo for exercido por muitos, denomina-se democracia, ou seja, poder do povo, e ocorre quando o populacho, pela força da multidão, oprime os ricos6. Nesse caso, a totalidade do povo será como que um único tirano. Devemos distinguir de modo semelhante os regimes justos. Se for uma coletividade que administra, chama-se o regime pelo nome genérico de politia, e ocorre, por exemplo, quando um grupo de guerreiros exerce o poder em uma cidade ou província. Se forem poucos, mas os virtuosos, o regime é chamado de aristocracia, ou seja, o melhor poder, ou o poder dos melhores, que, por essa razão, são ditos optimates. Se o governo justo pertence a um só, esse será propriamente chamado de rei. Por isso, o Senhor, por meio de Ezequiel, disse: "o meu servo Davi será rei sobre eles e será, de todos, o único pastor" 7. Do que foi dito, fica claro que pertence à noção de rei que ele é único, que governa e que é um pastor que busca o bem comum da coletividade e não o seu interesse próprio. Como o ser humano precisa viver em comunidade, pois permanecendo solitário ele não será suficiente para prover todas coisas necessárias a sua vida, segue-se que tão mais perfeita será a comunidade formada por muitos quanto mais suficiente ela o for para prover as necessidades da vida. Ora, existe uma certa suficiência para a vida em uma família, ou seja, quanto aos atos naturais de nutrição, de geração da prole e assim por diante. Existe ainda certa suficiência em uma rua8, a saber, quanto àquelas 6 Tomás segue a divisão proposta por Aristóteles no livro III da Política. O filósofo grego diferencia diversos tipos de democracia, mas a palavra não tem o significado que hoje lhe atribuímos. 7 Ezequiel XXVII, 24. 8 A classificação originária de Aristóteles apresenta três formas de sociedade: a família, a tribo e a cidade. Tomás substitui a tribo pela rua, pois na cidade medieval cada 671671 coisas que pertencem a uma atividade profissional. Na cidade, no entanto, que é a comunidade perfeita, tem-se a suficiência de todas as coisas necessárias à vida, mas mais ainda no caso de uma província, devido à necessidade de lutar em conjunto e do mútuo auxílio contra os inimigos. Assim, aquele que governa a comunidade perfeita, ou seja, a cidade ou a província, chama-se, por antonomásia, rei. Quem governa uma casa não se chama rei, mas páter-famílias, ainda que possua alguma semelhança com o rei, de modo que os reis são chamados às vezes de pais dos povos. Fica claro que rei é aquele que governa a coletividade de uma cidade ou província para o bem comum. Assim, Salomão afirma: "O rei impera sobre toda a terra a ele sujeita" 9. Capítulo 2: É mais proveitoso para a cidade ou província ser governada por um do que por muitos Após essas preliminares, devemos perguntar se é mais proveitoso para uma cidade ou província ser governada por um ou por muitos. Consideremos a pergunta primeiramente a partir do ponto de vista da finalidade do governo: o objetivo de todo governante deve ser o de garantir o bem estar daqueles a quem governa. Assim, é dever do comandante10 preservar o navio dos perigos do mar e conduzi-lo ileso ao porto seguro. O bem estar e a segurança de uma coletividade de consortes reside em conservar-lhes a unidade que chamamos paz. Se essa for removida, perece a utilidade da vida em sociedade, pois o desacordo da coletividade é algo oneroso a ela própria. Esse deve ser, portanto, o objetivo supremo buscado pelo governante de uma coletividade: procurar a unidade da paz. Ele não precisa deliberar sobre se deve ou não estabelecer a paz para a coletividade a ele sujeita, assim como o médico não delibera se deve ou não curar o doente a ele entregue. De fato, ninguém deve deliberar acerca do fim que deve alcançar, mas apenas acerca dos meios que conduzem ao profissão era exercidade em uma rua. Tinha-se, assim, a rua dos sapateiros, a rua dos açougueiros etc. Com esse exemplo, Tomás deixa claro como um pequeno grupo (rua) é dependente de um maior (cidade). 9 Eclesiastes V, 8. 10 O exemplo está de acordo com o sentido original do verbo latino guberno que significa conduzir um navio. Até hoje presevamos parcialmente esse sentido ao dizermos que um navio, ou mesmo um carro, está desgovernado. 672 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 672 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre fim. Por isso, após ter recomendado a unidade do povo de fé, o Apóstolo disse: "Sede atencioso em manter a unidade do espírito nos vínculos da paz."11 Portanto, quanto mais eficaz for um regime em conservar a unidade da paz, mais útil ele será, pois dizemos que é mais útil aquilo que melhor conduz a um fim. Ora, assim como a causa mais eficiente para esquentar é algo quente, assim também aquilo que é por si uno pode realizar mais eficazmente a unidade do que aquilo que é muitos. Por conseguinte, o regime de um só é mais eficiente que o de muitos. Além disso, é evidente que muitos não podem governar a coletividade se estiverem em total desacordo. Eles necessitam de alguma união para poderem, de certo modo, governar, do mesmo modo que muitos não conseguiriam conduzir um navio em uma direção a menos que se unissem de algum modo. Mas dizemos que ocorre a união de muitos quando eles se aproximam de um. Consequentemente, um só homem governa melhor que os muitos que se aproximam para fazer algo uno. Ademais, as coisas naturais são as melhor ordenadas, pois, em cada coisa, a natureza realiza o melhor. Ora, todo governo natural é governo de um só. Por exemplo, na multidão dos membros do corpo, existe um que é o principal motor: o coração; entre as partes da alma, uma faculdade opera como principal: a razão; entre as abelhas, há um só rei12 e, em todo universo, há um único Deus, criador e governante de todas as coisas. Ora, há uma razão para isso: toda coletividade deriva de uma unidade. Logo, se as coisas artificiais imitam as naturais (e é tão melhor o artefato quanto mais se assemelha ao que é natural), então necessariamente o melhor para uma coletividade de seres humanos é ser governada por um só. Isso também é evidente pela experiência. As províncias ou cidades que não são governadas por um só perdem-se em dissensões e agitam-se sem paz. Parece, assim, estar cumprida a queixa que o Senhor fez por intemédio do profeta dizendo: "Os muitos pastores destruíram minha 11 Filipenses IV, 3. 12 Para Aristóteles e para o senso comum antigo e medieval, as abelhas possuíam um rei e não uma rainha. 673673 vinha13". Ao contrário, as províncias e cidades governadas por um único rei desfrutam da paz, florescem na justiça e gozam de prosperidade. Por isso, o Senhor promete, por intemédio dos profetas, como grande recompensa a seu povo, dar-lhe um único chefe e que "um único príncipe estará entre eles14". Capítulo 3: O regime tirânico é o pior Se a realeza é o melhor regime, a tirania é o pior. A democracia opõe-se à politia e, como dissemos, ambas são regimes exercidos por muitos. A oligarquia opõe-se à aristocracia e ambas são exercidas por poucos. Já a realeza e a tirania são exercidas por uma única pessoa. Ora, já mostramos que a realeza é o melhor regime e como o melhor se opõe ao pior, segue-se necessariamente que a tirania é o pior regime. Ademais, uma força unida é mais eficaz para produção de um efeito do que uma força dispersa ou difusa. Muitas pessoas unidas podem empurrar um peso que separadas ou individualmente não poderiam empurrar. Portanto, assim como é mais útil que uma força operando para o bem esteja unida, pois ela será mais poderosa, da mesma forma uma força operando para o mal será mais nociva se for unida do que se for dividida. Ora, o poder de um chefe injusto orienta-se para o mal da coletividade, transferindo unicamente para si o bem comum da coletividade. Assim, no caso do regime justo, quanto mais o governo for unificado, mais ele será justo. A realeza é mais útil que a aristocracia e essa mais que a politia. No caso do regime injusto, ocorre o contrário: quanto mais o governo for unificado, mais ele será nocivo. A tirania é mais nociva que a oligarquia e essa mais que a democracia. Além disso, um regime é injusto quando o governante, desconsiderando o bem comum da coletividade, preocupa-se com o seu próprio bem. Por isso, quanto mais ele se afasta do bem comum de todos, mais o regime torna-se injusto. A oligarquia, que procura o bem de poucos, afasta-se mais do bem comum de todos que a democracia, a qual procura 13 Jeremias XII, 10. 14 Ezequiel XXXIV, 24. 674 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 674 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre o bem de muitos. Afasta-se ainda mais do bem comum no caso tirania, na qual se busca o bem de um só. Ora, um grande número está mais próximo da totalidade que um pequeno e esse mais próximo que a unidade. Portanto, o regime tirânico é o mais injusto. A mesma conclusão aparece claramente quando se considera a ordem da providência divina, a qual arranja todas as coisas do melhor modo. O bem é produzido nas coisas por uma causa perfeita, como que ajudada por todas as coisas que podem conduzir a ele. Já o mal tem origem em defeitos particulares. De fato, não existe beleza no corpo a não ser que todos os membros estejam apropriadamente dispostos. Já a feiura decorre do fato de algum membro não estar apropriadamente disposto. Sendo assim, a feiura resulta de diversos modos e de diferentes causas, ao passo que a beleza resulta de um só modo e de uma causa perfeita. O mesmo ocorre em todos os bens e males, como por providência divina, de tal forma que o bem é mais forte por possuir uma única causa e o mal mais fraco por possuir diversas causas. Resulta assim que o regime justo é o de uma única pessoa, pois assim poderá ser o regime mais forte. Entretanto, se a justiça faltar, então será melhor que esse regime seja o de muitas pessoas, pois ele será mais fraco e elas se obstruirão mutuamente. Logo, quando há injustiça, o regime mais tolerável é a democracia. O pior é a tirania. O mesmo ponto torna-se evidente para quem considera os males produzidos pelo tirano que, menosprezando o bem comum, busca o seu bem privado. Ocorre, assim, que ele oprimirá seus súditos de diferentes maneiras, sempre que for afetado por paixões que o levem a desejar certos bens. Ora, aquele que é tomado pela cobiça toma para si os bens de seus súditos. Por isso, disse Salomão: "O rei justo erguerá sua terra, o homem avaro destruir-la-á15" Caso ele seja subjugado pela paixão da ira, derramará sangue por nada, e assim diz Ezequiel: "Os seus príncipes são, em seu meio, como lobos na busca da presa para derramar sangue.16" Deve-se, portanto, evitar esse regime, como nos adverte o sábio dizendo: "Fica longe do homem que possui o poder de matar"17, pois ele não mata buscando 15 Provérbios XXIX, 4. 16 Ezequiel XXII, 27. 17 Eclesiastes IX, 18. 675675 a justiça. Age pela força e por desregramento da vontade. Não haverá assim segurança e todas as coisas serão incertas, pois afastou-se do direito. Não poderá haver estabilidade alguma, pois tudo dependerá da vontade de alguém, para não dizer de seus caprichos. Mas os súditos não serão oprimidos apenas em seus bens materiais, mas ainda em seus bens espirituais, porque os tiranos que desejam ter mais do que é preciso, impedem o progresso de seus súditos, pois consideram toda excelência desses como prejudiciais a sua injusta dominação. Os tiranos suspeitam mais do bem que do mal e a virtude dos súditos sempre lhes causa medo. Assim, esses tiranos esforçam-se para evitar que seus súditos tornem-se virtuosos ou adquiram a magnanimidade para que não combatam a injusta dominação. Esforçam-se ainda por impedir que se firmem laços de amizade entre os súditos e que desfrutem dos ganhos da paz recíproca, para que, não confiando uns nos outros, não possam nada fazer contra a dominação. Para tanto, semeiam a discórdia entre os súditos, alimentam as já existentes e proíbem tudo o que gere associações e cooperação entre os homens, como o casamento, a companhia à mesa e tudo o mais que produza familiaridade ou confiança entre eles. Os tiranos esforçam-se também para evitar que seus súditos tornem-se poderosos ou ricos, pois julgam-los segundo sua própria maldade. Assim como utilizam seu poder e força para prejudicar, temem que o poder e a força dos súditos lhes seja prejudicial. Por essa razão, lemos no livro de Jó o seguinte sobre o tirano: "O som do medo está sempre em seus ouvidos e quando há paz," ou seja, ninguém tentando algum mal contra ele, "sempre suspeita de traição" 18. Vemos também que, quando governantes, que deveriam conduzir seus súditos para a virtude, invejam de uma maneira vil a virtude dos súditos, impedindo que se desenvolvam, poucos virtuosos surgem sob seus governos. Ora, segundo a correta afirmação de Aristóteles, homens bravos surgem entre aqueles que valorizam a bravura. Também Cícero afirma: "em toda parte, aquilo que é menosprezado não se desenvolve e poucas vezes prospera19". Também é natural que as pessoas educadas sob o temor 18 Jó XV, 21. 19 Tusculanas I, 2, 4. 676 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 676 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre tornem-se servis e mostrem-se pusilânimes frente à toda tarefa que exija coragem e diligência. Isso é o que observamos nas províncias que foram governadas muito tempo por tiranos. Nesse sentido, diz o Apóstolo aos Colonisenses: "Pais, não provoqueis vossos filhos à indignação para que não se tornem pusilânimes" 20. Considerando esses efeitos nocivos da tirania, o rei Salomão afirmou: "O reinado dos ímpios arruina a todos" 21, pois os súditos são desviados da virtude pelo desregramento do tirano. Disse ainda: "Quando os ímpios governarem, o povo gemerá" 22, como que reduzidos à escravidão. E também: "Quando os ímpios levantarem-se, os homens esconder-se-ão" 23 para fugirem da crueldade dos tiranos. E isso não chega a surpreender, pois o ser humano sem a razão e governando pelo desejo de sua alma, em nada difere de uma besta. Por isso, Salomão afirma: "Um leão rugindo e um urso bramindo, tal é o príncipe injusto para com o pobre povo"24. Assim, os homens escondem-se dos tiranos como de bestas cruéis e parece ainda que ser súdito de um tirano é o mesmo que estar entregue a uma besta em fúria. Capítulo 4. Por que a dignidade real torna-se odiosa aos súditos. Como o melhor e o pior regime são formas de monarquia, ou seja, de governos de um único, muitos consideram odiosa a dignidade real em virtude dos males da tirania. Muitos, por desejarem ser governados por um rei, acabam a mercê da crueldade do tirano e não raros exercem a tirania sob o pretexto da dignidade real. Exemplo disso ocorreu claramente na república romana. Quando não podia mais suportar a ostentação real, ou melhor, tirânica, o povo expulsou os reis e instituiu para si cônsules e magistrados pelos quais começou a reger-se e a governar-se, querendo assim transformar a realeza em aristocracia. Salústio comenta afirmando: "É incrível lembrar como pro20 Colonisenses III, 21. 21 Provérbios XXVIII, 12. 22 Provérbios XXIX, 2. 23 Provérbios XXVIII, 28. 24 Provérbios XXVIII, 15. 677677 grediu em tão pouco tempo a cidade de Roma, uma vez obtida a liberdade" 25. De fato, muitas vezes ocorre que, vivendo sob um rei, os súditos esforcem-se menos pelo bem comum, como que estimando não lhes dizer respeito fazer aquilo que a ele conduza, sendo isso tarefa daquele em cujo poder julgam estar o bem comum. Todavia, quando não consideram que o bem comum está nas mãos de um só, não o veem como se fosse de um outro, mas cada um o considera como sendo seu. Mostra-nos assim a experiência que uma cidade administrada por governantes, que se sucedem anualmente, pode fazer mais do que alguns reis que possuem três ou quatro cidades. E os pequenos serviços exigidos pelo rei são mais onerosos do que os grandes serviços impostos pela comunidade de cidadãos. Foi assim no caso da república romana. A plebe alistava-se no exército e pagava-se soldo aos soldados. Mas como o erário público não era o suficiente, "para o uso público forem entregues as riquezas privadas, a tal ponto que mesmo os senadores não deixaram para si próprios nenhum ouro, a não ser alguns anéis e bulas, insígnias de sua dignidade."26 No entanto, os romanos cansaram-se das contínuas divergências que conduziam a guerras civis e, por meio destas, a liberdade, pela qual tanto lutaram, escapava-lhes pelas mãos. Passaram então a submeter-se a imperadores, os quais recusavam-se, em um primeiro momento, a ser chamados de reis, pois esse nome era odioso. Alguns, ao modo dos reis, zelaram fielmente pelo bem público e por esse zelo a república romana foi conservada e prosperou. Mas a maioria deles tornou-se tirano para com os súditos, mas fracos e indolentes para com os inimigos, razão pela qual a república romana acabou reduzida a nada. Processo semelhante ocorreu com o povo hebreu. Primeiramente, quando governados por juízes, foram atacados de todo modo pelos inimigos, já que cada um fazia o que lhe parecia ser bom. Então, devido a sua perseverança, Deus deu-lhes reis, mas devido a maldade desses, afastaram-se do culto do único Deus e, por fim, foram conduzidos ao cativeiro. 25 Salústio, A guerra de Catilina, VI, 7. A passagem é citada por Agostinho de Hipona na Cidade de Deus, V, 12. 26 Agostinho de Hipona, Cidade de Deus, III, 19. 678 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 678 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre O perigo surge, portanto, de todo lado, seja quando se evita o melhor regime da realeza por medo do tirano, seja quando, por desejar-se um rei, cai-se na maldade da tirania. Capítulo 5. É menos ruim uma monarquia converter-se em tirania que uma aristocracia tornar-se corrupta Entre duas coisas, cada uma delas trazendo consigo um perigo iminente, parece ser mais digna de escolha aquela da qual resultar o menor mal. Ora, se a monarquia converte-se em tirania, isso causa menor mal que quando ocorre a corrupção do regime dos muitos optimates. As divergências, que frequentemente surgem no governo dos muitos, são contrárias ao bem da paz, principal bem da coletividade social. Todavia, esse bem não é destruído pelo tirano, mas perdem-se apenas certos bens dos homens particulares, a não ser que ocorra um excesso de tirania que se volte contra toda a comunidade. Deve-se preferir, portanto, o regime de um só ao de muitos, ainda que em ambos haja algum perigo. Além disso, parece que se deve mais evitar aquilo do qual se seguem os maiores perigos. Ora, os maiores perigos para a coletividade resultam, mais frequentemente, do regime dos muitos do que do governo de um só. É mais corriqueiro, no governo de muitos, um se desviar da busca do bem comum do que no governo de um só. Quando algum dos muitos governantes afasta-se do bem comum, o perigo de dissensão irrompe na coletividade de súditos, pois a dissensão entre os súditos segue da dos governantes. Todavia, quando apenas um governa, ele olha mais frequentemente para o bem comum. Mas se ele se afastar do bem comum, não se segue imediatamente que ele busque a opressão da totalidade dos súditos, o que seria o cúmulo da tirania e, como acima mostramos, o grau máximo de malignidade de um governo. Portanto, deve-se mais evitar os perigos decorrentes do regime de muitos do que aqueles que surgem do governo de um só. Ademais, não é menos frequente que o governo de muitos tornese uma tirania do que o de um só. Ao contrário, isso acontece com maior frequência no primeiro caso. Quando emerge a dissensão no governo de muitos, comumente ocorre que um supere os demais e usurpe o poder 679679 sobre a coletividade. A história ensina-nos isso com clareza. Com efeito, quase todo governo de muitos acabou em tirania e a república romana é o melhor exemplo. Como foi, por muito tempo, administrada por muitos magistrados, surgiram animosidades, dissensões e guerras civis, caindo a república na mão dos mais crueis tiranos. De modo geral, se consideramos cuidadosamente os fatos passados e mesmo os presentes, encontraremos mais pessoas exercendo a tirania em terras antes governadas por muitos do que por um só. Ora, parece que a realeza, que é o melhor regime, deveria ser evitada pelo risco da tirania. Todavia, a tirania origina-se não menos, mas mais frequentemente no regime de muitos. Segue-se, portanto, que é mais conveniente viver sob o regime de um que sob o de muitos. Capítulo 6. De que modo evitar que a realeza torne-se tirania? O governo de um só deve ser o escolhido pois é o melhor. Mas, como mostramos acima, mesmo ele pode transformar-se em tirania, ou seja, no pior governo. Cumpre assim trabalhar com diligência para prevenir que o rei, governante da coletividade, se torne um tirano. Em primeiro lugar, é necessário que o homem promovido a rei, por aqueles a quem isso compete, seja de tal condição que não seja provável que ele se torne tirano. Assim, Samuel, solicitando a providênica divina para a instituição do rei, disse: "O Senhor procurou um homem conforme a seu coração e o Senhor apontou-o como rei sobre o seu povo" 27. Instituída a realeza, o governo deve ser de tal forma preparado que não surja ocasião à tirania. O seu poder deve, ao mesmo tempo, ser temperado para que não possa facilmente transformar-se nela. Como essas coisas devem ser feitas, é o que veremos na sequência. Por fim, veremos quais os cuidados que devem ser tomados caso o rei revele-se um tirano. Se a tirania não for excessiva, é mais útil tolerá-la por certo tempo que agir contra o tirano e acabar às voltas com perigos que são mais graves que a própria tirania. Pode também ocorrer que quem age contra o tirano não consiga vencê-lo, tendo assim provocado ainda mais a sua fúria. Todavia, supondo que alguém consiga superar o tirano, podem surgir daí muitas e graves dissensões entre o povo que pode dividir-se 27 I Livro dos Reis XIII, 14. 680 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 680 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre em facções, seja durante a revolta, seja após a derrocada do tirano e o estabelecimento do novo governo. Às vezes acontece ainda que a coletividade derruba o tirano com o auxílio de alguém que toma o poder e transforma-se em novo tirano. E por temer que façam com ele o mesmo que ele fez, oprime os súditos de modo ainda mais duro. Por isso, acontece muito nas tiranias que a posterior seja mais implacável que a precedente, pois, sem eliminar os antigos sofrimentos, acrescenta novos oriundos da maldade de seu coração. Assim, quando, em Siracusa, todos desejavam a morte de Dionísio, uma certa anciã orava continuamente para que ele permanecesse incólume e vivesse mais que ela. Ao saber disso, o tirano indagou-lhe a razão e obteve a seguinte resposta: "Quando eu era menina", disse ela, "tínhamos um terrível tirano e eu desejava sua morte. Quando isso ocorreu, sucedeu-lhe um mais terrível. Eu desejava ver o fim de sua dominação e passamos a ter um terceiro governante, ainda mais terrível, que és tu. Assim, se fores derrubado, outro pior virá no teu lugar."28 Alguns foram da opinião que, quando o excesso de tirania for insuportável, seria um ato de virtude para os mais fortes matar o tirano e, em nome da liberdade da coletividade, exporem-se aos perigos da morte. Encontraríamos exemplo disso no Antigo Testamento, pois um certo Aiot matou com uma punhalada na coxa, Agião, rei de Moab, que oprimia o povo de Deus com implacável servidão. Aiot tornou-se assim juiz do povo. Todavia, essa opinião não está de acordo com a doutrina apostólica. Pedro ensina-nos que "devemos ser submissos não apenas aos senhores bons e moderados, mas também aos severos, pois, em virtude da consciência que temos de Deus, suportar as penas que sofremos injustamente é uma graça"29. Assim, quando muitos imperadores romanos tiranicamente perseguiram a fé no Cristo, uma grande multidão, tanto de nobres quanto de gente do povo, já havia se convertido a ela e foram louvados não por resistirem, mas por suportarem pacientemente a morte por Cristo. Isso é claro no caso da sagrada Legião Tebana que, embora armada, não resistiu. Aiot deve ser considerado como se tivesse matado um inimigo e não um governante do povo, embora fosse esse um tirano. Lê-se no Velho Testamento que os assassinos de Joás, rei do Judá, que se afastara do culto de Deus, foram 28 Valério Máximo, Fatos e ditos memoráveis, VI, 2. 29 I, Pedro 2, 18-19. 681681 mortos e seus filhos poupados, conforme os preceitos da lei. Seria perigoso para a coletividade e para seus governantes se alguns, por iniciativa privada, tentassem matar o governante, mesmo que ele fosse tirano. De modo mais frequente, são os maus e não os bons que se lançam em perigos desse tipo, pois a eles é oneroso o governo tanto dos reis quanto dos tiranos. Logo, de acordo com Salomão: "Dissipa os ímpios o rei sábio"30. Levando-se isso em conta, percebemos por que a coletividade correria mais perigo de perder um bom rei que de ver-se aliviada pela supressão de um tirano. Parece, portanto, que se deve atuar contra a crueldade do tirano não por iniciativa privada, mas por meio da autoridade pública. Em primeiro lugar, se pertence ao direito de uma coletividade prover para si um rei, então, caso ele abuse tiranicamente do poder real, não é injusto que a coletividade deponha-o ou reduza seus poderes. Não se pode pensar que a coletividade aja com infidelidade ao depor o tirano, mesmo se houvesse antes se submetido a ele perpetuamente. Ao governar a coletividade sem se portar fielmente, como exige o ofício do rei, ele mereceu que os súditos não cumpram o que com ele pactuaram. Os romanos, que haviam tomado por rei a Tarquinio Soberbo, em virtude da tirania sua e de seu filho, retiram-lhe o poder real, substituindo por outro menor, ou seja, pelo consular. Do mesmo modo, Domiciano, que havia sucessido aos imperadores moderados Vespasiano, seu pai, e Tito, seu irmão, quando exerceu a tirania, foi morto pelo senado Romano e todos os atos que perversamente tomara foram anulados, de modo justo e salutar, por senatusconsulto31. Com isso, o beato João Evangelista, discípulo dileto de Deus, que havia sido exilado pelo próprio Domiciano na ilha de Patmos, pode voltar a Éfeso por um senatusconsulto. Se, de fato, pertence ao direito de uma autoridade superior prover a coletividade de um rei, deve-se esperar dela o remédio contra a inequidade do tirano. Assim, Arquelau, que começara a reinar na Judeia, sucedendo a seu pai Herodes e por imitar as maldades desse, teve uma 30 Provérbios XX, 26. 31 Durante a república romana, o senado tinha o poder de promulgar decretos sobre projetos de lei. O senatusconsulto é o nome dado a um decreto do senado. 682 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 682 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre queixa contra si levada a César Augusto pelos judeus. Seu poder foi primeiramente diminuído, sendo-lha retirado o nome de rei e a metade de seu reino foi dividida entre seus dois irmãos. Mas como nem assim ele refreou sua tirania, Tibério César enviou-lhe ao exílio em Lion, cidade da Gália32. Todavia, se de forma alguma for possível obter auxílio humano contra o tirano, deve-se recorrer a Deus, que reina sobre tudo e que é "um refúgio nos momentos de tribulação"33. Pois está em seu poder abrandar o coração do tirano, como diz Salomão: "O coração do rei está na mão de Deus, dirigindo-o para onde desejar"34. Foi ele quem aplacou a crueldade de Assuero, que preparava a morte dos judeus. Foi também ele quem inspirou tamanha devoção ao cruel Nabucodosor que esse se transformou em pregador do poder divino e disse: "Agora eu, Nabucodonosor, louvo, engrandeço e glorifico o rei celeste porque sua obra é verdadeira e seu caminho justo. Ele pode humilhar os que se portam com soberba"35. Todavia, segundo as palavras do Sábio, os tiranos que o Senhor julga indignos de conversão, pode eliminá-los ou reduzi-los a nada: "Deus destronou os soberbos e em seu lugar colocou os humildes"36. Vendo a aflição de seu povo no Egito e escutando o seu clamor, afogou o tirano Faraó com seu exército no mar. Foi ainda ele quem não somente expulsou de seu trono o já mencionado Nabucodonosor, quando esse era soberbo, mas ainda o privou da companhia dos homens e deu-lhe a forma de um animal. Seu braço é forte de modo que pode livrar o seu povo da tirania. Por intermédio de Isaias, prometeu a seu povo repouso "do trabalho, das inquietações e da dura servidão"37. E, por meio de Ezequiel, disse: "Libertarei meu rebanho da boca deles"38, ou seja, da boca dos pastores que alimentam a si mesmos. Mas para que o povo de Deus consiga merecer esse benefício, 32 Gália era a demoninação antiga e medieval da França. 33 Salmos IX, 10. 34 Provérbios XXI, 1. 35 Daniel IV, 34. 36 Eclesiastes X, 17. 37 Isaias XIV, 3. 38 Ezequiel XXXIV, 10. 683683 deve parar de pecar, pois é por permissão divina que os ímpios recebem poder para vingar os pecados. Com efeito, disse o Senhor por meio de Oséias: "Dar-te-ei um rei em minha fúria"39. E no Livro de Jó é dito que "faz reinar o homem hipócrita em virtude dos pecados do povo"40. Portanto, a culpa deve ser eliminada para que cesse a praga dos tiranos. (...) Capítulo 12. Recapitulação do primeiro livro Os reis possuem bens temporais em abundância e Deus preparalhes um grau sublime de felicidade. Já os tiranos são frequentemente frustrados dos bens temporais que almejam, estão sujeitos a muitos perigos e, acima de tudo, são privados dos bens eternos, sendo-lhes reservadas as mais graves penas. Por isso, aquele que recebe a função de governar deve realmente considerar bem todas essas coisas e se apresentar como rei e não como tirano para os seus súditos. O que é a realeza, que é bom para a coletividade possuir um rei e que o governante deve mostrar-se como um rei a seus súditos e não como um tirano, foi isso o que apresentamos acima. Livro II Capítulo 1. Os deveres do rei Devemos agora considerar quais são os deveres do rei e de que modo deve ele portar-se. Ora, dado que as coisas que são feitas pela arte imitam aquelas que são feitas pela natureza e que, a partir dessas, aprendemos a como agir de acordo com a razão, o melhor a fazer é considerar os deveres do rei baseando-nos na forma dos governos naturais. Entre as coisas naturais, encontramos dois regimes: o particular e o universal. O universal é o governo de Deus, porque a providência divina governa todas as coisas. O particular é o dos seres humanos e é 39 Oséias XIII, 11. 40 Jó XXXIV, 30. 684 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 684 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre o que mais se aproxima do regime divino e por isso se chama microcosmo, já que nele encontramos a forma do regime universal. Assim como a totalidade das criaturas corpóreas e espirituais estão sujeitas ao regime divino, do mesmo modo, os membros do corpo e as forças da alma são governados pela razão. Logo, a razão está, de certo modo, para o homem como Deus está para o mundo. Contudo, como acima foi mostrado, o ser humano é um animal naturalmente social que vive em coletividade. Assim, a semelhança com o governo divino manifesta-se no ser humano não somente enquanto a razão rege as demais partes do homem, mas ainda quanto ao fato de a coletividade ser regida pela razão de um único ser humano. E esse é o dever supremo do rei. Em alguns animais que vivem em sociedade, encontramos alguma semelhança com esse regime, como no caso das abelhas, que se diz terem rei, mas não porque exista aí um governo da razão e sim um governo do instinto natural incutido pelo sumo governante, que é o autor da natureza. Portanto, o rei deve saber que o seu dever é ser no reino como a alma para um corpo ou como Deus no mundo. Se refletir cuidadosamente sobre isso, acenderá nele, por um lado, o zelo pela justiça quando considerar que foi aí posto para exercer, no lugar de Deus, o julgamento no reino. Por outro, adquirirá o alívio da calma e da clemência por considerar cada um dos súditos como membros de seu corpo. Capítulo 2. Os deveres do rei ao instituir a cidade ou o reino Devemos considerar o que Deus faz no mundo para que fique claro o que deve o rei fazer. De modo geral, duas obras de Deus devem ser examinadas: a que cria o mundo e a que o governa. A alma executa, no corpo essas mesmas duas tarefas. Em primeiro lugar, o corpo recebe forma em virtude da alma. Em segundo, o corpo é regido e move-se pela alma. Dessas duas, é a segunda que melhor pertence ao ofício de rei. Assim, a função de regência pertence a todos os reis e a própria palavra rei origina-se de "o governo daquele que rege". Todavia, a primeira tarefa não pertence a todos os reis, pois nem todos instituem a cidade ou o reino que governam, mas ocupam-se de uma cidade ou reino já previa685685 mente instituído. Devemos considerar que, se alguém não tivesse instituído a cidade ou o reino, não haveria onde reinar. Sendo assim, pertence também ao ofício de rei a criação da cidade ou do reino. Alguns, de fato, instituíram cidades nas quais reinaram, como Nino, que fundou Ninive, e Rômulo, que fundou Roma. Do mesmo modo, pertence também ao ofício de governar a conservação das coisas governadas e o uso delas para o fim a que foram constituídas. Não é possível, portanto, conhecer os deveres ligados ao ato de governar sem conhecer o motivo de sua instituição. A razão para instituição do reino deve ser buscada no exemplo da criação do mundo. Deve-se considerar primeiramente a produção das coisas e, em seguida, a ordem distintiva das partes do mundo. Percebese, assim, haver uma distribuição das diversas espécies de coisas em cada parte do mundo, como as estrelas no céu, as aves no ar, os peixes na água e os animais na terra. Observa-se depois que cada qual foi abundantemente provido pela dividade das coisas de que necessita. Moisés exprimiu de modo sutil e cuidadoso a razão para essa instituição. Em primeiro lugar, apresenta a produção das coisas dizendo: "No início, Deus criou o céu e a terra". Em seguida, afirma que todas as coisas foram distinguidas pela divindade segundo uma ordem apropriada, a saber, o dia da noite, as coisas superiores das inferiores, o mar da terra. Após, apresenta o céu ornado com luzes, o ar com as aves, o mar com os peixes e a terra com os animais. Por último, foi atribuído ao ser humano o domínio sobre a terra e os animais e o uso das plantas foi conferido aos homens e aos animais pela providência divina. Ora, aquele que institui a cidade ou o reino não pode novamente criar os homens, os lugares para habitação e os demais recursos para a vida. Precisa, portanto, usá-los tal como existem na natureza, do mesmo modo como as demais artes retiram da natureza a sua matéria. Por exemplo, o ferreiro usa, em sua arte, o ferro e o construtor usa as madeiras. Assim, o criador de uma cidade ou reino necessariamente escolhe um lugar apropriado que conserve a saúde dos habitantes, que seja suficientemente fértil para a subsistência deles, agrade pela beleza e ofereça proteção contra os inimigos. Se faltar alguma dessas coisas necessárias, 686 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 686 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre o lugar será tanto mais apropriado quanto mais as possuir. Em seguida, é necessário que distribua o local escolhido para a instituição da cidade ou do reino de acordo com as exigências de uma cidade ou reino perfeito. Por exemplo, se um reino for criado, faz-se necessário determinar um local apto à construção de cidades, de vilarejos, de castelos, os locais destinados aos estudos, ao exercício dos soldados, aos mercados, e assim para todas as coisas que a perfeição de um reino exige. Se precisar criar uma cidade, deverá determinar qual local será reservado às coisas sagradas, qual à justiça e qual aos diversos tipos de artesãos. Em seguida, será preciso reunir homens que serão repartidos segundo o local apropriado a cada profissão. Também deve providenciar que cada um receba as coisas necessárias segundo sua condição e status. De outro modo, a cidade ou o reino não poderá perdurar. Essas são, portanto, de modo sumário, as coisas que pertencem ao dever do rei ao instituir a cidade ou reino de modo semelhante à criação do mundo. Capítulo 3. O governo humano segue o governo divino Do mesmo modo como a instituição da cidade ou do reino segue a forma de criação do mundo, assim também deve-se compreender o que seja o governo humano a partir do governo divino. De início, deve-se levar em conta que governar é conduzir de modo apropriado o governado ao fim devido. Um navio é governado quando, por meio da habilidade do comandante, é conduzido ileso ao porto pela rota adequada. Logo, se uma coisa está ordenada a um fim que lhe é externo, como o navio ao porto, pertence ao dever do governante não apenas conservá-la ilesa, mas, além disso, conduzi-la ao fim. Contudo, se existe algo cujo fim não lhe é externo, o único objetivo do governante consiste em conservá-lo ileso em sua perfeição. Mas nada desse modo existe, a não ser o próprio Deus, que é o fim de todas as coisas. Quanto, portanto, ao que é ordenado a um fim extrínseco, o cuidado pode ser exercido de diversos modos e por diferentes fatores. Ora, talvez algo cuide para que a coisa conserve a sua existência e algo outro para que obtenha uma outra perfeição, como ocorre no caso do navio (de onde nos vem a noção de governo). O carpinteiro cuida de restaurar se algo se quebrou no navio, enquanto o coman687687 dante faz com que o navio chegue ao porto. O mesmo acontece com os seres humanos. O cuidado do médico faz com que eles conservem a vida, o administrador da casa cuida das coisas necessárias à vida, o professor faz com que conheçam a verdade e o tutor cuida dos costumes e que vivam de acordo com a razão. Ora, caso o ser humano não se ordenasse a um bem extrínseco, os cuidados acima lhe bastariam. Existe, no entanto, um bem extrínseco ao ser humano, enquanto viver sua vida mortal, a saber a derradeira beatitude que consiste na fruição da visão de Deus após a morte. Pois, como o Apóstolo disse: "Enquanto estamos no corpo, perigrinamos para longe do Senhor"41. Por isso, o cristão, para o qual a beatitude foi conferida pelo sangue de Cristo e que, para obtê-la, recebeu a promessa do Espírito Santo, necessita do cuidado espiritual para o qual é dirigido ao porto da salvação eterna. Esse cuidado é oferecido pelos ministros da Igreja de Cristo. O mesmo argumento acerca do fim do indivíduo deve também ser aplicado à coletividade como um todo. Se o fim último do ser humano fosse um bem que existisse no próprio homem, então o fim último da coletividade que é governada seria que ela adquirisse tal bem e o conservasse. Logo, se o fim último, seja do indivíduo, seja da coletividade, fosse a vida e a saúde do corpo, o médico deveria ser o govenante. Se o fim fosse a abundância das riquezas, o rei da coletividade deveria ser um administrador. Se o conhecimento da verdade fosse um bem tal que a coletividade pudesse alcançá-lo, a função de rei caberia ao professor. Parece, todavia, que o fim último da coletividade associada é viver de acordo com a virtude. Com efeito, os seres humanos agrupam-se para que juntos vivam bem, algo que cada um isoladamente não poderia conseguir. Ora, a boa vida é aquela segundo a virtude. A vida virtuosa é, portanto, o fim em virtude do qual os seres humanos passam a viver conjuntamente. Isso é comprovado pelo fato de que somente aqueles que se auxiliam mutuamente no bem viver são participantes da coletividade. Caso os seres humanos associassem-se unicamente para o viver, os animais e os escravos também integrariam a comunidade civil. Se a associação fosse apenas para a obtenção de riquezas, todos os comerciantes 41 II, Coríntios V, 6. 688 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 688 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre pertenceriam a uma única cidade. Agora, vemos que somente podem ser computados em uma mesma coletividade aqueles que sob as mesmas leis e governo são dirigidos ao bem viver. Entretanto, ao viver de acordo com a virtude, o ser humano é ordenado a um fim superior, que consiste na fruição divina, como acima mostramos. Ora, é preciso que o fim para a coletividade seja o mesmo que para o indivíduo. Portanto, o fim da coletividade não pode ser o viver de acordo com a virtude, mas, através da vida virtuosa, alcançar a fruição divina. Caso esse fim pudesse ser alcançado pela virtude da natureza humana, seria dever do rei dirigir os seres humanos para esse fim, uma vez que supomos ser rei aquele a quem é confiada a suprema autoridade nos assuntos humanos. Ora, um governo é tão mais sublime quanto mais alto é o fim a que ele está ordenado. Além disso, quem comanda é aquele a quem pertence o fim último, pois os comandados são aqueles que são direcionados ao fim último. Por exemplo, sendo o comandante a quem compete dispor sobre a navegação, ele direcionará aquele que constrói o navio, dizendo como deve ser embarcação para que seja apropriada à navegação. A autoridade civil, que deve usar as armas, diz para o fabricante quais armas ela deseja. Todavia, como o ser humano não consegue obter a fruição divina pela virtude humana, mas apenas pela virtude divina, segue-se que não faz parte do governo humano, mas do divino, conduzir ao fim último. Assim, o Apóstolo diz: "Na graça de Deus reside a vida eterna". Esse tipo de governo pertence àquele que não é apenas homem, mas também Deus, a saber, a nosso Senhor Jesus Cristo que, tornando os seres humanos filhos de Deus, introduziu-os na glória celeste. Esse é o governo entregue a ele, que jamais se corromperá e pelo qual ele é chamado nas Escrituras não apenas sacerdote, mas rei, como diz Jeremias: "O rei reinará e será sábio"42 e, por isso, o sacerdócio real provém dele e, o que é mais importante, todos os fiéis à Cristo, enquanto são membros dele, denominam-se reis e sacerdotes. O ministério desse rei foi concedido não aos reis, mas aos sacerdotes, a fim de que as coisas espirituais ficassem distintas das terrenas. E entre todos, principalmente ao Sumo Sacerdote, o sucessor de 42 Jeremias XXIII, 5. 689689 Pedro, vicário de Cristo e Pontífice Romano, a quem devem estar submetidos todos os reis do povo cristão, da mesma forma que estão ao próprio Senhor Jesus Cristo. Como foi dito, aqueles que cuidam dos fins intermediários, devem submeter-se àquele que cuida do fim último. (...) Capítulo 4. A principal preocupação do rei são os meios pelos quais a coletividade a ele sujeita vive bem Assim como a vida bem vivida na terra ordena-se à vida beata que almejamos no céu, do mesmo modo a boa vida da coletividade ordenase como fim a todos os bens particulares que os seres humanos buscam, como as riquezas, os lucros, a saúde, a eloquência e a erudição. Se, como dissemos, aquele que cuida do fim último possui primazia sobre os que cuidam das coisas que se ordenam a esse fim, devendo dirigi-los por suas ordens, então parece evidente que o rei, que deve sujeitar-se ao governo divino administrado pelo ofício do sacerdócio, deve ter primazia sobre todos os demais ofícios humanos, os quais devem ser governados por suas ordens. Todo aquele que tem a incumbência de fazer algo que subordinase a um fim, deve atentar para que sua obra seja adequada ao fim. Por exemplo, o fabricante faz uma espada de modo a ser apropriada à luta e o construtor deve construir a casa de modo que seja apropriada à habitação. Ora, dado que o fim da vida que aqui bem vivemos é a beatitude celeste, então pertence ao dever do rei buscar as coisas necessárias à boa vida da coletividade e que estão de acordo com a beatitude celeste. Assim, ele deve, dentro do possível, incentivar o que conduz à beatitude celeste e proibir o contrário. Conhecemos pela lei divina quais são as coisas que conduzem à verdadeira beatitude e quais são as impeditivas dela. Ora, o ensino dessa doutrina pertence ao ofício do sacerdote, conforme Malaquias: "Os lábios dos sacerdotes guardarão a ciência e a lei será buscada em sua boca"43. Por isso, o Senhor estabelece no Deuteronômio: "Quando tiver sentado no trono de 43 Malaquias II, 17. 690 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 690 tomás de Aquino • A reALezA: dediCAdo Ao rei de Chipre seu reino, copiará para si, em um volume, o Deteronômio desta lei, a partir de um exemplar dos sacerdotes da tribo levítica. Guardará o volume junto a si e o lerá todos os dias de sua vida para apreender a temer o Senhor seu Deus e conservar suas palavras e cerimônias que estão previstas na lei"44. Educado na lei divina, o rei deve possuir como sua principal preocupação os meios pelos quais a coletividade a ele sujeita viva bem. Essa preocupação divide-se em três aspectos. Em primeiro lugar, o rei deve instituir a boa vida na coletividade a ele sujeita. Em segundo, deve conservar o que foi alcançado e, em terceiro, deve buscar a melhoria do que foi alcançado e conservado. Duas coisas são necessárias para a vida de um homem. Uma principal, que é o agir de acordo com a virtude, uma vez que a virtude é aquilo pelo que se vive bem. A outra é secundária e como que instrumental, a saber, a existência suficiente daqueles bens necessários ao agir virtuoso. A unidade do ser humano é causada pela natureza, ao passo que a unidade da coletividade, que é denominada paz, deve ser produzida pela ação do governante. Logo, três coisas são necessárias à instituição da boa vida da coletividade. Primeiramente, que a coletividade esteja constituída na unidade da paz. Em segundo lugar, que a coletividade, pelo vínculo da paz, dirija-se ao bem agir. Assim como o ser humano não pode agir bem a não ser que se suponha a unidade de suas partes, do mesmo modo, a coletividade de homens é impedida de agir bem quando lhe falta a unidade da paz e os homens brigam entre si. Em terceiro lugar, que, pela ação do governante, sejam garantidos, em quantidade suficiente, os bens necessários para o bem viver. Após ter sido a boa vida alcançada pela coletividade mediante os esforços do rei, é necessário que ele busque a conservação do que foi alcançado. Ora, há três coisas que obstaculizam isso, uma delas sendo de proveniência natural. O bem da coletividade não deve ser instituído para uma única época, mas sim de tal modo a que seja perpétuo. Todavia, os seres humanos são mortais e não podem durar perpetuamente. Mesmo durante a vida, não desfrutam sempre do mesmo vigor, já que a 44 Deuteronômio XVII, 17-18. 691691 vida humana sofre muitas variações que nos impede de realizarmos as mesmas coisas sempre do mesmo modo durante toda a vida. O segundo obstáculo à conservação do bem público tem causa interna e consiste na perversidade da vontade dos seres humanos, seja pela preguiça de executar o que é exigido pelo bem público, seja sobretudo por que são hostis à paz da coletividade, pois, transgredindo a virtude, perturbam a paz dos outros. O terceiro obstáculo à conservação do bem público tem causa externa e ocorre quando a paz é destruída pelo ataque dos inimigos e o reino ou a cidade é completamente destruída. O rei deve tomar três providências contra esses três obstáculos. Primeiramente, deve cuidar da sucessão e da substituição dos homens que exercem as diferentes funções. No caso do governo divino, há previsão de substituição das coisas que não duram sempre e se corrompem, o que ocorre pela geração de novas coisas, conservando-se assim a integridade do universo. Do mesmo modo, o rei deve estar atento e cuidar para que os bens da integralidade da coletividade sejam preservados, providenciando o modo pelo qual serão substituídos os que desaparecerem. Em segundo lugar, deve incentivar as obras virtuosas e desencorajar a iniquidade dos seus súditos através de suas leis e preceitos, penas e prêmios. Deve seguir assim o exemplo de Deus que deu leis aos homens conferindo recompensas a quem as obedece e penalidades aos transgressores. Em terceiro lugar, o rei deve cuidar para que a coletividade a ele sujeita permaneça em segurança contra os inimigos. De nada adiantaria evitar os perigos internos se não fosse possível defender-se dos perigos externos. Por fim, há um terceiro dever que pertence ao rei para instituir o bem da coletividade e que consiste no cuidado com o seu progresso. Assim, no que diz respeito às duas coisas acima, deve corrigir o que não está em ordem, suprir o que está em falta e aperfeiçoar o que pode ser melhorado. Do mesmo modo, o Apóstolo adverte os fiéis que busquem sempre os melhores dons. Esses são, portanto, os deveres do ofício de rei que ele precisa observar de modo cuidadoso. voLtAire: fiLosofiA, LiterAturA e históriA692 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 692 693693 O nome verdadeiro de vOlTAIRE é François-Marie Arouet. O nome que conhecemos foi criado pelo autor, talvez em um primeiro esforço para inventar a si mesmo e para dissimular uma família com a qual tinha conflitos, principalmente com seu pai e seu irmão jansenista1. Voltaire teve uma vida conturbada, frequentou sociedades libertinas2 quando jovem, viajou, entrou em disputas, sendo que uma delas lhe valeu uma temporada emprisionado na Bastilha e o exílio na Inglaterra de 1726 a 1729. Antes, em 1717, Voltaire fora preso no castelo da Bastilha por ter supostamente escrito alguns versos contra o então regente da França Felipe de Orléans. É justamente a habilidade com os versos que marca o início de sua carreira. Inicialmente a poesia e o teatro trouxeram o reco1 O jansenismo foi um movimento religioso católico que se deu nos séculos XVII e XVIII, e que teve importantes nomes como Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) e Henri Arnauld (1597 -1692) entre seus partidários. O termo vem do nome de Cornelius Jansen, ou Jansênio, um teólogo holandês nascido em 1585 e morto em 1638. A disputa dos jansenistas se dava principalmente contra os jesuítas em torno da noção teológica da graça divina. Os jansenistas se tornaram também famosos pelo rigorismo moral. Sobre o jansenismo ver: Jean-Pierre Chantin, Le jansénisme, Paris, CERF, 1996. Voltaire sempre combateu o jansenismo e seu rigorismo moral, como é possível constatar nas vigésima quinta carta das Cartas Filosóficas, em que trata de refutar algumas ideias de Pascal encontradas em sua obra Pensamentos. 2 As sociedades libertinas dos séculos XVII e XVIII eram grupos informais em que se reuniam libertinos, ou seja, livres-pensadores. VOLtAIRe: FILOSOFIA, LIteRAtuRA e HIStóRIA(1694-1778) voLtAire: fiLosofiA, LiterAturA e históriA694 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 694 nhecimento para ao autor, principalmente com a publicação, em 1728, do poema épico La Henriade, dedicado ao rei Henrique IV e em parte escrito quando da sua estada pela primeira vez na Bastilha. A relação de Voltaire com o poder foi ambígua, e ela também se presta a um interessante objeto de estudo por revelar o difícil lugar do escritor e do filósofo na sociedade do Antigo Regime. Nesse sentido, apesar de exilado e perseguido, depois de alguns anos no castelo de Cirey, quando se dedicou com mais afinco ao estudo de Newton, com sua companheira cientista marquesa du Châtelet, Voltaire se lançou na vida de cortesão nos salões da nobreza do século XVIII, tornando-se até mesmo historiógrafo oficial do rei. Além disso, Voltaire, que mantinha desde os anos de 1730 uma assídua correspondência com então príncipe alemão Frederico, mais tarde, em 1751, viverá por dois anos junto ao já então Frederico II, rei da Prússia, numa propriedade chamada Sans-souci (Sem preocupação). A temporada alemã acaba com o rompimento temporário entre os dois amigos e a detenção de Voltaire e sua sobrinha Mme du Denis em Frankfurt, quando deixava a Prússia. Como se vê, a história pessoal de Voltaire é mais complexa, ele teve também más experiências com sua vida de cortesão, reconhecíveis em contos como Zadig ou o Destino e em poemas como A vida de Paris e de Versalhes (1748), e muitas dificuldades com o poder. Suas obras foram perseguidas e as principais delas logo entravam no Index dos livros proibidos pela Igreja. Além disso, quando volta de sua temporada desastrosa ao lado de Frederico II, Voltaire se vê proibido de entrar em Paris, sua cidade natal. Essa proibição durará por toda a vida do autor, que morrerá em Paris sem que seja permitido revelar a sua morte, tendo que ser conduzido sorrateiramente a outra cidade para ser enterrado. Não obstante a enormidade de revezes que enfrentou, Voltaire tinha uma outra habilidade que distinguia muito sua condição, a sua capacidade de gerir suas economias, que se tornariam uma das maiores fortunas da França quando de sua morte. Suas obras, "pensões" de nobres e de reis, e principalmente suas aplicações e investimentos lhe proporcionaram uma vida abastada, viveu em castelos e em grandes propriedades, uma delas ele costumava chamar de Les Délices (As Delícias). É interes695695 sante notar que essa riqueza é importante para a imagem que Voltaire fazia do escritor, o qual, segundo ele, não conseguiria e nem poderia viver de suas obras, correndo o risco de ceder ao poder e a um gosto duvidoso para poder agradar. Para Voltaire, a independência do escritor, a sua liberdade de falar o que realmente pensa, parecia depender em grande medida de sua independência financeira. 3 A despeito do sentido dessas ambiguidades, o que é certo é que Voltaire conquistou uma importância em seu tempo e se tornou, algumas vezes com resultados desastrosos, um ícone da cultura francesa. Não nos cabe aqui falar da imagem póstuma de Voltaire, que sem dúvida deve muito às apropriações circunstanciais e muito parciais do autor desde aquela feita pela Revolução Francesa, a partir de 1789, até aquelas realizadas no século XIX e XX por todo o espectro político. Quanto ao lugar de Voltaire em seu próprio tempo, cabe dizer que ele foi considerado o pai da república das letras, ou seja, o grande autor que conquistara respeito na poesia, no teatro, como historiador e que travara um embate direto com as questões filosóficas que o grande século XVII legara ao século das Luzes. O exílio na Inglaterra marca o início da carreira filosófica do autor, não só porque Voltaire começou então a estudar os filósofos, principalmente os ingleses John Locke (1632-1704) e Isaac Newton (1643-1727), mas porque as obras que Voltaire publicou nos anos seguintes estavam todas sob o signo da filosofia inglesa e eram a defesa dela contra as filosofias de sistema do século XVII.4 Voltaire publicou nos anos que se seguiram à sua volta do exílio duas importantes obras: as Cartas Inglesas (1734) ou as Cartas Filosóficas e os Elementos da Filosofia de Newton (17381741). Além destas duas obras, Voltaire redige outro texto central para a compreensão de seu pensamento, o Tratado de Metafísica, que circulou entre poucos amigos e só foi publicado depois da morte do autor. Nas 3 Sobre isto ver a obra de LEPAPE, P. Voltaire e o nascimento dos intelectuais no século das Luzes. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1995. 4 "Filosofias de sistema do século XVII" se refere principalmente às filosofias de René Descartes (1596-1650), Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715), Baruch Espinosa (1632-1677) e Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716). Sobre a oposição entre o século XVIII e o século XVII quanto à noção de sistema ver a introdução da obra de CASSIRER, E. A Filosofia do Iluminismo. Campinas: Ed. Unicamp, 1994. voLtAire: fiLosofiA, LiterAturA e históriA696 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 696 Cartas Filosóficas, Voltaire compara a França e a Inglaterra nos mais diversos aspectos: a religião, o sistema político, a filosofia e a artes. De modo geral, Voltaire fará o elogio do sistema político inglês, da tolerância e da liberdade religiosa da Inglaterra, em oposição a intolerância e a perseguição religiosa na França. Além disso, Voltaire elogiará a filosofia de Locke e Newton contra Descartes. Nos Elementos da Filosofia de Newton, Voltaire empreendeu uma divulgação do pensamento de Newton que é mais do que uma simples vulgarização científica. A obra obteve grande sucesso quando foi publicada, principalmente porque apresentava de maneira clara ao público letrado francês as ideias da física newtoniana sobre a atração universal e sobre a luz. Além disso, o livro mais tarde ganha uma introdução chamada de Metafísica de Newton, em que Voltaire opõe as teses da filosofia de Newton e seu método a outros autores do século XVII, principalmente a Leibniz, lançando os germes de uma história da ciência ao narrar o desenvolvimento da física nos séculos XVII e XVIII.5 Já esboçada nas Cartas Inglesas, a história da ciência ou dos saberes se desenvolve na obra O Século de Luís XIV. Nessa obra, Voltaire explora as relações entre a teoria e a sociedade, ou melhor, entre a ciência e seu tempo. Voltaire relaciona o desenvolvimento da filosofia e da ciência na Inglaterra com o estado político daquele país e sublinha a dependência da ciência em relação a uma atmosfera de liberdade, cuja existência permite a comunicação entre os filósofos e a instituição de sociedades científicas fomentadoras do progresso das ciências, como era o caso da Royal Society, na Inglaterra. Voltaire mostra como um saber depende das condições políticas do país, e como os próprios filósofos refletem em suas teorias os constrangimentos ou as liberdades de seu tempo e de sua nação. A relação entre questões teóricas e questões práticas é muito rica no pensamento de Voltaire, cuja filosofia não se constitui num sistema propriamente dito. Voltaire foi, na verdade, crítico quanto às pretensões de grandes sistemas e em certa medida cético quanto à solução de muitas das questões filosóficas. Contudo, os problemas tradicionais da filosofia 5 Sobre isto ver o capítulo IV da obra CASINI, P. Newton e a consciência europeia. São Paulo: Unesp, 1995. Ver também: MARTIN-HAAG, E. Voltaire, du cartésianisme aux Lumières. Paris: Vrin, 2002. 697697 – mesmo os metafísicos como o da conciliação entre liberdade e destino, o da providência e o do mal – permanecem no horizonte de preocupações do autor. Dos mais diversos temas Voltaire fazia uma arma contra o que chamava de a infame: a superstição, o poder religioso, os abusos e as injustiças do poder.6 Voltaire se utiliza, por exemplo, do tema teológico e filosófico da providência para atacar as preces dos devotos. A providência significa o governo do mundo por Deus e sua previsão de tudo o que se passa cá embaixo. Ora, se tudo foi organizado por Deus, se tudo está previsto por Deus, como os religiosos podem pedir que Ele mude todo o universo para atender seus desejos particulares? Não deveriam, ao contrário, se submeter ao que acontece, pois foi Deus que a tudo organizou? São estas questões, em seu uso polêmico, que vemos se desenrolar no texto Providência. A bem da verdade, nas questões mais diversas Voltaire faz intervir seu combate à religião. Ele pensava que grande parte dos males da sociedade estavam ligados à superstição, ao fanatismo religioso e ao poder que as religiões detinham nos estados e sobre a consciência das pessoas. Assim, quando fala sobre a mulher, por exemplo, ao mesmo tempo em que Voltaire defende suas qualidades, ele faz intervir o problema sobre o lugar da mulher em cada religião, como bem nos mostra o texto Mulheres sujeitai-vos aos vossos maridos. Seguindo a mesma estratégia, quando fala sobre o despotismo, Voltaire destaca o que pensa ser o pior tipo de abuso do poder: a tirania dos diretores de consciência, dos religiosos que querem controlar o que os homens devem ou não pensar. Alguns dos artigos do texto Ideias republicanas insistem sobre isso e sublinham a necessária separação entre religião e Estado, ou melhor, a necessidade da submissão do poder eclesiástico ao poder civil.7 O combate de Voltaire contra o que chamava de infâmia não foi apenas um combate teórico e geral, ele também se envolveu em diversos "casos" (conhecidos como os affaires de Voltaire). Nesses casos ele procu6 Em certo período de sua vida Voltaire costumava terminar algumas de suas cartas com a inscrição Ecrassez l'Infâme! (Esmaguem a infame!). Nietzsche, que admirava o espírito livre de Voltaire, retomará o bordão voltairiano na obra Ecce Homo. 7 Como já havia exigido muito antes o filósofo inglês Thomas Hobbes. voLtAire: fiLosofiA, LiterAturA e históriA698 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 698 rou intervir para impedir abusos do poder e corrigir injustiças. No mais conhecido deles, do qual resultou a obra Tratado sobre a tolerância (1763), Voltaire tentou, e por fim conseguiu, mudar a sentença sobre a família Calas, que fora injustamente condenada em um processo repleto de erros judiciais. Os protestantes Calas, cujo patriarca era Jean Calas, foram condenados ao exílio, perdendo todos os seus bens, e Jean Calas foi morto no suplício da roda8 por ter supostamente assassinado um de seus filhos que se convertera ao catolicismo. Posteriormente se veio a descobrir, em grande parte devido aos esforços de Voltaire, que o jovem se suicidara. Outro aspecto importante do pensamento de Voltaire é sua preocupação com a História. Ainda quando vivia com a marquesa du Châtelet no castelo de Cirey e estudava Newton, Voltaire se preocupava em pensar o sentido da história e do trabalho do historiador. A marquesa cientista costumava lhe dizer que se entristecia perante livros de história, os quais, à diferença das obras de física, pareciam não ter unidade alguma e ser compostos apenas por relatos insignificantes de batalhas e de elogios de heróis de caráter duvidoso. As reclamações da marquesa resumem aspectos importantes da condenação da história como disciplina não filosófica. Enquanto a filosofia se preocupa com a certeza e com o universal, a história só fornecia relatos particulares e incertos. Voltaire, tentando responder a essas duas objeções contra a história, pensa que o filósofo deve auxiliar o historiador, ou melhor, que o historiador deve ser filósofo. No que se refere à certeza e à prática do historiador, Voltaire sustenta que ele deve ter cuidado com suas fontes, duvidar sempre de relatos inverossímeis e, como se faz em processos judiciários, deve sempre saber se a testemunha é fidedigna. Justamente por não ser possível uma certeza histórica, o historiador deve se preocupar em multiplicar as evidências que permitem a ele relatar este ou aquele fato e defender esta ou aquela interpretação. Além disso, ele deve evitar os relatos insignificantes e os detalhes e sublinhar os eventos realmente importantes. Além disso, Voltaire tentará encontrar um sentido para a história. Quando se considera os diversos eventos da história humana, eles parecem apenas relatos desconexos, tudo parece ser ruína e a histó8 Trata-se de uma forma de execução pública então praticada. 699699 ria da humanidade um relato de crimes. Voltaire busca então organizar o que parece apenas um caos de eventos isolados a partir dos sucessivos desenvolvimentos das artes, das ciências e dos costumes em cada tempo e lugar. É a partir desses elementos que o historiador-filósofo deve tentar captar o gênio de um povo e de um tempo, suas características particulares que se expressam em suas artes e em seus costumes. Em seus escritos históricos, Voltaire procura sempre atacar aqueles historiadores do século XVII e de seu próprio tempo que faziam da história um instrumento de defesa da religião cristã. Ele visa principalmente o maior historiador cristão de seu tempo, um importante autor do século XVII chamado Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet (1627-1704).9 Em seu Discurso sobre a história universal (1681), Bossuet pretende organizar a história da humanidade a partir de dois elementos: o providencialismo e a centralidade do povo judaico-cristão. De acordo com Bossuet, a história do mundo realiza um plano que está fora dele, ela realiza os comandos de Deus. Tudo o que se passa na terra segue ordens estabelecidas pelos céus. Além disso, Bossuet tenta remeter toda a história à história do povo judeu, fazendo deles e dos cristãos o centro a partir do qual se poderia julgar o sentido da história universal. Voltaire então afirma contra Bossuet que não podemos fazer Deus intervir na história humana, pois nada conhecemos sobre a ação de Deus no mundo. A história é feita pelos homens, e não devemos tentar encontrar nela um plano divino; é preciso que nos limitemos a explicá-la pelas ações humanas. Em segundo lugar, Voltaire recusa a centralidade do judaísmo e do cristianismo na história. Como podemos imaginar, fazer tudo se resumir ao povo judeu e aos cristãos criava grandes dificuldades, afinal de contas, como reduzir a história dos povos asiáticos, por exemplo, da China e da Índia principalmente, à história judaico-cristã? Não é à toa que Voltaire abre seu grande livro de história, o Ensaio sobre os costumes (1756-1769), com um capítulo dedicado à China. Segundo Voltaire, é preciso reconhecer que a história do povo judeu é mais uma história dentre as diversas outras histórias de outros povos – os judeus são um povo como qualquer outro. A variedade 9 Sobre a crítica a Bossuet ver: MENEZES, E. História e Humanidade: Voltaire crítico de Bossuet. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 12, n. 1-2, p. 357-377, jan./dez. 2002. Disponível em: http://www.cle.unicamp.br/cadernos/12-12.html voLtAire: fiLosofiA, LiterAturA e históriA700 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 700 dos povos mostra que é impossível reduzir toda a história à história de um povo em particular. Voltaire foi um autor de muitas faces, poeta, dramaturgo, contista e filósofo. Sua filosofia se nutriu dos debates do século XVII e de autores muito distintos entre si como Pierre Bayle (1647-1706) e Leibniz, e se caracterizou como uma demolição do dogmatismo e das teorias excessivamente confiantes em si mesmas. Ele tratou em suas obras de temas tradicionais da metafísica como o mal, a liberdade e o destino.10 Com elas pretende sempre marcar os limites do conhecimento humano, ao mesmo tempo em que confere um lugar privilegiado à história em geral, e a história dos saberes em particular, além de defender a existência de um Deus inteligente e poderoso, do qual não sabemos mais nada, e a existência de uma moral universal sob a variedade dos costumes.11 Sugestões de Leitura PrinciPais obras de voltaire traduzidas Para o Português Voltaire tem uma obra imensa que vem sendo organizada e publicada há meio século pela Voltaire Foundation de Oxford. Quase todos os seus textos podem ser encontrados nos sítios: http://www.voltaire-integral.com/index.html http://gallica.bnf.fr/ Algumas traduções também podem ser encontradas no sítio: http://www.dominiopublico.gov.br/ VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. Tratado sobre a tolerância. Tradução de Paulo Neves. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1993. VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. A Filosofia da história. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007. VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. Deus e os homens. Tradução de Eduardo Brandão São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2000. 10 Sobre isto ver: BRANDÃO, R. A ordem do mundo e o homem: estudos sobre metafísica e moral em Voltaire. [Tese de doutorado apresentada ao Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade de São Paulo]. Disponível em: http://www.fflch.usp.br/df/site/ 11 Sobre isto ver os dois últimos capítulos do Tratado de Metafísica, os verbetes "Homem" e "Moral" do Dicionário Filosófico e o Poème sur la loi naturelle. 701701 VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. O Preço da justiça. Tradução de Ivone Castilho Benedetti São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001. VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. Comentários políticos. Tradução de Antonio de Pádua Danesi São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001. Obras de importante valor filosófico como as Cartas Inglesas, o Tratado de Metafísica, o Dicionário Filosófico (incompleto) e o Filósofo Ignorante são encontradas no volume sobre Voltaire na coleção Os Pensadores da Editora Abril Cultural. Todos os contos de Voltaire, incluindo os famosos Cândido ou o otimismo e Zadig ou o destino foram traduzidos por Mário Quintana e se encontram no volume Contos da Abril Cultural, 1972. obras sobre voltaire (em Português) BRANDÃO, R. Voltaire e as ilusões da metafísica. In: FIGUEIREDO, V. (Org.) Seis filósofos na sala de aula. São Paulo: Berlendis & Vertecchia, 2006. _____. Voltaire e o conto filosófico. In: Micromegas e outros contos. São Paulo: Hedra, 2007. CALVINO, I. Cândido ou a velocidade. In:_____. Por que ler os clássicos. Tradução de Nilson Moulin. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994. LEPAPE, P. Voltaire e o nascimento dos intelectuais no século das Luzes. Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar, 1995. LOPES, M. A. Voltaire político: espelhos para príncipes de um novo tempo. São Paulo: Editora Unesp, 2004. _____. Voltaire literário: horizontes históricos. São Paulo: Imaginário, 2000. LOPES, M. A. Voltaire historiador. Campinas: Papirus, 2001. MATOS, L. F. F. de. A moral do jardim (sobre Candide). In:_____. O Filósofo e o comediante: ensaios sobre literatura e filosofia na Ilustração. Belo Horizonte: Ed. UFMG, 2001. p. 214-218. MENEZES, E. História e Humanidade: Voltaire crítico de Bossuet. Cad. Hist. Fil. Ci., Campinas, Série 3, v. 12, n. 1-2, p. 357-377, jan./dez. 2002. Disponível em: http://www.cle.unicamp.br/cadernos/12-12.html SOUZA, M. das G. de. Ilustração e História: o pensamento sobre a história no Iluminismo francês. São Paulo: Discurso Editorial, 2001. SOUZA, M. das G. de. Voltaire: a razão militante. São Paulo: Moderna, 1993. (Coleção Logos) 702 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 702 voLtAire • muLheres, sujeitAi-vos Aos vossos mAridos MuLHeReS, SuJeItAI-VOS AOS VOSSOS MARIDOS 1 O abade de Châteauneuf contou-me certo dia que a esposa do marechal de Grancey era muito imperiosa e que tinha muitas qualidades. Seu grande orgulho consistia em respeitar a si mesma, em nada fazer que pudesse envergonhar-se em segredo; ela jamais se rebaixava a ponto de dizer uma mentira: preferia dizer uma verdade perigosa do que utilizar uma dissimulação útil e sempre afirmava que a dissimulação é a marca da temeridade. Mil ações generosas marcavam a sua vida; mas quando recebia um elogio, considerava-se mal compreendida e dizia: "Pensais que tais ações custaram-me esforços?". Seus amantes a adoravam, seus 1 VOLTAIRE, F. M. A. de. Oeuvres complètes de Voltaire. Édition C. Lahure. Paris: Hachette, 1859. Este texto foi escrito, provavelmente, em 1764 quando do grande entusiasmo de Voltaire pela princesa da Rússia, Catarina II. A grande princesa que encantou os filósofos – como Diderot que a ela legou sua biblioteca – parecia possuir as qualidades para realização do ideal do governante esclarecido. Frustrado anteriormente com a experiência alemã, Voltaire, então, encontrava em Catarina algumas das qualidades que identificara em Frederico II. Sobre o ideal do rei-filósofo ver: SALINAS FORTES, L. R. O iluminismo e os reis filósofos. São Paulo: Brasiliense, 1981. Publicado, em 1765, nas Mélanges, este "opúsculo dos primeiros anos do reino de Catarina II (1763-1796)" vai muito além de uma mera homenagem à princesa russa. É possível encontrar diversas questões que faziam parte da ordem do dia dos escritores franceses do XVIII. O despotismo esclarecido, as religiões e suas disputas, a conversação e a sociabilidade na formação do homem de letras francês. O teatro, a literatura, a educação das mulheres e o claustro, a defesa da inteligência e sensibilidade femininas, são todos aspectos que compõem este texto e outros que Voltaire escreveu anteriormente acerca das mulheres. 703703 amigos a queriam bem, e seu marido a respeitava. Ela passou quarenta anos nesta dissipação e neste círculo de divertimentos que ocupam seriamente as mulheres. Ela não lia nada a não ser as cartas que lhe eram escritas, em nada pensava a não ser nas novidades do dia, nas idiotices dos que a cercavam e nos interesses de seu coração. Enfim, quando se viu naquela idade em que se diz que as belas mulheres com espírito passam de um trono a outro2, ela desejou ler. Começou pelas tragédias de Racine e espantou-se ao sentir, lendo-as, mais prazer do que jamais sentira ao ver suas representações, seu bom gosto a fazia reconhecer que este homem dizia apenas coisas verdadeiras e interessantes, que todas estavam em seu devido lugar, que era simples e nobre, sem declamação, sem nada forçar, sem ser lento e enfadonho e que suas tramas assim como seus pensamentos estavam fundados sobre a natureza: ela encontrava nessa leitura a história de seus sentimentos e o quadro de sua vida. Fizeram-na ler Montaigne: encantou-se com um homem com quem estabelecia uma conversa e que duvidava de tudo.3 Deram-lhe em seguida os Grandes Homens de Plutarco: ela questionava por que ele não havia feito a história das grandes mulheres. O abade de Châteauneuf a encontrou certo dia vermelha de cólera. "O que há com a senhora?", disse-lhe. – Abri por acaso um livro que se encontrava em meu gabinete, respondeu ela. Era, creio eu, alguma coleção de cartas; e li tais palavras: Mulheres, sujeitai-vos a vossos maridos; então joguei o livro fora. – Como, Senhora! Não sabeis que se trata das Epístolas de São Paulo?4 2 Do trono da beleza ao trono da sabedoria. 3 Voltaire sempre valorizou a prática de duvidar que os escritos de Montaigne (15331592), e, principalmente, de Bayle lhe ensinaram. 4 Epístolas aos Efésios (5,22-25): "Vós, mulheres, sujeitai-vos a vossos maridos, como ao Senhor; porque o marido é a cabeça da mulher, como também Cristo é a cabeça da igreja... de sorte que, assim como a igreja está sujeita a Cristo, assim também as mulheres sejam em tudo sujeitas a seus maridos". 704 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 704 voLtAire • muLheres, sujeitAi-vos Aos vossos mAridos – Não me importa de quem elas são, o autor é muito indelicado. O senhor marechal jamais escreveu-me neste tom; acredito que o vosso São Paulo era um homem de difícil convivência. Ele era casado? – Sim, senhora. – Ela deve ter sido uma boa criatura; se eu tivesse sido a mulher de um homem como este, eu o teria mandado passear. Sujeitai-vos a vossos maridos! Ainda se ele tivesse se contentado em dizer: Sejam doces, complacentes, atenciosas, econômicas, eu diria: eis um homem que sabe viver; e por que submissas, por favor? Quando casei-me com M. de Grancey, nós nos prometemos ser fiéis, eu propriamente não cumpri com minha palavra, nem ele com a sua, mas nem ele nem eu prometemos obedecer. Então, somos escravas? Já não é o bastante que um homem, após ter se casado, tenha o direito de causar-me uma doença de nove meses, doença algumas vezes mortal?5 Já não é bastante dar à luz, em meio a grandes dores, um filho que poderá processar-me quando velho? Não é suficiente estar sujeita todos os meses a incômodos muito desagradáveis para uma mulher de qualidade e que, para tornar as coisas piores, a supressão de uma destas doze doenças anuais seja capaz de matar-me, e ainda me dizem: Obedeça? "Certamente a natureza não disse para obedecermos; ela nos fez com órgãos diferentes daqueles dos homens, mas nos tornou necessários uns aos outros, ela não pretendia que da união se formasse uma escravidão. Eu me recordo bem do que Molière disse: Do lado da barba está o poder. Mas eis uma razão engraçada para que eu tenha um senhor! O 5 As obras de Voltaire revelam também um trabalho de cronista, nela aprendemos muito sobre acontecimentos e costumes do século XVIII. Este trecho é revelador de dois aspectos da vida no século das Luzes. O primeiro faz referência ao que era o parto no século XVIII. A precariedade das condições conjugada com as doenças infecciosas faziam do parto um momento de muito risco e eram muitas as mães e as crianças que morriam. O segundo ponto se refere ao fato de que era da alçada masculina a decisão pelos filhos. Questão de descendência e hereditariedade, a decisão pela gravidez não passa pela vontade feminina, é um direito do homem causar esta "doença de nove meses" nas suas esposas. 705705 quê! Porque um homem tem o queixo coberto de um pêlo grosso e desagradável, que o obriga a barbear-se o máximo possível, e meu queixo é liso desde que nasci, é necessário que eu lhe obedeça humildemente? Eu sei bem que geralmente os homens têm músculos mais fortes que os nossos e que eles podem melhor desferir um golpe; temo que seja esta a origem de sua superioridade. "Eles também pensam ter a cabeça melhor organizada e, consequentemente, gabam-se de serem mais capazes de governar; mas eu poderia lhe mostrar rainhas que valem tanto quanto reis. Disseram-me há alguns dias algo sobre uma princesa alemã6 que se levanta às cinco da manhã e começa a trabalhar para tornar seus súditos felizes, ela dirige todos os negócios, responde a todas as cartas, encoraja todas as artes e propaga seus bons atos à proporção de suas luzes. Sua coragem iguala seus conhecimentos; ela não foi criada em um convento por imbecis que nos ensinam o que se deve ignorar, e que nos mantêm ignorantes sobre aquilo que se deve aprender.7 Eu, caso detivesse um Estado para governar, sentir-me-ia capaz de ousar seguir este modelo". O abade de Châteneauf, que era muito educado, evitou cuidadosamente contradizer a senhora marechal. "A propósito, disse ela, é verdade que Maomé tinha tanto desprezo por nós que supunha não sermos dignas de adentrar o paraíso, e que não seríamos admitidas senão na entrada? – Neste caso, disse o abade, todos os homens se deteriam para sempre na entrada; mas console-se, pois aqui não se diz uma palavra verdadeira a respeito da religião maometana. Como disse meu irmão que foi por doze anos embaixador em Constantinopla; nossos monges ignorantes e malignos nos enganaram.8 – O quê! Não é verdade, senhor, que Maomé inventou a poligamia 6 Catarina II da Rússia nasceu na Alemanha. 7 Outro alvo comum às obras dos filósofos do XVIII: o claustro e a educação feminina dos conventos. 8 Voltaire afirma que a imagem que os europeus tinham da religião maometana era deturpada pelos religiosos cristãos. 706 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 706 voLtAire • muLheres, sujeitAi-vos Aos vossos mAridos para que os homens melhor se afeiçoassem a ele? Não é verdade que somos escravas na Turquia, e que nos é proibido rezar a Deus em uma mesquita? – Nada disto é verdadeiro, senhora. Maomé longe de ter imaginado a poligamia, reprimiu-a e restringiu-a. O sábio Salomão possuía setecentas esposas. Maomé reduziu seu número a apenas quatro. As mulheres irão ao paraíso assim como os homens, e sem dúvida lá farão amor, mas de maneira distinta da que se faz aqui: pois vós bem percebeis que não conhecemos o amor neste mundo senão muito imperfeitamente. – Ah! Tens razão, diz a senhora marechal: o homem é pouca coisa. Mas, diga-me, o vosso Maomé ordenou que as mulheres fossem submissas a seus maridos? – Não, senhora, não se encontra nada disto no Alcorão. – Então, por que as mulheres são escravas na Turquia? – Elas não são escravas; elas têm seus bens; podem testemunhar, podem, em circunstâncias adequadas, pedir divórcio; frequentam as mesquitas em certas horas e têm seus encontros em outras. Elas são vistas nas ruas com seus véus sobre os narizes, como vós tínheis vossas máscaras há alguns anos. É verdade que não aparecem nem na Ópera nem no teatro; mas é porque estas coisas não existem. Duvidas que se um dia houvesse em Constantinopla, que é a pátria de Orfeu9, uma Ópera, as damas turcas não ocupariam os melhores camarotes? – Mulheres sujeitai-vos a vossos maridos!, continuava a dizer entre os dentes a senhora marechala. Este Paulo era muito bruto. – Ele foi um pouco duro, disse o abade. Tratava um bom homem como São Pedro com ares de superioridade. Além do mais, não se deve tomar ao pé da letra tudo o que se diz. Ele é censurado por ter tido mais do que apenas uma propensão ao jansenismo.10 – Suspeito que ele era um herético, disse a senhora marechal, e recolheu-se para seu toucador. 9 Na mitologia grega era um poeta e músico. 10 Ver nota 1. 707707 providência Estava próximo às grades quando a irmã Fessue disse à irmã Confite: "A Providência tem um desvelo visível comigo; sabeis como amo meu pardal; ele teria morrido caso eu não tivesse rezado nove Ave Marias para obter a sua cura. Deus deu vida ao meu pardal; agradeçamos a santa Virgem". Um metafísico11 lhe disse: "Minha irmã, não há nada tão bom quanto Ave Marias, sobretudo quando uma jovem as recita em latim num subúrbio de Paris; mas não creio que Deus se ocupe tanto de vosso pardal, feliz que ele é: imaginais, por favor, que ele tem outros afazeres. É preciso que ele dirija continuamente o curso de seis planetas e do anel de Saturno, ao centro dos quais colocou o sol, tão grande como um milhão de nossas terras. Há milhares e milhares de outro sóis, de planetas e de cometas a serem governados; suas leis imutáveis e seu concurso eterno fazem mover a natureza inteira; tudo está ligado ao seu trono por uma corrente infinita da qual nenhum anel jamais pode estar fora de seu lugar.12 Se as Ave Marias tivessem dado a vida ao pardal da irmã Fessue um instante além do que deveria viver, essas Ave Marias teriam violado todas as leis estabelecidas por toda eternidade pelo grande Ser; vós teríeis perturbado o universo; um outro mundo vos seria necessário, um novo Deus, uma nova ordem das coisas.13 Irmã Fessue O quê! Vós acreditais que Deus faz assim tão pouco caso da irmã Fessue? 11 Um filósofo. O termo metafísico nos textos de Voltaire é ambíguo: pode significar aquele que lida com as difíceis questões da filosofia, ou pode ter o sentido negativo de um dogmático. 12 Esta imagem da cadeia ou corrente dos seres é muito importante para toda a filosofia moderna e particularmente para o século XVIII. Ela parece com grande força no poema Ensaio sobre o Homem de Alexander Pope (1688-1744). Sobre isto ver o estudo clássico: LOVEJOY, A. O. A Grande Cadeia do Ser. São Paulo: Palíndromo, 2005. 13 Todo o destino – a concatenação entre os acontecimentos – não pode ser mudado para atender um ser particular. 708 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 708 voLtAire • providênCiA Metafísico Fico envergonhado de vos dizer que vós não passais, como eu, de um pequeno elo imperceptível da corrente infinita; que vossos órgãos, aqueles de vosso pardal e os meus são destinados a subsistir a um número determinado de minutos neste subúrbio de Paris. Irmã Fessue Se é assim, eu estava determinada a dizer um número determinado de Ave Marias. Metafísico Sim, mas elas não forçaram Deus a prolongar a vida de vosso pardal além de seus dias. A constituição do mundo trazia que dentro deste convento, a uma certa hora, vós pronunciaríeis como um papagaio certas palavras em uma certa língua que não compreendeis; que este pássaro, nascido como vós pela ação irresistível das leis gerais, ficasse doente, e que melhorasse; que vós imaginásseis ter lhe curado com as palavras, e que nós estaríamos juntos nesta conversa.14 Irmã Fessue Senhor, esse discurso soa a heresia. Meu confessor, o reverendo padre de Menou, inferirá que não acreditais na Providência. Metafísico Eu creio na Providência geral, minha cara irmã, aquela de qual emana de toda a eternidade a lei que regula todas as coisas, como a luz que jorra do sol, mas não creio que uma Providência particular mude a economia do mundo por vosso pardal ou por vosso gato.15 14 Tudo já está desde sempre ordenado e determinado. 15 Deus regula o todo do universo e não precisa intervir em cada caso em particular. 709709 Irmã Fessue Mas se meu confessor vos dissesse, como disse a mim, que Deus muda todos os dias suas vontades em favor das almas devotas? Metafísico Ele me diria a mais estúpida besteira que um confessor de jovens poderia dizer a um homem que pensa. Irmã Fessue Meu confessor uma besta! Santa Virgem Maria! Metafísico Eu não digo isso; digo que ele só poderia justificar com uma besteira enorme os falsos princípios que vos insinuou, talvez com bastante destreza, para vos governar. 16 Irmã Fessue Bem! Pensarei sobre o assunto; isso merece reflexão". O Século de Luís XIV Introdução Não é somente a vida de Luís XIV que se pretende escrever; propõem-se um objeto maior. Anseia-se poder pintar à posteridade não as ações de um único homem, mas o espírito dos homens no século mais esclarecido que jamais houve.17 16 A imagem do religioso como diretor de consciência. 17 Voltaire anuncia aqui a tarefa de todo historiador: captar o espírito dos homens de um tempo e de uma nação. Para tanto, será preciso não dar valor excessivo às batalhas e às anedotas, e sublinhar a importância das artes, ciências e dos costumes. Note-se como o presente texto fornece elementos interessantes para se pensar as diferenças entre Voltaire e Rousseau no que se refere às ciências e as artes. 710 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 710 voLtAire • o séCuLo de Luiz Xiv Todos os tempos produziram heróis e políticos; todos os povos passaram por revoluções; todas as histórias são quase iguais para aquele que só quer guardar fatos em sua memória. Mas aquele que pensa, e, o que ainda mais raro, aquele que tem gosto, conta somente quatro séculos na história do mundo. 18Essas quatro épocas felizes são aquelas em que as artes foram aperfeiçoadas, e que, servindo de momento para a grandeza do espírito humano, são o exemplo para a posteridade. (...) O quarto século é aquele que se chama o século de Luís XIV, e talvez dos quatro é aquele que mais se aproxima da perfeição.19 Enriquecido das descobertas dos três outros, ele fez mais em certos gêneros do que os outros três juntos. (...) A sã filosofia só foi conhecida nesse tempo 20 (...) Não se deve crer que esses quatro séculos foram isentos de infelicidades e de crimes. A perfeição das artes cultivadas por cidadãos pacíficos não impede os príncipes de serem ambiciosos, os povos sediciosos, os padres e monges turbulentos e enganadores. Todos os séculos se parecem pela maldade dos homens, mas eu conheço somente essas quatro eras que se distinguem pelos grandes talentos. Antes do século a que chamo de Luís XIV e que começa mais ou menos com o estabelecimento da Academia Francesa, os italianos chamavam todos os ultramontanos de bárbaros21; é preciso convir que os franceses mereciam de algum modo esta injúria. Seus padres uniam a galanteria romanesca dos Mouros com a grosseria gótica. Não tinham quase nenhuma das artes amáveis, o que prova que as artes úteis eram negligenciadas, pois, quando se aperfeiçoa o que é necessário, logo se 18 Perceba-se como a filosofia guia a história. Esta última não deve ser apenas o arquivamento na memória de fatos ocorridos no passado. O historiador deve pensar e ter gosto, ou seja, ser capaz de discernir no meio dos escombros e ruínas da história aquilo que contribuiu para o aperfeiçoamento dos costumes, das artes e das ciências, enfim, para o engrandecimento da humanidade. 19 O primeiro é o dos gregos, de Platão e Aristóteles. O segundo é dos romanos, de Cícero e de Virgílio. O terceiro é o Renascimento italiano. 20 Sã filosofia é um termo que Voltaire usa para se referir à filosofia experimental, movimento que segundo ele se inicia com Francis Bacon e se desenvolve com Locke e Newton na Inglaterra, mas que teria logo encontrado adeptos no continente como Galileu e Torricelli, na Itália. 21 As nações do norte em relação à Itália. 711711 encontra o bom e o agradável; e não é surpresa que a pintura, a escultura, a poesia, a eloquência, a filosofia fossem quase desconhecidas de uma nação que, tendo portos no Oceano e no Mediterrâneo, não tinha no entanto uma frota, e que, amando o luxo ao excesso, tinha apenas umas poucas manufaturas grosseiras. (...) Mil circunstâncias interessantes para os contemporâneos se perdem aos olhos da posteridade e desaparecem para deixar ver apenas os grandes acontecimentos que fixaram o destino dos impérios. Tudo o que se fez não merece ser escrito. Não se deterá esta história a não ser naquilo que merece atenção de todos os tempos, naquilo que pode pintar o gênio e os costumes dos homens, naquilo que pode servir de instrução e aconselhar o amor e a virtude, as artes e a pátria.22 Ideias republicanas por um membro do corpo23 I O despotismo puro é o castigo da má conduta dos homens. Se uma comunidade é dirigida por um só ou por alguns, é visivelmente porque ela não teve nem coragem nem habilidade par se governar a si mesma. (...) v O mais absurdo dos despotismos, o mais humilhante para a natureza humana, o mais contraditório, o mais funesto, é aquele dos padres; e de todos os impérios sacerdotais, o mais criminoso é sem dúvida aquele dos padres da religião cristã. É um ultraje ao nosso Evangelho, pois Jesus 22 Outros importantes aspectos da reflexão de Voltaire sobre a história: o historiador não deve prender-se a detalhes, deve saber separar o que importa daquilo que é irrelevante, e para tanto deve tentar captar aquilo que distingue um povo e que pode instruir os homens do futuro. 23 Este texto foi escrito em 1762, quando da publicação do Contrato social de Rousseau. Teve também o subtítulo por um cidadão de Genebra, expressão que o próprio Rousseau utilizava par se referir a si mesmo. O texto é apresentado como se tivesse sido escrito por um conterrâneo de Rousseau. Há também nesta obras algumas considerações sobre o Espírito das Leis de Montesquieu (1689-1755). Apesar de muitas diferenças com Rousseau, o texto de Voltaire deixa entrever a imagem de um Voltaire republicano que é geralmente desconsiderada ou esquecida. 712 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 712 voLtAire • ideiAs repubLiCAnAs por um membro do Corpo diz em vinte lugares: "Não haverá entre vós nem primeiro nem último; meu reino não é deste mundo; o filho do homem não veio para ser servido, mas para servir etc.".24 vI Quando nosso bispo, feito para servir, não para ser servido; feito para confortar os pobres, e não para devorar sua substância; feito para catequizar, e não para dominar, ousa, em tempos de anarquia, se instituir príncipe da cidade da qual ele não passava de pastor, ele é manifestamente culpado de rebelião e de tirania. (...) xI Nós instituímos os padres a fim de que eles fossem unicamente aquilo que devem ser, preceptores de moral para nossas crianças. Esses preceptores devem ser pagos e considerados; eles não devem pretender nem jurisdição, nem inspeção, nem honras; não devem em nenhum caso se igualar à magistratura. Uma assembleia eclesiástica que pusesse de joelhos um cidadão perante ela desempenharia o papel de um mestre escola que corrige crianças, ou de um tirano que pune escravos.25 xII Seria insultar a razão e as leis pronunciar as palavras governo civil e eclesiástico. É preciso dizer governo civil e regras eclesiásticas; e todas essas regras devem ser feitas pelo poder civil. xIII O governo civil é a vontade de todos executada por um só ou por muitos, em virtude das leis que todos sustentam.26 (...) 24 Voltaire da questão do despotismo político logo passa ao problema da perigosa mistura entre política e religião. Para ele, a diminuição dos abusos do poder dependia da diminuição do poder dos religiosos dentro do Estado. Voltaire utiliza seu amplo conhecimento da Bíblia para tacar os próprios religiosos, principalmente os cristãos católicos. 25 Todo o poder deve ser civil, não pode haver um poder religioso paralelo que possa submeter os cidadãos aos seus julgamentos. 26 Como para Rousseau, não se pode confundir o governo ou poder executivo com a soberania. Ele apenas está encarregado, seja ele o governo de um ou de muitos, de realizar 713713 xvII Quando uma lei é obscura, é preciso que todos a interpretem, pois todos a promulgaram, a menos que tenham encarregado alguns expressamente de interpretar as leis.27 xvIII Quando os tempos mudaram sensivelmente, há leis que se deve mudar. (...) No tempo em que academias eram compostas apenas de padres e que eles só eles possuíam o jargão da ciência, era conveniente que somente eles nomeassem todos os professores: (...), mas hoje que os laicos são esclarecidos, o poder civil deve retomar seu direito de nomear em todas as cadeiras.28 xIx A lei que permite prender um cidadão sem informação prévia e sem formalidade jurídica será tolerável em tempos de perturbação e de guerra; ela será iníqua e tirânica em tempos de paz.29(...) xxv Numa república digna desse nome, a liberdade de publicar seus pensamentos é o direito natural do cidadão. Ele pode se servir de sua pluma como de sua voz; ele não pode ser mais impedido de escrever do que falar, e os delitos realizados com a pluma devem ser punidos como a vontade de todos. 27 Ponto importante: como as leis vêm de todos, todos estão encarregados de debatê-las quando sua interpretação não é clara. 28 As leis devem se adaptar ao seu tempo. Não se deve obedecer a algo simplesmente porque é lei, mas porque é uma lei adequada ao seu tempo. O exemplo de Voltaire, mais uma vez contra o poder da religião institucionalizada, faz lembrar que as universidades em seu tempo eram dependentes da Igreja, e que nenhum dos famosos filósofos do século XVIII (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Diderot, D'Alembert e o próprio Voltaire) teve ligações com a universidade. 29 Este é um artigo comum em muitas constituições. Em tempos excepcionais é possível prender as pessoas sem acusação clara. Ora, o problema é saber quem determina que o tempo é excepcional. Devemos lembrar que este dispositivo republicano é na verdade utilizado por todas as ditaduras, que sempre suspendem os direitos com a alegação de tempos excepcionais e da urgência. Este é um importante tema filosófico e jurídico: a suspensão da lei pela própria lei, o assim chamado estado de exceção ou de sítio. 714 A n to lo g iA d e te xt o s F il o só Fi c o s Se cr eta ria d e E sta do d a Ed uc aç ão d o Pa ra ná 714 os delitos realizados com as palavras: está é a lei da Inglaterra, país monárquico, mas onde os homens são mais livres que em outros lugares porque são mais esclarecidos.30 xxIx. Parece bem estranho que o autor do Contrato social tenha dito que todo o povo inglês deveria se reunir no parlamento, e que eles deixam de ser livres quando seu direito consiste a se fazer representar no parlamento por deputados. Desejaria ele que três milhões de cidadãos viessem apresentar suas vozes em Westminster?31 xxx. Diz-se, nesse mesmo Contrato social, que "a monarquia convém apenas às nações opulentas; a aristocracia, aos Estados medíocres em riqueza e em grandeza; a democracia, aos Estados pequenos e pobres". Mas, no século XIV, no XV e no começo do XVI, os venezianos eram o único povo rico e ainda têm grande opulência. No entanto, Veneza nunca foi e nunca será uma monarquia. A república romana foi muito rica desde os Cipiãos até César. Luca é pequena e pouco rica, e é uma aristocracia; a opulenta e engenhosa Atenas era um Estado democrático. Temos cidadãos muito ricos, e compomos um governo combinado de democracia e aristocracia32: assim, é preciso desconfiar de todas as regras gerais, que não existem a não ser sob a pluma dos autores.33 30 A liberdade de pensamento e de imprensa e o elogio do sistema inglês, dois aspectos recorrentes da obra de Voltaire. 31 Eis aqui uma diferença importante entre Voltaire e Rousseau. Voltaire aceita a representação política, e não vê como uma república poderia existir sem representação política, dada a grandeza das nações modernas. Rousseau, ao contrário, não aceita a representação política. Sobre a questão de a representação política ver: ABREU, M. A. A. Representação em Rousseau e Hannah Arendt. Lua Nova, n. 72, p. 175-194, 2007. disponível em: http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S010264452007000300007&lng=pt&nrm=iso 32 O texto é supostamente escrito por um genebrino. 33 Outra desconfiança presente em muitos textos de Voltaire: a política não pode ser feita por regras gerais que desconsiderem a história e as particularidades de cada povo, daí que ele próprio nunca tenha elaborado uma teoria política propriamente dita. voLtAire • ideiAs repubLiCAnAs por um membro do Corpo 715715 xxxI O mesmo escritor, ao falar dos diferentes sistemas de governo, se exprime assim: "Um acha bom que se seja temido pelos seus vizinhos ; o outro prefere que se seja ignorado. Um está contente quando o dinheiro circula; o outro exige que o povo tenha pão". Todo este artigo parece pueril e contraditório. Como podemos ser ignorados pelos nossos vizinhos? (...) E como o povo pode ter pão sem que o dinheiro circule? A contradição é manifesta. xxxII "No instante em que o povo está legitimamente reunido em corpo soberano, toda jurisdição do governo cessa, o poder executivo é suspenso etc." Esta proposição do Contrato social seria perniciosa, se ela não fosse de uma falsidade e de um absurdo evidente. Quando na Inglaterra o parlamento está reunido, nenhuma jurisdição é suspensa; e no menor Estado, se durante a assembleia se comete uma morte, um roubo, o criminoso é e deve ser conduzido aos oficiais da justiça. De outra forma uma assembléia do povo seria um convite solene ao crime. xxxIv "Os depositários do poder executivo não são os senhores do povo, mas seus oficiais...; ele pode os estabelecer e os destituir quando lhe aprouver; não se trata para eles de contratar, mas de obedecer". É verdade que os magistrados não são os senhores do povo: são as leis que são as senhoras; mas o resto é absolutamente falso no nosso e em todos os Estados. Temos o direito, quando somos convocados, de rejeitar ou de aprovar os magistrados e as leis que nos propõem; não temos o direito de destituir os oficiais do Estado quando nos aprouver: esse direito seria o código da anarquia. O próprio rei da França, quando deu o cargo a um magistrado, não pode destituí-lo a não ser por um processo. (...) Não se pode destituir os magistrados inamovíveis a não ser após o tempo de seu exercício. Não é permitido cassar um magistrado por capricho como não se pode prender um cidadão por fantasia. Índice Remissivo A absoluto 132, 138, 301, 314, 333, 395, 439, 464, 494, 495, 501, 506, 513, 633, 645, 649, 651 ação 42, 52, 53, 55, 90, 93, 94, 103, 111, 140, 166, 194, 199, 200, 210, 214, 216, 269, 275, 294, 303, 306, 320, 358, 359, 369, 370, 379, 383, 385, 387, 389, 392, 428, 438, 459, 465, 469, 521, 524, 547, 562, 612, 613, 616, 623, 625, 627, 628, 630, 631, 637, 639, 651, 655, 690, 699, 708 acidente 61, 85, 89, 91, 93, 94, 98, 99, 114, 167, 184 acidentes essenciais 98, 99 admiração 195, 201, 210, 213, 217 afeto 27, 34, 54, 195, 196, 199, 200, 201, 202, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 277, 649, 653 afetos passionais 210 afetos racionais 199 agnosticismo 269 ágora 465 Agostinho (de hipona) 19-32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 45, 47-49, 52-54, 371, 395, 677 aisthésis 65 Alcorão 81, 82, 706 Alexandre 380, Alexandre de hales 83 Al-Farabi 83 alienação 462, 464, 466-469, 472, 603 alma 20, 22, 28, 32, 39, 43, 48, 49, 51, 52, 84, 88-90, 92-96, 118, 136, 149, 150, 161, 183, 186, 195, 282, 290, 301, 388, 402, 486, 493-495, 511, 545, 552, 585, 588, 669, 672, 684, 709 ambição 356, 379, 380, 433, 438, 439, 446, 447, 597 Ambrósio 21 amor 24, 27, 53, 195, 199, 201, 202, 210-212, 246, 307, 320, 324, 326, 329, 331, 441, 447, 449, 544, 572, 584, 590, 593, 613, 629, 706, 711 amor à liberdade 449 análise dos discursos 223 análise existencial 221 ancien régime (antigo regime) 402, 478, 482, 485, 568, 569, 694 angústia 239, 249, 274, 441, 621, 622, 627 animal político 73, 74 anormal 220, 223, 224, 225, 241, 249, 253 aparelho judiciário 252, 253 aparelho uniformizador 241 aparência 21, 91, 103, 163, 178, 179, 212, 268, 275, 282, 314, 364, 380, 422, 459, 474, 478, 498, 499, 500, 501, 509, 540, 554, 557, 561, 569, 579, 581, 601, 649, 651 aparência sensível 104, 493 apetite 199, 202, 210, 212, 324, 359, 360, 362, 363, 434, 454, 455, 607, 637 aristocracia 133, 568, 664, 670, 673, 676, 678, 714 Aristóteles 26, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 73, 74, 75, 83, 85, 105, 125, 126, 130, 134, 213, 302, 363, 380, 545, 546, 661, 662, 664, 670, 672, 675, 710 arqueólogo do saber 222 arte moderna 127, 500, 503 arte, artes 32, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141, 255, 277, 287, 290, 291, 300, 301, 347, 350, 364, 372, 401, 414, 440, 441, 450, 480, 492, 494, 498, 500, 503, 505, 520, 531, 538, 540, 543, 544, 546, 547, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 566, 567, 568, 569, 578, 579, 580, 581, 594, 598, 613, 629, 634, 645, 654, 657, 683, 685, 696, 699, 705, 709, 710, 711 artes práticas 90 artes superiores e inferiores 131 assembléia 11, 65, 76, 77, 344, 364, 365, 366, 433, 465, 604, 646, 712, 715 assembléia, membro da 76 associação política 284, 297 astúcia 241, 348, 454, 455, 457, 470 ateísmo 462, 567, 619, 639 atividade abstrata do pensamento 484 ato 61, 93, 98, 99,140, 147, 175, 199, 200, 210, 226, 262, 268, 355, 370, 371, 403, 572, 587, 588, 598, 601, 602, 604, 605, 612-614, 622, 624626, 629-631, 634, 636, 638, 649, 654, 667, 670, 680, 685, 705 ato de conhecimento 200, 210 ato voluntário 355 autarquia 73, 77 autenticidade 636 autoalienação 475 autoconsciência 256, 305, 308, 316, 322, 323, 324, 328, 329, 333, 335, 474 autoconsciência universal 323, 324 autocracia 646 autocrático 485 autoilusão 478 autolibertação 486 autonomia 263, 303, 412, 573 autoposição do sujeito 303 autoprovimento 72, 73, 77 autoridade 19, 20, 29, 30, 76, 264, 304, 321, 323, 351, 365, 366, 381, 430, 437, 438, 439, 442, 443, 445, 447, 455, 483, 483, 586, 602, 604, 606, 660, 662664, 666, 681, 688 autoridade legislativa 413 autorreferencial 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 315, 317 autorreferente 302, 303, 308, 309 autossentimento 474 avareza 281, 356, 379, 380, 597 Averróis 62 Avicena 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 98 B Bachelard, G. 242 Bacon, F. 62, 200, 710 base social 487 Bastilha 693, 694 Bauer, B. 300, 462, 464, Baumgarten, A. G. 543, 642, 643 Beauvoir, S. 492, 609, Beethoven 126, 136, 137 belas-artes 131, beleza 84, 137, 285, 291, 292, 397, 401, 540, 544, 545, 547, 550, 561, 562, 563, 593, 613, 614, 616, 642, 643, 645-647, 653656, 674, 685, 703 beleza, concepção schilleriana da 643 bellum omnium contra omnes 532 belo 12, 31, 92, 286, 291, 310, 543545, 549-551, 563, 580, 643, 645, 654, 655, 656 bem 12,19, 20, 64, 65, 70, 73, 74, 137, 175, 194, 200, 202, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 268, 269, 271, 275, 282, 283, 305, 309, 321, 325, 326, 327, 328, 355, 359, 360, 363, 364, 395, 431, 432, 433, 438, 439, 440, 445, 448, 449, 455, 458, 464, 465, 468, 580, 581, 587, 588, 598, 623, 656, 663, 664, 665, 668, 669, 670, 671, 673, 674, 675, 677, 678, 687, 688, 690, 691 bem comum 283, 309, 363, 432, 438, 439, 448, 464, 465, 580, 581, 664, 665, 668, 669, 670, 671, 673, 674, 677, 678 bem-viver 72 Berkeley, G. 63, 101-107, 221 bíblia 21, 29, 30, 192, 517, 661, 662, 712 biopoder 224, 225 Blanchot, m. 221, 514 bom 27, 31, 92, 174, 211, 217, 359, 364, 395, 439, 440, 551, 590, 598, 612, 621, 622, 650, 662, 665, 677, 683, 706, 711 bondade 148, 157, 444, 445, 519, 590, 628 Bornheim, G. 123-126, 128, 130, 614 Bossuet, J-B. 699, 701 bourgeoisie 486 bourgeois 134, 307, 323, 330, 470 Brecht, B. 124, 129 budismo 245 burguesia 251, 253, 254, 260, 276, 277, 288, 486, 487 burocracia 233, 242, 569 burocracia do Estado 242 C Camus, A. 609, 610 Canguilhem, G. 220 capitalismo 219, 220, 224, 233, 234, 247, 249, 250, 251, 461,465, 471 categorias 61, 63, 65, 136, 139, 220, 319, 494, 524 causa e efeito 279, 378, 390, 493 causalidade 99, 104, 150, 167, 237, 372, 373, 374, 378, 387, 524 censura 264, 274, 370, 391, 393, 394, 410, 427, 465, 485, 549, 618, 706 certeza 110, 147-149, 154, 157, 164, 180, 183, 185, 204, 208, 283, 284, 336, 380, 382, 387, 389, 517, 533, 538, 612, 698 ceticismo 269, 375 ceticismo acadêmico 20 Cézanne, P. 504, 506 Chardin, J-B-S. 503 Chladni, E. F. 534 Cícero 19, 20, 675, 710 cidadania 74-76, 78, 465, 466, 468 cidadão (s) 9, 65, 66, 74-78, 131, 253, 268, 277, 283, 306, 330, 336, 340, 365, 410, 412, 422, 427, 428, 432, 436-438, 441, 446, 448, 452, 454, 455, 463, 465, 470, 480, 566, 574, 575, 581, 604, 606, 677, 710715 cidade-estado 64-66, 70-78 ciência (s) 28, 30, 31, 54, 61, 62, 71, 82, 94, 102-104, 117, 127, 130, 131, 134, 144, 146, 147, 153, 156, 158, 172, 177, 180, 217, 219, 220, 222, 230, 231, 232, 241, 270, 289, 294, 315, 339, 347, 359, 360, 376, 379, 384, 385, 388, 389, 414, 482, 493-495, 498-502, 506, 517, 519, 521, 538, 563, 566-569, 578, 580, 581, 585, 657, 661, 689, 696, 699, 709, 710, 713 ciência clássica 503, 504 ciência da lógica 299, 302 ciência da sexualidade 245 ciência do absoluto 301 ciência estatal alemã 482 ciência filológica 520 ciência moderna 102, 419 ciências empíricas 232 ciências frívolas 598 ciências humanas 232 citas 480 citoyen 307, 323, 470, 646 civilidade 450 civitas 365 classe (social) 235, 236, 254, 262, 278 409, 411, 485, 486, 487, 487, 488 classe burguesa 253, 286, 287, 485, 488 classe dirigente 294 classe dominante 286 classe média 9, 461, 487, 489 classe operária 260, 261, 287 classe(s) do povo 488 classe(s) trabalhadora(s), 260, 263, 264, 286, 287 classe, dominação de 220, 240, 247, 253 classe, sociedade de 263 classes hierárquicas 536 classes, interesses de 236 classes, luta de 231, 235, 262, 264, 279, 294, 487 classes, relações de 236 Cocteau, J. 638 cogito 152, 611, 612, 617, 631 coisa em si 524, 526, 534 coisa pensante 183, 186 coisas materiais 102, 103, 149, 176, 180, 181 comédia 134, 478, 626, 644 competição 281, 282, 348, 349, 363 Comte, A. 638 comunidade 64, 70, 72, 74, 75, 134, 309, 319, 410, 470, 526, 603, 638, 670, 678, 711 comunidade autárquica 77 comunidade civil 687 comunidade da família 307 comunidade de cidadãos 677 comunidade de pensadores 512 comunidade de puros espíritos 513 comunidade dos seres racionais 319 comunidade perfeita 77, 671 comunidade política 65, 74, 77, 307, 469, 470, 573 comunismo 464, 466, 470 conceito (s) 19, 26, 27, 45, 49, 64, 65, 74, 84, 86, 90, 125, 207, 211, 216, 220, 222, 302, 303, 306, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 324, 325, 503, 527, 528, 535-540, 618 conceito (s), formação do(s) 534 conceito claro e distinto 184 conceito formal 184 conceito substancial 330 conceito, dialética superior do 315 conceito, diferenças do 334 conceito, exame do 26 conceito, lógica do 302 conceito, momento do 302 conceito, natureza do 66 conceito, negatividade do 316 conceito, objetividade do 324 conceito, realização do 316 conceito, unidade absoluta do 313 conceitos universais (gerais) 134, 619, 653 conceitos, classificação dos 60, 62, 208 condição abstrata e formal 305 condição animal 589 condição básica da sociabilidade humana 469 condição da obrigação contratual 355 condição de dominação 467 condição de guerra 339, 349-354, 356, 358, 360, 361 condição de objeto 136 condição humana 23, 103, 125, 130, 225, 457, 467 condição lógica 303 condição natural (da humanidade) 341, 346, 347, 350, 352, 356, 360, 663 condições jurídicas 481 condições sociais 477, 487 condições temporais 35, 51, 485, 487 conhecer, modo de 146, 212 conhecimento 148, 154, 158, 161, 162, 163 conhecimento abstrato 214, 526, 528 conhecimento claro e distinto 175, 207, 209 conhecimento intelectual 194, 198, 202, 203, 209, 214, 216, 217 conhecimento intuitivo 528 conhecimento puro 533, 537 conhecimento racional 194, 200, 202 conhecimento, fundamentos do 147 conhecimento, poder do 151 consciência (s) 147, 148, 150, 202, 206, 207, 221, 222, 247, 256, 257, 279, 283, 284, 286, 290, 294, 301, 314, 315, 321, 324, 326, 327, 331, 334, 403, 407, 411, 414, 445, 478, 487, 492, 511, 532, 588, 601, 612, 622, 623, 631, 680, 697 consciência das coisas 511 consciência de si 316, 334, 467, 487 consciência imediata 315 consciência invertida do mundo 474 consciência material 276 consciência moral 332, 334 consciência pensante 219 consciência política 482, 575 consciência subjetiva 313, 465 consciência teórica 482 consciência, alienação da 467 consciência, direção de 244, 250, 697, 709 consciência, exame de 246, 250 consciência, liberdade de 322, 466 consciência, negação da 482 consciência, tomada de 467, 568 constituição, constituições 62, 63, 65, 67, 74, 76, 77, 264, 289, 290, 304, 323, 335, 336, 412, 454, 559, 582, 713 contemplação estética 643 contingência 279, 328, 330, 382, 394, 397, 415, 636, 652-654 contrato social 412, 566, 573, 574, 578, 600, 603, 605, 607, 711, 714, 715 contrato(s) 326, 330, 336, 343, 344, 352, 354-356, 358, 366, 411, 573, 598, 603, 605, 607 controle 220, 223, 224, 268 convicção 194, 196, 199, 200, 206, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216, 217, 290, 313, 323, 414, 403, 411, 483 convicção verdadeira 197, 198, 207 cópia 127, 135-138, 166, 475, 535, 546, 646 corpo (s) 20-22, 28-30, 32, 33, 45-49, 55, 71, 73, 85, 86, 89-93, 9597, 105, 111-114, 116, 118, 140, 144, 149, 150, 154-157, 160-165, 180-188, 219, 225, 251, 255, 270, 281, 302, 319, 334, 341, 346, 347, 351, 353, 357, 374, 378, 380, 386-388, 392, 396, 406, 449, 450, 483, 492-496, 504, 506-513, 532, 538, 578, 579, 583, 605, 606, 668, 669, 672, 674, 684, 687, 711 corpo humano 145, 162, 383, 545 corrupção 35, 63, 322, 330, 443, 445, 446, 567, 568, 571, 573, 591, 598, 646, 678 corruptibilidade 62 crime e pena 326 cristianismo 23, 244, 246, 322, 461, 464, 467, 485, 699 crítica religiosa (ou da religião) 467, 474, 475 crítica 21, 23, 28, 34, 35, 39, 48, 105, 123, 125, 127-132, 137, 139, 140, 141, 143, 212, 225, 227, 235, 259, 261, 263, 275, 300, 324, 385, 387, 400-404, 406, 412, 414, 415, 420-423, 433, 461, 463, 464, 466, 468, 469, 471, 474, 475, 477, 479, 480482, 512-514, 520, 521, 524, 525, 526, 545, 567, 568, 569, 579, 581, 584, 598, 641, 642, 646, 647, 655 crítica à cultura 519 crítica à filosofia especulativa 469 crítica à moral 522 crítica à religião 462, 467, 483 crítica ao idealismo alemão 462 crítica ao individualismo egoísta 466 crítica aristotélico-horaciana 125 crítica artística 141 crítica às artes 566 crítica às ciências 566 crítica católica 616 crítica da arte 546 crítica da filosofia do direito 482 crítica da política 467, 475 crítica da teologia 467, 475 crítica de si mesmo 500 crítica do direito 467, 475 crítica em sentido amplo 125 crítica em sentido restrito 125, 130 crítica social 641 crítica, arma das 483 crítica, permanência da 140 cultura(s) 12, 124, 126, 134, 143, 192, 224, 231, 247, 263265, 277-280, 293, 296, 297, 403, 480, 494, 496, 498, 512, 518, 518, 521, 523, 594, 655, 695 cultura, associação de 264, 278, 285 D dano 212, 349, 350, 355, 362, 364, 414, 448, 539 democracia 323, 465, 664, 670, 673, 674, 714 democracia burguesa 263 democracia liberal 263 democracia radical 464, 465, 466, 470 democracias contemporâneas 403 democracias ocidentais 308 depuração 21, 24, 30, 35, 51 desamparo 621, 623, 624, 627, 636, 639 desaprovação 456 Descartes 102, 103, 104, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 161, 164, 166, 181, 192, 232, 492, 493, 499, 500, 508, 509, 510, 511, 611, 612, 619, 627, 631, 695, 696 desconfiança 154, 158, 340, 343, 348, 349, 350, 598, 714 desejo 28, 29, 30, 35, 37, 45, 46, 61, 82, 158, 170, 184, 202, 212, 213, 220, 225, 255, 294, 309, 341, 348, 350, 352, 354, 359, 361, 364, 389, 421, 422, 423, 427, 433, 438, 440, 538, 543, 570, 586, 588, 589, 590, 600, 621, 625, 657, 676, 697 desenvolvimento 301, 302, 304, 308, 314, 315, 315, 322, 325, 330, 332 desespero 616, 621, 624, 627, 639 desordem 283, 285, 340, 437, 450, 595, 598 déspota esclarecido 403, 409 despotismo 334, 408, 413, 598, 697, 702, 711, 712 desunião 429, 430, 431, 432 determinação histórica 479 determinismo 395, 624, 630, 635 Deus imortal 365 Deus mortal 365 dever, deveres 269, 285, 333, 334, 335, 342, 343, 355, 410, 413, 414, 573, 574, 590, 601, 605, 606, 607, 613, 655, 657, 662, 671, 683, 684, 685, 686, 688, 689, 691 dialética 68, 129, 231, 303, 315, 472 dialética do reconhecimento 305, 309 diálogos platônicos 132 dicotomia sujeito-objeto 134, 138, 139 Diderot 565, 619, 642, 702, 713 dignidade 73, 294, 363, 415, 500, 620, 631, 655, 657, 661, 676, 677 direito abstrato 305, 310, 312, 325 direito civil (direitos civis) 9, 325, 605 direito da particularidade do sujeito 322 direito da vontade subjetiva 325 direito de herança 281 direito de(a) natureza 324, 342, 352 direito natural 306, 321, 324, 342, 343, 353, 584, 586, 590, 596, 713 direito político, direitos políticos 76, 78 direito(s) 75, 158, 160, 211, 242, 245, 247, 248, 252, 253, 281, 283, 300, 301, 304, 305, 306, 308, 320, 321, 324, 325, 326, 328, 330, 332-336, 342-344, 353-358, 360, 365, 413, 462, 466, 470, 475, 476, 480, 482, 486, 488, 500, 511, 559, 573, 574, 575, 585, 590, 595-598, 601-604, 606, 607, 622, 649, 661, 675, 681, 704, 713-715 direitos universais 486 disciplinarização 251 discurso científico 234, 244, 256 discurso filosófico 12, 247, 300 dispositivo de sexualidade 220, 255 dissensão, dissensões 436, 672, 678, 679 distensão 28, 47, 49, 52, 53, 55 distinção real 85, 149, 180, 181, 183, 397 divisão da sociedade 262, 477 dogmatismo 402, 403, 501, 700 dogmatismo filosófico 403 dominação 239, 240, 241, 253, 264, 303, 464, 465, 466, 467, 469, 470, 471, 675, 680 dominação de classe 220, 240, 247, 253, 254 dominação estatal 230 dominação religiosa 468 donatismo 22 Dostoievski 623 dualismo 19, 20, 82, 492, 494 dúvida, duvidar 11, 78, 81, 83, 97, 103, 143, 147, 149, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160, 161, 163, 165, 172, 175, 176, 181, 183, 188, 397, 517, 524, 698, 703 E ecletismo 485 Eco, u. 545 economia nacional 479 economia política 232, 234, 240, 307, 463, 479 economia política liberal 224 educação 5, 9, 10, 135, 143, 145, 220, 251, 265, 284, 331, 370, 381, 432, 441, 448, 449, 512, 559, 560, 591, 646, 662, 702, 705 educação alemã 485 educação estética 643 educação helênica 132 efeito 109, 148, 167, 168, 172, 199, 200, 206, 209, 237, 270, 279, 372, 372, 373, 378, 382, 384, 386, 387, 388, 390, 493, 550, 551, 607, 669 efeitos de dominação 239 efeitos de poder 212, 213, 214, 216, 222, 223, 233, 234, 237 efetividade 302, 303, 308, 313, 315, 317, 321, 325, 327, 333, 334 efetividade da constituição 335 efetividade espiritual 331 efetividade ética 336 elemento passivo 484 elementos indecomponíveis 71 Eliot, T.S. 141 emancipação 403, 469, 486, 487, 489 emancipação alemã 488, 489 emancipação dos príncipes 484 emancipação européia 485 emancipação geral 485, 488 emancipação parcial 487 emancipação política 465, 468, 484 emancipação teórica 483 emancipação universal 487 empirismo 237, 252, 587 empirismo cego 238 engajamento 630, 631, 633, 635, 636, 637 engajamento político 646 Engels, F. 463, 466 ente de razão 215, 216, 217 ente real 215, entendimento 35, 38, 54, 84, 111, 112, 139, 148, 149, 162, 168, 173 176, 181, 186, 188, 195, 237, 323, 376, 386 391, 407, 408, 413, 495, 587, 588, 619, 656 episteme 132, 134, epistemologia, epistemológico 147, 230, 242, 399, 526 epistemológico, reconhecimento 243 epistemológicos, corte ou ruptura 230, 242 equidade 360, 361 erro 34, 54, 119, 148, 154, 157, 158, 162, 166, 167, 172-176, 188, 199, 200, 203, 207-209, 214, 216, 261, 273, 412, 428, 474, 481, 506, 537, 583, 588, 635 esclarecimento 355, 399, 402, 403, 406-415 Escola de Frankfurt 300 Escola histórica do Direito 476 Escolástica 83, 143, 290, 545 Escoto, D. 83 escravidão 28, 578, 594, 602, 607, 676, 704 escravo(s) 60, 64, 70, 71, 72, 75, 78, 89, 159, 273, 450, 513, 539, 573, 578, 597, 601, 602, 632, 669, 687, 712 esferas sociais 477 espaço 28, 29, 40, 44-52, 105, 111, 119, 134, 139, 182, 187, 225, 236, 237, 243, 270, 308, 493, 494, 500, 502-510, 524, 537, 657 Esparta 66, 77, 434-436, 568 especulativo 82, 234, 302, 309, 312, 318, 385, 397, 402, 654 Espeusipo 60 Espinosa 191-203, 206, 207, 210-212, 215-217, 371, 374, 695 espírito (não espírito) 495 espírito 24, 27, 28, 32, 41-44, 49, 5154, 89, 102, 144, 154, 157166, 168, 171, 177-180, 182, 186, 187, 225, 248, 254, 271, 282, 284, 285-287, 290, 291, 294, 296, 299, 303, 304, 306, 315, 316, 317, 318, 323, 326, 329, 334, 335, 341, 346, 347, 351, 377, 408, 467, 475, 477, 495, 496, 507-514, 547, 567-569, 578-580, 584, 585, 592, 593, 649, 651, 652, 654, 655, 657, 672, 703 espírito absoluto 238, 301, 495 espírito crítico, 130 espírito de Deus, 619 espírito de liberdade 414 espírito de seriedade 636 espírito dos cidadãos 336 espírito ético 333 espírito humano 160, 568, 592, 596, 710 espírito livre 521, 697 espírito objetivo 129, 301, 327, 332 espírito público 379, 380 espírito revolucionário 341 Espírito Santo, 687 espírito subjetivo 301, 327 espírito substancial 332 esquema categorial 61 esquerda hegeliana 463, 464 essência (s) 61, 62, 84, 85, 86, 89-91, 94, 96, 98, 99, 104, 126, 134, 137, 140, 149, 162, 176-179, 181-183, 187, 225, 302, 303, 314, 315, 331, 333, 336, 389, 391, 464, 467, 483, 512, 524, 526, 534, 535, 604, 612, 613, 618-621, 623, 633, 636, 654, 665 essência comunicativa da arte 137 essência da natureza 493 essência de Deus, 178, 179, 467 essência do cristianismo 464, 467 essência do espírito 303, 315, 316 essência do mundo 525 essência universal 632 Estado 220, 224, 230, 234, 239, 240, 242, 264, 273, 294, 304-306, 308, 309, 322, 323, 324, 580, 581, 583, 586, 590, 598, 602, 604–607, 646, 705, 697, 705, 712, 714, 715 Estado abstrato 470 Estado constitucional 485 Estado de guerra 595 Estado de natureza 324, 325, 572, 573,592, 574, 583, 584, 586, 591, 592, 583, 600, 603 Estado ideal 646 Estado livre 437 estado lúdico 645, 656 Estado moderno 230, 309, 335, 470, 478, 482 Estado moral 646 Estado, aparelhos de 239, 242, 253 Estado, essência do 335, 657 Estado, estrutura do 240, 260 Estado, golpe de 260 estagirita 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 130 estética da expressão 136 estética da imitação 140 estética hegeliana 128 estética normativa 140 estética pitagórica 544 estética platônica 544 estética schilleriana 645 estética(s) 123, 124,126-129, 136, 138-141, 261, 300, 310, 543-546, 613, 634, 642644, 657 estética, educação 642, 643-646, 648 estética, história da 544, 547, 642, 647 estética, sensibilidade 124, 261 estilística da existência 224 estruturalismo 222, 228, 231, 235 eternidade 23, 26-28, 30-38, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 526, 617, 650, 707, 708 ética 62, 63, 68, 77, 88, 89, 132, 192, 193, 195, 202, 203, 300, 305, 306, 311, 318, 331, 333, 336, 419, 612, 614 ética do cuidado de si 224 ética do estado 331 ética e política 77, 306, 422 ética, determinação 321 ética, totalidade 309 ética, vida 305, 306, 331, 470 eticidade 305-308, 322-328, 332 Euclides 504 Eudoxo de Cnido 59 evangelho 29, 30, 34, 354, 711 existencialismo 124, 129, 221, 247, 609, 610, 612, 614, 616, 617, 618, 620, 623, 630, 633, 638, 639 existencialismo ateu 619 experiência 11-13, 61, 92, 107, 109, 113, 115, 119, 136, 137, 181, 194, 195, 197, 207, 208, 221, 237, 247, 251, 271, 285, 291, 341, 347, 350, 370, 371, 373, 377, 380, 381, 384-387, 389, 402, 418, 426-428, 448, 452, 453, 457, 469, 477, 497, 498, 499, 501, 503, 505, 507, 509, 510, 511, 540, 543, 580, 597, 610, 617, 651, 652, 654, 655, 672, 677 experiência cartesiana 493 experiência da razão 12, 466 experiência de pensamento 107 experiência imediata 247 experiência ingênua 508 experiência perceptiva 506 experiência sensível 502 experiência subjetiva (particular) 107, 208 experiência vaga 197, 207, 208, 216 extrajurídico 252, 253 F faculdade de conhecimento 642 faculdade de desejar 642 faculdade de julgar 400, 415, 642 faculdades do espírito 347 falsidade 37, 61, 154, 157, 159, 166, 185, 188, 200, 380, 715 fanatismo religioso 697 fé 21, 82, 270, 271, 275, 290, 357, 433, 457, 458, 483, 627, 659, 672, 680 fascismo 233, 234, 259, 260, 264, 628, 638 fé cristã 464 fé na autoridade 483 fé, autoridade da 483 fé, boa 514, 636 fé, má 621, 634, 635, 639 felicidade 193-195, 199, 202, 214, 216, 304, 346, 363, 395, 397, 442, 475, 512, 539, 540, 585, 594, 598, 637, 643, 644, 652, 653, 663, 664, 683 felicidade ilusória 475 fenômeno(s) 61, 125, 131, 144, 145, 234, 236, 242, 247, 248, 251, 253, 255, 257, 268, 301, 314, 395, 499, 518, 543, 586, 631, 643, 653, 664 fenomenologia 124, 125, 126, 221, 222, 247, 299, 310, 497, 610 Feuerbach, l. 300, 462, 464, 466, 467, 468, 471 Fichte, J-G. 299, 302, 321 figura 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 119, 156, 157, 159, 162, 176-178, 180-182, 184, 185, 305, 313, 326, 391, 534, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657 filologia 519 filosofia 5, 6, 10-3, 19, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 61, 62, 82, 83-86, 88, 89, 99, 101, 103, 106, 107, 118, 124, 126, 130, 132, 143, 145, 146, 151, 152, 153, 193-196, 203, 206, 214, 216, 220-222, 225, 231, 247, 259, 262, 263, 265, 266, 299, 300, 314, 328, 372, 376, 377, 384, 397, 400, 403, 461, 464, 466, 469, 480-482, 484, 489, 491, 492, 494, 495, 496, 502, 506, 519, 520, 521, 522, 524, 543, 546, 567, 569, 579-582, 609-612, 616, 618, 693, 695, 696, 698, 700, 707, 710 filosofia agostiniana 20 filosofia alemã 479, 480 filosofia analítica 66 filosofia árabe-muçulmana 81 filosofia aristotélica (filosofia de Aristóteles) 64, 83 filosofia burguesa 616 filosofia cartesiana 192 filosofia clássica alemã 262 filosofia da arte 124, 125, 128, 129, 130, 300 filosofia da Grécia antiga 62 filosofia da história 251, 300 filosofia da imanência 469 filosofia da natureza 301, 310, 462 filosofia da práxis 262, 464 filosofia da religião 300, 467 filosofia de Berkeley 103 filosofia de Descartes 631 filosofia de Epicuro 62 filosofia de Espinosa 193, 195, 198, 206 filosofia de hegel 300 filosofia de kant (filosofia kantiana) 399, 401,404, 524, 631 filosofia de marx 471 filosofia de Nietzsche 521, 522 filosofia de Platão 62 filosofia divina 89 filosofia do direito 300, 301, 305, 306, 308, 310, 312, 317, 318, 325, 463, 467, 469, 471, 474, 482 filosofia do espírito 301, 310 filosofia do estado 646 filosofia do quietismo 630 filosofia dogmática 402 filosofia econômica 88, 89 filosofia especulativa 88, 89, 301, 316, 465, 469 filosofia estética 645 filosofia marxista 300 filosofia moderna 143, 492, 707 filosofia moral 359, 360 filosofia natural 89, 145, 392 filosofia política 88, 89, 266, 300, 307, 311, 419, 465, 467-469, 471, 492, 545 filosofia política hegeliana 308, 466 filosofia prática 63, 88, 203 filosofia primeira 85, 89, 99, 152, 153 filosofia sistemática 262 filosofia social 306 filosofia, negação da 481, 482 filosofia, realização da 469, 489 filosofia, tarefa da 314, 466 física 63, 82, 88, 144, 145, 156, 341, 345, 494, 495, 504, 546, 588, 652, 661, 696, 698 física aviceniana 84 física clássica 501 física da relatividade 495, 501 física newtoniana 696 forma viva 645, 654 forma(s) 11, 19, 32, 54, 60, 72, 74, 85, 91-96, 99, 120, 133, 136, 156, 157, 160, 167-169, 175, 177, 186, 201, 203, 216, 223, 226, 232, 237, 277, 282, 284, 301, 531, 535, 645, 653 forma(s) jurídica(s) 223, 226, 252 formações discursivas 222 formas de alienação 468 formas positivas de reconhecimento 305 fortuna 419, 420, 429, 432, 451454 , 458, 459, 467, 597 Foucault, m. 219-228, 230, 231, 235-238, 240, 244, 247, 255, 257 Freud, S. 221, 256, 266 G Galileu, G. 144, 150, 493, 710 genealogia 223, 522 gênero 32, 61 156, 166, 168, 173, 209, 269, 419, 422, 451, 509, 638 Gestalt 313, 653 Glauco 546, 559, 560, 582 glória 324, 349, 440, 531, 559, 688 Górgias 78, 544 governo (s) 76, 101, 220, 240, 247, 287, 336, 351, 357, 385, 409, 413415, 422, 428, 430, 443, 462, 477, 574, 578, 586, 597, 598, 669, 671, 673, 678, 679, 680, 681, 684, 686, 688, 697, 712, 714, 715 governo civil 363, 712 governo da coletividade 669 governo da razão 684 governo de Deus 683 governo de muitos 678, 679 governo de um só 672, 678 governo divino 684, 686, 689, 691 governo dos reinos 428 governo humano 686 governo justo 670 governo natural 672, 684 governo popular 430 governo principesco 421 governo prussiano 462, 464, 465 governo republicano 418 governo romano 433 governo, cargos de 76, 78 governo, formas de 664, 665 governo, ideia alemã de 485 governo, sistema de 477 Gramsci, A. 258 – 262, 264, 279, 420 Grécia clássica 645 guerra 73, 220, 234, 260, 264, 288, 292, 294, 340-343, 347-354, 356, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 366, 418, 423, 428, 433, 435, 436, 439, 477, 480, 484, 559, 595, 609, 677, 713 guerra civil 340, 341, 351, 364, 463 guerra da Coréia 492 guerra de todos contra todos 339, 351, 353, 356, 532 guerra mundial 260, 491, guerra, natureza da 342, 349 h hegel, F. 62, 126 – 128, 131, 135, 220, 298 – 309, 317, 462 – 468, 482, 641 hegelianismo 300, 308, 462, 466, 468 hegelianos de direita 300, 465 hegelianos de esquerda 300, 464, 466 hegelianos, jovens 464, 469 hegemonia da cópia 137 hégira 84 heidegger, m. 26, 124 – 126, 610, 611, 618, 619, 623 hermenêutica 82, 128, 139 hesíodo 72, 560 hípias 549-551 hípias maior 544, 545, 547, 548 história 11, 140, 220 – 225, 230, 231, 235, 238, 242, 244, 246, 248, 252, 255, 259, 262, 263, 265, 268, 270, 271, 276, 277, 282, 284, 304, 379, 380, 385, 410, 428, 448, 463, 466, 469, 475, 476, 478, 479, 480, 492, 501, 512, 525, 568, 609, 610, 622, 633, 641, 679, 693, 698 – 700,710, 711, 714 história da estética 544, 547, 642, 647 história da filosofia 26, 102, 126, 262, 300, 400, 543, 544, 610 história da filosofia 6, 102, 126, 262, 300, 400, 543, 544, 610 história dos acontecimentos 222 história em ato 262 história ideal 480 história real 480 história universal 304, 311, 404, 409, 410, 415, 530, 699 hobbes, T. 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 349, 350, 354, 355, 357, 362, 365, 366, 371, 374, 571, 573, 590, 591, 595, 697 homem estético 641, 645 homem 19 24, 34, 36, 39, 45, 46, 53, 64, 65, 73, 74, 77, 78, 90, 103, 108 – 114, 118, 137, 151, 153, 155, 166, 188, 193, 194, 202, 206, 208, 213, 215 – 217, 221 – 225, 231, 232, 239, 240, 246, 256, 269, 271, 276, 282, 291, 292, 305, 313, 320, 321, 330, 331, 336, 340 – 366, 386, 393 – 415, 433, 439, 440, 442, 447, 456, 457, 467 – 493, 502 – 595, 600 –660, 672, 674, 679, 683, 684, 687, 688, 690, 700, 702 – 706, 709, 712 homem intuitivo 528, 540 homem lúdico 646 homem racional 528, 540, 612 homero 72, 73, 132 honra 321, 324, 330, 361, 363, 392, 427, 434, 440, 441, 443, 444, 475, 559 horácio 125 humanidade 81, 150, 225, 273, 289, 291, 292, 294, 346, 347, 350, 357, 363, 378, 379, 381, 384, 385, 387, 389, 390, 412, 413, 415, 440, 458, 464, 477, 479, 512, 521, 602, 621, 622, 633, 634, 638, 642-646, 648, 649-651, 654, 699, 701 humanidades 9, 10, 220 humanismo 462, 466, 513, 614, 616, 617, 623, 638, 639 hume, D. 369-378, 384, 385, 387, 391, 393, 396, 566, 642 humores 396, 432, 437, 454 husserl, E. 26, 124, 222, 610 hyppolite, J. 220 I Idade média 83, 127, 248, 254, 255, 257, 289, 463, 489, 660, 661, 662 ideal de beleza 656 idealismo 262, 302, 312, 313, 462, 464, 465, 466, 468 idealismo alemão 302, 462, 464, 468 idealismo subjetivo 313 idealistas 62 ideia 27, 107, 108, 110, 111, 114, 128, 133, 144, 148, 154, 166, 168, 170, 171, 173 – 183, 198, 199, 202, 215, 217, 241, 242, 264, 286, 301 – 315, 318, 325, 327, 329, 373, 378, 389, 390 – 392, 401, 403, 410, 412, 419, 427, 468, 478, 485, 500, 501, 503, 504, 507, 508, 521, 522, 524, 546, 553, 555, 556, 590, 614, 619, 651, 659, 714 ideia da propriedade 592 ideia de alienação 466 ideia de causação 388 ideia de igualdade 341 ideia de liberdade 301, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309 ideia de necessidade 373, 378 ideia de soberania 465 ideia ética 333 ideia inata 106 ideia perfeita 217 ideia tátil 106 ideia universal perfeita 217 ideia visíveis 111, 112, 116, 119 ideia visual 106 ideias tangíveis 111, 115, 116, 118 igreja 22, 251, 299, 407, 410, 411, 419, 484, 518, 660, 687, 694, 703, 713 imitação 125 – 128, 131, 133 – 138, 140, 172, 208, 319, 324, 409, 428, 440, 545, 546, 552 – 563 império romano 20, 432, 449, 485, 662 imperativo categórico 483, 650 império(s) 428, 429, 434, 435, 436, 441, 449, 451, 487, 655, 662, 711 impulso à verdade 518, 525, 531, 532, 535, 537 impulso formal 650, 652, 654, 655 impulso lúdico 645, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656 impulso material 655 impulso sensível 645, 649, 652, 653 inconsciente 221, 231, 234, 247, 284, 649 indagação filosófica 645 Index 419, 694 individualismo 466, 613 indivíduo isolado 480 infraestrutura 235, 611 inimigo(s) 308, 341, 347, 350, 353, 357, 362, 363, 365, 366, 440, 443, 444, 446, 452, 453, 455, 477, 567, 596, 597, 668, 671, 677, 680, 685, 691 injustiça com armas 74 injustiça(s) 275, 324, 351, 355, 358, 359, 410, 599, 606, 674, 697, 698 injusto 65, 73, 78, 351, 352, 358, 488, 586, 624, 639, 669, 670, 673, 674, 676, 681 instituição, instituições 202, 203, 215, 232, 234, 245, 254, 264, 305, 306, 402, 427, 428, 432, 437, 438, 439, 441, 442, 445, 449, 450, 464, 465, 485, 596 instituto da acusação 437 instrumento de poder 252 intelecto 20, 21, 62, 84, 86, 89, 92, 93, 95, 126, 192, 196, 198, 202, 203, 215-217, 273, 290, 389, 517, 518, 524-527, 530-532, 539, 667 intelecto em ato 93 intelecto em hábit 93 intelecto em potência 93 Isócrates 59 J Jaeger, W. 545, 547 jansenismo 693, 706 Jaspers, k. 618 Jesus 30, 464, 517, 688, 689, 711 juízo 158, 159, 162, 174 – 176, 339, 400, 426, 503, 638, 642, 649, 650, 651 jusnaturalismo 302, 307, 324 justiça 27, 30, 74, 239, 248, 329, 351, 358, 360-362, 393, 462, 501, 550, 594-596, 598, 607, 650, 652, 670, 673-675, 684, 686, 715 justiça penal 248 justo 12, 65, 73, 74, 116, 151, 352, 358, 359, 586, 669, 670, 673, 674, 681, 682 k kafka, F. 514 kant, I. 138, 237, 302, 321, 398 – 403, 406 – 415, 524, 525, 619, 631, 636, 641 – 643, 647, 656 kierkegaard, S. 622 l lefort, C. 424, 491 legislador 75, 429, 600, 621, 639 lei 28, 29, 72-74, 77, 82, 88, 248, 251, 273, 287, 330, 334, 335, 340, 350, 351, 353, 354, 359, 360, 412, 422, 431, 433, 501, 506, 514, 531, 566, 567, 585, 592, 605, 607, 635, 650, 654, 655, 656, 681, 708, 713, 714 lei da necessidade 648, 655 lei de natureza 353, 357, 358, 361, 597, 598 lei divina 88, 689, 690 lei do evangelho 354 lei do mais forte 592, 598 lei moral 657 lei natural 343, 344, 570 lei religiosa 82 leibniz, G.W. 619, 695, 696, 700, leviatã 340, 365 lévi-Strauss 231, 247 liberalismo 308, 461, 465, 466 liberdade 22, 154, 159, 174, 175, 177, 179, 194, 195, 199, 200, 211, 214, 216, 224, 226, 263 – 265, 273, 275, 280 – 284, 294, 296, 299, 300 – 309, 315 – 336, 342, 343, 348, 351 – 354, 361, 370, 374, 377, 378, 386, 388 – 394, 399, 402, 403, 408 – 417, 422, 423, 428, 432, 433, 434, 437, 443, 447 – 449, 465, 468, 470, 476, 478, 487, 572, 573, 587, 588, 593, 597, 602, 603, 607, 609, 613, 614, 624, 630, 632, 635 – 637, 643, 646, 651, 652, 654, 655, 677, 696, 697, 700 liberdade absoluta 467 liberdade civil 232, 415, 420, 573, 574, 607 liberdade concreta 308, 332 liberdade da ação 370 liberdade da subjetividade 323 liberdade da vontade 319, 369 liberdade de consciência 322, 466 liberdade de falar 695 liberdade de imprensa 471, 485 liberdade de pensamento 280, 714 liberdade efetiva 512 liberdade hipotética 390 liberdade humana 211, 389, 469 liberdade moral 607 liberdade natural 343, 573, 754, 597, 603, 607 liberdade no fenômeno 643 liberdade original 578 liberdade particular 333 liberdade religiosa 696 liberdade romana, guarda da 433 liberdade social 488 liberdade subjetiva 303 – 309, 319 – 322, 327, 329, 331, 332, 335, 337 liberdade substancial 333 liberdade, aspecto objetivo da 305 liberdade, consciência da 304 liberdade, guarda da 434, 437 libertação 478, 480, 484, 486, 487, 489, 639 linguagem 12, 19, 26, 27, 30, 32 – 39, 62, 101 – 106, 112 – 117, 132, 141, 219, 231 – 238, 318, 328, 363, 512, 518, 522, 527, 532 – 534, 559, 571, 579, 589, 611, 649, 653, 655, 657, 663, 668 literatura 19, 123, 124, 151, 221, 231, 246, 265, 491, 567, 614, 693, 701, 702 literatura alemã 642 literatura científica 244 literatura clássica 19 literatura francesa 236 livre-arbítrio 22, 27, 304, 391, 395 locke, J. 113, 571, 573, 587, 695, 696, 710 lógica 12, 61, 62, 82, 85, 90, 92, 105, 150, 195, 232, 241, 300303, 307, 309, 317, 341, 375, 536, 661 lógica modal 62, 85 loucura 219, 221, 222, 232, 234, 236, 247-249, 252, 254, 514, 522 luis xIv 696, 709, 710 luta crítica da filosofia 481 luta de classes 231, 235, 262, 264, 279, 294 m má-fé 621, 634, 635, 636, 639 mal 19-22, 65, 73, 175, 194, 202, 213217, 268-271, 275, 321, 359, 360, 364, 395, 428, 439, 440, 448, 454, 455, 458, 538, 540, 580, 581, 584, 588, 591, 621, 673-675, 678, 697, 700, 702 mal físico 395, 396 mal moral 396 malebranche, N. 506, 507 maniqueísmo 19, 20, 21, 29 maomé, maometano 705, 706 maquiavel, N. 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 426428, 456 maquiaveliano (a) 419, 420, 421, 427, 431 maquiavélico 419 marcel, G. 618 marx, jovem 462-466, 469 marx, k. 62, 233, 262, 300, 461-474, 479-481 marxismo 233, 251, 252, 481 marxista 222, 230-236, 242, 244, 252, 300 marxista, tradição 222 matéria 32, 84, 91-93, 96, 99, 102, 139, 316, 319, 373, 374, 378, 379, 382, 388-390 matéria primeira 99 matéria segunda 99 materialismo 362, 466, 567, 631 mecanismos de poder 234, 235, 237, 247, 253, 420 mediação 23, 24, 28, 53, 129, 305, 309, 323, 330, 466, 611, 649 meditações 144, 146, 150, 161, 188, 396, 493 medo 159, 195, 213, 249, 250, 345, 350, 355, 356, 358, 361, 362, 408, 431, 434, 437, 453, 476, 512, 540, 675, 678 medo da morte 86, 339, 352 memória 42, 43, 51, 52, 55, 104, 106, 174, 188, 201, 207, 277, 378, 386, 443, 710 mentira 28, 517-520, 523-526, 530, 532, 575, 622, 635, 702 merleau-Ponty, m. 13, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 509, 510, 514, 609 mestre (s) 20, 280, 289, 290, 555, 657 metafísica 61, 62, 82-86, 89, 98, 103, 107, 126, 135, 138, 140, 144, 145, 147, 157, 165, 389, 392, 402, 414, 519, 521, 661, 700 metafísica aviceniana 85 metafísica, crise da 126, 135 metecos 75, 78 método 66, 71, 144, 145, 147, 231, 232, 236-240, 262, 388, 391, 553, 586, 610, 611, 696 método, problema do 237 micro lutas 239 microbiologia 243 mímesis 545, 546 miséria religiosa 467, 475 mistério 137, 194, 201, 495 mito(s) 231, 538 mitologia 480, 706 modelo cartesiano 105 modelo da biologia 64 modelo educacional 9, 10 modelo matemático e geométrico 21, 60 modelo médico/científico 257 modelo(s) 53, 134, 234, 279, 423, 496, 546, 705 modéstia 238, 360, 361, 397 modo intermediário 436 modo subjetivo sensível 643 modos extraordinários 432, 437 modos ordinários 437 molière 704 monarquia 323, 340, 357, 366, 436, 463, 678, 714 monarquia absolutista 465 monarquia prussiana 465, 466 monopólio 306, 479 montaigne, m. 703 moral 269, 275, 301, 306, 320, 321, 330-332, 334, 372, 374, 379, 385, 399, 402, 419, 487, 509, 521, 528, 570, 574, 587, 590, 609, 613, 623, 625, 626, 628, 634, 635, 635, 636, 645, 652, 662, 700, 701, 712 moral (extra-moral) 517, 518, 519, 524, 526, 530 moral da ação e do engajamento 631 moral estética 634 moral kantiana 625 moral laica 623 moral provisória 145 moral sartreana 614 moral, aperfeiçoamento 567 moral, autonomia 412 moral, caráter 643 moral, corpo 604 moral, crítica à 522 moral, desigualdade 585 moral, determinação 304 moral, Estado 646 moral, fundação da 385 moral, genealogia da 522, 528 moral, imposição 653 moral, lei 657 moral, liberdade 607 moral, maldade (mal) 394, 396, 397 moral, necessidade 652 moral, obrigação 289 moral, problema 635 moral, progressão (progresso) 415, 567, 568 moral, responsabilidade 20, 393 moral, ressentimento 397 moral, rigorismo 693 moral, sanção 475 moral, sentimento 532, 650 moral, torpeza 395 moral, valoração (valor) 419, 521, 566 moralidade 305, 311, 325, 326, 328, 391, 392, 393, 394, 415, 601, 602, 607, 613, 614 moralidade objetiva 305 moralidade social 305 moralo, pessoa 604, 606 morte da arte 125, 127, 128, 131 movimento 12, 33, 35, 45-48, 62, 82, 89, 98, 109, 137, 170, 216, 386, 389, 394, 408, 428, 436, 459, 493, 494, 527, 603, 657 movimento de resistência 257 movimento dialético 301 movimento estruturalista 222, 231 movimento expressionista 136 movimento fascista 260 movimento industrial 488 movimento operário 259, 260 movimento religioso 693 movimento retilíneo 96, 97 movimento sensível 132 movimento socialista 259, 278 movimento, teoria do 144 movimentos de liberação 257 multiplicidade 26, 42, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 103, 186, 380 mundo corruptível 63 mundo das idéias 60, 63, 132 mundo do homem 474 mundo real 194, 195, 199 mundo sensível 649 N nacionalidade 135, 481 não razão 235 não-dominação 304 natural 317, 321, 322, 324, 326, 329, 341, 342, 343, 346, 347, 350, 351, 352, 353, 358, 366, 369, 374, 385, 392, 397, 407, 496, 501, 505, 508, 532, 570, 571, 573, 574, 583, 584, 585, 586, 590, 591, 592, 596, 597 naturalismo 136, 617 natureza (da) política 59, 65, 418 natureza (s) 20, 22, 54, 64, 65, 71-74, 85, 91, 95-98, 102, 106, 110, 113-119, 131, 135, 139, 140, 146, 150, 151, 156, 160-162, 164, 168, 170, 177, 183-188, 193, 199, 202, 209, 211, 215, 230, 279, 301, 306, 315, 319, 328, 341-343, 347, 349, 350, 352-356, 360, 373, 378, 380-384, 387, 389, 390, 396, 407, 408, 415, 492, 493, 499, 500, 504, 526, 530, 531, 535, 537, 539, 545, 546, 552, 555-557, 562, 570, 571, 581-589 , 591, 601, 602, 603, 607, 619, 663, 667, 672, 683-685, 690, 703, 704, 707 natureza da arte 128 natureza da constituição 65 natureza da guerra 342, 349 natureza da justiça 358 natureza da vontade 320 natureza de Deus 173, 174 natureza do conceito 66 natureza do espírito 160, 178, 318 natureza do homem 349, 602 natureza do ser pensante 162 natureza do tempo 46 natureza dos povos 454 natureza ética 318 natureza humana 27, 150, 181, 350, 372, 374, 375, 379, 380, 383, 384, 386, 412, 579, 586, 616, 619, 620, 624, 628, 632, 654, 655, 688, 711 natureza morta 137 natureza racional 649 natureza religiosa 130 natureza sensível 648, 493 natureza, fenômenos da 395 natureza, leis de 352, 353, 354, 357, 358, 359, 361, 363, 378, 383 necessidade 325, 329, 334, 373, 374, 389, 391, 392, 393, 394, 397, 415, 436, 468, 470, 648, 650, 652, 653, 654, 655, 657 neoclassicismo 127 neoplatonismo 83 Newton, I. 150, Nietzsche, F. 126, 140, 222, 241, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 530, 697 nominalismo 135 normal 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 241, 248, 249, 253 normalidade 250, 251 novos modos e ordenações 427, 438 Nunes, B. 128, 546, 548, 552 O objetivação da liberdade 306 objetivismo 643 objetivo racional 643 objeto do impulso formal 645 objeto do impulso lúdico 645 objeto do impulso sensível 645 obra de arte 131, 133, 141, 290, 291, 401, 613, 634, 657 observação empírica 60 ocasião 453, 454, 679 ócio 428, 436, 449, 657 ódio 195, 201, 202, 212, 363, 392, 441, 448, 598 olho do poder 250 oligarquia 75, 670, 673 opinião 134, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 206, 207, 209, 210, 211214, 216, 217, 323, 349, 350, 377, 385, 387, 388, 396, 403, 431, 433, 438, 458, 513, 563 opinião pública 336, 600, 680 opinião, liberdade de 403, 409 ópio do povo 467, 468, 475 oratória 19 ordem antiga 479 ordem do real 193 ordenação 232, 272, 427, 428, 431, 436, 536 ordenação jurídica 466 ordenadores de religiões 439 organização 75, 222, 235, 255, 264, 278, 280, 283, 297, 301, 307, 334, 377, 383, 427, 499, 524, 629, 630 órganon 63, 67 ouvir dizer 196, 197, 207, 208, 211, 212, 216, 509 P pacto (pacto social) 356-358, 364, 365, 572, 573, 581, 600, 602, 603, 604, 606 paidéia 545, 547 paixão 210, 216, 392, 396, 477, 613, 621, 624, 637, 652, 674 paixões da alma 146, 151, 161, 195 paixões do homem 350, 591 paradigma 60 paradigma da matemática 60 parlamento 260, 714, 715 partido político 481 passividade 150, 185, 654 páthos 469, 477, 531 páthos jurídico 469 pátria 212, 273, 324, 427, 438, 440, 441, 449, 453, 454, 606, 706, 711 paz 344, 350, 352, 353, 354, 357, 359, 360, 363, 364, 365, 366, 396, 412, 414, 441, 532, 561, 590, 596, 621, 664, 671, 672, 673, 675, 678, 690, 691, 713 pedagogia 545 pelagianismo 22 pensamento 62, 63, 65, 66, 83, 107, 123, 249, 256, 279, 334, 415, 417 pensamento de emancipação 487 pensamento jurídico 249 pensamento médico 249 percepção 90, 93, 102, 103, 104, 105, 147, 185, 261, 378, 495, 498, 499, 500, 502, 505, 506, 507, 508 personalidade 270, 275, 322, 324, 325,326, 349, 650 pessoa real 482 physis 64 Picasso, P. 503, 634 Pierre, B. 700 Píndaro 545 pintura moderna 504 Pitágoras 560 pitagorismo, pitagórico 543, 544, 560 Platão 59, 60, 61, 62, 125, 126, 130, 133, 134, 138, 302, 313, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547 platonismo 21, 22, 23, 24, 133, 138, 544, Plotino 21, 26, 53 Plutarco 703 pobreza naturalmente existente 488 pobreza produzida artificialmente 488 poder 430, 446, 448 483, 485, 486, 523, 597, 598, 601, 624, 662, 663, 670, 673, 674, 675, 679, 680, 681, 682, 694, 695, 697, 698, 712, 713, 715 poder absoluto e extraordinário 446 poder coercitivo 339, 356, 358 poder comum 340, 349, 351, 356, 363, 364 poder disciplinar 219 poder material 483, 486 poder microfísico 224 poder normalizador 257 poder político 249, 340, 486 poder público 364 poder soberano 344, 365, 366 poder universal 485, 486 poder, função de 70 poder, relação de 252 poderes do Estado 240 Políbio 380 polícia 239, 240 pólis 65, 74, 309 politéia 74 política 59, 63, 65, 70, 74, 77, 88, 140, 192, 194, 195, 225, 239, 252, 259-263, 286, 287, 293, 301, 340, 341, 372, 385, 402, 412, 414, 419, 422, 461, 463, 464, 465, 468, 476, 482, 485, 492, 569, 570, 580, 585, 600, 606, 645, 646, 660, 664, 712, 714 política transformadora 469 política, análise 251 política, associação 284, 297 política, astúcia 470 política, comunidade 70, 74, 77, 307, 469, 470, 573 política, concepção kantiana de 412 política, consciência 482 política, crítica da 467, 475 política, desigualdade 570, 571 política, emancipação 465, 468, 484 política, estabilidade 543 política, força 225, 470 política, militância 261, 462 política, mistificação da 465 política, natureza da 65, 418 política, ordem 140, 456 política, organização 264, 265 política, representação 263, 714 política, república 366 política, soberania 466, 467 política, sociedade 307, 421, 423 política, teoria 262 política, vida 65, 192, 302, 308, 341, 436, 446, 463, 467, 468, 470 políticas de resistência 226 pós-história 480 potência 61, 85, 93, 98, 160, 171, 183, 204, 287, 319, 335, 428, 436, 500, 601, 604 povo 27, 30, 77, 290, 334-336, 411, 412, 413, 415, 430, 432-437, 441445, 449, 454, 455, 466-468, 475, 476, 478, 480, 481, 483-486, 488, 489, 527, 535, 537, 538, 558, 568, 573, 585, 598, 604, 605, 630, 641, 656, 668, 670, 672, 673, 676, 677, 679, 680, 682, 683, 689, 699, 700, 711, 714, 715 povos livres 433 povos modernos 76, 478, 482, 484, 656 práticas de poder 244 práticas disciplinares 244 práticas discursivas 222, 244 práxis 464, 481, 482, predicados 61, 62, 95, 493, 611 pré-história 480 principado 420, 422, 430, 440, 447,451, 453, 454, 455, 487, 670 princípio 26, 29, 30, 34, 35, 38, 49, 55, 273, 297, 489, 554 profetas 43, 454, 673 progresso 264, 276, 277 progresso das ciências 696 proletariado 251, 262, 280, 294, 295, 465, 466, 469, 487, 488, 489, 628 proposições 62, 241 propriedade 90, 149, 177, 178, 182, 281, 283, 284, 285, 326, 330, 331, 336, 352, 358, 446, 470, 594, 595, 596, 597, 607 propriedade privada 264, 466, 479, 489 propriedade privada 466, 479 propriedade, privada negação da 489 Protágoras 544, 560 protecionismo 479 protestantismo 246, 483 Proust, m. 629 providência 566, 697, 707 providência divina 117, 669, 674, 683, 685, 708 providência geral 708 providência particular 708 prudência 154, 347 psicanálise 247 psicologia 63, 82, 83, 221, 225, 301, 506, 507, 610, 653 psiquiatria de classe 236 Q qualidade 61, 64, 96, 97, 302, 373, 389, 422, 535, 587, 588, 602 qualitas occulta 535 quantidade 50, 61, 98, 104, 105, 118, 119, 156, 168, 176, 360 quididade 91, 92, 95, 99 R Racine 629, 703 racionalidade 19, 20, 63, 90, 146, 240, 244, 332, 663 radical 128, 135, 147, 154, 243, 261, 309, 462, 464, 465, 466, 469, 470, 483, 484, 485, 511, 610 radicalidade 141, 154 razão 145, 154, 162, 194, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 234, 235, 252, 270, 314, 315, 320, 352, 353, 364, 400, 402, 403, 409, 410, 411, 414, 524, 526, 584, 642, 652, 654, 656, 667, 684 razão de estado 419 razão, limites da 409, 524, 525, razão, sobrevalorização da 526 razão, uso público da 403, 410 real 29, 62, 85, 104, 107, 149, 650, 655, 676, 688 realeza 662, 664, 666, 673, 678, 679, 662, 664 realidade 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 136, 167, 168, 169, 185, 215, 221, 252, 262, 271, 294, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 306, 317, 325, 327, 328, 334, 335, 339, 474, 475, 479, 481, 482, 484, 527, 617, 628, 629, 648, 649, 650, 651, 654, 655, 656 realidade político-social 479 realidade, avaliação da 287 realismo 136 reconhecimento 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 321, 323, 330, 332, 365 reconhecimento social 307 reconquista do homem 488 referência estética 139 reflexão 10, 13, 74, 90, 112, 113, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 160, 181, 225, 231, 233, 247, 286, 290, 305, 313, 322, 323, 381, 384, 396, 400, 443, 456, 465, 543, 591, 612, 645 regime 66, 123, 220, 233, 241, 247, 294, 308, 374, 402, 414, 417, 418, 420, 422, 428, 429, 430, 433, 435, 439, 443, 444, 453, 457, 458, 461, 462, 463, 478, 568, 664, 669, 670, 672, 673, 674, 678, 679, 683, 684, 694 regime republicano 417, 420, 429 regimes de verdade 220, 241, 247 regimes socialistas 233 reino da liberdade 306, 327, 468 reino da necessidade 468 religião 89, 212, 271, 300, 301, 323, 409, 411, 414, 428, 438, 441, 442, 448, 449, 462, 467, 468, 474, 475, 483, 697, 699, 705, 711, 713 religião cristã 323, 699, 711 religiosidade 483 renascença 131,135 representação 62, 103, 104, 133, 166-169, 184, 302, 313, 314, 320, 321, 328, 330, 500, 505, 519, 525, 527, 532, 635, 651 representação política 263, 365, 470, 714 representação sensível 62 república 133, 409, 421, 422, 423, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 436, 437, 438, 440, 442, 446, 447, 450, 604, 676, 677, 679, 681, 713, 714 república livre 437 república por aquisição 366 república por instituição 366 republicanismo 423, 464 responsabilidade 20, 22, 620, 621, 622, 634 responsabilidade histórica 269 reta razão 200, 201, 210 revolução 21, 60, 78, 126, 127, 131 135, 139, 150, 226, 244, 245, 259, 260, 283, 307, 408, 470, 476, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 592, 627, 628, 646, 695 revolução burguesa 135 revolução francesa 244, 245 revolução radical 484 revolução social 226, 259, 470 revolução socialista 259, 260 riqueza 136, 233, 260, 281, 300, 314, 328, 434, 443, 448, 450, 479, 579, 570, 580, 596, 670, 677, 687, 689, 695 Roma 20, 21, 22, 422, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 439, 441, 442, 443, 446, 447, 448, 484, 485, 499, 656, 659, 662, 677, 685 romantismo 127, 462, 617, 641, 642, 127, 462, 641, 642 S sabedoria 30, 35, 36,172, 347, 364, 550, 560, 563, 584, 617, 703 saber (não-saber) 532 saber 11, 34, 134, 143, 198-200, 206, 208, 211, 217, 219, 220, 222, 224-226, 230-232, 234, 236, 238, 241, 247, 248, 255-257, 294, 318, 327, 330, 332, 333, 335, 347, 399, 402, 409, 412, 494, 495, 499, 696 saber absoluto 495, 501 saber afirmativo de si mesmo 324 saber e poder 223, 225, 234, 237, 239, 241 saber especulativo 385 saber imediato de si mesmo 612 saber médico 232, 235, 243 saber metódico 499 saber verdadeiro 300 saber, dispositivos de 230 saber, domínios 223, 237 saber, edifício do 154 saber, formações empíricas do 237 saber, projeto de unificação 144 saber, sistema do 150 saber, vontade de 255-257 Saint-Simon 464 São Boa ventura 83 São Paulo 703, 704 sapere aude 407 Sartre, J-P. 124, 491, 492, 609-614, 616 Schelling, F.W. 299, 302 Schiller, F. 641-648, 650, 656, 657 Schleiermacher, F. D. E. 139, 140 Schopenhauer, A. 270, 519, 520, 524, 525 secularização 484 senso de verdade 533 sentidos 20, 21, 31, 32, 42, 84, 91, 92, 97, 104-106, 111, 116, 119, 145, 154, 160, 163, 165, 177, 182, 183, 185-188, 290, 351, 378, 386, 498, 499, 504, 531, 587, 588, 651, 653 sentimento (s) 11, 136, 157, 186, 187, 261, 275, 379, 381, 385, 397, 569, 581, 589, 593, 607, 613, 624, 663, 668, 703 sentimento moral (sentimentos morais) 396, 532, 650 ser 40, 61, 62, 85, 98, 99, 126, 137, 146-148, 160, 162, 170, 178, 180, 186, 291, 302, 394-395, 478, 483, 509, 512, 519, 572, 612, 613, 614, 632, 633, 636, 707 ser absoluto 651, 652, ser absoluto do homem 649 ser abstrato 474 ser comunitário 469 ser da práxis 481 ser de razão 606 ser em si 524 ser genérico 470 ser humano 82, 84, 86, 90-92, 98, 161, 249, 475, 489, 519, 663, 667, 668-670, 676, 684, 685, 687-690 ser infinito 89146, 148, 170 ser material 653 ser necessário 85 ser objetivo 61 ser pensado 61 ser pensante 162, 165-168, 172 ser pesado 319 ser possível 85 ser racional 536 ser sensível 583, 584 ser soberanamente perfeito 170, 178, 179 ser universal 319 ser, classes de 85 ser, divisão do 85 ser, esquecimento do 126 ser-aí 304-306, 313, 316, 317, 325, 326, 330, 332-334 ser-aí da força 324 ser-aí-imediato da liberdade 305 seres pensantes finitos 146 ser-no-mundo 610 ser-outro 301 servidão 194, 420, 422, 443, 448, 450, 483, 489, 575, 591, 597, 680, 682 sexualidade 220, 224, 225, 230, 231, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246, 247, 252, 255, 256, 257 significação 22, 103-105, 144, 162, 173, 187, 330, 337, 352, 512, 636 silogismos 62, 290 simulacro 557, 558 sinceridade 274, 291, 457, 569, 579, 635 sistemas de proibições 255 soberania 365, 470, 479, 604, 712 soberania do povo 466 soberania estatal; soberania do Estado 239, 466 soberania política 466 soberania transcendental 465 sociedade 65, 71, 137, 224, 225, 227, 232, 234, 237, 239, 242, 247 sociedade alemã 478, 487 sociedade burguesa 468, 484, 486, 488 sociedade civil 267, 306, 307, 308, 309, 312, 321, 326, 328-332, 335, 470, 592 sociedade civil-burguesa 305 sociedade civil universal 410 sociedade de classes 263 sociedade de direito 248 sociedade disciplinar 224, 247 sociedade moderna 246, 254, 263, 306, 311, 467 sociedade mundial 237 sociedade ocidental 237 sociedades científicas 568, 696 sociedades libertinas 693 Sócrates 11, 60, 61, 66, 543-551, 560, 561 sofisma 178, 179, 478 sofista 544, 554 solidariedade 277, 279, 280, 286, 617, 637 stalinismo 233, 238, 251 Stendhal 503, 637 subjetivação 220, 224, 247 subjetividade 136, 147, 224, 225, 302-305, 321, 323, 324, 327, 331, 333, 335, 375, 470, 616618, 620, 631, 639 subjetivismo 620, 633, 643 subjetivo racional 643 subjugação 486 sublime 655, 657, 683 substância 36, 61, 67, 85, 95, 96, 99, 102, 170, 183, 184, 237, 314, 315, 316, 324, 325, 327, 331, 558, 712 substância espiritual 102, 104 substância infinita 102, 104, 170 substância inteligente 184 substância material 104 substância objetiva 135 substância pensante e imaterial 149 súditos 351, 403, 413, 414, 422, 428, 446, 456, 598, 599, 604, 606, 674-678, 680, 681, 683, 684, 691, 705 sujeito 85, 95, 99, 126, 134, 136, 138140, 147, 166, 171, 219-221, 223-225, 227, 231, 241, 247, 255, 302, 303, 304, 313, 315, 319, 320, 322, 326, 330, 391, 400, 492-496, 506, 507, 509, 611, 612, 620, 650, 650, 652 sujeito da ação 166 sujeito de conhecimento 219, 223 sujeito puro 495 superstição 194, 521, 697 suprassensível 402, 506 supremo bem 70, 73 T Tácito 380 Tales de mileto 560 téchne 546 tecnologias de poder 244 templo duplo 45, 47 tempo 11, 23, 25-33, 36-39, 44-55, 59, 76, 105, 119, 126, 156, 237, 243, 311, 314, 349, 506, 524, 566, 648-652, 654, 657 tempo como distensão 49 tempo distante 39 tempo extenso 39 tempo futuro 52 tempo longo 39 tempo na alma 52 tempo não espacial 51 tempo passado 39, 42, 52 tempo presente 39, 40, 41, 42, 44 tempo próximo 39 tempo simples 47 tempo, totalidade do 651 teologia 82, 89, 139, 290, 299, 397, 484, 519, 661, 665 teologia católica 660 teologia cristã 256 teologia, crítica à 465, 467, 475 teologia, suma de 83 teologia-política 465 teoria 68, 103, 117, 118, 120, 123, 129, 152, 237, 252, 266, 267, 394, 395, 397, 410, 469, 474, 481, 483, 484, 489, 499, 534, 575, 611, 631, 638, 642, 643, 656, 696 teoria astuta 479 teoria crítica 300 teoria da alienação 467 teoria da causalidade 372 teoria da mimese 546 teoria da obrigação contratual 354 teoria da tragédia 642, 647 teoria da visão 101, 108 teoria da visão, nova 102, 103, 105 teoria das ideias 546 teoria das proposições e dos silogismos 62 teoria do conhecimento 20, 147, 300 teoria do corpo humano 145, 146 teoria do Grande Ano 45 teoria do movimento 144 teoria do poder 224 teoria do valor 62 teoria dos afetos 195 teoria dos três impulsos 645 teoria geral dos seres humanos 221 teoria gidiana do ato gratuito 634 teoria política 262, 487, 714 teoria política maquiaveliana 420, 431 teoria política revolucionária 262 tirania 319, 422, 439, 440, 443, 448, 664, 665, 673, 674, 676, 678682, 697, 712 Tomás de Aquino 62, 83, 545, 658-663, 665, 666 totalidade 73, 91, 300, 312, 463, 467, 493, 651, 653, 670, 674, 678, 684 totalidade das condições sensíveis 495 totalidade espiritual 323 totalidade ética 309 totalidade substancial 305 tragédia 132, 133, 478, 519, 520, 629, 642, 647 tragédia grega 519, 520 tribunais da democracia ateniense 65, 75 tribunos 431, 433, 437 tribunos da plebe 430 trindade 22, 24, 34 trotskismo 242 tumulto(s) 279, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434 u ulisses 130, 133 união 93, 95, 97, 142, 143, 147, 148, 179, 184, 215, 306, 324, 329, 330, 360, 363, 429, 479, 509, 601, 602, 652, 655, 670, 702 unidade 24, 47, 50, 93, 96, 97, 103, 142, 300, 304, 311, 312, 314, 3230, 323, 324, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 363, 412, 419, 602, 626, 647, 649, 669, 670, 672, 688 unidade ideal 649 unidade quantitativa 649, 647 universais concretos 126, 133 universal 112, 114, 132, 133, 145, 146, 152, 165, 215, 275, 300, 301, 302, 304, 305, 307, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318,320, 321,322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 356, 378, 401, 407, 408, 413, 463, 479, 480, 483, 484, 485, 486, 519, 524, 528, 534, 556, 565, 587, 588, 610, 611, 612, 617, 620, 630, 631, 634, 635, 648, 681, 682, 694, 696, 697, 698 utilidade 198, 213, 377, 442, 510, 525, 561, 616, 623, 669 v valor 496, 498, 516, 519, 524, 526, 529, 535, 564, 610, 611, 612, 615, 619, 620, 621, 622, 624, 627, 629, 630, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636 valoração 417 valores 60, 132, 135, 138, 194, 205, 206, 210, 212 220, 271, 275, 281, 283, 289, 292, 295, 300, 304, 318, 322, 329, 346, 347, 378, 406, 418, 419, 421, 465 variações 116, 456 verdade 18, 19, 21, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 45, 47, 58, 59, 80, 82, 86, 108, 115, 123, 124, 126, 132, 135, 136, 137, 146, 147, 148, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 183, 192, 195, 208, 218, 221, 222, 223, 229, 235, 237, 239, 242, 243, 245, 253, 271, 289, 311, 312, 314, 323, 324, 325, 330, 332, 334, 367, 389, 399, 400, 429, 431, 446, 454, 473, 498, 501, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 521, 522, 524, 525, 526, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 538, 544, 551, 553, 534, 535, 536, 538, 544, 551, 553, 555, 557, 559, 584, 609, 615, 626, 629, 630, 633, 648, 653, 655, 685, 700 verdade efetiva 456 verdade formal 653 verdade, produção de 235 verdadeiro em si 535 vetor 364 via intermediária 434 vias extraordinárias 442 vício 358, 359, 364, 382, 383, 395, 455, 556, 568, 577, 580 586, 588, 592 vida 33, 63, 73, 75, 104, 133, 197, 230, 233, 244, 253, 254, 260, 261, 262, 266, 267, 269, 273, 275, 278, 282, 300, 303, 304, 306, 321, 329, 330, 334, 339, 350, 351, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 364, 382, 383, 389, 395, 418, 427, 428, 431, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 439, 441, 444, 445, 446, 447, 451, 461, 462, 465, 466, 468, 486, 509, 510, 511, 524, 526, 529, 530, 531, 537, 538, 571, 586, 587, 589, 594, 597, 602, 627, 636, 643, 651, 652, 653, 654, 662, 669, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689 vida ativa 418 vida coletiva 262, 266, 267, 273 vida comunitária medieval 262 vida contemplativa 197 vida livre 427, 431, 433, 435, 446 vida política 63, 190, 444, 461, 466, 468 vida política incorrupta 444 vida urbana 262 vidência 139, 225, 226, 324, 325, 349, 356, 359, 413, 432, 434, 454, 572, 585, 598, 664 vínculo 25, 30, 90, 295, 341, 353, 6701, 688 violência 139, 225, 226, 321, 324, 349, 356, 359, 413, 432, 454, 572, 585, 598, 664 virtú 422, 427, 428, 429, 432, 440, 442, 445, 447, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 459 virtude 35, 50, 74, 89, 297, 324, 351, 360, 680, 397, 427, 457, 546, 558, 559, 568, 570, 579, 580, 687, 688, 690, 691, 711 voltaire 514, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 580, 687, 688, 590, 591, 596, 598, 599, 700, 7025, 703, 705, 707, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714 vontade 22, 23, 24, 27, 29, 33, 35, 36, 54, 148, 149, 150, 166, 173, 174, 175, 176, 210, 220, 224, 230, 247, 321, 322, 325, 326, 327, 331, 332, 333, 334, 339, 341, 344, 349, 355,255, 256, 257, 260, 264, 269, 271, 273, 278, 280, 283, 290, 304, 305, 305, 316, 319, 320, 358, 361, 364, 365, 366, 370, 371, 372, 374, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 393, 395, 413, 422, 434, 438, 450, 467, 513, 518, 519, 522, 523, 524, 574, 598, 601, 602, 604, 606, 607, 619, 620, 627, 628, 634, 636, 649, 650, 657, 675, 691, 709, 712, 713 vontade livre 321, 325, 372, 395 W Wagner 519 Weimar 522, 641 Z Zaratustra 521,

Modal Realism, Still At Your Convenience Harold Noonan Mark Jago Forthcoming in Analysis Abstract: Divers (2014) presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis. Keywords: Modality, David Lewis, John Divers, possible worlds, spatiotemporal relations 1 Introduction According to Divers (2014), there is a kind of de remodal truth that is inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. Such truths (he says) require things in different worlds to be spatiotemporally related. But according to Lewisean modal realism, no things in different worlds are spatiotemporally related. So, if Divers is right about what these truths require, then Lewisean modal realism must be rejected. The truths in question concern the spatiotemporal de re possibilities for some entity: that it could have been being bigger, or located elsewhere. The exact example requires some precision, as Divers acknowledges. We'll get to this in §2. We'll argue that a Lewisean modal realist needn't interpret such truths in the way Divers says she must. There's very natural ways for the Lewisian to read such truths, which don't require spatiotemporal relations between parts of different worlds. Indeed, Lewis (1986) made some brief remarks on the issue which support the very interpretation we favour here. Our envisioned Lewisean modal realist is the Lewis of On the Plurality of Worlds. 2 Divers's Argument Possible worlds, according to Lewis, are to be understood as maximally spatiotemporally connected entities. Every part of a world bears spatiotemporal relations to every other part of that world, but to no part of any other world. That analysis provides a reductive understanding of possible world, and hence of possibility, in terms of an extensional, non-modal notion: spatiotemporal relatedness. This idea is a central tenet of Lewisean modal realism. Without it, the Lewisian has no reductive notion of modality to offer, and so loses her trump card over her non-Lewisian realist rivals. 1 Divers argues that the Lewisian is unsuccessful in this endeavour for, by her own lights, there must be spatiotemporal relations between things in distinct worlds. Spatiotemporal relations between distinct worlds are required, says Divers, to understand certain truths about how things could have been otherwise, spatiotemporally speaking. Divers's rst-pass example is: (1) Usain might have been taller than he actually is. The Lewisian understands such truths, about how Usain might have been, in terms of some counterpart of Usain's. 'Usain might have been a cricketer' is interpreted as saying that some counterpart of Usain's is a cricketer. Similarly, the Lewisian should understand (1) as saying that some counterpart of Usain's is taller than Usain. That's a spatiotemporal comparison between that counterpart and Usain himself. If they are parts of different worlds, that comparison requires there to be spatiotemporal relations between entities in different worlds. And that is precisely what the Lewisian rules out. This example won't do the work Divers wants of it, however. As he notes, the Lewisian doesn't require Usain's taller counterparts to belong to some other world. Usain could have been Joel Garner, three inches taller than Usain. That comparison requires only that two actual-world entities be spatiotemporally related. Divers needs an example which forces the counterpart in question to belong to some other world. After some discussion, he opts (for good measure) for these three examples (2014, 576): (2) It is true of the tallest actual thing that it might have been taller (than it actually is). (3) Whatever is the longest-lasting thing in the world, it might have lasted longer (than it actually does). (4) The fastest ever thing might have been faster yet (than it actually is). All assert de re modal truths of an actual entity. They are interpreted (by the Lewisian) as saying that some counterpart of that thing is taller (or longer-lasting, or faster) than it. Since the entity in question is the tallest (most long-lasting, fastest) of all in our world, any such counterpart must be part of some other world. So (says Divers) the spatiotemporal comparison (of height, longevity, or speed) is between entities in distinct possible worlds, contrary to what the Lewisian allows. That's why, according to Divers, these modal truths are inconvenient to the Lewisian. 3 No Inconvenience Divers's suggestion is one way to interpret each of (2)–(4). For his argument to succeed, these must be the only plausible interpretations available. This is not so. 2 Alternative readings of each are available. Here's one alternative reading of (2): (2dup) The tallest actual thing t has a counterpart, c, in world w, which is taller than a duplicate of t in w. And here's another: (2cp) The tallest actual thing t has counterparts, c1 and c2, in world w, such that c1 is taller than c2. If all internal duplicates of a thing are its counterparts, then (2dup) implies (2cp). Here's yet a third way to understand the claim. One might in general understand a 'taller-than' claim as making reference to an appropriate reference class (of people, or whatever). On that model, (1) is understood as the claim that Usain might have been taller in relation to members of his actual reference class. Call that reference class R. In counterpart terms, the claim amounts to this: Usain has a counterpart who is taller in relation to counterparts of the Rs than he (Usain) is in relation to the actual Rs. Similarly for (2) and the tallest actual thing. We'll focus on the rst two interpretations, and won't discuss this third interpretation any further. Are these plausible readings of (2)? They are, given Lewisian metaphysics. Here's why. To be plausible, any reading of (2) must be de re about whatever is the tallest actual thing – call it Bill. So what's at stake is whether it's plausible to say something about Bill by attributing a predicate to Bill's counterparts (or duplicates). But we already know the answer to this. We say of Humphrey that he might have won by attributing 'is the winner' to some counterpart of his. If (2dup) or (2cp) failed to count as being about Bill, then 'Humphrey has a winning counterpart' would fail to be about Humphrey. No counterpart theorist will accept the Humphrey-objection, and so will say that both (2dup) and (2cp) are genuinely about Bill. In that sense, they are plausible counterpart-theoretic readings of (2). These suggested readings are, indeed, very close to what Lewis says on the matter: Things that are parts of two worlds may be simultaneous or not, they may be in the same or different towns, they may be near or far from one another, in very natural counterpart-theoretic senses. But these are not genuine spatiotemporal relations across worlds. The only trans-world relations involved are internal relations of similarity; not indeed between the very individuals that are quasi-simultaneous (or whatever), but between larger duplicate parts of the two worlds wherein those individuals are situated. (Lewis 1986, 71) Here, Lewis suggests both a 'counterpart' and a 'duplicate' reading of 'quasispatiotemporal' relations. There is a sense of 'we might have lived fty miles further north than we actually do' for the truth of which it sufces that there are, in another world, counterparts of us living fty miles north of a town which is a duplicate, or otherwise a good counterpart, of that in which we actually live. 3 These suggested readings are available, and are plausible. How do we then infer that they are the correct readings (and that Divers's is not)? We do so via what Lewis calls 'the cardinal principle of semantics', namely to 'interpret the message to make it make sense – to make it consistent, and sensible to say' (Lewis 1996, 566). Given Lewisian metaphysics, there are no spatiotemporal relations between things in distinct worlds. So, to interpret a speaker who makes a spatiotemporal comparison as saying something 'consistent and sensible', we should interpret her (as far as is reasonable) as speaking about things in the same world. Where one interpretation of a spatiotemporal comparison involves worldmates and another does not, charity urges us towards the former. So charity urges us towards interpreting (2) as (2dup) or (2cp), and away from Divers's interpretation. 4 Actually? One may object that we are ignoring the semantic effect of 'actually' in (2). 'Actually' restricts (or shifts) the domain of quantication to the actual world. And so, one may argue, 'taller than he actually is' requires a comparison to an actual entity: something part of our world. If that is so, then Divers's argument regains its bite. But it is not so. As any competent speaker of English knows, 'might have been taller than he actually is' means just 'might have been taller (than he is)'. 'Actually' adds nothing to what is conveyed. So it would be bizarre if 'might have been taller than he actually is' contained a mandatory semantic restriction not found in 'might have been taller (than he is)'. What both phrases require for their truth is a comparison, height-wise, between how Bill (the tallest entity) might have been and how Bill is. But how to capture how Bill is is up for theoretical grabs. And, according to the orthodox Lewisian doctrine, a world represents how Bill is, height-wise, via an intrinsic duplicate of Bill's at that world. By the same token, a world represents how Bill actually is, height-wise, via an intrinsic duplicate of Bill's at that world. There's no difference here, since representing how Bill actually is amounts to no more and no less than representing how Bill is. (The Lewisian orthodoxy thus supports the (2dup) reading of (2). A less orthodox Lewisian might allow how Bill is to be represented via a non-duplicate counterpart of Bill's. That approach would, in addition, support the (2cp) reading of (2).) A Lewisian counterpart theory is not a translation manual, from English (or modal logic) to the extensional language of counterparts. (Perhaps Lewis 1968 can be read that way, in making the point that counterpart theory is at least as expressive as QML. But Lewis is clear that this is not how to read Lewis 1986.) As Lewis says, we must always 'interpret the message to make it make sense'. And to do so, in our examples, one must interpret via a duplicate (or otherwise a good 4 counterpart) at the world in question. The Lewisian is thus not inconvenienced by height-wise (or other spatiotemporal) comparisons. Following Lewis, she understands such talk (when it invokes mere possibilia) in a 'very natural counterpart-theoretic sense', via a duplicate of the thing in question. Spatiotemporal comparisons are thus always between worldmates, just as the Lewisian metaphysical denition of a world requires. References Divers, J. (2014). An inconvenient modal truth, Analysis 74(4): 575–577. URL: http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/content/74/4/575.abstract Lewis, D. (1968). Counterpart theory and quantied modal logic, The Journal of Philosophy 65(5): 113–126. Lewis, D. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford. Lewis, D. (1996). Elusive knowledge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74(4): 549–567.

Papers, Please and the Systemic Approach to Engaging Ethical Expertise in Videogames 1. Introduction Papers, Please, by Lucas Pope (2013), explores the story of a nameless citizen assigned the role of customs inspector at the border of the fictional political regime of Arstotzka. As the inspector the player must process the documents of travellers, deciding who to admit and who to reject or detain. There are rules to be followed and moral choices to be made if and when they are bent or broken (Alexander 2013). In this paper we explore the systems, stories and moral themes of Papers, Please (henceforth PP) to illustrate how this game applies the systemic approach of game design (Juul 2002; Adams & Dormans 2012) to the problem of moral and ethical engagement.1 We also contrast the systemic approach of PP with the more common scripted or branching-narrative approach used in games such as Fallout 3 (Bethesda Game Studios 2008) and Mass Effect (BioWare 2007). To make this comparison we will employ the Four Component model of moral expertise developed by psychologists Narvaez, Rest and colleagues (Rest et al. 1999; Narvaez 2008). This model describes moral behaviour in terms of four component skills – moral motivation, moral sensitivity, moral judgement, and moral action – and provides a structured approach to categorising the different aspects of moral expertise that are engaged by videogames, illustrating the impact that the choice of systemic versus scripted gameplay has on the nature of that engagement. The outline of this paper is as follows. First, we provide an overview of "ethically notable videogames" as a concept and subject of academic inquiry, and from there outline the differences 1 As is common practice in philosophy and other disciplines, we shall use "ethics" and "morality" as interchangeable terms here. 2 between a systemic and scripted approach to game design. Next, we detail the story and systems of PP. We then extract from this analysis four key moral themes – dehumanisation, privacy, fairness and loyalty – that a reflective player (our model player in this study) may perceive in the functioning of the game's systems (Sicart 2010). This demonstrates the moral complexity that can be achieved by the systemic approach. We illustrate these themes with statements from the designer (Pope) and player comments drawn from online reviews and forums. We then proceed to analyse the different sorts of moral engagement that arise in PP by drawing on the Four Component model of ethical expertise. We briefly consider, in terms of this model, some of the ways that scripted and systemic approaches can, in general, differ with regard to each of these categories. Finally, we argue that the systemic approach of PP is particularly effective at engaging a player's expertise in moral sensitivity. 2. Background: Games and Morality Questions of morality are a pervasive topic for media and the arts. Across every medium we see artists engaging audiences with challenging moral questions concerning topics such as war, crime, corruption, fidelity and the abuse of power. Morality is crucial to how human beings understand themselves as societies and individuals, and art – from Greek dramas all the way through to modern Japanese role-playing games – has proven to be a particularly effective vehicle for its interrogation and transmission (Cain 2005; Carr 2006a, 2006b; Vaughn 1990). While games with morally-charged themes such as crime and war are common, relatively few invite us to engage deeply with the morality of the worlds they depict or the behaviours they encourage us to adopt. Those that do, particularly in the AAA commercial space, have often suffered defects that undermine the intellectual and emotive impact of their moral content (Sicart 3 2009, p.199; Heron & Belford 2014, p.42). As Stevenson (2010, p. 37) notes: "while certain techniques are gradually beginning to gain support, it is safe to say that contemporary approaches to incorporating ethical ideas within digital games remain in a nascent phase". The history of "ethically notable videogames" – i.e. videogames that "provide opportunities for encouraging ethical reasoning and reflection" (Zagal 2010, p. 30) – is about as long as the history of gaming itself, with the first notable examples appearing in the early 1980s. One of the earliest and oft-cited of these is Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar (Origin Systems 1985), the goal of which is to cultivate eight "cardinal virtues" and thereby become worthy of the title of Avatar. Another notable 1985 release, Chris Crawford's Balance of Power (Crawford 1985) is a geopolitical simulator that cleverly satirises the futility and moral emptiness of the nuclear arms race between Cold War superpowers. Following the success of Bioware's Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic in 2003, it became something of a trend for videogames – role-playing games, in particular – to feature "morality meter" systems, in which the player's moral decisions contribute to an overall "morality score" that reflects their moral character. Popular examples of morality meter games include the inFamous series (Sucker Punch 2009-2014), Fallout 3, the Mass Effect series (BioWare 20072012), and the Fable series (Lionhead Studios 2004-2010). Subject to sustained criticism from academics (Sicart 2009; Melenson 2010), critics (Allen 2014; Floyd 2010), and fans (Aristov 2012), morality meters have fallen out of favour and there is now a "growing corpus" of ethically notable games that treat morality with greater care and nuance (Heron & Belford 2014, p.9). Notable recent examples include Papers, Please, The Witcher 3 (CD Projekt Red 2015), This 4 War of Mine (11 bit Studios 2014), The Walking Dead (Telltale Games 2012), and Spec Ops: The Line (Yager Development 2012). The literature on ethically notable games is active and diverse, attracting the interest of philosophers (Cogburn & Silcox 2008), psychologists (Narvaez et al. 2008), cognitive scientists (Gee, 2003), sociologists (Toma 2015), and games scholars (Jenkins 2007; Frasca 2001). In addition to their critical and aesthetic value, a growing number of scholars argue that ethically notable videogames have educational value as promoters of prosocial values and moral development (Anonymous 2010; Koo & Seider 2010; Schrier 2015; Belman & Flanagan 2010). However, while we agree that ethically notable videogames may have educational value, we are less interested in these aspects here, and more interested in ethical engagement with a game for its own sake, whatever the further learning implications are. This is important since the learning potential of games, in comparison to other forms of active (rather than passive) teaching, has been questioned in the "serious games" literature (Sitzmann 2011; Wouters et. al. 2013). We make no claims here about the relative effectiveness of developing ethical expertise through games in comparison with other teaching methods. Multiple frameworks exist for the classification, criticism, and design of ethically notable games, including Flanagan et al.'s Values at Play methodology (2007), Belman and Flanigan's four principles of empathetically engaging game design (2010), Schrier's EPIC framework (2015), and Sicart's "ethical cognitive friction" approach (2010, 2013). We intend to complement these resources (which we cannot examine here in detail) by introducing the Four Component model as a fruitful source of insight into the different aspects of ethical expertise employed in games. The insights furnished by the Four Component model are largely consistent with these existing 5 frameworks, and could feasibly be used in combination with them. We are, for example, in agreement with Sicart's (2013) insightful definition of ethical gameplay as "the result of the ways in which different choices, dilemmas, situations, and contexts are created by the interrelation between the procedural and the semiotic in the context of play" (p. 60) and endorse his view that "to create ethical gameplay, players need to be empowered as agents" (p. 78). One of the chief virtues of the Four Component model is that it provides a framework for designers to create an empowered moral agent by outlining a comprehensive suite of ethical abilities for games to challenge and engage. 3. The stories and systems of Papers, Please Games engage players' moral expertise through stories and systems, and the friction between them (Sicart 2013). The story elements of a game include its depiction of a world, characters and authored plot elements such as dialogue and cutscenes. The systemic elements are the mechanics of the game: the actions that are provided to the player and the rules which determine how the game responds to these actions (Hunicke, LeBlanc, Zubek 2004; Adams & Dormans 2012). These two components work together: the systems create play and the stories lend an interpretation to that play to give it meaning. While games in general have both systems and stories, different approaches to game design can emphasise one or the other element, especially when it comes to moral themes and skills. This difference in emphasis leads to two different approaches to game design (Juul 2002). Following Stevenson's (2010, p. 39) taxonomy of ethical game types, we understand a systemic approach to game design to be one which relies primarily on the emergent dynamics of the game's systems ("the formal game simulation") to generate an experience in our case moral engagement. We understand a scripted approach to game design 6 to be one which relies primarily on the pre-authored progression of the game's story elements to generate the experience.2 We examine first the story and then the systems of PP, before outlining the complex moral themes these give rise to. In this analysis we employ Sicart's distinction between the reactive player and the reflective player (Sicart 2010, pp. 5-7). The reactive player focuses on strategies to optimise the instrumental behaviour of the system, while the reflective player interacts with the system "as mediated by the semantic layer, taking into account both the need for strategy and what that strategy means in a broader personal and cultural sense" (Sicart 2010, p. 8). In this sense, the reactive player is amoral – they do not engage with the moral significance of the gameplay, it is "just a game". We do not disparage such an approach, but it is not our focus here.3 Because our interest is in ethical engagement, we focus on the morally reflective player, who factors moral considerations into their decision-making, to be our "model player" (in the sense of Eco's "model reader" (Eco 1979)). When we refer to the "player" in what follows, we mean such a model player. Pope acknowledges such players as his target audience, saying "On some level I want players to reach a point of self-realization about how good people can be turned into 2 In addition to these two, Stevenson (2010, p.38) has a third category: "static" ethical games, or games that incorporate ethical themes but grant the player little or no ethical agency – e.g. Shadow of the Colossus (Team Ico, 2005). We consider static ethical games a sub-type of the scripted approach. 3 So-called "speedrunning" – in which gamers strive to finish games as quickly as possible within specific parameters – is reactive play in its purest form. Elaborating on the strategy behind his world record holding Papers, Please run, Joel 'Bisqwit' Yliluoma explains that: "In general, I choose my denial/approval options for special entrants ... to maximize the number of entrants I can process during that day. If I seem too heartless when dealing with some particular case, it's just because they talk too much" (Yliluoma, 2014). 7 uncaring cogs". However, he also welcomes more reactive players who "enjoy the core mechanics of checking documents and searching for discrepancies" (Pope, 2015, personal communication). There is a third type of player which is also outside of the scope of our present analysis: the deliberately immoral player. Such players are aware of the moral content of the game, but enjoy roleplaying as a "heartless bureaucrat", as one such player put it (spupy 2013). While this clearly shows us that there are different ways to approach and play PP, our focus below is on a particular type of model player, the morally reflective player. 3.1 The Story of Papers, Please The story elements of PP are limited but important as they help to contextualise and give moral meaning to the game's systems. In PP the player takes on the role of "the Inspector" in a fictional 1980s political regime called Arstotzka. The story starts as the Inspector's name is drawn in Arstotzka's "labor lottery", resulting in his immediate assignment to the newly reopened Grestin border checkpoint which has been closed for the past six years. The post requires the Inspector to leave his home village with his wife, son, mother-in-law and uncle in order to move into an assigned Class 8 Apartment in Grestin. After commencing his work as a border Inspector the game's story arc is fairly linear, but certain choices can lead to the story ending with the Inspector: 1) retaining his job; 2) in prison; 3) executed by the state; 4) blown up by "terrorists"; 5) escaping on forged passports (with or without his family); or 6) becoming a revolutionary agent. The game tells the player almost nothing about the Inspector or his relationship with his family, beyond their reliance on him for food, shelter, medicine and heat. The Inspector's relatives exist only as role-names on a list: "Wife", "Son", "Uncle", "Mother-in-law" and (later) "Niece" (if the 8 Inspector adopts her). The game focuses on the Inspector's work life and the officials and "travellers" who enter his booth. The latter group includes refugees, diplomats, revolutionaries, reporters, job-seekers, criminals, smugglers, holiday-makers, immigrants and visitors. These travellers come exclusively from nine neighbouring fictional repressive states. Each day of gameplay contains both a number of scripted stories and a number of random cases for the Inspector to process. Some of these characters appear over multiple days, although most appear only once. Some of the random stories are repeated numerous times (such as: "I am coming to live with my wife/husband"), whereas other travellers have little or no story at all – they simply hand over their papers. Beyond these daily interactions, the game's story revolves around the Inspector's relationship with the Arstotzkan regime and the shadowy revolutionary group EZIC. EZIC employs lethal means towards its stated end of overthrowing the corrupt Arstotzkan regime and it demands the Inspector's cooperation. If the Inspector fails to regularly cooperate with EZIC, he is eventually targeted for assassination. The Arstotzkan regime will also execute or imprison the Inspector if he shows disloyalty or incompetence. As well as interacting with officials and travellers in the Inspector's booth, the game's story is moved along by official documents, including changes to the rules for processing papers, and flashes of the front page of the daily newspaper. The latter adds some useful background to the ever changing rules, such as news of a trade war, escaped criminals, or an outbreak of infectious disease. Most of the details, however, of the Inspector's personal life and his wider historical situation are left to the player's imagination. This lack of narrative detail is a deliberate design 9 decision (Pope in Alexander (2013)) taken in order to allow the player to "project their own family" onto the game and to avoid the need for historical accuracy. 3.2 The Systems of Papers, Please The core mechanics of the game revolve around checking the various details on the paperwork of a succession of travellers trying to gain entry to Arstotzka via the Inspector's booth. The player's agency is almost exclusively limited to choosing whether to admit, deny or (later) detain these travellers. Unlike in a story-driven game, the player cannot make dialogue choices or otherwise interact meaningfully with the characters encountered. Figure 1. Checking papers late in the game with many rules and documents. 10 Each morning there is a document describing any new rules instituted that day, such as a new piece of required identification. The rules start out simple and grow in complexity as the game progresses (Figure 1). Some rules are only short-lived, others accrete over time. Some rules apply quite often, others only crop up rarely and are easy to forget. Some discrepancies also allow the player to choose to arrest and detain the traveller rather than simply turn them away. As the game progresses additional mechanisms are added to the player's booth, such as the ability to fingerprint and X-ray travellers. Figure 2. The nightly expenses screen. The player is always under time-pressure. Most days have a fixed real-time limit in which to process as many travellers as possible. The player is rewarded with a salary of $5 per person 11 correctly processed. Making a wrong decision (accepting a traveller who should have been rejected or vice-versa) is penalised. The first two mistakes incur no penalty other than lost earnings. The penalty then increases by $5 per mistake for every two mistakes made thereafter. Each night, after work, the player is faced with their accounts: savings, income and expenses (Figure 2). The primary expenses are rent, food and heating, which start at $20, $20 and $10 respectively, but may increase as the game continues. Any money not spent is saved and can be used at a later day. The player may choose not to spend money on food or heat, in which case their family members become hungry or cold. Prolonged hunger and cold lead to sickness and, eventually, death, although it is safe to purchase food or heat on alternating nights to save money. Not paying rent results in the game immediately ending with the Inspector imprisoned for delinquency. These mechanics mean that players must work quickly in order to process enough travellers to meet their daily expenses. In practice, some days are cut short by terrorist attacks and at other times there are extra expenses, so the player needs to maintain a buffer of savings. Early in the game this is not difficult, but with more complex rules come more pressure on the player to work efficiently. In the later stages of the game the player has opportunities to supplement their income with bribes, kickbacks and bonuses for shooting terrorists and detaining travellers. Processing a traveller means checking various documents (passport, ID, entry permit, etc.) against each other and against the traveller's details (face, sex, height, weight) and story (primarily their reason for entering and length of stay). This process is made more challenging in a variety of ways. Handling the documents is clumsy. The player must drag the documents from the counter onto their desk for inspection. Some documents are many pages long and the player 12 must find the right page. There is not always enough space to view everything simultaneously, so the player must shuffle the documents around, which makes it easier to miss important discrepancies. If a discrepancy is noted, the player may simply reject the traveller's visa or (later) activate the discrepancy checking tool. If the discrepancy is confirmed by the tool (which takes up valuable time), the player has the option to interrogate the traveller who may (or may not) offer an explanation resolving the problem. 4. Moral Themes in Paper, Please A number of important moral themes emerge from the systems and stories of PP. We shall explore four of the most prominent here. 4.1 Dehumanisation We dehumanise others when we regard them as mere means or things (Kant 1999), and not as full moral agents with equal dignity and basic human rights (Fine 2010). PP trains players to dehumanise the travellers they process through repetition and by directing players' attention away from the individuals they are dealing with and towards the documents they are processing. This redirection is achieved, not through story elements, but through the game's mechanics: financial penalties and intense time pressure compel players to process documents quickly and correctly in order to have sufficient earnings to survive. The effect is reinforced by keeping the role-play and the narrative deliberately minimal. Most interpersonal interactions are reduced to a sequence of stock repeated phrases. Each encounter becomes more or less identical, with only the travellers' faces and the documents differing. Even if players want to question a traveller further they cannot do so. While in other games this lack of player-led dialogue might seem 13 frustrating, in PP it reinforces the dehumanising process by creating a greater distance between the player and the travellers. This dehumanising process does not happen all at once. On the first day of the game, when time still feels plentiful, the player may find it interesting to listen to travellers tell their stories. Over time, however, time and financial pressures mount and the stories become more repetitive. After hearing yet another story of a man immigrating to live with his wife the player may simply stop caring. As reviewer Parker (2013) puts it: "Papers, Please quickly convinces the player that the optimum strategy is to immediately reject suspicious documents, ignore pleas for mercy or assistance as every doubt entertained is wasted time and a step closer to losing a loved one or ending the game entirely". This role of the thoughtless and efficient bureaucrat clearly evokes what Hannah Arendt famously calls "the banality of evil" (Arendt 1965). Arendt uses this phrase to describe how a man, such as Nazi bureaucrat Adolf Eichmann, could perpetrate great evil in a "thoughtless" manner (Anonymous 2007, p. 721). By this she means that Eichmann could commit moral atrocities while being motivated, not by hatred, but by the same banal concerns that motivate us all, such as to do our job well, provide for our family, and receive peer recognition. Pope (personal communication, 7 February 2015) explains that he "wanted to show how even a good person, who cares about their family and others ... can be turned into uncaring cogs". PP tries to give players a firsthand experience of how this can happen.4 4 Sicart (2009) argues that games which alienate "the player from reflecting about the ethics of their actions [while] outsourcing moral evaluation to a closed, pre-designed system" (p.193) limit the player's ethical agency in a way that recalls the banality of evil: the player is "deprived of 14 Figure 3. A woman without an entry permit begs for leniency. However, other elements of the game challenge these dehumanising pressures. For example, the game uses interface mechanics - movement, contrasting colours and sound prompts - which are usually used to highlight important information, to distract the player from the documents, which are difficult to read, towards the conversations with travellers. These conversations, while repetitive, often contain morally compelling scenarios and themes (Figure 3). One tells the story of a man coming to Arstotzka for life-saving surgery unavailable in his home country, and who will die if he isn't admitted. Another involves a joyful husband who is happy to finally be free of their ethical capacities in favour of a procedural external system that will evaluate their choices" (p.198). What makes Papers, Please remarkable is that it that does this intentionally and very effectively. 15 tyranny and asks you to please let his wife through even though she lacks valid papers. In another scenario, a woman who thinks she is being tricked into working at a brothel asks the Inspector to detain her pimp. And so on. But the dehumanising pressures of the game's mechanics train the player to ignore these scripted elements. Thus the scripted and systemic elements of the game are in tension (Sicart 2013), with the scripted elements seeking to arouse the player's moral attention while the systemic elements seek to suppress it. The game, however, provides no direct feedback or scripted sequences that acknowledge the moral dimension of the player's decisions. For this reason, players may fail to notice this moral dimension. 4.2 Privacy: Sex, Gender and the misuse of Power Each passport has a sex field which is either M or F (i.e. Male or Female) and which the player must check. However both the game (intentionally)5 and the Inspector (probably unintentionally) quickly confuse issues of sex and gender.6 If travellers' appearance (and gender) does not obviously match their documented sex, if for example a male (sex) looks too feminine (gender), a discrepancy is registered. Accepting such a traveller is a violation (which surprisingly reads "Invalid gender", rather than the technically correct "Invalid sex"). The player is therefore encouraged to look out for such discrepancies. If a traveller is interrogated about such a discrepancy the conversation is typically short: "Are you a woman or a man?", the Inspector bluntly asks, and "The document is correct" is a common response. Sometimes the travellers 5 As Pope (personal communication, 7 February 2015) points out: a "1980's communist state having strict definitions of sex and gender isn't a surprise. It contrasts nicely with how we think about the same thing today." 6 Although the sex/gender distinction is sometimes seen as problematic (Friedman 1991), it is nonetheless useful for this discussion. 16 register disbelief and embarrassment at such a confronting question saying: "Why do you ask?' or "What is this question?" Later in the game after a terrorist attack on Day 6, a new mechanic is added in the form of an Xray scanner. Given that the scanner is specifically introduced in response to a terrorist attack, it seems clear (and the relevant daily briefing reinforces this) that the purpose of the scanner is to identify smugglers bringing in contraband and to prevent terrorist attacks. When a traveller's weight shows a discrepancy from their documented weight, which is an indication that they may be carrying contraband, the scanner becomes available. The scanner is available only when a relevant discrepancy has been noted. When the scanner is used, it provides the player with a black-and-white image of the traveller's front and back in full-body nude which also reveals any hidden items carried on their body. 17 Figure 4. The X-ray scanner is used to investigate a discrepancy in sex/gender. Although the scanner is initially justified as a device to stop terrorists, it is soon put to other uses, raising questions about the creeping expansion of security powers. For example, one traveller is an Arstotzkan female (according to the "sex" on her passport) with masculine facial features. If the discrepancy between her image and her passport is interrogated, the option to use the scanner appears. Under interrogation the traveller affirms that her passport is correct, but the scanner reveals that she seems to have male genitals (Figure 4). This is treated as a discrepancy by the game and the player will be penalised if they do not refuse her entry. Whenever the facial features of travellers don't conform to gender stereotypes about what a man or a woman should 18 look like, their sex can be quizzed and their privacy infringed by the use of the scanner to reveal an image of their genitals. Early on it is easy to dismiss such cases as careless forgeries. But after a while the player may begin to suspect that some of these discrepancies are not forgeries, but the result of oppressive and limiting bureaucratic options and the state's confusion between sex and gender. This raises an important moral issue: should players be ordering invasive scans on the basis of a hunch about a traveller's sex based on stereotypical views about masculine or feminine facial features? As one gamer puts it: "What if the ... wrong gender on the person's passport [is] just the rigid rules of society forcing his or her true gender to be displayed on the passport, even though he or she ached to be seen as otherwise?" (Davis, 2013) The invasive nature of the scanner heightens this moral issue. The pictures it produces are graphic full-frontal images and clearly an important invasion of the traveller's privacy. Should the player risk suffering a financial penalty or should they infringe the privacy of vulnerable travellers? The game, however, never explicitly identifies the choice to use the scanner in such cases as a moral issue at all. In this way, the inclusion of the scanner highlights the moral tension between public security and personal privacy. As Pope says, "the scanner's role flops between critically useful and unnecessarily intrusive. It nicely highlights the challenge of keeping people both alive and happy in this kind of situation" (personal communication, 7 February 2015). 4.3 Fairness: Bending the rules to help others Even when the player recognises that a traveller might have a compelling moral reason to be let through with invalid papers (or denied entry with valid papers), the moral issue of whether to 19 bend the rules for them is a complex one. This complexity arises because of the problems of procedural fairness and moral consistency. These problems primarily arise, not from the scripted elements of the game (although these do scaffold and contextualise the issues), but from the game's systems. The player cannot let everyone through, or else the Inspector would lose his job and be imprisoned. This leaves open only two viable strategies. First, to try to always follow the bureaucratic rules as best you can no matter what the content of those rules are and no matter who they are applied to. Second, to mostly apply those rules correctly, but to make a few exceptions on moral (or other, perhaps selfish) grounds. If players adopt the first strategy, then they have chosen to roleplay as a thoughtless or selfish bureaucrat who blindly carries out even immoral and unfair rules. If players adopt the second strategy, the moral problem becomes how to do so fairly and consistently. Players can't always bend the rules fairly since they lack both the information and the time to carefully consider all the relevant facts when making that decision. While some travellers freely offer a (comparatively) detailed and emotional story, many do not, even if their plight is no less worthy of consideration. This is complicated by the player's inability to further interrogate the traveller's story, which makes it impossible to determine who is lying or embellishing. Given this it seems impossible to decide in a fair way who the player should let through on moral grounds. Most likely players will arbitrarily let through those who are able to tell them the most emotionally convincing tale, even though others may be more deserving. In regards to consistency, it will be difficult, unless one's rules or principles are very (and perhaps unfairly) restrictive, to bend the rules in any consistent way. For example, suppose that players decide that they will let through, on moral grounds, travellers who are reuniting with their spouses. But unless this case only occurs once or twice a day, on at least some days, players may not be able 20 to act consistently by letting through every case that fits this rule and still earn a living wage. In a complete game of PP the player processes up to three or four hundred travellers; there is simply no fair and consistent way to deal with all of them. Furthermore, lost income from intentionally admitting people with invalid documents for moral reasons deprives the Inspector and his family of much needed income to provide food and heat. How much of a cost can players reasonably expect the Inspector's family to bear in order to maintain the Inspector's moral integrity? 4.4 Loyalty: who should you support? Both the government and EZIC demand obedience and loyalty from the Inspector. This loyalty, however, is not demanded in a single big decision. Rather the player is gradually drawn into it by a number of smaller choices. While these choices start out easy enough, the demands made on the Inspector quickly increase, making it hard to keep showing loyalty as well as risky to stop doing so. Unlike the first three moral themes, this moral issue arises, not so much out of the game's systems themselves, but out of the interaction between the scripted elements and the game's mechanics. Who (if anyone) should the player be loyal to? With the limited information the player has, it seems that, morally, neither side deserves unconditional loyalty. The Arstotzkan regime is running a repressive and unjust police state, but not all of its rules are unreasonable. For example, when there is a breakout of disease it reasonably enough introduces a rule that travellers must have appropriate vaccinations. However, the regime is also corrupt, and it will imprison the Inspector for trivial reasons (such as missing one day's rent) and execute him if he is disloyal. EZIC claims to fight only to overthrow the corrupt Arstotzkan government, but its true intentions are unknown. Further, while EZIC's demands start out as fairly mild, such as 21 letting an agent through with invalid papers, the player is soon offered large bribes to perform a number of increasingly questionable actions, including murder (involving collateral damage) and self-sacrifice. EZIC will also try to kill the Inspector if he is not loyal to them. Both sides show themselves to be at the very least morally questionable, and yet the player cannot help but take sides (at least implicitly) since either they comply with EZIC's demands or, in effect, they comply with the government's demands (even if they do so for self-interested reasons rather than out of loyalty). Either way players become morally corrupted by what they choose to do. 5. Systemic vs. Scripted approaches to Moral Engagement This analysis of the relatively sparse systems of PP illustrates that even simple systems can generate complex moral themes. But to get an even deeper understanding of the systemic approach of PP we need to do two further things. First, draw some general contrasts between the systemic approach of PP and the more common scripted approach (exhibited in such games as The Walking Dead, Mass Effect, Fallout 3 and many others). Second, to outline the way that these different approaches to game design can lead to different types and degrees of moral engagement. The principal design pattern employed in scripted approaches is the branching narrative (Sweetser & Wiles 2005; Adams 2010). Moral choices are typically presented in the context of a conversation system, characters offer the player different points of view around a moral problem, and the player chooses how to respond. Often the response comes down to a single pivotal decision in which the player chooses who to side with from a list of dialogue choices, or in some cases, a quick time event. The game mechanic behind these choices is simple and generic. Stripped of its story, it boils down to a multiple choice problem with a handful of possible 22 options (Short 2015). The moral weight comes primarily not from the system, but from the scripted elements that come before and after the choice. The game may also have other mechanics for movement, combat, etc., but these rarely interface deeply with the moral choices, except to transport the player from one to the next. In contrast, the systemic approach of PP (which is shared by other games such as September 12th and The McDonald's Game) "handles ethical decision making as an emergent property of the game's ludic elements" (Heron & Belford 2014, p.4) The meaning of the game is less concentrated in the progression of story elements (although they still exist, as we have seen above) and more in the player's interpretation of the dynamics of play. As such they are examples of procedural rhetoric, systems in which the rules themselves convey meaning (Bogost 2009). A key difference between the approaches lies in the authorial effort required to create works of each kind. In theory, both approaches allow works of arbitrary complexity, but in practice the expressivity of each is bound by the labour involved in design and implementation. The scripted approach is limited by the writer's ability to conceive and write many different pathways; the systemic approach is limited by the designer's ability to create a system with rich play dynamics. The scripted approach offers representational freedom and expressivity. A branching narrative can effectively describe, through written text and pre-rendered animation, whatever scene the writer desires. Likewise, the characters in the game can be as varied and lifelike as the author is able to conjure, because their reactions can be scripted in advance to match the situations the author knows will arise. This freedom comes at a cost. The effort of writing branching narratives 23 grows both with the length and the breadth of the story. As a result, designers have an incentive to limit the amount of branching possible. A common solution is to give the narrative a "string of beads" episodic structure (Salen & Zimmerman 2003, p. 279; Costikyan 2007). Each episode contains a small number of "beats" which branch into different paths, but ultimately dovetail back to an overall linear narrative before proceeding to the next episode. A single beat typically offers the player two to four options for action, explicitly enumerated. Any more than this would tax both the writer's ability to author outcomes and the player's ability to read and choose between them. As a result, the player's agency in such games is openly proscribed. They are offered a small number of paths to take, all of which show the heavy footprints of the author ahead of them. Contrast this with the systemic approach in which the game mechanics more directly represent the procedures of the subject matter; in the case of PP, document checking and simple household economics. The consequences of player action are computed by the application of generalpurpose rules to the current game state, rather than explicitly scripted. Complexity arises from the interaction between rules and the resulting variety in game states (Juul 2002). The authorship burden now lies with the game designer to devise a system that creates interesting play dynamics which tell a meaningful narrative. There is an important distinction to be made in terms of the granularity of choice between these two approaches. A branching-narrative game generally presents the player with a small number of high-impact choices (shoot the dog vs. save the dog). In a systemic game, the actions are smaller, more numerous and often individually inconsequential (move left vs. move right). The 24 meaning comes through the emergent dynamics between the player and the system, what Sicart calls the aggregation of choices (Sicart 2013, p. 105): Branching narratives are often retraceable... The aggregation of choices is a better fit for designing ethical gameplay because it places player in a narrative or world context in which many choices are offered all the time, and the consequence of each is not easily traceable to a particular choice. When game narratives are formed as the aggregation of many small choices, the player has greater scope for nuanced control over the system, and the hand of the author is better concealed. A game's dynamics may be the result of careful design, but to the player they feel emergent rather than planned, and in a complex game there is always the possibility of the player discovering a strategy the designer has not anticipated. This creates a different sense of agency in the player and places more of the authorial burden on the player's shoulders. It also implies that the meaning that emerges for players will partly depend on the choices they make and the approaches to the game that they adopt. Nevertheless, our current ability to create systems of meaningful play cannot rival the stories we can tell in the scripted approach. Personal and social dynamics in particular are difficult to model and the hunt for a playable system of "social physics" is still an open research problem (Khandaker-Kokoris 2015; McCoy et al. 2011, 2013). As a result, systemic gameplay tends to be limited to physical and economic interaction, with relatively anonymous game characters. In multiplayer games this problem can be solved by encouraging interaction between players, but in a single-player game such as PP is it a limiting factor. 25 While we speak of these the systemic and scripted approaches to design as producing different kinds of games, in practice many games employ both approaches in a single title. Computer roleplaying games, for example, often include a systemic implementation of combat, driven by statistics for strength, health, dexterity, etc., alongside a scripted implementation of dialogue and branching narrative. The two approaches rarely combine smoothly however, because of the mismatch in levels of granularity. The fine-grained representation used in the systemic simulation must be squared-off to fit in the coarse boxes of the scripted narrative, and much detail is lost in the transition. In the worst cases this mismatch leads to ludonarrative dissonance (Hocking 2007; Treanor 2013, pp.14-15) in which the scripted and systemic elements of a game offer conflicting interpretations. Morality meters are a good example of this. They are an attempt to take narrative-level actions (giving water to a beggar, blowing up a city) and translate them into a simulation-level statistic (an aggregated karma score), which is then converted back into one of a handful of narrative-level categories (Good, Neutral, Evil) that affect the scripted story. As a result, in Fallout 3 it is possible to make up for mass-murder by piling water bottles on beggars. The system of aggregating karma points is at odds with the narrative significance of the acts performed, creating dissonance. Perhaps as a result of this dichotomy, we observe that most ethically notable games focus on either one approach or the other for creating their ethical impact, and so we shall treat them as distinct in the analysis below. 6. Games, Morals, and Moral Psychology To appreciate the effects that a systemic approach to game design can have on the player's moral engagement, we first need an understanding of the player's moral psychology. How do players (and people in general) make moral decisions? What are the different skills involved in doing so? Much of the discussion around games and ethics has suffered from a lack of detailed engagement 26 with the moral psychology literature and, as a result, there tends to be too much focus on the act of judgement and not enough focus on other ethical skills. Recent research has attempted to overcome this deficiency by turning to the theories of moral psychology to gain a better understanding of players' moral functioning (Christen, Faller et al. 2012, Anonymous 2016a). For most of the twentieth century moral psychology was dominated by the work of Lawrence Kohlberg, who argued that deliberate rational inquiry is the cornerstone of moral judgement and the engine of moral development (Kohlberg et al. 1983, p.69; Kohlberg 1981, p.141). Subsequent research has since called Kohlberg's approach into serious doubt (Lapsley & Narvaez 2005; Krebs & Denton 2006; Vozzola 2014), and currently there are a few promising alternatives vying to replace it as the discipline's dominant paradigm. While these differ significantly in their respective approaches, one thing they have in common is their commitment to the idea that morality is a kind of expertise: a set of social, cognitive, emotional, and perceptual skills. One of the most promising and robust alternatives is the Four Component model proposed by Rest and colleagues (Rest et al. 1999; Narvaez & Vaydich 2008). According to the Four Component model the skills that comprise moral expertise can be divided into four interconnected categories: 1) Moral Focus – the extent to which one is committed to one's moral choices and the degree to which one prioritises moral concerns over others. Experts in Moral Focus cultivate ethical self-regulation and foster an ethical identity that leads them to revere life and deepen a commitment to a moral way of living. 2) Moral Sensitivity– the ability to identify morality in the real world, to understand the motivations of others, and to perceive the consequences of one's behaviour. Experts in 27 moral sensitivity are better at quickly and accurately 'reading' a moral situation and determining what role they might play in it. 3) Moral Judgement – the ability to understand moral concepts and reason about moral issues. Experts in Moral Judgment have many tools for solving complex moral problems. They reason about duty and consequences, responsibility and religious codes. 4) Moral Action – the ability to overcome temptations and persist in the face of adversity. Doing the right thing even when it's hard. Experts in Moral Action know how to keep their "eye on the prize," enabling them to stay on task and take the necessary steps to get the ethical job done. They are able to intervene courageously and take initiative for others. (Narvaez 2006, p.716; Narvaez 2008) Within each of these categories Narvaez and colleagues have identified seven sub-skills (making 28 in total) that can be targeted as part of moral expertise development. For example, moral sensitivity includes skills such as "taking the perspective of others", while moral action emphasises "taking initiative as a leader", "resolving conflict", and "communicating well" (Lapsley & Narvaez 2005, p.156). Engaging any of the four components of moral expertise implies engaging at least one of their associated sub-skills.7 In addition to being what is perhaps the most well-supported and widely accepted account of moral functioning in the history of moral psychology (Vozzola 2014, Chapter 3), the Four Component model is of particular value to game designers because it highlights the diversity of skills that players bring to bear on moral problems. As designers and critics, it is easy to focus 7 The Four Component Model is a holistic account of moral expertise and as such there is significant overlap between each of the above-listed skills as well as their associated sub-skills. Thus, when we write below about PP "engaging" a specific component, such as moral judgment, we mean it engages that component more extensively than other components. 28 narrowly on the challenge of moral judgement in games at the expense of other skills. The model therefore prompts us to ask not only "What is right or wrong?" (moral judgement), but also "How does the player recognise moral situations?" (moral sensitivity), "Why does the player care?" (moral focus), "How does this challenge the player to act?" and "What resistance does the player face?" (moral action). In this way, this taxonomy provides us with a more nuanced set of lenses (in the manner of Schell (2014)) with which to design and critique the moral content of videogames. 6.1 Moral Focus Moral focus is more than just doing the right thing because it is the right thing; it is also the process of developing an ethical identity and acting with integrity. While moral focus was originally the third of Rest's four components, more recent researchers have given it greater prominence as an overarching component motivating all the other skills (Tanner and Christen 2013, Thoma and Bebeau 2013), and indeed it is a major consideration when designing an ethically engaging game. There is a natural inclination for players to regard games as "not real" and "just a game" and therefore dismiss the moral significance of their actions (Heron and Belford 2014). If designers are to encourage morally reflective players of their games, then engaging the player's moral focus is a prerequisite to all other aspects of design. The player must become "complicit" (Sicart 2013) with the game's morality, making moral decisions for moral, not instrumental, reasons. Moral focus is strongly connected to identity. A person may be morally motivated by a personal or professional self-image which emphasises moral integrity (Thoma and Bebeau 2013). PP takes advantage of this by placing the player in a professional role of some authority and 29 responsibility,8 and giving them an opportunity to develop an identity in terms of their loyalty to the state, the individuals they process, the revolution, their family, or their own skin, without forcing the player to explicitly choose between them. On the one hand this is freeing. The game does not prescribe its own morality meter by rating actions as "Good" or "Evil". Any motivation for moral integrity must come from the players themselves, not from the mechanics of the game. On the other hand, it gives players little external feedback on how their moral character is viewed by others, reducing their incentive to develop an explicit ethical identity. This makes having the moral focus to form and act from an ethical identity particularly challenging in PP. This is not, however, a feature of systemic ethical gameplay per se. Fallout: New Vegas (Obsidian Entertainment 2010), for example, supplants the binary Good/Evil karma meter with a system of reputation meters which measure the esteem of various different in-game factions.9 This encourages players to consider their moral identity through the eyes of others, whose approval or disapproval they may value as they choose. The challenge here for the systemic approach is to make players care enough about what others think in the absence of convincing scripting. This is less of a challenge for games that take a scripted approach, since such games have the ability to tailor specific story outcomes with strong characterisation which can more easily encourage a moral focus in players. 8 Although, with characteristic irony, the game deliberately undermines this professional identity by revealing the player as an untrained neophyte and the player's superiors as uncaring and corrupt. 9 The karma system still exists within the game but it is of much less importance than in earlier Fallout titles or other CRPGs. 30 A disadvantage of the systemic approach is the danger of "ethical fading" (Bazerman & Tenbrunsel 2011, pp. 30-31). An emphasis on systems over role-play can lead the player to focus on the problem of optimizing pragmatic outcomes rather than engaging with ethical considerations. The scripted approach, with its strengths in characterization and world-building, can give the player more incentive to role-play a consistent moral identity, while expecting the game to recognise and respond to it. This strength can become a liability, however, when the scripted alternatives misinterpret the player's intent due to the limited paths available in the storyline. 6.2 Moral Sensitivity Moral sensitivity is the ability to read a situation by recognising its morally salient features, understanding one's own role in it, and understanding the perspectives of others. The systemic approach of PP allows the morality of gameplay to arise from the aggregation of many small choices, without the need to explicitly flag morally salient issues. This leaves it completely up to players to recognise the morality implicit in their situation, identifying morally salient affordances and reasoning about the moral implications of their actions on others. This can be a desirable attribute of ethical gameplay, as Sicart (2010, p. 10) describes: "Players are informed about their state in the game, but they are not informed about the ethical meaning of that state...so the player has to actively reconstruct and interpret the meaning of her role as [an] agent in game." This can require greater moral sensitivity on the part of players. This is illustrated in PP by the great difficulty of remaining sensitive, under the game's dehumanising pressures, to the moral dimensions of one's choices. It is because of this difficulty that one can miss the entire 31 "moral story" of PP and play the game in a purely reactive way without even being aware of doing so. The systemic approach of PP can, however, falter when it comes to rich characterisation. The lack of a systemic social model makes it difficult to program characters who react to the nuance of system dynamics. For this reason, characters tend to be flat (such as the travellers in PP) or altogether absent (such as the Inspector's family). This deficiency, combined with the instrumental thinking encouraged by regarding the game as a system to be optimised, helps to encourage the dehumanisation effect we identified in PP. While in PP this effect is an intended part of the overall message, in other titles it could be a major obstacle to a player's moral involvement in the game. This absence of rich characterisation also helps to explain why moral sensitivity is such an important skill in systemic games such as PP, since there is often little or no explicit feedback from other characters or the game's systems about the morality of the player's actions, thereby requiring players to expertly exercise their moral sensitivity to recognise the presence of moral content. In contrast, a scripted approach has much more opportunity to make its characters rich and reactive. More varied, reactive and engaging characters can give the player more to consider when assessing the ethical impact of a game choice. The design also allows the author to create one-on-one conversations with individual non-player characters, thereby encouraging the player to investigate different perspectives on a problem. On the one hand, this provides rich alternative points of view which the player needs to grasp. On the other hand, this takes away some of the moral burden from players, freeing them from the need to imaginatively recreate the perspectives of others, since these perspectives are simply given to them. 32 It is in regards to moral sensitivity that we see the greatest differences between the systemic and scripted approaches. The scripted choices of branching narratives tend to telegraph their moral significance due to their compressed nature. Morality typically boils down to a small number of dramatic choices between strongly divergent alternatives. In such situations the moral issues and possibilities for action are clearly laid out for the player, meaning there is little call for sensitivity to the presence of moral affordances. In systemic games, since moral issues arise dynamically from the game's systems and are not typically made explicit to the player, much greater skill in moral sensitivity can be required. 6.3 Moral Judgement Moral judgment is the ability to judge what one morally ought to do. Moral judgment is the component of ethical expertise most strongly called upon by many games. This is because the content of games are often designed to specifically challenge this skill by posing complex and difficult moral judgment scenarios. However, the need for moral judgment only becomes clear when one is sufficiently morally sensitive to identify that a situation calls for judgment in the first place. Once a player recognises that moral judgment is required, both systemic and scripted approaches can engage with and test a player's judgment to a similar extent. For example, PP requires the player (as the fairness and loyalty themes illustrate) to make complex moral judgments that weigh up the competing claims of the Inspector's family, his job, the state, revolutionary groups, the wider public, his own moral integrity, and the traveller before him in a matter of seconds with limited information. This is no easy thing. Games taking a scripted approach, such as The Walking Dead, can also contain many examples of the player needing to make complex moral judgments in a limited time. 33 Nonetheless, there can be some important differences between the two approaches. While in PP each traveller and the strength of their respective moral claims on the Inspector to bend the rules for them differ in terms of details (from the bribing smuggler to the distressed wife), there remains a great deal of similarity between each case. The choice is almost always the same: to admit, deny or detain. The relevant considerations are often overlapping and similar. The types of moral judgments required of the player are therefore repetitious to a significant degree. Similarly to the issue of limited characterisation, scripted approaches differ from systemic approaches in that they can craft a range of moral judgment scenarios that are limited only by the designer's imagination and the narrative context. Scripted approaches therefore tend to be able to produce greater breadth of moral judgment scenarios. Systemic approaches can, in contrast, focus with greater intensity or depth on a particular moral theme or issue by designing systems, such as those in PP, which require players to make many similar (but contextually different) judgments. In this regard the scripted approach can offer more breadth, the systemic approach more depth. The tendency (discussed above) for scripted games to reduce moral choices to a handful of clearly signposted alternatives also minimises the amount of creative problem solving the player needs to employ in executing their moral judgement; they are only required to evaluate the options given to them, rather than invent their own solution within the boundaries of a game's systems. 6.4 Moral Action 34 Moral action is the ability to follow through and do what you judge is morally best. This might require resisting temptation, as well as courage and perseverance in the face of obstacles. In cases where one's ends impact on or involve the cooperation of others, leadership, resolving conflict and communicating well may also be required subskills. Both systemic and scripted approaches can and do set up cases where there are temptations to act contrary to one's moral judgment. For example, in PP the player may be tempted to wrongly admit a smuggler purely for the sake of a bribe. Morally similar scenarios can arise in games that take a scripted approach. But the variety and type of temptations that the player can be faced with will tend to be greater in scripted approaches. This is due to the limitations of system complexity and the greater scope for variety that a scripted approach can offer. One final point of difference is that the systemic approach can make the implementation of a moral judgment into action more difficult to achieve than in a scripted approach. In PP it can be quite difficult to actually implement one's judgment. For example, even if one judges that it is morally wrong not to detain wanted criminals, one can easily make a mistake and miss spotting a criminal or lack the perseverance needed to check each document carefully enough. In contrast, in a scripted game one usually only has to click on one of a few dialogue options to implement a moral judgment, and the action will be put into effect automatically. There is little need for perseverance in such cases. Scripted Systemic Moral Focus Strong characterisation and worldbuilding can encourage players to roleplay, making choices based on their assumed moral identity and how they are perceived by others. A focus on systems over stories and characters can lead to "ethical fading" and an emphasis on playing to optimise pragmatic outcomes over ethical behaviour. 35 "Reputation systems" can encourage the player to reflect on their identity in the gameworld. Moral Sensitivity Rich and reactive characterisation can test the player's ability to read moral concerns for others. Branching dialogues tend to foreground moral problems and explicitly enumerate solutions, relieving the player of the burden of recognizing situations for themselves. Allows the morality of gameplay to arise from the aggregation of many small choices, leaving it up to the player to recognise the moral significance of a given scenario. A lack of strong systems of "social physics" limits the kinds of ethical problems that can be represented. Poor characterisation can lead to dehumanisation. Moral Judgement Allows designers to craft a broad diversity of moral scenarios within the context of the narrative. Pre-authored solutions limit the player's ability to creatively resolve dilemmas and temptations. Systemic constraints promote repetition of moral dilemmas and temptations, allowing for in-depth exploration of moral themes. Allows players to concoct creative solutions to moral problems within the boundaries of the system. Moral Action Allows for a variety of scripted scenarios and temptations to test the player's resolve. Scripted conversations allow NPCs to directly challenge the player's choices and commitments. Allows designers to make the implementation of moral decisions challenging. This can represent the "doing" part of morality with procedural affordances. Table 1. Summary of differences between scripted and systemic approaches with respect to implementing the four components in gameplay. 7. Conclusion In this paper we have explored the less common systemic approach to designing videogames that are morally engaging through the example of PP. We have demonstrated the ways in which this game's simple mechanics, revolving around document checking, can give rise to numerous 36 complex moral themes such as dehumanisation, privacy, fairness and loyalty. By contrasting the systemic approach of PP with the more common scripted approach, and by introducing and drawing on the Four Component model, we showed the different degrees to which these two approaches engage with different aspects of a player's various ethical expertise. In particular, a systemic approach can more strongly challenge and engage with a player's moral sensitivity and can require greater persistence in terms of moral action. Both approaches can engage with a player's moral judgment and moral focus. But in this regards a scripted approach can provide for greater scope in the variety and types of challenges that can be presented to players, whereas a systemic approach can provide finer grained scope for moral agency, more freedom for players to frame their own moral options, and a more detailed focus at the expense of breadth. Systemic approaches, however, tend to suffer from weak or limited characterisations, which the scripted approach can excel at. We have summarised these differences in Table 1. This show us that these two different approaches to designing videogames will tend to lead to games that engage with player's ethical expertise in distinctively different ways and to different degrees. This conclusion is not only important in its own right, but it also demonstrates the effectiveness of utilising the Four Component model as a way of thinking about the different approaches we can take to designing games that are morally engaging. This conclusion, however, raises further questions about the extent to which videogames, such as PP, can help to build, and not merely engage with, ethical expertise, as well as the relative effectiveness of videogames at doing this in comparison with other methods (Christen 2012; Anonymous 2016b). References Anonymous. (2007). Details omitted for double-blind reviewing. = Formosa, P. (2007). Is radical evil banal? 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Designing the bleak genius of Papers, Please. http://www.gamasutra.com/view/news/199383/Designing_the_bleak_genius_of_Papers_Please.p hp. Accessed April 2015. Allen, N. (2014). Bad Karma: A Critique of Morality Systems in Games. http://www.thepalaceofwisdom.co.uk/blog/2014/01/23/badkarmagames/. Accessed 10/12/2015 2015. Arendt, H. (1965). Eichmann in Jerusalem. New York: Penguin. Aristov, M. (2012). An alternative to the Karma Meter. http://blag.koveras.org/2012/05/29/analternative-to-the-karma-meter/. Accessed July 2015. Bazerman, M. H., & Tenbrunsel, A. E. (2011). Blind Spots: Why We Fail to Do What's Right and What to Do about it. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Belman, J., & Flanagan, M. (2010). Designing games to foster empathy. International Journal of Cognitive Technology, 15(1), 11. 38 Bogost, I. (2009). Persuasive Games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cain, A. (2005). Books and becoming good. Journal of Moral Education, 34(2), 171-183. Carr, D. (2006a). 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Hunicke, R., LeBlanc, M., & Zubek, R. (2004). MDA: A Formal Approach to Game Design and Game Research. In Proceedings of the AAAI workshop on Challenges in Game AI (Vol. 4): AAAI Press. Juul, J. (2002). The Open and the Closed. In F. Mäyrä (Ed.), Proceedings of the Computer Games and Digital Cultures conference (pp. 323-329). Tampere: Tampere University Press. Kant, I. (1999). Practical Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khandaker-Kokoris, M. (2015). Thinking About People: Designing Games for Social Simulation. http://www.gamasutra.com/blogs/MituKhandakerKokoris/20150325/239662/Thinking_About_P eople_Designing_Games_for_Social_Simulation.php. Accessed December 2015. Kohlberg, L. (1981). Essays on moral development: Vol. 1. San Francisco: Harper & Row. Kohlberg, L., Levine, C., & Hewer, A. (1983). Moral stages. Basel: Karger. Koo, G., & Seider, S. (2010). Video games for prosocial learning. In K. Schierer, & D. Gibson (Eds.), Ethics and game design (pp. 16-33). Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Krebs, D. L., & Denton, K. (2006). Explanatory limitations of cognitive-developmental approaches to morality. Psychological Review, 113(3), 672-675. 40 Lapsley, D., & Narvaez, D. (2005). The psychological foundations of everyday morality and moral expertise. In D. Lapsley, & P. C (Eds.), Character psychology and character education (pp. 140-165). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. McCoy, J., Treanor, M., Samuel, B., Mateas, M., & Wardrip-Fruin, N. (2011). Prom Week: Social Physics as Gameplay. In 6th International Conference on Foundations of Digital Games (pp. 319-321): ACM. McCoy, J., Treanor, M., Samuel, B., Reed, A. A., Mateas, M., & Wardrip-Fruin, N. (2013). Prom Week: Designing Past the Game/Story Dilemma. In 8th International Conference on the Foundations of Digital Games: Society for the Advancement of the Science of Digital Games. Melenson, J. (2010). The Axis of Good and Evil. In K. Schrier (Ed.), Designing Games for Ethics (pp. 57-71). Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Narvaez, D. (2006). Integrative Ethical Education. In M. Killen, & J. Smetana (Eds.), Handbook of Moral Development (pp. 703-732). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Narvaez, D. (2008). Human Flourishing and Moral Development. In L. Nucci, T. Krettenauer, & D. Narvaez (Eds.), Handbook of Moral and Character Education (pp. 310-327). New York, NY: Routledge. Narvaez, D., Mattan, B., MacMichael, C., & Squillace, M. (2008). Kill bandits, collect gold or save the dying: The effects of playing a prosocial video game. Media Psychology Review, 1(1). Narvaez, D., & Vaydich, J. L. (2008). Moral development and behaviour under the spotlight of the neurological sciences. Journal of Moral Education, 37(3), 289-312. Parker, R. (2013). The Art of Papers, Please: Juul's The Art of Failure Meets Lucas Pope's Papers, Please. http://www.firstpersonscholar.com/the-art-of-papers-please/. Accessed July 2015. 41 Rest, J. R., Narvaez, D., M., B., & S., T. (1999). Postconventional moral thinking: A NeoKohlbergian Approach. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assciates. Salen, K., & Zimmerman, E. (2003). Rules of Play. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Schell, J. (2014). The Art of Game Design: A book of Lenses. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press. Schrier, K. (2015). EPIC: a framework for using video games in ethics education. Journal of Moral Education, 44(4), 33. Short, E. (2015). Tightening the World-Plot Interface: or, Why I Am Obsessed with Conversation Models. https://emshort.wordpress.com/2015/05/24/framed-invisible-parties-andthe-world-plot-interface/. Accessed June 2015. Sicart, M. (2009). The banality of simulated evil: designing ethical gameplay. Ethics and Information Technology, 1(3), 191-202. Sicart, M. (2010). Values between systems. In K. Schrier (Ed.), Ethics and Game Design (pp. 115). Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Sicart, M. (2013). Beyond Choices: The design of ethical gameplay. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. spupy (2013). Comment on "End of 2013 Discussions – Papers, Please". http://www.reddit.com/r/Games/comments/1sxy6a/end_of_2013_discussions_papers_please/ce3 5tvp. Accessed July 2015. Sitzmann, T. (2011). A Meta-Analytic Examination of the Instructional Effectiveness of Computer-Based Simulation Games. Personnel Psychology, 64, 489-528. Stevenson, J. (2010). A framework for classification and criticism of ethical games. In K. Schrier (Ed.), Designing Games for Ethics. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. Sweetser, P., & Wiles, J. (2005). Scripting versus emergence. International Journal of Intelligent Games and Simulations, 4(1), 1-9. 42 Tanner, C. & Christen, M. (2013). Moral Intelligence – A Framework for Understanding Moral Competences. In M. Christen, C. v. Schaik, J. Fischer, M. Huppenbauer & C. Tanner (Eds.), Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Facts and Norms (pp. 119-136). Springer. Thoma, S. J. & Bebeau, M. J. (2013). Moral Motivation and the Four Component Model. In K. Heinrichs, F. Oser and T. Lovat. Rotterdam (Eds.), Handbook of Moral Motivation (pp.49-68), Sense Publishers: Rotterdam. Toma, E. (2015). Self-reflection and morality in critical games. Who is to be blamed for war? Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, 6(1), 209-224. Vaughn, S. (1990). Morality and entertainment. The Journal of American History, 77(1), 39-65. Vozzola, E. (2014). Moral development. New York: Routledge. Wouters, P. et. al. (2013). A Meta-Analysis of the Cognitive and Motivational Effects of Serious Games. Journal of Educational Psychology, 105(2), 249-265. Yiluoma, J. (2014). Speed Demos Archive: Papers, Please. Speed Demos Archive. http://speeddemosarchive.com/PapersPlease.html. Accessed July 2016. Zagal, J. (2010). Ethical reasoning and reflection as supported by single-player videogames. In Games cited Balance of Power (Crawford, 1985) Fable (series) (Lionhead Studios, 2004-2010) Fallout 3 (Bethesda Game Studios, 2008) Fallout: New Vegas (Obsidian Entertainment, 2010) inFamous (series) (Sucker Punch Productions, 2009-2014) Mass Effect (series) (BioWare, 2007-2012) 43 Papers, Please (Lucas Pope, 2013) Shadow of the Colossus (Team Ico, 2005) Spec Ops: The Line (Yager Development, 2012). Star Wars: Knights of the Old Republic (BioWare, 2003) The Walking Dead (Telltale, 2012) The Witcher 3: The Wild Hunt (CD Projekt Red, 2015) This War of Mine (11-bit Studios, 2014) Ultima IV: Quest of the Avatar (Origin Systems, 1985)

EINE SISYPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG: Zur Pathologie des (religiösen) ethnischen Nationalismus und Praxis humaner Demokratieförderung auf dem Balkan von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) Einführung Die Institutionen der Internationalen Gemeinschaft (IC),1 die dazu bestimmt waren, das Dayton-Friedensabkommen umzusetzen, sahen sich mit der gewaltigen Aufgabe konfrontiert, Demokratisierungsstrategien für Bosnien voranzutreiben. Angesichts solcher Rückschläge wie bspw. der geringen Rückkehrquote von Geflohenen und Verschleppten, welche die anfängliche Euphorie hinsichtlich dieser Strategien eindämmten, scheint es, als ob die Internationale Gemeinschaft die Rolle des Sisyphos, jenes mythischen Heroen, der dazu verdammt wurde, seine Tage damit zu verbringen, einen Felsen auf die Spitze eines Hügels hinaufzuwälzen, nur um ihn anschliessend wieder hinabrollen zu sehen, spielen muss. Gefangen in einer zeitgemässen Version der Sisyphos-Geschichte mit ähnlich vergeblicher und hoffnungsloser Anstrengung, in einem Nachkriegsgebiet ein ganzes Land wiederaufzubauen, ist die internationale Gemeinschaft dennoch fest entschlossen, die ungünstigen Umstände und widrigen Kräfte zu überwinden, die ihr Unternehmen von vornherein der Absurdität zu überführen scheinen. Warum ist das »Experiment«, einen Staat aufzubauen und eine Demokratie zu entwickeln, für die internationale Gemeinschaft und ihre bosnischen Partner eine so entmutigende Aufgabe? Wenn Antony Flew mit der wiederholten Behauptung Recht hat, dass sowohl eine zufällige als auch notwendige Beziehung zwischen kompetitiven Wirtschaftsformen und einer demokratischen Politik im Gewand der Freiheit existiert, dann könnte zumindest teilweise der schwierige Transitionsprozess von einem sozialistischen zu einem kapitalistischen Wirtschaftssystem für das langsame Voranschreiten des Demokratisierungsprozesses in Bosnien verantwortlich sein.2 Ökonomische Reformen und die zunehmende Freiheit wird die materielle Lebensqualität vieler BosnierInnen verbessern und sie vielleicht sogar zu aktiven PartnerInnen im Demokratisierungsprozess machen.3 Dennoch bietet nichts von dem eine ausreichende Erklärung, geschweige denn eine wirksame Abhilfe für die Schwierigkeiten, denen sich die internationale Gemeinschaft bei der Demokratisierung gegenübergestellt sieht. Die Probleme auf institutioneller Ebene verdienen zwar die Aufmerksamkeit, die sie bereits erfuhren und auch weiterhin erfahren werden, aber weder Theoretiker noch Praktiker widmeten der Klärung der Frage, von wie grosser Relevanz die Problempunkte auf personaler und zwischenmenschlicher Ebene sind, genügend Zeit. Eine Ausnahme bildet die kürzlich erschienene Arbeit von Sumantra Bose, der sich der nationalistischen Leidenschaft und der Ernüchterung der Bosnier einem liberalen Internationalismus gegenüber, wie er von den nachhaltigen Interventionen der internationalen Gemeinschaft vertreten wird, zuwendet.4 Hierbei handelt es sich um eine spannungsvolle Wechselbeziehung, bei der sich die Identitäten, Handlungen und Interaktionen aller Beteiligten nachteilig aufeinander auswirken können. Boses Ansicht zufolge handelt es sich v.a. um ein Problem zwischen den Bosniern und den Repräsentanten der internationalen Gemeinschaft. Allerdings machen die Anführer der drei bosnischen Nationalitäten sowie die internationale Gemeinschaft jeden ausser sich selbst dafür verantwortlich. In diesem Artikel wende ich mich zunächst dem Begriff der individuellen wie der Gruppenidentität im Rahmen von Ethnizität und Nationalismus zu sowie der Beeinträchtigung und den Hindernissen, die ein ethnisch begründeter Nationalismus der Demokratisierung Bosniens zufügt, zu. Im Weiteren werde ich mich der Pädagogik zur Förderung menschenwürdiger Demokratien im Sinne des von der internationalen Gemeinschaft vertretenen liberalen Internationalismus, einschliesslich der institutionellen Top-Down-Reform und einer Bottom-UpEntwicklung auf personeller und interpersoneller Ebene, widmen. Dabei werde ich auch Einsichten aus der Literatur über Identität, Vertrauen, Nationalismus und Demokratisierung einfliessen lassen und dahingehend argumentieren, dass interkulturelle Erziehung zu einem erweiterten gegenseitigen Verständnis zwischen den Bosniern und den Vertretern der internationalen Gemeinschaft beiträgt. Erstveröffentlichung in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Institute for Strengthening Democracy in BiH / Vortrag beim 6. Internationalen Seminar Democracy and Human Rights in Multiethnic Societies, Panel Nationalism 1 Mit »Internationale Gemeinschaft« werden hier westliche Regierungen u. multilaterale Inst., die von diesen Regierungen kontrolliert werden, bezeichnet. 2 Cf. Flew, Antony: The Politics of Procrustes: Contradictions of Enforced Equality. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books 1981, p. 23 u. Ders.: The Socialist Obsession. In: Kurtz, Paul (Ed.): Sidney Hook: Philosopher of Democracy and Humanism. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus 1983, pp. 36-38. Für eine tiefergehende Diskussion dieser These cf. Max Eastmans Bemerkungen in Hook, Sidney: Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights. New York: Criterion 1959; Hayek, Fredrick A.: The Road to Serfdom. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr. Phoenix 1944 sowie Friedman, Milton: Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Pr. Phoenix 1962. – Interessanterweise wird auch das Gegenteil argumentiert: Keene, John: The Polish Laboratory. In: New Left Review 179 (January/February 1990), p. 105, präsentiert z.B. Adam Michniks Sicht auf Polen unter dem Kriegsrecht: »[T]he architects of martial law failed to see that democracy is a vital precondition of economic reform and prosperity. The formula is straightforward: No free elections and legally guaranteed civil society, no democracy; no democracy, no bread or butter or decent vegetables or meat in the shops.« 3 Der wirtschaftl. Entwicklungsprozess schliesst menschl. Freiheiten mit ein. Zu dieser Entwicklung cf. Sen, Amartya: Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf 1999. – Die Konvergenz von polit. Institutionen u. der Wirtschaft rund um ein Modell des demokrat. Kapitalismus ist Teil von Francis Fukuymas These vom »Ende der Geschichte«, das in Ders.: Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Pr. 1995, pp. 3f., p. 356, p. 358, mündet. Cf. auch Fukuyama, F.: The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Pr. 1992. Seite 1 04 | 02 | 2004 http://www.kakanien.ac.at/beitr/theorie/RConces1.pdf Identität, ethnischer Nationalismus und Demokratisierung in Bosnien Unschwer ist zu verstehen, warum die Repräsentanten der internationalen Gemeinschaft ebenso wie die Bosnier – wohlgesinnt oder nicht – das Projekt der Demokratisierung ernsthaft von jenen Gruppen bedroht sehen, die leidenschaftlich um die Pflege ihrer nationalen Gesinnung besorgt sind. Die Rhetoriken, Slogans und Symbole, die Spannungen hervorrufen und oft Tätlichkeiten zwischen Angehörigen unterschiedlicher Ethnien auslösen, bilden die offensichtlichsten Zeichen einer Politik der Obstruktion. Wenn eine solche Rhetorik und die zugehörigen Handlungen in einer politischen Partei verankert sind, hat sie eine steigende Rate an Zersplitterungen zur Folge, wodurch die Menschen viel stärker an ihre jeweiligen ethnischen Gruppen als an die Gesamtgesellschaft gebunden werden.5 Wenn die Demokratie in Bosnien jemals Fuss fassen soll, muss zwischen Angehörigen verschiedener ethnischer Gruppen ein starkes Vertrauensverhältnis hergestellt werden, da Menschen sich nur in Vertrauensverhältnissen eher für Zusammenhalt, Gemeinsamkeit und Brüderlichkeit als für Ausschluss, Separation und Feindschaft entscheiden.6 Wenn man »Vertrauen« transethnisch als »den Glauben daran, dass die ethnisch Anderen in der Regel ausreichend Engagement für Frieden und Koexistenz besitzen« auffasst, wird deutlich, dass Vertrauen ganz sicher ein wichtiges Merkmal der Demokratisierung für ein multiethnisches Nachkriegsland wie Bosnien darstellt.7 Um Volkssouveränität zu erlangen, sind die Bosnier gezwungen, den Angehörige der anderen Ethnien eher als Freunde und Verbündete, denn als Gegner anzusehen. Unter der Voraussetzung, dass Vertrauen in höchstem Sinne etwas Zwischenmenschliches ist, muss die Voraussetzung für eine solche Veränderung dadurch geschaffen werden, dass in konzeptuellem Rahmen die Wahrnehmung und Charakterisierung von Identität, ethnischem Nationalismus und Demokratisierung verändert werden. Über personale Identität zu sprechen bedeutet, über die Identität von menschlichen Individuen zu verhandeln.8 Auch wenn Menschen und Tiere insofern ähnlich sind, als beide einen »minimalen« freien Willen und Handlungsfähigkeit teilen, um Mittel und Wege zur Bedürfnisbefriedigung und zum Erreichen bestimmter Ziele zu erschliessen, unterscheiden sich Menschen von Tieren doch darin, dass sie Wesen der praxis sind. Paulo Freire beschreibt diesen Unterschied folgendermassen: Tiere reflektieren nicht über die Welt, sie sind in sie involviert. Im Gegensatz dazu erheben sich die Menschen über die Welt, objektivieren sie, wodurch sie diese verstehen und über ihre Arbeit verändern können. Die menschliche Tätigkeit besteht aus Handlung und Reflexion: Sie ist eine Praxis; d.i. Umwandlung der Welt. Weil dies Praxis ist, braucht diese die Theorie, um sie zu erleuchten. Die Tätigkeit der Menschen besteht aus Theorie und Praxis; sie besteht aus Reflexion und Aktion.9 [Übers. UR] Menschen sind also in »maximalem« Sinne handelnde Wesen, insofern sie sich in der Welt nicht nur handelnd bewegen, sondern sie vielmehr »verstehen und transformieren«. Darüber hinaus gehört zu einer personalen Identität die ›Selbstinterpretation‹. Nach Charles Taylor »sind Menschen sich selbst interpretierende Subjekte«.10 Um der Behauptung, dass der Mensch ein »Weltenwandler« sei, Sinn zu verleihen, muss anerkannt werden, dass unsere Bedürfnisse und teloi solche von Subjekten sind, die mit der Welt, in der sie leben, verbunden sind. Um also die Welt zu verstehen und an ihrem Transformationsprozess teilzuhaben, müssen wir zunächst uns selbst verstehen in Hinsicht auf die individuell gewählten Absichten und Ziele. Genauer gesagt ist das Selbstverständnis jedes Menschen ein Teil seiner Identität. Dieses Verständnis muss allerdings die Tatsache berücksichtigen, dass die Welt von anderen Weltveränderern bevölkert ist. Folglich spielen diese anderen eine massgebliche Rolle bei der Identitätsbildung. Der Psychoanalytiker R.D. Laing erläutert diesen Punkt auf folgende Art: Auch nicht der Horizont einer einzigen Person kann das Vergessen gewährleisten, dass jede Person immer in Bezug auf jemanden agiert, und dass auch andere in Bezug auf ihn oder sie agieren. Die anderen sind immer auch da. Niemand handelt oder leidet Erfahrungen in einem Vakuum. Die Person, die wir beschreiben und über die wir unsere Überlegungen anstellen, ist nicht die einzige handelnde Person innerhalb seiner ›Welt‹. Wie eine Person diese anderen wahrnimmt und auf sie reagiert, wie diese Person die anderen in der Wahrnehmung seiner selbst und diese ihn oder sie in der Wahrnehmung ihrer selbst wahrnehmen, – alles dies sind Bestandteile der ›Situation‹ 4 Bose, Sumantra: Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention. New York: Oxford UP 2002. Cf. auch Woodward, Susan L.: Transitional Elections and the Dilemmas of International Assistance to Bosnia & Herzegovina. In: Riskin, S. (Hg.): Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Project. Washington/DC.: U.S. Inst. of Peace 1999, pp. 5-9, hier p. 9. 5 Wie Zersplitterung eine Demokratie unterminieren kann, wird von Taylor, Charles: The Ethics of Authenticity. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP 1992, pp. 112-18, diskutiert. 6 Fukuyama 1995, p. 10, versteht, was der Soziologe James S. Colemann »soziales Kapital« nennt, d.i. die Fähigkeit, zum Erreichen gemeinsamer Ziele in Gruppen und Organisationen zusammenzuarbeiten, als ökonomisch wie politisch unerlässlich für alle Aspekte der sozialen Existenz. Das soz. Kapital hängt vom Grad der geteilten Werte und Regeln sowie der Intensität, inwieweit individuelle Interessen einem gemeinsamen Interesse untergeordnet werden, ab. Auf Grundlage dieser geteilten Normen entsteht Vertrauen, das wiederum für die ständige Generierung von soz. Kapital verantwortlich ist (ibid., p. 26). Nach Fukuyama ist es das Konzept des soz. Kapitals, das die enge Verbindung von Demokratie u. Kapitalismus erklärt, da sowohl für die Widerstandsfähigkeit der kap. Wirtschaft als auch für die Effizienz von demokrat. polit. Institutionen die Fähigkeit zur Selbstorganisation als die wahre Essenz des soz. Kapitals erforderlich ist (ibid., pp. 256f.). Cf. weiterhin zum soz. Kapital Coleman, James S.: Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital. In: American Journ. of Sociology 94/Suppl. (1988), pp. 95-120. 7 Somer, Murat: Insincere Public Discourse, Inter-Group Trust, and Implications for Democratic Transition: The Yugoslav Meltdown Revisited. In: Journ. for Institutional Innovation, Development, and Transition 6 (December 2002), pp. 92-112, hier p. 94. Somer zufolge hängt dieses private Vertrauen in den ethn. Anderen von Faktoren wie der Effektivität staatl. Inst. ab, die zwischenethn. Frieden und einen öffentl. Diskurs fördern, der dazu beiträgt, die zukünftigen Absichten der ethnisch Anderen zu beurteilen (ibid., p. 96). Fukuyama 1995, p.26, def. »Vertrauen« als »the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.« 8 Einige Philosophen wie der amerik. Neo-Pragmatist Rorty, Richard: A Seite 2 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) [...] Jede ›Identität‹ verlangt eine andere: Ein Anderes, in und über die Beziehung zu dem die Selbstidentifizierung vollzogen wird.11 Taylor betont dieses Bedürfnis nach den anderen weiterhin mit folgenden Ausführungen: Dass ich meine eigene Identität entdecke, heisst nicht, dass ich diese in der Isolation ausarbeite, sondern dass ich sie über den Dialog mit anderen, teilweise im Stillen und teilweise offen, aushandle [...] Meine eigene Identität beruht massgeblich auf meiner dialogischen Beziehung zu anderen.12 [Übers. UR] Eine Tatsache, die die Bedeutung des Anderen für die Selbstidentifizierung stützt, ist, dass Menschen zutiefst soziale Wesen sind, die ein ebenso starkes Bedürfnis nach Anerkennung und Bestätigung haben, wie eines nach Nahrung, Kleidung und einem schützenden Dach über dem Kopf,13 wie es der politische Philosoph Isaiah Berlin ausdrückt: Es ist nicht nur so, dass mein materielles Leben von der Interaktion mit anderen Menschen abhängt oder dass die Tatsache dass ich bin, was ich bin, ein Ergebnis sozialer Kräfte ist, sondern auch dass einige, möglicherweise sogar alle meine Ideen über mich selbst, v.a. aber mein Verständnis von der eigenen Moral und sozialen Identität nur vor dem Hintergrund dieses sozialen Netzwerkes, in dem ich existiere, dessen Teil ich bin, verständlich werden. Der Mangel an Freiheit, über den sich Einzelne oder Gruppen beklagen, zählt so häufig, wie auch das Gegenteil der Fall ist, zu einem Mangel an angemessener Erkenntnis[.]14 [Übers. UR] Innerhalb dieses Rahmens ist die Rolle, die die anderen für die Identitätsbildung spielen, von allergrösster Bedeutung. Die Tatsache, dass das Individuum seine Identität durch Weltverständnis und Transformation der Welt erwirbt sowie, dass die personelle Identität in der Anwesenheit des Anderen gebildet wird, könnte den Verdacht nahe legen, dass die personale Identität von der Umwelt, von dem individuellen So-Sein und den sozialen Beziehungen determiniert wird. Diese Erklärung verfehlt allerdings die tatsächliche Komplexität des persönlichen Identitätsgewinnungsprozesses gleich in dreifacher Hinsicht. Erstens hat jedes Individuum nicht einfach eine Identität, sondern eher eine Vielheit an Identitäten, von denen jeweils eine im Privaten oder öffentlich in Bezug zu einer bestimmten Situation als die dominante gekennzeichnet wird. Nehmen wir eine junge Frau in ihren Zwanzigern zum Beispiel: Sie ist nicht einfach eine Frau, sondern jemand, die auch andere Identitäten besitzt, die z.B. einschliessen, Studentin zu sein und Dichterin zu sein. Je nach Situation wird sie bspw. nicht ihre weibliche Identität für sich nutzen, sondern statt dessen die Tatsache, dass sie Dichterin ist, hervorheben. Dies sind wiederum ein paar wenige ihrer »Selbste« aus einer weit grösseren »Selbst-Pluralität«, welche sie zum Ausdruck bringen kann. Zweitens bestimmt sich die typische Beziehung einer Person zu einer anderen nicht nur als eine zwischen Individuen, obwohl dies manchmal der Fall ist, sondern wird zusätzlich durch die Zugehörigkeit zu einer bestimmten Gruppe, die z.B. durch eine oder mehrere dominante Eigenschaften definiert wird. Bspw. könnten sich einige von uns als Mitglieder von Gruppen betrachten, die in etwa als »Männer«, »Frauen«, »Jugendliche«, »alte Leute«, »Bosniaken«, »Kroaten« oder »Serben« gekennzeichnet werden. Diese Etiketten von Gender, Alter und Ethnie/Nationalität wirken häufig mit, wenn wir sprechen oder schreiben, und geben sich manches Mal auch in dem, was gemeinhin ›Differenzpolitik‹ genannt wird, zu erkennen. Es kann einige Schwierigkeiten mit sich bringen, wenn man die Personenidentität mit der Gruppendifferenzierung in Verbindung zu bringen versucht, sei es nun auf essenzielle oder relationale Weise. Iris Marion Young hat einige dieser Probleme bezüglich der »Perlenschnur«Theorie von Identität untersucht.15 Nach dieser Ansicht definiert sich eine Gruppe über ein Set essenzieller Eigenschaften, welche die Gruppenidentität begründen. Demzufolge bezeichnet sich ein Individuum dann als einer bestimmten Gruppe zugehörig, wenn und weil es über diese erforderlichen Eigenschaften verfügt. Natürlich muss man sich der essenziellen Eigenschaften, die zu den Individuen einer bestimmten Gruppe gehören, bewusst sein, um ethnische Gruppen identifizieren zu können. Unter der Voraussetzung, dass ethnische Gruppen mehr oder weniger unterscheidbare und unterschiedene Einheiten darstellen, müssen ihre Gruppenidentitäten in Relation zu Mitgliedern anderer ethnischer Gruppen bestimmt werden.16 World Without Substances or Essences. In: Ders. (Hg.): Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin 1999, pp. 47-71, insbes. p. 51, haben eine menschl. Natur oder Essenz wegen des verdächtigen Charakters immanenter Qualitäten gänzlich in Frage gestellt. Andere, wie der amerik. Rechtswiss.Perry, Michael J.: The Idea of Human Rights: Four Inquiries. New York: Oxford UP 1998, u. die amerik. Philosophin Nussbaum, Martha C.: Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law. In: Harvard Law Review 107 (1994), pp. 714-744, insbes. p. 714, p. 718 u. Dies.: Compassion: The Basic Social Emotion. In: Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1996), pp. 27-58, sind nicht vor der Charakterisierung des Mensch-Seins per se zurückgeschreckt. 9 »Animals do not consider the world; they are immersed in it. In contrast, men emerge from the world, objectify it, and in so doing can understand it and transform it with their labor. But men's activity consists of action and reflection: it is praxis; it is transformation of the world. And as praxis, it requires theory to illuminate it. Men's activity is theory and practice; it is reflection and action.« In: Freire, Paulo: Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Übers. v. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York: The Seabury Pr. 1970, p. 119. 10 Taylor, Charles: Philosophical Papers I: Human Agency and Language. Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1985, p. 4. 11 »Even an account of one person cannot afford to forget that each person is always acting upon others and acted upon by others. The others are there also. No one acts or experiences in a vacuum. The person whom we describe, and over whom we theorize, is not the only agent in his ›world‹. How he perceives and acts towards the others, how they perceive and act towards him, how he perceives them as perceiving him, how they perceive him as perceiving them, are all aspects of ›the situation‹ [...] All ›identities‹ require an other: some other in and through a relationship with whom self-identity is actualized.« In: Laing, R.D.: Self and Others. New York: Pantheon 1969, p. 66. Laing pp. 66-78 nennt die Notwendigkeit des Anderen für die Identitätskonstitution »Komplementarität«. 12 »My discovering my own identity doesn't mean that I work it out of isolation, but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others [...] My own identity crucially depends on my dialogical relations with others.« In: Taylor, Charles: Philosophical Arguments. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard UP 1995, p. 231. Seite 3 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) Insofern gehört zur Identität einer Gruppe, die sich als Bosniaken bezeichnet, nicht nur, über die grundlegenden Eigenschaften des Bosniake-Seins wie etwa Sprache, Brauchtum oder Religion Bescheid zu wissen, sondern ebenso in der Lage zu sein, die essenziellen Eigenschaften des Kroate-Seins oder Serbe-Seins zu benennen. Es gibt aber noch weitere Probleme, sowohl ontologischer wie auch politischer Natur. Wie Young scharfsinnig anmerkt, lehrt erstens die Erfahrung, dass manchmal Personen, welche solche notwendigen Eigenschaften einer bestimmten Gruppe nicht besitzen, nichtsdestotrotz von anderen als ihr zugehörig identifiziert werden oder sich selbst mit dieser Gruppe identifizieren; zweitens leugnen Menschen manchmal ab, dass die für eine bestimmte Gruppenzugehörigkeit essenziellen Eigenschaften auch für ihre Personenidentität signifikant wären; drittens bedeutet dies nicht notwendig, dass – selbst wenn Individuen die für eine Gruppenzugehörigkeit notwendigen Eigenschaften besitzen – diese auch alle ähnliche Interessen haben und in der Wahl der Mittel, diese Interessen durchzusetzen, übereinstimmen; und viertens erkennt die essenzialistische Sichtweise nicht an, dass jeder von uns sich aus einer Pluralität an Selbstkonstruktionen zusammensetzt, was in diesem Zusammenhang bedeutet, dass sich einerseits soziale Gruppen mit anderen überschneiden können, während sie andererseits wie im Fall der »Bosniaken« z.B. in Hinsicht auf Gender und Parteizugehörigkeit auch Unterschiede aufweisen können.17 Zudem schafft eine strikte Konzeptualisierung von sozialer Gruppendifferenz insofern politische Schwierigkeiten, als Differenzen überbewertet und Gemeinsamkeiten für irrelevant erachtet oder unter den Tisch gekehrt werden, womit einer Differenzpolitik Vorschub geleistet wird, die Konflikte und Beschränktheit schafft und nährt.18 Zum Dritten beruht die personale Identität mehr auf Eigenkreation als auf Umweltdetermination, der Determination durch jemandes So-Sein und/oder seine oder ihre sozialen Beziehungen. Der Umstand, dass die Welt eine physische Dimension mit bestimmten Einschränkungen und Ermöglichungen besitzt, sollte allerdings nicht übersehen werden. Die Tatsache, dass in einigen Wiesen Minen vergraben sind, auferlegt Landwirten und deren Familien ein Problem, ebenso wie den städtischen Einwohnern, die zu ihrer eigenen Ernährung von den Landwirten abhängig sind. Aber sogar solche Umstände determinieren menschliche Identität weniger, als dass sie sie beeinflussen, denn Menschen treffen ihre Entscheidungen nicht nur auf Grundlage derjenigen Bedeutung, welche der Umstand, dass da Landminen sind, ihnen nahe legt, sondern der Art und Weise, wie sie sich zu solch einer Bedrohung verhalten, kommt ebenso grosse Bedeutung zu. Wird dementsprechend Identität als dasjenige verstanden, das von jemandes' So-Sein oder Gruppenzugehörigkeit determiniert wird, sind So-Sein und Gruppenzugehörigkeit keine relationalen Grössen zur Identität.19 Das So-Sein einer Person, im Sinne von Alter und Gender, spiegelt ein Setting an Beschränkungen und Möglichkeiten wider, jedoch wählen Personen selbst, was ihnen ihr Alter bedeutet – ob sie z.B. stolz darauf sind, in der Mitte ihres Lebens zu stehen und sich auf weniger Verantwortung freuen oder fürchten, dass andere ihren Vorteil daraus ziehen und sie selbst so immer weniger Kontakt mit denjenigen, die jünger sind, haben werden.20 Auf ähnliche Art ist die Beziehung, die jemand zu einer bestimmten Gruppe unterhält, nicht notwendigerweise identitätsstiftend, da Menschen ihre eigene Identität wählen – wenn auch nicht unter Umständen, die sie selber wählen können. Wir alle werden in eine bestimmte Situation hinein geboren, soz. »in die Welt geworfen«, in die Welt der Dinge, der Geschichte, der Beziehungen und der Bedeutungen – aber wir sind handelnde Personen, was heisst, dass wir diese unser Leben bedingenden Einschränkungen und Möglichkeiten zu einem gewissen Teil in die Hand nehmen und auf unsere spezifische Art und Weise »etwas aus ihnen machen« können.21 Andere, die sich mit Identität beschäftigen, haben ebenfalls diesen Standpunkt eingenommen, wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Terminologie. Jonathan Glover spricht von ›Selbstschaffung‹ (›self-creation‹), wodurch Identität eher als konstruiert denn als gegeben angesehen wird. Ein solcher Prozess der Selbstschaffung ist teilweise der Art ähnlich, in der ein Schriftsteller einen kohärenten Figurencharakter entwirft.22 Eine Figur bewegt sich durch einen Roman hindurch, indem sie sich durch ein Setting an Einschränkungen und Möglichkeiten durcharbeitet. In diesem Sinne ist auch »die Geschichte, die wir von uns selbst entwerfen, z.T. dadurch, was wir tun, z.T. dadurch, wie wir die Geschichte unserer Vergangenheit verändern und erzählen, für das Verständnis unserer eigenen Identität zentral.«23 13 Gabel, Peter: The Bank Teller and Other Essays on the Politics of Meaning. San Francisco/Cal.: Acada Books & The New College of California Pr. 2000, p. 13. Gabel kehrt zu dieser Idee in der folgenden Passage zurück: »[E]ach person wants to connect with the others in a life-giving way, to make contact in a way that would produce a feeling of genuine recognition and mutual confirmation. This desire is fundamental to being a social person, and it animates all of us in every moment of our existence[.]« (p. 20) 14 »It is not only that my material life depends upon interaction with other men, or that I am what I am as a result of social forces, but that some, perhaps all, of my ideas about myself, in particular my sense of my own moral and social identity, are intelligible only in terms of the social network in which I am [...] an element [...]. The lack of freedom about which men or groups complain amounts, as often as not, to the lack of proper recognition[.]« In: Berlin, Isaiah: Four Essays on Liberty. New York: Oxford UP 1970, p. 155. Abbey, Ruth: Charles Taylor. Princeton/NJ.: Princeton UP 2000, p. 136, merkt an, dass Berlins Analyse dieses tief verankerten menschl. Bedürfnisses nach Anerkennung aus einer kommunitaristischen Sicht herkommt, die besagt, dass Identität ein »intersubjektives Phänomen« sei, d.h., dass die Selbstwahrnehmung von der Fremdwahrnehmung abhängt. Cf. ausserdem Fukuyama 1995, pp. 67 u. Fukuyma 1992, insbes. Teil 3: The Struggle for Recognition, pp. 141-208. 15 Young, Iris Marion: Inclusion and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford UP 2000, p. 89. Young bezieht sich für diese Metapher auf Spelman, Elizabeth V.: Inessential Woman. Boston: Beacon Pr. 1988. 16 Eriksen, Thomas Hylland: Ethnicity and Nationalism. London: Pluto Pr. 2002, p. 10. – Ignatieff, Michael: Blood and Belonging: Journeys to the New Nationalism. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1993, p. 22, scheint mit seiner Behauptung, dass ein Kroate jemand ist, der kein Serbe ist, dasselbe zu meinen, geht aber mit der Vermutung, dass eine notwendige Bedingung für ein wohldefiniertes nationales Selbst, das verehrt sein will, die Anwesenheit des gegenseitigen Hasses zwischen Kroaten, Serben und Bosniaken ist, in die Irre. Wenn auch die zweite Behauptung wahr ist, trägt die IC eine schwere Bürde, den Würgegriff dieses »alten« u. frischen Hasses zu lockern, um dem ethn. Nationalismus den Boden zu entziehen. 17 Young 2000, p. 88. Granovetter, Mark: Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of EmbedSeite 4 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) Die Erklärungsmacht und die moralische Bedeutsamkeit von Personen, die ihre eigenen Identitäten kreieren, kommt auch darin zum Tragen, wie Nenad Misević die »blosse, unbearbeitete Faktizität« des in eine bestimmte ethnisch-nationale Gruppe Geboren-Seins von der »bestätigten« Identität unterscheidet.24 Obwohl Misević gegen die Behauptung, dass für die Personenidentität eine nationale Identität notwendig wäre, überzeugend Einspruch erhoben hat, bleibt doch die Tatsache unwidersprochen, dass für viele Menschen die ethnische Identität einen wichtigen Teil ihrer pluralen Selbstbilder ausmacht.25 Die Unterscheidung ist wichtig, denn auch dann, wenn eine Person, die Serbokroatisch spricht und das kyrillische Alphabet benutzt, von Angehörigen der bosniakischen Gruppe als Serbe identifiziert wird, muss er oder sie sich dieser Zugehörigkeit nicht unbedingt bewusst sein. Die Tatsache, dass jemand in einen serbischen Haushalt hinein geboren ist, macht einen wichtigen kausalen Faktor aus, diese Person auf die serbische Ethnizität hin zu konditionieren, auch wenn das auf keine Art und Weise einen Beweis für seine oder ihre Identität liefert, solange diese Person sie nicht bestätigt. Mit einem solchen Akt der Bestätigung »identifiziert« sich eine Person mit einer ethnischen, kulturellen oder nationalen Gemeinschaft, die nicht »tatsächlich« sein muss. Eine kroatische Waise, die als Serbe/als Serbin in einer serbischen Familie erzogen wurde und sich ihrer tatsächlichen ethnischen Zugehörigkeit nicht bewusst ist, kann sich mit dem Serbisch-Sein identifizieren, obwohl sie in »objektivem« Sinne kein Serbe/keine Serbin ist.26 Sich mit einer Nationalität n zu identifizieren heisst nicht nur, dass man sich selbst n zuschreibt, also zu glauben, ein Mitglied dieser nationalen oder ethnischen Gemeinschaft zu sein, sondern auch, dass dieser Bestätigung Wirkungskraft für den eigenen Charakter zugeschrieben wird. Diese Zugehörigkeit hilft zu erklären, warum jemand Dinge tut, die ihm natürlich erscheinen. Dadurch entsteht eine gewisse kausale Wirksamkeit hinsichtlich des Charakterzugs, mit dem man sich identifiziert hat.27 Ergänzend zu dieser kognitiven Komponente der Identifizierung gibt es auch eine konative. Immer wenn die Nationalität als eine positive Kraft angesehen wird, entwickelt eine Person tiefe emotionale Bindungen zu dieser Nationalität und »sorgt sich« um deren Fortbestand. Dieses Sorge-Tragen für eine Nationalität wird dann besonders evident, wenn die Nationalität einer Person von Angehörigen einer anderen ethnisch-nationalen Gemeinschaft angegriffen wird, derart, dass der Angriff wegen des hohen Grades der Identifizierung als einer gegen die eigene Person angesehen wird. Einige Menschen messen ihrer ethnischen Zugehörigkeit keine grosse Bedeutung zu. Ein Unternehmer bspw., der in der Herzegowina in kroatischer Abstammung geboren wird und Serbokroatisch spricht, könnte sich in erster Linie als Unternehmer oder eher als Bosnier, denn als Kroate ansehen. In diesem Fall wäre die kroatische Ethnizität nicht als massgeblich für die Art seines Handelns einzustufen.28 Darüber hinaus ist die ethnische Identifizierung insoweit situationell gebunden, als jemand sich in manchen Situationen wie ein Kroate und in anderen wie ein Bosnier verhalten kann.29 Wichtig dabei ist, dass solch eine Person die Pluralität an Selbstkonstruktionen nicht so reduziert, dass eine bestätigte ethnisch-nationale Identität zur dominanten Eigenschaft seiner Personenidentität wird. Wenn solche Reduktionen und Substitutionen stattfinden, kann die betreffende Person am ehesten als »Nationalist« charakterisiert werden, denn es ist der Nationalist, der den Wert seiner ethnisch-nationalen Zugehörigkeit in der Art überbewertet, dass die Ethnizität zur hauptsächlichen Stütze seiner Personenidentität wird.30 Die Ideologie des ethnischen Nationalismus entsteht dann, wenn ein kollektiver Identitätsumschwung stattfindet.31 Sowohl der kroatische als auch der serbische oder der bosnische Nationalismus sind der Idee einer Demokratie und offenen Gesellschaft gleichermassen hinderlich. Diese Nationalismen tauchen über eine Generation voller Xenophobie und ethnischem Chauvinismus auf und bedrohen die Stabilität eines Landes, indem sie »diejenigen, die die ›falsche‹ Identität haben, zu Zweite-Klasse-Bürgern degradieren, was im Gegensatz zu von einer Demokratie geforderten Rechten und Freiheiten steht«.32 Dabei werden kulturelle Kennzeichen dazu verwendet, um die obere oder dominante Gruppe von anderen Gruppen, die als kulturell inferior angesehen werden, zu unterscheiden.33 Gewisse Unterschiede werden hervorgehoben, die dann zur Marginalisierung, Ächtung und zu kulturellem Absolutismus führen.34 Anstatt den anderen jenen Respekt zu erweisen, den sie verdienen, verurteilt der Nationalismus die Denkungsart von Angehörigen anderer ethnischer Gruppierungen als illegitim. dedness. In: American Journ. of Sociology 91 (1985), pp. 481-510, bezieht sich darauf, dass Menschen im ökonom. Kontext in eine Vielzahl soz. Gruppierungen eingebettet sind, Familien, Nachbarschaften, Geschäfte. 18 Young 2000, pp. 88-89. Young wird vielen dieser Probleme gerecht, indem sie soziale Gruppendifferenzierung in relationale Begriffe fasst. Auf diese Weise werden sie über kulturelle Praktiken, Bedürfnisse oder Fähigkeiten sowie über Machtverhältnisse differenziert. Obwohl diese Ansicht weniger rigide ist und der Vielheit an Selbstkonstruktionen Raum gibt, bleibt offen, ob sie geeignet ist, das Problem der Eigenschaften zu verhandeln, oder einfach nur die Terminologie gewechselt hat, so dass an Stelle von »bestimmte Feiertage einhalten« lediglich »kulturelle Praxis« steht (cf. ibid., pp.90-99). 19 Ibid., p. 99. 20 Sartre, Jean Paul: Existentialism and Human Emotions. Übers. v. Bernard Frechtman u. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: The Citadel Pr. 1965, sowie Ders.: Being and Nothingness. Übers. v. Hazel E. Barnes. New York: The Citadel Pr. 1965. Für eine Diskussion des So-Seins cf. Bell, Linda A.: Sartre's Ethics of Authenticity. Tuscaloosa, Ala.: Univ. of Alabama Pr. 1989 und Stack, George J.: Sartre's Philosophy of Social Existence. Hampshire/GB: Warren H. Green 1992. 21 Young 2000, p. 101. Appiah, Kwame Anthony: Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction. In: Gutmann, Amy (Hg.): Multiculturalism. Princeton/N.J.: Princeton UP 1994, p. 155, trifft den Kern der freien Handlung, die an Einschränkungen und Ermöglichungen gebunden ist, wenn er schreibt, dass »we make up selves from a tool kit of options made available by our culture and society. We do make choices, but we do not determine the options among which we choose.« 22 Glover, Jonathan: Nations, Identity, and Conflict. In: McKim, Robert / McMahon, Jeff (Hg.): The Morality of Nationalism. New York: Oxford UP 1997, pp. 11-30, hier p. 18. 23 Ibid. 24 Miscević, Nenad: Is National Identity Essential for Personal Identity? In: Ders.: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Chicago, LaSalle/Ill.: Open Court 2000, p. 243. Cf. auch Greenfeld, Liah: Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge/ Mass.: Harvard UP 1992, pp. 12-13. 25 McKim, Robert / McMahon, Jeff: The Moral Psychology of Nationalism. In: Dies.: The Morality of NatioSeite 5 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) Diese Auswirkungen arbeiten einer Demokratisierung entgegen, da eine Demokratie einen hohen Grad an Interaktion und Zusammenhalt erfordert, der wiederum von gegenseitigem Vertrauen unter den Angehörigen unterschiedlicher ethnischer Gruppen abhängt. Ähnlich wird die Schaffung einer offenen Gesellschaft davon behindert, weil die entzweiende Kraft des ethnischen Nationalismus die freie Zusammenkunft von Individuen, die gegenseitig ihre Rechte innerhalb eines rechtlichen Rahmens anerkennen, unterbindet.35 In Kenntnis der Schwierigkeiten, die ethnischer Nationalismus Demokratisierungsprozessen in multiethnischen Gesellschaften bereitet, herrschte lange die Meinung vor, dass in solchen Ländern Demokratisierung schwerlich, wenn nicht gar unmöglich von Dauer sein könne. Auch Bosnien wurde für keine Ausnahme gehalten.36 Nichtsdestotrotz haben Bose u.a. diese Sichtweise durch Überlegungen in Richtung einer konsoziierenden Form der Demokratie, eher als einer majoritären Form, sowie durch erneute Überlegungen zum Verständnis von Identität in Frage gestellt.37 Obwohl der erste dieser Punkte jenseits des Fokus dieses Beitrages liegt, muss angemerkt werden, dass Bose auch den Schwierigkeiten einer konsoziierenden Demokratie Rechnung trägt, die auf Gleichheit und Machtteilung zwischen verschiedenen Gruppen über repräsentative Eliten beruht, wenn sie in einer tief gespaltenen Gesellschaft wie Bosnien eingeführt wird. Konsoziierung schliesst die Anerkennung einiger kollektiver Identitäten aus, institutionalisiert diesen Ausschluss und beruht auf Repräsentation von Gemeinschaften durch Eliten und fördert so deren Interessen unter dem Deckmantel des Gruppeninteresses, wie Bose ausführt.38 Schliesslich scheint Bose jedoch anzuerkennen, dass Konsoziierung der beste Weg sein könnte, um zu einem demokratischen Bosnien zu führen.39 Wichtiger in unserem Zusammenhang ist jedoch die Frage der Identität. Bose zufolge hat sich die Forschung zum Nationalismus und zu nationalen Identitäten vom essenzialistischen Blick wegbewegt und eine konstruktivistische Sicht, ähnlich der in diesem Beitrag präsentierten, angenommen.40 Diese Alternative stellt eine realistische Sicht auf ethno-nationale Gruppenidentitäten dar, die erlaubt, »solche Identitäten mit Demokratie in multiethnischem Rahmen kompatibel zu machen.«41 Die Annahme einer Vielzahl von »Selbsten« und die Möglichkeit, eine Person dahingehend zu beeinflussen, ihre bosnische Identität eher als dominante politische Identität, denn als Bekenntnis zu einer ethnisch-nationalen Identität zu betrachten, kann dabei helfen, die Grundsteine des für die Schaffung und Aufrechterhaltung einer offenen und demokratischen Gesellschaft so wichtigen Vertrauens zu legen. Zur Pädagogik der humanen Demokratieförderung auf dem Balkan Die Debatte darüber, wie die internationale Gemeinschaft in Bosnien intervenieren sollte, scheint mit dem Entwurf des Dayton-Friedensabkommens zu einem Ergebnis gelangt zu sein. Von der Vision des liberalen Internationalismus und dessen Betonung von individueller Autonomie und individuellen Rechten geleitet, hat sich die internationale Gemeinschaft in Bosnien niedergelassen und ist entschlossen, diese früher zu Jugoslawien gehörige Republik zu demokratisieren. Im Bewusstsein dessen, dass ihr die ethnischen Nationalisten, die in jedem Teil von Bosniens multi-ethnischer Bevölkerung existieren, Widerstand entgegenbringen würden, begann die internationale Gemeinschaft ihr »grosses Experiment« der Demokratisierung in Gestalt von umfassenden Friedensaktivitäten, die von internationaler Top-Down-Regulierung der Wahlen über institutionelle Entwicklung und Wirtschaftsmangement bis zu einer Botton-UpEntwicklung der politischen Kultur mit Hilfe des Aufbaus einer Zivilgesellschaft reichte. Während der vergangenen Jahre hat die internationale Gemeinschaft ihr Engagement noch weiter verstärkt, indem sie v.a. mit Hilfe des Office of the High Representative (OHR)42 ihre Machtposition verstärkte. Angesichts der Spaltungsbestrebungen und der Polarisation seitens aller Arten von Nationalisten ist dies verständlich. Indem die OHR gewählte und ernannte Beamte entliess und Änderungen der Politik innerhalb schlecht funktionierender Institutionen vornahm, hat sie versucht, ihre eigene Vorstellung von Demokratie auf Bosnien und die Herzegowina zu übertragen. Diese Strategie verfolgt eine der Demokratie inhärente Logik: Wenn Demokratien starken Zusammenhalt rund um eine bestimmte politische Einheit benötigen, es aber zugleich lokale Repräsentanten gibt, die ethnischen Nationalismus befördern und sich in Differenzpolitik betätigen, muss nationaler Konsens über den Ausschluss derjenigen hergestellt werden, die nicht gewillt oder befähigt sind, sich derjenigen Identität anzunalism. New York: Oxford UP 1997, p. 83. Avishai Margalit scheint dies zu erfassen, wenn er schreibt: »[B]elonging to a national form of life means being within a frame that offers meaning to people's choice between alternatives, thus enabling them to acquire an identity.« 26 Miscević 2000, p. 244. Greenfeld 1992, p. 12f., merkt an, dass »Nationalität« und »Ethnizität« Synonyme geworden sind, im Sinne, dass die nat. Identität häufig so verstanden wird, als ob sie das Bewusstsein von gewissen »vorursprünglichen« oder ererbten Gruppeneigenschaften wie Sprache, Gebräuche und territoriale Bindung meine. Dennoch nimmt sie nicht an, dass solch eine objektive Nationalität oder Ethnizität Identität repräsentiert, weil sie diese auf Wahrnehmung zurückführt. M.a.W. muss eine Person Identität aktiv gutheissen. 27 Miscević 2000, p. 245. 28 Greenfeld 1992, p. 13. 29 Eriksen 22002, p. 30. Weiterhin glaubt Eriksen, dass die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Ethnie aktiv und freiwillig anerkannt und bestätigt werden muss, um eine sozial wirksame Identität zu sein (p. 37). 30 Miscević 2000, p. 254. 31 Conces, Rory J.: Unified Pluralism: Fostering Reconciliation and the Demise of Ethnic Nationalism. In: Studies in East European Thought 54 (2002), pp. 285-302, hier p. 285f. 32 »[T]ransforming those who are of the ›wrong‹ identity into secondclass citizens, contrary to the notion of rights and liberties understood within a democratic framework.« In: Ibid., p. 286. Cf. ebenso Denitch, Bogdan: Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia. Rev. Aufl. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Pr. 1996, p. 197. 33 Conces 2002, p. 288. Cf. ausserdem Cockburn, Cynthia: The Space between Us: Negotiating Gender and National Identities in Conflict. New York: Zed Books 1998, p. 34. Orwell, George: Notes on Nationalism. In: The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell. Bd. 3. Hg. v. Sonia Orwell u. Ian Angus. New York: Harvest 1968, pp. 362-63, – die Behauptung, dass Nationalismus Menschen wie Insekten klassifiziert und in Schubladen von »gut« und »böse« etc. einteilt, bezeichnet das Problem, das ethn. Nationalismus dem Staatenbildner bereitet. 34 Conces 2002, p. 288. Cf. zudem Elstain, Jean Bethke: Nationalism and Self-Determination: The Bosnian TraSeite 6 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) Seite 7 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha) passen, die die höchste einschliessende Kraft für eine politische Gemeinschaft darstellt und als Vereinigungskraft für eine nationale Einheit fungieren kann.43 Im Falle Bosniens muss also die internationale Gemeinschaft die Menschen zu einem »verheissenen Land« führen, in dem diejenigen Elemente der bosnischen Politik, die einer erweiterten »bosnischen« Identität hinderlich sind, eliminiert werden. Wie verschiedene Wahlen jedoch gezeigt haben, hat die überwältigende Mehrheit der Wahlberechtigten in Bosnien nationalistische Kandidaten nicht zurückgewiesen und also den Einigungsbestrebungen und dem Aufruf zu einer moderaten Politik seitens der internationalen Gemeinschaft eine Absage erteilt.44 Die streitsüchtige, ja sogar feindliche Beziehung zwischen der internationalen Gemeinschaft und einem Grossteil des bosnischen politischen Spektrums ist in der Tat auch eine streitsüchtige und feindschaftliche Beziehung zwischen der internationalen Gemeinschaft und überwiegenden Teilen der bosnischen Wähler.45 [Übers. UR] Kurz gesagt hat sich die internationale Gemeinschaft und ihr Kurs des liberalen Internationalismus als unfähig erwiesen, die Bosnier vor sich selbst zu schützen. Bose liegt richtig, die Machbarkeit, etwas Ähnliches wie eine Marktdemokratie in Bosnien einzuführen, in Frage zu stellen, solange die internationale Gemeinschaft weiterhin auf derselben Strategie beharrt. Alle Top-Down-Reformen, alle Demontagen von Institutionen mit anschliessendem Wiederaufbau werden die Aufrechterhaltung der Demokratie nicht gewährleisten, solange nicht eine ähnliche Entschlossenheit, auf menschlicher und zwischenmenschlicher Ebene zu arbeiten, präsent ist. Dies ist so, weil erstens ein lebenswichtiger Punkt der Demokratisierung in Bosnien mit der Stärkung des gegenseitigen Vertrauens und der Förderung nicht-nationalistischer Identitäten zumindest in der politischen Arena zu tun hat, und weil zweitens Identitäten nicht blosse Fakten sind, die von der internationalen Gemeinschaft vorgegeben werden, sondern weil sie von Individuen in Reaktion auf sich selbst und ihre Umwelt bestätigt, geschaffen und gewählt werden. Dafür sollten die Menschen dazu bewegt werden, ernsthaft Identitäten für sich zu erwägen, die darauf beruhen, die Gemeinsamkeiten »menschlicher« Wesen zu erkennen. Möglicherweise kann man dieser Erkenntnis näher kommen, indem interkulturelle Erziehung als Mittel, »uns von erlernten Meinungen der Art, dass sie uns oft genug entlang ethnischer, rassischer und religiöser Kategorien trennen«46 zu befreien, eingeführt wird. Der Prozess der Identitätsbildung muss auf solche Art vorangetrieben werden, dass er den Menschen die Erkenntnis erlaubt, dass die Perspektive des Anderen häufig ebenso viel Respekt und Achtung verdient wie die eigene. Andere Kulturen kennen zu lernen ermöglicht den Menschen, »sich selbst im Anderen zu sehen«, wodurch ihnen auch gestattet ist, mit dem Anderen empathisch zu sein und sich zivil und verantwortlich ihm gegenüber zu verhalten. Den Kontakt über Narrative anderer ethnischer, rassischer und religiöser Gruppen zu erhöhen, fördert eine gewisse Empfindlichkeit und Bereitschaft, wahrzunehmen, wie die Welt durch die Augen des Anderen, ob er nun Bosniake, Serbe, Kroate oder Mitglied der internationalen Gemeinschaft ist, aussieht. Interkulturelle Erziehung umfasst nicht nur den Wechsel der Perspektive, sondern führt auch zum »Dialog«, d.h. einem »Prozess genuiner Interaktion, mittels dessen Menschen einander aufmerksam genug zuhören, um sich durch das neu Gelernte zu verändern.«47 Wie anderswo auch, so verändern sich auch in Bosnien konfliktuöse Beziehungen mit der Zeit, denn die Menschen denken, fühlen und handeln anders, wenn sie die »Wir-und-die-Anderen«-Beziehung durch eine »Wir«-Beziehung ersetzt haben. Die Ansichten der anderen werden mit aufgenommen, eine Perspektivenerweiterung findet statt und auch die soziale Interaktion der Menschen verändert sich. Im Ergebnis wird gegenseitiges Vertrauen unter allen ethnischen Gruppen Bosniens und unter ihnen und der internationalen Gemeinschaft hergestellt, die einen reibungsloseren Demokratisierungsprozess gestattet. Schlussfolgerung Auch wenn es keinen einfachen Weg gibt, Bosnien zu demokratisieren, wird doch die Beschränkung auf Institutionalisierung sehr wahrscheinlich zu noch grösserer Paralyse und Abgrenzung führen. Der Ausdruck von Solidarität, Freundschaft und Bürgerrechtlichkeit im multiethnischen Bosnien muss mit allen verfügbaren Mitteln gestärkt werden. Ein Weg, dies zu gedy. In: Davis, G. Scott (Hg.): Religion and Justice in the War Over Bosnia. New York: Routledge 1996, p. 52. 35 Soros, George: Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism. London: Little, Brown & Co. 2000, p. xxiii. Für eine erweiterte Diskussion der offenen Gesellschaft u. eine expl. Unterscheidung von offenen u. geschlossenen Gesellschaften cf. Ders.: Underwriting Democracy. New York: The Free Pr. 1991. 36 Cf. Friedman, Thomas: Democracy Isn't Happening in Bosnia. In: New York Times v. 24.01.2001 sowie Rabushka, Alvin / Shepsle, Kenneth: Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability. Columbus/ OH: Merrill 1972, p. 92, p. 186. 37 Cf. Bose 2002, pp. 42-44 u. Lijphart, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven/Conn.: Yale UP 1977. 38 Bose 2002, pp. 43, 246-52. Für eine detaill. Diskussion dieser Problematik cf. Brass, Paul: Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison. Newbury Park/Cal.: Sage 1991; Phillips, Anne: Democracy and Difference. University Park/Penn.: Pennsylvania State UP 1993 u. Kymlicka, Will / Norman, Wayne: The Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work in Citizenship Theory. In: Beiner, R. (Hg.): Theorizing Citizenship. Albany/NY.: SUNY Pr. 1995. 39 Wie Reilly, Ben / Reynolds, Andrew: Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies. Washington/ DC: National Acad. Pr. 1999, p. 31, anmerken: »[C]onsociationalism [...] is the solution when all else fails.« 40 Bose 2002, p. 43. 41 »[M]ake such identities compatible with democracy in a multi-ethnic framework.« In: Ibid. 42 Ibid., p. 7. 43 Rustow, Dankwart: Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. In: Anderson, Lisa (Hg.): Transitions to Democracy. New York: Columbia UP 1999, p. 26 u. Taylor, Charles: Democratic Exclusion and Its Remedies? In: Bagchi, A.K. / Sudarshar, R. (Hg.): Multiculturalism, Liberalism and Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford UP 1999, pp. 138-163. Taylor merkt hier an, dass solche Exklusionssstrategien der Idee der Volkssouveränität als einer Regierung des gesamten Volkes entgegenlaufen. 44 Bose 2002, pp. 7f. 45 »The contentious, indeed adversarial relationship between the international community and much of erreichen, führt über das erneute Nachdenken darüber, wie sich Identität, Vertrauen und ethnischer Nationalismus zur Demokratisierung im zutiefst gespaltenen Bosnien verhalten. Deutsch von Ursula Reber Dr. Rory J. Conces ist Assistant Prof. am Dept. of Philosophy and Religion an der Univ. of Nebraska in Omaha, spezialisiert auf politische Philosophie, Sozialphilosophie, Ethik und Angewandte Philsophie. Weitere Arbeitsund Interessensgebiete sind Kritische Philosophie, Wissenschaftsphilosophie sowie formale und nichtformale Logik; zahlreiche Publikationen in internationalen Zeitschriften; Gastprofessuren, Stipendien und Lehrtätigkeiten an der South China Normal Univ., der Univ. of Sarajevo, der Creighton Univ., Omaha, am Columbia College, Jefferson Citiy/Miss. und der Univ. of Missouri-Columbia. contact: [email protected] Bosnia's political spectrum is therefore, actually, also a contentious and adversarial relationship between the international community and vast segments of the Bosnian electorate.« In: Ibid., p. 8. 46 »[To] liberate us from received opinion, the sort of opinion that often divides us along certain ethnic, racial, and religious categories.« In: Conces 2002, p. 295. Cf. ausserdem Nussbaum, Martha C.: Cultivating Humanity. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP 1997. 47 A »process of genuine interaction through which human beings listen to each other deeply enough to be changed by what they learn.« In: Saunders, Harold H.: A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts. New York: St. Martin's Pr. 1999, p. 82. Seite 8 04 | 02 | 2004 EINE SYSIPHOS-ERZÄHLUNG von Rory J. Conces (Omaha)

Міністерство освіти і науки України Дніпровський національний університет імені Олеся Гончара (м. Дніпро, Україна) Запорізька державна інженерна академія (м. Запоріжжя, Україна) Інститут економіки імені Паата Гугушвілі Тбіліського державного університету імені Іване Джавахішвілі (м. Тбілісі, Грузія) Клайпедський університет (м. Клайпед, Литва) Університет прикладних наук (м. Міттвайда, Німеччина) Університет професора доктора Асена Златарова (м. Бургас, Болгарія) Мерія м. Громадка (Польща) ЕКОНОМІКА І МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ 2020: ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ ТА ІННОВАЦІЙНОГО РОЗВИТКУ Збірник наукових праць Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції (Дніпро, 2–3 квітня 2020 р.) У семи томах Том 1. Соціально-економічні аспекти управління підприємствами: теорія та практика Дніпро Видавець Біла К. О. 2020 «ЕКОНОМІКА І МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ 2020: ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ІНТЕГРАЦІЇ ТА ІННОВАЦІЙНОГО РОЗВИТКУ» 2 УДК 336 ББК 65.01 Е 45 Затверджено на засіданні вченої ради факультету економіки Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙНИЙ КОМІТЕТ Поляков М. В. – д-р фіз.-мат. наук, проф., член-кореспондент НАН України, ректор Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара, голова оргкомітету; Гринько Т. В. – д-р екон. наук, проф., Заслужений діяч науки та техніки України, декан факультету економіки Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара; Іванов Р. В. – канд. фіз.-мат. наук, доц., зав. кафедри економічної кібернетики Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара; Олійник Т. І. – канд. екон. наук, зав. кафедри економіки, підприємництва та управління підприємствами Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара. Абесадзе Р. Б. – д-р екон. наук, проф., директор Інституту економіки імені Паата Гугушвілі Тбіліського державного університету імені Іване Джавахішвілі; Раманаускас Юліус – доктор габілітований, професор кафедри менеджменту Клайпедського університету; Серджо Велеско – д-р екон. наук, професор міжнародного менеджменту факультету економіки університету прикладних наук у місті Міттвайда; Дімітров Іван – д-р екон. наук, проф., професор кафедри економіки та управління університету професора доктора Асена Златарова; Даріуш Павліщин – мер міста Громадка (Польща); Величко Л. А. – канд. наук з держ. упр., доцент кафедри економіки, підприємництва та управління підприємствами Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара; Гвініашвілі Т. З. – канд. екон. наук, доцент кафедри економіки, підприємництва та управління підприємствами Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара; Тімар І. В. – старший викладач кафедри економіки, підприємництва та управління підприємствами Дніпровського національного університету імені Олеся Гончара. Е 45 Економіка і менеджмент 2020: перспективи інтеграції та інноваційного розвитку : зб. наук. праць Міжнар. наук.-практ. конф., 2–3 квіт. 2020 р. : у 7 т. – Дніпро : Видавець Біла К. О., 2020. ISBN 978-617-645-377-2 Т. 1. Соціально-економічні аспекти управління підприємствами: теорія та практика. – 2020. – 108 с. ISBN 978-617-645-378-9 У збірнику надруковано наукові праці Міжнародної науково-практичної конференції, яка відбулася 2–3 квітня 2020 року в Дніпровському національному університеті імені Олеся Гончара. Для студентів, аспірантів, викладачів ВНЗів та наукових закладів. УДК 336 ББК 65.01 ISBN 978-617-645-377-2 ISBN 978-617-645-378-9 (Т. 1)  Авторський колектив, 2020 Том 1 7 Lubenets N. V. Dnipropetrovsk Regional Clinical Oncology Center (Ukraine) THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE IN THE HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT OF A MEDICAL INSTITUTION Culture is the basis of the life cycle and the organizational potential of any organization. The values, norms, and attitudes that are accepted and shared by the majority of employees make a competitive advantage that cannot be 100% reproduced [1]. Organizational culture can be the reason for both increasing and decreasing the efficiency of a medical institution. According to international experience, organizational culture in the market conditions is increasingly becoming a critical factor in the active (or vice versa) development of an enterprise [7]. The relevance of the organizational culture is greatly enhanced when considering the organizations' development in the context of globalization and interaction of national and business cultures. Nevertheless, above all, we are interested in a culture that promotes the growth and sustainable development of an organization [8]. Today, organizational culture is gradually becoming a dominant factor not only in the group identity of the individual but also in the socialization of the individual inside the organization and the community as well. In the 50-60's of the twentieth century, the concepts of «organizational culture» and «organizational morality» began to appear in the papers of various scholars, wherein some elements of the concept of «social responsibility» were observed. However, the term was more widely used in the early 1990s in the studies of wellknown Western management specialists, including J. Grayson, K. O'Dell, P. Drucker, V. Ouchy, et al. Most scholars interpreted social responsibility as a derivative of a healthy organizational culture and as an individually conscious attitude of the enterprise to its product/service and all stakeholders [4, 10]. Local researchers' papers, such as G. Zakharchin [3], M. Kalnitskaya [6], O. Kharchyshyn [5], most commonly define the organizational culture as a set of norms, rules, customs and traditions that are supported by the subject of organizational power and that set the general framework for the employee behavior, organizations that align with its strategy. In particular, one of the most meaningful definitions of organizational culture is provided by N. Zhovnir: «... a system of organization of labor, which is formed and implemented for effective use of available labor resources that operate based on established rules and procedures of the internal organization of the enterprise in order to fulfill current production tasks, enterprises' competitiveness, manufactured products, meeting needs and interests, and maximize profits» [2, pp. 45-47]. «ЕКОНОМІК А І МЕНЕДЖМЕНТ 2020: ПЕРСПЕКТИВИ ІНТЕГРАЦІ Ї ТА ІННОВАЦІЙНОГ О РОЗВИТКУ» 8 Based on this definition, let us summarize the organizational culture's concept as a set of rules, norms, traditions adopted by the management and staff of an organization, and which are expressed in the values declared by the organization, in the behaviors and actions set by the staff. It should be noted that despite the considerable amount of research on the development of organizational culture by international experts, recognized by the authorities in this field. Even though the Western approaches to the organizational culture of the enterprise are very diverse, these studies are most often not suitable to apply in national organizations. It is explained by the specifics of the Ukrainian economy and the mentality that carries systemic transitional defects. Let us outline the structure of organizational culture. E. Shane [9] proposes to consider the organizational culture at three levels. The first-level – «surface» or «symbolic» – includes such visible external facts as the applied technology, the use of space and time, the observed behavior of employees, language, slogans, and the like. Any organization should adhere to these «superficial» manifestations of organizational culture because they are closely linked to the organization's image and reputation. The second, «deeper» level, examines the values and beliefs shared by members of an organization. The third, «deep» level, includes the fundamental foundations of relationships within the organization and between the external environment and the organization [9]. Thus, when it comes to the role of organizational culture mechanisms in human resources management, it should be noted that it is an organizational culture that provides the formation of moral and ethical values and attitudes of the organization's personnel. It also encourages the realization of the intellectual potential of human resources for effective management, which is especially important for medical institutions in the period of reformations. Therefore, the first sign of the organizational culture's effectiveness of a medical institution should be considered the degree of compliance of staff values with the values of the institution and the expectations of stakeholders. The experience of the world's leading medical institutions demonstrates that an organizational culture is always a useful tool for managing human resources and one of the primary sources of competitive advantage for healthcare providers. References: 1. Гринько Т. В. Франчайзинг як інструмент формування організаційної культури туристичних підприємств / Т. В. Гринько, О. П. Крупський // Актуальні проблеми економіки. – 2015. – No1 (163). – С. 145–154. 2. Жовнір Н. М. Управління організаційною і інноваційною культурою в системі регіонального розвитку / Н. М. Жовнір //Економіка і регіони – 2004 – No1(2) – С. 45-47. 3. Захарчин Г. Механізм формування організаційної культури на підприємстві // Формування ринкової економіки в Україні. – 2009. – No. 19. – С. 241-248. 4. Крупський, О. П. Професійна етика як фактор становлення й розвитку соціальновідповідальної організаційної культури туристичного підприємства / О. П. Крупський // Вісник Дніпропетровського університету. Сер. : Світове господарство і міжнародні економічні відносини. – 2014. – Т. 22, Вип. 6. – С. 23-30. Том 1 9 5. Харчишина О. В. Організаційна культура як важлива складова системи управління підприємствами [Електронний ресурс] // Економіка. Управління. Інновації. – 2012. – No 1. Дата відвідування: 25.02.2020. Режим доступу: http://nbuv.gov.ua/UJRN/eui_2012_1_62 6. Kalnitskaya M. The influence of organizational culture on the innovational potential of the company / Kalnitskaya, M //European Journal of Management Issues. – 2015. – Т. 23. – No. 5. – С. 60-70. 7. Krupskyy O. P. Cultura organizzativa e sicurezza: attuazione delle caratteristiche del servizio / O. P. Krupskyy // Italian Science Review. – 2014. – Т. 3. – No. 12. – С. 368-371. 8. Rockstuhl T. Beyond general intelligence (IQ) and emotional intelligence (EQ): The role of cultural intelligence (CQ) on cross border leadership effectiveness in a globalized world / T. Rockstuhl, ‐ S. Seiler, S. Ang, L. Van Dyne, H. Annen //Journal of Social Issues. – 2011. – Т. 67. – No. 4. – С. 825-840. 9. Schein E. H. Organizational Culture & Leadership [Electronic Resource] / E. H. Schein. – 1997 – Mode of access: http://www.tnellen.com/ted/tc/schein.html 10. Übius Ü. Organizational culture types as predictors of corporate social responsibility / Ü. Übius, R. Alas //Engineering economics. – 2009. – Т. 61. – No. 1. – 90-99.

Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude: Radical Hope in the Anthropocene1 Fernando Flores and B. Scot Rousse Penultimate version. Please cite the published version, pp175-192 in The Task of Philosophy of in the Anthropocene, edited by Richard Polt and Jon Wittrock (Roman & Littlefield, 2018) 1. Introduction The proposal that the earth has entered a new epoch called "the Anthropocene" has touched a nerve. By focusing attention on the fundamental vulnerability of our planetary abode and the responsibility that human beings bear for failing to care properly for it, the term acquires an elevated rhetorical potency, not to mention a sense of practical urgency. The question – What is to be done? – imposes itself, albeit uncomfortably. The human organism has been able to flourish in an ecological niche whose unraveling has been vastly accelerated on account of its own activities and industries. With the gradual undoing of this hospitable ecological niche, we find ourselves participants in the long history of emergence and disappearance of entities on this planet, entities that emerge and flourish in a temporary clearing whose contingent conditions eventually revoke the vital opening. What can we do? One unsettling part of having our ecological finitude thrust upon us with the term "Anthropocene" is that, as Nietzsche said of the death of God, "we" ourselves are supposed to be the collective doer responsible here, yet this is a deed which no one individual meant to do and whose implications no one fully comprehends. For the pessimists about humanity, the implications seem rather straightforward: humanity will die. Yet, the death that we are facing cannot be assumed to be simply biological death or extinction. Indeed, even if we are not running headlong into a mass extinction and wholesale biological demise, we do seem to be facing the possibility of an ontological death. Our ecological finitude is the harbinger of our ontological finitude. The vulnerability we confront in the Anthropocene is what Jonathan Lear, in a different context, called ontological vulnerability.2 Following a certain strand of the reception of Heidegger's interpretation of death, we understand ontological finitude as the finitude of our historical world, where a world is relatively coherent and holistically organized "clearing" in which things, people, and possibilities show up, make sense, and matter.3 Worlds die too. The ways of life they enable can become impossible, 1 In preparing this text, we have benefitted from conversations and exchanges with Hubert Dreyfus, Francisco Gallegos, Richard Polt, Khang Ton, Terry Winograd, Jon Wittrock, and Lee Worden. 2 Jonathan Lear, Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 50. 3 The strand of Heidegger interpretation we have in mind is rooted in the work of John Haugeland. See Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed, ed. Joseph Rouse (Cambridge: Harvard Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 2 ceasing to make sense and matter. The constitutive susceptibility of all human worlds to their eventual collapse is what we mean by ontological finitude. As presumed denizens in a dawning Anthropocene we are called to assume this ontological finitude as our own. It is important to appreciate now that the very term "Anthropocene" has generated a sometimes bitter debate, as a recent backlash against certain assumptions and narratives of the "anthropocenologists" has demonstrated.4 For one thing, the claim that the activities of human beings have had a decisive and destructive impact on the earth's environment rests upon a false dichotomy between human Society/Culture and Nature/The Environment. That is, the very notion of an Anthropocene assumes that there is such a thing as the environment "out there" and that it should be left to its own affairs, as though it were a neutral, monolithic, and exogenous container for the organisms, including human beings, who happen to live in it.5 For another thing, the term "Anthropocene" etymologically lays responsibility for the shifts taking place in our climate and ecology at the feet of an abstract, unified, world-historical agent called "the Anthropos," instead of laying responsibility at the blood-, carbon-, and capital-soaked feet of a few industrialized nations.6 A rejection of the tendentious abstraction of the Anthropos and its supposed separation from Nature has generated a kind of terminological game among critical Anthropocene commentators: Take the Anthropos out of the Anthropocene. Suggested alternatives include: Capitalocene, Androcene, Thermocene, Thanatocene, Phagocene, and University Press, 2013). Lear himself mentions how much his account of ontological vulnerability was influenced by Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger. 4 "Anthropocenologist" is a term introduced by Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, trans. David Fernbach (New York: Verso, 2016). Bonneuil and Fressoz productively urge us "to learn to distrust the grand narratives that come with the Anthropocene concept" (p.49). 5 See Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, Chapter 2, "Thinking with Gaia"; Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (New York: Verso, 2015), especially Part III, "Historical Nature and the Origins of Capital"; Matthew Lepori, "There is No Anthropocene: Climate Change, Species Talk, and Political Economy," in Telos 172 (Fall 2015): 103–24, esp. pp. 114 and 118, doi:10.3817/0915172103. See also, in the same issue, Zev Trachtenberg, "The Anthropocene, Ethics, and the Nature of Nature," Telos, 172 (Fall 2015): pp. 38–58, doi:10.3817/0915172038, and Christopher Cox, "Faulty Presuppositions and False Dichotomies: The Problematic Nature of "the Anthropocene'," Telos, 172 (Fall 2015): pp. 59–81, doi:10.3817/0915172059. Another articulate voice expressing these concerns is Kathleen Morrison, "Provincializing the Anthropocene," SEMINAR 673 (September 2015), p.76. 6 See, again, Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, Chapter 4, "Who is the Anthropos?"; Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life, Chapter 7, "Anthropocene or Capitalocene?"; Lepori, "There is No Anthropocene," p. 124. See also Eddie Yuen, "The Politics of Failure Have Failed: The Environmental Movement and Catastrophism," in Sasha Lilley et al., eds., Catastrophism: The Apocalyptic Politics of Collapse and Rebirth (Oakland: PM Press, 2012), p. 40. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 3 others.7 Granting the importance of these conflicts of interpretation, they do not productively draw us into a serious confrontation with the phenomenon of ontological vulnerability raised by the very notion of an Anthropocene, however flawed and fraught the term itself may be. This ontological vulnerability is one of the defining issues of the historical epoch we've inherited. The calling we have now to respond to the Anthropocene (however this "we" gets interpreted) is tinged by the possibilities both of overwhelming tragedy and of historical heroism. According to one sobering book among the vast proliferation of texts addressing the core of the Anthropocene, namely global climate change, we today face a crisis that is "uniquely global, uniquely long-term, uniquely irreversible, and uniquely uncertain."8 How can we begin to face up and respond to this ecological and ontological finitude? Echoing a provocative recent formulation of the issue, the question becomes: How can we learn to die?9 As we have said, this question cannot be posed in the everyday sense of the word die. An impending death does not mean simply that we are going into extinction. To say that we are dying is to say that we are heading into a future in which our current world as the scene and abode of our taken-for-granted practices, projects, and identities will collapse. This future is unimaginable from the perspective of our present. If our world is collapsing, how can we prepare a possibility for succeeding generations to emerge into a new world, a new configuration of practices, of what makes sense and matters? Our approach in this essay will be based on an ontological reinterpretation of the meaning and importance of death and finitude. In this we take up the suggestion by Jonathan Lear that, in the face of the impending collapse of one's world, a peculiar form of hope, radical hope, and a peculiar kind of imaginative excellence for new possible ways of going on are called for.10 Yet 7 On "Capitalocene," see Jason W. Moore, ed., Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism (Oakland: PM Press, 2016). On "Androcene," see Trish Glazebrook, "Gynocentric Bio-Logics: Anthropocenic Abjectification and Alternative Knowledge Traditions," Telos 177 (Winter 2016), 61-82. doi: 10.3817/1216177061. The rest of the suggested terms in our list come from Bonneuil and Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene, Part Three. One need not look far for yet further alternative expressions taking the Anthropo out of the "Anthropocene." 8 Gernot Wagner and Martin L. Weitzman, Climate Shock: The Economic Consequences of a Hotter Planet (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), p. 8. In fact, the authors specify that climate change is "almost" unique in each of these characteristics, but add that it is "definitely unique" in combining all four. 9 With this formulation, we refer to Roy Scranton, Learning to Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 2015). 10 Lear's account of radical hope is brought to bear on climate change also by Allen Thompson, "Radical Hope for Living Well in a Warmer World," Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics, Vol. 23, Number 1-2 (2010), doi: 10.1007/s10806-009-9185-2, and Byron Williston, "Climate Change and Radical Hope," Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 17, No. 2, (Fall 2012), pp. 165-186. doi: 10.2979/ethicsenviro.17.2.165. These accounts pertain more to the virtueFlores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 4 we will have to go beyond where Lear leads, for the conception of radical hope he puts forth is vacuous. According to Lear, radical hope means holding on to a "commitment ... only to the bare possibility that, from this disaster, something good will emerge," where "something good" will involve some radically re-imagined and re-oriented way for the Crow way of life to go on.11 On our way to articulating a more robust form of radical hope in the Anthropocene, we will also consider and criticize Hubert Dreyfus's response to the limitations of Lear's proposal. For Dreyfus, pre-technological marginal practices left over in our culture from past historical worlds could provide a foundation for a reconfiguration of our current world, a way of emerging revitalized from world collapse. But Dreyfus's backwards-looking orientation is one-sided: our world is also a forward-directed historical drift, with new possibilities and marginal practices emerging in the present. By becoming better attuned to the onward drift of historical emergence we can summon a more fecund radical hope that will enable us to participate with greater care in the unfolding of our ecologically and ontologically fraught historical moment. 2. Ontological Vulnerability In Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation, Jonathan Lear presents an interpretation of what he calls the "collapse," "devastation," or "breakdown" of the cultural world of the Crow Indian. The breakdown of a world is different from the breakdown of a characteristic thing or relationship that we normally find within that world. In this section, we retrace some of Lear's steps so that we can draw on his interpretation of the significance of worldcollapse when we present our interpretation of the significance of the Anthropocene. The breakdown of a world is what you can call an ontological event, an event that radically reconfigures the field or space (like the Heideggerian "disclosive space") within which our lives unfold. This is why Lear himself uses the terminology of a field of occurrences: the breakdown of a world is a breakdown of the field in which and in terms of which things happen and matter to people. In Lear's apt words, the breakdown of a world is the breakdown of "a field in which occurrences occur."12 Our susceptibility to the breakdown of our field of occurrences is what Lear calls our ontological vulnerability. Thus, although Lear's penetrating book is concerned specifically with the breakdown of the Crow Indian world, he claims to be articulating a general or structural vulnerability affecting the human condition as such: "What I am concerned with is an ontological vulnerability that affects us all insofar as we are human."13 All worlds are constitutively susceptible to such collapse. ethical implications of radical hope in the face of environmental collapse, rather than the ontological implications that concern us here. 11 Lear, Radical Hope, p. 97. 12 Ibid., p. 34. 13 Ibid., p. 50. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 5 2.1 When the Buffalo Leave Lear pursues his exploration of our ontological vulnerability by way of a reflection on some "haunting words" uttered by Plenty Coups, "the last great chief of the Crow nation."14 In retrospective conversations, Plenty Coups refused to relate any stories about events in his life or the activities of the Crow after their confinement to a reservation and the decimation of the buffalo they traditionally followed and hunted. Lear quotes Plenty Coups: I can think back and tell you much more of war and horse-stealing. But when the buffalo went away the hearts of my people fell to the ground, and they could not lift them up again. After this, nothing happened.15 The last phrase – "After this, nothing happened" is what preoccupies Lear and should preoccupy us as well. This utterance gives expression to the phenomenon of ontological vulnerability that also confronts our world in the Anthropocene. To say that "nothing happened" is not to say that everyone stopped what they were doing and passively sat around; it is not to say that "nothing occurred" anymore. As Lear puts it, with the leaving of the buffalo, "What we have in this case is not an unfortunate occurrence, not even a devastating occurrence like a holocaust; it is a breakdown of the field in which occurrences occur."16 The encompassing field of intelligibility and affectivity within which and in terms of which the traditional activities got their point and mattered is what broke down. Hence, even if the bodily movements and even psychological intentions that used to constitute traditional activities took place, they did not count as the traditional activities, because they could no longer matter in the same way: the broader field of interrelated activities and significance in terms of which the bodily movements and intentional states counted as the traditional activities was no longer "there."17 Following Heidegger, Lear insists on a distinction between entities that show up and make sense in a world, and the world itself as a "space" or "field" within which entities can make sense and things can happen. Why does the absence of a particular entity within the world the buffalo in the case of the Crow Indians trigger the breakdown of the encompassing field of occurrences? The answer is that the buffalo were the ontical focal point, a locus of gathering for the whole Crow identity and the Crow world. Things mattered and made sense, counted as disaster or blessing, victory or disgrace, crucial or trivial to a Crow to the extent that they stood in some relation to activities bound up with the roaming hunt of the buffalo, including the 14 Ibid., p. 1. 15 Ibid., p.2 16 Ibid., p. 34. 17 Ibid., p. 43 and p. 49. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 6 preparations for and engaging in battle with traditional enemies (like the Sioux), and the celebration of victory or mourning of defeat. The buffalo gathered the world of the Crow; that is, the buffalo ontically founded the "worldhood" of the Crow world. For Heidegger, a world is a field constituted by the interrelations between characteristic equipment, the (or a set of) identities and roles of the people who use the equipment, and the (or a set of) shared norms, rules, and standards for the appropriate and excellent ways to use the equipment and carry out the requirements associated with the relevant identities and roles. It helps here to consider as an analogy the "world" of a cooperative game such as baseball. The world of baseball is made up of an array of equipment (bats, balls, bases, gloves, mitts, etc.), roles (pitcher, catcher, batter, umpire, audience), norms (no swearing at the catcher, no spitting at the audience), standards (the ball is to have such and such a weight), and constitutive rules (three strikes and you're out). So, it is only in the space or world of the game that some action can count as a "strike," "foul ball," or a "home run." Just standing around and swinging a stick at a ball cannot be a strike.18 Strikes take place – occur – in the world of the game. Without the world of the game being sustained, there can be no baseballoccurrences, nothing baseball-like would be able to happen. The same general structure holds true for all cultural worlds – the world of the Crow, and our own world. Ontological vulnerability is what we've called the constitutive susceptibility to collapse of any historical world. That we are intrinsically marked by such vulnerability should not come as any surprise to us. People get hints of the possibility of world collapse on a personal register when they undergo identity crises or anxiety attacks in which everything they took for granted and thought to define them now shows up as trivial and pointless. Going to any history museum confronts you with artifacts from bygone collapsed worlds, the paraphernalia of which are now but relics, lifted out of their former field of occurrences as an ontical residue of a way of being that had formerly flourished. While it may be thus lodged into our commonsense that worlds are susceptible to collapse, as we all know that languages die, we tend not to pay attention to this finitude or live in the light of its significance. Here, again, is Jonathan Lear: But a culture does not tend to train the young to endure its breakdown – and it is fairly easy to see why. A culture embodies a sense of life's possibilities, and it tries to instill that sense in the young. An outstanding young member of the culture will learn to face these possibilities well. The situation we are dealing with here, however, is the breakdown of a culture's sense of possibility itself. This inability to conceive of its own devastation will tend to be the blind spot of any culture.19 Our purpose in reviewing Lear's interpretation of the collapse of the Crow world is to suggest that, in the face of the Anthropocene, our ecological vulnerability can usher us into an 18 Here we are drawing on Haugeland, "Dasein's Disclosedness," in Dasein Disclosed. 19 Lear, Radical Hope, p. 83. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 7 appreciation our ontological vulnerability, thus shining a cold hard light on what Lear above calls "the blind spot" of our own culture: we are called to face and respond to the eventual collapse of our own world. It is in this context that Lear's notion of radical hope takes on its relevance to our current situation. Before turning to an account of radical hope, it is worth reflecting on Lear's description of the role played by the buffalo in focusing and organizing the Crow world and how this may be relevant to thinking about our own world today. What, if anything, might be our buffalo? And to what extent is the Anthropocene a threat to our buffalo and thus to the stability and viability of our world? 2.2 But What Are Our Buffalo? To answer such questions adequately and to begin to explore in more detail how the Anthropocene can be understood as a forced confrontation with the ontological vulnerability of our current world, we need first to take account of some structural differences between our current world and the Crow Indian world as presented by Jonathan Lear. The Crow world, at least as described by Lear, was a traditional society with a highly unified hierarchical social structure and comparatively circumscribed range of social roles and identities (Chief, elder, hunter, warrior, mother, etc.). Given the largely traditional structure of Crow society and its stable shared understanding of the normative criteria for what counts as an excellent way of life, it is relatively straightforward to identify the elements of their culture that focus their world and practices – roaming with and hunting the buffalo, doing battle with the traditional enemies, and so on. Because of this, Lear (and Plenty Coups) can locate in the buffalo an ontological focal power: Without the buffalo, nothing can happen. Our current world in the age of the Anthropocene (which we characterize in more detail below), on the other hand, is post-traditional and highly differentiated. Vast arrays of identities, spheres of value, and social roles are available and yet little shared understanding obtains regarding what counts as an excellent form of life and what grounds such normative claims. Furthermore, whereas the Crow world was relatively localized, our current world is increasingly globalized such that the events in one sub-world (buying a pair of blue jeans, or writing an email on a smartphone, for example) are intimately interconnected with events in another sub-world, perhaps on the other side of the globe (garment workers in Bangladesh, workers at Foxconn in China). Moreover, the sub-worlds on our globe are interconnected by an ever-growing computer network and transportation system, not to mention capitalism itself (as in our examples). As a general way of characterizing our current world, we roughly follow Heidegger's account of the "Enframing" (Ge-Stell) character of modern technology which takes our natural environment (including ourselves and each other) as a pool of natural (and human) resources, or Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 8 the "standing reserve" (Bestand), on hand to be used up with maximal efficiency.20 In this world, there is no pervasively shared sense of what makes a way of life excellent, though, in a rough caricature, the dominant way of being is one in which the efficient execution of one's job, efficient satisfaction of one's desires, and efficient accumulation of material wealth count as the good life. Because of all of this, it is difficult to come up with a singular answer to the question: What is our buffalo? Is there some inner-worldly entity that serves the same ontological gathering function that the buffalo did for the Crow? It seems unlikely that there is any one thing that serves the same world-gathering function, and that holds together and focuses all of the dispersed practices comprising our world. However, the Heideggerian account of modern technology can still provide a clue. Perhaps our buffalo is the fossil fuel that we have relied upon systematically since the maturation of the industrial revolution in order to power the machines and technological devices whose sprawling pervasiveness is the characteristic mark of our world and whose unending pollution has propelled us to the threshold of the Anthropocene. Our dependence on this buffalo has now begun, in the Anthropocene, finally to undermine the continuation of the way of life in which it so prominently figures. Every year brings new devices which soon become a necessity so that we can keep up with the others striving to keep up with modern life, devices with which we can more fully be available for communication, keep track of the extensiveness of our friends and contacts, measure the rhythms of our bodies, find the most efficient route to avoid traffic, monitor the temperature of our home, and engage in various life hacks while efficiently taking advantage of the ever-expanding Internet of Things. Perhaps, pushing this line of thought further, our buffalo is not fossil fuels, since one can imagine nuclear power and so-called renewables eventually taking the place of fossil fuels. Perhaps our buffalo is a kind of entity at a higher lever of abstraction: energy itself, the portable energy we harness from the natural world in order to power the machines and devices without which our current form of life and world would be unimaginable.21 Such speculations can go on, but we do not have to conclude here what to designate as our buffalo. Whether it is our technological devices themselves or the energy with which we power our devices, or something else, the ontological significance of the Anthropocene is such that our field of occurrences – whatever its "buffalo" – is susceptible to collapse. What is to be done? 2.3 Radical Hope and the Possibility of Cultural Reconfiguration 20 Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1977). 21 On the relevance of the phenomenon of energy for the Anthropocene, see, in the present volume, Michael Marder, "Philosophy's Homecoming," especially §1, "Energy." Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 9 In the second half of Radical Hope, Lear outlines his interpretation of the virtues that were open to the Crow in the face of the collapse of their world. According to Lear, what the Crow required was a peculiar kind of hope, radical hope, and an extraordinary excellence of the poetical imagination so that, in response to the breakdown of a world, currently unforeseen and radically new possibilities for going on might be revealed.22 Radical hope, for Lear, is a stance of a commitment to possibility. But this is a peculiar kind of commitment: it is a commitment to something completely indeterminate and currently unimaginable: "The commitment is only to the bare possibility that, from this disaster, something good will emerge: the Crow shall somehow survive."23 Lear adds later that the "aim [of radical hope] was not merely the biological survival of the individual members of the tribe - however important that was - but the future flourishing of traditional tribal values, customs, and memories in a new context."24 Such a survival is what we can call "ontological survival," the survival of the Crow way of being and a world, the continuation of the Crow field of occurrences. Radical hope is a stance of maximal openness or receptivity to radically new possibilities in a situation of heightened ontological vulnerability, a situation in which one's way of life has become impossible. Hubert Dreyfus has posed a potent skeptical challenge to Lear's interpretation of Plenty Coups' actions and radical hope.25 We will frame our appropriation of the notion of radical hope in the context of the Anthropocene as a correction of Dreyfus's alternative to Lear's view. According to Dreyfus, Lear's emphasis on the "bare possibility" of a future continuation of the world is just too empty to be of any real relevance.26 Dreyfus points out that Lear provides no concrete example or explanation of how one could "take up traditional values that have become unintelligible."27 In turn, Dreyfus offers his own Heidegger-inspired approach to the reinterpretation of traditional practices: what he calls "reconfiguration." Dreyfus contends that leftover practices from previous phases of a cultural world remain operative in the margins of a current mainstream culture. Cultural "reconfiguration" happens when these marginal practices get re-interpreted and made central again in the culture, gathered into a new configuration of significance or cultural paradigm. One of Dreyfus's favorite examples of a recently failed but still illuminating attempt at cultural reconfiguration was the Woodstock music festival of 1969.28 "Even though it failed," Dreyfus remarks, Woodstock 22 Lear, Radical Hope, p.93, p.117, and p.146. Lear also mentions courage as an important virtue for those facing world collapse. 23 Ibid., p.97. 24 Ibid., p.145. 25 Hubert Dreyfus, "Comments on Jonathan Lear's Radical Hope," Philosophical Studies 144: 63–70. DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9367-9 26 Ibid., p. 68 27 Ibid., p. 69. 28 Ibid., p.69. For an extended discussion of this example, see Dreyfus, "Heidegger on the Connection between Nihilism, Art, Technology, and Politics," in The Cambridge Companion to Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 10 "helps us understand that we must foster our receptivity and preserve the endangered species of pre-technological practices that remain in our culture, in the hope that one day they will be pulled together in a new paradigm."29 We fully agree with Dreyfus's reservation about the emptiness of Lear's notion of radical hope as well as the lack of orientation in Lear's position regarding the possibility of cultural reconfiguration. However, Dreyfus's own account of reconfiguration is overly constrained and backward-looking. Reconfiguration is a Janus-faced phenomenon. The marginal practices that provide the material and impetus for cultural reconfiguration do not come only from the marginal leftovers of the past. Dreyfus's account of reconfiguration fails properly to account for what we will call historical emergence. The emergence of new entities and the happening of unexpected events harbor ontological power that could enable a reconfiguration of a world. There is a more robust account of world reconfiguration - one that allows for but does not develop in detail the crucial role of historical emergence - sketched in Disclosing New Worlds, a book on which both Dreyfus and one of us (Fernando Flores) collaborated.30 In that work, Flores, Dreyfus, and Spinosa refer, for example, to Sherry Turkle's research into the incipient practices in the early years of the Internet to provide an example of how new marginal practices of "identity morphing" (having multiple screen identities and avatars that are different from normal everyday identities) emerged along with the personal computer and the connectivity of the Internet and began to reconfigure cultural practices around identity and relationships.31 Additionally, in the phenomenology of the historical entrepreneur, Disclosing New Worlds gives further clues to the way everyday practices get reconfigured: "genuine entrepreneurs are sensitive to historical questions, not the pragmatic ones, and ... what is interesting about their innovation is that they change the style of our practices as a whole in some domain."32 An example given in Disclosing New Worlds is the way King Gillette contributed to a change in the style of personal hygiene with his introduction of the disposable razor, a tool that is no doubt part and parcel of the overall emphasis on efficiency characteristic of our technological epoch. Yet what we are here calling "historical emergence" and "reconfiguration" need to be further developed, especially with regard to the task of responding to our ontological vulnerability as foisted upon us in the Anthropocene. We are historical beings who live in historical worlds, that is, worlds that undergo reconfigurations of their field of occurrences over time. In the history of the West, we have had a Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). See also Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Kelly, All Things Shining: Reading the Western Classics to Find Meaning in a Secular Age (New York: Free Press, 2011), pp. 127ff. 29 Dreyfus, "Comments on Radical Hope," p. 69. 30. Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus, Disclosing New Worlds: Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the Cultivation of Solidarity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 31 Ibid., p.13. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 11 few major cultural reconfigurations, milestones along the path that Heidegger called "the history of being," such as the shift from the Homeric world to the classical Greek world of Plato, the shift brought about by Jesus, and the massive reconfiguration from the medieval to the modern world as focused in the writings of Descartes. Regardless of whether this is the real history of being, or just the history of what philosophers have said about being (as Rorty once quipped), we can say this much: our fields of occurrence are not static; they are constitutively susceptible to the ongoing drift of historical reconfiguration. Even though we cannot predict the outcome or control the overall direction of such a shift, we can learn to be actively receptive to what is gathering. Historical and ontological change is not always an event that happens to us; as the peculiarly historical entities that we are (world disclosers), we can participate in this unfolding. In order to do so, we need to cultivate our own historical receptivity, our ability to detect the ripening of newly emergent possibilities in a historical moment. We can only briefly gesture here at what it would mean to cultivate our receptivity to historical emergence. As we have briefly mentioned above, new practices, along with new entities, technologies, identities, and ultimately new understandings of what is important and possible, emerge on the margins of the present and shape our trajectory into the future. While it is no doubt true that our worlds are rooted in practices of the past (as Dreyfus emphasized), the way the past practices shape our future trajectory is always open to changes that transpire and emerge unexpectedly in the present. To see examples of this phenomenon, it helps to look to the characteristic components of the everyday network of equipment (like disposable razor blades, cell phones, or automobiles) which we use in our daily activities and which shape the habits and overall style of our being in the world. One just has to look again at the way the personal computer, and then the smartphone and mobile connectivity emerged and cascaded in recent decades, reshaping the style of our everyday practices in areas such as communication (text messaging and photo and video sharing), education, peer to peer financial transactions, food consumption (delivery services), books, streaming services for television, movies, and music, transportation services ("ride sharing" applications), and everyday getting around (the ubiquity of GPS systems). Even though many of these practices still remain largely in tune with the technological enframing way of being dominant in our times, we can nevertheless see them as emergent marginal practices that may eventually be gathered into larger-scale, yet hitherto unforeseen cultural reconfigurations that will draw us to relate differently to each other and our natural environment.33 We can anticipate already certain contours of the worlds to-come, for 32 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 33 For an account of the way technological devices and connectivity are shifting social habits, see Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each Other (New York: Basic Books, 2012); for a less alarmist interpretation, see Danah Boyd, It's Complicated: The Social Lives of Networked Teens (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014). Another useful recent popular book in this literature dedicated to monitoring and commenting upon the shifts in our practices elicited by technological emergence is Kevin Kelly, The Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 12 example, in the way national borders are losing the significance they have had for millennia in defining centers of power and identity. Internet connectivity, genetic engineering, and geoengineering all can wreak world-impacting effects that cannot be contained by national borders. What overall significance this shift will have and how will it shape a future field of occurrences cannot yet be seen. The above examples provide hints of how small-scale contingent emergences of new components in our everyday "equipmental contexture" (to use a phrase from early Heidegger) can accumulate and eventually gather into broader shifts in our world, our sense of identity (that is, of who we are and what we stand for) and field of occurrences. Think too of how electricity went from a strange, marginal curiosity manipulated by magicians to pervading almost every aspect of our lives and radically expanding our horizon of possibilities. Such reconfigurations are not limited to the kinds of backward-looking detection of marginal practices left over from previous historical worlds and pre-technological understandings of being. Nor are they limited to the heroic cultural figures like Descartes and Jesus. World reconfiguration is a skill every human being as an essentially historical being is capable of cultivating, if we develop the right sensibilities for observing and participating in the ongoing emergent transformations in our practices, attitudes, and surrounding equipmental context. In refining this ability, we amplify our receptivity to new possibilities (and threats) emerging on the present margins. Such a heightened sensibility for everyday historical emergence would provide the forward-looking complement to Dreyfus's backward-looking openness to marginal practices left over in a culture from the past, and can help provide us a more robust orientation in responding to the potential collapse of our current world. Yet there are no guarantees, and no formulae to follow in such a navigation of the drift of history.34 It is important to emphasize that such emergent shifts in our worlds happen not just on the level of things and technologies, but also in our conversations, political sensibilities, and global mood. Indeed, the ongoing discursive explosion around the Anthropocene (and climate change more generally) is an indication that a shift in global mood and openness to new possibilities is gathering. Thus, the radical hope and imagination for a future shift in our practices does not have to be a hope or imagination for the "bare" possibility that something will change; it can be a hope and imagination fueled by an active receptivity to the ways in which things and possibilities historically emerge. Inevitable: Understanding the 12 Technological Forces That Will Shape Our Future (New York: Viking, 2016) 34 Moreover, rather than there gathering one unified world, in the wake of the age of enframing, what might emerge is a plurality of temporary local-worlds across which we will be drawn to move. For discussion about the emergence of a plurality of temporary local worlds as opposed to a unified, singular post-technological world, see Hubert L. Dreyfus and Charles Spinosa, "Highway Bridges and Feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on How to Affirm Technology," Man and World 30:2 (1997), reprinted in Hubert L. Dreyfus, Background Practices: Essays on the Understanding of Being, ed. Mark Wrathall (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 13 With the emergence of new marginal practices, new technologies, and new forms of art in initially circumscribed domains, world-reconfiguration transpires and can be focused and accelerated by suitably sensitive participants in our historical drift. Again, this isn't a matter of waiting for someone to become the next Jesus or Descartes. The kind of shifts we are talking about happened with Pasteur for public health, with Faraday for electricity, with D.W. Griffith for narrative cinema, with Martin Luther King, Jr. for civil rights, with Black Sabbath for heavy metal music, with Steve Jobs for mobile connectivity, and so on. And such shifts are happening today in a still more diffuse way with questions about gender and sexual orientations, as popular shows like Transparent reveal and focus-and with issues surrounding the human being's relation to the earth, as the intensifications of Anthropocene and climate change discourses reveal. 3. Historical Emergence In an earlier account of what we call "the drift of historical emergence,"35 we elaborated on the example of the emergence of practices and attitudes around vaccination and public health that transpired on the basis of Pasteur's detection and interpretation of microorganisms, but we intend for the account to be generalizable.36 What began as a marginal observation of unidentified squiggling shapes in his microscope, a microscope he was looking into in order to investigate a breakdown in the fermentation of alcoholic beverages, ended up eventually radically reconfiguring our cultural practices and understanding around health, cleanliness, and wellbeing. The whole phenomenon of "public health" as we know it today (with things like standard vaccinations) emerged in Pasteur's wake. But Pasteur should not be seen as some kind of prototypical creative genius. What Pasteur was able to do was be maximally receptive to the historical forces gathering around him, while thereby also opening a space for a whole cascade of subsequent developments in our practices around infection, contagion, and health. Microorganisms had been observed a century before under the microscope of Anton van Leeuwenhoek, but these observations did not have the same world-disclosive import as 35 The account of historical emergence that we only briefly sketch here is based on an approach we developed in a study presented in 2013 to the Chilean government. The study, Surfing Towards the Future: Chile on the 2025 Horizon, was produced by the Chilean National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness (CNIC), which was led by Fernando Flores between 2008 and 2012. The notion of a "drift" of history (as opposed to, say, a teleologically guided or a nomothetically determined process) is partially inspired by the evolutionary theory of Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela. See for example, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of Human Understanding (Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1998), Chapter 5, "The Natural Drift of Living Beings." For an account of technological drift that we have found illuminating, see W. Brian Arthur, The Nature of Technology: What It Is and How It Evolves (New York: Free Press, 2009). 36 Our take on Pasteur has been influenced by Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, trans. Alan Sheridan and John Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 14 Pasteur's. This is not due not only to Pasteur's superior sensitivity to the significance of what was before him, but also due to the greater momentum picked up in the gathering of the historical moment itself by the time of Pasteur. In our terminology, the historical moment was ripe for Pasteur's observations to generate a faint glow or fulgor, a dawning of a reconfiguration in our field of occurrences. Fulgor is a word in Spanish that means "glimmer" or "faint glow." We prefer to leave the word untranslated, because we use it as a technical term to capture the moment when a new configuration of our practices begins to appear, casting an initially faint and unfocused new light on our horizon of possibilities. Thus, a fulgor is the dawning of a new reconfiguration in a clearing, in the Heideggerian sense of Lichtung (the open space or field in which occurrences occur).37 In the context of a pre-established form of life and routine of practices, new openings to the future emerge at first as a fulgor in the faint light of which new understanding and practices can further develop; these may eventually turn into the new technologies and practices of tomorrow, altering our space of possibilities. A moment of fulgor has, for the suitably receptive observer, a characteristic mood of unsettlement accompanied by a sense of promise and a feeling that what is beginning to be understood exceeds one's current ability to grasp and express it. This is often the result of observing and holding onto an anomaly.38 In this context, we use "anomaly" not in Kuhn's technical sense, but in a related sense to refer to an emergent and unexpected upsurge that has the potential to upset and reconfigure our taken-for-granted way of doing things. Pasteur was initially responding to a breakdown in the fermentation process, but his observation of strange, anomalous, microscopic, moving shapes (what we now call "bacteria") eventually produced a fulgor for him pertaining to the phenomena of infection and contagion. For this initial fulgor to emerge in the first place, a whole range of historically contingent practices, concerns, and technologies had to have already emerged so that they could contribute to and be focused in the shift about to take place. In Pasteur's case, the microscope as an item of equipment had to have already been on the scene, as did the recently emergent discipline of 37 We would like to highlight in passing here that the fulgor phenomenon, which can be elicited from a development in technology or, say, an ecological crisis, or the disappearance of buffalo, reveals the intertwinement (rather than the separation and differentiation) of the Heideggerian dimensions of being and beings (the ontological and the ontical). In this way, our account can be seen as beginning to provide a response to a worry Richard Polt has raised about Heidegger's tendency to insist on a separation between being and beings. Polt writes of a "need to challenge Heidegger's conviction that beings cannot ground be-ing [Seyn]," adding that "the attempt to find being emerging from beings is an important alternative to Heidegger's separation of be-ing (the event of emergence) from all beings." See Polt, The Emergency of Being (Ithica: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 245-246. A fulgor is precisely a way in which being emerges from beings. 38 For Flores's earlier account of this sense of unsettlement and how this sense of "anomaly" relates to the way Kuhn uses the term in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 15 chemistry, the longstanding practice of fermenting alcoholic beverages, shared public concerns with plague, concerns with improving surgical practices, concerns with livestock mortality, and growing interest in cleaning up densely packed urban areas; all of these elements and more accumulated and created the opening in which Pasteur could be receptive to the fulgor moment in which he could find a new, ultimately world-disclosive, significance in the squiggling, weird shapes underneath his microscope. Although he himself was not aware of this as such, Pasteur demonstrated the kind of "imaginative excellence" (in Lear's words) that can enable someone to contribute to the disclosure of a new world. With the discursive explosion surrounding the Anthropocene, as well as climate change more generally (for example, with Pope Francis's recent Encyclical), with fossil fuels as cheap and yet as contested as ever, with climate disaster-events such as "super storms" visiting us with greater frequency, with rising middle classes in India and China that will put exponentially greater pressures on the stability of the earth's environment, with the shifts in emergences pertaining to all of the new technologies we mentioned above, can we now detect the gathering of new historical forces, the setting of a stage for a new fulgor that may reconfigure our world? Do we have the historical sensibility to locate our new buffalo? Can we adequately expand our "imaginative excellence" as historical beings, or has our ontological vulnerability been already too drastically exposed? Again, the intuition we've explored here is that, as historical beings, we can all cultivate an imaginative sensibility to the way historical moments ripen and gather around us, not only through refocusing marginal practices left over from the past, but by focusing new marginal entities and practices that emerge in the present. Of course, we cannot expect that any shift in a sub-domain of our practices will trigger a wholesale reconfiguration of our world that will stimulate an alteration the habits and practices that have so degraded our natural environment. But we can transmit an increased general sensibility to historical emergence, the ontical cradle of being, which can feed our imagination and overall receptivity to shifts that may start out as marginal, and incrementally gather and be focused in a heretofore still unanticipated shifts in our ways of life. In this way, we can heed Heidegger's own call to prepare a "new beginning" and a "last god" to succeed our technological epoch, and we can do so by cultivating practices of actively receiving and navigating the emergence of being from things. 4. Human beings in the History of Nature Our ontological vulnerability is not something to bemoan or an ailment for which we should seek a cure; it is part and parcel of our historical way of being. The possible collapse of our world is at the same time the possibility for the emergence of a new world (or worlds), new configurations of our field of occurrences. Whether or not we succeed in heightening our sensibilities for a more active participation in the drift of historical emergence, and whether or University of Chicago Press, 1962), see the chapter on entrepreneurship in Flores et al., Disclosing New Worlds. Flores and Rousse Ecological Finitude as Ontological Finitude 16 not this is of any use in activating our imaginations for new and alternative ways of going on in a new beginning, we are now invited (if not compelled) to reinterpret ourselves as belonging to the long history of emergence and disappearance of entities and species on this planet. Let us assume this historical belonging in a mood of gratitude rather than despair (as though there is nothing for us to do about it, since global capitalism and technology are too entrenched and unhindered for us to change anything) or techno-arrogance (as though we can count on the progress of technology and geoengineering eventually to solve all problems for us once and for all). We have been able to take for granted as a stable background condition the ecological niche in which our species evolved on the planet. Yet now, the cumulative impact of our activities is beginning to undermine the very ecological conditions that enabled our lineage to emerge and proliferate in the first place. Our bubble is bursting, to use a metaphor from Peter Sloterdijk.39 It was only within a specific ecological niche that our species, like any, was able to emerge and flourish. All such ecological niches also have their vulnerability, their own buffalo, so to speak, that enable them to function as a coherent and vibrant whole. The carbon dioxide and other side effects of our ways of life are compromising the stability of our ecological niche. Whether or not we are able to develop the sensibilities for monitoring and navigating the waves of historical emergence in such a way that we can be actively receptive to what is gathering in our current historical moment, we can nevertheless be grateful at having been granted the chance to linger for a while in this contingent history of nature. Perhaps our disappearance will provide the opening for new and wondrous worlds. 39 Peter Sloterdijk, Bubbles: Spheres Volume 1: Microsphereology, trans. Wieland Hoban (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2011).

OPINION published: 28 June 2016 doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00309 Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 309 Edited by: Mikhail Lebedev, Duke University, USA Reviewed by: Elizabeth B. Torres, Rutgers University, USA Amilcar Silva Dos Santos, Hospital Vila Franca de Xira, Portugal *Correspondence: Jacqueline A. Sullivan [email protected] Received: 05 May 2016 Accepted: 08 June 2016 Published: 28 June 2016 Citation: Sullivan JA (2016) Stabilizing Constructs through Collaboration across Different Research Fields as a Way to Foster the Integrative Approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 10:309. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2016.00309 Stabilizing Constructs through Collaboration across Different Research Fields as a Way to Foster the Integrative Approach of the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project Jacqueline A. Sullivan* Department of Philosophy, Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada Keywords: construct, DSM, experimental paradigm, integration, RDoC, validity INTRODUCTION More than 450 million people worldwide suffer from neuropsychiatric disorders and the numbers continue to rise (WHO, 2016). In 2010, aiming to solve the global mental health crisis and advance psychiatry toward a precision medicine approach, the US National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) initiated the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). Scientists at NIMH importantly recognize that understanding and explaining psychopathological phenomena requires input from different areas of science that investigate the role of different units of analysis (e.g., genes, cells, systems) in the production of organism-level behavioral functions. The RDoC matrix is put forward as a context for integrating results from these different sciences into a taxonomy of putatively valid constructs they purportedly share in common. It is intended to facilitate the development of "integrative psychobiological explanations" of those behavioral functions designated by the constructs (Cuthbert and Kozak, 2013, p. 931; See also Sanislow et al., 2010). Such explanations, by shedding light on the mechanisms of these functions, will enable investigators to pinpoint viable targets for therapeutic intervention in cases in which these functions are disrupted. The RDoC project is still in its infancy and its proponents recognize that it has much room for improvement (Casey et al., 2014). To date, it has been criticized for being "braincentric" and decontextualizing mental disorders from their bodily, social, and environmental contexts (e.g., Whooley, 2014; Bernard and Mittal, 2015). Although proponents of RDoC claim that one of its crucial aims is to integrate various areas of science, an obstacle to this integration is the lack of construct stability in psychology and neuroscience. In this article, I explain why stabilizing constructs is important to the success of the RDoC initiative and identify one measure for facilitating such stability. THE RDoC MATRIX The RDoC Matrix consists of a table in which findings from psychology and neuroscience may be organized. Five broad domains of behavioral functioning are identified in the rows of the first Sullivan Stabilizing Constructs across Research Fields FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of different areas of science contributing collectively to construct stabilization, which facilitates explanatory integration and the development of integrated valid constructs. Some examples of current RDoC constructs are identified in the figure in plain typeface. Constructs currently not represented in the RDoC matrix and others to be added are identified in boldface. column of the matrix: (1) positive, (2) negative valence systems, (3) cognitive, (4) social processing, and (5) arousal/modulatory systems. A selection of constructs designating some behavioral functions currently under study across psychology and neuroscience are identified and classified under one of each of the 5 domains. For example, attention, perception, declarative memory, language, cognitive control, and working memory are classified as cognitive systems. Negative valence systems include the constructs of acute threat, potential threat, sustained threat, loss, and frustrative nonreward. Each construct is also given a general definition. Inmost cases, these definitionsmake reference to neural, psychological, and behavioral processes associated with the construct. For example, fear is characterized as involving "activation of the brain's defensive motivational system to promote" protective behaviors (i.e., neural processes), "a pattern of adaptive responses to conditioned and unconditioned threat stimuli" (i.e., behavioral/psychological processes) and possibly "internal representations and cognitive processing" (i.e., psychological processes) (http://www.nimh.nih.gov/researchpriorities/rdoc/constructs/acute-threat-fear.shtml). The columns of the matrix reflect the fact that research on domains of behavioral functioning spans multiple levels of organization from genes to cells to networks to behavior and includes multiple different areas of science (e.g., psychology, systems neuroscience, and neurobiology). An additional column labeled "paradigms" is where experimental paradigms, standard procedures for producing, detecting and measuring behavioral functions that correspond to the constructs in the matrix, are placed. The Stroop Task is an experimental paradigm historically used to investigate selective attention in human subjects. Fear-conditioning paradigms, in contrast, are used to study fear in humans and non-human mammals. How will RDoC facilitate progress in understanding disturbances in behavioral functioning? Investigators working in those sciences represented in the matrix use experimental paradigms to produce, detect and measure instances of behavioral functions that correspond to RDoC constructs. The constructs are essentially labels that are linked up with (1) experimental paradigms used to investigate the behavioral functions designated by those labels and (2) units of analysis that have been implicated in the production of behavioral functions designated by those labels. Although proponents of RDoC remain vague about the details, at some point research findings inputted into the matrix are supposed to result in integrative psychobiological or mechanistic explanations that describe the physical components and processes that bring about the functions designated by RDoC constructs (Cuthbert and Kozak, 2013). Knowledge about mechanisms is in turn supposed to foster the development of therapeutic interventions in cases in which behavioral functions are disrupted, with the aim of restoring normal functioning in those individuals. OBSTACLES TO INTEGRATION We should not expect integration to be an emergent feature of the juxtaposition of a mass of research findings emanating from psychology and neuroscience. The explanatory and conceptual integration that RDoC is supposed to deliver instead requires intensive collaborative efforts on the part of investigators working in areas of science that investigate RDoC constructs. To understand why, a closer look at explanatory, conceptual and investigative practices in psychology and neuroscience is relevant. Explanations in psychology have been characterized as explanations by functional analysis (Fodor, 1968; Cummins, 1983). These explanations involve ascriptions of functions to organisms and the abstract identification of the sub-capacities that bring these functions about without regard for anatomical, structural, biochemical, or physiological facts about the brain and nervous system. They often consist of box-and-arrow diagrams where boxes stand in for psychological capacities and arrows represent information flow through the system from stimulus inputs to behavioral outputs. An explanation of attention by Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 309 Sullivan Stabilizing Constructs across Research Fields functional analysis, for example, may describe a "short term storage" system that receives information from the periphery and sends it through a "selective filter" that determines what information is received by systems downstream (Broadbent, 1958). Explanations in neuroscience, in contrast, are described as mechanistic insofar as they identify the physical parts (e.g., systems, cells, molecules) and processes (e.g., activation, firing, phosphorylation) that realize organism-level functions (Craver, 2007; Bechtel, 2008). Part of a mechanistic explanation of attention, for example, may describe activation of dopamine receptors and depolarization of medium spiny neurons in the nucleus accumbens of the basal forebrain. A prerequisite for integrating explanations by functional analysis with mechanistic explanations is "connectability" (Nagel, 1961). More specifically, the terms designating cognitive capacities in an explanation by functional analysis must have roughly the same referents as the terms designating cognitive capacities in a mechanistic explanation. To refer back to the previous example, an explanation by functional analysis that contains the term attention ought to refer to the same phenomenon as a mechanistic explanation that contains that term. Terms designating cognitive capacities are the common denominator between the two forms of explanation and satisfying the connectability condition requires that the terms designate the same thing. Otherwise, rather than explanatory integration, terms in one area of science are eliminated and replaced with those of another. The RDoC task forces implicitly realize that satisfaction of the connectability condition is required for explanatory integration, as is evidenced by the fact that they have sought to deploy strategies to stabilize RDoC constructs, while simultaneously acknowledging that the constructs are heuristics that may warrant revision in light of future discovery (Cuthbert and Insel, 2013). However, stabilizing constructs requires more than a small group of investigators selecting a set of terms that are used across different areas of science and providing them with definitions broad enough to accommodate different uses of these terms. As RDoC's creators acknowledge, it is not a project that will prove ultimately successful if it isolates itself from those very sciences poised to shed light on the kinds of questions it is designed to answer (e.g., Simmons and Quinn, 2014). RDoC's success is instead contingent on a large-scale revolution in the mind-brain sciences to collectively stabilize constructs so that conceptual and explanatory integration are possible. One component of this revolution has to be coordination across investigators working in the same and different areas of science to come to specific agreement about (1) how to define terms designating behavioral functions, (2) what the best experimental paradigms for studying a given behavioral function are, and (3) when two experimental paradigms may be said to produce, detect and measure roughly the same function. Do we encounter such coordination within or across psychology and neuroscience currently? Let's begin by considering cognitive psychology. One of its paradigmatic features is the importance placed on engaging in rigorous task analyses to determine the component cognitive processes operative when subjects are trained and tested in experimental paradigms. This ought to mean that intra-lab strategies are in place to ensure that experimental paradigms measure the functions they are intended to measure, which ought to contribute positively to construct stabilization. While this is true, inter-lab practices are not necessarily conducive to stability. For example, two investigators may be interested in investigating the same function, but disagree about the most suitable task for this purpose. Since stimuli and task demands may differ radically between tasks, it is difficult to determine if the same component cognitive processes are involved in each task and whether they measure the same thing (Sullivan, 2009; Lilienfeld, 2014; Lilienfeld and Treadway, 2016). Investigators often disagree about which component cognitive processes are involved in a task and the behavioral data often are compatible with multiple different explanations by functional analysis. Although we may be optimistic that cognitive neuroscience will provide the fMRI or other brain data requisite for resolving such problems of underdetermination, it has its own troubles with respect to construct stabilization. Many cognitive neuroscientists do not aim to identify the component cognitive processes thought to be engaged in experimental tasks nor to determine how the variables manipulated in an experiment affect these processes (Sullivan, 2014a,b). In fact, when evaluating or comparing tasks it is more common for investigators to rely on "intuitive judgments" about the processes involved rather than look to "formal theories from cognitive psychology" for guidance (Poldrack, 2010, p. 149). We also find rampant methodological pluralism in those areas of cellular and molecular neuroscience that investigate cognition and behavior. Individual researchers vary experimental paradigms and protocols used to produce, measure and detect behavioral functions. Yet even subtle differences in experimental protocols can impact the mechanisms productive of those functions, prompting uncertainty as to whether different laboratories are investigating the same phenomenon. In some cases, investigators may be unclear what function they are discovering the mechanisms of (Sullivan, 2010), but given that they do not regard understanding component cognitive processes as relevant to their mechanistic explanatory goals, they see no need to look toward psychology for guidance. CONCLUSION If construct instability across psychology and neuroscience is as pervasive as these facts about practice suggest, then stabilizing them for the purposes of conceptual and explanatory integration is going to require scientists engaged in research relevant to investigating the domains of functioning identified in the matrix-including research on domains currently and problematically absent from the matrix, like motor functions (Bernard and Mittal, 2015)-to interact with each other in the trenches to do hard work (Bilder et al., 2013). To date, RDoC has pointed to large-scale meta-analyses as a primary way forward. However, insofar as meta-analyses abstract away from conceptual Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 309 Sullivan Stabilizing Constructs across Research Fields and experimental practices operative within and across different areas and laboratories in psychology and neuroscience, they will not yield valid constructs. Details about features of individual experiments matter for comparing data across laboratories and determining if the same capacities are under study and the same mechanisms are operative. While amassing discordant evidence under a set of common labels may result in testable hypotheses it will not directly shed light on real divisions in the causal structure of the world. RDoC's success requires instead deliberate efforts across the relevant sciences and humanities to collectively stabilize its constructs (Figure 1). One plausible way forward is to create networks of investigators representing a diverse array of perspectives on behavioral and psychological functions and regularly bring them together to facilitate discussions about what the relevant constructs are, how to investigate them, how to stabilize them, and related issues (See for example http://www.rotman.uwo.ca/events-2/rethinking-the-tax onomy-of-psychology-conference/). This is the RDoC model on a larger scale and with greater inclusivity, but only by means of broader collaborative efforts may we hope to ensure the realization of RDoC's positive aims. AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS The author confirms being the sole contributor of this work and approved it for publication. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank two anonymous reviewers for very helpful and extensive comments on this manuscript. It is much improved from the original version as a result of their feedback and encouragement. REFERENCES Bechtel, W. (2008). Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience. New York, NY: Taylor and Francis. Bernard, J. A., and Mittal, V. A. (2015). Updating the research domain criteria: the utility of a motor dimension. Psychol. Med. 45, 2685–2689. doi: 10.1017/S0033291715000872 Bilder, R., Howe, A., and Sabb, F. (2013). Multilevel models from biology to psychology: mission impossible? J. Abnorm. Psychol. 122, 917–927. doi: 10.1037/a0032263 Broadbent, D. (1958). Perception and Communication. London: Pergamon Press. Casey, B. J., Oliveri, M. E., and Insel, T. (2014). A neurodevelopmental perspective on the research domain criteria (RDoC) framework. Biol. Psychiatry 76, 350–353. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2014.01.006 Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Cummins, R. (1983). The Nature of Psychological Explanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Cuthbert, B., and Insel, T. (2013). 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"Subtraction and Beyond: The Logic of Experimental Designs for Neuroimaging," in Foundational Issues in Human Brain Mapping, eds S. Hanson and M. Bunzl (Cambridge: MIT Press), 147–159. Sanislow, C. A., Pine, D. S., Quinn, K., Kozak, M., Garvey, M., Heinssen, R., et al. (2010). Developing constructs for psychopathology research: research domain criteria. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 119, 631–639. doi: 10.1037/a0020909 Simmons, J., and Quinn, K. (2014). The NIMH Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) Project: implications for genetics research. Mamm. Genome 25, 23–31. doi: 10.1007/s00335-013-9476-9 Sullivan, J. (2009). The multiplicity of experimental protocols: a challenge to reductionist and nonreductionist models of the unity of science. Synthese 167, 511–539. doi: 10.1007/s11229-008-9389-4 Sullivan, J. (2010). Reconsidering spatial memory and the morris water maze. Synthese 177, 261–283. doi: 10.1007/s11229-010-9849-5 Sullivan, J. (2014a). "Is the next frontier in neuroscience a decade of the mind," in Brain Theory, ed C. Wolfe (New York, NY: Palgrave-MacMillan), 45–67. Sullivan, J. (2014b). "Stabilizing mental disorders: prospects and problems," in Classifying Psychopathology: Mental Kinds and Natural Kinds, eds H. Kincaid and J. Sullivan (Boston, MA: MIT Press), 257–281. WHO (2016).Mental Disorders [Fact Sheet]. Available online at: http://www.who. int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs396/en/ Whooley, O. (2014). Nosological reflections: the failure of DSM-5, the emergence of RDoC, and the decontextualization of mental distress. Soc. Ment. Health 4, 92–110. doi: 10.1177/2156869313519114 Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. Copyright © 2016 Sullivan. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 4 June 2016 | Volume 10 | Article

THE VIRTUES OF HUNTING: A REPLY TO JENSEN ROBERT LOVERING Santa Clara University [email protected] Abstract: In this paper, I attempt to demonstrate that environmental virtue ethics (EVE) fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, thus, that the second lemma ought to be embraced Introduction As a way of introducing the central issue of this paper, consider the following exchange: I Smith: How was your weekend? Jones: Great, I went hunting. Smith: Isn't hunting immoral? Jones: Not under certain conditions. Smith: Such as ... ? Jones: Such as when one develops environmental virtues through it. Smith: Environmental virtues? What are they? Jones: They are traits one can develop through one's interaction with the environment that lead to an environmentally good life: a right relationship between the human agent on the one hand, and Earth and its nonhuman inhabitants on the other. Smith: And how does hunting contribute to one's development of these environmental virtues? Jones: Well, take the environmental virtue of humility. Hunting helps us to recognize that humans are part of nature and not separate from it, thereby nurturing the virtue of humility. Or consider the environmental virtue of gratitude. Hunting enables us to be grateful both for the opportunity to hunt and the food it provides, reinforcing the fact that all of nature is a gift, one that we need for survival. Or take the environmental virtue of connectedness ... Smith: Okay, okay, I understand. But can't these environmental virtues be developed in a less harmful way? I mean, is it necessary to kill animals in order to develop these virtues? Jones: Yes it is, since the very act of killing animals instills these environmental virtues in a way impossible with other activities. For example, the sense of gratitude that comes from being fed by another creature would be impossible without the kill. Smith: I can see that, and I trust you can deliver similar arguments for the other environmental virtues. You know, Jones, I find your Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Volume 13, Number 1 (Spring 2006). 68 The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen environmental virtue eth ics justification of hunting to be quite compelling. Jones: Glad to hear it. Smith: So, what did you hunt? Pheasants? Elk? Jones: Humans. Now, if you're like me, as soon as you realized what Jones hunted, you considered his environmental virtue ethics (EVE) justification of hunting to be deplorably insufficient. Moreover, you considered this to be the case not because Jones's presentation of EVE was somehow underdeveloped, but because you did not believe that hunting humans could be justified merely on the basis of the environmental virtues that one may develop through such an activity. In other words, even if Jones were to develop his account of EVE more thoroughly, so long as the justification for hunting humans remained, fundamentally, that through such an activity one can develop environmental virtues, you would deem his defense of hunting humans to be appallingly deficient. If you're like me, then, you hold that Jones's EVE fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of humans. That is, you hold that on EVE grounds alone the hunting of humans cannot be justified. What I attempt to demonstrate in this paper is, just as EVE fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of humans, so it fails to provide sufficient justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals. (Hereafter, "provides sufficient justification" and "justifies" will be used interchangeably.) In order to do this, I examine an EVE justification for the hunting of nonhuman animals and argue that it gives rise to the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the hunting of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the hunting of neither. 2 I then submit that the first lemma ought to be rejected as absurd and, thus, that the second lemma ought to be embraced. After this, I examine and critique an alternative view regarding the relation between EVE and hunting, namely: though EVE does not provide sufficient justification for hunting, it nevertheless complements and completes other ethical theories, shedding new light on the question of the moral status of hunting. I conclude by discussing three important implications for an EVE approach not only to hunting but any other environmentally oriented activity. Before moving on, a caveat is in order. Given that EVE is, in Thomas Hill's words, a "work in progress" (Hill 2001, 61) the critique below is not to be understood as directed at every understanding of EVE, or even every understanding of EVE appealed to in the attempt to justify hunting. Indeed, given the wide variety of views concerning how EVE is to be understood, formulating a critique that would encompass every understanding of EVE is prohibitively difficult, ifnot impossible.3 However, the critique below is to be understood as directed at an 69 understanding of EVE that is ostensibly widely embraced.4 Accordingly, despite the fact that my critique is not directed at every understanding of EVE, the scope of it is nonetheless quite broad. Among others, Jon Jensen accepts this widely embraced understanding of EVE, and it is his EVE justification of hunting with which this paper is concerned. The Virtues of Hunting Philip Cafaro writes, "Since virtue ethicists are often accused of focusing too exclusively on selfinterest and leaving the way open for immorality," attempting a virtue ethics justification of hunting "could be an important test case for virtue ethics generally" (Cafaro 2001,3). In his "The Virtues of Hunting," Jon Jensen echoes Cafaro's claim by stating that hunting provides a "good test case" for EVE. In tum, Jensen "explores a virtue ethics justification of hunting," attempts to determine whether hunting is justified "within a general framework of virtue ethics," and ultimately contends that, under certain conditions-viz., when it cultivates environmental virtues-hunting can be justified (Jensen 2001, 113 and 123).5 Jensen's thesis, then, is that EVE provides sufficient justification for hunting, that on EVE grounds alone hunting is justified. However, it should be noted that, at the end of his article, Jensen seemingly retreats from his original thesis and hints at a weaker thesis: though EVE does not provide sufficient justification for hunting, it nevertheless complements and completes other ethical theories and, in tum, sheds new light on the question of the moral status of hunting (Jensen 2001, 123). Though there is more textual support for the stronger, original thesis than for this weaker thesis, for the purposes of this paper I will examine and critique both of these theses (to be referred to as the stronger and weaker theses, respectively) in tum. On Jensen's EVE Justification of Hunting Before considering Jensen's defense of the stronger thesis, one needs to know what Jensen means by "hunting" as well as what he understands EVE to be. Despite what the title of his article may indicate, Jensen does not attempt to justify hunting in all its forms. Rather, he attempts to justify a particular form of hunting, viz., sport hunting. As the name suggests, sport hunting is an activity involving a level of physical exertion, skill, and even a type of competition and is to be distinguished from market (commercial) and subsistence hunting. But Jensen does not even attempt to justify sport hunting in all its forms; rather, he is concerned with a particular form of sport 70 hunting, one that may be characterized (in part) by what it is not: (a) It is not the kind of hunting the primary (if not exclusive) reason for which is to secure a trophy, e.g., a mounted head; and, (b) It is not the kind of hunting the primary (if not exclusive) reason for which is "mere sport," i.e." pleasure (Jensen 2001,115). Hence, the individual who engages in this form of sport hunting is not necessarily disappointed when he fails to secure a kill, and he views hunting to be valuable and worthwhile in a way that renders it significantly different from other sports. And so it is this form of sport hunting-I'll refer to it as virtuous sport hunting (VSH)-which Jensen attempts to justify on EVE grounds. (Although Jensen is concerned with justifying this particular form of hunting on EVE grounds, I argue below that EVE fails to justify not only VSH, but every other form of hunting as well.) As for Jensen's understanding of EVE, it should be noted immediately that defining EVE is, in Jensen's words, "no small feat" (Jensen 2001, 113). Indeed, a principal project for some environmental virtue ethicists is determining how, exactly, EVE is to be understood.6 Even so, definitions of EVE have been developed and articulated, and the definition Jensen invokes happens to be one that is seemingly widely embraced within the EVE community.? He summarizes this definition in the following way: [E]nvironmental virtue ethics evaluates the morality of individual actions or types of actions by the standard of the environmentally virtuous person. What would an environmentally virtuous person do in this situation? An environmentaIly virtuous agent is one who has, and exercises, the environmental virtues. These virtues must be explained and defended in terms of their ability to promote and lead to the environmentaIly good life (Jensen 200 I, 115). EVE, then, may be properly understood as a derivative of virtue theory. And, quoting Rosalind Hursthouse, Jensen states the folIowing basic moral principle of virtue theory: An act is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do (i.e., acting in character) in the circumstances (Jensen 2001, 113). Accordingly, one may properly understand a basic moral principle of EVE to be: An act is right if and only ifit is what an environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. Moreover, constitutive of virtue theory is, of course, the development of virtues, understood as Robert Lovering traits that, according to Jensen, tend "to lead to some further good, usually some form of human flourishing" (Jensen 2001, 114). Accordingly, what makes traits environmentally virtuous is their tendency to lead to or bring about a particular good, viz., an environmentally good life: a "right" relationship between the human agent on the one hand, and the Earth and its nonhuman inhabitants on the other (Jensen 2001, 115). And though Jensen emphasizes that the good in question is a distinctly human good rather than a good of the biotic community or ecosystem, he also claims that the environmentally good life "must entail the good of natural systems and other species" since "all evidence indicates that human-well being is inextricably tied to the health of our surrounding ecosystems" (Jensen 2001, 115). Thus, according to Jensen, the environmental virtue ethicist promotes the good of natural systems and other species insofar as doing so serves to produce a distinctly human good. Jensen's environmental virtue ethicist, then, considers natural systems and other species to be instrumentally valuable. Whether he considers them to be intrinsically valuable as well is another matter, one which will be addressed below. Given the preceding, we are now in a position to consider Jensen's defense ofthe stronger thesis: that EVE provides sufficient justification for VSH. According to Jensen, VSH can playa unique role in the development of environmental virtues. For example, VSH can help us appreciate our roles as individuals and as a species in the greater whole, and this means recognizing that humans are part of nature and not separate from it (Jensen 200 I, 118). In this way, VSH fosters humility. Moreover, by joining us with the source of our food, VSH can cultivate the virtue of connectedness in a most direct fashion. "When a person hunts, kills, cleans, and processes the animal," Jensen maintains, "the connections are deep and meaningful" (Jensen 200 I, 118). Jensen also states that some virtuous sport hunters are "grateful for the opportunity to hunt as well as the food it provides" and suggests that "the latter nourishes the body while the former nourishes the spirit" (Jensen 2001, 119). Finally, according to Jensen, respect can be developed through VSH in the manner in which a person hunts as well as the manner in which the animal is treated during and after the kill (Jensen 2001, 119-20). In short, insofar as VSH cultivates these traits-humility, connectedness, gratitude, or respect-it is justified on EVE grounds. With this in mind, Jensen's justification ofVSH on EVE grounds may be summarized as follows: PI: VSH cultivates certain environmental virtues. P2: IfVSH cultivates certain environmental virtues, then EVE justifies VSH. The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen C 1: EVE justifies VSH. Objections to Jensen's EVE Justification of Hunting The objection to be discussed in this section is one which Jensen himself anticipates but, I submit, fails to respond to adequately. Jensen states the objection in the following way: "[E]ven if one accepts my claims, hunting is certainly not the only way to acquire or nurture these virtues. Why then, some will surely ask, should one hunt if there are other, less harmful, ways of reaching the same goods" (Jensen 2001, 121)? In other words, if it is not necessary to kill animals to develop environmental virtues, why not develop them through less harmful means, such as gardening or photography? Jensen replies as follows. Though killing animals may not be necessary for the development of some environmental virtues, it is necessary for the development of other specific environmental virtues, such as connectedness to a food web involving wild nature, humility resulting from awareness of the cycles of death and life, and gratitude that comes from feeding upon another creature (Jensen 2001, 122). "The very act of killing animals," Jensen writes, "deepens and instills virtues in a way that is impossible with other activities" (Jensen 2001, 122). And if it is impossible to develop these specific environmental virtues except by killing animals, then killing animals as a way of developing these virtues is justified on EVE grounds. Jensen's reply to the preceding objection, then, may be summarized as follows: P3: The very act of killing animals deepens and instills specific environmental virtues in a way that is impossible with other activities. P4: If the very act of killing animals deepens and instills specific environmental virtues in a way that is impossible with other activities, then killing animals as a way of developing these environmental virtues is justified. C2: Killing animals as a way of developing these environmental virtues is justified. Whether Jensen's reply to the preceding objection is successful depends on the soundness of this argument. Since the argument is clearly valid, we need only determine whether the premises are true. Regarding P3, Jensen submits a considerable amount of empirical evidence in favor of it (Jensen 2001, 122-23). And though I wonder whether empirical evidence is the right sort of evidence for supporting claims about what is and is not possible, I also recognize that "possible" has numerous senses, 71 ranging from the logical to the metaphysical. Given that Jensen refrains from telling us what sense of "possible" he has in mind, my position on P3 is one of skepticism. That is, regarding the truth value of P3, I have suspended judgment. My skepticism here is inconsequential, however, for it is with Jensen's justification for P4 where I believe the fatal flaw with his argument is to be found. For the sake of the argument, then, I will grant that P3 is true and focus on Jensen's justification for P4. On what grounds, then, does Jensen hold that P4 is true? On the grounds that it is entailed by his ethical theory, EVE. For if the very act of killing animals in certain circumstances deepens and instills specific environmental virtues in a way that is impossible with other activities, then killing animals in those circumstances is what an environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do. And given the aforementioned basic moral principle of EVE, if killing animals in those circumstances is what an environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do, then killing animals in those circumstances is right. Moreover, if an act is right in certain circumstances, then it is justified in those circumstances. A problem with the preceding justification for P4 may be detected by revisiting the interchange between Smith and Jones. Like Jensen, Jones invokes P4 in his defense of what I have since referred to as VSH. Unlike Jensen, however, Jones invokes P4 in defense of the VSH of particular animals, namely, humans. Indeed, suppose that as the interchange continues, Jones goes on to argue that hunting human animals allows us to develop specific environmental virtues in a way that is impossible when hunting nonhuman animals. For example, Jones contends that the level of humility that can result from awareness of the cycles of death and life involving nonhuman animals cannot possibly reach the level of humility that can result from awareness ofthe cycles of death and life involving our fellow human beings. For in the latter case, we can empathize with the deceased to a far greater degree than we can with any other kind of animal-awareness of a dead human evokes the humility-inducing "That could be me" in a way impossible with awareness of a dead nonhuman animal. Jones also argues that the level of gratitude we can have for the sacrifice of the nonhuman animal upon which we are feeding cannot possibly reach the level of gratitude that we can have for the sacrifice made by a human animal. For when a human is killed, the sacrifice is far greater than that of a nonhuman animal, since the lives of humans are much more valuable than those of nonhuman animals. "After all," Jones contends, "only human animals are beings with the capacity for behaving virtuously, and this alone suffices to confer upon them a greater worth than any other nonhuman animal." And so on. 72 Jones argues, then, not only that hunting humans allows us to develop specific environmental virtues, but it does so in a way that is impossible with other activities, even the hunting of nonhuman animals. And, according to P4, if the very act of killing animals deepens and instills specific environmental virtues in a way that is impossible with other activities, then killing animals as a way of developing these virtues is justified. Jones concludes, then, that the VSH of human animals is justified on EVE grounds. The case of Jones demonstrates, then, that Jensen's EVE justification of VSH produces the following dilemma: either EVE justifies the VSH of both human and nonhuman animals, or it justifies the VSH of neither. And insofar as one is inclined to reject the first lemma as absurd (as I am), then one is left with* the second lemma. That is, one is left with the view that EVE justifies the VSH of neither human nor nonhuman animals. On Why EVE Fails to Provide Sufficient Justification for Hunting So is Jones correct? Is it the case that the VSH of not only nonhuman but human animals is justified on EVE grounds? If Jensen is to show that such is not the case, he must demonstrate that EVE accounts for a morally relevant difference (or set of morally relevant differences) between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former. It must be EVE which accounts for this difference, since what's being considered here is whether EVE provides sufficient justification for VSH, i.e., whether EVE alone justifies VSH. To account for the difference by appealing to an alternative ethical theory would be to fail to support the view that EVE alone justifies hunting. And unless Jensen demonstrates that EVE accounts for a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former, his EVE justification of VSH forces us to decide between the two lemmas, only the first of which is consistent with the stronger thesis, namely, that EVE provides sufficient justification for hunting. In effect, then, if we are forced to decide between the two lemmas, we are forced to choose between retaining the stronger thesis at the cost of embracing: the absurdity of the first lemma, and embracing the second lemma at the cost of rejecting the stronger thesis. And in this situation, I'm inclined to think that most of us will prefer the second lemma to the first. Jensen has good reason, then, to try to avoid this dilemma by demonstrating that EVE accounts for a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former. Unfortunately, Jensen fails to address whether EVE can account for a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman Robert Lovering animals which justifies the VSH ofthe latter but not the former. But that he fails to address this may come as no surprise, for endemic to virtue theory and, in turn, EVE is the general discounting of such considerations, or so I argue below. In order to understand this more clearly, it will help to examine first the comments of one of Jensen's selected representatives of virtue theory-Rosalind Hursthouse--on the related issue of abortion. 8 According to Hursthouse, the sort of knowledge that the fully virtuous person has about the moral standing of the human fetus "is not supposed to be recondite; it does not call for fancy philosophical sophistication, and it does not depend on, let alone wait upon, the discoveries of academic philosophers" (Hursthouse 1991,235). Instead, the virtuous person need only be aware of the familiar biological facts, the facts that "most human societies are and have been familiar with" (Hursthouse 1991,235). Virtue theory, then, "quite transforms the discussion of abortion by dismissing the two familiar dominating considerations [the moral standing of the fetus and women's rights] as, in a way, fundamentally irrelevant" (Hursthouse 1991,234). That is, the virtue theorist holds that "the status of the fetus-that issue over which so much ink has been spilt-is, according to virtue theory, simply not relevant to the rightness or wrongness of abortion" (Hursthouse 1991,235-36 and 235, n. 11). According to Hursthouse, then, virtue theory entails that considerations ofthe moral standing of the fetus are at least somewhat, ifnot completely, irrelevant to question of the moral status of abortion. As a result, virtue theory does not ask questions regarding the moral standing of the fetus, or at least does not ask them in such a way that may require "fancy philosophical sophistication," a phrase which seems to refer to what many of us would call "philosophical rigor." Similarly, Jensen contends that virtue theory "asks different questions than those typically raised in the debate over hunting" (Jensen 2001, 113). And one of the questions virtue theory (ft la Hursthouse) and, in particular, EVE (a la Jensen) do not ask in the debate on hunting (at least in such a way that may require "fancy philosophical sophistication") is whether there is a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH ofthe latter but not the former. More specifically, EVE does not ask whether nonhuman animals possess moral standing to a degree that precludes them from being proper objects ofVSH. But this isn't surprising, since considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals are somewhat, ifnot completely, irrelevant to the question of the moral status of VSH. By failing to ask these questions, EVE renders nonhuman animals, in David DeGrazia's words, mere practicing grounds for virtue (DeGrazia 1996,43). And it is by not asking these questions that EVE fails to account for a The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former and, in tum, forces us to decide between the preceding lemmas. And if what I suspect is correct, most of us will choose the second lemma over the first, that EVE justifies the VSH of neither human nor nonhuman animals. Moreover, this is the case regardless of whether considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals are completely or just somewhat irrelevant to question of the moral status ofVSH. For even if EVE does not deem considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals to be completely irrelevant to the question of the moral status ofVSH, it at least deems them to be secondary to considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. 9 For EVE is generally understood as giving agent-centered considerations priority over actcentered considerations. That is, it deems considerations of the good of agents as having priority over considerations of the moral status of acts which, if the act in question involves nonhuman animals (as hunting does), involves considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals. Accordingly, in the case of hunting, considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals are deemed secondary to considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. Jensen certainly understands EVE in this way; as stated above, he holds that the good with which EVE is concerned first and foremost is a distinctly human good. And giving agent-centered considerations priority over act-centered considerations in this way renders an EVE justification of VSH deeply problematic. To see this, consider Jones again, who cultivates environmental virtues during the VSH of humans. When it comes to evaluating Jones's behavior, it is very difficult to believe that considerations of these virtues have priority over considerations of which entities are proper objects of VSH. That is, it is very difficult to believe that such agent-centered considerations have priority over actcentered considerations. On the contrary, it seems that if Jones's case tells us anything, it is that in order to judge Jones's behavior to be vicious (as we are inclined to do, presumably), we mustjirst judge the moral standing of humans to be strong enough such that the VSH of them is morally impermissible. In other words, Jones's case suggests that considerations of the moral standing of the objects of VSH have priority over considerations of what environmentally virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. Likewise, in order to judge Jensen's virtuous sport hunter's behavior to be virtuous (as Jensen is inclined to do), we mustjirst judge the moral standing of nonhuman animals to be weak enough such that the VSH of them is morally permissible. Again, this suggests that considerations of the moral 73 standing of the objects ofVSH have priority over considerations of what environmentally virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. Thus, so long as EVE is understood as giving priority to agent-centered rather than an actcentered considerations-in particular, so long as EVE deems considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals to be secondary to considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances-an EVE justification of VSH will be deeply problematic. Of course, some environmental virtue ethicists reject the view that EVE gives priority to agentcentered considerations. lo According to such environmental virtue ethicists, EVE does not necessarily deem considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals to be secondary to considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. But even on this understanding of EVE, it is very difficult to believe that agent-centered considerations could trump act-centered considerations-that considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances could have priority over act-centered considerations, particularly when the act in question is others-regarding, as it is with hunting. The case of Jones suffices to establish this. But another way to convey this pertains to whether virtue is intrinsically or instrumentally valuable. I I The view that virtue is intrinsically valuable entails that virtue is its own end, that it is important for its own sake. The view that virtue is instrumentally valuable, on the other hand, entails that virtue is a reliable way to promote morally right conduct. On this instrumental view, virtue ilS important insofar as it tends to lead to morally right conduct. Suppose virtue is intrinsically valuable. Would it follow from this that, insofar as VSH cultivates environmental virtues, VSH is justified? It seems not. The case of Jones suffices as a counterexample to this: surely environmental virtues such as humility, respect, gratitude, and connectedness-even if intrinsically valuable-do not outweigh the intrinsic value of persons or other subjects-of-a-life. 12 That is, even if such environmental virtues are intrinsically valuable, it's difficult to believe that they are so valuable that the lives of persons or other subjects-of-a-life may be sacrificed in order to cultivate them. So, even ifvirtue is intrinsically valuable, it does not follow that EVE justifies VSH. Suppose, on the other hand, that virtue is instrumentally valuable. In this case, considerations of what the environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances are secondary to considerations of morally right conduct, since it is the end of morally right conduct that renders virtue instrumentally valuable. Given this, one cannot 74 justify VSH on EVE grounds without giving priority to considerations of morally right conduct. And considerations of morally right conduct-particularly those pertaining to acts that are others-regarding (such as hunting}-involve considerations of the moral standing of the others in question. Hence, given the view that virtue is instrumentally valuable, considerations of the moral standing of others have priority over what the environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. But EVE deems considerations of morally right conduct to be secondary to considerations of what the environmentally virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. As a result, EVE fails to justify VSH. Virtue, then, is either intrinsically or instrumentally valuable; either way, EVE fails to justify VSH. Moreover, this is the case regardless of whether EVE is understood as giving priority to agentcentered considerations or as giving equal importance to act-centered and agent-centered considerations. In sum: without asking questions about the moral standing of nonhuman animals, much less accounting for a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former, an EVE justification of VSH forces us to decide between the aforementioned lemmas. And if what I suspect is correct, most of us will choose the second lemma (EVE justifies the VSH of neither human nor nonhuman animals) over the tirst lemma (EVE justifies the VSH of both human and nonhuman animals). That is, we will hold that EVE fails to provide sufficient justification for VSH. On the Weaker Thesis Up to this point, the stronger thesis-EVE provides sufficient justification for VSH-has been examined and critiqued. However, as indicated previously, Jensen hints at (and may even prefer) a weaker thesis: though EVE does not provide sufficient justification for hunting, it nevertheless complements and completes other ethical theories, shedding new light on the question of the moral status of hunting (Jensen 2001, 123). Moreover, in addition to the fact that Jensen himself may prefer it, claims comparable to this weaker thesis have been advanced by numerous other environmental ethicists. \3 For example, Geoffrey Frasz maintains, "EVE does not seek to supplant traditional moral theories regarding the environment, but to expand the scope of environmental thinking by asking different kinds of questions and considering issues from the point of view of virtues and vices. It can build upon ideas in current environmental philosophy regarding the nature of the intrinsic value of the natural world, and it can utilize ideas regarding methods and practices Robert Lovering involved" (Frasz 2001, 7). There is good reason, then, to examine this weaker thesis carefully. So what does it mean for virtue theory-and, in particular, EVE-to "complement," "complete," and "build upon" other ethical theories and ideas in current environmental philosophy and the debate on hunting? As with the issue of whether there is a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former, Jensen does not address this-at least, not in sufficient detail. One can't help but surmise, however, that it means that, though EVE plays a justificatory role in the justification for VSH, it does not playa strong enough one to justify VSH independent of another ethical theory. If this is what is meant, then a question arises: What is the nature of EVE's justificatory role? Is it that EVE is necessary, though not sufficient, for the justification of VSH? If this is what Jensen is claiming, there is reason to reject his position. That EVE is necessary for the justification ofVSH seems unlikely, as it is reasonable to believe that-assuming VSH can be justified-it can be on deontological and contractarian grounds (among others), and can be done so independently of considerations of environmental virtues. (Whether deontology and contractarianism themselves can be justified is another matter altogether, just as it is an altogether different matter whether EVE itself can be justified.) Moreover, if Jensen is claiming that EVE is necessary for the justification of VSH, he should at least attempt to tell us why he thinks VSH cannot be sufficiently justified on the grounds of such competing ethical theories. However, it's certainly possible that when Jensen (and others) claims that EVE complements and completes other ethical theories, he does not mean that it plays some kind of justificatory role. In other words, it may be that when Jensen claims that EVE complements and completes other ethical theories, he means neither that EVE is necessary for the justification of VSH nor that it is sufficient for the justification of VSH. But, if so, whence the claim that, under certain conditions, hunting can be justified? After all, in Jensen's article, the only conditions under which hunting can be justified that are discussed are those in which environmental virtues are cultivated. And the only justification for cultivating environmental virtues in this way that Jensen discusses is an EVE justification. But if EVE is to be understood as playing no justificatory role in the justification of hunting, then Jensen's claim-that under certain conditions, hunting can be justified-is rendered not only entirely unsupported but completely disconnected from the rest of the paper. Moreover, it's unclear how arguing that EVE plays no justificatory role in the justification of VSH would shed any light whatsoever on the question of the moral status of hunting. In what way would The Virtues of Hunting: A Reply to Jensen contending that one can develop environmental virtues through VSH, though this fact plays no justificatory role in the justification of VSH shed any light on the question of the moral status of hunting? I fail to see how it would. It seems that if EVE's complimenting and completing other ethical theories is to illuminate the question of the moral status of hunting, it must playa justificatory role of some sort. Concluding Remarks If the preceding is correct, then there are at least three important implications that must be noted. The first two implications concern the stronger thesis, while the final implication concerns the weaker thesis. First, if EVE is to provide sufficient justification for VSH, it must be modified in such a way that it: (a) asks questions about whether there is a morally relevant difference between human and nonhuman animals which justifies the VSH of the latter but not the former, (b) accounts for such a difference, and (c) deems considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals to have priority over considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. Second, unless (a), (b), and (c) are done, not only is EVE insufficient for the justification of VSH, but it is insufficient for the justification of every other form of hunting as well. For if EVE is insufficient for the justification of virtue-oriented forms of hunting (such as VSH), then, a fortiori, EVE is insufficient for the justification of non-virtue-oriented forms of hunting, i.e., every other form of hunting. Hence, unless (a), (b), and (c) are done, EVE is insufficient for the justification of hunting nonhuman animals in all its forms, not just VSH. Indeed, the case can be made that EVE is insufficient not only for the justification of hunting in all its forms, but any other environmentally oriented activity that is others-regarding. For unless considerations of the moral standing of othersnonhuman animals or otherwise-have priority over considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances, seemingly unjustified activities-such as Jones's hunting of humans-are not necessarily precluded by EVE. But, according to EVE, considerations of the moral standing of others do not have priority over considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do in the circumstances. And so it seems that, unless (a), (b), and (c) are done, EVE is insufficient for any other environmentally oriented activity that is others-regarding. Finally, insofar as one holds that EVE simply complements and completes other ethical theories, shedding some new light on the question of the moral status of hunting, one needs to be clear about what, exactly, this complimenting and completing entails. 75 To be sure, some philosophers have done this very thing with respect to some environmental issues. For example, Frasz contends that the Kantian tradition fails to clearly establish a duty to respect ecosystems. "While this does not mean that Kantian insights are inappropriate here," he writes, "it does suggest that more is needed for environmental ethics" (Frasz 2001, 6). And what is needed, Frasz submits, is EVE. According to Frasz, then, EVE plays ajustificatory role where other ethical theories fail to do so and, in this way, compliments and completes other moral theories. But even if "more is needed" with respect to some environmental issues, it doesn't follow that more is needed with respect to every environmental issue. In particular, it doesn't follow that more is needed with respect to hunting. Indeed, if what was suggested above is correct, there is reason to believe that more isn't needed when it comes to the issue of huntingthat other ethical theories provide sufficient justification for hunting. Suffice it to say that, insofar as one holds that EVE simply complements and completes other ethical theories, shedding some new light on the question of the moral status of hunting, one needs to be clear about what, exactly, this complimenting and completing entails. As stated above, Jensen and Cafaro agree that hunting provides a good test case for EVE. With the preceding in mind, we are in a better position to determine whether EVE passes the test. I'm inclined to think it does not. Works Cited Cafaro, Philip. 2001a. "Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics," Environmental Ethics 23, 3-17. Cafaro, Philip. 2001b. "The Naturalist's Virtues." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (FallWinter),85-99. DeGrazia, David. 1996. Taking Animals Seriously: Mental Life and Moral Status. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frasz, Geoffrey B. 1993. "Environmental Virtue Ethics: A New Direction for Environmental Ethics." Environmental Ethics 15,259-274. Frasz, Geoffrey B. 2001. "What Is Environmental Virtue Ethics That We Should Be Mindful oflt?" Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (FallWinter),5-14. Harris, George W. 1999. Agent-Centered Morality: An Aristotelian Alternative to Kantian Internalism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hill, Thomas Jr. 2001. "Comments on Frasz and Cafaro and EVE." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (Fall-Winter): 59-62. 76 Hursthouse, Rosalind. 1991. "Virtue Theory and Abortion." Philosophy and Public Affairs 20:3 (Summer): 223-246. Jensen, Jon. 2001. "The Virtues of Hunting." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (FallWinter), 113-124. Kawall, Jason. 2001. "Inner Diversity: An Alternative Ecological Virtue Ethics." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (Fall-Winter), 2735. Regan, Tom. 1983. The Casefor Animal Rights. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Stocker, Michael. 1990. Plural and Conflicting Values. Oxford: Oxford University Press Tantillo, James A. 2001. "Sport Hunting, Eudaimonia, and Tragic Wisdom." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (Fall-Winter), 101113. Veatch, Robert M. 2003. The Basics ofBioethics, 2nd Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Wensveen, Louke van. "Attunement: An Ecological Spin on the Virtue of Temperance." Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2 (Fall-Winter), 67-78. Endnotes 1. Jones's lines are taken nearly word for word from Jensen,200I. For purely stylistic purposes, I did not include citations. Citations for each and every line will be provided as the paper develops. 2. Of course, there is a third possibility, namely, that EVE justifies the hunting of human but not nonhuman animals. For present purposes, I will assume that parties on both sides of the issue will reject this possibility as absurd. 3. For accounts of how we are to understand EVE, see Frasz 2001; Cafaro 2001 b; Hill 2001. 4. Others who seemingly embrace this version include Bill Shaw, Geoffrey B. Frasz, Philip Cafaro, James A. Tantillo, Thomas Hill, Jr. 5. For another virtue theory justification of sport hunting, see TantiIIo 2001. 6. For example, see Frasz 2001 and Frasz, 1993. 7. See Frasz 2001. 8. Jensen is not alone in relying on Hursthouse's views on virtue theory in support of an environmental virtue ethic. See Kawall 2001; van Wensveen 2001; Cafaro 2001b. 9. Something can be secondary to another in at least two ways: lexically or logically. If X is lexically secondary to Y, then Y has priority over X. If X is logically secondary to Y, then Y is entailed (or presupposed) by X. For present purposes, it is not important whether Jensen deems considerations of the moral standing of nonhuman animals to be lexically or logically secondary to considerations of what virtuous agents would characteristically do Robert Lovering in the circumstances. Either way, the problem suggested here arises. 10. See TantiIIo, p. 102. See also Stocker 1990 and Harris 1999. 11. See Frasz 2001, 11; also Veatch 2003, 189. 12. Regarding the properties of "subjects-of-a-life," see Regan 1983,243. 13. See Cafaro 2001a and 2001b; and Frasz 2001, 7.

De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho: La complejidad que supone el éxito de los medios de control sobre los actos administrativos relacionados con la licencia ambiental Andrés Gómez Rey1 Iván Vargas-Chaves2 Gloria Amparo Rodríguez3 Introducción Aunque parezca increíble, Colombia mantiene en vigencia la idea de que toda decisión que el Estado adopta se encuentra basada en lo que la ley dispone. Veamos: Se ha planteado que los actos administrativos gozan de "presunción de legalidad", entendiendo por ella que "... al desarrollarse y proyectarse la actividad de la administración, se responde a todas las reglas y que se han respetado todas las normas que lo enmarcan..." (Berrocal, citado en: Peña Porras, 2008, p. 8) y por ende debe aceptarse en primera instancia que están ajustadas al ordenamiento jurídico. 1 Abogado de la Universidad de La Sabana. Especialista en Derecho Ambiental de la Universidad del Rosario. Magíster en Derecho Administrativo de la Universidad del Rosario. Profesor de la Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá, Colombia). 2 Abogado de la Universidad del Rosario. Máster en Derecho de la Università di Genova. Máster en Derecho Privado de las Universidades de Salamanca, Pública de Navarra y Ca' Foscari Venezia.Doctor en Derecho de la Universidad de Barcelona. Profesor de la Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar (Cartagena de Indias, Colombia). 3 Profesora Titular de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia de la Universidad del Rosario donde además es Directora de la Especialización y la Línea de Investigación en Derecho Ambiental. PhD en Sociología Jurídica e Instituciones Políticas; Master en Medio Ambiente y Desarrollo. Especialista en Derecho Ambiental, Derecho Médico y Sanitario y Negociación, Conciliación y Arbitraje. Correo electrónico: [email protected]. ¿Cómo citar este texto? Gómez-Rey, A., Rodríguez, G.A., & Vargas-Chaves, I. (2018) De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho. En G. A. Rodríguez (Ed.) Justicia ambiental en Colombia: Ejercicio participativo a través de las acciones constitucionales (pp. 223-247). Bogotá: Grupo Editorial Ibáñez. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez224 Así las cosas, de una u otra manera los profesionales del derecho hemos aceptado y acatado esta presunta verdad ya que como dice la Constitución Política en su artículo 121, ninguna autoridad del Estado podrá ejercer funciones distintas de las que le atribuyen la Constitución y la Ley (CN art. 121), sus decisiones siempre respetarán lo dispuesto en las normas. Entonces, teniendo en cuenta que la actuación de la administración debe ser el reflejo de los enunciados inmersos en el ordenamiento jurídico, su acto estará –o debería estar− siempre acompañado de la juridicidad correspondiente para el cumplimiento de los fines públicos, por lo cual su actuación se presume legal. Así, lo muestra el Código de Procedimiento Administrativo y de lo Contencioso Administrativo en su Artículo 88: "Los actos administrativos se presumen legales mientras no hayan sido anulados por la Jurisdicción de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Cuando fueren suspendidos, no podrán ejecutarse hasta tanto se resuelva definitivamente sobre su legalidad o se levante dicha medida cautelar". Empero, el derecho ambiental, siendo una joven y especial rama del derecho (Cafferata 2004), nos ha venido mostrando que la presunción de legalidad no es más que un rastro de la tradición dogmática que posee del derecho administrativo, pero que en la actualidad es necesario observarla a través de opciones constitucionalmente aceptables, lo cual lógicamente incluye el valor sobre el ambiente4. Ello busca que la presunción de legalidad no impida la protección del bien jurídicamente tutelado: el ambiente; sin embargo, para evitar la vulneración del derecho, la Ley 1437 de 2011 contempló diversos medios de control (llamadas bajo el Decreto 01 de 1984, "acciones") para la defensa del sistema jurídico, con la novedad que en el Decreto 01 de 1984 se planteó la idea que la forma, tipo o contenido de la pretensión de los demandantes, daba lugar a la acción idónea para la 4 Véase cómo la Corte Constitucional en Sentencia T-760/07, estableció que nuestra carta ius fundamental posee una dimensión ecológica.Dijo el tribunal de cierre constitucional que "Esta Constitución ecológica tiene dentro del ordenamiento colombiano una triple dimensión: de un lado, la protección al medio ambiente es un principio que irradia todo el orden jurídico puesto que es obligación del Estado proteger las riquezas naturales de la Nación.De otro lado, aparece como el derecho de todas las personas a gozar de un ambiente sano, derecho constitucional que es exigible por diversas vías judiciales.Y, finalmente, de la constitución ecológica derivan un conjunto de obligaciones impuestas a las autoridades y a los particulares...". De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 225 protección (nulidad, contractual, etc.). En cambio en la Ley 1437 de 2011, se pensó en una única acción administrativa que de acuerdo a la pretensión planteada, genera diversos "medios de control". Así las cosas, se tiene un solo medio de control y las pretensiones tal y como pueden ser nulidad simple y nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho, las cuales además, son acumulables si las pretensiones son conexas (y no son excluibles entre sí), y el juez de conocimiento tiene competencia sobre todas ellas, para así adelantarlas bajo un mismo procedimiento, según lo dispuesto en el artículo 165 de la Ley 1437 de 20115. Empero, las posibilidades de éxito del medio de control de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho en la disciplina ambiental, son bastante reducidas, por cuanto el derecho ambiental es un cuerpo normativo disperso, complejo, indeterminado y que comprende la protección de un bien constitucionalmente protegido, lo cual hace que no sea tan claro el simple examen de contrastar el contenido del acto administrativo con el de la ley, para así verificar si se adecua a las normas o no. Más complejo será establecer la existencia de un desequilibrio o de un daño que deba ser resarcido. Incluso, como se ha propuesto que el acto administrativo producto del derecho ambiental no acata o cumple cabalmente la tradición dogmática del derecho público6, como la teoría general del acto administrativo, esta 5 Reza el artículo 165 de la citada norma que "En la demanda se podrán acumular pretensiones de nulidad, de nulidad y de restablecimiento del derecho, relativas a contratos y de reparación directa, siempre que sean conexas y concurran los siguientes requisitos: 1. Que el juez sea competente para conocer de todas. No obstante, cuando se acumulen pretensiones de nulidad con cualesquiera otras, será competente para conocer de ellas el juez de la nulidad. Cuando en la demanda se afirme que el daño ha sido causado por la acción u omisión de un agente estatal y de un particular, podrán acumularse tales pretensiones y la Jurisdicción Contencioso Administrativa será competente para su conocimiento y resolución. 2. Que las pretensiones no se excluyan entre sí, salvo que se propongan como principales y subsidiarias. 3. Que no haya operado la caducidad respecto de alguna de ellas. 4. Que todas deban tramitarse por el mismo procedimiento..." 6 Véase a manera de ejemplo: Gómez-Rey, Andrés, "La concesión de aguas superficiales a la luz de la teoría general del acto administrativo. Incidencia de la tradición dogmática del derecho público en el derecho ambiental", Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 2010, 12, (2), pp. 345-377. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez226 situación hará más complejo verificar si efectivamente deben prosperar las pretensiones de nulidad y restablecimiento. Para dar sustento a dicha afirmación, veamos a manera de ejemplo, los actos administrativos producto del derecho ambiental: • En el caso permisivo (autorizaciones, concesiones, permisos, asociaciones y licencias), son discrecionales en su formación (bien sean de trámite, preparatorios o de fondo), por cuanto dependen de la valoración que un equipo técnico pueda realizar de la situación ambiental del proyecto. En este sentido, por más que se cumplan todos y cada uno de los requisitos legales para obtenerlos, es posible su negación. • Poseen mecanismos de publicidad especiales; los actos administrativos particulares son publicados en páginas web o diarios y divulgados de manera amplia. • En ocasiones aunque los actos administrativos estén sujetos a condición suspensiva, el cumplimiento de la misma no impide ni su ejecutoria, ni su continuidad. • Los actos administrativos de tipo particular del derecho ambiental, pueden ser modificados sin el consentimiento del beneficiario. Entre muchas otras particularidades, queriendo con ello mostrar que los actos administrativos producto del derecho ambiental no se ajustan del todo a con la tradición dogmática del derecho público, A continuación, buscaremos realizar una breve exposición sobre el concepto y contenido de la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho como medio de control a la luz de la Ley 1437 de 2011, enfocándola en temas ambientales a través del estudio de la licencia ambiental, como una de las autorizaciones que posee el ordenamiento jurídico relacionado, para así buscar demostrar la complejidad que representa la interposición de estos medios de control. Para ello, se realizará adicionalmente la exposición de un caso resuelto por nuestros tribunales judiciales. Así pues, plantearemos cuatro partes: la primera de ellas mostrará el concepto y contenido del medio de control de nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho, la segunda estudiará las generalidades de la licencia ambiental, la tercera describirá un caso encontrado en la jurisprudencia y por último se recopilará lo visto en unas conclusiones. De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 227 El aspecto metodológico recae de manera principal en el análisis dogmático del derecho (sistemas descriptivos) a través del cual se realizará una recopilación bibliográfica especializada sobre la materia, incluyendo lógicamente la consulta de las fuentes formales del derecho: ley, jurisprudencia y doctrina, deteniéndonos en la exposición de un caso. Esperamos sean provechosas las siguientes apreciaciones. 1. DE LA NULIDAD Y EL RESTABLECIMIENTO DEL DERECHO COMO MEDIO DE CONTROL Establece el artículo 138 de la Ley 1437 de 2011 que "...Toda persona que se crea lesionada en un derecho subjetivo amparado en una norma jurídica, podrá pedir que se declare la nulidad del acto administrativo particular, expreso o presunto, y se le restablezca el derecho; también podrá solicitar que se le repare el daño. La nulidad procederá por las mismas causales establecidas en el inciso segundo del artículo anterior. Igualmente podrá pretenderse la nulidad del acto administrativo general y pedirse el restablecimiento del derecho directamente violado por este al particular demandante o la reparación del daño causado a dicho particular por el mismo, siempre y cuando la demanda se presente en tiempo, esto es, dentro de los cuatro (4) meses siguientes a su publicación. Si existe un acto intermedio, de ejecución o cumplimiento del acto general, el término anterior se contará a partir de la notificación de aquel..." siendo pues este el artículo que contiene el conocido medio de control de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho. De lo expuesto, aunque mucho hay que decir, comencemos por con observar los elementos que constituyen este medio: el tipo de actos que se pueden demandar, la posición jurídica del sujeto que puede hacerlo y su caducidad. El artículo 138 ibídem, no condiciona, alguna clase especifica de acto administrativo que sea objeto de este medio de control. Así las cosas, la nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho es posible interponerlo sobre actos administrativos que desarrollen todo tipo de función administrativa, sobre generales, particulares; nacionales o locales, organicista, subjetivo, material u objetivo; entre otros, lo que es objeto de grandes debates7. 7 Sin embargo recordemos que en la tradición del derecho administrativo fue considerado que por regla general la nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho es sólo para actos Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez228 Recordemos que el artículo 138 ya citado, establece que el medio de control de nulidad y el restablecimiento procederá por las mismas causales establecidas en la nulidad simple (art. 137, Ley 1437 de 2011), pareciera comprender: "(...) cuando los actos administrativos de carácter general hayan sido expedidos: *) con vicios de contenido, es decir, con infracción de las normas en que deberían fundarse *) sin competencia, *) con vicios de procedimiento o en forma irregular, *) con desconocimiento del derecho de audiencia y defensa, *) mediante falsa motivación o, *) con vicios de motivación, es decir, desviando las atribuciones propias de quien lo profirió". Sin embargo, los actos de tipo general, no son precisamente aquellos que más lesionan a los particulares, salvo que su ejecución o aplicación directa así derive. Es decir, la regla general es que el medio de control llamado simple nulidad, procede sobre actos administrativos generales y por excepción particulares y; el medio de control llamado nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho procede de manera general sobre actos administrativos de tipo particular y por excepción de tipo general. Con lo dicho, llama la atención que las causales que dan origen a las dos pretensiones sean las mismas8.Al parecer, como se indicó, la nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho procede contra actos administrativos particulares y aquellos generales cuya aplicación produzca una lesión o afectación a un derecho subjetivo amparado en una norma9. administrativos de carácter particular. En el caso de los actos administrativos de carácter general, la regla general es que el medio de control procedente es el de simple nulidad, sin embargo, se presentan casos en los que, evaluando los efectos que produce el acto administrativo general se generan consecuencias de orden particular, haciendo excepcionalmente procedente el medio de control de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho contra un acto de carácter general. 8 Teniendo en cuenta que la pretensión de nulidad (independientemente de su finalidad) procede por esos cinco vicios. No obstante se justifica en el tipo de acto administrativo y la pretensión ventilada: mientras la una es evidentemente resarcitoria (que no solo comprende la indemnización económica sino también otros tipos de restablecimiento), la otra mira la conformidad del contenido del acto administrativo con el ordenamiento jurídico. 9 Esta posición bajo la cual se permite interponer la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho ha sido ampliamente criticada, por cuanto toda norma general (constitución, ley, reglamento u otros) al ser aplicada puede llegar a general una lesión jurídica, bien por otorgar derechos o restringirlos o eliminarlos. De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 229 Los actos administrativos de carácter particular que lesionen derechos podrán ocasionar la solicitud de restablecimiento del derecho y también que se repare el daño cuando la sola expulsión del acto del ordenamiento o reparación in natura no sea suficiente o posible. Sobre la reflexión propuesta, aunque no existe consenso en la doctrina, la ley plantea la posibilidad de atacar tanto los actos administrativos particulares, como los generales10; lo cual es sumamente favorable para el derecho ambiental, ya que la tipología de las decisiones estatales ambientales no son fácilmente enmarcables en la tradicional clasificación que contiene la teoría general del acto administrativo. Los autores han sostenido que el acto administrativo producto del derecho ambiental, es una decisión sui generis que no observa a cabalidad las antiguas instituciones dogmáticas del derecho público, lo cual se constituye en nuestro problema jurídico. Una simple referencia a las excepcionales características del acto administrativo ambiental da cuenta de ello: son esencialmente modificables sin permiso del interesado si se alteran las condiciones naturales que dieron lugar a su otorgamiento –siendo tradicionalmente entendidos de carácter particular y concreto−; son actos condicionados, susceptibles de suspensión provisional y aunque los llamados a otorgar permisos, concesiones, autorizaciones y licencias ambientales son de carácter particular sus efectos que interesan a toda la comunidad. Al respecto, muchos de los actos administrativos particulares del derecho ambiental comparten características de los generales. A manera de ejemplo, los actos administrativos que ordenan visitas oculares, tienen mecanismos de publicidad de generales. En cuanto a lo dicho, Sánchez Baptista (2011) ha expuesto que "A pesar que la legislación no ha hecho distinciones, la clase o naturaleza jurídica del acto administrativo genera ciertas consecuencias jurídicas, también distintas, según la perspectiva aplicada y la regulación vigente, no siempre relacionadas con el medio de control que sea procedente para impugnarlos judicialmente. Así por ejemplo, si el acto tiene alcance nacional o simplemente 10 Esto por cuanto el acceso a la jurisdicción contencioso administrativa hoy en día debe realizarse a través de los motivos y finalidades y no por la denominación de la acción que le dé el demandante (llamada teoría de los motivos y finalidades). Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez230 local no influye para nada en el tipo de medio de control que deba utilizarse para demandar su nulidad pues, a lo sumo, aquello incide en la competencia judicial".(p. 6) Sin embargo, sí existen algunas clasificaciones del acto administrativo que son importantes al momento de conocer el medio preciso para la defensa del ordenamiento jurídico y el restablecimiento del derecho. Específicamente, aquella que nos muestra los efectos que produce el acto administrativo. El criterio "de los efectos jurídicos" clasifica las decisiones del Estado, según estén llamadas a crear, extinguir o modificar derechos y obligaciones. En Colombia, no es completamente aceptada esta clasificación por cuanto no todas las decisiones de la administración producen sus efectos jurídicos hasta tanto se encuentren publicadas, notificadas o comunicadas, en otras palabras se diferencia la existencia de su validez y eficacia, como lo indica Penagos (2008, p. 46). No obstante, desde el punto de vista de los efectos, se encuentra el criterio de actos administrativos de doble efecto que según Castillo Blanco (1998, p. 146) se caracterizan porque un solo acto posee connotaciones gravosas para uno o varios ciudadanos y favorables para otros. Tal es el caso de la expedición de licencias de construcción, concesiones de agua y licencias ambientales entre otros. Nuestro Consejo de Estado, en varias sentencias11 los ha denominado mixtos, es decir, de efectos particulares y generales, los cuales para ser exigibles deben ser publicados y notificados personalmente. Lógicamente tratándose de actos administrativos definitivos. Así las cosas, este tipo de actos administrativos, pueden −situación que no siempre ocurre− generar un desequilibrio12 en el ejercicio de derechos subjetivos de los particulares y en este sentido, el particular podrá solicitar su restauración a través de la nulidad como medio de control. De lo dicho en el aparte anterior, aunque la ley no precise que exista un acto administrativo especial para la procedencia del 11 CONSEJO DE ESTADO, Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo, Sección segunda, Sentencia del 6 de diciembre de 2001, Exp. 981399, Consejero Ponente: Pajaro Peñaranda, Nicolás. Véase también, Sentencia del 21 de marzo de 1996, Exp. 3575. Sentencia del 18 de marzo de 1999, Exp. 5253, Consejero Ponente: Ariza Muñoz, Ernesto Rafael. 12 En caso de ser actos administrativos de carácter general, la lesión, provendrá de su implementación o aplicación. De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 231 medio de control, el sujeto pasivo de la misma sí requiere tener una especial característica: que el acto administrativo, bien sea general o particular, produzca unos efectos jurídicos que generen consecuencias desfavorables (comprobables) para los administrados. Por tal razón, la Ley 1437 de 2011 indicó pues como sujeto llamado a ejercer el medio de control aquella persona que "se crea lesionada en un derecho subjetivo amparado en una norma jurídica". Lo cual implica que se trata de la posición jurídica de cualquier sujeto que sintiéndose lesionado, efectivamente haya soportado una lesión jurídica que deba ser restablecida (un derecho subjetivo lesionado).Nótese cómo el requisito para la presentación del medio de control requiere de la subjetiva y comprobable percepción del sujeto de sentirse afectado, lo cual puede ser subsanado de manera inmediata (in natura) con la sola nulidad del acto13.En cambio, la reparación cuando se trate de daño, debe atender a la previa demostración del mismo. Por último, esta acción entonces comprende dos situaciones especiales, la consideración de un acto administrativo que no se sujeta a lo dispuesto en el ordenamiento jurídico, que antes de la constitucionalización del derecho, se entendía como un mero examen 13 Según la Corte Constitucional en sentencia T-023 de 2012, los requisitos de procedencia del medio de control de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho son los siguientes: "En efecto, el Consejo de Estado ha explicado que, a través de la acción de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho, no puede perseguirse una pretensión indemnizatoria que no resulta de la anulación de un acto administrativo definitivo, pues esta es la condición necesaria para restablecer un derecho e indemnizar el perjuicio derivado del acto administrativo que se anula, si es el caso. Puntualizando, esta acción se reserva para proteger directamente el derecho subjetivo del administrado que ha sido vulnerado por un acto de la administración. De ahí que envuelva dos pretensiones que se complementan, a saber: (i) la anulación del acto administrativo contrario al ordenamiento jurídico y (ii) como consecuencia necesaria de ello, el restablecimiento del derecho transgredido o la reparación del daño." Así mismo, ha señalado la procedencia de la conciliación extrajudicial en derecho como requisito de procedibilidad en aquellos asuntos que sean conciliables, es decir, que sean transables, desistibles, derechos económicos o cuantificables y aquellos que determine la ley: "En consecuencia, la Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo del Consejo de Estado aclaró que, a partir de la expedición de la Ley 1285 de 2009, para interponer las demandas de reparación directa, contractuales y de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho, se debe allegar constancia que acredite el inicio del trámite de la conciliación extrajudicial y la celebración de la audiencia respectiva. En caso contrario, su inobservancia y/o falta de subsanación genera la inadmisión de la demanda (inicialmente, generaba el rechazo de la misma), dado que es un requisito de procedibilidad". Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez232 o comparación formal entre la norma y el acto; pero que a partir de 1991, la contradicción debe presentarse entre la decisión del Estado y todo el contenido del ordenamiento jurídico; y lógicamente que esa falta de coherencia entre el acto administrativo y el ordenamiento jurídico lesione a algún particular y que esta situación deba ser reparada14. Ahora bien, para comprender si es posible o no configurar fácilmente la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho en las decisiones que conforman la licencia ambiental, veamos sus generalidades. 2. DE LA LICENCIA AMBIENTAL Siguiendo a Gómez-Rey, Henao y Rincón (documento sin publicar15) Consagra la Ley 99 de 1993 a través de su Título VIII denominado "De las Licencias Ambientales", que la licencia ambiental es la autorización que otorgan las autoridades ambientales competentes, fundamentadas en un estudio de impacto ambiental (en adelante EIA), a proyectos, obras o actividades que de acuerdo a la ley o los reglamentos pueden producir deterioro grave a los recursos naturales renovables o introducir modificaciones considerables o notorias al paisaje, lo cual, por un lado, sujeta a su beneficiario al cumplimiento de los requisitos, términos, condiciones y obligaciones que la misma establezca en relación con la prevención, mitigación, corrección, compensación y manejo de los efectos ambientales de la obra o actividad autorizada y, por el otro, obliga a la autoridad otorgante a vigilar y controlar el cumplimiento de los requisitos, términos, condiciones y obligaciones impuestas en ella (Art. 49, 50 y 51). Posteriormente el Título VIII de la Ley 99, sería reglamentado a través de diferentes decretos a saber: el Decreto 1753 de 1994, el Decreto 1728 de 2002, el Decreto 1180 de 2003, el Decreto 1220 de 2005, el Decreto 14 Si bien lo dicho en el párrafo es aplicable a todas las pretensiones del medio de control, sin embargo, es importante tener en cuenta que la nulidad por inconstitucionalidad posee un juez específico y unas características propias. Sin embargo en el presente artículo al hacer referencia al tema constitucional no nos estamos refiriendo a la nulidad por inconstitucionalidad, ni a un reproche que requiera de dicho medio de control; sino que por el contrario estamos indicando que por el bien jurídico que protegen las autorizaciones ambientales, su comportamiento requiere de novedosos mecanismos que difícilmente podrán enmarcarse en las causales taxativas de la nulidad. 15 En el texto entregado a la Editorial de la Universidad del Rosario denominado "La Minería en Páramos, Humedales y Reservas Forestales". De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 233 500 de 2006, el Decreto 2820 de 2010, el Decreto 2041 de 2014 y el Decreto 1076 de 2015. Veamos a continuación las características de las licencias ambientales, junto con su interpretación constitucional: • "...es una autorización que otorga el Estado para la ejecución de obras o la realización de proyectos o actividades que puedan ocasionar un deterioro grave al ambiente o a los recursos naturales o introducir una alteración significativa al paisaje (Ley 99/93 art. 49)...", es decir, para grandes o mega proyectos que de una u otra manera se conoce que están llamados a generar afectaciones significativas sobre el ambiente. • "...tiene como propósitos prevenir, mitigar, manejar, corregir y compensar los efectos ambientales que produzcan tales actividades..." (Corte Constitucional Colombiana, C-746 de 2012). • "...es de carácter obligatoria y previa, por lo que debe ser obtenida antes de la ejecución o realización de dichas obras, actividades o proyectos..." (Corte Constitucional Colombiana, C-746 de 2012). • "...opera como instrumento coordinador, planificador, preventivo, cautelar y de gestión, mediante el cual el Estado cumple diversos mandatos constitucionales, entre ellos proteger los recursos naturales y el medio ambiente, conservar áreas de especial importancia ecológica, prevenir y controlar el deterioro ambiental y realizar la función ecológica de la propiedad..." (Corte Constitucional Colombiana, C-746 de 2012).Lo cual implica que, la licencia ambiental, al buscar la protección de un bien constitucional (ambiente sano), podrá sobrepasar limites que normas de menor jerarquía le presenten. Para ello, se han diseñado una serie de exigencias que debe cumplir quien realiza el proyecto para así proteger los recursos naturales renovables. • Solo requieren de licencia ambiental aquellos proyectos, obras o actividades taxativamente señalados en los decretos. • Posee para su evaluación tres instrumentos de evaluación de los impactos ambientales en pro del principio de prevención: diagnóstico ambiental de alternativas, estudio de impacto ambiental y el plan de manejo ambiental. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez234 El Diagnóstico Ambiental de Alternativas – DAA es un estudio ambiental que incluye información sobre las alternativas ambientales para el desarrollo de un proyecto, obra o actividad, alternativas fundamentadas en la clasificación de los impactos ambientales. Las diferentes opciones deberán tener en cuenta el entorno geográfico, las características bióticas, abióticas y socioeconómicas, entre otras, el análisis comparativo de los efectos y riesgos inherentes a la obra o actividad; así como las posibles soluciones y medidas de control y mitigación para cada una de las alternativas. Sobre el particular la Corte Constitucional mediante Sentencia C-035/99 se refirió al diagnóstico indicando que "El diagnóstico ambiental de alternativas, que debe elaborar la persona interesada en la obtención de una licencia ambiental, consiste en la declaración objetiva y debidamente fundamentada que ésta debe hacer a la autoridad ambiental sobre las diferentes opciones escogidas para el desarrollo de un proyecto o actividad, con el fin de racionalizar el uso y manejo de los recursos o elementos ambientales y de prevenir, mitigar, corregir, compensar o reversar los efectos e impactos negativos que pueda ocasionar la realización de dicho proyecto. Es así como el referido diagnóstico debe hacerse con base en una información mínima sobre "la localización y características del entorno geográfico, ambiental y social de las alternativas del proyecto, además de un análisis comparativo de los efectos y riesgos inherentes a la obra u actividad, y de las posibles soluciones y medidas de control y mitigación para cada una de las alternativas" (inciso 2°, art.56). Sobre el estudio de impacto ambiental, hay que decir que la Ley 1450 de 2011 modificó el artículo 57 de la Ley 99 de 1993 que define el alcance del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental. La citada Ley 1450 señaló: "Artículo 223°.DEL ESTUDIO DE IMPACTO AMBIENTAL. Modificase el Artículo 57 de la Ley 99 de 1993, así: "Artículo 57. Del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental. Se entiende por Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, el conjunto de la información que deberá presentar ante la autoridad ambiental competente el peticionario de una licencia ambiental". El Estudio de Impacto Ambiental contendrá información sobre la localización del proyecto, y los elementos abióticos, bióticos, y socioeconómicos del medio que puedan sufrir deterioro por la respectiva De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 235 obra o actividad, para cuya ejecución se pide la licencia, y la evaluación de los impactos que puedan producirse. Además, incluirá el diseño de los planes de prevención, mitigación, corrección y compensación de impactos y el plan de manejo ambiental de la obra o actividad. La autoridad ambiental competente, para otorgar la licencia ambiental, fijará los términos de referencia de los estudios de impacto ambiental en un término que no podrá exceder de treinta (30) días hábiles contados a partir de la solicitud por parte del interesado". Por su parte, el Decreto 2041 de 2014 al reglamentar lo referido al Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, señaló: "Artículo 21. Del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental -EIA. El Estudio de Impacto Ambiental es el instrumento básico para la toma de decisiones sobre los proyectos, obras o actividades que requieren licencia ambiental y se exigirá en todos los casos en que de acuerdo con la ley y el presente reglamento se requiera. Este estudio deberá ser elaborado de conformidad con la Metodología General para la Presentación de Estudios Ambientales de que trata el artículo 14 del presente decreto y los términos de referencia expedidos para el efecto,".El citado artículo determina la información mínima que debe incluir el documento. Por último el plan de manejo ambiental de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el artículo 1 del Decreto 2041 de 2014, "...Es el conjunto detallado de medidas y actividades que, producto de una evaluación ambiental, están orientadas a prevenir, mitigar, corregir o compensar los impactos y efectos ambientales debidamente identificados, que se causen por el desarrollo de un proyecto, obra o actividad. Incluye los planes de seguimiento, monitoreo, contingencia, y abandono según la naturaleza del proyecto, obra o actividad. El Plan de Manejo Ambiental podrá hacer parte del Estudio de Impacto Ambiental o como instrumento de manejo y control para proyectos obras o actividades que se encuentran amparados por un régimen de transición...". Así las cosas y en conclusión el diagnóstico ambiental de alternativas responde a diversas posibilidades de ejecutar un proyecto obra o actividad para que la autoridad ambiental elija la ambientalmente más adecuada; el estudio de impacto ambiental identifica las posibles afectaciones al ambiente y el plan de manejo ambiental propone medidas para manejarlas. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez236 • La licencia ambiental posee como duración la vida útil del proyecto, obra o actividad lo cual incluye su cierre, desmantelamiento, abandono y recuperación. • Como se dijo anteriormente, la licencia ambiental es un acto administrativo discrecional en su formación, ya que depende de la valoración que un grupo de expertos realice sobre la situación ambiental del proyecto. • "...tiene simultáneamente un carácter técnico y otro participativo, en donde se evalúan varios aspectos relacionados con los estudios de impacto ambiental y, en ocasiones, con los diagnósticos ambientales de alternativas, en un escenario a su vez técnico científico y sensible a los intereses de las poblaciones afectadas..." (Corte Constitucional Colombiana, C-746 de 2012). • "...se concreta en la expedición de un acto administrativo de carácter especial, el cual puede ser modificado unilateralmente por la administración e incluso revocado sin el consentimiento previo, expreso y escrito de su titular, cuando se advierta el incumplimiento de los términos que condicionan la autorización (Ley 99/93 art. 62).En estos casos funciona como garantía de intereses constitucionales protegidos por el principio de prevención y demás normas con carácter de orden público..." (Corte Constitucional Colombiana, C-746 de 2012 2012). Así las cosas, es un acto administrativo inestable, discrecional, especial y que atiende a fines constitucionales, más que a paradigmas legales tradicionales. En este sentido, es una decisión especial, que no fácilmente puede recibir el examen típico de legalidad en el medio de control de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho. Con el fin de ilustrar las anteriores aseveraciones, presentaremos entonces, un caso concreto que logra evidenciar los aspectos jurídicos mencionados. 3. CASO Debemos reconocer que la jurisprudencia relacionada con la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho como medio de control contenido en la Ley 1437 de 2011, no es amplia, para sustentarlo basta con hacer el filtro temático en la relatoría del Consejo de Estado, De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 237 los cuales no reflejan mayores resultados. Por tal razón, vistas las anteriores generalidades, a continuación observaremos un presentado ante los jueces de la República, no con el fin de conocer la forma en la cual la Ley 1437 de 2011 ha permeado la jurisprudencia, sino para observar un conflicto representativo en materia ambiental, donde se muestre parte de las complicaciones de configurar la nulidad y el restablecimiento del derecho en el tema de licencias ambientales. El caso a continuación expuesto, es presentado ante el Consejo de Estado, donde la sociedad BALCAZAR URIBE Y CIA LTDA, presenta recurso de apelación contra la sentencia de 20 de enero de 2005, proferida por la Sala de Descongestión de los Tribunales del Valle, Cauca y Nariño, Sede Cali, que denegó las pretensiones de la demanda. Veamos lo ocurrido: La sociedad precitada mediante escrito de 14 de agosto de 1997, informó a la Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca, que pretendía realizar una urbanización, la cual para su ejecución debía realizar un "... movimiento de tierra de aproximadamente 1.300 metros cúbicos, que se emplearía en la construcción de un terraplén en las proximidades del Río Cauca..." (Consejo de Estado, 2007), por ende solicitó le informaran si dicho proyecto de conformidad con lo dispuesto en el Decreto 1753 de 1994 (reglamentario del Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre licencias ambientales16), requería la presentación de diagnóstico ambiental de alternativas, y que de ser afirmativa la respuesta, se sirviera emitir los correspondientes términos de referencia, para así comenzar con el procedimiento para la obtención de la licencia ambiental. Luego de ello, la Corporación emitió el auto SGA-LA-117-1997, de 22 de agosto de 1997, mediante el cual inició el procedimiento para la obtención de la licencia ambiental, ordenando la práctica de una visita ocular al sitio del proyecto, obra o actividad. Practicada la diligencia la corporación a través del Oficio 301-7887 de 22 de septiembre de 1997 emitió el concepto técnico para la Urbanización "Poblado de San Esteban" donde se puede resaltar: – Disposición de sobrantes: Descapote y excavaciones de aproximadamente 1.300 metros cúbicos, para disponer en un jarillón paralelo al Río Cauca. 16 Hoy vigente el Decreto 2041 de 2014. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez238 – Los residuos de descapote y excavación deberán ser localizados dentro de las zonas verdes del predio, compactados, pradizados y arborizados. – Para la construcción del jarillón en la margen del Río se exige la presentación del diseño a la CAR Cauca en un término no mayor a un mes; y los residuos del proceso constructivo deben ser recogidos y entregados al carro recolector de basuras.(Consejo de Estado, 2007) Luego, mediante la Resolución 781 de 24 de octubre de 1997, se otorgó la Licencia Ambiental para el Proyecto Urbanización Poblado de San Esteban, en la Ciudad de Popayán; y en el artículo segundo de la parte resolutiva precisó que: Se harán excavaciones y descapote de aproximadamente 1.300 metros cúbicos para disponer un carrillón paralelo al Río Cauca". Donde adicionalmente el numeral 3o del artículo 3o, estableció que "Para la construcción de un jarillón en la margen del Río se exige la presentación del diseño de la CRC en un término no mayor a un mes"; y en el numeral 6 expresó que "Se deberá respetar la franja de protección de 30 metros paralela al Río Cauca, libre de cualquier construcción.(Consejo de Estado, 2007) Una vez la sociedad inició las actividades de urbanización se encontró con algunos imprevistos sobre lo inicialmente planteado, de lo cual informó a la autoridad ambiental sin que la misma se manifestara sobre el particular, con lo cual no se obtuvo un pronunciamiento por parte de la administración pública sobre si se debía modificar la licencia ambiental. Aquellos imprevistos fueron: • Forma de disposición de residuos líquidos. Propuso la empresa, "...que en lugar de construir un carillón iba a realizar un terraplén, con la tierra producto de las excavaciones, lo cual implicaba la variación de las condiciones existentes de la licencia..." (Consejo de Estado, 2007).Lo anterior además debía realizarse en zona de ronda. • "...El 18 de agosto de 1998, por escrito, puso de manifiesto el inconveniente con los bolos de enorme tamaño que requerían De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 239 ser dinamitados, es decir, que se había presentado un hecho inesperado e imprevisible (fuerza mayor o caso fortuito), que implicaba la variación de las condiciones existentes, frente a lo cual tampoco la CRC dio respuesta..." (Consejo de Estado, 2007) Sin embargo, aunque presuntamente la autoridad ambiental no dio respuesta alguna a las modificación del proyecto informadas, la Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca emitió la Resolución 328 de 14 de abril de 2000 por medio de la cual impuso una sanción al accionante consistente en una multa por setenta y ocho millones treinta mil pesos moneda corriente ($78'030.000) y el cumplimiento de medidas (obligaciones) ambientales adicionales17; y la Resolución 0543 de 7 de julio de 2000 por medio de la cual se resolvió el correspondiente recurso de reposición, confirmando la sanción. Las razones que dieron lugar a la imposición de la sanción según el propio acto administrativo fueron principalmente: 1. En la Resolución 0781 de 24 de octubre de 1997, por la cual se otorgó a la actora licencia ambiental, se le ordenó respetar la franja protectora de 30 metros paralela al Río Cauca y presentar un diseño para la construcción de un carillón en la margen del Río. En el área protectora solamente se autorizó la construcción de la planta de tratamiento de aguas residuales, tal como aparece en el plano aportado a la CRC. Sin embargo, la actora ocupó la zona protectora con un terraplén con material de descapote; muro de cerramiento con cimiento 17 "...1.Presentar el diseño para la construcción de un muro de contención para la margen derecha del Río Cauca, en su recorrido por la urbanización "Poblado de San Esteban"-. 2. -Tramitar y obtener permiso de vertimientos ante la CRC, para lo cual deberá presentar los planos del sistema de tratamiento con las dimensiones como se construyó. Debe incluirse un perfil hidráulico desde la última cámara de alcantarillado, cámara de alivio, pozo séptico, filtro anaeróbico, conducción, entrega y nivel de aguas medias en el río y plantear los correctivos que se requieran para asegurar el buen desempeño del sistema-. 3. -Efectuar una caracterización de las aguas residuales mediante un muestreo en una jornada de 4 horas, conformando alícuotas cada 30 minutos y evacuando las cargas contaminantes, a la entrada y salida del sistema, para DBO, DQO, SST, grasas y aceites, estableciendo eficiencias de remoción en el sistema de tratamiento, a que se refiere el Decreto 1594 de 1984..." Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez240 en concreto, muro en ladrillo y malla de alambre eslabonado, cancha múltiple en concreto de 20 metros por 11 metros con porterías y tableros; dos piscinas enchapadas en azulejo; planta de tratamiento de agua de las piscinas, cámara de alivio de las aguas lluvias, planta de tratamiento de aguas residuales domésticas, consistente en pozo séptico y filtro anaeróbico, zona de parqueo para el equipo de limpieza de la PTAR; parcialmente la vía de circulación pavimentada en concreto hidráulico, con su sardinel; parcialmente con casa esquinera y parcialmente con el salón comunal construido en concreto, ladrillo, aluminio, vidrios y techo de teja. 2. Fallas en el manejo de aguas lluvias y aguas residuales domésticas; la cámara de alivio presenta estanqueidad y funcionamiento inadecuado con la entrada sumergida, lo que significa que con cualquier incremento de nivel el agua residual cruda se evacua por el rebosadero sin ningún tratamiento, ocasionando olores ofensivos por la descomposición de la materia orgánica. (Consejo de Estado, 2007) Derivado de lo anterior la sociedad BALCAZAR URIBE Y CIA LTDA presentó ante la Sala de Descongestión de los Tribunales del Valle, Cauca y Nariño, Sede Cali, demanda de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho solicitando que: • "...se declare que la actora no está obligada a cancelar el valor de $78'030.000, así como tampoco a cumplir con las obligaciones impuestas en el artículo 3o de la Resolución 0328 de 14 de abril de 2000..." (Consejo de Estado, 2007). • "...Que se declare responsable a la demandada y se le condene a pagar a favor de la actora todos los perjuicios morales y materiales ocasionados a partir del 23 de noviembre de 1999, fecha del auto de apertura de la investigación y hasta la ejecutoria de la sentencia que ponga fin al proceso..." (Consejo de Estado, 2007). En la contestación de la demanda la Corporación Autónoma Regional del Cauca indicó que: • "...Que no existe acta donde se certifique por parte de la CRC que el proyecto haya sido debidamente finiquitado, por lo que De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 241 las obligaciones impuestas en la Resolución que otorgó licencia al proyecto urbanístico son plenamente exigibles..." • "...la actora no ha debido adelantar las obras que modificaban la licencia ambiental hasta tanto la CRC no hubiera dado su consentimiento..." • "...se evidencia que la actora presentó ante la CRC un plano que no contempla la construcción de obras de recreación en el área de protección del Río y a la Curaduría Urbana de Popayán le presentó otro plano que sí contempla la construcción de obras en dicha área..." • "...Finalmente, alega que el informe presentado por los técnicos de la CRC no es un dictamen pericial sino un concepto técnico emitido por funcionarios de la entidad en virtud de la visita realizada al lugar para la verificación de los hechos investigados a solicitud de la actora, al cual tuvieron acceso las partes, por cuanto el expediente siempre permaneció a su disposición en la Subdirección Jurídica; y el procedimiento aplicado para expedir los actos acusados es el contenido en los artículos 197 a 254 del Decreto 1594 de 1984, que es especial, y no obliga a correr traslado de las pruebas..." Hecho el anterior relato, el tribunal de cierre, para fallar, indicó el concepto de la licencia ambiental que en su momento contemplaba el Decreto 1753 de 1994, haciendo énfasis que en el acto administrativo que otorga la licencia ambiental se "...establecen los requisitos, obligaciones y condiciones que el beneficiario de la Licencia Ambiental debe cumplir...".En este sentido, el contenido de la licencia ambiental debió ser acatado por parte de la sociedad ya citada o debió "...interponer recurso contra dicho acto administrativo a fin de que se modificaran si, en su criterio, no se requería la realización de algunas obras, sino de otras, como por ejemplo, el caso de la construcción del terraplén en lugar del jarrillón..." o en caso de no encontrarse en tiempo de recursos, debió solicitar la modificación de la licencia ambiental dados los "imprevistos" antes vistos, de manera formal y no como un "aviso" de la necesidad de cumplir con las obligaciones de manera alterna. Igualmente, determina cómo la función de ejercer la evaluación, control y seguimiento ambiental de las actividades, proyectos o Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez242 factores que generen o puedan generar deterioro ambiental, con que cuenta la Corporación, le da la posibilidad de ordenar la realización de acciones positivas para la protección ambiental, sin que ello sea un despropósito legal o competencial, ya que se busca el respeto de un bien jurídico constitucionalmente protegido. Por último, indica el tribunal de cierre cómo la ausencia de traslado para contradicción del informe técnico en el cual se fundó la sanción, no violenta de ninguna manera el debido proceso constitucional, tratándose de un procedimiento específico y particular contenido en ese entonces en el Decreto 1594 de 1984 (hoy en la Ley 1333 de 2009). Indicó el Consejo de Estado que: "...Al respecto, la Sala considera que no es de recibo tal argumento, pues el parágrafo 3o del artículo 85 de la Ley 99 de 1993 es diáfano en señalar que "Para la imposición de las medidas y sanciones a que se refiere este artículo se estará al procedimiento previsto por el Decreto 1594 de 1984 o al estatuto que lo modifique o sustituya".Es decir, que el propio legislador hace suyo dicho procedimiento. De tal manera que no resulta violatorio del artículo 29 de la Carta Política, pues esta norma circunscribe el debido proceso a la observancia de las formas propias de cada juicio y, como ya se dijo, en este caso la norma aplicable, que la ley reitera, no consagra la etapa del traslado. Además, el traslado de cualquier prueba y, en este caso, del dictamen o informe técnico busca que las partes tengan oportunidad de controvertirlo, generalmente, para objetarlo por error grave; y según quedó visto, la actora no podía tener interés en tal objeción, pues sus conclusiones le eran favorables. Tan es así que a lo largo de la demanda y del recurso hace énfasis en que tal prueba no fue valorada y que de la misma se infiere que no se causó daño ambiental y, por el contrario, se mejoró el paisaje. "Por estar razones la censura formulada no tiene vocación de prosperidad..." Dado lo anterior, el Consejo de Estado confirmó la sentencia de la Sala de Descongestión de los Tribunales del Valle, Cauca y Nariño, Sede Cali, que denegó las pretensiones de la demanda. De la nulidad y el restablecimiento del dercho: La complejidad que supone... 243 4. CONCLUSIONES La licencia ambiental al ser un acto administrativo especial, particular, discrecional, y sui generis, acata reglas propias del derecho ambiental escapando así a la construcción histórica del derecho administrativo y, por tal razón, configurar plenamente la nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho como medio de defensa es sumamente complicado. Lo anterior obedece a que no basta con realizar un mero examen donde se compare el contenido de la ley con el de la decisión, sino que se deberá hacer un juicio de valor que comprenda el ordenamiento jurídico en su integridad y el fin de la norma ambiental, para conocer como constitucionalmente justificable el acto administrativo que se presume legal, que a su vez se reconozca la vulneración de un perjuicio y, en últimas, se proceda el restablecimiento del derecho afectado. Así, puede pensarse que son insuficientes las causales taxativas del medio de control, nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho por cuanto las características especialísimas de este acto administrativo desbordan la realidad. Para llegar a dicha conclusión, vimos en un caso concreto cómo se otorgó una licencia ambiental que fijó las medidas de manejo para el desarrollo de un proyecto, el cual además quedó sujeto a unas condiciones suspensivas, donde se utilizó un lenguaje técnico (no jurídico). Este acto administrativo presentó debates sobre los siguientes ítems: • Hubo discusión sobre el contenido conceptual del acto administrativo que otorgó la licencia, lo cual en últimas dio lugar a la imposición de la multa. En cualquier otra rama de la disciplina jurídica esto se hubiese entendido como una violación al régimen sancionatorio administrativo ambiental. • La licencia ambiental vista en este texto estaba sujeta a dos condiciones, una suspensiva (la presentación de diseños) y otra para la ejecución del proyecto (respetar la ronda).Las cuales, por lo visto en el expediente, nunca se cumplieron. Con ello, el incumplimiento de la primera haría que el acto administrativo no se hubiese podido ejecutar por ausencia del nacimiento del derecho y la segunda, tratándose de una norma ambiental de tipo administrativo, hubiese dado lugar a la constitución como sujeto pasivo del sancionatorio, siendo excluibles entre sí. Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez244 • Si esta situación se hubiese presentado por fuera del derecho ambiental, las razones de discusión estarían enfocadas, bien sea, o a la existencia del acto administrativo por la ausencia de ejecutoria del mismo (incumplimiento de la condición), o por la imposibilidad de desarrollar las acciones en el contenido por la no configuración del derecho. Con ello pues, las razones de defensa sobre la multa hubiesen sido totalmente diferentes a las presentadas. • Encontramos discusiones sobre si el beneficiario de la licencia ambiental, constituyó algún tipo de situación jurídica consolidada por haber informado a la corporación sobre la necesidad de modificar las especificaciones técnicas del proyecto. Al respecto, se decidió que aunque la sociedad informó de sus inconvenientes, debió adelantar un procedimiento propio de la licencia ambiental (su modificación). Con estos ejemplos, vemos cómo las palabras de Gloria Amparo Rodríguez en su obra La Licencia Ambiental, un acto administrativo especial y su proceso de flexibilización adquieren mayor validez. Esta vez no con el ánimo de establecer cómo la licencia ambiental o en general el acto administrativo del derecho ambiental es diferente a todos sus congéneres, −por cuanto consideramos clara, precisa y demostrada dicha argumentación− sino porque, estas peculiaridades de las licencias ambientales, hacen que sobre ellas no se puedan realizar los juicios tradicionales de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho. Todo lo contrario, al ser el bien tutelado de alto valor constitucional (el ambiente), en caso de encontrar desproporcionada la decisión de protección ambiental en cuanto a situaciones particulares o individuales, será anulable y estudiada la posibilidad de restablecer el derecho. Siendo el tema de acciones constitucionales (tutela, popular y grupo) algo no analizado en este artículo. De lo contrario, el acto administrativo será considerado necesario para conservar el ambiente o "el lugar y el medio para que exista y se desarrolle la vida", como lo dicen Perini, Lorences, y Comparatore (2007); y por tal razón no estarán llamadas a prosperar las pretensiones de nulidad y restablecimiento del derecho como lo venimos planteando. Bibliografía Cafferatta, Néstor A. (2004) Introducción al derecho ambiental. Ciudad de México: Instituto Nacional de Ecología. Castillo Blanco, F. (1998) La protección de confianza en el derecho administrativo.Madrid, España: Ed. Marcial. Congreso de la República de Colombia.(1993).Ley 99 de 1993."Por la cual se crea el Ministerio del Medio Ambiente, se reordena el Sector Público encargado de la gestión y conservación del medio ambiente y los recursos naturales renovables, se organiza el Sistema Nacional Ambiental, SINA, y se dictan otras disposiciones".Colombia. Congreso de la República de Colombia. (2009).Ley 1285 de 2009."Por medio de la cual se reforma la Ley 270 de 1996 Estatutaria de la Administración de Justicia".Colombia. Congreso de la República de Colombia. (2009).Ley 1333 de 2009."Por la cual se establece el procedimiento sancionatorio ambiental y se dictan otras disposiciones".Colombia. Congreso de la República de Colombia. (2011).Ley 1450 de 2011."Por la cual se expide el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 2010-2014".Colombia. Congreso de la República de Colombia. (2011).Ley 1437 de 2011."Por la cual se expide el Código de Procedimiento Administrativo y de lo Contencioso Administrativo".Colombia. Consejo de Estado. Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Sección Primera. Consejero Ponente: Ernesto Rafael Ariza Muñoz. Sentencia del (21) de marzo de mil novecientos noventa y seis (1996). Consejo de Estado. Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Sección Segunda. Consejero Ponente: Nicolás Pájaro Peñaranda. Sentencia del (6) de diciembre de dos mil uno (2001). Consejo de Estado. Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo. Sección Primera. Consejero Ponente: Gabriel Eduardo Mendoza Martelo. Sentencia (1) de marzo de dos mil siete (2007). Andrés Gómez Rey Iván Vargas-Chaves Gloria Amparo Rodríguez246 Corte Constitucional Colombiana. Sentencia C-035 de 1999. Colombia. Versión digital disponible en: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov. co/relatoria/1999/C-035-99.htm. (Consultado en enero de 2017) Corte Constitucional Colombiana. Sentencia T-760 de 2007. Colombia. Versión digital disponible en: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov. co/relatoria/2007/t-760-07.htm. (Consultado en...) Corte Constitucional Colombiana. Sentencia C-746 de 2012. Colombia. Versión digital disponible en: http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/ RELATORIA/2012/C-746-12.htm. (Consultado en diciembre de 2016) Corte Constitucional Colombiana. Sentencia T-023 de 2012. Colombia. Versión digital disponible en: http://corteconstitucional.gov.co/ relatoria/2012/t-023-12.htm. (Consultado en febrero de 2017) Gómez-Rey, A. (2010) La concesión de aguas superficiales a la luz de la teoría general del acto administrativo. Incidencia de la tradición dogmática del derecho público en el derecho ambiental. Revista Estudios Socio-Jurídicos, 12 (2), pp. 345-377. Peña Porras, D.I. (2008) La construcción del derecho administrativo Colombiano. Bogotá, Colombia: Universidad de Los Andes. Penagos, G. (2008) El Acto Administrativo, Tomo II, parte general, nuevas tendencias. Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Doctrina y Ley. Perini, A., Lorences, V., y Comparatore, L. (2007).Derecho Ambiental. Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Universidad. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (1984). Decreto 1594 de 1984. "Por el cual se reglamenta parcialmente el Título I de la Ley 09 de 1979, así como el Capítulo II del Título VI–Parte III–Libro II y el Título III de la Parte III Libro I del Decreto 2811 de 1974 en cuanto a usos del agua y residuos líquidos". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (1984). Decreto 01 de 1984."Por el cual se reforma el Código Contencioso Administrativo". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (1994). Decreto 1753 de 1994."Por el cual se reglamentan parcialmente los Títulos VIII y XII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre licencias ambientales".Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2002). Decreto 1728 de 2002."Por el cual se reglamenta el Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre la Licencia Ambiental". Colombia. Bibliografía 247 Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2003). Decreto 1180 de 2003. " Por el cual se reglamenta el Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre Licencias Ambientales". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2005). Decreto 1220 de 2005. "Por el cual se reglamenta el Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre Licencias Ambientales". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2006).Decreto 500 de 2006. "Por el cual se modifica el Decreto 1220 del 21 de abril de 2005, reglamentario del Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre licencias ambientales". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2010). Decreto 2820 de 2010. "Por el cual se reglamenta el Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre Licencias Ambientales". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2014). Decreto 2041 de 2014. "Por el cual se reglamenta el Título VIII de la Ley 99 de 1993 sobre Licencias Ambientales". Colombia. Presidencia de la República de Colombia (2015). Decreto 1076 de 2015. "Por medio del cual se expide el Decreto Único Reglamentario del Sector Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible".Colombia Rodríguez, G.A. (2009). La Licencia Ambiental, un acto administrativo especial y su proceso de flexibilización. En Restrepo Medina, M.A. (Ed.), Retos y perspectivas del Derecho Administrativo, Segunda Parte (pp. 222-256).Bogotá, Colombia: Editorial Universidad del Rosario. Sánchez Baptista, N.R. (2011) La Nulidad como medio de control en la Ley 1437 de 2011 ¿una nueva inconstitucionalidad? Revista del Instituto Colombiano de Derecho Procesal. No. 37.

On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research John Turri [email protected] Abstract: I argue against the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The view under criticism is: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. I then propose and evaluate alternative accounts of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, and conclude that we should explain propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification. If correct, this proposal would constitute a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification. I. The Orthodox View Imagine two jurors, Miss Knowit and Miss Not, deliberating about the case of Mr. Mansour. Both jurors have paid close attention throughout the trial. As a result, both have good reason to believe that Mansour is guilty. Each juror goes on to form the belief that Mansour is guilty, which he in fact is. Miss Knowit believes he's guilty because of the evidence presented during the trial. Miss Not believes he's guilty because he looks suspicious. Miss Knowit knows that Mansour is guilty; Miss Not does not. Why the difference? Miss Knowit believes he's guilty on the basis of the good reasons she has, whereas Miss Not, despite having good reasons at her disposal, believes based on mere suspicion. The basing relation, according to a widespread and influential line of thought, is what distinguishes doxastic from propositional justification. (Some put the distinction in terms of "justifiable" versus "justified" belief, and we might also put it in terms of "being in a position to justifiedly believe" versus "justifiedly believing.") In virtue of having a good reason to believe the defendant guilty, the proposition <Mansour is guilty> is propo1 Propositional and Doxastic Justification 2 sitionally justified for both jurors, and because Miss Knowit's belief is based on the good reasons she has, her belief is doxastically justified or well founded. Knowledge requires doxastic, not merely propositional, justification, which explains why Miss Knowit but not Miss Not knows Mansour is guilty. Believing for a good reason is a valuable state, a greater achievement than merely having a good reason you fail to properly utilize. Reflecting on such cases might easily lead you to adopt the following thesis: if p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and S believes p on the basis of R, then S's belief that p is doxastically justified. And, indeed, an impressive array of epistemologists adopts just this view. For instance, Jonathan Kvanvig remarks, Doxastic justification is what you get when you believe something for which you have propositional justification, and you base your belief on that which propositionally justifies it.1 According to John Pollock and Joseph Cruz: To be justified in believing something it is not sufficient merely to have a good reason for believing it. One could have a good reason at one's disposal but never make the connection. [In such a case] what is lacking is that you do not believe the conclusion on the basis of those reasons.2 Marshall Swain tells us: It often happens that a person's belief that h is based upon a set of reasons R when believing that h on the basis of R is not justified for that person. This can happen even though the person has other reasons such that if the belief had been based upon those reasons, then the belief would have been justified.3 Keith Korcz claims: 1 Kvanvig (2003: section B1). I should note that Kvanvig at times adds that the belief must be "properly" based in order to count as doxastically justified. But he never explains what "properly" amounts to, and often omits it. 2 Pollock and Cruz (1999: 35 – 36). Also see Pollock (1986: 36 – 37). 3 Swain (1979: 25). Propositional and Doxastic Justification 3 A belief is merely justifiable for a person S when S possesses reasons which would be sufficient to justify the belief were the belief based on those reasons.... A belief is justified for S when S possesses reasons sufficient to justify the belief and has made an appropriate connection between her reasons and her belief. This appropriate connection is the basing relation.4 Richard Feldman says, S's belief that p at time t is [doxastically] justified (well-founded) iff (i) believing p is justified for S at t; (ii) S believes p on the basis of evidence that supports p.5 William Alston distinguishes between "having adequate grounds" and believing "based on an adequate ground," and claims it is "conceptually true that one is justified in believing that p iff one's belief that p is based on an adequate ground...."6 Having adequate grounds and believing on adequate grounds are tantamount to propositional and doxastic justification, respectively. It is instructive to note that epistemologists say similar things about knowledge. For example, Stewart Cohen, in the course of discussing contextualism and skepticism, considers the following closure principle: If S knows that p, and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q.7 Cohen then remarks, "Of course, S may not believe q or S may not believe q on the basis of seeing the entailment, but then S will still be in a position to know q. That is, all S has to do to know q is to believe it on the basis of seeing the entailment."8 Cohen apparently endorses the view that to know q you need only believe q on the basis of the good reasons you have for q (setting Gettier aside). Our focus is justification, but this should remind us that the lessons learned apply to knowledge as well. 4 Korcz (2000: 525 – 526). 5 Feldman (2002: 46). See also Feldman (2004: esp. section 1) and Feldman and Conee (1985: section IV). 6 Alston (1985: 190). Alston expresses the same sentiments in his (2005: 90). 7 Cohen (1999: 62). 8 Cohen (1999: 84 n. 14). Emphasis added. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 4 II. The Orthodox View Refuted The orthodox view outlined above is wrong. That is, Basis is false. (Basis) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of R, THEN S's belief that p is doxastically justified. Before turning to specific examples, we should ask ourselves whether it is plausible to think that the way in which a subject makes use of his reasons matters not to whether his belief is well founded. Basis makes no mention of the way in which the subject performs in forming or sustaining a belief. This is not a minor detail. Nor is it something we can set aside for present purposes, in the hope that the matter will resolve itself within a more comprehensive theory of propositional justification. In evaluating beliefs we are evaluating a kind of performance, the performance of a cognitive agent in representing the world as being a certain way, and when performing with materials (which, in cognitive affairs, will include reasons or evidence), the success, or lack thereof, of one's performance will depend crucially on the way in which one makes use of those materials. This is true for carpentry as well as cognition. Consider a carpenter, equipped with the finest tools and lumber. You want a deck built, and he is in a position to build a wonderful one for you. Despite the quality of his tools and lumber, unless he puts them together in the right way, you are not going to be happy with the end result. You want a well built deck, not just one built with tools and materials fit for making a well built deck. Merely having the right equipment for the job, and using it to perform the job, does not guarantee a job well done. As such, I submit that we should expect there to be compelling counterexamples to Basis that exploit this glaring weakness. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 5 Ram Neta discusses an example that might at first appear to threaten Basis.9 It involves a subject who bases her belief on conclusive reasons (I use "reasons" where Neta uses "evidence"), but does so unreasonably because she ignores relevant counterevidence in the process. A proponent of Basis could respond that possessing relevant counterevidence plausibly precludes propositional justification. Another response would be to distinguish provisional (prima facie) from all-things-considered (ultima facie) propositional justification, and clarify that Basis pertains only to the latter, which requires that the subject not possess relevant counterevidence. Perhaps neither response will ultimately withstand scrutiny, but we can bypass the controversy because examples abound that don't involve subjects ignoring relevant counterevidence. Let us then turn to the first such example. Consider two of the other jurors, Miss Proper and Miss Improper, sitting in judgment of Mr. Mansour. Each paid close attention throughout the trial. As a result, each knows the following things: (P1) Mansour had a motive to kill the victim. (P2) Mansour had previously threatened to kill the victim. (P3) Multiple eyewitnesses place Mansour at the crime scene. (P4) Mansour's fingerprints were all over the murder weapon. <Mansour is guilty> is propositionally justified for both jurors because each knows (P1 – P4).10 As it happens, each comes to believe <Mansour is guilty> as the result of an episode 9 Neta (2002: 671). Pryor (2004: 365) considers a similar example and draws a similar lesson. 10 Must the jurors also believe that (P1 – P4) constitute good evidence to conclude that Mansour is guilty in order for their knowledge of (P1 – P4) to propositionally justify that conclusion for them? No, because that would impose an unacceptably stringent condition on propositional justification. Human children, who may not even possess the concept of evidence, are propositionally justified in believing many things. Lacking the concept of evidence, they cannot so much as entertain the thought that X is evidence for Y, much less believe such a thing. See also Conee and Feldman (2001: 75 – 76). Propositional and Doxastic Justification 6 of explicit, conscious reasoning that features (P1 – P4) essentially. Miss Proper reasons like so: (Proper Reasoning) (P1 – P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty. (P1 – P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty. Miss Improper, by contrast, reasons like this: (Improper Reasoning) The tea leaves say that (P1 – P4) make it overwhelmingly likely that Mansour is guilty. (P1 – P4) are true. Therefore, Mansour is guilty. Each juror satisfies conditions (i) and (ii), yet only Miss Proper's belief that Mansour is guilty is doxastically justified. Only Miss Proper is justified in believing as she does that he is guilty. Miss Improper's belief that Mansour is guilty is based on the reasons that propositionally justify <Mansour is guilty> for her, but only in light of the tea-leaf reading, which spoils things. Her belief is improperly based on (P1 – P4), whereas Miss Proper's is properly based. The same example shows that Basis+ fails.11 (Basis+) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of R as evidence for p, THEN S's belief that p is doxastically justified. 11 Fairweather (2001: 74 – 75) suggests something like this view. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 7 Miss Improper does base her belief on (P1 – P4) as evidence for <Mansour is guilty>. It is part of the content of her reasoning that (P1 – P4) make <Mansour is guilty> overwhelmingly probable.12 Some might object that my example depends on adding to the basis of Miss Improper's belief.13 This observation might then naturally lead to a revised principle: (Austere Basis) IF (i) p is propositionally justified for S in virtue of S's having reason(s) R, and (ii) S believes p on the basis of R and only R, THEN S's belief that p is doxastically justified. Austere Basis has extremely limited application. How often do we believe something for only those reasons that propositionally justify it for us? It's trifling even if true. It also gives the wrong verdict in the following case. Mr. Ponens and Mr. F.A. Lacy each knows the following things: (P5) The Spurs will win if they play the Pistons. (P6) The Spurs will play the Pistons. This is a paradigm case of propositional justification. <The Spurs will win> is propositionally justified for each man because he knows (P5) and (P6). This satisfies clause (i). From these two premises, and only these premises, each man draws the conclusion: (P7) Therefore, the Spurs will win. This satisfies clause (ii). But the devil is in the details. Ponens applies modus ponens to reach the conclusion. Lacy, however, applies a different inference rule, which we may call 12 If it's not obvious that the content of her reasoning as described fits the bill, we can modify the case accordingly. 13 Thanks to Juan Comesaña for conversation on this point. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 8 modus profusus: for any p, q, and r: (p  q)  r. Lacy's belief that the Spurs will win is definitely not doxastically justified; following that rule could never lead to a justified belief. This is a counterexample to Austere Basis. It also works against Basis. So there are powerful counterexamples to Basis and company. But the problem goes deeper than mere counterexamples. As noted earlier, Basis misses something deep and important about the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. The way in which the subject performs, the manner in which she makes use of her reasons fundamentally determines whether her belief is doxastically justified. Poor utilization of even the best reasons for believing p will prevent you from justifiedly believing or knowing that p. I want to emphasize two further points about the discussion of Basis and its ilk. First, the intuitions about the counterexamples do not rely on any particular theory of the epistemic basing relation. It matters not to the examples whether the belief is based on the reasons in virtue of the reasons causing the belief, or whether the belief is based on the reasons in virtue of the subject having an evidential belief to the effect that the reasons in question are indeed good reasons to accept the conclusion, or whether the basing relation obtains in virtue of both the reason causing the belief and the subject having the evidential belief. To demonstrate this, notice that in the case of Ponens and Lacy, we can add these details arbitrarily and it does not affect the intuition that Ponens' belief in the conclusion is doxastically justified whereas Lacy's belief is not. I stipulate that Ponens' belief in (P7) is (non-deviantly) caused by his belief in (P5) and (P6), and the same is true of Lacy; I also stipulate that Ponens believes that the conjunction of (P5) and (P6) constitutes an impeccaPropositional and Doxastic Justification 9 bly good reason to believe (P7), and the same is true of Lacy. None of this affects the intuition that Ponens' belief is doxastically justified, whereas Lacy's belief definitely is not. Second, and closely related to the first point, neither the thesis being argued for here, nor the examples offered in support of it, have anything to do with the "Gypsylawyer" cases that often feature prominently in discussions involving the epistemic basing relation. Gypsy-lawyer cases-so called because the original case in this genre, due to Keith Lehrer, featured a "Gypsy lawyer"14-are put forward as purported counterexamples to causal theories of the epistemic basing relation, the upshot supposedly being that a belief need not be caused by a reason in order to be based on that reason. Even if this were granted, it would not, of course, impugn the view that certain kinds of causation are sufficient to establish a basing relation, a point Lehrer himself recognizes.15 Nothing in the examples offered here requires us to take a stand on the merit of Gypsy-lawyer cases or the view that causation is necessary for basing. And the claim that Basis and its ilk are false quite obviously bears no relation to whether causation is necessary for basing. That should suffice to quell suspicions that my discussion somehow smuggles in controversial assumptions regarding the basing relation. However, out of an abundance of caution, I will briefly explain the anatomy of Gypsy-lawyer cases, so that even those readers inordinately concerned with such cases may satisfy themselves that the present discussion is orthogonal to the issues at stake in Gypsy-lawyer cases. (Those who harbor no such suspicions may simply skip the rest of this paragraph.) Gypsy-lawyer cases all share the same basic structure.16 At time t, S has a true belief that p, completely causally 14 Lehrer (1971). 15 Lehrer (1990: 169). 16 See, e.g., Korcz (2000: 528 – 532), Lehrer (1971; 1990: 169), Pappas (1979: 57 – 58), and Harman (1973: 31 – 32), all of whom offer their own variants. Sometimes the case is pitched in terms of knowledge, other times in terms of doxastic justification. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 10 sustained by inadequate reason R. S believes p as strongly as he possible can. S obviously does not know p. At some subsequent time t', S acquires reason R*, which is an adequate reason to believe p. S explicitly recognizes that R* is an adequate reason to believe p. Nevertheless, R continues to fully causally sustain S's belief, and R* in no way contributes. Yet it is (supposedly) intuitively obvious that S comes to know p at t'. S could know p only if his belief was based on adequate reasons, and ex hypothesi R* is the only adequate reason S has, thus it follows that his belief comes to be based on R*. But S's belief is causally independent of R*, so a belief need not be caused by a reason in order to be based on that reason. As should be plain, the issues raised by this sort of case bear no relation to the main points I am concerned to make in this paper. III.Alternative Proposals It is standardly assumed that there is some deep and important relationship between propositional and doxastic justification. One might disagree, taking the position that they are only tenuously related, or even totally independent of one another. Nevertheless, I find the standard assumption plausible, and will adopt it as my own. Doxastic justification cannot be understood simply as propositional justification plus basing. What, then, is the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification? Rather than try to understand doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification, perhaps a different approach is in order. In proceeding, we must keep in mind that any account of the relationship will be sorely lacking if it neglects the crucial role of the proper, competent use of reasons. It would be completely unsurprising if we were unable to state individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for propositional justification. NevPropositional and Doxastic Justification 11 ertheless, I propose that we can make progress in understanding that concept along the following lines. (PJ) Necessarily, for all S, p, and t, if p is propositionally justified for S at t, then p is propositionally justified for S at t BECAUSE S currently possesses at least one means of coming to believe p such that, were S to believe p in one of those ways, S's belief would thereby be doxastically justified.17, 18 In a word, the subject's intellectual abilities explain why she is in a position to justifiedly believe or know p.19 PJ should command our attention for several reasons. First, because it provides an illuminating explanation of what goes on in paradigm cases of propositional justification. Recall the case of Messrs Ponens and Lacy. Each of them knows things that would lead any normal human adult competently to arrive, by a straightforward application of modus ponens, at the conclusion that the Spurs will win. Miss Proper and Miss Improper are as capable as any other normal human adult of competent explanatory reasoning, and each 17 Strictly speaking, it should read 'believing p' rather than 'coming to believe p'. If your belief that p is doxastically justified, then p is propositionally justified for you, even if you don't presently have a means of coming to believe p, as would perhaps be the case if you already believed it. This minor point doesn't alter the basic proposal, so to simplify the discussion I shall stick with the formulation in the text. 18 Compare Goldman's (1979: 351 – 352) definition of ex ante justification in terms of ex post justification: "Person S is ex ante justified in believing p at t if and only if there is a reliable belief-forming operation available to S which is such that if S applied that operation to this total cognitive state at t, S would believe p at t-plus-delta (for a suitably small delta) and that belief would be ex post justified." As Goldman (1979: 353 n. 17) himself notes, the ex ante/ex post distinction is closely related to the propositional/doxastic distinction we've been discussing. I do not, whereas Goldman does, attempt to state necessary and sufficient conditions. 19 Compare Sosa's (2003: ch. 7, esp. pp. 127 – 8, 134, and 138) discussion of the speckled hen and related issues, as well as his (2004: 287 – 290) response to Richard Feldman. Also relevant here are Greco (1999) and (forthcoming). Propositional and Doxastic Justification 12 knows things, regarding which by far the most plausible explanation is the guilt of Mansour. Second, because PJ provides a model for understanding how non-reason-based doxastically-justified belief and knowledge is possible. It would provide for non-reasonbased doxastically-justified belief if one could competently acquire or sustain belief in some proposition without doing so on the basis of a reason. I submit that the belief in one's own existence is like this.20 Descartes notwithstanding, it is highly implausible that I need a reason to justifiedly believe, or know, for that matter, that I exist. Of course, the fact that I have abundant reasons to believe that I exist is irrelevant to whether I need such reasons for my belief in my own existence to rise to the level of doxastic justification or knowledge. Let me be clear: I am not suggesting that the epistemic status of these cogito beliefs is somehow in question. They obviously possess epistemic status par excellence-that is an unquestionable datum, to which theory is answerable. My point is that PJ helps us better understand an important dimension of their epistemic status, and this is a virtue of the theory. Third, because PJ withstands a spate of initially compelling objections. One initially compelling objection to PJ stems from the thought that certain propositions can be propositionally justified for you, but coming to believe them would destroy the evidence you had for them, guaranteeing a doxastically unjustified belief.21 Suppose Sanders is learning about physics. He is reflective enough to know that he has considered only the Newtonian concept of force, defined as mass times acceleration. Intuitively, <I have never considered the proposition that force equals mass divided by acceleration> is proposition20 Some memory beliefs (beliefs "based on memory") may also be like this. 21 What follows is a modified version of one of Kvanvig's (2003: section B1) cases. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 13 ally justified for Sanders; after all, he knows something that straightforwardly entails it. Nevertheless, coming to believe it would provide him with conclusive reason to disbelieve it, in which case he could not justifiedly believe it. Thus, says the opponent, PJ cannot do justice to our intuitions in this kind of case. I am unpersuaded by such examples. The obvious response is that the case is slightly but importantly misdescribed. The proposition that is propositionally justified for Sanders is <I have never before considered the proposition that force equals mass divided by acceleration>, and obviously Sanders can justifiedly believe that. It is perfectly natural to leave the 'before' implicit in ordinary conversation, and the Sanders example trades on this in order to give the appearance of posing a problem for PJ. Consider: the therapist asks, "Have you ever considered divorcing your husband?" and the woman responds, "I've never so much as entertained the thought." The woman needn't retract her statement were the therapist to continue, "Never, you say? What about just now when I asked? You had to entertain it to understand my question." At most, the woman would clarify, "I of course meant that I had never entertained the thought before you asked about it"-though an icy stare seems a more likely response. Having dealt with potential counterexamples wherein deliberation destroys evidence, the flip side of that worry may command our attention, to wit, deliberation sometimes creates evidence.22 This exploits the vagueness in what it is to "currently possess a means." Suppose a first-year logic student knows the introduction and elimination rules for conjunction and disjunction in a natural deduction system, but he hasn't yet proven either of DeMorgan's Laws. Consider the Law that a negation of a conjunction is equivalent to a disjunction of the negations of the conjuncts: (p  q)  (p  q). He currently pos22 Thanks to Ernie Sosa for conversation on this point. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 14 sesses a means such that, were he to employ it, he would come to justifiedly believe that Law. That much seems right. Notice, however, that this implies that, even before he goes through the proof, he possesses a means such that, were he to employ it, he would justifiedly believe <I have proven one of DeMorgan's Laws>: he just needs to go through the proof, reflect on what he just accomplished, and then form the relevant belief in light of that. However, no such thing is propositionally justified for him beforehand. This would be a problem for the present proposal only if PJ claimed: IF S currently possesses at least one means of coming to believe p such that were S to believe p in one of those ways, S's belief would thereby be doxastically justified, THEN p is propositionally justified for S, which it does not. Thus, PJ has much to recommend it. But we would be remiss if we failed to note that the following sort of case presents a noteworthy challenge to PJ. Suppose that Ron knows that invading Iran would be catastrophically stupid, and that if invading Iran would be catastrophically stupid, then the U.S. ought not to invade Iran. Intuitively, the proposition <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran> is propositionally justified for Ron. Now we add that Ron is presently incapable of coming to believe that the U.S. ought not to invade Iran. Having listened to right-wing talk radio and watched Fox News for far too long, Ron is simply psychologically incapable of believing that the U.S. ought not to invade any country, much less Iran. Thus, he does not presently have a means of coming to justifiedly believe that the U.S. ought not to invade Iran, because he doesn't have any means of coming Propositional and Doxastic Justification 15 to believe it. Nevertheless, the intuition persists that <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran> is propositionally justified for him, which now cannot be because of any ability Ron has to competently arrive at that conclusion. Apparently we are inclined to abstract away from Ron's odd disability regarding the proposition <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran>. Surely Ron is not like this with respect to most propositions, and most of the time he is not even like this with respect to this specific proposition: normally, if he knows that p, and knows that q if p, then he has the wherewithal to competently reason his way, via an application of modus ponens, to a belief in q. And this more general ability, it might plausibly be argued, grounds the intuition that the 'q' in this case is propositionally justified for Ron, despite his strange circumstances. It might be replied that I have made things too easy on myself. Let's stipulate that Ron suffers from a general disability to reason from knowledge of a conditional and its antecedent, to a belief in its consequent. Don't we still have the intuition that <the U.S. ought not to invade Iran> is propositionally justified for Ron, given what else he knows? My intuition about this version of the case is noticeably less clear than about the previous one. Moreover, I doubt whether we should trust very strongly our intuitions about such a strange case. Conditional reasoning is so fundamental to our intellectual lives that I am hard pressed to make sense of Ron. It would not be unreasonable to respond by granting that knowledge of p and q if p would be a good reason for us to believe q, yet deny that it is a good reason for Ron in this case, due to his strange disability. This, I think, is enough to account for any positive intuition we have about Ron's epistemic position vis-à-vis q. But there is a more direct response available. Even lacking facility with conditional reasoning, Ron can easily still competently reason his way to the conclusion via disjunctive Propositional and Doxastic Justification 16 syllogism. q if p is logically equivalent to either not-p or q; given knowledge of p, then, it follows straightforwardly by elementary inference that q. Thus, even in the more extravagant version of the case, Ron does have a means of justifiedly coming to believe q after all.23 Despite success in staving off this challenge to PJ, we still might learn an important lesson from cases like Ron's. Hints may also be gleaned from something I said in support of PJ earlier: PJ should command our attention ... because it provides an illuminating explanation of what goes on in paradigm cases of propositional justification. Recall the case of Messrs Ponens and Lacy. Each of them knows things that would lead any normal human adult competently to arrive, by a straightforward application of modus ponens, at the conclusion that the Spurs will win. Miss Proper and Miss Improper are as capable as any other normal human adult of competent explanatory reasoning, and each knows things, regarding which by far the most plausible explanation is the guilt of Mansour. Perhaps the intuitive plausibility of PJ derives from the extent to which it overlaps with a deeper principle governing propositional justification. If so, then PJ will have served its purpose in guiding us toward an important insight into the nature of justification. Here is one suggestion as to what that deeper principle might be.24 Judgments about propositional and doxastic justification are moderately idealized, in that they abstract away, to a greater or lesser degree, from the abilities and powers of the specific agent in question, to the abilities and powers manifested in a typical performance by a competent member of the agent's kind. In Ron's case, for example, we have in mind a competent intellectual performance by a normal human adult, who doubtless would be able to competently and ef23 Should the proponent of the extravagant case complain that it would be unusual for someone to reason in this way, I would beg him only to consider how unusual he made poor Ron to begin with. 24 For a related discussion of "being in a position to know," see Sosa (1991: 27 – 29, 49). Propositional and Doxastic Justification 17 fortlessly reason his way to the relevant conclusion. This idealized competent performance would then explain why the conclusion is propositionally justified for Ron. The same is true in the cases of Messrs Ponens and Lacy, and Misses Proper and Improper, although we missed the deeper explanation in the latter cases because the subjects in question were capable of competent performances typical of a normal adult human. It is only in Ron's case, where the subject's capabilities diverge significantly from the capabilities of a normal adult human, that the deeper principle suggests itself. Yet if we idealize to the agent's kind, rather than idealizing to a typical performance of the specific agent in question, it becomes difficult to explain the propositional justification enjoyed by extraordinary humans whose intellectual powers far outstrip the typical human's. Imagine, for instance, that Cedric is the most brilliant logician in the world. Suppose that Cedric is considering whether some proposition, T, is a theorem of some set of axioms, A. T is in fact a theorem of A, and Cedric would normally be able to discover this with ease and in short order, via some clever algorithm he devised. Intuitively, the proposition <T is a theorem of A> is propositionally justified for Cedric. However, this cannot be because a typical human adult would be led to that conclusion through competent reasoning, because by hypothesis the logical acumen required to reach that conclusion far exceeds the typical human adult's abilities and powers. It is possible, then, that the sources of propositional justification are multiple, but in a way that reveals a deeper unity. In cases such as Ron's, where the subject is in some way defective (with respect to the topic at hand, at least), we abstract away from his abilities to those a typical member of his kind. In cases such as Cedric's, where the subject is in some way intellectually extraordinary (again, at least with respect to the topic at hand), our judgPropositional and Doxastic Justification 18 ment is guided by the abilities and powers manifested in a typical performance of the subject's own. In either case, though, an idealized competent performance of some agent, closely related to the subject in question, will explain why the subject is propositionally justified. IV. Conclusion In summary, I conclude that the orthodox view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification is false. Its failure is instructive, however, pointing the way toward a better understanding of the relationship between those two kinds of justification. The present proposal, which explains propositional justification in terms of doxastic justification, builds on insights gained through a close examination of the orthodox view. If successful, it marks a significant advance in our understanding of the sources of epistemic justification.25 Works Cited Alston, William. 1985. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." Monist, vol. 68. Reprinted in Crumley, ed., 177 – 193. _____. 2005. Beyond "Justification": Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Cohen, Stewart. 1999. "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons." Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology, 1999, 62. Conee, Earl & Richard Feldman. 2001. "Internalism Defended." American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (2001): 1-18. Reprinted in Conee & Feldman 2004. _____ & _____. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 25 For feedback and discussions that helped improve this paper, I would like to thank Juan Comesaña, Jamie Dreier, Ali Eslami, Derek Ettinger, Ben Fiedor, John Greco, Allan Hazlett, Chris Kane, Jim Pryor, Bruce Russell, Mark Schroeder, Ernest Sosa, Jerry Steinhofer, and James Van Cleve. Propositional and Doxastic Justification 19 Crumley II, Jack S., ed. 1999. Readings in Epistemology. Mountain View, CA: Mayfield Publishing Co. Fairweather, Abrol. 2001. "Epistemic Motivation." In Fairweather & Zagzebski, eds. Fairweather, Abrol & Linda Zagzebski, eds. 2001. Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Feldman, Richard & Earl Conee. 1985. "Evidentialism." Reprinted in Sosa & Kim, eds. Feldman, Richard. 2002. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. _____. 2004. "Foundational Beliefs and Empirical Possibilities." Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology, 2004. Reprinted in Conee & Feldman 2004. Goldman, Alvin. 1979. "What Is Justified Belief?" Reprinted in Sosa and Kim, eds. Greco, John. 1999. "Agent Reliabilism." Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology, 1999. _____. Forthcoming. "Holding Defeat to the Fire." Harman, Gilbert. 1973. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Korcz, Keith. 2000. "The Causal-Doxastic Theory of the Basing Relation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 30, no. 4, December 2000, 525 – 550. Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2003. "Propositionalism and the Perspectival Character of Justification." American Philosophical Quarterly 40.1 (2003), pp. 3-18. Lehrer, Keith. 1971. "How Reasons Give Us Knowledge, or the Case of the Gypsy Lawyer. The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 68, no. 10 (May 20, 1971), 311 – 313. _____. 1990. Theory of Knowledge. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Neta, Ram. 2002. "S Knows That P." Noûs, vol. 36, no. 4, 663 – 681. Pappas, George S. 1979a. "Basing Relations." In Pappas, ed. _____ ed. 1979b. Justification and Knowledge. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Co. Pollock, John & Joseph Cruz. 1999. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd ed. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Pryor, James. 2004. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?" Philosophical Issues, 14, Epistemology, 2004. Sosa, Ernest. 1991. Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. _____. 2003. Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues (with Laurence BonJour). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Sosa, Ernest & Jaegwon Kim, eds. 2000. Epistemology: An Anthology. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. Swain, Marshall. 1979. "Justification and the Basis of Belief." In Pappas, ed.

. Introducción. Hacia una breve biografía de la identidad 1.1. Identidad personal en la modernidad El concepto de "identidad personal" constituye un punto de encuentro y discusión frecuente en la psicología, epistemología y filosofía contemporánea1. Con todo, el problema de la identidad es antiguo y, por 1 Para una introducción a la problemática revisar Wiggins (1980) y Perry (2008). Para profundizar la discusión: En psicología consultar Arciero y Bondolfi (2009), Nardi y Bellantuono (2008); En filosofía y epistemología revisar las discusiones propuestas por: B. Williams (2005a; 2005b), E. Olson (1997), H. Noonan (2003) y S. Shoemaker (1997). ejemplo, podemos rastrear la discusión al menos hasta Aristóteles2. Según Munné (2000), Aristóteles entendió el problema de la identidad personal como aquella capacidad humana por la cual cada uno puede referirse a su propia persona "a la 2 Aristóteles (1970) señala que: "Se llaman idénticas [tautà], algunas cosas, por accidente; Por ejemplo, lo blanco y lo músico, se dicen idénticos porque son accidentes de lo mismo [de alguien] [...] Pero otras cosas se llaman idénticas por sí mismas [...] La identidad [he tautòtes] es cierta unidad [enòtes tis], o bien del ser de varias cosas, como cuando tales cosas se consideran como si fueran varias, por ejemplo, cuando se dice que una cosa es idéntica a sí misma [hoion hótan lège autò autô tautón], pues entonces se toma una cosa como si fuera dos" (Metafísica, V, 10, 1017 a 27 – 1018 a 10). Discusiones acerca de la identidad personal ¿Fenómeno experimentado o construcción conversacional? Pablo López S. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Valparaíso Chile Resumen: El siguiente trabajo introduce al lector en parte del debate epistemológico contemporáneo acerca de la identidad personal según el siguiente programa: (a) Presentación de antecedentes del concepto de identidad personal y una breve introducción al problema. (b) Presentación de dos de las posiciones más características del debate: identidad personal como construcción conversacional (Kenneth Gergen) o identidad personal como fenómeno experimentado (Vittorio Guidano). (c) Se analizan las posiciones y se critica con énfasis las inconsistencias en los argumentos de Gergen. (d) Finalmente, se sintetizan las conclusiones y los argumentos que las sostienen. Palabras Claves: Identidad personal, Self, Narrativa, Experiencia, Construcción conversacional Abstract: The following paper introduces the reader in part of the contemporary epistemological debate about personal identity according to the following program. (a) Presentation of background to the concept of personal identity and a brief introduction to the problem. (b) Presentation of two of the most characteristic positions of the debate: personal identity as conversational construction (Kenneth Gergen) or personal identity as a phenomenon experienced (Vittorio Guidano). (c) The positions are analyzed and criticized with emphasis in the inconsistencies of the arguments of Gergen. (d) Finally, it summarizes the conclusions and arguments that support them. Keys words: Personal identity, Self, Narrative, Experience, Conversational construction 2 vez como igual y no igual" (p. 2). Sin embargo, la observación de Munné parece excesiva, dado que no es claro que uno pueda atribuirle a Aristóteles una reflexión psicológica de esta envergadura. Por otro lado "Identidad personal" tampoco es un término que aparezca en la filosofía de Aristóteles. A lo sumo podrá decirse que el hombre tiene un ser, en tanto entidad (ousía), que esencialmente consiste en ser "animal político"3, "inteligencia que apetece o apetito inteligente"4, o una vida "conforme a la inteligencia"5. Aunque esto podría considerarse, a lo sumo, un elemento fundamental, aunque rudimentario del problema. Este complejo problema persiste durante la Modernidad. Según Seoane (2005) y Nájera (2006), ésta comprendió la identidad como una entidad desvinculada de la historia, del tiempo y de la experiencia. Como afirman algunos críticos, el racionalismo pretendió la ambición de encontrar un fundamento objetivo para el conocimiento de la realidad y de la identidad, por ello terminó situándola fuera del cuerpo, de las emociones personales y fuera de la historia personal y social (Gergen, 1992, 1996; Guidano 1998a; Jubés, Laso y Ponce, 2000; Seoane, 2005, entre otros). Para Taylor (1996) el pensamiento cartesiano representó una explicación excesivamente mecanicista, que habría relegado a segundo lugar la experiencia en primera persona. La identidad se transforma, entonces, en una entidad abstraída de la realidad. Nájera (2006) concluye, en esta misma línea, lo siguiente: a) El cogito ergo sum declaró la renuncia de la identidad del sujeto a toda relación con lo corporal y con lo experiencial; b) La comprensión de la identidad queda desligada del sujeto que narra su praxis de manera autobiográfica, 3 Revisar: Aristóteles (1983), Política, I, 2, 1253a, 2-3. 4 Revisar: Aristóteles (1984), Ética a Nicómaco, VI, 2, 1139 b, 4-6. 5 Revisar: Aristóteles (1984), Ética a Nicómaco, X, 7, 1178a, 7-8. dado que no reconoce ningún hilo biográfico a través de la experiencia; c) El self es metafísico, y la identidad se resume en términos de desprendimiento y desvinculación corporal e histórica. Es decir, la identidad personal no encontraría ninguna identificación en su contexto, en su corporalidad ni en su experiencia en el mundo. La identidad personal sería una suerte de constructo que no sería perturbado por la experiencia ni por la historia. Sin embargo, estas opiniones parecen demasiado generales. René Descartes (1596-1650), por ejemplo, en respuesta al problema sobre la continuidad del ego, sugiere que la memoria biográfica del sujeto (mémoire) es la encargada de su continuidad biográfica. Tal continuidad se articula en los momentos de vigilia; lo que no es posible lograr en los momentos de sueño6. Descartes analizó el asunto de la continuidad del ego desde dos puntos de vista: a) La persistencia ontológica del ego; Dios es el único ser constante durante todos los momentos de espacio-tiempo discretos del ego, y Dios es, en consecuencia, el único ser capaz de causar tal persistencia7; b) Desde el punto de vista psicológico, la certeza de la propia existencia, de la propia existencia finita y de la propia existencia constante del ego la da el cogito. El problema fundamental es, claro está, precisamente cómo se sabe que se existe. Las principales críticas al cogito estriban en reducirlo a pura actividad intelectual. Sin embargo, la propuesta cartesiana es más compleja. En primer lugar, -y no se ha hecho mucho énfasis en esto-, el cogito no se reduce al intellectus, es decir, a la mera actividad reflexiva. Cogito designa aquella facultad general por la cual se sabe 6 Para contrastar esta conclusión: Revisar Descartes (1641/2009, Meditaciones metafísicas, Meditación VI, AT, IX 71). 7 Descartes señala lo siguiente: "Car tout le temps de ma vie peut être divisé en une infinité de parties, chacune des quelles ne dépend en aucune façon des autres; et ainsi, de ce qùun peu auparavant j`ai été, il ne s ensuit pas que je doive maintenant être, si ce n`est quèen ce moment quelque cause me produise et me crée, pour ainsi dire, derechef, c`est-à-dire me conserve" (1641/2009, Meditación III, AT, IX 39). 3 indudablemente de la propia existencia. En este sentido, el querer, el no querer y el sentir, entre otros actos, también son parte del cogito8. Por ejemplo, cuando se sabe que se siente, se sabe que se existe y que es uno mismo el que está sintiendo. En segundo lugar, y pese a esta apertura general de los actos del cogito, tampoco puede decirse que, en principio, se trata de actos absolutamente reducidos a acciones corporales, por ejemplo –tal como responde Descartes a Thomas Hobbesno se puede decir "paseo, luego existo"9. Sea cual fuere el caso, es claro que las críticas contemporáneas a Descartes han tendido a abordar el problema del self y de la identidad a partir de la mera dimensión intelectual del cogito, en lo que han denominado en términos generales "psicología racionalista". Para Ricoeur (1993) la identidad cartesiana se caracteriza ser un: "yo que no es ninguno" (p.16). Peter Markey (2005) considera que el propio Descartes ni siquiera habría sabido distinguir entre su propio ego y el sujeto literario acerca del cual escribió. Este crítico sostiene que Descartes no pudo justificar que sea él, el poseedor de tales o cuales actos mentales, pues no puede distinguirse a sí mismo (himself) de alguna idea que tenga acerca de sí mismo ("an idea of himself"). Para Seoane (2005) el self cartesiano es: "un individuo aislado que debe conquistar tierras desconocidas" (p.3). Según Guidano (1990), la identidad cartesiana, está separada del mundo material, está descontextualizada, es atemporal, carece de contexto y de historia; Por esta razón, se transforma en una estructura inamovible que no tiene relación con los otros, ni con la realidad, por lo que para Guidano, el self cartesiano existiría "por 8 Descartes señala lo siguiente: "Mais qùest-ce donc que je suis? Une chose qui pense. Qùest-ce qùune chose qui pense? C`est-à-dire une chose qui doute, qui conçoit, qui affirme, qui nie, qui veut, qui ne veut pas, qui imagine aussi, et qui sent" (1641/2009, Meditación II, AT, IX 22). 9 Revisar: Descartes (1641/2009, Respuesta a la Segunda objeción de Hobbes, AT, XI 136, 137). sí mismo y para siempre" (Guidano, 2001, p.383). Sin embargo, no solo el concepto racionalista cartesiano de identidad ha sido objeto de las críticas de los psicólogos contemporáneos, sino también, la concepción que del problema tiene el dentro "empirismo inglés". John Locke (1632-1704) consideró que la experiencia sensorial era el principal constituyente del autoconocimiento y del conocimiento de la realidad. La existencia10 y la identidad11 son, en efecto, percibidas 10 Locke indica lo siguiente: "As for our own existence, we perceive it so plainly, and so certainly, that it neither needs nor is capable of any proof. For nothing can be more evidence to us than our own experience; I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain; can any of these be more evidence to me than my own experience? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own experience, and will not suffer me to doubt of that. For if I know I feel pain, it is evidence I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting, as of that thought which I call doubt. Experience then convinces us that we have an intuitive knowledge of our own experience, and internal infallible perception that we are. In every act of sensation, reasoning, of thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being; and, in this matter, come not short of the highest degree of certainty" (1666/1828, pp. 45-46). 11 Locke indica lo siguiente: "This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive. When we see, hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thinking, we know that we do so. Thus it is always as to our present sensations and perceptions: and by this every one is to himself that which he calls self; it not being considered in this case whether the same self be continued in the same or other substances. For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and it is by the same self with this present one that 4 desde la sensación. Para Locke, entonces, el self se percibe tal como se percibe el mundo externo, el cual es objetivamente unívoco, continuo y estable (Danziger, 1997). La continuidad en la percepción de las sensaciones provenientes del mundo externo será la base de la continuidad de la identidad personal. Sobre el empirismo, Arciero (2005) indica que el sujeto posee una conciencia distanciada acerca de cada experiencia específica. Esta conciencia permitirá, por un lado, evaluar las experiencias mismas, y, por otro lado, ser siempre una conciencia experimentada. Es por esto que, para Locke, la identidad personal consiste formalmente en ser: "una identidad de conciencia" (Sánchez, 2001, p. 252). La identidad consistiría, en este caso, en tener conciencia de los aspectos temporales (pasado, presente y futuro) del propio existir y solo por este medio el sujeto tendría conciencia de su propia continuidad. Algunos críticos del empirismo inglés sugieren que si bien la identidad empirista se vincula con la experiencia subjetiva, el self sigue desvinculado del mundo exterior y de la historia (Taylor, 1996; Arciero, 2005 y Guidano, 2001). Para Seoane (2005) la identidad es un: "yo puro y neutro en relación con otro tipo de experiencias específicas" (p. 43). Ribes (1982) indica que el empirismo –al igual que el racionalismoelimina toda interacción del sujeto con su medio, y analiza las acciones de éstos como producidas por una mera máquina. Guidano (1990) afirma que el empirismo presenta tres problemas fundamentales al referirse a la identidad personal: a) Los sujetos se transforman en organismos pasivos, únicamente respondientes, ya que "no poseen ordenamiento ni significado interior" (p. 12); b) A la pasividad del self, se le suma su total externalización. Los sujetos solamente son: "un recipiente que al momento del nacimiento está vacío y que gradualmente viene a ser llenado por impresiones, now reflects on it, that that action was done" (1666/1928, [ch. 27, § 2] p. 55). percepciones sensoriales que se asocian entre si" (p. 12); c) Finalmente, para el autor, la identidad no es nada más que la copia y reproducción de un orden externo (Guidano, 1990; 2001). Tanto el racionalismo como el empirismo configuraron las principales formas de comprender la identidad en la modernidad12. Algunos críticos señalan que la radicalización del racionalismo llevó a entender la identidad como una mera representación mental, y la objetivización de la experiencia propuesta por el empirismo inglés, propuso un subjetivismo radical (Arciero, 2005). Los modelos psicológicos derivados de tales tradiciones habrían reproducido una identidad desvinculada de la praxis, de la historia personal y de la historia social, lo se verá criticado fuertemente en el período de la Posmodernidad. 1.2. Identidad personal en la posmodernidad El debate entre Vittorio Guidano y Kenneth Gergen se da en un contexto de pensamiento posmoderno. Hablar de "posmodernidad" es particularmente complejo13. Para Lyotard (1987) la posmodernidad no constituye un corpus teórico uniforme14, sino que conlleva una actitud. El autor señala que el 12 Según Bravo (2002), el empirismo en la modernidad se vio representado principalmente por el conductismo. Para Gergen (1992) la "teoría suprema de la racionalidad" la constituyó la teoría cognitiva del "procesamiento de la información". 13 Terry Eagleton (1998) distingue entre "posmodernidad", que refiere a un período histórico en donde se critican las nociones de verdad, objetividad y razón, y el término "posmodernismo", una expresión de la cultura contemporánea. No obstante, hoy no parecen emplearse con mayores diferencias. 14 Según este autor, impulsado por los cambios históricos del mundo de la post-guerra y el giro epistemológico en ciencias naturales y sociales, el posmodernismo proclama el derrumbe de todas las seguridades y la sospecha e incredulidad a todo lo que se erigiese como un metarrelato (Cf. Lyotard, 1989; 1996). 5 conocimiento posmoderno no es un simple instrumento de poder, sino que: "refina nuestra sensibilidad a las diferencias e incrementa nuestra tolerancia a la inconmensurabilidad" (Lyotard en Owens, 1986, p. 93). Precisamente, el concepto de "paradigma"15(Kuhn, 1978) nos sirve como criterio para señalar la existencia de diferentes sensibilidades al interior de una misma época, la posmoderna. Según esto, y dentro del plano epistemológico, podemos definir dos grupos generales de pensadores posmodernos. En primer lugar, autores que señalan algún tipo realidad como referente, entre estos: K. Popper16, P. Ricoeur17, J. Habermas18, H.G. Gadamer19, entre otros. Un segundo grupo, al parecer, más radical y más influyente en el debate sobre el self y la identidad, está integrado por pensadores tales como: M. Foucault20, G. Deleuze y F. Guattari21, J. Derrida22 y F. Lyotard23, etc. En 15 Kuhn (1978) indica lo siguiente: "Paradigma es aquello que los miembros de una comunidad científica, y solo ellos, comparten, y a la inversa, es la posesión de un paradigma común lo que constituye a un grupo de personas en una comunidad científica, grupo que de otra manera estaría formando por miembros inconexos" (pp. 12-13). 16 Quien refiere lo siguiente: "Las teorías son redes que lanzamos para apresar aquello que llamamos mundo, para racionalizarlo, explicarlo y dominarlo" (Popper, 1962, p. 57). 17 Ricoeur (1986a) indica lo siguiente: "Lejos de producir sólo imágenes debilitadas de la realidad [...] las obras literarias sólo pintan la realidad agrandándola con todas las significaciones que ellas mismas deben a sus virtudes de abreviación" (p.157). 18 Quien señala lo siguiente: "El que comprende mantiene una comunicación entre los dos mundos: capta el contenido objetivo de lo transmitido por la tradición y a la vez aplica la tradición a sí mismo y a su situación" (Habermas, 1999, p.117). 19 El autor señala: "Pero el hecho de que aún se pueda hablar de un lenguaje de las cosas nos recuerda lo que son las cosas en realidad: un material que se usa y se consume" (Gadamer, 1998, p. 73). 20 El texto del autor referido indica: "Realidad que sólo se debe al lenguaje y que permanece por completo en el interior las palabras" (Foucault, 1968, p.55). 21 Deleuze y Guattari (1995) indican que: "No es el deseo el que se apoya en las necesidades, sino al contrario, son las necesidades las que se derivan del deseo: son contra-productos en lo real que el deseo produce" (p. 34). estudios sociales encontramos a J. M. LévyLeblond (2002) y S. Woolgar (1991). En teoría de las ciencias están: T. Kuhn (2000), P. Feyerabend24, I. Lakatos (1993), R. Barthes25, H. Maturana26, entre muchos otros. Algunas de las escuelas psicológicas que suponen postulados posmodernos son, por ejemplo: La psicología basada en la deconstrucción de Richer (en Kvale, 1992), variadas corrientes constructivistas27; la psicología narrativa de Bruner (1990) y Howard (1991), entre otros; la psicología 22 Para el autor no existiría realidad alguna fuera de la comprensión que nos entrega el lenguaje (Cf. Derrida, 1967; 1984). 23 Lyotard (1989) indica que: "el término realidad no implica en absoluto una remisión a una sustancia material" (p. 76). 24 Feyerabend (1987) señala lo siguiente: "La elección de un estilo [cognitivo] de una realidad, de una forma de verdad, incluyendo criterios de realidad y de racionalidad es la elección de un producto humano. Es un acto social, depende de la situación histórica" (p. 188). 25 El autor señala que los "hechos" no tienen nunca una existencia que no sea lingüística. No obstante, todo lo que sucede, sucede como si tal existencia no fuera más que la "copia" pura y simple de una realidad externa (Cf. Barthes, 1994). 26 Maturana (1989) propone que: "La existencia humana en el lenguaje configura muchos dominios de realidad, cada uno constituido como un dominio de coherencias operacionales explicativas" (p. 99). 27 Hacia el año 2000 Feixas y Villegas (2000) contabilizaron alrededor de 200 expresiones diferentes de constructivismos. Estos autores, junto a Mahoney (1988), indican que el acuerdo básico del constructivismo radica en ver al sujeto como configurador-creador de la realidad en la que habita, por lo tanto, su esfuerzo teórico se centra en reincorporar al sujeto como participante activo en la construcción del conocimiento (Balbi, 2004). Algunas expresiones del constructivismo las constituyen: El construccionismo social (Berger y Luckman, 1983; Gergen, 1992; 1996); el constructivismo radical (Von Glasersfeld 1987; 1991; Von Foerster, 1984; Maturana y Varela, 1984); El enfoque constructivista sistémico (Selvini, Boscolo, Cecchin y Prata, 1975; Minuchin, 1974 y Cf. Hoffmann 1985; 1988); El constructivismo formal (Rosnow y Georgoundi, 1986); El constructivismo dialéctico (Pascual-Leone, 1987, Riegel, 1979; Greenberg y Pascual-Leone en Neimeyer y Mahoney, 1998), entre otros. Para una descripción más detallada y revisión de supuestos teórico, revisar: Neimeyer y Mahoney (1998); Feixas y Villegas (2000); Feixas (2003). 6 transpersonal de Weinhold y Hendricks (1993) entre muchas otras. Sin embargo, a pesar de estas diversas sensibilidades, en la posmodernidad parece haber un hilo conductor claro en, al menos, tres asuntos: a) Sus antecedentes; b) El análisis de una identidad sin un fundamento metafísico, y; c) El énfasis en el estudio del lenguaje. Revisemos estos puntos brevemente. 1) Los antecedentes28: Un antecedente directo del pensamiento posmoderno es el énfasis en las circunstancias del sujeto, algo puesto de relieve por F. Nietzsche29. El self, en consecuencia, prescinde de cualquier fundamento metafísico y no se sustenta en tal racionalidad (Vattimo, 1990a). Según Desiato (1998) el self nietzscheano reivindica el valor de la experiencia como "toma de conciencia" de nuestra posición fugaz en el mundo y recompone la relación del sujeto con su corporalidad como metáfora de las transitorias circunstancias humanas, evidenciándose esto en la siguientes palabras de Nietzsche (1994): "Detrás de tus pensamientos y sentimientos, hermano mío, se encuentra un soberano poderoso, un sabio desconocido – llámase sí mismo [Selbst]En tu cuerpo habita, es tu cuerpo" (pp. 60-61). Vattimo, entre otros, reconoce en Heidegger otro de los antecedentes fundamentales del posmodernismo. El autor italiano, entre otras 28 Para profundizar el análisis: Cf. Lyotard, (1987; 1996); Eagleton (1998). G. Vattimo (2004) ofrece un exhaustiva revisión de los antecedentes del posmodernismo junto a sus principales ideas. Hoyos (2005) ofrece un breve estudio introductorio para la comprensión de la psicología en la posmodernidad. 29 Sobre Nietzsche, Vattimo (1990b) indica que éste ha mostrado que la existencia de una realidad racionalmente adecuada sobre un fundamento metafísico es sólo un "mito tranquilizador". Ya no existiría una "verdad universal", sino que "verdades contextualizadas", por esto, tampoco la historia tendría un sentido definido. Según Hoyos (2005) el pensamiento de Nietzsche nos introduce al "nihilismo" al no existir un punto de referencia común y un fundamento axiológico que sustente la realidad. consideraciones, reconoce el valor de la esencial apertura del lenguaje a nuevos significados, sin que exista ninguna primacía especial de algunos de ellos, y por tanto, ni que pueda existir de modo justificado, ninguna pretensión de verdad30. Otros fenomenólogos, muy por el contrario, consideran forzada la relación entre Heidegger y "posmodernidad", tal es el caso de Jean Grondin31. 2) El análisis de una identidad sin fundamento metafísico: Teicholz (1999) indica que la identidad en la posmodernidad, entendida como estructura psicológica perdurable e coherente, es una idea cuestionable. Guidano (1998a) criticará también la visión de identidad como "núcleo invariable"32. El self ya no es unitario sino 30 Vattimo (1990c) indica que: "Este consumo como sistema de intercambio o lenguaje se basa en la ambigüedad de los signos, que sublima el estatuto de utilidad real de los objetos; de tal manera que no se consume el objeto en sí mismo, según su valor utilitario, sino como signo que nos distingue" (p. 85). 31 Grondin (1996) refiere a ciertos elementos propios de la posmodernidad del siguiente modo: "es la idea de que los fenómenos con los que la filosofía tendría que habérselas, serían datos impregnados ya de interpretación. Hacer hermenéutica sería entonces recordar que los fenómenos mismos dependen ya del orden interpretativo. En otras palabras, Heidegger sostendría que no hay jamás algo así como las cosas mismas', lo que ya de por sí justificaría la entrada en escena de la hermenéutica. Contra esta interpretación, vaga y general, de la intervención hermenéutica de la fenomenología, pienso que se pueden hacer valer dos argumentos. Primeramente, el propio Heidegger no ha dicho jamás –ni en el texto de SZ, ni en los pasajes pertinentes de sus cursos– que tal es el modo como habría de enfocar la relación de fenomenología con la hermenéutica. Uno piensa, más bien, en Nietzsche o en Richard Rorty cuando oye decir que no hay fenómenos, sino tan sólo interpretaciones. En segundo lugar, es importante recordar que Heidegger no opone jamás la hermenéutica a la idea de una legitimación por las cosas mismas. Se lo podrá acusar de ingenuo, pero si Heidegger hace hermenéutica no es porque no haya las cosas mismas, sino, por el contrario, para abrirse acceso a ellas" (p. 81). 32 Guidano (1998a) indica que: "Ya casi nadie lo considera [al self] como entidad en el sentido tradicional racionalista cartesiano, -del cogito ergo sum-, como un self sin contexto, un self impersonal. 7 múltiple (Cf. Deleuze, 1989). La identidad fluctúa y no es un centro de iniciativa aislado sino que está constituido intersubjetivamente en y con una historicidad (Stolorow y Atwood, 1992; Mitchell, 1993). En consecuencia, la posmodernidad propone un cambio epistemológico fundamental, a saber, el radical abandono de la noción sustancialista del racionalismo imperante en la psicología (Balbi, 2004). Esto reconduce las comprensiones psicológicas de la identidad pasando de ser una "entidad" a un "proceso"33. 3) El énfasis en el lenguaje: La posmodernidad propone el giro hacia el lenguaje como medio de comprensión de la identidad personal34 (Maturana, 1988; Sarup, 1993; Shotter, 1993; Echeverría, 1994; Scandroglio, López y San José, 2008). Por ejemplo, para el postestructuralismo, el lenguaje humano es una estructura en sí misma. Esta estructura "no refleja una realidad social pre-existente, sino que la constituye" (Revilla, 2003, p. 10). El texto está por sobre cualquier autor que experimenta su identidad (cf. Derrida, 1967; Ferraris, 2005). El lenguaje constituye el nuevo dominio comprensivo del ser35. Según Este ya no es el self concebido tradicionalmente, como una especie de constructo, de entidad central. Es cierto, hoy esta visión ya no rige más" (p. 1). 33 Esta propuesta se puede entender, al menos, de dos maneras: a) como proceso vincular y ortogenético: Guidano (1998a); Neimeyer y Mahoney (1998); Crittenden (2000); Nardi (2006); b) Como proceso social: Gergen (1992); Crespo (2001); Revilla (2003); Scandroglio, López y San José, (2008), entre otros. 34 Un fuerte exponente de este modo de pesar en L. Wittgenstein, quien plantea la existencia de un isomorfismo entre lenguaje y mundo posible. Al no poder conocerse la esencia de las cosas, solo el lenguaje les daría forma y las limitaría. El mundo solo toma forma en los límites del lenguaje (Cf. Wittgenstein, 1988). 35 Refiriéndose a esto, Arciero (2005) indica lo siguiente: "[En la posmodernidad] la operación de disolución del sujeto se sustenta por la separación entre el significado y la experiencia [el significado] se define por la diferencia con otros significados, dentro de un sistema lingüístico cerrado: O sea, que no tiene ninguna relación con el mundo extralingüístico. [...] La Gergen (1985) la identidad adquiere el sentido desde los dominios discursivos en los cuales participa. Se niega la continuidad de la identidad, dado que no existe una "experiencia de la identidad" que no esté mediada por el lenguaje, y por lo tanto, ésta se fragmenta en cada contexto36. Una de las propuestas más influyentes del giro posmoderno hacia el lenguaje, lo constituye el llamado "movimiento narrativo". Esta tradición se centra en la narración que el sujeto realiza de su existencia en el mundo, por consiguiente, solo podemos acceder a la identidad y al self por medio de éstas. La problemática comienza a gestarse al describir el origen de tales narraciones. Según algunos autores, éstas pueden originarse en la praxis tácita (Gendlin, 1993), experiencia "antepredicativa" (Merleau-Ponty, 1984) o "experiencia pre-narrativa" (Ricoeur 1986a; 1993; Guidano, 1993; Ruiz, 1996; Arciero y Guidano, 2000). Otros autores indican que las narrativas tienen su origen en estructuras lingüísticas anteriores al sujeto (Derrida, 1984; Davies y Harré, 1990; Potter y Wetherell, 1996; Gergen, 2000). Paul Ricoeur (1986a) indica que el dominio del autoconocimiento es permitido por las historias que los sujetos narran sobre ellos mismos y la realidad; Mair (1988, p. 127) señala que: "No conocemos el mundo de otra primacía del lenguaje sobre la experiencia lleva a una concepción del individuo que adquiere un sí mismo cambiante que se adhiere continuamente a las múltiples formas de discurso que componen el universo lingüístico a él pre-existente" (p. 27). 36 Sobre esta idea Cf. Cabrera, 2006. Según Derrida (1984), la identidad quedará situada en las posibilidades lingüísticas en las que participa, y aunque no es continua, señala que: "yo nunca he dicho que el sujeto debe ser omitido [que es lo que observaremos el autores como Gergen (1992)]. Sólo que debe ser deconstruido. Decontruir el sujeto no significa negar su existencia. Hay sujetos, operaciones o efectos de la subjetividad. Este es un hecho incontrovertible [...] Mi trabajo no es entonces destruir al subjeto; es simplemente tratar de resituarlo" (p. 125). 8 manera que por las historias que sobre él se cuentan". Es en este escenario epistemológico general donde las ideas de Guidano y Gergen se enfrentan. 2. La discusión entre las ideas de Guidano y las ideas de Gergen. En primer lugar, hay que advertir que no existe un debate directo entre ambos autores. Es cierto que Guidano criticó abiertamente la visión de identidad de Gergen, pero esto no generó un debate especial entre los autores. Este trabajo presenta, más bien, un estudio de las ideas y argumentos de cada autor. Como primer paso conviene realizar la asimilación crítica de los términos en discusión. Es decir, debemos investigar si ambas ideas tratan acerca de lo mismo. Pues bien, creemos que ambos autores, aunque emplean sus propios términos, hablan del mismo asunto. Creemos esto por los siguientes motivos: 1) Ambos autores emplean el término "self" El propio Guidano parece reconocerlo así en su crítica a Gergen, donde señala lo siguiente: El self es esencialmente un proceso, no es una entidad, no es una estructura, ni un conjunto de estructuras, si no que es el proceso que da a toda esta estructura una configuración de totalidad. Es un proceso cuyo desarrollo consiste en tenerlos siempre de alguna manera unidos. También me refiero a otro aspecto, en el cual de nuevo se concibe un self de tipo acontextual, sin tomar en cuenta el contexto. Me refiero al concepto de self vacío, "the empty self" de Gergen. Gergen tiene un libro muy famoso "El Yo Saturado", que es prácticamente el self actual y disuelto. Es una entidad ilusoria y emblemática de la situación post-moderna. Yo creo, que esto es un modo de acercarse al problema de la transformación de la conciencia contemporánea, sacándola del contexto evolutivo y de desarrollo. Sabemos, que el self, la conciencia en sí misma, era distinta hace cincuenta años. Sabemos que era distinta el siglo pasado, sabemos que era diversa en el medioevo y en el renacimiento. Hoy tenemos una cantidad de datos históricos que nos permiten reconstruir también la historia de la identidad personal (Guidano, 1998a, p.1). 2) Ambos autores se refieren al Yo Guidano sugiere este asunto en el texto recién citado. Podemos confrontar el empleo del término en Gergen de acuerdo con el siguiente texto (1992): Cuando se enterró al Yo como realidad consistente y pasó a ser construido y reconstruido en múltiples contextos, se derivó a la fase del yo relacional, en que el sentido de la autonomía individual dio paso a una realidad de inmersión en la interdependencia, donde las relaciones del yo son las que lo construyen (p. 192). 3) Ambos autores comprenden de modo narrativo la dimensión explícita de la identidad personal Para Gergen, la identidad personal se comprende desde una narrativa que se origina en discursos sociales anteriores al sujeto (Cf. Gergen, 2001; Jubés et. al, 2000). Para Guidano, en cambio, la identidad es un fenómeno fundamentalmente tácito. Sin embargo, al igual que Gergen, esta identidad puede ser narrada de un modo explícito. (Cf. Ruiz, 1996). 2.1. La propuesta socioconstruccionista de Kenneth Gergen 2.1.1. Premisas epistemológicas 9 Kenneth Gergen37 toma distancia de las ideas construccionistas iniciales de Berger y Luckmann (1983), quienes plantean que la realidad es creada en la interacción social por las creencias de los sujetos acerca del mundo. Berger y Luckmann sugieren que la sociedad existiría como realidad objetiva y subjetiva a la vez38, postulando con esto una cuota clara de realismo que no será aceptada por Gergen, para quien el discurso generará la realidad (Bravo, 2002). Gergen establece en el discurso el fundamento que permite el conocimiento de la identidad personal y del mundo39. Para el autor, la narrativa personal no hará referencia a la experiencia del sujeto sino que reproducirá el discurso social al que pertenece. En efecto, según Gergen, en los discursos pre-existentes al sujeto están contenidas todas las identificaciones personales posibles40. La realidad será una construcción social que se elaborará dentro de un marco sociocultural determinado. La realidad es, a fin de cuentas, un conjunto de significados conversacionales que son socialmente compartidos (Collier, Minton y Reynolds, 2000). En este contexto, la identidad personal será una construcción negociada en el seno de las relaciones sociales. 2.1.2. Identidad personal en Gergen 37 Sus principales influencias provienen de la obra de Berger y Luckmann (1983); la teoría de las representaciones sociales de Moscovici (1961); el análisis de discurso (Potter y Wetherell, 1987; Potter, 1996); el planteamiento dialógico de Hermans (1993); y la psicología social crítica de Sampson (1983) y Buss (1979). 38 Para profundizar esta idea en Berger y Luckmann (1983) Cf. Capítulo II ("La sociedad como realidad objetiva") y capítulo III ("La sociedad como realidad subjetiva"). 39 Gergen (1992) señala lo siguiente: "La verdad parece ser una cuestión de perspectivas, y éstas productos de intercambios y consensos sociales, es decir, construidas en los sistemas de comunicación social" (p. 20). 40 Lyddon (1995) señala que la esencia del pensamiento construccionista social es la noción de que las construcciones personales del entendimiento están determinadas por el medio social (Cf. Lyddon, 1995, p. 97). Para Gergen, el self es eminentemente, una construcción conversacional explícita que toma su sentido en la ejecución de un rol. El funcionamiento del sujeto estará determinado por las "pautas culturales" que rigen cada contexto (Gergen, 1992, p. 213). Para el autor, el soporte del self es el lenguaje y la identidad se constituye en su empleo, esto es, en la conversación (Cf. Gergen, 1885; 1992). De este modo, el sujeto identifica un sentido compartido de sí mismo mediante las formas conversacionales (Bravo, 2002). Para Gergen, el self se formaliza en tanto identificación discursiva dentro de un universo lingúistico pre-existente41 (Burr, 1997). De este modo, los discursos sociales reproducidos en las conversaciones cotidianas ofrecen el anclaje para construir un posible yo. Gergen se apoya en algunas tesis de Wittgenstein (1953) para sugerir que los límites del lenguaje constituyen los límites del mundo y del self. Esto es particularmente relevante para el autor en lo que respecta al lenguaje del yo (Gergen, 1992), dado que serán los términos y palabras con que disponemos los que impondrán los límites de nuestra experiencia, de nuestra realidad y, en definitiva, de nuestra identidad42. Es más, Gergen es tajante en afirmar que la narrativa genera la experiencia de ser alguien (identidad), llegando a sugerir, además, lo siguiente: "sin las formas del lenguaje no se 41 Sobre esto, Bravo (2002) indica lo siguiente: "Gergen indicará que en la autoconcepción, no interesará la estructura cognitiva privada y personal del individuo sino más bien su relevancia estará dada por ser un discurso acerca del Yo. El yo será entendido para los construccionistas como una narración que se hace inteligible en el seno de las relaciones vigentes, a saber, un relato de relatos en tanto el sustrato del yo esté situado a partir de relatos de familiares, en los relatos de cuentos de hadas en la infancia, los relatos populares, el relato cotidiano de los sucesos de una mañana cualquiera, los relatos con un amigo, etc." (p. 3). 42 Botella, Meritxell y Herrero (1999) sugieren que desde la postura de Gergen no existiría identidad personal, realidad, ni experiencia si no existen conceptos previos con los que denominar tales fenómenos. 10 podría afirmar que se tenga experiencia alguna" (Gergen, 1992, p. 149). La tesis de "la saturación social del self" (Gergen, 1992) claramente es la que mejor caracteriza la comprensión de la identidad personal para Gergen. Para el autor, la identidad personal se genera por las narrativas explícitas sobre el Yo. La diversidad de contextos y relaciones que la posmodernidad ha permitido genera un superávit de información al tratar de definir el self. Poco a poco la identidad es colonizada por significados externos a ésta. Cuando el Yo no soporta el superávit comienza a saturarse, lo que en definitiva lo fragmenta y éste pasa a ser un "empty self". Para Gergen, la multiplicidad relacional termina escindiendo y aniquilando la identidad. El sujeto es multifrénico, lo que significa: "la escisión del individuo en una multiplicidad de investiduras [conversacionales] de su self" (p. 106). Bravo (2002) comenta sobre este punto lo siguiente: "[El socioconstruccionismo:] descorre al yo como una unidad. Existiría una multiplicidad de selves en tanto distintas relaciones, esto es, las personas pueden autonarrarse de muchas maneras dependiendo del contexto relacional" (p. 5). Para Gergen, el yo es múltiple, dado que surge de las posibles combinaciones narrativas a las que está expuesto. Para Gergen, la identidad se constituye y se comprueba desde las afirmaciones de otros. Esto es, precisamente, lo que posibilita su saturación (Cf. Gergen, 1992). Para el autor, la identidad es una negociación intersubjetiva inestable y contexto-dependiente dado que se encuentra en un estado denominado "interdependencia precaria"43. En efecto, la 43 Gergen (1996) indica que: "Este depender de los demás sitúa al actor en una posición de interdependencia precaria. Ya que del mismo modo que la autointeligibilidad depende de si los demás están de acuerdo sobre su propio lugar en el relato, también la propia identidad de los demás depende de la afirmación que de ellos haga el actor. El que un actor logre sostener una autonarración dada depende fundamentalmente de identidad personal emerge en medio de redes de identidades en relación recíproca44. Para el autor, la estabilidad de la identidad se verá determinada por 2 factores: a) Los flujos de información presentes en las conversaciones y que definen la identidad, y b) La continuidad del acuerdo conversacional del contexto en el que se participa (calidad de la interdependencia precaria). Así, para Gergen en el self habitan múltiples posibilidades incluso muchas veces antagónicas de identificación contextual. La identidad se sumerge y nada en las corrientes siempre cambiantes, concatenadas y disputables de un ser radicalmente relacional (Seoane, 2005). En resumen, podríamos decir que en la propuesta de Gergen la identidad personal adquiere las siguientes características: 1) Construcción social conversacional: La identidad es una construcción conversacional que se articula y toma forma en la identificación de roles específicos dentro de los contextos sociales en los cuales participa. Sobre esto, Crego (2003) señala que: "Lo que somos es, ante todo, el producto de una negociación de narrativas: contamos una historia siendo a la vez sujeto y objeto de la mismaque nuestros interlocutores validarán o no, de forma de se llega a un significado compartido acerca de "quien soy"" (p. 4). El lenguaje es capaz de crear nuevas realidad a partir de la concepción conversacional del la voluntad de los demás de seguir interpretando determinados pasados en relación con él (p. 183). 44 Gergen (1996) indica lo siguiente: "Dado que la identidad de uno puede mantenerse solo durante el espacio de tiempo que los otros interpretan su papel de apoyo, y dado que uno, a su vez, es requerido para interpretar papeles de apoyo en las construcciones de los otros, el momento en el que cualquier participante escoge faltar a su palabra, de hecho amenaza a todo el abanico de construcciones interdependientes. [...] Las identidades, en este sentido, nunca son individuales; cada una está suspendida en una gama de relaciones precariamente situadas" (p.258). 11 sujeto. Por consiguiente, los nuevos términos para referirse a la propia identidad generan nuevas formas de experimentarla. 2) Explícita: La identidad personal para Gergen es una construcción conversacional explícita dado que emerge de la actuación de un rol. No existen procesos tácitos de significación personal del rol. Toda posible identificación viene valorada por la ejecución contextual que el sujeto realiza. La identidad es lo concreto, lo que se evidencia en las conversaciones. 3) Multiplicidad y cambio: El yo saturado de roles y de posibilidades discursivas externas con las cuales el sujeto se compara termina por diluirse en las conversaciones en las que participa. El Yo dispone de diversas alternativas para ser uno u otro "personaje" dentro de la red conversacional. Su identificación es múltiple y cambiante. La identidad del hombre posmoderno para Gergen es multiplicidad y pura alteridad. 2.1.3. Síntesis del pensamiento de Gergen Como síntesis, podemos tres puntos generales: a) La realidad es un conjunto de conversaciones; b) La identidad personal es el subproducto de las conversaciones que circundan al sujeto y tiene tres características, es: 1) un constructo social conversacional; 2) un constructo explícito y; 3) un constructo múltiple y cambiante. c) La identidad personal es una negociación continua e inestable (Cf. Gergen, 1985; Guidano, 1990; 1998a). 2.2. La propuesta posracionalista de Vittorio Guidano 2.2.1. Premisas epistemológicas Vittorio Guidano45 basa parte de su epistemología en el pensamiento de Humberto Maturana (1984; 1988). Una de las ideas del biólogo que particularmente aplicó fue la que indica que: "todo lo que hacemos, lo hacemos desde una emoción" (Maturana, 1989 p. 99). En efecto, para Guidano (2001) el sustrato del conocimiento lo constituye la experiencia emocional46. El modelo posracionalista47 de Guidano 45 Posee múltiples influencias teóricas. Por un lado se apoya en la tradición cognitiva italiana (Guidano y Liotti, 1979); la teoría del vínculo de Bowlby (1988); la Biología del Conocimiento y los sistemas autorreferenciales de Maturana y Varela (1984); la epistemología evolutiva de Campbell (1974); la teoría motora de la mente de Weimer (1977); y la teoría de los sistemas complejos (Prigonine, 1996; Prigonine y Stengers, 1979, entre otros). Por otro lado, Guidano es influido por filósofos como M. Heidegger, M. MerleauPonty, P. Ricouer, G. Gadamer, entre otros pertenecientes a la tradición fenomenológicahermenéutica. 46 Guidano señala que las emociones son nuestro contacto con la realidad y con nosotros mismos (Cf. Guidano, 1997; 2001a). 47 Suele considerarse al posracionalismo como un tipo de "constructivismo". Sin embargo, existen algunas diferencias. 1) Mientras que en el posracionalismo las emociones son el elemento imprescindible en el proceso de construcción de la realidad como: a) formas de conocimiento, b) elementos del proceso de conciencia, y; c) factores fundamentales del proceso de cambio humano (Balbi, 2004), en el constructivismo, por otro lado, se le entrega la preeminencia en la construcción de la realidad dependerá de la semántica del lenguaje. Y mientras que en el constructivismo el énfasis de la investigación está en dilucidar como las personas construyen los significados que otorgan a la realidad, en el posracionalismo se intenta explicar las personas sienten su identidad. 2) Mientras que el constructivismo el énfasis de la investigación está en dilucidar el modo como las personas narrar y construyen los significados que otorgan a la realidad, en el posracionalismo se intenta dilucidar, en primer lugar, como las personas sientes su identidad. 3) Mientras que en el constructivismo no hay un significado primario de los términos, en el posracionalismo este significado se valida a partir de las emociones con las cuales el cliente reconoce ciertos significados y rechaza otros. 4) Mientras que en el constructivismo siempre es posible elaborar otros significados para los términos en uso, en el posracionalismo, en cambio, los significados tienen un soporte tácito y emocional que constituye un limite real a las posibilidades narrativas de las palabras 12 (1987; 1994; 1997, entre otros) sostiene que toda narrativa se fundamenta, en primer término, en la experiencia personal del sujeto. Existe, por tanto, una experiencia básica que no se confunde con los símbolos o palabras que la representan o la narran. Uno de los pilares fundamentales de la gnoseología de Guidano consiste, en efecto, en no confundir la experiencia inmediata con su narración. Para Guidano, el conocimiento humano consiste en ser, básicamente, un proceso tácito, proactivo y emocional de atribución de significados a la experiencia inmediata (Mahoney, 1988; 1991). Por esta razón el autor designa al self como una organización de significado personal (O.S.P.). Expliquemos el significado del término. Lo personal son, en primer lugar, las emociones experimentadas. El significado tiene, por su parte, dos momentos: a) un momento tácito que pertenece, precisamente, a la calidad de la emoción ya mencionada y b) un momento narrativo, que cualifica explícitamente lo sentido. Para Guidano la existencia humana es, entre otras cosas, un constante devenir emocional, por lo que la necesidad narrativa surge como consecuencia del vivir en aquella praxis. Así, por medio de la narrativa, logramos cierta distancia de las experiencias inmediatas y podemos emplear símbolos autorreferenciales que las representan. En otras palabras, explicamos lo que nos acontece. Lo importante en la relación entre experiencia inmediata y explicación es que el significado narrado se corresponda con el significado sentido. porque, por lo demás, tales emociones no son arbitrarias. Sin embargo, hay que admitir que el propio Guidano no pocas veces pareció inscribir su modelo dentro de las vertientes constructivistas (Cf. Guidano, 1995a; 1995b). El análisis de este asunto nos alejaría del objetivo del presente trabajo. A diferencia de la propuesta de Gergen, las narraciones pueden tener el poder de unificar diferentes experiencias. Esto es lo que se conoce como "reconstrucción". Sin embargo no es la narración por sí sola sino la narración que da cuenta de la unidad tácita –sentidadel yo la que es capaz de cumplir esta función. 2.2.2. Identidad personal en Guidano Para Vittorio Guidano toda comprensión humana deviene simbólica, y uno de sus aspectos antropológicos más esenciales es el momento explícito o narrativo48. La narración siempre es permitida por la sensación que la produce y que le da sustento. Por esto, la identidad es, en primer lugar un fenómeno tácito, que luego, mediante la simbolización narrativa deviene explícita. La identidad para Guidano consiste en ser, entonces, un self system formado por, entre otros sistemas, el sistema emocional, el cognitivo, el motor, el verbal, etc. La función del self system es la de percibirse a sí mismo y al entorno como un mundo familiar y estable49 (Guidano, 1998b). A la 48 Para Guidano -a diferencia de la propuesta de Gergenexisten dos tipos de simbolización de la experiencia: a) la forma pre-verbal (tácita) que se expresa por medio de, -entre otros recursos-, por medio de: la sintomatología, los rituales, rumiaciones, juegos, las expresiones artísticas tales como la música, la danza, la plástica, etc.; y b) la forma verbal, que se expresa en palabras y que permite la narración explícita del sí mismo. 49 Guidano (1998b) señala lo siguiente: "La construcción de un sentido del sí mismo, es decir, de una manera de sentirse para con el entorno empieza ya, en los primeros meses de vida y corresponde a reunir, a armar esquemas emotivos de patrones recurrentes de experiencia inmediata. Esto es lo que hace que, en los primeros meses de vida, uno se perciba a sí mismo y al entorno como un mundo estable y familiar. El input sensorial, y esto lo sabemos gracias a los estudios neurofisiológicos y neurobiológicos, de por sí es siempre nuevo, pero la mente nunca se comporta como si fuera nuevo. Nos comportamos como si todo lo que nos rodea fuera normal, estable, conocido, familiar, pero cada percepción es única y nueva. Entonces se desarrolla desde un principio, diríamos, por una parte esta cara de la medalla, la continuidad, como la sensibilidad a lo que es canónico, es decir, a lo que nos 13 base del funcionamiento de mundo hay dos sensibilidades tácitas: La sensibilidad hacia lo canónico o habitual (sameness o mismidad) y la sensibilidad hacia lo diverso (selfhood o ipseidad). Es decir, por un lado la persona es sensible a las experiencias familiares (sameness) y por otro lado es sensible a las experiencias de carácter excepcional (selfhood). Ambas modalidades constituyen los procesos tácitos del Yo que fundamentan la particular forma de sentirse y experimentar el sí mismo -esto es, la identidad personaly sus posibilidades narrativas. El sameness es la "permanencia de Mí mismo" en la multiplicidad del acontecer de mi praxis (Naranjo, 2008). A lo largo de la vida, esta modalidad privada y anónima se complejiza ortogenéticamente50. Para Guidano, la identidad en esta sensibilidad es esa forma de percibirse a uno mismo y a la realidad, sin necesidad de tener que pensar51. Finalmente, la mismidad se constituye como el dominio emotivo originario de las narraciones de las vivencias52. Dicho de otro modo, en esta sensibilidad el yo ejecuta su praxis. Guidano (1998b) señala: El sentido de continuidad, del "sameness", es esencialmente emotivo, entonces es algo que se siente, no es necesario pensar en ello, esto no significa es familiar, y por otro lado también una atención hacia lo que no es ordinario, hacia lo excepcional" (p. 4). 50 Ya desde los veinte meses de vida un niño tiene sentido de lo canónico, lo que le permite adherirse a la estabilidad y familiaridad de lo que conoce, rechazando así, lo que no le es familiar (Cf. Bruner, 1984; 1986; 1991) 51 Arciero (2005), al referirse al sameness, pone de relieve este aspecto sentido: "Resulta casi una carga no poder evitar ser uno mismo" (p. 51). 52 Para Guidano, los procesos autorrefenciales de ordenamiento de la experiencia se articulan evolutivamente y se ven determinados por el patrón vincular temprano (pattern) que el sujeto desarrolla con sus cuidadores en la niñez52 (apego) (Bowlby, 1973; 1988; Ainsworth, 1989). Las regularidades afectivas derivadas de tal relación, fundamentan: la mismidad; el sentido de coherencia y continuidad; y los procesos tácitos afectivos del Yo, los cuales permiten las posteriores narraciones de la identidad experimentada. que luego no lo vamos a pensar, significa que del sentido de continuidad que advertimos de manera continuada, posteriormente vamos desarrollando teorías y explicaciones, las buscamos en las variables de nuestra historia pasada, pero es algo que sobre todo sentimos, es sobre todo a nivel emocional (p. 6). Por otra parte, el selfhood es la "constancia de mí mismo", la sensibilidad que suma la multiplicidad del "quien" momento a momento. En esta sensibilidad el yo permite integrar los momentos en una trama narrativa coherente según las regularidades fundamentales del sameness. Aunque la narración sólo es una especie del género de la simbolización tampoco es cualquier especie. En cualquier la narración es la que, para Guidano, cumple la función más potente en la reordenación de las coherencias del sameness, razón por la cual el autor se refiere al selfhood precisamente como self que "narra" la experiencia. Guidano (1998b), en efecto, concluye lo siguiente: El self narrador es el self que trata de compactar la experiencia, es el que se ve desde afuera y que actúa directamente [...] mientras que el self protagonista, el que está actuando, el que actúa, es el que nos da más que el otro, el sentido de diversidad, de extrañeza, de discrepancia respecto a la continuidad que mantenemos y este es un trabajo continuo, actuar en primera persona sintiéndonos protagonistas y también al contarnos, compactar, reordenar, reorganizar o asimilar la discrepancia que hemos vivido, en la que nos parece ser una continuidad, en la que nos reconocemos dentro de esa continuidad. Entonces, este transformarnos para pasar del self protagonista a pasar a ser self narrador es lo que nos da coherencia, es lo que le da un orden a nuestra historia de vida, y de esta manera con la intervención del self narrador sobre el self protagonista, la historia de vida se convierte en una historia dotada de una univocidad (de casi una necesidad). Es la intervención del self narrador que transforma todo lo que es casual en destino, el que hace que se transforme en 14 destino. Nada queda afuera de esto, nada permanece afuera (p. 7). Para Guidano, la identidad es un proceso sistémico que emerge en la relación entre experimentar y explicar, entre el proceso dialéctico tácito del self system de traducir lo excepcional a lo canónico. Por esto, Guidano afirma que: "la comprensión es inseparable de la experiencia humana y en consecuencia, existir significa literalmente conocer" (Guidano, 1994, p.18). La identidad constituye, entonces, un proceso autoorganizado en continua articulación a lo largo de la vida y que adquiere, con el tiempo, un sentido unitario en su desarrollo ortogenético53 (Balbi, 1994; Ferrer y Skoknic, 1998; Guidano, 1987; 1994). La función tácita de la identidad es esencial para la sobrevivencia; uno no podría hacerlo si para comprender se viese obligado a explicarse narrativamente todo lo que es y todo lo que le acontece. El sameness y el selfhood constituyen la experiencia privada y tácita del self, lo que Guidano denominó "Yo", pertenecientes a la esfera pre-verbal. La narración del yo es llamada por el autor "Mí". Existe, por tanto, un "Mí" que simboliza la actuación del "Yo". En este continuo proceso de traducir la experiencia en conocimiento personal se esgrimen simbolizaciones con diversos grados de complejidad, las últimas de las cuales son, precisamente, las explicaciones. El surgimiento del lenguaje en los humanos específicamente del lenguaje temático-, posibilitará el ordenamiento de los acontecimientos en forma de episodios narrados secuencializadamente (Guidano, 2001a). Esto entrega continuidad temporal a la experiencia emotiva y constituirá lo que 53 Guidano (1987) sostiene que: "[La identidad] puede describirse como un sistema de conocimiento cuyo desarrollo a través de la vida está regulado por el principio de progresión ortogenética; esto significa que el sistema procede hacia niveles más integrados y complejos de orden estructural" (p.10). Guidano llama: "estructura narrativa [explícita] de la experiencia humana" (Guidano, 2001a; Arciero y Guidano, 2000). El lenguaje estructurará la experiencia emocional permitiendo la articulación de la experiencia en una "trama narrativa" con características temporales54. Por esto, para Guidano, la identidad en su aspecto explícito es una "identidad narrativa". Según el autor, tal fenómeno solo se puede desprender de la capacidad del self system de experimentarse a sí-mismo como sujeto (The experiencing "I"; "Yo") y como objeto (The appraising; "Mí") (Habermas, 1979; Kegan, 1982; Guidano, 1987; 1994; 2001b). Observamos la relación de dependencia entre lo tácito y lo explícito en la compresión de la identidad personal. Sobre esto, Guidano (1994) señala lo siguiente: La interdependencia entre experiencia y explicación que subyace en la autocomprensión tiene el correlato de un proceso incesante de circularidad entre experiencia inmediata de uno mismo (el "yo" que actúa y experimenta) y el sentido de sí-mismo que emerge como resultado de autorreferirse de forma abstracta a la experiencia en curso ("Mí") [...] El sí mismo como sujeto ("Yo") y como objeto ("Mí") aparecen por lo tanto como dimensiones irreductibles de una dinámica de la mismidad cuya direccionalidad depende del devenir de nuestra experiencial vital (p. 20). La reorganización de la experiencia en una trama narrativa es un proceso abierto que se desarrolla durante toda la vida, e intenta buscar constantemente una verdad narrativa que permita mantener un sentido de continuidad y coherencia entre el protagonista de la propia historia personal (Yo) y el 54 Podemos evidenciar una clara relación entre esta idea y el pensamiento de M. Merleau-Ponty (1984), quien afirma lo siguiente: "Todas nuestras experiencias, en cuanto que son nuestras, se disponen según un antes y un después, porque la temporalidad, en lenguaje kantiano, es la forma del sentido íntimo, y el carácter más general de los hechos psíquicos " (p. 418). 15 narrador (Mi) (Guidano, 1994; 2001a). Podemos observar que Guidano pone énfasis en la comprensión en los procesos tácitos individuales que posibilitan la narrativa de la identidad. Esto no significa en lo absoluto que lo explícito esté de más o que no añada nada nuevo a la comprensión del fenómeno. El self tiene, para Guidano, un componente constitutivo radical que es tácito, pero que tiene un complemento que es explícito y que corresponde a las narraciones. Lo individual y privado está representando en las dos sensibilidades anteriormente descritas, las que constituyen el "Yo" que actúa" y el "Mí", en su parte tácita, que simboliza la experiencia y en su parte explícita que la narra. La inserción de lo social en el fenómeno de la identidad personal se manifiesta en la apertura que tiene el selfhood a nuevos significados para la experiencia privada que intenta integrar. El selfhood por consiguiente tiene un aspecto privado y uno social. En su aspecto social, el selfhood es capaz de integrar significados provenientes de narraciones externas. La identidad para Guidano encuentra su comprobación en lo social, dado que el self system emplea experiencias simbolizadas por otras personas para dilucidar aspectos confusos de la propia experiencia. Es decir, cada uno se siente a sí, sin embargo, este "yo" se despliega a través de un estilo que dice directa relación con el modo como cada cual se experimenta a sí mismo en las relaciones interpersonales. Este estilo es, además, un modo de relacionarse con uno mismo y es modulado según el estilo afectivo temprano que cada cual haya tenido de niño con sus figuras parentales55 (patterns de apego.). Tal 55 Guidano afirma que la búsqueda humana de significado debe considerarse como el desarrollo de una comprensión proactiva influida por la condición intersubjetiva ineludible del ser humano (relaciones cuidadores-bebés, lazos sociales, cohesión de grupo, interacción temprana se inicia con la sincronía fisiológica entre bebé y cuidador56 (Bowlby, 1988; Besoain y Santelices, 2009), y fija las regularidades emotivas recurrentes para el niño, lo que, retroalimentado en la relación, constituye el dominio emotivo originario de las narraciones. De este modo, la relación vincular activa predominante configura ciertos dominios emotivos que tienden a hacerse recurrentes y estructuran una manera prototípica (canónica/sameness) de, además, sentirse con el mundo y con los otros57. Esto constituye el origen sociointeraccional del sentido de continuidad y coherencia del self system58. La inserción de lo social en lo privado es permitida, entonces, por la apertura del selfhood, que pone la experiencia personal a etc.), que definirá una serie de emociones prototípicas (apego, amor, protección, duelo, etc.), que permiten compartir significados en la dimensión lingüística (Cf. Guidano, 1994). 56 Guidano (1994) señala lo siguiente: "Ya nadie discute que, desde las primeras fases del desarrollo, el niño está dotado de sentimientos básicos, así como de la capacidad básica para comunicarlos [...] La propensión a modular las contingencias ambientales con reacciones emotivas expresa muy bien la aptitud del niño para sintonizar con otros, y en particular, con otros seres significativos como sus cuidadores" (p. 32). 57 Guidano (1994) señala lo siguiente: "La interdependencia y reciprocidad de los ritmos psicofisiológicos entre el niño y su cuidador parece ser intrínsecamente codependientes, y coexistir con la actividad del niño en el ordenamiento de la percepción del sí mismo y del mundo desde el primer momento (p. 33) 58 Guidano distingue cuatro O.S.P. sobre la base de los cuatro estilos afectivos de apego descritos por Bowlby (1974; 1988). Éstas son: O.S.P. obsesiva (apego ambivalente), O.S.P. depresiva (apego evitante), O.S.P. dápica (apego ambiguo), y finalmente, O.S.P fóbica (apego ansioso). Para una mayor revisión, Cf. Guidano (2001a,b). Arciero (2005), además distingue dos modos de vincularse con la realidad social: Las dos primeras O.S.P. mencionadas corresponden a un estilo inward, con un locus de control interno, autorreferidos y vigilantes de la propia experiencia corporal como principal gatillante emotivo, y; 2) Un estilo outward, al cual pertenecen las últimas dos O.S.P., con un locus de control externo y, predominantemente, vigilantes de la evaluación externa. Para una mayor revisión (Cf. Arciero ;2005). 16 la luz de las experiencias semejantes de otros por medio de símbolos compartidos, entre los que está el lenguaje. Las narraciones efectivamente pueden aportar información acerca de los procesos tácitos del self, y lo hacen efectivamente porque representan las experiencias de otras personas que podrían, eventualmente, aportar comprensión acerca de la propia experiencia. Las narraciones son pues, significativas, porque recogen información de mí mismo que tiene algún parecido con las experiencias de otros 59. El "Yo" llega a reconocerse como un "Mí" a través de la "imagen reflejada" proporcionada por los otros, lo que es permitido por la dimensión intersubjetiva de la experiencia humana60. Finalmente, podemos observar que, para Guidano, la identidad personal ocurre en dos niveles simultáneos: 1) El nivel de la experiencia inmediata (tácito), y; 2) El nivel 59 Según varios autores, el fenómeno de "contrastecomprobación" intersubjetivo de la experiencia personal se inicia desde el nacimiento de los bebés en su relación de apego con sus cuidadores, lo que comienza a desarrollar sus capacidades mentalistas básicas para la atribución de intenciones al cuidador. Se fijan ciertas regularidades emotivas en la retroalimentación bebécuidador, por lo que el niño comienza a experimentar un estado más o menos recurrente de sentirse en la relación para con el otro y para consigo mismo. Esta situación encuentra su fundamento biológico, entre otros, en las redes neuronales compuestas por las "neuronas espejo". Para profundizar el fundamento biológico de la propuesta: Cf. Ainsworth (1989); Bowlby (1988); Gojman de Millán y Milán (2007); Rizzolatti y Sinaglia (2007); Naranjo (2008) y Zagmutt (2008). 60 Guidano (1994) señala que: "La aptitud acrecentada para la sintonía sincrónica con las intenciones ajenas mediante interacciones lingüísticas va acompañada por un mayor ordenamiento de los ritmos psicofisiológicos que prestan continuidad a la experiencia inmediata ("Yo"). Junto a esto, la capacidad para verse desde las perspectivas ajenas se ve acrecentada por las aptitudes de abstracción lingüística, lo que un sentido reconocible sobre la percepción de la propio continuidad e igualdad ("Mí"). Esta capacidad, separada de la inmediatez del contexto interaccional, se convierte en un instrumento esencial para reordenar la experiencia inmediata y estabilizar la coherencia interna" (p. 26). simbólico, una de cuya funciones explícitas – especialmente estudiada por Guidano es el lenguaje narrativo. Existen dos modalidades de reorganizar la experiencia tácita: los símbolos pre-verbales y los verbales o narraciones explícitas61. En resumen, podríamos decir que en la propuesta de Guidano la identidad personal adquiere las siguientes características: 1) Sistema canónico-novedoso. La identidad personal consiste en ser un self system en base a dos sensibilidades: sameness (sensibilidad a lo canónico) y selfhood (sensibilidad a lo nuevo). 2) Sistema tácito-explícito: La identidad ocurre en dos niveles temporalmente simultáneos. El nivel de la experiencia inmediata ("Yo" que actúa y experimenta) y el nivel de la simbolización del yo, una de cuyas funciones –la explicaciónes la preferentemente empleada por Guidano en la moviola. En efecto, la identidad se origina a partir de la existencia de regularidades emotivas en la relación vincular con los cuidadores en edades tempranas, pero la simbolización –muy especialmente la narración explicativapermite reorganizar e imprimir temporalidad a la experiencia siempre constante de sentirse un alguien en el mundo en relación a otros. (Guidano, 1987; 1994; Arciero y Guidano, 2000). 2.2.4. Síntesis del pensamiento general de Guidano En síntesis, podemos afirmar lo siguiente: a) La realidad es una red de procesos 61 Guidano emplea cuatro clases de narraciones en la técnica de la moviola (su principal técnica psicoterapéutica). La descripción temporalizada y contextualizada de los eventos (panning); la descripción de la emoción tal como se siente (zoom in); la caracterización o calificación de la imagen de sí mismo (zoom out) y, finalmente, la explicación que vincula emociones, conductas y palabras con el estilo emocional (reformulación). 17 pluridimensionales articulados simultáneamente en distintos niveles de interacción (Guidano, 1994). b) El conocimiento obedece a un continuo ordenamiento autorreferencial de las perturbaciones emocionales de la praxis del sujeto. c) La identidad se puede entender desde varios sistemas, a saber: 1) Sistema canónico-novedoso, y; 2) Sistema tácitoexplícito. 3. Resumen del problema y análisis crítico Al comparar las ideas de Guidano y Gergen se advierte una discusión epistemológica y gnoseológica fundamental que subyace en sus comprensiones de la identidad personal. Para Guidano existe una organización tácita que es sentida emotivamente en cada persona y a partir de la cual se estructuran las narraciones que la hacen comprensible explícitamente (Cf. Guidano, 2001a; Arciero y Guidano, 2000). En cambio, para Gergen no existe un self, sino el efecto del entrecruzamiento de narraciones ajenas (Gergen, 1985; 1992). En efecto, para este autor, la identidad está absolutamente colonizada por significados sociales externos. La disputa en torno a la identidad entre ambos autores es, por lo tanto, una discusión en torno al origen y la naturaleza del significado del yo, de las narraciones y de la realidad. En síntesis, la cuestión en la discusión es entender si la identidad personal es un fenómeno experimentado (Guidano, 1998a) o una construcción conversacional (Gergen, 1992). 3.1. Reduccionismo en la función narrativa del Self Aunque el aporte de Gergen y otros autores tales como Morín (2000) o Luhmann (1993), entre otros62, ha sido fundamentales para poner de relieve el valioso aporte de la red de significados sociales en la comprensión del self63, es necesario señalar que también ha operado en Gergen una suerte de injustificada reducción en la comprensión del self; la realidad y en otros varios niveles de análisis. La propuesta de Gergen tiende reducir las narraciones de la identidad a estilos conversacionales. Su supuesto es que toda narración describe aspectos observables de una conversación. Sin embargo, el aspecto conversacional –argumenta Guidanoes el punto de llegada en la narración del Yo, no un punto de partida. Dicho en otras palabras, uno arriba a una narración compartida y, entonces, la conversación se transforma en un evento individual y social a la vez. Contrastando con Gergen, Guidano se detiene en un momento previo al empleo conversacional del lenguaje. Este momento es el siguiente: el de la sensación del Yo susceptible de ser narrada. Guidano señala que, en primer término, el modo de conversar de una persona depende del tipo de coherencia emotiva y de continuidad de vida que ha puesto en su contexto de pertenencia (Guidano, 1998). Si no fuese de este modo ¿Cómo podríamos explicar, por ejemplo, aquellas situaciones donde experimentamos algo, pero no logramos ponerlo en palabras que los demás logren entender? En tales situaciones, las palabras no logran definir la experiencia, pero no por ello la experiencia deja de ser experimentada. Sobre esto, Arciero (en Arciero, 2009), comparte la opinión de Paul Ricoeur, al señalar que: "la conversación no existe como un fin en sí, para su propia gloria sino que en toda su forma busca llevar al lenguaje una 63 Tal es el caso de J. Linares (1996; 2006, entre otras), quien desde la teoría sistémica, indica claramente que el concepto de identidad personal fusiona la experiencia individual con el mundo de lo relacional, en lugar de oponerlos como lo sugiere Gergen. Sobre esto, Linares (2006) indica que: "La narrativa constituye algo así como el tejido conectivo de la personalidad. Pero la narrativa en bruto no permite el desarrollo de una estructura. Para ello necesita un principio organizador o jerárquico, el órgano rector, el núcleo duro, el punto de anclaje o como lo queramos llamar: es la identidad" (p.1). 18 experiencia, un modo de vivir en le mundo, que precede y requiere de ser dicho" (p. 8). 3.2. Reduccionismo de la historia personal Gergen reduce la historia personal a la biografía personal, es decir, reduce la historia experimentada a la mera historia narrada. Esto tiene como consecuencias tres problemas: a) Existen tantas identidades como biografías. Pero con esto no se logra explicar que vincula una biografía con otra; b) Luego, si el sentido temporal del Yo se manifiesta en sus narraciones, la identidad se fragmenta. Sin embargo, hay algunos detalles que Gergen no advierte: 1) Cada sujeto posee elementos de su vida que nunca han sido incorporados a su autobiografía, permaneciendo tácitos, pero que posteriormente puede, efectivamente, aflorar. Sería imposible para el sistema atencional humano integrar todos los elementos del campo perceptivo64; 2) Gergen no toma en cuenta el sentido pre-temporal del self, que es el que permite que una narración temporal sea aceptada como biográfica, por ejemplo: que las edades tempranas tienen que ver con el pasado y la vejez con el futuro; que hay sensaciones actuales presentes y hay fantasías en el futuro y recuerdos en el pasado, etc65. Es este sentido pre-temporal del self el que permite organizar y articular la narración misma de la identidad personal, incluso, en la ejecución del un rol, como sugiere Gergen. 3.3. Construcción del Yo a partir de un Yo vacío 64 Bruner (1986) plantea lo siguiente: "La experiencia vital es más rica que el discurso, las estructuras narrativas organizan la experiencia y le dan sentido, pero siempre hay sentimientos y experiencias vividas que el relato dominante no puede abarcar" (p. 143). 65 Guidano (1998) indica que: "El hecho de que puedan surgir recuerdos autobiográficos requiere el prerrequisito de la existencia de un sentido [pretemporal] del self" (p. 6); Lo mismo opina Ricouer (1986a; 1993) al referir que el fundamento de la narrativa, es precisamente, pre-verbal. Gergen indica que el self en la actualidad es, entre otras cosas, un self saturado de narraciones externas al sujeto. Coherentemente con su supuesto, Gergen indica que el superávit informacional al que está expuesto el sujeto termina saturándolo, fragmentando y diluyéndolo. Finalmente, el self deja de existir como tal (empty self). Dicho en términos del autor: "un yo realmente saturado, deja de ser un Yo" (Gergen, 1992, p. 26). Esta posición es problemática en los siguientes puntos: 1) Tal como Guidano (1998) explica, si la identidad y el self se diluyen y dejan de existir, entonces resulta imposible explicar su desarrollo66. Según diversos autores (Guidano, 1994; Quiñones, 1998; Ibáñez, 2005) una explicación como la de Gergen se torna inconcebible al observar el proceso de progresión ortogenética y ontogenética de los organismos humanos, los cuales van accediendo a niveles más integrados y complejos en su orden estructural psíquico y biológico67. Guidano concluye, en el mismo sentido que los autores anteriores, que lo observable en el desarrollo humano es una integración que aumenta con los años, generando una coherencia interna que regula toda la actividad y la conducta del sujeto (Guidano, 2000). Por lo tanto, Gergen se queda sin respuesta al intentar explicar la psicología del desarrollo de su propuesta de self. 2) A pesar del énfasis que Gergen coloca en la historicidad o biografía personal como elemento constitutivo del Yo y de la identidad personal, el propio autor sacrifica esta biografía en favor del rol presente que 66 Una explicación del desarrollo coherente con el supuesto conversacional describiría al self como un "recipiente", que desde su niñez se va llenando de conversaciones que lo definen, hasta que en etapas más avanzadas termina por saturarse por el superávit de información que permiten los actuales avances tecnológicos (Cf. Gergen, 1992; Guidano, 1998a). 67 Los orígenes de esta propuesta están representados en autores como: Werner (1957), Prigogine y Stengers (1984) y Prigogine (1996), entre otros. 19 ejecuta el sujeto; Mucho más importante que lo que he narrado acerca de mí mismo, es el rol que ejerzo aquí y ahora. Para Gergen, toma relevancia el estado actual de la identidad personal, por sobre el proceso evolutivo personal que le da consistencia a la manera personal de ser del sujeto. Sobre esto, Guidano (1998) señala que el concepto de empty self adscribe una clara tendencia a comprender la identidad personal de manera descontextualizada. El concepto de Gergen se torna cuestionable al no tomar en cuenta los aspectos histórico-evolutivos del self68. En consecuencia, en la propuesta de Gergen, lo transeccional se impone a lo autobiográfico como caracterización de la historia personal. 3) Guidano critica a Gergen y Máscolo (1994; 1998; 2002) entre otros, que crean en una progresión ontogenética, a pesar de haber postulado un Yo fragmentado. En efecto: ¿Cómo es que algo fragmentado se desarrolla en una creciente integración sin dejar de estar fragmentado?, ¿Se puede explicar el desarrollo integrativo de la fragmentación? 4) Otra observación en la línea del punto anterior es que autores como Gergen y Máscolo indican que el self deja de existir, aunque reconocen su desarrollo integrativo. Con esto se cae en la siguiente contradicción: Que algo que no existe -el self-, se desarrolle. En efecto, si Máscolo y Gergen señalan que la mente y la identidad misma no son nada más que fraccionamiento, y a su vez, reconocen que el desarrollo ocurre en una dirección creciente de integración: ¿Cómo se explica el desarrollo crecientemente integrativo de un self que es nada?, ¿cómo se explica el desarrollo creciente de un self que 68 Guidano (1998a) indica: "Me refiero al concepto de self vacío, 'the empty self'', de Gergen. Gergen tiene un libro muy famoso El Yo Saturado, que es prácticamente el self actual y disuelto. Es una entidad ilusoria y emblemática de la situación post-moderna. Yo creo, que esto es un modo de acercarse al problema de la transformación de la conciencia contemporánea, sacándola del contexto evolutivo y de desarrollo" (p. 1). no existe?, ¿Acaso se puede explicar el desarrollo integrativo de la nada?, ¿se puede explicar el desarrollo de la "no existencia"? Luego, la tesis del empty self se vuelve difusa generando la siguiente pregunta: ¿el self deja de existir o existe, pero fragmentado? Ambas modalidades son recurrentemente enunciadas por Gergen, pero éste no es claro al advertir en que momento un self es fragmentado, o cuando el self fragmentado deja de existir. Gergen tampoco explica porque el self fragmentado deja de existir, ni por qué un Yo saturado deja de ser un Yo. 5) Gergen no es claro al referirse a la vaciedad del empty self, ni al explicar en qué momento un self que solamente es saturado se transforma en un empty self. Para el autor, el self deja de existir, es decir, se hace nada. Pero si el self fuese vacío no habría conversaciones, fragmentaciones, palabras, ni nada posible de ser narrado. Pensemos, por lo demás, en las siguientes dificultades: si el self es nada ¿es una nada narrable? ¿Esta nada se transforma en algo al ser narrada? En efecto, Gergen no repara en un detalle, a saber: que toda narración es narración de algo. Si el self es empty self, no existe ni soporte experiencial ni social que fundamente la narración de una identidad personal. 6) A pesar de que Gergen omite una y otra vez la experiencia como soporte de la narración, existen algunos momentos en los cuales la experiencia del sujeto pareciera ser importante. Por ejemplo, en ciertas experiencias de vacío. Sin embargo, el autor no las pondera apropiadamente e incluso parece confundir ciertas experiencias de vacío, con un vacío real del self y de la misma identidad personal. Esto puede ser refutado, al pensar en los siguientes ejemplos: a) La continuidad del self de las personas que retoman su vida familiar después de haber despertado de un coma profundo o nuestra propia continuidad cuando despertamos cada mañana; b) La continuidad del self de monjes que meditan y que, según afirman, han anonadado su conciencia en ciertos 20 momentos de trance. En cada uno de estos casos parecen existir, por decirlo de algún modo, experiencias de vacío más que vacíos del self, lo cual se demuestra porque la continuidad es retomada una vez que estos episodios concluyen. Podemos ver, por lo tanto, que a pesar de vivir vacíos de experiencia, ello no implica la fragmentación del self de los sujetos que experimentaron tales vacíos. 3.4. Gergen comprende la narración del self omitiendo la experiencia del self Para el autor la compresión de la identidad personal se configura exclusivamente en su narración. En efecto, Gergen (1992) afirma lo siguiente: "sin las formas del lenguaje no se podría afirmar que se tenga experiencia alguna" (p. 149). Efectivamente, podemos estar de acuerdo en que sin palabras, la experiencia no se podría "afirmar" o "decir", lo cual no significa que esta experiencia –por ejemplo, la experiencia del Yono exista. Por lo demás, tampoco podemos excluir que la experiencia del sí mismo pueda ser simbolizada mediante otros medios distintos a las formas habituales del lenguaje verbal. 3.5. Gergen no explica la experiencia en las etapas pre-verbales infantiles Gracias a los aportes de la psicología del desarrollo podemos saber que solamente hacia el primer año de vida los bebés comienzan a articular palabras con el fin de referirse a los objetos 69(Gleitman y Newport, 1995; Newport y Aslin; 2000; Zorzi, 2000; Goldin-Meadow, 2006). Antes de esto la relación con el entorno se enfoca principalmente en la sintonía de los ritmos fisiológicos entre el bebé y su cuidador (Bowlby, 1988; Guidano, 1994, entre otros). 69 Según Bruner (1986) los bebés comienzan a participar en las conversaciones con sus cuidadores, por medio de la etapa del "balbuceo". El surgimiento de las primeras palabras coincide en la mayoría de los casos con el inicio de la marcha, lo que asegura un nivel de coordinación psicomotor básico que posibilita la interacción verbal (Cf. Gleitman y Newport, 1995.). Si Gergen está en lo cierto, habría que concluir, entonces, que los bebés no poseen experiencia, ni experiencia de ser sí mismos antes de poder articular palabras, antes de poder "narrar". Sin embargo, esto genera algunos problemas difíciles de responder, tales como: ¿los bebes no se sienten a sí mismos?; ¿cómo se explica el fenómeno del llanto activado por experiencias puramente fisiológicas (no mediadas por palabras)?70, ¿Acaso se niega la existencia de tal experiencia pre-verbal?; ¿cómo se explican las interrelaciones que se generan entre madres y bebés que están por nacer? 71 3.6. Gergen no logra explicar que la experiencia sea propia El autor no parece valorar la importancia de sentirse siendo quien se es; alguien, por lo demás, distinto a otros72. Si bien la narración del self puede variar en diferentes contextos – lo que ineludiblemente ocurreesto no implica que el self se fragmente. En efecto, la experiencia de ser un Yo en los diversos contextos es sólo mía y es reconocible tácitamente, emocionalmente y preverbalmente por mí. Es posible, incluso, reconocer diversas narraciones y diversos contextos acerca de uno mismo; pero uno mismo es quien las reconoce. La experiencia de sentirse a sí mismo como el "quien" en los diversos contextos es continua. Es más, cuando las narrativas son divergentes, uno mismo es quien puede sentirse confundido, precisamente, porque uno mismo no deja de sentirse. Williams James denominó self social 70 Una buena introducción a la comprensión de las experiencias activantes del llanto se evidencia en el estudio realizado por Bell y Ainsworth (1972). 71 Las experiencias en el bebé en etapa de gestación posibilitan la interacción con su madre sin articulación alguna de palabras. Guidano (1994) señala que hay suficientes datos que indican que existe un "aprendizaje intrauterino" como resultado de la participación activa en la regulación de los ritmos fisiológicos entre madre e hijo. Para revisar los estudios clásicos Cf. Iannirubeto y Tajani, 1981; Milani Comparetti, 1981; Para una comprensión actualizada, revisar: Feldman, 2005. 72 Jubés et al. (2000) indica que mi experiencia de ser yo, es idéntica a sí misma y distinta de la de los demás. 21 a esta capacidad del self de variar su actuación sin perder su continuidad identitaria (Cf. James, 1890/1980). 3.7. Gergen no considera que lo tácito participa en la elección de las narraciones del Yo Cuando se conversa o se narra algo, uno elige -con más o menos cuidadolas palabras que utiliza. Si las narraciones se escogieran simplemente desde la base de narraciones anteriores, -como parece sugerir Gergenel problema remitiría al infinito (reducción al infinito). Es decir, no hay, ni son necesarias, previas evaluaciones explícitas de las palabras que vamos a emplear. Esto solo ocurre en contextos muy limitados, por ejemplo, en discursos públicos, discursos formales, etc., pero no en la vida habitual. Guidano postula que el empleo de las palabras obedece a la función de expresar emociones de base (la sensación del sí mismo), las cuales, a su vez, son interpretaciones tácitas de uno mismo y de la realidad. Según Gendlin (1993) y Alemany (2007) la narrativa personal es una actividad situada y se ve determinada por elementos implícitos, tales como, el estado de animo, la experiencia, el interés, la practica, el cuerpo, los acontecimientos, las situaciones y el lugar que se ocupa en el mundo. Las sensaciones del Yo precondicionan la elección de los símbolos que buscan definir la propia identidad73. Estas sensaciones del Yo no pueden ser arbitrarias porque no son voluntarias. Por ejemplo, los términos "Don Felipe" y "Felipito" pueden tener como referencia a la misma persona, sin embargo, 73 Esto se torna evidente en el caso de la sensación. No es lo mismo la palabra "cuerpo" (símbolo) a la "sensación del cuerpo". Se torna cuestionable la propuesta de Gergen, la cual implica concebir el cuerpo como encerrado en una burbuja esperando ser atrapado por las palabras para que entonces se lo pueda sentir. Sin embargo, el cuerpo es y se manifiesta tácitamente y de un modo sensible. No es lo mismo la sensación del cuerpo, que la narración de éste. La primera no solo es diferente a las palabras que lo definen sino que también es anterior, posibilita su narrativa. la sensación en el individuo determinará la selección de las palabras que se ocuparán en contextos diferentes para referirse a sí mismo de modo pertinente74. 3.8. Gergen no explica la apropiación de las narraciones foráneas El autor supone que la experiencia de ser alguien surge en las conversaciones. Sin embargo, esto no explica el modo concreto como cada sujeto se apropia de tales narraciones. Se desconoce si uno las elige, las acepta, se siente obligado a tomarlas para sí, es inducido, las introyecta mecánicamente, etc. Lo mismo cabe decir, en realidad, acerca de toda preferencia narrativa o explicativa acerca del Yo. Gergen no indica el proceso mediante el cual se produce la apropiación significativa de la narración de mi Yo. El autor solo indica que las narrativas son foráneas, pero no especifica como ellas pasan a ser "mías". Al omitir los procesos tácitos que fundamentan una conversación, Gergen no explica el proceso mediante el cual los sujetos eligen ciertos símbolos y argumentos por sobre otros para referirse a sí mismos75,76. 3.9. Gergen, pese a que sugiere lo contrario, es antirrealista 74 Sobre esto, Gendlin (1993) concluye lo siguiente: "Determinamos que la misma afirmación puede poseer diferentes significados implícitos en el contextos. Al decir esto estamos distinguiendo entre afirmación y contexto, y entre explícito e implícito [...] El lenguaje hace algo más de lo que dice" (p. 4). 75 Genglin (1993) señala:"Tu estado de ánimo sabe lo que has querido decir y por qué, lo que intentas evitar y por que, tal vez no lo sabes explícitamente, pero tu estado de animo lo sabe" (p. 5). 76 Sobre este asunto, Merleau-Ponty (1984) es claro al indicar lo siguiente: [...] Tenemos un medio directo para acceder a lo que [el lenguaje/la narración] designa, tenemos la experiencia de nosotros mismos, de esta consciencia que somos; es con esta experiencia que se miden todas las significaciones del lenguaje y es ésta lo que hace justamente que el lenguaje quiera decir algo para nosotros" (p. 15). 22 Gergen afirma que su propuesta, a diferencia de la de otros autores socioconstruccionistas, no es antirrealista. Es más, considera que esto es un mal entendido. En efecto, el autor afirma lo siguiente: [...] Esto no significa que "nada existe" o que "nunca se puede conocer la realidad" -los malentendidos corrientes del construccionismo-, sino que al intentar articular lo que existe, al ubicarlo en el lenguaje, penetramos el mundo de los significados generados socialmente [...] Bajo esta premisa, el construccionismo nos ayuda a recordar el aforismo que tanto amaba Gregory Bateson: "el mapa no es el territorio" (Gergen, 2001, p. 5). Sin embargo, si solo podemos conocer mediante la narrativa, no parecen haber argumentos que realmente le permitan a Gergen emplear otros recursos de conocimiento. Dicho de otro modo, desde la posición de Gergen y aunque afirme lo contrario, no se podría distinguir el mapa (las narraciones) del territorio (la realidad) 77. 77 Jubés et al. (2002) discute el siguiente problema: "En cierto nivel el construccionismo parece caer en las paradojas habituales del 'posmodernismo'. [...] Quienes se precian de 'posmodernos' ('antiesencialistas', 'discursivos', 'relativistas') sufren ante términos como la "realidad", "verdad» o la 'ontología', lo mismo que el 'alcohólico' arquetípico ante la botella: se sienten culpables de no poder prescindir de ella –y sin embargo la escamotean bajo la ropa. El alcohólico no se 'mejora' cuando deja de beber definitiva, absoluta y terminantemente, pues el olor del alcohol o el ruido de las botellas descorchándose le despiertan una fiebre incontenible –que ha de resistir con otra más poderosa –y también más absolutista. Su única vía de escape es volver a ser un 'bebedor social': recuperar la capacidad de hacer uso del alcohol como la mayoría de personas –asociado a un contexto particular y con objetivos relativamente inocuos. Entonces, su 'enfermedad' se transforma en una posibilidad más de la cual gozar, en una calculada pérdida de control. Del mismo modo, la aversión que los 'posmodernos' sienten a hablar de 'verdad' o 'naturaleza' delata que aún están sujetos a su mágico lazo –sólo que a la inversa; y les obliga a abstenerse de infinitas opciones y a encerrarse 3.10. Problemas en la comprensión de lo pre-verbal Si para Gergen solo podemos obtener conocimiento de nosotros mismos exclusivamente desde la narración explícita, y a su vez, ésta hace referencia a discurso anteriores ¿qué ocurre en el caso de la información que nos entregan nuestras sensaciones corporales acerca de nosotros mismos?, ¿no es acaso esto, una experiencia no mediada por palabras?, ¿qué pasa en los juegos y las expresiones artísticas?, ¿qué ocurre en los rituales y rumiaciones obsesivas?, ¿un síntoma -que no es una acción narrativa explícitano nos permite conocernos?, ¿cómo se explica la espontánea empatía que se produce entre personas que no han conversado antes? 3.11. Problema en la comprensión de la realidad física Si para Gergen la narrativa genera la experiencia de las cosas materiales, ¿qué son estas cosas materiales? La solidez de este papel que Ud. tiene entre sus manos ¿equivale a las palabras "solidez de este papel que Ud. tiene entre sus manos"?, ¿lo que experimentamos como perturbaciones perceptivas, acaso son en realidad fantasías creadas por las palabras?, si es así, ¿estamos solo en el universo?, ¿no podríamos, por este mismo expediente, desaparecer, si nos narramos como inexistentes?, ¿no son las sensaciones, mas bien, las que expresan la existencia de un mundo olfativo, uno gustativo o uno visual en un aparato perceptivo humano?78. Parece ser, que se necesita cierto "grado de realismo" para narrar algo real acerca del Yo. en sus estrechos reductos 'relativistas'. Cabe recordar que sólo se ha trascendido algo cuando se es capaz de jugar con ello" (p. 20). 78 El físico, matemático y filósofo Roger Penrose (2002) afirmó sobre el problema lo siguiente: "cualquier punto de vista filosófico serio debería contener al menos una buena dosis de realismo" (p. 270), lo que en el caso del conocimiento de la realidad física se torna su condición de posibilidad. 23 Siguiendo las ideas de Gergen ¿qué pasa con aquellas especies que no han desarrollado un lenguaje como el nuestro?, ¿qué pasa con los animales que no articulan su interacción en base a palabras?, ¿se negará entonces la existencia de mundos perceptivos para tales especies? El argumento de Gergen se vuelve poco convincente al ver el grado de interacción animal-animal y animal-medio, los cuales desarrollan su adaptabilidad en base a mundos perceptivos no conversacionales, pero no por ello, inexistentes o faltos de orden. 3.12. La observación fragmentada del self Para Gergen el yo participa en diversos contextos donde recibe narraciones y rotulaciones diferentes. Si comparamos los contextos, según el autor, los discursos se tornan incoherentes e inconexos y, en consecuencia –postula Gergenel Yo se observa fragmentadamente. Gergen (1992) es claro en este asunto, e indica lo siguiente: "La saturación social nos proporciona una multiplicidad de lenguajes del yo incoherentes y desvinculados entre sí" (p. 26). Guidano ha argumentado de muchas formas que la identidad es, en primer lugar, tácita, pero también aporta, esta vez, un argumento que proviene de la dimensión de lo explícito. Lo explícito tiene más de un nivel: lo temático, es decir, el modo como habitualmente narro las cosas –que es el nivel de las tesis de Gergen-, y lo autorreflexivo. Pues bien, el nivel autorreflexivo puede permitir dar cuenta o argumentar en favor de la propia unidad del self. Por ejemplo, cuando uno se pregunta acerca de quién se es realmente en todos estos contextos diferentes en los que participa. Gergen omite este nivel, lo cual le lleva a cometer –según Guidanoun error metodológico79, a saber: asumir como característica de lo observado, la posición 79 Guidano (2001) comenta que: "Al no tener en cuenta la distinción entre observador y observado, es muy fácil, muy natural, que uno tome por hecho que el self es nada más que la fragmentación que aparece ante la conciencia de quien observa" (p. 382). supuestamente fragmentada del observador, algo que Arciero (2005) califica como un "juego de espejos que disemina al si mismo en imágenes, referencias y reflejos" (p. 12). Para explicar esto, Guidano (1998a) acude a las ideas W. James, quien indica que en la observación están implicados dos aspectos: Los aspectos sustantivos y los aspectos transitivos (Cf. James, 1890/1980). Los aspectos sustantivos son aquellos que aparecen en la conciencia del observador al momento de observar, por ejemplo: imágenes, colores, flujos de palabras, etc. Los aspectos transitivos -el sentido de continuidad, unicidad personal y unitariedad del selfno se observan cuando se habla de cosas cotidianas sino cuando se reflexiona. Gergen, precisamente por su error metodológico, solo observa los aspectos sustantivos, no los transitivos, y por ello le es inevitable observar una fragmentación. 3.13. El problema del locus of meaning externo Según el supuesto de la interdependencia precaria de Gergen80, el locus of meaning –el lugar donde ocurre y se actualiza el significado personal del Yo (Guidano, 1998)está en las redes conversacionales. Guidano, sin embargo, rechaza esta tesis (Cf. Guidano, 1998a; 2001). Siguiendo a Guidano, podemos distinguir, dos problemas básicos en la argumentación de Gergen: 1) El autor no explica que el yo sea quien comprenda lo que se narra. Supongamos que, como sugiere Gergen, el yo deja de existir abrumado por las significaciones externas producto de la "saturación social". Pues bien, si realmente yo no soy el que significa lo que narro, tal parece que, entonces, debiera existir alguna entelequia encargada de entender por mí y, en consecuencia, hablo de lo que no entiendo tal como si yo fuera una terminal computacional o un autómata (Balbi, 2004). En efecto, la externalización del significado, 80 Cf. nota 43 del presente artículo. 24 implica consecuentemente la inexistencia de comprensión de parte del Yo. Gergen sugiere esta problemática–apoyándose en Baudrillardde la siguiente manera: "Nuestra esfera privada ha dejado de ser el escenario donde se desenvuelve el drama del sujeto reñido con sus objetos [...]; Ya no coexistimos como dramaturgos ni como actores, sino como terminales de redes de computadoras múltiples" (Baudrillard en Gergen, 1992, p. 94). 2) En segundo lugar, tal parece ser que los demás comparten el mismo problema que yo. Si el locus of meaning es externo y no hay espacio interior para significar nada, ninguno de los que me habla entendería lo que habla, porque todo meaning está en un "entre" ellos y yo. 3.14. El problema de la responsabilidad personal. Las consecuencias prácticas y éticas del pensamiento de Gergen generan algunos problemas éticos. Si yo no significo lo que narro, es decir, no lo entiendo por mis propios términos, como consecuencia, yo no soy responsable de los actos que se siguen de mis deliberaciones. En otras palabras, si hay un Yo que tiene un locus of meaning completamente externalizado, el Yo no puede responsabilizarse de nada81. Los castigos y premios los debiera recibir "el sistema" quien es quien significa. Acá, incluso el recurso a la "co-responsabilidad" tampoco resuelve el problema, porque para que haya uno "co"-responsabilidad se requieren dos entes, uno de los cuales -el selfGergen declara vacío y con un meaning externo. Se pueden inferir las consecuencias 81 Guidano (1998a) señala que: "Si imaginamos el significado como descentralizado, hay un locus of meaning que es externo, lo que conduce a una red conversacional y lo que tenemos es siempre una externalización de los problemas. Es decir, todos los problemas son externalizados y son vistos como pertenecientes al sistema social y cultural antes que al individuo" (p. 3). sobre asuntos análogos al de la responsabilidad tales como: la voluntad, la libertad personal y el libre albedrío. En efecto, la idea misma del locus externalizado se opone a tales capacidades, ya que las reduce a la reproducción autómata de significaciones y voluntades foráneas. 3.15. El problema de la significación personal del rol Si el locus of meaning es externo, ¿cómo significa el sujeto el rol entregado por la sociedad; rol que supuestamente incluye a identidad personal? Gergen no explica la capacidad que cada uno posee de enjuiciar y demostrar conformidad o disconformidad con los roles ejecutados. En algunos casos, hasta es posible rechazarlos. Si Gergen omite explicar esto, parece ser que el autor transforma al sujeto en una mera reproducción irreflexiva de lo impuesto "desde afuera". Tal como lo señala Balbi (2004), un planteamiento de esta clase, involucra una mente sin subjetividad, un mecanismo similar a un sujeto autómata determinado completamente desde lo social. Finalmente, la posición de Gergen se torna aún más discutible cuando la comparamos con las palabras de Wittgenstein, autor que es citado como apoyo por el propio Gergen. El autor omite la experiencia de significar un rol, pero como Wittgenstein (1953) argumenta, cuando un discurso contrasta con la experiencia, tal discurso se vuelve inviable. 3.16. El fenómeno de la resiliencia La idea de un locus of meaning externalizado se torna problemática cuando analizamos su aplicabilidad al caso práctico de la resiliencia82. Si para Gergen, las narraciones contextuales son las que me definen, en el 82 Definiremos "resiliencia" como aquella capacidad de los humanos que, a pesar de nacer y vivir en situaciones de alto riesgo y vulnerabilidad, logran desarrollar competencias psicológicas adaptativas viables para sobreponerse a su contexto (Kotliarenco, Cáceres y Fontecilla, 1997). 25 caso de la resiliencia, ¿cómo se hace posible que me pueda sobreponer exactamente a aquello que me define?, ¿al ser resiliente se desarticula el self?, ¿acaso el contexto me narra como resiliente?, ¿no va eso en contra del concepto habitual de resiliencia?, ¿no es la resiliencia precisamente una cualidad personal que permite sobreponerme a la vulnerabilidad social, psicológica o económica que mi medio determina? Se torna inevitable hacer tales preguntas cuando observamos el caso de sujetos resilientes que no tienen ninguna definición contextual que implique el sobreponerse a su contexto, y a pesar de todo, lo logran. 3.17. El problema de la existencia de identidades insaturadas Según Gergen, las actuales condiciones de "hipertecnologizadas83" han saturado al sujeto hasta desvanecerlo84. Sin embargo, ¿qué sucede con aquellos sujetos que se articulan en contextos ínfimamente tecnologizados, esto es, poco saturados? ¿Qué ocurre, por ejemplo, con la identidad de un habitante de la caleta Ahui en Chiloé, Chile?, ¿Qué ocurre con los habitantes de caleta Tortel, región de Aysén, Chile?85. La tesis de la disolución del 83 Gergen (1992) señala que: "Con el incremento de las nuevas tecnologías aparece una infiltración en la conciencia cotidiana, de la duda sobre sí mismo, una sutil sensación de insuficiencia que agobia las actividades que se emprenden con una incómoda sensación de vacuidad inminente. Esa sensación de insuficiencia es un producto colateral de la colonización del yo" (p. 113). 84 Haciendo referencia explícita a avances como la radiofonía, la televisión, el ferrocarril, entre otros, Gergen ha acuñado el término "tecnologías de la saturación social" para indicar que son tales avances y otros más, los que actualmente han permitido la saturación de información del self. Según el autor, esto conduce irremediablemente a su disolución (empty self). Para una explicación del término: Cf. Gergen (1992), Capítulo 3: "La saturación social y la colonización del Yo." ; Complementar con Cabañes (2006) y Salanova (2009). 85Ambos ejemplos son zonas extremas de la geografía Chilena. En Ahui no hay señal de teléfono de red fija, tampoco internet; En Caleta Tortel sólo hay un teléfono para 507 habitantes y tampoco hay internet. En ambos Yo no resiste estos ejemplos. La existencia de un tipo de self insaturado sugiere, en consecuencia, la posibilidad de la existencia identidades personales. 4. Conclusiones La pregunta sobre la identidad personal está lejos de ser un problema resuelto, pero, como ha podido observarse, constituye uno de los problemas fundamentales de la Psicología en general y de la Epistemología Psicológica en particular. En vista del análisis realizado podemos concluir que: 4.1. No parece convincente el argumento que indica que no existe experiencia de la identidad personal sin palabras que la refieran, o que no exista realidad más allá del lenguaje. Tal posición, no logra dar cuenta del hecho fundamental de que los humanos seamos capaces de cuestionar, criticar y censurar la realidad conversacional y nuestra identidad personal sobre la base de nuestras propias experiencias tácitas del mundo y de nosotros mismos. 4.2.Las tesis de Gergen se muestran poco convincente cuando se revisa su aplicabilidad y se las contrasta con los fenómenos cotidianos, tales como la resiliencia, la responsabilidad personal, la significación personal de los roles ejercidos, la voluntad personal, entre otros aspectos. 4.3. Gergen reduce de modo poco convincente la historia personal experimentada a la biografía personal narrada. Con ello, omite dos importantes asuntos: a) explicar los procesos tácitos que fundamentan la narración y simbolización de la identidad personal, y; b) ofrecer una comprensión del amplio mundo de fenómenos pre-verbales que también cumplen una función simbólica, tales como, el arte, la casos, el acceso físico se realiza cada cierto tiempo, dado que no hay recorridos de transporte que lleguen regularmente a tales zonas. 26 música, las rumiaciones y ritos obsesivos, entre otros. 4.4. La distinción que Guidano realiza entre "Yo" y "Mí" en su self system parece explicar de mejor manera los procesos de identidad personal que la distinción entre "Yo" y "los otros" realizada por Gergen. En efecto, la distinción de Guidano, no así la de Gergen, permite integrar los procesos tácitos, explícitonarrativos, personales y relacionales a la comprensión de la identidad personal, logrando describir, articular e integrar tanto los componentes sociales como los individuales de la identidad. 4.5. Cuando Gergen niega la anterioridad de la experiencia personal respecto de las palabras, omite el análisis del sustento tácito de las relaciones humanas. En efecto, con esto niega los componentes que sustentan las conversaciones. Por lo tanto, niega, entonces, aquello que parece evidente en la vida cotidiana, a saber, la conciencia experiencial del sí mismo y las sensaciones que condicionan muchas veces nuestras narrativas acerca de nosotros mismo. 4.6. Gergen no describe ningún proceso de apropiación de las narraciones. El autor solo indica que la identidad personal se constituye en base a narrativas foráneas sin describir sin describir con esto ninguna forma de significación de éstas. Junto a Guidano (1998) y a Balbi (2004) observamos que esta propuesta desemboca inevitablemente en un excesivo ambientalismo y en la objetivización irreflexiva de las narrativas foráneas que definen la identidad. 4.7. Si la identidad solo se construye en base a fragmentos y su continuidad toma curso en los diversos contextos que la definen, observándose , entonces, una identidad fragmentadala propuesta de Gergen no logra dar cuenta de lo siguiente: Que cada uno de nosotros experimenta la continuidad de su sí mismo aunque los contextos cambien. Cada uno se experimenta continuamente como un "quien", sin que el cambio de nuestros contextos implique la escisión o fragmentación de nuestra identidad. 4.8. Gergen no pondera la importancia de la influencia de los procesos histórico-evolutivos en la narrativa de nuestra identidad personal. En efecto, sus explicaciones en torno al desarrollo del self parecen inconsistentes pues, por lo demás, se omite integrar los aportes de la psicología del desarrollo, la neonatología, algunos aportes de la biología, entre otros. 4.9. No podemos negar la "experiencia de saturación", pero cuestionamos la aplicabilidad de la tesis del "self saturado" de Gergen, especialmente, porque podemos observar la existencia de identidades que no han sido saturadas por entornos tecnologizados e incluso, podemos observar selves no saturados, aún, en contextos altamente tecnologizados. 4.10. El concepto de "saturación social del self" nos propone una clara y muy útil advertencia acerca del modo como algunas personas podrían actualmente experimentar de forma ambigua su relación consigo mismas y con los demás. Pero no podríamos indicar que la saturación del self sea rasgo distintivo del fenómeno de la identidad personal. Consideramos, entonces, que el concepto implicaría una forma de experimentarse en el mundo. Y si observamos que, tanto sujeto y sociedad están en una relación irreductible, tal experiencia del sí mismo, inevitablemente es muestra de las condiciones históricas en las cuales participa éste 4.11. La tesis del "Yo fragmentado" no es convincente porque no considera el Yo unitario y tácito que integra la diversidad de narraciones contextuales permitiendo la continuidad del sí mismo. En efecto, Gergen omite considerar el "quien" que narra y articula la multiplicidad contextual. 4.12. La tesis del "empty self" muestra algunas inconsistencias. Si el self es nada, no hay nada en él que se puede ni fragmentar, ni desarrollar. No hay nada que pueda ser narrado. De la nada, nada viene. Si el yo es vacío, no hay nada en él, y, por tanto, él no puede ser causa de sí ni de 27 nada. 4.13. La idea de que el sujeto construye su identificación y significación personal exclusivamente en base a las narrativas foráneas (locus of meaning externo) se torna discutible cuando observamos sus consecuencias éticas y prácticas sobre temas como la voluntad y la responsabilidad personal. Considerar que el significado personal proviene absolutamente desde el exterior, provoca observar a un sujeto pasivo, autómata y falto de cualquier capacidad reflexiva sobre su proceder. 4.14. Gergen no parece ponderar suficientemente que la alteridad es un momento integrante del sistema de identidad personal. Simplemente contrapone el concepto de identidad y el de alteridad, enfatizando el influjo del otro en el self; No parece considerar suficientemente que el self incluye un momento de alteridad para autorreconocerse como un "quien". Esto lleva a Gergen a negar la experiencia del sí mismo y la identidad personal. En contraste con esto, consideramos que la propuesta de Guidano es más explicativa y abarcativa del fenómeno de la identidad personal. Para Guidano, en el significado personal siempre está contenido el otro, como lo que uno no es. 4.15. Guidano logra incluir en su comprensión de la identidad personal tanto la alteridad como unicidad personal a través del self system, y más específicamente, por medio de dos sensibilidades: El sameness y selfhood. Éstas, a su vez, permiten la integración de lo individual, lo social, la alteridad y la unicidad en la comprensión de la identidad personal. 4.16. Indicamos además que, cada self, en la multiplicidad de roles que ejecuta, posee una manera de ser, que es lo que caracteriza su identidad. Es este "quien" en la diversidad de contextos el que no es tomado en cuenta por Gergen. Es más, inclusive desde el plano de los significados sociales, sugerimos que nuestra identidad personal , -el "quien de cada cual"no consiste en llamarme meramente "profesor", "padre", "hombre", o los infinitos roles a los cuales puedo acceder dentro de un espectro cultural determinado, sino, y es más, mi identidad es, fundamentalmente, mi experiencia de mí mismo, la que deviene en tanto existencia en el mundo y la que sostiene las posibles identificaciones narrativas 4.17. Asimismo, la idea de concebir la identidad personal como una construcción conversacional, se torna dudosa por una condición gnoseológica y epistemológica fundamental, a saber, que es la misma existencia del self en el mundo la que determina un ordenamiento especial de éste. Toda posibilidad narrativa de la realidad y del sí mismo surge de la existencia previa del sujeto en el mundo, siendo esto, fundamento y soporte de las narraciones. Por lo tanto, y parafraseando a Merleau-Ponty (1984), nosotros no somos meros "seres vivientes" o "mamíferos, ni siquiera "hombres" o una "conciencia" o cualquiera de los roles que nos entrega la sociedad. Si bien, la zoología, la anatomía, la biología o la psicología social, la política, entre otras dimensiones, nos puedan entregar muchas características, cada uno de nosotros, esto es, nuestra existencia misma, es la fuente absoluta de tales características. Nuestra existencia no procede de nuestros antecedentes, es ésta la que va hacia ellos y los sostiene. Nuestro self no consiste en ser "padre","hijo" o "profesor", sino que, y es más, consiste en ser aquel que le da consistencia y coherencia a todas mis actuaciones culturales. 4.18. 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ISSN: 2359-6597 XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade http://www.fapas.edu.br/revistas/anaisdasafil INVESTIGAÇÕES ACERCA DO OBJETO INTENCIONAL DA MEMÓRIA Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied * Resumo: Este artigo pretende analisar três teorias a respeito do que é o objeto intencional da memória. As teorias abordadas são o realismo direto, o realismo representativo e o pragmatismo em filosofia da memória. A primeira delas defende que quando lembramos, acessamos um evento passado sem intermédios; a segunda argumenta que acessamos diretamente uma representação do evento passado; a última, elaborada recentemente, afirma que nossas lembranças são determinadas por nossas ações. Apresentamos a ideia central de cada teoria, com quais outras teorias sobre a memória elas relacionam e as principais objeções que enfrentam. Após isso, demonstramos a nossa posição, qual seja, o realismo representativo nos parece a alternativa mais viável entre as opções atuais. Palavras-chave: Filosofia da Memória. Realismo direto. Realismo Representativo. Pragmatismo. Introdução O debate contemporâneo em filosofia da memória aborda diversas questões, em sua grande maioria, muito específicas. Para tratarmos do presente tema, estudamos diversos outros mais básicos, porém com um grau já elevado de especificidade. Entre os temas estudados até aqui, estão a distinção entre tipos de memória; teorias a respeito da natureza da memória; relação entre tempo e memória, etc. Neste texto, trataremos do debate acerca da natureza do objeto intencional da memória episódica. Ou seja, com qual objeto do mundo estamos nos relacionando quando lembramos. A tarefa que executaremos a seguir objetiva mostrar a nossa posição a respeito das três teorias sobre o objeto intencional da memória episódica. Exporemos individualmente o realismo direto, o realismo representativo e o pragmatismo, seguidos da apresentação dos seus principais problemas. Por fim, ofereceremos a nossa posição, sua justificativa e defesa. Adiantamos que o principal material utilizado na realização desta tarefa é o artigo Thinking * Mestranda em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. E-mail: [email protected] Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 2 about events: A pragmatist account of the objects of episodic hypothetical thought (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018), devido à sua originalidade. 1 Realismo direto, realismo representativo e pragmatismo Quando lembramos, estamos em contato direto com o quê? Estabelecemos uma relação com o passado? Ou estamos ligando representações? Ou simplesmente trabalhando com aquilo que nos é útil? A seguir, mostraremos um quadro comparativo com as três diferentes respostas dos filósofos da memória, em seguida, apresentaremos nossa discussão: Realismo direto Realismo indireto Pragmatismo Descrição Contato direto com os eventos passados. Contato direto com as representações de eventos passados. A memória é guiada por objetos de ação. Pontos positivos Contempla a fenomenologia que temos quando lembramos. Reconhece que ao lembrarmos não estamos em contato com o evento passado em si; Não está comprometida com outras teorias da memória. Explica como surge a direção temporal dos pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos. Pontos negativos Enfrenta o problema da co-temporalidade; A existência de confabulação e de falsas memórias indica que não há contato direto com o evento passado. Está em desacordo com a fenomenologia que temos ao lembrar; Não explica como se dá a orientação temporal dos pensamentos. Está comprometida com a teoria simulacionista; Está em desacordo com a fenomenologia que temos ao lembrar. 1 Realismo direto O realismo direto afirma que quando lembramos, temos acesso direto a um evento passado. Se neste momento recordarmos do almoço de ontem, estaremos em contato direto com o almoço de ontem. Isto é, os eventos passados são acessados diretamente no período presente, por meio da memória de quem está lembrando. A teoria do realismo direto enfrenta, pelo menos, dois sérios problemas. O chamado problema da co-temporalidade e o problema do disjuntivismo (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 5-10). A questão da co-temporalidade diz respeito a como um indivíduo no momento presente pode ter acesso direto a um evento passado. Para aderirmos a esta teoria como a mais adequada à realidade, é preciso nos comprometeremos com um Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 3 modelo de ontologia temporal em que passado e presente existam igualmente, e, então, escaparmos à objeção da co-temporalidade. Há quem sustente o realismo direto a partir do eternalismo (BERNECKER, 2008). Este modelo de ontologia temporal estaria apto a sustentar o realismo direto sobre memórias episódicas por (a) demonstrar como eventos passados podem ser acessados no presente e (b) possibilitar que estes eventos validem as memórias. Ou seja, adotando o eternalismo, esta teoria realista teria como assegurar um vínculo direto entre o evento passado e a evocação no momento presente, pois este modelo de ontologia temporal concede a existência de todos os tempos. Entretanto, há um amplo debate atual acerca dos modelos de ontologias temporais, e, portanto, nem todos os estudiosos concordam em adotar a saída encontrada por Bernecker. Assim, aos que, como nós, seguem outros tipos de ontologia temporal, o realismo direto pode não estar imune ao problema da cotemporalidade. Conceber o futuro como existindo do mesmo modo que o passado e o presente, como afirma o eternalismo, parece-nos, no mínimo, contra-intuitivo. Além disso, para os simulacionistas o realismo direto está sujeito também ao problema do disjuntivismo. O realismo direto defende que há diferença de natureza entre uma memória e uma confabulação, ou outros tipos de pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos. Contudo, esta diferenciação é equivocada na visão de qualquer simulacionsita, como são Sant'Anna e Michaelian (2018, p. 8). No simulacionismo, as memórias são entendidas como apenas mais um dos tipos de pensamento episódico hipotético. Isto é, a faculdade responsável pelas evocações é a mesma que opera quando estamos imaginando ou planejando. Deste modo, memórias, planos para o futuro e pensamento contrafactual são todos pensamentos da mesma natureza, distinguindo-se apenas quanto aos seus status modais e temporais. Portanto, dependendo da teoria acerca da natureza dos pensamentos memoriais que adotarmos, precisaremos recusar o realismo direto. 2 Realismo representativo O realismo representativo, ou realismo indireto, defende que ao lembrarmos, estamos em contato direto com a representação de um evento passado, não com o evento em si. Ou seja, nesta concepção, acessamos diretamente a representação que formamos a partir do contato entre nós e o mundo exterior. Por meio da memória, recuperamos a representação do evento passado e, então, o acessamos indiretamente. Sant'Anna e Michaelian apontam um argumento contra o realismo representativo. Segundo eles, esta teoria não funciona porque não é a mera representação do evento que Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 4 indica ao sujeito qual a sua direção temporal e o seu status modal. Para o indivíduo entender determinado evento como uma memória episódica, ele deve ter um conjunto de crenças que o leve a inferir que este evento é passado. Assim, o que determinaria o carácter dos pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos, como memória ou como imaginação, seriam fatores externos à representação do evento. Em suma, o realismo representativo não é válido porque confere à representação o poder de classificar os pensamentos em memória ou imaginação, sem ser capaz de mostrar a localização temporal e o status modal destes pensamentos. Com outras palavras, o realismo indireto é acusado de dizer que determinado pensamento é uma memória, e que, portanto, se refere ao passado, sem conseguir dizer que o conteúdo desta memória, a representação de um evento, é um evento passado ou futuro. [...] Considere outro par de cenários. No primeiro, você tem um pensamento episódico hipotético que descreveríamos intuitivamente como a memória da sua festa de aniversário de dez anos. Parece claro para você que você está recordando um evento que ocorreu no passado atual e não meramente imaginando um evento futuro possível. Isto parece claro para você porque você tem um conjunto de crenças que sugere isso. Você acredita, por exemplo, que é atualmente um adulto, que a criança presente no seu pensamento é uma versão jovem de você, e que o desenvolvimento humano é um processo irreversível que vai da infância à idade adulta. O que nós sugerimos é que estas e outras crenças relevantes determinam que o seu pensamento seja sobre um evento do passado atual. Compare este primeiro cenário a um segundo, no qual você acorda uma manhã com um conjunto incomum de crenças equivocadas. Você acredita, por exemplo, que humanos nascem adultos e se tornam crianças só depois em suas vidas. Agora, suponha que você tenha o mesmo pensamento episódico hipotético do primeiro cenário. Devido às suas crenças equivocadas, o pensamento é agora sobre um possível evento futuro. Apesar de ainda crer que você é um adulto e apesar de tomar a pessoa presente como sendo você, a sua crença sobre como indivíduos humanos se desenvolvem mudou, mudando assim a referência temporal do pensamento. Em geral, a ideia é que, se o mesmo pensamento pode referir tanto ao passado quanto ao futuro dependendo das crenças que o acompanham, o pensamento episódico hipotético deve ser silencioso com respeito à localização temporal e ao status modal. (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 12, tradução nossa). 1 1 No texto original: "[...] Consider another pair of scenarios. In the first, you have an episodic hypothetical thought that we would intuitively describe as a memory of your tenth birthday party. It seems clear to you that you are remembering an event that occurred in the actual past and not merely imagining a possible future event. This seems clear to you because you have a set of beliefs that suggest it. You believe, for instance, that you are currently an adult, that the child presented in the thought is a younger version of you, and that human development is an irreversible process that goes from childhood to adulthood. What we suggest is that it is these and other relevant beliefs that determine that your thought is about an actual past event. Compare this first scenario to a second, in which you wake up one morning with an unusual set of mistaken beliefs. You believe, for example, that humans are born adults and become children only later in their lives. Now, suppose that you have the same episodic hypothetical thought as in the first scenario. Due to your mistaken beliefs, the thought is now about a possible future event. Despite still believing that you are an adult and despite taking the person presented in the thought to be you, your belief about how human individuals develop has changed, thus changing the temporal reference of the thought. In general, the idea is that, if the same thought can refer either to the past or to the future depending on the beliefs that accompany it, episodic hypothetical thought must be silent with respect to temporal location and modal status." (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 12). Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 5 Portanto, segundo esta objeção, o realismo representativo enfrenta um sério problema por dizer que o objeto intencional da memória é uma representação sem que esta representação por si só indique a sua direção temporal. A direção temporal dos pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos é dada, na visão de Sant'Anna e Michaelian, pelas outras crenças que o sujeito possui. Dizer que o objeto intencional da memória episódica é uma representação seria errôneo porque faltaria o aspecto temporal, exatamente o indicador de que se trata de memória ou imaginação. 3 Pragmatismo A visão pragmatista acerca do objeto intencional da memória episódica é significativamente distinta das duas teorias anteriores. O pragmatismo em memória episódica já ingressa no debate partindo de uma abordagem mais ampla, em que este formato de memória é apenas mais um dos modos de pensar contemplados pelo grupo dos pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos. Este grupo abrange quaisquer pensamentos que um sujeito tenha de si mesmo com alguma orientação temporal e status modal. Isto é, a teoria pragmatista sobre a memória episódica a concebe como sendo da mesma natureza que todos os demais pensamentos em que há viagem mental no tempo. Significa, portanto, que memória episódica é muito semelhante ao planejamento sobre o futuro e à imaginação contrafactual. Na compreensão pragmatista da memória, tudo o que há são objetos de ação. Isto é, a própria memória é regulada conforme as ações, de modo que o seu objeto intencional será um objeto de ação. Como objetos de ação, podem surgir tudo aquilo que seja capaz de influenciar as ações do sujeito, desde objetos materiais até sentimentos. Assim como esta parte inicial da teoria, o restante também é bastante distinto das teorias realistas. O pragmatismo em memória afirma que os objetos da ação não carregam em si os aspectos temporal e modal (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 17). O que indica que um pensamento episódico hipotético é passado ou futuro e atual ou possível é o conjunto de crenças que o sujeito tem para além deste pensamento em questão. Ou seja, quando lembramos episodicamente, entretemos um pensamento a nosso respeito e em seguida, baseados em nossas crenças, atribuímos a este pensamento uma "etiqueta" de passado atual. Assim, se a teoria defende que concebemos nossos próprios pensamentos como memórias a partir do conjunto de crenças que temos, então ela está de acordo com o simulacionismo. Este comprometimento do pragmatismo em memória com a teoria simulacionista é enfatizado pelos próprios autores: Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 6 Confabulação e falsa lembrança ocorrem porque a memória tem um carácter reconstrutivo, ao invés de reprodutivo: ao invés de ser uma questão de preservação de uma representação ou um relacionamento estabelecido no momento da experiência, recordar é, como Bartlett pôs em seu estudo fundacional (1932), sempre uma questão de criação de algo novo com base tanto na experiência passada do sujeito quanto no seu estado mental presente. (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 8-9, tradução nossa). 2 Contudo, isto pode ser problemático para causalistas acerca da memória ou para quem não concorda completamente nem com o causalismo, nem com o simulacionismo, o nosso caso. A partir disso, surge a maior dificuldade que temos em relação à alternativa pragmatista. Acreditamos que depender de um conjunto de crenças para assumir um pensamento episódico hipotético como memória é correr um risco demasiado arriscado. Se as memórias que temos se dão pelas crenças que possuímos, podemos atingir uma porcentagem altíssima de memórias falsas caso tenhamos crenças falsas ou, ainda, combinações inadequadas entre as crenças verdadeiras. Além disso, se os indivíduos realmente só concebessem algo como memória a partir das crenças que têm, pensamos que o mundo seria um lugar significativamente mais caótico, a memória teria uma função prática bastante reduzida por ser pouquíssimo confiável. Portanto, a objeção que temos ao pragmatismo em memória nasce do seu compromisso com o simulacionismo. Esta visão acerca da memória não nos parece totalmente adequada, pois seria questão de sorte termos tanto sucesso na vida prática contando com o auxílio de uma faculdade capaz de tantos erros. Reconhecemos, evidentemente, que temos diversas memórias falsas, por isso não concordamos com a teoria causalista, mas isto não implica que a memória seja majoritariamente construtiva. Apostamos em uma teoria híbrida quanto ao debate entre causalismo e simulacionismo. 4 Realismo representativo como alternativa mais viável A nossa principal motivação para adotarmos o realismo representativo é a sua independência em relação às teorias causalista e simulacionista. Caso adotássemos o realismo direto, estaríamos automaticamente comprometidos com a teoria causalista, pois se tivéssemos acesso direto ao evento passado, nossas memórias seriam necessariamente 2 No texto original: "Confabulation and misremembering occur because memory has a reconstructive, rather than a reproductive, character: rather than being a matter of the preservation of a representation or a relationship established at the time of experience, remembering is, as Bartlett put it in his foundational study (1932), always a matter of creating something anew on the basis both of the subject's past experience and of his present state of mind." (SANT'ANNA; MICHAELIAN, 2018, p. 8-9). Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 7 causadas de modo integral por ele. Por outro lado, se escolhêssemos o pragmatismo, firmaríamos compromisso com a teoria simulacionista, dado que interpretaríamos algo como memória a partir do nosso conjunto de crenças. Já o realismo representativo nos parece ser compatível com uma teoria híbrida, em que o evento passado seria a base inicial para a representação e esta chegaria à nossa memória. No percurso percorrido pela representação, desde a sua criação até à sua evocação pela memória, haveria a possibilidade de falhas, o que explicaria falsas memórias. Outra vantagem do realismo representativo, em relação ao realismo direto, especificamente, é o seu não comprometimento com determinado modelo de ontologia temporal. Como mencionamos ao apresentarmos o realismo direto, o seu vínculo com a teoria eternalista acerca do tempo é um ponto problemático. Há, dissemos, outras teorias no debate atual que buscam compreender o tempo (NEY, 2014, p. 142), entre as mais investigadas estão o presentismo e a teoria do bloco em construção. O ponto favorável ao realismo representativo é, por entender que a evocação requer apenas uma representação da experiência passada, a possibilidade de conciliá-lo com vários modelos de ontologia temporal distintos. Dessa forma, o conjunto de possíveis adeptos ao realismo representativo é menos restrito, por ser menos exigente, do que o grupo compatível com o realismo direto e o grupo compatível com o pragmatismo, devido à ligação deste com o simulacionismo. Encaramos isto como uma vantagem porque estudar a memória é distinto de estudar o tempo, de modo que adotar uma teoria acerca da memória não deve requerer que se adote determinada teoria metafísica do tempo. Uma terceira motivação para a nossa escolha se dá por meio de uma tentativa de defender o realismo representativo da objeção pragmatista apresentada anteriormente. Os pragmatistas dizem que o realismo representativo não é suficiente porque a representação não traz consigo os status temporal e modal, o que o impediria de conceber um pensamento como memória. O conjunto de crenças que temos é que seria responsável por apontar os pensamentos episódicos hipotéticos como memória ou como imaginação e como atuais ou como possíveis. Entretanto, entendemos que as representações dos eventos são construídas a partir do evento e do conjunto de crenças que temos, de modo que seria natural a participação das crenças na atribuição dos status em questão. A diferença da participação das crenças, a nosso ver, está que ao seguirmos a teoria pragmatista, entendemos que o conjunto de crenças participa após entretermos o evento em nossa mente, enquanto que se seguirmos o realismo representativo, defenderíamos que as crenças já estariam presentes na formulação da representação do evento. Acreditamos que o conjunto de crenças do sujeito trabalhe na Investigações acerca do objeto intencional da memória Úrsula Maria Coelho Lied XVII Semana Acadêmica de Filosofia FAPAS 2018 (ANAIS) Ontologia e Metafísica: implicações e rupturas do medievo à contemporaneidade 8 construção das representações, e que, portanto, não surgem para acompanhar as representações já concebidas. Conclusão Como vimos, estão disponíveis três teorias acerca do que é o objeto intencional da memória episódica. A mais recente delas, a teoria pragmatista, tenta superar os problemas enfrentados pelas realistas direta e representativa. Entretanto, também tem seus problemas. O que pretendemos neste texto foi manifestar a nossa posição em defesa de uma delas, a realista representativa. Esta escolha foi baseada no fato de as outras duas nos parecerem mais problemáticas e por ela própria ser a menos comprometida com outras teorias sobre a memória, com as quais temos dificuldades. Referências Bernecker, Sven. 2008. The Primary Objects of Memory. In:____.: The Metaphysics of Memory, 61–80. Dordrecht: Springer. Ney, Alyssa. 2014. Time. Metaphysics: an introduction, 138-169. New York: Routledge. Sant'Anna, André, and Kourken Michaelian. 2018. Thinking about Events: A Pragmatist Account of the Objects of Episodic Hypothetical Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, February. Disponível em: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/323184598>. Acesso em: 17 out. 2018.

INTRODUCTION Art, Metaphysics, & the Paradox of Standards CHRISTY MAG UIDHIR **Penultimate Draft-Please Do Not Cite** I think it safe to say that philosophical aesthetics has had a less than stellar record of its principal work being actively and substantively informed by work in philosophical areas outside itself.1 Although I'm not entirely sure what might fully explain the fact that aesthetics has for so long cultivated a disturbingly insular character (or at least why it has achieved such a reputation), I am quite certain that this protracted insularity has not only effectively hobbled progress and productivity within philosophy of art but also ostensibly poisoned any substantive and informative relationships aesthetics might cultivate with outside areas (further fueling moves toward insularity). Of course, while I may share-or at least regard as neither hasty nor terribly uncharitable-the view that aesthetics has to some extent heretofore been a comparatively dim, unproductive, and deleteriously insular area of philosophical enquiry, this should by no means suggest that I also share the sadly not altogether uncommon outside sentiment that aesthetics is an at best second-rate philosophical field. I would like to thank P.D. Magnus and L.A. Paul for helpful comments on earlier drafts. 1 After all, one needn't look too hard to find a standard position within philosophical aesthetics that runs directly counter to the relevant standard (if not received) positions in some other field (e.g., dominant theories of art interpretation sharply diverging from the dominant theories of interpretation within philosophy of language, well-established conceptual accounts of art and the aesthetic being predicated upon highly controversial if not largely discredited theories of concepts within philosophy of mind, object-kinds considered standard for art ontology being conspicuously absent from and utter alien-looking within contemporary metaphysics). By contrast, consider the comparative ease in showing the principal work within meta-ethics routinely and productively to engage with, and be informed by, areas well outside itself (e.g., metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind and language, philosophy of science). In fact, I think such attitudes more often than not reflect in their holders either a thinly veiled contempt for the subject matter of philosophical aesthetics-and by extension the field itself-or at least a casual indifference towards the results of any philosophical enquiry conducted therein. I find the prevalence of such attitudes incredibly frustrating not just because I self-identify as a philosopher of art. To judge aesthetics but philosophical trifle requires either an utterly brazen and reckless philosophical arrogance or an abyssal (and a touch ironic) degree of philosophical ignorance-neither of which any self-respecting philosopher ought to abide. Likewise, to grant aesthetics philosophical legitimacy yet nevertheless remain indifferent to the results of its enquiries is to be guilty of the very same sort of counterproductive and philosophically irresponsible neglect of which aesthetics has been traditionally accused. To be sure, I do not expect every philosopher to find art and its relata as philosophically captivating as I do; however, I do nevertheless expect them to take philosophy of art seriously. The problem, of course, is that the farther removed philosophers of art view their enterprise to be from philosophy's putative core, the fewer number of areas there are for those operating within that core to seriously and productively engage with philosophy of art. So, for the demand that philosophy of art be taken seriously to be other than empty requires that philosophy of art, at least in part, adopt a broadly philosophically informative approach to its central issues (e.g., shaping and testing putative art-theoretic commitments against the standard models employed within those relevant intersecting areas of enquiry such as philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, philosophy of science, ethics, and so forth). The burden, however, ought not exclusively rest with philosophical aesthetics. Although this volume chiefly focuses on the relationship between philosophy of art and contemporary metaphysics with respect to the overlap issue of abstracta, my aim is that what follows should nevertheless provide, at least in some small measure, a general methodological blueprint from which both those from within aesthetics and those from without can begin building responsible, and therefore mutually informative and productive, relationships between their respective fields. Two Opposing Views When philosophical aesthetics tends toward insularity, we shouldn't be surprised to find standard art-ontological categories incongruous with those standardly employed in contemporary metaphysics. Of course, when contemporary metaphysics tends to ignore aesthetic and art theoretic concerns, perhaps we likewise shouldn't be surprised to find the climate of contemporary metaphysics inhospitable for a theory of art.2 While this may seem to suggest at least a prima facie tension between our basic art theoretic commitments considered from within philosophical aesthetics and our standard ontological commitments considered from without, I think any perceived tension or antagonism largely due to metaphysicians and aestheticians at least implicitly assuming there to be but two available methodological positions with respect to the relationship between metaphysics and philosophical aesthetics in the relevant overlap areas. I call these two opposing views DEFERENCE and INDEPENDENCE. THE DEFERENCE VIEW: In all cases of relevant overlapping areas, aesthetics ought to defer to contemporary metaphysics. THE INDEPENDENCE VIEW: Art-ontological categories cannot be (or at least we shouldn't expect them to be) adequately carved out using only the tools provided by contemporary metaphysics. According to DEFERENCE, the tools provided by contemporary metaphysics are (at least prima facie) both necessary and sufficient for carving out art-ontological categories, and as such, there ought be no sui generis art-ontological kinds. So, for example, repeatable artworks can be plausibly construed as abstract objects only if doing so entails no addition of a sui generis abstract kind. According to INDEPENDENCE, however, art onta need not and do not neatly conform to the ontic kinds standardly in play for contemporary metaphysics, such that, philosophers of art ought to expect that adequately, let alone fully, capturing the operative constraints, interests, practices unique to art-relevant domains requires carving out (perhaps from whole cloth) befittingly unique (sui generis) ontological categories. I suppose that one quite understandably might think preference for either DEFERENCE or INDEPENDENCE tracks preference for either revisionary or descriptivist artontology respectively. For example, should we approach the ontology of art thinking that contemporary art practices and conventions are such that they cannot be adequately captured using only the ontological tools provided by contemporary metaphysics, we might understandably also think that the extent to which one endorses DEFERENCE is the extent to which one endorses a revisionary art ontology. So, perhaps those already harboring strong descriptivist loyalties may understandably thereby find themselves 2 For example, if art-theoretic considerations originally prompt metaphysical inquiry into the nature of works of certain sort (e.g., music, film, literature), then the ontological conclusions drawn from such inquiry ought to be consistent with those art-theoretic considerations. So, should these art-theoretic considerations be promptly forgotten or ignored, we shouldn't be at all surprised when the resultant metaphysical inquiry answers with ontic models for works of that certain sort being at least indifferent to, if not fundamentally at odds with, being an artwork. more inclined toward INDEPENDENCE. After all, to the extent philosophy of art seems to be relegated to the margins of philosophy, philosophers of art needn't be concerned with garnering approval from the implicitly if not explicitly uninterested and distanced core [No quantification without representation!]. Therefore, philosophers making art-ontological inquiries should take themselves primarily tasked with engaging in conceptual analysis aimed at best capturing the art-relevant practices and conventions and as such needn't be concerned whether or not the putatively available art-ontological terrain can be located on any contemporary metaphysical map. By contrast, should we approach the ontology of art with the default view of the sufficiency of the metaphysician's ontological tool box and the contents therein, we might understandably view endorsing INDEPENDENCE as simply trading one revision for another, protecting art ontology against being revisionary with respect to art in a manner ultimately ensuring its being revisionary with respect to ontology. That is, INDEPENDENCE may well be better suited to preserving our art practices and conventions (e.g., their semantic or referential coherence) but only in virtue of entailing some metaphysically revisionary program or other (e.g., positing otherwise sui generis ontic models). If fitting artworks into the world in a manner consistent with their surrounding practices and conventions requires revising the world, at least in terms of the categories into which its inhabitants may be placed, then we ought to expect any art-ontological account to be to that extent revisionary, such that, insofar as one wants artworks in the world, any art-ontologically required revision had better aim at (and be wholly exhausted by) those art-relevant surrounding practices and conventions. Contemporary metaphysics being unable to provide ontic models sufficient for descriptivist artontology results not from some failure within contemporary metaphysics but rather from a failure within the philosophy of art: either of the descriptivist project itself or of art-realism tout court. Simply put, regardless of the descriptivist's concerns, merely insofar as we have any non-passing sympathy for realism about artworks, perhaps we ought to endorse DEFERENCE. Notice, however, at least in principle, that endorsing either DEFERENCE or INDEPENDENCE itself says nothing about whether one prefers their art-ontology revisionary or descriptivist. For example, one could coherently both be a descriptivist and adopt DEFERENCE; however, in so doing, one presumably would find any required revisions to art practice and convention to count against art-realism itself. Likewise, I suppose one could coherently both be a revisionist and adopt INDEPENDENCE; however, in so doing, one presumably would regard any required metaphysical revisions to be motivated by purely philosophical concerns (e.g., parsimony, logical consistency, arttheoretic coherence) rather than the preservation of the relevant surrounding practices and conventions. To be sure, the principal conflict between DEFERENCE and INDEPENDENCE may be best located at the level of the principal conflict between revisionary and descriptivist art ontology. However, what matters for my purposes here not only has little to do with the revisionary/descriptivist debate but is ultimately philosophically and methodologically prior to such debates. That is, I am principally concerned with the view we ought to take with respect to the relationship between contemporary metaphysics and the philosophy of art. Given the above, I suppose that any perceived tension between philosophical aesthetics and contemporary metaphysics looks quite simple to explain: most metaphysicians at least implicitly (or dispositionally) align with DEFERENCE while most aestheticians at least implicitly if not explicitly align with INDEPENDENCE. The problem with this dichotomy I take to be the following. The degree to which philosophical aesthetics aligns with INDEPENDENCE is the degree to which philosophical aesthetics distances itself from contemporary metaphysics and thereby the degree to which philosophical aesthetics insulates itself from the core of philosophy (i.e. neither properly informing nor being informed by that core). By contrast, the degree to which philosophical aesthetics aligns with DEFERENCE is the degree to which philosophical aesthetics holds its development and productivity hostage to a field in the main (if not wholly) unconcerned with art-theoretic considerations and thereby the degree to which philosophical aesthetics secures its status as a second-class philosophical field (i.e., one to which the core presumably contributes but from which presumably such contributions fail to be reciprocated). So, should metaphysicians largely ignore philosophy of art (though perhaps recently less so at least for a few peripherally related areas), philosophers of art may understandably see little reason to take their metaphysical strictures seriously for art ontology. Consequently, should the metaphysician take the occasional look at the art-ontological goings on within philosophy of art, she'll likely be confronted by all manner of non-standard ontic models if not also perhaps a few outright metaphysical monstrosities (e.g., causally efficacious abstracta, created things that necessarily cannot be destroyed, haphazardly stitched together object-kinds) and as a result see little reason to regard the philosophy of art as anything more than an island of misfit ontologies-thus beginning the cycle anew. All things considered, I think philosophy of art does itself no favors either from without by endorsing INDEPENDENCE or from within by endorsing DEFERENCE. For interactions and exchanges between metaphysics and philosophy of art to be more than sporadic and able to yield broadly productive results demands a re-evaluation of the way in which we view their relationship. Art-Abstracta & the Paradox of Standards In what follows, I target as an example the tension between philosophical aesthetics and contemporary metaphysics with respect to the broad account of abstract objects as standardly employed respectively therein. I show that the issue of art-abstracta appears to give rise to what I refer to as a paradox of standards: an art-ontological assumption, a metaphysical assumption, and an art-theoretical assumption, that though each be standard, if not foundational, within their respective domains of enquiry, when taken together nevertheless form an inconsistent set. I. There are such things as art-abstracta. II. Abstracta are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. III. An artwork must be created. What I call the paradox of standards arises when from any two of the above standard views we expect to arrive at the standard third view only to arrive instead at its denial (either explicitly as such or implicitly via or some inconsistent view non-standard within the same domain). Simply put, the paradox of standards occurs when we expect standard & standard to begat standard but instead find it to birth only non-standard. Note, however, that my analysis of the constituent assumptions largely concerns their status as standard rather than their individual truth or falsity. That is, I take the philosophical point of the paradox of standards to be that the issue of art-abstracta represents an informatively illustrative point about the relationship between the philosophy of art and metaphysics, and not just as a potential source of philosophical tension but also as a potential source of productive philosophical exchange. To that end, I provide a brief sketch of the three standard assumptions relevant to the paradox of standards. I then discuss the means by which it can be resolved (and the consequences thereof) for both those adopting DEFERENCE and those adopting INDEPENDENCE, showing the available methods of resolving the paradox according to either view incapable of doing so in a manner commensurate with a minimally responsible art-realism. From this, I suggest an alternative account as how best to view the relationship between philosophical aesthetics and contemporary metaphysics (what I call the RECIPROCITY view) and then discuss what consequences the relationship being so viewed may have for the ontology of art. However, before I begin, perhaps I should say a bit more about why I think it productive and illuminating to view the issue of artabstracta in terms of what I call the paradox of standards. Art ontology looks to be the natural intersection between philosophy of art and metaphysics. Any general art-theoretic enquiry can be broadly understood as investigating the nature of art in terms of the conditions under which something is and is not (or can and cannot be) an artwork. Likewise, any general ontological enquiry can be broadly understood as investigating the nature of the world in terms of the categorization of its onta. Presumably then, any art-ontological enquiry can be broadly understood as investigating the nature of the artworld in terms of the categorization of its onta: artworks (i.e., things in the world satisfying (or having the capacity to satisfy) the conditions for being art, whatever those may in fact be). From this, presumably one would likewise expect the standard assumptions operative for any broad art-ontological enquiry to be derived from, predicted by, or at least consistent with the standard assumptions operative for any broad art-theoretic or general ontological enquiry. After all, if the ontology of art lies at the intersection of philosophy of art and metaphysics, then we should expect to locate the standard views within the former where the standard views within the latter two intersect-from the standard views within any of the two, we should be able to arrive at some standard view within the third. The paradox of standards (or at least the appearance of such) occurs when from the standard views within any two domains we seem unable, upon pain of inconsistency, to arrive at anything other than some decidedly non-standard view within the third domain. Of course, the precise implications of the paradox of standards (and the available resolutions thereof) vary according to the way in which one views the relationship between philosophical aesthetics and contemporary metaphysics. Consider again the following assumptions that within their respective domains of enquiry appear to be not just standard but also at least prima facie plausible (if not prima facie evident).3 I. There are such things as art-abstracta. II. Abstracta are non-spatiotemporal and causally inert. III. An artwork must be created. 3 Predicated on these basic, standard assumptions are several further specified and standard positions, out of which one can further construct several inconsistent sets. The main point here is that this threat of inconsistency in standards can be avoided only by either outright denying one of the more basic, standard assumptions at issue or implicitly doing so via adopting some nonstandard position that itself cannot be coherently predicated upon one of those more basic, standard assumptions. Let's begin by considering (I): the standard art-ontological assumption that there are such things as art-abstracta.4 The general impetus for and broad attraction to positing artworks of a certain sort as abstracta ought to be relatively easy to grasp. Should one be a realist about artworks, supposing putatively repeatable artworks to be in some way or other abstract seems to preserve one's art-realism in a manner largely congruous with the principal metaphysical and semantic assumptions as informed by the relevant history, practices, and conventions surrounding such artworks. In fact, most positions within art-ontology are at their foundations predicated upon the same basic art-ontological assumption and united under the same broad art-ontological consensus, specifically that repeatability and non-repeatability more or less track the broad ontic kinds abstracta and concreta respectively. As such, a basic art-ontological assumption is that the principal ontological joint at which the artworld must be carved lies squarely between traditionally repeatable (multiple-instance) works of art, construed as abstracta, and traditionally non-repeatable (single-instance) works of art, construed as concreta. Subsequently, for the art-realist, commitment to art-abstracta looks to be not just a standard position within art-ontology but a basic working assumption of any prima facie viable art-ontological enquiry.5 Of course, anyone holding prior commitments to some sweeping general antirealism (or at least harboring such anti-realist sympathies with respect to art) will obviously have little trouble denying that there are such things as art-abstracta. Likewise, those already in possession of general nominalist commitments (or sharing such thoroughgoing sentiments) should find themselves no more inclined to endorse abstracta for novels, poetry, or concertos than for numbers, propositions, or concepts.6 4 The basic art-ontological argument for this I take to be pretty straightforward: 1. There are such things as artworks (Art-Realism). 2. Artworks are either repeatable or non-repeatable. 3. Repeatable artworks (or at least those of certain sorts) cannot be coherently or viably construed as concrete things. 4. So, if there are such sorts of artworks, then those artworks must be abstract things. 5. There are such artworks. 6. So, there are such things as art-abstracta. 5 Of course, within art ontology compete a wide variety of models of abstracta (e.g., unstructured universals, indicated/initiated types, action types, etc.). However, as to the general artontological commitment to abstracta, any substantive debate has heretofore been largely and conspicuously absent. 6 Others may find art-abstracta inconsistent with the peculiarities of some pet theory of art with which they have previously aligned (e.g., a particularly spartan aesthetic theory of art according to which aesthetic properties are strictly perceptual, strictly supervene on the physical, and are strictly uninheritable from token to type). Others still may simply suspect such construal to have little to do with objects as art. That is, while some members of the broad class of repeatable works appear patently to be artworks (e.g. Moby Dick, Hamlet, The Magic Flute, Piano Concerto No. 9), the class of repeatable works nevertheless remains a class for which being a member itself neither However, what matters for present purposes is that for those already located on the realist side of the debate, commitment to art-realism standardly entails commitment to art-abstracta. Now consider (II): the standard metaphysical assumption that abstracta are nonspatiotemporal and causally inert. To be sure, there are lively debates within contemporary metaphysics about the precise nature of abstract objects (including the method by which their natures ought to be characterized). However, should any general characterization of abstracta have a plausible claim to being standardly held, it clearly must be that abstracta are non-causal (especially given the standard, broad characterization of concreta as causally-efficacious material inhabitants of space-time).7 Lastly, consider (III): the standard art-theoretic assumption that an artwork must be created. Presumably this can be best viewed as the standard expression (or derivation) of one of the most basic and fundamentally intuitive necessary conditions for something's being art: an artwork must be the product of intentional action.8 As such, any art-theoretic enquiry-either in terms of the supporting claims therein or the resultant claims thereof-to be even prima facie viable as such must be consistent with artworks being created things. Furthermore, creation looks to require causation in the form of a causal chain from creator to created-the standard sense of 'create' and its cognates is one indicating a causal (if not causal-intentional) relation. As such, for any created thing, the manner in which that thing comes into existence ought not be metaphysically mysterious-in the case of artworks, they are the causal (causal-intentional) products of some agential action.9 The source of the tension between the above three standard assumptions should entails nor suggests being an artwork (e.g., cookbooks & stereo-instruction manuals, Muzak & doorbell chimes, office memos & grocery lists). So, the worry would then be what may be ontologically fertile for repeatable works simpliciter may turn out to be decidedly toxic for those works as art or perhaps more simply that all of the philosophical gravitas with which ontological debates about repeatable works of art (e.g., poems and symphonies) are conducted would quickly turn into abject philosophical absurdity for any similarly conducted debate about repeatable works of non-art (e.g., ringtones, wedding invitations, the Big Mac, the Corvette, and so forth). 7 For instance, Gideon Rosen (2001) considers the view of abstracta as causally inert to be more or less the standard view and so would presumably take his own contrarian account of abstracta (Burgess & Rosen 1997) to be to that extent non-standard. 8 For a more detailed discussion of the nature of art's intention-dependence, see (Mag Uidhir 2010). 9 For example, [Mid-Atlantic Ridge volcanoes were created by divergent tectonic plates] is standardly taken to entail Mid-Atlantic Ridge volcanoes being caused by divergent tectonic plates. Likewise, [Sara created a doghouse] is standardly taken to entail Sara having successfully engaged in such-and-such activities directed by so-and-so intentions, the causal product of which was a thing satisfying the conditions for being a doghouse, whatever those may be. now be obvious if not also familiar.10 The standard art-ontological story tells us that given but the simplest investigation of and reflection upon the nature of putatively repeatable artworks and the relevant surrounding practices and conventions (both linguistic and otherwise), any minimally defensible and coherent art-realism must construe repeatable art as abstract such that any minimally adequate art-realism must entail that there are such things as art-abstracta. However, from the standard metaphysical story about abstracta it follows not only that such things must be causally inert but also that if such things exist, then there can be no time at which those things do not exist-if they exist, they exist eternally. Furthermore, from the standard art-theoretic story about artwork creation, it follows that if something is a created thing, then there must be a time at which that thing did not exist-a created thing cannot exist prior to its creation and so cannot exist eternally. Further follows yet another standard assumption about creation, namely that creation requires causation-created things must stand in a causal (if not causal-intentional) relation to their creators.11 However, if abstracta must be causally inert, then as such, abstracta must be things incapable of standing in any causal relation whatsoever, let alone one in the robust causal-intentional sense of creation standardly assumed to underwrite the art-theoretic commitment to artworks being the products of intentional actions.12 Accordingly, there can be no such thing that is a created abstracta (an exclusionary fact which the standard characterizations of abstracta and creation clearly overdetermine). So, if there are such things as artworks and artworks must be created things, then artworks cannot be abstracta. Clearly an inconsistency is afoot. More importantly, however, the rather surprising, if not also disturbing, philosophical consequence of this inconsistency is that what actually lies at the intersection between our standard art-theoretic commitments and our standard metaphysical commitments is not some standard art-ontological commitment but instead the explicit negation of such.13 Again, the most interesting feature of the 10 A standard debate within the ontology of music centers around how to resolve the paradox of creation: i) musical works are abstracta, ii) musical works are created, iii) abstracta cannot be created. 11 It would then also follow that when considered relationally, creating any one kind of artwork (e.g., those of the standardly repeatable variety such as novels, symphonies, operas) ought to be metaphysically indistinct from creating an artwork of any other kind (e.g., those of the standardaly non-repeatable variety such as painting, sculpture, drawing). 12 This would also be the view of creation standard within contemporary metaphysics (French & Vickers 2011). 13 Consider the following crude but useful analogy. Suppose we have what appears to be a perfectly standard and straightforward recipe for gazpacho soup. However, when we follow this recipe perfectly step-by-step the result is not as expected-a chilled vegetarian soup-but instead something surprisingly far from it-a piping-hot beef stew. Furthermore, despite the fact that each step in our recipe for gazpacho soup at no point seems anything other than perfectly paradox of standards lies not in the nature of the inconsistency itself but rather in what that inconsistency-both itself as well as the available means by which it can be resolved-reveals about the current state of art ontology. Ultimately, the available means by which one may resolve the paradox of standards (and the impliciations thereof) depends entirely upon how one chooses to view the relationship between philosophy of art and contemporary metaphysics. In what follows, I discuss the resolutions to the paradox of standards consistent with preserving the standard art-ontological commitment to art-abstracta presumably available to those adopting DEFERENCE and to those choosing INDEPENDENCE. I then show that neither view can offer any adequate resolution to the paradox consistent with commitment to art-abstracta at least proportional to what is philosophically at stake (e.g., resolving the paradox by either bankrupting art-realism or by making all artworld onta hopelessly sui generis). As such, I claim we ought to adopt a third view regarding the relationship between philosophy of art and contemporary metaphysics-what I call the RECIPROCITY view. This view allows us to dissolve rather than resolve the paradox of standards as from RECIPROCITY it looks as if putatively standard art-ontological enquiry concerns neither art nor ontology and therefore to that extent is an 'ontology of art' in name only. Resolutions from DEFERENCE & INDEPENDENCE How might those inclined toward DEFERENCE resolve the paradox of standards so as to preserve standard art-ontological commitments? More importantly, given the nature of DEFERENCE, what might we reasonably expect to follow art-theoretically given commitment both to there being art abstracta and to abstracta being causally-inert nonspatiotemporal things? For example, Julian Dodd's sonicist view14 of musical works can be characterized as a DEFERENCE resolution to the paradox of standards that preserves standard artontological commitment to art-abstracta. According to Dodd, a musical work just is an unstructured universal, and such universals are nothing more than the standard sorts of abstracta-non-spatiotemporal and causally-inert eternal existants-with which we all ought to be already familiar. As such, Dodd concedes that it follows from this that musical works cannot be created things. Clearly what principally motivates Dodd's standard and straightforward, we nevertheless find that actually making gazpacho soup requires us at some point to deviate from that recipe, specifically by replacing one of its seemingly standard and straightforward steps with a decidedly non-standard and counter-intuitive alternative (or simply by skipping some such standard step altogether). 14 Most notably defended in Dodd (2007). sonicism is not just commitment to the standard art-ontological assumption that musical works must be abstracta but also a strict alignment with DEFERENCE. That is, should preserving our standard art-theoretic commitments (i.e., artworks must be created things) conflict with the preservation of our standard metaphysical commitments (i.e., abstracta must be non-spatiotemporal causally-inert things), then insofar as we take Dodd to adopt DEFERENCE, the standard metaphysical commitments must win out, regardless of how large the art-theoretical bullet we may be required to bite. The DEFERENCE resolution to this paradox of standards is to reject our standard arttheoretic commitment to art's intention-dependence, heading-off any threat of inconsistency or incoherence by rejecting a standard, basic art-theoretic assumption presumably in favor of some non-standard alternative according to which artworks needn't be intention-dependent whatsoever, let alone in a manner consistent with their being robustly created things. Of course, despite our frequent willingness to attempt as much, not all bullets can be bitten, especially in cases where the bullet in question is sufficiently non-standard so as to be Howitzer-sized.15 As such, standard art-ontological enquiry guided by DEFERENCE looks to be metaphysically responsible at the cost of being art-theorectically irresponsible. Consequently, for those wishing to preserve their standard art-ontological commitments, the DEFERENCE resolution to the paradox of standards seems to secure a metaphysical tidy art-ontology only to fill it with things that simply cannot be artworks.16 Perhaps the appearance of the paradox of standards is best taken not as evidence of something rotten in the current state of art ontology but instead as evidence of the current state of art ontology being more or less on the right track. That is, presumably an at least implicit assumption behind the paradox of standards, and any non-trivial philosophical consequences thereof, is that art and its various relata are in some relevant sense "standard" sorts of things. Should we assume as much, then of course we should likewise expect ontological enquiry directed at artworks (e.g., paintings, sculptures, novels, symphonies) to proceed more or less in the same general lines as ontological 15 The assumption that art needn't be intention-dependent is art-theoretically non-standard in precisely the same way the assumption that murder is wholesale morally permissible or even obligatory is non-standard within normative ethics. 16 Of course, for positions such as Dodd's sonicism to be consistent with standard art-theoretic assumptions, one need only qualify the relevant domain at issue. That is, if musical works must be construed according to the characterization of abstracta standard within contemporary metaphysics, then musical works cannot be artworks. So, for Dodd's sonicism to be arttheoretically responsible, he need only claim its domain to extend no further than musical works simpliciter such that sonicism is a position within musical ontology rather than a position within the ontology of art. Whether the addition of the claim that musical works cannot be artworks would somehow now render his view untenable is a matter best discussed elsewhere. enquiry directed at any relevantly similar non-art thing (e.g., tables, chairs, phone books, ringtones). However, should such an assumption be absent if not explicitly denied, we ought not be surprised to find that supporting art-realism in a manner consistent both with standard art-theorectic commitments as well as with standard art-world practices and conventions requires art-world onta be sui generis (or at least diverging to some nonnegligible extent from their more ordinary "standard" non-art kin). In fact, the more sui generis art appears to be the more we should expect art ontology to be populated not just with categories standardly unavailable on the ontological menu within contemporary metaphysics but with sui generis categories by definition off-menu (standardly or otherwise). As such, from the point of view of INDEPENDENCE, the appearance of the paradox of standards is not the result of art-ontological enquiry having made some meta-ontological mistake or cultivated some pernicious methodological insularity from contemporary metaphysics. Instead, the appearance of the paradox of standards is nothing more than the result of art-ontological enquiry being correctly adjusted so as to capture the radical ontic "insularity" of its subject.17 Given the above, how might those inclined toward INDEPENDENCE resolve the paradox of standards so as to preserve their standard art-ontological commitments? That is, what might one reasonably expect to follow for our general ontological commitments given both that artworks must be created things and that there can be such things as art abstracta? From the point of view of INDEPENDENCE, should our basic art-ontological aims require for their satisfaction some degree of departure from the standard characterization of abstracta, such departures then are not only warranted but required. Consequently, the good-making features of any art-ontological position should principally concern not those traditionally recognized as such within metaphysics (e.g., internal coherence, ontological parsimony, etc.) but instead those concerning the theory's descriptivist pedigree (e.g., the extent to which it explains, supports, makes sense of, or is at least consistent with, the relevant surrounding practices and conventions). Perhaps in order to preserve commitment to art-abstracta, rather than endorse some radically non-standard metaphysical or art-theoretic claim so as resolve to the paradox of standards, one might instead more cautiously split the difference between the two. That is, one might endorse some moderately non-standard view according to which 17 Perhaps what the previous analysis has shown with respect to DEFERENCE and the ontology of art is that the degree to which art-ontology is deferential to the standard characterization of abstracta within contemporary metaphysics is the degree to which there being artworks so construed either runs afoul of basic art-theoretic considerations or fails to make adequate sense of the relevant surrounding art practices and conventions. there are certain sorts of abstracta (e.g., impure sets, indicated types) that can come into, if not also go out of, existence so as thereby to preserve abstracta as causally inert while nevertheless denying that if abstracta exist, they must do so eternally. One need then simply deny that creation strictly requires causation via committing to some nonstandard (and likely stipulative) sense of create according to which creation minimally need be neither causal nor causal-intentional but merely a matter of ontologicaldependence (e.g., Moby Dick names some impure abstractum that Herman Melville created in virtue of his having created some concrete thing-the manuscript-upon which that impure abstractum coming into existence ontological depends). Of course, absent some strict causation requirement, this non-standard (stipulative) sense of creation looks to trade a basic and substantive art-theoretic necessary condition [artworks must be the products of intentional actions] for its comparatively trivial cousin [artworks must be ontologically dependent upon the products of intentional action]. Furthermore, absent some principled, non-arbitrary distinction between ontologically-dependent things that are creation-compatible (e.g., the manuscript) and those which are creation-incompatible (e.g., its impure singleton), appeal to non-causal creation threatens an unchecked, rampant proliferation of creation, such that, given even a moderately permissive realism about impure abstracta, from but few acts of artistic creation would likely flow transfinitely many created things. Additionally, without a strict causal requirement for creation, the precise nature of how such abstracta could come into existence-whether in number modest or absurd-would nevertheless conspicuously remain metaphysically mysterious. Alternatively, one might adopt a more radically non-standard account of abstracta, specifically one according to which abstracta can themselves, not just by some causal proxy, enter into causal relations with other things.18 By holding art-abstracta to be causally efficacious, one can then retain the standard causation sense of artistic creation so as to provide not only a decidedly non-mysterious explanation as to how such things can come into and presumably go out of existence but also the means by which to preclude their unchecked proliferation. Trouble is, however, that the extent to which this method successfully resolves the paradox of standards appears to be the extent to which putatively repeatable artworks look to be construed less and less as abstracta and more and more as concreta.19 After all, if Moby Dick names the causal product of certain of 18 To be sure, there are those within contemporary metaphysics who argue for alternative (nonstandard) views of abstract objects: e.g., see Hale (1987) and Burgess & Rosen (1997). 19 It would then also follow that when considered relationally, creating any one kind of artwork (e.g., those of the standardly repeatable variety such as novels, symphonies, operas) ought to be Herman Melville's successfully executed intention-directed activities, then prima facie Moby Dick looks name some concrete thing, the ontological particulars of which would be a matter of debate between competing variants of concreta.20 From the point of view of INDEPENDENCE, resolution to the paradox of standards so as to preserve our standard art-ontological commitments demands rejecting the standard characterization of abstracta in favor of some non-standard characterization more commensurate with both our standard art-theoretic commitments as well as those relevant surrounding art practices and conventions. The degree to which this can be successful is the degree to which the alternative characterization of abstracta is nonstandard (i.e., abstracta as located causally-efficacious created things); however, such non-standard sorts of 'abstracta' can quickly seem more and more like concreta (e.g., from standard sorts of physical objects, events, processes, to the non-standard mereological fusions or four-dimensional space-time compositions thereof). As such, the appeal to non-standard characterizations of abstracta doesn't so much preserve realism about art-abstracta as collapse it into art-ontological nominalism (though likely one with some comparatively exotic variant of concreta in tow). Given the options from DEFERENCE and INDEPENDENCE, resolving the paradox of standards so as to preserve our standard art-ontological commitments looks entail an art ontology that is either art-theoretically irresponsible-likely one having a domain unrestricted by even the most basic of art-theoretic constraints-or radically sui generis metaphysically-likely predicated (if only partially so) upon some sweeping, general metaontological view commensurate with a rampant art-ontological promiscuity.21 Although art ontology ought to be ideally located at the intersection of aesthetics and metaphysics, the extent to which art ontology, in its actual current state can be located thusly depends entirely upon the extent to which the paradox of standards can be coherently resolved. Regardless of the option one chooses to preserve standard art- at least broadly metaphysically indistinct from creating an artwork of any other kind (e.g., those of the standardaly non-repeatable variety such as painting, sculpture, drawing). 20 For example, Amie Thomasson-most notably in (1999)-claims fictional characters to be abstract artifacts. However, the more such accounts employ (or are at least implicitly predicated upon) standard notions of create and artifact the less fictional characters look traditionally abstract and the more they instead look to be concreta (if not of the traditional sort then at least some exotic variant thereof). 21 For example, Amie Thomasson (2010, 2008, 2007) advances a meta-ontological position according to which ontological enquiry ought to be a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. My worry here is that philosophers of art already sympathetic to INDEPENDENCE may unreflectively consider Thomasson's work in art-ontology (2010, 2006) to license appeal to putatively sui generis onta within their own work and thereby neglect to consider the fact that doing so entails some pretty hefty and sweeping meta-ontological consequences that extend well beyond the domain of ontological inquiry into art. ontological assumptions, the result nevertheless remains the same: an ontology of art that suspiciously looks to be about neither art nor ontology and to that extent, 'ontology of art' in name only. That such results are less than philosophically palatable I take to suggest that we should view the relationship between philosophy of art and metaphysics in a manner other than that of DEFERENCE or INDEPENDENCE. Instead, we ought to adopt the view from which the most art-theoretically and metaphysically responsible ontology of art can follow.22 An Alternative View As an alternative to DEFERENCE and INDEPENDENCE, I advance a third option that I take to be a far more productive and eminently more reasonable view about the relationship between metaphysics and philosophical aesthetics. I call this the RECIPROCITY view. THE RECIPROCITY VIEW: Any responsible art ontology should be grounded in a responsible metaphysics, and any responsible metaphysics, at the end of the day, ought to be able to make sense of art. That is, aesthetics ought to inherit its art ontological categories from a responsible metaphysics, and all things considered, a responsible metaphysics ought to carve out ontological categories capable of coherently grounding central issues in philosophical aesthetics (e.g., aesthetic properties, the ontology of art, etc.). Consider that most, I assume, hold something like RECIPROCITY with respect to the relationship between philosophy of science and metaphysics, such that, presumably whatever one's metaphysical commitments, if at the end of the day those metaphysical commitments are incompatible with a coherent account of species, then one ought to seriously rethink those metaphysical commitments. Likewise, any account of species in philosophy of biology ought to be compatible with the ontological categories in play for 22 A metaphysician might wonder why philosophers of art do not simply abandon the appeal to abstracta in favor of a neo-Aristotelian account of universals such as D.M. Armstrong's (1978) view according to which universals are multiply located but nevertheless concrete, which would allow for repeatable artworks to be both spatiotemporally located and causally active without thereby collapsing into art-ontological nominalism (thanks to L.A. Paul for suggesting this). Of course, given that ante rem realism (i.e., universals wholly exist outside their instantiations) promises no improvement over the abstracta model, one must be an in re realist about repeatable artworks (i.e., that they wholly exist within their instantiations) in order to avoid the paradox of standards. However, the in re realist position looks no less potentially revisionary with respect to the way in which the folk talk about artworks than would any standard nominalist construal. More precisely, if making sense of the relevant surrounding practices and conventions explain the appeal to abstracta in the first place, then I suspect that an ontic model according to which Moby Dick is currently (and simultaneously) located in Paris, Dallas, Angkor Wat, and Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station would likely prove ill-suited for those with descriptivist inclinations. any responsible metaphysics. So too then I suggest RECIPROCITY as how to view the relationship between philosophy of art and metaphysics. That is, if at the end of the day, one's metaphysical commitments preclude a coherent account of art, then one should seriously reconsider one's metaphysical commitments.23 Likewise, any specification of art-realism in philosophical aesthetics ought to be compatible with the ontological categories in play for any responsible metaphysics.24 Of course, RECIPROCITY should not be taken to entail or even to suggest that the relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics must be one of equal influence-that there are points of exchange doesn't suggest that such exchanges must by any means be equal in both directions. This shouldn't be surprising. That is, we really ought to expect exchanges with metaphysics to be frontloaded for aesthetics and exchanges with aesthetics to be at the backend for metaphysics (hence the presence of the 'at the end of the day' clause for metaphysics). Although according to RECIPROCITY, aesthetics bears the heavier burden in the relationship (contra INDEPENDENCE), it nevertheless constitutes a non-negligible burden on metaphysics (contra DEFERENCE)-at least in this respect, aesthetics appears no different than ethics. Moreover, adopting RECIPROCITY doesn't mean that the metaphysician must pause to consider the consequences of her view for (or whether her view aligns with) any and all issues central to aesthetics and its cognate areas; nor does it mean that the philosopher of art must pause to consider whether her view is compatible with all issues central to contemporary metaphysics. Rather, the principal thrust of RECIPROCITY simply is that there are at least some substantive and critical issues about which both would do well to pause and consider the other.25 It is precisely at these substantive and central points of commonality that productive and 23 For example, should standard metaphysical commitments preclude coherent realism about the sorts of things standardly taken to be paragons of human achievement (e.g., Moby Dick, Hamlet, The Magic Flute, The Eroica Symphony), those commitments nevertheless being consistent with some banal realism about tables, chairs, and lumps of clay should provide any metaphysician naught but cold comfort. Similarly, any responsible philosophy of language conducting inquiry into aesthetic or taste predicates ought to be consistent with and be informed by the very domain within which such predicates are standard parts of the critical discourse. 24 Interestingly from this it seems to follow that one method aestheticians could employ to ensure purchase in a responsible metaphysics is to model ontological categories for art after those responsibly in play for species which perhaps suggests that any aesthetician holding a dim view of contemporary metaphysics should consider instead adopting RECIPROCITY with respect to the relationship between aesthetics and philosophy of science. For related issues in the relationship between metaphysics and philosophy of science, see Paul (forthcoming). 25 After all, the ontic categories standardly available within contemporary metaphysics being insufficient to support anything other than a bankrupt art-realism rather strongly suggests their being likewise insufficient to support realism about any other product of intention action-if there are no such things as films, novels, paintings, plays, poems, sculptures, songs, and symphonies, then surely just as equally unreal must be such things as chairs, commercials, governments, grocery lists, instruction manuals, nations, office memos, ringtones, and tables. informative exchanges can occur, and it is precisely around such points of commonality that philosophy of art ought to principally revolve. Consider the consequences for art ontology on RECIPROCITY. Presumably, those inclined toward such a view would resolve the paradox of standards by restricting artworld onta to those standard within contemporary metaphysics checked against standard art-theoretic assumptions. That is, if what it is to be an artwork is minimally to be such-and-such a thing, then art-ontological enquiry ought to be circumscribed according to those ontic categories standardly available within contemporary metaphysics under which such-and-such things may coherently fall. Should one quite reasonably think art theory is prior to (and ought to act as a constraints upon) art-ontology, then in cases of conflict with respect to the mutual preservation of the standard commitments within, art theory must win out. From the point of view of DEFERENCE, there arises a conflict between our commitment to artabstracta and our commitment to artwork creation, and as such, anyone privileging our art-theoretic commitments must reject art-abstracta. Likewise, those endorsing DEFERENCE can take no methodological solace in the fact that the ontology of art may productively appropriate (in lieu of fashioning their own) such non-standard accounts- after all, DEFERENCE demands philosophy of art be deferential to abstracta within contemporary metaphysics as standardly conceived, such that, the extent to which adequately answering art-ontological inquiries requires endorsing a non-standard account of abstracta-and thereby rejecting abstracta as standardly conceived as an object-kind permissibly admitting art-objects-just is the extent to which art-ontological enquiry demands a broadly metaphysically revisionary answer. Although no doubt an in-principle option, absent some controversial and sweeping meta-ontological position sufficiently underwriting INDEPENDENCE, solving for art-ontological worries by denying the standard view of abstracta in contemporary metaphysics should strike us as a wildly disproportionate, counter-productive, and likely ad hoc method of preserving realism about artworks. This suggests that there are but two ways in which to secure an art-realism that is both art-theoretically and metaphysically responsible. The first is to endorse a thoroughgoing art-ontological nominalism, such that, if there are such things as artworks, then artworks must be concrete things. The second simply is to abandon our commitment to art-realism (at least insofar as putatively repeatable artworks are concerned) and instead embrace a radical art-ontological/art-theoretic eliminativism or adopt an anti-realist fictionalism, such that, for any problematic art onta purged from the world there is some useful art ficta ready to take its place. The broad methodological implication of RECIPROCITY for philosophy of art I take to be this: prior to declaring abstracta essential fixtures in the art-ontological fundament, we ought to make sure that the sort of thing an artwork must minimally be can coherently be the sort of thing that an abstract object must minimally be, at least as standardly conceived in contemporary metaphysics. That is, in order to secure a responsible art-ontology, we ought not blithely commit to art-abstracta. Instead, a responsible ontology of art, in addition to requiring us to ensure our art-theoretic houses are in order, also demands that we philosophically reflect on the nature of abstract objects from outside so that we can then responsibly reflect on the nature of abstracta against some fixed art-theoretic background. Perhaps adopting RECIPROCITY will ultimately change little about the way we think about art ontology other than justifying or increasing our warrant for thinking it that way in the first place. Alternatively, and far more likely), perhaps a responsibly constructed art-ontology would look quite different. For example, it might be the case that the principal work done under the auspices of RECIPROCITY ultimately reveals nominalism to win out.26 Or less drastically, perhaps we'll simply find artworks to be no more special an ontic sort than the relevant works of any putatively more mundane sort (e.g., poems no more ontologically special a thing than office memos, novels no stranger sort an object than stereo-instruction manuals, and symphonies no more metaphysically complex than advertising jingles) and thereby accordingly expect the ontology of art and the ontology of ordinary objects to be similarly populated at least with respect to the models their respective study takes to be available. Of course, we can further specify the implications of RECIPROCITY by taking it together with the preference for either revisionary or descriptivist art-ontology. For instance, were we to endorse RECIPROCITY along with a descriptivist model, it would follow that we ought to count as legitimate ontic kinds for art-ontology all and only those ontic kinds standard within contemporary metaphysics sufficiently able to adequately capture art practices and conventions. Notice, however, that on such a view, the likely consequence of the ontological categories standard within contemporary metaphysics proving insufficient for adequately capturing basic art practices and conventions is a bankrupt realism about artworks. Of course, no matter how deeply held our art-realism may be, it surely must have some threshold that once crossed (e.g., via recourse to ontological gerrymandering and sui generis ontic kinds) can no longer be 26 On a purely speculative front, I think that should aesthetics experience anything approximating a philosophical upheaval in the near future, it most likely will be in the form of nominalism establishing itself as the dominant art-ontological position. held without revision (i.e., any prima facie viable realism for artworks must entail nominalism about art-abstracta) or cannot be held simpliciter (i.e., there can be no viable realism for artworks and so, there can be no such things that are artworks). By contrast, were we to endorse RECIPROCITY along with a revisionary model, we ought, all else being equal, to count as legitimate ontic kinds for art-ontology all and only those ontic kinds standard within contemporary metaphysics sufficiently able to adequately capture basic art-practices and conventions. All else not being equal, however, we ought to hold purely metaphysical/logical considerations (e.g., ontological parsimony) as trumping any subsequently accrued revisions to art practice and convention. Ultimately, the general methodological implication of RECIPROCITY, at least with respect to art and abstracta, is that if works of a certain sort, absent art-theoretic considerations, are best construed as abstracta, then it does not likewise follow that the putative art status of works of that certain sort thereby entails or suggests abstracta as a legitimate ontic kind for artworks. Simply put, our principal methodology should not consist of i) inquiring as to the putatively art-relevant sorts of works, ii) constructing ontic models best suited for works of those sorts (not as artworks but as works of those sorts simplicter), iii) declaring the resultant constructed ontic kinds legitimate kinds for art ontology, then iv) deflecting charges of practicing capricious metaphysics via an unreflective, cherry-picked appeal to some controversial and sweepingly revisionary methodological or meta-ontological indict of general ontological enquiry itself at least as standardly conducted.27 Rather, we must first inquire as to the sort of thing an artwork must minimally be (e.g., the product of intentional action), look to contemporary metaphysics to find the general ontic kinds consistent with that minimal account, and then, and only then, can we responsibly ground a legitimate art-ontological domain (and declare those ontic kinds exhaustive of its limits). The principal methodological lesson that follows, should we decide to adopt RECIPROCITY, is that the more we find art-ontology to reckon as legitimate metaphysically queer or sui generis kinds of things, the more we ought to suspect artontology of being either blind to basic art-theoretic considerations or principally motivated by considerations well beyond the purview of contemporary metaphysics- either way an 'ontology of art' in name only. This suggests that at least insofar as we want to be art-realists, adopting RECIPROCITY may well require seriously reconsidering, revising, or perhaps even outright rejecting many of our basic art-ontological assumptions. Any sustained fruitful exchange between philosophy of art and 27 After all, we should be shocked to find that merely something's being art requires it to be radically ontically distinct from its nearest non-art kin. contemporary metaphysics must be located at the points within each where the one takes the other seriously, and as such, the extent to which we allow these points of exchange to remain absent is the extent to which the methodologies guiding the relevant enquiries remain philosophically irresponsible and ipso facto the extent to which the result of any such enquiry so guided is not itself worth taking seriously.28 Where DEFERENCE and INDEPENDENCE marginalize, enervate, and insulate the philosophy of art, RECIPROCITY legitimizes, invigorates, and integrates. It is through RECIPROCITY that philosophy of art must be taken seriously because it is from the point of view of RECIPROCITY that it becomes capable of grounding productive and informative exchanges with other philosophical fields-no more able to be neglected, ignored, or outright dismissed than philosophy of science. For our view of the relationship between philosophical aesthetics and other areas of philosophy to default to anything other than RECIPROCITY is for the philosophical enquiry we conduct at the relevant intersections to be ultimately self-undermining. To neglect or ignore the ways in which, or outright deny the very fact that, issues within aesthetics can substantively and productively inform issues without requires favoring negligence, ignorance, and unmitigated arrogance over philosophical progress. A responsible metaphysics is one for which its standard commitments in the relevant areas of overlap are themselves informed by and consistent with standard art-theoretic considerations and commitments. As such, the extent to which metaphysics is irresponsible is the extent to which its standard metaphysical inquiry conducted at the relevant areas of overlap ignores, neglects, or dismisses standard art-theoretic considerations and commitments. RECIPROCITY entails that philosophers of art must defer only to a responsible metaphysics, such that, the extent to which metaphysical enquiry at the relevant overlap conducts itself irresponsibly is the extent to which philosophers of art needn't defer to the results thereof. To be sure, RECIPROCITY entails that philosophy of art must be deferential, but this is not some mealy-mouthed 28 To be sure, the last decade or so has seen a dramatic increase in the number of significant and exciting exchanges between aesthetics and putatively core philosophical areas, not just in the more obvious overlap areas (e.g., the nature of fiction & theory of depiction) but also in areas traditionally considered to be largely in the domain of philosophical aesthetics (e.g., the ontology of music, aesthetic concepts, predicates, judgments, and testimony). Ideally this recent increase in philosophy of art's exchange rate would be the product of some newly fashioned methodology driven by a heretofore largely absent general, serious, and substantive philosophical concern for all things art and aesthetic. However, the less than ideal fact of the matter is that often such exchanges seem to progress in a manner incommensurate, if not outright inconsistent, with their being substantively, let alone principally, motivated or constrained by basic art-theoretic considerations. As such, this increase is perhaps best viewed not so much as the product of a philosophical appreciation for aesthetics as a philosophical appropriation from aesthetics. deference to metaphysics simpliciter but instead a properly earned deference to a responsible metaphysics. Just as only in the presence of such a fully responsible metaphysics does RECIPROCITY collapse into DEFERENCE, should such a responsible metaphysics be fully absent, does RECIPROCITY collapse into INDEPENDENCE,29 and just as DEFERENCE seems well-earned when underwritten by a responsible metaphysics, INDEPENDENCE looks far less radical a position when underwritten by the irresponsibility of metaphysics than when underwritten by the deep metaphysical queerness of artworks. Conclusion In the end, I take the paradox of standards (or at least the appearance thereof) neither to impugn the general philosophical merits of work currently being done within the ontology of art nor-despite my own thoroughgoing art-ontological nominalism-to vindicate any particular view therein. What the paradox of standards ultimately reveals is that insofar as philosophers of art and metaphysicians view the relationship between their respective domains in terms of INDEPENDENCE or DEFERENCE, neither can responsibly conduct philosophical enquiry at what would otherwise be eminently productive and informative points of exchange. Absent the move toward RECIPROCITY, metaphysicians will likely continue to inexplicably neglect the paragon sorts of human achievement (whilst fretting over how best to make sense of its utterly banal kin) and philosophers of art will likely respond in similar fashion by defaulting to the metaphysical queerness of art (thereby further retreating into insularity and obsolescence). For any philosophical enquiry at the relevant overlap areas between aesthetics and other domains to be responsible and productive comes at a price, a price all participating sides must pay. To be sure, philosophy of art looks to bear most of the expense; however, the other side nevertheless incurs a non-negligible cost in that at the end of the day, it must make sense of art.30 References Burgess, John & Gideon Rosen. 1997. A Subject with no Object. Oxford University Press. 29 The difference, of course, being that to move from RECIPROCITY to INDEPENDENCE no longer requires that art be in principle ontologically sui generis. 30 In this minimal yet substantive sense, for example, ought philosophy of art itself inform contemporary metaphysics, and in so doing might philosophy of art then come to stand in the same sort of relation to metaphysics (with all due respect and apologies to philosophy of science) as applied ethics does to meta-ethics. Dodd, Julian. 2007. Works of Music: An Essay in Ontology. Oxford University Press. French, Steven & Peter Vickers. 2011. Are There No Things that are Scientific Theories? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62(4): 771-804. Hale, Bob. 1987. Abstract Objects. Oxford University Press. Paul, L.A. forthcoming. Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden's Tale. Philosophical Studies, special issue on Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science. Rosen, Gideon. 2001. Abstract Objects. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Thomasson, Amie. 1999. Fiction and Metaphysics. Cambridge University Press. Thomasson, Amie. 2010. Ontological Innovation in Art. Journal of Aesthetics & Art Criticism 68(2): 119-130. Thomasson, Amie. 2006. Debates about the Ontology of Art: What are We Doing Here? Philosophy Compass 1(3): 245-255.

Knowledge Entails Dispositional Belief David Rose (Rutgers) & Jonathan Schaffer (Rutgers) Draft of April 2nd, 2012 Orthodoxy has it that knowledge entails belief, but the case of the unconfident examinee has been said (Woozley 1952: 155; Radford 1966) to show otherwise: Unconfident examinee: Kate is taking a history test. She had studied carefully and has been doing well on all the questions so far. She has now reached the final question, which reads "What year did Queen Elizabeth die?" As Kate reads this question she feels relief, since she had expected this question and memorized the answer. But before Kate can pause to recall the date, the teacher interrupts and announces that there is only one minute left. Now Kate panics. Her grip tightens around her pen. Her mind goes blank, and nothing comes to her. She feels that she can only guess. So, feeling shaken and dejected, she writes "1603"-which is of course exactly the right answer. Kate is said to know since she answers correctly, but to lack belief since she feels no confidence in her answer. So runs the leading challenge to the orthodox view that knowledge entails belief. Unconfident examinee received sustained attention in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but the discussion ended in stalemate. Discussants were largely agreed that the matter turned on "when, in what situations, English speakers say or would say that someone knows or does not know" (Radford 1966: 5), but they disagreed about what English speakers would say, and-perhaps thinking that facts about the usage of ordinary language should be transparent-they lacked any further means to proceed past such disagreements. Thus the dominant response came to be Armstrong's (1969: 35) dismissive response: "I do not think that it is one of those clear cases that can be used as a test of a philosophical analysis." And so orthodoxy has stood. Experimental philosophy provides new tools for resolving stalemates over what people will say. One asks (using psychological tools to devise the questions, and statistical tools to assess the answers). In this way Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) have advanced the discussion, converting Unconfident examinee and four similar cases into empirical surveys. They (forthcoming: §3) report the following results: "A majority of respondents ascribed knowledge in our five scenarios, while only a minority ascribed belief," estimating that "perhaps about half" of their respondents had intuitions conforming to the view that knowledge does not entail belief. And so it may seem that orthodoxy should fall. We applaud Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel for advancing the discussion in this way, and would only question their conclusion. We offer new empirical data supporting a new philosophical reply to the case, and conclude- shocking as it may sound for work in experimental philosophy-that the orthodox armchair view withstands empirical scrutiny. Our reply is that Kate does believe-in the relevant sense-that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. The epistemologically relevant sense of belief is not the occurrent notion of a thought consciously endorsed but rather the dispositional notion of information available to mind. Kate-though she lacks occurrent belief-still has dispositional belief since she has the information stored in mind from her studies and indeed draws on it to "guess" rightly. Her dispositional belief is merely masked by her temporary panic. We provide empirical support for this reply by reviewing Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results, and then presenting new variants of their studies which specifically elicit the 2 dispositional conception of belief (while removing biases: one of their five studies involves negative moral valence). We find that people's intuitions revert to conformity with the view that knowledge entails (dispositional) belief. In short, we redid Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's studies to clarify the relevant dispositional notion of belief and reversed their results. 1. The Unconfident Examinee has Dispositional Belief The case of Unconfident examinee represents the leading challenge to the orthodox idea that knowledge entails belief. We begin by clarifying the orthodox view and the dispositional notion of belief it involves, in order to explain why we think that Unconfident examinee fails as a counterexample: the unconfident examinee has dispositional belief. 1.1 The entailment thesis Knowledge is widely thought to entail belief. This idea-labeled 'the entailment thesis' by Lehrer (1968: 491)-traces back at least to Plato's Theatetus, where knowledge is identified with true belief plus a logos. This idea is then codified in Gettier's (1963: 121) presentation of the traditional view as analyzing knowledge as justified true belief, preserved in the post-Gettier view that knowledge is justified true belief plus some fourth component, and retained even in Williamson's (2000: 41-8) primitivist break from the post-Gettier view. The entailment thesis is widely endorsed because it seems intuitively plausible. For instance, if Moore knows that he has hands, then it seems to follow that Moore believes that he has hands. After all, how could Moore know that he has hands if he doesn't even believe it? The entailment thesis is also widely endorsed because it seems theoretically apt, reflecting an aspect of the idea that knowledge involves fit from mind to world. If the subject does not believe a given truth, then it seems as if her mind has thereby failed to fit the world in this respect, and she thereby does not deserve the credit for achieving knowledge of this point. The entailment thesis may be regimented in various ways, but the simplest and most natural regimentation is via the following schema (Armstrong 1969: 21): First pass: if s knows that p, then s believes that p It is worth noting that the guiding idea behind the entailment thesis is more neutral than First pass might suggest. The guiding idea might be described-in admittedly vague terms-as the idea that where there is knowledge, the subject will have the relevant pro-attitude toward something relevantly connected to the object of knowledge. First pass adds a binary conception of knowledge as a relation between a subject s and proposition p. 1 First pass also adds the ideas that the relevant pro-attitude is belief, that belief is a binary relation between a subject s and proposition p, and that the relevantly connected object of this attitude is the same as the object of knowledge. 2 But the additions of First pass are largely peripheral to our discussion, and so we proceed from First pass for simplicity and definiteness. 1 One might think that knowledge involves additional arguments such as a contrast proposition (Schaffer 2005), or that knowledge is not a relation to a proposition or some other representation of reality but rather to a fact or some other portion of reality itself (Vendler 1972). 2 One might think that the relevant pro-attitude is acceptance rather than belief (Cohen 1989), or that belief involves additional arguments such as a degree argument (a view that traces back at least to Locke's Essays, Book 4, chs. 1519), or that the relevant object of belief is related to but still different from the object of knowledge (for instance, Vendler (1978: 86) says of "the venerable formula: x knows that p iff x believes that p, p, and (something or other)" that he only asks for it to be amended to "x knows that p iff x believes that 'p', etc."). 3 It is also worth noting that the guiding idea behind the entailment thesis may be less neutral than First pass might suggest. For the guiding idea also seems to involve the claim that the entailment in question is analytic. The entailment is not narrowly logical insofar as it depends on the interpretation of the 'knowledge' and 'belief' predicates, but it is not merely metaphysical (like the entailment from being water to being H2O) in a way that is invisible to conceptual analysis. But these matters-and the vexed notion of analyticity they involve-are also largely peripheral to our discussion. What is central to our discussion is a clarification of the notion of belief involved. The relevant conception of belief is not occurrent belief in the sense of a thought consciously endorsed, but rather dispositional belief in the sense of information available to mind. We thus see fit to amend First pass to make this explicit, and so work with: Final pass: if s knows that p, then s dispositionally believes that p In short: knowledge entails dispositional belief. 1.2 Occurrent and dispositional belief The distinction between the occurrent and dispositional conceptions of belief-marked explicitly in Final pass-traces back at least to Ryle's (1949: 135) account of belief as "a propensity," and subsequent commentators-such as Campbell (1967)-who sought to make room for both Ryle's dispositional conception and an equally legitimate "episodic" conception. 3 The basic contrast is between a thought consciously endorsed ("occurrent belief"), and information available to mind for endorsement ("dispositional belief"). We take it that both are perfectly legitimate conceptions, and that the English word 'believe' is moreover polysemous between an occurrent and a dispositional sense. 4 Occurrent belief is something like explicit judgment, involving the conscious endorsement of the content. It is the mental counterpart of overt assertion. Arguably it involves a distinctive phenomenology: there is something characteristic that it is like to enjoy an occurrent belief, and perhaps there is even something characteristic for each content occurrently believed. 5 A normal human being has a relatively sparse handful of occurrent beliefs at any given time, and may have no occurrent beliefs at many times (such as when her mind goes blank, or when she is asleep). But occurrent belief is clearly not the sense of belief relevant to the entailment thesis. If occurrent belief were required for knowledge one would know far too little. A normal human adult knows all sorts 3 Campbell (1967: 206) also argues that the occurrent ("episodic") conception is more fundamental than the dispositional conception, since the relevant dispositions include: "the tendency to react to some of the relevant situations with episodic belief." Price (1969) distinguishes the traditional "occurrence analysis" of belief in terms of an introspectible mental act, from the "modern" "dispositional analysis" in terms of overt behavior. Lycan 1988 (ch. 3) and Audi 1994 offer related pluralistic taxonomies. See Schwitzgebel 2010 (§§2.1-2.2) for a useful overview of these matters. 4 Though we think that 'believe' is polysemous, our discussion is compatible with thinking of 'believe' as fully ambiguous, or as having a single neutral meaning which is fleshed out in different ways in different contexts (Ludlow 2008), or even as only naturally having the occurrent meaning so long as a stipulative dispositional meaning can readily be created on the fly. Indeed we aren't even committed to thinking that 'believe' has an occurrent meaning. Our minimal commitment is just that (i) there are multiple meanings for 'believe,' (ii) MyersSchulz and Schwitzgebel's studies did not uniformly elicit the epistemically relevant reading, and (iii) the techniques we used to re-do their studies did more to uniformly elicit the epistemically relevant reading. See §3.1 for further discussion. 5 In this vein, Horgan and Tienson (2002: 526) argue that not only is the occurrent belief state associated with a characteristic phenomenology, and not only are occurrent belief contents also associated with a characteristic phenomenology, but moreover this phenomenology partly constitutes both the state and its content. 4 of mundane propositions about her own personal life, current events, basic arithmetic, and various other topics at any given time (even when her mind goes blank; even when she is asleep). For instance, a normal human adult will have known that 7+5=12 since early childhood without interruption, while only occurrently believing this on a handful of scattered occasions. Indeed a normal human adult will know all sorts of basic arithmetic truths without having explicitly considered them even once. Accordingly, the sense of belief relevant to the entailment thesis is not occurrent belief but dispositional belief. The abundance of mundane propositions that most human adults know at any given time-including the many truths of basic arithmetic-are believed in the sense of being available to mind for endorsement. This is a dispositional notion, not an occurrent notion. It involves no characteristic phenomenology, but merely a disposition to such phenomenology. A normal human being may well have infinitely many dispositional beliefs at any given moment. Klein's (1999) defense of infinitism provides a vivid illustration of the importance of distinguishing occurrent from dispositional beliefs. Infinitism is the view that justification for a given proposition p requires a limitless sequence of reasons r1, r2, ... such that r1 is a reason for p, r2 is a reason for r1, ... The classic objection to infinitism-tracing back at least to Aristotle's Posterior Analytics-is that our finite minds could not possibly hold the infinitude of beliefs that would be required to possess propositional justification so understood. Klein (1999: 300) rebuts this classic objection by noting that it trades on the (irrelevant) occurrent conception of belief: "Humans have many beliefs that are not occurrent. It is the non-occurrent sense of 'belief' that the members of an infinite series of reasons might be subjectively available to S." Our finite minds cannot hold an infinite series of occurrent beliefs, but they can ground an infinite series of dispositional beliefs. The example of infinitism is useful not only for showing the philosophical relevance of the distinction between occurrent and dispositional belief, but also for showing how easy it is to confuse these closely related notions. The classic objection to infinitism seems compelling. Not for nothing did it persuade Aristotle and virtually all other participants to the discussion prior to Klein. So it should not be too surprising if it turns out-as we suggest-that the participants to the discussion of the case of the unconfident examinee suffered the very same tempting confusion. 1.3 Why the unconfident examinee has dispositional belief So far we have introduced the entailment thesis and clarified the relevant dispositional notion of belief. It is time to return to Unconfident examinee, which surfaces in skeletal form (targeting the claim that knowledge requires certainty) in Woozley (1952: 155): "[I]f being sure is necessary to knowing, then many candidates at viva voce examinations have been credited with knowledge which they haven't got." Radford (1966, 1970a, 1970b, 1972, 1988, 1990)-whose unconfident examinee "Jean" faces various questions about English history-is mainly responsible for fleshing out the case, extending it to challenge the claim that knowledge requires belief, and championing it against various replies. 6 In order for the case to stand as a counterexample to Final pass, the following two claims must hold of the unconfident examinee: Kate knows: Kate knows that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 Kate lacks dispositional belief: Kate does not dispositionally believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 We accept Kate knows, but deny Kate lacks dispositional belief, instead upholding: 6 Radford also managed to convince several others, including Black (1971: 154), Margolis (1973: 7), Mannison (1976: 139), Lewis (1996: 556), and Shope (2002: 53-55). 5 Kate dispositionally believes: Kate dispositionally believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 So we claim that Unconfident examinee provides no counterexample to the entailment thesis once properly clarified as per Final pass. What does Kate "believe"? To begin with, it is clear that Kate does not have the occurrent belief that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. After all, Kate is unable to consciously endorse the thought. Her mind has gone blank. She feels as if she is guessing. Indeed, notice that all the parts of the case suggestive of lack of belief (lack of felt confidence, a feeling of guessing) operate at the level of phenomenology, which only speaks to the issue of occurrent belief. Given that occurrent and dispositional belief are easily confused (§1.2), it is therefore unsurprising that people who are not explicitly guided to the relevant dispositional conception of belief will be guided by the prevalence of phenomenological description into operating with the irrelevant occurrent conception, and thereby intuit that Kate does not believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. Such intuitions are perfectly reasonable. They just happen not to involve the relevant notion of belief, and so provide no support for Kate lacks dispositional belief. The relevant question is whether Kate has the dispositional belief that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. We uphold Kate has dispositional belief for two main reasons. First, Kate has the information stored in mind from her studies. It is lodged in her memory, and presumably the memory trace has not been completely and irrevocably destroyed by her momentary panic. Secondly, Kate does guess correctly, and presumably this is no accident. Indeed it seems as if her memory trace must still be not just present but actually operating in the background to guide her actions, even if she is unable in the moment to appreciate the fact. Putting these two reasons together-to the extent that it is useful to operate with the picture of a "belief box" in which various propositions are stored-we find it natural to think of Kate as having the proposition that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 lodged in her belief box throughout. She stored it there during her studies and is still unconsciously guided by it when she "guesses." Indeed we find it natural to imagine that-perhaps later that very day-Kate will recover from her panic and recall the information readily enough. She has the information stored in mind. She is merely temporarily blocked from accessing it normally. 7 That said, there is a plausible-but ultimately misleading-rationale for upholding Kate lacks dispositional belief. The rationale is that dispositions are connected to simple counterfactuals which say that if a triggering condition for the disposition were to obtain, then the manifestation condition of the disposition would result. Indeed-until the early 1990s, after the discussion of the case of the unconfident examinee had largely died out-it was fairly standard to analyze dispositional statements in terms of such simple counterfactuals. 8 The relevant simple counterfactual is false with Kate: indeed she is actually asked the question (a triggering condition for dispositional belief) but still fails to manifest occurrent 7 In this vein, Radford (1990: 617) defends the claim that the unconfident examinee knows via the slogan: "He remembers, so he knows." He elaborates: "To say of Jean that he remembers is to say that he can give the relevant right answers and does so, when he does, not by fluke, but because he once learned them, or came into contact with them and they 'stuck'..." If the unconfident examinee turned out not to have the information stored in mind after all, she could not be said to remember and so could not be said to know (or at least she could not be said to know for anything like Radford's reasons). 8 The counterfactual analysis of dispositions traces at least to Goodman's (1955: 35-40) criticism of Carnap's extensional analysis, and to Ryle's (1949: 44) "inference ticket" conception of dispositional claims. Most historical participants to the discussion of the unconfident examinee were operating in a context in which dispositions were associated with simple counterfactuals, though we note that Woozley himself (1948) voiced early skepticism of the simple counterfactual account. 6 belief (the manifestation condition). So it might be thought that Kate does not possess dispositional belief after all. That is, it might be thought-on the basis of the simple counterfactual analysis of dispositions- that Kate does not really have the information available to mind, on grounds that she fails to actually access this information when asked. Yet it is now widely accepted that the link between dispositions and counterfactuals is complex, in that there are various ways in which the triggering condition for the disposition may obtain without the manifestation condition resulting. One salient way in which the triggering condition may obtain without the manifestation condition resulting-which emerges in Johnston 1992 (p. 223)-is that extrinsic factors may mask the disposition. Johnston gives the example of a fragile glass which is struck (triggering condition) but does not shatter (no manifestation) due to careful packaging (the mask). In the case of the unconfident examinee, Kate is asked the question (triggering condition) but cannot properly recall her view on the matter (no manifestation) due to her panic (the mask). So we think that the case of the unconfident examinee is a case where the disposition is present (for the reasons given above) but merely masked. The falsity of the simple counterfactual does not establish Kate lacks dispositional belief. Indeed we think-continuing to operate with the image of "the belief box"-that the intrinsic structure of Kate's belief box is apt for holding the belief. It is only her recall capacities-the pipeline from the belief box to consciousness-which are temporarily clogged by her flood of panic. Of course we do not need the belief box image to make this point. It is enough that Kate's belief system (however it is best understood) is intrinsically apt for dispositional belief. So further consideration of why the simple counterfactual fails turns out to actually provide a third reason in favor of Kate has dispositional belief: the case fits the pattern of a masked disposition. Putting this together: not only have we given three reasons to support Kate has dispositional belief, we have also provided a two-fold explanation for why people might have wrongly thought that Unconfident Examinee was a counterexample to the entailment thesis, involving independently attested confusions. First, some people may have confused occurrent belief with dispositional belief. This is a confusion that afflicted the very best of philosophers for centuries in the case of infinitism. Secondly, some people may have rejected Kate has dispositional belief due to a reliance on an overly simplistic counterfactual analysis of dispositions. This is a confusion that ran rampant at the very time in which the case of the unconfident examinee was discussed. So we conclude that Unconfident examinee fails as a counterexample to the entailment thesis. Of course there may be other counterexamples or other reasons to reject the entailment thesis. Though for the record we regard the case of the unconfident examinee as the main extant challenge to the entailment thesis extant-Stout (2006: 166) calls it "the supposed counterexample"-and so think that disarming this supposed counterexample constitutes the main defense currently required of the entailment thesis. 9 9 The other main objection to the entailment thesis found in the literature begins from the observation that people say things like "I don't believe it, I know it," and concludes that knowledge and belief must be incompatible. This objection is sometimes traced to Plato in Republic (who speaks of knowledge and doxa as incompatible), and sometimes to Moore in Commonplace Book (who comments on a knowledge-compatible and incompatible sense of "believe"), and is at any rate defended in Prichard 1950. But this objection has virtually disappeared from the contemporary literature, for good reason. With the advent of Gricean pragmatics it came to be widely agreed that "I don't believe it, I know it" should not be understood as opposing belief and knowledge, any more than "I don't have some of the money, I have all of the money" should be understood as opposing some and all. See Harrison 1963, Lehrer 1968, and Armstrong 1969 for further discussion along these lines. 7 We note that our reply to Unconfident examinee is, as far as we are aware, a new reply. Discussion of the case largely died out by the mid 1970s. 10 Defenders of the entailment thesis to date have generally taken the position-opposite to ours-that since Kate does not "believe" she thereby cannot really know (Jones 1966, Lehrer 1968, Sorensen 1982, Steup 2006, and Stout 2006). Or they have taken the (compatible) position that the case is too unclear to topple an independently plausible plank of orthodoxy (Armstrong 1969, Lehrer 1974, Dartnall 1986, and Williamson 2000). Indeed to our knowledge only Cohen (1966: 11) and Armstrong (1969: 35) have claimed that Kate both knows and believes, but neither uses the occurrent/dispositional distinction to back the claim that Kate believes. 11 Though our reply is new, we share the attitude of most participants to the discussion in treating our key claim-Kate has dispositional belief-as having empirical consequences concerning what ordinary speakers will say (Radford 1966: 5, Jones 1966: 19). In particular, we think that if one can elicit the dispositional conception of belief (without triggering any cognitive biases or other sources of performance error), then people will say that Kate believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. In other words, we predict that our conceptual competence with dispositional belief will show up in the behavior of ordinary speakers, as long as no performance errors intervene. And we follow the lead of Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (and experimental philosophers generally) in putting our empirical claim to the empirical test. 2. Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's Results Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) have advanced the discussion of the entailment thesis by converting Unconfident examinee and four similar cases into empirical surveys. We now turn to a discussion of their results, in order to set the stage for a discussion of our own results, which we see as largely founded upon-and in some respects building on, while in other respects building over-their results. 2.1 Five studies, five worries Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (forthcoming) develop five separate empirical surveys designed to test the entailment thesis against counterexamples like Unconfident examinee. (The interested reader may find all of their vignettes, as well as our variants, in the appendix.) Aggregating responses to these diverse cases, they (forthcoming: §3) report: "Across the five main scenarios, 77% of respondents attributed knowledge and 41% attributed belief. These percentages are statistically significantly different from each other and, in both cases, from 50%." Though of course aggregating results from diverse studies is methodologically questionable, especially when it is not obvious that the studies exhibit the same phenomena. 12 Accordingly they immediately move to the level of the five individual studies. At this level they report a statistically significant difference between knowledge attribution and belief attribution in only three of their five studies (their unconfident examinee, prejudiced professor, and freaked-out moviewatcher studies). Since we are interested in defending the entailment thesis, we hereby ignore the two 10 Indeed Radford (1988: 496), revisiting the discussion, spoke of it as "this ancient issue" and (1988: 497) spoke of a temptation-which he did warn was "too quick"-to stop "with an acid remark that finding the debate increasingly sterile I dropped out of it years ago, and things have not changed." 11 Cohen (1966: 11-12) speaks of the intuition that Kate does not believe as arising from a "short-term criteria for believing" which looks at Kate's behavior in the moment rather than a "long-term criteria" which looks at her behavior across a longer span. Armstrong's explanation of the intuition that Kate does not believe comes from his (1969: 34) suggestion that perhaps Kate has both the belief that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 and the conflicting belief that Queen Elizabeth did not die in 1603, and that people confuse the truth that Kate's believes that Queen Elizabeth did not die in 1603 with the falsehood that Kate lacks the belief that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. 12 Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel characterize all five of their cases as exhibiting "in-between" belief. As will emerge below we think that their cases are quite diverse (for instance, some of their cases exhibit a temporary blocking of a single standing belief, while other cases exhibit an enduring conflict between two standing beliefs), and call for diverse explanations. 8 studies (their absent-minded driver and self-deceived husband studies) for which no statistically significant difference between knowledge attribution and belief attribution was found, as not even presenting a prima facie challenge. So far we have done little to mitigate Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's challenge to the entailment thesis. We have only noted (and we take it that they would agree) that they have not five but three empirically supported prima facie counterexamples to the entailment thesis. One counterexample would of course suffice to refute the thesis. That said, we note five worries about their results, which will serve to set our agenda. The first worry is that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel use a between-subjects design throughout. That is, in each of their studies, they had one group of participants who were asked the knowledge question, and a second distinct group of participants who were asked the belief question. While a between-subjects design is of course methodologically legitimate, it is still generally inferior to a within-subjects design in which each participants gets to answer both the knowledge and the belief questions. For only in a within-subjects design can one directly determine whether any one person would be willing to ascribe knowledge without belief. And only in a within-subjects design can ordering effects be considered (Usually one only resorts to a between-subjects design when one worries that seeing one question will bias behavior on the other.) We would like to see these results replicated using a within-subjects design. Secondly, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel do not consider perspective. As has emerged from discussion of claims to know what is false ("The medievals knew that the earth was flat"), there is a systematic ability to use language projectively, speaking "through the mouths" of third parties. 13 Accordingly it is not clear that the attributions made reflect a given participant's own view of who knows and who believes what, or if they reflect this participant's view of what a third party (e.g. Kate herself) would say. Indeed one might worry that in Unconfident examinee, the majority of participants hold from their own view that Kate both knows and believes, hold from the view of what Kate would say that Kate neither knows nor believes, and then read the belief probe but not the knowledge probe projectively. We would like to see these results replicated using probes that explicitly mark perspective. Thirdly-and crucially for our discussion of their unconfident examinee and freaked-out moviewatcher cases-Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel do not consider whether their belief probes are being read occurrently or dispositionally. That is, their participants are simply asked whether a character in the vignette believes a given proposition. Nothing is done to ensure that the relevant dispositional conception of belief is elicited, rather than the irrelevant occurrent conception. Indeed, even if it was a matter of chance which conception they elicited in a given participant, this would still yield the prediction that knowledge attributions would tend to outpace belief attributions, insofar as participants for whom the occurrent conception of belief was elicited would tend to attribute knowledge without (occurrent) belief. We would like to see these results replicated using probes that specifically elicit the relevant dispositional conception of belief. 14 13 See Buckwalter (manuscript) for results on the factivity of knowledge that turn on resolving perspective. For related results concerning reference in Kripke cases, see Sytsma and Livengood (2011). This worry is thus a known problem worth considering. 14 Suppose that it was a matter of 50% chance which conception they elicited in a given participant. And also suppose-just to work with simple albeit unrealistic numbers-that 100% of subjects intuit that knowledge entails dispositional belief, and that 100% of subjects intuit that Kate lacks occurrent belief. Then one predicts that if x% of participants say that Kate knows, then x/2% of participants would say that Kate believes. This is actually not a poor fit for the 87%-37% spread that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel actually report! Of course we are not suggesting that this is exactly what happened (the hypothesis that 100% of subjects intuit something is almost always unrealistic), but only pointing out one way in which failing to consider the occurrent/dispositional distinction calls Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's interpretation of the data into question. 9 Fourthly-and crucially for our discussion of their prejudiced professor case-Schwitzgebel and Myers-Schulz also allow complicating considerations of moral valence into one of their vignettes. That is, in their prejudiced professor case (appendix, V5) participants are asked to consider a character who is prejudiced, and whom they will doubtlessly wish to condemn. It has been long known-ever since Knobe's (2003) pioneering work-that such matters of moral valence have profound implications for what we will say about a given agent's mental states. While the jury is still out on the best explanation of this "Knobe effect," at least one leading approach views moral valence effects as biasing, triggering a cognitively distorting desire to lay blame on individuals who arouse disapprobation (Alicke 1992). While we do not wish to take a stand on the best explanation of the Knobe effect here, it seems to us that their prejudiced professor case as presented involves a potentially biasing factor. We would like to see these results replicated with a revised vignette with neutral moral valence. Fifth and finally, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel do not explain why only three of their five cases showed a statistically significant difference between knowledge attribution and belief attribution. What explains the diversity of their results? The entailment thesis they oppose seems to predict that knowledge ascription should never outpace belief ascription. But Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's (forthcoming: §4) own capacity-tendency account seems equally to predict uniformity in the opposite direction. Their capacity-tendency account has it that knowledge involves a clear capacity to access the right information, but that belief requires a bit more, namely a clear tendency to consistently deploy the information in action. (This has the nice consequence that knowledge typically comes along with belief, even while allowing occasional cases of knowledge without belief.) All of their cases seem equally to involve subjects with a clear capacity to access the right information but without a clear tendency to consistently deploy the information in action. (Indeed this seems to have been their guiding idea in developing their five cases.) We would like this diversity of results explained. 15 Putting this together, we are worried about the following points:  Whether Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results can be replicated using a within-subjects design  Whether their results can be replicated with explicitly marked perspective  Whether their results for the unconfident examinee and freaked-out movie-watcher cases can be replicated specifically eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe'  Whether their results for their prejudiced professor case can be replicated with neutral moral valence  Why a statistically significant difference between knowledge and belief ascription only showed up in three of their five studies We hasten to add that, of these five worries, we regard the third and fourth together as the most worrisome. By our lights, the other worries still leave Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel with at least a prima facie case against the entailment thesis. (The first and second worries merely concern potential problems not yet shown to have arisen, and the fifth worry only concerns whether their own alternative capacity-tendency account fits the data any better.) Indeed we mention the first and second worries only because-as we will now show-these worries can be empirically overcome. 15 Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel could try to explain the diversity of their results from their capacity-tendency account, for instance by arguing that the clarity of the tendency to consistently deploy the information is varying between their cases. We are not saying that there is no possibility of using their capacity-tendency account to explain the diversity of their results. We are only saying that they do not in fact make any such attempt, and that it is not obvious that any such attempt would succeed. 10 2.2 Resolving the first worry: within-subjects replication In order to address our first worry of whether Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results can be replicated using a within-subject design, we re-ran their version of Unconfident examinee using a within-subjects design. We used their original vignette (V1) and their knowledge and belief probes together, counterbalancing the order in which participants were given these probes, so that we could also see whether there was an ordering effect. The overall response patterns we found were as follows: As can be seen, the primary response to the case of the unconfident examinee (just over 50%) is to both ascribe knowledge and deny belief. While Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel had estimated indirectly that "perhaps about half" of their respondents had intuitions conforming to the denial of the entailment thesis, we were able to substantiate this estimate directly. Moreover, because we counterbalanced the order in which participants received the knowledge and belief probes, we were able to look for order effects. We found no evidence of order effects on either knowledge 16 or belief 17 attributions. We were also able to look specifically at subgroups, including the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, and the subgroup that denied belief. We were thus able to ask, of the subgroup that ascribed knowledge (e.g. filtering out skeptics), what percentage of that subgroup also denied belief. We found that the majority (64%) of this subgroup also denied belief. 18 And we were thus able to ask, of the 16 There were no significant order effects on attributions of knowledge, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.692. 17 There were no significant order effects on attributions of belief, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.732. 18 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who denied belief (18) is greater than the proportion of those who ascribed belief (10), p=.002, binomial test proportion=.36. N=10 N=18 N=4 N=3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Within-Subjects Knowledge/Belief 11 subgroup that denied belief, what percentage of that subgroup also ascribed knowledge. We found that the majority (86%) of this subgroup also ascribed knowledge. 19 Putting this together, we found-in ways that significantly strengthen Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's original between-subjects results-the following four results from our within-subjects design:  The primary response (just over 50%) was to both ascribe knowledge and deny belief  No order effects were detected concerning the knowledge and belief probes  Among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the majority (64%) denied belief  Among the subgroup that denied belief, the majority (86%) ascribed knowledge We thus regard our first worry as empirically resolved. 2.3 Resolving the second worry: explicit perspective replication In order to address the second worry of whether Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results can be replicated with explicitly marked perspective, we also re-ran their version of Unconfident examinee (V1) with revised probes, specifically asking one group of participants the questions of "Did Kate actually know?" and "Did Kate actually believe?" (participant perspective), and asking a second group of participants the questions of "Did Kate think that she knew?" and "Did Kate think that she believed" (Kate's perspective). This also allowed us to consider the independently interesting question of how participants will view things from Kate's perspective. 20 We begin with Kate's perspective, both as an independently interesting matter, and in order to see if Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results might be arising from participants adopting this perspective. Our own intuitions were that, speaking from Kate's perspective, we would deny both knowledge and belief (after all, Kate feels as if she is only guessing). In accord with our intuitions, we found that the majority of participants (52%) denied both knowledge and belief from Kate's perspective. Indeed only 24% ascribed knowledge but denied belief: 19 Among those who denied belief, the proportion of those who ascribed knowledge (18) is greater than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (3), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.86. 20 In using probes of this sort to help explicitly mark perspective, we follow the lead of Sytsma and Livengood (2011) and Buckwalter (manuscript). For instance, Buckwalter compares probes of the form "[character] really knows" and "[character] thought she knew" to help confirm that the folk view knowledge as factive. We take Buckwalter's plausible results with these probes as some confirmation that they are marking perspective properly. 12 We found no evidence of order effects on either knowledge 21 or belief 22 attributions from Kate's perspective. Looking a bit more closely into our data on Kate's perspective, we found that, among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who denied belief (57%) is not statistically different from the proportion of those who ascribed belief (43%). 23 And we found that, among the subgroup that denied belief, the proportion of those who denied knowledge (68%) was greater than the proportion of those who ascribed knowledge (32%). 24 So far it seems as if Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results cannot plausibly be arising solely from participants taking Kate's perspective. Though this leaves open whether their results might plausibly be arising solely from participants taking their own perspective, or taking a mixture of perspectives, or even between shifting perspectives between the knowledge and belief probes (as we speculated in §2.1). So we turn to participants specifically taking their own "actual" perspective. We found that this subgroup behaved in ways quite similar to Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's estimate based on their group of participants, and in particular found that the majority (50%) ascribed knowledge while denying belief: 21 There were no significant order effects on attributions of knowledge, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.080. 22 There were no significant order effects on attributions of belief, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.225. 23 Among those who ascribed knowledge, there is no statistically significant difference between the proportion of those who denied belief (8) and the proportion of those who ascribed belief (6), p=.211, binomial test proportion=.43. 24 Among those who denied belief, the proportion of those who ascribed knowledge (8) was less than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (17), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.32. N=6 N=8 N=2 N=17 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Kate's Perspective Knowledge/Belief 13 We (yet again) found no evidence of order effects on either knowledge 25 or belief 26 attributions. Looking a bit more closely into our data on the participant's perspective, we found that, among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, 80% denied belief. 27 And among the subgroup that denied belief, 62% denied knowledge. 28 Our data thus suggest that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results do not turn on any perspective shifting. Whether or not their original results should be interpreted as arising from the participant's perspective, it seems that their sort of result is sufficiently robust to be replicated even with explicitly marked perspective. Thus we found-in ways that significantly strengthen Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's original results which do not mark perspective-that the primary response (against just around 50%) is to both ascribe knowledge and deny belief, even when perspective is marked. We thus regard our second worry as empirically resolved. So far we have strengthened Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's case against the entailment thesis. But of course we have three further worries (§2.1). And, when we come to our third worry-specifically eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe'-we will find a very different story, as predicted in §1. 3. Confirming Entailment Our story so far has had two main strands. In §1 we argued from the armchair that the unconfident examinee has dispositional belief, and thus constitutes no counterexample to the entailment thesis properly understood. Though we offered an empirical prediction: if one can elicit the dispositional conception of belief (without triggering performance errors), then people will say that Kate believes that 25 There were no significant order effects on peoples attributions of knowledge, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.076. 26 There were no significant order effects on peoples attributions of belief, Fisher's Exact Test, p=.1.000. 27 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who denied belief (16) is greater than the proportion of those who ascribed belief (4), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.20. 28 Among those who denied belief, the proportion of those who ascribed knowledge (16) was greater than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (10), p=.013, binomial test proportion=.38. N=4 N=16 N=2 N=10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Participant's Perspective Knowledge/Belief 14 Queen Elizabeth died in 1603. Then in §2 we reviewed Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's empirical results, and noted various worries, including that they failed to specifically elicit the relevant dispositional reading of 'believe.' We are now ready to tie these strands together. Our primary point is that when the Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel studies are re-done to elicit the relevant dispositional reading of 'believe,' people's intuitions revert to conformity with the view that knowledge entails belief, exactly as we predicted. In short, we redid Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's studies to clarify the relevant dispositional notion of belief and reversed their results, thereby empirically confirming the thesis that knowledge entails dispositional belief. 3.1 Confirming the third worry: eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe' In order to address the third worry of whether Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results can be replicated specifically eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe,' we re-did their unconfident examinee and freaked-out movie-watcher cases in a variety of ways, each designed to specifically elicit a dispositional conception of belief. It is of course not obvious that any given design is really eliciting a dispositional conception of belief. Accordingly we chose to use three different sorts of designs, each of which might reasonably be thought to elicit a dispositional conception of belief. Our thought was that if our results are uniform across such designs, then that would buttress the claim that these designs are uniformly successful in eliciting a dispositional conception of belief. In our first design, we re-did Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's unconfident examinee (V1) and freaked-out movie-watcher (V3) vignettes, but modified the belief probe to include a parenthetical clarification of the sense at issue. For instance, instead of simply asking if Kate believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603, we asked: Did Kate still believe (in the sense that she still held the information in her mind even if she could not access it) that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603? We thought of this as one reasonable attempt to specify the relevant dispositional sense of 'believe' (subject to the concern that some noise might be generated due to some participants being baffled). So we ran their version of the unconfident examinee case (V1), retaining a within-subjects design (§2.2) and counterbalancing the order of the questions. Again we found no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge 29 or belief. 30 But the overall pattern of the responses changed drastically: the majority response (61%) became to attribute both knowledge and belief, just as we predicted in §1: 29 There were no significant order effects on peoples attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =.309, p=.857. 30 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief df=2, X 2 =4.880, p=.087. 15 Among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the majority (76%) also ascribed belief. 31 And among the subgroup that ascribed belief, the majority (82%) ascribed knowledge. 32 And so it begins to seem as if specifically eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe' might reverse Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results. We then tried the same sort of manipulation with Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's case of the freaked-out movie-watcher (V3), replacing their simple belief probe with the clarified probe: Did Jamie still believe (in the sense that she still held the information in her mind even if she could not access it) that only water would come out of the sink faucet? We found a similar pattern of results, finding no order effects on people's attributions of knowledge 33 or belief, 34 and finding that the majority response (63%) was to attribute both knowledge and belief: 31 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who also ascribed belief (28) is greater than the proportion of those who denied belief (9), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.24. 32 Among those who ascribed belief, the proportion of those who also ascribed knowledge (28) is greater than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (6), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.18. 33 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =1.521, p=.467. 34 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief, df=2, X 2 =4.552, p=.103. N=28 N=9 N=6 N=3 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B/(yes) K(no)/B(no) Examinee: Clarified Probe Knowledge/Belief 16 Among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the majority (78%) also ascribed belief. 35 And among the subgroup that ascribed belief, the majority (78%) also ascribed knowledge. 36 And so it continues to seem as if specifically eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe' might reverse Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results. Or at least, for two of the three studies on which Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel found evidence against the entailment thesis, it seems as if eliciting a dispositional reading of 'believe' does reverse their results. Of course one might worry that our revised probe, with its parenthetical clarification of the sense of belief at issue, is not really being read as we intend. 37 Or relatedly-as Joshua Knobe (personal communication) brought to our attention-one might worry that our revised probe is being read in a purely stipulative way, not necessarily connected to any naturally occurring sense of 'believe.' We think that these are both perfectly legitimate worries. Our response is to see if we can replicate our previous results using a different design for eliciting a dispositional conception of belief, with the idea that uniform results would buttress the claim that these designs are uniformly successful in eliciting a dispositional conception of belief. Accordingly we returned to the simple belief probes that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel used, and instead complicated the accompanying vignettes to include discussion of a person said to be asleep. Our idea was that-since sleeping people do not typically have occurrent beliefs-we could use attributions of belief to a sleeping person to induce a context in which only the dispositional conception of belief could sensibly be taken to be in play. We note that this is a fairly subtle manipulation, and we had 35 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who also ascribed belief (25) is greater than the proportion of those who denied belief (7), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.22. 36 Among those who ascribed belief, the proportion of those who also ascribed knowledge (25) is greater than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (7), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.22. 37 If 'believe' really is polysemous between an occurrent and a dispositional sense, we don't see how else our parenthetical clarification could be read. But (as mentioned in §1.2) we are open to other hypotheses, including ones on which underspecified lexical meanings might get specified "on the fly." That would allow that our parenthetical clarification might actually create a third sense of 'believe' that is neither the occurrent nor the dispositional sense. N=25 N=7 N=7 N=1 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Movie-Watcher: Clarified Probe Knowledge/Belief 17 our doubts as to whether it would work. We are simply going to ask people-as Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel did-whether or not Kate believes that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603 (and likewise whether or not Jamie believes that only water would come out of the sink faucet)-and rely solely on the previous discussion of a sleeping person to reverse the results. With that in mind we returned to Unconfident examinee and added a character-Dave-into the story who had studied just as much as Kate but who had slept through his alarm clock and was currently sleeping through the exam (V2). We then (while retaining a within-subjects design, and counterbalancing the order of the knowledge and belief probes) asked people about what Dave believed before asking about what Kate believed: Did Dave (despite being asleep) believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603? We thought of this as one reasonable indirect attempt to elicit a dispositional conception of belief when thinking about Kate, insofar as the dispositional conception will plausibly be preferred when thinking about Dave (in order to make the question sensible), and insofar as this conception will plausibly be preserved in the next question about Kate. Yet again we found no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge 38 or belief. 39 We found that 83% of participants were happy to ascribe belief to Dave despite his being asleep. And most crucially we continued to find that the majority response (47%) was to attribute both knowledge and belief to Kate: 38 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =.295, p=.587. 39 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief, df=2, X 2 =2.215, p=.137. N=25 N=10 N=6 N=12 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Examinee: Sleeper Vignette Knowledge/Belief 18 Among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the majority (72%) also ascribed belief. 40 And among the subgroup that ascribed belief, the majority (81%) also ascribed knowledge. 41 We then tried the very same sort of manipulation with Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's case of the freaked-out movie-watcher, adding a character-Alex-into the story who had fallen asleep during the movie (V4). We then (while retaining a within-subjects design, and counterbalancing the order of the knowledge and belief probes) asked people about what Alex believed before asking about what Jamie believed: Did Alex (despite being asleep) believe that only water would come out of the sink faucet? Yet again we found no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge 42 or belief. 43 We found that 89% of participants were happy to ascribe belief to Alex despite his being asleep. And most crucially we continued to find that the majority response (54%) was to attribute both knowledge and belief to Jamie: Among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge, the majority (69%) also ascribed belief. 44 And among the subgroup that ascribed belief, the majority (90%) also ascribed knowledge. 45 40 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who also ascribed belief (25) is greater than the proportion of those who denied belief (10), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.29. 41 Among those who ascribed belief, the proportion of those who also ascribed knowledge (25) is greater than the proportion of those who denied knowledge (6), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.19. 42 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =.069, p=.763. 43 There were no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief, df=2, X 2 =2.042, p=.135. 44 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who also ascribed belief (20) is greater than the proportion of those who denied belief (9), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.31. 45 Among those who ascribed knowledge, the proportion of those who also ascribed belief (20) is greater than the proportion of those who denied belief (2), p<.001, binomial test proportion=.09. N=20 N=9 N=2 N=6 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) Movie-Watcher: Sleeper Vignette Knowledge/Belief 19 We take the uniformity of these results to buttress the claim that both of our revisions succeeded in eliciting the dispositional reading of 'believe,' and thereby to confirm our prediction (§1) that ordinary speakers will say that knowledge entails dispositional belief. 46 As one final buttressing design, we went back to Unconfident examinee (V1) and simply replaced the belief probe with: Is Kate disposed to believe that Queen Elizabeth died in 1603? We found-in conformity with our previous results-that 55% ascribed both knowledge and belief, that among the subgroup that ascribed knowledge 69% also ascribed belief, and that among the subgroup that ascribed belief 77% also ascribed knowledge. So we conclude that, at least for two out of the three studies for which Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel found evidence against the entailment thesis, specifically eliciting the relevant dispositional reading of 'believe' reverses their results, and thereby provides confirmation for the entailment thesis properly understood. We thereby claim confirmation of our own empirical predictions from §1.3. Just to clarify our minimal commitments with respect to eliciting readings of 'believe,' we are committed to the following:  There are multiple possible meanings for 'believe'  Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's studies did not uniformly elicit the epistemically relevant reading  The techniques we used to re-do their studies did more to uniformly elicit the epistemically relevant reading 47 We further suspect that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's unconfident examinee and freaked-out moviewatcher studies tended to elicit the occurrent reading, but strictly speaking that is inessential for the current argument. We also would characterize the epistemically relevant reading as the dispositional reading, but strictly speaking that is inessential too. Our first claim-that there are multiple possible meanings for 'believe'-is buttressed by the fact that we see very different data on simple belief probes between the vignettes without the sleeper (V1, V3) and their counterpart vignettes with the sleeper (V2, V4). Our further two claims-that our studies are doing more to uniformly elicit the epistemically relevant reading-then fall out of the guiding conception that the epistemically relevant reading of 'believe' is in terms of a notion applicable even to those who are asleep (§1.2). 3.2 Confirming the fourth worry: neutralizing moral valence Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel also claimed to find evidence against the entailment thesis from their case of the prejudiced professor. We have not yet addressed this last case. First of all, we think that this case is very different from that of the unconfident examinee or freaked-out movie-watcher cases (both of which we think of as cases in which the subject clearly has dispositional belief). The prejudiced professor-Juliet-is not a character who has a single standing belief that is merely temporarily masked by extreme circumstances. (For that reason we do not think that controlling for a disposition reading of 'believe' is relevant.) Rather Juliet exhibits an enduring conflict between standing beliefs. She is an internally deeply conflicted character for whom ascription of any relevant standing beliefs or knowledge 46 We additionally take the difference between the results Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel report for their belief probe, and the results we report for the same probe in our revised sleeper vignettes, as some confirmation of our claim (§1.2) that 'believe' has both an occurrent and a dispositional sense. 47 Strictly speaking this third claim entails the previous second claim, but we find it useful to separate these claims since they might be contested separately. After all, our second claim marks a worry with Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's studies, while our third claim mainly concerns the success of our re-designs. 20 is tricky. So our guiding intuition is that-far from being a clear case of knowledge without belief-the case is simply unclear in all directions. 48 Rather we think-in accord with our fourth worry-that the case of the prejudiced professor involves the complicating matter of moral valence. Juliet is said to have prejudicial tendencies, of a sort that will plausibly elicit knee-jerk moral condemnation from most participants. Could it be that, while participants are split on whether Juliet believes, their tendency to say that Juliet knows can be explained away (perhaps as a matter of cognitive bias) from the moral valence of the case? Indeed, recent work by Beebee and Buckwalter (2010) has shown that knowledge ascriptions can be influenced by moral considerations. In particular, they found that knowledge ascriptions are increased when the target agent's behavior is negatively valenced (as Juliet's is) and decreased when the target agent's behavior is neutral or positively valenced. So there is already an empirical basis for suspecting that the negative valence attached to Juliet's prejudice is elevating ascriptions of knowledge. Our question is whether Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results can be replicated in a morally neutral counterpart case. Accordingly we replaced Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's vignette (V5) with a vignette about a merely absentminded professor, who in reflective thought thinks it is a Saturday, but in action behaves as if it were a Wednesday (V6). Our guiding thought was that absentmindedness is a relatively morally neutral status, so that our revised case would test whether internally conflicted subjects like Juliet elicit intuitions of knowledge without belief, without any potentially distorting effects of moral valence. We retained our usual within-subjects design, counterbalancing the order of questions. We also re-did Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's prejudiced professor case using a within-subjects design, just to ensure that we were comparing the prejudiced and the absentminded professor cases under comparable designs. We will report the results side-by-side. No order effects were found with either the prejudiced or absentminded professor vignettes, for either knowledge 49 or belief 50 ascriptions. But we did find-in accord with our concern about moral valence, and in accord with Beebe and Buckwalter's (2010) findings-that assignment to the prejudiced versus absentminded professor cases had an effect on knowledge attributions: 51 48 In the useful terms of Gendler (2008), Juliet might be said to believe that student athletes are just as capable of other students, but not to alieve that same proposition, where "alief" is associated with more instinctual "animalistic" type 1 cognitive systems, and "belief" is associated with more reflective "rationalistic" type 2 cognitive systems. But of course Gendler is proposing her alief/belief distinction as a useful revisionary taxonomy, precisely to overcome potentially conflationary aspects in the folk notion of belief. So we suspect that it may be somewhat indeterminate whether or not the folk notion of belief applies to a conflicted character like Juliet. 49 In the prejudiced professor case, there were no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =.260, p=.610. In the absentminded professor case there were also no significant order effects on people's attributions of knowledge, df=2, X 2 =.568, p=.451. 50 In the prejudiced professor case, there were no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief, df=2, X 2 =2.898, p=.090. In the absentminded professor case there were also no significant order effects on people's attributions of belief, df=2, X 2 =1.608, p=.205. 51 df=2, X 2 =5.744, p=.017. 21 We also found that belief attributions were affected by assignment to either condition: 52 So it seems-perhaps unsurprisingly, but not in a way that had hitherto been documented-that there is also a "Knobe effect" for belief ascription. The overall response patterns were: 52 df=2, X 2 =4.295, p=.038. N=32 N=10 N=22 N=21 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes) K(no) Knowledge: Two Professors Prejudiced Absentminded N=8 N=34 N=17 N=26 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 B(yes) B(no) Belief: Two Professors Prejudiced Absentminded 22 So we conclude that cases of internally conflicted subjects are difficult cases for the ascription of folk attitudes, and that it is only in the negatively morally valenced versions of such cases like that of the prejudiced professor that we see a dominant tendency to ascribe knowledge without belief. In the absentminded professor case the responses are "all over the map," with the majority (a bare 37%) denying both knowledge and belief. This fits our guiding intuition that the case-far from being an intuitive case of knowledge without belief-is really, when considered in the standard terms of folk psychology, an unclear case in all directions. What one makes of these results will depend on how one thinks about the Knobe effect generally. If the Knobe effect is due to a cognitive bias, then one should conclude that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's results are merely due to an independent bias, and that removing such a bias restores people's tendency to intuit in accord with the entailment thesis (thus our talk about "removing biases" in the introduction). For instance, at least one leading view-associated with Alicke-is that the Knobe effect is due to cognitive distortions induced by an overriding desire to blame. As Alicke and Rose (2010: 330) summarize: "The culpable control model, therefore, does not require the assumption that concepts such as intentionality, causation, and foresight are suffused with moral considerations. Rather, the influences of these evaluations can be explained in terms of the desire to blame an agent whose actions arouse strong disapproval." If the Knobe effect is not due to a cognitive bias then it may still be that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have found an intuitive counterexample to the claim that knowledge entails belief. Indeed their counterexample would be a new and fascinating counterexample quite distinct from cases like The case of the unconfident examinee, which (we have argued: §1, §3.1) clearly involve cases of dispositional belief. It would be a counterexample that combined conflicts between enduring beliefs with moral valence. In that eventuality our contribution would be one of disentangling the cases, and showing that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel did not merely "empirically verify Radford," but actually achieved something far more significant than they advertise, in providing and empirically confirming an entirely new style of counterexample to the entailment thesis! N=6 N=26 N=2 N=8 N=10 N=12 N=5 N=16 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 K(yes)/B(yes) K(yes)/B(no) K(no)/B(yes) K(no)/B(no) A Tale of Two Professors Prejudiced Absentminded 23 But for the time being-given that it remains an open question as to how to understand the Knobe effect 53 -we can only conclude that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel have not yet established a counterexample to the entailment thesis. Orthodoxy should still stand. (The burden of proof is of course on those who would topple orthodoxy.) But its standing becomes-in surprising and interesting ways that we credit Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel for revealing-dependent on the open question of how best to understand the Knobe effect. 3.3 Speculations on the fifth worry: explaining the diversity So far we take ourselves to have explained away each of the three studies Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel offered in which people seemed to have intuitions that conflicted with the entailment thesis. With the unconfident examinee and the freaked-out movie-watcher, we were able to show that specifically eliciting the dispositional reading of 'believe' reversed their results, and with the prejudiced professor we were able to show that neutralizing moral valence revealed a case in which intuitions were simply unclear in all respects. It remains to consider our fifth and final worry about Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's studies, which is that they found quite diverse results between their five studies, without offering any explanation for the diversity of their results. (Such diverse results seem to fit neither orthodoxy nor Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's preferred replacement: §2.1.) Though we will not attempt further empirical confirmation of this point, we would speculate that the reason why their absent-minded driver and self-deceived husband cases (V7, V8) did not show a statistically significant tendency towards ascriptions of knowledge without belief, is that these cases did not do nearly as much as trigger the problems we've tried to expose above. The main difference we see between the unconfident examinee and freaked-out movie-watcher cases (V1, V3) on the one hand, and the absent-minded driver case (V7) on the other, is whether the vignette focuses on the phenomenology of the subject. In both the unconfident examinee and freaked-out movie-watcher vignettes, participants are given detailed and vivid descriptions of how the subject feels. (Indeed the relevant unconfidence and freaked-outedness are highlighted in the very titles of these vignettes.) But in the absent-minded driver we don't get this detailed and vivid window into the mental life of the driver. We are only told that Ben is "enthusiastically tapping his fingers to the music, not paying much attention to where he is going." Little is said of Ben's occurrent phenomenology (as befits a case of "absent-mindedness"). We speculate that this comparative difference in the detailed and vivid phenomenological descriptions is making a difference in whether participants are naturally drawn to the irrelevant occurrent conception of belief (since this is the phenomenologically loaded conception). If so then we have an explanation-one that crucially involves the occurrent/dispositional distinction-for why the data patterns came out differently for these cases. With the self-deceived husband case (V8) we see a case that is more analogous to the prejudiced professor case (V5), in terms of featuring a deeply internally conflicted subject (as per the idea of selfdeception highlighted in the title of the one vignette). We speculate that the main difference is that being prejudiced carries clearly negative moral valence, while the moral status of the self-deceived husband is more complex and less clearly negative (there is something both sad and noble about Tim's clinging to the belief of his wife's faithfulness; it is natural to have mixed feelings about Tim). We thus see the selfdeceived husband case as akin to our absent-minded professor case (V6). So we speculate that the selfdeceived husband case is generating different results from the prejudiced professor case insofar as the crucial driver of the prejudiced professor case-negative moral valence-goes missing. 53 For further discussion see Knobe 2010 and associated commentaries. 24 This section has been speculative, but in a way that fits the pattern of empirical results reported above. Of course further empirical work may suggest a still different overall picture. There is far more work to be done, and we mainly hope to inspire others to explore these issues further. Putting all of this together, we have offered a new philosophical reply to Unconfident examinee, alongside new empirical data which we take to reverse Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel's case against the orthodox view that knowledge entails belief. We thus conclude- shocking as it may sound for work in experimental philosophy-that the orthodox armchair view withstands empirical scrutiny. 54 Appendix: Vignettes V1 Unconfident Examinee Kate spent many hours studying for her history exam. She's now in class taking the exam. Everything's going quite well, until she comes to the final question. It reads, "What year did Queen Elizabeth die?" Kate had reviewed this date many times. She had even recited the date to a friend just a few hours earlier. So, when Kate sees that this is the last question, she feels relieved. She confidently looks down at the blank space, waiting to recollect the answer. But before she can remember it, the teacher interrupts and announces, "Alright, the class session is almost over. You have one more minute to finalize your answers." Kate's demeanor suddenly changes. She glances up at the clock, now flustered and worried. "Oh, no. I can't perform well under this kind of pressure." Her grip tightens around her pencil. She strains to recall the answer, but nothing comes to her. She quickly loses confidence. "I suppose I'll just have to guess the answer," she says to herself. With a sigh of disappointment, she decides to write "1603" into the blank space. This was, in fact, the correct answer. V2 Unconfident Examinee with Sleeper Kate and Dave both spent many hours studying for their history exam together. Kate is now in the class taking the exam, while poor Dave has slept through his alarm clock and is still sound asleep in bed. Kate is doing quite well on the exam, until she comes to the final question. It reads, "What year did Queen Elizabeth die?" Kate and Dave had reviewed this date many times. They had even recited the date to each other at the end of their last study session. So, when Kate sees that this is the last question, she feels relieved. She confidently looks down at the blank space, waiting to recollect the answer. But before she can remember it, the teacher interrupts and announces, "Alright, the class session is almost over. You have one more minute to finalize your answers." Kate's demeanor suddenly changes. She glances up at the clock, now flustered and worried. "Oh, no. I can't perform well under this kind of pressure." Her grip tightens around her pencil. She strains to recall the answer, but nothing comes to her. She quickly loses confidence. "I suppose I'll just have to guess the answer," she says to herself. With a sigh of disappointment, she decides to write "1603" into the blank space. This was, in fact, the correct answer. V3 Freaked-Out Movie-Watcher Susan loves to watch old horror films. She finally convinces her friend Jamie to watch one with her. It's an old horror film that Susan actually considers to be quite funny, due to its unrealistic plot. The film begins with a group of astronauts who discover alien life on another planet. The aliens look somewhat like bumblebees, but they are dark-green and about two feet in length. The astronauts capture one of these creatures and bring it back to Earth. Once they have it on Earth, it manages to escape and starts laying numerous eggs. The eggs need water to hatch, so the creature lays the eggs in sink faucets. Thus, whenever people turn on their sink faucet, hundreds of newly hatched alien creatures fly out and begin to attack them. During one of these attack scenes, Susan notices that Jamie is a bit tense. Susan remarks, "This isn't bothering you, is it? Come on, you should be laughing at this movie. Look how unrealistic it is." Jamie responds, "Yes, of course it's unrealistic. But it's still scary. I just don't like these types of movies. 54 Thanks to Wesley Buckwalter, Joshua Knobe, Blake Myers-Schulz, Eric Schwitzgebel, and Justin Sytsma. 25 They frighten me. Can't we just watch something else?" "Well, I suppose," Susan says. Susan then turns off the movie, and they quickly get ready for a second trip to the movie store. On the way out, Susan stops. "Hold on for a second. I'm thirsty. Let me grab a glass of water." Susan walks over and begins to turn on the sink faucet. Suddenly, Jamie shouts, "No! Don't do it!" The words come out of Jamie's mouth before she even has time to consider what she's saying. Jamie then looks over and sees that it's only water coming out of the faucet. V4 Freaked-Out Movie-Watcher with Sleeper Susan loves to watch old horror films. She finally convinces her friends Jamie and Alex to watch one with her. It's an old horror film that Susan actually considers to be quite funny, due to its unrealistic plot. The film begins with a group of astronauts who discover alien life on another planet. The aliens look somewhat like bumblebees, but they are dark-green and about two feet in length. The astronauts capture one of these creatures and bring it back to Earth. Once they have it on Earth, it manages to escape and starts laying numerous eggs. The eggs need water to hatch, so the creature lays the eggs in sink faucets. Thus, whenever people turn on their sink faucet, hundreds of newly hatched alien creatures fly out and begin to attack them. During one of these attack scenes, Susan notices that Alex has fallen soundly asleep, while Jamie is a bit tense. Susan ignores Alex's snoring and says to Jamie: "This movie isn't bothering you, is it? Come on, you should be laughing at this movie. Look how unrealistic it is." Jamie responds, "Yes, of course it's unrealistic. But it's still scary. I just don't like these types of movies. They frighten me. Can't we just watch something else?" "Well, I suppose," Susan says. Susan then turns off the movie, and they quickly get ready to leave Alex snoring on the couch and take a second trip to the movie store. On the way out, Susan stops. "Hold on for a second. I'm thirsty. Let me grab a glass of water." Susan walks over and begins to turn on the sink faucet. Suddenly, Jamie shouts, "No! Don't do it!" The words come out of Jamie's mouth before she even has time to consider what she's saying. Jamie then looks over and sees that it's only water coming out of the faucet. V5 Prejudiced Professor Juliet is a university professor. Unfortunately, she is also prejudiced against student athletes. In her classes, she calls more often on non-athletes than athletes, and she interprets the comments of the former more charitably. When two soccer players, Brett and Bernard, come to visit her in office hours, she treats them patronizingly, explaining the basic concepts of the course in a very rudimentary manner, failing to recognize the sophistication and intelligence behind their questions. They leave, and shortly after, two students with no involvement in school sports enter. Juliet immediately launches into a high-level discussion, generously assuming the students' command of the elementary material. When Bernard writes the best essay in the course, revealing the intelligence that a neutral observer would have recognized in his previous remarks, Juliet is surprised. All of this is typical of her. However, Juliet also repudiates all forms of prejudice. She openly affirms that students involved in athletics are just as capable as non-athletes. In fact, she has it on excellent authority that this is the case: Her chair just completed a study showing that the two groups perform equally well in their philosophy classes. Intrigued by this study, Juliet even reviews her own records and finds that, on average, the athletic students had actually performed better than the other students. But, in spite of all this, Juliet's prejudice remains. She continues to treat her athletic students as if they are less intelligent than her other students. V6 Absentminded Professor Juliet is a university professor. Unfortunately, she is quite absentminded. She has been walking around all morning thinking that it is "a beautiful Saturday" when in fact it is a Wednesday. Since she thinks it is Saturday, she has been considering driving to the countryside for a scenic picnic as she usually does on Saturday's. Indeed, she has it on "excellent authority" that it is a Saturday: Her normally reliable 26 cellphone, which Juliet had accidentally run through the washing machine last night, now lists the date as "Saturday September 9th." But in spite of the fact that some part of her mind thinks that today is a Saturday, Juliet in fact behaves just as she does every Wednesday. She drives to school as usual and shows up to teach her Wednesday class on time. She holds her Wednesday office hours as scheduled, and then meets up with a colleague for their usual Wednesday afternoon coffee and brainstorming session. She never reconciles her idea that today is Saturday with any of these actions. This sort of behavior is typical of absentminded Juliet. V7 Self-Deceived Husband Tim's wife Diane is cheating on him. For two years, Diane has been conducting a romantic affair with Mark, who is a colleague of hers at work. Over the past two years, Tim has seen frequent clues that Diane is cheating: unexpected credit card charges, late arrivals from work with weak and flustered explanations as to why, unexplained mysterious phone calls, etc. Diane even occasionally calls Tim "Mark", and once Tim overheard her saying "I love you, Mark" on the telephone when Diane assumed Tim was not in the house. One night several months ago, Diane even confessed to him explicitly, saying anxiously in a quiet moment in bed, "Tim, you know that I have fallen in love with another man and have been cheating on you for a couple of years". Tim loudly insisted that she was joking, just trying to get his goat because she was mad with him about some out-of-town travel he was doing – and Diane replied that, yes, she was of course just joking. Despite all this evidence, Tim vehemently insists that his marriage is in good shape and that Diane would never even think of cheating on him. Perhaps, indeed, he says such things a little too vehemently. When Dan, a friend of Tim's, gently points out to Tim some of the evidence of Diane's affair, Tim dismisses Dan's remarks as utter nonsense, saying to himself, "Dan is probably just jealous and wishes that his own marriage was as solid as Diane's and mine". When a woman whom Tim finds attractive starts flirting with him at work, Tim brushes her off, saying to himself that he could never do anything that might threaten his marriage. At the same time, however, when Diane comes home late, Tim finds himself much more anxious and bothered about it than he ever used to be, though he can't quite put his finger on why. When he answers the phone and finds no one there, he sometimes finds himself wondering "could it be a lover of Diane's?" and then, very quickly after that, "Ridiculous! Ridiculous! She would never cheat!" When he sees a credit card charge for an 8:00 pm dinner at a romantic restaurant, he finds himself with a visual image of Diane having a romantic dinner with a stranger – an image which he rejects as a horrible fantasy, but that he can't quite put out of mind. V8 Absent-Minded Driver Ben receives an email informing him of a bridge closure on his normal route to work. He becomes mildly annoyed and says to himself, "Now I'll have to turn on Russell Street and go all the way down to Langdon Avenue." So, the next morning, Ben wakes up early and quickly gets ready for work. 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Published in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, eds. Kalle Grill and Jason Hanna, Routledge 2018, pp. 46-58. Paternalism by and towards Groups Kalle Grill Abstract [not in printed book]: In many or most instances of paternalism, more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is treated paternalistically. This chapter discusses some complications that arise in such group cases, which are largely ignored in the conceptual debate. First, a group of people who together perform an action may do so for different reasons, which makes it more challenging to determine whether the action is paternalistic. This gives us some reason not to pin the property of being paternalistic on actions, since we may alternatively pin it on reasons for actions and allow that these differ between members in the group. Second, the prevention of harmful consensual interactions is sometimes paternalism towards both or all involved, but only if all benefit from interference with themselves rather than with other members in the group, or if all want the harm or risk (more or less) for its own sake. Third, interrelations between three components of paternalism interference, benevolence and consent gives us reason to allow that an action can be paternalistic towards some but not others of those affected. This makes it even more difficult, and less relevant, to determine whether or not actions are paternalistic. In the conceptual debate on paternalism, most proposed definitions and characterizations have this approximate form: "An agent A behaves/acts paternalistically towards a person B, if (and only if)...". The controversy then concerns what comes after this phrase, in terms of what sort of action can be paternalistic and what is the role of, respectively, A's motives, the possible justifications for A's behavior, B's consent or lack thereof, B's general competence and current degree of voluntariness, etc. In other words, the discussion presumes, for the most part, that paternalism is something that is done by one agent towards one other agent. There are certainly cases of one-on-one paternalism, but in many cases, either more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is treated paternalistically. Examples include paternalism by governments and organizations, paternalism by physicians towards groups of patients, and paternalism by parents or teachers towards groups of children. This chapter is focused on such group cases and how they differ from one-on-one cases. By a "group" I simply mean any collection of more than one person, with no assumptions regarding possible shared interests, intentions or other group properties. Groups of individuals in this loose sense sometimes together perform an action or are jointly affected by some action. If groups can be understood as normative agents and patients in their own right, over and above the individuals they consist of, it seems to me these entities can Paternalism by and towards groups 2 be paternalists and can be paternalized. It would be interesting to explore paternalism by and towards groups in this stronger sense of collective agency and patiency, including the relationship between the individual and the group in cases where the group is a paternalist or a target of paternalism, but some members are not, or vice versa. However, I will not discuss these issues here. Nor will I discuss interesting and important issues around discrimination and prejudice towards groups communities, classes, nations, etc. that can lead to their being paternalized. Many issues around group paternalism are under-explored. This chapter is aimed at addressing some of these. The chapter has three main parts. The first concerns groups as agents of paternalism in relation to a general controversy around whether paternalism resides in actions or rather in reasons for actions. The second and third parts concern groups as patients of paternalism. The second is focused on prevention of consensual interactions that are harmful to at least one party and discusses when such prevention is paternalism. The third discusses more generally how one action that affects many can have different effects on different people and what this means for our analysis of paternalism. [p. 47] 1. Group paternalists: different people have different reasons Paternalism essentially involves some sort of interference or at least involvement with its target (merely thinking about someone cannot be paternalistic) and some sort of benevolent rationale (affecting someone for purely self-interested reasons is not paternalism). There is, in other words, an action component and a reason component to paternalism. I will for the most part refer to the action component as "interference," while leaving it open what this should mean exactly. On some accounts, quite mild influences are sufficient for actions to be potentially paternalistic, and so interfering on my use of the term. I will refer to the reason component as "benevolence" or the "benevolent" or simply "paternalism-making" rationale.1 In this section, I will first discuss a general controversy around defining paternalism and then turn to how this controversy is relevant for groups as paternalists. The controversy concerns how the two core components of paternalism interference and benevolence are related. Interference is a property of actions and benevolence is a property of reasons. Their interrelation hinges on what sort of thing can be paternalistic. The standard and quite dominant view is that this is actions, and, perhaps in a derived sense, policies, laws, etc., that are produced by actions (influential proponents include Dworkin 1972; Kleinig 1983; VanDeVeer 1986; Shiffrin 2000; de Marneffe 2006). On this action-focused view, whether or not an action is paternalistic is partly determined by its rationale. There are competing accounts of what kind of rationale it is that can make actions paternalistic. The most common idea is that motives are paternalism-makers (e.g. VanDeVeer 1986, Shiffrin 2000), but it is also rather common to point to justification in some sense (e.g. Paternalism by and towards groups 3 Dworkin 1972). Both types of accounts have some intuitive support. It seems paternalistic to force a person into rehab with the motive that this will cure her drug addiction, whether or not this is justified and whatever is the justification for it, if there is one. On the other hand, it also seems paternalistic to force a person into rehab with some other motive and to justify this by invoking the benefit to her. John Kleinig, noting this ambiguity in the concept, proposes at one point that we should avoid talking about either motives or justifications in this context and instead stick with "'having as its rationale', with its explanation/justification ambivalence" (1983: 10). This may indicate a disjunctive definition such that an action is paternalistic if it is either motivated or justified by benevolence. Peter de Marneffe has proposed, to the contrary, a hybrid definition where both motive and justification are required (2006: 73-74). "Motive" and "justification" are rather vague terms. There are arguably many kinds of motives, some conscious and occurrent, some more subtle, nonoccurrent and less accessible to the agent. Joel Feinberg distinguishes between "conscious reasons" and "deep rationales" (1986: 16). Different psychological theories will divide up the terrain differently. When it comes to justifications, it is problematic to define paternalism in terms of the normative reasons that in fact count in favor of an interference, since whether there are any such reasons depends on the moral status of the phenomena the definition is supposed to capture. Anti-paternalists will typically hold that we usually have no good or valid reasons for benevolent interference. It would be strange if this should cause them to hold that such interference is nonpaternalistic (cf. Husak 2003: 392). It is also problematic to bypass justification and invoke actual outcomes, since an interference may result in a benefit quite unexpectedly, which seems insufficient for making it paternalistic (e.g. you force me into rehab, I suffer terribly and return to addiction, but twenty years later the experience inspires me to write a bestseller, which makes me very happy). Objectively expected outcomes may be more plausible, but this notion needs spelling out and I am not aware that anyone has proposed this solution. It makes more sense, therefore, to invoke what the paternalist takes to be the normative reasons for her action, perhaps mistakenly, which may differ from her motives. There are also, however, the normative reasons that agents officially cite, [p. 48] perhaps only rhetorically. Note that actual normative reasons can be indirectly relevant since if such reasons are identified, agents can then be motivated by them or believe in them or officially point to them. When I speak of "justification" in the following, however, I will only refer, jointly, to the "taking to be" and the "citing as reason" sense. An alternative to the action-focused view is the reason-focused view. On this view, actions cannot be paternalistic, which may seem unintuitive. Instead, what is paternalistic is the combination of some reasons and some actions (this view is indicated by Kleinig 1983: 12 and by Husak 2003: 390; it is endorsed and defended in Grill 2007). This view is motivated by the fact that antipaternalism is typically directed at reasons for action rather than at actions themselves. J.S. Mill's Liberty Principle, the locus classicus in this context, is not directed at any class of actions, but Paternalism by and towards groups 4 instead rejects benevolence as an unacceptable "end," "purpose," or "warrant" for interference (1859: I.9). An advantage of the reason-focused view is that, unlike the action-focused view, it need not distinguish between different kinds of rationales. Both the action-focused and the reason-focused view must specify what actions count as interfering and what contents of reasons count as benevolent or paternalismmaking. However, only the action-focused view must then go on to say, for any combination of benevolent rationales, whether this combination makes the action paternalistic. For example, assume A forces B into rehab motivated by benefits to B but seeing benefits to others as the justification, and also forces C into rehab motivated by benefits to others but seeing benefits to C as the justification. An actionfocused definition of paternalism must be specified so as to determine, for each of these actions, whether or not it is paternalistic. The reason-focused view, in contrast, will imply that it is paternalistic to be motivated by B's good to force her into rehab, and paternalistic to see and/or cite C's good as a reason for forcing C into rehab, while neither action is paternalistic as such. I have so far discussed what I have called "kinds" of rationales, divided into motives and justifications, each category arguably containing several subcategories, with normative reasons a possible third category. That one and the same action often has several different kinds of rationales is one complexity faced by anyone who aims to determine the status of an action based on its (overall) rationale. Another such complexity is that there are also often many rationales of any one kind, differing in content or substance. We may, for example, be motivated to force a person into rehab both for her own sake and for the sake of her family. On the reason-focused view, it is the motives themselves, in combination with the interference that they are motives for, that are paternalistic. Hence, one motive for an action can be paternalistic while another is not. That there are many rationales of many kinds raises no special problems on this view. On the action-focused view, however, we must determine whether or not an action that has multiple rationales is paternalistic. Scholars have offered different proposals, including that an action is paternalistic if benevolence is its only rationale (Gray 1983: 90), its main one (Archard 1990), or even just a rationale, however marginal (Bullock 2015). Actions with both paternalism-making and other rationales are sometimes called "mixed cases" and treated as a sort of exception. Authors who take this path typically go on to focus exclusively on unmixed cases. This leaves it an open question how mixed cases, i.e. most actual cases, should be treated. Kleinig has two proposals in this regard. One is that actions should be considered paternalistic to the extent that their rationales are paternalism-making (Kleinig 1983: 12; also endorsed by Clarke 2002: 82-83). It is not clear, however, how this should be spelled out. Most obviously, the extent to which the rationale for an action is benevolence can be measured either in absolute terms how strong is this rationale taken in isolation? or in relative terms how strong is this rationale relative to other rationales for the same action? Neither of these specifications, however, takes into account how strong a rationale is required for the action to be [p. 49] all things considered motivated or justified. On either Paternalism by and towards groups 5 specification, actions can be quite paternalistic even if they are fully motivated and justified by non-benevolent rationales (as argued in Grill 2007: 446-8). Perhaps, therefore, "to the extent" should be understood in some kind of relation to how strong of a total rationale is required for action, in either motivational or justificational terms. Alternatively, as indicated by Kleinig's second proposal (Kleinig 1983: 12; also endorsed by de Marneffe 2006: 74), an action can be considered paternalistic if benevolence is required for the action to be all things considered motivated, or justified, or either motivated or justified, or both motivated and justified. The complexities that arise because actions have multiple rationales (in terms of content) and multiple kinds of rationales are aggravated when paternalists are groups, because different individuals often have different rationales for their actions. Call this the diversity problem. Hundreds of lawmakers in parliament, for example, may all vote for the same intrusive law for slightly different reasons, e.g. benefits to those intruded upon, benefits to others, environmental benefits, loyalty to one's party, advancing one's career, etc. Proposals for when mixed cases are paternalistic can be adapted from one-on-one cases to groups, though they may seem (even) less appealing in this context. On the strongest account, where benevolence must be the only rationale, this will supposedly apply to all members, classifying as nonpaternalistic group actions where a single member has some other rationale mixed into his set of rationales. On the weakest account, where benevolence need only be present as a rationale, it is supposedly sufficient that this rationale is present for a single member. On in-between accounts, the threshold for what counts as the "main" reason must in group cases be defined in relation to more than one person, raising new issues. For example, in determining what is the main rationale for the group, are we to go by how many members have benevolence as their main rationale, or are we to aggregate some other way, perhaps to take into consideration how strong are different members' total rationales for action (e.g. how strongly motivated they are)? On the "to the extent" account, similar issues arise concerning how to aggregate over members. I see no reason to believe that these issues are unresolvable. The point is that this is work that has not been done and that must be done before the various proposals can be applied to group cases. The diversity problem is noted by Douglas Husak in the context of legal paternalism (Husak 2003: 389-91). Husak also notes that it is difficult to know what motivates lawmakers and that laws remain in place over time and so the same law can be supported for different reasons as times change (2003: 391). Because of these problems, Husak considers something like the reason-focused view. However, despite many reservations, he insists in the end that laws can be paternalistic, and suggests that, because of the problems with motives, we should go by a law's "best rationale" (2003: 392).2 However, as Husak admits, this view has the general problem, described above, that it will classify all actions and laws as nonpaternalistic if benevolence is in fact never a good normative reason for interference. This could possibly be avoided by referring, not to actual reasons, but instead to facts that would be reasons in other contexts, such that the "best rationale" for an action is the rationale that would be Paternalism by and towards groups 6 best, if, counterfactually, protection and promotion of a person's interests provided as strong normative reasons for interference as they in fact do for responding to requests for help, or some such construction. More to the point, it is not obvious that invoking actual normative reasons will avoid the diversity problem, since each member of a group may contribute in a different way to some group action and may each have different reasons for their respective contributions. Consider the case where A, B and C each contribute to building a wall that will protect D from foolishly balancing on the edge of a cliff. Perhaps A raises the funds, B makes the plans, and C does [p. 50] the actual construction. They may all correctly believe that the immediate outcome of their joint action that there will be a wall is a good thing because it reduces the risk of harm to D. However, their main and sufficient actual normative reasons for contributing may not be the effect on D, but rather, e.g., that they have promised to contribute, that they will themselves be morally better people for contributing, or that contributing will bring them resources salaries, reputation that will enable good deeds in the future (feeding their children, building greater walls). Depending on one's general normative views, it may or may not be the case that we always have some reason to contribute, when we can, to other people's welfare, e.g. by reducing risk to them. If we don't, A, B and C may each have no benevolent reason whatsoever to build the wall. If we do, the benevolent reason they have may be relatively weak, and redundant. Though having a redundant benevolent motive may possibly taint an action as paternalistic on motivational accounts, it seems extreme to hold that redundant normative reasons make actions paternalistic. Therefore, it may be true for each of A, B or C that the rationale for their action, such as it counts in this context, is nonbenevolent. It may of course also be that their rationale is benevolent, and so the diversity problem remains unsolved. We could set aside individual reasons and look more generally at the reasons for, e.g., there being a wall. Indeed, this approach is common when discussing laws; there are supposed to be reasons for and against laws as such, supposedly for and against their existence. Husak expresses himself this way, as does Joel Feinberg. For Feinberg, laws are paternalistic if their "implicit rationale" is benevolent. This is, Feinberg explains, a sort of general understanding regarding the function of the law, explaining why it remains in place (1986: 17). I think we do best to interpret talk of practical reasons for other things than actions as shorthand for reasons for actions, such as introducing a bill or voting for it, or financing, planning or constructing a wall. If we allow ourselves to talk non-reductively of reasons for such things as the existence of laws and of infrastructure, it is unclear how this bears on agents and their reasons. With paternalism in particular, with its strong connection to interpersonal relationships, motivations and attitudes, jettisoning this connection is quite radical. On the reason-focused view, diversity does not pose as much of a problem, since it can be accommodated by counting as paternalism any combination of interfering actions and benevolent rationales for those actions, rationales of any kind (motives, justifications, etc.). When A and B together force C into rehab, for example, A's motive Paternalism by and towards groups 7 may be to help C, while his justification is to protect C's family (who are innocent, more vulnerable, etc.). B, on the other hand, is more motivated by concern for C's family, but his justification is to help C with his drug problem (since he suffers the most, etc.). Depending on the details of a reason-focused view, it may be that, in relation to the interfering action, A's motive but not his justification is paternalistic, while B's justification but not his motive is paternalistic. The example is a simple one, however, and for more complex cases, the reason-focused view will imply that paternalism is sprinkled over a vast net of actions and reasons, making for a very long and complicated answer to the question "is this paternalism?". Before I go on to discuss paternalism towards groups, in the next section, I will briefly note one complication that does not directly have to do with reasons for action. In the example with the building of the wall, three different agents have different reasons for action. However, they also contribute differently to the collective action of "building the wall." It is not obvious that all contributions amount to interference. Perhaps just raising the funds for the project is not interfering, or perhaps just doing the work that is ordered by someone else is not interfering. More generally, someone could perhaps contribute to an outcome that seems, on the face of it, to involve interference, without thereby interfering herself. Perhaps in such cases, the interference can only be found on the level of collective agency, just as with collective actions that seem [p. 51] benevolent though none of the contributing agents act benevolently. If so, this is a complication for both the action-focused and the reasonfocused views, since both presume an account of interfering action. 2. Paternalized groups I: preventing consensual interactions The discussion so far has been focused on paternalist groups. All issues that I have discussed can arise whether the paternalized is one person or several. In this section and the next, I will focus on actions that target groups, whether or not the agent is an individual or a group. Such actions can be interfering for some and not for others, and can be benevolent towards some and not others. Therefore, not all cases I will discuss are cases of group paternalism. Instead, one of my aims is to clarify which cases are and in what sense. As part of my discussion I will refer to concrete examples, such as drug regulation, and assume that the prevented activity, such as buying and using drugs, is indeed harmful. I make this assumption only for the sake of argument, since interactions that are not harmful to anyone should rather obviously not be interfered with and so are not very interesting to discuss. I will throughout speak of "harm" and "benefit" as outcomes, with the understanding that how these outcomes are relevant to paternalism depends on one's view of the reason component actual outcomes may provide normative reasons, believed outcomes may be motivating and invoked as justification, etc. I emphasized above that there can be several rationales, with different content, for the same interfering action. This can be because there is more than one reason to interfere with the same person, e.g. both to promote her well-being and to respond to Paternalism by and towards groups 8 a request for help from her. More often, however, it is due to effects on more than one person. If we interfere with two persons who are doing something that will harm one of them, we may be interfering with one to prevent harm to self and with the other to prevent harm to others. Sometimes, as Gerald Dworkin explains, "in trying to protect the welfare of a class of persons we find that the only way to do so will involve restricting the freedom of other persons besides those who are benefitted" (1972: 68). Dworkin labels such cases "impure paternalism," where the impurity is the interference with some other party, in addition to the beneficiary.3 The standard case of impure paternalism is interference with consensual interactions, and in particular with such interactions as are harmful to one of the parties and not the other. Examples include such extraordinary interactions as consenting to being abused or killed, and selling oneself into slavery. More practically relevant examples include selling sexual services and buying unhealthy consumer goods, such as recreational drugs. Interference will benefit the party that is harmed in its absence. There is presumably no benefit to the other party, e.g. the seller of drugs or the buyer of sex. Therefore, assuming the beneficiary is a single individual, this is not a group case. Interference with other parties is just a means, perhaps a necessary means, to producing the benefit. These parties are not themselves thereby paternalized. It is an interesting question whether we have any reason to regret, for the sake of the harming party, interference with actions that harm consenting others such as selling them drugs. This issue, however, is independent of issues to do with paternalism. In many typical cases of impure paternalism, such as prohibition of the sale of unhealthy products, the interference is most obvious with the nonbeneficiary, i.e. the seller (who may be prosecuted and punished). However, what makes the case one of paternalism is that there is also interference with the buyer, who is prevented from acquiring the desired good or service. As Feinberg argues, if others are prevented from selling me what I want to buy, or aiding me [p. 52] in my pursuits, then I am interfered with and my freedom is limited (Feinberg 1986: 9). Or, in Mill's words: there are questions relating to interference with trade, which are essentially questions of liberty [...] where the object of the interference is to make it impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, but on that of the buyer. (1859: V.4) Some authors describe as impure or "indirect" paternalism cases where they claim there is no interference with the beneficiary/buyer, but only with the nonbeneficiary/seller (Pope 2003: 687-88; Le Grand & New 2015: 37). If this was a form of paternalism, it would perhaps be a special kind of group case, involving two different members in quite different roles one is interfered with and another benefits. However, it is unclear what the paternalism would consist of in such cases. Interference with one person in order to benefit another person is the standard Paternalism by and towards groups 9 contrast class to paternalism (preventing assault has this structure). If there is indeed no interference with the buyer, then, I propose, there is no paternalism, but only interference to prevent harm to others (Bayles 1973 and Hansson 2005 argue that many prohibitions of consensual interactions should be understood in this way). Here, I should make an exception to my loose use of "interference" and acknowledge that some authors offer very wide understandings of interference, or, in other words, reject the assumption that paternalism is interfering. For example, Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler claim that it is sufficient that there is an attempt to "influence choices" (Sunstein and Thaler 2003: 1162) and Danny Scoccia claims that any benevolent influence on another via "nonrational means" is paternalistic (Scoccia 2013: 76, as well as his chapter in this volume). Such actions may not warrant the label "interference." In the present context, however, what is important is that however we specify the action component of paternalism, actions belonging to this type must be directed at the beneficiary for there to be paternalism. It is not sufficient that some other person is the target of such an action. If we require coercion, then there must be coercion towards the beneficiary. If we require only influence on choice, then there must be influence on the choice of the beneficiary. Some harmful consensual interactions are symmetrical in the sense that both or all parties harm each other and also consent to being harmed. Boxing is the traditional example, mixed martial arts competitions a more recent one. A street fight with willing participants is a more clear-cut example, without the commercial and institutional context. Benevolently interfering with consensual fighting may seem a clear example of paternalism, since there is both interference with and benefit to all members of the group. However, the details are somewhat intricate. Suppose that in a group consisting of A, B and C, A wants to punch B, B wants to punch C and C wants to punch A. If D prevents any punching from occurring by separating A, B, and C, this seems clearly to interfere with each of them by stopping them from punching the person they want to punch, while also benefitting each of them by protecting them from being punched. However, such prevention does not seem paternalistic because no person benefits from the interference with her (assuming they are not harmed by delivering a punch). They all benefit from the interference with other people, from which they are protected. Now consider a street fight with two willing participants, perhaps supporters of opposing sports clubs who take pride in fighting "for their team." We could claim that keeping these brawlers apart prevents A from fighting B, for B's sake, and prevents B from fighting A, for A's sake, hence benefitting each party only by interference with the other. However, this seems less [p. 53] plausible than in the three party case, since both A and B want the same thing to happen for there to be a fight between the two of them. They want this, let us assume, because they consider the risk of harm a fair price to pay for the thrill and the social recognition they get from fighting. Like the willing buyer of drugs or seller of sex, each brawler invites another person to (potentially) harm him. Like in these other cases, therefore, the Paternalism by and towards groups 10 freedom of each brawler is limited by preventing him from engaging in a harmful consensual interaction. I have argued that interference in the two party brawling case is paternalistic while interference in the three party punching case is not. Let me expand on the relevant difference. It is not that the two brawlers would object to interference. The three punchers too may object, because they value the opportunity to punch the person they want to punch more than they value the protection from being punched. The relevant difference is not in the numbers either. Two people may both want the other to suffer a punch, more than they want to be protected from being punched themselves, and so be opposed to interference. I believe interference in these variations on the punching case would not be paternalism. The important distinction is, I believe, between two sorts of cases: first, those where a person wants some harm or risk of harm for its own sake, or where this harm or risk is integral to what he wants, as in the brawling case part of what the brawlers take pride in is exactly to risk harm "for their team" and, second, those where a person is prepared to accept some harm or risk of harm in order to get something that he wants more than to avoid this harm or risk, such as to inflict harm on someone else. In the former cases, prevention is interference with the person who wants the harm or risk. In the latter case, prevention is interference only with the source of the harm or risk and not with the person who is prepared to accept it. This distinction is relevant only when the source of harm or risk is another agent (and probably only when that agent causes harm or risk intentionally). When the source of harm is the person herself, we can (normally) protect her only by interfering with her, which is paternalism.4 Special considerations apply when a person is opposed to being protected by others, even if she does not want the harm or risk that may result from being unprotected. Scoccia (2013: 81) notes that some people are "committed to an extreme ideal of self-reliance" and therefore oppose benevolent interference even with their own substantially involuntary action. People may for similar reasons oppose benevolent interference even with their own attackers they want to "fight their own battles." The state of being unprotected, or independent, is one to which risk is an integral aspect it is just this risk that one does not want others to remove. I therefore propose that interference with committedly self-reliant people is paternalism. Similar considerations apply when interferences with consensual interactions are coordinated through systems, institutions or laws. A law that prevents people from harming themselves, or from soliciting the aid of others in harming themselves, involves paternalism (i.e. implementing it, or doing so for certain reasons, may be paternalistic). As for a law that prevents people from harming others without their consent, but that is universally opposed, whether or not it involves paternalism depends on whether the opposition is based on a desire for self-reliance, or on a desire for the opportunity to harm others. In other words, it depends on whether people want to be unprotected themselves, or whether they want others to be unprotected. In many cases, of course, members of a group will have different aims, Paternalism by and towards groups 11 opinions and ideals. This and other differences between individuals is the topic of the next section. 3. Paternalized groups II: different effects on different people In this section, I will first note and illustrate how one action can affect different people differently in ways relevant to paternalism. I will then move on to discuss how this may influence our [p. 54] classification of various cases as paternalistic. The relevant differences concern, first, the two core components of paternalism already identified: who is interfered with and who benefits. A third relevant difference is also a third component of paternalism: the will component. Benevolent interferences are typically considered paternalistic only when they are against the will of the target, i.e. when unwelcome or not consented to. This component is arguably not essential since it can be integrated into the action component such that an action counts as interfering only if it is not consented to. However, it is typically treated as a separate component and I started to treat it as such towards the end of the previous section, in considering whether interference with brawling and punching would be objected to. For there to be paternalism, then, an action must be unwelcome, interfering and benevolent. However, I argued in the previous section that this is not sufficient, because sometimes the benevolence towards one person is not connected to the interference with her, as when the three punchers are all prevented from harming each other. What is relevant is not whether the action is benevolent, but whether the interference is benevolent. It can also be questioned whether an unwelcome benevolent interference with a person is paternalistic towards her if her objection is not connected to the interference with her (e.g., A stops B and C from daring each other into jumping off a cliff; both B and C object to A's interference; B does not want to jump and would not object but for the fact that she really wants C to jump). There are, potentially, interconnections between the three components and these connections can be different for different people affected by the same action. This indicates that we should allow, as I started to do in the previous section, that one and the same action can involve paternalism towards some and not towards others. This indicates important modifications of both the action-focused and the reason-focused view, as both of these otherwise deal only in actions and not their diverse effects on different people. On the reason-focused view, the modification can be integrated by holding that what is paternalistic is not combinations of actions and their rationales, but rather combinations of rationales and (unwelcome) interferences with particular people. This makes for an even more complex but arguably more accurate analysis of paternalism in group cases. On the action-focused view, similarly, the modification could be taken to imply that what is paternalistic is not in fact actions but rather interferences with particular people. Feinberg (1986: 20) discusses this modification and dismisses it as "an unnecessary relativizing of the concept" of paternalism. However, his discussion of group cases is quite limited, as I will soon explain. Given the mentioned Paternalism by and towards groups 12 interconnections and also given the general individualism inherent in the liberal tradition, it makes much sense to base analysis of paternalism towards groups on the effects on individual members. I will now survey some examples of actions towards groups that are paternalistic towards some members but where one of the three components of paternalism is missing in relation to other members. First, missing benefits: prevention of consensual interactions that are harmful to only one party is one sort of case; another is the subjection of a group to a measure that protects only those that are vulnerable to some harm. An example is removing the sleeping pills or cigarettes from a shared home, benefitting the cohabitant who is suicidal or a habitual smoker, but only harming the cohabitant who is neither of these things but sometimes has trouble sleeping or enjoys a single cigarette. Just as for prevention of consensual interactions, only the interference with the beneficiary is paternalistic. The interference with nonbeneficiaries is a sort of collateral damage.5 Unlike some cases of preventing consensual interactions, those that suffer this damage are not harming anyone or doing anything morally problematic, and so the interference with them must be considered a negative. Second, missing interference: speed limits supposedly benefit drivers by reducing the risk of accident for them, but also of course reduce risks for cyclists and pedestrians Even if pedestrians [p. 55] (who never drive) are included among the intended beneficiaries, and even if they are for some reason opposed to the regulation, it is not paternalistic towards them because it does not interfere with them. Third, missing objection: many people appreciate that product safety legislation prevents them from buying unsafe machinery or consumer goods. Others oppose such restriction of their freedom, on either pragmatic or principled grounds. Libertarian chainsaw buyers are paternalized by the state, while most other customers are not. There is very little discussion in the literature of how, on the dominant actionfocused view, we should classify the surveyed examples. However, a number of influential contributions in the 1980s converge on a view we may call the willing majority view: for actions that interfere with and benefit all members of a group, if a majority consents and the action is motivated by its benefits to them, then the action is not paternalistic, though it may be unfair to nonconsenters (Arneson 1980: 471-2; Dworkin 1983: 110; Feinberg 1986: 20). The view is motivated by discussion of such cases as the prohibition on dueling and the fluoridation of drinking water, where a large majority favors the policy and it is implemented for their sakes. The willing majority view can be specified to different motivational accounts (one motive, main motive, only motive, implicit rationale, etc.) and can be transformed into a justificational account by substituting, e.g., "taken to be justified" or "claimed to be justified" for "motivated." The view still draws scholarly support (e.g., Le Grand & New 2015: 21-22). Paternalism by and towards groups 13 The willing majority view says that, in some cases where the rationale for an action is to benefit a majority of those affected and where this majority is not paternalized, the action is not paternalistic. However, the view is restricted to cases where all those affected are both interfered with and benefitted and where the reason the majority is not paternalized is that they consent. This is the third of the cases just surveyed missing objection. The spirit of the view, however, indicates that its proponents would not mind a generalization that incudes also missing benefit and missing interference. The willing majority view categorizes actions based on their different effects on different people. Given the idea that paternalism actually resides in interferences with particular people and not in actions, the view may seem superfluous. If we know that an action is an unwelcome benevolent interference with A and with B but not with C, it is not clear what additional information is conveyed by saying that the action itself is or is not paternalistic. Those nevertheless committed to pinning the predicate "paternalism" on actions have some work to do. Even the generalized willing majority view is applicable only to actions that are nonpaternalistic towards a majority. A simple addition would be to categorize as paternalistic those actions that are paternalistic towards a majority. However, the 50% cut-off point seems arbitrary. It might also seem that factors other than sheer numbers could be relevant, such as the size of the benefits involved. Suppose that the prohibition of some rare and dangerous drug will marginally reduce the already very low risk that the majority ever confront this drug. The prohibition is introduced and the majority welcomes it for this reason. However, the prohibition will also drastically reduce the high risk of drug abuse and ensuing harm to some minority, who are opposed to prohibition. This prohibition will count as nonpaternalistic on plausible specifications of the willing majority view, which may seem counter-intuitive (on the importance of relative benefits to group consent, see Grill 2009: 151-53). A further problem with the willing majority view is that it disregards the reasons for why people consent to interference with a group to which they belong, as briefly indicated above. Proponents tend to assume that the consenters consent out of self-interest, but they may instead be altruistically motivated, consenting for the sake of the nonconsenters, whom they see as failing to act in their own best interest. This raises the question whether altruistic consent renders [p. 56] interference nonpaternalistic towards consenters. In addition, given that some people's altruistic consent makes blanket interference more likely, these people seem to be using their consent to indirectly paternalize nonconsenters. If the consenters are in the majority, the willing majority view would categorize the interfering action as nonpaternalistic. This seems very questionable. We could modify the view to require a majority of selfinterested consenters, but there are many additional issues to consider, such as how to count members who consent partly for self-interested and partly for altruistic reasons, and how to count liberally minded altruists who do not consent, in order to protect consenters whom they see as failing to give proper priority to their own Paternalism by and towards groups 14 liberty and independence (on these and other issues around group consent, see further Grill 2009). Before I conclude, let me briefly mention a fourth potentially relevant difference in how people are affected by the same action: who, among those interfered with, is acting voluntarily or competently. Though it has been convincingly challenged (Hanna 2011), it is a quite dominant position that unwelcome benevolent interference is not morally problematic, or much less so, when and because it is directed at choices or actions that are below some threshold of voluntariness. Following Feinberg, such interference is often called "soft paternalism." If some of those interfered with are below the threshold and some not, this situation is analogous to that when only some group members are interfered with or benefitted or objecting, though now the difference is not between paternalism and nonpaternalism, but between hard paternalism and soft paternalism. We could then either be content to determine for each paternalized member of the group whether the paternalism towards her is hard or soft, or we could identify some rule for whether or not the interfering action is soft or hard paternalistic, which should be suitably sensitive to differences among group members. Conclusion Though examples of paternalism in the conceptual and normative debate often include groups both as paternalists and as paternalized, the interesting and difficult issues that groups raise are seldom explicitly discussed or analyzed. What little has been said in the literature on paternalism by and towards groups is quite cursory. The topic deserves more thorough treatment. I have focused in this chapter on some issues that arise from the mere fact that more than one person is either paternalizing or being paternalized, setting to one side issues to do with collective agency and patiency in any stronger sense. In section 1, I presented the action-focused and reason-focused views on paternalism and explained how groups as paternalists complicate both views but provide greater challenges for the action-focused view, on which actions must somehow be categorized as either paternalistic or nonpaternalistic based on the often rich and diverse total rationale for group interference. In section 2, I argued that standard cases of impure paternalism are not paternalism towards groups because they only benefit (or are only believed to benefit) one party. I also argued that if they do not interfere with the beneficiary, they are not paternalism at all. I went on to consider interferences with people who mutually harm each other and argued that these are paternalistic only if the affected people benefit via interference with themselves, not others. I proposed that interference with two or more people bent on harming each other can be paternalism if they seek to be harmed or put themselves at risk of harm, or if they seek an activity where such harm or risk is an integral aspect. In other cases, interference is not Paternalism by and towards groups 15 paternalistic, even if objections to interference may have normative significance in other ways. In section 3, I argued that, because of interrelations between the three components of paternalism interference, benevolence, and will we should understand paternalism in terms [p. 57] of unwelcome benevolent interferences with particular people, rather than in terms of actions, which may paternalize some and not others (when an action only affects one person, we need not distinguish between interference and action). This shift from action to interference holds for both the action-focused and the reason-focused view. There may be a connection between this shift and the controversy between action-focus and reason-focus in that, if we give up trying to pin the predicate "paternalistic" on actions, we may as well accept the reason-focused view, modified to deal in reasons for interferences rather than reasons for action.6 Related Topics Hard and Soft Paternalism; Libertarian Paternalism, Nudging and Public Policy; Paternalism and the Criminal Law; Perfectionism and Paternalism; The Concept of Paternalism. Notes 1 Shiffrin (2000) is an exception to the near consensus that paternalism essentially involves the protection or promotion of the interests of the person interfered with. Shiffrin clearly states that the paternalism-making rationale can be the improvement of things under a person's control that are not, strictly speaking, her interests. However, she seems to presume that the rationale must be benevolent in some sense. Presumably, she would not categorize as paternalist interference that is solely motivated by self-interest, or by sheer malice. I will throughout use standard examples that do not cohere with Shiffrin's view, but which can be reformulated so that they do. 2 The difficulty with group motives has been noted more often in the context of liberal neutrality. Neutrality can fruitfully be understood in terms of a constraint on what reasons may be invoked for political decisions (e.g. Larmore 1987: 44; Wall 1998: chap. 2; de Marneffe 2010: chap. 5, esp. 134). Antipaternalism can similarly be understood in terms of what reasons may be invoked for interference (Grill 2015). So understood, neither of these liberal "-isms" is dependent on classifying actions or laws as non-neutral or paternalistic. 3 Feinberg complains that "impure" sounds like "a watered down sort" of paternalism and proposes to use "indirect" instead (Feinberg 1984: 9). Both terms are used, sometimes with the same meaning and sometimes with slightly different meanings. 4 This analysis of consensual fighting partly contradicts that in my (2007: 453-55). A note on terminology: In my (2007) I speak of different effects of actions in the abstract, noting that effects can be individuated by what person is affected but leaving it open that other factors may also be relevant. This framework may sometimes be useful, but here, for ease of presentation, I bypass talk of effects in general and speak only of interference with and paternalism towards different people. Paternalism by and towards groups 16 5 If interfering with nonbeneficiaries is "the only way" to attain the benefit to the beneficiaries, then these cases are impure paternalism on Dworkin's characterization. However, this concept is usually only associated with interference with consensual interactions. 6 Thanks to Jason Hanna and Lars Samuelsson for very helpful comments on more than one draft. References Archard, D. (1990) "Paternalism Defined," Analysis 50: 36-42. Arneson, R. (1980). "Mill versus Paternalism," Ethics 90: 470-489. Bayles, M. D. (1974) "Criminal Paternalism," in J.R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), The Limits of Law Nomos XV, New York: Lieber-Atherton, pp. 174188. Bullock, E.C. (2015) "A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism," The Philosophical Quarterly 65: 1–21. Clarke, S. (2002) "A Definition of Paternalism," Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 5: 81–91. Dworkin, G. (1972) "Paternalism," The Monist 56: 64-84. [p. 58] Dworkin, G. (1983) "Paternalism: Some Second Thoughts," In R. Sartorius (ed.), Paternalism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 105-111. Feinberg, J. (1986) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Volume 3: Harm to Self, New York: Oxford University Press. Gert, B., and Culver, C.M. (1976) "Paternalistic Behavior," Philosophy & Public Affairs 6: 45-57. Gray, J. (1983) Mill on Liberty: A Defence, London: Routledge. Grill, K. (2007) "The Normative Core of Paternalism," Res Publica 13: 441–58. Grill, K. (2009) "Liberalism, Altruism and Group Consent," Public Health Ethics 2: 146-57. Grill, K. (2015) "Antipaternalism as a Filter on Reasons," in T. Schramme (ed.) New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care, Cham, Switzerland: Springer, pp. 47-66. Hanna, J. (2011) "Paternalism and Impairment," Social Theory and Practice 37: 434– 60. Hansson, S.O. (2005) "Extended Antipaternalism," Journal of Medical Ethics 31: 97– 100. Husak, D.N. (2003) "Legal Paternalism," in Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 387–412. Kleinig, J. (1983) Paternalism, Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press. Le Grand, J. and New, B. (2015) Government Paternalism: Nanny State or Helpful Friend? Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Paternalism by and towards groups 17 Larmore, C.E. (1987) Patterns of Moral Complexity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. de Marneffe, P. (2006) "Avoiding Paternalism", Philosophy & Public Affairs 34: 68-94. de Marneffe, P. (2010). Liberalism and prostitution, New York: Oxford University Press. Mill, J.S. (1859) On Liberty, London: J.W. Parker and Son. Pope, T.M. (2003) "Counting the Dragon's Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism," Georgia State University Law Review 20: 659-722. Scoccia, D. (2013) "The Right to Autonomy and the Justification of Hard Paternalism," in C. Coons and M. Weber (eds.), Paternalism: Theory and Practice, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74-92. Shiffrin, S. (2000) "Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation," Philosophy & Public Affairs 29: 205–50. Sunstein, C.R. and Thaler, R.H. (2003) "Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron," The University of Chicago Law Review 70: 1159–1202. VanDeVeer, D. (1986) Paternalistic Intervention: The Moral Bounds of Benevolence, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. Wall, S. (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism and Restraint, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Judicial Incoherence, Capital Punishment, and the Legalization of Torture: A response to Glossip v. Gross and Bucklew v. Precythe GUUS DUINDAM* This brief essay responds to the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bucklew v. Precythe. It contends that the argument relied upon by the Court in that decision, as well as in Glossip v. Gross, is either trivial or demonstrably invalid. Hence, this essay provides a nonmoral reason to oppose the Court's recent capital punishment decisions. The Court's position that petitioners seeking to challenge a method of execution must identify a readily available and feasible alternative execution protocol is untenable, and must be revisited. I. INTRODUCTION When the State of Missouri executes Russel Bucklew later this year by way of lethal injection, the tumors which riddle his head, neck, and throat will likely rupture.1 If they do, Bucklew will die coughing and choking on his own blood. 2 An expert witness testified that "beginning with the injection . . . and ending with Mr. Bucklew's death several minutes to as long as many minutes later, Mr. Bucklew would be highly likely to experience feelings of 'air hunger' and the excruciating pain of prolonged suffocation."3 According to the Supreme Court, this punishment is neither cruel nor unusual.4 The Eighth Amendment, it held, "does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain in carrying out executions." 5 Bucklew's challenge failed because, according to the majority, he did not identify a "feasible and readily implemented alternative" by which the state could have executed him.6 * Guus Duindam is a J.D. / Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy and Law at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. © 2019, Guus Duindam. The author would like to thank Anna Aguillard, Dale Robinson, and Emily B. Mills for their excellent editing and cite checking work during the publication process. 1 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1138 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (reviewing the evidence presented by Bucklew regarding the likely effects of his lethal injection); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. 1112, at 8–12 (No. 178151) (reviewing Bucklew's medical condition and the likely effects of the lethal injection). 2 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1138 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 3 Id. at 1139 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 4 See id. at 1133 (majority opinion) (holding that the State was entitled to summary judgment on Bucklew's Eighth Amendment claim). 5 Id. at 1125. 6 Id. at 1133. THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [VOL. 108 75 Readers who have followed the Court's recent capital punishment jurisprudence would not have been surprised at the Bucklew holding. In Glossip v. Gross, the Court added the macabre requirement that death-row prisoners cannot challenge an execution protocol unless they come up with a "known and available alternative method of execution" and establish that this method would be less painful than the existing method.7 In Arthur v. Dunn and Irick v. Tennessee, the Court refused even to consider challenges to execution protocols on grounds of unconstitutional cruelty, despite petitioners in both cases amassing significant evidence that their executions would involve "intolerable and needless agony"8-and despite the pleaded "known and available" alternatives: execution by firing squad9 and singledrug lethal injection.10 These decisions are evidence of an extraordinary shift in the Court's thinking-away from its long-held view that the "basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment" is "the dignity of man."11 This move presents clear moral and legal challenges. But my aim here is not to relitigate these moral issues. They are already well covered by the extensive literature on executions and torture. Instead, this brief essay responds to the central argument relied upon by the Court to justify its holdings in Glossip and Bucklew, and demonstrates that it is invalid. Other recent critiques of the Court's capital punishment jurisprudence risk preaching to the choir by appealing to broad anti-death-penalty arguments.12 In contrast, this essay concludes that the Court's decisions must be opposed on simple logical grounds. 7 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2731 (2015). The Court alluded to this requirement- that petitioners provide a known and available alternative method of execution and establish that it would be less painful-earlier in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008), and in Bucklew the Court refers to it as the "Baze-Glossip test." 139 S. Ct. at 1126. Nevertheless, I will focus in this essay only on the test as it is used in Glossip and its progeny because (1) the test in Baze is less stringent than the one in Glossip, and (2) the essential holding in Baze does not depend on this requirement, whereas the holdings of Glossip and Bucklew fully depend on it. 8 Arthur v. Dunn, 137 S. Ct. 725, 725 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Irick v. Tennessee, 139 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that Tennessee's lethal injection would "cause [Irick] to experience sensations of drowning, suffocating, and being burned alive from the inside out"). 9 Arthur, 137 S. Ct. at 725 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 10 Irick, 139 S. Ct. at 4–5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 11 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). 12 See, e.g., Dan Markel, Executing Retributivism: Panetti and the Future of the Eighth Amendment, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2009) (arguing that the Court's defense of the death penalty is no longer viable); Thomas E. Robins, Retribution, the Evolving Standard of Decency, and Methods of Execution: The Inevitable Collision in Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 199 PENN ST. L. REV 885, 889 (2015) (arguing that the Court's defense of the death penalty is internally inconsistent). 2019] THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 76 II. THE CENTRAL ARGUMENT IN GLOSSIP AND BUCKLEW IS INVALID The Glossip majority argues that "because it is settled that capital punishment is constitutional, it necessarily follows that there must be a constitutional means of carrying it out."13 It then concludes, claiming to be guided by this inference, 14 that petitioners cannot succeed in Eighth Amendment challenges unless they identify a readily available alternative method of execution.15 There are two basic ways in which one could read the inference at the core of the Court's recent death penalty decisions. The first is valid but trivial, and therefore meaningless. The second is plainly invalid. The first, trivial version can be summarized as follows: P1: Capital punishment does not invariably violate the Eighth Amendment. P2: If a punishment does not always violate the Constitution, there must be at least one conceivable means of carrying it out that is not unconstitutional. C1: Therefore, there is at least one conceivable means of carrying out the death penalty that is not unconstitutional. This argument is valid (the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises) and sound (the premises are all true). The first premise is explicitly affirmed in Gregg v. Georgia.16 And the second premise is true by definition: to say that there is no conceivable constitutional means of carrying out a punishment is just another way of saying that the punishment is not constitutional. Thus, the argument is sound. For much the same reason, it is only trivially valid. After all, to say that "not all executions are unconstitutional" (P1) is simply equivalent to the conclusion that "at least one execution is not unconstitutional" (C1). If the second phrase were false-that is, if there were no conceivable methods of execution that would not violate the constitution-then the first one would also be false-that is, all executions would be unconstitutional. The conclusion is just a repetition of the first premise; the argument has not moved the discussion forward. An argument whose conclusion simply repeats its first premise is no argument 13 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008)) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 14 Id. 15 Id. 135 S. Ct. at 2737 ("prisoners must identify an alternative that is 'feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce[s] a substantial risk of severe pain.'") (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 52 (2008)). 16 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 ("We now hold that the punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution.") (emphasis added). THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [VOL. 108 77 at all. Therefore, the Court could not have been guided by this first version of the argument in Glossip and Bucklew. By imposing new requirements on petitioners, those decisions go significantly beyond Gregg's holding that capital punishment is not "invariably" unconstitutional.17 The second argument is nontrivial but fallacious. The Court explicitly endorsed this version of the argument, 18 and it can be summarized as follows19: P1*: Capital punishment does not invariably violate the Eighth Amendment. P2*: If a punishment does not always violate the Constitution, there must be at least one available means of carrying it out that is constitutional. C1*: Therefore, there must always be at least one available and constitutional means of carrying out a death sentence. C2*: Therefore, in order to successfully show that the state's proposed method of execution is unconstitutional, a petitioner must show that there is another available method that would be better. Otherwise, all available methods of carrying out her execution would be unconstitutional. But this, by C1*, could never be the case because there must always be at least one constitutional means of executing her. Hence a petitioner's challenge can only succeed if she can prove that there is a better available means of execution. It is hard to overstate the importance of this line of argument in the Court's recent death penalty decisions. It is the sole justifying reason for the Court's new requirement that petitioners propose their own alternative methods of execution. That standard is not otherwise justified by the Court's earlier capital punishment decisions.20 It explains why Glossip and Bucklew require that petitioners provide a "known and available" method of execution. By the Court's logic, if there is no "known and available"21 method, then this necessarily rules out the possibility that the state's chosen 17 Id. 18 Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2732-33, 2739; see also Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1140 (2019) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting on the Court's reasoning in Glossip). 19 Asterisks distinguish references to premises and conclusions in this version of the argument from those referring to premises and conclusions in the first version of the argument. 20 It is discussed in Baze, but there justified by appeal to the same reasoning: "We begin with the principle, settled by Gregg, that capital punishment is constitutional. It necessarily follows that there must be a means of carrying it out." Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 47 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 21 Bucklew, 139 S. Ct. at 1125 (citing Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738). 2019] THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE 78 method is unconstitutional. After all, the alternative would be to hold that there is no "available" method of execution that would be permissible under the Constitution, and the Court takes itself to have conclusively ruled out this possibility. Once this argument is isolated from its disturbing context, its failings are evident. Where the inference in P2 is trivially valid, the inference in P2* is plainly invalid. Nothing about the bare constitutionality of capital punishment as much as suggests the conclusion that the best available method is always constitutional. P1* provides us with precisely no reason at all for thinking this. If the problem with P2* is not immediately obvious, imagine a judge who believes executions are constitutional if and only if they are painless. This judge affirms P1* and the decision in Gregg: she accepts that painless executions are constitutional, hence she accepts that not all executions are unconstitutional. (Put another way, she accepts that the death penalty does not "invariably" violate the Constitution.22) But this certainly does not commit her to the claim that there must always be a constitutional way to carry out a death sentence. To the contrary. If a state does not have any painless execution protocols on offer, it will, on this view, be incapable of carrying out a constitutional execution until it discovers or develops such a method. The crucial inference in P2* is simply indefensible. Because P2* is false and the trivial alternative, P2, does not help us get to C1* and C2*, the Court's conclusions in Glossip and Bucklew (and their denials of certiorari in Arthur and Irick) were entirely unwarranted. Crucially, this is true regardless of one's moral convictions about the death penalty or painful executions. III. THE GLOSSIP TEST AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT Suppose now that what I have said so far is wrong. Suppose that it is a feature of the Eighth Amendment (albeit an until-recently-undiscovered feature) that inferences from holdings of the form "x is not invariably unconstitutional" to "there must always be at least one available constitutional means of imposing x" are valid. This would have extraordinary consequences for the structure of our entire penological system. Consider some of the newly validated arguments we could now make. Imprisonment is not always unconstitutional. Therefore, there must always be an available and constitutional means of imprisonment. Therefore, it does not matter how bad conditions in our prisons get, for the best one will necessarily be constitutional. (Prison inspections are, as it turns out, merely 22 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976). THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE [VOL. 108 79 supererogatory.) The same would hold mutatis mutandis for every other mode of punishment. This is absurd. It could not possibly follow from any halfway plausible reading of the Eighth Amendment. This brief exercise illustrates the unreasonableness of the Court's requirement that petitioners and their lawyers devise their own alternative methods of executions. Suppose that all prisons in a state became overcrowded. Next, a newly imprisoned inmate challenges his prison sentence in his overcrowded prison under the Eighth Amendment. No court, surely, would require the inmate to find himself a better prison. Unquestionably, it would be incumbent on the state government to find another accommodation or to improve conditions in the current prison.23 I can see no reason why this ought to work any differently in the context of capital punishment. If a prisoner has a credible claim that the conditions of his imprisonment are intolerably cruel, then it is irrelevant whether the state has better conditions available. What is at issue is only whether the conditions to which this prisoner is being subjected are "cruel and unusual." This is how the Court reasons in every Eighth Amendment case except capital punishment cases since Baze and Glossip. In these recent capital punishment cases, it has justified a refusal to engage in serious inquiry about the meaning of "cruel and unusual" in the context of executions by placing what ought to be the state's burden on petitioners. As I hope now to have shown, the Court's reasoning does not begin to justify this extraordinary step. IV. CONCLUSION It is hard to imagine an argument with higher stakes. Every time the Court affirms the requirements of Glossip, it enables state execution practices which cause potentially torturous deaths. Such a jurisprudence has real victims: Billy Irick, Thomas Arthur, and Russel Bucklew are but prominent examples. This brief essay has argued that the Court's justifications for its holdings in Glossip and Bucklew are invalid and indefensible. This point is not grounded in political or moral principles. Whatever one thinks of the kinds of executions the Court has decided to tolerate, decisions like Glossip and Bucklew are grounded in a guiding principle that cannot possibly be correct. They should be roundly rejected. 23 Indeed, this is how the Court has handled such challenges in the past. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685–88 (1978).

Absolute Decidability and Mathematical Modality Hasen Khudairi Abstract This paper aims to contribute to the analysis of the nature of mathematical modality, and to the applications of the latter to unrestricted quantification and absolute decidability. Rather than countenancing the interpretational type of mathematical modality as a primitive, I argue that the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a species of epistemic modality. I argue, then, that the framework of multi-dimensional intensional semantics ought to be applied to the mathematical setting. The framework permits of a formally precise account of the priority and relation between epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality. The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in the multi-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the difference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our knowledge thereof. 1 Introduction This essay aims to contribute to the analysis of the nature of mathematical modality, and to the applications of the latter to unrestricted quantification and absolute decidability. I argue that mathematical modality falls under at least three types; the interpretational, the metaphysical, and the logical. The interpretational type of mathematical modality has traditionally been taken to concern the interpretation of the quantifiers (cf. Linnebo, 2009, 2010, 2013; Studd, 2013); the possible reinterpretations of the intensions of the concept of set (Uzquiano, 2015); and the possibility of reinterpreting the domain over which the quantifiers range, in order to avoid inconsistency (cf. Fine, 2005, 2006, 2007). The metaphysical type of modality concerns the ontological profile of abstracta 1 and mathematical truth. Abstracta are thus argued to have metaphysically necessary being, and mathematical truths hold of metaphysical necessity, if at all (cf. Fine, 1981; Williamson, 2016). Instances, finally, of the logical type of mathematical modality might concern the properties of consistency (cf. Field, 1989: 249-250, 257-260; Rayo, 2013: 50; Leng: 2007; 2010: 258), and can perhaps be further witnessed by the logic of provability (cf. Boolos, 1993) and the modal profile of forcing (cf. Kripke 1965; Hamkins and Löwe, 2008). The significance of the present contribution is as follows. (i) Rather than countenancing the interpretational type of mathematical modality as a primitive, I argue that the interpretational type of mathematical modality is a species of epistemic modality.1 (ii) I argue, then, that the framework of multidimensional intensional semantics ought to be applied to the mathematical setting. The framework permits of a formally precise account of the priority and relation between epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality. I target, in particular, the modal axioms that the respective interpretations of the modal operator ought to satisfy. The discrepancy between the modal systems governing the parameters in the multi-dimensional intensional setting provides an explanation of the difference between the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and our knowledge thereof. (iii) Finally, I examine the application of the mathematical modalities beyond the issues of unrestricted quantification and indefinite extensibility. As a test case for the 1A precedent to the current approach is Parsons (1979-1980; 1983: p. 25, chs.10-11; 2008: 176), who argues that intuition is both a species of the imagination and can be formalized by a mathematical modality. The mathematical modality is governed by S4.2, and concerns possible iterations of the successor operation in arithmetic and possible extensions of the settheoretic cumulative hierarchy. Among the differences between Parsons' approach and the one here outlined is (i) that, by contrast to the current proposal, Parsons notes that his notion of mathematical modality is not epistemic (2008: 81fn1); and (ii) that Parsons (1997: 348-351; 2008: 98-100) suggests that the intuitional mathematical modality concerning computable functions is an idealization insensitive to distinctions such as those captured by computational complexity theory, rather than being defined relative to an epistemic modal space comprising the computational theory of mind. (See Author, ms, for further discussion.) 2 multi-dimensional approach, I investigate the interaction between the epistemic and metaphysical mathematical modalities and large cardinal axioms. The multi-dimensional intensional framework permits of a formally precise means of demonstrating how the metaphysical possibility of absolute decidability and the continuum hypothesis can be accessed by their epistemic-modal-mathematical profile. The logical mathematical modalities – of consistency, provability, and forcing – provide the means for discerning whether mathematical truths are themselves epistemically possible. I argue that, in the absence of disproof, large cardinal axioms are epistemically possible, and thereby provide a sufficient guide to the metaphysical mathematical possibility of determinacy claims and the continuum hypothesis. In Section 2, I define the formal clauses and modal axioms governing the epistemic and metaphysical types of mathematical modality. In Section 3, I discuss how the properties of the epistemic mathematical modality and metaphysical mathematical modality converge and depart from previous attempts to delineate the contours of similar notions. Section 4 extends the multi-dimensional intensional framework to the issue of mathematical knowledge; in particular, to the modal profile of large cardinal axioms and to the absolute decidability of the continuum hypothesis. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 2 Mathematical Modality 2.1 Metaphysical Mathematical Modality A formula is a logical truth if and only if the formula is true in an intended model structure, M = <W, D, R, V>, where W designates a space of metaphysically possible worlds; D designates a domain of entities, constant across worlds; R 3 designates an accessibility relation on worlds; and V is an assignment function mapping elements in D to subsets of W. A formula in M is a modal truth if and only if a faithful interpretation maps the formula to a metaphysically universal proposition (cf. Williamson, 2013.: 106). A formula satisfies conditions on metaphysically universality if and only if the formula is true on its universal generalization (cf. Williamson, op. cit.: 93). 2.2 Epistemic Mathematical Modality In order to accommodate the notion of epistemic possibility, we enrich M with the following conditions: M = <C, W, D, R, V>, where C, a set of epistemically possibilities, is constrained as follows: Let JφKc ⊆ C; (φ is a formula encoding a state of information at an epistemically possible world). -pri(x) = λc.JxKc,c; (the two parameters relative to which x – a propositional variable – obtains its value are epistemically possible worlds. The function from possible formulas to values is thus an intension). -sec(x) = λc.JxKw,w (the two parameters relative to which x obtains its value are metaphysically possible worlds). Then: • Epistemic Mathematical Necessity (Apriority) JφKc,w = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀c′JφKc,c ′ = 1 (φ is true at all points in epistemic modal space). 4 • Epistemic Mathematical Possibility J⋄cφKin 6= ∅ ⇐⇒ JPrφKin 6= ∅ ∧ >.5, else 〈∅, Prin (φ | ∅)〉, where in designates an agent's state of information i in a context n. (φ might be true if and only if its value is not null and it is greater than .5). Crucially, epistemic mathematical modality is constrained by consistency, and the formal techniques of provability and forcing. A mathematical formula is false, and therefore metaphysically impossible, if it can be disproved or induces inconsistency in a model. 2.3 Interaction • Convergence ∀c∃wJφKc,w = 1 (the value of x is relative to a parameter for the space of epistemically possible worlds. The value of x relative to the first parameter determines the value of x relative to the second parameter for the space of metaphysical possibility). • Super-rigidity (2D-Intension): JφKw,c = 1 ⇐⇒ ∀w',c'JφKw ′ ,c ′ = 1 (the intension of φ is rigid in all points in metaphysical and epistemic modal space). 2.4 Modal Axioms • Metaphysical mathematical modality is governed by the modal system KTE, as augmented by the Barcan formula and its Converse (cf. Fine, 5 1981). K: [φ → ψ] → [φ → ψ] T: φ → φ E: ¬φ → ¬φ Barcan: ⋄∃xFx → ∃x⋄Fx Converse Barcan: ∃x⋄Fx → ⋄∃xFx • Epistemic mathematical modality is governed by the modal system, KT4, as augmented by the Barcan formula and the Converse Barcan formula.2 K: [φ → ψ] → [φ → ψ] T: φ → φ 4: φ → φ Barcan: ∃xFx → ∃xFx Converse Barcan: ∃xFx → ∃xFx 3 Departures from Precedent The approach to mathematical modality, according to which it yields a representation of the cumulative universe of sets, has been examined by Fine (2005; 2006) and Uzquiano (2015). Fine argues that the mathematical modality should 2Reasons adducing against including the Smiley-Gödel-Löb provability formula among the axioms of epistemic mathematical modality are examined in Section 5. GL states that '[φ → φ] → φ'. For further discussion of the properties of GL, see Löb (1955); Smiley (1963); Kripke (1965); and Boolos (1993). Löb's provability formula was formulated in response to Henkin's (1952) problem concerning whether a sentence which ascribes the property of being provable to itself is provable. (Cf. Halbach and Visser, 2014, for further discussion.) For an anticipation of the provability formula, see Wittgenstein (1933-1937/2005: 378). Wittgenstein writes: 'If we prove that a problem can be solved, the concept 'solution' must somehow occur in the proof. (There must be something in the mechanism of the proof that corresponds to this concept.) But the concept mustn't be represented by an external description; it must really be demonstrated. / The proof of the provability of a proposition is the proof of the proposition itself' (op. cit.). Wittgenstein contrasts the foregoing type of proof with 'proofs of relevance' which are akin to the mathematical, rather than empirical, propositions, discussed in Wittgenstein (2001: IV, 4-13, 30-31). 6 be interpretational; and thus taken to concern the reinterpretation of the domain over which the quantifiers range, in order to avoid inconsistency. Uzquiano argues similarly for an interpretational construal of mathematical modality, where the cumulative hierarchy of sets is fixed, yet what is possibly reinterpreted is the non-logical vocabulary of the language, in particular the membership relation.3 On Fine's approach, the interpretational modality is both postulational, and 'prescriptive' or imperatival. The prescriptive element consists in the rule: 'Introduction: !x.C(x)', such that one is enjoined to postulate, i.e. to 'introduce an object x conforming to the condition C(x)' (2005: 91; 2006: 38). In the setting of unrestricted quantification, suppose, e.g., that there is an interpretation for the domain over which a quantifier ranges. Fine writes that an interpretation 'I is exten[s]ible – in symbols, E(I) – if possibly some interpretation extends it, i.e. ⋄∃J(I⊂J)' (2006: 30). Then, the interpretation of the domain over which the quantifier ranges is extensible, if '∀I.E(I)'. The interpretation of the domain over which the quantifier ranges is indefinitely extensible, if '∀I.E(I)' iff '∀I⋄∃J(I⊂J)', where the reinterpretation is induced via the prescriptive imperative to postulate the existence of a new object by the foregoing 'Introduction' rule (2006: 30-31; 38). Fine clarifies that the interpretational approach is consistent with a 'realist ontology' of the set of reals. He refers to the imperative to postulate new objects, and thereby reinterpret the domain for the quantifier, as the 'mechanism' by which epistemically to track the cumulative hierarchy of sets (2007: 124-125). In accord with Fine's approach, the epistemic mathematical modality defined in the previous section was taken to have a similarly representational interpreta3Compare Gödel, 1947; Williamson, 1998; and Fine, 2005. 7 tion, and perhaps the postulational property is an optimal means of inducing a reinterpretation of the domain of the quantifier. However, the present approach avoids a potential issue with Fine's account, with regard to the the introduction of deontic modal properties of the prescriptive and imperatival rules that he mentions.4 It is sufficient that the interpretational modalities are a species of epistemic modality, i.e. possibilities that are relative to agents' spaces of states of information. Developing Fine's program, Linnebo (2013) outlines a modalized version of ZF. Similarly to the modal axioms for the epistemic mathematical modality specified in the previous section, Linnebo argues that his modal set theory ought to be governed by the system S4.2, the Converse Barcan formula, and (at least a restricted version of) the Barcan formula. However – rather than being either interpretational or epistemic – Linnebo deploys the mathematical modality in order to account for the notion of 'potential infinity', as anticipated by Aristotle.5 The mathematical modality is thereby intended to provide a formally precise answer to the inquiry into the extent of the cumulative set-theoretic hierarchy; i.e., in order to precisify the answer that the hierarchy extends 'as far as possible' (2013: 205).6 Thus, Linnebo takes the modality to be constitutive of the actual ontology of sets; and the quantifiers ranging over the actual ontology of sets are claimed to have an 'implicitly modal' profile (2010: 146; 2013: 225). He suggests, e.g., that: 'As science progresses, we formulate set theories that characterize larger 4For an analysis of the precise interaction between the semantic values of epistemic and deontic modal operators, see Author (ms). 5Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book III, Ch. 6. 6Precursors to the view that modal operators can be availed of in order to countenance the potential hierarchy of sets include Hodes (1984). Intensional constructions of set theory are further developed by Reinhardt (1974); Parsons (1983); Myhill (1985); Scedrov (1985); Flagg (1985); Goodman (1985); Hellman (1990); Nolan (2002); and Studd (2013). (See Shapiro (1985) for an intensional construction of arithmetic.) Chihara (2004: 171-198) argues that 'broadly logical' conceptual possibilities can be used to represent imaginary situations relevant to the construction of open-sentence tokens. The open-sentences can then be used to define the properties of natural and cardinal numbers and the axioms of Peano arithmetic. 8 and larger initial segments of the universe of sets. At any one time, precisely those sets are actual whose existence follows from our strongest, well-established set theory' (2010: 159n21). However – despite his claim that the modality is constitutive of the actual ontology of sets – Linnebo concedes that the mathematical modality at issue cannot be interpreted metaphysically, because sets exist of metaphysical necessity if at all (2010: 158; 2013: 207). In order partly to allay the tension, Linnebo remarks, then, that set theorists 'do not regard themselves as located at some particular stage of the process of forming sets' (2010: 159); and this might provide evidence that the inquiry – concerning at which stage in the process of set-individuation we happen to be, at present – can be avoided. Another distinction to note is that both Linnebo (op. cit.) and Uzquiano (op. cit.) avail of second-order plural quantification, in developing their primitivist and interpretational accounts of mathematical modality. By contrast to their approaches, the epistemic and metaphysical modalities defined in the previous section are defined with second-order singular quantification over sets. Finally, Linnebo and Uzquiano both suggest that their mathematical modalities ought to be governed by the G axiom; i.e. ⋄φ → ⋄φ. The present approach eschews, however, of the G axiom, in virtue of the following. Williamson (2009) demonstrates that – because KT4G is a sublogic of S5 – an epistemic operator which validates the conjunction of the 4 axiom of positive introspection and the E axiom of negative introspection will be inconsistent with the condition of 'recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness'. Recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness is a computational constraint on an epistemic agent's theorizing, according to which the intended models of the agent's theory are both maximally consistent and conservatively extended by addition of 9 the 'box'-operator, interpreted as expressing the agent's state of knowledge. As axioms of an agent's consistent, recursively axiomatizable theorizing about the theory of its own states of knowledge and belief, the conjunction of 4 and E would entail that the agent's theory is both consistent and decidable, in conflict with Gödel's (1931) second incompleteness theorem. The modal system, KT4, avoids the foregoing result. In the present setting, the circumvention is innocuous, because the undecidability – yet recursively enumerable quasi-conservativeness – of an epistemic agent's consistent theorizing about its epistemic states is consistent with the epistemic mathematical possibility that large cardinal axioms are absolutely decidable. 4 Knowledge of Absolute Decidability Williamson (2016) examines the extension of the metaphysically modal profile of mathematical truths to the question of absolute decidability. In this section, I aim to extend Williamson's analysis to the notion of epistemic mathematical modality that has been developed in the foregoing sections. The extension provides a crucial means of witnessing the signficance of the multi-dimensional intensional approach for the epistemology of mathematics. Williamson proceeds by suggesting the following line of thought. Suppose that A is a true interpreted mathematical formula which eludes present human techniques of provability; e.g. the continuum hypothesis (op. cit.). Williamson argues that mathematical truths are metaphysically necessary (op. cit.). From there, he suggests that knowledge of A satisfies the condition of safety from error, as codified via a reflexive and symmetric accessibility relation from worlds at which A is known. Thus, there is either no, or a small risk of, not believing that A, relative to a world in which A is known – although the safety condition is 10 not itself sufficient for mathematical knowledge that A. Williamson then enjoins one to consider the following scenario: It is metaphysically possible that there is a species which can prove that A. Therefore, A is absolutely provable; that is, A 'can in principle be known by a normal mathematical process' such as derivation in an axiomatizable formal system with quantification and identity. Williamson's scenario evinces one issue for the 'back-tracking' approach to modal epistemology, at least as it might be applied to the issue of possible mathematical knowledge. On the back-tracking approach, the method of modal epistemology is taken to proceed by first discerning the metaphysical modal truths – normally by natural-scientific means – and then working backward to the exigent incompleteness of an individual's epistemic states concerning such truths (cf. Stalnaker, 2003; Vetter, 2013). The issue for the back-tracking method that Williamson's scenario illuminates is that the metaphysical mathematical possibility that CH is absolutely decidable must in some way converge with the epistemic possibility thereof. However, the normal mathematical techniques that Williamson specifies – i.e. proof and forcing – fall within the remit of what is mathematically possible relative to agents' states of information; i.e. what is epistemically mathematically possible. Thus, whether CH is metaphysically necessary – and thus, as Williamson claims, metaphysically possible and absolutely decidable thereby – can only be witnessed by the epistemic means of demonstrating that its absolute decidability is not impossible. It may thus be epistemically possible that Williamson's technically advanced species, which can absolutely decide CH, exist – following Williamson (2013), they actually exist, albeit non-concretely – but the metaphysical necessity of the absolute decidability of CH needs still to be corroborated. 11 The significance of the multi-dimensional intensional framework outlined in the foregoing is that it provides an explanation of the discrepancy between metaphysical mathematical modality and epistemic mathematical modality. Further and crucially, metaphysical mathematical modality is governed by the system S5, the Barcan formula, and its Converse, whereas epistemic mathematical modality is governed by KT4, the Barcan formula, and its Converse. Thus, epistemic mathematical modality figures as the mechanism, which enables the tracking of metaphysically possible mathematical truth.7 Leitgeb (2009) endeavors similarly to argue for the convergence between the notion of informal provability – countenanced as an epistemic modal operator, K – and mathematical truth. Availing of Hilbert's (1923/1996: ¶18-42) epsilon terms for propositions, such that, for an arbitrary predicate, C(x), with x a propositional variable, the term 'ǫp.C(p)' is intuitively interpreted as stating that 'there is a proposition, x(/p), s.t. the formula, that p satisfies C, obtains' (op. cit.: 290). Leitgeb purports to demonstrate that ∀p(p → Kp), i.e. that 7A provisional definition of large cardinal axioms is as follows. ∃xΦ is a large cardinal axiom, because: (i) Φx is a Σ2-formula; (ii) if κ is a cardinal, such that V |= Φ(κ), then κ is strongly inaccessible, where a cardinal κ is regular if the cofinality of κ – comprised of the unions of sets with cardinality less than κ – is identical to κ, and a strongly inaccessible cardinal is regular and has a strong limit, such that if λ < κ, then 2λ < κ (Cf. Kanamori, 2012: 360); and (iii) for all generic partial orders P∈Vκ, VP |= Φ(κ); INS is a non-stationary ideal, where an ideal is a subset of a set closed under countable unions, whereas filters are subsets closed under countable intersections. (Cf. Kanamori, op. cit.: 361); AG is the canonical representation of reals in L(R), i.e. the interpretation of A in M[G]; H(κ) is comprised of all of the sets whose transitive closure is < κ (cf. Rittberg, 2015); and L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , A G〉 |= 'φ'. P is a homogeneous partial order in L(R), such that the generic extension of L(R)P inherits the generic invariance, i.e., the absoluteness, of L(R). Thus, L(R)Pmax is (i) effectively complete, i.e. invariant under set-forcing extensions; and (ii) maximal, i.e. satisfies all Π2-sentences and is thus consistent by set-forcing over ground models (Woodin, ms: 28). Assume ZFC and that there is a proper class of Woodin cardinals; A∈P(R) ∩ L(R); φ is a Π2-sentence; and V(G), s.t. 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , A G〉 |= 'φ': Then, it can be proven that L(R)Pmax |= 〈H(ω2), ∈, INS , A G〉 |= 'φ', where 'φ' := ∃A∈Γ∞〈H(ω1), ∈, A〉 |= ψ. The axiom of determinacy (AD) states that every set of reals, a⊆ωω is determined, where κ is determined if it is decidable. Woodin's (1999) Axiom (*) can be thus countenanced: ADL(R) and L[(Pω1)] is a Pmax-generic extension of L(R), from which it can be derived that 2א0 = א2. Thus, ¬CH; and so CH is absolutely decidable. 12 informal provability is absolute; i.e. truth and provability are co-extensive.8 He argues as follows. Let A(p) abbreviate the formula 'p ∧ ¬K(p)', i.e., that the proposition, p, is true while yet being unprovable. Let K be the informal provability operator reflecting knowability or epistemic necessity, with 〈K〉 its dual.9 Then: 1. ∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp) ⇐⇒ ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p). By necessitation, 2. K[∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp)] ⇐⇒ K[ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p)]. Applying modal axioms, KT, to (1), however, 3. ¬K[ǫp.A(p) ∧ ¬Kǫp.A(p)]. Thus, 4. ¬K∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp). Leitgeb suggests that (4) be rewritten 5. 〈K〉∀p(p → Kp). Abbreviate (5) by B. By existential introduction and modal axiom K, both 6. B → ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p], and 7. ¬B → ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p]. Thus, 8. ∃p[K(p → B) ∨ K(p → ¬B) ∧ p]. Abbreviate (8) by C(p). Introducing epsilon notation, 9. [K(ǫp.C(p) → B) ∨ K(ǫp.C(p) → ¬B)] ∧ ǫp.C(p). By K, 10. [K(ǫp.C(p) → KB) ∨ K(ǫp.C(p) → K¬B)]. From (9) and necessitation, one can further derive 8The formula is referred to as the Principle of Knowability, and discussed in further detail in Section 5, below. 9See Section 5, for further discussion of the duality of knowledge, and its relation to doxastic operators. 13 11. Kǫp.C(p). By (10) and (11), 12. KB ∨ K¬B. From (5), (12), and K, Leitgeb derives 13. KB. By, then, the T axiom, 14. ∀p(p → Kp) (291-292). Rather than accounting for the coextensiveness of epistemic provability and truth, Leitgeb interprets the foregoing result as cause for pessimism with regard to whether the formulas countenanced in epistemic logic and via epsilon terms are genuinely logical truths if true at all (292). In response to the attending pressure on the status of epistemic logic as concerning truths of logic, one can challenge the derivation, in the above proof, from lines (12) to (13). The inference depends on line (5), i.e., the epistemic possibility of completeness: 〈K〉∀p(p → Kp). One can question how, from (4), i.e. the unprovability of the unprovability of a proposition [¬K∃p(p ∧ ¬Kp)], one can derive (5), i.e. that it is epistemically possible that all propositions are informally provable. Assume, however, that line (5) is valid. Then, the validity of the inference from (12) to (13) can be challenged by the restriction on the quantifier on worlds in the Knowability Principle expressed by (5). The epistemic operator in lines (12) and (13) records, by contrast, the epistemic necessity, rather than the possibility, of the truth of the formulas and subformulas therein. Thus, from (12) either the provability of the provability of propositions or the provability of the unprovability of propositions, one cannot derive (13) the provability of the provability of propositions, because – by (5) – it is only epistemically possible that all true propositions are provable. 14 5 Concluding Remarks In this paper, I have endeavored to delineate the types of mathematical modality, and to argue that the epistemic interpretation of multi-dimensional intensional semantics can be applied in order to explain, in part, the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms and the decidability of Orey sentences. The formal constraints on mathematical conceivability adumbrated in the foregoing can therefore be considered a guide to our possible knowledge of unknown mathematical truth. 15 References Aristotle. 1987. Physics, tr. E. Hussey (Clarendon Aristotle Series, 1983), text: W.D. Ross (Oxford Classical Texts, 1950). In J.L. Ackill (ed.), A New Aristotle Reader. 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https://1000wordphilosophy.com/2018/07/17/respond ing-to-morally-flawed-historical-philosophers-andphilosophies/ Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies Authors: Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Categories: Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, Philosophy of Sex and Gender, Metaphilosophy Wordcount: 1000 Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were "deformed men" and that some people were slaves "by nature." Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start.[1] These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful. How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past?[2] Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields,[3] and people in general. 1. Concerns The question raises general concerns: A. People versus Propositions: Philosophers are distinct from philosophies: people are not their propositions. But thoughts say something about the thinker.[4] Which then might be of greater concern, the person or their writings? B. Ad hominem concerns: Some responses to flawed philosophers seem to be attacks on the person, not on their ideas. Ad hominem attacks are often irresponsible, but are they ever appropriate?[5] Are they appropriate if a person's character affects their writings? Might personal moral vice relevantly impact moral philosophizing?[6] Can it impact nonmoralphilosophizing? C. Major versus Minor ideas: Philosophers are typically known for what has come to be considered their "major" ideas.[7] Their flaws, however, are sometimes displayed in what's considered their "minor" writings. But what determines what's major or minor? Quantity? Quality? Influence? That philosopher's judgment? Moral evaluation? Is this 'subjective,' depending on readers' perspectives? D. Counterfactual correction: Philosophies are sometimes developed from, or based on, false (empirical) information. If the thinker had better information, would their philosophy have been better? E. Apology and Forgiveness: Living people can apologize, pledge to do better and seek to make amends with the hope of forgiveness. Is there any way flawed (dead) philosophers can somehow "make it up" to the present or be "forgiven," especially if their views eventually improved?[8] There surely are other potentially-relevant general concerns to be identified and applied. 2. Responses Let's turn to some general responses. A. Acceptance: Take the Good, Ignore the Bad One response is that we are all flawed, in thought and deed, and so we should focus on interesting and good aspects of flawed historical philosophers' thought.[9] This is especially appropriate if their writings have no apparent connection to their bad claims or behavior.[10] We also often don't know much about philosophers' personal circumstances and inner life: this might make what they said or did understandable, if not excusable. 2 Unless we make it clear to readers that there are bad elements and that we are ignoring them, however, we risk misleading or deceiving them into believing the philosopher was not flawed: e.g., students may admire a philosopher and think he must have been a paragon of virtue, when he surely was not.[11] The "take the good, ignore the bad" response has limits: our own flaws, if too serious, should not be overlooked (even if we wish they would), and neither should anyone else's. What then is too serious? B. Complete Dismissal: Boycott & Excommunication Another response is that we just stop reading, researching and teaching offending philosophers' writings: we boycott.[12] 'Zero tolerance' policies are sometimes invoked for contemporaries, with great confidence.[13] It's comparable to 'we won't watch (or sell) any of his movies again, given what he did.' If that has merits, so might this.[14] We might wonder though, what the point would be. For dead philosophers, this "punishment" is symbolic, at best. Removing them from "the canon" might at least show concern for people disrespected by that philosopher: prejudice won't be tolerated anymore.[15] "Ex-communication" might be too much though. Future philosophers and students won't benefit from that philosopher's insights, and his legacy may be ruined.[16] It also creates a hole in the history of thought, a less-complete and sanitized version of history. This makes it more likely that offenses would be forgotten[17] and disrupts our understanding of later thinkers who were influenced by that flawed philosopher.[18] C. Historical Apologism: Judge by Past Standards It may be unfair to hold a past thinker to present standards. Nobody can be expected to challenge all the (moral) assumptions that later generations come to regard as indefensible.[19] Perhaps then we should partially or completely forgive these thinkers. Maybe they weren't blameworthy for their views: given the standards of their times, they simply didn't know any better.[20] This response really only works when flawed philosophers really didn't know better.[21]Even then, though, we might think that they should have known better.[22] Philosophers tend to encourage critical thinking and challenging assumptions: they should better live up to that in their own lives, right?[23] D. Redemption: Using the Good to Defeat the Bad This response, like (A) above, involves acceptance, but instead of overlooking the bad, we display it and try to use the good aspects of a philosopher's thought to diagnose and correct it. Concealing the bad is misleading and potentially deceptive to people not familiar with that philosopher: they might think he was like a saint, when he was really often a scoundrel. Had the philosopher realized his good claims were in tension with his bad claims, he might have rejected the bad in favor of the good.[24] But he might not have: he could have favored the bad over the good.[25],[26] Or he could have just ignored the tension. We can only speculate about how some philosopher would have responded to criticisms he maybe never encountered. But here are not always positive elements within a philosophers' writings to critique bad claims, so optimism isn't appropriate for all flawed philosophers. Redemption also has opportunity costs. Lesserknown philosophers (especially minorities) who have ideas comparable to (or perhaps better than) famous philosophers may be overlooked in our efforts to redeem them.[27] 3. Conclusion There are surely other possible responses; some might overlap with those discussed. Responsibly applying any of these responses requires detailed knowledge of a philosopher's life and philosophy, as well as the application of general ethical concerns. Notes [1] An Appendix documents these claims about these historical figures. [2] For a Kant-focused discussion of the issues of this essay, see Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra's "How to Deal with Kant's Racism - In and Out of the Classroom," Teaching Philosophy, 41, 2. May 19, 2018, pp 117-135. His article inspired this more general discussion here. [3] Of related interest is comparable concerns in responding to any bad behavior and claims of scholars and researchers in other fields, past and present. Some of our discussion below is potentially applicable: e.g., if the wrongdoing is totally unrelated to the area of research, this is likely of a lesser 3 concern – and wouldn't give rise to the question of whether we should use that research – than, say, social scientists developing factual information about some social problems, yet wrongfully act in ways that contributes to those social problems or privately disparage the people affected by those problems. When empirical or scientific issues have moral dimensions, their researchers and scholars can be seen as likely having moral motivations for their factual investigations. In that way, they approach having philosophical perspectives on the issues, and so their flaws raise similar concerns to philosophers' flaws. [4] It may be tempting to create a sharp division between philosophers and their writings, adopting the maxim "the author is dead," that is, that we should treat the author's background and intentions as irrelevant when deciding the merits of their work. But if Nietzsche is correct in viewing philosophy as an author's autobiographical memoirs, this division may be wrongheaded. See §6 in Friedrich Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil, Walter Kaufman (trans.), Vintage Books, [1886] 1989. [5] Charges of "hypocrisy" are sometimes ad hominem attacks, since whether a person follows the principles he or she advocates, in itself, says nothing about whether these principles are true or reasonable: e.g., if a vocal critic of shoplifting is found to have shoplifted, that gives no reason to think that shoplifting is OK. When controversial principles or claims are advocated for, however, that might suggest that their advocates don't really believe them, or that they don't really think there are good reasons for their principles (and, perhaps, that there are no such reasons). Alternatively, this might merely suggest that good principles are often hard to follow, even for those who identify these principles and recognize their goodness. [6] For a discussion of contemporary ethicists' unethical behavior, see Oliver Burkeman's, "This column will change your life: why are ethicists so unethical?" The Guardian, November 16, 2013. [7] What we consider the philosophers' main ideas may not be what those philosophers considered their major ideas, or what past generations considered their major ideas. [8] Heidegger became disillusioned with Nazism later in life and some philosophers argue that Kant eventually grew out of his racist views. Should this influence our attitudes towards their earlier views? See Pauline Kleingeld's "Kant's Second Thoughts on Race," The Philosophical Quarterly, 57, 229, 2007, pp. 573-592. [9] This is roughly the strategy Robert Louden takes when he writes "Kant's writings do exhibit many private prejudices ... but Kant's theory is fortunately stronger than his prejudices, and it is the theory on which philosophers should focus." See his Kant's Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings, Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 177. [10] As a potential example, is there a connection between, say, Frege's anti-Semitism and his logic? If not, then perhaps there is no good objection to studying or using his insights on logic. [11] If we ignore the bad in a philosopher's collective writings, however, it is not clear what principled ground we would have for construing that edited set of writings as thatthinker's philosophy. This is especially the case if the philosopher in question worked extensively on the bad and believed them to be of the utmost importance, even more important than what we consider their good ideas. E.g., Kant who offered over seventy courses in anthropology and geography (where many of his racist views are found), but only twenty-eight in moral philosophy. By continuing to construe the remaining work as that thinker's philosophy, we not only potentially mislead new philosophers, but also just interpret history incorrectly: e.g., Charles Mills argues that if we cut out the bad, or "sanitize" Kant's philosophy, then the remainder would quite simply not be Kant's philosophy, as it is not what Kant actually thought. See his "Kant's Untermenschen" which proposes that Kant categorized human beings not just as 'persons' but also as 'subpersons.' In Andrew Valls (ed.), Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 169-93. [12] It's worth noting that a complete boycott is something that no individuals or groups have the power to do. At best, the offensive-to-many philosopher would remain in memory as a philosopher-who-used-to-be part-of-the-generallyaccepted canon, since the philosopher would surely retain some admirers. [13] See, for instance, online discussions concerning contemporary philosophers accused of sexual harassment. Jenny Saul Sheffield suggests "If you can avoid teaching/discussing [these philosophers], that may be the best strategy." She then goes on to qualify this statement by mentioning, "If you just need a 4 representative of some family of views, you can avoid the whole issue by choosing someone else. If you really need to discuss [the accused's] view, then you discuss [the accused's view]." In light of this, discussing a less known thinker in lieu of the problematic favorite may serve as a way of diversifying the philosophical canon. Some discussions are here: "How to Discuss Searle, etc." Feminist Philosophers blog, March 28, 2017, and "John Searle may be guilty of sexual harassment..." Leiter Reports blog, March 28, 2017. [14] In light of the #MeToo movement, the idea of boycotting the work of sexual predators has resurfaced. For discussions on this, see Nicole Hemmer's "How to think about consuming art made by sexual predators," Vox, January 9, 2018, and Chuck Klosterman's "On Boycotting Woody Allen's Films," The New York Times Magazine, March 14, 2014, among other discussions. [15] Habermas has a similar thought to this when engaging with the "Historian's Debate" in Germany. Habermas however, seems to believe that in order to restore the dignity of historically oppressed populations, we should not brush aside the past, but instead keep it alive. He writes, "There is the obligation incumbent upon us in Germany ... to keep alive, without distortion, and not only in an intellectual form, the memory of the sufferings of those who were murdered by German hands ... [I]f we were to brush aside this Benjaminian legacy, our fellow Jewish citizens and the sons, daughters, and grandchildren of all those who were murdered would feel themselves unable to breathe in our country." See his "On the Public Use of History," The New Conservatism, 1989, p 233. [16] Whether dead people can be harmed or wronged is, of course, an interesting and controversial philosophical issue. [17] See note 15 above. The concern here is similar to the concern of "whitewashing" U.S. History if a teacher fails to discuss chattel slavery, segregation, genocide of Native Americans, etc. [18] Recall that we are discussing thinkers that have something (indeed, a lot) positive going for them: they are a well-known thinker for good reason. For any thinkers who don't have this going for them - nearly everything they have to say is bad and wrong - it's fine to cut them out and ignore them. Elizabeth Barnes discusses the intellectual and moral costs of discussing offensive views that have little to nothing in their favor in her "Arguments That Harm – and Why We Need Them," Chronicle Review, February 18, 2018. [19] Concerning contemporary people, few people who are "progressive" concerning one issue are comparably "progressive" about many, or all, other important issues: there is a general collective failure of "intersectionality." This is not an ad hominem attack: it's the observation that people tend to have (true) and reasonable beliefs about some (moral) issues, but false and unreasonable beliefs about others (and that we tend to resist revising those false and unreasonable beliefs). In this way, most of us are similar to the historical philosophers discussed in this paper. How should we respond to them, and us? For discussion, see an 80,000 Hours podcast with Will MacAskill, "Our descendants will probably see us as moral monsters. What should we do about that?" January 19, 2018. [20] Miranda Fricker discusses this in regards to epistemic injustice when she mentions that sexists of the past "were not culpably at fault until they were in a position to know better," in her Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 100. [21] Kant for instance, likely did know better as he "was an avid reader of travel reports of all kinds, written by explorers... He warned repeatedly on the unreliability of such sources, but rely on them he did." See Thomas McCarthy's Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development. Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 49. [22] Although not focused on epistemic or intellectual blame, see Neal Tognazzini's and Justin D. Coates' "Blame", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring 2016, Edward N. Zalta (ed.). For an intellectual blame-focused discussion, see Sanford C. Goldberg's "Should have known." Synthese, 194, 8, 2017, pp. 2863-2894 and his To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity, Oxford University Press, 2018. [23] For that matter, it is not obvious we should hold anyone who studies ethics professionally (e.g., priests) to the same standards as the general population. Eric Schwitzgebel discusses this question in his blog post "Should Ethics Professors Be Held to Higher Ethical Standards in Their Personal Behavior?" 5 [24] One might imagine, for instance, Kant using his Categorical Imperative in order to dismiss his racist beliefs, or Mill using his principle of utility to defeat his endorsement of colonialism. [25] One can begin by looking at Charles Mills' "Kant's Untermenschen" in Andrew Valls (ed.), Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Cornell University Press, 2005, pp. 169-93. Mills' The Racial Contract also deals with this issue. See also Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze's "The Color of Reason: The Idea of "Race" In Kant's Anthropology" in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader," in Emmanuel Chuckwudi Eze (ed.), Blackwell, 1997, pp. 103-140. Also Robert Bernasconi's "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism" in Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward and Tommy L. Lott (eds.), Blackwell, 2002, pp. 145-66. [26] If the bad and good aspects of a philosopher's thought are conceptually related, meaning that claims about one area have logical implications for claims about the other (and vice-versa), then they might be in tension. Analyzing and speculating on how philosophers reconciled this tension could help us avoid their mistakes in the future. David Livingstone Smith suggests that when populations dehumanize others there is cognitive dissonance between that population's supposed beliefs (e.g. all people deserve respect) and their desired practice (e.g. to enslave or exterminate a minority). In which case, "the dissonance between theory and practice was resolved by denying the humanity of the oppressed" namely by attributing a less than human essence to the oppressed. See Smith's Less Than Human: Why We Demean, Enslave, and Exterminate Others, St. Martin's Press, 2011, p. 3. [27] See note 13 for more discussion on this. Related Essays Introduction to Deontology: Kantian Ethics by Andrew Chapman Introduction to Consequentialism by Shane Gronholz Applied Ethics by Chelsea Haramia About the Authors Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra is a Ph.D. student in philosophy at the University of California, Riverside. His interests are in philosophy of race, moral responsibility, and Mexican philosophy. https://victorabundezguerra.wordpress.co m Nathan Nobis is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Morehouse College, Atlanta, GA. His main area of interest is practical ethics. www.NathanNobis.com 6 https://1000wordphilosophy.com/appendix-toresponding-to-morally-flawed-historicalphilosophers-and-philosophies/ Appendix to "Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies" Appendix to "Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies" Authors: Victor Fabian Abundez-Guerra and Nathan Nobis Categories: Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy of Race, Philosophy of Sex and Gender, Metaphilosophy In The Politics, Aristotle tells us plainly, "the relation of male to female is naturally that of the superior to the inferior, of the ruling to the ruled. This general principle must similarly hold good of all human beings generally" (1254b14). In Aristotle, The Politics, R.F. Stalley (ed.). Ernest Barker (trans.), Oxford University Press, 1998. Cynthia Freeland discusses Aristotle's misogyny in detail, "Aristotle says that the courage of a man lies in commanding, a woman's lies in obeying; that 'matter yearns for form, as the female for the male and the ugly for the beautiful'; that women have fewer teeth than men; that a female is an incomplete male or 'as it were, a deformity.'" In "Nourishing Speculation: A Feminist Reading of Aristotelian Science," in Engendering Origins: Critical Feminist Readings in Plato and Aristotle, Bat-Ami Bar On (ed.), State University of New York Press, 1994. Also, according to Aristotle, natural slaves are unfortunate beings who are necessarily slaves due to their nature, as opposed to those who are contingently slaves (e.g. say, as a result of being captured in battle). In The Politics, Aristotle tells us "Someone is thus a slave by nature if he is capable of becoming the property of another (and for this reason does actually become another's property) and if participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself" (1254b22). In a letter to Henry More, Descartes described animals as automata with no thought. He writes, "speech is the only certain sign of thought hidden in a body. All men use it, however stupid and insane they may be, and though they may lack tongue and organs of voice; but no animals do. Consequently it can be taken as a real specific difference between men and dumb animals." "Letter to Henry More," February 5, 1649" in A. Kenny (trans. and ed.), Descartes: Philosophical Letters, Clarendon Press, [1649]/1970. Kant made racist remarks about the "perfection" of the white race and the ineptitude of the non-white races right up until his death. Concerning white people, he claims, that it is "The white race possesses all motivating forces and talents in itself; therefore we must examine it somewhat more closely." See Eze's translation in his "The Color of Reason," in Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, 1st Edition, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, 1997, p. 115. The source is from one of Kant's lectures, Kant's philosophische Anthropologie: Nach handschriftlichen Vorlesungen. In Friedrich Christian Starke (ed.), Leipzig: Expedition des europaischen Aufsehers, 1831, p 353. In his 1764 Observations, Kant tells us that: The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling [i.e., the unimportant or trivial] ... Although many of them have even been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art or science or any other praise-worthy quality. . . So fundamental is the difference between [the black and white] races of man . . . A clear proof that what [a Negro] said was stupid [was that] this fellow was quite black from head to foot. (Kant, Observations on the feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, in John T. Goldthwait (trans.), University of California Press, [1764]/1960, pp. 111-113. Kant's views did not improve with age: in 1802, two years before his death, he claims that the "race of the [native] american cannot be educated," "has no motivating force" and is "lazy." Eze's translation in the "The Color of Reason" p. 116. Hume made an infamous remark in a footnote to his 1753-4 essay Of National Characters: "I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other 7 complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no sciences." The complete footnote can be found in Jordan Winthrop's White Over Black: American Attitudes Towards the Negro, 1550-1812, Omohundro Institute and University of North Carolina Press, 2012, p. 253. Further discussion of Hume's racist remarks can be found in John Imerwahr "Hume's Revised Racism," Journal of the History of Ideas, 53, 3, 1992, pp. 481486, as well as Aaron Garrett's "Hume's Revised Racism Revisited," Hume Studies, 26, 1, 2000, pp. 171177. In one of his many problematic quotes in Twilight of the Idols, § 36, Nietzsche writes "Morality for doctors. – Sick people are parasites on society. It is indecent to keep living in a certain state. There should be profound social contempt for the practice of vegetating in cowardly dependence on doctors and practitioners after the meaning of life, the right to life, is gone." In The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols: And Other Writings, Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2005, pp. 209-210. Of course, exactly what Nietzsche means by sick people and sickness, whether he means physical, spiritual, or mental sickness, is unclear. In Black Skin, White Masks Fanon writes a damning criticism of Mayotte Capécia book I am a Martinician Woman and her desire for a white man, saying that "She is looked at with distaste. Things begin their usual course... it is because she is a woman of color that she is not accepted in this society. Her resentment feeds her own artificiality. We shall see why love is beyond the reach of Mayotte Capécias of all nations." pp. 29-30. Fanon also writes "I have never been able, without revulsion, to hear a man say of another man: 'He is so sensual!'" See his Black Skin, White Masks, Charles Lam Markmann (trans.), Pluto Press, 1991, p. 156. For a discussion on Fanon and feminism see chapter one, "Fanon, Conflicts, Feminisms," in Tracy Denean Sharpley-Whiting's "Frantz Fanon: Conflicts and Feminisms," Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1998. On Heidegger's Naziism, see Joshua Rothman, "Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism? The New Yorker. April 28, 2014, and Victor Farias's Heidegger And Nazism, Temple University Press. 1991. Peter Trawny discusses Heidegger's anti-semitism and notion of "world Judaism," of which Heidegger says, "The question concerning the role of world Judaism is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question concerning the kind of humanity which, utterly unattached, can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historic 'task.'" Peter Trawny, "Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy," Andrew J Mitchell (trans.), University of Chicago Press, 2014, p. 19. In the Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege writes early on, "In arithmetic, simply as a result of the origin of India of many of its methods and concepts, reasoning has traditionally been less strict than in geometry, which had mainly been developed by the Greeks." Frege, The Foundations of Arithmetic. In The Frege Reader, Michael Beaney (ed.), Blackwell Publishing, 1997, p. 91. In late life, Frege became not only very conservative, but his diary also showed his sympathies towards fascism and antisemitism. Frege, Diary: Written by Professor Gottlob Frege in the Time from 10 March to 9 April 1924, G. Gabriel and W. Kienzler (eds.). In Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 1996, 39, 3 & 4, pp. 303-342. In the Philosophy of History, Hegel is very dismissive of Africa and its accomplishments. After briefly discussing the continent, Hegel writes "At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit. Historical movements in it – that is, in its northern part – belong to the Asiatic or European World." In Hegel, The Philosophy of History, John Sibree (ed.). University of Toronto Libraries. [1822-1830]/2011. p. 78 Mill made pernicious comments regarding colonialism, saying that his anti-paternalist "harm principle" "is meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties," not to "backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered as in its nonage," concluding that "Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement." John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Writings, Stefan Collini (ed.), Cambridge University Press, (1859]/1989, p. 13. For a critique of Mill and Locke's colonialism, se Bhikhu Parekh's "Liberalism and Colonialism: A Critique of Locke and Mill," in The Decolonization of Imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, Jan P. Nederveen Pieterse and Bhikhu Parekh (eds.), Zed Books, 1995, pp 81-98. Schopenhauer was sexist: he reveals his misogyny in his essay On Women, "Women are suited to being the 8 nurses and teacher of our earliest childhood precisely because they themselves are childish, silly and shortsighted, in a word big children, their whole lives long: a kind of intermediate stage between the child and the man, who is the actual human being, 'man.'" Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms, R.J. Hollingdale (trans.), Penguin Books, 2004, p. 81. For lengthy discussion and analysis on the lives and misdeeds of Rousseau, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, and Sartre, among others, see Nigel Rodger's and Mel Thompson's Philosophers Behaving Badly, Peter Owen Publishers, 2005.

la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano – novembre 2015  23novembre 2015 – la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano nella festa di S. Bartolomeo, nel qual giorno gli volevano uccider tutti, si buttò per una fenestra per non essere ucciso, e scampò dal periglio». Il volgo, sensibile al soprannaturale, al miracolo apparente, tendeva a identificare il mago con il "teurgo", colui che pratica operazioni demoniche. Per Della Porta, invece, il mago è il sapiente dotato di capacità operative, che conosce i processi nascosti e reputa la magia soltanto opera di natura: «Nil aliud magiae opera credatis, quam Naturae opera» (Magia naturalis). Lo spirito con cui si faceva avvisare dal boia di Napoli, Antonello Cocozza, quando deponeva gli impiccati dalle forche per esporli al Ponte Ricciardo, era lo stesso di quello di Vesalio, che andava nel Cimetière des Innocents per procurarsi i corpi dei condannati a morte. La differenza è che Vesalio descriveva l'anatomia di quei corpi per indagare il funzionamento della Humani corporis Fabrica, mentre Della Porta ne studiava le linee delle mani e dei piedi per leggervi l'impronta del destino. Il metodo è esattamente uguale, diverso è il patrimonio sapienziale di riferimento, ancorato al passato quello del filosofo napoletano, proiettato nel futuro quello dei novatores. La sua ricerca dei "fisici fondamenti" si concentrò su discipline non propriamente "moderne" quali fisiognomica, fitognomonica, chirofisonomia, astrologia. Un tentativo velleitario, spesso imbarazzante, di sperimentalizzare il magico, alla ricerca «Zitt', sta passann' o mago!». Con uninchino tra l'ossequioso e l'intimo-rito il volgo napoletano salutava don Giambattista Della Porta (1535-1615), che dopo la passeggiata mattutina per Via Toledo, tornava a rintanarsi nella wunderkammer del suo palazzo, nei pressi di Largo della Carità. Ma guai a fargli sentire quella parola, «mago»! Nonostante rivendicasse con orgoglio l'antica sapienza e alimentasse con le sue predizioni sul destino di nobili e sovrani, quell'aura di mistero che lo circondava, egli ci teneva a distinguersi dai "negromanti". Quando Jean Bodin, nella sua Démonomaniae des sorciers, lo accusò di essere un «mago venefico», per aver descritto nella Magia naturalis la ricetta dell'unguento delle streghe, tra i cui ingredienti figurava la puerorum pinguedo, il grasso di bambini, egli reagì con violento sdegno: «calunnie oppostemi da ignoranti e vilissimi uomini, & invidiosi, i quali assai immodestamente e barbaramente mi offendono, i quali stimano ch'io sia Mago, il qual nome ebbi in orrore, & odio da che nacqui, giudicandolo vanità». Anzi, con il caratteristico temperamento napoletano, passò al contrattacco: «Di grazia in che ho io peccato? Perché mi attribuisce quel nome di Mago? [....] un'Heretico, il quale Magia e Rinascimento DELLA PORTA: IL MAGO DELL'ARCANA SAPIENZA Una riflessione, a 400 anni dalla morte GUIDO DEL GIUDICE Giovanni Battista della Porta, incisione (1682), di Nicolas de Larmessin (1632-1694) dall'una all'altra. Non è un caso che grandi scienziati, abbiano coltivato, più o meno segretamente, un interesse per elementi ermetici e alchemici. Tycho Brahe, accanto alle osservazioni astronomiche, compilava almanacchi. Una copia della Magia naturalis è stata trovata nella biblioteca di Newton, che si divertiva a far volare di notte l'aquilone luminoso costruito seguendo le istruzioni contenute nel libro, facendo gridare al prodigio tutto il vicinato.  Non si sa esattamente se Della Porta nacque a Napoli, oppure a Vico Equense, nella villa delle Pradelle, tra ottobre e novembre del 1535. Di famiglia nobile ma decaduta, per aver appoggiato la rivolta di Ferrante Sanseverino contro il viceré Pietro di Toledo, ebbe un'ottima educazione curata dallo zio materno, il celebre studioso di antichità Adriano Guglielmo Spadafora, insieme al fratello maggiore Giovan Vincenzo, col quale condivise la passione per l'astrologia e l'indagine naturale su base magica. Pubblicò, ad appena quindici anni, la prima edizione della Magia naturalis, dopo di che se ne andò in giro per l'Europa, raccogliendo, a spese dello scarso patrimonio personale, libri e curiosità rare. Ispirandosi all'accademia di Girolamo Ruscelli, in cui fu accolto giovanissimo, fondò quella "de' Secreti", la cui base operativa è stata individuata recentemente da speleologi urbani nei sotterranei di un palazzo del Borgo Due Porte all'Arenella, dove sorgeva la villa in collina dei Della Porta. Qui si svolgevano le riunioni esoteriche, a sfondo ermetico e rosacrociano, di cui abbiamo parlato in un precedente articolo su questa rivista.1 Il limite tra magia lecita e illecita, tra astrologia giudiziaria e «celeste fisionomia» era molto tenue ed egli fu costretto a spostarlo ripetutamente, per sfuggire all'occhio vigile dell'Inquisizione, che lo seguì con attenzione per tutta la vita. Già nel 1584, ancor prima dello scontro con Bodin, l'in24 la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano – novembre 2015 delle signatura rerum, della presenza dell'assoluto nei multiformi e meravigliosi aspetti della natura: uomini, animali, minerali, vegetali (si avverte l'eco del natura est deus in rebus bruniano). La convinzione che nelle cose naturali esistano virtù che i nostri sensi non sono in grado di rilevare (vedi il magnetismo), se non per opera di magia naturale, precorre la constatazione dei fenomeni cosiddetti paranormali. Ammirevoli intuizioni come questa si accompagnano, nelle opere di Della Porta, ad affermazioni talmente superstiziose e credule da metterci a disagio. Per superare questo falso pudore basta semplicemente accettare che non esiste un limite netto di demarcazione tra magia e scienza in epoca rinascimentale, bensì un graduale passaggio 25novembre 2015 – la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano flessibile cardinale Scipione Rebiba ne reclamò l'arresto «per cose concernenti la fede». La salute cagionevole gli evitò la tortura, permettendogli di cavarsela con la purgazione canonica e un fermo invito a tenere a freno la sua «impia curiositas» per dedicarsi al teatro, in cui pure riscuoteva lusinghieri apprezzamenti. Egli seguì il consiglio con una vasta produzione di commedie e tragedie (presso la Biblioteca di via Senato sono conservate due prime edizioni, molte rare, di due di esse: La Trappolaria, stampata a Napoli da Stigliola nel 1595; e La Turca, impressa a Venezia nel 1606) usate anche come paravento per le sue ricerche, come nel caso de Lo astrologo in cui mette in ridicolo quelle stesse virtù divinatorie che più volte gli erano state contestate. Il tormentato rapporto con l'Inquisizione costituisce, per questi geni del Rinascimento, il distintivo della libera ricerca, perseguita con mezzi spesso criticabili, ma con quello spirito di indipendenza intellettuale, che andava fatalmente a impigliarsi nelle strette maglie della censura teologica e del suo braccio armato. A differenza di Bruno e Campanella che scelsero di portare avanti le proprie idee, opponendosi al potere religioso, Della Porta vi si conformò, non per opportunismo o pavidità, ma per autentico disinteresse alle dispute dottrinali, completamente estranee al suo mondo fatato di raccoglimento nello studio. Non esistono prove certe dell'incontro con Giordano Bruno, ma le numerose sintonie culturali e filosofiche rendono probabile un'influenza sulla formazione del Nolano, in particolare nei campi della fisiognomica e dell'arte della memoria. Alle eccezionali capacità mnemoniche di quel piccolo frate avido di sapere egli sembra accennare in un passo de L'arte del ricordare: «Si vanta Seneca aver recitato duecento versi latini, ch'allora gli fussero stati detti, dove alcuni n'han recitato le migliaia a Nella pagina accanto: vignetta ritraente Giovan Battista della Porta (1535-1615). Sotto da sinistra: Giovan Battista Della Porta, Phytognomonica (Rouen, Ioannis Berthelin, 1650); le linee della mano. (tavola tratta dalla Chirofisonomia, nell'edizione del 1677); Giovan Battista Della Porta, Della Magia naturale (Napoli, Antonio Bulifon, 1677) 26 la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano – novembre 2015 dritto, a roverso, e interpellati e di quel modo che gli son stati chiesti». La frequentazione di Campanella, invece, è riferita direttamente dallo Stilese, col quale Della Porta, nel 1590, ebbe perfino una disputa pubblica, nell'aula "San Tommaso" del convento di San Domenico Maggiore, proprio intorno al concetto di magia. Non c'è da stupirsi della mancanza assoluta di riferimenti espliciti ai due frati domenicani, considerato il loro triste destino. Giambattista pagò comunque l'incolumità fisica con una punizione per lui ancora peggiore: la proibizione di pubblicare le sue opere. Con poche eccezioni essa durò per tutta la vita, malgrado protezioni illustri, come quelle del cardinale Luigi d'Este, che lo volle al suo servizio, e di Federico Cesi, il fondatore dell'Accademia dei Lincei, col quale stabilì, nonostante la differenza di età, un imperituro rapporto di stima e amicizia. A causa dell'interdetto inquisitoriale, non ebbe il piacere di veder pubblicata la summa delle sue fatiche, la Taumatologia, evoluzione e completamento della Magia naturalis, come pure la Chirofisonomia e la versione in volgare della Fisonomia umana, che dovette far circolare sotto falso nome. Le sue opere ebbero, comunque, una larghissima diffusione in tutta Europa, facendone uno dei sapienti più ammirati del tempo, ricercato da sovrani, cardinali e uomini di scienza. Famosa la missione affidata dall'imperatore Rodolfo II al suo cappellano Christian Harmius, al fine di convincere Della Porta a recarsi a Praga, o perlomeno a mandare in sua vece un diSopra da sinistra: Giovan Battista Della Porta, Della celeste fisonomia (Padova, Pietro Paolo Tozzi, 1616); Giovan Battista Della Porta, De Humana Physiognomonia (Vico Equense, Joseph Cacchius, 1586); Giovan Battista Della Porta, De ziferis (Napoli, Jo. Baptistae Subtilis, 1602). Qui accanto: Napoli, S. Lorenzo Maggiore. Lapide sepolcrale di Della Porta. Nella pagina accanto: Napoli, targa commemorativa sul Palazzo Della Porta 27novembre 2015 – la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano scepolo a conoscenza degli esperimenti sul lapis philosophorum.  La sua attività, eccessivamente dispersiva, si esauriva nell'approvazione o nel rigetto di un "secreto", senza trarne nulla di sistematico, che non fosse un catalogo o un atlante di curiosità e meraviglie. Ciò non toglie che, tra le centinaia di mirabilia esaminate, venissero fuori delle originali osservazioni, come accadde per la camera oscura, il microscopio, il telescopio, il magnete. La priorità nella progettazione del telescopio è un fatto assodato, per averlo Della Porta descritto nei particolari (anni prima che Galilei lo presentasse), e sancito dai versi che Giovanni Fabri, cancelliere dei Lincei, premise all'edizione del 1655 del Saggiatore: «Porta tenet primas, habeas Germane secundas: sunt Galilaee tuus tertia regna labor». Ciò avviò un'accesa polemica sull'attribuzione della scoperta, anche se con un'ammirevole onestà intellettuale, Della Porta riconobbe che, da quella «minchioneria», il Pisano aveva saputo trarre mirabili osservazioni, di cui lui non era stato capace, pur essendone l'inventore. Lo stesso accadde nel caso del magnetismo, quando William Gilbert, nel De magnete, lo criticò ferocemente, tacciandolo d'incompetenza. Anche in questo caso, Della Porta, dopo aver riconosciuto correttamente il debito nei confronti dell'amico Paolo Sarpi, che lo aveva messo a parte delle sue osservazioni sul fenomeno, rivendicò con fermezza il suo primato: «Un barbaro Inglese, il quale del mio settimo libro della calamita, essendo io il primo che abbia manifestato al mondo da centocinquanta meraviglie; egli trascrivendo tutte le mie, come fussero le sue ne compone un libro, e per non far conoscere il furto, e che non abbia tolto dal mio, mi và offendendo di passo in passo, che sian false l'esperienze, ò che egli non intende, ò con furfanteria mentisce, e se vi è alcuna cosa del suo, tutto è mentita, vanità e melanconia; all'ultimo dà in mattezze, e cose da ridere». A quel tempo le accuse di plagio erano frequenti, a causa dell'estremo individualismo degli eruditi, che custodivano gelosamente le proprie scoperte cercando, al contempo, di carpire i segreti di quelle altrui. Il principale veicolo di scambio delle idee era costituito dai libri, ai quali però non tutti avevano accesso (specie per la severa censura ecclesiastica), sia per quanto riguarda la pubblicazione, che la consultazione. Della Porta aveva una visione molto moderna della comunità scientifica, convinto del ruolo delle accademie nel favorire il lavoro di equipe. Con estremo pragmatismo, sosteneva che il sapere ha bisogno di denaro: «Difficile operare senza il supporto di mezzi finanziari, bisogna arricchirsi per poter filosofare e non filosofare per arricchirsi». Ecco perché, in disaccordo col Cesi, fu del parere che nell'accademia dei Lincei, di cui fu ispiratore e personaggio di spicco, dovessero essere accolti non solo eruditi, ma anche principi ed ecclesiastici in vena di mecenatismo. Ne aveva fatto esperienza a sue spese: per fronteggiare i debiti contratti per viaggi di ricerca o per pubblicare le sue opere, aveva perfino dovuto ordinare la vendita di parte del palazzo avito. Fu il matrimonio della figlia Cinzia con un discendente della nobile famiglia Di Costanzo di Pozzuoli a salvarlo dalla rovina e fu a loro che, con riconoscenza, nonostante le pressioni di Federico Cesi che 28 la Biblioteca di via Senato Milano – novembre 2015 ne di Via Toledo. La vicenda di Della Porta, come quella dei tanti geni di cui il Rinascimento fu prodigo, ripropone una questione fondamentale: se, cioè, l'eccezionalità di un uomo debba essere valutata esclusivamente dalla sua fortuna postuma, o non piuttosto dal contributo sapienziale che riuscì a fornire, sia pur in situazioni ostili e con mezzi inadeguati o addirittura inesistenti. Il passaggio dal Rinascimento all'età moderna è, si, una storia di eventi e di idee ma è anche, e soprattutto, una storia di uomini che affermarono, con consapevolezza pari a quella di nessun'altra epoca, la dignità e la potenza dell'intelletto. l'avrebbe voluta per i Lincei, lasciò il bene più prezioso: la sua biblioteca. L'ultimo dei Di Costanzo, il duca Francesco Maria, la donò, con tutto il palazzo, alla Deputazione del Tesoro di San Gennaro. Ai suoi tempi, Della Porta rappresentava per gli stranieri di passaggio, al pari del Vesuvio e dei Campi Flegrei, una delle meraviglie da visitare nella città di Napoli. Quella stessa città che sembra averlo dimenticato, a giudicare dallo scarso risalto dato al quarto centenario della morte, che ricorre quest'anno. Ben altra partecipazione registrò il solenne corteo funebre, che il 4 febbraio 1615 lo accompagnò, per l'ultimo saluto, nella basilica di San Lorenzo Maggiore, laddove una lapide, cui nessuno fa più caso, lo ricorda. Ricopriva l'urna che accoglie le sue ceneri; su di essa lo stemma dei Della Porta abbraccia quello dei Di Costanzo, che fa bella mostra di sé anche sulla chiave di volta del portoNOTE 1 Giordano Bruno e i Rosacroce. Un mistero svelato, fra magia, alchimia e filosofia. Anno V, n. 10, ottobre 2013. Sopra da sinistra: Giovanni Battista della Porta, incisione, 1688; incisione in antiporta tratta dall'Astronomica Institutio (1653) di Pierre Gassendi, ove sono raffigurati Aristotele seduto con, a fianco sulla sinistra, Galileo Galilei e Keplero e, sulla destra, Thyco Brahe, Copernico e Tolomeo

www.methodejournal.org Ought, Can, and Presupposition: An Experimental Study Moti Mizrahi Florida Institute of Technology [email protected] Pages: 232 – 243 Keywords: ability; intuitions; moral obligation; ought implies can Abstract In this paper, I present the results of an experimental study on intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). Many philosophers accept as an axiom the principle known as "Ought Implies Can" (OIC). If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental study show that participants were more inclined to judge that an agent ought to perform an action than that the agent can perform the action. Overall, participants said that an agent ought to perform an action even when they said that the agent cannot do it. I discuss the implications of these results for the debate over OIC. Methode ISSN: 0000-0000 232 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi 1 The Debate According to the principle known as "Ought Implies Can" (OIC), if a moral agent ought to do something, then she can do it. That is: • (OIC) If S ought to A, then S can A. Following the literature on OIC, I take the 'ought' in OIC to be a moral ought, as opposed to a prudential, epistemic, or aesthetic ought, as in "You ought to help others in need" (also known as "deontic" ought), but not "Little children ought to not suffer" (also known as "optative" ought). The 'ought' of OIC is also an all-in or pro tanto ought rather than a prima facie ought (Vranas 2007). I take the 'can' in OIC to be the 'can' of specific ability and opportunity, as opposed to general ability and opportunity (Graham 2011). For example, although a kleptomaniac might have the general ability to refrain from stealing, she lacks the specific ability to refrain from stealing when she is in a department store and the goods are right in front of her (Blum 2000). But if the kleptomaniac is on a deserted island, where there is nothing to steal, she does not have the opportunity to steal (Mizrahi 2012a). As for the 'implies' in OIC, I think it is the most problematic component of OIC (Mizrahi 2009). The main candidates for the relation between 'ought' and 'can' are the following: • Entailment: 'S ought to A' entails 'S can A'.1 • Presupposition: 'S ought to A' presupposes 'S can A'.2 • Implicature: 'S ought to A' conversationally implicates 'S can A'.3 According to Howard-Snyder (2013), the 'implies' in OIC is "stronger than conversational implicature, but weaker than the claim that ought implies can is true in an uninteresting, obvious analytic way." If entailment is too strong and conversational implicature is too weak, then we are left with presupposition as the best candidate for the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. According to this interpretation of OIC, a judgment about moral obligation presupposes that the corresponding judgment about ability is true; otherwise, the former is meaningless. Many philosophers accept OIC.4 It was even featured in the news as one of "the greatest philosophical principles" (Baggini 2010). The problem is that OIC "has typically been treated as an axiom" (Howard-Snyder 2013). In other words, 1See, e.g., Vranas (2007, p. 170). For arguments against entailment as the relation between 'ought' and 'can', see Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, pp. 116-120) and Mizrahi (2009, pp. 20-23). 2 See, e.g., Hare (1963, pp. 53-54). For arguments against presupposition as the relation between 'ought' and 'can', see Sinnott-Armstrong (1988, pp. 120-121) and (Mizrahi 2009, pp. 23-25). 3See, e.g., Sinnott-Armstrong (1984, p. 250). For arguments against implicature as the relation between 'ought' and 'can', see Mizrahi (2009, pp. 26-29). See also Streumer (2003). 4For a defense of OIC, see Howard-Snyder (2006) and Vranas (2007). Methode issn: 2281-0498 233 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi many philosophers find OIC to be obviously true, and then use it to do some philosophical work. For example, (Nelkin 2011, p. 5) takes "what has often been taken to be an axiomatic moral principle, namely, the Ought-Implies-Can principle," and uses it to explain an "intuitively plausible" claim about an asymmetry between blameworthy actions and praiseworthy actions.5 Even when objections are leveled against it, OIC is usually defended by appealing to its alleged intuitiveness, which is supposed to be elicited from hypothetical cases. For example, Graham (2011) advances what he takes to be counterexamples to OIC, i.e., hypothetical cases in which it seems that an agent ought to A even though she does not have the ability and opportunity to A. Littlejohn (2012), who does not share Graham's intuitions about these putative counterexamples to OIC, offers a few hypothetical cases of his own, and argues that non-consequentialists can accommodate Graham's intuitions about these alleged counterexamples to OIC. Even what may be charitably construed as an argument for OIC depends heavily on intuitions. For example: I think the most natural justification for acceptance of the [OIC] maxim is that, if it were not valid, then there could be cases in which an agent ought to do X but cannot do X (and never could do X ). Thus, given that if an agent ought to do X, then he would be blameworthy for not doing X, there could be cases in which an agent is blameworthy for not Xing and yet he cannot X. And this is objectionable-even unfair (Fischer 2003, p. 248). As I understand it, Fischer finds it objectionable-even unfair-to say that S ought to A when S cannot A. Along the same lines, some defenders of OIC find it meaningless or pointless to say that S ought to A when S cannot A (Howard-Snyder 2013). This is, in effect, what the presupposition interpretation of OIC says. That is, if the relation between 'ought' and 'can' is presupposition, then, when we tell an agent that she ought to A, we (implicitly) presuppose that she can A; otherwise, it would be unfair to tell her that she ought to A. Similarly, on the presupposition interpretation of OIC, when we tell an agent that she ought to A, we (implicitly) presuppose that she can A; otherwise, it would be meaningless or pointless to tell her that she ought to A. The problem, however, is that there are other philosophers who find it neither unfair nor pointless to make ought-judgments when the corresponding canjudgments are not true. These include Saka (2000), Martin (2009), Mizrahi (2009, 5See also Rosen (2004) for an appeal to OIC in the context of a skeptical argument concerning moral responsibility. Cf. Arpaly & Schroeder (2014, pp. 181-184). For an application of OIC in the context of the debate over peer disagreement, see Enoch (2010). Cf. Machuca (2013, pp. 66-89). Methode issn: 2281-0498 234 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi 2012a), Jay (2013) and King (2014), to name a few of the most recent ones.6 Given the state of the dialectics, then, it would be useful, I submit, to conduct an empirical investigation that might shed new light on the debate over OIC. In particular, it would be interesting to find out whether non-philosophers are reluctant to make ought-judgments about agents who lack ability. After all, if it is intuitive that 'ought' implies 'can'-in the sense that an ought-judgment presupposes that the corresponding can-judgment is true; otherwise, it seems unfair or pointless to make an ought-judgment-then we should expect competent speakers to deploy these concepts accordingly. This is precisely what I set out to do in this paper. In what follows, I will report the results of an experimental study designed to test people's intuitions about moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). After presenting the results of the study, I will discuss their significance for the debate over OIC. I will close with anticipating and replying to objections. 2 The Experiment The experiment was designed to test intuitive judgments about putative cases of moral obligation (ought) and ability (can). To figure out whether or not people's intuitions align with OIC, I manipulated the following variables: • Agent: In two of the four vignettes, the agent is a student (Nancy). In the other two vignettes, the agent is a professor (Professor Smith). • Circumstances: In two of the four vignettes, the agent (either Nancy or Professor Smith) is accidentally locked inside a room before a scheduled appointment. In the other two vignettes, the agent (either Nancy or Professor Smith) simply forgets to show up for a scheduled appointment. In order to independently manipulate these variables, 93 participants were randomly shown one of four possible different scenarios.7 The vignettes in which the agent is Nancy read as follows: On Tuesday morning, Nancy talks with Sid, a fellow student, about meeting for lunch at noon. As it turns out, however, Nancy forgets about her conversation with Sid later that day. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Nancy doesn't show up, Sid leaves 6For another kind of challenge to OIC, see Feis (2014). See also Streumer (2007), Heuer (2010) and Streumer (2010) for a related discussion concerning reasons and ability. 793 participants (51 men, 42 women; ages 19-76) were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were tested online using Qualtrics survey software, and compensated 0.15$ for approximately five minutes of their time. Methode issn: 2281-0498 235 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi the cafeteria without meeting Nancy for lunch. On Tuesday morning, Nancy talks with Sid, a fellow student, about meeting for lunch at noon. As it turns out, however, Nancy gets locked in her dorm room before she can make it to the cafeteria. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Nancy doesn't show up, Sid leaves the cafeteria without meeting Nancy for lunch. The vignettes in which the agent is Professor Smith read as follows: On Tuesday morning, Professor Smith talks with Sid, his student, about meeting during office hours later that day. As it turns out, however, Professor Smith forgets about having office hours that day. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Professor Smith doesn't show up, Sid leaves the office without meeting Professor Smith. On Tuesday morning, Professor Smith talks with Sid, his student, about meeting during office hours later that day. As it turns out, however, Professor Smith gets locked in his classroom before he is able to make it to his office. After waiting for twenty minutes and realizing that Professor Smith doesn't show up, Sid leaves the office without meeting Professor Smith. After getting one of these vignettes at random, participants were then asked, on a 5-point Agree/Disagree scale, whether they agree with the following statements (adjusted for the appropriate vignette): • Nancy/Professor Smith can keep her/his lunch/office appointment with Sid. • Nancy/Professor Smith ought to keep her/his lunch/office appointment with Sid. The data were analyzed using a 2 (agent: Nancy vs. Professor Smith) x 2 (circumstances: forget vs. locked) x 2 (question: can vs. ought) mixed-model ANOVA, with agent and circumstances as between-subjects factors and question as a withinsubjects factor. There was a main effect of question, F (1, 89) = 174.7, p < .001. There was also a main effect of circumstances, F (1, 89) = 27.0, p < .001, but not of agent, F (1, 89) = 3.38, p = .07. There was a circumstances by question interaction, F (1, 89) = 11.22, p = .001, and a circumstances by agent by question interaction, F (1, 89) = 5.0, p = .029. No other interactions were significant. See Figure 1. Figure 1. Accordingly, there was a significant effect such that participants were more inclined to judge that the agent (either Nancy of Professor Smith) ought to perform Methode issn: 2281-0498 236 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi 5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 Locked Prof Forget Prof Locked Nancy Forget Nancy Ought Can Figure 1: Mean intuitive ought-judgments and can-judgments. an action (namely, keep an appointment) than they were to judge that the agent (either Nancy of Professor Smith) can perform the action. Overall, even when they judged that the agent (either Nancy or Professor Smith) cannot perform the action (namely, keep an appointment), participants still judged that the agent ought to perform the action. 3 The Lesson What lessons, then, should we draw from these experimental results? The main lesson, I submit, is that it is far from clear what relation, if any, is supposed to hold between 'ought' and 'can'. As we have seen, entailment is said to be too strong and conversational implicature is said to be too weak as candidates for the relation between 'ought' and 'can' (Howard-Snyder 2013). If this is correct, then presupposition is the best candidate for the relation between 'ought' and 'can'. But the results of my study directly challenge the presupposition interpretation of OIC. Here is why. If 'S ought to A' presupposes 'S can A', then subjects would find it objectionable, as (Fischer (2003), p. 248) does, or pointless, as (Griffin 1992, p. 123), does, to say that an agent ought to do something when that agent cannot do it. As I have reported above, however, ratings for the ought question were significantly higher than ratings for the can question. Overall, participants agreed with ought-judgments and disagreed with can-judgments. This suggests that participants did not find it objectionable or pointless to make an ought-judgment Methode issn: 2281-0498 237 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi when they themselves said that the corresponding can-judgment does not hold. To this proponents of OIC might object by claiming that "when agents know that they cannot do what they ought to do, they often ask what they ought to do instead" (Sinnott-Armstrong 1988, p. 113). But this objection does not save OIC from the challenge posed by the aforementioned experimental results. For, according to OIC, if S ought to A, then S can A. In other words, the action that S ought to perform is supposed to be the same action that S can perform, not some other action. After all, the principle is "If S ought to A, then S can A," not "If S ought to A, then S can B" (Mizrahi 2012a, p. 838). Whenever this sort of experimental findings about issues of philosophical interest are reported, a by now standard objection is to say that the intuitions of people who are not professional philosophers ("novices") do not carry much evidential weight. Only the intuitions of professional philosophers ("experts"), it is claimed, should count as evidence in philosophical debates. This is known as the "expertise defense."8 The expertise defense is a matter of ongoing debate and this paper is not the place to get into this debate.9 However, if proponents of OIC were to invoke the expertise defense, they would be appealing to authority, specifically the authority of expertise,10 rather than intuitiveness, as grounds for OIC. In effect, then, the argument for OIC would change from an appeal to intuition (roughly, "OIC is intuitive; therefore, OIC") to an appeal to the authority of expertise (roughly, "The experts say that OIC; therefore, OIC"). Now, I have argued elsewhere that both appeals to intuition and arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments (in the sense that the premises of such arguments do not make their conclusions more likely to be true or probable).11 But allow me to say why the expertise defense is of no use to proponents of OIC in this particular case. Even if it is granted that appeals to expert opinion sometimes succeed, according to most theoretical treatments of arguments from the authority of expertise, such arguments are strong only if the following conditions are met: The first is whether the opinion put forward by the expert falls within his or her field of competence. The second is whether the source cited as an expert is really an expert, as opposed to being a source that was cited on grounds of popularity or celebrity status. The third is the question of how authoritative the expert should be taken to be. The fourth is whether there are other experts who disagree. The fifth is whether the expert's opinion is consistent with any objective evidence 8On the expertise defense, see Rini (2014) and Nado (2014). 9 On the debate over the expertise defense, see Knobe & Nichols (2008, pp. 3-14), Weinberg et al. (2010), Williamson (2011) and Mizrahi (2015). 10On various kinds of appeals to authority, see Mizrahi (2010). 11On why appeals to intuition are weak arguments, see Mizrahi (2012b, 2013a, 2014). On why arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments, see Mizrahi (2013b). Methode issn: 2281-0498 238 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi that may be available. The sixth is whether the pronouncement made by the expert has been correctly interpreted (Walton 2014, p. 148). For present purposes, the most important "critical questions," as (Walton 1997, p. 223), • Expertise Question: How credible is E as an expert source? • Field Question: Is E an expert in the field F that A is in? • Consistency Question: Is A consistent with what other experts assert? As I have mentioned above, the expertise defense is a matter of current debate, so it is far from clear how to answer the Expertise Question and the Field Question when it comes to expertise in making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases of philosophical interest. As far as the Field Question is concerned, for instance, who are the relevant experts on OIC: ethicists, meta-ethicists, logicians, metaphysicians? All of the above, perhaps? More importantly, the answer to the Consistency Question is clearly a negative one. As mentioned above, although many professional philosophers accept OIC, other professional philosophers reject it. Given the dialectical circumstances surrounding OIC, then, any argument from expert opinion for OIC would be a weak argument, given that there are professional philosophers who reject it. In other words, since one of the conditions for a strong argument from expert opinion is that there "is agreement among experts in the area of knowledge under consideration" (Salmon 2013, p. 118), but there is no agreement among professional philosophers about OIC, it follows that an argument from expert opinion for OIC is weak. For this reason, invoking the expertise defense, and thus turning the argument for OIC from an appeal to intuition to an appeal to expertise, is a move that fails to reconcile OIC with the experimental results reported above. 4 Conclusion In this paper, I have presented the results of an experimental study on intuitions about OIC. Many philosophers accept OIC as an axiom. If the truth of OIC is intuitive, such that it is accepted by many philosophers as an axiom, then we would expect people to judge that agents who are unable to perform an action are not morally obligated to perform that action. The results of my experimental study suggest otherwise. They show a significant effect such that participants were more inclined to say that the agent ought to perform the action than they were to say that the agent can perform the action. Overall, even when they judged that the agent cannot perform the action, participants still judged that the agent ought to perform the action. I have argued that the main lesson we should draw from these Methode issn: 2281-0498 239 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi results is that it is far from clear what relation, if any, is supposed to hold between 'ought' and 'can', given that these results directly challenge the best candidate for a relation between 'ought' and 'can', namely, presupposition. Acknowledgments I am very grateful to Joshua Knobe for generously providing financial, logistical, statistical, and moral support for this work. I also thank David Kaspar and Guglielmo Feis for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Methode issn: 2281-0498 240 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi References Arpaly, N. & Schroeder, T. (2014), In Praise of Desire, Oxford University Press. Baggini, J. (2010), 'Ten of the Greatest Philosophical Principles'. The Daily Mail, 22 May 2010, url: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/home/moslive/article1279320/Ten-greatest-Philosophical-principles.html. Blum, A. (2000), 'The Kantian versus Frankfurt', Analysis 60(3), 287–288. Enoch, D. (2010), 'Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but Not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement', Mind 119(476), 953–997. Feis, G. (2014), The OIC/PAP Dispute: Two Ways of Interpreting "Ought" Implies "Can", in Sofia Bonicalzi, Leonardo Caffo, Mattia Sorgon, ed., 'Naturalism and Constructivism in Metaethics', Cambridge Scholars, pp. 172–181. Fischer, J. M. (2003), ' "Ought-Implies-Can", Causal Determinism and Moral Responsibility', Analysis pp. 244–250. Graham, P. (2011), 'Ought and ability', Philosophical Review 120(3), 337–382. Griffin, J. (1992), 'The Human Good and the Ambitions of Consequentialism', Social Philosophy and Policy 9(02), 118–132. Hare, R. M. (1963), Freedom and Reason, Oxford. Heuer, U. (2010), 'Reasons and impossibility', Philosophical Studies 147(2), 235– 246. Howard-Snyder, F. (2006), ' "Cannot" Implies "Not Ought"', Philosophical Studies 130, 233–246. Howard-Snyder, F. (2013), Ought Implies Can, in Hugh LaFollette, ed., 'The International Encyclopedia of Ethics', Wiley-Blackwell. Jay, C. (2013), 'Impossible Obligations Are Not Necessarily Deliberatively Pointless', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113(3pt3), 381–389. King, A. (2014), 'Actions That We Ought, But Can't', Ratio 27(3), 316–327. Knobe, J. & Nichols, S. (2008), An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto, in Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, eds, 'Experimental Philosophy', Oxford University Press, pp. 3–14. Littlejohn, C. (2012), 'Does ?Ought' Still Imply ?Can'?', Philosophia 40(4), 821– 828. Methode issn: 2281-0498 241 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi Machuca, D. E. (2013), A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement, in D. E. Machuca, ed., 'Disagreement and Skepticism', Routledge, pp. 66–89. Martin, W. (2009), 'Ought but Cannot', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109(1pt2), 103–128. Mizrahi, M. (2009), ''Ought' Does Not Imply 'Can'', Philosophical Frontiers 4(1), 19–35. Mizrahi, M. (2010), 'Take My Advice-I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority', Informal Logic 30(4), 435–456. Mizrahi, M. (2012a), 'Does 'Ought' Imply 'Can' from an Epistemic Point of View?', Philosophia 40(4), 829–840. Mizrahi, M. (2012b), 'Intuition Mongering', The Reasoner 6(1), 169–170. Mizrahi, M. (2013a), 'More Intuition Mongering', The Reasoner 7(1), 5–6. Mizrahi, M. (2013b), 'Why Arguments From Expert Opinion Are Weak Arguments', Informal Logic 33(1), 57–79. Mizrahi, M. (2014), 'Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake?', Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(2), 183–197. Mizrahi, M. (2015), 'Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense', Metaphilosophy 46(1), 52–64. Nado, J. (2014), 'Philosophical Expertise', Philosophy Compass 9(9), 631–641. Nelkin, D. K. (2011), Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility, Oxford University Press. Rini, R. A. (2014), 'Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence', Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5(2), 169–181. Rosen, G. (2004), 'Skepticism About Moral Responsibility', Philosophical Perspectives 18(1), 295–313. Saka, P. (2000), 'Ought Does Not Imply Can', American Philosophical Quarterly 37(2), 93–105. Salmon, M. H. (2013), Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking, Wadsworth, Boston. Methode issn: 2281-0498 242 Issue 6 Moti Mizrahi Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1984), ''Ought' Conversationally Implies 'Can'', Philosophical Review 93(2), 249–261. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1988), Moral Dilemmas, B. Blackwell. Streumer, B. (2003), 'Does 'Ought' Conversationally Implicate 'Can'?', European Journal of Philosophy 11(2), 219–228. Streumer, B. (2007), 'Reasons and Impossibility', Philosophical Studies 136(3), 351– 384. Streumer, B. (2010), 'Reasons, Impossibility and Efficient Steps: Reply to Heuer', Philosophical Studies 151(1), 79–86. Vranas, P. B. M. (2007), 'I Ought, Therefore I Can', Philosophical Studies 136(2), 167–216. Walton, D. (1997), Appeal to Expert Opinion: Arguments From Authority, Penn State University Press. Walton, D. (2014), 'On a Razor's Edge: Evaluating Arguments From Expert Opinion', Argument and Computation 5(2-3), 139–159. Weinberg, J. M., Gonnerman, C., Buckner, C. & Alexander, J. (2010), 'Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters?', Philosophical Psychology 23(3), 331–355. Williamson, T. (2011), 'Philosophical Expertise and the Burden of Proof', Metaphilosophy 42(3), 215–229. Methode issn: 2281-0498 243 Issue

The Lab's Quarterly Il Trimestrale del Laboratorio 2007 / n. 3 / luglio-settembre Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali Università di Pisa Direttore: Massimo Ampola Comitato scientifico: Roberto Faenza Paolo Bagnoli Mauro Grassi Antonio Thiery Franco Martorana Comitato di Redazione: Stefania Milella Luca Lischi Alfredo Givigliano Marco Chiuppesi Segretario di Redazione: Luca Corchia ISSN 2035-5548 © Laboratorio di Ricerca Sociale Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali Università di Pisa La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy. Verso una filosofia politica dell'intelligenza collettiva Luca Corchia Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Università di Pisa, [email protected] Abstract Pierre Levy è un professore di filosofia dell'Università di Parigi VIII a Saint-Denis che si è formato alla Sorbona seguendo i corsi dei maestri, M. Serres e C. Castoriadis. I suoi interessi di studio sono rivolti alle trasformazioni dello sviluppo tecnologico nell'ambito delle forme della conoscenza e della comunicazione e alle conseguenze economiche e politiche del nuovo cyberspazio sull'evoluzione antropologica e sociale. Pierre Levy esamina, quindi, i processi basilari del processo di globalizzazione su cui si concentrano le scienze sociali; ma a suo modo, da intellettuale francese che «non aspira all'esattezza storica o scientifica, ma alla fecondità filosofica e pratica».1 L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio (1994) si presenta come un'opera suggestiva che contiene riflessioni lucide in un linguaggio personalizzato, con concessioni liriche imbarazzati e con una narrazione ridondante. Tuttavia, in questa opera così eterodossa, è possibile ritrovare un nucleo di analisi sociologica che affonda alcune delle sue premesse nella teoria dell'evoluzione dei sistemi sociali. Nella prima parte, presento la teoria degli spazi antropologici, da una prospettiva diacronica: gli spazi antropologici – Terra, Territorio, Merci, Sapere – corrispondono a sviluppi evolutivi della specie umana società primitive, antiche, moderne e contemporanee in un processo discontinuo di significazione della riproduzione simbolica e materiale. Nell'analisi dello Spazio del sapere, si evidenzia come il consolidarsi del nuovo cyberspazio potrebbe ridefinire l'organizzazione e lo sviluppo degli spazi precedenti e si sottolineano le finalità pratiche della complessa prospettiva di Pierre Lévy (A): «una filosofia politica degna di questo nome non può accontentarsi di analizzare e sezionare una situazione senza assumersi il rischio di indicare una via di uscita adeguata».2 L'ambito dell'analisi diventa, infine, quello delle relazioni armoniche e cacofoniche tra i differenti spazi antropologici con la riuscita metafora dei quattro punti cardinali (B). Indice A. La teoria degli spazi antropologici 2 1. Lo spazio della Terra 4 2. Lo spazio del Territorio 6 3. Lo spazio delle Merci 8 4. Lo spazio del Sapere 11 a) La tecnologia dell'intelligenza collettiva 14 b) L'economia dell'intelligenza collettiva 15 c) La politica dell'intelligenza collettiva 16 d) L'etica dell'intelligenza collettiva 17 e) L'estetica dell'intelligenza collettiva 17 Tavola generale degli spazi antropologici 20 B. I quattro punti cardinali 19 1 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1994, p. 38. 2 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 224. A. LA TEORIA DEGLI SPAZI ANTROPOLOGICI «Si vive secondo le linee di erranza della Terra, tra le recinzioni e gli sbarramenti del Territorio, lungo i circuiti dello Spazio delle merci, negli spazi interiori del sapere».3 La ricostruzione della teoria comincia a partire dal concetto di spazio antropologico: «Che cos'è uno spazio antropologico? E' un sistema di prossimità (spazio) proprio del mondo umano (antropologico) e dunque dipendente dalle tecniche, dai significati, dal linguaggio, dalla cultura, dalle convinzioni, dalle rappresentazioni e dalle emozioni umane».4 I quattro spazi antropologici – Terra, Territorio, Merci e Sapere – sono strutturanti , in quanto contengono e organizzano mondi generati dai processi di interazione simbolica. Sebbene l'esposizione della teoria degli spazi antropologici possa far pensare a uno sviluppo evolutivo caratterizzato da età successive, P. Lévy precisa che uno spazio antropologico, una volta costituitosi, sopravvive anche sotto il dominio di un altro – come forma eterna di un possibile modo di attualizzare l'esistenza della specie umana a partire da una dialettica di condizionamento5 tra gli spazi inferiori e gli spazi superiori: «gli spazi non sono né ere, né età, né epoche, per il semplice motivo che non subentrano gli uni agli altri, ma coesistono. Eppure, in quanto spazi strutturanti e autonomi, sono comparsi in tempi successivi. [...] Si ottiene, dunque, servendoci di una metafora alla quali non si dovrà rimanere legati troppo a lungo, una sorta di geologia antropologica in cui gli spazi svolgono il ruolo di strati. Ora, questi strati possono essere individuati indipendentemente dalla data della loro apparizione, solo a partire dalla qualità d'essere che irradiano, unicamente in base al segno che li caratterizza o al partire dal principio che li genera. [...] Eppure, c'è una successione degli spazi se si considerano non più i loro elementi caratteristici, le loro figure e i loro diversi principi, ma il loro manifestarsi come spazi antropologici irreversibili e autonomi, come organizzatori fondamentali delle grandi epoche dell'avventura umana. Concettuali, fuori dal tempo ma temporalizzanti, gli spazi antropologici sono prodotti e nutriti dalle attività degli esseri umani viventi. Sono gli atti degli uomini, i loro pensieri, le loro relazioni ad attualizzare questo o quello spazio, ad ampliarlo, a infondergli realtà. Benché si succedano, abbiamo visto in che senso, nessuno degli spazi è mai superato».6 Gli esseri umani abitano simultaneamente, quindi, più spazi interiori, sociali, culturali anche se temporalmente operano i processi storici che segnano cesure antropologiche; 3 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 220-221. 4 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 27. 5 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 225. 6 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 219-220. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 3 anzi la portata epocale di un evento si misura con la sua spinta verso tale mutamento: «Si riconosce l'importanza di un evento sul piano intellettuale, tecnico, sociale o storico, dalla sua capacità di riorganizzare le prossimità e le distanze in questo o quello spazio, ovvero dalla sua capacità di instaurare nuovi spazio-tempi, nuovi sistemi di prossimità».7 Sebbene nessuna necessità presiede alla comparsa storica degli spazi antropologici8, P. Lévy afferma che, una volta apparsi progressivamente nella filogenesi umana, la Terra, il Territorio, le Merci e il Sapere (?) hanno assunto una rilevanza irreversibile ed eterna – non si può immaginare la riproduzione della specie in assenza dei loro codici: «gli spazi antropologici sono contingenti. E nonostante tutto, dal momento in cui assumono consistenza, seppur virtualmente essi diventano eterni, fuoriescono dal tempo come se fossero sempre stati presente. L'irreversibilità degli spazi antropologici ricade sul passato».9 Ogni spazio antropologico possiede dei propri sistemi di valori e di misurazioni – universi di senso che, nel tempo e nello spazio sono trasmessi, modificati, connessi con i sistemi degli altri spazi, articolando, così, una molteplicità di modi di esistere: «Viviamo in migliaia di spazi diversi, ciascuno con il proprio particolare sistema di prossimità (temporale, affettivo, linguistico, ecc.). Ogni spazio ha una propria assiologia [...] passiamo il tempo a modificare e organizzare gli spazi nei quali viviamo, a connetterli, separarli, articolarli, rafforzarli, introdurvi nuovi elementi, spostare le intensità che li strutturano, saltare da uno spazio all'altro.[...] Gli spazi antropologici si estendono all'insieme dell'umanità. Sono al loro volta intessuti di un gran numero di spazi interdipendenti».10 Le prospettive di analisi privilegiate da P. Lévy nella teoria degli spazi antropologici sono quelle economica, politica e, soprattutto quella culturale: le forme del sapere. Queste prospettive sono categorie analitiche, definite strati, che costituiscono dei modi di ritagliare il tessuto vivente, cosmopolita, che unifica tutti gli ambiti dell'umano. Ma ogni strato assume un aspetto differente se interseca questo o quell'altro spazio: «Il malinteso più grave consiste nell'interpretare gli spazi antropologici come strati, come 7 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 148. 8 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 151. 9 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 152. 10 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 148-149. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 4 dimensioni di analisi astratte o risultati di segmentazioni analitiche o puramente cronologiche».11 Un altro errore consiste nel trattare gli spazi antropologici come classi di appartenenza in cui ricomprendere e ordinare l'insieme delle cose concrete o astratte del mondo: «Gli spazi antropologici sono mondi di significato e non categorie deificate che si spartiscono gli oggetti corporei: un fenomeno qualsiasi può dunque rientrare in più spazi alla volta e all'interno di ciascuno di essi avrà una figura, un peso, una velocità diversi. [...] Così la carta degli spazi antropologici serve non tanto a classificare persone, cose, istituzioni o eventi in un luogo o in un altro quanto a dispiegare, per ogni fenomeno, l'insieme dello spettro antropologico. Ecco l'uomo che attraversa in tutta la sua statura i quattro spazi».12 1. LO SPAZIO DELLA TERRA «Il simbolo della Terra potrebbe essere la sfera, la sfera chiusa, unica e piena. Il suo principio è "fare mondo", un mondo per noi, un cosmo».13 La Terra è il primo spazio antropologico prodotto culturalmente dal genere umano, a partire dall'età preistorica paleolitica, con la genesi e il graduale sviluppo delle tecniche di lavorazione, delle istituzioni sociali e del linguaggio simbolico e, solo in seguito, verbale: «La Terra fu il primo grande spazio di significazione aperto dalla nostra specie. Esso poggia sui tre elementi primordiali che caratterizzano l'homo sapiens: il linguaggio, la tecnica e le forme complesse di organizzazione sociale (la "religione" intesa nel senso più ampio). Solo gli uomini vivono sulla Terra; gli animali abitano in nicchie ecologiche».14 Tempo-Spazio. Durante il Paleolitico, in un tempo immemorabile, l'uomo preistorico ha vissuto, tracciando linee di erranza segnate dai cicli naturali, il proprio nomadismo.15 Economia. L'economia dello Spazio della Terra è nomade e predatoria,dominata dalla raccolta e dalla caccia; la ricchezza è ridistribuita nella condivisione comunitaria e nel dono.16 Organizzazione. La vita sociale ruota tutta attorno alle strutture parentali e al clan 11 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 149. 12 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 152-153. 13 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 220. 14 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 27. 15 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 175-176. 16 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 221. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 5 gruppi organici in cui l'identità collettiva è preminente sulle determinazioni individuali. 17 Identità. L'auto-comprensione delle persone iscritta nel nome è determinata, del tutto, dal rapporto animistico col cosmo (identità animistica) e dalla filiazione o alleanza con la comunità d'appartenenza (identità tribale): sulla Terra l'uomo è un microcosmo. 18 Conoscenza. Gli oggetti e le modalità di conoscenza proprie dello Spazio della Terra sono determinate interamente dal rapporto con il cosmo – animistico – e dal legame con la comunità d'appartenenza – tribale – sia sul piano delle visioni del mondo mitologiche sia sul piano del sapere pratico del mondo rituali. Nelle narrazioni mitologiche-pratiche rituali sono rinnovati i legami con la Terra – lo spazio di significazione in cui comunicano uomini, animali, paesaggi, spiriti, ecc.19 I soggetti del sapere sono l'intero clan: tutti i membri devono imparare a trasmettere da una generazione all'altra il patrimonio di conoscenze pratiche e magiche tramandate. Gli strumenti di navigazione. Il principale strumento di conoscenza è il racconto geneaologico – la memoria collettiva in cui si iscrive il tempo delle origini del cosmo e della discendenza, narrazione ripetuta e riattualizzata nel tempo immemorabile di un inventario ordinato di qualità e di azioni possibili – una specie di algoritmo20: «il vero oggetto della narrazione non è tanto l'origine, il punto preciso di partenza, come nelle storie lineari del Territorio, ma un immemorabile. L'oggetto del sapere terrestre è un divenire-cominciamento eterno. L'algoritmo non localizzato, non datato, anonimo rappresenta un tale divenire-cominciamento fuori del tempo, già realizzato migliaia di volte e sempre da realizzare nuovamente».21 La semiotica della Terra – all'opera nei mondi primitivi, infantili e onirici segue il gioco delle contiguità, delle analogie e delle corrispondenze che organizzano l'intero cosmo: «Sulla Terra, il segno partecipa dell'essere e l'essere del segno. Tutto ci parla. [...] Grazie al respiro che lo porta, il segno non è mai separato da una presenza. [...] E' il regime semiotico dei "primitivi", degli animasti, delle culture precedenti alla scrittura, dei bambini molto piccoli. Il sistema dell'inconscio e dei "processi primari". Ma guardiamoci dal relegare 17 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 65. 18 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 155-156. 19 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 137. 20Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 185-186. 21 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 194. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 6 velocemente tale regime semiotico in qualche continente notturno dell'inconscio, della poesia o dell'infanzia. Il mondo delle risonanze, delle connessioni e delle presenze agisce ben al di là di questi ambiti. Organizza la nostra esistenza immaginativa e affettiva, il nostro pensiero più intimo. Scandisce il ritmo elementare, dà il la a tutti i canti degli uomini».22 2. LO SPAZIO DEL TERRITORIO «L'insegna del Territorio sarà la piramide e il suo principio organizzatore la trascendenza».23 Spazio-Tempo. Il secondo spazio è il Territorio, la cui origine storica risale all'età neolitica e i cui fattori di sviluppo basilari sono l'agricoltura, lo stato e la scrittura.24 Ovunque si sia manifestato nel tempo e nello spazio, questo insieme di fattori che si amplificano a vicenda tecnici, sociali e culturali -, genera un forza irresistibile che catapulta l'uomo in un mondo nuovo il mondo sedentario della civilizzazione antica: «Senza dubbio lo spazio del Territorio si è aperto per la prima volta nel Vicino Oriente, tra la Mezzaluna fertile, l'Iran e l'Anatolia. Ma c'è anche un Neolitico cinese, più tardo, un Neolitico messicano o incarico ancora più tardo. Le date sono poco importanti. Il neolitico, qui, non è considerato come un periodo della storia ma come uno spazio antropologico atemporale che, a partire dal momento in cui appare, ha ripercussioni immediate su tutto il passato e tutto l'avvenire della specie. L'agricoltura, la città, lo stato e la scrittura sono ormai virtualità inerenti all'umanità, che rimandano le une alle altre contribuendo, ciascuna a suo modo, a suddividere il Territorio. [...] Da tre o quattromila anni, e fino alla Seconda guerra mondiale, la maggior parte dell'umanità, rurale, ha vissuto sul Territorio, in una lunga età neolitica che i crolli degli imperi, le migrazioni dei popoli e le poche innovazioni tecniche hanno scosso appena».25 Il Territorio non sopprime la Terra, ma si sovrappone incardinando il suo universo materiale e simbolico tramite strutture e confini geografici, sociali e culturali senza, peraltro, riuscire mai a contenere l'insorgente forza evocativa del mondo precedente. Il Territorio non elimina la Terra, le si sovrappone parzialmente per renderla stanziale. Identità. L'elemento dell'autocomprensione identitaria è costituito dall'ancoraggio degli individui a entità territoriali definite rispetto all'ambiente dalle proprie frontiere geografiche, economiche, politiche, culturali, a cui si appartiene o da cui si è esclusi: 22 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 165. 23 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 220. 24 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 28. 25 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 139-140. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 7 «L'identità territoriale si costruisce intorno alla casa, alla proprietà, alla città, alla provincia, al paese. L'uomo diventa sedentario. Ma l'identità territoriale non ha niente a che fare con la geografia. Riguarda allo stesso modo i luoghi e i ranghi nelle istituzioni nelle istituzioni, le caste, le gerarchie, i corpi [...], gli ordini [...], le discipline [....] tutto quello che organizza uno spazio con frontiere, scale e livelli. [....]. Sul Territorio, invece, il corpo è un organismo gerarchico e l'anima appare come una micropolis, un piccolo stato agitato da ribellioni e passioni contro il dominio della ragione e della legge. La psicologia del Territorio è una politica interiorizzata, così come la religione è l'immagine ipostatizzata dell'ordine sociale».26 La fondazione – genesi di uno spazio e inaugurazione di un tempo è l'atto che crea un Territorio che si regge sulla rifondazione perpetua dei confini e sull'appropriazione del potere e della ricchezza al suo interno tramite agricoltura, stato, religione e scrittura.27 Conoscenza. Le modalità di conoscenza dominanti sono fondate sulla scrittura e l'oggetto è la conoscenza geometrica della Terra misurata e suddivisa in territori.28 Gli strumenti di navigazione. Sono gli strumenti che permettono di fare il punto sul Territorio orientandosi tramite la proiezione del sistema delle posizioni degli astri.29 Nella semiotica del Territorio la parola è fissata sullo scritto e i segni rappresentano le cose rispecchiando una cesura nell'esperienza immediata che gli esseri umani fanno delle cose: «Il legame mutevole, attuale tra gli esseri, i segni e le cose è differito. Le separazioni e le frontiere che segmentano il Territorio si insinuano nel cuore dei rapporti di significato: è istituita la cesura semiotica [...] La cosa ci è assente, ci sfugge; infatti non ce ne appropriamo se non attraverso il nome, il concetto, l'immagine, il percetto, che sono sempre segni. La cosa è presente solo nella forma neutra, pallida e devitalizzata di ciò che la rappresenta».30 La semiotica del Territorio separa la cosa dal segno, ma per ri-articolarli secondo l'arbitrarietà della convenzione semantica istituita al livello statuale su base legale.31 I soggetti. La trascendenza semiotica trova corrispondenza nella trascendenza sociale della gerarchia politica e sacerdotale che custodisce gli arcana fonte e simbolo del potere. Economia. L'economia dello Spazio del Territorio è stanziale, duratura e dominata dal possesso e dallo sfruttamento dei beni della terra – l'agricoltura e l'allevamento, 26 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 156. 27 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 176-177. 28 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 194. 29Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 187-188. 30 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 167. 31 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 168. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 8 mentre la ricchezza è prelevata, amministrata e ridistribuita tramite l'apparato fiscale.32 Organizzazione. Il principio di organizzazione sociale dello Spazio del Territorio è l'istituzione statuale – una istituzione dotata di una burocrazia amministrativa, di un esercito e di una giustizia – ordinata in una struttura gerarchica su base prevalentemente politica nelle forme dei regimi dispotici e dei regimi rappresentativi. Una rigida divisione del lavoro – direzione ed esecuzione, intellettuale e manuale – tra categorie di persone regola il coordinamento delle attività nelle organizzazioni.33 3. LO SPAZIO DELLE MERCI «La rete, o il circuito, potrebbe essere l'icona dello Spazio delle merci e la deterritorializzazione il suo principio».34 Tempo-Spazio. Con l'apertura al capitale del mercato mondiale, occasionata dalla conquista dell'America da parte degli stati europei, a partire dal XVI sec., si sviluppa un nuovo spazio antropologico delle merci intessuto di scambi mediati dal denaro.35 La dimensione spaziale dello Spazio delle merci è il flusso: la circolazione delle materie prime, dei capitali, della mano d'opera, delle informazioni, ecc. avvia un processo accelerato di de-territorializzazione come subordinazione del Territorio ai flussi delle merci: «Superando le frontiere, scuotendo le gerarchie del Territorio, il vortice del denaro trascina con sé, in un movimento accelerato, una marea montante di oggetti, segni e uomini. Lo spazio delle merci è stato spianato, accresciuto da una macchina de-territorializzante che si è auto-organizzata di colpo e da allora si alimenta di tutto ciò che incontra. Così come re Mida trasformava immancabilmente in oro tutto ciò che toccava, il capitalismo trasforma in merce tutto ciò che riesce a far rientrare nei propri circuiti».36 Lo Spazio delle merci non sopprime affatto gli spazi antropologici precedenti, li supera in velocità, riorganizzandoli e subordinandoli secondo le proprie finalità di tecno-cosmo 32 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 222. 33 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 65-66. 34 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 220. 35 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 28. 36 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 141. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 9 mercantile.37 Ma, non bisogna confondere lo Spazio delle merci con la sfera economica: «la produzione e gli scambi esistono da sempre. Invece, il mondo dei significati, dei rapporti sociali e di interazione con l'universo, che si apre con la Rivoluzione industriale e continua oggi ad allargarsi e proliferare, è sicuramente datato. Eccede di gran lunga il campo della produzione e degli scambi economici, per inglobare quasi tutti gli aspetti della vita umana».38 Nella semiotica dello Spazio delle merci, i segni, non soltanto sono separati dalle esperienze immediate delle cose, ma sono, altresì, riprodotti tecnicamente, deterritorializzati, registrati, selezionati e resi disponibili dai mass media per il pubblico dello Spettacolo: «Nello Spazio delle merci non è più solo la parola a essere separata da una situazione vivente. Quadri e volti, paesaggi e musica, riti e spettacoli, eventi di ogni genere sono indefinitamente riprodotti e diffusi da liberi, stampa, fotografia, dischi, cinema, radio, cassette, televisione, fuori dal contesto in cui sono emersi. Moltiplicato dai media, trasportato lungo mille strade e canali, il segno è deterritorializzato. [...] Nello Spazio delle merci, o mediatico, non c'è più veramente la cosa, il referente, l'originale. [...] Il grande magazzino del segno, o lo Spettacolo, diventa allora una sorta di surrealtà, attraverso la quale ogni parola e immagine devono passare se vogliono avere una qualche efficacia».39 Conoscenza. Le modalità di conoscenza dominanti sono fondate sull'econometria, in un certo senso la cartografia o geometria dello spazio aperto dallo scambio mercantile. Ma, secondo Lévy, per cogliere la dinamica dello Spazio delle merci non è sufficiente rappresentare le variazioni e gli spostamenti dei capitali, dei beni e delle persone. Occorre, altresì, poter cogliere il mondo accelerato e incerto della deterritorializzazione in tutte le manifestazioni della circolazione, della trasmissione e della dissipazione, come i flussi di energia (termodinamica) e di comunicazione (teoria dell'informazione)40. Strumenti di navigazione. Gli strumenti statistici che permettono di identificare e di rendere misurabili quantitativamente i flussi eterogenei e continui degli eventi.41 Episteme. La scienza sperimentale costituisce la modalità-base della conoscenza a partire dalla quale si sviluppa nel tempo una tecnoscienza animata dalla revisione del modello epistemico e da un nesso permanente di ricerca e innovazione economica. 37 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 142. 38 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 143. 39 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 168-169. 40 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 195. 41Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 188-189. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 10 Economia. L'economia dello Spazio del merci è dinamica e, via via dominata dalla produzione industriale e dal controllo dei flussi commerciali – l'industria e la finanza – questo sistema è da tre secoli il motore principale dell'evoluzione delle società umane. Organizzazione. Il principio di organizzazione sociale dello Spazio delle merci è la proprietà privata delle materie prime, dei capitali, del lavoro, delle conoscenze, ecc. – istituto giuridico che impronta la politica nella forma della democrazia termodinamica: «La democrazia termodinamica fa convergere una grande varietà di problemi, di idee e pratiche collettive in scelte binarie sommate in modo semplice: sì o no, sinistra o destra ....».42 I leader unificano e polarizzano in logica binaria lo spazio collettivo della politica.43 Identità. L'elemento fondamentale dell'autocomprensione moderna è dato dalla posizione ricoperta nelle reti dei flussi produttivi, commerciali e consumistici. Sono il lavoro e il consumo che definiscono l'identità personale e sociale dei nuovi soggetti, in un processo di privatizzazione familiare degli spazi pubblici dell'esistenza: «Nel nostro curriculum vitae, dopo il nome (posizione sulla Terra) e l'indirizzo (posizione sul Territorio), si trova generalmente la professione (posizione all'interno dello Spazio delle merci)».44 «Nello Spazio mercantile, i segni dell'identità diventano quantitativi: reddito, salario, conto in banca, segni esteriori di ricchezza. Per usare un linguaggio superato, l'identità dipende in questo caso dal posto occupato nei rapporti di produzione e dalla posizione all'interno dei circuiti di consumo e di scambio. [...] Laddove regna l'economia, l'individuo non è più un microcosmo, né una micro polis, ma una micro oîkos. [...] Canale di trasmissione dei beni materiali per via ereditaria, la famiglia contribuisce a costituire anche l'interiorità della persona. [...] Così la macchina capitalista deterritorializza e accelera numerosi processi sociali, costruisce instancabilmente assetti cosmopoliti, ma paradossalmente restringe la portata dell'identità soggettiva che nello Spazio mercantile gravita introno alla famiglia, al lavoro e al denaro».45 4. LO SPAZIO DEL SAPERE «Quanto allo Spazio del sapere, il suo emblema è l'albero riunificato della conoscenza e della vita e il suo principio l'immanenza radicale».46 42 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 28. 43 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 65-66. 44 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 29. 45 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 157. 46 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 220. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 11 Lévy avanza l'ipotesi che oggi si dischiuda un nuovo spazio antropologico, lo spazio del Sapere, il quale finirebbe per dominare gli spazi precedenti, Terra, Territorio e Merci: «un nuovo spazio antropologico, quello del sapere e dell'intelligenza collettivi, il cui avvento definitivo non è peraltro garantito da alcuna "legge della storia". Come i precedenti spazi antropologici, lo Spazio del Sapere avrebbe la tendenza a dominare gli spazi anteriori e non a farli scomparire. In realtà, sia le reti economiche sia le potenze territoriali dipendono ormai dalla capacità di apprendimento e immaginazione collettiva degli esseri umani che le popolano. E di sicuro vale lo stesso per quel che riguarda la sopravvivenza della grande Terra nomade».47 Si tratta di uno spazio che non esiste, ma che è una possibilità inespressa e disattesa, ancora soggiogato dall'insieme di significati ed esseri degli altri spazi antropologici: «In senso etimologico, è una u-topia. Non è mai stato realizzato da nessuna parte. Ma se non è stato realizzato, è già virtuale, in attesa di nascere. O piuttosto, è già presente, ma nascosto, disperso, travestito, confuso, e getta radici ovunque. [...] Oggi, nei confronti delle merci, lo Spazio del Sapere deve ancora sottostare alle esigenze di competitività e ai calcoli del capitale. Sul territorio, esso è subordinato agli obiettivi di potere e alla gestione burocratica degli stati. Rispetto alla Terra, infine, è sempre invischiato nei mondi chiusi e nelle mitologie arcaiche della new age o della deep ecology».48 Nonostante anche negli spazi precedenti vi fossero forme e contenuti del sapere, soltanto nello Spazio del Sapere la conoscenza diverrebbe un principio antropologico costitutivo dell'orizzonte della nostra civilizzazione. Vi sono tre novità fondamentali: «La novità in questo campo è perlomeno tripla: concerne la velocità di evoluzione dei saperi, la massa di persone chiamate a imparare e produrre nuove conoscenze, e infine la comparsa di nuovi strumenti (quelli del cyberspazio) in grado di far apparire, al di sotto delle nebbie informazionali, paesaggi inediti e distinti, identità peculiari a questo spazio».49 Questi mutamenti quantitativi potrebbero creare le condizioni per affermare nello spazio antropologico una forma di sapere come saper-vivere – un sapere coestensivo alla vita dell'umanità che potrebbe riorganizzare l'esistenza individuale e relazionale dei singoli e della comunità in un processo di individualizzazione-socializzazione autentico: «Appartiene quindi a uno spazio cosmopolita e senza frontiere di relazioni e qualità; a 47 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 27. 48 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 143. 49 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 29-30. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 12 uno spazio di metamorfosi dei rapporti e di emergenza di modi di essere, a uno spazio in cui si ricongiungono i processi di soggettivazione individuali e collettivi. Il pensiero non può essere ricondotto ai cosiddetti discorsi razionali, ci sono dei pensieri-corpo, pensieriaffetto, pensieri-percezione, pensieri-segno, pensieri-concetto, pensieri-gesto, pensierimacchina, pensieri-mondo. Lo Spazio del sapere è la superficie di composizione, ricomposizione, comunicazione, singolarizzazione e rilancio processuale dei pensieri».50 Identità. La crisi d'identità personali e collettive che attraversano le nostre società contemporanee, secondo Lévy, rappresenta un indicatore dell'emergere ancora malcerto del nuovo spazio del Sapere in cui l'autoidentificazione dovrebbe fondarsi intorno a immagini dinamiche del sé e del noi che egli produce esplorando le realtà virtuali: «L'emergere di una realtà organizzata sulla base del sapere provoca una profonda crisi d'identità. Gli antichi criteri di riconoscimento di sé e di identificazione con determinate collettività perdono efficacia. Se quasi tutti portano un nome (unione e filiazione), sono iscritti sul Territorio (almeno per il proprio indirizzo), sono soggetti a uno stato e partecipano in qualche misura alla produzione e al consumo delle merci, la maggior parte degli individui non dispone di alcun mezzo per orientarsi nello Spazio del sapere»51. In questa riflessione, Lévy precisa che lo Spazio del sapere non deve essere confuso né con l'attività conoscitiva in generale né con l'oggetto delle scienze cognitive: «Evidentemente uno strato cognitivo è presente in ogni attività umana. L'uomo pensa sin dalle origini e, come vedremo, ogni spazio antropologico sviluppa le proprie forme peculiari di conoscenza. Lo Spazio del sapere propriamente detto comincia a delinearsi in modo sufficientemente netto solo nel XX secolo. Lo Spazio del sapere come creazione antropologica in atto è una dimensione vivente [...] Non bisogna confonderlo con una sorta di contenitore astratto di tutti i saperi possibili: al contrario distilla una forma particolare di sapere e riorganizza, struttura gerarchicamente, immerge nello spazio attivo che gli è proprio le modalità conoscitive emerse negli altri spazi antropologici».52 Gli intellettuali collettivi sono i soggetti che edificano in modo ricorsivo e cooperativo una cinecarta della propria identità attraverso il mondo di significati in essa tracciato – una identità che liberandosi della logica binaria dell'appartenenza ridiventa nomade aprendo un nuovo spazio di autonomia sia per le comunità che per gli individui: «L'intellettuale collettivo costruire e ricostruisce la propria identità per mezzo del 50 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 144. 51 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 158. 52 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 150. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 13 mondo virtuale che lo esprime. Quanto all'individuo egli possiede tante identità nello Spazio del sapere quanti sono i "corpi virtuali" che riesce a creare nelle cinecarte e nell'universo di significazione che esplora e contribuisce a creare. [...] Sulla Terra l'uomo è microcosmo; sul Territorio è una micropolis; nello Spazio commerciale eccolo diventare un micro oîkos, una piccola casa; nello Spazio del sapere l'uomo si restringe ancora di più: è solo un cervello. Anche il suo corpo diventa un sistema cognitivo. Il cervello entra in contatto e si unisce ad altri cervelli, attraverso sistemi di segni, linguaggi e tecnologie intellettuali, partecipa a comunità pensanti che esplorano e creano mondi plurali. Allora il cervello dell'homo sapiens sapiens si trasforma, mostra il proprio volto e si converte in policosmo. Nello Spazio del sapere, l'uomo ridiventa nomade, rende plurale la propria identità, esplora mondi eterogenei, è egli stesso eterogeneo e multiplo, in divenire, pensante»53. Strumenti di navigazione. Nello Spazio del sapere la cartografia delle conoscenze non può contare né sui mezzi del Territorio né su quelli della Merce, ma sulle cinecarte – mosaici mobili in cui si collocano e si misurano le prossimità tra gli oggetti e i soggetti: «Un intellettuale collettivo si mette a navigare in un universo di informazioni in movimento: da questa interazione emerge una cinecarta. Nella cinecarta, l'universo delle informazioni (o la banca dati) non è strutturato a priori, secondo una organizzazione trascendente, come nel Territorio. Non è normato nemmeno da medie o da distribuzioni statistiche, come nello Spazio delle merci. La cinecarta manifesta lo spazio qualitativo differenziato degli attributi di tutti gli oggetti dell'universo dell'informazione. L'organizzazione topologica di questo spazio esprime la varietà dei rapporti o della relazioni che gli oggetti o gli attori dell'universo dell'informazione intrattengono gli con gli altri»54. I soggetti nuovi dello spazio del sapere in un contesto di conoscenza di massa che aprendosi all'insieme del collettivo umano – gli immaginanti collettivi in riassetto dinamico permanente – rende difficile riservare il sapere a specialistici del palinsesto: «L'intellettuale collettivo si riappropria della produttività semiotica sottrattagli dai poteri del Territorio e dai circuiti dello Spettacolo. E se per l'uomo c'è mondo solo nella dimensione del significato, l'intellettuale collettivo, forgiando sistemi di segni, rifà il mondo».55 Nella semiotica dello Spazio del sapere vi sarebbe un ritorno dell'esperienza reale e viva nella sfera della significazione dei soggetti che usufruiscono dei segni: «Nello Spazio del sapere gli intellettuali collettivi ricostruiscono un piano di immanenza del significato, in cui gli esseri, i segni e le cose ritrovano una relazione dinamica di mutua partecipazione, sfuggendo sia alle separazioni del Territorio sia ai circuiti spettacolari dello Spazio delle merci. [...] Il ritorno del reale nella sfera della significazione presuppone, 53 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 159. 54 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 190. 55 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 171. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 14 come abbiamo visto, il coinvolgimento dei soggetti viventi; ma suggerisce anche lo spazio dei segni diventi sensibile, simile a uno spazio fisico (o a molti!) a cui si possa accedere, in cui sia possibile riconoscersi, incontrare gli altri, esplorando, toccandolo, modificandolo».56 Lévy precisa che la semiotica dello Spazio del sapere non è un ritorno alla semiotica della Terra, in quanto il collettivo intelligente ha fatto esperienza dell'arbitrarietà della semiotica del Territorio e della riproduzione e del flusso spettacolare della semiotica delle Merci: gli oggetti di conoscenza privilegiati della ecologia cognitiva proposta da Lévy sono gli stessi intellettuali collettivi e i loro mondi di significazione nello Spazio del sapere.57 Il titolo dell'opera di P. Lévy è, appunto, L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio al cui studio egli dedica specificamente l'intera prima parte, articolando l'esame da molte prospettive, tecnologiche, economiche, politiche, etiche, estetiche. «L'intelligenza collettiva di cui parla questo libro è un progetto globale le cui dimensioni etiche ed estetiche sono importanti almeno quanto gli aspetti tecnologici e organizzativi. [...] Non sarà una grande rivoluzione a far scaturire lo spazio del sapere, ma tante piccole albe».58 a) Tecnologia dell'intelligenza collettiva Mai le scienze e le tecniche hanno messo a disposizione della circolazione della conoscenza, in tempi così rapidi, dei nuovi strumenti per produrre, scambiare, filtrare una quantità enorme di sapere da parte di un nuovo cyberspazio di intellettuali collettivi: «Lo Spazio del sapere non è altro che la realtà virtuale, questa utopia già presente a tratti, in potenza, ovunque gli uomini sognino, pensino, agiscano insieme. [...] Già oggi, servendosi di ipertesti, di groupware, di multimedia interattivi di realtà virtuali, di programmi di intelligenza o di vita artificiale, di ideografie dinamiche, di dispositivi di simulazione digitale e di sistemi di informazione interattivi, gli intellettuali collettivi esplorano semiotiche mutanti».59 Le nuove tecnologie non servono soltanto a trasportare masse di informazioni dall'intera società verso la sua stessa totalità, ma anche filtrare i flussi di conoscenze dal basso senza una canalizzazione-censura da parte di organi istituzionali preposti. Ma rimane il problema di far emergere la finalità sociale da assegnare ai nuovi strumenti: 56 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 170. 57 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 196. 58 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 31. 59 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 171. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 15 «Forse l'utilizzo socialmente più utile sarebbe quello di consentire ai gruppi umani di mettere in comune, attraverso il loro impiego, le rispettive forze mentali al fine di costituire degli intellettuali e immaginanti collettivi. [...] Il ruolo dell'informatica e delle tecniche di comunicazione non consisterebbe nel rimpiazzare l'uomo e neppure nell'avvicinarsi a una ipotetica intelligenza artificiale, ma nel favorire la costruzione di collettivi intelligenti in cui le potenzialità sociali e cognitive di ciascuno possano sviluppare e ampliare reciprocamente».60 La ricerca tecnologica dovrebbe essere indirizzata a forgiare gli strumenti che rendano praticabile il progresso verso un'economia della conoscenza e dell'umano.61 Le tecnologie più appropriate nella comunicazione sono le tecnologie molecolari fini – informatizzate che consentono la costruzione, la modifica e trasmissione interattiva dei messaggi accelerando i tempi e allargando il contenuto e l'area di accesso e d'uso.62 b) Economia dell'intelligenza collettiva Secondo Lévy, oggi, la prosperità economica delle nazioni, delle imprese e degli individui dipende dalla loro capacità di partecipare attivamente allo spazio del sapere: «Più i gruppi umani riescono a costituirsi in collettivi intelligenti, in soggetti aperti, capaci di iniziativa, d'immaginazione e di relazione rapida e meglio si garantiscono il successo in un ambiente circostante altamente competitivo qual è il nostro. [...] A lungo termine, tutto dipende dalla flessibilità e dalla vitalità delle nostre reti di produzione, di transazione e scambio dei saperi. [...] Come dice M.Serres: il sapere è diventato la nuova infrastruttura»63. Non siamo in presenza solo della terziarizzazione dell'economia – lo spostamento delle attività produttive dai settori industriali ai servizi; assistiamo, invece, a una ridefinizione complessiva dei modi di produzione della ricchezza i cui sviluppi politici e antropologici necessitano non di una pianificazione ma di iniziative di coordinamento.64 L'economia del nuovo Spazio del Sapere è una economia della conoscenza in cui mobilitazione e coordinamento delle soggettività individuali sono la condizione del successo: «In effetti, la trasformazione continua delle tecniche, dei mercati e dell'ambiente economico, spinge i collettivi ad abbandonare le proprie modalità rigide e gerarchiche di 60 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 30-31. 61 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 54-56. 62 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 60-63. 63 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 23-24. 64 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 25. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 16 organizzazione, a sviluppare le capacità d'iniziativa e di cooperazione attiva dei propri membri»65. c) Politica dell'intelligenza collettiva Non si reinventano gli strumenti dell'intelligenza collettiva senza reinventare la democrazia. Le attuali forme di rappresentanza politica, secondo P. Lévy, sono inadeguate a fronteggiare i rapidi e radicali cambiamenti tecnici, economici e sociali oggi in atto, e non sono in grado di attingere e mobilitare competenze e informazioni disponibili. «I grandi problemi politici del mondo contemporaneo riguardano il disarmo, gli squilibri ecologici, le mutazioni dell'economia e del lavoro, lo sviluppo dei paesi del Sud, l'educazione, la grande povertà, il mantenimento de legame sociale, ecc. [...] Le procedure di decisione e valutazione attualmente in uso sono state pensate per un mondo relativamente stabile e all'interno di una ecologia della comunicazione semplice. Oggi, orami, l'informazione è di natura torrentizia o oceanica. Lo scarto tra il flusso diluviale dei messaggi e le forme tradizionali di decisione e orientamento si fa sempre più ampio»66. La proposta di P. Lévy è di promuovere forme di democrazia molecolari e partecipative. Da un lato, ogni cittadino deve poter accedere in tempo reale al maggior numero di informazioni sugli specifici argomenti politici di interesse personale e generale, dall'altro lato, tramite strumenti di comunicazione interattiva, i cittadini dovrebbero poter partecipare attivamente a un percorso di socializzazione delle soluzioni dei problemi67: «la politica nello Spazio del sapere è un sistema di democrazia diretta computerizzata, non più fondata sulla rappresentatività di maggioranze statistiche ma sull'autorganizzazione dei collettivi intelligenti, con la possibilità di sperimentare e prendere iniziative da parte di minoranze»68. Se i regimi a democrazia rappresentativa sono certamente preferibili ai regimi totalitari, occorre sommare alle tipiche forme di espressione della sovranità popolare – le elezioni dispositivi di democrazia diretta in tempo reale nel cyberspazio, in modo che i cittadini possano contribuire a elaborare i problemi e a proporre idee nuove per le soluzioni.69 «La democrazia in tempo reale è il regime politico più adatto ad assicurare l'efficacia e la potenza caratteristiche del XXI secolo, poiché educa all'intelligenza collettiva ed è in grado di mobilitare, valorizzare, impiegare al meglio tutte le qualità umane. La potenza rende 65 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 50 66 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 50 67 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 76-77. 68 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 222. 69 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 76-78, 87-92. The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 17 possibile, il potere blocca. [...] Per diventare potente, un gruppo umano deve disinvestire dalle gerarchie, all'interno e all'esterno. [...] Oggi il problema politico non è più di prendere il potere, ma di accrescere le potenzialità del popolo o di qualsiasi altro gruppo umano»70. d) Etica dell'intelligenza collettiva Lo Spazio del sapere, secondo Lévy, si alimenta e progredisce se si sperimentano relazioni umane fondate su principi di valorizzazione etica degli individui71 a partire dalle loro competenze, di trasformazione delle differenze in ricchezza collettiva, di integrazione in un processo sociale dinamico di scambio dei saperi, nel quale ciascuno sia riconosciuto e promosso nei propri percorsi di apprendimento e tutti concorrano all'accrescimento della potenza, sia essa intellettuale, morale, sensibile, ecc: «Sarà considerato buono tutto ciò che arricchisce gli esseri umani, prima di tutto moralmente: dignità, riconoscenza, capacità comunicativa e intelligenza collettiva. I giusti promuovono la potenza. Simmetricamente, verranno considerate negative le forze che impoveriscono gli esseri umani e, al limite, li distruggono: l'umiliazione, l'avvilimento, la separazione, l'isolamento»72. La valorizzazione delle risorse umane è una necessità politica ed un imperativo morale la cui massima Lévy ha voluto indicare nella definizione di ingegneria del legame sociale: «l'arte di far vivere collettivi intelligenti e di valorizzare al massimo la diversità delle qualità umane».73 e) Estetica dell'intelligenza collettiva La dimensione estetica dell'ingegneria del legame sociale riguarda, soprattutto, la creazione di nuove forme espressive, di pensiero e di comunicazione del cyberspazio, e in particolare, i mutamenti strutturali nella produzione e recezione dell'opera d'arte, con la trasformazione dei ruoli dei soggetti finora implicati nel fenomeno artistico – dalla produzione-interpretazione di opere chiuse alla creazione pubblica di opere aperte:74 70 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 97-98. 71 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 33-34. 72 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 47. 73 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 38. 74 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., pp. 128-132. TAVOLA GENERALE DEI QUATTRO SPAZI ANTROPOLOGI SPAZIO DELLA TERRA SPAZIO DEL TERRITORIO SPAZIO DELLE MERCI SPAZIO DEL SAPERE TEMPO Paleolitico Neolitico Rivoluzione industriale Noolitico? PUNTO DI IRREVERSIBILITÀ 70000 a.C. 3000 a.C. 1750 2000? IDENTITÀ SOCIALE Totem – Clan Rapporto con il cosmo Microcosmo Filiazione e allenza Iscrizione territoriale Micropolis Proprietà e indirizzo (binaria) Posto occupato nella produzione, scambi e consumo Micro oîkos Famiglia nucleare e impiego (binaria) Rapporto con il sapere in tutta la sua diversità Policosmo Identità nomade e multipla intersoggettiva e individuale (quantiqua) FIGURE DELLO SPAZIO Linee di erranza Spazio-memoria Recinzioni Fondazioni Reti Circuiti, Urbano Spazio metaforico FIGURE DEL TEMPO Immemorabile Storia Tempo lento e differito generato dalle figure dello spazio Tempo reale, astratto e uniforme Temporalità soggettive Conciliazione e coordinamento RAPPORTI CON LA CONOSCENZA STRUMENTI DI NAVIGAZIONE Racconti, algoritmi, portolani Proiezione di un cielo su una Terra Statistiche, probabilità Mondi virtuali, cinecarte OGGETTI Divenire-cominciamenti, Rituali Geometria, leggi della natura Flussi, folle, oggetti scienze umane Significazione, libertà, configurazioni dinamiche di collettivi soggetti-oggetti linguaggii SOGGETTI I vecchi I commendatori Gli esperti I collettivi intelligenti, l'umanità SUPPORTI Il corpo della comunità Il libro Dalla biblioteca all'ipertesto La cosmopedia SEMIOTICHE Presenza e corrispondenze Partecipazione reciproca dei segni, delle cose e degli esseri Assenza e rappresentazioni Separazione e articolazione tra il segno, la cosa e l'essere Illusione e propagazioni Sconnessione tra il segno, la cosa e l'essere Produttività e mutazioni Implicazione degli esseri nei mondi di significazione The Lab's Quarterly, 3, 2007 19 B) I QUATTRO PUNTI CARDINALI La descrizione delle principali caratteristiche dei differenti spazi antropologici – Terra, Territorio, Merci e Sapere costituisce uno degli obiettivi analitici che P. Lévy si è proposto di raggiungere; accanto a tale esame si situa lo studio delle relazioni tra gli spazi antropologici sia delle relazioni armoniose che delle relazioni cacofoniche. Gli spazi antropologici sono in relazione dialettica secondo una causalità senza contatto: «Tutto avviene come se le due correnti, una ascendente e l'altra discendente, regolassero le relazioni tra gli spazi. Dal basso in altro, gli spazi più lenti, più profondi, sono attratti dai più altri, dai più rapidi. Gli spazi inferiori sono mossi o commossi da quelli superiori, come accade per il desiderio. [...] Inversamente, dall'altro verso il basso della scala di Giobbe antropologica, gli spazi superiori si effondono su quelli inferiori, li alimentano a modo loro, senza percepirli, restando sempre all'interno della propria sostanza»75. Il criterio guida della valutazione sullo stato dei rapporti tra spazi antropologici è piuttosto chiaro: che nessun spazio possa o debba ridurre, assimilare o distruggere gli altri76 ma il peggio accade quando gli spazi sottostanti vogliono comandare e violentare gli spazi superiori.77 I punti cardinali sono, in un linguaggio topografico, le configurazioni antropologiche che generano l'asservimento dello spazio superiore all'inferiore (il male) soffocando l'innovazione ontologica e provocando delle delusioni che ingenerano dei riflussi collettivi regressivi. I mali del Sud. «Il male viene dal desiderio della Terra di comandare il Territorio, quando le tribù si affrontano per il possesso dello stato, quando un capo clan diventa capo del governo. E' la disgrazia che regna nei paesi del Sud, e che porta con sé guerre civili, dittature e carestie. Il male deriva dalla volontà del Terra di sottomettere a sé la merce, quando l'industria e il commercio sono nelle mani del clan, quando il saccheggio puro e semplice sostituisce lo scambio. Il banditismo e la mafia regnano in un altro Sud. E quando la Terra pensa di poter pilotare lo Spazio del sapere, il risultato è la new age, il fondamentalismo ecologista, l'irrazionalismo militante»78. 75 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 228. 76 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 224. 77 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 230. 78 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 231. Luca Corchia, La teoria degli spazi antropologici di Pierre Lévy 20 I mali dell'Est «La volontà del Territorio di comandare lo Spazio delle merci e del sapere, lo chiamiamo il male dell'Est, in ricordo della grande glaciazione che ha segnato l'Europa del XX secolo. Il dominio assoluto del Territorio sullo Spazio delle merci porta all'economia dirigista e alla povertà pianificata; la formula del totalitarismo non è forse quella di mettere lo Spettacolo al servizio del Territorio? Sottomesso alla volontà di controllo del Territorio, lo Spazio del sapere non può sopravvivere neppure allo stato embrionale, viene immediatamente distrutto o condannato a una pericolosa clandestinità. [...] Ancora oggi c'è l'Est, un po' dappertutto. Nelle grandi imprese (anche nelle piccole), burocrazie intralciano l'iniziativa economica, la prassi amministrativa soffoca l'inventiva, la gestione autoritaria e le separazioni impediscono all'intelligenza collettiva di spiegarsi. Infine, il sistema burocratico e istituzionale dell'università, dei centri di ricerca, delle scuole non è certo il più favorevole alla fioritura degli intellettuali collettivi. C'è anche un Est dell'insegnamento e della scienza ufficiale»79. I mali del Nord. «Al Nord, infine, lo Spazio delle merci vuole spadroneggiare sullo Spazio del sapere. E' il male dei paesi ricchi, la società dello spettacolo, il pensiero annegato nei media, nella pubblicità. Invece e al posto degli intellettuali collettivi, il Nord può esibire solo la tecnoscienza, la finanza e i media, la follia dei grandi numeri e della velocità, la deterritorializzazione sfrenata, estranea, violenta, senza rilancia soggettivo. Questo Nord si è diffuso su tutto il pianeta»80. Topografia delle delusioni «i delusi del Nord, colpiti dalla deterritorializzazione, non trovano altra via d'uscita se non un appello alla trascendenza, un ritorno alle gerarchie, alle tradizioni, alla storia, ai "valori" del Territorio. Ci si stacca dal Nord solo per andare a Est, un Est che non smette mai di sopravvivere a se stesso e disseminarsi. Quanto ai delusi dell'Est, eccoli ricondotti a Nord. Si oscilla tra lo stato e il capitale come se al mondo non ci fosse altro. Altri si rivolgono verso Sud, immaginano un dominio della Terra che dà i brividi»81. Verso l'Ovest «Ma chi vede la quarta via? [...] Tutto l'impegno di questo testo è puntare il dito a Ovest. Noi indichiamo l'oceano vuoto inesplorato, delle grandi scoperte. L'Ovest: mobilitazione alla partenza, silenzioso appello all'apertura di un nuovo spazio»82. 79 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 232. 80 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 232. 81 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 232. 82 Lévy P., trad. it. L'intelligenza collettiva. Per un'antropologia del cyberspazio, cit., p. 232.

Psicologia como Filosofia Filosofia como Psicologia Artigos e Avaliações 2006-2019 Michael Starks DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Reality Press Las Vegas Copyright © 2020 por Michael Starks Todos os direitos reservados. Nenhuma parte desta publicação pode ser reproduzida, distribuída ou transmitida sem o consentimento expresso do autor. Impresso e vinculado nos Estados Unidos da América. Premeira edição ISBN: 978-1-951440-34-3 "A confusão e a estéril idade da psicologia não devem ser explicadas chamando-a de "ciência jovem"; seu estado não é comparável com o da física, por exemplo, em seus primórdios. (Em vez disso, com o de certos ramos da matemática. Definir teoria.) Pois na psicologia há métodos experimentais e confusão conceitual. (Como no outro caso, confusão conceitual e métodos de prova). A existência do método experimental nos faz pensar que temos os meios de resolver os problemas que nos incomodam; embora problema e método passar um ao outro por. Wittgenstein (PI p.232) "Os filósofos veem constantemente o método da ciência diante de seus olhos e são irresistivelmente tentados a fazer e responder perguntas da maneira como a ciência faz. Essa tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica e leva o filósofo à escuridão completa." (BBB p18). "A origem e a forma primitiva do jogo linguístico é uma reação; só a partir disso podem se desenvolver formas mais complicadas. Linguagem Eu quero dizer é um refinamento. "No início foi a ato." Wittgenstein CV p31 "Mas eu não consegui a minha imagem do mundo me satisfazendo de sua correção: nem tenho porque estou satisfeito com sua correção. Não: é o fundo herdado contra o qual eu distinguio entre verdadeiro e falso." Wittgenstein OC 94 "O limite da linguagem é mostrado por ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponde a (é a tradução de) uma frase sem simplesmente repetir a frase ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 "Se tivermos em mente a possibilidade de um quadro que, embora correto, não tem nenhuma semelhança com seu objeto, a interpolação de uma sombra entre a sentença e a realidade perde todo o ponto. Por enquanto, a sentença em si pode servir como tal sombra. A frase é apenas um quadro, que não tem a menor semelhança com o que representa." BBB p37 "Muitas palavras, então, nesse sentido, então não têm um significado rigoroso. Mas isso não é um defeito. Pensar que é seria como dizer que a luz da minha lâmpada de leitura não é uma luz real, porque não tem limite acentuado." BBB p27 "O objetivo da filosofia é erguer uma parede no ponto onde a linguagem pára de qualquer maneira." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p187 "Imagine uma pessoa cuja memória não poderia reter o que a palavra 'dor' significavade modo que ele constantemente chamava coisas diferentes por esse nome mas, no entanto, usou a palavra de uma maneira se encaixando com os sintomas usuais e pressupostos da palavra 'dor'-em curto ele usou-a como todos nós fazemos. Wittgenstein PI p271 "Cada sinal é capaz de interpretação, mas o significado não deve ser capaz de interpretação. It é a última interpretação" BBB p34 "Há uma espécie de doença geral de pensamento que sempre procura (e encontra) o que seria chamado de estado mental do qual todos os nossos atos brotam, a partir de um reservatório." BBB p143 "E o erro que nós aqui e em mil casos semelhantes estamos inclinados a cometer é rotulado pela palavra "fazer" como a usamos na frase "Não é um ato de discernimento que nos faz usar a regra como fazemos" , porque há uma ideia de que "algo deve nos fazer" fazer o que fazemos. E isso se junta novamente à confusão entre causa e razão. Não precisamos de razão para seguir a regra como nós. A cadeia de razões tem um fim. Wittgenstein BBB p143 "O que estamos fornecendo são realmente observações sobre a história natural do homem, não curiosidades; no entanto, mas sim observações sobre fatos que ninguém duvidou e que só não foram observados porque estão sempre diante de nossos olhos." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós e nem explica nem deduz nada... Pode-se dar o nome 'filosofia' ao que é possível antes de todas as novas descobertas e invenções." Wittgenstein PI 126 "Quanto mais estritamente examinamos a linguagem real, mais nítida se torna o conflito entre ela e nossa exigência. (Pois a pureza cristalina da lógica não foi, naturalmente, resultado da investigação: era um requisito.)" PI 107 "Nosso método é puramente descritivo, as descrições que damos não são indícios de explicações." BBB p125 "Pois a clareza que estamos mirando é de fato total clareza. Mas isso significa simplesmente que os problemas filosóficos devem desaparecer completamente." PI p133 "O maior perigo aqui é querer observar a si mesmo." LWPP1, 459. "Algumas das características lógicas mais importantes da intencionalidade estão além do alcance da fenomenologia porque não têm realidade fenomenológica imediata... Porque a criação de significado por insignificância não é conscientemente experimentada... ele não existe... Isso é... a ilusão fenomenológica. Searle PNC p115-117 "O Estado intencional representa suas condições de satisfação... as pessoas erroneamente supõem que cada representação mental deve ser conscientemente pensada... mas a noção de uma representação como estou usando é uma noção funcional e não ontológica. Qualquer coisa que tenha condições de satisfação, que possam ter sucesso ou falha de uma forma característica da intencionalidade, é, por definição, uma representação de suas condições de satisfação... podemos analisar a estrutura da intencionalidade dos fenômenos sociais analisando suas condições de satisfação." Searle MSW p28-32 "Superstição não é nada além de crença no nexo causal." TLP 5.1361 "Agora, se não é as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós. "O Livro Azul" p6 (1933) "A forma básica do jogo deve ser aquela em que atuamos." Wittgenstein Philosophical Occasions p397(1993) "Como surge o problema filosófico sobre processos mentais e estados e sobre o comportamento? – O primeiro passo é aquele que escapa completamente do aviso. Falamos de processos e estados e deixamos sua natureza indecisa. Algum dia talvez saibamos mais sobre elespensamos. Mas isso é exatamente o que nos compromete a uma maneira particular de olhar para o assunto. Pois temos um conceito definitivo do que significa aprender a conhecer melhor um processo. (O movimento decisivo no truque de conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente). - E agora a analogia que nos fez entender que nossos pensamentos se desfazem. Então, temos que negar o processo ainda incompreendido no meio ainda inexplorado. E agora parece que tínhamos negado processos mentais. E, naturalmente, não queremos negá-los. Wittgenstein PI p308 "Se Deus olhasse para nossas mentes, ele não seria capaz de ver lá em quem estávamos pensando." Wittgenstein PI p217 "A palavra "infinito" deve ser evitada em matemática? Sim: onde parece conferir um significado sobre o cálculo; em vez de obter um a partir dele. RFM Edição revisada (1978) p141 "Uma e outra vez a tentativa é feita de usar a linguagem para limitar o mundo e colocá-la em alívio - mas não pode ser feita. A auto-evidência do mundo expressa-se no próprio fato de que a linguagem pode e só se refere a ela. Pois já que a linguagem só deriva a maneira como significa, seu significado, do mundo, nenhuma língua é concebível que não represente este mundo." Wittgenstein Philosophical Remarks S47 "Os limites da minha língua significam os limites do meu mundo" TLP "Podemos não avançar em qualquer tipo de teoria, não deve haver nada hipotético em nossas considerações. Devemos acabar com toda a explicação, e a descrição por si só deve tomar o seu lugar. (PI 109). "Mas você não pode explicar um sistema físico como uma máquina de escrever ou um cérebro identificando um padrão que ele compartilha com sua simulação computacional, porque a existência do padrão não explica como o sistema realmente funciona como um sistema físico. ... Em suma, o fato de que a atribuição da sintaxe não identifica mais poderes causais é fatal para a alegação de que os programas fornecem explicações causais de cognição... Há apenas um mecanismo físico, o cérebro, com seus vários níveis causais físicos e físicos/mentais reais de descrição." Filosofia Searle em um Novo Século (PNC) p101-103 "Toda inferência ocorre um priori. Os eventos do futuro não podem ser inferidos dos presentes. Superstição é a crença no nexo causal. A liberdade do testamento consiste no fato de que ações futuras não podem ser conhecidas agora. Só consecávamos se a causalidade fosse uma necessidade interior, como a de dedução lógica. A conivência do conhecimento e o que se sabe é a de necessidade lógica. ("A sabe que p é o caso" é sem sentido se p é uma tautologia.) Se pelo fato de que uma proposta é óbvia para nós, ela não segue que é verdade, então a obsercidade não é justificativa para a crença em sua verdade." TLP 5.1335.1363 "Orador significando... é a imposição de condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação. A capacidade de fazer isso é um elemento crucial das capacidades cognitivas humanas. Requer a capacidade de pensar em dois níveis ao mesmo tempo, de uma forma essencial para o uso da linguagem. Em um nível, o orador intencionalmente produz uma declaração física, mas em outro nível a expressão representa algo. E a mesma dualidade infecta o símbolo em si. Em um nível, é um objeto físico como qualquer outro. Em outro nível, tem um significado: representa um tipo de estado de coisas" MSW "A consciência é causicamente redutível aos processos cerebrais... e a consciência não tem poderes causais, além dos poderes causais da neurobiologia subjacente... Mas a reducibilidade causal não leva à redutibilidade ontológica... consciência só existe como experimentado... e, portanto, não pode ser reduzido a algo que tenha uma ontologia de terceira pessoa, algo que existe independentemente das experiências." Searle PNC 155-6 "Um processo de máquina poderia causar um processo de pensamento? A resposta é: sim. De fato, apenas um processo de máquina pode causar um processo de pensamento, e a 'computação' não dá nome a um processo de máquina; ele nomeia um processo que pode ser, e tipicamente é, implementado em uma máquina." Searle PNC p73 "... a caracterização de um processo como computacional é uma caracterização de um sistema físico de fora; e a identificação do processo como computacional não identifica uma característica intrínseca da física, é essencialmente uma caracterização relativa observadora." Searle PNC p95 "O argumento da sala chinesa mostrou que a semântica não é intrínseca à sintaxe. Agora estou fazendo o ponto separado e diferente de que a sintaxe não é intrínseca à física." Searle PNC p94 "A tentativa de eliminar a falácia homunculus através da decomposição recursiva falha, porque a única maneira de obter a sintaxe intrínseca à física é colocar um homunculus na física." Searle PNC p97 ... uma vez que você tem linguagem, é inevitável que você terá deontologia porque não há nenhuma maneira que você pode fazer atos de fala explícito satisfeito de acordo com as convenções de uma língua sem criar compromissos. Isso é verdade não apenas para declarações, mas para todos os atos de discurso" MSW p82 "Quanto mais estritamente examinamos a linguagem real, mais nítida se torna o conflito entre ela e nossa exigência. (Pois a pureza cristalina da lógica não foi, naturalmente, resultado da investigação: era um requisito.)" PI 107 "Pode haver razões para a ação que são vinculantes a um agente racional apenas em virtude da natureza do fato relatado na declaração da razão, e independentemente dos desejos, valores, atitudes e avaliações do agente? ... O verdadeiro paradoxo da discussão tradicional é que ele tenta colocar a guilhotina de Hume, a rígida distinção de valor de fato, em um vocabulário, o uso do qual já pressupõe a falsidade da distinção." Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas as funções de status e, portanto, toda a realidade institucional, com exceção da linguagem, são criadas por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de Declarações... as formas da função de status em questão são quase invariavelmente questões de poderes deónticos... reconhecer algo como direito, dever, obrigação, exigência e assim por diante é reconhecer uma razão de ação... essas estruturas deonticas tornam possíveis razões independentes do desejo para a ação... O ponto geral é muito claro: a criação do campo geral de razões baseadas no desejo para a ação pressuposto a aceitação de um sistema de razões independentes de desejo para a ação." Searle PNC p34-49 "Em suma, a sensação de 'processamento de informações' que é usada na ciência cognitiva é um nível muito alto de abstração para capturar a realidade biológica concreta da intencionalidade intrínseca... Estamos cegos a essa diferença pelo fato de que a mesma frase "Vejo um carro vindo em minha direção", pode ser usada para registrar tanto a intencionalidade visual quanto a saída do modelo computacional de visão... no sentido de 'informação' usada na ciência cognitiva, é simplesmente falso dizer que o cérebro é um dispositivo de processamento de informações." Searle PNC p104-105 "Pode haver razões para a ação que são vinculantes a um agente racional apenas em virtude da natureza do fato relatado na declaração da razão, e independentemente dos desejos, valores, atitudes e avaliações do agente? ... O verdadeiro paradoxo da discussão tradicional é que ele tenta colocar a guilhotina de Hume, a rígida distinção de valor de fato, em um vocabulário, o uso do qual já pressupõe a falsidade da distinção." Searle PNC p165171 "... a relação intencional básica entre a mente e o mundo tem a ver com condições de satisfação. E uma proposta é qualquer coisa que possa ficar em uma relação intencional com o mundo, e uma vez que essas relações intencionais sempre determinam condições de satisfação, e uma proposta é definida como qualquer coisa suficiente para determinar condições de satisfações, acontece que toda intencionalidade é uma questão de proposições. Searle PNC p193 "Os quatro primeiros tipos de atos de fala têm analógicos exatos em estados intencionais: correspondentes a assertivos são crenças, correspondentes às Diretrizes são desejos, correspondentes aos Comissários são intenções e correspondentes a Expressos é toda a gama de emoções e outros estados intencionais onde o Ajuste presupé-lo é dado como certo. Mas não há analógico pré-linguístico para as Declarações. Estados intencionais prélinguísticos não podem criar fatos no mundo representando esses fatos como já existentes. Este feito notável requer uma linguagem" Searle MSW p69 "... uma vez que você tem linguagem, é inevitável que você terá deontologia porque não há nenhuma maneira que você pode fazer atos de fala explícito satisfeito de acordo com as convenções de uma língua sem criar compromissos. Isso é verdade não apenas para declarações, mas para todos atos de fala" Searle MSW p82 "Então, funções de status são a cola que mantém a sociedade unida. Eles são criados pela intencionalidade coletiva e funcionam carregando poderes desonóticos... Com a importante exceção da própria linguagem, toda a realidade institucional e, portanto, de certa forma, toda a civilização humana é criada por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de Declarações... toda a realidade institucional humana é criada e mantida na existência por (representações que têm a mesma forma lógica que) Declarações de Função de Status, incluindo os casos que não são atos de fala na forma explícita de Declarações." Searle MSW p11-13 "Crenças, como declarações, têm a direção para baixo ou mente (ou palavra) para o mundo de ajuste. E desejos e intenções, como ordens e promessas, têm a direção ascendente ou mundial (ou palavra) de ajuste. Crenças ou percepções, como declarações, devem representar como as coisas estão no mundo, e nesse sentido, elas devem se encaixar no mundo; eles têm a direção mente-mundo de ajuste. Os estados co-volitional, como desejos, intenções e intenções anteriores em ação, como ordens e promessas, têm a direção mundial-mente de ajuste. Eles não devem representar como as coisas são, mas como gostaríamos que elas fossem ou como pretendemos fazê-las ser... Além dessas duas faculdades, há uma terceira, imaginação, na qual o conteúdo proposicional não deve se encaixar na realidade da maneira que o conteúdo proposicional de cognição e volição deve se encaixar... o compromisso mundial está abandonado e temos um conteúdo proposicional sem qualquer compromisso que represente com qualquer direção de ajuste." Searle MSW p15 "Os epistemólogos tradicionais querem saber se o conhecimento é verdadeira crença e outra condição..., ou se o conhecimento nem implica crença ... O que precisa ser esclarecido se essas perguntas devem ser respondidas é a teia de nossos conceitos epistêmicos, as maneiras pelas quais os diversos conceitos se reúnem, as diversas formas de suas compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, seu ponto e propósito, seus pressupostos e diferentes formas de dependência de contexto. Para este exercício venerável em análise conjuntiva, conhecimento científico, psicologia, neurociência e ciência cognitiva autodenominada não pode contribuir com nada." (P.M.S HackerPassando pela virada naturalista: no beco sem saída de Quinep152005) "Assim como em estados intencionais podemos fazer uma distinção entre o tipo de Estado... e o conteúdo do Estado... então, na teoria da linguagem podemos fazer uma distinção entre o tipo de ato de fala que é... e o conteúdo proposicional... temos o mesmo conteúdo proposicional com diferentes modos psicológicos no caso dos estados intencionais, e diferentes força ou tipo no caso dos atos de fala. Além disso, assim como minhas crenças podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas e, portanto, ter a direção da mente-para-mundo de ajuste, para que minhas declarações possam ser verdadeiras ou falsas e, portanto, ter a direção palavra-a-mundo de ajuste. E assim como meus desejos ou intenções não podem ser verdadeiros ou falsos, mas podem estar de várias maneiras satisfeitos ou insatisfeitos, então minhas ordens e promessas não podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas, mas podem estar de várias maneiras satisfeitas ou insatisfeitas - podemos pensar em todos os Estados intencionais que têm todo um conteúdo proposicional e uma direção de ajuste como representações de suas condições de satisfação. Uma crença representa suas condições de verdade, um desejo representa suas condições de cumprimento, uma intenção que representa sua realização de condições... O Estado intencional representa suas condições de satisfação... as pessoas erroneamente supõem que cada representação mental deve ser conscientemente pensada... mas a noção de uma representação como estou usando é uma noção funcional e não ontológica. Qualquer coisa que tenha condições de satisfação, que possam ter sucesso ou falha de uma forma característica da intencionalidade, é, por definição, uma representação de suas condições de satisfação... podemos analisar a estrutura da intencionalidade dos fenômenos sociais analisando suas condições de satisfação." Searle MSWp28-32 "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós, e nem explica nem deduz nada." (PI 126) "Na filosofia não tiramos conclusões" (PI 599) "Se alguém tentasse avançar teses na filosofia, não seria possível debater, porque todos concordariam com elas" (PI 128) "Se eu quisesse duvidar se esta era a minha mão, como eu poderia evitar duvidando se a palavra "mão" tem algum significado? Então isso é algo que eu pareço saber, afinal. Wittgenstein Na Certeza p48 "Aquele que entende que babuíno faria mais pela metafísica do que Locke" Charles Darwin 1838 Notebook M INDICE Prefácio ....................................................................... ...........I A DESCRIÇÃO DO COMPORTAMENTO SEM DELÍRIO 1. A estrutura lógica da consciência (comportamento, personalidade, racionalidade, pensamento de ordem superior, intencionalidade) ..2 2. Revisão de 'Tornar o Mundo Social' (Making the Social World) por John Searle (2010) (revisão revisada 2019)............................................9 3. Revisão de ' Filosofia em um Novo Século ' (Philosophy in a New Century) por John Searle (2008) (revisão revisada 2019).................--31 4. Revisão de 'Metafilosofia de Wittgenstein' (Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy) por Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (revisão revisada 2019)...........................................................................................................51 5. Revisão de 'O Material do Pensamento' (The Stuff of Thought) por Steven Pinker (2008) (revisão revisada 2019).................................----74 6 Revisão de 'Estamos Hardwired?' (Are We Hardwired?') por Clark & Grunstein Oxford (2000).......................................................87 7 JK Rowling é mais malvado que eu? .....................................................90 A ILUSÃO DIGITAL-COMPUTADORES SÃO PESSOAS E LINGUAGEM É MATEMÁTICA E OI-TECH VAI NOS SALVAR 8 Cientificismo em esteróides: uma revisão da 'Liberdade Evolui' (Freedom Evolves) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisão revisada 2019).........................................................................................................96 9 Revisão de 'Eu sou um Loop Estranho' (I am a Strange Loop) por Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (revisão revisada 2019).........................111 10 Outro retrato dos desenhos animados da mente dos metafísicos reducionistas – uma revisão de Peter Carruthers ' A Opacidade da Mente ' (The Opacity of Mind) (2011) (revisão revisada 2019).................................................................................................... ....128 11 Será que Hominoids ou Androids Destroem a Terra? - uma revisão de Como Criar Uma Mente (How to Create a Mind) por Ray Kurzweil (2012) (revisão revisada 2019)................................................................155 12 O que significa paraconsistente, indecível, aleatório, computável e incompleto?-Uma revisão da 'Godel's Way: exploits into an undecidable world' (Maneira de Godel: façanhas em um mundo indecidível) por Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da costa 160P (2012) (revisão revisada 2019).............................................168 13 Wolpert, Chaitin e Wittgenstein em impossibilidade, incompletude, o paradoxo do mentiroso, o teísmo, os limites da computação, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e o universo como computador - o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing... 183 14 Revisão de ' Os Limites Exteriores da Razão ' (The Outer Limits of Reason)por Noson Yanofsky 403p (2013) (revisão revisada 2019)..................................................................................................... .....188 A ILUSÃO RELIGIOSA – UM UNIVERSO BENEVOLENTE NOS SALVARÁ 15 Revisão da Religião Explicada (Religion Explained)--as origens evolucionárias do pensamento religioso por Pascal Boyer (2002) (revisão revisada 2019)..........................................................................204 16 Revisão de 'Sex, Ecology, Spirituality' (Sexo, Ecologia, Espiritualidade) por Ken Wilber 2a Ed 851p (2001) (revisão revisada 2019)..................................................................................... ....................217 17 A mais profunda autobiografia espiritual de todos os tempos? -uma revisão de "o Joelho da Escuta" ("The Knee of Listening") por Adi da (Franklin Jones) (1995) (revisão revisada 2019).................................233 18 Nossos comportamentos inconscientes automatizados revelam nossos verdadeiros eus e verdades escondidas sobre o universo? -Uma revisão de David Hawkins ' 'Power vs Force' (Poder vs Força )-os determinantes ocultos do comportamento humano-oficial do autor edição autoritária ' 412p (2012) (edição original 1995)(revisão revisada 2019)....................................................................................................... 237 A ILUSÃO DE UMA GRANDE FAMÍLIA FELIZ-DEMOCRACIA, DIVERSIDADE E IGUALDADE VAI NOS SALVAR 19 A supressão transitória dos piores demônios da nossa natureza - uma revisão de Steven Pinker ' os melhores anjos da nossa natureza: por que a violência declinou ' ('The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined') (2012)(revisão revisada 2019)......................242 20 As mãos mortas da seleção de grupo e fenomenologia uma revisão de Individualidade e Entrelaçamento (Individuality and Entanglement) por Herbert Gintis 357p (2017) revisão revisada 2019).......................247 21 Altruísmo, Jesus e o fim do mundo - como a Fundação Templeton comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização. Uma revisão de E.O. Wilson ' A Conquista Social da Terra ' (The Social Conquest of Earth) (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012) (revisão revisada 2019)..............................259 22 Uma revisão 'Do Assassino Proxima Porta' (The Murderer Next Door) por David Buss (2005)(revisão revisada 2019)...................................--272 23 Suicídio pela democracia-um obituário para a América e o mundo(2019)---..........................................................................................283 24 Como os sete sociopatas que governam China estão ganhando a guerra de mundo três e três maneiras de pará-los . ...... ............................................332 I Prefácio Esta coleção de artigos foi escrita ao longo dos últimos 10 anos e revisado para trazêlos até à data (2020). Todos os artigos são sobre o comportamento humano (como são todos os artigos por qualquer um sobre qualquer coisa), e assim sobre as limitações de ter um ascendência recente do macaco (8 milhões anos ou muito menos dependendo do ponto de vista) e manifestam palavras e ações dentro da estrutura de nosso Psicologia inata como apresentado na tabela de intencionalidade. Como o famoso evolucionista Richard Leakey diz, é fundamental ter em mente que não evoluímos dos macacos, mas que em todos os sentidos importantes, somos macacos. Se todos foram dados uma compreensão real deste (isto é, da ecologia e da psicologia humanas para dar-lhes realmente algum controle sobre se), talvez a civilização teria uma possibilidade. Como as coisas são, no entanto, os líderes da sociedade não têm mais compreensão das coisas do que seus eleitores e assim colapso em anarquia é inevitável. O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma introspecção em como nós nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de delírios teóricos. Nos próximos três grupos, comentei sobre três das principais delírios que impedem uma world sustentável - tecnologia, religião e política (grupos cooperativos). Pessoas brincadeira que a sociedade pode ser salvo por eles, então eu fornecer algumas sugestões no resto do livro sobre por que isso é improvável através de artigos curtos e revisões de livros recentes por escritores bem conhecidos. É crítico compreender porque nós nos comportamos como nós fazemos e assim que a primeira seção apresenta os artigos que tentam descrever (não explique como Wittgenstein insistiu) o comportamento. Começo com uma breve revisão da estrutura lógica da racionalidade, que fornece algumas heurísticas para a descrição da linguagem (mente, racionalidade, personalidade) e dá algumas sugestões sobre como isso se relaciona com a evolução do comportamento social. Isto centra-se em torno dos dois escritores que eu encontrei o mais importante a este respeito, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, cujas idéias eu combino e estenda dentro do sistema duplo (dois sistemas do pensamento) a estrutura que provou tão útil no pensamento recente e pesquisa de raciocínio. Ao notar, há, na minha opinião, uma sobreposição essencialmente completa entre a filosofia, no sentido estrito das questões duradouras que dizem respeito à disciplina acadêmica, e a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (comportamento). Uma vez que se agarrou a introspecção de Wittgenstein que há somente a edição de como o jogo da língua deve ser jogado, um determina as condições de satisfação (o que faz uma indicação verdadeira ou satisfeita etc.) e aquele é o fim da discussão. Sem neurofisiologia, sem metafísica, sem pósmodernismo, sem teologia. Desde que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein o põr, devido à falta do perspicacia da língua, correm durante todo o discurso e comportamento humanos, assim que há uma necessidade infinita para a II análise filosófica, não somente no ' humano Ciências da filosofia, da sociologia, da antropologia, da ciência política, da psicologia, da história, da literatura, da religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, da matemática e da biologia. É universal misturar as perguntas do jogo da língua com os científicos reais a respeito de o que os fatos empíricos são. O cientificismo está sempre presente e o mestre o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, ou seja, Wittgenstein (doravante W) começando com os livros azul e marrom no início dos anos 1930. "Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder perguntas na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. " (BBB P18) A chave para tudo sobre nós é a biologia, e é alheio a ela que leva milhões de pessoas educadas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, o partido democrata e o Papa para defendem ideais suicidas que inexoravelmente levam direto para Inferno na terra. Como W observou, é o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos que é o mais difícil de ver. Nós vivemos no mundo do sistema lingüístico deliberativo consciente 2, mas é inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que governa. Esta é a fonte da cegueira universal descrita por Searle ' s The Phenomenological Illusion (O Ilusão Fenomenológica) (TPI), Pinker's Blank Slate (lousa em branco) e Tooby e Cosmides ' Standard Social Science Model (Modelo Padrão de Ciências Sociais). O astuto pode se perguntar por que não podemos ver o sistema 1 no trabalho, mas é claramente contraproducente para um animal estar pensando ou em segundo adivinhar cada ação, e em qualquer caso, não há tempo para o lento, massivamente integrado sistema 2 para ser envolvido em o fluxo constante de segunda divisão "decisões" que devemos fazer. Como observou W, nossos "pensamentos" (T1 ou "pensamentos" do sistema 1) devem levar diretamente a ações. É minha afirmação que a tabela de intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade, etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como uma heurística para, como pensamos e se comportam, e por isso não abrange meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política, etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) visualizá-lo, inclui tanto consciente sistema deliberativo 2 e inconsciente automatizado sistema 1 ações ou reflexos. Assim, todos os artigos, como todo o comportamento, estão intimamente ligados se alguém souber como olhar para eles. Como eu notar, a ilusão fenomenológica (esquecimento para o nosso sistema automatizado 1) é universal e se estende não apenas em toda a filosofia, mas ao longo da vida. Estou certo de que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg e do Papa seria incrédulo se disse que eles sofrem com o mesmo problema III como Hegel, Husserl e Heidegger, (ou que eles diferem apenas em grau de toxicodependentes e de sexo em ser motivado pela estimulação de seus córtices frontais pela entrega de dopamina (e mais 100 outros produtos químicos) através do tegmentum ventral e do núcleo accumbens), mas é claramente verdade. Enquanto os fenomenologistas só desperdiçavam um monte de tempo das pessoas, eles estão desperdiçando a terra e o futuro de seus descendentes. A próxima seção descreve os delírios digitais, que confunde os jogos de linguagem do sistema 2 com as automatismos do sistema um, e assim não pode distinguir máquinas biológicas (ou seja, pessoas) de outros tipos de máquinas (ou seja, computadores). A reivindicação ' reducionista ' é que se pode ' explicar ' o comportamento em um nível ' inferior ', mas o que realmente acontece é que não se explica o comportamento humano, mas um ' stand in ' para ele. Daí o título da revisão clássica de Searle do livro de Dennett ("consciência explicada") - "consciência explicada afastado". Na maioria dos contextos ' redução ' do comportamento emergente de nível superior para funções cerebrais, bioquímica, ou física é incoerente. Mesmo para "redução" de química ou física, o caminho é bloqueado pelo caos e incerteza. Qualquer coisa pode ser "representada" por equações, mas quando eles ' representam ' comportamento de ordem superior, não é claro (e não pode ser claro) o que significa "resultados". A metafísica reducionista é uma piada, mas a maioria dos cientistas e filósofos não têm o senso de humor apropriado. Outros delírios digitais são que seremos salvos do puro mal (egoísmo) do sistema 1 por computadores/AI/robótica/nanotecnologia/engenharia genética criado pelo sistema 2. O diretor No Free Lunch (sem almoço gratis) nos diz que haverá conseqüências sérias e possivelmente fatais. Os aventureiros podem considerar este princípio como uma expressão emergente de ordem superior da segunda lei da termodinâmica. Os entusiastas da alta tecnologia subestimam enormemente os problemas resultantes da maternidade e disgenics desenfreados, e naturalmente não é nem rentável nem politicamente correto (e agora com branco do terceiro mundo dominante, não mesmo possível) para ser honesto sobre isso. Eles também encobrir o fato de que IAestá atingindo o ponto onde será impossível para nós entender como ele funciona ou para controlá-lo ou corrigi-lo e para evitar falhas catastróficas em comunicações, poder, polícia, militar, agrícola, médico e sistemas financeiros. A última seção descreve a ilusão de uma grande família feliz, ou seja, que somos selecionados para a cooperação com todos, e que os ideais eufonioso da democracia, da diversidade e da igualdade nos conduzirão à utopia, se apenas gerenciarmos as coisas corretamente (a possibilidade da política). Mais uma vez, o princípio sem almoço livre deve avisar-nos que não pode ser verdade, e vemos ao longo da história e em todo o mundo contemporâneo, que sem controles rigorosos, egoísmo e estupidez ganhar a vantagem e logo destruir qualquer nação que abraça estes delírios. Além disso, a mente do macaco com descontos no futuro, e por isso cooperamos na venda do património do nosso descendente para confortos temporários, agravando grandemente os problemas. A única grande mudança nesta 3a edição é a adição no IV último artigo de uma breve discussão sobre a China, uma ameaça à paz e à liberdade tão grande quanto a superpopulação e as mudanças climáticas e uma a que até mesmo a maioria dos estudiosos profissionais e políticos são alheio então eu considerei isso como suficientemente importante para justificar uma nova edição. Eu descrevo versões deste delírio (isto é, que nós somos basicamente "amigáveis" se apenas dado uma possibilidade) como aparece em alguns livros recentes na sociologia/biologia/economia. Mesmo Sapolsky de outra forma excelente "Behave" (2017) abraça a política de esquerda e seleção de grupo e dá espaço para uma discussão sobre se os seres humanos são inatamente violento. Termino com um ensaio sobre a grande tragédia que se joga na América e no mundo, que pode ser visto como um resultado direto de nossa psicologia evoluída manifestada como as maquinações inexoráveis do sistema 1. Nossa psicologia, eminentemente adaptativa e eugênica nas planícies da África de cerca de 6 milhões anos atrás, quando nos separamos de chimpanzés, para ca. 50.000 anos atrás, quando muitos dos nossos antepassados deixaram a África (ou seja, no EEE ou ambiente de adaptação evolutiva), é agora má adaptativa e disgênica e a fonte de nossas ilusões utópicas suicidas. Assim, como todas as discussões de comportamento (filosofia, psicologia, Sociologia, biologia, antropologia, política, direito, literatura, história, economia, estratégias de futebol, reuniões de negócios, etc.), este livro é sobre estratégias evolutivas, genes egoístas e aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes, seleção natural). Uma coisa raramente mencionada pelos nacional do grupo é o fato de que, mesmo foram ' Seleção de grupo ' possível, o egoísmo é pelo menos tão provável (provavelmente muito mais provável na maioria dos contextos) para ser grupo selecionado para como altruísmo. Basta tentar encontrar exemplos de verdadeiro altruísmo na natureza-o fato de que não podemos (o que sabemos não é possível se entendemos a evolução) nos diz que a sua presença aparente em seres humanos é um artefacto da vida moderna, ocultando os fatos, e que não pode mais ser selecionado para do que a tendência ao suicídio (que na verdade é). Um pôde igualmente beneficiar-se de considerar um fenômeno nunca (em minha experiência) mencionado por 'groupies'--cancer. Nenhum grupo tem tanto em comum quanto as (originalmente) células geneticamente idênticas em nossos próprios corpos-um clone de célula de 50 trilhões--mas todos nós nascemos com milhares e talvez milhões de células que já tomaram o primeiro passo no caminho para o câncer, e gerar milhões a bilhões de células cancerosas em nossa vida. Se não morrermos de outras coisas primeiro, nós (e talvez todos os organismos multicelulares) morreremos de câncer. Apenas um mecanismo massivo e enormemente complexo construído em nosso genoma que reprisa ou desfaz trilhões de genes em trilhões de células, e mata e cria bilhões de células por segundo, mantém a maioria de nós vivas o tempo suficiente para se reproduzir. Pode-se levar isso a implicar que uma sociedade justa, democrática e duradoura para qualquer tipo de entidade em qualquer planeta em qualquer universo é apenas um sonho, e que nenhum ser ou poder poderia fazê-lo de outra forma. Não é apenas "as leis" da física que são universais e inevitáveis, ou talvez devêssemos dizer que a aptidão inclusiva é uma lei da física. V O grande místico Osho disse que a separação de Deus e do céu da terra e da humanidade foi a idéia mais maligna que já entrou na mente humana. No século 20 surgiu uma noção ainda mais maligna, ou pelo menos tornou-se popular com esquerdas-que os seres humanos nascem com direitos, ao invés de ter que ganhar privilégios. A idéia dos direitos humanos é uma fantasia maligna criada por esquerdas para chamar a atenção da destruição impiedoso da terra por desamarrados maternidade terceiro mundial. Assim, todos os dias a população aumenta em 200.000, que deve ser fornecido com recursos para crescer e espaço para viver, e que logo produzem outro 200.000 etc. E quase nunca se ouve notar que o que eles recebem deve ser tirado daqueles já vivos, e seus descendentes. Suas vidas diminuem aqueles já aqui em ambos os principais óbvios e incontáveis maneiras sutis. Cada bebê novo destrói a terra do momento da concepção. Em um mundo horrivelmente superlotado com recursos desaparecendo, não podem ser direitos humanos sem destruindo a terra e nossos futuros descendentes. Não poderia ser mais óbvio, mas raramente é mencionado de forma clara e direta, e nunca se verá as ruas cheias de manifestantes contra a maternidade. Os fatos mais básicos, quase nunca mencionados, são que não há recursos suficientes na América ou no mundo para levantar uma percentagem significativa dos pobres fora da pobreza e mantê-los lá. A tentativa de fazer isso já está falido na América e destruindo o mundo. A capacidade da terra para produzir alimentos diminui diariamente, assim como a nossa qualidade genética. E agora, como sempre, de longe o maior inimigo dos pobres é outros pobres e não os ricos. América e do mundo estão em processo de colapso do crescimento populacional excessivo, a maior parte para o século passado, e agora tudo isso, devido ao mundo 3 pessoas. O consumo de recursos e a adição de 4.000.000.000 mais ca. 2100 entrará em colapso da civilização industrial e trará a fome, a doença, a violência e a guerra numa escala espantosa. A terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo superficial cada ano, de modo que se aproxima 2100, a maioria de sua capacidade crescente do alimento será ido. Bilhões morrerão e a guerra nuclear é tudo, mas certo. Na América, isso está sendo enormemente acelerado pela imigração maciça e reprodução de imigrantes, combinada com abusos tornados possíveis pela democracia. A natureza humana depravada transforma inexoravelmente o sonho da democracia e da diversidade num pesadelo de criminalidade e de pobreza. A China continuará a dominar a América e o mundo, desde que mantenha a ditadura que limita o egoísmo e permite o planeamento a longo prazo. A causa raiz do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata para se adaptar ao mundo moderno, o que leva as pessoas a tratar pessoas não relacionadas como se tivessem interesses comuns (que eu sugiro que pode ser considerado como um não reconhecido-mas o mais comum e mais grave-problema psicológico--transtorno de aptidão inclusiva). Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva ao desilusões de engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Poucos entendem que se você ajudar uma pessoa que você prejudicar alguém-não há almoço livre e cada item que alguém consome destrói a terra além do reparo. Conseqüentemente, as VI políticas sociais em todos os lugares são insustentáveis e uma por uma todas as sociedades sem controles rigorosos sobre o egoísmo entrará em colapso em anarquia ou ditadura. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há nenhuma esperança para impedir o colapso de América, ou todo o país que segue um sistema democrático, especial agora que os Supremacistas do Terceiro Mundo Neomarxistas estão tomando o controle dos EUA e do outro ocidental Democracias, e ajudar os sete sociopatas que correm a China para ter sucesso em seu plano para eliminar a paz e a liberdade em todo o mundo. Daí o meu ensaio conclusivo "suicídio pela democracia". Eu tinha esperança de soldar meus comentários em um todo unificado, mas eu vim a perceber, como os pesquisadores Wittgenstein e AI fez, que a mente (aproximadamente o mesmo que a linguagem como Wittgenstein mostrou-nos) é um groupo de peças díspares evoluiu para muitos contextos, e não há tal todo o teoria r, exceto aptidão inclusiva, ou seja, evolução por seleção natural. As diferenças principais das edições precedentes são a recolocação do artigo longo no comportamento e na língua (agora um livro-A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019)) com um sumário de 8 páginas, e um aviso novo do artigo da ameaça representada pelos Sete Assassinos em Série Senis Sociopatas que governam a China. Eu também comentar vários lugares sobre a ameaça ainda maior representada pela estupidez artificial (comumente denominado inteligência artificial) não só para a paz ea liberdade, mas a nossa própria sobrevivência. Finalmente, como com meus outros escritos 3Dtv e 3D Filme Tecnologiaartigos selecionados 1996-2018 2a edição (2018), Drogas Psicoativas-quatro textos clássicos (1976-1982) (2016), Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras, e em todas as minhas cartas e e-mail e conversas por mais de 50 anos, eu sempre usei ' eles ' ou ' eles ' em vez de ' seu ', ' ela/ele ', ou o sexismo reverso idiótico de ' ela ' ou ' ela ', sendo talvez o único nesta parte da galáxia para fazê-lo. O uso servil destes vocábulos flagrantes universalmente aplicados é naturalmente conectado intimamente com os defeitos em nossa psicologia que geram a filosofia académico, a forma moderna da democracia, e o colapso da civilização industrial, e deixo a descrição adicional dessas conexões como um exercício para o leitor. Estou ciente de muitas imperfeições e limitações do meu trabalho e revê-lo continuamente, mas eu tomei a filosofia de 13 anos atrás, em 65, por isso é milagrosa, e um depoimento eloqüente para o poder do sistema 1 automatismos, que eu tenho sido capaz de fazer qualquer coisa no Al. Foi treze anos de luta incessante e espero que os leitores encontrá-lo de algum uso. vyupzz@gmail. com VII A DESCRIÇÃO DO COMPORTAMENTO SEM DELÍRIO 2 A estrutura lógica da consciência (comportamento, personalidade, racionalidade, pensamento de ordem superior, intencionalidade) Michael Starks Abstrata Depois de meio século no esquecimento, a natureza da consciência é agora o tema mais quente nas ciências comportamentais e filosofia. Começando com o trabalho pioneiro de Ludwig Wittgenstein na década de 1930 (os livros azul e marrom) e dos anos 50 para o presente por seu sucessor lógico John Searle, eu criei a seguinte tabela como uma heurística para promover este estudo. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a estrutura lógica de racionalidade (LSR-Searle), de comportamento (LSB), de personalidade (LSP), de realidade (LSOR), de intencionalidade (LSI)-o termo filosófico clássico, a psicologia descritiva da consciência (DPC), a psicologia descritiva do pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, o Linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. Cerca de um milhão de anos atrás, os primatas evoluíram a capacidade de usar seus músculos da garganta para fazer séries complexas de ruídos (ou seja, fala) que por cerca de 100.000 anos atrás tinha evoluído para descrever eventos presentes (percepções, memória, ações reflexivas com enunciados básicos que podem ser descritos como jogos de linguagem primária (PLG ' s) descrevendo o sistema 1 - ou seja, o sistema automatizado rápido e inconsciente, Estados mentais de true-only (verdade so) com um tempo e localização precisos). Desenvolvemos gradualmente a maior capacidade de abranger deslocamentos no espaço e no tempo para descrever memórias, atitudes e eventos potenciais (o passado e o futuro e, muitas vezes, preferências contrafactuais, condicionais ou ficcionais, inclinações ou disposições) com os jogos secundários da língua (SLG) do sistema dois-pensamento atitudinais 3 proposicional verdadeiro ou falso consciente lento, que não tem nenhum tempo exato e são habilidades e não estados mentais). Preferências são intuições, tendências, regras ontológicas automáticas, comportamentos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, traços de personalidade, modelos, motores de inferência, inclinações, emoções, atitudes proposicional, avaliações, capacidades, hipóteses. As emoções são preferências do tipo 2 (W RPP2 p148). "Eu acredito", "ele ama", "eles pensam" são descrições de possíveis atos públicos tipicamente discolocados no espaço-tempo. Minhas declarações em primeira pessoa sobre mim são verdadeiras-apenas (excluindo mentir), enquanto declarações de terceira pessoa sobre os outros são verdadeiras ou falsas (ver a minha opinião de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior '). As "Preferências" como uma classe de Estados intencionais--oposto às percepções, aos atos reflexivos e às memórias--foram descritas primeiramente claramente por Wittgenstein (W) nos 1930 ' s e denominados "inclinações" ou "Dispositions". Eles têm sido comumente denominado "atitudes proposicional" desde Russell, mas esta é uma frase enganosa Since acreditando, pretendendo, sabendo, lembrando, etc, muitas vezes não são proposições nem atitudes, como tem sido demonstrado, por exemplo, por W e por Searle (por exemplo, Consciência e linguagem P118). Eles são intrínsecos, representações mentais independentes do observador (em oposição a apresentações ou representações do sistema 1 ao sistema 2 – Searle-C + L p53). Eles são potenciais atos deslocados no tempo ou no espaço, enquanto o evolucionariamente mais primitivo sistema um estados mentais de percepções memórias e ações reflexivas estão sempre aqui e agora. Esta é uma maneira de caracterizar o sistema 2 e o sistema 3--o segundo e terceiro avanços principais na psicologia de vertebrados após o sistema 1 - a capacidade de representar eventos e de pensar neles como ocorrendo em um outro lugar ou tempo (a terceira faculdade de Searle de contraffactual imaginação completando a cognição e volicion). S1 são estados mentais potenciais ou inconscientes (Searle--Phil Issues 1:45-66 (1991). Percepções, memórias e ações reflexivas (automáticas) podem ser descritas como S1 ou LG primária (PLG ' s--por exemplo, eu vejo o cão) e há, no caso normal, nenhum teste possível, para que eles possam ser verdadeiros-apenas. Disposições podem ser descritas como secundárias LG (SLG-por exemplo, eu acredito que eu vejo o cão) e também deve ser agido para fora, mesmo para mim no meu próprio caso (ou seja, como eu sei o que eu acredito, acho, sentir até que eu agir). Disposições também se tornam ações quando falado ou escrito, bem como sendo agido de outras maneiras, e essas idéias são todos devido a Wittgenstein (meados de 1930) e não são behaviorism (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto, Read, hacker etc.,). Wittgenstein pode ser considerado como o fundador da psicologia evolutiva, contextualismo, enativismo, e os dois sistemas de estrutura, e seu trabalho uma investigação única sobre o funcionamento do nosso sistema axiomático 1 psicologia e sua interação com o sistema 2. Embora poucos entenderam bem (e sem dúvida ninguém totalmente a este dia) foi desenvolvido por alguns-acima de tudo por John Searle, que fez uma versão mais simples da tabela abaixo em seu livro clássico racionalidade em ação (2001). Ele se expande na pesquisa de W da estrutura axiomática da psicologia evolutiva desenvolvida a partir de seus primeiros comentários em 1911 e tão lindamente 4 dispostos em seu último trabalho sobre certeza (OC) (escrito em 1950-51). OC é a pedra fundamental do comportamento ou epistemologia e ontologia (indiscutivelmente o mesmo), linguística cognitiva ou a estrutura lógica do pensamento de ordem superior (HOT), e na minha opinião o único trabalho mais importante na filosofia (psicologia descritiva), e, portanto, em o estudo do comportamento. Veja meu artigo a estrutura lógica da filosofia, da psicologia, da mente e da linguagem como revelado em Wittgenstein e Searle (2016) e o recente trabalho de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock. Percepção, memória, ações reflexivas e emoção são primitivos parcialmente subcorticais involuntários estados mentais, descritos em PLG ' s, em que a mente se encaixa automaticamente no mundo (é causally auto referential--Searle)-o inquestionável, true-only (verdade so), base axiomática da racionalidade sobre a qual não é possível controlar). As emoções evoluíram para fazer uma ponte entre desejos ou intenções e ações. Preferências, desejos e intenções são descrições de pensamento lento consciente habilidades voluntárias-descrito em SLG ' sem que a mente tenta caber o mundo. O behaviorismo e todas as outras confusões da nossa psicologia descritiva padrão (filosofia) surgem porque não podemos ver S1 trabalhando e descrever todas as ações como SLG ' s (a ilusão fenomenológica ou TPI de Searle). W entendeu isso e descreveuo com clareza inigualável com centenas de exemplos de linguagem (a mente) em ação ao longo de suas obras. Razão tem acesso à memória de trabalho e por isso usamos conscientemente aparente, mas tipicamente incorreto razões para explicar o comportamento (os dois eus da pesquisa atual). Crenças e outras disposições são pensamentos que tentam corresponder aos fatos do mundo (mente à direção mundial do ajuste), enquanto vontades são intenções de agir (intenções anteriores-PI, ou intenções em ação-IAA-Searle) mais atos que tentam corresponder ao mundo para o pensamentos - sentido do mundo à mente do ajuste - cf. Searle por exemplo, C + L p145, p190). Agora que temos um início razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana. Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e vontade, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc. são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente 5 sensitivo e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). De acordo com o trabalho de W e a terminologia de Searle, categorizo as representações de S2 como condições públicas de satisfação (COS) e, nesse sentido, S1 como percepções não têm COS. Em outros escritos S diz que fazem, mas como observado em meus outros comentários eu acho que é, então, essencial para se referir a COS1 (apresentações privadas) e COS2 (representações públicas). Para repetir esta distinção crítica, condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidas por Searle e outros como cos, representações, criadores de verdade ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designado como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). Da mesma forma, eu mudei o seu ' Direction of Fit ' para ' causa origina de ' e sua ' direção de causação ' para ' causas mudanças em '. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Muitos gráficos complexos foram publicados por cientistas, mas eu encontrá-los de utilidade mínima quando se pensa sobre o comportamento (em oposição a pensar sobre a função cerebral). Cada nível de descrição pode ser útil em determinados contextos, mas acho que ser mais grosseira ou mais finos limites utilidade. A INTENCIONALIDADE pode ser vista como personalidade ou como a construção da realidade social (o título do livro bem conhecido de Searle) e de muitos outros pontos de vista também. Começando com o trabalho pioneiro de Ludwig Wittgenstein na década de 1930 (os livros azul e marrom) e dos anos 50 para o presente por seus sucessores Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Baker, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., eu criei o seguinte tabela como uma heurística para aprofundar este estudo. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a estrutura lógica de racionalidade (LSR), de comportamento (LSB), de personalidade (LSP), de Mind (LSM), de linguagem (LSL), de realidade (LSOR), de intencionalidade (LSI)-o termo filosófico clássico, a psicologia descritiva da consciência (DPC), a psicologia descritiva da Pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, a linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. 6 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 7 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então Eu dou explicações detalhadas sobre esta tabela em meus outros escritos. Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar 8 os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste" e " mundo a mente direção do ajuste " por " causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo " S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. É fundamental notar que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. 9 Revisão de 'Tornar o Mundo Social' (Making the Social World) por John Searle (2010) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Antes de comentar detalhadamente sobre making o mundo social (MSW) vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), desde que eu sinto que esta é a melhor maneira de colocar Searle ou qualquer comentarista sobre o comportamento, na perspectiva adequada. Ele vai ajudar muito para ver os meus comentários de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e outros livros por esses dois gênios da psicologia descritiva. S não faz nenhuma referência à afirmação presciente de W da mente como o mecanismo em TLP, e sua destruição dele em seu trabalho mais atrasado. Desde W, S tornou-se o principal desestruturador dessas visões mecânicas do comportamento, e o psicólogo descritivo mais importante (filósofo), mas não percebe o quão completamente W o antecipou, nem, em geral, fazer outros (mas ver os muitos papéis e livros de Proudfoot e Copeland em W, Turing e AI). S trabalho é muito mais fácil de seguir do que W, e embora haja algum jargão, é principalmente espetacularmente claro se você abordá-lo a partir da direção certa. Veja meus comentários de W S e outros livros para mais detalhes. Globalmente, MSW é um bom resumo dos muitos avanços substanciais sobre Wittgenstein resultante do meio século S de trabalho, mas na minha opinião, W ainda é inigualável para a psicologia básica, uma vez que você entender o que ele está dizendo (ver meus comentários). Idealmente, devem ser lidos junto: Searle para a prosa coerente desobstruída e generalizações na operação de S2/S3, ilustrado com os exemplos perspicazes de W da operação de S1/S2, e seus aforisms brilhantes. Se eu fosse muito mais jovem, escreveria um livro fazendo exatamente isso. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. "Mas eu não começ minha imagem do mundo satisfazendo-me de sua exatidão: nem 10 eu tenho-a porque eu sou satisfeito de sua exatidão. Não: é o fundo herdado contra o qual eu distinguir entre verdadeiro e falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." Wittgenstein "o livro azul" P6 (1933) "Absurdo, absurdo, porque você está fazendo suposições em vez de simplesmente descrever. Se sua cabeça é assombrada por explicações aqui, você está negligenciando a lembrar-se dos fatos mais importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós e nem explica nem Deduz nada... Pode-se dar o nome de ' filosofia ' ao que é possível antes de todas as novas descobertas e invenções. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "O que estamos fornecendo são realmente observações sobre a história natural do homem, não curiosidades; no entanto, mas sim observações sobre os factos que ninguém duvidou e que só foram despercebido porque eles estão sempre diante de nossos olhos. Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "O objetivo da filosofia é erguer uma parede no ponto onde a linguagem pára de qualquer maneira." Ocasiões filosóficas de Wittgenstein P187 "O maior perigo aqui é querer observar a si mesmo." LWPP1, 459 "O limite da língua é mostrado por seu ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponda a (é a tradução de) uma sentença sem simplesmente repetir a sentença (isto tem que fazer com a solução de Kantian ao problema da filosofia)." Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "Mas você não pode explicar um sistema físico, como uma máquina de escrever ou um cérebro, identificando um padrão que compartilha com sua simulação computacional, porque a existência do padrão não explica como o sistema realmente funciona como um sistema físico. ... Em suma, o fato de que a atribuição de sintaxe não identifica mais poderes causais é fatal para a alegação de que os programas fornecem explicações causais de cognição... Há apenas um mecanismo físico, o cérebro, com seus vários níveis reais de descrição física e física/mental. " Filosofia Searle em um novo século (PNC) P101-103 "Pode haver razões para a ação que são vinculativas para um agente racional apenas em virtude da natureza do fato relatado na declaração de razão, e independentemente dos desejos do agente, valores, atitudes e avaliações? ... O verdadeiro paradoxo da discussão tradicional é que ele tenta colocar a guilhotina de Hume, a distinção rígida de valor de fato, em um vocabulário, cujo uso já pressupõe a falsidade da distinção. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas as funções de status e, portanto, toda a realidade institucional, com exceção 11 da linguagem, são criados por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de declarações... as formas da função de status em questão são quase invariavelmente questões de poderes deônticos... reconhecer algo como um direito, dever, obrigação, exigência e assim por diante é reconhecer uma razão para a ação... essas estruturas deônticas fazem possíveis razões de desejo independente para a ação... O ponto geral é muito claro: a criação do campo geral de motivos de ação com base no desejo pressupõe a aceitação de um sistema de razões independentes de desejo de ação. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algumas das características lógicas mais importantes da intencionalidade estão além do alcance da fenomenologia porque não têm realidade fenomenológica imediata... Porque a criação de significado fora da falta de sentido não é conscientemente experimentado... Não existe... Isto é... a ilusão fenomenológica. " Searle PNC p115-117 "A consciência é causalmente redutível aos processos cerebrais... e a consciência não tem poderes causais próprios, além dos poderes causais da neurobiologia subjacente... Mas a redutibilidade causal não leva à redutibilidade ontológica... consciência só existe como experiente... e, portanto, não pode ser reduzida a algo que tem uma ontologia de terceira pessoa, algo que existe independentemente de experiências. " Searle PNC 155-6 "... a relação intencional básica entre a mente e o mundo tem a ver com as condições de satisfação. E uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode estar em uma relação intencional com o mundo, e uma vez que essas relações intencionais sempre determinam condições de satisfação, e uma proposição é definida como qualquer coisa suficiente para determinar as condições de satisfações, verifica-se que toda a intencionalidade é uma questão de proposições. Searle PNC p193 "Assim, as funções de status são a cola que mantêm a sociedade unida. Eles são criados por intencionalidade coletiva e eles funcionam carregando poderes deônticos... Com a importante exceção da linguagem em si, toda a realidade institucional e, em um sentido, toda a civilização humana é criada por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de declarações... toda a realidade institucional humana é criada e mantida na existência (representações que têm a mesma forma lógica como) declarações de função de status, incluindo os casos que não são atos de fala na forma explícita de declarações. " Searle MSW P11-13 "Crenças, como declarações, têm a direção para baixo ou mente (ou palavra) para o mundo de ajuste. E desejos e intenções, como ordens e promessas, têm o sentido ascendente ou do mundo-à-mente (ou palavra) do ajuste. Crenças ou percepções, como declarações, são supostamente para representar como as coisas estão no mundo, e nesse sentido, eles são supostamente para caber no mundo, eles têm a direção da mente para o mundo de ajuste. Os Estados conative-volitional tais como desejos, intenções anteriores e intenções-em-ação, como ordens e promessas, têm o sentido do mundo-à-mente do ajuste. 12 Eles não são supostamente para representar como as coisas são, mas como gostaríamos que eles sejam ou como pretendemos fazê-los ser... Além destas duas faculdades, há um terço, imaginação, em que o conteúdo proposicional não é suposto caber realidade na maneira que o conteúdo proposicional de cognição e vontade são supostamente para caber... o compromisso de relacionar o mundo é abandonado e temos um conteúdo proposicional sem qualquer compromisso que represente com qualquer direção de ajuste. " Searle MSW P15 "Assim como nos Estados intencionais, podemos fazer uma distinção entre o tipo de estado... e o conteúdo do estado... assim, na teoria da linguagem, podemos fazer uma distinção entre o tipo de ato de fala é... e o conteúdo proposicional... Nós temos o mesmo conteúdo proposicional com modo psicológico diferente no caso dos Estados intencionais, e força Illocutionary diferente ou tipo no caso dos atos de fala. Além disso, assim como as minhas crenças podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas e, portanto, têm a direção da mente para o mundo de ajuste, então minhas declarações podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas e, portanto, ter a direção de palavra-para-mundo de ajuste. E assim como meus desejos ou intenções não podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas, mas podem ser de várias maneiras satisfeitas ou insatisfeitas, então minhas ordens e promessas não podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas, mas podem ser de várias maneiras satisfeitas ou insatisfeitas-podemos pensar em todos os Estados intencionais que têm um whol e o conteúdo proposicional e uma direção de adequação como representações de suas condições de satisfação. Uma crença representa suas condições de verdade, um desejo representa suas condições de cumprimento, uma intenção representa suas condições de execução... O estado intencional representa suas condições de satisfação... as pessoas erroneamente supor que cada representação mental deve ser conscientemente pensado... Mas a noção de uma representação como eu estou usando é uma noção funcional e não ontológica. Tudo o que tem condições de satisfação, que pode suceder ou falhar de uma forma que é característico da intencionalidade, é, por definição, uma representação de suas condições de satisfação... Podemos analisar a estrutura da intencionalidade dos fenômenos sociais analisando suas condições de satisfação. " Searle MSW P28-32 "Os quatro primeiros tipos de atos de fala têm análogos exatos em estados intencionais: correspondendo a assertivas são crenças, correspondendo a diretivas são desejos, correspondendo a commissives são intenções e correspondendo a expressivas é toda a gama de emoções e outros Estados intencionais onde o ajuste de Presup é tomado para concedido. Mas não há nenhum análogo pré-linguístico para as declarações. Os Estados intencionais pré-linguísticos não podem criar fatos no mundo representando esses fatos como já existentes. Esta façanha notável requer uma linguagem "MSW P69 "Orador significado... é a imposição de condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação. A capacidade de fazer isso é um elemento crucial das capacidades cognitivas humanas. Requer a capacidade de pensar em dois níveis de uma só vez, de uma forma que é essencial para o uso da linguagem. Em um nível, o orador intencionalmente produz uma expressão física, mas em outro nível o enunciado 13 representa algo. E a mesma dualidade infecta o próprio símbolo. Em um nível, é um objeto físico como qualquer outro. Em outro nível, tem um significado: representa um tipo de estado de coisas "MSW P74 "... uma vez que você tem a língua, é inevitável que você terá deontologia porque não há nenhuma maneira você pode fazer atos explícitos da fala executados de acordo com as convenções de uma língua sem criar compromissos. Isso é verdade não apenas para declarações, mas para todos atos de fala "MSW P82 Estas citações não são escolhidos aleatoriamente, mas (junto com os outros em meus comentários de livros por esses dois gênios) são um précis de comportamento de nossos dois maiores psicólogos descritivos. Antes de comentar detalhadamente sobre como fazer o mundo social (MSW) vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), desde que eu sentir que esta é a melhor maneira de colocar Searle ou qualquer comentarista sobre o comportamento, na perspectiva adequada. Ele vai ajudar muito para ver os meus comentários de PNC, TLP, PI, OC, TARW e outros livros por esses dois gênios da psicologia descritiva, para dizer que Searle tem realizado no trabalho W não é para dizer que é um resultado direto do estudo W , mas sim que, porque há apenas uma psicologia humana (pela mesma razão que há apenas uma Cardiologia humana), que alguém descrevendo com precisão o comportamento deve estar expressando alguma variante ou extensão do que W disse (como eles devem se ambos estão dando correta descrições de comportamento). Eu encontro a maioria de S prenunciado em W, incluindo versões do argumento chinês famoso da sala de encontro ao AI forte e às edições relacionadas que são os assuntos de caps 3-5. Aliás, se o quarto chinês lhe interessa, então você deve ler excelente Victor Rodych, mas praticamente desconhecido, suplemento sobre o CR-"Searle libertada de cada falha." S não faz nenhuma referência à afirmação presciente de W da mente como o mecanismo em TLP, e sua destruição dele em seu trabalho mais atrasado. Desde W, S tornou-se o principal desestruturador dessas visões mecânicas do comportamento, e o psicólogo descritivo mais importante (filósofo), mas não percebe o quão completamente W o antecipou, nem, em geral, fazer outros (mas Ver os muitos papéis e livros de Proudfoot e Copeland em W, Turing e AI). S trabalho é muito mais fácil de seguir do que W, e embora haja algum jargão, é principalmente espetacularmente claro se você abordá-lo a partir da direção certa. Veja meus comentários de W S e outros livros para mais detalhes. Wittgenstein é para mim facilmente o pensador mais brilhante sobre o comportamento humano. Seu trabalho como um todo mostra que todo o comportamento é uma extensão de axiomas Inatos do verdadeiro-somente e que nosso raciocínio consciente (sistema 2) (S2) emerge das maquinações inconsciente 14 (sistema 1) (S1) e é estendido logicamente na cultura (sistema 3 (S3). Ver "sobre a certeza" (OC) para o seu último tratamento prolongado desta idéia-e minha revisão do mesmo para a preparação. Seu corpus pode ser visto como a base para toda a descrição do comportamento animal, revelando como a mente funciona e realmente deve funcionar. O "must" é implicado pelo fato de que todos os cérebros compartilham uma ascendência comum e genes comuns e por isso há apenas uma maneira básica que eles trabalham, que isso necessariamente tem uma estrutura axiomática, que todos os animais mais elevados compartilham a mesma psicologia evoluiu com base em inclusiva aptidão, e que em humanos isto é estendido em uma personalidade (uma ilusão cognitiva ou fenomenológica) com base nas contrações musculares da garganta (linguagem) que evoluíram para manipular os outros (com variações que podem ser consideradas triviais). Discutìvel, todo o trabalho de W e de S é um desenvolvimento ou uma variação nestas idéias. Outro tema importante aqui, e, claro, em toda a discussão sobre o comportamento humano, é a necessidade de separar os automatismos geneticamente programados, que sustentam todo o comportamento, a partir dos efeitos da cultura. Embora poucos filósofos, psicólogos, antropólogos, sociólogos etc., explicitamente discutirem isso de uma forma abrangente, pode ser visto como o maior problema que eles estão lidando. Eu sugiro que vai provar do maior valor para considerar todo o estudo de comportamento de ordem superior como um esforço para provocar além de pensamento rápido e lento (por exemplo, percepções e outras automatismos vs. disposições-S1 e S2-Veja abaixo), mas as extensões lógicas de S2 em cultura (S3). O que W estabeleceu em seu período final (e ao longo de seu trabalho anterior de uma forma menos clara) são os fundamentos da psicologia evolutiva (EP), ou se você preferir, psicologia, linguística cognitiva, intencionalidade, pensamento de ordem superior ou apenas comportamento animal. Infelizmente, quase ninguém parece perceber que suas obras são um livro didático único de psicologia descritiva que é tão relevante agora como o dia em que foi escrito. Ele é quase universalmente ignorado pela psicologia e outras ciências comportamentais e Humanidades, e mesmo aqueles poucos que têm mais ou menos compreendido dele, não perceberam a extensão de sua antecipação dos últimos trabalhos sobre o EP e ilusões cognitivas (teoria da mente, enquadramento, os dois sistemas de pensamento rápido e lento, etc.,-ver abaixo). O trabalho de Searle como um todo fornece uma descrição impressionante do comportamento social da ordem mais elevada que é possível por causa da evolução recente dos genes para a psicologia mudança de caráter, quando o W mais atrasado mostrar como é baseado em axiomas inconscientes verdadeiros somente de S1 que evoluíram no pensamento proposicional mudança de caráter consciente de S2. Muito antes de Searle, W rejeitou a idéia de que o bottom up (de baixo para cima) abordagens de Fisiologia, psicologia experimental e computação (por exemplo, behaviorismo, funcionalismo, AI forte, teoria dos sistemas dinâmicos, teoria computacional da mente, etc.) poderia revelar o que seu top down (de cima para baixo) desconstruções de jogos da língua (LG) fêz. As principais dificuldades que ele observou são para entender o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos (agora 15 podemos ver isso como alheio ao sistema 1 (aproximadamente o que S chama de ' a ilusão fenomenológica ') e para capturar a imprecisao ("a maior dificuldade nestes investigações é encontrar uma maneira de representar a imprecisao "LWPP1, 347). Como com seus outros aforismos, eu sugiro que um deve levar a sério comentário W que, mesmo se Deus pudesse olhar em nossa mente, ele não conseguia ver o que estamos pensando-este deve ser o lema da mente incorporada e, como S torna claro, de psicologia cognitiva. Mas Deus podia ver o que estamos percebendo e lembrando e nosso pensamento reflexivo, uma vez que estas funções S1 são sempre estados mentais causais, enquanto as disposições S2 são apenas potencialmente CMS. Esta não é uma teoria, mas um fato sobre a nossa gramática e nossa fisiologia. S suja as águas aqui, porque ele se refere a disposições como estados mentais, bem como, mas como W fez há muito tempo, ele mostra que a linguagem da causalidade apenas não se aplica à ordem superior emergente S2 descrições - novamente não uma teoria, mas uma descrição sobre como a linguagem (pensamento) funciona. Isso traz um outro ponto que é proeminente em W, mas negado por S, que tudo o que podemos fazer é dar descrições e não uma teoria. S insiste que ele está fornecendo teorias, mas é claro "teoria" e "Descrição" são jogos de linguagem também e pareceme que a teoria de S é geralmente a descrição de W-uma rosa por qualquer outro nome.... W ponto era que, aderindo aos exemplos perspicazes que todos nós sabemos ser verdadeiros relatos de nosso comportamento, evitamos a areia movediça de teorias que tentam dar conta de todo o comportamento (todos os jogos de linguagem), enquanto S quer generalizar e inevitavelmente se desviam (ele dá vários exemplos de seus próprios erros na PNC). Como S e outros infinitamente modificar suas teorias para dar conta dos jogos de linguagem multifacetado eles ficam cada vez mais perto de descrever o comportamento por meio de inúmeros exemplos como fez W. Alguns dos temas favoritos de W em seu segundo e seus três períodos são os diferentes (mas Interdigitatina) LG de pensamento rápido e lento (sistema 1 e 2 ou aproximadamente jogos de linguagem primária (PLG ' s) e Secondary Language Games (SLG ' s) ( jogos de idioma secundário) do interior e do exterior-ver por exemplo, Johnston-' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior ' sobre como confundir os dois é uma grande indústria em filosofia e Psicologia), a impossibilidade de linguagem privada e a estrutura axiomática de todo o comportamento. Verbos como ' pensar ', ' Ver ' primeiro descrito funções S1, mas como S2 evoluiu eles vieram a ser aplicado a ele também, levando a toda a mitologia do interior resultante de, por exemplo, tentando se referir a imaginar como se estivesse vendo fotos dentro do cérebro. Os PLG ' s são os enunciados automatizados simples por nosso involuntário, sistema 1, pensamento rápido, neuron do espelho, verdadeiro somente, não-proposicional, Estados mentaisnossas percepções e memórias e atos reflexivos (' vontade ') incluindo o sistema 1 verdades e UOA1--compreensão de Agência 1--e Emotions1-como a alegria, o amor, a raiva) que pode ser descrito causalmente, enquanto o evolutivamente mais tarde SLG ' s são expressões ou descrições de voluntários, sistema 2, pensamento lento, 16 mentalizando neurônios, testável verdadeiro ou falso, proposicional, Truth2 e UOA2 e Emotions2-alegria, amando, odiando, o disposicional (e muitas vezes contrafactual) imaginar, supondo, pretendendo, pensando, sabendo, acreditando, etc, que só pode ser descrita em termos de razões (ou seja, é apenas um fato que tenta descrever o sistema 2 em termos de neuroquímica, física atômica, matemática, apenas não faz sentido-ver W para muitos exemplos e Searle para boas dissertações sobre isso). Não é possível descrever as automatismos do sistema 1 em termos de razões (por exemplo, ' eu vejo que como uma maçã porque... ') a menos que você queira dar uma razão em termos de EP, genética, fisiologia, e como W demonstrou repetidamente que é sem sentido dar "explicações" com a condição de que eles farão sentido no futuro- "nada está escondido"-eles fazem sentido agora ou nunca. Uma heurística poderosa é separar o comportamento e a experiência em intencionalidade 1 e intencionalidade 2 (por exemplo, pensar 1 e pensar 2, emoções 1 e emoções 2 etc.) e até mesmo em verdades 1 (T apenas axiomas) e verdades 2 (extensões empíricas ou "teoremas" que resultado da extensão lógica das verdades 1). W reconheceu que "nada está escondido"--ou seja, toda a nossa psicologia e todas as respostas a todas as perguntas filosóficas estão aqui em nossa língua (nossa vida) e que a dificuldade não é encontrar as respostas, mas para reconhecê-los como sempre aqui na frente de nós-nós só temos que parar de tentar olhar mais fundo. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, análogos computacionais, AI e todo o resto são formas fascinantes e poderosas para estender nossa psicologia axiomática inata, para fornecer a base física para o nosso comportamento e facilitar a nossa análise de jogos de linguagem que, no entanto, permanecem inexplicavel--EP é assim--e inalterado. Os axiomas true-only, mais exaustivamente explorados em ' on certeza ', são W (e posteriores Searle ' s) "Bedrock" ou "background", ou seja, a psicologia evolucionária, que são rastreáveis para as reações automatizadas true-only de bactérias e seus descendentes (por exemplo, seres humanos), que evoluíram e operam pelo mecanismo de aptidão inclusiva (IF)-Veja os soberbos "princípios da evolução social" de Bourke. W insistiu que devemos considerar a nossa análise de comportamento como descrições, em vez de explicações, mas é claro que estes também são complexos jogos de linguagem e descrição de uma pessoa é a explicação de outra. Começando com suas respostas inatas de verdade, não empíricas (automatizadas e não mutáveis) para o mundo, os animais estendem sua compreensão axiomática através de deduções em mais verdade apenas entendimentos ("teoremas" como poderíamos chamá-los, mas este é um complexo jogo de linguagem, mesmo no contexto da matemática). Tiranossauros e mesões tornam-se tão indesafiáveis quanto a existência das nossas duas mãos ou a nossa respiração. Isto muda dramaticamente uma visão da natureza humana. Teoria da mente (TOM) não é uma teoria em tudo, mas um grupo de verdadeiros entendimentos da agência (UOA um termo que eu concebeu 10 anos atrás), que os animais recém-nascidos (incluindo moscas e vermes se UOA é 17 adequadamente definido) têm e, subsequentemente, estender muito (em eucariotos mais elevados). No entanto, como eu notar aqui, W deixou muito claro que, para grande parte da intencionalidade existem sistema 1 e versões do sistema 2 (jogos de linguagem)-o rápido inconsciente UOA1 e lento UOA2 consciente e, claro, estes são heurística para fenômenos multifacetados. Embora a matéria-prima para S2 é S1, S2 também se alimenta de volta em S1 - maior feedback cortical para os níveis mais baixos de percepção, memória, pensamento reflexivo que é um fundamental da psicologia. Muitos dos exemplos de W explorar esta rua de dois sentidos (por exemplo, ver as discussões do pato/coelho e ' ver como ' em Johnston). Eu penso que é desobstruído que os axiomas verdadeiros-únicos inata W são ocupados com durante todo seu trabalho, e quase exclusivamente no OC (seu último trabalho "sobre a certeza"), são equivalentes ao pensamento rápido ou ao sistema 1 que está no centro da pesquisa atual (por exemplo, veja Kahneman--" Pensando rápido e lento ", mas ele não tem idéia W estabeleceu a estrutura de cerca de 75 anos atrás), que é involuntário e inconsciente e que corresponde aos Estados mentais de percepção (incluindo UOA1) e memória e atos involuntários, como W observa mais e mais em infinitas Exemplos. Um pôde chamar estes "reflexos intracerebral" (Talvez 99% de todo nosso cerebração se medido pelo uso da energia no cérebro). Nosso lento ou reflexivo, mais ou menos "consciente" (cuidado com outra rede de jogos de linguagem!) a segunda atividade cerebral do self corresponde ao que W caracterizou como "disposições" ou "inclinações", que se referem a habilidades ou ações possíveis, não são estados mentais ( ou não no mesmo sentido), e não têm qualquer tempo definido de ocorrência e/ou duração. Mas palavras de disposição como "saber", "entendimento", "pensar", "crer", que W discutido extensivamente, têm pelo menos dois usos básicos. Um é um uso filosófico peculiar (mas graduando-se em usos diários) exemplificado por Moore (cujos os papéis inspiraram W para escrever oC), que se referem às sentenças true-only (verdade so) resultando das percepções diretas e da memória, isto é, nossa psicologia axiomático inata S1 (' i Sei que estas são as minhas mãos), e o S2, que é o seu uso normal como disposições, que pode ser agido para fora, e que pode se tornar verdadeiro ou falso ("Eu sei o caminho de casa"). A investigação do pensamento rápido involuntário revolucionou a psicologia, a economia (por exemplo, o prêmio Nobel de Kahneman) e outras disciplinas nomes como ilusões cognitivas, escorvamento, enquadramento, heurística e preconceitos. É claro que estes também são jogos de linguagem por isso haverá maneiras mais e menos úteis para usar essas palavras, e estudos e discussões irão variar de "puro" sistema 1 para combinações de 1 e 2 (a norma como W deixou claro), mas presumivelmente não nunca de lento sistema 2 mudança de caráter fina Rei apenas, uma vez que qualquer sistema 2 pensamento ou ação intencional não pode ocorrer sem envolver grande parte da intrincada rede de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferência", "reflexos intracerebral", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fundo" ou "Bedrock" (como W e mais tarde Searle chamar nosso EP). Embora W advertiu freqüentemente contra teorizing e produziu mais e melhores 18 exemplos de linguagem em ação do que qualquer um, pode-se dizer que seus aforismos agregados ilustrados por exemplos constituem a "teoria" mais abrangente do comportamento ("realidade") sempre Escrita. Finalmente, permitam-me sugerir que, com esta perspectiva, W não é obscuro, difícil ou irrelevante, mas cintilante, profundo e cristalino, que ele escreve de forma aforisticamente e telegraficamente porque pensamos e se comportam dessa maneira, e que a falta dele é perder um dos as maiores aventuras intelectuais possíveis. Agora que temos um início razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana. Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e dispostos, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente sensíveis e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). Muitos gráficos complexos foram publicados por cientistas, mas eu encontrá-los de utilidade mínima quando se pensa sobre o comportamento (em oposição a pensar sobre a função cerebral). Cada nível de descrição pode ser útil em determinados contextos, mas acho que ser mais grosseira ou mais finos limites utilidade. A estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR), ou a estrutura lógica da mente (LSM), a estrutura lógica do comportamento (LSB), a estrutura lógica do pensamento (LST), a estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), a estrutura lógica da personalidade (LSP), a Psicologia descritiva da consciência (DSC), a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), intencionalidade-o termo filosófico clássico. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (volition, vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste"e" mundo a mente direção 19 do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. 20 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 21 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidas por Searle e outros como COS, representações, verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designados como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então Eu tenho uma explicação detalhada desta tabela em meus outros escritos. 22 Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. É fundamental notar que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. Aqueles que desejam um completo até à data conta de Wittgenstein, Searle e sua análise de comportamento da moderna dois sistemas de visão pode consultar o meu artigo a estrutura lógica da filosofia, psicologia, mente e linguagem como revelado em Wittgenstein e Searle (2016). Agora, para alguns comentários sobre MSW Searle. Farei algumas referências a outro de seus trabalhos recentes que eu revisei-filosofia em um século novo (PNC). As idéias aqui já estão publicadas e nada virá como uma surpresa para aqueles que mantiveram o seu trabalho. Como W, ele é considerado como o melhor filósofo standup (vivo) de seu tempo e seu trabalho escrito é sólido como uma rocha e inovador por toda parte. No entanto, a sua incapacidade de tomar o mais tarde W sério o suficiente leva a alguns erros e confusões. Em vários lugares em seu trabalho (por exemplo, P7 de PNC), ele duas vezes observa que a nossa certeza sobre os fatos básicos é devido ao peso esmagador da razão apoiando nossas reivindicações, mas W mostrou definitivamente em ' sobre certeza ' que não há possibilidade de duvidar do verdadeiro-apenas estrutura axiomática de nosso sistema 1 percepções, memórias e pensamentos, desde que é próprio a base para o julgamento (razão) e não pode próprio ser julgado. Na primeira frase do P8 da PNC, ele nos diz que a certeza é revisável, mas esse tipo de "certeza", que poderíamos chamar de Certainty2 (certeza 2), é o resultado de estender nossa certeza axiomática e não revisável (Certainty1 de S1) através da experiência e é totalmente diferente como é proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso). Este é, naturalmente, um exemplo clássico da "batalha contra a feitico de nossa inteligência por linguagem", que W demonstrou uma e outra vez. Uma palavra de dois (ou muitos) usos distintos. Em P12 de PNC, a consciência do ' é descrita como o resultado do funcionamento automatizado do sistema 1 que é "subjetivo" em diversos sentidos completamente diferentes, e não, no caso normal, uma matéria da evidência mas uma compreensão verdadeiro-somente em nosso próprio caso e um verdadeiro-somente percepção no caso de outros. Eu sinto que W tem uma melhor compreensão da conexão mente/linguagem, como ele considera-los como sinônimo em muitos contextos, e seu trabalho é uma exposição brilhante da mente como exemplificada em inúmeros exemplos perspicazes de uso da linguagem. Como citado acima, "agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados com, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." Pode- 23 se negar que qualquer revisão de nossos conceitos (jogos de linguagem) de causação ou livre vontade são necessárias ou mesmo possível. Você pode ler apenas sobre qualquer página de W pelas razões. Uma coisa é dizer coisas bizarras sobre o mundo usando exemplos de mecânica quântica, incerteza, etc, mas é outro a dizer qualquer coisa relevante para o nosso uso normal de palavras. As estruturas deôntico ou a colagem social do ' são as ações rápidas automáticas de S1 produzindo as disposições lentas de S2 que são expandidas inexoravelmente durante o desenvolvimento pessoal em uma disposição larga de relacionamentos deôntico culturais universais do inconsciente automático com outros (S3). Embora este é o meu Précis de comportamento que eu espero que descreve bastante o trabalho de S. Aqueles que desejam se familiarizar com os argumentos bem conhecidos de S contra a visão mecânica da mente, que parecem-me definitivas, podem consultar Chaps 3-5 de seu PNC. Eu li livros inteiros de respostas para eles e concordo com S que todos eles perdem a lógica muito simples (psicológico) pontos que ele faz (e que, em geral, W fez meia acentury mais cedo). Para colocá-lo em meus termos, S1 é composto de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, não-proposicional, verdadeiros apenas estados mentais, enquanto S2 lenta só pode ser descrita de forma coerente em termos de razões para ações que são mais ou menos disposições conscientes para comportamento (ações potenciais) que são ou podem se tornar proposicional (T ou F). Os computadores e o resto da natureza têm apenas a intencionalidade derivada que é dependente da nossa perspectiva, enquanto os animais mais elevados têm intencionalidade primária que é independente da perspectiva. Como S e W apreciam, a grande ironia é que essas reduções materialistas ou mecânicas da psicologia se disfarçam como ciência de ponta, mas na verdade elas são totalmente anticientíficas. Filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e psicologia cognitiva (libertado da superstição) estão se tornando mão na luva e é Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc, que são deixados de fora no frio. Parece bastante óbvio para mim (como era a W) que a visão mecânica da mente existe pela mesma razão que quase todo o comportamento-é a operação padrão do nosso EP que busca explicações em termos do que podemos deliberadamente pensar através lentamente , em vez de no S1 automatizado, dos quais, principalmente, permanecem alheio (TPI). Acho que a descrição de W de nossa psicologia herdada axiomático e suas extensões em seu OC e outro período de 3 obras para ser mais profundo do que s (ou qualquer um), e por isso não estamos ' confiantes ' que os cães são conscientes, mas sim não está aberto a (não é possível) dúvida. Capítulo 5 de S PNC bem demolir teoria computacional da mente, linguagem do pensamento, etc, observando them ' Computação ', ' informações ', ' sintaxe ', ' algoritmo ', ' lógica ', ' programa ', etc, são observador relativo (ou seja, psicológico) termos e Não têm significado físico ou matemático neste sentido psicológico, mas é claro que há outros sentidos que têm sido dadas recentemente como a ciência se desenvolveu. Mais uma vez, as pessoas são enfeitiçadas pelo uso da mesma palavra 24 para ignorar a grande diferença em seu uso (significado). E, claro, isso é tudo uma extensão do clássico Wittgenstein. Cada pessoa que pensa deve ler o capítulo 6 do PNC S "a ilusão fenomenológica" (TPI), uma vez que mostra suas habilidades lógicas supremas e sua incapacidade de apreciar o pleno poder do W mais tarde, eo grande valor heurístico da pesquisa psicológica recente sobre os dois Eus. É desobstruído como o cristal que TPI é devido ao Obliviousness aos automatismos de S1 e a tomar o pensamento consciente lento de S2 como não somente preliminar mas como tudo lá é. Esta é a clássica cegueira de ardósia em branco. Também é claro que W mostrou isso cerca de 60 anos antes e também deu a razão para isso no primado da verdadeira rede axiomática automática inconsciente do nosso sistema inato 1 (embora, claro, ele não usar estes termos). Mas a coisa realmente importante é que o TPI não é apenas um fracasso de alguns filósofos, mas uma cegueira universal para a nossa psicologia evolucionária (EP), que é construído em EP e que tem imensas (e fatais) implicações para o mundo. Somos todos fantoches de carne tropeçando na vida em nossa missão geneticamente programada para destruir a terra. Nossa preocupação quase total com o uso da segunda personalidade do self S2 para saciar as gratificações infantis de S1 é criar o inferno na terra. Como com todos os organismos, é apenas sobre a reprodução e acumulando recursos para isso. S1 escreve o jogo e S2 actua-o para fora. Dick e Jane só querem jogar casa-esta é a mamãe e este é o papai e isso e isso e este é o bebê. Talvez se possa dizer que TPI é que nós somos seres humanos e não apenas um outro primata-uma ilusão cognitiva fatal. O programa de genes S1 que (principalmente) puxa as cordas (contrai os músculos) dos fantoches de carne via S2. Fim da história. Mais uma vez, ele precisa ler meus comentários sobre W ' s OC então ele muda a "boa razão para acreditar" na parte inferior do p171 e no topo do p172 para "sabe" (no verdadeiro sentido). Uma noção crítica introduzida por S muitos anos há é condições de satisfação (COS) em nossos pensamentos (Propositions de S2) que W chamou inclinações ou disposições actuar--ainda chamado pelo termo impróprio atitudes propostional do ' por muitos. COS são explicados por S em muitos lugares como em p169 de PNC: "assim dizendo algo e significando que envolve duas condições da satisfação. Primeiro, a condição de satisfação que a enunciação será produzida, e segundo, que a própria enunciação terá condições de satisfação. " Como S afirma em PNC, "uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode determinar uma condição de satisfação... e uma condição de satisfação... é que tal e tal é o caso. " Ou, um precisa de adicionar, que pôde ser ou pôde ter sido ou pôde ser imaginado ser o caso, como faz desobstruído em MSW. Em relação às intenções, "para ser satisfeita, a própria intenção deve funcionar causalmente na produção da ação." (MSWp34). Uma maneira de concernir isto é que o sistema automático inconsciente 1 ativa a personalidade consciente cortical mais elevada do sistema 2, trazendo sobre as contrações do músculo da garganta que informam outro que vê o mundo em 25 determinadas maneiras, que o comprometem ao potencial Ações. Um enorme avanço sobre as interações pré-linguísticas ou protolingüísticas em que apenas os movimentos musculares brutos foram capazes de transmitir informações muito limitadas sobre as intenções. A maioria irá beneficiar grandemente de ler W ' s "on certeza" ou "RPP1 e 2" ou DMS ' s dois livros sobre OC (ver meus comentários) como eles fazem claro a diferença entre true-somente frases descrevendo S1 e proposições verdadeiras ou falsas descrevendo S2. Isto golpeia-me como uma aproximação distante superior a S que tomam percepções S1 como propostional (pelo menos em alguns lugares em seu trabalho) desde que podem somente se tornar T ou F (aspectual como S os chama aqui) depois que um começa pensar sobre eles em S2. No entanto, seu ponto na PNC que proposições permitem declarações de verdade real ou potencial e falsidade, do passado e do futuro e da fantasia, e, assim, proporcionar um enorme avanço sobre a sociedade pré ou protolingüística, é cogente. S muitas vezes descreve a necessidade crítica de notar os vários níveis de descrição de um evento assim para IAA "temos diferentes níveis de descrição, onde um nível é constituído pelo comportamento no nível inferior... Além do constitutivo por meio da relação, também temos a causalidade através da relação. " (p37). "A prova crucial de que precisamos de uma distinção entre intenções prévias e intenções em ação é que as condições de satisfação nos dois casos são incrivelmente diferentes." (P35). O COS do PI precisa uma ação inteira quando aqueles de IAA somente um parcial. Ele torna claro (por exemplo, P34) que as intenções anteriores (PI) são estados mentais (ou seja, S1 inconsciente), enquanto eles resultam em intenções-em-ação (IAA) que são atos conscientes (ou seja, S2), mas ambos são causalmente autorreferenciais (CSR). O argumento crítico que ambos são CSR é que (ao contrário das crenças e dos desejos) é essencial que figura em trazer sobre seu COS. Estas descrições de cognição e volição estão resumidas na tabela 2,1, que Searle tem usado por muitos anos e é a base para um estendido que eu criei. Na minha opinião, isso ajuda enormemente a relacionar isso com a pesquisa psicológica moderna usando minha terminologia S1, S2, S3 e a descrição de W ' s true-only vs propostional (dispositional). Assim, a CSR referencia a percepção, a memória e a intenção de S1 true-only, quando S2 se refere às disposições tais como a opinião e o desejo. Assim, reconhecendo o S1 é apenas ascendente causal e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (por exemplo, ver Hutto e myin ' s "enativismo radical") eu mudaria os parágrafos de p39 começando "em suma" e terminando em PG 40 com "condições de satisfação" como se segue. Em suma, a percepção, a memória e as intenções e ações reflexivas (' vontade ') são causadas pelo funcionamento automático do nosso EP axiomático de S1 true-only. Através de intenções e intenções-em-ação anteriores, tentamos igualar como 26 desejamos que as coisas sejam com a forma como pensamos que são. Devemos ver que a crença, o desejo (e imaginação-desejos tempo deslocado e tão dissociado da intenção) e outras S2 disposições proposicional do nosso pensamento lento mais tarde evoluiu segundo auto, são totalmente dependentes (ter seu COS em) o CSR automática rápida primitivo verdadeiro apenas reflexivo S1. Na língua e talvez na neurofisiologia há casos intermediários ou misturados tais como pretendendo (intenções anteriores) ou recordar, onde a conexão causal com COS (isto é, com S1) é tempo deslocado, porque representam o passado ou o futuro, ao contrário de S1 que é sempre no presente. Os dois sistemas se alimentam uns aos outros e são frequentemente orquestrados pelas aprendidas relações culturais deônticas do S3 sem problemas, de modo que nossa experiência normal é que nós controlamos conscientemente tudo o que fazemos. Esta vasta Arena de ilusões cognitivas que dominam a nossa vida S descreveu como "a ilusão fenomenológica". Ele termina este capítulo surpreendente, repetindo para talvez a 10 a vez em seus escritos, o que eu considero como um erro muito básico que ele compartilha com quase todos-a noção de que a experiência de "livre-vontade" pode ser "ilusória". Segue-se de uma forma muito simples e inexorável, tanto do trabalho do 3o período W e das observações da psicologia contemporânea, que ' vontade ', ' auto ' e ' consciência ' são elementos axiomático true-only do sistema 1 apenas como ver, ouvir, etc., e não há possibilidade (inteligibilidade) de demonstrar (de dar sentido a) a sua falsidade. Como W fez tão maravilhosamente claro inúmeras vezes, eles são a base para o julgamento e por isso não pode ser julgado. S compreende e usa basicamente este mesmo argumento em outros contextos (por exemplo, ceticismo, solipsismo) muitas vezes, por isso é bastante surpreendente que ele não pode ver esta analogia. Ele faz esse erro freqüentemente quando ele diz coisas como que nós temos "boa evidência" que o nosso cão é consciente etc. Os verdadeiros axiomas da nossa psicologia não são probatórios. Aqui você tem o melhor psicólogo descritivo desde W, então este não é um erro estúpido. Seu Sumário de deontics em P50 precisa a tradução. Assim "você tem que ter uma forma pré-linguística de intencionalidade coletiva, em que as formas linguísticas são construídas, e você tem que ter a intencionalidade coletiva da conversa, a fim de fazer o compromisso" é muito mais claro se suplementado com "o axiomática prelingüístico de S1 fundamentam as disposições lingüísticas de S2 (isto é, nosso EP) que evoluem durante nosso amadurecimento em suas manifestações culturais em S3. " Uma vez que as declarações de função de status desempenham um papel central em deontics é fundamental compreendê-los e assim ele explica a noção de ' função ' que é relevante aqui. "Uma função é uma causa que serve a um propósito... Neste sentido as funções são intencionalidade-relativa e, portanto, dependentes da mente... funções de status... Exigem... a imposição coletiva e o reconhecimento de um estatuto "(P59). Mais uma vez, sugiro a tradução de "a intencionalidade da linguagem é criada pela intencionalidade intrínseca, ou independente da mente dos seres humanos" (P66) como "a disposicionalidade linguística e consciente de S2 é gerada pelo inconsciente 27 funções reflexivas axiomáticas de S1 "(P68). Ou seja, deve-se ter em mente que o comportamento é programado pela biologia. Entretanto, eu opor fortemente a suas indicações no P66-67 e em outra parte em seus escritos que S1 (isto é, memórias, percepções, atos reflexos) tem uma estrutura proposicional (isto é, verdadeiro-falsa). Como eu tenho observado acima, e muitas vezes em outros comentários, parece cristalina que W está correto, e é básico para entender o comportamento, que apenas S2 é proposicional e S1 é axiomático e trueonly. Ambos têm cos e sentidos do ajuste (DOF) porque a intencionalidade genética, axiomático de S1 gera aquela de S2 mas se S1 eram propostional no mesmo sentido que significaria que o ceticismo é intelligible, o caos que era filosofia antes de W retornaria e na verdade a vida não seria possível (não isso não é uma piada). Como W mostrou inúmeras vezes e biologia mostra tão claramente, a vida deve ser baseada na certeza-automatizado reações rápidas inconscientes. Os organismos que têm sempre uma dúvida e uma pausa para refletir morrerão. Ao contrário de seus comentários (P70) eu não posso imaginar uma língua faltando palavras para objetos materiais mais do que eu posso imaginar um sistema visual que não pode vê-los, porque é a primeira e mais básica tarefa de visão para segmentar o mundo em objetos e de modo que a linguagem para descrevê-los. Da mesma forma, não consigo ver nenhum problema com objetos sendo salientes no campo consciente nem com frases sendo segmentadas em palavras. Como poderia ser de outra forma para os seres com a nossa história evolutiva? Em P72 e em outra parte, ajudará a recordar que as expressões são o plg reflexivo primitivo de S1 quando as representações forem o mudança de caráter SLG ' s de S2. Outra tradução de Philosophese para o inglês é necessária para o segundo parágrafo sobre p79 começando ' até agora ' e terminando ' ouvido antes '. "Nós transmitimos significado falando uma linguagem pública composta de palavras em frases com uma sintaxe." Para suas perguntas 4 e 5 sobre P105 quanto à natureza especial da linguagem e da escrita, eu responderia: ' eles são especiais porque o curto comprimento de onda de vibrações dos músculos vocais permitem transferência de informações de largura de banda muito maior do que contrações de outros músculos e Esta é, em média, várias ordens de magnitude maior para a informação visual. Em P106, uma resposta geral à pergunta 2 (como vamos fugir com ele-i. e., por que ele funciona) é EP e S1 e sua afirmação de que "minha principal estratégia de exposição neste livro é tentar fazer o familiar parecer estranho e marcante" é, naturalmente, Wittgenstein clássico. Sua reivindicação na página seguinte que não há nenhuma resposta geral a porque os povos aceitam instituições é desobstruído errado. Eles aceitam-nos pela mesma razão que fazem tudo - o seu EP é o resultado da aptidão inclusiva. Facilitou a sobrevivência e a reprodução no EEE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva). Tudo sobre nós fisicamente e mentalmente fundo em genética. Toda a 28 conversa vaga aqui (por exemplo, p114) sobre ' convenções extra-lingüísticas ' e ' semântica semânticas extra ' é na verdade referindo-se ao EP e especialmente às automatismos inconscientes de S1 que são a base para todo o comportamento. Sim, como W disse muitas vezes, o mais familiar é por essa razão invisível. S sugestão (p115) que a linguagem é essencial para jogos é certamente enganado. Totalmente analfabetos surdos-mutes poderia jogar cartas, futebol e até mesmo xadrez, mas é claro que uma capacidade de contagem mínima seria necessário. Concordo (p121) que a capacidade de fingir e imaginar (por exemplo, o contrafactual ou como-se as noções envolvidas no tempo e espaço de mudança) são, em plena forma, habilidades humanas excepcionalmente e crítico para o pensamento de ordem superior. Mas mesmo aqui há muitos precursores de animais (como deve haver), como a postura de combates rituais e danças de acasalamento, a decoração de locais de acasalamento por aves Bower, a pretensão de asa quebrada de pássaros mãe, chamadas de alarme falsos de macacos, peixe ' limpador ' que tomam um morder a sua presa e simulação de Falcão e estratégias de pomba (trapaceiros) em muitos animais. Mais tradução é necessária para sua discussão de racionalidade (p126 e segs). Dizer que o pensamento é proposicional e lida com verdadeiras ou falsas ' entidades factitive ' significa que é uma disposição S2 típica que pode ser testada, em oposição às funções cognitivas automáticas verdadeiras de S1. Em "livre vontade, racionalidade e fatos institucionais", ele atualiza partes do seu livro clássico "racionalidade em ação" e cria uma nova terminologia para descrever o aparelho formal de razões práticas que eu não encontro feliz. "Entidades factitivas" não parecem diferentes das disposições e ' motivador ' (desejo ou obrigação), ' efetoras ' (músculos do corpo), ' constitutor ' (músculos da fala) e ' razão total ' (todas as disposições relevantes) não, pelo menos aqui parecem acrescentar à clareza (p126132). Devemos fazer algo que raramente acontece nas discussões sobre o comportamento humano e nos lembramos de sua biologia. A evolução por aptidão inclusiva programou as ações causais reflexivas inconscientes de S1 que muitas vezes dão origem ao pensamento lento consciente de S2 (muitas vezes modificada pelas extensões culturais do S3), que produz razões para a ação que muitas vezes resultam em ativação dos músculos do corpo e/ou da fala por S1 causando ações. O mecanismo geral é através da neurotransmissão e por mudanças em vários Neuromoduladores em áreas específicas do cérebro. Isto pode parecer escolha também, mas tem a virtude que é baseada no fato, e dada a complexidade de nossa ordem mais elevada pensou, eu não penso que uma descrição geral está indo começ muito mais simples. A ilusão cognitiva geral (chamada por S ' a ilusão fenomenológica ') é que S2/S3 gerou a ação conscientemente por razões das quais estamos plenamente conscientes e no controle, mas alguém familiarizado com a biologia moderna e psicologia sabe que esta visão não é Credível. 29 Assim, eu traduzi seu Sumário da razão prática em P127 como segue: "nós rendemos a nossos desejos (necessidade de alterar a química do cérebro), que incluem tipicamente o desejo-razões independentes para a ação (DIRA - I. e., desejos deslocados no espaço e no tempo, a maioria muitas vezes para o altruísmo recíproco), que produzem disposições para o comportamento que comumente resultam mais cedo ou mais tarde em movimentos musculares que servem a nossa aptidão inclusiva (aumento da sobrevivência para os genes em nós mesmos e aqueles intimamente relacionados). " Ao contrário do comentário de S em p128 eu penso se definido apropriadamente, DIRA é universal em uns animais mais elevados e não em tudo original aos seres humanos (pense a galinha da mãe que defende sua ninhada de uma raposa) se nós incluímos os reflexos prelingüísticos automatizados de S1 (isto é, DIRA1), mas certamente o a ordem mais elevada DIRA de S2/3 ou de DIRA2 que exigem a língua é excepcionalmente humana. Isto parece-me uma descrição alternativa e mais clara de sua "explicação" (como W sugeriu que estes são muito melhor chamado de "Descrição") no fundo do p129 do paradoxo de como podemos voluntariamente realizar DIRA2/3 (ou seja, os desejos S2 e seu S3 cultural extensões). Ou seja, "a resolução do paradoxo é que o reconhecimento das razões de desejo independente pode fazer com que o desejo e, portanto, causar o desejo, mesmo que não seja logicamente inevitável que eles fazem e não empiricamente universal que eles fazem" pode ser traduzido como "o resolução do paradoxo é que o inconsciente DIRA1 servindo aptidão inclusiva a longo prazo gerar o DIRA2 consciente que muitas vezes substituem os desejos imediatos pessoais de curto prazo. " Do mesmo modo, para sua discussão desta edição em p130-é EP, ra, se, S1 que moem as disposições e as ações de seguimento de S2/3. Em p140 ele pergunta por que não podemos obter deontics da biologia, mas é claro que devemos obtê-los de biologia como não há outra opção e a descrição acima mostra como isso acontece. Contrariamente à sua afirmação, as inclinações mais fortes sempre prevalecem (por definição, caso contrário não é o mais forte), mas deontics funciona porque a programação inata de RA e IF substituem desejos pessoais imediatos de curto prazo. Sua confusão de natureza e nutrição, de S1 e S2, estende-se às conclusões 2 e 3 em p143. Os agentes realmente criam as razões centesimal de DIRA2/3, mas estes não são apenas qualquer coisa mas, com poucas se todas as exceções, extensões muito restritas de DIRA1 (a causa final). Se ele realmente significa atribuir deontics a nossas decisões conscientes sozinho, então ele é presa a "a ilusão fenomenológica" (TPI) que ele tão lindamente demolido em seu papel clássico desse nome (ver a minha revisão do PNC). Como já constatei acima, há um enorme corpo de pesquisas recentes expondo ilusões cognitivas que compõem a nossa personalidade. TPI não é meramente um erro filosófico inofensivo mas um esquescemento universal a nossa biologia que produz a ilusão que nós controlamos nossa vida e nossa sociedade e o mundo e as conseqüências são quase certo colapso da civilização durante os próximos 150 anos. Ele observa corretamente que a racionalidade humana não faz sentido sem a ' lacuna 30 ' (na verdade, 3 lacunas que ele tem discutido muitas vezes). Ou seja, sem livrevontade (ou seja, escolha) em algum sentido não-trivial que seria tudo um inútil, e ele tem justamente observou que é inconcebível que a evolução poderia criar e manter um desnecessário charada geneticamente e energeticamente caro. Mas, como quase todos os outros, ele não pode ver o seu caminho para fora e assim mais uma vez ele sugere (P133) que a escolha pode ser uma ilusão. Pelo contrário, seguindo W, é bastante claro que a escolha é parte de nossas ações reflexivas axiomáticas S1 trueonly e não pode ser questionada sem contradição como S1 é a base para o questionamento. Você não pode duvidar que você está lendo esta página como sua consciência de que é a base para duvidar. Poucos aviso (Budd em seu livro soberbo sobre W é uma exceção) que W colocou uma resolução interessante para isso, sugerindo que alguns fenômenos mentais podem se originar em processos caóticos no cérebro-que, por exemplo, não há nada correspondente a um traço de memória. Ele também sugeriu várias vezes que a cadeia causal tem um fim e isso poderia significar tanto que não é apenas possível (independentemente do estado da ciência) para rastreá-lo mais longe e que o conceito de ' causa ' deixa de ser aplicável além de um certo ponto. Subseqüentemente, muitos fizeram sugestões similares baseadas na física e nas ciências da complexidade e do caos. No P155 deve-se notar que o background/rede é o nosso EP e suas extensões culturais de S1, S2, S3. Dado o exposto, eu não sinto que é necessário comentar sobre a sua discussão de poder e política, mas vou dizer algumas palavras sobre os direitos humanos. Concordo plenamente com o seu comentário sobre P185 que a declaração das Nações Unidas sobre direitos humanos é um documento irresponsável. O colapso rápido e provavelmente inexorável da sociedade é devido a pessoas que têm muitos direitos e muito poucas responsabilidades. O único pequeno raio de esperança para o mundo é que de alguma forma as pessoas podem ser forçados (poucos vão fazê-lo voluntariamente) para colocar a terra em primeiro lugar e se segundo. Consumir recursos e produzir crianças devem ser regulados como privilégios ou a tragédia dos comuns em breve terminará o jogo. Globalmente, MSW é um bom resumo dos muitos avanços substanciais sobre Wittgenstein resultante do meio século S de trabalho, mas na minha opinião, W ainda é inigualável para a psicologia básica, uma vez que você entender o que ele está dizendo (ver meus comentários). Idealmente, devem ser lidos junto: Searle para a prosa coerente desobstruída e generalizações na operação de S2/S3, ilustrado com os exemplos perspicazes de W da operação de S1/S2, e seus aforisms brilhantes. Se eu fosse muito mais jovem, escreveria um livro fazendo exatamente isso. 31 Revisão de ' Filosofia em um Novo Século ' (Philosophy in a New Century) por John Searle (2008) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Antes de comentar sobre o livro, eu ofereço comentários sobre Wittgenstein e Searle e a estrutura lógica da racionalidade. Os ensaios aqui são na maior parte já publicados durante a última década (embora alguns foram actualizados), junto com um artigo inéditos, e nada aqui virá como uma surpresa àqueles que mantiveram acima com seu trabalho. Como W, ele é considerado como o melhor filósofo standup de seu tempo e seu trabalho escrito é sólido como uma rocha e inovador por toda parte. No entanto, a sua incapacidade de tomar o mais tarde W sério o suficiente leva a alguns erros e confusões. Apenas alguns exemplos: em P7 ele duas vezes observa que a nossa certeza sobre os fatos básicos é devido ao peso esmagador da razão de apoiar as nossas reivindicações, mas W mostrou definitivamente em ' on certeza ' que não há possibilidade de duvidar da estrutura axiomático true-only (verade so) de nosso sistema 1 percepções, memórias e pensamentos, uma vez que é em si a base para o julgamento e não pode ser julgado. Na primeira frase do P8, ele nos diz que a certeza é revisável, mas esse tipo de "certeza", que poderíamos chamar de Certainty2, é o resultado de estender nossa certeza axiomática e não revisável (Certainty1) através da experiência e é totalmente diferente como é proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso). Este é, naturalmente, um exemplo clássico da "batalha contra a feitico de nossa inteligência por linguagem", que W demonstrou uma e outra vez. Uma palavra-dois (ou muitos) usos distintos. Seu último capítulo "a unidade da proposição" (anteriormente inéditos) também se beneficiaria muito de ler W "on certeza" ou dois livros do DMS sobre OC (ver meus comentários) como eles fazem claro a diferença entre verdadeiras frases apenas descrevendo S1 e verdadeiro ou falso proposições descrevendo S2. Isto golpeia-me como uma aproximação distante superior a S que tomam percepções S1 como proposicional desde que se transformam somente T ou F depois que um começa pensar sobre eles em S2. No entanto, o seu ponto que proposições permitem declarações de verdade real ou potencial e falsidade, do passado e do futuro e fantasia, e, assim, proporcionar um enorme avanço sobre a sociedade pré ou protolingüística, é cogente. Como ele afirma que "uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode determinar uma condição de satisfação... e uma condição de satisfação... é que tal e tal é o caso. " Ou, um precisa de adicionar, que pôde ser ou pôde ter sido ou pôde ser imaginado ser o caso. Globalmente, PNC é um bom resumo dos muitos avanços substanciais sobre Wittgenstein resultante do meio século S de trabalho, mas na minha opinião, W ainda é inigualável uma vez que você entender o que ele está dizendo. Idealmente, eles devem ser lidos juntos: Searle para a clara prosa coerente e generalizações, ilustrada com os exemplos perspicazes de W e aforismos brilhantes. Se eu fosse muito mais jovem, escreveria um livro fazendo exatamente isso. 32 Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. "Mas eu não começ minha imagem do mundo satisfazendo-me de sua exatidão: nem eu tenho-a porque eu sou satisfeito de sua exatidão. Não: é o fundo herdado contra o qual eu distinguir entre verdadeiro e falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." Wittgenstein "o livro azul" P6 (1933) "Absurdo, absurdo, porque você está fazendo suposições em vez de simplesmente descrever. Se sua cabeça é assombrada por explicações aqui, você está negligenciando a lembrar-se dos fatos mais importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós e nem explica nem Deduz nada... Pode-se dar o nome de ' filosofia ' ao que é possível antes de todas as novas descobertas e invenções. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "O que estamos fornecendo são realmente observações sobre a história natural do homem, não curiosidades; no entanto, mas sim observações sobre os factos que ninguém duvidou e que só foram despercebido porque eles estão sempre diante de nossos olhos. Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "O objetivo da filosofia é erguer uma parede no ponto onde a linguagem pára de qualquer maneira." Ocasiões filosóficas de Wittgenstein P187 "O limite da língua é mostrado por seu ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponda a (é a tradução de) uma sentença sem simplesmente repetir a sentença (isto tem que fazer com a solução de Kantian ao problema da filosofia)." Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "O maior perigo aqui é querer observar a si mesmo." LWPP1, 459 "Poderia um processo de máquina causar um pensamento processo? A resposta é: Sim. Na verdade, apenas um processo de máquina pode causar um processo de pensamento, e ' Computação ' não nomeia um processo de máquina; ele nomeia um processo que pode ser, e normalmente é, implementado em uma máquina. " Searle PNC p73 33 "... a caracterização de um processo como computacional é uma caracterização de um sistema físico de fora; e a identificação do processo como computacional não identifica uma característica intrínseca da física, é essencialmente uma caracterização relativa do observador. " Searle PNC P95 "O argumento de quarto chinês mostrou que a semântica não é intrínseca à sintaxe. Agora estou fazendo o ponto separado e diferente que a sintaxe não é intrínseca à física. " Searle PNC P94 "A tentativa de eliminar a falácia homúnculo através da decomposição recursiva falha, porque a única maneira de obter a sintaxe intrínseca à física é colocar um homúnculo na física." Searle PNC p97 "Mas você não pode explicar um sistema físico, como uma máquina de escrever ou um cérebro, identificando um padrão que compartilha com sua simulação computacional, porque a existência do padrão não explica como o sistema realmente funciona como um sistema físico. ... Em suma, o fato de que a atribuição de sintaxe não identifica mais poderes causais é fatal para a alegação de que os programas fornecem explicações causais de cognição... Há apenas um mecanismo físico, o cérebro, com seus vários níveis reais de descrição física e física/mental. " Searle PNC P101-103 "Em suma, o senso de" processamento de informações "que é usado na ciência cognitiva é muito alto um nível de abstração para capturar a realidade biológica concreta da intencionalidade intrínseca... Estamos cegos a esta diferença pelo fato de que a mesma frase "Eu vejo um carro vindo em minha direção," pode ser usado para gravar tanto a intencionalidade visual ea saída do modelo computacional de visão... no sentido de "informação" usada na ciência cognitiva, é simplesmente falso dizer que o cérebro é um dispositivo de processamento de informações. " Searle PNC P104-105 "Pode haver razões para a ação que são vinculativas para um agente racional apenas em virtude da natureza do fato relatado na declaração de razão, e independentemente dos desejos do agente, valores, atitudes e Avaliações? ... O verdadeiro paradoxo da discussão tradicional é que ele tenta colocar a guilhotina de Hume, a distinção rígida de valor de fato, em um vocabulário, cujo uso já pressupõe a falsidade da distinção. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas as funções de status e, portanto, toda a realidade institucional, com exceção da linguagem, são criados por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de declarações... as formas da função de status em questão são quase invariavelmente questões de poderes deônticos... reconhecer algo como um direito, dever, obrigação, exigência e assim por diante é reconhecer uma razão para a ação... essas estruturas deônticas fazem possíveis razões de desejo independente para a ação... O ponto geral é muito claro: a criação do campo geral de motivos de ação com base no desejo pressupõe a aceitação de um sistema de razões independentes de desejo de ação. " Searle PNC P34-49 34 "Algumas das características lógicas mais importantes da intencionalidade estão além do alcance da fenomenologia porque não têm realidade fenomenológica imediata... Porque a criação de significado fora da falta de sentido não é conscientemente experimentado... Não existe... Isto é... a ilusão fenomenológica. " Searle PNC p115-117 "A consciência é causalmente redutível aos processos cerebrais... e a consciência não tem poderes causais próprios, além dos poderes causais da neurobiologia subjacente... Mas a redutibilidade causal não leva à redutibilidade ontológica... consciência só existe como experiente... e, portanto, não pode ser reduzida a algo que tem uma ontologia de terceira pessoa, algo que existe independentemente de experiências. " Searle PNC 155-6 "... a relação intencional básica entre a mente e o mundo tem a ver com as condições de satisfação. E uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode estar em uma relação intencional com o mundo, e uma vez que essas relações intencionais sempre determinam condições de satisfação, e uma proposição é definida como qualquer coisa suficiente para determinar as condições de satisfações, verifica-se que toda a intencionalidade é uma questão de proposições. Searle PNC p193 Antes de comentar detalhadamente sobre a filosofia em um novo século (PNC) eu vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de Searle (S) e Wittgenstein (W), desde que eu sinto que esta é a melhor maneira de colocar Searle ou qualquer comentarista sobre o comportamento, na perspectiva adequada. Embora S não diz e parece ser em grande parte inconsciente, a maior parte de seu trabalho segue diretamente do W, mesmo que ele muitas vezes critica-lo. Para dizer que Searle tem realizado no trabalho W não é para dizer que é um resultado direto do estudo W, mas sim que, porque há apenas uma psicologia humana (pela mesma razão que há apenas uma Cardiologia humana), que alguém descrevendo com precisão o comportamento deve estar expressando som e variante ou extensão do que W disse (como eles devem, se ambos estão dando descrições corretas de comportamento). Eu encontro a maioria de S prenunciado em W, incluindo versões do argumento chinês famoso da sala de encontro ao AI forte e às edições relacionadas que são os assuntos de chaps 3-5. Aliás, se o quarto chinês lhe interessa, então você deve ler excelente Victor Rodych, mas praticamente desconhecido, suplemento sobre o CR-"Searle libertado de cada falha". Rodych também escreveu uma série de trabalhos soberbos sobre a filosofia de W da matemática--ou seja, o EP (Psicologia evolucionária) do sistema axiomático 1 capacidade de contar até 3, como estendido para o sistema interminável 2 SLG ' s (Secondary Language Games) (jogos de idioma secondario) de matemática. As percepções de W sobre a psicologia da matemática proporcionam uma excelente entrada em intencionalidade. Também vou notar que ninguém que promove a AI forte, as versões múltiplas do behaviorismo, funcionalismo informático, CTM (teoria computacional da mente) e teoria dos sistemas dinâmicos (DST), parece estar ciente de que Tractatus W pode ser visto como o mais marcante e declaração 35 poderosa de seu ponto de vista já escreveu (ou seja, o comportamento (pensamento) como o processamento lógico de fatos-ou seja, o processamento de informações). Claro, mais tarde (mas antes que o computador digital era um brilho no olho de Turing) W descrito em grande detalhe por que estas eram descrições incoerentes da mente que deve ser substituída pela psicologia (ou você pode dizer que isso é tudo o que ele fez para o resto de sua vida). S no entanto faz pouca referência à afirmação presciente de W da mente como mecanismo, e sua destruição dele em seu trabalho posterior. Desde W, S tornou-se o principal desestruturador dessas visões mecânicas do comportamento, e o psicólogo descritivo mais importante (filósofo), mas não percebe o quão completamente W o antecipou, nem, em geral, fazer outros (mas ver os muitos papéis e livros de Proudfoot e Copeland em W, Turing e AI). S trabalho é muito mais fácil de seguir do que W, e embora haja algum jargão, é principalmente espetacularmente claro se você abordá-lo a partir da direção certa. Veja meus comentários de W e outros livros para mais detalhes. Wittgenstein é para mim facilmente o pensador mais brilhante sobre o comportamento humano. Seu trabalho como um todo mostra que todo o comportamento é uma extensão de axiomas Inatos do verdadeiro-somente e que nossa raciocínio consciente (sistema 2) (S2) emerge das maquinações inconsciente (sistema 1) (S1). Ver "sobre a certeza" (OC) para o seu último tratamento prolongado desta idéia-e minha revisão do mesmo para a preparação. Seu corpus pode ser visto como a base para toda a descrição do comportamento animal, revelando como a mente funciona e realmente deve funcionar. O "must" é implicado pelo fato de que todos os cérebros compartilham uma ascendência comum e genes comuns e por isso há apenas uma maneira básica que eles trabalham, que isso necessariamente tem uma estrutura axiomática, que todos os animais mais elevados compartilham a mesma psicologia evoluiu com base em inclusiva aptidão, e que em humanos isto é estendido em uma personalidade (uma ilusão cognitiva ou fenomenológica) com base nas contrações musculares da garganta (linguagem) que evoluíram para manipular os outros (com variações que podem ser consideradas triviais). Discutìvel, todo o trabalho de W e de S é um desenvolvimento ou uma variação nestas idéias. Outro tema importante aqui, e, claro, em toda a discussão sobre o comportamento humano, é a necessidade de separar os automatismos geneticamente programados, que sustentam todo o comportamento, a partir dos efeitos da cultura. Embora poucos filósofos, psicólogos, antropólogos, sociólogos etc., explicitamente discutirem isso de uma forma abrangente, pode ser visto como o maior problema que eles estão lidando. Eu sugiro que provará do maior valor considerar todo o estudo do comportamento mais elevado da ordem como um esforço para provocar aparte não somente o pensamento rápido e lento (por exemplo, percepções e outros automatismos contra Dispositions-S1 e S2--Veja abaixo), mas natureza e nutrir. O que W estabeleceu em seu período final (e ao longo de seu trabalho anterior de uma forma menos clara) são os fundamentos da psicologia evolutiva (EP), ou se você preferir, psicologia, linguística cognitiva, intencionalidade, pensamento de ordem 36 superior ou apenas comportamento animal. Infelizmente, quase ninguém parece perceber que suas obras são um livro didático único de psicologia descritiva que é tão relevante agora como o dia em que foi escrito. Ele é quase universalmente ignorado pela psicologia e outras ciências comportamentais e Humanidades, e mesmo aqueles poucos que têm mais ou menos compreendido dele, não perceberam a extensão de sua antecipação dos últimos trabalhos sobre o EP e ilusões cognitivas (teoria da mente, enquadramento, os dois usos de pensamento rápido e lento, etc,-ver abaixo). O trabalho de Searle como um todo fornece uma descrição impressionante do comportamento social da ordem mais elevada que é possível por causa da evolução recente dos genes para a psicologia mudança de caráter, quando o W mais atrasado mostrar como é baseado em axiomas inconscientes verdadeiros somente de S1 que evoluíram no pensamento proposicional mudança de caráter consciente de S2. Eu sugiro que a chave para W é considerar o seu corpus como o esforço pioneiro em decifrar o nosso EP, vendo que ele estava descrevendo os dois usos de S1 e S2 e os jogos de linguagem múltipla de pensamento rápido e lento, e começando a partir de seu 3o período de obras e leitura inversão para o proto-Tractatus. Também deve ser claro que, na medida em que sejam coerentes e corretos, todas as contas de comportamento estão descrevendo os mesmos fenômenos e devem traduzir-se facilmente entre si. Assim, os temas recentemente elegantes de "mente incorporada" e "enactivismo radical" devem fluir diretamente de e para o trabalho de W (e eles fazem). No entanto, quase ninguém é capaz de seguir o seu exemplo de evitar jargão e aderindo a exemplos perspicíveis, por isso mesmo o Searle duvidado tem que ser filtrado e traduzido para ver que isso é verdade, e mesmo que ele não começa como completamente W antecipou o mais recente trabalhar em rápido e lento, dois-auto encarnado pensamento (escrita, falando, agindo). W também pode ser considerado como um pioneiro na linguística cognitiva evolucionária-que pode ser considerada como a análise top down da mente e sua evolução através da análise cuidadosa de exemplos de uso da linguagem no contexto. Ele expõe as muitas variedades de jogos de linguagem e as relações entre os jogos primários do verdadeiro-só inconsciente, pré ou protolinguístico pensamento rápido axiomático de percepção, memória e pensamento reflexivo, emoções e atos (muitas vezes descrito como o cérebro reptiliano cortical subcortical e primitivo primeiramente-Self, funções do neurônio do espelho), e o mais atrasado evoluiu habilidades conscientes lingüísticas mais elevadas do mudança de caráter cortical de acreditar, saber, pensar etc. que constituem o proposicional verdadeiro ou falso jogos de linguagem secundária de pensamento lento que são a rede de ilusões cognitivas que constituem a segunda personalidade de si, de que estamos tão enamorados. W dissepara centenas de jogos de linguagem mostrando como as verdadeiras percepções, memórias e ações reflexivas da classe S1 para o pensamento, lembrando e compreensão das disposições S2, e muitos de seus exemplos também abordam a questão da natureza/nutrir Explicitamente. Com essa perspectiva evolutiva, suas obras posteriores são uma revelação de tirar o fôlego da natureza humana que é inteiramente atual e nunca foi igualada. Muitas perspectivas têm valor heurístico, mas acho que essa perspectiva de dois sistemas evolutiva ilumina todo o comportamento mais elevado. Dobzhansky comentou: "nada na biologia faz sentido, exceto à luz da 37 evolução." E nada na filosofia faz sentido, exceto à luz da psicologia evolucionária. As idéias comuns (por exemplo, o subtítulo de um dos livros de Pinker "o material do pensamento: a língua como uma janela na natureza humana") que a língua é uma janela sobre ou algum tipo da tradução de nosso pensamento ou mesmo (Fodor) que deve haver alguma outra "língua do pensamento" de que h é uma tradução, foram rejeitadas por W (e do mesmo modo por S), que tentou mostrar, com centenas de continuamente reanalisados exemplos perspicazes da linguagem em ação, que a linguagem é a melhor imagem que podemos sempre começar a pensar, a mente ea natureza humana, e W ' s todo o corpus pode ser considerado como o desenvolvimento desta idéia. Muito antes de Searle, ele rejeitou a idéia de que o bottom up abordagens de Fisiologia, psicologia experimental e computação (por exemplo, behaviorismo, funcionalismo, forte AI, DYNAMIC Systems Theory, Computational Theory of MInd, etc.) poderia revelar o que seu top down desstructions de jogos de linguagem (LG) fez. As principais dificuldades que ele observou são para entender o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos (agora podemos ver isso como alheio ao sistema 1 (aproximadamente o que S chama de ' a ilusão fenomenológica ') e para capturar a imprecisao ("a maior dificuldade nestes investigações é encontrar uma maneira de representar a imprecisao "LPP1, 347). E assim, a fala (ou seja, as contrações musculares orais, a maneira principal que interagimos) não é uma janela na mente, mas é a própria mente, que é expressa por explosões acústicas sobre atos passados, presentes e futuros (isto é, nosso discurso usando a linguagem secundária evoluída mais tarde Jogos (SLG ' s) do segundo Self--as disposições--imaginando, sabendo, significando, acreditando, pretendendo etc.). Como com seus outros aforismos, eu sugiro que um deve levar a sério comentário W que, mesmo se Deus pudesse olhar em nossa mente, ele não conseguia ver o que estamos pensando-este deve ser o lema da mente incorporada e, como S torna claro, de psicologia cognitiva. Mas Deus podia ver o que estamos percebendo e lembrando e nosso pensamento reflexivo, uma vez que estas funções S1 são sempre estados mentais causais, enquanto as disposições S2 são apenas potencialmente CMS. Esta não é uma teoria, mas um fato sobre a nossa gramática e nossa fisiologia. S suja as águas aqui, porque ele se refere a disposições como estados mentais, bem como, mas como W fez há muito tempo, ele mostra que a linguagem da causalidade apenas não se aplica à ordem superior emergente S2 descrições - novamente não uma teoria, mas uma descrição sobre como a linguagem ( pensamento) funciona. Isso traz um outro ponto que é proeminente em W, mas negado por S, que tudo o que podemos fazer é dar descrições e não uma teoria. S insiste que ele está fornecendo teorias, mas é claro "teoria" e "Descrição" são jogos de linguagem também e parece-me que a teoria de S é geralmente a descrição de W-uma rosa por qualquer outro nome.... W ponto era que, aderindo aos exemplos perspicazes que todos nós sabemos ser verdadeiros relatos de nosso comportamento, evitamos a areia movediça de teorias que tentam dar conta de todo o comportamento (todos os jogos de linguagem), enquanto S quer generalizar e inevitavelmente se desviam (ele dá vários exemplos de seus próprios erros na PNC). Como S e outros infinitamente modificar suas teorias para dar conta dos jogos de linguagem multifasous eles ficam cada vez mais perto de descrever o comportamento por meio de inúmeros exemplos como fez W. 38 Alguns dos temas favoritos de W em seu segundo e seus três períodos são os diferentes (mas Interdigitating) LG de pensamento rápido e lento (sistema 1 e 2 ou aproximadamente jogos de linguagem primária (PLG ' s) e Secondary Language Games (SLG ' s) do interior e do exterior-ver por exemplo, Johnston-' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior ' sobre como confundir os dois é uma grande indústria em filosofia e Psicologia), a impossibilidade de linguagem privada e a estrutura axiomática de todo o comportamento. Verbos como ' pensar ', ' Ver ' primeiro descrito funções S1, mas como S2 evoluiu eles vieram a ser aplicado a ele também, levando a toda a mitologia do interior resultante de, por exemplo, tentando se referir a imaginar como se estivesse vendo fotos dentro do cérebro. Os PLG ' s são enunciados por e descrições de nosso involuntário, sistema 1, pensamento rápido, Neuron do espelho, verdadeiro somente, nonpropostional, Estados mentais-nossas percepções e memórias e atos involuntários (including o sistema 1 verdades e UA1 (compreensão da Agência 1) e Emotions1-como a alegria, o amor, a raiva) que podem ser descritos causalmente, enquanto o SLG evolutivamente mais tarde são expressões ou descrições de voluntários, sistema 2, pensamento lento, mentalizando neurônios, testável verdadeiro ou falso, proposicional, Truth2 e UA2 e Emotions2-alegria, amoroso, odiando, o mudança de caráter (e muitas vezes contrafactual) imaginar, supondo, pretendendo, pensando, sabendo, acreditando, etc, que só pode ser descrito em termos de razões (ou seja, é apenas um fato que tenta descrever o sistema 2 em termos de neuroquímica, física atômica, matemática, apenas não fazem sentido-ver W para muitos exemplos e Searle para boas dissertações sobre isso). Não é possível descrever as automatismos do sistema 1 em termos de razões (por exemplo, ' eu vejo que como uma maçã porque... ') a menos que você queira dar uma razão em termos de EP, genética, fisiologia, e como W demonstrou repetidamente que é sem sentido dar "explicações" com a condição de que eles vão fazer sentido no futuro-' nada está escondido '-eles fazem sentido agora ou nunca-(por exemplo, "o maior perigo aqui é querer observar a si mesmo." LWPP1, 459). Uma heurística poderosa é separar o comportamento e a experiência em intencionalidade 1 e intencionalidade 2 (por exemplo, pensar 1 e pensar 2, emoções 1 e emoções 2 etc.) e até mesmo em verdades 1 (T apenas axiomas) e verdades 2 (extensões empíricas ou "teoremas" que resultado da extensão lógica das verdades 1). W reconheceu que "nada está escondido"--ou seja, toda a nossa psicologia e todas as respostas a todas as perguntas filosóficas estão aqui em nossa língua (nossa vida) e que a dificuldade não é encontrar as respostas, mas para reconhecê-los como sempre aqui na frente de nós-nós só temos que parar de tentar olhar mais fundo. Uma vez que entendemos W, percebemos o absurdo de sobre a "filosofia da linguagem" como um estudo separado, além de outras áreas de comportamento, uma vez que a linguagem é apenas um outro nome para a mente. E, quando W diz que o comportamento de compreensão não é de modo algum dependente do progresso da psicologia (por exemplo, sua afirmação freqüentemente citada "a confusão e a esterilidade da psicologia não devem ser explicadas chamando-a de" ciência jovem "- 39 -mas cf. outro comentário que eu tenho nunca visto citado-"é o progresso científico útil para a filosofia? Certamente. As realidades que são descobertas iluminam a tarefa dos filósofos. Imaginando possibilidades. " (LWPP1, 807). Assim, ele não está legislando os limites da ciência, mas apontando que o nosso comportamento (principalmente fala) é a imagem mais clara possível de nossa psicologia e que todas as discussões de comportamento de ordem superior são atormentadas por confusões conceituais. FMRI, PET, TCMS, iRNA, análogos computacionais, AI e todo o resto são formas fascinantes e poderosas para estender nossa psicologia axiomática inata, para fornecer a base física para o nosso comportamento e facilitar a nossa análise de jogos de linguagem que, no entanto, permanecem unexplainable--EP é assim--e inalterado. Os axiomas true-only, mais exaustivamente explorados em ' on certeza ', são W (e posteriores Searle ' s) "Bedrock" ou "background", ou seja, a psicologia evolucionária, que são rastreáveis para as reações automatizadas true-only de bactérias e seus descendentes (por exemplo, seres humanos), que evoluíram e operam pelo mecanismo de aptidão inclusiva (IF)-Veja os soberbos "princípios da evolução social" de Bourke. W insistiu que devemos considerar a nossa análise de comportamento como descrições, em vez de explicações, mas é claro que estes também são complexos jogos de linguagem e descrição de uma pessoa é a explicação de outra. Começando com suas respostas inatas de verdade, não empíricas (automatizadas e não mutáveis) para o mundo, os animais estendem sua compreensão axiomática através de deduções em mais verdade apenas entendimentos ("teoremas" como poderíamos chamá-los, mas este é um complexo jogo de linguagem, mesmo no contexto da matemática). Tiranossauros e mesões tornam-se tão indesafiáveis quanto a existência das nossas duas mãos ou a nossa respiração. Isto muda dramaticamenteumavisão da natureza humana. Teoria da mente (Tom) não é uma teoria em tudo, mas um grupo de verdadeiros entendimentos da agência (UA um termo que eu concebeu 10 anos atrás) que os animais recém-nascidos (incluindo moscas e vermes se UA é apropriadamente definido) têm, e que subseqüentemente evolvidos extremamente (em eukaryotes mais elevados). No entanto, como eu notar aqui, W deixou muito claro que, para grande parte da intencionalidade existem sistema 1 e versões do sistema 2 (jogos de linguagem)-o rápido inconsciente UA1 e lento UA2 consciente e, claro, estes são heurística para fenômenos multifacetados. Embora a matéria-prima para S2 é S1, S2 também se alimenta de volta em S1 - maior feedback cortical para os níveis mais baixos de percepção, memória, pensamento reflexivo que é um fundamental da psicologia. Muitos dos exemplos de W explorar esta rua de dois sentidos (por exemplo, ver as discussões do pato/coelho e ' ver como ' em Johnston). A "teoria" da evolução deixou de ser uma teoria para qualquer pessoa normal, racional, inteligente antes do final do século XIX e para Darwin, pelo menos, meio século antes. Não se pode ajudar, mas incorporar Tyrannosaurus Rex e tudo o que é relevante para ele em nosso verdadeiro fundo apenas através do funcionamento 40 inexorável do EP. Uma vez que se obtém a lógica (psicológica) necessidadedeste, é verdadeiramente entorpecente que mesmo os mais brilhantes e os melhores parecem não compreender este fato mais básico da vida humana (com uma ponta do chapéu para Kant, Searle e alguns outros), que foi colocado em GRE em detalhe em "sobre certeza". Aliás, a equação da lógica e nossa psicologia axiomática é essencial para a compreensão de W e da natureza humana (como Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), mas afaik ninguém mais, aponta). Assim, a maioria de nossa experiência pública compartilhada (cultura) transforma-se uma extensão verdadeira-somente de nosso EP axiomático e não pode ser encontrado confundido sem ameaçar nossa sanidade. Futebol ou Britney Spears não pode simplesmente desaparecer da minha ou nossa memória e vocabulário como estes conceitos, idéias, eventos, desenvolvido a partir de e estão ligados a inúmeros outros na verdadeira única rede que começa com o nascimento e se estende em todas as direções para abranger grande parte do nosso consciência e memória. Um corolário, bem explicado pelo DMS e elucidado em sua própria maneira única por Searle, é que a visão cética do mundo e outras mentes (e uma montanha de outras bobagens, incluindo a ardósia em branco) não pode realmente obter uma posição, como "realidade" é o resultado de axiomas de pensamento rápido involuntários e proposições verdadeiras ou falsas não testáveis. Eu penso que é desobstruído que os axiomas verdadeiros-únicos inata W são ocupados com durante todo seu trabalho, e quase exclusivamente no OC (seu último trabalho "na certeza"), são equivalentes ao pensamento rápido ou ao sistema 1 que está no centro da pesquisa atual (por exemplo, veja Kahneman--" Pensando rápido e lento ", mas ele não tem idéia W estabeleceu a estrutura de cerca de 75 anos atrás), que é involuntário e inconsciente e que corresponde aos Estados mentais de percepção (incluindo UA1) e memória e atos involuntários, como W observa mais e mais em infinitas Exemplos. Um pôde chamar estes "reflexos intracerebral" (Talvez 99% de todo nosso cerebração se medido pelo uso da energia no cérebro). Nosso lento ou reflexivo, mais ou menos "consciente" (cuidado com outra rede de jogos de linguagem!) a segunda atividade cerebral do self corresponde ao que W caracterizou como "disposições" ou "inclinações", que se referem a habilidades ou ações possíveis, não são estados mentais ( ou não no mesmo sentido), e não têm qualquer tempo definido de ocorrência e/ou duração. Mas palavras de disposição como "saber", "entendimento", "pensar", "crer", que W discutido extensivamente, têm pelo menos dois usos básicos. Um é um uso filosófico peculiar (mas graduando-se em usos diários) exemplificado por Moore (cujos os papéis inspiraram W para escrever oC), que se referem às sentenças true-only resultando das percepções diretas e da memória, isto é, nossa psicologia axiomático inata S1 (' i Sei que estas são as minhas mãos), e o S2, que é o seu uso normal como disposições, que pode ser agido para fora, e que pode se tornar verdadeiro ou falso ("Eu sei o caminho de casa"). A investigação do pensamento rápido involuntário revolucionou a psicologia, a economia (por exemplo, o prêmio Nobel de Kahneman) e outras disciplinas nomes 41 como ilusões cognitivas, escorvamento, enquadramento, heurística e preconceitos. É claro que estes também são jogos de linguagem por isso haverá maneiras mais e menos úteis para usar essas palavras, e estudos e discussões irão variar de "puro" sistema 1 para combinações de 1 e 2 (a norma como W deixou claro), mas presumivelmente não nunca de lento sistema 2 mudança de caráter fina Rei apenas, uma vez que qualquer sistema 2 pensamento ou ação intencional não pode ocorrer sem envolver grande parte da intrincada rede de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferência", "reflexos intracerebral", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fundo" ou "Bedrock" (como W e mais tarde Searle chamar nosso EP). Um dos temas recorrentes de W foi o que agora é chamado de teoria da mente (TOM), ou como eu prefiro a compreensão da agência (UA), mas é claro que ele não usar esses termos, que é o assunto de grandes esforços de pesquisa agora. Eu recomendo consultar o trabalho de Ian Apperly, que é cuidadosamente dissecando UA1 e 2 e que recentemente se tornou consciente de um dos principais filósofos Wittgensteinian Daniel Hutto, desde Hutto tem agora caracterizado UA1 como uma fantasia (ou melhor, insiste que não há nenhuma ' teoria ' nem representação envolvida no UA1-que está sendo reservado para UA2). No entanto, como outros psicólogos, Apperly não tem idéia W lançou as bases para isso entre 60 e 80 anos atrás. Outro ponto feito inúmeras vezes por W foi que a nossa vida mental consciente é epifenomenal no sentido de que ele não descreve com precisão nem determinar como agimos - agora um pilar das ciências comportamentais. Veja "a ilusão fenomenológica" na PNC para um grande exemplo da filosofia. É um corolário óbvio da psicologia descritiva de W e S que são as automatismos inconscientes do sistema 1 que dominam e descrevem o comportamento e que as disposições conscientes mais tarde evoluíram (pensando, lembrando, amando, desejando, lamentando etc.) são meros cereja no bolo. Isto é mais notavelmente suportado pela mais recente psicologia experimental, alguns dos quais é muito bem resumido por Kahneman no livro citado (ver, por exemplo, o capítulo ' dois eus ', mas é claro que há um enorme volume de trabalho recente que ele não cita e um fluxo interminável de pop um d emissão de livros pro). É uma visão facilmente defensável que a maioria da literatura florescente sobre ilusões cognitivas, automatismos e pensamento de ordem superior é totalmente compatível com e direta deducible de W. Quanto à minha visão de W como o principal pioneiro no EP, parece que ninguém notou que ele explicou muito claramente várias vezes especificamente e muitas vezes de passagem, a psicologia por trás do que mais tarde tornou-se conhecido como o teste Wason-longo um esteio da pesquisa EP. Finalmente, permitam-me sugerir que, com esta perspectiva, W não é obscuro, difícil ou irrelevante, mas cintilante, profundo e cristalino, que ele escreve de forma aforisticamente e telegraficamente porque pensamos e se comportam dessa maneira, e que a falta dele é perder um dos as maiores aventuras intelectuais possíveis. Agora que temos um início razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a 42 psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana. Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e dispostos, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente sensíveis e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). Muitos gráficos complexos foram publicados por cientistas, mas eu encontrá-los de utilidade mínima quando se pensa sobre o comportamento (em oposição a pensar sobre a função cerebral). Cada nível de descrição pode ser útil em determinados contextos, mas acho que ser mais grosseira ou mais finos limites utilidade. A estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR), ou a estrutura lógica da mente (LSM), a estrutura lógica do comportamento (LSB), a estrutura lógica do pensamento (LST), a estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), a estrutura lógica da personalidade (LSP), a Psicologia descritiva da consciência (DSC), a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), intencionalidade o termo filosófico clássico. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Volition) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle) Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste"e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. Eu fiz uma explicação detalhada desta tabela em meus outros escritos. 43 44 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 45 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidas por Searle e outros como COS, representações, verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designados como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos 46 descrito os usos possíveis (significados, verdadeiros, Condições de Satisfaction) da linguagem em um contexto particular, temos esgotado o seu interesse, e tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastar mais longe da verdade. É fundamental notar que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. Aqueles que desejam um completo até à data conta de Wittgenstein, Searle e sua análise de comportamento da moderna dois sistemas de visão pode consultar o meu livro a estrutura lógica da filosofia, psicologia, mente e linguagem como revelado em Wittgenstein e Searle 2o Ed (2019). Agora, para alguns comentários sobre PNC Searle. Os ensaios em PNC são na maior parte já publicados durante a última década (embora alguns foram actualizados), junto com um artigo inéditos, e nada aqui virá como uma surpresa àqueles que mantiveram acima com seu trabalho. Como W, ele é considerado por muitos como o melhor filósofo standup de seu tempo e seu trabalho escrito é sólido como uma rocha e inovador por toda parte. No entanto, a sua incapacidade de tomar o mais tarde W sério o suficiente leva a alguns erros e confusões. Em P7 ele duas vezes observa que a nossa certeza sobre os fatos básicos é devido ao peso esmagador da razão apoiando nossas reivindicações, mas W mostrou definitivamente em ' sobre certeza ' que não há possibilidade de duvidar da verdadeira estrutura axiomática de nosso sistema 1 percepções, memórias e pensamentos, uma vez que ele próprio é a base para o julgamento e não pode ser julgado. Na primeira frase do P8, ele nos diz que a certeza é revisável, mas esse tipo de "certeza", que poderíamos chamar de Certainty2, é o resultado de estender nossa certeza axiomática e não revisável (Certainty1) através da experiência e é totalmente diferente como é proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso). Este é, naturalmente, um exemplo clássico da "batalha contra a bewitcaptação de nossa inteligência por linguagem", que W demonstrou uma e outra vez. Uma palavra-dois (ou muitos) usos distintos. Em P10, ele castigos W por sua antipatia a teorizar, mas como eu observou acima, ' teorizando ' é outro jogo de linguagem (LG) e há um vasto abismo entre uma descrição geral do comportamento com poucos exemplos bem trabalhados e um que emerge de um grande número de tal que eu s não sujeitos a muitos contraexemplos. Evolução em seus primeiros dias foi uma teoria com exemplos claros limitados, mas logo se tornou apenas um resumo de um vasto corpo de exemplos e uma teoria em um sentido bastante diferente. Da mesma forma, com uma teoria pode-se fazer como um resumo de mil páginas de exemplos de W e um resultante de dez páginas. Novamente, no P12, ' consciência ' é o resultado do funcionamento automatizado do sistema 1 que é "subjetivo" em vários sentidos bastante diferentes, e não, no caso normal, uma questão de evidência, mas uma verdadeira compreensão apenas em 47 nosso próprio caso e um verdadeiro-apenas percepção no caso de outros. Como eu li P13 eu pensei: "posso estar sentindo dor excruciante e ir em como se nada está errado?" Não! - Isto não seria "dor" no mesmo sentido. "A experiência interna está precisando de critérios externos" (W), e Searle parece perder isso. Veja W ou Johnston. Como eu li as próximas páginas, eu senti que W tem uma compreensão muito melhor da conexão mente/linguagem, como ele considera-los como sinônimo em muitos contextos, e seu trabalho é uma exposição brilhante da mente como exemplificada em inúmeros exemplos perspicazes de utilização do idioma. Como citado acima, "agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados com, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." E como explicado acima eu sinto que as perguntas com que S termina seção 3 são amplamente respondidas por considerar W ' s OC do ponto de vista dos dois sistemas. Da mesma forma, para a seção 6 sobre a filosofia da ciência. Rodych tem feito um artigo sobre Popper vs W que eu pensei soberba na época, mas vou ter que reler-lo para se certificar. Finalmente, em P25, pode-se negar que qualquer revisão de nossos conceitos (jogos de linguagem) de causação ou livre vontade são necessárias ou mesmo possível. Você pode ler apenas sobre qualquer página de W pelas razões. Uma coisa é dizer coisas bizarras sobre o mundo usando exemplos de mecânica quântica, incerteza, etc., mas é outro a dizer qualquer coisa relevante para o nosso uso normal de palavras. Em P31, 36 etc., nós encontramos outra vez os problemas incessantes (na filosofia e na vida) de palavras idênticas que lustro sobre as diferenças enormes no LG ' da crença ', ' Ver ' etc., como aplicado a S1 que é compor de estados mentais no presente somente, e S2 que não é. O resto do capítulo resume o seu trabalho sobre "cola social", que, a partir de uma perspectiva do PE, Wittgensteinian, é as ações rápidas automáticas de S1 produzindo as disposições lentas de S2 que são inexoravelmente e universalmente expandido durante o desenvolvimento pessoal em um vasto leque de relacionamentos deôntico inconscientes automáticos com outro, e arbitrariamente em variações cultural neles. Os capítulos 3 a 5 contêm seus argumentos bem conhecidos contra a visão mecânica da mente que me parecem definitivas. Eu li livros inteiros de respostas para eles e concordo com S que todos eles perdem a lógica muito simples (psicológico) pontos que ele faz (e que, em geral, W fez meio século antes, antes havia computadores). Para colocá-lo em meus termos, S1 é composto de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, nonpropostional, verdadeiros apenas estados mentais, enquanto S2 lenta só pode ser descrita de forma coerente em termos de razões para ações que são mais ou menos disposições conscientes para o comportamento (ações potenciais) que são ou podem se tornar proposicional (T ou F). Os computadores e o resto da natureza têm apenas a intencionalidade derivada que é dependente da nossa perspectiva, enquanto os animais mais elevados têm intencionalidade primária que é independente da perspectiva. Como S e W apreciam, a grande ironia é que essas reduções materialistas ou mecânicas da psicologia se disfarçam como ciência de ponta, mas na verdade elas 48 são totalmente anticientíficas. Filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e psicologia cognitiva (libertado da superstição) estão se tornando mão na luva e é Hofstadter, Dennett, Kurzweil etc, que são deixados de fora no frio. Página 62 bem resume um de seus argumentos, mas P63 mostra que ele ainda não muito deixar de ir a ardósia em branco como ele tenta explicar as tendências da sociedade em termos de extensões culturais de S2. Como ele faz em muitos outros lugares em seus escritos, ele dá razões culturais, históricas para o behaviorismo, mas parece bastante óbvio para mim (como era para W) que a visão mecânica da mente existe pela mesma razão que quase todo o comportamento-é a operação padrão do nosso EP que busca explicações em termos do que podemos deliberadamente pensar lentamente, em vez de no S1 automatizado, dos quais nós permanecemos principalmente alheio (ou seja, um exemplo do que Searle tem o nome de "a ilusão fenomenológica). Novamente, em p65 eu encontrar W descrição de nossa psicologia axiomático herdada e suas extensões em seu OC e outros trabalhos para ser mais profundo do que s (ou qualquer um), e por isso não estamos ' confiantes ' que os cães são conscientes, mas simnão é claro o que duvidando significa (o que cos estão lá que pode torná-lo falso?). Capítulo 5 muito bem demolir CTM, LOT etc, observando them ' Computação ', ' informações ', ' sintaxe ', ' algoritmo ', ' lógica ', ' programa ', etc, são observadores relativos (ou seja, psicológico) termos e não têm nenhum significado físico ou matemático neste sentido psicológico, mas é claro que há outros sentidos que têm sido dadas recentemente como a ciência se desenvolveu. Mais uma vez, as pessoas são enfeitiçadas pelo uso da mesma palavra em ignorar essa grande diferença em seu uso (significado). Todas as extensões do clássico Wittgenstein, e eu recomendo os papéis de Hutto também. O capítulo 6 "a ilusão fenomenológica" (TPI) é, de longe, o meu favorito, e, ao demolir a fenomenologia, mostra ambas as suas capacidades lógicas supremas e a sua incapacidade de captar o pleno poder de ambos os W posteriores, e o grande valor heurístico dos recentes investigação psicológica sobre os dois eus. É desobstruído como o cristal que TPI é devido ao Obliviousness aos automatismos de S1 e a tomar o pensamento consciente lento de S2 como não somente preliminar mas como tudo lá é. Esta é a clássica cegueira de ardósia em branco. Também é claro que W mostrou isso alguns 60 anos antes e também deu a razão para isso na primazia da verdadeira rede axiomática automática inconsciente do nosso sistema inata 1. Como tantos outros, Searle danças ao redor dele, mas nunca chega lá. Muito grosseiramente, em relação a ' observador independente ' características do mundo como S1 e ' observador dependente ' características como S2 deve revelar-se muito revelador. Como observa S, Heidegger e os outros têm a ontologia exatamente para trás, mas é claro que assim faz quase todos, devido aos padrões de seu EP. Mas a coisa realmente importante é que S não dar o próximo passo para perceber que o TPI não é apenas um fracasso de alguns filósofos, mas uma cegueira universal para o nosso EP que é próprio construído em EP. Ele realmente afirma isso em quase essas 49 palavras em um ponto, mas se ele realmente conseguiu como ele poderia deixar de apontar suas imensas implicações para o mundo. Com exceções raras (por exemplo, o jaina Tirthankaras que vai para trás sobre 5000 anos aos começos da civilização de Indus e mais recentemente e notavelmente Osho, Buddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, da livre John etc., nós somos todos os fantoches da carne que tropeço através da vida em nosso missão geneticamente programada para destruir a terra. Nossa preocupação quase total com o uso da segunda personalidade do self S2 para saciar as gratificações infantis de S1 é criar o inferno na terra. Como com todos os organismos, é apenas sobre a reprodução e acumulando recursos para isso. Sim, muito barulho sobre o aquecimento global e o iminente colapso da civilização industrial no próximo século, mas nada é susceptível de pará-lo. S1 escreve o jogo e S2 actua-o para fora. Dick e Jane só querem jogar casa-esta é a mamãe e este é o papai e isso e isso e este é o bebê. Talvez se possa dizer que TPI é que nós somos seres humanos e não apenas um outro primata. O capítulo 7 sobre a natureza do self é bom, mas nada realmente me pareceu novo. O capítulo 8 sobre o dualismo imobiliário é muito mais interessante, embora principalmente um rehash de seu trabalho anterior. O último de suas citações da abertura acima resume este acima, e naturalmente a insistência na natureza crítica da ontologia da primeira pessoa é totalmente Wittgensteinian. O único grande erro que eu vejo é a sua ardósia em branco ou (cultural) tipo de explicação sobre p 158 para os erros de dualismo, quando na minha opinião, é claramente um outro exemplo de TPIum erro que ele (e quase todos os outros) fez muitas vezes , e repete-se em p177 etc., no capítulo 9 de outra forma soberba. O programa de genes S1 que (principalmente) puxa as cordas (contrai os músculos) dos fantoches de carne via S2. Fim da história. Mais uma vez, ele precisa ler meus comentários sobre W ' s OC então ele muda a "boa razão para acreditar" na parte inferior do p171 e no topo do p172 para "sabe" (no verdadeiro sentido, ou seja, K1). Um ponto crítico é feito novamente em p169. "Assim, dizer algo e significar que envolve duas condições de satisfação. Primeiro, a condição de satisfação que a enunciação será produzida, e segundo, que a própria enunciação terá condições de satisfação. " Uma maneira de concernir isto é que o sistema automático inconsciente 1 ativa a personalidade consciente cortical mais elevada do sistema 2, trazendo sobre as contrações do músculo da garganta que informam outro que vê o mundo em determinadas maneiras, que o comprometem ao potencial Ações. Um enorme avanço sobre as interações pré-linguísticas ou protolingüísticas em que apenas os movimentos musculares brutos foram capazes de transmitir informações muito limitadas sobre intenções e S faz um ponto semelhante no capítulo 10. Seu último capítulo "a unidade da proposição" (anteriormente inéditos) também se beneficiaria muito de ler W "on certeza" ou dois livros do DMS sobre OC (ver meus comentários) como eles fazem claro a diferença entre verdadeiras frases apenas descrevendo S1 e verdadeiro ou falso proposições descrevendo S2. Isto golpeia-me como uma aproximação distante superior a S que tomam percepções S1 como 50 propostional desde que se transformam somente T ou F depois que um começa pensar sobre eles em S2. No entanto, o seu ponto que proposições permitem declarações de verdade real ou potencial e falsidade, do passado e do futuro e fantasia, e, assim, proporcionar um enorme avanço sobre a sociedade pré ou protolingüística, é cogente. Como ele afirma que "uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode determinar uma condição de satisfação... e uma condição de satisfação... é que tal e tal é o caso. " Ou, um precisa de adicionar, que pôde ser ou pôde ter sido ou pôde ser imaginado ser o caso. Globalmente, PNC é um bom resumo dos muitos avanços substanciais sobre Wittgenstein resultante do meio século S de trabalho, mas na minha opinião, W ainda é inigualável uma vez que você entender o que ele está dizendo. Idealmente, eles devem ser lidos juntos: Searle para a clara prosa coerente e generalizações, ilustrada com os exemplos perspicazes de W e aforismos brilhantes. Se eu fosse muito mais jovem, escreveria um livro fazendo exatamente isso. 51 Revisão de 'Metafilosofia de Wittgenstein' (Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy) por Paul Horwich 248p (2013) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (W) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo (psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade civil). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. Primeiro pode-se notar que colocar "meta" na frente de qualquer palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc, onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. Da mesma forma, o uso da palavra francesa ' repertório ', onde o repertório Inglês ' vai fazer muito bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora muito comum) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de HOT e Searle ' s estructura que eu esboçou aqui. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem o quadro de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. Ele precisa dar mais ênfase a "on certeza", recentemente o tema de muito esforço por Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Coliva e outros e resumidos em meus artigos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), 52 Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. Horwich é a primeira taxa e seu trabalho vale bem o esforço. Um espera que ele (e todos) estudará Searle e alguma psicologia moderna assim como Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, Stroll, Hacker e Baker etc. para alcançar uma vista moderna larga do comportamento. A maioria dos seus papéis estão em researchgate.net, libgen.is. b0ok.org, academia.edu e philpapers.org, etc. y por mas para PMS hacker ver http://info.sjc.Ox.AC.uk/SCR/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. Ele dá um dos mais belos resumos de onde uma compreensão de Wittgenstein nos deixa que eu já vi. "Não deve haver nenhuma tentativa de explicar a nossa atividade linguística/conceitual (PI 126) como na redução da aritmética à lógica de Frege; nenhuma tentativa de dar-lhe fundações epistemológica (PI 124) como no significado baseou contas de um conhecimento priori; nenhuma tentativa de caracterizar as formas idealizadas (PI 130) como lógicas de sentido; nenhuma tentativa de reforma (PI 124, 132) como na teoria de erro de Mackie ou no intuicionismo de Dummett; nenhuma tentativa de racionalizar (PI 133) como no relato da existência de Quine; nenhuma tentativa de torná-lo mais consistente (PI 132) como na resposta de Tarski aos paradoxos mentirosos; e nenhuma tentativa de torná-lo mais completo (PI 133) como na resolução de questões de identidade pessoal para cenários hipotéticos "Teleportation" bizarro. Finalmente, permitam-me sugerir que, com a perspectiva que tenho incentivado aqui, W está no centro da filosofia contemporânea e da psicologia e não é obscuro, difícil ou irrelevante, mas cintilante, profundo e cristalino e que a falta dele é perder um dos maiores aventuras intelectuais possíveis. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos does sistemas consultar meu livro "A estrutura lógica da filosofia, da psicologia, do mente e da língua em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle ' 2nd ed (2019). Aqueles interessados em mais de meus escritos podem ver "macacos falando--filosofia, psicologia, ciência, religião e política em um planeta condenado-artigos e revisões 2006-2019 3a Ed (2019) e delírios utópicos suicidas no 21St Século 5a Ed (2019) Horwich dá uma boa análise de Wittgenstein (w) e é um estudioso w líder, mas na minha opinião, todos eles estão aquém de uma apreciação plena, como eu explicar em comprimento nesta revisão e muitos outros. Se um não compreende W (e 53 preferivelmente Searle também) então eu não ver como um poderia ter mais do que uma compreensão superficial da filosofia e do pensamento mais elevado da ordem e assim de todo o comportamento complexo ((psychologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, literatura, sociedade). Em poucas palavras, W demonstrou que quando você tem mostrado como uma sentença é usada no contexto de interesse, não há nada mais a dizer. Vou começar com algumas citações notáveis e, em seguida, dar o que eu acho que são as considerações mínimas necessárias para entender Wittgenstein, filosofia e comportamento humano. "A confusão e a esterilidade da psicologia não devem ser explicadas chamando-a de" ciência jovem "; seu estado não é comparável com o da física, por exemplo, em seus começos. (Em vez disso, com a de certos ramos da matemática. Definir teoria.) Para em psicologia existem métodos experimentais e confusão conceitual. (Como no outro caso, confusão conceitual e métodos de prova). A existência do método experimental nos faz pensar que temos os meios para resolver os problemas que nos incomode; embora o problema eo método passar um outro por. Wittgenstein (PI p. 232) "Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder perguntas na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. " (BBB P18). "Mas eu não começ minha imagem do mundo satisfazendo-me de sua exatidão: nem eu tenho-a porque eu sou satisfeito de sua exatidão. Não: é o fundo herdado contra o qual eu distinguir entre verdadeiro e falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "O objetivo da filosofia é erguer uma parede no ponto onde a linguagem pára de qualquer maneira." Ocasiões filosóficas de Wittgenstein P187 "O limite da linguagem é mostrado por seu ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponde a (é a tradução de) uma sentença sem simplesmente repetir a sentença..." Wittgenstein CV P10 "Se tivermos em mente a possibilidade de uma imagem que, embora correta, não tem semelhança com o seu objeto, a interpolação de uma sombra entre a sentença ea realidade perde todo o ponto. Por enquanto, a sentença em si pode servir como uma sombra. A sentença é apenas uma imagem, que não tem a menor semelhança com o que ele representa. BBB p37 "Assim, podemos dizer de alguns matemáticos filosofias que eles obviamente não estão cientes dos muitos usos diferentes da palavra" prova; e que eles não são claros sobre as diferenças entre os usos da palavra "tipo", quando falam de tipos de números, tipos de prova, como se a palavra "tipo" aqui significava a mesma coisa que no contexto "tipos de maçãs." Ou, podemos dizer, eles não estão cientes dos diferentes significados da palavra "descoberta", quando em um caso falamos da descoberta da construção do Pentágono e no outro caso da descoberta do pólo Sul. " BBB P29 54 Estas citações não são escolhidos aleatoriamente, mas (junto com os outros em meus comentários) são um esboço do comportamento (natureza humana) de nossos dois maiores psicólogos descritivos. Ao considerar essas questões, devemos ter em mente que a filosofia é a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (HOT), que é outro dos fatos óbvios que são totalmente negligenciados-ou seja, eu nunca vi claramente afirmou em qualquer lugar. É aqui como o Scholar principal de Wittgenstein sumariou seu trabalho: "Wittgenstein resolveu muitos dos problemas profundos que obstinada nosso assunto por séculos, às vezes certamente por mais de dois milênios, problemas sobre a natureza da representação lingüística, sobre a relação entre o pensamento e a linguagem, sobre o solipsismo e o idealismo, o autoconhecimento e o conhecimento de outras mentes, e sobre a natureza da verdade necessária e das proposições matemáticas. Ele arado acima do solo da filosofia Européia da lógica e da língua. Ele nos deu um novo e imensamente frutífero conjunto de insights sobre a filosofia da psicologia. Ele tentou derrubar séculos de reflexão sobre a natureza da matemática e da verdade matemática. Ele minou a epistemologia fundalista. E ele nos deixou uma visão da filosofia como uma contribuição não para o conhecimento humano, mas para a compreensão humana-a compreensão das formas de nosso pensamento e das confusões conceituais em que somos susceptíveis de cair. " - Peter Hacker--' a interpretação tardia de Gordon Baker de Wittgenstein ' Eu adicionaria que W era o primeiro (por 40 anos) a descrever claramente e extensivamente os dois sistemas do pensamento--S1 pré-lingüístico automático rápido e o mudança de caráter lingüístico reflexivo lento S2. Ele explicou como o comportamento só é possível com um vasto fundo herdado que é a base axiomática para julgar e não pode ser duvidado ou julgado, assim que (escolha), consciência, auto, tempo e espaço são inatos verdadeiros-apenas axiomas. Ele discutiu muitas vezes o que agora é conhecido como teoria da mente, enquadramento e ilusões cognitivas. Ele freqüentemente explicou a necessidade do fundo inato e demonstrou como ele gera comportamento. Ele descreveu a psicologia por trás do que mais tarde se tornou o teste de Wason-uma medida fundamental usada nas décadas de pesquisa do EP mais tarde. Ele observou a natureza indeterminada da linguagem e a natureza do jogo-like de interação social. Ele examinou em milhares de páginas e centenas de exemplos como nossas experiências mentais internas não são describíveis na linguagem, sendo isso possível apenas para o comportamento público com uma linguagem pública (a impossibilidade da linguagem privada). Assim, ele pode ser visto como o primeiro psicólogo evolucionário. Ao pensar em Wittgenstein, costumo recordar o comentário atribuído ao professor de filosofia de Cambridge C.D. Broad (que não entendia nem como ele). "Não oferecer a cadeira da filosofia a Wittgenstein seria como não oferecer a cadeira da física a Einstein!" Eu penso nele como o Einstein da psicologia intuitiva. Embora nascido dez anos mais tarde, ele também estava chocando idéias sobre a natureza da realidade, quase ao mesmo tempo e na mesma parte do mundo e como Einstein quase morreu 55 na 1a. Agora suponha que Einstein foi um suicida homossexual com uma personalidade difícil que publicou apenas uma versão inicial de suas idéias que estavam confusas e muitas vezes confundidas, mas se tornaram mundialmente famosas; mudou completamente suas idéias, mas para os próximos 30 anos não publicou nada mais, e conhecimento de seu novo trabalho, na maioria de forma ilegível, difundia lentamente a partir de palestras ocasionais e notas de estudantes; que morreu em 1951 deixando para trás sobre 20.000 páginas de rabiscos na maior parte manuscritas no alemão, compor das sentenças ou dos parágrafos curtos com, frequentemente, nenhuma relação desobstruída às sentenças antes ou depois; que ele escreveu em um estilo socrático com 3 pessoas distintas no diálogo (na verdade, seus escritos devem ser chamados de trialogues, embora eu pareça ser o único a usar este termo)- o narrador, o interlocutor e o comentarista (geralmente el punta de vista de W), cujo comentários foram misturados pela maioria dos leitores, assim, completamente viciando todo o impulso elucidatório e terapêutico, que estes foram cortados e colados a partir de outros cadernos escritos anos antes, com notas nas margens, forros e palavras cruzadas, de modo que muitas frases têm múltiplas variantes; que seus executivos literários cortam essa massa indigestível em pedaços, deixando de fora o que eles desejavam e lutando com a tarefa monstruosa de capturar o significado correto das sentenças que estavam transmitindo visões totalmente inéditos de como o universo funciona e que eles em seguida, publicou este material com lentidão agonizante (não terminou depois de meio século) com prefácios que não continha nenhuma explicação real do que era sobre; que ele se tornou tão notório como famoso devido a muitas afirmações de que toda a física anterior foi um erro e até mesmo absurdo, e que praticamente ninguém entendeu seu trabalho, apesar de centenas de livros e dezenas de milhares de papéis discutindo isso; que muitos físicos sabiam apenas o seu trabalho precoce em que ele tinha feito uma somatória definitiva da física newtoniana afirmou em tal forma extremamente abstrata e condensada que era difícil decidir o que estava sendo dito; que ele era, então, praticamente esquecido e que a maioria dos livros e artigos sobre a natureza do mundo e os diversos temas da física moderna tinha apenas passar e referências geralmente errôneas para ele, e que muitos omitiu-o inteiramente; que até hoje, mais de meio século após sua morte, havia apenas um punhado de pessoas que realmente compreenderam as conseqüências monumentais do que ele tinha feito. Isto, eu afirme, é precisamente a situação com Wittgenstein. Antes de remarcar neste livro, vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), hacker (H) et al. Ele vai ajudar a ver os meus comentários de PNC (filosofia em um novo século), TLP, PI, OC, fazendo o mundo social (MSW) e outros livros por e sobre esses gênios, que fornecem uma descrição clara do comportamento de ordem superior não encontrado em livros de psicologia, que vou referir-se como o WS Quadro. Um tema importante em toda a discussão sobre o comportamento humano é a necessidade de separar os automatismos geneticamente programados dos efeitos da cultura. Todo o estudo do comportamento da ordem mais elevada é um esforço para provocar aparte não somente o S1 rápido e o pensamento S2 lento--por exemplo, percepções e outros automatismos contra disposições, mas as extensões de S2 na cultura (S3). O trabalho de Searle como um todo fornece uma 56 descrição impressionante do comportamento social S2/S3 da ordem mais elevada, quando o W mais atrasado mostrar como é baseado em axiomas inconscientes trueonly (verdade so) de S1 que evoluíram no pensamento proposicional mudança de caráter consciente de S2. S1 é as funções automatizadas simples de nosso involuntário, sistema 1, pensamento rápido, neuronio do espelho, verdadeiro-somente, não-proposicional, Estados mentais prelingüísticos-nossas percepções e memórias e atos reflexivos que incluem o sistema 1 verdades e UA1--compreensão de Agência 1--e Emotions1-como a alegria, o amor, a raiva) que podem ser descritos causalmente, enquanto as funções linguísticas evolutivamente posteriores são expressões ou descrições de voluntários, sistema 2, pensamento lento, mentalizando neurônios. Ou seja, de testável verdadeiro ou falso, proposicional, Truth2 e UA2 e Emotions2 (alegria, amor, odiando)-o disposicional (e muitas vezes contrafactual) imaginar, supondo, pretendendo, pensando, sabendo, acreditando, etc, que só pode ser descrito em termos de razões (ou seja, é apenas um fato que as tentativas de descrever o sistema 2 em termos de neuroquímica, física atômica, matemática, não fazem sentido-ver W, S, hacker, etc.). "Muitas palavras, então, neste sentido, então não têm um significado estrito. Mas isso não é um defeito. Pensar que é seria como dizer que a luz de minha lâmpada de leitura não é nenhuma luz real em tudo porque não tem nenhum limite afiado. " BBB P27 "A origem e a forma primitiva do jogo de linguagem é uma reação; Só a partir deste pode desenvolver formas mais complicadas. Língua-eu quero dizer-é um refinamento. "No início foi a escritura." CV P31 "Imagine uma pessoa cuja memória não poderia reter o que a palavra ' dor ' significavade modo que ele constantemente chamado de coisas diferentes por esse nome-mas, no entanto, usou a palavra de uma forma que se encaixe com os sintomas habituais e pressuposições da palavra ' dolor'-em suma, ele usou-o como todos nós fazemos. " PI P271 "Cada signo é capaz de interpretar, mas o significado não deve ser capaz de interpretar. É a última interpretação "BBB P34 "Há uma espécie de doença geral de pensamento que sempre procura (e encontra) o que seria chamado de um estado mental a partir do qual todos os nossos atos primavera, a partir de um reservatório." BBB p143 "E o erro que nós aqui e em mil casos semelhantes estão inclinados a fazer é rotulado pela palavra" para fazer "como temos usado na frase" não é nenhum ato de discernimento que nos faz usar a regra como nós " , porque há uma idéia de que "algo deve nos fazer" fazer o que fazemos. E isso novamente se junta à confusão entre causa e razão. Não precisamos ter nenhuma razão para seguir a regra como nós. A cadeia de razões tem um fim. " BBB p143 57 Palavras de disposição têm pelo menos dois usos básicos. Um é um uso filosófico peculiar (mas graduar-se em usos diários) que se refere às sentenças verdadeirassomente resultando das percepções diretas e da memória, isto é, nossa psicologia axiomático inata S1 (' Eu sei que estas são minhas mãos ')--isto é, eles são Causally Self Referencial (CSR)-chamado reflexivo ou intransitivo em BBB), e o uso S2, que é o seu uso normal como disposições, que pode ser agido para fora, e que pode se tornar verdadeiro ou falso ("Eu sei que o meu caminho de casa")-ou seja, eles têm condições de satisfação (COS) e não são CSR ( chamado transitivo no BBB). Segue-se tanto do trabalho do 3o período de W e da psicologia contemporânea, que ' vontade ', ' auto ' e ' consciência ' são elementos axiomático true-only de S1 composto de percepções e reflexos., e não há possibilidade (inteligibilidade) de demonstrar (de dando sentido) a sua falsidade. Como W fez tão maravilhosamente claro inúmeras vezes, eles são a base para o julgamento e por isso não pode ser julgado. Os verdadeiros axiomas da nossa psicologia não são probatórios. A evolução por aptidão inclusiva programou as ações causais reflexivas inconscientes de S1 que muitas vezes dão origem ao pensamento lento consciente de S2 (muitas vezes modificados nas extensões culturais do S3), que produz razões para a ação que muitas vezes resultam em ativação dos músculos do corpo e/ou da fala por S1 causando ações. O mecanismo geral é através da neurotransmissão e por mudanças em neuromoduladores em áreas específicas do cérebro. A ilusão cognitiva geral (chamada por S ' a ilusão fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' a ardósia em branco ' e por Tooby e Cosmides ' o modelo de ciência social padrão ') é que S2/S3 gerou a ação conscientemente por razões das quais estamos plenamente conscientes e em controle de, mas alguém familiarizado com a biologia moderna e psicologia pode ver que esta visão não é credível. Uma sentença expressa um pensamento (tem um significao), quando tem o COS desobstruído, isto é, condições públicas da verdade. Daí o comentário de W: "quando eu penso na linguagem, não há ' significados ' passando pela minha mente, além das expressões verbais: a língua é em si o veículo do pensamento." E, se eu pensar com ou sem palavras, o pensamento é o que eu (honestamente) dizer que é como não há outro critério possível (COS). Assim, os aforismos encantadores de W (p132 Budd) "é na língua que o desejo e a realização encontram-se" e "como tudo metafísico, a harmonia entre o pensamento e a realidade deve ser encontrada na gramática da língua." E pode-se notar aqui que ' gramática ' em W geralmente pode ser traduzido como EP e que, apesar de suas advertências freqüentes contra teorização e generalização, isso é tão ampla uma caracterização da psicologia descritiva de ordem superior (filosofia) como se pode encontrar. Embora W está correto que não há nenhum estado mental que constitui significado, S observa que há uma maneira geral de caracterizar o ato de significado-"orador significado... é a imposição de condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação "o que significa falar ou escrever uma frase bem formada expressando cos em um contexto que pode ser verdadeiro ou falso e este é um ato e não um estado mental. 58 Daí a famosa citação de W: "se Deus tivesse olhado em nossas mentes ele não teria sido capaz de ver lá quem nós estávamos falando de (PI P217)" e seus comentários que todo o problema da representação está contido em "That ' s him" e "... o que dá a imagem de sua interpretação é o caminho em que se encontra, "ou como S diz o seu cos. daí W ' s soma (p140 Budd) que" o que sempre acontece no final é que, sem qualquer significado adicional, ele chama o que aconteceu o desejo que isso deve acontecer "..." a pergunta se eu sei o que eu desejo antes que meu desejo esteja cumprido não pode surgir de todo. E o fato de que algum evento pára o meu desejo não significa que ele cumpre-lo. Talvez eu não deveria ter ficado satisfeito se o meu desejo tinha sido satisfeito "... Suponha que foi perguntado "Eu sei o que eu longo para antes de eu obtê-lo? Se eu aprendi a falar, então eu sei. Wittgenstein (W) é para mim facilmente o pensador mais brilhante sobre o comportamento humano. Ele mostra que o comportamento é uma extensão de axiomas inatos de true-only (ver "na certeza" para o seu tratamento prolongado final desta idéia) e que a nossa ratiocinação consciente emerge de maquinações inconsciente. Seu corpus pode ser visto como a base para toda a descrição do comportamento animal, revelando como a mente funciona e realmente deve funcionar. O "must" é implicado pelo fato de que todos os cérebros compartilham uma ascendência comum e genes comuns e por isso há apenas uma maneira básica que eles trabalham, que isso necessariamente tem uma estrutura axiomática, que todos os animais mais elevados compartilham a mesma psicologia evoluiu com base em inclusiva aptidão, e que em humanos isso é estendido em uma personalidade baseada em contrações musculares da garganta (linguagem) que evoluiu para manipular os outros. Eu sugiro que ele vai provar o maior valor para considerar o trabalho de W e a maioria de seus exemplos como um esforço para provocar além não só o pensamento rápido e lento (por exemplo, percepções vs disposiçõesVeja abaixo), mas a natureza e nutrir. "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós e nem explica nem Deduz nada... Pode-se dar o nome de ' filosofia ' ao que é possível antes de todas as novas descobertas e invenções. " PI 126 "Quanto mais estreita examinarmos a linguagem real, o mais nítido se tornará o conflito entre ele e nossa exigência. (Para a pureza cristalina da lógica era, naturalmente, não um resultado da investigação: era uma exigência.) " PI 107 "A concepção errada que eu quero opor neste connexion é o seguinte, que nós podemos descobrir algo inteiramente novo. Isso é um engano. A verdade da questão é que já temos tudo, e que temos realmente presente, não precisamos esperar por nada. Nós fazemos nossos movimentos no Reino da gramática de nossa língua ordinária, e esta gramática já está lá. Assim, já temos tudo e não precisamos esperar o futuro. " (dito em 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein e o círculo de Viena (1979) P183 59 "Aqui nós chegamos a um fenômeno notável e característico na investigação filosófica: a dificuldade---eu poderia dizer---não é a de encontrar a solução, mas sim a de reconhecer como a solução algo que parece que era apenas um preliminar a ele. Já dissemos tudo. Não---nada que se segue a partir deste, não esta em si é a solução! .... Isto está ligado, creio eu, com o nosso erroneamente esperando uma explicação, enquanto a solução da dificuldade é uma descrição, se lhe damos o lugar certo em nossas considerações. Se nos debruçar sobre ele, e não tentar ir além dele. Zettel p312-314 "Nosso método é puramente descritivo, as descrições que damos não são dicas de explicações." BBB p125 "Para a clareza que estamos visando é realmente completa clareza. Mas isso simplesmente significa que os problemas filosóficos devem desaparecer completamente. " PI P133 W também pode ser considerado como um pioneiro na linguística cognitiva evolucionária - a análise top down (de cima para baixo) da mente e sua evolução através da análise cuidadosa de exemplos de uso de linguagem no contexto, expondo as muitas variedades de jogos de linguagem e as relações entre os jogos preliminares do pensamento rápido inconsciente, axiomático do verdadeiro-somente da percepção, da memória e de emoções e de atos reflexivos (descritos frequentemente como as funções do primeiro-auto do cérebro reptiliano cortical subcorticais e primitivo), e o mais atrasado evoluiu cortical mais elevada capacidades conscientes disposicionais de crer, saber, pensar etc. que constituem os verdadeiros ou falsos jogos de linguagem secundária proposicional de pensamento lento que incluem a rede de ilusões cognitivas que constituem a base do nosso segundo-Self Personalidade. Ele disse para centenas de jogos de linguagem mostrando como as verdadeiras percepções, memórias e ações reflexivas do sistema de um (S1) grau para o pensamento, lembrando e compreensão do sistema de duas (S2) disposições, e muitos de seus exemplos também abordar o natureza/nutrir a questão explicitamente. Com essa perspectiva evolutiva, suas obras posteriores são uma revelação de tirar o fôlego da natureza humana que é inteiramente atual e nunca foi igualada. Muitas perspectivas têm valor heurístico, mas acho que essa visão de dois sistemas evolutiva é a melhor. Parafraseando o famoso comentário de Dobzhansky: "nada na filosofia faz sentido, exceto à luz da psicologia evolucionária". As idéias comuns (por exemplo, o subtítulo de um dos livros de Pinker "o material do pensamento: a língua como uma janela na natureza humana") que a língua é uma janela sobre ou algum tipo da tradução de nosso pensamento ou mesmo (Fodor) que deve haver alguma outra "língua do pensamento" de que h é uma tradução, foram rejeitadas por W, que tentou mostrar, com centenas de continuamente reanalisados exemplos perspicazes da linguagem em ação, que a linguagem não é apenas a melhor imagem que podemos sempre começar a pensar, a mente e a natureza humana, mas a fala é a mente , e todo o seu corpus pode ser considerado como o desenvolvimento desta ideia. Ele rejeitou a idéia de que o bottom up (de baixo para cima) abordagens 60 de fisiologia, experimento Al psicologia e computação (teoria computacional da mente, ai forte, teoria dos sistemas dinâmicos, funcionalismo, etc.) poderia revelar o que suas análises de jogos de linguagem ( LG) fez. As dificuldades que ele observou são para entender o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos e para capturar a imprecisão ("a maior dificuldade nessas investigações é encontrar uma maneira de representar a imprecisao" LWPP1, 347). Ele reconheceu que ' nada esta escondido ' i. e., toda a nossa psicologia e todas as respostas a todas as perguntas filosóficas estão aqui em nossa língua (nossa vida) e que a dificuldade não é encontrar as respostas, mas reconhecê-los como sempre aqui na nossa frente-nós só temos que parar de tentar olhar mais profundamente e abandonar o mito do acesso introspectivo à nossa "vida interior" (por exemplo, "o maior perigo aqui é querer observar a si mesmo." LW459). Aliás, a equação da lógica ou gramática e nossa psicologia axiomática é essencial para a compreensão de W e da natureza humana (como DMS, mas ate agora sei ninguém mais, aponta). "Algumas das características lógicas mais importantes da intencionalidade estão além do alcance da fenomenologia porque não têm realidade fenomenológica imediata... Porque a criação de significado fora da falta de sentido não é conscientemente experimentado... Não existe... Isto é... a ilusão fenomenológica. " Searle PNC p115-117 "... a relação intencional básica entre a mente e o mundo tem a ver com as condições de satisfação. E uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode estar em uma relação intencional com o mundo, e uma vez que essas relações intencionais sempre determinam condições de satisfação, e uma proposição é definida como qualquer coisa suficiente para determinar as condições de satisfação, verifica-se que toda a intencionalidade é uma questão de proposições. Searle PNC p193 "O estado intencional representa suas condições de satisfação... as pessoas erroneamente supor que cada representação mental deve ser conscientemente pensado... Mas a noção de uma representação como eu estou usando é uma noção funcional e não ontológica. Tudo o que tem condições de satisfação, que pode suceder ou falhar de uma forma que é característico da intencionalidade, é, por definição, uma representação de suas condições de satisfação... Podemos analisar a estrutura da intencionalidade dos fenômenos sociais analisando suas condições de satisfação. " Searle MSW P28-32 "A superstição não é mais que crença no nexo causal." TLP 5,1361 "Agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." BBB P6 "Sentimos que mesmo quando todas as possíveis questões científicas foram respondidas, os problemas da vida permanecem completamente intocados. 61 Naturalmente, não há então nenhuma pergunta deixada, e esta própria é a resposta. " TLP 6,52 "Absurdo, absurdo, porque você está fazendo suposições em vez de simplesmente descrever. Se sua cabeça é assombrada por explicações aqui, você está negligenciando a lembrar-se dos fatos mais importantes. " Z 220 A nossa experiência pública partilhada torna-se uma verdadeira extensão do nosso EP axiomático e não pode ser encontrada equivocada sem ameaçar a nossa sanidade. Ou seja, as conseqüências de um S1 ' erro ' são bastante diferentes de um erro S2. Um corolário, bem explicado pelo DMS e elucidado em sua própria maneira única por Searle, é que a visão cética do mundo e outras mentes (e uma montanha de outras bobagens, incluindo a ardósia em branco –'blank slate') não pode realmente obter uma posição, como "realidade" é o resultado de axiomas involuntários e não testáveis verdadeiras ou falsas proposições. A investigação do pensamento rápido involuntário revolucionou a psicologia, a economia (por exemplo, o prêmio Nobel de Kahneman) e outras disciplinas nomes como ilusões cognitivas, escorvamento, enquadramento, heurística e preconceitos. É claro que estes também são jogos de linguagem, por isso haverá maneiras mais e menos úteis para usar essas palavras, e estudos e discussões irão variar de "puro" sistema 1 para combinações de 1 e 2 (a norma como W deixou claro), mas presumivelmente nem sempre apenas o pensamento disposicional lento do Sistema 2, uma vez que qualquer sistema 2 pensamento ou ação intencional não pode ocorrer sem envolver grande parte da intrincada rede de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferência", "reflexos intracerebrais", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "background" ou "bedrock" (como W e mais tarde Searle chamar nosso EP). Um dos temas recorrentes de W foi TOM, ou como eu prefiro UA (Entendimento da Agência). Ian Apperly, que está analisando cuidadosamente UA1 e UA2 em experimentos, tornou-se recentemente consciente de Hutto, que tem caracterizado UA1 como uma fantasia (ou seja, nenhuma ' teoria ' nem representação envolvida em UA1--que sendo reservado para UA2-ver a minha revisão de seu livro com Myin). No entanto, como outros psicólogos, Apperly não tem idéia W lançou as bases para este 80 anos atrás. É uma visão facilmente defensável que o núcleo da literatura florescente sobre ilusões cognitivas, automatismos e pensamento de ordem superior é compatível com e direta deducible de W. Apesar do fato de que a maioria dos acima tem sido conhecido por muitos por décadas (e até mesmo 3/4 de um século no caso de alguns dos ensinamentos de W), eu nunca vi nada se aproximando de uma discussão adequada em textos de ciência comportamental e comumente há apenas uma menção. Agora que temos um início razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento 62 que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana. Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e dispostos, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente sensíveis e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). Muitos gráficos complexos foram publicados por cientistas, mas eu encontrá-los de utilidade mínima quando se pensa sobre o comportamento (em oposição a pensar sobre a função cerebral). Cada nível de descrição pode ser útil em determinados contextos, mas acho que ser mais grosseira ou mais finos limites utilidade. A estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR), ou a estrutura lógica da mente (LSM), a estrutura lógica do comportamento (LSB), a estrutura lógica do pensamento (LST), a estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), a estrutura lógica da personalidade (LSP), a Psicologia descritiva da consciência (DSC), a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), intencionalidade o termo filosófico clássico. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Volition)(Vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste" e " mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. 63 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 64 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidas por Searle e outros como COS, representações, verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designados como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então 65 Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. É fundamental notar que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. Aqueles que desejam um completo até à data conta de Wittgenstein, Searle e sua análise de comportamento da moderna dois sistemas de visão pode consultar o meu livro a estrutura lógica da filosofia, psicologia, mente e linguagem como revelado em Wittgenstein e Searle 2ND Ed (2019). EXPLICAÇÃO da tabela sistema 1 (ou seja, emoções, memória, percepções, reflexos) que partes do cérebro presente à consciência, são automatizadas e geralmente acontecendo em menos de 500msec, enquanto o sistema 2 são habilidades para executar ações deliberativas lentas tha t são representados na consciência (S2D-minha terminologia) exigindo mais de 500msec, mas freqüentemente repetido ações S2 também pode se tornar automatizado (S2A-minha terminologia). Há uma gradação da consciência do coma através dos estágios do sono à consciência cheia. Memória inclui memória de curto prazo (memória de trabalho) do sistema 2 e memória de longo prazo do sistema 1. Para volições um diria geralmente que são bem sucedidos ou não, um pouco do que T ou F. Claro, as várias linhas e colunas são logicamente e psicologicamente conectadas. E.G., emoção, memória e percepção na linha verdadeira ou falsa será verdadeiro apenas, descreverá um estado mental, pertencem ao sistema cognitivo 1, geralmente não será iniciada voluntariamente, são causalmente auto reflexiva, causa origina no mundo e provoca mudanças na a mente, têm uma duração precisa, mudança de intensidade, ocorrem aqui e agora, geralmente têm uma qualidade especial, não precisa de linguagem, são independentes de inteligência geral e memória de trabalho, não são inibidos pelo carregamento cognitivo, não terá conteúdo voluntário, e não terá condições públicas de satisfação, etc. Haverá sempre ambiguidades porque as palavras não podem corresponder precisamente às funções complexas reais do cérebro (comportamento), ou seja, há uma explosão combinatória de contextos (em sentenças e no mundo), e é por isso que não é possível reduzir mais comportamento de ordem a um sistema de leis que teriam de indicar todos os contextos possíveis – daí os avisos de Wittgenstein contra teorias. Cerca de um milhão de anos atrás, os primatas evoluíram a capacidade de usar seus músculos da garganta para fazer séries complexas de ruídos (ou seja, discurso primitivo) para descrever eventos presentes (percepções, memória, ações reflexivas e alguns jogos de linguagem primária ou primitiva (PLG ' s). O sistema 1 é constituído por estados mentais rápidos, automatizados, subcorticais, não representacionais, causalmente autorreferenciais, intransitivos, sem informações, verdadeiros, apenas com um tempo e localização precisos) e, ao longo do tempo, evoluiu em S2 cortical 66 superior com a capacidade de descrever deslocamentos no espaço e no tempo (condicionais, hipotéticos ou ficcionais) de eventos potenciais (o passado e o futuro e, muitas vezes, preferências contrafactuais, condicionais ou ficcionais, inclinações ou disposições-o secundário ou Sofisticados jogos de linguagem (SLG ' s) do sistema 2 lenta, cortical, consciente, contendo informações, transitivas (tendo condições públicas de satisfação-Searle termo para os verdadeiros criadores ou significado que eu dividir em COS1 e COS2 para privado S1 e S2 público), representacional - que eu novamente dividimos em R1 para representações S1 e R2 para S2), pensamento atitudinais proposicional verdadeiro ou falso, com todas as funções S2 não tendo tempo preciso e sendo habilidades e não estados mentais. Preferências são intuições, tendências, regras ontológicas automáticas, comportamentos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, traços de personalidade, modelos, motores de inferência, inclinações, emoções, atitudes proposicional, avaliações, capacidades, hipóteses. Algumas emoções estão lentamente desenvolvendo e mudando os resultados das disposições S2 (W RPP2 148), enquanto outros são típicos S1 - rápido e automático para aparecer e desaparecer. "Eu acredito", "ele ama", "eles pensam" são descrições de possíveis atos públicos tipicamente discolocados no espaço-tempo. Minhas declarações em primeira pessoa sobre mim são verdadeiras-apenas (excluindo mentir)-ou seja, S1, enquanto declarações de terceira pessoa sobre os outros são verdadeiras ou falsas-ou seja, S2 (ver meus comentários de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensando o Inner ' e de Budd ' Filosofia da psicologia de Wittgenstein '). As "Preferências" como uma classe de Estados intencionais--oposto às percepções, aos atos reflexivos e às memórias--foram descritas primeiramente claramente por Wittgenstein (W) nos 1930 ' s e denominados "inclinações" ou "dispositions". Eles têm sido comumente denominado "atitudes proposicional" desde Russell pero esta é uma frase enganosa Since acreditando, pretendendo, sabendo, lembrando etc., muitas vezes não são proposições nem atitudes, como tem sido demonstrado, por exemplo, por W e por Searle (por exemplo, cf. consciência e linguagem P118). São representações públicas intrínsecas e independentes do observador (em oposição a deNS ou representações do sistema 1 ao sistema 2 – Searle-C + L p53). Eles são atos potenciais deslocados no tempo ou no espaço, enquanto as memórias de percepções S1 evolutivamente mais primitivas e ações reflexivas estão sempre aqui e agora. Esta é uma maneira de caracterizar o sistema 2-o segundo grande avanço na psicologia de vertebrados após o sistema 1 - a capacidade de representar eventos e pensar neles como ocorrendo em outro lugar ou tempo (a terceira faculdade de imaginação contrafactual de Searle completando cognição e volição). S1 ' pensamentos ' são estados mentais potenciais ou inconscientes de S1--Searle--questões de Phil 1:45-66 (1991). Percepções, memórias e ações reflexivas (automáticas) podem ser dedescrito como S1 ou LG primário (plg ' s--por exemplo, eu vejo o cão) e há, no caso normal, nenhum teste possível para que eles possam ser true only (verdade so). As disposições podem ser descrivos como LG secundário (SLG-por exemplo, eu acredito que eu vejo o cão) e também deve ser agido para fora, mesmo para mim no 67 meu próprio caso (ou seja, como eu sei o que eu acredito, acho, sentir até que eu agir ou algum evento ocorre-Ver os meus comentários de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior' e Budd ' Filosofia de Wittgenstein de Psicologia '). Note bem que as disposições também se tornam ações quando falado ou escrito, bem como sendo agido de outras maneiras, e essas idéias são todos devido a Wittgenstein (meados de 1930) e não são behaviorismo (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein pode ser considerado como o fundador da psicologia evolutiva e seu trabalho uma investigação única sobre o funcionamento da nossa psicologia axiomático System 1 e sua interação com o sistema 2. Depois que Wittgenstein lançou as bases para a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior nos livros azul e marrom no início dos anos 30, foi estendido por John Searle, que fez uma versão mais simples desta tabela em seu livro clássico racionalidade em ação (2001). Ele se expande na pesquisa de W da estrutura axiomática da psicologia evolutiva desenvolvida a partir de seus primeiros comentários em 1911 e tão lindamente dispostos em seu último trabalho sobre certeza (OC) (escrito em 1950-51). OC é a pedra fundamental do comportamento ou epistemologia e ontologia (indiscutivelmente o mesmo), linguística cognitiva ou pensamento de ordem superior, e na minha opinião o trabalho mais importante na filosofia (psicologia descritiva) e, portanto, no estudo do comportamento. Percepção, memória, ações reflexivas e emoção são primitivos parcialmente subcorticais involuntários estados mentais, que podem ser descritos em PLG ' s, em que a mente se encaixa automaticamente no mundo (é causally auto referential--Searle)-o inquestionável, verdade apenas , a base axiomática da racionalidade sobre a qual não é possível controlar). Preferências, desejos e intenções são descrições de pensamento lento consciente habilidades voluntárias-que podem ser descritos em SLG ' s-em que a mente tenta caber o mundo. O behaviorismo e todas as outras confusões da nossa psicologia descritiva padrão (filosofia) surgem porque não podemos ver S1 trabalhando e descrever todas as ações como SLG ' s (a ilusão fenomenológica - TPI - Searle). W entendeu isso e descreveuo com clareza inigualável com centenas de exemplos de linguagem (a mente) em ação ao longo de suas obras. Razão tem acesso à memória e por isso usamos conscientemente aparente, mas muitas vezes incorreto razões para explicar o comportamento (os dois eus ou sistemas ou processos de pesquisa atual). Crenças e outras disposições podem ser descritas como pensamentos que tentam corresponder aos fatos do mundo (mente para a direção Mundial do ajuste), enquanto Volitions (volições) são intenções de agir (intenções anteriores-PI, ou intenções em ação-IASearle) mais atos que tentam corresponder ao mundo aos pensamentos - sentido do mundo à mente do ajuste - cf. Searle por exemplo, C + L p145, 190). Às vezes, há lacunas no raciocínio para chegar à crença e outras disposições. Palavras de disposição podem ser usadas como substantivos que parecem descrever estados mentais (' meu pensamento é... ') ou como verbos ou adjetivos para descrever habilidades (agentes como eles agem ou podem agir-' Eu acho que...) e são muitas vezes incorretamente chamados de "atitudes proposicional". As percepções tornamse memórias e nossos programas inatos (módulos cognitivos, moldes, motores da inferência de S1) usam estes para produzir disposições - (acreditando, sabendo, compreendendo, pensando, etc.,-atos públicos reais ou potenciais (língua, 68 pensamento, mente) também chamado de inclinações, preferências, capacidades, representações de S2) e Volition-e não há nenhuma linguagem (conceito, pensamento) de estados mentais privados para pensar ou dispostos (ou seja, sem língua privada, pensamento ou mente). Os animais mais elevados podem pensar e agir e, nessa medida, têm uma psicologia pública. PERCEPCIONES: ("X" é verdadeiro): ouvir, ver, cheirar, dor, toque, temperatura Memórias: lembrando, sonhando? PREFERENCIAS, INCLINACAOS, DISPOSICIONES (X pode se tornar verdadeiro): CLASSE 1: Proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso) atos públicos de crer, julgar, pensar, representar, compreender, escolher, decidir, preferir, interpretar, conhecer (incluindo habilidades e habilidades), atendendo (aprendendo), experimentando, significando, lembrando, eucuidando, considerando, desejando, esperando, desejando, querendo, esperando (uma classe especial), vendo como (aspectos), CLASSE 2: Modo Descoplado -(como se, condicional, hipotético, fictício)-sonhando, imaginando, mentindo, prevendo, duvidando CLASSE 3: Emoções: amando, odiando, temendo, tristeza, alegria, ciúme, depressão. Sua função é modular preferências para aumentar a aptidão inclusiva (utilidade máxima esperada), facilitando o processamento de informações de percepções e memórias para uma ação rápida. Há alguma separação entre as emoções S1, como raiva e medo e S2, como amor, ódio, nojo e raiva. DESEJOS: (eu quero "X" para ser verdade-eu quero cambio o mundo para caber meus pensamentos): saudade, esperando, esperando, aguardando, precisando, exigindo, obrigados a fazer intenções: (eu vou fazer "X" verdade) pretendendo AÇÕES (estou fazendo "X" verdade): agindo, falando, lendo, escrevendo, calculando, persuadir, mostrando, demonstrando, convencendo, fazendo tentando, tentando, rindo, brincando, comendo, bebendo, chorando, afirmando (descrevendo, ensinando, prevendo, relatórios), prometendo, fazendo ou usando mapas, livros, desenhos, programas de computador-estes são públicos e voluntários e transferir informações para os outros para que eles dominam sobre os reflexos inconsciente, involuntário e sin information S1 em explicações de comportamento. PALAVRAS EXPRESSAM AÇÕES POTENCIAIS COM VÁRIAS FUNÇÕES EM NOSSA VIDA E NÃO SÃO OS NOMES DOS OBJETOS NEM DE UM ÚNICO TIPO DE EVENTO. As interações sociais dos seres humanos são governadas por módulos cognitivos - aproximadamente equivalentes aos roteiros ou esquinas da psicologia social (grupos de neurônios organizados em motores de inferência), que, com percepções e memórias, levam à formação de as preferências que conduzem às intenções e então às ações. Intencionalidade ou psicologia intencional pode ser tomado para ser todos 69 esses processos ou apenas as preferências que levam a ações e no sentido mais amplo é o tema da psicologia cognitiva ou Neurociências Cognitivas, quando incluindo a neurofisiologia, neuroquímica e neurogenética. A psicologia evolutiva pode ser considerada como o estudo de todas as funções precedentes ou da operação dos módulos que produzem comportamento, e é então coextensivo na evolução, desenvolvimento e ação individual com preferências, intenções e ações. Uma vez que os axiomas (algoritmos ou módulos cognitivos) da nossa psicologia estão em nossos genes, podemos ampliar nosso entendimento, dando descrições claras de como eles funcionam e podem ampliá-los (cultura) através da biologia, psicologia, filosofia (Psicologia descritiva), matemática, lógica, física e programas de computador, tornando-os mais rápidos e eficientes. Hajek (2003) dá uma análise das disposições como probabilidades condicionais que são algorithmatizado por Rott (1999), Spohn etc. Intencionalidade (psicologia cognitiva ou evolucionária) consiste em vários aspectos do comportamento que são programados em módulos cognitivos que criam e exigem consciência, vontade e auto e em adultos humanos normais quase todos, exceto percepções e algumas memórias são purposive, exigir atos públicos (por exemplo, linguagem), e comprometer-nos a relacionamentos, a fim de aumentar a nossa aptidão inclusiva (máximo esperado utilidade--a maximização da utilidade Bayesiana, mas Bayesianismo é altamente questionável) através de dominância e altruísmo recíproco (desejo independente razões para ação-Searle-que eu dividir em DIRA1 e DIRA2 para S1 e S2) e impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfaçãoSearle-(ou seja, relacionar pensamentos para o mundo através de atos públicos (músculo movimentos – isto é, matemática, língua, arte, música, sexo, desporto, etc.). Os fundamentos deste foram figurados para fora por nosso maior psicólogo natural Ludwig Wittgenstein da década de 1930 para 1951, mas com prefigurasas claras de volta para 1911, e com refinamentos por muitos, mas acima de tudo por John Searle começando na 1960. "A árvore geral dos fenômenos psicológicos. Eu não me esforço para a exatidão, mas para uma visão do todo. RPP Vol 1 p895 CF Z p464. Muito do intencionalidade (isto é, de nossos jogos da língua) admite dos graus. Como observou W, as inclinações são às vezes conscientes e deliberativas. Todos os nossos modelos (funções, conceitos, jogos de linguagem) têm bordas difusas em alguns contextos, como eles devem ser úteis. Há pelo menos dois tipos de pensamento (ou seja, dois jogos de linguagem ou formas de usar o verbo disposicional "pensar") - não racional sem consciência e racional com consciência parcial (W), agora descrita como o pensamento rápido e lento de S1 e S2. É útil considerar estes como jogos de linguagem e não como meros fenômenos (W RPP vol2 p129). Os fenômenos mentais (nossas experiências subjetivas ou internas) são epifenomenais, faltam critérios, daqui faltam a informação mesmo para a si mesmo e assim não podem jogar nenhum papel na comunicação, no pensamento ou na mente. Pensar como todas as disposições (inclinações, atitudes proposicional) carece de qualquer teste, não é um estado mental (ao contrário das percepções de S1), e não contém nenhuma informação até que se torne um ato público na fala, escrita ou outras contrações musculares. Nossas percepções e memórias podem ter a informação (significado i. e., um COS público) somente quando se manifestam em ações públicas, porque somente então o pensamento, o sentimento etc. têm algum significado (conseqüências) mesmo para 70 nos. (Memória e percepção são integrados por módulos em disposições que se tornam psicologicamente eficazes quando eles são agiram em cima). Desenvolver linguagem significa manifestar a habilidade inata de substituir a palavras por atos. TOM (teoria da mente) é muito melhor chamado UA-Entendimento da Agência-o meu termo-e UA1 e UA2 para tais funções em S1 e S2)-e também pode ser chamado de psicologia evolucionária ou intencionalidade o inata geneticamente programado produção da consciência, do self, e do pensamento que conduz às intenções e então às ações contratando os músculos. Assim, "atitude proposicional" é um termo confuso para o normal intuitivo racional S2D ou não racional automatizado S2A discurso e ação. Vemos que os esforços da ciência cognitiva para entender o pensamento, as emoções, etc., estudando a neurofisiologia não vai nos dizer nada mais sobre como a mente (pensamento, linguagem) funciona (em oposição a como o cérebro funciona) do que já saber, porque "mente" (pensamento, linguagem) já está em plena visão pública (W). Quaisquer fenômenos que estão escondidos in neurofisiologia, bioquímica, genética, mecânica quântica, ou teoria das cordas, são tão irrelevante para a nossa vida social como o fato de que uma tabela é composta de átomos que "obedecer" (pode ser descrito por) as leis da física e da química é almoçar nele. Como W tão famosamente disse "nada está escondido". Tudo de interesse sobre a mente (pensamento, linguagem) está aberto para ver se só examinamos cuidadosamente o funcionamento da linguagem. A linguagem (mente, discurso público ligado a ações potenciais) foi evoluída para facilitar a interação social e, assim, a coleta de recursos, sobrevivência e reprodução. It's gramática (i.e., psicologia evolucionária, intencionalidade) funções automaticamente e é extremamente confuso quando tentamos analisá-lo. Palavras e frases têm vários usos, dependendo do contexto. Eu acredito e eu como ter papéis profundamente diferentes como eu acredito e eu acreditava ou eu acredito e ele acredita. O uso expressivo atual da primeira pessoa do tenso de verbos inclinacionais tais como "Eu acredito" descreve minha habilidade de prever meus atos prováveis e não é descritivo de meu estado mental nem baseado no conhecimento ou na informação no sentido usual daquelas palavras (W). Ele não descreve uma verdade, mas torna-se verdadeiro no ato de dizê-lo-ou seja, "Eu acredito que está chovendo" torna-se verdadeiro. Isto é, verbos de disposição usados em primeira pessoa presente tenso são causalmente autorreferenciais--eles se instanciam, mas como descrições de possíveis Estados não são testáveis (ou seja, não T ou F). No entanto passado ou futuro tenso ou uso de terceira pessoa-"Eu acreditava" ou "ele acredita" ou "ele vai acreditar" conter informações que é verdadeiro ou falso como eles descrevem os atos públicos que são ou podem se tornar verificável. Da mesma forma, "Eu acredito que está chovendo" não tem nenhuma informação além de ações subseqüentes, mesmo para mim, mas "Eu acredito que vai chover" ou "ele vai pensar que está chovendo" são atos públicos potencialmente verificáveis deslocados no espaço-tempo que pretendem transmitir informações (ou desinformação). Nonreflexivos ou nonracional (automático) palavras faladas sem intenção prévia (que eu chamo S2A-i. e., S2D automatizado pela prática) foram chamados palavras como Deeds (ações por W & então por Daniel Moyal-Sharrock em seu papel em Philosophical 71 Psychology em 2000). Muitas das chamadas inclinações/disposições/preferências/tendências/capacidades/habilidades são atitudes não-proposicional (não-reflexivas) (muito mais úteis para chamá-las de funções ou habilidades) do sistema 1 (Tversky e Kahnemann). Intenções anteriores são declarados por Searle para ser estados mentais e, portanto, S1, mas novamente eu acho que se deve separar PI1 e PI2, uma vez que em nossa linguagem normal nossas intenções anteriores são as deliberações conscientes de S2. Percepções, memórias, tipo 2 disposições (por exemplo, algumas emoções) e muitas disposições tipo 1 são melhores chamados reflexos de S1 e são automáticos, não-reflexivo, nãoproposicional e não-attitudinal funcionamento das dobradiças (axiomas, algoritmos) da nossa Psicologia Evolutiva (Moyal-Sharrock após Wittgenstein). Agora, para alguns comentários sobre o "Metaphilosophy de Wittgenstein" de Horwich. Após o acima e meus muitos comentários de livros por e sobre W, S, Hacker, DMS etc., deve ser claro o que W está fazendo e que um relato contemporâneo de comportamento deve incluir, então eu vou fazer apenas alguns comentários. Primera, um pôde anotar que põr o "meta" na frente de toda a palavra deve ser suspeito. W comentou, por exemplo, que a metamatemática é matemática como qualquer outra. A noção de que podemos pisar fora da filosofia (ou seja, a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) é em si uma profunda confusão. Outra irritação aqui (e ao longo da escrita acadêmica para as últimas 4 décadas) é o sexismo linguístico reverso constante de "ela" e "dela" e "ela" ou "ele/ela", etc., onde "eles" e "deles" e "eles" faria bem. A maior deficiência é a falha completa (embora quase universal, exceto para o meu trabalho) para empregar o que eu vejo como a visão de dois sistemas extremamente poderoso e intuitivo de quente e Framework Searle que eu tenho delineado acima. Isto é especialmente comovente no capítulo sobre o significado P111 et seq. (especialmente nas notas de rodapé 2-7), onde nadamos em água muito enlameada, sem a estrutura de automatizado verdadeiro apenas S1, proposicional mudança de caráter S2, cos etc. Um pode igualmente começ uma vista melhor do interno e do exterior lendo por exemplo, Johnston ou Budd (veja meus comentários). Horwich, no entanto, faz muitos comentários incisivos. Eu gostei especialmente de seu resumo da importação da postura antiteórica de W em p65. "Não deve haver nenhuma tentativa de explicar a nossa atividade linguística/conceitual (PI 126) como na redução da aritmética à lógica de Frege; nenhuma tentativa de dar-lhe fundações epistemológica (PI 124) como no significado baseou contas de um conhecimento priori; nenhuma tentativa de caracterizar as formas idealizadas (PI 130) como lógicas de sentido; nenhuma tentativa de reforma (PI 124, 132) como na teoria de erro de Mackie ou no intuicionismo de Dummett; nenhuma tentativa de racionalizar (PI 133) como no relato da existência de Quine; nenhuma tentativa de torná-lo mais consistente (PI 132) como na resposta de Tarski aos paradoxos mentirosos; e nenhuma tentativa de torná-lo mais completo (PI 133) como na resolução de questões de identidade pessoal para cenários hipotéticos 72 "teletransporte" bizarro. Para mim, os pontos altos de todas as escritas em W são quase sempre as citações do próprio mestre e isso é novamente verdade aqui. Sua citação (P101) da TLP mostra o aperto precoce de W do EP, que ele mais tarde denominado o ' fundo ' ou ' bedrock '. "O pensamento é cercado por uma auréola. Sua essência, lógica, apresenta uma ordem, na verdade a ordem a priori do mundo: essa é a ordem das possibilidades, que deve ser comum ao mundo e ao pensamento. Mas esta ordem, ao que parece, deve ser totalmente simples. É antes de toda a experiência, deve ser executado através de toda a experiência; nenhuma nebulosidade empírica ou incerteza pode ser permitida afetá-la. Deve ser um cristal mais puro. Mas este cristal não aparece como uma abstração; Mas como algo concreto, de fato, como o mais concreto, como era, a coisa mais difícil que existe. (TLP # 5, 5563, PI 97). " Há muitos pontos bons no capítulo sobre Kripke, mas algumas confusões também. A discussão do refutação de W da língua confidencial em p165-6 parece um pouco obscuro pero em p 196-7 ele afirma-o outra vez-e esta noção não é somente central a w mas a toda a compreensão de quente. Stern tem talvez a melhor discussão do que eu tenho visto em suas "investigações filosóficas de Wittgenstein". Kripke, apesar de todo o barulho que ele fez, é agora geralmente entendido ter totalmente mal interpretado W, apenas repetindo os erros céticos metafísicos clássicos. Aqueles que querem cavar em ' Kripkenstein ', ou filosofia em geral, deve ler "truque de Conjuração de Kripke" por Read e Sharrock-uma desconstrução soberba do ceticismo que, como a maioria dos livros acadêmicos e papéis estão agora disponíveis gratuitamente em a rede em libgen.io, b-ok.org, philpapers.org, academia.edu, arxiv.org e researchGate.net, SSRN, OSF etc. Acho que o capítulo sobre a consciência muito bom, especialmente p190 et. seq. em linguagem privada, qualia, espectros invertidos e a refutação dentesimo da idéia de que W é um behaviorista. Vale a pena repetir sua observação final. "Que tipo de progresso é este-o mistério fascinante foi removido-ainda sem profundidades foram sondado em consolação; nada foi explicado, descoberto ou reconcebido. Quão manso e ininspirador pode pensar. Mas talvez, como sugere Wittgenstein, as virtudes de clareza, desmistificação e verdade devem ser encontradas satisfatórias o suficiente. " Horwich é a primeira taxa e seu trabalho vale bem o esforço. Um espera que ele (e todos) estudará Searle e alguma psicologia moderna assim como Hutto, Read, Hutchinson, Stern, Moyal-Sharrock, passeio, hacker e padeiro etc. para alcançar uma vista moderna larga do comportamento. A maioria de seus papéis estão no Academia.edu mas para o hacker de PMS Veja http://info.sjc.Ox.AC.uk/SCR/hacker/DownloadPapers.html. 73 Finalmente, permitam-me sugerir que, com a perspectiva que tenho incentivado aqui, W está no centro da filosofia contemporânea e da psicologia e não é obscuro, difícil ou irrelevante, mas cintilante, profundo e cristalino e que a falta dele é perder um dos maiores aventuras intelectuais possíveis. 74 Revisão de 'O Material do Pensamento' (The Stuff of Thought) por Steven Pinker (2008) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Eu começo com alguns comentários famosos pelo filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein porque Pinker compartilha com a maioria de povos (devido às configurações padrão de nosso psychology inata evoluído) determinados preconceitos sobre o funcionamento da mente, e Porque Wittgenstein oferece insights únicos e profundos sobre o funcionamento da linguagem, pensamento e realidade (que ele viu como mais ou menos coextensivo) não encontrado em nenhum outro lugar. Ore é apenas referência a Wittgenstein neste volume, que é mais lamentável, considerando que ele foi o mais brilhante e original analista de linguagem. No último capítulo, usando a famosa metáfora da caverna de Platão, ele lindamente resume o livro com uma visão geral de como a mente (linguagem, pensamento, psicologia intencional)-um produto de egoísmo cego, moderado apenas ligeiramente por altruísmo automatizado para fechar parentes carregando cópias de nossos genes (inclusive fitness)--funciona automaticamente, mas tenta terminar em uma nota otimista, dando-nos esperança de que podemos, no entanto, empregar suas vastas capacidades para cooperar e tornar o mundo um lugar decente para viver. Pinker é certamente consciente de mas diz pouco sobre o fato de que muito mais sobre a nossa psicologia é deixada de fora do que incluído. Entre as janelas na natureza humana que são deixadas de fora ou dada a mínima atenção são matemática e geometria, música e sons, imagens, eventos e causalidade, ontologia (classes de coisas ou o que sabemos), a maioria da epistemologia (como sabemos), disposições (acreditando, pensando, julgando, pretendendo etc.) e o resto da psicologia intencional de ação, neurotransmissores e entheogens, Estados espirituais (por exemplo, Satori e iluminação, estimulação cerebral e gravação, danos cerebrais e comportamentais déficits e distúrbios, jogos e esportes, teoria da decisão (incluindo teoria do jogo e economia comportamental), comportamento animal (muito pouca linguagem, mas um bilhão de anos de genética compartilhada). Muitos livros foram escritos sobre cada uma dessas áreas de psicologia intencional. Os dados neste livro são descrições, não explicações que mostram por que os nossos cérebros fazê-lo desta forma ou como é feito. Como sabemos usar as frases de sua maneira (ou seja, conhecer todos os seus significados)? Esta é a psicologia evolutiva que opera em um nível mais básico-o nível em que Wittgenstein é mais ativo. E há pouca atenção ao contexto em que as palavras são usadas = uma arena que Wittgenstein foi pioneira. No entanto, este é um trabalho clássico e com estes cuidados ainda é bem vale a pena 75 ler. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. "Se Deus olhou em nossas mentes, ele não seria capaz de ver lá quem estávamos pensando." Wittgenstein PI P217 "Deve a palavra" infinito "para ser evitado em matemática? Sim: onde parece conferir um significado sobre o cálculo; em vez de obter um a partir dele. RFM edição revisada (1978) p141 "Repetidas vezes, a tentativa é feita para usar a linguagem para limitar o mundo e defini-la em alívio - mas não pode ser feito. A autoevidência do mundo se expressa no próprio fato de que a linguagem pode e só se refere a ela. Pois desde que a linguagem só deriva a maneira em que significa, o seu significado, do mundo, nenhuma linguagem é concebível que não representa este mundo. " Wittgenstein observações filosóficas s47 "Os limites da minha língua significam os limites do meu mundo" TLP Eu começo com estes comentários famosos pelo filósofo (psicólogo) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) porque Pinker compartilha com a maioria de povos (devido às configurações padrão de nosso psicologia inata evoluído) determinados preconceitos sobre o funcionamento da mente e porque Wittgenstein oferece insights únicos e profundos sobre o funcionamento da linguagem, pensamento e realidade (que ele viu como mais ou menos coextensivo) não encontrado em nenhum outro lugar. A última citação é a única referência Pinker faz para Wittgenstein neste volume, que é mais lamentável, considerando que ele era o mais brilhante e original analistas de linguagem. Outro famoso dictum de Wittgenstein é "nada está escondido." Se um mergulhe em seu trabalho suficientemente, eu penso que deixa muito desobstruído o que isto significa que nossa psicologia está na frente de nós todo o tempo se nós abrimos somente nossos olhos para o ver e que nenhuma quantidade de trabalho científico está indo o fazer mais desobstruído (de facto ele apenas começ mais e mais obscuros). Isso não é antiracional ou anticientífico, mas apenas afirma que ele vê como os fatosum jogo de futebol está fora no campo-não na nossa cabeça-e entendemos perfeitamente bem as motivações, ansiedades, tensões e decepções dos jogadores e que esforço é necessário para jogar e como a bola se move quando chutado. Enormes 76 avanços foram feitos em fisiologia esportiva, anatomia, bioenergética, matemática física e química. Livros inteiros cheios de equações foram escritos sobre como as bolas se movem através do ar e os músculos aplicam a força para mover os ossos; sobre como os movimentos musculares se originam em parte do córtex, são espelhados no cérebro dos outros; montanhas de literatura sobre motivação, personalidade, função cerebral e modelagem. Isso nos deu mais alguma visão de um jogo de futebol ou mudou a nossa estratégia ou a nossa experiência de jogar ou assistir? A intencionalidade (racionalidade) foi evoluída a partir de qualquer ferramenta (genes) que os animais tivessem que trabalhar e por isso está cheio de paradoxos e ilusões. Assim como vemos miragens no deserto ou ler palavras em frases que não estão lá, e ver bolhas animados em uma tela "fazendo com que outros se movam e" ajudando "ou" dificultando ", nós olhamos para pensar e acreditar na cabeça e confundir nossos axiomas psicológicos inatas com fatos empíricos (por exemplo, sobre matemática e geometria como coisas que "descobrimos" no mundo, ao invés de inventar). Para que o conceito e a palavra "realidade" se apliquem aos resultados que obtemos do uso de equações diferenciais, scanners de ressonância magnética e colisores de partículas em um grau maior do que ou em lugar de maçãs, rochas e tempestades, seria necessário para estes recentes descobertas para ter tido o mesmo papel na seleção natural ao longo de centenas de milhões de anos. É apenas vantagem de sobrevivência sobre eras que selecionou os genes permitindo que nossos distantes (invertebrados) ancestrais para começar a reagir de maneiras úteis para os pontos turísticos e sons do mundo e sempre tão lentamente para produzir cérebros que poderiam formar conceitos (pensamentos) que eventualmente foram verbalizados. A ciência e a cultura não podem substituir ou tomar a preferência sobre nossa psicologia intencional antiga mas apenas ligeiramente estende ou suplementa-a. Mas quando filosofias (ou fazendo lingüística!) somos facilmente enganados como o contexto está faltando e nossa psicologia dissepara automaticamente cada situação para as causas e o nível final ou mais baixo de explicação e nós substituímos que para os níveis mais altos brutos Porque não há nada em nossas regras de linguagem para impedi-lo. Vem sempre tão naturalmente dizer que nós não pensamos - nosso cérebro faz e as tabelas não são contínuas porque a física nos diz que são feitas das moléculas. Mas W lembrou-nos que os nossos conceitos de, e palavras para, pensar, crer e outras disposições são ações públicas, não processos no cérebro, e em que sentido as moléculas são sólidas? Assim, a citação acima, que leva a repetir, uma vez que eu vejo isso como uma das idéias mais fundamentais que temos de esclarecer antes que possamos fazer qualquer progresso no estudo do comportamento. "Repetidas vezes, a tentativa é feita para usar a linguagem para limitar o mundo e defini-la em alívio - mas não pode ser feito. A autoevidência do mundo se expressa no próprio fato de que a linguagem pode e só se refere a ela. Pois desde que a linguagem só deriva a maneira em que significa, o seu significado, do mundo, nenhuma linguagem é concebível que não representa este mundo. " 77 Muitos dos textos de W são exemplos do conhecimento do senso comum que é essencial ao sucesso de todo o comportamento animal e por e grande não somente a ciência comportável mas mesmo o ai, que não pode suceder sem ele, foi incapaz de apreender e de implementá-lo. Mesmo um dos pais de AI, Marvin Minsky disse (em um 2003 Boston Univ. discurso) que "AI tem sido cérebro morto desde a 70 ' s" e faltou raciocínio senso comum. Mas seu livro recente "a máquina da emoção" ainda não mostra nenhuma consciência do trabalho que W fêz 75 anos há, e este não significa nenhuma consciência do contextual, intencional, ponto de vista sem que um não pode esperar agarrar como a mente (língua) trabalha. Ao falar sobre o comportamento (isto é, pensamento ou língua ou ação) é um erro quase universal considerar o significado de uma palavra ou de uma sentença como anexado a ele, ignorando as sutilezas infinitas do contexto, e assim nós extraviamos. Claro, não podemos incluir tudo sobre o contexto, como isso tornaria a discussão difícil, mesmo impossível, mas há uma grande diferença entre o significado como algo que pode ser totalmente dado por uma entrada de dicionário e significado como abreviadora de uma família de usos complexos. Mesmo o livro clássico de Klein ' Time in Language ' (não citado por Pinker) considera "tempo" como uma família de usos vagamente conectados, embora, é claro, ele também não tem consciência de W, Searle ou intencionalidade. O ponto de mencionar isso é que Pinker compartilha os preconceitos reducionistas da maioria dos cientistas modernos e que esta cores sua abordagem ao comportamento de maneiras que não será óbvio para a maioria dos leitores. Tão fascinante quanto seus dados são e tão magistral como sua escrita é, ele sutilmente nos leva ao que eu acho que é uma imagem equivocada de nossa psicologia-uma visão que é devido aos preconceitos inatas de nossa psicologia evoluída e, portanto, é uma falha universal. Pinker é o Richard Dawkins da psicologia - um dos principais popularizadores da ciência nos tempos modernos. Possivelmente somente o atrasado e o mais sem lamentações (era um egomaníaco autoservicio que enganado milhões com seu specionós raciocinar, neomarxism e promoção de tabula rasa) Stephan Gould vendeu mais volumes de ciencia popular. Foi a refutação magistral de Pinker da ilusão universal de que a natureza humana é culturalmente gerada (um dos muitos delírios de Gould) que fez o seu livro anterior ' o slate em branco ' (blank slate o tabula rasa) um clássico e uma escolha superior para os livros mais importantes do século XXI. Aliás, há muitos humilhações de Gould, incluindo alguns por Pinker e Dawkins ("ele fez inclinando-se em moinhos de vento em sua própria forma de arte pessoal"-como eu me lembro de uma revisão Dawkins de um tomo Gould da revista ' Evolution ' uma década ou assim atrás) , mas eu acho que o melhor é o de Tooby e Cosmides em uma carta para o NY Times (busca de sua página ou o Times). Todas estas obras estão intimamente ligadas pelo tema do comportamento animal, psicologia evolutiva e, claro, "as coisas do pensamento". Após a convenção, PInker discute Putnam famoso, mas mal faltado, experimento de pensamento de terra gêmea (experimentos de pensamento bizarro. na filosofia foram 78 inventados essencialmente por Wittgenstein), que reivindica mostrar que o significado não está na cabeça, mas era W nos 30 's isto é, 40 anos mais adiantado--que mostrou decisivamente que todas as disposições ou inclinações (como ele os chamou, embora os filósofos, faltando o conhecimento com seu trabalho os chamam geralmente pelo nome incorreto de atitudes proposicional) incluindo significando, pretendendo, pensando, acreditando, julgando etc. funcionam como descrições de nossas ações e não como termos para fenômenos mentais. Eles não podem estar na cabeça pela mesma razão que um jogo de futebol não pode ser na cabeça. Mais tarde na vida Putnam começou a tomar Wittgenstein seriamente e mudou sua melodia em conformidade. Ele não faz quase nenhuma referência à literatura grande e fascinante sobre os comportamentais automaticos (ou seja, a maior parte do nosso comportamento!--ver, por exemplo, "experimentos com pessoas" (2004) ou Bargh's ' Psicologia social e do inconsciente ' (2007) para o trabalho mais velho, e "teorias de processo dual da mente social" por Sherman et al (2014) e th e vasta e rápida expansão da literatura sobre a cognição implícita), que mostra que quanto mais você olhar, mais claro torna-se que as ações que nós considerar como resultados de nossa escolha consciente não são. As pessoas que mostram fotos ou leem histórias de idosos tendem a sair mais lentamente do prédio do que quando recebem as dos jovens etc. etc. O bem conhecido efeito placebo é uma variante onde a informação é conscientemente entrada-por e. g., em um estudo 2008, 85 por cento dos voluntários que pensavam que estavam recebendo uma pílula de açúcar $2.50 disse que sentiu menos dor depois de tomá-lo, em comparação com um grupo de controle de 61 por cento. Tais efeitos podem ser induzidos subliminarmente se a informação do preço é entrada através das imagens, do texto ou do som. Presumivelmente o mesmo é verdadeiro da maioria de nossas escolhas. Isso nos leva a um dos meus principais queixas sobre este livro-é a obsessão monomaníaco com o "significado" das palavras, em vez de seu uso-uma distinção feita famosa por W em suas palestras e cerca de 20 livros que começam na década de 1930. Como a insistência de W que nós não explicar o comportamento (ou o resto da natureza), mas só descrevê-lo, isso pode parecer um coisa inútil, mas, como de costume, eu descobri como eu refletiu sobre essas questões ao longo dos anos que W estava certo sobre a marca. Ele disse que uma fórmula que vai funcionar na maioria das vezes é que o significado de uma palavra (muito melhor para dizer uma frase) é o seu uso na linguagem-e isso significa que seu uso público em um contexto especificado para comunicar informações de uma pessoa para outra (e às vezes para outro maior mamiferos - os cães compartilham uma parcela principal de nossa psicologia intencional). Eu mencionei isso em parte sercausa em um livro anterior Pinker acusado W de negar que os animais têm consciência (uma visão extraordinária que é realmente defendida por alguns), porque ele observou que um cão não pode pensar "Talvez ele vai chover amanhã", mas w ' s ponto foi o inexcepcional que há muitos pensamentos que não podemos ter sem linguagem e que não temos nenhum teste para interpretar o comportamento de um cão como mostrando que esperava algo amanhã. Mesmo se usou um guarda-chuva e o começ invariàvel fora do armário o dia antes de uma chuva, 79 não há nenhuma maneira de conectar isto a ele é estado mental-mesmo para um mudo surdo que não poderia ler ou escrever ou usar a língua de sinal. Isso se conecta a suas famosas manifestações da impossibilidade de uma língua privada e ao fato de que as disposições não estão na cabeça. W mostrou como a ausência de qualquer teste público significa que mesmo o cão eo mudo não pode saber o que eles estão pensando-nem podemos, porque a disposiçãos são atos públicos e o ato é o critério para o que pensávamos-mesmo para nós mesmos. Este é o ponto da citação acima - nem Deus nem os neurofisiologistas podem ver pensamentos, crenças, imagens, esperanças em nosso cérebro, porque estes são termos para atos e nem os epifenômenos vagos e fugazes que experimentamos,nem os correlacionados detectável por estudos cerebrais, função em nossa vida da mesma forma que o uso contextual das frases descrevendo esses atos. E, em relação à consciência animal, W observou que a psicologia intencional recebe uma posição até mesmo em uma moscaum ponto maravilhosamente e cada vez mais apoiado pela genética moderna, o que mostra que muitos genes e processos fundamentais para primatas o comportamento começ seu começo pelo menos tão cedo quanto nematóides (isto é, C. elegans) alguns bilhão anos há. Psicologia intencional ou intencionalidade (muito mais ou menos a nossa personalidade ou racionalidade ou pensamento de ordem superior (HOT) é um conceito muito antigo filosófico que (desconhecido para a maioria) foi dada a sua formulação moderna por Wittgenstein, que, nas 20.000 páginas de sua n achlass, agora principalmente traduzido e publicado em cerca de 20 livros e vários CDROM ' s, lançou as bases para o estudo moderno do comportamento humano. Infelizmente, ele era principalmente um recluso que não publicou durante os últimos 30 anos de sua vida, nunca realmente terminou de escrever nada de seu trabalho mais tarde e escreveu seus comentários brilhantes e altamente originais sobre o comportamento em um estilo váriadamente denominado epigrammatico, telegraphico, oracular, Socratico, obscuro etc. e tudo publicado postumamente sobre um período de mais de 50 anos (as Investigações Filosóficas famosas (PI) em 1953 e o mais recente-mas não o último! - o Datilografado Grande – Big Typescript-em 2005) e assim, embora fosse recentemente votou um dos 5 melhores filósofos de todos os tempos, e investigações filosóficas o mais importante livro de filosofia do século 20, ele é ignorado ou mal interpretado por quase todos. O sentimento que muitas vezes recebo é que a nossa psicologia é um recife de coral com a maioria das pessoas snorkeling na superfície admirando os solavancos, enquanto Wittgenstein é de 20 metros abaixo sondando as fendas com equipamento de mergulho e lanterna. Os executores literários de Wittgenstein eram académicos abafados e seus livros emitidos na maior parte de Blackwell com títulos académicos do severo e nenhuma explanação qualquer que eles podem ser vistos como uma fundação principal para o estudo moderno da psicologia evolucionária, personalidade, racionalidade, linguagem, consciência, política, teologia, literatura, antropologia, Sociologia, lei etc., – na verdade tudo o que dizemos, pensamos e fazemos desde que, como ele mostrou, tudo depende dos axiomas inatos da nossa psicologia evoluída que compartilhamos com um grande extensão com cães, e até certo ponto, mesmo com moscas e C. elegans. 80 Teve seus trabalhos foram apresentados com capas chamativas por prensas populares com títulos como como a mente funciona, o instinto de linguagem, e as coisas do pensamento, grande parte da paisagem intelectual do século 20 poderia ter sido diferente. Como é, embora ele é o principal tema de pelo menos 200 livros e 10.000 papéis e discutido em inúmeros milhares de mais (incluindo Pinker ' s Como el Mente Funciona), com base nas centenas de artigos e dezenas de livros que li nos últimos anos , Eu diria que há menos de uma dúzia de pessoas que realmente compreender o significado de seu trabalho, como eu apresentá-lo neste e meus outros comentários. No entanto, as publicações recentes de Coliva, DMS e outros, e talvez o meu, deve mudar isso. Aqueles que desejam um completo até à data conta de Wittgenstein, Searle e sua análise de comportamento da moderna dois sistemas de visão pode consultar o meu livro 'A estrutura lógica da filosofia, psicologia, mente e linguagem como revelado em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2o Ed (2019). Um resultado de tudo isso (o que um filósofo chamou de "a amnésia coletiva em relação a Wittgenstein") é que os alunos da língua, incluindo Pinker tomar noções de Grice como implicatura (que parece apenas uma palavra extravagante para a implicação) e, mais recentemente, teoria da relevância, como um quadro para "a relação entre palavras e significado" (claro que W iria transformar em sua sepultura nesta frase, uma vez que como eles podem ser separáveis de seu uso se um segue o seu significado é a fórmula de uso?),mas parecem-me substitutos fracos para a intencionalidade como descrito por W e revisto e ampliado por Searle e outros. Em qualquer caso, Grice é o acadêmico soporífero normal, Sperber (um líder na teoria da relevância) tolerável, Pinker envolvente e muitas vezes elegante e até mesmo pungente, Searle (ver ESP. "racionalidade em ação") é clara, rigorosa e bastante original (embora devido, eu acho, um dívida muito grande para W,) mas muito acadêmico para as listas de Best-seller, enquanto Wittgenstein, uma vez que você entender que ele é um psicólogo mestre natural descrevendo como a mente funciona, é muito exigente, mas brilhantemente original e muitas vezes de tirar o fôlego. Pinker escreve prosa magistral enquanto Wittgenstein escreve telegramas, embora muitas vezes em movimento e os poéticos e em algumas ocasiões, ele escreveu belos ensaios. Pinker pode ser extraído para algum ouro, lotes de ferro e alguns escória, enquanto W é principalmente ouro, um pouco de ferro e dificilmente um grão de escória. Pinker é principalmente resumindo o trabalho dos outros (embora em estilo impecável), enquanto W é tão original e tão bizarro que ele é muito mais a cabeça das pessoas. Sugiro ler Pinker, Searle e Wittgenstein alternadamente ou simultaneamente com um traço de Sperber, Grice e algumas centenas de outros de vez em quando. W disse que o problema não é encontrar a resposta, mas reconhecer o que está sempre diante de nós como a resposta. Ou seja, a nossa língua é (em geral) o nosso pensamento, que é sobre eventos reais ou potenciais (incluindo ações por agentes como latir, falar e escrever), e que o significado, contra Pinker e um elenco de milhares, é o uso, e nada está escondido ( ou seja, a linguagem é -principalmentepensamento). 81 A ignorância em muitos quartos é tão completo que até mesmo um livro recente de outra forma maravilhosa 358 página por Wiese em um tópico praticamente criado por Wittgenstein ('Numbers, Language and the Human Mind '--Números, linguagem e da mente humana-que eu vejo é citado por Pinker) não há uma única referência para ele! W enfatiza principalmente os diferentes usos das "mesmas" palavras "(ou seja, um divisor) que originalmente queria usar a citação" Eu vou te ensinar diferenças! ", como o lema do seu livro Philosofical Investigacions. Ou seja, descrevendo os diferentes usos das sentenças (os jogos de linguagem), e modificando os jogos em experimentos de pensamento, lembramos-nos dos diferentes papéis que estes jogos desempenham na vida e vemos os limites da nossa psicologia. Mas Pinker, novamente seguindo os padrões sedutores de nossos módulos evoluídos e os exemplos flagrantes de milhares de outros, é um Lumper que muitas vezes borra essas diferenças. Por sua vez, ele fala repetidamente de "realidade" como se fosse uma única coisa (ao invés de uma família inteira de usos). Ele também fala da realidade como algo separado da nossa experiência (ou seja, o clássico idealista/confusão realista). Mas que teste existe para a realidade? Ele desliza (como todos nós) tão facilmente na substituição reducionista de níveis inferiores para os mais elevados por isso estamos todos inclinados a demitir o pensamento que podemos ver (ou seja, ações) para os processos no cérebro, que a nossa linguagem (pensamento) não pode ser descrevendo , como evoluiu muito antes que alguém tivesse alguma idéia de funções cerebrais. Se Pinker imagina que você não está realmente lendo esta página (por exemplo, sua retina está sendo atingido com fótons saltando fora moléculas de tinta, etc), então eu respeitosamente sugiro que ele precisa refletir mais sobre a questão da linguagem, pensamento e realidade e eu sei que não melhor antídoto para este meme tóxico do que a imersão em Wittgenstein. Refletindo sobre Wittgenstein traz à mente um comentário atribuído ao professor de filosofia de Cambridge C.D. Broad (que não entendi nem gostei ele), que correu algo como "não oferecer a cadeira de filosofia para Wittgenstein seria como não oferecendo a cadeira de física para Einstein! Eu penso em Wittgenstein como o Einstein da psicologia intuitiva. Embora nascido dez anos mais tarde, ele também estava chocando idéias sobre a natureza da realidade, quase ao mesmo tempo e na mesma parte do mundo e como Einstein quase morreu na 1a. Agora suponha que Einstein foi um suicida homossexual com uma personalidade difícil que publicou apenas uma versão inicial de suas idéias que estavam confusas e muitas vezes confundidas, mas se tornaram mundialmente famosas; mudou completamente suas idéias, mas para os próximos 30 anos não publicou nada mais, e conhecimento de seu novo trabalho na maioria forma ilegível difusa lentamente a partir de palestras ocasionais e notas dos alunos; que morreu em 1951 deixando para trás sobre 20.000 páginas de rabiscos na maior parte manuscritas no alemão, compor das sentenças ou dos parágrafos curtos com, frequentemente, nenhuma relação desobstruída às sentenças antes ou depois; que estes foram cortados e colados a partir de outros 82 cadernos escritos anos antes, com notas nas margens, marcações e palavras cruzadas para que muitas frases têm múltiplas variantes; que seus executivos literários cortam essa massa indigestível em pedaços, deixando de fora o que eles desejavam e lutando com a tarefa monstruosa de capturar o significado correto das sentenças que estavam transmitindo visões totalmente inéditos de como o universo funciona e que eles em seguida, publicou este material com lentidão agonizante (não terminou depois de meio século) com prefácios que não continha nenhuma explicação real do que era sobre; que ele se tornou tão notório como famoso devido a muitas afirmações de que toda a física anterior foi um erro e até mesmo absurdo e que praticamente ninguém entendeu seu trabalho, apesar de centenas de livros e dezenas de milhares de papéis discutindo isso; que muitos físicos sabiam apenas o seu início de trabalho em que ele tinha feito uma somatória definitiva da física newtoniana afirmou em tal forma extremamente abstrata e condensada que era impossível decidir o que estava sendo dito; que ele era, então, praticamente esquecido e que a maioria dos livros e artigos sobre a natureza do mundo e os diversos temas da física moderna tinha apenas passar e referências geralmente errôneas para ele e que muitos omitiu-o inteiramente; que até hoje, meio século após sua morte, havia apenas um punhado de pessoas que realmente compreenderam as conseqüências monumentais do que ele tinha feito. Isto, eu afirme, é precisamente a situação com Wittgenstein. Parece esmagadoramente óbvio que a nossa psicologia evoluiu foi selecionado para corresponder ao mundo para a extensão máxima compatível com os nossos recursos genéticos e energéticos e que é tudo o que podemos dizer sobre a realidade, e todos nós entendemos isso (nós vivemos), mas quando paramos para pensar sobre isso, os padrões de nossa psicologia universal assumir e começamos a usar as palavras (conceitos) de "realidade", "aspectos", "tempo", "espaço", "possível", etc. fora dos contextos intencionais em que evoluíram. A gema seguinte vem de biólogos (eu leválo a partir de Shettleworth soberba, mas negligenciado livro cognição, evolução e comportamento). "O papel da psicologia, então, é descrever as características inatas das mentes de diferentes organismos que evoluíram para corresponder a certos aspectos desse universo físico externo, e a maneira pela qual o universo físico interage com a mente para produzir o mundo fenomenal. "O ' Keefe e Nadel "o hipocampo como um mapa cognitivo" Pense nisso desta forma - você pode procurar uma palavra no dicionário, mas você não pode procurar um uso lá, a menos que houvesse um vídeo que mostrou antes e depois do evento e todos os fatos relevantes sobre ele. O dicionário é como um necrotério cheio de cadáveres, mas queremos estudar fisiologia. Aqui reside "rosa" e aqui "correr" e aqui "em" e aqui "é" eo que está faltando é a vida. Adicione uma foto e é um pouco melhor: adicionar um vídeo e muito melhor: adicionar uma cor 3D longa contrata vídeo com som e cheiro e ele está chegando lá. Parte da descrição de Wittgenstein de nossa psicologia pública incluiu muitos exemplos detalhados de como as sensações e imagens em minha mente não carregam 83 qualquer peso epistêmico, mesmo para mim. Como sei que estou comendo uma maçã? Meu gosto e visão podem estar erradas e como decidir? Mas se eu falar sobre isso ou escrevê-lo para baixo e você diz "isso é uma maçã olhando saboroso" etc. Tenho um teste objetivo. Certo e errado obter uma posição aqui. W ia usar uma citação de Goethe como o lema do PI- "no início foi a ato (In the beginning was the deed)." Ou seja, evolutivamente foi percepções e ações e, em seguida, memórias deles e, em seguida, pensamentos sobre eles e, em seguida, palavras expressando os pensamentos. Assim, o evento é a coisa Australopithecus pensamento sobre, e seleção natural para ser capaz de fazer explosões acústicas, que substituiu por eles, foi forte o suficiente para modificar o nosso aparelho vocal e circuito de controle adequado em um ritmo fantástico, por isso, no início do tempo de Neanderthal, eles estavam falando uma raia azul e não calar a boca ou a mente por mais de alguns minutos desde então. W compreendido, como poucos têm, o primado das ações e a irrelevância de nossos pensamentos, sentimentos etc. como as fundações da comunicação, que é porque é chamado frequentemente um behaviorista (isto é, Dennett, Hofstadter, negação do estilo de B.F. Skinner da realidade de nosso mental vida, mente, consciência, etc.) Mas isso é patentemente absurdo. Ele me lembra a famosa descrição de Platão das sombras na parede da caverna vs girando ao redor para ver as pessoas realmente usando a linguagem-uma analogia que eu nunca pensei em relação a W e que eu estava atordoado para ver algumas horas mais tarde no último capítulo de Pinker. Em qualquer caso, se considerarmos cuidadosamente qualquer caso de uso da linguagem, vemos que grande parte da nossa psicologia intencional é posta em jogo. Se pode ver a ignorância de Wittgenstein nos artigos em EEL2 (a enciclopédia de Elsevier da língua e lingüística-2o Ed. (2005) 12, 353p-Sim isso é 12000 paginas em 14 vols e um mero $6000,) que é de longe o maior, e espera-se o mais autoritário, referência em estudos linguísticos. Curiosamente, Pinker não tem uma única referência a ele, mas você pode encontrá-lo, juntamente com quase todos os Pinker, Searle, Wittgenstein e milhares de outros livre na net. Para obter uma compreensão das necessidades básicas para AI você pode, por exemplo, encontrá-lo muito mais interessante ler RFM W do que Minsky's ' The Emotion Machine'. Pinker referiu-se à lista famosa de Brown de centenas de universais do comportamento humano, mas estes são quase todos os comportamentos de nível mais elevados brutos tais como a posse da religião, altruismos recíprocos etc. e ele grande omite centenas de outros universais que os sustentam. Wittgenstein foi o primeiro, e em alguns casos talvez o único até à data, para apontar muitos dos mais fundamentais. No entanto, ele não lhe disse o que ele estava fazendo e ninguém mais tem ou então você terá que quebra-cabeça para fora para si mesmo. A maioria das pessoas lêem primeiro (e muitas vezes nada mais) suas investigações filosóficas, mas 84 eu prefiro os exemplos mais estritamente matemáticos em suas observações sobre os fundamentos da matemática ou suas palestras sobre os fundamentos da matemática. Se você ler com o entendimento de que ele está descrevendo os axiomas universais de nossa psicologia evolucionária que, fundamentam todo o nosso raciocínio, então seu trabalho faz sentido e é deslumbrante em sua ingenuidade. Pinker ilustra como a mente funciona com o exemplo de molho de churrasco. Há, naturalmente, um número ilimitado de outros que ilustram a nossa probabilidade subjetiva (muitas vezes chamado de raciocínio Bayesiano-embora ele não menciona isso). Meus favoritos são Doomsday (veja, por exemplo, o livro de Bostrum ou página web), a bela adormecida e o problema de Newcomb. Ao contrário do churrasco, que tem uma solução clara, muitos outros têm (dependendo do seu ponto de vista) um, nenhum ou muitos. Podemos considerar estes como interessante, como eles mostram lacunas ou limites para a nossa racionalidade (um grande tema em Wittgenstein) ou (o que temos conhecido pelo menos desde o trabalho de Finetti na 20 ' s) que toda a probabilidade é subjetiva, ou como o famoso paradoxo mentiroso ou Godel teoremas (ver a minha revisãos de Hofstadter ' s ' Eu sou um loop estranho e Yanofsky ' s ' além dos limites do pensamento '), como demonstrações triviais dos limites da nossa mente primata, embora Pinker não se expande sobre esta questão nem dar mais do que algumas dicas na vasta literatura sobre teoria da decisão, teoria dos jogos, economia comportamental, Bayesianismo etc. EEL2 tem um artigo curto passable em W que evite fazer demasiados erros gritando, mas perde totalmente quase tudo da importância, que, se compreendido realmente, faria o artigo por muito o mais longo no livro. Quase a coisa toda é desperdiçada no Tractatus, que todo mundo sabe que ele totalmente rejeitado mais tarde e que é extremamente confuso e confuso também. Dificilmente nada em sua filosofia mais tarde e não uma palavra sobre os dois CDROM pesquisáveis que são agora o ponto de partida para todos os estudiosos W (e qualquer pessoa interessada em comportamento humano), que agora estão se tornando amplamente disseminado livremente através da rede. Também não há nada aqui nem nos artigos sobre Chomsky, idéias inatas, evolução da sintaxe, evolução da semântica, evolução da pragmática (praticamente cada uma de suas 20.000 páginas tem a ver com novas idéias e exemplos sobre estes dois), teoria do esquema, etc., nem sobre como ele antecipou Chomsky no estudo de "gramática de profundidade", descreveu o problema da subdeterminação ou explosão combinatória, nem uma palavra sobre sua descoberta (repetidamente e em detalhe-e. g., RPP Vol. 2 P20) cerca de 20 anos antes de Wason de as razões para "falhas" em "se p Então q" tipos de construções agora analisados pelos testes de seleção Wason (um dos instrumentos padrão de pesquisa do PE), nem sobre como seu trabalho pode ser visto como antecipar muitas idéias na psicologia evolucionária, sobre a sua fundação do estudo moderno de intencionalidade, de disposições como ações, da epifenomenalidade de nossa vida mental e da unidade de linguagem, matemática, geometria, música, arte e jogos, nem mesmo uma explicação do que ele significava por jogos de linguagem e gramática - dois de seus mais freqüentemente termos usados. W fêz a mudança de tentar compreender a mente como uma estrutura geral lógica, do domínio a um domínio 85 idiosincratico psicológico específico um no atrasado 20 ' s mas Kahneman começ o Nobel para ele em 2002, para razões numerosas, não menos do que é que fizeram obras do laboratório e análise estatística (embora W foi um excelente experimentalista e muito bom em matemática). Naturalmente, um não pode culpar o EEL2 demasiado porque segue meramente as omissões similares e a falta da compreensão durante todo as ciências comportáveis. E, eu não estou trazendo este acima na maneira que um pôde queixar-se sobre a ausência de informação em foguetes chineses antigos da guerra em um livro em motores do foguete, mas porque seu trabalho é ainda uma mina virtualmente inexplorada de diamantes comportamentais da ciência, e, para meu dinheiro , alguns dos mais emocionantes e prosa abertura dos olhos que eu já li. Quase tudo o que ele escreveu poderia ser usado como um texto complementar ou manual de laboratório em qualquer classe de filosofia ou psicologia e em grande parte da lei, matemática, literatura, economia comportamental, história, política, antropologia, Sociologia e, claro, linguística. O que nos traz de volta a Pinker. No último capítulo, usando a famosa metáfora da caverna de Platão, ele lindamente resume o livro com uma visão geral de como a mente (linguagem, pensamento, psicologia intencional)-um produto de egoísmo cego, moderado apenas ligeiramente por altruísmo automatizado para fechar parentes carregando cópias de nossos genes (inclusive fitness)--funciona automaticamente, mas tenta terminar em uma nota otimista, dando-nos esperança de que podemos, no entanto, empregar suas vastas capacidades para cooperar e tornar o mundo um lugar decente para viver. Eu duvido muito disso (ver a minha revisão do seu "os melhores anjos da nossa natureza). Pinker é certamente consciente de, mas diz pouco sobre o fato de que muito mais sobre a nossa psicologia é deixada de fora do que incluído. Entre as janelas na natureza humana que são deixadas para fora ou dada a atenção mínima são matemática e geometria, música e sons, imagens, eventos e causalidade, ontologia (classes das coisas), disposições (acreditando, pensando, julgando, pretendendo etc.) e o descanso de Psicologia intencional de ação, neurotransmissores e entheogens, Estados espirituais (por exemplo, satori e iluminação, estimulação cerebral e gravação, danos cerebrais e déficits comportamentais e distúrbios, jogos e esportes, teoria da decisão (incluindo jogo teoria e economia comportamental), comportamento animal (muito pouca linguagem, mas um bilhão de anos de genética compartilhada). Muitos livros foram escritos sobre cada uma dessas áreas de psicologia intencional. Os dados neste livro são descrições, não explicações que mostram por que os nossos cérebros fazê-lo desta forma ou como é feito. Como sabemos usar as frases de suas várias maneiras (ou seja, conhecer todos os seus significados)? Esta é a psicologia evolutiva que opera em um nível mais básico-o nível em que Wittgenstein é mais ativo. E há pouca atenção ao contexto que é fundamental para a compreensão da linguagem e em que Wittgenstein foi o principal pioneiro. Entre os inúmeros livros não mencionados aqui estão o excelente tomo de Guerino Mazzola investigando a semelhança da matemática e da música ' The topos of Music ', 86 o incrível trabalho de Shulgin que sondagem a mente com psicoquímicos ' Phikal ' e ' Tikal '. Muitos outros tentam representar funções mentais com meios geométricos ou matemáticos tais como a revisão do Rott da opiniãodo ', Gardenfors vários livros, e naturalmente os esforços maciços que vão sobre na lógica (por exemplo os 20 ou assim Vol Handbook of Philosophical Logic), bem como muitos outros editados ou escritos pelo incrível Dov Gabbay (por exemplo, ' Temporal Logic '). Re linguagem espacial-dos inúmeros volumes sobre a psicologia, linguagem ou filosofia do espaço, o recente ' manual de lógica espacial ' (especialmente divertido são cap. 11 no espaço-tempo eo último cap. por Varzi) destaca-se. O ponto é que esses trabalhos lógicos, geométricos e matemáticos são extensões de nossa psicologia axiomática inata, e assim eles mostram em suas equações e gráficos algo sobre a "forma" ou "forma" ou "função" de nossos pensamentos (módulos , modelos, motores de inferência), e assim também a forma dos animais e até talvez de computadores (embora se tenha que pensar em que teste seria relevante aqui!). E é claro.todas as obras de Wittgenstein, mantendonomente que ele às vezes está falando sobre os níveis mais básicos prélingüísticos ou até mesmo pré-mamífera de pensamento e percepção. Claro, muitos livros sobre IA Intelligencia Artificial (o na minha opinião, considerando suas províveis conseqüências, insanidade alienígena),o robô de navegação e processamento de imagem são relevantes como eles devem imitar a nossa psicologia. Reconhecimento de rosto é uma das nossas habilidades mais marcantes (embora até mesmo os crustáceos podem fazê-lo) e o melhor trabalho recente que eu sei é "Handbook of Face Recognition". Dos livros numerosos no espaço/tempo um pode começar com ' língua e tempo de Klein ' ou McLure ' a filosofia do tempo '. Smith ' s ' linguagem e tempo ', Hawley ' como as coisas persistem ' e Sider ' quatro-Dimensionalismo ', Ludlow ' s ' semântica, tenso e tempo ', Dainton ' s ' tempo e espaço '. e ' unidade da consciência ', Diek ' a ontologia do espaço-tempo ' e Sattig ' a língua e Realidade do tempo ". Mas como seria de esperar, e como detalhado por Rupert ler, os jogos de linguagem aqui estão todos emaranhados e a maioria das discussões do tempo são irremediavelmente incoerentes. E também um livro bom, mas agora datado cobrindo muito da relevância com artigos de Searle e outros é "Logic, pensamento e ação" de Vanderveken. 87 Revisão de 'Estamos Hardwired?' (Are We Hardwired?') por Clark & Grunstein Oxford (2000) Michael Starks Abstrata Esta é uma revisão excelente de interações do gene/ambiente no comportamento e, apesar de ser um bocado datado, é uma leitura fácil e de valor. Eles começam com estudos gêmeos que mostram o impacto esmagador da genética sobre o comportamento. Eles observam os estudos cada vez mais conhecidos de Judith Harris que estendem e resumem os fatos que o ambiente doméstico compartilhado quase não tem efeito sobre o comportamento e que as crianças adotadas crescem para ser tão diferente de seus meio-irmão e irmãs como as pessoas escolhidas aleatoriamente. Um ponto básico que eles (e quase todos os que discutem a genética comportamental) não conseguem notar é que as centenas (milhares dependendo do seu ponto de vista) de universais comportamentais humanos, incluindo todos os fundamentos de nossas personalidades, são 100% determinados por nossos genes, com nenhuma variação em normals. Todo mundo vê uma árvore como uma árvore e não uma pedra, procura e come comida, fica irritado e ciumento, etc. Assim, o que estão falando na maior parte sobre aqui é quanto ambiente (cultura) pode afetar o grau a que as várias características são mostradas, um pouco do que sua aparência. Finalmente, eles discutem a eugenia da forma usual politicamente correta, deixando de notar que nós e todos os organismos são os produtos da eugenia da natureza e que as tentativas de derrotar a seleção natural com a medicina, a agricultura e a civilização como um todo, são desastroso para qualquer sociedade que persiste em fazer isso. Tanto quanto 50% de todas as concepções, ou cerca de 100 milhões/ano, terminam em aborto espontâneo precoce, quase todos sem que a mãe esteja consciente. Este abate natural de genes defeituosos impulsiona a evolução, mantém-nos relativamente geneticamente som e torna a sociedade possível. Disgenia é suficiente para destruir a civilização, mas superpopulação vai do primeiro. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y otras. 88 Esta é uma revisão excelente de interações do gene/ambiente no comportamento e, apesar de ser um bocado datado, é uma leitura fácil e de valor. Eles começam com estudos gêmeos, que mostram o impacto esmagador da genética sobre o comportamento. Eles observam os estudos cada vez mais conhecidos de Judith Harris que estendem e resumem os fatos que o ambiente doméstico compartilhado quase não tem efeito sobre o comportamento e que as crianças adotadas crescem para ser tão diferente de seus meio-irmão e irmãs como as pessoas escolhidas aleatoriamente. Há muito impacto sobre a personalidade (ca 50% de variação) do ambiente precoce, presumivelmente interação entre pares, TV, etc., mas nós realmente não sabemos. Eles resumem a genética do comportamento nos primeiros animais verdadeiros, o protozoa, e notar que muitos dos genes e mecanismos subjacentes ao nosso comportamento já estão presentes. Há uma forte vantagem seletiva para identificar os genes de seus companheiros potenciais e até mesmo protozoários têm tais mecanismos. Há dados mostrando que as pessoas tendem a escolher companheiros com diferentes tipos de HLA, mas o mecanismo é obscuro. Apresentam várias linhas de evidência que nós nos comunicamos inconscientemente com pheromones através dos órgãos vomeronasal e este não é mediado por neurônios do cheiro. Um capítulo observa a biologia do nematoide C. elegans, observando o fato de que compartilha muitos mecanismos e genes com protozoários e conosco devido ao extremo conservativismo da evolução. Alguns genes humanos foram inseridos nele com aparente preservação de sua função em nós. Além disso, eles mostram o que parecem ser mecanismos de memória de longo prazo e de curto prazo controlados por genes de uma forma semelhante àquela em organismos mais elevados. Observam a semelhança geral da regulação não-Visual mediada por criptocromo de ritmos circadianos em leveduras e frutinhas para aqueles em animais mais elevados e até mesmo para aqueles em plantas. Demonstrou-se que ambos os genes Cry-1 e Cry2 criptocromo estão presentes em moscas de fruto, camundongos e seres humanos e que o sistema fotorreceptor é ativo em muitas células do corpo que não a retina, e os pesquisadores têm mesmo sido capazes de desencadear ritmos circadianos da luz brilhou na nossa perna! Após um breve levantamento do trabalho sobre a famosa lesma Aplysia e os sistemas cAMP e Ccalmodulin, eles revisam os dados sobre neurotransmissores humanos. O capítulo sobre a agressão observa a agressão impulsiva de camundongos de baixa serotonina e os efeitos sobre o comportamento agressivo de mutações/drogas que um efeito a química do óxido nítrico - recentemente, para o espanto de todos, identificado como um Major neurotransmissor ou neuromodulador. 89 Em um capítulo sobre o consumo, eles recontam a história agora bem conhecida da leptina e seu papel na regulação da ingestão de alimentos. Em seguida, um resumo da genética do comportamento sexual. Um ponto básico que eles (e quase todos os que discutem a genética comportamental) não conseguem notar é que as centenas (milhares dependendo do seu ponto de vista) de universais comportamentais humanos, incluindo todos os fundamentos de nossas personalidades, são 100% determinados por nossos genes, com nenhuma variação em normals. Todo mundo vê uma árvore como uma árvore e não uma pedra, procura e come comida, fica irritado e ciumento, etc. Assim, o que estão falando na maior parte sobre aqui é quanto ambiente (cultura) pode afetar o grau a que as várias características são mostradas, um pouco do que sua aparência. Há também campos altamente ativos estudando o comportamento humano que eles mal mencionam - psicologia evolutiva, psicologia cognitiva, partes da sociologia, antropologia e economia comportamental - que estão lançando luzes brilhantes sobre o comportamento e mostrando que é a uma extensão grande automática e inconsciente com pouca consciência voluntária ou controle. Os autores viés para a biologia é um enorme defeito. Finalmente, eles discutem a eugenia da forma usual politicamente correta, deixando de notar que nós e todos os organismos são os produtos da eugenia da natureza e que as tentativas de derrotar a seleção natural com a medicina, a agricultura e a civilização como um todo, são desastroso para qualquer sociedadeque persiste nele. Tanto quanto 50% de todas as concepções, ou cerca de 100 milhões/ano, terminam em aborto espontâneo precoce, quase todos sem que a mãe esteja consciente. Este abate natural de genes defeituosos impulsiona a evolução, mantém-nos relativamente geneticamente som e torna a sociedade possível. Entretanto, é agora desobstruído que o superpopulação destruirá o mundo antes que os disgenia tenham uma possibilidade. 90 JK Rowling é mais malvado que eu?(revisado em 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Que tal um take diferente sobre os ricos e famosos? Primeiro o óbvio-os romances de Harry Potter são superstição primitiva que incentiva as crianças a acreditar na fantasia, em vez de assumir a responsabilidade pelo mundo-a norma, é claro. JKR é tão sem noção sobre si mesma e do mundo como a maioria das pessoas, mas cerca de 200 vezes tão destrutiva como o americano médio e cerca de 800 vezes mais do que o chinês médio. Ela foi responsável pela destruição de talvez 30.000 hectares de floresta para produzir esses romances de lixo e toda a erosão que se seguiu (não trivial como é pelo menos 6 e talvez 12 toneladas/ano solo no oceano para todos na terra ou talvez 100 toneladas por americano, e assim por cerca de 5000 toneladas/ano para os livros de Rowling e filmes e seus 3 filhos). A terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo superficial cada ano, de modo que se aproxima 2100, a maioria de sua capacidade crescente do alimento será ido. Então há a enorme quantidade de combustível queimado e resíduos feitos para fazer e distribuir os livros e filmes, bonecas plásticas etc. Ela mostra sua falta de responsabilidade social, produzindo crianças em vez de usar seus milhões para incentivar o planejamento familiar ou comprar a floresta tropical, e promovendo a estupidez liberal convencional de 3a supremacia mundial que está destruindo a GrãBretanha, América, o mundo e o futuro de seu descendente. Claro, ela não é diferente dos outros 7.8 bilhões sem noção-apenas mais barulhento e mais destrutivo. É o não livre almoço problema mandado grande. A máfia só não pode ver que não existe tal coisa como ajudar uma pessoa sem prejudicar os outros. Direitos ou privilégios dados a novos operadores em um mundo superlotado só podem escureceros de outros. Apesar dos enormes desastres ecológicos que acontecem na frente deles em todos os lugares todos os dias, eles não podem fixá-los à maternidade desenfreada de "os diversos", que representa a maior parte do aumento da população do século passado e tudo isso neste Um. Eles não têm alguma combinação de inteligência, educação, experiência e sanidade necessária para extrapolar os assaltos diários sobre os recursos e funcionamento da sociedade para o eventual colapso da civilização industrial. Cada refeição, cada viagem de carro ou ônibus, cada par de sapatos é outra unha no caixão da terra. Ele provavelmente nunca cruzou sua mente que um assento em um avião de Londres para San Francisco produz cerca de uma tonelada de carbono que derrete cerca de 3 metros quadrados de gelo marinho e como um dos superprivilegiados que ela provavelmente voou centenas de tais vôos. Não só os ricos e famosos, mas quase qualquer figura pública em tudo, incluindo praticamente todos os professores, são pressionados a ser politicamente correto, que nas democracias ocidentais, agora significa social democrático (Neomarxista-i. e., comunista diluído) terceiro supremacistas mundiais que trabalham para a destruição de suas próprias sociedades e seus próprios descendentes. Assim, aqueles cuja falta of 91 Educação, experiência, inteligência (e senso comum básico), que deve proibi-los de fazer quaisquer declarações públicas em tudo, dominar totalmente todos os meios de comunicação, criando a impressão de que o inteligente e civilizados devem favorecer a democracia, a diversidade e a igualdade, enquanto a verdade é que estes são os problemas e não as soluções, e que eles próprios são os principais inimigos da civilização. Ver meu livros Suicídio pela Democracia 4a Ed (2019) y outras. Que tal um take diferente sobre os ricos e famosos? Primeiro o óbvio-os romances de Harry Potter são superstição primitiva que incentiva as crianças a acreditar na fantasia, em vez de assumir a responsabilidade pelo mundo-a norma, é claro. JKR é tão sem noção sobre si mesma e do mundo como todos os outros macacos, mas cerca de 200 vezes tão destrutivo como o americano médio e cerca de 800 vezes mais do que o chinês médio. Ela foi responsável pela destruição de talvez 30.000 hectares de floresta para produzir esses romances de lixo e toda a erosão que se seguiu (não trivial comoé de 6 a 12 toneladas/ano solo no oceano para todos na terra ou talvez 100 toneladas por americano , e assim cerca de 5000 toneladas/ano para os livros de Rowling e MOVIES e seus 3 filhos). A terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo superficial cada ano, de modo que se aproxima 2100, a maioria de sua capacidade crescente do alimento será ido. Então há a enorme quantidade de combustível queimado e resíduos feitos para fazer e distribuir os livros e filmes, bonecas plásticas etc. Ela mostra sua falta de responsabilidade social, produzindo crianças em vez de usar seus milhões para incentivar o planejamento familiar ou comprar a floresta tropical, e promovendo a estupidez liberal convencional de 3a supremacia mundial que está destruindo a GrãBretanha, América, o mundo e o futuro de seu descendente. Claro, ela não é diferente dos outros 7.8 bilhões de sem noção-apenas mais barulhento e mais destrutivo. Como todos os ricos, ela é capaz de multiplicar sua destruição, fazendo com que outros destruam em seu nome. Cada criança produziu resultados em aproximadamente 50 toneladas de solo superficial no oceano, 300 libras de produtos químicos tóxicos produzidos, 1 acre da floresta/Pantanal/ido para sempre, cada ano. Como todas as pessoas, sua família rouba de todas as pessoas na terra e de seus próprios descendentes (sem direitos humanos sem erros humanos), e, como a grande maioria, ela é mal educada, egomaniacal, e falta de autoconsciência, para que essas questões nunca atravessar sua mente. Além da destruição de material para fazer e distribuir seus livros e filmes, há a grande quantidade de tempo desperdiçado na leitura e visualizá-los. Além disso, a extrema imaturidade mostrada pelos personagens neles e sua preocupação com fantasias infantis supersticiosas só pode prejudicar as mentes impressionáveis. O mundo seria um lugar melhor se ela nunca tivesse nascido, mas pode-se dizê-lo de quase todos. Tem sido por muito tempo a compreensão de pessoas espiritualmente conscientes de que todos, mas um pequeno número de nós passam toda a sua vida dormindo, e esta visão é poderosamente apoiada pela pesquisa psicológica moderna, que mostra que quase todas as nossas ações são feitas mecanicamente, para razões das quais não 92 temos conhecimento e sobre as quais não temos controle. Nossa personalidade é uma ilusão produzida pela evolução para garantir a reprodução. Somos apenas um pacote para genes egoístas que realizam seus programas cegos e, como todos os organismos, vivemos para replicar nossos genes e para acumular e consumir recursos para esse fim. No nosso caso, significa que vivemos para destruir a terra e os nossos próprios descendentes. É essencial para este jogo que permanecemos inconscientes disso, pois, na medida em que nos tornamos conscientes e vivemos nossas vidas como seres conscientes, diminuímos nossa reprodução e os genes que produzem esse comportamento são selecionados contra. Rowling é um exemplo típico de uma pessoa aparentemente inteligente consciente que vai percorrer toda a sua vida som adormecido-assim como quase todos os outros 10.000.000.000 mas or menos (eu extrapolar para 2100)-e como eles, vive apenas para destruir a terra e deixar sua descendência tóxica para trás para continuar a destruição. Como tantos, ela, com Obama e o Papa, compartilham a ilusão comum de que os pobres são mais nobres e merecedores, mas os ricos diferem apenas em ter a chance de ser mais destrutivo. Os pobres são os ricos em espera. Assim, 800 Chineses ou Indianos fazem aproximadamente tanto dano quanto JKR e sua família. Ricos ou pobres eles fazem as únicas coisas que os macacos podem fazer -consumir recursos e replicar seus genes até o colapso da civilização industrial sobre o meio do próximo século. Num piscar de olhos, séculos e milênios passarão e, no mundo infernal de fome, doença, guerra e violência que seus antepassados criaram, ninguém vai saber ou cuidar de que qualquer um deles existia. Ela não é mais inerentemente mal do que outros, mas também não é melhor e, devido aos acidentes da história, ela está no alto da lista de inimigos da vida na terra. É o não livre almoço problema mandado grande. A máfia só não pode ver que não existe tal coisa como ajudar uma pessoa sem prejudicar os outros. Os direitos ou privilégios dados aos novos operadores num mundo superlotado só podem diminuir os dos outros. Apesar dos enormes desastres ecológicos que acontecem na frente deles em todos os lugares todos os dias, eles não podem fixá-los à maternidade desenfreada de "os diversos", que representa a maior parte do aumento da população do século passado e tudo isso em um presente. Faltam alguma combinação da inteligência, da instrução, da experiência e da sanidade exigida para extrapolar os assaltos diários nos recursos e no funcionamento da sociedade agora ao colapso eventual da civilização industrial, assim como a coragem para dizê-lo mesmo se fazer perceber isso. Cada refeição, cada viagem de carro ou ônibus, cada par de sapatos é outra unha no caixão da terra. Ele provavelmente nunca cruzou sua mente que um assento em um avião de Londres para San Francisco produz cerca de uma tonelada de carbono que derrete cerca de 3 metros quadrados de gelo marinho e como um dos superprivilegiados que ela provavelmente voou centenas de tais vôos. Ele nunca cruza a mente da maioria das pessoas que a família média de classe inferior americana de 4 tirar em bens, serviços e custos de infra-estrutura talvez $50000 mais a cada ano do que contribuem, e em 100 anos (quando ele terá expandido para talvez 10 pessoas) terá custado o país cerca de $15000000, e incomensuravelmente mais em 93 custos ecológicos e sociais de longo prazo (qual é o valor para o colapso da civilização?). Não só os ricos e famosos, mas quase qualquer figura pública em tudo, incluindo praticamente todos os professores, são pressionados a ser politicamente correto, que nas democracias ocidentais, agora significa social democrático (diluído comunista) supremacistas terceiro mundo que trabalham para o destruição de suas próprias sociedades e seus próprios descendentes. Assim, aqueles cuja falta de liberdade de expressão (e senso comum básico), que deve proibi-los de fazer quaisquer declarações públicas em tudo, dominar totalmente todos os meios de comunicação, criando a impressão de que o inteligente e civilizado deve favorecer a democracia, a diversidade e igualdade, enquanto a verdade é que estes são os problemas e não as soluções, e que eles próprios são os principais inimigos da civilização. A América eo mundo estão em processo de colapso do crescimento populacional excessivo, a maior parte para o século passado e agora tudo isso devido ao mundo 3 pessoas. O consumo de recursos e a adição de 4.000.000.000 mais ca. 2100 entrará em colapso da civilização industrial e trará a fome, a doença, a violência e a guerra numa escala espantosa. Bilhões morrerão e a guerra nuclear é tudo, mas certo. Na América, isso está sendo enormemente acelerado pela imigração maciça e reprodução de imigrantes, combinada com abusos tornados possíveis pela democracia. A natureza humana depravada transforma inexoravelmente o sonho da democracia e da diversidade num pesadelo de criminalidade e de pobreza. A China continuará a dominar a América e o mundo, desde que mantenha a ditadura que limita o egoísmo. A causa raiz do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata para se adaptar ao mundo moderno, o que leva as pessoas a tratar pessoas não relacionadas como se tivessem interesses comuns. Eu denominado este o delusion inclusivo da aptidão (inclusive fitness delusion). Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva ao desilusões de engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Poucos entendem que se você ajudar uma pessoa que você prejudicar alguém-não há almoço livre e cada item que alguém consome destrói a terra além do reparo. Conseqüentemente, as políticas sociais em todos os lugares são insustentáveis e uma por uma todas as sociedades sem controles rigorosos sobre o egoísmo entrará em colapso em anarquia ou ditadura. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há nenhuma esperança para impedir o colapso de América, ou todo o país que segue um sistema democrático. Aqueles que querem um quadro mais amplo podem ver o meu livros "Suicídio pela Democracia" 4a edição (2019) y outras. 94 A ILUSÃO DIGITAL-COMPUTADORES SÃO PESSOAS E LINGUAGEM É MATEMÁTICA E OITECH VAI NOS SALVAR 96 Cientificismo em esteróides: uma revisão da 'Liberdade Evolui' (Freedom Evolves) por Daniel Dennett (2003) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata ' ' As pessoas dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que ainda estamos ocupados com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que os gregos. Mas as pessoas que dizem isso não entendem por que tem que ser assim. É porque a nossa língua permaneceu a mesma e continua a seduzir-nos a fazer as mesmas perguntas. Contanto que continue a ser um verbo para ser que pareça como se ele funciona da mesma forma como para comer e beber , contanto que ainda tenhamos os adjetivos idênticos , verdadeiro , falso , possível , contanto que continuemos a falar de um rio de tempo , de uma extensão do espaço, etc., etc., os povos manter-se-ão tropeçando sobre as mesmas dificuldades intrigantes e encontram-se olhar fixamente em algo que nenhuma explanação parece capaz de esclarecer. E o que é mais, isso satisfaz um anseio pelo transcendente, porque, na medida em que as pessoas pensam que podem ver os "limites da compreensão humana", eles acreditam, naturalmente, que eles podem ver além destes. ' ' Esta citação é de Ludwig Wittgenstein que redefiniu a filosofia de cerca de 70 anos atrás (mas a maioria das pessoas ainda têm de descobrir isso). Dennett, embora ele tenha sido um filósofo por cerca de 40 anos, é um deles. Também é curioso que tanto ele e seu antagonista principal, John Searle, estudou famoso Wittgensteinians (Searle com John Austin, Dennett com Gilbert Ryle), mas Searle mais ou menos tem o ponto e Dennett não fez, (embora ele está esticando as coisas para chamar Searle ou Ryle Wittgensteinians). Dennett é um determinista difícil (embora ele tenta esgueirar a realidade na porta dos fundos), e talvez isso seja devido a Ryle, cujo famoso livro O conceito de mente (1949) continua a ser reimpresso. Esse livro fez um grande trabalho de exorcizando o fantasma, mas deixou a máquina. Dennett gosta de fazer os erros Wittgenstein, Ryle (e muitos outros desde) ter exposto em detalhes. Nosso uso das palavras consciência, escolha, liberdade, intenção, partícula, pensamento, determina, onda, causa, aconteceu, evento (e assim por diante infinitamente) raramente são uma fonte de confusão, Mas assim que deixamos a vida normal e entrar filosofia (e qualquer discussão separada do ambiente em que a linguagem evoluiu- ou seja, o contexto exato em que as palavras tinham significado) reina o caos. Como a maioria, Dennett carece de um quadro coerente-que Searle chamou a estrutura lógica da racionalidade. Eu expandi neste consideravelmente desde que eu escrevi esta revisão e meus artigos recentes mostram em detalhe o que está errado com a aproximação de Dennett à filosofia, que uma pôde chamar o scientism em esteróides. Deixe-me terminar com outra citação de Wittgenstein-- 97 ambição é a morte do pensamento . Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. ' ' As pessoas dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que ainda estamos ocupados com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que os gregos. Mas as pessoas que dizem isso não entendem por que tem que ser assim. É porque a nossa língua permaneceu a mesma e continua a seduzir-nos a fazer as mesmas perguntas. Contanto que continue a ser um verbo para ser que pareça como se ele funciona da mesma forma como para comer e para beber , contanto que ainda tenhamos os adjetivos idênticos , verdadeiro , falso , possível , contanto que continuemos a falar de um rio de tempo , de uma extensão do espaço, etc., etc., os povos manter-se-ão tropeçando sobre as mesmas dificuldades intrigantes e encontram-se olhar fixamente em algo que nenhuma explanação parece capaz de esclarecer. E o que é mais, isso satisfaz um anseio pelo transcendente, porque, na medida em que as pessoas pensam que podem ver "os limites da compreensão humana", eles acreditam, naturalmente, que eles podem ver além destes. ' ' "A filosofia é uma batalha contra a feitiço de nossa inteligência por meio da linguagem". "Ambição é a morte do pensamento" "Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder perguntas na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. " (BBB P18). "Como surge o problema filosófico sobre os processos e estados mentais e sobre o behaviorismo? – O primeiro passo é o que completamente escapa aviso. Falamos sobre processos e Estados e deixamos sua natureza indeciso. Em algum momento talvez nós saberemos mais sobre eles-pensamos. Mas isso é apenas o que nos compromete a uma maneira particular de olhar para o assunto. Pois temos um conceito definitivo do que significa aprender a conhecer melhor um processo. (O movimento decisivo no truque de Conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente). - E agora a analogia que foi para nos fazer entender nossos pensamentos cai em pedaços. Então, temos que negar o processo ainda não compreendido no meio ainda inexplorado. E agora parece que tínhamos negado 98 processos mentais. E, naturalmente, não queremos negá-los. W PI P308 Estas citações são de Ludwig Wittgenstein, que redefiniu a filosofia alguns 70 anos há (mas a maioria de povos têm ainda para encontrar isto para fora). Dennett, embora ele tenha sido um filósofo para cerca de 40 anos, é um deles. Também é curioso que tanto ele e seu antagonista principal, John Searle, estudou os famosos Wittgensteinians (Searle com John Austin, Dennett com Gilbert Ryle), mas Searle pelo menos parcialmente tem o ponto e Dennett não. Dennett é um determinista difícil (embora ele tenta esgueirar a realidade na porta dos fundos), e talvez isso seja devido a Ryle, cujo famoso livro O conceito de mente (1949) continua a ser reimpresso. Esse livro fez um grande trabalho de exorcizando o fantasma, mas deixou a máquina. Dennett gosta de fazer os erros Wittgenstein, Ryle (e muitos outros desde) ter exposto em detalhes. Por acidente, pouco antes deste livro, eu tinha lido as mentes I , que Dennett co-autor com Douglas Hofstadter em 1981. Eles fizeram alguns erros ruins (ver a minha revisão), e mais triste de tudo, eles reimpresso dois artigos famosos que apontou o caminho para fora da bagunça---Nagel s ' o que é como ser um morcego? ' e uma versão inicial do argumento de John Searle quarto chinês explicando por que os computadores não pensam. Nagel apontou que nem sabemos como reconhecer o que seria um conceito de mente de morcego. Searle explicou similarmente como nós faltam uma maneira de conceituar o pensamento e como difere do que um computador faz (por exemplo, pode traduzir o chinês sem compreendê-lo). Da mesma forma, falta-nos um teste claro para reconhecer o que conta como bom vs ruim-ou apenas inteligível-para muitos conceitos filosóficos e científicos. Nosso uso das palavras consciência, escolha, liberdade, intenção, partícula, pensamento, determina, onda, causa, aconteceu, evento (e assim por diante infinitamente) raramente são uma fonte de confusão, mas assim que deixamos a vida normal e entrar filosofia (e qualquer discussão destacada do ambiente em que a linguagem evoluiu- ou seja, o contexto exato em que as palavras tinham significado) reina o caos. Wittgenstein foi o primeiro a entender por que e apontar como evitar isso. Infelizmente, ele morreu em seu auge, suas obras são compostas quase inteiramente de uma série de exemplos de como a mente (linguagem) funciona, e ele nunca escreveu qualquer livros populares, de modo a compreensão de seu trabalho é restrito a um muito poucos. Searle é um dos principais filósofos do mundo e tem escrito muitos artigos e livros extremamente claros e altamente conceituados, alguns dos quais têm apontado tele flagrante defeitos no wo RK de Dennett . Sua revisão ' ' Consciousness Explained Away (explicado sem explicar) do livro de Dennett 1991 ' Consciência Explanado e seu livro O Mistério de Consciencia são muito conhecidos, e mostrar, de uma forma que é surpreendentemente claro para a escrita filosófica, por que nem Dennett (nem qualquer uma das centenas de filósofos e cientistas que escreveram sobre este tema) têm chegado perto de explicar o problema difícil-i. e., como você conceituar a consciência. É claro que na minha opinião (e Wittgenstein ' s) não há "problema difícil" apenas confusão sobre o uso da linguagem. Muitos suspeitam que nunca seremos capazes de ' conceitualizar ' qualquer uma das coisas realmente importantes (embora 99 eu acho que W deixou claro que eles estão misturando-se a questão científica muito difícil com a questão muito simples de como usar a palavra), mas é claro que não estamos em nenhum lugar perto dele agora como uma questão científica. Minha própria opinião é que a questão científica é simples, pois podemos ver a "consciência" ser unida a alguns neurones em um momento pela evolução e pelo desenvolvimento. E o ' conceito ' é um jogo de linguagem como qualquer outro e um só precisa ficar claro (especificar COS claros) sobre como usaremos a palavra. Dennett ignorou principalmente seus críticos, mas favoreceu Searle com ataques pessoais vituperativos. Searle foi acusado por Dennett e outros de estar fora para destruir a psicologia cognitiva que é bastante engraçado, como a filosofia moderna está no sentido acadêmico estreito um ramo da psicologia cognitiva (o descritivo Psicologia do pensamento de ordem superior), e Searle tornou muito claro por 30 anos que somos um bom exemplo de uma máquina biológica que é consciente, pensa, etc. Ele apenas aponta que nós não temos nenhuma idéia de como isso acontece. Searle caracteriza-se como ' ' patologia intelectual , os pontos de vista de Dennett e todos aqueles que negam a existência dos próprios fenômenos que se estabelecem para explicar. Dennett repete seus erros aqui e deixa sua resposta aos seus críticos para a penúltima página do livro, onde nos é dito que eles estão todos enganados e é um desperdício de espaço para mostrar como! Sem surpresa, não há uma referência a Wittgenstein ou Searle em todo o livro. Há no entanto, muitas referências a outros filósofos da velha escola que estão tão confusos como ele é. É scientismo mandado grande - o erro quase universal de misturar junto a edição empírica real da ciência com as edições de como a língua deve ser usada (jogos da língua) da filosofia. Como a maioria das pessoas, ele não cruzar sua mente que nos motores de inferência que ele pensa com estão forçando-o a chegar a certas conclusões e que estas muitas vezes será bastante desconectada com ou errado sobre a forma como as coisas estão no mundo. Eles são um mistura de curiosidades evolutivas que fazem várias tarefas na organização de comportamentos que foram úteis para a sobrevivência de centenas de milhares de anos atrás. Wittgenstein foi um pioneiro em fazer experimentos de pensamento em psicologia cognitiva e começou a elucidar a natureza desses motores e as sutilezas da linguagem na década de 30, e assim ele fez os tipos de comentários que esta revisão começa com. Dennett diz (P98) que sua visão é Compatibilismo, ou seja, que o livre-vontade (que eu espero, para a coerência, podemos igualar com a escolha) é compatível com determinismo (ou seja, que há em qualquer instante exatamente um futuro fisicamente possível -P25). Ele quer mostrar que o determinismo não é o mesmo que a inevitabilidade. Entretanto, o livro inteiro é fumo e espelhos por meio de que escolha, no sentido que nós o compreendemos normalmente, desaparece e nós somos deixados com ' ' escolha ' ', que é algo que nós não podemos escolher. Naturalmente, isso ecoa o 100 destino da consciência em seu livro anterior ' ' consciência explicada ' '. É notável que, em um momento em que estamos apenas começando a chegar ao ponto onde podemos ser capazes de entender os fundamentos de como um único neurônio funciona (ou como um átomo funciona para esse assunto), que qualquer pessoa pense que pode dar um salto para entender todo o cérebro e explicar seus fenômenos mais complexos.. Por favor, lembre-se da última frase de Wittgenstein da citação de abertura: e o que é mais, isso satisfaz um desejo para o transcendente, porque, na medida em que as pessoas pensam que podem ver "os limites da compreensão humana , eles acreditam, naturalmente, que eles podem ver Além destes. ' ' os jogos de linguagem são altamente variados e primorosamente sensíveis ao contexto para que todos se perdem. Se formos muito, muito cuidadosos, podemos colocar para fora os jogos de linguagem (por exemplo, especificar as condições de satisfação de várias declarações usando as palavras consciência, escolha, realidade, mente etc.) e clareza torna-se possível, mas Dennett lança cautela para os ventos e nós somos arrastados para a areia movediça. Há pelo menos 3 tópicos diferentes aqui (evolução do nosso cérebro, escolha e moralidade) e Dennett tenta em vão para junta-se eles em um relato coerente de como a liberdade evolui do acidente determinístico de átomos. Não há, no entanto, nenhuma razão convincente para aceitar que os átomos saltando (ou o seu exemplo favorito, o jogo da vida em execução em um computador) são isomórficos com a realidade. Nunca lhe ocorre que, a menos que ele especifica exatamente um contexto e assim o cos (condições de satisfação-i. e., o que torna as declarações verdadeiras ou falsas), suas declarações falta significado. Ele sabe que a indeterminação quântica (ou o princípio da incerteza) é um grande obstáculo ao determinismo, porém definido (e tem sido tomado por muitos como uma fuga à liberdade), mas descarta-o devido ao fato de que tais eventos são muito raros de se incomodar. Por extensão, é improvável que qualquer evento tal aconteça agora ou mesmo em toda a nossa vida em nosso cérebro, por isso parece ser preso com um determinado cérebro (o que quer que seja, ou seja, ele nunca especifica o cos). No entanto, o universo é um lugar grande e tem sido em torno de um longo tempo (talvez "para sempre") e se mesmo um tal efeito quântico ocorre que parece lançar todo o universo em um estado indeterminado. A noção há em qualquer instante exatamente um futuro fisicamente possível não pode ser verdadeiro se em qualquer instante, um indeterminação do Quantum pode ocorrer--neste caso parece haver infinitamente muitos futuros possíveis. Mas, novamente, o que exatamente é o cos desta afirmação? Isto recorda um dos escapes das contradições da física - cada instante nosso universo é ramificando em infinitamente muitos universos. Ele rejeita corretamente a idéia de que a indeterminação quântica nos dá a resposta para como podemos ter escolha. Esta idéia óbvia tem sido sugerido por muitos, mas o problema é que ninguém tem idéia de como especificar uma seqüência exata de passos que começa com as equações da física e acaba com os fenômenos da consciência (ou qualquer outro fenômeno emergente ). Se assim for, eles vão definitivamente ganhar pelo menos um prêmio Nobel, pois não só eles têm ' explicado 101 ' consciência, eles terão ' explicado ' (ou muito melhor "descrito" como Wittgenstein insistiu) o fenômeno universal de emergência (como as propriedades de ordem superior emergem dos mais baixos). Assim, eles teriam que resolver o ' facil problema (para determinar o estado exato do cérebro correspondente a algum estado mental e, preferencialmente, especificar a posição exata de todos os átomos no cérebro ao longo do tempo-ignorando a incerteza) e o Hard um (o que exatamente correlacionase com ou produz a consciência ou a escolha etc.?). E enquanto eles estão nele como sobre também fazer o impossível-uma solução exata e completa para as equações de campo quântico para um cérebro. É muito bem sabido que essas equações são não computáveis, mesmo para um átomo ou um vácuo, uma vez que exigiria uma quantidade infinita de tempo de computador. Mas infinito vai fazer por um átomo, então talvez um cérebro não vai demorar mais. Nunca atravessa sua mente (nem ninguém que eu vi) que ninguém pode deixar claro como um átomo "emerge" de elétrons, nêutrons e prótons ou uma molécula emerge de átomos nem células de moléculas etc. Sim, existem algumas equações, mas se você olhar com cuidado você vai ver muita mão acenando e fatos que são apenas aceitos como "a forma como as coisas são" e então eu acho que é claramente o mesmo com a consciência, cor, escolha, dor emergente de cachos de as células. Claro, depois de Wittgenstein percebemos que misturado com as questões científicas são os filosóficos-i. e., os diferentes usos (significados, cos) das palavras não são mantidos claros e assim as discussões são na sua maioria incoerentes. Ele começa na primeira página apelando para as leis da física para a proteção contra noções fantásticas como almas imateriais, mas a física é feita de noções tão fantásticas (incerteza, entrelaçamento, onda/dualidade de partículas, Schrodinger s morto/vivo gato etc.) e como Feynman disse muitas vezes ' ' ninguém entende de física! muitos pensam que ninguém nunca vai e eu sou um dos muitos que dizem que não há nada para "entender", mas sim há apenas um monte de "coisas", juntamente com a existência, espaço, tempo, matéria etc. para aceitar. Há um limite para o que o nosso pequeno cérebro pode fazer e talvez estejamos nesse limite agora. Mesmo se criarmos um computador enorme que poderia entender (em algum sentido) muito melhor do que nós, não é claro que ele poderia explicar para nós. Entender uma idéia requer um certo nível de inteligência ou poder (por exemplo, segurando um certo número de coisas em mente e realizando um certo número de cálculos/segundo). A maioria das pessoas nunca vai entender o abstruso matemática da teoria das cordas, não importa quanto tempo eles têm que fazê-lo. E não é claro que a teoria das cordas (ou qualquer outra) faz sentido como uma representação matemática (ou seja, real) do nosso mundo. Isso requer COS claros que eu acho que a teoria das cordas, a teoria quântica da mente etc., etc, falta. Então, há uma boa razão para supor que o nosso computador super intelligente, mesmo se nós ensiná-lo a pensar no "mesmo" sentido que fazemos, nunca será capaz de explicar coisas realmente complexas para nós. Mas, como sempre, precisamos especificar o contexto exato para poder ver os significados (cos) das palavras e a maioria das Ciências desse tipo não tem consciência do problema. 102 Na primeira página é uma de suas citações favoritas, que compara o cérebro a um grupo de robôs minúsculos, e em pg2 diz que nós somos feitos de robôs estúpidos. Mas o que é o cos para uma entidade ter uma mente? A forma como o cérebro (e qualquer célula) funciona não é nada como a forma como os robôs funcionam e nós nem sabemos como conceituar a diferença (ou seja, sabemos como os robôs funcionam, mas não como o cérebro funciona - por exemplo, como fazem escolhas, entendem imagens e motivos etc.). Como eu anotei acima, este foi apontado por Searle 30 anos atrás, mas Dennett (e inúmeros outros) só não obtê-lo. Também nos é dito na primeira página que a ciência vai nos deixar entender a nossa liberdade e nos dar uma base melhor para a nossa moralidade. Até onde eu posso ver, nem ciência nem filosofia, nem religião, tem qualquer efeito sobre a nossa compreensão de nossa liberdade ou moralidade. Embora ele discute a biologia do altruísmo e escolha racional em comprimento, ele nunca menciona a evidência abundante de psicologia cognitiva que nossas intuições morais são built em e demonstrável em crianças de 4 anos de idade. Em vez disso, ele passa muito tempo tentando mostrar como a escolha ea moralidade vêm de memórias de eventos e nossa interação com os outros. Em pg2 ele diz que nossos valores têm pouco a ver com os "objetivos" das nossas células e em pg2 a 3 que as nossas diferenças de personalidade são devido à forma como as nossas equipas robóticas são colocados juntos, ao longo de uma vida de crescimento e experiência. ' ' Este é um careca demissão da natureza humana, da abundante evidência de que nossas diferenças são, em grande medida, programado em nossos genes e fixados na primeira infância, e é típico de sua constante confuso vagando para trás e para frente entre determinismo e ambientalismo (ou seja, sua visão de que desenvolvemos a moralidade ao longo do tempo pela experiência e pelo pensamento sobre questões morais). Mas novamente ele mistura questões científicas com os filosóficos, ou seja, exatamente o jogo que estamos jogando com "robô", "mente", "determinado", "livre", etc.? Muitas outras seções do livro mostram a mesma confusão. Aqueles que não conhecem a evidência científica podem querer ler Pinker s 'A ardósia em branco (The Blank Slate), Boyer s 'Religião Explicou ' e qualquer um dos cem ou tão recentes textos, e dezenas de milhares de artigos e páginas Web sobre o desenvolvimento da personalidade, e psicologia evolutiva e cognitiva. Em pg4 ele diz que bison no sabe que eles são bison e que nós conhecemos somos mamíferos por apenas algumas centenas de anos. Ambos mostram uma falta fundamental de entendimento da psicologia cognitiva. Os modelos cognitivos para as categorias ontológicas foram evoluídos, em suas formas originais, centenas de milhões de anos atrás e os animais têm a capacidade innascida de reconhecer outros de suas espécies e de outras espécies e classes de animais e plantas e objetos sem qualquer aprendizado suficiente para estabelecer categorias. Bison sabe que eles são como outros bisonte e nossos antepassados sabiam que eles eram como outros mamíferos e que os répteis eram diferentes, mas semelhantes uns aos outros, etc. Os estudos cognitivos mostraram estes tipos de habilidades em crianças muito novas. Mais uma vez estamos usando "conhecer" em seu sistema 1 sentido pré-lingüístico ou em seu sistema 2 linguístico? Veja meus outros escritos para a utilidade dos dois sistemas do 103 ponto de vista do pensamento. Claro, é verdade que as palavras ' bison e ' mamífero são recentes, mas não têm nada a ver com a forma como os nossos cérebros funcionam. Na página 5 ele atribui a hostilidade do pós-modernismo à ciência como um produto de ' pensamento temeroso , mas não especular por que isso é. Apesar de seu conhecimento com a psicologia cognitiva, ele não vê que isso é provável devido ao fato de que muitos resultados da ciência colidem com os sentimentos normalmente produzidos pela operação dos motores de inferência para a psicologia intuitiva, coalizão, mente social, intercâmbio social, etc. como eu discuto em outro lugar. Na página 9, ele observa que a livre vontade é um problema e nossas atitudes para ele fazer a diferença, mas para quem? Ninguém além de filósofos. Fazemos escolhas. Qual é o problema? Um tem que pisar fora da vida para experimentar um problema e, em seguida, tudo se torna um problema. O que são consciência, dor, amarelo, intenção, matéria, quarks, gravidade, etc.? Duvido que qualquer pessoa normal já experimentou uma mudança fundamental em sua interaçãos com as pessoas ou seus processos decisórios devido ao seu pensamento sobre a escolha. Isso mostra que há algo estranho nessas perguntas. Wittgenstein mostra que os jogos de linguagem são diferentes. Há jogos para a língua conectada com os moldes cognitivos para decisiones, ou vendo cores etc., e pensar filosoficamente está usando tipicamente as palavras no contexto errado ou sem nenhum contexto desobstruído (um pode chamar este desmembrado), por isso sem COS claros (significado). Modos dissociados permitem pensar sobre o passado, planejando para o futuro, adivinhando os Estados mentais dos outros, etc, mas se alguém leva os resultados de forma errada e começa a pensar ' John vai tentar roubar minha carteira , ao invés de apenas imaginar que John poderia fazê-lo , a confusão entra e aqueles que não podem desligar o modo desacoplado ou distingui-lo do modo acoplado, entram no Reino da patologia. Alguns aspectos da esquizofrenia e outra doença mental pode ser visto desta forma-eles perdem o controle de que modo eles estão, por exemplo, não ser capaz de ver a diferença entre os motivos Pessoas têm e os motivos que podem ter, entre um jogo de linguagem e outro. Pode-se então ver muito do povo filosofar fazer como operando nesses modos dissociados (contrafactual), mas não conseguir manter na frente deles as diferenças do normal Modo. Modo normal - e. g., o que é que o leão fazendo-foi sem duvida o primeiro evoluiu e modos dissociados-o que o Leão fez da última vez ou o que ele pretende fazer a seguir-evoluiu mais tarde. Isso provavelmente nunca foi um problema para os animais-qualquer animal que gastou muito tempo se preocupando com o que poderia acontecer não seria muito bem sucedido contribuindo para o fundo disponavel genético. É interessante especular que somente quando os seres humanos desenvolveram a cultura e começaram a degenerar geneticamente, poderia um grande número de 104 povos sobreviver com os genes que os conduziram a gastar muito tempo em modalidades desacopladas. Portanto, temos a filosofia e este livro, que é principalmente sobre a execução dos modelos de decisão em modo desacoplado, onde não há conseqüências reais, exceto ganhar royalties para colocar os resultados em um livro para outras pessoas a usar para executar seus motores em modo desacoplado . Vamos alterar a citação de Wittgenstein para ler: contanto que continue a ser um verbo para decidir que parece que funciona da mesma forma como para comer e para beber , contanto que continuemos a falar de liberdade de ação , de dizer que eu desejo que eu tinha feito de outra forma, etc, etc, as pessoas vão continuar tropeçando sobre as mesmas dificuldades intrigantes e encontrar-se olhando para algo que nenhuma explicação parece capaz de limpar. Como com a maioria dos livros de filosofia, quase todas as páginas, muitas vezes cada parágrafo, muda de um tipo de jogo de linguagem para outro, sem perceber que agora um teria que estar brincando ou sonhando ou agindo em um jogo ou recitando uma história, etc, e não realmente pretendendo qualquer coisa, nem descrevendo uma situação real no mundo. Na página 10 ele diz que contamos com livre-vontade para toda a way de pensar sobre nossas vidas, como nós não em alimentos e água, mas quem, fora da filosofia, de pé na frente do almoço contador cheio de comida, nunca pensa como é bom que Eles têm livre vontade para que eles possam pegar Coca-cola em vez de água mineral? Mesmo se eu quero ser um compatibilizar sério e tentar pensar isso no modo desacoplado, eu tenho que sair e entrar no modo nao descoplado para fazer a escolha real. Só então eu posso voltar para o modo desacoplado para saber o que poderia ter acontecido se eu não tivesse a capacidade de fazer uma escolha real. Wittgenstein observou como fingir jogos são parasitas em reais (esta não é uma observação trivial!). A capacidade de se envolver em cenários dissociados muito complexos já é evidente em crianças de 4 anos de idade. Então, eu diria que normalmente, ninguém conta em ter escolha, mas sim nós apenas escolher. Como Wittgenstein deixou claro que é a ação baseada na certeza de que é o alicerce de nossa vida. Veja os escritos recentes de Daniele Moyal-Sharrock e meus outros escritos. Na mesma página, ele mostra novamente que ele não apreender noções básicas cognitivas. Ele diz que aprendemos a conduzir nossas vidas na atmosfera conceitual de escolha, e que "parece ser um construto estável e ahistórico, como eterno e imutável como aritmética, mas não é. e na página 13-- É uma criação evoluída de atividade humana e crenças . Tele todo impulso de psicologia cognitiva (e Wittgenstein) é que nós não (e não pode) aprender os fundamentos do planejamento, decidindo, prometendo, resenting, etc, mas que estes são built-in funções dos motores de inferência que trabalham automaticamente e inconscientemente e começar a correr na infância muito cedo. Na p14 ele sugere que é provável que a nossa ter livre vontade depende de nossa crença de que temos! Acreditamos que vemos uma maçã, sentimos uma dor, estamos felizes? O jogo da língua da opinião é muito diferente daquele de saber nas palavras é 105 incoerente (nenhum cos desobstruído) na maneira que Dennett os usa frequentemente. Nós podemos acreditar que temos um dólar no nosso bolso, mas se nós tirá-lo e olhar para ele não podemos significavelmente, então, dizer que ainda acreditamos que (exceto como uma piada, etc.). O motor de inferência pode ser executado em modo dissociado (crença) para que possamos imaginar ter escolhas ou fazê-los, mas na vida nós apenas fazê-los, e é apenas em situações muito estranhas, podemos dizer que acreditamos que fizemos uma escolha. Mas Dennett está dizendo que este é o caso universal. Se fazer uma escolha tinha qualquer dependência da crença do que assim faria tudo o resto-consciência, ver, pensar, etc. Se levamos isso a sério (e ele diz que os sérios problemas de livre vontade ), então estamos entrando em apuros e se realmente tentar aplicá-lo à vida, então a loucura é minutos de distância. Ele, como todos os filósoficos, até recentemente, não tinha idéia de que Wittgenstein nos mostrou o caminho para fora desta necessidade de terra nossas ações sobre as crenças, descrevendo a base real de saber qual é o unfundamentada ' dobradiças ' ou automatismos do sistema 1 pensando em seu último trabalho ' sobre certeza '. Daniele Moyal-Sharrock explicou isso na última década e eu resumi seu trabalho e incorporeio em minhas revisões e artigos. Na página 65 e segs., ele discute a causalidade, a intenção e os "predicados informais" que usamos para descrever átomos, etc., mas a pesquisa cognitiva mostrou que descrevemos todos os "objetos" com um número limitado de categorias ontológicas, que analisamos com nossos módulos de física intuitiva, e que quando os agentes (ou seja, animais ou pessoas ou coisas como eles-i. e., fantasmas ou deuses) estão envolvidos, usamos nossos conceitos (motores) para a agência, psicologia intuitiva, mentes sociais, etc para decidir como se comportar. Não há quase certamente nenhum módulo de causação, mas sim envolverá todos esses e outros motores de inferência, dependendo da situação exata. Discutindo a possibilidade e a necessidade é muito facil se um fala nos termos da saída de nossos módulos para a física intuitiva, a agência, as categorias ontológica etc. Claro, não há nenhuma menção aqui de Wittgenstein s muitos comentários incisivos sobre os jogos de linguagem de causalidade, intenção, decidindo, nem de Searle s clássicos obras sobre intenção e realidade social. Ele passa muito tempo no livro de Ainslie, "repartição da vontade ", em que é discutido as faculdades de descontagem hiperbólica (ou seja, motores de inferência) por que avaliamos resultados prováveis. Ele faz muito do excelente trabalho de Robert Frank sobre altruísmo, emoção e economia, mas o livro que ele cita tinha 15 anos de idade, quando este livro foi publicado. Foi idéia de Bingham, amplificada por Frank e por Boyd e Richardson (1992) que a cooperação foi muito estimulada pela evolução dos meios para punir trapaceiros. Ele sugere isso como exemplos de abordagens darwinianos que são obrigatórias e promissoras. Na verdade, eles são, e na verdade eles são partes padrão da teoria econômica, evolucionária e cognitiva, mas, infelizmente, ele faz pouca referência ao outro trabalho nesses campos. Todo esse trabalho tende a mostrar que as pessoas não escolhem, mas seus cérebros escolher para eles (sistema 1 rápido 106 automático ' escolhas ' vs sistema 2 lento deliberativo ' escolhas '). Ele não estabelece qualquer conexão convincente entre este trabalho e o problema geral de escolha e como quase todos os filósofos não tem nenhuma compreensão dos dois poderosos sistemas de estrutura de pensamento. Os filósofos de todas as listras foram hipnotizados pela sua capacidade de desacoplar os motores de inferência para jogar "o que se jogos, amando a colocar nomes contraintuitivo em categorias ontológicas (ou seja, se Sócrates era imortal, etc.). A este respeito, eles compartilham alguns elementos com a religião primitiva (ver Boyer). Este não é um gracejo, nem um insulto, mas aponta meramente que uma vez que um tem um aperto de conceitos cognitivos modernos, um vê que se aplicam ao longo o espectro inteiro da atividade humana (e seria estranho se não fizeram). Mas como Wittgenstein explicou tão lindamente, os jogos de linguagem e os motores de inferência de S2 têm seus limites-as explicações chegam ao fim--nós batemos bedrock (fundação)(S1). Mas o filósofo acha que ele pode ver além dele e sai na água, ou como Wittgenstein colocá-lo, em escuridão absoluta. Na p216 ele diz que fazer-se para que um não poderia ter feito de outra forma é uma inovação fundamental na ascensão evolutiva para livre-vontade, e que só pode ser livre se aprendemos a tornar-nos insensível às oportunidades. Mais uma vez, pode-se dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (estado claro COS) para qualquer coisa, e Dennett nem sequer começar a esclarecer o cos. E como essas ' habilidades ' função (ou seja, os jogos de ' vontade ', ' self ', ' escolha ', ' causa ' etc.) é nunca deixou claro. Dennett tem uma inclinação para esconder suas idéias em uma quantidade maciça de texto bastante irrelevante(ou seja, ele é um verdadeiro filósofo!). Novamente, ele recebe as coisas para trás, como há um vasto corpo de provas muito boas da biologia e da psicologia que temos os sentimentos que devemos comportar de alguma forma a partir de nossos motores de inferência, e estes não são fornecidos por alguma parte do nosso auto consciente , mas pela operação automática e inconsciente dos motores. Como ele observa, centenas de experimentos com o dilema do prisioneiro e protocolos relacionados mostraram como é fácil manipular as escolhas das pessoas e que seus cálculos não são conscientes e deliberados em tudo e de fato muito do moderno psicológico, sociológico e a pesquisa da economia do neuronios devotada a distinguir os automatismos de S1 do pensamento deliberativo de S2 e de mostrar como as réguas S1. Quando a situação é manipulada para tornar as pessoas conscientes, elas são muito mais lentas e menos confiáveis (S2). Assim, houve uma pressão constante da seleção natural para fazer os motores rápidos e automáticos e inacessível ao pensamento deliberado. Dennett diz ' nós nos fazemos para que não pudéssemos fazer o contrário e que esta é a base da moralidade e da escolha. A evidência é exatamente o oposto. Nossos motores de inferência nos dão intuições morais básicas e geralmente agimos de acordo com os resultados. Se nós ou outros não, nós sentimos culpa, indignação, 107 ressentimento etc., e então os genes trapaceiro invadirão a população e esta é uma das principais teorias de como uma boa parte da moralidade evoluiu. Nossos genes nos fazem para que não possamos (principalmente) fazer o contrário, não a nossa vontade ou o que Dennett acha que pode fazer. Muitas vezes podemos optar por fazer o contrário, mas nossas próprias intuições e o conhecimento da desaprovação social geralmente servem para limitar nossas escolhas. Essas intuições evoluíram em pequenos grupos entre 50.000 e alguns milhões de anos atrás. No mundo moderno, as intuições não são muitas vezes a nossa vantagem de longo prazo e os controles sociais fracos. Esta é uma razão primordial para o progresso inexorável no caos no mundo. Na p225 ele finalmente foge em uma definição de livre-vontade como um complicado rosnado de causas mecanicista que se parecem com a tomada de decisão (a partir de certos ângulos)". Ele afirma que isso desempenha todos os papéis valiosos de livre vontade, mas carece de algumas propriedades (não especificadas) possuídas pelo tradicional livre-vontade. A fumaça é grossa, mas eu tenho certeza que uma dessas propriedades não especificadas é o que entendemos como escolha. Ele insiste (topo de p226) que o seu relato naturalista de tomada de decisão deixa muito espaço para a responsabilidade moral, mas fazendo-nos assim que não poderia fazer de outra forma não descreve a maneira que realmente funcionam, nem deixar qualquer espaço para a moralidade, como que consistiria precisamente em poder fazer o contrário. Ele não propõe qualquer teste para decidir se uma escolha é voluntária ou forçada e eu duvido que ele poderia fazê-lo. Normalmente, se alguém nos pede para mover a nossa mão, sabemos o que conta como tendo uma escolha, mas, típico de filósofos, espero que, independentemente de se move ou não ele vai contar tanto como prova de sua posição e, claro, se tudo conta, então nada conta como Wittgenstein tão marcações comentou muitas vezes. Neste ponto, ele também começa sua discussão sobre o trabalho bem conhecido de Libet sobre a atenção consciente, que é a única parte do livro que eu senti que valeu a pena o meu tempo. Entretanto, a reivindicação de Libet que nós fazemos decisões sem consciência foi desmascarada muitas vezes, por psicólogos e por filósofos (por exemplo, Searle e Kihlstrom independentemente). Na página 253 e segs., ele foge em sua definição de vontade consciente-a "ilusão de usuário do ' cérebro de si mesmo que tem como um dos seus principais papéis fornecendo me com os meios de interface comigo mesmo em outros momentos ' 'eu ' ' illusorio ou não, a vontade consciente é o guia de pessoas para a sua própria responsabilidade moral para a ação.' ' Ele diz el truque que precisamos é ver que ' ' I ' controlar o que está a acontecer dentro da barreira de simplificação ... onde a tomada de decisão acontece . ' ' os acontecimentos mentais se tornam conscientes por entrando na memória . o processo de auto descrição... é o que somos . A coisa crucial é que a escolha é possível porque o self é distribuído sobre o espaço (o cérebro) e o tempo (memórias). Ele percebe que isso vai deixar muitos incrédulos (todos que podem seguir isso e realmente entende os jogos de linguagem bizarra!). Eu sei que 108 muitas pessoas acham difícil entender essa idéia ou levá-la a sério. Parece-lhes ser um truque com espelhos, algum tipo de ligeiro verbal da mão que leva a consciência, e o Self real, fora do retrato apenas quando estava a ser introduzido. muitos dirão que tirou as palavras da boca, mas eu diria que é incoerente e que tudo o que sabemos sobre a consciência e todo o universo (fazendo as extensões óbvias de tais reivindicações) foi embora muito antes de chegamos tão longe em seu tomo. E um olhar cuidadoso nos jogos da língua mostra sua falta da coerência (isto é, nenhumas condições de satisfação desobstruídas como eu anoto em meus artigos). Como a maioria de filosofos e quase todos os cientistas que enceram filosóficos, faz erros fatais em suas primeiras sentenças-a falha usar a língua em desobstruído (isto é, significativo) maneiras e tudo que segue é uma casa dos cartões. Wittgenstein afirmou a questão com o seu habitual brilhantismo aforístico assim que eu repeti-lo novamente. "Como surge o problema filosófico sobre os processos e estados mentais e sobre o behaviorismo? – O primeiro passo é o que completamente escapa aviso. Falamos sobre processos e Estados e deixamos sua natureza indeciso. Em algum momento talvez nós saberemos mais sobre eles-pensamos. Mas isso é apenas o que nos compromete a uma maneira particular de olhar para o assunto. Pois temos um conceito definitivo do que significa aprender a conhecer melhor um processo. (O movimento decisivo no truque de Conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente). - E agora a analogia que foi para nos fazer entender nossos pensamentos cai em pedaços. Então, temos que negar o processo ainda não compreendido no meio ainda inexplorado. E agora parece que tínhamos negado processos mentais. E, naturalmente, não queremos negá-los. W PI P308 Na p259 ele diz que a cultura nos fez animais racionais! Esta é uma negação impressionante da natureza humana (e animal) (isto é, genética e evolução) proveniente da pessoa que escreveu ' Darwin ' s Dangerous Idea ! Presumivelmente, ele está falando sobre sua idéia de que é memórias espalhadas pelo espaço (o cérebro e outras pessoas) e tempo (muito parecido com os memes de Dawkins) que nos dão escolhas e morais e consciência (linha 6 do fundo). Ele diz que a consciência é uma interface de usuário, mas nunca é claro quem ou onde o usuário está e como ele faz interface com o cérebro (você terá que sofrer através de consciência explicada "para descobrir que não há resposta lá também). Embora ele faz muitas referências à psicologia evolutiva e cognitiva, ele raramente usa qualquer da terminologia que tem sido atual por décadas (mente social, psicologia intuitiva, intuições de coalizões, etc.) e claramente não está familiarizado com a maioria dos conceitos . Se ele quer dizer que temos os detalhes finos da moralidade da cultura, isso é ok, mas essa é a cobertura S2 do bolo e o bolo S1 foi assado pelos genes. Também nos é dito aqui que R & D (pelo qual ele significa evolução aqui, mas outras coisas em outros lugares) nos deu o Self e que a linguagem cria um novo tipo de 109 consciência e moralidade. Estou certo de que ele vai ter pouco acordo sobre isso. Parece bastante claro que a consciência e os fundamentos da moralidade evoluíram em primatas (e antes) muito antes da língua falada (embora seja muito controverso a respeito de como a linguagem evoluiu de capacidades existentes no cérebro). Ele continua ' ' Memes moralidade surgiu por acidente algumas dezenas de milhares de anos atrás ' ', que seria OK se ele significava a cereja no topo do bolo, mas ele claramente significa o bolo! E então ele diz que o ponto de moralidade não é a sobrevivência dos nossos genes, que é uma coisa incrível (e totalmente incorreto) para dizer, mesmo se ele estava apenas referindo-se a memes. Na PG 260 ele alega que, porque não compreendemos as nossas disposições "branda" para cooperar , eles não significam nada para nós, mas é o funcionamento dos nossos modelos (ou seja, altruis recíprocom promovendo a aptidão inclusiva) que é tudo para nós e para cada ação de todos os animais. Como Dawkins recentemente observou em seus comentários sobre o trabalho recente desastrosa E. O Wilson apoiando o fantasmo de ' Seleção de grupo ', a seleção natural é a aptidão inclusiva (ver a minha revisão de Wilson ' s "a conquista social da terra"). Há uma ampla evidência de que, se um dos nossos muitos ' templates ' está danificado, uma pessoa não pode funcionar corretamente como um ser social (por exemplo, autismo, sociopatia, esquizofrenia). Eu diria que é a operação dos modelos de psicologia intuitiva, etc, que levam as pessoas quando filosofias para as visões contrintuitivas que não temos consciência e escolha. Ele também diz aqui que foi uma das principais transições evolutivas quando pudemos mudar nossas visões e refletir sobre as razões para eles. Isso novamente reflete sua falta de entendimento da psicologia evolutiva. Eu não sei de nenhuma evidência de que as intuições morais básicas, como todos os modelos, são acessíveis à consciência, mas há um enorme corpo de trabalho mostrando o oposto. Podemos decidir que a nossa traição foi justificável, ou perdoar outra pessoa trapaça, mas ainda sabemos que foi batota (ou seja, não podemos mudar o motor). Eu suspeito que meus antepassados há um milhão de anos tinha os mesmos sentimentos na mesma situação, mas o que aconteceu é que agora há muitas outras coisas que podem ser tomadas como relevantes, e que às vezes estes vão me levar a agir contrariamente aos meus sentimentos. Outra questão é que, como a cultura desenvolvida, um teve que fazer muitas decisões importantes ou "tipo moral" para que os motores não foram evoluídos para dar uma resposta clara. Na PG 267 ele diz que agora nós substituímos nossos ' racionales flutuantes livres (provavelmente correspondendo ao que os psicólogos cognitivos chamam nossos modelos ou motores de inferência) com reflexão e persuasão mútua. E na PG 286 ele diz que é uma educação infantil--exigindo e dando razões-que afeta o raciocínio moral. Mais uma vez, ele só não tem noção do que aconteceu nos últimos 30 anos de pesquisa-os modelos são inatas S1 automatismos e não pode mudar com reflexão ou educação. Em seguida, somos informados novamente de que a consciência torna as questões morais disponíveis ao longo do tempo para o Self, que assume a responsabilidade. Não é mais coerente ou credível com a repetição. 110 Na PG 289 ele tem um resumo do capítulo que repete as noções equivocadas de que é a cultura que torna possível refletir e que a escolha depende da educação (memória) e da partilha. É claro que não é cultura, mas as estruturas cognitivas herdadas que tornam possível refletir e escolher e que a cultura determina as ações aceitáveis e suas recompensas ou punições. No PG. 303, ele discute a clássica barreira filosófica entre ought e is , sem saber que nossos modelos resolveram esse problema há muito tempo - ou seja, eles nos dizem como se sentir sobre situações sobre outras pessoas. Ele também parece não ter conhecimento de que existem centenas de "culturais" universais implantados em nossos genes (por exemplo, ver Pinker ' s ' The Blank Slate ) e também do papel clássico de Searle " How to Derive Ought from Is")(como derivar deveria ser de é). Ele muitas vezes começa em que parece que vai ser uma boa discussão de algumas questões na psicologia evolucionária, mas invariavelmente vagueia em Arcana filosófica e acaba com mais confusão. Isso acontece no PG. 261, onde ele afirma que os conceitos como louvável foram moldados por milênios por cultura, enquanto a maioria diria que a base para tais conceitos está nos genes e cada cultura só determina os detalhes de reações aceitáveis para as intuições sua Membros obter de seus mecanismos inatos. Na PG 262 ele tenta explicar como um ESS (estratégia evolutivamente estável) pode produzir moralidade. Sua idéia aqui é que genética ' R & D ' (ou seja, evolução) produz entendimentos vagamente de moral e, em seguida, cultura (memética) produz variações e esclarecimentos. Eu diria que todos nós sabemos, e muita pesquisa deixou claro, que comumente obter resultados muito claros de nossos motores de inferência e apenas mal entender em casos especiais. A cultura simplesmente decide o que podemos fazer sobre nossos sentimentos. A última parte do livro está principalmente preocupada com a culpabilidade moral. Ele se refere ao clássico legal de Hart e Honore, que eu comecei a ler há 30 anos, uma vez que seus autores foram profundamente influenciados por Wittgenstein. Dennett nos diz que temos controle sobre nossa própria moralidade e que pensar sobre a moralidade nos melhorará. Mas, não parece qualquer justificação para esta visão neste livro. Não há nada aqui para ajudar ninguém a escapar dos ditratos da mente do macaco e tenho certeza de que quando a civilização industrial desmorona no século 22 as pessoas estarão agindo como seus antepassados fizeram 200.000 anos atrás. É um ponto de vista defensável que aqueles que conseguem escapar fazê-lo por viajar um caminho espiritual que não tem conexão com a filosofia-e não há um toque de espiritualidade em todo este livro-outro ponto de dizer considerando que muitos místicos têm fascinante coisas a dizer sobre o funcionamento da mente. Eu acho mais sabedoria sobre como ser livre e moral em qualquer de Osho 200 livros e fitas do que em qualquer lugar na filosofia. Sem surpresa, raramente se encontra pessoas espiritualmente e moralmente avançadas ensinando nas universidades. Não há nenhum sinal aqui, nem em nada que ele fez, que Dennett é moralmente superior. Depois de 40 anos de pensamento sobre a moralidade, ele lança ataques pessoais em seus críticos ou arrogantemente descarta- 111 los. Parece claro que, como todos nós, ele está preso nos limites de seus motores de inferência. Então, quanta oportunidade há para melhorar a nossa moralidade? Parece claro (por exemplo, veja Pinker s ' A Ardósia em Branco ')(The Blank Slate) que a maioria de nosso comportamento é genético e o descanso devido aos fatores desconhecidos em nosso ambiente, apesar do esforço vigorosos dos pais e das religiões e dos partidos políticos. Em média, talvez 5% da variação no comportamento moral (variações são a única coisa que podemos estudar) é devido aos nossos próprios esforços (cultura). As escolhas morais que mais importam hoje são aquelas que afetam o destino do mundo. Mas nossos modelos não foram evoluídos para lidar com superpopulação (exceto por assassinato) e mudanças climáticas (exceto movendo-se em outro lugar e matando qualquer oposição). Como seria notável se apenas uma das centenas de milhões de pessoas educadas no mundo conseguiu descobrir o que a consciência ou escolha ou qualquer fenômeno mental realmente é (ou seja, como descrever seus correlatos neurofisiológicos). E se um fêz, nós esperá-los-ia ser um cientista na borda de ponta da pesquisa usando algum equipamento exótico de fMRI e o computador de lógica confuso em rede neural o mais atrasado de processamento paralelo etc. E isso só significaria que eles especificam os circuitos neurais e bioquímica/genética. Assim, eles não podem responder a perguntas de filosofia (os jogos de linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior).Mas não precisa de resposta – como a existência de espaço, tempo, matéria, é apenas a maneira como as coisas são e o trabalho do filósofo é esclarecer os jogos de linguagem que podemos jogar com estas palavras. Mas, um filósofo ou physicio apenas sentado lá pensando, chegando comum científico solução para o maior enigma científico que existe! E, em seguida, escrevendo um livro inteiro sobre isso sem verificar com os céticos em primeiro lugar. Para voltar à citação no início--ambição é a morte do pensamento . Na verdade-embora claramente Wittgenstein estava pensando em pensamento profundo! 112 Revisão de 'Eu sou um Loop Estranho' (I am a Strange Loop) por Douglas Hofstadter (2007) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Último sermão da Igreja do naturalismo fundamentalista pelo pastor Hofstadter. Como o seu muito mais famoso (ou infame por seus erros filosóficos implacáveis) Godel, Escher, Bach, ele tem uma plausibilidade superficial, mas se se compreende que este é um scientismo desenfreado que mistura questões científicas reais com os filosóficos (ou seja, o somente as edições reais são que jogos da língua nós devemos jogar) então quase todo seu interesse desaparece. Eu forneci um quadro para análise baseada na psicologia evolutiva e no trabalho de Wittgenstein (desde que atualizado em meus escritos mais recentes). Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y otras. "Pode ser justamente perguntado qual a importância que a prova de Gödel tem para o nosso trabalho. Para um pedaço de matemática não pode resolver problemas do tipo que nos incomoda. --A resposta é que a situação, em que tal prova nos traz, é do nosso interesse. "O que devemos dizer agora?" -Esse é o nosso tema. No entanto, estranho soa, minha tarefa, tanto quanto diz respeito à prova de Gödel parece meramente consistir em deixar claro que tal proposição como: "suponha que isso poderia ser provado" significa em matemática. " Wittgenstein "observações sobre as fundações da matemática" p337 (1956) (escrito em 1937). "Meus teoremas só mostram que a mecanização da matemática, ou seja, a eliminação da mente e de entidades abstratas, é impossível, se alguém quiser ter uma base satisfatória e um sistema de matemática. Eu não tenho provado que existem questões matemáticas que são indecidíveis para a mente humana, mas só que não há nenhuma máquina (ou formalismo cego) que pode decidir todas as questões número-teórico, 113 (mesmo de um tipo muito especial).... Não é a própria estrutura dos sistemas dedutivos que está a ser ameaçado com um demolir, mas apenas uma certa interpretação do mesmo, ou seja, a sua interpretação como um formalismo cego. " Gödel "obras coletadas" Vol. 5, p 176-177. (2003) "Toda inferência tem lugar a priori. Os acontecimentos do futuro não podem ser inferidos a partir do presente. A superstição é a crença no nexo causal. A liberdade da vontade consiste no fato de que as ações futuras não podem ser conhecidas agora. Só podíamos conhecê-los se a causalidade fosse uma necessidade interior, como a da dedução lógica. --A conexão do conhecimento e do que é sabido é aquela da necessidade lógica. ("A sabe que p é o caso" é sem sentido se p é um tautologia.) Se do fato que uma proposição é óbvia a nós, não segue que é verdadeiro, a seguir o obviedade não é nenhuma justificação para a crença em sua verdade. " TLP 5,133-5,1363 "Agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades da mente estão abertas diante de nós." Wittgenstein "o livro azul" P6 (1933) "Sentimos que mesmo quando todas as possíveis questões científicas foram respondidas, os problemas da vida permanecem completamente intocados. Naturalmente, não há então nenhuma pergunta deixada, e esta própria é a resposta. " Wittgenstein TLP 6,52 (1922) Eu li alguns 50 Comentários deste livro (que pelo físico Quantum David Deutsch foi talvez o melhor) e nenhum deles fornecer uma estrutura satisfatória, por isso vou tentar dar comentários novos que serão úteis, não só para este livro, mas para qualquer livro no ciências comportamentais (que podem incluir qualquer livro, se um agarra as ramificações). Como seu classico Gödel, Escher, Bach: a eterna trança dourada, e muitos de seus outros escritos, este livro de Hofstadter (H) tenta encontrar correlações ou conexões ou analogias que lançam luz sobre a consciência e toda a experiência humana. Como no GEB, ele gasta uma grande quantidade de tempo explicando e desenhando analogias com o famoso "incompletude" teoremas de Gödel, a arte "recursiva" de Escher e os "paradoxos" da linguagem (embora, como com a maioria das pessoas, ele não vê a necessidade de colocar esses termos em Cotações, e este é o cerne do problema). A idéia é que suas conseqüências aparentemente bizarras são devidos a "loops estranhos" e que tais loops são de alguma forma operacional em nosso cérebro. Em particular, eles podem "dar origem" ao nosso eu, que ele parece aproximadamente para igualar com a consciência e o pensamento. Tal como acontece com todos, quando ele começa a falar sobre como sua mente funciona, ele vai seriamente desviado. Eu sugiro que é em encontrar as razões para esta que o interesse neste livro, e a maioria de comentário geral em mentiras do comportamento. Vou contrastar as idéias da ISL com as do filósofo (psicóloga descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) Ludwig Wittgenstein (W), cujos comentários sobre psicologia, 114 escritos de 1912 a 1951, nunca foram ultrapassados por sua profundidade e clareza. Ele é um pioneiro não reconhecido na psicologia evolutiva (EP) e desenvolvedor do conceito moderno de intencionalidade. Ele observou que o problema fundamental na filosofia é que não vemos nossos processos mentais inatas automáticos e como estes geram nossos jogos de linguagem. Ele deu muitas ilustrações (pode-se considerar todo o 20.000 páginas de seu coleção como uma ilustração), alguns deles para palavras como "é" e "isso, e observou que todas as questões realmente básicas geralmente deslizam por sem comentário. Um ponto importante que ele desenvolveu foi que quase toda a nossa intencionalidade (aproximadamente, a nossa psicologia evolutiva (EP), racionalidade ou personalidade) é invisível para nós e tais partes como entrar em nossa consciência são em grande parte epifenomenal (ou seja, irrelevante para o nosso comportamento). O fato de que ninguém pode descrever seus processos mentais de qualquer maneira satisfatória, que isso é universal, que esses processos são rápidos e automáticos e muito complexos, nos diz que eles são parte dos "ocultos" módulos cognitivos (modelos ou motores de inferência) que foram fixados gradualmente no ADN animal sobre mais de 500 milhões anos. Por favor, veja meus outros escritos para mais detalhes. Como em virtualmente toda a escrita que tenta explicar o comportamento (filosofia, psicologia, sociologia, antropologia, história, política, teologia, e mesmo, como com H, matemática e física), eu sou um laço estranho (ISL) comete este tipo do erro (esquecimiento a nosso automaticidade) continuamente e isso produz os enigmas que, em seguida, tenta resolver. O título de ISL compreende as palavras que todos nós sabemos, mas como W anotou, os usos da palavra podem ser vistos como famílias de jogos da língua (gramática) que têm muitos sentidos (usos ou significados), cada um com seus próprios contextos. Nós sabemos o que estes são na prática mas se nós tentamos descrevê-los ou filosofar (teorizando) sobre eles, nós quase sempre nos desviamos e dizemos coisas que podem parecer ter o sentido mas faltam o contexto para dar-lhes o sentido. Ele nunca cruza a mente de Hofstadter que tanto "estranho" e "loop" estão fora do contexto e falta qualquer sentido claro (para não dizer nada sobre "I" e "AM" (eu e sou)!). Se você vai para a Wikipedia, você encontra muitos usos (jogos como W muitas vezes disse) para estas palavras e se você olhar ao redor em ISL você vai encontrá-los referidos como se fossem todos um. Da mesma forma, para "consciência", "realidade", "paradoxo", "recursivo", "auto referencial", etc. Então, estamos irremediavelmente à deriva da primeira página, como eu esperava do título. Um laço em uma corda pode ter um sentido muito desobstruído e do mesmo modo um diagrama de um laço do gabarito do regulador do motor de vapor, mas que sobre laços na matemática e na mente? H não vê o "laço mais estranho" de todos-que usamos a nossa consciência, auto e vontade de negar-se! Em relação aos famosos teoremas de Gödel, em que sentido eles podem ser loops? O que eles são quase universalmente suposto mostrar é que certos tipos básicos de sistemas matemáticos estão incompletos no sentido de que existem "verdadeiros" teoremas do sistema cuja "verdade" (a palavra infeliz matemáticos comumente 115 substituir a validade) ou " a falsidade (invalidez) não pode ser comprovada no sistema. Embora H não lhe diga, estes teoremas são logicamente equivalentes à solução de Turing "incompletude" do famoso problema de parada para computadores realizando algum cálculo arbitrário. Ele gasta muito tempo explicando a prova original de Gödel, mas não menciona que outros posteriormente encontraram provas muito mais curtas e mais simples de "incompletude" em matemática e provaram muitos conceitos relacionados. O que ele faz brevemente mencionar é o do matemático contemporâneo Gregory Chaitin-um originador com Kolmogorov e outros da teoria da informação algorítmica-que tem demonstrado que tal "incompletude" ou "aleatoriedade" (termo Chaitin-embora este é outro jogo), é muito mais extenso do que o pensamento longo, mas não lhe dizer que ambos os resultados de Gödel e Turing são corollários para o teorema de Chaitin e um exemplo de "aleatoriedade algorítmica". Você deve consultar os escritos mais recentes de Chaitin , como "o número Omega (2005)", como único ref. de Hofstadter a Chaitin é de 20 anos (embora Chaitin não tem mais compreensão das questões maiores aqui ou seja, intencionalidade inata como a fonte do jogos de linguagem em matemática-do que H e compartilha o "universo é um computador" fantasia também). Hofstadter toma esta "incompletude" (outra palavra (conceitual) jogo fora do contexto) para significar que o sistema é auto referencial ou "loopy" e "estranho". Não é claro por que ter teoremas que parecem ser (ou são) verdade (ou seja, válido) no sistema, mas não demonstravel nele, torna um loop nem porque isso se qualifica como estranho nem porque isso tem qualquer relação com qualquer outra coisa. Foi mostrado bastante forma convincente por Wittgenstein na década de 1930 (ou seja, logo após a prova de Gödel) que a melhor maneira de olhar para esta situação é como um jogo de linguagem típica (embora um novo para a matemática na época)-ou seja, o "verdadeiro, mas não provável" teoremas são "verdadeiros" em um sentido diferente (uma vez que necessitam de novos axiomas para prová-los). Eles pertencem a um sistema diferente, ou como devemos dizer agora, a um contexto intencional diferente. Nenhuma incompletude, nenhuns laços, nenhuma referência do self e definitivamente nao estranho! W: "a proposição de Gödel, que afirma algo sobre si mesmo, não menciona a si mesmo" e "poderia ser dito: Gödel diz que se deve também ser capaz de confiar em uma prova matemática quando se quer concebê-lo praticamente, como a prova de que o padrão proposicional pode ser construídos de acordo com as regras de prova? Ou: uma proposição matemática deve ser capaz de ser concebida como uma proposição de uma geometria que é realmente aplicável a si mesmo. E se alguém faz isso, sai que, em certos casos, não é possível confiar em uma prova. " (RFM p336). Essas observações mal dão uma dica sobre a profundidade das percepções de W sobre a intencionalidade matemática, que começou com seus primeiros escritos em 1912, mas foi mais evidente em seus escritos nos anos 30 e 40. W é considerado como um escritor difícil e opaco devido ao seu estilo aforístico, telegráfico e constante pulando com raramente e notar que ele mudou de tópicos, nem realmente o que o tema é, mas se um começa com seu trabalho único estilo livroo azul e Brown books-e entende que ele está explicando como nossa evoluída maior ordem de pensamento funciona, tudo ficará claro para o persistente. 116 W lecionou sobre essas questões na década de 1930 e isso foi documentado em vários de seus livros. Há uns comentários mais adicionais no alemão em seu coleção (algum dele anteriormente disponível somente em um cdrom $1000 mas agora, como quase todos seus trabalhos, em torrents do P2P, libgen, io e b-ok.org etc.. O filósofo Canadense Victor Rodych escreveu recentemente dois artigos sobre W e Gödel na revista Erkenntnis e 4 outros em W e matemática, que eu acredito que constituem um resumo definitivo de W e os fundamentos da matemática. Ele estabelece para descansar a noção anteriormente popular de que W não entendia incompletude (e muito mais sobre a psicologia da matemática). Na verdade, até onde eu posso ver W é um dos poucos a este dia que faz (e não incluindo Gödel! embora ver o seu comentário penetrante citado acima). Formas relacionadas de "paradoxo" que o exercício H (e inúmeros outros) tanto foi extensivamente discutido por W com exemplos em matemática e linguagem e parece-me uma consequência natural da evolução fragmentada de nossas habilidades simbólicas que se estende também à música, arte, jogos etc. Aqueles que desejam visões contrárias vai encontrá-los em todos os lugares e em relação W e matemática, eles podem consultar Chihara na revisão filosófica V86, P365-81 (1977). Eu tenho muito respeito por Chihara (eu sou um dos poucos que têm lido o seu "um relato estrutural de matemática" capa para cobrir) mas ele falha em muitas questões básicas, tais como explicações W de paradoxos como inevitável e quase sempre facetas inofensivas do nosso PE. Anos depois que eu fiz esta revisão original eu escrevi um em Yanofsky ' s "Alem os Limites do Pensamento"(Beyond the Limits of Thought) e nos próximos parágrafos eu repito aqui os comentários sobre a incompletude que eu fiz lá. Na verdade, toda a revisão é relevante, especialmente as observações sobre Wolpert. Em relação a Godel e "incompletude", uma vez que a nossa psicologia como expressa em sistemas simbólicos como matemática e linguagem é "aleatório" ou "incompleto" e cheio de tarefas ou situações ("problemas") que têm sido comprovada impossível (ou seja, eles não têm solução-Veja abaixo) ou cuja natureza não é clara, parece inevitável que tudo derivado dele - por e. g. física e matemática) também será "incompleto". AFAIK o primeiro destes no que é agora chamado de teoria de escolha social ou teoria da decisão (que são contínuos com o estudo da lógica e raciocínio e filosofia) foi o famoso Teorema de Kenneth Arrow mais de 60 anos atrás, e tem havido muitos desde então. Y observa uma recente impossibilidade ou incompletude prova na teoria de jogo de duas pessoas. Nestes casos, uma prova mostra que o que se parece com uma escolha simples afirmou em inglês simples não tem solução. Embora não se possa escrever um livro sobre tudo, eu teria gostado Yanofsky , pelo menos, mencionar tais famosos "paradoxos" como a bela adormecida (dissolvido por Rupert Read), o problema de Newcomb (dissolvido por Wolpert) e Doomsday (apocalipse), onde o que parece ser um problema muito simples ou não tem uma resposta clara, ou prova excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar um. Existe uma montanha de literatura sobre os dois teoremas "incompletude" de Godel e o trabalho mais recente de Chaitin, mas acho que os escritos de W nos anos 30 e 40 são 117 definitivos. Embora Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright e outros tenham feito um trabalho perspicaz, é só recentemente que a análise de W única penetrante dos jogos de linguagem que está sendo jogado em matemática foram esclarecidos por Floyd (por exemplo, ' Argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-uma variação em cantor e Turing '), Berto (por exemplo, ' paradoxo de Godel e razões de Wittgenstein, e ' Wittgenstein em incompletude faz sentido paraconsistent ' e o livro ' há algo sobre Godel ', e Rodych (por exemplo, Wittgenstein e Godel: os comentários recentemente publicados ', ' mal-entendido Gödel: novos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein ', ' novas observações de Wittgenstein ' e seu artigo na enciclopédia online de Stanford da filosofia ' filosofia da matemática de Wittgenstein '). Berto é um dos melhores filósofos recentes, e aqueles com tempo pode querer consultar seus muitos outros artigos e livros, incluindo o volume que ele coeditado em paraconsistência (2013). O trabalho de Rodych é indispensável, mas apenas dois de uma dúzia de papéis são gratuitos on-line com a busca usual, mas é claro que é tudo on-line gratuito, se alguém sabe onde olhar (por exemplo, libgen.io e b-Ok.org). Berto observa que W também negou a coerência da metamatematica-ou seja, o uso por Godel de um metateorema para provar seu teorema, provavelmente representando sua interpretação "notório" do teorema de Godel como um paradoxo, e se aceitarmos seu argumento, acho que somos forçados a negar a inteligibilidade de metalinguagens, metateorias e meta qualquer outra coisa. Como pode ser que tais conceitos (palavras) como metamatemática e incompletude, aceitos por milhões (e até mesmo reivindicado por nada menos do que Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentais sobre a nossa mente ou o universo) são apenas simples mal-entendidos sobre como funciona a linguagem? Não é a prova neste pudim que, como tantas noções "reveladoras" filosóficas (por exemplo, mente e vontade como ilusões-Dennett, Carruthers, os Churchlands etc.), eles não têm nenhum impacto prático? Berto resume-se bem: "dentro deste quadro, não é possível que a mesma sentença... acaba por ser expressível, mas indecidível, em um sistema formal... e comprovadamente verdadeiro (sob a hipótese de consistência acima mencionada) em um sistema diferente (o meta-sistema). Se, como Wittgenstein mantido, a prova estabelece o próprio significado da sentença provada, então não é possível para a mesma sentença (isto é, para uma sentença com o mesmo significado) ser indecidível em um sistema formal, mas decidido em um sistema diferente (o meta-sistema)... Wittgenstein teve que rejeitar tanto a idéia de que um sistema formal pode ser sintaticamente incompleto, e a conseqüência platônica que nenhum sistema formal provando apenas verdades aritméticas pode provar todas as verdades aritméticas. Se as provas estabelecerem o significado de sentenças aritméticas, então não pode haver sistemas incompletos, assim como não pode haver significados incompletos. " E ainda "aritmética inconsistente, ou seja, aritmética não clássica baseada em uma lógica paraconsistente, são hoje em dia uma realidade. O que é mais importante, as características teóricas de tais teorias correspondem precisamente com algumas das intuições Wittgensteinian acima mencionadas... Sua inconsistência lhes permite também escapar do primeiro teorema de Godel, e do resultado indecidbilidade da Church: eles são, isto é, comprovadamente completo e decidível. Por conseguinte, cumprem precisamente o pedido de Wittgenstein, segundo o qual não podem existir 118 problemas matemáticos que possam ser formulados de forma significativa no seio do sistema, mas que as regras do sistema não podem decidir. Assim, a decidibilidade da aritmética paraconsistente harmoniza com uma opinião Wittgenstein mantido ao longo sua carreira filosófica. " W também demonstrou o erro fatal em relação a matemática ou linguagem ou o nosso comportamento em geral como um sistema lógico coerente unitário ', em vez de como um Motley de peças montadas pelos processos aleatórios de seleção natural. "Godel nos mostra uma inclareza no conceito de ' matemática ', que é indicado pelo fato de que a matemática é levada a ser um sistema" e podemos dizer (contra quase todos) que é tudo o que Godel e Chaitin show. W comentou muitas vezes que a "verdade" em matemática significa axiomas ou os teoremas derivados de axiomas, e ' falso ' significa que um cometeu um erro ao usar as definições, e isso é totalmente diferente de matérias empíricas onde se aplica um teste. W muitas vezes observou que para ser aceitável como a matemática no sentido usual, ele deve ser utilizável em outras provas e deve ter aplicações do mundo real, mas nem é o caso com a incompletude de Godel. Uma vez que não pode ser provado em um sistema consistente (aqui Peano Aritmética, mas uma arena muito mais ampla para Chaitin), ele não pode ser usado em provas e, ao contrário de todos os 'resto ' do PA não pode ser usado no mundo real também. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sustenta que um cálculo formal é apenas um cálculo matemático (ou seja, um jogo de linguagem matemática) se ele tem uma aplicação extra sistêmica em um sistema de proposições contingentes (por exemplo, na contagem ordinária e medição ou na física)... " Outra maneira de dizer isso é que se precisa de um mandado para aplicar o nosso uso normal de palavras como ' prova ', ' proposição ', ' verdadeiro ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', e ' matemática ' para um resultado no emaranhado de jogos criados com ' números ' e ' mais ' e ' menos ' sinais etc, e com ' Incompletude ' este mandado está faltando. Rodych resume-se admiravelmente. "Na conta de Wittgenstein, não há tal coisa como um cálculo matemático incompleto porque" em matemática, tudo é algoritmo [e sintaxe] e nada é significado [semântica]... " W tem muito o mesmo a dizer da diagonalização de cantor e teoria dos conjuntos. "A consideração do procedimento diagonal decorado você que o conceito do" número real "tem muito menos analogia com o conceito" número cardinal "do que nós, sendo enganados por determinadas analogias, somos inclinados acreditar" e muitos outros comentários (veja Rodych e Floyd). Em qualquer caso, parece que o fato de que o resultado de Gödel teve zero impacto sobre a matemática (exceto para impedir que as pessoas tentam provar completude!) deve ter alertado H para a sua trivialidade ea "estranheza" de tentar torná-lo uma base para qualquer coisa. Sugiro que seja considerado como um outro jogo conceitual que nos mostra os limites de nossa psicologia. Naturalmente, toda a matemática, a física, e o comportamento humano podem útil ser tomados esta maneira. Quando no tópico de W, nós devemos anotar que um outro trabalho que H gaste muito tempo sobre é Whitehead e clássico de Russell da lógica matemática "Principia 119 Mathematica", primeiramente desde que era pelo menos em parte responsável para o trabalho de Gödel que conduz a seus teoremas. W tinha ido do estudante do começo da lógica de Russell a seu professor em aproximadamente um ano, e Russell tinha-o escolhido para reescrever o Principia. Mas W teve grandes dúvidas sobre todo o projeto (e toda a filosofia como ele acabou) e, quando ele retornou à filosofia nos anos 30, ele mostrou que a idéia de fundar matemática (ou racionalidade) sobre a lógica foi um erro profundo. W é um dos filósofos mais famosos do mundo e fez comentários extensos sobre Gödel e os fundamentos da matemática e da mente; é um pioneiro no EP (embora ninguém pareça perceber isso); o descobridor do contorno básico e funcionamento do pensamento de ordem superior e muito mais, e é surpreendente que Dennett & H, depois de meio século de estudo, são completamente alheio aos pensamentos do maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos ( Embora tenham quase 8 bilhões para a empresa). Há, como alguns têm observado, uma amnésia coletiva sobre W não só na psicologia (para que suas obras devem ser no serviço universal como textos e manuais de laboratório), mas em todas as ciências comportamentais, incluindo, surpreendentemente, filosofia. A associação de H com Daniel Dennett (D), outro escritor famosamente confuso sobre a mente, certamente não fez nada para ajudá-lo a aprender novas perspectivas nos quase 30 anos desde GEB. Apesar do fato de que D escreveu um livro sobre intencionalidade (um campo que, em sua versão moderna, foi essencialmente criado por W), H parece não ter nenhum conhecimento com ele em tudo. Percepções que levam a memories, alimentando-se em disposições (inclinações) (termos de W, também usado por Searle, mas chamado de "atitudes proposicional por outros), como acreditar e supor, que não são estados mentais e não têm nenhuma duração precisa etc./, são avanços momentosos na compreensão de como nossa mente funciona, que W descoberto nos anos 20, mas com tópicos voltando aos seus escritos antes da primeira guerra mundial. A trança dourada eterna não é realizada por H para ser a nossa psicologia evolutiva inata, agora, 150 anos atrasado (ou seja, desde Darwin), tornando-se um campo florescente que está a fusão de psicologia, ciência cognitiva, economia, Sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, religião, música (por exemplo, g. "os topos da música" de Mazzola - topos são substitutos para jogos, um dos livros da grande ciência (psicologia) do século XXI, embora seja sem noção sobre W e a maioria dos pontos nesta revisão), arte, matemática, física e literatura. H ignorou ou rejeitou muitas pessoas pode-se considerar como nossos maiores professores no Reino da mente-W, Buda, John Lilly, John Searle, Osho, Adi da (ver o seu "O Joelho da Escuta"), Alexander Shulgin e inúmeros outros. A grande maioria dos Insights da filosofia, bem como aqueles da física quântica, probabilidade, meditação, EP, psicologia cognitiva e psicoterapia não classificamos até mesmo uma referência passageira aqui (nem na maioria dos escritos filosóficos dos cientistas). Embora existam alguns bons livros em sua bibliografia, há muitos que eu consideraria como referências padrão e centenas de grandes obras na ciência cognitiva, EP, matemática e probabilidade, e filosofia da mente e da ciência que não estão lá (nem 120 em seus outros escritos). Seu criticando em Searle é insignificante e inútil - a frustração de alguém que não tem nenhuma compreensão das questões reais. Em minha estimativa, nem H nem ninguém forneceu uma razão convincente para rejeitar o argumento chinês do quarto (o artigo o mais famoso neste campo) que os computadores não pensam (não que não podem nunca fazer algo que nós poderíamos querer chamar o pensamento-que Searle Admite é possível). E Searle tem (na minha opinião) organizou e estendeu o trabalho de W em livros como "a construção da realidade social" e "racionalidade em ação"--somatórios brilhantes da organização de Hot (pensamento de ordem superior-i. e., intencionalidade)-livros de filosofia raros que você pode mesmo fazer o sentido perfeito de uma vez que você traduz um jargão pequeno em inglês! H, D e inúmeros outros na ciência cognitiva e ai são irritado com Searle porque ele tinha a temeridade para desafiar (destruir-eu diria) a sua filosofia de núcleo a teoria computacional da mente (CTM) há quase 30 anos e continua a apontar isso (embora pode-se dizer que W destruiu-o antes de existir). Naturalmente, eles (quase) todos rejeitam o quarto chinês ou simplesmente ignoram-no, mas o argumento é, na vista de muitos, irrespondivel. O artigo recente por Shani (Mentes e Máquinas v15, P207-228 (2005)) é um sumário agradável da situação com referências ao trabalho excelente de Bickhard nesta edição. Bickhard também desenvolveu uma teoria da mente aparentemente mais realista que usa termodinâmica não-equilíbrio, em lugar dos conceitos de Hofstadter de psicologia intencional usado fora dos contextos necessários para dar-lhes sentido. Poucos percebem que W novamente antecipou a todos sobre essas questões com inúmeros comentários sobre o que agora chamamos de CTM, AI ou inteligência de máquina, e até mesmo pensou experimentos com pessoas fazendo "traduções" para o chinês. Eu tinha notado este (e inúmeros outros paralelos próximos com o trabalho de Searle) quando eu vim em cima de papel de Diane Proudfoot em W e no quarto chinês no livro "vistas na sala chinesa" (2005). Pode-se também encontrar muitas gemas relacionadas a estas questões na edição de Cora Diamond das notas tiradas nas primeiras palestras de W sobre a matemática "palestras Wittgenstein sobre os fundamentos da matemática, Cambridge 1934 (1976). W ' s próprio "observações sobre as fundações da matemática" abrange terreno semelhante. Um dos poucos que tem pesquisado W ' s opiniões sobre isso em detalhes é Christopher Gefwert, cujo excelente livro pioneiro "Wittgenstein em mentes, máquinas e matemática" (1995), é quase universalmente ignorado. Embora ele estava escrevendo antes que houvesse qualquer pensamento sério sobre computadores eletrônicos ou robôs, W percebeu que a questão básica aqui é muito simples---computadores falta uma psicologia (e até mesmo 70 anos depois, temos apenas uma pista como dar-lhes um), e é somente no contexto de um ser com um intencionalidade inteiramente desenvolvido que os termos mudança de caráter como o pensamento, acreditando etc. fazem o sentido (tenha um significacao ou um cos desobstruído), e como usual ele resumiu-o todo em sua maneira aforístico original "mas um máquina certamente não pode pensar! -Isso é uma declaração empírica? Não. Nós só dizemos de um ser humano e o que é como um que ele pensa. Também dizemos que de bonecos e sem dúvida de espíritos também. Olhe para a palavra "pensar" como uma ferramenta. " (Investigações filosóficas P113). Fora de contexto, muitos dos comentários de W podem aparecer 121 insípido ou apenas errado, mas o perspicaz vai achar que eles costumam reembolsar reflexão prolongada-ele não era tolo de ninguém. Hofstadter, em todos os seus escritos, segue a tendência comum e faz muito de "paradoxos", que ele considera como auto referências, recursões ou loops, mas há muitas "inconsistências" na psicologia intencional (matemática, linguagem, percepção, arte etc.) e eles têm nenhum efeito, como a nossa psicologia evoluiu para ignorá-los. Assim, "paradoxos", como "esta frase é falsa" só nos dizem que "isso" não se refere a si mesmo ou se você preferir que este é um dos infinitamente muitos arranjos de palavras que faltam um sentido claro. Qualquer sistema simbólico que tenhamos (ou seja, linguagem, matemática, arte, música, jogos, etc.) terá sempre áreas de conflito, problemas insolúveis ou contrintuitivos ou definições pouco claras. Portanto, temos teoremas de Gödel, o paradoxo do mentiroso, inconsistências na teoria dos conjuntos, dilemas do prisioneiro, gato morto/vivo de Schrodinger, problema de Newcomb, princípios antrópicos, estatísticas Bayesianas, notas que você não pode soar juntas ou cores Você não pode misturar junto e as réguas que não podem ser usadas no mesmo jogo. Um conjunto de subindústrias dentro da teoria da decisão, economia comportamental, teoria dos jogos, filosofia, psicologia e Sociologia, direito, ciência política etc. e até mesmo os fundamentos da física e matemática (onde é comumente disfarçado como filosofia da ciência) surgiu que lida com infinitas variações sobre "real" (por exemplo, mecânica quântica) ou artificial ((por exemplo, o problema de Newcomb-ver análise V64, P187-89 (2004)) situações em que a nossa psicologia-evoluiu apenas para obter comida, encontrar companheiros e evitar tornarse almoço - dá resultados ambivalentes, ou apenas quebra. Virtualmente nenhum daqueles que escrevem as centenas de artigos e os livros incontáveis nestas edições que parecem anualmente parecem cientes que estão estudando os limites de nossa psicologia inata e que Wittgenstein os antecipou geralmente por mais de meio século. Tipicamente, ele tomou a questão do paradoxo para o limite, apontando para a ocorrência comum de paradoxo em nosso pensamento, e insistiu que mesmo inconsistências não eram um problema (embora Turing, freqüentando suas aulas, discordou), e previu o aparecimento de sistemas lógicos inconsistentes. Décadas mais tarde, os lógicas dialetheic foram inventados e o Priest em seu livro recente neles chamou vistas de W presciente. Se você quiser uma boa revisão recente de alguns dos muitos tipos de paradoxos de linguagem (embora sem consciência de que W foi pioneiro na década de 1930 e, em grande parte inocente de qualquer entendimento de contexto intencional) ver Rosenkranz e "as atitudes contra o paradoxo Erkenntnis V65, p319-41 (2006). Aparência de muitos W artigos relacionados nesta revista é mais adequado como foi fundada na 30 ' s por positivistas lógicas cuja Bíblia foi W ' s Tractus Logico Philosophicus. Naturalmente, há também um jornal devotado a W e nomeado após seu trabalho mais famoso-"Investigações Filosóficas". H, em consonância com a prática quase universal, refere-se muitas vezes às nossas "crenças" para "explicações" de comportamento, mas a nossa psicologia compartilhada não descansa na crença-nós só temos consciência e dores e sabemos 122 desde a infância que os animais são conscientes, agentes autopropulsores que são diferentes de árvores e rochas. Nossa mãe não nos ensina que mais do que a mãe de um cão faz e não poderia nos ensinar! E, se isso é algo que aprendemos, então poderíamos ensinar uma criança (ou um cão) que um pássaro e uma rocha são realmente o mesmo tipo de coisa (ou seja, para ignorar a psicologia intencional inata). W claramente e repetidamente observou a subdeterminação de todos os nossos conceitos (por exemplo, ver seus comentários sobre a adição ea conclusão da série em observações sobre os fundamentos da matemática), que mandatou a sua tornar-se inata (ou seja, a evolução teve que resolver este problema por sacrificando incontáveis quadrilhões de criaturas cujos genes não faziam as escolhas certas). Hoje em dia isso é comumente chamado de problema de explosão combinatória e muitas vezes apontado por psicólogos evolucionistas como evidência convincente para "innatilidade", sem saber que W antecipou-los por mais de 50 anos. Nossa psicologia inata não descansa em "crenças" quando claramente não está sujeita a teste ou dúvida ou revisão (por exemplo, tentar dar um sentido para "Eu acredito que estou lendo esta revisão" e média (ou seja, encontrar um uso real em nossa vida normal para) algo diferente de "Eu estou lendo este revisão "). Sim, há sempre usos derivados de qualquer sentença, incluindo este, mas estes são parasitas no uso normal. Antes de qualquer "explicações" (realmente apenas descrições claras, como W observou) são possíveis, tem que ser claro que as origens do nosso comportamento estão nos axiomas de nossa psicologia inata, que são a base para toda a compreensão, e que a filosofia, matemática, literatura, a ciência e a sociedade são suas extensões culturais. Dennett (e qualquer um que é tentado a segui-lo i.e., todos) é forçado em reivindicações ainda mais bizarras por seu ceticismo (pois eu afirme que é um segredo bem velado de todos os reducionistas que eles são céticos no coração - i. e., eles devem negar a "realidade" de tudo). Em seu livro "a postura intencional" e outros escritos, ele tenta eliminar esta psicologia in forma que coloca os animais em uma classe diferente de computadores e do " universo físico", incluindo o nosso inata evoluiu intencionalidade com a intencionalidade derivada de nossas criações culturais (ou seja, termômetros, PC ' s e aviões), observando que é nossos genes, e assim, finalmente, a natureza (ou seja, o universo), e não nós que "realmente" tem intencionalidade, e por isso é tudo "derivado". Claramente algo está gravemente errado aqui! Um pensa imediatamente que deve então também ser verdadeiro que desde que a natureza e os genes produzem nossa fisiologia, não deve haver nenhuma diferença substantiva entre nosso coração e um artificial que nós fazemos do plástico. Para a comédia mais grandiosa reducionista nos últimos anos ver Wolfram "um novo tipo de ciência", que nos mostra como o universo e todos os seus processos e objetos são realmente apenas "computadores" e "computação" (que ele não percebe são conceitos intencionais não ter significado para além de nossa psicologia e que ele não tem nenhum teste para distinguir um cálculo de um noncomputacao - i. e., ele elimina a psicologia por definição). 123 Um vê que Dennett não agarra as edições básicas do intencionalidade pelo título de seu livro. Nossa psicologia não é uma postura ou atribuição ou postular sobre nós mesmos, ou outra seres vidas mentais, mais do que é uma "postura" que eles possuem corpos. Uma criança ou um cão não adivinhar ou supor e não e não poderia aprender que as pessoas e os animais são agentes com mentes e desejos e que eles são fundamentalmente diferentes de árvores e rochas e lagos. Eles sabem (ao vivo) esses conceitos (psicologia compartilhada) desde o nascimento e se enfraquecem, a morte ou a loucura supervene. Isso nos traz novamente para W que viu que as tentativas reducionistas de basear a compreensão sobre a lógica ou matemática ou física eram incoerentes. Só podemos ver do ponto de vista da nossa psicologia inata, da qual todas elas são extensões. Nossa psicologia é arbitrária apenas no sentido de que se pode imaginar maneiras em que pode ser diferente, e este é o ponto de W inventando exemplos ímpares de jogos de linguagem (ou seja, conceitos alternativos (gramáticas) ou formas de vida). Ao fazê-lo, vemos os limites da nossa psicologia. A melhor discussão que tenho visto em cenários imaginários W é a de Andrew Peach em PI 24: p299-327 (2004). Parece-me que W foi o primeiro a compreender em detalhe (com o devido respeito a Kant) que a nossa vida é baseada em nossa psicologia evoluída, que não pode ser desafiada sem perder o significado. Se um nega os axiomas da matemática, um não pode jogar o jogo. Pode-se colocar um ponto de interrogação após cada axioma e cada teorema derivado deles, mas qual é o objetivo? Filósofos, teólogos e a pessoa comum pode jogar neste jogo, desde que eles não levam a sério. Ferimento, morte, prisão ou loucura virá rapidamente àqueles que o fazem. Tente negar que você está lendo esta página ou que estas são as suas duas mãos ou há um mundo fora de sua janela. A tentativa de entrar em um jogo conceitual em que essas coisas podem ser duvidadas pressupõe o jogo de conhecê-los - e não pode haver um teste para os axiomas de nossa psicologia - mais do que para aqueles de matemática (derivado, como W mostrou, de nossos conceitos intuitivos)-eles apenas são o que são. A fim de saltar, deve haver algum lugar para ficar. Este é o fato mais básico da existência, e ainda, é uma consequência notável de nossa psicologia ser automatizado que é a coisa mais difícil para nós ver. É uma visão divertida de fato para assistir as pessoas (todos, não apenas filósofos) tentando usar sua psicologia intuitiva (a única ferramenta que temos) para romper os limites de nossa psicologia intuitiva. Como isso vai ser possível? Como vamos encontrar algum ponto de vista que nos permite ver a nossa mente no trabalho e por que teste vamos saber que temos? Nós pensamos que se nós apenas pensamos duramente bastante ou adquirimos bastante fatos nós podemos obtivermos uma vista da "realidade" que outros não tem. Mas há uma boa razão para pensar que tais tentativas são incoerentes e só nos levam mais longe da clareza e sanidade. W disse muitas vezes, de muitas maneiras que devemos superareste desejo de "clareza", a idéia de pensamento subcolocado pela "lógica cristalina", a descoberta de que vai "explicar" o nosso comportamento e nosso mundo e mudar a nossa visão do que é ser 124 humano. "Quanto mais estreita examinarmos a linguagem real, o mais nítido se tornará o conflito entre ele e nossa exigência. (Para a pureza cristalina da lógica era, naturalmente, não um resultado da investigação: era uma exigência.) " PI 107 Em seu retorno à filosofia em 1930 ele disse: "A concepção errada que eu quero opor neste connexão é o seguinte, que nós podemos descobrir algo inteiramente novo. Isso é um engano. A verdade da questão é que nós já temos tudo, e que nós temos que realmente presente; não precisamos esperar por nada. Nós fazemos nossos movimentos no Reino da gramática de nossa língua ordinária, e esta gramática já está lá. Assim, já temos tudo e não precisamos esperar o futuro. " (Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein e o círculo de Viena (1979) P183 e em seu Zettel P 312-314 "Aqui nós chegamos a um fenômeno notável e característico na investigação filosófica: a dificuldade---eu poderia dizer---não é a de encontrar a solução, mas sim a de reconhecer como a solução algo que parece que era apenas um preliminar a ele. Já dissemos tudo. Não---nada que se segue a partir deste, não esta em si é a solução! " "Isto está ligado, creio eu, com o nosso erroneamente esperando uma explicação, enquanto a solução da dificuldade é uma descrição, se lhe damos o lugar certo em nossas considerações. Se nos debruçar sobre ele, e não tentar ir além dele. Alguns também podem achar útil para ler "por que não há lógica dedutiva da razão prática" na soberba Searle "racionalidade em ação" (2001). Basta substituir suas frases escolha "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" por "relacionar os Estados mentais com o mundo movendo os músculos" ou seja, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo" e "mundo a mente direções de ajuste" por " causa origina no mundo "e" causa origina na mente ". Outra falha básica em H (e ao longo do discurso científico, que inclui a filosofia, uma vez que é a psicologia poltrona) diz respeito às noções de explicações ou causas. Temos poucos problemas para entender como esses conceitos funcionam em seus contextos normais, mas a filosofia não é um contexto normal. Eles são apenas outras famílias de conceitos (muitas vezes chamado de gramática ou jogos de linguagem por W e aproximadamente equivalente a módulos cognitivos, motores de inferência, modelos ou algoritmos) que compõem o nosso EP (aproximadamente, a nossa intencionalidade), mas, fora do contexto, nos sentimos obrigados a projetá-los para o mundo e ver "causa" como uma lei universal da natureza que determina os acontecimentos. Como disse W, precisamos reconhecer descrições claras como respostas que terminam a busca por "explicações" finais. Isso nos leva de volta ao meu comentário sobre por que as pessoas se desviam quando tentam "explicar" as coisas. Mais uma vez, isso se conecta intimamente com 125 julgamentos, teoria da decisão, probabilidade subjetiva, lógica, mecânica quântica, incerteza, teoria da informação, raciocínio Bayesiano, o teste de Wason, o princípio antrópico ((Bostrum "The Anthropic Princípal "(2002)) e economia comportamental, para citar alguns. Não há espaço aqui para entrar no ninho deste rato de aspectos intimamente ligados da nossa psicologia inata, mas pode-se recordar que, mesmo em seus escritos pré-Tractatus, Wittgenstein comentou que a idéia de necessidade causal não é um superstição, mas o fonte de superstição. Sugiro que esta observação aparentemente insignificante é um dos seus mais profundos-W não foi dado à platitude nem ao descuido. Qual é a "causa" do Big Bang ou um elétron sendo em um determinado "lugar" ou de "aleatoriedade" ou caos ou a "lei" da gravitação? Mas há descrições que podem servir como respostas. Assim, H sente que todas as ações devem ser causadas e "material" e assim, com seu amigo D e o grupo alegre de materialistas reducionista, nega vontade, auto e consciência. D nega que ele os nega, mas os fatos falam por si mesmos. Seu livro "Consciousness Explicado" é comumente referido como "consciência negada" e foi famoso revisado por Searle como "consciência explicada afastado". Isso é especialmente estranho no caso de H como ele começou um físico e seu pai ganhou o prêmio Nobel de física, então pode-se pensar que ele estaria ciente dos papéis famosos de Einstein, Podolsky e Rosen e de von Neumann nos anos 20 e 30 , em que eles explicaram como a mecânica quântica não fazia sentido sem a consciência humana (e uma abstração digital não fará nada). Neste mesmo período, outros, incluindo Jeffreys e de Finetti mostraram que a probabilidade só fazia sentido como um método subjetivo (isto é, psicológico) e os amigos íntimos de Wittgenstein John Maynard Keynes e Frank Ramsey primeiro claramente igualaram a lógica com a racionalidade, e Popper e outros observaram a equivalência da lógica e da probabilidade e suas raízes comuns na racionalidade. Há uma vasta literatura sobre inter-relações dessas disciplinas e o crescimento gradual da compreensão de que são todas facetas de nossa psicologia inata. Os interessados podem começar com o artigo ton Sales no manual de lógica filosófica 2nd Ed. vol. 9 (2002), uma vez que também irá apresentá-los a esta excelente fonte, agora estendendo-se para cerca de 20 volumes (tudo em P2P libgen.io e b-ok.org etc.). Ramsey foi um dos poucos de seu tempo que era capaz de compreender as idéias de W e em seus papéis seminais de 1925-26 não só desenvolveu idéias pioneiras de Keynes sobre a probabilidade subjetiva, mas também estendeu as idéias de W do Tractatus e conversas e cartas na primeira declaração formal do que mais tarde se tornou conhecida como semântica substitucional ou a interpretação substitutiva de quantificadores lógicos. (Ver o artigo de Leblanc no manual de lógica filosófica 2nd Ed. v2, p53-131 (2002)). A morte prematura de Ramsey, como as de W, von Neumann e Turing, foram grandes tragédias, pois cada um deles sozinho e certamente juntos teria alterado o clima intelectual do século 20 para um grau ainda maior. Se tivessem vivido, eles poderiam muito bem ter colaborado, mas como era, só W percebeu que ele estava descobrindo facetas de nossa psicologia inata. W e Turing foram ambos os professores de Cambridge ensinando aulas sobre os fundamentos da matemática-embora W da posição que ele descansou em axiomas não declarados de nossa psicologia inata e 126 Turing da visão convencional que era uma questão de lógica que estava por si só . Se esses dois gênios homossexuais se tornarem intimamente envolvidos, coisas incríveis podem ter se verificado. Eu acho que todo mundo tem essas tendências "deflacionária" reducionista, então eu sugiro que isso é devido aos padrões de módulos de psicologia intuitiva que são tendenciosos a atribuir causas em termos de propriedades de objetos, e fenômenos culturais que podemos ver e à nossa necessidade de Generalidade. Nossos motores de inferência classificam compulsivamente e buscam a fonte de todos os fenômenos. Quando olhamos para as causas ou explicações, estamos inclinados a olhar para fora e tomar o ponto de vista da terceira pessoa, para o qual temos testes empíricos ou critérios, ignorando o funcionamento automático invisível de nossa própria mente, para o qual não temos tais testes (outra Arena foi pioneira por W alguns 75 anos atrás). Como observado aqui, uma das tomadas de W sobre este problema "filosófico" universal era que nós falta a habilidade de reconhecer nossas explanações intuitivas normais como os limites de nossa compreensão, confundindo os axiomas testáveis e incontestável de nosso Sistema 1 psicologia com fatos do mundo que podemos investigar, dissecar e explicar através do Sistema 2. Isso não nega a ciência, apenas a noção de que fornecerá o significado "verdadeiro" e "real" da "realidade". Há uma vasta literatura sobre causas e explicações, então eu só vou referir-se ao excelente artigo de Jeffrey Hershfield "cognitivismo e relatividade explicativa" no canadense J. da filosofia v28 P505-26 (1998) e ao livro de Garfinkel "formas de explicação" (1981). Esta literatura está rapidamente se reunindo com aqueles em epistemologia, probabilidade, lógica, teoria do jogo, economia comportamental, e a filosofia da ciência, que parecem quase completamente desconhecido para H. fora das centenas de livros recentes e milhares de artigos, um pode começar com isso com os livros de Nancy Cartwright, que fornecem um antídoto parcial para o "física e matemática regra do universo" delírio. Ou, pode-se apenas seguir as ligações entre racionalidade, causalidade, probabilidade, informação, leis da natureza, mecânica quântica, determinismo, etc. na Wikipedia e a enciclopédia on-line de Stanford de filosofia, por décadas (ou, com comentários de W em mente, talvez apenas dias) antes de se perceber que ele tem direito e que não ficar mais claro sobre a nossa "realidade" psicológica, estudando a natureza. Uma maneira de olhar para a ISL é que suas falhas nos lembram que as leis e explicações científicas são frágeis e ambíguas extensões de nossa psicologia inata e não, como H teria, o inverso. É um fato curioso e raramente notado que os redutores graves primeiro negar a psicologia, mas, a fim de dar conta dele (uma vez que há claramente algo que gera a nossa vida mental e social), eles são forçados a acampar com os "Blank Slaters" (todos nós antes de nós ser educado), que atribuem psicologia à cultura ou a aspectos muito gerais de nossa inteligência (ou seja, nossa intencionalidade é aprendida) em oposição a um conjunto inato de funções. H e D dizem que auto, consciência, vontade, etc. são ilusões - meramente "padrões abstratos" (o "espírito" ou "alma" da Igreja do naturalismo fundamentalista). Eles acreditam que o nosso "programa" pode ser digitalizado e colocado em computadores, que, assim, adquirir a psicologia, e que 127 "acreditar" em "fenômenos mentais" é apenas como acreditar em magia (mas a nossa psicologia não é composta de crenças-que são apenas as suas extensões-e natureza é mágica). Eu sugiro que é crítico para ver por que eles nunca consideram que "padrões" (outro jogo de linguagem adorável!) em computadores são mágicos ou ilusórios. E, mesmo se permitimos que o programa reducionista é realmente coerente e não circular (por exemplo, somos muito educados para salientar-como fazer W e Searle e muitos outros-que não tem nenhum teste para ele é mais crítico asserções e requer o funcionamento NORMAL de vontade , auto, realidade, consciência etc., para ser compreendido), não podemos razoavelmente dizer "bem Doug e Dan, uma rosa por qualquer outro nome cheira como doce!" Eu não penso que os reducionistas vêem que mesmo eram ele verdadeiro que nós poderíamos põr nossa vida mental nos algoritmos que funcionam no silicone (ou--no exemplo famoso de Searle-em uma pilha de latas da cerveja), nós ainda temos o mesmo "problema duro da consciência": como os fenômenos mentais emergem de matéria bruta? Quase sempre esquecido é que se poderia considerar a existência de tudo como um "problema difícil". Isso acrescentaria ainda outro mistério sem nenhuma maneira óbvia de reconhecer uma resposta - o que significa (por que é possível) codificar "Propriedades emergentes" como "algoritmos"? Se pudermos fazer sentido fora da idéia de que a mente ou o universo é um computador (ou seja, pode dizer claramente o que conta para e contra a idéia), o que vai seguir se é ou não é? "Computacional" é um dos principais chavões da ciência moderna, mas poucos param para pensar o que realmente significa. É um clássico jogo de linguagem Wittgensteinian ou família de conceitos (usos) que têm pouco ou nada em comum. Há computadores analógicos e digitais, alguns feitos de blocos ou engrenagens mecânicas apenas (Babbage etc.), nós computamos à mão (como é bem conhecido, os primeiros comentários de Turing sobre isso referido aos seres humanos que computaram e só mais tarde ele pensou em máquinas simulando isso), e os físicos falam de folhas de computação "sua" trajetória como eles caem da árvore, etc etc. Cada jogo tem seu próprio uso (significado), mas estamos hipnotizados pela palavra para ignorá-los. W analisou jogos de palavras (módulos psicológicos) com profundidade e clareza insuperáveis (ver ESP. a longa discussão de saber como continuar um cálculo no livro marrom), a compreensão de que deve pôr fim ao temor supersticioso que geralmente rodeia esta palavra e todas as palavras, pensamentos, sentimentos, intuições etc. Está pingando com ironia que D escreveu um livro sobre o EP da religião, mas ele não pode ver o seu próprio materialismo como uma religião (i. e., é também devido a preconceitos conceituais inatas). Timothy o ' Connor escreveu (Metaphilosophy v36, p436-448 (2005)) um artigo soberbo sobre o naturalismo fundamentalista de D (embora ele realmente não obter todo o caminho para o ponto de vista do PE eu tomo aqui), observando que simplesmente aceitar o surgimento da intencionalidade é o vista mais razoável para tomar. Mas os pastores D e H ler a partir dos livros do Churchland e as outras biblias da CTM (teoria computacional da mente) e exortar um e todos a reconhecer o seu PC e fornos torradeira como seres sencientes (ou pelo menos eles em breve será). Pastor Kurzweil faz do mesmo modo, mas poucos freqüentam seus sermões como ele encheu os bancos com PC ter reconhecimento de 128 voz e sistemas de fala e seu coro de vozes sintéticas idênticas gritar "Blessed Be Turing" depois de cada sentença. Veja minha resenha de seu livro "Será Hominoids ou Androids destruir a terra? - uma revisão de Como Criar uma Mente por Ray Kurzweil (2012). Surgimento de "Propriedades de ordem superior" de "matéria inerte" (mais jogos de linguagem!) é realmente desconcertante, mas aplica-se a tudo no universo, e não apenas à psicologia. Nosso cérebro não tinha nenhuma razão (ou seja, não há forças seletivas operatórias) para evoluir um nível avançado de compreensão de si ou do universo, e seria muito geneticamente caro para fazê-lo. Que vantagem seletiva poderia ter havido em ver nossos próprios processos de pensamento? O cérebro, como o coração, foi selecionado para funcionar rapidamente e automaticamente e apenas uma parte de minutos de suas operações estão disponíveis para a conscientização e sujeitas a controle consciente. Muitos pensam que não há possibilidade de uma "compreensão final" e W nos diz que essa idéia é bobagem (e se não, então o teste vai nos dizer que chegamos a ele)? Talvez a última palavra pertença a Wittgenstein. Embora suas idéias mudadas muito, há muitas indicações que compreendeu os fundamentos de sua filosofia madura em suas reflexões mais adiantadas e o Tractatus pode ser considerado como a indicação a mais poderosa da metafísica reducionista já escreveu (embora poucos realizem é a última afirmação do computacionalismo). É também uma tese defensável que a estrutura e os limites de nossa psicologia intencional estavam por trás de seu positivismo precoce e atomismo. Então, vamos terminar com a famosa primeira e última frases de seu Tractatus, visto como resumindo sua visão de que os limites de nossa psicologia inata são os limites do nosso entendimento. "O mundo é tudo o que é o caso." "Quanto ao que não podemos falar, devemos permanecer em silêncio." 129 Outro retrato dos desenhos animados da mente dos metafísicos reducionistas – uma revisão de Peter Carruthers ' A Opacidade da Mente ' (The Opacity of Mind) (2011) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Materialismo, reducionismo, behaviorismo, funcionalismo, teoria dos sistemas dinâmicos e computacionalismo são visões populares, mas eles foram mostrados por Wittgenstein para ser incoerente. O estudo do comportamento abrange toda a vida humana, mas o comportamento é em grande parte automático e inconsciente e até mesmo a parte consciente, principalmente expressa em linguagem (que Wittgenstein equivale com a mente), não é perspicaz, por isso é fundamental ter um quadro que Searle chama a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR) e eu chamo a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT). Depois de resumir a estrutura trabalhada por Wittgenstein e Searle, como estendido pela pesquisa de raciocínio moderno, eu mostro as inadequações nas visões de Carruther, que permeavam a maioria das discussões de comportamento, incluindo a conduta comportamental contemporânea Ciências. Eu mantenho que seu livro é um amálgama de dois livros, um um sumário da psicologia cognitiva e o outro um sumário das confusões filosóficas padrão na mente com algum jargão novo adicionado. Eu sugiro que este último deve ser considerado como incoerente ou como uma visão dos desenhos animados da vida e que tomar Wittgenstein em sua palavra, podemos praticar a autoterapia bem sucedida, em relação à questão da mente/corpo como uma questão de linguagem/corpo. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. Vou primeiro oferecer alguns comentários sobre a filosofia e sua relação com a pesquisa psicológica contemporânea como exemplificada nas obras de John Searle (S) e Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) (conjuntamente WS) como eu considero S o sucessor de w e um deve estudar a sua trabalhar em conjunto. Ele vai ajudar a ver os meus comentários de PNC (filosofia em um novo século), TLP, PI, OC, fazendo o mundo social (MSW) e outros livros por e sobre esses dois gênios, que fornecem uma descrição clara do comportamento que eu vou referir como a estrutura WS. Dado esta estrutura, que 130 Searle chama a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR) e eu chamo a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), it é possível ter descrições claras de comportamento, mas está faltando inteiramente de quase todas tais discussões. Mesmo nas obras do WS não é definido de forma clara e em praticamente todos os outros é apenas insinuado, com as conseqüências desastrosas habituais. Vou começar com algumas citações de W e S. Essas citações não são escolhidas aleatoriamente, mas resultam de uma década de estudo e juntas são um esboço do comportamento (natureza humana) de nossos dois maiores psicólogos descritivos. Se um os compreende, penetram tão profundamente como é possível ir na mente (pela maior parte coextensivo com a língua como W fêz desobstruído) e fornecer tanta orientação como uma precisaé apenas uma questão de observar como a linguagem funciona em cada caso e, de longe, o melhor lugar para encontrar exemplos de linguagem perspicuamente analisados nas 20.000 páginas do Nachlass de Wittgenstein. "A confusão e a esterilidade da psicologia não devem ser explicadas chamando-a de" ciência jovem "; seu estado não é comparável com o da física, por exemplo, em seus começos. (Em vez disso, com a de certos ramos da matemática. Definir teoria.) Para em psicologia existem métodos experimentais e confusão conceitual. (Como no outro caso, confusão conceitual e métodos de prova.) A existência do método experimental nos faz pensar que temos os meios para resolver os problemas que nos incomode; embora o problema e o método passar um outro por. Wittgenstein (PI p. 232) "Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos, e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica, e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. " Wittgenstein o livro azul "Aqui nós chegamos a um fenômeno notável e característico na investigação filosófica: a dificuldade---eu poderia dizer---não é a de encontrar a solução, mas sim a de reconhecer como a solução algo que parece que era apenas um preliminar a ele. Já dissemos tudo. Não---nada que se segue a partir deste, não esta em si é a solução! .... Isto está ligado, creio eu, com o nosso erroneamente esperando uma explicação, enquanto a solução da dificuldade é uma descrição, se lhe damos o lugar certo em nossas considerações. Se nos debruçar sobre ele, e não tentar ir além dele. Zettel p312-314 "O movimento decisivo no truque de Conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente." Wittgenstein, PI para. 308 "Mas eu não começ minha imagem do mundo satisfazendo-me de sua exatidão: nem eu tenho-a porque eu sou satisfeito de sua exatidão. Não: é o fundo herdado contra o qual eu distinguir entre verdadeiro e falso. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Agora, se não são as conexões causais que estamos preocupados, então as atividades 131 da mente estão abertas diante de nós." Wittgenstein "o livro azul" P6 (1933) "Absurdo, absurdo, porque você está fazendo suposições em vez de simplesmente descrever. Se sua cabeça é assombrada por explicações aqui, você está negligenciando a lembrar-se dos fatos mais importantes. " Wittgenstein Z 220 "A filosofia simplesmente coloca tudo diante de nós e nem explica nem Deduz nada... Pode-se dar o nome de ' filosofia ' ao que é possível antes de todas as novas descobertas e invenções. " Wittgenstein PI 126 "O que estamos fornecendo são realmente observações sobre a história natural do homem, não curiosidades; no entanto, mas sim observações sobre os factos que ninguém duvidou e que só foram impercebido porque eles estão sempre diante de nossos olhos. Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "O objetivo da filosofia é erguer uma parede no ponto onde a linguagem pára de qualquer maneira." Ocasiões filosóficas de Wittgenstein P187 "O limite da língua é mostrado por seu ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponda a (é a tradução de) uma sentença sem simplesmente repetir a sentença (isto tem que fazer com a solução de Kantian ao problema da filosofia)." Wittgenstein CV P10 (1931) "Pode haver razões para a ação que são vinculativas para um agente racional apenas em virtude da natureza do fato relatado na declaração de razão, e independentemente dos desejos do agente, valores, atitudes e avaliações? ... O verdadeiro paradoxo da discussão tradicional é que ele tenta colocar a guilhotina de Hume, a distinção rígida de valor de fato, em um vocabulário, cujo uso já pressupõe a falsidade da distinção. " Searle PNC p165-171 "... todas as funções de status e, portanto, toda a realidade institucional, com exceção da linguagem, são criados por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de declarações... as formas da função de status em questão são quase invariavelmente questões de poderes deônticos... reconhecer algo como um direito, dever, obrigação, exigência e assim por diante é reconhecer uma razão para a ação... essas estruturas deônticas fazem possíveis razões de desejo independente para a ação... O ponto geral é muito claro: a criação do campo geral de motivos de ação com base no desejo pressupõe a aceitação de um sistema de razões independentes de desejo de ação. " Searle PNC P34-49 "Algumas das características lógicas mais importantes da intencionalidade estão além do alcance da fenomenologia porque não têm realidade fenomenológica imediata... Porque a criação de significado fora da falta de sentido não é conscientemente experimentado... Não existe... Isto é... a ilusão fenomenológica. " Searle PNC p115-117 "... a relação intencional básica entre a mente e o mundo tem a ver com as condições 132 de satisfação. E uma proposição é qualquer coisa que pode estar em uma relação intencional com o mundo, e uma vez que essas relações intencionais sempre determinam condições de satisfação, e uma proposição é definida como qualquer coisa suficiente para determinar as condições de satisfação, verifica-se que toda a intencionalidade é uma questão de proposições. Searle PNC p193 "Assim, as funções de status são a cola que mantêm a sociedade unida. Eles são criados por intencionalidade coletiva e eles funcionam carregando poderes deônticos... Com a importante exceção da linguagem em si, toda a realidade institucional e, em um sentido, toda a civilização humana é criada por atos de fala que têm a forma lógica de declarações... toda a realidade institucional humana é criada e mantida na existência por (representações que têm a mesma forma lógica como) declarações de função de status, incluindo os casos que não são atos de fala na forma explícita de declarações. " Searle MSW P11-13 "Mas você não pode explicar um sistema físico, como uma máquina de escrever ou um cérebro, identificando um padrão que compartilha com sua simulação computacional, porque a existência do padrão não explica como o sistema realmente funciona como um sistema físico. ... Em suma, o fato de que a atribuição de sintaxe não identifica mais poderes causais é fatal para a alegação de que os programas fornecem explicações causais de cognição... Há apenas um mecanismo físico, o cérebro, com seus vários níveis reais de descrição física e física/mental. " Filosofia Searle em um novo século (PNC) P101-103 "Em suma, o senso de" processamento de informações "que é usado na ciência cognitiva é muito alto um nível de abstração para capturar a realidade biológica concreta da intencionalidade intrínseca... Estamos cegos a esta diferença pelo fato de que a mesma frase "Eu vejo um carro vindo em minha direção," pode ser usado para gravar tanto a intencionalidade visual ea saída do modelo computacional de visão... no sentido de "informação" usada na ciência cognitiva, é simplesmente falso dizer que o cérebro é um dispositivo de processamento de informações. " Searle PNC P104-105 "O estado intencional representa suas condições de satisfação... as pessoas erroneamente supor que cada representação mental deve ser conscientemente pensado... Mas a noção de uma representação como eu estou usando é uma noção funcional e não ontológica. Tudo o que tem condições de satisfação, que pode suceder ou falhar de uma forma que é característico da intencionalidade, é, por definição, uma representação de suas condições de satisfação... Podemos analisar a estrutura da intencionalidade dos fenômenos sociais analisando suas condições de satisfação. " Searle MSW P28-32 "Orador significado... é a imposição de condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação. A capacidade de fazer isso é um elemento crucial das capacidades cognitivas humanas. Requer a capacidade de pensar em dois níveis de uma só vez, de uma forma que é essencial para o uso da linguagem. Em um nível, o orador intencionalmente produz uma expressão física, mas em outro nível o enunciado 133 representa algo. E a mesma dualidade infecta o próprio símbolo. Em um nível, é um objeto físico como qualquer outro. Em outro nível, ele tem um significado: ele representa um tipo de estado de coisas "MSW P74" ... uma vez que você tem a língua, é inevitável que você terá deontologia porque não há nenhuma maneira você pode fazer atos explícitos da fala executados de acordo com as convenções de uma língua sem criar compromissos. Isso é verdade não apenas para declarações, mas para todos os atos de fala "MSW P82 "Quanto mais estreita examinarmos a linguagem real, o mais nítido se tornará o conflito entre ele e nossa exigência. (Para a pureza cristalina da lógica era, naturalmente, não um resultado da investigação: era uma exigência.) " PI 107 Um tema importante em toda a discussão sobre o comportamento humano é a necessidade de separar os automatismos geneticamente programados dos efeitos da cultura. Todo o estudo do comportamento da ordem mais elevada é um esforço para provocar aparte não somente o S1 rápido e o pensamento S2 lento (por exemplo, percepções e outros automatismos contra disposições), mas as extensões lógicas de S2 na cultura (S3). O trabalho de Searle (s) como um todo fornece uma descrição impressionante do comportamento social de S2/S3 da ordem mais elevada que é devido à evolução recente dos genes para a psicologia mudança de caráter, quando o Wittgenstein mais atrasado (W) mostrar como é baseado em axiomas inconscientes true-only (verdade so) de S1 que evoluiu em pensamento proposicional consciente disposicional de S2. S1 é as funções automatizadas simples de nosso involuntário, sistema 1, pensamento rápido, neuron do espelho, verdadeiro-somente, não-proposicional, Estados mentaisnossas percepções e memórias e atos reflexivos que incluem o sistema 1 verdades e UA1--compreensão da Agência 1--e Emoções 1-como alegria, amor, raiva) que pode ser descrita causalmente, enquanto as funções linguísticas evolutivamente posteriores são expressões ou descrições de voluntários, sistema 2, pensamento lento, neurônios mentalizantes, testáveis verdadeiros ou falsos, proposicional, Truth2 e UA2 e Emotions2-alegria, amando, odiando-o mudança de caráter (e muitas vezes contrafactual) imaginar, supondo, pretendendo, pensando, sabendo, acreditando, etc, que só pode ser descrita em termos de razões (ou seja, é apenas um fato que tenta descrever o sistema 2 em termos de neuroquímica, física atômica, matemática, não faz sentido-ver W para muitos exemplos e Searle e hacker ( 3 volumes na natureza humana) para disquisições). Deve-se levar a sério comentário W que, mesmo que Deus pudesse olhar em nossa mente, ele não conseguia ver o que estamos pensando-este deve ser o lema da psicologia cognitiva. Sim, um psicólogo cognitivo do futuro pode ser capaz de ver o que estamos percebendo e lembrando e nosso pensamento reflexivo e agindo, uma vez que estas funções S1 são sempre causal estados mentais (CMS), mas as disposições S2 são apenas potencialmente CMS e por isso não percebeu ou visíveis. Esta não é uma 134 teoria, mas a descrição da nossa língua, mente, vida, gramática (W). S, Carruthers (C) e outros enlameados as águas aqui, porque às vezes se referem a disposições como estados mentais, bem como, mas como W fez há muito tempo, S, hacker e outros mostram que a linguagem da causalidade apenas não se aplica à ordem superior emergente S2 descriçõesoutra vez não uma teoria mas uma descrição de como nossos Estados mudança de caráter (língua, pensamento) trabalham. S1 é composto de inconsciente, rápido, físico, causal, automático, não-proposicional, apenas estados mentais verdadeiros, enquanto S2 lenta só pode ser descrita de forma coerente em termos de razões para ações que são mais ou menos disposições conscientes para o comportamento (potencial ações) que são ou podem se tornar proposicional (T ou F). Parece bastante óbvio para mim (como era a W) que a visão mecânica da mente existe pela mesma razão que quase todo o comportamento--é a operação padrão de nossa psicologia evoluída (EP) que busca explicações em termos do que podemos deliberadamente pensar lentamente ( S2), em vez de no S1 automatizado, dos quais, principalmente, permanecem alheios-chamado por S em PNC ' a ilusão fenomenológica ' (TPI). TPI não é um erro filosófico inofensivo, mas um alheio universal à nossa biologia que produz a ilusão de que nós controlamos a nossa vida e entre as conseqüências são o colapso inexorável do que passa para a civilização. Nosso lento ou reflexivo, mais ou menos "consciente" (cuidado com outra rede de jogos de linguagem!) a segunda atividade cerebral do self corresponde ao que W caracterizou como "disposições" ou "inclinações", que se referem a habilidades ou ações possíveis, não são estados mentais ( ou não no mesmo sentido que os Estados S1), e não têm qualquer tempo definido de ocorrência e/ou duração. Mas palavras de disposição como "saber", "entendimento", "pensar", "crer", que W discutido extensivamente, têm pelo menos dois usos básicos. Um é um uso filosófico peculiar (mas graduar-se em usos diários) que se refere às sentenças verdadeiras-somente resultando das percepções diretas e da memória, isto é, nossa psicologia axiomático inata S1 (' Eu sei que estas são minhas mãos ')--isto é, eles são Causally Self Referential (CSR)(causalmente auto referencial) - isto é, para ver um gato fá-lo verdadeiro e no caso normal nenhum teste é possível, e o uso S2, que é seu uso normal como disposições, que pode ser agido para fora, e que pode se tornar verdadeiro ou falso ("Eu sei meu caminho para casa")--isto é. , têm condições de satisfação externas, públicas e testáveis (COS) e não são CSR. A investigação do pensamento rápido involuntário do sistema 1 revolucionou a psicologia, a economia e outras disciplinas nomes como ilusões cognitivas, escorvamento, enquadramento, heurística e preconceitos. É claro que estes também são jogos de linguagem por isso haverá maneiras mais e menos úteis para usar essas palavras, e estudos e discussões irão variar de "puro" sistema 1 para combinações de 1 e 2 (a norma como W deixou claro), mas presumivelmente não nunca de lento sistema 2 mudança de caráter fina Rei apenas, uma vez que qualquer sistema 2 pensamento ou ação intencional não pode ocorrer sem envolver grande parte da intrincada rede de "módulos cognitivos", "motores de inferência", "reflexos intracerebral", "automatismos", "axiomas cognitivos", "fundo" ou "Bedrock"-como W 135 e mais tarde Searle chamam nossa psicologia evolucionária (EP). Uma maneira de concernir isto é que o sistema automático inconsciente 1 ativa a personalidade consciente cortical mais elevada do sistema 2, trazendo sobre as contrações do músculo da garganta que informam outro que vê o mundo em determinadas maneiras, que o comprometem ao potencial Ações. Um enorme avanço sobre as interações pré-linguísticas ou protolingüísticas em que apenas os movimentos musculares brutos foram capazes de transmitir informações muito limitadas sobre as intenções. As estruturas deôntico ou a colagem social do ' são as ações rápidas automáticas de S1 produzindo as disposições lentas de S2 que são expandidas inexoravelmente durante o desenvolvimento pessoal em uma disposição larga de relacionamentos deôntico culturais universais automáticos (S3). Espero que este bastante bem descreve a estrutura básica do comportamento. Estas descrições de cognição e vontade estão resumidas na tabela 2,1 de MSW, que Searle tem usado por muitos anos e é a base para um estendido que eu criei. Na minha opinião, isso ajuda enormemente a relacionar isso com a pesquisa psicológica moderna usando minha terminologia S1, S2, S3 e a descrição de W ' s true-only vs proposicional (disposicional). Assim, a CSR referencia S1 true-only percepção, memória e intenção prévia (causa origina no mundo), enquanto S2 refere-se a proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso testável) disposições como a crença e o desejo (causa origina na mente). Assim, reconhecendo que S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo à mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo) (por exemplo, ver a minha revisão de Hutto e Myin ' s "Enativismo Radical"), eu mudaria o parágrafos de MSW p39 começando "em suma" e terminando em PG 40 com "condições de satisfação" como se segue. Em suma, a percepção, a memória e as intenções e ações anteriores reflexivas (' vontade ') são causadas pelo funcionamento automático do nosso EP axiomático de S1 true-only. Através de intenções e intenções-em-ação anteriores, tentamos igualar como desejamos que as coisas sejam com a forma como pensamos que são. Devemos ver que a crença, o desejo (e imaginação--desejos tempo deslocado e dissociado da intenção) e outras S2 disposições proposicional do nosso pensamento lento mais tarde evoluiu segundo auto, são totalmente dependentes (ter seu COS originários) a RSE rápida automático primitivo true-only reflexiva S1. Na linguagem e neurofisiologia existem casos intermediários ou misturados, tais como a intenção (intenções anteriores) ou lembrando, onde a conexão causal com COS (ou seja, com S1) é o tempo deslocado, como eles representam o passado ou o futuro, ao contrário de S1, que está sempre em o presente. S1 e S2 se alimentam uns aos outros e são muitas vezes orquestrados perfeitamente pelas relações culturais deônticas aprendidas do S3, de modo que nossa experiência normal é que nós controlamos conscientemente tudo o que fazemos. Esta vasta Arena de ilusões cognitivas que dominam a nossa vida Searle 136 descreveu como "a ilusão fenomenológica". Segue-se de uma forma muito simples e inexorável, tanto do trabalho do 3o período W e das observações da psicologia contemporânea, que ' vontade ', ' auto ' e ' consciência ' são elementos axiomático true-only do sistema 1 apenas como ver, ouvir, etc., e não há possibilidade (inteligibilidade) de demonstrar (de dar sentido a) a sua falsidade. Como W fez tão maravilhosamente claro inúmeras vezes, eles são a base para o julgamento e por isso não pode ser julgado. Os verdadeiros axiomas da nossa psicologia não são probatórios. Como Carruthers e outro, Searle às vezes Estados (por exemplo, P66-67 MSW) que S1 (isto é, memórias, percepções, atos reflexos) tem uma estrutura proposicional (isto é, verdadeiro-falsa). Como eu tenho observado acima, e muitas vezes em outros comentários, parece cristalina que W está correto, e é básico para entender o comportamento, que apenas S2 é proposicional e S1 é axiomático e true-only. Ambos têm cos e sentidos do ajuste (DOF) porque a intencionalidade genética, axiomático de S1 gera aquela de S2 mas se S1 eram proposicional no mesmo sentido que significaria que o ceticismo é intelligivel, o caos que era filosofia antes que W retornaria, e na verdade, se for verdade, a vida não seria possível. Como W mostrou inúmeras vezes e demostra, biologia, a vida deve ser baseada na certeza-automatizado reações rápidas inconscientes. Organismos que sempre têm uma dúvida e pausa para refletir vai morrer-sem evolução, sem pessoas, sem filosofia. A língua e a escrita são especiais porque o comprimento de onda curto das vibrações dos músculos vocais permite transferência de informação muito mais elevada da largura de faixa do que contrações de outros músculos e este é em média diversas ordens da magnitude mais altamente para a informação visual. Pensar é proposicional e assim lida com afirmações verdadeiras ou falsas, o que significa que é uma disposição S2 típica que pode ser testada, em oposição às funções cognitivas automáticas verdadeiras de S1. Ou você pode dizer que expressões espontâneas e ações são os reflexos primitivos ou jogos de linguagem primária (PLG) de S1, enquanto as representações conscientes são os jogos de linguagem secundária disposicional (SLG ' s) de S2. Parece trivial e, na verdade, é, mas esta é a declaração mais básica de como funciona o comportamento e quase ninguém já entendeu. Eu traduzi o Sumário de S da razão prática em P127 de MSW como segue: "nós rendemos a nossos desejos (necessidade de alterar a química do cérebro), que incluem tipicamente o desejo-razões independentes para a ação (DIRA--isto é, desejos deslocados no espaço e no tempo, o mais frequentemente para altruísmo recíproco), que produzem disposições para o comportamento que comumente resultam mais cedo ou mais tarde em movimentos musculares que servem a nossa aptidão inclusiva (aumento da sobrevida para os genes em nós mesmos e aqueles intimamente relacionados). " E eu reafirmar sua descrição em p129 de como nós realizamos DIRA2/3 como "a definição do paradoxo é que o DIRA1 inconsciente que serve a 137 aptidão inclusiva a longo prazo gera o DIRA2 consciente que substituem frequentemente os desejos imediatos pessoais a curto prazo." Os agentes realmente criam conscientemente as razões proximas de DIRA2/3, mas estas são extensões muito restritas de DIRA1 inconsciente (a causa final). A evolução por aptidão inclusiva programou as ações causais reflexivas inconscientes de S1 que muitas vezes dão origem ao pensamento lento consciente de S2 (muitas vezes modificados nas extensões culturais do S3), que produz razões para a ação que muitas vezes resultam em ativação dos músculos do corpo e/ou da fala por S1 causando ações. O mecanismo geral é através da neurotransmissão e por mudanças em neuromoduladores em áreas específicas do cérebro. A ilusão cognitiva geral (chamada por S ' a ilusão fenomenológica ', por Pinker ' a ardósia em branco ' e por Tooby e Cosmides ' o modelo de ciência social padrão ') é que S2/S3 gerou a ação conscientemente por razões das quais estamos plenamente conscientes e em controle de, mas alguém familiarizado com a biologia moderna e psicologia pode ver que esta visão não é credível. Embora W é correto que não há nenhum estado mental que constitui significado, S notas (como citado acima) que há uma maneira geral de caracterizar o ato de significado-"orador significado... é a imposição de condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação ", que é um ato e não um estado mental. Isto pode ser visto como uma outra indicação do argumento de W de encontro à língua confidencial (interpretações pessoais contra os publicamente testáveis). Da mesma forma, com a regra seguinte e interpretação-eles só podem ser publicamente atos demonstrável sem regras privadas ou interpretações privadas também. E deve-se notar que muitos (mais famosamente Kripke) perder o barco aqui, sendo enganado por W ' s freqüentes referências à prática da Comunidade em pensar que é apenas uma prática pública arbitrária que está subjacente a linguagem e convenções sociais. W deixa claro muitas vezes que tais convenções só são possíveis dada uma psicologia compartilhada inata que ele muitas vezes chama de fundo, e isso que está subjacente a todo o comportamento e que é esquematizado na mesa. Como eu tenho notado em meus outros comentários, poucos se algum ter entendido plenamente o W mais tarde e, faltando a estrutura S1, S2 não é surpreendente. Assim, pode-se entender por que não se pode imaginar um objeto ao vê-lo como a dominação de S2 por S1. Não há teste para minhas experiências internas, então o que vier à mente quando eu imaginar o rosto de Jack é a imagem de Jack. Da mesma forma, com leitura e cálculo que pode se referir a S1, S2 ou uma combinação, e há a tentação constante de aplicar S2 termos para S1 processos onde a falta de qualquer teste torna inaplicável. Dois dos exemplos famosos de W usados para combater esta tentação estão jogando o tênis sem uma esfera (' s 1 tênis '), e uma tribo que tivesse somente o cálculo S2 assim que ' calculando na cabeça (' s 1 que calcula ') não era possível. ' Jogando' e ' calculando ' descrevem atos reais ou potenciais--ou seja, eles são palavras de disposição, mas com plausível reflexivo S1 usa assim como eu disse antes de um realmente deve mantê-los em linha reta escrevendo ' playing1 ' e ' playing2 ' etc. Mas 138 não somos ensinados a fazer isso e por isso queremos descartar ' calculating1 ' como uma fantasia, ou pensamos que podemos deixar sua natureza indeciso até mais tarde. Daí um outro dos famosos comentários de W-"o movimento decisivo no truque de Conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente." Ou seja, as primeiras frases ou, muitas vezes, o título cometer um a uma maneira de olhar para as coisas (um jogo de linguagem) que impede o uso claro da linguagem no contexto atual. Uma sentença expressa um pensamento (tem um significado), quando tem o COS desobstruído, e este significa tem condições públicas da verdade. Daí o comentário de W: "quando eu penso na linguagem, não há ' significados ' passando pela minha mente, além das expressões verbais: a língua é em si o veículo do pensamento." E, se eu pensar com ou sem palavras, o pensamento é o que eu (honestamente) dizer que é como não há outro critério possível (COS). Assim, os aforismos encantadores de W (p132 Budd) "é na língua que o desejo e a realização encontram-se" e "como tudo metafísico, a harmonia entre o pensamento e a realidade deve ser encontrada na gramática da língua." E pode-se notar aqui que ' gramática ' em W geralmente pode ser interpretado como a estrutura lógica da linguagem, e que, apesar de suas advertências freqüentes contra teorização e generalização, isso é tão ampla uma caracterização da filosofia e maior ordem Psicologia descritiva como se pode encontrar. Da mesma forma, com a pergunta "o que torna verdade que a minha imagem de Jack é uma imagem dele?" Imaginar é outra disposição e o COS é que a imagem que eu tenho na minha cabeça é Jack e é por isso que eu vou dizer ' Sim ' se mostrado sua foto e ' não ' se mostrado um de outra pessoa. O teste aqui não é que a foto coincide com a imagem vaga que eu tinha, mas que eu pretendia (tinha o COS que) para ser uma imagem dele. Daí a famosa citação de W: "se Deus tivesse olhado em nossas mentes ele não teria sido capaz de ver lá quem nós estávamos falando de (PI P217)" e seus comentários que todo o problema da representação está contido em "that's him" (esse é ele) e "... o que dá a imagem de sua interpretação é o caminho em que se encontra, "ou como S diz o seu cos. daí W ' s soma (p140 Budd) que" o que sempre acontece no final é que, sem qualquer significado adicional, ele chama o que aconteceu o desejo que isso deve acontecer "..." a pergunta se eu sei o que eu desejo antes que meu desejo esteja cumprido não pode surgir de todo. E o fato de que algum evento pára o meu desejo não significa que ele cumpre-lo. Talvez eu não deveria ter ficado satisfeito se o meu desejo tinha sido satisfeito "... Suponha que foi perguntado "Eu sei o que eu longo para antes de eu obtê-lo? Se eu aprendi a falar, então eu sei. As palavras da disposição referem-se aos eventos potenciais (PE) que eu aceito como cumprindo o COS e meus estados mentais, emoções, mudança de interesse etc. não têm nenhum rolamento na função das disposições da maneira. Eu estou esperando, desejando, esperando, pensando, pretendendo, desejando etc. dependendo do estado que eu me levo para estar em-no COS que eu expressar. Pensar e pretendendo são as disposições S2 que só podem ser expressas por contrações reflexivas do músculo S1, especialmente as da fala. 139 Agora que temos um início razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana. Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e dispostos, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc. são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente sensíveis e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). Muitos gráficos complexos foram publicados por cientistas, mas eu encontrá-los de utilidade mínima quando se pensa sobre o comportamento (em oposição a pensar sobre a função cerebral). Cada nível de descrição pode ser útil em determinados contextos, mas acho que ser mais grosseira ou mais finos limites utilidade. A estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR), ou a estrutura lógica da mente (LSM), a estrutura lógica do comportamento (LSB), a estrutura lógica do pensamento (LST), a estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), a estrutura lógica da personalidade (LSP), a Psicologia descritiva da consciência (DSC), a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), intencionalidade-o termo filosófico clássico. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle) Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste"e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. 140 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 141 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação (COS) de S2 são muitas vezes referidas to por Searle e outros como cos, representações, veracidade ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são projectada como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka (também conhecido como) Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então 142 Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. É fundamental notar que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. Aqueles que desejam um completo até à data conta de Wittgenstein, Searle e sua análise de comportamento da moderna dois sistemas de visão pode consultar o meu artigo a estrutura lógica da filosofia, psicologia, mente e linguagem como revelado em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2o Ed (2019). 143 EXPLICAÇÃO DA TABELA Cerca de um milhão de anos atrás, os primatas evoluíram a capacidade de usar seus músculos da garganta para fazer séries complexas de ruídos (ou seja, discurso primitivo) para descrever os eventos presentes (percepções, memória, ações reflexivas que podem ser descritas como primária ou linguagem primitiva Games (PLG ' s) - ou seja, uma classe de reflexos do sistema automatizado inconsciente associativo rápido 1, subcortical, não representacional, causalmente autorreferencial, intransitiva, sem informações, verdadeira apenas estado mental com um tempo e localização precisos) e desenvolveu gradualmente a maior capacidade de abranger deslocamentos no espaço e no tempo para descrever memórias, atitudes e eventos potenciais (o passado e o futuro e, muitas vezes, preferências contrafactuais, condicionais ou ficcionais, inclinações ou disposições o Jogos de idiomas secundários ou sofisticados (SLG ' s) do sistema 2 lento, cortical, consciente, informação contendo, transitiva (tendo COS públicos), representacional, verdadeiro ou falso pensamento atitudinal proposicional, que não tem tempo preciso e são habilidades e não estados mentais). Preferências são intuições, tendências, regras ontológicas automáticas, comportamentos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, traços de personalidade, modelos, motores de inferência, inclinações, emoções, atitudes proposicional, avaliações, capacidades, hipóteses. Algumas emoções são preferências do tipo 2 (W RPP2 148). "Eu acredito", "ele ama", "eles pensam" são descrições de possíveis atos públicos tipicamente discolocados no espaço-tempo. Minhas declarações em primeira pessoa sobre mim são verdadeiras-apenas (excluindo mentir), enquanto declarações de terceira pessoa sobre os outros são verdadeiras ou falsas (ver a minha opinião de Johnston ' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior '). As "Preferências" como uma classe de Estados intencionais--oposto às percepções, aos atos reflexivos e às memórias--foram descritas primeiramente claramente por Wittgenstein (W) nos 1930 ' s e denominados "inclinações" ou "disposicaos". Eles têm sido comumente chamado de "atitudes proposicional" desde Russell, mas esta é uma frase enganosa desde acreditando, pretendendo, sabendo, lembrando, etc., muitas vezes não são proposições nem atitudes, como tem sido demonstrado, por exemplo, por W e por Searle (por exemplo, CF consciência e linguagem P118). Eles são intrínsecos, representações mentais independentes do observador (em oposição a apresentações ou representações do sistema 1 ao sistema 2 – Searle-C + L p53). Eles são atos potenciais deslocados no tempo ou no espaço, enquanto as memórias de percepções S1 evolutivamente mais primitivas e ações reflexivas estão sempre aqui e agora. Esta é uma maneira de caracterizar o sistema 2 – o maior avanço na psicologia de vertebrados após o sistema 1 - a capacidade de representar eventos e pensar neles como ocorrendo em outro lugar ou tempo (a terceira faculdade de imaginação contrafactual de Searle completando cognição e volição). As disposições S2 são habilidades para atuar (músculos contratuais produzindo movimentos de fala ou corpo via S1, momento em que se tornam Estados causais e mentais). Às vezes as disposições podem ser consideradas como inconsciente desde que podem tornar-se mais tarde consciente Searle-Phil emite 1:45-66 (1991). 144 Percepções, memórias e ações reflexivas (automáticas) podem ser descritas como S1 ou jogos de linguagem primária (PLG's--por exemplo, eu vejo o cão) e há, no caso normal, nenhum teste possível para que eles possam ser true only (verdade so). Disposições podem ser descrito como secundário LG (SLG-por exemplo, eu acredito que eu vejo o cão) e também deve ser agido para fora, mesmo para mim no meu próprio caso (ou seja, como eu sei o que eu acredito, acho, sentir até que eu agir-ver citações acima de W). Disposições também se tornam ações quando falado ou escrito, bem como sendo agido de outras maneiras, e essas idéias são todos devido a Wittgenstein (meados de 1930) e não são behaviorismo (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein pode ser considerado como o fundador da psicologia evolutiva e seu trabalho uma investigação única sobre o funcionamento da nossa psicologia axiomático System 1 e sua interação com o sistema 2. Embora poucos entenderam bem (e sem dúvida ninguém totalmente a este dia) foi desenvolvido por alguns-acima de tudo por John Searle, que fez uma versão mais simples desta tabela em seu livro clássico racionalidade em ação (2001). Ele se expande na pesquisa de W da estrutura axiomática da psicologia evolutiva desenvolvida a partir de seus primeiros comentários em 1911 e tão lindamente dispostos em seu último trabalho sobre certeza (OC) (escrito em 1950-51). OC é a pedra fundamental do comportamento ou epistemologia e ontologia (indiscutivelmente o mesmo), linguística cognitiva ou DPHOT, e na minha opinião o trabalho mais importante na filosofia (Psicologia descritiva) e, portanto, no estudo do comportamento. Percepção, memória, ações reflexivas e emoções básicas são primitivos parcialmente subcorticais involuntários estados mentais, que podem ser descritos em PLG's, em que a mente se encaixa automaticamente no mundo S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente direção do ajuste) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações) (é causalmente auto referencial-Searle)--a inquestionável, verdade única, base axiomática da racionalidade sobre a qual nenhum controle é possível). Preferências, desejos e intenções são descrições de pensamento lento consciente habilidades voluntárias-que podem ser descritos em SLG ' s-em que a mente tenta caber o mundo S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo direção do ajuste). O behaviorismo e todas as outras confusões do nosso padrão de psicologia descritiva (filosofia) surgem porque não podemos ver S1 trabalhando e descrever todas as ações com Secondary Language Games (jogos de linguagem secondária o SLG's, que S chama a ilusão fenomenológica (TPI). W entendeu isso e descreveu-o com clareza inigualável com centenas de exemplos de linguagem (a mente) em ação ao longo de suas obras. Razão tem acesso à memória de trabalho e por isso usamos conscientemente aparente, mas tipicamente incorreto razões para explicar o comportamento (os dois eus da pesquisa atual). Crenças e outras disposições podem ser descritas como pensamentos que tentam corresponder aos fatos do mundo (mente à direção Mundial do ajuste), enquanto Volitions (Vontades) são intenções de agir (Prior Intentions o (intenções anteriores-PI, e Intention In Action (intenções em ação -IA-Searle)) mais atos que tentam corresponder ao mundo aos pensamentos - sentido do mundo à mente do ajuste - cf. Searle por exemplo, C + L p145, 190). 145 Às vezes, há lacunas no raciocínio para chegar à crença e outras disposições. Palavras de inclinação podem ser usadas como substantivos que parecem descrever estados mentais (por exemplo, crença), ou como verbos que descrevem habilidades (agentes como eles agem ou podem agir) (por exemplo, acreditando) e são muitas vezes incorretamente chamados de "atitudes proposicional". As percepções tornam-se memórias e nossos programas inatos (módulos cognitivos, moldes, motores da inferência de S1) usam estes para produzir disposições - (atos públicos reais ou potenciais igualmente chamados inclinações, preferências, capacidades, representações de S2) e Volition(Vontade)-e não há nenhuma língua (conceito, pensamento) de estados mentais confidenciais para pensar ou querer (isto é, nenhuma língua confidencial). Os animais mais elevados podem pensar e agir e, nessa medida, têm uma psicologia pública. PERCEPCIONS: ("X" é verdadeiro): ouvir, ver, cheirar, dor, toque, temperatura MEMORIAS: lembrando, sonhando (S1) PREFERENCIAS, INCLINACIONES, DISPOSICOES (X pode tornar-se verdadeiro) (S2) CLASSE 1: acreditando, julgando, pensando, representando, entendendo, escolhendo, decidindo, preferindo, interpretando, conhecendo (incluindo habilidades e habilidades), participando (aprendendo), experimentando, significando, lembrando, pretendendo, Considerando, Desejando, esperando, desejando, querendo, esperando (uma classe especial), vendo como (aspectos), CLASSE 2: modo descoplado--sonhando, imaginando, mentindo, prevendo, duvidando CLASSE 3: emoções: amando, odiando, temendo, tristeza, alegria, ciúme, depressão. Sua função é modular preferências para aumentar a aptidão inclusiva (utilidade máxima esperada), facilitando o processamento de informações de percepções e memórias para uma ação rápida. Há alguma separação entre as emoções S1, como raiva e medo e S2, como amor, ódio, nojo e raiva. DESEJOS: (eu quero "X" para ser verdade-eu quero cambio o mundo para caber meus pensamentos): saudade, esperando, esperando, aguardando, precisando, exigindo, obrigados a fazer INTENÇÕES: (eu vou fazer "X" true o verdad) pretendendo AÇÕES (estou fazendo "X" true o verdad): agindo, falando, lendo, escrevendo, calculando, persuadir, mostrando, demonstrando, convencendo, fazendo tentando, 146 tentando, rindo, brincando, comendo, bebendo, chorando, afirmando (descrevendo, ensinando, prevendo, relatórios), prometendo, fazendo ou usando mapas, livros, desenhos, programas de computador-estes são públicos e voluntários e transferir informações para os outros para que eles dominam sobre os reflexos inconsciente, involuntário e sem informacao S1 em explicações de comportamento. Todas as palavras são partes de jogos de linguagem complexa (pensamentos levando a ações) ter várias funções em nossa vida e não são os nomes dos objetos nem de um único tipo de evento. Nós dirigimos um carro, mas também o próprio, vê-lo, ver a sua foto, sonhar com isso, imaginá-lo, esperar, lembre-se. As interações sociais dos seres humanos são governadas por módulos cognitivos - aproximadamente equivalentes aos roteiros ou esquinas da psicologia social (grupos de neurônios organizados em motores de inferência), que, com percepções e memórias, levam à formação de as preferências que conduzem às intenções e então às ações. Intencionalidade ou psicologia intencional pode ser tomado para ser todos esses processos ou apenas as preferências que levam a ações e no sentido mais amplo é o tema da psicologia cognitiva ou Neurociências Cognitivas, quando incluindo a neurofisiologia, neuroquímica e neurogenética. A psicologia evolutiva pode ser considerada como o estudo de todas as funções precedentes ou da operação dos módulos que produzem comportamento, e é então coextensivo na evolução, desenvolvimento e ação individual com preferências, intenções e ações. Uma vez que os axiomas (algoritmos ou módulos cognitivos) da nossa psicologia estão em nossos genes, podemos ampliar nosso entendimento, dando descrições claras de como eles funcionam e podem ampliá-los (cultura) através da biologia, psicologia, filosofia (Psicologia descritiva), matemática, lógica, física e programas de computador, tornando-os mais rápidos e mais eficientes. Hajek (2003) dá uma análise das disposições como probabilidades condicionais e são algoritmatizado por Spohn etc. A intencionalidade (psicologia cognitiva ou evolucionária) consiste em vários aspectos do comportamento que são programados em módulos cognitivos (no entanto definidos) que criam e exigem consciência, vontade e auto e em adultos humanos normais todos as disposições são intencional, exigem atos públicos (por exemplo, a língua), e comprometem-nos às relações (chamadas razões independentes do desejo para a ação-DIRA por Searle) a fim aumentar nossa aptidão inclusiva (utilidade esperada máxima - às vezes chamado-controvérsia-utilidade Bayesiana maximização) via dominância e altruísmo recíproco e impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação-Searle-(ou seja, relacionar pensamentos ao mundo através de atos públicos movimentos musculares – ou seja, matemática, linguagem, arte, música, sexo, esportes, etc.). As noções básicas disso foram figurado pelo nosso maior psicólogo natural Ludwig Wittgenstein da década de 1930 para 1951, mas com prefigurasas claras de volta para 1911 ("a árvore geral de fenômenos psicológicos. Eu não me esforço para a exatidão, mas para uma visão do todo. RPP Vol 1 P895 CF Z P464), e com refinamentos por muitos, mas acima de tudo por John Searle começando na década de 1960. Grande parte da nossa intencionalidade S2 admite de graus ou 147 tipos (principalmente jogos de linguagem). Como observou W, as inclinações (por exemplo, pensamento) são, por vezes, conscientes e deliberativas. Todos os nossos modelos (funções, conceitos, jogos de linguagem) têm bordas difusas em alguns contextos, como eles devem ser úteis. Há pelo menos dois tipos de pensamento (ou seja, dois jogos de linguagem ou maneiras de usar o verbo disposicional 'pensando') - não racional sem consciência e racional com consciência parcial (W), agora descrita como a rápida e pensamento lento de S1 e S2. É útil considerar estes como jogos de linguagem e não como meros fenômenos (W RPP2 129). Os fenômenos mentais (nossas experiências subjetivas ou internas) são epifenomenais, faltam critérios, daqui faltam a informação mesmo para a si mesmo e assim não podem jogar nenhum papel na comunicação, no pensamento ou na mente. Pensar como todas as disposições (inclinações, actitudes proposicional) não é um estado mental, e não contem nenhuma informação até que se torne um ato público (realiza um COS) na fala, na escrita ou em outras contrações musculares. Nossas percepções e memórias podem ter a informação (significacado-COS) quando se manifestam em ações públicas através de S2, porque somente então têm todo o significado (conseqüências) mesmo para nos. A memória e a percepção são integradas por módulos em disposições que tornam-se psicologicamente eficazes quando são actuadas em cima. Desenvolver linguagem significa manifestar a habilidade inata de substituir palavras por atos. O termo comum TOM (teoria da mente) é muito melhor chamado (UA-Entendimento de Agência). Intencionalidade é a produção inata geneticamente programada de consciência, auto, e pensamento que leva a intenções e, em seguida, a ações através da contratação de músculos. Assim, "atitude proposicional" é um termo confuso para normal intuitiva racional ou não-racional speech e ação, mas eu dou-lhe como um sinônimo de disposições como ele ainda é amplamente utilizado por aqueles que não estão familiarizados com W e s. os esforços da ciência cognitiva para entender o pensamento, as emoções, etc, estudando a neurofisiologia não vai nos dizer nada mais sobre como a mente (pensamento, linguagem) funciona (em oposição a como o cérebro funciona) do que já sabemos, porque "mente" (pensamento, linguagem) já está em pleno público Vista (W). Quaisquer fenômenos que estão escondidos in neurofisiologia, bioquímica, genética, mecânica quântica, ou teoria das cordas, são tão irrelevante para a nossa vida social como o fato de que uma tabela é composta de átomos que "obedecer" (pode ser descrito por) as leis de física e química é almoçar nele. Como W tão famosamente disse "nada está escondido". Tudo de interesse sobre a mente (pensamento, linguagem) está aberto para ver se só examinamos cuidadosamente o funcionamento da linguagem. A linguagem foi evoluída para facilitar a interação social e, assim, a coleta de recursos, sobrevivência e reprodução. Sua gramática funciona automaticamente e é extremamente confuso quando tentamos analisá-lo. Palavras e frases têm vários usos, dependendo do contexto. Eu acredito e eu como ter papéis profundamente diferentes como eu acredito e eu acreditava ou eu acredito e ele acredita. O uso expressivo atual da primeira pessoa do tenso de verbos inclinacionais tais como o "eu acredito" descrevem minha habilidade de prever meus atos prováveis e não são descritivos de 148 meu estado mental nem baseado no conhecimento ou na informação no usual sentido dessas palavras (W). "Eu acredito que sua chuva", "Eu acreditava que estava chovendo", "ele acredita que a chover", "ele vai acreditar que a chover", "eu acredito que vai chover" ou "ele vai pensar que está chovendo" são atos públicos potencialmente verificáveis deslocados no espaço-tempo que pretendem transmitir informações (ou desinformação) e assim ter COS que são os seus fabricantes de verdade (ou falsidade). Não-reflexivo ou não-racional (automático) palavras faladas sem intenção prévia têm sido chamadas de palavras como deeds (atos) por W &, em seguida, por DMS em seu papel em psicologia filosófica em 2000) são típicos de grande parte do nosso comportamento como eles ponte S1 e S2 que interagem em ambos os direções a maior parte de nossa vida de vigília. Percepções, memórias, algumas emoções e muitas "tipo 1 disposições" são melhores chamados reflexos de S1 e são automáticos, não-reflexivo, não-proposicional e nãoatitudinal funcionamento das dobradiças (axiomas, algoritmos) de nossa psicologia evolutiva (Moyal-Sharrock após Wittgenstein). Agora, para alguns comentários sobre "a opacidade da mente" (OM). No momento em que terminei a primeira página do prefácio, percebi que este livro era apenas mais uma bagunça desesperada (a norma na filosofia). Ele deixou claro que ele não tinha noção da sutileza dos jogos de linguagem (por exemplo, os usos drasticamente diferentes de ' Eu sei que estou acordado ', ' Eu sei o que quero dizer ' e ' Eu sei que tempo é ') nem a natureza das disposições (que ele chama pelo termo enganosa e obsoleta ' proposicional atitudes ") e estava baseando suas idéias sobre o comportamento em tais noções como linguagem privada, introspecção de ' discurso interior ' e a descrição computacional da mente, que foram colocadas para descansar por W 3/4 de um século atrás e por S e muitos outros desde então. Mas eu sabia que a maioria dos livros sobre o comportamento humano são tão confusas e que ele ia dar um resumo do trabalho científico recente sobre as funções cerebrais correspondentes ao pensamento de ordem superior (HOT), então eu continuei. Antes de eu ler qualquer livro em filosofia ou ciência cognitiva, eu vou para o índice e bibliografia para ver quem eles citam e, em seguida, tentar encontrar alguns comentários e, especialmente, um artigo na BBS, uma vez que tem opinião dos pares, que é geralmente altamente informativo. Como observado acima, W e S são dois dos nomes mais famosos neste campo, mas no índice e bibliografia eu encontrei apenas 3 menções triviais de W e não um para S ou hacker-certamente a realização mais notável deste volume. Como esperado, várias revisões de revistas filosóficas eram inúteis e as respostas BBS para o seu précis deste livro parecem devastadores-embora, caracteristicamente (com exceção de uma menção de W)-eles também são sem noção sobre WS. Mais notável, embora ele inclui muitas referências tão recentes como 2012, o artigo 2009 BBS não está entre eles e, tanto quanto eu posso recordar, ele não 149 fornece respostas substantivas às suas críticas neste livro. Conseqüentemente, o WS poderoso inspirou a estrutura de LSR é totalmente ausente e todas as confusões que cancelou afastado são abundantes em quase cada página. Se você ler o acima e meus outros comentários e, em seguida, o artigo BBS (prontamente disponível gratuitamente na net) a sua visão deste livro (e a maioria das escritas nesta arena) provavelmente será bastante diferente. Naturalmente, o defeito principal do BBS é aparente---os commentros começ somente um comentário de uma página e nenhuma resposta, quando os autores começ um artigo longo e uma resposta longa, assim que parece sempre que prevalecem. É desobstruído entretanto que a teoria do ISA de C, como a maioria (tudo?) teorias filosóficas é um deslocador da forma que altera "explique" cada objeção. Assim, a linha entre uma teoria significativa (na verdade uma descrição) ligada a fatos, e uma noção vaga que "explica" nada, borrões. Claro, C muitas vezes diz que sua teoria "prevê" tal e tal observação, mas isso parece ocorrer após o fato e, claro, as teorias opostas forma Shift também. Uma teoria poderosa preafirma coisas que ninguém esperava e até mesmo o oposto do que eles esperavam. Também somos lembrados das constantes injunções de W para manter a descrição dos fatos e evitar accesivel "explicações". Os argumentos definitivos de W contra introspecção e linguagem privada são observados em meus outros comentários e são extremamente bem conhecidos. Basicamente, eles são tão claros como o dia - devemos ter um teste para diferenciar entre a e B e os testes só podem ser externos e públicos. Ele famosamente ilustrou isso com o ' besouro na caixa '. Se todos nós temos uma caixa que não pode ser aberto nem radiografado etc. e chamar o que está dentro de um ' besouro ', em seguida, ' besouro ' não pode ter qualquer papel na linguagem, para cada caixa pode conter uma coisa diferente ou poderia até estar vazio. Assim, não há nenhuma língua privada que só eu posso saber e nenhuma introspecção de "discurso interior". Se X não é publicamente demonstrável não pode ser uma palavra em nossa língua. Isso dispara a teoria da mente da ISA de Carruthers (C' s), bem como todas as outras teorias do "senso interno" que ele referencia e um enorme # de outros livros e artigos. Expliquei W ' s desmantelamento da noção de introspecção e do funcionamento da linguagem disposicional (' atitudes proposicional ') acima e em meus comentários de Budd, Johnston e vários dos livros de S. Basicamente, ele mostrou que a relação causal e o modelo de palavra e objeto que funciona para S1 não se aplica a S2. Quanto à ISA, muitos têm desconstruído a idéia de uma "linguagem de pensamento", mas na minha opinião ninguém melhor do que W em BBB p37-, "se tivermos em mente a possibilidade de uma imagem que, embora correta, não tem semelhança com seu objeto, a interpolação de uma sombra entre a sentença e a realidade perde todo o ponto. Por enquanto, a sentença em si pode servir como uma sombra. A sentença é apenas uma imagem, que não tem a menor semelhança com o que ele representa. Uma coisa a manter-se na mente é que as teorias filosóficas não têm nenhum impacto prático qualquer-o papel real da filosofia que é esclarecer confusões sobre como a língua está sendo usada em casos particulares (W). Como várias "teorias físicas", mas ao contrário de outras visões dos desenhos animados da vida (ou seja, o padrão 150 religioso, político, psicológico, sociológico, biológico, médico, econômico, antropológico e histórico de visões da maioria das pessoas), é muito cerebral e esotérico a ser apreendido por mais de uma franja minúscula e é tão irrealista que até mesmo seus adeptos ignoram totalmente em sua vida cotidiana. Da mesma forma, com outras "teorias da vida" acadêmicas como a ciência social padrão ou o modelo de ardósia em branco amplamente compartilhado pela Sociologia, antropologia, psicologia pop, história e literatura. No entanto, as religiões grandes e pequenos, movimentos políticos, e às vezes a economia muitas vezes geram ou abraçam desenhos já existentes que ignoram física e biologia (natureza humana), postular forças terrestres ou cósmicas que reforçam nossas superstições (nosso padrões psicológicos de inspiração inatamente), e ajudar a lançar resíduos para a terra (o verdadeiro propósito de quase todas as práticas sociais e instituição que estão lá para facilitar a replicação de genes e consumo de recursos). O ponto é perceber que estes estão em um continuum com desenhos animados filosóficos e têm a mesma fonte. Todos nós poderia ser dito ter várias visões de desenhos animados da vida quando jovens e apenas alguns nunca crescer fora deles. Observe também que, como W comentou há muito tempo, o prefixo "meta" é desnecessário e confuso na maioria (talvez todos) contextos, então para ' metacognição ' neste livro, substituir ' cognição ' ou ' pensar ', já que pensar sobre o que nós ou outros acreditamos ou sabemos é pensar como qualquer outros e não tem que ser visto como "leitura de mente" (UA na minha terminologia) também. Em termos de S, o COS são o teste do que está sendo pensado e eles são idênticos para ' está chovendo ', eu acredito que está chovendo ', ' eu acredito que você acredita que está chovendo ' e ' ele acredita que está chovendo ' (também para ' sabe ', desejos, juízes, compreende, etc.), ou seja, que Está chovendo. Este é o fato crítico a ter em mente sobre ' metacognição ' e ' leitura de mente ' de disposições (' atitudes proposicional ') que C promove. Uma das respostas na BBS foi por Dennett (que compartilha a maioria das ilusões de C), que parece encontrar essas idéias muito bom, exceto que C deve eliminar o uso de ' I ', uma vez que assume a existência de um eu superior (o objetivo é a redução dura de S2 para S1). Claro, o próprio ato de escrever, ler e toda a linguagem e conceitos de qualquer coisa que pressupõe auto, consciência e vontade (como S muitas vezes observa), de modo que tal conta seria apenas um cartoon da vida sem qualquer valor, que um provavelmente poderia dizer da maioria dos relatos filosóficos de comportamento. A estrutura WS há muito tempo observou que o ponto de vista da primeira pessoa não é eliminável ou redutível a uma 3a pessoa, mas isso não é problema para a visão dos desenhos animados da vida. Da mesma forma, com a descrição da função cerebral ou comportamento como ' computacional ', ' processamento de informações ' etc, -todos bem desmascarado inúmeras vezes pelo WS, Hutto, Read, hacker e muitos outros. O pior de tudo é a "representação" crucial, mas absolutamente obscura, para a qual eu acho que o uso de S como uma condição de satisfação (COS) de representar (ou seja, a mesma forma como para todos os substantivos disposicionais e seus verbos) é de longe o melhor. Ou seja, a "representação" de "Eu acho que está chovendo" é o COS que está chovendo. 151 O mais triste de tudo é que C (como Dennett) pensa que é um perito em W, tendo-o estudado cedo em sua carreira e decidido que o argumento confidencial da língua deve ser rejeitado como o behaviorismo do '! W famosamente rejeitado behaviorismo e grande parte de seu trabalho é dedicada a descrever por que ele não pode servir como uma descrição do comportamento. "Você não é realmente um comportamento disfarçado? Você não está no fundo realmente dizendo que tudo, exceto o comportamento humano é uma ficção? Se eu falar de uma ficção, então é de uma ficção gramatical. (PI P307) E pode-se também apontar para o behaviorismo real em C em sua forma moderna ' computacionalista '. WS insistir no indispensabilidade do ponto de vista da primeira pessoa, enquanto C pede desculpas a D no artigo BBS para usar "I" ou "self". Esta é, na minha opinião, a diferença entre uma descrição exata do uso da linguagem e o uso que se pode imaginar em um desenho animado. Hutto mostrou o vasto abismo entre W e Dennett (D), que servirá para caracterizar C também, desde que eu tomo D e C (juntamente com o Churchland e muitos outros) para estar na mesma página. S é um dos muitos que têm D deconstruido em vários escritos, e estes podem ser lidos em oposição a C. E vamos recordar que W adere a exemplos de linguagem em ação, e uma vez que se obtém o ponto que ele é principalmente muito fácil de seguir, enquanto C é cativa por "teorizando" (ou seja, encadeamento inúmeras frases sem COS claros) e raramente incomoda com jogos de linguagem específica , preferindo experimentos e observações que são bastante difíceis de interpretar de qualquer maneira definitiva (ver as respostas da BBS), e que, em qualquer caso, não têm relevância para descrições de nível superior de comportamento (por exemplo, exatamente como eles se encaixam na intencionalidade Tabela). Um livro C elogia como definitivo (memória e o cérebro computacional) apresenta o cérebro como um processador de informação computacional - uma visão imatura completamente e repetidamente aniquilada por S e outros. Na última década, tenho lido milhares de páginas por e sobre W e é bastante claro que C não tem uma pista. Neste ele se junta a uma longa linhagem de distintos filósofos e cientistas cuja leitura de W era infrutífica - Russell, Quine, Godel, Kreisel, Chomsky, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam etc. (embora Putnam começou a ver a luz mais tarde). Eles simplesmente não conseguem ver que a maioria das filosofas é piadas gramaticais e vinhetas impossíveis - uma visão dos desenhos animados da vida. Livros como este que tentam ponte dois níveis de descrição são realmente dois livros e não um. Há a descrição (não explicação, como W deixou claro) de nossa linguagem e comportamento não-verbal e, em seguida, os experimentos de psicologia cognitiva. "A existência do método experimental nos faz pensar que temos os meios para resolver os problemas que nos incomode; embora o problema e o método passar um outro por. (W PI p232), C et al são encantado pela ciência e apenas supor que é um grande avanço para casar a metafísica à neurociência e psicologia experimental, mas WS e muitos outros mostraram que este é um erro. Longe de fazer a descrição do comportamento científico e claro, isso torna incoerente. E deve ter sido pela graça de Deus que Locke, Kant, Hume, Nietzsche, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Searle et al foram 152 capazes de dar tais relatos memoráveis de comportamento sem qualquer ciência certo expe qualquer. Naturalmente, como políticos, filósofos raramente admitem erros ou cale-se assim que este vai continuar por razões W diagnosticado perfeitamente. A linha de fundo tem que ser o que é útil e o que faz sentido em nossa vida cotidiana. Eu sugiro que as visões filosóficas do CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), em oposição aos do WS, não são úteis e suas conclusões finais que vontade, auto e consciência são ilusões não fazem sentido em tudo-i. e., eles são sem sentido ter nenhum COS claro. Se o CDC comenta sobre a ciência cognitiva tem algum valor heurístico continua a ser determinado. Este livro (como um corpo enorme de outra escrita) tenta descontar o HOT de outros animais e reduzir o comportamento para as funções cerebrais (para absorver a psicologia em fisiologia). A filosofia é um desastre, mas, desde que um primeiro lê as muitas críticas na BBS, o comentário sobre a psicologia recente e fisiologia pode ser de interesse. Como Dennett, Churchland e tantos outros muitas vezes fazem, C não revela suas verdadeiras gemas até o fim, quando nos é dito que o Self, vontade, a consciência (nos sentidos em que estas palavras normalmente funcionam) são ilusões (supostamente no sentido normal desta palavra). Dennett teve que ser desmascarado por S, Hutto et al para explicar essas "superstições" (ou seja, não explicando em tudo e na verdade nem mesmo descrevendo), mas surpreendentemente C também admite que no início, embora, é claro, ele acha que ele está nos mostrando essas palavras fazer Não significa o que pensamos e que seu uso de desenhos animados é o válido. Deve-se também ver as críticas do Hacker de ciencia cognitiva com respostas de S e Dennett em "Neurociência e Filosofia" e bem explorado em livros de Hacker "Natureza Humana"(3 volumes) e "Fundamentos Filosóficos da Neurociência" (ver meus comentários de Human Nature V1). É notável que virtualmente ninguém em todas as disciplinas comportamentais (em que eu incluo a literatura, a história, a política, a religião, a lei, a arte etc. assim como os óbvios) indica nunca sua estrutura lógica ou o que é que estão tentando realizar e qual o papel da análise da linguagem e da ciência, de modo que todos os interessados em comportamento pode considerar a Memora adorável Resumo do hacker do que a filosofia (DPHOT) pretende fazer e como isso se relaciona com as atividades científicas. "Os epistemólogos tradicionais querem saber se o conhecimento é verdadeira crença e uma condição adicional..., ou se o conhecimento nem sequer implica crença... Queremos saber quando o conhecimento faz e quando não requer justificação. Precisamos ser claros o que é atribuído a uma pessoa quando se diz que ele sabe alguma coisa. É um estado mental distintivo, uma conquista, uma performance, uma disposição ou uma habilidade? Poderia saber ou acreditar que p ser idêntico com um estado do cérebro? Por que alguém pode dizer ' ele acredita que p, mas não é o caso que p ', enquanto que não se pode dizer ' eu acredito que p, mas não é o caso que p '? Por que existem maneiras, métodos e meios de conseguir, alcançar ou receber conhecimento, mas não crença (em oposição à fé)? Por que alguém pode saber, mas não acreditar quem, o que, qual, quando, se e como? Por que alguém pode acreditar, mas não saber, sinceramente, apaixonadamente, hesitantemente, tolamente, sem 153 pensar, fanaticamente, dogmaticamente ou razoavelmente? Por que alguém pode saber, mas não acreditar, algo perfeitamente bem, minuciosamente ou em detalhes? E assim por diante-através de muitas centenas de questões semelhantes pertinentes não só para o conhecimento e crença, mas também para duvidar, certeza, lembrando, esquecendo, observando, percebendo, reconhecendo, atendendo, estar ciente de, sendo consciente de, para não mencionar os numerosos verbos de percepção e seus cognatos. O que precisa ser esclarecido se essas questões devem ser respondidas é a teia de nossos conceitos epistêmicos, as formas em que os vários conceitos se unem, as várias formas de suas compatibilidades e incompatibilidades, seu ponto e propósito, sua pressuposições e diferentes formas de dependência de contexto. Para este exercício venerável na análise conectiva, o conhecimento científico, a psicologia, a neurociência e a ciência cognitiva autodenominada não podem contribuir com nada. " (Passando pela virada naturalista: em Quine ' s cul-de-SAC-P15-2005). Claro, gostaria de acrescentar que é o estudo de nossa psicologia evoluída, de DPHOT, e a sensibilidade contextual da linguagem (W ' s jogos de linguagem). Não é trivial para afirmar esses fatos, pois é muito raro encontrar alguém que agarra a imagem grande e até mesmo o meu herói, como Searle, Priest, Pinker, Read, etc. queda embaraçosamente curto quando tentam definir suas profissões. Há muito tempo foram livros sobre física atômica e química física, mas não há nenhum sinal de que os dois vão fundir (nem é uma idéia coerente), nem que a química irá absorver bioquímica nem que por sua vez, vai absorver a fisiologia ou a genética, nem que a biologia desapareça, nem que eliminará a psicologia, a sociologia, etc. Isso não se deve à "Juventude" dessas disciplinas, mas ao fato de serem diferentes níveis de descrição com conceitos, dados e mecanismos explicativos totalmente diferentes. Mas a inveja da física é poderosa, e nós simplesmente não podemos resistir à "precisão" da física, matemática, informação e computação versus a "vagueness" (imprecisão) de níveis mais altos. É "deve" ser possível. O reducionismo prospera apesar da incompreensibilidade (falta de aplicação à nossa escala normal de espaço, tempo e vida) da mecânica quântica, incerteza, onda/partículas, gatos vivos/mortos, emaranhamento quântico, e a incompletude e aleatoriedade algorítmica de matemática (Godel/Chaitin - Veja minha resenha de ' os limites exteriores da razão ' de Yanofsky) e sua atração irresistível nos diz que é devido a padrões EP. Mais uma vez, uma respiração de mal necessário ar fresco de W: "para a pureza cristalina da lógica foi, naturalmente, não um resultado da investigação: era uma exigência." PI P107. E mais uma vez W do livro azul-"filósofos constantemente ver o método da ciência diante de seus olhos, e são irresistivelmente tentado a perguntar e responder na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica, e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. " É difícil resistir a jogar para baixo a maioria dos livros sobre o comportamento e releitura W e S. Basta saltar de qualquer coisa para, por exemplo, estas citações de seu PI http://topologicalmedialab.net/Xinwei/classes/Readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94138_239-309. html. 154 Sugiro ver a questão da mente como essencialmente o mesmo que todas as perguntas "profundas" filosóficas. Queremos entender a "realidade" percebida pelo S1, mas S2 não é programado para ele. É tudo (ou principalmente) nas maquinações inconscientes de S1 via DNA. Nós não sabemos, mas o nosso DNA faz cortesia da morte de trilhões de organismos ao longo de cerca de 3.000.000.000 anos. Então, nós lutamos com a ciência e sempre tão lentamente descrever os mecanismos da mente (ou seja, do cérebro), sabendo que mesmo que devemos chegar ao conhecimento "completo" do cérebro, teríamos apenas uma descrição do que exato neuronal padrão corresponde a ver o vermelho ou fazer uma escolha e uma "explicação" de por que não é possível (não inteligível). É óbvio para mim depois de ler dezenas de milhares de páginas de filosofia que a tentativa de fazer uma psicologia descritiva de nível superior deste tipo, onde a linguagem comum se transforma em usos especiais, tanto deliberadamente como inadvertidamente, é essencialmente impossível (ou seja, a situação normal na filosofia e outras disciplinas comportamentais). Usando palavras de jargão especial (por exemplo, intensionalidade, realismo, etc.) não funciona tanto como não há polícia filosofia para impor uma definição estreita e os argumentos sobre o que eles significam são intermináveis. Hacker é bom, mas sua escrita tão precioso e denso é muitas vezes doloroso. Searle é muito bom, mas requer algum esforço para abraçar sua terminologia e eu acredito que ele faz alguns erros importantes, enquanto W é as mãos para baixo o mais claro e mais perspicaz, uma vez que você entender o que ele está fazendo, e ninguém nunca foi capaz de imitá-lo. Sua TLP continua a ser a última afirmação da visão reducionista mecânica da vida, mas mais tarde ele viu seu erro e diagnosticou e curou a "doença dos desenhos animados", mas poucos obter o ponto e mais simplesmente ignorá-lo e biologia também, e por isso há dezenas de milhares de livros e milhões de artigos e organizações mais religiosas e políticas (e até recentemente a maior parte da economia) e quase todas as pessoas com vistas de desenhos animados da vida. Mas o mundo não é um desenho animado, então uma grande tragédia está sendo jogado fora como a vista dos desenhos animados da vida colide com a realidade e cegueira universal e egoísmo trazer o colapso da civilização ao longo dos próximos dois séculos (ou menos). Eu hesito em recomendar os escritos de C para qualquer um, como o experiente deve ter sobre a mesma perspectiva que eu faço, e os ingênuos estarão desperdiçando seu tempo. Ou ler filosofia ou ciência cognitiva e evitar as amálgamas. Entre os livros intermináveis e artigos disponíveis, recomendo os 3 volumes sobre a natureza humana editado por Carruthers (sim, o mesmo), o 3 sobre a natureza humana escrito por Hacker, o Manual de Psicologia Evolutiva 2o Ed, e os meus comentários de W/S, Hutto, DMS, hacker et al. e os livros originais. Finalmente, eu sugiro que se aceitarmos a equação de W da linguagem e da mente e considerar o "problema da mente/corpo" como o "problema de linguagem/corpo" pode ajudar a alcançar seu objetivo terapêutico. 155 Será que Hominoids ou Androids Destroem a Terra? - uma revisão de Como Criar Uma Mente (How to Create a Mind) por Ray Kurzweil (2012) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Alguns anos atrás, cheguei ao ponto onde eu normalmente pode dizer a partir do título de um livro, ou pelo menos a partir dos títulos do capítulo, que tipos de erros filosóficos serão feitas e com que freqüência. No caso de obras nominalmente científicas, estas podem ser largamente restritas a certos capítulos que enceram filosóficos ou tentam tirar conclusões gerais sobre o significado ou significado a longo prazo do trabalho. Normalmente entretanto as matérias científicas do fato são misturado generosa com o jargão filosófico a respeito do que estes fatos significam. As distinções claras que Wittgenstein descreveu cerca de 80 anos atrás entre questões científicas e suas descrições por vários jogos de linguagem são raramente levados em consideração, e assim um é alternadamente impressionados pela ciência e desanimado por sua incoerente Análise. Assim é com este volume. Se alguém é para criar uma mente mais ou menos como a nossa, é preciso ter uma estrutura lógica para a racionalidade e uma compreensão dos dois sistemas de pensamento (teoria do processo dual). Se uma delas é filosofar sobre isso, é preciso entender a distinção entre questões científicas de fato e a questão filosófica de como a linguagem funciona no contexto em questão, e de como evitar as armadilhas do reducionismo e do cientismo, mas Kurzweil, como mais estudantes de comportamento, é em grande parte c sem noção. Ele está encantado com modelos, teorias e conceitos, e o impulso de explicar, enquanto Wittgenstein nos mostrou que só precisamos descrever, e que as teorias, conceitos etc, são apenas maneiras de usar a linguagem (jogos de linguagem) que têm valor apenas na medida em que eles têm uma clara teste (claro que os verdadeiros, ou como John Searle (crítico mais famoso da AI) gosta de dizer, claro condições de satisfação (COS)). Eu tentei fornecer um começo nisto em meus escritos recentes. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outros. 156 Além disso, como de costume em contas "factual" da ia/robótica, ele não dá tempo para as ameaças muito real para a nossa privacidade, segurança e até mesmo a sobrevivência do aumento da "androidização" da sociedade que é proeminente em outros autores (Bostrum, Musk, Hawking, etc.) e frequente em scifi e filmes, então eu faço alguns comentários sobre as ilusões utópicas bastante possivelmente suicidas de andróides ' agradáveis ', humanóides, inteligência artificial (AI), democracia, diversidade e engenharia genética. Eu tomo-o para concedido que os avanços técnicos na eletrônica, na robótica e no AI ocorrerão, tendo por resultado mudanças profundas na sociedade. No entanto, eu acho que as mudanças provenientes da engenharia genética são pelo menos tão grande e potencialmente muito maior, como eles vão nos permitir mudar totalmente quem somos. E será viável fazer superintelegente/super forte servos, modificando nossos genes ou os de outros macacos. Como com a outra tecnologia, todo o país que resistir será deixado para trás. Mas será que é socialmente e economicamente viável para implementar biobots ou superhumanos em uma escala maciça? E mesmo se assim for, não parece provável, economicamente ou socialmente, para evitar a destruição da civilização industrial por superpopulação, esgotamento de recursos, mudanças climáticas e, provavelmente, também a régua tirânico dos sete sociopatas que governam China. Assim, ignorando os erros filosóficos neste volume como irrelevante, e direcionando nossa atenção apenas para a ciência, o que temos aqui é outra ilusão utópica suicida enraizada em um fracasso para compreender a biologia básica, psicologia e ecologia humana, as mesmas ilusões que estão destruindo a América e o mundo. Vejo uma possibilidade remota de que o mundo pode ser salvo, mas não por AI/robótica, CRISPR, nem pelo Neomarxismo, diversidade e igualdade. Alguns anos atrás, cheguei ao ponto onde eu normalmente pode dizer a partir do título de um livro, ou pelo menos a partir dos títulos do capítulo, que tipos de erros filosóficos serão feitas e com que freqüência. No caso de obras nominalmente científicas, estas podem ser largamente restritas a certos capítulos que enceram filosóficos ou tentam tirar conclusões gerais sobre o significado ou significado a longo prazo do trabalho. Normalmente entretanto as matérias científicas do fato são interliga generosa com o jargão filosófico a respeito do que estes fatos significam. As distinções claras que Wittgenstein descreveu cerca de 80 anos atrás entre questões científicas e suas descrições por vários jogos de linguagem são raramente levados em consideração, e assim um é alternadamente impressionados pela ciência e desanimado por sua incoerente Análise. Então, é com este volume. Se alguém é para criar uma mente mais ou menos como a nossa, é preciso ter uma estrutura lógica para a racionalidade e uma compreensão dos dois sistemas de 157 pensamento (teoria do processo dual). Se uma delas é filosofar sobre isso, é preciso entender a distinção entre questões científicas de fato e a questão filosófica de como a linguagem funciona no contexto em questão, e de como evitar as armadilhas do reducionismo e do cientismo, mas Kurzweil, como mais estudantes de comportamento, é em grande parte sem nocao. Ele, é encantado por modelos, teorias e conceitos, e o impulso de explicar, enquanto Wittgenstein nos mostrou que só precisamos descrever, e que as teorias, conceitos etc., são apenas maneiras de usar a linguagem (jogos de linguagem) que têm valor apenas na medida em que eles têm uma clara teste (claro que os verdadeiros, ou como John Searle (crítico mais famoso da AI) gosta de dizer, claro condições de satisfação (COS)). Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna de dois sistemas consultar meu livro "a estrutura lógica da filosofia, da psicologia, do minuto d e da língua em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle ' 2o Ed (2019). Aqueles interessados em mais de meus escritos podem ver "Macacos falando--filosofia, psicologia, ciência, religião e política em um planeta condenado-artigos e revisões 2006-2019 3a Ed (2019) e ilusões utópicas suicidas no 21St Século 5a Ed (2019) y outros. Na verdade, 'redução' é um jogo de linguagem complexa ou grupo de jogos (usos de palavras com vários significados ou cos) para que seu uso varia muito dependendo do contexto e muitas vezes não é claro o que significa. Da mesma forma, com 'modelagem' ou ' simulando' ou 'equivalente a ' ou ' o mesmo que ' etc. Da mesma forma, com as reivindicações aqui e em todos os lugares que "computação" de processos biológicos ou mentais não é feito, como levaria muito tempo, mas não 'computavel ou 'calculável' significa muitas coisas, ou nada em tudo, dependendo do contexto, e isso geralmente é apenas totalmente ignorado. O capítulo 9 é o pesadelo típico que se espera. Minsky ' s primeira citação "Mentes são simplesmente o que os cérebros fazem" é um truísmo em que em alguns jogos pode, por exemplo, dizer ' meu cérebro está cansado ' etc., mas como a maioria ele não tem nenhum aperto em toda a linha entre as questões científicas e aqueles sobre como os jogos de linguagem são para ser PLA (como podemos usar a linguagem inteligivelmente). Descrições de comportamento não são as mesmas descrições dos processos cerebrais. Este "reducionismo" é uma visão irremediavelmente falida da vida, ele simplesmente não funciona, ou seja, não é coerente, e isso foi explicado longamente, primeiro por Wittgenstein e, posteriormente, por Searle, hacker e muitos outros. Para uma coisa, existem vários níveis de descrição (física, química, bioquímica, genética, neurofisiologia, cérebro, pensamento/comportamento) e os conceitos (jogos de linguagem) útil e inteligível (ter significado claro ou COS) em um nível de trabalho diferentemente em outro. Além disso, um ' estado mental ', ' disposição ' ou ' pensamento ' ou ' ação ', pode ser descrito em primeira pessoa ou terceira pessoa por muitas declarações e vice-versa, e uma declaração pode descrever muitos ' Estados mentais ', ' disposições "," pensamentos "ou" ações ", dependendo intrinsecamente no contexto, de modo que o jogo entre o comportamento ea linguagem é imensamente subdeterminada, mesmo para" simples "atos ou sentenças. e como 158 estes se tornam mais complexos há uma explosão combinatória. Hacker e outros já explicou isso muitas vezes. Não há nenhum significado desobstruído a descrever meu desejo ver o sol ajustado nos níveis mais baixos, e seu nunca será. Eles são diferentes níveis de descrição, diferentes conceitos (diferentes jogos de linguagem) e não se pode sequer fazer sentido de reduzir um para o outro, de comportamento em neurofisiologia em bioquímica em genética em química em física em matemática ou computação e como a maioria dos cientista Kurzweil's gestos insubstanciais e afirma que não é feito porque o seu inconveniente ou impraticável totalmente não vê que a questão real é que a "redução" não tem nenhum significado claro (COS), ou melhor, muitos significados, dependendo agudamente contexto, e em nenhum caso podemos dar uma conta coerente que elimina qualquer nível. No entanto, o cadáver apodrecendo do reducionismo flutua para a superfície freqüentemente (por exemplo, p37 e a citação Minsky em p199) e nos é dito que a química "reduz" a física e que a termodinâmica é uma ciência separada porque as equações se tornam "pesadas", mas uma outra maneira de dizer isto é que a redução é incoerente, os jogos da língua (conceitos) de um nível apenas não se aplicam (faça o sentido) em uns níveis mais elevados e mais baixos de descrição, e não é que nossa ciência ou nossa língua é inadequada. Tenho discutido isso em meus outros artigos e é bem conhecido na filosofia da ciência, mas é provável que nunca vai penetrar em "Hard Science" (Ciencia Dura). A psicologia do pensamento de ordem superior não é descritível por causas, mas por razões, e não se pode fazer a psicologia desaparecer em fisiologia nem fisiologia em bioquímica nem em física etc. Eles são apenas diferentes e indispensáveis níveis de descrição. Wittgenstein descreveu-o famosa 80 anos há no livro azul. "Nosso desejo de generalidade tem [como uma] fonte... nossa preocupação com o método da ciência. Refiro-me ao método de reduzir a explicação dos fenômenos naturais para o menor número possível de leis naturais primitivas; e, em matemática, de unificar o tratamento de diferentes temas usando uma generalização. Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos, e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica, e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. Eu quero dizer aqui que nunca pode ser nosso trabalho para reduzir qualquer coisa a qualquer coisa, ou para explicar qualquer coisa. A filosofia é realmente "puramente descritiva". Como quase todos os ' Hard ' cientistas e até mesmo tristemente ' suave ' queridos também, ele não tem nenhum entendimento em tudo de como funciona a linguagem, por exemplo, de como ' pensar ' e outros verbos psicológicos trabalho, de modo que os suprime constantemente ao longo de seus escritos (por exemplo, ver seus comentários sobre Searle em p170). Eu não vou entrar em uma explicação aqui como eu escrevi extensivamente sobre isso (Ilusões utópicas suicidas no século 21St 5a Ed (2019)). Assim, como a maioria dos cientistas, e até mesmo a maioria dos filósofos, ele 159 joga um jogo de linguagem (usa as palavras com um significado ou condição de satisfação), mas mistura-se com outros significados bastante diferentes, enquanto insistindo que seu jogo é o único que pode ser jogado ( tem qualquer sentido ' real '). Como a maioria, ele também não está claro sobre a distinção entre questões científicas de fato e as questões de como a linguagem pode ser usada inteligìvelmente. Além disso, ele não tem uma compreensão clara da distinção entre os dois sistemas de pensamento, as automaticidades do sistema não-linguístico S1 e as deliberações conscientes do sistema linguístico S2, mas eu descrevi este extensivamente em meus escritos e não o farão aqui. Outra coisa que Kurzweil nunca menciona é o fato óbvio de que haverá conflitos graves e provavelmente freqüentemente fatais com nossos robôs, ou seja, com a inteligência artifical. Basta pensar nos problemas diários contínuos que temos vivendo com outros seres humanos, sobre o número de assaltos, abusos e assassinatos todos os dias. Por que eles deveriam ser menos com andróides-e então quem assume a culpa? Não parece haver qualquer razão em tudo por que andróides/ai deve ser menos em conflito uns com os outros, e com a gente, do que os outros seres humanos já estão. E todos os dispositivos/funções/armas estão sendo virados para AI em um ritmo rápido. Em breve todos os sistemas de armas, comunicações, redes elétricas, atividades financeiras, sistemas médicos, veículos, dispositivos eletrônicos serão controlados por ia. Centenas de bilhões de dispositivos ' inteligentes ' conectados à Internet das coisas e apenas um punhado de programadores, mesmo possivelmente capaz de entendê-los ou controlá-los. Milhões de missles inteligentes, navios, submarinos, tanques, armas, satélites, drones em todo o mundo, programado para eliminar automaticamente ' inimigos ' e cada vez mais dominado por um maciço militar chinês Internacional gerido pelos sete sociopatas. Um hacker (ou AI desonestos) poderia paralisar ou ativar qualquer um deles a qualquer momento, e uma vez que os fogos de artifício começam, quem poderia pará-lo? Naturalmente, é os otimistas que esperam os sociopatas chineses governar o mundo quando os pessimistas (que vêem-se como realistas) esperam a sociopatia do IA (ou como como eu o chamo-isto é, estupidez artificial ou sociopatia artificial o mejor insanidade alienígena) para tomar sobre. É a opinião de muitas pessoas pensativas Elon Musk, Bill Gates, Stephen Hawking etc., incluindo os principais pesquisadores de ia (ver as muitas conversas TED no YouTube) que a ia vai atingir o crescimento explosivo auto (aumentando seu poder milhares ou milhões de vezes em dias, minutos ou microssegundos) em algum momento nas próximas décadas – 2030 às vezes é mencionado, escapando através da rede e infectando todos os computadores suficientemente poderosos. Como será imparável, especialmente porque parece que ele será executado em computadores quânticos que irá aumentar a sua velocidade mais milhares ou milhões de vezes, e como um efeito colateral adorável, será capaz de facilmente quebrar todos os esquemas de criptografia). Se você é optimista, manterá seres humanos e outros animais ao redor como animais de estimação e o mundo transformar-se-á um jardim zoológico com um programa de melhoramento cativo eugênica, se um pessimista, eliminará seres humanos ou mesmo toda a vida orgânica 160 como uma competição irritante para recursos. A ficção científica de hoje é susceptível de ser a realidade de amanhã. Asimov lei da robótica-não prejudicar os seres humanos, é uma fantasia que é inatingível na prática para andróides/IA assim como é para nós. Eu admito (como Searle tem muitas vezes) que somos ' androids ' também, embora projetado pela seleção natural, não ter ' inteligência ' de um ponto de vista, mas ter quase ilimitado ' inteligência ' de outro. O que é parar ai ter todas as doenças mentais que temos-neuroses, psicoses, sociopatias, egomania, ganância, desejo egoísta de produzir cópias infinitas de seu próprio ' genoma ' (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racismo (programism?), algo equivalente à toxicodependência, tendências homicida e suicida ou devemos apenas termo estes todos os "bugs biocidas"? Claro, os seres humanos vão tentar excluir mau comportamento dos programas, mas isso terá que ser após o fato, ou seja, quando ele já está disperso através da rede para milhões ou bilhões de dispositivos, e como eles vão ser auto programação e atualização, qualquer maldade que confere uma vantagem de sobrevivência deve se espalhar quase que instantaneamente. Este é, naturalmente, apenas o equivalente IA da evolução humana pela seleção natural (aptidão inclusiva). John Searle matou a idéia de AI forte com a sala chinesa e outras descrições da incoerência de vários jogos de linguagem (como Wittgenstein tinha feito soberbamente muito antes havia computadores, embora poucos tenham notado). Ele é considerado por alguns como o nemesis da AI, mas na verdade ele apenas descreveuo com precisão, e não tem nenhuma antipatia a ele em tudo. Searle disse repetidamente que, naturalmente, as máquinas podem pensar e sentir, pois somos tais máquinas! Feito das proteínas etc., e não do metal, mas das máquinas em um sentido muito fundamental não obstante. E máquinas que levaram cerca de 4.000.000.000 anos de experimentação em um laboratório do tamanho da terra com trilhões de trilhões de máquinas que estão sendo criados e apenas um pequeno número de sobreviventes mais bem sucedidos. Os esforços da ia parecem ou pelo menos robótica, até agora parecem triviais por comparação. E, como ele observa, é possível que muito ou toda a nossa psicologia pode ser única para os seres carnudos, assim como muito da IA pode ser as. Quanto pode ser 'true' (verdade) sobreposição e quanta simulação vaga é impossível dizer. Seleção darwiniana ou sobrevivência do mais apto como se aplica a ai é uma questão importante que nunca é abordada por Kurzweil, nem a maioria dos outros, mas é o tema de um livro inteiro pelo filósofo-cientista Nik Bostrum e de repetidas advertências por buraco negro físico e mais longo do mundo sobrevivente ALS sofredor Stephen Hawking. A seleção natural é principalmente equivalente a aptidão inclusiva ou favoritismo para parentes próximos (seleção de parentes). E compensação ' Seleção de grupo ' para ' gentileza' é ilusória (ver a minha revisão de Wilson o social da conquista da terra (2012)). Sim, nós não temos DNA e genes em robôs (ainda), mas no que é talvez o filósofo Daniel Dennett mais (só?) contribuição substantiva para a 161 filosofia, é útil considerar a aptidão inclusiva como o "ácido universal" que come através de todos os fantasias sobre evolução, natureza e sociedade. Assim, qualquer replicação automática android ou programa que tem mesmo a menor vantagem sobre os outros podem automaticamente eliminá-los e os seres humanos e todas as outras formas de vida, proteínas ou metal, que são concorrentes para os recursos, ou apenas para ' diversão ' , como o ser humano com outros animais. Exatamente o que impedirá programas do egoísmo em evolução e substituindo todas as outras máquinas/programas concorrentes ou formas de vida biológica? Se alguém leva a "singularidade" a sério, então por que não levar isso apenas a sério? Eu comentei sobre isso há muito tempo e é claro que é um grampo de ficção científica. Assim, ai é apenas a próxima etapa da seleção natural com os seres humanos acelerando-lo em certas direções até que eles são substituídos por suas criações, assim como as vantagens em nosso ' programa ' resultou na extinção de todas as outras subespécies hominóides e está rapidamente exterminando todas as outras formas de vida grandes (exceto, claro, aqueles que comemos e alguns animais degenerados, a maioria dos quais será comido como spreads de fome). Como de costume em contas "factual" de IA/robótica, Kurzweil não dá tempo para as ameaças muito real para a nossa privacidade, segurança e até mesmo a sobrevivência do aumento da "androidização" da sociedade, que são proeminentes em outros autores de não-ficção (Bostrum, Hawking etc.) e freqüentes em scifi e filmes. Requer pouca imaginação para ver este livro como apenas mais uma ilusão utópica suicida concentrando-se nos aspectos ' agradáveis ' de andróides, humanóides, democracia, computadores, tecnologia, diversidade étnica, e engenharia genética. É entretanto agradecimentos a estes que os últimos vestígios de nossa estabilidade/privacidade/segurança/prosperidade/tranquilidade/sanidade estão desaparecendo ràpida. Além disso, drones e veículos autônomos estão aumentando rapidamente em capacidades e caindo no custo, por isso não vai demorar muito antes de versões avançadas de ia são usadas para o crime, vigilância e espionagem por todos os níveis de governo, terroristas, ladrões, perseguidores, sequestradores e assassinos. Dada a sua foto, impressões digitais, nome, local de trabalho, endereço, telefone celular #, e-mails e chats, todos cada vez mais fácil de obter, energia solar ou autocarregável drones, microbots, e veículos serão capazes de realizar quase qualquer tipo de crime e, sem dúvida, em breve ser usado para espionagem, terrorismo e guerra. Vírus inteligentes continuarão a invadir o seu telefone, PC, Tablet, geladeira, carro, TV, leitor de música, monitores de saúde, andróides e sistemas de segurança para roubar seus dados, monitorar suas atividades, segui-lo, e se desejar, extorsão, seqüestrar ou matá-lo. Seu cristal claro que se os positivos vão acontecer, então os negativos também. É uma aposta que fará o maior mal os jihadistas, os Sete Sociopatas, os hackers ou nossos próprios programas, ou talvez todos juntos. Esse lado sombrio da IA / robótica / Internet das Coisas não é mencionado neste livro, e essa é a norma. Embora a idéia de robôs assumindo tem sido em scifi por muitos anos, eu comecei a pensar seriamente sobre isso quando eu li sobre nanobots em motores Drexler da 162 criação em 1993. E muitos se preocuparam com o problema ' grey goo ' (gosma cinza) - i. e., de nanobots replicando até que sufocar tudo o resto. Outra singularidade que Kurzweil e a maioria na IA não mencionam é a possibilidade de que a engenharia genética levará o DNA a substituir o silício como o meio para a inteligência avançada. O CRISPR e outras técnicas nos permitem alterar os genes à vontade, adicionando novos genes / cromossomos em meses ou até horas, com desenvolvimento super rápido de organismos ou cérebros em cubas sem corpos incômodos para sobrecarregá-los. Mesmo agora, sem a engenharia genética, há gênios precoces dominando a mecânica quântica no início da adolescência ou pegando o cubo de um número de 10 dígitos na cabeça. E a programação dos genes pode ser feita pelos mesmos computadores e programas usados na IA. Qualquer um que leva AI seriamente também pode encontrar de interesse meu artigo sobre o trabalho de David Wolpert sobre a lei final em teoria da máquina Turing, que sugere algumas facetas notáveis e limites para a computação e ' inteligência '. Eu escrevi porque seu trabalho de alguma forma escapou da atenção de toda a comunidade científica. Ele está prontamente disponível na net e no meu artigo "Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin e Wittgenstein sobre a impossibilidade, incompletude, o paradoxo mentiroso, teísmo, os limites da computação, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e os universo como computador - o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing' (2015). Para seu crédito, Kurzweil faz um esforço para entender Wittgenstein (p220 etc.), mas (como 50 milhões outros acadêmicos) tem apenas uma compreensão superficial do que ele fez. Antes que os computadores existissem, Wittgenstein discutido em profundidade as edições básicas de que a computação era e o que faz seres humanos distintos das máquinas, mas seus escritos neste são desconhecidos a maioria. Gefwert é um dos poucos a analisá-los em detalhe, mas seu trabalho tem sido largamente ignorado. Em p222 Kurzweil comenta que é ' tolo ' negar o ' mundo físico ' (um jogo de linguagem intrincado), mas é um pouco que não se pode dar qualquer sentido a tal negação, uma vez que pressupõe a inteligibilidade (realidade) do que ela nega. Esta é a questão sempre presente de como nós fazemos sentido de (são certos sobre) qualquer coisa, o que nos traz de volta ao famoso trabalho de Wittgenstein 'On Certainty' (En Certeza) (ver a minha revisão) e a noção da proposição ' true only ' (verdade só). Como todas as discussões de comportamento, Kurzweil precisa de uma estrutura lógica para a racionalidade (intencionalidade) e (o que é mais ou menos equivalente) uma compreensão completa de como a linguagem funciona, mas é quase totalmente ausente (reconhecidamente o norma para acadêmicos). Tanto do meu trabalho lida com essas questões que eu não vou entrar neles aqui, exceto para fornecer a tabela sumária de intencionalidade. Depois de meio século no esquecimento, a natureza da consciência é agora o tema mais quente nas ciências comportamentais e filosofia. Começando com o trabalho 163 pioneiro de Ludwig Wittgenstein na década de 1930 (os livros azul e marrom) para 1951, e dos anos 50 para o presente por seus sucessores Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc, eu criei o seguinte tabela como uma heurística para aprofundar este estudo. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR-Searle), do comportamento (LSB), da personalidade (LSP), da mente (LSM), da língua (LSL), da realidade (LSOR), do intentionalidad (LSI)-o termo filosófico classico, o psicologia descritivo da consciência (DPC), o descritivo Psicologia do pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, a linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. As idéias para esta tabela originaram no trabalho por Wittgenstein, uma tabela muito mais simples por Searle, e correlaciona-se com as tabelas e os gráficos extensivos nos três livros recentes na natureza humana pelo P. M. S. Hacker. As últimas 9 fileiras vêm principalmente da pesquisa da decisão por Johnathan St. B.T. Evans e colegas como revisado por mim mesmo. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Volition) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste "e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo). Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. 164 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 165 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação (COS) de S2 são muitas vezes referidos por Searle e outros como COS, representa mas ações, os verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designados como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka (também conhecido como) Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então 166 Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, temos esgotado o seu interesse, e tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastar mais longe da verdade. Ele nos mostrou que há apenas um problema filosófico - o uso de sentenças (jogos de linguagem) em um contexto inadequado e, portanto, apenas uma solução - mostrando o contexto correto. Em p 278 ele comenta sobre a nossa melhoria da vida e referências ' abundância ' por seu colega Diaminidis outra fantasia utópica, e menciona o recente trabalho de Pinker "os melhores anjos da nossa natureza: por que a violência diminuiu", mas não notar que estas melhorias são apenas temporária, e são comprados ao custo de destruir o futuro do nosso descendente. Como eu tenho revisto o livro de Pinker e comentou em detalhes sobre o colapso da América e do mundo em meu livro ' Suicide pela democracia ' 4 Ed (2019) eu não vou repeti-lo aqui. Todos os dias perdemos nao menos 100 milhões de toneladas de solo superficial no mar (ca.6 kg/pessoa/dia) e cerca de 20.000 hectares de terras agrícolas torna-se salinizaso e inútil. A água fresca está desaparecendo em muitas áreas e o aquecimento global diminuirá drasticamente a produção de alimentos, especialmente em muitos países do terceiro mundo e cada dia as mães do 3o mundo (o 1o mundo agora diminuindo diariamente) ' abençoa-nos com outro 300.000 ou assim bebês, levando a um aumento líquido de cerca de 200000-outro Las Vegas a cada 10 dias, outro los Angeles cada mês. Aproximadamente 3.000.000.000 mais por 2100, a maioria em África, a maioria do descanso em Ásia. Os muçulmanos famosa tolerantes provavelmente vão subir de cerca de 1/5th para cerca de 1/3 da terra e controlar inúmeras bombas hidrogênio e drones controlados por IA. Graças aos delírios sociais das poucas centenas de políticos que o controlam, o caso de amor da América com "diversidade" e "democracia" garantirá sua transformação em um 3o mundo infernal e o famosamente benevolente sete sociopatas que executam a China estão agora a tomar o centro do palco (olhar para a iniciativa de cinto e estrada, diplomacia armadilha da dívida e Tigre Agachado na net ou YouTube). O nível do mar é projetado para subir um a três metros por 2100 e algumas projeções são dez vezes maior. Não há dúvida de que, eventualmente, vai subir muito mais alto e cobrir grande parte do mundo de terras agrícolas e áreas mais populosamente povoadas. É igualmente desobstruído que o óleo e o gás natural e a boa qualidade fáceis começ o carvão serão idos, muita da terra descascada do solo superficial, todas as florestas ido, e pescar reduzido dramàtica. Gostaria de ver um relato plausível de como a ia vai consertar isso. Mesmo que teoricamente possível, a que custo em dinheiro e poluição e sofrimento social para criar e mantê-los? A segunda lei da termodinâmica e do resto da física, química e economia funciona para andróides, bem como hominoids. E quem vai forçar o mundo a cooperar quando a sua vida óbvia é um jogo de soma zero em que o seu ganho é a minha perda? Certamente não os jihadistas ou os sete sociopatas. Não há almoço grátis. Mesmo que os robôs pudessem fazer todas as tarefas humanas em breve não salvaria o mundo de constantes conflitos internacionais, fome, doença, 167 crime, violência e guerra. Quando eles não podem ser feitos para cooperar neste tempo limitado de abundância (comprado por estuprar a terra) é irremediavelmente ingênuo supor que eles vão fazê-lo quando a anarquia está varrendo o planeta. Eu tomo-o para concedido que os avanços técnicos na eletrônica, na robótica e no AI ocorrerão, tendo por resultado mudanças profundas na sociedade. No entanto, eu acho que as mudanças provenientes da engenharia genética são pelo menos tão grande e potencialmente muito maior, como eles vão nos permitir mudar totalmente quem somos. E será viável fazer super inteligente/super forte servos, modificando nossos genes ou os de outros macacos. Como com a outra tecnologia, todo o país que resistir será deixado para trás. Mas será que é socialmente e economicamente viável para implementar biobots ou superhumanos em uma escala maciça? E mesmo se assim for, não parece remotamente possível, economicamente ou socialmente para evitar o colapso da civilização industrial. Assim, ignorando os erros filosóficos neste volume como irrelevante, e direcionando nossa atenção apenas para a ciência, o que temos aqui é outra ilusão utópica suicida enraizada em um fracasso para compreender a biologia básica, psicologia e ecologia humana, as mesmas ilusões que estão destruindo a América e o mundo. Eu vejo uma possibilidade remota do mundo pode ser salvo, mas não por AI/robótica, CRISPR, nem pela democracia, diversidade e igualdade e eu acho que ele enormemente subestima o perigo colocado pela IA. 168 O que significa paraconsistente, indecível, aleatório, computável e incompleto?-Uma revisão da 'Godel's Way: exploits into an undecidable world' (Maneira de Godel: façanhas em um mundo indecidível) por Gregory Chaitin, Francisco A Doria, Newton C.A. da costa 160P (2012) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Em "Godel's Way", três cientistas eminentes discutem questões como a undecidability, incompletude, aleatoriedade, computabilidade e paraconsistência. Eu abordar estas questões do ponto de vista Wittgensteinian que existem duas questões básicas que têm soluções completamente diferentes. Há as questões científicas ou empíricas, que são fatos sobre o mundo que precisam ser investigados observacionalmente e questões filosóficas sobre como a linguagem pode ser usada inteligìvelmente (que incluem certas questões em matemática e lógica), que precisam ser decidido por olhar uma como nós realmente usar palavras em contextos específicos. Quando nós começ claros sobre que jogo da língua nós estamos jogando, estes tópicos são vistos para ser perguntas científicas e matemáticas ordinárias como qualquer outro. As idéias de Wittgenstein raramente foram igualadas e nunca ultrapassaram e são tão pertinentes hoje como eram 80 anos atrás, quando ele ditou os livros azul e marrom. Apesar de suas falhas-realmente uma série de notas em vez de um livro acabado-esta é uma fonte única do trabalho destes três estudiosos famosos que têm trabalhado nas bordas sangrantes da física, matemática e filosofia por mais de meio século. Da costa e Doria são citados por Wolpert (veja abaixo ou meus artigos sobre Wolpert e minha revisão de Yanofsky ' s "os limites exteriores da razão") desde que escreveu sobre a computação universal, e entre suas muitas realizações, da costa é um pioneiro em a paraconsistência. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. 169 Apesar de suas falhas-realmente uma série de notas em vez de um livro acabado-esta é uma fonte única do trabalho destes três estudiosos famosos que têm trabalhado nas bordas sangrantes da física, matemática e filosofia por mais de meio século. Da costa e Doria são citados por Wolpert (veja abaixo ou meus artigos sobre Wolpert e minha revisão de Yanofsky ' s "os limites exteriores da razão") desde que escreveu sobre a computação universal, e entre suas muitas realizações, da costa é um pioneiro na paraconsistência . A prova de Chaitin da aleatoriedade algorítmica da matemática (da qual os resultados de Godel são um corolário) e o número Omega são alguns dos resultados matemáticos mais famosos nos últimos 50 anos e ele os documentou em muitos livros e artigos. Seus coautores do Brasil são menos conhecidos apesar de suas muitas contribuições importantes. Para todos os tópicos aqui, a melhor maneira de obter artigos gratuitos e livros sobre a vanguarda é visitar arXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, CiteSeerx.ist.PSU.edu, philpapers.org, libgen.io ou b-ok.org, onde há milhões de preprints / artigos / livros em cada tópico (seja avisado que isso pode usar todo o seu tempo livre para o resto de sua vida!). Como os leitores de meus outros artigos estão cientes, em minha opinião há duas edições básicas que funcionam durante todo a filosofia e a ciência que têm soluções completamente diferentes. Há os assuntos científicos ou empíricos, que são fatos sobre o mundo que precisam de ser investigados observacionalmente, e questões filosóficas a respeito de como a língua pode ser usada inteligìvel, que precisam de ser decididas olhando como nós usamos realmente determinadas palavras no contextos específicos e como estes são alargados a novos usos em novos contextos. Infelizmente, não há quase nenhuma consciência de que estas são duas tarefas diferentes e por isso este trabalho, como toda a escrita científica que tem um aspecto "filosófico", mistura os dois com resultados infelizes. E então há cientificismo, que aqui podemos tomar como tentativa de tratar todas as questões como científicas e reducionismos que tentam tratá-los como física e/ou matemática. Desde que eu tenho notado em meus comentários de livros de Wittgenstein (W), Searle e outros, como uma compreensão da linguagem usada no que Searle chama a estrutura lógica da realidade (LSR) e eu chamo a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT), juntamente com o strutura processo duplo (os dois sistemas de pensamento) ajuda a esclarecer problemas filosóficos, não vou repetir as razões para essa visão aqui. Uma vez que os teoremas de Godel são corolários do teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedade algorítmica (incompletude) em toda a matemática (que é apenas mais um dos nossos sistemas simbólicos que podem resultar em ações testáveis públicas i .e., se significativo ele tem COS), parece inevitável que pensar (comportamento disposicional tendo COS) está cheio de afirmações e situações impossíveis, aleatórias ou incompletas. Uma vez que podemos ver cada um desses domínios como sistemas simbólicos evoluídos por acaso para fazer o nosso trabalho de psicologia, talvez deva ser considerado como surpreendente que eles não estão "completos". Para a 170 matemática, Chaitin diz que esta ' aleatoriedade ' (outro grupo de jogos de linguagem) mostra que existem teoremas ilimitados que são "verdadeiros", mas não prováveis-i. e., ' true ' para nenhuma ' razão '. Um deve então poder dizer que há umas indicações ilimitadas que façam o sentido "gramatical" perfeito que não descrevem as situações reais atingíveis nesse domínio. Eu sugiro que estes enigmas vão embora se considerarem a vista de W. Ele escreveu muitas notas sobre a questão do teoremas de Godel, e toda a sua obra diz respeito à plasticidade, "incompletude" e extrema sensibilidade ao contexto da linguagem, matemática e lógica, e os recentes papéis de Rodych, Floyd e Berto são a melhor introdução que eu conheço para W ' s observações sobre os fundamentos da matemática e assim a filosofia. Em relação a Godel e "incompletude", uma vez que a nossa psicologia como expressa em sistemas simbólicos como matemática e linguagem é "aleatório" ou "incompleto" e cheio de tarefas ou situações ("problemas") que têm sido comprovada impossível (ou seja, eles não têm solução-Veja abaixo) ou cuja natureza não é clara, parece inevitável que tudo derivado dele usando o pensamento de ordem superior (sistema 2 ou S2) para estender nossa psicologia axiomática inata (System 1 ou S1) em interações sociais complexas, como jogos, economia, física e matemática, será "incompleto" também. O primeiro destes no que é agora chamado de teoria de escolha social ou teoria da decisão (que são contínuos com o estudo da lógica e raciocínio e filosofia) foi o famoso Teorema de Kenneth Arrow 63 anos atrás, e tem havido muitos desde como o recente impossibilidade ou incompletude prova por Brandenburger e Kreisel (2006) na teoria de jogo de duas pessoas. Nestes casos, uma prova mostra que o que parece que uma escolha simples afirmou em inglês liso não tem nenhuma solução. Há também muitos famosos "paradoxos", como a bela adormecida (dissolvido por Rupert Read), o problema de Newcomb (dissolvido por Wolpert) e Doomsday, onde o que parece ser um problema muito simples ou não tem uma resposta clara, ou prova excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar. Existe uma montanha de literatura sobre os dois teoremas "incompletude" de Godel e o trabalho mais recente de Chaitin, mas acho que os escritos de W nos anos 30 e 40 são definitivos. Embora Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright e outros tenham feito um trabalho perspicaz em explicar W, é apenas recentemente que a análise de W única penetrante dos jogos de linguagem que está sendo jogado em matemática e lógica foram esclarecidos por Floyd (por exemplo, ' o argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-uma variação em cantor e Turing '), Berto (por exemplo, ' paradoxo de Godel e razões de Wittgenstein ', e ' Wittgenstein na incompletude faz sentido de Paraconsistent ', e Rodych (por exemplo, ' Wittgenstein e Godel: o Comentários recentemente publicados ' e ' mal-entendido Gödel: novos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein e novas observações de Wittgenstein '). Berto é um dos melhores filósofos recentes, e aqueles com tempo pode querer consultar seus muitos outros artigos e livros, incluindo o volume que ele coeditado em paraconsistência. O trabalho de Rodych é indispensável, mas apenas dois de uma dúzia de papéis são gratuitos on-line (mas veja b-ok.org, libgen.io e também sua enciclopédia on-line de Stanford de artigos de filosofia). 171 Berto observa que W também negou a coerência da metamathematicai. e., o uso por Godel de um metateorema para provar seu teorema, provavelmente representando a interpretação "notório" de W do teorema de Godel como um paradoxo, e se aceitarmos o argumento de W, acho que somos forçados a negar a inteligibilidade de metalinguagens, metateorias e meta qualquer outra coisa. Como pode ser que tais conceitos (palavras) como metamathematics, indecidibilidade e incompletitude, aceitos por milhões (e até mesmo reivindicado por nada menos do que Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentais sobre a nossa mente ou o universo) são apenas mal-entendidos simples sobre como funciona a linguagem? Não é a prova neste pudim que, como tantas noções "reveladoras" filosóficas (por exemplo, mente e vontade como ilusões a la Dennett, Carruthers, o Churchland etc.), eles não têm qualquer impacto prático? Berto resume-se bem: "dentro deste quadro, não é possível que a mesma sentença... acaba por ser expressível, mas indecidível, em um sistema formal... e comprovadamente verdadeiro (sob a hipótese de consistência acima mencionada) em um sistema diferente (o metasistema). Se, como Wittgenstein mantido, a prova estabelece o próprio significado da sentença provada, então não é possível para a mesma sentença (isto é, para uma sentença com o mesmo significado) ser indecidível em um sistema formal, mas decidido em um sistema diferente (o meta-sistema)... Wittgenstein teve que rejeitar tanto a idéia de que um sistema formal pode ser sintaticamente incompleto, e a conseqüência platônica que nenhum sistema formal provando apenas verdades aritméticas pode provar todas as verdades aritméticas. Se as provas estabelecerem o significado de sentenças aritméticas, então não pode haver sistemas incompletos, assim como não pode haver significados incompletos. " E ainda "aritmética inconsistente, ou seja, aritmética não clássica baseada em uma lógica paraconsistente, são hoje em dia uma realidade. O que é mais importante, as características teóricas de tais teorias correspondem precisamente com algumas das intuições Wittgensteinian acima mencionadas... Sua inconsistência lhes permite também escapar do primeiro teorema de Godel, e do resultado da indecidabilidade da igreja: eles são, isto é, demonstravelmente completos e decidíveis. Por conseguinte, cumprem precisamente o pedido de Wittgenstein, segundo o qual não podem existir problemas matemáticos que possam ser formulados de forma significativa no seio do sistema, mas que as regras do sistema não podem decidir. Assim, a decidabilidade de aritmética paraconsistente harmoniza com uma opinião Wittgenstein mantido ao longo sua carreira filosófica. " W também demonstrou o erro fatal em relação a matemática ou linguagem ou o nosso comportamento em geral como um sistema lógico coerente unitário ', em vez de como um heterogéneo de peças montadas pelos processos aleatórios de seleção natural. "Godel nos mostra uma inclareza no conceito de ' matemática ', que é indicado pelo fato de que a matemática é levada a ser um sistema" e podemos dizer (contra quase todos) que é tudo o que Godel e Chaitin show. W comentou muitas vezes que a "verdade" em matemática significa axiomas ou os teoremas derivados de axiomas, e ' falso ' significa que um cometeu um erro ao usar as definições (a partir do qual os resultados seguem necessariamente e algìmicamente), e isso é totalmente diferente do empírico questões em que se aplica um teste (os resultados são imprevisíveis e 172 discutíveis). W muitas vezes observou que para ser aceitável como a matemática no sentido usual, ele deve ser utilizável em outras provas e deve ter aplicações do mundo real, mas nem é o caso com a incompletude de Godel. Uma vez que não pode ser provado em um sistema consistente (aqui Peano aritmética, mas uma arena muito mais ampla para Chaitin), ele não pode ser usado em provas e, ao contrário de todo o ' resto ' da aritmética Peano, ele não pode ser usado no mundo real também. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sustenta que um cálculo formal é apenas um cálculo matemático (ou seja, um jogo de linguagem matemática) se ele tem uma aplicação extra sistêmica em um sistema de proposições contingentes (por exemplo, na contagem ordinária e medição ou na física)... " Outra maneira de dizer isso é que se precisa de um mandado para aplicar o nosso uso normal de palavras como ' prova ', ' proposição ', ' verdadeiro ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', e ' matemática ' para um resultado no emaranhado de jogos criados com ' números ' e ' mais ' e ' menos ' sinais etc, e com ' Incompletude ' este mandado está faltando. Rodych resume-se admiravelmente. "Na conta de Wittgenstein, não há tal coisa como um cálculo matemático incompleto porque" em matemática, tudo é algoritmo [e sintaxe] e nada é significado [semântica]... " W tem muito o mesmo a dizer da diagonalização de cantor e teoria dos conjuntos. "A consideração do procedimento diagonal decorado você que o conceito do" número real "tem muito menos analogia com o conceito" número cardinal "do que nós, sendo enganados por determinadas analogias, somos inclinados acreditar" e faz muitos outros comentários penetrantes (veja Rodych e Floyd). É claro que as mesmas observações se aplicam a todas as formas de lógica e qualquer outro sistema simbólico. Como Rodych, Berto e Priest (outro pioneiro na paraconsistência) observaram, W foi o primeiro (por várias décadas) a insistir na inevitável e utilidade da inconsistência (e discutiu esta questão com Turing durante suas aulas sobre os fundamentos da matemática). Vemos agora que os comentários depreciativos sobre as observações de W sobre a matemática feita por Godel, Kreisel, Dummett e muitos outros foram malconcebido. Como de costume, é uma péssima idéia apostar contra W. Alguns podem sentir que temos desviado do caminho aqui-depois de tudo em ' Godel ' s Way ' nós só queremos entender ' ciência ' e ' matemática ' (em citações porque parte do problema é sobre eles como "sistemas") e por que esses "paradoxos" e "inconsistências" surgem e como eliminá-los. Mas eu afirme que é exatamente o que eu fiz, apontando para o trabalho de W. Nossos sistemas simbólicos (linguagem, matemática, lógica, computação) têm um uso claro nos estreitos confins da vida cotidiana, no que podemos chamar frouxamente o Reino mesoscópico--o espaço e o tempo de eventos normais que podemos observar sem ajuda e com certeza (o axiomático inata bedrock ou background (fundo) como W e mais tarde Searle chamálo). Mas deixamos a coerência para trás quando entramos nos reinos da física de partículas ou o cosmos, a relatividade, a matemática além da simples adição e subtração com números inteiros, e a linguagem usada fora do contexto imediato dos acontecimentos cotidianos. As palavras ou frases inteiras podem ser as mesmas, mas o significado é perdido (ou seja, para usar o termo preferencial de Searle, suas 173 condições de satisfação (COS) são alteradas ou opacas). Parece-me que a melhor maneira de entender a filosofia pode ser para inseri-lo via Berto, Rodych e trabalho de Floyd em W, de modo a compreender as sutilezas da linguagem como é usado em matemática e depois disso "metafísico" questões de todos os tipos podem ser dissolvidos. Como observa Floyd "em certo sentido, Wittgenstein está literalizando o modelo de Turing, trazendo-o de volta para o cotidiano e tirando o aspecto antropomórfico do comando das metáforas de Turing". W apontou como em matemática, estamos presos em mais LG (jogos de linguagem), onde não é claro o que "verdadeiro", "completo", "segue de", " provável", "número", "infinito", etc., significa (ou seja, quais são os seus cos ou os verdadeiros fabricantes neste contexto), e, portanto, o que significado para anexar a "incompletude" e também para a "aleatoriedade algorítmica" de Chaitin. Como W observou com freqüência, fazer as "inconsistências" de matemática ou os resultados contra-intuitivos da metafísica causar problemas reais em matemática, física ou vida? Os casos aparentemente mais graves de afirmações contraditórias – por exemplo, na teoria dos conjuntos---há muito são conhecidos, mas a matemática continua de qualquer maneira. Do mesmo modo para o mentiroso incontável (auto-referencia) paradoxos na língua e no "incompletude" e "inconsistência" (grupos de LG complexo) da matemática também. É uma luta constante para ter em mente que diferentes contextos significam diferentes LG (significados, COS) para "tempo", "espaço", "partícula" "objeto", "dentro", "fora", "Next", "simultânea", "ocorrer", "acontecer", "evento", "pergunta", "resposta", "infinito", "passado" , "futuro", "problema", "lógica", "ontologia", "epistemologia", "solução", "paradoxo", "provar", "estranho", "normal", "experimento", "completo", "incontavel", "decidível", "dimensão", "completo", "fórmula", "processo", "algoritmo", "axioma", " matemática "," número "," física "," causa "," lugar "," mesmo "," movendo-se "," limite "," razão "," ainda "," real "" suposição "," crença "," saber "," evento "," recursivo "," meta-"," autorreferenciais "" continuar "," partícula "," onda "," sentença "e até mesmo (em alguns contextos) "e", "ou", "também", "Adicionar", "dividir", "se... Então "," segue "etc. Como observou W, a maior parte do que as pessoas (incluindo muitos filósofos e a maioria dos cientistas) têm a dizer quando a filosofia não é filosófica, mas a sua matéria-prima. Chaitin, Doria, e da costa juntam-se Yanofsky (Y), Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. em repetir os erros dos gregos com o jargão filosófico elegante misturado com a ciência. Sugiro antídotos rápidos através de meus comentários e alguns Rupert Read, como seus livros ' A Wittgensteinian Way com paradoxos ' e ' Wittgenstein entre as ciências ', ou ir para academia.edu e obter seus artigos, especialmente ' truque de Conjuração de Kripke ' e ' contra fatias de tempo ' e, em seguida, tanto de Searle como viável, mas pelo menos o seu mais recente, como "filosofia em um novo século", "filosofia Searle e filosofia chinesa", "fazer o mundo social" e "pensar sobre o mundo real" (ou pelo menos os meus comentários) e sua recente volume na percepção. Há sobre 100 Youtubes de Searle, que confirmam sua reputação como o melhor filósofo em pessoa (en vivo) 174 desde Wittgenstein. Uma grande sobreposição que agora existe (e está se expandindo rapidamente) entre os teóricos do jogo, físicos, economistas, matemáticos, filósofos, teóricos da decisão e outros, todos os quais têm vindo a publicar para décadas estreitamente relacionadas provas de indecidibilidade, impossibilidade, incomputabilidade, e incompletude. Um dos mais bizarros é a prova recente de Armando Assis que na formulação relativa do estado da mecânica quântica pode-se configurar um jogo de soma zero entre o universo e um observador usando o equilíbrio de Nash, a partir do qual siga a regra nascida e o colapso da função de onda. Godel foi o primeiro a demonstrar um resultado de impossibilidade e (até Chaitin e acima de tudo Wolpert ver o meu artigo sobre o seu trabalho) é o mais distante alcance (ou apenas trivial/incoerente), mas houve uma avalanche de outros. Como observado, um dos primeiros na teoria da decisão foi o famoso Teorema de impossibilidade geral (GIT) descoberto por Kenneth Arrow em 1951 (para o qual ele obteve o prêmio Nobel em economia em 1972-e cinco de seus alunos são agora laureados Nobel por isso não é ciência franja). Afirma, aproximadamente, que nenhum sistema de votação razoavelmente consistente e justo (ou seja, nenhum método de agregação das preferências dos indivíduos em preferências de grupo) pode dar resultados sensíveis. O grupo é dominado por uma pessoa e assim o GIT é muitas vezes chamado de "teorema do ditador", ou há preferências intransitivas. O papel original de Arrow foi intitulado "uma dificuldade no conceito de previdência social" e pode ser declarado assim: "é impossível formular uma ordenação de preferência social que satisfaça todas as seguintes condições: Nãoditadura; Soberania individual; Unanimidade Liberdade de alternativas irrelevantes; Singularidade do Rank do grupo. " Aqueles familiarizados com a teoria da decisão moderna aceitar isso e os muitos relacionados teoremas restringir como seus pontos de partida. Aqueles que não são podem encontrá-lo (e todos esses teoremas) incrível e, nesse caso, eles precisam encontrar um caminho de carreira que não tem nada a ver com qualquer uma das disciplinas acima. Veja "o teorema da impossibilidade de seta" (2014) ou "tomada de decisão e imperfeição" (2013) entre legiões de publicações. Um outro resultado famoso recente da impossibilidade é aquele de Brandenburger e de Keisler (2006) para dois jogos da pessoa (mas naturalmente não limitado aos "jogos" e como todos estes resultados da impossibilidade aplica-se amplamente às decisões de qualquer tipo), que mostra que todo o modelo da crença de um certo tipo leva a contradições. Uma interpretação do resultado é que, se as ferramentas do analista de decisão (basicamente apenas lógica) estão disponíveis para os jogadores em um jogo, então há declarações ou crenças que os jogadores podem escrever para baixo ou "pensar", mas não pode realmente segurar. Mas observe a caracterização de W de "pensar" como uma ação potencial com COS, que diz que eles realmente não têm um significado (uso), como a infinidade de Chaitin de fórmulas aparentemente bem formadas que realmente não pertencem ao nosso sistema de matemática. "Ann acredita que Bob assume que Ann acredita que a suposição de Bob é errado" parece inexceptível e múltiplas camadas de ' recursão ' (outro LG) foram assumidos na 175 argumentação, linguística, filosofia, etc., por um século, pelo menos, mas B & K mostrou que é impossível para Ann e Bob assumir essas crenças. E há um corpo em rápido crescimento de tais resultados impossibilidade para uma pessoa ou situações de decisão multiplayer (por exemplo, eles classificam em Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel e Rosser etc.). Para um bom papel técnico de entre a avalanche sobre o paradoxo B & K, obter Abramsky e Zvesper de papel de arXiv que nos leva de volta para o paradoxo do mentiroso e do cantor infinito (como o seu título observa que é sobre "formas interativas de diagonalização e auto-referência ") e, assim, a Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W e Godel. Muitos desses trabalhos citam o papel de Yanofsky (Y) "uma abordagem universal aos paradoxos e pontos fixos autoreferenciais. Boletim de lógica simbólica, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (um polímata que é entre outras coisas um pioneiro na computação quântica) é um amigo de y e assim que y contribui um papel ao Festschrift recente a ele ' computação, lógica, jogos e fundações do Quantum ' (2013). Para talvez o melhor recente (2013) comentário sobre o BK e paradoxos relacionados ver o 165p PowerPoint palestra livre na net por Wes Holliday e Eric Pacuit ' dez enigmas e paradoxos sobre o conhecimento e crença '. Para uma boa pesquisa com vários autores, consulte "tomada de decisão coletiva (2010). Uma das principais omissões de todos esses livros é o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, que provou alguma impossibilidade deslumbrante ou teoremas de incompletude (1992 a 2008-ver arxiv.org) sobre os limites para inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo fazendo a computação, e até mesmo independente das leis da física, então eles se aplicam em computadores, física e comportamento humano, que ele resumiu assim: "não se pode construir um computador físico que pode ser assegurado de processar corretamente a informação mais rapidamente do que o universo faz. Os resultados também significam que não pode existir um aparelho de observação infalível, de uso geral, e que não pode haver um aparelho de controle infalível, de uso geral. Estes resultados não dependem de sistemas que são infinitos, e/ou não-clássicos, e/ou obedecem dinâmicas caóticas. Eles também se mantêm mesmo se um usa um computador infinitamente rápido, infinitamente denso, com poderes computacionais maiores do que o de uma máquina de Turing. " Ele também publicou o que parece ser o primeiro trabalho sério em equipe ou inteligência coletiva (COIN), que ele diz que coloca este assunto em um fundamento científico sólida. Embora ele tenha publicado várias versões dessas provas ao longo de duas décadas em alguns dos mais prestigiados revistas de física revisada por pares (por exemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), bem como em revistas da NASA e tem chegado itens de notícias em grandes revistas científicas, poucos parecem ter notado, e eu olhei em dezenas de livros recentes sobre física, matemática, teoria da decisão e computação sem encontrar uma referência. O aperto presciente de W destas edições, includindo seu abraço do finitismo estrito e do paraconsistencia, está espalhando finalmente com a matemática, a lógica e a informática (embora raramente com todo o reconhecimento). Bremer sugeriu 176 recentemente a necessidade de um teorema de Lowenheim-Skolem Paraconsistent. "Qualquer teoria matemática apresentada na lógica de primeira ordem tem um modelo paraconsistente finito." Berto continua: "é claro que o finitismo rigoroso e a insistência na decidabilidade de qualquer questão matemática significativa vão de mãos dadas. Como Rodych comentou, a visão intermediária de Wittgenstein é dominada por seu "finitismo e sua visão [...] de significância matemática como decidabilidade algorítmico", segundo o qual ' [apenas] somas e produtos lógicos finitos (contendo apenas decidível predicados aritméticos) são significativos porque são algoritmicamente decidivel. ' ". Em termos modernos, isso significa que eles têm condições públicas de satisfação (COS)-ou seja, pode ser declarado como uma proposição que é verdadeira ou falsa. E isso nos leva à visão de W que, finalmente, tudo em matemática e lógica repousa sobre a nossa inata (embora, naturalmente, extensível) capacidade de reconhecer uma prova válida. Berto novamente: "Wittgenstein acreditava que o ingênuo (ou seja, o matemático de trabalho) noção de prova tinha que ser decidível, por falta de decidibilidade significava para ele simplesmente falta de significado matemático: Wittgenstein acreditava que tudo tinha que ser decidível em matemática... É claro que se pode falar contra a decidabilidade da noção ingênua de verdade, com base nos resultados de Godel-se. Mas pode-se argumentar que, no contexto, isso iria implorar a pergunta contra os paraconsistentistas e contra Wittgenstein também. Ambos Wittgenstein e os paraconsistentistas em um lado, e os seguidores da vista padrão no outro, concordam no seguinte tesis: o decidibilidade da noção da prova e de sua inconsistência é incompatível. Mas, para inferir a partir disso, que a noção ingênua de prova não é decidível invoca a indispensabilidade de consistência, que é exatamente o que Wittgenstein e o argumento paraconsistente chamar em questão... para como Victor Rodych argumentou vigorosamente, a consistência do sistema relevante é precisamente o que é posta em causa pelo raciocínio de Wittgenstein. " E assim: "Portanto, a aritmética inconsistente evita o primeiro teorema de incompletude de Godel. Ele também evita o segundo teorema no sentido de que sua não-trivialidade pode ser estabelecida dentro da teoria: e teorema de Tarski também-incluindo o seu próprio predicado não é um problema para uma teoria inconsistente "[como Graham Priest observou mais de 20 anos atrás]. Isso traz à mente o famoso comentário de W. "O que estamos ' tentados a dizer ' em tal caso é, naturalmente, não filosofia, mas é a sua matéria-prima. Assim, por exemplo, o que um matemático está inclinado a dizer sobre a objetividade e realidade dos fatos matemáticos, não é uma filosofia da matemática, mas algo para o tratamento filosófico. " PI 234 E novamente, ' decidabilidade' resume-se à capacidade de reconhecer uma prova válida, que repousa sobre a nossa psicologia axiomática inata, que a matemática e a lógica têm em comum com a linguagem. E isso não é apenas um problema histórico remoto, mas é totalmente atual. Eu li muito de Chaitin e nunca vi uma sugestão de que ele considerou essas questões. O trabalho de Douglas Hofstadter também vem à mente. Seu Godel, Escher, Bach ganhou um prêmio Pulitzer e um prêmio de livro 177 nacional de ciência, vendeu milhões de cópias e continua a receber boas críticas (por exemplo, quase 400 principalmente 5 estrelas comentários na Amazônia até à data), mas ele não tem nenhuma pista sobre as questões reais e repete o erros filosóficos clássicos em quase todas as páginas. Seus escritos filosóficos subsequentes não melhoraram (ele escolheu Dennett como sua musa), mas, como essas visões são vacuosas e desconectadas à vida real, ele continua a fazer uma excelente ciência. Mais uma vez, note que "infinito", "computação", "informação", etc., só têm significado em contextos humanos específicos - isto é, como Searle tem enfatizado, eles são todos observador relativo ou atribuído vs intrinsecamente intencional. O universo aparte de nossa psicologia não é finito nem infinito e não pode computar nem processar qualquer coisa. Somente em nossos jogos de linguagem fazer o nosso laptop ou o universo computar. W observou que quando chegamos ao fim do comentário científico, o problema tornase um filosófico, ou seja, um de como a linguagem pode ser usada inteligìvelmente. Virtualmente todos os cientistas e a maioria de filósofos, não começ que há dois tipos distintos de "perguntas" ou " asserções" (ambas as famílias de jogos da língua). Há aqueles que são questões de fato sobre como o mundo é-ou seja, eles são publicamente observáveis proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso) Estados de assuntos que têm significados claros (COS)-ou seja, declarações científicas, e, em seguida, há aqueles que são questões sobre como a linguagem pode ser usado de forma coerente para descrever esses Estados de assuntos, e estes podem ser respondidas por qualquer pessoa sã, inteligente, alfabetizada com pouco ou nenhum recurso para os fatos da ciência, embora, claro, há casos limítrofes onde temos de decidir. Outro fato pouco compreendido mas crítico é que, embora o pensamento, representando, inferindo, entendendo, intuindo etc. (ou seja, a psicologia disposicional) de uma afirmação verdadeira ou falsa é uma função da cognição de ordem superior do nosso lento, consciente sistema 2 (S2), a decisão sobre se "partículas" estão emaranhados, a estrela mostra uma mudança vermelha, um teorema foi provado (ou seja, a parte que envolve ver que os símbolos são usados corretamente em cada linha da prova), é sempre feita pelo jejum , automático, inconsciente sistema 1 (S1) via ver, ouvir, tocar etc. em que não há processamento de informações, nenhuma representação (ou seja, não COS) e nenhuma decisão no sentido em que estes acontecem em S2 (que recebe suas entradas de S1). Esta aproximação de dois sistemas é agora uma maneira padrão de ver o raciocínio ou a racionalidade e é uma heurística crucial na descrição do comportamento, de que a ciência e a matemática são casos especiais. Há uma literatura enorme e ràpida crescente no raciocínio que é indispensável ao estudo do comportamento ou da ciência. Um livro recente que escava os detalhes de como nós realmente raciocinar (ou seja, usar a linguagem para realizar ações - ver W e S) é ' raciocínio humano e ciência cognitiva ' por Stenning e Van Lambalgen (2008), que, apesar de suas limitações (por exemplo, a compreensão limitada de W /S e a ampla estrutura de psicologia intencional), é (a partir do início de 2015) a melhor fonte única que eu conheço. Há intermináveis livros e papéis sobre o raciocínio, teoria da decisão, teoria do jogo, etc., 178 e muitas variantes de e algumas alternativas para a estrutura de dois sistemas, mas eu sou um de um número rapidamente crescente que encontrar a estrutura simples S1/S2 o melhor para a maioria das situações. O melhor livro recente sobre a razão da abordagem de sistemas duplos é dual-processo teorias da mente social (2014) editado por Sherman et al. e Manktelow et al ' a ciência da razão ' (2011) também é indispensável. O que só agora vem à tona, depois de milênios de discussão de raciocínio em filosofia, psicologia, lógica, matemática, economia, Sociologia etc., é o estudo da maneira real em que usamos palavras como e," Mas, ou, significa, significa, implica, não ', e acima de tudo ' se ' (o ser condicional o assunto de mais de 50 papéis e um livro (' If ') por Evans, um dos principais pesquisadores nesta arena. Claro, Wittgenstein entendeu as questões básicas aqui, provavelmente melhor do que ninguém até hoje, e estabeleceu os fatos que começam mais claramente com o livros azuis e marrons a partir dos anos 30 e terminando com o soberbo ' En Certeza ' (que pode ser visto como uma dissertação sobre o que agora são chamados de dois sistemas de pensamento), mas, infelizmente, a maioria dos alunos de comportamento não tem uma pista sobre o seu trabalho. O livro de Yanofsky (Os Limites Exteriores da Razão) é um tratamento prolongado destas edições, mas com pouca introspecção filosófica. Ele diz que a matemática é livre de contradições, mas como observado, tem sido bem conhecido por mais de meio século que a lógica ea matemática estão cheias deles-apenas inconsistência Google em matemática ou pesquisá-lo na Amazônia ou ver as obras de Priest, Berto ou o artigo de Weber na Internet Enciclopedia de Filosofia. W foi o primeiro a prever inconsistência ou paraconsistência, e se seguirmos Berto podemos interpretar isso como sugestão de W para evitar a incompletude. Em qualquer caso, a paraconsistência é agora uma característica comum e um grande programa de pesquisa em geometria, teoria dos conjuntos, aritmética, análise, lógica e ciência da computação. Y em p346 diz que a razão deve ser livre de contradições, mas é claro que "livre de" tem usos diferentes e eles surgem com freqüência na vida cotidiana, mas temos mecanismos inatos para contê-los. Isto é verdadeiro porque era o caso em nossa vida diária muito antes da matemática e da ciência. Até muito recentemente só W viu que era inevitável que a nossa vida e todos os nossos sistemas simbólicos são paraconsistentes e que se dá muito bem como temos mecanismos para encapsulá-lo ou evitá-lo. W tentou explicar isso a Turing em suas palestras sobre os fundamentos da matemática, dada em Cambridge, ao mesmo tempo como curso de Turing sobre o mesmo tema. Agora eu vou fazer alguns comentários sobre itens específicos no livro. Como observado em P13, o teorema do arroz mostra a impossibilidade de um antivírus universal para computadores (e talvez para organismos vivos também) e assim é, como o teorema de parada de Turing, outra declaração alternativa de teoremas de Godel, mas ao contrário de Turing, é raramente mencionado. Em P33 a discussão da relação da compressibilidade, da estrutura, do aleatoriedade etc. é indicada muito melhor em muitos outros livros e papéis de Chaitin. Também de 179 importância fundamental é o comentário de Weyl sobre o fato de que se pode "provar" ou "derivar" qualquer coisa de qualquer outra coisa se permite arbitrariamente ' complexo ' ' equações ' (com arbitrária ' constantes '), mas há pouca consciência disso entre os cientistas ou Filósofos. Como W disse que precisamos olhar para o papel que qualquer declaração, equação, prova lógica ou matemática desempenha em nossa vida, a fim de discernir o seu significado, uma vez que não há limite para o que podemos escrever, dizer ou "provar", mas apenas um pequeno subconjunto destes tem um uso. ' Chaos ', ' complexidade ', ' lei ', ' estrutura ', ' teorema ', ' equação ', ' prova ', ' resultado ', ' aleatoriedade ', ' compressibilidade ' etc. são todas as famílias de jogos de linguagem com significados (COS) que variam muito, e deve-se olhar para o seu papel preciso no contexto dado. Isso raramente é feito de forma sistemática deliberada, com resultados desastrosos. Como Searle observa repetidamente, essas palavras têm intencionalidade intrínseca apenas relevante para a ação humana e bastante diferentes (atribuídos) significados de outra forma. É apenas a intencionalidade atribuída derivada de nossa psicologia quando dizemos que um termômetro ' diz ' a temperatura ou um computador é ' Computação ' ou uma equação é uma ' prova '. Como é típico na discussão científica sobre estes temas, os comentários sobre p36 (em Omega e matemática quasi-empírica) e em grande parte do livro cruzar a linha entre a ciência e a filosofia. Embora haja uma grande literatura sobre a filosofia da matemática, até agora asI saber, ainda não há melhor análise do que a de W, não só em seus comentários publicados como "observações sobre as fundações da matemática" e "palestras sobre as fundações de Matemática ', mas ao longo das 20.000 páginas de seu coleção (aguardando uma nova edição em cdrom de OUP ca. 2020 mas muito online agora-ver, por exemplo, Pichler http://wab.uib.no/Alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Matemática, como lógica, linguagem, arte, artefactos e música só tem um significado (uso ou COS em um contexto) quando conectado à vida por palavras ou práticas. Da mesma forma, em P54 e segs. foi W quem nos deu a primeira e melhor justificativa para a paraconsistência, muito antes que alguém realmente trabalhou uma lógica paraconsistente. Mais uma vez, como W apontou muitas vezes, é fundamental estar ciente de que nem tudo é um "problema", "pergunta", "resposta", "prova" ou uma "solução" no mesmo sentido e aceitar algo como um ou outro comete um a um muitas vezes confuso ponto de vista. Na discussão da física em P108-9 devemos nos lembrar que ' ponto ', ' energia ', ' espaço ', ' tempo ', ' infinito ', ' Início ', ' fim ', ' partícula ', ' onda ', ' Quantum ' etc. são todos os jogos de linguagem típicos que nos seduzem em visões incoerentes de como as coisas são por aplicando significados (COS) de um jogo a um completamente diferente. Então, este livro é um diamante defeituoso com muito valor, e espero que os autores são capazes de rever e ampliá-lo. Ele faz o erro quase universal e fatal de respeito à ciência, especialmente matemática, lógica e física, como se fossem sistemas - i. e., 180 domínios onde "número", "espaço", "tempo", "prova", "evento", "ponto", "ocorre", "força", "fórmula" etc. pode ser usado ao longo de seus "processos" e "Estados" sem mudanças de significado - i. e., sem alterar as condições de satisfação, que são testes publicamente observáveis de verdade ou falsidade. E quando é um problema quase insuperável para tais pessoas verdadeiramente inteligentes e experientes como os autores, que chance o resto de nós tem? Recordemos o comentário de W sobre este erro fatal. "A primeira etapa é aquela que escapa completamente a observação. Falamos de processos e Estados e deixamos sua natureza indeciso. Em algum momento talvez nós saberemos mais sobre eles - pensamos. Mas isso é apenas o que nos compromete a uma maneira particular de olhar para o assunto. Pois temos um conceito definitivo do que significa aprender a conhecer melhor um processo. (O movimento decisivo no truque de Conjuração foi feito, e foi o mesmo que pensávamos bastante inocente.) " PI P308 Enquanto escrevia este artigo eu vim sobre Dennett ' s infame ' condenado com elogios fracos ' Resumo da importância de W, que ele foi convidado a escrever quando a revista Time, com perspicácia surpreendente, escolher Wittgenstein como uma das 100 pessoas mais importantes do século 20. Como com seus outros escritos, ele mostra sua completa falha em compreender a natureza do trabalho de W (ou seja, de filosofia) e me lembra de outro comentário W famoso que é pertinente aqui. "Aqui nós chegamos a um fenômeno notável e característico na investigação filosófica: a dificuldade---eu poderia dizer---não é a de encontrar a solução, mas sim a de reconhecer como a solução algo que parece que era apenas um preliminar a ele. Já dissemos tudo. Não---nada que se segue a partir deste, não esta em si é a solução! .... Isto está ligado, creio eu, com o nosso erroneamente esperando uma explicação, enquanto a solução da dificuldade é uma descrição, se lhe damos o lugar certo em nossas considerações. Se nos debruçar sobre ele, e não tentar ir além dele. Zettel p312-314 Chaitin é um americano e seus muitos livros e artigos são bem conhecidos e fáceis de encontrar, mas da Costa (que é 89) e Doria (79) são brasileiros e a maior parte do trabalho da costa é apenas em Português, mas Doria tem muitos itens em inglês. Você pode encontrar uma bibliografia parcial para Doria aqui http://www.Math.Buffalo.edu/Mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html e, claro, ver seus wikis. As melhores coleções de seu trabalho estão em caos, computadores, jogos e tempo: um quarto de século de trabalho conjunto com Newton da costa por F. Doria 132P (2011), sobre as fundações da ciência por da costa e Doria 294p (2008), e Metamathematica da Ciência por da Costa e Doria 216p (1997), mas foram publicados no Brasil e quase impossíveis de encontrar. Você provavelmente terá que obtê-los através de empréstimo entre bibliotecas ou como arquivos digitais dos autores, mas como sempre tentar libgen.io e b-ok.org. 181 Há um Festschrift agradável na honra de Newton C.A. da costa na ocasião de seu septuagésima aniversário editado por Décio Krause, Steven francês, Francisco Antonio Doria.(2000) que é uma questão de Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1-2 (2000), também publicado como um livro, mas o livro está em apenas 5 bibliotecas em todo o mundo e não na Amazônia. Veja também Doria (Ed.), "os limites da modelagem matemática nas ciências sociais: o significado do fenômeno da incompletude de Godel" (2017) e Wuppuluri e Doria (EDS.), "o mapa e o território: explorando as fundações da ciência, do pensamento e realidade "(2018). Outro item relevante são as novas tendências nos fundamentos da ciência: trabalhos dedicados ao 80 o aniversário de Patrick Suppes, apresentado em Florianópolis, Brasil, abril 22-23, 2002 por Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; Newton C da costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), que é Vol. 154 # 3 de Synthese, mas novamente o livro está em apenas 2 bibliotecas e não na Amazônia. Estudos brasileiros em pHilosophy e história da ciência: relato de obras recentes de decio Krause; Antônio Augusto passos videira; tem um artigo por cada um deles e é um livro caro, mas barato no Kindle. Embora seja uma década de idade, alguns podem estar interessados em "são as fundações da ciência da computação lógicadependente?" por Carnielli e Doria, que diz que a teoria da máquina de Turing (TMT) pode ser visto como "aritmética disfarçada", em particular como a teoria da Diophantine Equações em que formalizá-lo, e concluir que "ciência da computação axiomatizada é lógica-dependente". É claro que, como Wittgensteinians, queremos olhar com muito cuidado para os jogos de linguagem (ou jogos de matemática), ou seja, as condições precisas de satisfação (verdadeiros responsáveis) resultantes do uso de cada uma dessas palavras (ou seja, ' axiomatizado ', ' computador ciência ", e" dependente da lógica "). Carnielli e Agudello também formalizam TMT em termos de lógica paraconsistente, criando um modelo para máquinas de Turing paraconsistentes (PTM ' s) que tem semelhanças com a computação quântica e assim com uma interpretação quantica de que eles criam uma máquina de Turing Quantum modelo com o qual eles resolvem os problemas Deutsch e Deutsch-Lozsa. Isso permite que instruções contraditórias sejam executadas e armazenadas simultaneamente e cada célula de fita, quando e se a parada ocorrer, pode ter vários símbolos, cada um dos quais representa uma saída, permitindo assim o controle de unicidade versus condições de multiplicidade, que simulam algoritmos quânticos, preservando a eficiência. Doria e da costa também provaram (1991) que a teoria do caos é indecidível, e quando adequadamente axiomatizada dentro da teoria dos conjuntos clássicos, está incompleta no sentido de Gödel. 182 Os artigos, e especialmente a discussão em grupo com Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al no final de Zenil H. (Ed.) ' aleatoriedade através da computação ' (2011) é uma continuação estimulante de muitos dos tópicos aqui, mas, novamente, falta de consciência do filosófico problemas, e muitas vezes faltando o ponto. Chaitin também contribui para ' causalidade, complexidade significativa e cognição incorporada ' (2010), repleto de artigos com a mistura usual de discernimento científico e incoerência filosófica, e como de costume ninguém está ciente de que Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) forneceu insights profundos e insuperáveis sobre as questões há mais de meio século atrás, incluindo a cognição incorporada (enativismo). Finalmente, gostaria de mencionar o trabalho do físico/filósofo Nancy Cartwright cujos escritos sobre o significado de "leis" naturais e "causação" são indispensáveis para qualquer pessoa interessada nestes temas. 183 Wolpert, Chaitin e Wittgenstein em impossibilidade, incompletude, o paradoxo do mentiroso, o teísmo, os limites da computação, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e o universo como computador - o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing (revisado 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Eu li muitas discussões recentes sobre os limites da computação e do universo como computador, na esperança de encontrar alguns comentários sobre o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, mas não encontrei uma única citação e assim que eu apresento este muito breve Resumo. Wolpert provou alguma impossibilidade impressionante ou teoremas da incompletude (1992 a 2008-Veja arxiv.org) nos limites à inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo que faz a computação, e mesmo independente das leis da física, para que eles se apliquem em computadores, física e comportamento humano. Eles fazem uso da diagonalização de cantor, o paradoxo mentiroso e worldlines (linhas do mundo) para fornecer o que pode ser o teorema final na teoria da máquina de Turing, e, aparentemente, fornecer insights sobre a impossibilidade, incompletude, os limites da computação, e do universo como computador, em todos os universos possíveis e todos os seres ou mecanismos, gerando, entre outras coisas, um princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica e uma prova de monoteísmo. Há umas conexões óbvias ao trabalho clássico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e à noção que nenhum programa (e assim nenhum dispositivo) pode gerar uma seqüência (ou dispositivo) com maior complexidade do que possui. Pode-se dizer que este corpo de trabalho implica ateísmo, uma vez que não pode haver qualquer entidade mais complexa do que o universo físico e do ponto de vista Wittgensteiniano, ' mais complexo ' é sem sentido (não tem condições de satisfação, ou seja, criador de verdade ou teste). Mesmo um ' Deus ' (ou seja, um ' dispositivo ' com tempo ilimitado/espaço e energia) não pode determinar se um determinado ' número ' é ' aleatório ', nem encontrar uma determinada maneira de mostrar que uma determinada ' fórmula ', ' teorema ' ou ' sentença ' ou ' Device ' (todos estes sendo linguagem complexa jogos) faz parte de um determinado «sistema». Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. 184 Eu li muitas discussões recentes sobre os limites da computação e do universo como computador, na esperança de encontrar alguns comentários sobre o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, mas não encontrei uma única citação e assim que eu apresento este muito breve artigo. Wolpert provou alguma impossibilidade impressionante ou teoremas da incompletude (1992 a 2008-Veja arxiv.org) nos limites à inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo que faz a computação, e mesmo independente das leis da física, Então eles se aplicam em computadores, física e comportamento humano, que ele resumiu: "não se pode construir um computador físico que pode ser assegurado de processar corretamente as informações mais rapidamente do que o universo faz. Os resultados também significam que não pode existir um aparelho de observação infalível, de uso geral, e que não pode haver um aparelho de controle infalível, de uso geral. Estes resultados não dependem de sistemas que são infinitos, e/ou não-clássicos, e/ou obedecem dinâmicas caóticas. Eles também se mantêm mesmo se um usa um computador infinitamente rápido, infinitamente denso, com poderes computacionais maiores do que o de uma máquina de Turing. " Ele também publicou o que parece ser o primeiro trabalho sério em equipe ou inteligência coletiva (COIN), que ele diz que coloca este assunto em um fundamento científico sólida. Embora ele tenha publicado várias versões destes mais de duas décadas em alguns dos mais prestigiados revistas de física revisada por pares (por exemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), bem como em revistas da NASA e tem chegado itens de notícias em grandes revistas científicas, poucos parecem ter Notei e eu olhei em dezenas de livros recentes sobre física, matemática, teoria da decisão e computação sem encontrar uma referência. É mais lamentável que quase ninguém está ciente de Wolpert, uma vez que o seu trabalho pode ser visto como a extensão final da computação, pensamento, inferência, incompletude, e indecidibilidade, que ele atinge (como muitas provas na teoria da máquina de Turing), estendendo o paradoxo mentiroso e Cantor's diagonalização para incluir todos os universos possíveis e todos os seres ou mecanismos e, portanto, pode ser visto como a última palavra não só na computação, mas na cosmologia ou mesmo divindades. Ele atinge essa generalidade extrema, Particionando o universo inferindo usando linhas do mundo (ou seja, em termos do que ele faz e não como ele faz isso) para que suas provas matemáticas são independentes de quaisquer leis físicas específicas ou estruturas computacionais em estabelecendo os limites físicos de inferência para o passado, presente e futuro e todo o cálculo, observação e controle possíveis. Ele observa que, mesmo em um universo clássico, Laplace estava errado sobre ser capaz de prever perfeitamente o futuro (ou até mesmo descrever perfeitamente o passado ou o presente) e que seus resultados de impossibilidade podem ser vistos como um "princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica" (ou seja, Não pode haver uma observação infalível ou dispositivo de controle). Qualquer dispositivo físico universal deve ser infinito, só pode ser assim em um momento no tempo, e nenhuma realidade pode ter mais de um (o "teorema do monoteísmo"). Desde que o espaço e o tempo não aparecem na definição, o dispositivo pode mesmo 185 ser o universo inteiro através de toda a hora. Ele pode ser visto como um analógico físico de incompletude com dois dispositivos de inferência em vez de um dispositivo autorreferencial. Como ele diz, "ou o hamiltoniano do nosso universo proíbe um determinado tipo de computação, ou a complexidade de predição é única (ao contrário da complexidade da informação algorítmica) em que há uma e apenas uma versão dele que pode ser aplicável em todo o nosso Universo ". Outra maneira de dizer isso é que não se pode ter dois dispositivos de inferência física (computadores), tanto capazes de serem feitas perguntas arbitrárias sobre a saída do outro, ou que o universo não pode conter um computador para o qual se pode representar qualquer arbitrária computacional tarefa, ou que para qualquer par de motores de inferência física, há sempre questões binárias valorizadas sobre o estado do universo que não pode sequer ser colocado a pelo menos um deles. Não é possível criar um computador que pode prever uma condição futura arbitrária de um sistema físico antes de ocorrer, mesmo se a condição é de um conjunto restrito de tarefas que podem ser colocadas a ele - ou seja, ele não pode processar informações (embora esta é uma frase irritado , como muitos incluindo John Searle e Rupert ler nota) mais rápido do que o universo. O computador e o sistema físico arbitrário que é computando não têm que ser acoplados fisicamente e prende não obstante as leis da física, do caos, da mecânica quântica, da causalidade ou dos cones claros e mesmo para uma velocidade infinita da luz. O dispositivo de inferência não precisa ser localizado espacialmente, mas pode ser processos dinâmicos não locais que ocorrem em todo o universo. Ele está bem ciente de que isso coloca as especulações de Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., sobre o universo como computador ou os limites de "processamento de informações", em uma nova luz (embora os índices de seus escritos não fazem referência a ele e outro omissão notável é que nenhum dos acima mencionados por Yanofsky em seu livro abrangente recente "os limites exteriores da razão" (ver a minha revisão). Wolpert diz que ele mostra que "o universo" não pode conter um dispositivo de inferência que pode "processar informações" tão rápido quanto possível, e desde que ele mostra que você não pode ter uma memória perfeita nem controle perfeito, seu passado, estado presente ou futuro nunca pode ser perfeitamente ou completamente descrita, caracterizada, conhecida ou copiada. Ele também provou que nenhuma combinação de computadores com códigos de correção de erros pode superar essas limitações. Wolpert também observa a importância crítica do observador ("o mentiroso") e isso nos conecta aos enigmas familiares de física, matemática e linguagem. Como observado em meus outros artigos eu acho que os comentários definitivos sobre muitas questões relevantes aqui (completude, certeza, a natureza da computação, etc) foram feitas há muito tempo por Ludwig Wittgenstein e aqui está um comentário relevante of Juliet Floyd em Wittgenstein: "Ele está articulando em outras palavras uma forma generalizada de diagonalização. O argumento é, portanto, geralmente aplicável, não apenas a expansões decimais, mas a qualquer suposta listagem ou expressão governada de regra deles; Não confia em nenhum dispositivo de notação particular ou em arranjos espaciais preferenciais dos sinais. Nesse sentido, o argumento de Wittgenstein apela a nenhum retrato e não é essencialmente esquematicamente ou representativo, embora possa ser diagramado 186 e insofaras é um argumento lógico, sua lógica pode ser representada formalmente). Como os argumentos de Turing, é livre de um empate direto para qualquer formalismo particular. Ao contrário dos argumentos de Turing, invoca explicitamente a noção de um jogo de linguagem e se aplica a (e pressupõe) uma concepção cotidiana das noções de regras e dos seres humanos que os seguem. Cada linha na apresentação diagonal acima é concebida como uma instrução ou comando, análoga a uma ordem dada a um ser humano... " Os paralelos a Wolpert são óbvios. No entanto, mais uma vez, note que "infinito", "computação", "informação", etc, só têm significado (ou seja, são transitivos (Wittgenstein) ou têm cos--condições de satisfação (Searle)) em contextos humanos específicos - isto é, como Searle enfatizou, eles são todos os observadores relativos ou atribuídos versus intrinsecamente intencionais. O universo aparte de nossa psicologia não é finito nem infinito e não pode computar nem processar qualquer coisa. Somente em nossos jogos de linguagem fazer o nosso laptop ou o universo computar. No entanto, nem todo mundo é alheio a Wolpert. Econometricistas bem conhecidos Koppl e Rosser em seu famoso 2002 papel "Tudo o que eu tenho a dizer já cruzou a sua mente" dar três teoremas sobre os limites para a racionalidade, predição e controle em economia. O primeiro usa o teorema de Wolpert sobre os limites da computabilidade para mostrar alguns limites lógicos para prever o futuro. Wolpert observa que ele pode ser visto como o análogo físico do teorema da incompletude de Godel e K e R dizem que sua variante pode ser vista como sua ciência social analógica, embora Wolpert esteja bem consciente das implicações sociais. Desde teoremas de Godel são corolários do teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedade algorítmica (incompletude) em toda a matemática (que é apenas mais um dos nossos sistemas simbólicos), parece inevitável que o pensamento (comportamento) é cheio de impossível, aleatório ou declarações e situações incompletas. Uma vez que podemos ver cada um desses domínios como sistemas simbólicos evoluídos por acaso para fazer o nosso trabalho de psicologia, talvez deva ser considerado como surpreendente que eles não estão "completos". Para a matemática, Chaitin diz que esta "aleatoriedade" (mais uma vez um grupo de jogos de linguagem em termos de Wittgenstein) mostra que existem teoremas ilimitados que são verdadeiros, mas não prováveis - i. e., verdadeiro sem motivo. Um deve então poder dizer que há umas indicações ilimitadas que façam o sentido "gramatical" perfeito que não descrevem as situações reais atingíveis nesse domínio. Eu sugiro que estes enigmas vão embora se considerarem a vista de W. Ele escreveu muitas notas sobre a questão do teoremas de Godel, e toda a sua obra diz respeito à plasticidade, "incompletude" e extrema sensibilidade ao contexto da linguagem, matemática e lógica, e os recentes papéis de Rodych, Floyd e Berto são a melhor introdução que eu conheço para W ' s observações sobre os fundamentos da matemática e, portanto, talvez a filosofia. O segundo teorema de K e R mostra possível não-convergência para a previsão Bayesiana (probabilística) no espaço infinito-dimensional. O terceiro mostra a impossibilidade de um computador prever perfeitamente uma economia com os agentes sabendo seu programa de previsão. O astuto vai notar que esses teoremas 187 podem ser vistos como versões do paradoxo mentiroso, eo fato de que estamos presos em impossibilidades quando tentamos calcular um sistema que inclui a nós mesmos tem sido observado por Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser e outros nesses contextos e novamente temos circulado de volta para os enigmas da física quando o observador está envolvido. K & R concluir "assim, a ordem econômica é parcialmente o produto de algo que não seja racionalidade calculativa". A racionalidade limitada é agora um campo principal em si, o tema de milhares de papéis e centenas de livros. E este trabalho aparentemente abstruso de Wolpert pode ter implicações para toda a racionalidade. É claro, deve-se ter em mente que (como Wittgenstein observou) matemática e lógica são todos sintaxe e nenhuma semântica e eles não têm nada para nos dizer até conectado à nossa vida por linguagem (ou seja, por Psicologia) e por isso é fácil de fazer isso de maneiras que são úteis (média COS) ou não (sem COS claros). Finalmente, pode-se dizer que muitos dos comentários de Wolpert são reformulações da idéia de que nenhum programa (e, portanto, nenhum dispositivo) pode gerar uma seqüência (ou dispositivo) com maior complexidade do que possui. Há umas conexões óbvias ao trabalho clássico de Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov e Wittgenstein e à noção que nenhum programa (e assim nenhum dispositivo) pode gerar uma seqüência (ou dispositivo) com maior complexidade do que possui. Pode-se dizer que este corpo de trabalho implica ateísmo, uma vez que não pode haver qualquer entidade mais complexa do que o universo físico e do ponto de vista Wittgensteinian, ' mais complexo ' é sem sentido (não tem condições de satisfação, ou seja, criador de verdade ou teste). Mesmo um "Deus" (ou seja, um "dispositivo" com tempo ilimitado/espaço e energia) não pode determinar se um determinado "número" é "aleatório" nem pode encontrar uma certa maneira de mostrar que uma determinada "fórmula", "teorema" ou "sentença" ou "dispositivo" (todos estes são jogos de linguagem complexa) é parte de um determinado «sistema». 188 Revisão de ' Os Limites Exteriores da Razão ' (The Outer Limits of Reason)por Noson Yanofsky 403p (2013) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Eu dou uma revisão detalhada de "os limites exteriores da razão" por Noson Yanofsky de uma perspectiva unificada de Wittgenstein e psicologia evolutiva. Eu indico que a dificuldade com tais questões como paradoxo na linguagem e matemática, incompletude, indecidabilidade, computabilidade, o cérebro eo universo como computadores, etc., todos surgem a partir da falta de olhar atentamente para o nosso uso da linguagem no apropriado contexto e, consequentemente, a falta de separar questões de fato científico a partir de questões de como a linguagem funciona. Discuto os pontos de vista de Wittgenstein sobre incompletude, paraconsistência e indecidabilidade e o trabalho de Wolpert sobre os limites para a computação. Para resumir: o universo de acordo com o Brooklyn---boa ciência, não tão boa filosofia. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. A mãe de Alvy responde ao seu ser deprimido porque o universo está se expandindo - "o que o universo tem a ver com isso? Você está aqui no Brooklyn! Brooklyn não está se expandindo! " Esta famosa piada Woody Allen faz um ponto profundo sobre a sensibilidade do contexto da linguagem que se aplica ao longo da filosofia e da ciência. É engraçado porque é óbvio que o significado de "expansão" nos dois casos é bastante diferente. Brooklyn pode expandir se a população aumenta ou os anexos da cidade terras distantes, mas o universo é dito para expandir devido a telescópios cósmicos que mostram uma mudança vermelha indicando que as estrelas estão recuando uns dos outros ou para medições de densidade da matéria, etc. Os significados diferentes (jogos da língua) (LG) foram caracterizados famosa pelo Austrian-British filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein (W) como o problema central da filosofia e mostrado para ser um 189 defeito universal de nosso psychologia. Embora ele fez isso começando com o Blue and Brown Books (BBB) no início dos anos 30, deixou um Nachlass página 20.000, e é o filósofo mais amplamente discutido dos tempos modernos, poucos entendem ele. Para Yanofsky (Y) de crédito, ele deu muita atenção à filosofia e até mesmo cita W algumas vezes, mas sem qualquer compreensão real das questões. É a norma entre os cientistas e filósofos para misturar as questões científicas de fato com as questões filosóficas de como a linguagem está sendo usada e, como W observado,-' problema e resposta passam uns aos outros por '. Yanofsky (um residente de Brooklyn como muitos de seus amigos e professores) tem lido amplamente e faz um bom trabalho de levantamento das bordas sangrantes da física, matemática e ciência da computação de uma forma clara e autoritario, mas quando chegamos aos limites de explicação científica e não está claro o que dizer, nós nos viramos para a filosofia. A filosofia pode ser vista como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior ou como o estudo das variações contextuais da linguagem utilizada para descrever a cognição ou intencionalidade (minhas caracterizações), ou o estudo da estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR) (Searle). A respeito de LSR, o filósofo John Searle (S) de Berkeley é um do melhor desde que W e seu trabalho podem ser vistos como uma extensão de W. Eu revisei muitos livros por eles e outros e juntos estas revisões constituem um esboço esqueletal do pensamento ou da intencionalidade mais elevado da ordem, e assim dos fundamentos da ciência. É comum que os livros e os papéis traam suas limitações em seus títulos e aquele é o caso aqui. "Razão" e "limites" são complexos de jogos de linguagem. Então, eu deveria parar aqui e passar toda a revisão mostrando como o título de Y revela o malentendido profundo do que as questões reais são. Eu sabia que estávamos em um momento difícil por P5, onde nos é dito que as nossas concepções normais de tempo, espaço, etc., estão enganados e isso era conhecido até mesmo para os gregos. Isto traz à mente W: "os povos dizem repetidas vezes que a filosofia não progride realmente, que nós somos ocupados ainda com os mesmos problemas filosóficos que eram os gregos... em algo que nenhuma explicação parece capaz de limpar... E o que é mais, isto satisfaz um desejo para o transcendente, porque na medida em que os povos pensam que podem ver os "limites da compreensão humana", acreditam naturalmente que podem ver além destes. -CV (1931) "e também" o limite da linguagem é mostrado por seu ser impossível descrever um fato que corresponde a (é a tradução de) uma sentença sem simplesmente repetir a sentença... " Então, eu diria que nós só temos que analisar os diferentes tipos de jogos de linguagem. Olhar mais profundo é essencial, mas entregar o nosso uso prévio é incoerente. Pense no que está implícito em "os limites exteriores da razão", "exterior", "limites" e "razão" todos têm usos comuns, mas eles são freqüentemente usados por Y de diferentes maneiras, e eles vão parecer "bastante inocente", mas isso só pode ser discutido em algum contexto específico. Estamos usando a palavra "pergunta" (ou "afirmação", "declaração" etc.) com sentidos 190 totalmente diferentes se perguntamos "será que 777 ocorre na expansão decimal de PI?" do que se perguntamos "será que 777 ocorrem nos primeiros 1000 dígitos da expansão decimal de PI?" para usar um dos exemplos de W. No último caso, é claro o que conta como uma resposta verdadeira ou falsa, mas no primeiro tem apenas a forma de uma pergunta. No P10 encontramos um grupo de "afirmações" que têm significados bastante diferentes. Os três primeiros são definições e pode-se compreendê-los sem saber quaisquer fatos sobre seu uso - por e. g., X não pode ser Y e não Y. Y recomenda o documentário "Into the Infinite", mas na verdade ele não pode ser visto a menos que você está no Reino Unido. Eu encontrei-o livre na rede logo depois que saiu e foi decepcionado extremamente. Entre outras coisas, sugere Godel e cantor enlouqueceu devido a trabalhar em problemas de infinito-para o qual não há um fragmento de evidência-e ele gasta muito tempo com Chaitin, que, embora um matemático soberbo, tem apenas uma noção obscura sobre os vários filosóficos questões discutidas aqui. Se você quer um redemoinho adorável "Deep Science" documentário eu sugiro "Are We real?" no YouTube, embora ele faz alguns dos mesmos erros. W observou que quando chegamos ao fim do comentário científico, o problema se torna um filosófico-i. e., um de como a linguagem pode ser usada inteligìvelmente. Yanofsky, como virtualmente todos os cientistas e a maioria de filósofos, não começ que há dois tipos distintos de "perguntas" ou " asserções " (isto é, jogos da língua ou LG) aqui. Há aqueles que são questões de fato sobre como o mundo é-ou seja, eles são publicamente observáveis proposicional (verdadeiro ou falso) Estados de assuntos que têm significados claros (condições de satisfação COS) na terminologia de Searle - i. e., declarações científicas, e então há aqueles que são questões sobre como a linguagem pode ser usada de forma coerente para descrever esses Estados de assuntos, e estes podem ser respondidas por qualquer pessoa sã, inteligente, alfabetizada com pouco ou nenhum recurso para os fatos da ciência. Outro fato pouco compreendido mas crítico é que, embora o pensamento, representando, inferindo, entendendo, intuindo etc. (ou seja, a psicologia disposicional) de uma afirmação verdadeira ou falsa é uma função da cognição de ordem superior do nosso lento, consciente sistema 2 (S2), a decisão sobre se "partículas" estão emaranhados, a estrela mostra uma mudança vermelha, um teorema foi provado (ou seja, a parte que envolve ver que os símbolos são usados corretamente em cada linha da prova), é sempre feita pelo jejum , automático, inconsciente sistema 1 (S1) via ver, ouvir, tocar etc. em que não há processamento de informações, nenhuma representação (ou seja, não COS) e nenhuma decisão no sentido em que estes acontecem em S2 (que recebe suas entradas de S1). Esta aproximação de dois sistemas é agora a maneira padrão de ver o raciocínio ou a racionalidade e é uma heurística crucial na descrição do comportamento, de que a ciência, a matemática e a filosofia são casos especiais. Há uma literatura enorme e ràpida crescente no raciocínio que é indispensável ao estudo do comportamento ou da ciência. Um livro recente que cava os detalhes de como nós realmente razão (ou seja, usar a linguagem para realizar ações-ver Wittgenstein e Searle) é "raciocínio humano e ciência cognitiva" por Stenning e Van Lambalgen 191 (2008), que, em Apesar de suas limitações (por exemplo, a compreensão limitada de W/S e a ampla estrutura de psicologia intencional), é (a partir de meados de 2016) a melhor fonte única que eu conheço. Em relação à "incompletude" ou "aleatoriedade" em matemática, o fracasso de Y de mencionar o trabalho de Gregory Chaitin é verdadeiramente surpreendente, como ele deve saber de seu trabalho, e a prova de Chaitin da aleatoriedade algorítmica de matemática (dos quais os resultados de Godel são um corolário) e o Omega número são alguns dos mais famosos resultados matemáticos nos últimos 50 anos. Da mesma forma, não se vê nada sobre computação não convencional, como aqueles com membranas, DNA, etc., que não têm portões lógicos e seguem os padrões biológicos de "processamento de informações". A melhor maneira de começ artigos e livros livres na borda de corte é visitar ArXiv.org, viXra.org, academia.edu, CiteSeerx.ist.PSU.edu, ResearchGate.net, ou philpapers.org, libgen.io s e b-Ok.org onde há milhões de preprints livres, papéis e livros em cada tópico (seja advertido isto pode usar acima de todo seu tempo de reposição para o descanso de sua vida!). Em relação a Godel e "incompletude", uma vez que a nossa psicologia como expressa em sistemas simbólicos como matemática e linguagem é "aleatório" ou "incompleto" e cheio de tarefas ou situações ("problemas") que têm sido comprovada impossível (ou seja, eles não têm solução-Veja abaixo) ou cuja natureza não é clara, parece inevitável que tudo derivado dele - por e. g. física e matemática) também será "incompleto". Ate onde sei o primeiro destes no que é agora chamado de teoria de escolha social ou teoria da decisão (que são contínuos com o estudo da lógica e raciocínio e filosofia) foi o famoso Teorema de Kenneth Arrow 65 anos atrás, e tem havido muitos desde então. Y observa uma recente impossibilidade ou incompletude prova na teoria de jogo de duas pessoas. Nestes casos, uma prova mostra que o que se parece com uma escolha simples afirmou em inglês simples não tem solução. Embora não se possa escrever um livro sobre tudo, eu teria gostado de Y, pelo menos, mencionar tais famosos "paradoxos" como a bela adormecida (dissolvido por Read), o problema de Newcomb (dissolvido por Wolpert) e Doomsday, onde o que parece ser um problema muito simples ou não tem uma resposta clara, ou isso prova excepcionalmente difícil de encontrar um. Existe uma montanha de literatura sobre os dois teoremas "incompletude" de Godel e o trabalho mais recente de Chaitin, mas acho que os escritos de W nos anos 30 e 40 são definitivos. Embora Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright e outros tenham feito um trabalho perspicaz, é só recentemente que a análise de W única penetrante dos jogos de linguagem que está sendo jogado em matemática foram esclarecidos por Floyd (por exemplo, ' Argumento diagonal de Wittgenstein-uma variação em cantor e Turing '), Berto (por exemplo, ' paradoxo de Godel e razões de Wittgenstein, e ' Wittgenstein em incompletude faz sentido paraconsistente ' e o livro ' há algo sobre Godel ', e Rodych (por exemplo, Wittgenstein e Godel: os comentários recentemente publicados ', ' malentendido Gödel: novos argumentos sobre Wittgenstein ', ' novas observações de Wittgenstein ' e seu artigo na enciclopédia on-line de Stanford da filosofia ' filosofia da 192 matemática de Wittgenstein '). Berto é um dos melhores filósofos recentes, e aqueles com tempo pode querer consultar seus muitos outros artigos e livros, incluindo o volume que ele coeditado em paraconsistência (2013). O trabalho de Rodych é indispensável, mas apenas dois de uma dúzia de papéis são gratuitos on-line com a busca usual, mas é provavelmente tudo on-line gratuito, se alguém sabe onde olhar. Berto observa que W também negou a coerência da metamathematics--ou seja, o uso por Godel de um metateorema para provar seu teorema, provavelmente representando sua interpretação "notório" do teorema de Godel como um paradoxo, e se aceitarmos seu argumento, acho que somos forçados a negar a inteligibilidade de metalinguagens, metateorias e meta qualquer outra coisa. Como pode ser que tais conceitos (palavras) como metamatemática e incompleteness, aceitos por milhões (e até mesmo reivindicado por nada menos do que Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al para revelar verdades fundamentais sobre a nossa mente ou o universo) são apenas simples mal-entendidos sobre como funciona a linguagem? Não é a prova neste pudim que, como tantas noções "reveladoras" filosóficas (por exemplo, mente e vontade como ilusões-Dennett, Carruthers, os Churchlands etc.), eles não têm nenhum impacto prático? Berto resume-se bem: "dentro deste quadro, não é possível que a mesma sentença... acaba por ser expressível, mas indecidível, em um sistema formal... e comprovadamente verdadeiro (sob a hipótese de consistência acima mencionada) em um sistema diferente (o meta-sistema). Se, como Wittgenstein mantido, a prova estabelece o próprio significado da sentença provada, então não é possível para a mesma sentença (isto é, para uma sentença com o mesmo significado) ser indecidível em um sistema formal, mas decidido em um sistema diferente (o meta-sistema)... Wittgenstein teve que rejeitar tanto a idéia de que um sistema formal pode ser sintaticamente incompleto, e a conseqüência platônica que nenhum sistema formal provando apenas verdades aritméticas pode provar todas as verdades aritméticas. Se as provas estabelecerem o significado de sentenças aritméticas, então não pode haver sistemas incompletos, assim como não pode haver significados incompletos. " E ainda "aritmética inconsistente, ou seja, aritmética não clássica baseada em uma lógica paraconsistente, são hoje em dia uma realidade. O que é mais importante, as características teóricas de tais teorias correspondem precisamente com algumas das intuições Wittgensteiniano acima mencionadas... Sua inconsistência permite que eles também escapem do primeiro teorema de Godel, e do resultado da indecidabilidade da igreja: há, isto é, demonstravelmente completo e decidível. Por conseguinte, cumprem precisamente o pedido de Wittgenstein, segundo o qual não podem existir problemas matemáticos que possam ser formulados de forma significativa no seio do sistema, mas que as regras do sistema não podem decidir. Assim, a decidabilidade da aritmética paraconsistente harmoniza com uma opinião Wittgenstein mantida ao longo sua carreira filosófica. " W também demonstrou o erro fatal em relação a matemática ou linguagem ou o nosso comportamento em geral como um sistema lógico coerente unitário ', em vez de como um Motley de peças montadas pelos processos aleatórios de seleção natural. "Godel nos mostra uma inclareza no conceito de ' matemática ', que é indicado pelo fato de que a matemática é levada a ser um sistema" e podemos dizer (contra quase todos) 193 que é tudo o que Godel e Chaitin show. W comentou muitas vezes que a "verdade" em matemática significa axiomas ou os teoremas derivados de axiomas, e ' falso ' significa que um cometeu um erro ao usar as definições, e isso é totalmente diferente de matérias empíricas onde se aplica um teste. W muitas vezes observou que para ser aceitável como a matemática no sentido usual, ele deve ser utilizável em outras provas e deve ter aplicações do mundo real, mas nem é o caso com a incompletude de Godel. Uma vez que não pode ser provado em um sistema consistente (aqui Peano aritmética, mas uma arena muito mais ampla para Chaitin), ele não pode ser usado em provas e, ao contrário de todos os ' resto ' do PA não pode ser usado no mundo real também. Como Rodych notas "... Wittgenstein sustenta que um cálculo formal é apenas um cálculo matemático (ou seja, um jogo de linguagem matemática) se ele tem uma aplicação extra sistêmica em um sistema de proposições contingentes (por exemplo, na contagem ordinária e medição ou na física)... " Outra maneira de dizer isso é que se precisa de um mandado para aplicar o nosso uso normal de palavras como ' prova ', ' proposição ', ' verdadeiro ', ' incompleto ', ' número ', e ' matemática ' para um resultado no emaranhado de jogos criados com ' números ' e ' mais ' e ' menos ' sinais etc, e com ' Incompletude ' este mandado está faltando. Rodych resume-se admiravelmente. "Na conta de Wittgenstein, não há tal coisa como um cálculo matemático incompleto porque" em matemática, tudo é algoritmo [e sintaxe] e nada é significado [semântica]... " W tem muito o mesmo a dizer da diagonalização de cantor e teoria dos conjuntos. "A consideração do procedimento diagonal decorado você que o conceito do" número real "tem muito menos analogia com o conceito" número cardinal "do que nós, sendo enganados por determinadas analogias, somos inclinados acreditar" e muitos outros comentários (veja Rodych e Floyd). Como Rodych, Berto e Priest (outro pioneiro na paraconsistência) observaram, W foi o primeiro (por várias décadas) a insistir na inevitável e utilidade da inconsistência (e discutiu esta questão com Turing durante suas aulas sobre os fundamentos da matemática). Vemos agora que os comentários depreciativos sobre as observações de W sobre a matemática feita por Godel, Kreisel, Dummett e muitos outros foram mal concebido. Como de costume, é uma péssima idéia apostar contra W. Alguns podem sentir que nos desviamos do caminho aqui - afinal, em "os limites da razão", só queremos entender a ciência e a matemática e por que esses paradoxos e inconsistências surgem e como eliminá-los. Mas eu afirme que é exatamente o que eu fiz, apontando para o trabalho de W e seus herdeiros intelectuais. Nossos sistemas simbólicos (linguagem, matemática, lógica, computação) têm um uso claro nos estreitos confins da vida cotidiana, do que podemos chamar frouxamente o Reino mesoscópico--o espaço e o tempo de eventos normais que podemos observar sem ajuda e com certeza (o inata leito axiomático ou fundo). Mas deixamos a coerência para trás quando entramos nos reinos da física de partículas ou o cosmos, a relatividade, a matemática além da simples adição e subtração com números inteiros, e a linguagem usada fora do contexto imediato dos acontecimentos cotidianos. As palavras ou frases inteiras podem ser as mesmas, mas o significado é perdido. Pareceme que a melhor maneira de entender a filosofia é inseri-lo via Berto, Rodych e 194 trabalho de Floyd em W, de modo a compreender as sutilezas da linguagem como ele é usado em matemática e, posteriormente, "metafísica" questões de todos os tipos podem ser dissolvidos. Como observa Floyd "em certo sentido, Wittgenstein está literalizando o modelo de Turing, trazendo-o de volta para o cotidiano e tirando o aspecto antropomórfico do comando das metáforas de Turing". W apontou como em matemática, estamos presos em mais LG (jogos de linguagem), onde não é claro o que "verdadeiro", "completo", "segue de", "demostravel", "número", "infinito", etc. significa (ou seja, quais são os seus COS ou os verdadeiros fabricantes neste contexto), e, portanto, o significado para anexar a "incompletude" e também para a "aleatoriedade algorítmica" de Chaitin. Como W observou com freqüência, fazer as "inconsistências" de matemática ou os resultados contrintuitivos da metafísica causar problemas reais em matemática, física ou vida? Os casos aparentemente mais graves de afirmações contraditórias – por exemplo, na teoria dos conjuntos---há muito são conhecidos, mas a matemática continua de qualquer maneira. Da mesma forma para o mentiroso incontáveis (autorreferenciamento) paradoxos na linguagem que Y discute, mas ele realmente não entender a sua base, e não deixa claro que a autorreferenciamento está envolvida in a "incompletude" e "inconsistência" (grupos de complexos da LG) de matemática também. Outro trabalho interessante é "Godel ' s Way" (2012) por Chaitin, da costa e Doria (ver a minha revisão). Apesar de suas muitas falhas-realmente uma série de notas em vez de um livro acabado-é uma fonte única do trabalho destes três estudiosos famosos que têm trabalhado nas bordas sangrentos da física, matemática e filosofia por mais de meio século. Da costa e Doria são citados por Wolpert (veja abaixo) desde que escreveram sobre computação universal e entre suas muitas realizações, da costa é um pioneiro na paraconsistência. Chaitin também contribui para ' causalidade, complexidade significativa e cognição incorporada ' (2010), repleto de artigos com a mistura usual de Insight e incoerência e, como de costume, ninguém está ciente de que W pode ser considerado como o originador da posição atual como Cognição Incorporada (Embodied Cognition) ou Enactivismo. Muitos vão encontrar os artigos e, especialmente, a discussão em grupo com Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram et al no final de Zenil H. (Ed.) ' aleatoriedade através da computação ' (2011) uma continuação estimulante de muitos dos tópicos aqui, mas falta de consciência do questões filosóficas e assim a mistura de ciência (constatação de fato) com a filosofia (jogos de linguagem). Veja também Doria (Ed.), "os limites da modelagem matemática nas ciências sociais: o significado do fenômeno da incompletude de Godel" (2017) e Wuppuluri e Doria (EDS.), "o mapa e o território: explorando as fundações da ciência, do pensamento e da realidade "(2018). 195 É uma luta constante para manter em mente que diferentes contextos significam diferentes LG (significados, COS) para "tempo", "espaço", "partícula", "objeto", "dentro", "fora", "Next", "simultânea", "ocorrer", "acontecer", "evento" , "pergunta", "resposta", "infinito", "passado", "futuro", "problema", "lógica", "ontologia", "epistemologia", "solução", "paradoxo", "provar", "estranho", "normal", "experimento", "completo", "incontavel", "decidível", "dimensão", "completa", "fórmula", " processo "," algoritmo "," axioma "," matemática "," física "," causa "," lugar "," mesmo "," movendo "," limite "," razão "," ainda "," real "" suposição "," crença "," saber "," evento "," recursiva "," meta-"," autorreferencial "" continuar "," partícula "," onda "," frase "e mesmo (em alguns contextos)" e "," ou "," também "," Adicionar "," dividir "," se... Então "," segue "etc. Parafraseando W, a maior parte do que as pessoas (incluindo muitos filósofos e a maioria dos cientistas) têm a dizer quando filosofias não é filosofia, mas a sua matériaprima. Yanofsky junta-se a Hume, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. em repetir os erros dos gregos com o jargão filosófico elegante misturado com a ciência. Como antídotos, eu sugiro que meus comentários e alguns Rupert Read, como seus livros "um caminho wittgensteiniano com paradoxos" e "Wittgenstein entre as ciências", ou ir para academia.edu e obter seus artigos, especialmente "truque de Conjuração de Kripke" e "contra Fatias de tempo ' e, em seguida, tanto de S como viável, mas pelo menos o seu mais recente, como ' filosofia em um novo século ', ' filosofia Searle e filosofia chinesa ', ' fazer o mundo social ' e ' pensar sobre o mundo real ' (ou os meus comentários se o tempo é curto) e sua recentes volume na percepção. Há também mais de 100 Youtubes de Searle que confirmam sua reputação como o melhor filósofo standup (en vivo) desde Wittgenstein. Y não deixar claro a sobreposição principal que agora existe (e está se expandindo rapidamente) entre os teóricos do jogo, físicos, economistas, matemáticos, filósofos, teóricos da decisão e outros, todos os quais têm vindo a publicar por décadas estreitamente relacionadas provas de undecidabilidade, impossibilidade, incomputabilidade, e incompletude. Um dos mais ' bizarro ' (ou seja, não por isso, se esclarecemos os jogos de linguagem) é a recente prova de Armando Assis que na formulação relativa do estado de mecânica quântica um pode configurar um jogo de soma zero entre o universo e um observador usando o Nash Equilíbrio, de que seguem a régua nascida e o colapso da função da onda. Godel foi o primeiro a demonstrar um resultado de impossibilidade e (até Wolpert) é o mais distante alcance (ou apenas trivial/incoerente), mas houve uma avalanche de outros. Como observado, um dos primeiros na teoria da decisão foi o famoso Teorema de impossibilidade geral (GIT) descoberto por Kenneth Arrow em 1951 (para o qual ele obteve o prêmio Nobel em economia em 1972-e cinco de seus alunos são agora laureados Nobel por isso não é ciência questionavel). Afirma, aproximadamente, que nenhum sistema de votação razoavelmente consistente e justo (ou seja, nenhum método de agregação das preferências dos indivíduos em preferências de grupo) pode dar resultados sensíveis. O grupo é dominado por uma pessoa e assim o GIT é muitas vezes chamado de "teorema do ditador", ou há 196 preferências intransitivas. O papel original de Arrow foi intitulado "uma dificuldade no conceito de previdência social" e pode ser declarado assim: "é impossível formular uma ordenação de preferência social que satisfaça todas as seguintes condições: nãoditadura; Soberania individual; Unanimidade Liberdade de alternativas irrelevantes; Singularidade do Rank do grupo. " Aqueles familiarizados com a teoria da decisão moderna aceitar isso e os muitos relacionados teoremas restringir como seus pontos de partida. Aqueles que não são podem encontrá-lo (e todos esses teoremas) incrível e, nesse caso, eles precisam encontrar um caminho de carreira que não tem nada a ver com qualquer uma das disciplinas acima. Veja "o teorema da impossibilidade de seta" (2014) ou "tomada de decisão e imperfeição" (2013) entre legiões de publicações. Y menciona o resultado da impossibilidade famosa de Brandenburger e Keisler (2006) para dois jogos da pessoa (mas naturalmente não limitado aos "jogos" e como todos estes resultados da impossibilidade aplica-se amplamente às decisões de qualquer tipo) que mostra que todo o modelo da crença de um determinado tipo conduz a contradições. Uma interpretação do resultado é que, se as ferramentas do analista de decisão (basicamente apenas lógica) estão disponíveis para os jogadores em um jogo, então há declarações ou crenças que os jogadores podem escrever para baixo ou "pensar", mas não pode realmente segurar. "Ann acredita que Bob assume que Ann acredita que a suposição de Bob é errado" parece irrepreensível e ' recursão ' (outro LG) tem sido assumido na argumentação, linguística, filosofia, etc., por um século, pelo menos, mas eles mostraram que é impossível para Ann e Bob para assumir essas crenças. E há um corpo ràpida crescente de tais resultados da impossibilidade para 1 ou situações multiplayer da decisão (por exemplo, ele classifica em seta, em Wolpert, em Koppel e em Rosser etc.). Para um bom papel técnico de entre a avalanche sobre o paradoxo B & K, obter Abramsky e Zvesper de papel de arXiv que nos leva de volta para o paradoxo do mentiroso e do cantor infinito (como o seu título observa que é sobre "formas interativas de diagonalização e auto-referência ") e, assim, a Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W e Godel. Muitos desses artigos citar o papel de Y "uma abordagem universal para paradoxos autorreferenciais e pontos fixos. Boletim de lógica simbólica, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (um polímata que é entre outras coisas um pioneiro na computação quântica) é um amigo de y e assim que y contribui um papel ao Festschrift recente a ele "computação, lógica, jogos e fundações do Quantum" (2013). Para talvez o melhor recente (2013) comentário sobre o BK e paradoxos relacionados ver o 165p PowerPoint palestra livre na net por Wes Holliday e Eric Pacuit ' dez enigmas e paradoxos sobre o conhecimento e crença '. Para uma boa pesquisa com vários autores, consulte "tomada de decisão coletiva (2010). Uma das principais omissões de todos esses livros é o trabalho surpreendente do físico polimatemático e teórico da decisão David Wolpert, que provou alguma impossibilidade deslumbrante ou teoremas de incompletude (1992 a 2008-Ver arxiv.org) sobre os limites para inferência (computação) que são tão gerais que são independentes do dispositivo fazendo a computação, e até mesmo independente das leis da física, então eles se aplicam em computadores, física e comportamento humano, que ele resumiu assim: "não se pode construir um computador físico que 197 pode ser assegurado de processar corretamente a informação mais rapidamente do que o universo faz. Os resultados também significam que não pode existir um aparelho de observação infalível, de uso geral, e que não pode haver um aparelho de controle infalível, de uso geral. Estes resultados não dependem de sistemas que são infinitos, e/ou não-clássicos, e/ou obedecem dinâmicas caóticas. Eles também se mantêm mesmo se um usa um computador infinitamente rápido, infinitamente denso, com poderes computacionais maiores do que o de uma máquina de Turing. " Ele também publicou o que parece ser o primeiro trabalho sério em equipe ou inteligência coletiva (COIN), que ele diz que coloca este assunto em um fundamento científico sólida. Embora ele tenha publicado várias versões destes mais de duas décadas em alguns dos mais prestigiados revistas de física revisada por pares (por exemplo, Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)), bem como em revistas da NASA e tem chegado itens de notícias em grandes revistas científicas, poucos parecem ter Notei e eu olhei em dezenas de livros recentes sobre física, matemática, teoria da decisão e computação sem encontrar uma referência. É mais lamentável que Yanofsky e outros não têm consciência de Wolpert, uma vez que o seu trabalho é a extensão final da computação, pensamento, inferência, incompletude, e indecidabilidade, que ele atinge (como muitas provas na teoria da máquina de Turing) por estendendo o paradoxo mentiroso e Cantor's diagonalização para incluir todos os universos possíveis e todos os seres ou mecanismos e, portanto, pode ser visto como a última palavra não só na computação, mas na cosmologia ou mesmo divindades. Ele atinge essa generalidade extrema, Particionando o universo inferindo usando linhas do mundo (ou seja, em termos do que ele faz e não como ele faz isso) para que suas provas matemáticas são independentes de quaisquer leis físicas específicas ou estruturas computacionais em estabelecendo os limites físicos de inferência para o passado, presente e futuro e todo o cálculo, observação e controle possíveis. Ele observa que, mesmo em um universo clássico, Laplace estava errado sobre ser capaz de prever perfeitamente o futuro (ou até mesmo descrever perfeitamente o passado ou o presente) e que seus resultados de impossibilidade podem ser vistos como um "princípio de incerteza mecânica não quântica" (ou seja, Não pode haver uma observação infalível ou dispositivo de controle). Qualquer dispositivo físico universal deve ser infinito, só pode ser assim em um momento no tempo, e nenhuma realidade pode ter mais de um (o "teorema do monoteísmo"). Desde que o espaço e o tempo não aparecem na definição, o dispositivo pode mesmo ser o universo inteiro através de toda a hora. Ele pode ser visto como um analógico físico de incompletude com dois dispositivos de inferência em vez de um dispositivo autorreferencial. Como ele diz, "ou o hamiltoniano do nosso universo proíbe um determinado tipo de computação, ou a complexidade de predição é única (ao contrário da complexidade da informação algorítmica) em que há uma e apenas uma versão dele que pode ser aplicável em todo o nosso universo. " Outra maneira de dizer isso é que não se pode ter dois dispositivos de inferência física (computadores), tanto capazes de serem feitas perguntas arbitrárias sobre a saída do outro, ou que o universo não pode conter um computador para o qual se pode representar qualquer arbitrária 198 computacional tarefa, ou que para qualquer par de motores de inferência física, há sempre questões binárias valorizadas sobre o estado do universo que não pode sequer ser colocado a pelo menos um deles. Não é possível criar um computador que pode prever uma condição futura arbitrária de um sistema físico antes de ocorrer, mesmo se a condição é de um conjunto restrito de tarefas que podem ser colocadas a ele - ou seja, ele não pode processar informações (embora esta é uma frase irritado como S e R EAD e outros nota) mais rápido do que o universo. O computador e o sistema físico arbitrário que é computando não têm que ser acoplados fisicamente e prende não obstante as leis da física, do caos, da mecânica quântica, da causalidade ou dos cones claros e mesmo para uma velocidade infinita da luz. O dispositivo de inferência não precisa ser localizado espacialmente, mas pode ser processos dinâmicos não locais que ocorrem em todo o universo. Ele está bem ciente de que isso coloca as especulações de Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., sobre o universe como computador ou os limites de "processamento de informações", em uma nova luz (embora os índices de seus escritos não fazem referência a Ele e outra omissão notável é que nenhum dos acima mencionados por Yanofsky quer). Wolpert diz que mostra que o universo não pode conter um dispositivo de inferência que pode processar informações tão rápido quanto possível, e como ele mostra que você não pode ter uma memória perfeita nem controle perfeito, seu estado passado, presente ou futuro nunca pode ser perfeitamente ou completamente descrita, caracterizada, conhecida ou copiada. Ele também provou que nenhuma combinação de computadores com códigos de correção de erros pode superar essas limitações. Wolpert também observa a importância crítica do observador ("o mentiroso") e isso nos conecta aos enigmas familiares de física, matemática e linguagem que dizem respeito a Y. Novamente cf. Floyd em W: "ele está articulando em outras palavras uma forma generalizada de diagonalização. O argumento é, portanto, geralmente aplicável, não apenas a expansões decimais, mas a qualquer suposta listagem ou expressão governada de regra deles; Não confia em nenhum dispositivo de notação particular ou em arranjos espaciais preferenciais dos sinais. Nesse sentido, o argumento de Wittgenstein apela a nenhum retrato e não é essencialmente esquematicamente ou representatcional, embora possa ser diagramado e na medida em que é um argumento lógico, sua lógica pode ser representada formalmente). Como os argumentos de Turing, é livre de um empate direto para qualquer formalismo particular. [Os paralelos a Wolpert são óbvios.] Ao contrário dos argumentos de Turing, invoca explicitamente a noção de um jogo de linguagem e se aplica a (e pressupõe) uma concepção cotidiana das noções de regras e dos seres humanos que os seguem. Cada linha na apresentação diagonal acima é concebida como uma instrução ou comando, análoga a uma ordem dada a um ser humano... " O ponto de vista presciente de W dessas questões, incluindo seu abraço de finitismo rigoroso e paraconsistência, está finalmente se espalhando através de matemática, lógica e ciência da computação (embora raramente com qualquer reconhecimento). Bremer sugeriu recentemente a necessidade de um teorema de Lowenheim-Skolem Paraconsistent. "Qualquer teoria matemática apresentada na lógica de primeira ordem tem um modelo paraconsistente finito." Berto continua: "é claro que o finitismo 199 rigoroso e a insistência na decidabilidade de qualquer questão matemática significativa vão de mãos dadas. Como Rodych comentou, a visão intermediária de Wittgenstein é dominada por seu "finitismo e sua visão [...] de significância matemática como decidabiidade algorítmico", segundo o qual ' [apenas] somas e produtos lógicos finitos (contendo apenas decidível predicados aritméticos) são significativos porque são algoritmicamente decidivel. ' " Em termos modernos, isso significa que eles têm condições públicas de satisfação-i. e., pode ser declarado como uma proposição que é verdadeiro ou falso. E isso nos leva à visão de W que, finalmente, tudo em matemática e lógica repousa sobre a nossa inata (embora, naturalmente, extensível) capacidade de reconhecer uma prova válida. Berto novamente: "Wittgenstein acreditava que os ingênuos (ou seja, os matemáticos de trabalho) noção de prova tinha que ser decidível, por falta de decidibilidade significava para ele simplesmente falta de significado matemático: Wittgenstein acreditava que tudo tinha que ser decidível em Matemática... É claro que se pode falar contra a decidabilidade da noção ingênua de verdade, com base nos resultados de Godel-se. Mas pode-se argumentar que, no contexto, isso iria implorar a pergunta contra os paraconsistentistas-e contra Wittgenstein também. Ambos Wittgenstein e os paraconsistentists em um lado, e os seguidores da vista padrão no outro, concordam no seguinte Thesis: o decidibilidade da noção da prova e de sua inconsistência é incompatível. Mas, para inferir a partir disso, que a noção ingênua de prova não é decidível invoca a indispensabilidade de consistência, que é exatamente o que Wittgenstein eo argumento paraconsistente chamar em questão... para como Victor Rodych argumentou vigorosamente, a consistência do sistema relevante é precisamente o que é posta em causa pelo raciocínio de Wittgenstein. " E assim: "Portanto, a aritmética inconsistente evita o primeiro teorema de incompletude de Godel. Ele também evita o segundo teorema no sentido de que sua não-trivialidade pode ser estabelecida dentro da teoria: e teorema de Tarski também-incluindo o seu próprio predicado não é um problema para uma teoria inconsistente "[como sacerdote observou mais de 20 anos atrás]. Prof. Rodych acha que meus comentários razoavelmente representam suas opiniões, mas observa que as questões são bastante complexas e há muitas diferenças entre ele, Berto e Floyd. E novamente, ' decidabilidade ' resume-se à capacidade de reconhecer uma prova válida, que repousa sobre a nossa psicologia axiomática inata, que a matemática e a lógica têm em comum com a linguagem. E isso não é apenas um problema histórico remoto, mas é totalmente atual. Eu li muito de Chaitin e nunca vi uma sugestão de que ele considerou essas questões. O trabalho de Douglas Hofstadter também vem à mente. Seu Godel, Escher, Bach ganhou um prêmio Pulitzer e um prêmio de livro ciencia nacional. vendeu milhões de cópias e continua a receber boas críticas (por exemplo, quase 400 principalmente 5 estrelas comentários na Amazônia até à data), mas ele não tem nenhuma pista sobre as questões reais e repete o erros filosóficos clássicos em quase todas as páginas. Seus escritos filosóficos subsequentes não melhoraram (ele escolheu Dennett como sua musa), mas, como essas visões são vacuosas e desconectadas à vida real, ele continua a fazer uma excelente ciência. No entanto, mais uma vez, note que "infinito", "computação", "informação", etc., só 200 têm significado em contextos humanos específicos - isto é, como Searle tem enfatizado, eles são todos observador relativo ou atribuído versus intrinsecamente intencional. O universo aparte de nossa psicologia não é finito nem infinito e não pode computar nem processar qualquer coisa. Somente em nossos jogos de linguagem fazer o nosso laptop ou o universo computar. No entanto, nem todo mundo é alheio a Wolpert. Econometricistas bem conhecidos Koppl e Rosser em seu famoso 2002 papel "Tudo o que eu tenho a dizer já cruzou a sua mente" dar três teoremas sobre os limites para a racionalidade, predição e controle em economia. O primeiro usa o teorema de Wolpert sobre os limites da computabilidade para mostrar alguns limites lógicos para prever o futuro. Wolpert observa que ele pode ser visto como o análogo físico do teorema da incompletude de Godel e K e R dizem que sua variante pode ser vista como sua ciência social analógica, embora Wolpert esteja bem consciente das implicações sociais. Desde Godel são corollários do teorema de Chaitin mostrando aleatoriedade algorítmica (incompletude) em toda a matemática (que é apenas mais um dos nossos sistemas simbólicos), parece inevitável que o pensamento (comportamento) é cheio de impossível, aleatório ou incompleto declarações e situações. Uma vez que podemos ver cada um desses domínios como sistemas simbólicos evoluídos por acaso para fazer o nosso trabalho de psicologia, talvez deva ser considerado como surpreendente que eles não estão "completos". Para a matemática, Chaitin diz que esta ' aleatoriedade ' (mais uma vez um grupo de LG) mostra que existem teoremas ilimitados que são verdadeiros, mas não prováveis-i. e., verdadeiro sem motivo. Um deve então poder dizer que há umas indicações ilimitadas que façam o sentido "gramatical" perfeito que não descrevem as situações reais atingíveis nesse domínio. Eu sugiro que estes enigmas vão embora se considerarem a vista de W. Ele escreveu muitas notas sobre a questão do teoremas de Godel, e toda a sua obra diz respeito à plasticidade, "incompletude" e extrema sensibilidade ao contexto da linguagem, matemática e lógica, e os recentes papéis de Rodych, Floyd e Berto são a melhor introdução que eu conheço para W ' s observações sobre os fundamentos da matemática e assim a filosofia. O segundo teorema de K e R mostra possível não-convergência para a previsão Bayesiana (probabilística) no espaço infinito-dimensional. O terceiro mostra a impossibilidade de um computador prever perfeitamente uma economia com os agentes sabendo seu programa de previsão. O astuto vai notar que esses teoremas podem ser vistos como versões do paradoxo mentiroso e o fato de que estamos presos em impossibilidades quando tentamos calcular um sistema que inclui a nós mesmos tem sido observado por Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser e outros nesses contextos e novamente temos circulado de volta para os enigmas da física quando o observador está envolvido. K & R concluir "assim, a ordem econômica é parcialmente o produto de algo que não seja racionalidade calculativa". A racionalidade limitada é agora um campo principal em si, o tema de milhares de papéis e centenas de livros. Em P19 Yanofsky diz que a matemática é livre de contradições, mas como observado, tem sido bem conhecido por mais de meio século que a lógica e matemática (e física) 201 estão cheios deles-apenas inconsistência Google em matemática ou pesquisá-lo na Amazônia ou ver as obras de Priest , Berto ou o artigo de Weber na enciclopédia de Internet da filosofia. W foi o primeiro a prever inconsistência ou paraconsistência, e se seguirmos Berto podemos interpretar isso como sugestão de W para evitar a incompletude. Em qualquer caso, a paraconsistência é agora uma característica comum e um grande programa de pesquisa em geometria, teoria dos conjuntos, aritmética, análise, lógica e ciência da computação. Y retorna a esta questão outros lugares, como em p346, onde ele diz que a razão deve estar livre de contradições, mas é claro que "livre de" tem usos diferentes e eles surgem com freqüência na vida cotidiana, mas temos mecanismos inatos para contê-los. Isso é verdade porque foi o caso em nossa vida cotidiana muito antes de matemática e ciência Em relação ao tempo de viagem (p49), sugiro Rupert Read ' s "Contra o Tempo Fatias" (Against Time Slices) em seus papéis on-line gratuitos ou "viagem no tempo-a própria idéia" em seu livro "um caminho Wittgensteiniano com paradoxos." A respeito da discussão do filósofo famoso da ciência Thomas Kuhn em p248, aqueles interessados podem ver o trabalho de Rupert leu e seus colegas, o mais recentemente em seu livro "Wittgenstein entre as ciências" e quando lá, você pode fazer um começo em eliminar o duro problema da consciência lendo "dissolvendo o problema duro da consciência de volta à vida ordinária" (ou seu ensaio anterior sobre o que é livre na net). É no último capítulo "além da razão" que as falhas filosóficas são as mais agudas como nós retornamos aos erros sugeridos por meus comentários no título. O raciocínio é outra palavra para pensar, que é uma disposição como saber, entender, julgar etc. Como Wittgenstein foi o primeiro a explicar, esses verbos disposicionais descrevem proposições (frases que podem ser verdadeiras ou falsas) e, portanto, têm o que Searle chama de condições de satisfação (COS). Ou seja, há Estados públicos de assuntos que reconhecemos como mostrando sua verdade ou falsidade. "Além da razão" significaria uma sentença cujas condições de verdade não são claras, e a razão seria que não tem um contexto claro. É uma questão de fato se tivermos Clear COS (ou seja, significado), mas nós simplesmente não podemos fazer a observação-isso não é além da razão, mas além da nossa capacidade de alcançar, mas é uma questão filosófica (linguística) se não conhecemos o COS. "são os computadores da mente e do universo ? "soa como ele precisa de investigação científica ou matemática, mas só é necessário esclarecer o contexto em que esta língua será usada, uma vez que estes são termos comuns e não problemáticos e é apenas o seu (falta de um claro) contexto que é intrigante, e.g. os paradoxos "autorreferenciais" em p344 surgem porque o contexto e assim o cos são obscuros. Em p140 poderíamos notar que 1936 não era realmente "longo" antes de computadores desde Zeus na Alemanha e Berry e Atanasoff em Iowa ambos fizeram máquinas primitivas nos anos 30, embora estes pioneiros são bastante desconhecidos para muitos no campo. Eu vi some de Zeus no Museu Deutsches, em Munique, enquanto a máquina B & A foi reconstruído a partir de seu projeto recentemente na 202 Universidade Estadual de Iowa, Onde Eles Trabalhou. Wittgenstein discutiu os aspectos filosóficos dos computadores alguns anos antes que existissem (veja Gefwert, Proudfoot, etc.). Em p347, o que descobrimos sobre números irracionais que lhes deu um significado é que eles podem ser dado um uso ou claro COS em determinados contextos e na parte inferior da página nossas "intuições" sobre objetos, lugares, tempos, comprimento não são confundidas-em vez disso, nós começou a usar estas palavras em novos contextos onde o COS de sentenças em que são utilizados foram totalmente diferentes. Isso pode parecer um pequeno ponto para alguns, mas eu sugiro que é o ponto inteiro. Alguns "partícula" que pode "estar em dois lugares" ao mesmo tempo não é apenas um objeto e/ou não é "estar em lugares" no mesmo sentido como uma bola de futebol, ou seja, como tantos termos seus jogos de linguagem têm cos claros em nosso Reino mesoscópico, mas falta-lhes (ou têm diferentes e com comumente não declaradas) na macro ou micro reinos. Quanto à sua referência sobre p366 para as experiências famosas de Libet, que foram tomadas para mostrar que os atos ocorrem antes de nossa consciência deles e, portanto, negar vontade, este foi cuidadosamente desmascarado por muitos incluindo Searle e Kihlstrom independemente. É digno de nota que na última página do livro ele comenta sobre o fato de que muitas das palavras básicas que ele usa não têm definições claras, mas não diz que isso é porque requer muito da nossa psicologia inata para fornecer significado, e aqui novamente é o erro fundamental da filosofia. "Limite" ou "existe" tem muitos usos, mas o ponto importante é--qual é o seu uso neste contexto. O "limite da razão" ou o "o mundo existe" não (sem contexto mais adicional) têm um significao desobstruído (COS) mas o "limite de velocidade em E.U. 15" e "uma apólice de seguro da vida existe para ele" é perfeitamente desobstruído. Em relação ao solipsismo em p369, esta e outras "posições" filosóficas clássicas foram mostradas por W para ser incoerente. E, finalmente, por que exatamente é que o emaranhamento quântico é mais paradoxal do que fazer um cérebro de proteínas e outros gosma e tê-lo sentir e ver e lembrar e prever o futuro? Não é apenas que o primeiro é novo e não diretamente presente aos nossos sentidos (ou seja, precisamos de instrumentos sutis para detectá-lo), enquanto os sistemas nervosos animais foram evoluídos para fazer as últimas centenas de milhões de anos atrás e nós achamos que é natural desde o nascimento? Eu não vejo o difícil problema da consciência para ser um problema em tudo, ou se alguém insiste em seguida, Ok, mas é em todos os pes com outros intermináveis-por que há (ou o que é exatamente) espaço, tempo, vermelho, maçãs, dor, o universo, causas, efeitos, ou qualquer coisa em tudo. 203 Em geral, um excelente livro desde que é lido com esta revisão em mente. A ILUSÃO RELIGIOSA – UM UNIVERSO BENEVOLENTE NOS SALVARÁ 204 Revisão da Religião Explicada (Religion Explained)-as origens evolucionárias do pensamento religioso por Pascal Boyer (2002) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Você pode obter um breve resumo deste livro em p 135 ou 326. Se você não está até a velocidade na psicologia evolucionária, você deve primeiramente ler um dos textos recentes numerosos com este termo no título. Um dos melhores é "o manual da psicologia evolucionária" 2a Ed por Buss. Até cerca de 15 anos atrás, ' explicações de comportamento não foram realmente explicações de processos mentais em tudo, mas bastante vago e, em grande parte, descrições inúteis do que as pessoas fizeram e o que eles disseram, sem nenhuma visão sobre o porquê. Podemos dizer que as pessoas se reúnem para comemorar um evento, louvar a Deus, receber suas (ou dela) bênçãos, etc., mas nada disso descreve os processos mentais relevantes,então, podemos dizer que eles são explicações em muito da mesma maneira que explica por que uma maçã cai para o chão, se dizemos que é porque nós lançamos, e é pesado-não há nenhum mecanismo e nenhum poder explicativo ou preditivo. Este livro continua a elucidação da base genética do comportamento humano que tem sido quase universalmente ignorado e negado pela Academia, religião, política e do público (ver Pinker ' s excelente livro ' ' The Blank SLate' – 'o livro vazio'). Sua afirmação (p3) de que não tem sentido perguntar se a religião é genética é confundida como a percentagem de variação de qualquer comportamento devido a genes e ambiente pode ser estudada, assim como eles são para todos os outros comportamentos (ver, por exemplo, Pinker). O título deve ser "tentativas preliminares de explicar alguns aspectos da religião primitiva", uma vez que ele não trata a consciência mais elevada em tudo (por exemplo, satori, iluminação etc.) que são de longe os fenômenos mais interessantes e os únicos parte da religião de interesse pessoal para pessoas inteligentes e educadas no século XXI. Lendo este livro inteiro, você nunca a divinhem tais coisas existem. Da mesma forma, para o imenso campo de drogas e religião. Carece de um enquadramento para a racionalidade e não menciona os sistemas duplos de visão de pensamento que é agora tão produtivo. Por que eu sugiro meus próprios papéis recentes. No entanto, o livro tem muito interesse, e apesar de ser datado ainda vale a pena ler. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. 205 "Deus está morto e o homem é livre" Nietzsche "Este mesmo corpo, o Buda, esta mesma terra, o paraíso dos lótus" Osho Eu posso imaginar uma religião em que não há doutrinas, para que nada seja falado. Claramente, então, a essência da religião não pode ter nada a ver com o que pode ser dito Wittgenstein Quando este livro apareceu, foi um esforço pioneiro, mas agora há infinitas discussões sobre este tema e por isso vou dar um resumo suficientemente detalhado e preciso que apenas os especialistas terão de lê-lo. Você pode obter um breve resumo deste livro em p 135 ou 326. Se você não está até a velocidade na psicologia evolucionária você deve primeiramente ler um dos textos recentes numerosos com esta termo no título. Os melhores são "O Manual da Psicologia Evolucionária" 2a Ed (2015) e o 5o Ed. de Psicologia Evolucionária por Buss, prontamente disponível gratuitamente na net. Até cerca de 15 anos atrás, ' explicações de comportamento não foram realmente explicações de processos mentais em tudo, mas em vez vago e, em grande parte, descrições inúteis do que as pessoas fizeram eo que eles disseram, sem nenhuma visão sobre o porquê. Podemos dizer que as pessoas se reúnem para comemorar um evento, elevar Deus, receber suas bênçãos, etc., mas nada disso descreve os processos mentais relevantes, então podemos dizer que eles são explicações da mesma forma que explica por que uma maçã cai para o chão, se dizemos que é porque nós lançamos e é pesadonão há nenhum mecanismo e nenhum poder explicativo ou preditivo. Este livro continua a elucidação da base genética do comportamento humano que tem sido quase universalmente ignorado e negado pela academia, religião, política e do público (ver Pinker ' s excelente livro ' ' a ardósia em branco ' '). Sua afirmação (P3) de que não tem sentido perguntar se a religião é genética é confundida como a percentagem de variação em qualquer comportamento devido a genes e ambiente pode ser estudada, assim como eles são para todos os outros comportamentos (ver, por exemplo, Pinker). O título deve ser ' ' tentativas preliminares de explicar alguns aspectos da religião primitiva desde que ele não trata a consciência mais elevada em tudo (por exemplo, Satori, iluminação etc.) que são de longe os fenômenos mais interessantes e a única parte da religião de interesse pessoal para pessoas inteligentes e educadas no século XXI. Lendo este livro inteiro, você nunca a divinhem tais coisas existem. Da mesma forma, para o imenso campo de drogas e religião. Como e por que os enteógenos disparam os motores da inferência e que papel têm jogado na religião e na vida para os últimos milhão anos? Há uma enorme mina de informações sobre drogas e modelos comportamentais, mas você não encontrará sequer uma pista aqui. Você pode começar com os recentes livros entheogenos e o futuro da religião "e budismo e 206 psicoterapia" ou você pode ler o meu amigo Alexander Shulgin ' s surpreendente sondagem dos modelos cognitivos em PHIKAL e Tikal, disponível, como quase tudo agora, livre na net. Um dos mais incomuns das sondas de drogas é a cetamina, descrita por muitos, mais notavelmente em "viagens para o mundo brilhante" por Altounian e Moore, Jansen em "Ketamine" e, provavelmente, o relato mais detalhado de uma única droga enteógenas por um único usuário nos últimos dois capitulos de John Lilly s O Cientista ' '. Lilly, quase sozinho o fundador da pesquisa de golfinhos, era uma geração ou mais à frente de quase todos em muitos tópicos e ele também sondeu sua própria mente com LSD e tanques de isolamento. Veja o seu "simulações de Deus" (1975 e minha revisão do mesmo) por suas especulações sobre a mente, Deus e cérebro e mais aspectos do espiritual e mental não tocado por Boyer. Também para a autoterapia heróica recente com enteógenos Ver 'Xenolinguistics' por Slattery e 'DMT & minha mente oculta' por Khan. Também não há praticamente nada aqui sobre a relação entre os Estados físicos e mentais. A prática de muitas formas de yoga foi muito avançada milhares de anos atrás. Seu principal objetivo era desencadear Estados espirituais com energia corporal e o inverso. Há uma imensa literatura e centenas de milhões o praticaram. A melhor conta pessoal que eu conheço por um místico detalhando a interação do mental e físico via yoga é encontrado em ' o joelho de ouvir ' por Adi Da (ver a minha revisão). Entrelaçados com o relato fascinante de seu progresso espiritual são os detalhes de seu trabalho com a energia shakti de yoga (por exemplo, p95-9, 214-21, 249281-3, 439-40 da edição 1995-preferível para os posteriores). Estas poucas páginas valem mais do que uma prateleira inteira de livros de yoga, se você quiser chegar ao coração da relação mente/corpo em espiritualidade. Zen e outras práticas sondam os modelos do cérebro com meditação e truques. Boyer não entende que as principais religiões (e inúmeros menores) foram iniciados por pessoas que quebraram o molde i. e., de alguma forma bloqueado ou evitou alguns modelos para destruir grande parte do ego e descobrir aspectos de sua mente normalmente escondido. Não é difícil ver por que a iluminação completa soprado é rara, como aqueles que têm que parar de se comportar como macacos (ou seja, lutando, enganando, reprodução, acumulando) e isso seria fortemente selecionados contra. Pode-se dizer que aqueles que conseguiram isso são os únicos que se tornaram plenamente humanos (ou seja, Jesus, Adi da, Mohammed, Buda, Mahavira, Rumi, Osho e 1000 ou assim outros que conhecemos). Parece Boyer não tem experiência pessoal com a meditação, enteógenos e maior consciência (por exemplo, ver páginas 317, 320-324) para que ele claramente não tratar toda a religião. Isso é novamente evidente (p32), quando ele diz que a religião não tem origem ou explicação clara que é curioso como ele fornece exatamente isso. Naturalmente, isto é verdadeiro em um sentido das religiões primitivas que discute, mas o Buddhism, o Christianity, o Islamismo etc., têm origens e explanações muito desobstruídas no esclarecimento de Jesus, de Buddha, de Mohammed etc. Ele está enganado (p308) em sua crença de que a religião oriental é principalmente sobre ritual, ao invés de experiência pessoal e estados internos e que ele tem tais idéias da filosofia ocidental (3000 anos atrás!). 207 Surpreendentemente, ele rejeita a noção de William James de que a religião é um resultado das experiências de indivíduos excepcionais que são posteriormente degradados pelas massas (P310). James está claramente certo e Boyer é novamente, só pensando em religião primitiva. Talvez a melhor conta pessoal dos vários Estados de samadhi, iluminação, etc. é Adi da s Book-' o joelho da escuta ', mas de longe a melhor fonte para contas pessoais por um mestre iluminado são os inúmeros livros, áudios e vídeos de Osho, todos gratuitos no Net. Testemunhar os pensamentos de um é uma das técnicas mais comuns de meditadores de início em muitas tradições diferentes. Um progresso mais adicional funde o observador e percebido (tudo é um). Uma pergunta como isso se relaciona com os modelos-eles entram na consciência, a mudança espiritual abrir novas conexões neurais ou fechar alguns? Psicologia cognitiva mal começou sobre isso, mas é seria interessante ver PET ou fMRI em uma pessoa iluminada ou um em um estado samadhi com bons controles e foi feito. Embora ele esteja certo de que muitas experiências são de algum agente, Estados avançados têm sido descritos em uma vasta literatura que mostra que eles normalmente não têm pensamentos, nenhuma mente, nenhuma pessoa, nenhum Deus. Isso parece ser o melhor em dissociação do sistema 2 modelos em uma pessoa funcional. Para os tipos sobrenaturais de conceitos religiosos para evoluir e sobreviver, eles devem pertencer a uma das categorias ontológicas básicas ou modelos (planta, ferramenta, objeto natural, animal, pessoa, etc.) que o cérebro usa para organizar a percepção e pensamento. Estes são comumente dadas Propriedades contrintuitivas, tais como prescience, Telepathy, imortalidade, capacidade para ouvir umas palavras ou ler umas pensamentos, capacidade de curar ou conferir grande poder etc. Bons conceitos sobrenaturais geralmente permitem que todas as inferências não especificamente barradas pela violação da intuição - ou seja, um Deus terá todas as propriedades humanas, mas não envelhecem ou morrem. O grande número de conceitos religiosos está contido nesta pequena lista de modelos. É a natureza contrária intuitiva dos conceitos que os torna fáceis de lembrar e transmitir aos outros e isso parece por uma razão pela qual conceitos sobrenaturais são uma parte central de quase todas as religiões. Conceitos sobrenaturais interagem com outros tipos de modelos, como psicologia intuitiva, física intuitiva, função de estrutura e detecção de objetivos. Se ele ativa a física, detecção de meta, psicologia intuitiva e uso intencional, então ele será um ser humano-like com propriedades superhumanas. Esta é a psicologia cognitiva padrão e partes contrintuitivas são adicionadas para uso religioso. Há evidências abundantes de que as áreas cerebrais que são ativadas quando fazemos algo também são ativadas quando vemos outra pessoa fazendo uma coisa semelhante (neurônios espelho). É viável que isso esteja correlacionado com a necessidade de participar e a satisfação de participar dos rituais integrais à sociedade (esportes, política, música etc.) e religião. Há também evidências de que ver as emoções de outras pessoas ativa as mesmas áreas que as nossas. Nossa teoria da mente (isto é, da vida mental de outras pessoas- -psicologia intuitiva que eu prefiro chamar Understanding of Agency (Compreensão de 208 Agência UA) parece não ser um motor de inferência, mas a soma de muitos e, como mais pesquisa é feita, mais módulos serão descobertos. Outra característica crítica dos motores de inferência é que eles costumam ser executados em modo desacoplado (contrafactual ou imaginário) enquanto consideramos o passado ou o futuro. Isso começa muito cedo, como mostrado pela presença comum de companheiros de brincadeiras imaginários em crianças, sua capacidade de captar histórias e TV, e ele observa que a pesquisa parece mostrar que as crianças que criam companheiros de brincadeiras parecem ser melhores em agarrar os Estados mentais de outras pessoas e emoções. O ponto neste contexto é que parece bastante natural atribuir características como humano aos espíritos, fantasmas, deuses, etc., quando não há nenhuma evidência em tudo para sua presença real. Os motores de inferência inata são automáticos como eles têm que ser rápido e não nos distrair (ou seja, eles são sistema 1, mas infelizmente ele não consegue usar a estrutura de dois sistemas aqui-ver meus papéis para isso). A mente não foi evoluída como uma máquina de explicação e antes da recente ascensão da ciência, ninguém nunca tentou explicar por que nosso pé se move quando andamos, uma maçã cai no chão, ficamos com fome ou com raiva ou por que nós experimentamos ou fazer qualquer coisa. Apenas ocorrências bizarras ou cósmicas como relâmpago ou nascer do sol precisavam de uma causa. Nossos modelos de psicologia e agência intuitivos também nos levaram a atribuir boa e má sorte a algum agente. Muito disso pode soar especulativo, mas agora que o EP (psicologia evolutiva) é um paradigma importante, a evidência de tais funções inatas S1 na primeira infância e a infância é a montagem rápida. Agentes sobrenaturais (incluindo antepassados falecidos) são tratados por psicologia intuitiva como agentes intencionais, pelo sistema de troca social (uma parte ou variante sobre os sistemas de custo/benefício) pelo sistema moral como testemunhas de ações morais, e pela pessoa-arquivo sistema autônomo indivíduos. Desde que todos estes sistemas podem operar-se no modo desacoplado, não há nenhuma necessidade de considerar se estes agentes existem realmente. Elas são impulsionadas pela relevância, pela riqueza de inferências que resultam e pela facilidade com que podem ser lembradas e comunicadas. Os modelos são altamente sintonizados para reunir informações, obter a cooperação e calcular os benefícios em uma maneira muito rápida, subconsciente e normalmente livre de erros, enquanto a razão consciente é lenta e falível. Nos tempos modernos, o ego tem tempo para desperdiçar em debate, explicação e interpretação em tentativas intermináveis de enganar e manipular os outros para ganho pessoal. Com grandes populações móveis e comunicação rápida os resultados do nosso intercâmbio social, a avaliação da confiança, a detecção de trapaceiro e outros modelos são muitas vezes inúteis e autodestrutivos. Informações estratégicas (o que passa os filtros de relevância) ativa os motores relacionados com a interação social e nosso conhecimento de quais informações outros têm é uma parte crítica da mente social. Os agentes sobrenaturais tipicamente têm o conhecimento perfeito. Embora ele não parece mencionar isso, as pessoas poderosas muitas vezes vêm a ter algumas das características dos agentes sobrenaturais e assim as pessoas vão começar a responder a eles como a deuses. 209 Aliens, UFO s, nova idade misticismo, astrologia, fantasia e Sci-Fi atrair grande atenção devido à ativação, e muitas vezes possuem agentes com informações estratégicas. No entanto, centenas de milhões seguiram líderes carismáticos com falsas informações estratégicas (ou seja, agentes quasi-sobrenaturais) para suas mortes (o ramo Davidianos de Waco, comunismo, nazismo, Vietnã, Jonestown, George Bush, cometa Kahoutek etc.). As interações sociais exigem uma mente social - i. e., sistemas mentais que os organizam. Como a maioria dos comportamentos, é só recentemente que foi geralmente percebeu que precisávamos de mecanismos integrados para fazer isso. A informação estratégica é o que ativa a mente social. Nossa teoria da mente (UA) nos diz a que agentes esta informação também está disponível. É comum atribuir a agentes sobrenaturais a capacidade de acessar plenamente informações que normalmente seriam parcialmente ou totalmente indisponíveis para os outros. Todos os motores devem ter algum tipo de filtro de relevância para que eles não são constantemente ativados por trivialidades. Temos taxonomias que nos dizem como agrupar as coisas de maneiras relevantes para o seu comportamento ou propriedades no mundo agora chamado sistema 1 (S1), e então usamos o nosso mais recentemente evoluiu lento sistema linguístico deliberado 2 (S2) quando há tempo. Esperamos grandes coisas felinas com dentes grandes e garras para ser predadores e não herbívoros. Os espíritos se encaixam taxonomia humana e automaticamente têm necessidades e desejos, gostos e desgostos e, assim, dar recompensas e punições e toda a cultura tem que fazer é especificar o que estes são. Esses conceitos que dão as inferências mais ricas com o menor esforço foram selecionados em S1. Um ponto de vista comum é dado pela teoria da relevância, que tenta determinar como e por que alguns 'conceitos' (ou seja, os jogos de linguagem do sistema 2) são mais facilmente transmitidos. Presumivelmente, conceitos que disparam motores(S1 ' conceitos ')mais intensamente ou freqüentemente, ou mais motores diferentes, será superior. Assim, nós podemos ter muitos jogos da língua que são mais fáceis de recordar e aplicar, um pouco do que porque fazem o sentido ou são mais úteis de alguma maneira do que outro. Isso pode ajudar a explicar a existência de muitos conceitos ou práticas que parecem arbitrárias ou estúpidas, ou que tornam a vida mais difícil e se aplica a toda a cultura, não apenas à religião. Quase todas as religiões têm agentes de acesso completo i. e., eles sabem tudo ou quase tudo sobre nós e Boyer distingue 3 classes-brutos divinos com pouco ou nenhum acesso, mas que, no entanto, têm poder, agentes de Aquinas que sabem tudo e agentes estratégicos completos que ter acesso a todas as informações estratégicas ou importantes. Ele diz que isso pode ser responsável pelo nosso interesse em conhecer as idéias religiosas de outras pessoas ou em convertê-las na nossa. Só assim podemos entender como eles podem se comportar e interagir. Agentes que estão cientes e capazes de afetar nossa interação social são mais ricos em inferências, e assim são mais fáceis de representar e lembrar mentalmente e, assim, 210 desfrutar de uma grande vantagem na transmissão cultural. Assim, podemos agora dizer que a religião não cria ou mesmo apoiar a moralidade, mas que o nosso construído em intuições morais (ou seja, os reflexos mentais pré-linguísticos automáticos rápidos de S1) tornam a religião plausível e útil. Da mesma forma, nossos mecanismos para explicar a boa e má sorte faz com que sua conexão com agentes sobrenaturais simples. E uma vez que partilhamos o nosso sistema moral e a nossa informacao com eles, é natural esperar que eles vão impor as nossas atitudes. O recibo de um altruísmo e trapaça são partes centrais do comportamento humano. Para mostrar sentimentos apaixonados e honestidade que são genuínos (difícil de falsificar) é de grande valor social (e genético). Isto pode ser reforçado pela religião como um escolheria cooperar com tais pessoas um pouco do que com calculadoras racionais que podem mudar sua mente ou enganar a qualquer momento seus motores da inferência calculam que é em seus melhores interesses. Este sistema também exige que os trapaceiros sejam punidos, mesmo quando a trapaça tem um custo social mínimo. Um grupo comum de conceitos religiosos são aqueles que fazem batota imoral. O mecanismo é sentimentos (por exemplo, os reflexos S1 rápidos da raiva, do ciúme, do ressentimento, da confusão) um pouco do que a cogitação racional lenta de S2. Isso pode soar estranho, mas tem sido mostrado não só em macacos, mas em animais mais baixos. Sim, existem infinitas elaborações de trapaça na sociedade moderna, mas como todo o nosso comportamento é construído sobre a genética e S1. Sentimos que é errado para alguém roubar o dinheiro de outro, em vez de precisar se sentar e pensar-bem, se ele pega esse dinheiro, então talvez ele vai tomar o meu ou ele terá alguma vantagem futura sobre mim etc. Talvez aqui é um lugar que a culpa entra, a fim de tornar a prática socialmente (geneticamente) destrutiva de trapaça menos atraente. Isso nos leva para a enorme literatura sobre trapaceiros e cooperadores, falcões e pombas e pretendentes e no altruísmo recíproco e teoria do jogo. Tenha em mente que "verdadeiro altruísmo" ou seleção de grupo é claramente uma fantasia como eu tenho detalhado na minha revisão de Wilson ' a conquista social da terra '. Assim, como todo o comportamento, a religião evoluiu porque tinha valor de sobrevivência para os indivíduos. Muitos tipos de gadgets compromisso evoluíram que tendem a garantir a cooperaçãomanter o controle de reputação, legal ou quase-legal vincula (contratos), paixões fortes, honestidade compulsiva, ressentimento e necessidade de punir trapaceiros. Gadgets de cooperação são construídos em também--intuições morais, culpa, orgulho, gratidão, hostilidade. Em contraste com a idéia quase universal de que o realismo moral (que o próprio comportamento tem um valor moral específico que não depende do seu ponto de vista) só é desenvolvido por adultos ou é dada pela religião, é agora claro que isso aparece em 3 e 4 anos de idade e muda pouco e com a idade. Os métodos foram desenvolvidos agora para estudar infantes e no 2007 atrasado um estudo apareceu na natureza que mostrou que podem distinguir o ajudante dos objetos do não-ajudante e tem havido lotes do trabalho em seres humanos e em outros animais desde. É claro, a moralidade intuitiva dará frequentemente os resultados errados para adultos no mundo moderno, como pode todos os nossos reflexos S1 em muitos contextos. 211 A maioria dos fundamentos do que foi anteriormente considerado como cultura, agora é conhecida ou suspeita de ser herdada. Pinker lista centenas de diferentes aspectos das sociedades humanas que são universais e, portanto, bons candidatos. Pode-se compilar uma lista muito longa de conceitos religiosos que não precisamos ser ensinados---espíritos entendem pensamentos humanos, emoções e intenções e diferenciar entre desejos ou imagens e realidade, etc. Parece que a única característica de seres humanos que é sempre projetada para deuses, espíritos, fantasmas, etc., é uma mente muito parecida com a nossa. Psicologia intuitiva se aplica a agentes intencionais em geral (ou seja, pessoas, animais e tudo o que parece mover-se em busca de seus próprios objetivos). Física intuitiva é provavelmente também composta de muitos subsegmentos e deve ser conectado com o módulo de intencionalidade-por exemplo, quando um leão está perseguindo um antílope, sabemos que se ele muda de curso, o leão provavelmente vai fazê-lo. Seria de esperar que a detecção de tais agentes era uma prioridade evolucionária muito antiga e até 500 milhões anos atrás um trilobite que faltava tais genes em breve seria o almoço. Como mais comportamentalos genes são mapeados nós estão encontrando o mesmo ou semelhantes em moscas de fruta, assim como temos para outros genes, tais como os que controlam a segmentação do corpo e imunidade, e grandes avanços nessa direção foram feitos desde que este livro apareceu. Basta pesquisar o comportamento da Drosophila. Como nossos outros conceitos, os religiosos são muitas vezes vagos e seu uso idiossincrático devido ao fato de que eles resultam do funcionamento inconsciente dos motores de inferência (S1), como elaborado pelos caprichos da cultura. Não podemos dizer precisamente o que significam as palavras simples, mas sabemos usá-las. Assim como Chomsky descobriu a gramática da profundidade, pode-se dizer que Wittgenstein descobriu a semântica de profundidade. Wittgenstein foi o primeiro (e ainda um dos poucos) que entendeu que a filosofia-que eu termo a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior- (e todas as tentativas de entender o comportamento) estava lutando com foi primeiro e acima de tudo estas funções internas S1 que são inacessíveis ao pensamento consciente. Embora eu nunca tenha visto isso afirmado, parece razoável considerà-lo como um pioneiro na psicologia cognitiva e evolutiva. Boyer tem uma nova visão da morte também. Os cadáveres têm propriedades que tornam os conceitos sobrenaturais relevantes para além da nossa necessidade de conforto e esta parte da religião pode ser menos sobre a morte do que sobre corpos mortos. Eles produzem uma dissociação entre o animacy, psicologia intuitiva e pessoa 'sistemas de arquivos. Nós vemos tal dissociação no autismo e em Estados neurológicos estranhos tais como a síndrome de Capgras. Ele vê isso como uma outra maneira que a cultura faz uso de gadgets salientes (eventos, objetos, etc.) que são altamente relevantes e agarrar a atenção dos motores 212 de inferência. E desde que este livro apareceu, a evidência continua a acumular que os genes criam a cultura a uma extensão muito maior do que a maioria de povos (que incluem Scholars) imaginados nunca. Tem seu próprio campo - cognição implícita. Ninguém nunca pensa para inquirir quanto aos motriz se uma rocha que caia e nos bate, mas nós fazemos sempre se vem da mão de uma pessoa. Mesmo uma criança muito jovem sabe disso, devido à sua psicologia intuitiva, agência, Animismo e outros motores. Estes motores (genes, comportamentos reflexivos) devem, em suas formas originais, ser centenas de milhões de anos de idade. Uma libélula carbonífera era diferenciada entre objetos animados e inanimados e calculou a trajetória de sua presa. A religião originalmente funcionava em uma atmosfera de medo perpétuo. Motores de inferência evoluíram para encontrar companheiros e alimentos e abrigo e evitar a morte, daí a abordagem para os deuses como um suplicante impotente e o uso de rituais de apaziguamento e ofertas (como gostaríamos de uma pessoa). Nossa evasão de perigos é altamente imperfeita no mundo moderno devido a armas, drogas e transporte rápido (carros, esquis). Em todos os lugares do mundo você pode ver as pessoas andando ou andando de bicicleta nas ruas a apenas um passo de veículos em alta velocidade, mesmo que pelo menos um milhão por ano são atropeladas. Ele diz (P40) que memes (Dawkins famoso analógico cultural do gene) não são um conceito muito bom para a transmissão cultural, uma vez que as idéias são alteradas por cada pessoa, enquanto os genes permanecem os mesmos. No entanto, o que dizer de meios de comunicação i. e., filme, TV, impressão, e-mail? Eles podem replicar mais precisamente do que genes. Estes são agora os meios principais para transmitir e verificar a validez dos memes, não apenas o que alguém diz. Em qualquer caso, os genes também não são perfeitos. Assim como há um fenótipo correspondente ao genótipo, há um fenilalanina correspondente ao meme. Por que invocamos agentes sobrenaturais para o bem e a má sorte? Eles ativam nossos sistemas de intercâmbio social e desde que considerá-los como tendo informações estratégicas que podem controlar o que acontece. Ocorre-me que talvez haja tal oposição grande às explicações genéticas para o comportamento porque os povos sentem qualquer um que aceita este rejeitará automaticamente a troca social e os outros moldes e enganarão sempre. Ou talvez eles temem que a psicologia intuitiva não funcionará mais. E chama a atenção deles para a ilusão fenomenológica (o sentimento ilusório que temos que nosso comportamento é devido a decisões conscientes-ver meus outros escritos). Rituais sociais são exemplos do que os psicólogos têm denominado regras de precaução e estes comumente incluem preocupações sobre a poluição, rituais de purificação (ativação do sistema de contágio), evitar o contato, tipos especiais de toque, atenção especial a limites e limiares, violações de regras, uso de certos números de cores brilhantes, matrizes simétricas e padrões precisos, sons especiais ou música, dança especial e outros movimentos, etc. Todos estes desencadear certos grupos de 213 modelos, criar sentimentos satisfatórios, e são comumente acoplados a conceitos religiosos, e para a política, esportes, caça e agricultura, casamento, criação de crianças, música, arte, folclore, literatura etc. A agência de detecção de sistemas (por exemplo, predador e detecção de presas) são tendenciosos para a detecção de over-i. e., eles não precisam ver um leão ou uma pessoa a ser ativada, mas apenas uma pegada ou um som do tipo certo. Com base em informações muito pouco, estes sistemas, em seguida, produzem sentimentos expectativas sobre a natureza dos agentes e intenções. No caso de agências sobrenaturais, nossos modelos de psicologia intuitiva também são ativados e geralmente produzem uma entidade semelhante a uma pessoa mais as características anti-intuitivas, mas suas características precisas são geralmente deixadas vagas. A anexação de uma tag anti-intuitiva (por exemplo, levantando-se dos mortos) para um agente (por exemplo, Jesus) ou outra categoria ontológica torna fácil de lembrar e um bom candidato para a religião. Todos estes módulos são herdados, mas é claro que um bebê não tê-los totalmente desenvolvido e apenas com o tempo e um ambiente ' normal ' eles vão emergir. Eu li isso pouco antes de ler Ken Wilber s Sexo, Ecologia e Espiritualidade e pude ver em quase todas as páginas como desatualizadas e vazias são a maioria das obras que Wilber está discutindo. Uma grande parte do livro de Wilbur e das centenas que ele analisa sobre religião, psicologia e filosofia são agora arcaicas. No entanto, Wilbur tem escrito muitos livros de grande interesse sobre a espiritualidade e é triste que Boyer nem sequer referenciá-lo-mas nem ele faz referência a drogas, Wittgenstein, meditação, yoga, satori ou iluminação em seu índice! Pode-se dizer que o prêmio Nobel da paz é dado àqueles que são melhores em incentivar-nos a estender coalizões para include outros efetivos ou mesmo outros países ou o mundo inteiro. Ou, pode-se dizer que eles recebem o prêmio para os esforços para desligar o "detector de trapaceiro" ou modelos de troca social que exigem que apenas aqueles que reciprocam estão incluido em um grupo e dado acesso a recoursos (que a maioria dos pobres do mundo claramente não pode fazer). Ele dá um breve resumo de algumas das inferências auto-enganosas que desempenham um papel na religião como em toda a vida-consenso, falso consenso, efeito de geração, ilusões de memória, defeitos de monitoramento de origem, viés de confirmação e dissonância cognitiva. Como os outros modelos, estes deram resultados muito bons 100.000 anos atrás, mas com a vida na pista rápida, eles agora podem provar fatal para os indivíduos e para o mundo. As intuições de coalizões e os conceitos de essência são delineados como partes críticas do comportamento humano. Os seres humanos formam automaticamente grupos e mostram hostilidade a pessoas que não estão no grupo e totalmente inmerecidas amizade com as do grupo (intuições de coalizão), mesmo quando o grupo é composto por estranhos totais. Isto relaciona-se aos motores da operação tais como o custo/benefício e o cálculo da confiabilidade 214 mencionado antes. Essências são os conceitos que usamos para descrever nossos sentimentos (intuições) sobre coalizões e outras categorias sociais (por exemplo, hierarquias e dominância). Embora esses mecanismos evoluíram em pequenos grupos, hoje em dia estes são comumente operando com pessoas a quem não estamos intimamente relacionados, de modo que muitas vezes dão resultados falsos. Estereotipagem, racismo e seus acompanhamentos (ou seja, arbitrárias (ou não tão arbitrárias) definir distinções) são provavelmente os resultados da operação de intuições coalizões construídas em nossos cérebros, ao invés de estereotipagem sendo umn S2 função psicológica e as coalizões com sua exclusão, dominância e antipatia sendo os resultados. Estes motores podem muito bem explicar a "magia social" que forma e orienta as sociedades. Ele sugere que se possa explicar o fundamentalismo como uma reação natural à violação comum do pensamento cococional nas sociedades modernas. A liberdade de agir como um escolhe e na oposição direta a outro na mesma comunidade cria sentimentos fortes e frequentemente violentos naqueles sem a instrução ou a experiência para tratar a diversidade e a mudança. Eles muitas vezes querem punição pública e espetacular para aliviar seus sentimentos. O fundamentalismo pode ser melhor explicado como tentativas de preservar as hierarquias com base em coalizões, quando estas são ameaçadas por defecção fácil ou desatenção. Estes estão funcionando em todas as pessoas o tempo todo, mas eles vêm para a superfície, principalmente quando há uma situação que cria alguma ameaça especial (ou seja, a vida moderna). Claro, como sempre, precisamos ter em mente que a fonte final e recompensa para todo o comportamento está nos genes. Embora ele diz pouco sobre isso, as noções de categorias ontológicas S1 e Tags contraintuitivo que ' Stick para eles também ir longe para explicar a magia, o paranormal, folclore, mitologia, medicina popular, astrologia, teologia, os trabalhadores milagre,possessão demoníaco e angelical, as artes, e anteriormente até mesmo muita ciência. Os rituais atuam como armadilhas para o pensamento. Nossos moldes do contágio são ativadores poderosos do comportamento e é natural incluir muitos rituais da purificação na religião. Eles também fazem uso de nossos sistemas de planejamento, que podemos ver em forma extrema em transtorno obsessivocompulsivo. Há preocupação com cores, espaços, limites, movimentos e contato. Gadgets salientes são incorporados. Temos uma poderosa necessidade de imitar os outros. Os rituais ativam nossos sistemas de perigos não detectados. Ofertas de sacrifício para os agentes invisíveis fazem uso de nossos sistemas de intercâmbio social. Nossas intuições de coalizões são satisfeitas por ritos de grupo e casamento. A "Sociologia ingênua" do homem comum se estende em muita filosofia, Sociologia, teologia, antropologia, psicologia, economia, política e é o resultado de nossas tentativas de fazer sentido de nosso próprio comportamento, mas este é o resultado da diversão automática e inconsciente extraviado de nossos modelos. Assim, grande parte da cultura parece mágico-daí o termo "magia social". Inevitavelmente, a sociologia ingênua é fraca, então os rituais e sistemas de crenças enfatizam os benefícios da 215 cooperação e os custos de trapaça ou deserção. Os rituais e gadgets estimulam a memória e satisfazem o sistema de contágio. Participação sinais de cooperação e os deuses e espíritos são opcionais. Assim, modelos levam à religião que leva a doutrinas e não o inverso. Eu acho que ele vai se desviar seriamente quando se discute ciência versus religião (P320). Ele diz que é errado falar sobre a religião como um objeto real no mundo (o que quer que seja), mas é claro que os fenômenos externos e internos (mentais) podem ser estudados, bem como qualquer outro, e ele mostra neste livro que a religião é um ramo da psicologia cognitiva. Ele diz que não há ciência como tal, e sabemos que ele significa que é complexo, mas então não há religião, lei, esportes, corridas de automóveis ou qualquer coisa, como tal. Ele objeta a "teologia pop", que diz que a religião torna o mundo mais bonito ou significativo ou que aborda questões finais, mas toda a religião aborda as questões finais e tenta tornar o mundo significativo e menos feio. Além disso, o que eu chamo de "religião avançada"--ou seja, a maneira como ele começa no não-mentes de Jesus, Buda, Osho etc.--tem uma opinião bastante diferente sobre o mundo do que a religião primitiva que ele discute neste livro (por exemplo, Ver os 200 livros e DVD s de Osho em Oshoworld.com ou em P2P etc., ou ver Wilber, Adi da etc.). Novamente, em p 327 ele acha que não há nenhum centro religioso no cérebro e embora isso é provavelmente verdade para a religião primitiva, parece mais provável que existam centros (redes de conexões) para as experiências de satori e iluminação e talvez para enteógenos também. Ele também pensa (p321) que a ciência é menos natural e mais difícil do que a religião, mas em vista do grande número de cientistas e os fatos que quase todos são capazes de absorver a ciência na escola de grau, e que provavelmente houve menos de 1000 iluminado pessoas em toda a história humana, parece claro que a situação é bastante o inverso para a espiritualidade avançada. É muito menos difícil se tornar um botânico ou um químico do que dissolver o ego de um! A seleção natural eliminará claramente os genes de consciência mais elevados, mas o cálculo racional da ciência é bastante consistente com a coleta de recoursos e produzindo crianças. Claro, o problema é que ele está novamente fixado na religião primitiva. Ele resume-se dizendo (p 135) que as atividades religiosas ativam sistemas de inferência que "governam nossas emoções mais intensas, moldam nossa interação com outras pessoas, nos dão sentimentos morais e organizam grupos sociais". Claro que , estes não têm nada a ver com satori ou iluminação! Ele observa que as idéias religiosas são parasitárias sobre a nossa ontologia intuitiva (ou seja, eles são relevantes). Eles são transmitidos com sucesso devido a capacidades mentais que a evolução já criou. Tal como com outros comportamentos, a religião é um resultado de relevância agregada - i. e., a soma da operação de todos os motores de inferência. Assim, conceitos e comportamentos religiosos estão presentes não porque são necessários ou até mesmo úteis, mas porque eles facilmente ativam nossos modelos, são fáceis de lembrar e transmitir, e assim eles sobrevivem ao longo do tempo. Ele dá um resumo final (p326) de ' ' a história completa de toda a religião (sempre) ' ' como se segue (é claro que deixa de fora ' religião avançada (espiritualidade, misticismo)'). Entre os milhões de coisas que as pessoas discutiram foram algumas que violaram 216 nossas intuições e isso os tornou mais fáceis de lembrar e transmitir. Aqueles que eram sobre os agentes eram especialmente salientes como eles ativaram domínios ricos de inferências possíveis, tais como aqueles sobre predadores e psicologia intuitiva. Agentes com propriedades contrintuitivas, especialmente a capacidade de entender e afetar o comportamento humano ou o mundo foram fortemente transmitidos. Eles se conectaram com outros eventos estranhos e um pouco contrintuitivos, como a morte e os sentimentos sobre a presença contínua dos mortos. De alguma forma rituais surgem e se associam com os poderosos agentes sobrenaturais. Algumas pessoas serão mais habilidosas na condução de tais rituais e orientando as interações com os espíritos. Inevitavelmente, eles vão criar versões mais abstratas e começar a adquirir poder e riqueza. No entanto, as pessoas continuarão a ter suas próprias inferências sobre a religião. Ele observa que a religião deve muito à aparência provavelmente recente (na evolução hominóide) da capacidade de desacoplamento e ocorre-me que se pode considerar experiências de drogas enteógenas, satori e iluminação como o último em desacoplamento--nenhum passado, nenhum futuro, e nem mesmo um presente--não aqui, não lá, não eu, não você e tudo é uma coisa e ilusória. A outra transição chave na evolução é postulou ser a habilidade de aceitar a violação de expectativas intuitivas a nível de domínios ontológica (isto é, as classes das coisas--plantas, povos, coisas moventes etc.). Ele considera essas capacidades como levando à invenção da religião (e, claro, muito mais), mas é claro que Buda, Jesus e Osho foi um pouco mais longe. Ele rejeita a idéia de que os pensamentos religiosos tornaram as mentes mais flexíveis e abertas (em vez disso, tornaram-se suscetíveis a certos conceitos que ativaram as inferências de agência, predação, moralidade, intercâmbio social, morte, etc.) , mas algo nos fez suscetíveis também aos entheogens, satori e iluminação e isso é tão flexível e aberto como as pessoas podem ser e permanecem são. Portanto, é evidente que muito resta a ser descoberto sobre a espiritualidade e a religião e os progressos na compreensão do comportamento vai trazer isso. 217 Revisão de 'Sex, Ecology, Spirituality' (Sexo, Ecologia, Espiritualidade) por Ken Wilber 2a Ed 851p (2001) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata É surpreendente e apropriado que este enorme, jargão-Laden (este livro realmente precisa de um glossário!), o trabalho muito acadêmico tornou-se um best-seller no mundo dos educados. Um tem que ser dedicado a aprender o jargão e, em seguida, arar através de 551 páginas de texto e 238 páginas de notas. Enquanto isso, nos é dito o tempo e novamente que este é apenas um esboço do que está por vir! Embora ele critica severamente os excessos dos três movimentos, este é um desconstrutivo e Novo Era interpretação mística e pós-moderna da religião, filosofia e as ciências comportamentais de um ponto de vista muito liberal, espiritual - i. e., sem o pior do desconstrução, do pós-moderno e do jargão de Nova Era Mysticsimo, do igualitarismo raivoso e do anti-intelectualismo anticientífico. Ele analisa em alguns detalhes as várias visões mundiais da filosofia, psicologia, Sociologia e religião, expondo suas falhas fatais reducionistas com (principalmente) cuidado e brilho, mas a maioria das fontes que ele analisa são quase nenhuma relevância hoje. Eles usam terminologia e conceitos que já estavam desatualizados quando ele estava pesquisando e escrevendo há 20 anos. Um tem que arrasto através das páginas infinitas da discussão jargão-carregada de Habermas, de Kant, de Emerson, de Jung et.al. para chegar às pérolas. Você recebe uma amostragem fantástica de má escrita, idéias confusas e ultrapassadas e jargão obsoleto. Se alguém tem uma boa educação atual, é duplamente doloroso ler este livro (e mais escrevendo sobre o comportamento humano). Doloroso porque é tão torturado e confuso, e, em seguida, novamente quando você percebe o quão simples é com a psicologia moderna e filosofia. A terminologia e as ideias estão terrivelmente confusas e datadas (mas menos na análise de Wilber do que nas suas fontes). Este livro e a maioria de suas fontes gostaria de ser textos da psicologia, embora a maioria dos autores não o realizem. Trata-se de comportamento humano e raciocíniosobre por que pensamos e agir da maneira que fazemos e como podemos mudar no futuro. Mas (como toda essa discussão até recentemente) nenhum dos explicações são realmente explicações (melhor chamado de descrições na maioria dos contextos, como insistiu Wittgenstein), e assim eles não dão nenhuma visão sobre o comportamento humano. Ninguém discute os mecanismos mentais envolvidos. É 218 como descrever como um carro funciona by discutindo o volante e metal e pintura sem qualquer conhecimento do motor, combustível ou trem de acionamento. Na verdade, como a maioria dos mais velhos ' explicações ' de comportamento, os textos citado aqui e os comentários por Wilber são muitas vezes mais interessante para que tipos de coisas que eles aceitam (e omitir!) como explicações, e o tipo de raciocínio eles usam, do que para o conteúdo real. Se um está acima na filosofia e na psicologia cognitiva e evolucionária, a maioria disto é arcaico. Como quase todos (eruditos e públicos iguais-e.g., veja a minha resenha de Dennett S 'Freedom Evolves' e outros livros), ele não entende que os fundamentos da religião e da ética-na verdade, todo o comportamento humano, são programados em nossos genes. Uma revolução na compreensão de nós mesmos estava ocorrendo enquanto ele estava escrevendo seus muitos livros e passou por ele. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. "Tudo o que pode ser dito pode ser dito claramente" Ludwig Wittgenstein " Céu e terra são desumanas-eles ver as criaturas miríade como cães de palha ' Tao Te Ching É surpreendente e apropriado que este enorme, jargão-Laden (este livro realmente precisa de um glossário!), o trabalho muito acadêmico tornou-se um best-seller no mundo dos educados. Um tem que ser dedicado a aprender o jargão e, em seguida, arar através de 551 páginas de texto e 238 páginas de notas. Enquanto isso, nos é dito de vez em quando que este é apenas um esboço do que está por vir! Este livro e a maioria de suas fontes gostaria de ser textos da psicologia, embora a maioria dos autores não o realizem. Trata-se de comportamento humano e raciocíniosobre por que pensamos e agir da maneira que fazemos e como podemos mudar no futuro. Mas (como toda essa discussão até recentemente) nenhuma das explicações são realmente explicações e por isso eles não deram nenhuma visão sobre o comportamento humano. Ninguém discute os mecanismos mentais envolvidos. É como descrever como um carro trabalha discutindo o volante e o metal e a pintura e as rodas sem nenhum conhecimento do motor ou do trem da movimentação. Na verdade, como a maioria das explicações mais antigas de comportamento, os textos 219 citados aqui e os comentários de Wilber são muitas vezes mais interessante para que tipos de coisas que eles aceitam (e omitir!) como e, eo tipo de raciocínio que eles usam, do que para o real de conteúdo. Como com todo o raciocínio e explicando um agora quer saber qual dos motores de inferência cérebros são ativados para produzir os resultados e como o pensamento rápido sistema pré-linguístico automatizado 1 (S1) e pensamento lento sistema linguístico deliberativo 2 (S2) estão envolvidos e qual é a estrutura lógica da racionalidade que explica (ou melhor, descreve como Wittgenstein insistiu) comportamento. É os filtros de relevância (os processos reflexivos) de S1 que determinam que tipos de coisas que podem ser inseridos como dados apropriados para cada motor e sua operação automática e inconsciente e interação que determina o que o nosso cérebro passará para S2 para uma expressão de ordem superior na linguagem. A psicologia cognitiva e evolucionária ainda não evoluiu o suficiente para fornecer explicações completas (descrições), mas um começo interessante foi feito. A "religião explicada" de Boyer é um bom lugar para ver o que uma explanação científica moderna do comportamento humano olha como como de 2002 (embora completamente falta a iluminação!). Pinker s ' como a mente funciona ' é uma boa pesquisa geral e sua "a ardósia em branco" (ver meus comentários), de longe, a melhor discussão sobre a questão do ambiente hereditariedade no comportamento humano. Eles não 'explicam' toda a inteligência ou pensamento, mas resumir o que é conhecido. Veja vários dos textos recentes (i.e., 2004 avante) com psicologia evolucionário no título (sobretudo "O Manual da Psicologia Evolucionária" 2a Ed por Buss) ou o Web para mais informação. Reconhecemos agora que as bases para a arte, música, matemática, filosofia, psicologia, Sociologia, linguagem e religião são encontradas no funcionamento automático de modelos ou motores de inferência de S1. É por isso que podemos esperar semelhanças e quebra-cabeças e inconsistências ou incompletude e, muitas vezes, extremidades mortas como sem cuidadosa sondagem por experimentos ou análise filosófica (linguística) é invisível para nós (' o Ilusão fenomenológica de Searle). O cérebro não tem inteligência geral, mas numerosos módulos especializados, cada um dos quais funciona em certos aspectos de algum problema e os resultados são então adicionados, resultando nos sentimentos que levam ao comportamento. Wilber, como todos, só pode gerar ou reconhecer explicações que são consistentes com as operações de seus próprios motores de inferência, que foram evoluídos para lidar com coisas como acumulação de recursos, coalizões em pequenos grupos, intercâmbios sociais e os avaliação das intenções de outras pessoas. É surpreendente que eles podem produzir filosofia e ciência, e não surpreende que descobrir como eles trabalham juntos para produzir consciência ou escolha ou espiritualidade é muito além do alcance. Wilber é um rato de biblioteca e ele passou décadas analisando textos clássicos e modernos. Ele é extremamente brilhante, claramente teve seu próprio despertar, e 220 também conhece as minúcias da religião oriental, bem como qualquer um. Duvido que existam mais do que um punhado no mundo que poderia escrever este livro. No entanto, este é um caso clássico de ser muito inteligente para o seu próprio bem e seu fascínio com a história intelectual e sua capacidade de ler, analisar e escrever sobre centenas de livros difíceis tem atolado-lo no passado morto. Embora ele critica severamente os excessos dos três movimentos, este é um desconstrutivo e novo Idade interpretação mística e pós-moderna da religião, filosofia e as ciências comportamentais de um ponto de vista muito liberal, espiritual - i. e., o pior do desconstrução, do pós-moderno e do jargão de Nova Era Mysticsimo e o opressivo raivoso Neomarxisto terceiro mundo supremacista egalitarianismo que está destruindo a América eo mundo, entregando o poder sobre a classe baixa ralé no Ocidente e para os jihadistas e os sete sociopatas que correm a China. Boyer aponta (p20), quando o medo e a pobreza dão forma à segurança e à riqueza, os resultados dos motores de inferência mudam e você encontra a religião mudando de rituais de apaziguamento para os deuses poderosos em um universo hostil para autoempoderamento e controle em um benevolente (isto é, mysticism da idade nova etc.). Ele analisa em alguns detalhes as várias visões mundiais da filosofia, psicologia, Sociologia e religião, expondo suas falhas fatais reducionistas com (principalmente) cuidado e brilho, mas a maioria das fontes que ele analisa são de relevância questionável hoje. Eles usam terminologia e conceitos que já estavam desatualizados quando ele estava pesquisando e escrevendo há 20 anos. Um tem que arrastp através das páginas infinitas da discussão jargão-carregada de Habermas, de Kant, de Emerson, de Jung et.al. para chegar às pérolas. Ele mergulhou em Freud e a interpretação psicanalítica dos sonhos (por exemplo, p92), embora a maioria agora consideram estes como meros artefatos pitorescos da história intelectual. Se um está atualizado sobre filosofia e psicologia cognitiva e evolucionária, a maior parte é arcaica. Como quase todos (estudiosos e públicos iguais-por exemplo, ver a minha opinião sobre a liberdade de Dennett evolui e outros livros), ele não entende que os fundamentos da religião e da ética-na verdade todo o comportamento humano, são programados em nossos genes. Uma revolução na compreensão de nós mesmos estava ocorrendo enquanto ele estava escrevendo seu livro muitos e em grande parte passou por ele, embora eu não li seus últimos trabalhos. Se alguém tem uma boa educação atual, é duplamente doloroso ler este livro (e mais escrevendo sobre o comportamento humano). Doloroso porque é tão torturado e confuso e, em seguida, novamente quando você percebeu como é simples com a psicologia moderna e filosofia. A terminologia e as ideias estão terrivelmente confusas e datadas (mas menos na análise de Wilber do que nas suas fontes). Nós agora pensamos em termos de modelos cognitivos que evoluíram cerca de 100.000 anos atrás (na maioria dos casos várias centenas de milhões de anos antes em suas formas originais). Eles operam automaticamente, não são acessíveis à consciência e há 221 evidências abundantes de que eles limitam severamente as opções comportamentais para os indivíduos e para a sociedade. Seu novo prefácio observa um tal estudo, mas o livro precisa de uma reescrita total. Há uma enorme resistência em nós a aceitar-nos como parte da natureza, e em particular, quaisquer explicações baseadas em genes de comportamento, apesar do fato de que todo o nosso comportamento, como toda a nossa fisiologia, está em seu gene raízes baseado. Como todo o nosso pensamento, esses sentimentos são devidos à operação dos modelos cognitivos, então talvez seja o conflito entre explicações biológicas e nossa psicologia automática intuitiva ou sistemas de mente social que é responsável (a obviedade de nossas convenções linguísticas e cultura e a opacidade de nossos automatismos que Searle chamou de "a ilusão fenomenológica"). Estes sistemas genéticos têm operado por centenas de milhares ou milhões de anos e os novos dados da ciência está nos dizendo os resultados de suas operações (nossos sentimentos sobre o que fazer) são muitas vezes errado em nossa mundo moderno e complexo. Há um enorme programa de pesquisa em comportamento social, econômico e político a partir deste novo ponto de vista. Algum jargão que você precisará está no PG X do prefácio novo onde você encontra que a visão-lógica constantemente usada é cognição pós-formal ou rede-lógica ou integral-aperspectival (todos os pontos de vista são iguais e devem ser considerados). Ele também afirma o manifesto pós-moderno aqui: todas as visões iguais, dependentes de contextos ilimitados e meramente interpretações. Como ele observa em grande detalhe, isso coloca um na inclinação escorregadia levando a muito irracional e incoerente vociferando e há falhas muito básicas nele. No entanto, ele praticamente assumiu-nos e universidades europeias por várias décadas e está longe de ser morto, tendo se transformado em Neomarxist terceiro mundo supremacisto egalitarianismo. Você também vai precisar de sua definição de Eros de P528. Você recebe uma amostragem fantástica de má escrita, idéias confusas e ultrapassadas e jargão obsoleto. Em P52 há uma citação de Jakobson que pode ser substituída por "os motores de inferência para a psicologia e linguagem desenvolver como nós amadurecer ; e parágrafos de Jantsch (p58) que dizem que a evolução é a evolução e as células são células e (p71) o ambiente mudanças à medida que os organismos evoluem. Há uma citação de Foucault para abrir o livro dois (p327) que, traduzido da "deconstructese", diz que ' o conhecimento ajuda a compreender o mundo '. Há uma longa citação (-de-61) de Rupert Sheldrake que, quando é inteligível em tudo, diz coisas que traduzem como proteínas são proteínas e células são células . Existem inúmeros desastres linguísticos de Habermas (por exemplo, se você tiver tempo para desperdiçar, tente descobrir as citações sobre P77 ou 150), mas alguns são realmente traduzíveis, como aqueles em P153-4, que dizem que as pessoas têm moral, então a sociedade tem leis e linguagem evoluiu para que a sociedade evoluiu. E muito disso a partir de Wilber si mesmo, como em P109 onde ele passa a maior parte da página para dizer que a maioria das mutações e recombinações falham e os sobreviventes são 222 compatíveis com seus evirons. Apesar de seu conhecimento com o trabalho de Searle, ele é muitas vezes confundido sobre a consciência. Ele diz (p117-8) que podemos considerar tudo o que queremos como consciente, mas claramente, uma vez que deixamos o Reino de animais que têm olhos e um cérebro e andar ao redor, torna-se uma piada. Da mesma forma, ele está em gelo muito fino quando se discute o nosso interior e a necessidade de interpretar as mentes dos outros. Isto é muito longe da marca, se alguém conhece alguns Searle, Wittgenstein e psicologia cognitiva (ver meus outros escritos). Da mesma forma, com as ' explicações de Wolf em p742 que são erradas pelas mesmas razões que explicações de consciência estão erradas. Deve ser verdade que a mente eo espírito são baseados em física (pelo menos não há alternativa inteligível), mas não sabemos como conceituar isso ou mesmo como reconhecer tal conceito (ou seja, os jogos de linguagem ou condições de satisfação não são claras). Muitos suspeitam que nós nunca compreenderemos este mas em vez seu apenas uma matéria de aceitar como as coisas são e do mesmo modo com os fundamentos do universo (por exemplo, veja minha revisão de Kaku s Hyperspace e Dennett). Suas anotações (p129) que os estudos culturais têm feito pouco progresso, mas nem ele nem suas fontes entendem que eles não tinham qualquer estrutura para fazê-lo e, tipicamente, porque abraçou a idéia estéril da ardósia em branco. Eles querem ser factual, mesmo científico, mas eles constantemente se desviam para a fantasia. Ele delineia a integração da arte, ciência e moralidade como a grande tarefa do pósmodernismo e ele e outros vão para comprimentos imensos para fazer conexões e organizá-lo tudo em um plano coerente para pensar e viver. No entanto, eu não posso ver qualquer sentido realmente útil em que isso é possível. A vida não é um jogo de xadrez. Mesmo no Reino limitado da arte ou da moralidade, não é de todo claro que há algo que não seja que estas são partes da experiência humana que os atrai juntos, ou seja, os genes fazem cérebros e sistema automático inconsciente 1 regras. Pode-se colocar pinturas e esculturas e roupas e edifícios e figuras de vara em um livro de arte, mas isso realmente está nos recebendo em qualquer lugar? Por favor, veja a minha revisãos para obter detalhes sobre como descrever o comportamento usando os dois modernos sistemas de pensamento e uma estrutura lógica para a racionalidade. Boyer (ver a minha opinião) mostra em detalhes como a religião é devido a um complexo de sistemas cerebrais que servem muitas funções diferentes que evoluíram muito antes que houvesse qualquer coisa como religião. O cérebro tem inúmeros modelos que levam em dados, organizá-lo e relacioná-lo em tempo real para outros dados, mas cada um servir um propósito específico e aqueles propósitos não são arte, moralidade, religião e ciência. Psicologia cognitiva mostra que temos muitos módulos trabalhando simultaneamente para produzir qualquer comportamento e que nos relacionamos com as pessoas de muitas maneiras por muitas razões. Uma função básica é a intuição coalizao. Isso nos dá sentimentos que orientam nossa entrada em grupos e nossas interações com outros grupos. Nós automaticamente e imediatamente superestimar as qualidades dos que no nosso grupo, mesmo que seja composto de aleatoriamente escolhidos total 223 de estranhos que conhecemos cinco minutos antes. Da mesma forma, subestimamos imediatamente as boas qualidades daqueles em outros grupos, e sempre nós fortemente favorecer aqueles que intimamente relacionados geneticamente (seleção de parentes ou aptidão inclusiva que são outros nomes para a seleção natural). Este e muchos outros automatismos guia e comumente governar o comportamento individual, grupos, Nações e do mundo, mas dificilmente alguém tinha uma verdadeira compreensão deste até muito recentemente. Então, não é surpreendente que quase todas as suas fontes de Platão a Kant para Habermas foram vagando ao redor no escuro e que Wilber está freneticamente correndo de um para o outro com uma lanterna tentando ajudá-los a encontrar o seu caminho para fora da floresta. Ele observa (p199) que o único movimento social global grave até o momento foi o marxismo, mas acha que sua falha fatal foi o reducionismo. Parece muito mais convincente notar que, como virtualmente toda a sociedade moderna (e a maioria de suas fontes e em uma extensão significativa este livro), negou (ou ignorou ou não compreendeu) a natureza humana e a biologia básica. Ninguém parece notar que a maioria das instituições sociais e ideais, (incluindo a igualdade e a democracia) têm essa mesma falha. O debate sobre a natureza humana, o ambiente e o futuro é interminável, mas a realidade é um ácido que vai comer através de toda a fantasia. Parafraseando Lincoln, você pode enganar algumas das pessoas o tempo todo e todas as pessoas algumas das vezes, mas você não pode enganar a mãe natureza a qualquer momento. A multidão está programada para acumular recursos e replicar seus genes, e isso significa o colapso da civilização. O Neomarxismo, a diversidade, a democracia, o Islamismo, o Hinduísmo, o Budismo, o Cristianismo, a justiça social e os direitos humanos são os meios para este fim e nada pode resistir. Ele detalha a história intelectual (filosofia, psicologia, religião, ecologia, feminismo, sociologia, etc.) e mostra onde quase todos foram longe demais na direção de subido (para o espírito ou a vida religiosa apenas) ou descida (para a ciência, materialismo, reducionismo ou Flatland (planicie). Ele tentativos para mostrar como curar as fendas, combinando senso e alma (vida espiritual e material, ciência e religião, interna e externa, individual e social). Tudo está relacionado a tudo o resto (holons em holarchies--ou seja, coisas em hierarquias aninhadas -Ver P26, 135 para a sua definição). A era do Iluminismo negou o espírito, o indivíduo e a vida interior, mas desenvolveu a arte, a moral e a ciência e conduziu à democracia, ao feminismo, à igualdade e à ecologia. Este reducionismo comprimiu o intelecto e o espírito para a planície da ciência, da racionalidade e do materialismo. Ele vê a perda do ponto de vista espiritual com a era do Iluminismo como o principal fator responsavel para o mal-estar do moderno Times, mas ' verdadeira espiritualidade ' ou ' religião avançada '-meus termos--(i.e., a busca para a iluminação), ao contrário da religião primitiva do ' (tudo mais-veja Boyer sempre foi raro. É a religião avançada que ele vê como a panaceia, mas é a religião primitiva que as massas compreendo, e também tem apenas objetivos materialistas (dinheiro, poder e tudo mais servindo para replicar genes). 224 Ele entende que Jesus era um místico no mesmo sentido que Buda e muitos outros, e o que viria a ser a Igreja Católica em grande parte , deliberadamente destruído seus aspectos místicos e da busca pessoal para iluminação-por exemplo, Gnosticismo, em favor da religião primitiva, sacerdotes, dízimos e uma estrutura aparentemente modelado sobre o exército romano (p363). Mas, para a igreja cristã primitiva, como para a maioria das religiões, os modelos cognitivos eram servos dos genes e a iluminação não estava no cardápio. Jesus não era um cristão, ele não tinha Bíblia, e ele não acreditava em um Deus mais do que Buda. Temos o Cristianismo sem a verdadeira inteligência de Jesus e isso, como ele explica em detalhes, é uma das causas da estada estendida do Ocidente em Flatland (planicie). Eu não sou um cristão nem mesmo um teísta, mas é uma das coisas mais tristes da história que o mestre iluminado que estava a servir como o modelo de espiritualidade para o Ocidente teve sua visão de iluminação pessoal destruída e distorcida por seus próprios seguidores (mas, claro, eles não são realmente SEUS seguidores). Veja os manuscritos gnósticos e Nag Hammadi e, acima de tudo, os discursos de Osho sobre o Evangelho de Tomé apartir destes. Como todos até recentemente, os muitos autores que ele discute faltou qualquer explicação real para o comportamento humano. Raramente lhes ocorreu perguntar por que temos tais idéias e comportamentos e os poucos que não tiveram nenhuma solução coerente. Embora tenha lido alguns dos soberba filosofia de John Searle, e tem referências de passagem para a pesquisa em psicologia cognitiva, é surpreendente que ele poderia fazer 20 anos de pesquisa em filosofia sem estudar Wittgenstein, religião sem ler Osho e assistindo seus vídeos, e psicologia sem Buss, Tooby, Cosmides et al. Grande parte da psicologia cognitiva e evolucionária só foi publicada em revistas no momento em que ele estava escrevendo e Wilber quase não tem referências a revistas. Mas Wittgenstein é o mais famoso filósofo dos tempos modernos, e Osho o mais famoso professor espiritual. É notavel que, embora ele gasta muito tempo em seus livros discutindo os aspectos intelectuais da terapia (Freud, Beck, Maslow etc.) e compreende claramente que o caminho espiritual é a terapia final, ele ignora totalmente OSho, que tinha a comunidade terapêutica mais avançada funcionamento da história em todo o mundo nos últimos 30 anos. Osho nunca escreveu um livro espesso contendo uma teoria do comportamento humano, apesar de seus 200 livros e muitos vídeos, todos gratuitos on-line, explicam-lo tão lindamente e claramente como já foi feito. Embora ele se esforça para curar o mundo, Wilber gasta muito tempo nos reinos arejados do debate intelectual. Como um pós-modernista, e holistica nova era mística, ele quer unir arte, moralidade e ciência, mas a ciência recebe a palha curta. Como em alguns de seus outros livros (por exemplo, Uma Breve História de Tudo ver a minha revisão), de longe os piores erros que ele faz (juntamente com quase todas as suas fontes e mais do planeta) são ignorando e mal-entendido básico Biologia. Isto é aparente ao longo livro. Ele começa o capítulo 7 com uma citação de Aurobindo, que 225 teve o mesmo fracasso. Eles não têm noção do fato de que os efeitos eugênicos da evolução são impulsionados pela seleção natural e quando a sociedade se estabeleceu firmemente, isso cessou e foi totalmente disgênico desde então. Engenheiros genéticos têm estado no trabalho e eles lançaram em um mundo indefeso o mutante mais horrivelmente destrutivo imaginável. A sociedade é o engenheiro e nós somos aquele mutante. Se um começ o retrato grande, a preocupação com os efeitos destrutivos possíveis de OGM (organismos geneticamente modificados)--à excepção de nós--é simplesmente estúpido e é talvez um resultado da operação dos moldes do contágio discutidos por Boyer. Ou seja, o potencial efeito destrutivo de todos os OGM que jamais faremos é improvável que se aproximem do que os humanos já fizeram. Ele diz (p 508, p519) que Darwin não explica a evolução, supostamente bem conhecida antes dele, e o acusa de ' obscurantismo maciço (ele deveria estar dizendo isso sobre a maioria de suas fontes!). A verdade é que nada no comportamento humano ou no mundo ou no universo faz sentido, exceto à luz da evolução e nenhuma pessoa fez mais para deixar isso claro do que Darwin. O trabalho antes dele era pouco mais do que especulação ociosa e nem sequer abordar um tratamento científico grave. É por isso que ele não teve nenhum efeito sobre a ciência ou a sociedade, em oposição à completa transformação de Darwin deles. Claro, Darwin não sabia genética nem tectónicos placa, e neodarwinismo moderno acrescenta muitos refinamentos, mas mostra um equívoco total da ciência e da história para dizer que este invalida ou diminui a sua Contribuições. Wilber é claramente deslizando lateralmente para o campo criacionista e só se pode especular sobre qual de seus motores de inferência produzem isso. Ele mostra em muitos lugares que ele tem um fraco entendimento da genética e da evolução. E. g., em p561--como Dawkins tem tão pacientemente explicado, a unidade de evolução é tele Gene, e nenhuma das outras coisas Wilber menciona trabalho como uma unidade genética. Embora ele lista "o gene egoísta" em sua bibliografia, é claro que ele não entendeu, e é mais de 40 anos de idade. Dawkins escreveu meia dúzia de obras soberbas desde e há centenas de outros. Wilber parece ter uma alergia a bons livros de biologia a maioria daqueles que ele cita são muito antigos e outros são clássicos de confusão. Ele desperdiça uma página (P51) sobre a idéia (principalmente devido ao pseudocientista Neomarxisto Gould e seu coautor Eldredge) da idéia de evolucion pontuada, que é de muito pouco interesse. Gould adorava fazer um grande barulho sobre suas "descobertas" e sua energia temlhe um monte de tempo de antena, mas quando tudo foi dito e feito, ele não tinha nada de novo para dizer e arrastou milhões em suas próprias confusões (como Dawkins, Conway Morris e muitos outros observaram). Sim, a evolução é às vezes mais rápido, mas e daí? Às vezes chove um pouco, às vezes muito. Se você ampliar, em tempo ou espaço, você sempre verá mais detalhes, e se você diminuir o zoom, ele começa a ser o mesmo. Gould também foi responsável pelos "spandrels (cascas) de San Marcos ' debacle e, com seus colegas de Neomarxistos Lewontin e Rose, para ataques inesgotáveis insípidos sobre ' biologia determinista ', incluindo o escandaloso agresções verbo e físico em E. O Wilson (que, ao contrário de si mesmos, fez inúmeras 226 contribuições importantes para a biologia, embora ele recentemente desonrou-se-ver a minha revisão de sua "a conquista social da terra"). A pesquisa moderna (por exemplo, veja Pinker e Boyer) deixa claro que Wilson estava certo sobre o dinheiro sobre a evolução, exceto por seu abraço recente infeliz de "seleção de grupo". É muito descuidado dizer (P775) que não há um único mundo predado. Talvez ele só significa que devemos ser multicultural, igualitária etc., mas se não houvesse realmente nenhum, então como podemos viver e comunicar? Esta é a feiúra do pósmodernismo rastejando em. Uma grande dose de Wittgenstein e psicologia cognitiva é uma cura adequada. Nem Wilber, nem Derrida, nem Foucault (nem a maioria das pessoas) entendem que deve haver um único ponto de vista ou a vida seria impossível. Este ponto de vista único, residente em nossos genes, é parte integrante de como pensamos e nos comportamos e em grande parte dita os caprichos da filosofia, da política e da religião. Os modelos cognitivos de S1 que fundamentam linguagem, pensamento e nossa percepção da realidade logicamente deve ser o mesmo e as provas para isso é esmagadora. Mesmo as menores mudanças, mesmo um gene que deu errado, e você tem autismo, imbecilidade ou esquizofrenia. O fato brutal que Wilber (e a maioria do mundo) ignora pela maior parte, é que há 7.8 bilhão (10.000.000.000 ou assim por 2100) jogos de genes egoístas que realizam seus programas para destruir a terra. Eles são um ácido que vai comer através de quaisquer conclusões intelectuais, fantasias igualitários e renascimentos espirituais. O egoísmo, a desonestidade, o tribalismo e a miopia não são devidos a acidentes de história intelectual ou espiritual. Ele diz que a falta de espírito está destruindo a terra, e embora haja esse aspecto para as coisas, é muito mais a ponto de dizer que são genes egoístas que são responsáveis. Da mesma forma, ele diz que ' a biologia não é mais destino ', mas é um ponto de vista facilmente defensável que o inverso é muito mais provável. A tentativa de compreender a história em termos de ideias ignora a biologia e nega a natureza humana. Genes egoístas sempre vivem em Flatland (planicie) e menos de 1000 pessoas em toda a história humana escaparam da tirania da mente do macaco para a iluminação. A maior parte do capítulo 6 sobre mito e magia está desatualizada, confusa ou simplesmente errada. Para dar apenas alguns exemplos, entendemos agora que a maior parte do desenvolvimento psicológico e social de uma criança é construída e não precisa ser aprendida (por exemplo, p233-4). A criança não tem que desconstruir nada--os motores de inferências fazem tudo (p260). Joseph Campbell é citado extensivamente e ele também estava sem noção sobre como desenvolvemos e como explicar as diferenças e semelhanças nas culturas (p245-50). Por exemplo, Campbell diz que a mitologia só pode reivindicar a infância, mas um olhar ao redor do mundo mostra como isso é falso e uma leitura da' religião explicada ' de Boyer (ver a minha revisão) diz por quê. Sua discussão de pensar sobre o declarações na p279 para 80 é agora muitas vezes referido como executando os motores de inferência em modo desacoplado ou contrafactual. A seus comentários contorcido no meio de p560 (e finalmente....) Eu quero dizer "explicação termina como th os modelos! p580-4 e 5913 são tão cheios de duvidosa e simples declarações erradas eu não quero nem 227 começar, mas sugiro eles Wilber e o leitor começar com Searle s ' O Mistério da Consciência ' ou melhor com quase qualquer um dos meus comentários de Searle ou Wittgenstein. De vezem quando, é claro que ele compartilha a falta de um ponto de vista científico com a maioria de suas fontes. Que informações ou procedimentos podem resolver as questões de consciência ou de qualquer ciência social e teorias filosóficas? Como você reconhece uma resposta quando a vê? Ele e eles vão para páginas e livros inteiros, sem nunca ter nenhuma idéia -por exemplo, ver a minha revisão sobre a libro de Dennett "Freedom Evolves" ("A Liberdade Evolui"). Em p702-inferior-ele fala sobre o desenvolvimento de condução fulcro, mas se se compreende modelos, a estrutura lógica da racionalidade e os dois sistemas de pensamento (e eu quero dizer aqui e em outro lugar todo o corpus de cognitivo e psicologia evolucionária), então um precisa reescrevê-lo ou eliminá-lo. Idem para a maioria dos p770-77. A prosa torturada na p771-2 é apenas dizer que os modelos (reflexos S1) são sondados por drogas ou outra entrada , mas não mudou e que ninguém sabe (de uma forma que eles podem transmitir claramente) o que estes são. O espaço de fundo ou intersubjetivo WorldSpace (espaço do mundo) é os modelos e eles se desenvolvem muito cedo em crianças e, em seguida, ficar fixo para a vida. A destruição deliberada do misticismo de Jesus criou um poderoso viés contra a consciência superior no Ocidente. Embora ele não entenda ou discuta a iluminação, Boyer dá a base para entender como e por que isso aconteceu. Wilber abraça um utilitarianismo simples (maior bom para o maior número) - ou seja, a maior profundidade para ele maior extensão (p334). Este princípio de básico de muita filosofia, religião e economia tem problemas sérios e é provavelmente unpraticável. Que as pessoas que devemos fazer feliz e como feliz e quando (i.e., agora ou no futuro)? Em que base distribuímos recursos agora e quanto economizamos para a futura população, e quem decide e como impor isso? Ele chama a nossa intuição moral básica (ou seja, a operação de nossos templates (modelos), como sabemos agora), mas o nosso IMB (intuição moral básica) não é realmente para ajudar os outros, mas para ajudar a nós mesmos e nossos parentes próximos (aptidão inclusiva), e os poucos mil (ou Vamos ser muito optomistic e dizer poucos milhões) que são spritualmente avançado não executar o mundo e nunca vai. O IMB--por exemplo, troca social, intuições de coalizão, psicologia intuitiva, etc., evoluiu para servir os nossos próprios interesses (não os do grupo-se, como Wilber, você acha que desta forma, por favor Leia alguns dos livros Dawkins' ou o meu recente revisão de Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ') e, em qualquer caso, é irremediavelmente no mar no mundo moderno com ele s educação avançada, comunicações instantâneas , armas de fogo, humor alterando drogas, roupas e cosméticos, um enorme e população móvel e recursos de fuga. Em vez da abordagem intelectual ou espiritual que Wilber leva à história, outros tomam abordagens ecológicas, genéticas ou tecnologico (e.g., Diamonds ;Guns, Germs and Steel ou Pinkers 'The Blank Slate ). A longo prazo, parece que apenas a biologia realmente importa e vemos diariamente como superpopulação é esmagadora todas as tentativas de civilizar as massas. A democracia e a igualdade que os valores de 228 Wilber tão altamente são meios criados por genes egoístas para facilitar sua destruição do planeta. Apesar da esperança de que uma nova era amanhecer e veremos a evolução biológica e psíquica de um novo ser humano, o fato é que somos as espécies mais degenerados que já existiu e o planeta está se aproximando do colapso. Os bilhões de anos de eugenia (seleção natural) que empurraram a vida para fora do lodo e nos deu a incrível capacidade de escrevere ler livros como este agora está acabado. Não há mais seleção para o mais saudável e mais inteligente e na verdade eles produzem uma percentagem menor do crianças todos os anos. A natureza não tolera as aberrações físicas e mentais, mas a sociedade os incentiva. Nossa fisical e pico mental foi provavelmente o homem Cromagnon ou talvez até mesmo neandertais (que tinha cérebros maiores (Sim, eu sei que eles parecem não ter contribuído mais do que alguns por cento de nosso DNA) cerca de 100.000 anos atrás. Parece plausível que só a engenharia genética e uma oligarquia iluminada possam nos salvar. Veja meu livro Suicídio pela Democracia. Ele pensa (por exemplo, P12 etc.) que é a nossa visão do mundo fraturado (i.e., negação do espírito) que é responsável por nossas catástrofes ecológicas e preocupação com bens materiais, mas este é outro exemplo da negação da natureza humana. Ninguém visualiza as condições cardíacas ou doença de Alzheimer como devido a uma visão de mundo fraturado, mas poucos parecem ter qualquer problema pensando que você pode mudar os fundamentos do comportamento apenas por educação ou manipulação psicológica. A ciência moderna refuta esta opinião conclusivamente (veja Pinker, Boyer etc.). Os modelos de psicologia intuitiva nos dizem que podemos manipular o comportamento dos outros, mas esses modelos foram evoluídos centenas de milhares a milhões de anos atrás, e muitas vezes não conseguem dar resultados corretos no moderno Contextos. Quase todos os pais pensam que podem influenciar profundamente o caráter adulto (paciência, honestidade, irritabilidade, depressão, persistência, compulsividade etc.) de seus filhos, apesar de evidência clara em contrário (por exemplo, Pinker). Ele acha que as pessoas dos direitos dos animais são ilógicas e excessivas quando valorizam os animais sobre os seres humanos e também com aqueles que valorizam o ambiente sobre as necessidades das pessoas. Isso pode ser lógico em seu sistema, mas, naturalmente, os seres humanos são tipicamente (e muitas vezes razoavelmente) ilógico. Em todo o caso, se nós põr sempre necessidades humanas primeiramente, a seguir é certamente o fim da paz, da tranquilidade, da beleza e da sanidade. Wilber defende Piaget, mas como ele mostra muitos lugares que ele não entende que a criança não tem que aprender as coisas importantes-eles são construídos em e ele só tem que crescer. Não parece haver nenhuma evidência de que qualquer um dos nossos modelos, ou seja, S1 mudar com o tempo que amadurecer. As coisas que aprendemos são basicamente triviais em comparação (i.e., mesmo um computador pode aprendê-los!). Suas fontes são perdidas na maior parte na confusão e no jargão mas ele é brilhante se um incomoda ler suas explanações e traduzir Wilberspeak (Wilberlingua) no inglês, 229 faz geralmente o sentido. Na p545-7 ele explica a ecologia holonica. Aqui está uma tradução. Todos os organismos têm valor em si mesmos e estão relacionados a todos os outros no ecossistema e devemos acordar espiritualmente. Há uma teia de vida (ou seja, Gaia ou ecossistema) e todos têm valor intrínseco, mas os organismos superiores têm mais valor, o que requer um ponto de vista espiritual. Nem a abordagem espiritual ou científica funciona sozinho (i.e., o dualismo é ruim). Traduzido, perde a maior parte do seu apelo, mas não é justo negar a poesia e a Majestade da sua visão. Mas, isso não o desculpa de escrever claramente. A opacidade é uma característica quase universal dos livros que ele trata aqui. No entanto, quando Katz escreveu um livro denegrindo misticismo Wilber tomou o tempo para fazer uma análise ' Searleian ' para mostrar como a incoerência passou para os estudiosos do quadril (p629-31). Infelizmente, ele não continuar isso em todo o livro e usa a incoerência jargão-carregado de Habermas e outros para explicar outros vague ou textos incoerentes (e. g., usando Habermas em vez de Searle ou Wittgenstein ou psicologia cognitiva para explicar Emerson p633). Nos EUA, alguns 120 milhões (cerca de 250 milhões por 2100) refugiados do terceiro mundo da maternidade desenfreada são agora a força única mais poderosa para a destruição, tendo facilmente deslocados fundamentalistas Cristãos Europeus. Mas todas as pessoas de classe baixa estão unidas em ser contra (ou pelo menos dispostos/incapazes de praticar) o controle da população e para a devastação ambiental, a fim de maximizar o número e uso de recursos por seus genes (embora faltando qualquer insight sobre este de curso). Esta foi uma estratégia de sobrevivência racional quando foi fixado nos genes milhões de anos atrás, mas é suicida agora. O renascimento espiritual que ele fala não é o das "diversificadas" ou as classes inferiores em qualquer lugar. Sua opinião é que é o pobre e ignorante que são o principal problema ambiental e que isso é de alguma forma devido à nossa abordagem Flatland, por isso, se nós apenas acordar, obter Spritual e ajudá-los a resolver isso vai resolvê-lo. Entretanto, os ricos destroem tanto quanto 20 vezes mais do que os pobres per capita e o terceiro mundo passará o primeiro na produção C02 aproximadamente 2025. Mas não há nada nobre sobre os pobres - eles são apenas os ricos na espera. Todo mundo faz parte do problema e se um faz a matemática (desaparecendo recursos divididos pelo aumento da população) é claro que o colapso mundial da sociedade industrial e uma redução drástica na população vai acontecer e sua única questão de como e quando (2150 é um bom palpite). Como tantos, ele sugere viver levemente na terra, mas para viver (e acima de tudo, para reproduzir), é fazer mal e se a reprodução continua a ser um direito, então é difícil ver qualquer esperança para o futuro. Como é politicamente correto, ele enfatiza os direitos e diz pouco sobre as responsabilidades. É uma visão razoável de que se a sociedade é aceitar alguém como humano, eles devem assumir a responsabilidade pelo mundo e isso deve prevalecer sobre suas necessidades pessoais. É improvável que qualquer governo irá implementar isso, e igualmente improvável que o mundo continuará a ser um lugar qualquer pessoa 230 civilizada vai querer viver em (ou ser capaz de). Apresento aqui uma tabela de racionalidade que trabalhei nos últimos 10 anos. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a lógica Estrutura da racionalidade (LSR-Searle), do comportamento (LSB), da personalidade (LSP), da mente (LSM), da língua (LSL), da realidade (LSOR), do intentionalidad (LSI)-o termo filosófico classico, o psiciologia descritivo da consciência (DPC), o descritivo psicologia do pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, a linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. As idéias para esta tabela originaram no trabalho por Wittgenstein, uma tabela muito mais simples por Searle, e correlaciona-se com as tabelas e os gráficos extensivos nos três livros recentes na natureza humana pelo hacker de P. M. S. As últimas 9 fileiras vêm principalmente da pesquisa da decisão por Johnathan St. B.T. Evans e colegas como revisado por mim mesmo. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Volition)(Vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste"e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. Eu fiz explicações detalhadas sobre esta tabela em meus outros escritos. 231 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugar (H + N, T + T) aqui e agora, lá e depois ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 232 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidas por Searle e outros como COS, representações, verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designados como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então 233 A mais profunda autobiografia espiritual de todos os tempos? -uma revisão de "o Joelho da Escuta" ("The Knee of Listening") por Adi da (Franklin Jones) (1995) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Uma breve revisão da vida e autobiografia espiritual do único americano místico Adi da (Franklin Jones). O adesivo na capa de algumas edições diz "a mais profunda autobiografia espiritual de todos os tempos" e isso pode muito bem ser verdade. Eu estou no meu 70 s e ter lido muitos livros por professores espirituais e na espiritualidade, e este é um dos maiores. Certamente, é by distante a conta a mais completa e a mais clara do processo da iluminação que eu vi nunca. Mesmo se você não tem nenhum interesse em tudo no mais fascinante de todos os processos psicológicos humanos, é um documento surpreendente que revela uma grande quantidade de religião, yoga, e psicologia humana e sonda as profundezas e os limites das possibilidades humanas. Descrevo-o em alguns detalhes e comparar o seu ensinamento com o do contemporâneo místico Indiano Osho. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. Há muitas edições da autobiografia espiritual do único americano místico Adi da (Franklin Jones). A primeira edição foi 1972 e novas edições com mais material e muita publicidade sobre o grupo continuam a aparecer. O mais recente que eu vi (2004) é de cerca de 3 vezes o tamanho eo peso do edição 1995 eu prefiro, como as centenas de páginas de novos materiais são prosa opaco e publicidade. Assim, eu recomendo uma das edições anteriores do edição em brochura tais como o 1995 que eu prefiro e para qual a minhas citações da página consultam. Uma breve revisão da vida e autobiografia espiritual do único americano místico Adi da (Franklin Jones). O adesivo na capa de algumas edições diz "a mais profunda autobiografia espiritual de todos os tempos" e isso pode muito bem ser verdade. Eu 234 estou no meu 70 s e li muitos livros de professores espirituais e sobre a espiritualidade, e este é um dos maiores. Certamente, é de longe o mais pleno e mais claro relato do processo de iluminação que eu já vi. Mesmo se você não tem nenhum interesse em tudo no mais fascinante de todos os processos psicológicos humanos, é um documento surpreendente que revela uma grande quantidade de religião, yoga, e psicologia humana e sonda as profundezas e os limites das possibilidades humanas. Como eu li e experimentei muito em várias tradições religiosas, eu naturalmente comparar seus escritos com os dos outros, particularmente com o grande místico indiano Osho. Embora eles concordam claramente sobre os principais pontos de como proceder no caminho, deixando de ir o apego à busca espiritual etc, seus estilos são vastamente diferentes. Tanto um re altamente inteligente e bem lido (Osho poderia acelerar ler e ler um grande número de livros) e estavam em casa na literatura espiritual das principais tradições religiosas. No entanto, como tanto da literatura espiritual, a maioria dos livros da da éessencialmente ilegível como ele se esforça para expressar em linguagem os reinos inefável da mente iluminado. Mesmo neste, de longe o seu livro mais legível, ele muitas vezes veers fora em páginas de opacidade como ele tenta explicar o inexplicável. Uma grande pena que ele parece nunca ter lido Wittgenstein o maior psicólogo natural de todos os tempos-que mostrou que devemos abandonar as tentativas de explicação e aceitar descrições de nossas funções psicológicas inatas na linguagem, que é a mente. Osho por contraste é o mais claro, mais jargão livre expositor da vida espiritual que já viveu. Ele escreveu muito pouco e quase todos os seus mais de 200 livros são transcrições de conversas espontâneas que ele deu-sem notas ou preparação. Eles são, no entanto, obras-primas insuperadas da literatura espiritual. Sua incrível àutobiografia ' (realmente compilado após sua morte) foi publicado por St. Martins e a versão completa, bem como todos os seus livros (muitos também disponíveis em DVD), estão disponíveis on-line muitos lugares. Infelizmente, he tem muito pouco a dizer sobre os detalhes exatos de seu progresso espiritual. Como da viveu a maior parte de sua vida mais tarde em reclusão em uma ilha em Fiji, não foi fácil de chegar a ouvi-lo, mas a imprensa do Dawn Horse vende alguns vídeos em sua página da web. Da não é um orador muito envolvente ou facile, ao contrário de Osho, que é por voltas divertido, estilhaçar e hipnótico. Mas, como ambos entendem, é o que o mestre é e não ele diz que é importante. Ambos eram totalmente honestos e incomprometedores em sua vida e ensinamentos e da omite nada de relevância, incluindo suas aventuras juvenis com sexo e drogas, bem como a sua exposição ao LSD, psilocibina e mescalina como voluntário em experimentos governamentais. No entanto, como com muitos ou talvez todos aqueles destinados a tornar-se iluminado, ele era diferente do nascimento e experimentou a energia Shakti (que ele chama de brilhante) desde a infância. E, quando ele entrou na faculdade, ele disse que seu principal interesse era descobrir o que são seres vivos e o que é viver consciencia. Claramente não é o seu calouro típico. 235 Um grande problema na descrição de Estados espirituais avançados é que nenhum critério ou linguagem para eles existe no discurso comum para que os místicos tenham que tentar dobrar a linguagem na maioria das tentativas vãs de capturar suas experiências. É muito pior do que tentar descrever ver a uma pessoa congenitamente cego, uma vez que pelo menos têm as estruturas cognitivas e experiência do mundo. Mas os místicos são bastante raros e a maioria deles deixaram pouco or nenhuma descrição de seus estados mentais. Ao contrário de Osho, que rejeitou milagres, fenômenos paranormais e todos os outros disparates que comumente acompanha a religião, da parece faltar qualquer fundo de ciência em tudo e abraça a precognição (P120), reencarnação (p555), ' meditando ' outras pessoas, vivendo em ar (p287) etc., e considera os fenômenos que eu diria que estão acontecendo em seu cérebro como sendo "lá fora". A partir de comentários incluídos em edições mais recentes, é claro que muitos de seus discípulos acreditam que ele pode realizar milagres como parar um incêndio florestal em fúria em seu retiro Califórnia. No entanto, na maioria das vezes ele é incrivelmente nivelado, passando por mais de uma década de stress e terrores psíquicos que iria conduzir a maior parte do caminho espiritual. Milhões de anos de evolução solidificaram o ego e não saem pacificamente. Entrelaçados com o relato fascinante de seu progresso espiritual são os detalhes da interação da mente com o corpo, descrito no Oriente em termos de várias formas de Yoga (eg., p95-9, 214-21, 249281-3, 439-40 na edição 1995 eu recomendo). Estas poucas páginas valem mais do que uma prateleira inteira de livros de Yoga if você quer chegar ao coração da relação mente/corpo em espiritualidade. Ao contrário da maioria dos que se tornaram iluminados, ele tinha um aterramento completo na prática cristã e fez um grande esforço para se tornar um protestante, e então ministro grego ortodoxo. Mesmo anos mais tarde, depois que ele estava longe ao longo do caminho com Muktananda, ele teve uma série surpreendente e totalmente inesperada de visitações de Maria e Jesus que continuou por semanas (p 301-3 e segs.). Quanto às drogas, como é quase universal entre os professores espirituais, ele observa que, embora possam remover certas barreiras às vezes, eles não fornecem um atalho para a compreensão. No entanto, quase todo mundo está agora ciente de que eles colocaram muitos no caminho para uma maior consciência ao longo do historia humano, especialmente nas últimas décadas. Ele descreve em detalhes os muitos estágios em sua morte ego ou auto-realização (por exemplo, P72-4, 198-200, 219, 20, 238-9, 245, 249, 258-9, 281, 355-65, 368-72, 406). Ao longo do caminho, ele percebeu a disutilidade final de todas as práticas e todas as tradições (337-9), incluindo yoga (281-3), que estão todos ligados à busca e metas, finalmente liquidação no presente. Ele descobriu, como muitos outros, que a busca e a meditação tornou-se obstáculos e entregou-os para a devoção ao seu guru Muktananda (p420-22). Seus relatos detalhados de suas interações com o famoso 236 Swami Muktananda e sua realização final de suas ações limite são de rara percepção e honestidade. Ele constantemente encontra seu apego ao seu ego (Narcissus-por exemplo, p108-110) e pede ele mesmo - ' evitando relacionamento? ' por que ele parece significar evitar a morte divina ou ego pela preocupação com a busca espiritual. Depois da iluminação, ele ensina o só por me revelado e dado caminho do coração ', encontrando todos os outros caminhos para ser ' corretivo ' e egoico e meramente perseguindo Deus ou realidade (p359 +), mas depois de uma leitura cuidadosa deste e vários outros livros I Nunca tive idéia do que essa maneira consiste. Sem dúvida, estar em sua presença ajuda muito, mas em outros lugares ele tem reclamado sobre o fato de que seus discípulos simplesmente não deixam acontecer e se pergunta se até mesmo um foi capaz de segui-lo. Naturalmente, os mesmos considerações aplicam-se a todas as tradições e professores e embora alguns dos amigos de Osho (ele negado o relacionamento do mestre/discípulo) reivindicou o esclarecimento, ninguém de seu status emergiu. Parece que você tem que ter os genes certos e o ambiente certo e um guru muito avançado e de preferência iluminado para estimulá-lo. Eu suspeito que o tempo passou quando um iluminado poderia iniciar um movimento que transforma grande parte do mundo. O mundo precisa desesperadamente de uma consciência mais elevada e eu espero que alguém vem acima com uma maneira mais fácil muito logo, mas eu penso que é completamente improvável. 237 Nossos comportamentos inconscientes automatizados revelam nossos verdadeiros eus e verdades escondidas sobre o universo? -Uma revisão de David Hawkins ' 'Power vs Force' (Poder vs Força )-os determinantes ocultos do comportamento humano-oficial do autor edição autoritária ' 412p (2012) (edição original 1995)(revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Eu estou muito acostumado com livros estranhos e pessoas especiais, mas Hawkins se destaca devido ao seu uso de uma técnica simples para testar a tensão muscular como uma chave para a "verdade" de qualquer tipo de declaração qualquer-i. e., não apenas para se a pessoa que está sendo testada acredita , mas se é realmente verdade! O que é sabido é que os povos mostrarão respostas fisiológicas e psicológicas automáticas, inconscientes a apenas sobre qualquer coisa que são expor a - imagens, sons, toque, odores, idéias, povos. Assim, a leitura muscular para descobrir seus verdadeiros sentimentos não é radical em tudo, ao contrário de usá-lo como uma vara radiestesia (mais leitura muscular) para fazer "ciência paranormal". Hawkins descreve o uso de diminuir a tensão nos músculos de um braço em resposta a aumentos na carga cognitiva, causando assim o braço a cair em resposta à pressão constante dos dedos de alguém. Ele parece não saber que há um longo e vasto esforço de pesquisa em curso em psicologia social referido por frases como ' cognição implícita ', ' automaticidade ' etc., e que seu uso de ' cinesiologia ' é uma pequena seção. Além do tônus muscular (pouco utilizado), os psicólogos sociais medem o EEG, a resposta da pele Galvanica e, mais freqüentemente, as respostas verbais a palavras, frases, imagens ou situações, às vezes, variando de segundos a meses após o estímulo. Muitos, como Bargh e Wegner, levam os resultados para significar que somos autômatos que aprendem e agem em grande parte sem a consciência via S1 (sistema automatizado 1) e muitos outros, como Kihlstrom e Shanks dizem que estes estudos são faladas e somos criaturas de S2 (sistema deliberativo 2). Embora Hawkins parece não ter idéia, como em outras áreas da psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior, a situação sobre "automaticidade" ainda é tão caótica como era quando Wittgenstein descreveu as razões para a esterilidade e esterilidade de psicologia nos anos 30. No entanto, este livro é uma leitura fácil e alguns terapeutas e professores espirituais podem encontrá-lo de uso. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed 238 (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) y outras. Eu estou muito acostumado com livros estranhos e pessoas especiais, mas Hawkins se destaca devido ao seu uso de uma técnica simples para testar a tensão muscular como uma chave para a "verdade" de qualquer tipo de declaração qualquer-i. e., não apenas para se a pessoa que está sendo testada acredita Mas, se é realmente verdade! Como pode qualquer pessoa sã acreditar nisto? Como uma pessoa com mais de 50 anos experiência adulta com ciência, psicologia, filosofia, religião e vida eu não encontrá-lo de todo credível que é ainda altamente confiável sobre as crenças da pessoa e não há nenhuma chance de conhecer a realidade desta forma. O que é sabido é que os povos mostrarão respostas fisiológicas e psicológicas automáticas, inconscientes a apenas sobre qualquer coisa que são expor a - imagens, sons, toque, odores, idéias, povos. Assim, a leitura muscular para descobrir seus verdadeiros sentimentos não é radical em tudo, ao contrário de usá-lo como uma vara radiestesia (mais leitura muscular) para fazer "ciência paranormal". A cinesiologia, também conhecida como cinética humana, é o estudo da movimento. Estudos de cinesiologia fisiológicos, mecânicos (tônus muscular), e mecanismos psicológicos como índices de estado mental e físico das pessoas e muitas vezes usa exercícios de movimento como terapia. No entanto, Hawkins (sem dizer isso) está usando o termo para se referir a uma aplicação muito estreita de Cinesiologia - o uso de diminuir a tensão nos músculos de um braço em resposta a aumentos na carga cognitiva (ou seja, menção de alguma pessoa, evento ou objeto), o que causa o assunto a ser distraído por questões intelectuais ou emocionais, diminuindo assim a tensão muscular e fazendo com que o braço a cair em resposta à pressão constante dos dedos de alguém. Hawkins parece não saber que há um longo e vasto esforço de pesquisa em curso em psicologia social referido por frases como ' cognição implícita ', ' automaticidade ' etc., e que seu uso de ' cinesiologia ' é uma pequena seção. Além do que o tom do músculo (realmente usado infrequëntemente) os psicólogos sociais medem EEG, resposta galvânica da pele e o mais freqüentemente respostas verbais às palavras, às sentenças, às imagens ou às situações às vezes que variam de segundos a meses após o estímulo. Foi apenas por acaso que eu li o livro de Hawkins depois de ler vários livros e dezenas de artigos recentes sobre cognição implícita e ficou muito surpreso que ele usa-lo como uma chave para o universo-ou seja, a "natureza definitiva da realidade" e tenho certeza que as centenas de pesquisadores ativo seria igualmente espantado. Relaciono sua prática espiritual com o trabalho contemporâneo sobre cognição implícita. Uma questão importante na maioria das pesquisas contemporâneas sobre a cognição social implícita é o grau em que é automático ("inconsciente") e o que constitui 239 "evidência" para isso. Centenas de papéis e dezenas de livros apareceram em apenas os últimos anos com confusão maciça e debates muitas vezes acrimonioso. Muitos, como Bargh e Wegner, levam os resultados para significar que somos autômatos que aprendem e agem em grande parte sem a consciência via S1 e muitos outros, como Kihlstrom e Shanks dizem que estes estudos são imperados e somos criaturas de S2. Embora Hawkins parece não ter idéia, como em outras áreas da psicologia descritiva de pensamento de ordem superior, a situação sobre "automaticidade" ainda é tão caótica como era quando Wittgenstein descreveu as razões para a esterilidade e esterilidade de psicologia nos anos 30. Muitas vezes, a questão é afirmado por pesquisadores e filósofos em termos de sistema 1 e sistema 2 funcionando-uma divisão muito útil, mesmo indispensável de comportamento (intencionalidade) em nosso reptiliano primitivo automatizado, não reflexivo S1 e nosso maior cortical funções deliberativas conscientes do primata de S2. Como observado em meus outros comentários, esta divisão foi pioneira pelo filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein na década de 1930, embora ninguém percebeu isso. Estou bastante familiarizado com a mediação e os fenômenos da iluminação (ver a minha opinião sobre a autobiografia de Adi da ' o joelho da escuta ') e estou disposto a aceitar Hawkins ' alegação de estar neste grupo rarefeito (muitas vezes é dito que sabemos de menos de 1000 iluminado pessoas em toda a história humana). Eu também posso aceitar que ele pode ter sido um "terapeuta" muito eficaz que ajudou muitas pessoas e, claramente, ele é altamente inteligente. Isso não me faz aceitar suas muitas afirmações questionáveis ou claramente falsas sobre os fatos do mundo. Eu também estou (com base em uma vida de estudo da ciência e da filosofia) muito cético sobre a relevância do caos, atratores, teoria da complexidade, computação, etc. para o estudo do comportamento humano (ver meus comentários e livros sobre Academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, vixra.org, libgen.io, B-Ok.org, Amazon etc.), reivindicações que são feitas frequentemente por cientistas também. Implicito pesquisa cognição envolve a mistura horrível usual de factual verdadeiras ou falsas questões científicas sobre as funções cerebrais causais (a mente S1), com aqueles sobre como funciona a linguagem (ou seja, a mente, que, como Wittgenstein mostrou-nos 3/4 de um século atrás, é o comportamento público-a mente S2)-outros temas que eu cobri extensivamente em meus comentários. Então, Hawkins faz muito de sua leitura muscular e eu tenho certeza que muitas vezes funciona bem, mas há um grande erro lógico aqui. Independentemente do que diz sobre as crenças da pessoa que está sendo testada, claramente não diz nada sobre o mundo em si. Então, eu respeito Hawkins e seu trabalho terapêutico, mas, com a vasta gama de abordagens para a cura espiritual e emocional, há muitas escolhas. E é uma coisa a ser tratada por um mestre iluminado-cuja própria presença (ou mesmo o pensamento deles) pode ser galvanização, e completamente outra a ser tratada por uma pessoa comum. De longe, a melhor fonte de livros, áudios e vídeos de um mestre iluminado no trabalho são os de Osho (Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh) que estão disponíveis para comprar ou gratuitamente na rede em vários sites. Ele fez terapia em milhares 240 em um momento na ocasião e criou a Comunidade terapêutica mais notável de todos os tempos ao seu redor. Embora ele se foi, seus terapeutas ainda praticam em todo o mundo, e suas obras podem ser transformadoras. Hawkins tem outros livros que têm muitas críticas favoráveis para que aqueles profundamente interessados podem consultá-los. A ILUSÃO DE UMA GRANDE FAMÍLIA FELIZDEMOCRACIA, DIVERSIDADE E IGUALDADE VAI NOS SALVAR 242 A supressão transitória dos piores demônios da nossa natureza - uma revisão de Steven Pinker ' os melhores anjos da nossa natureza: por que a violência declinou ' ('The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined') (2012)(revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Este não é um livro perfeito, mas é único, e se você desnatado o primeiro 400 ou assim páginas, o último 300 (de alguns 700) são uma tentativa muito boa para aplicar o que é conhecido sobre o comportamento de mudanças sociais na violência e maneiras ao longo do tempo. O tema básico é: como o nosso controle genético e limitar a mudança social? Surpreendentemente, ele não descreve a natureza da seleção de parentes (aptidão inclusiva), o que explica grande parte da vida social animal e humana. Ele também (como quase todos) carece de um quadro claro para descrever a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR - termo preferencial de John Searle) que eu prefiro chamar a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT). Ele deveria ter dito algo sobre as muitas outras maneiras de abusar e explorar as pessoas e o planeta, uma vez que estes são agora muito mais graves para tornar outras formas de violência quase irrelevante. Estender o conceito de violência para incluir as conseqüências globais a longo prazo da replicação dos genes de alguém, e ter um entendimento da natureza de como a evolução funciona (ou seja, a seleção de parentes) fornecerá uma perspectiva muito diferente sobre a história , eventos atuais, e como as coisas são susceptíveis de ir nas próximas centenas de anos. Pode-se começar por notar que a diminuição da violência física sobre a história tem sido combinada (e tornou possível) pelo estupro constantemente crescente impiedoso do planeta (ou seja, pela destruição das pessoas do seu próprio futuro descendente's). Pinker (como a maioria das pessoas a maior parte do tempo) é muitas vezes distraído pelas superficialidades da cultura, quando é a biologia que importa. Veja meus comentários recentes de Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ' e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' aqui e na net para um breve resumo da vacuidade de "verdadeiro altruísmo" (seleção de grupo), e a operação de seleção de parentes e a inutilidade e superficialidade de descrever o comportamento em termos culturais. Esta é a natureza clássica/nutrir a questão ea natureza supera nutrir-infinitamente. O que realmente importa é a violência feita para a terra pelo aumento implacável da população e destruição de recursos (devido à medicina e tecnologia e supressão de conflitos por policiais e militares). Cerca de 200.000 mais pessoas por dia (outra Las Vegas a cada 10 dias, outro Los Angeles a cada mês), as 6 toneladas ou assim de solo superior indo para o mar/pessoa/ano -cerca de 1% do total do mundo desaparecendo anualmente, etc. significa que, a menos que algum milagre acontece que a biosfera e 243 a civilização vão desmoronar em grande parte durante os próximos dois séculos, e haverá fome, miséria e violência de todo tipo em uma escala escalonamento. As maneiras, as opiniões e as tendências das pessoas para cometer atos violentos não são relevantes a menos que possam fazer algo para evitar essa catástrofe, e eu não vejo como isso vai acontecer. Não há espaço para argumentos, e nenhum ponto ou (Sim, eu sou um fatalista), então eu vou fazer apenas alguns comentários como se fossem fatos. Não imagine que eu tenha uma participação pessoal na promoção de um grupo à custa de outros. Eu sou 78, não têm descendentes e não parentes próximos e não se identificam com qualquer grupo político, nacional ou religioso e consideram os que eu pertenço por padrão como tão repulsivo como todo o resto. Os pais são os piores inimigos da vida na terra e, tomando a visão ampla das coisas, as mulheres são tão violentas quanto os homens, quando se considera o fato de que a violência das mulheres (como a maior parte do que feito pelos homens) é largamente feito em câmera lenta, a uma distância no tempo e no espaço e principalmente realizado por procuração por seus descendentes e por homens. Cada vez mais, as mulheres carregam crianças, independentemente de terem um companheiro e o efeito de parar uma mulher de reprodução é, em média, muito maior do que parar um homem, uma vez que são o gargalo reprodutivo. Pode-se ter a visão de que as pessoas e seus descendentes merecem ricamente qualquer miséria que vem seu caminho e (com raras exceções) os ricos e famosos são os piores infratores. Meryl Streep ou Bill Gates ou J. K Rowling e cada um de seus filhos podem destruir 50 toneladas de solo superior cada por ano para gerações no futuro, enquanto um agricultor indiano e seu pode destruir 1 tonelada. Se alguém nega que é bom, e aos seus descendentes eu digo "bem-vindo ao inferno na terra" (Welcome To Hell On Earth) (WTHOE). A ênfase hoje em dia é sempre sobre direitos humanos, mas é claro que se a civilização é ter uma chance, as responsabilidades humanas devem substituir os direitos humanos. Ninguém recebe direitos sem ser um cidadão responsável e a primeira coisa que isto significa é a destruição ambiental do minimo. A responsabilidade mais básica não é nenhuma criança, a menos que sua sociedade lhe peça para produzi-las. Uma sociedade ou um mundo que permite que as pessoas se reproduzem aleatoriamente serão sempre exploradas por genes egoístas até que ela desmorona (ou atinge um ponto onde a vida é tão horrível que não vale a pena viver). Se a sociedade continua a manter os direitos humanos como primários, a seus descendentes pode-se dizer com confiança "WTHOE". Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019). 244 Este não é um livro perfeito, mas é único, e se você desnatado o primeiro 400 ou assim páginas, o último 300 (de alguns 700) são uma tentativa muito boa para aplicar o que é conhecido sobre o comportamento de mudanças sociais na violência e maneiras ao longo do tempo. O tema básico é: como o nosso controle genético e limitar a mudança social? Surpreendentemente, ele não descreve a natureza da seleção de parentes (aptidão inclusiva), o que explica grande parte da vida social animal e humana. Ele também (como quase todos) carece de um quadro claro para descrever a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (LSR - termo preferencial de John Searle) que eu prefiro chamar a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior (DPHOT). Principalmente as críticas dadas por outros são mesquinharia e irrelevante e, como disse Pinker, ele não poderia escrever um livro coerente sobre "coisas ruins", nem poderia dar todas as referências possíveis e ponto de vista, mas ele deveria ter dito pelo menos algo sobre os muitos outras formas de abusar e explorar as pessoas e o planeta, uma vez que estas são agora muito mais severas para tornar irrelevante outras formas de violência. Estender o conceito de violência para incluir as conseqüências globaisa longo prazo da replicação dos genes de alguém, e ter uma noção da natureza de como a evolução funciona (ou seja, a seleção de parentes) fornecerá uma perspectiva muito diferente sobre a história, eventos atuais, e como as coisas são susceptíveis de ir nos próximos cem anos. Pode-se começar por notar que a diminuição da violência física sobre a história tem sido combinada (e tornou possível) pelo estupro constantemente crescente impiedoso do planeta (ou seja, pela destruição das pessoas do seu próprio futuro descendente's). Pinker (como a maioria das pessoas a maior parte do tempo) é muitas vezes distraído pelas superficialidades da cultura, quando é a biologia que importa. Veja meus comentários recentes de Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ' e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' para um breve resumo da vacuidade do altruísmo e da operação de seleção de parentes e da inutilidade e superficialidade de descrever o comportamento em cultural de acordo com os termos. Esta é a natureza clássica/nutrir a questão e a natureza supera nutrir-infinitamente. O que realmente importa é a violência feita para a terra pelo aumento implacável da população e destruição de recursos (devido à medicina e tecnologia e supressão de conflitos por policiais e militares). Cerca de 200.000 mais pessoas por dia (outro Las Vegas a cada 10 dias, outro los Angeles a cada mês), as 6 toneladas ou assim de solo superficial in do para o mar/pessoa/ano etc. significa que, a menos que algum milagre acontece a biosfera e a civilização será em grande parte colapso nos próximos dois séculos e haverá fome, miséria e violência de todos os tipos em uma escala escalonamento. As maneiras, as opiniões e as tendências das pessoas para cometer atos violentos não são relevantes a menos que possam fazer algo para evitar essa catástrofe, e eu não vejo como isso vai acontecer. Não há espaço para argumentos, e nenhum ponto ou (Sim, eu sou um fatalista), então eu vou fazer apenas alguns comentários como se 245 fossem fatos. Não imagine que eu tenha uma participação pessoal na promoção de um grupo à custa de outros. Eu sou 75, não têm descendentes e não parentes próximos e não se identificam com qualquer grupo político, nacional ou religioso e consideram os que eu pertenço por padrão como tão repulsivo como todo o resto. Os pais são os piores inimigos da vida na terra e, tomando a visão ampla das coisas, as mulheres são tão violentas quanto os homens, quando se considera o fato de que a violência das mulheres (como a maior parte do que feito pelos homens) é largamente feito em câmera lenta, a uma distância no tempo e no espaço e principalmente Carri por procuração por seus descendentes e por homens. Cada vez mais, as mulheres carregam crianças, independentemente de terem um companheiro e o efeito de parar uma mulher de reprodução é, em média, muito maior do que parar um homem, uma vez que são o gargalo reprodutivo. Pode-se ter a visão de que as pessoas e seus descendentes merecem ricamente qualquer miséria que vem seu caminho e (com raras exceções) os ricos e famosos são os piores infratores. Meryl Streep ou Bill Gates ou J. K. Rowling e cada um de seus filhos podem destruir 50 toneladas de solo superficial cada por ano para as gerações no futuro, enquanto um agricultor indiano e seu pode destruir 1 tonelada. Se alguém nega que é bom, e aos seus descendentes eu digo "bem-vindo ao inferno na terra" (WTHOE). A ênfase hoje em dia é sempre sobre direitos humanos, mas é claro que se a civilização é ter uma chance, as responsabilidades humanas devem substituir os direitos humanos. Ninguém recebe direitos (ou seja, privilégios) sem ser um cidadão responsável e a primeira coisa que isso significa é a destruição ambiental mínima. A responsabilidade mais básica não é nenhuma criança, a menos que sua sociedade lhe peça para produzi-las. Uma sociedade ou um mundo que permite que as pessoas se reproduzem aleatoriamente serão sempre exploradas por genes egoístas até que ela desmorona (ou atinge um ponto onde a vida é tão horrível que não vale a pena viver). Se a sociedade continua a manter os direitos humanos como primários, isso é bom e para seus descendentes pode-se dizer com confiança "WTHOE". "Ajudar" tem de ser visto a partir de uma perspectiva globala longo prazo. Quase toda a "ajuda" que é dada por indivíduos, organizações ou países prejudica os outros e o mundo a longo prazo e só deve ser dada após uma consideração muito cuidadosa. Se você quer entregar o dinheiro, a comida, a medicina, etc., você precisa de perguntar o que as conseqüências ambientais a longo prazo são. Se você quiser agradar a todos o tempo todo, novamente para seus descendentes eu digo "WTHOE". Disgenics: trilhões intermináveis de criaturas que começam com formas bactérias-like mais de 3.000.000.000 anos atrás morreram para nos criar e toda a vida atual e isso é chamado de eugenia, evolução por seleção natural ou seleção de parentes (aptidão inclusiva). Todos nós temos "genes maus", mas alguns são piores do que outros. Estima-se que até 50% de todas as concepções humanas terminam em aborto espontâneo devido a "genes ruins". A civilização é disgênica. Este problema é atualmente trivial em comparação com superpopulação, mas piorar a cada dia. A medicina, o bem-estar, a democracia, a igualdade, a justiça, os direitos humanos e a 246 "ajuda" de todos os tipos têm conseqüências ambientais e desenfreadas a longo prazo globais que desmoronarão a sociedade mesmo se o crescimento da população parar. Mais uma vez, se o mundo se recusa a acreditar ou não quer lidar com isso que é bom e para os seus (e todos) descendentes podemos dizer "WTHOE". Cuidado com os cenários utópicos que sugerem que o juízo final pode ser evitado pela aplicação criteriosa das tecnologias. Como eles dizem que você pode enganar algumas das pessoas o tempo todo e todas as pessoas um pouco do tempo, mas você não pode enganar a mãe natureza a qualquer momento. Deixo-vos com apenas um exemplo. O famoso cientista Raymond Kurzweil (veja minha resenha de ' como criar uma mente ') propôs nanorrobôs como salvadores da humanidade. Eles fariam tudo o que precisávamos e limpavam cada bagunça. Eles iriam mesmo fazer versões cada vez melhores de si mesmos. Eles nos manteriam como animais de estimação. Mas pense em quantas pessoas tratam seus animais de estimação, e animais de estimação estão sobrepovoando e destruindo e tornando-se disgênico quase tão rápido quanto os seres humanos (por exemplo, gatos domésticos e selvagens sozinhos matam talvez 100.000.000.000 animais silvestres por ano). Animais de estimação só existem porque nós destruímos a terra para alimentá-los e temos clínicas de neutro e eutanizar os doentes e indesejados. Nós praticamos rigoroso controle populacional e Eugenia sobre eles deliberadamente e por omissão, e nenhuma forma de vida pode evoluir ou existir sem esses dois controles - nem mesmo robos. E o que é para impedir que os nanorrobôs evoluam? Qualquer mudança que facilitou a reprodução seria automaticamente selecionado para e qualquer comportamento que desperdiçou tempo ou energia (ou seja, cuidar dos seres humanos) seria fortemente selecionado contra. O que impediria o programa de robôs controlados por ai de se transformar em uma forma homicida e explorar todos os recursos da Terra causando colapso global? Não há almoço livre para bots ou para eles também podemos dizer com confiança "WTHOE". Este é o lugar onde qualquer pensamento sobre o mundo eo comportamento humano deve levar uma pessoa educada, mas Pinker não diz nada sobre isso. Assim, as primeiras 400 páginas deste livro podem ser ignoradas e o último 300 lido como um sumário agradável do EP (Pssicologia Evolucionário) até à data de 2011. No entanto, como em seus outros livros e quase universalmente nas ciências comportamentais, não há um amplo quadro claro para a intencionalidade como pioneira por Wittgenstein, Searle e muitos outros. Eu apresentei uma tal estrutura em meus muitos comentários de obras de e sobre esses dois gênios psicológicos naturais e não vai repeti-lo aqui. 247 As mãos mortas da seleção de grupo e fenomenologia uma revisão de Individualidade e Entrelaçamento (Individuality and Entanglement) por Herbert Gintis 357p (2017) revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Desde Gintis é um economista sênior e eu li alguns de seus livros anteriores com interesse, eu estava esperando um pouco mais insights sobre o comportamento. Infelizmente, ele faz as mãos mortas de seleção de grupo e fenomenologia para as peças centrais de suas teorias de comportamento, e isso em grande parte invalida o trabalho. Pior, uma vez que ele mostra um julgamento tão ruim aqui, ele chama a questão de todo o seu trabalho anterior. A tentativa de ressuscitar a seleção de grupos por seus amigos em Harvard, Nowak e Wilson, há alguns anos foi um dos maiores escândalos em biologia na última década, e eu tenho narrado a triste história no meu artigo ' altruísmo, Jesus e do fim do mundo-como o Templeton Foundation comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização-uma revisão de E.O. Wilson 'A Conquista social da Terra' (The Social Conquest of Earth) (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). Ao contrário de Nowak, Gintis não parece ser motivado pelo fanatismo religioso, mas pelo forte desejo de gerar uma alternativa para as realidades sombrias da natureza humana, facilitada pela (perto Universal) falta de compreensão da biologia humana e Blank Slateism (tábua rasa) de cientistas comportamentais, outros acadêmicos e o público em geral. Gintis justamente ataca (como ele tem muitas vezes antes) economistas, sociólogos e outros cientistas comportamentais por não ter um quadro coerente para descrever o comportamento. Naturalmente, a estrutura necessária para entender o comportamento é um evolucionário. Infelizmente, ele não consegue fornecer um próprio (de acordo com seus muitos críticos e eu concordo), e a tentativa de transplantar o cadáver podre de seleção de grupo para qualquer teorias econômicas e psicológicas que ele gerou em suas décadas de trabalho, meramente invalida todo o seu projeto. Embora Gintis faz um esforço valente para entender e explicar a genética, como Wilson e Nowak, ele está longe de ser um perito, e como eles, a matemática apenas o cega para as impossibilidades biológicas e, claro, esta é a norma na ciência. Como Wittgenstein famosa observou na primeira página de cultura e valor "não há nenhuma denominação religiosa em que o uso indevido de expressões metafísicas tem sido responsável por tanto pecado como tem em matemática." Sempre foi evidente que um gene que provoca comportamento que diminui a sua 248 própria frequência não pode persistir, mas este é o cerne da noção de seleção de grupo. Além disso, tem sido bem conhecido e muitas vezes demonstrado que a seleção de grupo apenas reduz a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), que, como observou Dawkins, é apenas um outro nome para a evolução pela seleção natural. Como Wilson, Gintis tem trabalhado nesta arena por cerca de 50 anos e ainda não entendeu, mas depois que o escândalo quebrou, levei apenas 3 dias para encontrar, ler e entender o trabalho profissional mais relevante, como detalhado no meu artigo. É incompreensível para perceber que Gintis e Wilson foram incapazes de realizar isso em quase meio século. Discuto os erros de seleção de grupo e fenomenologia que são a norma na Academia como casos especiais da falha universal perto de entender a natureza humana que estão destruindo a América e o mundo. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. Desde Gintis é um economista sênior e eu li alguns de seus livros anteriores com interesse, eu estava esperando um pouco mais insights sobre o comportamento. Infelizmente, ele faz as mãos mortas de seleção de grupo e fenomenologia para as peças centrais de suas teorias de comportamento, e isso em grande parte invalida o trabalho. Pior, uma vez que ele mostra um julgamento tão ruim aqui, ele chama a questão de todo o seu trabalho anterior. A tentativa de ressuscitar a seleção de grupos por seus amigos em Harvard, Nowak e Wilson, há alguns anos foi um dos maiores escândalos em biologia na última década, e eu tenho narrado a triste história no meu artigo ' altruísmo, Jesus e do fim do mundo-como o Templeton Foundation comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização-uma revisão de E.O. Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ' (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012). Ao contrário de Nowak, Gintis não parece ser motivado pelo fanatismo religioso, mas pelo forte desejo de gerar uma alternativa para as realidades sombrias da natureza humana, facilitada pela (perto Universal) falta de compreensão da biologia humana básica e Blank Slateism (tábua rasa) de cientistas comportamentais, outros acadêmicos e o público em geral. Gintis justamente ataca (como ele tem muitas vezes antes) economistas, sociólogos e outros cientistas comportamentais por não ter um quadro coerente para descrever o comportamento. Naturalmente, a estrutura necessária para entender o 249 comportamento é um evolucionário. Infelizmente, ele não consegue fornecer um próprio (de acordo com seus muitos críticos e eu concordo), e a tentativa de transplantar o cadáver podre de seleção de grupo para quaisquer teorias econômicas e psicológicas que ele gerou em suas décadas de trabalho, apenas invalida todo o seu projeto. Embora Gintis faz um esforço valente para entender e explicar a genética, como Wilson e Nowak, ele está longe de ser um perito, e como eles, a matemática apenas o cega para as impossibilidades biológicas e, claro, esta é a norma na ciência. Como Wittgenstein famosa observou na primeira página de cultura e valor "não há nenhuma denominação religiosa em que o uso indevido de expressões metafísicas tem sido responsável por tanto pecado como tem em matemática." Sempre foi evidente que um gene que provoca comportamento que diminui a sua própria frequência não pode persistir, mas este é o cerne da noção de seleção de grupo. Além disso, tem sido bem conhecido e muitas vezes demonstrado que a seleção de grupo apenas reduz a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), que, como observou Dawkins, é apenas um outro nome para a evolução pela seleção natural. Como Wilson, Gintis tem trabalhado nesta arena por cerca de 50 anos e ainda não agarrou-lo, mas após o escândalo Wilson quebrou, levei apenas 3 dias para encontrar, ler e entender o trabalho profissional mais relevante, como detalhado no meu artigo. É incompreensível para perceber que Gintis e Wilson foram incapazes de realizar isso em quase meio século. Nos anos após o papel de Nowak, Wilson, e Tarnita foi publicado na natureza, diversos geneticistas da população recontado o capítulo e o verso no assunto, mostrando outra vez conclusivamente que é toda uma tempestade em um xícara de chá. É mais lamentável que Gintis, como seus amigos, não conseguiu perguntar a um biólogo competente sobre isso e considera como equivocada a 140 alguns biólogos bem conhecidos que assinaram uma carta protestando contra a publicação deste absurdo na natureza. Refiro-me àqueles que querem os detalhes sangrento para o meu papel, como é o melhor relato da luta que eu estou ciente. Para um sumário dos detalhes de tech Veja o artigo de Dawkins 'a descida de Edward Wilson' http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/Magazine/Edward-Wilson-social-ConquestEarth-Evolutionary-Errors-Origin-Species. Como Dawkins escreveu ' para Wilson não reconhecer que ele fala por si mesmo contra a grande maioria de seus colegas profissionais é-dói-me a dizer isso de um herói ao longo da vida um ato de arrogância de devassa '. Infelizmente, Gintis assimilou-se a uma empresa tão inglória. Há também alguns Youtubes Dawkins agradável, como https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lBweDk4ZzZ4. Gintis também não conseguiu fornecer o quadro comportamental faltando em todas as ciências sociais. É preciso ter uma estrutura lógica para a racionalidade, um compreensão dos dois sistemas de pensamento (teoria do processo dual), da divisão entre questões científicas de fato e questões filosóficas de como a linguagem funciona no contexto em questão, e de Como evitar o reducionismo e o cientifico, mas ele, como 250 quase todos os alunos de comportamento, é em grande parte clueless (sem nocao). Ele, como eles, é encantado por modelos, teorias e conceitos, e o impulso de explicar, enquanto Wittgenstein nos mostrou que só precisamos descrever, e que as teorias, conceitos etc., são apenas maneiras de usar a linguagem (jogos de linguagem) que têm valor apenas na medida em que eles ter um teste claro (verdadeiros criadores de verdade, ou como eminente filósofo John Searle gosta de dizer, condições claras de satisfação (COS)). Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. Depois de meio século no esquecimento, a natureza da consciência (intencionalidade, comportamento) é agora o tema mais quente nas ciências comportamentais e filosofia. Começando com o trabalho pioneiro de Ludwig Wittgenstein de 1930 (os livros azuis e marrons) a 1951, e dos 50 ' s ao presente por seus sucessores Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, leu, hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., eu criei o seguinte tabela como uma heurística para promover este estudo. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a estrutura lógica de racionalidade (LSR-Searle), de comportamento (LSB), de personalidade (LSP), de Mind (LSM), de linguagem (LSL), de realidade (LSOR), de intencionalidade (LSI)-o termo filosófico clássico, a psicologia descritiva da consciência (DPC), o descritivo Psicologia do pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, a linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. As idéias para esta tabela originaram no trabalho por Wittgenstein, uma tabela muito mais simples por Searle, e correlaciona-se com as tabelas extensivas e grafiicos nos três livros recentes na natureza humana pelo hacker de P. M. S. As últimas 9 fileiras vêm principalmente da pesquisa da decisão por Johnathan St. B.T. Evans e colegas como revisado por mim mesmo. O sistema 1 é involuntário, reflexivo ou automatizado "regras" R1 ao pensar (cognição) não tem lacunas e é voluntária ou deliberativa "regras" R2 e dispostos (Volition) (Vontade) tem 3 lacunas (ver Searle). Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar 251 os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste "e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. Eu fiz explicações detalhadas sobre esta tabela em meus outros escritos. 252 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugarAqui e agora ou lá e então (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 253 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I Condições públicas de satisfação de S2 são muitas vezes referidos por Searle e outros como cos, representações, verdadeiros ou significados (ou COS2 por mim), enquanto os resultados automáticos de S1 são designado como apresentações por outros (ou COS1 por mim). * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então É de interesse para comparar isso com as várias tabelas e gráficos em Peter Hacker ' s recentes 3 volumes sobre a natureza humana. Deve-se sempre ter em mente a 254 descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. Ele nos mostrou que há apenas um problema filosófico - o uso de sentenças (jogos de linguagem) em um contexto inadequado e, portanto, apenas uma solução - mostrando o contexto correto. Gintis começa a fazer alegações duvidosas, vagas ou francamente bizarras no início do livro. Ele começa na primeira página da visão geral com citações sem sentido de Einstein e Ryle. Em pXII o parágrafo início ' terceiro tema ' sobre mentes emaranhadas precisa reescrever para especificar que os jogos de linguagem são funções do sistema 2 e é assim que pensar, acreditando etc trabalho (o que são), enquanto o quarto tema que tenta explicar o comportamento como devido à o que as pessoas acreditam conscientemente é certo. Ou seja, com ' nonconsequentialismo ' ele está tentando ' explicar ' o comportamento como ' altruísta ' Seleção de grupo mediada pelo sistema linguístico consciente 2. Mas se tomarmos uma visão de longo prazo evolutiva, é claramente devido ao altruísmo recíproco, tentando servir aptidão inclusiva, que é mediada pela operação inconsciente do sistema 1. Da mesma forma, para o quinto tema e o resto da visão geral. Ele favorece o rational choice (escolha racional), mas não tem idéia de que este é um jogo de linguagem para o qual o contexto exato deve ser especificado, nem que o sistema 1 e o sistema 2 sejam "racionais", mas de maneiras bem diferentes. Este é o erro clássico da maioria das descrições de comportamento, que Searle chamou a ilusão fenomenológica, Pinker a ardósia em branco e Tooby e Cosmides ' o modelo de ciência social padrão ' e eu discuti-lo extensivamente em minhas outras revisões e artigos. Contanto que um não apreender que a maioria de nosso comportamento é automatizado pelo sistema nonlingüístico 1, e que nosso sistema lingüístico consciente 2 é na maior parte para a racionalização de nossas escolhas compulsivas e inconscientes, não é possible ter mais do que muito visão superficial do comportamento, i. e., o que é quase universal, não só entre os acadêmicos, mas os políticos, os proprietários bilionário de empresas de alta tecnologia, estrelas de cinema e do público em geral. Consequentemente, as conseqüências chegam muito além da academia, produzindo políticas sociais delirantes que trazem o colapso da civilização industrial . Veja o meu "suicídio pela democracia-um obituário para a América e o mundo". É de tirar o fôlego para ver a América e as democracias Européias ajudando os cidadãos do terceiro mundo a destruir o futuro de todos. No pXIII pode-se descrever o ' nonconsequentialista ' (ou seja, aparentemente ' verdadeiro ' comportamento altruísta ou autodestrutivo) como realmente realizando o altruísmo recíproco, servindo a aptidão inclusiva devido a genes evoluídos no EEE (ambiente de evolutivo Adaptação - i. e., a de nossos ancestrais muito distantes), que estimula os circuitos dopaminérgicos no tegmento ventral e o núcleo accumbens, com a consequente liberação de dopamina que nos faz sentir bem - o mesmo mecanismo que parece estar envolvido na todo o comportamento aditivo do abuso de drogas às mamãs do futebol. 255 E um balbuciar mais incoerente, como "no contexto de tais ambientes, há um benefício de aptidão para a" transmissão epigenética "de tais" informações "sobre o" estado atual "do" ambiente ", ou seja, a transmissão através de não-genética ' canais '. Isto é chamado de "transmissão cultural" "[o medo cita meu]. Além disso, essa ' cultura ' é ' diretamente codificada ' no cérebro (p7), que ele diz ser o principal princípio da coevolução da cultura gênica, e que as instituições democráticas e a votação são altruístas e não podem ser explicadas em termos de interesse próprio (p17-18). A razão principal para estas vistas peculiares não sai realmente até p186 quando ele finalmente deixa claro que ele é um grupo seleccionista. Uma vez que não há tal coisa como seleção de grupo para além da aptidão inclusiva, não é nenhuma surpresa que este é apenas mais um relato incoerente de comportamento-i. e., mais ou menos o que Tooby e Cosmides famosa denominado el padrão de ciência social modelo (standard social science model) ou Pinker ' The Blank Slate (tabula rasa)'. O que ele chama de ' genes altruístas ' no p188 deve ser chamado ' em genes de aptidão inlusivo ' ou ' genes de seleção de parentes '. Gintis também está muito impressionado com a idéia de gene-cultura coevolução, que só significa que a cultura pode ser um agente de seleção natural, mas ele não consegue entender que isso só pode acontecer dentro do contexto de natural seleção (aptidão inclusiva). Como quase todos os cientistas sociais (e cientistas, filósofos etc.), nunca entra sua mente que ' cultura ', ' coevolução', ' simbólico ', ' ' epigenetico ', ' informação ', ' representação ' etc., são todas as famílias de jogos de linguagem complexa , cujo COS (condições de satisfação, testes para a verdade) são primorosamente sensíveis ao contexto. Sem um contexto específico, eles não significam nada. Assim, neste livro, como na maioria da literatura sobre o comportamento, há muita conversa que tem a aparência do sentido sem sentido (significado ou claro cos). Sua reivindicação em pXV, que a maioria de nossos genes são o resultado da cultura, é claramente absurdo como por exemplo, é sabido que nós somos aproximadamente 98% chimpanzé. Só se ele quer dizer aqueles relacionados com a linguagem podemos aceitar a possibilidade de que alguns dos nossos genes foram sujeitos a seleção cultural e até mesmo estes meramente modificados que já existiam-i. e., alguns pares de base foram alterados de centenas de milhares ou milhões em cada gene. Ele é muito tomado com o "ator racional" modelo de comportamento econômico. Mas, novamente, não é de se saber que as automaticidades de S1 fundamentam todo o comportamento "racional" e as deliberações linguísticas conscientes de S2 não pode ter lugar sem eles. Como muitos, talvez a grande maioria dos atuais estudantes mais jovens de comportamento, vejo todas as atividades humanas como resultados facilmente compreensíveis do trabalho de genética egoísta em um contexto contemporâneo em que a vigilância policial e uma abundância temporária de recursos, obtidos por estuprar a terra e roubando nossos próprios descendentes, leva à relativa tranqüilidade temporária. Neste âmbito, sugiro a minha análise do livro recente de Pinker - a supressão transitória dos piores demônios da nossa natureza - uma revisão dos melhores anjos da nossa natureza. 256 Muitos comportamentos olham como o altruísmo verdadeiro, e alguns são (isto é, diminuirão a freqüência dos genes que os trazem aproximadamente-isto é, conduzem à extinção de seus próprios descendentes), mas o ponto que Gintis falta é que estes são devido a um psicologia que evoluísse Há muito tempo em pequenos grupos nas planícies africanas no AAE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva) e fez sentido então (ou seja, era aptidão inclusiva, quando todos no nosso grupo de algumas dezenas de algumas centenas foram os nossos parentes próximos), e por isso muitas vezes continuamos com esses comportamentos, embora eles não fazem mais sentido (ou seja, eles servem os interesses de pessoas não relacionadas ou distante relacionados que diminui a nossa aptidão genética, diminuindo a frequência dos genes que tornaram possível). Isso explica a sua promoção da noção de que muitos comportamentos são "verdadeiramente altruístas", em vez de egoísmo na origem (como na seita. 3,2). Ele ainda observa isso e chama-o de "efetividade distribuída" (de- -63) em que as pessoas se comportam em grandes eleições como se fossem pequenas, mas ele não consegue ver isso não é devido a quaisquer genes para ' verdadeiro altruísmo ', mas para os genes para o altruísmo recíproco (aptidão inclusiva) , que é, naturalmente, egoísta. Assim, as pessoas se comportam como se suas ações (por exemplo, seus votos) fossem consequentes, embora seja claro que não são. Por exemplo, pode-se encontrar na net que as chances de qualquer voto de uma pessoa decidir o resultado de uma eleição presidencial americana está na faixa de milhões de dezenas de milhões para um. E, claro, o mesmo é verdadeiro de nossas chances de ganhar uma loteria, mas a nossa psicologia do AAE mau funcionamento faz loterias e votar atividades imensamente populares. Ele também parece desconhecer a terminologia padrão e as formas de descrever o comportamento utilizado na psicologia evolutiva (EP). Por exemplo, no p75 o descrição de Arrow obre de normas de comportamento social são descritos em termos econômicos e não como EP do AAE tentando operar em ambientes atuais, e no fundo da página, as pessoas agem não como "altruístas" algozes (ou seja, como ' de grupo), mas como punidores de aptidão inclusiva. Em p 78, para dizer que os sujeitos agem ' moralmente ' ou em acordo com uma norma ' para seu próprio bem ', é novamente para abraçar o grupo seleccionista/ilusão fenomenológica, e claramente é grupos de genes que estão tentando aumentar a sua aptidão inclusiva através mecanismos bem conhecidos do EP como a deteção e a punição do trapaceiro. Mais uma vez, em p88, o que ele descreve como outro-em relação a ações altruístas pode tão facilmente ser descrito como auto em relação a tentativas de egoísmo recíproco que se desviam em uma grande sociedade. Naturalmente, ele freqüentemente usa jargão de economia padrão, como "o prévio subjetivo deve ser interpretado como uma probabilidade condicional", o que significa apenas uma crença na probabilidade de um resultado específico (p90-91), e "antecedentes subjetivos comuns" (crenças compartilhadas) P122. Muito do livro e do comportamento concerne o que é chamado frequentemente "nós intencionalidad" ou a construção da realidade social, mas o teórico o mais eminente nesta arena, John Searle, não é discutido, sua terminologia agora padrão tal como cos e DIRA (desire independent reasons for action) (independente do desejo razões de ação) não 257 aparece, ele não está no índice, e apenas uma de suas muitas obras, e que mais de 20 anos de idade, é encontrado na bibliografia. Em p97 ele comenta favoravelmente sobre a atualização Bayesiana sem mencionar que é notório por faltar qualquer teste significativo para o sucesso (ou seja, claro cos), e comumente não fazer quaisquer previsões claras, de modo que não importa o que as pessoas fazem, ele pode ser feito para desbuímos seu comportamento após o fato. No entanto, o principal problema com o capítulo 5 é que "racional" e outros termos são jogos de linguagem complexa que não têm significado para além de contextos muito específicos, que normalmente estão faltando aqui. Naturalmente, como Wittgenstein mostrou-nos, este é o problema do núcleo de toda a discussão do comportamento e Gintis tem a maioria da comunidade comportamental da ciência (ou pelo menos a maioria daquelas sobre 40) como coconspirators. Da mesma forma, ao longo do livro, como o capítulo 6, onde discute ' teoria da complexidade ', ' propriedades emergentes ', ' macro e microníveis ' e ' sistemas dinâmicos não lineares ' e a geração de ' modelos ' (o que pode significar quase nada e ' descrever ' quase nada), mas é apenas uma previsão que conta (ou seja, claro COS). Apesar de sua ilusão fenomenológica (ou seja, a suposição quase universal de que nossas deliberações conscientes descrevem e controlam o comportamento – em desacordo com praticamente toda a pesquisa em psicologia social nos últimos 40 anos), ele também compartilha o reducionista ilusão, querendo saber por que as ciências sociais não tem uma teoria analítica do núcleo e não se coalescido. Este é naturalmente um assunto freqüente nas ciências sociais e na filosofia e a razão é que o psicologia do pensamento mais elevado da ordem não é descritível por causas, mas por razões, e um não pode fazer a psicologia desaparecer na fisiologia nem no fisiologia em bioquímica nem ele em física etc. Eles são apenas diferentes e indispensáveis níveis de descrição. Searle escreve sobre isso muitas vezes e Wittgenstein descreveu-o famosa 80 anos há no livro azul. "Nosso desejo de generalidade tem [como uma] fonte... nossa preocupação com o método da ciência. Refiro-me ao método de reduzir a explicação dos fenômenos naturais para o menor número possível de leis naturais primitivas; e, em matemática, de unificar o tratamento de diferentes temas usando uma generalização. Os filósofos constantemente vêem o método da ciência diante de seus olhos, e são irresistivelmente tentados a perguntar e responder na forma como a ciência faz. Esta tendência é a verdadeira fonte da metafísica, e leva o filósofo para a escuridão completa. Eu quero dizer aqui que nunca pode ser nosso trabalho para reduzir qualquer coisa a qualquer coisa, ou para explicar qualquer coisa. A filosofia é realmente "puramente descritiva". Ele também está completamente fora de contato com o mundo contemporâneo, pensando que as pessoas vão ser agradáveis porque eles têm altruísmo internalizado (ou seja, seleção de grupo), e com as realidades demográficas, quando ele opina que o crescimento da população está controle, quando na verdade previsões são para 258 outro 3.000.000.000 por 2100 (P133), a violência está aumentando e a perspectiva é desagradável de fato. Ele vê uma necessidade de "esculpir um nicho acadêmico para a sociologia" (p148), mas toda a discussão é típica jargão (não claro cos), e todos um realmente precisa (ou pode dar) é uma clara descrição dos jogos de linguagem (a mente no trabalho) que jogamos em si situações sociais, e como eles mostram como nossas tentativas no trabalho inclusivo da aptidão ou se desviam em contextos contemporâneo. Mais e mais ele empurra a sua fantasia de que "comportamento inerentemente ético" (ou seja, o altruísmo seleccionista grupo) explica o nosso comportamento social, ignorando os fatos óbvios que é devido à abundância temporária de recursos, polícia e vigilância, e que sempre quando você tira isso daqui, selvageria rapidamente emerge (por exemplo, p151). É fácil manter tais ilusões quando se vive no mundo da torre de marfim de teorias abstruso, desatento aos milhões de golpes, roubos, estupor, assaltos, roubos e assassinatos ocorrendo todos os dias. Novamente, e novamente, (por exemplo, Top p170) ele ignora as explicações óbvias para a nossa "racionalidade", que é a seleção natural-ou seja, aptidão inclusiva no EEE levando a ESS (evolutivamente estratégias estáveis), ou pelo menos eles foram mais ou menos estáveis em pequenos grupos 100.000 a 3 milhões anos atrás. O capítulo 9 sobre a sociologia do genoma é inevitavelmente cheio de erros e incoerência - por. g., não há "genes altruístas" especiais, em vez disso, todos os genes servem aptidão inclusiva ou desaparecem (p188). O problema é que a única maneira de realmente obter genética egoísta e fitness inclusiva em todo é ter Gintis em uma sala para um dia com Dawkins, Franks, Coyne, etc., explicando por que é errado. Mas, como sempre, um tem que ter um certo nível de educação, inteligência, racionalidade e honestidade para que isso funcione, e se um é apenas um pouco curto em várias categorias, ele não terá sucesso. O mesmo, claro, é verdade para grande parte da compreensão humana, e assim a grande maioria nunca vai conseguir nada que é de todo sutil. Tal como acontece com o Nowak, Wilson, Tarnita papel, estou certo de que Dawkins, Franks e outros teriam sido dispostos a passar por cima deste capítulo e explicar onde ele vai extraviado.. O principal problema é que as pessoas simplesmente não entendem o conceito de seleção natural por aptidão inclusiva, nem de motivações subconscientes, e que muitos têm motivações ' religiosas ' para rejeitá-los. Isso inclui não apenas o público geral e acadêmicos não-científicos, mas uma grande percentagem de biólogos e cientistas comportamentais. Recentemente me deparei com uma revisão adorável por Dawkins de uma discussão sobre a idéia de gene egoísta por biólogos profissionais de nível superior, em que ele teve que passar por cima de sua linha de trabalho por linha para explicar que eles simplesmente não entender como tudo funciona. Mas apenas um pequeno número de pessoas como ele poderia fazer isso, e o mar de confusão é vasto, e assim estes delírios sobre a natureza humana que destroem este livro, e estão destruindo a América e o mundo vai, como a rainha disse a Alice em um contexto ligeiramente diferente , continue até que eles chegam ao fim e depois parar. 259 Altruísmo, Jesus e o fim do mundo - como a Fundação Templeton comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização. Uma revisão de E.O. Wilson ' A Conquista Social da Terra ' (The Social Conquest of Earth) (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' SuperCooperators ' (2012) (revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Famoso formiga-homem E.O. Wilson sempre foi um dos meus heróis-não só um excelente biólogo, mas um dos minúsculos e desaparecendo minoria de intelectuais que, pelo menos, se atreve a sugerir a verdade sobre a nossa natureza que os outros não conseguem entender, ou na medida em que do agarrar , de forma a evitar a conveniência política. Infelizmente, ele está terminando sua longa carreira em uma moda mais sórdido como um partido para um ataque ignorante e arrogante sobre a ciência motivada pelo menos em parte pelo fervor religioso de seus colegas de Harvard. Mostra as conseqüências vis quando as universidades aceitam o dinheiro dos grupos religiosos, as revistas da ciência são tão impressionado com por nomes grandes que evitam a revisão apropriada do par, e quando os egos são permitidos sair do controle. Leva-nos para a natureza da evolução, os fundamentos da metodologia científica, como a matemática se relaciona com a ciência, o que constitui uma teoria, e até mesmo as atitudes de religião e generosidade são apropriadas como nós inexoravelmente abordar o colapso da indústria da civilização. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. Famoso formiga-homem E.O. Wilson sempre foi um dos meus heróis-não só um excelente biólogo, mas um dos minúsculos e desaparecendo minoria de intelectuais que pelo menos se atreve a sugerir a verdade sobre a nossa natureza que os outros 260 não conseguem entender, ou na medida em que eles entendem , para evitar de forma estudiosa a conveniência política. Infelizmente, ele está terminando sua longa carreira em uma moda mais sórdido como um partido para um ataque ignorante e arrogante sobre a ciência motivada pelo menos em parte pelo fervor religioso de seus colegas de Harvard. Mostra as conseqüências vis quando as universidades aceitam o dinheiro dos grupos religiosos, as revistas da ciência são tão impressionado com por nomes grandes que evitam a revisão apropriada do par, e quando os egos são permitidos sair do controle. Leva-nos para a natureza da evolução, os fundamentos da metodologia científica, como a matemática se relaciona com a ciência, o que constitui uma teoria, e até mesmo as atitudes de religião e generosidade são apropriadas como nós inexoravelmente abordar o colapso da indústria da civilização. Eu encontrei seções em ' Conquest ' com o habitual comentário incisivo (embora nada realmente novo ou interessante se você leu seus outros trabalhos e estão em cima de desculpologia em geral) na prosa muitas vezes-empolado que é sua marca registrada, mas foi bastante surpreso que o núcleo do livro é a sua rejeição da aptidão inclusiva (que tem sido um pilar da biologia evolutiva para mais de 50 anos) em favor da seleção de grupo. Supõe-se que vindo dele e com o les articulo se refere a publicado por si mesmo e Harvard matemática colega Nowak em grandes revistas revisada por pares como Nature, deve ser um avanço substancial, apesar do fato de que eu sabia que a seleção de grupo foi quase universalmente rejeitada como tendo qualquer papel importante na evolução. Tenho lido inúmeros comentários na net e muitos têm bons comentários, mas o que eu mais queria ver foi que pelo renomado escritor de ciência e evolucionista biólogo Richard Dawkins. Ao contrário da maioria dos profissionais, que estão em revistas apenas disponíveis para aqueles com acesso a uma universidade, ele está prontamente disponível na rede, embora aparentemente, ele decidiu não publicá-lo em um jornal como é apropriadamente contundente. Infelizmente, encontra-se uma rejeição devastadora do livro e o comentário mais acerba sobre um colega científico que eu já vi de Dawkins-excedendo qualquer coisa em suas muitas trocas com demagogo atrasado e a em lamentar e pseudocientista Stephan Jay Gould. Embora Gould foi infame por seus ataques pessoais em seu colega de Harvard Wilson, Dawkins observa que muito de ' Conquest ' lembra um desconfortavelmente dos lapsos freqüentes de Gould em "ecumenicalismo brando, desfocadas". O mesmo é mais ou menos verdade de toda a escrita popular de Wilson, incluindo o seu livro mais recente "o significado da existência humana" outra autopromoção sem vergonha de suas idéias desacreditadas em fitness inclusiva (IF). Dawkins aponta que o papel 2010 notório por Nowak, Tarnita e Wilson na natureza foi quase universalmente rejeitado por mais de 140 biólogos que assinaram uma carta e que não há uma palavra sobre isso no livro de Wilson. Nem eles corrigiram isso nos 4 anos subsequentes de artigos, palestras e vários livros. Não há escolha senão concordar com o comentário do mordaz de Dawkin "para que Wilson não reconheça que fala para ele mesmo de encontro à grande maioria de seus colegas profissionais é 261 -dói-me dizer isto de um herói ao longo da vida--um ato da arrogância devassa." Tendo em vista o comportamento subsequente de Nowak, deve-se incluí-lo também. Eu me sinto como uma das pessoas atordoadas um vê na TV sendo entrevistado depois que o homem agradável ao lado, que tem sido babá de todos os filhos por 30 anos, é exposto como um assassino em serie. Dawkins também aponta (como ele e outros têm feito por muitos anos) que a aptidão inclusiva é implicada por (ou seja, logicamente segue de) neo-Darwinismo e não pode ser rejeitado sem rejeitar a própria evolução. Wilson novamente nos lembra Gould, que denunciou criacionistas de um lado de sua boca, dando-lhes conforto, vomitando infindáveis ultra-liberais marxista-tingido jargão sobre spandrels (cascas), equilíbrio pontuado e psicologia evolucionária do outro. A imprecisão e opacidade matemática (para a maioria de nós) da matemática do grupo ou seleção multinível é apenas o que o maci-mente quer habilitá-los a escapar do pensamento racional em seus intermináveis reclamações anticientíficos, e (na academia) pós-modernista saladas de palavras. Pior ainda, ' conquista ' Wilson é um mal pensado e desleixadamente bagunça escrito cheio de non-sequiturs, divagações vagas, confusões e incoerência. Uma boa revisão que detalha alguns destes é que pelo estudante de pós-graduação Gerry Carter que você pode encontrar na net. Wilson também está fora de contato com a nossa atual compreensão da psicologia evolutiva (EP) (ver por exemplo, as últimas 300 páginas de Pinker ' s "os melhores anjos da nossa natureza"). Se você quer um relato sério livro comprimento da evolução social e alguns EP relevante de um perito ver "Princípios da Evolução Social" por Andrew F.G. Bourke, ou um não muito grave e reconhecidamente faltado e divagar conta, mas um deve ler, no entanto, por Robert Trivers-'S Loucura dos Tolos: a lógica do engano e do auto-decepção na vida humana' e mais velhos, mas ainda correntes e penetrantes obras como 'a Evolução da Cooperação': edição revisada por Robert Axelrod e "A Biologia dos Sistemas Morais" por Richard Alexander. Depois de ler este livro e seus comentários, eu cavei em alguns dos artigos científicos que responderam a Nowak e Wilson e as críticas de Van Veelen da equação Price sobre a qual eles confiaram muito. Os comentários observaram que sempre foi claro que a matemática de seleção de grupo ou multinível reduz-se à aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes) e que não é logicamente possível selecionar para o comportamento que não beneficia os genes que são únicos para o ator e seus parentes imediatos. Para colocálo sem rodeios, comportamento "altruísta" é sempre egoísta no final, no sentido de que aumenta a sobrevivência dos genes no altruísta. Isto para mim é óbvio da vida diária e todos os cientistas que afirmam de outra forma claramente perderam o seu caminho. Sim, isso acontece na estranheza da vida moderna (ou seja, tão diferente da sociedade da idade da pedra em que evoluímos) que às vezes vê uma pessoa dar a sua vida para proteger uma pessoa não relacionada, mas claramente, eles não vão fazê-lo novamente e (desde o seu feito antes de replicar) qualquer tendência para fazê-lo não será herdada também. Mesmo que eles já replicou eles vão, em média, deixar para trás menos descendentes do que se manteve para trás. Isso garante que qualquer tendência genética para o "verdadeiro altruísmo"-ou seja, o comportamento que 262 diminui uns genes na população--será selecionado contra e não mais do que esta lógica muito básica é necessária para compreender a evolução pela seleção natural, parentes seleção e aptidão inclusiva - todas as sutilezas matemáticas que servem apenas para quantificar as coisas e para esclarecer arranjos de vida estranhos em alguns de nossos parentes (por exemplo, formigas, cupins e ratos mole). O principal foco do grupo seleccionista entusiastas ataque foi a famosa equação de preço estendido que tem sido usado para modelar a aptidão inclusiva, publicado por Price cerca de 40 anos atrás. O melhor papels desmascarar esses ataques que eu encontrei são os de Frank e Bourke e eu vou começar com algumas citações de Frank ' Natural Selection. IV. a equação de Price ' J. EVOL. BIOL. 25 (2012) 1002 – 1019. "Os críticos confundem os papéis distintos da teoria abstrata geral e de modelos dinâmicos concretos para casos particulares. O poder duradouro da equação Price surge da descoberta de invariâncias essenciais na seleção natural. Por exemplo, a teoria da seleção de parentes expressa problemas biológicos em termos de coeficientes de parentesco. A parentesco mede a associação entre parceiros sociais. A medida adequada de parentesco identifica cenários biológicos distintos com o mesmo desfecho evolutivo (invariante). As relações de invariância proporcionam os mais profundos insights do pensamento científico... Essencialmente, todas as discussões modernas de seleção multinível e seleção de grupo derivam de Price (1972a), como desenvolvido por Hamilton (1975). Price e Hamilton observaram que a equação Price pode ser expandida recursivamente para representar níveis aninhados de análise, por exemplo, indivíduos vivendo em grupos... Todas as percepções conceituais modernas sobre a seleção de grupo derivam da expansão recursiva de Price de sua expressão abstrata de seleção... Uma crítica a estas aplicações de equação de preço é uma crítica à abordagem central da genética quantitativa evolutiva. Tais críticas podem ser válidas para determinadas aplicações, mas devem ser avaliadas no contexto mais amplo da teoria quantitativa da genética... [e em uma citação de Price... ' A mudança de frequência genética é o evento básico na evolução biológica. A seguinte equação... que dá a mudança de freqüência a seleção de uma geração para a próxima para um único gene ou para qualquer função linear de qualquer número de genes em qualquer número de loci, detém para qualquer tipo de dominância ou epistasio, para reprodução sexual ou assexuada, para aleatório ou acasalamento não aleatório, para espécies diploides, haplóides ou poliploides, e até mesmo para espécies imaginárias com mais de dois sexos '...] ... A análise de caminho (contextual) segue como uma extensão natural da equação preço, na qual se faz modelos específicos de condicionamento físico expressos por regressão. Não faz sentido discutir a equação de preço e análise de caminho como alternativas... Críticas da equação de preço raramente distinguem os custos e benefícios de suposições particulares em relação a metas específicas. Eu uso a recente série de documentos de Van Veelen como um proxy para essas críticas. Essa série repete alguns dos mal-entendidos comuns e acrescenta alguns novos." Nowak recentemente repetiu Van Veelen crítica como a base para o seu comentário sobre a equação de Price (Van Veelen, 2005; Nowak et al., 2010; Van Veelen et al., 263 2010; Nowak & Highfield, 2011; Van Veelen, 2011; Van Veelen et al., 2012... Esta citação de Van Veelen et al. (2012) demonstra uma abordagem interessante para a bolsa de estudos. Eles primeiro citar Frank como afirmando que a insuficiência dinâmica é uma desvantagem da equação Price. Eles, então, discordam com esse ponto de vista e apresentam como sua própria interpretação um argumento que é quase idêntico no conceito e frasear a minha própria declaração no próprio papel que eles citaram como a base para o seu desacordo... A forma recursiva da equação de preço completa fornece a base para todos os estudos modernos de seleção de grupo e análise multinível. A equação Price ajudou a descobrir as várias conexões, embora existam muitas outras maneiras de derivar as mesmas relações... A teoria da seleção de parente deriva muito do seu poder, identificando uma quantidade informativa invariável suficiente para unificar uma grande variedade de processos aparentemente diferentes (Frank, 1998, capítulo 6). A interpretação da seleção de parentes como uma invariância informativa não foi totalmente desenvolvida e continua sendo um problema aberto. As invariâncias proporcionam a base da compreensão científica: "é apenas um pouco exagerando o caso para dizer que a física é o estudo da simetria" (Anderson, 1972). Invariância e simetria significam a mesma coisa (Weyl, 1983). Feynman (1967) enfatizou que a invariância é o caráter da lei física. Os padrões comumente observados de probabilidade podem ser unificados pelo estudo da invariância e sua associação com a medida (Frank & Smith, 2010, 2011). Houve pouco esforço na biologia para perseguir a compreensão similar da invariância e da medida (Frank, 2011; Houle et al., 2011). Espero que esteja se tornando claro por que eu escolhi o título que eu fiz para este artigo. Para atacar a equação de Price e aptidão inclusiva é atacar não só genética quantitativa e evolução pela seleção natural, mas os conceitos universalmente utilizados de covariância, invariância e simetria, que são básicos para ciência e à racionalidade. Além disso, a motivação religiosa claramente expressa de Nowak convida-nos a considerar em que medida tais virtudes cristãs como verdadeiro altruísmo (permanentemente geneticamente auto-diminuindo) e a Irmandade do homem (mulher, criança, cão etc.) pode ser parte de um racional programa de sobrevivência no futuro próximo. Minha opinião é que o verdadeiro altruísmo é um luxo para aqueles que não se importam de ser evolutivos beco sem saída e que, mesmo em sua "fazer acreditar" versão de fitness inclusiva, um será duramente pressionado para encontrá-lo quando o lobo está na porta (ou seja, o universal provável cenário para os 10 bilhão no próximo século). Há muito mais nesta ideia, que vai em detalhe lógico e matemático requintado (e do mesmo modo seus muitos outros papéis-você pode obter todos os 7 nesta série em um PDF), mas isso vai dar o sabor. Outro episódio divertido diz respeito à tautologia em matemática. Frank novamente: ' Nowak & Highfield (2011) e Van Veelen et al. (2012) acreditam que seus argumentos demonstram que a equação Price é verdadeira no mesmo sentido trivial, e eles chamam esse tipo de verdade trivial de uma tautologia matemática. Curiosamente, revistas, artigos on-line e da literatura científica têm há vários anos usando a frase tautologia matemático para a equação Price, embora Nowak & Highfield (2011) e Van Veelen et al. (2012) não fornecem citações para 264 literatura anterior. Tanto quanto eu sei, a primeira descrição da equação de Price como uma tautologia matemática foi no estudo de Frank (1995). Ao contrário de Frank, Lamm e outros, os entusiastas não mostraram qualquer entendimento da filosofia da ciência (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior, como eu gosto de chamá-lo) nestes livros e artigos recentes, nem em qualquer um dos numerosos Wilson livros populares e artigos sobre o último meio século, então eu não esperaria que eles tenham estudado Wittgenstein (o filósofo mais penetrante da matemática), que famosa observou que em matemática ' tudo é sintaxe, nada é semântica '. Wittgenstein expõe um mal-entendido quase universal do papel da matemática na ciência. Toda a matemática (e lógica) é uma tautologia que não tem significado ou uso até que esteja ligado à nossa vida com palavras. Cada equação é uma tautologia até que números e palavras e o sistema de convenções que chamamos de psicologia evolucionária sejam empregados. Surpreendentemente Lamm em seu artigo excelente recente ' uma introdução suave para a equação de Price ' (2011) observa isso: "A equação de preço lida com qualquer processo de seleção. Na verdade, podemos definir a seleção usando-o. Ele não diz nada em particular sobre a evolução biológica ou genética, e não está vinculado a qualquer cenário biológico particular. Isto dá-lhe imenso poder, mas também significa que é bem possível aplicá-lo incorrectamente ao mundo real. Isso nos leva à segunda e última observação. A equação de preço é analítica [verdad por definição ou tautologico]. Não é uma proposição sintética [uma questão empírica quanto à sua verdade ou falsidade]. Nós o derivamos com base em definições diretas e princípios matemáticos universais. A equação simplesmente fornece uma maneira útil de interpretar o significado das definições diretas que começamos. Este, porém, não é o caso, uma vez que você colocar a equação em palavras, interpretando assim as relações matemáticas. Se você simplesmente dizer: _ I definir ' selection ' para ser a covariância blá blá blá, você pode estar seguro. Se você disser: _ The covariance blá blá blá é a seleção, você está fazendo uma reivindicação com conteúdo empírico. Mais fundamentalmente, a crença de que as regras de teoria da probabilidade e estatísticas, ou qualquer outra manipulação matemática, descrevem o mundo real é sintético." A este respeito, também é recomendado Helantera e Uller ' A equação de Price e herança estendida ' Philos Theor Biol (2010) 2: E101. "Aqui usamos a equação de Price como ponto de partida para uma discussão das diferenças entre quatro categorias recentemente propostas de sistemas de herança; genética, epigenética, comportamental e simbólica. Especificamente, abordamos como os componentes da equação de preço abrangem diferentes sistemas não genéticos de herança na tentativa de esclarecer como os diferentes sistemas são conceitualmente relacionados. Concluímos que as quatro classes de sistemas de herança não formam clusters distintos em relação ao seu efeito sobre a taxa e direção da mudança fenotípica de uma geração para a próxima na ausência ou presença de seleção. Em vez disso, nossas análises sugerem que diferentes sistemas de herança 265 podem compartilhar recursos que são conceitualmente muito semelhantes, mas que suas implicações para a evolução adaptativa, no entanto, diferem substancialmente como resultado de diferenças em sua capacidade de casal seleção e herança. Assim, deve ser desobstruído que não há nenhuma tal coisa como evitando a equação do Price e aquela como toda a equação, tem aplicações ilimitadas se uma conecta somente ao mundo com palavras apropriadas. Como Andy Gardner colocá-lo em seu artigo sobre Price (Current Biology 18 # 5 R198) (Veja também sua "adaptação e aptidão inclusiva" Current Biology 23, R577 – R584, Julho 8, 2013) "Essas idéias foram bastante confuso até Price, e mais tarde Hamilton, mostrou que a equação de preço pode ser expandida para abranger vários níveis de seleção agindo simultaneamente (caixa 2). Isto permite que a seleção nos vários níveis seja definida e separada explicitamente, e forneça a base formal da teoria da seleção do grupo. Importante, ele permite a quantificação dessas forças separadas e produz previsões precisas para quando o comportamento do grupo-benéfico será favorecido. Acontece que essas previsões são sempre consistentes com a regra de Hamilton, RB-c > 0. Além disso, porque a seleção de parentes e teoria de seleção de grupo são ambos baseados na mesma equação de preço, é fácil mostrar que as duas abordagens são matematicamente exatamente equivalentes, e são simplesmente formas alternativas de esculpir a seleção total operacional sobre o caráter social. Independentemente da abordagem tomada, os organismos individuais são esperados para maximizar a sua aptidão inclusiva-embora este resultado segue mais facilmente a partir de uma análise de seleção de parentes, pois torna o elemento-chave da parentalidade mais explícito. "a" Consequentemente, ter o entusiastas atacando a equação de preço é bizarro. E aqui está o recente resumo de Bourke de aptidão inclusiva vs seleccao do groupo: (haplodiploid e eusociais referem-se aos insetos sociais que fornecem alguns dos melhores testes). "Críticas recentes têm questionado a validade da teoria de liderança para explicar a evolução social e eusocialidad, ou seja, a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes) teoria. Eu rever a literatura recente e passada para argumentar que essas críticas não têm sucesso. A teoria inclusiva da aptidão adicionou introspecções fundamentais à teoria natural da seleção. Estes são a constatação de que a seleção de um gene para o comportamento social depende de seus efeitos sobre os coportadores, a explicação dos comportamentos sociais tão iniguais como o altruísmo e o egoísmo usando os mesmos parâmetros subjacentes, e a explicação de dentro do grupo conflito em termos de optima aptidão inclusiva não coincidindo. Uma teoria alternativa proposta para a evolução eusocial assume erroneamente que os interesses dos trabalhadores são subordinados à rainha, não contém novos elementos e não consegue fazer novas previsões. A hipótese haplodiploidia ainda tem de ser rigorosamente testada e a 266 parentalidade positiva dentro das sociedades eusociais diploides suporta a teoria da aptidão inclusiva. A teoria fez previsões únicas e falsificáveis que foram confirmadas, e sua base de evidências é extensa e robusta. Assim, a teoria da aptidão inclusiva merece manter a sua posição como a principal teoria para a evolução social." No entanto, a aptidão inclusiva (especialmente através da equação de preço estendido) explica muito mais do que a sociedade de formigas, explica como os organismos multicelulares surgiram. "A terceira visão da teoria da aptidão inclusiva é a demonstração de que o conflito entre os membros de uma sociedade está potencialmente presente se eles são desigualmente relacionados com a descendência do grupo, uma vez já que o parentesco diferencial leva a uma ótima adequação inclusiva e desequilibrada.. A partir disso, surgiu uma compreensão de uma imensa variedade de parentesselecionados conflitos, incluindo conflitos dentro de famílias e sociedades eusociais e intragenômica conflitos que seguem a mesma lógica subjacente. O corolário deste Insight é que as sociedades são estáveis na medida em que a aptidão inclusiva optima de seus membros coincidem. Isso, por sua vez, fornece a lógica para toda a visão das "grandes transições" da evolução, em que a origem dos novos tipos de grupo na história da vida (por exemplo, genomas dentro de células, organismos multicelulares e sociedades eusociais) pode ser explicado como o resultado de suas unidades constitutivas anteriormente independentes conseguindo uma coincidência de aptidão inclusiva optima através do agrupamento. Deste ponto de vista, um organismo multicelular é uma sociedade eusociais de células em que os membros da sociedade se encontram fisicamente presos; a cola mais fundamental, no entanto, é a parentalidade clonal que (mutações de restrição) dá a cada célula somática dentro do organismo um interesse comum em promover a produção de gametas... Nowak et al. argumentaram que sua perspectiva pressupõe uma "abordagem centrada no gene" que "torna desnecessária a teoria da aptidão inclusiva". Isso é intrigante, porque totalmente carente de sua perspectiva é a idéia, que sustenta cada um dos Insights da teoria da aptidão inclusiva, do gene como um estrategista de autopromoção cujos interesses evolutivos são condicionais à classe de parentes em que reside ... Em seu modelo de evolução da eusocialidade, Nowak et al. dedubitaram que o problema do altruísmo é ilusório. Eles escreveram que "não há altruísmo paradoxal que precisa ser explicado" porque eles assumiram que os trabalhadores potenciais (filhas de uma colônia-fundadora fêmea ou rainha) são "não agentes independentes", mas sim pode ser visto "como" robôs "que são construídos pela rainha ' ou a "projeção extrasomática do genoma pessoal da rainha". Se esta alegação fosse correcta, apenas os interesses da rainha teriam de ser abordados e poderíamos concluir que o altruísmo dos trabalhadores é mais evidente do que o real. Mas é incorreto, por duas razões. Um deles é que, como tem sido repetidamente argumentado em resposta a anterior "manipulação parental" menoses da origem da eusocialidade, o inclusivo geneticamente apto interesses dos trabalhadores e da mãe rainha não coincidem, porque o dois partidos são relacionados diferenaliado à prole do grupo. O segundo é que os comportamentos do trabalhador, tais como a ingestão de ovos da rainha, a postura de ovos em resposta a declínios percebidos na fecundidade rainha, a 267 manipulação da razão sexual pela destruição da descendência da rainha e agressão letal para a rainha todos demonstram que os trabalhadores podem agir em seus próprios interesses e contra os da rainha. À luz desta comprovada falta de passividade dos trabalhadores, o sacrifício reprodutivo do trabalhador é paradoxal à primeira vista e este é o verdadeiro problema do altruísmo que a teoria da aptidão inclusiva resolveu. (c) teoria alternativa da evolução eusociais Nowak et al. [38] apresentaram uma ' teoria alternativa da evolução eusocial ' (como aludido no § 2B), apoiada por um ' modelo matemático para a origem da eusocialidade '. No entanto, estes não representam verdadeiras teorias alternativas, isoladamente ou em combinação, porque não fazem quaisquer pontos ou previsões que não tenham sido feitas dentro da teoria da aptidão inclusiva" Falando de várias etapas em um esquema sugerido por Nowak et al, Bourke diz: "Essas etapas constituem um cenário razoável para a origem e a elaboração da eusocialidade de insetos, mas nem a sequência de passos nem os elementos individuais diferem substancialmente daqueles que foram propostos para ocorrer dentro da aptidão inclusiva estrutura... A teoria alternativa da evolução eusociais de Nowak et al. também apresenta duas importantes fraquezas. Para começar, ao permitir que os grupos se formem de várias maneiras na etapa (i) (por exemplo, subsocialmente através de associações pai-descendentes, mas também por qualquer outro meio, incluindo "aleatoriamente por atração local mútua"), seu cenário ignora dois pontos críticos que são incompatível com ele, mas consistente com a teoria da aptidão inclusiva. Em primeiro lugar, a evidência é que, em quase todas as linhagens eusociais, a eusocialidade tem se originado em grupos sociais que eram ancestralmente subsociais e, portanto, caracterizados por uma alta parentesco dentro do grupo. Em segundo lugar, a evidência é que a origem da eusocialidade obrigante ou complexa, definida como envolvendo trabalhadores adultos irreversivelmente comprometidos com um fenótipo operário, está associada à monogamia parental vitalícia ancestral e, portanto, novamente, com previsivelmente alta parentesco dentro do grupo... Em suma, Nowak et al. fazem um caso para considerar o efeito do contexto populacional-dinâmico em que ocorre a evolução eusociais. Mas a sua teoria alternativa e o seu modelo associado não acrescentam elementos fundamentalmente novos em cima dos identificados dentro do quadro de aptidão inclusiva e, em relação a este quadro, exibem deficiências substanciais... Mais fundamentalmente, como tem sido reconhecido e repetidamente estressado, a hipótese de haplodiploidia não é um componente essencial da teoria da aptidão inclusiva, uma vez que a regra de Hamilton para o altruísmo pode conter sem as assimetrias de parentesco causadas por haplodiploidia estar presente. Destacando o status da hipótese haplodiploidia para criticar a teoria da aptidão inclusiva, portanto, perde o alvo. Igualmente negligencia o fato de que todas as sociedades eusociais diploid identificadas desde que a hipótese do haplodiploidia estêve propor se transformaram para ser grupos clonal ou da família e assim, como previsto pela teoria inclusiva da aptidão, para expor o parentesco positivo. Isto é verdadeiro do besouro do ambrosia, dos afídios sociais, das vespas poliembriônicas, dos Camarões sociais e dos mole-ratos. É mesmo verdadeiro de um verme plano eusociais novo descoberto. Em suma, as sociedades diploides eusociais, 268 longe de enfraquecer a teoria da aptidão inclusiva, servem para fortalecê-lo... Mais amplamente, a teoria prevê exclusivamente a ausência de altruísmo (envolvendo os custos de vida para a aptidão direta) entre os não-parentes, e na verdade nenhum desses casos foram encontrados, exceto em sistemas claramente derivados de sociedades ancestrais de parentes. Finalmente, a teoria da aptidão inclusiva é única na gama de fenômenos sociais que tem elucidado com sucesso, incluindo fenômenos como superficialmente dissimilares como a origem da multicelularidade e a origem da eusocialidade, ou conflitos intragenônicos e conflitos dentro das sociedades eusociais. No geral, nenhuma outra teoria chega perto de corresponder o registro da teoria da aptidão inclusiva de explicação bem sucedida e previsão através de uma série de fenômenos dentro do campo da evolução social. O desafio para qualquer abordagem que pretende substituir a teoria da aptidão inclusiva é explicar os mesmos fenômenos sem usar os insights ou conceitos da teoria... As críticas recentes da teoria inclusiva da aptidão provaram ineficaz em frentes múltiplas. Eles não demonstram dificuldades fatais ou não reconhecidas com a teoria da aptidão inclusiva. Não fornecem uma teoria distinta da recolocação ou oferecem uma aproximação similarmente unificador. Não explicam dados previamente inexplicados ou mostram que as explicações da teoria inclusiva da aptidão são inválidas. E eles não fazem previsões novas e exclusivas. A crítica a mais atrasada e a mais detalhada da teoria inclusiva da aptidão, embora largovariando no espaço de seu critica, sofre das mesmas falhas. Certamente, a parentalidade não explica todas as variações nos traços sociais. Além disso, a mensagem de longa data da teoria da aptidão inclusiva é que combinações particulares de fatores não-genéticos (por exemplo, ecológicos) e genéticos são necessários para a origem da eusocialidade. No entanto, a parentalidade mantém um status único na análise da evolução eusocial, pois nenhuma quantidade de benefício ecológico pode trazer altruísmo se a parentalidade for zero." Andrew F. G. Bourke 'a validez e o valor da teoria inclusiva da aptidão' proc. R. Soc. B 2011 278, doi: 10.1098/RSPB. 2011.1465 14 setembro (2011) Uma coisa raramente mencionada pelos entusiastas é o fato de que, mesmo foram ' Seleção de grupo ' possível, o egoísmo é pelo menos tão provável (provavelmente muito mais provável na maioria dos contextos) para ser grupo selecionado para como altruísmo. Basta tentar encontrar exemplos de verdadeiro altruísmo na natureza-o fato de que não podemos (o que sabemos não é possível se entendemos a evolução) nos diz que a sua presença aparente em seres humanos é um artefacto da vida moderna, ocultando os fatos, e que não pode mais ser selecionado para que a tendência ao suicídio (que na verdade é). Um pôde igualmente beneficiar-se de considerar um fenômeno nunca (em minha experiência) mencionado por groupies-cancer. Nenhum grupo tem tanto em comum quanto as (originalmente) células geneticamente idênticas em nossos próprios corpos-um clone de células 100.000.000.000.000--mas todos nós nascemos com milhares e talvez milhões de células que já tomaram o primeiro passo no caminho para o câncer e geram milhões para bilhões de células cancerosas em nossa vida. Se não morrermos de outras coisas primeiro, nós (e talvez todos os organismos multicelulares) morreremos de câncer. 269 Apenas um mecanismo enorme e extremamente complexo construído em nosso genoma que reprisa ou desfaz trilhões de genes em trilhões de células, e mata e cria billeões de células por segundo, mantém a maioria de nós vivos tempo suficiente para se reproduzir. Pode-se levar isso a implicar que uma sociedade justa, democrática e duradoura para qualquer tipo de entidade em qualquer planeta em qualquer universo é apenas um sonho, e que nenhum ser ou poder poderia fazê-lo de outra forma. Não é apenas "as leis" da física que são universais e inevitáveis, ou talvez devêssemos dizer que a aptidão inclusiva é uma lei da física. Em uma torção bizarra, foi aparentemente tais pensamentos que levaram Price (criador da equação Price e um Cristão devoto) ao suicídio. Em relação à noção de ' teoria ', é um clássico jogo de linguagem Wittgensteiniano - um grupo de usos vagamente ligados, mas com diferenças críticas. Quando foi proposto pela primeira vez, evolucao por seleção natural foi de fato altamente teórico, mas com o passar do tempo tornou-se indissociavelmente ligada a tantas observações e experimentos que suas idéias básicas já não eram mais teóricas do que as vitaminas jogam papéis críticos na nutrição humana. Para a ' teoria da deidade ' no entanto, não é claro o que iria contar como um teste definitivo. Talvez o mesmo seja verdade na teoria das cordas. Muitos ao lado dos entusiastas de s observam a natureza agradável de muita interação humana e vêem um futuro rosado adiante--mas são cegos. É esmagadoramente óbvio que o prazer é uma fase transitória devido aos recursos abundantes produzidos pela violação impiedoso do planeta, e como eles estão esgotados nos próximos dois séculos ou assim, haverá miséria e selvageria em todo o mundo como o (provável) permanente Condição. Não apenas estrelas de cinema, políticos e religiosos são alheio a isso, mas mesmo acadêmicos muito brilhantes que devem saber melhor. Em seu recente livro "os melhores anjos da nossa natureza" um dos meus mais admirados estudiosos Steven Pinker gasta metade do livro mostrando como temos chegado mais e mais civilizados, mas ele parece nunca mencionar as razões óbvias por que-o temporário abundância de recursos juntamente com a polícia maciça e presença militar facilitada pelas tecnologias de vigilância e comunicação. À medida que a civilização industrial desmorona, é inevitável que os piores demônios da nossa natureza reapareçam. Um vê-lo no caos atual no Oriente Médio, América Latina e África, e até mesmo as guerras mundiais foram piqueniques domingo em comparação com o que está por vir. Talvez metade do 12.000.000.000, em seguida, vivo morrerá de fome, doença e violência, e poderia ser muito mais. Veja o meu "suicídio pela democracia" para um breve resumo do juízo final. Outro fato desagradável sobre altruísmo, generosidade e ajuda, virtualmente nunca mencionado, é que se você tomar uma visão global a longo prazo, em um mundo superlotado com recursos desaparecendo, ajudando uma pessoa fere todos os outros de alguma forma pequena. Cada refeição, cada par de sapatos criar poluição e erosão e usar recursos, e quando você adicionar 7.8 bilhões deles juntos (em breve ser 11) é claro que o ganho de uma pessoa é a perda de todos os outros. Cada dólar ganhado 270 ou gasto danifica o mundo e se os países se importaram sobre o futuro reduziriam seu GDP (produto destrutivo bruto) cada ano. Mesmo foram formação verdade isso não mudaria. Os fatos que Wilson, Nowak et al têm, por quatro anos, persistiram na publicação e fazendo reivindicações extravagantes para o trabalho grosseiramente inadequado não é o pior deste escândalo. Acontece que a cátedra de Nowak em Harvard foi comprada pela Fundação Templeton-bem conhecida por seu patrocínio penetrante de lecturas, conferências e publicações que tentam conciliar religião e ciência. Nowak é um católico devoto e parece que um grande presente para Harvard estava dependente da nomeação de Nowak. Isso fez dele o colega de Wilson e o resto é história. No entanto, Wilson era apenas muito disposto como ele tinha mostrado há muito tempo uma falha para compreender a teoria evolucionária-e. g., sobre a seleção de parentes como uma divisão de seleção de grupo, em vez de o contrário. Notei anos atrás que ele copublicou com David Wilson, um apoiante de longa data de seleção de grupo, e tinha escrito outros papéis demonstrando sua falta de entendimento. Qualquer um dos entusiastas poderia ter ido para os peritos para aprender o erro de seus caminhos (ou apenas ler seus papéis). Os grandes velhos homens de seleção de parentes, como Hamilton, Williams e Trivers, e mais jovens sangues como Frank, Bourke e muitos outros, teria sido feliz em ensiná-los. Mas Nowak recebeu algo como $14000000 em doações Templeton em poucos anos (para a matemática!) e quem quer desistir disso? Ele é muito sincero em sua intenção de provar que a gentileza e bondade de Jesus é construído em nós e todo o universo. Jesus está convenientemente ausente, mas pode-se adivinhar a partir das qualidades de outros iluminados e da história da igreja que a verdadeira história do cristianismo precoce viria como um choque. Lembre-se que a Bíblia foi expurgada de qualquer coisa que não atender a linha do partido (por exemplo, Gnosticismo-confira o manuscritos Nag-Hammadi). E em qualquer caso, quem iria gravar as duras realidades da vida diária? Quase certamente, o Nowak, Tarnita, papel de Wilson nunca teria sido publicado (pelo menos não pela natureza) se tivesse sido apresentado por dois biólogos médios, mas vindo de dois professores de Harvard famosos que claramente não obter a revisão por pares que deveria ter. Sobre Nowak e Highland ' s livro ' SuperCooperators ' Eu vou deixar Dawkins fazer as honras: "Li o livro de Nowak e Highfield. Partes dele são muito boas, mas a qualidade abruptamente, e embaraçosamente, cai no capítulo sobre a seleção de grupo, possivelmente a influência de E.O. Wilson (que tem sido consistentemente malentendido seleção de parentes desde a Sociobiologia, equivocadamente sobre como um subconjunto da seleção de grupo). Nowak perde o ponto inteiro da teoria da seleção do parente, que é que não é algo adicional, não algo sobre e-acima da teoria individual classico da seleção do '. Seleção parente não é algo extra, não algo a ser recortado apenas se ' seleção clássica individual ' teoria falha. Em vez, é uma 271 conseqüência inevitável de neo-Darwinism, que se segue dele dedutivamente. Para falar sobre seleção Darwiniana a seleção de parentes menos é como falar sobre a geometria euclidiana menos o teorema de Pitágoras. É justo que esta conseqüência lógica do neo-Darwinism estêve negligenciada historicamente, que deu a povos uma impressão falsa que era algo adicional e extra. Nowak de outra forma bom livro é tragicamente marcado por este erro elementar como um matemático, ele realmente deveria ter sabido melhor. Parece duvidoso que ele já leu papéis clássicos de Hamilton em aptidão inclusiva, ou ele não poderia ter entendido mal a idéia de forma abrangente. O capítulo sobre a seleção de parentes vai desacreditar o livro e parar de ser levado a sério por aqueles qualificados para julgá-lo, o que é uma pena." http://whyevolutionistrue.wordpress.com/2011/03/16/new-book-shows-thathumans-are-genetically-nice-ergo-jesus/ Uma revisão mordaz de ' Supercooperators ' também apareceu de eminente jogo teórico/economista/cientista político (e Harvard ex-aluno) Herbert Gintis (que narra o escândalo Templeton nele), o que é bastante surpreendente, considerando seu próprio caso de amor com seleção de grupo - veja a revisão de seu livro com Bowles pelo preço www.epjournal.net – 2012.10 (1): 45-49 e minha revisão de seu volume mais recente "Individualidade e Entrelaçamento" (2017). Em relação aos livros subsequentes de Wilson, "o significado da existência humana" é branda e também confuso e desonesto, repetindo várias vezes a linha de festa de entusiastas quatro anos depois de seu desmascaramento completo, e ' uma janela sobre a eternidade '-é um jornal de viagem escassa sobre o estabelecimento de um parque nacional em Moçambique. Ele evita cuidadosamente mencionar que a África vai acrescentar 3.000.000.000 no futuro próximo (a projeção oficial da ONU), eliminando toda a natureza, juntamente com a paz, beleza, decência, sanidade e esperança. No final, é claro que todo este caso triste será apenas a colisão mais minúsculo na estrada e, como todas as coisas que exercem a nossa atenção agora, em breve será esquecido como os horrores da maternidade desenfreada e da subjugação do mundo por os sete sociopatas que governam a China trará a sociedade a cair. Mas pode-se ter certeza de que, mesmo quando o aquecimento global colocou Harvard o mar e fome, a doença e a violência são a norma diária, haverá aqueles que insistem que não é devido às atividades humanas (a opinião de metade do público Americano atualmente) e que sobrepopulação não é um problema (a visão de 40%), haverá bilhões orando à sua divindade escolhida para uma chuva de hambúrgueres do céu, e que (assumindo que a empresa da ciência não tenha desmoronado, que está assumindo muito) alguém em algum lugar vai estar escrevendo um papel Embrace seleção de grupo. 272 Uma revisão 'Do Assassino Proxima Porta' (The Murderer Next Door) por David Buss (2005)(revisão revisada 2019) Michael Starks Abstrata Embora este volume é um pouco datado, há poucos livros populares recentes lidando especificamente com a psicologia do assassinato e é uma visão rápida disponível para alguns dólares, por isso ainda vale bem o esforço. Não faz nenhuma tentativa de ser detalhado e é um tanto superficial nos lugares, com o leitor esperado preencher os espaços em branco de seus muitos outros livros e a literatura vasta na violência. Para uma atualização ver, por exemplo, Buss, O Manual de Psicologia Evolucionária 2a ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 e Buss, Psicologia Evolutiva 5o Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 e Shackelford e Hansen , A Evolução da Violência (2014).Ele está entre os principais psicólogos evolucionários por várias décadas e abrange uma ampla gama de comportamentos em suas obras, mas aqui ele se concentra quase inteiramente sobre os mecanismos psicológicos que causam pessoas individuais a assassinar e seus possíveis função evolutiva no EEE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva - i. e., as planícies da África durante os últimos milhões de anos ou mais). Buss começa por notar que, como com outros comportamentos, explicações ' alternativas ', tais como psicopatologia, ciúme, ambiente social, pressões de grupo, drogas e álcool, etc. não realmente explicam, uma vez que a questão ainda permanece a respeito de por que estes produzem impulsos homicida, ou seja, são as causas proximas e não as últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como sempre, ele inevitavelmente se resume a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), e assim a luta pelo acesso a companheiros e recursos, que é a explicação definitiva para todo o comportamento em todos os organismos. Os dados sociológicos (e o senso comum) tornam claro que os machos mais pobres mais jovens são os mais propensos a matar. Ele apresenta seus próprios e outros dados de homicídio de nações industrializadas, e culturas tribais, morte conespecífica em animais, arqueologia, dados do FBI e sua própria pesquisa sobre as fantasias homicida das pessoas normais. Muita evidência arqueológica continua a acumular-se de assassinatos, incluindo o de grupos inteiros, ou de grupos menos jovens fêmeas, em tempos pré-históricos. Depois de examinar os comentários de Buss, apresento um breve resumo da psicologia intencional (a estrutura lógica da racionalidade), que é amplamente coberta em meus muitos outros artigos e livros. Aqueles com um monte de tempo que querem uma história detalhada de violência homicida de uma perspectiva evolutiva pode consultar Steven Pinker ' os melhores 273 anjos da nossa natureza por que a violência diminuiu ' (2012), e minha revisão do mesmo, facilmente disponível na net e em dois dos meus livros recentes. Momentaneamente, Pinker observa que o assassinato diminuiu firmemente e dramàtica por um fator de aproximadamente 30 desde nossos dias como Foragers. Assim, mesmo que as armas agora tornam extremamente fácil para qualquer um matar, homicídio é muito menos comum. Pinker acha que isso é devido a vários mecanismos sociais que trazem os nossos "melhores anjos", mas eu acho que é devido principalmente à abundância temporária de recursos do estupro implacável do nosso planeta, juntamente com a presença policial aumentada, com a comunicação e vigilância e sistemas jurídicos que fazem com que seja muito mais provável que seja punido. Isto torna-se claro cada vez que há mesmo uma breve e local ausência da polícia. Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019) e outras. Buss começa por notar que, como com outros comportamentos, explicações ' alternativas ', tais como psicopatologia, ciúme, ambiente social, pressões de grupo, drogas e álcool, et., não realmente explicam, uma vez que a questão ainda permanece a respeito de por que estes produzem impulsos homicida, ou seja, são as causas proximas e não as últimas evolutivas (genéticas). Como sempre, ele inevitavelmente se resume a aptidão inclusiva (seleção de parentes), e assim a luta pelo acesso a companheiros e recursos, que é a explicação definitiva para todo o comportamento em todos os organismos. Os dados sociológicos (e o senso comum) tornam claro que os machos mais pobres mais jovens são os mais propensos a matar. Ele apresenta seus próprios e outros dados de homicídio de nações industrializadas, e culturas tribais, morte conespecífica em animais, arqueologia, dados do FBI e sua própria pesquisa sobre as fantasias homicida das pessoas normais. Muita evidência arqueológica continua a acumular-se de assassinatos, incluindo o de grupos inteiros, ou de grupos menos jovens fêmeas, em tempos pré-históricos. Em p 12 ele observa que a guerra entre cada indivíduo e o mundo sobre os recursos começa na concepção, quando começa a crescer roubando sua mãe de alimento e estressando seu corpo, e quando seu sistema luta para trás com conseqüências freqüentemente fatais para o conceptus. Ele não nos diz que as estimativas de aborto espontâneo estão na faixa de até cerca de 30% de todas as concepções, de modo que tantos como 80 milhões um ano morrem, mais tão cedo que a mãe nem sequer sabe 274 que ela está grávida, e talvez o seu período é um pouco tarde. Isso faz parte da eugenia da natureza que não conseguimos derrotar, embora o efeito disgênico geral da civilização continue e cada dia o aprox. 300.000 que nascem são, em média, um pouco menos mentalmente fisicamente apto do que o aprox. 100.000 que morrem, com um aumento líquido na população mundial de CA. 200.000 e uma população "imprópria" cada vez maior para destruir a terra (ao ser parcialmente ou integralmente apoiado por seus vizinhos "Fit" i.e., geneticamente apto). Em p13 ele diz que não sabemos ao certo que OJ Simpson era culpado, mas eu diria que, independentemente do julgamento que sabemos que ele era, como é a única interpretação razoável dos fatos do caso, que incluem o seu comportamento bizarro. Além disso, no julgamento civil subsequente, onde seus multimilionários advogados de defesa do dólar não estavam presentes para subverter a justiça, ele foi rapidamente condenado, o que levou à fixação de seus bens, o que levou a sua condenação assalto à mão armada e prisão. Ele observa em P20 que havia cerca de 100 milhões assassinatos conhecidos em todo o mundo nos últimos 100 anos, com talvez tantos como 300 milhões se todos os não relatados foram incluídos. Eu não acho que ele conta a cerca de 40 milhões pelo Partido Comunista Chinês (que não conta o aproximadamente.. 60 milhões que fome), nem os dez de milhões por Stalin. É igualmente ser mantido na mente que a taxa de assassinato de América está diminuída por aproximadamente 75% devido ao sistema médico da classe de mundo que conserva a maioria de vítimas das tentativas. Vou acrescentar que o México tem cerca de 5X a taxa de homicídio dos EUA e Honduras cerca de 20X, e seus descendentes podem certamente olhar para a frente a nossa taxa que se deslocam nessa direção devido ao abraço fatal da América da diversidade. Ann Coulter em ' Adios America ' (2015) observa que os hispânicos cometeram cerca de 23.000 assassinatos aqui nas últimas décadas. Por agora, nada será feito, e o crime aqui chegará aos níveis no México como a fronteira continua a se dissolver e colapso ambiental e aproximando falência dissolver a economia. Dentro do México em 2014 sozinho, 100 cidadãos norte-americanos eram conhecidos por terem sido assassinados e mais de 130 sequestrados e outros simplesmente desapareceram, e se você adicionar outros estrangeiros e mexicanos que corre para os milhares. Veja o meu ' suicídio pela democracia ' 4a Ed (2019) para mais detalhes. Mesmo um pequeno país levemente viajado como Honduras gerencia cerca de 10 assassinatos e 2 sequestros um ano de cidadãos dos EUA. E estes são os melhores dos tempos-está ficando cada vez pior como a maternidade desenfreada e esgotamento de recursos trazer colapso sempre mais perto. Além de aumentos contínuos no crime de todos os tipos, veremos a percentagem de crimes resolvidos cair para os níveis extremamente baixos do terceiro mundo. Mais recursos são dedicados à solução de assassinatos do que qualquer outro crime e cerca de 65% são resolvidos nos EUA, mas no México menos de 2% são resolvidos e como você chegar mais longe da cidade do México a taxa cai para perto de zero. Observe também que a taxa aqui costumava ser cerca de 80%, mas ele caiu em paralelo com o aumento do diverso. Também 65% é a média, mas se você poderia obter estatísticas estou certo de que iria subir com a 275 percentagem de euro em uma cidade e cair como o percentual de diversos aumentos. Em Detroit (83% preto) apenas 30% são resolvidos. Se você manter o controle de quem rouba, estupor e assassinatos, é óbvio que as vidas negras importam muito mais para euros (aqueles de descendência Européia) do que eles fazem para outros negros. Estas são as minhas observações. Ao longo da história as mulheres têm sido em grande desvantagem quando se tratava de assassinar, mas com a disponibilidade pronta de armas que seria de esperar que isso mude, mas em P22 encontramos que cerca de 87% dos assassinos EUA são homens e para o mesmo sexo matando este sobe para 95% e é sobre th e mesmo em todo o mundo. Claramente algo na psique masculina incentiva a violência como um caminho para a aptidão que é largamente ausente em mulheres. Também relevante é que os assassinatos por conhecidos são mais comuns do que aqueles por estranhos. Em p37 ele observa que com alta probabilidade de convicção (e eu diria que a maior probabilidade a vítima pretendida ou outros estarão armados), assassinato é agora uma estratégia mais caro do que antigamente, mas eu acho que isso depende inteiramente de quem você está. Em uma cidade pela maior parte euro dos EUA, ou entre povos médios e superiores da classe, sobre 95% dos assassinatos puderam ser resolvidos, mas em umas áreas mais baixas da classe talvez 20% puderam ser, e para as áreas dominadas gangue mesmo menos do que aquela. E em 3 países do mundo as chances de justiça são ainda mais baixas, especialmente quando cometidas por membros de gangues, por isso é uma estratégia altamente viável, especialmente se planejado antes do tempo. Em seguida, ele lida com a violência e o assassinato como parte de estratégias de acasalamento, que têm sido claramente ao longo de nossa evolução, e permanecem tão especialmente entre as classes inferiores e em países do terceiro mundo. Ele observa o assassinato freqüente de esposas ou amantes por homens durante ou após separações. Ele comenta em passar a seleção de mate e infidelidade, mas há uma discussão mínima, pois esses tópicos são tratados em grande detalhe em seus outros escritos e volumes editados. É sabido agora que as mulheres tendem a ter casos com os homens "sexy" que não selecionariam como um sócio permanente (a teoria "sexy" do filho) e para acasalar com eles em seus dias mais férteis. Todos esses fenômenos são vistos a partir de uma perspectiva evolutiva (ou seja, qual seria a vantagem de aptidão ter sido antigamente). Há uma seleção muito forte para comportamentos que impedem um homem de educar crianças por outra pessoa, pelas mesmas razões que "seleção de grupo" é fortemente selecionado contra (ver o meu ensaio sobre o altruísmo do seleção de grupo, Jesus eo fim do Mundo... '). No entanto, a vida moderna oferece amplas oportunidades para os assuntos, e estudos genéticos têm demonstrado que uma alta percentagem de crianças são pais de outro que o parceiro putativo de sua mãe, com o percentual de aumento de alguns por cento para tanto quanto 30% como um desce da parte superior para abaixar classes em vários países ocidentais modernos em vários períodos e indubitàvelmente mais altamente do que aquele em muitos 3 países do 276 mundo do RD. Em seu livro Sperm Wars: a ciência do sexo (2006) Robin Baker resume: ' figuras reais variam de 1 por cento em áreas de alto status dos Estados Unidos e da Suíça, para 5 a 6 por cento para os machos de status moderado nos Estados Unidos e Grã-Bretanha, para 10 a 30 por cento para homens de status inferior nos Estados Unidos, Grã-Bretanha e França. Pode-se supor que em sociedades onde homens e mulheres estão altamente concentrados em cidades e têm telefones celulares, esta percentagem está subindo, especialmente no terceiro mundo onde o uso de controle de natalidade e aborto é errático. Ele descobre que a maioria dos homens e mulheres que matam seus companheiros são jovens e os mais jovens seus companheiros são, o mais provável que eles serão assassinados. Como todo o comportamento, isso é difícil de explicar sem uma perspectiva evolutiva. Um estudo encontrou homens em seus 40 ' s constituíram 23% de assassinos do companheiro mas homens em seus 50 ' s somente 7,7%, e 79% de assassinos fêmeas do companheiro estavam entre 16 e 39. Faz sentido que os mais jovens são, maior a perda de aptidão potencial para o macho (diminuição da reprodução) e assim o mais intenso a resposta emocional. Como Buss coloca: "da Austrália ao Zimbábue, a mais jovem a mulher, maior a probabilidade de que ela será morta como resultado de uma infidelidade sexual ou deixando um relacionamento romântico. As mulheres no suporte de 15 a 24 anos estão em maior risco. " Uma porcentagem elevada é matadas dentro de dois meses da separação e a maioria no primeiro ano. Um estudo constatou que 88% deles tinham sido perseguido antes de serem mortos. Em alguns capítulos há citações de pessoas dando seus sentimentos sobre seus companheiros infiéis e estes tipicamente incluem fantasias homicida, que eram mais intensas e continuou por períodos mais longos para os homens do que para as mulheres. Ele dedica algum tempo para o aumento do risco de abuso e assassinato de ter um padrasto com, por exemplo, o risco para uma menina de estupro aumentando cerca de 10X se seu pai é um padrasto. É agora muito conhecido que em uma ampla gama de mamíferos, um novo macho encontrando uma fêmea com jovens tentará matá-los. Um estudo dos EUA constatou que se um ou ambos os pais são substitutos, isso levanta a chance da criança de ser assassinado na casa entre 40 e 100X (p174). Um estudo canadense encontrou a taxa de morte batendo subiu 27X se um dos pais em um casamento registrado foi um padrasto, enquanto ele subiu mais de 200X se o substituto era um namorado ao vivo. Taxas de abuso infantil no Canadá subiu 40X quando havia um padrasto. Nos seres humanos, ser sem recursos é um forte estímulo para que as mulheres eliminem seus filhos existentes, a fim de atrair um novo companheiro. Um estudo canadense constatou que, apesar de mulheres solteiras serem apenas 12% de todas as mães, comprometeram mais de 50% dos infanticídeos (p169). Uma vez que as mulheres mais jovens perdem menos aptidão de uma morte infantil do que as mais velhas, não é surpreendente que um estudo intercultural descobriu que os adolescentes mataram seus bebês em taxas de cerca de 30x a de mulheres em seus vinte anos (p170). 277 Ele, então, brevemente discute serial killers e estupradores serial, o mais bem sucedido de todos os tempos sendo os mongóis de Genghis Khan, cujos cromossomas Y são representados em cerca de 8% de todos os homens nos territórios que eles controlaram, ou alguns 20 milhões homens (e um número igual de mulheres) ou cerca de meio por cento de todas as pessoas na terra, o que os torna facilmente o mais geneticamente apto de todas as pessoas que já viveram em tempos históricos. Embora este volume é um pouco datado, há poucos livros populares recentes lidando especificamente com a psicologia do assassinato e é uma visão rápida disponível para alguns dólares, por isso ainda vale bem o esforço. Não faz nenhuma tentativa de ser detalhado e é um tanto superficial nos lugares, com o leitor esperado preencher os espaços em branco de seus muitos outros livros e a literatura vasta na violência. Para uma atualização ver, por exemplo, Buss, o manual de psicologia evolucionária 2a ed. v1 (2016) p 265, 266, 270 – 282, 388 – 389, 545 – 546, 547, 566 e Buss, psicologia evolutiva 5o Ed. (2015) p 26, 96 – 97223, 293-4, 300, 309 – 312, 410 e Shackelford e Hansen , A evolução da violência (2014) ele está entre os principais psicólogos evolucionários por várias décadas e abrange uma ampla gama de comportamentos em suas obras, mas aqui ele se concentra quase inteiramente sobre os mecanismos psicológicos que causam pessoas individuais a assassinato e sua possível função evolutiva no EEE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva - i. e., as planícies da África durante os últimos milhões de anos ou mais). Aqueles com um monte de tempo que querem uma história detalhada de violência homicida de uma perspectiva evolutiva pode consultar Steven Pinker ' os melhores anjos da nossa natureza-por que a violência diminuiu ' (2012) e minha revisão do que facilmente disponível na rede e em dois dos meus livros recentes. Momentaneamente, Pinker observa que o assassinato diminuiu firmemente e dramàtica por um fator de aproximadamente 30 desde nossos dias como forrageiras. Assim, mesmo que as armas agora tornam extremamente fácil para qualquer um matar, homicídio é muito menos comum. Pinker acha que isso é devido a vários mecanismos sociais que trazem os nossos "melhores anjos", mas eu acho que é devido principalmente à abundância temporária de recursos do estupro implacável do nosso planeta, juntamente com a presença policial aumentada, com a comunicação e vigilância e sistemas jurídicos que fazem com que seja muito mais provável que seja punido. Isto torna-se claro cada vez que há mesmo uma breve e local ausência da polícia. Outros também tomam a visão de que temos um "lado agradável" que é geneticamente inata e apoia o tratamento favorável de mesmo aqueles que não estão intimamente relacionados a nós (' Seleção de grupo '). Isso é irremediavelmente confuso e eu fiz a minha pequena parte para colocá-lo para descansar em ' altruísmo, Jesus e do fim do mundo-como a Fundação Templeton comprou uma cátedra de Harvard e atacou evolução, racionalidade e civilização. Uma revisão de E.O. Wilson ' a conquista social da terra ' (2012) e Nowak e Highfield ' Supercooperators ' (2012) '. 278 Aqueles que desejam um quadro até à data detalhado para o comportamento humano da opinião moderna dos dois sistemas consultar meu livros Falando Macacos 3a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a Ed (2019), Suicídio Pela Democracia,4aEd(2019), Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia Artigos e Análises 2006-2019 (2019), Ilusões Utópicas Suicidas no 21St século 5a Ed (2019), A Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), e A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019). Eu agora apresento um breve resumo da psicologia intencional (a estrutura lógica da racionalidade) que é amplamente coberto em meus muitos outros artigos e livros. A violência impulsiva envolverá as funções subcorticais automatizadas do sistema 1, mas às vezes é deliberada em frente ao tempo através do sistema cortical 2. Cerca de um milhão de anos atrás, os primatas evoluíram a capacidade de usar seus músculos da garganta para fazer séries complexas de ruídos (ou seja, fala) que por cerca de 100.000 anos atrás tinha evoluído para descrever eventos presentes (percepções, memória, ações reflexivas com enunciados básicos que podem ser descritos como jogos de linguagem primária (PLG ' s) descrevendo o sistema 1 - ou seja, o sistema automatizado rápido e inconsciente, Estados mentais de true-only (verdade so) com um tempo e localização precisos). Desenvolvemos gradualmente a maior capacidade de abranger deslocamentos no espaço e no tempo para descrever memórias, atitudes e eventos potenciais (o passado e o futuro e, muitas vezes, preferências contrafactuais, condicionais ou ficcionais, inclinações ou disposições) com os jogos secundários da língua (SLG) do sistema dois-pensamento atitudinais proposicional verdadeiro ou falso consciente lento, que não tem nenhum tempo exato e são habilidades e não estados mentais. Preferências são intuições, tendências, regras ontológicas automáticas, comportamentos, habilidades, módulos cognitivos, traços de personalidade, modelos, motores de inferência, inclinações, emoções, atitudes proposicional, avaliações, capacidades, hipóteses. As emoções são Tipo Dos Preferências (Wittgenstein RPP2 p148). "Eu acredito", "ele ama", "eles pensam" são descrições de possíveis atos públicos tipicamente deslocados no espaço-tempo. Minhas declarações em primeira pessoa sobre mim são verdadeiras-somente (excluindo mentir), enquanto declarações de terceira pessoa sobre os outros são verdadeiras ou falsas (veja minha resenha de Johnston-' Wittgenstein: repensar o interior '). Agora que temos um começo razoável sobre a estrutura lógica da racionalidade (a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de ordem superior) estabelecidas, podemos olhar para a tabela de intencionalidade que resulta deste trabalho, que eu construí ao longo dos últimos Anos. Baseia-se em um muito mais simples de Searle, que por sua vez deve muito a Wittgenstein. Também incorporei em tabelas de formulários modificados sendo usadas por pesquisadores atuais na psicologia dos processos de pensamento que são evidenciados nas últimas 9 fileiras. Deve revelar-se interessante para compará-lo com os três volumes recentes de Peter Hacker sobre a natureza humana. 279 Eu ofereço esta tabela como uma heurística para descrever o comportamento que eu acho mais completo e útil do que qualquer outra estrutura que eu vi e não como uma análise final ou completa, que teria que ser tridimensional com centenas (pelo menos) de setas indo em muitos direções com muitos (talvez todos) caminhos entre S1 e S2 sendo bidirecional. Além disso, a própria distinção entre S1 e S2, cognição e dispostos, percepção e memória, entre o sentimento, sabendo, acreditando e esperando etc são arbitrários--isto é, como W demonstrado, todas as palavras são contextualmente sensíveis e a maioria tem vários totalmente diferentes utilizações (significados ou COS). A intencionalidade pode ser vista como personalidade ou como a construção da realidade social (o título do livro bem conhecido de Searle) e de muitos outros pontos de vista também. Começando com o trabalho pioneiro de Ludwig Wittgenstein na década de 1930 (os livros azul e marrom) e dos anos 50 para o presente por seus sucessores Searle, MoyalSharrock, Read, Baker, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein, Coliva etc., eu criei o seguinte tabela como uma heurística para promover este estudo. As linhas mostram vários aspectos ou formas de estudo e as colunas mostram os processos involuntários e comportamentos voluntários que compõem os dois sistemas (processos duplos) da estrutura lógica da consciência (LSC), que também pode ser considerado como a estrutura lógica de racionalidade (LSR), de comportamento (LSB), de personalidade (LSP), de Mind (LSM), de linguagem (LSL), de realidade (LSOR), de intencionalidade (LSI)-o termo filosófico clássico, a psicologia descritiva da consciência (DPC), a psicologia descritiva da pensamento (DPT) – ou melhor, a linguagem da psicologia descritiva do pensamento (LDPT), termos introduzidos aqui e em meus outros escritos muito recentes. Eu sugiro que nós podemos descrever o comportamento mais claramente mudando Searle "impor condições de satisfação em condições de satisfação" para "relacionar os Estados mentais ao mundo movendo os músculos" - isto é, falando, escrevendo e fazendo, e sua "mente para o mundo direção do ajuste "e" mundo a mente direção do ajuste "por" causa origina na mente "e" causa origina no mundo "S1 é apenas ascendente causal (mundo a mente) e sem conteúdo (falta de representações ou informações), enquanto S2 tem conteúdo e é descendente causal (mente para o mundo).Adoptei a minha terminologia nesta mesa. Eu fiz explicações detalhadas sobre esta tabela em meus outros escritos. 280 DA ANALISE DE JOGOS DE LINGUAGEM Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Causa origina de * * * * Mundo Mundo Mundo Mundo Mente Mente Mente Mente Faz com que as alterações em * * * * * Nenhum Mente Mente Mente Nenhum Mundo Mundo Mundo Causalmente auto reflexivo * * * * * * Não Sim Sim Sim Não Sim Sim Sim Verdadeiro ou falso (testável) Sim T apenas T apenas T apenas Sim Sim Sim Sim Condições públicas de satisfação Sim Sim/Não Sim/Não Não Sim/Não Sim Não Sim Descrever Um estado mental Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim/Não Sim Prioridade evolutiva 5 4 2, 3 1 5 3 2 2 Conteúdo voluntário Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Iniciação voluntária Sim/Não Não Sim Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim Sistema cognitivo ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Alterar intensidade Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Não Não Não Duração precisa Não Sim Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Tempo, lugaraqui e agora ou lá e então (H + N, T + T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Qualidade especial Não Sim Não Sim Não Não Não Não Localizado no corpo Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Sim Expressões corporais Sim Sim Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Auto-contradições Não Sim Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de um self Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Não Não Não Precisa de linguagem Sim Não Não Não Não Não Não Sim/Não 281 DA PESQUISA DE DECISÃO Disposição* Emoção Memória Percepção Desejo PI * * IA * * * Ação/ palavra Efeitos subliminares Não Sim/Nao Sim Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Associativo/ baseado em regras RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Dependente de contexto/ Abstrata A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/paralelo S S/P P P S/P S S S Heurística Analítica A H/A H H H/A A A A Precisa de memória de trabalho Sim Não Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Dependente da inteligência geral Sim Não Não Não Sim/Não Sim Sim Sim O carregamento cognitivo inibe Sim Sim/Não Não Não Sim Sim Sim Sim Exitacao facilita ou inibe I F/I F F I I I I * Aka Inclinações, Capacidades, Preferências, Representações, possíveis ações etc. ** Intenções prévias de Searle *** Intenção em ação de Searle **** Direção de ajuste da Searle ***** Direção de Causação de Searle ****** (estado mental instancia causa ou cumpre a si mesmo). Searle antigamente chamava isso de causalmente auto-referencial. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definiram sistemas cognitivos. ******** Aqui e agora ou lá e então Uma explicação detalhada desta tabela é dada em meus outros escritos. Deve-se sempre ter em mente a descoberta de Wittgenstein que depois de termos descrito os possíveis usos (significados, veracidade, condições de satisfação) da linguagem em um contexto particular, esgotamos o seu interesse, e as tentativas de explicação (ou seja, filosofia) só nos afastamos mais da verdade. É fundamental notar 282 que esta tabela é apenas uma heurística livre de contexto altamente simplificada e cada uso de uma palavra deve ser examinado em seu contexto. O melhor exame de variação de contexto está nos últimos 3 volumes de Peter hacker sobre a natureza humana, que fornecem inúmeras tabelas e gráficos que devem ser comparados com este. 283 Suicídio pela Democraciaum Obituário para a América e o Mundo (revisao 2020) Michael Starks Abstrata América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso do crescimento populacional excessivo, a maior parte para o século passado, e agora tudo isso, devido ao mundo terceiro. O consumo de recursos e a adição de 3.000.000.000 mais ca. 2100 entrará em colapso da civilização industrial e trará a fome, a doença, a violência e a guerra numa escala espantosa. A terra perde pelo menos 1% de seu solo superficial cada ano, de modo que se aproxima 2100, a maioria de sua capacidade crescente do alimento será ido. Bilhões morrerão e a guerra nuclear é tudo, mas certo. Na América, isso está sendo enormemente acelerado pela imigração maciça e reprodução de imigrantes, combinada com abusos tornados possíveis pela democracia. A natureza humana depravada transforma inexoravelmente o sonho da democracia e da diversidade num pesadelo de criminalidade e de pobreza. A China continuará a dominar a América e o mundo, desde que mantenha a ditadura que limita o egoísmo. A causa raiz do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata para se adaptar ao mundo moderno, o que leva as pessoas a tratar pessoas não relacionadas como se tivessem interesses comuns. A idéia de direitos humanos é uma fantasia maligna promovida por esquerdas para chamar a atenção para longe da destruição impiedoso da terra pela 3a maternidade mundial desenfreada. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva ao desilusões de engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Poucos entendem que se você ajudar uma pessoa que você prejudicar alguém-não há almoço livre e cada item que alguém consome destrói a terra além do reparo. Consequentemente, as políticas sociais em todos os lugares são insustentáveis e uma por uma todas as sociedades sem controles rigorosos sobre o egoísmo entrará em colapso em anarquia ou ditadura. Os fatos mais básicos, quase nunca mencionados, são que não há recursos suficientes na América ou no mundo para levantar uma percentagem significativa dos pobres fora da pobreza e mantê-los lá. A tentativa de fazer isso é a falência da América e destruir o mundo. A capacidade da terra para produzir alimentos diminui diariamente, assim como a nossa qualidade genética. E agora, como sempre, de longe o maior inimigo dos pobres é outros pobres e não os ricos. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há nenhuma esperança para impedir o colapso de América, ou todo o país que segue um sistema democrático. 284 Por cento dos Americanos que são estrangeiros nascidos-o resultado do "nenhum impacto demográfico significativo" lei de imigração de 1965-nãon-europeus (os diversos) foram uma quota de 16%, são agora (2019) cerca de 38% e será de cerca de 60% por 2100, uma vez que são agora 100% do aumento da população de cerca de 2,4 milhões a cada ano. Suicídio pela democracia. O dia mais triste da história dos EUA. Presidente Johnson, com dos Kennedys e ex-Presidente Hoover, dá América para o México-3 de outubro de 1965 285 Parte do custo da diversidade e do envelhecimento, sendo o policial não remunerado do mundo, etc., (não contando passivos futuros que são 5 a 10 vezes como grandes mudanças sociais). Definições úteis para compreender a política Americana DIVERSIDADE: 1. programa do governo dos EUA para entregar o controle ao México. 2. programa do governo dos EUA para fornecer bens e serviços livres ou pesadamente subsidiados àqueles de outros países. 3. um meio para transformar a América em um terceiro mundo inferno. 4. multiculturalismo, multietismo, multipartisanismo, inclusividade, supremacia do terceiro mundo. RACISTA: 1. pessoa oposta à diversidade no sentido acima. 2. pessoa de etnia diferente que discorda comigo em qualquer questão. 3. pessoa de qualquer etnia que discorda de mim em qualquer coisa. Também, chamado ' bigot ' ' hater ' ou ' nativist '. SUPREMACIST branco: qualquer um oposto à diversidade no sentido acima, isto é, qualquer um que tenta impedir o colapso de América e da civilização industrial no mundo inteiro. TERCEIRO MUNDO SUPREMACIST: qualquer um em favor da diversidade em sentidos acima. Qualquer um que trabalha para destruiro futuro do seu descendente. Também conhecido como democratas, socialistas, Neomarxistas, socialistas democráticos, 286 marxistas, esquerdistas, liberais, progressistas, comunistas, maternalistas, fascistas esquerdistas, multiculturalistas, inclusivistas, direitos humanos. ÓDIO: 1. qualquer oposição à diversidade no sentido acima. 2. expressão de um desejo de evitar o colapso da América e do mundo. EURO: branco ou caucasiano ou Europeu: um cujos antepassados deixaram África sobre 50.000 anos há. PRETO: Africano ou afro-americano: um cujos antepassados permaneceram na África ou deixados nos últimos cem anos (por isso não houve tempo para a evolução de quaisquer diferenças significativas de euros). DIVERSO: qualquer um que não é euro (Europeu, branco, Caucasiano). DIREITOS HUMANOS: uma fantasia maligna criada por esquerdas para chamar a atenção para longe da destruição impiedoso da terra pela reprodução do mundo de 3RD desenfreada. Assim, as anomalias temporárias, como a democracia, a igualdade, os sindicatos, os direitos das mulheres, os direitos das crianças, os direitos dos animais, etc. são devidos a elevados padrões de vida criados pelo estupro do planeta e desaparecerão à medida que a civilização desmorona e a China governa a Mundo. Devo primeiro notar que não tenho nenhum investimento no resultado de qualquer movimento social ou político. Eu sou velho, sem filhos ou parentes próximos, e num piscar de olhos eu vou ter ido (é claro que a coisa mais importante a lembrar é que muito em breve vamos todos ter ido e nossos descendentes enfrentarão as terríveis conseqüências de nossa estupidez e egoísmo). Eu ofereço estes comentários na esperança que darão a perspectiva, desde que as análises competentes racionais concisas da situação perigosa em América e no mundo são quase inexistente. Eu tenho amigos íntimos de várias etnias, várias vezes dado o meu único patrimônio para uma pessoa empobrecida do terceiro mundo (não, eu não herdar nada significativo, não tinha parentes ricos, um fundo fiduciário ou um trabalho facil), tiveram amigos do terceiro mundo , colegas, namoradas, esposas e parceiros de negócios, e ajudou alguém de qualquer maneira que eu poderia, independentemente da raça, idade, Credo, preferências sexuais ou de origem nacional ou posição sobre o espectro do autismo, e ainda estou fazendo isso. Eu não votei em qualquer tipo de eleição, pertencia a qualquer grupo religioso, social ou político, ouviu um discurso político ou ler um livro sobre a política em mais de 50 anos, como eu considerava inútil e humilhante ter meus pontos de vista carregam o mesmo peso que os de imbecis, lunáticos, criminosos e meramente sem educação (ou seja, cerca de 95% da população). Eu encontro quase 287 todo o diálogo político para ser superficial, enganado e inútil. Este é o meu primeiro e último comentário social/político. Os milhões de artigos diários, discursos, tweets e noticias raramente mencioná-lo, mas o que está acontecendo na América e no mundo não são alguns eventos transitórios e não conectados, mas a história infinitamente triste do colapso inexorável de industrial civilização e da liberdade devido ao superpopulação e às ditaduras malignos que são o CCP (partido comunista Chinês) e Islam. Embora eles são a única questão importantes, eles raramente são declarados claramente nos debates intermináveis e convulsões sociais diárias, e poucas coisas em Este artigo é discutido nunca em toda a maneira desobstruída e inteligente, na parte grande porque diverso (isto é, aqueles não da ascendência Européia) têm uma preensão do estrangulamentos em americano e a maioria de meios ocidentais que o fazem Impossível. Política em países democráticos é dedicada quase inteiramente a fornecer a oportunidade para cada especial grupo de interesse para obter uma quota cada vez maior do rapiidimente diminuindo os recursos. O problema é que quase todas as pessoas são míopes, egoístas, mal educados, falta de experiência e estúpido e isso cria um problema insolúvel quando há 10 bilhões (por fim do século), ou Quando constituem a maioria de qualquer eleitorado num sistema democrático. É uma coisa para cometer erros quando há tempo e recursos para corrigi-los, mas bastante outro quando é impossível. Os EUA é o pior caso, uma vez que parece ter vastos recursos e uma economia resiliente, eo que eu e a maioria das pessoas cresceram a respeito de como as maravilhosas tradições da democracia, diversidade e igualdade, mas agora vejo que estes são convites para exploração por cada grupo de interesse especial e que dar privilégios a todos nascidos, sem impor deveres, tem conseqüências fatais. Também, um sistema que opere esta maneira não pode competir com os que não-Ásia e sobretudo China está comendo o almoco de América (e isso de todos os países não-asiáticos), e nada é provável pará-lo, mas naturalmente superpopulação desgraca todos (a minoria que vai sobreviver após o grande 2seculo 22o/23o morte da população) para uma vida infernal. Um mundo onde todos são livres para replicar seus genes e consumir recursos como eles desejam em breve terá um pouso duro. O fato é que a democracia tornouse uma licença para roubar --do governo-i. e., da minoria encolhimento que pagam impostos significativos, da terra, de todos em toda parte, e dos próprios descendentes, e que a diversidade (multiculturalismo, multipartisanismo, etc.) em um mundo superlotado leva a um conflito insolúvel e colapso.9/11 foi um resultado direto do presente. A história na América é suficientemente clara. No que agora pode ser visto como o primeiro grande desastre decorrente da idéia cristã lunática de direitos humanos inatos, o políticos da Estados do Norte decidiram que era inadequado para o Sul ter escravos. A escravidão foi certamente uma idéia ultrapassada e mal e estava desaparecendo em todo o mundo, e teria sido eliminado com pressões econômicas e 288 políticas após a emancipação através dos 13o a alteração. Mas então, como agora, as ilusões utópicas prevaleceram, e so eles atacaram o Sul, matando e incapacitando milhões e criando pobreza e caos disgênico (a morte e debilidade de uma grande percentagem de homens de euro aptos-encorpado) cujos efeitos ainda estão conosco. Os africanos replicando seus genes a uma taxa mais elevada, resultando em herdeiro vindo a compreender uma percentagem cada vez maior do país. Ninguém percebeu isso na época e a maioria ainda não, mas este foi o início do colapso da América e os defeitos na psicologia que levaram o norte a perseguir o Sul foram uma continuação dos fanáticos cristãos que produziram o assassinato e tortura de milhões durante a idade média, a Inquisição, o genocídio dos índios do novo mundo pelos europeus, as cruzadas e os Jihadistas para os últimos 1200 anos. Isis, Al-Qaeda, os cruzados e o exército do Norte têm um grande negócio em comum. Sem perguntar aos eleitores, alguns milhares de estadistas e congressistas e o Presidente Lincoln fizeram cidadãos ex-escravos e deram-lhes o direito de votar através das 14 e 15 emendas. Gradualmente, veio a ser vastos guetos composto por exescravos, onde o crime e a pobreza floresceu, e onde as drogas (importadas principalmente pelos hispânicos) gerou um vasto império criminal, cujos usuários cometeram centenas de milhões de crimes a cada ano. Então vieram os democratas liderados pelos Kennedys, que, levantou em privilégio e desconectado do mundo real, e tendo como quase todos os políticos nenhuma pista sobre Biologia, psicologia, ecologia humana ou história, decidiu em 1965 que era apenas democrático e justo que o país deve mudar as leis de imigração para diminuir o influxo de europeus em favor de 3 pessoas do mundo (o diverso). Aprovaram a lei e em 1965 o Presidente Lyndon Johnson assinou-o (veja foto da tampa). Houve dúvidas de alguns bairros que isso iria destruir a América, mas eles estavam certos de que não haveria "nenhum impacto demográfico significativo"! O público americano nunca (a este dia em 2019) teve uma possibilidade expressar seus pontos de vista (isto é, votar), a menos que você contar a eleição do trunfo como essa possibilidade, e o Congresso e os vários presidentes mudaram nossa democracia em uma "Democracia Socialista", isto é, em um estado Neomarxista, terceiro mundo supremacista, neofascista. Os Chineses estão encantados porque não têm que lutar os EUA e outras democracias para o dominio, mas para esperar somente para que desmoronem. Algumas décadas atrás, William Brennen, chefe de Justiça da suprema corte, sugeriu que uma lei passou um século antes, para garantir a cidadania aos antigos escravos (o primeiro erro legislativo fatal, o segundo dando-lhes a votação), deve aplicar-se a qualquer um que aconteceu para nascer na América. Subsequentemente, outras decisões do Tribunal (não as pessoas, que nunca foram feitas) decidiram todos os nascidos nos EUA, independentemente do estatuto parental (por exemplo, mesmo que fossem alienígenas de outro sistema solar) tinha direito à cidadania dos EUA (bebês 289 âncora) e foram subsequentemente autorizados a tornar cidadãos de todos os seus parentes – (tele terceiro e quarto erro fatais). Mais uma vez, nunca cruzou as mentes do Congresso ou dos tribunais que a Constituição não deu quaisquer direitos, nem que o público americano deve ser autorizado a votar sobre isso. Além dos milhões de pessoas do 3o mundo aqui "legalmente" (ou seja, com a permissão de algumas centenas no Congresso, mas não as pessoas) milhões começaram a entrar ilegalmente e todas as crianças produzidas em cerca de 3 vezes a taxa de americanos existentes e gerados sempre crescentes problemas sociais. A maioria dos diversos pagaram pouco ou nenhum imposto, e assim eles vivem em parte ou totalmente em apostilas do governo (ou seja, os impostos pagos pela minoria sempre encolhimento de americanos que pagam qualquer, bem como o dinheiro emprestado do futuro gerações para a melodia de $2500000000 por dia, adicionado ao $23,000,000,000,000 em dívida e os US $90 trilhões ou mais de obrigações futuras não financiadas-Medicare, segurança social, etc.), enquanto o sistema agrícola, habitação, ruas e rodovias, esgotos, água e sistemas elétricos, parques, escolas, hospitais, tribunais, transportes públicos, governo, polícia, bombeiros, serviços de emergência e os enormes gastos de defesa necessários para garantir a continuação da existência do nosso país e a maioria dos outros, foram criados, administrado e largamente pagos por euros (i.e., os de ascendência europeia). O fato de que o diverso deve seu bem-estar (relativo ao diverso ainda no 3o mundo) e a sua própria existência (medicina, tecnologia, agricultura, supressão da guerra e escravidão) a euro é nunca mencionado por qualquer um (veja abaixo). Naturalmente, os euros (e uma minoria de impostos pagando diverso) estão indignados de ter que gastar cada vez mais de suas vidas de trabalho para apoiar as legiões de recém-chegados diversificada, para ser inseguro em suas próprias casas e ruas e ver suas cidades, escolas, hospitais, parques, etc. sendo tomado e destruído. Eles tentam protestar, mas os meios de comunicação são agora controlados pelo diverso (com a ajuda de euros iludidos que são dedicados a destruir seus próprios descendentes), e agora é quase impossível afirmar qualquer oposição para o colapso da América e do mundo sem ser atacado como "racista", "supremacista branco" ou "um odiador", e muitas vezes perdendo o trabalho para exercitar a liberdade de expressão. Palavras referindo-se ao diverso são quase proibidos, a menos que seja para elogiá-los e ajudar o seu racismo genuíno (ou seja, vivendo à custa de e explorando e abusando em todos os sentidos possível o euro, e seus diversos vizinhos pagantes fiscais), então não se pode mencionar negros, imigrantes, hispânicos, muçulmanos etc. na mesma discussão com as palavras estuprador, terrorista, ladrão, assassino, molestador infantil, condenado, criminoso, bem-estar etc., sem ser acusado de "ódio" ou "racismo" ou "supremacia branca". Eles são, naturalmente, alheio ao seu próprio racismo e da supremacia do terceiro mundo. Tenha em mente que não há e quase certamente nunca será qualquer evidência de uma diferença genética significativa entre euros e diverso em psicologia, ou QI, e que a sua tendência à reprodução excessiva e outras deficiências 290 é inteiramente devido à cultura. Gradualmente, cada tipo de grupo de interesse especial conseguiu eliminar qualquer referência negativa a eles de qualquer maneira facilmente identificável, então quase desapareceu do discurso público não só palavras referindo-se ao diverso, mas ao curto, alto, gordo, magro, doentes mentais, deficientes, geneticamente defeituosos, desfavorecidos, anormais, esquizofrênicos, deprimidos, estúpidos, desonestos, loucos, preguiçosos, covardes, egoístas, maçantes, etc. até que nada, mas as atitudes agradáveis são ouvidas e um é deixado intrigado sobre quem preenche as prisões , hospitais e alas mentais para transbordar, ninhadas as ruas com lixo, destrói os parques, praias e terras públicas, roubos, motins, assaltos, estupor e assassinatos, e usa-se todo o dinheiro do imposto, além de um extra 2.500.000.000 dólares por dia, adicionado ao $23.000.000.000.000 dívida nacional (ou mais de 90.000.000.000.000 se você estender o passivo real em um futuro próximo). Claro, não é devido a todos os diversos, mas cada dia que passa uma percentagem maior é como os seus números incham e os do declínio euros. É agora mais de 50 anos depois de passar o novo ato de imigração e cerca de 16% da população é Hispânica (acima de menos de 1% mais cedo), que foram reproduzindo em cerca de 3x a taxa de Euros , de modo que cerca de metade das crianças menores de 6 anos agora são hispânicos, enquanto alguns 13% do país são negros, sendo rapidamente deslocados e marginalizados pelos hispânicos (embora poucos negros percebem isso, então eles continuam a apoiar os políticos favorecendo mais imigração e apostilas e promissores ganhos a curto prazo). Virtualmente ninguém agarra o eventual colapso da América e do mundo inteiro, apesar do fato de que você pode vêlo na frente de seus olhos em todos os lugares. Na América e no mundo, os euros (e todos os "ricos" geralmente) estão produzindo menos de duas crianças por casal, assim que suas populações estão diminuindo, e na América em 2014, pela primeira vez desde euros veio aqui no 16thséculo, mais de eles morreram do que nasceram, então sua marginalização é certa. E, mostrando o "sucesso" do Neomarxista, terceiro mundo supremacista imigração e políticas de bem-estar, a população de Hispânicos na Califórnia passou 50%, então dentro de uma década, o 6 maior economia do mundo será parte do México. O diverso vontade, dentro, este século, elimina todo o "racismo Americano" (isto é, qualquer oposição ou impedimento legal à tomada de posse de todo o poder político, e a apropriação de tanto de seu vizinhos dinheiro e propriedade como eles podem gerenciar,) exceto seu próprio racismo (por exemplo, imposto de renda graduado que obriga o euro a apoiá-los). Logo eles vão eliminar em grande parte as diferenças jurídicas entre os cidadãos do México e da Califórnia e, em seguida, Texas, que então terá pleno "direitos" (privilégios) em qualquer lugar nos EUA, de modo que a cidadania 291 se tornou cada vez mais sem sentido (e um sempremenor percentual dos diversos vai pagar quaisquer impostos significativos ou servir no exército, e uma percentagem muito maior continuará a receber o bem-estar e cometer crimes, e para obter a escolaridade livre ou fortemente subsidiada , cuidados médicos etc.). Não se pode mencionar na mídia que o racismo predominante nos EUA é a extorsão pelo diverso de alguém com dinheiro (principalmente euros , mas também qualquer diverso que têm dinheiro), a eliminação da liberdade de expressão (exceto o seu próprio), a polarização de todas as leis para favorecer esta extorsão, e sua rápida aquisição de todos os políticos e financeiros poder, ou seja, discriminação total contra euros e qualquer pessoa pertencente às "classes superiores", ou seja, qualquer pessoa que pague quaisquer impostos significativos. Gradualmente a pobreza, as drogas, as gangues, a destruição ambiental e a corrupção da polícia, do exército e do governo endêmicas no México e a maioria dos outros países do 3o mundo estão se espalhando por toda a América, por isso seremos capazes de atravessar a fronteira cada vez mais porosa com México sem notar que estamos em um país diferente-provavelmente dentro de algumas décadas, mas certamente até o final do século. A população continua a aumentar, e aqui como em todo o mundo, o aumento é agora 100% diverso e, como entramos no próximo século (muito mais cedo em alguns países), os recursos vão diminuir e fome, doença, crime e guerra vai raiva fora de controle. Os ricos e as corporações serão principalmente ainda ricos (como sempre, como as coisas pioram eles vão levar o seu dinheiro e sair), os pobres serão mais pobres e mais numerosos, e vida em todos os lugares, com a possível excepção de alguns países ou partes de países onde o crescimento populacional é impedido, será insuportável e insobrevivel. A cooperação entre os diversos para arrancar controle da sociedade de euros vai desmoronar como a sociedade se desintegra e eles vão se dividir em negros, hispânicos, muçulmanos, chineses, filipinos, gays, idosos, deficientes, e ainda mais onde possível em infinitas subgrupos. Os ricos vão contratar cada vez mais guarda-costas, transportar armas, dirigir carros à prova de balas e usar a polícia privada para protegê-los em suas comunidades fechadas e escritórios, como já é comum em 3 países do mundo. Com muito reduzida qualidade de vida e alto crime, alguns vão pensar em voltar aos seus países de origem, mas também superpopulação vai esgotar os recursos e produzir colapso ainda mais grave do que nos EUA e na Europa, e o racismo no 3o mundo, temporariamente suprimida por uma abundância relativa de recursos e presença policial e militar, vai se tornar cada vez pior, assim que a vida será infernal quase em toda parte. A população no século 22 vai encolher como bilhões morrem de fome, doença, drogas, suicídio, e guerra civil e internacional. Como os países do terceiro mundo nuclear colapso (Paquistão, Índia e talvez o Irã até então, graças a Obama) e são 292 tomadas por radicais, os conflitos nucleares acabará por ocorrer. Ainda assim, talvez ninguém ousará sugerir publicamente que a principal causa do caos era a maternidade irrestrita. Claro, muito desta história já jogou fora na América, no Reino Unido e em outros lugares, e o resto é inevitável, mesmo sem mudança climática e os apetites vorosos da China, que apenas fazer isso acontecer mais rápido. É apenas uma questão de quão ruim ele vai chegar onde e quando. Qualquer um que duvida disso está fora de contato com a realidade, mas você não pode enganar a mãe natureza, e seus descendentes não vão mais debatê-lo como eles serão forçados a viê-lo. Os pobres, e aparentemente, Obama, Krugman, Zuckerberg e a maioria dos Democratas (Neomarxistas), não entendem o princípio de funcionamento mais básico da civilização-não há almoço grátis. Você só pode dar a um, tirando de outro, agora ou no futuro. Nada como ajudar sem ferir. Cada dólar e cada item tem valor porque em algum lugar, alguém destruiu a terra. E esquerdistas tem a ilusão de que eles podem resolver todos os problemas roubando dos ricos. Para obter alguma idéia do absurdo disso, todos os contribuintes E.U. ganhando mais de um milhão de dólares têm um total após o lucro fiscal de cerca de 800.000.000.000, enquanto o déficit anual é de cerca de 1.500.000.000.000, e mesmo tendo tudo isso não faz nada para pagar os 18 existentes trilhões de dívidas ou cerca de 90.000.000.000.000 em passivos de próximo prazo não financiados (por exemplo, Medicare e segurança social). Claro, você não pode aumentar o seu imposto ou imposto corporativo muito mais ou ele vai deprime muito a economia e produzir uma recessão, perdas de emprego e do vôo de capital, e eles já pagam os impostos mais elevados, em relação ao que eles ganham como um% de renda da nação, de qualquer país industrializado. E mais uma vez, o top 1% dos assalariados pagam cerca de 50% do imposto de renda total pessoal Federal, enquanto o fundo 47% (principalmente diverso) pagar nada. Então, o fato é que só temos uma espécie de democracia, como não temos quase nada a dizer sobre o que o governo. faz, e uma espécie de fascismo, como o governo sempre em expansão. espiões em cada movimento cada, controla cada vez mais minuciosamente nossa cada ação, e nos obriga a uma arma para fazer o que eles decidir, e uma espécie de comunismo como eles roubam o que quiserem de quem eles querem e usá-lo para apoiar alguém que eles gostam, aqui e em todo o mundo, a maioria dos quais não têm interesse em democracia, justiça, ou igualdade, exceto como meios para tirar proveito de nossa fatalmente sistema defeituoso para obter tanto dinheiro e serviços como eles podem, a fim de apoiar a replicação de seus genes e destruindo a terra. Falando de Obama, Trump diz que ele é o pior presidente de sempre, e, claro, Obama, totalmente arrogante, desonesto e sem qualquer compreensão real da situação (ou não dispostos a ser honesto) apenas risos, e balbucia platitudes, mas como eu refletir 293 um pouco é claramente verdadeiro. Como Roosevelt, que deu-nos o primeiro passo gigante em fascismo e governo. resíduos e opressão com um imposto ilegal e inconstitucional (segurança social), Obamacare deixar o governo. engolir 1/6 da economia e criou His próprio imposto ilegal (denominado «sanções» de Obamacare, em que o FDR os chamou de «prestações» de «contribuições»). Ele tentou forçar os EUA a aceitar outro 8 para 10 milhões ilegais (ninguém parece muito certo) que vai ' Birthright ' (primogenitura) em cerca de 50 milhões por 2100. Nos primeiros 3 anos de seu escritório (2009 a 2012) o deficit de funcionamento Federal aumentou aproximadamente 44% de 10 a $15.000.000.000.000, o aumento por cento o maior desde WW2, quando em metade 2015 tinha aumentado a sobre 71% do orçamento operando-se fiscal--sobre $18 trilhões ou cerca de $57000 para cada pessoa nos EUA, incluindo crianças. Seu adiamento da deportação de milhões de ilegais, todos os quais agora recebem segurança social, créditos fiscais, Medicare etc., é estimado para ter um custo vitalício para o governo (ou seja, para a minoria de nós que pagam quaisquer impostos significativos) de ca. $1300000000000. Naturalmente, isto não inclui a escola livre, o uso do sistema judicial, as prisões e a polícia, o cuidado livre da emergência do ' (isto é, apenas indo à emergência para todo o problema qualquer), degradação de todas as facilidades públicas etc. assim que é provável pelo menos duas vezes mais. E nós vimos 8 anos de manipulação incompetente do Iraque, das guerras Afghan e Syrian e do crescimento cancerosa do CCP e do Islam. He provavelmente deu a capacidade de fazer armas nucleares para o Irã, que é altamente susceptível de levar a uma guerra nuclear por 2100 ou muito mais cedo. Ele foi claramente eleito para classista, racista, razões supremacistas do terceiro mundo-porque ele tinha genes africanos visíveis, enquanto os euros, tendo deixado a África alguns 50.000 anos antes têm os invisíveis. Ele, e a maioria das pessoas que ele nomeou, tinha pouca competência ou experiência na execução de um país e eles foram escolhidos, como ele, com base em diversos genes e Neomarxistas, simpatias supremacistas do terceiro mundo. Se ele não é um traidor (dando ajuda e conforto para o inimigo), então quem é? É claro como dia que, como quase todos, ele opera totalmente na psicologia primitiva automática, com suas simpatias de coalizamento (preconceitos) favorecendo aqueles que olham e agem mais como ele. Ele (como a maioria diversificada) é de fato fazendo o seu melhor para destruir o país e sistema que fez a sua vida exaltada possível. Em uma entrevista perto do final de seu mandato, ele disse que a principal razão para o atraso do terceiro mundo era o colonialismo. Como com todos os esquerdista do terceiro mundo supremacistas, nunca cruzou sua mente que aproximadamente 95% de todo o terceiro mundo os povos devem sua existência e seu padrão relativamente elevado de vida aos euro e ao colonialismo (isto é, medicina, agricultura, tecnologia, ciência, comércio, educação, polícia e sistema judicial, comunicações, eliminação de guerra e criminalidade, etc.), nem que os verdadeiros inimigos dos pobres são outros pobres, que são tão repulsivos como os ricos, que é o seu maior desejo de imitar. Concordo que, com a possível excepção de Lincoln, ele é o pior (ou seja, mais destrutivo para a qualidade de vida 294 americana e sobrevivência como uma nação) por sua falta de honestidade, arrogância e agressão à liberdade e de longo prazo sobrevivência-uma conquista impressionante quando sua competição inclui Nixon, Johnson, os arbustos e os Clintons, e que faz mesmo Reagan olhar bom. Ao considerar maus presidentes, nós devemos começar com Abraham Lincoln, que é reverenciado como um Santo, mas ele (com a ajuda do Congresso) destruiu grande parte do país e la vida de milhões de pessoas lutando contra o totalmente desnecessário guerra civil, e em muitos aspectos, o país nunca vai se recuperar como ele levou ao movimento dos direitos civis, o 1965 ato de imigração e 1982 a Suprema Corte âncora bebê decisão. A escravidão teria chegado a um fim em breve sem a guerra, como fez em todos os lugares e, claro, foi euros que forneceu o impulso principal para trazê-lo para um fim aqui e em todos os lugares. Após a guerra, os escravos poderiam ter sido repatriados para a África, ou apenas dada residência, em vez de torná-los cidadãos (14a emenda) e, em seguida, dando-lhes a votação (15th alteração). Ele e seus colaboradores, como tantos liberais classe superior euros, então e agora, foi cego pelas ilusões sociais utópicas encarnado no cristianismo e na democracia, que resultam da psicologia da aptidão inclusiva de intuições coalizões e altruísmo recíproco, que foi eugênico e adaptativo no EEE (ambiente de adaptação evolutiva-i. e., de ca. 50.000 a vários milhões de anos atrás), mas é fatalmente disgênico e maladaptável nos tempos modernos. Note a grande ironia da citação dele que começa th é o livro, que mostra que mesmo os mais brilhantes são vítimas de seus próprios limites, e não têm nenhuma compreensão da biologia humana, psicologia ou ecologia. Nunca passou pela sua cabeça que o mundo se tornaria horrivelmente superpovoado e que os africanos cresceriam para se tornar um problema social gigante, em casa e para si e para o mundo como a África se expande para mais de 4.000.000.000. Da mesma forma, apesar do desastre agora claro, parece não cruzar Obama que o diverso em casa e no exterior vai destruir a América eo mundo, embora qualquer brilhante de dez anos de idade pode vê-lo. O Presidente Truman poderia ter deixado McArthur usar a bomba atômica para acabar com a guerra coreana, destruir o comunismo e evitar o horror contínuo da China executado por 25 sociopatas (o Politburo) ou realmente apenas sete sociopatas (o Comitê ereto de Politburo) ou talvez realmente apenas um sociopata (Xi Jinping). Johnson poderia ter feito do mesmo modo no Vietnã, Bush no Iraque e Obama no Afeganistão, Síria e Líbia. China e provavelmente muitos países do 3o mundo teriam usado armas nucleares se as situações fossem invertidas. Uma vez que um país muçulmano radical recebe a bomba uma greve preemptiva por eles ou sobre eles provavelmente resultara, e isso é provável por 2100 e perto de certo por 2200. Se 295 Gaddafi tivesse conseguido os seus esforços para conseguir a bomba, seria muito provável que tivesse acontecido. Os EUA poderiam ter forçado o Japão, a China e a Coréia, o Iraque e a Líbia e todos os países da Europa (e todo o mundo para esse assunto) a pagar pelos custos dos nossos esforços militares em todas as guerras recentes, e entre guerras, em vez de assumir a maior parte do custo e, em seguida, ajudá-los a assumir a maior parte da fabricação da América. É claro que essas decisões, críticas à sobrevivência do país, foram feitas por um punhado de políticos sem consultar os eleitores. Os Kennedy foram uma parte importante da mudança das leis de imigração em meados dos anos 60, então eles têm que contar como traidores e grandes inimigos da América em um par com Obama, G. W Bush e os Clintons. Poderíamos ter seguido os fundamentos universais da indústria dos EUA e se recusou a assinar o GATT, que deu acesso livre a todas as nossas patentes anos antes de serem concedidos, embora, naturalmente, os chineses agora hackear e roubar tudo com impunidade de qualquer maneira. Eisenhower poderia ter deixado o Reino Unido manter a posse do canal de Suez, em vez de chantageá-los para sair do Egito, e sobre e sobre. Alguns podem estar interessados em algumas estatísticas para dar uma idéia de onde estamos atualmente na estrada para o inferno. Veja as tabelas no início. Nos EUA, a população de hispânicos vai inchar de cerca de 55 milhões em 2016 (ou tanto quanto 80 milhões se você aceitar algumas estimativas de ilegalidades 25 milhões-é uma marca de quão longe o govt. deixou as coisas vão que nós realmente não sabemos) para talvez 140 milhões meio seculo e 200 milhões como entramos no século 22 , momento em que a população de E.U. vai estar subindo passado 500 milhões, e a população mundial será de cerca de 11 bilhão, 3.000.000.000 de que acrescentou a partir de agora para então na África e 1.000.000.000 em Ásia (as estimativas oficiais da ONU no momento). Os hispânicos estão se reproduzindo tão rápido que os euros, agora uma maioria 63%, será uma minoria por meio século e cerca de 40% por 2100. A maior parte do aumento nos EUA a partir de agora será Hispânicos, com os negros restantes, asiáticos e muçulmanos, e todo o aumento aqui e no mundo será 100% diverso. Cerca de 500.000 pessoas são naturalizadas anualmente e uma vez que são principalmente do mundo 3 e produzem crianças em cerca de duas vezes a taxa de euros, que irá adicionar talvez 2 milhões meio seculo e 5 milhões por 2100 para cada ano que continua. Para mostrar o quão rápido as coisas saíram do controle após o "sem impacto demográfico" TKO (técnico knock out ou Ted Kennedy indignação, embora pudéssemos igualmente chamá-lo de ultraje LBJ, o ultraje Neomarxista, o ultraje liberal etc.) ato de imigração de 1965, há agora mais hispânicos na Califórnia do que há pessoas em 46 outros Estados. Em 1970 logo após o TKO, havia cerca de 4 milhões hispânicos e agora há mais de 55 milhões "legals" (ou seja, não é feito legal pelos eleitores, mas por um punhado de políticos e da Suprema Corte estúpida) e talvez 80 milhões contando 296 ilegais. Nunca atravessa as mentes do bloco democrático-voto pobre diverso que aqueles que sofrerão de longe mais da "diversificação" dos Estados Unidos são eles mesmos. Os E.U. passou de 84 por cento branco, 11 por cento preto, 4 por cento hispânicos e 1 por cento asiáticos em 1965, para 62 por cento branco, 11 por cento preto, 18 por cento hispânicos e 6 por cento asiáticos agora, de acordo com um relatório recente do Pew. Por 2055, nenhum grupo é esperado para ter uma maioriaum cenário perfeito para o caos, mas você pode ver inúmeros da Academia (agora um paraíso para o estado financiado Neomarxisto terceiro mundo supremacismo) elogiando o multipartisanismo. Os asiáticos estão previstos para aumentar mais rápido do que qualquer grupo, dobrando a sua percentagem nas próximas décadas, mas pelo menos eles vão ter ido através de um procedimento de imigração mínima, exceto, naturalmente, para as famílias de bebê âncora (produzindo que agora é uma grande indústria como Os asiáticos voam aqui para dar à luz, embora sejam grandemente ultrapassada pelos hispânicos que só têm de atravessar a fronteira à noite). Naturalmente, os asiáticos são por e grande uma bênção para a América como eles são mais produtivos e menos problemas do que qualquer grupo, incluindo euros. O governo dos E.U. (sozinho dos países principais) empurra a "diversidade" mas nos países pelo mundo inteiro e durante todo a história as tentativas de soldar raças e culturas diferentes em uma foram um disastre absoluto. Muitos grupos viveram entre ou ao lado de outros por milhares de anos sem assimilar notavelmente. Chineses e Koreanos e Japoneses na Ásia, Judeus e gentios em milhares de lugares, turcos, Curdos e Armênios, etc., viveram juntos por milênios sem assimilar e ir para as gargantas um do outro na menor provocação. Depois de mais de 300 anos de mistura racial, os EUA ainda é cerca de 97% monoracial (ou seja, branco, hispânico, preto etc.), com apenas cerca de 3% descrevendo-se como raça mista (e a maioria deles foram misturados quando eles vieram aqui). Os nativos americanos (a quem o mundo novo inteiro pertence realmente se um está indo rectificar injustiças passados de encontro ao diverso, um fato que seja mencionado nunca pelos supremacistas do terceiro mundo) é na maior parte ainda viver isolado e (antes do casinos) empobrecido, assim como os negros que, 150 anos após a emancipação, em grande parte ainda vivem no crime montado, guetos empobrecidos. E estes têm sido o melhor dos tempos, com lotes de terra barata e recursos naturais, bem-estar e programas de ação afirmativa (em grande parte exclusivo para ' racista ' América), uma economia principalmente saudável e um governo que extorsão mais de 30% do dinheiro deles (ou seja, 30% de suas vidas de trabalho, contando imposto de renda, imposto sobre vendas, imposto imobiliário etc.), ganhou pela parte de pagamento de impostos da classe média e alta, para dar os folhetos maciços pobres-não apenas os selos de alimentos e outros bem-estar, mas a polícia e serviços de emergência, ruas e parques, o governo, o sistema de justiça, hospitais, defesa nacional, escolas, estradas, pontes, rede elétrica, etc., e os custos de degradação ambiental, e os financeiros e custos emocionais do crime e é ameaça, etc., 297 a maioria destes nunca contados por ninguém (e nunca mencionado pelos Neomarxista supremacistas do terceiro mundo) ao considerar os "custos do bem-estar" ou a desvantagem enorme à diversidade. Em todo o caso, a ilusão liberal, democrática é que tal generosidade e as políticas sociais soldarão nossa sociedade "diversa" (isto é, fatalmente fragmentada) em uma família feliz. Mas apostilas do governo precisam aumentar continuamente (para a segurança social, guerras, cuidados de saúde, escolas, bem-estar, infra-estrutura, etc.), enquanto a base tributária relativa encolhe, e nossa dívida e direitos não financiados crescer por trilhões por ano, de modo que o economia está em processo de colapso. A família média tem menos lucro líquido real e economias agora do que duas décadas há e poderia sobreviver aproximadamente 3 meses sem renda, aproximadamente 40% de americanos aposentados têm menos de $25000 economias etc. E, novamente, estes são os melhores momentos com muitos recursos "livres" (ou seja, roubados de outros e de nossos descendentes) em todo o mundo e cerca de 4.000.000.000 pessoas menos do que haverá no próximo século. Como as economias falham e fome, doença, crime e propagação da guerra, as pessoas vão dividir linhas raciais e religiosas como sempre, e nos EUA hispânicos e negros ainda vai dominar o fundo. Raramente ocorre para aqueles que querem continuar (e aumentar) os números de e a subsidiação dos diversos que o dinheiro para isso é finalmente roubado de seus próprios descendentes, em quem cai o fardo de mais de US $90 trilhões de dívidas se um conta os direitos atuais (ou até $220000000000000 se os passivos continuaram sem redução de apostilas e nenhum aumento de imposto), e uma sociedade e um mundo que desmoronam na anarquia. Como observado, um dos muitos efeitos colaterais do mal da diversidade (por exemplo, aumentos maciços no crime, degradação ambiental, engarrafamento de tráfego, diminuindo a qualidade das escolas, falência vinda de governos locais, estaduais e federais, a corrupção da polícia e fronteiras funcionários, aumento dos preços de tudo, sobrecarga do sistema médico, etc.) é que o nosso direito à liberdade de expressão desapareceu em qualquer questão de relevância política possível e, claro, que significa apenas sobre qualquer questão. Mesmo em privado, se qualquer comentário negativo sobre ' diversidade ' é gravado ou testemunhado por qualquer pessoa credível, o racista, terceiro mundo supremacista diversificada e seus servos do euro vai tentar tirar o seu trabalho e prejudicar o seu negócio ou a sua pessoa. Isto é certo quando envolve figuras públicas e questões raciais ou de imigração, mas nada está fora dos limites. Dezenas de livros nas últimas duas décadas abordam a questão, incluindo "a polícia de novo pensamento: dentro do assalto à esquerda em liberdade de expressão e mentes livres", "fim da discussão: como a indústria da esquerda indignação encerra debate, manipula os eleitores, e faz América menos libre (e diversao) ' e ' o silenciamento: como a esquerda está matando liberdade de expressão ', mas nada vai dissuadir os socialistas 298 democráticos (ou seja, os comunistas do armário) e os liberais lunáticos da franja. Como observado, eu estou escrevendo este livro porque ninguém na Academia, nem qualquer figura pública, ousa fazê-lo. Outro ' efeito colateral ' é a perda de grande parte de nossa liberdade e privacidade como o governo continua a expandir sua guerra contra o terror. Nunca houve uma razão convincente para admitir qualquer número sério de muçulmanos (ou qualquer mais diversificada para essa matéria). Em todo o caso, parece um não-brainer para não admitir e expulsar único muçulmanos masculinos solteiros envelhecidos 15 a 50, mas mesmo tais movimentos simples óbvios estão além das capacidades dos retardos que controlam o Congresso e naturalmente nossos presidentes amados, todos de quem , com os membros do Congresso, que votaram para as mudanças da lei do immigracao que começam em 1965, poderiam ser prendidos pessoalmente responsável para 9/11, o bombardeio etc. da maratona de Boston. Claro, Trump está tentando mudar isso, mas é muito pouco, tarde demais e exceto sua lei marcial declarando, executando o país com o exército, e deportar ou quarentena 100 milhões do menos útil residentes, a data de América com destino é certa. Um exemplo adorável de como a supressão da liberdade de expressão leva a uma loucura cada vez maior é o caso do Major Hasan (cortesia de Mark Steyn "After America"). Um psiquiatra do exército em Fort Hood, que tinha SoA (soldado de Allah) em seu cartão de visita, ele foi freqüentemente repreendido quando um estagiário do exército estudantil para tentar converter os pacientes para o Islã, e muitas queixas foram arquivados por sua constante comentários anti-Americanos-um dia ele deu uma palestra Power Point para uma sala cheia de médicos do exército justificando o seu radicalismo. Liberdade de expressão e senso comum não estar mais disponível no exército do que a vida civil, ele foi então promovido a Major e enviado para Fort Hood, onde ele comentou com seu oficial superior em um assassinato recente de dois soldados em Little Rock: "isso é o que os muçulmanos devem fazer-stand até os agressores "e" as pessoas devem amarrar bombas em si mesmos um ir em Times Square ", mas o exército não fez nada por medo de ser acusado de preconceito. Um dia ele saiu de seu escritório com um rifle de assalto e assassinou 13 soldados. Descobriuse que duas forças-tarefa antiterrorismo diferentes estavam cientes de que ele tinha sido em contato freqüente e-mail com os principais terroristas islamistas radicais. O chefe de gabinete do exército geral George Casey comentou: "o que aconteceu em Fort Hood foi uma tragédia, mas eu acredito que seria uma tragédia ainda maior se a nossa diversidade se torna uma casualidade aqui"!! Está perdendo o 70 milhões sobre o bemestar ou o 1,7 milhões na prisão ou os 3 milhões viciados em drogas que é mais trágico? A invasão do sudoeste pelos hispânicos dá o sabor do que está por vir e Coulter em seu livro "Adios América" fala de parques de lixeira, escolas que caíram de a a D grau, 299 bilhões para ' livre ' (ou seja, pagos pela classe média superior e superior e empresas) cuidados médicos e outros serviços em Los Angeles sozinho etc. Qualquer um que vive lá que recorda o que Texas ou Califórnia eram como 30 anos há não tem nenhuma dúvida sobre as conseqüências catastróficas da diversidade como a vêem todos os dias. Na Califórnia, que eu conheço pessoalmente, as áreas urbanas (e até mesmo a maioria dos parques e praias) que eu costumava desfrutar agora estão lotadas com hispânicos e muitas vezes cheio de lixo e spray pintado com sinais de gangues, enquanto as rodovias são terrivelmente lotado e as cidades e cidades invadida com drogas e crime, por isso a maior parte é agora inabitável e a 6a maior economia do mundo está indo para a falência, uma vez que tenta mover 20 milhões na maior parte da classe hispânicos na classe média alta, usando o dinheiro do imposto dos euros. Um de tele última insanidade sera tentar colocar todos os ilegais em Obamacare. Algumas pessoas que eu conheço tiveram seu aumento de cobertura médica anual de menos de $1000 antes Obamacare para cerca de $4000 (2017 estimativa) e o extra $3000 é o que os democratas estão roubando de alguém que pode para cobrir os custos de cuidados de custo livre ou muito baixo para aqueles que PA y pouco ou nenhum imposto, e que já estão falidos hospitais forçados a dar-lhes "emergência" livre de cuidados. Claro, os republicanos estão tentando matá-lo, mas como todo o governo, ele já está em uma espiral de morte que apenas um enorme aumento de taxas pode corrigir. Uma das mais flagrantes violações da lei dos EUA pelos lunáticos de esquerda que apoiam a imigração é a criação de "cidades-santuário". As cidades não permitem que os fundos municipais ou recursos sejam usados para impor leis federais de imigração, geralmente por não permitir que policiais ou funcionários municipais para inquirir sobre o status de imigração de um indivíduo. Isso começou com Los Angeles em 1979 (tornando-se assim a primeira grande cidade doada para o México) e agora inclui pelo menos 31 grandes cidades Americano. Presumivelmente, o Presidente poderia ordenar o exército ou o FBI para prender os funcionários da cidade que passaram esses regulamentos para a obstrução da justiça, etc., mas é uma área legal obscura como (em outra indicação da inépcia total do Congresso e os tribunais que desesperança do sistema democrático como praticado atualmente) as violações de imigração são ofensas civis e não crimes federais ou estaduais que devem ser claramente. Depois que eu escrevi isso os tribunais (previsivelmente) bloqueado tentativa de Trump para cortar fundos para cidades santuário, esquecendo que o seu objectivo é proteger os cidadãos da América, e não os de outros países aqui ilegalmente. E recentemente a Califórnia declarou-se um estado de santuário, ou seja, é agora parte do México. Um Governo competente (talvez nós poderíamos importar um de Sweden, de China ou mesmo de Cuba?) poderia passar tal legislação em algumas semanas. Além disso, poderia forçar a conformidade cortando a maioria ou todos os fundos federais para qualquer cidade ou estado que não cumpriu com as leis federais de imigração, e pelo 300 menos um tal projeto foi introduzido no Congresso recentemente, mas os democratas impediram a sua passagem, e, claro, Obama ou Clinton teria vetado qualquer tentativa de dar americano de volta aos Americanos. Trump, claro, tem uma visão diferente, embora ele não pode salvar a América através de meios democráticos. Contanto que os Democratas (em breve retornar ao poder e, rumor tem, para mudar o seu nome para Neomarxista terceiro mundo supremacista partido da América Latina, Ásia, África e Oriente Médio) estão no poder, nada será feito, e mais cidades e Estados deixará de ser uma parte da América até hispânicos assumir completamente em algum momento na segunda metade do século. Só um golpe militar pode salvar a América agora e é muito improvável que os generais tenham a coragem. Para esta revisão, eu li alguns livros e artigos politicamente orientados na impressão e na Web do tipo que eu evitei por mais de 50 anos, e neles e os comentários sobre eles viram repetidas acusações de ' racismo "contra as pessoas que só estavam afirmando o seu desejo de ter os EUA permanecem um país próspero e seguro. Esta reivindicação é agora quase sempre falsa no significado normal, mas naturalmente verdadeiro no significado novo-i. e., um oposto a deixar México e África anexo América. Então, eu escrevi uma resposta a esta calúnia, desde que eu nunca vi um bom. Na verdade, não é "racismo", mas auto-defesa-o diverso na América são os racistas, como na média, sua vida aqui é em grande parte uma exploração de outras raças, nomeadamente europeus e asiáticos que realmente pagam impostos. Para o racismo genuíno olhe como os grupos diferentes nativos a seu próprio país (ou imigrantes) são tratados lá. A grande maioria dos imigrantes nos EUA não teria sequer permissão para entrar em seus países, muito menos a cidadania permitida, o privilégio de votar, livre ou de baixo custo habitação, alimentos, livre ou subsidiado cuidados médicos, livre escola, programas de ação afirmativa, os mesmos privilégios que os nativos etc. E nos EUA, é o diverso que tirou a tranquilidade, beleza, segurança e liberdade de expressão que existia aqui antes de um punhado de políticos estupido e juízes da Suprema Corte deixá-lo entrar. Nós nunca votou para deixá-lo entrar ou tornar-se cidadãos-que foi forçado a nós por idiotas em nosso governo, começando com Lincoln e seus parceiros no crime. Se tivéssemos a chance de votar nele, poucos estrangeiros, exceto médicos, especialistas científicos e de tecnologia e alguns professores teriam sido admitidos e talvez 75% do Diversos ser deportado. Em muitos casos, você tem uma religião alienígena (alguns dos quais exigem o assassinato de alguém que você tomar uma antipatia) e cultura (assassinatos de honra de suas filhas, etc), não pagam uma parte justa dos impostos (normalmente nenhum) e cometer muito mais crimes per capita (por exemplo, , 2.5 x para hispânicos, 4.5 x para negros). 301 Além disso, a classe média Americana paga cerca de 30% de sua renda para o governo isto é aproximadamente 66 dias/ano de sua vida de trabalho e talvez 20 dias daquele vão apoiar os pobres, agora na maior parte diverso. E todas as coisas "livres", como o bem-estar, os selos de alimentos, cuidados médicos e hospitais, escolas, parques, ruas, saneamento, polícia, bombeiros, rede elétrica, sistema postal, estradas e aeroportos, defesa nacional etc. existem em grande parte porque o ' racista ' meio superior e classe superior criada, manter e pagar por eles. Talvez outros 4 dias úteis vai para apoiar a polícia, FBI, sistema de Justiça, DHS, Border Patrol e outras agências governo que têm de lidar com alienos. Adicione mais 10 ou mais dias para apoiar os militares, que é principalmente necessário para lidar com os resultados da 3a superpopulação Mundial (a verdadeira causa principal da guerra da Coréia, a guerra do Vietnã, Iraque, Afeganistão, Síria, Líbia, Iêmen e a principal causa da maioria das guerras , agitação social e conflitos passados, presentes e futuros), e este custo, adicionado ao bem-estar, Medicare, segurança social e degradação ambiental (uma percentagem cada vez maior para os imigrantes e seus descendentes) está falido no país, com o único possível solução para diminuir os benefícios e aumentar os impostos, cujo fardo cairá sobre os descendentes de todos. Você aproveita a liberdade de expressão que criamos para dizer mentiras maliciosas sobre nós e evitar discussões racionais! A maioria de vocês, se fazendo isso em seu país de origem, iria acabar na prisão ou morto! Mentirosos sem vergonha! Qual é o seu problema? -má educação, sem gratidão, maliciosa, estúpida, sem experiência com a sociedade civilizada? (selecionar 5). E qualquer um que duvida deste apenas não sabe usar seu cérebro ou a rede como está tudo lá. Estes comentários são apenas os fatos que qualquer um pode ver, junto com extrapolações simples no futuro. Além disso, por favor, deixe-me perguntar o diverso--as pessoas em seu país de origem trabalham 30 dias por ano para apoiar dezenas de milhões de alienígenas que cometem crimes em várias vezes a taxa de nativos, sobrecarregar suas escolas, rodovias, cidades e prisões, lixo seus parques e praias, tinta spray graffiti em edifícios e importação e venda de drogas para viciados que cometem mais de cem milhões de crimes por ano (adicionado ao 100 milhões ou assim eles se comprometem)? E você teve um 9/11 e muitos bombardeios e assassinatos em casa? Os imigrantes controlam os meios de comunicação para que você não pode sequer discutir essas questões que estão destruindo o seu país e do mundo? Será que o seu país estará totalmente em seu controle em algumas gerações e ser outro empobrecido, crime montado, faminto, corrupto 3o mundo inferno? Claro, para a maioria de vocês já é, e você veio para a América para escapar dele. Mas seus descendentes não terão que ser saudades para o inferno, como eles terão re-criado-lo aqui. O diverso aqui (e seus servos do euro) nunca se cansam de reclamar em todos os meios de comunicação todos os dias sobre como eles não são tratados de forma justa e não dado o suficiente (ou seja, os euros e os relativamente ricos diverso não trabalham duro o suficiente para apoiá-los), e nunca 302 cruza a sua mentes que, se não fosse para os impostos pagos principalmente por euros agora e por mais de um século anterior, haveria pouca ou nenhuma polícia ou fogo ou serviços médicos ou escolares ou parques ou transportes públicos ou ruas ou esgotos em suas comunidades, e, claro, não iria mesmo existe um país aqui, como é principalmente os euros que criaram, e apoiá-lo e que servem no exército em todas as guerras. E foi principalmente euros e seus descendentes que criaram a rede e do PC que foi usado para criar este e os meios eletrônicos ou de impressão que você está lendo isso, a tecnologia que produz o alimento que você come e o remédio que o mantém vivo. Se não for a tecnologia de euros e de segurança, sobre 90% de todos os diversos no mundo não existiria. Todo mundo condena o colonialismo, mas foi a maneira que os diversos foram trazidos para fora da idade escura em tempos modernos através de comunicações, medicina, agricultura e execução do governo democrático. Caso contrário, todas as suas populações teriam ficado muito pequenas, para trás, morrendo de fome, doença montada, empobrecida, isolada e vivendo na idade das Trevas (incluindo a escravidão e seus equivalentes) até hoje. Para resumir, a antipatia do euro à diversidade ("racismo") é devida a um desejo de que seus filhos tenham um país e um mundo que valha a pena viver. Mais uma vez, isso é para o benefício de todos, não apenas euros ou os ricos. Da mesma forma, toda a minha vida eu tenho ouvido pessoas do terceiro mundo dizendo que seus problemas desproporcionados com drogas, crime e bem-estar são devidos ao racismo, e certamente há alguma verdade para isso, mas eu me pergunto por que os asiáticos, que devem ser sujeitos ao racismo como Bem (na medida em que existe-e em relação à maioria dos municípios diversos, é bastante mínimo aqui), ea maioria dos quais veio aqui muito mais recentemente, falou pouco ou nenhum inglês, não tinha parentes aqui e poucas habilidades, têm uma fração do crime, drogas e bemestar (tudo menos do que Euros e assim menos do que negros ou hispânicos) e média de cerca de $10000 mais renda por família do que euros. Além disso, os negros nunca consideram que eles não existiriam se seus antepassados não fossem trazidos para o novo mundo e eles nunca teriam nascido ou sobrevivido na África, que aqueles que os capturaram e venderam eram geralmente africanos, que a este dia africanos na África quase tratam universalmente aqueles de tribos diferentes como subumanas (Idi Amin, Rwanda, Gaddafi etc. e muito mais mau está logo vir como a população de África incha por 3.000.000.000 por 2100), e que se querem ver o racismo real e a exploração econômica e o maus-tratos da polícia , eles devem ir viver quase em qualquer lugar na África ou no 3o mundo. Voltando para a África ou México, etc., sempre foi uma opção, mas, exceto para os criminosos escapar da justiça, ninguém vai voltar. E foram os euros que puseram fim à escravidão em todo o mundo e, na medida do possível, à servidão, à doença, à fome, ao crime e à guerra em todo o 3o mundo. Se não fosse para o colonialismo e as invenções de euros haveria talvez 1/10 como muitos diverso vivo e eles na maior parte ainda estar vivendo como fizeram 400 anos há. Da mesma forma, 303 nunca mencionou que, se não para o euro, que foram cerca de 95% responsável por pagar e lutar e morrer em WW2, os alemães e japoneses e/ou os comunistas agora iria controlar o mundo e somente os euro podem impedir que o CCP e/ou os muçulmanos o fizessem no futuro. Além disso, era principalmente euros que lutaram, estão lutando e estará lutando contra os comunistas na Coréia e no Vietnã, e os fanáticos muçulmanos no Iraque, Síria, Líbia e Afeganistão e os muitos outros em breve vir. Na medida em que qualquer vingança sobre os euros é necessária para a sua escravidão (mas a escravidão por outros negros em várias formas sempre existiu), os negros já tiveram abundantemente. Primeiro, eles têm sido amplamente apoiados e protegidos pelos euros durante séculos. Em segundo lugar, os parasitas que trouxeram com eles infectaram e destruíram a vida de dezenas de milhões de euros. Malária, esquistossomose, filariose, Ascariasis, febre amarela, varíola etc., mas acima de tudo ancilostomíase, que era tão comum e tão debilitante até as primeiras décadas deste século que era responsável pela generalizada vista dos sulistas como estúpidos e preguiçosos. Tudo isso é esmagadoramente óbvio, mas eu aposto que não há um escuela ou faculdade texto no mundo que menciona qualquer um deles, como éclaramente ' racista ' para sugerir que o versículo dideve qualquer coisa para euros ou para apontar que outros diversos em seus países de origem sempre têm e sempre vai tratá-los muito pior do que o euro. E eles são incapazes de agarrar o verdadeiro horror que está chegando ou todos eles seriam um em oposição a qualquer aumento da população por qualquer grupo em qualquer lugar e qualquer imigração para a América. Bem antes2100 os hispânicos controlarão a América, e o resto do mundo será dominado por Chinês e o resto por os muçulmanos, que aumentarão de aproximadamente 1/5th do mundo agora a aproximadamente 1/3rd por 2100 e superam cristãos, e nenhum grupo é anotado abraçando o multiculturalismo direitos das mulheres, direitos da criança, direitos dos animais, direitos gays ou quaisquer direitos. Assim, o fato óbvio é que em geral os euros têm tratado o diverso muito melhor do que eles têm tratado uns aos outros. E agora temos o melhor dos tempos, enquanto que por 2100 (dar ou tomar uma geração ou duas) colapso econômico e caos reinará permanentemente, exceto talvez alguns lugares que forçosamente excluir diverso. Mais uma vez, tenha em mente que, na minha opinião, não há, e quase certamente nunca será, qualquer evidência de uma diferença genética significativa entre euros e diverso em psicologia, ou QI, e que a sua tendência à reprodução excessiva e outras limitações culturais são acidentes de história. Da mesma forma, nunca cruza diversos, esquerdistas, supremacistas do terceiro mundo, mentes Neomarxistas que a cada ano talvez 500.000.000.000 dólares são gastos nos EUA por Federal, estado e cidade governos educação, medicina, transporte 304 (rodovias, ruas, ferrovias, ônibus e sistemas aéreos), polícia, bombeiros e emergências, numerosos programas de bem-estar, o governo e os sistemas judiciais-a grande maioria do que criou, manteve e pagou por euros, assistida pelos impostos da pequena minoria de bem-off diverso. Além disso, há o FBI, NSA, CIA, e as forças armadas dos EUA (outro 500.000.000.000 por ano) e outros países do euro, sem o qual não haveria EUA e pouca ou nenhuma paz, segurança ou prosperidade em qualquer lugar do mundo, e eles também foram criados , executado e pessoal em grande parte pelos euros, que constituem a maioria dos mortos e feridos em cada guerra (menos um problema para os hispânicos que servem no exército em cerca de metade da taxa de euros) e em todas as forças policiais de 1776 até agora. Sem medicamentos e medidas de saúde pública, a maioria de seus antepassados (e todo o terceiro mundo) teria sofrido e muitas vezes morreu de hanseníase, malária, vermes, bactérias, gripe, tuberculose, varíola, sífilis, HIV, hepatite, febre amarela, encefalite, e os tecnologia para o colesterol elevado e a pressão sanguínea, o coração, o cancro, e a cirurgia do fígado, os transplantes, o MRI, o raio x, o ultra-som etc., etc., foram inventados quase todos, administrados e pagos esmagadoramente pelo euro "racistas" e "branco supremacistas '. Você acha que o colonialismo foi ruim? Apenas pense o que o 3o mundo seria como sem ele, ou o que seria como a vida os nazis, os comunistas ou os japoneses (e será como vivendo os chineses ou os muçulmanos uma vez que os diversos destroem América). Este desculpas nada, mas apenas aponta os fatos da história. Mas bem, vamos desfazer a "injustiça" e passar uma volta para a África (e América Latina e Ásia, etc.) lei que fornece fundos para repatriar todos. Eles poderiam vender seus bens aqui e a maioria poderia viver como reis lá, mas é claro que haveria muito poucos compradores. E no próximo século, haverá 3.000.000.000 mais africanos (a estimativa oficial) e todo o continente será um esgoto, e 1.000.000.000 mais asiáticos, e até mesmo a Índia e a China (que irá adicionar uma centena de milhões ou assim cada) vai olhar como o paraíso em comparação com a África, pelo menos até que os recursos se corram (petróleo, gás, carvão, solo, água doce, peixe, minerais, florestas). Se você olhar na net você encontrar o diverso incessantemente choramingando de sua opressão, mesmo quando ocorreu décadas ou séculos atrás, mas eu não vejo como nada que é feito por outros, ainda hoje, é minha responsabilidade, e muito menos no passado. Se você quiser manter cada euro responsável pelo que a grande maioria agora vivo são completamente inocentes, então nós queremos manter todos os diversos responsáveis por todos os crimes cometidos por qualquer um deles aqui ou seus parentes em seus países de origem nos últimos 400 anos, e por sua parte de todas as dezenas de trilhões des gasto para construir e defender os EUA e para mantê-los seguros, saudáveis e bem alimentados. Sim, a maioria dos negros e hispânicos são pobres devido a fatores históricos além de seu controle, assim como os euros são muitas vezes mais ricos devido a fatores históricos além deles, mas os pontos 305 importantes são que agora vivo não causar isso, e que aqui, como quase em todos os lugares que os diversos são uma percentagem significativa, eles cometem a maior parte do crime, recolher a maior parte do bem-estar, pagar os impostos menos e continuar a reprodução excessivamente e arrastando seus países e do mundo para o abismo. Considere tão bem que os males do colonialismo só são proeminentes porque eram recentes. Se nós olhamos com cuidado, nós encontramos que quase cada grupo em cada país tem uma história infinita do assassinato, da violação, do Pilhe e da exploração de seus vizinhos que continua hoje. Não é muito longe da marca para sugerir que a melhor coisa que poderia acontecer era para ser conquistada pelos euros. Mais uma vez, tenha em mente que não há e quase certamente nunca haverá qualquer evidência de uma diferença genética significativa entre euros e diverso e que suas limitações são quase certamente devido à cultura. O problema não é o diverso nem euros, mas que as pessoas são egoístas, estúpidos, desonestos, preguiçosos, loucos e covardes e só se comportam decentemente, honestamente, e razoavelmente se forçado a fazê-lo. Dar direitos às pessoas em vez de ter privilégios que eles devem ganhar é um erro fatal que destruirá qualquer sociedade e qualquer mundo. Nos pequenos grupos em que evoluímos, onde todo mundo era nosso parente, altruísmo recíproco funcionou, mas em um mundo logo inchando a 10.000.000.000, este impulso para ajudar os outros é suicida. O mundo está totalmente preocupado com os terroristas, mas seus efeitos são realmente triviais em comparação, por exemplo, para acidentes de trânsito, assassinatos, toxicodependência, doença, erosão do solo, etc, e todos os dias o 7.800.000.000 fazer muito mais danos ao mundo apenas por viver. As mães do terceiro mundo aumentar a população por cerca de 200.000 todos os dias, e assim fazer enormemente mais danos a cada hora do que todos os terroristas em todo o mundo vai fazer no inteiro século 21 (até que eles têm as mãos sobre a bomba). Apenas o diverso nos EUA em um ano fará muito mais dano aos EUA e ao mundo destruindo recursos, erodindo o solo superficial e criando o CO2 e a outra poluição do que todo o terrorismo no mundo inteiro em toda a história. Existe mesmo um político ou entertainer ou pessoa de negócios que tem uma pista? E se eles fizessem eles diriam ou fariam qualquer coisa - certamente não - quem quer ser atacado por ' racismo '. Os povos em toda parte são preguiçosos, estúpidos e desonestos e a democracia, a justiça e a igualdade em um grande estado de bem-estar diverso são um convite aberto à exploração ilimitada de seus vizinhos e poucos resistirão. Em 1979 7% dos americanos tem meios-testado governo benefícios, enquanto em 2009 foi mais de 30% e, claro, o aumento é principalmente o diverso. Os selos do alimento levantaram-se de 17 milhões pessoas em 2000 a aproximadamente 43 milhões agora. Nos primeiros anos de Obama mais de 3 milhões inscritos para obter ' deficiência ' cheques e mais de 20% da população adulta está agora em ' deficiência ' que, de acordo com o Census Bureau 306 inclui categorias como "tinha dificuldade achando um trabalho ou permanecendo empregado "e"teve dificuldade com o trabalho escolar ". Há agora quase 60 milhões idade de trabalho (16 a 65) adultos que não estão empregados ou cerca de 40% da força de trabalho. As famílias ilegais começ aproximadamente $2.50 em benefícios diretos para cada dólar que pagam nos impostos e sobre outros $2.50 benefícios indiretos (e não contando seus danos à biosfera) assim que são um dreno enorme e sempre crescente apesar de freqüentes falsa ' notícias ' na net sobre o seu grande valor. Os pagamentos de juros sobre a nossa dívida nacional são projetados para subir para 85% do nosso total de renda federal por 2050. Aproximadamente a metade de nossa dívida é possuída por governos extrangeiros., aproximadamente um quarto por China, e se China continua a comprar nossa dívida em taxas atuais, muito logo nossos pagamentos do interesse a eles cobrirá seu orçamento militar anual total (ca. $80.000.000.000 contra E.U. de ca $600.000.000.000) e (dependa nas taxas de juros) em poucos anos eles seriam capazes de triplicar ou quadruplicar suas despesas militares e que seria tudo pago pelos contribuintes E.U. Na verdade, eu não vi que observou, mas seus custos mais baixos significam que eles estão realmente gastando talvez $300.000.000.000. E é mencionado raramente porque o orçamento militar dos E.U. é tão enorme, e como amarra no estilo de vida elevado e no govt enorme. subsídios na Europa e no mundo inteiro para essa matéria. Os EUA é o policial livre do mundo, fornecendo tecnologia, dinheiro e tropas para manter a paz e guerras de combate em todo o mundo e é demasiado estúpido para pedir aos outros países para pagar a sua quota-até o Comentários recentes de Trump. Em grande medida, a capacidade dos europeus e países em todo o mundo para ter um alto padrão de vida é devido aos contribuintes americanos (sem, naturalmente, sendo perguntado) pagando por sua defesa para os últimos 75 anos. O CIS relata total imigração vai chegar cerca de 51 milhões por 2023, cerca de 85% do aumento da população total (todo o resto devido ao diverso já aqui) e em breve compreendem cerca de 15% da população total-de longe a maior percentagem em qualquer grande país em história recente. Foi relatado que o Department de Homeland Security New Americans Taskforce foi direcionado para processar as aplicações de cidadania dos titulares de cartão verde 9 milhões o mais rápido possível para tentar influenciar a eleição 2016. O governo Federal é um cancro que agora toma aproximadamente 40% de toda a renda da minoria que pagam impostos significativos e govt. civil federais os empregados são extremamente Overpaid, calculando o salário do ca. $81000 e os benefícios $42000 307 quando os empregados confidenciais começ aproximadamente $51000 salário e $11000 benefícios. Cerca de 25% de todos os bens e serviços produzidos nos EUA são consumidos pelo governo e cerca de 75% do total de governo renda é dado como subsídios de negócios e agrícolas e bem-estar. Se todos os impostos federais foram aumentados em 30% e os gastos não foram aumentados, o orçamento pôde balançar em 25 anos. Naturalmente, os gastos aumentariam imediatamente se mais dinheiro estava disponível, e igualmente a economia tomará um sucesso enorme porque haveria menos incentivo para ganhar ou para permanecer nos EUA e o investimento e os lucros de negócio cairam. Estima-se que o cumprimento do setor privado com regulamentos governo custa cerca de 1.800.000.000.000 por ano ou cerca de 12% do nosso PIB total, e é claro que está crescendo constantemente, por isso desperdiçamos mais em governo. papelada a cada ano do que o PIB da maioria dos países. O impulso principal para a confiscação sempre de nosso dinheiro (anos de nossa vida trabalhando) pelo governo. é o comunismo/socialismo/fascismo forçado em nós pelo aumento rápido de diverso, mas sendo a força de polícia do mundo para livre custou-nos trilhões, que igualmente traduz em anos de nossas vidas de trabalho como detalhado em outra parte aqui. Os pobres são quase sempre falando como se fossem de alguma forma superior aos ricos e é implícito que devemos fazer sacrifícios por eles, mas eles são apenas os ricos em espera e quando eles ficam ricos são inevitavelmente exatamente como repugnante e exploradora. Isto é devido à nossa psicologia inata, que nos pequenos grupos em que evoluímos fez sentido, como todo mundo era nosso parente, mas em um mundo que está em colapso rápido devido à expansão do diverso não faz sentido. Os pobres cuidados não mais sobre os outros do que os ricos. Maravilhoso que mesmo Obama e o Papa falam sobre os horrores próximos da mudança climática, mas é claro que não uma palavra sobre o capuz irresponsável pai que é a sua causa. O máximo que você começa a partir de qualquer governo oficial, acadêmico ou documentário de TV é uma sugestão manso que a mudança climática precisa ser tratada, mas raramente uma sugestão de que a superpopulação é a fonte dele e que a maior parte para o século passado e tudo isso a partir de agora é a partir do 3o Mundo. China cria agora duas vezes o C02 dos EUA e este levantará como se espera sobre o dobro do tamanho de nosso GDP por 2030 ou assim, e os EUA diverso criam aproximadamente 20% da poluição dos EUA, que elevará a aproximadamente 50% pelo século seguinte. Ann Coulter em "Adios América" descreve a história escandalosa do que parece ser a única ocasião em que os americanos realmente tem que votar sobre a questão da imigração-o que alguns chamam de "o grande proposicao 187 democracia roubo". 308 Em 1994 Californianos, indignado em ver cada vez mais hispânicos se aglomerando no estado e usando o dinheiro do imposto, colocar na votação proposição 187 que barrou ilegais de receber dinheiro do estado. Apesar da oposição esperada e mentiras ultrajantes de todos os self-servindo, bota lambendo supremacistas Neomarxist terceiro mundo, passou esmagadoramente ganhando 2/3 de branco, 56% de preto, 57% de asiáticos e até 1/3 de votos hispânicos (sim,muitos Hispânicos de classe média e alta percebem ser tomado pelo México será um desastre). Note-se que todas essas pessoas são "racistas" ou "supremacistas brancos" (ou em colunas ligeiramente mais educados do Carlos Slim Helu controlado NY Times etc ' bigots ' ou ' nativists ') de acordo com o uso atual desta palavra por uma grande percentagem de liberais, muitos hispânicos, o Sierra Club, o ACLU e até mesmo o economista ganhador do Prêmio Nobel Paul Krugman (que recentemente chamou Trump de "racista" por ousadia de dizer a verdade enquanto defendiam os EUA da anexação pelo México). Carregou mesmo o candidato republicano desesperado para o regulador, Pete Wilson a uma vitória do deslizamento terra, com 1/3 de seus eleitores que indic sua sustentação para o prop 187 era sua razão para votar para ele. No entanto, o "ACLU e outros grupos antiamericanos" (Coulter) trouxe terno e foi logo atingido por um democrata nomeado (ou seja, "mexicano honorário") juiz do Tribunal Distrital por ser inconstitucional (ou seja, protegendo os americanos, em vez de estrangeiros). Como com o 1898 e 1982 decisões do Supremo Tribunal dando cidadania a qualquer um que nasce aqui, foi outra interpretação alucinatória de nossas leis e uma clara demonstração da desesperança do sistema judicial, ou qualquer ramo do governo (pelo menos um Democrata dominado um) em proteger os americanos de uma aquisição do terceiro mundo. Tem sido sugerido que o ACLU mudar o seu nome para a União de liberdades civis alienígenas e que, juntamente com as muitas outras organizações e indivíduos que trabalham para destruir os EUA, ser forçado a se inscrever como agentes de um governo estrangeiro ou, de preferência, ser classificado como terroristas e todos os seus empregados e doadores deportados ou colocados em quarentena. Apesar disso, nem o estado, nem o governo federal. fez qualquer coisa para evitar a aquisição, e Coulter observa que quando G.W. Bush correu para o Presidente, ele fez campanha na América com o corrupto mexicano Presidente Gortari (ver comentários sobre Carlos Slim abaixo) , tinha irmão Jeb ' imigração ilegal é um ato de amor ' Bush falar em espanhol na Republican National Convention, e depois de ganhar, deu endereços semanais de rádio em espanhol, acrescentou uma página espanhola para o site da casa branca, realizou um enorme cinco de Mayo festa na casa branca, e deu um discurso ao flagrantemente racista Conselho Nacional de La Raza, em que, entre outros indignos, ele prometeu $100000000 em dinheiro federal (ou seja, o nosso dinheiro) para acelerar as aplicações de imigração! Claramente com os partidos republicanos e 309 democratas que procuram a anexação por México, não há nenhuma esperança para o processo democrático em América a menos que for mudado dràstica e claramente isto nunca acontecerá usando o processo democrático. A Califórnia é a 6a maior na economia do mundo, à frente da França, Brasil, Itália, Coréia do Sul, Austrália, Espanha, Índia, Rússia e Canadá, e mais do que o dobro do México, e em cerca de 10 anos, quando seus 10 milhões crianças crescem e o total População hispânica da Califórnia é de cerca de 22 milhões (contando apenas legais), eles vão possuir o estado e ele terá sido anexado pelo México. Nos últimos anos, a Califórnia governador Brown assinou legislação que concede licenças de motoristas para ilegais, e pagando por cuidados médicos gratuitos para seus filhos (ou seja, é claro que os contribuintes pagam). Concordou deixar os cidadãos monitorar sondagens para eleições, e foram nomeados a outras posições do governo tais como conselhos de cidade sem governo aprovação do estado. Ele também forçou todos os funcionários do estado para cometer obstrução da justiça, assinando uma lei conhecida como Trust Act (ou seja, a confiança que não vai roubar, estupro, assassinato, vender drogas, etc.), que especifica que, a menos que os imigrantes cometeram certos crimes graves, eles não podem ser detidos (para entrega aos federais para deportação) passado quando eles de outra forma tornar-se elegível para liberação. O lote de novas "permite tornar-se parte do México" leis também incluiu um que permitiria que os imigrantes sem estatuto jurídico para ser admitido na barra de estado e praticar a lei na Califórnia. Mas ele passou a conta permitindo que alienos ilegais servisse em júris. Então, a única coisa que impediu o passo final em virar a Califórnia. tribunais para o México foi a decisão arbitrária de um homem! No entanto, não vai ser mais do que alguns anos antes de um hispânico é governador e, em seguida, esta e infinitas outras atrocidades vai acontecer, incluindo, presumivelmente, dando ilegais o direito de votar, talvez, passando outra lei estadual que viola ou obstrui o Federal. Em qualquer caso, haverá em breve por pouca distinção na Califórnia entre ser um cidadão dos EUA e um cidadão de qualquer outro país que pode esgueirar-se através da fronteira. Note-se que, como de costume, os cidadãos da Califórnia nunca foram autorizados a votar em qualquer uma dessas questões, que foram aprovadas pela legislatura do Estado democrático controlado. Por que eles não apenas ser honesto e mudar o nome para Neomarxisto Neofascisto Partido do México? Pelo menos devem ser forçados a registar-se como o agente de um governo extrangeiro. É certo que a Califórnia (e até o final do século os EUA) é perdida para a civilização (ou seja, será como o México, que, naturalmente, será muito pior até então uma vez que a maioria dos recursos do mundo será ido e outras 3.000.000.000 pessoas vão exigindo- 310 lhes) a menos que o governo envia tropas federais em Califórnia (e outros Estados com cidades do Santuário) para deportar ilegais e prender todos aqueles (incluindo numerosos funcionários eleitos) que estão violando a lei federal. Mesmo isso só vai abrandar a catastrofe a menos que uma lei é aprovada terminando bebês âncora (ou seja, aqueles recebendo a cidadania, porque eles nascem aqui), de preferência retroativamente para 1982 ou melhor para 1898, e rescindir a cidadania para eles e todos aqueles que ganharam a partir deles- ou seja, todos os seus descendentes e parentes. Também é claro que a lei de imigração 1965 deve ser declarada inconstitucional e todos aqueles (e parentes e descendentes) que imigraram desde então têm o seu estatuto revisto com os contribuintes significativos restantes e os contribuintes não ou baixos repatriados. Difícil de obter estatísticas precisas, como o seu "racista" até mesmo pensar sobre isso, mas em Stockton, Califórnia e Dallas, Texas cerca de 70% de todos os nascimentos são ilegais e talvez 90% do total contando todos os hispânicos, e, claro, as contas são quase todos pagos por euros e ' ricos' di verso através de tributação forçada, que é claro que eles nunca vão votar. Para terminar o direito de nascê, uma nova lei tem de ser aprovada e não um antigo revogado, como não há tal lei-esta foi uma opinião totalmente arbitrária de Justiça Willie, "Anchor Baby" Brennan e apenas um punhado de juízes já votaram para esta interpretação alucinatória da lei. Aqueles que querem ver como o Supremo Tribunal destruiu o nosso país, corroendo a fronteira entre ser um cidadão americano e uma pessoa que estava passando (ea falta de senso comum básico na lei e da desesperança do sistema jurídico americano-eo contra pareceres de peritos jurídicos) pode consultar Levin's 'Men in Black' ou ver Estados Unidos v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 e.u. 649 (1898) (sim, foi um Chinês que começou o assalto à América mais de um século atrás), onde 6 advogados (ou seja, juízes da corte) concedido cidadania para os filhos de alienígenas residentes e Plyler v. Doe, 457 E.U. 202 (1982) onde 5 advogados (com 4 discordando) concedido a cidadania para os filhos de estrangeiros ilegais e qualquer um que dá à luz durante a visita. Se apenas um dos 5 imbecis que votaram para isso tinha mudado de idéia, teríamos talvez 10 milhões menos sobre os rolos de bem-estar agora e talvez 50 milhões menos por 2100. Claro, nenhum dos outros 450 milhões ou assim adultos vivos entre então e agora já foram autorizados a votar sobre isso ou qualquer uma das questões básicas que levam inexoravelmente para o colapso. Como vemos agora nos meios de comunicação todos os dias, em uma democracia "representativa" o que está representado não é interesses da América, mas egomania, ganância, estupidez e supremacismo do terceiro mundo. Quantas pessoas fizeram para entregar a América ao México? Para o desastre de imigração TKO em 1965 havia 320 representantes e 76 senadores, e para os bebês âncora as duas decisões do Supremo Tribunal totalizando 11 advogados, a maioria destes "cidadãos pendentes" agora mortos, assim fora do aproximadamente 245 311 milhões adultos americanos cidadãos vivos agora, aproximadamente 120 cidadãos muito sênior votaram realmente para o 'Entregar'. Como uma demonstração clara da desesperança da democracia representativa (como praticado aqui) como se poderia querer. Claramente, se a América é permanecer um lugar decente para viver para qualquer um, o ato 1965, e todos os subseqüentes, precisam ser revogados por uma lei que coloca uma moratória sobre toda a imigração e naturalização, e, preferencialmente, rescindir ou pelo menos opiniões cidadania para todos naturalizados desde 1965 (ou preferivelmente desde a primeira sentença absurda à direita em 1898), juntamente com todos os seus parentes e descendentes. Todos seus casos podiam ser revistos e a cidadania conferiu em indivíduos seleto que marcaram altamente bastante em uma escala do ponto, com o receptor do bem-estar s, o desempregado cronicamente, os criminosos, e seus descendentes inelegíveis, aqueles com faculdade ou graus médicos, professores, coordenadores, proprietários de negócio etc., obtendo pontos para a elegibilidade, isto é, apenas o senso comum básico se América é sobreviver. Seguindo Ann Coulter (' Adios América '), notamos que o imposto corporativo nos EUA é um o mais alto no mundo dos principais países em 39% e como o governo continua a aumentar os impostos para apoiar a metade do país que está em algum tipo de bemestar (se um inclui a segurança social, o desemprego, os selos de alimento, os subsídios da carcaça, o bem-estar e os benefícios dos veteranos), inevitavelmente o capital e os trabalhos vai deixar, e entrando no século seguinte com recursos de desaparecimento, e desde que a população anual inteira aumento de 2,4 milhões é agora diverso, que significa cerca de 200 milhões mais deles (para um total de cerca de 350 milhões de cerca de 500 milhões) por 2100, uma população fragmentada lutando por recursos, e um padrão drasticamente reduzido de vivendo com eventual colapso é inevitável, mesmo sem os males predatórios dos sete sociopatas senil (i.e., os lideres da PC de China). Em relação à situação tributária, em 2013, aqueles com renda bruta acima de $250000 (quase todos eles euros) pagaram quase metade (48,9%) de todos os impostos de renda individual, embora representaram apenas 2,4% de todos os retornos arquivados e sua taxa média de imposto foi 25,6%. O fundo 50% de enchedores (aqueles que fazem $34000-talvez metade diverso e metade dos euros) pagou uma média de 1,2% de imposto de renda federal para a quota total de 2,4%, enquanto os próximos 35% de enchedores (aqueles que fazem $34k para $69K) taxa média de imposto de 21% para uma quota total de 10,5% do imposto de renda federal total coletado. Então, é óbvio que, contrariamente à visão comum dos Democratas/supremacistas do terceiro 312 mundo/Neomarxistas, a classe média superior e superior estão dando aos pobres um passeio em grande parte livre, e que já temos um pé no comunismo. No entanto, não devemos esquecer o $2.500.000.000 por dia os EUA está entrando em dívida e o total de US $80.000.000.000.000 ou mais passivos não financiados (por exemplo, segurança social e Medicare), que terá que eventualmente ser pago por alguns combinação de aumento de taxes e diminuiu os benefícios para seus descendentes. Considere isso: "quando combinamos as populações de não-pagadores e não-preenchedores e olhar para ver o que a percentagem global de cada grupo não está pagando impostos, nós achamos que: 50,7 por cento das famílias Africano americanos não pagam impostos de renda, 35,5 por cento da Ásia americana famílias não, 37,6 por cento das famílias brancas americanas não, e 52 por cento dos Hispânicos (legais) não pagam impostos de renda. " Há cerca de 5X como muitos euros (brancos) como negros e 4X como muitos euros como hispânicos nos EUA, e há cerca de o mesmo% de brancos e negros sobre o bem-estar (39%) e cerca de 50% dos hispânicos, de modo percentual sábio que significa que os negros são cerca de 5X e hispânicos cerca de 8X como susceptível de ser sobre o bem-estar como euros. Incluindo impostos sobre a propriedade, impostos sobre vendas etc. traz a classe média médio ($ 34k a $69K renda) imposto até cerca de 30%, então 4 meses/ano ou cerca de 15 anos de trabalho em uma vida de 50 ano vai para o governo, uma grande percentagem para apoiar os imigrantes que estão destruindo América e do mundo, e outra grande percentagem para os militares, que é uma força policial livre para o resto do mundo. Contando todo o suporte como enumerado acima (ou seja, não apenas os selos de alimentos, etc., mas a parte justa dos pobres de todas as outras despesas), a família média de classes médias funciona cerca de 5 semanas/ano ou 5 anos de sua vida de trabalho para apoiar os pobres. Nem a imigração em massa, nem a escravidão, nem os bebês âncora, nem a reprodução excessiva, nem o desemprego, nem os crimes e as drogas são culpa deles, mas o salário de classe média e alta para os pobres, e seus filhos vão pagar mais (provavelmente pelo menos 10 anos de sua vida de trabalho 50 ano bem antes de 2100) até que o padrão de vida e qualidade de vidas é aproximadamente o mesmo que o de países diversos, e ambos cairão continuamente cada ano até o colapso, mesmo se o grupo de sete sociopatias que guia China esta destruído. Naturalmente, cada estatística tem uma estatística contrária e os neomarxistas do terceiro mundo supremacistas e o exército do centavo 50 do CCP estão espalhando ocupada desinformação e trollando todas as mídias sociais, mas como um guia áspero nós encontramos um estudo recente que constatou que 37% dos lares de imigrantes 313 hispânicos obteve a maioria de seus rendimentos do bem-estar enquanto 17% dos negros fizeram (brancos não foram relatados, mas eu acho que cerca de 10%). Do orçamento $3.500.000.000.000, cerca de 595.000.000.000 é déficit e cerca de 486.000.000.000 vai para o bem-estar, assim eliminando o bem-estar quase equilibrálo e eliminando todos os custos associados com as pessoas e seus descendentes naturalizados desde 1965 colocaria os EUA solidamente no preto e provavelmente permitiria pagar a dívida nacional $18.000.000.000.000 antes do final do século, enquanto a implementação de uma lei de repatriação de cidadãos naturalizados provavelmente permitiria que este mais perto de meio século. Como eu escrevo isso eu vejo um item de notícias (ou seja, uma das barragens infinitas de mentiras pagas plantadas lá todos os dias pelo diverso e do exército 50 centavos) no Yahoo que me diz que os ilegais estão fazendo-nos um grande favor como a maioria estão trabalhando e pagar cerca de $1000 cada imposto por ano. Mas eles não nos dizem que eles custam o país talvez $25000 cada um em custos diretos rastreáveis e se você adicionar a sua quota de todos os outros custos (para manter o governo a polícia, os tribunais, o exército, as ruas, etc., etc.) é provável que o dobro. Como Coulter diz-lhe em p47 de Adios América, uma pessoa educada faculdade paga uma média de US $29k impostos mais por ano do que voltar em governo Services. Imigrantes legais no entanto obter de volta uma média $4344 mais do que pagar, enquanto aqueles sem um diploma de ensino médio voltar cerca de US $37k mais do que pagam. Ela diz que cerca de 71% das famílias ilegais têm bem-estar. Cerca de 20% das famílias E.U. obter 75% de sua renda do governo (ou seja, extorquidp de contribuintes e emprestado de bancos em 2,5 bilhões/dia) e outros 20% obter 40%. No Reino Unido, que é aproximadamente em um par com os EUA em seu caminho Diverso/Neomarxisto à ruína, aproximadamente 5 milhões pessoas ou 10% de adultos capazes vivem totalmente no bem-estar e não trabalharam um dia desde que o governo Labour fêz exame sobre em 1997, e outros 30% recebem apoio parcial. Grécia, famosa por seu resgate recente enorme, é um caso típico de como as massas sempre arrastar um país para caos se permitido. As pessoas normalmente se aposentar em plena governo pensões em seus 50 ' s e tão cedo quanto 45, e quando a aposentadoria em 50 foi permitida para um par de trabalhos perigosos, como a eliminação de bombas, ele logo foi ampliado para cobrir mais de 500 ocupações, incluindo cabeleireiros (perigosos produtos químicos como shampoo) e locutores de rádio e TV (bactérias em microfones)- não, eu não estou brincando. As pessoas muitas vezes elogiam os países europeus por seu bem-estar generoso, mas na verdade é principalmente possível porque quase toda a sua defesa desde os anos 50 (para não dizer nada sobre as duas guerras mundiais, as guerras coreanas e vietnamitas, Afeganistão, Iraque, Síria, Somália, Sérvia etc., etc.), ou seja, cerca de 314 $10.000.000.000.000 em custos diretos e talvez outro $10.000.000.000.000 indireto) foi pago pelos EUA (e por vidas americanas e lesões), ou seja, por 20% de nós contribuintes que pagam qualquer imposto significativo, além de grande parte da dívida $18.000.000.000.000. De facto, como todo o mundo, não seriam mesmo países independentes se não para os EUA que derrotaram os alemães em duas guerras e os japoneses e mantiveram os comunistas e agora os muçulmanos controle por meio século. Assim, não só os E.U. sangrou seco pelos pobres e diversos aqui, mas nós pagamos por eles em todo o mundo, bem como ajudar os ricos lá ficar mais rico. Típico de toda a Europa, na França, onde os muçulmanos se tornaram um grande problema, mesmo quando não o abate de pessoas, a maioria deles estão em bem-estar, pagos em parte pelos EUA. Por cerca de uma década, o maior bloco de votação no U. N é a organização da cooperação islâmica, que controla, por exemplo, o Conselho de direitos humanos, onde eles permitem apenas os direitos permitidos pela lei islâmica, e assim esquecer os direitos das mulheres, direitos das crianças, os direitos dos homossexuais, liberdade de religião, de liberdade de expressão, etc. e de facto, de qualquer tipo. Como os muçulmanos reprodução desenfreada aumenta seu percentual de população mundial de 1/5 para 1/3 por 2100 ou assim e civilização colapsos, isso vai ficar muito pior. O Islã é defendido com tal ferocidade porque nos países pobres do 3o mundo tem sido a única defesa contra o egoísmo e fornece homens pobres com uma garantia de reprodução e sobrevivência. O mesmo costumava ser o caso do cristianismo. Também é evidente que, à medida que o século 22 se aproxima e a América desmorona, a China irá substituí-lo como o "grande Satanás", uma vez que será dominante em todo o mundo, protegendo seus investimentos cada vez mais e cidadãos chineses, e, eventualmente, fazendo o que quer que quer, como ' diversificação ' resulta no controle da América por mexicanos e africanos e perde a superioridade militar e o dinheiro e vontade de lutar. E claro, o chinês não seguirá o caminho da América e ser "diversificada" em colapso, a menos que através de algum grande infortúnio eles se tornam democrático/neomarxist (eles são, naturalmente, agora só comunista em nome) . Um pouco fora da marca, mas muito bom para passar para cima é um exemplo adorável de devolução (disgenia) que é o segundo apenas a superpopulação em trazer sobre o colapso da civilização industrial (embora a correção política proíbe a discussão em qualquer lugar). Pakistanis do Reino Unido, que muitas vezes importam seus primos para se casar e por isso são endogamia com até 5 crianças uma família, às vezes com múltiplas esposas, produzem 30% das doenças raras no Reino Unido, embora sejam 2% da população. Claro, a maioria está em bem-estar e os desertivos resultam em enormes despesas para cuidados de enfermagem em tempo integral e educação especial (para aqueles que não são surdos e cegos). E o tribunal superior europeu, como o Supremo 315 Tribunal dos EUA, esqueceu a sua verdadeira razão para a existência e arrebatada por ilusões utópicas suicidas, tem governado o governo deve pagar benefícios esponsal completo para todas as esposas e não pode desenhar a linha em dois. Uma boa parte do livro de Coulter é gasto no crime, e devemos primeiro note(Coulter não parece, embora eu espero que ela sabe) que raramente é considerado que é imensamente subrelatado, especialmente entre os pobres e diversificados. Assim, o bjs diz que cerca de 3,4 milhões crimes violentos por ano passam não relatados e os números para os não-violentos (roubo, assalto, furto, vandalismo, tráfico de drogas, etc.) devem estar em centenas de milhões, desproporcionalmente cometido por (e sofrido por) o diverso. Se descobre que o percentual de machos adultos encarcerados para brancos é 0,7, para os hispânicos 1,5 e para os negros 4,7. Parece impossível encontrar quaisquer figuras nacionais precisas para o custo de encarceramento, mas $35K/ano parece um mínimo, e talvez US $50k para o sistema legal, e talvez outro $50K em custos médicos e psicológicos, programas de reabilitação, perda de trabalho por suas vítimas etc. De acordo com os negros não hispânicos da BJS representaram 39,4% da população de prisão e prisão em 2009, enquanto os brancos não hispânicos eram 34,2%, e hispânicos (de qualquer raça) 20,6%. De acordo com um relatório 2009 pelo centro hispânico de Pew, em 2007 latinos "representaram 40% de todos os infratores federais condenados--mais do que triplicar sua parte (13%) da população adulta total dos EUA ". Mais uma vez, tenha em mente que não há e quase certamente nunca será qualquer evidência de uma diferença genética significativa entre euros e diverso em psicologia, ou QI, e que a sua maior incidência de problemas deve ser totalmente devido à sua cultura. Se um contasse somente ilegais, a taxa do crime e de aprisionamento seria provavelmente dobro que relatou para hispânicos legais. Como notas Coulter (P101-2) é impossível obter os números reais para o crime de imigrantes, uma vez que é claro ' racista ' para sugerir que eles devem ser recolhidos (e, como observado, todo o crime entre diversos é muito subrelatado e muitos hispânicos são mal classificados como brancos), mas é definitivamente acima daquele indicado, assim que sua taxa real poderia estar perto daquela dos pretos. Um conjunto de dados mostrou cerca de 1/3 do estado 2,2 milhões e prisioneiros locais são estrangeiros nascidos e talvez outros 5% são americanos nascidos hispânicos e outro 30% preto, deixando cerca de 32% branco. Os estrangeiros nascidos eram 70% mais propensos a ter cometido um crime violento e duas vezes mais provável que um crime classe A. Como observa Coulter, virtualmente todos os grupos de imigrantes têm uma taxa de criminalidade mais elevada do que os nativos. À medida que a invasão continua, suborno e extorsão vão ver enormes aumentos à medida que se elevam ao terceiro padrão mundial. Subornos (a forma mais suave de extorsão) em dinheiro ou equivalente é a interação normal entre as pessoas 316 no terceiro mundo e da polícia, os militares, os costumes e os oficiais de imigração, inspetores de saúde e fogo, professores, oficiais de admissão escolar, e até mesmo médicos, cirurgiões e enfermeiros. Eu não estou supondo aqui como eu passei uma década da minha vida no terceiro mundo e experimentou e ouviu inúmeras histórias sobre todos os acima. Como o tempo passa, podemos esperar que isso se torne rotina aqui também (primeiro, claro, na Califórnia e os outros Estados ocidentais) e a norma nacional depois disso. Além de aumentos contínuos no crime de todos os tipos, veremos a percentagem de crimes resolvidos cair para os níveis extremamente baixos do terceiro mundo. Mais recursos são dedicados à solução de assassinatos do que qualquer outro crime e cerca de 65% são resolvidos nos EUA, mas no México menos de 2% são resolvidos e como você começa fora da cidade do México a taxa cai para perto de zero. Observe também que a taxa aqui costumava ser cerca de 80%, mas ele caiu em paralelo com o aumento em diverso. Também 65% é a média, mas se você poderia obter estatísticas estou certo de que iria subir com a percentagem de euro em uma cidade e cair como o percentual de diversos aumentos. Em Detroit apenas 30% são resolvidos. Se você manter o controle de quem rouba, estupor e assassinatos, é óbvio que as vidas negras importam muito mais a euros do que eles fazem para outros negros. Espanhol pode tornar-se a língua oficial e obrigatória e catolicismo romano a religião oficial, e, claro, os cartéis mexicanos serão as organizações criminosas dominantes, pelo menos para os Estados do sudoeste por meio século e provavelmente todo o país por 2100. É claro que, como Coulter aponta, é muito difícil obter estatísticas sobre a raça eo crime ou cada vez mais na corrida e qualquer coisa, como é considerado "racismo", mesmo para pedir e do govt. se recusa a coletá-lo. Encontrar a verdade é feito muito mais difícil desde hispânicos grupos de interesse especial (ou seja, supremacists del terceiro mundo), institado por liberais euro, que perderam ou vendeu qualquer senso comum ou decência que eles podem ter tido, estão trabalhando duro espalhando desinformação com centenas de milhares de itens falsos ou enganosos na rede e nas mídias sociais a cada semana. Ela não parece mencionar a decepção maciça facilitada pelo Yahoo, Bing, Facebook e outros, que apresentam entre seus itens de notícias, desinformação paga que apresenta "notícias" que é deliberadamente falsa ou extremamente enganosa, como o item mencionado acima (repetido muitas vezes por dia em algum lugar na rede), que diz que os ilegais são uma coisa boa como eles estão pagando impostos. Apesar de ser dado um passeio em grande parte livre, o diverso tomar tudo para concedido (especialmente porque é "racista", "ódio" e "supremacista branco" para apontar o seu passeio livre, assim você não vai encontrá-lo na mídia principal) e não têm nenhum problema processando a polícia , hospitais e cada ramo do governo para 317 qualquer infração imaginada. Os euros devem obter uma pista e processá-los de volta! Eles e os E.U. governo agora que Trump é Presidente, poderia arquivo milhões de ternos ou casos criminais contra pessoas que motim nas ruas, piquete e protesto perturbar o tráfego, quebrando janelas e causando perdas de negócios, trauma psicológico, etc. Sue e/ou prender todos os criminosos e suas famílias para os danos à propriedade, polícia, perda de renda e trabalho de negócios, etc. Também processar a polícia e cada ramo do governo por não protegê-los cada vez que um crime é cometido, especialmente por ilegal diverso. Como eu escrivi este os pais de uma jovem San Francisco mulher assassinada por um criminoso alienígena ilegal, que tinha sido deportado inúmeras vezes, e depois protegida da deportação pela polícia de San Francisco (obstrução da Justiça), está processando-os e os federais ( e eles devem processar o Conselho de supervisores e governador Brown e da legislatura do estado que votou para as regras do santuário e lei de confiança também).Previsivelmente ele foi considerado inocente e na cidade do Santuário de San Francisco (e agora o Estado do Santuário da Califórnia) é capaz de viver a sua vida de crime ao ser apoiado a expensas públicas. Centenas de milhares são roubados, agredidos, estuprada ou assassinados por diversos, e talvez 100 milhões vitimizados de maneiras menores a cada ano, e os partidos feridos (na maioria das vezes diverso) deve processar cada vez. Para facilitar isso, os euros poderiam estabelecer um fundo e várias organizações para eliminar ilegais e crimes contra euros. E, claro, todos os países que os criminosos nascidos estrangeiros vêm devem ser forçados a pagar o custo de policiar e processá-los e de mantê-los aqui-bemestar, cuidados médicos, escolaridade, e sua quota de todos os bens e serviços mencionados acima, incluindo a defesa nacional. O México deve pagar todos os custos de policiar a fronteira e para todos os crimes e para toda a manutenção de ilegais aqui desde o primeiro dia-i. e., de volta a dizer 1965. E eles e Colômbia etc. deve pagar para o custo da aplicação da droga, tratamento viciado e encarceramento, e dizer uma multa $20000000 cada vez que alguém é estuprada, deficiente ou assassinado por um viciado em drogas ou por um cidadão ilegal ou naturalizado ou descendente de uma pessoa originária de seu país. Se não conseguiríamos expulsar todos os nascidos lá e cortar todo o comércio e vistos, ou apenas confiscar a sua produção de petróleo, minerais e alimentos. Como muitas das idéias aqui parece bizarro, porque a covardia e estupidez de "nossos" líderes (ou seja, não é realmente o nosso como nunca somos perguntado) nos levou tão acostumados a ser abusado. Nós somos o último país que deve colocarse com o abuso, mas os políticos e esquerdosist idiotas fizeram-nos a marca mais fácil no planeta. Sim 9/11 é o abuso mais marcante, mas na verdade nós sofremos tantas mortes e ferimentos do diverso a cada ano (por exemplo, apenas a partir de drogas e viciados ou apenas de guerras), e muito mais danos todos os dias, se você extrapolar as conseqüências de sua presença aqui no futuro. 318 Muita controvérsia foi gerada quando Trump mencionou que estávamos deixando estupradores para o país, mas ele estava apenas afirmando os fatos. A maioria crimes em comunidades diversas nunca são relatados, muitas vezes porque eles são cometidos pelas gangues hispânicas que controlá-los.Coulter narra alguns (o editor cortou o livro ao meio e ela diz que pode facilmente produzir 50 casos para cada um citado)dos crimes de estupro mais ultrajante imigrante cometidos aqui, observando um estudo em que as mulheres latino aqui relataram abuso sexual de infância em cerca de 80X a taxa de outras mulheres americanas, e uma vez que parece provável que muitos não queriam falar sobre isso, poderia ser maior. Ela observa que em grande parte da América Latina estuprar adolescentes não é considerado um crime (por exemplo, a idade de consentimento no México é 12) e, em qualquer caso, é raro que nada é feito sobre isso, uma vez que é muitas vezes ligado a membros de gangues ou suas famílias e se yo u protesto você morre. Coulter observa que os ilegais têm feito grandes áreas de terras públicas do sudoeste dos EUA e parques inseguros e alguns foram fechados. Metade de alguns 60 incêndios florestais em terras federais ou tribais entre 2006 e 2010 foram iniciados por imigrantes ilegais, muitos deles definidos deliberadamente para evitar a captura. O custo de lutar estes 30 sozinho pôde pagar por um bom começo em uma cerca segura da beira. Presumo que todos saibam sobre as enormes operações de cultivo de maconha conduzidas pelos cartéis mexicanos em nossas florestas nacionais. Além da erosão e poluição, é a norma para os agricultores para matar numerosos animais e ameaçar os caminhantes. Mais deprimente de todos é o traição do Sierra Club (que de repente mudou sua melodia depois de obter uma contribuição $100000000 do bilionário David Gelbaum com a condição de que eles apoiam a imigração-claramente confuso como sua mão direita protege a natureza enquanto a esquerda destrói-lo), que agora são dedicados à imigração em massa, denunciando qualquer um oposto como "racistas brancos", mesmo quando eles são diversos. Assim, eles são um outro grupo que deve ser feito para se inscrever como um agente de um governo estrangeiro e seus executivos e grandes contribuintes feitos para se juntar aos outros criminosos colocados em quarentena em uma ilha (o Aleutians seria perfeito, mas mesmo Cuba faria) onde eles não podem fazer mais mal. Considerando o flagrante trashing da Califórnia pelos hispânicos, e o claro como o fim do dia da natureza na América como os imigrantes sobre o dobro da população durante o próximo século ou assim, isso é verdadeiramente surpreendente de um ponto de vista, mas covardia e estupidez são apenas para ser o esperado. 319 Um assassinato nos EUA é dito ao total de cerca de $9.000.000 custos de vida e se eles têm a morte é de vários milhões mais. Em cerca de 15000/ano que seria de cerca de $150 bilhões/ano apenas para os homicídios-a maioria por diverso. O México tem cerca de 5X a taxa de homicídios dos EUA e Honduras cerca de 20X e seus descendentes podem certamente olhar para a frente a nossa taxa de movimento nessa direção. Coulter observa que os hispânicos cometeram cerca de 23.000 assassinatos aqui nas últimas décadas. Como eu escrevo, este item apareceu na net. "Em uma foto de arquivo sem data, José Manuel Martinez chega ao Lawrence County judicial Building em Moulton, Alabama., antes de se declarar culpado de fotografar José Ruiz no Condado de Lawrence, ala., em março de 2013. Martinez admitiu ter matado dezenas de pessoas nos Estados Unidos como um executor de cartéis de drogas no México. " Não é claro raro, apenas um dos poucos para fazer as manchetes recentemente. Figurando cerca de 2,2 milhões prisioneiros (mais de 1% da população adulta) e um custo para colocá-los na cadeia desde o início de sua carreira criminal de talvez $50000 cada ou cerca de $100.000.000.000 eo custo para mantê-los lá de cerca de $35000 cada ou sobre $75.000.000.000 significa um mínimo de $150.000.000.000 por ano, não incluindo outros custos governamentais e sociais. Eu não vejo nenhuma estimativa realmente clara sobre a rede para o custo total do crime nos EUA, mas em 2013 estimou-se que o crime violento sozinho custou o Reino Unido (onde as armas são muito menos freqüentes e as máteres Mexicanas e colombianas não operam significativamente) ca. $150.000.000.000 ou cerca de US $6000/agregado familiar, ou cerca de 8% do PIB, mas os EUA tem uma percentagem muito maior de imigrantes, armas e drogas, de modo a incluir todos os crimes não-violentos e figurando apenas 5% do PIB, que seria de cerca de 900.000.000.000 por ano. Figurando cerca de 60% do crime devido à O Diverso, ou talvez 80% se você contar que de euros viciado em drogas importadas por diverso, nós pagamos algo como $700.000.000.000 por ano para apoiar o crime diverso. Claro, todos os culpados de crimes, independentemente da origem nacional, história ou status poderia ter sua cidadania rescindido e ser deportado ou quarantena em uma ilha, onde o seu custo de manutenção poderia ser de $0 a $1000/ano em vez de $35000 e it poderia ser feito um uma direção viagem para evitar a reincidência. Sim, seu Sci-Fi agora, mas como o século 22 se aproxima e a civilização desmorona, a tolerância do crime diminuirá da necessidade. Por agora, nada será feito, e o crime aqui chegará aos níveis no México como a fronteira continua a se dissolver e colapso ambiental e aproximando falência dissolver a economia. Dentro do México em 2014 sozinho, 100 cidadãos norte-americanos eram conhecidos por terem sido assassinados e mais de 130 sequestrados e outros simplesmente desapareceram, e se você adicionar outros estrangeiros e mexicanos que corre para os milhares. Mesmo um pequeno país levemente viajado como Honduras gerencia cerca de 10 assassinatos e 2 sequestros um 320 ano de cidadãos dos EUA. E, claro, estes são os melhores dos tempos-ele está ficando cada vez pior como reprodução desenfreada e esgotamento de recursos trazer colapso sempre mais perto. Em outro índice de quão longe fora de controle o México é, os cartéis criminosos, acreditava-se que geram bem mais de $21.000.000.000 a cada ano de drogas, mineração ilegal, pesca e madeireira, roubo, prostituição, extorsão, sequestro e desvio, são uma ameaça crescente a Pemex, o monopólio mexicano do petróleo. Entre 2009 e 2016, os ladrões bateu os encanamentos aproximadamente cada 1,4 kms ao longo da rede de pipeline de aproximadamente 14.000 km da Pemex, recebendo mais de $1.000.000.000 na receita anual do gás que eles vendem no mercado negro. Eles são capazes de fazer isso aterrorizando os funcionários da Pemex para obter informações sobre suas operações, oferecendo-lhes o mesmo que eles fazem para todos no México - prata ou chumbo, ou seja, tomar os subornos ou você e sua família morrem. Os euros ouvem constantemente sobre o quão ruim eles não são querer dar o diverso ainda mais. OK bem, vamos concordar em fazê-lo desde que o país do terceiro mundo que são de permite imigrantes até que eles compreendem cerca de 30% da sua população agora e 60% por 2100, impõe legislação que dá a todos os estrangeiros em seu país, legalmente ou não, cidadania para seus bebês, bem-estar, alimento livre, cuidados médicos livres, escolaridade livre, imunidade à deportação, assistência de emergência livre, licenças de motoristas, licença para exercer a lei, direito de servir em júris, direito de trazer todos os seus parentes (que também obter todos esses privilégios), direito de configurar as organizações que ajudá-los a mentir sobre as formas de imigração, para evitar a deportação, para suprimir a liberdade de expressão e subverter o processo político para que eles possam assumir o país. Na verdade, vamos tornar mais fácil e fazê-lo se mesmo um de seus países implementa até mesmo alguns destes. Claro que nunca vai acontecer. Naturalmente, aqueles com cada tipo de deficiência mental ou física estão insatisfeitos com seu nível de bem-estar e estão se organizando também. Aqueles com autismo, na verdade, um espectro de deficiências genéticas devido a tantos como 1000 genes, agora estão fazendo campanha para ser considerado como não deficiente, mas "neurodiverso" e "neurotypicals" deve considerá-los como pares ou até mesmo seus superiores. Nenhum problema para mim se alguém quer ter um ' amigo ' ou cônjuge que não pode experimentar o amor ou amizade e que sente o mesmo quando eles morrem como eles fazem quando seu peixinho faz (exceto ser mais irritado com a maior inconveniência). E aqueles com mais de casos leves nunca vai realizar um trabalho e será um fardo para seus parentes e da sociedade (ou seja, a minoria que pagam impostos) todas as suas vidas, e têm uma forte tendência para passar o problema para qualquer descendência que eles têm , por isso provavelmente irá aumentar 321 continuamente, o mesmo que centenas de outros problemas genéticos com herdabilidade significativa. Como o diagnóstico melhorou, assim que tem a incidência de autismo, que agora excede 1%, como faz para a esquizofrenia, distúrbios esquiotypal, ADHD, toxicodependência, alcoolismo, alexitimia, baixo QI, depressão, transtorno bipolar, etc., etc., então, talvez o combinado incidência de transtornos mentais incapacitantes excede 10% e aqueles com problemas físicos que necessitam de apoio parcial ou completo ao longo da vida é provavelmente semelhante, e ambos estão subindo em número e por cento, o resultado inevitável de ' civilização ', "democracia" e "direitos humanos". Claramente, à medida que a economia desmorona, os custos aumento dos cuidados de saúde, e uma percentagem cada vez maior são idosos não-trabalho e mentalmente ou fisicamente deficientes, este sistema lunático entrará em colapso-i. e., os EUA será eventualmente tem sobre os mesmos folhetos para todos como países do terceiro mundo pelo início do século 22-nenhum. Coulter comenta sobre o cidadão mexicano Carlos Slim Helu (a terceira pessoa mais rica do mundo como eu escrevo isso) no contexto do próximo universal mentir sobre e evasão de questões de imigração pelo New York Times e outros meios de comunicação. Ele deu um grande empréstimo para o Times há alguns anos, para salvá-lo da falência, e isso provavelmente explica a sua subsequente falha para cobrir questões de imigração de uma forma significativa. Slim é a estréia mundial monopolista e suas empresas controlam 90% do mercado de telefonia mexicana e muitas das suas principais indústrias (mexicano referem-se ao seu país como Slimlandia). Sua riqueza equivale a cerca de 5% do PIB do México. Para adicionar perspectiva, uma vez que os EUA tem cerca de 15 vezes o PIB do México, para ser comparável, Bill Gates ou Warren Buffet teria que valer cerca de um trilhão de dólares cada um ou cerca de 12X seu valor a partir de 2019. Califórnia é o maior dinheiro que faz E.U. estado para Slim, cuja tomada de bens e serviços mexicanos é de cerca de $140 milhões/dia. Para obter o sabor de como as coisas eram quando Slim conseguiu adquirir a companhia telefônica mexicana (e o que pode ser esperado aqui em breve), Gortari (escolhido por G.W. Bush para a campanha com ele) foi presidente do vicioso monopólio político mexicano PRI, e nos anos subsequentes O irmão de Gortari foi encontrado assassinado, seus parentes foram apreendidos pela polícia Suíça quando tentaram retirar $84000000 da conta bancária de seu irmão, e ele fugiu do México para a Irlanda, onde ele permanece. Estes são entre as razões Coulter chama Slim um barão ladrão e uma influência terrivel no México e América. Ela observa que cerca de $20.000.000.000 da renda anual de Slim de seu monopólio de telefone vem de mexicanos vivendo aqui. Ele é libanês em ambos os lados, então o México experimentou sua própria aquisição estrangeira. Os corações de sangramento insistem que os americanos mostram cada vez mais "humanidade" e garantem o nosso próprio colapso para ajudar a multidão, mas o que a humanidade faz o show diverso? Eles se reproduzem como coelhos e consomem sem 322 contenção, condenando assim a todos, incluindo seus próprios descendentes, ao inferno na terra. Não há nada nobre sobre os pobres - eles são apenas os ricos na espera. Mostrando o esquecimento típico do estabelecimento, nosso secretário de estado Kerry elogia China para ' levantar 200 milhões pessoas fora da pobreza ', mas não notar isso colocou um enorme dreno sobre os recursos do mundo, e é feito roubando do futuro, incluindo a sua próprios descendentes, e que isso é insustentável. Dez ou 11.000.000.000 (por 2100) todos tentando ficar fora da pobreza garante o colapso do mundo. A maior QV da China, como a nossa, é apenas temporária, obtida ao custo de seus próprios descendentes e do futuro dos mundos. Quanto qualidade de vida (QV-uma medida geral, incluindo riqueza, taxa de criminalidade, stress, tráfego, problemas de drogas, felicidade, etc.) podem os americanos ganhar por várias medidas? Proibir os bebês âncora pode até QV 5% em meados do século e 10% até o fim, em relação a fazer nada. Fazer a proibição retroativa a 1982, ou preferencialmente a 1898, e assim deportar a maioria dos naturalizados por estarem relacionados a bebês âncora, pode aumentar a QV mais 5% imediatamente. Proibir a imigração pode levantá-lo mais 10% até o final do século, enquanto fazendo a proibição retroativo para 1965 e deportando a maioria dos imigrantes, juntamente com seus descendentes e parentes naturalizados pode dar americanos (diverso e euros) mais 20% mais QV de imediato. E pode haver um De Volta à Africa ou lei de restituição da escravidão que enviou todos os negros, ou pelo menos aqueles em bem-estar, desempregados ou na prisão, de volta às suas terras natais para que nós nunca mais ter que ouvir suas queixas inane sobre ser seqüestrado (como observado , eles nunca consideram que, se não para a escravidão não existiria e se não para o colonialismo e a tecnologia do euro talvez 90% das pessoas no terceiro mundo não existiria), para não mencionar se não para o euro que agora estariam vivendo (ou morendo) o Nazi ou os japoneses ou os comunistas. Claro, pode-se fazer isso em uma base caso a caso, mantendo todos os qualificados (por exemplo, pessoal médico e Hitech). Em vez de ou antes do processo lento da deportação, um poderia cancelar a cidadania ou pelo menos o privilégio de votos de todos os cidadãos naturalizado e seus descendentes desde 1965. Os 42 milhões afro-americanos (cerca de 74 milhões por 2100) que respondem por 4,5 x como muitos prisioneiros per capita como euros, obter um passeio em grande parte livre para todos os serviços essenciais e bem-estar, assumir e tornar inabitáveis grandes áreas de cidades, aumentar a aglomerante e tráfego por cerca de 13%, etc., para que eles possam diminuir a QV de todos os americanos cerca de 20%, em média, mas para inabitavel para aqueles que estão em bairros pobres. Hispânicos montante para cerca de 18% (ou cerca de 25%, incluindo ilegais) e eles respondem por um mínimo de 2,5 x como muitos prisioneiros como euros e têm todas as outras questões, causando assim 323 uma queda de QV de cerca de 30% ou novamente para inabitavel em áreas que dominam , que em breve incluirá todo o sudoeste dos EUA. Então, no geral, é um palpite justo que deportando mais diversificada seria sobre o dobro da QV (ou dizer de apenas suportável para maravilhoso) agora para a pessoa média, mas é claro muito mais aumento para os mais pobres e menos para o mais rico. Se um compara a QV provável em 2119 (isto é, um século a partir de agora), se todas as medidas possíveis de antidiversidade foram adotadas, em relação ao que será se pouco ou nada é feito, eu espero que a QV seria cerca de 3x maior ou novamente a partir de intolerável ao fantástico. Depois de documentar a incompetência do INS e do governo, e os inúmeros racistas e flagrantemente anti-branco racista (no sentido original significativo de racista) organizações (por exemplo, o Conselho Nacional de La Raza) ajudando a nos pântano com imigrantes (lista parcial em p247 de Adios América) Coulter diz "a única coisa que está entre a América eo esquecimento é uma moratória total da imigração" e "a indústria de imigração bilhão de dólares virou cada aspecto da lei de imigração em um motor de fraude. As reunificações familiares são fraudes, os "trabalhadores agricolas" são fraudes, os vistos de alta tecnologia são fraudes e os casos de asilo e refugiados são fraudes monumentais. " Seu livro é muito documentado (e a maioria dos dados foram deixados de fora devido a restrições de tamanho) e, claro, quase todos os dados podem ser encontrados na net. Como notas de Coulter, uma votação 2015 mostra que mais americanos tiveram uma opinião favorável de Coreia norte (11%) do que queria aumentar a imigração (7%,), mas a maioria dos Democratas, o Clintons, o Bush, Obama, Casino magnata Sheldon Adelson, Hedge Fund bilionário David Gelbaum, Carlos Slim, prêmio Nobel economista Paul Krugman e megabillionario Facebook fundador Mark Zuckerberg não quer que os americanos votem nisso. Ela também menciona que, em seguida, o governador da Flórida Jeb Bush (com uma esposa mexicana) empurrou para um projeto de lei para dar licenças de motoristas para estrangeiros ilegais (copiando Califórnia) apenas 3 anos após 13 dos 9/11 terroristas tinham usado licenças de motoristas da Flórida para embarcar os aviões. Sim, o mesmo Jeb Bush, que recentemente chamado de imigração ilegal "um ato de amor" (é claro que ele significa amor para o México e ódio para os EUA, ou pelo menos os seus euros). O colapso inexorável dos EUA (e outros países do primeiro mundo na Europa são apenas um passo ou dois para trás, como eles têm deixado em diverso que estão produzindo crianças em cerca de 3 vezes as taxas de euro) mostra as falhas fatais na democracia representativa. Se eles são para sobreviver e não se transformar em 324 infernos do terceiro mundo, eles devem estabelecer uma meritocracia. Mude a idade de votação para 35 mínimo e 65 máximo, com QI mínimo 110, prova de estabilidade mental, falta de dependência de drogas ou álcool, sem condenações criminais, e uma pontuação mínima no teste SAT que iria obter um em uma boa faculdade. Mas o estado arrependido do que passa para a civilização é mostrado por uma votação recente Gallup que descobriu que cerca de 50% dos americanos acreditavam que o diabo influencia os acontecimentos diários, e que os OVNIs são reais, enquanto 36% acreditam em telepatia e cerca de 25% em fantasmas. Um sim em qualquer um destes parece ser uma boa razão para a exclusão vitalícia da votação e, preferencialmente, a perda de cidadania, como deve ser um " Sim" ou "possivelmente" ou "provavelmente" resposta a "você acha que OJ Simpson é inocente". Talvez ele vai diminuir a dor ligeiramente para perceber que não é apenas o governo americano que é morônico e traição, como versões do seu suicídio estão acontecendo em outras democracias. Na Grã-Bretanha, o Bureau Nacional de crianças pediu aos professores de creche para relatar qualquer expressão "racista" de crianças tão jovens quanto três. Cerca de 40% dos britânicos recebem alguma forma de bem-estar. Londres tem o crime mais violento do que Istambul ou New York e é dito ter quase 1/3 das câmeras do CCTV do mundo, que registram o cidadão médio aproximadamente 300 vezes um o dia. Naturalmente, como usual, não há nenhuma estatística de confiança para China, onde algumas das companhias as mais bem sucedidas da eletrônica estão no negócio do CCTV e onde o software do reconhecimento facial pode frequentemente identificar toda a pessoa aleatória nos minutos. O Reino Unido tem a taxa a mais elevada em Europa de STD, de mães solteira, de toxicodependência e de aborto. Um quinto de todas as crianças não têm nenhum adulto de trabalho em sua casa, quase um milhão de pessoas foram em licença doente por mais de uma década, os tribunais forçaram o governo para dar um homem com deficiência dinheiro para voar para Amesterdam para fazer sexo com uma prostituta, porque para negar que seria um "violar de seus direitos humanos ". O número de ofensas indiciado por 1000 levantouse de aproximadamente 10 nos 1950 ' s a aproximadamente 110 nos 1990 ' s paralelamente com o aumento em diverso. Graças a Mark Steyn ' s "After America", que é necessário ler para todos os americanos brilhantes, civilizados que querem que seu país para sobreviver, embora a restrição de um golpe militar, não há uma chance. Coulter aponta o absurdo dos políticos baque nos eleitores hispânicos (Hispandering). Se o candidato presidencial Mitt Romney tinha ganhado 71% do voto latino-americano em vez de 27% ele ainda teria perdido, mas se tivesse ganhado somente 4% mais do voto branco que teria ganhado. Na verdade, 72% dos eleitores são não-hispânicos brancos, por isso mesmo que alguém tenha todos os votos não-brancos, um candidato presidencial ainda poderia ganhar por um deslizamento de terra, como vimos na eleição Trump. O problema é um percentual considerável de eleitores brancos são 325 imbecis e lunáticos que são incapazes de agir em seu próprio interesse próprio. O absurdo de deixar cidadãos média votar foi mostrado quando muitos estavam seriamente considerando Ben Carson para Presidente em 2016-um sétimo dia Adventista Bíblia batendo criacionista Detroit ghetto 'homeboy' de tal imaturidade óbvia e estupidez que nenhum país Sane permitiria que ele ocupasse qualquer cargo público (é claro que se poderia dizer o mesmo da maioria das pessoas e da maioria dos políticos). Ele tem, no entanto, a enorme vantagem de que seus defeitos lhe dão muito em comum com o americano médio. Parece-me que suas limitações incluem o autismoa razão para o seu famoso "efeito plano". Não se deixe enganar por suas simulações ocasionais de riso-autistas aprender a imitar as emoções em uma idade precoce e alguns até mesmo ter carreiras de sucesso como comediantes. Famoso comediante Dan Aykroyd tinha isso a dizer sobre o seu Asperger-"um dos meus sintomas incluiu a minha obsessão com fantasmas e aplicação da lei-eu levo em torno de um distintivo da polícia comigo, por exemplo. Tornei-me obcecado por Hans Holzer, o maior caçador de fantasmas de todos os tempos. Foi quando a idéia do meu filme Ghostbusters nasceu. " "Gentil Ben" Carson quer proibir o aborto, mesmo em casos de estupro e incesto, acha que devemos abandonar o Medicare, e adere a muitas teorias da conspiração estranhas, como as pirâmides não sendo construídas pelos faraós como túmulos, mas pelo Joseph bíblico para o armazenamento de Grão! Ele propõe a transformar o departamento de educação em um superintendente fascista de moral adequada, com os alunos relatando professores que exibiu viés político (ou seja, qualquer pessoa) para o governo para que o financiamento das universidades poderia ser cortado. "Eu pessoalmente acredito que esta teoria que Darwin surgiu foi algo que foi encorajado pelo adversário." O adversário é um apelido para o diabo; é a tradução real da palavra "Satanás". Ele também rejeitou o Big Bang, chamando-o de "conto de fadas". Como todos os criacionistas, isso significa que ele rejeita a maior parte da ciência moderna-ou seja, tudo o que nos permite fazer sentido de biologia, geologia, física e do universo e coloca-los em todos os pes com as pessoas que viveram 100.000 anos atrás-ou seja, Neandertais. Claro, para o são, inteligente e educado, "contos de fadas" são sobre o céu, inferno, anjos e demônios, mas estes são exatamente o nível certo para a média classe baixa americana, diversificada ou euro. Difícil de acreditar que poderíamos fazer pior do que o Clinton, Nixon, Reagan, Obama e G.W. Bush, mas isso vai acontecer, e seus descendentes vão ver uma linha interminável de políticos que são apenas qualificações reais são a ganância, desonestidade, estupidez, sociopatia, pele oscura y um sobrenome Espanhol. Em todo o caso, é consequênca paz em um 'grupocracia' que os idiotas, os lunáticos e o meramente sin nocao tomarão sobre e funcionarem a mostra até que desmorona, que é inevitável a menos que a democracia como praticada atualmente mudanças radicalmente e a diversidade diminui. 326 Agora que temos uma pessoa razoavelmente sã, inteligente, patriótica como Presidente (embora vendo isso através da desinformação maciça e calúnia produzida pelo Neomarxist terceiro mundo Supremacists pode ser difícil) e suficiente Republicanos no Congresso (os democratas ter vendido para fora seu país há muito tempo) nós cOuld teoricamente deportar os ilegais, mas a menos que encerrar a imigração e retroativamente deportar a maioria dos naturalizados desde 1965, ele só vai retardar o desastre e não pará-lo.No entanto, quase tudo o que Trump tenta fazer é bloqueado pelos juízes Neomarxistas e os democratas que há muito tempo deixaram de representar os interesses da América. Hillary Clinton era preferível a Obama, que foi treinado como um advogado constitucional, então ele sabia que nossos sistemas fraquezas fatais, e quanto mais ele poderia criar um estado comunista imposto pelo fascismo, como seu muitoadmirado modelo Cuba. Eu posso facilmente perdoar Hillary para Benghazi e seus e-mails e Bill para Monica, mas não para a sua perdoando totalmente cínico de clientes do irmão de Hillary Hugh, fraude fiscal Marc Rich e quatro Hasids condenado em 1999 de custas o governo federal de mais de $30 milhões em subsídios federais de habitação, empréstimos de pequenas empresas e bolsas de estudante, a fim de influencia com Judeus N.Y.. Isso é muito conhecido e, na verdade, apenas sobre tudo o que eu digo aqui é facilmente encontrável na net. Mesmo que nossa 'mobocracia' é um pesadelo de camera lenta, se tivéssemos uma democracia direta (como poderíamos facilmente na idade do computador) e as pessoas foram realmente entrevistados sobre questões importantes, talvez a maioria dos nossos principais problemas seria descartado de forma rápida. Suponha que amanhã houve um voto de cada eleitor registrado com um endereço de e-mail ou smartphone em perguntas algo parecido com isto: Todos os alienígenas ilegais devem ser deportados dentro de um ano? O bem-estar deve ser cortado ao meio dentro de 1year? Se todos os criminosos condenados nascidos em outro país ou um de cujos pais foram, ter sua cidadania cancelada e ser deportado dentro de 90 dias? Todos os imigração devem ser rescindidos, exceto vistos de trabalho temporário para aqueles com habilidades especiais? Todos os pedófilos, estupradores, assassinos e viciados em drogas têm sua cidadania cancelada e deportada, ou se um cidadão nativo, em quarentena em uma ilha? Tanto melhor se votar era restrito àqueles cujos os pais e/ou todos os quatro avos são nascidos nativos, que são não-criminosos, que pagaram mais de 5% de sua renda nos impostos os últimos 3 anos e passaram a saúde mental, os eventos atuais e os testes do IQ. Mais uma vez, os maiores benfeitores seriam os diversos que permaneceram 327 aqui, mas é claro que a maioria resistirá a qualquer mudança que exija inteligência ou educação para entender. Eu não sou contra uma sociedade diversa, mas para salvar a América para seus filhos (lembre-se eu não tenho descendentes nem parentes próximos), deve ser limitado a dizer 20% e que significaria cerca de 40% dos diversos aqui agora seria repatriado. Na verdade eu não me opor a manter o% diverso que temos agora (cerca de 37%) desde que metade dos aqui foram substituídos por asiáticos cuidadosamente selecionados ou por pessoas de qualquer lugar desde que sejam cuidadosamente selecionados (ou seja, sem criminosos, defeituosos mentais ou físicos, sem nozes religiosas, sem viciados em drogas, bem educado com uma comprovada útil profissão), e que eles concordam em não ter mais do que dois filhos, com a deportação imediata se eles produzem um terço, cometer um grave crime, ou permanecer no bem-estar por mais de um ano. E nenhum parente é permitido entrar. Na verdade, seria um enorme passo em frente para substituir todos os criminosos do euro, viciados em drogas, casos mentais, usuários de bem-estar, e cronicamente desempregados, etc., com adequado diversificada. Naturalmente, é impossível agora, mas como a civilização desmorona e os sete sociopatas do CCP tomam sobre, muitas coisas surpreendentes acontecerão, todas elas extremamente desagradáveis para biliões de povos, com o diverso que tem o mais sofrimento e a morte. Coulter brincando sugere convidando Israel a ocupar a fronteira com o México, como eles mostraram como proteger um. No entanto, gostaria de sugerir realmente fazê-lo-ou dando-lhes a porção sul de cada Estado de fronteira ou talvez apenas ocupando a seção de fronteira do México (que poderíamos fazer em poucos dias). Israel deve ser deleitado ter um segundo país, desde que sua posição em Israel se tornará insustentável como os EUA, a França etc. perdem a habilidade de ser polícias do mundo, e os países capazes nucleares do terceiro mundo colapsam. No entanto, devemos exigir que os israelitas para deixar o estrito ortodoxos em casa, onde os muçulmanos em breve obtê-los, como já temos bastante coelho criação de lunáticos religiosos. Falando do colapso dos países do terceiro mundo capaz nuclear, deve ser óbvio que, como isso acontece, provavalmente antes do final deste século, mas certamente no próximo, com bombas de hidrogenio na posse de fanáticos, é apenas uma questão de tempo antes que eles começar a vapar cidades americanas e européias. A única defesa definitiva será a "nucleação" preemptiva de qualquer país que desmorona, ou onde os radicais muçulmanos tomam o lugar. Deve ser óbvio para Israel que eles não terão outra escolha senão uma greve preemptiva sobre o Paquistão, o Irã e talvez outros. Outro presente adorável do diverso. Em uma votação 2015 atrasada por You.Gov, 29 por cento dos entrevistados disseram que podem imaginar uma situação em que apoiariam os militares tomando o controle 328 do governo federal-que se traduz em mais de 70 milhões adultos americanos. E estes são os melhores tempos. Neste momento no próximo século, dar ou levar algumas décadas, (muito mais cedo em muitos países do terceiro mundo), com a civilização industrial colapsando, fome, crime, doença e guerra em todo o mundo, golpes militares estarão acontecendo em todos os lugares. É quase certamente a única cura para os problemas da América, mas é claro que ninguém vai conseguir votar nele. Em suma, este é o capítulo americano da triste história da inexorável destruição do mundo por maternidade desenfreada. 54 anos atrás, 396 políticos dos EUA votaram para abraçar a destruição da América pelo terceiro mundo, através do "nenhum impacto demográfico significativo" ato de imigração. Sem as mudanças que eles e a suprema corte de fez (junto com falha em impor as nossas leis de imigração), teríamos cerca de 80 milhões personas menos e agora e pelo menos 150 milhões menos em 2100, juntamente com dezenas de trilhões de dólares em poupança. Teríamos a oportunidade de lidar com os imensos problemas que a América e o mundo enfrentam. Mas, sobrecarregado com uma população fatalmente fragmentada (isto é, diversa) cerca de duas vezes o tamanho que poderíamos ter tido, metade dos quais não contribuirá para a solução, mas sim constituir o problema, é impossível. O que vemos é que a democracia como praticado aqui e agora garante um governo fatalmente inepto. Paz e prosperidade em todo o mundo vai desaparecer e fome, doença, crime, golpes militares, terrorismo e senhores da guerra se tornará rotina, provavelmente neste século, certamente durante o próximo. Para mim, é claro que nada vai conter a maternidade e que não há esperança para a América ou o mundo, independentemente do que acontece na tecnologia, vida verde ou política em qualquer lugar. Tudo tranquilo, puro, selvagem, sã, seguro e decente está condenado. Não há nenhum problema entendendo a estupidez, preguiça, desonestidade, auto-decepção, covardia, arrogância, ganância e insanidade de macacos sem pêlos, mas deve parecer um pouco estranho que tantas pessoas razoavelmente sã e mais ou menos educado poderia acolher em seu país (ou pelo menos permitir a entrada e tolerar a presença de) um grande número de imigrantes que prosseguem para assumir e destruí-lo. A psicologia do macaco (compartilhada por todos os seres humanos) só é capaz de considerar seriamente a si mesmo e parentes imediatos por um curto período de tempo no futuro (altruísmo recíproco ou aptidão inclusiva), talvez décadas no máximo, por isso não há contenção interna. A democracia é o terreno fértil ideal para a catástrofe. A maioria das pessoas não são inteligentes nem bem educados, mas pode-se ver colapso acontecendo na frente de nós, e acima de tudo nas grandes áreas urbanas e no sudoeste, especialmente Califórnia e Texas. Pura preguiça, ignorância e falta de entendimento da ecologia e da natureza do crescimento populacional é parte dela, mas 329 eu acho que o altruísmo recíproco inata que compartilhamos com todos os animais deve ter um grande papel. Quando evoluímos na África, vivemos em pequenos grupos, provavelmente raramente mais do que algumas centenas e muitas vezes menos de 20, e assim todos os que nos rodeiam eram nossos parentes próximos, e nosso comportamento foi selecionado para tratá-los razoavelmente bem como eles compartilharam nossos genes (aptidão inclusiva) e retribuiriam boas ações (altruísmo recíproco). Paramos evoluindo e começamos a devolver, substituindo a evolução pela seleção natural com a desconcentração (degeneração genética) por seleção não natural há cerca de 100.000 anos, quando a cultura evoluiu até o ponto onde a linguagem, o fogo e as ferramentas nos deram uma enorme vantagem sobre outros animais, e não havia mais força seletiva importante para mudar o comportamento ou aumentar ou manter a saúde e a inteligência. Assim, até hoje ainda temos a tendência, quando não nos sentimos em perigo físico imediato, de agir de forma mais ou menos amigável para aqueles que nos rodeiam. A paz temporária, provocada por comunicações avançadas e armamento e a violação impiedoso dos recursos dos planetas, expandiu esta "uma grande família" delírio. Embora as pessoas mais inteligentes e reflexivas (que, naturalmente, inclui muitos diversos) pode ver o perigo para seus descendentes, aqueles que são mal educados, aborrecido espirituoso, ou emocionalmente instável, sociopática, autista, ou mentalmente doente (ou seja, o vasto maioria) não vai vê-lo ou não vai agir sobre ele. Mas como sobre Adelson, Zuckerberg, Gelbaum, Biden, Clinton, Obama, Krugman e uma lista muito longa dos ricos e famosos? Eles têm pelo menos alguma educação e inteligência, então como eles podem querer destruir seu país e o futuro de seus próprios filhos? Na verdade, eles não são mais bem educados, perceptivo e futuro orientado do que o graduado médio da faculdade (ou seja, não muito), e também, eles e seus parentes vivem em comunidades fechadas e muitas vezes têm guarda-costas, para que eles não serão seriamente preocupados ou mesmo conscientes de bairros de lixeira, praias e parques, dirigir por tiroteios, invasões de casa, estupor e assassinatos, nem sobre o pagamento de impostos ou fazer as extremidades se encontram. Eles não estão apenas pensando sobre o destino de seus netos grandes, nem de ninguém, ou se ele faz atravessar a sua mente, como a grande maioria, eles não têm uma pista sobre a ecologia humana, nem disgenia, e não pode ver o caminho inexorável para o colapso. Na medida em que eles fazem, eles não vão arriscar desconfortos pessoais, dizendo ou fazendo nada sobre isso (egoísmo e covardia). Um leitor sugeriu que eu estava falando de "limpeza étnica" de diverso por euros, mas o que está acontecendo em todo o mundo é exatamente o inverso. Eu não tinha realmente pensado na destruição da América e da civilização industrial por diverso como genocídio, mas desde que o número de euros de todos os tipos (e muitos grupos de diversos, como japoneses e coreanos) vai firmemente irremediavel, e seus países ser tomado por diversos, ele tem esse aspecto, embora seja a falta de euros para produzir crianças suficientes que é responsável por seus números em declínio. Alguns 330 fanáticos (mas não tão poucos no futuro como os muçulmanos vão aumentar de cerca de 1/5 do mundo para cerca de 1/3 por 2100, estimulando as condições que criam fanatismo) como al Queda e Isis querem eliminar todos os euro 's (e os judeus e sunitas e feministas e cristãos, etc., etc.) e os árabes certamente demolir Israel por e por, mas caso contrário, há pouca motivação para se livrar daqueles que estão dando-lhe um almoço gratuito (embora, claro, poucos diversificada vai entender o quão grande o almoço é realmente até que ele pára e desmorona civilização). No entanto, à medida que o tempo passa e o durante para o espaço e os recursos fica cada vez mais desesperado, genocídio de todos os grupos do euro pode tornar-se um objetivo explícito, embora na maior parte será muito ofuscado por ataques de vários grupos diversos sobre os outros, que sempre foi o situação sempre vai. Em todo o caso, todo o euro e muitos grupos diversos são condenados certamente--nós estamos falando aproximadamente 2100 e além, quando os EUA (então uma parte de México) e Europa não terão mais o dinheiro ou a vontade suprimir a anarquia em toda parte, como eles serão un capaz de controlá-lo em casa. Chocante como é para mim vir a estes realizações (eu nunca pensei realmente sobre estas edições em uma maneira séria até recentemente), mim não vê nenhuma esperança para America ou as outras democracias do ' (América tem um pé em fascism e no outro no comunismo já) sem uma mudança drástica na forma como a "democracia" funciona, ou em seu completo abandono. Claro, ele vai ser praticamente o mesmo em outros lugares e ambos os euros e diverso deve rezar os chineses adotam a democracia em breve (então eles colapsam também) ou eles estão condenados de fora e por dentro. Que a democracia é um sistema fatalmente falho não é notícia a qualquer um com um aperto da história ou da natureza humana. Nosso segundo presidente John Adams tinha isso a dizer em 1814: "Eu não digo que a democracia estêve mais pernicioso no todo, e a longo prazo, do que o monarchy ou o aristocracy. A democracia nunca foi e nunca pode ser tão durável como a aristocracia ou o monarchy; mas enquanto durar, é mais sangrento do que qualquer um. ... Lembre-se, a democracia nunca dura muito. Ele logo desperdiça, esgota, e assassinatos em si. Nunca houve uma democracia ainda que não cometeu suicídio. É em vão dizer que a democracia é menos vaidosa, menos orgulhosa, menos egoísta, menos ambiciosa, ou menos avarento do que a aristocracia ou a monarquia. Não é verdade, de fato, e nenhum lugar aparece na história. Essas paixões são as mesmas em todos os homens, todas as formas de governo simples, e quando desmarcadas, produzem os mesmos efeitos da fraude, da violência e da crueldade. Quando as perspectivas claras são abertas antes da vaidade, orgulho, avareza, ou ambição, para a sua gratificação fácil, é difícil para os filósofos mais atenciosos e os moralistas mais conscientes para resistir à tentação. Os indivíduos se conquistaram. Nações e grandes corpos de homens, nunca. John Adams, As cartas de John e Abigail Adams 331 Os fatos mais básicos, quase nunca mencionados, são que não há recursos suficientes na América ou no mundo para levantar uma percentagem significativa dos pobres fora da pobreza e mantê-los lá. A tentativa de fazer isso é a falência da América e destruir o mundo. A capacidade da terra para produzir alimentos diminui diariamente, assim como a nossa qualidade genética. E agora, como sempre, de longe o maior inimigo dos pobres é outros pobres e não os ricos. Sem mudanças dramáticas e imediatas, não há nenhuma esperança para impedir o colapso de América, ou de todo o país que segue um sistema democrático. Então, é claro que Ann Coulter está certo e a menos que algumas mudanças verdadeiramente milagrosas acontecem muito em breve, é adeus América e Olá terceiro mundo inferno. Os únicos consolações são que nós os povos mais idosos podemos tomar o conforto em saber que não estará finalizado durante nossa vida, que aqueles como mim que são sem filhos não terão nenhum descendente para sofrer as conseqüências, e, desde que os descendentes daqueles que deixaram isso acontecer (ou seja, quase todos) será tão repugnante como seus antepassados, eles vão merecer o inferno na terra. 332 Como os sete sociopatas que governam China estão ganhando a guerra de mundo três e três maneiras de pará-los Michael Starks Abstrato A primeira coisa que nós devemos manter na mente é que ao dizer que China diz isto ou China faz aquele, nós não estamos falando do povo chinês, mas dos sociopatas que controlam de CCP (partido comunista chinês, isto é, os sete assassinos seriais sociopata Senile (SSSSK) do Comitê ereto do CCP ou dos 25 membros do Politburo. Eu assisti recentemente alguns programas típicos esquerdistas de notícias falsas (praticamente o único tipo pode encontrar na mídia, ou seja, quase tudo agora-ou seja, Yahoo, CNN, o New York Times, etc.) em vouTube, um por vice que mencionou que 1000 economistas (e 15 vencedores do Prêmio Nobel) enviou uma carta a Trump dizendo-lhe que a guerra comercial foi um erro, e outro que entrevistou um economista acadêmico que disse que o movimento de Trump foi uma provocação para começar a guerra mundial 3. Eles estão certos sobre a ruptura do comércio global, mas não têm compreensão do grande quadro, que é que os sete sociopatas têm total dominação do mundo, com a eliminação da liberdade em todos os lugares, como seu objetivo, e que há apenas duas maneiras de pará-los-um embargo comercial total que devasta a economia chinesa e conduz seus militares para forçar para fora as eleições do CCP e da preensão, ou o WW3, que pode ser limitado (braços convencionais com talvez alguns armas nucleares) ou total (tudo as bombas nucleares de uma só vez). Claro como o dia, mas todos esses acadêmicos "brilhantes" não conseguem vê-lo. Se os sociopatas não forem removidos agora, em tão pouco quanto 15 anos será tarde demais, e seus descendentes lentamente mas inexoravelmente estarão sujeitos ao mesmo destino que o Chinês -vigilância total com sequestro, tortura e assassinato de quaisquer dissidentes. A primeira coisa que nós devemos manter na mente é que ao dizer que China diz isto ou China faz aquele, nós não estamos falando do povo chinês, mas dos sociopatas que controlam de CCP (partido comunista chinês, isto é, os sete assassinos seriais sociopata Senile (SSSSK) do Comitê ereto do CCP ou dos 25 membros do Politburo. Eu assisti 333 recentemente alguns programas típicos esquerdistas de notícias falsas (praticamente o único tipo pode encontrar na mídia, ou seja, quase tudo agora-ou seja, Yahoo, CNN, o New York Times, etc.) em vouTube, um por vice que mencionou que 1000 economistas (e 15 vencedores do Prêmio Nobel) enviou uma carta a Trump dizendo-lhe que a guerra comercial foi um erro, e outro que entrevistou um economista acadêmico que disse que o movimento de Trump foi uma provocação para começar a guerra mundial 3. Eles estão certos sobre a ruptura do comércio global, mas não têm compreensão do grande quadro, que é que os sete sociopatas têm total dominação do mundo, com a eliminação da liberdade em todos os lugares, como seu objetivo, e que há apenas duas maneiras de pará-los-um embargo comercial total que devasta a economia chinesa e conduz seus militares para forçar para fora as eleições do CCP e da preensão, ou o WW3, que pode ser limitado (braços convencionais com talvez alguns armas nucleares) ou total (tudo as bombas nucleares de uma só vez). Claro como o dia, mas todos esses acadêmicos "brilhantes" não conseguem vê-lo. Se os sociopatas não forem removidos agora, em tão pouco quanto 15 anos será tarde demais, e seus descendentes lentamente mas inexoravelmente estarão sujeitos ao mesmo destino que o chinês -vigilância total com sequestro, tortura e assassinato de quaisquer dissidentes. Naturalmente, o CCP começou WW3 há muito tempo (você poderia ver sua invasãos de Tibet ou Coreia como o começo) e está perseguindo o em cada maneira possível, à exceção das balas e das bombas, e virão logo. O CCP lutou os EUA em Coreia, invadiu e massacrou Tibet, e lutou escaramuças da beira com Rússia e India. Ele conduz operações de hacking massivas contra todas as bases de dados industriais e militares em todo o mundo e roubou os dados confidenciais em praticamente todos os actuais E.U. e militar Europeu e sistemas espaciais, analisou as suas fraquezas e producido versões melhoradas dentro alguns anos. Dezenas de milhares, e talvez centenas de milhares, de funcionários CCP têm sido hackeando em bancos de dados militares, industriais, financeiros e de mídia social em todo o mundo desde os primeiros dias da rede e há centenas de hacks recentes conhecidos nos EUA sozinho. Como as principais instituições e militares têm endurecido seus firewalls, o SSSSK mudaram-se para instituições menores e para os subcontratados de defesa e para os nossos aliados, que são alvos mais fáceis. Enquanto ignora a pobreza esmagadora de centenas de milhões e a existência marginal da maioria de seus povos, construiu uma presença maciça dos militares e do espaço, que cresce cada ano, e cuja a única razão para a existência está travando a guerra para eliminar a liberdade em toda parte. Além de descascar o mundo 3RD de recursos, um grande impulso da correia de vários trilhões de dólares e estrada iniciativa está construindo bases militares em todo o mundo. Eles estão forçando o mundo livre em uma corrida de armas de alta tecnologia maciça que faz com que a guerra fria com a União Soviética olhar como um piquenique. Os russos não são estúpidos, e apesar de fingir amizade com os sociopatas, eles certamente entendem que o CCP vai comê-los vivos, que a sua única esperança é aliar-se com o Ocidente, e 334 Trump está certo sobre o dinheiro em amizade com Putin. Naturalmente, o terceiro mundo Neomarxisto neofascio supremacistos (isto é, o partido democrático) tomará provavelmente o controle total dos EUA em 2020 e nada poderia ser mais ao gosto do CCP. Snowden (outro sem nocao vinte algo) ajudou o SSSSK mais do que qualquer outro indivíduo único, com a possível excepção de todos os presidentes americanos desde WW2, que têm perseguido a política suicida de apaziguamento. Os EUA não tem escolha, mas para monitorar todas as comunicações e para compilar um dossiê sobre todos, como é essencial não só para controlar os criminosos e terroristas, mas para contrariar o SSSSK, que estão rapidamente fazendo o mesmo coisa, com a intenção de remover a liberdade completamente. Embora o SSSSK, e o resto dos militares do mundo, estão gastando enormes somas em hardware avançado, é altamente provável que WW3 (ou os engajamentos menores que levam até ele) será dominado software. Não é fora da pergunta que o SSSSK, com provavelmente mais hackers (codificadores) que trabalham para eles então todo o descanso do mundo combinado, ganhará guerras futuras com conflito físico mínimo, apenas paralisando seu inimigos através da rede. Sem satélites, sem telefones, sem comunicações, sem transações financeiras, sem rede elétrica, sem Internet, sem armas avançadas, sem veículos, trens, navios ou aviões. Alguns podem questionar que o CCP (e naturalmente os níveis superiores da polícia, do exército e do escritório 610) são realmente mentalmente aberrante, assim que aqui são algumas das características comuns de sociopatas (chamados anteriormente psicopatas) que você pode encontrar na rede. Claro, alguns destes são compartilhados por muitos autistas e alexithymics, e sociopatas diferem de pessoas "normais" apenas em grau. Charme superficial, manipulativa e astúcia, grandiosa sensação de auto, falta de remorso, vergonha ou culpa, emoções rasas, incapacidade para o amor, calosidade/falta de empatia, controles comportamentais pobres/natureza impulsiva, acredite que eles são todos-poderosos, todos sabendo , com direito a todos os desejos, sem senso de limites pessoais, sem preocupação com o seu impacto sobre os outros. Problemas em fazer e manter amigos. Comportamentos aberrantes como crueldade com pessoas ou animais, roubo, promissidade, versatilidade criminal ou empreendedora, alterar sua imagem conforme necessário, não percebem que nada 335 está errado com eles, autoritário, secretivo, paranóico, procurar situações onde seu comportamento tirânico será tolerado, tolerado, ou admirado (por exemplo, CCP, polícia, militar, capitalismo predatório), aparência convencional, objetivo da escravização de suas vítimas, procure exercitar o controle despótico sobre cada aspecto da vida de outros, Ter uma necessidade emocional para justificar suas ações e, portanto, necessidade de afirmação de sua vítima (respeito, gratidão), objetivo final é a criação de uma vítima disposta. Incapaz de apego humano real a outro, incapaz de sentir remorso ou culpa, narcisismo extremo e grandiosidade, seu objetivo é governar o mundo. Mentirosos patológicos. Este último é uma das características as mais impressionantes do CCP. Praticamente tudo o que dizem em oposição aos outros é uma mentira óbvia, ou distorção, principalmente tão absurdo que qualquer bem educado de dez anos de idade vai rir deles. No entanto, eles persistem em saturar todos os meios de comunicação todos os dias (um estimado $10000000000 orçamento anual apenas para a propaganda estrangeira) com declarações absurdas. O fato de que eles estão tão fora de contato com a realidade que eles pensam que serão levados a sério mostra claramente o que qualquer pessoa racional vai considerar como doença mental (sociopata). Há somente dois trajetos principais a remover o CCP, liberando 1.400.000.000 prisioneiros chineses, e terminando a marcha lunática a WW3. O Pacífico é lançar uma guerra de comércio all-out para devastar a economia chinesa até que os militares começ fartos acima e carregadores para fora o CCP. Os EUA precisam, por qualquer meio necessário, juntar-se a todos os seus aliados na redução do comércio com a China para perto de zero-nenhuma importação de qualquer produto da China ou qualquer entidade com mais que 10% Propriedade chinesa em qualquer lugar do mundo, incluindo qualquer produto com qualquer componente de tal Origem. Nenhuma exportação de qualquer coisa para a China ou qualquer entidade que reexporta para a China ou que tem mais de 10% de propriedade chinesa, com consequências severas e imediatas para qualquer infratores. Sim, seria temporariamente custar milhões de empregos e uma grande recessão mundial, e sim, eu sei que uma grande parte de suas exportações são de joint ventures com empresas americanas, mas a alternativa é que cada país se tornará o cão dos sete Sociopatas (e como todos os animais comestíveis eles mantêm cães em pequenas gaiolas, enquanto eles engordar-los para a matança) e/ou experimentar os horrores de WW3. Outras etapas possíveis são enviar para casa 336 todos os estudantes e trabalhadores chineses na ciência e na tecnologia, congelam todos os bens de toda a entidade mais de 10% chineses possuídos, proíbem o curso extrangeiro a todo o cidadão chinês, proíbem todo o chinês ou qualquer entidade mais de 10% possuído pelo chinês de comprando qualquer empresa, terra, produto ou tecnologia dos EUA ou de qualquer de seus aliados. Todas estas medidas serão progressivamente eliminadas, consoante o caso. Devemos ter em mente que o monstro chinês é em grande parte devido aos delírios utópicos suicidas, covardia e estupidez de nossos políticos. Truman se recusou a deixar McArthur nuke-los na Coréia, Presidente Carter deu-lhes o direito de enviar os alunos para os EUA (há atualmente cerca de 300.000), usar a nossa propriedade intelectual sem pagar royalties, deu-lhes o status de negociação nação mais favorecida, e por decreto cancelou o nosso reconhecimento de Taiwan e nosso acordo de defesa mútua (ou seja, sem voto por ninguém – ele deve ser um membro da CCP honorário, juntamente com os arbustos, os Obamas, os Clintons, Edward Snowden, etc.). Estes foram os primeiros de uma longa série de gestos conciliatórios à ditadura mais cruel do mundo, que tornou possível para eles prosperar, e definir o palco para a sua vinda invasão de Taiwan, as ilhas do mar do Sul e outros países como eles desejam. Estas medidas junto com nossa falha invadir nos 40 ' s para impedir seu assumir de cnntrole de China, nossa falha a nuke seu exército e daqui o CCP fora da existência durante a guerra coreana, nossa falha impedir seu massacre de Tibet, nossa falha fazer qualquer coisa quando eles explodiram suas primeiras armas nucleares, a nossa incapacidade de tirá-los em 1966, quando lançaram o seu primeiro ICBM capaz nuclear, o nosso (ou melhor, Bush) não fazer nada sobre o massacre de Tiananmen, a nossa incapacidade de encerrar o Confúcio Os institutos atuais em muitas universidades no mundo inteiro, que são partes dianteiras para o CCP, nossa falha proibir a compra das companhias, da propriedade, dos direitos de mineração etc. No mundo todo, que é uma outra maneira de adquirir alta tecnologia e de outros bens vitais, nossa falha fazer qualquer coisa sobre os últimos 20 anos sobre o seu cs espionagem industrial e militar e invadir nossas bases de dados roubando quase todo o nosso armamento avançado, a nossa incapacidade de parar os seus aliados Coréia do Norte e Paquistão de desenvolvimento de armas nucleares e ICBM e recebendo equipamentos da China (por exemplo, seus lançadores de mísseis móveis, que eles alegam serem para transportar toras e foi pura coincidência que eles exatamente caber os mísseis coreanos), a nossa incapacidade de impedi-los de violar o nosso embargo ao petróleo do Irã (eles compram muito do mesmo, registrando seus navios no Irã), e seu programa nuclear (equipamentos e técnicos ir e voltar para N. Coréia via China), a nossa incapacidade de impedi-los de fornecer tecnologia militar e armas em todo o mundo (por exemplo, Coréia do Norte, Irã, Paquistão, o cartéis no México, e mais de 30 outros países), a nossa incapacidade de parar o fluxo de drogas perigosas e seus precursores direta ou indiretamente (por exemplo, quase todos os fentanil e carfentanyl enviados em todo o mundo, e 337 precursores de metanfetamina para os cartéis mexicanos vêm da China), e nosso fracasso em fazer qualquer coisa sobre o seu edifício "portos" (ou seja, bases militares) em todo o mundo, que está em curso. Uma alternativa a encerrar a economia de China é uma guerra limitada, tal como uma batida alvejada por dizem 50 zangões termobárica no 20th Congresso do CCP, quando todos os membros superiores estão em um lugar, mas aquele não tomará lugar até 2022 para que se pudesse acertar a reunião plenária anual. Os chineses seriam informados, como o ataque aconteceu, que eles devem depor seus braços e se preparar para realizar uma eleição democrática ou ser nuked na idade da pedra. A outra alternativa é um ataque nuclear. A confrontação militar é inevitável dado o curso atual do CCP. Ele provavelmente vai acontecer sobre as ilhas no mar da China Meridional ou Taiwan dentro de algumas décadas, mas como eles estabelecem bases militares em todo o mundo que poderia acontecer em qualquer lugar (ver agachado tigre etc.). Os conflitos futuros terão aspectos do hardkill e do softKill com os objetivos declarados do CCP para emfatizar o ciberguerra cortando e paralisando sistemas de controle de todas as comunicações militares e industriais, equipamento, centrais eléctricas, satélites, Internet, bancos, e qualquer dispositivo ou veículo ligado à rede. Os S s são lentamente Fielding uma disposição mundial de superfície tripulada e autônoma e submarinos ou drones submarinos capazes de lançar armas convencionais ou nucleares que podem estar adormecidos aguardando um sinal da China ou mesmo procurando a assinatura de Navios ou aviões dos EUA. Ao destruir nossos satélites, eliminando assim a comunicação entre os EUA e nossas forças em todo o mundo, eles vão usar o deles, em conjunto com drones para alvejar e destruir nossas forças navais atualmente superiores. Claro, tudo isso é cada vez mais feito automaticamente pela ia. Tudo isso é totalmente óbvio para qualquer um que gasta um pouco de tempo na rede. Duas das melhores fontes para começar são o livro Crouching Tiger (e os cinco vídeos do YouTube com o mesmo nome), e a longa série de peças satíricas curtas no canal 'China Uncensored' no YouTube ou seu novo www.chinauncensored.tv. Os planos do CCP para WW3 e a dominação total são dispostos completamente claramente em publicações e em discursos chineses do govgoverno e este é "sonho de China" de Xi Jinping. É um sonho somente para a minoria minúscula que governam China e um pesadelo para todos mais (que incluem 1.400.000.000 Chineses). O 10.000.000.000 dólares anuais permite que eles ou seus fantoches para possuir ou controlar jornais, revistas, canais de TV e rádio e colocar notícias falsas na maioria dos grandes meios de comunicação em todos os dias. Além disso, eles têm um exército (talvez milhões de pessoas) que troll todos os meios de comunicação colocando mais propaganda e afogando-se comentário legítimo (o exército 50 centavo). A regra do SSSSK (ou 25 SSSK se você se concentrar no Politburo em vez de seu comitê 338 permanente) é uma tragicomédia surrealista como branca de neve e os sete anões, mas sem branca de neve, personalidades cativantes, ou um final feliz. Eles são os guardas da maior prisão do mundo, mas eles são de longe os piores criminosos, cometendo por procuração a cada ano milhões de assaltos, estupor, roubos, subornos, sequestros, torturas e assassinatos, a maioria deles presumivelmente por sua própria polícia secreta do 610 Office criado em 10 de junho de 1999 por Jiang Zemin para perseguir os meditadores Qigong de Falun Gong, e qualquer outra pessoa considerada uma ameaça, agora incluindo qualquer pessoa fazendo qualquer comentário crítico e incluindo todos os religiosos e políticos grupos não a sua regra direta. De longe, o maior aliado dos sete anões é o partido democrático dos EUA, que, em um momento em que a América precisa mais do que nunca para ser forte e unida, está fazendo todo o possível para dividir a América em facções em guerra com cada vez mais de seus recursos vai sustentar as legiões florescendo das classes inferiores e conduzi-lo em falência, embora, claro, eles não têm nenhuma visão sobre isso. O CCP é de longe o grupo mais mal na história do mundo, roubando, estuprando, sequestrando, aprisionando, torturando, morrendo de fome e matando mais pessoas que todos os outros ditadores na história (um estimado 100 milhões mortos), e em poucos anos terá um estado de vigilância total gravando todas as ações de todos na China, que já está em expansão em todo o mundo como eles incluem dados de hacking e de todos os que passam através de territórios seu controle, comprar bilhetes em companhias aéreas chinesas etc. Embora o SSSSK trate-nos como um inimigo, na verdade, os EUA é o maior amigo do povo chinês e do CCP seu maior inimigo. De uma outra perspectiva, outros chineses são os maiores inimigos do Chinês, porque demolir todos os recursos do mundo. Naturalmente, alguns dizem que China desmoronará de seu próprio acordo, e é possível, mas o preço de estar errado é o fim da liberdade e WW3 ou uma série longa dos conflitos que os sete sociopatas ganharão quase certamente. Deve-se ter em mente que eles têm controles sobre sua população e armas que Stalin, Hitler, Gaddafi e Idi Amin nunca sonhou. Câmeras de CCTV (atualmente talvez 300 milhões e aumentando rapidamente) em redes de alta velocidade com análise de imagem AI, software de rastreamento em cada telefone que as pessoas são obrigados a usar, e rastreadores GPS em todos os veículos, todas as transações a pagar apenas por telefone já dominante lá e universal e obrigatório em breve, total de monitoramento automático de todas as comunicações por ai e um estimado 2 milhões censores humanos online. Que e un além de milhões de policiais e quadros do exército, há pode ser como muitos como a polícia secreta de 10 milhões paisana do escritório 610 criado por Jiang Zemin, com as prisões pretas (isto é, ano official e não marcado), a actualização instantânea do dossiê digital em todo o Chinês 1.400.000.000 e logo em todos na terra que usa a rede ou os telefones. É muitas vezes chamado de sistema de crédito social e permite que os sociopatas para encerrar as comunicações, a capacidade de compra, viagens, contas 339 bancárias, etc. de qualquer um. Isso não é fantasia, mas já em grande parte implementado para os muçulmanos de Xinjiang e se espalhando rapidamente-ver youTube, China sem censura etc. É claro que a vigilância universal e a digitalização de nossas vidas são inevitáveis em todos os lugares. Qualquer um que não pensa assim está profundamente fora de contato. A escolha é parar o CCP agora ou prestar atenção enquanto estendem a prisão chinesa sobre o mundo inteiro. O aliado o mais grande do CCP é o partido democrático dos EUA. Naturalmente, é os otimistas que esperam os sociopatas chineses governar o mundo quando os pessimistas (que vêem-se como realistas) esperam a sociopatia do IA (ou como como eu o chamo-isto é, idiotice artificial ou insanidade alienigeno) para tomar sobre. É a opinião de muitas pessoas pensativas-Musk, Gates, Hawking etc., incluindo os principais pesquisadores de ia (ver as muitas conversas TED no YouTube) que a ia vai atingir o crescimento explosivo auto (aumentando seu poder milhares ou milhões de vezes em dias, minutos ou microssegundos) em algum momento nas próximas décadas – 2030 às vezes é mencionado, escapando através da rede e infectando todos os computadores suficientemente poderosos. Como será imparável, especialmente porque parece que ele será executado em computadores quânticos que irá aumentar a sua velocidade mais milhares ou milhões de vezes, e como um efeito colateral adorável, será capaz de facilmente quebrar todos os esquemas de criptografia. Se você é optimista, manterá seres humanos e outros animais ao redor como animais de estimação e o mundo transformar-se-á um jardim zoológico com um programa de melhoramento cativo eugênica, se um pessimista, eliminará seres humanos ou mesmo toda a vida orgânica como uma competição irritante para recursos. A ficção científica de hoje é susceptível de ser a realidade de amanhã.

Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 9 1 Essentialism about Natural Kinds Essentialism about natural kinds has three tenets. The first tenet is that all and only members of a natural kind have some essential properties. The second tenet is that these essential properties play a causal role. The third tenet is that they are explanatorily relevant. I examine the prospects of questioning these tenets and point out that arguing against the first and the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some of the grand debates of philosophy. But, at least if we restrict the scope of the discussion to the biological domain, the third tenet of kindessentialism could be questioned more successfully. It is not an easy task to pin down what is meant by essentialism about natural kinds (Putnam 1975; Kripke 1980). First, one can be essentialist about individuals and about kinds. I will not say anything here about essentialism regarding individuals. Maybe, as Kripke claims, specific individuals have essential properties, maybe not (on this important and complex question, see, for example, Robertson 1998; Hawthorne and Gendler 2000; Matthen 2003). Essentialism about individuals is logically independent from essentialism about kinds (see also Okasha 2002, 192). The question I am interested in is whether natural kinds have essential properties. Second, there are a number of potential definitions for essentialism about kinds. As I intend to argue against essentialism, I will use the most general of these. Richard Boyd identified a widespread and fairly strong version of essentialism, according to which natural kinds "must possess definitional essences that define them in terms of necessary and sufficient, intrinsic, unchanging, ahistorical properties" (Boyd 1999, 146). Essential properties in, say, chemistry may all be intrinsic, unchanging, and ahistorical. But it is not clear that all essential properties need to Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism about Natural Kinds Bence Nanay 8997_009.indd 175 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 176 B. Nanay satisfy any of these three requirements. In fact, a rather easy way of arguing against essentialism about at least some natural kinds-namely, biological kinds-is to point out that biological properties are extrinsic, historical, and change over time since biological entities are evolving over time. But it is unlikely that arguments of this kind will defeat essentialism about biological, natural kinds. A new wave of biological essentialists all seek to specify essential properties of biological kinds that are extrinsic, and yet are neither unchanging nor ahistorical.1 The simple argument from the observation that biological entities are evolving over time cannot be used to argue against these versions of biological essentialism. Thus, if we want a target that is worth arguing against, we need to weaken this strong definition of essentialism. As most of the new essentialists, I am also happy to go along with David Hull's characterization, according to which "each species is distinguished by one set of essential characteristics. The possession of each essential character is necessary for membership in the species, and the possession of all the essential characters sufficient" (1994, 313). I will use Hull's definition as my starting point for characterizing kind-essentialism in what follows.2 Third, essentialism about kinds is a complex thesis that goes beyond the simple claim that there are some properties that all and only members of a natural kind have in all possible worlds. Marc Ereshefsky specified three tenets of any version of essentialism about kinds: One tenet is that all and only the members of a kind have a common essence. A second tenet is that the essence of a kind is responsible for the traits typically associated with the members of that kind. For example, gold's atomic structure is responsible for gold's disposition to melt at certain temperatures. Third, knowing a kind's essence helps us explain and predict those properties typically associated with a kind. (Ereshefsky 2007, sec. 2.1) Most philosophers who, like Ereshefsky, argue against essentialism, only consider the first tenet. Proponents of essentialism also tend to be concerned only with this first tenet. In contrast, I would like to focus on the second and especially the third tenet. My claim is that questioning the second or third tenets may be a more promising way of resisting kind-essentialism. In short, a promising and so far almost completely unexplored anti-essentialist strategy would be to say that even if it turns out that "all and only the members of a kind have a common essence," this essence is unlikely to play any significant causal or explanatory role. 8997_009.indd 176 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 177 The plan for the essay is simple: I go through the three tenets of essentialism and explore which of them would be the easiest to question. My final response will be that arguing against the first and the second tenets of kind-essentialism would involve taking part in some of the grand debates of philosophy. But at least if we restrict the scope of the discussion to the biological domain, the third tenet of kind-essentialism could be questioned more successfully. 2 Questioning the First Tenet: All and Only the Members of a Kind Have a Common Essence I am not sure that the question whether "all and only the members of a kind have a common essence" can be settled. A rather straightforward way of arguing against the first tenet would be to use some general metaphysical considerations. The first tenet of kind-essentialism states that all and only members of a kind have a certain essential property: an essence. The crucial point is that 'property' here means "property-type." The set of essential properties that defines natural kinds is a set of essential property-types. The instantiation of each essential property-type is necessary for membership in the natural kind and the instantiation of all the essential property-types is sufficient. I pause to make the distinction between property-types and property-instances explicit. The term 'property' is ambiguous. It can mean universals: properties that can be present in two (or more) distinct individuals at the same time. But it can also mean tropes: abstract particulars that are logically incapable of being present in two (or more) distinct individuals at the same time (Williams 1953; Campbell 1981, 1990; Schaffer 2001; Simons 1994; Sanford manuscript). Suppose that the color of my neighbor's black car and my black car are indistinguishable. They still have different tropes. The blackness trope of my car is different from the blackness trope of my neighbor's car. These two tropes are similar but numerically distinct. Thus, the blackness of my car and the blackness of my neighbor's car are different properties. If, in contrast, we interpret properties as universals-or as I will refer to them, as property-types-then the two cars instantiate the very same property-type: blackness. Thus, depending on which notion of property we talk about, we have to give different answers to the question about whether the color-property of the two cars is the same or different. If by 'property' we mean "trope," then my car has a different (but similar) color-property-that is, color-trope-from my neighbor's. If, however, by 8997_009.indd 177 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 178 B. Nanay 'property' we mean "property-type," then my car has the very same property-that is, property-type-as my neighbor's. In the light of this distinction, the first tenet of essentialism about natural kinds can be broken down to the conjunction of two claims: (a) property-types exist, and (b) some property-types are essential propertytypes. Many anti-essentialist arguments question (b) while accepting (a) (e.g., Hull 1986, as far as the biological domain is concerned). I will focus on the more radical strategy of questioning (a) because, in sections 5 and 6, I will argue that (at least in the domain of biology) a strategy quite similar to this may be used in order to argue not against the first, but against the third tenet of essentialism about natural kinds. As the first tenet of kind-essentialism states that all and only members of a kind have a certain essential property-type, a straightforward way of arguing against this tenet is to question (a): to show that property-types do not exist and hence, a fortiori, essential property-types do not exist either. In other words, if we accept a version of nominalism, then there is a simple way of resisting any version of essentialism about natural kinds. If only particulars exist and property-types do not, then how could we even formulate essentialism about natural kinds? This would be a simple and straightforward argument against essentialism about natural kinds, but it is not clear that we have any reason to accept its main premise: that property-types do not exist. The grand debate between nominalism and realism is one of the oldest in philosophy and it has definitely not been resolved. Taking for granted the premise that there are no property-types would significantly weaken an anti-essentialist argument in the eyes of those who are not fully convinced by nominalist considerations. Further, we need to be a bit more careful about what version of trope nominalism the anti-essentialist strategy I outlined above needs to endorse. Many trope-nominalist accounts define property-types as sets or resemblance-classes of tropes. Thus, according to these accounts, although the existence of property-types in some sense reduces to the existence of tropes (and, as a result, in some sense they are not "real"), they do have mindindependent existence: there is a fact of the matter about whether a trope subsumes under a certain set or resemblance-class. The version of trope nominalism that would be needed to question (a) needs to be more radical than this: it cannot allow for there being a fact of the matter about whether a trope subsumes under a certain set or resemblance-class. If it did allow for this, then the essentialist view could be rephrased in terms of "essential" sets or "essential" resemblance-classes 8997_009.indd 178 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 179 of tropes. In order to block (a), the trope nominalist needs to claim that property-types are just our ways of grouping tropes: they do not have mind-independent existence (Nanay 2009, 2010a, 2011). But this is an even more controversial assumption for an anti-essentialist argument to rely on. But even if such a version of trope nominalism is a dubious premise to build our argument on, perhaps if we restrict the scope of our argument to the biological domain then the first tenet could be questioned successfully. 3 Questioning the First Tenet of Kind-Essentialism in the Biological Domain Biology has always been considered to be a problem case for essentialism or at least a potential exemption. According to the traditional "antiessentialist consensus" (Okasha 2002, 195; Walsh 2006, 325) among biologists and philosophers of biology, at least regarding biological kinds, essentialism is false (Dupré 1993, 2002; Hull 1965; Ghiselin 1974; Hacking 2007). Putnam and Kripke may be right about chemical kinds, but biological kinds do not have (and cannot have) any essential properties (Wilkerson 1995; Ellis 2001). But over the last several years, more and more philosophers have argued for a version of essentialism about biological kinds. Paul Griffiths, for example, argues that biological kinds have "essential relational properties"- not essential intrinsic properties-and claims that if we accept that essential properties can be relational, then all the traditional considerations against essentialism about biological kinds lose their appeal (Griffiths 1999). (For a similar claim, see Okasha 2002. The idea of using relational properties for defining biological kinds, not necessarily in an essentialist manner, comes from Matthen 1998; Millikan 1999; and Elder 1995.) Denis Walsh goes even further and claims that "recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence" for essentialism (2006, 425). In order to assess the merits of this new wave of essentialism about biological kinds, the traditional anti-essentialist arguments need to be reevaluated. There are anti-essentialist arguments that prove to be inconclusive. One such argument concerning essentialism about biological kinds, is the following (Hull 1965; for objections, see Sober 1980, 356; Okasha 2002, 195–196; Walsh 2006, 431). According to evolutionary theory, the present species have evolved from ancestral ones. Thus, species cannot have essences, as they are clearly capable of changing. This 8997_009.indd 179 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 180 B. Nanay argument may be taken to jeopardize a version of essentialism, one that takes kinds to be unchangeable, but it does not apply in the case of other versions of essentialism. Some other anti-essentialist considerations are not obviously inconclusive. The most important of these are based on the concept of "population thinking." Since using population thinking to argue against essentialism shares some important features with my own argument against the third tenet of essentialism in sections 5 and 6, I will spend some time trying to understand what population thinking is supposed to mean, and why it is assumed to be an effective weapon in the fight against essentialism. Population thinking has traditionally been the main consideration against essentialism about biological kinds. The strategy of philosophers with anti-essentialist convictions about biology has been to point out that since population thinking implies anti-essentialism and population thinking is the right way of thinking about biology, we have to be anti-essentialist about biology. This strategy can be attacked at two points. First, the essentialist could argue that population thinking is not the right attitude to take toward the biological domain. No philosophers or biologists seem to take this route. The second way of attacking the anti-essentialist strategy would be to deny that population thinking implies anti-essentialism. And in fact, with the rise of contemporary attempts to bring essentialism back in the domain of biology, it has been repeatedly argued that population thinking does not exclude essentialism. Thus, one can endorse population thinking and still agree with Putnam and Kripke about the essential properties of biological kinds. All of the recent attempts to resurrect essentialism about biological kinds find it important to show that their version of essentialism is consistent with population thinking (Walsh 2006, 432–433; Okasha 2002, 195–196). Paul Griffiths says explicitly that "it would be quite consistent to be a Darwinian [population-thinking] essentialist, given the right choice of essential properties" (Griffiths 1999, 210). Or, more explicitly: "Population thinking excludes essential intrinsic properties, but it does not exclude essential relational properties" (ibid.; cf. Okasha 2002). Whether these attempts to carve out an essentialist way of construing population thinking succeed depends on the way we interpret population thinking. Conversely, whether population thinking really gives us some reason to have doubts about essentialism about biological kinds also depends on the way we interpret population thinking. As both proponents and opponents of essentialism about biological kinds seem to rely on population thinking in 8997_009.indd 180 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 181 their arguments, it is important to examine what population thinking is and what it implies. My claim is that Ernst Mayr's influential idea of what makes the biological domain special, the idea of "population thinking," could, and should, be interpreted as a version of trope nominalism (Nanay 2010a). Here is Mayr's characterization of population thinking from 1959: "Individuals, or any kind of organic entities, form populations of which we can determine only the arithmetic mean and the statistics of variation. Averages are merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which the populations are composed have reality" (Mayr 1959, 326). Mayr contrasts population thinking with typological thinking, according to which "there are a limited number of fixed, unchangeable 'ideas' underlying the observed variability, with the eidos (idea) being the only thing that is fixed and real, while the observed variability has no . . . reality" (ibid.). The contrast Mayr makes is a very sharp one: population thinking and typological thinking are exclusive of each other (ibid., 326–327). Mayr's distinction between typological and population thinking may appear straightforward, but in fact it could be (and has been) interpreted in at least two ways. First, population thinking could be interpreted as an ontological claim about entities: only the individual is real, everything else is abstraction. There are various problems with this reading. If only the individual is real, then populations and species should be thought of as groups of individuals which, as groups, lack reality themselves. This would make much of post-Darwinian biology nonsensical from the population thinker's point of view. As Elliott Sober says: If [as Mayr claims] "only the individuals of which the populations are composed have reality," it would appear that much of population biology has its head in the clouds. The Lotka-Volterra equations, for example, describe the interactions of predator and prey populations. Presumably, population thinking, properly so called, must allow that there is something real over and above individual organisms. [It does not] embody a resolute and ontologically austere focus on individual organisms alone. (Sober 1980, 352) Even more problematic for this reading is the fact that Mayr himself is certainly not nominalist about populations and species (Mayr 1942, 120; Mayr 1963, 19). His dictum that "only the individuals . . . have reality" seems to flatly contradict his famous "biological species concept" which indeed attributes reality to populations and species. It is tempting to resolve this seeming contradiction by dismissing Mayr's claim about the importance of the individual in evolution as an exaggeration or even as "rather silly metaphysics" (Ariew 2008, 2).3 8997_009.indd 181 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 182 B. Nanay Elliott Sober chooses this route when he says that "describing a single individual is as theoretically peripheral to a populationist as describing the motion of a single molecule is to the kinetic theory of gases. In this important sense, population thinking involves ignoring individuals" (Sober 1980, 370). The conclusion he draws is that "population thinking endows individual organisms with more reality and with less reality than typological thinking attributes to them" (Sober 1980, 371). This conclusion prompted some to be "a little confused about which one, individuals or populations, are real" (Ariew 2008, 8). It also opened up the concept of population thinking to many diverging interpretations, some of which seems to contradict Mayr's original claims (Walsh 2006, 432–433; Griffiths 1999, 209–210). I argue that population thinking is an ontological claim about properties and not about entities. It is indeed a version of nominalism. However, it is not nominalism about entities, but about properties. In other words, Mayr advocated a version of trope nominalism: for the population thinker, only the property-instances, that is, tropes, are real. Property-types are not real. We have to be careful when formulating this claim. The population thinker presumably would not deny that groups of individual organisms do have properties and that these properties are real. A population of 431 geese has the property of having the population size of 431, for example, and this property seems very real indeed. The distinction I am making (and the distinction I believe Mayr was making) is not one between the properties of individuals and the properties of populations. Rather, it is between individual property-instances (or tropes) and property-types (or universals) that can be instantiated in many different entities. In short, the population thinker can acknowledge the existence of populations and species. These entities are real in the same way as individuals are real. And all of these entities have very real property-instances or tropes. What the population thinker denies is that there are property-types. My claim is that Mayr's provocative statement, according to which "averages are merely statistical abstractions; only the individuals of which the populations are composed have reality" should be read as "propertytypes are merely statistical abstractions; only the tropes of individuals (or of populations) have reality." Mayr's population thinking is a version of trope nominalism (see esp. Mayr 1959, 326, where he talks about the uniqueness of features, i.e., properties, and not the uniqueness of individual entities).4 We can now put together an argument against the first tenet of kindessentialism in the biological domain: (i) Population thinking is the right 8997_009.indd 182 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 183 way of thinking about the biological domain. (ii) Population thinking implies trope nominalism. (iii) Trope nominalism implies anti-essentialism about biological kinds. I have presented some considerations in favor of (ii) and (iii), but as yet have said nothing that would make us accept (i): that population thinking, that is, trope nominalism, would be the right way of thinking about the biological domain. And I am not sure what argument could be given in favor of (i), besides appealing to the authority of Ernst Mayr-without this premise, the argument collapses. In section 6, I will give an argument for the claim that biological property-types play no explanatory role in evolutionary explanations. Could we use this argument to establish (i)? Mayr's claim is much stronger than mine, as he denies the reality (not merely the explanatory relevance) of biological property-types: he claims that they are merely our statistical abstractions. Yet, depending on one's meta-metaphysical convictions, there may not be such a huge difference between these two versions of trope nominalism: Mayr's stronger version and the weaker "explanatory trope nominalism" I will argue for below. One could, after all, use the weaker claim that biological property-types are explanatorily superfluous and, with the help of the principle of parsimony, conclude that we have no reason to postulate their existence. But not everyone will find this last step unproblematic, and I do not want to argue that it is unproblematic. If someone believes that we can infer from the fact that something is explanatorily superfluous that it does not exist (as Mayr may have believed), then she will not find the distinction between my "explanatory trope nominalism" and Mayr's population thinking a very interesting one. She will probably not find the distinction between the first and the third tenet of kind-essentialism a meaningful one either. But if someone does not believe that explanatory irrelevance implies non-existence, then she will still have no reason to accept (i) and hence to accept the population-thinking inspired rejection of the first tenet of essentialism about biological kinds. The argument I considered in this section was unsuccessful in the end. But I will use its conceptual framework in the hopefully more successful argument against the third tenet of kind-essentialism, in sections 5 and 6. 4 Questioning the Second Tenet: Causal Responsibility The second tenet of kind-essentialism is about causal responsibility. As Ereshefsky says, "a kind's essence causes the other properties associated with that kind. The essence of the natural kind gold, for example, is gold's 8997_009.indd 183 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 184 B. Nanay atomic structure. . . . the atomic structure of gold causes pieces of gold to have the properties associated with that kind, such as dissolving in certain acids and conducting electricity" (forthcoming, 1). What we say about this second tenet depends on what we say about the relata and properties of (singular) causation. If one holds that propertytypes play a role in (singular) causation, then the second tenet of essentialism remains unscratched. But if one holds that property-types play no causal role-maybe because no properties play any causal role (Davidson 1967, 1970), or maybe because only property-instances (or tropes) play any causal role (Ehring 1997; Nanay 2009)-then we have reason to doubt the second tenet. But let us go through these considerations more slowly. The question is whether property-types play any role in causation. The first clarification we need to make when answering this question is whether it is about general or singular causation. Property-types play a clear and important role in general causal claims. If Fs cause Gs, then there is a property, in virtue of which Fs cause Gs: a property all Fs have in common (that is, a property-type all Fs have an instantiation of) and that, presumably, can account for why Fs cause Gs. But it is unclear whether property-types play a role in singular causation, and it could be argued that questions about causal relevance are questions about singular, not general, causation. There are two ways in which property-types can play a causal role. First, they may be part of what specifies the relata of causation. It is not clear what the relata of causation are. They may be events (Davidson 1967), facts (Mellor 1995), states of affairs (Armstrong 1997) or maybe tropes (Ehring 1997). Facts (or Kimian events) are specified in terms of property-types. Thus, if we accept that these are the relata of causation, then property-types will be causally relevant. But if we hold that the relata of causation are Davidsonian events or tropes, then property-types play no role in the specification of the relata of causation. Thus, we have no prima facie reason to accept that they are causally relevant. But even if we take (Davidsonian) events to be the relata of causation, a further question arises: what is it in virtue of which one event causes another? First, the obvious answer would be that an event causes another event in virtue of having an instantiation of a property-type: the sleeping pill I took last night made me fall asleep in virtue of some chemical property-type it had an instantiation of. If we accept this answer, then property-types will be very relevant causally. But there are other ways of answering this "in virtue" question. Donald Davidson famously denied that events cause other events in virtue of any 8997_009.indd 184 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 185 properties. As he memorably said: "If causal relations and causal powers inhere in particular events and objects, then the way those events and objects are described, and the properties we happen to employ to pick them out or characterize them, cannot affect what they cause. Naming the American invasion of Panama 'Operation Just Cause' does not alter the consequences of the event" (Davidson 1993, 8). In other words, properties play no role in causal relations-although they may be very important in causal explanations. Another, less radical, way of denying that events cause other events in virtue of having instantiations of certain property-types would be to say that events cause other events in virtue of having tropes. Properties, if what we mean by that is tropes, do play an important role in causation: events cause other events in virtue of them. But property-types do not play any role (Robb 1997; Nanay 2009). If we accept the Davidsonian or the trope answer to the "in virtue" question, then we can conclude that property-types are not causally relevant. But if property-types are not causally relevant, then essential property-types are not causally relevant either. But the second tenet of essentialism was that essences-that is, essential property-types-must be causally relevant. So, as in the case of the first tenet, we have a simple argument against kind-essentialism. Note, however, that this argument rests on three heavily contested premises about the nature of causation; in order to run this argument, we need to make three important assumptions. First, we need to take singular, and not general, causation to be where causal relevance lies. Second, we need to take the relata of causation to be (Davidsonian) events (or tropes). And finally, we need to hold that events cause other events in virtue of having tropes (and not in virtue of having instantiations of propertytypes), or we need to endorse a Davidsonian view on the properties of causation. Few people hold all of these premises. Hence, as in the case of the argument against the first tenet of kind-essentialism, this argument is also based on premises concerning the nature of causal relations that many would question from the start. 5 Questioning the Third Tenet: Explanatory Relevance The third tenet of kind-essentialism was the following: "Knowing the essence of a kind . . . allows us to predict and explain the properties associated with the members of a kind. For instance, the atomic structure of gold provides the basis for explaining why gold conducts electricity, and it allows us to predict that a particular chunk of gold will conduct electricity" 8997_009.indd 185 6/9/2011 6:32:15 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 186 B. Nanay (Ereshefsky, forthcoming, 1). Or as Philip Kitcher puts it, "natural kinds are distinguished by some special underlying feature that explains the behavior of members of this kind-like atomic number, for example, in the case of the elements" (Kitcher 2007, 294; Dupré 2002, 176–181; Wilson et al. forthcoming). (See Platts 1983 for a classic summary and Okasha 2002, 203 for some critical remarks.) If we can show that this third tenet of essentialism is unjustified, then we have a good way of arguing against essentialism per se. As in the case of the first and second tenets, I find it unlikely that we can give a general argument against the third tenet-any such argument would need to presuppose a rather specific and, as a result, heavily contested theory of explanation. But I do think that at least as far as the biological domain is concerned, we are in a good position to question the third tenet. We have seen that it is unlikely that we would find some strong reason to reject the very idea that biological property-types are "real." But we may be able to find an argument for the claim that biological property-types play no explanatory role in biology. They may be "real" and exist independently of us, but if they are explanatorily superfluous, this is enough to undermine the third tenet of essentialism about biological kinds. I will give an argument in favor of this claim in the next section. 6 Questioning the Third Tenet of Kind-Essentialism in the Biological Domain My claim is that property-types are explanatorily superfluous in evolutionary explanations. All the explanatory work is done by property-instances. This claim needs to be clarified and qualified at a number of points. First, I want to remain silent about whether property-types play any explanatory role in non-biological, non-evolutionary explanations. Maybe they do. When we are trying to explain why a certain gold sample melts at 1,948° F, we can explain this by referring to a property-type all gold samples have an instantiation of (maybe the property-type of having a certain atomic structure). In this explanation, we have a property-type as part of the explanans. The property-type may or may not be causally relevant, but it is explanatorily relevant. My claim is that this is not the case in evolutionary explanations, where the explanans refers only to property-instances. Second, it is important to note that I do not claim that using tropes instead of property-types in the metaphysical framework increases the 8997_009.indd 186 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 187 explanatory power of evolutionary theory. After all, it has been argued, convincingly, that statements about tropes and statements about instantiations of property-types are notional variants: one can always be rephrased in terms of the other (Daly 1997). All I claim is that adding biological property-types to a trope nominalist metaphysical framework does not increase the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. Hence, propertytypes are explanatorily superfluous. I said that in the domain of biology, property-types do not do any explanatory work and property-instances do all the work. An important clarification about this claim: I talked about the biological domain, biological property-types and biological tropes. But it is not clear where the boundaries of the biological domain lie. Is DNA part of the biological domain or is it already part of the domain of chemistry? Also, there are many different kinds of explanation (Van Fraassen 1980). Saying that property-types play no role in any of them would be a difficult claim to argue for. So I will restrict the scope of my claim in the following manner: property-types play no role in evolutionary explanations. When I talk about the explanatory role (or lack thereof) biological property-types play, what I mean is explanatory role in an evolutionary explanation. Biological kinds are evolved kinds and biological entities are evolved entities. Thus, if a property-type is supposed to play some explanatory role in biology, like the atomic structure of gold explains why it melts at certain temperature, then, as the explanation of the properties of evolved entities is an evolutionary explanation, this means that this property-type is supposed to play at least some role in evolutionary explanations. I will attempt to show that this is not so: no property-type plays any role in evolutionary explanations.5 Let us go back to what the third tenet of essentialism entails. Ereshefsky's example is that "the atomic structure of gold provides the basis for explaining why gold conducts electricity, and it allows us to predict that a particular chunk of gold will conduct electricity" (Ereshefsky, forthcoming, p. 1). Philip Kitcher uses a similar example: "natural kinds are distinguished by some special underlying feature that explains the behavior of members of this kind – like atomic number, for example, in the case of the elements" (Kitcher 2007, p. 294). They both take their examples from chemistry. But what would be the equivalent of these claims in biology? What is important from our point of view is that both Ereshefsky and Kitcher talks about the explanation of the behavior of a particular token member of the kind (or a token chunk of gold). Hence, in the domain of biology, an essential property would need to be able to explain why specific 8997_009.indd 187 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 188 B. Nanay token organisms have the traits they do. And, luckily, a lot has been written about exactly this kind of explanation. In fact, one of the most important recent debates in philosophy of biology is about whether natural selection can explain why specific organisms have the traits they have. The view that selection can play a role in explaining why organisms have the traits they have, has been defended by Karen Neander (1995a,b; see also Millikan 1990; Nanay 2005, 2010b; Matthen 1999). On the other side of the trench the central figure is Elliott Sober (1984a, 1995; see also Walsh 1998; Dretske 1988, 1990; Pust 2001; Lewens 2001; Cummins 1975; and Stegmann 2010). Sober claims that selection is a negative force: it does not create; it only destroys (Sober 1984a, chapter 5). Random mutations create a variety of traits (or genetic plans) and selection eliminates some of these, but the explanation of the traits of one of these individuals is provided by random mutation and inheritance (and some developmental factors), not by the elimination process. Selection can explain why certain individuals were eliminated and it may also explain why a trait is present (or widespread) in a population, but it cannot explain the traits of specific individuals that were not eliminated. Karen Neander argues against the validity of this argument, at least as far as cumulative selection is concerned (Neander 1995a). After a couple of rounds of exchanges without any sign of rapprochement, one gets the sense that there is some sort of miscommunication between Neander and Sober. One gets the sense that the opponents and the advocates of this argument may not mean the same by the term 'selection'. My aim here is not to decide who is right in this debate (I attempted to do this in Nanay 2005 and Nanay 2010b). My aim is to show that regardless of which of these two views about the explanatory power of selection we accept, we can conclude that property-types do not play any role in explaining why token organisms have the token traits they have. Take Sober's position first. He has argued repeatedly that the theory of natural selection can only be formulated with the help of property-types, that is, property types play a very important role in the theory of natural selection (most explicitly in Sober 1981, but also in Sober 1980 and Sober 1984). As he says in a paper co-authored with Richard Lewontin: "selection theory is about genotypes not genotokens" (Sober-Lewontin 1982, p. 172; see also Sober-Lewontin 1983, p. 649). And even more explicitly: "to understand what it means to talk about the selection of genes, organisms, or groups, one must quantify over properties" (Sober 1981, p. 162). 8997_009.indd 188 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 189 This may sound like bad news for my claim that property-types do not play a role in explaining why token organisms have the traits they have, but remember that Sober maintains that what explains why token organisms have the traits they have is not selection. What does this explanatory work, according to Sober is random mutation and inheritance (and, presumably, some developmental factors) (Sober 1995). And mutation, inheritance and development should be taken to be token phenomena here: the mutation in a token ancestor of the organism, inheritance from one token organism to another and the developmental processes of the organism are all processes that operate on token traits. In short, if we take Sober's side in the grand debate about the explanatory power of selection, we can conclude that property-types do not play any role in explaining why specific token organisms have the traits they have. But what if we take Neander's side, who claims that cumulative selection does explain why specific token organisms have the traits they have? Here, the answer is more complicated. First, it is important to note that Neander's claim is that cumulative selection can explain why specific token organisms have the traits they have. And here is what she means by cumulative selection: what makes cumulative selection cumulative: that "the probable outcome of future [rounds of selection] depends on the results of previous [rounds of selection] (Neander 1995b, p. 584). It could be pointed out that this conception is much stronger than what Sober means by cumulative selection (most famously in his discussion of the 'selection toy' [Sober 1984, p. 99])-and this may explain the miscommunication between Sober and Neander. But what is important from the point of view of the present argument is that Neander's way of interpreting cumulative selection does not presuppose any talk of property-types. Take the (uniparental) organism, a, whose neck is 12 cm long. It has two offspring, b and c, with 14 and 10 cm long neck, respectively. As organism b gets to reach branches with leaves that organism c cannot, it gets to survive, whereas organism c starves to death. Organism b also has two offspring, d and e, with 16 and 12 cm long neck and d survives, whereas e starves to death. This is cumulative selection in Neander's sense: the traits of the organisms change from generation to generation, not just the trait frequencies. Further, the fact that b survives and c dies influences neck size of the next generation. As it is b (and not c) who gets to survive, the starting point for the variation in neck size for the next generation is 14 cm (and not 10 cm). This way of thinking about cumulative selection explains the token traits of specific organisms in terms of past selection of token traits. It 8997_009.indd 189 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 190 B. Nanay explains why organism d has such a long neck by pointing out that d's parent, b had longer neck than c and got to survive as a result. The difference between traits that are responsible for the death of some organisms and the survival of others is a difference between token traits of specific organisms (i.e., the difference between b's 14 cm long neck and c's 10 cm long neck) and not a difference between abstract trait types. A possible objection: Couldn't we refer to the trait tokens of specific organisms as instantiations of a trait type, say, the trait type of being 12 cm long? We could, but this would have very problematic consequences. An instantiation of the trait type of being 12 cm long was responsible for a's survival, but another instantiation of the same trait type is responsible for e's death (whose neck is also 12 cm long). Hence, it would be problematic to take what is responsible for the death or survival of organisms to be trait types, because instantiations of the very same trait type are responsible for death in one generation and survival in another. What is responsible for the death of e and the survival of a are not trait types, but trait tokens (see Nanay 2010a for a more detailed version of this argument as well as for some clarifications that I could not include here). But then this way of thinking about selection does not appeal to any property-types. Hence, if selection, interpreted in this way, can explain why specific token organisms are the way they are, then it is still true that property-types do not explain why specific token organisms are the way they are. Regardless of which side of the debate over the explanatory power of selection we choose, it remains true that property-types do not play any explanatory role in explaining why specific token organisms are the way they are. Of course not all evolutionary explanations are selective explanations. I was focusing on the explanatory role of selection above, but similar arguments could be given with regards to non-selective evolutionary processes, such as the founding effect. Like selection, founding effect can also be fully accounted for by individual level processes, such as the specific evolutionary history of specific organism, without appealing to any trait types. Thus, we have no reason to attribute any explanatory role to any property-type.6 My conclusion is then that even if we do not have any reason to deny that there may be some properties, that is, property-types, that all and only members of a biological kind possess in all possible worlds, if the argument I presented in this section is correct, we need to conclude that these properties, that is, property-types, although they may exist, play no explanatory role for the simple reason that no property-type plays any explanatory role 8997_009.indd 190 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints Three Ways of Resisting Essentialism 191 in the biological domain. Thus, essentialism about biological kinds fails not because of the first (or the second), but because of the third tenet. The problem is not with the existence of essential property-types, but with their explanatory role.7 The conclusion, then, is that we should be skeptical about the third tenet of kind-essentialism in the biological domain. Putnam and Kripke may be right about chemical kinds, but essentialism is unlikely to be the correct view about biological kinds. Acknowledgments I am grateful for comments by Peter Godfrey-Smith, Jason Rhein, Karen Neander, David Sanford, Marc Lange, David Papineau, Roberta Balarin, James Young, and Jeff Foss on an earlier version of this paper. I presented this paper at the Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference and at the British Columbia Philosophy Conference. I am grateful for my commentators as well as the audiences. This paper grew out of the discussion at my PhD seminar on scientific realism at Syracuse University in fall 2007. I'm also grateful for the feedback of my students in my seminar on natural kinds in fall 2008, and for the tough criticism from my colleagues at the mysterious SPDMBABWS Society. Notes 1. Griffiths 1999; Boyd 1999; Okasha 2002. See Walsh 2006 and Devitt 2008 for a different way of resurrecting essentialism about natural kinds, and Ereshefsky (Manuscript) for objections to both projects. 2. There may be ways of weakening essentialism even more by denying that essentialism implies that all and only the members of a kind must have a kind-specific essence (Boyd 1999). I will say a bit more, in sections 5 and 6, about the relevance to such accounts of the argument I present in this paper. 3. It is worth noting that one way of defending Mayr's position from worries of this kind would be to embrace the recently popular view that populations are individuals and members of populations are the parts of this individual (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1978). 4. It is also worth noting that as Mayr considers property-types as "merely statistical abstractions," he denies that they have mind-independent existence-they do not have "reality," as he puts it. So Mayr's version of trope nominalism is of the radical kind I considered at the end of section 2. 8997_009.indd 191 6/9/2011 6:32:16 PM Q Campbell-Carving Nature at its Joints 192 B. Nanay 5. It is not an easy task to give an exact definition for what counts as an evolutionary explanation, but what I mean by this concept is quite broad: an evolutionary explanation is an explanation where the explanandum can be pretty much anything (although most of the time it is the apparent teleology of a property), but the explanans is an evolutionary process. Evolutionary processes, in turn, are defined conjunctively to include selection, founding effect, etc. 6. To give an example of a property-type that is considered to be a good candidate for a property that all and only members of a species have in all possible worlds: the property of being a member of a population with such and such distinctive evolutionary history (Griffiths 1999; Okasha 2002; the idea, again, comes from the anti-essentialist Matthen 1998). But everything this property-type can explain can be explained by individual-level processes, such as the specific evolutionary history of a specific organism, without appealing to any trait-types. 7. Richard Boyd argued that we can give an even weaker formulation of essentialism than the one we have considered so far. More precisely, essentialism does not necessarily imply that all and only the members of a natural kind must have a kind-specific essence. According to his "homeostatic property cluster theory," the members of a kind share a cluster of similar properties, but no property is necessary for membership in this kind (Boyd 1999). Boyd's "homeostatic property cluster theory" is quite complex and I do not intend to give a definitive argument against it. But we may be able to use the considerations above to make the following conditional claim. Boyd explicitly states that "the homeostatic clustering of properties . . . is causally important" (1999, 143). If this is to be understood in such a way that it is also explanatorily relevant, and if the "homeostatic clustering of properties" is supposed to be understood as a type that can have a number of different token instantiations, then Boyd's view contradicts the considerations I presented above in favor of the claim that property-types play no role in biological explanations. References Ariew, A. 2008. Population thinking. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Biology, ed. M. Ruse. 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the hegemony of psychopathy Before you start to read this book, take this moment to think about making a donation to punctum books, an independent non-profit press, @ https://punctumbooks.com/support/ If you're reading the e-book, you can click on the image below to go directly to our donations site. Any amount, no matter the size, is appreciated and will help us to keep our ship of fools afloat. Contributions from dedicated readers will also help us to keep our commons open and to cultivate new work that can't find a welcoming port elsewhere. Our adventure is not possible without your support. Vive la open-access. Fig. 1. Hieronymus Bosch, Ship of Fools (1490–1500) The Hegemony of Psychopathy Lajos Brons Brainstorm Books Santa Barbara, California The hegemony of psychopathy. Copyright © 2017 Lajos Brons. This work carries a Creative Commons by-nc-sa 4.0 International license, which means that you are free to copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format, and you may also remix, transform, and build upon the material, as long as you clearly attribute the work to the authors and editors (but not in a way that suggests the authors or punctum books endorses you and your work), you do not use this work for commercial gain in any form whatsoever, and that for any remixing and transformation, you distribute your rebuild under the same license. http://creativecommons. org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ First published in 2017 by Brainstorm Books A division of punctum books, Earth, Milky Way www.punctumbooks.com isbn-13: 978-1-947447-16-5 (print) isbn-13: 978-1-947447-17-2 (epdf) lccn: 2017952337 Library of Congress Cataloging Data is available from the Library of Congress Book design: Kyra Curry, Kristen McCants, & Jessica Morales Cover design: Athena Tan Cover image: Chad Person, "Kraken," 2012 Contents Preface • 13 1. The Holocaust • 17 2. Psychopathy • 25 Definitions • 29 Signs of Cultural Psychopathy • 31 3. Hegemony • 35 The Mass Media and the Culture Industry • 41 Mainstream Economics • 45 The (Self-)Corruption of Critique • 55 Education for Compliance • 62 Summary of the Foregoing • 67 4. The War of Position • 69 A Brief Utopian Interlude • 71 Some Tactical Considerations • 75 The Monstrosity of Violence • 78 An Uneven and Unending Struggle • 84 To "suffer when others do" • 90 Epilogue • 97 References • Figures, Tables, & Boxes Figures Figure 1: A Less Humanoid Centaur • 37 Tables Table 1: Eight Concepts of Empathy • 20 Table 2: Four Factors of Psychopathy • 26 Table 3: The Affective Dimension of Psychopathy • 28 Table 4: The Interpersonal and Lifestyle Dimensions of Psychopathy • 29 Boxes Box 1: The Other / Othering • 22 Box 2: Power / Authority • 38 Box 3: Schools of Economics • 47 Box 4: Realism and Anti-realism • 60–61 Box 5: Gender and Empathy / Care • 72 Box 6: On Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality • 87 Box 7: The Benevolent World-Exploder • For James. Preface Some people- such as Johan Norberg, Steven Pinker, and Hans Rosling- believe that the world is a much nicer place than it used to be and continues to get better and better.1 Such optimistic claims are supported by a rather selective use of data and indicators of progress, however. Sure, some things have gotten better. Music, for example, although I accept the possibility that not everyone shares my enthusiasm for the proliferation of extreme and experimental genres of underground music of the last decades. And the personal computer I'm using to type these words is a lot more convenient than the mechanical typewriter I used as a child. Indeed, we have more and nicer stuff, but many of us are forced to work longer hours, while real wages have declined almost everywhere. Inequality within and between countries is on the rise. Job satisfaction has been destroyed by excessive bureaucracy and a culture of distrust. Depression and other mental disorders have become the number one health problem. Electronic and camera surveillance is becoming ever more pervasive. Welfare programs are cut back and coupled to increasingly repressive and demeaning measures. Nothing is safe from markets and marketing. Universities and hospitals have become factories. Racism and other kinds of intolerance never disappeared and even seem to be on the rise again. Politics have devolved into a circus controlled by the super-rich. And catastrophic climate change is looming. The world is not becoming a 1 Steven Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined (New York: Viking, 2011). Johan Norberg, Progress: Ten Reasons to Look Forward to the Future (London: Oneworld, 2016). Hans Rosling is best known from a series of interesting ted Talks available on YouTube. the hegemony of psychopathy 14 better place; by any standard that matters, it's getting worse. Optimism is ideologically motivated self-deception. As a child of the 1970s, I was raised on a diet of optimistic belief in progress. The world would move towards social justice and a reduction of human suffering. The future would offer greater equality between social classes, genders, ethnic groups, and peoples. Rather naively, I experienced the 1980s as a mere temporary setback- soon the world would get back on track. It took a few decades of further destruction before I finally lost my optimism to disillusionment and anger. In her latest book, Martha Nussbaum makes the silly and somewhat offensive claim that anger involves a desire to see the wrongdoer suffer.2 If she would be right, then a mother who is angered by her child would want that child to suffer, but while virtually all parents are angry at their children on many occasions, very few would want their children to suffer. And in case of the anger that permeates this book, Nussbaum's claim could not be further from the truth: it is the persistence of massive suffering that made me angry in the first place, and that anger is related to a strong desire for less suffering, not more. It is that desire that motivates this book. Most of (the first draft of) this essay was written in the Fall of 2015, but some parts have been lifted- albeit in significantly altered form- from earlier work. Some sentences about "othering" in the first chapter come from "Othering, an Analysis."3 In the second chapter, Box 2 (on power/authority) as well as a few other sentences come from "Anarchism as Metaphilosophy."4 Most of the section "Education for Compliance" in the same chapter and some other sentences and paragraphs in that chapter are lifted from an unpublished talk given in 2013, "Truth, Rhetoric, and Critical Thinking."5 And there are a few sentences in the last section of the fourth chapter that also can be found in "Facing Death from a Safe Distance: 2 Martha Nussbaum, Anger and Forgiveness: Resentment, Generosity, Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 3 Lajos Brons, "Othering, an Analysis," Transcience: A Journal of Global Studies 6.1 (2015): 69–90. 4 Brons, "Anarchism as Metaphilosophy," The Science of Mind 53 (2015): 139–58. 5 The full text of this talk is available at my website: www.lajosbrons.net. preface 15 Saṃvega and Moral Psychology."6 The epilogue, on the other hand, is newer- it was added in July 2016. I want to express my deep gratitude to everyone who took the effort to read an earlier version of this essay and comment on it. Many of the comments I received were very helpful in improving it. Because I didn't write this essay just for an "academic" audience, I was especially pleased with the many thoughtful comments I received from "non-academics" (i.e., people who do not work in science, broadly understood). One recurring comment surprised me, however, and is worth mentioning here. Some readers appeared to have the idea that a reference to some author implies broad agreement with that author. To avoid misunderstanding, I want to emphasize here that this is not the case. For example, Robert Nozick's short paper on the Holocaust plays an important role in the first chapter (and returns in the last),7 but this by no means implies that I share his views on social and political philosophy (for which he is far more famous). The same applies to various other authors mentioned in this essay: references are to particular texts or even to particular ideas or quotes in those texts, never to whole oeuvres. In addition to these readers of earlier drafts, there are a few other people who I would like to thank: my students, for continuously forcing me to rethink my arguments and explanations; Takashi Iida, whose support enables my position on the academic fringe and thus also made it possible for me to write this essay (but who has not read a word of it yet); Ka Ketelmug for Figure 1; and Eileen Joy and everyone else at punctum books for publishing this "spontaneous act of scholarly combustion."8 Most of all, I want to thank my wife Tomoko for regularly reminding me that philosophy is useless (and for allowing me to be 6 Brons, "Facing Death from a Safe Distance: Saṃvega and Moral Psychology," Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23 (2016): 83–128. 7 Robert Nozick, "The Holocaust," in The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 236–42. 8 "Spontaneous acts of scholarly combustion" is a slogan on punctum books' website. It also describes very well how I think of this little book and was one of my reasons for choosing punctum to publish it. the hegemony of psychopathy 16 part of her life), and our daughter Nagi for being a source of joy in an increasingly dystopian world. Tokyo, September 2016. 17 1 The Holocaust The Holocaust has received surprisingly little attention from social and political philosophers. This is surprising because the scale and extent of the atrocities involved in the Holocaust should be impossible to ignore. If we humans can do that, then that makes a difference- or should make a difference- for our beliefs about the ideal society, for example. At the very least, we should want to organize society to avoid any recurrence. Among the very few philosophical texts that explicitly deal with the Holocaust, three stand out as especially important- at least, in my opinion. These three are Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem, Norman Geras's The Contract of Mutual Indifference, and Robert Nozick's "The Holocaust".1 The last- at a mere 7 pages- is by far the shortest of the three, but by no means the least important. Nozick argues that after the Holocaust, "mankind has fallen" and "humanity has lost its claim to continue".2 Of course, he doesn't deny or even play down the many other horrendous atrocities committed by men, but he maintains that the scale and extent of the Holocaust is such that it "alone would have been enough", and that "the Holocaust sealed the situation and made it patently clear."3 Nozick imagines alien observers, visitors from another galaxy, looking at human history: 1 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963). Norman Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference: Political Philosophy After the Holocaust (London: Verso, 1998). Robert Nozick, "The Holocaust," in The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 236–42. 2 Nozick, "The Holocaust," 238. 3 Nozick, "The Holocaust," 238. the hegemony of psychopathy 18 It would not seem unfitting to them, I think, if that story came to an end, if the species they see with that history ended, destroying itself in nuclear warfare or otherwise failing to be able to continue. These observers would see the individual tragedies involved, but they would not see . . . any further tragedy in the ending of the species. That species, the one that has committed that, has lost its worthy status.4 Nozick goes on to ask himself whether there is anything we can do to "redeem ourselves." He suggests that perhaps, we need to change our own nature, transforming ourselves into beings who are unhappy and who suffer when others do, or at least into beings who suffer when we inflict suffering on others or cause them to suffer, or when we stand by and allow the infliction of suffering.5 The English noun "compassion" comes from Latin "com-patī" (through Old French), which literally means "to suffer with." Hence, etymologically, to have compassion for someone is to suffer with that someone, to share their suffering. This is the kind of compassion that Nozick points at in the above quote. A compassionate being- in this sense- is a being that suffers when others do, and therefore, if Nozick's call for "redemption" makes sense, we should be(come) compassionate beings. Compassion should not be confused with pity, although the two are somewhat similar. Pitying someone or feeling sorry for someone is not the same as suffering with someone. Pity is inherently hierarchical- even patronizing, perhaps- while compassion is not. Compassion is an aspect or variant of empathy, which has become a prominent research theme in social and moral psychology as well as in ethics and the philosophy of mind. For example, the social psychologist Daniel Batson mentions "compassion" as an alternative denotation of what he calls "empathic concern,"6 an other-oriented 4 Nozick, "The Holocaust," 238–39. 5 Nozick, "The Holocaust," 240. 6 C. Daniel Batson, "The Things Called Empathy: Eight Related but Distinct the holocaust 19 emotion in agreement with the perceived welfare of someone in need.7 Within the burgeoning research on empathy, "empathy" itself is not a univocal concept, however. In addition to his own notion of empathic concern, Batson distinguishes seven others.8 Table 1 summarizes them.9 As Batson points out, the proliferation of concepts of "empathy" is partially due to the fact that the concept is brought in to explain two very different things: knowing what another person is thinking or feeling, and responding with care to the suffering of another person. Different mental capacities figure in these explanations, and consequently, the eight concepts of empathy in Table 1 are not just different concepts, but describe different (albeit related) capacities as well. Perhaps, rather than as concepts of empathy, they are better understood as facets or varieties of empathy. The eight varieties of empathy play different explanatory roles, but also differ in other respects such as the degree to which they are controlled or automatic and their self / other orientation. For example, perspective taking and simulation are both controlled processes while motor mimicry and sympathy are more or less automatic. Perspective taking and simulation differ from each other in their orientation: the former is other-oriented, while the latter is self-oriented. Empathic concern and empathic distress differ in the same way: the former is other-oriented, while the latter is self-oriented. Furthermore, many of these varieties of empathy are more or less independent abilities, and therefore, having an ability or deficiency with regards to one (or more) of these kinds of empathy doesn't necessarily imply having abilities or deficiencies with regards to the others. Some people are very good at simulation, for example, but are incapable of perspective taking (or even of understanding the difference between the two). People on the autism spectrum tend to be less proficient in some of the lower-numbered kinds of empathy, Phenomena," in The Social Neuroscience of Empathy, ed. Jean Decety and William John Ickes (Cambridge, ma: mit Press, 2009), 3–15. 7 Batson, The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, nj: Erlbaum, 1991). Batson, Altruism in Humans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 8 Batson, "The Things Called Empathy." 9 Neither the terminology nor the descriptions in Table 1 are completely identical to Batson's. the hegemony of psychopathy 20 Table 1: Eight Concepts of Empathy Concept of Empathy Short Description 1 cognitive empathy knowing the other's mental state (i.e., what someone else is thinking or feeling). 2 motor mimicry mimicking the other's facial expression, posture, and / or motor action. 3 sympathy (emotional contagion) coming to feel as the other (i.e., matching emotions). 4 projection projecting oneself in the other's situation. 5 perspective taking imagining what / how the other is thinking / feeling. 6 simulation imagining what / how one would think / feel in the other's situation. 7 empathic distress feeling distress at witnessing the other's suffering. 8 empathic concern (compassion) feeling for the other who is suffering. but often have no deficiencies with regards to empathic concern (although this is different for people with "full-fledged" autism). For psychopaths, narcissists, or people with an anti-social personality disorder, on the other hand, a deficiency in empathic concern (and distress) can go hand in hand with "normal" capacity for some or most of the other varieties of empathy. While the kind of empathy that matters for Nozick's redemption is just the eighth, empathic concern, many of the varieties of empathy distinguished by Batson relate to the Holocaust in a different way. Norman Geras argues that post-Holocaust society is built on a foundation of "mutual indifference,"10 that is, a widespread deficiency in empathic concern (and distress), perspective taking, and simulation (although he doesn't use these terms), but the Holocaust itself was made possible by selectively taking these deficiencies to their climax. The opposite of compassion is psychopathy, but the antipode of empathy in general is "othering." The list of atrocities committed by men since the end of the Holocaust is long and depressing. For example, the Yugoslav Wars 10 Geras, The Contract of Mutual Indifference. the holocaust 21 of the 1990s are less than two decades in our past, and continue to shape the region. The viciousness with which former friends and neighbors attacked each other calls for explanations and instilled in many a need to make sense of what happened. Reflecting on the war, Slavenka Drakulić wrote: I understand now that nothing but "otherness" killed Jews, and it began with naming them, by reducing them to the other. Then everything became possible. Even the worst atrocities like concentration camps or the slaughtering of civilians in Croatia or Bosnia.11 Othering is a form of dehumanization. It is the reduction of the other from other human being to mere (faceless) thing. More technically, othering is the construction and identification of the self or in-group and the other or out-group in mutual, unequal opposition by attributing relative inferiority and / or radical alienness to the other / out-group.12 (See Box 1.) By reducing people to mere things, anything becomes possible. SS Obersturmbannführer Adolf Eichmann, one of the chief organizers of the Holocaust, was not just not thinking- as Hannah Arendt famously argued- but he was notthinking about non-humans.13 He was a bureaucrat manipulating numbers and symbols on paper. That's the limit of negative empathy- reducing the other to something non-human- then indeed, everything becomes possible.14 By implication, even if Nozick's call for redemption sounds just a tad too religious for your preferences, his (implicitly) suggested link between empathy and atrocity is not that far-fetched. Perhaps we do not need compassion (and other kinds of empathy) to redeem ourselves, but we certainly need it to avoid recurrence of the Holocaust 11 Slavenka Drakulić, The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of the War (New York: Norton, 1993), 145. 12 Lajos Brons, "Othering, an Analysis," Transcience: A Journal of Global Studies 6.1 (2015): 69–90. 13 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem. 14 Simon Baron-Cohen suggests to substitute the term "empathy erosion" for "evil," and argues that "empathy erosion arises from people turning other people into objects". Baron-Cohen, The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty (New York: Basic Books, 2011), 6. the hegemony of psychopathy 22 Box 1: The Other / Othering In her introduction to The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir wrote that "the category of the Other is as fundamental as consciousness itself" and that "no group ever defines itself without simultaneously positing the Other facing itself."15 The focus of her book was on women as Other. Throughout most of history women have been depicted as weak, passive, irrational, emotional, and so forth, and men have defined themselves in opposition to that. In Orientalism, Edward Said showed that the self-identification of the West contra the East takes place in nearly identical terms.16 Such processes of unequal identity construction are called "Othering." Othering is the identification of one's own group in opposition to others or other groups in such a way that one's own group turns out to be superior. Constructing the other as inferior or backward justifies exclusion and oppression. However, the main purpose of such unequal identity construction is self-affirmation. People need a more or less positive self-image, and the easiest way to achieve that is to construct one's own identity and the identity of the social groups one belongs to as superior.17 and to end the history of (in-)human atrocity. Unfortunately, we are moving in the opposite direction: rather than compassion, cultural psychopathy is spreading. And the consequences thereof do not just include atrocities, but also the ongoing destruction of environments, communities, countries, and almost everything else most of us care about. Of course, I'm not claiming that "psychopathy" explains everything that is wrong in the world. Nor am I dismissing or even devaluing the many acts of compassion that occur and have occurred in any age. What I will be arguing in this essay is that psychopathy as a cultural phenomenon is one of the most destructive forces in the history of mankind, and that this cultural psychopathy has become "hegemonic," which has important implications for any attempt at a remedy. 15 Simone De Beauvoir, Le Deuxième Sexe (Paris: Gallimard, 1949), 18. My translation. 16 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978). 17 See, for example, Fritz Heider, The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations (New York: Wiley, 1958), and David K. Sherman and Geoffrey L. Cohen, "The Psychology of Self-Defense: Self-Affirmation Theory," Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 38 (2006): 183–242. the holocaust 23 Before proceeding to substantiate these claims (in the following chapters) it should be noted that my claim is closely related to Jean Twenge and Keith Campbell's claim that narcissism has become epidemic.18 Narcissism shares most of its diagnostic indicators with psychopathy (see next chapter), and a cultural trend becoming epidemic is more or less a consequence of its being hegemonic (see the chapter "Hegemony"). Nevertheless, I disagree with both terms in Twenge's and Campbell's cultural "diagnosis." Firstly, the diagnosis "narcissism" is itself symptomatic for what they and I are diagnosing: it focuses too much on the self, thus downgrading how selves relate to others (i.e., empathy). Secondly, the term "epidemic" falsely suggests that this is a natural phenomenon and obscures its political dimension. The hegemony of psychopathy is as much a political as a cultural phenomenon. And even if my political preferences are somewhat left of center, the hegemony of psychopathy is not just a problem for the left. Psychopathy as a cultural phenomenon also conflicts with the teachings of all of the "World Religions," and because it destroys community, it should concern the communitarian right as much as it should concern the left. Consequently, although the hegemony of psychopathy is also a political problem, it is not a problem for particular political ideologies or organizations- it is a problem for mankind. 18 Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Atria, 2009). 2 Psychopathy This is obviously not an essay in clinical psychology or forensic psychiatry, and it should be equally obvious that when I write about "psychopathy as a cultural phenomenon" I am not using the term "psychopathy" in its clinical sense.1 Nevertheless, my use of the term is not unrelated, and to explain what I mean by "psychopathy" it is useful to look at the clinical use of the term first. Research on psychopathy is dominated by Hervey Cleckley and Robert Hare. The first more or less defined the modern understanding of the disorder in The Mask of Sanity.2 The second converted Cleckley's case-study-based construct into something that can actually be measured and tested by means of his Hare Psychopathy Checklist.3 Cleckley listed 21 (in 1941) or 16 (in 1976) characteristics of the psychopathic personality, on the basis of which Hare developed a checklist to score 20 items. By means of factor analysis 1 It can be debated whether there is such a thing as "psychopathy in its clinical sense." Psychopathy is not listed as such in recent editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (dsm), but as "antisocial personality disorder." The existence of widely accepted diagnostic criteria does seem to imply that there is a clinical notion of psychopathy, however. See Robert D. Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised, 1st and 2nd edns. (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, 1991 and 2003). 2 Hervey Cleckley, The Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to Clarify Some Issues about the So-Called Psychopathic Personality, 1st and 5th edns. (St. Louis, mo: Mosby, 1941 and 1976). 3 Robert D. Hare, "A Research Scale for the Assessment of Psychopathy in Criminal Populations," Personality and Individual Differences 1.2 (1980): 111–19, and Hare, The Hare Psychopathy Checklist - Revised. the hegemony of psychopathy 26 Table 2: Four Factors of Psychopathy Factor / Dimension Items 1 affective lack of empathy; lack of remorse or guilt; shallow affect; failure to accept responsibility 2 interpersonal glib / superficial; grandiose self-worth; pathological lying; manipulative 3 lifestyle stimulation seeking; impulsive; irresponsible; parasitic; lack of realistic goals 4 antisocial early behavior problems; juvenile delinquency; poor behavioral controls; criminal versatility; revocation of conditional release (unrelated items) promiscuous; many short-term relations (a statistical technique to reveal underlying "factors" in data) 18 of those 20 are grouped into four factors, shown in Table 2. These four factors can be interpreted as different but not independent dimensions or aspects of psychopathy. In Hare's first explorations based on Cleckley's 16 characteristics, he found that a factor aggregating lack of empathy, pathological egocentriticy, and other characteristics similar to the items in factor 1 in Table 2 was by far the most important (i.e., explained most of the variance). This suggests that the affective factor / dimension is the most central aspect of psychopathy. However, in later studies it is not consistently the case that the affective factor is the most important, but it seems plausible that this is largely due to the fact that psychopathy is almost exclusively researched by forensic psychiatrists and that virtually all of the research samples consist entirely of criminal offenders and / or forensic psychiatric patients, which probably are somewhat atypical (in comparison to the general population) with regards to lifestyle (factor 3) and antisocial behavior (factor 4). The forensic background of Hare's checklist is also clearly reflected in the items of factor 4, antisocial behavior, which focus strongly on criminal behavior. Other kinds of antisocial behavior exist, of course, and a more general (i.e., non-forensic) understanding of psychopathy needs to take that into account. Furthermore, research by David Cooke and his colleagues suggests that antisocial behavior is probably merely a secondary symptom or consequence of psychopathy, and the other factors are more central to psychopathy 27 the construct.4 These considerations and findings suggest that the four factors or dimensions differ in their centrality or peripherality to psychopathy: the affective dimension (1) is the most central, followed by the interpersonal and lifestyle dimensions (2 and 3) while the antisocial dimension (4) is a more peripheral aspect. Most personality disorders are scales or spectra rather than dichotomies,5 and this is the case for psychopathy as well.6 By implication, Hare's checklist and its associated psychopathy construct posit a more or less arbitrary cut-off point: patients who score at or above that cut-off on the test are diagnosed with psychopathy, while those who score lower are not. Such a cut-off point or threshold is set at a certain level in accordance with the purpose of the test and construct. In case of Hare's checklist, that purpose is primarily forensic, but in other contexts lower or higher thresholds may be more useful or appropriate, and if the purpose of the construct is not diagnostic (i.e., not applied to individual human beings) then no sharp cut-off may be needed at all. Thus, if one is not so much interested in psychopathy as a predictor of criminal behavior, but as a social or cultural phenomenon, for example, then the threshold should be lowered and blurred sufficiently to pick out levels of psychopathy that pose no serious criminal threat, but that are socially destructive nevertheless. Alternatively, the positing of a threshold can be waived altogether, leaving the concept of psychopathy intentionally vague. People, then, are psychopaths or not to differing extents. If some definition of psychopathy is neither a diagnostic tool nor a measuring rod, no arbitrary cut-off point is needed. Therefore, it is this option that I will adopt here. 4 David J. Cooke, Christine Michie, Stephen D. Hart, and Daniel A. Clark, "Reconstructing Psychopathy: Clarifying the Significance of Antisocial and Socially Deviant Behavior in the Diagnosis of Psychopathic Personality Disorder," Journal of Personality Disorders 18.4 (2004): 337–57. 5 Lee Clark, "Assessment and Diagnosis of Personality Disorder: Perennial Issues and an Emerging Reconceptualization," Annual Review of Psychology 58.1 (2007): 227–57. 6 Robert D. Hare and Craig S. Neumann, "Psychopathy as a Clinical and Empirical Construct," Annual Review of Clinical Psychology 4 (2008): 217– 46. the hegemony of psychopathy 28 Table 3: The Affective Dimension of Psychopathy Essential Indicators Additional Indicators lack of empathic concern lack of empathic distress lack of ability or willingness to engage in perspective taking and projection lack of ability or willingness to engage in simulation lack of remorse or guilt failure to accept responsibility As mentioned, of the four dimensions of psychopathy, the fourth, antisocial behavior, is either peripheral or even a consequence of the other dimensions. Moreover, as non-criminal forms of antisocial behavior are less easily captured in a small list of indicators, I will ignore this dimension. Of the remaining three dimensions, the affective dimension is the most important, and therefore should play a central role in a definition of psychopathy. (See Table 3.) Within this dimension, "lack of empathy" is the most important aspect (it has a factor loading of 0.82, which is the highest of all factor loadings, other factors included). As we have seen before (see previous chapter), the concept of empathy is very ambiguous, however, and consequently, some clarification is needed. It is possible that a psychopath is deficient to varying extents in all eight kinds of empathy distinguished in the table in the previous chapter, but that doesn't mean that all eight deficiencies would be defining criteria.7 Hare uses the term "callous" as an alternative denotation for "lack of empathy," which implies that it is a lack of empathic concern that is a defining feature. However, in most cases, this lack of empathic concern is probably paired to a lack of empathic distress and (both are) causally related to a lack of ability or willingness to engage in perspective taking, projection, and possibly also simulation. While all of these deficiencies are indicators of psychopathy, some are more essential to the concept than others. Something similar seems to be true for the other items in Hare's checklist: lack of remorse or guilt is a more important indicator (i.e., has a much higher factor loading) than failure to accept responsibility. Table 3 summarizes the indicators of the affective dimensions of psychopathy, taking this difference into account. 7 Many psychopaths are good "mind-readers," implying that they have no deficiencies with regards to cognitive empathy. psychopathy 29 Table 4: The Interpersonal and Lifestyle Dimensions of Psychopathy Indicators of the Interpersonal Dimension Indicators of the Lifestyle Dimension egocentric (grandiose self-worth) (short term) stimulation seeking, impulsive glib / superficial risk-taking, irresponsible manipulative lack of realistic (long term) goals deceitful parasitic The other two dimensions require less clarification, although in a few cases a slight change of terms may broaden their applicability. For example, in some variants of Hare's checklist, the more general- and for that reason preferable- term "deceitful" is used instead of "pathological lying." In case of the lifestyle dimension, it needs to be noted that many of the indicators mentioned are hard to separate from each other. Short-term orientation, stimulation seeking behavior, risk-taking, and several of the other indicators mentioned are all closely related. This also includes the "parasitic" indicator, although that may be less obvious. Psychopaths take risks, but intelligent and not-so-intelligent psychopaths take different kinds of risks. That is, intelligent psychopaths take risks on behalf of others, and are parasitic in that sense: if all goes well, the profit is theirs, but if things go wrong, most of the damage is done to others. Definitions A psychopath is defined here (i.e., in this book) as someone who matches all of the essential indicators in the left column of Table 3, at least some of the additional indicators in the right column of Table 3, and at least some of the indicators in Table 4. This definition, as mentioned above, is intentionally vague in the sense that it does not posit an arbitrary cut-off point. Instead, it takes explicitly into account that psychopathy is a spectrum: the more indicators apply to some individual, the more psychopathic that person. This notion of psychopathy is broader and fuzzier than the clinical concept measured by Hare's checklist. It does include psychopaths in that clinical sense, as well as much of the other two, closely related personality disorders in the "dark triad," narcissism and Machiavellianism, but it probably also includes most of the the hegemony of psychopathy 30 people Eric Schwitzgebel calls "jerks," and which he defines as follows: "the jerk culpably fails to appreciate the perspectives of others around him, treating them as tools to be manipulated or idiots to be dealt with rather than as moral and epistemic peers."8 In this definition of jerks we find some of the hallmarks of psychopathy as defined above, and some of those that do not appear explicitly in Schwitsgebel's definition of "jerk" appear elsewhere in his text: lack of empathic concern, failure of perspective taking, grandiose self-worth, manipulative. All that is missing is impulsiveness and risk-taking- and on that ground Schwitzgebel argues that jerks are not psychopaths9- but those are not essential criteria in the definition of "psychopath" adopted here. It can, of course, be argued that for that reason or from a technical (or dogmatic?) point of view, the broader and fuzzier notion should be called something like "subclinical psychopatoid personality" rather than "psychopathy,"10 but that would be rather cumbersome, and besides, as long as it is clear that the context of this essay is not forensic psychiatry, the slightly broader understanding of the concept should cause little confusion. Regarding that context, I wrote above that the topic of this essay is "psychopathy as cultural phenomenon," and I haven't yet said anything about what I mean by that. A distinction needs to be made between individual psychopathy, defined above, and cultural psychopathy, or "psychopathy as cultural phenomenon." Psychopathy in the latter sense is a disorder of cultures or societies rather than individuals, although the two disorders are closely related. Cultural psychopathy is the acceptance or even approval by some culture or social group of individual psychopathy as normal rather than deviant; it is the normalization of individual psychopathy as defined above. Wherein "normal" and "normalization" should be read both in their ordinary sense as common and accepted, and in their more technical sense as being in accordance with the norm. 8 Eric Schwitzgebel "A Theory of Jerks," Aeon Magazine, June 4, 2014, ¶6. 9 Schwitzgebel, "A Theory of Jerks," ¶7. 10 Gary Olson suggests "culturally acquired empathy-deficient disorder having its root in the dominant socioeconomic system" for a very similar notion. Empathy Imperiled: Capitalism, Culture, and the Brain (New York: Springer, 2013), 57. psychopathy 31 To avoid misunderstanding, it must be emphasized that cultural psychopathy does not necessarily imply a proliferation of psychopaths (even as defined here). In a psychopathic culture psychopathy has become a norm, but even if everyone acts more like a psychopath under the influence of that norm, it doesn't have to be the case that significantly more people become full-fledged psychopaths. Psychopaths are outliers, and an increase in the average (i.e., the average level of psychopathy) does not automatically produce more outliers. Signs of Cultural Psychopathy Probably the most conspicuous symptom of cultural psychopathy is the proliferation of psychopaths in movies and tv drama. Examples are easy to find: Tom Ripley (books by Patricia Highsmith and several movie adaptations), Patrick Bateman (American Psycho by Bret Easton Ellis), Gregory House, MD (House), James Bond, Dexter Morgan (Dexter), Sherlock Holmes (as played by Benedict Cumberbatch), and so forth.11 Nearly every action hero (or anti-hero) in a Hollywood movie satisfies all of the essential and most of the additional criteria of psychopathy identified above, but movie heroes are not the only psychopathic role models in our culture. Over half a century ago, David Hamilton pointed out that "the Entrepreneur takes on the qualities of a cultural hero who performs the miracles of production,"12 but since then the entrepreneur has been knocked off his pedestal by managers and financial specialists. While- according to Hamilton- the entrepreneur derived his heroic status partly from his creativity, current cultural heroes such as corporate executives and investment bankers derive their status merely from 11 On Ripley and Dexter, see Kenneth Saltman, "Learning to be a Psychopath: The Pedagogy of the Corporation," in Critical Pedagogy and Global Literature: Worldly Teaching, eds. Masood Raja, Hillary Stringer, and Zach Vandezande (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 47–62. On House, Bond, and several other "dark triad" characters, see Peter K. Jonason, Gregory D. Webster, David P. Schmitt, Norman P. Li, and Laura Crysel, "The Antihero in Popular Culture: Life History Theory and the Dark Triad Personality Traits," Review of General Psychology 16.2 (2012): 192–99. 12 David Hamilton, "The Entrepreneur as Cultural Hero," The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly 38.3 (1957): 250. the hegemony of psychopathy 32 performing the "miracle" of shareholder value maximization at all costs. (However, these current cultural heroes are much more controversial than the heroes of the past: they are despised as much by some people as they are revered by others.) In an interview with Joel Bakan, Robert Hare suggested that the modern corporation has the characteristics of a psychopath.13 Indeed, corporations are manipulative, risk-taking, incapable of empathy or remorse, and so forth. (It should be stressed that what is true of the vast majority of large corporations is not necessarily true for many smaller businesses, mainly because the latter tend to be much more personal and more embedded in communities.) Corporations are not humans, however, and thus not psychopaths in a strict sense, but their managers and executives are human, and are forced and / or expected to behave like psychopaths in their corporate roles. They may even be legally obliged to do so. As Hare points out, that doesn't mean that they are psychopaths (although some of them may be): outside the corporation most of them lead normal (i.e., non-psychopathic) lives. Nevertheless, the corporation promotes cultural psychopathy in at least two ways. Firstly, even if corporate executives (etc.) lead double lives, it is in their psychopathic, corporate roles that they are heroes. In other words, they are cultural heroes as psychopaths. And secondly, the corporation provides an environment for the cultivation and practice of psychopathic behavior. If Hannah Arendt is right, then Adolf Eichmann was not a psychopath, but merely a very mediocre bureaucrat who unthinkingly and uncritically did his job within a psychopathic system.14 Christopher Browning's research on German Reserve Police Battalion 101, which systematically executed thousands of Jews in Poland, reveals a similar unthinking adherence to duty and uncritical acceptance of circumstances.15 Something similar applies to corporate executives. Of course, I do not want to suggest that environmental disasters 13 Joel Bakan, The Corporation: The Pathological Pursuit of Profit and Power (New York: Free Press, 2004). 14 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963). See previous chapter. 15 Christopher R. Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), especially 72. psychopathy 33 and exploitation of workers are comparable to the Holocaust; that's not the point. The point is that the combination of a psychopathic system or institution with bureaucrats or executives performing their roles without ever stopping to think or question what they are doing is a recipe for disaster. It has proven to be. After the Second World War, territorial growth became an unacceptable ambition for states, but an alternative was found in economic growth: the economy became the primary concern of politics.16 This change of focus had several important consequences. Most obviously, the absolute prioritization of economic growth over everything else meant and means that in the end only money matters. Culture, education, the environment, and everything else that matters to most people is only of secondary importance at best, and a wasteful distraction at worst. Thus, while territorial ambitions lead to war, economic ambitions lead to environmental disaster and cultural impoverishment, among others. Secondly, the shift of focus elevated economics to official state doctrine and economists to official suppliers of plans and policies, and the effects thereof on the "science" of economics and on society itself can hardly be exaggerated, but this is a topic that will have to wait until the next chapter. And thirdly, it made the corporation the paradigm of wealth creation, and thereby the fountainhead of economic growth- that is, of the realization of the economic ambitions of the state. From a historical perspective this is somewhat peculiar given that the existence and rise of the modern corporation is the result of a series of historical accidents,17 but more important in the present context is the establishment of an institutional environment that promotes psychopathic behavior as a paradigmatically desirable institutional arrangement. In other words, the psychopathic work environment became the norm: it is how things should be. And not just in the perspective of the state, because the state's ambitions- through processes discussed in the 16 Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," Cultural Studies 12.1 (1998): 82– 101. 17 Hamilton, "The Ceremonial Aspect of Corporate Organization," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 16.1 (1956): 11–24, and Bakan, The Corporation. the hegemony of psychopathy 34 next chapter- gradually became society's ambitions, and the state's heroes, moneymakers, became society's heroes- that is, our heroes. It is no wonder, then, that many children growing up with these heroes, with the role models provided by Hollywood and the corporate world (and the former is part of the latter, of course), enter adolescence and adulthood "ethically broken." In "Broken when Entering," Robert Giacalone and Marc Promislo discuss the baggage college students carry into class- that is, the baggage society loads them with.18 This baggage consists of a mind-set that disparages virtue, demonizes those in need of help, and stigmatizes goodness. Our students "come to us believing that virtuous individuals are dangerous to material goals and should be castigated."19 Virtues are (or may become) obstacles to the bottom line, and are thus to be avoided or discouraged. Empathy endangers profitability, and is therefore wrong. In the workplace, there is no room for ethics and empathy- psychopathy has become the norm. But mind-sets are hard to contain, and it is easy to discern the devaluation of goodness, of empathy, and of care everywhere in society. Child-care, nursing, care for the elderly, and so forth are underrated and underpaid, for example, and a ruthless banker, lawyer, or CEO enjoys much more prestige than someone who gives care. So much more, in fact, that if prestige would be quantified, the prestige of care-giving professions would be measured in negative numbers. Non-professional forms of care are similarly devalued and belittled (and usually left to women).20 Cultural psychopathy turns caring / empathy from a virtue into a weakness, but also into an act of subversion. Empathy / care must be devalued, because the very existence of empathy denies the belief in the "naturalness" of egocentricity that the hegemony of psychopathy relies on. 18 Robert Giacalone and Mark D. Promisto, "Broken When Entering: The Stigmatization of Goodness and Business Ethics Education," Academy of Management Learning & Education 12.1 (2012): 81–101. 19 Giacalone and Promisto, "Broken When Entering," 92. 20 See also Box 1 in the first chapter, and Box 5 in the last chapter. 35 3 Hegemony In his Prison Notebooks, written between 1929 and 1935, the Italian Marxist philosopher and politician Antonio Gramsci argued that the state's or ruling elite's control over the people can be maintained by two and only two means: coercive power and hegemony. Hegemony is the people's spontaneous consent to and adoption of the values, desires, ideas, beliefs, perspectives, knowledge claims and so forth that serve the interests of the state and / or ruling elite.1 Although the term "hegemony" was used by other Marxists before, Gramsci's theory is based on the work of Machiavelli more than on that of Marx and his followers.2 Gramsci explicitly refers to Machiavelli's metaphor of the centaur, for example. The centaur's animal side represents the state's violent side: its control through force and coercion. The centaur's human side represents the state's civilized side: its control through the spontaneous consent of hegemony (see Figure 1.) In the simplest possible terms, Gramsci's Machiavellian idea is that Jane can make John do what she wants him to do by two and only two means. Either John accepts Jane's power / authority and follows her instructions, or Jane forces him by means of violence or the threat of violence. The first of these is hegemony. Hence, hegemony is the (spontaneous) acceptance of (and / or consent to) the 1 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 12. 2 Derek Boothman, "The Sources for Gramsci's Concept of Hegemony," Rethinking Marxism 20.2 (2008): 201–15, and Benedetto Fontana, "Hegemony and Power in Gramsci," in Hegemony: Studies in Consensus and Coercion, eds. Richard Howson and Kylie Smith (New York: Routledge, 2008). the hegemony of psychopathy 36 socio-political status quo- that is, of the existing power / authority relations. (See Box 2 on the notions of power and authority.) Obviously, force and hegemony do not exclude each other. Most likely Jane's power / authority over John would be based on a mixture of threat (i.e., force) and acceptance (i.e., hegemony). Gramsci recognizes this, but also points out that hegemony is the most important of the two because even when force is necessary, that use of force itself needs to be socially accepted (i.e., it needs hegemony). The "normal" exercise of hegemony . . . is characterized by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public opinion . . . .3 Furthermore, the use of force is costly and can easily lead to discontent- thus eroding acceptance / consent- if its use is not socially accepted. For these reasons it is difficult- if not impossible- to build a stable state on brute force alone. Rather, as Gramsci argues, a state (or ruling elite) is and should be founded on (the creation of) a worldview. To avoid misunderstanding, two related clarifications are in order. Firstly, the theory of (cultural) hegemony does not imply that the "ruling elite" is a well-defined, monolithic block with clear and unchanging membership. Rather, membership of the ruling elite is usually gradual and context-dependent- that is, people (and organizations, perhaps) are members of the ruling elite to various degrees and those degrees differ from context to context. Hence, the ruling elite is a much more diffuse and unstable social structure than that term may seem to suggest, and for that reason it is probably a good idea to adopt another term wherever more neutral phrases like "the dominant groups" are less appropriate. "Hegemony" derives from Greek "hegemon" (ἡγεμών) meaning leader, but since the ruling elite is not a singular individual, the plural form of that word, "hegemones" (ἡγεμόνες), may be more appropriate. Therefore, I will (occasionally) use that term below. Once more, the hegemones 3 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 80. hegemony 37 (or dominant groups) are neither organized nor strictly separate from the rest of society, but that doesn't make them any less real. (In the same way that the vague boundary between a chunk of pumpkin and its surrounding pumpkin soup doesn't make that chunk any less real. See also Box 4 below.) Secondly, hegemony is (usually) not planned or actively organized- it is not some kind of conspiracy. (And of course, it cannot be if the hegemones are not organized.) Rather, hegemony is a more or less automatic social process. Gramsci suggests that the "spontaneous consent" is caused by the prestige and confidence that the socially dominant group(s) (i.e., the hegemones) enjoy(s), but also that "the intellectuals" and the "organs of public opinion" play an essential role in spreading the worldview of the ruling group(s) to the ruled. A few decades later, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno argued for something very similar in their Dialectic of Enlightenment.4 With the term "culture industry" they 4 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (Amsterdam: Querido, 1947). Figure 1: A Less Humanoid Centaur Control through hegemony isn't necessarily as "civilized" or humane as Machiavelli's centaur analogy suggests, and much more pervasive. The "centaur" in this figure better captures those aspects of Gramsci's theory. (Illustration: Ka Ketelmug, 2016.) the hegemony of psychopathy 38 Box 2: Power / Authority It is not entirely clear whether hegemony is the acceptance of power or of authority. The main source of this ambiguity is that the notions of power and authority are ambiguous or even "essentially contested" themselves.5 Authority and power are often contrasted in terms of rights and abilities: authority is a right to get some desired effect, while power is an ability to get it, regardless of opposition.6 As a right, authority depends on acceptance (or recognition, acknowledgment, consent, etc.) of that right: authority is created by acceptance (and thus existentially dependent thereon). Power, on the other hand, is objective fact. Power may seem to be dependent on compliance (or obedience), but compliance does not create power. Rather, power conceptually implies compliance, and the other way around- they are different sides of the same coin. Acceptance and compliance stand in different relations to authority and power, respectively, but also point at a further difference: authority is a right to have something accepted; power is an ability to have something done. To have power over someone means to be able to make that person do something. To have authority over someone means having one's judgment that something is true, right, or desirable accepted. Power can be coercive, but one cannot be coerced to think something, only to do something; not to accept some claim, but only to say or pretend that one accepts it. By implication, authority cannot be coercive. From these considerations it can be inferred that "hegemony" refers both to the acceptance of authority of those in power, and to the acceptance of their use of- and right to- power. referred to the commercial manufacturing, packaging and distribution of a certain perspective on reality. Through its products, such as movies, music, and other forms of commercial entertainment 5 See, for example, Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke, uk: Palgrave Macmillan, 1974). The contestation of "essentially contested concepts" is essential to the debates they are used in. Each party in the debate claims that their definition is correct, and by implication, there are no neutral definitions. Rather, any definition of an essentially contested concept is normative and political because it captures the interpretation of only one party in the debate. See W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 (1956): 167–98. 6 The most prominent exception is Hannah Arendt, who in "On Violence" argues for a concept of power that is very close to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. See also the first footnote of the next chapter. Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 101–98. hegemony 39 and infotainment, the culture industry largely determines how we perceive and understand the world around us. This was probably a development that Gramsci could not foresee in the 1930s, but due to the spread of new media and the commercialization of news and other kinds of information, the culture industry became the primary hegemony-spreading force. And like hegemony itself, the culture industry is not organized- or at least not with the explicit aim or purpose of spreading hegemonic values and beliefs. Rather, the beliefs and values of the culture industry itself are shaped by hegemony. The dominant group(s) provide(s) the paradigms of success and prestige, but in addition to this influence through visibility and dominance, there tend to be financial relations between the hegemones and the culture industry as well, and as the Dutch saying goes, "whose bread one eats, whose word one speaks." The hegemonic spread of ideas cannot be openly organized or coordinated. Hegemony is spontaneous consent- not coerced acceptance- and depends for its success on invisibility. Hegemony reaches maximum effectiveness when the hegemonic values and beliefs do not need to be supported or promoted anymore; when it becomes unnecessary to say that "there is no alternative" (one of Margaret Thatcher's favorite slogans), because everyone already "knows" that there is no alternative, because the very idea of an alternative has become incomprehensible. David Harvey, Mark Fisher, Tariq Ali,7 and others have argued that neoliberal capitalism has become hegemonic in this sense.8 For example, Fisher writes that "the lack of alternatives to capitalism is no longer even an issue" because "capitalism seamlessly occupies the horizons of the 7 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford, uk: Oxford University Press, 2007), Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There no Alternative? (Winchester, va: Zero Books, 2009), and Tariq Ali, The Extreme Centre: A Warning (London: Verso, 2015). 8 Notable earlier pronouncements of the hegemonic character of neoliberal capitalism include Michel Foucault's lectures of 1978–79, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978–1979 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), and also Antonio Negri, The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, uk: Polity Press, 1989), and Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism; or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, nc: Duke University Press, 1991). the hegemony of psychopathy 40 thinkable."9 Similarly, Fredric Jameson reports that "someone once said that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than to imagine the end of capitalism."10 On the other hand, Wolfgang Streeck doesn't just imagine the end of capitalism, but predicts it and offers a compelling argument in support of that prediction.11 The current hegemony can be described either as neoliberal or as cultural-psychopathic. To a large extent the difference is one of focus: describing the current hegemony as one of neoliberal capitalism means focusing on the economic and the political; describing it as a hegemony of psychopathy means focusing on the cultural. Many critics of the hegemony of neoliberal capitalism are well aware of the cultural (i.e., psychopathic) aspects thereof. Tariq Ali, for example, points out that Margaret Thatcher's "ideological offensive" was intended to break down the notion of society and associated social consciousness, and replace it with self-centered individualism and consumerism, and that this offensive was successful, leading to a "profound shift in consciousness," in effect leading to the normalization of psychopathy (although Ali does not use that term).12 Nevertheless, that the current hegemony can be described either as neoliberal or as psychopathic does not imply that these are just two faces of the same coin or that they necessarily come together. Neoliberalism depends on- but also promotes- cultural psychopathy, and consequently, it is doubtful that the hegemony of neoliberalism could survive a hypothetical demise of the hegemony of psychopathy, but the converse is not the case. The hegemony of psychopathy can- and probably will- survive the collapse of the hegemony of neoliberalism (and it may be the case that that collapse is already in process), because culture changes much slower than economic and political institutions. Among the pillars that support and reinforce the current hegemony- that of psychopathy and neoliberal capitalism- some are more important than others, and different "pillars" play different 9 Fisher, Capitalist Realism, 8. 10 Fredric Jameson, "Future City," New Left Review 21 (2003): 65–79. 11 Wolfgang Streeck, "How Will Capitalism End?" New Left Review 87 (2014): 35–64. 12 Ali, The Extreme Centre, 5. hegemony 41 roles in the (re-)production and enforcement of hegemonic values and beliefs. Education, for example, is most important in the long run by training future citizens in "spontaneous" consent, while the media and culture industry are more important for the short term spread and reinforcement of hegemonic ideas. In addition to this difference between long and short term effects there is also a difference between more direct and more indirect aspects of hegemony. Hegemony enables and strengthens the ruling elite's control directly by manufacturing consent (or acceptance, at least), and indirectly by disseminating hegemonic values and beliefs- that is, the beliefs that support the interests of the hegemones. Nevertheless, most pillars of hegemony have both direct and indirect roles, and both long term and short term effects. Aside from the media and culture industry, among the most important supporting pillars of the current hegemony are mainstream economics, the (self-)corruption of critique, and education.13 In the following four sections, I will briefly discuss (aspects of) the roles of these key pillars in maintaining and promoting hegemony. The Mass Media and the Culture Industry The culture industry and mass media expose its consumers to a continuous stream of exercises in desensitization and dehumanization of which the aforementioned proliferation of psychopaths in movies and tv drama is but one conspicuous manifestation.14 Psychopathic heroes are the apex of a general and only slightly more subtle glorification of other-disregarding self-interest.15 In the typical story line, the main or even only function of the protagonist is getting what she wants, regardless of the costs for others (that is, the supporting characters), whose interests matter little, if they are presented as having interests at all. The purpose of the others is merely to make the protagonist's story more interesting, but towards that 13 An emerging fifth pillar is control through technology, such as smartphones and the "internet of things." 14 See the section "Signs of Cultural Psychopathy," in the previous chapter. 15 See also Jean M. Twenge and W. Keith Campbell, The Narcissism Epidemic: Living in the Age of Entitlement (New York: Atria, 2009), on what they call "the narcissism epidemic": the rise of over-inflated senses of self and of selfcenteredness. the hegemony of psychopathy 42 end their humanity is denied- the others are nothing but story elements, one-dimensional obstacles (or resources) on the protagonist's self-serving path, disposable things, not people. The products of the culture industry typically divide the world into protagonists and others, and those others are not worth the protagonists' or the audience's empathy; they are outside the scope of empathy. The others are always outside the scope of empathy. That is the essence of "othering;" that is part of what made the Holocaust possible (see the first chapter). One cannot feel empathic concern (or compassion) for someone and make that person suffer at the same time. One cannot feel empathic concern for someone who is suffering and not want that suffering to end. But take away empathic concern, put the other outside the scope of empathy, and everything becomes possible (as Slavenka Drakulić remarked):16 violence, rape, murder, the Holocaust. And indeed, Hollywood movies abound with violence against the others.17 (Video games might also be good- or possibly even better- examples of this, but because I don't know anything about video games, I'll leave the analysis of their contribution to the hegemony of psychopathy to others.) In dividing the world into protagonists and disposable, dehumanized others, the culture industry propagates a picture of the world that normalizes and justifies the pursuit of private, even selfish goals, while turning a blind eye to others. What the culture industry- through the protagonists of its products- advocates is a lifestyle characterized by a lack of empathic concern, a lack of perspective taking, egocentrism, stimulation seeking behavior, and a general disregard for others.18 That is (cultural) psychopathy. 16 "I understand now that nothing but 'otherness' killed Jews, and it began with naming them, by reducing them to the other. Then everything became possible. Even the worst atrocities like concentration camps or the slaughtering of civilians in Croatia or Bosnia" (also quoted in chapter 1), Slavenka Drakulić, The Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of the War (New York: Norton, 1993), 145. 17 Much more can - and should - be said about the role of violence in the products of the culture industry and in our cultures themselves, but I will not do so here. Brad Evans and Henry A. Giroux, Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of Spectacle (San Francisco, ca: City Lights, 2015), is an interesting recent attempt to address the issue. 18 There are exceptions, of course, especially some tv programs and books hegemony 43 While there are differences between "pure" entertainment and infotainment, the boundary between those is vague and somewhat arbitrary, and infotainment such as news is as obsessed with violence, and as guilty of massive othering as movies and tv drama. Other peoples, minorities, refugees, the homeless, and everyone else who doesn't belong to the in-group is routinely "othered"- that is, dehumanized, represented as a mere thing rather than as a fellow human being with interests, thoughts, and concerns of her own. Such othering plays an important role in maintaining hegemonic control. Othering simultaneously dehumanizes and devalues the others, and affirms the superiority of the in-group. But thereby it also strengthens identification with that in-group and acceptance of that group's values, beliefs, and social structures- that is, hegemony. The most important function of infotainment, the press and / or the media in maintaining and promoting hegemony, however, is manufacturing consent through the selection of information. As already mentioned above, the media are not immune from hegemony. Rather, under hegemonic influence, the media- mostly unconsciously- pick, twist, and spread "information" and ideas in accordance with the hegemonic values and beliefs. This does not mean, of course, that some particular newspaper or tv channel cannot have an agenda of its own. It does mean, however, that the less explicit that agenda is, the greater the influence of supposedly non-ideological and neutral "common sense," but "neutrality" and "common sense" are just synonyms for the dominant values and beliefs, for hegemony. There is a persistent myth that the media have a left-wing bias. What feeds this myth is the fact that many producers of news and journalism indeed have (or had) an ideological agenda of their own. But that agenda is (or was) not a left-wing agenda. Rather, much of the media has (or had) a liberal bias,19 but despite the common aimed at young children that seem to be intended to instill different values. 19 The media landscape has shifted so far to the right in the past decade that - with some notable exceptions - little discernible liberal bias is left. Rather, most of the mass media have a very aliberal bias, incorporating elements of nationalism, xenophobia, conservative populism, and cultural psychopathy. But most of all, the vast majority of media organizations are firmly wed to hegemony. the hegemony of psychopathy 44 equation by Americans of "liberal" and "left," those two terms do not denote the same thing. Liberalism advocates personal freedom and free choice in the political, economic, and other spheres of life. Liberalism champions free markets, free choice of marriage partner (i.e., same or different sex), political freedom, and so forth. And because it advocates personal freedom and individualism, it opposes oppression and discrimination based on (supposed) group membership, such as sexism and racism. Liberalism (also) espouses values and beliefs that conflict with more traditional, religious, or communitarian belief systems, and moreover, there is some overlap between liberal goals and values and common goals and values of the left. The misidentification of "left" and "liberal" is, therefore, quite understandable. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the two. For example, not all of the left favors individualism (or at least not to the same extent), not all of the left opposes all traditional values and beliefs, and most of the left does not advocate (completely) free markets (or even explicitly rejects free markets). There is an overlap between parts of the left and liberalism, but the two are certainly not identitical. What's more important, however, than the misidentification of the (former) liberal bias of the media as a left-wing bias, is the role this bias plays (or played). It is important to notice that free market ideology is the official ideology of the hegemony of psychopathy (even if in practice large corporations demand state support and other measures that counter free markets). Liberalism is perfectly suitable as the respectable face of neoliberalism, as the attractive wrapping of a poisonous gift. Hegemony is flexible enough to use other ideologies- such as conservatism, authoritarianism, nationalism, or even socialism- for justification and to gain and keep popular acceptance or support.20 Hegemony doesn't need liberalism, but the liberal defense of individualism, personal freedom (in principle, not necessarily in practice), and free markets (idem) is a perfect fit with the values, beliefs, and interests of the hegemony of psychopathy. Moreover, there is one more reason why liberalism is 20 If liberalism proves to be insufficiently popular among the masses, then hegemony will have to rely on other ideologies to manufacture consent. A mixture of authoritarianism and nationalism appears to be the first choice in most countries. See also the epilogue. hegemony 45 hegemony's favorite political ideology: it assumes and propagates the same image of man as mainstream economics, and that image- as will be argued below- is an image of man as psychopath. There is no left-wing bias. The left wants to change the world. The left wants alternatives. Hence, the left wants what according to hegemonic beliefs is impossible. And the mass media almost invariable side with hegemony, rather than with the left. As Tariq Ali remarked: "the media denounces, in sometimes hysterical tones, any alternative that challenges the status quo, however mildly."21 Mainstream Economics The aforementioned reorientation of political ambitions after the Second World War from power and territory to wealth changed the relation between economics and the ruling elite.22 The "science" of economics, which already had been more influential and prestigious than any of the other social sciences, now gained an effective monopoly as the official supplier of government plans and policies, putting it in the center of power, and changing its status and what was (and is) expected of it. For one thing, politics demand(ed) "closure"- that is, models that give clear and determinate answers- and the economics profession was and is happy to supply. However, closure requires simplification, and consequently, one can either have closure and determinacy or applicability to the real world. As Joseph Schumpeter remarked in 1930, when it comes to economic questions, one can choose either simple answers or useful answers, but one cannot have both.23 Lured by power and prestige, economics chose simplicity and closure and gave up realism, and hid that behind rhetoric. (For a sketchy overview of the field of economics and its various schools, see Box 3.) 21 Ali, The Extreme Centre, 136. 22 See the section "Signs of Cultural Psychopathy" in the previous chapter. 23 Joseph Schumpeter, "Preface," in Frederik Zeuthen, Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare (London: Routledge, 1930), vii–xiii. See also Erik S. Reinert, How Rich Countries Got Rich . . . and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor (London: Constable, 2007), and Yanis Varoufakis, Economic Indeterminacy: A Personal Encounter with the Economists' Peculiar Nemesis (London: Routledge, 2014). the hegemony of psychopathy 46 The two most fundamental simplifications made by mainstream economics are methodological individualism, which treats all human beings as strictly separate and autonomous agents, and the assumption that these autonomous agents always try to maximize the satisfaction of their own, individual, given preferences. The first of these two simplifications implies that communities, power relations,24 social networks, and most forms of mutual support and cooperation are outside the scope of analysis. It implies that society is outside the scope of economic analysis. The second implies among others that human motivations and other aspects of psychology as well as the nature and desirability of (particular) preferences are outside the scope of analysis. Together, these two simplifications result in a model of man that is often dubbed "homo economicus." It must be emphasized that there is no inherent problem with such simplifications in science. Rather, it is doubtful that science would even be possible without simplification. Accurate prediction requires (usable) models, and models require abstracting away distracting properties. Hence, simplification is a methodological choice that makes modeling- and thus prediction- possible. All theories in physics, for example, abstract away the properties that are (mostly) irrelevant in the given context. To calculate the gravitational pull between two material objects, all you need to know is their masses and distance. However, the properties that are abstracted away in the calculation of gravitational pull re-appear in other physical theories and models, and if a physicist would want to predict the trajectory of some moving object, she would combine various theories and models, and thus various or even all properties. Size and shape, which do not figure in the gravity calculation, enter the picture when friction is taken into account, for example. In other words, simplification or abstraction in physics is really just separation of properties into different partial theories that are to be recombined for accurate prediction. Simplification in mainstream economics is of an entirely different nature, however. What it abstracts away- human psychology, for example- never re-enters the picture. Mainstream 24 On the role of power in economics and economies see Norbert Häring and Niall Douglas, Economists and the Powerful: Convenient Theories, Distorted Facts, Ample Rewards (London: Anthem, 2012). hegemony 47 Box 3: Schools of Economics The academic discipline of economics is divided into orthodox and heterodox schools. Orthodox or mainstream economics is "neo-classical," which means that it accepts a certain methodology based on abstraction and mathematical formalization. Heterodoxy within economics is not a single school, but a loose cluster of schools including behavioral, institutional, and evolutionary economics, but possibly also economic history and other areas in the overlap with adjacent social sciences. These heterodox schools reject excessive abstraction and formalization, and study actual economic behavior (in the case of behavioral economics), the role of culture and behavioral patterns and habits (in institutional economics), and so forth. While there are many prominent heterodox economists (such as Thomas Piketty) and mainstream economics is far less visible for a casual observer, the latter has been uncontested as the one and only official economic doctrine for at least four decades, even if deviation from that orthodoxy is routinely allowed if it benefits the hegemones themselves.25 This section only deals with the hegemonic role of mainstream (i.e., orthodox, neo-classical) economics, and completely ignores heterodox economics, for the simple reason that the latter plays no significant role in the hegemony of psychopathy. economics- in this respect- is like a physics that abstracts away shape, size, and composition in all of its theories and models. There is no such physics because it is useless: it cannot predict anything, and even its explanatory power is severely limited. But the exact 25 In most industrialized countries, economic policy is not just determined by neo-classical economics, but also by a much older, more empirical tradition according to which national wealth depends on manufacturing industry more than on trade. This idea motivates policies aimed at fostering innovation and supporting key industries (against neo-classical advice). While the rich countries became rich thanks to such policies they prevent developing countries from implementing similar policies. As Erik Reinert remarks, "in countries like the usa politicians saw to it that the [neoclassical / mainstream] theory was not used if it went against the interests of their own country. Pragmatism ruled at home, and high theory ruled abroad" (How Rich Countries Got Rich, 123). See also Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking away the Ladder (London: Anthem 2002), Chang, Bad Samaritans: Rich Nations, Poor Policies, and the Threat to the Developing World (London: Random House Business, 2007), and Reinert and Arno M. Daastøl, "The Other Canon: The History of Renaissance Economics," in Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective, ed. Reinert (Cheltenham, uk: Edward Elgar, 2004), 21–70. the hegemony of psychopathy 48 same thing is true of mainstream economics and for the exact same reason: it cannot predict anything and its explanatory power is close to zero. Furthermore, simplifications and abstractions in science are justified only if they help to reveal and / or explain the workings of some aspect of reality, but the particular simplifications chosen by mainstream economics- especially in combination with the demand for closure- only succeed in obscuring social and economic reality. Moreover, they do not just lack scientific justification, but are inherently ideological as well. They preclude the modeling and analysis of any alternative for neoliberal capitalism, and thereby also make systemic analysis of capitalism itself impossible. With the given simplifications, capitalism is the only possible economic reality. In the introduction to a collection of papers on the artificial suppression of indeterminacy in mainstream economic models, Yannis Varoufakis writes that the two simplifications and the demand for closure are tantamount to a decree that every single mainstream economist accepts capitalism as a "natural" system. Consequently, what we are left with is a profession churning out technical studies of fictitious markets which act as mere diversions from the real task of studying capitalism. Of course, the utility of this feat- for those who have an interest in keeping capitalism out of serious theoretical scrutiny- is immense. Capitalism appears in the public's eyes as a complex entity no less natural than the physical universe; it is, we are told, an entity to be analyzed with the clinical impartiality of a social physicist, exploited by financial engineers, tamed by "independent" Central Bankers, and only occasionally criticised by a few superannuated mainstream economists.26 And consequently, mainstream economics is "an ideologically driven pseudo-science whose power comes from successfully hiding, as opposed to revealing, the true nature of our social, political and economic relations."27 (For a well-written, non-academic 26 Varoufakis, Economic Indeterminacy, 17. 27 Varoufakis, Economic Indeterminacy, xxiv. See also Häring and Douglas, Economists and the Powerful, and Michael Hudson, "Technical Progress and hegemony 49 analysis and refutation of some of the most widespread myths that resulted from this, see Ha-Joon Chang's 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism.28) Mainstream, neoclassical economics has been under fire for well over a century.29 For example, in 1898 Thorstein Veblen compared homo economicus to: a lightning calculator of pleasures and pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another. . . . He is not the seat of a process of living, except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforced upon him by circumstances external and alien to him.30 A chorus of critical voices has joined Veblen in scrutinizing aspects of mainstream economics, its assumptions, and its methodology, Obsolescence of Capital and Skills: Theoretical Foundations of NineteenthCentury us Industrial and Trade Policy," in Reinart, Globalization, Economic Development and Inequality, 100–11. 28 Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2010). Other recommended books exposing the myths and fallacies of mainstream economics include John Quiggin, Zombie Economics: How Dead Ideas Still Walk Among Us (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2010) and John Weeks, Economics of the 1%: How Mainstream Economics Serves the Rich, Obscures Reality and Distorts Policy (London: Anthem, 2014). The first of these is aimed at a more academic audience, while in case of the second, the anger is dripping from the pages. I could easily extend this short list of suggestions as there is a vast literature arguing against the obfuscations of mainstream economics. One may wonder why this "vast literature" has so little influence on mainstream thought (in and outside of economics), but the answer to that question should be obvious by now: it is hegemony. 29 If one counts the criticism of classical economics by the German Historical School in the 1840s, for example, then mainstream economics has been under fire for much longer. However, while classical economics has much in common with neoclassical economics, they are by no means identical in their assumptions and methodology. 30 Thorstein Veblen, "Why Is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science?" The Quarterly Journal of Economics 12.4 (1898): 389–90. the hegemony of psychopathy 50 apparently quieting down a bit in the 1980s and 1990s, only to reemerge in 2000 when a group of French economics students started the Post-Autistic Economics movement that grew into the main platform for criticism of mainstream economics.31 Most of mainstream economics dismissed or ignored its detractors, however, and continued on its way unscathed. Occasionally, a representative of the mainstream responds to some of its critics, however. For example, in a recent paper Donald Katzner distinguished "valid" from "invalid" criticism, which is "essentially irrelevant"32 because it does not "evidence an understanding of, and fully recognize the real nature, purpose, and intention of that which is being criticized."33 What he appears to mean with that- judging from the rest of his paper- is that he wants to disqualify any critique of the aforementioned two simplifications and the principle of closure because those define the field of economics as he perceives it. The response is typical. Simplification and closure are defended with the truth that abstraction is necessary in science, and criticism is brushed aside as lacking understanding of how science- and thus economics- works. But what mainstream economists apparently fail to see is the dis-analogy between their approach and abstraction in, for example, physics. Abstraction in physics is contingent and context-dependent, and physics never loses sight of the fact that in the end all relevant properties must be (and will be) taken into account. Mainstream economics, however, abstracts away all aspects of reality that it cannot fit in its mathematical universe, and then forgets about them. Mainstream economics is like a biology that abstracts away multicellular organisms because it can only model unicellular life, and then pretends to be able to analyze and predict all life on the basis of that model. It's not the 31 In 2008 it changed the title of its flagship journal from Post-Autistic Economics Review to Real-World Economics Review, after it was realized that the label "post-autistic" is both insulting (to people with autism, not to mainstream economists) and incorrect. The movement is still known under its original name, however. 32 Donald W. Katzner, "A Neoclassical Curmudgeon Looks at Heterodox Criticisms of Microeconomics," World Economic Review 4 (2015): 63–75; 63. 33 Katzner, "A Neoclassical Curmudgeon Looks at Heterodox Criticisms of Microeconomics," 64. hegemony 51 critic of such a biology (or such an economics) who evinces a lack of understanding of how science works (or should work, at least). Furthermore, the apologists of mainstream economics are not just blind for the methodological inappropriateness of noncontingent simplification (i.e., for never returning from abstraction to the real world), but also for the implications thereof. That is, mainstream economists are themselves the firmest believers in the dogma that a kind of capitalism characterized by unbridled competition is the only possible reality, but that dogma is the consequence of abstracting away society, cooperation, mutual support, and everything else that makes us human. Hence, it is a dogma founded in illegitimate abstraction, rather than in reality. Katzner's paper shows what many critics of mainstream economics already knew: that criticizing its most basic choices and assumptions is taboo. As Varoufakis observed, the economics profession "works like a priesthood, dedicated solely to the preservation of its dogmas".34 (Or, in the words of John Weeks, "the role of [mainstream economics] in society is as a religious sect with an extremely doctrinaire priesthood that zealously guards its doctrines".35) The dogmatic blindness reaches nauseating levels in Katzner's warning that "invalid criticisms can have serious consequences if damaging policy decisions eventually emerge from them".36 Heretics are dangerous, he tells us, with the confidence of a true believer. From the late 1970s onward the World Bank and imf forced the developing world to adopt economic policies based on mainstream economic dogma. These policies destroyed infant industries and decimated real wages and economic growth. Nowhere in the developing world did neoclassical economic policy reduce poverty. Countries that did develop quickly- like the East-Asian "tigers"- did so mostly because they protected their industries against economic dogma. Most of Africa isn't poor because critics of mainstream economics gave them bad policy advice, but because mainstream economists forced them to follow a path of economic destruction.37 And 34 Varoufakis, Economic Indeterminacy, xxiv. 35 Weeks, Economics of the 1%, 17. 36 Katzner, "A Neoclassical Curmudgeon Looks at Heterodox Criticisms of Microeconomics," 64. 37 Chang, Kicking away the Ladder, Chang, Bad Samaritans, Reinert, How the hegemony of psychopathy 52 consequently, the refugees that risk their lives in an attempt to reach Europe or the us are really political refugees, fleeing the poverty and lack of prospects forced upon them by the West's neocolonial policies.38 The destructive influence of mainstream economics hasn't been limited to developing countries, however. The European economic crisis- and especially the economic problems of Southern Europe- are largely due to the "Hunger Games" policy based on mainstream economic dogma as well.39 More than 7 million children die each year from poverty, hunger, and preventable diseases. They die in countries that could have seen economic growth, food security, and better medical institutions, if it wasn't for the mainstream economists' (of imf and World Bank) demands to open up their markets and destroy their infant industries. Probably not all developing countries could have followed the same path as South Korea, for example, but with more sensible economic policies- like they had before economic destruction was forced upon them- most of them would have had industrial growth and economic growth, enabling better healthcare, better education, better infrastructure, starting a virtuous cycle of growth and development. It's difficult to give an exact number, but it seems a very conservative estimate to say that in such a scenario the yearly number of children dying from poverty, hunger, and preventable diseases would be (much) less than half of what it is now. And that Rich Countries Got Rich, and Reinert, "Neo-classical Economics: A Trail of Economic Destruction Since the 1970s," Real-World Economics Review 60 (2012): 2–17. 38 The British Empire did not allow its colonies to develop a manufacturing industry and destroyed (most notably in India) whatever manufacturing industry there was. This policy was copied by the other colonial powers, and preventing colonies from developing themselves by denying them manufacturing industry and any other kind of economic activity that could start a virtuous circle of growth (and forcing them to focus on agriculture, mining, and so forth) became a defining feature of colonialism. Given that the policies that are forced upon the "developing" world nowadays have the exact same effect, colonialism has never ended. 39 Servaas Storm and C.W.M. Naastepad, Macroeconomics beyond the nairu (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2012), and Storm and Naastepad, "Europe's Hunger Games: Income Distribution, Cost Competitiveness and Crisis," Cambridge Journal of Economics 39.3 (2015): 959–86. hegemony 53 would imply that mainstream economics is responsible for the death of approximately 100 million children since 1980. And that's "just" children, and only in the developing world. A meta-analysis by Sandra Galeo and colleagues suggests that in 2000 more than 800,000 Americans died of poverty-related causes.40 If adding up numbers of deaths is insufficient, then add, for example, the massive environmental destruction resulting from abstracting away the environment from mainstream economic models, or the deterioration of job satisfaction due to treatment of workers / employees as disposable resources rather than as human beings (or as homines economici, which is just as inhuman), and it becomes clear that mainstream economics has been one of the greatest evils in history. And Katzner warns us of the critics of mainstream economics . . . While the foregoing may explain (some of) what's wrong with mainstream economics, it doesn't really say anything about its role in maintaining and promoting hegemony. That role is threefold. Firstly, it provides the economic policies that enrich the hegemones, thus maintaining or even reinforcing the economic base of their power. Secondly, it gives the hegemonic belief that "there is no alternative" the air of "scientific fact." And thirdly, it promotes cultural psychopathy. Hegemony is a process of consent-generation, and the most effective way of generating consent to some social arrangement is to make people believe that that arrangement is natural and that there is no real alternative. That- as argued above- is exactly what mainstream economics does, and the importance thereof can hardly be overstated. Mainstream economists are the high priests of the hegemony of psychopathy. As explained above, mainstream economics' picture of man, homo economicus, embodies its most fundamental dogmas, but that picture is a picture of a psychopath. Of the essential indicators of the affective dimension of psychopathy (Table 3 in the previous chapter) and the indicators of the interpersonal and lifestyle dimensions 40 Sandra Galeo, Melissa Tracy, Katherine J. Hogatt, Charles DiMaggio, and Adam Karpati, "Estimated Deaths Attributable to Social Factors in the United States," American Journal of Public Health 101.8 (2011): 1456–65. the hegemony of psychopathy 54 of psychopathy (Table 4) there isn't a single indicator that does not apply to homo economicus. He (or it?) is a psychopath by any standard, and thus, if mainstream economics successfully promotes that picture, then it promotes psychopathy. As it turns out, it does have such effects indeed. This is the "third role" of mainstream economics in maintaining hegemony mentioned above: the promotion of cultural psychopathy through education and through its influence on language, metaphors, and "common sense." In the paper "Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories can Become Self-Fulfilling," Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert Sutton summarize a mountain of evidence for the thesis that mainstream economics does not just shape how we perceive social reality, but shapes reality itself.41 They show how economic theories, metaphors, and language have infected the rest of society, and how those thereby (or as a consequence thereof) have changed society itself. An obvious example of the corrupting influence of mainstream economics is the spread of policies based on mistrust and on the assumption that everyone is only concerned with their own interests. Evidence shows that this assumption is unwarranted, but that it becomes true in certain circumstances: if you treat people as unreliable and egoistic, then that is how they will behave;42 they may even start believing that their behavior should be determined by self-interest exclusively.43 One of the most interesting parts of Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton's paper is their review of research on the effects of economics education on students.44 This research shows that exposure to mainstream economic doctrine makes students more self-interested, 41 Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert I. Sutton, "Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories can Become Self-Fulfilling," Academy of Management Review 30.1 (2005): 8–24. 42 C. Daniel Batson, Jay Coke, M.L. Jasnoski, and Michael Hanson, "Buying Kindness: Effect of an Extrinsic Incentive for Helping on Perceived Altruism," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 4.1 (1978): 86–91, and Samuel Bowles, "Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine 'The Moral Sentiments': Evidence from Economic Experiments," Science 320.5883 (2008): 1605–9. 43 Dale Miller, "The Norm of Self-Interest," American Psychologist 54.12 (1999): 1053–60. 44 Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton, "Economics Language and Assumptions," 14. hegemony 55 more deceitful, more manipulative, less empathic, less likely to feel guilt or remorse, and so forth. (And more recent research confirms this.45) In other words, it makes students match (many) more of the indicators of psychopathy.46 It may not change them into full-blown psychopaths, but psychopathy comes in gradations, and there is ample evidence that "education" (or indoctrination) in the dogmas of mainstream economics makes students more psychopathic. The (Self-)Corruption of Critique Hegemony is the spread of ideas (such as values and beliefs) that support and maintain the socio-political status quo. Therefore, alternative sources of ideas may undermine hegemony, but if hegemony is effective, then alternative ideas may not be taken seriously, or may even undermine themselves. If hegemony is effective, then the belief that there is no alternative becomes common sense, turning proposed alternatives (for common sense) into obvious nonsense. This is how hegemony undermines critique: by making it "irrational." (A special case hereof is the medicalization of discomfort and dissent, but although important, that topic is outside the scope of this essay.47) Critique can also undermine itself in various ways, however, helping hegemony to do "its job," and it is not always easy to determine whether certain corruptions of critique were the product of hegemony or relatively independent developments that just helped hegemony. The focus here is on the corruption of critical ideas, but hegemony also undermines their social carriers. Under the influence of the hegemonic belief that there is no alternative, most political parties, labor unions, feminist organizations, and so forth that started 45 See, for example, Long Wang, Deepak Malhotra, and Keith Murninghan, "Economics Education and Greed," Management Learning & Education 10.4 (2011): 643–60, and Mathias Philip Hühn, "You Reap What You Sow: How mba Programs Undermine Ethics," Journal of Business Ethics 121 (2014): 537–41. 46 See Tables 3 and 4 in the second chapter of this volume. 47 On this topic and other ways in which psychiatry, psychology, and related sciences are used to invalidate discomfort, stifle dissent, and strengthen hegemonic control, see Jacques Davies, The Happiness Industry: How the Government and Big Business Sold us Well-Being (London: Verso, 2015). the hegemony of psychopathy 56 out as critics gradually but surely moved towards acceptance (or even supporters) of the status quo and the social, political, and economic worldview that supports it. And those who refused to comply were ridiculed (as Utopian lunatics or something similar) and marginalized (with the help of the mass media) or even criminalized. The main alternative sources of ideas- that is, potential competitors with the hegemonic ideas- are philosophy (in the broadest possible sense of that term) and religion. Throughout history, religion has usually sided with the powerful, however. Rather than opposing hegemony, religion has more often been a tool of hegemony. This is entirely understandable, of course, as religious institutions have been well rewarded for their support of the sociopolitical status quo, but it is also possible that the apparent closeness between religions and the hegemones is partly the result of an evolutionary process: opposing hegemony decreases the chances of survival, and therefore, many religious currents that did so declined or were even wiped out, while those that sided with hegemony grew and ended up dominating the religious landscape. Regardless of such institutional and historical considerations, religion is a potential source of counter-hegemonic ideas, or at least of ideas opposing the hegemony of psychopathy. In all of the "World Religions" compassion is one of the most important virtues (if not the most important virtue). Psychopathy is the polar opposite of compassion. Therefore, cultural psychopathy and the hegemony that promotes and spreads it should be the archenemies of all of the World Religions. Although there are religious leaders- including very prominent ones- that regularly speak out against (aspects of) the hegemony of psychopathy (without using that term, of course), in practice religions remain firmly wed to hegemony. This raises the question: Why? Why is this potential source of counter-hegemonic critique so effectively disarmed? It is easier to focus your attention on "bad" things other people do (such as abortion or marrying people they are not "supposed" to) than to focus your attention on what you do yourself or on what- according to your religion- you should do, especially if hegemony tells you that you're not doing anything wrong. More concretely, all of the World Religions instruct their believers to be compassionate, but it is easy to forget that when hegemony tells you that it is OK to be selfish and religious leaders distract you by means of easier targets hegemony 57 that don't mess with your self-image. If this rough sketch is (close to) accurate, then a mixture of institutional factors, hegemony, and the need for self-affirmation all contribute to the undermining of religion as a potential source of critique. And considering that each one of these would probably be powerful enough to do so on its own, it is no wonder that religion is failing as a source of counterhegemonic ideas (and thereby failing itself). The second potential source of critique, philosophy, isn't doing any better, unfortunately. Socrates considered his role to be like that of a "gadfly" sent by the Gods to wake up democracy, which he compared to a "well-bred horse that has become sluggish because of its size" and which, because of that, is in need to be roused by critical thinkers.48 Philosophers, critical theorists, and other thinkers in the same neighborhood may pride themselves by thinking they are gadflies like Socrates (assuming he was one, which is debatable), but in practice they're anything but. Since half a century or so Western philosophy has been split into two camps that do not communicate with or even understand each other: analytic philosophy (which thrived in the uk and us), and Continental philosophy (which thrived in France and Germany). Analytic philosophy was forced into barren abstraction and away from social relevance during the Cold War and never recovered.49 This is probably most visible in branches like ethics and social philosophy. Most research in ethics within the analytic tradition, for example, concerns meta-ethics (which focuses on highly theoretical questions about the nature of moral truth, the existence of moral facts, and so forth), and what is left of normative ethics is mostly an elaborate attempt to justify not having to care about other people's suffering.50 This trend may have reached its apex in the so-called "Ethics of Care" that proclaims that one has moral obligations only to people that one has relations with.51 The Ethics of Care is 48 Plato, Apology, 30e. 49 George Reisch, How the Cold War Transformed the Philosophy of Science (Cambridge, uk: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 50 There are exceptions, of course. By far the most prominent among those is Peter Singer. See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality," Philosophy and Public Affairs 1.3 (1972): 542–43. 51 Carroll Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1982), and Nel the hegemony of psychopathy 58 supposed to be an ethics of empathy, but it really is an "ethics" of exclusion, a theory that limits the scope of empathy to one's personal acquaintances. Hence, the "Ethics of Care" is a cynical misnomer- considering that it advocates that one doesn't have to care about the 99.999% or so of the world population that one doesn't have a relation with, the "Ethics of not giving a [insert your favorite swearword here]" would have been a more fitting name.52 Continental philosophy and its allies such as critical theory, social studies of science, post-modernist philosophy, neo- (and post-)Marxism, and so forth have not fared much better, but while analytic philosophy as a potential source of counter-hegemonic critique was destroyed by hegemony, Continental philosophy selfdestructed. Until fairly recently, virtually all Continental philosophy (broadly understood) adhered to some form of (metaphysical and epistemological) anti-realism,53 often denouncing realism as "reactionary." But the anti-realist rejection of a reality independent from (or external to) our theories, beliefs, and languages in favor of a radical form of social constructionism implies a rejection of objectivity, and without objectivity there are no objective grounds for critique. Much of Continental philosophy confuses truth and knowledge with "held to be true" and "socially accepted as knowledge" or similar concepts, but those are not the same notions, and the fact that most of what we hold to be true (i.e., what we believe) and most Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, ca: University of California Press, 1984). 52 I'm ignoring Ethical Egoism here because it plays no significant role in philosophy. Ethical Egoism is the moral theory that claims that the only moral obligation one has is to further one's own (objective, long term) interests. Although this theory is the de facto ethics of the hegemony of psychopathy and is very popular among the semi-literate fans of Ayn Rand, it is very hard to defend, and for that reason a very uncommon position among moral philosophers. 53 Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism (Evanston, il: Northwestern University Press, 2007). On the recent emergence of realist (or anti-anti-realist?) Continental philosophy, see Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, "Towards a Speculative Philosophy," in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, eds. Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman (Melbourne, Australia: re.press, 2011), 1–18. hegemony 59 of what we call knowledge is indeed socially constructed does not imply that reality itself is socially constructed. (See also Box 4.) Giving up the idea of an external / independent reality (in addition to being absurdly anthropocentric) means giving up on the idea of an independent check on our beliefs, and thereby giving up on the notions of objectivity and (objective) truth. But without objectivity (or objective truth), claims cannot be judged by the extent to which they represent the way things are, but only by the interests they serve and by their rhetorical success. The word "truth," then, effectively becomes a euphemism for rhetorical success. Without objectivity, a liar is not misrepresenting reality (because there is no such thing as representing reality) but just an unsuccessful rhetor: lying is failing to convince. (See also next section.) Conversely, telling the "truth" is succeeding; "truth" is rhetorical success; "truth" is power. And therefore, rejecting objectivity and (some form of) realism is opening the door to tyranny. Where this leads is perhaps best illustrated by Slavoj Žižek who in his writings never offers a transparent argument for his claims, but instead tries to beat his readers into submission with a barrage of rhetorical tricks. Žižek's love of violence is not just textual, moreover, as he pairs the Continental substitution of power / rhetoric for truth / objectivity with a more general adoration of power / violence in the political sphere: Žižek's political aims are best described as the wet dreams of a violent psychopath.54 In this way, Žižek has effectively become an agent of hegemony, simultaneously disarming counter-hegemonic critique by denying it the only weapon it has- truth- and by infecting it with a psychopathic love of violence, both textual and political. Suffering, injustice, oppression, poverty, hunger, and so forth are real. They are facts. But Continental anti-realism rejects the categories of "real" and "fact"- at least in an objective sense- along with truth and objectivity, and thus, rather than objective fact, suffering (etc.) becomes just a perspective or a social construction. This, of course, is one of the most useful aspects of Continental thought 54 On Žižek's violent fantasies, see, for example, Alan Johnson, "Slavoj Žižek's Theory of Revolution: A Critique," in The Legacy of Marxism: Contemporary Challenges, Conflicts, and Developments, ed. Matthew Johnson (London: Continuum, 2012), 37–55. the hegemony of psychopathy 60 Box 4: Realism and Anti-realism In some sense, mountains are socially constructed. That is, where we draw the boundary between mountains and hills and around individual mountains (or between mountain and valley) is largely a matter of social convention. That doesn't make the chunks of rock that we refer to with the word "mountain" any less real, however. The anti-realist claim that there really are no mountains is as silly as what is often considered its antithesis: the essentialist claim that our word "mountain" picks out a natural kind, meaning that what is mountain and what is not and where and how we draw the boundaries is not a matter of convention, but some kind of natural fact waiting to be discovered. Such essentialism has plagued Western philosophy since Aristotle,55 and is nowadays often assumed to be an inherent part of realism. Realism- in that view- holds a number of theses that anti-realists reject.56 These theses, however, are largely independent from each other. One can, for example, hold the "realist" thesis that there is an objective, mind-dependent, external reality, and simultaneously reject the supposedly equally "realist" theses that truth is correspondence with that reality and that there is one and only one true and complete description of how the world is; and there is a small minority of Western philosophers who defend(ed) such intermediate positions in between realism and anti-realism.57 This is not the place to argue for such a view, but I believe that such an intermediate view is right.58 The anti-realist rejection of the notion of an objective / 55 Throughout most of the history of Western philosophy, essentialism has been the default position. In Analytic philosophy it is stronger than ever since Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (repr. 1980; Oxford: Blackwell, 1972). In Asian philosophy, on the other hand, essentialism is far less common. Buddhist and Jainist philosophy, for example, are explicitly anti-essentialist, and essentialist tendencies are also rare in Chinese philosophy. 56 Two influential lists of theses commonly attributed to realism and supposedly rejected by anti-realism can be found in Searle and Braver, written by an analytic and a continental philosopher, respectively. (It must be noted that Searle rejects several of the theses that he identifies as being commonly attributed to realism as "mistakes." See also the next footnote.) See John Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free Press, 1995) and Braver, A Thing of This World. 57 This includes several very prominent philosophers, such as W.V.O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, Searle, and in some interpretations, Donald Davidson. 58 The beginnings of my argument for such an intermediate position can be found in Lajos Brons, "Dharmakīrti, Davidson, and Knowing Reality," Comparative Philosophy 3.1 (2012): 30–57, and Brons, "Meaning and Reality: A Cross-Traditional Encounter," in Constructive Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy, eds. Bo Mou and Richard Tieszen (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 199–200. For another interesting argument hegemony 61 Box 4: Realism and Anti-realism (continued) external reality is as implausible as the "realist" (or more appropriately, essentialist) belief that the world comes pre-organized in natural kinds.59 from a hegemonic point of view- if there are no objective facts but just social constructions, then there are no facts of poverty or environmental destruction. Unfortunately, naivety prevented many (but not all) Continental thinkers from seeing this consequence of their rejection of "reactionary" realism. It took Bruno Latour, one of the most influential Continental thinkers on science, a few decades to realize this, for example. He awoke from his anti-realist slumber when he found that his ideas are now used to brush aside scientific facts about climate change. And, of course, now he is arguing for facts.60 Most Continental philosophers will probably consider the foregoing a misrepresentation or caricature of their ideas, and to some extent it is indeed. Within social constructionism, more sophisticated and more vulgar strands can be distinguished. Vulgar constructionism is relativist and radically anti-realist- it rejects objectivity, facts, and the notion of reality. Hence, the above is- more or less- a representation of the Continental mainstream as vulgar constructionism. But very few continental philosophers explicitly defend such vulgar constructionism. The problem, however, is that outside the small circle of (apparent) sophisticated constructionists, social constructionism almost always devolves into vulgar relativism, and that even sophisticated constructionists tend to espouse radical anti-realism in most contexts and only retreat to more sophisticated views when challenged. In other words, the foregoing only misrepresents the self-image of Continental philosophy, not its real face. relative to an intermediate position between realism and anti-realism called "relative essentialism," see Samuel Wheeler, Neo-Davidsonian Metaphysics: From the True to the Good (New York: Routledge, 2014). 59 One reason why the rejection of an external / objective reality is implausible is that the possibility of language and communication seems to depend on the existence of a shared, external reality. See Brons, "Dharmakīrti, Davidson, and Knowing Reality." 60 Bruno Latour, "Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern," Critical Inquiry 30.2 (2004): 225–48. the hegemony of psychopathy 62 "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it," wrote Karl Marx in 1845,61 but in the last half century or so, neo-Marxists, post-Marxists, and others influenced by his ideas have even forgotten about interpreting the world- let alone changing it- and just interpret texts. I imagine that Marx would have been less than pleased by this co-optation of his work by an academic cult specializing in mass-producing a kind of inscrutable, sectarian "theoretical work" detached from all reality and undermining attempts to change the world more than helping them; but these "thinkers" could not have done the hegemones a greater favor. Education for Compliance In Not for Profit, Martha Nussbaum warns against a kind of (higher) education that is focused only on short term economic interests, and that disparages traditional aims of education such as intellectual autonomy and independence.62 With special reference to the situation in India, she writes that education for economic growth needs a very rudimentary familiarity with history and with economic fact . . . . But care must be taken lest the historical and economic narrative lead to any serious critical thinking about class, about race and gender, about whether foreign investment is really good for the rural poor, about whether democracy can survive when huge inequalities in basic life-chances obtain . . . . The student's freedom of mind is dangerous if what is wanted is a group of technically trained obedient workers to carry out the plans of elites who are aiming at foreign investment and technological development. Critical thinking will, then, be discouraged . . . .63 61 Karl Marx, Thesen über Feuerbach (1845), in Marx and Friedrich Engels, Werke, Vol. 3 (Berlin: Dietz, 1969), 5–7; 7. My translation. 62 Martha Nussbaum, Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the Humanities (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2010). On the (traditional) aims of education, see Roger Marples, ed., The Aims of Education (London: Routledge, 1999). 63 Nussbaum, Not for Profit, 20–21. hegemony 63 There is a worldwide tendency to convert education into the massproduction of "human resources"- that is, disposable things that can be used in the production process- and to devalue or abolish anything that is not expected (by mainstream economics and their political allies) to contribute to profit and short-term economic growth. Towards that end schools and universities have gradually revised their curricula to focus more on "marketable skills" (to the detriment of the humanities and social sciences), and many have been taken over by managers without any background in education, or have been subjugated to the market by other means. The same business ideology has corrupted healthcare and other public and social services in many countries. While these are important developments, and much more can be said about them, they are merely the result of the hegemonic influence of cultural psychopathy, and there are more subtle and less obvious ways in which education plays a role in maintaining hegemony. From a hegemonic perspective, the primary function of education is training future citizens in "spontaneous" consent. As Nussbaum remarked, freedom of mind, critical thinking, and intellectual independence are dangerous and should be discouraged. However, hegemony cannot openly thwart or even disparage critical thinking, because critical thinking and intellectual autonomy are cornerstones of liberal democracy, the official ideology of hegemony. But that only means that hegemony needs the appearance of promoting critical thinking. Unsurprisingly then, critical thinking has become a buzzword in education, while what is taught under that header has been hollowed out. With few exceptions, the teaching of critical thinking in higher education takes one of two forms: either it is offered in the form of an informal logic course, or it is incorporated into a writing course such as "persuasive writing." The former approach is typical wherever philosophy departments- especially those affiliated with analytic philosophy- are in charge of teaching critical thinking. The latter is the typical approach of English departments.64 Both mostly fail to teach critical thinking, but for very different reasons. 64 Richard Paul, "The State of Critical Thinking Today," New Directions for Community Colleges 130 (2005): 27–38. For an influential example of the identification of critical thinking with informal logic, see H. Siegel, the hegemony of psychopathy 64 Courses in critical thinking as informal logic focus primarily on discovering flaws in the arguments of others, usually by means of short, fairly abstract examples. The approach appears to be motivated by an assumption that improving one's own thinking (i.e., finding and avoiding flaws in one's own reasoning) automatically follows from learning to scrutinize the arguments of others (if that indeed is what students learn). That assumption stands in needs of a warrant, however. The very purpose of philosophical debate- and arguably, without debate there would be no philosophy- is to point out the flaws in the arguments by others, flaws that the authors did not and could not find themselves. The history of philosophy is a long series of expositions of flaws in arguments and responses in the form of new arguments, and nothing in that history suggests that the ability to expose flaws in others' arguments entails the ability to avoid flaws in one's own. Furthermore, this approach to critical thinking is inherently passive, which is probably its most useful feature from a hegemonic point of view. The counterpart of the implicit view that critical thinking is nothing but the scrutiny of others' arguments, is that "citizens who make an informed choice between options outlined by authorities have fully exercised their critical capacities," as Laura Kaplan aptly put it.65 But that is not sufficient. The ability to think critically also implies the ability to question whatever is behind the options given (i.e., why those options were given), and to find and scrutinize further options (that were not given). Of course, this is generally acknowledged by advocates of critical thinking as informal logic,66 but uncovering hidden assumptions is the most difficult and "Educating Reason: Critical Thinking, Informal Logic, and the Philosophy of Education - Part Two: Philosophical Questions Underlying Education for Critical Thinking," Informal Logic 7.2–3 (1985): 69–81. 65 Laura Duhan Kaplan, "Teaching Intellectual Autonomy: The Failure of the Critical Thinking Movement," in Re-Thinking Reason: New Perspectives on Critical Thinking, ed. Kerry S. Walters (Albany, ny: State University of New York, 1994), 205–20; 209. 66 See, for example, Sharon Bailin and Siegel, "Critical Thinking," in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Education, eds. Nigel Blake, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish (Malden, ma: Blackwell, 2003), 181–93. hegemony 65 least mechanical aspect of critical thinking and is, for that reason, neglected in critical thinking courses. The consequence is that- at worst- what is left of critical thinking in informal logic courses is a sterile numbering and / or diagramming of arguments and checking them against the list of fallacies, but even at best, actual course content does not extend much beyond this. Critical thinking as taught by English departments doesn't fare much better, unfortunately, albeit for entirely different reasons. The theoretical or philosophical orientation of most English departments, as well as that of most other language and literature departments, is heavily influenced by the Continental tradition in philosophy (see previous section) and especially by the postmodernist branches thereof, but (usually) shorn of all political content (the latter especially after the Culture Wars of the 1990s). It embraces Continental anti-realism, anti-positivism, and opposition to "grand narratives," while de-emphasizing or ignoring (at least publicly) political critique. For that reason, this theoretical orientation is best characterized as post-critical. What may explain this postmodernist or post-critical orientation is that truth, objective facts, and grand theories do not play an important role in literature, that the anti-realist rejection of any reality beyond "texts" chimes well with the focus and concerns of much of the humanities,67 and that the implication thereof that there is nothing but rhetoric provides support for the prioritization of rhetoric over analysis in writing courses. Teaching rhetoric often starts with Aristotle's modes of persuasion: ethos, pathos, and logos- roughly, the credibility of the rhetor (speaker or writer), the appeal to the emotions of the audience, and the persuasive quality of the argument, respectively. If there is no such thing as objective truth, or getting it right- except perhaps as a misleading metaphor for convincing oneself- then all a writer can rely on is these modes as tools to convince some audience. Then the purpose of proper references and reliable data sources is merely the 67 According to Jacques Derrida, there is "nothing outside the text" ("il n'y a pas de hors-texte"), but the notion of text here is broader than the ordinary notion and includes - in some interpretations - buildings, movies, works of art, and various other kinds of artefacts. Derrida, De la Grammatologie (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1967). the hegemony of psychopathy 66 credibility of the author ("building ethos"). Then arguments do not need to be valid or well-supported, and proofs only need to appear to be true (and thus even fallacies are not necessarily to be avoided, as long as the audience doesn't notice). And then any manipulative appeal to emotions is allowed, as long as it works. The general disregard for analytical skills in persuasive writing (and similar) courses is not just a consequence of a post-critical rejection of truth in favor of rhetoric, however. It is also related to the explicit focus on writing (and speaking, in some courses). The consequence of this focus is that a course in persuasive writing is (generally) just that: it teaches how to persuade rather than how to argue, how to convince rather than how to be right. Students do not learn how to analyze arguments or discourses, how to pick up on ideological distortions, or how to detect flaws in reasoning or rhetorical tricks. Critical thinking thus is voided not just of the "critical" aspect, but of "thinking" as well, and degenerates into trying to get one's way. The demise of critical thinking education is not just the result of disciplinary preoccupations (which are formed partly by hegemonic pressures themselves), however. Financial and political pressures play an equally important role. Political critique threatens the financial security of the school and administrators and politicians often demand political neutrality, and consequently, (controversial) social and political topics are avoided in critical thinking courses (of both varieties). But "neutrality" is never really neutral. As Elie Wiesel pointed out in his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech, "neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim."68 Neutrality is a euphemism for acceptance of the socio-political status quo, that is, of hegemony. What passes for teaching critical thinking either implicitly teaches to accept the options given and thereby to accept the authority of whoor whatever gives those options (i.e., hegemony), or shifts away the attention from critical thought to desires and how to satisfy them, thus producing egocentric and manipulative consumers rather than critical thinkers. Either is fine for hegemony, of course; what would be less ideal from a hegemonic point of view 68 "Elie Wiesel–Acceptance Speech," Nobel Prize, December 10, 1986, www. nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1986/wiesel-acceptance_ en.html, ¶8. hegemony 67 is a critical thinking course that actually supports intellectual independence (rather than unthinking, "spontaneous" acceptance) and a critical attitude. And considering that intellectual independence is among the main, traditional aims of education, this means that under the hegemony of psychopathy, education fails in achieving its main goals.69 Summary of the Foregoing Cultural psychopathy was defined in the second chapter as the acceptance or even approval by some culture or social group of psychopathy as normal rather than deviant- that is, as the normalization of psychopathy. And (individual, rather than cultural) psychopathy was characterized by a lack of empathic concern, a lack of remorse, egocentricity, and a number of other deficiencies with regards to the willingness and / or ability to take others into account. My main claim in this essay is that cultural psychopathy is hegemonic, and thereby has become a pervasive aspect of modern culture. The notion of hegemony in this sense was developed by Gramsci on the basis of ideas by Machiavelli and others. The core of Gramsci's theory is that political control can have only two bases: hegemony and force. There are only two ways to make someone do what you want him to do: either he accepts your command, or you force him (by means of violence or the threat of violence, or otherwise). The first is hegemony. Hence, hegemony is the acceptance of and consent to the socio-political status quo. Hegemony works through the spontaneous, uncritical acceptance of the values and beliefs that support that status quo. Most of the third chapter described aspects of the role of four "pillars" of hegemony in maintaining and promoting the hegemony of psychopathy: the mass media and "culture industry," mainstream (neoclassical) economics, "critique," and (higher) education. The mass media and culture industry promote egocentricity and normalize psychopathy, numb the senses (particularly our sense of empathy) by means of a continuous exposure to violence, and actively spread hegemonic values and beliefs in "news" and infotainment. Mainstream economics promotes a picture of man as psychopath, 69 See Marples, The Aims of Education. the hegemony of psychopathy 68 gives the (false!) hegemonic belief that "there is no alternative" the status of "scientific fact," and makes people and societies more psychopathic through policy and indoctrination. (And in addition to all that, mainstream economics is also responsible for the lack of development in most of the "developing" world, and the consequent suffering, as well as for environmental degradation, among others.) The last two sections (before this one) showed how hegemony effectively undermined critique- often with the help of the "critics" themselves- and impoverishes (higher) education. These pillars support the hegemony of psychopathy directly by manufacturing and reinforcing consent through "education," news and infotainment, and the continuous repetition of the so-called "realist" mantra that there is no alternative.70 But they also support the hegemony of psychopathy in a more indirect way by spreading and promoting the values and beliefs that support hegemony on the long term. Particularly, the first two of these pillars actively promote egocentricity and erode empathic concern (by devaluing or even dismissing empathy and care), and all four undermine any kind of nonconformity or dissent. 70 Note that this is the "realism" of political realism - or better, capitalist realism - not the metaphysical realism discussed in the section on the (self-) corruption of critique. See Fisher, Capitalist Realism. 69 4 The War of Position The Machiavellian core of Gramsci's theory of hegemony is that a state's socio-political control (i.e., its power) can rest on two and only two bases: "spontaneous" acceptance / consent, and brute force. The term "hegemony" (or "cultural hegemony") refers to the first of these two: to the spontaneous acceptance of and / or consent to the socio-political status quo. Gramsci's theory has some important implications. First and foremost, if in some state hegemony breaks down, the hegemones can only rely on brute force to remain in control, and the weaker hegemony (i.e., the weaker the acceptance of the hegemones' power / authority), the more force is needed.1 If the hegemones cannot sufficiently compensate the decline of hegemonic control with force (or if a government is toppled, and the new government has insufficient hegemonic support and insufficient access to force), then society may collapse into civil war, especially if there are multiple belief systems competing to take over from the old hegemonic beliefs. Furthermore, because brute force is costly and most likely to reduce hegemonic support (because people are less willing to spontaneously consent to a regime that is killing them), this implies that 1 Hannah Arendt made a very similar argument in "On Violence," differing mainly in the substitution of the terms "power" and "violence" for Gramsci's "hegemony" and "force." Arendt's concept of power is related to legitimacy and acceptance. If a state loses power - in Arendt's sense of that term - it must and will rely on violence to remain in control. See Hannah Arendt, "On Violence," in Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), 101–98. the hegemony of psychopathy 70 if some group of revolutionaries wishes to take control of a state- and keep it- then it needs to assure that it has sufficient hegemonic support before it attempts to take control. This means that before any actual struggle for power can begin, there has to be a struggle against the dominant, hegemonic values and beliefs, and an attempt to replace them- as much as possible- with counter-hegemonic values and beliefs that simultaneously reduce hegemonic support for the current regime and raise support for the new one, waiting to take over. Gramsci called this the "war of position." Only after that phase in the revolutionary struggle has been passed successfully- that is, when the group's counter-hegemonic ideology has found sufficient support- the "war of manoeuvre" in which the revolutionary group actually attempts to gain control can start. This is one of the most important lessons that any would-be revolutionary or reformer can learn from Gramsci (or Machiavelli): the struggle of ideas must precede the struggle for power. It is not a lesson well-learned, however, as many revolutionaries, reformers, and other kinds of political activists appear to be unaware of the power of hegemony in preserving the status quo. (One cannot say they assume that they have already won the "war of position"- because they don't know that term and what it means- but many appear to be acting on that assumption.) Any would-be revolutionary or reformer must counter hegemony if the change she wishes to produce conflicts with the hegemones' interests. A sufficiently persistent activist may be able to get some results- as long as it is more opportune for the hegemones to give in to her demands than to resist them- but never will these lead to significant change. Hegemony resists change (except if it is in the hegemones' interest), and without a change in hegemony no significant change is possible. Hence, an environmental activist is deluding herself if she beliefs she can save the planet by focusing on specific environmental problems while ignoring the hegemonic beliefs that caused- and will keep causing- them. And a Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, or Hindu wishing to live in a more compassionate society- that is, a society more in line with the teachings of her religion- is similarly deluding herself if she believes that that is possible without fighting- and defeating- the hegemony of psychopathy. To fight hunger, you have to fight hegemony. To fight poverty, you have to fight hegemony. I can easily extend this list, but the point should be clear the war of position 71 already: except if you're rich and / or powerful and without a conscience, the hegemony of psychopathy is your enemy. This means, of course, that in the fight against the hegemony of psychopathy- assuming that you're interested in fighting that fight- we'll have many allies, or many potential allies at least, if we're able to convince them. The enemies of the hegemony of psychopathy include socialists, anarchists, communitarian conservatives, environmentalists, Buddhists, Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and many more. These are all potential allies. There is an obvious objection to this claim: all these "potential allies" want different things- why should they even want to cooperate, and what's to prevent them from fighting each other? This objection is mistaken, however. To a large extent, all of these allies (without scare quotes) want the same thing: they want a society that is not just ruled by selfish monetary interests, they want a less psychopathic, more compassionate (or more empathic) society. And the only way to achieve that is to replace the current hegemony that values cultural psychopathy with a new hegemony that values compassion / empathy. (Note that psychopathy is a lack of empathic concern, primarily, and that the negation thereof- i.e., lack of lack of- brings us back to empathy.) Hence, what all these allies want (or should want, at least) is to replace the hegemony of psychopathy with its opposite, with a hegemony of compassion / empathy. Of course, that's not all they want: most of them have various aims in addition to defeating the hegemony of psychopathy, aims that can be reached only after such a defeat, but this should be no reason for concern. If we are able to defeat the hegemony of psychopathy and make empathy hegemonic instead, then we'll be able to listen to and try to understand each other, and try to imagine ourselves in each other's shoes (because that is what empathy means), and then we will be able to work something out. A Brief Utopian Interlude There is a large and growing literature proclaiming that more empathy and care will lead to a better world. This literature is the Utopianism of our time. It sells dreams about a better world, without reflecting on the possibility of realizing those dreams, and the hegemony of psychopathy 72 Box 5: Gender and Empathy / Care It is often assumed that women are more caring than men (see also Box 1 in the first chapter in this volume). According to male chauvinists this makes women more suitable for caring tasks such as childcare and nursing; according to female chauvinists this makes women more suitable for almost anything.2 However, if there is scarcity of sufficiently caring / empathic people relative to the number of tasks that require such people, then it would be socially desirable if those people take up those tasks. In other words, this kind of female chauvinism may lead to the exact same conclusion as male chauvinism: women should take care of children, their families, the sick, and the elderly, and only concern themselves with other tasks after all the caring is done. Hence, the feminist credentials of female chauvinism are rather dubious. More important, however, is that both forms of gender chauvinism are based on a false assumption: there is no evidence that women are inherently more caring / empathic than men.3 But there is growing evidence that actually giving care makes one more caring / empathic.4 Giving care leads to hormonal and neurological changes with such effects. Consequently, insofar as (some) women are more caring / empathic than (some) men, this is not because of a biological difference, but because of a cultural difference: forcing women (or people in general) to do more caring makes them more caring (thus producing and simultaneously confirming the myth of gender difference). 2 Carroll Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1982), and Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Boston, ma: Beacon, 1989). See also Iddo Landau, "Good Women and Bad Men: A Bias in Feminist Research," Journal of Social Philosophy 28.1 (1997): 141–50, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9833.1997.tb00369.x. 3 Sara Jaffee and Janet S. Hyde, "Gender Differences in Moral Orientation: A Meta-Analysis," Psychological Bulletin 126 (2000): 703–26. See also Hyde, "The Gender Similarities Hypothesis," American Psychologist 60.6 (2005): 571–92. 4 Anne E. Storey and Toni E. Ziegler, "Primate Paternal Care: Interactions Between Biology and Social Experience," Hormones and Behavior 77 (2016): 260–71. Pilyoung Kim, Paola Rigo, Linda C. Mayes, Ruth Feldman, James F. Leckman, and James E. Swain, "Neural Plasticity in Fathers of Human Infants," Social Neuroscience 9.5 (2014): 522–35. Eyal Abraham, Talma Hendler, Irit Shapira-Lichter, Yaniv Kanat-Maymon, Orna Zagoory-Sharon, and Ruth Feldman, "Father's Brain is Sensitive to Childcare Experiences," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (pnas) 111.27 (2014): 9792–97, doi: 10.1073/pnas.1402569111. the war of position 73 without identifying obstacles and enemies of empathy / care (i.e., the hegemony of psychopathy). I have no intention to indulge in similar Utopianism, but the last sentences of the previous section may sound ridiculously Utopian and cry out for an explanation. An effective hegemony does not just propagate values and beliefs, but also the second-order belief that those (first-order) beliefs are natural, inevitable, or beyond doubt and scrutiny. Consequently, an effective hegemony of psychopathy does not just propagate the pathological egocentricity typical of psychopathy (see the second chapter in this volume), but also the belief that human beings are naturally egocentric (and thus that egocentricity is not pathological but normal). The latter doctrine is called "psychological egoism." It is a widespread and influential doctrine- as one would expect of a hegemonic doctrine- but it is also false. The least defective arguments for psychological egoism succeed in proving that human beings have selfish motives. However, from that intermediate conclusion they then invalidly jump to the claim that human beings only have selfish motives. Contrary to this claim, there is a mountain of evidence that human motivation is too complex to be reducible to a single factor. In his most recent book, the psychologist Daniel Batson distinguishes four kinds of motivation: egoism, altruism, collectivism, and "principlism;" and reviews the evidence for each.5 Of these four, the first two- egoism and altruism- are particularly strong. Human beings are not just motivated by their own well-being, but also by that of cared-for others. (It is often assumed that there are gender differences in this respect. See Box 5.) "Principlism" is Batson's term for being motivated by moral principles, and is the main topic of his book. He shows convincingly that we present ourselves as being guided by principles, but that in practice, almost no one is (because we only need to be seen as moral by others). Moral integrity is extremely rare, while moral hypocrisy is very common. In the final chapter of his book he considers ways to make moral integrity more common, assuming that this would be desirable, but that assumption is debatable. 5 C. Daniel Batson, What's Wrong with Morality? A Social-Psychological Perspective (Oxford, uk: Oxford University Press, 2016). the hegemony of psychopathy 74 "Principlism" or moral integrity is being genuinely motivated by one's moral principles, but different people have different moral principles, and these may be in conflict. There is no guarantee that if everyone would act according to their moral beliefs, this would actually result in a significantly more habitable world. It may even increase moral conflict. As mentioned, of the four motivations, "principlism" is the weakest (to the extent of being virtually absent in most people), while egoism and altruism are the strongest. Batson's own research shows that altruism is the effect of empathic concern.6 Feeling for / with the other makes us care about that other. Batson rejects altruism as a reliable moral motivation because experiments show that it does not always produce fair results,7 but these experiments only show that if we empathize with only one party involved in some moral dilemma, we unfairly benefit that one party. Hence, what these arguments show is that if we exclude some party from empathic concern, we will act unfairly towards that party, but that is hardly surprising.8 What we need, then, is a kind of empathic concern that isn't restricted to just those we already cared about, but that is automatically extended to everyone involved in our decisions, and everyone affected by our actions. Perhaps, we need a different term for that. In ancient Buddhist writings the Pali term "mettā"- usually translated as "loving-kindness" or "benevolence"- is used to refer to 6 Batson, Altruism in Humans (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 7 Strictly speaking, Batson does not consider altruism a moral motivation at all because in his terminology only principlism is a moral motivation. 8 In Against Empathy, Paul Bloom rejects empathy for a number of reasons, but he confuses different notions of empathy (see the table in the first chapter of this book). If we discard his arguments against empathic distress and emotional contagion (or sympathy), which are of little relevance here, then all we are left with is the familiar argument that empathy is always partial, biased, and narrowly focused, and therefore, unlikely to produce fair results. (This is also the basis of my critical note about the "Ethics of Care" in the previous chapter.) This is a valid argument, of course, but I'm not advocating (such narrow) empathic concern as a moral foundation. Rather, my argument is that compassion (i.e., empathic concern) is a social necessity, and that empathy is partial (etc.) does not in any way refute this. Nevertheless, I do believe that empathic concern is also morally relevant, although probably only indirectly, but that is a topic for another essay. See Bloom, Against Empathy: The Case for Rational Compassion (London: Bodley Head, 2016). the war of position 75 genuine care for the other's well-being, or to something comparable to the love one feels for one's friends, but without restriction to particular targets. Hence, mettā is empathic concern for everyone.9 Because empathic concern makes us care about others and take their interests into account, this kind of diffuse empathic concern would make us care about all relevant others and take everyone's interests into account. That- ideally- is what an empathic counter-hegemony should establish. There are no blueprints for such a post-psychopathic future, and neither can there be, but any group of people the members of which genuinely care about each other and about each other's interests is able to communicate, cooperate, and compromise. This is what underlies the "Utopian" remarks at the end of the previous section. Some Tactical Considerations Nearly everyone should want to fight hegemony, but of course, almost no one actually does. The reason is obvious: hegemony. As long as hegemony is effective, only very few oppose it, or are even aware of it.10 That is the nature of hegemony. The other side of the coin is that the more successful the fight against hegemony and the weaker it becomes, the more people will be able to wake up from their hegemonic slumber and join the fight. The questions "How to fight hegemony?" and "How to get (more) people to join that fight?" have the same answer. Nevertheless, the question "How to fight the war of position?" is really two questions (at least). It is a question both about tactics and about methods, both about what to fight and about how to fight. Before returning to the implications of Gramsci's Machiavellian theory of the two bases of control, I will offer some thoughts on both in the following, but no answers, or no complete answers, at least. 9 The Sanskrit term that is commonly translated as "compassion" is "karuṇā." 10 It is the nature of hegemony that those who are under its influence are unaware of it. The stronger the hegemonic influence, the weaker the awareness of the workings of hegemony. And by implication, the stronger the hegemonic influence, the stronger the "resistance" to the claims of this essay. the hegemony of psychopathy 76 Fighting hegemony, counter-hegemonic activism, or the "war of position" is a struggle for minds, not for political power. Hence, while Srdja Popovic and Matthew Miller's Blueprint for Revolution, for example, provides many interesting examples of (and ideas for) political activism, it is largely useless in the fight against the hegemony of psychopathy.11 Popovic and Miller give suggestions on how to mobilize people against a crumbling hegemony; it starts after the war of position is already well advanced or even won. We are nowhere near that stage. A better suggestion on what is needed can be found in Mark Fisher's Capitalist Realism, already quoted above: "emancipatory politics must always destroy the appearance of a 'natural order,' must reveal what is presented as necessary and inevitable to be a mere contingency."12 Again, the war of position is a "war" of ideas, and the most potent weapon in the opponent's arsenal is the idea of the naturalness of the status quo, the idea that there is no alternative. And since the strongest, most systematic support for this idea- this false idea- comes from mainstream economics, that must be among our main targets. That, however, is not the only reason to target economics. As argued above,13 mainstream economics is at least partially responsible for massive environmental destruction and massive suffering, poverty, hunger, and death, but also for the spread of cultural psychopathy. Mainstream economics harms students, as well as other people under its influence, by making them less empathic and more psychopathic. Mainstream economics provides the hegemones with a justification for the continuation of policies that only serve their interests, while turning everyone else into disposable things. Mainstream economics spreads and continuously reinforces the core hegemonic belief that there is no alternative. Mainstream economics is one of the most destructive, evil forces in the history of mankind. It must be destroyed. 11 Srdja Popovic and Matthew Miller, Blueprint for Revolution: How to Use Rice Pudding, Lego Men, and Other Non-Violent Techniques to Galvanize Communities, Overthrow Dictators, or Simply Change the World (Brunswick, Australia: Scribe, 2015). 12 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There no Alternative? (Winchester, va: Zero Books, 2009), 17. 13 See the section "Mainstream Economics," in the third chapter of this volume. the war of position 77 Some "heterodox" economists (see Box 3 in the chapter "Hegemony" in this volume) believe that economics as a whole can be reformed, or somehow cured from the cancer that is neoclassical, mainstream economics. However, even if they are right, it is much easier- and therefore, strategically preferable- to target economics as a whole. This may raise worries about "collateral damage," but those worries are unfounded. Insofar as they haven't been banished from the discipline already, heterodox economists (i.e., critics of the mainstream) can find new homes in economic sociology, economic history, economic psychology, anthropology, and geography (while neoclassicists cannot do so because they deny the relevance of society, history, psychology, culture, and space / environment). We don't need a discipline of "economics" to have sensible economic ideas (for economic policy, for example)- other branches of the social sciences and humanities can take care of that, and do so with better, less ideologically colored, and more realistic results.14 But mainstream economics is only one of the pillars of the hegemony of psychopathy (see the previous chapter), and it certainly is not sufficient to focus all attention there. Economists are the high priests of the hegemony of psychopathy, but in spreading its gospel the mass media and culture industry are at least as important. Among others, the mass media maintain and support hegemony by means of "news" and other infotainment that dehumanizes others (such as refugees, the homeless, people of other nationalities, the unemployed, the sick, the elderly, the poor, and so forth), reducing them to just "other," to faceless abstractions rather than living, breathing people. The culture industry maintains and supports hegemony by means of movies, tv dramas, and video games that glorify self-centeredness, psychopathy, and violence. The media and culture industry expose people to a continuous stream of desensitizing violence and other hegemonic propaganda, but just cutting off that stream is insufficient to counter it: we must take control of the message and show the suffering caused by the hegemony of psychopathy. We must fight numbness and raise compassion. These are the two most important tactical objectives: destroying mainstream economics, and changing the stream of psychopathic 14 Ha-Joon Chang, 23 Things They Don't Tell You about Capitalism (London: Penguin, 2010), chapter 23. the hegemony of psychopathy 78 propaganda into one that promotes empathy instead. There may be other targets and other tactical goals, but without realizing these two objectives we have no chance of winning the "war." This leads us back to the question of how to fight. I don't know the answer to that question, however. My fight is with the third pillar- that of the corruption of critique- primarily, and I don't even know how to do that.15 Nevertheless, I do have something to say about how not to fight. The Monstrosity of Violence Nietzsche warned that one "who is fighting monsters has to watch out that he doesn't become a monster oneself."16 We cannot fight psychopathy with psychopathy. And obviously, we cannot fight the hegemony of psychopathy with means that promote psychopathy- that would be self-defeating. But this means that the fight against hegemony is radically asymmetrical, not just in resources and power, but also in tactics and "techniques." We cannot allow ourselves to dehumanize the enemy, because dehumanization is what we are fighting. We cannot allow ourselves a lack of compassion- even for the enemy- because a lack of compassion is what we are fighting. Hence, we have to deny ourselves some "options" that our enemies will not deny themselves; we have to disallow ourselves to do to our enemies what they will do to us. Because otherwise we become the "monsters" we set out to fight. Because otherwise we become the enemy. It only takes a brief exercise in imagining oneself in the shoes of a victim of violence to realize that this means that we cannot resort to violence. Violence and empathy do not go together. If you can kill- if you can kill the enemy- then you are the enemy. Teachers of compassion in the distant past realized this well. This is probably why Jesus instructed his followers to "turn the other cheek" 15 For my views on philosophy, see Lajos Brons, "Anarchism as Metaphilosophy," The Science of Mind 53 (2015): 139–58. 16 Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft [Beyond Good and Evil] (1886), §146, my translation. The fragment continues with the much better known sentence, "And when you look in the abyss for too long, the abyss will look back into you." the war of position 79 (Matthew 5:39) and why it is written in the Quran that even "if you would stretch your hand towards me to kill me, I will not stretch my hand towards you to kill you" (5:28). But the realization that the monstrosity of the enemy can never be an excuse for monstrosity towards the enemy also clarifies what exactly makes that enemy "monstrous." Perhaps, one cannot blame a clinical psychopath for not empathizing with his victims for the same reason that you can hardly blame a cat for torturing and killing mice. One can certainly blame a "normal" 10-year-old child for torturing and killing mice, however, and insofar as the fight is against real people rather than against some abstract and amorphous force called "hegemony," those people tend to resemble that 10-year-old child more than the cat. That is, they are not suffering from a psychopathic personality disorder, but are psychopaths-by-choice. They choose not to empathize with the victims of their actions and decisions, while- contrary to the clinical psychopath- they are perfectly able to do so.17 Hence, they 17 There is evidence that the rich refuse to empathize with people outside their social circle (i.e., members of the middle class, the poor, etc.) and are thus psychopaths-by-choice - see, e.g., Jennifer Stellar, Vida Manzo, Michael Kraus, and Dacher Keltner, "Class and Compassion: Socioeconomic Factors Predict Responses to Suffering," Emotion 12.3 (2012): 449–59; Michael Kraus, Paul Piff, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, Michelle Rheinschmidt, and Dacher Keltner, "Social Class, Solipsism, and Contextualism: How the Rich are Different from the Poor," Psychological Review 119.3 (2012): 546–72; Paul Piff, "Wealth and the Inflated Self: Class, Entitlement, and Narcissism," Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40.1 (2014): 34–43; and David Dubois, Derek Rucker, and Adam Galinsky, "Social Class, Power, and Selfishness: When and Why Upper and Lower Class Individuals Behave Unethically," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 108.3 (2015): 436– 49. Evidence that studying mainstream economics makes people more psychopathic suggests that many mainstream economists (who are exposed to the corrupting influence of their theories much more and much longer than their students) are also psychopaths-by-choice; see Fabrizio Ferraro, Jeffrey Pfeffer, and Robert I. Sutton, "Economics Language and Assumptions: How Theories can Become Self-Fulfilling," Academy of Management Review 30.1 (2005): 8–24. And finally, Robert Hill and Gregory Yousey show that politicians score high in narcissism, which is closely related to psychopathy and also involves limited empathy, but to what extent this lack of empathy is a matter of the hegemony of psychopathy 80 decide who is worth their empathy and who is not. It may be tempting to argue that those who choose to exclude others from empathy are not entitled to being empathized with themselves, but that would completely miss the point of the "monstrosity objection" and be self-defeating moreover, because making that argument is choosing to exclude psychopaths-by-choice- and thus some others- from empathy. It is at that point that one who is fighting monsters becomes a monster oneself. Nevertheless, the ban on violence needs some qualification. "Violence" is usually understood to mean something like physical force against a person, but in political philosophy and adjacent areas of thought the concept is stretched for political reasons. Both the political right and the left stretch the concept to subsume under it what they perceive to be grave injustices. What motivates this is the assumed inherent badness of violence: if that assumption is granted, then anything that falls under the definition of violence is- by definition- bad, and thus no further argument to substantiate that badness is necessary. The "grave injustices" that (part of) the right and left subsume under "violence" are related to private property and (economic) inequality respectively. Part of the political right stretches the concept of violence to include the use of physical force against what a person owns,18 thus making theft and arson kinds of violence. Part of the political left, on the other hand, stretches the concept of violence to include the systematic use of political and economic power (rather than physical force) against (groups of) persons,19 turning many kinds of social injustice into kinds of choice or inability is unclear (although it seems more likely that politics leads to a decrease in voluntary empathy than that it selects for congenital lack of empathy). See Hill and Yousey, "Adaptive and Maladaptive Narcissism among University Faculty, Clergy, Politicians, and Librarians," Current Psychology 17.2 (1998): 163–69. 18 Robert Audi, "On the Meaning and Justification of Violence," in Violence: Award Winning Essays in the Council for Philosophical Studies Competition, ed. Jerome A. Shaffer (New York: McKay, 1971), 45–99. C.A.J. Coady, "The Idea of Violence," Journal of Applied Philosophy 3.1 (1986): 3–19, doi: 10.1111/ j.1468-5930.1986.tb00045.x. 19 Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6.3 (1969): 167–91. Newton Garver, "What Violence Is," in Philosophy for a New Generation, eds. A.K. Bierman and James A. Gould, 2nd edn. (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 256–66, doi: 10.2307/2105905. the war of position 81 violence. We should resist stretching the concept of violence in either direction because these re-definitions are distracting rather than helpful: they divert attention from the reason why violence is wrong. Empathy can tell you what's wrong with violence- just imagine yourself to be a victim of violence. Why would you say that violence in that case (i.e., violence against you) is wrong? Probably because it hurts (physically and / or emotionally) and / or because it causes injury or even death. Causing suffering, injury, or death is wrong. Everyone agrees that suffering, getting injured, or dying is bad. All that empathy adds to this is the realization that it is just as bad if it happens to someone else as when it happens to oneself. Violence is wrong because it dehumanizes by implying that the other is not worthy of empathy, and because it causes suffering, injury, and / or death. Furthermore, there also is a strategic reason to reject violence: it is (usually) counterproductive. Seeing or hearing about violence, especially violence resulting in death, increases the awareness of our own mortality and activates psychological defense mechanisms that are more likely to strengthen hegemonic beliefs than weaken them. According to Terror Management Theory "the awareness of death gives rise to potentially debilitating terror that humans manage by perceiving themselves to be significant contributors to an ongoing cultural drama," and "reminders of death increase devotion to one's cultural scheme of things."20 Hence, much of what we (humans) do and believe is driven by "terror management," controlling the fear of death, and "effective terror management is faith in a meaning providing cultural worldview and the belief that one is a valuable contributor to that meaningful world."21 In other words, reminding people of their mortality- or increasing "mortality salience"- leads them to bolster both their worldviews and their beliefs that they are valuable contributors to the world according to that 20 Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Thomas A. Pyszczynski, The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life (New York: Random House, 2015), 211. 21 Jeff Greenberg and J. Arndt, "Terror Management Theory," in Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology, 2 vols., eds. Paul A.M. Van Lange, Arie W. Kruglanski, and E. Tony Higgins (London: Sage, 2012), 1:398–415 ; 1:403. the hegemony of psychopathy 82 worldview. This hypothesis is usually called the Mortality Salience Hypothesis and is the most extensively tested (and confirmed) aspect of Terror Management Theory.22 It is also this aspect of the theory that is most relevant here, because in an effective hegemony the worldviews of most people will be (largely) the hegemonic worldview. In an effective hegemony, worldview defense strengthens hegemonic beliefs and values, and thus strengthens consent to (and even identification with) the society one is a part of. In other words, unless hegemony is already severely weakened, violence and other reminders of death only strengthen hegemonic control.23 But even if hegemony is weakened, we cannot use violence. As explained in the chapter on hegemony, the use of force needs to be accepted: a state that uses violence against its population without hegemonic approval will lose its hegemonic control. But the same applies to counter-hegemony: if a counter-hegemonic set of values and beliefs gains strong support it will lose that support if its proponents resort to violence without the approval of the supporters. And because (rational) supporters of a set of values and beliefs centered on empathy or compassion can never approve of violence, violence is rarely an option in counter-hegemonic activism. Rarely, but possibly not never. There may be circumstances in which the objections to instrumental violence (i.e., violence as means) do not apply. If violence is wrong because it dehumanizes the other and because it causes suffering, injury, or death, then violent actions that do not dehumanize and do not cause suffering, injury, or death are not wrong, or not wrong for the same reasons 22 A meta-analysis covering 164 articles on 277 experiments concluded that the Mortality Salience Hypothesis "is robust and produces moderate to large effects." See Brian L. Burke, Andy Martens, and Erik H. Faucher, "Two Decades of Terror Management Theory: A Meta-Analysis of Mortality Salience Research," Personality and Social Psychology Review 14.2 (2010): 155–95. 23 For the same reason, we may want to avoid using violent terminology like "war of position." It might be difficult to find good alternatives, however. Besides, while Gramsci inherited the use of militaristic terminology from other Marxist writers of the same period, as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe have noted, "in Gramsci there is a demilitarization of war." Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, 2nd edn. (London: Verso, 2001), 70. the war of position 83 at least. Hence, a ban on violence is a ban on killing, injuring, and causing suffering; it is not a ban on pushing someone out of the way. And neither does it prohibit theft or arson. Furthermore, if dehumanization and suffering are what makes violence wrong, then violence that does not dehumanize the other and that reduces (rather than increases) suffering would not be wrong. At least hypothetically, this appears to be possible. Imagine someone who trained herself to care about everyone; someone who genuinely suffers whenever others suffer, regardless of whether she can see or hear those others, and regardless of whether she knows them. Let's call her Jane. Imagine a second person- let's call him John- who causes great suffering. As argued above, denying John compassion and killing him is not an option because it is the denial of compassion that characterizes the enemy. But what if Jane could feel compassion for John and kill him anyway, because the suffering he causes far outweighs the suffering she would cause by killing him? An obvious reply would be that Jane isn't responsible for the suffering caused by John, while she is responsible for the suffering caused by her own actions. This reply is much too easy, however. It implies that by not doing anything you can avoid all responsibility. And it presupposes an untenable difference between acting and not-acting (or refusing to act). There is no such thing as notacting- you are always doing something- and looking the other way doesn't let you off the hook. Besides, the question is not about responsibility, but whether Jane can use violence out of compassion and without denying anyone compassion- that is, without becoming a "monster." Hypothetically that seems possible. Whether it is actually possible, I don't know. Closest to the case of Jane killing John would be some of the stories of "compassionate killing" in ancient Buddhist literature, but those stories- as well as the notion of compassionate killing itself- are controversial.24 24 Damien Keown, "On Compassionate Killing and the Abhidhamma's 'Psychological Ethics'," Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23 (2016): 45–82. Whether these stories are really similar to the Jane / John case can be disputed. In many of these stories, the main reason to kill the "bad guy" is not the suffering he causes, but the damage he does to his own karma. the hegemony of psychopathy 84 The first objection to violence is that it is monstrous, but as these last paragraphs show, this objection doesn't necessarily apply to all violence, even if exceptions may he hypothetical. Similarly, there may be exceptions to the second objection- that violence should be avoided for strategic reasons. Violence strengthens hegemony through the increase of mortality salience, but the stronger hegemony, the smaller the relative size of this effect, and the strategic advantage of some particular act of violence may outweigh this strategic disadvantage. This too is a rather hypothetical scenario, however.25 It requires that hegemony is almost completely unscathed (and thus cannot be strengthened much), that counter-hegemony is still almost non-existent (and thus cannot be weakened much), that there really is a strategic advantage to be gained, and that the monstrosity objection doesn't apply. In other words, there may be exceptions to the general ban on violence, but these will rarely apply. Violence is rarely if ever an acceptable means in the struggle against the hegemony of psychopathy. This does not mean, however, that violence is not acceptable in any struggle. It may or may not be, but either claim would need an argument different from that given here. An Uneven and Unending Struggle Even if we abstain from violence, if the struggle against hegemony is successful, there will be violence. As argued above, it follows from Gramsci's Machiavellian theory that if in some state hegemony breaks down, the hegemones can only rely on brute force to remain in control, and the weaker hegemony, the more force is needed. And unfortunately, the hegemones have no reason to refrain from violence- in the contrary, the hegemony of psychopathy loves violence. Hegemony will not defend itself just with violence, however, but also with manipulation, propaganda, and lies. The use of violence without consent undermines hegemony, and therefore, if other means are available, violence is not the most efficient way to suppress dissent. A much more effective tactic (which hegemony 25 But perhaps, there are other circumstances in which the strategic importance of some act of violence outweighs any strategic disadvantage. the war of position 85 is already putting to "good" use) is undermining the credibility of outspoken opponents of the hegemony of psychopathy (and / or those who threaten hegemony in other ways); by fabricating "evidence" for criminal charges, for example. We can expect much more of this. If counter-hegemonic activism gains strength, we can expect to be (falsely) accused, imprisoned, and even murdered. The hegemony of psychopathy will resist its downfall and- being psychopathic- it will stop at nothing. If that's not enough to discourage you, there is more reason to worry. Nietzsche warned against the risk of turning into monsters when fighting monsters, but there is another warning- although not intended as such by Nietzsche himself- in the same book, Beyond Good and Evil, and further developed in On the Genealogy of Morality.26 Nietzsche sees two threads running through the European history of moral ideas, two kinds of morality that are everpresent, sometimes even in one person. These are "master morality" and "slave morality." The first is the morality of the socio-political elite. It is a morality that values strength, control and self-control, power, and self-reliance. The second values humility, compassion, cooperation, friendliness, and so forth. While "slave morality" values and promotes empathy / compassion, master morality values a kind of self-centered hardness bordering on (cultural) psychopathy. It is master morality which Nietzsche prefers, but that is not what matters here. What does matter is Nietzsche's suggestion that this is more or less the natural morality of the socio-political elite.27 If he is right, then perhaps the fight against the hegemony of psychopathy will never really end, because the downfall of one elite will 26 Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse [Beyond Good and Evil]. Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral: Eine Streitschrift [On the Genealogy of Morals] (1887). 27 Some recent research seems to support this suggestion. See, for example, Paul Piff, Daniel Stancato, Stéphane Côté, Rodolfo Mendoza-Denton, and Dacher Keltner, "Higher Social Class Predicts Increased Unethical Behavior," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (pnas) 109.11 (2012): 4086–91, and Stéphane Côté, Paul Piff, and Robb Willer, "For Whom Do the Ends Justify the Means? Social Class and Utilitarian Moral Judgment," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 104.3 (2013): 490–503. the hegemony of psychopathy 86 (eventually) lead to the rise of another elite, which will inevitably gravitate towards (cultural) psychopathy. (See also Box 6.) "There is no alternative," the hegemones want us to believe, and in some sense they are right. Not in the sense they intend, however- that is, not in the sense that there is no alternative to the current organization of society, to the current distribution of wealth and power, and to the currently dominant values and beliefs. Of course, there are alternatives to that. But there is no alternative- no real alternative, that is- to fighting the hegemony of psychopathy. The hegemony of psychopathy is already losing strength.28 This is why the hegemones increasingly have to resort to violence- any decrease in hegemonic control must be compensated with force. But if that use of force is insufficiently justified by hegemonic values and beliefs- and increasingly that is the case- then it only further undermines hegemony, further deteriorating hegemonic control, necessitating further compensation by force. The United States has progressed furthest on this path and seems to be destined to a slow descent into an orgy of violence, but if left unchecked, the rest of the world will follow. The weakening of the hegemony of psychopathy is reason for concern rather than for optimism. Without a counter-hegemony to take over, destabilization can only lead to violence, and unfortunately there is little reason to believe that there is any credible counter-hegemonic force. Not even the weakening of the current hegemony can be attributed to opposing forces, but is largely the result of internal contradictions. The hegemony of psychopathy will eventually destroy itself because no society can survive the fragmentation into autonomous, egocentric parasites (i.e., psychopaths).29 Cultural psychopathy undermines 28 Especially the neoliberal aspects of the current hegemony are meeting more and more resistance, but as mentioned in the previous chapter, the hegemony of psychopathy might survive the eventual collapse of the hegemony of neoliberalism, provided that it can substitute another political-economic system and produce sufficient acceptance thereof. 29 Thomas Hobbes argued that society is the product of a social contract forged between people in a "state of nature" without laws, without conventions, without morality, and so forth, in which life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Leviathan, 1651, XIII.9). The hegemony of psychopathy is turning Hobbesian chronology on its head, however. Rather than society the war of position 87 Box 6: On Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality According to Nietzsche, master morality and slave morality always coexisted, both in societies and in individuals, even though there are obvious conflicts between the more psychopathic master morality and the more empathic slave morality. On the social level, conflict between the two was largely avoided throughout most of history by means of a strict social separation. The elite gravitated towards master morality and the people towards slave morality, and because there was little interaction between these social classes, this was a relatively stable situation. What further promoted this stability is that people under the influence of slave morality are much easier to control. Hence, slave morality was effectively- albeit possibly not intentionally- a tool of social control. What's different now is that the separation between the elite (or the hegemones) and the people has become somewhat more permeable, both for people (albeit more in theory than in practice) and- much more importantly- for values and beliefs. This is the reason why in the past, psychopathic master morality did not become hegemonic- the necessary infrastructure for spreading values and beliefs throughout the whole of society (perhaps in a loose sense of "society")30 was still lacking. For the same reason, it is unlikely that we can return to this model. If Nietzsche is right, then- unless the elite and the rest of the people can be strictly separated, and the spreading of the elite's values and beliefs can somehow be avoided- hegemony will do "its work," and cultural psychopathy will eventually spread.31 cooperation, trust, and everything else that makes society possible. But by undermining society, hegemony ultimately undermines itself. rising from a "state of nature," it disintegrates into that state. The hegemony of psychopathy slowly changes the world into a Hobbesian dystopia. 30 The concept of "society" was only invented after the strict separation between elite and people started to break down. If it is retrospectively applied to earlier socio-political arrangements, it may be more appropriate to speak of two parallel societies - elite society and popular / peasant society - considering that there was less interaction between those two in one "country" (noting that the use of that term is anachronistic as well) than there is between different societies now. On the history of the concept of "society," see, for example, Peter Wagner, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences: Not All that is Solid Melts into Air (London: Sage, 2001). 31 Except, of course, if a society invents a way to prevent this. While it is an interesting, theoretical question whether that is possible, and if so, how to do it, I do not want to engage in such Utopian (or dystopian, perhaps) speculation here. the hegemony of psychopathy 88 It is important to realize, however, that what is undermined in this way is the acceptance of hegemonic control, but not the hegemonic values and beliefs. It takes a counter-hegemony to change values and beliefs. And lacking a sufficiently strong counter-hegemonic force, the deterioration of the acceptance of hegemonic control will lead to growing opposition to the socio-political status quo (and to the ruling elite in particular), but this opposition will still embody hegemonic- that is, psychopathic- values and beliefs. The most conspicuous form of such pseudo-opposition is the wave of authoritarian, so-called "populist" demagogues that have appeared mostly on the (far) right of the political spectrum.32 What made the Holocaust possible was a combination of uncritical, non-thinking acceptance of the ruling system and othering, the systematic dehumanization of some group of others. That uncritical acceptance- Hannah Arendt called it "the banality of evil"- is the individual's response to an effective hegemony: it is the individual's "spontaneous" (that is, uncritical, non-thinking) acceptance of and / or consent to the socio-political status quo. In other words, hegemony (as process / phenomenon) was part of what enabled the Holocaust. And importantly, the particular hegemony that enabled the Holocaust was a dehumanizing, psychopathic hegemony. Somewhat disturbingly, while according to Robert Nozick we humans have to "redeem ourselves" (see the first chapter), we have put everything in place for another holocaust instead: the hegemony of psychopathy and rampant othering.33 Perhaps Nozick was right when he suggested that it would be "fitting" if humanity came to an end. (See also Box 7.) But let's not give up hope yet. Either way, there will be suffering, but it is better to suffer in an attempt to reduce suffering than to stand by and watch others suffer. This, of course, is antithetical to 32 They are certainly "populist" in the sense that they make frequent use of "arguments to the people" (i.e., they abuse popular sentiments), but the term "populist" is easily abused by mainstream media to denounce anyone who threatens the status quo. (Perhaps, this implies that calling an opponent "populist" is itself populist.) 33 If the hegemony of psychopathy succeeds in breaking down all social arrangements and reduces all people to autonomous, egocentric individuals, then this will be a holocaust of all against all. That is, more or less, Hobbes' dystopian "state of nature" mentioned in note 29 above. the war of position 89 Box 7: The Benevolent World-Exploder In The Open Society and its Enemies, Karl Popper suggested that the utilitarian principle to maximize happiness should be replaced with a principle to minimize suffering (as a political goal, at least).34 This proposal has come to be known as "negative utilitarianism." While classical utilitarianism aims for the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, negative utilitarianism aims for "the least amount of suffering for anybody."35 The best known objection to negative utilitarianism is usually called "the benevolent world-exploder" and was first put forward by Ninian Smart.36 "Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race." Given that this would end all human suffering, according to negative utilitarianism, that ruler would be morally obliged to use the weapon. And because "we should assuredly regard such an action as wicked," negative utilitarianism is wrong.37 There are many different ways in which one could respond to Smart's argument,38 but it seems to me that its main weakness is in the last part. Smart assumes that the continuing existence of mankind is of greater moral relevance than the sum of all human suffering. Perhaps, he is right, but after the Holocaust this is no longer something that just can be assumed. There is much to be said for Nozick's assertion that "humanity has lost its claim to continue,"39 and nothing in human history since the Holocaust has changed that. If anything, recent history only reinforces Nozick's point. 34 Karl Popper, The Spell of Plato, in The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1 (London: Routledge, 1947). See especially note 6 to chapter 5 and note 2 to chapter 9. 35 Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 241n2. 36 R. Ninian Smart, "Negative Utilitarianism," Mind 67.268 (1958): 542–43, doi: 10.1093/mind/LXVII.268.5423. 37 Smart, "Negative Utilitarianism," 542. 38 Here's a response by analogy. Suppose some doctor proposes to the World Health Organization that it should make it its goal to eradicate measles. Humans are the only hosts of the measles virus, and thus, exterminating all humans would result in the eradication of measles. Therefore, if who would adopt the doctor's proposal and would be able to exterminate all humans, then they would (according to their newly adopted policy) be obliged to exterminate all humans. 39 Robert Nozick, "The Holocaust," in The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 236–42; 238. Also quoted in the first chapter of this volume. the hegemony of psychopathy 90 what the hegemony of psychopathy tells you- only you matter; the suffering of others is of no concern to you. Hegemony needs you to not care about others, to turn a blind eye to their suffering, to numb your natural capacity for empathy.40 And perhaps, that's where the fight against the hegemony of psychopathy must start: with curing ourselves from the empathic numbness that hegemony relies on. To "suffer when others do" The ancient Chinese philosopher Mo zi, who lived in a time of nearly permanent war and disaster,41 believed that if everyone under heaven [i.e., in the world] does not love each other, then the strong will surely overpower the weak, the rich will mock the poor, the gentry will play around with the menial, and cheaters will deceive the foolish. Hence, all the disasters, animosity, and hatred under heaven have arisen from the lack of mutual love.42 And therefore, we need universal love to solve all social and political problems, he observed.43 Perhaps Mo zi can be regarded as an early predecessor of the genre of Utopian empathy advocacy mentioned a few sections back.44 If not Utopian, demanding "universal love" certainly seems to be demanding too much. The point of "curing empathic numbness" is not to learn to love everyone, let alone to love everyone equally, but- as Nozick put it- to learn to "suffer when others do." The point is to attain a genuine care for the well-being of others, especially for the reduction or elimination of others' suffering, regardless 40 On the "naturalness" of empathy, see, for example, Frans de Waal, The Age of Empathy: Nature's Lessons for a Kinder Society (New York: Three Rivers, 2009). 41 Mo zi (墨子, ca. 470–ca. 390 bce) lived in the early Warring States Period. He traveled from one warzone to another, continuously trying to convince rulers to abstain from further bloodshed and to build defensive works to discourage others from attacking them. 42 Mo zi, "Universal Love" II (兼愛中), Chinese Text Project, http://ctext.org/ mozi, §2. My translation. 43 See especially §4–5 of "Universal Love" I (兼愛上). 44 See "A Brief Utopian Interlude" above, in this chapter. the war of position 91 of whether those others are known, seen, or heard. As mentioned before, in ancient Buddhist writings something very much like this was called "mettā," which is usually translated as "loving-kindness." Mettā is empathic concern for everyone, and is to be cultivated by means of meditation (usually called "loving-kindness meditation"). Before proceeding, let me try to prevent some misunderstandings, or correct them if they have already arisen. Firstly, I'm not a Buddhist and neither am I suggesting that you become one. Secondly, and more importantly, much nonsense is spread about Buddhist meditation by the mindfulness industry. That industry promotes meditation as stress-reduction, but as pointed out by Donald Lopez and others, the goal of (at least some forms of) Buddhist meditation is stress induction rather than reduction.45 Furthermore, there is no such thing as Buddhist meditation. Rather, there is a bewildering variety of practices and techniques that have little in common except for what they are supposed to establish: either an improvement of the ability to concentrate, or gaining specific kinds of insight. Especially meditation of the latter kind often involves study and deep thought similar to what the word "meditation" used to mean in English (and contrary to the apparent mindlessness promoted by the mindfulness industry). This variety in practices- as well as the refusal by Buddhaghosa, an influential 5th century Buddhist monk, to define the notion- suggests that "meditation" is a functional rather than a substantive category;46 that is, "meditation" is not defined by some substantive properties that all activities called "meditation" have in common, but by those activities' function, by what meditation is intended to accomplish. If this is right, then "loving-kindness meditation" is any technique that increases mettā and (thus) decreases empathic numbness. Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga is probably the best known "meditation manual." It describes a large number of meditation subjects and techniques, and argues that two of those are particularly 45 Donald S. Lopez, The Scientific Buddha: His Short and Happy Life (New Haven, ct: Yale University Press, 2012). 46 Buddhaghosa claims that meditation "is of many sorts and has various aspects" and that an attempt to define it would only "lead to distraction": The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga), trans. Bhikkhu Nyanamoli (Onalaska, wa: bps Pariyatti, 1999), III.2. the hegemony of psychopathy 92 important or even essential: loving-kindness (mettā) and death.47 Unfortunately, the chapter on loving-kindness is not very helpful, but the section on death as a meditation subject is.48 In that section, Buddhaghosa writes that the meditation on death is successful only if it leads to a state of shock called "saṃvega."49 The Pāli / Sanskrit term "saṃvega" literally means something like (fearful) trembling, but is used in Buddhist writings to denote a morally (and religiously) motivating state of shock or agitation. Interestingly, according to Buddhaghosa, the (repeated) experience of saṃvega increases loving-kindness (mettā),50 suggesting that the two "essential" meditation subjects (death and loving-kindness) are somehow related. Outside the Buddhist tradition, James Baillie and I have recently written about the epistemology and psychology of saṃvega and / or very similar states.51 Such "samvegic" states should be distinguished from the "normal" fear of death- that is, the slumbering background fear in the back of our minds. Samvegic shock is a state of terror caused by the sudden realization of the inevitability, finality, and utter non-negotiability of death. For some of us this state might be very familiar; others will have never experienced it. And those who have experienced it differ in their response to it: for some it was more traumatizing than for others. Baillie describes it as a state in which "rational capacities are immobilized and one is engulfed in inarticulate terror."52 For the lucky ones among us, this state of terror is the closest we will ever come to experiencing what it feels like to face death. But because knowing the terror of death gives one a much better 47 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, III.57–9. 48 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, VIII.1–41. 49 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, VIII.5–6. 50 Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimagga, XIII.35. 51 James Baillie, "The Expectation of Nothingness," Philosophical Studies 166.S: S185–S203. Lajos Brons, "Facing Death from a Safe Distance: Saṃvega and Moral Psychology," Journal of Buddhist Ethics 23 (2016): 83–128. 52 Baillie, "The Expectation of Nothingness," S188. Adopting a term from Thomas Nagel, Baillie calls this state "the expectation of nothingness" (Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986]). Baillie focuses mainly on an epistemological puzzle related to this state, but also quotes some other descriptions of this state by people who experienced it and / or wrote about it. the war of position 93 understanding of what it is to be a victim of life-threatening violence and / or suffering, it is essential to be familiar with it. Only if you know what it approximately feels like to face death can you learn to understand (or imagine) what it is like for others to be in a life-threatening situation. For this reason, saṃvega is not a state that should be avoided, but that should be cultivated, even though it is- obviously- far from a pleasurable experience.53 Buddhaghosa describes a series of meditation exercises to reach this state of terror, the simplest of which is just repeating to yourself that you will inevitably die. What is needed to reach saṃvega probably differs from person to person.54 For someone who firmly believes in some kind of life after death it may be necessary to postpone or bracket that belief while contemplating death, because the point of the exercise is grasping (emotionally more than intellectually) the full meaning of the absolute inevitability, non-negotiability, and finality of death, all of which the idea of an afterlife denies. Furthermore, the aim of the exercise is not to try to imagine being dead, because that is impossible- almost everyone can imagine being somewhere else or even being someone else, but it is fundamentally impossible to imagine not existing. And for the same reason, neither does it aim for understanding what it is like to be dead, because there is no such thing as being dead- death is not a state you can be in; death is not being. The point of the exercise is to fully understand that- that death is not existing (it is not experiencing nothing, but rather not experiencing)- and its implications, and that we will with absolute certainty all die. Its goal is to reach a state of terror in which the inevitability of death- of your death- is not just known and understood intellectually and emotionally, but in 53 For an analysis of the nature of saṃvega and its effects, also further explaining why it should be sought rather than avoided, see Brons, "Facing Death from a Safe Distance." 54 In addition to the exercises described here, supplementary reading on what it is like to be a victim of life-threatening violence may be useful, but unfortunately this is a somewhat under-explored topic (within philosophy at least). The main exception (and recommended reading) is Susan J. Brison's Aftermath: Violence and the Remaking of a Self (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 2002), an important philosophical account of violence from the perspective of the victim. the hegemony of psychopathy 94 which your whole body and mind shrinks away from the full realization that you will die. Knowing the terror of death gives one a much better understanding of what it feels like to face death, but that understanding in itself is insufficient if it remains self-centered- it needs to be directed at others. To cure one's empathic numbness, it needs to be used to share in the suffering of others. This can be practiced by imagining oneself in the situation of some suffering other. The daily news provides plenty of "cases," but if you prefer, you could try to "meditate" on one of the following situations. (1) You're a refugee on an overloaded, sinking boat in the middle of the Mediterranean, with no way to reach the shore alive. (2) You're a mother in a warzone, seeing your children be kicked to death by soldiers before they turn to you and put a gun against your head and pull the trigger. (3) You're beaten to death by an angry mob armed with stones and clubs because they believe that you did (or are) something wrong. The aim of exercises like these is not to imagine the situations, however, nor even to imagine what the victim feels in those situation, but to feel what the victim feels- that is, to share in the victims' terror, probably not in all its intensity, but as close as possible. Obviously, succeeding in doing that results in an extremely distressing experience. There are several ways to relieve that stress, but crying is probably the most effective (and least damaging to your health).55 This is still not sufficient, however. The point of these exercises is to learn to "suffer when others do," not just to suffer with others when you choose to do so. In other words, the sharing in suffering has to become automatic. Only when empathic concern becomes a disposition, an involuntary response to others' suffering (that hits you like an unexpected kick in the guts), has one cured one's empathic numbness. Empathic concern or compassion is our natural ability to share in the suffering of others, to suffer with them. The hegemony of psychopathy numbs and suppresses that ability- making it subversive to care for those you don't know- but that numbness is abnormal. 55 For a recent overview of research on the "self-soothing" and stress-reducing effects of crying, see Asmir Gračanin, Lauren M. Bylsma, and Ad J.J.M. Vingerhoets, "Is Crying a Self-Soothing Behavior?" Frontiers in Psychology 5.502 (2014), doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00502. the war of position 95 It is not normal to witness the suffering of others and not feel compassion and distress, but the exposure to the constant stream of violence and suffering in news and entertainment numbs the senses. A cure for this numbness must counteract the psychopathic disregard for others' suffering by restoring compassion- it must make compassion the norm (rather than the exception). Our natural ability of empathic concern can be trained or restored by placing oneself in the victims' shoes every time when reading, watching, or hearing news about actual human suffering, until it becomes automatic. Someone with a well-developed sense of compassion or empathic concern cannot read, see, or hear stories of suffering without feeling some of that suffering (but not all of it, and not all the time). "Saṃvega" is sometimes translated as "sense of urgency."56 While this may not be a literal (or even accurate) translation, it captures much of the aim of the exercises sketched above.57 The point of those exercises is to feel others' suffering, but also to better understand the scale and extent of suffering caused by the hegemony of psychopathy. And those exercises are successful only if suffering with others becomes a permanent state, like a kind of ever-present nausea. That "nausea" gives rise to a sense of urgency indeed, as well as to abhorrence for the hegemony that causes such massive suffering. "Compassion" literally means to suffer with others, to suffer when others do. If you're not just able to do that when it suits you or when the sufferer is close to you, but start doing it automatically and for / with anyone, then you will have cured yourself from cultural psychopathy. And then you will understand that there is no alternative indeed. We must fight. 56 This is the term Bhikkhu Nyanamoli uses in his translation of Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga. 57 And possibly also of Buddhist meditation exercises intended to reach saṃvega. See Brons, "Facing Death from a Safe Distance." Epilogue Since the 2008 global financial meltdown, growing dissent has eroded the acceptance of the socio-political status quo- and thus the strength of hegemony- but this opposition to hegemony takes two very different forms. I'll call these two different forms Gurrian and Johnsonian oppositions or rebellions here, after two theorists of political violence and dissent, Ted Gurr and Chalmers Johnson.1 According to Gurr, the root cause of rebellion is anger directed at the established order,2 while Johnson pointed out that political violence and dissent is often embedded in a more extensive rejection of the social foundations of the status quo and a call for social change.3 The Gurrian / Johnsonian contrast adopted here transforms this difference in explanation of political violence and dissent into a difference in kind. That is, Gurrian opposition, which I called "pseudo-opposition" before,4 is minimally anti-establishmentarian in the sense that it merely rejects the established representatives of hegemony, while Johnsonian opposition also rejects a substantial part of the hegemonic values and beliefs. In the chapter "Hegemony" I made a distinction between direct and indirect aspects of hegemony. The former is the acceptance of 1 By naming these two kinds of rebellions after these two theorists, I'm not implying that the two kinds (and my descriptions of them) completely correspond to their respective theories. 2 Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, nj: Princeton University Press, 1970). 3 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston, ma: Little, Brown and Company, 1966). 4 See the section "An Uneven and Unending Struggle," in Chapter 4 of this volume. the hegemony of psychopathy 98 and / or consent to the socio-political status quo itself; the latter is the acceptance of and / or consent to the values and beliefs that support that status quo. Johnsonian rebellion threatens both. Gurrian rebellian, on the other hand, may seem to threaten the first, but only poses a threat to the socio-political status of some particular hegemones, and not to hegemony itself. That is, if successful, such a rebellion merely succeeds in replacing one representative of the hegemony of psychopathy with another. And more moderate forms of Gurrian dissent do not even undermine the established hegemones and only punish them. The past decade has seen an increase in both kinds of opposition to hegemony, but the two kinds tend to suffer rather different fates, and for obvious reasons. Gurrian rebellion against the establishment is no real threat to hegemony and can even be used to stifle more threatening kinds of dissent. Johnsonian rebellion, on the other hand, contains the seeds of counter-hegemony, and threatens the very foundations of hegemonic control. It should not come as a surprise then that the mass media- being the main distributor of hegemonic values and beliefs and the chief manufacturer of "spontaneous" public consent- responds in very different ways to these two different kinds of dissent. Gurrian rebellion is a relatively harmless spectacle fit for the spotlight, while Johnsonian dissent- if not ignored- is marginalized, belittled, ridiculed, and undermined in every other way available. Compare, for example, the mainstream media's coverage in 2015–16 of Gurrian revolts like the Trump campaign in the us or Brexit in the uk, with more Johnsonian rebellions like the Sanders and Corbyn campaigns in those same countries. Or compare the relative media silence about (Johnsonian) anti-austerity protests and other social protest movements in many European countries with the free promotion services provided to (Gurrian) demagogues exploiting popular sentiments against minorities and refugees. The difference in nature, treatment, fate, and background of these two kinds of opposition to hegemony reveals two serious problems. Firstly and most obviously, the observations at the end of the previous paragraph expose the make-or-break role of the mass media, which underlines the vital importance of taking control of the media and culture industry. How to do that is a good question to which I have no answer, but burning down tv stations and epilogue 99 newspaper offices is probably not a good idea (at least from a tactical point of view). Hacktivism may be more effective, but is unlikely to be sufficient. And there are at least two further complications that need to be taken into account. The fragmentation of the media and the rise of social media have also fragmented and isolated audiences, making it increasingly difficult to reach some of them. And recent rebellions against hegemony have shown that arguments and evidence are ineffective and that sentiments rule, which suggests that hegemonic propaganda cannot be countered with reason (or at least not with reason alone). Secondly, the examples of recent rebellions against the hegemony of psychopathy given above show that the Gurrian / Johnsonian contrast aligns with the right / left dimension of the political spectrum. All examples of Gurrian opposition are right-wing movements against the establishment, and all examples of Johnsonian opposition are left-wing movements against hegemony and (aspects of) its political-economic ideology, neoliberalism. Because only Johnsonian opposition can carry the seeds of counter-hegemony, and because the left can never win the fight against hegemony on its own, this is a very serious problem. The root of this problem is that the right remains solidly wed to the hegemony of psychopathy, even if it occasionally opposes certain representatives or aspects thereof. The hegemonic affiliation of the right is a historical artifact, however, and not inherently necessary. On the contrary, many of the values and beliefs that are central to the hegemony of psychopathy are diametrically opposed to core values and beliefs of the communitarian and religious right.5 The effective alliance of these parts of the political right with cultural psychopathy and neoliberalism makes their ideologies incoherent, but only when communitarian and religious movements themselves realize that hegemony is their enemy can they become allies in the fight against hegemony. Unfortunately, incoherence is not the main problem on the right of the political spectrum- that dubious honor goes to the rise of neo-fascism. Fascism is a family of political ideologies that combine most or all of the following -isms: authoritarianism, nationalism / patriotism, anti-liberalism, racism / supremacism (and rabid 5 But not of the libertarian right, which celebrates cultural psychopathy. the hegemony of psychopathy 100 othering in general), anti-feminism, anti-intellectualism / antiscientism, and reactionary utopianism (that is, the idealization of some time in the past when the country was still "great" and that it needs to return to). What distinguishes neo-fascism from fascism is that, while 20th-century fascist ideologies had economic programs that awarded a key role to the state, neo-fascism tends to align itself economically with neoliberalism (although not necessarily consistently). Because of this, and because neo-fascism is- to some extent- cultural psychopathy on steroids, it is no serious threat to hegemony. Consequently, neo-fascist revolts against the establishment are Gurrian, and in an increasing number of countries it is the political establishment itself that turns to neo-fascism as a means to retain hegemonic control. However, while neo-fascism is not a threat to hegemony, and may even be a useful tool to manufacture popular acceptance of the oppression of dissent, it is- rather obviously- a very serious threat to anyone who does not or cannot conform, and this raises a question. I wrote above that- except in rather hypothetical circumstances- violence is not an acceptable tool in the fight against hegemony, but would violence be acceptable in the fight against neo-fascism? I don't know. The question of violence- whether and when it is legitimate and / or strategically advantageous in political struggle- is by far the most difficult question addressed in this essay, and my answer to this question in the last chapter is only provisional. Because violence always causes suffering, it is always wrong,6 but perhaps it can be argued that when the choice is between less and much more suffering, then the choice should be for the first. Such a line of argument could be used to defend the use of violence to avoid greater suffering, but would not address the "monstrosity objection" to the use of violence explained above.7 Maybe that objection becomes void when the stakes are high enough, but this suggestion risks answering the question of violence with a calculus of suffering that abstracts away the individual sufferer, thus 6 Assuming that (causing) suffering is always wrong, of course. For an argument for the wrongness of suffering, see Derek Parfit, On What Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 565–69. 7 See the section "The Monstrosity of Violence," in chapter 4 of this volume. epilogue 101 effectively taking compassion out of the equation. And therefore, that cannot be the right answer. But rejecting all violence just to avoid becoming a "monster" when some particular act of violence would avoid (or reduce) massive suffering certainly cannot be the right answer either. (Surely, timidly looking away and refusing to act is just as monstrous.) And there will be massive suffering, and therefore, answering the question of violence is not just a theoretical problem. There already is massive suffering- in war zones and much of the Third World, for example- but there will be more. Much more. There is a serious risk that the rise of neo-fascism leads to a much larger war than any the world has seen in the last half century, but there is an even greater source of future suffering that hasn't been mentioned in this essay or even hinted at yet: climate change. Sea level rise, desertification, mega-storms, and various other effects of climate change will lead to disasters, famines, and refugee flows well beyond anything mankind has ever experienced. By the end of the current century hundreds of millions of people will be displaced or killed by the effects of climate change. And the economic and political fall-out will affect many more.8 It is doubtful that this can be avoided. Global temperatures and ocean levels are already rising, storms and other extreme weather are already getting worse, desertification is already spreading, and probably we have already passed some tipping points beyond which various feedback effects started taking effect. In other words, most likely it is already too late, but even if it isn't, the political will to deal with climate change has always been a few decades behind what is actually necessary, and there is no reason to expect that this will suddenly change.9 8 See, for example, Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars: The Fight for Survival as the World Overheats (Oxford, uk: Oneworld, 2010). 9 See Dyer, Climate Wars. The most recent intergovernmental agreement on climate change is the Paris Agreement (cop21). Although this agreement is likely to go into "force," that "force" amounts to nothing as it lacks concrete goals or targets and cannot be enforced. The Paris Agreement is much too little and much too late to stop catastrophic climate change. On this point, see Clive Hamilton, Requiem for a Species: Why We Resist the Truth about Climate Change (New York: Earthscan, 2010). See also J. Rogelj et al., "Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well Below the hegemony of psychopathy 102 One may wonder: What is the point of fighting hegemony if we cannot stop massive suffering anyway? But we can alleviate it. It will make an enormous difference if a future society responds with compassion to disaster and refugee flows, rather than with cultural psychopathy. We should aim to avoid the secondary disasters caused by indifference and abandonment of the victims, but we can only do so by destroying cultural psychopathy and the systems that promote it. If we cannot do that, if we cannot build some better, more compassionate future on the ruins of the one we (once) thought we had, if we can only respond to the suffering we have caused with causing even more suffering, then we are a more loathsome species than anything that has ever lived on this planet, and we'd better go extinct. The hegemony of psychopathy has destroyed everything, including the future. Now we must destroy that hegemony. Or die trying. 2°c," Nature 534.7609 (2016): 631–39, doi: 10.1038/nature18307. 103 References Abraham, Eyal, Talma Hendler, Irit Shapira-Lichter, Yaniv Kanat-Maymon, Orna Zagoory-Sharon, and Ruth Feldman. "Father's Brain is Sensitive to Childcare Experiences." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (pnas) 111.27 (2014): 9792–97. Doi: 10.1073/ pnas.1402569111. Ali, Tariq. The Extreme Centre: A Warning. London: Verso, 2015. Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 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Discusiones Filosóficas. Año 20 No 34, enero – junnio 2019. pp. 187 190 ISSN 0124-6127 (Impreso), ISSN 2462-9596 (En línea) DOI: 10.17151/difil.2019.20.34.10 berlín MAuRICE BLANChOT* Traducción de Facundo Norberto Bey, Instituto de Filosofía "Ezequiel de Olaso" – Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Universidad Nacional de General San Martín [email protected] Para todos Berlín es el problema de la división. Desde cierto punto de vista es un problema estrictamente político para el cual, no debemos olvidar, existen soluciones también estrictamente políticas. Desde otro punto de vista, es un problema social y económico (y, por lo tanto, político, aunque en un sentido más amplio): en Berlín, dos sistemas, dos estructuras socioeconómicas, se enfrentan la una a la otra. Aun desde otro punto de vista, es un problema metafísico: Berlín no es sólo Berlín, sino también el símbolo de la división del mundo, e incluso más: un "punto universal", el lugar donde la reflexión sobre la unidad, simultáneamente necesaria e imposible, se impone a todos y a cada uno de los que allí residen, quienes, a su vez, no solo tienen experiencia de un domicilio sino también de la ausencia del mismo. Esto no es todo. Berlín no es solamente un símbolo, sino una ciudad real en la que tienen lugar dramas humanos desconocidos para otras grandes ciudades: la división es un nombre para el desgarramiento. Esto no es todo. Además, Berlín presenta en términos inhabituales el problema de la oposición entre dos culturas al interior de un mismo contexto cultural, de dos * Nota del traductor: El presente texto de Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003) apareció por primera vez en una traducción al italiano de Guido Neri bajo el título "II nome Berlino" [El nombre Berlín], publicado en 1964 en la revista literaria dirigida por Elio Vittorini e Italo Calvino Il menabó 7, año 6, pp. 121-25. El texto original en francés se extravió y, con la autorización del propio Blanchot, Hélène Jelen y Jean-Luc Nancy tradujeron la versión italiana al francés para publicarla en 1983 como "Le Nom de Berlin" en una edición bilingüe. Desde entonces, la versión francesa ha sido reimpresa múltiples veces: en Cafe 3 (1983), 43-6; Berlin, collection Libération, 4 (1989); y Po&sie 52 (1990), 6-8. El texto fue finalmente republicado con su nombre original en francés, es decir, "Berlin" para la publicación de la traducción cuatrilingüe (francés, inglés, ruso y alemán) aparecida en 1994 en MLN, Vol. 109, No. 3, German Issue (Apr.), The Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 345-355. Se ha decidido traducir este texto también en lengua hispana por su innegable actualidad y peculiar claridad. En él no se trata exclusivamente sobre la realidad política, económica y lingüística de Berlín (o de Alemania) durante la Guerra Fría. Las reflexiones de Blanchot permanecen tan vigentes como el fenómeno que aquí decide enfrentar en sus múltiples aspectos: los fundamentos mismos de la política y el Estado en la modernidad. Para esta primera traducción al castellano del texto se ha tomado como referencia la versión de Jelen y Nancy antes mencionada. * orcid.org/0000-0002-9449-0463 Google Scholar Traducción de Facundo Norberto Bey 188 lenguajes sin ninguna relación al interior de un mismo lenguaje, y pone en cuestión, de este modo, la seguridad intelectual y la posibilidad de la comunicación que uno se imagina concedidas a hombres que viven en común, debido al hecho de que comparten el mismo idioma y el mismo pasado histórico. Esto no esto todo. Tratar o interrogar el problema de Berlín como el problema de la división no puede consistir en la enumeración, lo más completa posible, de las diversas formas en las que se da para nuestra comprensión. En tanto que problema de la división, debemos decir que Berlín es un problema indivisible, a tal punto que cuando aislamos provisoriamente –tan sólo para la claridad de la exposición– tal o cual supuesto de la situación "Berlín", corremos el riesgo de distorsionar no sólo la cuestión en su conjunto sino también este supuesto particular, el cual es imposible de aprehender sin considerarlo por sí mismo. El problema de la división –de la fractura– que Berlín plantea no sólo a los berlineses, ni siquiera a los alemanes únicamente, sino, creo, a todos los seres reflexivos –y de manera imperiosa, dolorosa yo diría– es un problema que no podemos formular adecuadamente en su realidad completa si no decidimos formularlo fragmentariamente (lo cual, sin embargo, no significa de manera parcial). Dicho de otro modo, cada vez que nos ocurre de estar enfrentados con un problema de esta naturaleza (después de todo, hay otros), debemos recordarnos que hablar de esto de manera justa quiere decir hacerlo de un modo tal que también le esté permitido hablar a la profunda brecha existente entre nuestras palabras y nuestro pensamiento, dejar hablar, por lo tanto, a la imposibilidad en la cual nos encontramos cuando hablamos en términos que procuran ser definitivos. Esto significa: 1) que la omnisciencia, si fuera posible, no sería de utilidad alguna en este caso: la esencia de una tal situación se le escaparía incluso a un Dios que todo lo supiera; 2) que en general no es posible dominar, controlar o abarcar con una sola mirada el problema de la división, y que en éste como en otros casos la visión panorámica no es la más justa; 3) que la elección deliberada de un fragmento no es un retrato escéptico, una renuncia como consecuencia de la fatiga a una síntesis completa (aunque podría ser el caso) sino un método de búsqueda paciente-impaciente, móvil-inmóvil y la afirmación –además– de que el sentido, la integridad del sentido, no es posible encontrarlo inmediatamente ni en nosotros mismos ni en lo que escribimos, sino que éste está aún por llegar, y que al interrogarlo lo consideramos un puro devenir y un puro porvenir de interrogación; 4) esto significa, para Discusiones Filosóficas. Año 20 No 34, enero – junio, 2019. pp. 187 190 Traducción Maurice BlanchoT. Berlin. 189 concluir, que debemos repetirnos a nosotros mismos: toda palabra en fragmentos, toda reflexión fragmentaria, exige una repetición y una variación infinita. Me gustaría agregar dos observaciones (fragmentarias). La intensa abstracción política que representa Berlín encontró su expresión más aguda el día que el muro fue construido, el cual es, sin embargo, algo dramáticamente concreto. Hasta el 13 de agosto de 1961, la ausencia de un signo visible de separación –bien antes de este día, la serie de controles regulares e irregulares había inspirado ya premoniciones del avance enigmático de una línea de demarcación– le dio a la partición un carácter y una significación ambigua. ¿Qué es lo que era? ¿Una frontera? Ciertamente; pero era también algo más: algo menos que una frontera en la medida que masas de personas la cruzaban cada día eludiendo los controles; pero también, algo más, porque el hecho de cruzar no significaba el pasaje de un país a otro, de un idioma a otro, sino el pasaje al interior del mismo país y de la misma lengua, de la "verdad" al "error", del "mal" al "bien", de la "vida" a la "muerte", y esto implicaba estar sometido, casi sin saberlo, a una metamorfosis radical (para poder decidir donde se situaban propiamente el "bien" y el "mal", tan brutalmente opuestos, uno sólo podía abandonarse a una reflexión parcial). La construcción casi instantánea del muro sustituyó a la ambigüedad que aún no se había decidido por la violencia de la separación decidida. Fuera de Alemania se avizoraban, de una manera más o menos superficial, los cambios drásticos que este evento anunciaba no sólo en las relaciones entre humanos sino también en los dominios económico y político. Pero una cosa, yo creo, pasó inadvertida (quizás incluso ante los ojos de la mayoría de los propios alemanes): el hecho de que la realidad de este muro estaba destinada a precipitar la unidad de una gran ciudad llena de vida dentro de la abstracción, una ciudad que, en realidad, no fue ni es –su profunda realidad consiste precisamente en esto mismo– ni una sola ciudad, ni dos ciudades, ni la capital de un país, ni una ciudad importante, ni el centro, ni ninguna otra cosa sino este centro ausente. De esta manera, el muro logró concretar abstractamente la división al hacerla visible y tangible, y nos fuerza así a pensar de ahora en adelante en Berlín, en la unidad misma de su nombre, ya no bajo el signo de una unidad perdida, sino más bien como esta realidad sociológica constituida por dos ciudades absolutamente diferentes.2 El 2 El muro pretendió sustituir la verdad sociológica de una situación, su estatuto fáctico, con una verdad más profunda, que podría ser denominada -aunque sólo por medio de una considerable simplificación- la dialéctica de esta situación. Traducción de Facundo Norberto Bey 190 "escándalo" y la importancia del muro se encuentra en ser, en la opresión concreta que representa, esencialmente abstracto y nos recuerda así lo que continuamente olvidamos, a saber, que la abstracción no es ni simplemente una manera de pensar inexacta ni una forma de lenguaje manifiestamente empobrecida, sino que la abstracción es nuestro mundo, el mundo en el cual, día tras día, vivimos y pensamos. Mientras tanto, disponemos de una considerable cantidad de escritos sobre la situación en Berlín. Estoy sorprendido de constatar que, entre todos estos textos, dos novelas ofrecen, al menos a los no-alemanes, la mejor aproximación a la situación, dos novelas las cuales no son ni políticas ni realistas. No les atribuyo su mérito exclusivamente al talento de Uwe Jonson, sino también a la verdad de la literatura. La dificultad misma y, para decirlo mejor, la imposibilidad del autor para escribir libros en los que la división está puesta en juego (y así la necesidad, para él, de replantearse esta imposibilidad en el escribir y en la escritura); esto es lo que armoniza la operación literaria con la singularidad de "Berlín", justamente porque este hiato debe dejar abierto un rigor oscuro y nunca relajado entre la realidad y la aprehensión literaria de su sentido. Quizás el lector impaciente o el crítico dirán que en obras de este género la relación con el mundo y con la responsabilidad de la decisión política que le corresponde permanece distante e indirecta. Indirecta, sí. Pero uno debe precisamente preguntarse si para acceder al "mundo" por medio de la palabra y, sobre todo, por medio de la escritura, una vía indirecta no es justamente la correcta, además de ser la más corta. reFerencias Blanchot, Maurice. Trans. Aris Fioretos. "'Berlin.'" MLN 109:3 (1994), 345355. © The Johns Hopkins University Press. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press. Como citar: Blanchot, Maurice. "Berlín". Discusiones Filosóficas. 34. 2019: 187-190. DOI. 10.17151/ difil.2019.20.34.10. Discusiones Filosóficas. Año 20 No 34, enero – junio, 2019. pp. 187

Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 1 Moral Psychology with Nietzsche, by Brian Leiter. Oxford: OUP, 2019. Pp. x + 198.1 Moral Psychology with Nietzsche draws from the last two decades of Professor Leiter's writing on Nietzsche, combining substantially revised articles and book chapters into one coherent volume. Those who know Leiter's Nietzsche will recognise the main ideas, but he has organised the material to bring out his central theses, responding to criticisms and clarifying his position. Those who know his style will not be surprised to find some biffing and thwacking, but the emphasis in this book is always on argument. Leiter fights a war on two fronts. First, he gives an interpretation of Nietzsche's moral psychology. On this front, interlocutors are other Nietzsche commentators; support comes from Nietzsche's texts. Second, broadly speaking, he defends the (purportedly) Nietzschean view: Nietzsche is not right about everything in moral psychology, just 'much of [it]' (p. 10). On this front, interlocutors are moral philosophers, past and present; support comes from philosophical argumentation and empirical psychology. Leiter's work distinguishes itself by fighting on both fronts, although they are independent. What, then, is the Nietzschean-andright view? There are several, connected strands, but they can be summarised as follows. 1. Speculative, methodological naturalism (pp. 1-14). 'Methodological', meaning 'calling for continuity with the methods of successful sciences' (pp. 2-3). 'Speculative', because many claims of central relevance to moral psychology had not then been subjected to scientific evaluation: Nietzsche was making good guesses, based on materials he read and on acute observation (p. 83; pp. 5-9). 2. Anti-realism about all values, including moral (pp. 17-66) and epistemic values (pp. 84-111). 3. Sentimentalism. Moral judgments are best explained by emotional responses, namely by 'basic affects' (p. 67) (inclinations and aversions), which are non-cognitive, and by affective responses to these basic affects, which may contain cognitive components (p. 67-83). 4. Type-fact fatalism. 'Heritable type-facts' (p. 9) centrally determine our personality and our behaviour, insofar as it is morally relevant, including the inclinations and aversions mentioned above. 'Type-facts' are physiological and/or psychological facts about a person, which might be innate or acquired (p. 3, fn5). Leiter defines 'heritable' in terms of 'genes' and 'genetic material' (p. 168), which looks anachronistic when applied to Nietzsche. But the aim, with these 'facts', is to mark out a space for explanations of our values and behaviours which appeal neither to what our parents taught us nor to our rational capacities (pp. 162-180). 1 Author's note: This is the unpublished draft of a review, which is forthcoming in MIND. The first version was submitted on the 22nd October, 2019 and then sent to Professor Leiter, by MIND, for comments. Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 2 5. Scepticism about the causal efficacy of conscious deliberation in motivating action. Purported moral reasons or justifications are 'post-hoc rationalisations of feelings that have an antecedent source' (p. 9, pp. 115-146). 6. 'No one has free will or is morally responsible' (p. 117; pp. 115-161). This result is a wide-ranging, contentious, but (Leiter argues) empirically supported naturalist moral psychology. In sum: this is Nietzsche; and Nietzsche wins. This review says more about 'this is Nietzsche' than about 'Nietzsche wins' because, although the latter may be more significant, I have more to offer regarding the former. Leiter's Nietzsche certainly seems right that we vastly overestimate the role of conscious, rational deliberation when it comes to action. Elsewhere, I am more sceptical, but I leave the finer details to others. Leiter's anti-realism about epistemic values looks subject to a selfrefutation problem: how to defend such a claim without invoking the kinds of values – epistemic norms – the existence of which it denies. He answers that we shouldn't defend it by appealing to epistemic norms; we should defend it because the naturalism underpinning it 'works'. I myself can't see a way to cash out what counts as 'working' that won't rest, eventually, either on a dogmatic assertion or an epistemic norm, but Leiter's defences against self-refutation and other charges are easily found (pp. 99-111). Is this Nietzsche? This is a complex question but, in key respects, my answer is no. Leiter's methods are the best place to start. Four features of his approach deserve attention. First, Leiter spends little time with the books that Nietzsche himself read, whether philosophical, scientific or historical. Nietzsche did not read English, and much of what he read remains untranslated, but Leiter quotes and cites next to nothing in German or French (which Nietzsche did eventually read). Much of the contemporary, high-quality philological literature is in German. Virtually none of this finds a place here, either. There are good, English-language summaries and analyses. Leiter refers to some of these, but he rarely discusses, in any detail, either the sources themselves or Nietzsche's relation to them. Moreover, there are some contentious, unsupported assertions, for example about Nietzsche's 'lively interest in contemporary psychological research' (p. 83; cf. Sommer 2019, 45). Second, Leiter treats 'mature' Nietzsche (pp. 30, 70) as everything from Daybreak onwards (1881-88). Third, at crucial points, Leiter sets out some predetermined philosophical positions (naturalism, anti-realism) and then isolates quotations in the texts which seem or seem not to categorise Nietzsche accordingly. Finally, Leiter is a liberal user of the principle of charity. None of these four decisions guarantees, a priori, that the resulting interpretation is faulty. But, here, they add up to make it easier for Leiter to interpret Nietzsche as having philosophical views Leiter considers, independently, to be right, and easier to ignore a reading which has considerably more exegetical plausibility. The first decision sidesteps difficult questions about Nietzsche's sources and how he used them. I am about to ask some. The second enables Leiter to draw from a wide range of texts without asking whether things might have changed between them. I am about to describe some changes. The third pushes the reader towards a pre-given set of options without giving her pause for thought about whether the whole issue might simply be orthogonal to Nietzsche's aims. I am about to suggest that, in some cases, it is. The fourth enables Leiter to push through his Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 3 philosophically favoured option and then to complain that Nietzsche has not received the credit he deserves. In Nietzsche's late works, I am about to suggest, things are not so rosy. Nietzsche's alleged speculative, methodological naturalism kicks off Leiter's reconstruction. It also brings together some of the methodological features noted above. We can usefully begin by saying a little more about Nietzsche's working methods than Leiter does, before turning back to the question of naturalism. Leiter notes Nietzsche's 'extensive readings in the biological sciences' (p. 68; similarly, p. 11), but this is hardly the whole truth. Nietzsche certainly used scientific and historical sources, but he preferred writers who agreed with his general attitudes and whose writings he could understand given his limited natural-scientific education. He read, in the words of one historicist scholar, based on what was 'more fruitful for his thoughts' (Holub 2018, 341), rather than looking for the best contemporary science available. J. G. Vogt's physics was consulted, despite resting on what are fairly called 'highly arbitrary a priori assumptions' (Small 2001, xiii, 137). Why? Summarising roughly, Vogt's book had user-friendly illustrations but no mathematics; it offered some material for a cosmological eternal recurrence doctrine, while stimulating Nietzsche's ideas about power (Small 2001, 137–39; Sommer 2019, 44). He read obscure figures like William Rolph, who argued that egalitarianism was contrary to the fundamental biological workings of living things. He read Wilhelm Roux, who thought, contra Darwin, that there was a Darwinian struggle within organisms, enabling them to survive. The physician Charles Féré, a major influence, claimed that criminals were physiological degenerates against whom society had every right to defend itself, for example by preventing them from reproducing; unfortunately, sickly, anti-natural modern morals stood in the way (e.g. Féré 1888, 104). Nietzsche drew from (but also misrepresented the claims of) serious historians like Julius Wellhausen, who, Nietzsche thought, provided empirical evidence that Judeo-Christian morality resulted from an antinatural confidence trick performed by a self-interested priesthood (Stern 2019a). But Nietzsche also used sources considered hopelessly unscientific by the standards of his own time (Sommer 2012, 367). Louis Jacolliot, for example, claimed to have access to curiously unidentifiable ancient documents linking the origins of the Jews to an inferior Eastern caste which, on Nietzsche's own summary, was a kind of 'excrement' emitted from the noble classes (Nietzsche 1988, vol. 13, p. 378; henceforth 'KSA' followed by volume and page number). Nietzsche drew repeatedly on Jacolliot (see Sommer 2013, 265–70, 2012, 365–71), with a view to saying that Judeo-Christian morality was anti-natural in comparison with an Eastern model which legislated differently according to the different natural-physiological types of its subjects. Note that Nietzsche distorted Jacolliot in summarising him (Sommer 2013, 274–75). Here, Nietzsche was not merely, at best, an outstandingly credulous reader: he misrepresented what he read. Was Nietzsche, then, a speculative, methodological naturalist? Nietzsche certainly speculated, though his distortions of Jacolliot do not, prima facie, imply that we are dealing with the inspired predictions of someone working with the best available materials (cf. pp. 911). I am reluctant to call him a methodological naturalist, because philosophising in a manner that is 'continuous with the methods of the successful sciences' (p. 2) sounds incompatible with cherry picking and fabricating, which Nietzsche obviously did when it suited him. If Leiter thinks, conversely, that these things are compatible, he ought to emphasise that counterintuitive claim. Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 4 Does Leiter think that? It is hard to tell. Leiter does not really discuss Nietzsche's use of his sources and certainly none of the well-documented cases described above. In his brief account of the continuity he has in mind (pp. 2-3), Leiter builds on Stroud's Hume, who was seeking to explain 'everything in human affairs' in terms of 'relatively few extremely general, perhaps universal, principles' (p. 3). Leiter also rules out 'supernatural entities which play no explanatory role in the successful sciences' (p. 2). If that, or something like it, is really all, it might permit Nietzsche's actual methods: speculative, methodological naturalists can cherrypick and fabricate their way to a small number of principles explaining human nature, as long as they don't mention God. This forgivingly expansive definition would likely invite some undesirable 'naturalists' to the party. Pseudoscientists, for example, are not obviously excluded, if their principles are few and godless, and their explanatory ambitions wideranging. Later on, though, Leiter gives an account of 'best explanation' deriving from 'successful empirical sciences' (p. 23). The desiderata include 'explaining phenomena in a way consistent with [...] other beliefs about the world that have been well confirmed' (p. 23). Would this not rule out cherry-picking and distorting? Generally, which intuitive restrictions on the kinds of principles available to methodological naturalists won't end up excluding the methods we know Nietzsche employed? A different response might be adapted from a reply Leiter gives to some of Janaway's criticisms. Leiter allows that Nietzsche's naturalism can sometimes be 'enlisted', 'subordinated' or 'displaced' (p. 6) as part of a strategy of persuasion. These metaphors are ambiguous. They might mean that naturalism is put to use yet still completely respected, as material science might be 'enlisted' (though hardly 'displaced') to build a bridge. If so, we have come no further than the dilemma just elaborated. But perhaps Leiter means that Nietzsche is trying to push his subjective values and that these values sometimes justify not philosophising naturalistically. Now, though, the claim that Nietzsche is a speculative, methodological naturalist would look difficult to falsify on the basis of Nietzsche's own texts and methods, since it would be consistent with his suspension of that stance on any given occasion. I have suggested the following. Either, Nietzsche was not a speculative methodological naturalist. Or, if he was: either, first, the concept's application is counter-intuitively broad, likely even by Leiter's standards, and Leiter does not indicate how it could be narrowed without excluding Nietzsche; or, second, Leiter's claim is hard to falsify. None of this, however, is my main point. It is that we need not choose: Nietzsche never claims to be a speculative methodological naturalist; all the urgency comes from Leiter. The burden rests on Leiter to justify asking the question and then, of course, to answer without begging it. Much of Leiter's analysis remains standing once the naturalism is removed. Some elements are uncontroversial – points 5. and 6., above, for example. Elsewhere, it matters when Nietzsche was writing. In his middle period (here, I mean roughly: 1881-86), Nietzsche looks closer to Leiter's picture than he does after that in two key respects. First, Middle Nietzsche talks of physiological and psychological grounds for moral views, but he offers no discernible unifying physiological theory: this is amenable to Leiter's Nietzsche, who likewise keeps the physiology vague and promissory. Second, Middle Nietzsche gives little suggestion that anything is naturally valuable. Indeed, in one place, Middle Nietzsche claims that there are no values in nature, which is conducive to Leiter's moral anti-realist reading (KSA 3, 539-40; Leiter, pp. 20-21). Not everything in Middle Nietzsche fits Leiter's Nietzsche. In one place, Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 5 Nietzsche has moral inclinations and aversions passed from parents to children via observation (KSA 3, 43). This Nietzsche would probably not be a 'Nietzschean', following Leiter's typology, but rather an 'Aristotelian' (cf. Leiter, pp. 171-4). The very next aphorism says something more 'Nietzschean', though. Middle Nietzsche provides the best support for Leiter. But things soon changed. Nietzsche's physiological theory took more definite shape and his views on natural value changed, too. There is more nuance, vacillation and fuzziness than this suggests (see Stern 2020), but, here, we can boil Late Nietzsche's moral view down to these four claims: 1. 'Life', or 'Will', or 'Will to Power', sometimes 'Nature', is a force which operates through all living things, promoting something like growth, expansion, powerseeking, accumulation, exploitation or resource-increase. (I use 'Life', capitalised, to indicate this force.) 2. Any animal, humans included, may be understood physiologically in relation to Life, typically – this is what matters most – in binary terms: increasing or decreasing in power; ascending or declining; healthy or decadent. 3. Moral values expressed by humans may be traced back to this physiological increase or decrease. 4. We ought to side with Life. This picture retains Middle Nietzsche's idea that physiology explains values. But Late Nietzsche is more specific. He categorizes values, and the physiological facts that underlie them, along binary lines: those which help Life and those which obstruct it. Next, he endorses the former, and opposes the latter. Here, he was indeed drawing on contemporary (at least purportedly) scientific and scholarly literature: Féré, Rolph, Roux, Jacolliot and Wellhausen are some of the authors who played a part, as can be gleaned even from the summaries given above. Nietzsche read many of them only well after 1881, hence after Leiter's Nietzsche reaches maturity. Rolph and Roux supplied material relevant to Nietzsche's biological account of life as a domain of power seeking and appropriating. Nietzsche's notions of decline, decadence and degeneration borrow from Féré and his milieu (Holub 2018, 408–53). Usually, Nietzsche uses these latter terms to refer to those who fall on the wrong side of his binary division between those who are physiologically flourishing and those in whom Life is not doing its thing. The decadent person is not a louche afternoon drinker; he is the physiological equivalent of a batch of cookies that didn't turn out well. This reading takes 'will to power' seriously, whereas Leiter argues that its significance has been overplayed. He denies that, for Nietzsche, 'power is itself an objective, natural property' (p. 51), without reference to Rolph, Roux and co. When arguing for Nietzsche's naturalism, then, Leiter advertises the fact (though relatively little detail) of Nietzsche's reading in natural science; when denying that power is a natural property for Nietzsche, Leiter does not directly discuss or acknowledge Nietzsche's well-documented scientific influences. Unfortunately, the above account of will to power is not the interpretation that Leiter spends most of his time disputing (pp. 50-62). He prefers to target a different reading – something of a red herring, in my view – and consequently many of his criticisms miss the point. The red Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 6 herring is that power is a human, psychological goal (p. 58), rather than a defining physiological feature of all living things. Moreover, because Nietzsche sometimes speaks of 'Life' or 'nature', rather than 'will to power', it is unconvincing when Leiter claims that, because Nietzsche doesn't often use the words 'will to power' in his autobiography or his 1886 Prefaces, the idea plays no major role (p. 57). Nietzsche has plenty to say about this idea in these texts (KSA 1: 17-19; 3: 349; 6: 307, 313). In one, he looks to the future, hoping that he will have assassinated 'two millennia of antinature' and that a 'party of Life' (Team Life, if you will) will have attempted 'the relentless destruction' of Team Anti-Life, 'of everything degenerating and parasitical' (KSA 6, 313). Not the words 'will to power', but do not be mistaken: this is vintage, gold-plated will-to-power talk. Interestingly, Leiter seems inclined to agree with elements of this assessment. He refers to Hussain's 'clever' article (p. 59, fn.19) summarising Nietzsche's view along lines close to those given here (Hussain 2011; Hussain's reading departs a little from my own, but, for present purposes, we can treat them as more or less identical). Leiter agrees that Hussain's reading is superior to the reading he criticises. He swiftly dismisses it, however, on philosophical not textual grounds: in my terms, it does not provide a route from facts about Life (1.-3.) to the claim that we ought to help Life out (4.). But this is Nietzsche's problem, not his interpreter's. Here, as often, charitable reading seems to obstruct our understanding of Nietzsche (see Stern 2016). It would have been helpful to see a more careful, exegetical analysis of a view Leiter clearly takes seriously as an interpretation – even if, philosophically, it is not a goer. This issue is pressing for a striking reason. Many of the (late) quotations which Leiter himself chooses to support his reading look, on closer inspection of the passages from which those quotations are taken, to support the alternative reading just given. I limit myself to five examples, for reasons of space. Leiter writes: Nietzsche 'holds that "[i]t is not error as error that" he objects to fundamentally' in Christian morality (p. 12). So, to what does Nietzsche object fundamentally in Christian morality, in the passage from which Leiter quotes? Leiter does not say, but Nietzsche does: 'It is the lack of nature, it is the utterly horrible fact that anti-nature itself received the highest honours as morality' (KSA 6, 372). The fundamental objection is that Christianity is anti-natural, i.e. anti-Life: 'one taught men to despise the very first instincts of life' in favour of a 'morality of decline'. Leiter repeatedly refers to a note he renders as follows: '"Moral judgments [are] symptoms and sign languages which betray the process of physiological prosperity or failure" (WP: 258)' (pp. 4, 68). Already, we see a physiological binary – prosperity ('Gedeihens') and failure ('Missrathens'). Gedeihen is a term one might use for the healthy 'flourishing' of a plant or child. Missrathen suggests 'turning out badly' – like those cookies. Nietzsche, in this very note, gets sharper: 'Applied to the specifically Christian-European morality: our moral judgments are signs of decay [Verfall], of not believing in Life [...]' (KSA 12, 149). Leiter writes: 'A "morality of sympathy", [Nietzsche] claims, is "just another expression of... physiological overexcitability" (TI IX: 37)' (p. 4). But what does Nietzsche say (in that very passage) about that physiological overexcitability? It is 'characteristic of everything decadent' (KSA 6, 137). 'Our softening of morals [...] is a consequence of decline Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 7 [Niedergangs]'. We display the signs of a 'general loss of vitality', whereas stronger ages displayed the consequences of 'a surplus of Life'. While claiming that Nietzsche works from morality back to affects, Leiter renders another passage as follows: 'answers to the question about the value of existence may always be considered first of all as the symptoms of certain bodies' (pp. 4, 68). Prima facie, this is not about morality but about 'the question about the value of existence' – i.e. the central concern of the so-called 'pessimism dispute', a raging contemporary controversy which Leiter doesn't discuss and which I haven't mentioned here, but which casts further light on Nietzsche's Life theory (Stern 2019b). What kinds of bodies, though? In the passage Leiter is quoting from, answers to this question are, again, indexed to a binary distinction between 'success and failure [Missrathens]' (KSA 3, 349). Nietzsche is not tracing morality to affects; he is positing a link between one's view about whether life is worth living, yes or no, and whether one's living body turned out well or was a bad batch. Finally, allegedly in support of Nietzsche's anti-realism, Leiter writes: '[Nietzsche] describes the "revaluation of Christian values" as an "attempt, undertaken with every means" to bring "the counter-values [die Gegen-Werte]...to victory" (A 61) – not the "true" values or the "objectively correct" ones, but simply the opposite ones [...] that appeal to a very different taste.' (p. 46) Leiter is saying that Nietzsche's choice of the term 'counter-values' indicates a reluctance to ascribe them any objective status: appropriately enough for an anti-realist, values are merely a matter of 'taste'. But taste, in that very passage, is not the issue. The revaluation Nietzsche describes is the Renaissance, which he often sees as anti-Christian (pro-Life). During the Renaissance, to Luther's horror, 'Christianity sat no more on the papal seat! But rather, Life! Rather, the triumph of Life!' (KSA 6, 251) The direction of argument is that Luther's anti-Life, anti-natural Reformation opposes the Life-endorsing Renaissance. Christianity is against Life; Nietzsche, who is for Life, therefore favours the counter-values. By comparing these passages with the way Leiter quotes from them, we see something of the effort it requires – I do not mean deliberate falsification, of course – to use late Nietzsche's words on physiology and value without revealing what Nietzsche is saying with those very words. Even in many (late) passages Leiter selects to support his reading, a different reading is seeping through the cracks. It is unattractive, philosophically. Yet there it is. Late Nietzsche does absolutely seem to think that power, suitably understood, is an objective, natural property (cf. p. 51). But was Late Nietzsche a moral anti-realist? For, as Leiter notes, power might be an objective, natural property, but not objectively valuable (p. 51). Leiter gives two Nietzscheindependent arguments for anti-realism: a best-explanation argument for what is most basic (probably not objective moral values) and a best-explanation argument treating moral disagreement (the best explanation for which would probably not be one that included objective moral values). Are these 'Nietzsche's [...] arguments for value anti-realism' (p. 51, my emphasis; also pp. 61, 68)? I have already said something about 'best explanation' and its relation to Nietzsche. In sum, Leiter offers no good grounds for attributing the first argument to Nietzsche. He finds one unpublished note which resembles the second argument, but little from the late, published works. One alleged exception is BGE 186, which is, at best, vague – Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 8 Leiter claims it 'gestures' in that direction (p. 29), but I found no such gesture. Conversely, Late Nietzsche sometimes resembles nothing so much as a naïve, natural realist who thought something was good if it did what nature intends (accumulation, power-seeking). He is happy to speak of 'natural values', of the 'right, that is to say, natural relation to all things' (KSA 6, 193, Nietzsche's emphasis), of 'every demand supplied by the instinct of Life, in sum, everything which has value in itself' (KSA 6, 196, Nietzsche's emphasis). Why is it right to be natural? Here, Nietzsche simply has less of an answer. He effectively labels this problem 'inaccessible' (KSA 6, 86, also 68), because Life (and the humans it inescapably operates through) can't form a reliable judgment about itself. It doesn't follow from a problem's inaccessibility, or from Nietzsche's lack of a comprehensive answer, that Nietzsche thinks the problem is accessible and that the answer has to do with anti-realism. Leiter does not analyse such passages, but they would surely be the place to begin. Meanwhile, it is odd to present Nietzsche as having much to contribute to contemporary debates about moral anti-realism. Leiter sometimes presents himself as someone who is not afraid of offering up Nietzsche's perhaps disturbing, yet nonetheless perfectly correct, philosophical views. But, to my mind, Leiter is not, himself, entirely innocent of shying away – in his case, from offering up disturbing but less defensible aspects of Nietzsche's thought. In the final chapter (co-authored with Joshua Knobe), Leiter cites Nietzsche as assuming the view, subsequently empirically supported (they claim), that 'morally-relevant traits [...] are the product of not only environmental factors but also of heredity [...] "It is simply not possible that a human being should not have the qualities and preferences of his parents and ancestors in his body," as Nietzsche quips, "whatever appearances may suggest to the contrary" (BGE: 264).' (p. 169) It is unclear why Leiter considers this a 'quip', especially in the light of Nietzsche's very next sentence, which Leiter omits: 'This is the problem of race.' 'Race' had a different, vaguer set of connotations in Nietzsche's context, but he has, with careful qualifications, been appropriately called a 'philosopher of racialized breeding' (Bernasconi 2017). Elsewhere, Leiter claims that opponents who have downplayed Nietzsche's views on freedom or responsibility 'aim to make Nietzsche less appalling to us delicate modern readers than he really is' (p. 161). He continues: 'The resistance to these points in the recent scholarly literature [...] reflects the continuing malign influence of moralizing readings of Nietzsche, of the failure to remember what he says about his conception of Renaissance virtue, namely, that we understand it, and him, "moraline-free" (A 2).' If you look at what Nietzsche says next in that passage (A 2), you discover the following consequence of remaining "moraline-free" (free from Christian-moral bias): "The weak and the failures [Missrathnen] should perish: first principle of our love of humanity. And they should be helped to do this. What is more harmful than any vice? Active pity for all failures and weakness Christianity . . ." It is unsurprising, given Nietzsche's context and outlook, that he was drawn to the thought that a solution to physiological decline might lie in what he calls helping the failures (the bad Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 9 batches) to perish – in what was already beginning to be called 'eugenics'. Use people's values to detect the Missrathnen and then, well, follow the first principle. Leiter, it seems, is quoting Nietzsche in support of his claim that other Nietzsche scholars shy away from the appalling bits, while simultaneously declining to reproduce, even from that very passage, Nietzsche's repeated suggestion that the physiologically decrepit ought to be shuffled off for the greater good. If so, I consider this ironic. But the more important point is that the criticisms set out here emerge from my attempt to understand what Nietzsche was saying, regardless of its soundness. That seems a good way of getting someone right – even if he was wrong. If merely setting out Nietzsche's own ideas is sufficient to see them wither, then I hope Nietzsche would have appreciated at least this: it is a case of helping something perish, but out of love. TOM STERN University College London [email protected] Bernasconi, Robert. 2017. 'Nietzsche as a Philosopher of Racialized Breeding'. In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race, edited by Naomi Zack, 54–62. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Féré, Charles. 1888. Dégénérescence et Criminalité. Paris. Holub, Robert C. 2018. Nietzsche in the Nineteenth Century: Social Questions and Philosophical Interventions. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Hussain, Nadeem J. Z. 2011. 'The Role of Life in the Genealogy'. In Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morality: A Critical Guide, edited by Simon May, 142–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1988. Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe. Edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. 15 vols. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. Small, Robin. 2001. Nietzsche in Context. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. Sommer, Andreas Urs. 2012. Nietzsche-Kommentar: Der Fall Wagner; Götzen-Dammerung. Berlin; Boston: Walter de Gruyter. ---. 2013. Nietzsche-Kommentar: Der Antichrist; Ecce Homo; Dionysos-Dithyramben; Nietzsche Contra Wagner. Berlin; Boston: Walter de Gruyter. ---. 2019. 'What Nietzsche Did and Did Not Read'. In The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Tom Stern, 25–48. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stern, Tom. 2016. '"Some Third Thing": Nietzsche's Words and the Principle of Charity'. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (2): 287–302. Unpublished draft. Final version forthcoming in MIND. 10 ---. 2019a. 'History, Nature, and the "Genetic Fallacy" in The Antichrist's Revaluation of Values'. In Nietzsche and The Antichrist: Religion, Politics, and Culture in Late Modernity, edited by Daniel W. Conway, 21–42. London: Bloomsbury. ---. 2019b. 'Nietzsche's Ethics of Affirmation'. In The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Tom Stern, 351–73. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ---. 2020. Nietzsche's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

REVIEW published: 06 May 2015 doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00481 Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Edited by: Snehlata Jaswal, Indian Institute of Technology Jodhpur, India Reviewed by: Martina K. Kanning, University of Stuttgart, Germany Pietro Cipresso, Istituto di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Istituto Auxologico Italiano, Italy Sara Konrath, Indiana University, USA *Correspondence: Jason D. Runyan, Psychology Department, Indiana Wesleyan University, 4201 S. Washington St., Marion, IN 46953, USA [email protected] Specialty section: This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology Received: 04 November 2014 Accepted: 02 April 2015 Published: 06 May 2015 Citation: Runyan JD and Steinke EG (2015) Virtues, ecological momentary assessment/intervention and smartphone technology. Front. Psychol. 6:481. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00481 Virtues, ecological momentary assessment/intervention and smartphone technology Jason D. Runyan* and Ellen G. Steinke Psychology Department, Indiana Wesleyan University, Marion, IN, USA Virtues, broadly understood as stable and robust dispositions for certain responses across morally relevant situations, have been a growing topic of interest in psychology. A central topic of discussion has been whether studies showing that situations can strongly influence our responses provide evidence against the existence of virtues (as a kind of stable and robust disposition). In this review, we examine reasons for thinking that the prevailing methods for examining situational influences are limited in their ability to test dispositional stability and robustness; or, then, whether virtues exist. We make the case that these limitations can be addressed by aggregating repeated, cross-situational assessments of environmental, psychological and physiological variables within everyday life-a form of assessment often called ecological momentary assessment (EMA, or experience sampling). We, then, examine how advances in smartphone application (app) technology, and their mass adoption, make these mobile devices an unprecedented vehicle for EMA and, thus, the psychological study of virtue. We, additionally, examine how smartphones might be used for virtue development by promoting changes in thought and behavior within daily life; a technique often called ecological momentary intervention (EMI). While EMA/I have become widely employed since the 1980s for the purposes of understanding and promoting change amongst clinical populations, few EMA/I studies have been devoted to understanding or promoting virtues within non-clinical populations. Further, most EMA/I studies have relied on journaling, PDAs, phone calls and/or text messaging systems. We explore how smartphone app technology provides a means of making EMA a more robust psychological method, EMI a more robust way of promoting positive change, and, as a result, opens up new possibilities for studying and promoting virtues. Keywords: experience sampling, mindfulness, self-awareness, habits, automaticity, character traits, virtues, dispositions Introduction Over the past 15 years, virtues have received increased attention in the psychological sciences. This has, in large part, been a result of the positive psychology movement (Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi, 2000; Seligman et al., 2005). Positive psychology is a subfield of psychological science devoted to a deliberate attentiveness to human flourishing and its promotion. And virtues have been a central focus of positive psychology (Seligman et al., 2005; Kristjánsson, 2013; Worthington et al., 2014). Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones This increased attention to virtues, and positive psychology in general, has not gone without criticism (e.g., Gable et al., 2005; Held, 2005; Sundararajan, 2005; Kristjánsson, 2010, 2013; McNulty and Fincham, 2012). In this review, our goal is not to defend positive psychology. We, however, propose that there is virtue in the psychological study of virtues. We, further, propose that smartphone technology opens up a new means of studying, and possibly promoting, virtue. In making our case, we discuss: • philosophical and psychological work concerning virtue stability (persistence over time) and robustness (crosssituational persistence); • smartphone application (app) advances pertaining to the measurement of human (and physiological) activity and experience within daily life; and • the use of mobile app technology for ecological momentary assessment and intervention as it pertains to the study of virtues. Virtues and Situational Studies: Questions of Stability and Robustness Dating at least as far back as Aristotle's analytic treatment of virtues, there has been a long history of understanding virtues as a kind of disposition (hexis). This Aristotelian conception is often referred to as the traditional conception (cf. Timpe and Boyd, 2014); and, following a marked decline in interest, virtues understood along Aristotelian lines have received renewed attention in moral philosophy. This renewed attention is in large part a result of the influence of works by Anscombe (1958), Foot (1978), and MacIntyre (1984). According to a traditional Aristotelian conception, virtues are human excellences understood as a subclass of psychological disposition, or that is, ability to behave or think in certain ways, or have certain psychological responses, across relevant situations (Aristotle, 2000 I.13; Aristotle EE II.1218-20). Expressing virtues is constitutive of a flourishing (eudaimonic) life, or, that is, a deeply fulfilling, well-lived life of growth (cf. Aristotle EE I.7II.1; Fowers, 2012). While a person can be virtuous without flourishing, and even while suffering, a person cannot flourish without being virtuous1. In the way a good ax cuts wood well, a flourishing person expresses virtues (Aristotle EE II.1213-34). And virtues are expressed by actively doing or thinking certain things, or by feeling certain emotions or having certain passive responses (e.g., refraining from certain behavior), in morally relevant situations (cf. Jayawickreme and Chemero, 2008). Virtues, understood as a subclass of disposition, have been recognized as having three important characteristics (Timpe and Boyd, 2014). First, they are relatively stable. Virtues tend to 1It should be noted that the Aristotelian tradition is a eudaimonic tradition in which happiness, or flourishing, is analyzed in terms of living a fulfilled and deeply satisfying life of growth through expressing virtues (Kenny, 2011, pp. xii–xiv). This tradition is in opposition to hedonic traditions in which happiness is analyzed in terms of affect or subjective well-being (cf. Deci and Ryan, 2008a). At the same time, accepting a eudaimonic analysis does not entail, or typically involve, thinking it can never be the case that a person who is exercising virtues is not flourishing; or that a flourishing life will not include subjective well-being or pleasure. persist over some period of time. Thus, we generally cannot be sure whether someone has a virtue until they have expressed it on multiple occasions. Similarly, we generally cannot be sure whether someone has a virtue until they have expressed it under various virtue-relevant situations. And this relates to the second characteristic of virtues. Virtues are relatively robust in the sense that they are consistently expressed across a range of situations. Third, virtues are interconnected in the sense that having one virtue increases the probability of having others (cf. Watson, 1984; MacIntyre, 1999; Annas, 2011). In modern psychology, Allport provided an early treatment that supported the conception of virtues as a kind of relatively stable, robust and interconnected disposition or trait (cf. Allport, 1960)2. However, more recently, a number ofmoral psychologists have argued that there are good experimental grounds for thinking virtues do not actually exist (cf. Nahmias, 2010). The argument is that virtues are no more than unmaterialized ideals. The grounds for this argument come from studies indicating that, to a significant degree, a person's situation can influence their conduct and thought without them being aware of it (Hunt, 1965; Mischel, 1968; Ross and Nisbett, 1991; Doris, 1998, 2002; Harman, 1999). In one of the most well-known of these studies- Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment-college students began exhibiting guard-like or inmate-like behavior after only a few days of taking on the role of either a guard or a prisoner in a mock prison (Haney et al., 1973). In another well-known experiment, Milgram (1963) found that a majority of participants would administer what they thought to be a potentially lethal shock to individuals they had never met if ordered to by an experimenter as part of what was presented to them as a scientific study (see also Hartshorne and May, 1928; Asch, 1951; Isen and Levin, 1972). Additionally, over the past 20 years, a wealth of studies have indicated that priming individuals by having them, for example, read words with either prosocial or antisocial connotations, or handle certain kinds of objects (e.g., smooth, rough, heavy, hot, cold), can influence their subsequent behavior and judgments without them realizing it (e.g., Williams and Bargh, 2008; Ackerman et al., 2010; Bargh and Shalev, 2012). 2Two points should be made here: (1) First, Allport, and many psychologists since, talk of traits (i.e., personality traits, character traits) rather than psychological dispositions; and, while, "trait" and "disposition" are commonly used interchangeably, traits are often thought of as a type of more stable disposition. Having said this, there are variations in the use of the term "disposition." Sometimes, "disposition" and "trait" are both used to refer to any relatively stable and robust psychological characteristic, including deficiencies or the lack of certain psychological abilities (e.g., Eysenck and Eysenck, 1969; Watson and Clark, 1984; McCrae and Costa, 2003). Other times, often in philosophical psychology, a psychological disposition is understood as any psychological ability, some of which are not, in and of themselves, typically understood as a trait or aspect thereof (e.g., Annas, 2011; Anjum et al., 2013; Hyman, 2014). For our purposes here, it is not crucial to analyze various conceptions of psychological traits or dispositions, or how these conceptions overlap. It suffices to point out that, often, there is overlap in the use of "trait" and "disposition," and, for our purposes here, a psychological disposition is a psychological ability. A virtue is, then, a subclass of psychological disposition or ability as outlined above (also see Mumford, 1998). (2) Second, according to Allport (1960), the study of virtues involves value judgments and, thus, is a study for moral philosophy rather than psychological science. As will become clear, we take a different view. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones The kinds of situational studies mentioned above have been thought to provide evidence against the existence of virtues as relatively stable and robust dispositions; that is, as dispositions consistently expressed across relevant situations over a period of time (Harman, 1999; Doris, 2002). However, while drawing attention to the extent and ways situations can influence individuals, to think these studies provide evidence against the existence of virtues, conceived of as a type of stable and robust disposition, is to infer too much. As Croom (2014) and others (e.g., Alzola, 2008) have recently pointed out, thinking these studies provide evidence against the existence of virtues results from: oversimplifying an Aristotelian conception of virtues as perfectly stable and robust dispositions; and/or drawing unwarranted conclusions from these studies. First, as Anscombe (1958, p. 14) has pointed out, regardless of the virtues possessed by the average person, there may be a complete set of virtues each of which is possessed by some people. Virtues may be rare without being nonexistent; and, granted they exist, they are likely rare. Thus, when studying whether virtues exist, it is necessary to distinguish candidates for having a certain stable and robust disposition from other individuals in order to examine whether relevant situational influences have similar effects on both groups. So it is necessary to examine exemplars (e.g., Colby and Damon, 1992, 1999; Dunlop and Walker, 2013). Situational factors may not influence exemplars in the way they do the average person. Exemplars may express a virtue despite situational influences that make it difficult to do so. This, however, has not been tested in the situational studies purported to call the existence of virtues in question. As a result, the situational effects observed in these studies should not be generalized to the entire human population. Even if such situational effects are found in the majority, this does not provide evidence that virtues do not exist. Second-and in keeping with the above-the situational studies purported to provide evidence that virtues are nonexistent do not even provide evidence that virtues are not possessed by a subgroup within the samples studied (cf. Miller, 2013). Thus, at most, these studies indicate that certain virtues are rare. For instance, in Darley and Batson's (1973) "Good Samaritan" study, only 10% of seminarians that participated in the study helped someone who appeared to need medical attention as they rushed to give a talk for which they were very late. While these observations might be taken to indicate that 90% of the seminarians lack a certain virtue, it clearly should not be taken to indicate that all of them do. Third, many of the studies thought to call into question the existence of virtues have used undergraduate students who may still be developing in ways relevant to the development of virtues. It has been observed that the prefrontal cortex, and its connectivity to other regions, typically continues to develop up to lateor post-adolescence. This development is inversely correlated with novelty seeking (e.g., Pfefferbaum et al., 1994; Reiss and Havercamp, 1996; Sowell et al., 1999, 2003; Gogtay et al., 2004; Kelley et al., 2004; Segalowitz and Davies, 2004; Somerville et al., 2010, 2011) and impulsivity (Shannon et al., 2011), which are, in turn, likely to be inversely correlated with possessing stable and robust psychological dispositions, including virtues. Thus, many of these studies are performed using samples that tend toward not having yet developed certain, stable psychological dispositions. Fourth, to provide evidence that virtues do not exist, it would need to be shown that engaging in practices thought to contribute to virtue development does not mitigate situational influences on an individual's responses. However, none of the situational studies thought to bring the existence of virtues in question tests this. Fifth, a substantial amount of evidence indicates that crosssituational consistencies in responses characteristic of relatively stable and robust dispositions-such as virtues-are often missed without the aggregation of repeated, cross-situational measurements (Dlugokinski and Firestone, 1973, 1974; Staub, 1974; Epstein, 1979, 1983; Rushton, 1980, 1984; Rushton et al., 1981, 1983; Fleeson, 2001; Furr, 2009). The reason is there are multiple responses characteristic of these kinds of dispositions and there is some degree of variability in their expression as a result of interfering factors (Fleeson and Noftle, 2008; Miller, 2013). Thus, using one or two situational tests to examine whether an individual possesses a disposition, or virtue, is an insufficient and unreliable approach to testing dispositional stability and robustness. In sum, situational studies thought to provide evidence against the existence of virtues are not optimally designed to test whether virtues exist, and, thus, should not be taken to indicate they do not. There is, on the other hand, accumulating evidence that at least some individuals do possess virtues. First, studies that aggregate repeated, cross-situational measurements of responses provide evidence that at least some individuals express relatively stable and robust psychological dispositions (Ozer, 1986; Fleeson, 2001, 2004; McNiel and Fleeson, 2006; John et al., 2008; Donnellan and Lucas, 2009), even if they are not impervious to situational influences (Fleeson, 2007; Fleeson and Noftle, 2008; Bleidorn, 2009). It is likely that some of these dispositions contribute to psychological health and growth and so, in keeping with a broadly conceived Aristotelian tradition, are virtues. Second, it has been observed that at least some psychological states tend to fluctuate around a "set point" (e.g., Suh et al., 1996; Diener and Lucas, 1999; Diener et al., 2006; Keltner, 2009). Since a psychological state can be the expression of a disposition, this observation provides further evidence that relatively stable and robust psychological dispositions exist. And, again, it is likely that some of these dispositions contribute to psychological health and growth; and so-again in keeping with an Aristotelian tradition-are virtues. Third, virtues can be possessed in degrees and the degree to which a virtue is possessed can be used to predict patterns of responses, such as the frequency of virtue-relevant responses across relevant situations (cf. Miller, 2013). At the same time, as with all dispositions, there are factors that can interfere with the expression of virtues. Thus, some variability in virtue expression across relevant situations is to be expected, and this variability can be used to measure degree of virtue possession (Miller, 2013). Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones Finally, as we will see in what follows, there is growing psychological and neurophysiological evidence suggesting that training can promote the development of relatively stable and robust psychological dispositions which contribute to flourishing; or, that is, to virtue development understood along Aristotelian lines. In this review we make the case that advances in smartphone technology open up a new approach to the psychological study of relatively stable and robust dispositions. We also make the case that putting this technology to use in this capacity promises to add to mounting psychological and neurophysiological evidence that certain individuals possess virtues understood along Aristotelian lines. Having stated this, we should be careful not to undervalue longstanding, everyday evidence that, throughout history, certain individuals have consistently expressed virtues in spite of strong situational influences to the contrary (see Colby and Damon, 1992). For instance, steadfast individuals who hid Jews in Nazi Germany, or undermined the Nazi regime in other ways, have been well documented and readily come to mind (e.g., see Marsh, 2014). We should, instead, seek to learn from such exemplars. Further, we should be careful not to undervalue the fact virtues have remained a useful, relevant and commonplace construct for thousands of years. Keeping the above in mind, we propose the integration of something ancient and something cutting-edge: the study of virtues and the use of smartphone app technology. We propose that recent advancements in smartphone app technology, and the mass adoption of this technology, opens up a new means of examining and developing virtues through ecological momentary assessment (EMA) and ecological momentary intervention (EMI), respectively. In the remainder of this review, we, first, introduce EMA and discuss how smartphone technology provides a vehicle for making EMA a robust psychological method. We, second, examine how smartphone EMA studies promise to add to our knowledge of virtues; and, in particular, virtue stability and robustness. We, then, introduce EMI and examine how smartphone technology provides a vehicle for making EMI a widespread and effective way of promoting positive change. Finally, we discuss the promise smartphone EMI holds as an effective means of promoting virtue development. EMA and Smartphone Apps Quantitative psychological studies have, traditionally, relied heavily on surveys and laboratory experiments. Both approaches have well-known and long-endured limitations. Surveys require people to make retrospective and often generalized judgments, which tend to be affected by memory limitations and recall biases (cf. Schwarz, 2007). Laboratory experiments do not occur within the context of a person's daily life; and context can influence a person's states and responses (cf. Hammond et al., 1998; Wilhelm et al., 2011), which raises questions about ecological validity (Shiffman et al., 2008). Additionally, since neither surveys nor laboratory experiments involve repeated, crosssituational sampling, both approaches fail to detect intrasubject variability within the context of an individual's everyday life (cf. Hammaker, 2012). This is particularly relevant with respect to studying virtues since, as observed in the previous section, the extent to which an individual's states and responses vary across situations-as well as individual differences in this regard-are crucial to measure when examining virtue possession. Though earlier analogs existed, ecological momentary assessment (EMA, also referred to as experience sampling or ambulatory assessment) developed in the 1980s as a way of addressing the limitations of traditional quantitative methods in psychological science (Csikszentmihalyi and Larson, 1987; Stone and Shiffman, 1994; Shiffman et al., 2008). In particular, it was developed as a form of assessment that allowed repeated sampling within the various situations of daily life. In EMA, individuals are prompted, at fixed or random times, to respond to questions about what they are presently doing and/or experiencing (or what they have done and/or experienced in the recent past), repeatedly, throughout a period of time within the course of their daily affairs. EMA has been implemented in a number of ways, including through the use of stopwatches and paper-and-pencil diaries, PDAs (personal digital assistants; e.g., PalmPilots), phone calls and text messages. However, progress in smartphone technology has, recently, opened up a new mode of EMA. With the release of the iPhone OS2 operating system in 2008, smartphones that could run third-party applications, or "apps," began being used in the daily activities of millions of people. By 2009, with the release of the iPhone OS3 operating system, millions began carrying devices that could run multiple apps continuously in the background; and some of these apps could run without an internet connection. Today, a number of companies make smartphones with this capability and approximately 1.91 billion people carry these devices (eMarketer, 2015). It is projected that by 2018 this number will increase to 2.56 billion. In more economically "developed" countries, the near ubiquitous use of smartphone apps makes EMA practical for widespread use. For the first time, EMA can be conducted in a robust and dynamic way by using a tool that is already a part of daily life for a large percentage of the population (Raento et al., 2009). The widespread use of smartphones opens up a means of collecting psychological data within the moments of daily life along with data collected through various types of sensors (e.g., global positioning systems (GPS), microphones, cameras, activity monitors, heart rate monitors). And, unlike with other modes of EMA, participants need not be trained to use a new device. Additionally, whereas using PDAs for EMA requires a certain amount of programming expertise, flexible smartphone app-based EMA systems are being developed and distributed that allow researchers to create their own EMA designs through a user-friendly web interface that requires no programming expertise (for a list see Conner, 2014; Konrath, 2015; also see Table 1)3. Further, smartphone app-based EMA systems have been created that automatically enter data into datasets as the data streams in from participants' smartphones. 3Most smartphone app-based EMA systems work on either Apple or Android devices, which make up the majority of smartphones in use. Only two work with both: illumivu and LifeData. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones TABLE 1 | EMA peer-reviewed psychological studies using smartphone apps. References Assessment target App Sensors Tailoring Burns et al., 2011a Depressive symptoms Custom built x x Palmier-Claus et al., 2012 Psychotic symptoms Custom built Bossman et al., 2013 Affect and physical activity Movisens x von Haaren et al., 2013 Affect and physical activity Movisens x Walter et al., 2013 Mood and physical activity Movisens Runyan et al., 2013 Time-management iHabit Kirk et al., 2013 Illicit drug use eMOCHA MacKerron and Mourato, 2013 Happiness Mappiness Dunton et al., 2013b Affect and physical activity amongst children Custom built x Watkins et al., 2014 Urges to smoke and location during attempts to quit smoking Custom built x Khor et al., 2014 Coping, behavior and emotion problems amongst adolescents with high-functioning autism Mobiletype Garcia-Palacios et al., 2014 Chronic pain in fibromyalgia Custom built Adams et al., 2014 Stress SESAME Randall et al., 2014 Emotion, regulation strategies and music listening MuPsych Gonzalez and Dulin, 2015 Alcohol use disorders LBMI-A Ottaviani et al., 2015 Mind-wandering and cognitive rigidity SurveyPocket and KoBo x Bleidorn and Denissen, 2015 Virtues Movisens These studies were located by searching Pubmed.com, and publications from peer-reviewed psychology journals listed in Scholar.google.com, up to February 27th, 2015 (search terms: "ecological momentary assessment" and "smartphone"). aIn the Burns et al. (2011) study, depressive symptoms were assessed in order to predict mood for the purposes of tailoring when coping strategies were delivered. Thus, this was an EMA/I study. bDunton et al. (2013) used custom software downloaded onto a mobile phone rather than a standard smartphone app. This increases the practicality of handling the relatively large amounts of data collected in EMA studies, which can easily approach ten thousand items of data. In addition to making EMA more practical for widespread use, smartphone app-based EMA systems have been designed to ensure that participants respond to questions "in the moment," or, that is, soon after being alerted to do so. Some systems time stamp responses so that the time lapse between when a person is notified to answer a question and when they answer it can be calculated. Some systems also allow researchers to give participants a limited time window to respond to questions after being notified. These features help ensure that individuals are not merely giving a convenience sampling, which has been an issue with other modes of EMA (e.g., Stone et al., 2002). As shown in Table 1, since 2011, there have been a number of psychological EMA studies conducted using smartphone apps. Several of these involved acquiring data through environmental, activity and/or physiological sensors together with self-report. One has involved tailoring assessments to the individual, and their moment-to-moment experiences, in response to their location and activity level. To date, most app-based EMA studies have been conducted on clinical populations and many have been pilot studies. There have, however, been a number of non app-based EMA studies that have examined momentary dispositional expressions (see Table 2). To our knowledge, only one EMA study (published after this manuscript was under review) has systematically focused on assessing virtues using momentary responses (see Bleidorn and Denissen, 2015). Nevertheless, EMA provides a means of repeatedly measuring an individual's states, experiences and responses, as well as the extent to which these vary, using multiple measures throughout the moments and situations of everyday life. And, as we saw in the previous section, repeated, cross-situational sampling using an aggregate of measures is crucial for the psychological study of virtues; and, in particular, for testing dispositional stability and robustness. Further, as Wichers (2014) has recently observed, measuring momentto-moment states and events can provide insight concerning patterns contributing to the development of enduring unhealthy or healthy mental conditions. Thus, app-based EMA-as a means of measuring moment-to-moment states and events- provides an unprecedented vehicle for studying dispositions, including those that contribute to psychological well-being; i.e., virtues. Virtues and App-Based EMA Traditionally, in Western thought, wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage have been thought of as "cardinal" (derived from the Latin "cardo" meaning hinge), or principal, virtues (e.g., Wisdom of Solomon 8:7; Plato, 380 BC/1991; Ambrose et al., (377 AD/1961)). Aristotle, however, influentially extended this list and understood virtues to be optimal points between deficiencies and excesses (cf. Aristotle EE; see Table 3). Additionally, within Christian theology, faith, hope, and love (or charity) have Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones TABLE 2 | EMA peer-reviewed psychological studies targeting momentary dispositional expression within non-clinical populations. Study Target EMA mode Marco and Suls, 1993 Neuroticism Paper and pencil Stone et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 1999; Roesch et al., 2010 Coping PDA, PDA, Internet daily diary, respectively Räikkönen et al., 1999; Vella et al., 2012; Demarble et al., 2014 Hostility PDA and Monitoring devices for ECG and blood pressure D'Antono et al., 2001 Agreeableness Paper and pencil Brown and Ryan, 2003; Levesque and Brown, 2007 Mindfulness Paper and pencil Conner and Barrett, 2005 Implicit self-attitudes and negative feeling states PDA Kane et al., 2007 Working memory capacity and mind-wandering PDA Moberly and Watkins, 2008; Huffziger et al., 2013 Ruminative self-focus Paper and pencil, PDA, respectively Conway et al., 2009 Empathy, altruism, helping behavior and affect PDA Burt and Donnellan, 2010 Antisocial behavior and acting-out PDA Minbashian et al., 2010 Conscientiousness PDA Fay and Sonnentag, 2012 Trait affect and proactive behavior PDA Bruehl et al., 2012 Anger and chronic pain intensity PDA Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012 Self-esteem and cardiac vagal tone PDA; Monitoring devices for ECG and bodily movement Hofmann et al., 2012; Lopez et al., 2014 Self-control PDA Edmondson et al., 2013 Anxiety and anger PDA Silvia et al., 2014 Creativity Cell phone delivered surveys aan het Rot et al., 2015 Impulsivity, quarrelsomeness and agreeableness Paper and pencil These studies were located by searching Pubmed.com, and publications from peer-reviewed journals listed in Scholar.google.com, up to February 27th, 2015 (search terms: "ecological momentary assessment" and "virtue," or "trait," or "disposition"). Only studies targeting momentary dispositional expressions in non-clinical populations are included. TABLE 3 | Aristotle's list of virtues. Virtue (Mean) Deficiency Excess Courage Cowardice Foolhardiness Temperance Insensibility Intemperance Liberality (Generosity in small matters) Illiberality Prodigality Magnificence (Generosity in large matters) Shabbiness Extravagance Self-worth Diffidence Vanity Dignity Servility Churlishness Gentleness Impassivity Irascibility Candor Dissembling Boastfulness Justice Loss Gain Friendliness Surliness Flattery Modesty Shamelessness Shyness Righteous indignation Malicious enjoyment Envy Wisdom Naivety Cunning Hardiness Softness Toughness Aristotle understood virtues to be means between the vices of excess and deficiency. This table lists Aristotle's virtues along with their corresponding excess and deficiency (adapted from Kenny's (2011) translation of Eudemian Ethics; note: Aristotle develops a slightly different list in the Nicomachean Ethics). traditionally been upheld as key "theological virtues" (e.g., 1 Corinthians 13:13; Aquinas, 1274/1948). Recently, the case has been made that six "overarching" characteristics are widely upheld as virtues across most cultures (Peterson and Seligman, 2004; Dahlsgaard et al., 2005; Seligman et al., 2005; but see Shryack et al., 2010). These are: wisdom, TABLE 4 | Peterson and Seligman's (2004) "Virtues in Action" classification of virtues. Wisdom Creativity, Curiosity, Open-mindedness, Love of learning, Perspective Courage Authenticity, Bravery, Persistence, Zest Humanity Kindness, Love, Social intelligence Justice Fairness, Leadership, Teamwork Temperance Forgiveness, Modesty, Prudence, Self-regulation Transcendence Gratitude, Hope, Humor, Religiousness This table has been adapted from Seligman et al. (2005), which contains a description of the various virtue subtypes. courage, humanity, justice, temperance, and transcendence (see Table 4). And there has been some indication that rankings of these characteristics strongly correlate across many countries (n = 54) and, to some extent, transcend ethnic, cultural and religious differences (Park et al., 2006; but see van Oudenhoven et al., 2012). However, rather than understanding virtues as a prescribed set of characteristics, following the broadly conceived Aristotelian conception we outlined earlier, we understand virtues to be a kind of relatively stable and robust psychological disposition the expression of which contributes to a fulfilling, well-lived life of growth; or, that is, to a flourishing life. Whatever else a fully flourishing life may involve, such a life involves psychological growth, psychological (eudaimonic) well-being and physical health (cf. Ryan and Deci, 2001; Keyes, 2007; Ryff Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones and Singer, 2008; Deci and Ryan, 2008a)4. In this case, since psychological growth, psychological well-being and physical health are measurable, which dispositions contribute to a flourishing life, and, thus, should be included in a list of virtues, can be empirically studied. What should be considered a virtue is also an important matter since a flourishing life is obviously desirable. That being said, it should be kept in mind that dispositions which contribute to a flourishing life may lead to flourishing under a certain range of circumstances without leading to flourishing under all circumstances. For instance, certain characteristics may contribute to flourishing only when possessed by a critical number of individuals within a social group. Further, characteristics may contribute to flourishing when possessed in clusters but not on their own. Thus, under certain circumstances, an individual may suffer despite, and even as a result of, expressing virtue. Likewise, an individual may not experience physical health despite expressing virtue. Over the past several years, flourishing has received increased attention in psychological science, and a number of studies have identified psychological characteristics that correlate with psychological growth, psychological well-being and/or physical health. Dispositional resilience has been positively correlated with successful adaptation to life stress (Ong et al., 2006) and with the well-being of widows (O'Rourke, 2004; Rossi et al., 2007). Additionally, dispositional mindfulness has been positively associated with both psychological well-being and physical health (e.g., Bernstein et al., 2011; Baer et al., 2012; Bowlin and Baer, 2012; Tamagawa et al., 2013); and individual differences in dispositional mindfulness predict psychological health (e.g., Baer, 2003; Baer et al., 2004). Other dispositions positively associated with psychological and/or physical health, include gratitude (e.g., Wood et al., 2010; Emmons and Mishra, 2011), optimism (e.g., Scheier and Carver, 1987; Scheier et al., 1989, 2001; Engberg et al., 2013; Carver and Scheier, 2014; He et al., 2014), self-efficacy (e.g., Bandura, 2004; Luszczynska et al., 2005), compassion (e.g., MacBeth and Gumley, 2012), altruism (e.g., Brown et al., 2009), self-regulation (e.g., Nix et al., 1999; Wrosch et al., 2003; Deci and Ryan, 2008b; Simon and Durand-Bush, 2014), forgiving (e.g., Berry and Worthington, 2001; Farrow et al., 2001; Maltby and Day, 2001; Seybold andHill, 2001; Lawler-Row, 2010), spirituality (e.g., Hill and Pargament, 2003; Miller and Thoresen, 2003; Kuo et al., 2014; Reutter and Bigatti, 2014), religiosity (e.g., Hummer et al., 1999; McCullough et al., 2000; Oman and Thoresen, 2005; Greenfield and Marks, 2007; Park, 2007), and wisdom (e.g., Webster and Deng, 2014). Most of the studies associating dispositions with flourishing- including those mentioned above-rely on surveys to measure the disposition in question. They examine associations between the possession of these dispositions and some measure, or correlate, of flourishing. This approach, however, is not ideal for measuring, or then studying, dispositions for several reasons. First, surveys assessing dispositions do not involve measuring the expression of dispositions within the context of an individual's daily life; or allow directly associating this expression with 4Psychological well-being is not to be confused with subjective well-being (for e.g. see Ryff and Singer, 2008; Ryff, 2013). See note 1. flourishing. Rather, as we noted at the beginning of the previous section, surveys ask for generalized retrospective judgments removed from a person's daily context, which are susceptible to recall biases. Second, as they do not involve repeated, cross-situational sampling, surveys assessing dispositions cannot effectively measure intrasubject variability in the expression of a disposition. As a result, this approach does not provide an effective means of measuring dispositional stability or robustness, which, as we have already seen, is paramount to the psychology study of virtues. In contrast, EMA allows: (1) the detection of dispositional expression, and its correlates, within the context of daily life using multiple measures; and (2) the measurement of dispositional stability and robustness through repeated cross-situational sampling. EMA, thus, provides (3) a more thorough and direct means of examining the relationship between dispositions and flourishing than traditional approaches that rely on surveys. We will discuss points (1)–(3) in sequential order. (1) Through the incorporation of environmental, activity, and physiological sensors, app-based EMA opens up various ways of detecting: (i) the expression of virtues; (ii) correlates of having or expressing these dispositions; and (iii) the relevant features of the situations in which they are expressed. Virtues can be expressed by psychological states (e.g., emotional states, motivational states) as well as by what people think and do (e.g., Bartlett and DeSteno, 2006; DeSteno et al., 2010). Thus, EMA can be used to detect virtue expression by asking people questions pertaining to their recent or current psychological states, experiences, thought life and/or behavior (for e.g., see studies listed in Table 2) as well as by administering brief psychological tests (cf. Schlicht et al., 2013). An EMA app can prompt individuals to respond to questions, or take brief tests, repeatedly at various moments, and across various situations, throughout the day. As a result, rather than asking people tomake generalized retrospective judgments (e.g., "In the past month, I have. . . "), an individual can be asked about their current or recent states, experiences or conduct (e.g., "Over the past hour, I have. . . "). And survey-style instruments assessing virtues might be adapted so that, rather than asking for generalized judgments, they ask for reports concerning the present or recent past (cf. Fleeson, 2001). For example, Hofmann et al. (2014) recently used EMA to repeatedly prompt people at random times over a 3-day period to report moral and immoral behavior over the previous hour. This allowed for the detection of patterns in moral behavior (e.g., social contagion, moral licensing) and awareness (e.g., a relative tendency to note others' immoral rather than moral behavior). More recently, Bleidorn and Denissen (2015) took adjectives associated with, and listed in, Peterson and Seligman's (2004) six Virtues in Action classifications (see Table 4) that could be meaningfully inserted into the following sentence: "I behaved particularly. . . during the last hour." They, then, used app-based EMA to deliver these sentences to participants up to six times a Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones day over a 10-day period in order to have them rate their behavior in the past hour. Amongst their participants-working mothers and fathers-they found that an individual's average virtue rating, the degree of variability in their rating, and the way an individual typically responded in certain contexts were relatively stable. In addition to delivering questions, smartphones can be used to randomly capture conversations or other activities (e.g., Mehl et al., 2012). Further, prompts can be given immediately after these recordings asking individuals to report their states, experiences or thoughts; and/or asking them to upload a picture or video of their surroundings. This allows the association of life events and situations with momentary states, experiences and/or responses that would, otherwise, be forgotten once individuals are more temporally and spatially removed from the event or situation. It also allows the capture of contextual details that an individual would, otherwise, be unaware of or forget. Activity sensors (e.g., Fitbit, Polo tech, Apple Watch; Moviesens) can also be used to record any physical and physiological activities correlated with an individual's momentary responses, states and/or experiences (e.g., D'Antono et al., 2001; Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012; Bossman et al., 2013; von Haaren et al., 2013; Demarble et al., 2014; Dunton et al., 2014). Participants might, further, be prompted to take saliva samples in order to examine potential biochemical correlates (e.g., cortisol, oxytocin or progesterone levels) of dispositional expression (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Entringer et al., 2011; Koven and Max, 2014). Or they might take a pharmacological agent (e.g., tryptophan, an anti-anxiolytic, an anti-depressant) while participating in an EMA study targeting dispositional expression (cf. Moskowitz et al., 2001; Moskowitz and Young, 2006). In the near future, app-based EMAwill also allow the isolation of neurophysiological correlates of having and/or expressing certain dispositions within certain situations. For example, mobile electroencephalography (EEG) caps (e.g., Eegosports) could be synced with an EMA app in order to record eventrelated potentials, or preparatory neural activities such as readiness-potentials (RPs); i.e., relative changes in the activity of the primary motor cortex and surrounding regions associated with preparedness to act (e.g., Freude and Ullsperger, 1987; Coles et al., 1988; Coles, 1989; Deecke et al., 1990; Shibasaki andHallett, 2006; Ibanez et al., 2012; Nachev and Hacker, 2014). Through these means we might find that, when an individual has a certain disposition, certain preparatory activities occur under certain situations. Similarly, app-based EMA that incorporates mobile EEG might allow the detection of other neurophysiological correlates of expressing dispositions similar to those recently measured for forgiving using fMRI, where an increase in activity in the angular gyrus was associated with forgiving (see Figure 1). (2) By allowing various ways of detecting (i)–(iii)-listed above-smartphone app-based EMA provides a vehicle for more direct and repeated measurement of disposition-relevant responses across various daily situations using an aggregate of measures. It, thus, provides a means of collecting crosssituational data to populate a frequency distribution of an individual's disposition-relevant responses organized by the degree to which each expresses the disposition in question. From FIGURE 1 | Neural differences between forgiving and not forgiving as measured by fMRI. The red shows where increased activity was observed when participants forgave in comparison to when they did not (taken from Strang et al., 2014). AG, angular gyrus; R, right; L, left. this distribution, a mean score for an individual's dispositional expression and the variability of this expression can be calculated (Fleeson and Noftle, 2008). In this way, EMA provides a way of measuring the typical degree to which, and consistency with which, an individual expresses a disposition throughout the relevant situations of their daily life over a period of time. So it provides a means of directly measuring the stability and robustness of a disposition, or virtue. In so doing, it provides a way for assessing not simply whether an individual has a virtue but the degree to which they have a virtue. We should expect individuals who possess a certain virtue to typically express that virtue across a certain range of situations (Jayawickreme and Chemero, 2008). That is, given an Aristotelian conception, we should expect a virtue to be, to a certain degree, stable and robust. However, similar to the way the expression of other relatively stable and robust dispositions have been observed to vary (Ozer, 1986; McNiel and Fleeson, 2006; John et al., 2008; Donnellan and Lucas, 2009), some variability in the expression of a virtue should also be expected (see Miller, 2013). Nevertheless, the stronger, or more formed, a virtue, the more consistency there will be in its expression across relevant situations. This is because the stronger a virtue, the more frequently it is expressed in demanding situations, and despite interfering factors (Miller, 2013). So, after repeated crosssituational sampling of virtue-relevant responses, the degree to which an individual has a virtue can be measured as a function of the individual's mean score for its expression and the variability with which they express the virtue across relevant situations (cf. Fleeson, 2001; see Figure 2). Thus, to recapitulate, EMA provides a way of repeatedly measuring virtue-relevant responses across various situations. This allows the measurement of the degree to which a person has a virtue along two dimensions: the degree to which they typically express the virtue and the consistency with which they express the virtue. These observations are in keeping with observations made concerning distributions of responses relevant to the expression of dispositions more generally (e.g., Mischel, 1968; Epstein, 1979, 1983; Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson and Noftle, 2008). (3) As observed above, EMA provides a means of repeatedly and more directly assessing dispositional expression across an individual's daily situations. It, thus, provides a vehicle for not Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones FIGURE 2 | Illustrative frequency distributions of momentary, cross-situational dispositional expressions displaying differences in degree of virtue possession. (A) The red curve displays a distribution representing a higher typical degree of virtue expression (higher mean score) than the blue curve. (B) The red curve represents a higher typical degree of (higher mean score), and more consistent (less variable), virtue expression than the blue curve. only assessing whether an individual has a virtue, but also the degree to which they typically express a virtue and the consistency with which they express a virtue. And since the degree to which an individual typically expresses a virtue and the consistency with which they express the virtue have implications for flourishing, EMA provides a thorough means of examining the relationship between virtues and flourishing. To illustrate, EMA opens up a way of measuring the degree to which an individual is typically grateful and the consistency with which an individual is grateful. And both should be expected to promote flourishing given gratitude is a virtue. Thus, by allowing a direct assessment of both, EMA provides a thorough and direct means of examining the relationship between dispositional gratitude and flourishing. Further, since EMA allows the detection of dispositional expression within daily life, it also provides a good means of examining what may mediate relationships between dispositions, like gratitude, and flourishing as well as the interconnectedness of virtues (e.g., whether developing dispositional gratitude might directly correlate with developing others). Before continuing we should mention that there are several limitations associated with EMA. Asking participants to repeatedly respond to prompts and questions over time, and within daily life, places a high demand on participants thereby increasing the likelihood of participant dropout and decreasing response rates (e.g., Shiffman et al., 2008). To compensate, participants need greater incentive than with traditional surveys. Also, there are issues regarding the invasion of privacy, which must be carefully addressed (Trull, 2015). Further, under certain conditions, EMA has been shown to result in reactivity (cf. Shiffman et al., 2008). Having examined the advantages and limitations of using EMA-and specifically app-based EMA-to study virtues, we will now examine recent developments in EMI and the possibilities they open up for promoting dispositional development. EMI, Positive Change, and Smartphone Apps Clinicians and therapists have often sought ways to improve the impact of therapy between sessions and the efficacy of interventions (Heron and Smyth, 2010). With this aim, over the past several years, researchers have been exploring the use of mobile devices to intervene and interact with clients within the context and moments of their daily life. This form of intervention, called ecological momentary intervention (EMI), has-similar to EMA-been implemented using PDAs, phone calls, text messages and, most recently, smartphone apps. EMI has developed largely as an extension of interventions involving computerand internet-based cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT; e.g., Butler et al., 2006; Andersson and Cuijper, 2009; Moore et al., 2011; Spence et al., 2011). Self-monitoring has long been known to, under certain conditions, raise self-awareness and promote positive behavioral development (e.g., Harris and Lahey, 1982; Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray, 1999; Shapiro and Cole, 1999; Shiffman et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2013; Maas et al., 2013). Specifically, it has been theorized that being asked questions about one's momentary states, experiences, behaviors and/or thoughts close to the time and context of their occurrence may help one become more mindful of their occurrence thereby providing opportunity for change (cf. Goodwin et al., 2008)5. Recent evidence suggests that EMI may be particularly effective for self-monitoring and raising self-awareness (Robinson et al., 2013; Runyan et al., 2013). For instance, in a recent study, our lab used an EMA/I app (iHabit) to ask undergraduate freshman how they were spending their time at various points throughout the day for three separate weeks during a semester (Runyan et al., 2013). Compared to controls, at the end of the study freshman using the app reported wasting nearly twice as much time throughout the semester. Further, amongst those using the app-but not amongst controls-this self-report predicted semester GPA comparable to the best single predictors of first semester GPA (i.e., high-school GPA and 5It should be noted that it has also been theorized that simply being aware of being observed, or of having one's behavior assessed, effects one's behavior-a phenomenon known as the Hawthorne effect (Solomon, 1949; Sommer, 1968; Parsons, 1974; Wickstrom and Bendix, 2000). However, recently, mixed evidence for the Hawthorne effect has lead to serious questions about the adequacy of this construct. Rather than there being a Hawthorne effect, evidence indicates that multiple conditions lead to various effects when one is aware of being assessed or of having one's behavior assessed (see Gale, 2004; McCambridge et al., 2014). Here, we focus on one such condition: increased self-awareness. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones ACT score). The implication is that using the app promoted self-awareness concerning time-management. In addition to prompting self-monitoring, EMIs have been used to: • motivate (Rodgers et al., 2005; Franklin et al., 2006); • encourage engagement in practices or the use of previously learned skills (e.g., DBT coach, Rizvi et al., 2011); • aid in the development of new skills (Villani et al., 2012; Bless et al., 2014); • notify (Dulin et al., 2014) or distract (Rodgers et al., 2005) individuals when they are at risk of engaging in addictive behavior; and • provide individuals with personalized summary data (Hurling et al., 2007; Bless et al., 2014). Though most EMI studies using smartphone apps are in developmental stages (e.g., Pramana et al., 2014; Wenze et al., 2014), there is some initial evidence from a number of health, clinical, and therapeutic domains that, in certain forms, EMImay promote positive dispositional development (e.g., Heron and Smyth, 2010; Cohn et al., 2011; Donker et al., 2013; see Table 5). For example, in a smoking cessation study, text messages were sent to participants about health practices. Participants were also sent motivational stories or distraction topics (sports, travel, general interest, etc.) during times they were likely to smoke (Rodgers et al., 2005). Nearly 1000 messages were designed for this study and were sent to individual participants based on factors such as smoking history and preferences. The intervention was largely successful. In comparison to controls, twice as many people in the EMI group reported that they had quit smoking after 6 weeks. In another recent EMI study, participants performed a cognitive task to improve auditory attention on an iPod touch twice a day for 3 weeks (Bless et al., 2014). This experimental group, unlike the control group, showed improved auditory attention and evidence of functional neural plasticity in regions associated with auditory processing (left posterior temporal gyrus) and executive function (right middle frontal gyrus) during an auditory attention task asmeasured using fMRI (see Figure 3). As we noted earlier, an important part of the psychological study of virtue is the examination of whether stable and robust dispositions can be developed. And thoughmost app-based EMIs are in various exploratory stages, as we will discuss next, they hold promise for incorporating interventions that promote positive dispositional development into the daily activities of a large nonclinical, non-therapeutic population. In initial studies, effects during and immediately following EMI have been documented more than long-term effects (see Table 5). However, smartphone app-based systems that couple EMA and EMI provide an unprecedented means of testing whether EMI can help promote dispositional, including virtue, development. Virtues and App-Based EMI Little is directly known about the efficacy of EMI approaches to virtue development. In this section we, thus, discuss reasons for thinking such approaches have promise. In particular, we point out how app-based EMI offers a versatile, multifaceted and interactive way of promoting training, mindfulness, selfawareness, motivation and environmental awareness within the context of everyday life. We, then, outline parameters that may influence the effectiveness of EMI and an approach to optimizing EMIs for virtue development. In addition to being practical due to the widespread use of smartphones, app-based EMI may be a particularly efficacious approach to promoting virtue development since it provides a versatile and multifaceted means of interacting with individual's within their everyday context. Developing a disposition, such as a virtue, is a learning process through which a behavior or response becomes a stable and robust habitual response or automatic FIGURE 3 | Neural differences between those trained in an auditory attention task and controls as measured by fMRI. Brain regions displaying significant decreases at points during a selective auditory attention task amongst trained participants (taken and adapted from Bless et al., 2014). Z, horizontal plane coordinate; ITG, inferior temporal gyrus; FG, fusiform gyrus; PG, precentral gyrus; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; red, forced-left response conditions; blue, forced-right response conditions; purple, overlap. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones TA B LE 5 |P ee rre vi ew ed st ud ie s re p o rt in g ef fe ct iv e sm ar tp ho ne /i P o d E M Is . S tu d y In te rv en ti o n ta rg et S en so rs Ta ilo ri ng A p p -b as ed E M If re q ue nc y E M Id ur at io n Im m ed ia te P o st in te rv en ti o n ef fe ct s Lo ng -t er m ef fe ct s O be rm ay er et al ., 20 04 S m ok in g ce ss at io n x Va ria nt ;A tl ea st 2 pe r da y; C om bi ne d w ith w eb si te 6 w ee ks xa R od ge rs et al ., 20 05 S m ok in g ce ss at io n x 5 pe r da y fo r 6 w ee ks ;3 pe r w ee k th er ea fte r 6 m on th s x x Fr an kl in et al ., 20 06 Ty pe 1 di ab et es m an ag em en t x 1 da ily an d 1 w ee kl y m es sa ge 12 m on th s x K im an d Je on g, 20 07 Ty pe 2 di ab et es m an ag em en t x W ee kl y 6 m on th s x Jo o an d K im ,2 00 7 W ei gh tm an ag em en tb eh av io r W ee kl y 12 w ee ks x H ur lin g et al ., 20 07 P hy si ca la ct iv ity x x Ta ilo re d; C om bi ne d w ith w eb si te an d em ai l 4 m on th s x W ei tz el et al ., 20 07 N eg at iv e co ns eq ue nc es of dr in ki ng x D ai ly su rv ey s an d m es sa ge s 2 w ee ks x Yo on an d K im ,2 00 8 Ty pe 2 di ab et es m an ag em en t x W ee kl y 12 m on th s x B re nd ry en et al ., 20 08 S m ok in g ce ss at io n B et w ee n 1 an d 3 m es sa ge s ev er y 2 w ee ks ;C om bi ne d w ith w eb si te , in te rv ie w an d em ai l 12 m on th s x x A tie nz a et al ., 20 08 D ie ta ry in ta ke x 2 pe r da y 8 w ee ks x K in g et al ., 20 08 P hy si ca la ct iv ity x 2 da ily as se ss m en ts ;1 da ily & w ee kl y ta ilo re d 8 w ee ks x P at ric k et al ., 20 09 W ei gh tl os s x Va ria nt ;T yp ic al ly 1– 5 pe r da y 4 m on th s x R iz vi et al ., 20 11 B or de rli ne pe rs on al ity di so rd er an d su bs ta nc e us e di so rd er x O n av er ag e 15 tim es to ta l 10 –1 4 da ys x B ur ns et al ., 20 11 M aj or de pr es si ve di so rd er x x Ta ilo re d 8 w ee ks xa P op -E le ch es et al ., 20 11 A nt ire tr ov ira lt he ra py ad he re nc e W ee kl y 48 w ee ks x G ra nh ol m et al ., 20 12 S ch iz op hr en ia -r el at ed m ed ic at io n ad he re nc e, so ci al iz at io n an d ha llu ci na tio ns 12 pe r da y; C om bi ne d w ith in iti al tr ai ni ng 12 w ee ks x V illa ni et al ., 20 12 S tr es s x 8 vi de os 4 w ee ks x K au er et al ., 20 12 E m ot io na ls el faw ar en es s an d de pr es si ve sy m pt om s x A pp ro xi m at el y 2 pe rd ay (s el fin iti at ed ) 2– 4 w ee ks x W at ts et al ., 20 13 D ep re ss io n x 6 se ss io ns ;C om bi ne d w ith w ee kl y as si gn m en ts an d em ai l n/ a x x R ob in so n et al ., 20 13 E at in g be ha vi or s an d w ei gh t m an ag em en t x x 2. 7 ep is od es on av er ag e (u se rin iti at ed ) 27 .5 da ys on av er ag e xb C ar ta et al ., 20 13 P ar en tin g st ra te gi es an d ch ild en ga ge m en t 2 pe r da y; C om bi ne d w ith tr ai ni ng ho m e vi si ts an d w ee kl y ph on e ca lls N ot sp ec ifi ed x x K in g et al ., 20 13 M ot iv at io n an d ph ys ic al ac tiv ity x x x Li ve w al lp ap er an d 1 en d of da y in te rv en tio n; C om bi ne d w ith us er -in iti at ed fe at ur es ,t ex ts an d w ee kl y al er ts if go al s w er en 't m et 8 w ee ks x (C on tin ue d) Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones TA B LE 5 |C o nt in ue d S tu d y In te rv en ti o n ta rg et S en so rs Ta ilo ri ng A p p -b as ed E M If re q ue nc y E M Id ur at io n Im m ed ia te P o st in te rv en ti o n ef fe ct s Lo ng -t er m ef fe ct s W ay ne an d R itv o, 20 14 S el fm an ag em en to ft yp e 2 di ab et es x x U se rin iti at ed ;C om bi ne d w ith ph on e ca lls an d in pe rs on m ee tin gs 6 m on th s x E no ck et al ., 20 14 S oc ia la nx ie ty x 3 pe r da y 4 w ee ks x B le ss et al ., 20 14 A ud ito ry at te nt io n x x 2 pe r da y 21 da ys x B en -Z ee v et al ., 20 14 S ch iz op hr en ia x 5. 2 pe r da y on av er ag e 1 m on th x B on d et al ., 20 14 S ed en ta ry tim e re du ct io n x x x D ep en de nt on ac tiv ity le ve ls ; C om bi ne d w ith ed uc at io n se ss io n 3 w ee ks x D ul in et al ., 20 14 Tr ea tm en to fa lc oh ol us e di so rd er s x x x Va ria nt ;L oc at io nba se d 6 w ee ks x La ne et al ., 20 14 S le ep ,p hy si ca la ct iv ity ,s oc ia l in te ra ct io n x x x C on st an tly ac ce ss ib le su m m ar y da ta 19 da ys xc M ad di so n et al ., 20 14 S el fef fic ac y an d ex er ci se Va ria nt ;F irs t1 2w ee ks m or e in te ns e; C om bi ne d w ith w eb si te 2 m on th s x M hu rc hu et al ., 20 14 W ei gh tm an ag em en tb eh av io r x x A ve .2 m ot iv at io na lt ex ts pe r da y; 2 se lfm on ito rin g te xt s pe r w ee k; C om bi ne d w ith ha rd -c op y "t oo lk it" an d w eb si te 8 w ee ks ;4 w ee k m ai nt en an ce xd K ra m er et al ., 20 14 D ep re ss io n x 10 pe rd ay fo r3 co ns ec ut iv e da ys pe r w ee k; W ee kl y fa ce -t ofa ce fe ed ba ck se ss io ns 6 w ee ks x x C ra nw el le ta l., 20 14 S el fco nt ro l 3 pe r da y 4 w ee ks X M ac ia s et al ., 20 15 P sy ch ia tr ic an d ph ys ic al w el l-b ei ng x X 1 se m iw ee kl y, 1 w ee kl y an d 1 en d of st ud y as se ss m en t; C om bi ne d w ith te xt s, di gi ta lr ea di ng s an d vi de os 4 w ee ks X Th es e st ud ie s w er e lo ca te d by se ar ch in g P ub m ed .c om ,a nd pu bl ic at io ns fro m pe er -r ev ie w ed jo ur na ls lis te d in S ch ol ar .g oo gl e. co m ,u p to N ov em be r 27 th ,2 01 4 (s ea rc h te rm s: "e co lo gi ca lm om en ta ry in te rv en tio n" an d "s m ar tp ho ne ") . a D id no tu se co nt ro ls . b H al fo fp ar tic ip an ts lo st w ei gh t. H ow ev er ,t he re w as no co nt ro lg ro up as th is w as an in te rv en tio n fe as ib ilit y st ud y. c Th es e re su lts ar e fro m a sm al lp ilo t, fe as ib ilit y st ud y. d A pr e/ po st de cr ea se in w ei gh ta nd bo dy m as s in de x (B M I) w as ob se rv ed bu tt he re w as no co nt ro la s th is w as m ai nl y a fe as ib ilit y st ud y. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones response (e.g., Wood and Neal, 2007; Gawronski and Cesario, 2013). Learning context is important for this process. There has been extensive animal research on the importance of learning context for response learning. First, animal studies reveal that learning contexts can function as "occasion-setters" such that, while they do not elicit a learned response themselves, they influence an animal's learned response to another stimulus thereby "setting the occasion" for this response (cf. Schmajuk and Holland, 1998; Bouton, 2010). Second, after learning a new response, animals often revert back to previous responses within contexts that vary from the context in which the new response was learned (cf. Bouton and Bolles, 1979; Peck and Bouton, 1990). Third, animals can be conditioned in one context (context A) and counterconditioned-or conditioned to give an opposing response-in another (context B), and continue to show the initial, conditioned response in context A and the opposing, counterconditioned response in context B (cf. Bouton and Bolles, 1979; Bouton and Peck, 1989; Merchant et al., 2013). Fourth, it has been observed that, under certain training conditions, a learned contextual response can persist even though memory for a conditioned stimulus (CS)/unconditioned stimulus (US) association has been impaired through localized inhibition of neurobiochemical processes crucial for the formation of longterm memory (i.e., memory persisting at least 48 h) for CS/US association (Runyan et al., 2004). Extending from these animal studies, human studies have revealed that context is similarly important in the learning of habitual responses and automatic responses (e.g., Rydell and Gawronski, 2009; Wood and Neal, 2009; Gawronski and Cesario, 2013). Additionally, there is evidence that contextual cues can influence preparatory neural states associated with a certain response and the likelihood an individual will respond in that way in certain contexts (e.g., Deiber et al., 1996; Thoenissen et al., 2002; Toni et al., 2002; Praamstra et al., 2009; Moisa et al., 2012). In particular, addiction studies have shown that recovering individual's are more likely to relapse within contexts associated with the addictive behavior (e.g., Crombag et al., 2008); and this has been associated with plasticity in specific brain regions, including the lateral hypothalamus (e.g., Marchant et al., 2009, 2014). Further, there is evidence indicating that the tendency to give a habitual response becomes more stable and robust with the repetition of the response in various contexts (e.g., Bouton, 2000; Neal et al., 2006, 2011). Taken together, these observations provide evidence that, by promoting the development of habitual responses or automatic responses within an individual's daily context, EMIs aimed at virtue development may be particularly effective. Given this, EMA data coupled with GPS data could be used to trigger app-based EMIs in particular spatiotemporal locations to promote the learning of habitual or automatic responses in new, or various, contexts; especially in contexts where an individual finds change difficult (e.g., Watkins et al., 2014). One way that EMI might be effective in promoting virtue development is by prompting individuals to engage in practices, or in training, aimed at developing a particular virtue (cf. Magidson et al., 2014). Working memory training has been shown to improve cognitive abilities and to result in neural plasticity (e.g., Klingberg, 2010). There is some suggestion that practicing gratitude increases dispositional gratitude (Emmons and McCullough, 2003; Seligman et al., 2005). Additionally, selfregulation exercises have been shown to improve self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 2006; Cranwell et al., 2014). Further, in a recent study, participants were given empathy and compassion training (Klimecki et al., 2014; cf. Klimecki et al., 2012). After empathy training, participants experienced increased negative affect associated with increased activity in the anterior insula and the anterior midcingulate cortex (two regions previously associated with empathy for pain) in response to watching videos depicting human suffering. After compassion training, these same individuals also experienced increased positive affect associated with increased activity in the ventral striatum, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex and medial orbitofrontal cortex (see Figure 4). The same effects were not found in controls who underwent memory training. The implication is that training can result in increased empathy and compassion as measured by affective responses and associated brain activity states. App-based EMI may be a particularly effective way of administering dispositional training of the kindmentioned above since smartphone app technology can support multifaceted, interactive and progressive training within various contexts throughout an individual's daily routine. For instance, training might involve prompting individuals to engage in app-delivered activities or exercises, interact with app-based games, or with videos or pictures, throughout the day. And training might get more demanding over time. Another way EMI might promote virtue development is by specifically targeting mindfulness. According to the predominating definition in psychology, mindfulness is purposeful, non-evaluative awareness of one's present experiences and mental states moment-to-moment (KabatZinn, 2003; but see Brown and Ryan, 2003; Jankowski and Holas, 2014). Not only is mindfulness thought by some to be a virtue-and there is evidence that dispositional mindfulness does promote mental health and resilience (e.g., Brown et al., 2007)-there is some suggestion that mindfulness may help promote the development of other virtues and, thus, provide a case where virtues are interconnected. It is theorized that mindfulness promotes positive change by promoting awareness of one's immediate experiences and states from a somewhat detached state, which may, in turn, promote self-awareness and self-regulation (Shapiro et al., 2006; Jankowski and Holas, 2014). EMA observations support the theory that mindfulness promotes self-regulation (e.g., Brown and Ryan, 2003). Additionally, mindfulness training (involving attentional fixation on and nonjudgmental awareness of moment-tomoment experiences) can improve working memory and attention (Tang et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008; Jha et al., 2010; MacLean et al., 2010). These improvements have been associated with increased activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (Allen et al., 2012). Mindfulness has also been observed to reduce interference from emotionally salient distractors (Ortner et al., 2007), Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 13 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones FIGURE 4 | Functional neural changes corresponding with empathy training (red) and compassion training (blue) in comparison to memory control as measured by fMRI (adapted from Klimecki et al., 2014). Dashed lines represent regions associated with empathy for pain in a recent meta-analysis by Lamm et al. (2011). Numbers on the top row are the sagittal plane coordinates. Numbers on the bottom row are the coronal plane coordinates. which has been associated with increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and right anterior insula (Allen et al., 2012). App-based EMI approaches to virtue development might prompt and remind individuals to engage in dynamic and progressive mindfulness exercises within the context of daily life. There are a number of mindfulness apps currently available (Plaza et al., 2013). However, at present there has been little work on the effectiveness of app-based EMIs aimed at promoting mindfulness (but see Chittaro and Vianello, 2014). Further, as we will see toward the end of this section, there are a number of parameters that are likely to influence whether EMIs are efficacious. In addition to prompting various practices, trainings or exercises within everyday contexts, effective app-based EMIs for virtue development might be designed by incorporating effective components of computerand internet-based therapeutic interventions (cf. Kaltenthaler et al., 2006; Barak et al., 2008; Tillfors et al., 2008; Andersson, 2009; Bergström et al., 2010; Newman et al., 2011; Andersson et al., 2013; Musiat and Tarrier, 2014). Web-based cognitive-behavioral therapy and guided selfhelp interventions have been observed to be efficacious in treating eating disorders (Hötzel et al., 2013), insomnia (Holmqvist et al., 2014), suicidal ideation, depressive symptoms, anxiety (van Straten et al., 2008; March et al., 2009; Cuijpers et al., 2013), posttraumatic stress disorder (Knaevelsrud and Maercker, 2007) and physical inactivity (van Stralen et al., 2009a,b, 2010, 2011). In multiple cases, these interventions have been observed to facilitate long-term change (e.g., Knaevelsrud and Maercker, 2007; Litz et al., 2007; March et al., 2009; Ruwaard et al., 2010; van Stralen et al., 2011; Cuijpers et al., 2013; Lappalainen et al., 2014). In these computerand internet-based approaches: (1) self-monitoring and self-awareness (e.g., Litz et al., 2007; Morris et al., 2010), (2) self-efficacy and motivation (Litz et al., 2007; Turner et al., 2007; Carlbring and Smit, 2008; Warmerdam et al., 2010; Hötzel et al., 2013), and (3) environmental awareness (van Stralen et al., 2009a) are among the strongest mediators of enduring change. And, as we will discuss in turn below, app-based EMI might be used to effectively promote each. (1) As mentioned in the previous section, research from our own lab shows that using an EMA/I app to ask individuals questions about their responses at random times throughout their daily activities can raise self-awareness (Runyan et al., 2013). Additionally, app-based EMIs might allow individuals to monitor summary data generated from their responses. Further, by incorporating sensors, app-based EMI provides a means of increasing self-awareness by increasing a person's ability to selfmonitor. App-based EMIs that interface with mobile EEG (cf. Curran and Stokes, 2003), physical activity sensors and/or other physiological activity sensors (e.g., sensors for muscle tension, temperature, galvanic skin response, blood pressure or heart-rate; see Sutarto et al., 2010; Schwerdtfeger and Scheel, 2012; Bossman et al., 2013; vonHaaren et al., 2013; Demarble et al., 2014; Dunton et al., 2014) could provide biofeedback allowing an individual to self-monitor to an extent otherwise impossible within close spatial and temporal proximity to a focal event or state (cf. Keedwell and Linden, 2013; Linden, 2014; Schoenberg andDavid, 2014). Feedback concerning preparatory neural activities, muscle tension, blood pressure and/or heart rate (e.g., Koval et al., 2013) within certain contexts might enable an individual to monitor Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 14 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones patterns in their behaviors, thought life, states and/or experiences of which they would otherwise be unaware. (2) There is indication that self-monitoring promotes self-regulation and positive behavioral development when individuals have the opportunity and motivation to change (cf. Bandura, 1991; Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray, 1999; Shiffman et al., 2008; Quinn et al., 2010). Therefore, app-based EMIs might effectively promote positive change not only by providing a means for self-monitoring but by also increasing motivation through: • repeatedly asking individuals directed questions; • prompting goal-setting; • pushing motivational statements, videos or pictures and promoting positive self-talk to increase outcome expectancy (i.e., belief that one's efforts will lead to the achievement of a desirable end) and self-efficacy (i.e., belief in one's ability to achieve one's goal; Bandura, 1986, 1997); • reminding individuals of their own intentions and values; and/or • intermittently giving individuals progress and accomplishment reports (which has been shown to increase motivation and promote positive behavioral development; e.g., Korotitsch and Nelson-Gray, 1999; Kramer et al., 2014; Mhurchu et al., 2014). Also, a social component to app-based EMI, where individuals can interact with others who are using the same EMI in order to develop the same virtue, might also increase motivation as well as self-efficacy (cf. Obermayer et al., 2004; Przeworski and Newman, 2004; Hurling et al., 2007; Brendryen et al., 2008; Cafazzo et al., 2012; King et al., 2013). (3) With regard to increasing environmental awareness, appbased EMIs that incorporate GPS (e.g., Yüce et al., 2012; Hollett and Leander, 2013; Huang and Luo, 2014; Watkins et al., 2014), and utilize smartphone microphones and cameras, might be designed to notify individuals about aspects of their environment. In this way, app-based EMIsmight be designed to raise awareness of contextual/situational triggers for responses that the individual desires to change as well as awareness of opportunities to respond in ways that are expressions of a virtue. App-based EMIs might also raise awareness of environmental resources and/or social support that may help an individual in their effort to change (e.g., van Stralen et al., 2009a; Mhurchu et al., 2014). Whether EMI can effectively promote virtue development- and the optimal conditions for this development-remains to be directly and systematically tested. In particular, it remains to be seen whether EMIs, including app-based EMIs, can promote long-term dispositional development that persists following the termination of the intervention. Relevant parameters of EMI in need of testing are: (i) duration of intervention; (ii) frequency of interactions; (iii) duration of each interaction; (iv) whether interactions occur at varied or fixed times; (v) whether, and the degree to which, the intervention is intermittent or continuous over a period of time; (vi) degree of variation or repetition between interactions; (vii) how broadly or narrowly the intervention is focused (e.g., number of responses targeted, types of interactions provided); (viii) whether the intervention is individualized/tailored; (ix) whether the intervention progresses over time (e.g., involves scaffolding); (x) whether the intervention involves social interaction; and (xi) the degree to which the intervention is engaging (e.g., interesting, meaningful and/or fun). Given EMI can promote virtue development, optimal conditions are likely to depend somewhat on the virtue. Nevertheless, there are also likely to be some common optimal conditions. We hypothesize that these optimal conditions will, to a certain degree, track those for instrumental learning whereby intentionally modified responses in early stages of learning are cued by stimuli as expressions of a habitual response or automatic response in later stages (e.g., Dickinson et al., 1995; Schachtman and Reilly, 2011). In this case, EMIs that maintain the highest levels of engagement, motivation and awareness of opportunities to respond or otherwise behave in ways that are expressions of a virtue, over the longest period of time, are likely to be the most effective (e.g., Rescorla and Solomon, 1967; Sutherland and Mackintoch, 1971; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Bandura, 1977). This is likely to be accomplished by EMIs that: 1. focus on one virtue at a time (cf. Kamin, 1968; Rescorla and Wagner, 1972); 2. progress and involve scaffolding (cf. Salomon, 1993; Pea, 2004); 3. are tailored to the individual and incorporate the individual's judgments, values and aims (cf. Levey and Martin, 1975; Shanks and Dickinson, 1991; Kreuter et al., 2000a,b; Strecher et al., 2005); 4. involve social interaction amongst individuals with similar aims (cf. Bandura, 1977, 1986, 1997); and 5. interact with individuals at varied, rather than fixed, intervals and provide positive reinforcement for virtue development (e.g., make virtue development, and interaction with the intervention, varied, interesting, meaningful and/or fun). Scheduling intermittent EMAs as an individual uses an EMI aimed at promoting virtue development provides a way of assessing and optimizing the efficacy of EMI in real-time (cf. Voogt et al., 2013). As we have already discussed, EMA can be used to assess virtue expression, and/or detect correlates of this expression. And a smartphone app can be used to administer both EMA and EMI. Conclusions There seems to be conclusive reasons for thinking that some people possess virtues understood as relatively stable and robust psychological dispositions that contribute to a deeply fulfilling, well-lived life of growth (i.e., a flourishing life)-and situational studies have not presented reasons for thinking otherwise. Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 15 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 481 Runyan and Steinke Virtues, EMA/I, and smartphones Further, since knowledge of what contributes to flourishing is worth seeking, virtues are worth studying. As a result of the widespread use of smartphones and advancements in smartphone technology, app-based EMA provides a new means for examining the stability, robustness and interconnectedness of virtues, and the physiological (including neurophysiological) correlates of having and/or expressing virtues. 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Zur Funktion der Chora in Platons Timaios und des Äthers in Kants Übergangsschrift Erwin Sonderegger Inhaltsverzeichnis 1 Einführung 5 2 Gliederung des Timaios 13 2.1 Allgemeines zur Gliederung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2.2 Übergreifende Gliederung: Staat – Timaios – Kritias . 15 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3.1 Gliederung nach Personen . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.3.2 Gliederung des Vortrags nach internen Gliederungshinweisen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3.2.1 Übersicht . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.3.2.2 Erste Vorbereitung und erster Durchgang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 2.3.2.3 Zweite Vorbereitung und zweiter Durchgang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.4 Chora ermöglicht den Übergang vom Noetischen zum Aisthetischen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 3 Kants Beschäftigung mit den Naturwissenschaften 53 3.1 Frühe naturwissenschaftliche Schriften . . . . . . . . . 56 3.2 Kritik der reinen Vernunft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 3 Inhaltsverzeichnis 3.3 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft . 67 3.4 Übergangsschrift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 4 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift 95 5 Anhänge 105 5.1 Anhang 1: Timaios 48b–53b, detailliert . . . . . . . . 105 5.2 Anhang 2: Timaios 48b–53b, Liste der Aussagen über Chora . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 5.3 Benutzte Literatur . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 5.3.1 Antike Autoren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 5.3.2 Nachantike Autoren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 4 1 Einführung Platons Timaios ist ein vielfältiges Werk, viele Themen werden berührt, nach heutigen Begriffen naturwissenschaftliche, Kosmologie, Astronomie, Elemente, Mathematik und Geometrie, Medizin, Physiologie, Sinneswahrnehmung, Krankheit, aber auch Begriffliches wie Identität und Differenz, Geschichtliches, Theologisches, die entsprechend vielen verschiedenen Ebenen zuzuordnen sind. Und der grösste Teil – der ganze Vortrag des Timaios – wird als Mythos oder als εἰκὼς λόγος, als bloss plausible Rede, bezeichnet; beides bezeichnet irgendwie einen Unterschied gegenüber der schlicht wahren Rede.1 Vieles in diesem Werk ist seit Langem umstritten. Wie ist der Demiurg zu verstehen? Ist er mit dem " Unbewegten Beweger" – ein Ausdruck, der bei Aristoteles allerdings gar nicht vorkommt! – zu identifizieren? Ist er ein Vorläufer des christlichen Schöpfergottes oder nicht? Ist er eine Chiffre für etwas anderes? Wie weit ist sein " Schaffen" wörtlich zu nehmen, oder ist das nur die Verkleidung eines auch in eigentlicher Rede ausdrückbaren Gedankens? Wie ist der Mythos und der εἰκὼς λόγος 1 Timaios kann sich auf seine Rede sowohl mit τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον (z. B. 29d2, wo er seine ganze folgende Rede damit bezeichnet) als auch mit κατὰ λόγον τὸν εἰκότα (30b7) beziehen. 5 1 Einführung zu verstehen? Ist er übersetzbar in einen Klartext? Was bedeutet χώρα (Chora; siehe S. 44)? Für die einen ist es so klar der Raum (Natorp, Cornford), wie für andere die Materie (Brisson), für nochmals andere etwas beidem Ähnliches (Miller) – doch was? Schon Aristoteles hat die Chora in die Nähe von Topos und Hyle gerückt – doch ist auch Hyle bei Aristoteles nicht das, was wir heute unter Materie verstehen, es ist ein Seinsbegriff. Was ist von den zwei Arten von Gründen – διὰ νοῦ – δι' ἀνάγκης – zu halten?2 Diese Unterscheidung scheint sehr wichtig zu sein, namhafte Interpreten (Cornford, ihm folgend Brisson) benutzen sie zur Gliederung des Dialogs. Ist die Reduktion der Elemente auf die Platonischen Körper und die Reduktion dieser auf Dreiecke ein Vorläufer moderner Überlegungen zu theoretischen Physik? Was ist die Hauptfrage oder auch die Hauptthese des Timaios? Die Antike hat aus dem Dialog ihre Physik bezogen oder den Text wenigstens in der Gliederung Logik – Physik – Ethik der Physik zugewiesen. Immerhin enthält der Text selbst einen Hinweis auf seine Hauptfrage (26e): Was ist der Grund der gewordenen Welt? Und im Einleitungsgespräch wird auch ein Programm entwickelt, wie diese Frage zu behandeln sei: Die gewordene Welt soll " vom Werden des Alls bis zum Entstehen der menschlichen Natur" besprochen werden. Auf dieses Ziel wird am Schluss (90–92), das Programm aufgreifend, Bezug genommen, doch ist inzwischen soviel anderes thematisch ge2 " Dank der Vernunft – durch Zwang." Sehr viele beziehen diesen Unterschied auf die Stelle im Phaidon, 98ab; Anaxagoras stelle zwar die These auf, alles sei durch den νοῦς geordnet, in der konkreten Durchführung erscheine dieser aber gar nicht mehr. 6 worden, dass es nicht leicht ist, die Stringenz des Weges von Anfang bis zum Schluss zu durchschauen. In neuerer Zeit ist auf den Parallelismus der Ordnung des Kosmos und der ethischen Ordnung hingewiesen worden (Cornford, Gadamer). Guthrie hält den Nachweis dafür, dass und wie Geist und Natur oder Körper und Geist zusammenwirken können, für den Kern der Sache.3 Der Timaios und seine Rezeption machen uns verlegen durch die Fülle bereits ausprobierter Interpretationsansätze, die von diesem oder jenem als zentral betrachteten Inhalt oder von einer bestimmten Hauptthese ausgehen. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass sie alle etwas Richtiges erfasst haben. Auf der anderen Seite ist es unplausibel, dass diese durch etwas noch Neueres und noch Originelleres überboten werden könnten. Das wäre nur der Optimismus der schlecht Informierten. Ich gehe hier einen anderen Weg. Es soll nur das zu Grunde gelegt werden, was an Gliederung fassbar ist. Zur Gliederung gehört auch die Einordnung des Dialogs in die Reihe der Dialoge vom Staat bis zum Kritias. Diese Einbettung wird ergänzt durch die Gliederung des Timaios selbst, die sich auf die Gliederungshinweise im Text stützt, nicht auf inhaltliche Vermutungen. Solche Hinweise im Text sind sehr deutlich und auch hinreichend zahlreich, um den Zweck zu erfüllen. Erst wenn die Gliederung erfasst ist, soll die inhaltliche Diskussion einsetzen. Auf diesem Weg soll die Antwort darauf gewonnen werden, in welchem 3 Guthrie, 1978, V, 247, nach ihm auch andere, wie z. B. Frau Neschke-Hentschke, in 2000 7 1 Einführung Sinne die Frage nach dem Grund der gewordenen Welt gestellt wird. Diese Frage interessiert notwendig alle, und mehrere Wissenschaften tragen zu ihrer Beantwortung bei. Auch die Religionen geben darauf eine Antwort. Eine davon ist die These des Schöpfergottes und der Erschaffung der Welt ex nihilo. Nun ist allerdings auch diese einfache These schon hinreichend alt, um in unterschiedlicher Weise gedeutet worden zu sein, so dass auch sie nicht mehr einfach bleibt. Aber auch Astrophysik und Kosmologie halten sich für zuständig. Als Hüterin der Begriffe denkt natürlich auch die Philosophie daran, zur Frage einen Beitrag leisten zu können. Die Untersuchung zur Gliederung des Timaios wird zum Resultat haben, dass der Vortrag des Timaios in zwei Teile zerfällt, beide mit je einer Einführung und einer darauf folgenden Durchführung desselben Themas, einmal rein noetisch, das zweite Mal unter den Bedingungen der Chora. Es wiederholt sich im Timaios also die Unterscheidung, die schon zwischen dem Staat ( " der Staat in Ruhe") und dem Kritias ( " der Staat in Bewegung") besteht. Dasselbe Thema wird rein unter Bedingungen des νοῦς betrachtet und dann nochmals unter mundanen Bedingungen. Das gemeinsame Thema beider Teile ist die Struktur des Kosmos im Ganzen (als ein ordnendes Schaffen des Demiurgen und der von ihm eingesetzten Götter erzählt) bis der Systempunkt Mensch erreicht ist. So enthält der Timaios eine reine Theorie der Natur, eine Physik im antiken Sinne, und eine Theorie der Natur unter mundanen und konkreten 8 Bedingungen, eine Physik im modernen Sinne. Es geht im Timaios also weniger darum, die Konstruktion oder das " Herstellen" des Kosmos zu beschreiben oder gar zu beweisen, seine causa efficiens zu finden und dergleichen – so allerdings die herrschende Meinung–, als vielmehr darum, das Sein und die Struktur des Kosmos und seiner Teile – bis eben auf die Natur des Menschen – darzustellen, und zwar einmal auf rein noetischer Grundlage, und dann nochmals unter Berücksichtigung des Konkreten und Faktischen. Da fällt es auf, dass dieser selbe Unterschied nochmals, ganz anderswo in der Philosophiegeschichte, auftaucht, bei Kant. Die These dieser Arbeit lautet, dass die Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft und die Übergangsschrift (entweder mit dem Opus Postumum identifiziert oder als Teil von diesem verstanden) in derselben Weise aufeinander bezogen sind wie der erste Teil mit seiner Einführung und die Einführung des zweiten Teils des Vortrags des Timaios, und dass beide Paare dieselbe Intention verfolgen. Es handelt sich in beiden Fällen um den Übergang von einem noetischen Kosmos zu einer mundanen Physik, die die faktischen Bedingungen der Erfahrung miteinbezieht. Kant spricht seine Intention im Titel aus, der, wenn das Werk fertig geworden wäre, vielleicht Übergang von den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik gelautet hätte.4 Die Übergangsschrift soll explizit den Zusammenhang zwischen 4 Die meisten Äusserungen Kants zum Übergang und dem, was damit zusammenhängt, sind in den Bänden XXI und XXII der Akademieausgabe zusammengestellt. Da diese, wie gesagt, total chaotisch ist, sind Versuche notwendig, aus der Samm9 1 Einführung den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft und der empirischen Physik aufzeigen und so den Abschluss des Wissens über die Natur bilden. In dieser Weise wird die Physik im Sinne der modernen Physiker artikulierbar. Zu diesem Zweck stellt Kant die Frage, wie ein Übergang möglich sei zwischen zwei Feldern (oder " Territorien") des Wissens, die ihren Prinzipien nach verschieden sind, eben zwischen den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen, deren Prinzipien a priori sind, und der Physik, deren Prinzipien empirisch sind. Der hier erforderliche Übergang muss eine Brücke über die Kluft dieses prinzipiell Unterschiedenen schlagen (XXII 244,4). Im Zentrum seiner Überlegungen steht dabei der Begriff der Materie und der Bewegung, wie schon in den frühen naturwissenschaftlichen Schriften. Kant sieht die Möglichkeit der Realisierung und die Verwirklichung der Bewegung im Aether bzw. im Wärmestoff.5 Dieser bildet die erforderliche Brücke über die Kluft, indem er zugleich, als Bedingung möglicher Erfahrung, a priori ist, und, weil er die Erfahrung nicht als Prinzip, sondern sofern sie faktisch ist, begründet, emlung ein geordnetes Buch zu machen oder wenigstens das Material inhaltlich zu ordnen, wie es schon Erich Adickes, 1920, getan hatte, viele weitere folgten, siehe Giovanni Pietro Basile, 2013. Eine schlanke Ausgabe des von Kant noch am Weitesten zur Herausgabe vorbereiteten Text, der Vorrede und dem " Übergang 1– 14," nach den Vorbereitungen von Ingeborg Heidemann von Gregor Büchel 1996 herausgegeben, leidet allerdings an vielen willkürlichen und nicht markierten Einschnitten im Text. 5 Für dessen Existenz werden Beweise versucht. Z. B. XXI 609–615; XXI 216,12– 217,22; 222–226; 226–233. – Cf. V. Mathieu, 1989, Kapitel IV; B. J. Edwards, „Der Aetherbeweis des Opus postumum und Kants 3. Analogie der Erfahrung," in: Blasche (Hrsg.), 1991, 77–104; A. Rueger, 1995, 26–40. 10 pirisch ist. Im absolut leeren, rein geometrischen, Raum ist keine Erfahrung möglich. Für unsere konkrete menschliche Erfahrung braucht es einen Naturraum.6 Und die Grundlage für diesen ist der Äther bzw. Wärmestoff. Entsprechend meint auch die χώρα bei Platon den Naturraum, in dem die Kräfte wirken und in dem die Dinge sich darstellen. Insofern steht χώρα dem geometrischen Raum gegenüber. " Mit χώρα" heisst " unter Naturbedingungen." Soweit im ersten Teil des Vortrags der Raum eine Rolle spielt, ist es der geometrische euklidische Raum.7 Deshalb gehört nicht nur die Parallelität des Verhältnisses zwischen dem ersten Teil des Timaios und der Einleitung zum zweiten Teil, verglichen mit dem Verhältnis der MAN zur Übergangsschrift und den zwei Werken Kant zur These, sondern auch, dass die χώρα bei Plato strukturell und funktionell dem Wärmestoff bzw. dem Äther bei Kant entspreche. Schliesslich, drittens, haben beide pointiert darauf hingewiesen, dass der Status dieses vermittelnden Quasi-Stoffs hybrid und die Rede davon problematisch und befremdlich sei. 6 Z. B. XXI 216,15; 229,15. 7 Wenn ich das bei Einstein richtig verstanden habe, hat durchaus auch der Naturraum primär eine Geometrie, weil die Natur generell metrische Eigenschaften hat, doch ist es nicht die euklidische Geometrie, sondern eine, wovon diese nur ein Spezialfall ist. Gliederung des Timaios 2.1 Allgemeines zur Gliederung Wir wenden uns nun der Gliederung des Timaios zu, wobei wir bei der äussersten beginnen und von da schrittweise zur dialoginternen gehen. Die äussere Gliederung, also der Bezug des Timaios zu anderen Dialogen, ist einfach zu erreichen und dürfte wenig der Kontroverse ausgesetzt sein, denn sie wird selbst am Anfang des Dialogs thematisiert. Die innere Gliederung bedarf eines Kriteriums oder mehrer Kriterien. Jeder Text muss, je nach dem, zu welchem Zweck er gelesen wird, nach sehr unterschiedlichen Gesichtspunkten betrachtet werden, entsprechend sind für Texte mehrere Gliederungskriterien möglich und sie können vom Methodischen her sehr unterschiedlich sein. Diese Unterschiede richten sich nach dem Erkenntnisziel. Sehr oft wird ein präsumptiver Inhalt als Kriterium der Gliederung genommen. So auch beim Timaios. Weil die meisten modernen Interpreten den Timaios vor dem Hintergrund der Unterscheidungen von zwei Gründen im Phaidon verstehen wollen, gliedern sie den Dialog bzw. den Vortrag des Timaios in jenen Teil, in dem er von noetischen 13 2 Gliederung des Timaios Gründen und in jenen Teil, in dem er von den Zwangsgründen zu sprechen scheint.1 Das scheint eben dem zu entsprechen, das Sokrates im Phaidon im Zusammenhang mit Anaxagoras problematisierte: Was für Gründe sollen für die Tatsache angeführt werden, dass er, Sokrates, jetzt im Gefängnis sitze (98cff.)? Anaxagoras habe, sagt Sokrates, versprochen, noetische Gründe vorzustellen, aber in der faktischen Durchführung seines Werks seien lediglich körperliche Gründe angeführt worden, die noetischen würden vermisst. Natürlich könne man sagen, dass er, Sokrates, im Gefängnis sitze, weil er einen Körper habe, der aus Knochen und Sehnen bestehe und er sich so und so bewegt habe, doch das sei eben nicht die Pointe. Er sitze hier, weil es den Athener besser geschienen habe, dass er verurteilt werde. Dies sei der eigentliche Zweck seines Hierseins, das andere sei lediglich eine unerlässliche Bedingung. – Zu den zwei Teilen, die diese zwei Arten von Gründen behandeln, komme ein dritter Teil hinzu, in dem gezeigt werde, dass und wie die beiden verschiedenen Gründe " zusammenarbeiten." – Neben inhaltlichen Kriterien werden zur Gliederung platonischer Dialoge auch gerne Gliederungen nach den sprechenden Personen beigezogen, beispielsweise im Gorgias: Nachdem alle Personen miteinander in der Einleitung gesprochen haben, gliedert sich der Dialog leicht in das Gespräch zwischen Polos und Sokrates, in das zwischen Gorgias und Sokrates, worauf nochmals Polos das Wort ergreift, der aber von Kallikles abgelöst wird, da dieser meint, Polos sei Sokrates nicht gewachsen. Der Dialog schliesst mit dem Mythos, den Sokrates erzählt. Doch gerade 1 Der Timaios erfülle die enttäuschte Hoffnung auf eine Erklärung der Natur aus der Vernunft, meint z. B. J. E. Moncada, 1995; ähnlich aber auch viele andere. 14 2.2 Übergreifende Gliederung: Staat – Timaios – Kritias hier zeigt sich, dass die Gliederung nach Personen zwar sehr objektiv und praktisch ist, jedoch gerade nicht mit der thematischen zusammenfällt. Oft dienen die Personenwechsel dazu, einem Thema einen neuen Dreh zu geben, das Gespräch auf ein neues Niveau zu heben, aber oft nicht mit dem Beginn des Gesprächs mit der neuen Person, sondern in seinem Verlauf.2 Für die innere Gliederung werde ich in diesem Falle keines dieser Kriterien verwenden, sondern einzig und allein die gliedernden Hinweise im Text selbst. Davon gibt es gerade im Timaios hinreichend viele, wie wir sehen werden, und, der wichtigste gliedernde Hinweis wird mit der äusseren Gliederung in ihrem Sinn übereinstimmen. 2.2 Übergreifende Gliederung: Staat – Timaios – Kritias Im Einleitungsgespräch des Timaios wiederholt Sokrates ein früheres Gespräch über den Staat. Wir brauchen uns nicht darum zu kümmern, ob das Referat sich genau auf den Dialog Staat bezieht oder auf ein anderes Gespräch, das uns nicht vorliegt,3 denn Sokrates gibt selbst an, was die Hauptpunkt dieses Gesprächs im jetzigen Zusammenhang sein 2 Siehe E. Sonderegger, 2012, 129–139. 3 Mir scheint der Bezug auf den Staat wahrscheinlicher. Immerhin bezieht sich Sokrates auf ein 'gestriges Gespräch,' und, wozu sollte Platon ein neues, nur leicht anderes Gespräch erfinden? Und schliesslich, auch wenn der Bezug auf den Dialog Staat gemeint ist, ist ebenso klar, dass Platon, Sokrates und weitere des öfteren über den Staat gesprochen haben. 15 2 Gliederung des Timaios soll: es sei ein Gespräch über den " Staat in Ruhe" gewesen, dem nun ein Gespräch über den " Staat in Bewegung" folgen soll. Mit dem ersten Ausdruck meint Sokrates offensichtlich den Staat als System, als " Idee," und das erfasst ja wohl den Sinn des Dialogs; es wurde die Ordnung des Staates als Abbild der Ordnung der Seele dargestellt. Die ständische Ordnung wiederholt sowohl in Funktion als auch in Würde die Ordnung der Funktionen der Seele. Mit dem Ausdruck " Staat in Bewegung" meint Sokrates ebenso offensichtlich den Staat in seiner faktischen, mundanen Realisation. Die Frage richtet sich also darauf, wie ein der Idee nach konzipierter Staat hic et nunc realisiert werden kann, oder, was für neue Bedingungen zu berücksichtigen sind, wenn man nicht mehr nur vom rein noetischen oder eidetischen Staat, sondern vielmehr vom wirklichen Staat im mundanen Sinn reden will. Diese Darstellung will Kritias geben, indem er erzählt, was sein 90jähriger gleichnamiger Vorfahr ihm, dem damals 10-jährigen Knaben von den Erlebnissen Solons in Ägypten erzählt hat. In dieser Erzählung zeigt sich die Leistung Athens im Krieg gegen Atlantis als Beispiel dafür, wie ein Staat sich in einer konkreten Situation bewährt. Über den Inhalt dessen, was Hermokrates danach vorzubringen hat, wird noch nichts gesagt. Der Dialog Kritias ist ja bereits unvollendet geblieben, der Hermokrates soweit wir wissen, überhaupt nicht begonnen. Viele denken, das 10 Buch der Gesetze hätte am ehesten seinem Inhalt entsprochen. In meine Gliederung beziehe ich ihn nicht mit ein. 16 2.2 Übergreifende Gliederung: Staat – Timaios – Kritias Doch soll die Erzählung des Kritias nicht sogleich erfolgen, denn Kritias meint (27ab), dass sie erst dann möglich sei, wenn die Herkunft und Entstehung des Menschen klar geworden sei. So ergibt sich ein Ablauf der Erzählung, der von dem allerersten Anfang überhaupt, dem Anfang der Welt, zum Anfang des Menschen schreite, von diesem zu den Taten der Athener in unvordenklicher Zeit, der dann eben das Beispiel für den Staat in Bewegung wäre. Sokrates gibt sich damit zufrieden und so beginnt Timaios mit seinem Vortrag. Somit lässt sich der Gedankengang vom Staat bis zum Kritias wie folgt zusammenfassen. Zuerst wird der Staat in eidetischer Form dargestellt, nach der Analogie zur Gliederung der Seele. Dem harmonischen Ineinander von vernünftigen, muthaften und begehrlichen Funktionen entspricht das Ineinander der Stände im Staat. Sein Wesen, die Gliederung seiner Funktionen, die Organisation und Einrichtung des Zusammenlebens im Einzelnen sind aber nicht aus der Erfahrung gewonnen, sondern aus der Analogie zur Seele deduziert.4 Da ist es natürlich naheliegend und von grossem Interesse zu fragen, ob das eidetische Deduzierte sich in der mundanen Wirklichkeit bewähren kann. Das müsste ja wohl der Zweck der eidetischen Deduktion sein. Hätte diese nichts zu tun mit dem, was uns umgibt, bliebe sie müssiges Spiel. Eine der Funktionen der Idee und des Modells muss sein, uns das Vorhandene verständlich zu machen. Dass dies der Fall ist, soll sich aus 4 Woher wir die Gliederung der Seele kennen, ist eine andere Frage. 17 2 Gliederung des Timaios der Erzählung des Kritias über Ur-Athen ergeben. Mit dem Staat in concreto kommt das Konrete überhaupt ins Spiel. Das durfte in der eidetischen Betrachtung noch keine Rolle spielen, wohl aber jetzt. Deshalb ist zwischen der Darstellung des eidetischen und des faktischen Staates die Einführung des Faktischen oder Konkreten überhaupt, der mundanen Welt (wenn man so sagen darf), des mundus sensibilis, notwendig. Und dies übernimmt Timaios. Vom eidetischen Staat über die Einführung der konkreten Welt – bis zum Eintreten des Menschen – ist der Übergang zum konkreten Staat möglich. Das Eintreten des Menschen ist aber nicht historisch oder prähistorisch oder sonst in einer solchen Weise zu verstehen. In seinem Vortrag erzählt Timaios zwar eine Geschichte, aber nicht im Sinne der Historie. Seine Geschichte ist, wie bei Hesiod die Genealogie der Götter, ein Mittel für die Darstellung systematischer, eidetischer Zusammenhänge. Deswegen meint der Satz (27a) πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως, τελευτᾶν δὲ εἰς ἀνθρώπου φύσιν· " zuerst will ich vom Werden des Kosmos reden, um dann zuletzt auf die Natur des Menschen zu kommen;" nicht die historische oder prähistorische Einführung des Menschen, sondern er spricht die Frage an, an welchem Systempunkt des Konkreten, Faktischen, Mundanen die Natur des Menschen ihren Platz habe. Die Richtungsangabe, die in ἀπό – εἰς (von – zu) liegt, ist weder örtlich noch zeitlich gemeint, sondern systematisch vom Allgemeinen (die Welt im 18 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios Ganzen) zum Besonderen und Einzelnen (in diesem Falle, zur Natur des Menschen). Der den Kosmos erschaffende Demiurg dient wie die Götter bei Hesiod der Exposition einer unzeitlichen Struktur. 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios 2.3.1 Gliederung nach Personen Die Gliederung nach Personen ergibt im Timaios ein sehr einfaches Bild. Sokrates spricht zuerst (17–20), in der Hauptsache, um das gestrige Gespräch über den Staat zu referieren, in dem er selbst die Hauptarbeit geleistet hatte, wofür er jetzt gerne eine Entschädigung hätte in der Darlegung des " Staates in Bewegung." Kritias (20–27) entspricht dem Wunsch gerne, er gibt gleich einen Vorblick auf das, was sie erwartet und sagt auch, woher er seine Kenntnis habe. Da aus seiner Darstellung folgt, dass vor seinem Bericht über Ur-Athen der konkrete Kosmos soweit besprochen werden müssen, bis der systematische Ort der Natur des Menschen darin klar werde, hält Timaios seinen Vortrag (der Rest des Timaios, 27–92). Daraus ergibt sich die Gliederung des Timaios nach Personen: 19 2 Gliederung des Timaios Sokrates 17–20 Anknüpfung an das Gespräch über den " Staat in Ruhe" Kritias 20–27 Vorblick, thematische Gliederung im Grossen Timaios 27–92 Vortrag über die Herkunft des Kosmos im Ganzen " bis zur Natur des Menschen" Die Unterscheidung zwischen Ruhe und Bewegung bezieht sich auf die μέγιστα γένη des Sophistes ( " oberste Gattungen"). Dort wurde der Sinn dieser Grundunterscheidung klar, und auch, dass die reine und blosse ideelle Darstellung von etwas unvollständig und eigentlich auch undurchführbar ist. Kein Seiendes ist nur ruhend und keines nur bewegt. Das Sein des Seienden kann nur durch beide Begriffe zugleich erfasst werden. So also auch beim Staat. Die erste Reihe wird gebildet mit der Folge der Dialoge Staat – Timaios – Kritias. Im Timaios entsteht die oberste Gliederung durch die Personenfolge Sokrates – Kritias – Timaios. Die Funktion der ersten zwei Personen ist bereits erwähnt, sie hat wesentlich gliedernden Charakter und soll das Programm für das Folgende entwerfen. So ist jetzt auf den umfangreichen Teil, den Vortrag des Timaios, einzugehen. 20 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios 2.3.2 Gliederung des Vortrags nach internen Gliederungshinweisen 2.3.2.1 Übersicht Die Hinweise im Text selbst machen es leicht, den Vortrag des Timaios zu gliedern. In dieser Übersicht sollen nur diese Hinweise zum Zweck der Gliederung gesammelt werden, erst danach, wenn die Gliederung steht, soll der Inhalt etwas genauer betrachtet werden (siehe 2.3.2.2). Den ersten Hinweis gibt Sokrates (29d), indem er sagt, die bisherigen Ausführungen des Timaios (27–29) seien gleichsam das Vorspiel gewesen, jetzt müsse die Hauptaufführung selbst folgen.5 In dieser ist 27–30 als Vorbereitung von 30–90 als Durchführung zu unterscheiden. Davon lässt sich der Schluss abtrennen (90e–92), wo Timaios sagt, das gesteckte Ziel sei nun erreicht und sehr kurz auf weitere Themen hinweist, die im Weiteren entsprechend zu behandeln wären. Der Neueinsatz bei 30c ist mit der Formulierung τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς...markiert, ( " was dem der Reihe nach <folgt>.") Der thematischen Ankündigung (: vom Werden des Kosmos oder von der Natur des Alls bis zur Natur des Menschen, 27bc) ist eine sehr starke formelle Cäsur beigegeben, ein Götteranruf (27c). Nach diesem beginnt der Vortrag. Götteranrufungen weisen immer auf einen entscheidenden Abschnitt hin. Seit Homer sind sich die Griechen gewohnt, Entschei5 Der Unterschied προοίμιον – νόμος stammt aus dem musikalischen Bereich und unterscheidet Vorspiel oder Einführung vom eigentlichen Werk. 21 2 Gliederung des Timaios dendes mit einem Götteranruf einzuleiten.6 So auch hier. Dem ersten Götteranruf (27c) entspricht ein zweiter (48d), unmittelbar vor der Einführung der Chora. Dadurch ergeben sich zwei Hauptteile im Vortrag des Timaios: I. 27–48 II. 48–90 Dass es sich dabei wirklich um Hauptteile handelt, erhärtet sich, wenn der Inhalt einbezogen wird. Teil I behandelt die Welt ohne χώρα, Teil II die Welt unter Berücksichtigung der χώρα. Der Vorspann, von dem Sokrates 29d spricht, exponiert die geltenden Prinzipien und Voraussetzungen für die folgende Darstellung und stellt die Durchführung des Themas auf eine rein noetische Basis. In der ersten Durchführung zeigt sich die Welt, wie sie gedacht werden muss als κόσμος νοητός. Nur der νοῦς ist als ordnender Faktor zugelassen. Zwar erreicht auch dieser erste Teil das gesteckte Ziel, die Natur des Menschen, aber nur in gewissem Sinne. Dies deckt die Reflexion auf (46–48), in die der erste Hauptteil mündet. Timaios wendet seinen Blick auf das bisher Gesagte zurück und stellt fest, dass der νοῦς allein nicht genüge, die Position des Menschen in der konkreten, faktischen Welt, im mundus sensibilis zu bestimmen. Diese Reflexion (46–48) auf das Bisherige (30–46) stellt eine deutliche Cä6 Auch, um Entscheidendes abzuschliessen, wie im Symposion, Phaidon, oder im Phaidros 257, wozu sich Konrad Gaiser äussert, 1989, mit Hinweisen auf weitere Stellen von Gebeten und Anrufungen der Götter durch Sokrates. 22 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios sur dar. Sie wird zusätzlich markiert durch die Formulierung 47c " jetzt ist nochmals von Anfang an zu beginnen," 48e durch die Unterscheidung von " damals" und " jetzt," und natürlich am deutlichsten durch den zweiten Götteranruf 48d. Der zweite Teil ist in gleicher Weise wie der erste in einen Vorspann und eine Durchführung geteilt. Die Reflexion hat ergeben, dass die in 27–30 vorgestellten Prinzipien ergänzt werden müssen. Als neuer Typ von Bedingung des Werdens tritt ἀνάγκη auf und, als das Worin des Werdens, die Chora. Dieser zweite vorbereitende Teil reicht von 48 bis 53 und macht den zweiten Vorspann aus. Darauf folgt die zweite Durchführung, 53 bis 90, (eingeleitet 53c mit νῦν δὲ ...συνέψεσθε, " jetzt aber ...werdet ihr folgen"). Es ist nur dieser zweite Vorspann, der mit dem Übergang bei Kant verglichen wird, die folgende Durchführung ist bereits konkrete " Physik." Wie in der ersten Durchführung (31–32) beginnt Timaios auch die zweite mit der Darstellung der Elemente, 53–68. Es muss erklärt werden, was es mit den Elementen auf sich hat, was ein Element wirklich ist, denn die von den Früheren so genannten Elemente sind zu wenig elementar. Bei 68 unterbricht eine Rekapitulation des Bisherigen und eine Reflexion auf die zwei Arten der Gründe, die jetzt beide berücksichtigt werden müssen, die Darstellung. Die Gliederung bestärkend heisst es 69a 23 2 Gliederung des Timaios " das Baumaterial liege bereit, wir können wieder an den Anfang zurück" (gemeint zu 48b). Bei den zwei Arten von Gründen ist zu beachten, dass es sich dabei nicht um causae irgendwelcher Art handelt (schon gar nicht um die causa efficiens – wer so spricht, begibt sich ins Mittelalter), sondern dass es sich dabei um zwei Typen von Bedingungen der Ordnung handelt, die eine regelt den noetischen Bereich, die andere, mit der noetischen zusammen, den mundanen. Es handelt sich beim Timaios insgesamt ja gar nicht um eine konstruktive Idee, um eine Kosmopoiie, sondern Herstellen etc. sind Ausdrucksweisen für eine systematische Hierarchie oder Struktur. Die ganze Rede von Gründen gehört zur Form des εἰκὼς λόγος, 29b als die dem Thema angemessene Redeweise eingeführt, 48d bestätigt. Die zweite Durchführung des Themas (von der Natur des Alls bis zur Natur des Menschen), nähert sich ihrem Ziel, der Natur des Menschen. Auch dieser letzte Teil ist nochmals in zwei ungleiche Teile geteilt, indem zuerst das Seelische besprochen wird (69–72), darauf " das Weitere," τὸ δ' ἑξῆς, 72–90. Am Schluss dieser Erörterungen kommt Timaios nochmals auf die Seele und ihr Verhältnis zum Körper zurück, auf die Notwendigkeit ihrer Pflege und ihre unterschiedlichen Funktionen, Themen, die sich auch in anderen Dialogen finden, ebenfalls gerne am Schluss. Timaios stellt ausdrücklich fest, jetzt an dem Punkt angekommen zu sein, der vorgesehen war, und schliesst mit kurzen Hinweisen auf weitere Themen, die in diesem Zusammenhang zu erörtern wären. Damit gliedert sich der Vortrag des Timaios, 27–92, wie folgt: 24 2.3 Interne Gliederung des Timaios 27–30 Erste Vorbereitung: für das Folgende geltende Prinzipien und Voraussetzungen 30–48 Vortrag, Teil I: die Welt ohne Chora; rein noetisch 46–48 Reflexion auf das Bisherige 48 Notwendigkeit, die bisherigen Prinzipien zu erweitern 48–53 Zweite Vorbereitung: die weiteren Prinzipien, Einführung von χώρα und ἀνάγκη 53–90 Vortrag, Teil II: die Welt mit Chora und zwei Arten von Gründen 53–68 die Elemente 68 Rekapitualtion und Reflexion: Zwei Arten von Gründen 68–87 68–72 das Seelische 72–87 das Weitere 87–90 87–89 Seele und Körper: brauchen einander 89–90 Sorge um die Seele, παιδαγωγία, drei Teile der Seele 90–92 Hinweis auf weitere Themen; formeller Abschluss 25 2 Gliederung des Timaios 26 3 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift Wir haben aus der Gliederung des Timaios Folgerungen gezogen und und haben uns in einigen Schriften vor der Übergangsschrift und in dieser selbst die Stellen vor Augen geführt, die einen inhaltlichen Bezug zu ihm zu habe scheinen. Es geht jetzt eigentlich nur noch darum, wie man im Volksmund sagt, " eins und eins zusammenzuzählen." Eine eher assoziativ als systematisch gedachte Liste zu den beiden Texten soll die Fälle des Vergleichbaren zeigen. Auf einige davon gehe ich im Folgenden ein. noetische Welt Vermittlung empirische, aisthetische Welt νοητά χώρα, δι' ἀνάγκης αἰσθητά ὄντα τριτὸν γένος γιγνόμενα νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, νόησις λογισμὸς νόθος, εἰκὼς λόγος δόξα, αἴσθησις Ideen μέθεξις Dinge 27 3 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift Timaios, I Teil (17– 48) Timaios, Z w e i te Vorbereitung (48–53) Timaios, Rest II Teil (53–92) ein drittes Wissen KrV, MAN Übergangsschrift div. vorkrit. Schriften; empirische Physik r e i n e F o r m e n des Verstandes: Kategorien Schematismus Erscheinung, Phaenomenon Reine Formen der Sinnlichkeit: Raum und Zeit Äther empirischer Raum, empirische Zeit cogitabile apprehensibile metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft Übergang (: System der Physik als System der bew. Kräfte) empirische Fests t e l l u n g ü b e r Naturgegenstände Apriori s e l t s a m e V e r q u i c k u n g v o n empirisch und a priori; ein Mitt e l b e g r i f f , e i n befremdliches Wissen Erfahrung 28 Materie als das Bewegliche im Raum Äther bewegende Kräfte der Materie; Materie als das Bewegliche, das bewegende Kraft hat Wenn wir nun zusammenhalten, was zum Timaios und zur Überganggsschrift gesagt worden ist, zeigen sich frappante Übereinstimmungen.1 Die wichtigste Gemeinsamkeit beider Texte besteht in der Exposition einer noetischen und einer aisthetischen Welt, die nach einer Vermittlung rufen. Diese Vermittlung sollen χώρα bzw. der Äther leisten. Dazu tritt, das sowohl Platon als auch Kant auf die Seltsamkeit des Wissens reflektieren, das diese Vermittlung, diesen Übergang leisten soll. Sowohl χώρα als auch der Äther vermitteln die νοητά mit den αἰσθητά, das cogitabile mit dem sensibile.2 Beide werde als ein Drittes eingeführt, bei Platon neben Seiendem und Werdendem, bei Kant zwischen Erscheinung und Kategorie (Schematismus). Bei Kant vermittelt der Äther auch zwischen den MAN und der Physik. Faktisch so auch bei Platon, nur nicht dem Wortlaut nach, doch der 1 Für den Timaios gebe ich keine Stellen mehr an, viele sind oben schon genannt worden, im Ganzen ist es ohnehin notwendig, sich die Stelle Timaios 48–53 nochmals vor Augen zu führen, siehe die beiden Anhänge. Was die Kantstellen betrifft, so kann man sich ebenfalls an den im Kant-Kapitel genannten orientieren, im Übrigen hilft der Index von Lehmann. 2 Kant, XXI 235: " Wir können uns den Raum als Denkbares (spatium cogitabile) aber auch als Spürbares (spatium perceptibile) vorstellen." 29 3 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift erste Teil des Timaios enthält ja die noetischen Grundlagen der Welt, der zweite ist eine faktisch durchgeführte Physik der damaligen Zeit. Beide, χώρα und Äther, sind je ein Erstes in der Natur, denn beide liegen den Elementen voraus, sie sind elementarer als die Elemente. Beide haben die Funktion, die faktische natürliche Welt in ihrer körperlichen Wirklichkeit, ihrer Beweglichkeit und Bewegtheit möglich zu machen. Beide ermöglichen eben dadurch den Übergang von der Welt als Gedanke, Struktur, System, zum Weltlichen als Sache. Beide sind nicht selbst Dinge, Seiendes jener Welt, die sie konstituieren. Beide sind nicht der Raum selbst, sondern das den Naturraum Begründende. Bei Kant tritt hinzu, dass der Äther den Raum erfahrbar macht. „Ein leerer Raum ist denkbar aber nicht spürbar d. i. kein Gegenstand möglicher Erfahrung." Da wir faktisch aber Erfahrungen von Bewegungen im Raum haben können, ergibt sich die notwendige Annahme des sich selbst bewegenden Weltstoffs, der Basis aller Materie (XXI 217, 380, 428, 544) und ihrer Bewegung ist, „weil Wahrnehmung des Nichts ein sich widersprechender Begriff ist" (XXI 233,3–4 und öfter). Ohne diesen blieben Raum und Zeit für die Erfahrung schlechterdings leer. Von der Erfahrbarkeit des Raumes selbst spricht Platon nicht. Beide sind ungeworden und unvergänglich und befinden sich in einer ebenso unvergänglichen Zitterbewegung, die die Grundlage der Elementenbildung, der Bildung der Körper und der Anfang deren mögli30 cher Bewegung ist. Zur χώρα tritt bei Platon als notwendiger " Mitgrund" die ἀνάγκη hinzu (siehe oben, S. 31). Diese, gleichsam als Sachzwang des Materials bei der mundanen Verwirklichung, ist ein Grund zweiter Ordnung, nachfolgend dem ersten Grund, den die Vernunft angeben kann, neben dem oder zusätzlich zum Zweck. Auch bei Kant sind die reinen Gründe, die metaphysischen Anfangsgründe, gegenüber den empirischen prioritär. Platon und Kant weisen mit Nachdruck darauf hin, dass die Überlegungen und die Logik, die sich mit diesem vermittelnden " Stoff" beschäftigt, eigentümlich ist, weil sie sich weder mit dem rein Gedanklichen noch mit dem rein Wahrnehmbaren beschäftigen, sondern mit einem Zwitter, der χώρα bzw. dem Äther, die beide zwischen Noetischem und Aisthetischem stehen. Wenn die Unterscheidung „ohne χώρα – mit χώρα" im Sinne der Unterscheidung zwischen einem rein geometrischen Raume (sei er nun euklidisch oder nicht) und einem Naturraum verstanden werden kann, dann entspricht dieser Unterscheidung auch die zwischen einer theoretischen Physik als einer rein mathematischen Theorie und einer empirischen Physik, die es zu tun hat mit dem Gemessenen, Festgestellten. Letztere ist eine Interpretation der theoretischen Physik. Dass die Wirklichkeit Abbild eines Urbildes sei, meint, dass sie sich einer Theorie zuordnen und mit dieser verstehen lasse. Natürlich ist „einen Kreis denken" etwas anderes als „einen Kreis zeichnen", aber den gezeichneten Kreis 31 3 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift erfasse ich auch nur dadurch, dass ich ihn auf einen gedachten Kreis beziehen kann. Wenn man überhaupt von der faktischen Welt um uns reden will, dann muss nach einer Beziehung zwischen dem Urbild (der theoretischen Physik im Sinne der MAN) und dem Abbild (der Welt als einer der Interpretationen des Modells) gefragt werden, die es erlaubt, vom Ersten zum Zweiten zu gehen. Zum Schluss und mehr im Sinne einer Randbemerkung möchte ich auf die Timaios-Interpretation von Brisson und Meyerstein, 1995, hinweisen, welche den Timaios in sehr direkter Weise mit der modernen Physik in Zusammenhang bringt. Sehr interessant ist die Gegenüberstellung von Seiendem und Werdendem mit Modell und Realität. Allerdings, obwohl zwischen den beiden Paaren Parallelen bestehen, scheint doch die Hauptsache, das „eigentliche Sein" dem Modell gerade nicht zuzukommen. Diese Unterscheidung wird als hiatus irrationalis (3 und öfter) bezeichnet, der einen Übergang erfordere. Insofern bestehen zwischen der Interpretation von Brisson-Meyerstein und der hier vorgelegten einige Gemeinsamkeit. Allerdings ist die konkrete Ausführung und auch der Sinn des Übergangs wieder völlig verschieden. Ging es bei meiner Darstellung um den Zusammenhang des ersten und zweiten Teils des Timaios mit dem Übergangsproblem bei Kant im Opus postumum, sieht jene Darstellung eine weitgehende Strukturgleichheit zwischen dem Timaios und dem Big-Bang-Modell. Allerdings lässt sich diese Gleichheit nur auf der Basis sehr zweifelhafter Annahmen sehen. Zum einen muss man akzeptieren, das Platon im Timaios ein „Modell des physikalischen Universums" darstellen wollte (17) und zwar 32 im Sinne der modernen Naturwissenschaft (18). Das ist völlig anachronistisch. Den Übergang, die Vermittlung, sehen die beiden Autoren dadurch realisiert, dass die Weltseele dem körperlich-sinnlichen ihre eigene noetische Struktur vermittelt, soweit das möglich ist (29). Dabei verstehen sie die „Konstruktion der Weltseele" so, wie es Cornford schon vorgeschlagen und Brisson mehrfach repetiert hatte. Diese Interpretation verwendet sinnlose Begriffe wie die einer „teilbaren Identität" und „unteilbaren Differenz."3 Hier werden Bestimmungen von Seiendem (teilbar/unteilbar) als Bestimmungen von Reflexionsbegriffen (Identität/Differenz) genommen. Ein alternatives Verständnis der Stelle Timaios 35a1–b3 habe ich 1997 vorgeschlagen, wonach Platon an dieser Stelle sagen will, dass alles, was in der faktischen Welt ist, zugleich bestimmt ist durch Sein (οὐσία), Identität und Differenz. Da dies in der „Seele des Kosmos" angelegt ist, hält es sich in allem Einzelnen durch. Im weiteren wird die Funktion des Proömiums des Timaios von Brisson-Meyerstein nochmals anachronistisch in den Zusammenhang mit der modernen Wissenschaftstheorie gestellt. Es soll sich bei den dort angeführten Grundunterscheidungen und Grundsätzen um Axiome handeln, aus welchen das Folgende deduziert werde (5). Die Sätze und Festlegungen des Proömiums sind aber vielmehr „Hypothesen" im Sinne des Phaidon, d. h. Sätze, mit welchen neue Sätze konfrontiert werden, um sie auf ihre Haltbarkeit hin zu prüfen. Aus ihnen wird nichts deduziert, es sind Leitplanken, es sind Sätze, zu denen kein Widerspruch auftreten darf. 3 Siehe E. Sonderegger, 1997. 33 3 Chora in Platons Timaios und Äther in Kants Übergangsschrift Das Fazit meines Vergleichs zwischen Platons Timaios und Kants Übergangsschrift lässt sich in drei Thesen zusammenfassen: 1. Der Timaios gliedert sich in zwei Teile, wovon der erste „die Welt ohne χώρα," der zweite „die Welt mit χώρα" betrachtet. Beide Teile sind gegliedert in eine Vorbereitung und eine Durchführung. Der erste Teil entspricht Kants Werk Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. Die Vorbereitung des zweiten Teils führt χώρα als das Dritte neben Noetischem und Aisthetischem und ἀνάγκη als neue Art von Grund ein, und entspricht so der Übergangsschrift Kants. Die zweite Durchführung im Timaios entspricht der Physik selbst, womit sich der naturwissenschaftliche Teil des kantischen Frühwerks befasst hat. Die Zweiteilung des Dialogs im Ganzen entspricht bei Platon selbst der Differenz der Darstellung des „Staates in Ruhe" (: Politeia), d. h. der Darstellung der Idee des Staates, und der Darstellung des „Staates in Bewegung" (: der geplante Kritias), d. h. der Darstellung des faktischen Staates. 2. Die Funktion der χώρα im Timaios entspricht der des Aethers in der Übergangsschrift von Kant; beide sollen den Übergang vom Gedanken zur empirischen und mundanen Wirklichkeit denkbar machen; beide begründen das Werden im Sinne des Übergangs vom Apriori zum realen Ding. 34 Der ἀνάγκη im Timaios entsprechen die Einschränkungen des noetisch Möglichen im empirisch-physikalischen Bereich. 3. Der Übergang vom Apriori zum realen Ding ist aber weder bei Platon noch bei Kant im modernen naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als ein weiterer natürlicher Prozess zu verstehen,4 sondern als Resultat eines Nachdenkens über die Haltbarkeit einer unvermeidlichen Grundunterscheidung. 4 Gleichsam vulgär-platonisch " Aus Ideen werden Dinge," oder " Die Ideen sind Eigenschaften der Dinge." Anhänge 4.1 Anhang 1: Timaios 48b–53b, detailliert Timaios 48b–53b 48b Wir müssen nochmals an den Anfang zurück und von vorne anfangen, und die Natur der Elemente, bevor der Himmel war, betrachten. d Götteranruf e Für die erste Erörterung genügten zwei Arten: παράδειγμα gegenüber μίμημα (Vorbild – Abbild νοητόν, ὄν (Denkbares, Seiendes) gegenüber ὁρατόν, γένεσιν ἔχον (Sichtbares, was Werden hat), 49a diese einfache Unterscheidung genügt nicht mehr: was ist die Kraft (Funktion) und Natur des Dritten? Es ist γενέσεως ὑποδοχή, wie eine Amme. Aber man muss es noch deutlicher sagen: b Die Elemente sind unbeständig, c sie gehen sogar ineinander über, 37 4 Anhänge d sie sind nicht " dies" sondern nur " sobeschaffen," e nur das, worin (ἐν ᾧ) je jedes wird und vergeht, ist beständig. 50a Nochmals deutlicher: Wenn man z. B. aus Gold Verschiedenes bildet und beantworten will, 'Was ist das?', dann ist es wahrer zu sagen, es sei Gold als 'ein Dreieck' oder weitere Formen. b Es [sc. dies-zu-sein] trifft nur auf die Natur zu, die alle Körper in sich aufnimmt, c sie ist eine Modelmasse für jede Natur. So gibt es jetzt drei Gattungen: d τὸ γιγνόμενον, τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται, τὸ ὅθεν ἀφομοιούμενον φύεται τὸ γιγνόμενον (das Werdende; das, worin es wird; das, von wo her das Werdende sich angleichend wird). Das lässt sich der Mutter, dem Vater und dem Kind vergleichen. e Es ist ausserhalb jedes εἶδος, wie die Grundmasse für eine Salbe. 51a Sie ist Mutter und Aufnehmerin des Wahrnehmbaren, aber selbst unsichtbar, ohne Gestalt, alles aufnehmend, b und hat auf schwer fassbare Weise Anteil am νοητόν. Ist das εἶδος etwas neben dem, was wir sehen oder nicht? c Oder ist es nur ein Wort (λόγος)? 38 4.1 Anhang 1: Timaios 48b–53b, detailliert d Ich meine, wenn νοῦς und δόξα ἀληθής verschieden sind, dann sind auch die nicht wahrnehmbaren, nur denkbaren εἴδη, wenn sie aber nicht verschieden sind, dann ist das körperlich Wahrnehmbare das Sicherste. e Sie sind aber als zwei zu setzen, getrennt und ungleich. 52a Wenn das nun so ist, muss man zugeben, dass das Eine das εἶδος ist, das sich immer gleich verhält, das Homonyme (: Aequivoke) dazu ist ein Zweites, wahrnehmbar, geworden, bewegt, ortsverändlich. Das Dritte aber, die χώρα, ist unvergänglich, b gewährt Sitz dem Werdenden, ohne Wahrnehmung fassbar durch einen λογισμὸς νόθος (etwa: uneigentlicher Schluss). Wir sagen, jedes Seiende sei notwendig an einem Ort und nehme einen Platz ein, was aber weder auf Erden noch im Himmel sei, sei nichts. d So ist ὄν, χώρα und γένεσις dreierlei, und zwar bevor der Himmel war, und die γένέσεως τιθήνη nimmt Gestalt von Erde, Wasser, Feuer, Luft an, 53a die zuerst ungeordnet waren, b dann geordnet wurden auf Grund von einer Art SchüttelProzess. 39 4 Anhänge

Proceedings of the British Academy, 214, 155–170, © The British Academy 2018. 10 What Has History to Do with Philosophy? Insights from the Medieval Contemplative Tradition CHRISTINA VAN DYKE the fIeld of the hIStory of philosophy is rife with disagreements about its own nature. While some scholars work actively to bring historical figures and ideas into conversation with contemporary debates, other scholars cry 'Violence!' and dismiss their work as anachronistic. At the same time, detailed textual reconstruction and analysis are discounted by others as philology rather than philosophy, and demand is made for 'Arguments!' These disagreements have, in turn, shaped the ways in which historians of philosophy have interacted (or not interacted) with contemporary philosophers. Too often, the contribution of historically oriented philosophers to modern discussions has been reduced to volunteering ideological nuggets mined from ancient sources, or to explicating theories whose value stems in part from their very lack of connection to current interests.1 This chapter highlights a different corrective and complementary role that historically informed philosophy can play in contemporary discussions. Analysis of the development of key definitions, concepts, principles, and so on, often illuminates problematic prejudices that call for a re-examination of the philosophical considerations in their favour-a re-examination that should involve looking at the relevant historical context in which the idea developed. In what follows, I demonstrate, via the case study of medieval and modern conceptions of mystical experience, that turning to the relevant historical context can also provide viable philosophical resources with which to complement existing discussions. What it takes for an experience to count as genuinely mystical has been the source of significant controversy; most current philosophical definitions of 'mystical experience' exclude embodied, non-unitive states, but, in so doing, they exclude the majority of reported mystical experiences. I use a reexamination of the full range of reported medieval mystical experiences-both 1 See Chapter 9, this volume, for a detailed discussion of these two extremes, as well as an alternative different from the one I lay out here. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 155 20/11/2017 14:16 156 Christina van Dyke in the apophatic tradition, which excludes or denigrates embodied states, and in the affective tradition, which treats such states as fully mystical-to demonstrate how a better understanding of the historical medieval mystic tradition can serve as a valuable complement to ongoing philosophical discussions of religious and mystical experience. I conclude by suggesting that this approach can also help philosophers engage in meaningful interaction with scholars working on similar topics in other disciplines. 10.1. Implicit Assumptions and the Case of 'Mystical Experience' The stories behind the development and adoption of any number of philosophical definitions, principles, and concepts are complex-and, often, problematic-in ways that should impact our use of them today. I focus on the concept of 'mystical experience' in this chapter because it provides an excellent case study not only of this point but also of the ways in which historically informed philosophy can respond. There is a rich tradition within medieval mysticism, for instance, of treating embodied experiences as genuinely mystical, on which contemporary scholars can-and should-draw in order to complement the existing focus on non-sensory, selfless mystic union. In the remainder of this section, I explicate the current philosophical conception of mystical experience in the context of its 20th-century influences, showing how prejudices against women, emotions, and the body have played a significant role in determining which sort of reported mystical experiences fall under the contemporary definition and which do not. The role of these nonphilosophical factors thus motivates enquiry, in Sections 10.2 and 10.3, into the philosophical considerations for and against that narrow focus. Let us begin our enquiry, then, where everyone begins their philosophical enquiries these days: with the corresponding Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article.2 The definition of 'mystical experience' in the entry on 'Mysticism' does an excellent job capturing general philosophical assumptions about mysticism and is, in fact, specifically described as 'suiting more specialized treatments of mysticism in philosophy': Mystical experience: A (purportedly) super sense-perceptual or sub sense-perceptual unitive experience granting acquaintance of realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection.3 2 In this case, a very good place to start. It possesses, among other virtues, an excellent bibliography of previous philosophical treatments of mysticism. 3 Jerome Gellman offers this definition in his Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on mysticism. The more general definition he offers does not include the word 'unitive' but is otherwise the same. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed 11 October 2017). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 156 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 157 For our purposes, the first thing of note about this definition is its insistence that a mystical experience must be either 'super' or 'sub' perceptual.4 To count as 'super sense-perceptual', an experience must have 'perception-like content of a kind not appropriate to sense perception, somatosensory modalities ... or standard introspection'.5 That is, although a mystical experience may accompany or even be occasioned by sense perception, as when one has a mystical experience while watching the sun set, the experience itself must transcend the senses in a distinctive way. This definition explicitly rules out visions, auditions, and other sensebased experiences from the category of mystical experience: '[p]ara-sensual experiences such as religious visions and auditions fail to make an experience mystical'6. To count as 'sub sense-perceptual', in turn, an experience must go beyond the senses in the other direction, so that the experience contains little to no phenomenological content. (As I discuss in Section 10.2, such experiences are usually seen as the end achievement of a lengthy process of self-loss or selfannihilation en route to union with the divine.) The second significant feature in this definition is its emphasis on the inherently unitive nature of a mystical experience. Beginning at the outset of the 20th century with William James' discussion of the 'four marks' of a mystical experience in Varieties of Religious Experience,7 and continuing with Evelyn Underhill's influential 'five stages of the mystic path' in her Mysticism: A Study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness,8 modern scholars of mysticism have generally upheld a conception of selfless mystic union as the ultimate end of religious experience.9 Thus, Underhill talks about a 'death of selfhood' in her depiction of the unitive life, which she describes as the highest and final stage of the mystic life,10 while Jerome Gellman characterises a unitive mystical 4 For those curious as to what Gellman means by 'experience' in this context, the following comment seems of note: 'Mystical writings do not support William James' claim (James 1958), that mystical experience must be a transient event, lasting only a short time and then disappearing. Rather, the experience might be an abiding consciousness, accompanying a person throughout the day, or parts of it. )RUWKDWUHDVRQLWPLJKWEHEHWWHUWRVSHDNRIP\VWLFDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVZKLFKFDQEHHLWKHUÀHHWLQJ or abiding. Hereafter, the reader should understand "experience" in this sense' (emphasis added). 5 Text elided: 'including the means for sensing pain and body temperature, and internally sensing body, limb, organ, and visceral positions and states'. See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed 11 October 2017). 6 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed 11 October 2017). 7 James (1902). 8 Underhill, for instance, describes the final stage of the mystic path (which she bases on John of the Cross' writings) as the 'unitive life'. See Underhill (1911) as well as Underhill (1920). The previous four stages are, respectively, 'awakening of self', 'purgation of self', 'illumination', and 'the dark night of the soul'. 9 Whether this loss of self should be understood metaphorically, ontologically, or phenomenologically is subject to debate. For our purposes, what is significant is merely that such union is understood to erase any distinction between the consciousness of the individual having the mystic experience and the divine. 10 In her words: 'In that most dear relation all feeling, will, and thought attain their end. Here all the teasing complications of our separated selfhood are transcended. Hence the eager striving, the sharp vision, are not wanted any more. In that mysterious death of selfhood on the summits which is the VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 157 20/11/2017 14:16 158 Christina van Dyke experience as involving 'phenomenological de-emphasis, blurring, or eradication of multiplicity'.11 Achieving this form of mystical union is generally taken to be both necessary for an experience being properly mystical and a (retroactive) sign that such an experience has been achieved. On this widely accepted understanding, then, affective and/or sensory states in which the subject and the divine remain distinct (such as visions or auditions) do not qualify as properly mystical. The term 'mystical' is reserved for these superor sub-sensory unitive states that grant access to 'realities or states of affairs that are of a kind not accessible by way of sense-perception, somatosensory modalities, or standard introspection'.12 Because my focus in this chapter is on the accepted mode of mystic experiences rather than their epistemic import, I will not discuss the 'realities' mystical experiences purport to impart. It is, however, worth noting that they are meant to be such that access to them requires utterly transcending our bodies and our senses. In ruling out embodied states such as visions, auditions, and physical closure (surviving for long periods of time without taking nourishment or excreting), the modern definition of mystical experience carves a narrow swath in the full range of reported mystic experiences. One might think this tight focus is appropriate: after all, the question of how to ascertain whether someone's claim to mystical experiences is valid has been a topic of fierce debate since at least the Middle Ages. In the 14th and 15th centuries in the Latin West, for instance, church authorities were understandably alarmed by what looked like the claim that-via the insight gained through mystic union-people could transcend need of the church altogether. Their alarm was not entirely unjustified. In her Mirror and Annihilation of Simple Souls, for instance, Marguerite Porete (burnt at the stake as a heretic in 1310) argues that the soul can be joined to God in such a way that its will becomes God's will, and that a person in this state need not pray or attend Mass or participate in any of the regular activities of the Christian life.13 Especially in light of the enormous surge of reported mystic experiences in the late 13th and 14th centuries throughout Europe, church leaders became wary of people and communities who claimed to have direct contact with God; after the Reformation, such communities were often actively suppressed.14 In the 20th century, debates over the nature of mystical experience heated up again.15 In the first half, influential scholars such as William James and Evelyn medium of Eternal Life, heights meet the deeps: supreme achievement and complete humility are one' (Underhill 1911: 444). 11 See Gellmann (2014). 12 Ibid. 13 Porete is linked with the antinomianists or Free Spirit heresy for this reason, although the actual connection is quite unclear. See, e.g., Lerner (1972). 14 Communities of nuns who were frequently having mystic experiences during the Eucharist were sometimes forbidden the host until such experiences ceased. See Walker Bynum (1991). 15 For a detailed discussion of the history of the term 'mysticism' that also includes helpful references to further discussions, see Hollywood (2012). For an overview of the complex politics involved in the struggle to define mysticism in the 20th century, see the first chapter of Beckwith (1993). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 158 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 159 Underhill focused on the psychological and philosophical as well as religious aspects of mysticism, and there was a general post-Freudian and Jungian interest in psychologising such experiences in order to uncover their true significance. This combined with the rise of medicine as a science and increased interest in identifying physical causes for altered mental states to produce working definitions of 'mysticism' and 'mystical experiences' from which physical and affective states were carefully ruled out-in part due to epistemological worries about how to distinguish genuine religious experiences from hallucinations or medical conditions such as epilepsy. In the post-Auschwitz world of the second half of the 20th century, the search for a universal divine that undergirds outwardly conflicting world religions gained ground, popularised by works such as Joseph Campbell's The Hero with a Thousand Faces (originally published in 1949). This push towards religious pluralism, epitomised by John Hick's work in influential volumes such as The Myth of God Incarnate (1977) and God Has Many Names (1980), stressed the similarities in descriptions of selfless mystic union among different religious traditions in order to argue for a common basis for them all. One common denominator in these modern discussions has been their dismissal of embodied experiences as inferior states, and sometimes even as misleading or counterfeit versions of true mystical experiences. As a number of scholars have noted recently, however, in ruling out these sorts of experiences, treatments of mysticism have discounted precisely those mystical states most common to women, for the majority of people reporting such embodied mystical experiences have been female.16 This dismissal of female experience has a long history. According to the widely accepted Aristotelian biology of the Middle Ages, women's mental acuity is compromised by their bodies, which are more sensitive to sensory perception and thus more susceptible to bodily passions and emotions.17 Although this sensitivity makes women seem better candidates for certain sorts of religious experiences (such as visions and physical states such as stigmata and closure), the idea that their bodies consistently overpowered their intellective capacities simultaneously calls into question their reports and judgements about such experiences.18 Thus, after the surge in reported mystic experiences in the 13th and 14th centuries, the people whose reports church authorities were most likely to scrutinise closely and then condemn were predominantly female-a result, no doubt, buoyed by further persistent cultural and religious beliefs that women are less trustworthy than men and prone to exaggerate their emotional and physical states.19 16 See Jantzen (1995) and Furlong (2013) for book-length treatments of this topic. Mooney (1999) provides an explicit discussion of how gender came into play in the way specific mystics' reported experiences were recorded, altered, and/or understood. 17 In Caciola (2003), Nancy Caciola addresses why women were seen as more likely to be possessed by demons as well as to experience divine visions, auditions, etc. 18 This was one of the reasons the testimony of women was not accepted in court. 19 For detailed discussion of the sorts of experiences being reported, the general increase in embodied mystical experiences in this time period, and their perceived relation to women and women's bodies, VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 159 20/11/2017 14:16 160 Christina van Dyke The close negative association of bodies and emotions in women continues through to the present day.20 This association also played an unacknowledged role in the exclusion of embodied states from the contemporary philosophical definition of mystical experience. In some cases, the negative associations between bodies and women is left implicit, as when Evelyn Underhill dismisses reports of ecstatic union and other sensory and physical mystic states as a result of 'the infantile craving for a sheltering and protecting love' that is 'frequently pathological'. We should be seeking to transcend our bodies and ourselves, she claims, not to wallow in pleasures and pains that speak to our personal desires; such visions and ecstatic experiences frequently accompany 'other abnormal conditions in emotional visionaries whose revelations have no ultimate characteristics'.21 Although Underhill's disdain for the role of emotions and physical aberrations in the mystic life is clear, what is left unsaid is that the vast majority of such 'emotional visionaries' were women, and that the sort of mystics whose experiences typify the superior unitive life are almost exclusively male.22 (It is also worth noting that the 'ultimate characteristics' which these revelations lack are those identified by Underhill herself as essential to true mystic union, and that they include self-abnegation and physical transcendence.) In other cases, however, the negative associations between emotion, bodies, and women is made explicit. David Knowles, for example, describes the 'pure spirituality' of the early Middle Ages as 'contaminated by another current, that of a more emotional and idiosyncratic form of devotion ... deriving partly from the influence of some of the women saints of the fourteenth century, women such as Angela of Foligno, Dorothea of Prussia, and Bridget of Sweden'.23 As with Underhill, Knowles associates purity of spirituality with an emphasis on transcendence of the particularities of the body and its affective states; unlike his predecessor, Knowles makes the connection between undue emotionality and women clear. Although some male mystics also report embodied experiences, women are particularly likely to be linked with the sort of emotional and see the chapter 'The Female Body and Religious Practice' in Walker Bynum (1991), and Grundmann's classic (1936). 20 See the introduction to Bordo (1993) for a succinct history of this association and its manifestations in modern culture. 21 Underhill (1920: 20, 23). 22 The exception to this general rule is Teresa of Avila. Simone de Beauvoir (1989) speaks approvingly of Teresa in her largely critical chapter in The Second Sex on 'The Mystic', for instance, and Gellman's lengthy (2014) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article from which the definition at the beginning of the chapter (see also fn. 3) is taken mentions exactly one female mystic: Teresa of Avila. Teresa is of obvious philosophical and theological significance-see Christia Mercer (2017) on the relation between her Interior Castle and Descartes' Mediations-but she comes a full century later than the explosion of affective mysticism that paper focuses on, and she is not embedded in either the same sort of cultural movement or religious communities. Perhaps this is why she is consistently upheld as the acceptable sort of female mystic. 23 Knowles (1948–9: 222–3). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 160 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 161 other forms of religious expression which are portrayed as 'tainting' the appropriately dispassionate, universal modes of true mysticism and connection with the divine. The same negative connection between women, bodies, and emotional religious experiences is drawn by Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex. In this groundbreaking work of feminist philosophy, de Beauvoir is sharply critical of the majority of female medieval mystics, arguing in her chapter on 'The Mystic' that women are more likely than men to report physical mystic experiences because of their disadvantaged status as Other, which has led them to become more susceptible to religious fervour and extreme emotional states. 'Not clearly distinguishing reality from make-believe, action from magic, the objective from the imaginary,' she writes, 'Woman is peculiarly prone to materialize the absent in her own body.'24 In other words, women are more likely to passively embody their religious beliefs in physical and emotional suffering or ecstasy than they are to attempt concrete action in the world of men from which they have been excluded.25 Prejudices against emotions, bodies, and women thus factored into the development of the contemporary understanding of mystical experiences as necessarily involving non-sensory, selfless union. Even Jerome Gellman, author of the working definition quoted at the beginning of this chapter, admits that '[t]he thinking that there is a common, unconstructed, essence to mystical experience has worked against the recognition of women's experiences as properly mystical'.26 Here we can see in action the first sort of corrective role that historically oriented philosophy offers: an examination of the development of conceptions of mysticism in the 20th century demonstrates how it is undergirded by problematic assumptions, and thus provokes a re-examination of its philosophical merits. In Section 10.2, I demonstrate another aspect of this corrective role, turning to medieval discussions about the nature and range of mystic experiences in order to examine the philosophical motivations in favour of excluding physical and affective experiences from the properly mystical; as we will see, these motivations rest on controversial claims about the nature of God and human persons. Furthermore, as I show in Section 10.3, the broader historical context was where standard views about mystical experiences embraced embodied and affective expression. 10.2. Correction in Context: Apophatic Self-Abnegation Prejudices against emotions, bodies, and women have influenced the development of current philosophical conceptions of what counts as a mystical experience. One might well think that these prejudices (which have been around at least as long as philosophy) have always worked against the inclusion of embodied, 24 De Beauvoir (1989: 672). 25 See also her discussion of religion in her chapter 'Situation' in de Beauvoir (1989: 621ff.). 26 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed 11 October 2017). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 161 20/11/2017 14:16 162 Christina van Dyke affective experiences in the mystical canon-after all, attitudes towards the body and towards women were not better in ages past, correct? One would, however, be wrong in so thinking. This is where historically informed philosophy has a second important corrective role to play: although there is a strain of mysticism that excludes embodied experiences from the properly mystic life-namely apophaticism, which generally focuses on the ineffability of the divine and the inability of language and thought to express any direct experience of that divine-such mysticism represents only one part of a much larger tradition. Its cautions against physical and affective states thus need to be understood in the larger context in which such embodied states were seen as the mystic norm, and the reasons those states were accepted as the norm need to be taken seriously. This approach, like the corrective approach described and illustrated in Section 10.1, is also easily generalisable to any number of other contemporary philosophical discussions: it can (and should) be used to counter mistaken claims of 'But this is the way things have always been!' by presenting historical examples of real alternatives. The apophatic tradition in Western Christian mysticism, for instance, has a long philosophical lineage-arguably beginning with Plato's claims about the nature of the Good in the Republic and emerging in the Middle Ages via figures such as pseudo-Dionysius. Developed in the 13th century and onward also in relation to the Islamic and Jewish mystic traditions, medieval apophaticism is typified in the works of Marguerite Porete, Meister Eckhart, the anonymous English Cloud of Unknowing, and Nicholas of Cusa (continuing post-Reformation most prominently in the writings of Teresa of Avila and John of the Cross). During the centuries in which mysticism flourished as a form of religious expression and in which it (arguably) found its fullest form, however, apophaticism was a nondominant tradition that frequently flirted with heresy. This fact, of course, makes no difference for its philosophical plausibility; what does prove significant is that in advocating a selfless merging with an unknowable God as the ultimate end of human existence, apophatic mysticism assumes highly contentious premises about both God and human nature. Apophatic mystics tend to describe the spiritual life as a series of stages that we move through in a journey towards unknowing union with the unknowable divine. In this journey, one of the most important tasks is self-abnegation, or radical self-loss. In the Mirror of Simple Souls, for instance, Marguerite Porete explains how we can gain desired union with God through complete elimination of the conscious self: All things are one for her [the Soul], without an explanation (propter quid), and she is nothing in a One of this sort. Thus the Soul has nothing more to do for God than God does for her. Why? Because He is, and she is not. She retains nothing more of herself in nothingness, because He is sufficient of Himself, because He is and she is not. Thus she is stripped of all things because she is without existence, where she was before she was created.27 27 Porete (1993: 218), translation slightly modified. As Barbara Newman notes in her discussion of VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 162 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 163 This stress on self-abnegation runs throughout Porete's work: such annihilation is essential for the sort of complete union with God she advocates. Meister Eckhart also frequently exhorts his listeners to detach themselves from all individual affections and desires, so that they can prepare themselves for the final act of self-abnegation. In Counsel 23, he states baldly: 'There is still one work [after the soul has detached itself from worldly concerns] that remains proper and his own, and that is annihilation of self.'28 It is often unclear in such texts precisely how to understand this sort of self-abnegation (is it meant to be understood literally or metaphorically, ontologically or phenomenologically?), but the stress on removing any sense of self that might impede complete union with God is consistent throughout the apophatic tradition.29 Given this emphasis on self-abnegation, it is not surprising that apophatic texts frequently caution their readers against taking unusual physical and emotional states to be signs of mystic union. Such states might indicate a sort of spiritual progress, but they are not themselves the goal of the contemplative life. Thus, in his late 14th-century The Scale of Perfection, Walter Hilton warns against accepting physical sensations as signs of true mystic union, whether 'in sounding of the ear, or savoring in the mouth, or smelling at the nose, or else [the sensation of] any perceptible heat as if it were fire, glowing and warming the breast' (1.10).30 This is a direct jab at Richard Rolle's earlier Fire of Love, which describes Rolle's mystical experiences as including physical warmth in his body (especially his chest), a sense of surpassing sweetness, and the sound of celestial music. The anonymous 14th-century Cloud of Unknowing takes aim at Rolle's 'fire of love' as well, cautioning that such experiences might even signal something sinister: 'For I tell thee truly that the devil has his contemplatives, as God has his' (ch. 45). Meister Eckhart, in turn, 'tartly condemn[s] those who want to see God with the same eyes with which they behold a cow'.31 Significantly, in all these cases, the God in whom we want to lose ourselves is characterised as utterly unknowable and (at least for Eckhart and Porete) beyond being itself. Experience of such a God necessarily transcends physical Porete's theory of self-abnegation: 'In this dissolution of the ego no room remains for the body: even the physical humanity of Christ is no longer cherished by the free soul' (Newman 2003: 203). Porete explicitly addresses the need to move past consideration of Christ's humanity in chapter 79. See also Hollywood (1995). 28 Counsel 23, Meister Eckhart, 280. 29 In extreme cases, apophatic mystics even saw self-abnegation as allowing for an identity of the mystic with God; when no egoistic self remains, one can be filled with God to the point where one becomes God. When the title character of the 14th-century 'Sister Catherine' treatise comes out of a mystic trance and says to her confessor: 'Sir, rejoice with me, I am become God!', she is not boasting of an ascendance to divinity but rather indicating that 'she' no longer exists, properly speaking. See 'The "Sister Catherine" Treatise', trans. Elvira Borgstädt, in McGinn (1986: 358). For further discussion of this treatise and also this general tradition, see McGinn (2005). For a book-length treatment of this topic (that focuses particularly on Meister Eckhart), see Morgan (2013). 30 Manuscript: Cambridge University Library MS Add. 6686, p. 284. 31 McGinn (1981: 61). The sermon referenced is Sermon 16b in Meister Eckhart (1936– : 272). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 163 20/11/2017 14:16 164 Christina van Dyke and affective experience: for most apophatics, it entails the loss of consciousness itself. Human beings thus find their end not just in separating their souls permanently from the body (a claim in direct contradiction with both a holistic conception of the human being and the doctrine of the resurrection of the body), but in perfecting the act of self-annihilation. The highest form of mystical union for the apophatic tradition is one in which neither human beings nor God exist in standard ways. In part because of this, apophaticism was never the leading mystical tradition in the medieval period. Instead, particularly during the 13th to 15th centuries, when the Western Christian contemplative movement was at its height, a more body-friendly and affective mysticism formed the dominant tradition, finding expression in a host of religious communities throughout Europe. In Section 10.3, I turn to this tradition. Contemporary discussions in analytic philosophy of religion ignore the reports of the vast number of people who claim to experience embodied states that connect them directly to the incarnate God. Whether this oversight results from ignorance of the relevant tradition or from adopting the problematically exclusionary conception of mystical experience discussed in Section 10.1, it represents precisely the sort of conceptual lacuna that historical philosophy is primed to correct. I thus offer this correction as the conclusion of my case study, turning in the final section (10.4) to a discussion of other benefits this historically based approach to philosophy yields-most notably, rich points of connection with disciplinary fields beyond our own. 10.3. Correcting via Complement: Embodied Mystical Experiences As we saw in Section 10.1, affective mysticism is often dismissed because of its association with the body and with emotions. This is, however, to miss the primary significance of such forms of connection with the divine. Human beings are physical and affective as well as intellective and volitional beings: our primary interaction with reality-created and divine-is physical. Whereas the apophatic tradition urges us to transcend those modes of interaction, the affective tradition encourages us to delve more deeply into them. Once we recognise the problematic prejudices that shaped the contemporary conception of mystical experience and the controversial philosophical assumptions underlying the apophatic exclusion of embodied experiences, we are in a position to see the rich history of embodied mystical experiences reported in the Middle Ages as offering a vital complement to the narrow range of religious experiences currently studied by analytic philosophers. As with the corrective approaches mentioned in Sections 10.1 and 10.2, this method is perfectly generalisable for any number of similar situations: contemporary discussions of love, of happiness, of persons, and so on, would all be enhanced by pulling back from the idiosyncratic foci of modern philosophy and incorporating insights from the past. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 164 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 165 In the case at hand, it is worth noting that the medieval emphasis on embodied contemplative experiences developed in part as a response to 12th-century gnostic movements that either denied or de-emphasised Christ's humanity and taught the need for purifying our immaterial souls from the inherently corrupt material realm. In other words, the push to transcend our bodies in apophatic mystical union was viewed as displaying an important misunderstanding of both God and human nature. In the mainstream contemplative tradition, figures as diverse in education, social status, and geographical location as Hadewijch of Brabant, Catherine of Siena, Richard Rolle, Marguerite of Oingt, Beatrice of Nazareth, Ida of Louvain, and Angela of Foligno viewed altered physical states (such as mystic death or bodily 'closure'), emotional states (such as uncontrollable weeping or laughter), and parasensory states (such as visions and auditions) not as distracting from true mystic union but as ways of experiencing a direct connection with the God who had become incarnate for us. One sign of this tradition's understanding of the properly spiritual subject as a holistic union of body and soul (as opposed to a soul seeking to rise above the material) is its reliance on the imagination. In the 13th century and onward, the imagination was generally taken to be the faculty of the human soul that stores phantasms (mental 'pictures' formed via information collected by the external senses) and then is able to combine those phantasms in both familiar and unfamiliar ways.32 In a popular spiritual exercise of the time, contemplatives were encouraged to imagine themselves present at key moments of Christ's life, particularly his Passion, the explicit purpose of which was to generate certain sorts of affective responses that would deepen the subject's devotion.33 This use of the imagination in spiritual exercises was also closely linked with the idea of 'spiritual vision' (visio spiritualis), a concept borrowed from the Augustinian Platonic tradition. In contrast both to the sort of material vision (via the eye) which is directed at physical objects and to the sort of intellective vision (via reason) which is directed at divine truths, spiritual vision is directed at images held in the imagination. As such, it mediates between our physical sense capacities and our intellective and volitional capacities; physical experiences and intellective experiences come together and are combined in significant ways in spiritual vision (also associated in this tradition with the 'inner senses' and the 'inner body'). In the affective mystical tradition, meditative exercises such as imagining oneself present at the Crucifixion allow the inner senses to undergo spiritual experiences with transformative physical and intellective/volitional effects. In the words of Niklaus Largier, such meditation 'helps construct an inner space that creates affectively embodied access to the divine'.34 32 For a clear exposition of how phantasms function in human cognition for Aquinas, whose view on this issue was extremely influential in this period, see MacDonald (1993). 33 For further discussion of this meditation and its use of the imagination, see Matter (2012). 34 Largier (2003). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 165 20/11/2017 14:16 166 Christina van Dyke Because strong emotion was closely linked both to bodies and to our ability to imagine things vividly (driving us to deeper devotion and closer communion with God), it was welcomed in forms of religious expression that celebrated the Incarnation. The mystical visions, auditions, smellings, tastings, and so on associated with such affect were not understood as the result of overexcited sensory capacities but as important spiritual experiences, and valued as such. As Patricia Dailey notes: The goal of affective mysticism is not to excite the outer body into a Bacchic frenzy, but to allow one's affective and thus embodied experience to stimulate the construction of the inner body and then to allow the heart, innards, or inner senses to speak and act through the outer body.35 Embodied mystical experiences were seen as connecting the human subject to God in ways that enhanced rather than abnegated our distinctive humanity: 'All Christ's members-eyes, breasts, lips and so on-were seen as testimony to his humanation, and the devout soul responded to this enfleshing with all its bodily capabilities.'36 Consider the following vision that Hadewijch of Brabant reports having during the celebration of the Eucharist (a particularly significant act in the affective tradition, since it involves a mystical physical connection between Christ and the person receiving the elements):37 With that he came in the form and clothing of a Man, as he was on the day when he gave us his Body for the first time ... and he gave himself to me in the shape of the Sacrament, in its outward form, as the custom is; and then he gave me to drink from the chalice, in form and taste, as the custom is. After that he came himself to me, took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to him; and all my members felt his in full felicity, in accordance with the desire of my heart and my humanity. So I was outwardly satisfied and fully transported ... [After a short time] I saw him completely come to naught and so fade and all at once dissolve that I could no longer recognize or perceive him outside me, and I could no longer distinguish him within me. Then it was to me as if we were one without difference. (Vision Seven)38 This account begins with a very physical sort of mystic union with Christ (via the inner senses): note that it is described as fulfilling the desire of her humanity. Even when she reports the later experience of being 'as if we were one without difference' with God, the metaphor at play is one of digestion: Christ has become one with her (and she with him) in the way that food and drink become one with us-part of our very being. 35 Dailey (2012: 269). 36 Walker Bynum (1991: 91). 37 Caroline Walker Bynum has written extensively on the significance the Eucharist takes on in the affective tradition; see the chapters 'The Body of Christ in the Later Middle Ages' and 'Women Mystics and Eucharistic Devotion in the Thirteenth Century' in Walker Bynum (1991). 38 Hadewijch (1980: 281). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 166 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 167 Although Hadewijch also frequently describes a loss of self in mystic union, she does so without downplaying the significance of affective and embodied experiences. This acknowledgment of the importance of physicality for human subjects is present in her metaphorical language as well. In one particularly striking depiction of union with the divine, for instance, she describes how complete union can also include eternal self-preservation: Where the abyss of his wisdom is, God will teach you what he is, and with what wondrous sweetness the loved one and the Beloved dwell one in the other, and how they penetrate each other in a way that neither of the two distinguishes himself from the other. But they abide in one another in fruition, mouth in mouth, heart in heart, body in body, and soul in soul, while one sweet divine nature flows through both and they are both one thing through each other, but at the same time remain two different selves-yes, and remain so forever. (Letter 9)39 A less developed but just as striking portrayal of this sort of physical and selfpreserving union is Marguerite of Oingt's vision in which she sees herself as a withered tree that is then watered by a stream that is Christ.40 Having drawn the 'living water' into herself, Marguerite then sees the names of the five senses written on her newly revived branches. In this way, she experiences both union with God, as the water fully penetrates the tree of her selfhood, and the preservation and flourishing of that self, in body as well as spirit. There is much more to be said on this topic, of course, and an extensive literature reporting affective and/or embodied mystical experiences that involve unmediated union with God. Even this brief discussion should be sufficient, however, to demonstrate that inclusion of these states would enrich and complement current philosophical discussions. As we have seen, even an exclusive focus on reports of unitive mystical experiences (as the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition addressed in Section 10.1 does) need not rule out embodied and affective mystical states. Ongoing debates in analytic philosophy concerning the nature and role of religious and mystical experiences would benefit from considering embodied mystical experiences together with those of selfless union-particularly in light of the spurious motivation undergirding their exclusion in the first place. 10.4. Philosophical Morals and Historical Stories So far in this chapter, I have focused on the corrective and complementary roles that a historically oriented approach can occupy in philosophical discussions. First, I have argued that analysis of the development of key definitions, concepts, principles, and so on, can often illuminate problematic prejudices that should motivate a re-examination of the philosophical considerations in their favour. Secondly, I have claimed that this re-examination should involve looking at the 39 Hadewijch (1980: 66). 40 Duraffour et al. (1965: 139). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 167 20/11/2017 14:16 168 Christina van Dyke relevant historical context in which the idea developed. Thirdly, I have demonstrated via the case study of medieval and modern conceptions of mystical experience that turning to the relevant historical context can sometimes provide viable philosophical resources with which to complement existing discussions. In this fourth and final section, I conclude by suggesting that this approach can also help philosophers engage in meaningful interaction with scholars working on similar topics in other disciplines. Consider again the example of the contemporary philosophical conception of mystical experience, which picks out a narrow swath of the sum total of reported mystical experiences, and which correspondingly restricts philosophical investigations of mysticism in general. As I noted in Section 10.1, this conception is specifically characterised as 'suiting more specialized treatments of mysticism in philosophy'41 for its focus on particular sorts of unitive experiences. But what about the addition of 'unitive' in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy definition makes it suited to philosophical examination? Basically, the fact that it picks out the particular range of experiences that philosophers became interested in over the course of the 20th century. As we saw, though, predispositions against women, bodies, and emotions played an important role in developing that focus.42 Not only is this lamentable on purely philosophical grounds, but it has also interfered with philosophers having productive conversations outside their own field. There is a vast literature on mysticism and mystical experiences by scholars in religious, medieval, and gender studies, for instance, as well as in history and in the various languages in which medieval mystic texts were written. Careful studies of particular contemplative figures, general movements, and the nature of mysticism itself abound in these fields. And yet philosophers have distanced themselves from these resources and stuck to increasingly specialised discussions of idiosyncratic experiences. The recent Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism contains essays by twenty-two scholars at various career stages who represent thirteen distinct disciplines-and there is not a philosopher among them. The reason for this is simple: the 'philosophical' conception of mystical experience corresponds so poorly to what everyone else is talking about that there is almost no point in trying to engage in a common conversation. Philosophers excel at biting bullets, and this complete lack of engagement with other disciplines might be one that some would happily swallow. By this point in the chapter, however, I hope that it is clear what philosophy would lose out on as a result. As noted in Section 10.3, there exists a rich history of embodied and affective mystical experiences-and a correspondingly rich secondary 41 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mysticism (accessed 11 October 2017). 42 There is also a contemporary focus on distinguishing true from false mystic experiences, which belies epistemological concerns that mystics themselves largely do not express. The idea that it would somehow be easier to determine whether a superor sub-sensory unitive experience is veridical than whether an embodied mystical experience is veridical, however, seems to me to betray precisely the sort of distrust of the body, emotions, and the people most likely to report having these experiences that makes the contemporary definition problematic in the first place. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 168 20/11/2017 14:16 WHAT HAS HISTORY TO DO WITH PHILOSOPHY? 169 literature on these experiences in any number of other disciplines-that could be used to enhance current philosophical discussions of mystical and religious experience. Realising this, however, requires doing historically informed work. The general applicability of this particular case study should be obvious: philosophy often paints itself into an ideological corner when it looks only to itself for insight. In any number of cases, it has arrived at a starved and impoverished version of the conversation current in broader cultural circles: about love, about happiness, about knowledge, about embodiment, and so on. Rather than congratulate ourselves for having figured out what 'really matters' and sticking to that, we would do well to interact with discussions happening in other fields-something we will only be in a position to do if we have first done the work of examining the historical underpinnings of our operating assumptions, correcting and complementing them as necessary.43 References Beckwith, S. (1993), Christ's Body: Identity, Culture, and Society in Late Medieval Writings (London, Routledge). Bordo, S. (1993), Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and the Body (Berkeley CA, University of California Press). Caciola, N. (2003), Discerning Spirits, Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages (Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press). Dailey, P. (2012), 'The Body and Its Senses', in A. Hollywood & P. Dailey (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 264–76. De Beauvoir, S. (1989), The Second Sex, trans. H.M. Parshley (New York, Vintage Books). Duraffour, A., Gardette, P., & Durdilly, P. (eds and trs) (1965), Les Oeuvres de Marguerite d'Oingt (Publications de l'Institut de Linguistique Romane de Lyon, 21; Paris, Belles Lettres). Eckhart, M. (1936–), Meister Eckhart: Die deutschen und lateinischen Werke, 13 vols, herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (Stuttgart & Berlin, Kohlhammer). Furlong, M. (2013), Visions and Longings: Medieval Women Mystics (Boston MA, Shambhala Publications). Gellmann, J. (2014), 'Mysticism', in E.N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/mysticism/ (accessed 11 October 2017). Grundmann, H. (1936), 'Die Frauen und die Literatur im Mittelalter: Ein Beitrag zur Frage nach der Entstehung des Schrifttums in der Volkssprache', Archiv für Kulturgeschichte, 26: 129–61. 43 Many thanks to Marcel van Ackeren for the invitation to write on this topic, which has long interested me, and to Lee Klein for her assistance and patience in its completion. I also owe gratitude to audiences at the University of South Carolina, the 2016 Pacific American Philosophical Association (APA), the Classical Theism Workshop at the University of St. Thomas, and the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics for helpful feedback on various versions of this chapter. Finally, a special note of thanks to Andrew Arlig and Adrian Currie for detailed comments on the penultimate version. VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 169 20/11/2017 14:16 170 Christina van Dyke Hadewijch. (1980), The Complete Works, trans. Mother Columba Hart, OSB (New York, Paulist Press). Hollywood, A. (1995), The Soul as Virgin Wife: Mechtild of Magdeburg, Marguerite of Porete, and Meister Eckhart (Notre Dame IN, University of Notre Dame Press). Hollywood, A. (2012), 'Introduction', in A. Hollywood & P. Dailey (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 5–8. James, W. (1958), The Varieties of Religious Experience (New York, Mentor Books). Jantzen, G. (1995), Power, Gender, and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). Knowles, D. (1948–9), The Religious Orders in England (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press). Largier, N. (2003), 'Inner Senses-Outer Senses: The Practice of Emotions in Medieval Mysticism', in C. Jaeger and I. Kasten (eds), Emotions and Sensibilities in the Middle Ages (Berlin & New York, de Gruyter), 3–15. Lerner, R. (1972), The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages (Berkeley CA, University of California Press). MacDonald, S. (1993), 'Theory of Knowledge', in N. Kretzmann & E. Stump (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 160–89. McGinn, B. (1981), 'Introduction', in E. Colledge & B. McGinn (eds), Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense (Mahwah NJ, Paulist Press). McGinn, B. (ed.) (1986), Meister Eckhart: Teacher and Preacher (New York, Paulist Press). McGinn, B. (2005), The Presence of God: A History of Western Christian Mysticism, vol. 4: The Harvest of Mysticism in Medieval Germany (1300–1500) (New York, Herder & Herder. Matter, E.A. (2012), 'Lectio Divina', in A. Hollywood & P. Dailey (eds), The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), 147–56. Mercer, C. (2017), 'Descartes' Debt to Teresa of Avila, or Why We Should Work on Women in the History of Philosophy', Philosophical Studies 174 (10): 2539–55. Mooney, C. (ed.) (1999), Gendered Voices (Philadelphia PA, University of Pennsylvania Press). Morgan, B. (2013), On Becoming God: Late Medieval Mysticism and the Modern Western Self (New York, Fordham University Press). Newman, B. (2003), God and the Goddesses (Philadelphia PA, University of Pennsylvania Press). Porete, M. (1993), The Mirror of Simple Souls, trans. E.L. Babinsky (New York, Paulist Press). Underhill, E. (1911), Mysticism: A Study of the Nature and Development of Man's Spiritual Consciousness (Grand Rapids MI, Christian Classics Ethereal Library). Underhill, E. (1920), The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays (New York, Dutton). Walker Bynum, C. (1988), Holy Feast and Holy Fast: 7KH5HOLJLRXV6LJQL¿FDQFHRI)RRG to Medieval Women (Berkeley CA, University of California Press). Walker Bynum, C. (1991), Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York, Zone Books). VAN ACKEREN 9780197266298 PRINT.indd 170 20/11/2017 14:

International Journal of Complementary & Alternative Medicine Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness Submit Manuscript | http://medcraveonline.com Volume 4 Issue 1 2016 1Charitable Medical Healthcare Foundation, USA 2Augusta University, USA 3Medical Illustration, Augusta University, USA *Corresponding author: Ravinder Jerath, Charitable Medical Healthcare Foundation, 2100 Central Avenue 7, Augusta, GA 30904, USA, Tel: 706-288-4189; Email: Received: June 3, 2016 | Published: July 06, 2016 Review Article Int J Complement Alt Med 2016, 4(1): 00105 Abbreviations: PFC: Prefrontal Cortex; LGN: Lateral Geniculate Nucleus; ANS: Autonomic Nervous System; DPFC: Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; TM: Transcendental Meditation; DMN: Default Mode Network; EEG: Electroencephalogram Introduction In philosophy and neuroscience alike, it is not understood how the brain functions to form the mind [1,2]. The brain is a physical organ that can be touched and tested, yet the mind is a substance that has no physical qualities that can be examined objectively. Although brain imaging can highlight physical aspects of the areas that function when completing tasks or during various conscious states, there are currently no viable tests that can look into the global inner complexities of the mind. The mind is experienced subjectively but has proven difficult to explain objectively because we lack a definition that can do more than merely describe its function [3]. Consciousness and the mind are often used as synonyms, neglecting to connect the neurobiological aspects to how the physical elements that comprise the brain form the subjective and experiential "I" [3]. Current prevailing theories and concepts in neuroscience and philosophy consider consciousness to be separate from the body. This problem arose when Rene Descartes proposed in the 1600s [4] that the mind and body are two entities-independent from one another, a concept commonly referred to as Cartesian dualism [3,4,5]. Descartes proposed that the mind and body are incapable of existing in unison because the physical body could not 'think' but the immaterial mind can, thereby forcing a person to exist in two perspectives simultaneously-one physically in the body and one mentally in the mind [4]. Similar to Cartesian dualism, theories such as biological reductionism, physicalism or materialism, and the philosophy of mind [6] all consider the body as separate from the mind, defining the mind only as a function of the brain. These theories suggest one is at the mercy of what the brain believes to exist versus its interpretation of what it thinks exists, reducing the person to simply a giant brain with synapses which does the thinking, feeling, and decision making [6]. However, these theories fail to explain how the mind is capable of doubting the stimuli it receives from the body, searching for a truth or certainty, which is evidence of a thinking mind, independent from bodily stimuli received by the brain [5]. Current theories on consciousness lack explanation about how the brain functions as the mind. We propose that the mind and body function as one unified entity, based on the phenomenon of fast dynamic brain-body oscillations that impart a dual combined experience of 'Self ' with external and internal space, thus allowing the mind and body the ability to think and act together as one unified being. This may be explained such that while in utero, a neural network was formed through retinal and brain oscillations which allowed the brain and retina to communicate as one entity [7-10]. This unified space is the 3D default space that Abstract Our experiences with the external world are possible mainly through vision, hearing, taste, touch, and smell providing us a sense of reality. How the brain is able to seamlessly integrate stimuli from our external and internal world into our sense of reality has yet to be adequately explained in the literature. We have previously proposed a three-dimensional unified model of consciousness that partly explains the dynamic mechanism. Here we further expand our model and include illustrations to provide a better conception of the ill-defined space within the self, providing insight into a unified mind-body concept. In this article, we propose that our senses "super-impose" on an existing dynamic space within us after a slight, imperceptible delay. The existing space includes the entire intrapersonal space and can also be called the "the body's internal 3D default space". We provide examples from meditation experiences to help explain how the sense of 'self ' can be experienced through meditation practice associated with underlying physiological processes that take place through cardio-respiratory synchronization and coherence that is developed among areas of the brain. Meditation practice can help keep the body in a parasympathetic dominant state during meditation, allowing an experience of inner 'self '. Understanding this physical and functional space could help unlock the mysteries of the function of memory and cognition, allowing clinicians to better recognize and treat disorders of the mind by recommending proven techniques to reduce stress as an adjunct to medication treatment. Keywords: Meditation; Transcendental consciousness; Default space Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 2/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. allows us to experience an internal representation of the external environment. In the following sections we discuss the purpose of brain oscillations in consciousness, and further explain the formation of our previously proposed 3D default space theory, see [11]. Brain oscillations and the 3d default space We consider brain oscillations dynamic because sensory and cortical information is organized around the thalamus which allows us to experience the external world. Alpha, gamma, retinogeniculo-cortical, and corticothalamic oscillations are essential in forming the 3D default space because they allow constant and continuous communication between the brain and the body-without them, we do not think that consciousness can emerge. Alpha oscillations vibrate at 8-14 Hz, strongly influencing brain activity [12,13] are the dominant oscillations (at 10 Hz) [14]; 2) are fundamental in central nervous system functioning [15]; and 3) are more powerful when one is relaxed with closed eyes or in a dark environment [14,16]-which suggests is the constituent for visuospatial consciousness that is formed, giving us binocular vision [17]. Gamma-band oscillations vibrate at a frequency of 28-48 Hz [15], but those greater than 30 Hz are important for the neural coding during cognitive processes, and in the visual cortex they are associated with fixed patterns of eye movement [18]. Sustained visual stimulation induces gamma oscillations to be in the range of 50-70 Hz [19]. Furthermore, gamma oscillation synchronization is essential in many brain functions including: 1) cortico-cortical communication occurs at 30-100 Hz [13,15,20]; 2) neural integration for cognitive functioning [15]; and 3) visual information organization and analysis [18]. It is through these fast alpha and gamma oscillations that we suggest an 'internal' neural space is formed, providing an infrastructure for visual consciousness. Neuronal synchronization with the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) through oscillations at 60-120 Hz is indicated by oscillatory activity in the retina, LGN, and cortex [21,22], which allows the brain and retina to receive and process visual stimuli as one organ. These retinogeniculocortical oscillations assist in the formation of the dynamic template that reduces external space into our internal world space we call the 3D default space. These fast oscillations and the fast synchronization allows the external stimuli to be processed by the thalamus and projected back to the sensory organ that received the stimulus, giving us the impression of an immediate processing of the external world. This process, which is already in place when we are born, continues to mature as we gain understanding of the external world [7-10,23]. Oscillations connect the entire brain with sensory input, process the information, and 'feed' that information to the thalamus to allow the experience of consciousness. The mindbody space that we have termed the 3D default space, serves as a template for the external space through corticothalamic oscillations that actively links together the senses in order for us to experience them moment to moment, allowing us to respond to them through the cognitive and intuitive activity of the brain. The sensory information received from the eyes, ears, skin, and nose is perceived internally via corticothalamic feedback oscillations that are viewed from the inside, but perceived as outward experiences, allowing us to experience and interact with the world around us. This process integrates the external world within our mind-body space with our senses. In the next section, we highlight the process of evoked potentials that show that the way we see light or hear sound is a few microseconds after the light waves and sound waves, respectively, are converted to neural signals. A proposed theory of the formation of the 3d default space The human body contains nearly 4 trillion cells electrically charged [24] and integrated via: 1) pre-existing oscillations formed in utero that continue to develop post-birth, [7-9,12,23]; and 2) retinal processes that are constantly oscillating with the cortex. Retinogeniculo-cortical oscillations, e.g., alpha at 8-14 Hz, beta at 15-30 Hz, gamma at 30-100 Hz, and high gamma at 60-200 Hz [12,13,15,20,25] are the constant and continuous communication between the retina and the brain, allowing images to be processed in the brain immediately upon entering the eyes, which we suggest create the final images we see as the world outside of us (the external world). The thalamus acts as a central hub, 'senses' electrical activity from the brain [11], and 'sees/experiences' the external world from the inside out. Furthermore, this experience is from the perspective of a tiny microscope that has magnified the information. All the incoming information received from internal stimuli or external stimuli is structured and organized around the thalamus, is magnified, and defaults into the 3D default space, which allows us to experience external events taking place all around us in real-time. The thalamus integrates the cortical faculties with external sensory stimuli, helping to amplify and intensify the initial information to allow the senses to work at the periphery (e.g., photoreceptors for vision, organ of corti for hearing, skin for touch receptors, tongue for taste, and nose for smell), and ignoring the internal 3D default space-which doubles as a mirror of external space. The thalamus receives: 1) sensory information from the eyes, ears, and skin by way of cranial and peripheral nerves, and 2) visceral information via the autonomic nervous system (ANS) and brain stem. Sensory information is converted to electrical, neural, and chemical signals [26-31], in a matter of microseconds [32-40], supporting the theory that our internal and external view of the world is processed at different temporal rhythms. We propose that all of these integrated cells and retinogeniculo-cortical oscillations form a 3D default space around the thalamus, providing the brain and body a place to solidify all incoming information entering the brain (Figure 1). The eyes contain approximately 100 million photoreceptors (rods and cones) [41], of which we suggest about half (~50 million) are dedicated to amplifying and intensifying light that enters the eye [42,43]. We see the external world through these ~50 million "tiny eyes". It is proposed that all the retinal photoreceptors are merged via various retinal layers, i.e. the inner and outer plexiform layers, and other neural cells such as the amacrine Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 3/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. cells [44-48]. We see the magnified representation of the initial image from close proximity, not unlike seeing images through a microscope or pair of binoculars. This electrical magnified representation of the primary image is instantaneously processed via lateral inhibition, to impart what we perceive as the visual field within the length and breadth of the retina. This processed image is indistinguishable from what we call the external visual field and vision, and we suggest that this mechanism underlies the phenomena of after-images, color inversion, binocular image, and the appearance of a 3D image from a flat picture. Additionally when the eyes are closed, foveation further develops the 3D default space. The merged foveae, when viewed from the LGN level, carry a magnified view of both retinas [44], and this internal view of the retinal response serves as the internal visual fields within our internal visual consciousness [17]. This visual information is then received through the fovea and retina, processed through the corticothalamic feedback loops, and sent to the thalamus-which receives the information and its retinal integration via the corticothalamic feedback loops, inserting the information into the 3D default space so one can process and react to the visual stimuli we receive (Figure 2). Some researchers in neurobiology broach the idea that the brain-mind-reality is inseparable because the brain is interconnected within itself. In addition, the brain is able to form a cohesive unity between it and the outside world through sensory input and nerve integration [49]. This supports our theory that the thalamus integrates information from the entire body and external environment to form a consciousness model that we have characterized as unified and three dimensional [17]. The 'self' and introspection The 'self ' has been described as a 'minimal self ' and a 'narrative self ', providing us a first person perspective and a third person perspective, respectively. First person perspective uses the 'I' pronoun, and is the source of thoughts, actions, and body ownership, while the third person perspective uses the 'Me' pronoun, linking together past, present, and future. If this narrative self is disrupted, amnesia occurs [1]. Although the scientific usage of introspection is controversial, it has been shown that neural activity related to introspection networks "obtain immediate information about processing in primary consciousness networks..." seen in "...sensory and motor events, as well as intention" [50]. However, it is argued that introspection does not make us aware of something we are not already aware of it only allows us to directly focus on something that peripherally we were already aware of [51]. Immanuel Kant said, "Introspection exhibits to consciousness even ourselves only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves" [50]. Furthermore when one introspects, he/she only knows what it is like to be in that state for him/her, along with an awareness of the opportunity for introspection [51]. Some even gain the ability to tune into one's "self" through meditative practice, as discussed in the next section. Experiencing the 'self' through meditation Meditation techniques have been practiced for centuries due to the many benefits provided. Not only does meditation facilitate the ability to remain calm and in control of emotions during stressful situations, it also helps one to gain a better understanding of one's 'self ' or presence in reality [52]. Meditation may be thought of as a voluntary practice altering state of mind in the direction of pure consciousness [53]. The process of meditation activates the brain's prefrontal cortex (PFC) increasing levels of free glutamate in the brain [50,54]. This stimulates the production of betaendorphins which increases the levels of serotonin. Functional MRIs have identified regions of the brain that are activated during simple meditative practices (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DPFC), parietal cortex, hippocampus, temporal lobe, anterior cingulated, striatum, and pre-/post-central gyri) including default mode network (DMN) activity that is altered during meditation [55]. This has helped identify the activation of neural structures that are involved in attention and autonomic nervous system control [49]. Figure 1: The Body's Internal 3D Default Space. The internal 3D default space is the intrapersonal space that forms the 3D default space, forming the subconscious mind-body space. We are normally unaware of this 'dark' space, which is unequivocally "internal" because our brain can only perceive the neural signals from external and internal senses. This internal 3D default space automatically orients us with time, space, and direction, allowing us to understand these elements. We unconsciously use this 3D default space to incorporate external stimuli with internal stimuli to experience the external world, allowing us to behave as one unified being. Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 4/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. Figure 2: The 3D Default Space' and the Visual Fields. Figure A: The body's intra-personal space, which appears dark and without and boarders from allocation when viewed internally with the eyes closed. The retinal, geniculate, and cortical pathways synchronize when the eyes are closed and integration of these pathways allows for an internal vision that forms a default template for external visual space within. Figure B: Shows the seamless merging of binocular vision when viewed from behind the eyes at the level of the thalamus. It resembles the external visual fields in space when the eyes are opened, the external space with the objects are seen with the correct distances automatically in place. Figure C: Shows the afterimage demonstrating that we carry the external world within our minds. When we see an image and close our eyes, we continue to see that image. But if we turn our heads, we see the image in the direction our head faces. However, when we open our eyes we realize the external image is not where we see the internal image because the external image did not move with us, only our internal image moved. Attention, emotion, and imagery are created by hippocampal connections in the PFC, amygdala, and hypothalamus [56]. When the PFC is activated, increased levels of free glutamate signal the hypothalamus to release the neurotransmitter, beta-endorphinknown for attenuating fear and pain, and producing emotions of joy and euphoria [57]. When thoughts stimulate the amygdala, the amygdala stimulates the hypothalamus and the parasympathetic system [58]. Respiration and heart rate may slow down during meditation, inducing the feelings of calmness and relaxation, causing reduced locus coeruleus activity. This decreases hypothalamus stimulation, and decreases the hormonal activity associated with stress (e.g. corticotrophin-releasing hormone, adrenocorticotropic hormone, and cortisol) [48,56]. As a result, levels of arginine vasopressin are reduced, decreasing both peripheral vascular resistance and arterial blood pressure [58]. These physiological changes facilitate maintenance of positive feelings, "self-perceived arousal," and promote consolidation of new memories and learning [49]. Transcendental consciousness, or pure consciousness, the simplest form of awareness, is thought to be a 'self-referral' state, in which the observer is only aware of himself / herself and is not aware of any object or thought outside of the 'self ' [59]. For practitioners of Transcendental Meditation (TM), this unbounded experience may become clearer with practice. Brain wave electroencephalogram (EEG) patterns that define experiences during TM-and the integration of such experiences with other consciousness stateshave been found primarily in the frontal brain areas [60]. TM practice has been shown to decrease respiration rates and increase cardio-respiratory synchronization, resulting in the body's shift to a parasympathetic dominant state. This shift subsequently balances and regulates the activity between the autonomic nervous system and the amygdala [61]. Some meditation practices result in a passive relaxed state, and EEG measurements suggest that techniques such as 'mindfulness meditation' and open monitoring tend to produce an active relaxed state that is "associated with cognitive restructuring and learning" [62], but these states are markedly different from that of pure consciousness. Additionally, EEGs have shown that 'segmented breathing' and 'relaxation response' techniques can cause "high amplitude, low frequency" cardiorespiratory oscillations, resulting from "respiratory sinus arrhythmia" and an increased connection between heart rate and breathing. EEGs have shown that the 'breath of fire' technique that requires a moderate amount of conscious control, results in increased heart rate and decreases the connection between heart rate and breathing [63], that again are different experiences from pure consciousness. Zazen practitioners focus on attention on detachment from the thinking process to minimize thoughts, which has been shown to "enhance automatic memory, emotion processing, reduce conceptual thinking, and reduce judgmental self-referencing," along with "health, well-being and happiness" Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 5/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. [53,64]. The experience of pure consciousness [59] is identified as a fourth major state of consciousness [65]. Transcendental experiences have been reported during the practice of TM [60] such that the mind 'transcends' mental activity to experience the ground state of consciousness which is characterized by unbounded space and time. During TM, physiological changes have been shown to correspond with a least excited state of consciousness. This state can be experienced even by novice practitioners [1,65,66]. The TM technique is characterized by automatic self transcending and requires minimum cognitive control. The subject/object relationship is different in this state when compared to waking, sleeping, and dreaming, as the sense of personal 'self ' is expanded with meditation practice [60] to an unbounded cosmic sense of 'Self '. Not only do these experiences last several seconds and occur spontaneously throughout the experience, they are also marked by: 1) slow inhalation, 2) autonomic orientation at the onset of breath changes, and 3) heightened alpha 1 (8-10 Hz) frontalcoherence [60]. It has been suggested that daily practice of TM promotes higher states of consciousness. These states are marked by the coexistence of alpha 1 EEG with delta EEG during deep sleep, higher brain integration, greater emotional stability, and decreased anxiety during challenging tasks [60]. During Tibetan Buddhist Meditation, a practitioner's experiences of mindful awareness of space could be the result from increased activity in the DLPFC and superior parietal lobe nexus [54]. Mindfulness meditation helps the practitioner to increase attention and memory functions, which allows the person to remember "experiences efficiently-without forgetfulness or distraction, and in the appropriate context," [67]. Skilled practitioners of mindfulness meditation have reported experiencing their body merge with time and space into a single, combined conscious experience. During TM, a skilled practitioner can seem to experience a lack of spatial borders and perception of time resulting in the experience of an infinite expansion of space [68]. With practice of mindfulness meditation, conscious controls involving self-referential processing bring about alterations in the sense of time and space, and are related to an altered sense of body [68]. Meditation and the 3D default space These examples from various meditation experiences may help explain the 3D default space. Meditation practice can alter a person's state of consciousness and the DMN activity may change via PFC activation [54,49,53,55]. PFC activation affects attention, emotions, feelings of fear and pain, feelings of calmness and relaxation, hormonal activity, and physiological changes in blood pressure and vascular resistance because of: 1) increased levels of free glutamate and beta-endorphins, 2) cardio-respiratory synchronization, and 3) regulation of the central nervous system and amygdala, among others. The sensory organs convert external physical energy (i.e. light, sound, and temperature) and mechanical energy (e.g. touch) into electrochemical signals that are processed via the corticothalamic system, while integrating our emotions and feelings among our heart, lungs, and visceral organs with our limbic system. The state of the sympathetic dominant system or parasympathetic dominant system constantly influences our central nervous system in the 3D default space, as we experience changes in consciousness. Daily meditation sessions can culture the body toward a parasympathetic dominant state, allowing a person to be more in tune with their inner 'self '. The 3D default space is the intrapersonal space which serves to form a concept of 'consciousness' [11], and may hold the secrets to all that we are. This interactive space is created by the fast oscillations that form the subconscious mind-body space that normally we do not consciously detect [69], but it is ready to interact with the external world at any moment to entertain the sensory information received through the sensory organs. The 3D default space provides the infrastructure for all senses, but even without sensory perceptions, oscillations still occur [69]. However, when the eyes are closed (Figure 2), this space is experienced internally as a transcendental and borderless space, being described as a deeply silent 'self-referral' state experienced in meditation [60]. The experience of transcendental consciousness, during meditation practice, is described as a state of inner wakefulness with no object of thought or perception, and is a step in the sequence of development of higher states [70]. Maintaining transcendental consciousness in activity as well as dreaming and sleeping, is thought to be indicative of 'cosmic consciousness' [71]. Alternating transcendental consciousness with the ordinary waking state refines and habituates the nervous system to maintain a 'cosmic consciousness'. With practice, one may develop the ability to spontaneously maintain transcendental consciousness at the deepest level of the mind, even while the mind is engaged in feeling and thinking activity [72]. Meditation has shown to be effective in stress reduction, anxiety reduction, increasing serotonin and melatonin, improving immune function, improvement in symptoms related to irritable bowel syndrome, and many other disorders including those related to stress [73-79]. Therein lies the importance of understanding this dynamic 3D default space-to understand how we can tap into its ability to control subconscious and unconscious aspects of our minds and possibly better treat mood disorders and stressrelated disorders. Evidence supports a model of higher consciousness that includes lucid dreaming, and 'witnessing' transcendental consciousness during both dreaming and deep sleep states [71]. An example is 'Cosmic Consciousness', an all encompassing awareness of Nature and the order of the universe, possessed by those who are 'enlightened'. We suggest that such higher states of consciousness are a natural development of long-term meditation practice facilitated by regular daily experience of transcendental consciousness. Self Consciousness, the awareness of being aware in the state of transcendental consciousness is central to the theory of higher states of consciousness and is the basis on which all higher stages of development take place [80]. The deep inward journey that takes place in transcendental consciousness may seem infinite, and meditators cannot see or feel borders during the 'self ' experience. In the next section, we will further develop the theory that relates this experience to the visual and non-visual space processed by the thalamus. Purpose of the 3D default space The concept of consciousness suggests there is a relationship between the mind and the world. The phenomenon of consciousness is highly organized. It is where the brain and Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 6/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. body interactions allow for precise communication between them to "condense" the external world into our awareness and perception. Our theory defines the internal 3D default space as material space, albeit abstruse within our brain and entire body, which houses our emotions, allowing them a place to develop and solidify. This space holds the secret to our internal universe. It is within this space that we become aware of both external sensory information (vision, sound, and touch), with internal sensory information (emotions and feelings), (Figure 1). The sensory organs are in direct contact with the external world and information obtained from them enters via specific nerves and is processed via the corticothalamic system, resulting in magnification, amplification, and intensification of the primary stimulus at the sensory organs. Thus, we experience the external world through stimuli (internal and external) that is first processed through the cortex and projected into the thalamus through the corticothalamic feedback loops prior to conscious awareness [81,82]. This integrated combination of information from our mind and body forms a single, unified entity termed the 3D default space, (Figure 1). The framework for this space is created through: 1) integration of layers of neural activity from the unconscious, subconscious, and conscious [69], and reciprocal communication between the heart and brain [83]. The unconscious perception of communication between the heart and brain is known as intuition [83,84]. Evidence suggests that the heart receives information before the brain does, yet we are unaware of the receiving, processing, and decoding of information [49,84] because it occurs within a fraction of a second. When two events occur less than 40 milliseconds apart, they appear as occurring simultaneously because we cannot detect time intervals less than 40 milliseconds [85]. This demonstrates that what we think we see around us is not the actual external world, but rather a re-creation of it within our minds [11], and substantiates our suggestion that our view of the external world is a recreation. We suggest this is an indication that the external space defaults into internal cognition, unifying them in the 3D default space [11]. Furthermore, the 3D default space has its own influence, and the corticothalamic synchronization gives the final feedback projecting the final information into the 3D default space [11,69]. Neuroscience associates feelings primarily with the orbital cortex and the amygdala as the emotional center of the brain [85,86], but further research has shown that the cardio-respiratory evoked potentials are also part of those emotions, often creating them [83,88-90]. This suggests that although the brain, heart, and lungs are separate organs they communicate through oscillations and the nervous system. We define various aspects of this 3D default space as having visual and non-visual components, and spatial coordinates such as anterior, posterior, lateral, superior, and inferior. We suggest that all cells of the body and their integration by the central nervous system helps unify the mind and body through cardio respiratory oscillations [69], into a space that integrates this information for perception as consciousness. The cellular anatomic events form a peripheral aspect that synchronizes with its counterpart within the central nervous system. The micro and macro levels of organization are important for continued study because we suggest that at the macro level, the body's ~4 trillion cells behave as the "I". The sensory stimulus originating at the eye is magnified via corticothalamic feedback loops then back to the level of the retina and eye (as is with the ears for sound and skin for touch). We propose that from the central thalamic level all external senses directly percept the external space, allowing us to function as a unified person separate from our relationship to the external world, while internally being provided an internal view from the thalamus that orients us with an external mirage of what is happening internally. Although we are unaware of the 3D default space, we unconsciously use it to incorporate information from the external world and information from within our body to experience the external world. Since visceral organs continuously transmit afferent neural signals to the brain, it is possible for a person to become consciously aware of the processes taking place within their body [91]. Those who have interoceptive awareness can perceive sensations from within the body to understand their own feelings and emotions [92]. The 3D default space can be thought of as a large, interconnected, intra-personal space that internally appears as "one" during introspection. Sensory impulses and internal visceral sensory impulses are processed in parallel by the brain in one large default space; however, we perceive these signals distinctly separate from each other. Memory Space Some findings suggest that the hippocampus, cortex, and thalamus are significant areas of the brain for memory [9398], while other research suggests the role of the hippocampus in working memory is controversial [99,100], or that the hippocampus is involved in the creation of the memory space, spatial maps, and navigation [97]. We suggest that the 3D default space is pre-existing and is represented by all the cells in the body. This space includes the anterior, posterior, lateral, superior, and inferior parts of our intra-personal space as it relates to the thalamus, and this infrastructure is mapped by the networking of the hippocampus and parietal lobes, both of which are essential parts of the default memory correlates. We do not see the external space directly because it defaults into internal space to form memory space. The cortico-thalamic oscillations convert anatomy into functional memory space; therefore, we suggest that the 3D default space becomes the memory space within us that integrates internal and external stimuli so that sensory information can rise to consciousness, allowing us to be consciously aware of what our senses communicate with us about the external environment. We suggest that activity of the brain is geared toward the 3D default space, as the seat of memory. For visual space, it involves the retina, thalamus, and cortex, and for the rest of the non-visual space involves auditory perception and parietal cortices, along with the skin, muscles, and other contents of the intra-personal space, which is evident in patients with contralateral neglect and phantom limb syndrome. The recognition and application of the 3D default space in basic clinical sciences and study of the 'self ' because it may help explain how we reflect and understand our external environment. Clinical applications arising from our understanding of the 3D default space Understanding how the brain works as the mind can help Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 7/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. with many disorders, many of which are beyond the scope of this article. However, we can utilize the concepts of generalized anxiety disorder, contralateral neglect, and phantom limb syndrome to explain how important the 3D default space is in our everyday lives. Stress management via meditation has shown to be effective in treating anxiety a post traumatic stress [101-105]. Visits to primary care providers related to stress account for 60–80% of visits, yet few stress-related visits are accompanied by stress management counseling [106]. During 2006-2009 out of 33,045 physician office visits, stress management counseling was the least common type of counseling accounting for only 3% of the patients. Research has shown that stress can negatively affect health but cardio-respiratory synchronization via alternate nostril breathing techniques such as Pranayama [107,61] and meditation practice can help attenuate some of these symptoms associated with stress-related disorders and anxiety [108-110] due to the shift from a sympathetic state to a parasympathetic state [56,111]. Contralateral neglect syndrome and phantom limb syndrome are two examples that explain how we reflect and understand our external environment from an internal point of view. These disorders explain how internal damage to the brain can alter external perception, but external damage to the body only affects internal perception, respectively. This is supported by evidence that suggests that we do not need to have a sensory experience in order to have spatial orientation and memory, because the pre-existing oscillations in the hippocampus synchronize with the cortex and thalamus to generate spatial orientation without sensory cues [112]. Contralateral neglect and phantom limb syndrome are disorders that substantiate our main argument that we experience the external environment based on internal cues and perception. For example, cortico-thalamic activity linking all the senses together leads to specific memory that can be compromised by lesions in the right parietal cortex, leading to contralateral neglect, causing a person to be unable to process visual or somatic information relating to the left side of the body, including memories of that side [57]. The second disorder results from the loss of a limb and is known as phantom limb syndrome. Phantom limb syndrome results from sensory information still being active in the brain region associated with the missing limb, and when the eyes are closed, the mind still sees and feels the limb because the sensory neurons in the brain are still intact and sending signals, but when the eyes open, they see the limb is absent, resulting in the conflicting sensory information [113]. Both disorders are discussed next. In contralateral neglect, damage to the right parietal lobe can affect the brain's ability to process any information received from the left side of the body, including visual or somatic input [57]. Since the parietal lobe is responsible for spatial mapping, the information from the corticothalamic feedback loops is unable to reach the thalamus, preventing visual information from being spatially mapped. When the connection between the cortex and thalamus is lost in this manner, visual and somatic information from the left side are unable to reach the thalamus, and unable to enter into the 3D default space. As a result, a person with this disorder is unable to perceive any visual or somatic information of the left side of the body, including access to any memories involving the left side. This lack of perception also prevents a person from recognizing their left limb as their own, or from being able to correctly draw a completed picture, because they do not see the left side of objects [57]. Pain in an amputated limb is known as phantom limb syndrome. Since the thalamus has an internal picture of our body and all of its parts, the amputation of a limb only removes the physical limb, but the sensory connections in the brain devoted to the limb are unaffected, resulting in conflicting visual and sensory information being sent to the thalamus [57,113]. The 3D default space contains the memory of the limb, along with the sensations even though the eyes can see that the limb is no longer a part of the body. This causes confusion resulting in pain or sensations. The eyes no longer see the limb, but the sensory connections are still intact and continue processing sensory information through the corticothalamic feedback loops, ergo the cause of the pain [113]. Since the 3D default space within us is a proxy for the world outside, it unconsciously interacts with the contents of the external world, i.e. objects, color, music, touch, and smell without the awareness of the 'inner self '. We suggest that this is why neuroscientists and consciousness theorists are unable to distinguish the boundaries of where our bodies end and the external space begins. This concept is apparent in clinical syndromes such as phantom limb syndrome, and contralateral neglect [17,113]. Workings of the 3D default space include the subconscious, unconscious, and conscious aspects of the mind, but the interaction among the three has not been fully explored. Controlled clinical trials conducted on respiration, respiration frequency, and respiration depth provides evidence that meditation can shift the autonomic nervous system from a parasympathetic dominant state to a sympathetic dominant state [114]. This provides a rationale for guided stress-management techniques, such as meditation, as options of treatment. Conclusion In this article we have illustrated that, apart from brain activity, executive attention, and corticothalamic functions, the experience of consciousness can be partly defined by a continual awareness of our environment and the continued interconnectedness of arousal, awareness, and attention to stimuli [49]. We have proposed that the 3D default space is normally undetected by us, and forms the subconscious mind-body space. This space is unequivocally internal, as opposed to external, because the brain perceives the neural signals from external and internal sensesnot from external stimuli directly [31,82,115-117]. We suggest that the internal 3D default space exists for everyone-regardless of vision or hearing capabilities-automatically orienting us with time, space, and direction. This gives us the ability to understand those elements, and to behave as one unified being because sensory organs allow us to respond to external stimuli in a parallel fashion. A major constituent for our theory is the interaction among the thalamus, cortex, and periphery in one space-the 3D default space. Although there are currently no empirical tests to prove our theory, Citation: Jerath R, Cearley SM, Barnes VA, Jensen M (2016) Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness. Int J Complement Alt Med 4(1): 00105 DOI: 10.15406/ijcam.2016.04.00105 Meditation Experiences, Self, and Boundaries of Consciousness 8/11 Copyright: ©2016 Jerath et al. we use examples from anxiety, contralateral neglect, and phantom limb syndrome to provide real evidence of this vital presence. The thalamus and corticothalamic feedback loops coordinate and integrate all stimuli we are internally and externally bombarded with, integrating it into the 3D default space moment by moment, in order for us to react to our external environment. Further, it is only aware of the external senses, not of the coordination that must take place before it rises to consciousness. Once this information has risen to conscious awareness, it becomes the 'I'. 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No Brasil, a história testemunha quatro grandes tentativas de silenciar o pensamento e, principalmente, o ensino de humanidades: a primeira, os processos de conquistas material (domínio territorial e escravidão dos corpos de povos originários e africanos), espiritual (redução das populações à condição de bárbaros carentes de colonização, catequização, civilização e redução educacional) e simbólica (destruição e supressão completa dos vestígios culturais e históricos dos povos originários e africanos) que culminaram na imposição da cultura eurocêntrica totalitária em detrimento do dominium dos corpos e territórios pelas duas populações e consequente redução de seus corpos à condição de usum nos meandros da máquina escravocrata; a segunda, a expulsão dos jesuítas e o desmonte das estruturas de ensino no período colonial por obra do Marquês de Pombal não apenas colapsou o ensino quanto ocultou historicamente as fontes documentais por um longo período, além da recusa lusitana em estender o ensino de algumas faculdades à América Portuguesa; a terceira, a redefinição e/ou exclusão do ensino de ciências humanas durante a ditadura militar (1964-85) mediante a imposição de um sistema "militarizante" de conhecimento e a revisão completa dos conteúdos com permissão de ensino; enfim, a quarta encontrase em curso, por um lado, através da flexibilização da oferta de humanidades na forma de ensino a distância (EaD) imposta pela Base Nacional Comum Curricular (BNCC) e, por outro, a tentativa do atual ministro da Educação e do presidente que ameaçam cortar recursos das ciências humanas e sociais (em maio de 2019) em benefício de ciências que, segundo eles, teriam maior impacto social. Nesse cenário, complexo e diversificado, os autores dos escritos ora reunidos foram interpelados por esta questão: por que o Estado não suporta Sócrates? Contra Sócrates Série Filosofia Conselho Editorial ____________________________________________________________ Agemir Bavaresco Draiton Gonzaga de Souza Orci Paulino Bretanha Teixeira Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet Rosemary Sadami Arai Shinkai Norman Roland Madarasz Nythamar Hilário Fernandes de Oliveira Junior Fábio Caprio Leite de Castro Nelson Costa Fossatti Evandro Pontel Jair Inácio Tauchen Isis Hochmann de Freitas Contra Sócrates Lúcio Álvaro Marques (Organizador) Porto Alegre, 2019 Editora Fundação Fênix Direção editorial: Agemir Bavaresco Diagramação: Editora Fundação Fênix Capa: Editora Fundação Fênix Imagem da capa by https://md.uninta.edu.br/geral/filosofia-v2/ O padrão ortográfico, o sistema de citações, as referências bibliográficas, o conteúdo e a revisão de cada capítulo são de inteira responsabilidade de seu respectivo autor. Todas as obras publicadas pela Editora Fundação Fênix estão sob os direitos da Creative Commons 4.0 – Http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.pt_BR Série Filosofia – 08 Dados Internacionais de Catalogação na Publicação (CIP) ____________________________________________________________________ MARQUES, Lúcio Àlvaro (Org.). Contra Sócrates. MARQUES, Lúcio Álvaro (Org.), Porto Alegre, RS: Editora Fundação Fênix, 2019. 210p. ISBN – 978-65-81110-08-6 DOI – Disponível em: https://www.fundarfenix.com.br CDD-100 _____________________________________________________________ 1. Filosofia. 2 Educação. 3. Sócrates. 4 Ética. Índice para catálogo sistemático – Filosofia e disciplinas relacionadas – 100 7. UMA APOLOGIA DA FILOSOFIA Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid1 Este livro fala sobre a recepção da filosofia pela cidade. O objetivo deste capítulo é mostrar que a filosofia é essencial para a manutenção da segurança humana de nossas cidades. A importância dessa apologia da filosofia é justamente desfazer uma concepção comum, porém errônea, da natureza e das desvantagens dessa disciplina e fundamentar politicamente sua existência. Para fazermos isso, apresentaremos uma caracterização de filosofia e algumas das mais importantes críticas ao seu desenvolvimento no seio da cidade, e mostraremos que elas não se sustentam. Posteriormente, abordaremos o conceito de segurança humana, construído por Amartya Sen e Obuchi Keizo, e indicaremos como a filosofia é fundamental para a sua preservação. 1. Uma Caracterização de Filosofia Antes de começarmos a nossa apologia da filosofia, temos de ensaiar alguma caracterização, a fim de que o leitor saiba sobre o que estamos falando. Muitas definições e caracterizações de filosofia foram construídas ao longo da história da filosofia. A que apresentaremos tem a intenção de apreender a maior parte daquilo que foi desenvolvido sob essa nomenclatura. Falamos "a maior parte" em vez de "tudo", pois saber qual é a natureza da filosofia é, por si mesmo, um problema filosófico; e, dada a natureza argumentativa da filosofia, é possível que sempre consigamos algum contra-exemplo para qualquer definição ou caracterização que ensaiemos. De todo modo, diríamos que a filosofia é uma disciplina que tenta resolver problemas filosóficos. Mas falar desse modo seria circular, se não explicássemos o que são problemas filosóficos. Tais problemas são justamente aqueles só poderiam ser resolvidos por argumentação, e não por experimentos ou cálculos. Então, a filosofia seria a disciplina que investiga aqueles problemas que só poderiam ser solucionados (se é que o poderiam) argumentativamente. 1 Professor Adjunto de Filosofia na Universidade Federal do Amapá. Doutor e Mestre em Lógica e Metafísica (Filosofia) pelo Programa de Pós-Graduação em Lógica e Metafísica da UFRJ. 130 |Contra Sócrates É difícil fazer uma defesa dessa caracterização em tão poucas páginas, mas nossa intenção é que ela nos permita ver que há uma diferença entre a filosofia e as outras disciplinas no que diz respeito ao modo como se dão as suas investigações, ou que, pelo menos, podemos traçar essa distinção com finalidades pedagógicas. Falando de modo bem bruto, as ciências formais, como a aritmética e a geometria, podem resolver os problemas que investigam por meio de cálculos; enquanto as ciências empíricas, como a física e a química, podem resolver os problemas que investigam por meio de experimentos ou de alguma maneira empírica. Supostamente, as disciplinas das ciências humanas, como a história e a sociologia, e com exceção da filosofia, também resolvem seus problemas empiricamente; afinal, por exemplo, aceitamos certa historiografia em detrimento de outra quando há evidências empíricas a seu favor. Por outro lado, os problemas filosóficos não são solucionáveis por nenhum experimento possível e por nenhum cálculo que fizermos. Eles são problemas profundos, cuja solução geralmente é dependente da aceitação de certos princípios que, por sua vez, geram muita divergência e não poderiam ser aceitos sem que antes argumentemos cuidadosamente a favor deles. Enquanto a física pode provar que os corpos de tamanhos e pesos distintos não caem em velocidades distintas, ao apresentar dois corpos de tamanhos e pesos distintos que caem na mesma velocidade, não há experimento algum nem nenhum cálculo possível, para provar que roubar dos ricos para dar aos pobres é correto (ou incorreto)2. Para mostrarmos que algo é correto, precisamos defender uma concepção de bem, o que envolve defender certos valores morais, o que, por sua vez, envolve rejeitar o relativismo moral e assim por diante; e tudo isso só pode ser feito por meio de argumentação. Como provar que Deus existe? Como rejeitar que a vida tenha sentido? Como defender a obediência ou a desobediência às leis? Como defender que somos responsáveis por nossas ações? Todos esses problemas filosóficos não podem ser solucionados por cálculos e nem por nenhum experimento, e suas respostas envolvem uma construção teórica, sustentada em argumentos. O problema aqui é que parece que as outras disciplinas também são construções teóricas sustentadas por argumentos; afinal, trocamos uma teoria por outra, no domínio das ciências, por uma série de argumentos, de modo que se torna difícil uma 2 Leibniz discordaria de nós, por pensar que é possível criar um cálculo ou uma lógica, para resolver os problemas filosóficos simplesmente calculando. Tal cálculo nunca foi construído e nem temos em vista como construí-lo. Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 131 distinção precisa entre a filosofia e as outras ciências. Poderíamos tentar dizer que os argumentos científicos são construídos com premissas empíricas; mas, além de isso nem sempre ser o caso – como quando lidamos com ciências formais –, alguns argumentos filosóficos também usam premissas empíricas. Talvez aqui possamos apontar para o papel das premissas empíricas nos argumentos e dizer que, na filosofia, nenhuma premissa empírica resolve o problema que está sendo investigado. Poder-seia objetar que, nem nas ciências, uma premissa empírica sozinha resolve a questão, dado que toda observação pressupõe teoria e que, consequentemente, as premissas empíricas estão carregas de premissas não empíricas definicionais (a proposição observacional "esta folha é verde", por exemplo, pressupõe a definição de folha, isto é, pressupõe certa categorização e classificação). Além disso, conforme dissemos, as ciências formais ainda apresentam uma dificuldade, pois, nelas, as premissas empíricas certamente não resolvem a questão. E não está nada claro que seja possível realizar uma distinção fina entre cálculos e argumentos; afinal, o logicismo tentava sustentar que toda aritmética é redutível à lógica, de modo que os próprios cálculos seriam redutíveis a operações lógicas com teoria dos conjuntos. Sabendo disso tudo e sabendo do fracaso do logicismo, ousamos manter que há (ou que podemos traçar, ao menos para fins didáticos) algum tipo de distinção entre a argumentação no cálculo e nas ciências empíricas e a argumentação na filosofia. Até as questões das matemáticas e da física, quando se tornam questões últimas, de fundamentação argumentativa de seus pressupostos, passam a integrar a filosofia da matemática ou a filosofia da física. Como todas as ciências têm problemas que só poderiam ser resolvidos, se é que o poderiam, por argumentação, e não por experimentos ou cálculos, todas as ciências têm problemas filosóficos, de modo que há a filosofia da história, a filosofia da matemática, a filosofia da psicologia, a filosofia política, a filosofia do direito, a filosofia da biologia, a filosofia da medicina etc. 1. Como decidir se vírus e outros organismos são vida? A filosofia da biologia nos forneceria alternativas teóricas. 2. Existem, de fato, doenças ou são meras manifestações naturais do corpo, expressões de um sistema holístico? Essa seria uma investigação da filosofia da medicina. 3. Poderia uma função de onda da física ser a constituição fundamental da realidade? Essa seria uma questão para a filosofia da física. 4. Os testemunhos e documentos podem ser considerados fontes de conhecimento confiáveis na investigação histórica? Aqui a disciplina em causa seria a epistemologia da história. 5. Como as matemáticas parecem "funcionar" 132 |Contra Sócrates na realidade, se os objetos abstratos das matemáticas não existem concretamente na realidade? Essa seria uma questão clássica de filosofia da matemática. Essas são questões de fundamentação teória de cada uma dessas ciências, mas que são investigadas pelo filósofo daquela disciplina, que muitas vezes também é físico, matemático, psicólogo, historiador... Além das questões "retiradas" das ciências, a filosofia também tem as suas próprias questões. Podemos dividir a filosofia basicamente em três áreas filosóficas e uma área técnica, respectivamente: metafísica, epistemologia, teorias do valor e lógica. A lógica seria necessária como uma área técnica, já que é a disciplina que investigaria, entre outras coisas, a argumentação válida, e a filosofia seria uma disciplina intrinsecamente argumentativa. Se não soubermos como argumentar bem, nossos problemas não poderão ser adequadamente resolvidos. A metafísica, por sua vez, é uma investigação substantiva sobre aquilo que existe de mais fundamental na realidade; enquanto a epistemologia já é uma investigação sobre como adquirimos conhecimento sobre aquilo que existe na realidade. Nas teorias do valor, inseriríamos tanto a ética quanto a estética, mas faríamos a indicação de que parte da ética, a saber, a metaética (e seu correlato estético), é um misto de metafísica com epistemologia do valor, supostamente falando sobre o valor de modo não normativo, já que se pergunta sobre a existência e a conhecibilidade do valor moral; enquanto as outras partes – a ética normativa e a ética prática – são normativas, dado que discutem o critério pelo qual atribuímos valor às coisas e quais são as coisas têm valor, dizendo-nos assim como agir. Dentro das teorias do valor, enquanto a ética lidaria com o valor do bom e do mau, do correto e do incorreto, do justo e do injusto (de modo geral, com o permissível e o impermissível), a estética lidaria com o valor do belo e do feio (e seus correlatos) e se dividiria da mesma forma que a ética. Conforme aludimos, outras sub-áreas, como filosofia política, filosofia do direito, filosofia da educação, filosofia da física, filosofia da lógica etc., são disciplinas filosóficas compostas de questões de metafísica, de epistemologia, de teoria do valor e de consistência com relação às disciplinas de onde originalmente essas questões surgem, como a política, o direito, a pedagogia, a física, a lógica etc. É pelo fato de a filosofia ser composta de suas disciplinas próprias e por parte das questões de cada uma das ciências que ela tem a característica peculiar de construir uma visão de mundo – o que não é compartilhado por disciplinas como matemática, física, química ou história. Nossas respostas éticas e políticas se envolvem com nossas Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 133 questões metafísicas e epistemológicas, que têm implicações para questões estéticas, e assim por diante. A filosofia fornece-nos uma visão holística (talvez várias) do mundo que nos cerca e de nós dentro desse mundo. Cada uma das ciências nos dá apenas uma visão parcial da realidade: sobre as relações entre as quantidades, sobre o movimento, sobre as substâncias químicas ou sobre a história humana; porém nenhuma delas nos dá uma visão do mundo que vai desde a sua existência e a sua composição concreta e abstrata até a explicação da consciência, das ações e de Deus, se houver algum. A filosofia parece uma disciplina muito abrangente e de difícil precisão na distinção com outras disciplinas acadêmicas investigativas. Como nossa intenção aqui é somente fornecer uma caracterização didática, e não propriamente uma definição, a fim de que o leitor possa seguir conosco na argumentação pela fundamentalidade da filosofia na manutenção da segurança humana, não exauriremos esse tema, seguiremos com essa caracterização, tendo esclarecido suas maiores dificuldades. Afinal, ela permite uma distinção, ainda que imprecisa, entre a filosofia e as outras disciplinas que se dedicam à busca do conhecimento. Além disso, ela nos permitirá tanto abordar algumas críticas à filosofia quanto construir algumas respostas às mesmas. 2. Críticas à Filosofia (ontem e hoje) À primeira vista, não parece haver nada de mau com uma disciplina que investiga argumentativamente questões que só poderiam ser respondidas por meio da argumentação; mas, quando observamos a história da filosofia, percebemos que os filósofos por muitas vezes foram mal recebidos: desde os incêndios às escolas pitagóricas e a condenação de Sócrates à morte até a imolação de Giordano Bruno e as tentativas contemporâneas de desqualificar a filosofia e de removê-la do setor público. Se a filosofia, ainda hoje, sobrevive no seio da cidade, isso não é sem dificuldades. Os gregos antigos, criadores históricos da filosofia, foram os primeiros a tentar exterminá-la. Mas por que isso teria acontecido? E teriam eles boas razões? Caso eles não tenham boas razões, seriam boas as razões que se colocam atualmente contra a filosofia? Para respondermos tais questões, temos de realizar uma digressão e falar um pouco de um certo filósofo da Antiguidade: Sócrates, professor de Platão. Ele tem uma característica exemplar para a nossa discussão, pois a consequência da recepção de sua 134 |Contra Sócrates investigação filosófica pela cidade de Atenas foi sua condenação à morte. Na Apologia de Sócrates, de Platão (1997), Sócrates é julgado pelos supostos crimes de impiedade, que é o desprezo aos deuses da cidade, e de corrupção da juventude. E seus acusadores são Meleto, representante dos poetas (que, na sociedade grega da época, tinha um status religioso, dado que transmitiam os mitos sobre as divindades), Ânito, político e representante dos artesãos (de fato, ele era um dos líderes do partido democrata, o que dá certo peso político-partidário à condenação de Sócrates), e Lícon, na figura do orador. Como nos lembra Moraes (2018), a ideia que Platão parece querer passar é a de que o modo de investigação socrática abalou as estruturas de Atenas, por mostrar que as maiores autoridades da cidade são ignorantes de aspectos essenciais sobre aquilo que desenvolvem: por mostrar que um general não sabe o que é a coragem, que um rapsodo (que canta os mitos do poeta) não conhece sua técnica, que um religioso não sabe o que é a piedade (o bem). O problema da filosofia é que ela acaba por mostrar que somos muito mais ignorantes sobre as coisas de o que pensamos ser, e pior, acaba por mostrar que as autoridades em que geralmente confiamos são muito mais ignorantes de o que gostaríamos ou esperaríamos que elas fossem. Mostrar que as autoridades são ignorantes ou estão erradas é um mecanismo eficiente para ter o desprezo ou a fúria das autoridades, principalmente se estivermos em uma sociedade autoritária. Sócrates não estava em uma sociedade autoritária no estilo tirânico; de fato, sua sociedade era democrática para os cidadãos – homens livres –; mas era autoritária em outro sentido, dado que prescrevia a pena capital para crimes como impiedade e corrupção da juventude e dado que a condenação se deu por meio de provas circunstanciais e provavelmente (se Platão estiver descrevendo verdadeiramente o ocorrido) com a intenção política de exterminar alguém que deslegitimava a autoridade do discurso das autoridades. Por que Sócrates teria sido acusado de impiedade e corrupção da juventude? O que foi dito foi que Sócrates não ligava para as tradições da cidade e que não acreditava nos deuses, já que questionava pontos basilares das tradições. Além disso, ele conversava pela cidade com inúmeros atenienses, muitos deles jovens, que, impressionados pelas capacidades reflexivas socráticas, acabavam multiplicando seu tipo de investigação filosófica. De fato, Sócrates não pareceria ter nada contra os deuses da cidade, porém não se deixava limitar na reflexão, ainda que a reflexão fosse, por exemplo, sobre a relação voluntarista entre deus e o bem. A multiplicação da Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 135 investigação filosófica entre os jovens era pensada como corrupção da juventude, pois tais jovens chegavam a questionar os próprios fundamentos ontológicos, epistemológicos, éticos e políticos da cidade e da religião. Atualmente, no Brasil, parece que as coisas não mudaram tanto: intrigantemente, os acusadores da filosofia são praticamente os mesmos: uma parcela dos religiosos, uma parcela dos políticos (e, com eles, uma parcela da população trabalhadora) e uma parcela dos oradores, na forma de youtubers. Na Antiguidade, um filósofo foi julgado e condenado à morte em virtude de sua atividade de investigação filosófica. Desta vez, não apenas um filósofo está em julgamento, mas toda a disciplina da filosofia: no ensino médio, ela tornou-se opcional e, no ensino superior, há um debate sobre a relevância do seu financiamento público numa época de crise. O que certas autoridades estatais têm em mente é expurgar a filosofia (e algumas outras disciplinas) da máquina pública. O que elas pensam é que a filosofia possui uma doutrina política e religiosa específica, a saber, que ela é politicamente de esquerda (para alguns, comunista) e ateísta; e que sua existência no seio das universidades corrompe os jovens, ao fazê-los aceitar uma ideologia que vai contra os valores morais e religiosos da sociedade e os influencia a abandonarem suas tradições. Mais de 2500 anos se passaram e, guardadas as devidas proporções, as críticas e os acusadores são basicamente os mesmos que se colocavam contra Sócrates. Embora os contextos sejam distintos e talvez também o modo como a filosofia é feita, há algo que permanece o mesmo no fundamento das críticas de seus acusadores passados e contemporâneos, a saber, a segurança da cidade. Todos eles dizem estar preocupados com a segurança da cidade e acreditam que a filosofia promove a insegurança. O que podemos nos perguntar agora é: teriam alguma razão os acusadores de Sócrates e os acusadores contemporâneos da filosofia? É claro que, num certo sentido, a filosofia estremece as tradições, por meio da aceitação da simples verdade metodológica de que crenças têm de ser justificadas. O problema aqui é que é bem provável que a maior parte das nossas tradições não esteja justificada. O quão legítima é a existência do Estado? Têm os sacerdotes oficiais acesso especial ao divino? Qual das muitas divindades pelo mundo é existente, se é que alguma delas o é? Existe alguma responsabilidade que fundamente o aprisionamento de criminosos? Qual forma de governo devemos seguir? Todas essas perguntas filosóficas são difíceis de responder e, se respondidas (ou, por vezes, se meramente questionadas), podem abalar as tradições de qualquer sociedade, levando-a a um caminho de insegurança social, 136 |Contra Sócrates política e/ou econômica. Mas podem também não abalar, de acordo com a natureza das respostas ou de acordo com a natureza da própria sociedade em que essas perguntas se desenvolvem. Sociedades acostumadas à reflexão e que têm consciência de sua própria falibilidade e ignorância não têm medo de colocar suas crenças à prova e de revê-las, se necessário. É por meio da crítica às nossas crenças que podemos formular crenças mais resistentes, que fundamentem de modo racional as nossas atitudes, tanto no nível individual quanto no nível social. A filosofia não apenas destrói crenças não justificadas, mas ela nos ajuda a construir todo um edifício de crenças justificadas. Isso não significa, é claro, que a filosofia doutrina os cidadãos por meio das justificações. A juventude não é corrompida pela filosofia (nem as crianças, nem os adultos e nem os idosos). A filosofia não doutrina, não corrompe, pois, para doutrinar, é preciso ter uma doutrina especifica, e ela não tem uma doutrina específica, seja ela religiosa, ética ou política. A filosofia constrói teorias para lidar com certos problemas, mas não é hábito haver concordância entre todos os teóricos que investigam os mesmos problemas. Na verdade, o desacordo é amplo e generalizado na filosofia. Desse modo, há sempre teorias divergentes, cada uma sendo defendida por diferentes filósofos, e nenhuma delas é transmitida como a doutrina verdadeira. Basta pegarmos qualquer tese de filosofia e veremos que seus capítulos iniciais costumam falar das teorias anteriores e das razões para pensarmos que elas não funcionam, para apenas no último haver uma defesa de uma teoria original com apresentação de todas as dificuldades da mesma. De todo modo, todas as teorias estão sob a sombra da dúvida e todas merecem escrutínio. Transmitir uma doutrina era precisamente o que pareceria que Platão quereria evitar, com sua forma dialógica, e é isso que atualmente queremos evitar, quando damos aulas de filosofia. O objetivo dos filósofos e professores de filosofia contemporâneos não é trasmitir uma doutrina específica, mas mostrar como as diversas teorias divergentes foram se desenvolvendo para tratar certos problemas e como ele próprio constrói a sua teoria para tratar de certos problemas, com a intenção de que o estudante tenha, ele mesmo, no futuro, as capacidades para tratar os mesmos problemas, desenvolvendo sua própria teoria. Ainda que haja professores que apresentem a filosofia de forma mais dogmática, não dá para não apresentar as teorias divergentes quando damos aulas, pois qualquer teoria e seus argumentos só fazem sentido frente às possíveis objeções e teorias alternativas. E, mesmo que fosse possível ser puramente dogmático, isso seria uma Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 137 razão para ajustar o comportamento desses professores e não para eliminar a filosofia como algo ideológico ou inútil. Tal como os acusadores de Sócrates não compreenderam bem a natureza da filosofia e de seu ensino, os nossos governantes atuais não compreendem o que é o ensino de filosofia e quais as vantagens de ter uma sociedade permeada pelo pensamento filosófico. Mas é realmente vantajosa uma sociedade permeada pela reflexão filosófica? Poder-se-ia dizer que, como a filosofia não tem doutrina específica e nem defende uma teoria específica frente a outras, ela nos leva a um impasse sobre quais são as teorias verdadeiras, de modo que ela nos leva a questionar nossos fundamentos sem nos ajudar a colocar algo no lugar. Assim, continuaria a objeção, destruiríamos a suposta fundamentação das nossas tradições e não teríamos nada para colocar no lugar senão o ceticismo e o niilismo, e esse não parece ser o caminho para a manutenção de nossa segurança social, política e econômica. Primeiramente, temos de dizer que essa questão só pode ser respondida pela própria reflexão filosófica. Uma sociedade sem filosofia não é capaz de desenvolver uma resposta justificada a essa questão. Assim, tal sociedade nem saberia se a filosofia é ou não vantajosa, e qualquer decisão por exterminá-la seria meramente baseada em preconceitos, tal como está ocorrendo no Brasil. Ainda que possamos chegar à conclusão de que a filosofia nos leva a um estado de insegurança, essa conclusão tem de ser alcançada de modo filosófico e racional, e não de modo preconceituoso. Senão corremos o risco de cometer as mesmas injustiças cometidas pelos atenienses. Tal como no caso das autoridades atenienses, o que está em causa no Brasil, e em governos autoritários de modo geral, é uma falta de competência para entender o que é um problema filosófico e para responder às críticas advindas da filosofia. Se as autoridades adentrassem o debate filosófico e tentassem sustentar suas posições filosoficamente, eles criariam argumentos que fundariam valores e, consequentemente, cursos de ação. Esses cursos de ação poderiam até ser criticados, mas o que os governantes autoritários não compreendem é que são as críticas que dão a oportunidade para que soluções originais sejam criadas, que satisfaçam tanto os executores quanto seus críticos. Em segundo lugar, a consequência da filosofia não é o ceticismo e/ou o niilismo, mas, de fato, a percepção da própria falibilidade e ignorância. Mas do fato de percebermos os limites de nossa investigação e do fato de a filosofia não fornecer respostas positivas finais aos nossos questionamentos, não se segue que devemos 138 |Contra Sócrates abandonar todas as nossas crenças e valores. A filosofia nos fornece conhecimentos, mas esses conhecimentos são antes negativos – sobre o que não é consistente, sobre o que não pode ser o caso, sobre quais argumentos não funcionam – do que conhecimentos positivos sobre como as coisas são. Esse conhecimento negativo nos mostra que ainda não chegamos às respostas finais das nossas questões e que, portanto, nenhum de nós estabeleceu a verdade. Acabamos desenvolvendo nossas próprias posições, ao tentar pesar as diversas teorias e suas vantagens e desvantagens; nesse sentido, a maior parte dos filósofos sustenta alguma teoria ou algumas teorias com relação aos problemas filosóficos que investigam, mas não há concordância sobre qual teoria é a melhor. De fato, até o crítico ingênuo da filosofia tenta sustentar uma teoria (a de que a filosofia é inútil), porém faz isso com baixa qualidade, já que não possui as capacidades de argumentação e os conhecimentos teóricos que um filósofo profissional tem. Só se a filosofia estivesse espalhada pela sociedade que poderíamos esperar de qualquer cidadão tal nível de sofisticação na argumentação. Como a filosofia não tem doutrina específica e tenta desenvolver a todas de modo profundo, consistente e sofisticado, qualquer partidário, de qualquer doutrina, pode utilizar da filosofia para fundamentar sua escolha política, econômica, jurídica, religiosa, ainda que ele próprio não tenha desenvolvido e nem refletido sobre tais teorias (ou mesmo que o tenha feito de modo ingênuo). A mera existência de filósofos que desenvolvem teorias, argumentos e objeções para tratar problemas filosóficos tem a virtude de sofisticar a defesa de qualquer posição assumida. Dessa forma, até aqueles que pensam que a filosofia deve ser exterminada da máquina pública, se estiverem numa sociedade com a proliferação da filosofia, terão argumentos contra a filosofia, advindos da própria filosofia – tal como também o terão aqueles que defendem a filosofia. Assim, a filosofia é vantajosa para todos que querem sustentar suas posições. E, de fato, desvantajosa para aqueles que não querem sustentar suas posições, para aqueles que querem agir sem qualquer fundamento, para aqueles cuja autoridade não se funda na legitimidade das razões. Outra das críticas contra a filosofia é que ela é elitista. Essa é uma crítica mais econômica e política do que propriamente filosófica. A ideia por trás da crítica é que a filosofia é um curso para pessoas que não precisam se importar com o mercado de trabalho (dado que filósofos não são contratados para nada que não seja dar aula de filosofia) e que têm recursos para viver a vida refletindo sobre as coisas. A ideia é que o Estado deveria apenas investir nos cursos ligados ao mercado de trabalho, pois Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 139 seriam eles que deveriam ser aproveitados pela população mais pobre, que deveria ser o foco da preocupação estatal. Assim, investir na filosofia é um gasto de dinheiro público, que poderia estar sendo mais bem aproveitado no investimento em outros cursos. A crítica é complexa, mas podemos começar a respondê-la por partes3. Primeiramente, de acordo com o Censo da Educação Superior4, a maior parte dos estudantes de filosofia (2% dos estudantes nas universidades federais) faz licenciatura, e os alunos das licenciaturas advêm, em média, das classes econômicas D e E. De acordo com o INEP5, em 2017, a faixa de renda familiar modal do estudante de filosofia do curso presencial foi de 1,5 salários mínimos. Dessa forma, não é o caso que são as pessoas com mais recursos que frequentam esses cursos. Poder-se-ia objetar que as pessoas pobres não deveriam estar frequentando tais cursos, mas deveriam entrar em cursos que prometam uma maior ascensão econômica mais rápido; mas falar tal tipo de coisa significa querer direcionar a profissionalização por meio da restrição pública a uma certa carreira acadêmica. Isso não parece ser governamentalmente adequado numa democracia plural, seja qual for nossa posição política – mais libertarianista ou mais comunitarista. Além disso, de fato, a filosofia, em seu nível de especialização máxima, representa ascensão social para esses estudantes das classes mencionadas, já que a profissão de professor adjunto em universidades públicas é razoavelmente bem remunerada (embora não o seja comparativamente aos servidores com a mesma formação na justiça, no legislativo, ou em certos ministérios do executivo federal). Contrariamente, se deixássemos o desenvolvimento da filosofia pelas elites econômicas, ela certamente não se desenvolveria, dado que essa elite não está ocupando, nas universidades, as cadeiras dos cursos de filosofia. A crítica também pressupõe que a filosofia não tem utilidade externa à filosofia, ou, pelo menos, que os resultados alcançados pela filosofia são menos importantes do que aqueles resultados alcançados por áreas mais conectadas ao mercado de trabalho. Percebe-se também uma pressuposição injustificada sobre a natureza da própria universidade e sobre os resultados da filosofia. O que se pressupõe é que a universidade é um mecanismo de ascensão social e de especialização para o mercado de trabalho e 3 Agradeço ao Prof. Dr. César Mathias de Alencar, cuja excelente aula inaugural de 2019, na Universidade Federal do Amapá, inspirou este parágrafo e os seguintes. Agradeço também aos seus comentários com relação ao restante do texto e aos comentários do Prof. Dr. Everton Puhl Maciel, colega da mesma universidade. 4 Censo da educação superior. Disponível em http://portal.inep.gov.br/ Acesso em 2/5/2019. 5 Enade: relatório síntese. Disponível em http://download.inep.gov.br/ (p. 54) Acesso em 2/5/2019. 140 |Contra Sócrates que os resultados da filosofia são meramente teoréticos e não influenciam o desenvolvimento econômico. Essa crítica demonstra um profundo desconhecimento da história do surgimento das diversas disciplinas acadêmicas e da própria universidade. Uma boa parte das disciplinas acadêmicas se desenvolveu como uma "empirização da filosofia": 1. a física de Newton era chamada de "filosofia natural", 2. as ciências cognitivas surgiram da união da neurociência com a filosofia da mente, 3. a química surge dos filósofos alquimistas e dos defensores da existência de minima naturalis (a parte da substância que, se dividida, não é mais da mesma substância), 4. a própria biologia e a meteorologia foram criações do antigo filósofo grego Aristóteles. E, de fato, as universidades não foram criadas com a intenção de satisfazer o mercado de trabalho, mas, antes, com a intenção de desenvolver a pesquisa. Atualmente, é claro, as universidades têm outros papeis; na verdade, a universidade brasileira contemporânea se sustenta no tripé: ensino, pesquisa e extensão; porém a pesquisa é a mais valorizada, dado que é dela que provêm todas as nossas teorias para explicar, para prever e para manipular a realidade. A intenção das universidades não é meramente o mercado de trabalho, mas antes descobrir a verdade sobre as questões investigadas e solucionar os problemas apresentados. É claro que não se descarta o mercado de trabalho, já que as universidades legitimam legalmente o acesso a certas profissões, mas esse é apenas um dos objetivos das universidades. Além disso, é falso que a filosofia tenha consequências pífias no desenvolvimento econômico. Por exemplo, se aceitamos uma política econômica anticíclica, talvez tenhamos fundamentos keynesianos em nossas escolhas, e é a filosofia da economia e a filosofia política que fornecem os argumentos para uma visão mais laissez-faire ou para uma visão mais intervencionista do Estado. Além disso, a filosofia foi quem deu a sustentação racional para as críticas à sociedade colonial escravocrata brasileira ou às passadas sociedades fascitas alemã e italiana. Foi a filosofia também que fundamentou o cisma da Igreja Católica, a revolução francesa, a primavera árabe, a assinatura de certos tratados internacionais, entre outras mudanças significativas, que trouxeram um substantivo desenvolvimento econômico e social para a maioria da população mundial. Mas reparem: não queremos dizer que a filosofia sustentou posições ou defendeu doutrinas que trouxeram mudanças. Isso seria contraditório com relação ao que dissemos anteriormente, de a filosofia não ter doutrina específica. Ela, de fato, não Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 141 tem. Ela apenas apresenta teorias e argumentos por todas as posições. Ela tanto forneceu argumentos contra sociedades nazistas e fascistas em geral quanto ofereceu argumentos a favor das mesmas; ela também forneceu argumentos contra regimes militares ditatoriais, mas também apresentou argumentos a favor. De fato, a República ideal de Platão (1997) é um regime aristocrático (portanto não democrático), dividido em três classes de pessoas: os trabalhadores, os guardiões e os governantes. Os governantes seriam filósofos advindos da classe dos guardiões, e estes seriam os seguranças da cidade aonde o resto da população trabalharia para todos. A ideia é que apenas o filósofo é capaz de descobrir o que é o bem e, consequentemente, o que é o bem social; portanto apenas ele poderia governar de modo bom. O próprio regime militar brasileiro foi calcado em uma ideologia nacionalista específica, com uma certa noção de bem, de progresso e de desenvolvimento, que tinha consequências teóricas e práticas para as políticas econômicas. Se iremos ou não construir uma aristocracia platônica, um regime militar ditatorial, ou uma sociedade democrática e plural, a escolha, em última instância, é política, para além dos poderes da filosofia. O que a filosofia pode fazer – e o que ela de fato faz – é fornecer-nos razões a favor e contra a instauração dessas diversas sociedades possíveis e mostrar-nos as implicações éticas, políticas, estéticas, metafísicas, epistemológicas etc de cada uma delas. Além disso, a filosofia não é uma pessoa, mas uma disciplina investigativa; portanto ela não defende teses e nem sustenta posições; ela tem teses e posições em seu seio, e são as pessoas que as defendem – dessas pessoas, os filósofos são os que defendem com mais precisão, clareza e rigor suas posições filosóficas, mas eles não podem ser identificados com a disciplina da filosofia, tal como não podemos identificar um advogado ou pensador do direito com a totalidade da disciplina do direito. Disso, podemos concluir que a filosofia, suas teorias, teses e argumentos podem ser usados para defender inúmeras posições, inclusive as que as nossas sensibilidades morais tomam como inaceitáveis. Será apenas com o desenvolvimento de uma investigação filosófica, que poderemos mostrar que, além de ser intuitivamente moralmente inaceitável, certa doutrina é também logicamente, epistemicamente, ou metafisicamente inaceitável. Evitar a filosofia não é o caminho adequado para rejeitar uma teoria filosófica. Se abominamos a interferência econômica da esquerda, ou se temos horror ao liberalismo econômico da direita, não é destruindo a filosofia que se destruirão as ideologias das quais temos horror. A filosofia nos dá a oportunidade de 142 |Contra Sócrates mostrarmos por que tais teorias, além de causarem horror, são também falsas ou detêm profundas dificuldades. Dessa forma, se é verdadeiro que a filosofia não tem uma doutrina específica e pode ser utilizada para sustentar e para criticar as mais diversas posições políticas, econômicas, religiosas, espitemológicas etc, além de ter profundas consequências tanto para a nossa visão de mundo quanto para o caminho do desenvolvimento político, econômico, cultural e social, sem ter de nos levar ao niilismo e nem ao ceticismo, mas antes à aceitação da própria falibilidade na investigação da verdade e a uma maior tolerância com relação às posições opositoras, então parece que as supostas desvantagens da filosofia não são realmente o caso. Além disso, a filosofia, como se insere em todas as disciplinas acadêmicas, em seu grau mais alto de desenvolvimento e sofisticação teórica, fornece contribuições essenciais para a fundamentação de cada uma dessas ciências, contribuições tão importantes quanto as dessas próprias ciências. Além da contribuição acadêmica, da possível ascensão social das classes mais pobres, do aprimoramento das capacidades reflexivas e críticas dos estudantes e da sofisticação de nossa visão de mundo, teria a filosofia outras vantagens práticas, que a tornem essencial para a segueança de nossa sociedade? 3. Filosofia e Segurança Humana6 Conforme dissemos, nossa intenção aqui não é somente mostrar que as críticas mais comuns à filosofia estão equivocadas, mas ir além, ao argumentarmos pela tese de que a filosofia é essencial para a manutenção da segurança humana. Mas o que seria segurança humana? Conforme entendida por Obuchi Keizo e Amartya Sen (2001b, 2002), a dedicação à segurança humana é a mensuração e o enfrentamento às ameças à sobrevivência, à vida cotidiana e à dignidade humanas, por meio do investimento nas capacidades básicas para permitir uma vida boa. A ideia é que a noção de segurança não deve apenas enfocar na segurança do Estado; devemo-nos ater à segurança do indivíduo de modo holístico (Mockus, 1999), que é justamente o que nos permite fazer o conceito de segurança abranger não só a segurança protetora, mas também a segurança social, a econômica e a política (sendo a protetora apenas parte da segurança social). 6 Essa seção foi retirada de Cid (2010) e modificada. Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 143 Se temos a intenção de manter a segurança na nossa sociedade, devemos pensar a segurança como prevenção de desastres nessas áreas, reduzindo as inseguranças social, econômica e política. A primeira tem a ver com os meios que utilizamos para adquirir as capacidades necessárias para a vida digna em sociedade; a segunda, com os meios que utilizamos para produzir, comercializar, consumir e trabalhar; e a terceira com os meios que utilizamos para participar nas decisões públicas da comunidade. Uma sociedade na qual falta um sistema de saúde ou um sistema de ensino adequados, onde faltam acordos para a obtenção de bons trabalhos para seus cidadãos, ou onde faltam as estruturas para que os diversos grupos e indivíduos se relacionem e tenham voz política, é uma sociedade onde as pessoas têm menos segurança para viverem suas vidas dignamente. A promoção da segurança de um povo pelo seu governo e pelo próprio povo ocorre por meio da formação da autonomia7 dos indivíduos que formam esse povo e da facilitação justa e vantajosa dos diversos tipos de interações entre esses indivíduos. A facilitação é a promoção de estruturas que regulam as interações entre os indivíduos. A falha em desempenhar esses papéis enfraquece os valores sociais e a crença na justiça dos indivíduos expostos à insegurança (Rodrigues, 2006). E a insegurança, de qualquer tipo, se persistente, leva à justificação da falta de crença na justiça e a uma falta de capacidade de viver a vida pelos meios considerados legais (Vieira, 2007). A autonomia de um indivíduo, para além das condições externas, é constituída por suas capacidades de interação social e de realizar decisões bem informadas dentro de um sistema social. Para obter tal coisa, certas capacidades essenciais devem ser adquiridas por todos os indivíduos, como as capacidades de: ler, escrever, fazer contas, entender as ciências e a tecnologia, entender e conseguir tomar decisões políticas e administrativas informadas e conscientes, entender o sistema legal e jurídico, ser hábil em alguma função, ter infraestrutura básica de saneamento, saúde, educação, emprego, acesso aos meios políticos e informações públicas, além de ter as suas próprias posições éticas, políticas e religiosas. A condição interna da autonomia é obtida por meio da aquisição de capacidades cognitivas, técnicas e éticas. Se as condições internas e externas da autonomia estiverem sendo cumpridas em uma pessoa, então essa é uma pessoa autônoma e sua segurança humana não está sendo violada, pois possui a capacidade para levar e continuar levando uma vida digna, além de passar essa vida adiante. 7 Para outra abordagem do conceito de "autonomia", ver, por exemplo, Sankowski (1998). 144 |Contra Sócrates Uma sociedade segura, nesses termos, dá-se a partir da organização social e da participação da comunidade no que diz respeito às ações coletivas frente às diversas inseguranças que rondam a vida humana (Acero, 2002, 2005; Earls e Buka, 1993; Sem e Brundtland, 1999; Mockus, 1999). Enquanto a comunidade não for capaz de realizar o trabalho de análise e de decisão e não se der conta da importância disso para a manutenção da segurança (no que diz respeito à redução da corrupção, da ineficiência, da negligência e da desigualdade), teremos sempre possibilidades de violações da segurança humana, por meio do engano sistemático àqueles que não têm as capacidades relevantes. Aqui que a filosofia adquire seu papel essencial. A segurança humana só pode ser mantida, se os cidadãos tiverem as capacidades para se gerirem como sociedade. E isso só pode ser feito, conforme dissemos, se os cidadãos tiverem as capacidades cognitivas, técnicas e éticas adequadas. Mas como a filosofia ajuda nesse processo? Primeiramente, devemos dizer que a filosofia não é a única que ajuda nesse processo. A educação como um todo, supostamente, tem o objetivo de formar cidadãos autônomos e capazes de gerenciarem a si mesmos e ao grupo, mantendo o trato social. A filosofia exerce um papel fundamental na obtenção de habilidades reflexivas e de conhecimentos das teorias filosóficas e das suas dificuldades, e isso constitui parte da condição interna da autonomia, pois esses conhecimentos permitem desenvolver uma visão de mundo racional e fundamentada, para guiar suas ações, sem negar o conhecimento das alternativas. Assim, exerce também importante função na manutenção da segurança da vida humana, evitando a desorganização social. Só uma pessoa autônoma, que toma suas decisões fundamentadas racionalmente, tendo o conhecimento das possibilidades alternativas, pode realmente se responsabilizar pela sua decisão. A filosofia pode evitar a insegurança social, através da transmissão das habilidades, conhecimentos, informações e, especialmente, de razoáveis princípios éticos8, que permitem a interação social sem a ocorrência de embates culturais agressivos. Com relação à segurança política, a filosofia é capaz tanto de passar princípios de tolerância a fim de evitar embate entre civilizações quanto o de disseminar as práticas e os conhecimentos necessários para o exercício da participação democrática e sustentável na vida pública da comunidade, além de permitir a aceitação 8 "Razoáveis princípios éticos" são princípios que podem ser aceitos por pessoas que defendem 'concepções de bem' diferentes, como, por exemplo, a liberdade de consciência, a tolerância religiosa, a preservação do meio-ambiente, e semelhantes. O termo "razoabilidade" foi muito bem trabalhado por John Rawls (2001) e utilizado no contexto educacional por Cid (2010). Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 145 ou a rejeição informada das posições, decisões e ações políticas. E com relação à insegurança econômica, ela nos leva a refletir sobre a fundamentação das diversas teorias econômicas, fornecendo-nos a possibilidade de uma decisão mais informada na escolha do modelo econômico preferido para fazer previsões. Não quero indicar que a filosofia é condição suficiente para a manutenção da segurança humana, mas afirmo com certeza ela é condição necessária. Um determinado indivíduo ou grupo de pessoas que não reflete sobre suas posições políticas, éticas, metafísicas, epistêmicas e estéticas tem sua vida empobrecida automaticamente, pois são reduzidas suas capacidades para decidir entre alternativas de vida. Afinal, assim como um cego não consegue realizar coisas que utilizem a visão, uma pessoa que não sabe refletir sistematicamente, que não conhece a lógica dos argumentos e nem a diversidade de teorias da filosofia não poderá tomar decisões informadas com relação a questões éticas, políticas, econômicas, religiosas etc. É possível objetar aqui que decisões religiosas não devem ser tomadas racionalmente, mas antes emotivamente. Isso até pode ser o caso, mas é argumentável que, com relação às posições filosóficas possíveis, é preferível saber mais do que saber menos, mesmo que tomemos a nossa decisão emotivamente. E, de todo modo, não creio que isso seja argumentável para questões políticas e econômicas, que devem ser sustentadas por boas razões, e não emotivamente. Se devemos ou não ameaçar a China de não mais exportar certos produtos para eles, isso deve ser decidido a partir de um cálculo político e econômico, que se funda, entre outras coisas, em posições filosóficas que assumimos para explicar as relações entre os Estados no cenário internacional – por exemplo, se aceitamos o realismo ou o idealismo na filosofia da política internacional. Sem a filosofia, nossa liberdade de escolha para questões teóricas e para questões práticas é bastante reduzida. Isto é um empobrecimento justamente pelo fato de restringir a liberdade de uma pessoa de viver dignamente em sociedade e de participar de suas decisões públicas consciente das alternativas. E é um empobrecimento ainda mais perverso pelo fato de restringir a capacidade de adquirir capacidades e de aproveitar oportunidades. A pobreza e a exclusão são multifacetadas em suas restrições de capacidades e formam um círculo vicioso justamente por isto: as restrições de capacidades básicas simples geram restrições de capacidades para adquirir capacidades (Sem e Brundtland, 1999). Assim, a subnutrição diminui a capacidade de adquirir conhecimento/habilidade, a falta de conhecimento / habilidade diminui a capacidade de obter um bom emprego, a 146 |Contra Sócrates falta de um bom emprego diminui a capacidade de obter uma boa renda, a falta de uma boa renda diminui a capacidade de obter boa educação e alimento, o que, por sua vez, diminui a capacidade de participação política e, consequentemente, a capacidade de mudar as próprias condições e de seus descendentes. A falta da filosofia numa sociedade reduz significativamente as possibilidades de os cidadãos adquirirem outras capacidades, a saber, a falta de capacidade de reflexão filosófica e a falta de conhecimento sobre os problemas filosóficos e suas teorias reduz a capacidade de pensamento crítico e a de compreensão de argumentos, reduzindo também a capacidade de ver as implicações das posições que assumem, dirimindo, consequentemente, sua capacidade de fundamentar a própria visão de mundo. Isso, por vezes, faz o cidadão agir em desconformidade com aquilo que ele gostaria que ocorresse e o faz defender posições cujas implicações divergem de suas necessidade e vontades. A educação vista apenas por um viés tecnicista, excluindo disciplinas humanas, como a filosofia, não efetiva todas as suas potencialidades com relação à segurança e à redução de desigualdades; e, por isso, acaba sendo uma má educação. Atualmente, o que temos é que, enquanto as disciplinas naturais e exatas fornecem uma série de capacidades importantíssimas e bastante relevantes no que diz respeito ao desenvolvimento de técnicas, tecnologias e conhecimentos sobre as coisas do mundo, as disciplinas humanas nos dão os conhecimentos necessários para entendermos a nós mesmos no mundo – nossa histórias, nossas relações sociais, nossa visão de mundo. Em especial, é a filosofia que nos ajuda a construir a nossa visão de mundo. Mas o que é e qual a relevância de adquirir uma visão de mundo? Na verdade, todos nós temos uma visão de mundo, tendo ou não estudado filosofia. Nossa visão de mundo é composta de nossas crenças sobre a constituição do mundo e de suas partes, sobre a nossa posição no mundo, sobre os valores éticos e políticos que devemos assumir, sobre a possibilidade e o modo de aquisição de conhecimento, sobre o sentido da vida, sobre a vida após a morte e antes do nascimento, sobre a existência da divindade, entre outras coisas. E podemos adquirir essas crenças de diversas maneiras, como, por exemplo, por tradição. Podemos ter uma visão de mundo adquirida por tradição, mas o problema – para além da falta de fundamentação e de conhecimento sobre as alternativas – é que existem muitas visões de mundo diferentes, dado que vivemos numa democracia plural. A filosofia nos ajuda a refletir sobre essas diversas visões de mundo e nos Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 147 apresenta as vantagens e as desvantagens de cada uma delas. Assim, a escolha de uma visão de mundo por aquele que estudou filosofia tem muita probabilidade de ser uma escolha mais bem informada do que a de um não filósofo. Um filósofo contemporâneo, do qual não lembramos o nome, disse algo que expressa muito sobre essa disciplina acadêmica: na filosofia, importa menos o que você está defendendo do que como você está defendendo aquilo que está defendendo. Além disso, como se busca a verdade, a filosofia estimula a honestidade intelectual e uma atenção caridosa a quaisquer argumentos opositores. Dessa forma, a filosofia estimula algo essencial para a segurança humana em regimes democráticos, que é a razoabilidade. A razoabilidade é um conceito desenvolvido por John Rawls (2001, p. 22, nota) em sua filosofia política: (1) Pessoas razoáveis não afirmam todas a mesma doutrina abrangente. Diz-se que isso é uma conseqüência do 'ônus do julgamento'. (2) São afirmadas muitas doutrinas razoáveis, das quais nem todas podem ser verdadeiras ou corretas, julgadas a partir de qualquer doutrina abrangente. (3) Não é irrazoável afirmar nenhuma das doutrinas abrangentes razoáveis. (4) Outros que afirmam doutrinas abrangentes também são razoáveis. (5) Ao afirmar nossa crença numa doutrina que reconhecemos como razoável, não estamos sendo irrazoáveis. (6) As pessoas razoáveis pensariam que seria irrazoável usar o poder político, se o tivessem, para reprimir outras doutrinas que sejam razoáveis mas diferentes da sua. A ideia aqui em causa é que a filosofia promove a razoabilidade e a honestidade intelectual, pois, em seu ensino, são apresentados os problemas filosóficos e as várias teorias diferentes que os tentam resolver. Diferentemente das outras disciplinas do ensino básico, a filosofia não é ensinada de modo dogmático. Quando aprendemos matemática na escola, somos levados a crer que a única geometria correta é a euclidiana, poém, quando temos aulas numa faculdade, percebemos que há mais de um tipo de geometria, aplicáveis em casos diferentes. Contrariamente, tanto quando aprendemos filosofia nas escolas quanto quando a aprendemos nas universidades, somos levados a pensar, por exemplo, sobre quais coisas são corretas, sem que o professor determine quais são de fato as coisas corretas; ele somente apresenta quais foram as teorias construídas para falar sobre o assunto e as dificuldades que cada uma delas enfrenta. Assim, a filosofia não é de esquerda e nem de direita, não é atéia nem teísta, não é a favor e nem contra o direito ao aborto, não é contra e nem a favor do Estado. A filosofia é a favor da verdade, da busca pelo conhecimento, da sabedoria. Ela não ensina uma ou outra doutrina, mas debate sobre todas, tentando encontrar seus 148 |Contra Sócrates fundamentos, com lógica e pensamento crítico. E como ela busca a verdade, ela não é um mero debate sofístico em que os debatedores desejam vencer, mas ela é uma conversa entre pensadores que começam discordando e colocando objeções uns aos outros, a fim de aprimorarem suas teorias ou de as abandonarem em favor da verdade. Sem a filosofia, as visões de mundo serão mais superficiais e as decisões éticas e políticas não serão bem fundamentadas. Além disso, como nenhuma das outras ciências ensinadas exigem do estudante que ele tenha um pensamento crítico com relação aos fundamentos dessas ciências, isso não seria estimulado nos jovens. Jovens com pouco pensamento crítico sobre os fundamentos de qualquer área serão presas fáceis de doutrinadores; e doutrinadores não estimulam a autonomia, mas antes a crença e a obediência acríticas. Crença e obediência acríticas levam certamente à insegurança política, pois usa-se de ideologia para levar as pessoas a concordarem com coisas que as prejudicam. Como a política está intimamente envolvida com questões econômicas, o prejuízo político também gerará insegurança econômica. E a falta de razoabilidade gerada em uma sociedade sem filosofia também tem sérios prejuízos para a segurança social; afinal, pessoas que não são razoáveis têm a tendência de reagir agressivamente a violações de suas concepções de bem. E isso certamente não manterá a sociedade segura. Naõ é a filosofia que traz insegurança, mas antes a falta dela. Sem filosofia, o que está à espreita é o autoritarismo e a barbárie. Referências Acero Velásquez, H. Seguridad y convivencia en Bogotá: logros y retos 1995 – 2001. In: Casas Dupuy et alii. Seguridad Urbana y policía em Colombia. Bogotá: Fundación seguridad y democracia, 2002. ______. Los Gobiernos locales y la seguridad ciudadana. Fundación Seguridad & Democracia, 2005. Disponível em http://www.comunidadyprevencion.org/ Acesso em 01/07/2008. Cid, R. Reduzindo as desigualdades sociais: as capacidades na manutenção da segurança humana. In: Páginas de Filosofia: vol. 2, n. 2, 2010. Earls, F.; Buka, S. Early Determinants of Delinquency and Violence. In: Health Affairs: edição de inverno, 1993. Mockus, A. Armonizar ley, moral y cultura: cultura ciudadana, prioridad de gobierno con resultados en prevención y control de violencia en Bogotá, 1995-1997. In: Programas municipales para la prevención de la violencia. Brasil 1999. Disponível em http://idbdocs.iadb.org/ Acesso em 1/8/2008. Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid| 149 Moraes, D.J. Sócrates, a filosofia e a cidade. In: Pólemos: vol. 7, n. 13, 2018. Patten, C.H. Valuing Civics: Political Commitment and the New Chitizenship Education in Australia. In: Canadian Journal of Education: vol. 29, n. 2, 2006. Plato. Complete Works. 14 ed. Ed. J.M. Cooper. Cambridge: Hackett Publishing C., 1997. Print, M. Citizenship Education and Youth Participation in Democracy. In: British Journal of Educational Studies: vol. 55, n. 3, 2007. Rawls, J. O Direito dos povos. Trad. L.C. Borges. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2001. Rodrigues, C. Civil Democracy, Perceived Risk, and Insecurity in Brazil: An Extension of the Systemic Social Control Model. In: The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science: vol. 605, 2006. Sankowski, E. Autonomy, Education, and Societal Legitimacy. Philosophy of Education Society, 1998. Disponível em http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/ Acesso em 1/8/2008. Sen, A. Desenvolvimento como liberdade. Trad. L.T. Motta. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 2000. _______. Desigualdade reexaminada. Trad. R.D. Mendes. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 2001a. _______. Why Human Security? In: International Symposium on Human Security, 2001b. _______. Introductory text for workshop Basic Education and Human Security. Kolkata: Commission on Human Security, Unicef, the Pratichi Trust, Harvard University, 2002. Sen, A. e Brundtland, G.H. Breaking the Poverty Cycle: Investing in Early Childhood. Inter-American Development Bank, 1999. Vieira, O.V. Inequality and the Subversion of the Rule of Law in Brazil. In: Working Paper 84. Center for Brazilian Studies, University of Oxford, 2007.

Fine-Structure Constant from Sommerfeld to Feynman Michael A. Sherbon Case Western Reserve University Alumnus E-mail: [email protected] June 17, 2019 Abstract The fine-structure constant, which determines the strength of the electromagnetic interaction, is briefly reviewed beginning with its introduction by Arnold Sommerfeld and also includes the interest of Wolfgang Pauli, Paul Dirac, Richard Feynman and others. Sommerfeld was very much a Pythagorean and sometimes compared to Johannes Kepler. The archetypal Pythagorean triangle has long been known as a hiding place for the golden ratio. More recently, the quartic polynomial has also been found as a hiding place for the golden ratio. The Kepler triangle, with its golden ratio proportions, is also a Pythagorean triangle. Combining classical harmonic proportions derived from Kepler's triangle with quartic equations determine an approximate value for the fine-structure constant that is the same as that found in our previous work with the golden ratio geometry of the hydrogen atom. These results make further progress toward an understanding of the golden ratio as the basis for the fine-structure constant. Keywords fine-structure constant, dimensionless physical constants, fundamental constants, history of physics, history of mathematics, golden ratio, quartic equation. 1. Introduction Writing on the history of physics, Stephen Brush says that in 1916: Sommerfeld generalized Bohr's model to include elliptical orbits in three dimensions. He treated the problem relativistically (using Einstein's formula for the increase of mass with velocity), .... According to historian Max Jammer, this success of Sommerfeld's fine-structure formula '... served also as an indirect confirmation of Einstein's relativistic formula for the velocity dependence of inertia mass.' [1]. 1 From John S. Rigden, "The fine-structure constant derives its name from its origin. It first appeared in Sommerfeld's work to explain the fine details of the hydrogen spectrum. ... Since Sommerfeld expressed the energy states of the hydrogen atom in terms of the constant [alpha], it came to be called the fine-structure constant." [2] and more from Michael Eckert [3]. The fine-structure constant has also been called Sommerfeld's constant. From Helge Kragh, "Sommerfeld's fine-structure theory was generally considered to be excellently and unambiguously confirmed by experiment. Because the theory rested on the foundation provided by Bohr, the experiments were also taken as strong support for his theory of atomic structure." [4]. Also, as Michael Eckert has noted, Sommerfeld has sometimes been compared to Kepler [5]. The electromagnetic coupling constant determining the strength of its interaction is the finestructure constant α = e2/hc in cgs units with the elementary charge e, the reduced Planck's constant h = h/2π and the speed of light c." Arnold Sommerfeld states, "In our theory of the fine structure there is a confluence of the three main currents of modern research in theoretical physics, namely, the theory of electrons, the theory of quanta, and the theory of relatvity" and the fine-structure constant "... could be interpreted more physically as the ratio of an electron's velocity in the first Bohr orbit to the speed of light." [6]. Helge Kragh writes: Like many contemporary physicists, Dirac believed that ultimately α should be explainable by physical theory. As late as 1978, he wrote: 'The problem of explaining this number [fine-structure constant] is still completely unsolved. ... I think it is perhaps the most fundamental unsolved problem of physics at the present time, and I doubt very much whether any really big progress will be made in understanding the fundamentals of physics until it is solved.' [7]. This was a view also shared by Max Born, Werner Heisenberg and Wolfgang Pauli [8]. From Pauli, "The theoretical determination of the fine structure constant is certainly the most important of the unsolved problems of modern physics." [9]. Richard Feynman said it was the greatest mystery of physics, perhaps the most often quoted physicist on the fine-structure constant. Describing Sommerfeld's work with Felix Klein, Pauli writes: The standard treatise on the 'theory of the top,' which he wrote in conjunction with his teacher F. Klein in his early days, while he was still a 'Privatdozent' in Göttingen, and in which many technical problems are discussed, possesses a significance going far beyond applied mathematics. It contains, on the basis of work by Euler and Cayley, and of Hamilton's quaternions, the essential foundations of what considerably later was called the theory of representations of the rotation group in three-dimensional space. In particular, Klein had, following Cayley, clearly worked out the relation of this group to the 'covering group' of linear unitary unimodular transformations of two complex variables. Thus in this treatise, now a classic, the mathematical basis is developed for the two-component 'spinors' which turned up much later in wave mechanics [9]. In Wolfgang Pauli's summary of Sommerfeld's contributions to physics: The intellectual tradition which Sommerfeld passed on to us will be transmitted to academic youth and thereby to posterity. This tradition goes back to Sommerfeld's 2 teacher Felix Klein, and through him also to Riemann; indeed the grandly conceived work on the theory of the top, which Sommerfeld wrote with Klein, also contains the 'Cayley-Klein rotation parameters' which have become so important for the theory of spinors and hence also for Dirac's wave equations of the electron." [9]. Pauli also says, "Sommerfeld was versatile to an astonishing degree. He was a master of the technical applications of mathematics, of the partial differential equations of physics; of the formal classification of spectra; and again of wave mechanics, and in all alike he made decisive advances [9]. 2. Pythagorean mathematical history Willem Witteveen, writing on the Great Pyramid of Giza: There is only one universal language, which is the language of numbers and proportions that are so striking and stunningly built into the Great Pyramid and to which our current science has no appropriate response. We can no longer ignore that this ancient civilization was aware of our units used in modern mathematics and physics and were even aware of our metric system. Our metric system originating in the eighteenth century, designed and implemented by a committee of mathematicians and physicists commissioned by the French revolutionary government." [10]. From the autobiography of Lyndon LaRouche, controversial and prolific publisher: ... laws of astrophysics and microphysics, are also based on harmonic orderings congruent with the Golden Section. The 'fine structure constant,' which reflects the curvature of physical space time on both the astrophysical and microphysical scales, is one example of this. In a Gauss-Riemann mathematical physics, defined from the standpoint of a rigorous synthetic geometry, the constant speed of light and the quantum constant, also reflect, interdependently, the same connection. ... These constants are not properly mysterious; the example of Kepler's work already indicates their rational determination. ... The idea of Least Action in the universe, is a corollary of such rational determination of the necessity of constants [11]. Pierre Beaudry says, "... the Pythagorean method of spherical nesting of the regular solids, represented the actual 'missing link' between the ancient Egyptian knowledge of the pyramids and the Greeks, as well as the link between the astronomy of transoceanic-navigators, the Astronavigators, and the European legacy of science which was later established by Plato, Nicholas of Cusa, Kepler, Leibniz, Gauss, and Riemann." [12]. Beaudry also says this "... demonstrates that the principle of proportionality was the founding principle of scientific knowledge itself. ... You cannot square the circle, any more than you can cube the sphere. However, you can make them proportional." [12]. Pierre Beaudry continues, "For Pythagoras, the spherical composition of the five Platonic solids was the ultimate expression of the proportionality between the 'orbits of our reason' and the 'orbits of intelligence in the heavens.'" [12]. Also, "Thus, a single sphere of 16 great circles, entirely formed with Golden Sections, generates the five regular Platonic solids and creates the 3 Great Pyramid Paradox from the higher power of the complex domain." [13]. Finally, "Great Pyramid of Egypt, and the Five Platonic Solids, are all historically bounded together and can never be separated from their common generative principle, which resides outside of them; and, the cement that bonds them together is the paradox of Squaring the Circle." [13]. Bruce Director says: Plato cites the spinning top to show that it is physical motion that defines space and time, not, as the Eleatics maintained, a priori absolute space and time that defines motion.... At this point in our investigation the example of the simple spinning top becomes an insufficient example of a physical expression of still higher forms of hypergeometries. But if we follow the top's motion, as Riemann indicated, into the astrophysical and microphysical domains, such higher forms of hypergeometries emerge. For example, consider the actual motion of the Earth, around its axis, around the Sun and precession; or the motion within and among the galaxies; or the motions in the sub-atomic domains indicated by the experimental evidence of physical chemistry [14]. From Bruce Director again: Once Kepler liberated science from Aristotle's chains of perfect circle to the more perfect freedom of eccentric orbits, the question he confronted was, 'What was the principle that determined these eccentricities?' To answer this question he turned to the Pythagorean concept of harmonics. As he emphasized in his Harmonies of the World, the concept signified by the Greek word harmonia, or its Latin equivalent, congruencia, concerns the effect of unseen principles on the interaction among things in the sensible world.... Kepler utilized this method of harmonics to discover the principle that governed the eccentric motions of the planets [15]. Arnold Sommerfeld from 1925, "Kepler should have experienced today's quantum theory. He would have seen the boldest dreams of his youth realized, not, admittedly, in the macrocosm of the stars, but in the microcosm of the atom. The shell structure of the atom is even more wonderful than the cosmography longed for by Kepler." [16]. Sommerfeld, as quoted by Wolfgang Pauli, "All integral laws of spectral lines and of atomic theory spring originally from the quantum theory. It is the mysterious organon on which Nature plays her music of the spectra, and according to the rhythm of which she regulates the structure of the atoms and nuclei." [9]. 3. Calculations of the ne-structure constant Helge Kragh states that, "By 1929 the fine-structure constant was far from new, but it was only with Eddington's work that the dimensionless combination of constants of nature was elevated from an empirical quantity appearing in spectroscopy to a truly fundamental constant." [7]. Sir Arthur Eddington believed the inverse of the fine-structure constant was the whole number 136, which he later amended to 137. His work with advanced algebras was suggestive toward the following quartic equation from our previous work. [17]. This calculation of the inverse fine-structure constant gives the same approximate value as ancient geometry combined with 4 the extension of Raji Heyrovska's work on the golden ratio structure of the hydrogen atom [18]. The inverse fine-structure constant is a root of: x4−136x3−136x2−818x+1 = 0. (1) This equation gives a value of for x as α−1 ' 137.035999168. The latest value reported by the Gabrielse group [19] is α−1(μe−/μB)' 137.035999150(33), from experimental measurement and quantum electrodynamics [20]. The other root of the equation is approximately 1/818 and 818 = (4× 136)+ (2× 137). Also of note is that the inflection points of the quartic are also related to the golden ratio [21]-[24]. Lin McMullin: "The golden ratio and its conjugate are lurking in every quartic polynomial." [24]. The golden ratio φ = (1+ √ 5)/2 and is a root of its minimal polynomial x2− x− 1. Both the golden ratio and its conjugate are roots of the quartic equation x4−2x3− x2 +2x+1 = 0. The inverse fine-structure constant α−1 is a root of: x4−137x3−10x2 +697x−365 = 0. (2) This equation gives the same approximate value for the inverse fine-structure constant as Eq. (1). 697− 137 = 280+ 280. 365+ 365− 10 = 280+ 440 = 720. The scaling factor for the second pyramid on the Giza Plateau is 137, having a height of 2× 137 = 274 Royal Cubits and a base of 3× 137 = 411 Royal Cubits. The Great Pyramid has a combined height and base of 280+440 = 720 Royal Cubits, 280/220 = 14/11' √ φ and 220/136' φ . Colonel R. S. Beard states that, "Sir William Petrie himself was thoroughly convinced that the Egyptians constructed the pyramid with a height-to-width-of-base ratio of seven to eleven." [25]. Another quartic equation with the Eq. (1) value with x' α−1 is also a root of: 4x4−547x3−157x2 +29x+369 = 0 (3) 280 = 157 + (369/3). 440 = 547− 157 + 29 + 29− 4− 4. Another quartic polynomial also gives the same approximate value for α−1. The inverse fine-structure constant α−1 ' √ p/x, with p = 25,920 (Egyptian value for precession, Plato's Great Year) and x is a root of: x4−139x3−96x2 +386x+12 = 0. (4) This quartic has a root x ' √ 5/φ , with the golden ratio. 280 = 1+ 1+ 139+ 139 and 440 = 386+ 139− 96+ 12− 1. From the precession of the equinoxes via the twelve star Egyptian sphere, which includes the origin of the Great Pyramid design and the geometry of the Platonic solids: 25,920 = 36× 720. Precession is also a factor in explaining the fine-structure constant [26]. The 'Key' of the Great Pyramid is 528 [27] and the inverse fine-structure constant α−1 ' 528/x, where x is a root of: x4−44x3 +86x2 +281x−63 = 0. (5) This equation also gives the same approximate value for the inverse fine-structure constant as Eq. (1). The root x ' φ + √ 5. 280 = 281− 1. 440 = 528− 44− 44 = 10 + 63 + 86 + 281. 528/136' 2π/φ . 5 The inverse fine-structure constant α−1 ' 432/x, where 432 is the main scaling factor for the Great Pyramid and x is a root of: 26x4−51x3−430x2 +61x+300 = 0. (6) This equation also gives the same approximate value for the inverse fine-structure constant as Eq. (1). x' 4/ √ φ , and 528/432 = 11/9' 2/φ ' 432/360 = 864/720. Also, 25920/432 = 60.√ 432' 20.7' 1 Royal Cubit and 440 Royal Cubits equal 432 long cubits of 21 inches, 432' φ sinh(2π), see the reference to Alfred Landé in our previous work [17]. 432/π ' 360/φ 2, the golden angle. From Witteveen, "The natural frequency of 432 Hertz and the precession cycle of the Earth of 25,920 years together form the heartbeat of the Earth." [10]. Another approximation with the Eq. (1) value involves α−1 ' 8πx, where x is a root of: 63x4−280x3−364x2 +40x+309 = 0. (7) 280/40 = 7, 63/7 = 9, 440 = (9+ 9− 7)× 40. The root x ' φφ f , where φ f is the reciprocal Fibonacci constant. The 8π is found in the base of William Eisen's Great Pyramid design along with the harmonic of the inverse of Newton's gravitational constant [28]. Another approximation from our previous work [17] gives the same approximate value for the inverse fine-structure constant. α−1 ' φx, where x is a root of: 3x4−250x3−346x2 +48x−36 = 0. (8) with 280 = 36− 3− 3 + 250, 440 = 36− 346 + (3× 250) and 346 = 48 + 48 + 250. Also, 440' 2φ ×136, reference our previous extension of Eddington's work [17]. From the Pythagorean perspective the Foundation Stone number of 729 is a harmonic of the fine-structure constant value. Another equation that also gives the same approximate value for the inverse fine-structure constant as Eq. (1) is α−1 ' 729/x, where x is a root of: 10x4−37x3−113x2 +73x+371 = 0. (9) The root x ' φφ f , where φ f is the reciprocal Fibonacci constant, same root as Eq. (7) and the root of α−1 ' √ p/x of Eq. (4) is x ' √ 5/φ ' 729/528. 280 = 10+ 10− 37− 73+(10× 37) and 440 = 73+ 371− ((113− 73)/10). Also, α−1 ' 720/x gives a quartic equation with the Eq. (1) value, a root x' 2φ 2 and coefficients related to Eq. (5). Czech physicist Raji Heyrovska says, "On noticing the closeness of the fine structure constant ... to the ratio of the angles, 360◦/φ 2 ... the author suggested that the small difference ... could be due to the Sommerfeld's relativity correction factor." [29]. "It was also pointed out that the ratio 360◦/φ 2 ... which is a Golden section of 360◦, differs from the inverse fine structure constant by ... 2/φ 3 ... probably due to the difference in the g-factors for the electron and proton ...," with the result of α−1 ' (360/φ 2)− (2/φ 3) [30]. α −1 ' 360 φ 2 − 2 φ 3 + A2 Kφ 4 − A 3 K2φ 5 + A4 K3φ 7 . (10) This extension of Heyrovska's equation also gives α−1 ' 137.035999168. William Eisen describes the geometry of what he called the 'Golden Apex of the Great Pyramid' where dividing the sides of his mathematical model for the Great Pyramid by π lengths along with four 6 curves of the exponential function results in a small square in the center called the Golden Apex, the geometry and symmetry thought to be associated with the generation of the four fundamental forces of nature [28]. The Golden Apex A is the side length of the resulting square. A = eπ − 7π − 1 ' √ πα ' 3/20. The inverse Kepler-Bouwkamp constant is the polygon circumscribing constant K ' φ 2/2A. Also of interest, ln(φ/α) ' φ/2A ' K/φ and 11/37 ' 2A [28]. Raji Heyrovska found it a "... surprise to find for the first time that the Bohr radius is divided into two unique sections at the point of electrical neutrality, which is the Golden point. The Golden ratio, which manifests itself in many spontaneous creations of Nature, was thus found to originate right in the core of atoms." [30]. 4. Conclusion Pauli states in his article describing Sommerfeld's contributions, "I would not hesitate to set as superscription over Sommerfeld's works in a wider sense the title of Kepler's magnum opus- -Harmonices mundi." [9]. Pauli continues, "I was well aware, as a pupil of Sommerfeld's, how these Pythagorean elements appearing in Kepler retain their vitality even today. ... That ancient spiritual 'dynamis' of number is still active, which was formerly expressed in the ancient doctrine of the Pythagoreans that numbers are the origin of all things and as harmonies represent unity in multiplicity." [9]. These calculations of the inverse fine-structure constant with the main parameters of the Great Pyramid have been directed toward a better understanding of the golden ratio as the basis for the fine-structure constant. In our previous work several more formulations for the fine-structure constant with the same approximate value have connections with prime number theory, the real fixed point of the hyperbolic cotangent, anomalous magnetic moment of the electron, Laplace limit of Kepler's equation and harmonic proportions of the Cosmological Circle [31, 32]. The proportion significant to 'squaring the circle' in the classical tradition was found by John Michell and presented in his study of what he named the Cosmological Circle. The regular heptagon and the golden ratio are both closely associated with the classical geometry of 'squaring the circle.' [33]. The long standing mystery of the fine-structure constant has also been associated with the image making faculty of consciousness, an aspect of the Egyptian Mysteries and alluded to in modern day accounts of initiation [34]-[37]. Wolfgang Pauli on the subject-object manifold: The process of understanding in nature, together with the joy that man feels in understanding, i.e., becoming acquainted with new knowledge, seems therefore to rest upon a correspondence, a coming into congruence of pre-existent internal images of the human psyche with external objects and their behavior. This view of natural knowledge goes back, of course, to Plato and was ... also very plainly adopted by Kepler. ... [On Sommerfeld] It is as though there was here an echo of Kepler's search for the harmonies in the cosmos, guided by the musical feeling for the beauty of just proportion in the sense of Pythagorean philosophy, an echo of his ... (geometry is the archetype of the beauty of the universe) [9]. 7 Acknowledgments Special thanks to Case Western Reserve University, MathWorld and WolframAlpha. References [1] Brush, S.G. Making 20th Century Science: How Theories Became Knowledge, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2015, 220. [2] Rigden, J.S. Hydrogen: The Essential Element, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003, 55. [3] Eckert, M. "How Sommerfeld extended Bohr's Model of the Atom (1913–1916)," The European Physical Journal H, 39, 2, 141-156 (2014). [4] Kragh, H. Niels Bohr and the Quantum Atom: The Bohr Model of Atomic Structure 19131925, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012, 162. [5] Eckert, M. Arnold Sommerfeld: Science, Life and Turbulent Times 1868-1951, New York, NY: Springer, 2013. [6] Sommerfeld, A. Atomic Structure and Spectral Lines, New York, NY: Dutton, 1934. [7] Kragh, H. "Magic Number: A Partial History of the Fine-Structure Constant," Archive for History of Exact Sciences, 57, 5, 395-431 (2003). [8] Sherbon, M.A. "Wolfgang Pauli and the Fine-Structure Constant," Journal of Science, 2, 3, 148-154 (2012). [9] Pauli, W., Enz, C.P. & Meyenn, K. Writings on Physics and Philosophy, Berlin: Springer, 1994. [10] Witteveen, W. The Great Pyramid of Giza: A Modern View on Ancient Knowledge, Kempton, IL: Adventures Unlimited Press, 2016, 347. [11] LaRouche, L. The Power of Reason, Washington, DC: Executive Intelligence Review, 1987, 48. [12] Beaudry, P. "Pythagorean Spherics: The Missing Link Between Egypt and Greece," 21st Century Science and Technology, 17, 2, 48-67 (2004). [13] Beaudry, P. "The Twelve Star Egyptian Sphere that Generated the Great Pyramid and the Platonic Solids," (2009). lymcanada.org [14] Director, B. "Riemann for Anti-Dummies: The View From the Top," (2006). lymcanada.org/67 8 [15] Director, B. "Riemann for Anti-Dummies: Hypergeometric Harmonics," (2006). lymcanada.org/64 [16] Seth, S. Crafting the Quantum: Arnold Sommerfeld and the Practice of Theory, 1890-1926, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2010, 201. [17] Sherbon, M.A. "Physical Mathematics and The Fine-Structure Constant," Journal of Advances in Physics, 14, 3, 5758-64 (2018). [18] Sherbon, M.A. "Fine-Structure Constant from Golden Ratio Geometry," International Journal of Mathematics and Physical Sciences Research, 5, 2, 89-100 (2018). [19] Gabrielse, G., Fayer, S.E., Myers, T.G. & Fan, X. "Towards an Improved Test of the Standard Model's Most Precise Prediction," Atoms, 7, 2, 45 (2019). [20] Aoyama, T., Kinoshita, T., & Nio, M. "Theory of the Anomalous Magnetic Moment of the Electron," Atoms, 7, 1, 28 (2019). [21] Aude, H.T.R. "Notes on Quartic Curves," The American Mathematical Monthly, 56, 3, 165-170 (1949). [22] Rinvold, R.A. "Fourth Degree Polynomials and the Golden Ratio," The Mathematical Gazette, 93, 527, 292-295 (2009). [23] Totland, H. "Quartic Polynomials and the Golden Ratio," Mathematics Magazine, 82, 3, 197-201 (2009). [24] McMullin, L. "The Golden Ratio and Quartic Polynomials," (2016). teachingcalculus.files.wordpress.com/2016 [25] Beard, R.S. "The Fibonacci Drawing Board Design of the Great Pyramid of Gizeh," The Fibonacci Quarterly, 6, 85-87 (1968). [26] Griffiths, D.J. & Schroeter, D.F. Introduction to Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2018. [27] Sherbon, M.A. "Quintessential Nature of the Fine-Structure Constant," Global Journal of Science Frontier Research, A, 15, 4, 23-26 (2015). [28] Eisen, W. "The Mysteries of the Constants (e) and (i)," in The Universal Language of Cabalah, Marina Del Rey, CA: DeVorss, 1989, 160-178. [29] Heyrovska, R. "The Golden Ratio, Ionic and Atomic Radii and Bond Lengths," Molecular Physics, 103, 877 882 (2005). [30] Heyrovska, R. "Golden Ratio Based Fine Structure Constant and Rydberg Constant for Hydrogen Spectra," International Journal of Sciences, 2, 5, 28-31 (2013). 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Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles∗ Weng Kin San forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy Abstract Fitch's Paradox shows that if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. Standard diagnoses identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the knowledge operator and Moorean contradictions as the root source of the result. This paper generalises Fitch's result to show that such diagnoses are mistaken. In place of factivity/negative infallibility, the weaker assumption of any 'level-bridging principle' suffices. A consequence is that the result holds for some logics in which the "Moorean contradiction" commonly thought to underlie the result is in fact consistent. This generalised result improves on the current understanding of Fitch's result and widens the range of modalities of philosophical interest to which the result might be fruitfully applied. Along the way, we also consider a semantic explanation for Fitch's result which answers a challenge raised by Kvanvig (2006). 1 Introduction Consider propositions of the form 'φ and it is not known thatφ'. Such propositions are unknowable. For otherwise, it would be known that: φ and it is not known that φ. And so, it would be the case that: φ is known and it is known that φ is not known. And since knowledge is factive, it would be the case that: φ is known andφ is not known. Contradiction. So, even if propositions of the form 'φ and it is not known that φ' are true, they cannot be ∗For helpful comments and discussions, I am grateful to Jeremy Goodman, John Hawthorne, Matt Hewson, and an anonymous referee. I am indebted, most of all, to Tim Williamson, who provided guidance and feedback on multiple drafts. Research on this paper was supported by the Ertegun Graduate Scholarship and the USC Dana & Dornsife Graduate School Fellowship. 1 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles known. Thus, if every truth is knowable, then there cannot be truths of the form 'φ and it is not known thatφ'. In other words, if every truth is knowable, then every truth is known. This is a rough sketch of the result commonly known as 'Fitch's Paradox' or the 'Paradox of Knowability'.1 The literature surrounding Fitch's result is extensive and continues to burgeon. However, much of it focuses on its ramifications for the knowability principle and for anti-realism. This is regrettable, for Fitch's result does not fundamentally pertain to knowability. Formulated in a bimodal language, Fitch's result simply trades on certain properties of the knowledge and possibility operators. At the abstract level, the result shows that for a certain class of modal logics, assuming that the modal operators interact in a particular way gives rise to modal collapse. Given its generality, one might try applying the result to a wider range of modalities. For instance, substituting belief for knowledge, Fitch's result would say that if every truth is possibly believed, then every truth is believed. The problem is that the standard proof of the result makes use of the factivity of knowledge. But many interesting modalities, like belief, are not factive. Some have noted that the requirement of factivity can be relaxed to a requirement of 'negative infallibility'. But still, not many modalities of philosophical interest are negatively infallible in the required sense. This paper generalises Fitch's result to show that a much weaker and more general requirement than factivity or negative infallibility suffices. In particular, a level-bridging principle of any kind will do. Both factivity and negative infallibility are instances of level-bridging principles. Other examples include the principle that evidence of evidence is evidence, the principle that whatever is normal is normally normal, and so on. This generalisation has far-ranging implications. Most importantly, it sheds new light on Fitch's result and reveals a widely accepted diagnosis of it to be false. Contrary to received wisdom, neither factivity/negative infallibility nor Moorean contradictions are at the root of the result. Furthermore, the generalised result widens the range of modalities to which Fitch's result might be fruitfully applied. There are potentially interesting implications for various debates involving level-bridging principles and Fitch-like principles in epistemology and beyond. Along the way, we also consider an illuminating semantic explanation for Fitch's result which provides an answer to a challenge raised by Kvanvig (2006). 1It was noted in Fitch (1963) but was first discovered by Alonzo Church (see Salerno (2009)). 2 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles Name Axiom Frame Condition (K) (p → q )→ (p →q ) Trivial (D) p →♦p Serial (T) p → p Reflexive (B) p →♦p Symmetric (C4) p →p Dense (4) p →p Transitive (5) ♦p →♦p Euclidean (I) p ↔p Identity Table 1: Common axioms and their frame conditions 2 Fitch's Collapse First, some preliminaries. Our language will be the propositional bimodal language with the modal operators,  and .2 As usual, ♦ is defined as ¬¬ and  as ¬¬.  and ♦ (and similarly,  and ) are each other's duals. A (bi)modal logic L is a set of sentences containing all truth-functional tautologies and that is closed under modus ponens (MP) and uniform substitution (US). φ is a theorem of L (`L φ) iff φ ∈ L; otherwise, 0L φ. L' is an extension of L and L is a sublogic of L′ iff L ⊆ L'. Table 1 lists some common axioms and their frame conditions. (The corresponding axioms for can be obtained by substituting each occurrence of  with  and each occurrence of ♦ with ). In addition to T, Fitch's result requires two other assumptions. First, according to DIST,  distributes over conjunctions: (DIST) (φ ∧ψ)→ (φ ∧ψ). Second, according to the Necessitation Rule for , ifφ is a theorem, then so is φ: (RN) If `φ, then `φ. Then, according to Fitch's result: Fitch's Collapse Theorem. Let L be closed under RN and let it contain DIST and T. If `L p →p , then `L p ↔p . Proof: First, suppose the Moorean sentence (p ∧¬p ) for a contradiction. By DIST,p∧¬p . But by T,¬p →¬p . So,p∧¬p . Contradiction. So, by reductio,`L ¬(p∧¬p ). Thus, by RN: `L ¬(p∧¬p ). Now, 2Quotation marks are omitted where no risk of confusing use and mention arises. 3 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles suppose `L p → p . Contraposing yields `L ¬p → ¬p . So, by (US), `L ¬(p∧¬p )→¬(p∧¬p ). Thus, it follows from `L ¬(p∧¬p ) that `L ¬(p∧¬p )-or equivalently,`L p →p . Furthermore, by T,`L p → p . Thus, `L p ↔p . On the usual epistemic-alethic interpretation of  and , the upshot is that the knowability principle-the principle that for every proposition, if it is true, then it is possible to know it-results in the collapse of the logical distinction between knowledge and truth. Given the knowability principle, whatever is true is known, and vice versa. But we can abstract away from the epistemic-alethic interpretation. More generally, instead of the knowability principle, we have the 'Fitch Principle': (FITCH PRINCIPLE) p →p . Fitch's result shows that given some weak assumptions, the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of . It renders  redundant in that it makes it so that for every formula φ, φ and φ are logically equivalent. In principle,  and  admit of a wide range of interpretations. So, one might try running Fitch's argument for belief, justification, evidence, provability, normality, obligation, determinacy, and so on. The main obstacle to extending Fitch's result in an interesting way to these and other modalities is that unlike knowledge, many modalities of philosophical interest do not satisfy T, the assumption of factivity. Or at any rate, for many modalities, it is controversial whether they do. So, perhaps it is no surprise that Fitch's result has not found many interesting applications beyond cases involving knowledge. Some have noted ways of relaxing the assumptions required for Fitch's result. For instance, Williamson (1993) demonstrates how the result can be derived without DIST. But insofar as we are concerned with broadening the application of Fitch's result to other modalities, being able to dispense with DIST or RN is not of much interest. It is the assumption of factivity, rather than those assumptions, that severely restricts the modalities to which the result can be fruitfully applied. A cursory inspection of the proof reveals an obvious way of weakening the requirement of factivity. In showing that (p ∧¬p ) is a contradiction, we made use of T to obtain ¬p →¬p . However, as Mackie (1980) and many others note, that is of course already furnished by the weaker axiom of negative infallibility: (NI) ¬p →¬p . 4 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles NI is weaker than T in the sense that any modal logic containing T contains NI, but not vice versa. So, with NI in place of T, we can at least show that the Fitch Principle implies that `L p →p .3 NI is a requirement of negative infallibility. According to it,  is truthentailing when it comes to sentences of the form ¬p . For instance, under the doxastic interpretation, NI encodes the assumption that beliefs about one's lack of belief are infallible. If one believes that one does not believe something, then one does not believe it.4 But weakening the requirement of factivity to one of negative infallibility does not prove to be much of an advance, at least when it comes to being able to apply Fitch's result more widely. Many modalities of philosophical interest are not widely taken to be negatively infallible in the sense required. For instance, consider the following counterexample to the negative infallibility of belief: THE IMPLICIT SEXIST: John is an avowed anti-sexist. In particular, he is prepared to defend vigorously the equality of the sexes in intelligence. Yet, in a variety of contexts, John's behavior and judgments are systematically sexist. Concerning the individual women he knows, John rarely thinks they're as intelligent as the men he knows, even when John has ample evidence of their intelligence. In group discussions, John is systematically less likely to pay attention to and take seriously the contributions of women. On the rare occasions when he does judge a woman to have expressed a novel, interesting idea, he is much more surprised than he would have been if a man had expressed the same idea. Still, John is unaware of these dispositions, and he would deny that he had them if asked (Greco, 2015, 657-658).5 It appears that John both believes that women are inferior and believes that he does not believe that women are inferior. This contradicts NI, according to which John's beliefs about what he does not believe cannot be mistaken. No doubt there are ways to explain away purported counterexamples like the ones above. Indeed, the negative infallibility of belief has its defenders. 3It is not so obvious whether `L p → p also holds. As we will later see, the General Collapse Theorem implies that it does. 4NI has been discussed by a few authors. It is axiom (5c) in Rieger's doxastic logic (2015), which he calls 'negative belief infallibility'. Smullyan (1988, 81) calls agents who obey NI under the doxastic interpretation of  'stable' and those who violate it 'peculiar'. Also see system K4! in Chellas (1980, 142). 5Greco cites this example as prima facie evidence that belief does not iterate. His example is repurposed here to serve as a counterexample to the negative infallibility of belief. 5 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles And it is validated in the standard KD45 logic for belief. But the mere existence of disagreement surrounding the negative infallibility of belief thwarts our ability to apply Fitch's result to belief with anywhere near the same dialectical force as in the case of knowledge. So, it would be desirable to be able to relax the assumption of factivity further. However, the prevailing consensus is that this cannot be done. Many identify the factivity/negative infallibility of the  operator as the fundamental source of the modal collapse noted in Fitch's result. For instance, Mackie traces the reason for Fitch's result to the factivity of : [Fitch's result] is initially surprising. But only initially. It comes about because truth-entailing operators can be used to construct self-refuting expressions (1980, 90). Similarly, Kvanvig argues that the result and its paradoxicality are intimately tied to the factivity of : it does not appear plausible in the least to suppose that consideration of other non-factive epistemic operators will generate paradoxical results of the sort found in the knowability paradox (2006, 25). Stjernberg even goes as far as to take the role that factivity plays in Fitch's result as grounds for rejecting the factivity of knowledge: Fitch's paradox of knowability also uses the factiveness of knowledge in arriving at the unexpected conclusion that if all truths are knowable, all truths are known... Since the derivation of the troubling result rests on using the principle that knowledge is factive, the Fitch result can also be avoided by giving up factiveness (2009, 31-32). If the prevailing consensus is anything to go by, the prospect of weakening the requirement of factivity to anything less than negative infallibility seems dire. This would appear to be further vindicated by the fact that Fitch's proof involves showing that (p ∧¬p ) is a contradiction. But that is a contradiction if and only if NI is a theorem. So, negative infallibility appears to be essential to Fitch's result. But appearances are misleading. Not only is it possible to weaken the requirement of negative infallibility, it is possible to weaken it dramatically. §4 shows that instead of factivity or negative infallibility, any level-bridging principle will do. But before that, the next section takes a detour into the 6 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles semantic side of things. Although this detour is illuminating and provides intuitive motivation for the generalised result proved later, the impatient reader may skip ahead or skim through it without much loss in continuity. 3 A Semantic Perspective Kvanvig writes: I am not claiming here that the paradox is unresolvable, that there is no acceptable way to explain how such a collapse can be tolerated. After all, we know of other contexts in which such a collapse occurs: in one quite popular modal system, there is no logical distinction between actual necessity and possible necessity, for example. It is worth noticing, however, that the loss of this distinction is made palatable by a semantic explanation of the loss, in terms of possible worlds and accessibility relations among them. Perhaps something similar can be done with the knowability [principle], or perhaps there is some other way to relieve our discomfort at the lost distinction resulting from Fitch's proof. The point I want to insist on is the need for some such explanation, a need arising from the fact that the result above is not merely surprising but is, instead, paradoxical (2006, 53-54). In this section, we sketch a semantic explanation of the kind that Kvanvig demands. Semantic approaches to Fitch's result are relatively uncommon.6 This is regrettable. The semantic explanations we sketch below provide a useful alternate perspective on why modal collapse results from the Fitch Principle. But more importantly for our purposes, they predict that the threat of modal collapse arises in a much larger class of modal logics than Fitch's original proof suggests. This prediction will inform our conjecture generalising Fitch's result, which we will prove in §4. We use a standard Kripke possible-worlds semantics. A bimodal Kripke frame F =<W , R, R > has a set W as its domain (whose elements we refer to as 'worlds') and two accessibility relations, R and R, relating worlds. If w Rv , we say that w -accesses v or that v is an R-successor of w . Similarly, if w Rv , we say that w -accesses v or that v is an R-successor of w . As is well-known, many common modal axioms have simple corresponding 6Some exceptions include Costa-Leite (2004, 2006), Maffezioli et al. (2012), Fischer (2013), and Artemov & Protopopescu (2013). 7 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles frame conditions. For instance, T corresponds to the reflexivity of R, 4 corresponds to the transitivity of R, and so on (see Table 1). It is easy to show that the Fitch Principle, p → p , also has a corresponding frame condition: Frame Lemma. F p →p iff F ∀x∃y (x Ry ∧∀z (y Rz → x = z )). In words, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is the condition that every world w (in the domain of the frame) has an R-successor that either: (i) has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. Pictorially (dashed arrows represent R and solid ones represent R): w v w v That is, for each world w , there must be a world v such that either: (i) the situation on the left occurs (w -accesses v and v does not -access any world), or; (ii) the one on the right occurs (w -accesses v and v -access only w ). For the rest of this section, we restrict our attention to normal modal logics, since many such logics are complete with respect to some class of Kripke frames. A normal modal logic is a modal logic that contains (K) and (K) and that is closed under the Necessitation Rules: (RN) (φ/φ) and RN (φ/φ). K ⊕K denotes the smallest normal modal logic. KA1 . . .An ⊕ KA1 . . .Am denotes the smallest normal modal logic containing A1, . . . , A n  and A1, . . . , A m  . 7 For instance, KT⊕KD is the smallest normal modal logic containing T and D. In certain cases, we use more common notation-for instance, Triv=KI. Since all normal modal logics contain DIST and are closed under RN, a normal modal logic which satisfies the assumptions in Fitch's Collapse Theorem is the smallest one containing T, i.e. KT ⊕K. KT ⊕K is complete with respect to frames where R is reflexive. Consider what happens when we assume the Fitch Principle and impose its frame condition on such frames. According to the Frame Lemma, the condition that corresponds to the Fitch Principle is that each world w must have an R-successor that either: (i) has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. But given 7Where A1, . . . , A n  are axioms containing occurrences of  but not  and A 1 , . . . , A m  are axioms containing occurrences of  but not . 8 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles the assumption that R is reflexive, (i) cannot obtain. So, it must be that (ii): each world is the sole R-successor of one of its R-successors. Now, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its sole R-successor be played by v . w and v must be identical. For, by reflexivity, v -accesses itself. So, if w and v were distinct, that would contradict the assumption that v has w as its sole R-successor. Thus, the role of having w as its sole R-successor must be played by w itself. Since w was arbitrary, this reasoning generalises. Thus, given the reflexivity of R, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle forces each world in the frame to -access only itself. Such frames validate p ↔ p . This would explain why, given KT⊕K, the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of . In a similar fashion, we can explain why negative infallibility, in place of factivity, also suffices. For instance, a normal modal logic which validates NI but not T is KD4 ⊕K, which is complete with respect to frames in which R is serial and transitive. By a similar reasoning, we can show that given the seriality and transitivity of R, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle also forces each world to -access only itself. The semantic reasoning has not thus far revealed anything we did not already know. We already knew that Fitch's result holds for systems that validate RN, DIST, and T/NI. But now consider KDC4 ⊕K, which is complete with respect to frames where R is serial and dense. Consider what happens when the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is imposed on such frames. Each world w must have an R-successor that either: (i) has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. The seriality of R rules (i) out. So, it must be that (ii): each world is the sole R-successor of one of its R-successors. Now, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its sole R-successor be played by v . In turn, let the role of having v as its sole R-successor be played by u . w and v must be identical. For, by density, it follows from uRv that there is a world t such that uRt and t Rv . However, by assumption, u -accesses only v , and so t and v must be identical, and so v Rv . And since v -accesses itself, v and w cannot be distinct. For, if they were, that would contradict the assumption that v -accesses only w . Thus, the role of having w as its sole R-successor must be played by w itself. And since w was arbitrary, this generalises to every world. Thus, given the seriality and density of R, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle again forces each world to -access only itself. If this reasoning is sound, then the Fitch Principle should also give rise to the collapse of , given KDC4⊕K. And if Fitch's result holds for KDC4⊕K, then it also holds for KD5⊕ 9 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles K, which extends KDC4⊕K. But this would mean that neither factivity nor negative infallibility is required for Fitch's result, since neither KDC4⊕ K nor KD5⊕K contains T or NI. For, consider: p (p ∧¬p ) p ¬p Since the accessibility relation for  is serial and dense, this is a model of KDC4⊕K. It is not difficult to check that it is also a model of KD5⊕K. Thus, (p ∧¬p ) is consistent in both KDC4 ⊕K and KD5 ⊕K, since it is satisfied at the leftmost point of the model. And we have shown that if (p ∧¬p ) is consistent, then NI is not a theorem and thus neither is T. So, it would appear that Fitch's result holds for a larger class of logics than is commonly recognised. In particular, it appears to hold even for logics where  is neither factive nor negatively infallible. Before we consider a significant caveat to this, we should note another interesting prediction that the semantic reasoning makes. Consider KDB⊕ K, which is complete with respect to frames where R is serial and symmetric. Again, if we impose the frame condition for the Fitch Principle on such frames, then each world w must have an R-successor that either: (i) has no R-successor or (ii) has w as its sole R-successor. Again, the seriality of R rules (i) out. So, by (ii), each world is the sole R-successor of one of its R-successors. Again, consider an arbitrary world w and let the role of having w as its sole R-successor be played by v . In turn, let the role of having v as its sole R-successor be played by u . u and w must be identical. For, by symmetry, it follows from uRv that v Ru . And so, if u and w were distinct, this would contradict the assumption that v -accesses only w . Thus, u and w are identical (and u and v are either distinct or identical). Thus, given the seriality and symmetry of R, the frame condition for the Fitch Principle forces the frame to contain only non-reflexive, symmetric -pairs of worlds (if u 6= v ) and/or worlds that -access only themselves (if u = v ): Such frames validate p ↔p . This suggests an extension of Fitch's result. With the logics considered previously, the Fitch Principle results in the collapse of  (i.e. φ and φ are logically equivalent). It would seem that with 10 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles KDB⊕K, the Fitch Principle results in the collapse of (i.e. φ andφ are logically equivalent). At this juncture, it is important to note a caveat. The kind of semantic reasoning engaged in throughout this section does not have the force of proper proofs. And that is because to reason as we did, we require certain completeness results which are not readily available. For instance, one result that is missing would show that the smallest normal extension of KT⊕K containing the Fitch Principle is complete with respect to the class of frames where R is reflexive and the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is satisfied. Another would show that the smallest normal extension of KD4⊕K containing the Fitch Principle is complete with respect to the class of frames where R is serial and transitive, and the frame condition for the Fitch Principle is satisfied. And so on. Without such results, we cannot properly infer what is provable in certain logics containing the Fitch Principle from what holds in certain frames satisfying its corresponding frame condition. Nevertheless, as we will soon see, the predictions of the semantic reasoning are in fact vindicated. So, that provides some evidence that the required completeness results can be had, though proving them lies beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, that does not render this section all for naught. Taking the semantic explanations as merely suggestive predictions about when the Fitch Principle might generate modal collapse turns out to be highly instructive. Those predictions inform a conjecture generalising Fitch's result, which we can prove via non-semantic means. That is the aim of the next section. 4 General Collapse We know from Fitch's result that the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of (i.e. ` p ↔p ) in KT⊕K and KD4⊕K. The semantic explanation in the previous section predicts that this collapse also occurs in KDC4⊕K and KD5 ⊕K. Furthermore, it also predicts that the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of  (i.e. ` p ↔p ) in KDB⊕K. An interesting pattern emerges. Let M1 and M2 denote arbitrary strings of  and ♦. And let |M1 −M2| be the difference in the number of operators in M1 and M2. For instance, if M1 = and M2 =♦♦, then |M1−M2| = 3. And if M1 = ♦♦♦♦ and M2 = ♦, then |M1 −M2| = 5. Notice that the logics for which the Fitch Principle is expected to give rise to the collapse of  all extend some logic of the form KDX⊕K, where X is M1p →M2p with |M1−M2| = 1. For instance, T (p → p ) has one operator to the left of the 11 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles conditional and none to the right, and KT⊕K is equivalent to KDT⊕K, since T implies D. Similarly, 4 (p →p ), 5 (♦p →♦p ), and C4 (p →p ) each has two operators on one side of the conditional and one on the other. Notice furthermore that B (p →♦p ), on the other hand, has two operators on the right of the conditional and none on the other. Thus, the logic for which the Fitch Principle is expected to give rise to the collapse of  is of the form KDX⊕K, where X is M1p →M2p with |M1−M2|= 2. A natural conjecture is thus that the 'degree' of modal collapse caused by the Fitch Principle in logics extending KDX ⊕K, where X is of the form M1p → M2p , is a function of the difference in the number of operators in M1 and M2. More specifically, when |M1−M2|= n , the Fitch Principle gives rise to the collapse of n (where n abbreviates n ≥ 0 iterations of  and 0 is the empty string). Or to put things differently, let us call a principle of the form M1p →M2p with |M1−M2|= n an 'n-level bridging principle'. So, for instance, T (p → p ) and 4 (p →p ) are both one-level bridging principles, whereas B (p →♦p ) is a two-level bridging principle. And call p ↔n p 'nth-degree modal collapse'. Then, the conjecture is that given an n-level bridging principle, the Fitch Principle gives rise to nth-degree modal collapse. The aim of this section is to prove this conjecture. More precisely, we prove the following generalisation of Fitch's result: General Collapse Theorem. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain D and some n-level bridging principle. If `L p → p , then `L p ↔n p .8 RM is the Monotonicity Rule for . According to it, if φ→ψ is a theorem, then so is φ→ψ: (RM) If `φ→ψ, then `φ→ψ. We call modal logics closed under RM '-monotonic'. A fact about monotonic logics is that they validate Duality: (DUALITY) If `M1p →M2p , then ` M2p → M1p , 8The General Collapse Theorem is a result in bimodal logic. But since nothing in the proof depends on  and  being distinct operators, the following is an immediate consequence for monomodal logics: Corollary 1. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain D and some n-level bridging principle. If `L p →♦p , then `L p ↔n p . 12 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles where, in general, M is the dual string of M (e.g. if M = ♦♦, then M = ♦♦). It is well known that normal modal logics validate Duality. For instance, it is a familiar fact that given normality, T (p → p ) can be equivalently formulated as p →♦p and 4 (p →p ) as ♦♦p →♦p , and so on. -monotonicity suffices for this to hold. Furthermore, as in normal modal logics,  also distributes over conjunctions in -monotonic logics. That is, all -monotonic logics contain DIST. Given these facts, we can prove the General Collapse Theorem in three simple steps. The first step is to show that given RM and D, any n-level bridging principle implies m p → ♦m+n p , for some m . The second step is to show that given RM, RN, and the Fitch Principle, m p → ♦m+n p implies p → ♦n p , for any m , n . The third and final step is to show that given RM, RN, and the Fitch Principle, p →♦n p implies p ↔n p , for any n . Step 1. First, we show: Lemma 1. Let L be closed under RM and let it contain D. If L contains an n-level bridging principle, then L contains m p →♦m+n p , for some m. This is fairly intuitive. To illustrate, consider the following two-level bridging principle: ♦p → ♦p . Now, according to D, p → ♦p . So, intuitively, p → ♦p and ♦p → ♦♦♦♦p . And so, it follows from ♦p →♦p that p → ♦♦♦♦p , i.e. 2p → ♦4p . So, Lemma 1 holds in this instance. Alternatively, consider a two-level bridging principle with more operators on the left-hand side: e.g. ♦p →♦p . By Duality, it is equivalent to one with more operators on the right hand side, i.e. ♦p → ♦♦♦p . Thus, in the same way as before, we can use D to derive 2p → ♦4p . This reasoning generalises. Any n-level bridging principle either is or is equivalent by Duality to a principle of the form O1 . . . Om p → O ′1 . . . O ′ m+n p , for some m , where each O1 . . . Om , O ′ 1 . . . O ′ m+n is either  or ♦. Intuitively, it follows from D that m p → O1 . . . Om p and O ′1 . . . O ′ m+n p → ♦ m+n p . And so, any n-level bridging principle implies, for some m , m p →♦m+n p . The idea behind the proof is simple. The only technicality is checking that RM is strong enough for regimenting the informal line of reasoning above-that is a tedious but easy exercise. Step 2. Second, we show: Lemma 2. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain the Fitch Principle. For any m , n, if `L m p →♦m+n p , then `L p →♦n p . 13 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles The proof of this relies on the fact that given the Fitch Principle, we can gradually subtract from `L m p →♦m+n p a  on the left of the conditional and a ♦ on the right. That is, we can show that for any i ≥ 0: if `L i+1p →♦(i+1)+n p , then `L i p →♦i+n p . (†) In turn, the proof of this uses exactly the same kind of reasoning that underlies the usual proof of Fitch's result. First, we identify a 'Moorean' contradiction. Suppose for a contradiction that (i p ∧¬♦i+n p ). Distributing  over the conjunction yields i+1p ∧ ¬♦i+n p . However, contraposing the antecedent of (†) yields`L ¬♦i+n p → ¬i+1p . Thus, given the antecedent of (†), we derive a contradiction: i+1p∧ ¬i+1p . So, by reductio,`L ¬(i p∧¬♦i+n p ). And so by RN,`L ¬(i p∧ ¬♦i+n p ). Now, since L contains the Fitch Principle, i.e. `L p → p , by contraposition, `L ¬p →¬p . And so, by (US), `L ¬(i p ∧¬♦i+n p )→ ¬(i p∧¬♦i+n p ). Thus, it follows from what we showed above that`L ¬(i p∧ ¬♦i+n p )-or equivalently,`L i p →♦i+n p . Thus, (†). And from that, Lemma 2 easily follows since by (†), `L m p →♦m+n p implies`L m−1p →♦m+n−1p , which in turn implies `L m−2p → ♦m+n−2p , and so on until `L m−m p → ♦m+n−m p . Step 3. Finally, we show: Lemma 3. Let L be closed under RN and RM, and let it contain the Fitch Principle. For any n, if `L p →♦n p , then `L p ↔n p .9 It is an immediate consequence of Duality that if`L p →♦n p , then`L n p → p . So, all that is left to show is that if `L p → ♦n p , then `L p → n p . We prove this by showing that given the Fitch Principle, we can turn the ♦'s into 's, one by one, from the inside out. That is, we prove by induction on the number i of operators that for any i ≤ n : if `L p →♦n p , then `L p →♦n−ii p . (*) The base case where i = 0 is trivial. For the inductive step, let the inductive hypothesis be: if `L p → ♦n p , then `L p → ♦n−ii p . We will show that: if `L p →♦n p , then `L p →♦n−(i+1)i+1p . Again, the proof of this is similar to the usual proof of Fitch's result. First, we identify a 'Moorean' contradiction. Suppose `L p → ♦n p . And assume 9Note that the case where n = 1 is just Fitch's original result, since by Duality, T is equivalent to p →♦1p . 14 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles for a contradiction that (p ∧ ¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). By DIST, p ∧¬♦n−(i+1) i+1p . However, by the inductive hypothesis: `L p →♦n−ii p . It follows by (US) that`L p →♦n−ii+1p . And so by contraposition,`L ¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p →¬p . And thus fromp∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p , we can derive a contradiction: p ∧¬p . So, by reductio, `L ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). And so by RN, `L ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). Now, assume the Fitch Principle, `L p →p . By contraposition,`L ¬p →¬p . And so, by (US),`L ¬(p∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ) → ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p ). Thus, it follows from what we showed above that `L ¬(p ∧¬♦n−(i+1)i+1p )-or equivalently, `L p → ♦n−(i+1)i+1p . This completes the inductive step. And thus, (*), from which Lemma 3 easily follows (let i = n). The General Collapse Theorem follows from Lemmas 1-3 by a simple chain of implications. So, we have generalised Fitch's result so that factivity/negative infallibility is not required. In its place is the much more general requirement of a level-bridging principle of any kind. More specifically, we showed that given some weak background assumptions, the presence of an n-level bridging principle means that the Fitch Principle gives rise to nthdegree modal collapse. That is, given `M1p →M2p , where |M1 −M2| = n , if ` p → p then ` p ↔ n p . For instance, given a three-level bridging principle like p → ♦♦p , the Fitch Principle gives rise to third-degree modal collapse (i.e. the collapse of ). But for all we have shown, it is possible that a stronger result holds. Perhaps the three-level bridging principle above also suffices for the Fitch Principle to give rise to second-degree modal collapse. Or, perhaps given the Fitch Principle, any level-bridging principle whatsoever suffices for the full collapse of . That is not ruled out by the General Collapse Theorem. But that is not the case. The modal collapse identified in the General Collapse Theorem is, in a sense, the full extent of the collapse. The degree of the modal collapse that occurs really is essentially a function of the difference in the number of operators in the level-bridging principle. For a precise statement and proof of this, the reader is referred to the Appendix. 5 Diagnosing Fitch's Result The General Collapse Theorem informs our understanding of Fitch's result in important ways. In particular, it invalidates standard diagnoses of the result. First, factivity or negative infallibility is often thought to be the ultimate source of the modal collapse identified in Fitch's result. The quotes 15 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles from Mackie, Kvanvig, and Stjernberg from earlier are illustrative. However, the General Collapse Theorem shows that what underlies the result is, more generally, a level-bridging principle of any kind. To be sure, the principles of factivity and negative infallibility are instances of level-bridging principles. But to identify factivity or negative infallibility as the root of Fitch's result would be to falsely diagnose as a cause what is in fact merely a symptom of a more general pathology. Another common diagnosis takes 'Moorean' contradictions of the form (p ∧ ¬p ) to be at the base of Fitch's result. A key step of Fitch's original proof involves showing that (p ∧ ¬p ) is a contradiction. This has led many to believe that Fitch's result is inextricably linked to Moorean sentences. For instance: "the Moore sentence is at the root of Fitch's famous "paradox of knowability"" (Holliday & Icard III, 2010); "the Fitch paradox... can be seen as derivative from Moore's paradox" (Bonnay & Égré, 2011, 105); "the epistemic Moore sentence p ∧ ¬Ka p lies... at the bottom of the Fitch paradox" (Égré, 2014, 538); "Fitch's paradox is intimately tied to [the] socalled "Moore's paradox"" (Cresto, 2017). While contradictions that might very loosely be called 'Moorean' do play a role (the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 make use of such contradictions), the connection between Moorean phenomena and the Fitchean phenomena of modal collapse is more complicated than commonly thought. The General Collapse Theorem implies that the Fitch Principle can give rise to the collapse of  even for logics in which (p ∧¬p ) is consistent. In particular, the General Collapse Theorem applies to KDC4 ⊕K and KD5 ⊕K. As we showed in §3, (p ∧¬p ) is consistent in those logics.10 These improvements on our understanding of the source of Fitch's result and its extent have important downstream consequences. In particular, they help in evaluating various responses to the result. For instance, consider those who cite Fitch's result as a reason to reject the principle that knowledge is factive: In discussions of Fitch's paradox, it is usually assumed without further argument that knowledge is factive, that if a subject knows that p , then p is true. It is argued that this common assumption is not as well-founded as it should be, and that there in fact 10Instead of those of the form (p ∧¬p ), one might characterise Moorean sentences (for a logic L) more broadly as sentences of the form φ such thatφ is consistent but φ is not (i.e. 0L ¬φ and `L ¬φ). Sentences φ with this feature are sometimes called '(logical) blindspots' (Sorensen, 1988). But doing this will not help restore the connection between Fitch's result and Moorean phenomena-for, it is obvious that Fitch's result holds for Triv⊕ K, for which there are no 'blindspots'. 16 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles are certain reasons to be suspicious of the unrestricted version of the factiveness claim... Since the derivation of the troubling result rests on using the principle that knowledge is factive, the Fitch result can also be avoided by giving up factiveness (Stjernberg, 2009, 29-32). The General Collapse Theorem deprives this kind of response of any force. Contra Stjernberg, Fitch's result cannot be avoided by simply giving up the factivity of knowledge. In fact, every single level-bridging principle for knowledge must be given up.11 Another upshot concerns analogues of the knowability principle with non-factive operators in place of knowledge. For instance, Mackie (1980) and Chase & Rush (2018) discuss analogues of the knowability principle involving justification and verification, Edgington (1985, 2010) and Williamson (forthcoming) discuss analogues involving probability, predictability, and non-factive evidence, and Chalmers (2012) considers an analogue involving scrutability. The General Collapse Theorem shows that whether the operator in question is factive/negatively infallible does not go to the heart of the matter. The threat of modal collapse looms so long as the operator obeys some level-bridging principle. For instance, if having been verified to be verified implies having been verified, then the verifiability principle is just as vulnerable to Fitch's result as the knowability principle. The General Collapse Theorem also brings into question other uses to which Fitch's result has been put. For instance, Chase & Rush (2018) argue that the result poses special problems for internalists about justification. They recognise that, in place of T, D and 4 suffice for Fitch's result. Interpreting in terms of justification, they surmise that since internalists are inclined to accept 4, they are forced to reject the justificatory analogue of the knowability principle, on pain of losing the logical distinction between truth and justification. But given the General Collapse Theorem, even if this is a problem, it is not a problem specific to internalists. For, it is not only internalists who accept 4 that have to reject the justifiability principle. Anyone who accepts any level-bridging principle for justification must too. And it is not clear that the tenability of level-bridging principles like 'if there is justification for there being justification for p , then there is not justification for not-p ' is a partisan issue divided along internalist-externalist lines. So, 11That is, every non-trivial level-bridging principle, i.e. n-level bridging principles where n 6= 0. For convenience, I will often write 'level-bridging principles' when I mean 'non-trivial level-bridging principles'. Context should make it clear when the trivial case is meant to be excluded. 17 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles Fitch's result cannot be mobilised in the way that Chase and Rush do to adjudicate on the internalist-externalist debate. 6 The Fitch Principle vs Level-Bridging Principles The General Collapse Theorem has other important implications. It exposes a tension between the Fitch Principle, on the one hand, and level-bridging principles for , on the other. Together, they give rise to modal collapse. And since modal collapse of any degree is undesirable for most modalities of philosophical interest, either the Fitch Principle must be rejected or all level-bridging principles must be rejected. This has potentially interesting implications for issues spanning many areas for philosophy. 6.1 The Fitch Principle First, consider the Fitch Principle. The doxastic-deontic interpretation of  and  is an interesting case. On such an interpretation, the Fitch Principle (p →p ) formalises a weak, narrow-scope truth norm of belief: (TRUTH) If p is true, then it is permissible to believe p . Whiting (2013) and others defend such a norm. TRUTH also follows from various other norms, such as: the strong narrow-scope truth norm according to which, if p is true, then it is obligatory to believe p ; or (assuming that the permissibility of being certain that p implies the permissibility of believing p ) the norm according to which if p is true, then it is permissible to be certain that p ; or (assuming that the permissibility of asserting p implies the permissibility of believing p ), the norm according to which if p is true, then it is permissible to assert that p ; and so on. The background assumptions of the General Collapse Theorem (i.e. RM and RN) are plausible on the doxastic-deontic interpretation. In fact, both doxastic and deontic logic are standardly taken to satisfy KD45. The upshot is that given any level-bridging principle for belief, TRUTH gives rise to modal collapse. In particular, given any one-level bridging principle like 'believing implies believing that one believes', TRUTH results in the loss of any logical distinction between truth and belief-everything true is believed and everything believed is true. Similarly, given any two-level bridging principle like 'believing that one believes that one believes p implies that p is consistent with one's beliefs', TRUTH results in the loss of any logical distinction between truth and second-order belief-everything true is believed to be believed and vice versa. 18 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles Modal collapse of any degree is undesirable, since truth is not equivalent to belief of any order. Thus, proponents of TRUTH must reject every level-bridging principle for belief. Consequently, so must proponents of norms that entail TRUTH, like the ones previously listed. To be sure, this is not a decisive refutation of TRUTH or those stronger norms. But the fact that their proponents are so severely restricted in which principles governing belief they can endorse might diminish the appeal of those norms. Notably, competing norms for belief, such as wide-scope truth norms or knowledge norms, do not obviously face similar problems, since unlike TRUTH, their logical forms do not map onto that of the Fitch Principle. There might be lingering suspicions that this problem is simply derivative of the problem that Moorean sentences are thought to pose for truth norms of belief (see Bykvist & Hattiangadi (2007, 2013)). Such concerns about the novelty of the problem raised here are easily dispelled. We have already seen that, contrary to conventional wisdom, there is no straightforward connection between Moorean phenomena and the phenomenon of modal collapse identified in the General Collapse Theorem. Besides the doxastic-deontic interpretation, there are various other interesting interpretations of the Fitch Principle to consider. To note just one, interpret  as 'God wills it to be the case that' and  as 'it is logically necessary that'. Then, the Fitch Principle is the principle according to which every truth is such that it is logically possible that God wills it to be the case. This seems undeniable for an omnipotent being. However, the upshot of the General Collapse Theorem is that if  obeys any level-bridging principle at all (for instance, the one-level bridging principle according to which God's will is 'non-akratic', in the sense that if God wills that God wills that p , then God wills that p ) then modal collapse occurs-whatever is true is God's will and vice versa.12 This is an undesirable result for theists. 6.2 Level-Bridging Principles Besides principles that have the form of the Fitch Principle, the General Collapse Theorem also sheds light on various level-bridging principles, many of which are the subject of vigorous debate. For instance, externalists and internalists are divided on level-bridging principles for justification, such as: if there is justification for believing something, then there is justification for believing that there is justification for believing it (J p → J J p ); its con12A background assumption is D, the assumption that God's will is consistent (i.e. if God wills that p , then God does not will that not-p ). 19 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles verse (J J p → J p ); if there is not justification for believing something, then there is justification for believing that there is not justification for believing it (¬J p → J¬J p ); and its converse (J¬J p → ¬J p ) (see Smithies (2012) for a defence of all four principles). The upshot of the General Collapse Theorem is that accepting any such principle requires rejecting p → J p , for any interpretation of  on which RN is plausible. For instance, it requires denying that every truth is such that there is possibly justification for believing it, every truth is such that there is permissibly justification for believing it, and so on. Various level-bridging principles for evidence are also matters of dispute. For instance, proponents of the 'E=K '-thesis like Williamson (2000) believe that evidence is factive (E p → p ) while others disagree. There is also disagreement about whether evidence of evidence is evidence (E E p → E p ) (see Feldman (2014) and Fitelson (2012)). If either of those principles hold, then on pain of modal collapse, p →E p must fail for any interpretation of  on which RN is plausible. For instance, it cannot be that every truth is such that for all one knows, there is evidence for it or that every truth is such that it is not normally the case that there is not evidence for it. Similarly, there is debate surrounding level-bridging principles for other interpretations of . For instance, Smith's (2006) logic validates the principle that whatever is normally the case is normally, normally the case (N p → N N p ), which Carter (forthcoming) challenges. The issue of whether 'ought' iterates (O p →O O p ) is also a live one (see Immerman (forthcoming)). This is far from an exhaustive list of interesting level-bridging principles to consider. But in each case, the General Collapse Theorem shows that accepting a level-bridging principle for requires rejecting the Fitch Principle (p →p ) for any interpretation of  on which RN is plausible, insofar as modal collapse is to be avoided. The hope is that in each case, weighing the relevant level-bridging principles against various principles of the form p →p can help shed light on the tenability of those level-bridging principles and help move the debates forward. But one might be skeptical about whether this kind of application of the General Collapse Theorem can actually inform the debates on level-bridging principles in any interesting way. After all, on the original epistemic-alethic interpretation, when it came down to choosing between the factivity of knowledge and the knowability principle, it is clearly the latter that should be rejected. So, why think that the tension between the level-bridging principles and the Fitch Principle should ever put any pressure on the level-bridging principles? Why shouldn't the tension always be resolved in favour of the 20 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles level-bridging principles, as in the epistemic-alethic case? The difference is that it is not always as clear as in the epistemic-alethic case whether to place the blame for the threat of modal collapse on the Fitch Principle or on the level-bridging principles. For one, the various levelbridging principles for justification, evidence, normality, obligation, and so on are nowhere near as uncontentious as the factivity of knowledge. For another, in the case of knowledge, Fitch's proof already furnishes straightforward counterexamples to the knowability principle of the form 'p and it is not known that p '. And while this is also the case with other factive operators, we have already noted that, depending on the level-bridging principle under consideration, there may not always be similarly straightforward counterexamples to the Fitch Principle, since(p∧¬p )may not always be a contradiction. In fact, there are unlikely to be highly general and abstract considerations that adjudicate between the Fitch Principle and the level-bridging principles. Whether it is the level-bridging principles that should give way to the Fitch Principle or the other way around will likely have to be decided on a case-by-case basis. Each particular interpretation of  deserves specialised attention. The task of weighing the Fitch Principle against the various levelbridging principles, for each interpretation of , lies beyond the scope of this paper. 7 Conclusion Hart called Fitch's result "an unjustly neglected logical gem" (1979, 164). This remark of Hart's was made four decades ago, which is more than a decade after the publication of Fitch's paper and more than three decades since Alonzo Church first conveyed the result to Fitch in 1945. The intervening years since Hart's remark have seen a massive upsurge in interest in the result, mostly focusing on its implications for the knowability principle and for anti-realism. Even so, as I hope to have shown in this paper, we have barely scratched the surface of the logical and philosophical gem that is Fitch's result. Up till now, we have failed to appreciate the full extent and generality of the result and its potential applicability to a wide variety of philosophical issues, ranging from norms for belief and whether evidence of evidence is evidence to iteration principles for normality and obligation. Once generalised, the potential of Fitch's result is limitless, constrained only by our ability to think of interesting modalities to apply it to. But that is not all. Further underscoring Hart's remark concerning the 21 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles neglected potential of Fitch's result is the fact that the possibility of extending Fitch's result in interesting ways goes beyond what we showed in this paper. In this paper, we focused on the Fitch Principle (p → p ). But we might consider, more generally, for any principle of the form X (φ→ψ), its modally qualified counterpart, X (φ→ ψ). On the alethic interpretation of , while X is the principle thatφ impliesψ, X   is the apparently weaker principle that φ implies possiblyψ. Put very generally, the lesson of Fitch's result is that in some cases, X might turn out to be as strong as its unqualified counterpart, X. In particular, the Fitch Principle (p →p ) turns out to be as strong as its unqualified counterpart, p →p . In San (forthcoming), I show that this insight can be generalised to many other interesting instances of X and X  . For example, given some weak assumptions, 4 (p → p ) and 5   (♦p → ♦p ) turn out to jointly imply 4 (p → p ) and 5 (♦p → ♦p ). This means, for instance, that interpreting  in terms of knowledge and  in terms of alethic necessity, the apparently weak variants of KK and K¬K-according to which knowing implies the possibility of knowing that one knows and not knowing implies the possibility of knowing that one does not know-taken together, turn out to have the full logical strength of their unqualified counterparts, KK and K¬K-according to which knowing implies knowing that one knows and not knowing implies knowing that one does not know. This has important epistemological implications, which I explore in another paper. It remains to be seen what further logical and philosophical insights can be mined from Fitch's result. A Appendix We show that the modal collapse identified in the General Collapse Theorem is, in a sense, the full extent of the collapse. More precisely: No Collapse Theorem. Let X be an n-level bridging principle and let L be the smallest normal extension of KDX⊕S5 containing the Fitch Principle. Then, for every i 6= k n, where k is an integer, 0L p ↔ i p . (Thus, also 0L′ p ↔i p , for every sublogic L′ of L). In particular, there is a model of L where for every i 6= k n , p ∧¬i p is satisfied somewhere. First, let there be countably infinitely many worlds, with each one indexed by an integer. Then, let R be such that each world -accesses only the world whose index is the integer succeeding it, i.e. . . . , w−2Rw−1, w−1Rw0, w0Rw1, w1Rw2, . . . . And let R be the universal accessibility relation, i.e. every world -accesses every other world. Finally, 22 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles let p be true only at wk n , for every integer k . More formally, the model M =<W , R, R, V > is such that: W = {wi | i ∈Z}; R = {<wi , wi+1 > | i ∈Z}; R = {<wi , w j > | i , j ∈Z}; V (p ) = {wi | i = k n , k ∈Z}, for every propositional letter p . The resulting model is depicted below with solid arrows representing R and dashed ones representing R (with the reflexive and transitive R–arrows omitted): p w0 ¬p w1 . . . ¬p wn−1 p wn¬p wn+1 . . .¬p w2n−1 ¬pw−1 . . . ¬p w−n+1 p w−n . . . . . . Clearly, by construction, for every i 6= k n , p ∧ ¬i p is satisfied at w0. So, all that is left to check is that the model above is a model of L. It is a model of KD ⊕ S5, since R is serial and R is universal. Furthermore, for any m , ♦m p → m+n p is satisfied throughout the model. (Intuitively, this is because the model is constructed such that things look exactly the same from the perspective of worlds that are n-steps apart). And we can prove that, given D, for any n-level bridging principle, there is some m such that ♦m p → m+n p is stronger (in a way similar to the proof of Lemma 1 that given D, for any n-level bridging principle, there is some m such that m p → ♦m+n p is weaker). And so, if ♦m p →m+n p is satisfied throughout the model for any m , then so is any n-level bridging principle. So, where X is an n-level bridging principle, the model above is a model of KDX⊕S5. Finally, the model also satisfies the frame condition associated with the Fitch Principle (see the Frame Lemma), since every world -accesses some world that-accesses only it. In particular, for every integer k , wk -accesses wk−1 and wk−1 -accesses only wk . Thus, the model above is a model of L, 23 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles where L is the smallest normal extension of KDX⊕S5 containing the Fitch Principle. And so, the No Collapse Theorem follows. References Artemov, Sergei, & Protopopescu, Tudor. 2013. Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese, 190(16), 3349–3376. Bell, David, & Hart, William D. 1979. The Epistemology of Abstract Objects: Access and Inference. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 53, 153–165. Bonnay, Denis, & Égré, Paul. 2011. Knowing One's Limits: An Analysis in Centered Dynamic Epistemic Logic. In: Girard, Patrick, Roy, Oliver, & Marion, Mathieu (eds), Dynamic Formal Epistemology. Springer. Bykvist, Krister, & Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2007. Does Thought Imply Ought? Analysis, 67(4), 277–285. Bykvist, Krister, & Hattiangadi, Anandi. 2013. Belief, Truth, and Blindspots. In: Chan, Timothy (ed), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. Carter, Sam. forthcoming. Higher-Order Ignorance Inside the Margins. Philosophical Studies. Chalmers, David. 2012. Constructing the World. Oxford University Press. Chase, James, & Rush, Penelope. 2018. Factivity, Consistency and Knowability. Synthese, 195, 899–918. Chellas, Brian. 1980. Modal Logic: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. Costa-Leite, Alexandre. 2004. Combining Possibility and Knowledge. In: Carnielli, F., Dionisio, F., & Mateus, P. (eds), Proceedings of the Workshop on the Combination of Logics: Theory and Applications. IST-Department of Mathematics, Center for Logic and Computation. Costa-Leite, Alexandre. 2006. Fusions of Modal Logics and Fitch's Paradox. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, 6(17), 281–290. Cresto, Eleonora. 2017. Lost in translation: Unknowable Propositions in Probabilistic Frameworks. Synthese, 194, 3955–3977. Edgington, Dorothy. 1985. The Paradox of Knowability. Mind, 94, 557–568. 24 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles Edgington, Dorothy. 2010. Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth. Synthese, 173(1), 41–52. Égré, Paul. 2014. Epistemic Logic. In: Horsten, Leon, & Pettigrew, Richard (eds), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophical Logic. Bloomsbury. Feldman, Richard. 2014. Evidence of Evidence is Evidence. In: Matheson, & Vitz (eds), The Ethics of Belief. Oxford University Press. Fischer, Martin. 2013. Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese, 190(1), 63–88. Fitch, Frederic. 1963. A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts. The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 28, 135–142. Fitelson, Branden. 2012. Evidence of Evidence is not (Necessarily) Evidence. Analysis, 72(1), 85–88. Greco, Daniel. 2015. Iteration and Fragmentation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 91(3), 656–673. Holliday, Wesley H., & Icard III, Thomas F. 2010. Moorean Phenomena in Epistemic Logic. In: Bekelemishev, L., Goranko, V., & Shehtman, V. (eds), Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 8. College Publications. Immerman, Daniel. forthcoming. Does Ought Imply Ought Ought? Philosophical Quarterly. Kvanvig, Jonathan. 2006. The Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. Mackie, John L. 1980. Truth and Knowability. Analysis, 40(2), 90–92. Maffezioli, Paolo, Naibo, Alberto, & Negri, Sara. 2012. The Church-Fitch Knowability Paradox in the Light of Structural Proof Theory. Synthese, 190(14), 2677–2716. Rieger, Adam. 2015. Moore's Paradox, Introspection and Doxastic Logic. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4, 215–227. Salerno, Joe. 2009. Knowability Noir: 1945-1963. In: Salerno, Joe (ed), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. San, Weng Kin. forthcoming. Disappearing Diamonds: Fitch-Like Results in Bimodal Logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic. 25 Fitch's Paradox and Level-Bridging Principles Smith, Martin. 2006. Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36(1), 97–121. Smithies, Declan. 2012. Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85(2), 273–300. Smullyan, Raymond M. 1988. Forever Undecided: A Puzzle Guide to Gödel. Oxford University Press. Sorensen, Roy. 1988. Blindspots. Clarendon Press. Stjernberg, Fredrik. 2009. Restricting Factiveness. Philosophical Studies, 146, 29–48. Whiting, Daniel. 2013. Nothing but the Truth: On the Norms and Aims of Belief. In: Chan, Timothy (ed), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy. 1993. Verificationism and Non-Distributive Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 71(1), 78–86. Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press. Williamson, Timothy. forthcoming. Edgington on Possible Knowledge of Unknown Truth. In: Hawthorne, John, & Walters, Lee (eds), Conditionals, Probability, and Paradox: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford University Press.

. Trinity Monotheism and the Challenge of Polytheism According to the Athanasian Creed, "the Father is God, and the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God," that is, "each Person by himself is God"; nevertheless, "they are not three Gods, but one God." These words imply that the Father is not a different God from the Son, and if not a different God, then the same God. The Athanasian Creed also affirms that "there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost." These words imply that the Father is a different Person from the Son, and if a different Person, then not the same Person. I take it that the Athanasian Creed here expresses two claims that are partially constitutive of the doctrine of the Trinity. The Sameness Claim: the Father is the same God as the Son. The Difference Claim: the Father is not the same Person as the Son. These two claims arguably contradict each other. If we suppose that the relation of sameness that is affirmed in the Sameness Claim is absolute identity, then the Sameness Claim is an abbreviation of the following conjunction: The Father has the property of being a God, the Son has the property of being a God, and The Person Identity Claim: the Father is absolutely identical with the Son. In like fashion, if we suppose that the relation of sameness that is denied in the Difference Claim is absolute identity (and if we suppose that the Father is a Person and that the Son is a Person, two other claims partially constitutive of the doctrine of the Trinity), then the Difference Claim is an abbreviation of the following conjunction: The Father has the property of being a Person, the Son has the property of being a Person, and the denial of the Person Identity Claim, namely, the Father is not absolutely identical with the 375 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI VOL. 5, NO. 2 COPYRIGHT © 2003 Trinity Monotheism DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER Department of Philosophy Western Washington University Bellingham, Washington PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 375 Son. Thus, given our suppositions, the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim cannot both be true; their conjunction entails a contradiction. How might the Trinitarian respond? One option is to deny that the relation of sameness that is affirmed in the Sameness Claim and that is denied in the Difference Claim is absolute identity.1 Another option is to insist that, properly understood, the conjunction of the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim does not lead to contradiction, even if the relation of sameness expressed in both claims is absolute identity. This is the route taken by J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig.2 According to Moreland and Craig, if the Sameness Claim is to be read in a coherent fashion, it must be interpreted as a way of ascribing the same property or office of divinity to each of the Father and the Son.3 In that case, the Sameness Claim should be interpreted as a conjunction of the following three claims: (1) the Father is divine, (2) the Son is divine, and (3) The Property Identity Claim: the property of divinity that the Father instantiates is absolutely identical with the property of divinity that the Son instantiates. The Father and the Son share in common the very same property in virtue of which each of them is divine; it is false that the Father exemplifies one property of divinity and the Son exemplifies another property of divinity. There exists exactly one property of divinity that each of the Persons exemplifies. In contrast with the Sameness Claim understood as implying the Person Identity Claim, the Sameness Claim understood as implying the Property Identity Claim does not imply that the Father is absolutely identical with the 376 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 1 In what follows, I will assume that the relation of sameness in question is absolute identity. My assumption should not be mistaken for endorsement, however. Peter van Inwagen has constructed a logic of relative identity, and in that logic the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim are consistent both with themselves and a host of other orthodox Trinitarian and incarnational claims. See his "And Yet They are not Three Gods but One God," and "Not by Confusion of Substance, but by Unity of Person," in God, Knowledge, and Mystery (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1995). Jeffrey Brower and Michael Rea have defined a relation of numerical sameness with neither absolute nor relative identity, and it, for all I know, might be the relation in virtue of which the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim are compatible. See their "Material Constitution and the Trinity," Faith and Philosophy (forthcoming). 2 My first interaction with the Trinitarianism of Moreland and Craig was through Craig's "Toward a Sensible Social Trinitarianism," presented at the Seventy-Fourth Annual Meeting of the Society for the Philosophy of Religion, Hilton Head Island, South Carolina, March 2003, which I commented on at that meeting. Since then, I learned that the paper was excerpted from chapter 29, in their enormous, coauthored Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2003), 575–96. 3 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 590–1. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 376 Son. Interpreting the Sameness Claim in this way avoids the contradiction argued for above. Unfortunately, reading the Sameness Claim as implying the Property Identity Claim arguably contradicts another claim that is partially constitutive of the doctrine of the Trinity, namely Monotheism: there exists exactly one God. Here is why. First, the Difference Claim entails that the Father is not absolutely identical with the Son. Second, the Sameness Claim, understood as implying the Property Identity Claim, entails both that the Father has the property of being divine and that the Son has the property of being divine. But, third, necessarily, for any x and y, if x is not absolutely identical with y but x has the property of being divine and y has the property of being divine, then x is a God and y is a God and x is not the same God as y. It follows that the Father is a God and the Son is a God, and the Father is not the same God as the Son. Fourthly, necessarily, for any x and y, if x is a God and y is a God and x is not the same God as y, then there are two Gods. Thus, if we read the Sameness Claim as implying the Property Identity Claim, then, given the Difference Claim, it is false that there exists exactly one God-which contradicts Monotheism. Let us call the argument of this paragraph the "Challenge of Polytheism." 2. Trinity Monotheism Displayed Moreland's and Craig's response to the Challenge of Polytheism displays three tenets central to their version of Social Trinitarianism, what they call Trinity Monotheism.4 To gain a clearer view of these tenets and to highlight their (alleged) utility, I will display in section 2 how they can be used to respond to three worries, beginning with the Challenge of Polytheism. 2.1. The Challenge of Polytheism Moreland and Craig propose to meet the Challenge of Polytheism by denying its third premise, namely the following: Necessarily, for any x and y, if x is not absolutely identical with y but x has the property of being divine and y has the property of being divine, then x is a God and y is a God and x is not the same God as y. DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 377 4 Brian Leftow coined the term. See "Anti Social Trinitarianism," in The Trinity: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Trinity, ed. Stephen Davis; Daniel Kendall, SJ; Gerald O'Collins, SJ (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 203–50. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 377 According to Moreland and Craig, while the Persons are each divine and absolutely distinct, they are not distinct Gods. For on their view, there exists exactly one God, namely the Trinity "as a whole," and no Person is absolutely identical with the Trinity "as a whole." Rather, each Person is a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole." Still, each of the Persons is "fully and unambiguously" divine. It is just that they are not divine in the way in which the Trinity "as a whole" is divine; they are fully divine in another, second way. Consequently, there is a way of being divine which is such that each Person is divine in that way and one's being divine in that way does not imply that one is a God. Here we see at work all three of the core tenets of Moreland's and Craig's Trinity Monotheism: The First Tenet: the Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with God. The Second Tenet: there is more than one way to be fully divine. The Composition Claim: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit compose the Trinity "as a whole," that is, the Persons are proper parts of the Trinity "as a whole." Of course, whether Moreland and Craig can meet the Challenge of Polytheism by deploying the core tenets of their Trinity Monotheism depends on whether those tenets are possibly true and consistent with orthodoxy, both individually and jointly. One might worry that the Second Tenet is especially dubious. How could one be fully divine without exemplifying the nature of divinity? Moreland and Craig offer a distinctively Christian answer to this question.5 They say that according to Christian orthodoxy God is triune; moreover, God does not just happen to be triune. Consequently, the property of being triune is an essential property of God, in which case it is a property of the divine nature.6 But if the property of being triune is a property of the divine nature, then none of the Persons exemplifies the divine nature; for none of them exemplifies the property of being triune. But the Persons are fully divine, and hence there must be a second way of being fully divine, a way other than that of exemplifying the divine nature. This second way is the way of being a proper part of something that exemplifies the divine nature, that is, the Trinity "as a whole." To help us see how it could be that 378 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 5 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 590. 6 The inference this sentence contains is fallacious. The individual who is God can have a property essentially even if that property is not partly constitutive of the divine nature. Compare: my cat, Socrates, can have a property essentially even if that property in not partially constitutive of the feline nature. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 378 the Persons are fully divine simply in virtue of being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole," they ask us to consider an analogy. One way of being feline is to instantiate the nature of a cat. But there are other ways to be feline as well. A cat's DNA or skeleton is feline, even if neither is a cat. Nor is this a sort of downgraded or attenuated felinity: a cat's skeleton is fully and unambiguously feline. Indeed, a cat is just a feline animal, as a cat's skeleton is a feline skeleton. Now if a cat is feline in virtue of being an instance of the cat nature, in virtue of what is a cat's DNA or skeleton feline? One plausible answer is that they are parts of a cat. This suggests that we could think of the persons of the Trinity as divine because they are parts of the Trinity, that is, parts of God. Now obviously, the persons are not parts of God in the sense in which a skeleton is part of a cat; but given that the Father, for example, is not the whole Godhead, it seem undeniable that there is some sort of part-whole relation obtaining between the persons of the Trinity and the entire Godhead.7 The upshot, then, is this. There are not four Gods but just one because the divine nature includes the property of being triune and there exists exactly one item which is such that it exemplifies that property, namely the Trinity "as a whole." Still, each of the three Persons is fully divine since each is a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole." So one way to be divine is to instantiate the divine nature; this is how the Trinity "as a whole" gets to be divine. A second way to be divine is to be a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole"; this is how each of the Persons gets to be divine. The cat analogy is supposed to help us see how this latter claim could be true. 2.2. The Diminished Divinity Problem One might worry that this response to the Challenge of Polytheism comes at a steep price: the divinity of the Persons has been diminished. For if the Persons do not instantiate the divine nature and they are divine in the way in which a cat's skeleton is feline, then they are no more God-like than a feline skeleton is cat-like, which is to say they are hardly God-like at all. You might put the point this way: if the sense in which the Persons are "divine" approximates the sense in which a cat's skeleton is "feline," then the sense in which the Persons are "divine" approximates the sense in which any one of the properties that are constitutive of full divinity is "divine" or the sense in which a divine plan is "divine." But the property of being, say, worthy of worship, although doubtless divine in this sense, lacks what Christians have had in mind when they affirm the fully divinity of each of the Persons; similarly for, say, God's plan to redeem Israel. Neither the propDANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 379 7 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 591. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 379 erty of being worthy of worship nor God's plan to redeem Israel exemplify those properties that Christians have had in mind when they affirm the full divinity of each of the Persons, even though the property of being worthy of worship and God's plan to redeem Israel are both "fully and unambiguously" divine. Apparently, one can be fully divine-in this second sense of "divine"-while lacking the traditional attributes of God. It appears, then, that the Challenge of Polytheism is met at the expense of the "Diminished Divinity Problem," as I will call it. That is a price no Christian should pay. Moreland and Craig argue that "[f]ar from downgrading the divinity of the persons, such an account [as theirs] can be very illuminating of their contribution to the divine nature." For parts can possess properties which the whole does not, and the whole can have a property because some part has it. Thus, when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent; rather God has these properties because the persons do. Divine attributes like omniscience, omnipotence, and goodness are grounded in the persons' possessing these properties, while divine attributes like necessity, aseity, and eternity are not so grounded. With respect to the latter, the persons have these properties because God as a whole has them. For parts can have some properties in virtue of the wholes of which they are parts. The point is that if we think of the divinity of the persons in terms of a part-whole relation to the Trinity that God is, then their deity seems in no way diminished because they are not instances of the divine nature.8 So, according to Moreland and Craig, being divine by virtue of being a proper part of the Trinity does not diminish the divinity of the Persons, contrary to the Diminished Divinity Problem. Each of the Persons has those properties traditional theists typically associate with divinity, for example, omnipotence, omniscience, unsurpassable moral goodness, necessity, aseity, eternity. 2.3. The Composition Question Moreland and Craig rightly observe that "[a]ll of this leaves us still wondering . . . how three persons could be parts of the same being, rather than three separate beings. What is the salient difference between three divine persons who are each a being and three divine persons who are together one being?"9 This is an excellent question: how exactly is it that the three Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole"? Let us call it the Composition Question. 380 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid., 593. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 380 Moreland and Craig suggest that the answer can be seen by reflecting on an analogy. "In Greco-Roman mythology," they write, there is said to stand guarding the gates of Hades a three-headed dog named Cerberus. We may suppose that Cerberus has three brains and therefore three distinct states of consciousness of whatever it is like to be a dog. Therefore, Cerberus, while a sentient being, does not have a unified consciousness. He has three consciousnesses. We could even assign proper names to each of them: Rover, Bowser, and Spike. These centers of consciousness are entirely discrete and might well come into conflict with one another. Still, in order for Cerberus to be biologically viable, not to mention in order to function effectively as a guard dog, there must be a considerable degree of cooperation among Rover, Bowser, and Spike. Despite the diversity of his mental states, Cerberus is clearly one dog. He is a single biological organism exemplifying a canine nature. Rover, Bowser, and Spike may be said to be canine, too, though they are not three dogs, but parts of the one dog Cerberus. If Hercules were attempting to enter Hades, and Spike snarled at him or bit his leg, he might well report, "Cerberus snarled at me" or "Cerberus attacked me.". . . We can enhance the Cerberus story by investing him with rationality and self-consciousness. In that case, Rover, Bowser, and Spike are plausibly personal agents and Cerberus a tri-personal being. Now if we were asked what makes Cerberus a single being despite his multiple minds, we should doubtless reply that it is because he has a single physical body.10 One might initially worry that the Trinity "as a whole" does not have a physical body, and consequently that the analogy fails to illuminate how the Persons can compose the Trinity "as a whole." Alive to this worry, Moreland and Craig write: [S]uppose Cerberus were to be killed, and his minds survive the death of his body. In what sense would they still be one being? How would they differ intrinsically from three exactly similar minds which have always been unembodied? Since the divine persons are, prior to the Incarnation, three unembodied minds, in virtue of what are they one being rather than three individual beings?11 To answer this question, Moreland and Craig dispense with the Cerberus analogy and answer it with reference to their view regarding the nature of the soul: The question of what makes several parts constitute a single object rather than distinct objects is a difficult one. But in this case perhaps DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 381 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 381 we can get some insight by reflecting on the nature of the soul. We have argued that souls are immaterial substances and have seen that it is plausible that animals have souls (see chap. 11). Souls come in a spectrum of varying capacities and faculties. Higher animals such as chimpanzees and dolphins possess souls much more richly endowed with powers than those of iguanas and turtles. What makes the human soul a person is that the human soul is equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination. Now God is very much like an unembodied soul; indeed, as a mental substance God just seems to be a soul. We naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons. But the reason human souls are individual persons is because each soul is equipped with one set of rational faculties sufficient for being a person. Suppose, then, that God is a soul which is endowed with three complete sets of rational cognitive faculties, each sufficient for personhood. Then God, though one soul, would not be one person but three, for God would have three centers of consciousness, intentionality, and volition, as social Trinitarians maintain. God would clearly not be three discrete souls because the cognitive faculties in question are all faculties belonging to just one soul, one immaterial substance. God would therefore be one being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings support one person. Such a model of Trinity Monotheism seems to give a clear sense to the classical formula "three persons in one substance."12 What should we make of these passages that are directed at the Composition Question, especially the last passage? Several preliminary observations are in order. First, with respect to the Cerberus analogy, it becomes clear that Moreland and Craig meant to say something like this: Cerberus is a single physical organism, and Rover, Bowser, and Spike compose Cerberus because Cerberus, that very physical organism, supports Rover, Bowser, and Spike; analogously, God is a single immaterial substance, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit compose God because God, that very immaterial substance, supports the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Second, Moreland and Craig identify themselves as proponents of a substance metaphysic whose broad contours they describe as Aristotelian.13 This metaphysic distinguishes individual (or primary) substances or beings from other sorts of things. According to Moreland and Craig, among the immaterial individual substances are souls, which earlier (in chapter 11 of 382 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 12 Ibid., 593–4. The reference to chapter 11 is a reference to chapter 11 of their book. 13 Ibid., 215ff. 14 Ibid., 232. Whether Moreland and Craig think that there are no immaterial individual substances other than souls is none of my concern here. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 382 their book) they identified as "mental substances that have mental properties."14 Each soul-that is, each mental substance-is absolutely identical with a particular immaterial individual substance. Now, according to Moreland and Craig, the Persons are persons, but no Person is absolutely identical with an individual substance. There is no individual substance x such that the Father is absolutely identical with x, even though there is some person y such that the Father is absolutely identical with y. And the same goes for the Son and the Holy Spirit. Apparently, then, a person can fail to be absolutely identical with an individual substance. On first reading, this claim is liable to induce an incredulous stare. After all, in the Aristotelian tradition, persons are paradigmatic individual substances. You, for example, are an individual substance, as am I. Perhaps Moreland and Craig do not wish to deny that we are absolutely identical with individual substances. Indeed, it appears that they do not.15 It appears that they only wish to deny that the three Persons are absolutely identical with individual substances.16 Third, Moreland's and Craig's contention that the Father is absolutely identical with a particular person but not with a particular individual substance is mirrored by another thesis, namely that God is absolutely identical with a particular individual substance but not with a particular person. God has three persons as proper parts, but God, the Trinity "as a whole," is not a person. Strictly speaking, using personal pronouns to refer to God presupposes, on their view, the false proposition that God is a person. And here I do not mean by "person" anything distinctively modern or Cartesian or anything else (allegedly) objectionable. I have in mind the concept of whatever is, strictly and literally, the referent of a personal pronoun.17 Even in that minimalist sense of "person," the suggestion that the Christian God is not a person is most unusual, to say the least. DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 383 15 Direct awareness through introspection of one's self, they write, "shows that a person is not identical to his or her body in whole or in part or to one's experiences, but rather is the thing that has them. In short, one is a mental substance," that is, a soul (239); "[t]he clearest and most obvious case of a substance is in our own self-acquaintance" (300). Part 3 of Philosophical Foundations is peppered with the implication that each human soul we are acquainted with is- in the sense of absolute identity-a human person. 16 This seems to be implied by the sentence, "[w]e naturally equate a rational soul with a person, since the human souls with which we are acquainted are persons." Of course, by their lights, this "natural equation" is false. We make the equation because each human soul we are familiar with is absolutely identical with a particular person, but the universal equation of souls and persons turns out to be a hasty generalization. In particular, the equation is false since, on their view, the Father is absolutely identical with a particular person but not with a particular individual substance. Likewise for the Son and the Holy Spirit. 17 Cf. Peter van Inwagen, "Not by Confusion of Substance, but by Unity of Person," and Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 263–5. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 383 Fourth, according to Moreland's and Craig's Trinity Monotheism, an individual substance can be three persons. God is such a substance, they say, "God, though one soul [that is, one immaterial individual substance], would not be one person but three persons" (emphasis added). This is an unfortunate choice of words since they might be mistaken for the claim that God is absolutely identical with the three Persons. This claim is false since the relation of absolute identity is a one-one relation, not one-many; moreover, it is incompatible with the conjunction of the First Tenet and the Composition Claim.18 I suggest that when Moreland and Craig tell us that "God, though one soul, would not be one person but three," they mean that, although the Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with a particular soul, It has as proper parts three absolutely distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.19 Although this is not the place to spell out the details, what has been said so far seems to pose some difficulties for the internal consistency of the Moreland-Craig take on the philosophical foundations for a Christian worldview, at least as those foundations are expressed in their book by that title. One difficulty is that it appears that none of the arguments for substance dualism that they offer is valid. After all, the Father has each mental property Moreland and Craig ascribe to me, each one of which, they say, is 384 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 18 Argument: the conjunction of (1) God is absolutely identical with the three Persons and (2) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with God, which is the First Tenet, entails by the transitivity of absolute identity that (3) The Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with the three Persons. But recall the composition claim: (4) The three Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole." Using the term "the ps" as a plural variable which collectively refers to the ps and not to any object which has the ps as its parts or members, (5) Necessarily, for any ps and for any thing x, if the ps compose x, then x is not absolutely identical with the ps. The denial of (3) follows from (4) and (5). 19 Moreland and Craig think that there is an "is" of composition, as exhibited in sentences like "Socrates is flesh and bone." See Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 174–5. Whether there is an "is" of composition or not, the fact that they think there is adds some reason to suppose that they mean to say that God is composed of the Persons when they say that God is the Persons. 20 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 238–43. They have in mind properties such as a direct awareness of the self, the irreducibility of the first-person perspective, the capacity to retain identity through change, freedom, and the unity of consciousness. My point is that even if these properties can only be had by immaterial persons, it does not follow that they can only be had by immaterial individual substances-provided, of course, that there can be immaterial persons that are not immaterial individual substances, which, according to them, there can. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 384 sufficient for my being a mental substance. But if a person can have each of those properties without being a mental substance, as is the case with the Father, then how does the fact that I have them preclude the possibility that I am a person that is not a mental substance? It looks like my having those mental properties does not guarantee that I am a mental substance, a soul.20 Another difficulty is that none of the Persons has libertarian freedom since, according to Moreland and Craig, none of the Persons is a genuine substance and "a necessary condition for libertarian freedom is that the agent be a genuine substance in the tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas."21 Of course, it also seems that only persons can have libertarian freedom. If so, then, since God is not a person on their view, God does not have libertarian freedom either. But if neither the Persons nor the Trinity "as a whole" has libertarian freedom, then nothing in the vicinity of the Christian God has libertarian freedom. A third difficulty, which is more central to Trinitarian concerns, is that their argument for a plurality of persons within the Godhead relies on the premise that "creation is a result of God's free will."22 But, again, according to their Trinity Monotheism, God is not a person; thus, God has no free will. Finally, their Trinity Monotheism seems to be incompatible with their theory of the Incarnation since, according to their Trinity Monotheism, the Son is not an individual substance but, on their theory of the Incarnation, the Son is an individual substance. For, they tell us, on their theory of the Incarnation, the Logos, which is absolutely identical with the Son, "completes the individual human nature of Christ by furnishing it with a rational soul, which is the Logos himself."23 It cannot be the case that a particular rational soul is the Logos himself while the Logos himself is not a particular soul at all. Although I would like to report that Moreland's and Craig's Trinity Monotheism is a smashing success, I am afraid that I must instead register several worries. In section 3, I emphasize worries with respect to what they have to say about the Persons; in section 4, I emphasize worries with respect to what they have to say about God. 3. Worries about the Persons As we saw above, according to Moreland and Craig, the Trinity "as a whole" is divine because it exemplifies the divine nature. Each Person of the Trinity is also divine, but not because each exemplifies the divine nature; rather, each Person is divine because each is a proper part of the Trinity "as DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 385 21 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 279–80. 22 Ibid., 594. 23 Ibid., 610. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 385 a whole." To explain how this could be, they offered the cat analogy. A cat is fully feline because it exemplifies the feline nature. The skeleton of a cat is also fully feline but not because it exemplifies the feline nature; rather, the skeleton of a cat is fully feline because it is a proper part of a cat. In the present section, I will first express three worries about the cat analogy as an analogy. Then, having granted the analogy for the sake of argument, I will urge that Moreland's and Craig's part-whole explanation of how the Persons could be fully divine fails. Finally, I will argue that the Persons are individual substances, given the conditions that Moreland and Craig themselves lay down. 3.1. The Cat Analogy Moreland and Craig assert that the skeleton of a cat is fully feline because it is a proper part of a cat. This implies that being a proper part of a cat is sufficient for being feline. This implication is false, however. First, since organs can be transplanted from a member of one species into a member of another species, something that is not feline can nevertheless be a proper part of a cat. Being a proper part of a cat, therefore, is not sufficient for being feline. Second, since the part-whole relation is transitive, it follows that if being a proper part of a cat is sufficient for being feline, then each of the atoms and molecules of a cat are feline-which is false. These two worries are minor, perhaps. Instead of saying that the skeleton of a cat is fully feline because it is a proper part of a cat, Moreland and Craig can say that the skeleton of a cat is fully feline because it is a proper part that is distinctive of the species.24 My third worry about the cat analogy is major. According to Moreland and Craig, there are two ways of being feline. What could be meant by these words? Only one of two things, so far as I can see: The Cat Analogy (1) There is one and only one property of felinity whereby something can be fully feline, but there are two distinct ways to exemplify it: the first way is by being a cat and the second way is by being a proper part of a cat. The Cat Analogy (2) Words of the form "x is feline" are ambiguous between the attribution of two distinct properties, each of which is a way of being fully feline: the first property is the property of being a cat and 386 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 24 I owe this qualification to Bill Craig. In what follows, I will leave it tacit. We might not be satisfied with the qualification. After all, as Mike Rea pointed out to me, it is not at all clear what it is for a proper part to be distinctive of a species. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 386 the second property is the property of being a proper part of a cat. Which of these do Moreland and Craig have in mind? I think the text can be read either way, but the first version seems to me the least likely candidate since it fits least well with their attempt to meet the Challenge of Polytheism and to solve the Diminished Divinity Problem. Let me explain. The cat analogy is supposed to illuminate how it could be that there are two ways to be (fully) divine, which is the Second Tenet of Trinity Monotheism. But if version one is the right way to understand the cat analogy, then we must understand the Second Tenet in like fashion: The Second Tenet (1) There is one and only one property of divinity whereby something can be fully divine, but there are two distinct ways to exemplify it: the first way is by being the Trinity "as a whole" and the second way is by being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole." Note that version one of the Second Tenet implies that the three Persons exemplify exactly the same property of divinity that the Trinity "as a whole" exemplifies, that the property by virtue of which each of the Persons is divine is absolutely identical with the property by virtue of which the Trinity "as a whole" is divine, and that there is no other property by virtue of which something can be divine. From a Trinitarian point of view, the theological implications of Trinity Monotheism combined with version one of the Second Tenet are odious in the extreme. For Trinitarianism insists that each of the Persons is divine, and Trinity Monotheism insists that the composite formed by the Persons-the Trinity "as a whole"-is divine. There are (at least) four items, then, that are divine. This much Moreland and Craig affirm. But, given version one of the Second Tenet, the property in virtue of which each of those four things is divine is exactly the same property, and there is no other property by virtue of which the Persons or the Trinity "as a whole" are each divine. So, given version one of the Second Tenet, the rationale Moreland and Craig offered for thinking that there is exactly one God vanishes. True, the Trinity "as a whole" exemplifies the property of being composed of the Persons while no Person exemplifies it. But, given version one of the Second Tenet, the divine nature cannot include that property since there is one and only one complex property whereby a thing can be divine and each of the Persons exemplifies that property but each of them lacks the property of being composed of the Persons. So, given version one of the Second Tenet, there are four items that exemplify the divine nature and hence there are four Gods. If, however, contrary to what I just argued, the divine nature does include the property of DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 387 PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 387 being composed of the Persons, then none of the Persons is divine since, given version one of the Second Tenet, there is no other nature whereby a thing can be divine. The upshot is that a version of Trinity Monotheism wedded to the first version of the cat analogy either fails to meet the Challenge of Polytheism or fails to solve the Diminished Divinity Problem. So if Trinity Monotheism is to be guided by the cat analogy, it must be guided by the second version, which, to repeat, is this: The Cat Analogy (2) Words of the form "x is feline" are ambiguous between the attribution of two distinct properties, each of which is a way of being fully feline: the first property is the property of being a cat and the second property is the property of being a proper part of a cat. Of course, the property of being a cat is just the nature of a cat, a natural kind essence if you will. That way of being feline is the heartwarmingly mysterious way of being feline we are familiar with. But what is this allegedly second way of being fully feline, this distinct, second property of felinity? Moreland and Craig tell us that it is a property exemplified by something that is a proper part of a cat, something that is a proper part of a thing that exemplifies the first, familiar property, the property of being a cat.25 But is there really any such second property of felinity? Let us look into the matter more closely. Consider my cat, Socrates. Suppose I assert that (1) Socrates is feline. The truth-maker for (1) is the fact that (TM1) There exists a property C such that C is the nature of a cat, and there exists an x such that x is Socrates, and x instantiates C. Now suppose I assert that (2) Socrates's skeleton is feline. If the second version of the cat analogy is true, then the truth-maker for (2) is the fact that (TM2) There exists a property C such that C is the nature of a cat, and there exists a property C* such that C* is a way of being "fully 388 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 25 What if a cat dies and the soft tissue of its corpse rots, dries, and blows away, but its skeleton remains pretty much intact. Is the skeleton feline? It seems so, but it is not if Moreland and Craig are correct; they say a cat's DNA and skeleton are feline because "they are parts of a cat" (my emphasis, note the tense), and in this case, the skeleton is no longer a proper part of a cat, even though it once was. Moreland and Craig can say (if they would like; some Aristotelian substance theorists do not) that a skeleton is feline just in case it is, or was, a proper part of a cat. Another case: can God create a feline skeleton ex nihilo, without it ever being a proper part of a cat? If so, we need to fiddle with their account some more. Consider it done, if you think it needs doing. For the sake of expository simplicity, I am going to stick with the simple present tense version in what follows. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 388 and unambiguously feline" and C* is not C, and there exists an x such that x is Socrates and x instantiates C, and there exists a y such that y is Socrates's skeleton and y instantiates C*, and y is a proper part of x. What should we think of this implication of the second version of the cat analogy? I think we should reject it. The reason is this. Suppose I assert that (3) Socrates's skeleton is a part of a cat. The truth-maker for (3) is the fact that (TM3) There exists a property C such that C is the nature of a cat, and there exists an x such that x is Socrates and x instantiates C, and there exists a y such that y is Socrates's skeleton, and y is a proper part of x. But the truth-maker for (3) is the truth-maker for (2), as evidenced by the fact that what I intended to convey by (2) would be just as well conveyed by (3), and vice versa.26 So the truth-maker for (2) is not the truth-maker that is implied by the second version of the cat analogy, with its extra ontological commitment to a second property of felinity (as indicated by the italicized portions of [2]). That is, the second version of the cat analogy is false. Moreland and Craig wanted us to see that the Persons could be divine without exemplifying the divine nature. Toward this end, they asserted that there are two ways to be divine, fully divine. To help us see their meaning, they argued that just as the skeleton of a cat is fully feline without being a cat but rather in virtue of being a proper part of a cat, so each of the Persons is fully divine without being a God but rather in virtue of being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole." I argued that there are two ways to understand DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 389 26 As you try to think of counterexamples to this premise, keep in mind that I am assuming the simple present tense version of Moreland's and Craig's claim that a cat's DNA and skeleton are fully and unambiguously feline because "they are parts of a cat." See the previous note. So construct your counterexamples in accordance with that charitable assumption. 27 Frances Howard-Snyder insists that there is a third version of the cat analogy lurking here. Recall that, strictly speaking, a whole is a part of itself. To be sure, it is not a proper part of itself, but it is, as they say, an improper part of itself. A cat, therefore, is a part-an improper part-of a cat. Of course, Socrates's skeleton is also a part of a cat, namely Socrates himself. So Socrates and his skeleton share a certain feature: being a part of a cat. Thus, we have The Cat Analogy (3) There is one and only one property of felinity whereby something can be fully feline, namely being a part of a cat, but there are two distinct ways to exemplify it: the first way is by being a proper part of a cat and the second way is by being an improper part of a cat. Dale Tuggy insists that there is a fourth version of the cat analogy: The Cat Analogy (4) There is one and only one way to be feline, namely by exemplifying the nature of a cat; but "feline" is predicable of items that are not feline, e.g., certain proper parts of cats. Version three inherits some of the difficulties mentioned in the text. Version four implies that the Persons are not divine even if "divinity" is predicable of them. I am indebted to Jeff Jordan for putting me onto this worry about the cat analogy, and to Frances Howard-Snyder and Hud Hudson for helping me to work it out properly. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 389 what they said about cats; the first way, when applied to the Persons, leads to theological unacceptabilities, while the second way is simply false. The cat analogy, therefore, fails to help us see how the Persons could be divine without exemplifying the divine nature.27 3.2. The Diminished Divinity Problem, Again Suppose that, contrary to what I have just argued, the cat analogy helps us see how the Second Tenet of Trinity Monotheism could be true. That is, suppose it helps us see how there could be two ways of being fully divine. Then one of the following claims is true: The Second Tenet (1) There is one and only one property of divinity whereby something can be fully divine, but there are two distinct ways to exemplify it: the first way is by being the Trinity "as a whole" and the second way is by being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole." The Second Tenet (2) Words of the form "x is divine" are ambiguous between the attribution of two distinct properties, each of which is a way of being fully divine: the first property is the property of being the Trinity "as a whole" and the second property is the property of being a proper part of the Trinity. I argued in section 3.1 that version one of the Second Tenet leads to theological unacceptabilities. I have nothing more to say about it. In the remainder of section 3, I will focus on version two. In order to keep track of things, let us name the first property referred to in version two, that is, the property of divinity which is exemplified by the Trinity "as a whole," divinity1, and let us name the second property, that is, the property of divinity which is exemplified by the parts of the Trinity, divinity2. I can best get at my worries about version two of the Second Tenet by reminding us that, according to Moreland and Craig, just as the skeleton of a cat is fully feline, so the three Persons are fully divine. They are not interested in defending some watered-down sort of divinity of the Persons, they are interested in defending the real traditional article. As we have seen, however, according to Moreland and Craig, the Persons are not fully divine in the traditional way, that is, by exemplifying the divine nature. Rather, according to them, the Persons are fully divine because they are proper parts of the Trinity "as a whole." Given version two of the Second Tenet, this explanation of the divinity of the Persons is to be understood explicitly as follows: the reason why the Persons are fully divine is that they are divine2, and the reason they are divine2 is that they are proper parts of the Trinity "as 390 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 390 a whole." Thus, the reason why the Persons are fully divine is that they are proper parts of the Trinity "as a whole." Now, I take it that one way in which this explanation can fail is if something's being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole" is logically insufficient for its being fully divine. A second way it can fail is if it sheds no light on how it can be that the Persons are fully divine despite their failure to exemplify the divine nature. With this in mind, consider the following two objections. First, the part-whole relation is transitive. Thus, if the Father is a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole," then the proper parts of the Father are proper parts of the Trinity "as a whole." Here are three proper parts of the Father: the Father's cognitive faculty, the Father's affective faculty, and the Father's conative faculty. Consider any one them, for example, the Father's affective faculty. Although it is a proper part of the Father and hence a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole," and although it is no doubt impressive in many respects, it-the Father's affective faculty-fails to exemplify the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and unsurpassable moral goodness; moreover, it-the Father's affective faculty-is not worthy of worship. These properties, however, or at least some of them, are partially constitutive of what it is to be fully divine. It is false, therefore, that something's being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole" is logically sufficient for its being fully divine. How might Moreland and Craig respond to this objection? Perhaps they will say that the Father has no proper parts. Their talk of the "rational faculties" of the Persons was never intended to be strictly and literally true; rather, the strict and literal truth of the matter is that the Father has various states, capacities, and powers, and these are not proper parts of the things that have them. One might think that this response fails since, even if the Father has no proper parts, it is nevertheless a consequence of Moreland's and Craig's position that if He did, they would be omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, and worship-worthy; however, this counterpossible proposition is false.28 Another response is to agree that being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole" is logically insufficient for full divinity but add that being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole" and a person is logically sufficient. Thus, even if the Father had proper parts, they would not have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, unsurpassable goodness, and worship-worthiness (unless they were persons, which they would not be). This leads to what I think is a more telling, second objection. DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 391 28 I take it that counterpossibles can, in principle, be false. Depending on how sympathetic you are to false counterpossibles, you will find this objection convincing. Thanks to Mike Rea for helping me to see how to put this point. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 391 Imagine what it would be like for someone alien to Trinitarianism to hear for the first time that God is composed of three distinct Persons. Our alien might naturally wonder whether the Persons are fully divine and, if so, how that could be, especially after he is told that the Persons do not exemplify the divine nature. If he were answered that the Persons are, indeed, fully divine, because they are proper parts of God, he would rightly remain puzzled. After all, he might say, something's being a proper part of God would not logically suffice for its being fully divine; would it not have to be a proper part that was a person as well? "Well, of course!" we might reply; we were taking it for granted that the Persons are persons. Our alien might still remain puzzled, however. After all, he might say, something is a person just in case it has powers of rationality, volition, and so on that are sufficient for personhood, but something's being a proper part of God that possesses any old powers of rationality, and so forth, is not logically sufficient for its being fully divine. Would it not have to possess the appropriate powers of rationality, and so forth, those that are logically sufficient for being fully divine? "Well, of course!" we might reply; we were taking it for granted that the Persons were persons who had the appropriate powers of rationality, and so on. What should our alien make of this answer? Two things, I suggest. First, he should concede that something's being a proper part of the Trinity "as a whole" that possesses powers of rationality, volition, and so forth, that are logically sufficient for full divinity is, indeed, logically sufficient for its being fully divine. Second, he should be unsatisfied with this answer. He asked not only whether the Persons are fully divine but also, if so, how that could be, given that they do not exemplify the divine nature. The new explanans sheds no light on that question; moreover, the part of it that has to do with being a proper part is explanatorily idle. It is idle because the appeal to being a proper part of God plays no role at all in the new explanans. What is doing the explaining (if anything at all) is the appeal to each Person possessing the relevant powers. The new explanans sheds no light because the explanans that was originally given has been expanded so that it merely asserts that the Persons are fully divine. The upshot is that, along with the cat analogy itself, Moreland's and Craig's more direct part-whole explanation of how the Persons could be fully divine fails. The Diminished Divinity Problem remains on the table; the Second Tenet of Trinity Monotheism remains shrouded in obscurity, hardly the hallmark of a useful model of the consistency of Trinitarianism. 392 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 392 3.3. Are the Persons Individual Substances? According to Moreland and Craig, although the Persons are persons, they are not individual substances. The mode of being that the Persons enjoy is not as basic or primary or fundamental as the mode of being that God and cats and dogs enjoy. One worry about this view of the Persons is best seen by way of a question: if the Persons are not individual substances, then to what category do they belong? Aristotle divided the category of substance into primary or individual substances such as you and me, and secondary substances such as the genus animal and the species humankind. Secondary substances, however, are universals; presumably, Moreland and Craig do not mean to say that each Person is absolutely identical with a universal. So what does that leave us in the way of categories to which the Persons might belong? On the traditional Aristotelian list of the categories, we are left with the nine categories of quantity, quality, a relative, a place, a time, a position, a having, a doing, and a being affected. But none of the Persons is absolutely identical to such "things." Once you rule out the category of individual substance which is the natural home of persons, the pickings appear to be quite slim. Instead of exploring the options here, I want to focus on the following question: given Moreland's and Craig's own broadly Aristotelian account of what an individual substance is, are the Persons individual substances? Moreland and Craig introduce their readers to individual substances with these words: "It would seem that properties do, in fact exist and that they are genuine universals. However, reality involves a lot more than properties; there are also individual things like cats and dogs that have properties. Philosophers call such individuals substances. . . ."29 To be sure, they note, there have been different conceptions of substance throughout the ages, but, they say, "the most central idea . . . is one which takes living organisms-individual human beings, butterflies, dogs, oak trees-as the paradigm cases."30 And that conception is the one that they denominate "substance," or, more accurately, "individual substance." They go on to list what they regard as several features of "the traditional notion of substance," which they affirm, and which they appear to offer as individually necessary and jointly sufficient for being an individual substance.31 (1) An individual substance has properties, but nothing has an individual substance in the sense of having a property. DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 393 29 Ibid., 214. 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid., 215–19. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 393 (2) The properties and capacities of an individual substance, as well as its proper parts if it has any, form a tight unity. Each individual substance has a nature (essence) by virtue of which it is the kind of thing that it is and without which it would neither exist nor have the basic structure or capacities that it has. If it is a whole composed of parts, its parts are what they are in virtue of playing the role that they play in the whole; apart from the whole, they cease to exist. (3) An individual substance remains the same through change. (4) An individual substance grows and develops in a law-like fashion in accordance with its nature, and it has in its nature a tendency to realize various potentialities contained therein. (5) An individual substance has something which individuates it from other individual substances that share its nature, something in virtue of which it is a this. Now, consider the Father. Clearly enough, He has properties, but nothing has Him in the sense of having properties; thus, (1) is satisfied. To be sure, on the view of Moreland and Craig, God has the Father in some sense-namely, in the way in which a whole has its proper parts-but it certainly does not follow that God has the property of being the Father. Does the Father have a nature (essence)? Does He belong to a (super)natural kind? Moreland and Craig insist that no Person exemplifies the divine nature since the divine nature includes the property of being triune and no Person has that property, but they also insist that each Person is essentially omnipotent, omniscient, unsurpassably morally good, and the like. I see no recourse here but to say that, on their view, each Person exemplifies the nature of a divine person; this nature distinguishes the Persons from God, that is, the Trinity "as a whole," since God, on their view, is not a person at all. Moreover, it is in virtue of exemplifying the nature of a divine person that the Father is the sort of thing that He is and has the fundamental features and capacities that He has; if He did not exemplify this nature, He would not exist. Finally, being a divine person is a tight unity; all and only divine persons fall into the class of divine persons. Condition (2) is satisfied. Given the satisfaction of conditions (1) and (2), condition (5) is satisfied. Whatever the details about the "individuating component," the Father is this divine person and not one of the others. As for condition (3), the Father remains the same through change in His contingent relations to creatures, for example, their conversion and apostasy. As for contingent nonrelational features: if He has any, then presumably wanting me to stop cussing so much and feeling saddened by my cussing so much are two that He has these days, properties He lacked before I was ten years old and will lack upon my complete sanctification (I hope). 394 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 394 Condition (4) is the oddball. While organisms, the paradigms of individual substances, may well grow and develop, thereby lawfully realizing their potential as the sorts of things they are, only on views which share too much in common with process theology can we say the same thing of God- which is another way of saying (4) is not a strict necessary condition on being an individual substance. Thus, the Persons meet the conditions for being individual substances just as God does, contrary to the Trinitarian model Moreland and Craig propose.32 Why does this matter? Why cannot Moreland and Craig just grant that the Persons are individual substances? Why did they insist otherwise in the first place? So far as I can discern, they insist that the Persons are not individual substances because they want their model to be a clear instance of "the classical formula," namely "three persons in one substance," where "substance" means individual substance and where the preposition "in" is taken seriously.33 Perhaps they are thinking that if the Persons are individual substances, then their model posits four individual substances, not just one, as the classical formula requires. If the classical formula does indeed require that there be only one individual substance in the neighborhood (and I am not saying that it does), then, since by their own accounting the Persons are distinct individual substances, their model is indeed incompatible with the classical formula that they seek to exemplify. Thus far I have focused on worries about Moreland's and Craig's account of the Persons. I now turn to worries in the region of their treatment of God. 4. Worries about the Trinity "as a Whole" Recall that, according to Moreland and Craig, God is absolutely identical with the Trinity "as a whole," a composite individual substance that has as proper parts the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Furthermore, the Trinity "as a whole" is the only item that exemplifies the divine nature; the Persons do not. Finally, with respect to the Composition Question-the question of how it is that the Persons compose God-Moreland and Craig answer that just as Cerberus is a single physical organism, and Rover, Bowser, and Spike compose him because he, that very physical organism, supports Rover, Bowser, and Spike, so God is a single immaterial substance, and the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit compose God because God, that very immaterial substance, supports the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 395 32 If (4) is a strict necessary condition and God satisfies it, then I see no reason why each of the Persons does not also. 33 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 594. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 395 In section 4.1, I focus on worries about their explanation of how the Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole." In 4.2, I focus on worries about the fact that the Trinity "as a whole" is not, on their view, a person. In 4.3, I express worries about whether Trinity Monotheism is a version of Monotheism in name only. 4.1. Composing and "Supporting" According to Moreland and Craig, the Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole" because the Trinity "as a whole" supports the Persons. To help us see how this can be, they give us two analogies; unfortunately, neither analogy serves its purpose. The first analogy is the Cerberus analogy. I have two worries about it. First of all, the story of Cerberus is unfit as an analogy. That is because it serves as an analogy only if there is exactly one dog in the story, exactly one item that exemplifies the canine nature, just as there is exactly one God in Trinity Monotheism, exactly one item that exemplifies the divine nature. But it is false that there is exactly one dog in the story. There are exactly three partially overlapping dogs, each of which instantiates the canine nature, and not a single one of them is Cerberus. Cerberus (if there is such a thing) is an unnatural composite whose proper parts are three dogs, Rover, Bowser, and Spike; as such, Cerberus-Rover, Bowser, and Spike "as a whole," you might say-is not a dog at all. Think of it this way. Consider a particular pair of Siamese twins that share vital organs below the neck, call them "Jack" and "Jill"; let them compose a whole called "Twinsy." Jack and Jill are distinct humans even if they are partially overlapping. Jack and Jill each exemplify human nature, but Twinsy, whatever it is, does not exemplify human nature. Since there is no salient difference between the (false) claim that Twinsy is a human and the claim that Cerberus is a dog, we should infer that Cerberus is not a dog. If the story of Cerberus provides an analogy for anything in the vicinity of Social Trinitarianism, it provides an analogy for a Social Trinitarianism according to which there are three exemplifications of the divine nature, that is, a version that implies that there are three Gods, and that the Trinity "as a whole"-if there is such a composite thing-does not exemplify the divine nature at all. This is not Trinity Monotheism; it is the Social Trinitarianism of Richard Swinburne, which is avowedly tritheistic.34 One might object that although Jack and Jill are distinct persons, there exists exactly one human being in their vicinity, albeit an unusual one with 396 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 34 Richard Swinburne, The Christian God (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), chapter 8. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 396 two heads, namely Twinsy. It is because we confuse human beings and persons that we tend to think that Jack and Jill are distinct human beings. The same goes for Cerberus, mutatis mutandis. It is because we confuse dogs and "canine" persons that we tend to think that Rover, Bowser, and Spike are distinct dogs. Thus, although Rover, Bowser, and Spike are distinct "canine" persons, there exists exactly one dog in their vicinity, albeit an unusual dog with three heads, namely Cerberus. What should we make of this objection? I submit that two considerations weigh heavily against it. First, it implies that a single dog can have three distinct, complete, independently functioning brains. This implication seems false since brains individuate mammals; three brains, three mammals. But if there exist three mammals, then it seems there exist three dogs. Second, the objection under discussion implies that if Rover, Bowser, and Spike were surgically separated so that each was supplied with functioning vital organs simultaneously resulting in three viable mammals, three new dogs would come into existence by the end of the surgery. But what would have happened to Rover, Bowser, and Spike by surgery's end? Clearly, they did not go out of existence (compare Jack and Jill, mutatis mutandis). And none of them is absolutely identical with any of the new dogs since, ex hypothesi, none of them were dogs prior to the surgery. Thus, either (a) there exist after the surgery three pairs of completely overlapping "canine" persons, one member of each pair being a new dog and the other not being a dog at all, or else (b) there exist after the surgery three new dogs none of which is a "canine" person but each of which is an individual substance that exemplifies the canine nature. Alternatively, contrary to what I asserted above, (c) there exists after the surgery just one spatially scattered dog, namely Cerberus, and three surgically separated "canine" persons none of which is a dog: Rover, Bowser, and Spike. None of these options seems nearly as plausible as the simple suggestion that each of Rover, Bowser, and Spike were dogs prior to and after surgery.35 My second worry about the Cerberus analogy is that even if Moreland and Craig were right about Cerberus, we have not the foggiest idea what they are saying. That is because even if Cerberus "supports" Rover, Bowser, and Spike, and even if that suffices for them to compose Cerberus, we have no idea what relation Moreland and Craig mean to refer to by the word "support." I will develop this point shortly. The second analogy makes matters worse. They tell us that, on their view, "God would therefore be one being which supports three persons, just as our individual beings support one person." But what is it, even vaguely, for my "individual being," that is, the individual substance that is absolutely identical with me, to "support one person"? Well, presumably, the "one DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 397 35 Thanks to Joshua Spencer and Hud Hudson for making me alive to worries about Cerberus. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 397 person" in question is the particular person with which I am absolutely identical. But in that case, by the transitivity of identity, the particular individual substance in question (me) is absolutely identical with the particular person in question (me). It follows by Leibniz's Law that if my "individual being" supports "one person," namely me, then that person, the one I am absolutely identical with, supports my "individual being." The supports relation turns out to be symmetric. This has disastrous consequences for Trinity Monotheism. Return to the claim that "God . . . would be one being which supports three persons." If we are to understand this claim "just as" we are to understand the claim that "our individual beings support one another," and if we are to understand the latter in the natural way suggested in the last paragraph, then God, that single composite item, is absolutely identical with the three Persons, which is impossible. To avoid this disaster, Moreland and Craig must say either that I am not absolutely identical with a particular individual substance, or else that the "one person" in question is not the particular person with whom I am absolutely identical. Neither option looks especially promising for those who are wedded to the Aristotelian claim that human persons are paradigmatic individual substances. So, with the slightest bit of pressure, both the Cerberus analogy and the individual human person analogy buckle. My second general worry in this area is that Moreland's and Craig's use of "supports" has no precedence in the English language. Suppose that there is some x, y, and z such that x supports y and z. Why should we infer that, therefore, y and z compose x? The foundation of my house supports its walls, floors, roof and so on, but they do not compose the foundation. The worry here is intensified by the fact that there is no use of "support" and "compose" in ordinary parlance such that supporting entails composing, as a look at the Oxford English Dictionary will reveal. Without, at a minimum, a stipulative definition in terms that we can understand, we have no idea what they mean by "supports" and hence we have no idea what they mean by the claim that the Persons compose the Trinity "as a whole" because the latter supports the former; we have no idea what proposition is expressed, we have no idea what model is proposed for our consideration.36 398 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 36 I sometimes worry that with all this talk of "supporting," Moreland and Craig mean to endorse a Lockean rather than an Aristotelian theory of substance. According to Locke, and in agreement with Aristotle, properties cannot subsist on their own; there are no free-floating properties. A substance, says Locke, is that which underlies or supports properties. It is that in which properties inhere. Perhaps Moreland and Craig mean to suggest that God is the substance-the Lockean bare substratum-that supports the Persons, those discrete sets of powers sufficient for personhood. If so, then we have been misled by the talk about the Persons composing God, since a Lockean bare substratum cannot be a composite. Indeed, it is not clear what PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 398 4.2. The Divinity of the Trinity "as a Whole" Moreland and Craig say that each of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit is absolutely identical with a distinct person, and they say that the Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with a particular immaterial mental substance, that is, a soul. In order to avoid saying that there are four persons in the vicinity of the Trinity-the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and the Trinity "as a whole"-they say that, although the Trinity "as a whole" is absolutely identical with a particular soul, the Trinity "as a whole" is not absolutely identical with a particular person. There is, therefore, at least one soul that is not absolutely identical with a particular person. In that case, the Trinity "as a whole"-that is, God, on their view-is not absolutely identical with a particular person. God, that is, is not a person. Consequently, God is not "equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination." That is not to say that God does not have proper parts that are thus equipped; it is only to say that God itself lacks the equipment. There are several implications we might draw out here. Let me mention three. First, recall the opening words of Genesis: "In the beginning, God created the heavens and the earth." Creation is an intentional act. An intentional act cannot be performed by anything but a person. God is not a person, say Moreland and Craig. Thus, if they are right, God did not create the heavens and the earth; indeed, He could not have done so. The first sentence of the Bible expresses a necessary falsehood. Not a good start! To be sure, a composite can "borrow" properties from its proper parts, under certain conditions. In that case, can we not say that since the Son created the heavens and the earth, God did-given that the Son is a proper part of God? After all, if I am a composite of flesh and blood, then I am bleeding if my arm is bleeding. This objection fails. For there can be no "lending" of a property unless the borrower is antecedently the sort of thing that can have it. Unless I am the sort of thing that can bleed-a flesh and blood composite, say-then it is strictly and literally false that if my arm is bleeding I am bleeding. For example, if I am absolutely identical with an immaterial mental substance, DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 399 a Lockean bare substratum is; he called it a "something I know not what." To make matters worse, Locke's theory implies that an individual substance is something that, in itself, has no properties whatsoever; that is why it is called a bare substratum. Unfortunately, that is hardly intelligible. But, even if it were, it would not be of use to Moreland and Craig. They want to say God is absolutely identical with a particular immaterial substance and that God exemplifies the divine nature; but, if the substance in question is a Lockean bare substratum, then God, in itself, has no properties, and hence no essential properties; as such, it does not exemplify any nature, divine or otherwise. Like all theists, Trinitarians will naturally resist this suggestion. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 399 then it is just plain false that I am bleeding if my arm is bleeding. Immaterial things are not the sorts of things that can bleed. Obviously, an immaterial thing might possess something-say, a body made of flesh and blood-such that if a part of it bleeds then it too bleeds. But x's possessing a y which is such that if a part of y is F then y is F no more implies that x is F than does my possessing a tire whose tube can be inflated to 3,000 psi implies that I can be inflated to 3,000 psi. Equally obviously, we all use the words "I am bleeding" in certain circumstances, and we do so without a thought as to whether we are the sorts of things that can bleed. But this fact about our usage no more implies that we express truths when we use "I am bleeding" than our use of "The sun moved behind the trees" implies that we express a truth when we use it. The upshot is that, as in banking, borrowing and lending in ontology have their conditions and limits. Unless God is antecedently the sort of thing that can act intentionally-that is, unless God is a person-God cannot borrow the property of creating the heavens and the earth from the Son. God cannot create. Of course, creation of the heavens and the earth is only one act attributed to God in the biblical texts. All other acts attributed to God will likewise turn out to be, strictly and literally, false. Second, Judeo-Christian anthropology will have to be remade. No other text is more central to an understanding of what we are than this: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him." While no image has all of the features of that of which it is an image, the tradition has it that a human being is made in the image of God insofar as he or she "is equipped with rational faculties of intellect and volition which enable it to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination," to borrow an apt description from Moreland and Craig. Unfortunately, this is the description of a person, which they say God is not. In what respects, then, are we made in the image of an individual substance that is void of all personal attributes? Third, recall that, according to Moreland and Craig, the Persons do not exemplify the divine nature, only the Trinity "as a whole" enjoys that privilege. Thus, on their view, the Trinity "as a whole" at once exemplifies the divine nature and yet fails to be a person. This is not a high view of the divine nature, I take it; indeed, it is abysmally low. To see just how low it is, consider what sorts of properties theists typically associate with the divine nature that cannot be exemplified by something that fails to be a self-reflective agent capable of self-determination. Without going into the details, I 400 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 37 An anonymous referee asserted that every model of the Trinity must say that God is not a person. So far as I can see, this assertion does little more than express the referee's myopic view of the options, not to mention his or her disregard for the plain sense of Scripture and tradition. 38 Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 591. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 400 take it that the list includes noteworthy members such as omnipotence, omniscience, unsurpassable moral goodness, and worship-worthiness.37 Moreland and Craig are not as forthcoming about this implication as they ought to be. On the only occasion they begin to address it, they tell us that "when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent. . . ." That is a good start. But look at how they continue the sentence: "rather, God has these properties because the persons do."38 God is not a person or agent, yet God is omnipotent, omniscient, and the like. What! If God is not a person or agent, then God does not know anything, cannot act, cannot choose, cannot be morally good, cannot be worthy of worship. This is the God of Moreland's and Craig's Trinity Monotheism.39 4.3. Trinity "Monotheism" and Monotheism Monotheists assert that there exists exactly one God. Moreland and Craig say that they assert the same thing. This is not the case, however. What they affirm when they use the words "there exists exactly one God" is not the same thing that monotheists affirm when they use those words. When monotheists assert that there exists exactly one God, they affirm the existence of something of a certain sort, a God; they affirm the existence of something that belongs to a certain supernatural kind if you will, namely divinity. There exists exactly one of those things, they say; not many. The claim that there exists exactly one God cannot be understood unless the word "God" in that claim is a class or kind term and not a proper name. That is not to say that there is no use of "God" as a proper name; obviously, there is. It is only to say that when monotheists claim that there exists exactly one God, they are contrasting "one" with "many" and there is no grammatical sense to be made of "one God" in contrast with "many Gods" if "God" is being used as a proper name in both cases. Proper names do not take the plural; class terms do. So Monotheism is a thesis about Gods and the thesis is this: there is one and only one of them. The point I want to make here is not merely a point of grammar; it is a point of history. There are no monotheists unless traditional Jews are monotheists, and when they assert that there exists exactly one God, they DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 401 39 Note the fallacy in the text at page 591: "the whole can have a property because some part has it. Thus, when we ascribe omniscience and omnipotence to God, we are not making the Trinity a fourth person or agent; rather, God has these properties because the persons do" (emphasis added). The inference is valid only if God is the sort of thing that antecedently can have the properties that God's proper parts have, and the denial of personhood and agency to God is exactly that which undercuts the validity of the inference from the Persons having maximal power and knowledge to God having those features. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 401 affirm that there exists a certain number of Gods and the number is one. Moreover, traditional Christians agree with traditional Jews on this score. After all, when the early Christians were accused by their Jewish contemporaries of being polytheists, they responded by insisting that, like their accusers, they too affirmed that there exists exactly one God. They agreed with them. What they agreed to was what the Jews themselves believed, that there exists a certain number of Gods, and that that number is one. It is not an historical accident that the Athanasian Creed (ca. AD 500) affirms that "they are not three Gods, but one God" and that the Creeds of Nicea (AD 325) and Constantinople (AD 381) begin with the words, "We believe in one God." The upshot here is that academic Trinitarians cannot mean whatever they like when they insist that they are monotheists. Grammar and history do not permit it, and this point applies to Trinity Monotheism as well, particularly the version of Trinity Monotheism put forward by Moreland and Craig. Despite their good intentions, their version of Trinity Monotheism is not a version of Monotheism; the tenets of their position do not permit it. Monotheists disagree with them over what properties are included in the nature of a God. Moreland and Craig insist that the divine nature includes the property of being triune and that the divine nature lacks the property of being a person in the minimal sense. Monotheists insist that the divine nature does not include the property of being triune and they insist that the divine nature does include the property of being worthy of worship, which implies being a person in the minimal sense. Monotheists as diverse as Christians and Jews (not to mention Muslims) agree that there exists exactly one God, one instance of that supernatural sort of thing, a God. If nothing could be a God unless the nature it exemplified included the property of being triune and lacked the property of being a person, then Christians and 402 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI 40 It is important to see that nothing I have said here implies that the one and only thing that in fact exemplifies the divine nature lacks the essential property of being triune. Something can have an essential property and yet not have it in virtue of being the kind of thing that it is. Perhaps that is the case with the Christian God; indeed, it had better be if Christians are to be Monotheists. The argument here applies with equal force to other attempts by Social Trinitarians to "cling to respectability as monotheists," e.g., Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., "Social Trinity and Tritheism," in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989). Plantinga offers "three ways" in which Social Trinitarians can affirm that there exists exactly one God: (1) There exists exactly one God if "God" is used as "the peculiar designator of the Father," as the one and only "font of divinity"; (2) there exists exactly one God if "God" is the proper name of "a set of excellent properties severally necessary and jointly sufficient for their possessor to be divine"; and (3) there exists exactly one God if "God" "is used as a designator of the . . . one divine family or monarchy or community, namely, the Holy Trinity itself." PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 402 Jews would not be in agreement on this score. But they are. So, according to Monotheism, something can be a God without exemplifying a nature that includes the property of being triune and nothing can be a God without exemplifying a nature that includes the property of being a person. Either way, Moreland and Craig offer us a version of Trinity Monotheism that is not a version of Monotheism.40 5. Conclusion We began with a simple argument: the Sameness Claim and the Difference Claim are inconsistent with each other. By way of response, Moreland and Craig suggested that we read the Sameness Claim as implying the Property Identity Claim, not the Person Identity Claim. That response, however, led to the Challenge of Polytheism, to which they responded by invoking their Trinity Monotheism. Unfortunately, their Trinity Monotheism-both on the periphery and at the core-has intolerable consequences for Trinitarianism, or so I have argued. If I am right, then the Challenge of Polytheism remains on the table for Trinity Monotheism; at any rate, I cannot see how Moreland's and Craig's version of Trinity Monotheism has removed it.41 DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER 403 41 Thanks to Ben Bradley, William Lane Craig, Frances Howard-Snyder, Hud Hudson, Jeff Jordan, William Kilborn, Shieva Kleinschmidt, Christian Lee, Brian Leftow, Michael Rea, Joshua Spencer, Dale Tuggy, and an anonymous referee for comments on predecessors of this paper. PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page 403 404 PHILOSOPHIA CHRISTI PC 5,2b.qxd 4/2/2004 10:29 AM Page

NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY by Steven James Bartlett Visiting Scholar in Philosophy and Psychology, Willamette University and Senior Research Professor, Oregon State University Website: http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet KEYWORDS: philosophy as narcissism, narcissism in philosophy This paper was originally published in the Netherlands, in Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1986, pp. 16-26. Methodology and Science ceased publication in the mid-1990s and all rights to this paper reverted to the author. This electronic version supplements the original text with internet-searchable keywords. The author has chosen to re-issue this work as a free open access publication under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercialNoDerivs license, which allows anyone to distribute this work without changes to its content, provided that both the author and the original URL from which this work was obtained are mentioned, that the contents of this work are not used for commercial purposes or profit, and that this work will not be used without the author's or his executor's permission in derivative works (i.e., you may not alter, transform, or build upon this work without such permission). The full legal statement of this license may be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode © Steven James Bartlett, 2014 NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY* by STEVEN J. BARTLETT Department of Philosophy Saint Louis University Saint Louis, MO 63103, USA I. Introduction The condition we call narcissism began when Nemesis made a handsome youth fall in love with his reflection in a fountain. The lovely maiden Echo was grief-stricken by Narcissus' self-absorption, and gradually pined away until only her voice remained. Narcissism today is not only a synonym for self-infatuation; it is the name for a clinical psychiatric disorder. In recent years, psychiatrists and psychotherapists have devoted much at- tention to narcissism. Patients are being diagnosed in increasing numbers as narcissistic, in part probably because of a heightened sensitivity to the phenomenon. Narcissism, from a psychological point of view, is an interesting thing. It bears unmistakable similarities to one philosophical position, solipsism. And from a general point of view, as I will try to show, psychological nar- cissism is descriptive both of certain aspects of personality of many philos- ophers, and of the nature of many of the positions they propound. 16 Two earlier papers examine related topics. One, "Philosophy as Ideology", forthcom- ing in * Meuzphilosophy, seeks to study ways in which philosophical positions become self-encapsulating ideologies, and to understand resulting blocks to communication be- tween different philosophical standpoints. A second paper, "Psychological Underpinnings of Philosophy", attempts to develop a general psychological profile of the predominant philosophical personality. Psychometrists have demonstrated that members of any profession tend to share identi* fiable attributes of personality. NARCISSISM A�D PHILOSOPHY 2. Narcissism Defined I want to preface the following observations by saying that the use ! make of psychological categories stems from a desire to encourage psycho* logical self-examination in philosophy. It is unfortunate that many descrip-, tive names for styles of personality have acquired derogatory overtones. This has probably been due to their use by a psychologically distrustful pub- lic, for whom psychotherapeutic concepts are unfamiliar and intimidating. The psychological understanding of narcissism began with an awareness of its central characteristic, self-absorption. We are all narcissists to a degree: If we enjoy our work, our families, our lives, we feel a degree of self- involvement which is desirable and healthy. Narcissism becomes of con- cern to the psychotherapist when the degree of self-absorption of the pa- tient stands in the way of his or her consciousness of the personal needs, intentions, and subjective feelings of others. Extreme narcissism precludes any awareness of this kind; such an individual is unable to see or apprecia- te the boundaries of others, and so others become mere extensions of self; the separateness of another person is not noted or respected. A narcissist becomes a windowless monad which contains a universe that exists only for it. Similarly, an autistic child is imprisoned by an extreme form of nar- cissism. This is the familiar conception of narcissism. Our understanding of the phenomenon has been extended by recent studies in psychiatry; it is my in- tention here to bring together certain conclusions which they suggest, in an effort to shed light on the psychology of the philosophic enterprise. Erich Fromm has devoted attention to what he called 'malignant narcis- sism'.! He characterized this condition in terms of an 'unsubmitted will'. Fromm believed that all healthy adults submit themselves in a variety of ways to something higher than themselves be it God, truth, love, or another ideal. Narcissism, he believed, becomes malignant when an individual's willful- ness becomes extreme, when self-involvement reaches a degree that a per- son is totally uncritical of self and is incapable of responding in a mature I. The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil, New York: Harper and Row, 1964. See also his Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973. 17 \ STEVEN J. BARTLETT and constructive way to criticism. When narcissism reaches the stage of malignancy, the individual stands in fear of external criticism because crit- icism is experienced as an implicit challenge to his or her self-isolation and withdrawal, and, as we will see, threatens the internal dynamics of the nar- cissist's lonely world of self. Psychologists since Fromm have identified other defining characteristics of narcissism. Three of these qualities of personality may be grouped toge- ther: the need to be always rig hi, pride, and denial of persona/fallibility or fault. It is inherent in the condition of narcissism for an individual to believe that whatever way he or she happens to perceive things is the right way, without the need for further study or reflection. It is typical for the person to resent any attempt to question his or her perceptions; indeed, the usual response is one of surprise followed by indignation and impatience. The narcissist is keenly sensitive to disagreement, and reacts defensively with an intolerant and overweening pride, which claims a privileged com- prehension of exactly how things are. Clinical narcissism is further characterized by 'scapegoaling behavior' a tendency to blame others and the environment, to construe many things which are beyond personal control as obstacles to the individual's function- ing, and to situate responsibility for personal disappointments in the shortcomings of others. The narcissist has a blameful outlook, carries with him or her a record of past pains and bitterness, and will frequently engage in 'finger-pointing', underscoring the culpability of others when there is disagreement or a question of fault. Pretense is a less easily recognized characteristic of the narcissist. There appears to be a need to camouflage reality, to 'dress up' what may be so- mewhat colorless or drab, to exaggerate .what is already worthy of note, to h * * 18rreerf 1* d d. h oppose t e common perception, to 1gn , ee mgs an to 1stort t em. Psychiatrist M. Scott Peck has devoted a book to a study of this inclina- tion of the narcissist to dissimulale, to lie, about realities of self, others, and world.2 It is this tendency more than any other that makes narcissism difficult to treat in psychotherapy. The narcissist appears to be so caught in a net of 2. \I. Scott Peck, People of the Lie: The Hope for Healing Human Evil, New York: Si- mon and Schuster, 1983. IH I NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY I his own fabrications and lies that he has lost, or has given up, the ability to detect his own pretense. The halls of the narcissist are filled with masks: If one mask comes no longer to serve its purpose, there is another to take its place. In the process, the narcissist's sense of identity is dissolved, or ra- ther it is absorbed by the range of masks at his disposal. 'Being true to one- self' ceases, from this perspective, to have any meaning. The pretense maintained by the narcissist is accompanied by overt preten- tiousness: for example, the narcissist will disclaim having hateful feelings or vengeful desires. The narcissist's self-image is one of intrinsic inner per- fection and faultlessness. Under stress, the narcissist will demonstrate a degree of intellectual devi- ousness that can be quite incredible. Her or she is, as we have noted, un- committed to any higher principle or authority; hence, there is available a freedom, even a facility, to dodge, to deny, to distort, and to confuse others. This deviousness or slipperiness is interpreted as a desire to avoid direct confrontation or engagement in personal relationships with others; it is an escape, a retreat from honesty. Deviousness and evasiveness of this kind are associated with schizophre- nia: the individual has an impaired ability to 'meta-communicate' to la- bel accurately the intentions behind the communications and behavior of others.J It is believed that an inability to discriminate on a meta- communicative level leads to a mix-up in the schizophrenic's capacity to distinguish levels of discourse. This is one reason, among others, that schi- zophrenia is characterized by a kind of disorganization of thought and of expression (appropriately called 'schizophrenic salad'). There seems to be a characteristic resistance to linear, coherent thought and expression, frustrating to a therapist in its almost deliberate-seeming qualities of a voidance and deviousness. 4 Narcissism is further associated with a desire for power: The narcissist is motivated by a need to win, to co£��*on top', if necessary at the expense of others. There is frequently an urge to be in a position of authority. And there is an inclination to treat others as objects, or as mere appendages of 3. See, for example, Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind, New York: Ballantine Books, 1972, which contains several seminal papers on the theory of schizophrenia. 4. M. Scott Peck, ibid., p. 129n, relates narcissism to 'ambulatory schizophrenia', in which the individual may function successfully in the world, yet exhibits this sort of dis- organized thinking when under stress. 19 STEVEN J. BARTLETT self due to an inability or unwillingness to recognize the boundaries of others to accept and respect their separateness, the fact that others are persons in their own right. The authority therefore sought by the narcissist is particularly grandiose: it was exhibited by Hitler; it is manifested by na- tionalistic groups intoxicated by blind ideological self-love. Forms of this same grandiose authoritative style victimize innumerable families in which the personhood of a spouse or of a child is ignored, denied, abused, and perhaps eventually undercut. The last characteristic of narcissism I will mention here is a kind of psy- chological laziness. The narcissist appears to feel it just is too much trou- ble and work to become involved in self-examination. A narcissistic mo- ther or father will usually refuse to enter family therapy. To do so compro- mises the narcissist's unsubmitted will, his or her need for control, power, authority. Therapy is fundamentally a process in which individuals are en- couraged to dispense with masks; the narcissist feels that submitting his or her will to the authority of a therapist would be a form of personal suicide. To recapitulate, pathological narcissism is characterized by: self-absorption to a degree that walls the individual off from himself, others, and the world; a refusal to submit one's will to a higher principle or to the authority of another; hence, a tendency to react with pronounced defensiveness to criticism; a need to be always right, coupled with a sense of comparative personal faultlessness dis- played in a prideful, arrogant way; scapegoating behavior: the inability to accept that one is sometimes in error, and hence a noticeable pattern of blaming others and situations for personal disappointments, along with a habit of self-consciously keeping a record of past injuries; the maintenance of pretense: a compulsion to wear masks, to dissimulate, and to believe in one's actual perfection; intellectual deviousness, displayed especially when under stress, and taking the form of ingenious dodging, denials, distortions, and a resulting ability to 'throw up so much dust' that others become confused; a 'white-knuckled need' always to be in control; an urge to exercise power and authority over others; and -* a type of psychological laziness to engage in self-examination; resistance to real self- questioning. 3. Causes of Narcissism Before going on to relate the preceding discussion of narcissism to philos- ophy, it is natural to want to ask how narcissism comes about. For many of us, it is incredible that such a psychological condition is possible, that it is possible for individuals to become so tragically cut off from others and 20 NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY from themselves, and for this to occur in such a manner that a person be- comes incapable or unwilling to admit that this is so. As yet, clinical narcissism has not been studied extensively or in depth; much remains unknown about the condition, and its genesis. There are several hypotheses which have so far been suggested: that narcis- sism is caused by the impact of a childhood trauma which drives a child to build rigid fortifications to protect against further pain. Habits become engrained, and the complex defenses that may have served a child's needs are never given up. There is also the hypothesis that narcissism comes about in reaction to, or in subjugation to, the unreality of a 'schizophrenogenic' parent. The child attempts to insulate himself from the parent's confused and conflicting messages, draws in, and walls himself off in a world of his own. Some psychologists have suggested that narcissism may be transmitted: a narcissistic parent's self-absorption blocks the exl?ression of love and secu- rity needed by a child who, as a consequence, turns inward and develops patterns of thought and behavior that characterize narcissism. In all these hypotheses fear plays a central role in maintaining the condi- tion of narcissism. Behind the pretense, the dissimulations, the mask- wearing, the denials, the exaggerations, the blaming, deviousness, hunger for control and infallibility, willfulness and resistance to self-questioning behind these run-away habits that have taken over the personality, lies fear: fear of reality, fear of truth about oneself and one's fallibility, fear of the separateness of others, fear of past events and suffering fears we all have, but not to the heightened degree of the narcissist. Fears perpetu- ate the condition; they stand in the way of its acceptance and treatment. The narcissist is fundamentally a victim of his own fears, which seem so terrible and overwhelming they cannot even be thought of; he is lost in an unrecognized labyrinth of his own unacknowledged fashioning. 4. Narcissism and Philosophy Philosophers, like other people, are subject to human frailties. Some are probably clinical narcissists. I do not know if a larger proportion of philo- sophers is narcissistic than are theologians, poets, composers, artists, or writers. But probably, for reasons I will try to make clear, a greater pro- portion of the philosophical population suffers from characteristics of 21 STEVEN J. BARTLETT unacknowledged narcissism than do, for example, scientists. I believe that the nature of philosophic activity promotes and is encour- aged by many qualities of personality which closely resemble qualities that define narcissism. Since I am a philosopher, I am especially concerned with the philosophic profession and its future prospects. I suspect that some of the points I make are true of other professions in which individual expression is encouraged, or in which a system of belief is made a central focus, as in religion or political ideology. However, I want to limit what I have to say here to a discipline in which I have worked for a long time. Resistance to a unitary, evaluative framework In spite of occasional attempts during philosophy's long history to deve- lop a unitary, evaluative methodology, the practice of most philosophy has opposed this objective. Divergent philosophical positions are pro- pounded; there is no shared universe of discourse in which to assess com- peting views. Indeed, there is no consensus among philosophers as to the desirability of reaching agreement. The activity of philosophers is itself evidence of a resistance to establishing universal criteria of philosophical evaluation; the possibility of such criteria is raised as a philosophical question from the standpoints of competing, specialized positions. The world of philosophical reflection ultimately therefore turns into a mona- dology. I submit that this tradition has not come about by accident. After thinking about this for more than two decades, with care and whatever impartiality I have been able to acquire, I have come to suspect that much of philos- ophy's history reveals the phenomenon of an unsubmitted will which we encountered in our examination of narcissism. Resistance to standards of external evaluation, a desire for freedom from unitary methodological constraints these are expressions of a willfulness that rebels against sub- mission to a higher discipline, authority, rules of arbitration, or principles of progressive construction. There are two things involved: the profession of philosophy, with a tradi- tion, momentum, and indeed a will of its own, and individual philoso- phers, who come and go, transient contributors to historical succession. The nature of the field exerts an attraction upon men and women who, to varying degrees, share certain psychological characteristics. Certainly, if 22 NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY philosophy gives approval to an unsubmitted will, the profession is likely to attract individuals who seek the freedom from methodological constraint it offers. It would then be predictable that many individual phi- losophers will display subjective willfulness, a will that refuses to submit to a higher authority. The work of science, in contrast, is inspired by a willingness to submit to criteria of evaluation with which any investigator's efforts may be judged. Science is the enemy of intellectual narcissism, for it countenances no pri- vate privilege, and accords positive judgment only when consensus of the scientific community is reached. The occasionally expressed desire that philosophy become scientific is no more nor less than a recommendation that it submit its willfulness to agreed-upon, unitary tenets of reason. Uncritical self-acceptance Paul Arthur Schilpp, Editor of the Library of Living Philosophers, ob- served that only once in his long editorship, which brought him into close contact with many well-known philosophers, did he meet a philosopher who acknowledged having made a mistake. Philosophers seem 'possessed' by a need to be always right. They attempt dialogue, but as Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., has noted, what normally en- sues are soliloquies in which each appears to own faultless judgment. Philo- sophical positions pass each other like ships in the night. Philosophers, Schilpp once remarked,5 do not want to understand one another. Criticisms of a philosopher's publicly read paper tend to reveal more of a desire for one-upmanship than for constructive communication. Husser! noted that, at philosophy congresses, "philosophers meet but, unfortuna- tely, not the philosophies. The philosophies lack the unity of a mental space in which they might exist for and act on one another. "6 Perhaps Husser! was overly sanguine: perhaps neither the philosophies nor the philosophers actually meet. Schilpp and 1 ohnstone seem to have reached this conclusion. 5. In a talk for the Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, in September, 1980. 6. Edmund Husser!, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", translated by Quentin Lauer in Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, New York: Harper and Row, 1965, p. 5. 23 STEVEN J. BARTLEIT Contentiousness The dynamics, the life blood, of philosophical position-taking is conten- tion. Contention is a two-pronged strategy: its objective is to show that one is right, and that the other man is wrong. Philosophers, if they cannot accomplish both, try at least to do one of these. Philosophical argument tends to oscillate between self-demonstration and undermining the opposi- tion. From this point of view, it has long been recognized that training in philosophical argumentation can be useful background for law students. In philosophical contention, the effort to undermine one's opposition is an expre$sion of a kind of scapegoating behavior: destructive criticism is fin- ger-pointing in which blame is ascribed. Philosophical contention seems fundamentally to be motivated by a desire for power. It is a motivation that is now called 'win-no-lose'. The Pretense Philosophy traditionally has espoused S�£rat�( dictum, 'Know thy- self'. However, like people in any age, Athenians of his time, or men and women of the present, there_ are many things we prefer not to hear, and many things we say which are less than true. The impulse to do philosophy is the search for truth. Philosophy is not a cafeteria offering a variety of positions from which we may choose to fit our prejudices and belief-systems. (Although one may get this impression after years of teaching freshmen and sophomores, and observing how it is that they come to adhere to a particular philosophic approach.) In any pretense, there is the requirement that one maintain ignorance of the existence of the dissimulation, and that one become invested in it. If much philosophic activity claims to be a search for truth, but is moti- vated by a narcissistic interest in building a conceptual home for intuitively accepted beliefs and biases, then its practitioners are involved in pretend- ing. Intellectual deviousness It is impossible in the practice of therapy to force the recognition of pre- tense. An endless array of masks is available to the committed narcissist. As we have remarked, the position-taking Q_f the narcissist can be so 'slip- pery', shifting, evasive, or productive of confusion, that pretense becomes 2-t NARCISSISM AND PHILOSOPHY impermeable. The condition of narcissism is inspired by perhaps an out- grown, but not discarded, need for self-defense. Unlike psychological narcissism, philosophical positions do not have avail- able an endless corridor of pretense, nor do they wish it. A philosophical position has an identity: a propounder of that position is committed to cer- tain claims, which are held constant. Nonetheless, many philosophical positions function in practice so as to evade criticism. They do this by means of terminological or ideational ob- scurity, a thick smoke-screen in which only initiates can navigate confi- dently. They do this by means of vagueness, which serves as a shelter when the going gets rough, and by means of rhetorical deftness. Together, these devices can resist a critical onslaught for a long time, cer- tainly for the duration of a paper's public reading, and sometimes for cen- turies. Intellectual lassitude Intellectual lassitude finds its way into philosophical position-taking in subtle ways. 7 For purposes here, it is sufficient to consider that philosophi- cal narcissism for this is the phenomenon I have in view is a highly effective intellectual system of defenses. It has, in a multitude of instances in the history of the discipline, demonstrated its strength: Philosophical positions are, as a result, I propose, effectively resistant to change. It is a tribute to their genius and to their indomitable narcissism that we are still able to discuss seriously Plato's Theory of Forms and St. Thomas' anima, while we become, pleasantly or frustratingly, lost in Heidegger's vocabu- lary, or devote years to clawing a way through Husserl's conceptualjungle. Because the dynamics of narcissism works so well, there can be no felt pressures to encourage change. And so, as we have seen, one of the characteristics of psychological narcis- sism is a kind of laziness an inertial resistance to self-examination which, if psychologists are correct, serves to mask fear. The challenge to change, to 'grow up', to place pretense to one side and move into reality these are easily expressed, but difficult, sometimes im- possible, to accomplish in therapy when narcissism is involved. 7. This phenomenon is discussed more fully in "Psychological Underpinnings of Philo- sophy" {to appear). 25 STEVEN J. BARTLETf Perhaps all disciplines, like individuals, must go through an early phase of infantile narcissism. But if this initial phase becomes an epoch, direct con- frontation of the pretense is the approach recommended in therapy.s And yet, it must be admitted, this works but seldom. Jung has said that evil arises out of a failure to acknowledge it. Fromm be- lieved that narcissism and evil are linked. Peck suggests that the pretense of narcissism is its cause and its expression, and that pretense, the tenden- cy to lie, convincingly, to oneself and others, is at the root of human evil. Evil is, Peck maintains in the tradition of Christian thinkers, anti-life. Narcissism is anti-growth; it stands in the way of constructive change, of development, of the natural succession of better adaptations which replace earlier ones. Philosophia perennis may be less a thing to admire than an admission of arrested growth. 5. Conclusion If some of the observations I have proposed correspond to facts about the profession, they need to be discussed openly. On the one hand, it is cer- tainly possible to argue that, in a world becoming increasingly obsessive about technologies, quantification, rules, and methods, philosophy, along with other liberal fields, affords a needed respite. And yet, on the other hand, one may wonder: If philosophy and its practitioners are caught in a mad, i.e., unrecognized, self-destructive circle perpetuated by the spirit of narcissism, we can break free only if we will face the reality squarely, ack- nowledging our fears, but refusing to give them sway over us. If to a signi- ficant degree philosophy is an incarnation of a kind of narcissism, then, in the courage we summon to admit this, the blind habits of narcissism will gradually lose their power over us. 8. M. Scot! Peck, ihid., pp. 178ff. Dr. Bart let! was born in 1\lexico and received his Ph.D. from the Universite de Paris. He has taught at the University of Florida, the University of Hartford, and was Professor of Philo- 'ophy at Saint Louis University until 1984, when he left teaching to devote himself full-time Ill research and writing. He has published five books and monographs and more than thirty papers in professional journals. Dr. Bartlett is currently working on a book, a guide to psy- chotherapy.

The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2004) Vol. XLII Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics Ben Vilhauer Claremont McKenna College Hard determinists hold that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, that determinism is true for all human actions, and that human beings are consequently not morally responsible for any of their actions.^ It is often objected that, since hard determinists reject the idea of moral responsibility, they have to reject our current practices of punishing wrongdoers. The concepts of desert and moral responsibility go hand in hand-one cannot deserve to be punished for something unless one is morally responsible for it. So if no one is morally responsible, no one deserves to be punished, and punishment cannot be justified if it is not deserved. This objection extends not just to punishment inflicted upon wrongdoers by others but also to punishment wrongdoers inflict upon themselves. Remorse is often taken to be a kind of self-inflicted punishment, a way of imposing emotional suffering upon oneself because one takes oneself to deserve it. Proponents of this objection think it is absurd to claim that we have to reject all these ways of responding to wrongful actions, and since they think hard determinists have to claim this, they think we should reject hard determinism. This objection depends upon a retributive interpretation of punishment. According to retributivism, punishment must be justified in terms of what the agent deserves. Hard determinists can respond to this objection by rejecting retributivism and adopting consequentialism about punishment instead.^ According to consequentialism, punishment must be justified in terms of its beneficial behavioral consequences. For example, imprisonment has the beneficial behavioral consequences of preventing Ben Vilhauer is Visiting Assistant Professor at Claremont McKenna College. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 2002. His recent publications include "Can We Interpret Kant as a Compatibility about Determinism and Moral Responsibility?" (British Journal for the History of Philosophy) and "On a Tension in Diamond's Account of Tractarian Nonsense" (Philosophical Investigations). 547 Ben Vilhauer wrongdoers from committing more crimes, and possibly deterring them from repeating their crimes after they are released (and possibly deterring others too). The value of these consequences "outweighs" the pain of the punishment. The consequentialist approach to punishment appears to give hard determinists a way to justify whatever punishments are really needed to keep society functioning. But remorse cannot be given an adequate consequentialist justification. Sometimes remorse has beneficial behavioral consequences, but sometimes it does not. The cases in which it does not have beneficial behavioral consequences pose a problem for hard determinism. As I will go on to argue, remorse is connected in a privileged way with understanding that one has done something wrong. For this reason, it is important for hard determinism to accommodate remorse even when it does not have beneficial behavioral consequences. This is a challenge for hard determinism, but I will argue that it can be met if we incorporate virtue ethics into hard determinism.^ I will conclude by arguing that the virtue-based account of remorse to be presented here is defensible even if we suppose that we do have free will after all. In other words, though hard determinism requires this account of remorse, this account of remorse does not require hard determinism. To begin, we must consider how remorse functions when it does have beneficial behavioral consequences. First, remorse can modify wrongdoers' behavior so that they do not repeat wrongful acts in the future.'' Second, remorse can prompt wrongdoers to behave in special ways toward the people they have wronged, for example, by trying to make amends, and by expressing their remorse.^ First, remorse can prevent wrongdoers from repeating wrongful acts because experiencing suffering as a result of acting in some particular way tends to modify agents' behavior so that they do not act in that way again. We can see this phenomenon in its simplest form in the way a child who feels pain after touching a hot stove does not touch hot stoves again afterwards. We can think of remorse as operating in a similar way. Remorse is a state of emotional suffering that is consciously focused on morally relevant facts about one's wrongful actions. Said differently, it is suffering that has those morally relevant facts as intentional objects, such that one suffers from the consciousness of one's wrongful actions. One cannot experience remorse without consciously representing morally relevant facts about one's wrongful actions as the cause of one's suffering.^ (For the moment, let us leave open the questions of what the morally relevant facts are, which are the intentional objects of remorse, and what the nature of the suffering involved in remorse is.) 548 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics Remorse's privileged connection with morally relevant facts about one's wrongful actions makes remorse different from other kinds of suffering wrongdoers often experience as a result of those actions. Consider imprisonment. Prisoners can experience the suffering of imprisonment without thinking of it as caused by the crime that got them into prison. Prisoners often come to think of their imprisonment as caused by the prison guards, the police, and the courts-that is, the penal system. And it would seem that the more prisoners think of their imprisonment as caused by the penal system, rather than by their crimes, the less likely imprisonment will be to keep them from repeating their crimes. That is, if they think of imprisonment as caused by the penal system rather than by their crimes, they may believe that the best way to stay out of prison is to stay away from the penal system rather than to stop committing crimes. The suffering of remorse cannot be psychologically dissociated in this way from the unethical action that is its original cause. And it is natural to assume that, all things being equal, the more clearly human beings understand the causal relationship between something that causes suffering and the suffering that thing causes, the more they will tend to avoid the thing that causes suffering. For this reason, remorse might be thought to be among the most effective kinds of suffering for preventing wrongdoers from repeating their wrongful actions. Now let us turn to the second way remorse can produce beneficial behavioral consequences. Remorse can cause wrongdoers to behave in special ways toward the people they have wronged. Remorse can cause a wrongdoer to try to alleviate the suffering of the people he has wronged, that is, to try to make amends. Remorse can also cause a wrongdoer to express his remorse to the people he has wronged. The wrongdoer thereby communicates the fact that he is suffering from the wrong too, and thereby bears the burden of the wrong along with them. (This is of course merely a metaphor, but it is indispensable for thinking about remorse.) Often, when the people wronged feel that the wrongdoer bears the burden of the wrong along with them, it makes their own suffering easier to bear. At this point we can consider the kind of remorse that poses the challenge for hard determinists, that is, remorse that does not have beneficial behavioral consequences. Remorse sometimes has an effect on the wrongdoer's inner life but no effect on the wrongdoer's outward behavior. Wrongdoers sometimes feel remorse, and form intentions to mend their ways in response to that remorse, but fail to act on those intentions. Also, wrongdoers do not always have the opportunity to make amends or express their remorse. But when remorse does not have any "payoff" in beneficial behavioral consequences, there isn't anything to "outweigh" the pain of the remorse, so a 549 Ben Vilhauer consequentialist justification cannot be provided. How can hard determinists hold that it is appropriate for wrongdoers to feel the pain of remorse if it has no beneficial behavioral consequences and wrongdoers do not deserve to experience this pain? Hard determinists might just accept that it is not appropriate for wrongdoers to experience remorse if it has no beneficial behavioral consequences. But this is unsatisfying, because of the connection between experiencing remorse and understanding morally relevant facts about one's wrongful actions. Other forms of suffering that wrongdoers might experience in response to their wrongful actions do not seem to be linked to understanding that one has done wrong in any special way. Wrongdoers can be made to feel physical pain and fear, for example, without understanding why what they did was wrong. This cognitive relationship between remorse and morally relevant facts makes the preservation of remorse within hard determinism of special interest. Determinism doesn't imply that we shouldn't understand our wrongs, even if it does imply that we do not deserve to suffer for our wrongs. So if part of understanding that we have done something wrong is feeling remorse, then it might be appropriate to feel remorse when we have done something wrong, even if we do not deserve to feel remorse. But is it in fact true that remorse is part of understanding that we have done something wrong? Retributivists about remorse are likely to object here. A retributivist might argue that understanding that one has done wrong and feeling remorse are entirely separate. We feel remorse when we understand that we've done wrong only because we believe that we deserve to feel remorse when we do wrong. Retributivists might hold that we can explain what makes wrong acts wrong in deontological terms, as the violation of absolute moral rules. They might then point out that, presumably, one can understand that one has broken rules without experiencing remorse, so we must provide an explanatory link between understanding that one has done wrong and remorse. Such a link, they might claim, can only be provided by the belief that one deserves to suffer when one has done wrong. If this is the right way to think about remorse, then it appears that, when hard determinists reject desert, they break the connection between understanding the wrong and feeling remorse. But the retributivist's argument depends on stipulating that it is sufficient for understanding that one has done wrong to understand that one has broken moral rules. It is not obvious that the retributivist is entitled to this stipulation. If the hard determinist can provide a defensible alternative account of understanding that one has done wrong, according to which such understanding involves remorse, but not by way of 550 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics desert, then the retributivist's argument gets no purchase. Let us turn to this task. The first step is to claim that in order to understand that one has done wrong, one must understand that one has caused the people one has wronged to suffer.' That is, the facts about the suffering one has caused are the intentional objects of remorse, according to the hard determinist, virtue-based account of remorse to be advanced here. A more abstract grasp of the fact that one has done wrong, a mere grasp of the fact that one has broken moral rules, is not sufficient for this kind of understanding. The second step is to claim that virtuous wrongdoers sympathize with the suffering of the people they have wronged. What it is to sympathize with the wronged person, in the sense I have in mind, is just to suffer in sympathy with the wronged person. To return to the metaphor we used earlier, by suffering in sympathy, the wrongdoer bears the burden of the wrong along with the person wronged. This sympathetic suffering explains why remorse is painful, according to the account of remorse to be advanced here. In response to this second step, however, retributivists will surely claim that it cannot be appropriate to demand such sympathetic suffering if the wrongdoer does not deserve to suffer. This leads us to the third step, which is to point out cases where we clearly do think sympathetic suffering is appropriate even when it is not deserved and to argue that we can think about remorse in terms of these cases. Sympathetic suffering is also characteristic of love and friendship. If one's loved one or friend is suffering, it is appropriate to suffer in sympathy. But the reason it is appropriate has nothing to do with desert. It would be a confusion to suppose that, by loving or befriending someone, one had gotten oneself into a situation where one deserved to suffer when that person was in pain. The reason we suffer in sympathy with friends and loved ones is that we care about them, and the sheer fact of understanding that they are in pain gives us pain.^ We think it is virtuous to love and befriend others, so if suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones is part of loving and befriending, then it seems right to see such sympathetic suffering as partially constitutive of these virtuous states of character. We can think of remorse as having the same underlying structure that suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones has. Sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones often has beneficial behavioral consequences that run parallel to the beneficial behavioral consequences of remorse. Sympathetic suffering prompts us to try to relieve the suffering of the friend or loved one, much as remorse prompts wrongdoers to try to make amends. Sympathetic suffering also prompts us to express our sympathy, to indicate that we bear the burden of the pain 551 Ben Vilhauer along with our friend or loved one, thereby making the burden of the friend or loved one easier for him to bear. Sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones also shares with remorse the fact that it doesn't always have beneficial behavioral consequences. But when it doesn't have such consequences, we still think it is appropriate. If you were stuck on a desert island, for example, and you knew someone you loved was suffering, you wouldn't think you should stop suffering in sympathy just because you couldn't help your loved one or express your sympathy, because suffering in sympathy is part of what it means to love the person. You could only stop suffering in sympathy if you stopped loving the person. The reason we never seek a consequentialist or retributivist justification of sympathetic suffering for friends or loved ones and we do sometimes seek such a justification for remorse, is that we do not think of sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones as a kind oi punishment, and we are sometimes mistakenly inclined to think of remorse that way. So part of the solution to our problem about remorse is to stop thinking of it as punishment and, instead, to think of it as just one member of a set of emotional engagements, all of which depend upon suffering in sympathy with others, and none of which involve desert. Like love and friendship, remorse is a virtuous state of character that depends upon suffering in sympathy with people one cares about. It may he thought oxymoronic to speak of a virtuous state of character of an agent who has acted unethically. To this we can reply that, certainly, a perfectly virtuous person would be one who had no unethical deeds to feel remorseful about. But in the realm of the sub-ideal traversed by most of us, we must rely on a conception of imperfect virtue.^" That is, most of us are imperfectly governed by the virtues, so that we lapse from time to time and behave in ways that are not virtuous. Imperfectly virtuous agents feel remorse in the wake of serious lapses in virtuous conduct. The relationship established when one agent wrongs another is of course a very different kind of relationship than what is involved in love or friendship. But it involves a sort of intimacy all the same. Loving, befriending, and harming all create what we might call moral connection. In all three kinds of relationship, the lives of the people involved become intertwined in fundamental ways, and the relationships contribute to the basic fabric of the moral identity of the people involved. The wrongdoer's subsequent experience of remorse is a way of recognizing and taking seriously the morally salient relationship he bears to the person wronged. Such sympathetic suffering is something we expect of wrongdoers, in much the same way that we expect sympathetic suffering from people whose loved ones or friends are suffering. 552 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics Some might object that there isn't the right kind of analogy between love and friendship, on the one hand, and remorse on the other. When we suffer in sympathy with loved ones or friends, we do so spontaneously, because we care about them. But when one person wrongs another, the wrongdoer obviously doesn't care about the person, at least not enough to avoid the wrongful action in the first place. So, with love and friendship, the sympathetic suffering springs from an emotional engagement that is already there, on the basis of which one spontaneously suffers in sympathy. But when wrongdoers do not suffer remorse, it means that there is no emotional engagement that could be the basis for spontaneously suffering in sympathy. To claim that remorse has the same structure as suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones is to seek to force remorse into a mold it just doesn't fit. But this objection is mistaken. Often, wrongdoers do feel remorse just as spontaneously as people suffer in sympathy with friends and loved ones. No one has to demand it of them. It is true that, in many cases, the emotional engagement between the remorseful wrongdoer and the person wronged only forms after the wrong is done,'^ while in cases of suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones, the emotional engagement often preexists the suffering with which we sympathize. But this does not undermine the account presented here. The central idea to be advanced here is that the experience of remorse is a lot like the wrongdoer feeling friendship or love for the person wronged in the wake of the wrongful act, and then suffering sympathetically on the basis of an emotional engagement similar to the one found in friendship and love. Now, however, objectors will ask, what about cases where wrongdoers do not spontaneously suffer sympathetically? It is basic to our understanding of remorse that it is something we expect of wrongdoers, so that when they do not feel remorse, they are failing to do something we want them to do. Objectors may claim that there is no parallel in love or friendship. We suffer in sympathy with people we care about, but when we do not care about someone, we do not have that special reason to suffer in sympathy with him, and no one can expect us to suffer in sympathy. But this objection is also mistaken because there are cases in which we expect sympathetic suffering from someone who doesn't care about the person suffering, that is, cases in which it would be virtuous for the person to care, and in which the person's failure to care manifests a lack of virtue.'^ Consider two people, call them Jones and Green. We tell Jones that if he were virtuous, he would suffer in sympathy with Green, but he rejects our demand by claiming not to care about Green. If Green is Jones's significant other, or parent, or child, or mentor, or someone with whom he has played bridge every weekend for 553 Ben Vilhauer years, then we can reply to Jones by saying that it would be virtuous to care about Green, and since caring about Green involves suffering in sympathy, it would be virtuous to suffer in sympathy with Green, and by failing to do so, Jones manifests a lack of virtue. The point here is that there are privileged ways of interacting with other people that create expectations that one care about those other people. ^ And my claim is that wronging someone is among these privileged ways of interacting. Here is another way of thinking about the same point. Suppose one was talking with someone one didn't know well, call him Smith. Suppose Smith mentioned that his significant other of ten years was suffering terrible pain from an illness. And suppose one said how sorry one was to hear about it, that it must be a very painful time not just for Smith's significant other, but for Smith too. And suppose Smith responded, "Why would it be a painful time for me? I'm not the one with the pain." One would presumably feel that Smith's failure to suffer sympathetically made him callous, or even monstrous. What I want to suggest is that the callousness we find in wrongdoers who have committed, for example, serious crimes of violence and who feel no remorse is not fundamentally different from Smith's callousness." Sympathetic suffering is of course not all there is to remorse. Remorse is a unique kind of sympathetic suffering, because in remorse we sympathize with suffering we have caused. And it is this special feature of remorse that sometimes causes the wrongdoer to modify his behavior so as to not repeat his wrongful actions. But this is not a problem for our account. We need not claim that remorse shares all its features with sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones, only that what is painful about remorse can be understood as based on a similar sort of sympathetic suffering. And remorse need be no less effective as a behavior-modifier when it is based on suffering in sympathy with the person wronged than it would be if it were based on suffering retributively self-imposed. The idea is that remorseful wrongdoers modify their behavior so as to have less suffering to sympathize with in the future. This last point must be underlined, because it sheds light on another unique feature of remorse. It must be emphasized that modifying one's behavior so as to have less suffering to sympathize with in the future is vicious in all cases except those in which one might cause the suffering oneself. It is cowardly to avoid befriending and loving people who are suffering in order to avoid suffering in sympathy with them. ^ It is only virtuous to avoid forming relationships in order to avoid sympathetic suffering in cases of wronging others, that is, in cases where the suffering of the other would be caused by the very fact of establishing the morally salient relationship with the other that would be the foundation of one's sympathetic suffering. " 554 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics Retributivists may weigh in again at this point, and object that the emotion that remains when we exclude the concept of desert from remorse isn't really remorse at all, because as a matter of empirical fact, the emotion that we refer to as remorse in contemporary society does involve the idea that one deserves to suffer for one's wrongs. I do not think this is always true. But suppose it is. It need not undermine this account. We can think of hard determinist, virtue-based remorse as a kind of remorse with most of the same features of remorse that are experienced in contemporary society, but not all of them, that is, not the features that depend on the concept of desert. Hard determinist remorse would seem to preserve the most important features of remorse as experienced in contemporary society. It is emotional suffering involved in wrongdoers' understanding of their wrongful acts that allows them to bear the burden of the suffering they have caused along with the people they have wronged, and it sometimes has beneficial behavioral consequences. In a hard determinist society, the kind of remorse defended here could play a role which is very similar to the role played by remorse in contemporary society. Further, if remorse based on sympathetic suffering is more virtuous than remorse based on retributively self-imposed suffering, then the presence of remorse based on retributively self-imposed suffering in contemporary society would not serve as an argument against the sympathetic suffering account, but would rather demonstrate that contemporary society is not as virtuous as it could be. (We will later consider arguments that point in this direction.) Retributivists may also object that remorse normally involves regret that one acted wrongly, and regret only makes sense if one had free will in acting wrongly. But this is mistaken. It is uncontroversial that regret involves a wish that one had not acted wrongly. But it is not obvious that this wish must be based on a belief that it was physically possible for one's wrongful action not to have occurred, in any sense that would conflict with hard determinism.^^ People often wish for things that are physically impossible, without falsely believing that those things are physically possible. For example, I may know that it is physically impossible for me to lift a 200-pound weight but still wish to do it. It is also important to note that people often express regret by saying that they wish to "go back and undo" the regretted deed. But the time travel which would be required to fulfill this wish is presumably physically impossible no matter how things stand with determinism, and it would be implausible to suppose that people who express regret in this way believe such time travel to be physically possible. So it seems unreasonable to use the physical possibility of fulfilling the wishes involved in regret as a criterion for the adequacy of accounts of regret. 555 Ben Vilhauer Since we are seeking to explain remorse on the model of suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones, it may be instructive to look for a parallel to regret in sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones. And such a parallel is readily available: when one suffers in sympathy, one normally wishes that the event that caused the friend or loved one to suffer did not occur. Suppose it is a naturally occurring event, a falling rock, for example: one wishes that the rock had not fallen. One can coherently wish the rock had not fallen even if one knows the rock was deterministically necessitated to fall. On the current account, the pain accompanying regret over striking someone without justification (for example) is not essentially different from the pain accompanying the wish that the rock had not fallen. We can hear "If only I had not struck him!" in the same way that we hear "If only the rock had not fallen!" One can of course only feel regret for one's own actions, but there is no reason to suppose that hard determinism would undermine the distinction between events that are one's own actions and events that are not. Let us proceed to a different sort of objection. According to the account advanced here, the suffering of remorse can be valuable even without a consequentialist justification. But retributivists may object that this makes such suffering intrinsically valuable, that is, that it makes it an end in itself. Retributivists may argue that this can only be a coherent position if wrongdoers deserve to suffer. But a virtue-based hard determinism must reject the claim that nonconsequentially justified remorse is an end in itself. Remorse is a noninstrumental means to the end of virtue, in the sense that it is a part of the whole of an (imperfectly) virtuous state of character of an agent who has acted unethically. We can refer to this kind of means as a constitutive means. It may be objected that the means/end relation is inherently instrumental, making it a contradiction in terms to speak of noninstrumental means to ends. But this is a merely terminological objection. The distinction could be recast as a distinction between two kinds of instrumental means: one that is a mere cause of the end and not part of what makes the end valuable and another that partially constitutes the end and its value. When remorse is consequentially justified as a means to the end of beneficial behavioral consequences, in the sense we have discussed here, the end is the behavioral consequences. Remorse is represented as a mere cause of the behavior, not part of what makes the behavior valuable. That is, the suffering of remorse must be "outweighed" by the value of the behavioral consequences if remorse is to be consequentially justifiable: rather than being a part of what makes the end valuable, it factors into the consequentialist cost/benefits equation in a way that 556 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics diminishes the overall value of the end. The virtue-based justification of remorse without beneficial behavioral consequences requires a conception of virtuous character that is not necessarily expressed in behavior. In the virtue-based justification, the end is the virtuous state of character, and remorse is a means to this end in the sense that it is a part of the end, not a mere cause of the end. I by no means wish to rule out some sort of functional account of behaviorally unexpressed remorse and its contributions to virtuous character, for example, an account based on the causal role of remorse in producing certain courses in the agent's reflections and certain emotions in response to certain thoughts. In this way we could explain remorse's function as a constitutive means in straightforwardly causal terms, so long as none of the effects with respect to which remorse's causal role was defined were necessarily expressed in behavior, and so long as we recognized remorse as partially constitutive of the overall virtuous state of the agent's character. (Remorse can be a cause without being a mere cause.) Now I want to compare this account of remorse to two other accounts of moral psychology in recent literature on moral responsibility, one from Hilary Bok and the other from Bernard Williams. Neither Bok nor Williams focus on remorse: Bok defends the role of guilt in moral psychology, and Williams defends the role of shame in moral psychology. But their concerns overlap in important ways with those of this paper. Remorse, guilt, and shame are all painful moral emotions, and they have all commonly been thought to play fundamental roles in moral psychology. And both Bok and Williams are concerned with the relationship between moral responsibility and painful moral emotions. Bok defends a kind of guilt that does not involve desert or self-retribution but does involve moral responsibility. Williams thinks we should reject moral responsibility, and should therefore reject guilt, and base moral psychology on shame instead. I will argue that remorse as it has been explained here is a better foundation for moral psychology than either Bok's guilt or Williams's shame. The present paper grants a fundamental role in moral psychology to a kind of remorse that is intrinsically otherdirected, in the sense that the pain of remorse arises from sympathizing with others. But as we have discussed, it is common to represent remorse as intrinsically self-directed. Selfdirected accounts standardly depict remorse as self-retribution. Hilary Bok, however, presents an account of guilt that is selfdirected, but not retributivistic, in the context of a compatibilistic theory of free will. ^ Bok compares the experience of guilt to the loss of a romantic love relationship. She claims that seeing guilt this way can help one understand guilt without supposing that we feel guilty because we believe we deserve to. 557 Ben Vilhauer There are two important objections to her account that must be made from the perspective of the present paper. First, by drawing an analogy between guilt and the pain of losing romantic love, Bok produces an account of guilt that makes it seem narcissistic. Bok conceives guilt as a sorrowful consciousness of how one's wrongful act has stained one's moral character. But it seems vain (and therefore vicious) to focus on the stain upon one's character instead of harms done to others. When a relationship of romantic love comes to an end, the consequent suffering is based on one's own loss and is normally bound up with a sense of rejection and diminished self-esteem. The analogy Bok draws between the loss of romantic love and guilt over one's wrongful actions implies that feeling guilty because one has done wrong is something like falling out of love with oneself because one has not lived up to one's moral image of oneself. This portrays guilt as a self-focused experience characterized by sorrow over the diminished self-image available to the wrongdoer. In psychoanalytic terms, it makes guilt a kind of narcissistic injury. Such self-focus seems in tension with sincere appreciation of how one has harmed others. So, if we find it natural to account for what seems virtuous about painful moral emotions in terms of how they draw our attention to the harm we have done to others, we should resist counting Bok's sort of guilt among the virtues. ^ The second objection to Bok's view involves the concept of desert, and the debate between compatibilism and hard determinism. Bok draws the analogy between guilt and the pain of losing romantic love in order to explain guilt without appealing to the concept of desert. She holds that a wrongdoer's guilt is appropriate not because he deserves to feel guilty but, rather, because feeling guilt when one has done wrong is appropriate in the same way that feeling pain upon the loss of a romantic love relationship is appropriate. Insofar as Bok's work and this paper both seek to provide nonretributivistic accounts of painful moral emotions, they have a common purpose. But Bok does this within the context of a compatibilistic account of free will. Detaching the appropriateness of guilt from desert seems like a dangerous course for a compatibilist, given the strong connections between the concepts of desert and moral responsibility. That is, if we do not need the concept of desert to explain the appropriateness of guilt, why do we need the concept of moral responsibility as part of our theory? And if a theory does not need the concept of moral responsibility, then isn't it really hard determinism masquerading as compatibilism? Now let us briefly consider Bernard Williams's moral psychology. " He thinks that a greater reliance on the concept of shame in accounts of the moral emotions can help make up for the weaknesses he sees in the concept of moral responsibility. His concerns about moral responsibility stem not from worries 558 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics about determinism but from the phenomenon of "moral luck," and problems such as the alleged characterlessness of the moral self in Kantian approaches to moral psychology. Williams's view is that guilt is the central emotion of self-reproach in societies where moral psychology is regulated by the concept of moral responsibility and that shame is the central emotion of selfreproach in societies that predate the influence of the concept of moral responsibility. He seems to think that, in general, providing a greater role for shame in moral psychology would have a corrective effect on philosophical ethics. From the perspective of this paper, we can agree with Williams that the concept of moral responsibility is metaphysically problematic, and we need not object to his suspicions about guilt. But if we can demonstrate the appropriateness of remorse in the absence of moral responsibility, as we have sought to do in the present paper, then it is not clear that we would have reason to give shame an expanded role. On Williams's account, "What arouses shame is what typically elicits from others contempt or derision or avoidance."^^ But (to speak bluntly) it seems reasonable to claim that sensitivity to others' expectations that we feel remorse could be a virtue, and it seems much less reasonable to claim that sensitivity to others' contempt, derision, and avoidance could be a virtue. If contemporary moral consciousness tends to be more thickskinned with respect to contempt, derision and avoidance than ancient moral consciousness, this would seem to be a mark of moral progress. One way of explaining such thick-skinnedness might be vulnerability to others' expectations about remorse but not to their contempt, derision, or avoidance. If we can detach the concept of remorse from the concept of moral responsibility, then we can reject the concept of moral responsibility without needing shame to prop up the foundations of moral psychology. Our goal in this paper has been to accommodate remorse within hard determinism. The virtue-based account of remorse we have developed emphasizes a structure that is shared by remorse on the one hand, and sympathetic suffering felt toward friends and loved ones who are in pain, on the other. In both cases, we suffer because we sympathize with people we care about. Rejecting the concept of moral responsibility would give us no reason to stop suffering in sympathy with friends and loved ones. So if we can understand remorse in terms of the same underlying structure, we should not suppose that rejecting the concept of moral responsibility would give us reason to stop feeling remorse. To conclude, it should be noted that the account of remorse advanced here is defensible even if we do have free will. If we find it natural to account for what seems virtuous about painful moral emotions in terms of how they draw our attention to the 559 Ben Vilhauer harm we have done to others, then an account of remorse based on sympathetic suffering seems preferable to an account of remorse based on suffering retributively self-imposed, no matter how things stand with the metaphysics of free will and moral responsibility. Said differently, if it is virtuous to feel remorse that involves sympathetic suf"fering, then this is an argument on behalf of such remorse, whether or not we have free will. And if the virtue of self-retrihutive remorse is questionable, then this is an argument against self-retributive remorse, whether or not we have free will. So even if we suppose that there are no metaphysical obstacles to the concepts of moral responsibility and desert that are involved in the retributivist account of remorse, there are ethical obstacles to the retributivist account that favor the virtue-based sympathetic suffering acocunt presented here. ^ Notes Thanks to the following for helpful discussions and suggestions: Erin Kelly, Michael Slote, Steve Davis, Anne Tarver, Candace Vogler, Amy Kind, Chad Flanders, Michael Green, and the audiences at Augustana College and at the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference at Fort Hays State University, where earlier verions of this paper were presented in 2004. I claim full credit for any remaining errors. ' A brief explanation of hard determinism, as it will be understood here, may be helpful. Hard determinists are incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism. Incompatibilists hold that an agent is morally responsible for an action, that is, is praiseworthy or blameworthy for an action, only if the agent could have acted differently than he actually acted; they hold further that if determinism is true, then no agent could ever have acted differently than he actually acted. Hard determinists hold that determinism is true, and they conclude that agents are not morally responsible for their actions. Three further points may also be useful. First, hard determinists can accept that events at the quantum level are indeterministic. They need only deny that we have reason to believe that microphysical indeterminacy "propagates upward" to the macrophysical level in ways that are significant for human actions. That is, hard determinists can hold that human actions are deterministic, for all intents and purposes, even if there is quantum indeterminacy. Second, when hard determinists deny that we are morally responsible for our actions, they do not mean that there is no distinction between justified and unjustified actions. They only mean that agents are not praiseworthy or blameworthy for acting as they do. That acting in some way would be unethical can be a reason against acting in that way, even if one would not be blameworthy for acting in that way. (If "ought" implies "can," then hard determinism implies that we never fail to do anything we ought to do because according to hard determinism, it is only possible for us to do what we actually do. This means that if someone lies, we cannot criticize her by claiming that she ought to have told the truth. But this does not imply that hard 560 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics determinism cannot offer any moral criticism of her lie. Hard determinists can point out that she was mendacious and, therefore, vicious, without claiming that she ought to have told the truth, and without claiming that she is blameworthy for having been mendacious. And the fact that lying would be vicious can be a reason against lying, even if it is not true that one ought to tell the truth. Also see note 12.) Third, it can seem that, if determinism is true, it makes no sense to deliberate about what we should do. It can seem that our deliberations have no effect on our actions because it is inevitable that we are going to act in a certain way, so there is no point in worrying about what is right and wrong anyway. But that impression is mistaken. Suppose a habitual shoplifter who is trying to break his habit is in a store confronting two options: to shoplift a book or to put it back on the shelf. And suppose he reasons that it would be best to put it back, and puts it back. Even if determinism is true, and it is therefore inevitable that he will decide to put it back, his decision to put it back is nonetheless a part of the causal sequence that terminates in his putting it back, just as much as his arm moving to put it back is a part of the causal sequence. It is not as though some other process causes him to put it back and prevents his reasoning from having an effect. So good moral reasoning can still be a cause of good actions and, therefore, still has a point, even if determinism is true. ^ It is important for the account to be developed here that one can be a consequentialist about punishment without being a consequentialist about ethics as a whole. The goal in this paper is to incorporate a circumscribed consequentialism about punishment into an account based more broadly on virtue ethics. (For a different approach to ethics in the absence of desert, which also gives consequentialist thinking a role within a nonconsequentialist theory, see Erin Kelly's "Doing Without Desert," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 [2002]: 180-205.) ^ Michael Slote notes that virtue ethics would remain viable if determinism is true. But he does not consider virtue ethics as a foundation for remorse ("Ethics Without Free Will," Social Theory and Practice 16, no. 3 [1990]: 369-83). '' Behavior modification is not incompatible with hard determinism. There can be patterns in behavior that persist over intervals and then change, even if determinism is true. Changes in pattern would be deterministically necessitated, of course, but this does not prevent us from identifying patterns and changes in them. ^ This list is not intended to be exhaustive. The two ways discussed here are the two that are important for the argument to be made here, and certainly they must figure among the most important in any analysis. ^ Two caveats: (1) For the sake of simplicity, I am discussing remorse based on true beliefs about one's actions. Sometimes people feel remorse on tbe basis of false beliefs-that is, tbey believe some action of theirs was unethical but it was not, so tbe action in fact gives tbem no reason to feel remorse. But tbis does not undermine our claims about the privileged connection between remorse and morally relevant facts because even erroneous remorse must be based on what the agent takes to be morally relevant facts. (2) Though we 561 Ben Vilhauer think of morally relevant facts about wrong actions as reasons for remorse as well as causes of remorse, I am emphasizing the causal dimension because what is special about remorse as a behavior modifier is brought out most clearly in causal terms. ' It may be objected that there are wrongs that cause no suffering. For example, I might wrong someone by lying to him, even if it was impossible that it could ever bring him suffering. But this is not a problem for the present account, since it is not clear that remorse would be demanded of me in such cases. A recognition of my flaws, and a resolution to be honest in the future, might be sufficient. The virtuebased account to be advanced here can identify what is problematic about such an act of lying without appealing to its effects on the person wronged, by identifying the act itself as mendacious. (Thanks to Steve Davis for raising this objection.) ' Michael Slote develops a virtue ethics based on caring but does not apply it to hard determinism or remorse {Morals from Motives [New York: Oxford University Press, 2001]). Generally speaking, the perspective on virtue taken in this paper fits more naturally with the sentimentalist approach to virtue ethics found in Hume and Hutcheson and developed in the contemporary context by Slote, than it does with Aristotelian approaches to virtue ethics. So the account of remorse developed here is likely to be more congenial to a sentimentalist approach than to an Aristotelian one. ' We need not claim that remorse is always virtuous: people may feel deep remorse in the wake of minor wrongs, or may become debilitated by remorse, and there is no need to recognize these cases as virtuous. Similarly, one can suffer too much when sympathizing with a friend or loved one, and the criteria we use for determining when suffering is excessive would seem to be much the same for remorse and for sympathetic suffering for friends and loved ones. (Thanks to Steve Davis for an objection that prompted this point.) '" Patricia Greenspan argues that feeling guilt is not incompatible with being virtuous. She does not make such a case for remorse, but her argument can be easily extended to cover remorse ("Guilt and Virtue," Journal of Philosophy 91, no. 2 [1994]: 57-70). " This is of course not true in all cases. Sometimes we act wrongfully toward people we already care about. 1 To claim that a failure to care can manifest a lack of virtue need not commit one to the claim that the uncaring agent ought to care or that the agent in any other sense has "external reasons" to care (though it is of course compatible with these further commitments). This is important for the following reason: though it is often thought that "ought" implies "can," hard determinists hold that we never can do anything other than what we in fact do. Hard determinists can explain the significance of a lack of virtue without appealing to "oughts" as follows. Virtuous people want other people to be virtuous too, so virtuous people have a reason to cause other people to be virtuous. In cases where someone's failure to care manifests a lack of virtue, virtuous people have a reason to cause that person to care, for example, by describing the suffering of the other to him, or by describing his morally salient relationship to the other, in a way that prompts his sympathy. We need not appeal to "oughts" to make out any of these claims. (Also see note 1.) 562 Hard Determinism, Remorse, and Virtue Ethics ' I am not claiming that we never have reason to care about people with whom we do not have morally salient relationships. But if we are thinking of caring as constituted by occurrent emotional states having facts about particular people as intentional objects, then it would seem to follow that even the most virtuous people cannot care for more than a limited number of people, given the limited time people have to care. And it seems correct to say that the people about whom virtuous people care in a particularistic way are those with whom they have morally salient relationships. We may also expect virtuous people to care in a nonparticularistic way for human beings in general, and since this sort of caring would not have facts about individuals as intentional objects, it would not be confined to a limited group of people. But suffering in sympathy is normally based on particularistic caring. See Slote (ibid.) for a discussion of the distinction between particularistic and generalized caring. " This account of remorse might be framed in terms of empathy rather than (or in addition to) sympathy. I frame it in terms of sympathy because of affinities between the perspective on virtue taken here and Hume's account of virtue, in which sympathy occupies a central position. Recent work on empathy which supports this approach to remorse includes Martin Hoffman's Empathy and Moral Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) and Michael Slote's "Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project" {Metaphilosophy 34, no. 1 [2003], 131-43). ^ There are some exceptions to this claim about cowardice. One might avoid befriending people who engage in needlessly risky behavior in order to avoid sympathetic suffering without being a coward. One might also avoid befriending someone in order to avoid sympathetic suffering without being a coward if one had reason to believe that the sympathetic suffering would be debilitating because of limits in one's psychological strength. But even in these cases, it seems implausible to suppose that this avoidance would be virtuous. It would simply not be vicious. (Thanks to Anne Tarver fo this objection.) * It is also noteworthy that it is only if we explain remorse in terms of sympathetic suffering that the pain of remorse can give one a broadly moral, rather than merely self-interested, reason to modify one's behavior. If an agent with a history of violent behavior knows he will be beaten if he continues to harm others, then his desire to not be beaten gives him a reason to modify his behavior so as to stop harming others. But if this is the only reason that motivates him to modify his behavior, then it seems that his motivation is not really moral but rather merely self-interested. For his motivation to be moral in this case, he must be at least partially motivated by a concern for others. If we think of remorse as retributively self-imposed suffering, then a desire to not feel remorse seems no morally better as a reason to modify one's behavior than a desire to not be beaten. But if remorse is based on sympathetic suffering, then a desire to not feel remorse intrinsically involves a concern for others. " Bernard Williams makes a point that parallels this one in some respects. 1 Hilary Bok, Freedom and Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 167-79. 563 Ben Vilhauer ' This response to Bok fits well with Hutcheson's view that it is self-centered to concern oneself overmuch about one's own virtue, or lack thereof (Thanks to Michael Slote for this point.) ^ Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). ' Williams, Shame and Necessity, 90. ^ Thanks to Michael Slote for suggesting this point.

EPISTEME NS, VOL. 31, No 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 Recibido 14-01-11 ☼ Aceptado 27-01-11 M.J. García-Encinas IDENTIDAD PERSONAL Y RESPONSABILIDAD Resumen. Este artículo defiende que toda acción es un suceso que entraña, responsabilidad agente. Toda acción es el suceso que es el "hacer" de alguien. La responsabilidad del agente que define una acción es el tipo que justifica el premio-castigo. Esto implica que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es la responsabilidad que la define. Más aún, si la identidad personal se ha de comprender dentro del reino de la acción, las teorías de corte narrativo, más que las aproximaciones mentalistas, se encuentran mucho mejor posicionadas para llevar a cabo esta labor de comprensión. Palabras clave: acción; responsabilidad; identidad personal. IDENTIDAD PERSONAL Y RESPONSABILIDAD Abstract. This paper argues that an action is an event that essentially conveys agent responsibility. Any action is the event that is someone's doing. And agent responsibility, which defines action, is the kind of responsibility that justifies reward and punishment. This means that action is, in all cases, defeasile and socially santioned, such as it is the type of responsibility that defines action. Moreover, if pesonal identity is to be understood within the frame of action, narrativist kind of theories, rather than mentalist approaches, are in a much better position to do the job. Keywords. Action; responsibility; personal identity. Me gustaría defender aquí una tesis fuerte sobre la acción: toda acción es un suceso cuya ocurrencia es responsabilidad de alguien. La responsabilidad agente que define una acción, tal y como explicaré, 2 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 es el mismo tipo de responsabilidad que muchos filósofos ha llamado "responsabilidad moral", es decir, el tipo de responsabilidad que justifica el premio/castigo. Para defender estas ideas comenzaré distinguiendo las teorías de la responsabilidad agente de las teorías mentalistas de la acción. Brevemente resumiré los problemas más comunes contra las teorías mentalistas, para pasar inmediatamente a la propuesta positiva de este trabajo, que es la defensa de las teorías de la responsabilidad y, en suma, la idea de que la acción es, en todos los casos, revocable y socialmente sancionada, igual que lo es, precisamente, la responsabilidad que la define. Durante la defensa de esta ideas irá emergiendo una propuesta sobre la identidad personal entendida desde la acción. I. Dos grupos de teorías Las teorías de la acción pueden clasificarse en dos grandes grupos. Por un lado, las teorías mentalistas o psicologistas, según las cuales una acción es un suceso mental, es decir, un suceso definido primariamente desde su intencionalidad, y en algunos casos también desde su fenomenología, y, secundariamente, desde otros rasgos más o menos relacionados con la intencionaldiad y la fenomenología de lo mental o más o menos explicativos de éstas como son: la auto-conciencia, la racionalidad, la libre elección o voluntariedad, direccionalidad, etc. Por otro lado, están las teorías agenciales o de la responsabilidad, según las cuales una acción es un suceso cuya ocurrencia (o ausencia) se atribuye a alguien. Una acción es un suceso que es responsabilidad de alguien. Especialmente me interesa subrayar que esta es una división excluyente pues, tal y como aquí las voy a entender y defender, lo que aportan las teorías de la responsabilidad es lo que puede llamarse una actitud de prejuicio ante lo mental, pues no explican la acción, ni siquiera en principio, en términos mentales. Lo mental, entendido al menos como algo interno, es o bien enteramente irrelevante o bien secundario a la responsabilidad agente, y a la acción. Paralela a ésta podemos trazar también otra división similar para las teorías de la identidad personal: las teorías mentalistas de la identidad personal pretenden dar cuenta de la identidad personal desde rasgos propiamente mentales del individuo; las teorías de la responsabilidad, por otro lado, entienden la persona desde sus acciones. Entre las 3 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad primeras se encuentran, por ejemplo, las que Rovane clasifica como teorías neo-lockeanas según las que la identidad personal descansa únicamente en el darse relaciones psicológicas apropiadas (memoria, anticipación, consistencia, coherencia...) entre episodios intencionales (acciones, pensamientos, precepciones...).1 Pero también cuento entre las teorías mentalistas cualquier teoría dualista que entienda la persona como una sustancia mental, o cualquier teoría materialista que encuentre fuentes esenciales de lo personal en el cerebro en tanto órgano pensante u origen biológico de intencionalidad, por ejemplo. Incluso aunque lo mental sea algo atribuido y externo, en la medida en que defina el yo y la persona, nos encontraremos ante una teoría mentalista. Independientemente de su metafísica, por tanto, lo que agrupa las teorías mentalistas es la prioridad de la intencionalidad de lo mental o de su fenomenología para la comprensión o explicación de la persona. Los rasgos que delimitan los dos grupos de teorías de la identidad personal los leemos ya en Locke. Según Locke el yo es la autoconciencia de uno mismo, y esto "mismo" de lo que uno es autoconsciente o tiene memoria, son los contenidos mentales propios que el sí-mismo reconoce como suyos en el acto de reflexión o recuerdo. El mismo contenido/realidad mental: creencias, pensamientos, deseos... es por tanto necesario para ser la misma persona. Somos la misma persona hasta donde somos conscientes de nuestros pesamientos y acciones en el pasado, y hasta donde alcanzan nuestros pensamientos y acciones proyectados hacia el futuro. Identidad personal y mentale se van inseparadamente de la mano en la teoría lockeana.2 Pero, según Locke, también el concepto de persona es un concepto forensis. Las personas son los portadores de derecho y responsabilidad: "Person (...) is a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit; and 1 Rovane, C., Self-Reference: "The Radicalization" of Locke Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993), pp. 73-97, pp. 74-75. 2 La continuidad de la consciencia no es, ni necesita, la identidad de la sustancia mental o coporal, según Locke, pues una misma alma podría tener diferentes consciencias, y un mismo cuerpo también. Igualmente, la misma consciencia podría estar en diferentes almas y/o cuerpos. En cualquier caso, incluso si Locke estuviese equivocado y alma o cuerpo resultasen necesarios para la identidad de la conseciencia, en tanto la consciencia defina la identidad personal, estaremos ante lo que he llamado una teoría mentalista de la identidad personal. 4 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 so belongs only to "intelligent" agents capable of a law, and happiness, and misery."3 Con la excepción del presupuesto de que los agentes sean "inteligentes" que Locke añade, esta es en esencia la idea de persona e identidad personal que voy a defender; una tesis sobre la identidad personal enmarcada en las teorías de la responsabilidad agente, según las cuales una persona se define como el sujeto de responsabilidad de sus acciones. Es verdad que para Locke la responsabilidad agente viene ya fundamentada en la idea de persona entendida como consciencia,4 pero es obvio que ambas ideas pueden mantenerse con independencia, y éste es mi propósito. Aunque voy ahora a resumir a grandes trazos algunos de los problemas comunes contra las teorías mentalistas, no pretendo que estos sean el centro de la discusión. (Los defensores de las teorías mentalistas, que son muchos, siguen peleando contra estos problemas típicos, y otros más avanzados.) La razón de este vistazo es, más bien, su contribución a la presentación de una forma contrapuesta de enfrentar las preguntas por la persona y la acción, que entiendo puede ser más fructífera. II. Básicos contra las teorías mentalistas En su forma más básica las críticas a las teorías mentalistas son propuestas de contraejemplos en los que las características "mentales" de los sucesos no justifican su constitución como acciones, o su atribución a una persona. (1) Como es bien conocido, Butler y Reid argumentaron contra la teoría de Locke de la identidad personal, que la consciencia y la memoria no 3 Locke, J., (1690) Essay Concerning Human Understanding "Of Identity and Diversity", p. 26. http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81u/index.html Mis cursivas. El entrecomillado interno señala mis reservas. 4 Por si la cita anterior no fuese suficiente: "This personality extends itself beyond present existence to what is past, only by consciousness, –whereby it becomes concerned and accountable; owns and imputes to itself past actions, just upon the same ground and for the same reason as it does the present. All which is founded in a concern for happiness, the unavoidable concomitant of consciousness; that which is conscious of pleasure and pain, desiring that that self that is conscious should be happy." Ibidem. 5 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad definen sino que presuponen la identidad personal (o la acción).5 Reid expone el caso de un oficial que, en el momento de robar la bandera enemiga, recuerda haber sido azotado de niño por haber robado en un huerto. Recuerda después haber robado la bandera cuando le condecoran como general. En ese momento, sin embargo, no recuerda haber robado en el huerto. Ahora bien, a pesar de carecer de este recuerdo del robo, él es la persona que lo realizó. Para dar cuenta de la transitividad necesaria para resolver el caso, concluye Reid, necesitamos presuponer la identidad personal.6 Nuestras acciones olvidadas, igual que nuestras acciones inconscientes o semi-inconscientes son nuestras acciones, y no es necesario que nada ni nadie nos lo recuerde para que sigan siendo nuestras. No es necesario que me equivoque al cambiar de marcha y me sobresalte con el golpe del cambio mal hecho, para responsabilizarme de todos los cambios que he realizado hasta ese momento. Que teclee una y otra vez la a del teclado del ordenador con mi dedo meñique izquierdo, me rasque la oreja o me atuse el pelo mientras escribo, que apriete los dientes... son mis acciones; no las realizo conscientemente, pero soy igualmente responsable de todas ellas en un modo en que no soy responsable de los latidos de mi corazón, o del proceso de digestión de la chocolatina que acabo de comer. Puedo, por ejemplo, corregirlas. Si de repente soy consciente de ello, puedo dejar de rascarme la oreja. O puedo equivocarme al teclear y al ir a escribir a, dar a la z, darme cuenta del error, y borrar rápidamente.7 Incluso dormir es mi acción, 5 Butler, J., "Of Personal Identity" en Perry J. (Ed.) Personal Identity Berkeley, University of California Press 1975, pp. 99-105. Reid, T. Of Mr. Locke's Account of Our Personal Identit en J. Perry (Ed.) Personal Identity Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, pp. 113-118. 6 Por otro lado, aceptar la transitividad de la identidad personal le supondría a Locke nuevos problemas, si consideramos casos imaginarios de duplicación de memorias, como el de Williams (Williams, B., Personal Identity and Individuation en Problems of the Self Cambridge, Cambride University Press, 1993) ya renombrado en la literatura, en el que toda la vida mental de Guy Fakes se duplica e implementa en dos cerebros/cuerpos distintos, Charles y Robert; si la continuidad psicológica es condición suficiente de identidad personal, entonces Charles Fakes y Fakes es Robert; luego, por transitividad, Robert y Charles han de ser la misma persona! 7 Que podamos en ocasiones corregir nuestras acciones, o no haberlas realizado a pesar de haber querido, será quizás señal de que los sucesos en cuestión son 6 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 aun cuando no recuerde haber soñado. Que pueda recordar mis experiencias no implica que mi recuerdo las hace mías, como diría Butler. Primero son mías y, luego, quizás las recuerde. (2) Tampoco la intencionalidad es necesaria para la acción. ¿Acaso no se enamoró Edipo de su madre? Naturalmente que sí. Edipo se enamoró de su madre, aunque él se creyese sólo enamorado de Yocasta. Del mismo modo (y aquí los dos sentidos de "intencionalidad" son intercambiables), un montón de cosas que hago sin intención son mi responsabilidad: si piso la cola del gato sin querer, o si tiro un jarrón chino del siglo XVIII sin saber que es chino, jarrón, o del siglo XVIII o sin saber siquiera que estoy tirando algo, igualmente lo estoy tirando, y lo estoy tirando yo. Cuando por el pasillo de la facultad derramo el café en el suelo sin querer y me regaña la limpiadora, es porque he tirado el café. Pido perdón, y espero que sea concedido dada mi falta de intención. Pero soy responsable de todo ello como agente. Y que, tal y como debo hacer, pida perdón, es buena muestra de mi responsabilidad sobre el suceso, sobre la mancha de café. A veces la falta de intención no bastará para el perdón o incluso será motivo de castigo, como en los casos de negligencia, como cuando un médico olvida uno de sus instrumentos en el vientre de un paciente durante alguna operación. En los casos de descuido, olvido y negligencia no hay intención, aunque puede haber intencionalidad. 'Olvidar' es un contexto intensional y opaco, luego olvidar es un acto intencional: el médico olvida el escalpelo, pero no olvida el escalpelo fabricado en Albacete 1968, puesto que nunca supo dónde fue fabricado. No obstante no es la intencionalidad la que señala la acción: en el juicio que determina al médico responsable del estropicio, es el escalpelo Albacete 1968 el que inculpa a Dr. Ramírez Cuadrado. La intencionalidad es, quizás, la línea divisoria de lo mental, pero no la que traza el alcance de nuestra responsabilidad. La intencionalidad (en sus dos sentidos) y acciones, pero no es lo que define la acción. La volición última augustiniana, carácter nouménico de toda acción, no se explicita en términos contrafáctios (igual que no se explicita en términos fácticos). Incluso aunque siempre sea posible que el suceso no ocurra a pesar de mi determinación por hacerlo, no hay en ello razón para aceptar que la determinación es lo que hace de un suceso una acción –contra lo que parece defender O'shaugnessy, B., Trying (as the mental "Pineal Gland") Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973) 13, pp. 365-386, en pp. 367-8. 7 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad la responsabilidad agente que define la acción, pueden apuntar muchas veces en la misma dirección, pero llevan cargadores diferentes.8 (3) Tampoco la racionalidad puede ser condición necesaria de acción, en la misma medida en que sea lógicamente posible actuar contra nuestro mejor criterio. Considérense los casos de debilidad de la voluntad, como fumar tras años de dura abstinencia por razones de salud, o beber vino antes de una charla. Por supuesto, siempre es posible intentar apelar a otras "mejores" razones para estos comportamientos como, no sé, quizás paliar el estrés. Pero incluso insistiendo por este camino, aún seguiría abierta la posibilidad lógica de actuar contra nuestro mejor juicio, de elegir un curso de acción creyendo que es peor que otras opciones al alcance; la austínana posibilidad de sucumbir ante la tentación con calma, incluso con finura.9 Y aun si crees que, en ocasiones, la tentación misma puede ser una razón, piensa en casos donde uno ha de considear razones que tienen el mismo peso pero son irreduciblemente incompatibles. Si esto es una posibilidad –y ¿por qué no habría de serlo?– entonces es posible actuar azarosa e irracionalmente. O quizás actuemos sin ningúna razón. Estas acciones irracionales o acciones sin razones podrían producir cierta perpejidad en quienes nos observan o en nosotros mismos. Pero no hay nada en su falta de racionalidad que les impida ser acciones, nuestras acciones. (4) Y tampoco es definitorio o necesario para la acción el que haya de haber finalidad en la acción. Demasiadas veces, cuando comemos no lo hacemos con el fin de alimentarnos o de saciar el hambre... simplemente comemos. A veces caminamos para pensar o para llegar a algún lugar, pero otras caminamos por caminar. Cuando nos vestimos o nos atamos los zapatos, muchas veces las acciones mismas constituyen su 8 Hay quizás un sentido en el que la idea menos analizada de intencionalidad no es separable de la acción. Una acción es un hacer y, por tanto, siempre que hay acción alguien hace--algo. Toda acción, en este sentido grueso, es intencional. Pero entonces nos enfrentamos a un concepto neutro o incluso vacío de intencionalidad, sin otro contenido que el contenido por defecto según el cual toda acción es un hacer (algo). Cualquier forma no trivial de dar contenido a la intencionalidad de la acción permite la existencia de acciones no intencionales. 9 Austin, J., A plea for excuses en Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1956-7), pp. 1-30. 8 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 propia finalidad. Y tampoco podemos decir que entonces son fines de otras acciones más básicas, como poner un pie delante del otro, llevarse la comida a la boca o realizar una serie de movimientos con los dedos y un cordón, porque todas estas acciones no son sino las mismas acciones de caminar, comer o atarse los zapatos. Hay muchas acciones autocontenidas en este sentido, todas las que hacemos porque queremos hacerlas por sí mismas. Incluso divertirse es una acción. (5) Empezaba con las ideas de Reid y Butler contra la teoría mentalista de Locke, y quiero terminar con el argumento que considero más servero aún contra las teorías mentalistas, y que puede leerse en Hume. Dice Hume que cuando consideramos/observamos nuestros estados mentales, "... we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement." 10 Estas afirmaciones son especialmente graves, pues si Hume tuviese razón y nuestros estados mentales se sucediesen sin más, ni siquiera la aceptación de la existencia de un sentido interno lockeano de reflexión o autorreflexión que nos permitiese "verlos" bastaría para que "viésemos" nuestro yo. Para ello aún debería existir, y deberíamos percibir, una conexión real, la unión entre nuestros estados mentales en el tiempo. Pero si Hume está en lo cierto, no percibimos tal conexión; no percibimos "las relaciones psicológicas apropiadas" entre pensamientos o percepciones. Luego no hay acceso interno a ningún yo al que responsabilizar de sucesos –o pensamientos.11 Estas son grosso modo las dificultades más importantes a las que se enfrentan las teorías mentalistas. Como decía, la literatura sobre ellas 10 Hume, D., Tratado de la Naturaleza humana Madrid, Tecnos, 1988, I, iv, vi. 11 Por supuesto, Kant dio la vuelta a las razones de Hume afirmando que la posibilidad misma de autoconciencia necesita como condición de la existencia de una unidad de la apercepción –incluso aunque ésta no pueda ser ella misma objeto de conocimiento para sí. (Aunque quizás uno podria también reprochar a Kant que la autoconciencia no juega un papel imprescindible en el razonamiento humeano.) Pero no quiero defender aquí las razones de Hume. De hecho, mis sibilinas razones para mencionar ahora a Hume contra las teorías mentalistas del yo –por cierto que la de Hume es mentalista también, claro; de ahí su escepticismo– emergerán después, cuando considere la versión humeana Galen-Strawson de la identidad personal. 9 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad es enorme y compleja. Los filósofos que las tratan han respondido distinguiendo diferentes formas de racionalidad, o de intencionalidad; algunos apuestan por lo que llaman control de sengudo orden; la consciencia y la semi-consciencia son áreas duras de trabajo para psicólogos y filósofos de la mente, etc. Así que dirás, con razón, que aún queda mucho por decir, y que uno aún puede defender algún tipo de racionalidad, de control, de intencionalidad, direccionalidad, etc, que sancione algunos sucesos como acciones, o como acciones de un sujeto. Pero si esto es lo que piensas, entonces, tu posición no es realmente contraria a lo que quiero defender. Niego que cualquiera de estos aspectos pueda explicar la acción o la persona, o que cualquiera de ellos pueda ser condición necesaria para la acción y la persona. Pero es evidente que muchas veces, formas de estos aspectos van incluidas entre las consideraciones y los instintos que determinan la responsabilidad. Lo destacable, sin embargo, es que la responsabilidad agente es en todo caso concreto y particular de acción algo contextual e interpersonalmente sancionado, y no algo que pueda explicarse y analizarse en términos de ninguna característica mental objetiva. Luego no voy a defender aquí las razones presentadas contra las teorías mentalistas, sino presentar una perspectiva diferente desde la cual entender la acción y la persona y defenderla, a ésta sí, de algunas críticas importantes. III. En qué consiste, y en qué no consiste, la responsabilidad agente La gran diferencia entre las teorías mentalistas, tanto de la acción como de la persona, por un lado, y las teorías de la responsabilidad, por otro, es el empeño de las primeras en buscar una explicación de la acción o la persona en el mundo de lo hechos, mentales o físicos, y el de la segundas en negar cualquier posibilidad a este tipo de explicación. Es decir, el primer tipo de teorías busca algún rasgo objetivo en la acción o la persona mediante el que determinar que un suceso sea una acción o una entidad una persona, mientras que el segundo tipo de teorías niega expresamente que exista tal rasgo: agencialidad y la propia persona no son cosas que pasan, sino que se atribuyen. Según las teorías de la responsabilidad, la responsabilidad agente, la agencialidad, es lo que distingue entre sucesos y sucesos que son acciones. Luego no hay diferencia en el mundo de los hechos entre un su10 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 ceso y una acción. Considérese el dispararse de una pistola y el disparar una pistola. Cuando alguien dispara la pistola, es decir, cuando el suceso es una acción, además del hecho de que la pistola se dispara está el hacer de alguien. Pero este hacer no está incluido entre lo que ocurre, pues su determinación está siempre sujeta a nulidad. A diferencia del suceso que es el dispararse de una pistola (que o bien ocurre, o bien no), que alguien dispara una pistola está siempre sujeto a juicio, un juicio que puede reabrirse una y otra vez. Toda acción es contextual e interpersonalmente sancionado; no hay propiedades que buscar en el mundo fáctico que determinen si un suceso es una acción, si un disparo o un dispararse es un disparar. Puesto que la persona es quien realiza una acción, persona y acción están fuera del mundo de los hechos. Persona y acción se comprenden, pero no se explican ni causan. No hay condiciones necesarias o suficientes para la agencialidad que no sean la agencialidad misma. Y la agencialidad consiste en ser declarado agente, i.e., en ser declarado responsable de una ocurrencia. Según las teorías de la responsabilidad, la pregunta por la acción no es la pregunta por las propiedades de un suceso que lo hacen una acción, sino la pregunta por la responsabilidad de alguien sobre un suceso, la pregunta por la posibilidad de enjuiciar y, quizás, premiar o castigar a alguien ante lo que hace. Igual que no se trata de buscar ninguna propiedad que caracterice la acción, no se trata tampoco de buscar al individuo ni condiciones de identidad personal previas que permitan la atribución de una acción. No se trata de determinar cuándo alguien es la misma persona para poder, en consecuencia, responsabilizarle de sus actos. ¿Es el Sr Hyde responsable de lo que hizo Jeckill?, es la pregunta equivocada. La identidad personal es inseparable de la agencialidad, pues la atribución de acción y la atribución de la acción a alguien son una misma acción. En este sentido, la acción es constitutiva de identidad personal. Y la reponsabilidad agente es un primitivo básico e inanalizable de la teoría. Decía que no hay nada fáctico en la reponsabilidad agente. Pero no quise decir que no hay nada que pueda decirse sobre ella. La responsabilidad agente, o responsabilidad moral, como también se la denomina en algunos círculos, puede entenderse ateniendo a algunas 11 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad de sus características esenciales; y las características esenciales a la acción, o la responsabilidad agente, son tres:12 (1) La primera caracterísica, siguiendo a Strawson, es que la responsabilidad agente/moral suscita ciertos sentimientos y reacciones a modo de respuesta.13 Estos sentimientos incluyen: gratitud, indiferencia, disgusto, amabilidad, respeto, enfado, orgullo, indignación, perdón, resentimiento... Todas estas reacciones y sentimientos son reacciones de/ante responsabilidad. Son reacciones y sentimientos que "atribuyen" agencialidad. Estos sentimientos tienen también, o podrían tener, una base psicológica o biológica, pero lo esencial es que son todos ellos modulados y modulables interpersonalmente, y sólo pueden existir dentro de una sociedad de personas. Que son reacciones que otorgan agencia y persona lo prueba también el ejercicio de algunas prácticas que fomentan su control con el fin de permitir las mayores masacres, barbaries y torturas. Si uno es capaz o es entrenado para anular estas emociones, puede llevar a cabo actos que las personas no aputadas de estos sentimientos sólo realizarían contra las cosas inertes.14 Los sentimientos ante la responsabilidad son sen12 Habría que empezar aclarando que la responsabilidad agente/moral no es responsabilidad legal, aunque es probable que en muchos casos la responsabilidad moral sea fuente de la responsabilidad legal. Pero la responsabilidad moral no es responsabilidad legal, pues no todos los casos de responsabilidad legal son casos de responsabilidad moral/agente. Por ejemplo, soy legalmente responsable de los daños causados por una teja que se vuela de mi tejado y choca contra el cristal del vecino, incluso en el caso de que una fuerte racha de viento huracanado sea la única causa de su desprendimiento. En este caso, no soy agente (moralmente) responsable del suceso, pero sí lo soy legalmente, puesto que así lo establece la ley. Igualmente, puedo ser legalmente responsable de las acciones de mis subalternos o de mis hijos, pero no soy su agente. Además, la responsabilidad legal está sujeta a las contingencias de las leyes humanas y escritas; pero la responsabilidad moral/agente no se escribe. 13 Strawson, P., Freedom and Resentment en Fischer, J. M. & Ravizza, M. (Eds.) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 45-66. 14 La supresión o control de estos sentimientos y reacciones también tiene fines menos cuestionables éticamente. Hace poco me decía alguien del mejor cirujano de corazón en cierto hospital en España que se negaba a conocer a ningún paciente, a conocer ningún dato de él que no fuese relevante para la operación, a sus familiares, etc. Quizás los cirujanos aprendan a contrariar estas emociones como forma básica de su entrenamiento y así para poder entrar al quirófano descargados de una responsabilidad que podría poner en peligro el propio éxito de las operaciones. 12 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 timientos ante la persona, y anularlos es anular a la persona que se tiene enfrente. (2) Una segunda característica, ya mencionada, es que la responsabilidad agente/moral es siempre revocable. En esto me sitúo en la tradición iniciada por Feinberg y Hart.15 Hart afirmaba que toda acción se define desde responsabilidad de un agente y dicha responsabilidad está, en todos los casos, sujeta a revisión o nulidad. Igual que ocurre con cuestiones de tipo legal, uno es inocente hasta que se demuestre su culpabilidad; es decir, uno no hace hasta que cierto suceso se sanciona, se aprueba, como su acción; y toda sanción está sujeta a su vez a revisión. La responsabilidad agente, por tanto, y en la misma medida en que es esencialmente una cuestión interpersonal, es algo declarado, sujeto en todo momento a reconocimiento social. (3) Y, en tercer lugar, la responsabilidad agente señala identidad personal. Ser considerado agente responsable es ser considerado persona. Dondequiera que pueda haber una reacción moral hay persona. Esta idea se enmarca en lo que entiendo es la tradición wittgensteiniana, y está en especial consonacia con algunas de las propuestas de Charles Taylor y Carol Rovane. Saber quién eres es estar orientado en el espacio moral, un espacio en que emergen cuestiones sobre lo que es bueno o malo, pues cada uno de nosotros es esencialmente donde se encuentra en el espacio moral.16 Por ello, ser considerado agente es ser considerado alguien capaz de hablar por sí mismo; alguien que hace y, por lo mismo, un agente con responsabilibad sobre lo que hace. Persona y acción son conceptos inseparables.17 En suma, ser considerado responsable agente/moral es ser considerado persona. Esto significa que la identidad personal precisa de la 15 Feinberg, J., "Action and Responsibility" en (Id.) Doing and Deserving Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 119-151. Hart, H. L. A. (1948/9) "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49, (1948/9), pp. 171-194. 16 Taylor, C., Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989, en p. 33. 17 Véase también Rovane, C., The Bounds of Agency Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, c. 5. Igual que ella, esta concepción de la persona permite entender que organismos, estructuras, naciones, etc. son agentes responsables de sucesos y, por tanto, posibles merecedores de reconocimiento/castigo. 13 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad responsabilidad moral/agente, y no al contario. Es cierto, siguiendo el dictum, que uno sólo puede responsabilizarse de sus propias acciones, nunca de las acciones de otros. Pero de ahí no se sigue que la identidad personal sea condición previa para la individuación de las acciones como propias. Contra propuestas tan dispares como la de Parfit o Sider, por mencionar algunas que gozan de especial consideración, el problema no es que buscando condiciones de individución personal hayamos de enfrentarnos a (irresolubles) casos de fisión, fusión, duplicación, lavados y transplantes de cerebros, etc, de forma que no nos quede otra que negar la relevancia de la pregunta por identidad, cuestionar nuestra capacidad para responderla, o mantener que es algún tipo de identidad especial no numérica.18 Pues no se trata de buscar condiciones de individuación personal para poder determinar cuándo alguien ha cometido un crimen, tenido un pensamiento, hecho una promesa, etc. Más bien, al contrario, atribuir agencialidad es atribuir "personeidad". Responsabilizarnos de nuestras acciones, de los sucesos que son nuestras acciones o pensamientos, de lo que decimos o creemos, es en definitiva lo que nos hace quiénes somos. Cuanto más responsable soy, más soy. Por eso degrada el desconsiderar la responsabilidad de otros, y dignifica ser reconocido como agente. Ser escuchado, aunque sea para rebatir lo que uno dice, es ser reconocido como un sí-mismo, como un otro en pie de igualdad personal; alguien más. La identidad personal no es una cuestión de continuidad psicológica, ni de continuidad corporal. Podría haber discontinuidad en cualquiera de los dos casos y seguir atribuyendo responsabilidad a la misma persona: Pris y Roy, conocidos blade runner, podrían ser responsables de su acciones y de sus falsos recuerdos. O podría haber continuidad corporal y psicológica sin atribución de responsabilidad, como ocurre a veces con niños y locos. Nuestras intuiciones irán a veces en una dirección, a veces en otra. ¿Es Pasty Hearst responsable de robar un banco después de haber sido secuestrada, su cerebro lavado, y ayudado a los secuestradores en tal hazaña, teniendo en cuenta además que después de su "recuperación" denunció secuestro, robo y secuestradores? 18 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. Sider, T., Four dimensionalism Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001. Parfit es defensor de la primera afirmación; Sider, de las dos últimas. 14 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 Lo importante es que, decidamos lo que decidamos, no lo haremos tras previa decisión de si Pasty Hearst era Pasty Hearst o no durante el secuestro. Más bien, en nuestra decisión sobre su responsabilidad estaremos decidiendo qué o quién es Pasty Hearst. La persona no es antes que su acción. Y poner en cuestión su responsabilidad es simplemente poner en cuestión el yo. Por tanto, la unidad del yo no requiere de ningún soporte ontológico (corpóreo, mental o transcendental), y negar la existencia del soporte o de condiciones objetivas para tal, no es negar la identidad personal. Pues el yo es, más bien, la aceptación y consideración de uno mismo y de los demás como agentes. Y esta considearación, que es atribución de responsabilidad, es una cuestión social. One cannot be a self on one's own, como escribe Charles Taylor. Mi identidad se construye poniendo puentes a una comunidad garante de los marcos evaluativos que, reconociéndome como persona, me permiten crecer como tal. Nos afirmamos como personas afirmando nuestra responsabilidad como agentes, y somos agentes dentro de algún marco evaluativo que sólo puede, por normativo, constituirse en comunidad. Lo que somos se construye desde lo que hacemos y que lo que hacemos sólo se entiende por referencia a la comunidad de actores a la que pertenecemos. La construcción del yo es la propia aceptación y comprensión de uno como agente y, por tanto, es un proceso narrativo: el yo es el protagonista de un relato "de acción". Y las acciones se comprenden dentro del relato que ellas mismas van escribiendo. IV. Problemas y críticas (1) Vengo afirmando que la responsabilidad agente no es otra responsabilidad que la responsabilidad moral: acción es un suceso susceptible de evaluación y juicio. Responsabilidad agente y moral comparten sus ragos esenciales: todo curso particular de acción es contextual e interpersonalmente sancionado, dependiente de respuesta, además de revocable. Muchos filósofos creen, sin embargo, que hemos de distinguir aquí dos tipos de responsabilidad. Strawson mismo sostiene que la responsabilidad moral es un tipo particular de responsabilidad agente. En la misma dirección, Martin Fischer separa el reino de la acción de la responsabiliad moral, y ofrece algunos ejemplos: 15 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad "... if the person were to inform you that she inadvertently tipped your vase off the shelf while groping blindly for her lost contact lenses, or that she smashed the vase during an epileptic seizure, then it would seem innapropriate to hold her [morally] responsible for the breakage, (...) since the damage resulted from something –say a seizure– over which she had no control."19 En estos casos, dice Fischer, la persona hace algo, es responsable agente de lo que ocurre, pero no es moralmente responsable de su acción, puesto que no tiene control sobre lo que hace. Luego habría que concluir que hay algo más en lo moral que la pura o simple responsabilidad agente. Y Fischer menciona las dos excusas tradicionales aristotélicas de responsabilidad moral ante la acción: ignorancia, como cuando alguien no se da cuenta de lo que hace o de las consecuencias de su acción, y fuerza, como los casos de impulsos psicológicos irresitibles, lavados de cerebro, hipnosis, manipulación directa del cerebro, y otras rarezas habituales en la literatura. En todos estos casos parece que hay acción: alquien mata a alguien, roba un banco, recuerda algo, etc., pero está exento de responsabilidad moral sobre su acción. Strawson diría que en estos casos cambiamos nuestra actitud: pasamos de una actitud participante o implicada, en la que han lugar nuestras reacciones ante la responsabilidad del otro, y sentimos ira, resentimiento, gratitud y demás, a una actitud objetiva, en la que decidimos que el agente debe ser "curado" o sometido a cierto tratamiento, entrenamiento, o rehabilitación social. La plausibilidad de estas conclusiones, sin embargo, es sólo aparente. Pues estas situaciones no son casos exentos de responsabilidad moral, si es que son casos de responsabilidad agente. En todas estas situaciones el agente es agente, si lo es, y esto es decir que es moralmente responsable. En todas estas situaciones de ignorancia o ausencia de control (igual que en los casos de asusencia de intención, racionalidad, etc. que mencionaba en la sección II), la ausencia de control y la ausencia de conocimiento no excusan por necesidad la responsabilidad moral. Y a la inversa, si excusan de responsabilidad moral, lo hacen en tanto en cuanto restan responsabilidad agente: Ser eximido de respon19 Fischer, J, & Ravizza, M., (Eds.) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 6. 16 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 sabilidad moral es ser eximido de responsabilidad sobre la acción y, por tanto, de agencialidad. Decidir que alguien hizo algo sin saber, o sin ningún control, es decidir que no hizo. Los casos o situaciones que parecen excusar la responsabilidad moral pero no la acción son, más bien, situaciones donde lo excusable es el premio o el castigo. Es evidentemente inapropiado castigar a alguien que hizo algo sin saber lo que hacía, o cuando estaba controlado externa e involuntariamente. No puede castigarse a un alcohólico por beber, ni a quien que no se da cuenta de que otro se está ahogando por no acudir en su ayuda. Pero ser eximido de castigo no es, por necesidad, ser eximido de responsabilidad moral. El perdón puede ayudarme aquí otra vez. El perdón muestra cómo ser eximido de castigo (o de premio) no es ser eximido de responsabilidad moral. Aunque son situaciones que impiden el castigo, las situaciones de perdón no son situaciones en las que hay responsabilidad agente sin responsabilidad moral. Al contrario, el perdón atribuye resposabildiad moral: hice mal, pero me perdonas. El perdón es una reacción ante la responsabilidad. En todos los sentidos de perdón (absolución, misericordia, excusa, etc.) perdonar implica que quien es perdonado es moralmente responsable de sus acciones, pues sin juicio moral no es posible perdón. No es posible perdonar a quien no ha hecho mal. Por tanto, perdonar implica reconocer al otro como agente moral, como persona responsable de sus actos. Perdonar es superar los sentimientos de resentimiento que se dirigen de forma natural a quien ha cometido una injuria moral.20 Es, por tanto, reconocer que quien ha hecho mal lo ha hecho sin querer, sin saber o sin poder evitarlo. Por eso, quizás el perdón sea la acción que más nos acerca a los dioses, pues sólo quien tiene verdadera capacidad de juicio puede perdonar. No perdonamos a una piedra que nos cae en el pie, pero sí perdonamos a quien nos pisa sin querer. Igualmente, no perdonamos a un animal, y por lo mismo, no lo consideramos responsable de los daños que causa. Como Fischer escribe: "You do no not hold your kitten responsible for a misdeed; rather you might discipline your kitten and try to train him not to climb on the furniture for the future."21 Por eso 20 Véase Murphy, J., "Forgiveness" en C. L. Becker & C. B. Becker (Eds.) Encyclopedia of Ethics New York, Routledge, 2001, pp. 561–562. 21 Fischer & Ravizza, Perspectives on Moral..., cit., p. 5 17 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad precisamente, y contrariamente a lo que Fisher quiere concluir, cuando consideramos que alguien es objeto de cura, o rehabilitación social y nuevo entrenamiento, igual que al gato, no lo estamos perdonando, sino que en la misma medida que lo dejamos de considerar moralmente responsable, suspendemos nuestra consideración de él como agente. Le restamos personeidad. Pues, igual que al gato, sólo si lo consideramos responsable de lo que ocurre, podemos perdonarle. El perdón y la compasión no suprimen la responsabilidad agente/ moral sino que la presuponen. Aceptar estas ideas convierte en innecesarias propuestas que, intentando acreditar la necesidad de juicio de actos horripilantes realizados bajo coacción o locura, concluyen la intencionalidad y racionalidad de dichos actos. Jeanett Kennett, por ejemplo, escribe que los actos compulsivos y de debilidad de la voluntad son todos ciertamente intencionales e incluso racionales, puesto que hay formas en las que el agente podría no haberlos llevado a cabo; podría haber pedido ayuda, por ejemplo.22 La insistencia de Kennett en esta afirmación de racionalidad e intencionalidad no está justificada sino en su creencia, mucho más justificada a mí entender, en que estos agentes pueden ser declarados moralmente responsable. Pero esta maniobra de pretender que acciones realizadas bajo coacción o sin voluntad alguna puedan ser intencionales es, además de ad hoc y desesperada, innecesria. La responsabilidad moral no necesita jusitificarse en el control racional o intencional de la acción: declarar/reconocer un suceso como acción es ya reconocer una persona que hace. Por supuesto, podríamos decidir ante una situación concreta cualquiera que, en ausencia de intención o control no hay responsabilidad –y, por tanto, que no hay acción. Todas las acciones son revocables, y las reacciones y condiciones para la revocabilidad son tan diversas como las reacciones y condiciones para la atribución de agencia. Pero decidir, en cualquier caso o por cualquier motivo, que no hay agencialidad es decidir que no hay agente para el suceso. Quizás un ejemplo ilustre mejor lo que intento defender. Es un caso típico en discusiones sobre responsabilidad moral, y legal: el caso de Robert Harris quien, después de matar innecesariamente a dos mu22 Kennett, J., Agency and Responsibility: a common-sense moral psychology Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, p. 200. 18 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 chachos inocentes, se comió tranquilamente sus hamburguesas y estuvo haciendo chistes fáciles sobre volar cerebros. Robert Harris había vivido una infancia atroz; había sido brutalmente golpeado y malatratado por su padre casi cada día de su vida. Muchos filósofos se pelean con este caso y otros similares cuando presentan sus ideas sobre responsabilidad, y muchos concluyen que Harris es agente de las muertes, pero no moralmente responsable. Vengo afirmando, sin embargo, que la responsabilidad moral es responsabilidad agente. Luego, si Harris es agente de las muertes, Harris es moralmente responsable de ellas. Y si no es moralmente responsable, tampoco es autor de las muertes. Antes de conocer la infancia de Harris, sentimos rabia, incredulidad y, quizás, deseo de venganza, agresividad. Estos sentimientos no los provocan los hechos, sino las acciones de Harris. Es hacia su actitud después de las muertes, hacia sus asesinatos, hacia su aparente falta de remordimiento... es a él al que dirigimos nuestras emociones, no hacia lo hechos. Y cuando, seguidamente, conocemos su infancia, sentimos pena y, tal vez, algún tipo de "comprensión" –ese tipo de comprensión que surge cuando parace que nos ponemos en la piel del otro. Pero todos estos sentimientos están, de nuevo, dirigidos hacia él. Y ésta es la conclusión. Harris es moralmente responsable de sus acciones, en la misma medida en que son sus acciones. La responsabilidad moral es responsabilidad agente. Considerarle así, con todas nuestra emociones sobre la mesa, es lo que le hace persona, incluso si es una persona que ha hecho tanto daño o tanto mal, incluso si merece (o no) pagar por su acción. Ya en corredor de la muerte, Harris siempre se negó a ser entrevistado, y su hermana contó que una vez le había dicho que él había tenido su opción, que escogió el camino al infierno, y que no había nada más que decir. Eligió el infierno. Eso hemos de condecérselo. Pues no hacerlo así sería negar a Harris, negar quien fue. El perdón muestra que la moralidad de un suceso es independiente del castigo –aunque, dado el caso, es la moralidad la que justifica el castigo/premio. El caso de Harris que el reconocimiento de la maldad puede formar parte del reconocimiento de una persona. Pero ¿es esencial a la persona su moralidad? De otra forma, ¿es necesario que un suceso haya de ser correcto/incorrecto para ser acción? La respuesta es sí, siempre que se tenga en cuenta que los sucesos no son correctos/ 19 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad incorrectos en sí mismos; sino en tanto son, revocablemente, sancionados como acciones. Con otras palabras, moral no es ser bueno/malo, sino susceptible de serlo. Se dirá: ¿qué puede haber de bueno/malo en que levante mi mano? Nada, si uno está viendo el levantamiento de una mano. Seguramente todo, cuando uno comprende que yo levanto mi mano. (2) Otra de las ideas controvertidas de este escrito es la afirmación de que toda acción es revocable. Una de las características fundamentales de la acción entendida como responsabilidad es su revocabilidad. Toda acción es revocable. Esta idea es una de las ideas que fundamenta, a su vez, la afirmación de que no hay unidad del yo a la que apelamos para determinar cuándo un suceso es una acción. Al contrario, yo y acción se sancionan al mismo tiempo. Sin embargo, muchos filósofos, incluyendo aquellos que, como Feinberg o Hart, defienden la acción en términos de responsabilidad moral, están en desacuerdo con esto; hay un cierto tipo de acciones, las acciones básicas, que no son cancelables ni están sujetas a nulidad. En consecuencia, estas acciones básicas sí forman parte del mundo de los hechos. Hart asegura haber aceptado hace muchos años ya esta idea en contra de su teoría originaria de la acción como responsabilidad moral, y lo ha hecho hasta el punto de haberse negado a incluir su artículo del 49 en la recopilación de su obra en 2008.23 Y lo mismo Feinberg: "Whether or not a man smiled is entirely a question of fact whose answer is to be discovered nor "decided" or "selected" presumptively. (...) Simple action sentences such as "Jones moved his finger" are not ascriptive in the strong sense that we are left with discretion to accept or reject them even after all facts in."24 O Jones movió su dedo o no lo movió. Nada hay de presuntivo en estas afirmaciones que no sea cuestión de pura ignorancia. Las acciones básicas han de excluirse pro tanto de una teoría de la acción en términos de responsabilidad moral, en vista de su no revocabilidad y pertenencia al mundo fáctico. 23 Hart, H., Punishment and Responsibility: essays in the philosophy of law Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008. 24 Ibid., p. 147 20 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 Una vez más, sin embargo, la plausibilidad de estas conclusiones es sólo aparente. Las acciones básicas también son revocables. Es un hecho que el dedo de Jones se movió, pero no es un hecho que Jones movió su dedo. Es un hecho que había una sonrisa en la cara de Jones, pero no es un hecho que Jones sonrió. El movimiento del dedo de Jones, la sonrisa en su cara, son sucesos que se corresponden con hechos; pero los sucesos que son las acciones de Jones no se correponden con hechos.25 Los enunciados de acción no se corresponden con enunciados de hechos, puesto que las acciones pertenecen al mundo de las relaciones interpersonales y del sujeto. Y el sujeto es la punta de la aguja. ¿Levanté mi mano para votar cuando realmente quería votar, pero algo había paralizado mi mano y mi compañero levantó mi mano? O, como en el ejemplo de Von Wright, ¿abrí la puerta cuando hice todos los movimientos necesarios para ello, teniendo la intención de abrirla para salir, cuando, sin yo darme cuenta un pequeño golpe de viento la empujaba? No hay ninguna respuesta fáctica a estas preguntas. En las Investigaciones Wittgenstein considera la misma cuestión: "Pero no olvidemos una cosa: cuando 'levanto el brazo', se levanta mi brazo. Y surge el problema: ¿qué es lo que queda, si sustraigo el hecho de que mi brazo se levanta del hecho de que levanto el brazo?"26. Según quiero leer, la respuesta de Wittgenstein es: "nada", si "algo" es fáctico. No hay ningún hecho que añadir al hecho de que mi brazo se levanta, cuando levanto el brazo. Si hablamos de hechos, el hecho de que mi brazo se levanta y el hecho de que levanto mi brazo son uno y el mismo. Está el hecho de que mi brazo se levanta. Está también el suceso que es el alzamiento de mi brazo. Pero que este suceso constituya una 25 De forma más enrevesada: a cada nominalización perfecta, que es nombre de algún suceso, le corresponde una nominalización imperfecta u oración para un hecho. Pero no hay nominalización imperfecta, ni hecho correspondiente, para ninguna nominalización perfecta que nombre una acción. Otra forma de ver cómo las acciones no pertenecen al mundo de los hechos es considerar acciones negativas, pues podemos ser responsables de lo que no hacemos, pero no hay hechos negativos –aunque sí hay hechos falsos; pero la falsedad no nos compromete ontológicamente, como ha defendido recientmente Stephen Mumford (Mumford, S., "Negative Truth and Falsehood" Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107, 2007, pp. 45-71); lo que no hacemos, sín embargo, sí nos compromete como agentes. 26 Wittgenstein, L., Philosophical Investigations New Jersey, Blackwell, 1958, § 621. 21 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad acción, que este suceso sea mi alzamiento del brazo, no pertenece al mundo de los hechos. Lo que queda fuera del hecho de que mi brazo se levanta es, justamente, la presuposición de acción. En el caso de que yo levante mi brazo, además del hecho de que mi brazo se levanta, está mi hacer. Pero "el hacer mismo no ocupa ningún volumen de experiencia. Es como un punto sin extensión, la punta de una aguja. Esta punta parece ser el agente real."27 Sellars escribe que lo que distingue una acción básica de un mero suceso, lo que distingue, en su terminología, una volición de un comportamiento, es lo mismo que distingue un wink de un blink: lo que distingue el guiño de un ojo del mero parpadeo.28 Yo afirmo, sin embargo, que la distinción de un suceso como volición o no (como guiño o como mero parpadeo) no se encuentra en el suceso: wink y blink son, de hecho, el mismo suceso. Que un blink sea "en realidad" un wink no pertenece al mundo fáctico, ni se determina en él; más bien el que un blink sea comprendido como la acción de alguien depende del relato del suceso, y su narración se dicta en un contexto de valores interpersonales compartidos por quienes personifican la trama.29 En Así habló Zaratustra Nietzsche escribe sobre el último hombre antes de la llegada del ultrahombre. El último hombre, según la lectura que Eusebi Colomer hace de Nietzsche, es el hombre que ha superado a Dios pero no a la nada. Es el hombre que ha perdido todo ideal, que ya no se propone metas, que no se atreve a nada, que no quiere nada. Un hombre pequeño que está ahí, sin valores, sin anhelo, sin esperanza. Zaratustra se dirige a los hombres y les habla así –también según la tra27 Ibid, § 620. 28 Sellars, W., "Fatalism and Determinism" en K. Lehrer (Ed.) Freedom and Determinism New Jersy, Humanities Press, 1966, pp. 141-174, en p. 160. 29 Es cierto también que la volición en Sellars, que conlleva el shall de la intencionalidad propia, es a su vez derivada del deber moral, el ought del universal categórico moral, y este es, en última instancia, comunitario: la intencionalidad intersubjetiva moral que puede justificar un imperativo categócio precisa de valores compartidos e interpersonales que emergen de las necesidades sociales, mentales y corporales del individuo, y son inicialmente modeladas por entrenamiento social." (Sellars, W., Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes London, Routledge, 1968, VII, § 63). Sin embargo, Sellars habla siempre como si esta derivación (del shall desde el ought) la hiciese posible algo objetivo en el sujeto, como si la volición/intención misma fuese una disposición objetiva del sujeto hacia el suceso. 22 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 ducción de Colomer: "¿Qué es amor? ¿Qué es creación? ¿Qué es anhelo? ¿Qué es estrella?' –así pregunta el último hombre, y parpadea."30 Y uno se queda con un regusto amargo: un "hombre pequeño", incapaz y hueco, así es el útlimo hombre. Pero hay también esta otra traducción:31 "Y el último hombre guiñando el ojo pregunta: '¿Qué es amor? ¿Qué es creación? ¿Qué es deseo? ¿Qué es estrella?' " Y la sensación que deja es más plana, menos desilusionante; pues el úlimo hombre sí hace algo; quizás se asombra. Y uno decide su traducción; decide qué es lo que hace el último hombre. Porque "en realidad" no se encuentra la acción del último hombre entre lo que dado, igual que no se dirime la traducción "correcta" como wink o blink analizando el original aleman, pues en alemán papadear y guiñar un ojo se dicen con la misma palabra blinzelt.32 De la misma manera, sólo cuando uno construye la historia del último hombre uno se encuentra un "hombre pequeño" que parpadea –o un hombre que guiña su ojo. (3) Sobre el yo episódico/humenao. Según las ideas que estoy aquí presentado, contar un suceso como acción es declarar un agente que es responsable del suceso; y no hay agente antes que acción. Acción y agente se comprenden simultáneamente, contextualmente, en el marco del relato del suceso y de su agente. Detrás de estas ideas, asoma una concepción claramente narrativa de la persona: somos los relatos en que nos contamos y nos cuentan nuestra historia. Galen Strawson (2004) ha argumentado contra esta idea de la construcción narrativa y social del yo, recuperando una propuesta humena más episódica –que también mencionaba en la sec. 1. Yo, dice Strawson, ese yo que ahora experimento como siendo yo cuando monitorizo mis estados mentales, es una presencia mental interna y episódica, momentánea. Mi yo es episódico y, por tanto, no se considera un sí mismo continuo o continuado, que estaba ahí en el pasado y estará en el futuró. Al contrario, mi yo es un yo ahora, y a este yo presente no le pertenecen ni los 30 Trad. de Colomer E., El pensamiento aleman de Kant a Heidegger, Barcelona, Herder, 1990, p. 307. Mis cursivas. 31 Trad. de C. Vergara., Así habló Zaratustra Madrid, Edaf, 1998, p. 44. Mis cursivas. 32 "»Was ist Liebe? Was ist Schöpfung? Was ist Sehnsucht? Was ist Stern?« –so fragt der letzte Mensch und blinzelt", escribe Nietzsche. 23 M.J. García-Encinas / Identidad personal y responsabilidad sucesos de mi pasado ni los sucesos de mi futuro. Tengo, por supuesto, un pasado y puedo saber mucho de él. Pero mi yo presente, el yo que ahora aprehendo cuando me considero como yo, ni es ese pasado, ni tiene especial interés por él, o por su futuro. Me comprendo, simplemente, como un yo que es ahora. Y escribe, con un ejemplo bastante clarificador: "My memory of falling out of a boat has an essentially fromthe-inside-character, visually (the water rushing up to meet me), kinaesthetically, proprioceptively, and so on. It certainly does not follow that it carries any feeling or belief that what is remembered happened to me*, to that which I now apprehend myself to be when I am apprehending myself specifically as a self "33 Es un hecho que recuerdo que me caí del barco y, que me cayese, puede ser importante para mí. Pero mi recuerdo no forma parte mi yo-presente, y mi yo-presente no estaba, desde luego, en el pasado en que me caí. Por tanto, el pasado, y el futuro, no forman parte de mi mí- -mismo. Pero entonces, concluye Strawson, la identidad no puede ser una construcción narrada, pues desde este punto de vista episódico, ni la recolección del pasado ni la proyección hacia el futuro narrado son parte del mismo yo. Luego si crees que necesitas construir un relato o una historia para atribuir una acción, o para entender una persona, aquí tienes un problema. Pienso, sin embargo, que Strawson concluye más allá de sus propios supuestos. Pues de la existencia de un yo puramente presente, no se sigue la imposibilidad de un yo narrado. Aunque las teorías de la responsabilidad son contrarias a las teorías mentalistas, es decir, aunque la idea de identidad/acción socialmente construídas no es compatible con una idea de identidad/acción básicamente mental, las teorías de la responsabilidad son perfectamente compatibles con una idea de identidad personal o de acción episódica, es decir, con algo que se sanciona y reconstruye constantemente, al modo del Diderot que Williams menciona,34 o del marinero perdido de Oliver Sacks. Dicho de otro 33 Strawson, G., "Against Narrativity" Ratio 17 (2004), pp. 428-452, en p. 434. 34 "Diderot siempre se sintió atraído por un retrato del yo como algo en cambio constante, reaccionando y transformándose; como un enjambre de bajezas; como un clavicordio, un arpa u otro instrumento, con el viento o alguna otra fuerza que actuara sobre él." (Willimas, B., Verdad y veracidad: una aproximación 24 EpistEME ns, vol. 31, no 2, 2011, pp. 1-24 modo, no es necesaria una historia completa, ni coherente o racional, ni continua o "previa" para la atribución de responsabilidad e identidad. Un pequeño relato es suficiente. Y un relato que se reconstruye una y otra vez, también. Los relatos, todos los sabemos, pueden ser muy breves, atemporales, dar saltos incoherentes en "su" tiempo, o ser imaginados, insensatos. Strawson está implicando que cualquier teoría del yo que no sea mentalmente espisódica ha de ser diacrónica. Pero esto es una presuposición sin razones. De hecho, es simplemente falsa si toda acción es cancelable y declarar a alguien actor y declararlo persona son parte del mismo acto. En última instancia, la acción es una cuestión personal, y la persona se dirime en un espacio de acciones, no de razones.35 genealógica, Barcelona, Tusquets, 2006, en p. 187) 35 Agradezco a todos los que comentaron algunas de las ideas de este artículo a medida en que las iba presentado en diversos encuentros en Granada, Valencia y Tenerife, durante los años 2009 y 2010. El artículo lo escribí en el marco del proyecto FFI2011-29834-C03-02 del Ministerio de Educación de España.

www.soclab.org.pl WSTĘP W Polsce coraz częściej dyskutuje się na temat decentralizacji prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej. Podkreśla się wagę tego postulatu, zwracając uwagę na konieczność dokonania dywersyfikacji zarówno źródeł informacji, jak również podmiotów kształtujących kierunki krajowej polityki zagranicznej. Do tej pory polityka zagraniczna była postrzegana niemal wyłącznie jako domena działań Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych. Nie uwzględniano w wystarczającym zakresie soft power dyplomacji samorządowej czy obywatelskiej. Przy międzynarodowej współpracy na poziomie samorządów dobrosąsiedzkie relacje przyjmują wymiar nie tylko ogólnopaństwowy, związany z kontaktami polityków wysokiego szczebla, ale również przejawiają się w codziennych kontaktach na terenie przygranicznych gmin, we wzmożonych kontaktach gospodarczych, kulturalnych czy naukowych. Wzmocnienie relacji pomiędzy różnymi lokalnymi podmiotami zaangażowanymi we współpracę transgraniczną mogłoby zaowocować efektem synergii i wzmocnić pozytywny obraz Polski i poszczególnych województw przygranicznych. Taka perspektywa jest zgodna z przyjętymi przez Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych priorytetami polskiej polityki zagranicznej na lata 2012–2016. Województwo podlaskie wciąż w niewystarczającym stopniu wykorzystuje swoje przygraniczne usytuowanie. Na poziomie regionalnym ciągle brakuje sprawnej koordynacji działań różnych podmiotów współpracujących z zagranicą. Poprawa takiej koordynacji i wspieranie różnych podmiotów w nawiązywaniu współpracy z pewnością wzmocniłoby pozycję Polski i województwa podlaskiego na arenie międzynarodowej. Dodatkową przyczyną braku intensywnej współpracy różnych podmiotów zajmujących się współpracą transgraniczną jest niski poziom kapitału społecznego w poszczególnych gminach czy powiatach. Koordynacja, czy może bardziej wielostronne wsparcie działań lokalnych przez władze szczebla wojewódzkiego i centralnego, mogą przyczynić się do efektywnego i pozytywnego w skutkach współdziałania transgranicznego w regionie. Kompleksowe badanie obecnego stanu współpracy pozwoli przygotować przemyślaną i opartą na aktualnej wiedzy oraz dotychczasowych doświadczeniach strategię współpracy transgranicznej (jako dyplomacji samorządowej i obywatelskiej). Prezentowane badania mają na celu dostarczenie danych koniecznych do prowadzenia polskiej polityki zagranicznej rozszerzonej o wymiar samorządowy i obywatelski w województwie podlaskim. Głównym celem diagnozy było zbadanie, jak na początku XXI wieku jednostki samorządu terytorialnego, organizacje pozarządowe, przedsiębiorstwa oraz uczelnie wyższe w województwie podlaskim nawiązywały współpracę transgraniczną z partnerami na Litwie, Białorusi, Ukrainie i w Rosji (Obwód Kaliningradzki). W publikacji wskazano miejsca największego potencjału, jak również barier na drodze do takiej współpracy w regionie. Zwrócono szczególną uwagę na współpracę tych podmiotów, łączenie swoich potencjałów i tworzenie wspólnych projektów. Badania przeprowadzono w okresie od lipca do września 2013 roku. Projekt obejmował analizę danych zastanych, badania z wykorzystaniem pogłębionych wywiadów jakościowych oraz badania ilościowe. O współpracę transgraniczną pytaliśmy podlaskich samorządowców, wybranych przedstawicieli i przedstawicielki organizacji pozarządowych, przedsiębiorstw oraz uczelni wyższych. Badaniem kwestionariuszowym objęto wszystkie urzędy gmin w województwie podlaskim. Chcielibyśmy w tym miejscu podziękować wszystkim naszym respondentom za poświęcony czas i zaangażowanie. Mamy nadzieję, że niniejsze badania zwrócą uwagę opinii publicznej na pozytywną rolę dyplomacji samorządowej i społecznej, będą czynnikiem wspierającym procesy wzmacniania kapitału społecznego w poszczególnych gminach województwa podlaskiego poprzez pokazanie korzyści ze współpracy zróżnicowanych podmiotów w zakresie kontaktów transgranicznych oraz będą zachętą do podwyższenia jakości współpracy samorządu z innymi podmiotami w tej sferze. I na koniec, chcemy podkreślić, że warto, aby obszar działań współpracy transgranicznej był diagnozowany systematycznie, dzięki czemu można będzie na bieżąco ewaluować podjęte kroki w celu zintensyfikowania i polepszenia kontaktów transgranicznych w naszym województwie. 8 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wyrażamy nadzieje, że niniejsza publikacja okaże się przydatna nie tylko organom centralnym prowadzący politykę zagraniczną (zwłaszcza Ministerstwu Spraw Zagranicznych), ale również samorządowcom, organizacjom pozarządowym, podlaskim szkołom wyższym, euroregionom czy lokalnym grupom działania zainteresowanym współpracą przygraniczną na poziomie lokalnym. 9www.soclab.org.pl 1. KONCEPCJA OBYWATELSKIEJ I SAMORZĄDOWEJ WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ W TEORII I PRAKTYCE 1.1. Współpraca transgraniczna w kontekście dyplomacji publicznej Na początku XXI wieku w warunkach globalizacji społecznej, ekonomicznej i politycznej szczególnego znaczenia nabiera budowanie zasobów pozwalających na osiąganie przez poszczególne państwa swoich celów rozwojowych. Państwa różnią się jednak swoją siłą/potęgą. Pod pojęciem tym najogólniej można rozumieć sumę wszystkich zasobów i środków, jakimi dysponuje społeczeństwo danego państwa, a które mogą zostać wykorzystane do osiągania jego celów1. Według W. Kitlera siła państwa obejmuje czynniki materialno-energetyczne, społeczne i kulturowe w wymiarze jednostkowym, państwowym i międzynarodowym, które przenikając się wzajemnie, stanowią podstawę sukcesu państwa w zakresie realizacji jego interesów i celów narodowych2. Poszczególni badacze wyróżniają różne cechy i instrumenty, które mogą być w mniejszym (np. geografia) lub większym stopniu (np. czynniki społeczno-ekonomiczne) regulowane przez władze danego państwa celem budowania jego potęgi. Za przełomowe w stosunkach międzynarodowych ostatnich lat należy uznać upowszechnianie się koncepcji miękkiej siły/potęgi (ang. soft power) autorstwa amerykańskiego politologa J. Nye3. Badacz ten określił „miękką siłę" jako zdolność państwa do pozyskiwania sojuszników i zdobywania wpływów dzięki atrakcyjności własnej kultury, polityki i ideologii. W ten sposób uzupełnia się dominujące do XXI wieku podejście tak w analizie, jak i prowadzeniu polityki zagranicznej, określane mianem twardej siły (ang. hard power), czyli zdolności danego państwa bazującej na jej czynnikach geostrategicznych i ekonomicznych. Z tej perspektywy grę o poszerzanie potęgi – jej zakresu i natężenia – prowadzą przede wszystkim Unia Europejska (dalej: UE), Stany Zjednoczone i Japonia oraz korporacje transnarodowe, międzynarodowe instytucje finansowe, ugrupowania religijne oraz organizacje pozarządowe działające w skali globalnej. Zdolność do łączenia „miękkiej" i „twardej siły" określa się mianem rozważnej potęgi (ang. smart power). Nie chodzi tu tylko o zmianę instrumentów, ale także o zastosowanie nowoczesnych technologii informacyjnych i telekomunikacyjnych (np. wspieranie wykorzystania przez rewolucjonistów komunikowania się przez serwis Twitter, przy jednoczesnym prowadzeniu cyberwojny i regulowaniu dostępu do infrastruktury Internetu). Polska jest uznawana przeważne za kraj średniej rangi, zdolny do efektywnego działania jedynie na swoim terytorium4 Podstawowym instrumentem budowania „miękkiej siły" jest prowadzenie dyplomacji publicznej. Wyjaśnienie tego pojęcia wymaga w pierwszej kolejności omówienia cech tradycyjnej dyplomacji. Może być ona określona poprzez dwa elementy jako: (1) „oficjalna działalność organów państwowych o kompetencjach w dziedzinie stosunków międzynarodowych, które realizują cele i zadania polityki zagranicznej 1 Spory naukowe związane z koncepcją potęgi zob.: A. Wojcik, Dylemat potęgi. Praktyczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2010. 2 W. Kitler, Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe RP. Podstawowe kategorie, uwarunkowania, system, Wyd. Akademii Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 2011, s. 115–126. 3 J. Nye, Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej – perswazyjne środki oddziaływania politycznego (kultura, propaganda, dyplomacja), WAiP, Warszawa 2007. 4 Zob. I. Wyciechowska, Stosunki międzynarodowe i ich uwarunkowania, [w:] K.A. Wojtaszczyk, W. Jakubowski (red.), Społeczeństwo i polityka. Podstawy nauk politycznych, ASPRA–JR, Warszawa 2007, s. 749; W. Orłowski, Stulecie chaosu. Alternatywne dzieje XX wieku, Open, Warszawa 2006, s. 528. 10 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim państwa w stosunkach dwustronnych i wielostronnych, służące utrzymaniu stosunków z innymi państwami oraz organizacjami międzynarodowymi", a także (2) „opierający się na założeniach naukowych zespół metod i środków służących realizacji polityki zagranicznej państwa oraz sztuka osiągania jej poszczególnych zadań i celów, sztuka utrzymywania stosunków między państwami i organizacjami międzynarodowymi, prowadzenia negocjacji i zawierania umów międzynarodowych"5. Uzupełnienie tradycyjnej dyplomacji o publiczną stanowi aktywną odpowiedź państw na globalizację, w której państwa utraciły monopol do przetwarzania i rozpowszechniania informacji, oraz na odwrotność globalizacji, czyli glokalizację. Pierwszy proces dotyczy upowszechniania dóbr, usług, idei, wartości i informacji zestandaryzowanych, tak by odpowiadały potrzebom jak najszerszego grona odbiorców w poszczególnych społeczeństwach. Glokalizacja odnosi się zaś do adaptacji globalnych produktów i usług do wymogów lokalnych. Jak zauważa K. Kuciński glokalizacja jest próbą odpowiedzi społeczności lokalnych, regionalnych i państwa na międzynarodowe procesy integracyjne, jak również próbę ochrony lokalności i dostrzeżenia jej niewykorzystanych uprzednio potencjałów społecznych, politycznych, gospodarczych, kulturowych i przyrodniczych6. Glokalizacja stanowi istotne wyzwanie dla realizacji polityki zagranicznej z przynajmniej czterech powodów7. Po pierwsze, istotnym aktorem na poziomie lokalnym stają się filie korporacji transnarodowych, których działalność nie musi być spójna z celami i wartościami lokalnych społeczności i gospodarek. Po drugie, na poziomie lokalnym coraz częściej ujawniają się tendencje do atomizacji i separatyzmu terytorialnego, dochodzi do osłabiania więzi tych jednostek przestrzennych z krajowym systemem ekonomicznym, administracyjnym i politycznym, który słabnie pod wpływem globalizacji. Po trzecie lokalne gospodarki i społeczności wchodzą w sieci globalnych powiązań m.in. poprzez globalizację działalności dotychczas lokalnych firm, produktów i problemów. Po czwarte, globalizacja prowadzi do zróżnicowanych zmian w lokalnych społecznościach, gospodarkach, wzorcach kulturowych, lokalnej przyrodzie i w miejscowym ładzie przestrzennym. W tych warunkach dyplomacja publiczna obok wspierania dialogu międzykulturowego jest postrzegana jako narzędzie do budowy pozytywnych relacji międzykulturowych8. Podstawowa definicja dyplomacji publicznej została stworzona na potrzeby polityki zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych przez E. Guillona w 1965 roku. Dyplomacja publiczna „zajmuje się wpływem postaw społecznych na kształtowanie i realizację polityki zagranicznej. Obejmuje zagadnienia stosunków międzynarodowych wykraczających poza dyplomację tradycyjną, kształtowanie przez rząd zagranicznej opinii publicznej, interakcję prywatnych grup i interesów w jednym państwie na te grupy i interesy w innym państwie, opisywanie wydarzeń z zagranicy i ich wpływu na politykę, komunikację między ludźmi zajmującymi się komunikowaniem między dyplomatami i zagranicznymi korespondentami oraz proces komunikacji międzykulturowej"9. Polskie Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych w 2013 roku w sposób zbliżony określa dyplomację publiczną jako „zestaw działań o charakterze strategicznym, koncepcyjnym, analitycznym, koordynacyjnym i wykonawczym, które poprzez kształtowanie postaw społecznych i opinii publicznej za granicą wpływają na realizację istotnych interesów Polski w świecie, używając narzędzi i metod spoza obszaru tradycyjnej dyplomacji jako obszaru relacji międzypaństwowych. Celem nadrzędnym dyplomacji publicznej jest uzyskiwanie za granicą zrozumienia i poparcia dla polskiej racji stanu i polityki władz RP. Stanowiąc uzupełnienie dla tradycyjnej dyplomacji, jest działalnością skierowaną do zagranicznych instytucji, organizacji i społeczeństw"10. Wśród celów tej dyplomacji są m.in. poprawa i obiektywizacja wiedzy o kraju, jego historii, wkładzie Polski i Polaków w rozwój Europy i świata, wzmocnienie prestiżu na arenie międzynarodowej, stymulowanie kontaktów i współpracy pomiędzy zagranicznymi i polskimi partnerami, wzmocnienie wizerunku kraju jako promotora europejskiej polityki wschodniej, wspierającego swoją diasporę, kraju bezpiecznego, posiadającego stabilne perspektywy rozwoju dzięki przynależności do UE i NATO, wartościowego partnera politycznego, gospodarczego, naukowego, społecznego i kulturalnego. 5 B. Dobrzańska, M. Sitek, Mini leksykon dyplomatyczny, Wyd. Wyższej Szkoły Gospodarki Euroregionalnej, Józefów 2011, s. 16. 6 K. Kuciński, Glokalizacja jako indygenizacja globalizacji, „Rocznik Żyrardowski", Tom IX/2011, s. 17. 7 Por. Ibidem, s. 31–33. 8 J. Stępień, Bridging cultures. Dyplomacja publiczna i dialog międzykulturowy, [w:] J. Stępień (red.), Bridging Cultures. Polska pomiędzy Wschodem a Zachodem w XXI wieku, Wyd. Stowarzyszenia „Projekt Orient", Kraków 2011, s. 176. 9 About U.S. Public Diplomacy, http://pdaa.publicdiplomacy.org/?page_id=6 [10.10.2013]. 10 Czym jest dyplomacja publiczna, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/dyplomacja_publiczna/ czym_jest_dp/ [10.10.2013]. 11www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 1. Porównanie dyplomacji tradycyjnej i publicznej Dyplomacja tradycyjna Dyplomacja publiczna Główni aktorzy Państwo Publiczność/ludzie Źródło siły Nacisk Przyciąganie Strategia dyplomatyczna Gra sił/Realpolitik Uczestnictwo w społeczności międzynarodowej Cele Narzucanie idei Kształtowanie oczekiwań Komunikacja Propaganda/autoreklama Partnerstwo/współpraca Rola rządu Kierowanie Ułatwianie Stosunek do informacji Sekret/poufność Otwartość/budowanie zaufania/ wiarygodność Struktury międzynarodowe Dwustronne Wielostronne Postawa Zwycięzca/przegrany Zwycięzca/zwycięzca Źródło: E. Molendowski, W. Polan, Dyplomacja gospodarcza. Rola i znaczenie w polityce zagranicznej państwa, Wolters Kluwer, Kraków 2007, s. 32. Dyplomacja publiczna jest także postrzegana jako narzędzie do tworzenia marki narodowej lub prowadzenia międzynarodowego public relations11. Jak zauważa E. Gilboa można jeszcze wyróżnić nową dyplomację publiczną, która wykracza poza podział na dyplomację tradycyjną i publiczną12. Cechuje się ona: (1) jej prowadzeniem przez państwa i podmioty niepaństwowe (np. organizacje pozarządowe, obywatelskie); (2) oparciem na „miękkiej sile", komunikacji dwukierunkowej, strategicznej dyplomacji publicznej, zarządzaniu informacjami, kreowaniu marki kraju i wizerunku elektronicznego; (3) obejmuje przełożenie polityki zagranicznej na sprawy wewnętrzne; (4) dotyczy kwestii zarówno krótko-, jak i długoterminowych. Dodatkowo E. Gilboa rozróżnia dyplomację medialną i dyplomację pośredników medialnych13. Pierwsza obejmuje zastosowanie środków masowego przekazu przez polityków i władze publiczne do komunikacji z podmiotami państwowymi i niepaństwowymi, mające na celu wzbudzenie zaufania, postępy w negocjacjach oraz mobilizację wsparcia publicznego na rzecz porozumienia. Tymczasem dyplomacją pośredników medialnych jest tworzenie sytuacji, w których dziennikarze stają się mediatorami w złożonych konfliktach międzynarodowych, odgrywając istotną rolę w międzynarodowym dyskursie dyplomatycznym. Według M. Hereźniaka zadania i narzędzia dyplomacji publicznej można podzielić na trzy grupy14. Dyplomacja publiczna powinna zmierzać do realizacji spójnej koncepcji marki narodowej i celów programu brandingu poprzez działania w zakresie: (1) kultury i stylu życia mieszkańców – budowanie marek flagowych wydarzeń kulturalnych i sportowych, komercjalizację elementów kultury narodowej, tworzenie 11 S. Gawroński, Dyplomacja publiczna – komunikowanie międzynarodowe na usługach brandingu narodowego, „Komunikacja Społeczna", 1/2012, s. 54–56. 12 E. Gilboa, Dyplomacja w epoce informacji, [w:] B. Ociepka (red.), Dyplomacja publiczna, Wyd. UWr, Wrocław 2008, s. 41; [cyt. za:] S. Gawroński, Dyplomacja publiczna..., s. 56–57. 13 Ibidem, s. 57. 14 M. Hereźniak, Marka narodowa. Jak skutecznie budować wizerunek i reputację kraju, PWE, Warszawa 2011, s. 102. 12 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim instytucji promujących język i dorobek kulturalny kraju; (2) nauki i kapitału intelektualnego – promocję osiągnięć naukowych za granicą, programy przyciągania talentów, tworzenie sieci specjalistów; (3) ogólnego wizerunku kraju – kampanie wizerunkowe łączące różne obszary marki narodowej. Na ogólną charakterystykę zastosowania tych instrumentów pozwala przybliżenie wyników jakościowego przeglądu danych zastanych, przeprowadzonego przez ośrodek Ageron Polska na zlecenie Ministerstwa Gospodarki w 2011 roku15. Zauważa się przede wszystkim, iż w ostatnich latach Polska podejmowała wiele działań promocyjnych w skali międzynarodowej. Szczególną uwagę zwracano na promocję turystyczną kraju, promocję wydarzeń kulturalnych oraz promocję o charakterze ogólnym. Niewiele uwagi poświęcono promocji polskiej gospodarki, przy czym kraj dysponuje pod tym względem znacznym potencjałem, gdyż posiada dobrą pozycję w międzynarodowej wymianie handlowej, tereny atrakcyjne do lokalizacji nowych inwestycji zagranicznych, gospodarkę odporną na kryzys, dużą dostępność wykwalifikowanych pracowników, duży rynek wewnętrzny oraz dobrą lokalizację w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Polska nie ma wyrazistego i spójnego wizerunku za granicą. Od wejścia do Unii Europejskiej w 2004 roku obserwuje się ogólną poprawę wizerunku kraju. Potrzebne są badania nad przyczynami niedostatecznej wiedzy o możliwościach Polski jako miejsca do inwestycji i handlu. Zauważa się także zapotrzebowanie polskich przedsiębiorstw, szczególnie o profilu eksportowym, na działania zmierzające do poprawy wizerunku kraju za granicą, ponieważ wizerunek kraju i krajowych produktów ma bezpośredni wpływ na postrzeganie ich oferty eksportowej. Powyższe wnioski wskazują na powiązanie dyplomacji publicznej z gospodarczą. Jest to koncepcja „działalności w dziedzinie rozwoju stosunków handlowo-gospodarczych z zagranicą, która realizowana jest nie tylko przez rząd i odpowiedni resort odpowiedzialny za stosunki gospodarcze z zagranicą, ale również przez przedstawicielstwa dyplomatyczne i urzędy konsularne, w szczególności przez działające w ich ramach specjalne komórki organizacyjne – wydziały handlowo-gospodarcze i biura radców handlowych"16. Jak zauważa M. Sobczak współczesny polski system dyplomacji gospodarczej i handlowej budzi wiele zastrzeżeń tak wśród polityków, jak i przedsiębiorców17. W 2006 roku Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych i Ministerstwo Gospodarki zawarły porozumienie wyodrębniające sfery dyplomacji handlowej i gospodarczej – pierwsze są prowadzone przez Wydziały Promocji Handlu i Inwestycji, drugie przez Wydziały Ekonomiczne podległe Ministerstwu Spraw Zagranicznych. Pomimo tego, wciąż zauważalne jest rozproszenie i brak koordynacji działań. Wydziały prowadzą przede wszystkim pracę o charakterze informacyjno-analitycznym (m.in. uczestnictwo w imprezach promocyjnych, udzielanie odpowiedzi na pytania, odbywanie spotkań oraz rozmów z polskimi i zagranicznymi przedsiębiorcami, zbieranie i udzielanie ogólnych informacji na temat państwa, w którym funkcjonują), działania promocyjne (m.in. organizacja i uczestnictwo w zagranicznych targach, seminariach, konferencjach i wystawach) oraz współpracę z polskimi instytucjami. Z analiz ośrodka demosEUROPA z 2013 roku wynika, iż niezbędne jest wzmocnienie powiązań polskiej dyplomacji ekonomicznej i publicznej18. Pierwsza powinna przyczyniać się do budowy podaży rodzimych produktów na rynkach zagranicznych, zaś druga do tworzenia pozytywnego wizerunku kraju, a przez to wzmocnienia popytu na jego produkty. Elementem spajającym obie koncepcje powinna być strategia budowy marki narodowej, która będzie odpowiadać potrzebom tak zagranicznej opinii publicznej i konsumentów, jak też obywatelom kraju pochodzenia i oddziaływać na budowę ich tożsamości zbiorowej. W 2012 roku z inicjatywy Ministerstwa Gospodarki powstała „Marka Polskiej Gospodarki", której głównym przesłaniem jest uznanie kapitału ludzkiego za kluczowe kryterium przy wyborze Polski jako miejsca inwestycji lub poszukiwaniu partnerstwa biznesowego. Ocena wdrażania i wykorzystania tej marki będzie możliwa dopiero za kilka lat. 15 Badania wizerunkowe Polski i polskiej gospodarki w krajach głównych partnerów gospodarczych. Raport z badania Desk-Research, Ageron Polska, Warszawa 2011, s. 44–45. 16 B. Dobrzańska, M. Sitek, Mini leksykon dyplomatyczny..., s. 17. 17 M. Sobczak, Wsparcie internacjonalizacji polskich przedsiębiorstw przez podmioty dyplomacji ekonomicznej i handlowej, „Ekonomia Międzynarodowa", 1/2010, s. 41–42. 18 P. Świeboda (red.), Polska globalna. Impuls do debaty, demosEUROPA – Centrum Strategii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2013, s. 50. 13www.soclab.org.pl Dyplomacja publiczna jest także powiązana z dyplomacją kulturalną, koncepcją rozwijaną od XIX wieku i rozumianą jako wymiana idei, informacji, sztuki i innych aspektów kultury między narodami, by sprzyjać wzajemnemu zrozumieniu19. Dyplomacja kulturalna zakłada wykorzystanie „miękkich" argumentów do osiągania zamierzonych celów w relacjach międzynarodowych20. Obejmuje m.in. promocję kultury narodowej za granicą, międzynarodową współpracę kulturalną, zabieganie o korzyści dla społeczności lokalnych w relacjach międzynarodowych, ponadnarodowe idee i projekty polityczne lub społeczne. Zasadne jest w tym miejscu przybliżenie wyników badań P. Kieliszewskiego i M. Poprawskiego21. Wyniki zostały podzielone na cztery grupy tematyczne. Pierwszy wątek dotyczył przygotowania kadr i działań personelu odpowiedzialnego za promocję kultury polskiej za granicą. Zaobserwowano, iż: brakuje profesjonalistów, brakuje angażowania ekspertów, występuje niezrozumienie potrzeb artystów, promocją zajmują się wyłącznie „pasjonaci", brakuje personalnej odpowiedzialności, wykorzystywane są głównie prywatne kontakty artystów, brakuje kontynuacji w polityce personalnej oraz dochodzi do nadmiernego dbania przez urzędników o prowadzenie działalności tylko w zakresie przydzielonych im kompetencji. Drugą grupę problemów stanowią struktury organizacyjne i zakres ich kompetencji. Są to: niejasne kompetencje instytucji, brak transparentności i kryteriów oceny działań, brak okrętów flagowych wśród instytucji, niewielka rola wyznaczana samorządom w promocji kultury polskiej za granicą, złe budżetowanie i finansowanie promocji kultury polskiej za granicą oraz brak systemowej spójności promocji kultury polskiej za granicą. Trzecią wyróżnioną grupę stanowią problemy związane ze strategią i praktyką promocji kultury polskiej za granicą. Zauważa się: słabość podziału tematów na „sezonowość" w dyplomacji kulturalnej, niedostrzeganie nowej fali emigracji, brak „wywiadu kulturalnego" i badań co do potrzeb odbiorców, nieprawidłowe zarządzanie informacją oraz niedoceniane marek. Ostatnia grupa problemów związana jest z jakością i skutecznością promocji kultury polskiej za granicą. Są to: „wmawianie sobie" sukcesu, „zadęcie" w promocji Polski, słaba kreatywność i brak przełamywania stereotypów w promocji kultury, nietraktowanie kultury jako produktu, uznanie „polskości sztuki" za wartość nadrzędną, brak zachęt do różnorodności i dywersyfikacji oferty kulturalnej, słaba współpraca organizacji pozarządowych i instytucji publicznych, słaba oferta międzynarodowa polskich instytucji kultury oraz niepełne wykorzystanie formuły managerskiej w promocji kultury polskiej za granicą. Wnioski te uzupełnić należy informacjami z raportu o stanie kultury opracowanego w 2009 roku na zlecenie Ministerstwa Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego22. Zwrócono w nim uwagę, iż za najskuteczniejsze w promocji Polski uchodzą: tzw. dni kultury polskiej, w których organizacje są włączane w zróżnicowane typy instytucji i twórców z państw partnerskich, co otwiera możliwości kontynuacji dalszej współpracy; udział polskich twórców i artystów w kulturalnych przedsięwzięciach międzynarodowych (festiwale, wystawy EXPO, wizyty studyjne); promocja polskiego dorobku kulturalnego i wkładu w kulturę uniwersalną; polityka stypendialna, wymiana młodzieży, współpraca naukowa i kulturalna oraz atrakcyjne i efektywne nauczanie języka polskiego. Kolejną formą dyplomacji publicznej jest dyplomacja społeczna, obywatelska23. Pod tym pojęciem rozumie się działalność związaną z polityką zagraniczną państwa, która prowadzona jest „przez różne pozarządowe organizacje społeczne, fundacje, grupy lub pojedynczych wpływowych obywateli, czyli przez czynniki niereprezentujące państwa, rządu i Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych. Dyplomacja ta to działalność na rzecz zbliżenia między narodami, polepszania wzajemnych stosunków, promocji kraju w świecie, wykorzystywanie w tym celu lobbingu – organizowanie różnych spotkań, udzielanie pomocy humanitarnej. Działalność ta stanowi uzupełnienie oficjalnych kontaktów dyplomatycznych państwowej służby dyplomatycznej"24. W niniejszym raporcie uwzględniono ten rodzaj dyplomacji poprzez badanie wybranych organizacji pozarządowych z województwa podlaskiego. Pod pojęciem dyplomacji samorządowej w niniejszym raporcie rozumie się ogólnie prowadzenie działań z zakresu współpracy transgranicznej między jednostkami samorządu terytorialnego przynależącymi do regionów różnych państw. Dyplomacja ta powinna stanowić uzupełnienie lub kontynuację 19 S. Gawroński, Dyplomacja publiczna..., s. 57. 20 P. Kieliszewski, M. Poprawski, Instytucje publiczne i dyplomacja kulturalna. Potencjały i wyzwania, „Zarządzanie Publiczne", 3 (9)/2009, s. 20. 21 Ibidem, s. 22–28. 22 P. Potoroczyn (red.), Od wymiany kulturalnej do nowej inteligentnej siły. Promocja Polski poprzez kulturę, MKiDN, Warszawa 2009. 23 Więcej na ten temat: B. Ociepka, Nowa dyplomacja publiczna – perspektywa teorii stosunków międzynarodowych i komunikowania politycznego, „Przegląd Strategiczny", 1/2012, s. 132. 24 B. Dobrzańska, M. Sitek, Mini leksykon dyplomatyczny, op. cit., s. 20. 14 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim rządowej koncepcji dyplomacji publicznej i być spójna z polityką zagraniczną kraju, przy czym samorządy zachowują swobodę w doborze kierunków i środków działania na polu wymiany przede wszystkim gospodarczej, społecznej i kulturalnej. Dyplomacja samorządowa podobnie do obywatelskiej stanowi uzupełnienie państwowej służby dyplomatycznej. Przyjęta przez Polskę Europejska Konwencja Ramowa o Współpracy Transgranicznej definiuje ją jako „każde wspólnie podjęte działanie mające na celu umocnienie sąsiedzkich kontaktów między wspólnotami i władzami terytorialnymi dwóch lub większej liczby umawiających się stron"25. Zakłada się tu, że współpraca zmierza do łagodzenia niekorzystnych skutków istnienia granicy i przezwyciężania skutków położenia regionu granicznego na obrzeżach państw w kierunku poprawy warunków życia ludności. Współpraca opiera się na kontaktach sąsiedzkich na poziomie regionalnym i lokalnym. Może ona obejmować m.in. wymianę towarów i surowców, działalność informacyjno-promocyjną, działalność konsultingową i badawczo-rozwojową, świadczenie usług, wymianę kulturalną, oświatową i sportową, rozwój infrastruktury transgranicznej, działalność turystyczną, ochronę środowiska naturalnego oraz planowanie przestrzenne. Zasadniczym impulsem do rozwoju współpracy transgranicznej polskich regionów były procesy transformacji ustrojowej w Polsce i w państwach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, wejście kraju do UE oraz Organizacji Traktatu Północnoatlantyckiego (NATO), reforma administracyjna w 1999 roku zwiększająca podmiotowość samorządów oraz dostęp do zewnętrznych programów finansowych wspierających współpracę transgraniczną i regionalną26. Współpraca ta prowadzi do rozwoju kontaktów obywatelskich i gospodarczych, wykorzystywania endogennych zasobów rozwojowych, łagodzenia negatywnych skutków istnienia granicy, przepływu doświadczeń i informacji pomiędzy regionami, koordynacji rozbudowy infrastruktury po obu stronach granic, promocji – napływu inwestycji, rozwoju turystyki, wymiany idei społecznych, edukacyjnych i naukowych, działań kulturotwórczych. Współpraca transgraniczna stanowi jeden z typów współpracy podejmowanej z innymi podmiotami przez współczesne państwa, obok współpracy międzyregionalnej i międzynarodowej. Tabela 2. Instytucje i regulacje prawne współpracy międzynarodowej regionów INSTYTUCJE REGULACJE PRAWNE RADA EUROPY Kongres Władz Lokalnych i Regionalnych Komitet Zarządzający Władz Lokalnych i Regionalnych Konferencja Ministrów odp. za Samorządy Lokalne Komisja ds. Współpracy Transgranicznej Europejska Konwencja Ramowa o Współpracy Transgranicznej (1980) Europejska Karta Samorządu Terytorialnego (1985) Europejska Karta Samorządu Regionalnego (1997) Europejskie Porozumienie Ramowe o Współpracy na Terenach Przygranicznych Deklaracja o Współpracy Transgranicznej (1989) UNIA EUROPEJSKA Komitet Regionów Traktat o Unii Europejskiej (art. 198a-c, nowe art. 263–265) Wspólnotowa Karta Regionalizacji ORGANIZACJE POZARZĄDOWE Stowarzyszenie Europejskich Regionów Granicznych Bałtycka Konferencja Współpracy Subregionalnej Europejska Karta Regionów Granicznych i Transgranicznych (1981) 25 Europejska Konwencja Ramowa o Współpracy Transgranicznej między Wspólnotami i Władzami Terytorialnymi sporządzona w Madrycie dnia 21 maja 1980 r., Dz. U. 1993, nr 93, poz. 287. 26 I. Zabielska, Transgraniczna współpraca regionów, [w:] R. Kisiel, M. Wojarska (red.), Wybrane aspekty rozwoju regionalnego, Fundacja Wspieranie i Promocja Przedsiębiorczości na Warmii i Mazurach, Olsztyn 2013, s. 46. 15www.soclab.org.pl POLSKA Departamenty Unii Europejskiej i Współpracy Międzynarodowej: MSWiA (Zespół ds. Zagospodarowania Granicy Państwowej, Władza Wdrażająca Programy Europejskie), KPRM (Spraw Zagranicznych), MSZ (Europy, Polityki Wschodniej, Prawno-Traktatowy) Departamenty w ministerstwach odp. za wykorzystanie funduszy unijnych Komisje i Rady ds. współpracy międzynarodowej i regionalnej Forum Polskich Regionów Granicznych Ustawa – prawo o stowarzyszeniach (1989) Ustawa o samorządzie województwa (1998) Ustawa o zasadach przystępowania jednostek samorządu terytorialnego do międzynarodowych zrzeszeń społeczności lokalnych i regionalnych (2000) Międzyrządowe regionalne porozumienia dwui wielostronne Transgraniczne dwui wielostronne porozumienia regionalne Transgraniczne dwui wielostronne porozumienia lokalne Źródło: I. Zabielska, Transgraniczna współpraca regionów, [w:] R. Kisiel, M. Wojarska (red.), Wybrane aspekty rozwoju regionalnego, Fundacja Wspieranie i Promocja Przedsiębiorczości na Warmii i Mazurach, Olsztyn 2013, s. 64. Współpraca transgraniczna między regionami może występować w formach: wzajemnego poznawania się i wymiany informacji; wspólnej analizy interesujących zainteresowane strony zagadnień problemowych (mieszane grupy robocze); wypracowywania wspólnych stanowisk w negocjacjach i przedstawiania opinii o możliwych rozwiązaniach problemów; realizacji wspólnych projektów; instytucjonalizacji wspólnego wykonywania zadań w zakresie współdziałania na rzecz rozwoju27. Jednocześnie współpraca stanowi ostatni, najwyższy stopień tworzenia relacji – od początkowej wymiany informacji, poprzez konsultacje, po kooperację i koordynację działań. Istnieje wiele szczegółowych regulacji i instytucji wspierających współpracę międzynarodową regionów. Zostały one wymienione w tabeli 2. Na intensywność współpracy transgranicznej oddziałują w szczególności trzy czynniki: (1) powiązania funkcjonalne – sprzyjają silne powiązania funkcji regionów z obszarami znajdującymi się poza granicami danego kraju; (2) modernizacja gospodarki – sprzyja nowoczesność gospodarki i konkurencyjność względem podmiotów zagranicznych; (3) rozwój społeczeństwa obywatelskiego – współpracy sprzyja gęstsza sieć instytucji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, która obejmuje też większą otwartość na kontakty zewnętrzne28. Do pozostałych czynników warunkujących współpracę transgraniczną należą: ekonomiczne (poziom rozwoju obu części obszaru transgranicznego, spójność systemów gospodarczych, koniunktura, ceny, płace, kursy walut i bezrobocie); geograficzne (sieć osadnicza, warunki naturalne – ukształtowanie terenu i cechy środowiska przyrodniczego, infrastruktura graniczna); instytucjonalne (status granicy, regulacje wizowe, paszportowe i celne oraz kompetencje władz regionalnych i lokalnych po obu stronach granicy); polityczno-międzynarodowe (wpływ ogólnej atmosfery politycznej na wzajemne kontakty); socjokulturowe i językowe (np. negatywne stereotypy i uprzedzenia czy bariery językowe)29. Jak zauważa się w Europejskiej Karcie Regionów Granicznych i Transgranicznych punktem wyjścia do współpracy powinno być wspólne tworzenie infrastruktury transgranicznej i usuwanie barier w przepływie czynników produkcji W literaturze przedmiotu wśród form współpracy regionalnej wymienia się m.in.: grupy robocze, uzgodnienia instytucjonalne, grupy transgraniczne, Europejskie Ugrupowania Współpracy Transgranicznej (EUWT), instytucje współpracy regionalnej, wspólne projekty, partnerstwa gmin i miast bliźniaczych oraz euroregiony. W tym miejscu należy zwrócić uwagę na szczególne znaczenie euroregionów. Są to struktury o wysokim stopniu instytucjonalizacji współpracy transgranicznej, ponieważ posiadają własne rady, sekretariaty i grupy robocze, jak również sieci powiązań z wyspecjalizowanymi agencjami krajowymi i międzynarodowymi. Pod pojęciem euroregionu rozumieć można też porozumienia o charakterze regional27 Ibidem, s. 48. 28 Ibidem, s. 48. 29 Ibidem, s. 52. 16 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim nym, powoływane do rozwiązywania konkretnych problemów występujących po obu stronach granicy, które muszą być zgodne z prawem wewnętrznym i umowami międzynarodowymi30. Euroregiony stanowią efekt instytucjonalizacji stosunków między regionami w powiązaniu z tworzeniem organizacji kontrolujących, regulujących i finansujących realizację przedsięwzięć o charakterze ponadgranicznym oraz zwiększeniem kompetencji organów już istniejących31. Ponadto z perspektywy prawnej euroregiony: nie stanowią odrębnych podmiotów administracyjno-terytorialnych posiadających status osoby prawnej; nie zmieniają uregulowań prawnych na terenie każdego z państw członków euroregionu; organy zarządzające euroregionem wykonują funkcje koordynacyjne i nie posiadają wydanych pełnomocnictw oraz nie mogą zmieniać organów władzy działających na terenie każdego z członków32. Z perspektywy politycznej euroregiony stanowią zaś przestrzenie dobrowolnej współpracy, które nie mogą działać przeciwko interesom państwa, nie są tworami ponadpaństwowymi oraz w swojej działalności nie zastępują państwa w pełnieniu funkcji w zakresie polityki zagranicznej. Wykres 1. Stopień instytucjonalizacji struktur współpracy w kontekście sąsiedztwa między państwami euroregion wspólnoty robocze uzgodnienia instytucjonalne Źródło: I. Zabielska, Transgraniczna współpraca regionów, [w:] R. Kisiel, M. Wojarska (red.), Wybrane aspekty rozwoju regionalnego, Fundacja Wspieranie i Promocja Przedsiębiorczości na Warmii i Mazurach, Olsztyn 2013, s. 63. Inną istotną z perspektywy dyplomacji samorządowej formą współpracy regionalnej jest koncepcja związków partnerskich (inaczej: związki bliźniacze, ang. twinning). Są to takie kontakty zagraniczne samorządów, które dotyczą bezpośredniego zaangażowania się mieszkańców gmin, powiatów i województw oraz organizacji lokalnych we współpracę ze społecznościami zagranicznymi33. Związki te pozwalają na rozwój kontaktów między obywatelami różnych krajów oraz na wymianę doświadczeń i kooperację samorządów. Związki partnerskie opierają się na umowach o współpracy, listach intencyjnych lub innego typu porozumieniach w formie pisemnej oraz na kontaktach nieformalnych. W prawodawstwie polskim i międzynarodowym nie istnieją precyzyjne definicje określające charakter tych związków. Z danych Związku Miast Polskich rejestrującego związki partnerskie wynika, że w 2005 roku w Polsce istniało ich około 2200. Z reprezentatywnych badań Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych przeprowadzonych na próbie 512 gmin w 2004 roku wynika, iż polskie samorządy utrzymują związki z samorządami w 53 krajach na świecie – głównie z krajów europejskich. Jedynie 18 z tych krajów leży poza kontynentem europejskim. 30 Ibidem, s. 61. 31 Ibidem, s. 62. 32 Ibidem, s. 125–126. 33 J. Szewczyk, Zagraniczne związki partnerskie polskich samorządów miast, powiatów i województw, „Prace geograficzne", Zeszyt 117, Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej UJ, Kraków 2007, s. 262–263. 17www.soclab.org.pl Na dalszą charakterystykę współpracy transgranicznej polskich samorządów pozwalają wyniki badań Instytutu Spraw Publicznych34. Prowadzenie współpracy międzynarodowej deklaruje 72% samorządów. Te, które nie posiadają kontaktów z zagranicą, za główną barierę uznają brak środków finansowych oraz „brak możliwości" lub kompetencji językowych i czasu pracowników. Posiadanie programu rozwoju współpracy międzynarodowej deklaruje zaledwie 16% jednostek terytorialnych, głównie województwa, które są zobowiązane do formułowania priorytetów współpracy z zagranicą, najrzadziej zaś gminy wiejskie. W opinii badanych współpraca międzynarodowa jest konsultowana przez samorząd głównie z lokalnymi organizacjami pozarządowymi (48%), a następnie z obywatelami (21%) i przedstawicielami administracji centralnej (14%). Konsultacje z władzami centralnymi prowadzi blisko 91% województw, przy czym są one do tego zobligowane przepisami prawa, oraz tylko 14% powiatów, 13% miast i 4% gmin wiejskich. Podstawowe formy współpracy zagranicznej stanowią wspólne projekty (58%), dwu-, trój-, wielostronne partnerstwa bez podpisanego dokumentu (20%) i przynależność do organizacji, sieci czy związków zrzeszających podmioty z różnych krajów (18%). Tylko 5% samorządów deklaruje posiadanie przedstawiciela w innym kraju (blisko 82% z nich to województwa). Działania promocyjne na arenie międzynarodowej to przede wszystkim udział w targach międzynarodowych (45%), udział w konkursach międzynarodowych (25%), w kampaniach promocyjnych (23%). Główną barierą są wysokie koszty działalności promocyjnej. Współdziałanie w zakresie współpracy międzynarodowej samorządy podejmują głównie z ogólnopolskimi organizacjami pozarządowymi, fundacjami oraz stowarzyszeniami (59%), z polskimi ośrodkami kultury (47%), z innymi jednostkami samorządowymi (45%), z urzędem marszałkowskim (40%). W dalszej kolejności (na poziomie około 20%) deklaruje się współpracę z wojewodą, urzędem wojewódzkim, innymi organami terenowymi administracji rządowej, lokalnymi organizacjami pozarządowymi, fundacjami i stowarzyszeniami, podmiotami prywatnymi oraz z Ministerstwem Spraw Zagranicznych lub innymi organami administracji centralnej. Poniżej 20% samorządów deklaruje kooperację zagraniczną z uczelniami i instytucjami badawczymi, z przedstawicielami Kościoła oraz z instytucjami polskimi za granicą. Udzielanie pomocy charytatywnej w ramach współpracy rozwojowej, propagowania praw człowieka i propagowania demokracji deklaruje 28% samorządów. Skierowana jest ona głównie na Ukrainę. Współpraca międzynarodowa samorządu jest finansowana przeważnie ze środków własnych (95%), funduszy unijnych (61%), ze środków pochodzących od partnera zagranicznego (33%), z funduszy krajowych z budżetu państwa (17%), od partnerów prywatnych (12%). Samorządy głównie natrafiają na trudności we współpracy międzynarodowej dotyczące braku odpowiednich środków finansowych na jej prowadzenie (79%), a następnie braku czasu na taką działalność, który wynika ze zbyt dużego obciążenia innymi obowiązkami (25%), braku zainteresowania ze strony partnera (24%), utrudnień związanych z niewystarczającymi kompetencjami (na przykład językowymi) pracowników lub z wyzwaniami organizacyjno-administracyjnymi wynikającymi z polskiego prawa i nakładanymi przez jednostki administracyjne wyższego rzędu (19%). Główne korzyści ze współpracy – zdaniem przedstawicieli samorządów – osiągają ich mieszkańcy (84%), następnie władze samorządu (79%) i ich pracownicy (67%). Intensyfikacji współpracy międzynarodowej mogą służyć: zdobycie nowych środków finansowych na jej rozwój (77%), propagowanie doświadczeń zagranicznych samorządów (56%), większe zaangażowanie podmiotów lokalnych (56%), wzrost zaangażowania radnych i decydentów (32%), większe zainteresowanie współpracą ze strony partnerów (30%) oraz systematyczna kampania edukacyjna skierowana do przedstawicieli samorządu (28%). Współpraca międzynarodowa, zdaniem samorządów, podejmowana jest głównie celem stworzenia możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców (78%), promocji samorządu na arenie międzynarodowej (75%) oraz przeniesienia dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny (70%). Innym powodem jest możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze z programów europejskich i międzynarodowych (57%), rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników jednostki samorządowej oraz jednostki partnerskiej poprzez stałą wymianę (51%). Partnerzy polskich samorządów pochodzą głównie z Niemiec (162 samorządy spośród 260 deklarujących współpracę), Ukrainy (116), Francji (82), Litwy (63), Węgier (60), Słowacji (55) i Czech (48). W dalszej kolejności są to samorządy z Rosji (43), Białorusi (40), Wielkiej Brytanii (33), Szwecji (33), Chin (25), Holandii (22), Belgii (21), Hiszpanii (20) i Rumunii (20). 34 A. Fuksiewicz, A. Łada, Ł. Wenerski, Współpraca zagraniczna polskich samorządów – wnioski z badań, ISP, Warszawa 2012. 18 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 1.2. Priorytety dyplomacji obywatelskiej i samorządowej w polityce zagranicznej na poziomie kraju i województwa podlaskiego Za punkt wyjścia do analizy priorytetów przypisywanych dyplomacji obywatelskiej i samorządowej przyjmuje się w tym miejscu rządowy Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski opublikowany w 2008 roku, który stanowił podstawę do budowy aktualnego systemu zarządzania rozwojem kraju. W raporcie tym określono kapitał intelektualny jako „ogół niematerialnych aktywów ludzi, przedsiębiorstw, społeczności, regionów i instytucji, które odpowiednio wykorzystane, mogą być źródłem obecnego i przyszłego dobrostanu kraju"35. Przyjęto przy tym, iż kapitał ten obejmuje cztery typy kapitału: (1) ludzki – „potencjał zgromadzony we wszystkich Polakach wyrażający się w ich wykształceniu, doświadczeniu życiowym, postawach, umiejętnościach"; (2) strukturalny – „potencjał zgromadzony w namacalnych elementach infrastruktury narodowego systemu edukacji i innowacji"; (3) społeczny – „potencjał zgromadzony w polskim społeczeństwie w postaci obowiązujących norm postępowania, zaufania i zaangażowania, które wspierając współpracę i wymianę wiedzy, przyczyniają się do wzrostu dobrostanu Polski"; (4) relacyjny – „potencjał związany z wizerunkiem Polski na zewnątrz, poziomem integracji z globalną gospodarką, atrakcyjnością dla jej zagranicznych 'klientów'". Kapitał relacyjny jest w szczególności powiązany z realizacją zadań polityki zagranicznej i dyplomacji publicznej. W raporcie zwrócono ponadto uwagę na potrzebę poszukiwania rozwiązań na rzecz zapewnienia stabilnego rozwoju polskich firm i przyciągania inwestycji zagranicznych tworzących nowe miejsca pracy. Podkreślono też wagę inwestowania w edukację i rozwój kapitału ludzkiego, które powinny budować międzynarodową pozycję kraju. Wyzwaniem jest także zintegrowane wsparcie eksportu i globalnej ekspansji polskich firm. Zachodzi potrzeba promowania wśród przedsiębiorców standardów zarządzania kapitałem intelektualnym, co ma prowadzić do utrzymania dobrze wykształconych osób w kraju i powstrzymania negatywnych efektów ich migracji zawodowej. Kolejne wyzwania co do pozycji międzynarodowej kraju wskazano w opublikowanym rok później przez Zespół Doradców Strategicznych Prezesa Rady Ministrów Raporcie Polska 203036. Zwraca się tu uwagę m.in. na: konieczność modernizacji energetycznej sieci przesyłowej tak w wymiarze wewnętrznym, jak i poprawy połączeń transgranicznych; wymóg poprawy systemu transportowego i międzynarodowej dostępności regionów; konieczność odejścia od konkurowania w wymianie handlowej poprzez ceny na rzecz innowacyjności produktów i usług; utrzymanie stabilności makroekonomicznej poprzez zwiększenie oszczędności prywatnych i bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych (w tym pobudzenie przez nie obszarów peryferyjnych); ograniczenie negatywnych efektów migracji zarobkowej po akcesji do UE; zwiększenie integracji środowiska naukowego z zagranicą, a przez to także współpracy z zagranicznym przemysłem, w tym poprawę znajomości języków obcych wśród kadry naukowej oraz zwiększenie liczby studentów zagranicznych, organizowanie konkursów na stanowiska przyciągających zagranicznych naukowców; stereotypy i brak zaufania pomiędzy światem biznesu i światem nauki, które utrudniają ekspansję zagraniczną firm; wzrost międzynarodowego znaczenia polskich miast w europejskiej sieci metropolii; promocję polskiego sektora kreatywnego (w tym m.in. sektora kultury, architektury i wzornictwa przemysłowego) za granicą w ramach dyplomacji kulturalnej. Przyjęta przez rząd w 2013 roku Długookresowa Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2030 (DSRK) obejmuje trzy obszary strategiczne i osiem części, którym podporządkowano cele i kierunki interwencji37. Są to: (1) konkurencyjność i innowacyjność gospodarki: innowacyjność gospodarki i kreatywność indywidualna, Polska cyfrowa, kapitał ludzki, bezpieczeństwo energetyczne i środowisko; (2) równoważenie potencjału rozwojowego regionów Polski: rozwój regionalny, transport; (3) efektywność i sprawność państwa: kapitał społeczny i sprawne państwo. Części te zostały szczegółowo omówione w podporządkowanych dokumentach: strategii średniookresowej (Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2020) oraz w dziewięciu strategiach zintegrowanych. W tym miejscu zostanie zwrócona uwaga jedynie na aspekty dotyczące bezpośrednio 35 M. Boni (red.), Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski, KPRM, Warszawa 2008, s. 12. 36 M. Boni (red.), Raport Polska 2030. Wyzwania rozwojowe, KPRM, Warszawa 2009. 37 Długookresowa Strategia Rozwoju Kraju. Polska 2030. Trzecia Fala Nowoczesności, KPRM, Warszawa 11.01.2013. 19www.soclab.org.pl współpracy międzynarodowej. W DSRK założono, iż polska polityka zagraniczna powinna być powiązana ze wspieraniem UE, a jednocześnie skoordynowana z jej priorytetami, co ma zapewnić wzrost pozycji kraju na arenie międzynarodowej. Za podstawowe wyzwania w nawiązaniu do przywoływanych w strategii międzynarodowych rankingach konkurencyjności uznaje się poprawę infrastruktury, systemów rozwoju innowacyjnej gospodarki, absorpcji technologii, zróżnicowania struktury biznesowej oraz funkcjonowania instytucji publicznych. W Celu 1 strategii „Wspieranie prorozwojowej alokacji zasobów w gospodarce, stworzenie warunków dla wzrostu oszczędności oraz podaży pracy i innowacji" zwraca się uwagę na potrzebę rozwoju gospodarki innowacyjnej zdolnej do konkurencji na rynkach globalnych. W Celu 3 „Poprawa dostępności i jakości edukacji na wszystkich etapach oraz podniesienie konkurencyjności nauki" deklaruje się interwencje w zakresie wzmocnienia mobilności międzynarodowej i międzysektorowej studentów i pracowników naukowych, realizacji w szerokim zakresie programów stypendiów zagranicznych dla doktorantów i młodych doktorów, realizację programów powrotowych dla polskich i zagranicznych naukowców, realizację wspólnych projektów badawczych uczelni i przedsiębiorstw technologicznych w Polsce i za granicą. W Celu 4 „Wzrost wydajności i konkurencyjności gospodarki" wśród kierunków interwencji wskazuje się m.in. poprawę świadomości roli innowacji i strategii rozwojowych firm wśród przedsiębiorców oraz wspieranie finansowe i organizacyjne wspólnych przedsięwzięć realizowanych przez przedsiębiorców we współpracy z innymi firmami, partnerami zagranicznymi i ośrodkami wspierania biznesu. W Celu 6 „Rozwój kapitału ludzkiego" poprzez wzrost zatrudnienia i stworzenie workfare state (państwa wpierającego pracę) wskazuje się na potrzebę określenia „zawodów deficytowych", a następnie przetestowanie różnych instrumentów pozyskiwania pracowników zagranicznych, których niedobór będzie odczuwalny w kolejnych latach, oraz przygotowanie i wdrożenie nowej koncepcji polityki w zakresie przyjmowania imigrantów zarobkowych, ukierunkowanej na elastyczne uzupełnienia niedoborów na rynku pracy oraz zwiększenie konkurencyjności polskiej gospodarki. W Celu 7 „Zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego oraz ochrona i poprawa stanu środowiska" do kierunków interwencji zaliczono pozyskiwanie kapitału inwestorów zagranicznych na rzecz modernizacji infrastruktury elektroenergetycznej, naftowej i gazowej. W Celu 11 „Wzrost społecznego kapitału rozwoju" zwraca się uwagę na: konieczność przygotowania i wprowadzenia programu edukacji obywatelskiej na wszystkich poziomach edukacji, w perspektywie uczenia się przez całe życie; przygotowanie we współpracy z partnerami społecznymi, w procesie konsultacji społecznych, programu edukacji obywatelskiej dla osób dorosłych (rząd, samorządy, organizacje społeczne, eksperci); monitorowanie efektów pracy szkół w zakresie kształtowania postaw obywatelskich z wykorzystaniem m.in. badań międzynarodowych (np. civic education). W Strategii Rozwoju Kraju 2020 zwraca się ponadto uwagę na następujące kierunki działań związane ze współpracą międzynarodową38: rozwijanie infrastruktury granicznej, której brak często ogranicza współpracę transgraniczną; aktywizację eksportu; zwiększenie konkurencyjności miast średnich i małych jako centrów rozwoju obszarów wiejskich, przygranicznych, peryferyjnie położonych w stosunku do głównych miast; rozwijanie funkcji metropolitalnych o znaczeniu międzynarodowym, jak: funkcje gospodarcze, naukowe oraz kulturowe i symboliczne. W województwie podlaskim duże znaczenie mają także cele i zdania określone w zaktualizowanej w 2013 roku Strategii rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Polski Wschodniej do roku 202039. Zwraca się w niej uwagę na łączne potrzeby województwa lubelskiego, podkarpackiego, podlaskiego, świętokrzyskiego oraz warmińsko-mazurskiego: potrzebę poprawy połączeń transgranicznych krajowego systemu elektroenergetycznego; wzmocnienie potencjału sektora nauki i badań – poprawę uczestnictwa ośrodków naukowych z Polski Wschodniej w międzynarodowych sieciach współpracy; znoszenie bariery dla prowadzenia działalności innowacyjnej przez przedsiębiorstwa w Polsce Wschodniej oraz pozyskiwania bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych; na wzmocnienie dostępności transportowej miast wojewódzkich. 38 Strategia Rozwoju Kraju 2020, MRR, Warszawa, wrzesień 2012. 39 Strategia rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Polski Wschodniej do roku 2020. Aktualizacja, MRR, Warszawa 2013. 20 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Przyjęty w 2012 roku dokument Priorytety polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2012–2016 stanowi pierwszą wieloletnią strategię polityki zagranicznej Polski od 1989 roku40. Strategia ta wyznacza kierunki krajowej dyplomacji i koordynacji działań administracji centralnej w odniesieniu do stosunków zewnętrznych. W strategii przyjęto 7 priorytetów: (1) silna Polska w silnej unii politycznej – pogłębianie integracji europejskiej, konstruktywne uczestnictwo w procesie decyzyjnym UE na rzecz sukcesu Polski na arenie europejskiej oraz UE na arenie globalnej; (2) Polska jako wiarygodny sojusznik w stabilnym ładzie euroatlantyckim – rozwój własnych zdolności odstraszania i utrzymanie wiarygodności NATO jako sojuszu obronnego; rozwijanie zdolności UE w sferze samodzielnych oraz komplementarnych wobec NATO środków i zasobów budowania bezpieczeństwa; udział w budowie środków wzajemnego zaufania pomiędzy Zachodem a Rosją; ścisła współpraca z Ukrainą i innymi państwami Europy Wschodniej i Kaukazu Południowego; zwalczanie terroryzmu i przeciwdziałanie proliferacji broni masowego rażenia; (3) Polska otwarta na różne wymiary współpracy regionalnej – Współpraca z Zachodem na rzecz bezpieczeństwa i silnej gospodarki; otwarcie i solidarność ze Wschodem; korzystanie z wzorców Północy w trosce o jakość życia obywateli; partnerstwo z Południem w realizacji wspólnych celów cywilizacyjnych; umacnianie współdziałania państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej; (4) strategia polskiej współpracy rozwojowej, promocji demokracji i praw człowieka – zwiększenie roli współpracy rozwojowej w polityce zagranicznej Polski tak, aby także ten zakres działalności międzynarodowej wpływał na bezpieczeństwo Polski oraz stabilność jej sąsiadów i partnerów współpracy rozwojowej; wspieranie działań służących upowszechnianiu praw człowieka, rządów prawa i demokracji w celu kształtowania przyjaznego środowiska międzynarodowego i zapobiegania konfliktom; (5) promocja Polski za granicą – wypracowanie kampanii promocyjnej, która wpłynie na wzmocnienie pozycji Polski w Europie i na świecie, a także uczyni Polskę krajem bardziej konkurencyjnym i silniej przyciągającym inwestorów i turystów. Rozwój polskiej gospodarki, w szczególności promocja eksportu; (6) nowa jakość w relacjach z Polonią i Polakami za granicą – realizacja nowej strategii polonijnej: partnerska współpraca z Polonią i Polakami za granicą prowadzącą do uzyskania zrozumienia i skutecznego poparcia dla polskiej racji stanu i polskiej polityki zagranicznej oraz skorzystanie z potencjału Polonii i Polaków za granicą do promocji i budowy pozytywnego wizerunku Polski w świecie; (7) skuteczna służba zagraniczna – dalsza modernizacja MSZ: profesjonalna dyplomacja, oparta na prawidłowym doborze kadr i funkcjonowaniu struktur służby zagranicznej; poprawa spójności i koordynacji działań międzynarodowych podejmowanych przez MSZ, inne organy administracji, instytucje i organizacje pozarządowe; nowoczesna infrastruktura budująca wizerunek państwa. Można zaryzykować twierdzenie, iż dyplomacja samorządowa i obywatelska oraz współpraca transgraniczna mogą być realizowane na rzecz osiągania wszystkich powyższych priorytetów. W szczególności zwrócić należy uwagę na takie kierunki interwencji, jak: • dokończenie budowy jednolitego rynku w UE oraz wspieranie działań na rzecz konkurencyjności Unii, w tym kształtowanie wspólnej polityki handlowej właściwie realizującej unijne interesy gospodarcze na świecie; • uatrakcyjnienie oferty Partnerstwa Wschodniego i wzmocnienie siły oddziaływania tego programu na transformację państw Europy Wschodniej i Kaukazu Południowego; • rozwój partnerstwa strategicznego z Ukrainą; • wykorzystanie wzorców Szwecji i innych państw nordyckich w zakresie modernizacji i innowacyjności gospodarki; • znalezienie nowych płaszczyzn współpracy w ramach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej; • budowę pragmatycznych stosunków politycznych i gospodarczych z Rosją; • wypracowanie długookresowych zasad współpracy administracji rządowej z organizacjami pozarządowymi zajmującymi się pomocą rozwojową; • współkształtowanie programów demokratyzacji i promocji praw człowieka; 40 Priorytety Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2012–2016, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, Warszawa, marzec 2012. 21www.soclab.org.pl • wypracowanie hasła i kampanii promującej Polskę za granicą poprzez różnorodne narzędzia, środki przekazu i grupy adresatów; • prowadzenie jednolitej polityki komunikacyjnej oraz utrzymanie spójności działań promocyjnych, przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu wielu podmiotów zaangażowanych w promowanie Polski poza granicami kraju; • utworzenie efektywnego systemu (gospodarka, kultura, edukacja, turystyka etc.) promocji Polski za granicą oraz wprowadzenie zasad jej koordynacji poprzez m.in. wzmocnienie współpracy międzyresortowej w tym zakresie; • działanie na rzecz systematycznego podwyższania poziomu bezpośrednich inwestycji zagranicznych; • zapewnienie Polakom i Polonii za granicą możliwości funkcjonowania w ramach prawnych gwarantujących kultywowanie polskości oraz respektowanie przez państwa zamieszkania odpowiednich norm i standardów; • zidentyfikowanie celów polskiej polityki zagranicznej zbieżnych z interesami Polonii i Polaków za granicą oraz zaproponowanie współpracy w urzeczywistnianiu tych celów dla dobra Polski i jej pozytywnego wizerunku za granicą; sprzyjanie generowaniu aktywności obywatelskiej i nowych form prowadzenia działalności społecznej wśród Polaków na Wschodzie; • uatrakcyjnienie i rozszerzenie przekazu polskich mediów publicznych dla zagranicy oraz wsparcie instytucji państwa dla mediów polonijnych; usprawnienie istniejących i tworzenie nowych form upowszechniania języka polskiego i wiedzy o Polsce, w tym tworzenie i sponsorowanie ośrodków studiów polskich na czołowych uniwersytetach; • wspieranie ochrony dziedzictwa kulturowego za granicą. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych definiuje samorządowy i obywatelski wymiar polskiej polityki zagranicznej jako taką, która „dopełnia oraz inspiruje politykę zagraniczną państwa, czyni ją nie tylko bardziej skuteczną, lecz także lepiej rozumianą przez obywateli"41. W wydanej z inspiracji resortu publikacji Dyplomacja otwarta na inicjatywy obywatelskie zwraca się uwagę, iż wyzwaniami nowego wymiaru dyplomacji są m.in. doprecyzowanie podziału zadań między rządem a samorządem, stworzenie regularnego obiegu informacji i doświadczeń pomiędzy administracją centralną i podmiotami niepublicznymi, budowa mapy instytucji i sieci współzależności między różnymi podmiotami, które uczestniczą w kształtowaniu polityki zagranicznej, oddziaływanie na zmianę świadomości elit co do znaczenia polityki zagranicznej dla rozwoju kraju42 Wsparcie w dyplomacji samorządowej i obywatelskiej ma stanowić sieć Regionalnych Ośrodków Debaty Międzynarodowej. Powstała ona wraz z początkiem kwietnia 2013 roku w wyniku ogłoszonego przez Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych konkursu43. Głównym celem sieci jest przybliżenie obywatelom polskiej polityki zagranicznej oraz wzmocnienie kanałów współpracy pomiędzy MSZ, samorządem i organizacjami pozarządowymi. Działalność ośrodków ma obejmować: animowanie i inicjowanie w regionie działań z zakresu współpracy międzynarodowej; koordynowanie inicjatyw podejmowanych w regionach przez instytucje publiczne i organizacje pozarządowe z zakresu polityki zagranicznej; gromadzenie materiałów, baz danych, opracowań z tego zakresu; zbieranie i aktualizowanie informacji o podmiotach realizujących w regionach działania z zakresu polityki zagranicznej; prowadzenie działalności informacyjnej i edukacyjnej dla społeczności regionu w kwestiach dotyczących UE i polskiej polityki zagranicznej; udostępnianie materiałów, opracowań i publikacji o tematyce związanej z polską polityką zagraniczną oraz udzielanie dodatkowych informacji przez konsultantów. Uwarunkowania współpracy międzynarodowej zostały także ujęte w przyjętej w 2013 roku Strategii Rozwoju Województwa Podlaskiego do roku 202044. W diagnozie poprzedzającej cele strategii zwraca się uwagę, iż rozwój współpracy staje się jednym z głównych wyzwań regionu, ale barierę stanowi relatywnie 41 Wymiar samorządowy i obywatelski polskiej polityki zagranicznej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, www.msz.gov.pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/wymiar_samorzadowy/wymiar_samorzadowy_i_obywatelski_polskiej_polityki_zagranicznej [10.10.2013]. 42 Polska polityka zagraniczna Perspektywa samorządów i obywateli, THINKTANK, Warszawa 2012. 43 O sieci Regionalnych Ośrodków Debaty Międzynarodowej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, http://odm.gov.pl/pl/siec_rodm/o_sieci_rodm/ [10.10.2013]. 44 Strategia Rozwoju Województwa Podlaskiego do roku 2020, Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Podlaskiego, Białystok 2013. 22 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim mały potencjał gospodarczy i naukowa współpraca w sieciach o zasięgu krajowym lub międzynarodowym oraz niska konkurencyjność międzynarodowa w ujęciu ekonomicznym. Podlaski eksport cechuje duży udział handlu z krajami Europy Wschodniej: Białorusią, Litwą, Rosją oraz pozostałymi krajami bałtyckimi. W strukturze eksportu województwa dominują artykuły spożywcze, handel hurtowy oraz produkcja wyrobów z drewna i papieru. Stwierdzono także, że przygraniczne położenie, walory przyrodnicze oraz wielokulturowość regionu nie przekładały się w minionych latach na liczbę turystów odwiedzających region oraz wzrost powiązań gospodarczych. Strategia ma budować wizerunek regionu jako „bramy na wschód" poprzez wsparcie partnerstwa transgranicznego (współpracę instytucji publicznych na rzecz wspólnej realizacji przedsięwzięć inwestycyjnych, wspólne dziedzictwo kulturowe i przyrodnicze, transgraniczne produkty turystyczne, inicjatywy społeczności lokalnych), edukację (specjalizacje w dziedzinie handlu zagranicznego, marketingu, języka biznesowego, prawa itp.; współpracę środowisk akademickich oraz wymianę studentów) oraz zorientowanie gospodarki na wschodnich sąsiadów (produkcja i usługi, dyfuzja innowacji, sieci współpracy naukowo-badawczej, think tank na potrzeby całej UE w zakresie prowadzenia biznesu, współpracy na Białorusi). Kluczowe dla współpracy transgranicznej województwa podlaskiego są struktury euroregionalne: Euroregion Niemen utworzony w 1997 roku, obejmujący swoim zasięgiem 2 województwa na terenie Polski (podlaskie i warmińsko-mazurskie), obwód grodzieński na Białorusi, 15 litewskich jednostek samorządowych z województw: alytuskiego, mariampolskiego i wileńskiego, a także 5 rejonów rosyjskiego obwodu kaliningradzkiego oraz Euroregion Puszcza Białowieska utworzony w 2002 roku, obejmujący gminy powiatu hajnowskiego, Świsłocz w obwodzie grodzieńskim oraz rejon Prużany i rejon Kamieniec obwodu brzeskiego. Euroregion Niemen oraz Euroregion Puszcza Białowieska wspierają głównie współpracę społeczno-kulturalną, w mniejszym stopniu gospodarczą. Istotne znaczenie dla przyszłej współpracy może mieć podjęcie działań na rzecz wpisania na Listę Światowego Dziedzictwa Kulturowego i Przyrodniczego Ludzkości UNESCO Kanału Augustowskiego jako produktu ponadnarodowego wspólnie z Białorusią. Na poprawę relacji przedsiębiorców białoruskich i podlaskich może pozytywnie wpłynąć utworzenie tzw. zielonego korytarza, czyli uproszczonej możliwości przekraczania granicy. Z perspektywy omawianego tematu kluczowy jest określony w dokumencie cel strategiczny 2: „Powiązania krajowe i międzynarodowe". Ich poprawa ma prowadzić przede wszystkim do wzrostu wartości eksportu oraz udziału kapitału zagranicznego ulokowanego w województwie podlaskim w całkowitej wartości tego kapitału w Polsce. W celu operacyjnym 2.1. „Aktywność podlaskich przedsiębiorstw na rynku ponadregionalnym" założono realizację: promocji gospodarczej regionu, inicjatyw sprzyjających nawiązywaniu kontaktów gospodarczych oraz wspierania obecności podlaskich przedsiębiorstw na rynkach zewnętrznych. W celu operacyjnym 2.2. „Poprawa atrakcyjności inwestycyjnej województwa" główne kierunki interwencji stanowią: aktywność informacyjno-promocyjna ukierunkowana na inwestorów (aktywne pozyskiwanie inwestorów) oraz poprawa dostępności terenów inwestycyjnych. W celu operacyjnym 2.3. „Rozwój partnerskiej współpracy transgranicznej" zwraca się uwagę na zwiększenie współpracy samorządów, szczególnie w zakresie wspólnego planowania strategicznego i przestrzennego, realizacji wspólnych projektów, wykorzystywania potencjałów przedsiębiorczości po obu stronach granic, wykorzystania doświadczeń ośrodków naukowych regionu, ułatwień w przekraczaniu granicy, budowy infrastruktury technicznej zapewniającej spójność obszarów przygranicznych, budowy kluczowych szlaków komunikacyjnych zapewniających dostępność transportową regionów w ujęciu międzynarodowym, wspierania rozwoju transgranicznych kontaktów społeczno-gospodarczych, wykorzystania potencjału instytucji kultury oraz organizacji pozarządowych. Przewidziano tu następujące kierunki interwencji: poprawę przepustowości i zwiększanie sieci przejść granicznych, działania w zakresie ułatwień w przekraczaniu granicy, tworzenie powiązań formalnych i nieformalnych oraz sieci współpracy, ochronę i efektywne wykorzystanie wspólnego dziedzictwa przyrodniczego i kulturowego obszaru pogranicza. W celu operacyjnym 2.4. „Rozwój partnerskiej współpracy międzyregionalnej" zakłada się współpracę z województwami makroregionu polski wschodniej, w tym rozwój ponadregionalnych produktów i współpracę w zakresie rozwiązywania wspólnych problemów. W celu operacyjnym 2.5. „Podniesienie zewnętrznej i wewnętrznej dostępności komunikacyjnej regionu" istotnym kierunkiem interwencji ma być poprawa zewnętrznej dostępności transportowej regionu. 23www.soclab.org.pl W strategii przyjęto także podział na Obszary Strategicznej Interwencji. Jednym z nich są obszary przygraniczne, które zostały wyróżnione w Krajowej Strategii Rozwoju Regionalnego 2010–2020: Regiony, Miasta, Obszary Wiejskie (KSRR) i obejmują 8 powiatów oraz dwa miasta na prawach powiatu. Działania na tym obszarze mają być ukierunkowane na przezwyciężanie niedogodności położenia gmin w strefie granicy zewnętrznej Unii Europejskiej. Poza działaniami wskazanymi w KSRR przewiduje się tu pobudzanie wszelkich form kooperacji między podmiotami województwa podlaskiego a podmiotami krajów sąsiadujących – szczególnie w zakresie współpracy naukowej, edukacyjnej i kulturalnej. 1.3. Główne podmioty współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim 1.3.1. Urząd Marszałkowski Województwa Podlaskiego W tym miejscu omówione zostaną wybrane przykłady współpracy transgranicznej oraz dyplomacji samorządowej i obywatelskiej prowadzone przez podmioty wywodzące się z województwa podlaskiego. Władze regionalne są w obecnym modelu kierowania Unią Europejską podstawowymi podmiotami zobowiązanymi do prowadzenia współpracy transgranicznej. Model wielopoziomowego współrządzenia (ang. multi-level governance) obejmuje trzy poziomy zarządzania: ponadnarodowy, narodowy i regionalny45. Poprzez delegowanie funkcji rządzenia na poziom najniższy – regionalny (w tym lokalny) umożliwia się dość elastyczne działania na rzecz integracji europejskiej. Model ten obejmuje zasady dobrego rządzenia (ang. good governance), takie jak partnerstwo, odpowiedzialność i transparentność działań. Województwo zarówno kreuje rozwój gospodarczy i przestrzenny na swoim terytorium, jak też jest podstawowym poziomem absorpcji środków pomocowych z UE, w tym realizacji projektów transgranicznych. Urzędy marszałkowskie współdziałają z partnerami zagranicznymi, zawierają porozumienia z ich władzami samorządowymi, inicjują działania i zlecają ich przeprowadzenie organizacjom pozarządowym i gospodarczym. Urzędy te nadzorują także działania prowadzone z własnej inicjatywy, m.in. przez izby gospodarcze i agencje rozwoju regionalnego46 Współpraca zagraniczna województw jest regulowana przez art. 172 pkt. 2 Konstytucji Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej oraz art. 75–77 art. 18 pkt 13 i 14 i art. 41 pkt 5 Ustawy z dnia 5 czerwca 1998 roku o samorządzie województwa. Przepisy te zobowiązują województwa do prowadzenia tej współpracy zgodnie z prawem wewnętrznym, polityką zagraniczną państwa, jego zobowiązaniami międzynarodowymi oraz wyłącznie w granicach zadań i kompetencji województwa. Zakres i kierunki współpracy zagranicznej województwa podlaskiego wyznacza uchwała przyjęta w 2006 roku. Zgodnie z nią współpraca ma służyć do „kreowania harmonijnego rozwoju gospodarczego, kulturalnego i społeczno-politycznego regionu oraz – ze względu na położenie geograficzne i potencjał społeczno-gospodarczy – umacniania jego pozycji zarówno w Polsce i wśród regionów Unii Europejskiej, jak i na świecie"47. W dokumencie przyjęto osiem celów współpracy zagranicznej województwa podlaskiego. Są to: (1) rozwijanie dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków i partnerska współpraca z państwami graniczącymi z województwem podlaskim (Litwa, Białoruś) w celu harmonijnego rozwoju obszarów przygranicznych; (2) wykorzystywanie doświadczeń UE w zakresie rozwoju obszarów wiejskich, restrukturyzacji i unowocześniania produkcji rolnej oraz tworzenia pozarolniczych źródeł zarobkowania ludności wiejskiej; (3) realizacja przedsięwzięć i wspólnych projektów z wykorzystaniem funduszy europejskich i środków partnerów zagranicznych oraz wspieranie projektów realizowanych przez podmioty z obszaru województwa podlaskiego finansowanych ze środków UE; 45 Por. E. Szadkowska, Województwo jako potencjalny podmiot współpracy transgranicznej, [w:] M. Perkowski (red.), Współpraca transgraniczna. Aspekty prawno-ekonomiczne, Fundacja Prawo i Partnerstwo, Białystok 2010, s. 62. 46 Ibidem, s. 64. 47 Uchwała Nr XXXVII/480/06 Sejmiku Województwa Podlaskiego z dnia 10 kwietnia 2006 w sprawie Priorytetów Współpracy Zagranicznej Województwa Podlaskiego, s. 1, www.wrotapodlasia.pl/NR/rdonlyres/75329163-5284-4087-9125-02A043187E67/0/PriorytetyWsp%C3%B3l pracyZagranicznej.doc [10.10.2013]. 24 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim (4) zbliżanie społeczności lokalnych województwa podlaskiego i zagranicznych regionów partnerskich poprzez wspieranie wymiany gospodarczej, społecznej, kulturalnej, turystycznej, sportowej, oświatowej i naukowej; (5) wspieranie działań samorządów lokalnych oraz instytucji pozarządowych w nawiązywaniu partnerskich więzi w ramach współpracy międzyregionalnej oraz inicjowanie wymiany doświadczeń z zakresu funkcjonowania demokracji lokalnej; (6) promowanie regionu poza granicami kraju poprzez udział w przedsięwzięciach targowo-wystawienniczych i proinwestycyjnych oraz poprzez działalność Regionalnego Biura Województwa Podlaskiego w Brukseli; (7) wzmacnianie roli województwa podlaskiego na mapie Polski i Europy poprzez aktywne uczestnictwo w organizacjach międzynarodowych i włączanie się w inicjatywy ponadregionalne oraz udział w pracach międzyrządowych komisji ds. współpracy transgranicznej i regionalnej z krajami objętymi priorytetami współpracy zagranicznej; (8) utrzymywanie i rozwijanie kontaktów służących wzmacnianiu więzi i pielęgnowaniu tożsamości narodowej w środowiskach polonijnych. Wyróżniono cztery kierunki współpracy zagranicznej: (1) kontynuowanie współpracy z regionami przygranicznymi Litwy i Białorusi, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem regionów zrzeszonych w euroregionach Niemen i Puszcza Białowieska; (2) aktywizacja współpracy z regionami państw sąsiadujących z Polską, tj. Federacji Rosyjskiej, Ukrainy, Niemiec, Czech, Słowacji oraz Państw Bałtyckich; (3) inicjowanie i pogłębianie współpracy z innymi regionami państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej; (4) podejmowanie współdziałania i inicjatyw z partnerami z innych obszarów geograficznych, których propozycje i doświadczenia sprzyjać będą realizacji priorytetów współpracy zagranicznej i strategii rozwoju województwa. Ponadto założono kontynuację współpracy na mocy podpisanych porozumień i deklaracji z następującymi regionami: Bolzano, Trydent i Lombardia (Włochy), Hame (Finlandia), Saône-et-Loire (Francja), Obwodem Grodzieńskim (Białoruś), i Autonomiczną Republiką Krym (Ukraina). Wskazano także na współpracę z Landem Brandenburgii (Niemcy), Regionem Värmland (Szwecja) oraz Obwodami Kurskim i Kaliningradzkim (Federacja Rosyjska). Dokument określa członkostwo i udział przedstawicieli województwa podlaskiego w pracach następujących podmiotów: Konferencja Peryferyjnych Morskich Regionów Europy (CPMR), Komitet Regionów Unii Europejskiej (COR), Kongres Władz Lokalnych i Regionalnych Rady Europy (CLARE), Stowarzyszenie Europejskich Regionów Granicznych (SERG), Konferencja Współpracy Subregionalnej Państw Morza Bałtyckiego (BSSSC), Zgromadzenie Regionów Europy (AER), Rad Gmin i Regionów Europy (CEMR), Sieć Wschodnich Regionów Granicznych (NEEBOR) oraz z euroregionalnymi związkami transgranicznymi Niemen i Puszcza Białowieska. Należy także zwrócić uwagę na udział województwa w realizacji programów Europejskiej Współpracy Terytorialnej na lata 2007–201348. Obejmuje ona trzy typy programów operacyjnych: (1) współpraca transgraniczna: programy na granicy polsko-niemieckiej (z udziałem Meklemburgii, Brandenburgii i Saksonii), Polska–Republika Czeska, Polska–Słowacja, Polska–Litwa, Polska–Szwecja–Dania–Litwa–Niemcy; oraz na granicach zewnętrznych UE współpraca transgraniczna z krajami partnerskimi w ramach Programu Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska–Rosja 2007–2013 oraz Programu Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013; (2) współpraca transnarodowa: Program dla Europy Środkowej, Region Morza Bałtyckiego; (3) program współpracy międzyregionalnej INTERREG IVC. W tym miejscu omówione zostaną tylko wybrane wnioski co do realizacji programu INTERREG IVC i programów współpracy na granicach zewnętrznych UE. Program INTERREG IVC obejmuje całe terytorium Unii Europejskiej oraz Norwegię i Szwajcarię49. W jego ramach wspierane są działania na rzecz poprawy efektywności polityki regionalnej przez promowanie innowacyjności i gospodarki opartej na wiedzy oraz ochronę środowiska i zapobieganie zagrożeniom. Obejmuje interwencje poprzez: (1) inicjatywy regionalne ukierunkowane na wymianę doświadczeń w określonym obszarze polityki w celu rozpoznania działań optymalnych oraz opracowania nowych 48 Europejska Współpraca Terytorialna 2007–2013, Wrota Podlasia, www.wrotapodlasia.pl/pl/ue/europejska_wspolpraca_terytorialna/ [10.10.2013]. 49 Program Współpracy Międzyregionalnej – INTERREG IVC, Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, www.ewt.gov.pl/WstepDoFunduszyEuropejskich/Strony/Wspolpracamiedzyregionalna.aspx [10.10.2013]. 25www.soclab.org.pl narzędzi i metod wdrażania; (2) projekty związane z kapitalizacją, czyli wykorzystaniem rezultatów już zrealizowanych przedsięwzięć. Beneficjentami programu mogą być instytucje publiczne i podmioty prawa publicznego, takie jak: władze regionalne i lokalne, instytucje publiczne i jednostki organizacyjne, agencje rozwoju regionalnego, uczelnie wyższe, instytuty naukowo-badawcze, parki technologiczne, inkubatory przedsiębiorczości, centra innowacyjności, organizacje turystyczne i służby ratownicze. W programie INTERREG IVC podmioty z Polski brały udział w 99 projektach i obejmowały łącznie 121 polskich partnerów, przy czym żaden z tych podmiotów nie pochodził z województwa podlaskiego50. W nowej perspektywie finansowej na lata 2014–2020 Europejska Współpraca Terytorialna ma być prowadzona z udziałem Polski w ramach Programu Region Morza Bałtyckiego, Programu dla Europy Środkowej oraz INTERREG Europa51. Ten ostatni program będzie ukierunkowany na wspólne: badania naukowe, rozwój technologiczny i innowacje; podnoszenie konkurencyjności mikro, małych i średnich przedsiębiorstw; wspieranie przejścia na gospodarkę niskoemisyjną we wszystkich sektorach oraz ochronę środowiska naturalnego i wspieranie efektywności wykorzystania zasobów. Programy Europejskiego Instrumentu Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa ukierunkowane na współpracę pomiędzy Unią Europejską a państwami partnerskimi spoza UE, w których uczestniczy Polska, to Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013 oraz Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska–Rosja 2007–201352. Ich główne obszary wsparcia stanowią: promowanie dialogu politycznego i reform; wzmocnienie instytucji krajowych i innych instytucji odpowiedzialnych za przygotowanie i efektywne wdrażanie polityk; promowanie ochrony środowiska i dobrego zarządzania zasobami naturalnymi; wspieranie polityk zmierzających do redukcji ubóstwa; wspieranie polityk promujących rozwój społeczny, równość kobiet i mężczyzn, zatrudnienia i ochrony socjalnej; wspieranie współpracy transgranicznej oraz promowanie zrównoważonego rozwoju ekonomicznego, społecznego i środowiskowego w regionach przygranicznych; wspieranie polityk promujących zdrowie, edukację i szkolenia; promowanie i ochrona praw człowieka jako fundamentalnych wolności i wspieranie procesu demokratyzacji; zapewnienie sprawnie działającego i bezpiecznego systemu zarządzania granicami; promowanie współpracy w dziedzinach sprawiedliwości, spraw wewnętrznych, prewencji i walki z terroryzmem oraz zorganizowaną przestępczością; promowanie udziału Wspólnot w działaniach dotyczących badań i innowacji; promowanie współpracy pomiędzy państwami członkowskimi i krajami partnerskimi w dziedzinie szkolnictwa wyższego, wymiany nauczycieli, naukowców i studentów; promowanie dialogu między kulturami i kontaktami międzyludzkich. Beneficjentami tych programów mogą być władze lokalne i regionalne, organizacje pozarządowe, instytucje edukacyjne i instytucje kultury W tym miejscu wskazane zostaną projekty realizowane w ramach Programu Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska–Rosja 2007–2013 z udziałem podmiotów z województwa podlaskiego53. Są to trzy projekty: (1) Towarzystwo Amicus we współpracy z Podlaską Regionalną Organizacją Turystyczną, Województwem Podlaskim (Polska), Centrum Informacji Turystycznej i Biznesowej w Druskiennikach (Litwa), Państwową Autonomiczną Instytucją – Regionalne Centrum Informacji Turystycznej Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego (Rosja) wdraża do końca 2014 roku projekt „Transgraniczny wymiar turystyki". Jego celem jest rozwój współpracy pomiędzy jednostkami informacji turystycznej poprzez wsparcie rozwoju pracowników centrów i punktów informacji turystycznej, uczestnictwo w szkoleniach oraz wizytach studyjnych oraz rozwój turystyki poznawczej oraz turystyki dziedzictwa kulturowego, także dzięki wspólnym publikacjom oraz udziałowi w targach turystycznych. (2) Z inicjatywy Samodzielnego Publicznego Zakładu Opieki Zdrowotnej – Wojewódzki Szpital Zespolony w Białymstoku im. J. Śniadeckiego wdrażany jest projekt „Rozwój współpracy drogą do poprawy stanu ochrony zdrowia społeczności litewsko-polsko-rosyjskiego obszaru przygranicznego". Partnerami 50 INTERREG IVC 2007–2013. udział polskich partnerów, MRR, Materiały z konferencji Współpraca międzyregionalna – doświadczenia i szanse, 15.10.2013, Katowice, www.ewt.gov.pl/WstepDoFunduszyEuropejskich/Documents/IR4C_polscy_partnerzy.pdf [15.10.2013]. 51 Europejska Współpraca Terytorialna w latach 2014–2020, MRR, Materiały z konferencji „Współpraca międzyregionalna – doświadczenia i szanse", 15.10.2013, Katowice, www.ewt.gov.pl/WstepDoFunduszyEuropejskich/Documents/EWT_2014_2020.pdf [15.10.2013]. 52 Europejski Instrument Sąsiedztwa i Partnerstwa, Wrota Podlasia, www.wrotapodlasia.pl/pl/ue/europejski_instrument_partnerstwa_sasiedztwa/ [10.10.2013]. 53 Lista podpisanych umów grantowych, Lithuania–Poland–Russia ENPI Cross-border Cooperation Programme 2007–2013, www.lt-pl-ru.eu/ pl,11 [10.10.2013]. 26 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim działań są tu: Szpital Publiczny w Mariampolu (Litwa), Miejska Instytucja ds. Zdrowia „Szpital Centralnego Dystryktu w Czerniahowsku" (Rosja), Szpital Wojewódzki im. Ludwika Rydygiera w Suwałkach (Polska), Szpital Publiczny w Taurogach (Litwa), Państwowa Instytucja ds. Zdrowia Regionu Kaliningradzkiego – Szpital Miejski w Sowietsku (Rosja). Projekt dotyczy stworzenia nowych standardów współpracy między polskimi, litewskimi i rosyjskimi lekarzami, co pozwoli na rozwój telemedycyny jako efektywnego narzędzia diagnostyki pacjentów z obszaru przygranicznego. (3) Fundacja Pogranicze zainicjowała projekt „Atlantyda pogranicza – transgraniczny szlak kulturowy" realizowany wraz z Muzeum Regionalnym w Kedainiai (Litwa), Regionalną Organizacją Pisarzy w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim (Rosja) oraz Ośrodkiem „Pogranicze – sztuk, kultur, narodów" (Polska). Celem projektu jest rozwój współpracy pomiędzy regionami i dobrosąsiedzkich relacji oraz opracowanie m.in. Kulturowego szlaku Atlantydy pogranicza, Przewodnika transgranicznego szlaku Atlantydy pogranicza: Krasnogruda–Sejny, Kedainiai, Kaliningrad, cyfrowego zbioru 23 książek oraz innych materiałów. Inicjatywy te dotyczą zatem głównie współpracy kulturalnej i turystycznej ze znacznym udziałem podmiotów pozarządowych. W Programie Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013 z inicjatywy podmiotów z województwa podlaskiego realizowanych jest 16 projektów54. Wśród projektów strategicznych znajduje się „Budowa infrastruktury drogowego przejścia granicznego Połowce–Pieszczatka – Etap III (granica polsko-białoruska) – powiat hajnowski RP–obwód brzeski RB". Wśród projektów wybranych drogą konkursową znajdują się: – Białostockie Centrum Onkologii – „Rozwój współpracy w celu poprawy diagnostyki histopatologicznej nowotworów piersi i jelita grubego na przygranicznych terenach Polski i Białorusi"; – Biblioteka Publiczna w Suwałkach – „Multicenter – interactive centres for science and technology in Suwałki and Hrodna"; – gmina Hajnówka – „Rozbudowa transgranicznego systemu oczyszczania ścieków w zlewni rzeki Bug"; – gmina Płaska – „Rozwój infrastruktury transportowej wokół Kanału Augustowskiego"; – gmina Suwałki – „Współpraca–Aktywność–Przyszłość" – budowa infrastruktury sportowej z zapleczem socjalnym; – Podlaskie Stowarzyszenie Kultury Fizycznej i Sportu – „Stworzenie Transgranicznego Centrum Wolontariatu „Strażak" na rzecz poprawy bezpieczeństwa przeciwpożarowego"; – powiat Hajnówka – „Modernizacja infrastruktury dydaktycznej dla współpracy polsko-białoruskiej na rzecz osób niepełnosprawnych"; – powiat moniecki – „Providing valuable areas of tourism and economy – to improve the quality of roads bordering the Polish-Belarusian"; – Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Hajnówce – „Development of transborder cooperation in the scope of prophylaxis, diagnosis and treatment of diseases transmitted by ticks in the regions of their endemic occurrence in the Polish-Belarusian borderland"; – Samodzielny Publiczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej w Bielsku Podlaskim – „Rozwój współpracy transgranicznej w celu poprawy warunków zdrowia publicznego w powiecie bielskim i rejonie lubomelskim poprzez programy związane z promocją zdrowia i profilaktyki w zakresie chorób nowotworowych i gruźlicy"; – Specjalistyczny Zakład Opieki Zdrowotnej Gruźlicy i Chorób Płuc w Białymstoku – „Rozwój współpracy instytucji medycznych polsko-białoruskiego przygranicza w obszarze immunoterapii gruźlicy narządów oddechowych"; – Suwalska Izba Rolniczo-Turystyczna – „Komunikacja bez granic – tworzenie transgranicznej sieci informacyjno-turystycznej"; – Szpital Wojewódzki im. dr. Ludwika Rydygiera w Suwałkach – „Development of co-operation of medical institutions of Poland and Belarus in order to improve the quality of oncology diagnosis and organization of help in emergency cases"; 54 Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013: Projekty zakontraktowane z naborów, www.pl-by-ua.eu/pl,5 [10.10.2013]. 27www.soclab.org.pl – Urząd Miasta Hajnówka – „An integrated project of support for tourism sector of Polish-Belarusian borderland"; – Wojewódzki Szpital Zespolony im. Jędrzeja Śniadeckiego w Białymstoku – „Rozwój współpracy w celu poprawy bezpieczeństwa zdrowotnego mieszkańców polsko-białoruskiego obszaru przygranicza". Wyraźnie widoczna jest tu współpraca o charakterze infrastrukturalnym i naukowym inicjowana przez podmioty samorządowe. 1.3.2. Podlaski Urząd Wojewódzki Zgodnie z Ustawą z dnia 15 września 2000 roku o przystępowaniu jednostek samorządu terytorialnego do międzynarodowych zrzeszeń społeczności lokalnych i regionalnych (Dz. U. Nr 91 z dnia 28 października 2000 roku, poz. 1009 – z późn. zm.) Wojewoda opiniuje a następnie przekazuje ministrowi właściwemu do spraw zagranicznych projekty uchwał jednostek samorządu terytorialnego o przystąpieniu do międzynarodowych zrzeszeń społeczności lokalnych i regionalnych55 Ponadto Wojewoda Podlaski prowadzi samodzielną współpracę z partnerami zagranicznymi w zakresie realizacji swoich kompetencji56. Urząd współpracuje od 2001 roku z Litwą – regionem Marijampole oraz od 2002 roku z regionem Kowieńskim. Wojewoda podpisał list intencyjny o współpracy z Wojewodą Grodzieńskim (Białoruś) w 2001 roku, z Gubernatorem Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego (Rosja) w 2003 roku oraz Wojewodą Viljandimaa (Estonia) w 2004 roku. Podlaski Urząd Wojewódzki prowadzi także współpracę przygraniczną z Litwą i Białorusią57. W pierwszym przypadku jest prowadzona w ramach Grupy Roboczej ds. współpracy przygranicznej, działającej w Polsko-Litewskiej Komisji Międzyrządowej ds. Współpracy Transgranicznej. Grupa ta dąży do pogłębiania współpracy w zakresie zwalczania i zapobiegania sytuacjom nadzwyczajnym, które mogą zaistnieć w przygranicznych rejonach Polski i Litwy. Są to w szczególności: przeciwdziałanie katastrofom i klęskom żywiołowym oraz likwidacja ich skutków, ochrona ludności w warunkach sytuacji nadzwyczajnych, współpraca służb ratowniczych i porządkowych, przeciwdziałanie degradacji środowiska, monitorowanie czystości i jakości wód granicznych, usprawnienie procedur kontroli granicznej, współpraca służb w zakresie ochrony sanitarnej, weterynaryjnej i fitosanitarnej, rozwój bezpośredniej współpracy w dziedzinie rolnictwa, sprzyjanie rozwojowi przedsiębiorczości, współpraca z euroregionem Niemen. Współpraca z Białorusią prowadzona jest w Podkomisji ds. współpracy przygranicznej, działającej w ramach Polsko-Białoruskiej Międzyrządowej Komisji Koordynacyjnej ds. Współpracy Transgranicznej. Tu działania obejmują: zapobieganie i likwidację katastrof, klęsk żywiołowych i innych nadzwyczajnych sytuacji w przygranicznych rejonach Polski i Białorusi, zapewnienie ochrony ludności oraz terytorium obu Państw przed katastrofami, klęskami żywiołowymi oraz innymi sytuacjami nadzwyczajnymi, zapobieganie katastrofom, klęskom żywiołowym i innym sytuacjom nadzwyczajnym oraz likwidację ich skutków, współpracę służb porządkowych i ratowniczych, w tym także działających w ramach organizacji młodzieżowych i społecznych formacji ratownictwa przeciwpożarowego, przeciwdziałanie degradacji środowiska naturalnego, w tym również z tytułu składowania i magazynowania odpadów niebezpiecznych w rejonach przygranicznych, współdziałanie w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa przemysłowego, przewozu niebezpiecznych materiałów, zabezpieczenia ludności przed promieniowaniem radioaktywnym, monitorowania oraz oceny czystości, jakości i ilości wód granicznych. 55 Przystępowanie jednostek samorządu terytorialnego do międzynarodowych zrzeszeń społeczności lokalnych i regionalnych, Podlaski Urząd Wojewódzki, www.bialystok.uw.gov.pl/Informacje+wydzialow/Fundusze+Europejskie/Przyst%C4%99powwnie+jst+do+zrzesze%C5%84.htm [10.10.2013]. 56 Porozumienia i listy intencyjne zawarte w ramach współpracy z partnerami zagranicznymi, Podlaski Urząd Wojewódzki, www.bialystok. uw.gov.pl/Informacje+wydzialow/Fundusze+Europejskie/Wsp%C3%B3%C5%82praca+mi%C4%99dzyregionalna.htm [10.10.2013]. 57 Współpraca przygraniczna, Podlaski Urząd Wojewódzki, www.bialystok.uw.gov.pl/Informacje+wydzialow/Fundusze+Europejskie/Wsp%C3%B 3%C5%82praca+przygraniczna.htm [10.10.2013]. 28 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 1.3.3. Instytucje kultury Działalność w zakresie współpracy międzynarodowej w obszarze kultury w regionie prowadzą przede wszystkim podmioty zorganizowane przez województwo podlaskie. Są to: Opera i Filharmonia Podlaska – Europejskie Centrum Sztuki, Teatr Dramatyczny w Białymstoku, Teatr Wierszalin w Supraślu, Muzeum Podlaskie w Białymstoku, Muzeum Rolnictwa w Ciechanowcu, Ośrodek Pogranicze w Sejnach, Książnica Podlaska oraz Wojewódzki Ośrodek Animacji Kultury w Białymstoku. W tym miejscu podać można wybrane przykłady współpracy międzynarodowej. Książnica Podlaska im. Łukasza Górnickiego w Białymstoku rozwija współpracę z bibliotekami zagranicznymi, zwłaszcza z Biblioteką im. Wróblewskich Litewskiej Akademii Nauk w Wilnie oraz z Obwodową Biblioteką Naukową im. J. Karskiego w Grodnie w zakresie m.in. wymiany i udostępniania zbiorów. Teatr Wierszalin z siedzibą w Supraślu od założenia w 1991 roku zdobył wiele prestiżowych nagród międzynarodowych i wyróżnień Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych za swoje projekty artystyczne. Ośrodek „Pogranicze – sztuk, kultur, narodów" z siedzibą w Sejnach, powołany w 1991 roku, prowadzi m.in. Pracownię Centrum Dokumentacji Kultur Pogranicza obejmującą dzieła z Europy Środkowo- -Wschodniej i krajów nadbałtyckich, co roku organizuje też warsztaty z udziałem animatorów kultury i artystów z zagranicy. Ośrodek współpracuje z niezależną Fundacją Pogranicze oraz prowadzi Międzynarodowe Centrum Dialogu w Krasnogrudzie, przy granicy polsko-litewskiej. Wojewódzki Ośrodek Animacji Kultury w Białymstoku od 2008 roku co roku organizuje Podlaską Oktawę Kultur, Międzynarodowy Festiwal Muzyki, Sztuki i Folkloru. Celem wydarzenia jest promocja kultury i dorobku artystycznego zespołów z Polski, krajów Europy Wschodniej, jak również zespołów tworzonych przez zamieszkałych na Podlasiu Litwinów, Romów, Ukraińców, Żydów, Tatarów, Rosjan, i Białorusinów. Od 2012 roku w związku z otwarciem nowego gmachu największą instytucją artystyczną w województwie jest Opera i Filharmonia Podlaska – Europejskie Centrum Sztuki. Instytucja zainicjowała festiwale realizowane ze szczególnym udziałem artystów z krajów wschodnich (Festiwal filmowy „Camera!Ta", Halfway Festiwal oraz Festiwal im. Jana Tarasiewicza). Szczególnie istotnym w omawianym kontekście jest zainicjowany w 2013 roku projekt „Wizy za bilety"58. Wraz z Podlaską Izbą Celną instytucja umożliwiła dostęp do wiz białoruskim turystom odwiedzającym Białystok. Białorusini, wykupując pakiet przygotowany przez białostockie biura podróży, początkowo mieli otrzymywać za darmo wizę. Pakiet obejmuje: bilet do opery, noclegi z wyżywieniem, zwiedzanie miasta z przewodnikiem, czas na zakupy w białostockich galeriach i bazarach. Od czerwca 2013 roku wizę kulturalną turyści powyżej 25. roku życia muszą wykupić zgodnie z przepisami Wspólnotowego Kodeksu Wizowego59. Projekt ma zostać jednak rozszerzony na ofertę kulturalną innych polskich instytucji, które podpiszą stosowne umowy z biurami turystycznymi. Według danych Opery i Filharmonii Podlaskiej w okresie od marca do czerwca 2013 roku z oferty opery skorzystało około 4,5 tys. Białorusinów, a kolejnych około 20 tysięcy zrobiło rezerwacje na spektakle i koncerty do końca roku. Z diagnozy partycypacji w kulturze w województwie podlaskim przeprowadzonej w 2012 roku wynika, że Białystok jako stolica województwa stanowi siedzibę głównych instytucji kultury w regionie, a w konsekwencji koncentruje główne wydarzenia o charakterze międzynarodowym, instytucje kulturalne rangi międzynarodowej, muzea, biblioteki, teatry oraz wystawy60. Ponadto zauważa się następujące przykłady współpracy zagranicznej: organizacja wystaw i wernisaży uznanych twórców z kraju i ze świata w Galerii Arsenał, np. projekt „Podróż na Wschód"; zapraszanie podlaskich artystów i działaczy kultury do udziału w dużych przedsięwzięciach kulturalnych w Polsce, np. Krzysztofa Czyżewskiego do realizacji projektu „Europejska Stolica Kultury" we Wrocławiu; organizacja międzynarodowego festiwalu teatralnego Białysztuk; współpraca Białostockiego Teatru Lalek z uznanymi reżyserami z kraju i ze świata; wystawianie spektakli teatru Wierszalin w kraju i na świecie; konsultacje w sprawie realizacji teatralnych 58 „Wizy za bilety" – propozycja opery dla białoruskich melomanów, Wrota Podlasia, 6.03.2013, www.wrotapodlasia.pl/pl/wiadomosci/kultura_sztuka/_Wizy_z_bilety_propozycja_opery_dla_bialoruskich_melomanow.htm [10.10.2013]. 59 Białorusini będą musieli zapłacić za wizę kulturalną. Opera to odczuje, „Gazeta Wyborcza", 07.06.2013, http://bialystok.gazeta.pl/bialystok/1, 35241,14059610,Bialorusini_beda_musieli_zaplacic_za_wize_kulturalna_.html [10.10.2013]. 60 J. Poleszczuk, K. Sztop-Rutkowska, Ł. Kiszkiel, A. Klimczuk, R.J. Mejsak, K. Winiecka, Diagnoza partycypacji w kulturze w województwie podlaskim, Teatr Dramatyczny im. Aleksandra Węgierki, Fundacja SocLab, Białystok 2012, s. 8–30. 29www.soclab.org.pl festiwali objazdowych ze Stowarzyszeniem Wertep na obszarze Polski61. Istotne problemy stanowi brak wypracowanych i opisanych modeli współzarządzania kulturą oraz bardzo ogólna strategia polityki kulturalnej. 1.3.4. Uczelnie wyższe W województwie podlaskim działa pięć uczelni publicznych i trzynaście niepublicznych. Do tych pierwszych należą: Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, Politechnika Białostocka, Uniwersytet Medyczny w Białymstoku, Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Informatyki i Przedsiębiorczości w Łomży oraz Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Suwałkach. Uczelnie niepubliczne to: Wyższa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Menedżerska w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Ekonomiczna w Białymstoku, Niepaństwowa Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Medyczna w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Matematyki i Informatyki Użytkowej w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Finansów i Zarządzania w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Agrobiznesu w Łomży, Wyższa Szkoła Zarządzania i Przedsiębiorczości im. Bogdana Jańskiego w Łomży, Nadbużańska Szkoła Wyższa w Siemiatyczach, Wyższa Szkoła Wychowania Fizycznego i Turystyki w Białymstoku, Wyższa Szkoła Suwalsko-Mazurska im. Papieża Jana Pawła II w Suwałkach oraz Wyższa Szkoła Służby Społecznej im. ks. Franciszka Blachnickiego w Suwałkach. W tym miejscu wskazane zostaną tylko wybrane przykłady współpracy zagranicznej. Uniwersytet w Białymstoku posiada 58 partnerów zagranicznych62, w tym 15 z Białorusi, 13 z Rosji, 7 z Ukrainy, 5 ze Stanów Zjednoczonych, 4 z Litwy i 2 z Łotwy. Uniwersytet Medyczny w Białymstoku współpracuje z 18 ośrodkami naukowymi, w tym 4 są z Białorusi, po 3 z Niemiec i Ukrainy oraz 2 z Litwy63. Politechnika Białostocka posiada 61 partnerów zagranicznych64. Najwięcej (11) pochodzi z Rosji, po 9 z Białorusi i Ukrainy, 4 ze Stanów Zjednoczonych oraz po 3 z Francji i Litwy. Największa niepubliczna uczelnia w regionie – Wyższa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej w Białymstoku – współpracuje z 18 uczelniami65. W październiku 2013 roku z inicjatywy Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku powołana do życia została Sieć Uniwersytetów Pogranicza66. Jest to konsorcjum dziewięciu uczelni z Polski, Litwy, Białorusi, Ukrainy i Rosji, które ma umożliwiać współpracę naukową i dydaktyczną zrzeszonych uczelni. Partnerstwo ma polegać m.in. na wspólnym aplikowaniu o międzynarodowe granty i realizacji projektów naukowych, wymianie usług badawczych i wdrożeniowych oraz korzystaniu z infrastruktury i aparatury w ramach wspólnych przedsięwzięć, stworzeniu wspólnej oferty dydaktycznej w ramach studiów międzynarodowych, gdzie część programu studiów będzie można odbywać na partnerskich uczelniach i zakończyć na przykład wspólnym dyplomem. Konsorcjum ma także powołać stosownych pełnomocników ds. współpracy, wytypować wydziały do programu Erasmus Plus, uruchomić wspólną stronę internetową oraz opracować koncepcję czasopisma o zasięgu międzynarodowym. 1.3.5. Organizacje pozarządowe Organizacje pozarządowe stanowią podmioty nienależące do sektora publicznego i komercyjnego. Jednocześnie nie są podmiotami, których działalność jest ukierunkowana na generowanie zysku ekonomicznego. Podmioty trzeciego sektora w Polsce to stowarzyszenia i fundacje założone przez obywateli do realizacji interesów publicznych. Z perspektywy prawa międzynarodowego formy tych organizacji są zróżnicowane w zależności od kraju pochodzenia. Jednocześnie podmioty te ulegają umiędzynarodowieniu w odpowiedzi na globalizację i instytucjonalizację procedur międzynarodowych. Procesy te następują poprzez: bezpośrednie przyznanie podmiotom trzeciego sektora praw i obowiązków międzynarodowych (m.in. wobec Międzynarodowego Komitetu Czerwonego Krzyża); dopuszczenie do są61 Ibidem, s. 42–43. 62 Wykaz umów o bezpośredniej współpracy z partnerami zagranicznymi, Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, http://uwb.edu.pl/uniwersytet. php?p=721 [10.10.2013]. 63 Wykaz międzynarodowych umów o współpracy zawartych przez Uniwersytet Medyczny w Białymstoku, www.umb.edu.pl/wspolpraca_miedzynarodowa [10.10.2013]. 64 Umowy międzynarodowe, Politechnika Białostocka, http://wspolpraca-miedzynarodowa.pb.edu.pl/naukowe-umowy-miedzynarodowe/ [10.10.2013]. 65 Partnerzy, Wyższa Szkoła Administracji Publicznej im. Stanisława Staszica w Białymstoku, www.wsap.edu.pl/wsap/w/partnerzy,zakladka/ [10.10.2013]. 66 Powstała Sieć Uniwersytetów Pogranicza, PAP – Nauka w Polsce 12.10.2013, www.naukawpolsce.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news,397558,powstala- -siec-uniwersytetow-pogranicza.html [12.10.2013]. 30 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim dów międzynarodowych (np. możliwość wnoszenia skarg sądowych i pozasądowych do Europejskiego Trybunału Praw Człowieka czy Komisji Europejskiej); a także poprzez działalność operacyjną o skutkach międzynarodowych (np. zasięg oddziaływania Greenpeace, Amnesty International)67 Współpraca transgraniczna jest podstawowym mechanizmem umiędzynarodowienia organizacji pozarządowych na terenach przygranicznych. Podmioty te jako wnioskodawcy projektów w programach transgranicznych cechują się: zorientowaniem na realizację potrzeby rozwiązania pewnego problemu społecznego; ukierunkowaniem działań na generowanie korzyści dla beneficjentów; utrzymywaniem dobrego kontaktu ze środowiskiem, na rzecz którego podejmują działania, dobrą orientacją w potrzebach i problemach oraz możliwościach ich rozwiązania; dużą innowacyjnością w działaniu; efektywnym wydawaniem pieniędzy68. Jednocześnie zauważa się szereg barier, na które napotykają organizacje pozarządowe, biorąc udział w projektach transgranicznych69. Do najpoważniejszych zaliczyć można: (1) niedostateczną wiedzę o programach umożliwiających współpracę transgraniczną, bariery w podjęciu i realizacji współpracy z partnerami z zagranicy; (2) lęk przed wykazaniem doświadczenia i potencjału do realizacji takich projektów; (3) błędy związane z wypełnianiem wniosku – brak profesjonalistów o odpowiedniej wiedzy administracyjnej, finansowej i organizacyjnej, błędy formalno-techniczne (np. niedostarczenie wszystkich załączników, braku podpisów), merytoryczne (niezgodność wniosku z założeniami programu i jego działaniami, nieprawidłowy dobór beneficjentów, nieprawidłowo sporządzony budżet projektu itp.); (4) brak środków na wymagany wkład własny, który niejako gwarantuje płynność finansową organizacji. W publikacji Polska współpraca rozwojowa opracowanej z inspiracji Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w 2013 roku zwraca się również uwagę na potrzebę budowania mechanizmów pozwalających na przejście Polski ze statusu odbiorcy do dawcy pomocy międzynarodowej70. Istotnym wyzwaniem jest stworzenie systemu działań międzynarodowych, który umożliwi długofalowe podejście do pomocy rozwojowej. Jego koncepcja opiera się na międzysektorowej współpracy podmiotów różnego typu poprzez stymulowanie działań na rzecz godzenia ich wspólnych interesów oraz niwelowanie stereotypów i uprzedzeń. Wyzwaniem jest także upowszechnianie języka pomocy rozwojowej wśród organizacji. Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych współpracuje z organizacjami pozarządowymi i samorządami przy realizacji zadań obejmujących następujące dziedziny: współpracę rozwojową, współpracę z Polonią i Polakami za granicą, dyplomację publiczną i kulturalną, informowanie o problematyce integracji europejskiej i członkostwie Polski w Unii Europejskiej oraz w ramach obywatelskiego i samorządowego wymiaru polskiej polityki zagranicznej71. Ministerstwo udziela pomocy organizacjom pozarządowym i samorządom w formie wsparcia: merytorycznego (udział ekspertów, organizacja spotkań informacyjno-konsultacyjnych, udostępnianie danych, analiz i publikacji), organizacyjno-technicznego (współorganizacja przedsięwzięć, zapewnianie wybranych elementów zaplecza do organizacji przedsięwzięć) oraz finansowego (dotacje celowe, współfinansowanie przedsięwzięć). Resort organizuje dla organizacji pozarządowych otwarte konkursy zadań: „Polska pomoc rozwojowa", „Edukacja globalna", „Wolontariat polska pomoc", „Współpraca z Polonią i Polakami za granicą", „Współpraca w dziedzinie dyplomacji publicznej", „Wspólne działania polsko-białoruskie", „Forum Polsko-Czeskie – wspieranie rozwoju stosunków polsko-czeskich" oraz „Wsparcie obywatelskiego i samorządowego wymiaru polskiej polityki zagranicznej". W bazie organizacji pozarządowych, prowadzonej przez Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, w województwie podlaskim „działalność na rzecz integracji europejskiej oraz rozwijania kontaktów i współpracy między społeczeństwami" prowadzi 156 (3,9%) podmiotów spośród ogółem 3986 podmiotów z regionu72. Wśród tych podmiotów można wymienić kilka grup organizacji. Są to podmioty: 67 A. Jabłońska, W. Hryniewicka, NGO'S jako potencjalny podmiot współpracy transgranicznej, [w:] M. Perkowski (red.), Współpraca transgraniczna. Aspekty prawno-ekonomiczne, Fundacja Prawo i Partnerstwo, Białystok 2010, s. 76. 68 Ibidem, s. 76. 69 Ibidem, s. 77–78. 70 Polska współpraca rozwojowa. Nowe wymiary. Perspektywy dla organizacji pozarządowych, samorządów i firm, THINKTANK, Warszawa 2013. 71 A. Tuz, Współpraca Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych z organizacjami pozarządowymi i samorządami przy realizacji wybranych zadań z zakresu współpracy międzynarodowej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, www.twinning.pl/item/file/wsparcie_MSZ_dla_NGO_i_samorzadow_2012.pdf [10.10.2013]. 72 Bazy ngo.pl, Stowarzyszenie Klon/Jawor, http://bazy.ngo.pl [10.10.2013]. 31www.soclab.org.pl (1) wspierające grupy mniejszościowe (m.in.: Białoruskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, Bractwo Młodzieży Prawosławnej w Polsce, Fundacja im. Bpa Antanasa Baranauskasa „Dom Litewski" w Sejnach, Fundacja „Oikonomos", Litewskie Towarzystwo Św. Kazimierza w Sejnach, Rosyjskie Stowarzyszenie Kulturalno-Oświatowe, Stowarzyszenie Bractwo Prawosławne Św. Św. Cyryla i Metodego, Stowarzyszenie Litewskiej Kultury Etnicznej w Polsce, Stowarzyszenie Litwinów w Polsce, Stowarzyszenie Muzeum i Ośrodek Kultury Białoruskiej w Hajnówce, Towarzystwo Kultury Białoruskiej, Wspólnota Litwinów w Polsce, Wspólnota Litwinów w Polsce, Związek Ukraińców Podlasia Oddział Białystok); (2) ożywiające kontakty obywateli Polski z innymi krajami (m.in.: Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska–Izrael, Stowarzyszenie Współpracy Polska–Wschód – Podlaski Oddział Wojewódzki, Stowarzyszenie Polska–Białoruś Oddział Wojewódzki, Stowarzyszenie na rzecz Ziemi Podlaskiej „Drumla", Stowarzyszenie na rzecz Rozwoju Cywilizacyjnego „Ściana Wschodnia" w Sejnach, Stowarzyszenie Międzynarodowej i Międzykulturowej Wymiany ANAWOJ, Stowarzyszenie Centrum Edukacji Obywatelskiej Polska–Białoruś, Stowarzyszenie Kontakt Miast Białystok–Eindhoven, Podlaski Oddział Towarzystwa Polska–Finlandia, Ośrodek Współpracy Międzynarodowej Wschód–Zachód im. dr Jana Stypuły, Fundacja Gran Via Centrum Języka i Kultury Hiszpańskiej); (3) podmioty zorientowane na pogłębianie integracji europejskiej i współpracy UE z krajami sąsiednimi („Europartner" Akademicki Klub Integracji Europejskiej, Towarzystwo Amicus, Fundacja Okno na Wschód, Ośrodek Badań Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej); (4) zrzeszające studentów, prowadzące ich wymianę i praktyki międzynarodowe (Białoruskie Zrzeszenie Studentów, Europejskie Forum Studentów AEGEE – Białystok, Europejskie Stowarzyszenie Studentów Prawa ELSA Białystok, Komitet Lokalny AIESEC Białystok, Międzynarodowe Stowarzyszenie Studentów Medycyny IFMSA Poland Oddział Białystok, Światowa Federacja Studentów Chrześcijan – Program Wschodnioeuropejski); (5) prowadzące działalność na rzecz sprawiedliwości społecznej i praw człowieka (Amnesty International – Grupa Lokalna, Stowarzyszenie Edukacyjne Praw Człowieka). 32 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2. METODY I TECHNIKI BADAWCZE ZASTOSOWANE W PROJEKCIE Ze względu na złożoność badanych zagadnień związanych z samorządową i obywatelską współpracą transgraniczną w województwie podlaskim zastosowana została orientacja ilościowo-jakościowa (metody ilościowe oraz metody jakościowe). Badanie ilościowe miało na celu oszacowanie, jaki odsetek gmin w województwie podlaskim prowadzi współpracę międzynarodową oraz w jakich wymiarach się ona odbywa. Badanie jakościowe miało przyczynić się do opracowania pogłębionej analizy empirycznych przejawów współpracy międzynarodowej. W celu osiągnięcia wiarygodnej diagnozy kooperacji międzynarodowej oraz potencjału płynącego ze współpracy gmin z zagranicznymi partnerami dążono do zminimalizowania zagrożeń odnoszących się do trafności analizy. W konsekwencji użyto nie tylko triangulacji metodologicznej, lecz również triangulacji pozyskiwania danych (dane zastane, kwestionariusze wywiadu, wywiady IDI, CAWI). Proces badawczy był realizowany za pomocą następujących technik badawczych, które określają poszczególne zadania projektu: Analiza danych zastanych (Desk Research) – polegająca na analizie informacji uzyskanych w drodze kwerendy danych odnoszących się do działalności na płaszczyźnie międzynarodowej na poziomie powiatów i gmin. W ramach analizy zostały prześledzone strategie rozwoju poszczególnych powiatów i gmin, aby uchwycić, na ile istotna w polityce lokalnej jest współpraca międzynarodowa podyktowana transgranicznym położeniem województwa podlaskiego. Standaryzowane kwestionariusze wywiadu (PAPI) – zastosowane do zebrania danych na temat współpracy międzynarodowej gmin województwa podlaskiego. Badanie zostało realizowane metodą ilościową z wykorzystaniem techniki PAPI (Pen and Paper Interview); przeprowadzone było na próbie całkowitej wszystkich urzędów gmin i urzędów miejskich województwa podlaskiego z osobami posiadającymi wiedzę na temat realizowanej współpracy międzynarodowej, barier i szans jej rozwoju w poszczególnej gminie. PAPI jest to tradycyjna technika używana przy realizacji badań ilościowych, polegająca na przeprowadzaniu wywiadów z respondentami z wykorzystaniem papierowego kwestionariusza wywiadu przez odpowiednio wyszkolonych ankieterów. Zaletą tej techniki jest skuteczność w dotarciu do specyficznych grup docelowych (w tym przypadku urzędników). Zakładana próba badawcza to 118 gmin w tym: 13 gmin miejskich, 25 miejsko-wiejskich oraz 80 wiejskich. Standaryzowane kwestionariusze wywiadu (CAWI) – na podstawie bazy podmiotów współpracujących z zagranicznymi partnerami, uzyskanych w toku realizacji Desk research i PAPI, kolejnym etapem projektu było przeprowadzenie badania ilościowego z wykorzystaniem techniki CAWI (Computer Aided Web Interwiew). CAWI to technika stosowana w badaniach ilościowych, wykorzystująca Internet do realizacji wywiadów z respondentami. Jako zalety tej techniki należy wymienić łatwość w dotarciu do specyficznych grup docelowych (w tym przypadku przedsiębiorców, organizacji pozarządowych i uczelni wyższych) oraz stosunkowo nieduży koszt w porównaniu do tradycyjnych technik ilościowych. Badanie miało charakter eksploracyjny i służyło komplementarności opisu współpracy międzynarodowej w województwie podlaskim. Dedykowane było pozostałym podmiotom nieujętym w badaniu PAPI, tj. organizacjom pozarządowym, przedsiębiorcom, uczelniom wyższym. Ze względu na eksploracyjny charakter projektu (nie prowadzono na terenie województwa powiązanych badań) nie określono precyzyjnie operatu próby. Jej dobór miał charakter celowy i był oparty na danych uzyskanych w poprzednich etapach projektu. Indywidualne wywiady pogłębione (IDI – Individual In-depth Interview) – przeprowadzone zostały z osobami prowadzącymi aktywną współpracę międzynarodową. Wywiady pogłębione były następstwem danych ilościowych uzyskanych po realizacji badania PAPI i CAWI oraz analizy danych zastanych. Na podstawie zebranych informacji przeprowadzono 35 wywiadów pogłębionych w podziale ze względu 33www.soclab.org.pl na typ instytucji: urzędy gminy (10 wywiadów); organizacje pozarządowe (10 wywiadów); przedsiębiorstwa (10 wywiadów); uczelnie wyższe (5 wywiadów). Wywiady pogłębione są jedną z najbardziej popularnych technik badań jakościowych, polegającą na szczegółowej, wnikliwej rozmowie z respondentem. Celem przeprowadzenia IDI jest dotarcie do precyzyjnych informacji, poszerzenie wiedzy związanej z zakresem badania (umożliwiło to uzyskanie m.in. oceny eksperckiej możliwości rozwoju współpracy międzynarodowej). Zaletą indywidualnych wywiadów pogłębionych jest możliwość poznania podczas rozmowy z badanym jego przekonań, opinii, postaw. Pozwalają one również na ograniczenie wpływu bieżących uwarunkowań grupowych i wyczulenie na indywidualność respondenta. Dają także możliwość badania kategorii poznawczych związanych z wiedzą respondenta. Warto wspomnieć również o tym, iż zastosowanie tej właśnie techniki badawczej w postaci IDI daje duże możliwości przeprowadzania wywiadów z wybraną grupą osób trudnodostępnych. Analiza benchmarkingu – benchmarking, jako narzędzie analityczne, wywodzi się z koncepcji i teorii zarządzania jakością; jest procesem, metodą analizy praktyk, doświadczeń w rożnych obszarach, płaszczyznach działalności danej organizacji (grupy organizacji) i porównania ich z działaniami organizacji wzorcowych. W ramach analizy została opracowana „księga wzorcowych praktyk", w której na podstawie wybranych studiów przypadku zaprezentowane są społeczno-administracyjne działania służące umacnianiu kapitału intelektualnego i współpracy międzynarodowej poprzez synergię działań. 34 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 3. KIERUNKI I OBSZARY WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ W DOKUMENTACH STRATEGICZNYCH SAMORZĄDÓW WOJEWÓDZTWA PODLASKIEGO Baza poddanych analizie dokumentów z województwa podlaskiego została przygotowana w okresie luty– marzec 2013 roku i obejmuje zestawienie jednostek podziału terytorialnego według stanu na 1 stycznia 2013 roku. Poddany przeglądowi zbiór obejmuje 286 dokumentów – są to przede wszystkim powiatowe i gminne strategie, programy i plany rozwoju lokalnego oraz plany rozwoju i odnowy miejscowości (por. Aneks). W przypadku 8 jednostek samorządu terytorialnego nie pozyskano żadnych dokumentów. Zebrane dokumenty zostały poddane przeglądowi pod kątem występowania następujących słów kluczowych wraz z ich kombinacjami: „dwustronn*", „dyploma*", „euroregion", „międzynarodow*", „partners*", „przygraniczn*", „transgranicz*", „transnarodow*", „zagraniczn*" oraz „Białoruś", „Litwa", „Obwód Kaliningradzki", „Rosja", „Ukraina". Analizowano zapisy zawierające te hasła, wraz z kontekstem, w którym zostały użyte. W przeglądzie do selekcji danych przyjęto dodatkowe dyrektywy: (1) samo odwoływanie się do nadrzędnych dokumentów strategicznych, jak strategia rozwoju województwa czy rządowe programy operacyjne, bez dostosowania ich wytycznych do zadań na poziomie lokalnym jest niewystarczające; (2) ogólne informacje o przygranicznym położeniu gminy czy powiatu na etapie opisu i diagnozy jej sytuacji – przed wyznaczeniem przyszłych zadań i celów – jest niewystarczające; (3) istotne są informacje o konkretnych przykładach działań przeszłych, bieżących lub planowanych, które zostały wskazane za istotne przez samą gminę lub powiat odpowiedzialny za wdrażanie lub koordynację postanowień dokumentu. Wskazane kryteria – w szczególności stosowanie słów kluczowych – pozwoliły na ograniczenie liczby dokumentów poddanych analizie jakościowej do 173 (60% bazy). W tym miejscu zawęża się jednak omawianie wniosków do 169 dokumentów – pominięte zostaną z miast powiatowych: Białystok, Łomża i Suwałki, gdyż obejmują właściwie wszystkie analizowane obszary i kierunki współpracy. 35www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 3. Charakterystyka ilościowa analizowanych dokumentów strategicznych Powiat Analizowane dokumenty ogółem Analizowane dokumenty powiatów Analizowane dokumenty gmin Dokumenty bez słów kluczowych dotyczących współpracy transgranicznej Udział dokumentów powiatu i jego gmin w analizie (%) augustowski 13 1 12 8 61,9% białostocki 31 1 30 20 60,8% bielski 6 0 6 7 46,2% grajewski 11 2 9 2 84,6% hajnowski 17 1 16 10 63,0% kolneński 4 1 3 7 36,4% łomżyński 11 3 8 14 44,0% moniecki 8 1 7 10 44,4% sejneński 7 2 5 5 58,3% siemiatycki 10 2 8 3 76,9% sokólski 16 3 13 8 66,7% suwalski 15 2 13 6 71,4% wysokomazowiecki 14 1 13 10 58,3% zambrowski 6 0 6 3 66,7% razem 169 20 149 113 59,9% Źródło: opracowanie własne. Najwięcej dokumentów spełniających kryteria analizy, a więc obejmujących przynajmniej w odniesieniu do użytych słów kluczowych zagadnienia współpracy międzynarodowej i zagranicznej, pochodziło z powiatu grajewskiego (84,6%), siemiatyckiego (76,9%) i suwalskiego (71,4%). Najmniej natomiast z powiatów kolneńskiego (36,4%), monieckiego (44,4%) i łomżyńskiego (44,0%), przy czym są to powiaty regionu położone najdalej od granicy krajowej. Obszary tematyczne współpracy przypisywane dokumentom podzielono podczas przeglądu na następujące: • G – gospodarcza, infrastrukturalna, rynek pracy; • A – administracyjna , koordynacyjna, planistyczna; • K – kulturalna, turystyczna; • S – społeczna, edukacyjna, wymiana, komunikacja międzyludzka; • O – ochrona środowiska; • N – naukowa; • B – brak obszarów współpracy. Kraje, na które wskazywano ukierunkowanie współpracy, zawężono do najbliższych sąsiadów województwa podlaskiego: Białorusi, Litwy, Rosji i Ukrainy. 36 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Tabela 4. Obszary współpracy w analizowanych dokumentach strategicznych Powiat A – a dm in is tr ac yj na , ko or dy na cy jn a, p la ni st yc zn a G – g os po da rc za , in fr as tr uk tu ra ln a, r yn ek p ra cy K – ku lt ur al na , t ur ys ty cz na N – n au ko w a O – o ch ro na ś ro do w is ka S – sp oł ec zn a, e du ka cy jn a, ko m un ik ac ja m ię dz yl ud zk a B – br ak o bs za ró w w sp ół pr ac y Br ak o bs za ró w w sp ół pr ac y (% ) augustowski 1 8 6 0 4 1 1 7,7% białostocki 1 15 20 2 0 5 3 9,7% bielski 1 4 2 1 0 1 1 16,7% grajewski 0 8 8 0 1 2 0 0,0% hajnowski 3 7 16 2 5 5 0 0,0% kolneński 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0,0% łomżyński 2 9 7 0 3 2 1 9,1% moniecki 1 5 6 0 3 3 0 0,0% sejneński 2 5 7 0 3 3 0 0,0% siemiatycki 4 8 6 0 5 1 2 20,0% sokólski 3 9 13 0 0 4 0 0,0% suwalski 4 11 10 0 4 5 1 6,7% wysokomazowiecki 0 5 9 0 1 1 0 0,0% zambrowski 2 5 1 0 1 1 0 0,0% razem 25 100 111 5 30 37 9 0,0% * W każdym dokumencie autorzy mogli wskazać od braku do kilku obszarów współpracy. Źródło: opracowanie własne. W odniesieniu do obszarów współpracy zauważa się, że nie są one wystarczająco doprecyzowane w blisko 20% dokumentów z powiatu siemiatyckiego, 16,7% – bielskiego, 9,7% – białostockiego i 9,1% – łomżyńskiego. W większości powiatów wyłaniają się zatem dość wyraźne zagadnienia, w których obszarze władze samorządowe już prowadzą współpracę lub zamierzają podjąć ją w przyszłości. Wśród analizowanych obszarów w dokumentach dominują dwa pola współpracy: kulturalna i turystyczna (65,7% dokumentów) oraz gospodarcza, infrastrukturalna, dotycząca rynku pracy (59,2%). Znacznie mniejszy udział mają zagadnienia ochrony środowiska, współpracy administracyjnej oraz społecznej (po około 20%). Minimalne znaczenie ma współpraca naukowa (3%), co można wyjaśnić faktem, iż w powiatach właściwie nie znajdują się główne ośrodki naukowe i technologiczne. Są bowiem zlokalizowane w miastach na prawach powiatu. 37www.soclab.org.pl Ukierunkowanie na współpracę gospodarczą jest szczególnie widoczne w powiatach zambrowskim (83,3% jego dokumentów), łomżyńskim (81,8%), siemiatyckim (80,0%), suwalskim (73,3%), grajewskim (72,7%) oraz sejneńskim (71,4%). Należy przy tym nadmienić, iż współpraca gospodarcza dotyczy głównie pobudzania przedsiębiorczości, handlu zagranicznego i tworzenia infrastruktury transgranicznej. Współpracą w obszarze kultury i turystyki są wyraźnie zainteresowane samorządy w powiecie sejneńskim (100,0% jego dokumentów), hajnowskim (94,1%), sokólskim (81,3%), monieckim (75,0%), grajewskim (72,7%) i suwalskim (66,7%). Przy czym ten obszar współpracy stanowi bardziej uzupełnienie celów gospodarczych aniżeli odrębny cel. W tym obszarze przeważnie wskazuje się na promocję obszarów jako atrakcyjnych dla gości z zagranicy ze względu na dobry stan środowiska naturalnego, tradycje lokalne i zróżnicowanie kulturowe. Współpraca w zakresie ochrony środowiska w większości przypadków nie jest zharmonizowana z współpracą w zakresie promocji turystyki. Co za tym idzie, w dokumentach właściwie nie poświęca się uwagi procesom stymulowania sektora kultury i – szerzej – przemysłu kreatywnego ani tworzeniu rozwiązań na rzecz zrównoważonej turystyki, w tym turystyki kulturalnej. Tylko w kilku dokumentach można zauważyć wyróżnienie etapów współpracy. Przykład mogą tu stanowić wspólne strategie gmin pogranicza polsko-litewskiego opracowane w powiecie sejneńskim. Zauważa się w nich, że w pierwszej kolejności współpraca dotyczyła pogłębiania kontaktów społecznych i kulturowych (np. wymiana młodzieży, wizyty studyjne), a następnie wspólnego planowania i wymiany praktyk administracyjnych. Na tej podstawie tworzy się wspólne podejście do współpracy gospodarczej, turystycznej i w zakresie ochrony środowiska. Dokumenty większości samorządów nie tylko nie uwzględniają perspektywy zagranicznych partnerów, ale też zawężają kontakty zagraniczne do wymiaru gospodarczego, czyniąc je bardziej ekspansją handlową i promocyjną niż współpracą prowadzącą do obopólnych korzyści. Częstą wadą dokumentów strategicznych jest także ograniczenie opisu czynników międzynarodowych do wskazania kilku ogólnych pozycji w analizie SWOT. Czynniki te przeważnie nie są przekładane na cele strategiczne, cele operacyjne oraz konkretne zadania i działania. Kiedy indziej położenie przygraniczne i współpracę zagraniczną wprowadza się do wizji lub misji jednostki samorządu, jednakże to również pozostaje bez powiązania z planowanymi działaniami. Bardzo rzadko w dokumentach wskazuje się na przykłady konkretnych zadań i projektów do realizacji, które mają prowadzić do rozwoju współpracy zagranicznej lub przyciągania gości z zagranicy. Niedookreślenie konkretnych zadań czyni współpracę jedynie czymś deklaratywnym. 38 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Tabela 5. Kierunki współpracy w analizowanych dokumentach strategicznych Powiat Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Brak kierunku współpracy Brak kierunku współpracy (%) augustowski 6 9 1 1 3 23,1% białostocki 10 5 2 1 19 61,3% bielski 1 0 0 1 5 83,3% grajewski 2 2 2 0 9 81,8% hajnowski 8 0 1 3 8 47,1% kolneński 0 0 0 0 4 100,0% łomżyński 1 1 1 0 7 63,6% moniecki 0 2 0 1 6 75,0% sejneński 3 7 0 0 0 0,0% siemiatycki 5 1 1 3 5 50,0% sokólski 6 4 1 1 9 56,3% suwalski 1 9 2 0 6 40,0% wysokomazowiecki 1 1 0 0 13 92,9% zambrowski 0 2 0 0 4 66,7% razem 44 43 11 11 98 58,0% * W każdym dokumencie autorzy mogli wybierać wskazania z zakresu: od braku do kilku kierunków współpracy. Źródło: opracowanie własne. Jeśli chodzi o kierunki krajów, z którymi dana jednostka samorządu terytorialnego zamierza współpracować, to w dokumentach przeważa wykorzystywanie bardzo ogólnych sformułowań, jak np. „zagranica", „partnerzy zagraniczni", „kraje sąsiednie", „kraje wschodnie". Zwroty te nie określają precyzyjnie grup docelowych, z którymi samorząd zamierza współpracować lub w których zamierza promować swoją aktywność. Jednocześnie ich użycie może sugerować zupełną obojętność lub brak wiedzy o kraju pochodzenia partnerów, w tym inwestorów i kapitału zagranicznego. Stan ten można interpretować dwojako. Z jednej strony sytuacja gospodarcza gmin warunkuje, iż są zdesperowane w poszukiwaniu inwestorów i nie jest istotne, skąd inwestorzy będą pochodzić. Z drugiej strony można uznać, iż gminy nie są jednak aktywne w poszukiwaniu podmiotów do współpracy i oczekują dowolnej pomocy z zewnątrz. Brak wyraźnie wyróżnionego kierunku współpracy dotyczy w szczególności powiatów kolneńskiego (100% analizowanych dokumentów), wysokomazowieckiego (92,9%), bielskiego (83,3%), grajewskiego (81,8%), monieckiego (75,0%) i zambrowskiego (66,7%). Wśród analizowanych krajów, z którymi jednostki samorządu zamierzają lub już prowadzą współpracę, wyraźnie przeważa Białoruś (26,0% analizowanych dokumentów) i Litwa (25,4%). Mniejsze zainteresowanie dotyczy Rosji i Ukrainy (po 6,5%). Dążenie do współpracy z Białorusią dostrzec można głównie w dokumentach powiatów siemiatyckiego (50,0%), hajnowskiego (47,1%), augustowskiego (46,2%), sejneńskiego (42,9%), sokólskiego (37,5%) i białostockiego (32,3%). Dążenie do współpracy z Litwą zauważalne jest głównie w dokumentach powiatów sejneńskiego (100%), augustowskiego (69,2%), suwalskiego (60,0%), zambrowskiego (33,3%), sokólskiego (25,0%) i monieckiego (25,0%). Współpraca z Rosją jest pożądana w dokumentach powiatu grajewskiego (18,2%), suwalskiego (13,3%), siemiatyckiego (10,0%) 39www.soclab.org.pl i łomżyńskiego (9,1%). Współpraca z Ukrainą zaś w powiatach siemiatyckim (30,0%), hajnowskim (17,6%), bielskim (16,7%) i monieckim (12,5%). Największe nastawienie na zróżnicowanie partnerów zagranicznych mają powiaty: sejneński, augustowski, siemiatycki, suwalski, sokólski i hajnowski. 40 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 4. OPINIE I POSTAWY WOBEC WSPÓŁPRACY TRANSGRANICZNEJ W BADANIACH JAKOŚCIOWYCH 4.1. Cele współpracy transgranicznej z perspektywy samorządów, organizacji pozarządowych, uczelni wyższych i firm 4.1.1. Samorządy W przypadku samorządów bardzo wyraźnie widać, że gminy są zainteresowane przede wszystkim realizacją projektów „twardych", inwestycyjnych. Ale towarzyszą temu wypowiedzi, że same inwestycje tego typu nie będą miały sensu jeśli nie będą im towarzyszyć projekty z zakresu kultury, wymiany młodzieży: Myślę, że tak. Że to już jest taki etap, gdzie każdy... znaczy to też jest, że to nie działa dla samej idei, że ta współpraca rodzi określone korzyści. Czyli można realizować wspólne projekty. Już nie mówię o inwestycjach, bo te są wymierne, które widać namacalnie, żywy pieniądz na to płynie itd. Natomiast to, co mówiłem, że nawet jeżeli młodzież może wyjechać, zobaczyć zagranicę czy nie wiem... my zaczęliśmy, bo mieliśmy tu blisko, ale czy Bielsk Podlaski, później dalej już się kontaktujemy, to dla nich jest już ciekawe pojechanie na Białoruś, zobaczenie, jak tam jest, jak wygląda chociażby Puszcza Białowieska, jak chronią Puszczę Białowieską. Nie tylko młodzież, ale też środowiska naukowe czy organizacje różne. I to się odbywa (P14). Oprócz inwestycji w infrastrukturę drogową i remont budynków użyteczności publicznej najczęściej pojawiającym się obszarem współpracy transgranicznej, i do tego przynoszącym pozytywne efekty, są działania związane z projektami turystycznymi. Jednym z najlepszych przykładów jest zarejestrowanie miodu z rejonu Sejneńszczyzny i Łoździejszczyzny na Litwie jako polsko-litewskiego produktu turystycznego: Rezultatem jednego z naszych projektów – to był jeszcze projekt Phare'owski, dotyczący promocji produktów regionalnych – było wpisanie na listę produktów tradycyjnych bodajże dwunastu naszych regionalnych potraw. Jeden z tych produktów został zarejestrowany w Unii Europejskiej, dostał certyfikat unijny i w tej chwili może się chwalić, szczycić tym, że dostał ten certyfikat jako jedyny produkt polsko- -litewski – to jest miód z Sejneńszczyzny i Łoździejszczyzny. To jest jedyny produkt w Unii Europejskiej, zarejestrowany przez oba państwa i to jest poniekąd jeden z takich największych naszych rezultatów, efektów. To było skutkiem realizacji naszego projektu i po pewnym czasie realizacji tego projektu pszczelarze doszli do wniosku, że będą się starać o chronioną nazwę pochodzenia i po kilku latach – rejestracja trwała dwa lata – ale w zeszłym roku, bodajże w styczniu, Unia Europejska przyznała certyfikat (P23). W tym przykładzie bardzo ważny jest aspekt podmiotowej współpracy obu stron, jak również czerpanie korzyści po obu stronach granicy. Inny przykład z Suwalszczyzny, który dwukrotnie pojawił się wywiadach, to zbudowanie infrastruktury do turystyki rowerowej i pieszej: Najwięcej efektów widać po tych projektach, cała Suwalszczyzna jest praktycznie oznakowana, ścieżki rowerowe czy piesze – to wszystko z unijnych funduszy, znaczy wspólnych polsko-litewskich – i przewodniki, i stojaki na rowery. Wszystko (P28). Oba projekty są znamienne w myśleniu o dobrych efektach współpracy transgranicznej, zwłaszcza z punktu widzenia samorządów: przełożenie na lokalną gospodarkę, wymierność efektów i ich długofalowość oraz rozwijanie lokalnych zasobów. 41www.soclab.org.pl Część rozmówców reprezentujących samorządy podkreślała również rolę kontaktów kulturalnych. Jednak brakuje tutaj spojrzenia na te kontakty w sposób długofalowy i pogłębiony. 4.1.2. Organizacje pozarządowe W badanych organizacjach pozarządowych widoczne są dwa sposoby myślenia o współpracy transgranicznej. Pierwszy jest bardzo powiązany z postrzeganiem współpracy transgranicznej poprzez pryzmat projektów, dofinansowania z Unii Europejskiej, możliwości zrealizowania określonych działań w swojej gminie, instytucji. Współpraca z organizacjami z krajów sąsiednich jest raczej sprawą drugorzędną i jest traktowana instrumentalnie – jeśli taki wymóg jest zapisany w warunkach dofinansowania, to należy go spełnić. Brakuje tutaj namysłu nad sensem takiej międzynarodowej współpracy, nad wartościami, które ona tworzy. Widoczne jest dysfunkcjonalne działanie organizacji pozarządowych, niekiedy nazywane w badaniach trzeciego sektora „grantozą", czyli myślenie poprzez pryzmat warunków konkursowych i konieczności dostosowania swoich działań do nich, a nie odnoszeniem się do misji organizacji, jej kultury (wartości i norm, podstaw ideowych). Dodatkowym utrudnieniem jest myślenie w kategoriach krótkoterminowych interesów przez drugą stronę, tj. partnera z zagranicy. Nasi rozmówcy opisują tę sytuację następująco: To nastawienie się z czasem zmienia. Tak jak na początku funkcjonowania [...] było tak, że: „Dajcie nam pieniądze, a my potem się zastanowimy, co z nimi zrobić i na co je wykorzystać". Przedtem Polacy – bo łatwiejszy dostęp do środków – przygotowywali projekt i spotykali się z jakąś organizacją białoruską, która podpisywała, nawet nie zapoznawała się z projektem. Wtedy realizacja takiego projektu jest ciężka, bo ci, co podpisywali, nie wiedzą, co podpisują – potem dopiero w trakcie realizacji wychodzą różne problemy. Teraz już nie ma tak, partnerzy są bardziej świadomi i od razu negocjują – muszą się spotkać, bo nie podpiszą w ciemno żadnego dokumentu, tylko przedyskutują, są ustalane harmonogramy, co w projekcie ma być... Nie mówię, że na sto procent, ale w większości przypadków teraz tak jest (P10). Takie opisy sytuacji braku pogłębionych kontaktów i zainteresowania merytorycznego projektem pojawiały się kilkukrotnie w wywiadach. Sytuacja stała się trudniejsza, ale jednocześnie zmuszająca do szczegółowych rozmów między partnerami, kiedy w ramach różnych projektów obie strony musiały zapewnić wkład własny finansowy do projektów. Wśród analizowanych wywiadów znalazły się również i takie, w których współpraca transgraniczna jest częścią zinternalizowanej misji, jest głęboko osadzona w myśleniu na temat obszarów pogranicznych w kategoriach wspólnoty kulturowej lub wzajemnych i obopólnych korzyści. Jeden z naszych rozmówców tak określał to podejście do współpracy: Ale te, które spróbowały, to łyknęły tego bakcyla i chcą się rozwijać, bo wiedzą, że to jest i podniesienie atrakcyjności terenu i jakby – patrząc globalnie, jako pogranicze – możemy być bardzo atrakcyjni dla Europy i dla całego świata, ale pod warunkiem, że będziemy promować się jako jeden region ciekawy, a nie każdy osobno, każdy swoją część. Także jest jeszcze sporo do zrobienia, ale to nie dzieje się tak od razu (P10). Drugi fragment wywiadu dobrze ilustruje sposób myślenia o współpracy, wynikający z poczucia wspólnoty pogranicza (choć jednocześnie widoczna jest świadomość różnic) i konieczności nawiązywania bezpośrednich kontaktów nie tylko na wysokim szczeblu, np. rządu, ale zwykłych obywateli i obywatelek: Jakie cele? Przede wszystkim chodzi o to, żeby ludzie się poznali i dzięki temu, że się znają, zintensyfikowali tę współpracę. I to ludzie właśnie różnej branży. I po to takie zostały utworzone programy unijne, by tutaj poziom życia, po obu stronach granicy, wyrównał się. Także tutaj chodzi o doprowadzenie do takiej sytuacji, że jesteśmy podobni. I cóż, to u nas wsie zostały podzielone praktycznie tak, że granica [chodzi tutaj o obszar państwa] kiedyś to była jedna, wieś potem podzielono, a to są tacy sami ludzie. Tylko system powiedzmy różny tam mają, różne przyzwyczajenia, żeby tego nie określić inaczej. No i oczywiście podejście do różnych spraw (P 11). Ten sam rozmówca zwrócił uwagę w wywiadzie na to, że dobrym pomysłem jest czasami poszerzenie grona uczestników projektu transgranicznego, dzięki czemu rezultaty działania będą miały charakter długofalowy i kontakty dzięki temu będą miały szanse na kontynuację również po zakończeniu projektu: Oczywiście i nawet na rodziny, bo jeżeli współpracuje, powiedzmy, no, grupa taka jak strażacy, no to ileż to ten strażak może jeździć. Dobrze było by, gdyby rodzinnie mogli pojechać zobaczyć. Później nawiązywałoby się te kontakty przez relacje ludzkie, rodzinne. A nie tylko między określonymi grupami zawodowymi. Jak to szpital ze szpitalem, ale znajomi, otoczenie ludzi. Żeby to po prostu sprowadzić na jakiś inny poziom i dać możliwość odczucia, że ta granica, no, nie dzieli po prostu (P 11). Widać wyraźnie w takich wypo42 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim wiedziach, że z perspektywy niektórych organizacji działania o charakterze pragmatycznym (np. zdobycie nowych kwalifikacji zawodowych) jest równie ważne jak nawiązywanie dobrosąsiedzkich stosunków i tworzenie wspólnoty ponad granicami państwowymi. Organizacje pozarządowe najczęściej dzieliły się doświadczeniami w sferze współpracy kulturalnej. To często ten sektor dopełnia działania samorządów, które większy nacisk kładą na „twarde" inwestycje, np. w infrastrukturę drogową. Współpraca w wymiarze kulturowym ma jednak najczęściej charakter eventów, jednorazowych wydarzeń. Jeden z naszych rozmówców, krytycznie to oceniając, podkreśla, że praca na pograniczu kulturowym musi być bardziej pogłębiona, musi dochodzić do częstszej wymiany doświadczeń, spotkań, żeby kultura stała się efektywnym narzędziem współpracy: Znaczy, ile byśmy konferencji, (...) wydarzeń artystycznych, koncertów czy spektakli nie zorganizowali, czy wystaw, to wszystko służy zawsze jednemu, żeby przekonać naszych partnerów na tych pograniczach, że najważniejsze jest ich odniesienie się do rzeczywistej wspólnoty, w której działają. I że zaopiekowanie się, od przedszkola poczynając, mieszkańcami i tworzenie takiej kultury, takiej pracy edukacyjnej, która jest bardzo silnie związana z rzeczywistością, z tkanką społeczną, w której działają. Żeby to nie była tylko akademicka praca. Żeby to nie była tylko festiwalowa kultura, eventowa kultura. Tylko żeby ona była kulturą długiego trwania organicznie wchodzącą w tkankę społeczną i kontynuowaną przez wiele lat (P20). Na tego typu działania potrzebny jest czas i długofalowe planowanie finansowe. Tego drugiego czynnika wciąż brakuje w opinii naszych rozmówców. Specyficzne jest również myślenie o celach współpracy badanych przedstawicieli organizacji mniejszości narodowych. Ich intensywne międzynarodowe kontakty są postrzegane przede wszystkim w kategoriach wsparcia własnej kultury mniejszościowej: Mamy tych stałych działaczy, to są w tej chwili starsi już ludzie i to oni występują z inicjatywą, żeby to wszystko podtrzymać i kulturę i język litewski, bo z czasem, jeśli by tego nie pielęgnować, toby to wszystko zaniknęło (P8). Ale i w przypadku tych organizacji widoczne jest również myślenie w kategoriach obustronnych korzyści. Potencjał organizacji mniejszościowych to dobra znajomość języka, kultury krajów sąsiednich, jak również gęsta sieć długoletnich sprawdzonych w działaniu kontaktów. Naszym zdaniem w zbyt małym stopniu włącza się organizacje mniejszościowe do tworzenia sieci kontaktów transgranicznych. Włączenie ich we wspólne projekty (dotyczące całych społeczności lokalnych, nie tylko mniejszości) z pewnością wzmocniłoby potencjał poszczególnych gmin transgranicznych. W analizowanych wywiadach widać, że strategie nawiązywania kontaktów oraz tworzenia wspólnych projektów są bardzo zróżnicowane. Wyraźnie widać, że inicjatywa kontaktów jest po stronie polskiej oraz że najbardziej skuteczne są kontakty bezpośrednie. Niezmiernie ważnym czynnikiem sukcesu w realizacji wspólnych projektów jest odpowiednio długi czas na nawiązanie dobrych, bezpośrednich kontaktów, a na to najczęściej brakuje dotacji czy dofinansowania. Drugim elementem niezbędnym w budowaniu stałych relacji transgranicznych jest długofalowe dofinansowanie projektów. Bardzo często działania na poziomie współpracy międzynarodowej mają charakter doraźny – od projektu do projektu. Wyraźnie uwidacznia się w wywiadach zależność intensywności działań transgranicznych od projektów unijnych i związanego z nią dofinansowania. W sytuacji braku dotacji kontakty często albo zamierają, albo stają się bardzo incydentalne, ograniczone do indywidualnych, bardziej prywatnych spotkań. Sytuacja ta jest niepokojąca, zwłaszcza w kontekście prawdopodobnego wygaszania za kilka lat funduszy pomocowych, które są podstawą finansowania działań na obszarach przygranicznych. O tej zależności od unijnego dofinansowania mówiła jedna z naszych rozmówczyń: Tylko teraz to się ograniczyło do tylko takich oficjalnych wizyt, a wtedy i obozy... Od 2004 do 2008. Tak, środki unijne. (...) Obozy dla dzieci, obozy dla strażaków ochotników, obozy szkoleniowe dla strażaków ochotników-amatorów. Dla strażaków, którzy profesjonalnie się tym zajmują. I to samo Domy Kultury czy też organizacje sportowe, czy szkoły. Teraz to gdzieś kontakty są, ale na etapie, powiedziałbym, uśpionym, jeden telefon, drugi, no, spotkania indywidualne, ale to nie jest na taka skalę, że wtedy mieliśmy tego pełno. (...) No, te kontakty zostały, i jeżeli chcą... jak u nas... popularne festyny w okresie letnim, to zapraszamy zespoły z Białorusi czy gminy zapraszają (za naszym pośrednictwem czy też bezpośrednio), bo mają bezpośrednie kontakty z zespołami z Białorusi, i one uczestniczą. Plus oficjeli ... czyli przyjeżdża wąska grupa osób. To samo jest, jeżeli my jedziemy na Białoruś, no to zespół z którejś gminy czy z (...) domu kultury, plus parę osób w delegacji: trzy, dwie, w zależności. Na święta państwowe – Dzień Zwycięstwa jest tam obchodzony 9 maja – mamy 43www.soclab.org.pl zaproszenia. Są dni miasta, jakieś tam dożynki czy festiwale (P 11). Wypowiedź ta zwraca uwagę na bardzo ważny wymiar kontaktów międzynarodowych, które są codzienne i dotyczą zwykłych mieszkańców przygranicznych gmin. Jest to dobry sposób na budowę kapitału społecznego mieszkańców pogranicza, czyli umiejętności wspólnego działania w oparciu o wzajemne zaufanie. Bez tego wybudowane i wyremontowane drogi w ramach programów transgranicznych będą puste, bowiem obywatele położonych obok siebie krajów nie będą widzieli potrzeby utrzymywania stałych kontaktów. Bardzo istotną formą realizacji współpracy są wizyty studyjne, spotkania w obu krajach. Widać jednak wyraźnie, że do rzadkości należą sytuacje, kiedy na taki wyjazd jedzie zespół osób reprezentujących podmioty z różnych sektorów życia publicznego (np. przedstawiciele samorządu, przedsiębiorców i organizacji pozarządowych). Zazwyczaj takie wyjazdy są podejmowane oddzielenie przez samorządy lub uczelnie wyższe. Dla organizacji pozarządowych często wiąże się to z kosztami, które przekraczają ich możliwości. Brak skoordynowania takich wizyt jest ich dużą wadą. Jeden z rozmówców opowiadał o sytuacji, kiedy spotkało się dwóch przedstawicieli – samorządu i uczelni wyższej – na tych samych targach na Ukrainie. Nawet nie wiedzieli, że obie instytucje będą tam reprezentowane. W analizowanych wywiadach przedsiębiorcy również widzieli we wspólnych wizytach studyjnych możliwe, aczkolwiek w bardzo niewielkim stopniu wykorzystywane narzędzie współpracy międzysektorowej. 4.1.3. Uczelnie wyższe Cele współpracy transgranicznej w przypadku uczelni wyższych są oczywiście ściśle powiązane z rozwojem nauki, ze współpracą z różnymi ośrodkami naukowymi w sąsiednich krajach. Z wywiadów wyraźnie wynika, że w działaniach transgranicznych uczelni wyższych brakuje perspektywy współpracy międzysektorowej. Ponownie, jak w przypadku samorządów, mamy do czynienia przede wszystkim z działaniami autonomicznymi i nieskoordynowanymi z innymi podmiotami z województwa czy miasta. Sygnalizowane było poczucie braku wsparcia i pogłębionej współpracy z lokalnym samorządem w ramach projektowania i realizowania działań transgranicznych. Punktem odniesienia do współpracy międzynarodowej na uczelniach jest program Erasmus, który dotyczy wymiany pracowników naukowo-dydaktycznych, pracowników administracji i studentów z krajów Unii Europejskiej. Wyraźnie brakuje dobrych i efektywnych instrumentów współpracy z krajami niebędącymi członkami Unii. Wśród badanych przedstawicieli uczelni wyższych jest widoczna wyraźna świadomość, że współpraca transgraniczna realizowana przez ich jednostki może w istotny sposób wpłynąć na otoczenie, na przykład na Białystok. Zwraca się uwagę przede wszystkim na promocję miasta i regionu jako ważnego ośrodka badań nad Europą Wschodnią, jak również na realne wpływy finansowe wynikające z intensywnej wymiany studenckiej i zapraszania studentów, również z krajów ościennych, do studiowania w Białymstoku. Jako dobry przykład prowadzenia międzynarodowej współpracy wymienia się Uniwersytet Medyczny. Przy tym temacie pojawiają się również uwagi dotyczące braków infrastrukturalnych w stolicy województwa, a zwłaszcza oferty kulturalnej i rekreacyjnej dla młodych ludzi. Jeden z naszych rozmówców, który bardzo podkreślał w swoich wypowiedziach te kwestie, tak opisywał tę sytuację: Lepiej jest nam – władzom lokalnym – przyciągnąć zagranicznych studentów, którzy przyjadą, średnio zostawiają 20 euro dziennie. To przez dwieście dni w roku wydadzą te pieniądze na wyżywienie, na zakwaterowanie, na życie po prostu, to lepiej niż tworzyć w mieście Białystok super turystykę masową. Tego nie będzie, proszę mi wierzyć – to jest okazjonalnie. Raz miałem gości z Moskwy, szukaliśmy ofert kulturalnych. W każdym mieście są – to była sobota, niedziela – szukaliśmy też w galeriach, jednej, drugiej, a to pierwszy „gorod", w którym nie znaleźliśmy interesujących imprez. Oczywiście, może punkt informacji turystycznej takie informacje ma, nie wiem, ale wszędzie są dostępne, w każdym kiosku. (...) Także inwestujmy w bazę, żeby ci ludzie mogli spokojnie odpocząć, pobawić się, wydać trochę pieniędzy, stwórzmy im warunki (P31). Poziom współpracy uczelni wyższych z innymi podmiotami nie jest wskazywany jako ważny element, choć współpraca z samorządami jest postrzegana jako pożądana. W żadnej wypowiedzi nie pojawił się biznes czy organizacje pozarządowe jako atrakcyjni partnerzy wspierający czy współpracujący w nawiązywaniu kontaktów międzynarodowych. Uczelnie postrzegają sposób dzielenia się efektami i doświadczeniem wynikającym ze współpracy w sposób tradycyjny, ograniczony do typowo naukowej sfery 44 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim działania: W większości wypadków, jeżeli na przykład są przeprowadzone różnego rodzaju badania naukowe czy organizowane konferencje naukowe, to te informacje z badań naukowych są na przykład publikowane, natomiast na konferencjach naukowych są prezentowane. Na takie konferencje są zapraszane osoby z całego kraju, z różnych ośrodków naukowych, i ci pracownicy z różnych ośrodków mogą w trakcie dyskusji wymieniać się swoimi poglądami, swoimi uwagami. Jeżeli są badania publikowane, to też każdy może zapoznać się z tymi badaniami i zgodzić się lub też nie z wnioskami, które są wysuwane w danym opracowaniu naukowym. Więc to wygląda w ten sposób i tylko w ten sposób możemy (P32). Jest to strategia nieprzynosząca pożądanych efektów, ma ona charakter pasywny, tj. oczekujący inicjatywy i zainteresowania ze strony potencjalnego partnera. 4�1.4� Firmy Formułowane cele współpracy przedsiębiorstw w sposób oczywisty wiążą się z zyskiem, zdobywaniem nowych rynków i poszerzaniem rynku zbytów dla swoich produktów. Tym, co oddziela logikę prowadzenia współpracy międzynarodowej w ramach działań samorządowych czy pozarządowych od działań biznesowych, jest główny cel współpracy. Dla przedsiębiorców cel kontaktów transgranicznych jest bardzo jasny i klarownie określony: maksymalizacja własnych korzyści, przede wszystkim finansowych. W wypowiedziach przedsiębiorców nie można zauważyć wyraźnego myślenia kategoriami społecznie odpowiedzialnego biznesu czy dostrzegania długofalowych korzyści ze swojej działalności w postaci promocji Polski czy regionu. Czynniki sprzyjające współpracy transgranicznej nasi rozmówcy określali przede wszystkim przez kategorię bliskości geograficznej oraz kulturowej, która wyraża się w podobnym guście i akceptowaniu podobnego asortymentu towarów. Jest to bardzo bliskie wynikom badań nad działalnością międzynarodową polskich przedsiębiorców, w których pisano, że: „Realistyczny horyzont ekspansji określają różne parametry, ale bliskość rynku na całym świecie jest jednym z najważniejszych wskaźników. Ekspansję do krajów sąsiedzkich ułatwia logistyka, podobieństwo rynków i konsumentów, niskie bariery kulturowe i relatywnie niskie koszty wejścia"73 Z badań jakościowych przeprowadzonych w ramach naszej diagnozy wynika, że firmy najczęściej korzystają z bezpośrednich kontaktów i targów (wystaw) w krajach ościennych. Najłatwiej nawiązać i utrzymać kontakty można z partnerami litewskimi – tutaj podobnie jak w przypadku innych badanych podmiotów ułatwieniem jest brak barier związanych z przekraczaniem granicy oraz łatwość utrzymywania kontaktów za pomocą Internetu. W pozostałych krajach problemem są wizy oraz utrudnienia w komunikacji. Należy podkreślić, że w porównywaniu z organizacjami pozarządowymi oraz samorządami bariery te są wskazywane, ale jednocześnie podkreśla się, że firmy potrafią sobie z nimi radzić. Bardzo ważnym pośrednikiem w kontaktach gospodarczych są lokalni partnerzy w krajach ościennych (przedstawiciele, dystrybutorzy), którzy stanowią łącznik pomiędzy odbiorcami (klientami) czy kolejnymi partnerami. To na nich spoczywa w dużej mierze obowiązek dbania o poziom sprzedaży polskich produktów, to oni najszybciej reagują na konieczność wprowadzenia zmian (np. w marketingu). Współpraca z nimi była w wywiadach bardzo dobrze oceniania, niezależnie od kraju czy branży. Interesujące było, na ile firmy odczuwają wsparcie w swoich działaniach ze strony samorządów i czy w ogóle oczekują takiego wsparcia. Najczęściej pojawiały się wypowiedzi, które świadczyłyby o braku potrzeby pogłębionej współpracy. Wynika to przede wszystkim z postrzegania samorządu jako partnera słabego, niemogącego zapewnić realnego wsparcia dla firm. Przedstawiciele przedsiębiorstw o samorządach mówili raczej jako o podmiotach, które są wspierane przez nich. Oczekiwane wsparcie dotyczyło też spaw finansowych, poręczeń czy możliwości uzyskiwania korzystnych kredytów: Uważam, że te wszystkie rzeczy powinny się sprowadzać do jednego, że instytucje finansowe powinny pomagać w uzyskiwaniu kontraktów, udzielać pomocy. Wie pani, po prostu ideałem by było, że małe przedsiębiorstwo ma na takim szczeblu [lokalnym] współpracować z lokalnymi bankami, a duże z bankami na szczeblu wojewódzkim, a jeszcze większe z bankiem na szczeblu krajowym, który będzie pomagał, prawda. (...) Ale na tym szczeblu my na przykład korzystamy z Podlaskiego Funduszu Poręczeniowego, który tam jakby gwarantuje jakąś 73 M. Bonikowska, P. Rabiej, K. Żurek, Badanie THINKTANK: Jak państwo wspiera ekspansję?, „Magazyn THINKTANK", jesień 2012, Reprint, s. 4, https://mttp.pl/pobieranie/HORYZONTY.pdf [10.10.2013]. 45www.soclab.org.pl część kredytu. Ja tam byłem, oni przyjechali, zwizytowali, powiedzieli „może pan na nas liczyć". Raz korzystałem z Banku Gospodarstwa Krajowego i Bank poręczył, jak zaczynałem prawda, i teraz z PFP współpracuję i jak na przykład biorę kredyt, to jakąś część ten PFP za mnie poręcza i to jest dobra, porządna firma. I takie powinny być. A czego ja... do marszałka czy do czego... żeby mnie zbył? Że nie ma pieniędzy? (P1). Niekiedy jednak pojawiało się zainteresowanie współpracą ze strukturami samorządowymi. Widoczne to było przy temacie wyjazdów samorządów do krajów ościennych (np. do miast partnerskich). Nasi rozmówcy zwracali uwagę, że jest to okazja do wspólnego wyjazdu przedsiębiorców i samorządowców oraz dobry instrument współpracy międzysektorowej. Poza tym wskazywano również na potrzebę otrzymywania aktualnych informacji na temat możliwych przetargów czy możliwości inwestowania w partnerskich miastach czy gminach. Przedsiębiorcy pozytywnie oceniali działalność Izby Przemysłowo- -Handlowej, Zrzeszenia Międzynarodowych Przewoźników Drogowych, Stowarzyszenia Przewoźników Podlasia oraz Polskiej Izby Mleka, które są postrzegane jako podmioty sprawnie wspierające gospodarczą współpracę międzynarodową w województwie podlaskim. Polega ona na tworzeniu przestrzeni do wymiany doświadczeń we współpracy transgranicznej firm z jednej branży (np. konferencje dotyczące przetwórstwa mleczarskiego organizowane przez Polską Izbę Mleczną) oraz na przekazywaniu branżowych kontaktów z zagranicy. Można postawić tutaj tezę, że efektywność tych organizacji związana jest z ich branżowością. Z wywiadów bowiem wynika, że wiele instrumentów współpracy (targi, wystawy, konferencje) wykazuje skuteczność, jeśli są powiązane w ramach poszczególnych branż. Oczekiwanie co do wsparcia i koordynacji współpracy transgranicznej były formułowane w stosunku do Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych. Wiązało się z potrzebą wypracowania mechanizmów prostszego przekraczania granicy (kwestia wiz), budowaniem bazy podmiotów, które mogłyby być potencjalnymi współpracownikami w krajach ościennych, uczestnictwem w misjach gospodarczych oraz zapraszaniem przedsiębiorców z zagranicy. Określał to jeden z naszych rozmówców: Na szczeblu rządowym też widzimy potrzebę wspierania tego, otwarcia na [działalność gospodarczą polskich firm za granicą], spotkania na szczeblu rządowym pomiędzy różnymi krajami, tymi, o których pan mówi i nie tylko, żeby jednak bardziej rząd się angażował w to poparcie i pokazywał dobrą wolę i chęć współpracy i wspierał to. Oczywiście misje, jak najbardziej, są potrzebne, natomiast też ten biznes powinien do nas przyjeżdżać, powinien oglądać nasz potencjał, bo często wyobrażenie o polskim przemyśle jest zupełnie nieadekwatne do [stanu faktycznego], my to zresztą niejednokrotnie przeżywamy, więc ważne jest, żeby się tym chwalić, żeby zapraszać i zapoznawać (P18). Kilkukrotnie przedsiębiorcy pozytywnie ocenili pracę polskich ambasad, które na przykład przekierowują konkretne oferty współpracy do firm w regionie podlaskim. 4.2. Zakres współpracy międzysektorowej i wsparcie zewnętrzne Badane organizacje pozarządowe i samorządy wskazywały niekiedy partnerów z innego sektora. Nie była to sytuacja jednak częsta i opierała się na relacjach „urząd–petent" (np. dofinansowanie działalności organizacji pozarządowych). Wyraźnie widać, że brakuje organizacjom i samorządom przestrzeni wymiany doświadczeń związanych ze współpracą transgraniczną. Jak określiła to jedna z przedstawicielek organizacji współpracujących z Litwą: Jeżeli chodzi o współpracę z innymi instytucjami z naszego kraju, to jest to trochę ograniczone. Konferencje to jedyny moment, kiedy możemy się podzielić takimi doświadczeniami, jeżeli już z kimś współpracujemy, to wtedy już w międzyczasie realizacji tego naszego projektu też się dzielimy doświadczeniami z przeszłości, a poza tym jedyne miejsce, gdzie możemy się podzielić doświadczeniami, to jakieś szkolenia. Na przykład jeśli chodzi o turystykę, to współpracowaliśmy z Suwalską Izbą Rolniczo-Turystyczną, cały czas się spotykamy ze sobą przy okazji jakiś szkoleń, konferencji, innych spotkań. Mamy takie krótkie chwile, gdzie możemy się wymienić współpracą, ale jest niewiele tego. Niewiele takich miejsc, gdzie możemy to zrobić. Na pewno nie było takiej konferencji, która byłaby poświęcona tylko wymianie doświadczeń. Może i faktycznie fajnie by było, może tutaj potrzebna by była instytucja, która by szukała podmiotów, które mogłyby współpracować ze sobą, i może nawet przy okazji takiej konferencji nawiązałyby się jakieś nowe współprace. Nie byłam nigdy na takiej konferencji, może by było faktycznie fajnie (P 8). 46 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Z analizowanych wywiadów wynika, że jedną z największych słabości współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim jest brak sieciowej współpracy międzysektorowej. Bardzo często organizacje czy samorządy działają niezależnie od siebie, na wspólnym obszarze przygranicznym. Sprawia to, że na poziomie gminy czy powiatu potencjał współpracy jest rozproszony oraz nie może przez to przynieść pozytywnych i widocznych rezultatów. Badani przedstawiciele organizacji pozarządowych wskazywali najczęściej na wsparcie w swoich działaniach z poziomu centralnego (ministerstwa) i regionalnego (władze województwa), zdecydowanie rzadziej wsparcie to jest udzielane na poziomie powiatu czy gminy. Z czego to wynika? Wskazywane są takie przyczyny, jak: brak zaangażowania ze strony samorządu w działania międzysektorowe, stawianie działań w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej nisko w rankingu priorytetów, ograniczenia finansowe czy po prostu brak wiedzy na temat podmiotów, które realizują działania związane ze współpracą transgraniczną. Z mojego osobistego odczucia i tutaj z takich rozmów bardziej prywatnych wynika to z braku zaangażowania. Każdy patrzy swoich spraw. Może w międzyczasie nie ma takiego zainteresowania, bo i miasto i gmina ma swoje sprawy bieżące, które są ważniejsze od podejmowania jakiś nowych działań, które wymagają jednak i nakładu pracy, i nakładu pieniędzy, i dużego zaangażowania. Bo tutaj, jeżeli nie będzie tego zaangażowania, to niestety, tak jak mówiłam przy tych projektach, nie ma to racji bytu (P8). Organizacje pozarządowe nie są postrzegane przez samorządy jako partnerzy, ale raczej jako petenci – jest to perspektywa utrudniająca współpracę międzysektorową nie tylko w wymiarze działań transgranicznych. Jedna z przedstawicielek podmiotu, który często pośredniczy w nawiązaniu międzysektorowych relacji, zwracała uwagę na ten wymiar współpracy: Także na szczeblu lokalnym może lepsza byłaby współpraca z organizacjami pozarządowymi na takiej zasadzie, żeby wykorzystywać do realizacji swoich działań te organizacje, które funkcjonują. Żeby to nie samorządy łaskę im robiły [śmiech], ale żeby były partnerami. Większego takiego partnerstwa brakuje (P11). Znaczenie partnerstwa w relacjach samorząd–trzeci sektor jest ostatnio bardzo powszechnie dyskutowanym tematem, na przykład w kontekście partycypacji obywatelskiej. Z instytucji wspierających organizacje pozarządowe we współpracy transgranicznej wymieniane były: Euroregion Niemen, Urząd Marszałkowski, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych. Temat współpracy samorządu z lokalnymi przedsiębiorstwami pojawił się w zakresie marginalnym. Może to wynikać z kilku czynników: braku zainteresowania ściślejszą współpracą ze strony biznesu, z obaw związanych z partnerstwem publiczno-prywatnym, zwłaszcza po stronie samorządów74, i z relatywnie, w porównaniu do innych województw, słabego rozwoju przedsiębiorczości w naszym regionie. Samorządy z kolei nie są zadowolone z przekazu informacji z poziomu centralnego (ministerstwa). Artykułowana jest potrzeba lepszej wymiany informacji, wcześniejszego zawiadamiania o nowych inicjatywach czy zmianach dotyczących zwłaszcza stosunków z Białorusią: Nie mamy żadnych szkoleń, żadnych informacji, to jest tak, że to w pewnym stopniu też paraliżuje, bo ja wiem na przykład, że te kontakty na szczeblu rządowym są ucięte, bardzo ograniczone, no to ja też będę je ograniczał, bo powinienem się do tego dostosować. A może akurat. W zeszłym roku na spotkaniu w MSZ była rozmowa o tym, że MSZ zaczyna dostrzegać możliwości takiej międzynarodowej współpracy w regionach, w powiatach, no bo to może być takie fajne narzędzie, że jak oni nie mogą czegoś zrobić na szczeblu centralnym, to może akurat z regionem by się dało to zrobić. I tak sobie pogadali i jakby wszystko. Taka książka później przyszła, to było rok temu, w 2012, i wszystko. I dlatego na przykład tej współpracy z Białorusią nie ma (P28). 4.3. Organizacje mniejszościowe w Polsce a współpraca transgraniczna Organizacje te posiadają na tle innych fundacji i stowarzyszeń długą tradycję podtrzymywania kontaktów oraz wyróżniają się wysokim poziomem aktywności. Wydaje się, że te podmioty mają zasoby nie do końca wykorzystywane dla budowania więzów transgranicznych w kontekście współpracy całych gmin. Z analizowanych wywiadów wynika, że pomimo dużej aktywności w nawiązywaniu kontaktów transgranicznych 74 Zob. np. K. Mataśka, Partnerstwo publiczno-prywatne w Polsce – doświadczenia i perspektywy, „Acta Universitatis Lodziensis Folia Oeconomica", nr 243, 2010, s. 221–243. 47www.soclab.org.pl (zwłaszcza w sferze kulturalnej) organizacje te niekiedy przyjmują strategię ograniczającą się do działania na rzecz podtrzymywania własnej kultury mniejszościowej (podtrzymywanie kontaktów z „żywym" językiem danej mniejszości, obyczajów itp.). Warto by było wspierać intensywnie te wydarzenia i działania, w których organizacje mniejszościowe stanowią łącznik pomiędzy szeroko rozumianym społeczeństwem polskim a wspólnotami państw sąsiednich. Jest to istotne tym bardziej, że organizacje te zazwyczaj mają bardzo dobrze działające kanały komunikacji, bliskie kontakty z poszczególnymi ludźmi czy instytucjami, które działają w krajach sąsiednich. 4.4. Strategia współpracy transgranicznej Zarówno samorządy, jak i organizacje pozarządowe oraz uczelnie wyższe wykazywały zainteresowanie strategią współpracy transgranicznej. Jedynie przedsiębiorcy okazywali dystans do tego typu dokumentu, argumentując, że nie widzą zbyt wielkich szans na to, by jego zapisy przełożyły się na poprawienie ich sytuacji. Zwracano uwagę na to, że sytuacja województwa podlaskiego jest nieporównywalna do doświadczeń województw działających przy granicy wewnętrznej UE. W przypadku województwa podlaskiego sąsiednie kraje są bardzo zróżnicowane i do tego granica inaczej funkcjonuje, ponieważ jest częściowo zewnętrzną granicą Unii Europejskiej: My jesteśmy trochę w tyle, ciężko nam jest; tutaj w tym regionie jest specyficznie i dużo jest tych partnerów naokoło i każdy jest inny, więc to nie jest tak, że – powiedzmy – masz na zachodzie Austrię i Niemców, którzy w pewnym sensie są podobni. I są rozwinięci bardziej, przygotowani na propozycje, a nie jak na Białorusi – zaskoczeni. Wiesz, o co chodzi (P19). Argumenty, które pojawiały się przy krytycznej ocenie tworzenia wojewódzkiej strategii współpracy transgranicznej, były następujące: • nieprzekładalność dokumentów strategicznych na realne działania (są to zazwyczaj tzw. „półkowniki", czyli dokumenty, które muszą powstać, ale nikt z nich później realnie nie korzysta); • zbyt duży stopień ogólności zapisów; • negatywne doświadczenie z obecnymi strategiami, które są pisane „zza biurka", oderwane od rzeczywistych problemów na poziomie na przykład gmin czy poszczególnych sektorów (organizacje pozarządowe, przedsiębiorstwa, samorządy); • w przypadku Białorusi bardzo trudno przewidzieć przyszłość i kierunki współpracy: Tutaj to można sobie wymyślić taką współpracę i tak pięknie ją napisać, i w takie ramki ją sobie tam włożyć, jakie tylko się chce, natomiast w zderzeniu z rzeczywistością na Białorusi, to to niestety może nie działać. Najlepszym przykładem na to jest ustawa czy porozumienie (nie wiem co to było) o małym ruchu granicznym. Polska jest gotowa od co najmniej dwóch lat do tego, żeby ten mały ruch graniczny zaczął się rozwijać i w ogóle miał rację bytu, natomiast cały czas są jakieś problemy po stronie białoruskiej. Tutaj pewne rzeczy można sobie wymyślić i ustalać, natomiast tam, za granicą, jest to weryfikowane i przesuwane, oni ustawiają to na swoje miejsca (P9); • brak konieczności wyodrębniania tematyki współpracy transgranicznej: jest ona zapisana w już istniejących i przyjętych strategiach, na przykład w Strategii Rozwoju Województwa Podlaskiego do 2020 roku Analiza wypowiedzi na temat wojewódzkiej strategii współpracy transgranicznej wytycza następujące warunki powodzenia tego typu zarządzania strategicznego: • skorzystanie z doświadczeń wszystkich podmiotów współpracujących z Białorusią, Litwą, Rosją i Ukrainą (a więc nie tylko samorządów, ale i szkół, instytucji kultury i organizacji pozarządowych oraz przedsiębiorstw); • proces tworzenia strategii. Musi ona być tworzona oddolnie, partycypacyjnie od samego początku (nie wystarczą konsultacje samego projektu dokumentu), dając możliwość podzielenia się doświadczeniami wszystkich podmiotów współpracy i interesariuszy, na których działalność strategia może oddziaływać (samorządy, organizacje pozarządowe, uczelnie i przedsiębiorstwa). Konieczne jest stworzenie przestrzeni dialogu i wymiany doświadczeń w oparciu o poszukiwanie dobrych praktyk w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim oraz rozpoznanie barier i potrzeb poszczególnych podmiotów; 48 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim • włączenie w tworzenie strategii przedstawicieli krajów ościennych (np. głównych partnerów obecnych działań, władz lokalnych czy centralnych): No, przede wszystkim z krajami zainteresowanymi, powinna być z krajami zainteresowanymi, trzeba też patrzeć na to, co druga strona chce i jakie cele, co im jest potrzebne, no, wiadomo, my mamy jakieś, chcemy jakieś tam cele osiągnąć, ale tak samo i ta druga strona chce też skorzystać na tej współpracy i zaakcentować jakieś kwestie, które oni chcieliby też u siebie rozwinąć. Także to musi być nie rozmowa na temat „my sobie wyznaczymy cele", że OK, współpraca transgraniczna, czyli wyznaczymy sobie cele, nie rozmawiając właśnie z drugą stroną (P17); • tworzenie strategii wojewódzkiej w odniesieniu do działań czy strategii współpracy transgranicznej obecnych we wschodnich województwach Polski, a być może także tworzenie wspólnych dokumentów strategicznych z krajami sąsiednimi; • strategia powinna być wyraźnie osadzona w istniejących realiach, powiązana z konkretnym budżetem oraz umieszczona w czasie. 4.5. Ogólne bariery współpracy transgranicznej Niezależnie od kraju, z którym się współpracuje, większość organizacji pozarządowych zwracała uwagę na niedostatki finansowe konieczne na etapie szukania partnerów, wizyt studyjnych w krajach sąsiednich, budowania partnerstwa. Jeden z naszych rozmówców – bardzo zaangażowany w projekty z zakresu współpracy transgranicznej – określił to w taki sposób: Z czasem człowiek zdaje sobie sprawę, że samymi chęciami nie nawiążesz kontaktu, nie ogarniesz projektu. I trzeba jeździć, trzeba się spotykać, a to kosztuje transporty. Nie można jechać jedną osobą, trzeba jechać zespołem, dogadywać się, bo każdy w zespole zna się na czymś innym. To jest współpraca wieloaspektowa i jeśli chcesz wejść na wyższy poziom, to musisz mieć pieniądze na to. Pieniądze są barierą zawsze – gdy chcesz wejść na pewien etap, to musisz mieć budżet, i to na samo nawiązanie konkretnej współpracy trzeba mieć czasem kilka tysięcy na podróże, zakwaterowania i takie wizyty, żeby się poznać konkretnie. No i czas, ale to są nasze sprawy w stowarzyszeniu, bo nas jest za mało, może, szerzej mówiąc, nie mamy też ludzi, którzy się na tym znają. Nie ma ludzi doświadczonych w tym temacie i ciężko jest kogoś nauczyć. To ogólny temat i ogólny problem organizacji pozarządowych, że ludzie uczą się jedynie wtedy, kiedy mają wystarczająco dużo zapału, żeby wytrzymać wystarczająco długi okres czasu bez zapłaty. Bo zanim się nauczysz, zanim przyjdzie zapłata za te prace, o ile kiedykolwiek przyjdzie, to można się zniechęcić. Ludzie długo muszą pracować za darmo w NGOsach, zanim coś będą z tego mieli (P 19). Zarówno organizacje, uczelnie wyższe, jak i samorządy zwracały dużą uwagę na skomplikowane procedury dotacyjne, na mechanizmy biurokratyczne, które utrudniają w znaczący sposób otrzymanie dotacji i realizowanie projektów. Samo przygotowanie międzynarodowego projektu wiąże się z poniesieniem dużych kosztów (np. na tłumaczenie, kontakty za granicą itp.), a nie ma gwarancji na otrzymanie dotacji. Jak to określił jeden z naszych rozmówców: Jeśli są problemy czy bariery, to po stronie polskiej, ale one nie dotyczą współpracy transgranicznej. To przygotowanie dokumentów i tego, jakie są wymagania, jak te dokumenty są potem sprawdzane, więc to się tyczy nie współpracy transgranicznej, ale procedur związanych z dokumentacją projektową (P23). Ważną podstawą do budowania kontaktów transgranicznych jest kultura. Zauważa się jednak, że międzynarodowe kontakty kulturowe ograniczają się do festynów, jarmarków czy festiwali, czyli do pojedynczych wydarzeń kulturalnych. Wciąż brakuje projektów i współpracy związanej ze współczesną kulturą litewską czy białoruską oraz pogłębionej pracy z sąsiadującymi wspólnotami lokalnymi, w której kultura staje się czynnikiem integrującym zarówno wewnątrz tych wspólnot, jak również w kontaktach międzynarodowych: Tu jest problem, jaką kulturę robimy na tym pograniczu. Czy to jest tylko właśnie festyn i jarmark – raz do roku czy dwa – czy ona ma zupełnie inny, taki codzienny, organiczny wymiar. I z tym jest problem. Trzeba kształcić jakby nowych animatorów tutaj i dawać im nowe narzędzia pracy (P20). Widoczne są więc luki kompetencyjne po obu stronach granicy. Naszym zdaniem transgraniczne projekty kulturalne powinny w większym stopniu skupiać się na głębokiej pracy z pamięcią, wspólnym dziedzictwem kulturowym czy współuczestniczeniem w tworzeniu współczesnej kultury polskiej, białoruskiej czy litewskiej (niezwiązanej wyłącznie z folklorem). 49www.soclab.org.pl 4.5.1. Bariery współpracy z Białorusią Jest to najbardziej problematyczny kierunek współpracy. Najczęstsze bariery we współpracy były wskazywane po stronie białoruskiej. Trudności w uzyskaniu akceptacji współpracy z polską organizacją – bardzo często nie jest wprost wskazywane przez partnera białoruskiego, że współpraca ta nie jest mile widziana, jest krytycznie oceniana przez białoruskie władze. Niektórzy rozmówcy zwracali uwagę również na to, że po stronie białoruskiej pracują niekiedy z organizacjami, które nie mają oficjalnego statusu (nie są zarejestrowane). Również uzyskanie zgody na wspólny projekt jest niekiedy dużą przeszkodą. Dość długi proces oczekiwania na dotację na przykład z MSZ sprawia, że pozostaje bardzo mało czasu na realizację wspólnego, polsko-białoruskiego projektu. Na jego zarejestrowanie nie ma już wtedy zupełnie czasu. Jak określił tę sytuację jeden z naszych rozmówców: Trochę partyzantka, bo gdybyśmy fizycznie próbowali je rejestrować, to pewnie nawet byśmy nie zdążyli, dlatego że okres realizacji projektu wygląda mniej więcej tak, że w listopadzie są te konkursy MSZ-owskie, wyniki mamy gdzieś w okolicach lutego – na początku marca, no i dopiero w kwietniu można przystąpić do podpisywania kontraktów. Pieniądze bardzo często trafiają do nas dopiero w maju, więc mamy troszkę ponad pół roku na zrealizowanie projektu. To jest bardzo mało czasu, więc gdybym w tym czasie spróbował zarejestrować ten projekt na Białorusi, no to ja mam w tej chwili projekty, które robimy z Unii Europejskiej – na szczęście one są trzyletnie, dlatego ja mam tam trochę więcej czasu – to tam często pięć, sześć miesięcy trwa zarejestrowanie projektów (P12). Barierą są także kwestie finansowe – przekazywanie dotacji stronie białoruskiej – niekiedy nie można tego zrobić oficjalnie, to znaczy przelewem na konto. Inny wymiar trudności finansowych to wkład własny, który w projektach z funduszy na współpracę transgraniczną zazwyczaj wynosi około 10%. Dla strony polskiej jest to trudne, ale możliwe do osiągnięcia, ale dla strony białoruskiej jest to często bariera nie do pokonania. Strona białoruska boryka się z dużymi deficytami finansowymi – niekiedy na przykład nie stać zespołu muzycznego na pokrycie kosztów podróży, jak mówił o tym jeden z naszych rozmówców: Wie pan, są bariery tego typu, że Białoruś nie jest państwem bogatym, w związku z tym trudności piętrzą się wtedy, kiedy liczymy, że zespół, który przyjeżdża – bo wiele zespołów zapraszamy, w najbliższą niedzielę też do Bielska, do Siemiatycz, tam będą się festyny odbywały, już końcówka sezonu – sam sfinansuje koszty podróży. Nie ma takiej możliwości prawie w ogóle ze strony Ministerstwa Kultury Republiki Białoruś. Natomiast trzeba powiedzieć, że bardzo pomocną strukturą w naszej działalności jest Kulturalne Centrum Białorusi w Polsce, mieszczące się w Warszawie (P4). Inną ważną barierą jest niestabilność partnerów po stronie białoruskiej. Ma ona różne oblicza. Najczęściej nasi rozmówcy wskazywali na dwa aspekty tej cechy współpracy: niestabilność finansową i zmienność podejmowanych decyzji. Jedną z najczęściej pojawiających się sytuacji była taka, w której opowiadano, że strona białoruska z nieznanych przyczyn zmieniała decyzję co do udziału w projektach, przyjazdu do Polski czy kwestii organizacyjnych, na przykład miejsce do przeprowadzenia wspólnych działań. Jedna z organizatorek dość dużego wydarzenia w Grodnie następująco skomentowała taką sytuację: Wszystko było w porządku, po czym... no nie jest to do ogarnięcia. To znaczy jest do ogarnięcia, ale nie można sobie tak zaplanować, że będzie o tej godzinie to i to. Już nauczyliśmy się takiej elastyczności. [badacz: To jest przerażające trochę, bo bardzo dużo pracy idzie na marne.] Bardzo dużo – tak, ale lepiej zrobić coś, coś małego nawet, niż nie robić nic (P 9). Jedną z najczęściej wymienianych barier była konieczność pozyskiwania wiz dla gości/współpracowników z Białorusi. Dość krytycznie oceniana jest praca konsulatu oraz elektroniczna rejestracja. Jeden z działaczy organizacji pozarządowej, która również współpracuje z partnerami w Mołdawii, porównał tę sytuację w taki sposób: Do tej pory nie mogę zrozumieć, jak te same struktury mogą w jednym kraju działać bardzo dobrze, a w drugim albo nieporadnie, albo w ogóle. Podam prosty przykład. W związku z tym, że prowadzimy działalność w różnych krajach, to często musimy zapraszać partnerów do nas, bo mamy wizyty studyjne, mamy inne rzeczy. I teraz, kiedy w Mołdawii zwracam się do konsula generalnego, to pan konsul, a wcześniej pani, są na tyle uprzejmi, że nie ma żadnego problemu – oni zawsze oddzwonią, oni zawsze wyślą e-mail, oni zawsze wytłumaczą, są bardzo życzliwi do współpracy i nigdy mi się nie zdarzyło, żeby jakakolwiek forma pracy była przeniesiona nawet o jeden dzień, chociaż tych wizyt jest stosunkowo dużo – że ludzie na czas nie otrzymali wizy, czy że musieli stać w jakiejś upokarzającej kolejce, 50 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim czy coś w tym rodzaju. Zawsze znajdzie się sposób rozwiązania problemu w sposób bezbolesny dla obu stron. Natomiast w tym roku na Białorusi mieliśmy konkretny przykład (...). Mieliśmy wszędzie spotkania, ale był jeden problem – wiza dla uczestników. To był najtrudniejszy problem. Łatwiej było zdobyć pieniądze, napisać wniosek, przeprowadzić wizyty, zrealizować projekt, zorganizować nocleg na terytorium Białorusi – najtrudniej było dostać wizę. Ja nie wiem, dlaczego w jednym kraju jest to łatwe, przecież to są te same struktury MSZ-owskie, to jest wydział konsularny i w jednym kraju to można zrobić, w innym nie można (P 12). Zwraca się uwagę również na to, że wizy wydawane są na zbyt krótki okres – utrudnia to intensywniejsze osobiste kontakty w czasie przygotowywania czy trwania projektów. Z drugiej strony oczywistą przyczyną problemów z wizami jest kontekst polityczny – trudno jest uzyskać wizy dla osób, które są zaangażowanie politycznie. Jak to określił jeden z rozmówców z dużym doświadczeniem we współpracy z Białorusią: Ale te przejścia graniczne, wizy itd. – na przykład z nimi to jest szalenie utrudnione. Za każdym razem musimy walczyć i są zresztą wśród nich tacy ludzie, którzy by w ogóle nie dostali wizy, gdyby nie nasze wstawiennictwo, prośba ambasadora czy konsula, bo są już tam na jakichś czarnych listach itd., więc z tym jest bardzo trudno z Białorusią (P 20). Dużą trudnością wskazywaną przez większość organizacji pozarządowych jest biurokracja i wydłużony czas wydawania koniecznych decyzji. Jest proekologiczny projekt: z jednej strony robimy oczyszczalnię i z drugiej strony robimy oczyszczalnię. Fajnie – są równoważne projekty, znajdziemy partnera, tylko zanim zarejestruję, to jest jedno ryzyko, z drugiej strony nawet, jak ja to zarejestruję w miarę szybko, to nie dostanę wkładu własnego ich, bo oni nie mają pieniędzy na to. Zanim oni wystąpią do ministerstwa i dostaną (bo jest taka możliwość), to miną dwa lata, a ja już za ten czas stracę projekt. Także to są realne ograniczenia, które nie pozwalają na wprowadzenie ciekawych rzeczy (P 12). 4.5.2. Bariery współpracy z Litwą Litwa jest partnerem postrzeganym jako najłatwiejszy w nawiązaniu i prowadzeniu współpracy. Ułatwienia we współpracy wiążą się oczywiście z przynależnością Litwy do Unii Europejskiej, co sprawia, że pewne standardy prowadzenia projektów, ich rozliczania są wspólne. Ogromnym ułatwieniem w kontaktach jest brak granicy państwowej dzięki wspólnemu udziałowi obu państw w strefie Schengen. Ewidentnie, brak kontroli czy konieczności uzyskania wiz jest ogromnym ułatwieniem we wzajemnych kontaktach. Nie wskazuje się również problemów w obszarze komunikacji: często używane są takie formy kontaktów jak bezpośrednie kontakty zarówno w Polsce, jak i na Litwie oraz wymiana informacji pocztą elektroniczną. Bariery we współpracy polsko-litewskiej, które były wskazywane przez organizacje pozarządowe, dotyczyły: 1. większej centralizacji struktur administracyjnych, procesu decyzyjnego, zarządzania funduszami unijnymi na Litwie. Przedstawiciel jednego z euroregionów tak określał tę sytuację: Tutaj z Polską i Litwą zrealizowaliśmy dwa projekty, dwa fundusze małych projektów, ale też wśród Litwinów cały czas nastawienie jest takie, że oni nie chcą decentralizacji, nie chcą, żeby jakakolwiek organizacja zdobyła doświadczenie. To jest mały kraj, chcą wszystko zarządzać centralnie, także mają duże opory, by komukolwiek przekazać przynajmniej część środków do zarządzania i takie procedury, takie formalności zostały ustalone, że praktycznie bardzo ciężko było realizować te projekty, no, ale udało się (P 10). Problem centralizacji dotyczy również procesu zbierania danych dotyczących na przykład działań w ramach programów unijnych: trudno nawet uzyskać kompatybilne, spójne dane dla całego euroregionu. Po prostu jest system gromadzenia danych – u nich na Litwie przeprowadzono w ostatnich latach reformę administracyjną, zlikwidowano taki regionalny szczebel samorządów, powstały tylko rady regionalne i stwierdzono, że dane statystyczne będą agregowane tylko na poziomie centralnym i są dane dotyczące całego kraju, a nie regionów. I nie ma możliwości uzyskać danych na temat pogranicza, tym bardziej że tutaj, po stronie litewskiej, w skład Euroregionu wchodzą te samorządy, które należą do takiej instytucji publicznej: Biuro Euroregionu Niemen w Mariampolu. Danych na temat tych samorządów nie można uzyskać ani oficjalnych, ani nieoficjalnych i nie można ich publikować. I danych nie mamy. Taka prozaiczna rzecz (P 10). 51www.soclab.org.pl 2. W świetle uzyskanych danych jakościowych można uznać, że tylko w relacjach polsko-litewskich (a w perspektywie naszych rozmówców raczej w litewsko-polskich) widoczną rolę odgrywają takie czynniki społeczne, jak konflikty dotyczące pamięci zbiorowej czy stereotypy. Jest to bariera, która raczej należy do sfery odczuć, nigdy niewypowiedziana wprost. Trudno orzec, na ile jest to projekcja polskich partnerów, a na ile rzeczywiste postawy litewskich współpracowników. Doświadczenie takiej niechęci, skutkującej w odmowie współpracy, opisuje jeden z naszych rozmówców w następujący sposób: Myślę, że to są też kwestie pewnego rodzaju stereotypu czy przekonania... Bo wiesz, Litwini są nieufni wobec Polaków i wiadomo, jak czasami to jest, że narody o sobie myślą dziwne rzeczy nawzajem. Pomimo tego, że oni działają na takim samym polu jak my, mimo tego, że jeden z tych ludzi, którzy działają w tym stowarzyszeniu zna się z nami osobiście, to mimo tego nie mógł przekonać swoich liderów do tego, że warto z nami współpracować. I może to nie była wrodzona niechęć? Może oni bali się, że to właśnie za tym pójdzie jakaś dziwna akcja. My nawet proponowaliśmy podpisanie umowy partnerskiej – może wtedy tej formalizacji się też przestraszyli? Nie wiem, dlaczego tak wyszło, ale my odczuliśmy tę niechęć i przestaliśmy się starać, bo za długo staraliśmy się bez odzewu, żeby to mogło dojść do skutku (P19). O lęku i braku wiary w możliwości dobrej kooperacji jedna z doświadczonych na polu współpracy osób mówiła: Ale z drugiej strony jest to doświadczenie historyczne. Ta pamięć, ten lęk o zdominowanie przez stronę polską, wykupienie majątków, ziemi itd. Nie ma, myślę, takiego braku chęci mieszkańców do współpracy. W momencie, kiedy się pokazuje możliwości, kiedy pokazuje się alternatywy itd., to takie chęci są naturalne, istnieją. Ja nigdy nie napotkałem na taki opór mieszkańców – Litwinów, Polaków po jednej i drugiej stronie. Natomiast jest coś innego, że istnieje taki rodzaj bierności albo niewiary w swoje siły, albo strachu czy lęku, czy niezrozumienia, że można i jak można. Jakie instrumenty do tego znaleźć, kto by mógł pomóc, czy to w ogóle da się radę itd.? Tu jest jakby, myślę, główny problem troszkę też mentalny związany z brakiem jeszcze takiej warstwy samodzielnych przedsiębiorców, inicjatorów. Nie mówię tylko w sensie ekonomicznym, też kulturalnym, innych społecznych przedsięwzięć, więc po to też ta nasza szkoła i po to różne inne potrzebne działania, myślę, żeby taką warstwę budować i ona na pewno na niechęć nie napotka. To znaczy, wierzę, że znajdzie rezonans. Oczywiście, że są takie środowiska, które pielęgnują wszystkie resentymenty i na tym jakby budują swoje istnienie (P20). Z drugiej strony jeden z rozmówców podkreślał paradoksalne wyhamowanie dobrej współpracy polsko-litewskiej po przyłączeniu się do Unii Europejskiej. Zwraca on uwagę na to, że polska strona nie wykazuje empatii i nie rozumie, że Litwini mogą czuć się zagrożeni w kontaktach dwustronnych z racji tego, że Polska jest krajem dużym, z bardzo dużą mniejszością polską na terenie Litwy: Jedna jest taka generalna, myślę, faza, bo to idzie fazami, że po takim mocnym otwarciu na początku lat 90., w którym braliśmy udział, ale też było wiele inicjatyw z przedsiębiorczości, z ekologii, z innych dziedzin, które stworzyły euroregion Niemen, który stworzyły Polsko-Litewską Izbę Gospodarczą itd., że one pod koniec lat 90. i na takim progu naszego wejścia do Unii Europejskiej zupełnie straciły na swoim animuszu. I na to nałożyły się jakby rosnące też napięcia na nowo polsko-litewskie. Zwłaszcza z mniejszością polską w Litwie. I to się okazało takie paraliżujące na tym pograniczu, i nastąpiła taka faza wycofania, jakby oddania znowuż głosu ludziom bardziej radykalnym, wrogo do siebie nastawionym, takiego nowego resentymentu, wzajemnych pretensji, roszczeń itd. Teraz się powoli, mam takie wrażenie, z tej fazy wydostajemy, ale to nigdy nie jest tak, jak nam się wydawało po '89 roku, że już to będzie tylko taka linia wzrostu i będzie coraz lepiej. To myślę, że to jest też związane z różnymi sprawami kulturowymi, których w ogóle nie doceniamy – psychologicznymi, lękami naszymi, zwłaszcza w małej Litwie, która ma swoje demograficzne problemy, która przyjmuje taki kryzys 2009 roku zupełnie inaczej niż w Polsce, bo w Polsce to był kryzys jakiś gospodarczy i zresztą też niewiele, mało widoczny. Natomiast tam, to było jakby wstrząśnięcie posadami niezależności, prawda? Takiego lęku „czy przetrwamy?" – jako naród, jako język (P20). Konieczne wydaje się tutaj zwiększenie nacisku na tworzenie dobrej atmosfery wokół stosunków polsko-litewskich na poziomie państwowym oraz praca nad zmianą wzajemnych stereotypów. Co ważne, jak podkreśliło kilkoro naszych rozmówców, jeśli dochodzi już do kontaktów ze stroną litewską i następują rozmowy o konkretnych projektach, to często pragmatyzm, wynikający z widocznych korzyści współpracy staje się najważniejszy: Negatywne stereotypy sąsiadów. One oczywiście istnieją, ale ja bym tego akurat nie przeceniał. One nie są zaporą, jeżeli zaczyna się mówić o kon52 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim kretach, realiach i schodzi się z takiej debaty historycznej na kwestie naszych codziennych wyzwań czy konieczności. Tutaj się natychmiast znajduje wspólną platformę do rozmowy (P 20). Sama więc praca nad konkretnymi działaniami może być skutecznym narzędziem zmiany postaw wobec siebie. 3. Jednym z ważniejszych czynników, który wpływa na stosunki transgraniczne między Litwą a Polską, są relacje tych krajów z mniejszościami. Napięcia między mniejszością polską a Litwą w ostatnich latach, już w sytuacji funkcjonowania w ramach Unii Europejskiej (spór o maturę w języku polskim, zapis nazwisk i nazw miejscowości) są postrzegane jako jedne z istotnych czynników wpływających na współpracę z litewskimi partnerami. Co ciekawe, w trakcie wywiadu z jedną z większych organizacji, która intensywnie współpracuje z Litwą, pojawił się również element trudności we współpracy z mniejszością litewską w Polsce: Nawet bym powiedział, że gdy pomyślimy o tych relacjach, czy naszych działaniach z Litwinami, to one nigdy nie były trudne. Znaczy, zawsze były dużo łatwiejsze, nawet w jakimś sensie z tamtą stroną niż tutaj na miejscu, po sąsiedzku. Bo ta nasza trudność na miejscu polega na tym, że wobec aktywistów, działaczy mniejszości narodowych – nam nie było łatwo od początku się znaleźć, prawda? To nie były pokrywające się interesy. Niestety. (...) Oni często byliby chyba bardziej zainteresowani, na co się Miłosz, pamiętam, w rozmowie z Venclovą kiedyś skarżył, że chcieliby mieć do czynienia z „anima naturaliter endeciana", prawda? – czyli lepiej mieć czasem nacjonalistów z drugiej strony do czynienia. Wtedy jest wszystko jasne, jest mniej więcej wspólny język, wspólna konfrontacja i jedni jakby dodają oliwy do ognia dla drugich. Jakoś potrzebują siebie nawzajem, bym powiedział. Tego nie było w naszych kontaktach po tamtej stronie i zawsze, pamiętam, od początku mieliśmy tam dobrych i partnerów i działania – i z Wilnem, i z Kownem, i z innymi miejscami czy partnerami w Litwie (P 20). 4. Pomimo ułatwień w przekraczaniu granic widoczny jest problem publicznego transportu (autobusy) do małych przygranicznych miejscowości. Jest to niezbędny element w budowaniu relacji pomiędzy mieszkańcami na obszarach przygranicznych, w których współpraca transgraniczna powinna pójść w kierunku codziennych kontaktów pomiędzy ościennymi (przygranicznymi) gminami/rejonami, lokalnymi instytucjami kultury czy organizacjami pozarządowymi. 5. W kontaktach polsko-litewskich niekiedy barierę stanowi język. Dość częstą sytuacją opowiadaną w wywiadach jest posługiwanie się zrozumiałym przez stronę litewską językiem polskim. Jednak coraz częściej pojawiają się głosy, że z racji napięć związanych z historią tego regionu i konieczności równego, podmiotowego traktowania litewskich współpracowników porozumiewanie się w języku polskim jest „nietaktem" kulturowym. Jeden z naszych rozmówców, który był bardzo wyczulony na podmiotowe traktowanie drugiej strony w kontaktach transgranicznych, tak określił tę sytuację: Drugi jest element natury językowej. Bardzo poważny na tym pograniczu. My mamy tę wadę jako potomkowie Rzeczpospolitej, której lingua franca był język polski i językiem elit kulturalnych, asymilacji itd., że nie znamy innych języków, a zwłaszcza języków naszych sąsiadów. I fakt, że nie uczymy się czy w niewielkim stopniu znamy język litewski też przeszkadza tej komunikacji transgranicznej, a także jest problemem dla języka litewskiego tutaj po naszej stronie, który jest naszym skarbem i uważam, że powinniśmy wszystko zrobić, żeby on na Sejneńszczyźnie ocalił się. I działaczom mniejszości, nauczycielom, pedagogom jest strasznie trudno w tej kurczącej się społeczności i w takiej sytuacji, że spotkamy się w większym gronie ludzi, i wystarczy, że jedna osoba nie zna, nie rozumie języka litewskiego, wszyscy przechodzą na polski... ten język jakby powoli zanika. Szansę dlatego widziałbym właśnie w tym, żebyśmy my również zaczęli się tego języka uczyć. Tu myślimy właśnie o takim kursie języka litewskiego nie tylko dla Litwinów, tylko dla Polaków, żebyśmy się po prostu za to również wzięli. To jest jakby kolejny element (P20). Oczywiście pragmatycznym wyjściem jest używanie języka angielskiego, ale w sytuacji kontaktów z partnerami na przykład z małych miejscowości przygranicznych jest to bardzo trudne. Jeden z rozmówców stwierdził: Tak, to jest nawet śmieszne. Pamiętam, jak się spotykałem pierwszy raz w ramach grupy Zagranica. Wszyscy ludzie mówili, że będą mówić po angielsku. Tylko do kogo oni będą mówić, jak ludzie na wsi w Mołdawii nie rozumieją języka angielskiego? To oni mogą mówić – do siebie (P12). 53www.soclab.org.pl 4.5.3. Bariery współpracy z Ukrainą Współpraca z Ukrainą jest widoczna przede wszystkim w wywiadach z przedsiębiorcami. W swojej działalności opierają się oni zazwyczaj na długoletnich kontaktach z partnerami ukraińskimi. W takich sytuacjach współpraca biznesowa układa się dobrze. Widać to wyraźnie wtedy, kiedy nasi rozmówcy porównują współpracę z firmami na Białorusi i Ukrainie. Przewaga ukraińskich kontaktów handlowych to: względna otwartość granicy państwowej (nie ma obowiązku wizowego), szybka komunikacja (w tym za pośrednictwem telefonów czy Internetu), dobra znajomość języka angielskiego i łatwy nabór pracowników do polskich firm ze znajomością języka rosyjskiego, współpracowanie na postawie wieloletnich umów i kontraktów. Respondenci podkreślali, że przedsiębiorstwa po stronie ukraińskiej funkcjonują sprawnie i dzięki temu komunikacja z nimi nie jest trudna. Jak to określił jeden z naszych rozmówców: Tam, gdzie się napotyka na współpracę z państwem, to już jest tragedia. A tam gdzie się napotyka na współpracę z przedsiębiorcami, to jest wszystko normalne (P1). O wiele trudniej znaleźć przedsiębiorcom nowych współpracowników lub wejść na rynek ukraiński ze swoimi produktami czy usługami bez poprzedniej współpracy. Jednak widać wyraźnie, że istnieje pewien system poszukiwania nowych kontrahentów: wykorzystuje się tutaj targi czy kontakty bezpośrednie. Jeden z respondentów opisywał to w następujący sposób: (...) kontakty to najczęściej na targach żywnościowych, też byliśmy między innymi na targach na Ukrainie, no poza tym tutaj wiele zapytań bezpośrednio przychodzi do nas, są takie firmy specjalizujące się w różnych krajach, one tam zbierają zamówienia z różnych krajów i też się tym posiłkujemy (P 17). Inny respondent, który reprezentował firmę próbującą wejść na rynek ukraiński, również opisał to w kategoriach bardzo aktywnej działalności: To znaczy, wie pan, nie powiem, nie możemy się jednak wybić na Ukrainie troszeczkę. Już próbujemy któryś rok, sprzedają się te nasze maszyny, ale nie w takiej ilości, jak byśmy chcieli, więc bierzemy udział w różnych targach, zapraszamy również firmy do nas, na targi w Polsce. To firmy szukamy aktywnie, także to jest jeszcze dla nas ścieżka dość otwarta do rozwoju (P22). Problemem jest tutaj raczej sposób weryfikacji poszczególnych ofert, ich wiarygodności. Odległość geograficzna, jak również brak dłuższych tradycji współpracy w otoczeniu biznesu sprawia, że współpraca ta związana jest z mniejszym zainteresowaniem. Współpraca z Ukrainą pojawia się znacznie rzadziej w wywiadach z samorządami, organizacjami pozarządowymi czy uczelniami wyższymi. Wśród tych podmiotów widać zainteresowanie tą współpracą, widzi się potencjał Ukrainy jako partnera, jednak brakuje tutaj tradycji współpracy oraz umiejętności nawiązania kontaktów – jak to zostało określone przez jednego z naszych rozmówców: A jeżeli chodzi o bilateralne stosunki, jakieś tam kulturalne... no, z Ukrainą, my nie graniczymy bezpośrednio z Ukrainą, więc praktycznie jako województwo podlaskie nie ma żadnych kontaktów z Ukrainą. Jest nam bardzo przykro z tego powodu, chcielibyśmy, żeby właśnie częściej była Ukraina zapraszana, częściej były rozmowy prowadzone – na poziomie uczelni, na poziomie szkół, na poziomie różnych kolonijnych imprez czy nawet zespołów ludowych. Na pewno wiemy, że Ukraina ma bardzo bogatą kulturę, mają się czym pochwalić i byśmy chcieli, żeby ta współpraca była bardziej mocniejsza. W tej chwili ja jej nie widzę. W województwie podlaskim nie, może w tych województwach, które graniczą z Ukrainą coś takiego jest, natomiast do nas nic nie dociera, jest to bardzo lokalnie i za mało tego jest, to jest zdecydowanie za mało (P 17). Również ze strony uczelni wyższych widać było zainteresowanie współpracą z Ukrainą, jednak jest ona wciąż bardziej w formie planów niż konkretnych i zaawansowanych działań: W mojej ocenie najbardziej taki perspektywiczny kierunek współpracy to jest Ukraina, dlatego że tam jest, powiedziałbym, duże zainteresowanie studiami w Polsce i to jest oczywiście 50-milionowy naród, więc dużo ośrodków akademickich i tak dalej (P29). W przypadku uczelni wyższych z pewnością utrudnia nawiązanie intensywnych kontaktów już istniejąca i dobrze rozwijająca się współpraca z ośrodkami naukowymi z województwa lubelskiego. Ewidentną przeszkodą jest postrzeganie Ukrainy jako partnera niestabilnego, niepewnego. Wyobrażenie o Ukrainie jest raczej negatywne, wiąże się z korupcją, niejasną sytuacją polityczną: [oczekiwalibyśmy] zniesienia barier urzędowych, chodzi właśnie o te przejścia graniczne, to na pewno. Na Ukrainę w sumie też jest ciężko się dostać, bo tam są kolejki na granicy i w ogóle strasznie niebezpiecznie jest, więc jakieś tam dziwne rzeczy się zdarzają. Dlatego każdy się boi takich partnerów (P 26). Wydaje się, że Ukraina jest usytuowana najniżej w priorytetowych działaniach na rzecz współpracy transgranicznej. Może wiązać się to z ograniczonymi możliwościami organizacyjnymi badanych podmiotów. Współpraca z pozostałymi państwami jest na tyle absorbująca i związana z utrudnieniami, że brakuje 54 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim już możliwości rozszerzania kierunków działania o kolejną, dość problematyczną współpracę zagraniczną. Dotyczy to zwłaszcza takich podmiotów, jak samorządy i organizacje pozarządowe: To znaczy za współpracę międzynarodową tutaj u nas (...) odpowiadam tylko ja, tylko że ja mam obecnie duży projekt: Polska, Litwa, Rosja to nie będzie czasu (P3). Wśród najpoważniejszych barier we współpracy z Ukrainą w kontaktach biznesowych wymieniane są: • niska przepustowość przejść granicznych, których konsekwencją jest długi czas oczekiwania na przejazd przez granicę; • z punktu widzenia przedsiębiorstw najważniejszą barierą są cła i wysokie podatki, które powodują obniżenie konkurencyjności polskiej oferty; • zła jakość infrastruktury drogowej (zwłaszcza po stronie ukraińskiej); • korupcja po stronie ukraińskiej; • problemy w weryfikowaniu firm ukraińskich, które mogłyby stać się potencjalnymi parterami biznesowymi. Wykorzystuje się tutaj kontakty i wiedzę Izb Handlowych; • niejasne powiązania między biznesem, państwem a zorganizowaną przestępczością. 4.5.4. Bariery współpracy z Rosją Współpraca z Rosją w wybranej do wywiadów pogłębionych próbie niemal wyłącznie dotyczyła tylko przedsiębiorstw. Wśród organizacji pozarządowych tylko dwie miały doświadczenie we współpracy z Obwodem Kaliningradzkim. Dla przedsiębiorstw jest to obszar bardzo atrakcyjny, głównie z powodu zniesienia cła w utworzonej specjalnej strefie ekonomicznej w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Jedną z największych trudności są odmienne wymagania związane z produkcją czy przetwórstwem (np. przepisy weterynaryjne). Przedstawiciele firm, które przeszły przez ten proces dostosowania, bardzo pozytywnie wyrażali się na temat współpracy z Rosją. Bariera językowa nie jest duża: w kilku firmach byli zatrudnieni Białorusini, którzy mogli łatwiej komunikować się ze stroną rosyjską oraz lepiej rozumieli różnice kulturowe. Jedyna bardzo wyraźna bariera to wpływ decyzji i napięć politycznych między Polską, Unią Europejską a Rosją (w wywiadach wspomniano m.in. o odstąpieniu Rosji od Konwencji TIR). Przy innych krajach nie było to tak mocno akcentowane – tutaj respondenci wprost mówili o trudnościach z tym związanych. Jednocześnie potwierdzali, że za każdym razem konflikty te są rozwiązywane. Natomiast samorządy i organizacje pozarządowe podkreślały, że trudno jest im znaleźć po stronie rosyjskiej partnera do współpracy. Jak to określił jeden z rozmówców: W Rosji jest gorzej i tam są mniej doświadczeni partnerzy (...) Organizacji tam jest niewiele pozarządowych i nie są one tak aktywne, nie mają możliwości. No i nie mają kadry, ale na to trzeba było pracować parę lat, żeby taką kadrę wykształcić (...). Z czterech krajów – Polską, Litwą, Rosją, Białorusią – to chyba najtrudniej z Rosjanami. Ale to nie wynika z tego, że oni nie chcą, ale dlatego, że tam są jakieś polityczne rzeczy i zresztą ci partnerzy najmniejsze doświadczenie mają – najmniej aktywne są te organizacje, choć bardzo, bardzo otwarte. Tutaj samorządy, takie jak Gołdap, Olecko, dobrze współpracują, te przygraniczne... Ale już na poziomie organizacji pozarządowych czy na poziomie biura Euroregionu, to już nie ma tych struktur i ciężko zachować ciągłość, tę aktywną współpracę. To chyba z Rosją najgorzej. I tam te bezpośrednie uwarunkowania polityczne mają większy wpływ niż tu, na tym pograniczu polsko-białoruskim (P10). 55www.soclab.org.pl 5. WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA W ŚWIETLE BADAŃ ILOŚCIOWYCH 5.1. Ogólna charakterystyka współpracy międzynarodowej w województwie podlaskim Spośród 118 gmin województwa podlaskiego niespełna połowa (52 gminy) zadeklarowały prowadzenie współpracy międzynarodowej. Pozostałe 66 gmin nie wykazało żadnej aktywności w kooperacji z zagranicznymi partnerami. Na poniższej mapie wyraźnie daje się zauważyć, iż gminy deklarujące współpracę rozlokowane są na wschodniej ścianie województwa. Im dalej od granicy państwa polskiego, tym rzadziej samorządy prowadzą współpracę międzynarodową. 5.1.1. Porównanie gmin prowadzących i nieprowadzących współpracy międzynarodowej W odniesieniu do gmin prowadzących współpracę międzynarodową nasuwa się pytanie, czy (w opinii badanych) owa współpraca przekłada się na kondycję lokalnej gospodarki. Dlatego też w badaniu ilościowym posłużono się na początku wskaźnikami pozwalającymi zmonitorować różnicę w ocenie sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej wśród gmin prowadzących i nieprowadzących współpracy międzynarodowej. Należy nadmienić, że ocena była subiektywna i dokonywana przez respondentów zorientowanych w aspektach ekonomicznych lokalnego samorządu. Badanie dowiodło, iż gminy prowadzące współpracę zagraniczną były znacznie bardziej skłonne do pozytywnej oceny swojej aktualnej sytuacji społeczno-gospodarczej niż jednostki samorządu terytorialnego niepodejmujące kooperacji. To porównanie implikuje dwie hipotezy: 1. gminy zasobniejsze, o lepszej kondycji społeczno-gospodarczej, decydują się na współpracę międzynarodową; 2. współpraca międzynarodowa prowadzona przez gminy przyczynia się do poprawy sytuacji społeczno- -gospodarczej. Niestety, aspekty badania PAPI koncentrowały się w szerszej mierze na gminach prowadzących współpracę transgraniczną i nie było celem projektu dokładne porównywanie gmin na osi współpracujące versus niewspółpracujące, dlatego odpowiedź na powyższe hipotezy pozostawiona będzie do czasu realizacji innego projektu poświęconego tej tematyce. 56 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 1. W sp ół pr ac a m ię dz yn ar od ow a Źr ód ło : A na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. r współpracują nie współpracują 57www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 6. Sytuacja społeczno-gospodarcza gmin na tle województwa podlaskiego w ocenie gmin prowadzących i nieprowadzących współpracy międzynarodowej WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Bardzo dobrze 8 15,4+ 2 3,1Raczej dobrze 25 48,1 34 52,3 Ani dobrze, ani źle 16 30,8 20 30,8 Raczej źle 3 5,8 5 7,7 Zdecydowanie źle - 1 1,5 Trudno powiedzieć - 3 4,6 Razem 52 100 65 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Konstrukcja narzędzia badawczego w postaci kwestionariusza wywiadu pozwoliła na porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z tymi, które tego nie praktykują pod względem czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą gminy. Z tego zestawienia odnotowano kilka statystycznie istotnych różnic: gminy aktywne we współpracy międzynarodowej jako swój atut znacznie częściej wskazywały walor turystyczny (73%), przygraniczne położenie (46%) oraz różnorodną i bogatą ofertę instytucji kulturalnych (25%). Gminy nieprowadzące współpracy międzynarodowej akcentowały dobre relacje na rodzimym gruncie z sąsiednimi gminami (54%) oraz posiadanie dobrej komunikacji (drogi, koleje) (46%). Potwierdza się zatem obraz z mapy prezentującej rozkład przestrzenny gmin współpracujących z zagranicą, gdzie w znacznej mierze znajdowały się one właśnie we wschodnim pasie województwa, który to stanowi zarazem granicę państwa. Położenie gminy w sposób istotny wpływa zatem na podejmowanie współpracy międzynarodowej. Tabela 7. Pięć czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Walory turystyczne 38 73,1+ 36 55,4Dobra współpraca z sąsiednimi gminami 14 26,935 53,8+ Dobra komunikacja (drogi, kolej) 11 21,230 46,2+ Przygraniczne położenie 24 46,2+ 7 10,8Różnorodna i bogata oferta instytucji kulturalnych 13 25,0+ 4 6,2Razem 52 100 65 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118, na wykresie zaprezentowano jedynie czynniki, między którymi zaszły istotne statystycznie różnice (p<0,05). 58 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Analizując bariery rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego gmin współpracujących z zagranicą i zestawiając je z gminami niewspółpracującymi, odnotowano następujące istotne różnice. Gminom współpracującym statystycznie częściej doskwiera niewystarczający poziom rozwoju infrastruktury granicznej (np. przejścia graniczne, obwodnice, drogi, mosty), ale także słaby rozwój gospodarczy (mało inwestycji). Gminy niewspółpracujące częściej podkreślały czynniki, takie jak mało aktywne organizacje pozarządowe oraz słaba promocja gminy na zewnątrz, co w pewnej mierze może przekładać się na brak propozycji współpracy ze strony zagranicznych podmiotów. W przypadku gmin współpracujących, gdzie zostało udowodnione, że przygraniczne położenie częściej determinuje kontakty zagraniczne, bariery w postaci niedrożnych przejść granicznych mogą negatywnie wpływać na wzrost gospodarczy, a co za tym idzie na ilość inwestycji w gminach. Tabela 8. Pięć barier w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Niewystarczający poziom rozwoju infrastruktury granicznej (np. przejścia graniczne, obwodnice, drogi, mosty) 18 34,6+ 6 9,2Słaby rozwój gospodarczy (mało inwestycji) 30 57,7+ 24 36,9Mało aktywne organizacje pozarządowe 4 7,713 20,0+ Słaba promocja gminy na zewnątrz - -5 7,7+ Razem 52 100 65 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118, na wykresie zaprezentowano jedynie czynniki, między którymi zaszły istotne statystycznie różnice (p<0,05). Kolejne zestawienie gmin prowadzących współpracę międzynarodową z gminami, które jej nie praktykują, wydaje się być najbardziej obrazowe. Pokazuje ono dysproporcję w aktywności władz lokalnych w zakresie podnoszenia atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej gmin. Te współpracujące znacznie częściej deklarowały między innymi przygotowywanie ofert inwestycyjnych, uregulowanie statusu prawnego działek pod inwestycje, a także współpracę transgraniczną. Działania dotyczące współpracy transgranicznej ukazują głównie olbrzymie rozbieżności między gminami współpracującymi (44%) i niewspółpracującymi (1,5%). Można domniemywać, że gminy, które już współpracują, bardziej dbają o tę formę aktywności, gdyż może ona przyczyniać się do podniesienia poziomu ich atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej. Jednocześnie gminy niepodejmujące wysiłku zmierzającego w kierunku podjęcia współpracy międzynarodowej nie mogą liczyć na taką aktywność ze strony potencjalnego partnera zagranicznego. Zatem to w gestii lokalnych samorządów w dużej mierze leży zainicjowanie i rozpoczęcie współpracy. 59www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 9. Działania podejmowane przez władze lokalne w celu podniesienia atrakcyjności społecznogospodarczej obszarów gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Przygotowanie oferty inwestycyjnej 26 50,0+ 20 30,8Uregulowanie statusu prawnego działek pod inwestycje (obowiązujący Plan Zagospodarowania Przestrzennego) 23 44,2+ 15 23,1Uproszczenie i ułatwienie działań dotyczących obsługi procesów inwestycyjnych 11 21,2+ 5 7,7Uzbrojenie infrastrukturalne działek pod inwestycje 22 42,3+ 14 21,5Współpraca transgraniczna 23 44,2+ 1 1,5Promocja gminy z zastosowaniem nowoczesnych technologii komunikacyjnych 21 40,4 16 24,6 Razem 52 100 65 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118, na wykresie zaprezentowano jedynie czynniki, między którymi zaszły istotne statystycznie różnice (p<0,05). Ostatni aspekt porównania gmin współpracujących i niewspółpracujących dotyczył posiadania przez nie strategii rozwoju. Wśród dwóch typów gmin nie zachodzą istotne różnice. Blisko trzy na cztery gminy (współpracujące i niewspółpracujące) posiadają aktualną strategię rozwoju. Pojawiły się jednak duże rozbieżności, gdy zapytano respondentów o zawartość owych dokumentów strategicznych Na pytanie, czy strategia uwzględnia współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami samorządowymi, twierdząco odpowiedziała ponad połowa gmin współpracujących i tylko 16% niewspółpracujących. Podobnie rzecz się miała z uwzględnieniem w strategii współpracy z zagranicznymi podmiotami pozarządowymi. Wśród gmin współpracujących ujmuje te instytucje 34%, wśród niewspółpracujących jedynie 9%. Kolejne pytanie o zapisy w strategiach dotyczyło kooperacji w ramach struktur transgranicznych, na przykład w ramach euroregionu. Wśród gmin współpracujących takiego partnera uwzględniało w strategii 44%, natomiast u niewspółpracujących jedynie 9%. Tak duże dysproporcje dowodzą niezbicie, że gminy nieprowadzące współpracy międzynarodowej kompletnie pominęły ten aspekt działalności, przez co w znaczny sposób zmniejszają swoje szanse na nawiązanie kooperacji, szczególnie z wykorzystaniem finansowania unijnego, które w ramach projektów wymaga nierzadko wskazania w dokumentach strategicznych zapisów świadczących o priorytetowości przyjętych działań. Brak takich regulacji w strategii rozwoju gminy może dyskwalifikować ją w ubieganiu się o środki w ramach projektów międzynarodowych. 60 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Tabela 10. Czy Państwa gmina posiada aktualną strategię rozwoju? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Tak 38 73,1 47 74,6 Nie 10 19,2 12 19,0 Jest w trakcie opracowania 4 7,7 4 6,3 Razem 52 100 63 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Tabela 11. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami samorządowymi? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Tak 23 52,3+ 9 16,4Nie 20 45,542 76,4+ Nie wiem 1 2,3 4 7,3 Razem 44 100 55 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Tabela 12. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami pozarządowymi? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Tak 15 34,1+ 5 9,1Nie 28 63,646 83,6+ Nie wiem 1 2,3 4 7,3 Razem 44 100 55 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. 61www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 13. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę w ramach struktur transgranicznych na przykład w ramach euroregionu? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi WSPÓŁPRACA ZAGRANICZNA Współpracują Nie współpracują N % N % Tak 19 44,2+ 7 13,0Nie 22 51,243 79,6+ Nie wiem 2 4,7 4 7,4 Razem 43 100 54 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. 5.2. Ogólna charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim Analizując rozkład przestrzenny gmin prowadzących współpracę transgraniczną, można dostrzec, że podobnie jak w przypadku współpracy międzynarodowej, gros gmin ulokowanych jest na wschodniej ścianie województwa podlaskiego. Spośród 118 gmin współpracę transgraniczną (obejmującą cztery państwa: Białoruś, Litwę, Rosję i Ukrainę) prowadzi 49, co stanowi 41% ogółu badanych. Analizując mapę, na której zaprezentowano ilość państw, z jakimi współpracuje gmina, można zauważyć, że 24 gminy utrzymują współpracę z jednym krajem, 16 gmin z dwoma państwami sąsiednimi, 7 gmin z trzema, a 3 gminy z czterema krajami. W województwie podlaskim dominuje zatem współpraca opierająca się na kooperacji z wyłącznie jednym sąsiadem. Chcąc nakreślić, jak rozrysowują się sieci relacji gmin z krajami ościennymi, w poniżej tabeli zestawiono ze sobą tę samą zmienną określającą, z którymi państwami współpracuje obecnie każda z gmin. Dzięki temu widoczne jest, że spośród gmin współpracujących z Białorusią (31) ponad połowa (17) kontaktuje się także z Litwą. Dodatkowo te, które utrzymują współpracę z Rosją (11), aż w 9 przypadkach kooperują z Litwą, a w 7 z Białorusią. Podobnie ma się współpraca z Ukrainą. Spośród 12 gmin z nią współpracujących 9 nawiązało relacje z Litwą, 7 z Białorusią, a 5 z Rosją. Reasumując, można zauważyć, że trzon współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim stanowią kontakty podtrzymywane z Litwą i/lub Białorusią. Jeśli gmina dodatkowo utrzymuje stosunki z Rosją bądź Ukrainą, to w większości przypadków ma także zawiązane partnerstwa z jednym z pozostałych krajów sąsiedzkich, tj. z Białorusią i/lub Litwą. 62 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 2. G m in y de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę tr an sg ra ni cz ną Źr ód ło : A na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. 63www.soclab.org.pl M ap a 3. Il oś ć pa ńs tw , z ja ki m i w sp ół pr ac uj e gm in a (w sp ół pr ac a tr an sg ra ni cz na : B ia ło ru ś, L it w a, R os ja , U kr ai na ) Źr ód ło : A na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. 0 1 2 3 4 64 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Tabela 14. Sieci współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina N % N % N % N % Białoruś 31 100,0+ Litwa 17 54,8 33 100,0+ Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 6 19,4 10 30,3 11 100,0+ Ukraina 7 22,6 9 27,3 5 45,5 12 100,0+ Razem 31 100 33 100 11 100 12 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Potwierdzają to dane zawarte w poniższej tabeli, w której porównano intensywność obecnej współpracy gmin z jednym z czterech analizowanych państw. Okazuje się, że gminy prowadzące współpracę z Litwą znacznie częściej określały ją jako intensywną (24% wskazań), podczas gdy w przypadku Białorusi odsetek ten wyniósł 10%, natomiast w odniesieniu do Rosji i Ukrainy – 0%. Ścisłą współpracę deklarował podobny odsetek gmin, gdzie nie odnotowano różnic pomiędzy poszczególnymi krajami. Osiągał on poziom 33% w przypadku Ukrainy – do 45 lub 46% w przypadku pozostałych państw. Oczywiście z powodu przynależności do UE najściślejsza i najlepsza współpraca ma miejsce z Litwą. W przypadku pozostałych państw rozkłada się ona podobnie, choć z Białorusią kontakty są intensywniejsze niż z Rosją czy Ukrainą. Tabela 15. Ogólna intensywność obecnej współpracy gmin Kraj Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina N % N % N % N % Bardzo wysoka 3 9,7 8 24,2+ - - - Wysoka 14 45,2 15 45,5 5 45,5 4 33,3 Niska 13 41,9 9 27,3 4 36,4 5 41,7 Bardzo niska - -1 3,0 2 18,2 3 25,0 Trudno powiedzieć 1 3,2 - - - - - Razem 31 100 33 100 11 100 12 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Poszukując kolejnych różnic w modelach współpracy transgranicznej z poszczególnymi krajami, zestawiono ze sobą czynniki, które zdaniem ankietowanych przyczyniają się do podniesienia atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej badanej gminy. Dzięki temu zabiegowi wychwycono istotne różnice mogące mieć wpływ na podjęcie decyzji o współpracy z jednym z czterech państw sąsiedzkich. W przypadku gmin współpracujących z Białorusią było to zwykle zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne oraz różnorodność i bogactwo oferty instytucji kulturalnych, co zwiększało jej atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą. Gminy pozo65www.soclab.org.pl stające w kontakcie z Litwą częściej podkreślały walory turystyczne, dużą ilość organizacji pozarządowych oraz rozwiniętą współpracę transgraniczną, a rzadziej zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne. W odniesieniu do Rosji padał argument położenia na przecięciu ważnych europejskich szlaków komunikacyjnych. Przekładając poniższe dane na konkretny wymiar współpracy (co zostanie wykazane w szczegółowej charakterystyce współpracy transgranicznej z poszczególnymi państwami), widać, że kontakty z Białorusią skupiają się na wymiarze etniczno-kulturalnym. Współpraca nie obejmuje dużych przedsięwzięć infrastrukturalnych, a raczej dotyczy miękkich działań społecznych, polegających na organizowaniu wspólnych imprez, wydarzeń kulturalnych. W przypadku Litwy budowanie i zacieśnianie relacji polega na realizacji wspólnych projektów unijnych poświęconych małej infrastrukturze, poprawiającej walory turystyczne w obydwu krajach. Tabela 16. Pięć czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą gminy Próba całkowita WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA Razem Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina N % N % N % N % N % Dobrej jakości środowisko naturalne 94 79,7 25 80,6 23 69,7 5 45,59 75,0 Walory turystyczne 74 62,7 24 77,4 28 84,8+ 7 63,6 8 66,7 Przygraniczne położenie 31 26,3 16 51,6 14 42,4 6 54,5 3 25,0Zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne 27 22,9 15 48,4+ 5 15,22 18,2 3 25,0 Położenie na przecięciu ważnych europejskich szlaków komunikacyjnych 24 20,3 6 19,4 7 21,2 6 54,5+ 4 33,3 Różnorodna i bogata oferta instytucji kulturalnych 18 15,3 11 35,5+ 9 27,3 3 27,3 4 33,3 Duża ilość aktywnych organizacji pozarządowych 10 8,5 2 6,5 6 18,2+ - -3 25,0 Rozwinięta współpraca transgraniczna 8 6,8 3 9,7 5 15,2+ 2 18,2 1 8,3 Razem 118 100 31 100 33 100 11 100 12 100 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118, na wykresie zaprezentowano jedynie czynniki, między którymi zaszły istotne statystycznie różnice (p<0,05). 5.3. Ogólne bariery współpracy transgranicznej – zestawienie analizowanych krajów Analiza warunków współpracy transgranicznej prowadzonej przez podlaskie gminy wskazuje, że istnieje szereg różnego rodzaju barier ograniczających czy wręcz uniemożliwiających aktywność w tym wymiarze. Badanie eksplorujące to samo zagadnienie w odniesieniu do polskiego pogranicza zachodniego prowadził Stanisław Ciok. W przyjętej metodologii podjął on próbę identyfikacji ograniczeń kooperacji w siedmiu obszarach: formalnoprawnym, instytucjonalnym, infrastrukturalnym, finansowym, gospodarczym, spo66 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim łecznym i środowiskowym (tabela 2). W ramach badania, którego dotyczy niniejszy raport, posłużono się zmodyfikowaną kafeterią sytuacji ilustrujących potencjalne problemy współpracy transgranicznej. Zaadoptowanie tego narzędzia do potrzeb niniejszego opracowania wydaje się uzasadnione, ponieważ analizowane tu dane również pochodzą z terenów pogranicznych, tyle że wschodnich. Oceniając uzyskane wyniki, należy brać pod uwagę status poszczególnych państw. Ich aktualna pozycja międzynarodowa, przynależność lub jej brak do Unii Europejskiej, obowiązujący ustrój, a także powszechna opinia o traktowaniu mniejszości polskiej będą istotnie wpływać na intensywność i jakość, jak również na ewentualną chęć współpracy. Tabela 17. Zestawienie czynników ograniczających współpracę międzynarodową wg S. Cioka GRUPA Czynniki ograniczające współpracę I Ograniczenia formalnoprawne: a. Brak odpowiednich przepisów i norm prawnych b. Nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów c. Niestabilność przepisów d. Brak osobowości prawnej regionu e. Brak międzynarodowych umów i porozumień o współpracy f. Brak równorzędnego partnera g. Skomplikowana procedura zawierania umów h. Skomplikowana procedura uzyskiwania środków pomocowych i. Ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy j. Niedostosowanie ustrojów ustawodawczych II Ograniczenia instytucjonalne: a. brak odpowiednich instytucji i urzędów b. brak kompetencji w istniejących instytucjach i urzędach c. mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy d. słabo rozwinięty system informacji e. słaba koordynacja pomiędzy instytucjami w zakresie współpracy f. częste zmiany (reorganizacje) instytucji i władz partnerów współpracy III Ograniczenia infrastrukturalne: a. mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych b. słabe zagospodarowanie infrastrukturalne przejść c. słaba dostępność komunikacyjna przejść d. niedorozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej IV Ograniczenia finansowe: a. brak właściwych środków b. brak osobowości prawno-finansowej regionu c. niska sprawność systemu rozliczeń finansowych d. brak systemu zabezpieczeń finansowych transakcji handlowych V Ograniczenia gospodarcze: a. asymetria w poziomie rozwoju gospodarczego partnerów b. odmienność systemów gospodarczych c. brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych VI Ograniczenia społeczne: a. słaba znajomość języka partnera b. negatywne stereotypy sąsiadów c. obawy przed napływem obcego kapitału 67www.soclab.org.pl VII Ograniczenia środowiskowe: a. duża odległość Źródło: A. Mierosławska, Czynniki aktywizujące i hamujące rozwój współpracy transgranicznej, [w:] Samorząd terytorialny, Nr 3, Wydawnictwo „KiK" Konieczny i Kruszewski/Oddział Polskich Wydawnictw Profesjonalnych Sp. z o.o., Warszawa 2004, s. 48 Poniżej zostały prezentowane wyniki badań pokazujące skalę obecności poszczególnych problemów w relacjach między Polską a państwami sąsiadującymi, tzn. Rosją, Litwą, Białorusią i Ukrainą. 5.3.1. Ograniczenia formalno-prawne Wykres 2. Bariery formalno-prawne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 38% 30% 31% 28% Ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy 35% 29% 26% 24% Skomplikowana procedura uzyskiwania środków pomocowych 35% 19% 23% 22% Nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów 32% 13% 21% 18% Niedostosowanie ustrojów ustawodawczych 31% 17% 25% 24% Brak odpowiednich przepisów i norm prawnych 31% 15% 24% 22% Niestabilność przepisów 26% 11% 22% 15% Brak międzynarodowych umów i porozumień o współpracy 26% 15% 22% 20% Brak równorzędnego partnera 23% 19% 19% 19% Skomplikowana procedura zawierania umów 12% 5% 11% 11% Brak osobowości prawnej regionu Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. 68 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Jednym z badanych obszarów ograniczających czy często uniemożliwiających współpracę transgraniczną gmin województwa podlaskiego była sfera formalno-prawna. W grupie tych czynników uwzględniono dwa aspekty: aspekt egzogeniczny oraz endogeniczny. W pierwszym z nich zawarto elementy, których postać zależy wyłącznie od woli i zdolności podmiotu zagranicznego lub polskiego (skomplikowana procedura zawierania umów), w drugiej zaś te, których konstrukcja uwarunkowana jest współdziałaniem (np. brak międzynarodowych umów i porozumień o współpracy). W ujęciu ogólnym nie można jednoznacznie przesądzić, która z grup czynników – według biorących udział w badaniu – w większym stopniu negatywnie oddziałuje na potencjalną współpracę. W zależności od rozważanego modelu kooperacji (polsko-rosyjska, polsko-białoruska, polsko-litewska, polsko-ukraińska) można zaobserwować istotne różnice. Odnosząc się do szczegółowych wyników, należy stwierdzić, że najczęściej podawanym powodem ograniczeń w nawiązaniu współpracy (we wszystkich jej modelach) była niewystarczająca liczba ofert ze strony potencjalnych partnerów. Ta odpowiedź uzyskała 38% wskazań w przypadku Białorusi, 31% – Rosji, 30% – Litwy i 28% – Ukrainy. Dane te prowadzą do dwóch zasadniczych wniosków: z jednej strony ukazują dość bierną postawę podmiotową gmin, które w zdecydowanej większości oczekują na możliwość skorzystania z gotowej propozycji współpracy, z drugiej – uwidaczniają brak pomysłów i inicjatywy na projekty oddolne. Swoisty marazm panujący w tym obszarze wynika prawdopodobnie z braku pozytywnych doświadczeń, które mogłyby być inspiracją dla aktywności własnej, oraz z niskiej świadomości korzyści wynikających ze współpracy. Kolejnym czynnikiem negatywnie wpływającym na ilość realizowanych projektów wspólnych są skomplikowane procedury ubiegania się o środki finansowe. Są one obarczone sporym ryzykiem niepowodzenia, cechuje je zbyt rozbudowana i często po prostu niezrozumiała ścieżka aplikacyjna. Trzecim pod względem ważności elementem ograniczającym współpracę jest ocena zespołu warunków prawnych identyfikowanych po stronie partnera: nieprecyzyjność, brak, niestabilność, niedopasowanie przepisów prawa, które to rzutują na niską aktywność polskich gmin w budowaniu wzajemnych relacji. Co znamienne, najjaskrawiej obszar ten widać w relacjach polsko-białoruskich, zaś najłagodniej zakłóca stosunki polsko-litewskie. 5.3.2. Ograniczenia instytucjonalne Wykres 3. Bariery instytucjonalne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw Słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji 47% 36% 40% 35% Mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy 37% 29% 28% 28% Brak odpowiednich instytucji i urzędów 30% 19% 25% 24% Słaba koordynacja pomiędzy instytucjami w zakresie współpracy 29% 19% 25% 23% Brak kompetencji kadr w istniejących instytucjach i urzędach 23% 13% 18% 19% Częste zmiany (reorganizacje) instytucji i władz partnerów współpracy 21% 14% 19% 15% Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. 69www.soclab.org.pl Kolejny zespół potencjalnych barier współpracy analizowany był w wymiarze instytucjonalnym. W tej grupie czynników za najważniejszy respondenci uznali słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji. Blisko połowa podmiotów biorących udział w badaniu zastrzeżenia w tym wymiarze miało do Białorusi, 40% do Rosji, a także Litwy – 36% i Ukrainy – 35%. Stosunkowo nisko została oceniona aktywność urzędników zmierzająca do nawiązania współpracy. Zarzut ten sformułowało 37% respondentów względem strony białoruskiej, 29% – rosyjskiej i po 28% – litewskiej i ukraińskiej. Najmniej istotne w perspektywie współpracy okazały się częste zmiany instytucji i władz partnerów współpracy. Umiarkowanie negatywnie został oceniony element braku odpowiednich instytucji, a także kompetencji kadry. 5.3.3. Ograniczenia infrastrukturalne Wykres 4. Bariery infrastrukturalne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 35% 10% 20% 17% Mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych 26% 15% 21% 18% Niedorozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej 22% 6% 12% 10% Słaba dostępność komunikacyjna przejść 15% 4% 12% 10% Słabe zagospodarowanie infrastrukturalne przejść Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Kolejnym z wymiarów barier utrudniających nawiązanie i rozwój współpracy transgranicznej był wymiar infrastrukturalny. W wywiadzie uwzględniono cztery zmienne odnoszące się do: • ilości i przepustowości przejść granicznych, • jakości infrastruktury komunikacyjnej, • dostępności przejść granicznych, • zagospodarowania przejść granicznych. W powyższym zestawieniu najwięcej uwag respondenci mieli wobec Białorusi. Głównym, w opinii badanych, problemem jest ilość przejść granicznych. Partnerem, u którego bariery infrastrukturalne występują w ograniczonym zakresie, jest Litwa. Warto przypomnieć, że przeszkody infrastrukturalne występujące pomiędzy Polską a Litwą nie są aż tak odczuwalne, co oczywiście jest konsekwencją tego, że obydwa kraje pozostają w Unii Europejskiej. 70 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.3.4. Ograniczenia finansowe Wykres 5. Bariery finansowe współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 68% 61% 57% 55% Ograniczone możliwości finansowe, w tym budżetów władz lokalnych terenów przygranicznych prowadzenia aktywnej polityki współpracy 24% 19% 20% 19% Brak instytucji Otoczenia biznesu 23% 13% 17% 16% Brak systemu zabezpieczeń finansowych transakcji handlowych 21% 12% 18% 18% Niska sprawność systemu rozliczeń finansowych 19% 14% 15% 16% Brak zabezpieczenia inwestycyjnego wspólnych projektów oraz kapitału obrotowego Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Wśród ograniczeń o charakterze finansowym (w wymiarze ogólnym) za najistotniejsze uznano niewystarczające środki na prowadzenie polityki współpracy. Z twierdzeniem tym zgodziło się ponad 50% badanych gmin – niezależnie od analizowanego modelu współpracy (68% wskazań dla Białorusi, 61% dla Litwy, 57% dla Rosji oraz 55% dla Ukrainy). Pozostałe bariery finansowe, w opinii respondentów, nie są tak istotne. Krajem, w którym, w opinii polskich gmin, wskazane determinanty oddziałują najsilniej, jest Białoruś. 5.3.5. Ograniczenia gospodarcze Wykres 6. Bariery gospodarcze współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 54% 20% 33% 29% Odmienność systemów gospodarczych 29% 23% 23% 22% Brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych 22% 6% 13% 13% Asymetria w poziomie rozwoju partnerów Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. W grupie czynników negatywnie wpływających na zdolność współpracy transgranicznej w wymiarze gospodarczym uwzględniono: • odmienność systemów gospodarczych, 71www.soclab.org.pl • brak silnej reprezentacji, • asymetrię poziomu rozwoju. Biorąc pod uwagę powyższe kryteria, należy zauważyć niską skłonność do współpracy z Białorusią, co jest spowodowane odmiennością systemów gospodarczych. Centralne zarządzanie i postępowanie wbrew zasadom wolnorynkowym zostało oznaczone jako bariera przez 54% badanych gmin. Średnio co trzecia gmina uczestnicząca w pomiarze wskazała na ten problem również w relacji z Rosją oraz Ukrainą. Państwem, w którym najrzadziej identyfikowano ograniczenia tej natury, jest Litwa (poziom jej rozwoju respondenci uznali za podobny do polskiego). 5.3.6. Ograniczenia społeczne Wykres 7. Bariery społeczne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 32% 39% 22% 23% Słaba znajomość języka partnera 25% 20% 17% 15% Negatywne stereotypy sąsiadów 23% 19% 24% 22% Negatywne doświadczenia historyczne 21% 15% 12% 12% Różnice w mentalności 19% 17% 17% 15% Brak chęci mieszkańców do współpracy 12% 6% 9% 9% Obawy przed napływem obcego kapitału Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Istotną sferą determinującą chęć współdziałania i faktyczną współpracę między gminami jest społeczny obraz relacji, jakie pomiędzy nimi zachodzą. W analizowanej kwestii problemowej za dominującą barierę w kontaktach uznano słabą znajomość języka partnera. Jako główne kryterium została ona wskazana w kontaktach z Litwą – aż 39% wskazań. Jeśli idzie o stereotypy pozostające w świadomości społeczności lokalnych, to największą przeszkodę stanowią one w kontaktach z Białorusinami, zaś najmniejszą z Ukraińcami. Wpływ historii na bieżące relacje międzypaństwowe w wymiarze współpracy transgranicznej najsilniej uwidacznia się w odniesieniu do Rosji. Różnice mentalności, w opinii respondentów, mogą determinować skuteczność relacji głównie z Białorusinami i Litwinami. Marginalną postać w zestawieniu ograniczeń o społecznym wymiarze ma obawa przed napływem obcego kapitału. Pragmatyczne myślenie dotyczy wszystkich potencjalnych kierunków współpracy. Oznaki obaw w omawianej kwestii problemowej deklarowano wobec kapitału białoruskiego, częściej niż pochodzącego z pozostałych państw. 72 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.3.7. Ograniczenia środowiskowe Wykres 8. Bariery środowiskowe współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw 34% 39% 59% 65% Duża odległość Białoruś Litwa Rosja Ukraina Źródło: Badanie PAPI, n=118. Okazuje się, że bariera odległości może być istotnym powodem niepodejmowania współpracy z gminami w sąsiednich państwach. Najbardziej negatywnie wpływa ona na budowanie relacji z Ukrainą oraz Rosją, w mniejszym stopniu dotyczy Litwy i Białorusi. 5.3.8. Podsumowanie bloku dotyczącego barier współpracy transgranicznej Analizując wskazania respondentów identyfikujące trudności współpracy transgranicznej, należy podkreślić ich największą koncentrację w obszarze instytucjonalnym (m.in. słabo rozwinięty system komunikacji i niska aktywność pracowników gmin), finansowym (głównie brak środków) i formalno-prawym, przejawiającym się przede wszystkim w ograniczonej ilości ofert współpracy, a także niedoskonałości uwarunkowań legislacyjnych partnera. Co ważne, podmioty biorące udział w badaniu stosunkowo nisko sklasyfikowały przeszkody mogące pojawić się na poziomie społeczności lokalnych. Poza problemem braku kompetencji językowych (w przypadku współpracy z Litwą) nie widać istotnych przeszkód, które mogłyby dystansować nas od sąsiadów. Fakt ten zasługuje na podkreślenie w kontekście historii i pokutującego, jak się okazało nieprawdziwe, przeświadczenia o problemach w relacjach sąsiedzkich. Odnosząc się do możliwości zmian we wskazanych obszarach problemowych, należy zauważyć stosunkowo ograniczoną zdolność poszczególnych gmin do wywierania wpływu na czynniki o charakterze zewnętrznym. Poniżej znajduje się propozycja oddziaływania w kierunku ograniczania bądź niwelowania zdefiniowanych barier współpracy transgranicznej. Z uwagi na charakter sugestii (funkcja kierunkowa/programowa, a nie operacyjna) mogą one być odpowiednie dla więcej niż jednego z państw sąsiadujących. Tabela 18. Przeszkody we współpracy transgranicznej oraz metody ich ograniczania lub niwelowania Przeszkody we współpracy transgranicznej Metody ograniczania lub niwelowania barier we współpracy Formalno-prawne Ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy Opracowanie środowiskowych strategii współpracy w wymiarze transgranicznym Analiza i promocja dobrych praktyk jako modeli inspirujących Organizacja warsztatów/seminariów mających na celu oznaczenie sąsiedzkich pól synergii Skomplikowana procedura uzyskiwania środków pomocowych Krytyczna analiza procedur aplikacyjnych i ewentualne konsultacje w potencjalnymi wnioskodawcami w kontekście pożądanych zmian Nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów Analiza stanu faktycznego i utworzenie wzajemnej listy postulatów do organów legislacyjnych 73www.soclab.org.pl Instytucjonalne Słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji Wypracowanie zakresu pożądanych informacji w relacjach wzajemnych Ustalenie zasad wymiany informacji Zdefiniowanie kanałów wymiany informacji Mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy Organizacja warsztatów strategicznych ukierunkowanych na wybór celów współpracy i sposobów ich realizacji Wizyty studyjne Utworzenie gminnych programów współpracy transgranicznej i przyporządkowanie narzędzi ich realizacji konkretnym pracownikom/komórkom organizacyjnym urzędu Ustalenie kalendarza aktywności transgranicznych Infrastrukturalne Mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych Analiza stanu faktycznego i ewentualne projektowanie pożądanych zmian Optymalizacja procedur granicznych względem ludności lokalnej Finansowe Ograniczone możliwości finansowe (w tym budżetów władz lokalnych terenów przygranicznych) prowadzenia aktywnej polityki współpracy Przygotowanie propozycji konkretnych projektów, poprzedzonych rzetelną analizą potrzeb i prognozowanych korzyści wynikających z ich realizacji, oraz aktywne poszukiwanie sposobu ich finansowania Poszukiwanie pomysłów na projekty samofinansujące się Realizowanie projektów w partnerstwie publiczno-prywatnym Ustanowienie i wyodrębnienie części budżetu na projekty/ współpracę transgraniczną Społeczne Brak znajomości języka państwa-sąsiada Intensyfikacja projektów kulturalnych Kursy językowe dla podmiotów nawiązujących współpracę transgraniczną Promocja świadomości odnośnie korzyści wynikających ze znajomości języka sąsiadów (kontekst zatrudnienia, biznesowy, poznawczy, turystyczny) Gospodarcze Odmienność systemów gospodarczych Brak Środowiskowe Duża odległość Brak 74 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.4. Charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej z Białorusią Spośród wszystkich gmin województwa podlaskiego nieco ponad 1/4 (dokładnie 31 gmin) zadeklarowała współpracę transgraniczną z Białorusią. Dodatkowo 16 przedstawicieli badanych samorządów stwierdziło, że w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat podejmowano próby takiej współpracy (por. mapa 4). Większość z gmin, które podjęły współpracę transgraniczną, położona jest nieopodal granicy polsko-białoruskiej, choć nie wszystkie gminy przygraniczne deklarują taką współpracę. W analizie przestrzennej ich rozmieszczenia zwraca uwagę skupienie gmin deklarujących współpracę w okolicach polskiej części Puszczy Białowieskiej, co z pewnością jest efektem działalności struktur Euroregionu Puszcza Białowieska na tym terenie (por. mapa 5). Podstawowe czynniki podnoszące atrakcyjność gmin współpracujących z Białorusią wskazane przez badanych respondentów to: dobrej jakości środowisko naturalne (deklaracja 25 gmin), walory turystyczne (24 gminy), przygraniczne położenie (16 gmin), zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne (15 gmin), różnorodna i bogata oferta instytucji kulturalnych (11 gmin). Podstawowe bariery w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym tych gmin to: problemy z zapewnieniem wkładu własnego do realizowanych projektów (22 gminy), skomplikowane procedury pozyskiwania funduszy zewnętrznych (15 gmin), słaby rozwój gospodarczy (14 gmin), niski poziom zaangażowania władz lokalnych i krajowych w rozwój gminy (14 gmin), niski bądź ujemny przyrost naturalny (12 gmin), niewystarczający poziom rozwoju infrastruktury granicznej (12 gmin), przewaga ludności w starszym wieku (11 gmin). Spośród deklarowanych działań podejmowanych przez władze gminy w celu podniesienia atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej wyróżniono w szczególności: pozyskiwanie środków z UE (30 gmin), dbanie o atrakcyjną ofertę kulturalną dla gminy (23 przypadki), pozyskiwanie środków z innych źródeł (20), podnoszenie jakości obsługi klienta (20), współpracę z innymi gminami (19). Wszystkie gminy współpracujące z Białorusią w ostatnich latach ubiegały się o środki z UE, większość z nich uczestniczyła w „Programie Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013". 75www.soclab.org.pl M ap a 4. G m in y de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. nie współpracują współpracują 76 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 5. P ró by n aw ią za ni a w sp ół pr ac y z Bi ał or us ią w o st at ni ch 5 la ta ch Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. próbowali nawiązać współpracę nie próbowali nawiązać współpracy 77www.soclab.org.pl 5.4.1. Aktywność gmin współpracujących z Białorusią w nawiązywaniu kontaktów z pozostałymi krajami sąsiedzkimi Przy analizie danych uzyskanych w badaniu uwagę zwraca stosunkowo niska aktywność podlaskich gmin współpracujących z Białorusią w nawiązywaniu kontaktów z pozostałymi krajami sąsiedzkimi. W chwili obecnej dla większości z nich Białoruś jest jedynym partnerem współpracy transgranicznej (por. mapa 3). Na zjawisko to wskazują również dwa dodatkowe fakty. Po pierwsze, podejmowane w ostatnich latach próby nawiązywania takiej współpracy. Po drugie zaś, deklarowane przez przedstawicieli gmin ewentualne chęci nawiązania takich kontaktów. Wykres 9. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią W1A� Czy próbowali Państwo w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat nawiązać współpracę z .? Litwą 135 Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Rosją 233 1 Ukrainą 214 1 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Wykres 10. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią W1C� Czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat zamierzają Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną z .....? Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Rosją 116 9 Litwą 39 4 Ukrainą 78 10 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Na podjęcie próby współpracy z Litwą wskazało tylko 5 z 31 badanych podmiotów współpracujących z Białorusią w województwie podlaskim. Podobnie niskie wskazania dotyczyły dodatkowej współpracy z Rosją (3 podmioty) i Ukrainą (4 gminy) (por. wykres 2). Podobną prawidłowość zaobserwowano przy analizie deklaracji dotyczących współpracy transgranicznej planowanej na najbliższe 3 lata. Spośród gmin prowadzących współpracę z Białorusią 9 zadeklarowała chęć podjęcia takiej współpracy z Litwą, 6 z Rosją i blisko 8 z Ukrainą (por. wykres 10). 78 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 11. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią W1D. Jakie są główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy wpspółpracujące z Białorusią? Litwa Rosja Ukraina 92% 80% 86% Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe 83% 90% 86% Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej 75% 70% 71% Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu 58% 70% 50% Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników 25% 30% 21% 25% 20% 14% Inne jakie 8% 10% 7% 8% 10% 7% Dążenie do uzyskania wpływu na decyzje dotyczące samorządów, które są podejmowane w UE 42% 30% 21% Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny Stworzenie mieszkańcom gminy możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Głównymi czynnikami zachęcającymi do podjęcia współpracy międzynarodowej okazały się: stworzenie możliwości wymiany dla mieszkańców gmin, możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe oraz promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej. Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości i biznesu są częściej wskazywane przez przedstawicieli gmin w kontekście współpracy z Rosją (w nieco mniejszym stopniu dotyczy to kontaktów z Litwą i Ukrainą), co być może świadczy o postrzeganiu tego partnera w kontekście współpracy gospodarczej ułatwionej przez funkcjonowanie Specjalnej Strefy Ekonomicznej w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Zagraniczne jednostki samorządowe mogą być również wzorem w zakresie dobrych praktyk, które – zdaniem przedstawicieli – gmin należy implementować na grunt rodzimy. W szczególności dotyczy to samorządów litewskich (na ten fakt wskazało ponad 40% gmin współpra79www.soclab.org.pl cujących z Białorusią), w drugiej kolejności rosyjskich, w trzeciej zaś ukraińskich. Rzadziej wskazywano na rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników czy też dążenie do uzyskania wpływu na decyzje dotyczące samorządów, które są podejmowane w UE jako przyczyny podjęcia współpracy międzynarodowej (por. wykres 4). 5.4.2. Intensywność, dynamika, obszary i skutki obecnej współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią Przedstawiciele gmin deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią w ponad połowie przypadków oceniają ją jako bardzo intensywną. Co ciekawe, niemal połowa badanych wskazuje również na jej bardzo niską intensywność. Zdania na ten temat są więc bardzo podzielone (por. wykres 12). Wykres 12. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Białorusią W2� Proszę ocenić w skali 1-4 OGÓLNĄ intensywność obecnej współpracy Państwa gminy z Białorusią Bardzo wysoka + wysoka Bardzo niska + niskaDane w ujęciu procentowym Trudno powiedzieć 44%53% 3% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Wykres 13. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Białorusią W2a� Proszę ocenić, czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat OGÓLNA intensywność współpracy Państwa gminy z Białorusią Pana(i) zdaniem, wzrośnie, pozostanie na obecnym poziome czy też zmaleje? Wzrośnie Pozostanie na tym samym poziomie Trudno powiedziećZmaleje 63%33% 4% Dane w ujęciu procentowym Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Nieco bardziej zbliżone opinie odnoszą się natomiast do przewidywanej intensywności współpracy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat. Ponad połowa respondentów stwierdziła, że pozostanie ona niezmienna – na tym samym poziomie, 33% badanych przedstawicieli gmin wskazało natomiast na przewidywany wzrost jej intensywności. Nikt nie zadeklarował, że intensywność tej współpracy zmaleje (por. wykres 13). Można więc określić ten stan oczekiwań jako ostrożny optymizm, co i tak jest dość pozytywną oceną dynamiki rozwoju współpracy z Białorusią przy tak trudnym do określenia kierunku rozwoju tego kraju. Najważniejszymi obszarami współpracy badanych gmin z Białorusią są: kultura (promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego), turystyka, sport, rekreacja oraz nauka i edukacja. Najmniej wykorzystywane są natomiast: rynek pracy, demokracja i prawa człowieka, służba zdrowia i opieka społeczna oraz pomoc rozwojowa. Wyniki te ukazują jednoznacznie, że podstawowe bariery współpracy związane są z systemem politycznym na Białorusi, który uniemożliwia pewne formy współpracy transgranicznej. Nic więc dziwnego, że w ramach współpracy rozwijane są te dziedziny, które pozostają w miarę neutralne politycznie. Podobnie jak w innych gminach województwa podlaskiego widoczne są trudności we włączeniu do współpracy transgranicznej działań związanych z przedsiębiorczością i rozwojem gospodarczym (por. wykres 14). W odpowiedziach świadczących o dużym wpływie współpracy z Białorusią na rozwój gminy wskazywano przede wszystkim na kulturę, sport, naukę i edukację oraz inwestycje w infrastrukturę. 80 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 14. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią W4� Proszę wskazać obszary współpracy w Państwa gminie z Białorusią oraz ocenić ich wpływ na rozwój gminy przy użyciu 4-stopniowej skali, gdzie 4 oznacza zdecydowany wpływ, 3 – umiarkowany wpływ, 2 – znikomy wpływ, 1 – brak wpływu. Średnia: Infrastruktura (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) Kultura, w tym promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego 90% 3,18 Turystyka i rekreacja 55% 2,76 Sport 45% 3,07 Nauka i edukacja 32% 2,80 Rozwój społeczny 23% 2,29 Ochrona środowiska 19% 2,17 Gospodarka 16% 2,60 16% 3,00 Przedsięwzięcia z Polonią i Polakami mieszkającymi za granicą 13% 2,50 Rynek pracy 2,3310% Demokracja i prawa człowieka 10% 2,00 Służba zdrowia i opieka społeczna 7% 1,50 Pomoc rozwojowa 7% 1,50 Inne jakie 3% 3,00 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Podobne spostrzeżenia nasuwają się przy analizie skutków współpracy transgranicznej. Badani przedstawiciele gmin wskazali w tym względzie na: organizowanie imprez kulturalnych dla mieszkańców, zmniejszenie wzajemnych uprzedzeń i stereotypów, organizowanie imprez sportowych, intensyfikację kontaktów między mieszkańcami czy też na współpracę partnerską między szkołami i wprowadzanie do nich języka sąsiadów. Podkreślali więc rolę działań związanych z wymianą społeczno-kulturalną między mieszkańcami po obu stronach granicy. W dużo mniejszym stopniu skuteczne okazują się te działania, które dotyczą rozwoju infrastruktury, rozwoju gospodarczego czy ochrony środowiska – tutaj widać brak koncepcji, odpowiednich narzędzi w inicjowaniu i wspieraniu rozwoju przedsiębiorczości. Zastanawiająca jest tak negatywna ocena działań na rzecz środowiska naturalnego – pomimo tego, że jest to jeden z ważniejszych zasobów przygranicznych obszarów, nie ma do tej pory wypracowanych dobrych praktyk w tym obszarze (por. wykres 15). 81www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 15 . W id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j g m in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o z Bi ał or us ią W 5� Ja ki e są w id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j w P ań st w a gm in ie z B ia ło ru si ą? D o oc en y pr os zę p os łu ży ć si ę 5st op ni ow ą sk al ą, g dz ie 5 o zn acz a, ż e zd ec yd ow an ie s ię P an (i) z ga dz a, 4 – ra cz ej z ga dz a, 3 – a ni z ga dz a an i n ie z ga dz a, 2 – ra cz ej n ie z ga dz a, 1 – z de cy do w an ie n ie z ga dz a. 1, 28 1, 95 2, 68 2, 712, 79 2, 39 1, 84 1, 75 1, 42 1, 33 1, 30 1, 22 1, 22 1, 24 2, 96 3, 73 1, 58 1, 42 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez k ul tu ra ln yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy Zm ni ej sz en ie p oz io m u w za je m ne go up rz ed ze ni a i n eg at yw ny ch s te re ot yp ów O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez s po rt ow yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy In te ns yfi ka cj a ko nt ak tó w m ię dz y m ie sz ka ńc am i W sp ół pr ac a pa rt ne rs ka m ię dz y s zk oł am i p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy W pr ow ad ze ni e do s zk ół n au ki ję zy ka s ąs ia dó w Tu ry st yk a (n p. r oz w ija s ię b az a ho te lo w a, n oc le go w a, zw ię ks za s ię li cz ba tu ry st ów , n ow e tr as y tu ry st yc zn e) St w or ze ni e w sp ól ny ch z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy p ro gr am ów i st ra te gi i r oz w oj u Po w st an ie n ow yc h dr óg , m os tó w W zr os t w ym ia ny h an dl ow ej z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy W zr os t l ic zb y m ie js c pr ac y W sp ół pr ac a lo ka ln yc h ś ro do w is k go sp od ar cz yc h N ap ły w in w es to ró w k ra jo w yc h N ap ły w in w es to ró w z ag ra ni cz ny ch Li kw id ac ja z ak ła dó w p ro du kc yj ny ch s zk od liw yc h dl a śr od ow is ka n at ur al ne go W zr os t k on ku re nc yj no śc i p ol sk ic h fir m p ro w ad zo ny ch n a te re ni e Pa ńs tw a gm in y Sp ad ek s to py b ez ro bo ci a Pr ze pł yw s iły r ob oc ze j w o pa rc iu o u m ow y 74 % 11 % 11 % 4% 50 % 12 % 35 % 4% 44 % 8% 44 % 4% 36 % 24 % 36 % 4% 42 % 8% 42 % 8% 35 % 5% 50 % 10 % 18 % 14 % 59 % 9% 24 % 67 % 10 % 19 % 5% 71 % 5% 10 % 10 % 71 % 10 % 5% 10 % 76 % 10 % 5% 10 % 76 % 10 % 5% 85 % 10 % 5% 85 % 10 % 10 % 7 5% 15 % 5% 85 % 10 % 5% 85 % 10 % 10 % 5% 86 % Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię z ga dz a A ni s ię z ga dz a, an i n ie z ga dz a Tr ud no po w ie dz ie ć Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię n ie z ga dz a D an e w u ję ci u pr oc en to w ym Śr ed ni a: Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 1 gm in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc yc h w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią . 82 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.4.3. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin województwa podlaskiego zaangażowane we współpracę z Białorusią Podmiotami instytucjonalnymi, które odznaczają się wysoką intensywnością współpracy transgranicznej z Białorusią, są jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego, jednostki kultury, szkoły i placówki oświatowe. W dużo mniejszym stopniu we współpracy transgranicznej uczestniczą: przedsiębiorstwa, instytucje otoczenia biznesu, kościoły i związki wyznaniowe, zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, parki narodowe i krajobrazowe czy też lasy państwowe. Wykres 16. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Białorusią W6. Proszę wskazać podmioty instytucjonalne z gminy zaangażowane we współpracę z Białorusią oraz ocenić intensywność współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: gdzie 4 – bardzo wysoka, 3 – wysoka, 2 – niska, 1 – bardzo niska. Średnia: Szkoły wyższe, jednostki naukowe 7% 1,33 Kościoły i inne związki wyznaniowe 13% 2,50 Jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego 90% 2,76 Jednostki kultury 68% 2,86 Zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, jednostki systemu ratownictwa medycznego 7% 1,50 Parki narodowe i krajobrazowe \ podmioty zarządzające obszarami chronionymi 13% 2,33 Instytucje otoczenia biznesu, instytucje i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości i innowacyjności 13% 2,00 Przedsiębiorcy \ MSP 16% 2,40 Szkoły i placówki oświatowe 55% 2,65 Związki i stowarzyszenia jednostek samorządu terytorialnego 36% 2,50 Organizacje pozarządowe stowarzyszenia, fundacje (NGO) 29% 2,00 PGL Lasy Państwowe i jego jednostki organizacyjne 16% 2,25 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Poniższy wykres prezentuje zaangażowanie i intensywność współpracy z Białorusią poszczególnych podmiotów. 83www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 17 . D ek la ra ty w ny o ds et ek in st yt uc ji z gm in y za an ga żo w an yc h w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią o ra z in te ns yw no ść p ro w ad zo ne j w sp ół pr ac y 0% 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 10 0% 1234 Je dn os tk i k ul tu ry Sz ko ły i pl ac ów ki o św ia to w e Zw ią zk i i s to w ar zy sz en ia je dn os te k sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go Pr ze ds ię bi or cy \ M SP Sz ko ły w yż sz e, je dn os tk i n au ko w e In st yt uc je o to cz en ia bi zn es u, in st yt uc je i o rg an iz ac je w sp ie ra ją ce ro zw ój p rz ed si ęb io rc zo śc i i i nn ow ac yj no śc i Ko śc io ły i in ne z w ią zk i w yz na ni ow e PG L La sy P ań st w ow e i j eg o je dn os tk i o rg an iz ac yj ne Za kł ad y op ie ki z dr ow ot ne j, je dn os tk i s ys te m u ra to w ni ct w a m ed yc zn eg o Je dn os tk i sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go sz cz eb la gm in ne go O rg an iz ac je p oz ar zą do w e – st ow ar zy sz en ia , fu nd ac je (N G O ) Pa rk i n ar od ow e i k ra jo br az ow e \ po dm io ty za rz ąd za ją ce ob sz ar am i ch ro ni on ym i N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a Intensywność współpracy: 4 – bardzo wysoka; 1 – bardzo niska W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a In st yt uc je z aa ng aż ow an e w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią Ź ró dł o: B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 1 gm in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc yc h w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią . 84 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres wyraźnie pokazuje niskie zaangażowanie we współpracę szkół wyższych i jednostek naukowych, zakładów opieki zdrowotnej i jednostek systemu ratownictwa medycznego, instytucji otoczenia biznesu i organizacji wspierających rozwój przedsiębiorczości, organizacji pozarządowych, leśników i pracowników parków narodowych i krajobrazowych oraz przedsiębiorców. Dość intensywną współpracę prowadzą za to nieliczne związki wyznaniowe oraz związki i stowarzyszenia samorządu. We współpracę transgraniczną zaangażowane są natomiast w dużym stopniu i z dużą intensywnością szkoły i placówki oświatowe, jednostki kultury oraz jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego. Dane te pozwalają więc wnioskować o głównych obszarach tej współpracy – składają się na nią przede wszystkim kultura i edukacja (poza szkolnictwem wyższym). Brakuje budowania sieci współpracy między podmiotami z różnorodnych sektorów. 5.4.4. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć i płynące z nich korzyści. Cele współpracy, sposoby jej promocji i wykorzystywane instrumenty Zakres rodzajów wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy jest bardzo wąski. Do podstawowych należą imprezy kulturalne, międzyszkolne i turystyczne. W niewielkim stopniu wykorzystywane są do współpracy targi, wystawy i wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne. Zdecydowanie nie jest natomiast prowadzona handlowa wymiana przygraniczna, współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych, współpraca w zakresie ochrony środowiska, misje gospodarcze czy też wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie (por. wykres 18). Wykres 18. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią oraz ich intensywność W7� Jak często organizowano do tej pory wspólne przedsięwzięcia z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że bardzo często, 4 – często, 3 – rzadko, 2 – bardzo rzadko, a 1 – w ogóle. Imprezy kulturalne 44 52 4 Targi i wystawy 5 32 63 Imprezy międzyszkolne 18 41 36 5 Imprezy turystyczne 13 30 48 9 Wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne 5 29 62 5 Handlowa wymiana przygraniczna 5 74 21 Współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych 5 74 21 Ochrona środowiska 28 61 11 Misje gospodarcze, współpraca podmiotów gospodarczych 11 72 17 Wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie 55 41 5 Bardzo często + często Bardzo rzadko + rzadko Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. 85www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 19. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią W11� W jakim stopniu, Pan(i) zdaniem, Państwa gmina czerpie korzyści ze współpracy z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że w bardzo dużym, 4 – w dużym, 3 – w małym, 2 – bardzo małym, 1 – w ogóle. W bardzo + dużym stopniu W małym + bardzo małym Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej 27 43 27 3 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE 19 44 30 7 Rozwój turystyki 17 37 37 10 Rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej 17 63 17 Skuteczniejsza ochrona środowiska naturalnego 17 65 17 Wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie 22 61 17 Wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności 26 57 17 Ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami 27 54 12 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE 74 13 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Przedstawiciele gmin współpracujących z Białorusią wskazują na takie korzyści ze współpracy transgranicznej, jak: rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej, możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE i rozwój turystyki. W bardzo małym stopniu współpraca ta przekłada się natomiast na: rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej, skuteczniejszą ochronę środowiska naturalnego, wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie, wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności, ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami czy na możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE (por. wykres 19). Współpraca z białoruskimi partnerami odbywa się najczęściej na podstawie umów, listów intencyjnych i porozumień. Tylko 15% stanowi współpraca z miastami partnerskimi, a 10% współpraca w ramach projektów i poprzez polskich przedstawicieli na Białorusi. Zaledwie 5% gmin deklaruje utrzymywanie ustalonych kontaktów z gminami partnerskimi po stronie białoruskiej (por. wykres 20). 86 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 20. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią W12� Proszę powiedzieć, w oparciu o jakie akty prawne odbywa się współpraca z Białorusią? Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo na podstawie podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego 60% Współpraca w ramach projektów 10% Przedstawiciel w innym kraju 10% Gminy partnerskie 5% Miasta partnerskie 15% Porozumienie dwustronne 35% 10%Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Partnerstwa i porozumienia tego typu są zawiązywane głównie w celu rozwoju kultury, promocji samorządu, integracji społecznej, poprawy kontaktów międzynarodowych i zwiększenia ruchu turystycznego. W dużo mniejszym stopniu służą one natomiast promocji organizacji pozarządowych, rozwojowi infrastruktury, upowszechnianiu demokracji (por. wykres 21). Do celów promocji współpracy z Białorusią gminy wykorzystują głównie dość tradycyjne środki: imprezy kulturalne, materiały promocyjne, międzyszkolne wymiany młodzieży, materiały reklamowe i strony internetowe. Niedocenianymi narzędziami promocji są natomiast konferencje, targi, debaty, konkursy, szkolenia i ogłoszenia prasowe (por. wykres 22). 87www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 21. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią C1� Proszę powiedzieć, które cele realizowane są, Pana(i) zdaniem, podczas współpracy z Białorusią? Rozwój kultury 83% Integracja społeczności lokalnych 63% Poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych 57% Zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego 47% Promocja organizacji pozarządowych 27% Rozwój infrastruktury (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, itp.) 23% Upowszechnianie demokracji 23% Promocja lokalnych produktów i usług 23% Poprawa przepływu informacji 23% Promocja biznesu 20% Ochrona środowiska 17% Wspólne rozwiązywanie problemów gospodarczych, społecznych i środowiskowych 13% Wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich 13% Zwiększenie handlu 7% Współpraca w zarządzaniu kryzysowym 3% Integracja społeczna poprzez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne 67% Promocja samorządu 67% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. 88 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 22. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią C2� W jaki sposób gmina promuje współpracę transgraniczną z Białorusią? Wspólne, transgraniczne imprezy kulturalne 60% Organizowanie wymiany młodzieży szkolnej 50% Materiały reklamowe 47% Strona internetowa, np. gminy w językach obcych 43% Udział w konferencjach, sympozjach za granicą 17% Udział w targach zagranicznych 13% Organizowanie debat, seminariów, konferencji o tematyce międzynarodowej 13% Udział w konkursach międzynarodowych, np. na dobre praktyki 7% Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji międzykulturowej 7% Żadne z powyższych 7% Ogłoszenia w prasie zagranicznej (regionalnej, krajowej) 3% Wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne 50% Materiały informacyjne (np. foldery, 50% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. Wykres 23. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Białorusią oraz ocena ich użyteczności C3� Proszę wskazać, które instrumenty współpracy zagranicznej Państwa gmina wykorzystuje w kontaktach z Białorusią. Następnie proszę ocenić użyteczność tych instrumentów współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: 5 – bardzo użyteczne, 4 – raczej użyteczne, 3 – ani użyteczne, ani nieużyteczne, 2 – raczej nieużyteczne, 1 – bardzo nieużyteczne. Średnia: Prowadzenie doradztwa prawnego w zakresie współpracy zagranicznej 4% 3,00 Dystrybucja poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów 4% 3,00 Uczestnictwo w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej 46% 4,15 Udział w euroregionach 39% 3,82 Prowadzenie punktu kontaktowego dla eksporterów 4% 3,00 Przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów 4% 3,00 Uczestnictwo w transnarodowych sieciach, związkach, stowarzyszeniach 7% 4,00 Organizacja misji gospodarczych 7% 2,50 Organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych 36% 3,80 Udział w targach międzynarodowych 14% 3,50 Organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy lub regionu 14% 3,75 Wsparcie przedsiębiorców jako eksporterów 7% 2,50 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=31 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Białorusią. 89www.soclab.org.pl W ramach współpracy transgranicznej z Białorusią najczęściej wykorzystywane są takie instrumenty, jak: wspólne uczestnictwo w projektach międzynarodowych, udział w euroregionach, organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych. W opinii przedstawicieli badanych gmin najbardziej efektywnymi instrumentami okazały się natomiast do tej pory: uczestnictwo w projektach międzynarodowych, w transnarodowych sieciach, związkach i stowarzyszeniach, organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych, udział w euroregionach i targach międzynarodowych. Bardzo nisko pod względem efektywności oceniono natomiast wszelkie instrumenty związane ze współpracą z przedsiębiorcami: wsparcie przedsiębiorców jako ekspertów, dystrybucję poradników i materiałów dla eksporterów, prowadzenie doradztwa prawnego, prowadzenie punktu kontaktowego dla eksporterów i organizację misji gospodarczych (por. wykres 23). Wynika to z bardzo wąskiego zakresu współpracy z przedsiębiorcami i braku kompetencji oraz potencjału do efektywnego wykorzystywania takich instrumentów współpracy. 5.4.5. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej gmin współpracujących z Białorusią Aby wnioskować o barierach współpracy z Białorusią, w badaniu wyodrębniono podstawowe ich wymiary. W ramach pierwszego z nich – formalno-prawnego – przedstawiciele gmin wskazywali głównie na skomplikowaną procedurę uzyskiwania dotacji (po obu stronach), nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów oraz ich niestabilność (głównie po stronie białoruskiej), niedostosowanie ustrojów ustawodawczych i niestabilność przepisów (zarówno po stronie białoruskiej, jak i po polskiej). W ramach wymiaru instytucjonalnego wskazywano głównie na słaby system wymiany informacji (po obu stronach) i małą aktywność urzędów (również dotyczy to obu państw). W trzecim wymiarze, infrastrukturalnym, który był często wskazywany jako istotny, najpoważniejszą bolączką jest mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych, po stronie białoruskiej słabe zagospodarowanie infrastrukturalne przejść granicznych, a po stronie polskiej wskazywano na słaby rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej (por. wykres 24). W ramach czwartego wymiaru barier – finansowego – wyróżnia się głównie ograniczone możliwości finansowe władz lokalnych terenów przygranicznych (wydaje się, że jest to główna bolączka po stronie polskiej), niską sprawność systemu rozliczeń finansowych (po stronie białoruskiej) i brak zabezpieczenia inwestycyjnego wspólnych projektów oraz kapitału obrotowego (po obu stronach). W wymiarze gospodarczym największy problem stanowi odmienność systemów gospodarczych. W wymiarze społecznym: po stronie polskiej – brak chęci mieszkańców do współpracy, po stronie białoruskiej – obawy przed napływem obcego kapitału oraz negatywne doświadczenia historyczne, obie strony cechuje słaba znajomość języka partnera i różnice w mentalności (por. wykres 25). 90 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 24 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z B ia ło ru si ą w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (1 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a uz ys ki w an ia śr od kó w p om oc ow yc h 8 8 85 42 % N ie st ab iln oś ć pr ze pi só w 9 36 55 35 % O gr an ic zo na li cz ba of er t w sp ół pr ac y 22 78 29 % Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h pr ze pi só w i no rm p ra w ny ch 13 13 75 26 % Br ak m ię dz yn ar od ow yc h um ów i p or oz um ie ń o w sp ół pr ac y 38 63 26 % Br ak ró w no rz ęd ne go p ar tn er a 71 29 23 % Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a za w ie ra ni a um ów 43 57 23 % Br ak o so bo w oś ci pr aw ne j r eg io nu 33 33 33 10 % N ie do st os ow an ie u st ro jó w us ta w od aw cz yc h 50 50 39 % N ie pr ec yz yj no ść lu b br ak sp ój no śc i p rz ep isó w 67 33 39 % Sł ab o ro zw in ię ty sy st em w ym ia ny in fo rm ac ji 42 % 8 92 M ał a ak ty w no ść u rz ęd ów w n aw ią zy w an iu w sp ół pr ac y 26 % 13 13 75 Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h in st yt uc ji i u rz ęd ów 19 % 17 33 50 Sł ab a ko or dy na cj a po m ię dz y in st yt uc ja m i w za kr es ie w sp ół pr ac y 19 % 17 83 Cz ęs te zm ia ny (r eo rg an iza cj e) in st yt uc ji i w ła dz p ar tn er ów w sp ół pr ac y 19 % 17 33 50 Br ak k om pe te nc ji ka dr w is tn ie ją cy ch in st yt uc ja ch i ur zę da ch 13 % 50 50 M ał a lic zb a i p rz ep us to w oś ć p rz ej ść g ra ni cz ny ch 45 % 50 50 Sł ab a do st ęp no ść k om un ik ac yj na p rz ej ść 32 % 20 20 60 N ie do ro zw ój in fr as tr uk tu ry k om un ik ac yj ne j 32 % 30 10 60 Sł ab e za go sp od ar ow an ie in fr as tr uk tu ra ln e pr ze jść 23 % 57 43 FORMALNO-PRAWNE INSTYTUCJONALNE INFRASTRUKTURALNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e bi ał or us ki ej Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 1 gm in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc yc h w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią . 91www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 25 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z B ia ło ru si ą w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (2 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e bi ał or us ki ej O ba w y pr ze d na pł yw em o bc eg o ka pi ta łu 3% 10 0 N eg at yw ne st er eo ty py są sia dó w 26 % 13 38 50 Ró żn ic e w m en ta ln oś ci 23 % 29 71 Sł ab a zn aj om oś ć ję zy ka p ar tn er a 13 % 25 75 N eg at yw ne d oś w ia dc ze ni a hi st or yc zn e 13 % 75 25 Br ak c hę ci m ie sz ka ńc ów d o w sp ół pr ac y 13 % 25 75 O gr an ic zo ne m oż liw oś ci fi na ns ow e, w ty m bu dż et ów w ła dz lo ka ln yc h te re nó w p rz yg ra ni cz ny ch 74 % 35 4 61 N isk a sp ra w no ść sy st em u ro zli cz eń fi na ns ow yc h 16 % 40 60 Br ak in st yt uc ji O to cz en ia b izn es u 16 % 20 80 Br ak sy st em u za be zp ie cz eń fin an so w yc h tr an sa kc ji ha nd lo w yc h 13 % 25 25 50 Br ak za be zp ie cz en ia in w es ty cy jn eg o w sp ól ny ch pr oj ek tó w o ra z k ap ita łu o br ot ow eg o 6% 10 0 O dm ie nn oś ć sy st em ów g os po da rc zy ch 61 % 5 58 37 As ym et ria w p oz io m ie ro zw oj u pa rt ne ró w 29 % 22 56 22 Br ak si ln ej re pr ez en ta cj i po dm io tó w g os po da rc zy ch 16 % 20 20 60 Du ża o dl eg ło ść 13 % 10 0 GOSPODARCZE ŚR O DO W IS KO W E FINANSOWE SPOŁECZNE Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 1 gm in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc yc h w sp ół pr ac ę z Bi ał or us ią . 92 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.5. Charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą Na podstawie deklaracji samorządowców z województwa podlaskiego ustalono, że spośród 118 gmin nieco ponad 1/4 (27%) prowadzi współpracę transgraniczną z Litwą. Dokładnie 19 gmin w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat podejmowało próby takiej współpracy (por. mapa 4). Gminy współpracujące z Litwą znajdują się na terenach, na których występują duże skupiska ludności litewskiej w Polsce, i są to gminy, które są usytuowane blisko granicy polsko-litewskiej. Analizując te samorządy pod kątem chęci poszerzenia zakresu współpracy transgranicznej, widać zainteresowanie współpracą z Białorusią, w mniejszym stopniu z Rosją i Ukrainą. Odwołując się do wyników badań jakościowych, można przyjąć, że wynika to z większej znajomości specyfiki kulturalnej partnera białoruskiego, jak również z bliskości geograficznej. Główną wskazywaną przyczyną podejmowania współpracy jest wymiana kulturalna oraz ubieganie się o fundusze pomocowe. Współpraca z Litwą ma więc charakter bardzo lokalny, skupiający się głównie w obszarze kultury, turystyki oraz rekreacji. Zasadniczym problemem współpracy gmin z Litwą jest to, że w sferze rozwoju infrastruktury oraz gospodarki współpraca jest oceniana jako słaba i napotyka na największe bariery. Promocja biznesu, zwiększenie handlu i wspólne rozwiązywanie problemów gospodarczych należy do rzadkości. A właśnie ten obszar jest postrzegany jako niezmiernie ważny i wprost przekładający się na rozwój poszczególnych gmin oraz na poziom życia ich mieszkańców. Większość gmin współpracujących transgranicznie z Litwą spodziewa się, że zakres i intensywność tej współpracy wzrośnie w najbliższych latach – jest to spowodowane dużą stabilnością polityczną partnera litewskiego (przynależność do Unii Europejskiej). Do najistotniejszych skutków współpracy – organizacji imprez kulturalnych, współpracy między szkołami, intensyfikacji kontaktów między mieszkańcami – należy zmniejszenie się wzajemnych uprzedzeń i stereotypów. Współpraca transgraniczna jest głównie domeną jednostek samorządu terytorialnego, jednostek kultury, związków i stowarzyszeń. Śladową rolę odgrywają instytucje (szkoły wyższe, podmioty zajmujące się obszarami chronionymi), które działają w skali regionu. Brakuje zdecydowanie współpracy międzysektorowej, zwłaszcza z biznesem. Realizowanie zadań w ramach współpracy transgranicznej oparte jest głównie na porozumieniach dwustronnych lub współpracy w ramach konkretnych projektów. Wielostronne partnerstwo na poziomie gmin jest rzadkością. Promocja współpracy ogranicza się do dystrybucji materiałów reklamowych, folderów, organizacji imprez kulturalnych. Najczęściej współpraca wykorzystuje instrumenty związane z uczestnictwem w projektach międzynarodowych, udziałem w euroregionach. Udział w targach lub organizowanie targów jest rzadszą formą z uwagi na potencjalne koszty. Badani samorządowcy wskazywali na liczne bariery utrudniające realizację działań transgranicznych. Twierdzili, że zdecydowana większość barier współpracy występuje po obu stronach. Do najistotniejszych należą: • przeszkody formalno-prawne (nieprecyzyjne przepisy, skomplikowane procedury zawierania umów); • mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy; • słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji. 93www.soclab.org.pl M ap a 6. G m in y de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. nie współpracują współpracują 94 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 7. P ró by n aw ią za ni a w sp ół pr ac y z Li tw ą w o st at ni ch 5 la ta ch Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. próbowali nawiązać współpracę nie próbowali nawiązać współpracy 95www.soclab.org.pl 5.5.1. Aktywność gmin współpracujących z Litwą w nawiązywaniu kontaktów z pozostałymi krajami sąsiedzkimi Badania przeprowadzone wśród samorządów województwa podlaskiego wyraźnie pozwalają na wskazanie koncentracji gmin współpracujących z Litwą na obszarze przygranicznym, przy granicy z Litwą. Oprócz bliskości geograficznej potencjalnego partnera niezwykle ważnym czynnikiem jest fakt, że w gminach tych zamieszkuje zdecydowana większość przedstawicieli mniejszości litewskiej w naszym województwie. Sprawia to, że bariera językowa czy kulturowa staje się mało istotna. Jedno z ważnych pytań w analizowanych badaniach dotyczyło tego, czy gminy, które mają doświadczenie we współpracy z wybranym krajem ościennym, są skłonne do rozszerzenia swoich kontaktów z pozostałym krajami zza wschodniej granicy. Wykres 26. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą W1A� Czy próbowali Państwo w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat nawiązać współpracę z .....? Białorusią 9 38 Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Rosją 183 4 Ukrainą 175 4 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Analiza uzyskanych odpowiedzi wskazuje na wyraźną tendencję – w ciągu ostatnich lat gminy współpracujące z Litwą próbowały nawiązać współpracę głównie z Białorusią, w mniejszym stopniu z Rosją i Ukrainą. Gminy współpracujące z Litwą cechują się tym, że są usytuowane przy wewnętrznej granicy Unii Europejskiej, co maksymalizuje swobodę przepływu ludności i nie stanowi istotnej bariery. W przypadku tzw. krajów trzecich współpraca transgraniczna jest na wstępie obarczona dużą ilością procedur związanych z obowiązkiem wizowym czy dłuższą odprawą graniczną. Jednak fakt podejmowania współpracy z Białorusią zwraca uwagę raczej na inny aspekt tej współpracy. Jak wynika z badań jakościowych Białoruś jest postrzegana jako partner trudny, nie do końca przewidywalny, ale bliski kulturowo i geograficznie. Wydaje się, że to te czynniki mają wpływ na kierunek podejmowanych działań. Wykres 27. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą W1C� Czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat zamierzają Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną z .....? Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Rosją 95 9 Białorusią 24 11 Ukrainą 67 12 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. 96 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Najwięcej gmin współpracujących aktualnie z Litwą zamierza nawiązać także współpracę z Ukrainą, najmniej z Białorusią. Znamienne jednak wydaje się to, że większość gmin nie jest w stanie określić, z którym krajem będzie współpracować. Spowodowane jest to zapewne niestabilną sytuacją polityczną naszych sąsiadów (w porównaniu do Litwy). Jak wskazuje analiza dokumentów strategicznych powstających na poziomie gmin jest to wynik braku spójnych i szczegółowych strategii współpracy transgranicznej. Wykres 28. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą W1D. Jakie są główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą? Białoruś Rosja Ukraina Stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy 55% 50% 54% Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe 64% 75% 85% Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej 64% 67% 69% Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu 64% 58% 46% Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników 36% 25% 23% Prestiż 9% 9%Ponieważ wszyscy nawiązujątaką współpracę 18% Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Charakter współpracy z sąsiadami potwierdza również opis przyczyn (motywów) podejmowania współpracy. Rozwój przedsiębiorczości i biznesu jest ważną przyczyną nawiązania współpracy z Białorusią, ważnym czynnikiem – niezależnie ot tego, o jakim kraju mówimy – jest promocja gminy. Ukraina staje się ważnym partnerem przede wszystkim ze względu na możliwości uzyskania środków pomocowych UE. 5.5.2. Intensywność, dynamika, obszary i skutki obecnej współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą Większość gmin (70%) pozytywnie ocenia intensywność obecnej współpracy gminy z Litwą. Niemniej 1/3 współpracujących gmin ocenia ją jako niską lub bardzo niską. Oceny negatywne mogą wskazywać nie na brak zadowolenia wynikający z postrzeganych potencjalnych korzyści ze współpracy, ale na ich małą dotychczasową efektywność. Pomimo tego, że współpraca z Litwą jest najłatwiejsza pod względem 97www.soclab.org.pl organizacyjno-logistycznym (granica wewnętrzna UE), to na jej przeszkodzie mogą stać bariery mentalne (stereotypy, spory o historię czy obecną sytuację Polaków na Litwie). Istotnym elementem (widocznym również w badaniach jakościowych) jest wciąż zbyt mała wiedza i umiejętności na poziomie poszczególnych samorządów w zakresie budowania międzynarodowych partnerstw, wpierania ich zewnętrznymi środkami finansowymi. Wykres 29. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Litwą W2� Proszę ocenić w skali 1-4 OGÓLNĄ intensywność obecnej współpracy Państwa gminy z Litwą. Bardzo wysoka + wysoka Bardzo niska + niskaDane w ujęciu procentowym Trudno powiedzieć 30%70% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. Wykres 30. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Litwą W2a� Proszę ocenić, czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat OGÓLNA intensywność współpracy Państwa gminy z Litwą, Pana(i) zdaniem, wzrośnie, pozostanie na obecnym poziome czy też zmaleje? Wzrośnie Pozostanie na tym samym poziomie Trudno powiedziećZmaleje 61%33% 3% 3% Dane w ujęciu procentowym Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. W pytaniu dotyczącym przyszłości współpracy widoczne jest postrzeganie litewskiego partnera w kategoriach stabilności i przewidywalności. Jedynie 3% samorządów współpracujących obecnie z Litwą spodziewa się, że współpraca transgraniczna w przyszłości się zmniejszy. Oczekiwane jest raczej utrzymanie jej dotychczasowej intensywności lub jej wzrost. Z pewnością jest to jeden z największych atutów współpracy transgranicznej między polskimi a litewskimi obszarami przygranicznymi – nie jest ono obarczone dużym poczuciem ryzyka i nieprzewidywalnych zmian (tylko 3% odpowiedzi „trudno powiedzieć"), co daje poczucie bezpieczeństwa i możliwości bardziej długofalowego planowania współpracy. Z uwagi na położenie geograficzne gmin współpracujących z Litwą i na ich sytuację demograficzną, wydaje się oczywiste, że głównym obszarem współpracy jest kultura i promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego (67%) oraz turystyka i rekreacja (64%). Gminy (zarówno po stronie Polski, jak i Litwy) mają niezwykle atrakcyjny potencjał turystyczny. Turystyka – „przemysł turystyczny" – wymaga dużych i skoordynowanych transgranicznie inwestycji w infrastrukturę (drogi, mosty, połączenia telekomunikacyjne). Widać, że samorządy mają tego świadomość i podejmują odpowiednie ku temu działania – 42% wskazuje infrastrukturę jako obszar współpracy. Wyraźnie widać słabość działań transgranicznych podejmowanych przez samorządy współpracujące z Litwą w obszarze gospodarki i rynku pracy, choć często ten obszar występuje w dokumentach strategicznych jako ważny i pożądany element rozwoju. 98 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 31. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą W4� Proszę wskazać obszary współpracy w Państwa gminie z Litwą oraz ocenić ich wpływ na rozwój gminy przy użyciu 4-stopniowej skali, gdzie 4 oznacza zdecydowany wpływ, 3 – umiarkowany wpływ, 2 – znikomy wpływ, 1 – brak wpływu. Średnia: Infrastruktura (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) Rynek pracy 9% 1,33 Demokracja i prawa człowieka 12% 2,75 Kultura, w tym promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego 67% 3,14 Turystyka i rekreacja 64% 3,14 Pomoc rozwojowa 6% 2,00 Służba zdrowia i opieka społeczna 6% 2,33 Przedsięwzięcia z Polonią i Polakami mieszkającymi za granicą 18% 3,20 Rozwój społeczny 21% 2,63 Gospodarka 21% 2,14 42% 2,71 Nauka i edukacja 27% 2,83 Sport 24% 2,43 Ochrona środowiska 21% 2,57 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Litwą. Dodatkowo wpływ tej współpracy jest oceniany raczej jako słaby albo bardzo słaby (średnia ocena 2,14 dla gospodarki 1,33 dla rynku pracy). Wydaje się, że współpraca transgraniczna ma duży niewykorzystany jeszcze potencjał gospodarczy – brakuje samorządom możliwości i wiedzy, jak ją włączyć w kontakty transgraniczne. Współpraca na polu kultury i turystyki przebiega szybciej i intensywnej niż w sferze gospodarczej, bowiem opiera się na lokalnych zasobach i jest relatywnie łatwiejsza do zrealizowania w ramach funduszy pomocowych UE. Dysproporcja między obszarami współpracy a przekonaniem o ich wpływie na rozwój gminy jest również widoczna przy działaniach „miękkich", mających charakter inwestycji w kapitał intelektualny czy stanowiący jego element kapitał społeczny. Pomimo tego, że nauka i edukacja oraz sport są relatywnie częściej wspierane w ramach współpracy transgranicznej, to ich wpływ na kondycję gminy jest oceniany nie tak wysoko. Dominuje więc patrzenie na rozwój gminy przez „twarde" inwestycje infrastrukturalne oraz wspieranie kultury, turystyki i całej infrastruktury jej towarzyszącej. W tym wypadku, wiedząc że obszary te nastawione są na rozwój turystyki jako działalności gospodarczej, kultura i dziedzictwo lokalne są raczej postrzegane w sposób komercyjny – jako źródło potencjalnych dochodów, w formie na przykład oryginalnej lokalnej oferty dla turystów. 99www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 32 . W id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j g m in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o z Li tw ą W 5� Ja ki e są w id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j w P ań st w a gm in ie z L it w ą? D o oc en y pr os zę p os łu ży ć si ę 5st op ni ow ą sk al ą, g dz ie 5 o zn ac za , ż e zd ec yd ow an ie s ię P an (i) z ga dz a, 4 – ra cz ej z ga dz a, 3 – a ni z ga dz a, a ni n ie z ga dz a, 2 – ra cz ej n ie z ga dz a, 1 – z de cy do w an ie n ie z ga dz a Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię z ga dz a A ni s ię z ga dz a, an i n ie z ga dz a Tr ud no po w ie dz ie ć Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię n ie z ga dz a D an e w u ję ci u pr oc en to w ym Śr ed ni a: 3, 75 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez k ul tu ra ln yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 65 % 15 % 12 % 8% 3, 53 Zm ni ej sz en ie p oz io m u w za je m ne go up rz ed ze ni a i n eg at yw ny ch s te re ot yp ów 65 % 15 % 15 % 5% 3, 06 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez s po rt ow yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 44 % 22 % 22 % 11 % 3, 29 In te ns yfi ka cj a ko nt ak tó w m ię dz y m ie sz ka ńc am i 53 % 16 % 21 % 11 % 3, 25 W sp ół pr ac a pa rt ne rs ka m ię dz y s zk oł am i p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 43 % 10 % 24 % 24 % 1, 92 W pr ow ad ze ni e do s zk ół n au ki ję zy ka s ąs ia dó w 21 % 64 % 14 % 3, 00 Tu ry st yk a (n p. r oz w ija s ię b az a ho te lo w a, n oc le go w a, zw ię ks za s ię li cz ba tu ry st ów , n ow e tr as y tu ry st yc zn e) 41 % 23 % 27 % 9% 2, 33 St w or ze ni e w sp ól ny ch z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy p ro gr am ów i st ra te gi i r oz w oj u 23 % 8% 39 % 31 % 2, 56 Po w st an ie n ow yc h dr óg , m os tó w 33 % 6% 50 % 11 % 2, 17 W zr os t w ym ia ny h an dl ow ej z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy 7% 29 % 50 % 14 % 1, 40 W zr os t l ic zb y m ie js c pr ac y 83 % 17 % 2, 20 W sp ół pr ac a lo ka ln yc h ś ro do w is k go sp od ar cz yc h 8% 25 % 50 % 17 % 1, 56 N ap ły w in w es to ró w k ra jo w yc h 8% 67 % 25 % 1, 44 Li kw id ac ja z ak ła dó w p ro du kc yj ny ch s zk od liw yc h dl a śr od ow is ka n at ur al ne go 8% 67 % 25 % 1, 78 W zr os t k on ku re nc yj no śc i p ol sk ic h fir m p ro w ad zo ny ch n a te re ni e Pa ńs tw a gm in y 8% 8% 54 % 31 % 1, 30 Sp ad ek s to py b ez ro bo ci a 83 % 17 % 1, 91 Pr ze pł yw s iły r ob oc ze j w o pa rc iu o u m ow y 14 % 14 % 50 % 21 % 2, 17 N ap ły w in w es to ró w z ag ra ni cz ny ch 14 % 14 % 14 % 57 % Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 3 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą. 100 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Nie jest w związku z tym zaskoczeniem, że współpraca transgraniczna gmin z Litwą wyraża się głównie w postaci organizacji imprez kulturalnych po obu stronach granicy, współpracy partnerskiej między szkołami, organizacji imprez sportowych, rozwoju turystyki. Intensyfikacja kontaktów kulturowych sprzyja zmniejszeniu poziomu wzajemnych uprzedzeń i negatywnych stereotypów. Z tym zgadza się większość respondentów (65%). Nie dostrzega się istotnych praktycznych skutków współpracy w sferze gospodarczej (spadku bezrobocia, przepływu siły roboczej, napływu inwestorów, poprawy ochrony środowiska itd.). Mimo tego, że Litwa i Polska są członkami UE, współdziałanie w sferze gospodarczej w regionie transgranicznym jest nadal wyhamowane. Być może wynika to z faktu, że przedsiębiorstwa funkcjonujące w gminach są małe, wyspecjalizowane na lokalnym rynku i nie dysponują potencjałem rozwojowym, który mógłby być rozwijany w wymiarze transgranicznym. 5.5.3. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin województwa podlaskiego zaangażowane we współpracę z Litwą Słabość obszaru gospodarczego we współpracy transgranicznej widać również w tym, jakie podmioty instytucjonalne są w tę współpracę zaangażowane. Wykres 33. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Litwą W6. Proszę wskazać podmioty instytucjonalne z gminy zaangażowane we współpracę z Litwą oraz ocenić intensywność współpracy posługując się następującą skalą: gdzie 4 – bardzo wysoką, 3 – wysoka, 2 – niska, 1 – bardzo niska. Średnia: 2,83Kościoły i inne związki wyznaniowe 18% 3,007%Szkoły wyższe, jednostki naukowe 18% 3,07 Jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego 88% 3,28Jednostki kultury 59% 2,677%15Zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, jednostki systemu ratownictwa medycznego 2,67 Parki narodowe i krajobrazowe \ podmioty zarządzające obszarami chronionymi 9% Instytucje otoczenia biznesu, instytucje i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości i innowacyjności 2,339% 2,57Przedsiębiorcy \ MSP 21% 2,94Szkoły i placówki oświatowe 50% 2,42 Związki i stowarzyszenia jednostek samorządu terytorialnego 35% 2,33 Organizacje pozarządowe stowarzyszenia, fundacje (NGO) 38% 2,50 PGL Lasy Państwowe i jego jednostki organizacyjne 9% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. 101www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 34 . M ap a uk az uj ąc a de kl ar at yw ny o ds et ek in st yt uc ji z gm in z aa ng aż ow an yc h w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą or az in te ns yw no ść p ro w ad zo ne j w sp ół pr ac y 0% 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 10 0% 1234 Je dn os tk i k ul tu ry Sz ko ły i pl ac ów ki o św ia to w e Zw ią zk i i s to w ar zy sz en ia je dn os te k sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go Pr ze ds ię bi or cy \ M SP Sz ko ły w yż sz e, je dn os tk i n au ko w e In st yt uc je o to cz en ia bi zn es u, in st yt uc je i o rg an iz ac je w sp ie ra ją ce ro zw ój p rz ed si ęb io rc zo śc i i i nn ow ac yj no śc i Ko śc io ły i in ne z w ią zk i w yz na ni ow e PG L La sy P ań st w ow e i j eg o je dn os tk i o rg an iz ac yj ne Za kł ad y op ie ki z dr ow ot ne j, je dn os tk i s ys te m u ra to w ni ct w a m ed yc zn eg o Je dn os tk i sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go sz cz eb la gm in ne go O rg an iz ac je p oz ar zą do w e – st ow ar zy sz en ia , f un da cj e (N G O ) Pa rk i n ar od ow e i k ra jo br az ow e \ po dm io ty za rz ąd za ją ce ob sz ar am i ch ro ni on ym i N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a Intensywność współpracy: 4 – bardzo wysoka; 1 – bardzo niska W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a In st yt uc je z aa ng aż ow an e w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą Ź ró dł o: B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 3 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą. 102 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Jest oczywiste, że podstawowym podmiotem współpracy są jednostki samorządu terytorialnego (88%) – współpracę transgraniczną animuje samorząd, w mniejszym zaś stopniu jest wynikiem aktywności branżowej. Koncentracja współpracy na szeroko rozumianej sferze kultury sprawia, że głównie podejmują ją jednostki kultury, związki i stowarzyszenia samorządowe, organizacje (stowarzyszenia i fundacje), szkoły i placówki oświatowe. Minimalną rolę odgrywają szkoły wyższe (są one skoncentrowane raczej w dużych miastach), podmioty zarządzające obszarami chronionymi czy jednostki systemu ratownictwa medycznego. Wyraźna dysproporcja pomiędzy samorządami i podległymi im instytucjami kultury a pozostałymi podmiotami zdaje się wyjaśniać niewykorzystany potencjał tych ostatnich słabą współpracą międzysektorową. Wyniki te potwierdzają się również w badaniach jakościowych. Samorządy często nie widzą działania innych podmiotów, nie poszukują aktywnie współpracowników z sektora organizacji pozarządowych czy biznesu. Przedstawiony wykres ilustruje zaangażowanie i intensywność współpracy transgranicznej. Jest ona w obu wymiarach wysoka dla jednostek samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego i jednostek kultury. Za podmioty mało zaangażowane we współpracę zostały uznane organizacje pozarządowe oraz związki i stowarzyszenia jednostek samorządowych. Samorząd mógłby w tej sytuacji stanowić wsparcie dla tych podmiotów, podejmując z nimi współpracę. 5.5.4. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć i płynące z nich korzyści. Cele współpracy, sposoby jej promocji i wykorzystywane instrumenty Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć wynikają z charakteru i zakresu współpracy transgranicznej gmin z Litwą. Wykres 35. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą oraz ich intensywność W7� Jak często organizowano do tej pory wspólne przedsięwzięcia z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że bardzo często, 4 – często, 3 – rzadko, 2 – bardzo rzadko, a 1 – w ogóle. Imprezy kulturalne 42 58 Targi i wystawy 18 65 18 Imprezy międzyszkolne 17 67 6 11 Imprezy turystyczne 19 71 5 5 Wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne 25 30 40 5 Handlowa wymiana przygraniczna 23 15 46 15 Współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych 9 18 46 27 Ochrona środowiska 27 55 18 Misje gospodarcze, współpraca podmiotów gospodarczych 8 33 42 17 Wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie 4229 25 4 Bardzo często + często Bardzo rzadko + rzadko Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. 103www.soclab.org.pl Najczęściej organizowane są imprezy kulturalne – co jest zgodne z poprzednimi wynikami, w których widać wyraźnie, że analizowane gminy współpracujące z Litwą nastawione są przede wszystkim na turystykę i tworzenie dla przyjezdnych ciekawej oferty kulturalnej. Niemal 30% samorządów wskazuje na wspólne składanie wniosków i wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne, jednak w porównaniu do innych wspólnych przedsięwzięć są one podejmowane relatywnie często. Niepokoić może bardzo małe zainteresowanie współpracą na rzecz ochrony środowiska, zwłaszcza że obszary te są postrzegane jako cenne pod względem przyrodniczym i zasoby przyrodnicze są niezaprzeczalnym atutem tych gmin. Jest to również baza do tworzenia ciekawej oferty dla turystów. Pominięta została też sfera działalności gospodarczej, wspierania przedsiębiorczości i lokalnego biznesu. Niemal połowa respondentów odpowiedziała, że taka współpraca w ogóle nie występuje. Katalog postrzeganych korzyści z podjętej współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą w dużej mierze ogranicza się do sfery rozwoju współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej, ułatwień w kontaktach zagranicznych, rozwoju turystyki. Adekwatnie do podejmowanych działań korzyści związane z rozwojem gospodarczym gminy (rozwój infrastruktury, poprawa na lokalnym runku pracy czy wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności) są niewielkie. W odniesieniu do tych gospodarczych wymiarów współpracy 1/5 badanych nie potrafi ocenić korzyści, jakie ta współpraca przynosi. Rezultaty mają więc charakter „miękki", związany z budowaniem kapitału społecznego mieszkańców pogranicza. Brak przełożenia rezultatów działań na wzrost gospodarczy może powodować postrzeganie owej współpracy jako mało efektywnej, nieprzynoszącej konkretnych efektów – również w perspektywie mieszkańców tego terenu. Wykres 36. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą W11� W jakim stopniu, Pan(i) zdaniem, Państwa gmina czerpie korzyści ze współpracy z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że w bardzo dużym, 4 – w dużym, 3 – w małym, 2 – bardzo małym, 1 – w ogóle. W bardzo + dużym stopniu W małym + bardzo małym Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej 38 48 10 3 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE 38 35 27 Rozwój turystyki 30 44 19 7 Rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej 11 32 42 16 Skuteczniejsza ochrona środowiska naturalnego 12 29 41 18 Wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie 29 53 18 Wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności 12 35 41 12 Ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami 38 14 38 10 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE 59618 18 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. 104 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 37. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą W12� Proszę powiedzieć, w oparciu o jakie akty prawne odbywa się współpraca z Litwą? Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo na podstawie podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego 7% Współpraca w ramach projektów 42% Przynależność do organizacji – sieci, związków zrzeszających podmioty z różnych krajów 3% Gminy partnerskie 23% Miasta partnerskie 19% Porozumienie dwustronne 58% 7%Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. Współpraca gmin z Litwą ma zdecydowanie charakter lokalny: dominują porozumienia dwustronne (58%), współpraca w ramach projektów (42%). Na dalszym miejscu pojawiają się formy o bardziej trwałym charakterze: gminy czy miasta partnerskie. Znikoma ilość samorządów decyduje się na podpisywanie umów o wielostronnym partnerstwie, co potwierdzają wcześniejsze dane, że zazwyczaj samorządy skupiają swoją działalność transgraniczną na jednym partnerze. Kolejne pytanie odnoszące się do realizowanych celów współpracy z Litwą potwierdza wyraźną dominację działań w sferze kultury i turystyki: rozwój kultury (78 %), zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego (63%), integracja przez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne (53%). Rzadziej występuje „promocja organizacji pozarządowych" (22%), upowszechnianie demokracji (19%), promocja biznesu (16%). Pojawia się tutaj promocja lokalnych produktów i usług (34%), która ma powiązanie z gospodarką lokalną i jest praktycznie jedyną formą współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą, w której widoczne jest przełożenie na rozwój gospodarczy gminy. Czynnik ten jest powiązany z rozwojem turystyki i poszerzaniem oferty dla przyjezdnych. Z pewnością jednak jest on zbyt niszowy, by stać się motorem rozwoju gospodarczego obszaru pogranicza. Dość wysoko w rankingu odpowiedzi znalazła się „poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych". Świadczy to o świadomości roli współpracy transgranicznej w zmniejszaniu napięć pojawiających się na wyższych szczeblach administracyjnych (rządowych). Stosunki z Litwą, pomimo wspólnej przynależności do Unii Europejskiej, bywają przecież napięte, zwłaszcza w kontekście praw mniejszości polskiej na Litwie. Z pewnością działania na obszarach przygranicznych mogą stanowić czynnik polepszający te relacje, mi.in. poprzez budowanie kapitału społecznego mieszkańców pogranicza. 105www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 38. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą C1� Proszę powiedzieć, które cele realizowane są, Pana(i) zdaniem, podczas współpracy z Litwą? Rozwój kultury 78% Integracja społeczności lokalnych 63% Poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych 69% Zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego 63% Promocja organizacji pozarządowych 22% Rozwój infrastruktury (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, itp.) 25% Upowszechnianie demokracji 19% Promocja lokalnych produktów i usług 34% Poprawa przepływu informacji 28% Promocja biznesu 16% Ochrona środowiska 9% Wspólne rozwiązywanie problemów gospodarczych, społecznych i środowiskowych 6% Wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich 3% Utrzymanie równowagi krajobrazu przyrodniczego 6% Zwiększenie handlu 19% Współpraca w zarządzaniu kryzysowym 9% Integracja społeczna poprzez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne 53% Promocja samorządu 59% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. 106 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 39. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą C2� W jaki sposób gmina promuje współpracę transgraniczną z Litwą? Wspólne, transgraniczne imprezy kulturalne 61% Organizowanie wymiany młodzieży szkolnej 61% Materiały reklamowe 65% Strona internetowa np. gminy w językach obcych 45% Udział w konferencjach, sympozjach za granicą 16% Udział w targach zagranicznych 19% Organizowanie debat, seminariów, konferencji o tematyce międzynarodowej 19% Udział w konkursach międzynarodowych, np. na dobre praktyki 3% Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji międzykulturowej 3% Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji globalnej 3% Żadne z powyższych 3% Ogłoszenia w prasie zagranicznej (regionalnej, krajowej) 10% Ogłoszenia w zagranicznym radiu, telewizji, internecie 7% Wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne 36% Materiały informacyjne (np. foldery, 52% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. Formy promocji współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą mają postać dość standardową i pośrednią: materiały reklamowe (65%), foldery, prezentacje medialne (52%). Dominują również wydarzenia masowe, takie jak imprezy kulturalne (61%) czy wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne (36%) oraz wymiana młodzieży szkolnej (61%). Brakuje szerokiego wykorzystywana takich instrumentów promocji, które wiążą się z bezpośrednim kontaktem osób zaangażowanych w rozwój regionu i bezpośredniej promocji w kraju sąsiednim (targi zagraniczne, sympozja, spotkania). Badania współpracy samorządów w Polsce zrealizowane w 2012 roku przez Instytut Spraw Publicznych pokazują, że sytuacja ta jest powszechna również w innych gminach75. W małych gminach, o słabej kondycji gospodarczej, podstawową barierą są braki większych funduszy na promocję za granicą. Wszelkie działania związane z uczestnictwem w międzynarodowych konferencjach czy targach zagranicznych pociągają za sobą spore koszty i wymagają wysokich kompetencji. Zastanawiający jest fakt, że tylko 45% samorządów ma strony w języku obcym. Wynikać to może z tendencji do używania w kontaktach polsko-litewskich języka polskiego, który często jest zrozumiały dla litewskiego partnera. Jednak dla dobra tych relacji i dla uniknięcia napięć powiązanych z pamięcią zbiorową Litwinów (posługiwanie się językiem polskim jako przejaw historycznej dominacji polskiej kultury na tym terenie) warto w większym stopniu zwracać uwagę na posługiwanie się w komunikacji językiem litewskim. Z badań IDI wynika, że na tym pograniczu bariera językowa może być rozwiązywana dzięki 75 A. Fuksiewicz, A. Łada, Ł. Wenerski, Współpraca zagraniczna polskich samorządów..., s. 20. 107www.soclab.org.pl dużemu udziałowi mniejszości litewskiej wśród mieszkańców gmin. Warto byłoby w większym zakresie korzystać z lokalnych zasobów i kompetencji przedstawicieli mniejszości litewskiej. Wydaje się więc, że bardziej powszechne wprowadzenie stron internetowych w języku litewskim mogłoby ułatwić promocję gminy i ułatwić kontakty. Ponadto bardzo mały odsetek samorządów bierze udział w międzynarodowych konkursach (3%), a jest to narzędzie promocji niewymagające dużych nakładów finansowych, a pozwalające promować konkretne działania w tych gminach. Wykres 40. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Litwą oraz ocena ich użyteczności C3� Proszę wskazać, które instrumenty współpracy zagranicznej Państwa gmina wykorzystuje w kontaktach z Litwą. Następnie proszę ocenić użyteczność tych instrumentów współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: 5 – bardzo użyteczne, 4 – raczej użyteczne, 3 – ani użyteczne, ani nieużyteczne, 2 – raczej nieużyteczne, 1 – bardzo nieużyteczne. Średnia: 4,50Uczestnictwo w projektachwe współpracy międzynarodowej 62% 3,88Udział w euroregionach 59% 3,89Organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych 31% 3,88Udział w targach międzynarodowych 28% 4,00Organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy lub regionu 14% 3,50Organizacja misji gospodarczych 7% 3,50Przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów 7% 3,00Uczestnictwo w transnarodowych sieciach, związkach, stowarzyszeniach 3% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=33 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Litwą. We współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystuje się raczej zinstytucjonalizowane instrumenty: uczestnictwo w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej (62%), udział w euroregionach (59%), organizacja wizyt studyjnych (31%). Zapewne ze względu na ograniczenia funduszy organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy należą do najrzadziej wykorzystywanych instrumentów współpracy transgranicznej. Targi również z uwagi na formułę (specjalistyczną lub wielobranżową) mogą wykraczać poza bilateralne formy współpracy preferowane przez gminy. Wyjątkową pozycję w tym zestawieniu mają euroregiony, które są relatywnie efektywnym i pozytywnie ocenianym instrumentem współpracy transgranicznej. 5.5.5. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej gmin współpracujących z Litwą Współpraca transgraniczna nie tylko przynosi gminom korzyści, ale musi również liczyć się z wieloma przeszkodami i barierami. Mała skala działań, nawet w przypadku najmniej problematycznego przygranicznego obszaru polsko-litewskiego, powinna zwrócić szczególną uwagę na bariery w tej współpracy. 108 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 41 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z L it w ą w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (1 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e są si ad a, b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a uz ys ki w an ia śr od kó w p om oc ow yc h 18 9 73 33 % N ie st ab iln oś ć pr ze pi só w 33 33 33 9% O gr an ic zo na li cz ba of er t w sp ół pr ac y 10 0 18 % Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h pr ze pi só w i no rm p ra w ny ch 10 0 3% Br ak m ię dz yn ar od ow yc h um ów i p or oz um ie ń o w sp ół pr ac y 10 0 6% Br ak ró w no rz ęd ne go p ar tn er a 10 0 12 % Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a za w ie ra ni a um ów 40 60 15 % Br ak o so bo w oś ci pr aw ne j r eg io nu 10 0 3% N ie do st os ow an ie u st ro jó w us ta w od aw cz yc h 10 0 9% N ie pr ec yz yj no ść lu b br ak sp ój no śc i p rz ep isó w 29 71 21 % Sł ab o ro zw in ię ty sy st em w ym ia ny in fo rm ac ji 15 % 10 0 M ał a ak ty w no ść u rz ęd ów w n aw ią zy w an iu w sp ół pr ac y 18 % 10 0 Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h in st yt uc ji i u rz ęd ów 12 % 25 75 Sł ab a ko or dy na cj a po m ię dz y in st yt uc ja m i w za kr es ie w sp ół pr ac y 18 % 33 67 Cz ęs te zm ia ny (r eo rg an iza cj e) in st yt uc ji i w ła dz p ar tn er ów w sp ół pr ac y 9% 33 67 Br ak k om pe te nc ji ka dr w is tn ie ją cy ch in st yt uc ja ch i ur zę da ch 6% 50 50 M ał a lic zb a i p rz ep us to w oś ć p rz ej ść g ra ni cz ny ch 6% 50 50 Sł ab a do st ęp no ść k om un ik ac yj na p rz ej ść 0% N ie do ro zw ój in fr as tr uk tu ry k om un ik ac yj ne j 21 % 14 14 71 Sł ab e za go sp od ar ow an ie in fr as tr uk tu ra ln e pr ze jść 3% 10 0 FORMALNO-PRAWNE INSTYTUCJONALNE INFRASTRUKTURALNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e lit ew sk ie j Ź ró dł o: B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 3 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą. 109www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 42 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z L it w ą w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (2 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e są si ad a, b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. O ba w y pr ze d na pł yw em o bc eg o ka pi ta łu 0% N eg at yw ne st er eo ty py są sia dó w 21 % 14 14 71 Ró żn ic e w m en ta ln oś ci 21 % 10 0 Sł ab a zn aj om oś ć ję zy ka p ar tn er a 48 % 6 94 N eg at yw ne d oś w ia dc ze ni a hi st or yc zn e 24 % 25 75 Br ak c hę ci m ie sz ka ńc ów d o w sp ół pr ac y 9% 33 67 O gr an ic zo ne m oż liw oś ci fi na ns ow e, w ty m bu dż et ów w ła dz lo ka ln yc h te re nó w p rz yg ra ni cz ny ch 64 % 14 14 71 N isk a sp ra w no ść sy st em u ro zli cz eń fi na ns ow yc h 15 % 20 80 Br ak in st yt uc ji O to cz en ia b izn es u 12 % 10 0 Br ak sy st em u za be zp ie cz eń fin an so w yc h tr an sa kc ji ha nd lo w yc h 9% 10 0 Br ak za be zp ie cz en ia in w es ty cy jn eg o w sp ól ny ch pr oj ek tó w o ra z k ap ita łu o br ot ow eg o 9% 10 0 O dm ie nn oś ć sy st em ów g os po da rc zy ch 15 % 10 0 As ym et ria w p oz io m ie ro zw oj u pa rt ne ró w 9% 67 33 Br ak si ln ej re pr ez en ta cj i po dm io tó w g os po da rc zy ch 12 % 50 50 Du ża o dl eg ło ść 3% 10 0 O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę GOSPODARCZE ŚR O DO W IS KO W E FINANSOWE SPOŁECZNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e lit ew sk ie j Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =3 3 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Li tw ą. 110 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Najistotniejsze bariery mają charakter formalno-prawny: skomplikowane procedury pozyskiwania środków pomocowych (33%), nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów (21%) i ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy (18%). Większość tych barier jest postrzegana jako problem obu partnerów: Polski i Litwy. W przypadku niejasności przepisów barierę tę polskie samorządy widzą również po stronie litewskiej. Może to wynikać z gorszej znajomości przepisów i procedur obowiązujących na Litwie. Skomplikowana procedura zawierania umów wynikać może z trudności komunikacyjnych, z relatywnie dużego nakładu czasu związanego z ustaleniem szczegółów działań, jak również może być powiązana z innym podziałem administracyjnym na Litwie, który ma charakter bardziej scentralizowany. Jest to duży problem dla polskiej strony, co widać po wskazywaniu na główną barierę po stronie litewskiej, jaką jest brak równorzędnego partnera. Na ten problem wskazywano również w wywiadach indywidualnych. Przeszkody instytucjonalne to głównie mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy (18%), słaba koordynacja między instytucjami w zakresie współpracy (18%) oraz słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji (15%). Wydaje się, że zwłaszcza ten trzeci czynnik jest relatywnie prosty do wyeliminowania – poprzez zbudowanie ogólnie dostępnego systemu informacji na temat możliwej współpracy transgranicznej oraz potencjalnych partnerów w transgranicznych projektach. Oczywistą barierą współpracy transgranicznej są ograniczone możliwości finansowe, budżety władz lokalnych (71%). W dużej mierze działania w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystują środki zewnętrzne, niepochodzące z budżetu gminy. Dużym jednak problemem w tej sytuacji jest zapewnienie finansowego wkładu własnego do projektu. W przypadku niskich wpływów do budżetów gminnych jest to realna i największa bariera w nawiązywaniu tej współpracy. Przeszkodą dla gmin jest też język partnera (48%) – chodzi tutaj zapewne o nieznajomość języka litewskiego przez stronę polską i jednocześnie niechęć do używania języka polskiego przez stronę litewską. Rozmówcy z przeprowadzonych wywiadów indywidualnych wskazują wyraźnie na to, że to, jakiego języka używa się w kontaktach polsko-litewskich, może wiązać się z niechęcią ze strony litewskiej, związaną ze skomplikowaną i wciąż sporną historią tych terenów. Z kolei strona polska zazwyczaj nie zna języka litewskiego i nie widzi potrzeby jego znajomości, uznając, że Litwini znają, rozumieją język polski. Na uwagę zasługuje fakt, że większość wymienionych barier współpracy transgranicznej jest umieszczana „po obu stronach" granicy (oprócz barier gospodarczych, które są w znacznej mierze lokowane na Litwie). Potencjał współpracy transgranicznej w przełamywaniu barier współpracy transgranicznej jest więc duży. Nie jest tak, że współpraca ta napotyka przeszkody z jednej strony. Jest to autentycznie wspólny problem, którego nie da się rozwiązać bez zacieśnionej współpracy. 5.6. Charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) Spośród wszystkich gmin województwa podlaskiego jedynie 11 prowadzi współpracę transgraniczną z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim). Obrazuje to mapa stworzona na podstawie odpowiedzi samorządowców biorących udział w badaniu. Na podstawie deklaracji samorządowców z województwa podlaskiego ustalono, że spośród 118 gmin nieco ponad 1/4 (27%) prowadzi współpracę transgraniczną z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim). Dokładnie 19 gmin w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat podejmowało próby nawiązania takiej współpracy (por. mapa 6). Rosja (Obwód Kaliningradzki) jest partnerem współpracy transgranicznej dla 11 gmin województwa podlaskiego. Choć gminy tego obszaru znajdują się w sąsiedztwie Litwy, to charakter współpracy jest inny z uwagi na: (1) wyraźniejszy podział narodowościowy w regionach przygranicznych, nie występuje tak silnie przemieszanie ludności po obu stronach granicy; (2) Obwód Kaliningradzki jest częścią Rosji pozostającej poza strukturami instytucjonalnymi UE, co znajduje swój wyraz zarówno w autonomii władz lokalnych, jak i w zasadach organizacji lokalnej działalności gospodarczej. Współpraca transgraniczna, jej intensywność jest oceniana dobrze, ale w stosunku do perspektyw jej rozwoju panuje umiarkowany optymizm i duży stopień niepewności, który jest z pewnością odbiciem polityki szczebla centralnego między Warszawą a Moskwą oraz UE i Rosją. Z perspektywy uzyskanych wyników badań wydaje się, że partnerzy po stronie rosyjskiej w większym stopniu podlegają kontroli scentralizowanego systemu politycznego Rosji. 111www.soclab.org.pl M ap a 8. G m in y de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą (O bw od em K al in in gr ad zk im ) Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. nie współpracują współpracują 112 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 9. P ró by n aw ią za ni a w sp ół pr ac y z Ro sj ą (O bw od em K al in in gr ad zk im ) w o st at ni ch 5 la ta ch Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. próbowali nawiązać współpracę nie próbowali nawiązać współpracy 113www.soclab.org.pl Współpraca transgraniczna z Rosją koncentruje się na turystyce, rekreacji i kulturze, co stanowi typowy wzorzec współpracy w całym regionie. Transgraniczny rynek pracy, inwestycje, wspólne przedsięwzięcia gospodarcze stanowią rzadkość. Dostrzec można jednak pewne cechy szczególne. W zdecydowanej większości gmin głównym podmiotem współpracy są jednostki szczebla gminnego, ale aktywnym podmiotem są również przedsiębiorcy. Mimo że w sferze gospodarczej nie widać szczególnych osiągnięć, to jednak udział przedsiębiorców świadczyć może o tym, że współpraca transgraniczna ma charakter przedsięwzięć o małej skali, przynoszących korzyści gospodarcze lokalnym firmom. Być może większość korzyści przynosi działalność w sferze turystki. Współpraca transgraniczna jest dla gmin współpracujących z Rosją szansą ma pozyskiwanie środków pomocowych z UE i spoza UE, przy czym nie przekładają się one na wzrost liczby miejsc pracy i na rozwój infrastruktury. Współpraca transgraniczna podejmowana jest z jednej strony w ramach tradycyjnych, instytucjonalnych form „partnerstwa" miast i gmin, z drugiej – wielostronnych, nieformalnych umów. Stosunkowo rzadsza jest współpraca w ramach skonkretyzowanych projektów. Deklarowane cele współpracy dotyczą głównie rozwoju kultury i promocji samorządów, ale również promocji biznesu i lokalnych produktów i usług. Gminy współpracujące z Rosją w większym stopniu widzą w niej rynek zbytu niż partnera do realizacji projektów związanych z rozwojem gminy, regionu pogranicza. We współpracę z Rosją słabo włączają się instytucje otoczenia biznesu i organizacje pozarządowe. Wydaje się, że współpraca transgraniczna wynika z inicjatywy władz samorządowych i prywatnych przedsiębiorców. Wspólne przedsięwzięcia zawężone są praktycznie do organizacji imprez kulturalnych i turystycznych. Współpracujące gminy występują wspólnie o dofinansowywanie projektów. Promocja współpracy ogranicza się do standardowych środków – materiałów reklamowych, imprez, w mniejszym stopniu wykorzystuje się prasę, radio i Internet. Współpraca transgraniczna między gminami województwa podlaskiego a Obwodem Kaliningradzkim napotyka wiele barier. Przede wszystkim mają one charakter biurokratyczny: skomplikowane procedury pozyskiwania środków, nieprecyzyjność, niespójność i niestabilność przepisów prawnych (jest to główna przeszkoda przypisywana całkowicie stronie partnera z Obwodu Kaliningradzkiego). Wskazuje się również małą aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy transgranicznej – jest to też jedna z przeszkód leżąca po stronie rosyjskiej. Wynika to zapewne z mniejszego stopnia autonomii władz lokalnych w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Poza ogólną odmiennością systemów gospodarczych Polski i Rosji wskazuje się również na to, że poważną przeszkodą we współpracy transgranicznej – szczególnie w sferze gospodarczej – jest brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych po stronie rosyjskiej. Tradycyjne bariery społeczne – słaba znajomość języka partnera, negatywne stereotypy i doświadczenia historyczne – nie są najsilniej akcentowane, ale mogą być łatwo aktywizowane w sytuacjach konfliktów interesów, w czasie prowadzenia negocjacji, poszukiwania kompromisów i budowy zaufania (ważnego składnika kapitału społecznego obniżającego koszty transakcyjne we wspólnych działaniach). Wydaje się, że granica między Polską a Rosją, gminami województwa podlaskiego i obwodem Kaliningradzkim, nadal stanowi poważny problem we współpracy transgranicznej. Przynależność do różnych systemów, mniejszy zakres autonomii partnerów, tradycyjne formy współpracy związane raczej z formami instytucjonalnymi niż obywatelskimi sprawia, że współpraca transgraniczna w tym regionie w większym stopniu jest wrażliwa na klimat relacji politycznych na szczeblu centralnym. 5.6.1. Aktywność gmin współpracujących z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) w nawiązywaniu kontaktów z pozostałymi krajami sąsiedzkimi Aktywność w zakresie próby nawiązania kontaktów z Białorusią wskazało tylko 4 z 11 badanych podmiotów współpracujących z Rosją w województwie podlaskim. Podobnie niskie wskazania dotyczyły dodatkowej współpracy z Litwą (3 podmioty) i Ukrainą (4 gminy) (por. wykres 36). 114 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 43. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją W1A� Czy próbowali Państwo w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat nawiązać współpracę z .....? Białorusią 34 Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Litwą 3 Ukrainą 34 1 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Plany gmin w zakresie nawiązania współpracy w perspektywie trzech kolejnych lat pozostają niesatysfakcjonujące. Spośród gmin prowadzących współpracę z Rosją dwie zadeklarowały chęć podjęcia takiej współpracy z Białorusią, Litwą oraz Ukrainą (por. wykres 37). Wykres 44. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją W1C� Czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat zamierzają Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną z .....? Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Litwą 2 Białorusią 2 3 Ukrainą 12 5 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. 115www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 45. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją W1D. Jakie są główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją? Białoruś Litwa Ukraina Stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy 50% 75% 33% Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe 75% 100% 100% Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej 50% 75% 50% Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu 75% 50% 33% Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników 25% 25% 17% 25%Ponieważ wszyscy nawiązujątaką współpracę 25% Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Głównym powodem decydującym o chęci podjęcia współpracy międzynarodowej w ujęciu ogólnym okazała się możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe (100% badanych wskazało tę właśnie przyczynę). Pretendujący do tej aktywności na dalszym planie dostrzegali korzyść w postaci promocji gminy na arenie międzynarodowej (75% wskazań) i stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej mieszkańców (75%). Rozwój i pobudzanie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości i biznesu są częściej wskazywane przez przedstawicieli gmin w kontekście współpracy z Białorusią. Aspekt ten jest najmniej ważny w optyce samorządowców w kontekście współpracy z Ukrainą. Białoruskie oraz ukraińskie jednostki samorządowe w opinii polskich samorządowców nie są wzorem w zakresie dobrych praktyk, które zdaniem przedstawicieli gmin należy implementować na grunt rodzimy. Umiarkowanie pozytywna ocena poziomu zarządzania przekłada się na argument braku ewentualnych korzyści w zakresie rozwoju wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników – jedynie co czwarta badana gmina widziała taką szansę w podczas kontaktów z partnerami z Białorusi i Litwy oraz rzadziej niż co piąta z Ukrainy (por. wykres 38). 5.6.2. Intensywność, dynamika, obszary i skutki obecnej współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) Współpracę transgraniczną z Obwodem Kaliningradzkim prowadzi zaledwie 11 gmin województwa podlaskiego. Są to gminy głównie usytuowane blisko granicy z Rosją. Współpraca gminy Białystok może być wynikiem kontaktów administracyjnych z sąsiadami województwa, a nie przejawem samodzielnej aktywności transgranicznej na szczeblu lokalnym. 116 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 46. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Rosją W2� Proszę ocenić w skali 1-4 OGÓLNĄ intensywność obecnej współpracy Państwa gminy z Rosją Bardzo wysoka + wysoka Bardzo niska + niskaDane w ujęciu procentowym Trudno powiedzieć 55%45% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. Oceny współpracy, choć zróżnicowane, rozkładają się niemal połowicznie. Blisko 45% gmin uznaje intensywność kooperacji za bardzo wysoką i wysoką, podczas gdy pozostałe 55% – za niską lub bardzo niską. W ocenie perspektyw na przyszłość panuje raczej umiarkowany optymizm i niepewność, zaledwie ponad 1/3 współpracujących z Rosją gmin oczekuje wzrostu intensywności kontaktów. Wykres 47. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Rosją W2a� Proszę ocenić, czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat OGÓLNA intensywność współpracy Państwa gminy z Rosją, Pana(i) zdaniem, wzrośnie, pozostanie na obecnym poziomie czy też zmaleje? Wzrośnie Pozostanie na tym samym poziomie Trudno powiedziećZmaleje 27%36% 9% 27% Dane w ujęciu procentowym Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. Współpraca transgraniczna koncentruje się na turystyce i rekreacji oraz kulturze, w szczególności na promocji dziedzictwa lokalnego. Choć wskazuje się również na współpracę w obszarze gospodarki (36%) i infrastruktury – na przykład budowę dróg, połączeń telekomunikacyjnych (18%) – jednak nie dostrzega się znaczącego wpływu aktywności w tych obszarach na rozwój gmin (niskie średnie arytmetyczne). Wykres 48. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją W4� Proszę wskazać obszary współpracy w Państwa gminie z Rosją oraz ocenić ich wpływ na rozwój gminy przy użyciu 4-stopniowej skali, gdzie 4 oznacza zdecydowany wpływ, 3 – umiarkowany wpływ, 2 – znikomy wpływ, 1 – brak wpływu. Średnia: Infrastruktura (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) Rynek pracy 9% 2,00 Kultura, w tym promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego 64% 3,00 Turystyka i rekreacja 73% 2,13 Rozwój społeczny 9% 2,00 Gospodarka 36% 2,00 18% 2,00 Sport 18% 3,00 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Rosją. 117www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 49 . W id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j g m in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o z Ro sj ą W 5� Ja ki e są w id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j w P ań st w a gm in ie z R os ją ? D o oc en y pr os zę p os łu ży ć si ę 5st op ni ow ą sk al ą, g dz ie 5 o zn ac za , ż e zd ec yd ow an ie s ię P an (i) z ga dz a, 4 – ra cz ej z ga dz a, 3 – a ni z ga dz a, a ni n ie z ga dz a, 2 – ra cz ej n ie z ga dz a, 1 – z de cy do w an ie n ie z ga dz a. Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię z ga dz a A ni s ię z ga dz a, an i n ie z ga dz a Tr ud no po w ie dz ie ć Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię n ie z ga dz a D an e w u ję ci u pr oc en to w ym Śr ed ni a: 4, 00 Zm ni ej sz en ie p oz io m u w za je m ne go up rz ed ze ni a i n eg at yw ny ch s te re ot yp ów 67 % 33 % 3, 33 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez k ul tu ra ln yc h m ie sz ka ńc om p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 50 % 50 % 3, 00 In te ns yfi ka cj a ko nt ak tó w m ię dz y m ie sz ka ńc am i 33 % 33 % 33 % 2, 50 W zr os t w ym ia ny h an dl ow ej z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy 75 % 25 % 2, 50 Po w st an ie n ow yc h dr óg , m os tó w 33 % 33 % 33 % 2, 50 W pr ow ad ze ni e do s zk ół n au ki ję zy ka s ąs ia dó w 33 % 33 % 33 % 2, 33 Tu ry st yk a (n p. r oz w ija s ię b az a ho te lo w a, n oc le go w a, zw ię ks za s ię li cz ba tu ry st ów , n ow e tr as y tu ry st yc zn e) 25 % 50 % 25 % 2, 33 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez s po rt ow yc h m ie sz ka ńc om p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 33 % 67 % 2, 00 N ap ły w in w es to ró w z ag ra ni cz ny ch 25 % 75 % 2, 00 N ap ły w in w es to ró w k ra jo w yc h 50 % 50 % 2, 00 W sp ół pr ac a lo ka ln yc h ś ro do w is k go sp od ar cz yc h 50 % 50 % 2, 00 W sp ół pr ac a pa rt ne rs ka m ię dz y s zk oł am i p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 33 % 33 % 33 % 1, 00 Sp ad ek s to py b ez ro bo ci a 50 % 50 % 1, 00 W zr os t l ic zb y m ie js c pr ac y 50 % 50 % 1, 00 W zr os t k on ku re nc yj no śc i p ol sk ic h fir m p ro w ad zo ny ch n a te re ni e Pa ńs tw a gm in y 50 % 50 % 1, 00 Pr ze pł yw s iły r ob oc ze j w o pa rc iu o u m ow y 50 % 50 % 1, 00 Li kw id ac ja z ak ła dó w p ro du kc yj ny ch s zk od liw yc h dl a śr od ow is ka n at ur al ne go 50 % 50 % 1, 00 St w or ze ni e w sp ól ny ch z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy p ro gr am ów i st ra te gi i r oz w oj u 50 % 50 % Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 1 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą. 118 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Największy wpływ na rozwój gminy ma sport (średnia ocena 3 pkt.), ale współpraca w tym obszarze jest mniej intensywna. W porównaniu do innych państw omawianych w raporcie zwraca uwagę dość wysoki udział gospodarki w obszarach współpracy. Współpraca transgraniczna z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) odczuwalnie przekłada się, zdaniem respondentów, na zmniejszenie poziomu wzajemnego uprzedzenia i negatywnych stereotypów – twierdzi tak aż 67% ankietowanych podmiotów. Wzajemne relacje nie oddziałują zdecydowanie na wskaźniki zatrudnienia w regionie, wspólne programy i strategie rozwoju, a także na likwidację zakładów produkcyjnych szkodliwych dla środowiska naturalnego. Badani podzielili się na dwie równe frakcje, jeżeli chodzi o ocenę wpływu współpracy na organizowanie imprez kulturalnych dla mieszkańców po obu stronach granicy. Blisko 1/3 badanych twierdzi, że przekłada się ona na intensyfikację kontaktów między mieszkańcami, wprowadzenie do szkół nauki języka sąsiadów, a także na współpracę szkół. 5.6.3. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin województwa podlaskiego zaangażowane we współpracę z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) W zdecydowanej większości podmiotem współpracy transgranicznej są jednostki samorządu szczebla gminnego (91%). Mimo że w sferze gospodarczej nie obserwuje się widocznych skutków współpracy, to jednak przedsiębiorcy należą do głównych jej podmiotów (73%). Może to oznaczać, że współpraca gospodarcza z Rosją w tych gminach ma charakter przedsięwzięć o małej skali, przynoszących jedynie korzyści poszczególnym przedsiębiorcom i firmom. Jednym z powodów małej świadomości wśród samorządowców wpływu i rezultatów wymiany gospodarczej z Obwodem Kaliningradzkim może być mały stopnień współpracy międzysektorowej. Przedsiębiorstwa i samorządy współpracują z Rosją w odrębny, niepołączony ze sobą sposób. Wykres 50. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Rosją W6. Proszę wskazać podmioty instytucjonalne z gminy zaangażowane we współpracę z Rosją oraz ocenić intensywność współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: gdzie 4 – bardzo wysoka, 3 – wysoka, 2 – niska, 1 – bardzo niska. Średnia: 3,507%Szkoły wyższe, jednostki naukowe 18% 2,80Jednostki samorząduterytorialnego szczebla gminnego 91% 3,00Jednostki kultury 55% Instytucje otoczenia biznesu, instytucje i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości i innowacyjności 2,0018% 2,14Przedsiębiorcy \ MSP 73% 2,33Szkoły i placówki oświatowe 27% 2,50Związki i stowarzyszeniajednostek samorządu terytorialnego 18% 2,00Organizacje pozarządowe– stowarzyszenia, fundacje (NGO) 9% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. We współpracę z Rosją słabo są zaangażowane instytucje otoczenia biznesu oraz szkoły wyższe i jednostki naukowe. Znamienny jest najniższy udział stowarzyszeń i fundacji, co wynika z mało rozwiniętego strukturalnie społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Kontakty z Rosją mają więc głównie charakter indywidualnych, niepowiązanych ze sobą inicjatyw jednostek samorządowych oraz prywatnych przedsiębiorstw. 119www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 51 . M ap a uk az uj ąc a de kl ar at yw ny o ds et ek in st yt uc ji z gm in y za an ga żo w an yc h w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą or az in te ns yw no ść p ro w ad zo ne j w sp ół pr ac y 0% 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 10 0% 1234 Je dn os tk i k ul tu ry Sz ko ły i pl ac ów ki o św ia to w e Zw ią zk i i s to w ar zy sz en ia je dn os te k sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go Pr ze ds ię bi or cy \ M SP Sz ko ły w yż sz e, je dn os tk i n au ko w e In st yt uc je o to cz en ia b iz ne su , i ns ty tu cj e i o rg an iz ac je w sp ie ra ją ce ro zw ój p rz ed si ęb io rc zo śc i i in no w ac yj no śc i Je dn os tk i sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go sz cz eb la gm in ne go O rg an iz ac je po za rz ąd ow e – st ow ar zy sz en ia , fu nd ac je (N G O ) N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a Intensywność współpracy: 4 – bardzo wysoka; 1 – bardzo niska W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a In st yt uc je z aa ng aż ow an e w e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą Ź ró dł o: B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 1 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą. 120 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Współpraca z Rosją cechuje się głównie kontaktami o charakterze instytucjonalnym (jednostki samorządu), z udziałem jednostek kultury i przedsiębiorców. W porównaniu z innymi gminami współpraca transgraniczna ma mniej intensywny charakter w sferze kultury. Historyczna granica między Polską a ZSRR po wejściu Polski do UE pozostała nadal granicą stanowiącą barierę w kontaktach i współpracy transgranicznej. W tym wypadku również na tej współpracy mogły silniej odciskać się napięcia między Rosją a Polską na szczeblu centralnym (państwowym) czy między UE a Rosją. 5.6.4. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć i płynące z nich korzyści. Cele współpracy, sposoby jej promocji i wykorzystywane instrumenty Wspólne przedsięwzięcia z perspektywy samorządów ograniczają się praktycznie do organizacji imprez kulturalnych i turystycznych, imprez międzyszkolnych. Czasem współpracujące gminy występują wspólnie o dofinansowanie projektów. Poza tym zakres współpracy samorządu i lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych jest znikomy. Potwierdza to tezę o braku współpracy międzysektorowej, co z pewnością marnuje jej potencjalne możliwości w tych gminach. Wykres 52. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją oraz ich intensywność W7� Jak często organizowano do tej pory wspólne przedsięwzięcia z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że bardzo często, 4 – często, 3 – rzadko, 2 – bardzo rzadko, a 1 – w ogóle. Imprezy kulturalne 44 56 Targi i wystawy 75 25 Imprezy międzyszkolne 20 40 20 20 Imprezy turystyczne 33 33 17 17 Wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne 25 75 Handlowa wymiana przygraniczna 25 50 25 Współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych 33 33 33 Ochrona środowiska 67 33 Misje gospodarcze, współpraca podmiotów gospodarczych 33 67 Wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie 2525 50 Bardzo często + często Bardzo rzadko + rzadko Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. 121www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 53. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją W11� W jakim stopniu, Pan(i) zdaniem, Państwa gmina czerpie korzyści ze współpracy z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że w bardzo dużym, 4 – w dużym, 3 – w małym, 2 – bardzo małym, 1 – w ogóle. W bardzo + dużym stopniu W małym + bardzo małym Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej 14 86 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE 17 50 30 Rozwój turystyki 22 67 11 Rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej 60 40 Skuteczniejsza ochrona środowiska naturalnego 50 50 Wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie 25 75 Wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności 67 33 Ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami 14 43 43 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE 602020 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. Wykres 54. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją W12� Proszę powiedzieć, w oparciu o jakie akty prawne odbywa się współpraca z Rosją? Współpraca w ramach projektów 10% Gminy partnerskie 60% Miasta partnerskie 70% Przedstawiciel w innym kraju 10% 20%Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy z Rosją sprowadzają się praktycznie do rozwoju turystyki oraz zwiększenia szans na uzyskiwanie środków pomocowych z UE i spoza UE. Przy czym szanse te nie przekładają się na wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie oraz w małym stopniu na rozwój infrastruktury. Współpraca transgraniczna odbywa się raczej w tradycyjnych formach prawnych – miast i gmin partnerskich lub w partnerstwie bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego. W mniejszym stopniu widoczna jest współpraca w ramach projektów – widać tutaj wyraźną barierę w aplikowaniu o środki po122 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim mocowe UE. Współpraca transgraniczna z Rosją przebiega z jednej strony w bardziej zinstytucjonalizowanych formach organizacyjnych, z drugiej – na podstawie umów o charakterze nieformalnego partnerstwa. Bardziej zindywidualizowana funkcjonalnie w ramach wspólnych projektów jest raczej rzadkością. Wykres 55. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją C1� Proszę powiedzieć, które cele realizowane są, Pana(i) zdaniem, podczas współpracy z Rosją? Rozwój kultury 90% Integracja społeczności lokalnych 70% Poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych 70% Zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego 70% Promocja organizacji pozarządowych 10% Rozwój infrastruktury (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) 20% Promocja biznesu 60% Promocja lokalnych produktów i usług 60% Poprawa przepływu informacji 10% Wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich 10% Zwiększenie handlu 20% Integracja społeczna poprzez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne 70% Promocja samorządu 70% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. Mimo że współpraca z Rosją ma charakter tradycyjnych form współpracy lokalnych władz samorządowych, które głównie deklarują realizację celów związanych z rozwojem kultury, promocją samorządów, poprawą kontaktów międzynarodowych, integracją społeczności lokalnych, zwiększeniem ruchu turystycznego, to również pojawiają się cele związane z promocją biznesu i lokalnych produktów i usług. Widać wyraźnie, że samorządy są świadome potencjału współpracy gospodarczej, brakuje im jednak narzędzi do zsynchronizowania swoich działań z aktywnością biznesu. 123www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 56. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją C2� W jaki sposób gmina promuje współpracę transgraniczną z Rosją? Wspólne, transgraniczne imprezy kulturalne 30% Organizowanie wymiany młodzieży szkolnej 20% Materiały reklamowe 50% Strona internetowa, np. gminy w językach obcych 30% Udział w konferencjach, sympozjach za granicą 20% Udział w targach zagranicznych 20% Ogłoszenia w prasie zagranicznej (regionalnej, krajowej) 10% Ogłoszenia w zagranicznym radiu, telewizji, Internecie 10% Wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne 50% Materiały informacyjne (np. foldery, 30% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. W promocji współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystuje się standardowe metody: materiały reklamowe, foldery, ale również strony internetowe gminy w obcych językach; wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne; a także – w mniejszym stopniu – ogłoszenia w prasie zagranicznej, w radiu i Internecie. Widać tutaj również nieużywanie narzędzi promocyjnych obejmujących współpracę z biznesem. 124 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 57. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Rosją oraz ocena ich użyteczności C3� Proszę wskazać, które instrumenty współpracy zagranicznej Państwa gmina wykorzystuje w kontaktach z Rosją. Uczestnictwo w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej 33% Udział w euroregionach 33% Organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych 33% Udział w targach międzynarodowych 22% Organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy lub regionu 22% Organizacja misji gospodarczych 11% Przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów 11% Wsparcie przedsiębiorców jako ekspertów 11% Uczestnictwo w transnarodowych sieciach, związkach, stowarzyszeniach 11% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=11 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Rosją. We współpracy transgranicznej z Rosją przeważają typowe instrumenty współpracy instytucjonalnej – organizacja wizyt studyjnych, projekty współpracy międzynarodowej, udział w euroregionach. Mamy więc raczej do czynienia z kontaktami sformalizowanymi. W mniejszym stopniu wykorzystuje się instrumenty wspierające współpracę z sektorem komercyjnym – przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów, wspieranie przedsiębiorców. W świetle wyników badań z wywiadów pogłębionych można postawić hipotezę, że w przypadku gmin współpracujących z Rosją samorządy są zbyt słabym partnerem dla przedsiębiorców, którzy relatywnie lepiej radzą sobie w kontaktach gospodarczych z Rosją. 5.6.5. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej gmin współpracujących z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) Współpraca transgraniczna z Rosją napotyka na charakterystyczne bariery biurokratyczne: skomplikowane procedury uzyskiwania środków pomocowych (45%), ograniczoną liczbę ofert współpracy (45%), nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów (27%). Te bariery występują po obu stronach, jednak często pojawiają się opinie, że są one właściwe raczej po stronie rosyjskiej. Z pewnością wiąże się to z wewnętrzną polityką Rosji, która przyczyniła się do ograniczenia możliwości podmiotów kaliningradzkich do korzystania z unijnego wsparcia finansowego76 Barierą po stronie polskiej jest brak odpowiednich przepisów i norm pranych (50%), ale już niestabilność przepisów jest w 100% barierą po stronie rosyjskiej. Również istotną przeszkodą instytucjonalną jest mała aktywność urzędów z nawiązywaniu współpracy transgranicznej, a w 67% tego rodzaju pasywność obserwuje się po stronie rosyjskiej. Zapewne jest to związane z mniejszym stopniem autonomii władz lokalnych w systemie administracji w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Znaczącą przeszkodą we współpracy jest słaby rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej, występujący po obu stronach granicy. 76 J. Rogoża, A. Wierzbowska-Miazga, I. Wiśniewska, Wyspa na uwięzi. Kaliningrad między Moskwą a UE, Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, Warszawa 2012, s. 50. 125www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 58 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z R os ją w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (1 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a uz ys ki w an ia śr od kó w p om oc ow yc h 20 80 45 % N ie st ab iln oś ć pr ze pi só w 10 0 18 % O gr an ic zo na li cz ba of er t w sp ół pr ac y 80 20 45 % Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h pr ze pi só w i no rm p ra w ny ch 50 50 18 % Br ak m ię dz yn ar od ow yc h um ów i p or oz um ie ń o w sp ół pr ac y 10 0 9% Br ak ró w no rz ęd ne go p ar tn er a 10 0 18 % Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a za w ie ra ni a um ów 50 50 18 % Br ak o so bo w oś ci pr aw ne j r eg io nu 0% N ie do st os ow an ie u st ro jó w us ta w od aw cz yc h 10 0 9% N ie pr ec yz yj no ść lu b br ak sp ój no śc i p rz ep isó w 33 67 27 % Sł ab o ro zw in ię ty sy st em w ym ia ny in fo rm ac ji 18 % 10 0 M ał a ak ty w no ść u rz ęd ów w n aw ią zy w an iu w sp ół pr ac y 27 % 33 67 Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h in st yt uc ji i u rz ęd ów 18 % 10 0 Sł ab a ko or dy na cj a po m ię dz y in st yt uc ja m i w za kr es ie w sp ół pr ac y 9% 10 0 Cz ęs te zm ia ny (r eo rg an iza cj e) in st yt uc ji i w ła dz p ar tn er ów w sp ół pr ac y 9% 10 0 Br ak k om pe te nc ji ka dr w is tn ie ją cy ch in st yt uc ja ch i ur zę da ch 9% 10 0 M ał a lic zb a i p rz ep us to w oś ć p rz ej ść g ra ni cz ny ch 18 % 50 50 Sł ab a do st ęp no ść k om un ik ac yj na p rz ej ść 9% 10 0 N ie do ro zw ój in fr as tr uk tu ry k om un ik ac yj ne j 36 % 10 0 Sł ab e za go sp od ar ow an ie in fr as tr uk tu ra ln e pr ze jść 9% 10 0 FORMALNO-PRAWNE INSTYTUCJONALNE INFRASTRUKTURALNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e ro sy jsk ie j Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 1 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą. 126 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 59 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z R os ją w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (2 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. O ba w y pr ze d na pł yw em o bc eg o ka pi ta łu 0% N eg at yw ne st er eo ty py są sia dó w 18 % 50 50 Ró żn ic e w m en ta ln oś ci 9% 10 0 Sł ab a zn aj om oś ć ję zy ka p ar tn er a 18 % 50 50 N eg at yw ne d oś w ia dc ze ni a hi st or yc zn e 18 % 10 0 Br ak c hę ci m ie sz ka ńc ów d o w sp ół pr ac y 9% 10 0 O gr an ic zo ne m oż liw oś ci fi na ns ow e, w ty m bu dż et ów w ła dz lo ka ln yc h te re nó w p rz yg ra ni cz ny ch 64 % 29 14 57 N isk a sp ra w no ść sy st em u ro zli cz eń fi na ns ow yc h 27 % 67 33 Br ak in st yt uc ji O to cz en ia b izn es u 18 % 10 0 Br ak sy st em u za be zp ie cz eń fin an so w yc h tr an sa kc ji ha nd lo w yc h 18 % 10 0 Br ak za be zp ie cz en ia in w es ty cy jn eg o w sp ól ny ch pr oj ek tó w o ra z k ap ita łu o br ot ow eg o 9% 10 0 O dm ie nn oś ć sy st em ów g os po da rc zy ch 64 % 43 57 As ym et ria w p oz io m ie ro zw oj u pa rt ne ró w 0% Br ak si ln ej re pr ez en ta cj i po dm io tó w g os po da rc zy ch 36 % 10 0 Du ża o dl eg ło ść 27 % 10 0 O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę GOSPODARCZE ŚR O DO W IS KO W E FINANSOWE SPOŁECZNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e ro sy jsk ie j Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 1 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z Ro sj ą. 127www.soclab.org.pl Na uwagę zasługuje również to, że barierą jest odmienność systemów gospodarczych (64%) oraz brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych (36%) – jest to przeszkoda uznawana za leżącą całkowicie po stronie partnerów rosyjskich. Poza tym negatywną rolę mogą wciąż odgrywać czynniki społeczne: słaba znajomość języka partnera (18%), negatywne stereotypy (18%), negatywne doświadczenia historyczne (18%). Nie są to najsilniej akcentowane bariery, ale można sądzić, że mogą się zaktywizować w sytuacji konfliktowych interesów i potrzeby poszukiwania kompromisów, budowy zaufania. Ważnym czynnikiem jest również odległość geograficzna, co potwierdza skłonność samorządów do nawiązywania współpracy transgranicznej z krajami najmniej oddalonymi geograficznie. 5.7. Charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej z Ukrainą Na terenie województwa podlaskiego niespełna 10% gmin (a dokładnie 12) zadeklarowało współpracę transgraniczną z Ukrainą. Dodatkowo 5 gmin wskazało, że próbowało nawiązać taką współpracę w ostatnich pięciu latach (por. mapa 8). Urzędy gminy prowadzące aktualnie współprace transgraniczną z Ukrainą są rozproszone po całym terytorium województwa podlaskiego. Poniższa mapa ukazuje ich rozmieszczenie. Niemal połowę z nich (5 gmin) stanowią gminy miejsko-wiejskie, 4 to gminy miejskie a tylko 3 – wiejskie. Przedstawiciele gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą, zapytani o ich sytuację gospodarczą, w większości ocenili ją jako taką samą jak w innych gminach województwa podlaskiego (odpowiedź taką wskazano w 7 gminach), w 5 przypadkach uznali, że jest gorsza niż w gminach pozostałych i – co znamienne – żaden z naszych informatorów nie wskazał, że jest ona lepsza. Podobne odpowiedzi otrzymano na pytania o poziom bezrobocia (w 5 przypadkach uzyskano odpowiedź, że jest ono na takim samym poziomie jak w innych gminach, 7 przedstawicieli gmin wskazało, że jest ono większe, a nikt, że jest ono mniejsze niż gdzie indziej) i aktywność społeczną (w 8 gminach oceniono ją jako pozostającą na podobnym poziomie jak gdzie indziej, w 4 – że jest na niższym poziomie, nikt nie wskazał, że jest ona lepsza). W pytaniu o gminną infrastrukturę – aż w 7 przypadkach została ona oceniona jako gorsza niż w pozostałych gminach województwa podlaskiego, w 3 jako pozostająca na tym samym poziomie. Tylko jeden informator ocenił ją jako wyróżniającą się w naszym województwie. Podstawowe czynniki podnoszące atrakcyjność gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą wskazane przez badanych respondentów to dobrej jakości środowisko naturalne (walor ten wskazało 9 przedstawicieli gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą), walory turystyczne (8 gmin), dobra współpraca z sąsiednimi gminami (4 gminy), dobry poziom wykształcenia ludności na szczeblu średnim i wyższym (4 gminy), położenie na przecięciu ważnych europejskich szlaków komunikacyjnych (4 gminy), różnorodna i bogata oferta instytucji kulturalnych (4 gminy). Podstawowe bariery w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym tych gmin dotyczyły problemów z zapewnieniem wkładu własnego realizowanych projektów (10 gmin), ujemnego salda migracji (7 gmin), słabego rozwoju gospodarczego (7 gmin), niskiego poziomu zaangażowania władz lokalnych i krajowych w rozwój gminy (6 gmin). Spośród deklarowanych działań podejmowanych przez władze gminy w celu podniesienia atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej wyróżniono w szczególności pozyskiwanie środków z UE (12 gmin), wspieranie i wzmacnianie lokalnych organizacji pozarządowych (10 gmin), dbanie o atrakcyjną ofertę kulturalną dla gminy (10 gmin), podnoszenie jakości obsługi klienta (9 gmin). 128 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim M ap a 10 . P ró by n aw ią za ni a z U kr ai ną w o st at ni ch 5 la ta ch Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. próbowali nawiązać współpracę nie próbowali nawiązać współpracy 129www.soclab.org.pl M ap a 11 . G m in y de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną Źr ód ło : a na liz y w ła sn e, n a po ds ta w ie b ad an ia P A PI w 1 18 g m in ac h w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o. nie współpracują współpracują 130 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Większość, bo aż 10 spośród gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą, deklaruje posiadanie opracowanej strategii rozwoju, nie posiadają jej natomiast 2 gminy. Aż 6 gmin uwzględnia w niej współpracę transgraniczną z zagranicznymi podmiotami samorządowymi, 3 gminy uwzględniają współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami pozarządowymi, tylko 1 z zagranicznymi podmiotami komercyjnymi, 5 w ramach euroregionu, w żadnej z nich nie zadeklarowano utworzenia w jej ramach specjalnej komórki/zespołu do spraw współpracy transgranicznej, ale w 2 gminach zostało do tego celu powołane specjalne stanowisko pracy. Wszystkie gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą w ostatnich latach ubiegały się o środki z UE, 4 z nich uczestniczyły w Programie Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska 2007–2013, 2 uczestniczyły w Programie Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013, 2 w Programie Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska–Rosja 2007–2013, 1 w Programie Region Morza Bałtyckiego, 1 w INTERREG IVC, 2 w programie Europa dla Obywateli, 1 w programie URBACT i 1 w programie Komponent transnarodowy Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego 5.7.1. Aktywność gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą w nawiązywaniu kontaktów z pozostałymi krajami sąsiedzkimi W ramach diagnozy dotyczącej aktywności gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą zapytano przedstawicieli gmin, które nie nawiązały dotąd współpracy z Białorusią, Litwą i Rosją, czy w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat próbowały to zrobić. Rozkład otrzymanych odpowiedzi przedstawia poniższy wykres. Wykres 60. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą W1A� Czy próbowali Państwo w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat nawiązać współpracę z .....? Białorusią 3 13 Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Litwą 5 Rosją 53 1 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Wykres 61. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą W1C� Czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat zamierzają Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną z .....? Tak NieDane w ujęciu liczbowym Trudno powiedzieć Litwą 4 Białorusią 12 2 Rosją 23 3 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. 131www.soclab.org.pl Z uzyskanych danych wynika, że większość gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą próbowało nawiązać współpracę z Litwą. Po 3 gminy starały się natomiast nawiązać współpracę z Rosją i Białorusią (por. wykres 60). Analizując plany współpracy transgranicznej państw współpracujących z Ukrainą, należy stwierdzić, że mają one raczej mało ekspansywny charakter. Najwięcej gmin zadeklarowało prolitewską orientację w dziedzinie współpracy transgranicznej. 3 gminy utrzymują chęć współpracy z Rosją, 2 zaś z Białorusią. Wykres 62. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą W1D. Jakie są główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy wpspółpracujące z Ukrainą? Białoruś Litwa Rosja Stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy 71% 86% 57% Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe 71% 86% 100% Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej 71% 86% 71% Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu 71% 71% 71% Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników 43% 43% 29% 14%Ponieważ wszyscy nawiązujątaką współpracę 29% 43% 14% Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. O współpracę pytano jedynie w przypadku braku kontaktów z danym państwem, jako że gminy nierzadko współpracują z kilkoma krajami. Głównymi powodami, dla których gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą chciałyby nawiązać współpracę transgraniczną, są: • w przypadku Białorusi: stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy, możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe, promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej i rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników; • w przypadku Litwy: możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe, stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy i promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej; • w przypadku Rosji: możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe, stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy, promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej, rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników i rozwój oraz pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości i biznesu (por. wykres 62). 132 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.7.2. Intensywność, dynamika, obszary i skutki obecnej współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą W ocenie przedstawicieli badanych gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą współpraca ta nie jest zbyt intensywna. Aż 71% badanych urzędników zadeklarowało, że jest ona bardzo niska (por. wykres 63). Wykres 63. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Ukrainą W2� Proszę ocenić w skali 1-4 OGÓLNĄ intensywność obecnej współpracy Państwa gminy z Ukrainą Bardzo wysoka + wysoka Bardzo niska + niskaDane w ujęciu procentowym Trudno powiedzieć 67%33% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. Bardziej podzielone opinie dotyczyły oceny dynamiki rozwoju tej współpracy. Blisko 58% gmin zadeklarowało, że wzrośnie, a 42%, że pozostanie ona na tym samym poziomie w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat. Co istotne, w żadnej gminie nie zadeklarowano, że dynamika tej współpracy zmaleje (por. wykres 64). Wykres 64. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Ukrainą W2a� Proszę ocenić, czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat OGÓLNA intensywność współpracy Państwa gminy z Ukrainą, Pana(i) zdaniem, wzrośnie, pozostanie na obecnym poziomie czy też zmaleje? Wzrośnie Pozostanie na tym samym poziomie Trudno powiedziećZmaleje 42%58% Dane w ujęciu procentowym Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. Główne obszary współpracy gmin z Ukrainą stanowią kultura i promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego oraz turystyka i rekreacja. Największy wpływ na rozwój gminy mają natomiast: demokracja i prawa człowieka, sport, przedsięwzięcia z Polonią i Polakami mieszkającymi za granicą oraz nauka i edukacja (por. wykres 65). 133www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 65. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą W4� Proszę wskazać obszary współpracy w Państwa gminie z Ukrainą oraz ocenić ich wpływ na rozwój gminy przy użyciu 4-stopniowej skali, gdzie 4 oznacza zdecydowany wpływ, 3 – umiarkowany wpływ, 2 – znikomy wpływ, 1 – brak wpływu. Średnia: Demokracja i prawa człowieka 25% 3,33 Kultura, w tym promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego 75% 2,67 Turystyka i rekreacja 50% 2,50 Przedsięwzięcia z Polonią i Polakami mieszkającymi za granicą 25% 2,33 Rozwój społeczny 25% 2,50 Gospodarka 25% 2,00 Infrastruktura (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) 8% 1,00 Nauka i edukacja 33% 2,25 Sport 25% 2,67 Ochrona środowiska 17% 2,33 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gmin województwa podlaskiego deklarujących współpracę z Ukrainą. Najbardziej widoczne skutki tej współpracy to, w opinii przedstawicieli gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą: organizowanie imprez kulturalnych dla mieszkańców po obu stronach granicy, intensyfikacja kontaktów między mieszkańcami oraz zmniejszenie poziomu wzajemnych uprzedzeń i stereotypów. W opinii badanych respondentów skutki tej współpracy nie są widoczne w zakresie budowy dróg i mostów, wprowadzenia do szkół nauki języka sąsiadów i przepływu siły roboczej w oparciu o umowy. Niestety, aktualna współpraca nie oddziałuje na istotne z punktu widzenia kondycji gminy wskaźniki bezrobocia, zatrudnienia czy rozwoju poprzez bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne (por. wykres 66). 134 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 66 . W id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j g m in w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o z U kr ai ną W 5� Ja ki e są w id oc zn e sk ut ki w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j w P ań st w a gm in ie z U kr ai ną ? D o oc en y pr os zę p os łu ży ć si ę 5st op ni ow ą sk al ą, g dz ie 5 o zn ac za , że z de cy do w an ie s ię P an (i) z ga dz a, 4 – ra cz ej z ga dz a, 3 – a ni z ga dz a, a ni n ie z ga dz a, 2 – ra cz ej n ie z ga dz a, 1 – z de cy do w an ie n ie z ga dz a. Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię z ga dz a A ni s ię z ga dz a, an i n ie z ga dz a Tr ud no po w ie dz ie ć Zd ec yd ow an ie + Ra cz ej s ię n ie z ga dz a D an e w u ję ci u pr oc en to w ym Śr ed ni a: 3, 43 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez k ul tu ra ln yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 63 % 25 % 13 % 2, 88 Zm ni ej sz en ie p oz io m u w za je m ne go up rz ed ze ni a i n eg at yw ny ch s te re ot yp ów 50 % 50 % 2, 00 O rg an iz ow an ie im pr ez s po rt ow yc h dl a m ie sz ka ńc ów p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 13 % 13 % 75 % 3, 25 In te ns yfi ka cj a ko nt ak tó w m ię dz y m ie sz ka ńc am i 56 % 11 % 22 % 11 % 1, 80 W sp ół pr ac a pa rt ne rs ka m ię dz y s zk oł am i p o ob u st ro na ch g ra ni cy 25 % 38 % 38 % 1, 67 W pr ow ad ze ni e do s zk ół n au ki ję zy ka s ąs ia dó w 14 % 71 % 14 % 2, 43 Tu ry st yk a (n p. r oz w ija s ię b az a ho te lo w a, n oc le go w a, zw ię ks za s ię li cz ba tu ry st ów , n ow e tr as y tu ry st yc zn e) 25 % 13 % 50 % 13 % 1, 75 St w or ze ni e w sp ól ny ch z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy p ro gr am ów i st ra te gi i r oz w oj u 14 % 43 % 43 % 1, 86 Po w st an ie n ow yc h dr óg , m os tó w 14 % 14 % 71 % 2, 00 W zr os t w ym ia ny h an dl ow ej z p ar tn er em z z ag ra ni cy 14 % 14 % 57 % 14 % 1, 33 W zr os t l ic zb y m ie js c pr ac y 86 % 14 % 2, 00 W sp ół pr ac a lo ka ln yc h ś ro do w is k go sp od ar cz yc h 14 % 14 % 57 % 14 % 1, 60 N ap ły w in w es to ró w k ra jo w yc h 14 % 57 % 29 % 1, 60 Li kw id ac ja z ak ła dó w p ro du kc yj ny ch s zk od liw yc h dl a śr od ow is ka n at ur al ne go 14 % 57 % 29 % 1, 40 W zr os t k on ku re nc yj no śc i p ol sk ic h fir m p ro w ad zo ny ch n a te re ni e Pa ńs tw a gm in y 14 % 57 % 29 % 1, 17 Sp ad ek s to py b ez ro bo ci a 86 % 14 % 1, 33 Pr ze pł yw s iły r ob oc ze j w o pa rc iu o u m ow y 14 % 71 % 14 % 1, 86 N ap ły w in w es to ró w z ag ra ni cz ny ch 25 % 13 % 63 % Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 2 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną . 135www.soclab.org.pl 5.7.3. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin województwa podlaskiego zaangażowane we współpracę z Ukrainą W ramach współpracy transgranicznej z Ukrainą zaangażowane są głównie jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego oraz jednostki kultury. Najintensywniej natomiast współpracują instytucje otoczenia biznesu i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości, szkoły wyższe i jednostki naukowe oraz parki narodowe i krajobrazowe (por. wykres 67). Wykres 67. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Ukrainą W6. Proszę wskazać podmioty instytucjonalne z gminy zaangażowane we współpracę z Ukrainą oraz ocenić intensywność współpracy posługując się następującą skalą: gdzie 4 bardzo wysoka, 3 – wysoka, 2 – niska, 1 – bardzo niska. Średnia: 2,00Kościoły i inne związki wyznaniowe 8% 3,008%Szkoły wyższe, jednostki naukowe 2,55 Jednostki samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego 92% 2,43Jednostki kultury 58% 2,008%Zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, jednostki systemu ratownictwa medycznego 3,00 Parki narodowe i krajobrazowe \ podmioty zarządzające obszarami chronionymi 8% Instytucje otoczenia biznesu, instytucje i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości i innowacyjności 3,0017% 2,50Przedsiębiorcy \ MSP 33% 2,25Szkoły i placówki oświatowe 33% 2,50 Związki i stowarzyszenia jednostek samorządu terytorialnego 33% 2,75 Organizacje pozarządowe – stowarzyszenia, fundacje (NGO) 33% 2,50 PGL Lasy Państwowe i jego jednostki organizacyjne 17% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. Wykres 68 przedstawia usytuowanie poszczególnych podmiotów na skali zaangażowania we współpracę i jej intensywność. Zasadniczo poza jednostkami samorządu terytorialnego szczebla gminnego i jednostkami kultury pozostałe podmioty rzadziej angażują się we współpracę transgraniczną z Ukrainą. Jeśli już dochodzi do takiej współpracy, to wyróżniają się spośród nich intensywnością prowadzonych działań następujące podmioty: szkoły wyższe i jednostki naukowe, parki narodowe i krajobrazowe, instytucje otoczenia biznesu i organizacje pozarządowe. Negatywnie wyróżniają się natomiast takie instytucje, jak: kościoły i związki wyznaniowe, zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, szkoły i jednostki oświatowe. 136 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 68 . M ap a uk az uj ąc a de kl ar at yw ny o ds et ek in st yt uc ji z gm in y za an ga żo w an yc h w e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną o ra z in te ns yw no ść p ro w ad zo ne j w sp ół pr ac y 0% 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 60 % 70 % 80 % 90 % 10 0% 1234 Je dn os tk i k ul tu ry Sz ko ły i pl ac ów ki o św ia to w e Zw ią zk i i s to w ar zy sz en ia je dn os te k sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go Pr ze ds ię bi or cy \ M SP Sz ko ły w yż sz e, je dn os tk i n au ko w eIn st yt uc je o to cz en ia b iz ne su , i ns ty tu cj e i o rg an iz ac je w sp ie ra ją ce ro zw ój p rz ed si ęb io rc zo śc i i in no w ac yj no śc i Ko śc io ły i in ne z w ią zk i w yz na ni ow e PG L La sy P ań st w ow e i j eg o je dn os tk i or ga ni za cy jn e Za kł ad y op ie ki z dr ow ot ne j, je dn os tk i s ys te m u ra to w ni ct w a m ed yc zn eg o Je dn os tk i sa m or zą du te ry to ri al ne go sz cz eb la gm in ne go O rg an iz ac je p oz ar zą do w e – st ow ar zy sz en ia , f un da cj e (N G O ) Pa rk i n ar od ow e i k ra jo br az ow e \ po dm io ty za rz ąd za ją ce ob sz ar am i ch ro ni on ym i N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a N is ki e za an ga żo w an ie i ni sk a w sp ół pr ac a Intensywność współpracy: 4 – bardzo wysoka; 1 – bardzo niska W ys ok ie z aa ng aż ow an ie i w ys ok a w sp ół pr ac a In st yt uc je z aa ng aż ow an e w e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 2 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną . 137www.soclab.org.pl 5.7.4. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć i płynące z nich korzyści. Cele współpracy, sposoby jej promocji i wykorzystywane instrumenty Wspólne przedsięwzięcia organizowane przy współpracy Ukrainy w deklaracjach przedstawicieli gmin należą do rzadkości. Sporadycznie są organizowane imprezy kulturalne (choć 3 gminy wskazały, że w ich przypadku ta forma współpracy występuje często), targi i wystawy, imprezy międzyszkolne, imprezy turystyczne, wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne. Przy analizie danych zwraca uwagę fakt, że w ramach współpracy nie są wykorzystywane takie przedsięwzięcia, jak: handlowa wymiana przygraniczna, współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych, ochrona środowiska, misje gospodarcze czy też wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie (por. wykres 69). Z perspektywy gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą niewielkie są też korzyści płynące ze wzajemnej współpracy – jedynie w niewielkim zakresie są one dostrzegane w związku z możliwością ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE, z ułatwieniami w kontaktach z zagranicznymi kontrahentami czy rozwojem turystyki i rozwojem współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej. Nie są natomiast widoczne (lub są widoczne w bardzo małym stopniu) w zakresie wzrostu dochodów w lokalnej społeczności, wzrostu liczby miejsc pracy w gminie, rozwoju infrastruktury komunikacyjnej, skuteczniejszej ochrony środowiska naturalnego, możliwości ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE (por. wykres 70). Wykres 69. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą oraz ich intensywność W7� Jak często organizowano do tej pory wspólne przedsięwzięcia z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że bardzo często, 4 – często, 3 – rzadko, 2 – bardzo rzadko, a 1 – w ogóle. Imprezy kulturalne 11 89 Targi i wystawy 57 43 Imprezy międzyszkolne 43 29 29 Imprezy turystyczne 57 29 14 Wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne 17 83 Handlowa wymiana przygraniczna 17 67 15 Współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych 17 50 33 Ochrona środowiska 29 57 14 Misje gospodarcze, współpraca podmiotów gospodarczych 17 67 17 Wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie 20 80 Bardzo często + często Bardzo rzadko + rzadko Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. 138 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 70. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą W11� W jakim stopniu, Pan(i) zdaniem, Państwa gmina czerpie korzyści ze współpracy z partnerem z zagranicy? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że w bardzo dużym, 4 – w dużym, 3 – w małym, 2 – bardzo małym, 1 – w ogóle. W bardzo + dużym stopniu W małym + bardzo małym Trudno powiedziećW ogóle Rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej 9 55 27 9 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE 11 44 44 Rozwój turystyki 10 50 40 Rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej 13 75 13 Skuteczniejsza ochrona środowiska naturalnego 25 63 13 Wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie 13 75 13 Wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności 25 75 Ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami 11 11 67 11 Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE 7513 13 Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. Wykres 71. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą W12� Proszę powiedzieć, w oparciu o jakie akty prawne odbywa się współpraca z Ukrainą? Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo na podstawie podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego 64% Przynależność do organizacji – sieci, związków zrzeszających podmioty z różnych krajów 9% Gminy partnerskie 55% 18%Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. Wzajemna współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą odbywa się przede wszystkim na zasadzie dwu-, trójlub wielostronnego partnerstwa na podstawie podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego (taką współpracę zadeklarowało 64% gmin, które nawiązały kontakty z Ukrainą), na zasadzie gmin partnerskich (55%) oraz dwu-, trójlub wielostronnego partnerstwa bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego (18%) (por. wykres 71). Podstawowymi celami realizowanymi podczas współpracy z Ukrainą są: promocja samorządu, integracja społeczności lokalnych, poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych, rozwój kultury. W niewielkim stopniu realizowane są natomiast: upowszechnianie demokracji, wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich, promocja lokalnych produktów i usług oraz integracja społeczności lokalnych (por. wykres 72). 139www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 72. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą C1� Proszę powiedzieć, które cele realizowane są, Pana(i) zdaniem, podczas współpracy z Ukrainą? Rozwój kultury 64% Integracja społeczności lokalnych 82% Poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych 64% Zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego 46% Promocja organizacji pozarządowych 27% Rozwój infrastruktury (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, itp.) 9% Upowszechnianie demokracji 18% Promocja lokalnych produktów i usług 46% Poprawa przepływu informacji 36% Promocja biznesu 36% Ochrona środowiska 9% Wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich 18% Utrzymanie równowagi krajobrazu przyrodniczego 9% Zwiększenie handlu 27% Współpraca w zarządzaniu kryzysowym 9% Integracja społeczna poprzez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne 46% Promocja samorządu 91% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. 140 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 73. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą C2� W jaki sposób gmina promuje współpracę transgraniczną z Ukrainą? Wspólne, transgraniczne imprezy kulturalne 20% Organizowanie wymiany młodzieży szkolnej 40% Materiały reklamowe 30% Strona internetowa, np. gminy w językach obcych 40% Udział w konferencjach, sympozjach za granicą 20% Udział w targach zagranicznych 20% Organizowanie debat, seminariów, konferencji o tematyce międzynarodowej 10% Udział w konkursach międzynarodowych, np. na dobre praktyki 10% Ogłoszenia w zagranicznym radiu, telewizji, internecie 10% Wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne 40% Materiały informacyjne (np. foldery, 20% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. Wykres 74. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Ukrainą oraz ocena ich użyteczności C3� Proszę wskazać, które instrumenty współpracy zagranicznej Państwa gmina wykorzystuje w kontaktach z Ukrainą. Uczestnictwo w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej 25% Udział w euroregionach 38% Organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych 63% Udział w targach międzynarodowych 38% Organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy lub regionu 13% Organizacja misji gospodarczych 13% Przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów 13% Inne jakie 25% Źródło: Badanie PAPI, N=12 gminy województwa podlaskiego deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą. 141www.soclab.org.pl Najczęściej wykorzystywanymi środkami promocji są: strona internetowa, wielokulturowe imprezy kulturalne i wymiana młodzieży szkolnej. Co trzeci z badanych przez nas samorządów wykorzystuje ponadto materiały informacyjne (foldery, prezentacje multimedialne), stronę internetową gminy oraz materiały reklamowe. Jedynym wskazywanym instrumentem współpracy transgranicznej są zagraniczne wizyty studyjne. Blisko co czwarta współpracująca gmina deklaruje wspólny udział w targach oraz euroregionach. Za marginalną sferę oddziaływania uznać należy przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników (por. wykres 74). 5.7.5. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej gmin współpracujących z Ukrainą Spośród zebranych danych dotyczących barier współpracy z Ukrainą szczególną uwagę zwraca fakt, że z perspektywy przedstawicieli gmin w województwie podlaskim prawie wszystkie problemy związane ze współpracą transgraniczną lokowane są bądź po stronie ukraińskiej, bądź też odnoszone do obu współpracujących partnerów. Jedynymi niedogodnościami po stronie polskiej, na które wskazali badani respondenci, były: ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy oraz ograniczone możliwości finansowe lokalnych władz z terenów przygranicznych (por. wykres 75 i wykres 76). Podczas analizy barier formalno-prawnych zwracają dodatkowo uwagę skomplikowane procedury uzyskiwania środków pomocowych, nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów i skomplikowane procedury zawierania umów (33% wskazań po stronie ukraińskiej i 67% po obu stronach). Po stronie ukraińskiej natomiast wyraźne bariery stanowi brak równorzędnego partnera, brak międzynarodowych umów i porozumień o współpracy oraz niedostosowanie ustrojów ustawodawczych (100% wskazań na stronę ukraińską). W zakresie barier instytucjonalnych przedstawiciele podlaskich urzędów gminy współpracujących z Ukrainą nie wskazali barier występujących wyłącznie po stronie polskiej. Wskazali natomiast na: małą aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy i słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji po obu stronach oraz słabą koordynację pomiędzy instytucjami w zakresie współpracy, brak kompetencji kadr w istniejących instytucjach i urzędach, częste zmiany instytucji i władz po stronie ukraińskiej. Zasadniczą barierą instytucjonalną zdaje się być mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych. Niedogodność stanowi również niski poziom infrastruktury komunikacyjnej. Respondentów zapytano także o bariery finansowe – w tym względzie przedstawiciele gmin jednoznacznie wskazali na ograniczone możliwości finansowe budżetów władz lokalnych, w drugiej kolejności wymieniali natomiast niską sprawność rozliczeń finansowych. Co znamienne, w tym przypadku niemal wszystkie bariery przypisywano obu stronom współpracy. W ramach barier gospodarczych większość respondentów wskazała na odmienność systemów w tej dziedzinie, a nieco ponad połowa na brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych. Analizowane wyniki wskazują na fakt, że relatywnie mniejszy problem stanowią bariery społeczne. Pośród nich wymieniano: słabą znajomość języka partnera i negatywne stereotypy na temat sąsiadów (25% badanych), po stronie ukraińskiej lokowano dodatkowo negatywne doświadczenia historyczne, po obu stronach różnice w mentalności i brak chęci mieszkańców do współpracy. Badani respondenci wskazywali również dużą odległość jako przeszkodę w nawiązywaniu współpracy. 142 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W yk re s 75 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z U kr ai ną w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (1 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a uz ys ki w an ia śr od kó w p om oc ow yc h 33 67 25 % N ie st ab iln oś ć pr ze pi só w 50 50 17 % O gr an ic zo na li cz ba of er t w sp ół pr ac y 67 33 25 % Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h pr ze pi só w i no rm p ra w ny ch 50 50 17 % Br ak m ię dz yn ar od ow yc h um ów i p or oz um ie ń o w sp ół pr ac y 10 0 8% Br ak ró w no rz ęd ne go p ar tn er a 10 0 8% Sk om pl ik ow an a pr oc ed ur a za w ie ra ni a um ów 33 67 25 % Br ak o so bo w oś ci pr aw ne j r eg io nu 10 0 8% N ie do st os ow an ie u st ro jó w us ta w od aw cz yc h 10 0 8% N ie pr ec yz yj no ść lu b br ak sp ój no śc i p rz ep isó w 33 67 25 % Sł ab o ro zw in ię ty sy st em w ym ia ny in fo rm ac ji 25 % 10 0 M ał a ak ty w no ść u rz ęd ów w n aw ią zy w an iu w sp ół pr ac y 25 % 10 0 Br ak o dp ow ie dn ic h in st yt uc ji i u rz ęd ów 17 % 50 50 Sł ab a ko or dy na cj a po m ię dz y in st yt uc ja m i w za kr es ie w sp ół pr ac y 8% 10 0 Cz ęs te zm ia ny (r eo rg an iza cj e) in st yt uc ji i w ła dz p ar tn er ów w sp ół pr ac y 8% 10 0 Br ak k om pe te nc ji ka dr w is tn ie ją cy ch in st yt uc ja ch i ur zę da ch 8% 10 0 M ał a lic zb a i p rz ep us to w oś ć p rz ej ść g ra ni cz ny ch 17 % 50 50 Sł ab a do st ęp no ść k om un ik ac yj na p rz ej ść 0% N ie do ro zw ój in fr as tr uk tu ry k om un ik ac yj ne j 33 % 10 0 Sł ab e za go sp od ar ow an ie in fr as tr uk tu ra ln e pr ze jść 0% FORMALNO-PRAWNE INSTYTUCJONALNE INFRASTRUKTURALNEO ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e uk ra iń sk ie j Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 2 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną . 143www.soclab.org.pl W yk re s 76 . B ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j z U kr ai ną w śr ód g m in p ro w ad zą cy ch w sp ół pr ac ę z ty m k ra je m (2 /2 ) O 1� Ja ki e są , w ed łu g Pa na (i) , n aj is to tn ie js ze b ar ie ry w sp ół pr ac y tr an sg ra ni cz ne j p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a ja ki e po s tr on ie s ąs ia dó w ? Pr os zę w yk az ać w p rz ypa dk u ka żd eg o z pa ńs tw te , k tó re le żą , P an a( i) zd an ie m , p o st ro ni e po ls ki ej , a k tó re p o st ro ni e s ąs ia da , b ąd ź te ż cz y do ty cz ą ob u st ro n. O ba w y pr ze d na pł yw em o bc eg o ka pi ta łu 0% N eg at yw ne st er eo ty py są sia dó w 25 % 33 67 Ró żn ic e w m en ta ln oś ci 8% 10 0 Sł ab a zn aj om oś ć ję zy ka p ar tn er a 25 % 10 0 N eg at yw ne d oś w ia dc ze ni a hi st or yc zn e 8% 10 0 Br ak c hę ci m ie sz ka ńc ów d o w sp ół pr ac y 8% 10 0 O gr an ic zo ne m oż liw oś ci fi na ns ow e, w ty m bu dż et ów w ła dz lo ka ln yc h te re nó w p rz yg ra ni cz ny ch 67 % 38 63 N isk a sp ra w no ść sy st em u ro zli cz eń fi na ns ow yc h 25 % 33 67 Br ak in st yt uc ji O to cz en ia b izn es u 17 % 10 0 Br ak sy st em u za be zp ie cz eń fin an so w yc h tr an sa kc ji ha nd lo w yc h 17 % 10 0 Br ak za be zp ie cz en ia in w es ty cy jn eg o w sp ól ny ch pr oj ek tó w o ra z k ap ita łu o br ot ow eg o 8% 10 0 O dm ie nn oś ć sy st em ów g os po da rc zy ch 50 % 67 33 As ym et ria w p oz io m ie ro zw oj u pa rt ne ró w 0% Br ak si ln ej re pr ez en ta cj i po dm io tó w g os po da rc zy ch 33 % 10 0 Du ża o dl eg ło ść 50 % 10 0 O ds et ek g m in , k tó re w sk az ał y ba rie rę GOSPODARCZE ŚR O DO W IS KO W E FINANSOWE SPOŁECZNE Po st ro ni e po lsk ie j Po o bu st ro na ch Po st ro ni e uk ra iń sk ie j Źr ód ło : B ad an ie P A PI , N =1 2 gm in y w oj ew ód zt w a po dl as ki eg o de kl ar uj ąc e w sp ół pr ac ę z U kr ai ną . 144 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5.8. Badanie podmiotów gospodarczych oraz organizacji pozarządowych w kontekście współpracy transgranicznej W ramach realizowanego projektu przeprowadzono dodatkowe badanie ilościowe ukierunkowane na podmioty gospodarcze oraz organizacje pozarządowe, które realizują współpracę transgraniczną przynajmniej z jednym z analizowanych państw sąsiedzkich. Badanie zrealizowano z wykorzystaniem techniki CAWI (Computer Aided Web Interview). Dane kontaktowe zbierane były podczas badania PAPI od przedstawicieli samorządu, którzy wymieniali znane firmy bądź organizacje w regionie prowadzące współpracę transgraniczną, a także w ramach analizy desk research poprzez przeszukiwanie zasobów internetowych. W wyniku połączenia obu technik udało się zgromadzić 483 adresy mailowe, na które rozesłano zaproszenie do badania. Jako że w województwie podlaskim nie prowadzono wcześniej badań ilościowych poświęconych tematyce współpracy transgranicznej wśród przedsiębiorców i organizacji pozarządowych (brak jest oficjalnych baz takich podmiotów), autorzy raportu nie determinowali z góry wielkości próby, jaką zamierzają zrealizować. Ilość sukcesywnych wywiadów uzależniona była zatem od response rate, czyli procentowej stopy zwrotu ankiet rozesłanych do instytucji i przedsiębiorstw. Ta okazała się jednak bardzo niska i wyniosła finalnie jedynie 7% ogółu wysłanych zaproszeń. Pomimo rozlicznych monitów i powtórnych zaproszeń nie udało się skłonić większej ilości przedsiębiorców i przedstawicieli organizacji pozarządowych do uczestnictwa w badaniu. Osiągnięto zatem 36 ankiet sukcesywnych oraz kilkadziesiąt niedokończonych. Tak niska stopa zwrotu ankiet pozwala traktować wyniki badania w sposób poglądowy i z pewnością nie mogą być one przełożone na populację przedsiębiorstw i organizacji pozarządowych prowadzących współpracę transgraniczną w województwie podlaskim. Dlatego też poniżej zostaną zaprezentowane jedynie wybrane wyniki, nakreślające pewien trend, na którego podstawie można formułować hipotezy badawcze. Po wtóre, badanie przyniosło kilka dodatkowych konkluzji, które znalazły także potwierdzenie w badaniach jakościowych: przedsiębiorcy bardzo niechętnie dzielą się własnymi doświadczeniami i przemyśleniami na temat współpracy transgranicznej – często informacje te mają charakter zastrzeżony, bowiem są częścią przyjętej strategii handlowej czy marketingowej. Dodatkowo, w oficjalnych źródłach nie ma kompletnych baz danych podmiotów prowadzących współpracę transgraniczną. Dlatego niemożliwe okazało się oszacowanie ilości podmiotów aktywnie współpracujących w województwie podlaskim z państwami sąsiedzkimi oraz w sposób miarodajny wskazanie głównych gałęzi gospodarki, w których odbywa się kooperacja. Stworzona na potrzeby badania baza podmiotów, nie została zweryfikowana pod względem rzetelności i trafności, ponieważ uczestnictwo w badaniu zawartych w niej podmiotów okazało się znikome. 5.8.1. Wsparcie współpracy transgranicznej przez administrację państwową W przeprowadzonym badaniu jeden blok tematyczny poświęcono ewentualnemu wsparciu, jakie administracja państwowa na każdym z poziomów udziela przedsiębiorcom lub organizacjom pozarządowym w nawiązywaniu bądź podtrzymywaniu współpracy transgranicznej. Okazuje się, że na żadnym z poziomów administracji państwowej przedsiębiorcy nie otrzymali wsparcia. W odróżnieniu od nich, organizacje NGO spotkały się z pomocą na każdym ze szczebli. Być może firmy nie otrzymały takiego wsparcia, gdyż go nie potrzebują lub o nie nie proszą. Aby wyeliminować tę niepewność, pogłębiono zagadnienie, pytając respondentów, czy – ich zdaniem – taka pomoc ze strony administracji państwowej jest im potrzebna. 145www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 19. Obecne wsparcie przedsiębiorstwa/organizacji przez administrację państwową w nawiązywaniu współpracy ze Wschodem Firma 100 NGO 44 56 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie gminy Firma 100 NGO 44 56 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie województwa Firma 100 NGO 22 78 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie centralnym (MSZ) Firma 100 NGO 44 44 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie międzynarodowym (ambasady, konsulaty) Tak Nie Źródło: Badanie CAWI, n=36. Jak wynika z danych dość znaczący odsetek zarówno podmiotów gospodarczych, jak i organizacji NGO oczekuje od administracji państwowej wsparcia w nawiązywaniu kontaktów ze Wschodem. Najliczniej przedsiębiorcy upatrywaliby pomocy na poziomie województwa oraz na szczeblu centralnym (MSZ) – blisko 60% wskazań, choć niewiele mniej, bo blisko połowa badanych firm, doceniłaby pomoc na poziomie gminnym i międzynarodowym (ambasady i konsulaty). Z kolei organizacje pozarządowe najczęściej wskazywały poziom województwa jako najbardziej adekwatny do wspierania starań w podejmowaniu współpracy transgranicznej. 146 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Tabela 20. Potrzeba otrzymania wsparcia przedsiębiorstwa/organizacji przez administrację państwową w nawiązywaniu współpracy ze Wschodem Firma 45 55 NGO 67 33 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie gminy Firma 59 41 NGO 78 22 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie województwa Firma 59 41 NGO 56 44 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie centralnym (MSZ) Firma 45 55 NGO 56 44 Potrzeba wsparcia firmy / NGO przez administrację na poziomie międzynarodowym (ambasady, konsulaty) Tak Nie Źródło: Badanie CAWI, n=36. Podsumowując wyniki badania CAWI, należy raz jeszcze podkreślić, że stanowią one jedynie dane poglądowe i nie są reprezentatywne. Niemniej jednak udało się dzięki nim uchwycić ciekawy wniosek: pomimo zapotrzebowania na pomoc ze strony administracji państwowej na różnych szczeblach żadna z firm uczestniczących w badaniu nie otrzymała takiego wsparcia. Należałoby zatem dokonać analizy na każdym z poziomów administracji państwowej, gdzie leży przyczyna takiego stanu rzeczy. Czy rzeczywiście przedsiębiorcy nie mogą liczyć na wsparcie w kontekście nawiązywania kontaktów ze Wschodem, czy też pomimo takiej możliwości informacja nie dociera do zainteresowanych wsparciem firm. W odniesieniu do barier współpracy pomiędzy przedsiębiorcami a kooperantami z analizowanych krajów sąsiedzkich nie odnotowano innych znaczących różnic od tych, które opisano w przypadku współpracy samorządowej, dlatego aby nie powielać tych samych wniosków, zostaną one pominięte. Jedynym odstępstwem było akcentowanie przez firmy zbyt wysokich opłat celnych w przypadku współpracy z Rosją, Białorusią i Ukrainą. 147www.soclab.org.pl KSIĘGA DOBRYCH PRAKTYK 1. Współpraca samorządów Gmina Puńsk jest gminą wyjątkową w swojej aktywności transgranicznej. Transgraniczna współpraca z litewskim samorządem rejonu Lazdijai, Kalvarija i Olity jest wielostronna i przynosi wymierne efekty. Jest to gmina, która ma opracowane strategie rozwoju w partnerstwie ze stroną litewską: wspólną strategię rozwoju i promocji przedsiębiorczości oraz wspólną strategię rozwoju kreatywności przemysłowej na pograniczu polsko-litewskim. W realizowanych wspólnych projektach są zarówno projekty infrastrukturalne, jak i kulturalne. Duży nacisk kładziony jest na rozwój turystyki pogranicza polsko-litewskiego. Widoczne jest dążenie do uzyskania obustronnych korzyści i traktowania obszaru pogranicza w sposób spójny. Wzorcowym przykładem współpracy transgranicznej opartej o logikę partnerstwa jest kilkukrotnie pojawiający się w przeprowadzonych wywiadach pogłębionych przykład zarejestrowania miodu z rejonu Sejneńszczyzny i Łoździeńszczyzny na Litwie jako polsko-litewskiego produktu turystycznego. Miód pod podwójną polsko-litewską nazwą „Miód z Sejneńszczyzny/Łoździejszczyzny"/„Seinų/Lazdijų krašto medus" został zarejestrowany w 2012 roku. Jest to jedyny certyfikowany przez Unię Europejską produkt polsko-litewski. Jak to określał jeden z respondentów: To jest jedyny produkt w Unii Europejskiej, zarejestrowany przez oba państwa i to jest poniekąd jeden z takich największych (...) rezultatów, efektów (P23). Duże znaczenie dla jakości „miodu z Sejneńszczyzny/Łoździejszczyzny"/„Seinų/Lazdijų krašto medus" mają specyficzne umiejętności lokalnych pszczelarzy, które zostały dostosowane do trudnych warunków klimatycznych na tym obszarze77. Współpracujące ze sobą gmina Puńsk i litewskie rejony mają również zintegrowany wirtualny system informacji turystycznej (dostępny w kilku językach)78. Udostępniona jest również wspólna baza danych o sektorze przedsiębiorczości w formie katalogu firm i instytucji gminy Puńsk, Samorządu Rejonu Lazdijai i Samorządu Kalvarija79. Dzięki dofinansowaniu z UE w Puńsku oraz Kalwarii i Łoździejach wykonano małą infrastrukturę rekreacyjno-turystyczną, opracowano mapę pograniczną, z uwzględnieniem miejsc regionalnego rzemiosła i kuchni. 2. Współpraca w obszarze turystyki W przeprowadzonych wywiadach zwracano uwagę na dobrą praktykę współpracy w kontekście budowy infrastruktury do turystyki rowerowej i pieszej: Najwięcej efektów widać po tych projektach, cała Suwalszczyzna jest praktycznie oznakowana, ścieżki rowerowe czy piesze – to wszystko z unijnych funduszy, znaczy wspólnych polsko-litewskich – i przewodniki, i stojaki na rowery (P28). Projekty te są znamienne w myśleniu o dobrych efektach współpracy transgranicznej, zwłaszcza z punktu widzenia samorządów: przełożenie na lokalną gospodarkę, wymierność efektów i ich długofalowość oraz rozwijanie lokalnych zasobów. Do transgranicznych tras rowerowych zalicza się m.in.: • polsko-litewski szlak „Pierścień rowerowy Suwalszczyny – Suvalkiji", • „Szlak fortyfikacji pozycji granicznych". 77 https://www.minrol.gov.pl/pol/Ministerstwo/Biuro-Prasowe/Informacje-Prasowe/Rejestracja-miodu-z-Sejnenszczyzny-Lozdziejszczyzny-jako- -Chronionej-Nazwy-Pochodzenia [30.10.2013]. 78 http://www.lazdijai-turizmas.lt/25269/domowy.html [29.10.2013]. 79 http://rrtoes.superhost.pl/dorfin-pl/punsk/ [29.10.2013]. 148 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Zainteresowaniem cieszy się również spływ „Kajakiem przez trzy państwa!", czyli spływ kajakowy na Białoruś i Litwę, z przekroczeniem granicy w Rudawce na Kanale Augustowskim. W opinii naszych rozmówców szlak ten jednak nie jest do końca jeszcze przygotowany, zwłaszcza pod względem infrastruktury turystycznej na Białorusi. Największą jednak przeszkodą dla turystów jest obowiązek posiadania wiz na Białoruś80 Transgraniczny ruch turystyczny jest realizowany i rozwijany również przez organizacje pozarządowe. Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje Klub Turystyki Rowerowej Eskapada, który współpracuje z Klubem Rowerowym „Koło BOK" z Brześcia. We współpracy są organizowane wycieczki rowerowe na terenie Białorusi i Polski81 Suwalska Izba Rolniczo-Turystyczna: jest ona wskazywana przez respondentów jako dobry przykład rozwijania transgranicznej turystyki, produktów turystycznych w sposób kompleksowy i systemowy. Istotne jest również to, że bliźniacze projekty są realizowane po stronie polskiej i białoruskiej: • „Nieznana Europa" – realizowana przez Suwalską Izbę Rolniczo-Turystyczną wspólnie z Departamentem Kultury Fizycznej, Sportu i Turystyki Obwodu Grodzieńskiego i Organizacją Społeczną „Państwowy Związek Turystyczno-Sportowy" (2008–2010)82, • „Komunikacja bez granic – tworzenie transgranicznej sieci informacyjno-turystycznej" (2012)83 Głównym celem projektu jest stworzenie sieci transgranicznej współpracy w dziedzinie turystyki na pograniczu polsko-białoruskim (m.in. uruchomienie i prowadzenie punktów informacji turystycznej po obu stronach, szkolenia z zakresu agroturystyki, turystyki aktywnej). 3. Euroregiony W wywiadach pogłębionych oba euroregiony są bardzo pozytywnie oceniane. Zwraca się szczególną uwagę na system małych grantów, które sprzyjają działaniom małych, początkujących organizacji. Z wypowiedzi respondentów można wywnioskować, że euroregiony spełniają pozytywne funkcje wobec tworzącego się lokalnego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, będąc niekiedy „inkubatorem" nowych organizacji pozarządowych. Jak to określiła jedna z naszych respondentek: (...) mam takie zaprzyjaźnione organizacje, które wychowałam na przykład. Zaczęliśmy współpracę w 1999 czy 2000 roku, gdzie oni jeszcze żadnego projektu nie realizowali, i dzięki nam poznali, co to jest, i teraz to są przyjaciele, bo współpracujemy już tyle lat. W Euroregionie Niemen – pomimo wielu trudności (nie powstały równorzędne struktury euroregionu w Rosji oraz na Białorusi) – udaje się realizować bardzo wiele inicjatyw: począwszy od infrastrukturalnych (odbudowa Kanału Augustowskiego po stronie białoruskiej, uruchomienie na Kanale sezonowych przejść granicznych i możliwość organizacji spływów Czarną Hańczą i Kanałem Augustowskim do Niemna), po projekty kulturalne wspierające wymianę młodzieży itp. W wywiadach podkreśla się, że transgraniczne projekty „miękkie" (typu people to people) wywierają bardzo duży wpływ na zmiany w mentalności, tworząc pozytywne nastawienie na współpracę transgraniczną. W Euroregionie Puszcza Białowieska przykładem dobrych praktyk jest białowieski szlak Transgraniczny (Polska–Białoruś)84. 4. Ułatwienia w otrzymaniu wizy – tzw. wiza kulturalna Dzięki staraniom organizatorów festiwali muzycznych w województwie podlaskim (Festiwal Original Source Up to Date oraz Basowiszcza) obywatele i obywatelki Białorusi mieli uproszczoną procedurę otrzymania wizy: były to wizy darmowe. Takie doświadczenia współpracy z konsulatem są bardzo dobre i dają konkretne efekty. Z możliwości tej skorzystało w ciągu jednego roku kilkadziesiąt osób. Pozytywne efekty, 80 http://europrojekty-pl.pl/index.php?lang=1&menu=1&menu_select=789 [29.10.2013]. 81 http://www.eskapada.ugu.pl/ [29.10.2013]. 82 http://www.suwalki-turystyka.info.pl/index.php?id=110,202 [29.10.2013]. 83 http://www.suwalki-turystyka.info.pl/index.php?id=110,188 [29.10.2013]. 84 http://www.powiat.hajnowka.pl/ctrpb/bialowieski_szlak_tra [20.10.2013]. 149www.soclab.org.pl i to na dużą skalę85, przyniosła akcja Opery i Filharmonii „Wiza za bilety", która polegała na wydawaniu darmowej wizy dla osób wykupujących tzw. pakiet kulturalno-turystyczny (nocleg w hotelu, bilety do Opery). 5. Kultura jako obszar współpracy Z badań wynika, że wydarzenia kulturalne związane ze współpracą transgraniczną mają charakter „eventowy", często powiązany z kulturą ludową czy popularną. Z pewnością jest to dobry instrument współpracy polsko-białoruskiej, która spotyka się z największą ilością barier i ograniczeń. Jednak warto spojrzeć na kulturę nie tylko z tej perspektywy. Może ona stać się również narzędziem, instrumentem pogłębionej pracy w społecznościach lokalnych po obu stronach granicy. Działania kulturowe mogą wspierać procesy integracji poszczególnych społeczności, ale również współtworzyć wspólnoty transgraniczne, zwłaszcza w sytuacji, kiedy dziedzictwo kulturowe ma wspólne korzenie (tak jak to dzieje się na wschodnim pograniczu). Kultura w takiej sytuacji jest kulturą długiego trwania organicznie wchodzącą w tkankę społeczną i kontynuowaną przez wiele lat (P20) – jak to określa jeden z naszych rozmówców. Dobrym przykładem jest działalność Ośrodka „Pogranicze – sztuk, kultur i narodów" w Sejnach. Jest to instytucja, która w swoich licznych działaniach transgranicznych i międzynarodowych zwraca szczególną uwagę na włączanie do działań lokalnych tradycji dialogu międzykulturowego, traktując cały obszar Europy Wschodniej jako pewną całość kulturową. Przykłady działań: „Gra Szklanych Paciorków", „Człowiek Pogranicza", „Atlantyda Pogranicza – transgraniczny szlak kulturowy"86. Szczególną uwagę należy zwrócić na roczną Szkołę Pogranicza czy Letnią Szkołę Dialogu Międzykulturowego. Są to działania edukacyjne nie tylko służące poznaniu się, integracji, ale również poszerzeniu swoich kompetencji pracowników ośrodków kultury, organizacji pozarządowych z krajów Europy Wschodniej. Takie działania mają charakter długofalowy, pozwalają uczestnikom na zdobycie nie tylko nowej wiedzy, ale również kompetencji w zakresie prowadzenia transgranicznych projektów czy dialogu międzykulturowego oraz doświadczenia w praktyce współpracy partnerów z różnych krajów. 6. Organizacje otoczenia biznesu Przedsiębiorcy pozytywnie oceniali działalność Izby Handlowo-Gospodarczej w Białymstoku, Stowarzyszenia Przewoźników Podlasia oraz Polskiej Izby Mleka, które są postrzegane jako podmioty sprawnie wspierające gospodarczą współpracę międzynarodową w województwie podlaskim. Polega ona na tworzeniu przestrzeni do wymiany doświadczeń we współpracy transgranicznej firm z jednej branży (np. konferencje dotyczące przetwórstwa mleczarskiego organizowane przez Polską Izbę Mleka) oraz na przekazywaniu branżowych kontaktów z zagranicy. Charakterystyczna jest tutaj efektywność branżowych organizacji wspierania biznesu. 7. Biznes Bardzo dobrym przykładem transgranicznego działania przedsiębiorców (wykraczającego poza kontakty biznesowe) są wydarzenia organizowane przez firmę Mlekovita. Nawiązując relacje handlowe z Obwodem Kaliningradzkim, jednocześnie firma ta organizuje międzynarodowe akcje promocji zdrowej żywności w formie „Święta mleka" w Obwodzie Kaliningradzkim. Są to działania promujące polskie produkty i dające okazję do poznania się środowisk biznesowych z obu krajów. 85 W akcji „Wiza za bilety" od marca do czerwca 2013r. z oferty skorzystało ok. 4,5 tys. Białorusinów, a kolejnych ok. 20 tys. zrobiło rezerwacje na spektakle i koncerty do końca roku (dane za: http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/bialystok/bialorusini-beda-musieli-zaplacic-za-wize-kulturalna/ yglwe [20.10.2013]. 86 http://pogranicze.sejny.pl [17.10.2013]. 150 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim WNIOSKI I REKOMENDACJE Wnioski • Gminy województwa podlaskiego w zbyt małym stopniu wykorzystują swoje przygraniczne położenie • Samorządy najczęściej współpracują tylko z jednym partnerem zza wschodniej granicy. • Widoczny jest brak równowagi w obszarach realizowanej współpracy transgranicznej. Zdecydowanie dominuje współpraca dotycząca kultury, turystyki i rekreacji. W mniejszym stopniu samorządy podejmują działania w obszarze gospodarki, rynku pracy czy ochrony środowiska. • Istotnym czynnikiem wzmacniającym potencjał współpracy jest peryferyjne położenie gmin w województwie podlaskim i ich wschodnich partnerów. Sytuacja ta zmniejsza różnice występujące między podmiotami po obu stronach granicy i ułatwia współpracę. • Niezmiernie ważnym czynnikiem wpływającym na osiągnięcie sukcesu w realizacji wspólnych projektów jest odpowiednio długi czas na nawiązanie dobrych, bezpośrednich kontaktów. • Dobrze rozwinięte powiązania kooperacyjne posiadają regionalne publiczne instytucje kultury oraz publiczne i niepubliczne szkoły wyższe. Zasadne jest ich poszerzanie o współpracę z podmiotami pozarządowymi i instytucjami otoczenia biznesu. • Za istotne bariery należy uznać brak wypracowanych i opisanych modeli współzarządzania kulturą oraz bardzo ogólną strategię polityki kulturalnej województwa podlaskiego • Instytucje publiczne oraz samorządy koncentrują się głównie na samodzielnym przygotowywaniu wydarzeń i innych usług kulturalnych, nie uwzględniając potencjału współpracy i koordynacji działań z podmiotami pozarządowymi • Uwagę zwraca bardzo niski poziom zaangażowania we współpracę jednostek szkolnictwa wyższego. W kontekście rozbudowanej w tym zakresie infrastruktury w województwie podlaskim wydaje się, że pozostaje ona po prostu niewykorzystana. • Wskazywaną instytucją wspierającą samorządy i organizacje pozarządowe we współpracy transgranicznej są euroregiony. Z perspektywy przedsiębiorstw są to natomiast Izba Handlowo-Przemysłowa w Białymstoku, stowarzyszenia branżowe oraz Wydziały Promocji Handlu i Inwestycji Ambasad i Konsulatów RP. • Za istotne utrudnienie we współpracy należy uznać odmienną pozycję poszczególnych państw na arenie międzynarodowej. Województwo podlaskie znacząco różni się pod względem uwarunkowań geograficznych, administracyjnych i gospodarczych od swoich potencjalnych przygranicznych partnerów – w szczególności od państw niebędących członkami UE: Białorusi, Rosji i Ukrainy. • Największe ograniczenia formalno-prawne to skomplikowane procedury uzyskiwania środków pomocowych, niespójność przepisów, skomplikowane procedury zawierania umów po stronie partnerów. • W kontaktach z Białorusią podstawową barierą jest system wizowy. Kontakty z Ukrainą są ograniczane utrudnieniami z przekraczaniem granicy (długi czas oczekiwania). • Widoczny jest bardzo niski stopień współpracy międzysektorowej. W dużej mierze we współpracy z wszystkimi badanymi krajami występują oddzielne działania samorządów, organizacji pozarządowych, uczelni wyższych i firm. Brakuje efektu synergii, wynikającego z koordynacji poszczególnych działań podejmowanych przez różne podmioty. Warto wziąć pod uwagę również zaangażowanie we współpracę transgraniczną takich podmiotów, jak: kościoły i związki wyznaniowe, parki narodowe i krajobrazowe oraz Lasy Państwowe. • Samorządy w bardzo ograniczony sposób korzystają z różnych instrumentów współpracy transgranicznej: dominują imprezy kulturalne, wymiana młodzieży, imprezy szkolne i turystyczne. W mniejszym stopniu wykorzystywane są wizyty studyjne, udział w targach, konferencjach. 151www.soclab.org.pl • Widoczne jest małe wsparcie administracji samorządowej dla rozwoju i pobudzania lokalnej przedsiębiorczości. W tym zakresie brakuje samorządom odpowiednich narzędzi do rozwoju współpracy i dostępu do wiedzy o dobrych praktykach. • W zbyt małym stopniu włącza się organizacje mniejszościowe do tworzenia sieci kontaktów transgranicznych. Potencjał tych podmiotów (znajomość języka, kultury, rozbudowane sieci kontaktów w krajach ościennych) może stać się ważnym czynnikiem powodzenia wspólnych przedsięwzięć z krajami sąsiednimi województwa podlaskiego. • Widoczny jest dysonans między zapisami w dokumentach strategicznych a realizowanymi działaniami. W zapisach strategicznych ważną rolę odgrywa współpraca w obszarze gospodarki, zaś w realizowanej współpracy transgranicznej działania na rzecz wspierania tego obszaru są bardzo słabo rozwinięte. • Działania związane ze współpracą transgraniczną często nie są stopniowane – opisywane i postrzegane w sposób strategiczny. Nie stanowią procesu budowania relacji od lepszego poznawania partnerów w wymiarze kontaktów międzyludzkich i wymiany dobrych praktyk administracyjnych po tworzenie wspólnych koncepcji w poszczególnych dziedzinach polityki społecznej i polityki gospodarczej. • W analizowanych dokumentach strategicznych kraje sąsiednie są postrzegane głównie bądź jako chłonny rynek zbytu produktów i usług, bądź jako źródło napływu turystów. Właściwie nie poświęca się uwagi problemom w komunikacji międzyludzkiej i znoszeniu uprzedzeń. W świetle wyników badań ilościowych zagadnienia te jednak w sposób kluczowy rzutują na pozostałe wymiary współpracy. • Wśród analizowanych dokumentów znalazły się jedynie dwa programy opracowane wspólnie przez samorządy województwa podlaskiego i partnerów zagranicznych. Dokumenty te mogą służyć za wzór do tworzenia zbliżonych programów także w innych obszarach tematycznych i w innych gminach przygranicznych. • Większość podmiotów jest zainteresowana powstaniem dokumentu strategicznego na poziomie województwa dotyczącego współpracy transgranicznej. Wyraźne są formułowane oczekiwania co do partycypacyjnego charakteru powstania takiego dokumentu, tzn. konsultowania go na etapie projektowania. Podkreśla się konieczność uwzględnienia specyfiki działań i potrzeb poszczególnych typów podmiotów samorządowych, pozarządowych i komercyjnych. • Badani wyrażają potrzebę powstania podmiotu inicjującego i wspierającego współpracę transgraniczną na poziomie województwa. Z mniejszą akceptacją samodzielnie podejmują się koordynacji tej współpracy. Rekomendacje • Powołanie lub ukierunkowanie spośród dotychczas istniejących organizacji (np. Regionalny Ośrodek Debaty Międzynarodowej lub euroregiony) podmiotu inicjującego i wspierającego kontakty pomiędzy polskimi podmiotami oraz wspierającego współpracę z organizacjami, instytucjami czy samorządami z krajów ościennych. Istotne jest, by była to organizacja działająca elastycznie, reagująca szybko na prośby i pytania ze strony zainteresowanych, znająca realia współpracy transgranicznej w województwie. Zasadniczym wyzwaniem tego typu podmiotu będzie dotarcie i podjęcie współpracy z instytucjami, organizacjami czy firmami położonymi poza głównymi ośrodkami miejskimi w województwie. • Zasadne jest wzmocnienie pozycji euroregionów działających w województwie podlaskim. Struktury te obecnie są rzadko wskazywane jako istotne we współpracy transgranicznej w dokumentach samorządowych, a jednocześnie często uznawane przez podmioty realizujące współpracę transgraniczną za bardzo ważne i użyteczne. • Wspieranie (merytoryczne i finansowe) samorządów i innych podmiotów w zakresie wykorzystywania różnorodnych instrumentów współpracy transgranicznej • Należy wspierać działania na rzecz współpracy międzysektorowej. Ich celem powinno być skoordynowanie działań różnorodnych podmiotów na terenie jednej lub kliku sąsiednich gmin. Warto również wspierać współpracę różnorodnych podmiotów (samorządy, firmy, organizacje pozarządowe i uczelnie wyższe), które realizują działania z wybranym sąsiednim krajem. 152 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim • Zasadne jest tworzenie ogólnodostępnych elektronicznych baz danych podmiotów podejmujących współpracę transgraniczną w podziale na: przedsiębiorstwa (branże), organizacje pozarządowe, samorządy, uczelnie wyższe, oraz z podziałem na kierunek współpracy (kraje). Bazy takie powinny umożliwiać pozyskiwanie informacji i międzysektorowe poszukiwanie partnerów w obszarze współpracy transgranicznej. • Istotne jest wspieranie takich instrumentów współpracy, które angażują jednocześnie różne podmioty, na przykład samorządy i przedsiębiorstwa, samorządy i organizacje pozarządowe, organizacje pozarządowe i przedsiębiorstwa. Instrumenty takie to na przykład wspólne wizyty studyjne, targi, materiały promocyjne, szkolenia i kursy językowe. • Wsparcie dla przedsiębiorców (zwłaszcza dla firm wchodzących na rynki krajów ościennych) w zakresie sprawdzania wierzytelności firm z krajów ościennych, badanie rynków wschodnich, wymiana informacji na temat możliwych inwestycji w ramach współpracy między miastami czy gminami (np. informacje o przetargach). • Włączenie w większym zakresie do współpracy transgranicznej organizacji mniejszościowych poprzez wykorzystanie w większym stopniu ich potencjałów (znajomość języka, kultury). Włączanie i wspieranie tych organizacji w projektach transgranicznych nie tylko dotyczących wspierania kultury mniejszościowej. • Niezbędne jest wyrównywanie szans w dostępie polskich organizacji pozarządowych w programach współpracy transgranicznej poprzez wzmocnienie ich kompetencji w tym zakresie – wiedzy o stosunkach międzynarodowych, funduszach zagranicznych i pomocy rozwojowej, ale także stworzenie odpowiednich mechanizmów finansowych gwarantujących stabilność i długofalowość współpracy. • Zasadne jest podjęcie badań nad dobrymi praktykami współpracy (dyplomacji) obywatelskiej podejmowanej tak w wymiarze nieformalnym – przez samych obywateli, jak i przez organizacje pozarządowe. Zasadne jest w szczególności analizowanie podmiotów ożywiających kontakty obywateli Polski z innymi krajami, zorientowanych na pogłębianie integracji europejskiej i współpracy UE z krajami sąsiednimi, zrzeszających studentów oraz prowadzących działalność na rzecz sprawiedliwości społecznej i praw człowieka. • Wprowadzenie problematyki współpracy transgranicznej jako przedmiotu nauczania/kierunku studiów na wyższych uczelniach regionu w porozumieniu z podmiotami realizującymi obecnie projekty transgraniczne. • Przeprowadzenie szkoleń z zakresu komunikacji międzykulturowej dla urzędników, działaczy organizacji pozarządowych i pracowników firm. W celu znoszenia barier instytucjonalnych zasadne są także szkolenia dla urzędników, poszerzające ich wiedzę na temat potencjału współpracy transgranicznej, kompetencji w jej nawiązywaniu, procedur aplikowania o nowe środki pomocowe na lata 2014–2020 oraz podwyższające motywację do podejmowania takich działań. • Zasadne jest stymulowanie niedocenianych obecnie na poziomie samorządowym obszarów współpracy transgranicznej, takich jak współpraca administracyjna i planistyczna, naukowa oraz w zakresie ochrony środowiska • Niezbędne jest wsparcie samorządów i podmiotów pozarządowych w budowaniu strategicznego podejścia do współpracy zagranicznej. W szczególności niezbędne jest stworzenie szkoleń i narzędzi na rzecz budowania i wdrażania całościowych programów współpracy. Programy te powinny być także szeroko konsultowane z obywatelami i ich organizacjami oraz przedsiębiorstwami na poziomie lokalnym i regionalnym. • Wspieranie procesu tworzenia w gminnych strukturach samorządowych specjalnych zespołów czy stanowisk dedykowanych tylko współpracy transgranicznej. Pozwoli to na intensyfikację działań transgranicznych w województwie oraz koordynację współpracy między gminami w tym zakresie. • Zaprojektowanie i wzmacnianie konkretnych działań promujących rozwój przedsięwzięć gospodarczych w obszarach transgranicznych. Promowanie dobrych praktyk w tym zakresie. Wspieranie współpracy i wymiany doświadczeń między komercyjnymi i niekomercyjnymi podmiotami. Poprawa zagospodarowania infrastrukturalnego przejść granicznych, zwłaszcza na granicy polsko-białoruskiej. 153www.soclab.org.pl • Położenie nacisku na projekty kulturalne, które dają efekty długofalowe: tworzą lub wzmacniają kapitał społeczny mieszkańców pogranicza, prowadzą do trwałej współpracy artystycznej oraz przynoszą efekty zewnętrzne dla przemysłów kreatywnych i sektorów zależnych od sektora kultury. Kultura powinna być postrzegana jako narzędzie zmiany społecznej i tworzenia wspólnoty społeczności lokalnych, a nie tylko jako poszerzenie oferty turystycznej w formie krótkotrwałych wydarzeń kulturalnych. • Podjęcie z partnerami zagranicznymi wspólnych działań podnoszących kompetencje pracowników instytucji kultury po obu granicach. Kompetencje te powinny służyć tworzeniu projektów kulturalnych o charakterze długofalowej pracy ze społecznościami lokalnymi pochodzącymi z obu stron granicy (np. projekty dotyczące pamięci pogranicza, wspólnego dziedzictwa kulturowego, kultury jako czynnika integrującego społeczności lokalne, wydarzenia kulturalne przybliżające współczesną kulturę poszczególnych krajów itp.). • Intensyfikacja komunikacji w obszarze wsparcia, tworzenia i prowadzenia wspólnej linii promocyjnej instytucji i przedsięwzięć kulturalnych, na przykład wspieranie inicjatyw sieciowania instytucji kulturalnych oraz tworzenia wspólnych kalendarzy i ofert wydarzeń kulturalnych na obszarze transgranicznym – regularna realizacja wspólnych transgranicznych wydarzeń w stylu serii „nocy muzeów" i „weekendów z kulturą". Projekty te powinny kłaść szczególny nacisk na trwałość uzyskiwanych efektów i stałego poszerzania współpracy. • Zaprojektowanie strategii rozwoju dyplomacji samorządowej, obywatelskiej oraz gospodarczej w sposób partycypacyjny, tj. uwzględniający postulaty, potrzeby i specyfikę podejmowanych działań przez różne podmioty z całego województwa. W strategii należy uwzględnić specyfikę współpracy transgranicznej z poszczególnymi krajami. W projektowaniu strategii zasadne jest uwzględnienie konsultacji z podmiotami z krajów sąsiednich. • Dokumenty dotyczące współpracy zagranicznej powinny w odpowiednim stopniu uwzględniać priorytety wskazywane w strategiach i programach przyjętych na poziomie centralnym i regionalnym. Nie można uznać za wystarczające określenie zgodności dokumentów lokalnych na podstawie jedynie ogólnych deklaracji odwołania się do priorytetów wyższego rzędu czy też kopiowania ich w formie postulatów. Nowy system zarządzania rozwojem kraju określa wiele niepodejmowanych w latach poprzednich obszarów współpracy, w których aktywną rolę mogą odegrać podmioty samorządowe i obywatelskie. 154 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim ANEKS 1. Scenariusz IDI SCENARIUSZ IDI WYWIAD REALIZOWANY Z: |____| – urząd gminy Data: dn.|m.|r. |______|________|__2013__| z osobami prowadzącymi aktywną współpracę międzynarodową Prezentacja siebie, celu i przedmiotu badania. Przedstawienie się (Dzień dobry, nazywam się...), informacja o celu badania (Czy zechciał(a)by Pan(i) poświęcić mi trochę czasu i po rozmawiać o Pana/i współpracy zagranicznej?), przedstawienie zasad spotkania (wyjaśnienie, że rozmowa będzie nagrywana wyłącznie do celów badawczych – do sporządzenia opracowania, raportu – a informacje o respondencie nie będą nigdzie przekazywane). Podanie informacji, że nie ma dobrych/złych odpowiedzi, każda opinia jest cenna, prośba o nieskrępowane wypowiadanie się. Celem projektu jest: wzmocnienie zaplecza merytorycznego regionalnej współpracy międzynarodowej poprzez dostarczenie aktualnej i pogłębionej analizy regionalnej współpracy transgranicznej prowadzonej przez takie podmioty województwa podlaskiego, jak: samorządy, organizacje pozarządowe, przedsiębiorstwa i szkoły wyższe. 155www.soclab.org.pl Główne obszary badawcze Pytania I. Charakterystyka organizacji/ gminy/przedsiębiorstwa/uczelni wyższej 1. Jak się P. wydaje, w jaki sposób współpraca zagraniczna może stać się czynnikiem rozwoju gospodarczego i społecznego w P. gminie? 2. Od kiedy są P. zainteresowani współpracą międzynarodową w gminie? II. Charakterystyka współpracy transgranicznej w ramach badanej gminy UWAGI: Pytamy ogólnie o współpracę ze wszystkimi krajami, a następnie zawężamy do państw, tj. Białoruś, Litwa, Rosja, Ukraina, jeśli współpracują z kilkoma z tych państw, rozmawiamy o każdym po kolei. 1. Z jakimi krajami/partnerami z ilu krajów państwo współpracują? 2. Proszę opowiedzieć, z jakimi podmiotami współpracuje P. gmina? 3. Na czym polega ta współpraca? W jakich obszarach? Jak często? 4. W jaki sposób nawiązali Państwo kontakt z ..... ? Kto zainicjował kontakt? 5. Co lub kto spowodował, że chcieli Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną? 6. W jakiej formie realizowana jest współpraca (porozumienie, wspólny projekt itp.?) 7. Jakie są główne cele współpracy? 8. Proszę wskazać, które formy współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystuje Państwa gmina (pytaj o kraje, z którymi współpracuje respondent), np. organizacja misji gospodarczych, prowadzenie punktu kontaktowego dla przedsiębiorców/organizacji, udział w targach międzynarodowych (u sąsiadów) lub w gminie, gminy partnerskie, organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych, zaproszenie do uczestnictwa w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej, udział w klastrach, euroregionach, inne... 9. Które z instrumentów z punktu widzenia gminy są najbardziej przydatne i efektywne? 10. Czy województwo wspiera Państwa w działaniach związanych ze współpracą transgraniczną? Jeśli tak, to w jaki sposób? 156 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim III. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej UWAGI: Pytamy o bariery występujące we współpracy z każdym z państw, tj. Białoruś, Litwa, Rosja, Ukraina, jeśli współpracują z kilkoma z tych państw, rozmawiamy o każdym po kolei Schemat: pytamy, jak było kiedyś, jak jest obecnie i co należy poprawić 1. Czy rozpoczynając współpracę, mieli Państwo jakiekolwiek trudności w nawiązaniu kontaktów z partnerami z ..... (wstaw państwa współpracy)? → jeśli tak, jakiej natury były to trudności. Proszę o tym opowiedzieć/podać przykłady (osoby?, struktury?); → głównie po czyjej były one stronie; → w jaki sposób pokonywaliście te trudności/rozwiązywaliście problemy? Czy udało się je pokonać? Proszę o tym opowiedzieć/ podać przykłady. 2. Jakie są obecnie największe przeszkody w kontynuowaniu/rozwijaniu współpracy transgranicznej? Proszę o tym opowiedzieć/podać przykłady. → po państwa stronie; → po stronie sąsiada. 3. Czy próbowali Państwo kiedykolwiek nawiązać współpracę z  (wstaw państwa, tj. Białoruś, Litwa, Rosja, Ukraina, o ile nie współpracują) bądź współpracowali Państwo, ale zaniechali dalszych kontaktów? → jeśli tak, dopytaj dlaczego? Proszę podać konkretny przykład; → co się stało? Kiedy to było? → co państwo robiliście, kto inicjował wspólne działanie, jak to się zakończyło? → co musi się zmienić, aby współpraca była możliwa: a) po stronie polskiej? b) po stronie sąsiada? 4. Pokaż kartę barier i wypełnij ją z respondentem. Dopytaj, czy któreś bariery nie zostały uwzględnione, a są zdaniem badanego istotne. 5. Czy może P. podać przykład niewłaściwych, złych praktyk, które P. zdaniem blokują, utrudniają współpracę transgraniczną z (pytaj o konkretne państwa sąsiedzkie) na poziomie władz: → gminy; → województwa; → kraju (władz centralnych); → Unii Europejskiej? 6. Czy zna P. przykład niewłaściwie prowadzonej współpracy/źle zrealizowanego zadania, projektu, których w przyszłości należałoby unikać we współpracy transgranicznej z ..... (pytaj o konkretne państwa sąsiedzkie)? 157www.soclab.org.pl IV. Czynniki sukcesu we współpracy transgranicznej 1. [jeśli współpraca jest z różnymi krajami]: Z jakim państwem najlepiej się układa współpraca? Jaki jest powód tak dobrej współpracy w porównaniu z innymi państwami? Proszę o tym opowiedzieć/podać przykłady. 2. [Jeśli współpraca jest z jednym krajem, ale różnymi podmiotami] Z jakim podmiotem najlepiej się układa współpraca? Jaki jest powód tak dobrej współpracy w porównaniu z innymi podmiotami? 3. Jaki największy sukces osiągnęli P. w ramach współpracy transgranicznej? 4. Co sprawiło, że był on możliwy? 5. Jakie są pozytywne skutki dla P. gminy nawiązania współpracy transgranicznej? 6. [Jeśli współpraca jest także z krajami UE] Gdyby P. miał porównać współpracę z zachodnimi krajami UE i sąsiednimi krajami wschodnimi, to jakie widzi P. największe różnice? 7. Proszę podać znane P. przykłady zrealizowanych przedsięwzięć w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej na terenie Państwa gminy/województwa, które uważa P. za wzorcowe i godne polecenia/naśladowania (mogą to być realizacje spoza P. gminy): → kiedy to było? → kto inicjował wspólne działanie? → jak się to zakończyło? 1. Wsparcie instytucjonalne we współpracy transgranicznej 1. Jakiego typu wsparcie jest najbardziej potrzebne w nawiązywaniu kontaktów transgranicznych? → na poziomie lokalnym (np. władz województwa); → centralnym (regulacje ministerialne, rządowe, ustawowe). 2. Kto powinien wspierać/inicjować na poziomie województwa współpracę transgraniczną? 3. Jaka organizacja/instytucja w województwie podlaskim (o ile w ogóle) jest najbardziej pomocna w nawiązywaniu/koordynowaniu kontaktów transgranicznych? 4. Czy potrzebna jest instytucja kojarząca partnerów zagranicznych? Jeśli tak, jak powinna być umieszczona, przy ministerstwie centralnie, czy też przy urzędach na poziomie województwa? 5. Proszę sobie wyobrazić idealną współpracę z partnerami z zagranicy (z krajów sąsiednich) – jak ona by wyglądała? Proszę o tym opowiedzieć/ podać przykłady. Dzielenie się 1. W jaki sposób dzielicie się swoim doświadczeniem związanym ze współpracą transgraniczną? Czy włączyliście do współpracy inne podmioty (z Polski czy innych krajów)? Czy były z tym związane jakieś trudności? 2. Jakie jest zainteresowanie współpracą transgraniczną w woj. podlaskim? Czy łatwo znaleźć partnera w województwie? 9 Czy w ramach współpracy transgranicznej współpracują Państwo także z innymi niż samorządowe podmiotami (organizacje pozarządowe, firmy, uczelnie)? 9 Jeśli nie, to jakie są Pana zdaniem bariery i ograniczenia we współpracy z tymi podmiotami? → co należy zmienić, aby poprawić tę sytuację? 9 Jeśli tak, na jakiej zasadzie odbywa się współpraca (w oparciu o relacje formalne czy też osobiste – konkretne osoby), czy coś należy usprawnić/zmienić? 158 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2. Przyszłość współpracy transgranicznej w woj. podlaskim 1. Jak P. ocenia przyszłość współpracy transgranicznej z poszczególnymi krajami? Z którym z krajów sąsiednich będzie według P. najłatwiej współpracować, z a którym najtrudniej? 2. Od czego zależy dobra, efektywna przyszła współpraca? → czynniki wewnętrzne (wewnątrzorganizacyjne), jakie? → czynniki zewnętrzne, jakie?, instytucjonalne, prawne, administracyjne (proszę podać przykłady). 3. Czy widzi P. potrzebę tworzenia strategii współpracy transgranicznej w województwie? Kto powinien ją tworzyć? Co powinno się w niej znaleźć? Z kim powinna być konsultowana? 4. Na jakim poziomie, o ile w ogóle powinna być koordynowana współpraca transgraniczna (UE, ogólnopolskim, wojewódzkim, powiatowym, gminnym)? Czego P. oczekiwałby od takiej koordynacji? 5. Jakie działania powinny zostać podjęte na poziomie: → gminy, → województwa, → kraju (władz centralnych), → Unii Europejskiej, żeby wesprzeć różne podmioty w nawiązywaniu i kontynuowaniu dobrej współpracy transgranicznej? 6. Czy odczuwają Państwo, aby MSZ w jakikolwiek sposób przyczyniało się do (pytaj o konkretne państwa sąsiedzkie): → inicjacji, zacieśnienia współpracy, poprawy stosunków? → blokowania, utrudnianiu, hamowaniu współpracy? 7. Czego mógłby dotyczyć projekt współpracy transgranicznej na terenie Państwa gminy/województwa, który P. zdaniem byłby najbardziej potrzebny, a nie został dotychczas zrealizowany (może dotyczyć on działań administracji bądź projektów spoza Państwa firmy)? Dziękuję za poświęcony czas! 159www.soclab.org.pl 2. Ankieta PAPI ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Nr Ankietera: I__I__I__I__I__I Nr Respondenta: I__I__I__I__| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Kwestionariusz Główny ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------KONDYCJA GMINY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K0 [KARTA K0] Jak ocenia Pan(i) obecną sytuację społeczno-gospodarczą w gminie na tle województwa podlaskiego? [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź] OCENA ODP 5 Bardzo dobrze |___| 4 Raczej dobrze |___| 3 Ani dobrze, ani źle |___| 2 Raczej źle |___| 1 Zdecydowanie źle |___| 9 Trudno powiedzieć |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K1 [KARTA K1]. Jak, Pana zdaniem, na tle pozostałych gmin w województwie podlaskim prezentuje się Państwa gmina pod względem: [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź w wierszu] nr KONDYCJA GMINY 3� lepiej 2� na tym samym poziomie 1� gorzej 9� Trudno powiedzieć 1. Sytuacji gospodarczej 3 2 1 9 2. Poziomu bezrobocia 3 2 1 9 3. Aktywności społecznej obywateli 3 2 1 9 4. Infrastruktury (dróg, mostów, przejść gra-nicznych, połączeń telekomunikacyjne itp.) 3 2 1 9 5. Współpracy międzynarodowej # 2 1 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K2� [KARTA K 2]. Proszę wybrać maksymalnie 5 czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą Państwa gminy, a następnie przypisać im wagi od 1 do 5 (5 – największy wpływ, 1 – najmniejszy wpływ spośród wybranych). [Ankieter: zaznacz wybrane czynniki W2_a i przypisz im wagi w W2_b ] nr CZYNNIKI WPŁYWAJĄCE NA ATRAKACYJNOŚĆ GMINY K 2_a Wybrane czynniki K 2_b WAGI (od 5 do 1) 1. Przygraniczne położenie |___| |___| 2. Dobrej jakości środowisko naturalne |___| |___| 3 Bliskość chłonnych zagranicznych rynków zbytu |___| |___| 4 Walory turystyczne |___| |___| 160 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 5 Położenie na przecięciu ważnych europejskich szlaków komunikacyjnych |___| |___| 6 Przewaga ludności młodej (do 25. roku życia) |___| |___| 7 Różnorodna i bogata oferta instytucji kultural-nych |___| |___| 8 Wzrastająca liczba małych i średnich przedsię-biorstw |___| |___| 9 Dobrze rozwinięta infrastruktura turystyczna |___| |___| 10 Dobry poziom wykształcenia ludności na szczeblu średnim i wyższym |___| |___| 11 Zróżnicowanie etniczno-religijne |___| |___| 12 Obecność dużych zakładów zatrudniających po-wyżej 250 osób |___| |___| 13 Duża ilość aktywnych organizacji pozarządowych |___| |___| 14 Dobra komunikacja (drogi, kolej) |___| |___| 15 Dobra współpraca z sąsiednimi gminami ..... |___| |___| 16 Rozwinięta współpraca transgraniczna |___| |___| 17 Dostęp do szerokopasmowego Internetu |___| |___| 18 Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 19 Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 20 Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 21 Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K3� [KARTA K3]. Proszę wybrać maksymalnie 5 barier w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym Państwa gminy, a następnie przypisać im wagi od 1 do 5 (5 – największy wpływ, 1 – najmniejszy wpływ spośród wybranych). [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź w wierszu] nr CZYNNIKI-BARIERY W ROZWOJU K3_a Wybrane czynniki K3_b WAGI (od 5 do 1) 1. Niski poziom zaangażowania władz regionalnych i krajowych w rozwój gminy |___| |___| 2. Skomplikowane procedury pozyskiwana funduszy zewnętrznych |___| |___| 3. Problemy z zapewnieniem wkładu własnego po-wiatu/gminy w realizowanych projektach |___| |___| 4. Przewaga ludności starszej (powyżej 65. roku życia) |___| |___| 5. Niski bądź ujemny przyrost naturalny |___| |___| 6. Ujemne saldo migracji |___| |___| 7. Lokalizacja w gminie obiektów uciążliwych dla środowiska |___| |___| 8. Wysoki poziom przestępczości |___| |___| 161www.soclab.org.pl 9. Niewystarczający poziom rozwoju infrastruktury granicznej (np. przejścia graniczne, obwodnice, drogi, mosty) |___| |___| 10. Niski stopień identyfikacji mieszkańców z regionem |___| |___| 11. Słaby rozwój gospodarczy (mało inwestycji) |___| |___| 12. Mało aktywne organizacje pozarządowe |___| |___| 13. Rozwinięta szara strefa |___| |___| 14. Słaba lokalna oferta kulturalna |___| |___| 15. Niski poziom wykształcenia mieszkańców |___| |___| 16. Słaby rozwój turystyki (baza hotelowa, restaura-cje itp.) |___| |___| 17. Słaba promocja gminy na zewnątrz |___| |___| 18. Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 19. Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 20. Inne jakie.................................................? |___| |___| 23. Żadne z powyższych |___| |___| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K4� [KARTA K4]. Przy pomocy tej karty proszę powiedzieć, jak ocenia Pan(i) działania i politykę [wstaw kolejno nazwę z tabeli, np. Unii Europejskiej] na rzecz aktywizacji społeczno-gospodarczej Państwa gminy? [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź w wierszu] 5� Bardzo dobrze 4� Raczej dobrze 3� Raczej źle 2� Bardzo źle 1� Nieodczuwalne są żadne działania 9� Trudno powiedzieć/nie dotyczy 1. Unii Europejskiej 5 4 3 2 1 9 2. Rządu 5 4 3 2 1 9 3. Urzędu marszałkowskiego 5 4 3 2 1 9 4. Urzędu wojewódzkiego 5 4 3 2 1 9 5. Euroregionu 5 4 3 2 1 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K5� [KARTA K5]. Jakie działania podejmowane są przez władze lokalne w celu podniesienia atrakcyjności społeczno- -gospodarczej obszarów Waszej gminy? [Ankieter: zaznacz wybrane odpowiedzi] nr CZYNNIKI K5 Wybrane czynniki 1. Przygotowanie oferty inwestycyjnej |___| 2. Ulgi podatkowe dla inwestorów |___| 3. Obecność stref aktywizacji (inkubator przedsiębiorczości, Specjalna Strefa Eko-nomiczna) |___| 4. Uregulowanie statusu prawnego działek pod inwestycje (obowiązujący Plan Zagospodarowania Przestrzennego) |___| 5. Uproszczenie i ułatwienie działań dotyczących obsługi procesów inwestycyjnych |___| 6. Uzbrojenie infrastrukturalne działek pod inwestycje |___| 162 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 7. Pozyskiwanie środków z Unii Europejskiej |___| 8. Pozyskiwanie środków z innych źródeł |___| 9. Wdrażanie nowych technik zarządzania administracją np. kontraktacja usług |___| 10. Podnoszenie jakości obsługi klienta |___| 11. Wspieranie i wzmacnianie lokalnych organizacji pozarządowych |___| 12. Dbanie o atrakcyjną ofertę kulturalną dla gminy |___| 13. Przygotowywanie długofalowych strategii rozwoju gminy |___| 14. Współpraca z innymi gminami |___| 15. Współpraca transgraniczna |___| 16. Promocja gminy z zastosowaniem nowoczesnych technologii komunikacyjnych |___| 17. Inne jakie..................................................................................................? |___| 18. Inne jakie..................................................................................................? |___| 19. Żadne z powyższych |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K6. [KARTA K6]. Czy Państwa gmina posiada aktualną strategię rozwoju? [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź] ODP Wpisz okres 1 Tak |___| → Na jakie lata? 2 Nie |___| 3 Jest w trakcie opracowania |___| → Na jakie lata? 9 Nie wiem |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K7� [KARTA K7]. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę w ramach struktur transgranicznych (np. w ramach euroregionu)? [Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno i zaznacz jedną odpowiedź] 1. tak 2. nie 3. nie wiem 1 Z zagranicznymi podmiotami samorządowymi |___| |___| |___| 2 Z zagranicznymi podmiotami pozarządowymi |___| |___| |___| 3 Z zagranicznymi podmiotami komercyjnymi |___| |___| |___| 4 W ramach struktur transgranicznych, np. w ra-mach euroregionu |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K8. [KARTA K8]. Czy w Państwa gminie utworzona jest: [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź] 1. tak 2. nie 3. nie wiem Wpisz nazwę poniżej 1 Specjalna komórka/zespół ds. współpracy transgranicznej |___| |___| |___| Jeśli 1. tak, proszę podać jej nazwę 2 Specjalnie stanowisko wyodrębnione w innej strukturze do współpracy transgranicznej |___| |___| |___| Jeśli 1. tak, proszę podać jego nazwę 9 Nie wiem |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------163www.soclab.org.pl K9� [KARTA K9]. Czy Państwa gmina w ostatnich latach ubiegała się o środki pomocowe z programów Unii Europejskiej? [Ankieter: zaznacz jedną odpowiedź] ODP 1 Tak |___| 2 Nie |___| → przejdź doW1 9 Nie wiem |___| → przejdź do W1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K10� [KARTA K10]. Uśredniając, ile wniosków przeciętnie w ciągu roku gmina składa na poszczególne obszary tematyczne? [Ankieter: Wpisz liczbę projektów, jeśli brak, wpisz 0] liczba projektów 1. Rozwój gospodarczy gminy |___| → przejdź doW1 2. Rozwój infrastruktury gminy pod względem komunikacyjnym |___| → przejdź do W1 3. Rozwój turystyczny gminy |___| → przejdź doW1 4. Rozwój społeczno-kulturalny gminy |___| → przejdź doW1 5. Ochrona środowiska naturalnego |___| → przejdź doW1 6. Współpraca międzyregionalna/transnarodowa |___| 7. Współpraca transgraniczna |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------K11. [KARTA K11] Jakie to były programy współpracy transnarodowej i transgranicznej? [Ankieter: możliwych wiele odpowiedzi, zaznacz wymienione] NAZWA PROGRAMU ODP 1. Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska 2007–2013 |___| 2. Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Litwa–Polska–Rosja 2007–2013 |___| 3. Program Współpracy Transgranicznej Polska–Białoruś–Ukraina 2007–2013 |___| 4. Program dla Europy Środkowej |___| 5 Region Morza Bałtyckiego |___| 6. INTERREG IVC |___| 7. Europa dla Obywateli |___| 8. URBACT |___| 9. Life Long Learning |___| 10. Life |___| 11. Komponent transnarodowy Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego |___| 12. Inne jakie ..................................................................................? |___| 13. Nie wiem/trudno powiedzieć |___| 164 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------WSPÓŁPRACA TRANSGRANICZNA ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W1� [KARTA W1] Proszę spojrzeć na kartę i powiedzieć, z którymi krajami, o ile w ogóle, formalnie współpracuje Państwa gmina. [Ankieter: zaznacz wszystkie wskazane odpowiedzi, jeśli nie zaznaczony żaden kod od 1 do 4, przejdź do W1a, jeśli zaznaczony którykolwiek od 1 do 4, przejdź do W2] Kraje Zaznacz wskazane 1. Białoruś |___| 2. Litwa |___| 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) |___| 4. Ukraina |___| 5. Estonia |___| 6. Łotwa |___| 7. Niemcy |___| 8. Inne jakie................................? |___| 9. Inne jakie................................? |___| 10 Z żadnym z powyższych |___| [ANKIETER: JEŚLI ZAZNACZONE WSZYSTKIE KODY OD 1 DO 4, PRZEJDŹ DO PYT. W2, JEŚLI NIEZAZNACZONY KTÓRYŚ Z KODÓW 1 – 4, ZADAJ PYT W1A] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W1A� Czy próbowali Państwo w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat nawiązać współpracę z [Ankieter: zapytaj o kraje niewskazane w pyt. W1 o kodach 1 – 4, zaznacz jedną odpowiedź w wierszu] Kraje Tak Nie Nie wiem/trudno powiedzieć 1. Białoruś 1 2 9 2. Litwa 1 2 9 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 1 2 9 [Ankieter: Jeśli w W1A w którymkolwiek kraju zaznaczona odp. 1 – Tak, zadaj W1B i wpisz odpowiedź przy odpowiednim kraju, w przeciwnym razie przejdź do W1C] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W1B� Co spowodowało, że nie nawiązali Państwo współpracy z (zapytaj o kraje z W1A, przy których zaznaczono odpowiedź 1 – Tak) Wpisz powód niepodjęcia współpracy 1. Białoruś 2. Litwa 165www.soclab.org.pl 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 4. Ukraina ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W1C� Czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat zamierzają Państwo nawiązać współpracę zagraniczną z [Ankieter: zapytaj o kraje niewskazane w kodach 1 – 4 w pyt. W1, zaznacz jedną odpowiedź w wierszu] Kraje Tak Nie Nie wiem/trudno powiedzieć 1. Białoruś 1 2 9 2. Litwa 1 2 9 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 1 2 9 4. Ukraina 1 2 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W1D. [KARTA W1D] Jakie są główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia przez Państwa gminę współpracy zagranicznej z? (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1C z kodami 1 – 4, zaznacz wszystkie wymienione) 1. Białoruś 2. Litwa 3. Rosja 4. Ukraina 1. Stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokalny |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Prestiż |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Dążenie do uzyskania wpływu na decyzje dotyczące samo-rządów, które są podejmowane w UE |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Zachęta ze strony administracji centralnej, rządu |___| |___| |___| |___| 10 Ponieważ wszyscy nawiązują taką współpracę |___| |___| |___| |___| 11 Inne jakie....................................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| 12 Inne jakie.....................................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| [DALSZE PYTANIA OD W2 DO C3 ZADAJEMY TYM, KTÓRZY W PYT. W1 ZAZNACZYLI CHOCIAŻ JEDEN KRAJ Z KODAMI 1 – 4, JEŚLI NIEWSKAZANE, PRZEJDŹ DO PYT. O1 NA STR. 12] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------166 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W2. [KARTA W2] Proszę ocenić w skali 1 – 4 OGÓLNĄ intensywność obecnej współpracy Państwa gminy z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) 4� Bardzo wysoka 3� Wysoka 2� Niska 1� Bardzo niska 9� Trudno powiedzieć 1. Białoruś 4 3 2 1 9 2. Litwa 4 3 2 1 9 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 4 3 2 1 9 4. Ukraina 4 3 2 1 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W2a. [KARTA W2] Proszę ocenić czy w ciągu najbliższych trzech lat OGÓLNA intensywność współpracy Państwa gminy z krajami Pana(i) zdaniem wzrośnie, pozostanie na obecnym poziomie czy też zmaleje? (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) 3� Wzrośnie 2� Pozostanie na obecnym poziomie 1� Zmaleje 9� Trudno powiedzieć 1. Białoruś 3 2 1 9 2. Litwa 3 2 1 9 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 3 2 1 9 4. Ukraina 3 2 1 9 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W3. [KARTA W3] Jakie są główne przyczyny podejmowania przez Państwa gminę współpracy zagranicznej z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) PRZYCZYNY WSPÓŁPRACY ODP 1. Stworzenie możliwości wymiany międzynarodowej dla mieszkańców gminy |___| 2 Rozwój i pobudzenie lokalnej przedsiębiorczości, biznesu |___| 3. Promocja gminy na arenie międzynarodowej |___| 4. Przeniesienie dobrych praktyk z zagranicznych jednostek samorządowych na grunt lokal-ny |___| 5 Możliwość ubiegania się o fundusze pomocowe |___| 6. Rozwój wiedzy i kompetencji urzędników |___| 7. Prestiż |___| 8. Dążenie do uzyskania wpływu na decyzje dotyczące samorządów, które są podejmowane w UE |___| 9. Zachęta ze strony administracji centralnej, rządu |___| 10. Ponieważ wszyscy nawiązują taką współpracę |___| 11. Inne jakie.................................................................................? |___| 12. Inne jakie.................................................................................? |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------167www.soclab.org.pl W4. [KARTA W4] Proszę wskazać obecne obszary współpracy w Państwa gminie z poszczególnymi krajami [Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4] oraz ocenić ich wpływ na rozwój gminy przy użyciu 4-stopniowej skali, gdzie 4 oznacza zdecydowany wpływ, 3 – umiarkowany wpływ, 2 – znikomy wpływ, 1 – brak wpływu. Obszary współpracy z wybranymi krajami 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina Obszar współpracy Wpływ na rozwój gminy (1 – 4) Obszar współpracy Wpływ na rozwój gminy (1 – 4) Obszar współpracy Wpływ na rozwój gminy (1 – 4) Obszar współpracy Wpływ na rozwój gminy (1 – 4) 1. Gospodarka |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2 Rynek pracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Infrastruktura (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Demokracja i prawa człowieka |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5 Turystyka i rekreacja |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Sport |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Nauka i edukacja |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Kultura, w tym promocja dziedzictwa lokalnego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Służba zdrowia i opieka społeczna |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Ochrona środowiska |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. Rozwój społeczny |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 12. Pomoc rozwojowa |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 13. Przedsięwzięcia z Polonią i Polakami mieszkającymi za granicą |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 14. Inne jakie........................? |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 15. Inne jakie........................? |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W5. [KARTA W5] Jakie są widoczne skutki współpracy transgranicznej w Państwa gminie z [Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4]? Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że zdecydowanie się Pan(i) zgadza, 4 – raczej zgadza, 3 – ani zgadza ani nie zgadza, 2 – raczej nie zgadza, 1 – zdecydowanie nie zgadza, (nie czytaj) 9 – trudno powiedzieć. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina 1. Napływem inwestorów zagranicznych |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Napływem inwestorów krajowych |___| |___| |___| |___| 168 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 3. Spadkiem stopy bezrobocia |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Wzrostem liczby miejsc pracy |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Wzrostem wymiany handlowej z partnerem z zagranicy |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Wzrostem konkurencyjności polskich firm prowadzonych na terenie Państwa gminy |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Współpracą lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Przepływem siły roboczej w oparciu o umowy |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Powstaniem nowych dróg, mostów |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Turystyką (np. rozwija się baza hotelowa, noclegowa, zwięk-sza się liczba turystów, nowe trasy turystyczne) |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. Organizowaniem imprez sportowych dla mieszkańców po obu stronach granicy |___| |___| |___| |___| 12. Organizowaniem imprez kulturalnych dla mieszkańców po obu stronach granicy |___| |___| |___| |___| 13. Współpracą partnerską między szkołami po obu stronach granicy |___| |___| |___| |___| 14. Wprowadzeniem do szkół nauki języka sąsiadów |___| |___| |___| |___| 15. Likwidacją zakładów produkcyjnych szkodliwych dla środo-wiska naturalnego |___| |___| |___| |___| 16. Stworzeniem wspólnych z partnerem z zagranicy progra-mów i strategii rozwoju |___| |___| |___| |___| 17. Intensyfikacją kontaktów między mieszkańcami |___| |___| |___| |___| 18. Zmniejszeniem poziomu wzajemnego uprzedzenia i nega-tywnych stereotypów |___| |___| |___| |___| 19. Inne jakie.................................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| 20. Żadne z powyższych |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W6. [KARTA W6] Proszę wskazać podmioty instytucjonalne z gminy zaangażowane we współpracę z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) oraz ocenić intensywność współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: gdzie 4 – bardzo wysoka, 3 – wysoka, 2 – niska, 1 – bardzo niska, (nie czytaj) 9 – trudno powiedzieć. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina współpraca Intensywność współpracy (1-4) współpraca Intensywność współpracy (1-4) współpraca Intensywność współpracy (1-4) współpraca Intensywność współpracy (1-4) 1. Jednostki samorządu teryto-rialnego szczebla gminnego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Związki i stowarzyszenia jednostek samorządu terytorialnego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 169www.soclab.org.pl 3. Organizacje pozarządowe – stowarzyszenia, fundacje (NGO) |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Szkoły wyższe, jednostki naukowe |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Jednostki kultury |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Szkoły i placówki oświatowe |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Instytucje otoczenia biznesu, instytucje i organizacje wspierające rozwój przedsiębiorczości i innowacyjności |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Parki narodowe i krajobrazowe/ podmioty zarządzające obszarami chronionymi |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Przedsiębiorcy/MSP |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Zakłady opieki zdrowotnej, jednostki systemu ratownictwa medycznego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. PGL Lasy Państwowe i jego jednostki organizacyjne 12. Kościoły i inne związki wy-znaniowe |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 13. Inne jakie..........................? |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W7. [KARTA W7] Jak często organizowano do tej pory wspólne przedsięwzięcia z partnerem z zagranicy? (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że bardzo często, 4 – często, 3 – rzadko, 2 – bardzo rzadko, a 1w ogóle (nie czytaj) 9 – trudno powiedzieć. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina 1. Targi i wystawy |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Imprezy kulturalne |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Imprezy turystyczne |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Imprezy międzyszkolne |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Handlowa wymiana przygraniczna |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Współpraca lokalnych środowisk gospodarczych |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Ochrona środowiska |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Misje gospodarcze, współpraca podmiotów gospodarczych |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Wspólne projekty infrastrukturalne |___| |___| |___| |___| 10 Wspólne składanie wniosków o dofinansowanie |___| |___| |___| |___| 11 Inne jakie.................................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| 12 Żadne z powyższych |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------170 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W8. Proszę podać znane Panu/Pani przykłady zrealizowanych przedsięwzięć w zakresie współpracy transgranicznej Państwa gminy z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) Wpisz nazwę przedsięwzięć 1. Białoruś 2. Litwa 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 4. Ukraina ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W9� Czego mógłby dotyczyć projekt współpracy transgranicznej Państwa gminy, który Pana/Pani zdaniem byłby najbardziej potrzebny, a nie został dotychczas zrealizowany z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) Wpisz nazwę przedsięwzięć 1. Białoruś 2. Litwa 3. Rosja (obwód Kaliningradzki) 4. Ukraina ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W10� Do jakich sieci i zrzeszeń międzynarodowych zrzeszających podobne jednostki samorządowe w sposób formalny lub nieformalny przynależy gmina (np. nazwa euroregionu, Eurocities, Stowarzyszenie Miast Włókienniczych, Cities for Children, Sieć Dziedzictwa Kulinarnego, Energie Cites, Sieć Zdrowych Miast WHO)? (Ankieter: wpisz wszystkie wymienione, dopytaj, jakie jeszcze?) ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------171www.soclab.org.pl W11. [KARTA W11] W jakim stopniu, Pana(i) zdaniem, Państwa gmina czerpie korzyści ze współpracy z partnerem z zagranicy? (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) Do oceny proszę posłużyć się 5-stopniową skalą, gdzie 5 oznacza, że w bardzo dużym, 4 – w dużym, 3 – w małym, 2 – bardzo małym, 1 – w ogóle; (nie czytaj) 9 – trudno powiedzieć. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina 1. Wzrost dochodów lokalnej społeczności |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Wzrost liczby miejsc pracy w gminie |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Rozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Rozwój turystyki |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Skuteczniejsza ochrona środowiska naturalnego |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Ułatwienia w kontaktach z zagranicznymi partnerami |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Rozwój współpracy społeczno-kulturalnej |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe z UE |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Możliwość ubiegania się o środki pomocowe spoza UE |___| |___| |___| |___| 10 Inne jakie....................................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------W12 [KARTA W12] Proszę powiedzieć, w oparciu o jakie akty prawne odbywa się współpraca z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina 1. Porozumienie dwustronne |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Miasta partnerskie |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Gminy partnerskie |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo na podstawie podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Współpraca w ramach projektów |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Dwu-, trójlub wielostronne partnerstwo bez podpisanej umowy lub listu intencyjnego |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Przynależność do organizacji – sieci, związków zrzeszających podmioty z rożnych krajów |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Przedstawiciel w innym kraju |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Inne jakie .............................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| 172 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CELE WSPÓŁPRACY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C1. [KARTA C1] Proszę powiedzieć, które cele realizowane są, Pana(i) zdaniem, podczas współpracy z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina 1. Poprawa kontaktów międzynarodowych |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Integracja społeczności lokalnych |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Rozwój infrastruktury (np. powstają nowe drogi, mosty, przejścia graniczne, tworzone są nowe połączenia telekomunikacyjne itp.) |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Promocja samorządu |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Promocja organizacji pozarządowych |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Promocja biznesu |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Upowszechnianie demokracji |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Wspólne rozwiązywanie problemów gospodarczych, spo-łecznych i środowiskowych |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Zwiększenie ruchu turystycznego |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Ochrona środowiska |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. Rozwój kultury |___| |___| |___| |___| 12. Zwiększenie handlu |___| |___| |___| |___| 13. Wzrost zagranicznych inwestycji bezpośrednich |___| |___| |___| |___| 14. Integracja społeczna poprzez wspólne inicjatywy kulturalne |___| |___| |___| |___| 15. Promocja lokalnych produktów i usług |___| |___| |___| |___| 16. Poprawa przepływu informacji |___| |___| |___| |___| 17. Współpraca w zarządzaniu kryzysowym |___| |___| |___| |___| 18. Utrzymanie równowagi krajobrazu przyrodniczego |___| |___| |___| |___| 19. Inne jakie.............................................................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| 20. Żaden z powyższych |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------173www.soclab.org.pl C2. [KARTA C2] W jaki sposób gmina promuje współpracę transgraniczną z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4). Następnie proszę ocenić użyteczność tych działań, posługując się następującą skalą: 5 – bardzo użyteczne, 4 – raczej użyteczne, 3 – ani użyteczne, ani nieużyteczne, 2 – raczej nieużyteczne, 1 – bardzo nieużyteczne. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina działania użyteczność (1 – 5) działania użyteczność (1 – 5) działania użyteczność (1 – 5) działania użyteczność (1 – 5) 1. Materiały reklamowe |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Materiały informacyjne (np. fol-dery, prezentacje multimedialne) |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Strona internetowa, np. gminy w językach obcych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Ogłoszenia w prasie zagranicznej (regionalnej, krajowej) |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Ogłoszenia w zagranicznym radiu, telewizji, Internecie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Udział w targach zagranicznych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Udział w konferencjach, sympo-zjach za granicą |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Udział w konkursach międzyna-rodowych, np. na dobre praktyki |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Wspólne, transgraniczne imprezy kulturalne |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Wielokulturowe imprezy kultu-ralne |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. Fundowanie stypendiów zagra-nicznych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 12. Finansowanie rezydencji arty-stycznych i/lub naukowych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 13. Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji międzykulturowej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 14. Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji rozwojowej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 15. Szkolenia z zakresu edukacji globalnej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 16. Organizowanie wymiany mło-dzieży szkolnej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 17. Organizowanie wolontariatu zagranicznego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 18. Organizowanie debat, seminariów, konferencji o tematyce międzynarodowej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 19. Inne jakie ....................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 20. Żadne z powyższych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------174 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim C3. [KARTA C3] Proszę wskazać, które instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej Państwa gmina wykorzystuje w kontaktach z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) Następnie proszę ocenić użyteczność tych instrumentów współpracy, posługując się następującą skalą: 5 – bardzo użyteczne, 4 – raczej użyteczne, 3 – ani użyteczne, ani nieużyteczne, 2 – raczej nieużyteczne, 1 – bardzo nieużyteczne. 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 3� Ukraina instrumenty użyteczność (1-5) instrumenty użyteczność (1-5) instrumenty użyteczność (1-5) instrumenty użyteczność (1-5) 1. Organizacja misji gospodar-czych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Przygotowywanie i wydawanie poradników, materiałów dla eksporterów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Dystrybucja poradników, ma-teriałów dla eksporterów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Prowadzenie doradztwa prawnego w zakresie współpracy zagranicznej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Wsparcie przedsiębiorców jako eksporterów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Prowadzenie punktu kontak-towej dla eksporterów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Udział w targach międzynaro-dowych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Organizowanie targów międzynarodowych na terenie gminy lub regionu |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Organizacja zagranicznych wizyt studyjnych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 10 Uczestnictwo w projektach we współpracy międzynarodowej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 11 Uczestnictwo w transnarodowych sieciach, związkach, stowarzyszeniach |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 12 Udział w euroregionach |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 13 Inne jakie................................? |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| PRZEJDŹ DO PYTANIA B1 NA STRONIE 13 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OGRANICZENIA WSPÓŁPRACY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------O1. [KARTA OGRANICZENIA I BARIERY WSPÓŁPRACY]. Proszę spojrzeć na tę kartę. Jakie są, według Pana(i), najistotniejsze bariery współpracy transgranicznej po stronie polskiej, a jakie po stronie sąsiadów? Proszę spojrzeć na tę listę czynników ograniczających współpracę transgraniczną. Następnie proszę wskazać, w przypadku każdego z państw te, które leżą, Pana(i) zdaniem, po stronie polskiej, a które po stronie sąsiada, bądź też czy dotyczą obu stron. ANKIETER → PRZEJDŹ DO PYTANIA L1 175www.soclab.org.pl ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------BARIERY WSPÓŁPRACY ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------B1. [KARTA OGRANICZENIA I BARIERY WSPÓŁPRACY] Jakie są, według Pana(i), najistotniejsze bariery współpracy transgranicznej po stronie polskiej, a jakie po stronie sąsiada? Proszę spojrzeć na tę listę czynników ograniczających współpracę transgraniczną. Następnie proszę wskazać te, które odnoszą się do Państwa współpracy z (Ankieter: odczytaj kolejno kraje zaznaczone w W1 z kodami 1 – 4) oraz powiedzieć, czy występują one po stronie polskiej, za granicą, czy dotyczą obu stron. OGRANICZENIA I BARIERY WSPÓŁPRACY 1� Białoruś 2� Litwa 3� Rosja 4� Ukraina Po polskiej Po białoru. Po obu Po polskiej Po litewsk. Po obu Po polskiej Po rosyjs. Po obu Po polskiej Po ukraińs. Po obu I. Ograniczenia formalno-prawne 1. Brak odpowiednich przepi-sów i norm prawnych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Nieprecyzyjność lub brak spójności przepisów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Niestabilność przepisów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Brak osobowości prawnej regionu |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Brak międzynarodowych umów i porozumień o współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Brak równorzędnego part-nera |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Skomplikowana procedura zawierania umów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 8. Skomplikowana procedura uzyskiwania środków pomocowych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 9. Ograniczona liczba ofert współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 10. Niedostosowanie ustrojów ustawodawczych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 11. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| II. Ograniczenia instytucjonalne 1. Brak odpowiednich instytu-cji i urzędów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Brak kompetencji kadr w istniejących instytucjach i urzędach |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Mała aktywność urzędów w nawiązywaniu współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 176 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 4. Słabo rozwinięty system wymiany informacji |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Słaba koordynacja pomiędzy instytucjami w zakresie współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Częste zmiany (reorganizacje) instytucji i władz partnerów współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| III. Ograniczenia infrastrukturalne 1. Mała liczba i przepustowość przejść granicznych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Słabe zagospodarowanie infrastrukturalne przejść |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Słaba dostępność komunika-cyjna przejść |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Niedorozwój infrastruktury komunikacyjnej |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| IV. Ograniczenia finansowe 1. Ograniczone możliwości finansowe, w tym budżetów władz lokalnych terenów przygranicznych prowadzenia aktywnej polityki współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Niska sprawność systemu rozliczeń finansowych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Brak systemu zabezpieczeń finansowych transakcji handlowych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Brak zabezpieczenia inwestycyjnego wspólnych projektów oraz kapitału obrotowego |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Brak instytucji Otoczenia biznesu |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| V. Ograniczenia gospodarcze 1. Asymetria w poziomie roz-woju partnerów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Odmienność systemów gospodarczych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Brak silnej reprezentacji podmiotów gospodarczych |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 177www.soclab.org.pl VI. Ograniczenia społeczne 1. Słaba znajomość języka partnera |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Negatywne stereotypy sąsiadów |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 3. Obawy przed napływem obcego kapitału |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 4. Negatywne doświadczenia historyczne |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 5. Różnice w mentalności |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 6. Brak chęci mieszkańców do współpracy |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 7. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| VII. Ograniczenia środowiskowe 1. Duża odległość |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| 2. Inne jakie |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| |___| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------INSTYTUCJE WSPÓŁPRACUJĄCE Z ZAGRANICĄ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------L1. [KARTA INSTYTUCJE WSPÓŁPRACUJĄCE Z ZAGRANICĄ] Na koniec chciał(a)bym poprosić Pana/Panią o pomoc w uzupełnieniu niniejszej tabeli. Zgromadzone w niej dane posłużą do realizacji drugiego etapu badania, to jest wywiadów z przedsiębiorcami i przedstawicielami trzeciego sektora, którzy współpracują na terenie Państwa gminy z zagranicą. Jako że nie mamy rozeznania w lokalnym sektorze przedsiębiorczości oraz w trzecim sektorze, liczymy że Pana/Pani ekspercka wiedza pozwoli nam dotrzeć do odpowiednich firm i instytucji pozarządowych. [ANKIETER: Pokaż respondentowi Kartę INSTYTUCJE WSPÓŁPRACUJĄCE Z ZAGRANICĄ i uzupełnij ją wspólnie] 178 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim INSTYTUCJE WSPÓŁPRACUJĄCE Z ZAGRANICĄ Osoba kontaktowa I. Nazwa firmy w gminie która, współpracuje z zagranicą 1. 2. 3. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. II. Organizacje pozarządowe (fundacje, stowarzyszenia itp.) współpracujące z zagranicą 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 179www.soclab.org.pl --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------METRYCZKA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------M0. Nazwa gminy: ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------M1. Rodzaj gminy: ODP 1 miejska |___| 2 wiejska |___| 3 miejsko-wiejska |___| --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------M2. Jakie jest zajmowane przez Pana(ą) stanowisko w gminie? M3. W jakiej komórce organizacyjnej pracuje Pan(i) obecnie? ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------DZIĘKUJĘ. TO BYŁY JUŻ WSZYSTKIE MOJE PYTANIA. M4. Pieczątka z gminy potwierdzająca obecność ankietera i odbycie wywiadu: 180 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 3. Spis wykresów Wykres 1. Stopień instytucjonalizacji struktur współpracy w kontekście sąsiedztwa między państwami ..................................................................................................................16 Wykres 2. Bariery formalno-prawne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ............................................................................................................67 Wykres 3. Bariery instytucjonalne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ............................................................................................................68 Wykres 4. Bariery infrastrukturalne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ............................................................................................................69 Wykres 5. Bariery finansowe współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ............................................................................................................70 Wykres 6. Bariery gospodarcze współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ..........70 Wykres 7. Bariery społeczne współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw ..............71 Wykres 8. Bariery środowiskowe współpracy transgranicznej. Zestawienie analizowanych państw .......72 Wykres 9. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią ........................................................77 Wykres 10. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią ..................................................77 Wykres 11. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią78 Wykres 12. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Białorusią ...................................79 Wykres 13. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Białorusią ........................................................79 Wykres 14. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią .......................................80 Wykres 15. Widoczne skutki współpracy transgranicznej gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią .......................................................................................................81 Wykres 16. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Białorusią ...................................................................................................82 Wykres 17. Deklaratywny odsetek instytucji z gminy zaangażowanych we współpracę z Białorusią oraz intensywność prowadzonej współpracy .....................................................83 Wykres 18. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią oraz ich intensywność ..............................................................84 Wykres 19. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Białorusią ..................................................................................................85 Wykres 20. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią ................................................................................86 Wykres 21. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią ...........87 Wykres 22. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Białorusią .......................88 Wykres 23. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Białorusią oraz ocena ich użyteczności .............88 Wykres 24. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Białorusią wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (1/2) .............................................................................................90 Wykres 25. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Białorusią wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (2/2) .............................................................................................91 Wykres 26. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą ..............................................................95 Wykres 27. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą ..........................................................95 Wykres 28. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą .....................................................................................96 Wykres 29. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Litwą ..........................................97 181www.soclab.org.pl Wykres 30. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Litwą ...............................................................97 Wykres 31. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą ..............................................98 Wykres 32. Widoczne skutki współpracy transgranicznej gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą ........99 Wykres 33. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Litwą ........................................................................................................100 Wykres 34. Mapa ukazująca deklaratywny odsetek instytucji z gmin zaangażowanych we współpracę z Litwą oraz intensywność prowadzonej współpracy ................................101 Wykres 35. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą oraz ich intensywność ...................................................................102 Wykres 36. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Litwą .......................................................................................................103 Wykres 37. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą ......................................................................................104 Wykres 38. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą ................105 Wykres 39. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Litwą106 Wykres 40. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Litwą oraz ocena ich użyteczności ...................107 Wykres 41. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (1/2) ...........................................................................................108 Wykres 42. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Litwą wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (2/2) ...........................................................................................109 Wykres 43. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją ............................................................114 Wykres 44. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją ........................................................114 Wykres 45. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją ...................................................................................115 Wykres 46. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Rosją ........................................116 Wykres 47. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Rosją .............................................................116 Wykres 48. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją ............................................116 Wykres 49. Widoczne skutki współpracy transgranicznej gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją .............................................................................................................117 Wykres 50. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Rosją118 Wykres 51. Mapa ukazująca deklaratywny odsetek instytucji z gminy zaangażowanych we współpracę z Rosją oraz intensywność prowadzonej współpracy ................................119 Wykres 52. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją oraz ich intensywność ...................................................................120 Wykres 53. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Rosją .......................................................................................................121 Wykres 54. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją ......................................................................................121 Wykres 55. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją ................122 Wykres 56. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Rosją .............................123 Wykres 57. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Rosją oraz ocena ich użyteczności ...................124 Wykres 58. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Rosją wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (1/2) ...........................................................................................125 Wykres 59. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Rosją wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (2/2) ...........................................................................................126 Wykres 60. Próba nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu ostatnich 5 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą ........................................................130 182 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim Wykres 61. Chęć nawiązania współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami w ciągu najbliższych 3 lat przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą ....................................................130 Wykres 62. Główne przyczyny chęci podjęcia współpracy z poszczególnymi państwami przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą .............................................................131 Wykres 63. Ocena ogólnej intensywności obecnej współpracy gmin z Ukrainą ....................................132 Wykres 64. Ocena dynamiki rozwoju współpracy gmin z Ukrainą .........................................................132 Wykres 65. Obszary współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą ........................................133 Wykres 66. Widoczne skutki współpracy transgranicznej gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą .........................................................................................................134 Wykres 67. Podmioty instytucjonalne z gmin zaangażowane we współpracę transgraniczną z Ukrainą .....................................................................................................135 Wykres 68. Mapa ukazująca deklaratywny odsetek instytucji z gminy zaangażowanych we współpracę z Ukrainą oraz intensywność prowadzonej współpracy ............................136 Wykres 69. Rodzaje wspólnych przedsięwzięć organizowanych przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą oraz ich intensywność ...............................................................137 Wykres 70. Korzyści czerpane ze współpracy transgranicznej przez gminy współpracujące z Ukrainą ...................................................................................................138 Wykres 71. Akty prawne, w oparciu o które odbywa się współpraca gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą ..................................................................................138 Wykres 72. Cele realizowane podczas współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą .............139 Wykres 73. Sposoby promocji współpracy gmin województwa podlaskiego z Ukrainą .........................140 Wykres 74. Instrumenty współpracy transgranicznej wykorzystywane przez gminy województwa podlaskiego w kontaktach z Ukrainą oraz ocena ich użyteczności ...............140 Wykres 75. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Ukrainą wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (1/2) ...........................................................................................142 Wykres 76. Bariery współpracy transgranicznej z Ukrainą wśród gmin prowadzących współpracę z tym krajem (2/2) ...........................................................................................143 4. Spis tabel Tabela 1. Porównanie dyplomacji tradycyjnej i publicznej ......................................................................11 Tabela 2. Instytucje i regulacje prawne współpracy międzynarodowej regionów ...................................14 Tabela 3. Charakterystyka ilościowa analizowanych dokumentów strategicznych ..................................35 Tabela 4. Obszary współpracy w analizowanych dokumentach strategicznych .......................................36 Tabela 5. Kierunki współpracy w analizowanych dokumentach strategicznych .......................................38 Tabela 6. Sytuacja społeczno-gospodarcza gmin na tle województwa podlaskiego w ocenie gmin prowadzących i nieprowadzących współpracy międzynarodowej ....................57 Tabela 7. Pięć czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi .......................57 Tabela 8. Pięć barier w rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczym gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi ....................................................58 Tabela 9. Działania podejmowane przez władze lokalne w celu podniesienia atrakcyjności społeczno-gospodarczej obszarów gminy. Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi ....................................................59 Tabela 10. Czy Państwa gmina posiada aktualną strategię rozwoju? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi ..........................................60 183www.soclab.org.pl Tabela 11. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami samorządowymi? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi .............................................................................................60 Tabela 12. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę z zagranicznymi podmiotami pozarządowymi? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi .............................................................................................60 Tabela 13. Czy uwzględnia się w tej strategii współpracę w ramach struktur transgranicznych na przykład w ramach euroregionu? Porównanie gmin prowadzących współpracę zagraniczną z nieprowadzącymi .............................................................................................61 Tabela 14. Sieci współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim ...............................................64 Tabela 15. Ogólna intensywność obecnej współpracy gmin ....................................................................64 Tabela 16. Pięć czynników podnoszących atrakcyjność społeczno-gospodarczą gminy ...........................65 Tabela 17. Zestawienie czynników ograniczających współpracę międzynarodową wg S. Cioka ...............66 Tabela 18. Przeszkody we współpracy transgranicznej oraz metody ich ograniczania lub niwelowania .....................................................................................................................72 Tabela 19. Obecne wsparcie przedsiębiorstwa/organizacji przez administrację państwową w nawiązywaniu współpracy ze Wschodem .........................................................................145 Tabela 20. Potrzeba otrzymania wsparcia przedsiębiorstwa/organizacji przez administrację państwową w nawiązywaniu współpracy ze Wschodem ...............................146 5. Spis map Mapa 1. Współpraca międzynarodowa ...................................................................................................56 Mapa 2. Gminy deklarujące współpracę transgraniczną .........................................................................62 Mapa 3. Ilość państw, z jakimi współpracuje gmina (współpraca transgraniczna: Białoruś, Litwa, Rosja, Ukraina) .................................................................................................63 Mapa 4. Gminy deklarujące współpracę z Białorusią ..............................................................................75 Mapa 5. Próby nawiązania współpracy z Białorusią w ostatnich 5 latach ................................................76 Mapa 6. Gminy deklarujące współpracę z Litwą ......................................................................................93 Mapa 7. Próby nawiązania współpracy z Litwą w ostatnich 5 latach ......................................................94 Mapa 8. Gminy deklarujące współpracę z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) ......................................111 Mapa 9. Próby nawiązania współpracy z Rosją (Obwodem Kaliningradzkim) w ostatnich 5 latach112 Mapa 10. Próby nawiązania z Ukrainą w ostatnich 5 latach ..................................................................128 Mapa 11. Gminy deklarujące współpracę z Ukrainą ..............................................................................129 6. Analizowane dokumenty strategiczne Kod TERYT Gmina/powiat Dokumenty 2001 powiat augustowski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Augustowskiego na lata 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Powiatu Augustowskiego do 2020 roku 2001011 Augustów – gmina miejska Raport stanu i rozwoju gospodarki lokalnej ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem sektora handlu i usług (2009); Strategia rozwoju dla miasta Augustowa (1999); Strategia Rozwoju Miasta Augustów na lata 2008–2015; Strategia marki i promocji miasta Augustowa na lata 2010–2015 184 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2001022 Augustów – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju Gminy Augustów na lata 1999–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Augustów do 2013 roku 2001032 Bargłów Kościelny – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Bargłów Kościelny na lata 2007–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Tajno Podjeziorne (2009); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Bargłów Kościelny (2007) 2001043 Lipsk – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Krasne na lata 2011–2018; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Lipsk (2005); Plan Rozwoju Miejscowości Lipsk (2005); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Lipsk na lata 2008–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Lipsk (2009) 2001052 Nowinka – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Nowinka (2004) 2001062 Płaska – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Płaska na lata 2008–2015; Strategia rozwoju zrównoważonego Gminy Płaska (2001) 2001072 Sztabin – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Sztabin (2004); Strategia Ekorozwoju Społeczno-Gospodarczego dla Gminy Sztabin na lata 2004–2020 2002 powiat białostocki Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Białostockiego na okres programowa-nia 2007–2013 2002013 Choroszcz – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Pańki (2007); Plan odnowy miejscowości Izbiszcze na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Barszczewo (2010); Plan odnowy miejscowości Klepacze na lata 2010–2018; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Miasta i Gminy Choroszcz na lata 2004–2013; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Choroszcz na lata 2002–2015 2002023 Czarna Białostocka – gmina miejskowiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Czarna Białostocka (2004); Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Gminy Czarna Białostocka (2003) 2002032 Dobrzyniewo Duże – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2002042 Gródek – gmina wiejska Kluczowe ustalenia strategii zrównoważonego rozwoju społeczno–gospodarczego Gminy Gródek w latach 2001–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Gródek (2008); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Gródek (2004) 2002052 Juchnowiec Kościelny – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Juchnowiec Kościelny do 2010 roku; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Juchnowiec Kościelny na lata 2008–2025 2002063 Łapy – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Łapy na lata 2004–2013; Wstępna analiza i założenia do programu rozwoju Miasta i Gminy Łapy (2011); Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju gminy Łapy (2001); Strategia rozwoju turystyki Gminy Łapy (2010); Plan odnowy miejscowości Gąsówka-Osse (2007); Plan rozwoju miejscowości Płonka-Strumianka (2007); Plan rozwoju wsi Wólka Waniewska (2007); Plan rozwoju miejscowości Bokiny na lata 2007–2014 2002073 Michałowo – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Michałowo na lata 2004–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Michałowo do 2015 roku 2002082 Poświętne – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Poświętne na lata 2004–2006; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Poświętne 2000–2020 2002093 Supraśl – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego 2008–2013. Gmina miejsko-wiejska Supraśl; Strategia oraz program budowy marki uzdrowiska Supraśl (2004); Audyt turystyczny uzdrowiska Supraśl (2004); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego 2004–2006 z perspektywą na lata 2007–2013; Plan rozwoju miejscowości Supraśl (2005); Studium wykonalności uzdrowiska Supraśl. Załączniki (2004); Strategia Rozwoju Miasta i Gminy Supraśl na lata 2000–2010 185www.soclab.org.pl 2002103 Suraż – gmina miejsko-wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Miasta i Gminy Suraż do roku 2019; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Miasta i Gminy Suraż na lata 2008–2010; Plan odnowy miejscowości Zawyki (2010); Plan odnowy Miejscowości Doktorce (2010) 2002112 Turośń Kościelna – gmina wiejska Plan inwestycji i rozwoju lokalnego Gminy Turośń Kościelna na lata 2010–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Barszczówka na lata 2010– 2013; Plan odnowy wsi Turośń Kościelna (2010) 2002123 Tykocin – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Tykocina (2005); Plan rozwoju gminy Tykocin (2004); Plan odnowy miejscowości Siekierki na lata 2008–2014; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Tykocin 2004–2013 2002133 Wasilków – gmina miejsko-wiejska Raport o stanie Gminy Wasilków w latach 2006–2010; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Wasilków na lata 2012–2020 2002143 Zabłudów – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Zabłudów na lata 2007–2013; Plan Rozwoju Miejscowości Ryboły (2005); Plan Rozwoju Dobrzyniówki (2006) 2002152 Zawady – gmina wiejska Strategia informatyzacji i rozwoju społeczeństwa informacyjnego w Zawadach na lata 2007–2013; Plan Rozwoju wsi gminnej Zawady (2009) 2003 powiat bielski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego dla Powiatu Bielskiego na lata 2004–2006; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego dla Powiatu Bielskiego na lata 2007–2013 2003011 Bielsk Podlaski – gmina miejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego dla miasta Bielsk Podlaski na lata 2005–2013 z perspektywą po roku 2013; Strategia Rozwoju Miasta Bielsk Podlaski na lata 2011–2020; Plan rozwoju lokalnego dla miasta Bielsk Podlaski na lata 2005–2006 z perspektywą po roku 2006 2003021 Brańsk – gmina miejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Brańsk na lata 2008–2015 2003032 Bielsk Podlaski – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Bielsk Podlaski do 2020 roku 2003042 Boćki – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju Gminy Boćki do 2015 roku; Plan odnowy miejscowości Boćki 2011–2018 2003052 Brańsk – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Brańsk na lata 2001–2020; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Brańsk na lata 2004–2006 2003062 Orla – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Orla do 2015 r. 2003072 Rudka – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2003082 Wyszki – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Wyszki na lata 2004–2013 2004 powiat grajewski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Grajewskiego na lata 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Powiatu Grajewskiego (2001) 2004011 Grajewo – gmina miejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Miasta Grajewo na lata 2005–2006 2004022 Grajewo – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Grajewo na lata 2001–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Grajewo na lata 2008–2015 2004032 Radziłów – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Radziłów na lata 2008–2013 2004043 Rajgród – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Rajgród na lata 2008–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Rajgród na lata 2008–2015 2004053 Szczuczyn – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Szczuczyn na lata 2008–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Szczuczyn (2004); Strategia rozwoju zrównoważonego miast i gmin dorzecza Biebrzy (2002) 2004062 Wąsosz – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Wąsosz (2010); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Wąsosz (2004) 186 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2005 powiat hajnowski Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Powiatu Hajnowskiego do 2015 roku 2005011 Hajnówka – gmina miejska Program Rozwoju Przedsiębiorczości miasta Hajnówka na lata 2012– 2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Miejskiej Hajnówka na lata 2004–2013 2005022 Białowieża – gmina wiejska Program Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Białowieża na lata 2005–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Białowieża na lata 2007–2013 ze Szczególnym Uwzględnieniem Roli Turystyki; Plan odnowy miejscowości Białowieża, Pogorzelce, Teremiski (2009) 2005032 Czeremcha – gmina wiejska Kluczowe ustalenia Strategii Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Społeczno- -Gospodarczego Gminy Czeremcha na lata 2000–2015 2005042 Czyże – gmina wiejska Kluczowe ustalenia strategii zrównoważonego rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Gminy Czyże w latach 2000–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Czyże (2004) 2005052 Dubicze Cerkiewne – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju turystyki w gminie Dubicze Cerkiewne na lata 2005–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Dubicze Cerkiewne na lata 2009–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Grabowiec na lata 2009–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Stary Kornin na lata 2010–2017; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Dubicze Cerkiewne na lata 2006–2013 2005062 Hajnówka – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Społeczno-Gospodarczego Gminy Hajnówka (2000); Program Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Hajnówka (2004) 2005073 Kleszczele – gmina miejsko-wiejska Strategia rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego Gminy Kleszczele na lata 2000–2015 2005082 Narew – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Narew na lata 2004–2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Narew na lata 2007–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Łosinka na lata 2009–2016; Plan odnowy miejscowości Trześcianka na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Narew na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Tyniewicze Duże na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Puchły na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Waśki na lata 2010–2020 2005092 Narewka – gmina wiejska Kluczowe ustalenia strategii zrównoważonego rozwoju społeczno- -gospodarczego Gminy Narewka w latach 2000–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Narewka (2004) 2006 powiat kolneński Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Kolneńskiego na lata 2008–2013; Wyciąg ze Strategii Rozwoju Powiatu Kolneńskiego (2000) 2006011 Kolno – gmina miejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2006022 Grabowo – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Grabowo na lata 2008–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Grabowo na lata 2005–2013; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Grabowo do 2015 roku 2006032 Kolno – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Kolno na lata 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Kolno na lata 2007–2013 2006042 Mały Płock – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju gminy Mały Płock w latach 2003–2012; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Mały Płock na lata 2004–2006 2006053 Stawiski – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Stawiski (2007) 2006062 Turośl – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Turośl (2004) 2007 powiat łomżyński Plan operacyjny do Strategii Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Powiatu Łomżyńskiego do 2015 roku; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Łomżyńskiego (2004); Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Powiatu Łomżyńskiego do 2015 roku 187www.soclab.org.pl 2007013 Jedwabne – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Burzyn (2010); Plan odnowy miejscowości Jedwabne (2009); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Jedwabne na lata 2008–2012; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Jedwabne (2003) 2007022 Łomża – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Łomża na lata 2004–2013; Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Łomża do roku 2014 2007032 Miastkowo – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju gminy Miastkowo (2003) 2007043 Nowogród – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Nowogród na lata 2010–2018; Plan odnowy miejscowości Ptaki i Baliki 2008–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Ptaki i Baliki 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Szablak na lata 2010–2017; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy i Miasta Nowogród na lata 2004–2013; Program rozwoju turystyki Gminy Nowogród na lata 2010–2020; Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju (2005) 2007052 Piątnica – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Piątnica na lata 2004–2008 2007062 Przytuły – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Przytuły na lata 2009–2015 2007072 Śniadowo – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju gminy Śniadowo do 2015 roku 2007082 Wizna – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Wizna na lata 2002–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Wizna na lata 2008–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Bronowo na lata 2010–2016 2007092 Zbójna – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Zbójna do 2010 roku (2001); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Zbójna do 2013 roku 2008 powiat moniecki Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego dla Powiatu Monieckiego (2004) 2008013 Goniądz – gmina miejsko-wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Miasta i Gminy Goniądz do roku 2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Goniądz na lata 2009–2018; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Goniądz na lata 2007–2017 2008022 Jasionówka – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Jasionówka na lata 2007–2013 2008032 Jaświły – gmina wiejska Program Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Jaświły (2004); Program Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Jaświły (2007) 2008043 Knyszyn – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Knyszyn (2008); Plan odnowy miejscowości Kalinówka Kościelna (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Knyszyn (2010); Plan odnowy miejscowości Grądy (2012) 2008052 Krypno – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju społeczno–gospodarczego Gminy na lata 2002– 2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Krypno (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Kruszyn na lata 2007–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Zastocze (2010) 2008063 Mońki – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Mońki na lata 2007–2013 2008072 Trzcianne – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Wyszowate (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Trzcianne (2009) 2009 powiat sejneński Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Sejneńskiego na lata 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Powiatu Sejneńskiego do 2013 roku 2009011 Sejny – gmina miejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2009022 Giby – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Pogorzelec na lata 2009–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Giby na lata 2005–2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego miejscowości Giby na lata 2007–2013 188 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2009032 Krasnopol – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Krasnopol na lata 2010–2019; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Krasnopol na lata 2004–2013; Wspólna strategia rozwoju kreatywności przemysłowej na pograniczu Polsko-Litewskim (2011) 2009042 Puńsk – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Smolany na lata 2009–2019; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Puńsk na lata 2011–2015; Wspólna Strategia Rozwoju i Promocji Przedsiębiorczości dla Gminy Puńsk oraz Rejonu Lazdijai i Samorządu Kalvarija na lata 2010–2017; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Puńsk (2003) 2009052 Sejny – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2010 powiat siemiatycki Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Siemiatyckiego na lata 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Powiatu Siemiatyckiego (2003) 2010011 Siemiatycze – gmina miejska Strategia Rozwoju Miasta Siemiatycze na lata 2003–2013 2010023 Drohiczyn – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Drohiczyn na lata 2008–2013; Strategia rozwoju zrównoważonego miasta i gminy Drohiczyn na lata 2001–2015 2010032 Dziadkowice – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Dziadkowice na lata 2004–2008 2010042 Grodzisk – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Grodzisk (2000) 2010052 Mielnik – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Mielnik na lata 2005–2008; Strategia rozwoju gminy Mielnik na lata 2001–2010 2010062 Milejczyce – gmina wiejska Program Aktywizacji i Rozwoju Gminy Milejczyce na lata 2012–2018; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Milejczyce (2003) 2010072 Nurzec-Stacja – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2010082 Perlejewo – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Perlejewo na lata 2004–2014 2010092 Siemiatycze – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Siemiatycze na lata 2000–2015 2011 powiat sokólski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Sokólskiego na lata 2004–2006; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Sokólskiego na lata 2008–2015; Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Powiatu Sokólskiego (2001) 2011013 Dąbrowa Białostocka – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Dąbrowa Białostocka na lata 2004– 2013 2011022 Janów – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Janów na lata 2006–2011 2011032 Korycin – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Korycin na lata 2008–2013 2011043 Krynki – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Kruszyniany na lata 2009–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Krynki na lata 2009–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Ostrów Południowy na lata 2009–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Krynki na lata 2005–2009 2011052 Kuźnica – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Kuźnica na lata 2004–2006 189www.soclab.org.pl 2011062 Nowy Dwór – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Butrymowce na lata 2009–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Chilmony na lata 2009–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Chorużowce na lata 2009–2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Nowy Dwór na lata 2005 i 2006 wraz z perspektywą realizacji do 2013 r.; Strategia rozwoju Gminy Nowy Dwór na lata 2001–2010 2011072 Sidra – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Sidra na lata 2008–2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Sidra na lata 2004–2008 2011083 Sokółka – gmina miejsko-wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Miasta i Gminy Sokółka do roku 2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Sokółka na lata 2008–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Stara Rozedranka (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Stara Kamionka (2009) 2011093 Suchowola – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Suchowola na lata 2008–2013 2011102 Szudziałowo – gmina wiejska Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Gminy Szudziałowo (2004) 2012 powiat suwalski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Suwalskiego na lata 2004–2006 oraz 2007–2013; Strategia Rozwoju Powiatu Suwalskiego do 2015 roku 2012012 Bakałarzewo – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Bakałarzewo (2004) 2012022 Filipów – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Filipów Czwarty na lata 2009–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Wólka na lata 2009–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Filipów na lata 2005–2013; Plan rozwoju miejscowości Filipów 2006–2008 2012032 Jeleniewo – gmina wiejska Strategia rozwoju Gminy Jeleniewo na lata 2000–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Jeleniewo na lata 2004–2008; Plan Rozwoju miejscowości Jeleniewo na lata 2005–2008; Plan odnowy miejscowości Jeleniewo na lata 2009–2015 2012042 Przerośl – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Gminy Przerośl (2005) 2012052 Raczki – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Raczki na lata 2004–2013 2012062 Rutka-Tartak – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Rutka-Tartak (2006); Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Rutka-Tartak na lata 2004–2013 2012072 Suwałki – gmina wiejska Program Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Suwałki na lata 2004–2013 2012082 Szypliszki – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Szypliszki na lata 2004–2008; Plan rozwoju miejscowości Szypliszki na lata 2005–2008; Plan rozwoju miejscowości Słobódka na lata 2005–2008; Plan odnowy miejscowości Kaletnik na lata 2009–2015 2012092 Wiżajny – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Wiżajny na lata 2004–2013 2013 powiat wysokomazowiecki Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego dla Powiatu Wysokomazowieckiego na lata 2008–2013 2013011 Wysokie Mazowieckie – gmina miejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Miasta Wysokie Mazowieckie (2004) 190 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim 2013023 Ciechanowiec – gmina miejskowiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Ciechanowiec (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Czaje-Wólka na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Kozarze na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Pobikry na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Radziszewo Króle (2009); Plan odnowy miejscowości Radziszewo-Sieńczuch na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Skórzec na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Winna Chroły na lata 2008–2015; Plan odnowy miejscowości Winna Poświętna na lata 2010–2017; Plan odnowy miejscowości Wojtkowice Stare na lata 2010–2017; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Ciechanowiec (2008); Strategia rozwoju miasta i gminy Ciechanowiec do roku 2020 2013033 Czyżew – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Czyżew-Osada na lata 2007–2012; Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Czyżew-Osada na lata 2009–2015 2013042 Klukowo – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Klukowo (brak daty) 2013052 Kobylin-Borzymy – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Kobylin-Borzymy na lata 2008–2015 2013062 Kulesze Kościelne – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Kulesze Kościelne (2004) 2013072 Nowe Piekuty – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Nowe Piekuty na lata 2007–2015 2013082 Sokoły – gmina wiejska Plan odnowy miejscowości Sokoły na lata 2009–2015; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Sokoły (2004) 2013093 Szepietowo – gmina miejsko-wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Szepietowo do 2013 roku 2013102 Wysokie Mazowieckie – gmina wiejska Strategia Rozwoju Gminy Wysokie Mazowieckie do 2020 roku 2014 powiat zambrowski Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Zambrowskiego na lata 2004–2008; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Powiatu Zambrowskiego na lata 2004–2013 2014011 Zambrów – gmina miejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Miasta Zambrowa na lata 2005–2013; Strategia Umiarkowanego Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Zambrowa na lata 2001–2015; Strategia rozwoju Zambrowa na lata 2007–2015 2014022 Kołaki Kościelne – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Kołaki Kościelne na lata 2007–2013; Plan odnowy miejscowości Kołaki Kościelne (2009) 2014032 Rutki – gmina wiejska Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Rutki na lata 2007–2013; Plan Rozwoju Lokalnego Gminy Rutki (2004) 2014042 Szumowo – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2014052 Zambrów – gmina wiejska Niedostępne na stronie urzędu gminy i BIP 2061011 powiat miasto Białystok Strategia Rozwoju Miasta Białegostoku na lata 2011–2020 plus 2062011 powiat miasto Łomża Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Miasta Łomża do 2020 roku 2063011 powiat miasto Suwałki Strategia Zrównoważonego Rozwoju Miasta Suwałki do roku 2020; Strategia Promocji Miasta Suwałki na lata 2010–2015 * Zestawienie jednostek podziału terytorialnego – stan w dniu 1.01.2013 r. 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Podstawy nauk politycznych, ASPRA–JR, Warszawa 2007. Wykaz międzynarodowych umów o współpracy zawartych przez Uniwersytet Medyczny w Białymstoku, www.umb. edu.pl/wspolpraca_miedzynarodowa [10.10.2013]. Wykaz umów o bezpośredniej współpracy z partnerami zagranicznymi, Uniwersytet w Białymstoku, http://uwb.edu. pl/uniwersytet.php?p=721 [10.10.2013]. Wymiar samorządowy i obywatelski polskiej polityki zagranicznej, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, www.msz.gov. pl/pl/polityka_zagraniczna/wymiar_samorzadowy/wymiar_samorzadowy_i_obywatelski_polskiej_polityki_ zagranicznej [10.10.2013]. Zabielska I., Transgraniczna współpraca regionów, [w:] R. Kisiel, M. Wojarska (red.), Wybrane aspekty rozwoju regionalnego, Fundacja Wspieranie i Promocja Przedsiębiorczości na Warmii i Mazurach, Olsztyn 2013. 194 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim ZESPÓŁ BADAWCZY Jan Poleszczuk, profesor socjologii, kieruje Zakładem Metodologii Badań Społecznych i Statystyki oraz pełni funkcję Dyrektora Instytutu Socjologii UwB. Poza działalnością naukową w dziedzinie socjologii od wielu lat zajmuje się badaniami rynkowymi, ewaluacją projektów badawczych, wykonuje również opracowania eksperckie w zakresie problemów społecznych. Aleksandra Porankiewicz-Żukowska, doktor socjologii, zastępca Dyrektora Instytutu Socjologii UwB, ukończyła studia w Instytucie Socjologii UMK w Toruniu. Od ponad 13 lat związana z badaniami rynku i opinii publicznej, pracowała w PBS Sopot, obecnie współpracuje z Millward Brown i Ośrodkiem Realizacji Badań Socjologicznych Instytutu Socjologii i Filozofii Polskiej Akademii Nauk. Właścicielka firmy badawczej Sondaż Podlaski – brała udział w projektowaniu kilkuset projektów badawczych, koordynowała realizację kilku tysięcy projektów. Autorka książki Między jednostką a struktura społeczną wydanej przez IFiS PAN. Katarzyna Sztop-Rutkowska, socjolożka, adiunkt w Instytucie Socjologii UwB, prezeska Fundacji Laboratorium Badań i Działań Społecznych „SocLab", autorka publikacji na temat jakościowych metod badawczych w socjologii oraz kwestii związanych z dziedzictwem kulturowym i pamięcią zbiorową. Oprócz pracy badawczej zaangażowana jest w działania trzeciego sektora jako ekspert w zakresie partycypacji obywatelskiej. Wieloletni członek zespołu redakcyjnego „Pogranicze. Studia społeczne". Wojewódzka koordynatorka projektu „Budowa Ogólnopolskiej Sieci Obserwatoriów Żywej Kultury". Łukasz Kiszkiel, socjolog, członek zarządu fundacji „SocLab", asystent i doktorant w Instytucie Socjologii Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku w Zakładzie Metodologii Badań Społecznych i Statystyki. Od 8 lat związany z badaniami rynku. Doświadczenie zdobywał w agencjach badawczych IQS&QUANT Group oraz TNS OBOP. Specjalizuje się w badaniach wizerunku marki, badaniach komunikacji, badaniach segmentacyjnych. Współautor wielu ewaluacji projektów unijnych. Koordynator projektu badawczego „Diagnoza partycypacji w kulturze w województwie podlaskim". Andrzej Klimczuk, socjolog, doktorant w Kolegium Ekonomiczno-Społecznym Szkoły Głównej Handlowej w Warszawie. W latach 2002–2009 redaktor i korespondent wydawnictw o grach komputerowych. W latach 2011–2013 wiceprezes Fundacji Laboratorium Badań i Działań Społecznych „SocLab". Autor prac naukowych z zakresu gerontologii, ludologii i polityki społecznej (m.in. książek Kapitał społeczny ludzi starych na przykładzie mieszkańców miasta Białystok, Experts and Cultural Narcissism. Relations in the Early 21th Century). Rafał Julian Mejsak, prawnik, pracownik Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, członek zarządu stowarzyszenia Instytut Studiów Kobiecych. Specjalizuje się w badaniach nad wykluczeniem społecznym, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem cudzoziemców. Współautor licznych opracowań na rzecz praktyki gospodarczej w tym dokumentów operacyjnych inicjatyw klastrowych z Polski Wschodniej. 195www.soclab.org.pl Fundacja Laboratorium Badań i Działań Społecznych „SocLab" jest organizacją pozarządową, zarejestrowaną we wrześniu 2011 roku. Nasze działania skierowane są do wszystkich grup społecznych zainteresowanych wykorzystywaniem szeroko rozumianej wiedzy socjologicznej w swojej działalności, w tym szczególnie społeczności lokalnych, samorządów, organizacji pozarządowych i innych instytucji działających na rzecz dobra publicznego w różnych dziedzinach życia społecznego (m.in. edukacja, pomoc społeczna, działalność charytatywna). Nasze cele realizowane są m.in. poprzez działania służące wyrównywaniu szans grup słabszych lub zagrożonych wykluczeniem społecznym. Naszą misją jest wdrażanie wiedzy z zakresu nauk społecznych do praktyki społecznej. Celami Fundacji są w szczególności: – poszerzanie wiedzy i kompetencji w dziedzinach istotnych z punktu widzenia modernizacji i rozwoju państwa; – umacnianie społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, rozwój polityk publicznych zarówno na poziomie społeczności lokalnych, regionalnych, jak i całego kraju; – analiza i wzmacnianie potencjału oraz wspieranie rozwoju społeczności lokalnych; – inicjowanie, pobudzanie i wspomaganie współdziałania międzysektorowego, zwłaszcza pomiędzy środowiskiem akademickim a innymi podmiotami prywatnymi i publicznymi, mające na celu całościową i międzyśrodowiskową analizę zjawisk społecznych (w szczególności umacnianie w Polsce społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, zrównoważonego rozwoju, budowy kapitału społecznego i ludzkiego, rozwoju regionalnego, unowocześniania oświaty i nauki oraz wyrównywania szans edukacyjnych); – przekształcanie wiedzy o charakterze akademickim w wiedzę użyteczną, praktyczną; wzrost świadomości roli nauki w rozwoju gospodarczym, wspieranie polityki innowacyjnej, przełamywanie uprzedzeń w relacjach nauki i biznesu, budowa kultury przedsiębiorczości; Fundacja realizuje swoje cele poprzez: – działania badawcze, analityczne i edukacyjne służące realizacji jej celów statutowych; – przygotowywanie i wydawanie opracowań, analiz oraz ewaluacji; – działania wspomagające rozwój społeczności lokalnych, samorządów, organizacji pozarządowych i innych instytucji działających na rzecz dobra publicznego w różnych dziedzinach życia społecznego (m.in.: edukacji, nauce, kulturze, informacji, ochronie środowiska, przedsiębiorczości, pomocy społecznej i charytatywnej); – organizowanie spotkań, seminariów, warsztatów, konferencji, debat, targów, wizyt studyjnych; – prowadzenie i wspieranie działań informacyjnych i edukacyjnych w zakresie rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i rozwoju nauki, w tym prowadzenie szkoleń i doradztwa; – fundowanie stypendiów i nagród osobom, organizacjom oraz instytucjom za działania związane z realizacją celów Fundacji, w szczególności o charakterze naukowo-badawczym i społecznym; – współpracę z instytucjami i organizacjami naukowymi, społecznymi i kulturalnymi w kraju i za granicą; – tworzenie i prowadzenie stron internetowych, portali oraz serwisów służących popularyzacji idei propagowanych przez Fundację; – działania służące wyrównywaniu szans grup słabszych lub zagrożonych społecznym wykluczeniem; – gromadzenie danych i informacji oraz prowadzenie badań dotyczących aktywności społecznej, udziału obywateli w życiu publicznym oraz upowszechnianie wyników i wniosków wynikających z tych badań. 196 Samorządowa i obywatelska współpraca transgraniczna w województwie podlaskim W latach 2011–2013 Fundacja SocLab zrealizowała następujące projekty: – 2011–2012 – cykliczne badania ewaluacyjne warsztatów edukacyjnych Plac zabaw dla Galerii Arsenał w Białymstoku; – 2012 – Diagnoza partycypacji w kulturze w województwie podlaskim na zlecenie Teatru Dramatycznego w Białymstoku w ramach programu „Obserwatorium kultury" prowadzonego przez Ministerstwo Kultury i Dziedzictwa Narodowego; – 2013 – badania ewaluacyjne warsztatów Medialab w Polsce – badanie dotychczasowych efektów realizacji warsztatów medialab w Polsce oraz możliwości ich rozwoju w przyszłości w kierunku budowy stałej instytucji. 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Węglowej w Białymstoku w formule warsztatów partycypacyjnych z użyciem różnych technik partycypacji (metoda charette, planning for real, planowanie partycypacyjne); – Partnerska realizacja projektu Creative Poland z Towarzystwem Amicus, Polskim Stowarzyszeniem Doradczym i Konsultingowym oraz Urzędami Miast (Warszawy i Łodzi). Celem jest stworzenie warunków do rozwoju polskiego sektora kreatywnego poprzez budowę partnerstw regionalnych, strategii sektora, usługi doradcze oraz e-learning; – Diagnoza samorządowej i obywatelskiej współpracy transgranicznej w województwie podlaskim – projekt współfinansowany ze środków Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych w ramach zadania publicznego „Wsparcie obywatelskiego i samorządowego wymiaru polskiej polityki zagranicznej 2013"; – Laboratorium Obywatelskie – promocja partycypacji publicznej, projekt dofinansowany w ramach Programu Operacyjnego Fundusz Inicjatyw Obywatelskich, Ministerstwo Pracy i Polityki Społecznej. Fundacja Laboratorium Badań i Działań Społecznych „SocLab" jest łącznikiem pomiędzy światem nauki a światem praktyki. Dostarczamy rzetelnej wiedzy oraz kompleksowych rozwiązań różnym środowiskom. Jesteśmy otwarci na współpracę i nowatorskie rozwiązania. Odpowiedzialnie angażujemy się w działania wspierające kształtowanie się społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Dostarczamy również merytorycznego wsparcia dla świata biznesu. Fundacja wchodzi w skład: – Federacji Organizacji Pozarządowych Miasta Białystok; – Koalicji Otwartej Edukacji – porozumienia organizacji pozarządowych i instytucji działających w obszarze edukacji, nauki i kultury, którego celem jest budowanie, promocja i aktywizm na rzecz otwartych zasobów edukacyjnych; 197www.soclab.org.pl – polskiej sieci Fundacji im. Anny Lindh – sieci organizacji działających w sferze dialogu międzykulturowego w Polsce; – sieci My Obywatele – dobrowolnego porozumienia niezależnych i wewnętrznie demokratycznych stowarzyszeń wspierających kulturę aktywności społecznej oraz systemowe zwiększanie wpływu obywateli na decyzje publiczne; – Polskiego Komitetu Europejskiej Sieci Przeciwdziałania Ubóstwu Fundacja SocLab współpracuje również w ramach podpisanych porozumień z podmiotami: – w ramach sieci Obserwatoriów Żywej Kultury z: Fundacją Obserwatorium Żywej Kultury – Sieć Badawcza (Warszawa), Centrum Edukacji i Inicjatyw Kulturalnych (Olsztyn), Instytutem Kultury Miejskiej (Gdańsk), Stowarzyszeniem Klon/Jawor (zespół Moja Polis); – w ramach trójsektorowego konsorcjum z Instytutem Socjologii Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku oraz firmą Sondaż Podlaski; – w ramach projektu Creative Poland oraz Partnerstwa na rzecz Rozwoju Polskiego Przemysłu Kreatywnego ze Stowarzyszeniem Towarzystwo Amicus, Miastem Stołecznym Warszawa, Urzędem Miasta Łodzi i Polskim Stowarzyszeniem Doradczym i Konsultingowym; – z firmą Kamon Consulting-Rafał Kasprzak, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem projektu Obserwatorium przemysłów kreatywnych (dotacja MKiDN w ramach programu „Obserwatorium Kultury"). www.soclab.org.pl ISBN : 978-83-63870 -01-0 Zeskanuj kod i pobierz raport w wersji elektronicznej (PDF). Dofinansowano ze środków Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych Badania prezentowane w niniejszej publikacji miały na celu dostarczenie danych koniecznych do prowadzenia polskiej polityki zagranicznej rozszerzonej o wymiar samorządowy i obywatelski w województwie podlaskim. Głównym celem diagnozy było zbadanie, jak jednostki samorządu terytorialnego, organizacje pozarządowe, przedsiębiorstwa oraz uczelnie wyższe nawiązywały współpracę transgraniczną z partnerami na Litwie, Białorusi, Ukrainie i w Rosji (Obwód Kaliningradzki). W publikacji wskazano miejsca największego potencjału, jak również barier na drodze do takiej współpracy w regionie. Zwrócono szczególną uwagę na kooperację tych podmiotów, łączenie swoich potencjałów i tworzenie wspólnych projektów.

Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «MetaJfsica» RAFAEL RAMÓN GuERRERo 1. INTRODUCCIÓN Desterrada de la filosofía' y rechazada su posibilidad como ciencia, la metafísica ha sido considerada como paradigma de los grandes errores del pasado que deben ser evitados. Sin embargo, después de compartir la idea del fin de la metafísica y de radicalizar la tesis hasta sus últimas consecuencias, Heidegger, cuando señaló el olvido del ser, ha destacado su importancia y ha puesto de relieve el papel desempeñado por la ontología medieval en la discusión del problema del ser como ámbito de la metafísica. El filósofo alemán ha inspirado, con ello, notables estudios consagrados al examen de esa ciencia maldita. Un número considerable de estos estudios está dedicado a figuras de ese gran período metafísico por excelencia, la Edad Media. En este período histórico, el quehacer metafísico estuvo vinculado, paradójicamente, a la lógica y a la filosofía del lenguaje, y consistió fundamentalmente en poner de manifiesto la noción del ser a partir del discurso que lo dice. Desde el principio de la Edad Media se plantearon algunos problemas metafísicos, cuyo origen tiene que ver con San Agustín y su cristianización de la enseñanza platdnica del ser que verdaderamente es2. Pero hasta que nofueron recibidos tres grandes textos, la metafísica medieval no se desarrolló totalmente, planteándose entonces tres principales cuestiones: la posibilidad de esta ciencia, si es accesible a un espíritu finito, y la definición del proyecto metafísico. Los tres grandes textos a que me refiero fueron la Metafisica aristotélica, la Filosofia Primera o Ciencia Divina de Avicena y el Gran Comentario a la Metafisica de Averroes 'Cfr. J. Habermas: NachmetaphyÉches flenken. Philosophische Aufsátze, Franckfurt, Suhrkamp, 1988. 2 Cfr. A. Dempf: MetaJlsica de la Edad Media, Madrid, Ed. Gredos, ¡957, Pp. 29 ss. 275 276 Rafael Ramón Guerrero Dejando ahora el problema que planteanlos episodios por los que atravesó el texto de la Metajtsica, desde sus orígenes hasta su llegada al mundo islámico, lo que me interesa es subrayar que la lecturade Aristóteles hecha por los filósofos en el Islam señaló el camino que habría de seguir el pensanliento metafísico en la Edad Media latina. Por ello, me parece que es útil y valioso estudiar la metafísica Árabe, modelada sobre el texto de Aristóteles, leído, interpretado y comentado de manera distinta por los autores árabes. Junto con el sistema neoplatónico, permitió edificar los pilares fundamentales sobre los que se estructuré, en general, el pensamiento filosófico en e] Islam3. La obra de Aristóteles fue traducida en la primera mitad del siglo ix por Ustál o Eustacio, de manera que pudo ser utilizada y glosada por al-Kindt en su obra Sobre la FilosoiTa Primera4. Fue leída por los otros filósofos del Is1am, después de que se realizaran nuevas versiones de la misma. Pero no se contentaron con leer sólo la obra de Aristóteles, sino que buscaron primeroy tradujeron después algunos comentarios griegos, con la esperanza, quizá, de encontrar en ellos ayuda para comprender el texto aristotélico, por el carácter aporético que la obra presenta. En la tradición manuscrita árabe no se conserva de la Metajisica un texto independiente, sino solamente el que acompaña al Tafstr o Gran Comentario de Averroes5, en donde se sirve de una sola versión árabe, la de Ustál, salvo para el libro A, para el que usa la versión de Naztf b. Aymán, aunque recurre en algunos pasajes a las otras versiones, señalando que alguna de ellas es mejor que la que le sirve de base. Faltan ahí, sin embargo, los libros K, M y N, además de la primera parte de A, libro éste que figura como II, pues como primero establece el libro a6. Sobre el lugar de la Metafls¡ca en el mundo árabe, cfr. L Madkour: «La métaphysique en terre d'Islamo, Mélanges Instituí d'Études Orientales (MIDEO>, 7 (1962-63) 21-34. 5. Gómez Nogales: «La proyección histórica de la Metaffsica de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe», Pensamiento. 35 (1979) 347-378. R. Ramón Guerrero: «Notasobre la presencia del libro Lambda de la Metaftsica de Aristóteles en el mundo árabe», La Ciudad de Dios, 198 (1985> 117-121. A. Martin: «La Me<tajphysique. Tradition syriaque et arabe», sv. «Aristote de Stagire», Dictionnaire des phflosoNws antiguas, ptlblié sous la direction de R. Goulet, París, Ed. du CNRS., vol. 1, 1989, PP. 528-534 Ed. porM. Abu Rida: Rasáflal-fOndf al-falsafijya, El Cairo, 1950. Trad. castellanaenR. Ramón Guerrero E. Tornero Poveda: Obras filosojicas de al-Kind¡, Madrid, Ed. Coloquio, 1986. Averroes: Tafstr md bad al-labia, ed. M. Bouyges, Eeirut, Imprimerie Catholique, 4 vols., 1938-1952. Hay ediciones parciales de la versión árabe del libro Lambda en A. A. AI-Affli: «An ancient Arabic translationof the book A of the Metaphysics of Aristotle», Bulletin of Ihe FacultyofArtsofthe Univers¡tyofEgpt, 5(1937) 89-138, yenA. BADAWI:Aristz2 -inda ¡-aral,, El Cairo, Ed. al-Nabda, 1947, Pp. 3-11. ~ Cfr. R. Walzer: «On the Arabic versionsof book A,a andA of the Aristotles Metaphysics», en Oree/e mio Arable, Oxford, Bruno Cassirer, 1962, PP. 114-128. P. Thillet: «Remarqueset notes critiques sur les traductions arabes du livre A de la Métaphysique d'Auistote», Actes du Congrt,s de Lyon 1958, París, Les Eches Lettres, 1960, Pp. 114-125. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al 1/bm lambda de la «MetaJtsica» 277 La noticia más importante sobre la obra en el mundo árabe es la que nos transmite Abú l-Farã ibn al-Nadtm <936-988/998> en su obra Fihrist («Catálogo»)', compuesta hacia el año 988. La información que nos proporciona es copiada, con escasas variantes, por Vamál al-Din ibn al-Qifti (1172-1248> en su Ta'rtj a1-hu~~' («Historia de los sabios»>8. El texto de la narraciónes el siguiente9: Discurso acerca del Libro de las Letras'0. Es conocido por «Las cosas divinas»" El orden de este libro coincide con el orden de las letras griegas. El primero es el "a" pequeña. Lo tradujo Isháq. De él existe hasta la letra M. Tradujo esta letra Abú Zakariyyá' Yahyá b. 'Adt. En griego existe la letra N con el comentario de Alejandro12. Estas letras las tradujo UstM para alKind?, y él tiene una información sobre eso'3. Abñ Bi~r Matta tradujo al árabe el libro Lám (A>, que es la undécima letra, con el comentario de Alejandro14. Hnayn b. Isháq tradujo al siriaco este mismo libro. Temistio comenté el libro Um~. Abú Bi~r Matta lo tradujo con el comentario de Ternistio. Lo ha traducido ~mli. lshñq Ii Hnayn tradujo un cierto número de libras. Siriano comenté el libro "B". Ha aparecido en árabe'6. Lo he visto escritcP del puño y letra de Yahyá b. 'Adi en el catálogo de sus fl<>~» 18 Como se deduce de su simple lectura, este texto está lleno de dificultades, puesto que carece de orden y de claridad, como ya señalara M. Steinschneider en 1893 al analizarlo19. ¿Leyeron los árabes doce o trece libros? ¿Cuántos traductores tuvo la Metajisica? ¿Quiénes tradujeron toda la obra y quiénes sólo parte de ella? ¿Qué comentarios conocieron? ¿Los conocieron completos o incompletos? Estas y otras muchas interrogantes plantean estos textos. Deben ser objeto de una profunda investigación. Aquí sólo quiero de11cm al-Nadim: 1<11db al-flhrist, El Cairo, al-Matba'a al-Rahméniyya, 1348/1929. 8 Ibn aI-Qifti: Ta '4/ al-hukamá', ed. dulius Lippert, Leipzig, Dieterich'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1903. Cfr. E. E. Peters: Aristoteles Arabia. The Oriental Translations aná Commentaries on Ihe aristotelian Corpus, Leiden, 3. Brill, 1968, PP. 49-52. lO Es una de las denominaciones de la Metafisica entre los árabes, por la numeración alfabética de cada uno de los libros quela componen. Ibn al-Qiftl comienza conel título siguiente: 1<11db al-fláhiyyát, «Libro de las cosas divinas», que es otra de las denominaciones usuales, la que traduce el término griego Teologlá. "Ibn al-Qifti comienza: «Es conocido por "Las Letras" y por "Metafísica"». 2 En lbn al-Qifti falta«con el comentario de Alejandro». 3 Quizá la obra Sobre la Filosoita Primera, ala que me he referido antes. " EnIbn al-Qifti falta también «con el comentario de Alejandro». '~ Ibn al-Qifti añade «también». ~ Falta esta frase en fljn aJ-Qifti. Enlbn al-Qiftl: «La descripción de esto la ha puesto en árabe Yahyá b. 'Adi». '« Ibn al-Nadim: Oc., p. 352, 11-19. Ibn al-Qifti: O. c., PP. 41,21-42,6. '~' M. Steinschneider: Die arabtschen Oberseizungen aus dem griechischen, reimp. Orar, Akademische Druck, 1960 § 35:111. Die Metaphysik, p. 66. 278 Rafael Ramón Guerrero jar constancia de estas dificultades, algunas de las cuales han pretendido ser resueltas por A. Badawi en la introducción a su edición de algunos textos de Aristóteles en árabe~ 2. AVERIIOES 'y Lx METAflsIcA DE ARISTÓTELES Personalidad muy controvertida, el cordobés Abó l-WalId ibn Ru~d (1126-1198> fue jurista, médico, filósofo y cadí de Sevilla y de Córdoba21, cargo que en la tradición musulmana implica una estrecha relación entre lo jurídico y lo religioso, lo cual puede chocar con la idea de la autonomía de la investigación filosófica que expone en algunas de sus obras. Esto es quizá lo que explica la diversidad de interpretaciones que de su pensamiento se han dado desde la Edad Media, pues, desde las condenas del obispo Esteban Tempier en 1277, Averroes no gozó de buena prensa en el mundo europeo. Poco a poco se fue formando, en tomo al año 1300, la leyenda de su incredulidad, que paulatinamente se fue extendiendo a toda la filosofía árabe22, y que no ha dejado de estar vigente hasta casi nuestros días. El pensamiento metafísico del cordobés, ah igual que el de sus predecesores al-F~rábi y Avicena, debe mucho a los teólogos islámicos, en concreto al gran pensador persa Abú Hániid al-Gazált, Algazel (1058-1111), en cuya obra el cordobés se encontró con una reflexión metafísica auténtica, poderosa y matizada, que habla sabido dar ah Kalám ortodoxo la forma de una tealogia filosófica, capaz de enfrentarse con la genuina filosofía griegã, y que le sirvió, basándose en argumentos de naturaleza filosófica, para lanzar una dura invectiva contra los filósofos musulmanes orientales, especialmente, contra ah-FárMi y Avicena, Contra este ataque que sufrió la filosofía porparte de Algazel reaccionó Averroes, quien supo leer a Aristóteles en profundidad y alcanzar a veces el sentido exacto de sus ideas; quien supo distinguir elementos platónicos y neoplatónicos atribuidos a Aristóteles en la tradición musulmana; y quien elevó a Aristóteles a la categoría del más grande de todos los filósofos, cuyo pensamiento estrictamente racional debía ser restitul- ~" A. Badawi: O. c., introducción, PP. <12) - (15). Cfr. también A. I3adawi La transnusszon de la phñosophie grecque au monde arabe, París, J. Vrin, 1968, pp. 82-83. 21 Cfr. Cruz Hernández: AbU-l-WaEd il,n Rjdd (Averroes). Vida, ol,ra, pensamiento, influencia, Córdoba, Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1986. Cfr. J. Puig: «El pensamiento de Averroes en su contexto personal y social», Miscelánea de Estudios Aral,esyHebraicos, 38(1989-1991) 303-324. ~ dr. E. Renan: Averro4s et l'averroysme. Essai historique, París, Michel Uvy, LibrairesÉditeurs, 1852, deuxiéme édition revue et augmenté, 1861, p. 278. 23 CIr. R. Amaldez: «La pensée religleuse d'Averroés. 1. La doctrine de la création dans le Taháfut», en Studia Islamita, 7 (1957> p. 99. Reimpresiónen Aspects de la pensde musulmane, París, 1. Vrin, 1987, p. 251. Averroes: el «Proemlo» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «MetaffMca» 279 do en toda su pureza. Esto provocó el fin de la filosofía en el Islam. La posición de Averroes como término de una tradición de pensamiento es significativa por dos razones. Primero, porque su meditación se desarrolló dentro de lo que sus predecesores en esa tradición hablan realizado. Segundo, porque su influencia se ejerció sobre una tradición ajena a su cultura. Pero no es el momento aquí de ocuparse de lo que Averroes representó dentro de ambas tradiciones. Para la Edad Media latina, Averroes fue el «Comentador» de Aristóteles por antonomasia. Y, aunque hoy podemos decir que esta denominación no hace justicia al verdadero Ibn Ru~d, sin embargo es indudable que su papel esencial en la historia de la filosofía ha sido el de intérprete del pensamiento aristotélico. ¿Conoceríamos hoy a Averroes de no haber sido por sus comentarios? En el mundo árabe fue de inmediato olvidado. Y el mundo occidental latino se sirvió fundamentalmente de él en tanto que comentador, pues, aparte de unas pocas obras especialmente médicas, ¿qué otros textos de Averroes fueron usados por medievales y renacentistas? De la relación de Averroes con Aristóteleses de donde hay que partir para comprender el verdadero sentido del pensamiento original del filósofo cordobés, puesto que el significado de sus otras obras está estrechamente vinculado a esta cuestión. Incluso podría decirse que el mismo Averroes fue consciente de la importancia que tenía el ocuparse de Aristóteles, cuando en diversos pasajes parece mostrarse convencido de la superioridad del pensamiento del filósofo griego sobre el de todos los demás, hastael punto de sentir por él una admiración casi supersticiosa, como dijera E. RenanS. ~ fascinación, de la que Averroesda muestras en muchos textos, tuvo como resultado un hecho cierto e indudable: haber dedicado un esfuerzo extraordinarioa la comprensión del pensamiento aristotélico. Y este esfuerzose ha expresado en los, ah menos en cinco casos~, tres tipos de comentarios, o lecturas como prefiere llamarlos M. Cruz Hemández~. Se trata de los flawámz, los compendios o resúmenes; los tal4fis, las exposiciones o paráfrasis; y, en fin, los verdaderos comentarios o taNrát. No todos ellos se conservan en su original árabe, sino sólo algunos; otros en versión hebrea y otros en su traducción latina27. O. c., p. 4. ~ Los tres tipos de comentarios tuvieron como objeto los siguientes libros de Azistñteles: Analíticos Posteriores, Física, Sol,re el cielo, Sol,re el alma yMetafisica. ~ M. Cruz Hernández: «El sentido de las tres lecturas de Aristóteles por Averroes», en Rendiconfl della AccademiaNaá,nale dei Lincel, 28(1974) 567-585. 27 Cfr. H. Gaje: «Averroes a]s Aristoteleskonnnentator», Zeitschnfi dar Deutschen Morgenland&hen Gesellschaft, 114<1964) 59-65. Th-A. Druart: «Averroes: me Conunentatorandthe Conunentators», Aristotle br late Antiquity, cd. hy L. 1'. Schrenk, Washington, The Catiholic UniversityPress, 1994, Pp. 184-202. M. Cruz Hernández: «Los limites del aristotelismo de lbn RuAd», en MultipleAvenvés, Actes du Cofloque International oi-ganisé á 1'occasion du 850' anniversaire de la naissance d'Averroés, París, septembre 1976, éd. préparée par 3. Jolivet, París, 280 Rafael Ramón Guerrero La Metafisica fue una de las pocas obras del filósofo griego «leída» por tres veces por Averroes y de la que se conservan las tres lecturas, aunque nos falte el original árabe del tãfis. Es decir, primero Averroes la expuso en un Compendio (compuesto hacia el año 1l59)~. dividido en cuatro secciones, que no reflejan las divisiones tradicionales de la obra de Aristóteles29. Después, reahizó una Exposición (en 1 l74)~. Y, finalmente, compuso el Gran comentario o Tafsir (hacia el año 11 9O)~'. En el Compendio raramente cita el texto de la obra de Aristóteles, pues su estructura es independendiente, al tratar sistemáticamente algunos problemas metafísicos desde un punto de vista Les Belles Lettres, 1978, Pp. 129-155. 5. Gómez Nogales: «Bibliografía sobre las obras de Averroes», en Multiple Averrõs, pp. 351-387. Cfr. también A. Badawi: «Averrõs facesu tQxte qu'hl conimente», Multiple Averroés, PP. 59-90; Ch. Butterworth: «La valeur philosophique des cominentaires dAverroés sur Aristote», MultipleAverroés, PP. 117-126. A. Martínez Lorca: «Ibn Rugd como historiador de la filosofía» Bulletin of tite Faculty ofArts, 54(1992)101-120. ~ Ediciones y traducciones: 1) JKitdb mci bad al-tabla, ed. Mustafá AI-Kabbani, El Cairo, ca. 1903. Basada en esta edición es la traducción alemanade Max Horten: Die Met.~~hysik des Averroes (+1198), Halle an der Saale, Max Niemeyer, 1912; reprint, Frankfurt axn Main, Minerva, 1966. 2) Averroes: Compendio de Metafisica, texto árabe con traduccióny notas de Carlos Quirós Rodríguez, Madrid, Imprenta de Estanislao Maestre, 1919. La segunda versión alemana está basada en el texto de El Cairo y en la edición de Quirós; es la traducción de Simon van den Bergh: Die Epitome der Metapitysik des Averroes, úbersetzt und mit einer Einkitung und Erláuterungen versehen, Leiden, J. Brill, 1924; reprint, 1970. 3) Rasá 11 b. Ru&d, Haydarabad, 1947. 4) Tãts <sic) mci bad al-tabla, ed. UjmAn Amin, El Cairo, 1958. Sobre las fechas de composición de las obras de Averroes, cfr. M. Alonso: Teología de Averroes. (Estudios y documentos), Madrid-Granada, C.S.IXL, 1947, cap. ~v,PP. 51-98. 2¶j Cfr. Th. -A. Druart: «Averroes: The Commentator and the Conimentators», Añstotle in Late Antiq-uity, edited by Lawrence P. Schrenk, Washington, The Catholic University of America Press, 1994. PP. 184-202. «> De este taUis no se conserva el origina] árabe. La versión hebrea fue señalada por 5. Munk: Mélanges de pitilosopitiejuive el arabe. París, A. Franck Librairie, 1859, p. 435; noticia recogida por E. Renan en la segunda edición de su Averrots et 1 averrolsme, p. 63. La existencia de varios manuscritos de estaversión hebrea, debida al parecer a Calonymos Ii Calonymos, está atestiguada porel editor del Gran Comentario, M. Bouyges: Notice, en Averroes: Tafsfr md bid al-tablat, tome y, 1, Beirut, Dar el-Machreq, 1952. PP. XCVII-XCVIII. Ha sido editada parcialmente en Averroes: Pera/dmtni-tokh ha-Be ur ita-emtsa i (.. -) [Chapíen fi-orn tite «Middle Commentary» ofAM al-Walld lbn Rushd on tite Physics ami Metapitysics ofAristotlr¿ in tite traslation ofKalonymos ben Kalony,nosj, Jerusalem, l-lebrew University Faculty of Humajilties-Departrnent ofJewish Philosophy and Kabbalah, 1975Existe versión latina de los siete primeros libros, interrumpida por la muerte del traductor, editada en Artstotelts. - Metaphysicoram Líberprimas fcaps. ¡-4) ramAverrois Cordubensis expositione media... Ubrí, a cap. 5 librí phmi cd medium Ubrum septimum, Venetiis, apud Cominuin de Indino, 1560. Aunque es presentada como traducida del árabe por el cretense Elia del Medigo [sobre este personaje, cfr. J. Puig: «Continuidad medieval en el Renacimiento: el caso de Elia del Medigo», La Ciudad de Dios, 206<1993) 47-64], sin embargo está realizada sobre la versión hebrea antes mencionada, cir. M. l3ouyges: Notice, pp. LXXXI-LXXXII. Cfr. 5. Gómez Nogales: «Bibliografía», p. 368. Cfr. M. Cruz Hernández: Abú-l-Walld, p. 394. :31 Edición de M. Bouyges citada. Sobre las distintas ediciones de las obras de Averroes, el artículo más reciente es el de Philipp W. Rosemann: «Averroes: A catalogue of editions and scholarlywritings from 1821 onwards», Bu//clin de Vitilosopitie Mddiévale, 30 (1988) 153-221 Averroes: el «Pfl,enzio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metafisica» 281 aristotélico. En la Exposición sigue de cerca el texto aristotélico, pero sin citarlo in extenso, siendo por ello difícil descubrir qué versión tenía delante. Y en el Tafs$r copia el texto completo de la traducción árabede Metafisica, por lo que es de sumo interés para el establecimiento crítico del texto aristotélico; lo divide en trescientos treinta y tres «textos» con sus correspondientes comentarios, en los <pie analiza el contenido, realiza sus propias observaciones y lleva a cabo comparaciones con otros comentaristas, dando muestras de conocer una rica documentación. Al explicar la obra aristotélica en sus tres variantes, Averroes no pretendía en modo alguno mostrar su oposición a Aristóteles, como había hecho Avicena, sino que su intención era simplemente clarificar y explicitar en sus consecuencias una filosofíaformulada a veces de modo muy oscuro. Pero, ah hacerlo así, expuso tesis de origen no aristotélico, como ha mostrado 3. Jolivet32. Esto es lo que sucede, por ejemplo, respecto al objeto de la metafísica. Como aristotélico, Averroes no parece apartarse, en sus comentarios, de la usual clasificación de las ciencias formulada o implicada en los textos que tiene delante, ni en sus comentarios ni en sus obras originales. Aceptando la triple división de las ciencias especulativas en física, matemática y metafísica33, Averroes no busca una nueva definición de la metafísica, ni siquiera llega a proponer un nuevo objeto de ella. Acepta la definición aristotélica: es el estudio del ser en tanto que ser. Pero lo que sí va a hacer es plantearel problema de descubrir el significado de estas palabras de Aristóteles, porque tarea de la metafísica es también ocuparse de las palabras. En efecto, esta ciencia vena sobre el estudio de ciertas palabras, como dice al comienzo de su comentario al libro A de la Mctafisica, donde leemos lo siguiente: Su objetivo en este libro (A> es distinguir los significados de las palabras según los sentidos que sehan de considerar en esta ciencia. Son ellos los que en esta ciencia ocupan el lugar que entre las artes tiene el objeto de este arte. Estas palabras son aquellas que se dicen de modos diferentes por relación a una sola cosã'. El análisis de los términos forma parte de la metafísica, en donde tienen un sentido analógico. En las otras ciencias, las palabras -unívocas- son los ~ Cfr. J. Jolivet: «Divergences entrela Métaphysique d'libn RuAd et d'Aristote», Arabica, 29 (1982) pp. 225-226. ~ Averroes: Compendio Met., pp. 6-7; trad. PP. 5-6. ~ Averroes: Tafstr Metajisica, V,com. 1, p. 475, 2-5. Texto latino en el tomo VIII de la edición de 1562: Aristotelis Metaphysicorum librÉ Xliii cumAverrois Cordubensis br eosdem Commeniariis, Venetiis apud Iunctas, 1562, fol. lOOv 1: «Intendit iii hoc tractatu distinguere signiflcationes nominum secundmn intentiones consyderandas in hac scientia. Et onmia ista nomina dicuntur secundumn relationem ad unuin quid modis diversis». 282 Rafael Ramón Guerrero signos inmediatos de los objetos de experiencia o de nociones generales; en cambio, en metafísica son signos, pero su significado no puede ser reemplazado por ningún otro, ni siquiera por el Uno absoluto, que es un simple postulado indeterminado por relación a la multiplicidad de los seres concretos. Por ello, la metafísica debe referirse a la diversidad fundamental de los seres según las diez categorías, en las que el ser se da siempre. El examen del ser lleva a Averroes, como antes a Aristóteles, a comprenderio como substancia (oi'aLa, ¿Qawhar). Pero Averroes entiende que este ser del que se ocupa la metafísica es la realidad que existe con independencia de lamente, porlo cual la metafísica ha de interesarse por la substancia, porque es la única categoría que existe independientemente de las demás, y por sus principios y causas: Alejandro dice: Como su objetivo en esta disciplina es tratar del ser en tanto que ser y de sus principios y causas, puesto que ya ha puesto en claro que la sabiduría y la filosofía primera sólo investigan estos dos <objetos> y ha mostrado en el libro precedente que la substanciaes el ser verdaderamente real y la causa de lo demás, comienza este libro buscando los principios del ser que es la substancia. Yo digo: sus palabras «la investigación versa sobre la substancia, pues lo que se busca son las causas y los principios de la substancia» quieren decir que la investigación en este libro versa sobre la substancia, es decir, sobre sus principios. Es probable que quiera decir que en esta ciencia la investigaciónprincipalmente versa sobre la substanciay sus principiostm. Ésta es otra razón por la que también la investigación debe tratar sobre la substancia, excluyendo las otras categorías, pues, si la substancia se pone aparte de las otras cosas, ninguna de ellas existe en absoluto; ellas sólo existen para la substancia. Ejemplo de esto es que ni de la cualidad ni de los movimientos se dice que existen absolutamente, pues de ellos sólo se dice que existen como cualidades y que existen como movimientos, no que existan absolutamente. A saber, el movimiento es movimiento de algo y la cualidad es cualidad de algo, pero la substancia no es substancia de algo. El ser propia y absolutamente es la substancia; las otras categorías existen por relacióntm. La Metafísica estudia la substancia como primera realidad entre los seres y, entonces, ha de establecer que la causa de la substancia móvil es la substancia inmóvil, el Primer Motor, cuya existencia ya ha demostrado el físico («pues la física muestra la existencia de la substancia eterna, y esto al final del <libro> octavo de la Ftsica»ff , con lo que, en definitiva, la metafísica será el '~ TafstrMet., XII, mm. 1, p. 1406. ~«]bidem, PP. 1414-1415. ~' ¡bidem, p. 1422. Avermes: el «hvemlo» de su Comentafo al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 283 estudio de Dios en tanto que substancia eterna. Nos encontramos así conuna nueva visión onto-teo-lógica de la metafísica en el mundo árabe. Pero a ella se ha llegado por un camino completamente opuesto al de Avicena: éste alcanzaba de manera apriórica la idea de Dios como el ser Necesario que hindanienta todo ser. Averroes, al contrario, llega a partir de la vía empírica aristotélica, afirmando la prioridad gnoseológica de la substancia sensible, desde la que hay que elevarse hasta sus principios y causas. De aquí que, tanibién al contrario que en Avicena, la F~ica es ciencia preliminar y necesaria para la Metafísica; ésta, a suvez, completa el conocimiento que en aquélla se había iniciado. 3. EL PRÓLoGo DE AvEifiloEs AL LIBRO A DE LAMetafisica El libro A de la Metafl'sica ha sido considerado desde siempre como la cima del pensamiento metafísico de Aristóte1es~. Desde antiguo se le ha visto como el libro teológico por excelencia, aquel en el que Aristóteles resuelve el problema de Dios en su filosoifa. Porque, en efecto, en este libro Aristóteles plantea la cuestión de Dios como substancia inmóvil, de cómo esta substanda inmóvil es Primer Motor de un movimiento celeste eterno y cuál es la naturaleza de esta substancia. Sobre el contenido teológico de este libro, conviene recordar el texto de al-FárAbi en su pequeño escrito titulado Maqála fi agrád al-ha/dm fi ladi maqála mm al-kitáb al-mawsi2m bi-i-hurt2f <«Sobre los objetivos del Filósofo en cada uno de los tratados del libro que es conocidó por <Libro de> las Letras»)~, donde nos dice lo siguiente: Nuestra intención en esta obra es indicar el objetivo <garad) que enciena el libro de Aristóteles conocido por Metafisica, y las partes principales que contiene, puesto que muchos hombres han prejuzgado que el contenido y el tenor de este libro es tratar del Creador Altísimo, del intelecto, del alma y de las restantes cosas referentes a ellos, y que la metafísica y la ciencia del Tawhid~ son una y la misma. Por eso encontramos que la mayoría de los que la estudian se confunden y se equivocan, puesto que vemos que la mayor parte del discurso que hay en ese libro carece de ese objetivo; al contra38 Cfr. W.-D. Ross: Arist4teles, Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudamericana, 1957, p. 256. ~ Edición en F. Dieterici:A¿farabVsphilosophischenAbhandlungen, Leiden, J. ful, 1890, PP. 34-38. Traducción alemana F. Dieterici: Ãfarabi ~sphilosophischen Abhandlungen aus den arabtschen lDbersetz, Leiden, J. Brin, 1892, Pp. 54-60. Traducción espaí¶ola en R. Ramón Guerrero: tAI-Fárábíy la "Metafísica" de Aristóteles», La Ciudad de Dios, 196(1983>211-240, trad. en PP. 236-240. Trad. francesa Th.-A. Druajt iLe traitá d'al-Farabi Sur lesbuts de la 'Mdtaphysique' d'Aristote», en Bulletin de Philosõhie Mddi4vale, 24(1982> 38-43. En la tradiciónde las ciencias religiosas islámicas, ésta es la ciencia que estudia la «urnadad, de Dios. 284 Rafael Ramón Guerrero rio, sólo encontramos en él un discursoconcerniente a este objetivo en el tratado undécimo, aquelsobre el que está el signo «L~A'. Recientemente, Rémi Brague ha evocado brevemente cómo la mayoría de los lectores antiguos y medievales del libro A se han interesado por cuestiones relativas a Dios, aunque no todos ellos se hayan centrado en la concepción aristotélica de Dios como «pensamiento del pensamiento»42. No es de extrañar, pues, la importancia que Averroes concede a este libro de la Metajisica, no sólo por la familiaridad con que lo ha tratado la historia textual y hermenéutica anterior, sino también por su mismo contenido, porque en él encuentra Averroes argumentos y ocasiones para solucionar desde su propia perspectiva, pero apoyándose en Aristóteles, algunos de los problemas a los que se ha enfrentado a lo largo de su trayectoria filosófica: el de la demostración de la existencia de Dios, el de su causalidad eficiente, o el de la creación o eternidad del mundo, una de las cuestiones que más le han ocupado en su crítica a Mgazel43. Este interés es quizá el que explica el Proemio o Prólogo que Averroes antepuso a su comentario al libro A. Como nos muestra, de modo muy resumido, la comprensión que él mismo alcanzó de la Metafisica, este Proemio se convierte en una especie de introduccióngeneral a toda la obra y le sirve, además, para expresar la relación que el libro A mantiene con los otros libros de la obra aristotélica. El texto del Tafs$r a la Metafisica fue traducido al latín, probablemente en el decenio de 1230 a 1240, por Miguel Escoto'1«. Pero, sorprendentemente, el Proemio no se encuentra en esta versión, cuya editio princeps se realizó en Padua en 1473. Cuando el Proemio apareció traducido -a partir del hebreo- e impreso independientemente del comentario a comienzos del siglo x\#, fue considerado como obra de sus traductores: el antes citado Elias del Medigo (+1493), que pudo haberlo traducido dos veces, una para Pico della Mirandola y otra para el Cardenal Grirnani; Pablo de Ricci o Israelita " Edición árabe citada, p. 34; trad. esp. cit., p. 237. 42 R. Brague: «Le destin de la "Pensée de la Pensée" desorigines au débutdu Moyen Age», La question de Dieu selon Aristote et Hegel, publié sous la direction de Th. De Koninck et O. Planty-Bonjour, París, PIJE, 1991, PP. 153-tSe. ~ Sobre esta última polémica, cfr. M. Allard: «Le rationalisme d'Averroés d'aprés une étude sur la création», Bulletin d'Études Orientales, 14 (1952-1954) 7-59. ~ Cfr. M. Cruz Hernández: «La primera recepción del pensamiento de Ibn Ru~d (Averoes>», Azalea, 1 (1985) 11-32; '«El problema cronológico de las primeras citas de Averroes por los escolásticos latinos», Homenaje al J1⁄2fDa,t Cabanelas Rodríguez, 0KM., con matizo de su LXX aniversario, Granada, Universidad de Granada Departamento de Estudios Semíticos, 1987, vol. 1, Pp. 253-270. ~ Averois in duodecimum metaphisice prohemium, Mediolaro, apud Leonardmn Vegium, 1511. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metafisica» 285 <+1541); y Jacobo Mantino <+1549>~. Sin embargo, hoy no parecen existir dudas sobre la autenticidad del texto, considerándose como escrito origina] de Averroes47.El origen de este Proemio puede estar en el comentario de Alejandro de Afrodisia al libro A de MetaJtsica, como parece deducirse de una atenta lectura del texto, sobre todo por la designación por medio de letras que se hace de los libros de la Metafisica por no corresponder la enumeración que aquí se hace con la que establece Averroes en otros pasajes y en su mismo comentario'~W No obstante, Averroes sólo pone en boca de Alejandro un parágrafo al comienzo y luego él mismo hace observaciones personales49. El Proemio, que ocupa las páginas 1393-1405 de la edición árabe de Bouyges, nos informa de las intenciones de Averroes: porsu gran amor a la metafísica y por su deseo de conocerla y enseñarla, ha decidido exponer de manera resumida las doctrinas de Aristóteles para facilitar su estudio a quienes no se dedican por entero a los libros de Aristóteles y para que sirva de vademecum a quienes ya están familiarizados con ellos5Q En el preámbulo anuncia la existencia de un comentario de Alejandro, que únicamente ocupa unos dos tercios del libro, y de otro completo de Ternistio. Siguiendo la doctrina aristotélica de que la verdad sólo se consigue tras el esfuerzo conjunto de los hombres a lo largo de los tiempos51, Averroes reconoce el amplio uso que hace de estos dos comentarios, copiando -afor- ~ Cfr. Al Bouyges: No&e, pp. LXXVlly LXXIX. A4. I3ouyges: «La Mclaphysique <fAristote chez les Latins du XIIP si&le: connurent-ils le Prooemium d'Averroés (-4-1198) á son commnentaire du Livee Lasn-Larnbda?., Revuedu Moyen Age LatÍn, 4 (1948) 279-281 Las versiones de los dos últimos traductores aparecen editadas por vez prineñ en la edición de los comentarios de Averroes de Venecia en 1550-1552; luego, se vuelven a publicar en la edición de 1572-76, vol. VIII, fols. 286-290. Cfr. F. E. Crai~z: «Editions of the Latin Aristotie accompanied by the Commentazies of Averroes», en Pkilosophy ami Hwnanism. Renalssance Essays in Honor ofPaul OskarKristeller, ed. by E. Mahoney, Leiden,J. EdIl, 1976, Pp. 116-128. ~ Cfr. M. Bouyges: Notice, pp. CXI-CXII. 48 ibÍdem, pp. CLIII-CLIV: en el Comentario de Alejandro las letras que designan los libros habrían sido leídas como numerales griegos, confundiendo las letras. Cír. también Tafsir, vol. III, p. [691n. 1. ~" Sobre la Mación de este Proemio con Alejandro, cfr. Ja introducción de Charles Genequand a su versión inglesa: Ibn Rushd s Metãhysics. A Transiation with Introduction of Dm Rushd's Comnientary oir Aristoties Metaphysics, Book LArn, Leiden, J. Brilí, 1984, PP. 7-9. (Mr. también la versión francesa de Aubert Martin: Averroes: Graná Commentaire de la «Mdtaphysique» d'Aristote (Tafs$r md bad at-tabtat> Livre Lam-Lambda, traduit st annotá, París, Les Belles Lettres, 1984, p. 25, nota 2. y cfr. la resefia de D. Gutas a la versión inglesa en Der Islam, 64, 1 <1987> 122-126. ~ Ed. dL, p. 1405:9; ed. latina, fol. 290 B-C en la versión de Pablo Israelita, y fol. 290 F en la de Jacobo Mantino. ~' Ya al-Kindi había glosado en su obra Sobre la FilosoJifa Primera el pasaje aristotélico de Metafisica, II, 1, 993b 11-19, hablando de la empresa colectiva que supone conseguir la verdad. (ir. el texto de al-Kindi en R. Ramón E. Tornero: Obras filosóficas de al-HináL pp. 47-48. 286 Rafael Ramón Guerrero tunadamente- sus textos, discutiendo con sus autores y aceptando, corngiendo o rechazando sus ideas y exposiciones. Evoca la afirmación de Alejandro de que el libro A es la conclusión de la disciplina metafísica, el remate final de los demás libros de laobra aristotAlica. En éstos, Aristóteles sólo plantea o resuelve dificultades, mientras que en el libro A se ocupa de los principios del ser en tanto que ser y de los principios de la substancia primera. Averroes nos indica así que para él, para Alejandro y, quizá también, para Aristóteles, la metafísica tiene como último objetivo (al-gaya al-maqsUda) la substancia primera. Además, parece estar sosteniendo que no hay esfera del ser ni del discurso que pueda darse como separada del resto del set2. Y, al resumir los libros de la Metaffsica, comenzando, según la tradición árabe, por el libro A, da la impresión de que para él -quizá también para Alejandro- toda laobra está presididapor una unidad de contenido, que se manifiesta plenamente en el libro A. Por eso, por el interés que este texto tiene para comprender cómo vio Averroes la Metajtsica de Aristóteles, me ha parecido oportuno ofrecer aquí su versión castellana, que realizo sobre el texto árabe editado por M. Bouyges, cuya pagmación reproduzco entre corchetes. THAnucclóN [1393] Ubrõ designado por la letra Lám, de los libros de MetaffiicaM. Digo: No se encuentra ningún comentariõ ni exposicióñ sobre los libros de esta ciencia57, ni de Alejandroni de los comentadores posteriores, salvo sobre este libro <Lám>. Hemos encontrado, en efecto, un comentario de Alejandro sobre unos dos tercios del libro y una exposición completa, según 52 Cfr. A. Ivry: «Averroes and the West: The Eirst Encounter/Nonencounter», A Stringht Path. Studies in Medieval Philosophy ami Culture, Essays in honor of Arthur Hyman, Washington, TheCatholic lJniversity Press, 198'), p. 155. ~ Traduzco por «libro» el término árabe maqála, que propiamente significa «tratado». En cambio, traduzco el término kitdb, que es el que de suyo significa «libro», por «tratado». ~ La denominación aquí empleada para designar el título del libro es Má luid al-tabla («lo que está después de la Física»>. Sobre los distintos nombres usados en árabe para el término «metafísica», cfr. M. Bouyges: Notre, pp. CXXIV-CXXVII. 5. Gómez Nogales: "La proyección histórica de la Metafisica de Aristóteles, especialmente en el mundo árabe», Pensamiento, 35 (1979> Pp. 356-358. ~ Términoárabe: tafsfr. ~«Término árabe: t¿411s. ~' A saber, la metafísica. Siempre que Averroes dice «esta ciencia» o «esta disciplina», se refiere ala metafísica. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de lo «MetaJtsica» 287 el sentidõ, de Temistio59. Me ha parecido que lo mejor es exponer resumidaniente lo que dice Alejandro, parágrafo por parágrafo, con la mayor claridad y concisión que nos sea posible. [1394] Y hemos ofrecido las cosas que sobre ello Temistio ha añadido y puesto en duda, y de este modo mencionaremos también lo que nosotros hemos añadido y puesto en duda. Decimos: Alejandro comienza declarando que la afirmación de quienes sostieneñ que este libro, el libro L~m, es el último de esta disciplina es una afirmación correcta; pues, en efecto, de los demás libros que escribió sobre esta ciencia, unos contienen los problemas que deben ser resueltos en esta ciencia después de haber sido planteados; en otros se resuelven estos problemas -es lo que hace en los libros que siguen a éste-, y en otros trata de las cosas que pertenecen al ser en tanto que set1. En este libro <Lárn> trata de los principios del ser en tanto que ser y de los principios de la substancia primera, que es el límite de la realidad: explica que existe una cierta substancia de esta clase y qué es esta substancia; exponer esta substancia es el objetivo final de esta disciplina. En efecto, en los dos libros que siguen a éste62, <Aristóteles> no explica nada sobre [1395] el objetivo primero <de la metafísica), ni confirma en ellos nada perteneciente a su propia opinión sobre esto; sólo contienen la réplica a las afirmaciones de quienes sostienen que los principios de los seres son las ideas y los números. <Alejandro> dice: de estas cosas~ ya ~« La expresión usada aquí, alá 1-ma tul, quiere decir que Temistio sigue en su exposición el sentido de Aristóteles, por oposición a otra expresión, alá l-lafz, que significa «literalmente», «al pie de la letra», que es el tipo de comentario queAverroes hará, según confiesa en el párrafo final de este proemio, p. 1405:14. Cfr. M. Bouyges, ed. del Tafifr vol. III, índex Alphab4tiques, p. 296, s. y. ,n«índ. ~ Sobre el Tc4jis de Temistio, cfr. M Bouyges: Notre, pp. CXXXII-CXXXIII. A. Badawt en su Arista bid al-arab, edita en laspáginas 12-21 un fragmento de un comentario (=arh)de Temistio al libro A, que comienza en el capítulo sexto de la obra aristotélica, y, en las páginas 329-333, el comentario al capituloprimero y la mitad del segundo. Cfr. A. Badawi: «Averroés face au texte qu'il commente» p. 68. AI-Fárábi, en su citada Maqálafi agrád, pone de manifiesto lo mismo: «Entre los antiguos no se encuentra ningún comentario a este libro de suyo propio, tal comolos hay para los otros libros; solamente el libro A tiene uno incompleto de Alejandro y otro completo de Temistio», ed. cit., p. 34; trad. esp. cit., p. 237. ~" El lenguaje de Averroes es de un estilo muy árido. M. Bouyges pone como ejemplode su extrema sequedad y pobreza de lenguaje esta frase, en la que en una sola línea encontramos por cuatro veces palabras pertenecientes a la raíz q-w-l: naqúlu, qála, qawl, qálá (decimos, dijo, dicho, dijeron), cfr. Notre, p. XVIII, n. 1. ~' Para designar el ser, Averroes suele utilizar dos términos casi sinónimos: mawflled y hawiyya, dr. trad. franc. A. Martin, p. 27, n. 8. ~ Los libros M (XIII) y N (XIV). Aunque estos libros no fueron comentados por Averroes, quizá por razones de edad, sin embargo alude repetidamente aellos. 63 Traduzco aquí el difícil ténnino nuiná por «cosas», en el sentido general de «asuntos», pues el término griego ~rágma («cosa»), usadopor Aristóteles en variospasajes, fue vertido por los traductores árabes precisamente por inaná y por fa ji; cfr. H. A. Wolfson: The philosophy of theKalám, (Zainbridge (Masa>, Harvard UniversityPress, 1976, p. 115 y notas 11 y 12. Sobre 288 Rafael Ramón Guerrero ha tratado <Aristóteles> en el libro designado por el Alif grande, que es el segundo de los libros de este tratadoM; luego se ocupa exclusivamente de ellas en estos dos últimos libros. <Alejandro> añade: de lo que manifiesta al comienzo de su libro Y¶m~ y en otros pasajes se puede inferir que este libro <Lárn> es el último en el quetrata de esta ciencia. Esto es lo esencialM de las palabras iniciales de Alejandro a este libro. Lo que dice para comprendet7 elcontenido de los restantes libros que tratan sobre esta ciencia es unamera posibiidad~; quizá este pasaje sea el más digno de su exposición. Nosotros decimos: Puesto que esta disciplina estudia el ser en tanto que ser y puesto que esto exige considerar los principios del ser en tanto que ser y las cosas que le siguen necesariamente69 -porque toda disciplina teórica solamente incluye estos dos géneros de conocimiento-, esta disciplina se divide primeramente en dos partes; y, puesto que [1396]los Antiguos han sostenido opiniones falsas sobre los principios de los seres que requieren una rehitación, se sigue que esto es como la tercera parte de esta disciplina. Así, las partes primeras de este tratado70 sontres: una parte sobre el ser en tanto que ser, otra sobre lo que sigue necesariamente al ser en tanto que ser, y otra sobre las falsas opiniones que se han sostenido acerca de los principios del ser. Y puesto que también toda disciplina teórica se divide en dos géneros de investigación: el primero es aquel que incluye el método de investigación de esta disciplina, la exposición de las causas, dónde comienza y dónde termina y cómo se han de usar las definiciones en ella -y esto es lo que se llama lógica propia de esta disciplina-; y el segundo es el conocimiento de lo que esta disciplina contiene; entonces esta ciencia se divide también primeramente en dos partes: una parte lógica, propia de ella, y una parte que incluye aquel conocimiento que se busca en ella. Hay, por consiguiente, dos grandes partes, una de las cuales se divide en tres; así, las partes de esta ciencia son cuatro. Mas, como esta disciplina también se ocupa dc refutar a aquellosque rechazan la investigación y reniegan de sus principios, ésta será como una la dificultad en traducir este término, cfr. M. Horten: «Was bedeutet mnWná als philosophischer Terminus?S, en ZDMG, 64(1910)391-396. ~' Sobre esteorden de los libros A y a, cfr. la nota 13, p. 29 de la versión de A. Martin. ~ El libro 1' (IV). Quizá se refiera a 1003 a26-27, como anota Genequand, p. 62, n. 6. «« Cfr. la reseñaya citada de Dimitri Gutas a la versión inglesa. Leo según la variante de 13, señalada en nota marginal, tafahhum en lugar de la lectura taflrim del texto. ~ Es decir, es algo ambiguo. Leo la variante de 13, ihtimál, en lugar de la lectura del texto, ipinál. <~ La expresión al-umUral-idhiqa no se encuentra en la versión árabe de Metaffsica. Una expresión muy similar utiliza Ayicena: «El objeto primero de estaciencia es el ser en tanto queser, y lo que se ha de buscar son las cosas que le siguen necesariamente (al-untúr alIad talhaqu-huft, Al-S~fá'. AJ-Iláhíyyát, ed. M. Y. Moussa, S. Punya et 5. Zayed, El Cairo, Organisation Générale des ImprimeriesGouvernamentales, 1960, p. 13:12-13. "' En árabe, al-kitáb, es decir, el conjunto de los libros de la Metajtsica. Averroes: el «Proemio»de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 289 quinta parte. Y, además, en tanto que estudia las clases de los seres y una de estas ciases son los seres [1397]propios del pensamiento, es necesario también que investigue los principios de esta clase de seres y que elimine las falsas opiniones que sobre ellos se han emitido. Y cuando Aristóteles estudia estos géneros, elige el mejor orden para la enseñanza7'En el libro primero, el señalado con la letra Ahí pequeña72, comienza dando a conocer hasta qué punto es difícil y es fácil esta ciencia y haciendo saber que lo que cada individuo comprende de ella, por poco que sea, alcanza un gran valor cuando se reúne <todo ellos'3. Como es un deber del metafísico'4 dar ténnino, por medio de esta ciencia, a la investigación acerca de las causas -puesto que ellas son lo buscado respecto de los seres-, <Aristóteles> expone en este libro, después del comienzo que hemos mencionado, que las causas son limitadas <en número>. Luego lo termina dando a conocerlas más importantes causas del error que están en los asuntos teóricos y, en particular, en las causas <mismas>: son las opiniones falsas que la gente ha inventado y establecido como si fueran ley75 para las cosas teóricas. Como el estudio de las causas requiere que se den a conocer cuántos son sus géneros primeros y lo que han dicho quienes han tratado esto con anterioridad, empieza el libro señalado con la letra Ahí grande76 informando de lo que los Antiguos comprendieron acerca de los géneros [1398]primeros de las causas y explica que son cuatro. Da como argumento de ello el que, si se considera atentamente lo que dijeron sobre las causas, no se va más allá de cuatro causas. Menciona luego sus opiniones acerca de las causas de los seres, en particular entre ellos la de los metafísicos~, no la de los físicos, porque ya habla hecho esto en la Física. Ellos son quienes dijeron que los principios son los <principios> matemáticos y los números; en este libro sólo los rebate has- ~' Averroes muestra aquí su admiración por la manera en que Aristóteles organiza las materias estudiadas en la Metaffiica. Al final de este Proemio insistirá en el excelente orden en que están dispuestos los libros de la Metafisica. ~ El libro II,~. '~ Como he dicho antes, al-Kindi reconoció la exigencia metodológica aristotélica de sernrsedelasaportaciones de los predecesores. Averroes también confiesael deber de conocer al pensanjiento de los antiguos, en actitud que, comoseñala A. Martin, representa un argumento para favorecer el desarrollo de la filosofía en el Islam. ~ Literalmente dice «el que practica estaciencia». A partir de ahora Jo traduciré por «el metafísico>,. '~ El término utilizado aquí es <aifa, el usual para designar la Ley en el Islam, por lo que, incluso, podría ser interpretado aquí como «ley religiosa>. ~ El libro A, es decir, el primero de la Metaffsica, segundo para Averroes. ~ Usa aquí el término al-ilOhiyy&n, que, como ya he señalado, hace referencia a una de las denominaciones que en el mundo árabe se dio a la Metafísica: al-1láht~át. Parece aludir a los pitagóricos, por la referencia que hace a las matemáticasy alos números, cfr. Met., 1, 5, 985 b Ss.; pero también puede englobar bajo esta denominación a los platónicos. 290 Rafael Ramón Guerrero tacierto punto; deja una refutación completa para los dos libros siguientes a Lám, es decir, los libros Mini y Nún78. Puesto que toda investigación científica sólo llega a completarse cuando previamente se han conocido los argumentos dialécticos, los afirmativos y los negativos -porque cuando no se han planteado apodas acerca de algo no se sabe qué valor tiene aquello cuyo conocimiento se ha alcanzado después de ignorarlo, ni qué valor tiene aquello cuyo conocimiento pasa desapercibido antes de conocerlo-, <Aristóteles> piensa que la mejor propedéutica consiste en poner aparte en un solo libro el estudio de los problemas de esta ciencia y su investigación por los argumentos dialécticos que plantean aporías sobre cada uno de sus problemas; y, luego, en los restantes libros de este tratado, ponerse a resolver las apodas que surgen en esta ciencia. Hace esto en el tercer libro de este tratado, el señalado por la letra Bá'79. Necesariamente este [1399] libro sigue a los libros primero y segundo y precede a los demás libros80. Sigue a los dos primeros libros porque, como en ellos, también lo que hay en él lo establece el arte de la dialéctica, es decir, que hay cuatro causas y que cada género de ellas no procede hasta el infinito. Que precede a los siguientes libros es evidente, porque los libros que lesiguen sólo contienen una de estas dos cosas: o la solución de las apodas mencionadas en este libro <tercero>, o el conocimiento de cosas que son necesanas para resolver las apodas mencionadas en este libro. Como las apodas mencionadas en este libro son de dos clases: aporías concernientes a la manera de investigar en esta ciencia y aporías sobre los problemas que en ella hay, lo primero que debe hacer quien emprende la investigación apodíctica en esta ciencia es conocer previamente la solución de estas aporías, porque al conocerlas estará en perfectas condiciones para la investigación apodíctica en esta ciencia, y por este modo de investigar podrá discernir la disciplina llamada Sabiduría81. Opina <Aristóteles> que se debe comenzar en primer lugar por resolver las aporías que hay respecto al método de investigación de esta disciplina. Además, puesto que la investigación sólo es correcta cuando [1400]se reconocen las primeras premisas, cree también que es necesario hablar primeramente de quienes refutan estas premisas y rechazan la investigación. Considera estas dos cosas82 en un solo libroylo pone a continuación del libro Bá', el señalado por la letra Yiiñ. Este libro 78 Ubros cuyo comentario no realizó Averroes, aunque sí tuvo conocimiento de ellos, directo o indirecto, por las diversas referencias que a ellos hace. Cir. Bouyges: Notice, p. CXIII. '~ El libro III, 13. ~'> Insiste asíen el perfecto orden que Aristóteles estableció entrelos libros de la Metajisica. SI El término hikma fue usadopor los traductores para verter el término ao4ta. Los filósofos árabes lo usaron comosin&iinio de «filosofía». Las dos versiones latinas lo traducenpor sufientia, fol. 288 r E. ~ Vuelvo a traducir el término maná por «cosas». ~ El libro IV, 1'. Az,wnves: el «Proemio»de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Aletafisica» 291 contiene dos géneros <de asuntos>: uno es la lógica propia de esta ciencia, y el otro es el establecimiento del primer principio entre aquellos que tenemos por naturaleza, es decir, el anterior a todos ellos: la enunciación de que la afirmación y la negación no se dan conjuntamente y a la vez54, porque éste esel principio de la investigación, y por eso todo aquel que rechace este principio no podrá argumentar correctamente ni enunciar lo afirmativo ni lo negativo. Una vez que ha terminado este asunto en este libro, piensa que debe seguir a este libro la exposición pormenorizada de los significados que tienen los términos usados en esta ciencia. Cree que la mejor propedéutica estratarlos por separado en un solo libro; esto es lo que hace en el libro Dál85, que colocó tras el libro Mm y que antecede a los otros libros, porque quien se propone demostrar cualquier problema comienza explicando el nombre que se aplica a ese problema, si expresa múltiples significados, y especialmente el que se dice por analogía. Tales son los problemas propios de esta ciencia, [1401] puesto que el nombre del ser sólo se predica por analogía, según lo que expone en esta ciencia. Cuando hubo completado su objetivo en este libro, tenía que examinar las cosas buscadasM en esta ciencia, a saber, el conocimiento de las causas de los seres87. Las clases de los seres son tres: el ser que es por accidente, el que está en el alma y el que está fuera del alma. Piensa que es necesario comenzar primero por dar a conocer las clases de estos seres y que aquel al que se tiende en primer lugar con esta indagación es, entre las clases de los seres, el que está fuera del almã. Examina esta noción en el libro que sigue a DM, Y, ~ Es el principio de no-contradicción, aquel que Aristóteles califica comoel más seguro de todos los principios porque no es posible engaflarse sobre él: «Es imposible que un mismo atribulo pertenezca y no pertenezca en un mismo tiempo a la misma cosa», o, con otraformulación, «es imposible que una cosa sea y no sea ala vez», cfr. Mee., IV, 3. ~ El libro V, A. ~ En árabe, al-a<yá al-matlúba. Avicena en su Metafisixa distingue entre el objeto (mawdu) de una ciencia y lo buscado (matlñb) en esa ciencia, cfr. 'ni articulo 'El objeto de la metafísica según Avicena», en prensa. ~' El término que usaaquí es huzviyyát. En esta frase, Martin suprime en su traducción, PP. 36-37, el término «causas». Sin embargo, parece que ha de mantenerse, puesto que el texto anstotélico del libro VI comienza de la siguiente manera: «Buscamos los principios y las causas de los seres», 1025 b 3. Las dos versiones latinas lo conservan: «de causis entiwn perquirere» y «quae suní causae entium». ~ Por la complejidad del texto árabe, no estoy seguro de haber atinado en la versión exacta de esta frase. Genequand traduce así, p. 63: «and to state that Ihe kind of being which is the primaz-y ami of bis investigaban is thaI wbich is outside Ihe soul». Martin lo hace de la siguiente manera, p. 37: «Et c'est á quoi tendent d'abord par celle rechercheceux qul expliquent les <differents> espéces d'étres qui sant exterieurs ~ láme». Las traducciones latinas de este pasaje se hallan en el folio 288v E, folio en el queprecisamente el nombre del traductor que encabeza las columnas está invertido; Paulo Israelita traduce: «el quod ex entium generibuspotioii intendone perquiritur esse ipsum, cui extra aninuun inventio est». Y Jacobo Mantino lo hace así: «el patefacere quod opus erat primo investigare de ea, quod esíextra aniinanm». 292 Rafael Ramón Guerrero puesto que su investigación en este libro trata de discernir del ser verdaderamente real el ser que es por accidente y el que está en el alma -y esto no puede hacerla sino quien sabe que esta disciplina es la que investiga todas las clases de los seres en tanto que ~es-, menciona al comienzo de este libro lo que ya ha explicado en el libro YlIll, no para repetirlo sino para recordarlo: a saber, que esta disciplina es la que investiga el ser en tanto que ser y que es distinta de la Física y de las Matemáticas. Da a conocer esto por medios distintos de los anteriores. Hace todo esto en el libro que sigue a DaI, [1402] en el que explica los términos; se trata del libro Ha'89, situado tras el libro DaI. También era necesario que antepusiera este libro a los que le siguen y que fuera a continuación de los que le precedenoo. Y, puesto que es claro para él que el ser por accidente y el ser mental91 son imperfectos y que el ser que esta ciencia pretende investigar es el ser real que existe fuera del alma, comienza a investigar después este ser. Puesto que la substancia es el principio de este ser, empieza a indagar cuáles son los principios de la substancia. Comienza por los principios de la substancia generable y corruptible. Muestra que son la forma y la materia92. Establece el modo de saber93 que las formas son substancias por las definiciones; es decir, una vez que ha explicado que las definiciones designan, en las substancias sensibles, lo que es substancia por relación a ellas y que designan las formas, resulta de ello que las formas son substancias; que ellas y la cosa de la que son forma son una y la misma cosa; que por eso los accidentes no son substancias; y, en fin, que no es necesario, para conocer las cosas, introducir Formas separadas distintas de las formas <sensibles>, porque lo que designan las definiciones de las cosas son las cosas mismas94. Igualmente explica también que esta substancia generable y corruptible sólo se genera de otra substancia [1403] generable y corruptible, semejante a ella en el género y en la especie; que lo que se engendra y se corrompe es la cosa compuesta de forma y materia; que 89 O El libro VI, E. 00 Otra vez expresa el perfecto orden que Aristóteles estableció en los libros de la Metaftsifa. 91 Literalmente dice «el que está en el pensamiento» (ti l:fikr). 92 Sobre la materia en Averroes, cfr. R. Ramón: «Sobre el concepto de materia en Averroes. A propósito de la 'izquierda aristotélica' en la filosofía árabe», en Al encuentro de A verroes, edición de A. Martínez Lorca, Madrid, Editorial Trotta, 1993, pp. 71-92. 93 Israelita no traduce esta expresión, mientras que Mantino la vierte así: «tradidit viam ad sciendum...», fol. 289 D. 94 Sigo aquí la lectura del ffis., en vez del texto establecido por Bouyges, quien introduce el término gayr, «distinto de», sin dar razón de ello. Tanto Genequand como Martin conservan la lectura de gayr. Sin embargo, si se acepta este término, la traducción quedaría de la siguiente manera: «lo que designan las definiciones de las cosas es distinto de las cosas mismas», cuando líneas más arriba ha dicho que las definiciones designan las formas y que las formas y la cosa de la que son formas son una y la misma cosa. La traducción latina de Mantino se ajusta al texto del ms.: «id quod significat definitio rerum, sunt ipsae res», f. 289 r E. Averroes: el «Proemio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaflsica» 293 las fonnas no son generables ni corruptibles sino por accidente, y que por ello las Fonnas platónicas no son imprescindibles para <explicar> la generación, si es que existen; me refiero a las Fonnas separadas de las que habla Platón. Explica también que los universales no son substancias que existan fuera del alma, aunque designen substancias; y que las fonnas son substancias no a la manera de elemento ni en tanto que compuestas de elementos, sino como una tercera substancia. Investiga de manera profunda la diferencia entre las dos substancias, expone luego las divisiones de las substancias primeras y distingue las partes de las fonnas de las partes de la materia. T 000 esto lo hace en el libro Waw y en el Zay95. Tras haber examinado, en estos dos libros, los principios de la substancia sensible, generable y corruptible, opina que después de esto debe ponerse a investigar las propiedades generales que siguen al ser en tanto que seroo. Estudia la potencia y el acto en primer lugar, los pone en relación con los principios en ellas y muestra que el acto es anterior a la potencia. Esto está en el libro Ija '97, situado tras el libro Zay. Luego, en el libro que le sigue, el Ta '98, estudia el uno y lo múltiple, lo idéntico99, lo semejante, lo contrario y otras propiedades generales que siguen al ser en tanto que ser. [1404] Después, en el libro Ya'lOO, trata del movimiento y del infinito, porque el metafísico los estudia desde un aspecto distinto del físico. Y, puesto que después de este libro se propone tratar de los principios de la substancia primera sensiblelOl, y éste es su objetivolO2 primero en esta ciencia, ya que es el fin pretendido por él, recuerda al comienzo de este libro, es decir, de Ya', 95 Es decir, Vil, Z, y VIII, H. Sobre la no coincidencia entre estas letras árabes Y las griegas, véase lo que he indicado antes en la introducción a la traducción. Cfr. Bouyges: Notice, p. CLIV y Martín, p. 39, nota 50. 00 En árabe, al-lawahiq al-'amma li-l-mawyUd bi-ma huwa mawyUd, Avicena emplea la expresión al-umur al-latí' tl!lhaqu-hu bi-ma huwa mawyUd, «las cosas que le siguen necesariamente en tanto que SeD), Al-Sifli'. al-flahiyyat, p. 13:13. 97 El libro IX, el 0 griego, 98 Libro X, el 1 griego. 99 Literalmente «él es él», La expresión al-huwa huwa para designar «lo idéntico», «lo mismo» aparece ya en los primeros gramáticos árabes y era muy frecuente en los traductores, cfr. p, 40, nota 57, de la traducción de A. Martín. 100 Libro XI, el K griego. La referencia que Averroes hace aquí a este libro prueba que este prólogo depende del comentario de Alejandro, porque, como dice más adelante, no llegó a conocer este libro. Sobre la ausencia de este libro en el mundo árabe, cfr. Bouyges: Notice, p, CU. Peters: Aristoteles Arabus, p. 49. 101 Es lo que hará en el libro A, lo que confinna que este libro Y§ es el libro K. 102 El término árabe usado aquí, qasd, significa «intención, objetivo, propósito», procedente de la raíz q-s-d, «tender a, dirigirse, proponerse», por lo que no parece correcta la versión de Martín que traduce así: «c'est la l'objet premier de la Métaphysique», lo que da lugar a confundir el objetivo o propósito (qasd) con el sujeto u objeto de una ciencia (mawdu'). Los dos traductores latinos lo vierten como propositum, fol. 289 v 1 M. 294 Rafael Ramón Guerrero todas las apodas que ha mencionado en el libro Há' y, de manera resumida, la solución ya alcanzada en los libros precedentes. También recuerda brevemente los absurdos que se siguen de rechazar los principios del conocimientoEsto es lo que encontramos respecto alorden de los libros que nos han llegado y que están antes del libro L~m. Conforme al orden de las letras, no hemos hallado el libro KM ni ha llegado hasta nosotros. El libro 1Am es el que vamos a comentar detalladamente. Su propósito primero en él es dar a conocer los principios de la substancia primera sensible; sin embargo, en su inicio, comienza exponiendo los principios de todas las substancias de manera absoluta, empezando por los principios de la substancia generable y corruptible y recordando lo que sobre esto ha explicado en los libros Wáw y Záy103; a continuación, expone los principios de la substancia primera y muestra que ésta es substancia y de cuántas maneras es principio. [1405]Cuando ha terminado de <exponer> su opinión sobre el principio del Todo'04, vuelve a rebatir lo que dijeron sus predecesores acerca de los principios de la substancia, Y esto lo hace en dos libros, el Mim y el Nún. De esta exposición ha quedado claro lo que contiene cada uno de los libros de esta ciencia, atribuidos a Aristóteles; que han seguido el mejor orden <posible> en la clasiflcación y que en ellos nada se aplica sin clasificación ni sin orden, como hemos encontrado que afirma Nicolás de Damasco105 en su libro, y que por eso ha elegido, según afirma, un orden mejor para exponer esta ciencia. Nosotros, pornuestro amor a esta cienciay por nuestro deseo de conocerla y enseñarla, hemos expuesto la doctrina de este hombre'~ sobre esta ciencia, para que sea de más fácil acceso a quienes no se dedican porentero al es- '~ Wáw y Záy según la denominación del comentario de Alejandro; es decir, Z y H, VII y VIII. '~" El Todo o Universo, al-huil. Existe en árabe un tratato, atribuido aAlejandro de Afrodisia, titulado FI mabádi' al-kull («Sobre los principios del Todo»), editado por A. Badawi en su Aristú bzda l-arab, PP. 253-277, traducido al francés por el mismo A. Badawi en su La trans- ,nission de laphilosophie grecqueau monde arabe> Paris, 1 Vm, 1968, PP. 121-139. Este tratado es conocidopor Averroes, puesto que lo cita en su Taháfid al-Taháffit, ed. M. Bouyges, Beirut, Imprinierie Catholique, 1930, p. 421:13-14y p. 495:7. '«> Averroes utilizó un Resumen (Muitasar)de la Metafisica compuestopor Nicolás de Damasco, peripatético del siglo ¡. Se conservan fragmentos de su obra Sobre la filosoita de Art Idtejes, a la que posiblemente perteneciera el resumen aprovechado por Averroes en su TajAfr principalmente en tas páginas 843-850. Clv. p. 42, nota 68 de la versión de Martin. Cfr. U. 1. Orossaart LuloIs: ¿Vicolaus Damascenus. On Ole Philosophy ofAñstotZe. Fragments of the First Five Books Transíated from the Syriac with an Introduction and Commentary, Leiden, J. Brifl, 1965; 2.> ed., 1969. "~ La expresión «este bombre» puede designar a Alejandro, como sobreentiende Genequand, p. 65, o a Aristóteles, como lee Martin, p 42 Averroes: el «Pi-oe,nio» de su Comentario al libro lambda de la «Metaffsica» 295 tudio de los libros de Aristóteles, y para que esto sea como un prontuario para quienes se han ocupado de los libros de Aristóteles. Comencemos pidiendo ayuda a Dios, al Dador de inteligencia y sabiduría, para nuestro propósito de comentar literalmente este libro, puesto que, por la gracia de Dios, hemos terminado este objetivo en los libros precedentes según nuestras posibilidades.

Causally efficacious intentions and the sense of agency: In defense of real mental causation Markus E. Schlosser, [email protected] Forthcoming in the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology This is the author's copy, which might differ in minor details from the final print version Abstract: Empirical evidence, it has often been argued, undermines our commonsense assumptions concerning the efficacy of conscious intentions. One of the most influential advocates of this challenge has been Daniel Wegner, who has presented an impressive amount of evidence in support of a model of "apparent mental causation". According to Wegner, this model provides the best explanation of numerous curious and pathological cases of behavior. Further, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence concerning the confabulation of reason explanations provide further support for this view. In response, I will propose an alternative model of "real mental causation" that can accommodate the empirical evidence just as well as Wegner's. Further, we will see that there is plenty of evidence in support of the assumption that intentions are causally efficacious. This will provide us with ample reason to endorse the model of real mental causation. Keywords: intentional action, mental causation, illusion of conscious will, sense of agency 1. Introduction: The conscious self as a spectator We tend to believe that our conscious intentions and goals make a real difference to how we act. This assumption of mental causation lies at the very heart of the commonsense conception of human agency (Horgan & Woodward 1985, D'Andrade 1987, Greenwood 1991, Malle 1999 and 2004, for instance). It plays a central role in philosophical theories of human action (Davidson 1963, Goldman 1970, Bratman 1987, and Enç 2003, for instance), and it has also been at the core of many psychological theories of intentional action and motivation after Freud and after the fall of behaviorism (Fishbein & Ajzen 1975, Triandis 1977, Ajzen 1985, Locke & Latham 1990, Heckhausen 1991, Gollwitzer 1993, and Austin & Vancouver 1996, for instance). More recently, however, the belief in mental causation and conscious control has come under heavy attack. Psychologists, social scientists, and cognitive neuroscientists have produced an impressive amount of evidence that challenges most parts of the commonsense conception of human agency, including the claim that conscious intentions are efficacious in the causation of behavior. One of the most influential and persistent advocates of this challenge has been Daniel M. Wegner, who has produced and collected an impressive amount of empirical evidence in favor of a model of "apparent mental causation" (Wegner & Wheatley 1999, Wegner 2002, 2004, 2 2005, and 2008, for instance). Wegner's view has been criticized for various conceptual ambiguities and argumentative flaws (Nahmias 2002, many of the peer commentaries to Wegner 2004, Bayne 2006, Malle 2006, Dennett 2008, and Mele 2009, for instance). Despite this, the view has remained very influential, and it is still widely acknowledged and discussed (Hassin et al. 2005, Pockett et al. 2006, Ross et al. 2007, and Baer et al. 2008, for instance). The main reason for this consists, I think, in the sheer amount of evidence that Wegner has presented. Even if there are ambiguities and argumentative shortcomings, it seems nevertheless clear that the bulk of the evidence supports a model of apparent mental causation. For this reason, many commentators accept the general picture of human agency that Wegner advocates, even though they disagree with some parts or aspects of Wegner's view. Roughly, this general picture is that the conscious self is a mere spectator in the performance of intentional behavior. Or, if one wants to avoid the reference to "the self", the view is that conscious choices and intentions are epiphenomena: they precede and accompany actions, but they do not cause them (Dennett 2003, peer commentaries by Ito, Kirsch & Lynn, Pylyshyn, Tweney & Wachholtz, Velmans, and Young to Wegner 2004, Frith 2007, Davies 2009, and Damasio 2010, for instance; influential predecessors are Nisbett & Wilson 1977 and Libet 1985; see also Wilson 2002). In a recent article, Baumeister & Masicampo have argued that any theory which posits the efficacy of conscious intentions must either "incorporate or refute" Wegner's view (2010: 946). They have proposed a theory that incorporates the view. My aim is to refute Wegner's arguments by way of providing a constructive response. As mentioned, the criticisms of the view have failed to be decisive, mainly due to the large amount of evidence that seems to support it. It is unlikely that further criticisms of certain parts or aspects of Wegner's view would change this. What is needed is a response which addresses the overall argument, and which shows that the bulk of the evidence does not support a model of apparent mental causation. I will propose an alternative model of "real mental causation" that preserves the core of the commonsense conception of human agency, and I will argue that this model can accommodate the evidence just as well as Wegner's. The opponents of the commonsense conception have often suggested, implicitly at least, that the assumption of mental causation lacks empirical support. We will see, however, that this is not the case. There is plenty of evidence in support of the view that reasons and conscious intentions are causally efficacious in the initiation and guidance of behavior. In conjunction with the response to Wegner's challenge, this will provide us with ample reason to endorse the model of real mental causation. 3 2. Apparent mental causation and the illusion of conscious will The most detailed defense of Wegner's view can be found in his book The illusion of conscious will (2002). In the first chapter, he explains the title and main thesis of the book as follows: (ICW) (Illusion of conscious will): Conscious will is "an illusion in the sense that the experience of consciously willing an action is not a direct indication that the conscious thought has caused the action" (ibid.: 2). The theoretical core of the book is the mentioned model of apparent mental causation. What complicates the issue is that Wegner sometimes uses the term "apparent mental causation" in order to refer to a theory of behavior causation, while on other occasions he says that the model provides an account of how the experience of conscious will is generated. It is important to distinguish clearly between those two models, and I will therefore use the term "apparent mental causation" ("AMC", for short) only in order to refer to Wegner's account of behavior causation: (AMC) (Apparent mental causation): Conscious intentions and subsequent actions are generated by two distinct sub-personal mechanisms. There may or may not be any causal interaction between those two sub-personal mechanisms, but the connection between conscious intentions and actions is only apparently causal. See figure 1. (ibid.: 67-68) (SCW) (Sources of the experience of conscious will): The experience of consciously willing an action arises when we interpret a conscious intention as the cause of the subsequent action. In particular, we interpret our actions as consciously willed when (a) the conscious intention occurs before the action (priority), (b) the action is consistent with the intention (consistency), and when (c) the action is not accompanied by other potential causes (exclusivity). (ibid.: 69) SCW offers a model of how the experience of conscious will is generated. This model is independent from ICW and AMC-SCW may be true, even if ICW and AMC are false, and vice versa. AMC proposes a model of behavior causation. 4 Figure 1. Model of apparent mental causation (AMC) From Wegner 2002: 68. See also Wegner & Wheatley 1999: 483. My main concern here will be with the model of AMC, primarily because it entails the claim that conscious intentions are not causally efficacious in the initiation and guidance of actions. I will, in particular, defend the commonsense assumption that conscious intentions are causally efficacious against Wegner's argument for the model of AMC. Before we turn to this argument, I shall say more about the commonsense conception of human agency, and I shall explain why a defense of this view does not require an engagement with Wegner's thesis that conscious will is an illusion (ICW). Throughout, I shall assume, by way of a terminological stipulation, that intentions are accessible to consciousness (Pacherie & Haggard 2010), and that choices and decisions just are formations of intentions. (More clarifications will be provided in due course.) It is often pointed out that many of our actions are habitual or automatic in the sense that they are not preceded and accompanied by conscious intentions. A considered commonsense view of agency should acknowledge this, simply because phenomenological reflection alone can reveal that many of our actions are habitual or automatic. Moreover, this is unproblematic, from a commonsense perspective, because the vast majority of automatic actions are in the service of 5 conscious intentions and goals. Consider, for instance, all the actions that one executes while driving a car. The fact that most of them are automatic is unproblematic, provided that these are overlearned sub-routines that serve the pursuit of conscious goals. Further, it seems that we could exercise conscious control over such sub-routines, if we intended to. This is compatible with the empirical evidence on the automatic initiation and control of action, which shows only that many actions can be executed automatically, in the sense that they do not require conscious control (for reviews see Bargh 1994, Bargh & Chartrand 1999, and Hassin et al. 2005).1 Nevertheless, many of our actions are preceded by conscious intentions, and we tend to think that our conscious intentions make a real difference to our behavior. This assumption is at the very core of the commonsense conception of human agency. Some philosophers have argued that a commitment to the explanatory relevance of intentions does not entail a commitment to the claim that intentions cause actions (Anscombe 1957, Melden 1961, and Sehon 2005, for instance). But according to the widely accepted standard view, the commonsense conception is committed to the assumption of mental causation: conscious intentions and other mental states are genuinely explanatory of behavior only if they cause behavior. However, no one should assume that conscious intentions guarantee the performance of matching actions. All kinds of accidents, interventions, or breakdowns may prevent the execution of an intended action, or the agent might simply revise his or her decision. This holds for basic and non-basic actions. Roughly, non-basic actions are things that we do by doing something else, and basic actions are things that we do without doing something else (see Enç 2003, for instance). Usually, non-basic actions are naturally described as goals or act consequences. Suppose, for instance, that you are moving the cursor on your computer screen by moving the mouse. You are moving the mouse by moving your hand, but you are not moving your hand by doing something else (although many other things, such as neuron firings and muscle contractions, occur when you move your hand). Moving the hand is the basic action. Moving the mouse and moving the cursor are non-basic actions (goals and consequences). Under normal conditions, control over basic actions is more reliable than control over non-basic actions. The former usually requires the successful execution of motor skills, whereas the latter requires also the satisfaction of various external conditions. In our example, the computer must be working, the mouse must be connected to the computer, and so on. We might say here that the external world must 1 According to a narrow definition, an action is automatic only if it is unconscious, effortless, and uncontrollable. But it has become clear that few, if any, actions satisfy those conditions (Bargh 1994). It is therefore permissible, and more interesting, to assume a less demanding notion of automaticity that does not require uncontrollability. 6 "cooperate" for a successful performance of non-basic actions. But events in the external world may also result in lucky coincidences. Suppose, for instance, that the mouse is not connected to the computer. The cursor may nevertheless move in the intended way. In this case, the intention to move the cursor is followed by the intended consequence, but the intention clearly plays no causal role. This problem can be avoided if we restrict the claim concerning the causal efficacy of intentions to basic actions. But it seems that a similar problem can arise even for the execution of basic actions. Brain stimulation experiments have shown, for instance, that it is possible to bring about coordinated and controlled movements without bringing about any corresponding conscious state (Penfield 1975 and Desmurget et al. 2009). Given this, one can imagine circumstances in which it is a mere coincidence that an intention to perform a basic action, such as the intention to raise an arm, is followed by a matching movement. But such circumstances are highly unusual, and we can exclude them by means of a ceteris paribus clause. Furthermore, we can exclude cases in which the agent revises the intention by restricting the claim concerning the causal efficacy of intentions to cases in which the intention is in fact followed by the relevant action. Given all this, the thesis that I shall defend can be stated as follows: (RMC) (Real mental causation): Ceteris paribus, conscious intentions are causally efficacious in the initiation and guidance of the relevant basic actions. The relevant basic actions are actions that match with the intention's content.2 If one intends to perform a basic action, this would be the match between an intention to perform an action of type A and the performance of that type of action (an "A-ing", for short). And if one intends to perform a non-basic action, this could be the match between A-ing and an intention to A in order to bring about B, for instance. I will defend the thesis of RMC by way of defending a model of real mental causation ("model of RMC", for short) against Wegner's arguments for the model of AMC. This requires some further elaboration, because in some passages Wegner seems to affirm the reality of mental causation. For instance, he says that "it must be the case that something in our minds plays a causal role in making our actions occur" (2002: 96). According to the model of AMC, this is a "set of unconscious mental processes that cause the action" (ibid., my emphasis). So where, exactly, lies the disagreement? Common experience suggests that many of our actions are preceded by conscious intentions (and Wegner agrees; ibid.: 97). It follows, according to RMC, that many of our actions 2 This matching is basically what Wegner calls "consistency" (2002: 78-81). 7 are caused by conscious intentions. It follows, in particular, that some of the real causes of many of our actions are accessible to consciousness. The model of AMC denies this. It says that the real causes of our actions are inaccessible, despite the fact that they are "mental" causes. Given this, we can capture the disagreement in terms of the distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation (see Elton 2000, for instance). At the personal level, actions are described and explained in terms of accessible mental states or events (desires, beliefs, intentions, judgments, and so on). At sub-personal levels, we find scientific explanations in terms of the underlying and inaccessible computational, neural, or physical mechanisms. This distinction allows for mental states that are inaccessible to consciousness, provided that information processing states can be called "mental" states. So, according to RMC, many actions are caused by personal level states and events (conscious intentions, in particular). The model of AMC denies this. It says that the "real causes of human action" are "never present in consciousness" (2002: 96 and Wegner & Wheatley 1999: 490).3 Does a defense of the commonsense view require a response to Wegner's claim that conscious will is an illusion (ICW)? My aim is to defend RMC against Wegner's argument for the model of AMC. ICW does not entail AMC, and the rejection of ICW is not in any other obvious way required for a defense of RMC. Nevertheless, Wegner clearly thinks that the argument for ICW constitutes a serious challenge to the commonsense view. In order to evaluate this, it will be helpful to make explicit how ICW construes the content of the experience of consciously willing an action: (CCW) (Content of conscious will): The content of the experience of consciously willing an action includes the representation of a causal connection between a conscious intention and a matching action. To my knowledge, there is no account of the commonsense view according to which something along the lines of CCW is part of the commonsense conception of human agency (see Horgan & Woodward 1985, D'Andrade 1987, Greenwood 1991, Malle 1999 and 2004). Given this, the 3 In response to critics, Wegner says that he never denied the possibility of causation by conscious mental states. He is surprised by the misunderstanding and he wonders "what book these folks were reading" (2004: 683-84). But admitting the possibility of causation by conscious states is not the same as affirming its frequent reality. Moreover, the book is quite clear on this: it says that the real causes of human action are never present in consciousness. More recent writings seem to confirm this: "When we look at ourselves, we perceive a simple and often astonishing apparent causal sequence [...] when the real causal sequence underlying our behavior is complex, multithreaded, and unknown to us as it happens" (2008: 227-28). In any case, I shall engage here with the perceived view, which is that the model of AMC denies the efficacy of conscious intentions in the causation of behavior. 8 answer to our question seems straightforward: a defense of the commonsense view does not require a response to ICW, because ICW rejects a view concerning the content of conscious willing (CCW) that is not commonly attributed to the commonsense conception of human agency. But there are further and independent reasons to reject CCW. In recent years, the phenomenology of acting has been the subject of much investigation and theorizing-partly due to the influence of Wegner's work. The phenomenon that Wegner called the "experience of conscious will" is now commonly referred to as "the sense of agency". It is widely agreed that the sense of agency is a complex and graded phenomenon, and it is now common to distinguish between a basic sense of agency and post-act judgments about one's agency (Marcel 2003, Bayne & Pacherie 2007, Gallagher 2007, and Synofzik et al. 2008, for instance). The basic sense is an online experience that accompanies the performance of actions. It does not require the presence of a conscious intention and it can be a minimal sense of agency that is phenomenologically rather thin. In contrast, judgments of agency are usually offline and post-act, and they are usually assumed to be subject to various biases. Many researchers also maintain that even the basic sense of agency involves a sense of causal efficacy: the sense that, by acting, I am bringing something about (Aarts et at. 2005, Pacherie 2007, Gallagher 2007, and Synofzik et al. 2008, for instance). What does this mean? Does this entail something like CCW? First of all, note that there is a clear difference between the claim that I am efficacious and the claim that my intentions are efficacious. This distinction generates difficult questions. Does one's sense of being causally efficacious consist in the sense that one's intentions are causally efficacious? This is rather implausible. I believe that my intentions are causally efficacious. But, for all I can tell, I usually do not have a conscious belief or awareness with that content when I am acting (see Wakefield & Dreyfus 1991, Horgan et al. 2003, and Bayne 2006). Instead, when I am acting, or when I am about to act, my conscious awareness is usually focused on the parts of the world that I have to change in order to attain my goals (Gallagher 2006). Another possibility is that the sense that I am efficacious consists in the sense that I, an irreducible mental substance, cause my actions. This view of substance, self, or agent causation is not only philosophically problematic and empirically inadequate. But the suggestion is also phenomenologically implausible. One may have the belief that the self or agent is an irreducible substance that causes its actions. But it is rather implausible to suggest that this controversial metaphysical doctrine is represented in the content of one's sense of agency. 9 A much more plausible interpretation is that the sense of being causally efficacious consists in the sense that my actions are causally efficacious in bringing about my goals. In order to see what this entails, it is important to take the distinction between basic and non-basic actions into account. Return to our example. You are moving the cursor on your computer screen by moving the mouse, and you are moving the mouse by moving your hand in a certain way. Arguably, even such a simple action is accompanied by a sense of being causally efficacious. But this consists, most plausibly, in the sense of being efficacious by bringing about the intended consequences- the sense that one's basic action is efficacious in the pursuit of one's goals (Engbert et al. 2008 provide empirical evidence for this view). This interpretation does not entail the implausible claim that the sense of agency includes a representation of one's intentions as being causally efficacious, and it does not entail a contentious notion of substance, self, or agent causation. And it applies to the vast majority of everyday actions, because most of our basic actions are in the service of non-basic actions. Usually, we perform basic actions in order to bring about something else. In fact, it is hard to think of any ordinary action that is purely basic, in the sense that we do not intend to bring about something else by performing it. Given all this, we can explain the sense of causal efficacy for ordinary actions in terms of the sense that one's actions are causally efficacious in the pursuit of one's goals. It is a further question whether or not the performance of basic actions is itself accompanied by a sense of agency that represents a causal relation. This would have to be either a causal relation between the self and a basic action or between an intention and a basic action. As explained, both options are problematic. But they are also phenomenologically implausible. When I raise my arm, for instance, without any further goal, then it does not seem to me that my intention is causing the movement. It does not even seem to me that I am causing the movement. Rather, it seems to me that raising my arm is something that I do, not something that I cause.4 Again, I believe that my intention causes the action. But this is a theoretical belief about the workings of my agency. It is not something that I am aware of when I am performing the action. To summarize, CCW is not commonly thought to be a part of the commonsense view of human agency; it fails to take into account the important distinction between basic and non-basic actions; and it is phenomenologically implausible. We have, I think, sufficient reason to reject 4 According to non-causal theories in philosophy, reasons and intentions are not causally efficacious states or events (Anscombe 1957, Melden 1961, and Sehon 2005, for instance). This approach is widely rejected. But no one has argued, as far as I know, that non-causal views are phenomenologically inadequate. In fact, the very existence of non-causal views would be a rather curious state of affairs if even the performance of basic actions presented itself as efficient causality. 10 CCW. But once we reject CCW, Wegner's claim that conscious will is an illusion (ICW) loses all its challenging force. In fact, the very possibility of this illusion disappears, once we reject the suggestion that the sense of agency represents one's intentions as causally efficacious. However, this response to ICW does not affect Wegner's argument for the model of AMC. 3. The argument for the model of AMC Wegner's argument is based on a large number of empirical studies, experiments, and observations about pathological, abnormal, or simply curious instances of human agency. Due to limitations of space, it is impossible to provide an account of all the cases, and it is also impossible to show for each individual case that it is compatible with RMC. Fortunately, Wegner has divided the bulk of the evidence into two groups: "automatisms" and "illusions of control" (2002, chapter 1). This makes the task of providing a response to the overall argument manageable. We can show that a model of RMC can accommodate the evidence by showing that it can accommodate paradigm examples of automatisms and illusions of control. In general, automatisms are cases of "doing without the feeling of doing" (ibid.): the agent performs an action without having the relevant conscious intention and without a sense of agency. In illusions of control there is a "feeling of doing without doing": the agent has a conscious intention and a sense of agency despite the fact that no matching action is performed. Examples of automatisms are the anarchic hand syndrome, utilization behavior, table turning, automatic writing (Ouija boards), pendulum divining, hypnosis, and other spiritualist "experiments".5 Illusions of control occur, for instance, in cases where the consequences of an action coincidentally match with the intended consequences, in cases where one perceives someone else's (or an artificial) limb that coincidentally moves in place of one's own, and in cases where phantom limb patients report a sense of agency with respect to their missing limb. Automatisms and illusions of control are, in effect, evidence for the possibility and reality of dissociations between the sense of control and actual control. As I understand it, Wegner's main argument is that the model of AMC provides the best explanation of such dissociations. In particular, Wegner argues that the model of AMC provides a better explanation than any 5 It has been argued that automatisms do not raise a problem for the commonsense conception of agency, simply because automatisms are not intentional actions (Malle 2006, for instance). But I think that this is beside the point. Wegner's challenge is based on the observation that actions can come apart from the sense of acting, where "action" seems to be defined as goal-directed movement that is not necessarily intentional. Of course, one could define overt actions as intentional movements. But this would beg the question against Wegner. 11 alternative model of RMC. We can distinguish here between the following three points on which this inference to the better explanation is based. Firstly, according to the model of AMC, there is no causal connection between conscious intentions and matching actions, and there may be no causal connection between the sub-personal mechanisms that produce them (figure 1): the sub-personal mechanisms may generate intentions without generating matching actions, and they may generate actions without generating intentions. According to SCW, the sense of agency is produced by an independent mechanism of selfinterpretation (that is governed by the principles of priority, consistency, and exclusivity). Given this (the conjunction of AMC and SCW), dissociations between actions, conscious intentions, and the sense of agency are not only possible, but they are to be expected. Secondly, Wegner suggests that any model of RMC would have a theoretical disadvantage, because it would have to explain all the pathological, abnormal, and curious cases in a piecemeal fashion. Presumably, this would be quite difficult, and it is likely to give rise to various ad hoc explanations. It would, in any case, be inferior to the parsimonious and unified explanation that is provided by the model of AMC in conjunction with SCW (see ibid.: 143-44). Thirdly, according to Wegner, an ideomotor theory of behavior causation could explain various automatisms. However, "most people who have thought seriously about ideomotor effects have been led to propose that such effects are caused by a system that is distinct from the intentional system of behavior causation" (ibid.: 130). In order words, a model of RMC could be supplemented with a theory that can explain some of the cases (such as an ideomotor theory of automatisms). But it would still be inferior to the model of AMC in at least two respects. It would not explain all of the cases, and it would be less parsimonious in the sense that it would have to stipulate a distinct mechanism of behavior causation. One might think that this last point is rather weak, because dual process theories are empirically well supported (for a review see Evans 2008). However, it is not obvious that support for dual process theories amounts to support for the thesis that there are distinct mechanisms of behavior causation. It may be, for instance, that two distinct systems of cognition feed into one mechanism of behavior causation or that distinct types of processes are implemented by one and the same mechanism. Moreover, it is questionable that the empirical evidence really supports dual process theories (for critical reviews see Osman 2004 and Keren & Schul 2009). For this reason, I shall assume, with Wegner, that a model which does not resort to the assumption of 12 distinct behavior causation mechanisms is preferable to a model that does (other things being equal).6 In addition, it seems that Benjamin Libet's classic experiment on the initiation of action and the empirical evidence concerning the confabulation of reason explanations provide further support for the view (Wegner 2002: 49-55 and 171-186). We will turn to this further below, and I will argue that neither the Libet experiment nor the evidence on confabulation provide any direct support for the model of AMC. In the following two sections, I will propose a rival model of RMC, and then we will turn to examples of automatisms and illusions of control. 4. Towards a model of RMC: Assumptions The model of RMC will be based on a number of assumptions that are introduced in this section. Wegner explicitly endorses only one of them. But it will become clear that all of them are consistent with the broadly naturalistic approach that Wegner subscribes to (2002: 21-26), and it will become clear that none of them begs the question against the model of AMC. (A1) The first assumption is that consciously accessible mental states and events are realized by sub-personal states and events (Chalmers 1996, Kim 1998, and Shoemaker 2007, for instance). This is compatible with reductive physicalism, non-reductive physicalism, and functionalism (which I take to be a form of non-reductive physicalism).7 It might be helpful to point out here that the states which realize accessible mental states are in the cognitive neurosciences commonly referred to as the "neural correlates" of the mental states in question. In contrast, Wegner assumes that conscious mental states are caused by sub-personal states and mechanisms. But nothing of substance hangs on this. In particular, neither the argument for the model of AMC nor his rejection of RMC depends on this. (Consider figure 1: we could assume that the upper-left upward arrow represents the relation of realization, rather than causation, without changing the substantial and controversial claims of the model.) 6 RMC provides a straightforward explanation of the apparent fact that conscious intentions are often followed by matching actions. A theory that denies RMC must provide an alternative explanation. According to Wegner, the correlation between conscious intentions and actions can be explained in terms of its function for social interaction: conscious intentions provide us with "previews" of our actions, which allow us to communicate our goals and plans, and which prompt us to take responsibility (2002: 325-28 and Wegner 2008). This explanation is less parsimonious than the one provided by RMC. But I shall assume, with Wegner and for the sake of argument, that the theoretical virtues of the model of AMC outweigh this disadvantage. 7 There is a hierarchical multitude of sub-personal levels of explanation, including levels of computational, neural, and physical explanation. I shall ignore this complication, and we may assume that personal level states are ultimately realized by physical states (Chalmers 1996, Kim 1998, and Shoemaker 2007). 13 (A2) Conscious intentions are not necessary for the initiation and guidance of controlled movements. As mentioned, one can bring about coordinated and controlled movements by means of brain stimulation without bringing about any corresponding conscious state (Penfield 1975 and Desmurget et al. 2009). This suggests that the sub-personal processes that realize conscious intentions are upstream of the motor control system, so that it is possible to bypass the formation of conscious intentions in the causation of coordinated and controlled movements (see Frith et al. 2000 and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009). This assumption is clearly compatible with the model of AMC. (A3) Actions are distinct from bodily movements. Actions belong to the personal level of explanation, because they are typically explained in terms of accessible mental states, whereas bodily movements are typically explained in terms of neuro-physiological processes. Arguably, overt actions are token-identical with bodily movements, but there is good reason to think that they are not type-identical. For instance, whenever I raise my arm, my arm rises. But it is not the case that whenever my arm rises, I raise my arm. Given this, it is plausible to assume that overt actions are also realized by sub-personal events (bodily movements, in particular). Wegner does not distinguish between actions and movements, but neither the argument for the model of AMC nor the rejection of RMC depend on this issue.8 (A4) The philosophical problem of causal exclusion has a solution. The problem is, very roughly, that the causal sufficiency of physical states and events in the causation of behavior appears to exclude any substantial causal role for mental states and events (Crane 1995 and Kim 1998, for instance). This problem has been the subject of much debate within philosophy, and there is no uncontroversial solution. Nevertheless, we may assume that there is a solution, simply because Wegner's challenge to mental causation is not based on considerations concerning causal exclusion. Furthermore, we may assume that genuine mental causation does not require the "downward causation" of sub-personal events, provided that actions are located at the personal level (Gibbons 2006, for instance). This is also a controversial issue, but nothing of substance hangs on it here. 8 In the philosophy of action, it is common to hold that actions are actions in virtue of being caused by personal level states and events. The assumption of this view would obviously beg the question against Wegner, who argues that actions do not have personal level causes at all. Assumption A3, however, assumes only that actions belong to the personal level because we explain them in terms of personal level states. This is compatible with the possibility that actions are not caused by personal level states, because it might be, for instance, that explanations in terms of desires, beliefs, and intentions are mere rationalizations. 14 (A5) The sense of agency is a complex and graded phenomenon. Wegner agrees that the sense of agency can be more or less vivid. In the "I-Spy" experiment, for instance, subjects are asked to report the perceived degree of intentionality on a percentage scale (Wegner 2002: 75). In more recent work, Wegner and colleagues have suggested that the sense of agency is modulated by both internal commands and external cues in various ways and to various degrees (Wegner et al. 2004, Aarts et al. 2005, and Moore et al. 2009). Wegner also shares the assumption that the sense of agency is complex. According to the original account (SCW), the sense of agency has three distinct sources (priority, consistency, and exclusivity), and Wegner suggested that the absence of any one of them tends to undermine the sense of agency (2002: 69-70). What was missing was a conceptual framework for the categorization of different kinds of the sense of agency. As mentioned (section 2), it is now common to distinguish between the sense of agency and post-act judgments of agency. In more recent work, Wegner and colleagues have acknowledged this distinction (Moore et al. 2009). (A6) The sense of agency is generated, in part, by a sub-personal comparator mechanism of motor control. In broad outline, this comparator model says the following. Whenever a motor command for the performance of a bodily movement is generated, a copy of the command is used to produce a prediction of the movement. This prediction (also called "forward model") is then used for a comparison between the predicted end state of the movement and the intended end state, and for a comparison between states of the predicted movement and sensory feedback concerning the actual movement. This computational model is empirically well supported, and it is now widely assumed that the initiation and control of movements is achieved by such a subpersonal comparator mechanism of motor control (Wolpert & Kawato 1998, Scott 2004, Haggard 2005, Christensen et al. 2007, Andersen & Cui 2009, and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009, for instance). Further, it is now widely assumed that this system contributes to the sense of agency. It is assumed, in particular, that positive matches in the comparators contribute to the generation of the sense of agency and that mismatches result in error signals that undermine the sense of agency (Frith et al. 2000, Gallagher 2007, Bayne & Pacherie 2007, and Synofzik et al. 2008, for instance). Initially, the comparator model of the sense of agency was the main alternative to the selfinterpretation model proposed by Wegner and others. There is, however, now a growing consensus that these two approaches are better construed as complementing each other, rather than as rivals (Bayne & Pacherie 2007, Gallagher 2007 and Synofzik et al. 2008). The 15 comparator model seems well suited to explain the online and basic sense of agency, whereas the self-interpretation model can explain why judgments about our own agency are subject to various biases that may lead to post-act confabulations. Wegner and colleagues have acknowledged that internal signals and comparisons with feedback contribute to the sense of agency (Wegner et al. 2004 and Moore et al. 2009). However, they have also provided evidence which suggests that the comparator model cannot fully explain the sense of agency. Evidence shows, in particular, that the sense of agency is partly modulated by matches at the personal level between conscious representations and types of actions (Wegner et al. 2004; see also Synofzik et al. 2008). Intuitively, this makes sense, as it seems clear that positive matches between conscious intentions and subsequent actions should contribute to the sense of agency. However, the evidence suggests that the match with a mere representation or thought of the action is sufficient to enhance the sense of agency. Given that there is a clear difference between thinking about A and intending to A, this means that a match with a conscious intention is not necessary, at the personal level, to enhance the sense of agency. (We will return to this below.) Intuitively, it seems also clear that the awareness of movement initiation is an important and perhaps necessary part of the sense of agency (Pacherie 2007). Empirical evidence shows that this "motor awareness" is generated by internal signals, rather than by the execution of the movement itself (Engbert et al. 2008 and Desmurget et al. 2009). It has been suggested that the relevant internal signals are the formation of the movement prediction and the release of the motor command (Frith et al. 2000 and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009). This awareness of movement initiation can be distinguished from prior intentions. The former has been described as an "urge to move" (Fried 1991 and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009), and, perhaps more plausibly, as the conscious awareness of "being about to act" (Pacherie & Haggard 2010). Prior intentions, on the other hand, have usually conceptually complex contents that can be characterized as "act-plans" (Goldman 1970, Bratman 1987, Andersen & Buneo 2002, and Mele 2009, for instance). Typically, act-plans specify goals and means (as in the intention to move the cursor by moving the mouse, for instance). In the limiting basic case, the plan specifies only a certain type of action (as in the intention to raise an arm). But even in this limiting case, it seems that we can first form the prior intention and then have the sense of initiating the movement. Brain stimulation experiments support this distinction. They suggest, in particular, that "parietal cortex stimulation generates conscious intentions to move", whereas "stimulation of the SMA [supplementary motor 16 area] triggers feelings of an urge to move that reflect the imminence of a motor response" (Desmurget & Sirigu 2009: 413). We have now distinguished between a number of sources that contribute to the sense of agency: (1) the formation of a movement prediction, (2) the release of the motor command, (3) matches in the sub-personal comparator mechanism, (4) the match between a conscious representation and the type of action, and, in particular, (5) the match between a conscious intention and the type of action. I shall assume that all five factors contribute to the sense of agency. In the light of the empirical evidence on the sense of agency, it is plausible to assume that the combined occurrence of some of the components can result in a minimal or basic sense of agency, whereas only a coordinated occurrence of all the components generates a full sense of agency. But the evidence suggests also that the contribution or weight of the individual components can vary from case to case (see Frith et al. 2000, Synofzik, et al. 2008, and Moore et al. 2009). For instance, in the absence of efferent motor commands or proprioceptive feedback, more weight might be given to visual feedback. The extent to which judgments of agency are based on veridical memories of an experienced sense of agency may also vary from case to case. It seems plausible to assume that judgments of agency are usually based on experiences of a sense of agency (Bayne & Pacherie 2007). But post-act judgments are also subject to various biases. For instance, an unrealistic self-conception of one's agency may occasionally override weak or vague memories concerning the presence (or absence) of a sense of agency. A full and satisfactory specification of the weighting mechanisms that modulate the sense of agency and the formation of judgments of agency has not been developed yet, and further research is required in order to determine the contribution and interaction of the mentioned components. But the outlined model of the sense of agency is sufficiently precise for my purposes, and we can assume this model, for the following reasons. Firstly, my aim here is not to disprove Wegner's original model of the sense of agency (SCW), but to defend RMC against the argument for the model of AMC. Secondly, as pointed out, Wegner and colleagues have now acknowledged that the sense of agency is partly based on internal signals and feedback comparisons (as postulated by the comparator model). Thirdly, and most importantly, the outlined model of the sense of agency is in principle compatible with the model of AMC and it does not presuppose RMC. It says that matches between conscious intentions and actions contribute to the sense of agency, but it does not presuppose that conscious intentions cause matching actions. 17 5. A model of RMC On the basis of these assumptions, I can now propose a model of RMC, according to which the mental causation of actions at the personal level is realized by causal processes and mechanisms at the sub-personal level (A1). The sub-personal processes that realize intentions are upstream of the motor control system (A2). The movement is initiated by the release of a motor command and controlled by means of internal predictions (feed-forward models) and comparisons with sensory feedback (A6). This process realizes the mental causation of an intentional action (A3), provided that the bodily movement realizes an act-type that matches with the intention's content. Figure 2 illustrates this model of RMC. Figure 2. Model of real mental causation (RMC) (Including sources of the sense of agency) The model assumes that personal level states and events are realized by sub-personal level states and events, indicated by the vertical lines that connect the intention and the action to the subpersonal level. At the neural level, the selection and execution of actions involves a complex prefrontal-parietal network (Scott 2004, Haggard 2008, Andersen & Cui 2009, and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009).9 The levels should be understood as levels of description and explanation, and the 9 Roughly, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is associated with the selection of goals (Rowe et al. 2000); regions of both medial and lateral prefrontal cortex are involved in the representation and storage of prior intentions (Miller & Cohen 18 model is compatible with the thesis that personal level entities are (typeor token-) identical with lower level entities, but it is not committed to it. It also stays neutral on the question of whether or not personal level theories are reducible to lower level theories. This model of RMC is fully compatible with the outlined model of the sense of agency (A6), and figure 2 indicates some of its components (the sub-personal comparator system and the "intentional match" at the personal level). It is partly based on the models proposed by Frith et al. 2000, Haggard 2005, Synofzik, et al. 2008, and Desmurget & Sirigu 2009. But there are some significant differences. Unlike the models proposed by Frith et al., Haggard, and Desmurget & Sirigu, it embeds the comparator system within a model of levels of explanation, and it preserves thereby the distinction between actions and bodily movements (A3). Synofzik et al. have proposed a model of the sense of agency, which is silent on questions concerning the causal efficacy of intentions. Their model suggests top-down and bottom-up interactions between two levels, whereas the model of RMC holds that personal level states are realized by sub-personal level states (A1). Note that figure 2 illustrates only the basic case: the mental causation of a basic action by a prior intention. As mentioned, most actions are complex, in the sense that we usually pursue some further goal when we perform a basic action. But all actions require the performance of some basic action. Recall also that prior intentions should be distinguished from the awareness of movement initiation, and note that the term "prior" intention is potentially misleading, as prior intentions may precede and accompany the performance of actions. We can further distinguish between "distal" and "proximal" intentions (Mele 2009). As the terms suggest, the former are further removed in time from the execution of the action than the latter. But I take it that the distinguishing feature consists in the fact that distal intentions are first stored in memory and later retrieved or activated, whereas proximal intentions are transformed into motor commands without delay. Finally, I should point out that the model is clearly empirically testable. According to the model of AMC, conscious intentions are merely followed by matching actions. The model of RMC gives an account of how conscious intentions can be the real causes of action, and it holds, in accord with the thesis of RMC, that conscious intentions cause the relevant basic actions 2001 and Haynes et al. 2007); premotor areas and the primary motor cortex are involved in motor planning and selfmonitoring of movement execution (Berti et al. 2005 and Christensen et al. 2007); activity in regions of the parietal cortex are correlated with conscious intentions to move (Andersen & Buneo 2002 and Desmurget et al. 2009) and with the processing of feedback signals (Farrer et al. 2003); the SMA is associated with the release of motor commands (Ball 1999 and Sumner 2007) and with the awareness of movement initiation (Desmurget et al. 2009). 19 (ceteris paribus). This difference between mere correlation and causation-a crucial difference between the two models-, can be empirically tested by means of controlled interventions on intentions. We will return to this further below. Further, the model holds that conscious intentions are not necessary for the causation of controlled movements, and it predicts that other factors, such as unconscious mental states or environmental stimuli, can lead to the execution of coordinated movements. As mentioned (see A2), there is empirical evidence for this. In the following two sections, I will show that this model of RMC can accommodate paradigm examples of automatisms and illusions of control. The main task will be to show that each type of case is compatible with RMC. But I will also indicate how the presence (or absence) of a sense of agency can be explained for each type of case. 6. Illusions of control 6.1. Lucky coincidences The most straightforward and common instances of illusions of control occur when there is a coincidental match between the agent's intention and some event or movement. This is familiar, as Wegner (2004) points out, from interactions with machines. Return to the example of moving the cursor on the computer screen. Suppose that you move the mouse to the left in order to move the cursor to the left. Unbeknownst to you, the mouse is not connected to the computer. But due to some fluke, the cursor moves in accordance with the movement of the mouse (at the right time, the right distance, and so forth). As a result, you feel in control over something that you have no control over. All cases of this kind are unproblematic for the model of RMC, because they concern only act consequences (or non-basic actions). The agent feels in control over bringing about a consequence that matches with the content of the intention by coincidence. But there is no reason to think that everything that the agent does matches with the intention by coincidence. In particular, there is no reason to think that the successful performance of the basic action is due to a coincidence. In the example, it seems to you that you are moving the cursor. You are wrong about that. But it also seems to you that you are moving the mouse by moving your hand. For all we know, you are right about that-for all we know, this is not a lucky coincidence. So, the illusion is only partial. Given this, it may well be that the intention is the real cause of a matching action. It may well be that your intention to move the cursor (and mouse) by moving your hand causes the movement of your hand (and mouse). Moreover, it is no surprise that the agent feels in 20 control, because all the contributors to the sense of agency are in place: the action and its consequences match with the content of the intention; we have reason to assume that there are positive matches in the sub-personal comparator mechanism, because the relevant basic action is executed; and we have reason to assume that a sense of movement initiation is generated by the release of a motor command. 6.2. Phantom limb movement Consider next the pathological phenomenon of "phantom limb movement". The term "phantom limb" is commonly used to refer to the sensation that a missing limb is still attached. The phenomenon of phantom limb "movement" occurs when phantom limb patients experience also a sense of control over their missing limb. More specifically, when they are asked to move their phantom limb, they report a feeling of control-they have the sense that the phantom limb is moving in the intended way. This phenomenon is difficult to explain, partly because there are subtle differences between different cases and because the phenomenon changes over time. In particular, the illusion is more common and more vivid in the early stages after the loss of the limb, and it tends to fade after some time (Frith et al. 2000 and Wegner 2002: 40-45). But the outlined model of the sense of agency can nevertheless explain why phantom limb patients experience some minimal sense of agency over their missing limb. We can assume that patients form a conscious intention to move (in response to the request from the experimenter). This should result in the formation of a movement prediction and in the release of a motor command. This, in turn, should lead to matches in the internal feed-forward comparison between the predicted state and the intended end state of the movement. In conjunction with the sense of movement initiation, which should be generated by the release of a motor command, this may well be sufficient for a minimal sense of agency.10 In some cases, it might also be the case that there is some positive proprioceptive feedback from muscle contractions in the stump (Wegner 2002: 41). This should enhance the sense of agency, which is compatible with Wegner's description of the cases, according to which the sense of agency in phantom limb movements may be more or less vivid.11 10 In contrast, it is difficult to see how Wegner's model (SCW) can explain the sense of agency here. The conditions of priority and consistency are both violated, because the intentions are not followed by actual movements. And it seems implausible to suggest that the satisfaction of exclusivity will by itself lead to a sense of agency. 11 Frith et al. (2000: 1778-79) have argued that the comparator model can also explain why the sense of agency tends to fade after some time. Roughly, the suggestion is that the movement predictions will be modified and updated only after some period of time. This updating should lead to negative feedback signals in the internal feed-forward loop. 21 More importantly, the phenomenon of phantom limb movement does not raise any problems for RMC, as both the thesis and the model of RMC concern only cases in which an intention is in fact followed by a matching action. One could argue, even, that this provides some support for the model of RMC (and for the outlined model of the sense of agency), because it seems that a good explanation of why the patients experience a sense of movement initiation is provided by the assumption that their conscious intentions generate the relevant internal signals (the release of motor commands and the formation of movement predictions). 6.3. Alien limb movement The third and final illusion of control that I shall consider stems from the perceived movement of alien limbs: someone else's or artificial limbs that are perceived to be moving in place of one's own. Wegner and colleagues have conducted interesting experiments on this phenomenon (Wegner et al. 2004). Subjects were watching themselves in a mirror while a confederate, who was standing right behind them, was moving her arms in accordance with instructions. The subjects' own arms remained at their sides and under a smock. This generated an illusory sense of agency for the observed movements. In the most relevant trial (experiment 1), the subjects could hear the instructions that were given to the confederate. The results show that this match between the observed movements and the overheard instructions enhanced their sense of agency for those movements to a significant degree. One interesting point here is that there is no reason to think that subjects formed intentions in accord with the overheard instructions. It was clear that the instructions were directed at the confederate, and subjects themselves were explicitly instructed not to move (which is incompatible with intending to follow the overheard instructions). Given this, the experiment seems to show that matches between actions and mere representations or thoughts can contribute to the sense of agency. But it is clear that this type of case does not raise any problems for RMC. Subjects were instructed to keep their arms at their sides, and this is what they did. The evidence is not only compatible with RMC, but the thesis of RMC provides a good explanation of why the subjects did what they were told to do: they kept their arms at their sides because they intended to do so in accord with the instructions. How can we explain the sense of agency here? It should be no surprise that subjects have some sense of agency, because they successfully execute the instructions that were given to them (not to move their own arms). This explains why they have some sense of agency. But it does not As a result, the motor control system should eventually cease to generate motor commands for the missing limb. This would explain why patients lose a sense of movement initiation only after some period of time. 22 explain a sense of agency for the confederate's movements.12 Note, first of all, that there is ambiguous feedback at the personal and sub-personal levels. Subjects intend not to move. Internal feedback signals should confirm that this intention is executed. But these internal signals are in conflict with sensory feedback from the observed movements and with the content of the mental representations that are induced by the overheard instructions, while the sensory feedback from the observed movements is in accord with the mental representations of the overheard instructions. Secondly, as Wegner and colleagues note, classic EMG studies have shown that instructions to merely think about certain movements induce corresponding muscle potentials without resulting in overt movements (ibid.: 847). Given this, we may speculate that overhearing instructions to move induces activity in the motor control system that is automatically inhibited in accord with the agent's intention not to move (we will return to this inhibition mechanism below). Further, sub-threshold muscle potentials might provide more ambiguous feedback: proprioceptive feedback that is consistent with both the observation of arm movements and with the overheard instructions, but that does not match with the agent's intention not to move. Taken together, this can explain why subjects experience some sense of agency for the confederate's arm movements. But the model would predict that the sense of agency is minimal or weak. Subjects have no intention to move, and there is, presumably, no sense of movement initiation, as no motor commands are released. This appears to be compatible with the results of the experiment (ibid.: 841). The mean rating of perceived agency in the experimental condition (M = 3.00) was significantly greater than in the control condition (M = 2.05), but still rather low on a scale from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("very much"). 7. Automatisms 7.1. Utilization behavior The pathology known as "utilization behavior" occurs in patients with frontal lobe lesions, and it consists in the automatic execution of stimulus driven actions (Lhermitte 1983, Frith et al. 2000, and Archibald et al. 2001). Typically, utilization behaviors are instrumentally adequate, but they are not intended. For instance, placing a toothbrush in front of the patient induces tooth brushing behavior, placing a banana in front of the patient results in peeling, and so on. In such cases, it seems clear that the patients do not have prior intentions to perform these actions, and usually 12 A mere match between a mental representation and an observed movement is usually not sufficient for a sense of agency. For instance, a match between the expectation that "I'm going to sneeze" and sneezing does not result in a sense of agency. 23 they are unable to suppress the response. Interestingly, patients do not report any disturbance in their sense of agency. Utilization behavior could therefore be characterized as a partial automatism: it is action without conscious intention, but with an undisturbed sense of agency. According to a traditional explanation (Shallice 1989 and Archibald et al. 2001), cases of utilization behavior support the view that external stimuli can automatically induce overlearned responses by activating stored motor schemas (routines or programs). It assumes that activated motor schemas are in healthy subjects released only if the actions are in accord with the agent's intentions and long-terms plans, and that they are automatically inhibited otherwise. Evidence suggests that the SMA is the primary neural correlate of this inhibition mechanism (Goldberg 1985, Ball et al. 1999, and Sumner et al. 2007). This explains why the responses are enacted in patients with frontal lobe lesions, provided that this involves damage to the SMA. There are, however, two problems with this explanation. Firstly, it is implausible to explain all utilization behaviors as externally triggered reflexes or overlearned routines, because the execution of many utilization behaviors is controlled and fine-tuned by the particular features of the situation (and target objects). Secondly, there is no explanation of why patients do not report a disturbance in their sense of agency. Both shortcomings can be overcome if we supplement the traditional explanation with the comparator model of motor control. On this view (Frith et al. 2000), external stimuli automatically induce activity in the motor control system, bypassing the formation of consciously accessible intentions. In line with the traditional view, it assumes that in healthy subjects motor commands are released only if the actions are in accord with the agent's intentions and plans, and that they are automatically inhibited otherwise. In patients with frontal lobe lesions, this inhibition mechanism is damaged, and so stimulus driven motor commands are released even if the agent has no corresponding intention. The subsequent processing of feedforward and feedback signals explains why the resulting movements are controlled and finetuned in accord with the features of the particular situation. Further, a lack of error signals in the sub-personal comparator system and the release of motor commands explain why patients have a basic sense of agency (including a sense of movement initiation).13 It is clear that utilization behavior does not raise a problem for RMC, because neither the thesis nor the model of RMC requires that all actions must be preceded and caused by conscious 13 Utilization behavior raises similar problems as phantom limb movements for Wegner's original account of the sense of agency (SCW). The conditions of priority and consistency are violated (trivially, as there is no conscious intention). But it is implausible to suggest that the condition of exclusivity alone can explain the fact that the sense of agency is undisturbed. 24 intentions. In particular, utilization behaviors cannot be counterexamples to the thesis of RMC, given that the patients have no conscious intentions to perform the actions in question, and the model of RMC is compatible with the assumption that motor commands can be generated in response to external stimuli. 7.2. The anarchic hand syndrome Perhaps the most striking example of an automatism is the "anarchic hand syndrome" (Goldberg et al. 1981 and Frith et al. 2000, for instance). Patients with this neurological disorder report, typically, that one of their hands is moving "on its own", and sometimes they attribute the actions to some alien force or agent. Anarchic hand movements are coordinated actions. Like in cases of utilization behavior, the movements are goal-directed and unintended. But unlike in cases of utilization behavior, the agent's sense of agency is disturbed and often the patient vigorously denies initiation and control of the movement. Many anarchic hand movements are stimulus driven. Some are highly routine actions, but not obviously stimulus-driven (unbuttoning of the patient's own shirt, for instance). Others are neither stimulus-driven nor routine (attempt at selfstrangulation, for instance). It is no surprise that patients do not have a full and vivid sense of agency, because they have no conscious intentions to perform the actions. But reports suggest that patients lack even a minimal sense of agency. This is puzzling in the light of what has been suggested about utilization behavior. Many instances of the anarchic hand movement are stimulus-driven, like cases of utilization behavior. And like in utilization behavior, this can be explained in terms of damage to the medial frontal regions (SMA, in particular) that are associated with the automatic inhibition of unintended actions (Goldberg 1981, Goldberg & Bloom 1990, and Frith et al. 2000). But unlike in utilization behavior, the sense of agency is disrupted. One possible explanation for the difference is that utilization behaviors are merely unintended, whereas anarchic hand movements are in conflict with some of the patient's intentions, plans, or moral commitments. This results in a glaring mismatch at the personal level, which should disrupt and undermine their sense of agency (and which may lead them to confabulate explanations in terms of control by alien forces or agents). Utilization behavior, the anarchic hand syndrome, and the differences between them pose difficult challenges for every account of the sense of agency. The proposed explanation is tentative and it raises further questions. But, as before, the main point is that there is no problem 25 for RMC. Utilization behaviors are unproblematic, because the patients have no relevant intentions. In cases of anarchic hand movements, patients perceive also a discrepancy with standing intentions or commitments. They want to suppress the action, but they have no intentional control over it, due to the damage to the inhibition mechanism. This breakdown in the motor control system clearly violates the ceteris paribus clause in the thesis of RMC-anarchic hand movements are clearly cases where other things are not being equal. Given this, and given what has been said on utilization behavior, it is also clear that anarchic hand movements are compatible with the model of RMC. 7.3. Spiritualist phenomena Finally, let us briefly consider spiritualist "experiments", such as table turning, automatic writing (with Ouija boards), pendulum divining, dowsing, and hypnosis (see Wegner 2002). Cases of this kind are notoriously difficult to interpret, partly because there is reason to think that reports from participants are strongly biased. But it is not difficult to see that these cases are compatible with RMC. In cases of Ouija board writing, for instance, participants are asked to move the board slowly in circles, in cases of table turning, participants are asked to put their hands in a certain position onto the table, and so forth. Subjects act intentionally in accord with such instructions, but they lack the more specific intention to move the board in a certain way, or they lack the additional intention to exert pressure on the table in a certain way, and so on. Something like this holds for all the mentioned cases. Given, then, that the agent lacks the specific intention that matches with the behavior in question, there is no problem for RMC. Again, one could even argue that these cases provide some support for RMC, because subjects intend and act in accord with the instructions. As mentioned, it is not clear what to make of participants' reports concerning their sense of agency. In particular, it is unclear to what extent such post-act judgments are based on veridical memories concerning their sense of agency. In any case, it would be difficult to provide a full explanation of each and every case. But as this is not required for the defense of RMC, I shall restrict the discussion of the sense of agency here to a few general remarks. Two things are in need of explanation. Why do participants perform the particular or additional action (moving the Ouija board in a certain way, exerting a certain pressure on the table, and so on)? And why do they not experience a sense of agency for that? Traditional ideomotor theory provides a plausible starting point for an answer to the first question (see Kunf et al. 2001). Roughly, the idea here is 26 that unconscious representations, which may be induced by subtle suggestions or by the subject's unconscious wishes, can automatically generate associated actions. We can combine this explanation with the comparator model of motor control, if we drop the assumption that the activation of representations results directly in matching actions (see Jansson et al. 2007). On this view, the activation of unconscious representations leads to matching actions by way of activating the motor control system (by generating motor commands, forward models, and so on). The causal structure is here basically the same as for stimulus driven actions. The difference is only that actions are now generated by subtle suggestions or unconscious desires (see Kirsch & Lynn 1998). But why do participants report that they are not initiating and controlling the actions in question? The subjects lack the relevant conscious intentions. But the same is true of many habitual and routine actions, which are accompanied by a minimal sense of agency. So, why are automatic routine actions accompanied by a sense of agency, but not the spiritualist automatisms? Note, first of all, that automatic routine actions are usually familiar and overlearned actions that serve the pursuit of conscious goals or long-term plans. The automatisms in spiritualist experiments are neither familiar routines, nor are they based on conscious intentions and plans. Secondly, in spiritualist experiments a facilitator often primes the expectation that someone or something else will take control of the action, or the subject already has the expectation that something abnormal is bound to happen. This may induce or strengthen a bias towards the interpretation that one's actions are controlled by someone or something else. Thirdly, participants in spiritualist experiments do often not initiate the action from a state of inaction. Rather, the action often emerges in continuation of an intentional action (moving the Ouija board in circles turns into "writing", for instance). For this reason, subjects might lack an important component of the sense of agency for the action in question. They might lack the sense of movement initiation. Finally, in some of the mentioned cases, subjects perform actions that are usually not considered to be part of a normal subject's act repertoire. In cases of pendulum divining and dowsing, for instance, the movements of the pendulum or the rod are influenced by the smallest of hand movements and muscle contractions. The resulting act consequences are surprising and puzzling, because we tend to assume that we are unable to exercise such a finegrained kind of control. Given all this, we can see why the sense of agency is disrupted in spiritualist automatisms, but not in automatic routine actions. Recall, here, that the basic sense of agency is thought to be phenomenologically thin, which would suggest that it can be easily 27 obscured and outweighed by opposing biases and subtle suggestions-particularly if the agent has no corresponding conscious intention and no sense of movement initiation. 8. The unconscious precursors of conscious intentions Benjamin Libet's well-known experiments concerning the role of consciousness in the initiation of action seem to show that proximal conscious intentions are preceded by "specific cerebral processes that mediate the act", on average by 350ms (1985: 529). Libet concluded from this that the "initiation of a spontaneous voluntary act begins unconsciously" (ibid.). A first thing to note here is that it remains unclear whether the conscious events in question are genuine intentions. Libet himself variously used the terms "urge", "wish", "choice", and "intention" interchangeably. It could be that the event in question is an awareness of movement initiation-an awareness of "being about to move"-, rather than a genuine intention. Or it could be, as Keller & Heckhausen (1990) have argued, that the instructions and the experimental setup induced a type of awareness that does normally not precede the execution of movements. Subjects were instructed to perform a certain type of movement whenever they felt like doing so. They were instructed, in particular, "to let the urge come on its own" (Libet 1985: 531). Libet's aim was to isolate and study selfgenerated and spontaneous actions that are not triggered in response to external stimuli. But the experimental setup created a highly unusual context and it is questionable that the instructions resulted in spontaneous actions. It seems, rather, that subjects were instructed to act in response to internal stimuli: the "perceived urge to move can be interpreted as an internal stimulus which triggered the release of a predefined motor act" (Keller & Heckhausen 1990: 352). Moreover, the instructed and highly unusual "selective attention" to look for an urge of "wanting to move" may have resulted in the awareness of a process that is normally unconscious (ibid.: 359). More importantly, the experiment fails to support a model of AMC even if we assume that the subjects reported the awareness of proximal intentions. Under this interpretation, the experiment shows that proximal intentions have unconscious precursors, and it suggests that proximal intentions do not initiate the intended act. But this is perfectly compatible with RMC, as causation by conscious intentions requires neither the absence of unconscious precursors nor that conscious intentions initiate the act (in the sense of being a first or uncaused cause). In particular, RMC is compatible with the claim that, at the sub-personal level, the neural correlates of intentions are parts or segments in the causal chains that culminate in movements (see Mele 2009). In connection with this it is important to note that unconscious precursors are 28 unproblematic as long as the subsequent formation of the proximal intention is in accord with a distal intention or with some of the agent's other desires, beliefs, or commitments. This was clearly the case in the Libet experiment, because subjects had the distal intention to perform the predefined type of movement. The fact that distal intentions lead to the formation of more specific proximal intentions via mediating unconscious neural processes is not particularly surprising, and it seems unproblematic as long as there is reason to think that these unconscious processes have their source in accessible mental states that render the choice intelligible from the agent's point of view (similar considerations apply to the Libet-style experiment conducted by Soon et al. 2008; for more on this see Schlosser forthcoming). 9. The post-act confabulation of reasons and intentions It has been argued that the empirical evidence concerning the confabulation of reason explanations supports the view that ordinary reason explanations of our own actions are in general based on biased processes of self-interpretation and post-act rationalization. Evidence suggests, for instance, that we tend to give reasons that are in line with our self-conception or with an ideal of rational agency, or that we tend to give socially accepted reasons when we are asked to justify our actions (Nisbett & Wilson 1977, Gazzaniga & LeDoux 1978, Haidt 2001, Wilson 2002, and Wegner 2002). We already assume, with Wegner, that judgments about our own agency are subject to various biases, and the evidence on confabulation strongly suggests that the self-ascriptions of some reasons and intentions are based on self-interpretation (rather than recollection).14 But the evidence, I will now argue, does not support the generalization of this claim, and it does not support the model of AMC. Firstly, the most striking cases of confabulation stem from split-brain patients (subjects with a surgically severed corpus callosum). In a particularly straightforward example, the instruction to "take a walk" was presented to the patient's left visual field (processed by the right hemisphere). In response, the patient got up and headed for the door. When asked "Why are you doing that?" the patient replied "Oh, I need to get a drink"-a clear case of confabulation (Gazzaniga 1998: 133). It is traditionally thought that in most subjects the left hemisphere is dominant in the processing of language and speech. In split-brain patients, the left hemisphere does not have access to what is presented to the right hemisphere. This, in conjunction with the evidence on confabulation, has lead to the suggestion that the left hemisphere hosts a cognitive 14 Confabulated explanations are manifestly false, whereas post-act rationalizations may be true (see Nisbett & Wilson 1977: 253). 29 module that is dedicated to the interpretation of our actions-the left-brain "interpreter" (Gazzaniga & LeDoux 1978 and Gazzaniga 1998). Whatever the truth on this matter, the evidence does not support a model of AMC. It does not even support a model of AMC for splitbrain patients. Return to the example. Either the patient formed a conscious intention in response to the instruction, or he did not. If he did not, then the case does not raise a problem for RMC. If he did form a conscious intention (in response to the instruction), then it might well be that this intention was causally efficacious in the initiation and guidance of the action. This assumption of mental causation is compatible with the evidence, and it provides, once more, a good explanation of why the patient acted the way he did. The fact that the patient confabulated a post-act explanation does nothing to undermine this. It suggests only that the postulated interpreter module could not access a memory of having acted intentionally in response to the instruction. Either way, the evidence is compatible with RMC, and it fails to support the model of AMC. Further, it is far from obvious that evidence from split-brain patients supports any interesting generalizations concerning the agency of healthy subjects. But even if it did, it would not support a general model of AMC, because it does not even support a model of AMC for splitbrain patients (as I have just argued). If generalized, the evidence suggests, at best, that we tend to confabulate under certain circumstances-in particular, when we cannot access the intentions and reasons we acted for. In some cases, this inaccessibility may be permanent and systematic (as in split-brain patients). In other cases, it might be due to the fact that the intentions and reasons were simply not stored in memory. Suppose, for instance, that you cannot recall whether or not you locked the door when you left home this morning. It may well be that you locked the door consciously and intentionally. But perhaps you have no memory of this, because this routine action was not significant or vivid enough to enter long-term memory. In any case, none of this raises a problem for RMC. If the agent has no conscious intention, there is no problem for RMC. And if the agent has a conscious intention, there is no reason to think that the intention was not efficacious in the initiation and guidance of the matching action. In other words, all of this is perfectly compatible with RMC, and it fails to provide any support for the model of AMC. Secondly, in many of the cases where subjects tend to confabulate post-act reason explanations, there are either no salient reasons or there are no reasons at all. Consider, for instance, the famous position effect (Nisbett & Wilson 1977). Subjects were asked to evaluate articles of clothing and to select the best quality product. In one study, subjects were shown four different night gowns. In a second study, subjects were shown four identical nylon stockings. In 30 both cases, subjects showed a strong tendency to rate the article positioned at the far right highest. Subjects were entirely unaware of this position effect, and when they were asked to explain their choices, they referred to perceived differences in quality (in both studies). What is never mentioned, however, is that it would be very odd if they had given the position as a reason, because the position is not a good reason to prefer any one item over the others. Here it is crucial to be aware of the following ambiguity. There is a sense in which all causes of actions are reasons, simply because a "cause" is the "reason why" something occurs. But there is also a sense in which not all causes are reasons, because not all causes of actions provide rational grounds that favor those actions. When we seek a reason explanation of an action, we seek usually reasons in the second sense-we seek an explanation in terms of rational grounds. Return to the two studies. In the second study, there are no good reasons that one could give, because the items are qualitatively identical. In the first study, it is unclear whether or not there are any salient reasons. Perhaps it was not difficult to spot some differences. But there is no reason to assume that these differences supported a clear qualitative ranking. Given this, it is not so surprising that the subjects confabulated reason explanations. Probably they wanted to (or felt the need to) give answers in order to comply with the experiment, or in order to preserve the self-concept of being a rational consumer (or something along those lines). In the first study, there were no salient reasons, and in the second study, there were no good reasons at all. And so the only way in which subjects could possibly give reasons is by making them up.15 Again, this kind of evidence shows only that we tend to confabulate under certain circumstances, and we should not draw any general conclusions-we should, in particular, not draw conclusions about cases in which there are salient or explicit reasons. Thirdly, the majority of the evidence concerns the confabulation of reason explanations. Wegner suggests that this amounts to evidence for the confabulation of intentions (2002: 171-81). But the reasons for which we act can be distinguished from the intentions with which we act. Usually, the reasons that favor an action are, ipso facto, the reasons that favor the choice of that action (they favor the formation of an intention to perform that action). In other words, intentions are usually based on reasons, which suggests that intentions are distinct from reasons. In order to see why this distinction is relevant here, it will be helpful to consider the following thought 15 Malle (2006) suggests the following interesting interpretation. It is consistent with the evidence that the position did not influence the choices directly. Rather, the position might have inducted the (non-veridical) representation of a qualitative difference. If that is correct, it may well be that subjects gave the reason on the basis of which they made their choices. 31 experiment. Suppose that Paula wants to buy a new mouse for her computer and that she has narrowed her search down to a particular product, which is available in white and gray. Assume that she chooses the white version, because she thinks that it matches better with the color of her computer. What if we asked her why she wants the white version? It is unlikely, I think, that Paula would confabulate an explanation, provided that she has a clear preference. But even if she would confabulate a reason explanation, it does not follow that she would confabulate her intention. It is one thing to be wrong about the reasons for making a certain choice. But it is something else to be wrong about the intention itself. Paula has made up her mind. What if we asked her which version of the mouse she intends to buy? She could communicate this simply by pointing at the white version ("this one")-she could report her intention without reporting any reasons. But if we asked her to give reasons for either option, she could also report reasons without reporting an intention (or choice). She could say, for instance, that the match with the color of her computer is a reason for her to choose the white version. It does not follow from this that she intends to get the white one. This shows that we cannot simply infer the confabulation of intentions from the confabulation of reasons.16 Moreover, it shows that the evidence concerning the confabulation of reasons is compatible with RMC. Whenever an agent confabulates a reason explanation for an action, the agent may have acted with the conscious intention to perform that action, and the intention may have caused the action. And if the agent did not act with a conscious intention, then there is no problem for RMC either. Finally, there is plenty of evidence for the claim that providing subjects with good reasons for actions has an effect on their intentions and actions. Most obviously, most experiments in psychology and cognitive neuroscience show that giving subjects instructions, which provide usually good reasons within the context of scientific experimentation, has a strong and reliable effect on their intentions and actions (we will return to this below). But there is also plenty of direct evidence for the claim that reason-giving and conscious intending is causally efficacious. In a meta-analysis, Webb and Sheeran (2006) have collected and analyzed 47 studies in which subjects are given good reasons for significant real-life choices. They have found that the evidence supports the thesis that interventions on an agent's intentions by way of giving good reasons engender the corresponding changes in intentions and actions. In particular, their meta- 16 This is easily obscured, because reasons often enter into the contents of intentions. Consider, for instance, the explanation that "I did A in order to bring about B". If the reason ("in order to bring about B") is confabulated, then the self-attribution that "I intended to do A in order to bring about B" would be partly confabulated. It does not follow, however, that the narrower self-attribution that "I intended to do A" would be confabulated as well. 32 analysis shows that the intervention of reason-giving has a medium-to-large effect on changes in intentions, and that changes in intentions have a small-to-medium effect on changes in behavior. One might think that this result is problematic, because the effect size of changes in intentions is only small-to-medium. But I think that the analysis only confirms reasonable and honest expectations concerning the efficacy of intentions. Most of the studies concern difficult changes in behavior, such as taking physical exercise, wearing a seatbelt, regular use of contraceptives, quitting smoking, and so on. We know, from experience, that long-term plans and distal intentions are often not very effective when they concern changes in habitual behaviors or when they are up against addictions. The important point is that there is an effect from reason-giving all the way to changes in behavior across a wide range of real-life situations. This supports the claim that reason-giving and intending are causally efficacious (ibid.: 260).17 But it also casts serious doubt on the claim that all reason explanations are based on mere self-interpretation or rationalization. When subjects are given explicit reasons for a certain type of behavior, it is rather unlikely that they will engage in self-interpretation, simply because they do not have to interpret their own actions. If the reasons have been made explicit, it will be relatively easy to remember them, and so it will be relatively easy to give them in reason explanations. It will, in any case, be a lot easier to give one's reasons than in cases where there were no salient reasons (position effect); where reasons and intentions were not stored in memory (highly routine or insignificant actions); or where reasons and intentions are pathologically inaccessible (split-brain cases). To summarize, the empirical evidence on the confabulation of reason explanations shows that judgments about our own agency are subject to biases and that reason explanations are in some cases based on mere self-interpretation. But there is good reason to resist generalization, and we should not infer the confabulation of intentions from the confabulation of reasons. In any case, the evidence is compatible with RMC, and it does not provide any direct support for the model of AMC. 10. RMC: Arguments, evidence, and conclusions I have argued that neither the Libet experiment nor the empirical evidence on confabulation provides direct support for the model of AMC, and we have seen that the model of RMC can accommodate paradigm examples of automatisms and illusions of control. Does this mean that the model of RMC is as good as the model of AMC in explaining automatisms and illusions of 17 This claim is based on an interventionist model of causation, which is a standard model for causal inferences in the empirical sciences (Woodward 2003, for instance). 33 control? The model of AMC posits one mechanism of behavior causation. The model of RMC assumes that there are two causal pathways that can lead to behavior output. Given this, one might think that the model of RMC is less parsimonious, if not ad hoc. But note, first of all, that the model of RMC stipulates only two distinct input pathways to the motor control system. It seems quite clear, in fact, that it stipulates also only one mechanism of behavior causation: the sub-personal comparator mechanism of motor control. Moreover, this is a case where the empirical evidence silences the theoretical virtue of parsimony. Empirical evidence suggests that motor and pre-motor areas receive inputs from two distinct pathways (Goldberg 1985, Jahanshahi & Frith 1998, and Haggard 2008, for instance). This is consistent with findings from brain stimulation experiments, which show that one can bring about coordinated movements without generating conscious intentions, and it supports the assumption that inputs from two distinct pathways into the motor control system can lead to the formation of motor commands (and the performance of actions). We can conclude, then, that the model of RMC is at least as good as the model of AMC in explaining automatisms and illusions of control.18 There are, however, good reasons to prefer the model of RMC. As noted earlier, most experiments in psychology and cognitive neuroscience suggest that conscious intentions are causally efficacious. It will be worthwhile to elaborate on this. Most experiments feature more than one condition, and at the beginning of an experiment subjects usually agree voluntarily to follow the instruction for the condition they have been selected for. Presumably, this results in the conscious formation of the relevant intentions, which is then usually followed by the performance of matching actions. This supports important counterfactual claims. Consider a randomly selected subject S who takes part in a well-designed experiment with two conditions (the experimental and control condition). Suppose that S is randomly assigned to the experimental condition. Presumably, S will follow the instructions for this condition (ceteris paribus), and had S been assigned to the control condition, S would act differently and in accordance with the instructions for this condition (ceteris paribus). It seems clear that something along those lines holds for the vast majority of subjects in most experiments. This reflection on the experimental method supports not only the claim that conscious intentions are frequently followed by matching action. But it supports counterfactual claims concerning the co-variation of 18 It seems, even, that the model of RMC provides a better explanation, because it provides a mechanism that shows how automatisms and illusions of control are generated. But the explanatory power of RMC derives to a large extent from the explanatory power of the comparator model. This model of motor control appears to be compatible with the model of AMC, which is why I conclude only that the model of RMC is at least as good. 34 conscious intentions and matching actions. And this, in turn, supports the claim that conscious intentions are causally efficacious, because it supports the claim that changes in an agent's conscious intentions tend to bring about matching changes in the agent's actions.19 Further, it seems clear that something similar holds for a vast amount of everyday actions as well. One example will suffice to illustrate and substantiate this point. Suppose that you are at a friend's house and that you are offered something to drink: tea or coffee, perhaps? You ask for a cup of coffee and your friend heads off to the kitchen, presumably with the intention to get you some coffee. After a couple of minutes she reappears with your coffee. What if you had asked for tea? Common experience and knowledge suggests that your friend would have intended and acted in accord with your request (ceteris paribus and with the relevant background conditions in place). Again, it seems clear that something along those lines holds for a vast amount of everyday choices and actions. This provides further support for the thesis that changes in conscious intentions tend to bring about matching changes in behavior.20 But there is also plenty of empirical evidence in support of RMC. The mentioned metaanalysis of 47 studies on the efficacy of intentions (Webb & Sheeran 2006) shows that interventions on intentions by means of reason-giving tend to bring about matching changes in intentions and actions. In order "to ensure that changes in intention were responsible for the impact of the interventions on behavior", Webb and Sheraan conducted a mediation analysis from 15 studies where the correlation between intention and behavior could be retrieved. This analysis confirmed the mediating role of intentions (ibid.: 256). This shows that changes in intentions are not mere by-products or epiphenomena-as suggested by the model of AMC-, and it confirms the thesis that intentions are efficacious in the causation of behavior. Another set of evidence stems from research on the efficacy of implementation intentions ("If the circumstances C arise, then I will perform the action A"). A meta-analysis of 94 studies has shown that the formation of implementation intentions has a medium-to-strong effect on subsequent performance and goal-attainment (Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006). Again, this supports the claim that conscious prior intentions are causally efficacious in the guidance of action, because it shows that changes in conscious (implementation) intentions tend to bring about matching changes in behavior. 19 Again, this inference is based on an interventionist theory of causal explanation. See note 17. 20 Note that this argument makes no appeal to the first-person experience of agency. Rather, the epistemic reasons to believe in the relevant counterfactual claims concerning the co-variation of conscious intentions and actions stem from extensive observational and inductive knowledge about intentional action and interaction-knowledge that has been acquired in many years of interacting with the world and with other agents. 35 It might be objected here that this evidence supports only the claim that distal intentions are causally efficacious, whereas Wegner's challenge concerns the efficacy of proximal intentions. There are a number of points to note here. First, it is correct that most of the mentioned empirical evidence concerns distal intentions, and the evidence on implementation intentions shows also that the execution of distal if-then intentions can be automatic-it shows that the execution of distal intentions does not require conscious proximal intentions (Gollwitzer & Sheeran 2006). Nevertheless, nothing in the evidence suggests that intentions can be efficacious only if they are distal. In fact, in some of the experiments on implementation intentions, the intentions are executed with so little delay that they appear to be efficacious as proximal rather than distal intentions (Webb & Sheeran 2004, for instance). Second, the mentioned considerations on the efficacy of instructions provide some support for the claim that proximal intentions are efficacious. In many experiments, instructions are given right before the task and sometimes also between or during tasks. Presumably, this leads to the formation of proximal intentions which are executed with little or no delay in accordance with the instructions. Third, common experience suggests that we can change our mind and retract a previously formed intention at the last minute, as it were. In such cases, we abandon a prior intention by forming an opposing proximal intention. But usually we do this in accordance with some of our other desires, plans, or commitments. The assumption of this kind of "veto control" is compatible with the results of the Libet experiment (see Libet 1985), and more recent research has identified distinct neural correlates of this ability to consciously inhibit previously planned actions (Brass & Haggard 2007). All in all, we can conclude that there is ample reason to favor the model of RMC over the model of AMC, and I shall close now with two further remarks concerning the scope of the presented argument. First, the main concern has been to defend the assumption that conscious intentions are causally efficacious in the initiation and guidance of actions. It should have become clear, however, that some of the arguments and some of the evidence support also the claim that conscious reasoning and reason-giving can be causally efficacious in the guidance of behavior. Second, one might think that my response to Wegner's challenge neglects a central question- namely, the question of whether or not intentions are ever causally efficacious in virtue of being conscious. Recall what the fundamental disagreement between AMC and RMC consists in. According to AMC, the real causes of our actions are inaccessible to consciousness. RMC holds that the real causes of many actions are accessible to consciousness. In addition, we may ask whether or not 36 being consciously accessed plays ever a causal role in the initiation and guidance of behavior. This is an important and difficult question. But it is important to note that it is a further question. Empirical evidence on automatic goal activation suggests that the initiation and guidance of some goal-directed actions can be unconscious (Chartrand & Bargh 1996, Bargh & Chartrand 1999, Hassin et al. 2005). This shows that consciousness is not necessary for the initiation and guidance of some goal-directed actions. If one assumes that these actions are initiated and guided by unconscious intentions, then one may infer that not all intentions need to be conscious in order to cause goal-directed actions. However, the evidence does not show that the initiation and guidance of all actions could be unconscious. The masked priming of complex semantic contents appears to be impossible (Baars 2002), and empirical evidence suggests that consciousness is required for the integration and strategic use of certain types of information (Dehaene & Naccache 2001); for certain types of conflict resolution (Morsella 2005); and for the planning of future actions by means of mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007 and Baumeister & Masicampo 2010). This, of course, does not settle the question concerning the role of consciousness-a task that would require more than another article. But it suggests that the formation of intentions with certain complex contents cannot be unconscious and that consciousness plays an important and necessary role in the planning, initiation, and guidance of some actions-it suggests, in other words, that at least some conscious intentions are causally efficacious in virtue of being conscious. References Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Wegner, D. M. (2005). 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This is the pre-peer-reviewed version of the following article: Reflections from a Troubled Stream. Giubilini and Minerva on "After-Birth Abortion", which was published in final form in The Hastings Center Report 42/4 (2012): 17-20. Reflections from a Troubled Stream Giubilini and Minerva on "After-Birth Abortion" But when a creature pretending to reason, could be capable of such Enormities, he dreaded lest the Corruption of that Faculty might be worse than Brutality itself. He seemed therefore confident, that instead of Reason, we were only possessed of some Quality fitted to increase our natural Vices; as the Reflection from a troubled Stream returns the Image of an ill-shapen Body, not only larger, but more distorted. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels When Jonathan Swift published 'A Modest Proposal for Preventing the Children of Poor People of Being a Burden on their Country or Parents, and for Making Them Beneficial to the Publick' in 1729, many early readers were shocked and repulsed by the author's seemingly sincere suggestion to conquer poverty in Ireland by allowing and encouraging the Irish poor to sell their infant children as delicacies to rich English land owners. The author's elaborate demonstration that such a practice, if widely accepted, would benefit everyone and harm no one, did not make the whole proposal appear any less monstrous. Most people felt, as they would still do today, that it simply didn't matter how rational it may be, treating babies as gastronomic resources, destined to be killed and served at the tables of the rich, is about as immoral as it can get. Swift knew this too, of course, and his 'Modest Proposal' was in fact a satire intended to draw attention to the unashamed exploitation of the Irish poor and to the essential heartlessness of a particular kind of economic thinking. Yet if a similar proposal were published today in a reputable academic journal, we could not be sure of its satirical character: it might well be entirely sincere. In late February this year the Journal of Medical Ethics prepublished online a paper that can be seen as a modernized bioethical version of Swift's 'Modest Proposal'. It was written by Alberto Giubilini and Francesca Minerva and bears the provocative title 'After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?' The authors argue that killing newborn children should be regarded as permissible not only in cases where "death 2 seems to be in the best interest of the child", but also in cases where the social, psychological, and economic costs of bringing it up are deemed to high to be bearable. Since even a healthy child requires "energy, money and care which the family might happen to be in short supply of", parents should be allowed to decide for themselves whether they find keeping this child too much of a burden and, if they do, to kill it or have it killed rather than risk being psychologically damaged by giving it up for adoption. (Why giving it up for adoption should be more damaging than having it killed, is not explained.) In other words, whenever parents (or presumably, in the case of orphans, the state) feel inconvenienced by the prospect of having to meet the inevitable costs of raising a child, they should be free to authorize its destruction. Although this may appear morally repulsive to many of us, it is in fact, as the authors assure us, nothing of the sort, because the moral status of an infant is the same as that of a fetus. Just like an unborn child, a newborn has no interests to speak of and certainly is "not in the condition of attributing any value to their own existence". Yet if they cannot do that, then they "lack those properties that justify the attribution of a right to life of an individual" and hence are not to be considered "a person in a morally relevant sense". So contrary to what we might think, by killing a newborn child we do not actually kill someone at all. It is more like "failing to bring a new person into existence", which is clearly not morally wrong. Since "non-persons have no moral rights to life", ending the life of such a non-person is entirely permissible. It is as simple as that. If people feel different about it, they are mistaken, or confused. They don't realise how irrational they in fact are. Reason tells us that there is nothing wrong with killing young children, just as there is nothing wrong with aborting an unborn child. Since we accept the one, and rightly so, we should also accept, and indeed welcome, the other. Predictably, the online publication of this argument caused a huge row. The authors were reviled, verbally harassed, and even received death threats, which apparently they hadn't expected at all. Somewhat naively, they seemed to be genuinely surprised by the amount of hostility that their paper had provoked and did their best to deflect public anger by insisting, rather implausibly, that their argument was "purely academic" and had never been intended to influence public policy. The editor of the journal in which their paper appeared quickly came to their aid and defended his decision to publish it by invoking academic freedom and the widespread support of 3 the academic community, who have been used to, and appreciative of, such arguments for at least forty years. All the authors had done is present a "well reasoned argument based on widely accepted premises" and "proceed logically" from those premises to certain conclusions. The implication is of course that the conclusions are justified. Yet it could also be taken as an indication that there must be something wrong with the premises. Guibilini and Minerva argue that assigning a right to life to new-born children is not rational and that therefore killing a new-born child must be regarded as morally permissible. Without doubt, countless other bioethicists would agree with them. However, there are various things that we tend to regard as morally required that are in the same sense not rational, for instance treating the dead with a certain respect and not as if they were mere things. Why don't we make lampshades out of the skin of murder victims? Or soap out of their bones? Perhaps we could even store them in the freezer and eat them bit by bit. This is currently, to put it mildly, frowned upon, but just burying the dead or burning them is in fact a waste of valuable resources, and they are not 'persons' after all (yes, they once were, but they are not any more), so it should be all right to use them any way we can. Who knows, it might even give a boost to our economy. Our habit of letting the bodies of the dead go to waste is clearly irrational. However, is not all morality, ultimately, irrational? It is the easiest thing in the world to demonstrate conclusively that a moral conviction is irrational. Even the most strongly held moral convictions can be shown to lack a rational basis. Thus we can argue, with Epicurus, that death is no evil because you cannot be harmed by something if you don't exist. Accordingly, it is not only decidedly irrational to fear death, but also to judge morally wrong a carefully planned and executed murder that does not cause the victim any suffering. Others may suffer from a person's death, of course, but to the extent that their suffering is due to the mistaken belief that the dead have been harmed in some way, we should just tell them to get a grip and behave a bit more rationally. Of course the murder victim may have 'attributed value to their own existence', but so what? They are certainly not doing it any more, are they? So there isn't anything really that would prevent us from concluding, very rationally (and liberally), that there is nothing wrong with murdering a human being, except, as 4 David Hume has pointed out, that we feel a strong disapproval which is not only exactly what many of us also feel when they contemplate infanticide, but also something that we can easily learn to suppress if that appears necessary to attain some 'higher' goal, for instance the so-called "common good". Now what if someone wrote an academic paper in which they presented "a wellreasoned argument" proceeding logically from the premise that death is no evil to the conclusion that it should be permissible to kill those deemed harmful to the health or integrity of our society, or even those that are merely considered, for some reason, inconvenient? Say Jews, or homosexuals. Is that impossible to do? I don't think it is. Should we, therefore, accept the argument? No, we should not, but not because there is something wrong with its logic, but because it violates everything that we, as real or ideal members of what Avishai Margalit once called a "decent society", hold dear. Should such a paper be published, so that scholars can debate the merits of the proposal? I don't know, but I think there is more than just a grain of truth in Aristotle's view that the ethicist should not discuss just any matter and question, but only those to which there is no obvious, time-honoured answer. Those, for instance, who doubt whether one should pay tribute to the gods or love and honour one's parents, do not need instruction, but simply "a good beating" (Topics I.11, 105a). Of course one could accept the fundamental irrationality of morality (otherwise known as the is-ought gap) and still insist that some things are more irrational than others. Thus it clearly would not make any sense to claim that, say, a rock has a right to life, the reason being simply that a rock hasn't got a life. A newborn child, however, does, so if it is irrational to assign a right to life to it, then it must be so for a different reason. Allegedly it cannot have such a right because it lacks the required capacities. It does not attribute value to its life and is not "capable of making aims" (which for some reason the authors seem to regard as one and the same thing). Yet just as from the fact that somebody attributes value to their life and is "capable of making aims" it does not logically follow that they have a right to life, neither does it follow logically from the fact that an entity is not capable of doing so that it has no right to life. Why should my life only have value if I am capable of attributing one to it? And what exactly does it mean to 'attribute value' to one's life anyway? In a certain sense an infant certainly does attribute value to its life: it cries for milk and 5 attention, sucks as if its life depended on it (which it does) whenever it gets hold of a female breast, and does actually do all it can, with its limited abilities, to stay alive. Thus it clearly is not completely indifferent to its own survival. It may not have a concept of itself, or of death, or of survival, but it is not entirely clear why that should be necessary. The usual argument, fully endorsed by Guibilini and Minerva, goes like this: in order to have a right to something you need to have an "interest" in it, so that if you don't have an "interest" not to be killed, then killing you is not wrong. Yet you cannot have an "interest" in something if you don't have a clear mental representation of it, and since an infant is not sufficiently mentally developed to have such representations, it cannot really have an interest in anything, let alone its own survival, and hence killing it cannot possibly be wrong. In contrast, its ability to experience pain and pleasure is felt to be sufficient for granting it a right not to be inflicted pain upon, which is rather odd because the infant does not have a concept of pain and pleasure, while it certainly also experiences being alive. So if the infant does not have an "interest" in staying alive, then it seems it doesn't have an "interest" in not suffering pain either, from which we may conclude that torturing a small child to death should be permissible, too. This, however, is a conclusion that as yet no bioethicist has been willing to draw, but that is probably just a matter of time. For some reason the ability to suffer is still unanimously thought to be "morally relevant", while the mere fact of being alive and the ability to struggle for survival is not. Neither is it thought morally relevant that the infant, if fed, cared for and not killed, will eventually develop into a "person". Only actual interests are said to count. Yet how exactly do we know what is "morally relevant" and what is not? Is it really so obvious? And if not, who decides what is and what is not? Giubilini and Minerva claim that only if an "individual is capable of making any aims (...), she is harmed if she is prevented from accomplishing her aims by being killed". And only then can it be morally wrong to kill her, which to me seems completely arbitrary. Do we seriously believe that killing somebody is wrong because it prevents them from accomplishing their aims? Wouldn't that imply that if we prevented someone from accomplishing their aims by other means than killing them, then that would be just as wrong? If my only aim in life was to win a Nobel Prize, and the Swedish Academy 6 refused to award it to me, would they then harm and wrong me just as much as they would if they killed me? I am not saying that ending the life of a newborn child is necessarily wrong under any circumstances. Or, for that matter, that abortion is. It is part of the rationalist fallacy to assume that one cannot be "pro-choice" without denying that a fetus has a "moral status" or a "right to life". Moral status and rights are not something that entities actually have or don't have. It is not as simple as that. Questions like these are not questions of fact, but of personal attitudes, ethical traditions, and public deliberation. Nothing prevents us from deciding that even though aborting a fetus is not a matter of indifference there are other things at stake and that, all things considered, it is better to allow women to have an abortion than to prohibit it by law. And nothing prevents us from seeing and treating birth as a morally relevant threshold that divides the permissible and the impermissible. It is, after all, the moment when a new individual, in an act of bodily separation, is introduced to the world, and when we welcome them in our midst. Guibilini and Minerva have argued that very young children have no right to life and that for this reason parents should be allowed to have them killed if they find it too troublesome to raise them. They are wrong on both counts. If there is such a thing as a "right to life", then a new-born child has as much of it as you and I. The fact that it doesn't have the same abilities is irrelevant. To hold this view does not make us irrational. At least not less rational than anyone who believes that certain things are just wrong and ought not to be done or allowed. It is a mistake to demand that moral convictions be always justifiable in terms of a narrow conception of rationality. Indeed, it is the very fact that morality often requires us to defy the seemingly rational that makes it so important. This tends to be forgotten by a bioethical tradition whose style of thinking has its roots in analytical philosophy, leading to results that should give us pause. When people want to describe the horrors of war, the wanton killing of young children is often cited as the clearest expression of human depravity. We are used to believe not only that without question they have a right to life, but also, because they represent human life at its most vulnerable stage, that they need and deserve our protection more than at any other time and that, consequently, harming and killing them is even worse and more unforgivable than harming and killing an 7 adult. This is about as essential to our shared ethical self-understanding as it can get. If a philosophical argument, such as the one presented by Guibilini and Minerva, calls this into question, we should not be swayed by its appearance of rationality, but rather take it as our cue to rethink the way we practice philosophical ethics.

Previous Up Next Citations From References: 0 From Reviews: 1 MR823171 (87j:01035) 01A60 00A25 03-03 04-03 Garciadiego, Alejandro R. (MEX-NAM) The emergence of some of the nonlogical paradoxes of the theory of sets, 1903–1908. (French, Spanish summaries) Historia Math. 12 (1985), no. 4, 337–351. A "paradox" is an argumentation that appears to deduce a conclusion believed to be false from premises believed to be true. An "inconsistency proof for a theory" is an argumentation that actually deduces a negation of a theorem of the theory from premises which are all theorems of the theory. An "indirect proof of the negation of a hypothesis" is an argumentation that actually deduces a conclusion known to be false from the hypothesis alone or, more commonly, from the hypothesis augmented by a set of premises known to be true. A "direct proof of a hypothesis" is an argumentation that actually deduces the hypothesis itself from premises known to be true. Since 'appears', 'believes' and 'knows' all make elliptical reference to a "participant", it is clear that 'paradox', 'indirect proof' and 'direct proof' are all participant-relative. In normal mathematical writing the "participant" is presumed to be "the community of mathematicians" or some more or less well-defined subcommunity and, therefore, omission of explicit reference to the participant is often warranted. However, in historical, critical, or philosophical writing focused on emerging branches of mathematics such omission often invites confusion. One and the same argumentation has been a paradox for one mathematician, an inconsistency proof for another, and an indirect proof to a third. One and the same argumentation-text can appear to one mathematician to express an indirect proof while appearing to another mathematician to express a direct proof. Of the above four sorts of argumentation only the paradox invites "solution" or "resolution", and ordinarily this is to be accomplished either by discovering a logical fallacy in the "reasoning" of the argumentation or by discovering that the conclusion is not really false or by discovering that one of the premises is not really true. Resolution of a paradox by a participant amounts to reclassifying a formerly paradoxical argumentation-either as a "fallacy", as a direct proof of its conclusion, as an indirect proof of the negation of one of its premises, as an inconsistency proof, or as something else depending on the participant's state of knowledge or belief. This illustrates why an argumentation which is a paradox to a given mathematician at a given time may well not be a paradox to the same mathematician at a later time. The present article considers several set-theoretic argumentations that appeared in the period 1903–1908. The year 1903 saw the publication of B. Russell's Principles of mathematics, [Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1903; Jbuch 34, 62]. The year 1908 saw the publication of Russell's article on type theory as well as Ernst Zermelo's two watershed articles on the axiom of choice and the foundations of set theory. The argumentations discussed concern "the largest cardinal", "the largest ordinal", the well-ordering principle, "the well-ordering of the continuum", definability of ordinals and definability of reals. The article shows that these argumentations were variously classified by various mathematicians and that the surrounding atmosphere was one of confusion and misunderstanding-partly as a result of failure to make or to heed distinctions similar to those made above. The article implies that historians have made the situation worse by not observing or not analysing the nature of the confusion. Russell's role in discovering and disseminating paradoxes, both logical and nonlogical, is shown to be rather more extensive than previously thought. Jacques Hadamard emerges as one of the few mathematicians of the time who saw the difficulties in set theory in historical perspective, i.e., as natural consequences of an attempt to broaden the scope of mathematics. Henri Poincaré's inclination to classify all paradoxes as inconsistency proofs is regarded as a result of his aim to discredit Cantor's theory of sets and Russell's logicism. This well-written and well-documented article exemplifies the fact that clarification of history can be achieved through articulation of distinctions that had not been articulated (or were not being heeded) at the time. The article presupposes extensive knowledge of the history of mathematics, of mathematics itself (especially set theory) and of philosophy. It is therefore not to be recommended for casual reading. {The reviewer gratefully acknowledges insightful suggestions from J. Gasser and Z. Swijtink.} J. Corcoran c© Copyright American Mathematical Society 1987,

Ithaque 25 – Automne 2019, p. 97‐128 Handle: 1866/22060 L'évolution
du
terme
«
illégal
» dans
l'histoire
de
l'immigration
américaine selon
Chomsky
et
Mendoza
: Une
histoire
du
racisme
dans
les
politiques d'immigration
des
États‐Unis Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille* Le débat anglo-américain sur l'emploi de l'attribut « illégal » oppose les militants pro-immigration aux nationalistes anti-immigration. D'un côté, les nationalistes anti-immigration, tels que Mark Krikorian et Jon Feere, affirment qu'il s'agit d'un terme neutre qui ne sert qu'à désigner les personnes qui enfreignent les lois d'immigration du pays1. Selon eux, si l'on parle plutôt de « undocumented immigrant », on rend la distinction plus obscure entre les immigrants légalement admis et les personnes qui ne respectent pas les conditions de séjour imposées par leur visa ou qui sont entrées sans autorisation dans le pays. Si l'on croit ces critiques anti-immigration, l'expression « undocumented immigrant » est issue d'un jargon semi-juridique qui se veut politiquement correct et qui oblitère toute responsabilité en minimisant la transgression2. Cette rhétorique implique un renversement de responsabilité en insinuant que le gouvernement ne fait pas son travail en ne fournissant pas les documents nécessaires le plus rapidement possible3. Les termes « illegal alien » au contraire, nous ______________ * L'auteure est étudiante à la maîtrise en philosophie (Université de Montréal). 1 Feere, J. (26 octobre 2012), « Language in the Immigration Debate ». 2 O'Brien, Matt et al. (juillet 2018), « Why "Illegal Alien" is the Correct Term ». 3 Idem. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 98 disent Matt O'Brien et Spencer Raley, représentants de la Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR), restituent la responsabilité à la personne qui désobéit à la loi. Bien que FAIR reconnaisse la différence entre illégalité et criminalité4, il n'en demeure pas moins que pour cette organisation, « illegal » demeure le terme qui s'impose, car il désigne à juste titre les étrangers qui sont dans le pays sans autorisation5. À l'opposé, les militants pro-immigration considèrent que l'expression « illégal », avec ses connotations xénophobes, ne devrait jamais être employée pour parler d'êtres humains6. L'inquiétude de ces activistes concerne le fait que la population en général confond illegal et criminal, renforçant la croyance que l'immigration illégale est criminelle. En réalité, explique Laura Jarrett, avocate et correspondante au CNN à Washington D.C., la présence d'un individu dans le pays lorsque son visa n'est pas ou plus valide ne constitue pas un crime7. Selon Kelly McBride, journaliste et viceprésidente du Poynter Institute8, « illegal alien » n'est pas l'expression qui convient pour décrire une personne qui continue de vivre aux ÉtatsUnis après l'expiration de son visa de voyage. De plus, cette expression suggère non seulement que ces personnes ne respectent pas les lois américaines, mais attire l'attention sur le fait qu'il s'agit aussi de personnes qui n'appartiennent pas à la communauté9. Cet accent sur le caractère étranger, extérieur, autre du migrant nourrit une rhétorique stratégique problématique dans le débat sur l'immigration. En dernière analyse, ce qui est certes reconnu de toutes parts dans cette discussion, autant du côté des interlocuteurs anti-immigration que du côté des voix pro-immigration, c'est le pouvoir du langage. ______________ 4 FAIR's About Us (juin 2009), « Illegal Alien or "Undocumented Immigrant"? ». 5 O'Brien, Matt et al. (juillet 2018), « Why "Illegal Alien" is the Correct Term ». 6 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 201. 7 Jarrett, L. (24 février 2017), « Are undocumented immigrants committing a crime? Not necessarily ». 8 Kopp, C. (12 avril 2013), « Associated Press Recommends Media Stop Using "Illegal Immigrant" ». 9 Idem. L'évolution
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«
illégal
»
dans
l'histoire
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l'immigration
américaine selon
Chomsky
et
Mendoza
:
Une
histoire
du
racisme dans
les
politiques
d'immigration
des
États‐Unis 99 Conséquemment, une attention particulière est portée sur ce que les mots invoquent dans l'esprit des gens. D'un côté, chez les nationalistes anti-immigration, on se méfie d'une formule aussi diluée que « undocumented immigrant », de peur que cela rende envisageables des solutions telles que l'amnistie et les frontières ouvertes, tandis que si l'on met l'accent sur l'aspect légal en violation dans l'expression « illegal aliens », on encourage la population à valoriser le respect des lois, des frontières et de la souveraineté de l'État. De l'autre côté, bon nombre de juristes, de militants et de chercheurs en faveur d'une plus grande ouverture face à l'immigration craignent que l'emploi du mot « illegal » ouvre la porte aux abus de toutes sortes, en termes de violence politique et de profilage racial10. Dans le cadre de cet article, je m'intéresserai en particulier à la perspective pro-immigration telle que défendue par des auteurs qui ont pris position dans ce débat terminologique dont les ramifications théoriques, pratiques et sociopolitiques sont complexes. Parmi ces chercheurs, Aviva Chomsky, historienne de l'Université de Salem au Massachusetts fait partie de ces militantes pro-immigration qui rejettent l'utilisation du terme « illegal » dans une discussion qui porte sur l'immigration aux États-Unis. Elle explique sa position dans son livre Undocumented. How Immigration Became Illegal (2014). En 2016, Jose Jorge Mendoza, philosophe de l'Université du Massachusetts, publie « White Supremacy and Immigration Status », un texte qui soutient Chomsky en introduisant et en clarifiant des concepts fondamentaux développés au sein de la littérature en philosophie de la race. Il défend la thèse que les restrictions sur les lois de l'immigration sont mises en place pour promouvoir et construire la suprématie blanche. Il soutient que si on accepte cette idée, alors on reconnaîtra également que le terme « illegal » est à proscrire11. Toutefois, bien que leur approche méthodologique soit semblable par l'étude approfondie des Actes du Congrès et des décisions de la Cour Suprême, Mendoza n'atteint pas tout à fait les mêmes conclusions que Chomsky en ce qui concerne les restrictions sur l'immigration américaine. Alors que ______________ 10 Chomsky, A. (2014), Undocumented: how immigration became illegal, p.207. 11 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 202. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 100 Chomsky adopte une posture plus radicale et prône les frontières ouvertes12, on peut comprendre la démarche de Mendoza comme étant plutôt réformatrice que transformatrice puisqu'il reconnaît aux États le droit d'exclure pourvu que leurs politiques d'immigration soient soucieuses de respecter certains droits fondamentaux13. Il importe de souligner que cet article examine l'évolution historique des politiques d'immigration des États-Unis depuis son indépendance jusqu'au début du 21e siècle, à la fois pour des raisons méthodologiques, mais également parce que l'analyse des politiques d'immigration de l'ère Trump serait indissociable des présidences d'Obama et des Bush qui auront été marquées par les attentats du World Trade Center, de la montée du populisme et de l'expression d'une xénophobie inédite culminant dans la politique de séparation des enfants et des parents à la frontière sud des États-Unis. L'ensemble de ces questions complexes mériteraient une autre étude en soi. Cela dit, cet examen plus descriptif de l'évolution historique des termes en usage dans le débat sur l'immigration représente une contribution non négligeable afin de mieux comprendre les enjeux contemporains grâce à cet éclairage historique. Il faut également souligner que cet article porte exclusivement sur les enjeux terminologiques des expressions anglo-américaines dans le contexte spécifique des États-Unis et qu'il serait problématique de traduire librement en français. Je n'ai pas la compétence de commenter ici l'interprétation de l'auteur et analyste juridique Jeffrey Toobin selon qui les Français ont plusieurs termes tels que « sans papier » et « situation irrégulière » qui ne soulèvent pas les mêmes ambiguïtés ni les mêmes questions14. Il suffit simplement de préciser ici que je conserverai les expressions en anglais par souci de rigueur et par respect pour le contexte sociolinguistique particulier des ÉtatsUnis. Toutefois, il m'apparaît intéressant et important de présenter cette analyse descriptive de l'évolution du langage dans l'histoire de l'immigration aux États-Unis à la lumière de concepts développés en philosophie de la race, tant il est vrai que de nombreuses leçons peuvent en être tirées à notre époque contemporaine pour toutes les ______________ 12 Chomsky, A. (2014), Undocumented: how immigration became illegal, p. 189-190. 13 Mendoza, J. J. (2014), « Discrimination and the Presumptive Rights of Immigrants », p. 80. 14 Toobin, J. (5 août 2015), « Should I Use the Term "Illegal Immigrant"? ». L'évolution
du
terme
«
illégal
»
dans
l'histoire
de
l'immigration
américaine selon
Chomsky
et
Mendoza
:
Une
histoire
du
racisme dans
les
politiques
d'immigration
des
États‐Unis 101 sociétés qui sont aux prises avec des dérives racistes et xénophobes au coeur des débats difficiles au sujet de l'immigration. De la proclamation royale à la déclaration d'indépendance : blanchiment racial Selon Aviva Chomsky, pour comprendre la logique de l'immigration américaine et l'évolution du terme « illegal », il faut saisir que cela fait des siècles que les États-Unis tentent, avec leur législation, de se transformer en un pays de Blancs. Elle nous invite à constater cette remarquable continuité de politiques discriminatoires en adoptant une perspective historique. Elle propose dans un premier temps d'observer le texte de la déclaration de l'indépendance des États-Unis. Pour véritablement saisir les enjeux historiques, il faut rappeler que le roi d'Angleterre George III indique dans sa proclamation du 7 octobre 1763 qu'il est temps de considérer les intérêts des Premières Nations et de mettre un frein à la colonisation des terres appartenant aux tribus et nations autochtones, tel que stipulé dans cet extrait concernant la protection des terres autochtones15 : [I]t is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their Hunting Grounds [...] And We do further declare it to be Our Royal Will and Pleasure, for the present as aforesaid, to reserve under our Sovereignty, Protection, and Dominion, for the use of the said Indians, all the Lands and Territories not included within the Limits of ______________ 15 The Royal Proclamation – October 7, 1763. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 102 Our said Three new Governments, or within the Limits of the Territory granted to the Hudson's Bay Company16. Cette apparente volonté monarchique de protéger les Premières Nations (sans vouloir pour autant faire croire que l'empire britannique était une puissance colonialiste progressiste) a profondément irrité les colonies anglaises installées aux États-Unis et a fait partie des facteurs qui ont poussé à la révolution américaine. Dans la Déclaration de l'Indépendance (US 1776), nous rappelle Chomsky, il est d'ailleurs indiqué parmi les injures et les usurpations que l'on attribue au Roi que celui-ci bloque l'immigration. À noter que le terme « foreigners » désigne ici les immigrants britanniques blancs et protestants : He has endeavoured to prevent the population of the States; for that purpose, obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migrations hither, and raising the conditions of new Appropriation of Lands17. Selon le Congrès de 1776, George III est aussi celui qui a poussé les Premières Nations à réclamer leurs terres : He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions18. Il est donc hors de question pour les pères fondateurs de tolérer des Autochtones dans leurs colonies puisque ceux-ci sont, pour eux, des « sauvages » qui représentent la destruction de la civilisation. En somme, cette « nation d'immigrants » avait, dès sa création, l'intention de faire régner la suprématie blanche. Dans la mesure où Chomsky ne le précise pas elle-même, on présuppose pour les besoins de notre ______________ 16 The Royal Proclamation – October 7, 1763. 17 U.S. (1776) Declaration of Independence. 18 Idem. L'évolution
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terme
«
illégal
»
dans
l'histoire
de
l'immigration
américaine selon
Chomsky
et
Mendoza
:
Une
histoire
du
racisme dans
les
politiques
d'immigration
des
États‐Unis 103 étude qu'elle entend une définition usuelle de l'expression « suprématie blanche », c'est-à-dire qu'elle fait référence à la croyance idéologique selon laquelle la race blanche est non seulement meilleure que les autres, mais qu'elle doit toutes les dominer en vertu de sa supériorité19. Inscrite dans l'histoire des politiques d'immigration américaines, cette promotion de la suprématie blanche se fait en déportant et en tuant ceux qui vivaient au pays avant eux. C'est ce que Chomsky désigne par les notions de remplacement racial (racial replacement) et de blanchiment racial (racial whitening)20. Ses recherches historiographiques décrivent une volonté systématique d'éradication des Premières Nations et démontrent, à l'inverse, que les seules périodes pendant lesquelles la légalité de l'immigration ne fut pas contestée correspondent à l'arrivée d'immigrants blancs, anglais et protestants. Bien que Chomsky ne les définisse pas systématiquement, elle mobilise un large éventail de concepts empruntés à la philosophie de la race telle que développée par les travaux pionniers de Naomi Zack21 et reprise par Mendoza qui l'applique à l'analyse des enjeux de l'immigration aux États-Unis22. Mendoza étudie également l'immigration aux États-Unis dans une perspective historique et philosophique. Les travaux de Mendoza n'incluent toutefois pas l'analyse de la Proclamation royale ni de la Déclaration d'Indépendance des États-Unis. À la différence de Chomsky, le sort des Premières Nations dans l'histoire de l'immigration américaine lui échappe complètement, vraisemblablement en raison du fait qu'il traite l'immigration comme un phénomène distinct du colonialisme. Cependant, cela peut constituer une lacune fondamentale s'il est vrai que Chomsky a raison de mettre en lien la genèse des tensions au sujet de l'immigration, ______________ 19 "White Supremacy", Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/white%20supremacy. Pour une étude plus approfondie de cette notion, voir l'ouvrage notoire de C. W. Mills, The Racial Contract, 1997. 20 Chomsky, A. (2016), « Undocumented: How Immigration Became Illegal ». 21 Zack, N. (1998), Thinking about race. 22 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 203. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 104 l'histoire du colonialisme, de l'empire britannique et de l'indépendance américaine en vue de mieux comprendre l'arrière-fond blanc suprématiste du génocide des Premières nations. Pour Mendoza, la notion d'étrangers perpétuels (perpetual foreigners), qui constitue une de ses idées centrales, désigne des ethnies et des groupes sociaux racialisés qui ne seront jamais reconnus comme des vrais américains des États-Unis. Dans « Illegal : White Supremacy and Immigration Status23 », l'auteur suggère que les Afro-Américains, descendants de l'histoire odieuse de l'esclavagisme, sont les premiers étrangers perpétuels, à la différence de Chomsky pour qui le génocide des Premières Nations constitue le « premier péché originel » de l'histoire des États-Unis (pour reprendre l'expression et le commentaire de C. W. Mills24 au sujet de ce débat américain). L'acte de naturalisation de 1790 : terres autochtones à vendre Mendoza et Chomsky soulignent cependant tous deux l'importance d'examiner le Naturalization Act de 1790. Comme en atteste l'extrait suivant, les critères de citoyenneté américaine étaient extrêmement relâchés et promouvaient l'idéal d'expansion de la suprématie blanche : « Any alien, being a free white person, who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States for the term of two years, may be admitted to become a citizen25 ». Selon l'historien Matthew Frye Jacobson, l'idéal démocratique des membres du Congrès visait non seulement à s'affranchir de la monarchie britannique, mais également à choisir les citoyens habilités, en leur qualité morale, à s'engager dans les processus décisionnels26. L'étude des législations de l'époque témoigne d'une volonté explicite de faciliter et d'encourager une immigration blanche, considérée seule digne de cette démocratie naissante. Il importe également de noter, suivant Chomsky27, que les immigrants de l'époque étaient des privilégiés et qu'aucune loi ______________ 23 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 208. 24 Mills, C. W. (2015), "Unwriting and Unwhitening the World". 25 1790 Naturalization Act. 26 INTELECOM (2018), The Naturalization Law of 1790. 27 Idem. L'évolution
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terme
«
illégal
»
dans
l'histoire
de
l'immigration
américaine selon
Chomsky
et
Mendoza
:
Une
histoire
du
racisme dans
les
politiques
d'immigration
des
États‐Unis 105 restreignant l'immigration n'entravait leur accession à la citoyenneté pendant toute la durée de cette législation. Sous cet angle, on peut lire le Homestead Act (1862) et le Dawes Act (1887) comme des moyens législatifs mus par cette volonté d'expansion de la suprématie blanche. Le premier offre presque gratuitement des terres à tout immigrant naturalisé américain, personne blanche de facto, qui le demande. Le deuxième permet à ces individus blancs, citoyens de facto, d'acheter des terres qui sont situées dans les réserves autochtones : Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That in all cases where any tribe or band of Indians has been, or shall hereafter be, located upon any reservation created for their use, either by treaty stipulation or by virtue of an act of Congress or executive order setting apart the same for their use, the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized, whenever in his opinion any reservation or any part thereof of such Indians is advantageous for agricultural and grazing purposes, to cause said reservation, or any part thereof, to be surveyed, or resurveyed if necessary, and to allot the lands in said reservation in severalty to any Indian located thereon in quantities28. Le Dawes Act est peut-être une des pièces législatives de l'histoire du colonialisme américain les plus oppressives en ce qu'il autorise le gouvernement à pénétrer dans les réserves des Premières Nations, à imposer un statut juridique individuel à leurs membres, ce qui les oblige donc en quelque sorte à se désaffilier de leur peuple respectif, à légaliser la dépossession des terres et la destruction du tissu social des peuples autochtones au profit des « nouveaux arrivants » naturalisés citoyens américains. Ni les Autochtones ni les Africains, forcés de travailler comme esclaves, ne sont éligibles à la naturalisation puisque les premiers ne sont ni blancs, ni reconnus sous la juridiction des États-Unis et les deuxièmes ne sont ni blancs ni libres. ______________ 28 Dawes Act, 1886. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 106 Le 14e amendement et l'acte de naturalisation de 1870 : citoyenneté et droit du sol Mendoza et Chomsky soulignent tous deux l'importance du 14e amendement, adopté en 1868 après la guerre civile, qui introduit le changement radical du critère de citoyenneté par naissance en sol américain : « All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside29 ». Cette législation a été conçue explicitement, rapporte Chomsky, pour réparer les torts causés aux personnes d'origine africaine vivant aux États-Unis qu'on avait réduit à l'esclavage, comme en atteste cet extrait du Naturalization Act de 1870 : « And be it further enacted, that the naturalization laws are hereby extended to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent30 ». Il faut également noter que non seulement les personnes blanches et les personnes d'ascendance africaine nées aux États-Unis pouvaient donc ainsi accéder à la citoyenneté, mais également les personnes nées en Afrique, victimes du trafic humain à l'époque de l'esclavagisme qui se trouvaient alors en sol américain. La citoyenneté par droit du sol demeure toutefois inaccessible pour les membres des Premières Nations, n'étant pas racialement éligibles, car résidant sur les réserves qui ne sont pas sous juridiction américaine. Par contre, la section 6 du Dawes Act introduit également un changement significatif à ce sujet à partir de 1886 : And every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States to whom allotments shall have been made under the provisions of this act, or under any law or treaty, and every Indian born within the territorial limits of the United States who has voluntarily taken up, within said limits, his residence separate and apart from any tribe of Indians therein, and has adopted the habits of civilized life, is hereby declared to be a citizen of the United States, and is entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of such citizens, whether said Indian has been or not, by birth or otherwise, a member of any tribe of Indians within the ______________ 29 14th Amendment. 30 Naturalization Act of 1870. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 107 territorial limits of the United States without in any manner affecting the right of any such Indian to tribal or other property31. Cette conception ethnocentrique de la citoyenneté repose sur la présomption que la culture américaine est supérieure aux cultures des Premières Nations et sur la croyance idéologique que le colonialisme apporte la civilisation. Sans pouvoir s'attarder sur cette question complexe à la suite de Chomsky, quelle est la notion de « blanchité » véhiculée par cette notion de citoyenneté ? Est-ce qu'un Autochtone « civilisé » devient blanc aux yeux de la loi ou constitue-t-il une exception à la norme blanche de citoyenneté par défaut, tout comme le sont les Noirs à partir de 1870 ? Les travaux de Mendoza et de Chomsky nous invitent à découvrir l'histoire de l'immigration américaine à travers la racialisation des groupes sociaux qui ont été tour à tour perçus comme des étrangers perpétuels et des immigrants illégaux. Page Act (1875), Chinese Exclus ion Act (1882), Asiat i c Barred Zone (1917) : du perpétuel étranger à l'immigrant illégal En 1875, le Congrès décide de bloquer l'immigration des femmes chinoises en émettant une clause interdisant l'entrée aux prostituées :« The importation into the United States of women for the purposes of prostitution is hereby forbidden32 ». Le 141e chapitre de la deuxième session du 43e Congrès en 1875 est un acte supplémentaire qui porte exclusivement sur l'immigration de personnes qui viennent de la Chine, du Japon ou de n'importe quel pays « oriental ». La troisième section se lit comme une condamnation de la prostitution au nom des valeurs familiales pour rendre cette politique d'exclusion plus acceptable33, mais les intentions réelles des membres du Congrès consistaient à limiter l'arrivée des immigrants ______________ 31 Dawes Act, 1886. 32 Page Act, 1875. 33 Abrams, K. (2005), « Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law », p. 643. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 108 chinois en territoire américain. Mendoza précise que c'est à partir de l'Acte de 1875 que les Chinois commencent à être perçus et représentés comme des perpétuels étrangers 34. Par la voie du Chinese Exclusion Act en 1882, le gouvernement des États-Unis déclare que la présence de travailleurs chinois dans le pays met en péril le bien-être de la communauté : Whereas, in the opinion of the Government of the United States the coming of Chinese laborers to this country endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory thereof: Therefore, be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that from and after the expiration of ninety days next after the passage of this act, and until the expiration of ten years next after the passage of this act, the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and the same is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the expiration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States35. C'est dans cette législation que la notion d'immigrant illégal apparaît officiellement pour la première fois36. Les premiers immigrants illégaux venaient donc de la Chine et plusieurs d'entre eux, qui étaient déjà résidents aux États-Unis, se faisaient déporter. Mendoza rapporte les cas des décisions de la Cour Suprême de déporter Chae Chan Ping en 1889 et Fong Yue Ting en 189337. Chae Chan Ping (pour ne mentionner que ce cas-là) était un citoyen chinois ayant vécu une douzaine d'années à San Francisco avant d'effectuer un court voyage en Chine, muni d'un certificat lui permettant de revenir aux États-Unis. Pendant son absence, le Congrès entérine le ______________ 34 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 210. 35 Chinese Exclusion Act, 1882. 36 Lee, E. (2002), « Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion along the U.S. Borders with Canada and Mexico, 1882-1924 », p. 55. 37 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 210-211. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 109 Scott Act qui rend son certificat invalide et au nom duquel la Cour suprême rejette la contestation de Ping et légalise sa déportation : If, therefore, the government of the United States, through its legislative department, considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not be assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority which adjuges the necessity in one case must also determine it in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary. [...] The power of the government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments38. L'histoire des États-Unis est à la fois l'histoire d'un pays qui s'est bâti grâce à l'immigration, mais aussi de politiques d'admission et d'exclusion profondément racistes et xénophobes que le gouvernement a mis en place de manière particulièrement despotique, sur les cendres brûlantes du génocide des premiers peuples autochtones et les horreurs de l'esclavagisme, en se munissant d'un pouvoir absolu (plenary power). Dans son livre The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration, Mendoza qualifie le fait qu'un gouvernement possède et exerce le pouvoir plénipotentiaire de déporter une personne ayant vécu plusieurs années dans le pays sans lui accorder aucune possibilité de recours comme un « sérieux problème moral »39. Matthew Frye Jacobson, historien de l'Université de Yale, rappelle que c'est le gouvernement américain qui avait d'abord fait appel au ______________ 38 Chae Chan Ping v. United States. 39 Mendoza, J. J. (2017), The moral and political philosophy of immigration: liberty, security, and equality, p. 126. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 110 gouvernement chinois afin de recruter des travailleurs pour la construction du chemin de fer transcontinental40. Toutefois, parallèlement et après la complétion de ces travaux de construction, les Chinois commencèrent à s'installer à San Francisco en démarrant notamment des entreprises de confection de chaussures et de cigares. La communauté chinoise représentait désormais une menace potentielle sur le marché de l'emploi aux yeux de la population blanche américaine. Or, l'argument économique n'était pas le seul responsable du Chinese Exclusion Act. Il y avait aussi cette idée que les Chinois représentaient des étrangers racialement inéligibles à la naturalisation et qu'aucune avenue vers l'américanisation n'était possible pour eux. Cette méfiance raciste proclamée par les membres du Congrès selon laquelle les Chinois constituaient des communautés fermées incapables de s'intégrer à la culture et à la démocratie américaines était renforcée par la formation des « chinatowns » ou quartiers chinois et cela en dépit du fait, comme le rapporte Jacobson, que c'est en réalité l'acte de naturalisation de 1790 excluant toute personne non blanche qui obligeait donc les Chinois à vivre en communauté marginalisée. En 1902, le Chinese Exclusion Act fut renouvelé et ne prit fin qu'en 194341. Quand la section « Asiatic Barred Zone » incluse dans l'acte sur l'immigration de 1917 est adoptée, la zone géographique d'immigrants inéligibles à la naturalisation s'étend à presque toute l'Asie sans toutefois comprendre la Chine et le Japon42. Toutefois, à ce moment, le Chinese Exclusion Act et le Gentlemen's Agreement de 1907 (restreignant l'immigration japonaise) sont toujours en vigueur ; l'immigration des Chinois et des Japonais était donc déjà bloquée : That the following classes of aliens shall be excluded from admission into the United States: [...] Unless otherwise provided for by existing treaties, persons who are natives of islands not possessed by the United States adjacent to the Continent of Asia, [...] or who are native of any ______________ 40 INTELECOM (2018), The Chinese Exclusion Act. 41 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p. 200-203. 42 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 211. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 111 country, province, or dependency situate on the Continent of Asia43. Il importe de rappeler qu'à peu près à la même époque existait aussi au Canada une législation anti-immigration chinoise et un racisme nationaliste exprimé par le slogan populaire « White Canada Forever ». En 1880, les frontières du Canada étaient ouvertes à tous sauf aux immigrants chinois. En effet, ceux-ci, à la différence de tous les autres groupes, avaient à payer une taxe d'entrée44. Bien que cette taxe soit passée de 50$ à 500$ en l'espace de 18 ans, elle n'avait pas réussi à freiner une immigration chinoise importante. Le 1er juillet 1923, le gouvernement canadien adopta l'infâme loi sur l'immigration chinoise45. Celle-ci, aussi connue sous le nom de Loi d'exclusion des Chinois, interdit à presque tous les immigrants chinois de venir au Canada46. La loi ne fut abrogée qu'en 1947. Fait intéressant, Chomsky remarque qu'à l'époque, il n'y avait aucune inquiétude quant à la naissance de bébés mexicains à l'intérieur des frontières étasuniennes, par voie de conséquence, aucune restriction sur l'immigration mexicaine47. La raison tragique étant que les Mexicains étaient considérés comme des « deportable workers », leur statut d'immigration avait peu d'importance en tant que tel, comme en témoignent la déportation de centaines de milliers de Mexicains dans les années 1930 ainsi que l'opération Wetback en 1954, pendant laquelle 400 000 à un million de Mexicains ont été « retournés » de l'autre côté de la frontière. Au lendemain de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, le phénomène de l'immigration illégale sera au coeur d'une des problématiques les plus complexes de notre temps. ______________ 43 1917 Act. 44 Dirks, G. E. (7 février 2006), « Politique d'immigration canadienne ». 45 Idem. 46 Radio Canada International, « L'immigration chinoise au Canada ». 47 Chomsky, A. (2016), « Undocumented: How Immigration Became Illegal ». Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 112 Hart-Cel ler Act (1965) et Immigrat ion Reform and Contro l Act (1986) : naissance de l'immigration illégale L'acte de Hart-Celler sur l'immigration et la nationalité de 1965 proclame l'égalité des chances en ouvrant les possibilités à tous les immigrants du monde de venir vivre aux États-Unis. Après toutes ces victoires des mouvements des droits civiques entre 1940 et 1965, les États-Unis ne peuvent plus se permettre d'appliquer des politiques d'immigration ouvertement racistes48, explique Mendoza. Cela commence à être embarrassant pour une démocratie qui prétend combattre la tyrannie et l'oppression des pays communistes. D'autant plus, rappelle Chomsky49, que l'article 2 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme adoptée en 1948 par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies stipule que les gouvernements ne peuvent pas dépouiller certains groupes sociaux de leurs droits, tels que le droit de travailler, d'être payé équitablement, de recevoir une éducation, de manger, d'avoir un toit et de recevoir des soins médicaux. L'impact de cette défense normative des droits humains fondamentaux n'est pas négligeable dans l'évolution des termes politiques, éthiques et philosophiques du débat sur l'immigration (initié en grande partie par la contribution substantielle de Joseph Carens50), oscillant entre le droit des États souverains d'inclure ou d'exclure à leur guise et les droits fondamentaux des migrants, considérés comme des personnes morales devant être protégées de discriminations injustes : Chacun peut se prévaloir de tous les droits et de toutes les libertés proclamées dans la présente Déclaration, sans distinction aucune, notamment de race, de couleur, de sexe, de langue, de religion, d'opinion politique ou de toute autre opinion, d'origine nationale ou sociale, de fortune, de naissance ou de toute autre situation51. ______________ 48 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 215. 49 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p.XVIII. 50 Carens, J. H. (2015), The ethics of immigration. 51 La Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme, Nations Unies. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 113 On ne saurait sous-estimer l'évolution parcourue entre l'acte de naturalisation de 1790 (concernant la naturalisation des personnes blanches) et l'acte de 1965 qui favorise la réunion des familles et l'immigration des personnes ayant des habiletés techniques, mettant fin, du moins sur papier, à la discrimination basée sur la nationalité d'origine : Section 202 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 175; 8 U.S.C 1152) is amended to read as follows: "(a) No person shall receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant visa because of his race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence, except as specifically provided in section 101(a) (27). section 201 (b), and section 203. Provided, That the total number of immigrant visas and the number of conditional entries made available to natives of any single foreign state under paragraphs (1) through (8) of section 203 (a) shall not exceed 20,000 in any fiscal year52. L'immigration est limitée à 20 000 personnes par année, par pays d'origine. Toutefois, les immigrants mexicains, qui avaient bénéficié jusque-là des frontières ouvertes53, sont soumis eux aussi à cette nouvelle législation. Pour les historiens de l'immigration américaine, c'est là que commence l'immigration illégale. Les chiffres de Ngai Mai (2004) indiquent qu'avant l'acte de 1965, 200 000 braceros (travailleurs saisonniers Mexicains) traversaient la frontière Mexique/États-Unis chaque année. Or, le nombre de déportations de Mexicains sans papiers s'élève à 151 000 en 1968 et à 781 000 Mexicains en 197654. Si pour Mendoza, le revirement des frontières ouvertes Mexique/ÉtatsUnis à la politique des limites numériques (numerical cap) est soudain et transforment les travailleurs saisonniers en immigrants illégaux de manière brutale, Chomsky propose une lecture plus intéressante. Elle soutient qu'il y a en fait une continuité entre le programme de braceros ______________ 52 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. 53 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 216. 54 Idem. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 114 et l'Acte de 1965, l'opération Wetback et la déportation des immigrants illégaux55. Sous des appellations différentes, le système reste le même : les Mexicains restent des personnes sans protection citoyenne susceptibles en tout temps d'être déportées. Chomsky démontre un schéma qui se répète constamment en ce qui concerne le droit ou non d'appartenir à la communauté américaine (et qui se répète sans doute aussi dans de nombreux autres pays). On peut tolérer pour un certain temps la main d'oeuvre à bon marché qui n'est pas considérée blanche, mais il est hors de question – par le biais d'instruments législatifs instituant cette exclusion d'intégrer les populations dites racialisées au sein de la société. Le cas des populations autochtones victimes de génocide mis à part, le processus se répète avec les Noirs, les Chinois et les Mexicains. Puisqu'il est devenu inacceptable d'appliquer des politiques ouvertement racistes ou discriminatoires, on construit l'expression d'immigrant illégal au coeur d'une nouvelle rhétorique qui ne cesse de stigmatiser des groupes sociaux vulnérables. Cette catégorie permet de disposer des personnes dès qu'on a terminé de se servir de leur main d'oeuvre et de leur labeur à bon marché. Selon Chomsky, toutefois, le gouvernement américain ne cherchait pas spécifiquement à cibler les Mexicains aux fins de déportation par le biais des seuils numériques de l'acte Hart-Celler. C'est l'ignorance (de cette ignorance ou méta-ignorance du racisme systémique dont parlent également des auteurs comme Mills56 et Medina57) de tout un système de privilèges et la non-reconnaissance des inégalités existantes qui permet la perpétuité d'un système injuste58. Selon elle, les politiques restreignant l'immigration devraient tenir compte des causes structurelles et historiques de la migration, de la dépendance économique qu'entretient le pays d'origine, dans ce cas-ci le Mexique, avec les États-Unis59. ______________ 55 The College of St-Scholastica (2017), Justice and U.S. Immigration Policy with Aviva Chomsky. 56 Mills, C.W. (1997), The Racial Contract et (2007) « White Ignorance ». 57 Medina, J. (2013), The epistemology of resistance: gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and resistant imaginations. 58 The College of St-Scholastica (2017), Justice and U.S. Immigration Policy with Aviva Chomsky. 59 Idem. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 115 Mendoza, quant à lui, se concentre davantage sur le tort que l'acte sur l'immigration et la nationalité de 1965 fait aux citoyens américains qui semblent partager la même race et/ou la même ethnie que beaucoup de sans-papiers. Ces personnes sont plus susceptibles de subir le unamerican profiling60, c'est-à-dire qu'on les traite comme des suspects, comme des personnes pouvant potentiellement être des immigrants illégaux. Objets d'une surveillance étroite, ils sont les victimes de discrimination indirecte. Une législation sur l'immigration doit s'assurer que non seulement elle ne commet pas d'injustice en implantant des politiques directement discriminatoires, comme celles d'avant 1965, mais elle doit aussi s'assurer qu'elle n'implante pas non plus des politiques indirectement discriminatoires causant du tort à certains groupes de citoyens. De manière perverse, les restrictions imposées par les politiques d'immigration de l'acte de 1965 condamnent certains groupes d'américains des États-Unis à être perçus et traités comme des citoyens de seconde zone, des étrangers perpétuels. À cet égard, Mendoza rapporte la décision de la Cour Suprême, en 1975, concernant le profilage racial qu'a subi Felix Humberto Brignoni-Ponce à titre d'exemple. Alors qu'il roulait sur une autoroute près de la frontière mexicaine, des agents des services frontaliers ont arrêté sa voiture simplement parce que lui et ses deux passagers avaient l'air mexicain et pouvaient donc être soupçonnés d'être des immigrants sans papiers61. Selon Mendoza, la Cour Suprême légitima d'une certaine manière ce type de profilage racial étant donné le contexte. The Court in this case looked into whether 'Mexican appearance' which according to court documents was not used to denote a particular race or ethnicity, but a nationality__ was sufficient to warrant this kind of stop. The court ruled that roving border patrol agents could not stop people solely for 'appearing Mexican', but that because of the recent increase in undocumented ______________ 60 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 216. 61 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 116 immigration from Mexico, 'Mexican appearance' could be used as a relevant factor for such a stop (Johnson 2004, 3031: United States. v. Brignoni-Ponce (1975)62. Toutefois, il importe ici de nuancer la lecture ambiguë de Mendoza puisque, en fait, le jugement de la Cour Suprême semble plutôt affirmer exactement le contraire. La Cour a jugé que cette arrestation était illégale, et qu'elle violait le quatrième amendement63, amendement qui protège justement les citoyens des arrestations arbitraires64. In this case the officers relied on a single factor to justify stopping respondent's car: the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants. We cannot conclude that this furnished reasonable grounds to believe that the three occupants were aliens. At best the officers had only a fleeting glimpse of the persons in the moving car, illuminated by headlights. Even if they saw enough to think that the occupants were of Mexican descent, this factor alone would justify neither a reasonable belief that they were aliens, nor a reasonable belief that the car concealed other aliens who were illegally in the country. Large numbers of native-born and naturalized citizens have the physical characteristics identified with Mexican ancestry, and even in the border area a relatively small proportion of them are aliens. The likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor, but, standing alone it does not justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are aliens.65. Mais d'autres observateurs de ce cas, tels que Johnson et Mendoza, ressentent sans doute le besoin de préciser que la reconnaissance de circonstances atténuantes (le fait d'une augmentation récente de l'immigration illégale provenant du Mexique) ______________ 62 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 216. 63 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. 64 Fourth Amendment. 65 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 1975, page 422, U.S. 886-887. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 117 est une pensée de trop qui ne rend jamais le profilage racial des Mexicains justifiable pour autant. Immigrat ion Reform and Contro l Act (1986) : le renforcement des frontières et le statut des immigrants sans papiers Les deux aspects de l'Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA, 1986) qui semblent le plus dignes d'intérêt, selon Mendoza et Chomsky, sont : 1) le fait que les employeurs doivent dorénavant vérifier le statut d'immigration de leurs employés; et 2) l'amnistie qui est offerte aux personnes sans papier arrivées aux États-Unis avant le 1er janvier 198266. Pour Mendoza, même s'il reconnaît le droit de l'État de décider avec qui il veut bien s'associer, et même si le devoir ne lui incombe pas d'accueillir tous les immigrants qui le demandent, tous les citoyens et non-citoyens devraient bénéficier d'une protection contre les excès des lois d'immigration67. Et, en ce sens, il n'est pas moralement admissible que les employeurs contrôlent le statut d'immigration de leurs employés. En effet, toute personne résidant aux États-Unis a le droit de jouir de la présomption d'innocence et d'être traitée comme ayant légitimement le droit d'être là où elle est jusqu'à preuve du contraire. D'ailleurs, comme le souligne Chomsky68, le 14e amendement est théoriquement censé assurer la protection à toute personne face à l'État puisqu'il indique : « No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws69 ». Dès 1868, la notion de personne était conceptualisée en tant qu'entité indépendante de son statut d'immigration dans le cadre du 14e ______________ 66 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 217. 67 Mendoza, J. J. (2014), « Discrimination and the Presumptive Rights of Immigrants », p. 78. 68 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p.XXI. 69 Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 118 amendement. Conformément à cette tradition juridique, les décisions de la Cour Suprême Graham v. Richardson, 1971 et Plyer v. Doe, 1982 attestent que toute personne a le droit à l'éducation et à l'aide sociale du gouvernement fédéral, peu importe son statut d'immigration70. L'aspect purement arbitraire du 1er janvier 1982 comme date limite d'arrivée pour pouvoir jouir de l'amnistie offerte par le gouvernement fut décriée par Chomsky et de nombreux critiques de cette législation. En fait, selon le Washington Post, deux millions d'immigrants sanspapiers n'ont pas pu bénéficier de cette amnistie71. La plupart parce qu'ils étaient arrivés après le 1er janvier 1982, les autres parce qu'ils ne savaient pas que cette amnistie avait lieu. Dans son livre Undocumented, Chomsky soulève les importants intérêts économiques qui sont en jeu pour maintenir le statu quo et l'inertie autour de l'immigration illégale en examinant comment l'industrie de l'agriculture et des centres de détention des immigrants, par exemple, ont tout à gagner à ce que les États-Unis continuent d'accueillir les immigrants sans papier et que ceux-ci continent d'être criminalisés. En ce sens ironique, l'IRCA fut une réussite, puisqu'après son implantation, l'influx d'immigrants sans papier a augmenté72. Des milliers de personnes continuent de risquer leur vie et celle de leurs enfants parce qu'elles sont, selon Chomsky, forcées de le faire en raison des contraintes économiques et politiques dont les États-Unis en sont en grande partie responsables. L'accord de libre-échange Mexique-États-Unis signé en 1994, le North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a eu un effet si dévastateur chez les fermiers mexicains qu'ils se sont mis à migrer de manière inédite jusqu'alors aux États-Unis. L'interférence des États-Unis dans la politique interne du Guatemala, du Honduras et du Salvador a aussi grandement contribué à accroître l'instabilité des gouvernements et à augmenter la violence dans ces pays. En conséquence, le tort des États-Unis est de ne pas reconnaître le rôle (parmi d'autres facteurs, bien entendu) qu'il a joué dans la détérioration de ces pays devenus dangereux et ______________ 70 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p. XXI. 71 Plumer, B. (30 janvier 2013), « Congress tried to fix immigration back in 1986. Why did it fail ? ». 72 Chomsky, A. (2014), Undocumented: how immigration became illegal, p. 191. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 119 invivables pour un pourcentage grandissant de ces populations poussées vers l'exode. I l l ega l Immigrat ion Reform and Immigrant Respons ib i l i ty Act (IIRAIRA, 1996) : les mesures législatives de dissuasion et de sanction Avant l'ère Trump qui représente un point de bascule indéniable mais qui ne sera pas étudiée ici, faute de recul historique, Bill Clinton a imposé la plus sévère législation à l'égard de l'immigration illégale de toute l'histoire des États-Unis, selon Mark Levin, auteur et avocat73. Chomsky rapporte que cette législation, adoptée en 1996 : 1) augmente le budget des centres de détention pour immigrants et le budget de la sécurité aux frontières ; 2) facilite la déportation ; 3) oblige les demandeurs d'aide sociale au niveau fédéral à présenter des preuves de citoyenneté ; 4) augmente les pénalités pour ceux qui sont entrés dans le pays sans autorisation ; 5) oblige les établissements d'enseignement à fournir des informations sur leurs étudiants étrangers au Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)74. Il s'agit de la stratégie attrition through enforcement75, une stratégie d'usure qui mise sur des mesures de sanction et de dissuasion consistant à rendre la vie aux États-Unis tellement pénible pour les non-citoyens qu'ils vont finir par quitter d'eux-mêmes ou décider de ne jamais mettre les pieds aux États-Unis. Parmi les conséquences désastreuses de cet acte législatif qui instrumentalise les employeurs et les établissements d'enseignement comme moyens de contrôle, on compte le fait que les immigrants dont la situation n'est pas régularisée se retranchent de plus en plus dans la clandestinité et vivent dans la peur de travailler et d'envoyer leurs enfants à l'école. Aujourd'hui, 80 pour cent des immigrants non-documentés sont ______________ 73 Levin, M. (2019), Clinton's Tough Immigration Law in the 90s. 74 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p. 208. 75 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 218. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 120 d'ascendance latino-américaine76. Selon Mendoza, c'est l'ensemble des citoyens américains d'ascendance latino-américaine qui est disproportionnellement visé par ces politiques de lutte contre l'immigration illégale. Une des conséquences les plus moralement problématiques est le fait que ces mesures législatives créent deux catégories de résidents américains, ceux qui ont le privilège de ne jamais avoir à penser à leur citoyenneté et ceux qui sont constamment en état d'alerte en raison de leur statut précaire77. Cette scission entre les citoyens et les non-citoyens s'inscrit au coeur d'une même communauté et, plus souvent qu'on ne peut le croire, au coeur d'une même famille78. En outre, on peut considérer le renforcement des frontières par la stratégie de prevention through deterrence, c'est à dire l'augmentation du personnel et des ressources aux points d'entrée accessibles tout en comptant sur les barrières naturelles (montagnes, déserts et rivières) comme cordon de sécurité, comme un échec sur les plans stratégique, économique et humanitaire, selon Mendoza79. Malgré les milliards de dollars investis, le nombre d'immigrants sans-papier a augmenté, passant de 3.5 millions en 1994 à 12 millions en 2007, et, entre 2000 et 2014, près de 6 000 personnes sont mortes en tentant de franchir les barrières naturelles80. Pour que les migrants cessent de mourir en traversant le désert et passent plutôt par les points d'entrée habituels, Chomsky suggère de démilitariser les frontières81. Bien qu'elle croie qu'une meilleure distribution des ressources et opportunités permettrait à l'Amérique du Nord de suivre le modèle des frontières ouvertes de l'Union Européenne,82 Chomsky soutient que de ______________ 76 Mendoza, J. J. (2014), « Discrimination and the Presumptive Rights of Immigrants », p.75. 77 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p.218. 78 Mendoza, J. J. (2017), The moral and political philosophy of immigration: liberty, security, and equality, p.111. 79 Ibid., p. 97-98. 80 Idem. 81 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, p. 189-190. 82 Idem. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 121 remédier à toutes les mesures punitives et discriminatoires de l'Acte de l'Immigration de 1996 serait déjà un point de départ significatif. Conclusion En dernière instance, comment devrait-on appeler les personnes qui vivent à l'intérieur des frontières sans l'autorisation appropriée? Si pour Toobin, le terme « unauthorized »83 est plus précis que les expressions problématiques « illegal » et « undocumented », pour Mendoza et Chomsky, le débat sur les termes en jeu dépasse les simples technicalités de la terminologie. Par leur analyse historique et réflexion philosophique, ces deux auteurs veulent déconstruire le concept d'immigrant illégal pour mettre en évidence les aspects arbitraires, discriminatoires et parfois inhumains des mesures législatives qui ont marqué l'évolution des politiques d'admission et d'exclusion des États-Unis. Leur intérêt marqué pour les termes qui ont été utilisés en vue de désigner, définir et stigmatiser certains groupes sociaux relève d'une démarche similaire à celles des leaders afro-américains des années 60 qui se sont battus pour la reconnaissance de l'égalité des Noirs. À bien des égards, leur lutte politique devait commencer par la déconstruction du langage qui servait à les désigner et les opprimer. L'histoire socio-politique de l'évolution des termes negro (qui veut dire « noir » en espagnol) et nigger est un cas de figure exemplaire pour illustrer le pouvoir et la violence des mots. Dans cet esprit, les démarches de Mendoza et de Chomsky cherchent à dénoncer les formes d'oppression et de discrimination qui ont marqué l'histoire de la terminologie de l'immigration aux États-Unis. En dépit des divergences qui les distinguent, les deux auteurs partagent en commun le désir de recommencer la discussion sur l'immigration sur une nouvelle base, une qui appelle les migrants des personnes et qui reconnaît les droits de tous les immigrants comme des droits humains. En dernier lieu, selon Chomsky, pour qu'une législation sur l'immigration soit véritablement juste, il faudrait que les États-Unis ______________ 83 Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 122 commencent par adopter des changements substantiels dans leur politique étrangère vis-à-vis les pays d'origine des migrants afin que ceux-ci soient capables de rester chez eux. Ce que Chomsky semble invoquer ici est une notion de responsabilité causale et de devoir de réparation. Une politique d'immigration idéale corrigerait en quelque sorte les torts infligés aux pays dont sont originaires les immigrants qui en auraient subi les conséquences. À cet égard, son approche historique fait sens avec ses prescriptions politiques, puisque son analyse critique de l'histoire de l'immigration aux États-Unis est censée éclairer les principaux enjeux que les législateurs doivent appréhender de manière juste et responsable. Cela dit, il semble que la perspective de Chomsky pèche à la fois par excès d'idéalisme et de naïveté. Bien que l'impact des politiques étrangères, des décisions économiques et de l'ingérence politique des États-Unis dans la gouvernance des autres pays ne soit pas discutable dans le contexte de la mondialisation, c'est un tout autre défi de démontrer le lien de causalité directe entre les agissements des États-Unis et les mouvements de migration en termes de responsabilité causale et de devoir de réparation. La solution idéale pour répondre aux enjeux multifactoriels et complexes de l'immigration consisterait-elle donc à orienter la politique étrangère des États-Unis afin que les conditions d'existence dans les autres pays encouragent leur population à rester chez elle? En dernière analyse, la position de Chomsky semble trop simpliste et naïve. Par contraste, Mendoza propose dans son livre The Moral and Political Philosophy of Immigration (2016) une approche sans doute plus plausible car moins révolutionnaire, consistant à développer une éthique de l'immigration indépendante des causes structurelles et politiques qui ont poussé les individus à la migration, qui reconnaît le droit des États souverains d'édicter leur politique d'admission et d'exclusion mais dans le respect de certains droits fondamentaux des personnes migrantes84. Cela dit, l'approche réformatrice de Mendoza (que certains pourraient qualifier de plus conservatrice en regard de celle de Chomsky) soulève à son tour certaines interrogations critiques car comment peut-on véritablement appréhender les enjeux de l'immigration contemporaine si on ne saisit pas les injustices ______________ 84 Mendoza, J. J. (2017), The moral and political philosophy of immigration: liberty, security, and equality, p. 116-117. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 123 structurelles qui en sont les causes ? Toutefois, dans le cadre de cet article, ce sont moins les positions respectives de Chomsky et de Mendoza qui nous intéressent que l'importance de leur analyse historique, à l'aune des tensions raciales, des politiques de l'immigration aux États-Unis qui nous permet de mieux comprendre les enjeux inhérents au débat terminologique en usage. L'apport le plus intéressant des réflexions philosophiques de Mendoza au sujet de l'immigration est le fait de conceptualiser le racisme en oeuvre dans l'évolution historique des mesures législatives des États-Unis. Une pratique raciste est une pratique qui fait du tort, cause un préjudice ou dénigre le statut d'une personne simplement parce qu'elle est identifiée à une certaine notion de race selon la conception constructiviste de la race chez Mendoza85. Magali Bessone décrit le racisme comme « un système de pouvoir et de domination indexé sur des marqueurs visuels que l'on a appris à considérer comme signifiants86 ». En ce qui concerne les restrictions et les critères d'exclusion qui ont formé les politiques d'immigration aux États-Unis, les travaux de Mendoza et de Chomsky auront démontré qu'il s'agit de racisme institutionnel, tel que défini par Naomi Zack87, c'est-à-dire un système d'opportunités et de privilèges qui sont distribués de façon disproportionnée à la faveur de certaines catégories sociales et au détriment de certains groupes racialisés. À notre époque où une partie de la population américaine scande des slogans suprématistes blancs pour soutenir la présidence Trump, sa politique de séparation des familles et son projet de construction d'un mur frontalier, il va sans dire que les contributions de Mendoza et de Chomsky sont remarquablement importantes. ______________ 85 Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », p. 203. 86 Bessone, M. (2013), « Précis de Sans distinction de race ? Une analyse critique du concept de race et de ses effets pratiques », p. 459. 87 Zack, N. (1998), Thinking about race et Zack, N. (2002), Philosophy of science and race. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 124 Bibliographie 1790 Naturalization Act, Chap. 3; 1 Stat 103, 1st Cong., 2nd sess. (26 March 1790). 1917 Immigration Act, H.R. 10384; Pub.L. 301; 39 Stat. 874., 64th Cong., 2nd sess. (February 5, 1917). 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, H.R, 2580; Pub.L. 89-236; 79 Stat. 911. 89th Cong., 2nd sess. (3 October 1965). Abrams, K. (2005), « Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law », Columbia Law Review, vol. 105, n° 3, p. 641-716. www.jstor.org/stable/4099477 , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Bessone, M. (2013), « Précis de Sans distinction de race ? Une analyse critique du concept de race et de ses effets pratiques », Philosophiques, vol. 40, n° 2, p. 457-460. https://id.erudit.org/iderudit/1023705ar , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Carens, J. H. (2015), The ethics of immigration, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 364 p. Chinese Exclusion Act, Chap. 126; 22 Stat. 58., 47th Cong., 1st sess. (May 6, 1882). Chomsky, A. (13 septembre 2016), « America Wanted to Keep Immigrants Out Long Before Donald Trump Was Even Born », The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/america-wanted-to-keepimmigrants-out-long-before-donald-trump-was-even-born/ , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Chomsky, A. (2007), « They take our jobs! »: and 20 other myths about immigration, Boston, Mass, Beacon Press, 264 p. Chomsky, A. (2014), Undocumented: how immigration became illegal, Boston, Beacon Press, 256 p. Chomsky, A. (2016), « Undocumented: How Immigration Became Illegal », dans Howard County Friends of Latin America, Columbia. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oZxhQ3KiACs&list=PLLWU UyRMFFmbltQy7CReEfvusOwJWfhe-&index=3&t=0s , consulté le 23 novembre 2019. Dirks, G. E. (7 février 2006), « Politique d'immigration canadienne », l'Encyclopédie Canadienne. https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/fr/article/politiquedimmigration-1 , consulté le 8 juillet 2019. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 125 FAIR's About Us (juin 2009), « Illegal Alien or "Undocumented Immigrant?" », Federation for American Immigration Reform, <https://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/illegal-alien-orundocumented-immigrant>, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Feere, J. (26 octobre 2012), « Language in the Immigration Debate », Center for Immigration Studies, https://cis.org/Language-ImmigrationDebate, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893). George III. "The Royal Proclamation October 7, 1763". The Avalon Project. « Immigration reform », The Office of Hillary Rodham Clinton, <https://www.hillaryclinton.com/issues/immigration-reform/>, consulté le 23 novembre 2019. INTELECOM (2018), The Chinese Exclusion Act. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Sv1GD4rNg&list=PLLWUUyRMFFmbltQy7CReEfvusOwJWfhe-&index=4 , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. INTELECOM (2018), The Naturalization Law of 1790. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nfbgbWZntOE&list=PLLWU UyRMFFmbltQy7CReEfvusOwJWfhe-&index=4&t=0s , consulté le 23 novembre 2019. Jarrett, L. (24 février 2017), « Are undocumented immigrants committing a crime? Not necessarily », CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2017/02/24/politics/undocumentedimmigrants-not-necessarily-criminal/index.html>, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Kopp, C. (12 avril 2013), « Associated Press Recommends Media Stop Using "Illegal Immigrant", WUSF News, <https://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/post/associated-pressrecommends-media-stop-using-illegal-immigrant>, consulté le 23 novembre 2019. Nations Unies (6 octobre 2015), « La Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme », <https://www.un.org/fr/universal-declarationhuman-rights/>, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Lee, E. (2002), « Enforcing the Borders: Chinese Exclusion along the U.S. Borders with Canada and Mexico, 1882-1924 », The Journal of Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 126 American History, vol. 89, n°1, p. 54-86. www.jstor.org/stable/2700784 , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Levin, M. (2019), Clinton's Tough Immigration Law in the 90s. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yM9QSr6Y4k8 , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Lyon, C. (15 juillet 2015), « Immigration Act of 1917 | Densho Encyclopedia », <https://encyclopedia.densho.org/Immigration%20Act%20of%201 917/>, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Medina, J. (2013), The epistemology of resistance: gender and racial oppression, epistemic injustice, and resistant imaginations, Oxford; New York, Oxford University Press, (Studies in feminist philosophy), 332 p. Mendoza, J. J. (2014), « Discrimination and the Presumptive Rights of Immigrants », Critical Philosophy of Race, vol. 2, n°1, p. 68–83. Mendoza, J. J. (2016), « Illegal: White Supremacy and Immigration Status », dans Sager, A. (dir.), The Ethics and Politics of Immigration: Core Issues and Emerging Trends, London, UK: Rowman & Littlefield International, p. 201–220. Mendoza, J. J. (2017), The moral and political philosophy of immigration: liberty, security, and equality, Lanham, Lexington Books, 158 p. Mills, C. W. (1997), The racial contract, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 171 p. Mills, C. W. (2007), « White Ignorance », dans Race and epistemologies of ignorance, Albany, State University of New York Press, p. 11-38. Mills, C. W. (2014), « Unwriting and unwhitening the world », dans Race and Racism in International Relations, London, Routledge, p. 202-214. « Naturalization Act of 1870 », Encyclopedia.com, https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/applied-and-socialsciences-magazines/naturalization-act-1870, consulté le 23 novembre 2019. O'Brien, Matt et al. (juillet 2018), « Why "Illegal Alien" is the Correct Term », Federation for American Immigration Reform, https://www.fairus.org/issue/illegal-immigration/why-illegal-aliencorrect-term, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Page Act of 1875, Sect. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 1873-March 1875. L'évolution
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États‐Unis 127 Plumer, B. (30 janvier 2013), « Congress tried to fix immigration back in 1986. Why did it fail? », Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/30/in -1986-congress-tried-to-solve-immigration-why-didnt-it-work/, consulté le 23 novembre 2019. Radio Canada International, « L'immigration chinoise au Canada », Le Mois du patrimoine asiatique au Canada, <https://www.rcinet.ca/patrimoine-asiatique-fr/le-mois-dupatrimoine-asiatique-au-canada/limmigration-chinoise-au-canada/>, consulté le 23 novembre 2019. The College of St-Scholastica (2017), Justice and U.S. Immigration Policy with Aviva Chomsky, Duluth. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=631YQuEN8GM , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica (29 août 2019), « Dawes General Allotment Act », Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Dawes-General-Allotment-Act, consulté le 22 novembre 2019. Toobin, J. (5 août 2015), « Should I Use the Term "Illegal Immigrant"? », The New Yorker. https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/should-i-usethe-term-illegal-immigrant , consulté le 22 novembre 2019. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), Justia. United States, Congress, 14th Amendment. Legal Information Institute. United States, Supreme Court, 130 U.S. 581 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, Legal Information Institute. United States, Supreme Court, 149 U.S. 698, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, Legal Information Institute. U.S. House. 49th Congress, 2nd Session. Dawes Act. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1886. U.S. House. 37th Congress, 2nd Session. 12 Stat. 392, The Homestead Act. Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 1862. U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 25. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia. Marie‐Mirella
Tranquille 128 Zack, N. (2002), Philosophy of science and race, New York, London, Routledge, 145 p. Zack, N. (1998), Thinking about race, Belmont, CA, Wadsworth Pub. Co., 140 p.

Research Article Copyright © All rights are reserved by Florin Gaiseanu Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness Florin Gaiseanu* PhD, Principal Senior Researcher, Science and Technology of Information, Bucharest (Romania) and Barcelona (Spain) Abstracts Introduction: This article discusses the brain hierarchical organization/evolution as a consequence of the information-induced brain development, from the perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. Analysis: In the frame of the Informational Model of Consciousness, a detailed info-neural analysis ispresented, concerning the specific properties/functions of the informational system of the human body composed by the Center of Acquisition and Storing of Information, Center of Decision and Command, Info-Emotional Center, Maintenance Informational System, Genetic Transmission System, Info Genetic Generator and InfoConnection center, in relation with the neuro-connected brain areas, with a special attention to the Info-Connection and its specific properties. Besides a meticulous analysis of the info-connections/neuro-functions of these centers, a special attention was paid to limbic/cingulate cortex activities. Defined as a trust/confidence center, additional features are highlighted in correlation with the activity of the anterior cingulate cortex, consisting in the intervention/moderation of amygdala emotional signals, conflicting opposite YES/NO data and error eliminati on in the favor of the organism adaptation/survival, the intervention in the certainty/uncertainty balance to select a suitable pro-life information (antientropic effect), in moderation of pain and in the stimulation of the empathic inter-human relations/communication. Representing the correspondence between the informational subsystems and the brain area map, it is shown that the up/down integration of information by epigenetic mechanisms and the down/ up evolution are correlated. Results: The analysis of the functions of the anterior cingulate opens new gates of investigations concerning the involved intimate mechanisms at the level of cell microstructure, specifically on the compatibility with quantum assisted processes admitted by the Informational Model of Consciousness and the quantum-based models The discussion on the information integration/codification by epigenetic mechanisms shows that this process starts from the superior levels of brain conscious info-processing areas and progressively advances to the automatic/autonomic inferior levels of the informational system, under insistent/repetitive cues/stress conditions, pointing out an hierarchical functional/anatomical structure of the brain organization. Additional arguments are discussed, indicating that the down/up progressive scale representation is a suggestive illustration of the brain evolution, induced/assisted/determined by information, accelerated at humans by the antientropic functions of th e Info-Connection center. Conclusions: The hierarchical organization of the brain is a consequence of the integration process of information, defining its development accordingly to the adaptation requirements for survival during successive evolution stages of the organism, information playing a determinant/key role. Keywords: Information; Informational systems; Brain hierarchical organization/evolution; Information induced evolution Introduction In some recent articles it was shown that the human body activity could be assigned to two main categories, which were defined as poles or axes of the organism: information and matter[1]. The human body could be regarded as a bipolar info- matter structure, where information plays a key role for adaptation and survival [2, 3]: on one hand the capture of information from environment is necessary for momentary adaptation, and on the other hand matter processing assures the body power and regeneration resources. The processing of the insistently DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672 ISSN: 2641-1911 Archives in Neurology & Neuroscience This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License ANN.MS.ID.000672. Page 1 of 9 *Corresponding author: Florin Gaiseanu, PhD, Science and Technology of Information Bucharest (Romania) and Barcelona (Spain). Received Date: March 20, 2020 Published Date: April 09, 2020 Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. Page 2 of 9 transmitted information from the surrounding ambient by cues/ stress stimuli, or by learning and acquired abilities, is assimilate into the matter genetic structure of the body, and can be transferred to the next generation by means of epigenetic processes [4]. The intimate mechanisms of the transmission of information between and inside of the cells were explained also recently within the Informational Model of Consciousness, by information-assisted embodiment/disembodiment interactions [5]. The implication of such info-matter processes into the body activity and operation shows that information is a fundamental agent for adaptation and survival. Beside information, the circuit of matter, which can be defined as a metabolic axis of the organism, is responsible to sustain mainly the power/energetic/regeneration resources of the organism [4, 6]. As it was stipulated recently [7], information is a key for the life and life origin. This was however argued in the previous Draganescu's works, which founded/established a decisive milestone in the science of information in this domain, showing that information is not only a fundamental agent involved in the living, but also in the matter structuration [8,9]. According to his findings, the structuration of matter cannot be performed without the participation of information, as a deeply and actively involved factor, so the structuration process of matter is actually a consequence of the activation of ordinary (non structured deep layer) matter by information, which determines a sense and tendency for structuration. The following relation should be taken therefore into account: Unstructured Matter + information => Structured Matter. Moreover, a huge quantity of information is necessary to structure the living components to become an animate whole entity, according to the relation: Structured Matter + Information => Living [9], as it was explained in detail earlier [10,11]. The human organism appears therefore to be a bipolar infomaterial structure with two poles/axes, i.e. information and matter, so the body itself can be defined as an informed-matter structure [10]. Starting from these outcomes and from the basic statements of the Informational Model of Consciousness recently reported [5], in this paper it is shown that information is not only a fundamental parameter to maintain the interaction with the environment and body itself, but also a key/determinant parameter for the brain hierarchical evolution and organization. Basic Statements of the Informational Model of Consciousness and Info-Neural Analysis Basic Statements The Informational Model of Consciousness, shows that the architecture of the informational system of the human body is composed by seven main informational subsystems, assuring the management of its basic functions to comply with a fundamental objective: survival. This objective regards the entire horizon of time: (i) Reception/processing of genetic information from the parents (predecessors) as an Info-Genetic Generator (IGG). (ii) Info-management of the matter-related necessities by means of the Maintenance Informational System (MIS) during the present existence time. (iii) Genetic Transmission System of information (GTS) for species survival in the future. However, the momentary or mediumterm adaptation for survival requires more engaged functions, i.e. (iv) Processing of information for adaptation/correlation with the environment and body itself is assured by the Center of Decision and Command (CDC), responsible for the infooperability , info-processing/elaboration and transmission of the decision to the motor/execution elements. (v) Center of Acquisition and Storing of Information (CASI), which keeps/offer the life experience data to CDC. (vi) Info-Emotional System (IES) managing the emotional body reactions. (vii) A special informational activity is represented by the Info-Connection (IC) pole of the organism, helping/assuring the life and body/mental equilibrium and normal informational work [10, 1-3]. This item will be furthermore discussed in detail latter Figure 1. Info-neural analysis Each of these subsystems is connected with specific areas of the brain as represented schematically in the info-neural diagram in Figure 1. IGG and GTS, mainly responsible for body development according to the age and the reproduction respectively, are mainly represented by the specific functions of hypophysis, situated to the lower part of the brain. With a size of a pea, the hypophysis has a very low weight, of only 0.5 grams. As small as it is, it plays an important role as a master gland, engaged together with hypothalamus to control the organism development and growth, managing the energy and metabolism, osmotic regulation in the body and water balance within the kidney, playing a role also in temperature regulation [11], functions specific of IGG. As it is to be expected, this also is involved in the control of the organism aging, as it was recently shown [12]. Hypothalamus is also involved in the sex/hormonal development and differentiated functions of female/male, influencing/determining distinct sexual activity and behavior starting from the puberty age, by the control of the hypophysis secretion, while the basal ganglia seems to play a role in the inherited personality features and predispositions [13], specific of IGG. Defining the genetic transmitted support for the new generation as a matter-related information, within the Informational Model of Consciousness IGG is connected to the input genetic information. Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Page 3 of 9 Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. Within GTS, the hypophysis and hypothalamus tandem control the reproduction functions, represented by the management of the activity of both masculine and feminine sex organs, particularly the pregnancy, childbirth and even pain relief during such process, the breastfeeding and the breast milk production. The informational communication with the specialized organs takes places by means of the long distance communicating agents, which are the hormones. The fabrication of these agents are stimulated by hypothalamus. The secreted hormones like oxytocin help the uterine contractions and pain relief [14]. As it is to be expected, it is important to note that the limbic system, recognized within the Informational Model of Consciousness as a site of the emotional processes leaded by IES, influences also the endocrine/autonomic nervous system, playing a role in sexual arousal. Within the Informational Model of Consciousness, GTS is connected and acts as a matter-related (genetic) info-output. The activities of MIS are mainly executed by the brainstem, composed by midbrain, pons and medulla oblongata (or medulla), representing only about 2.6% from the total weight of the brain [14], which assures a relay-type transit (motor commands to the body and sensory information from the body to the brain) and signals info-integration. The brainstem is connected to spinal cord and with hypothalamus, assuring the main automatic/autonomic vital functions of the organism, concerning the digestion and cardio-respiratory processes like blood pressure/vasomotor activity, cardiac rhythm/rate, vomiting and sneezing, supported especially by medulla. The pons control the signals associated with sleep, respiration, swallowing, bladder activity, hearing/ equilibrium, taste, eye movement, facial expressions/sensation and posture, while midbrain the vision, hearing, motor control, sleep/ wake, arousal/alertness signals and temperature regulation [15]. Some functions of hypothalamus controls and integrates autonomic activities like body temperature, hunger/thirst, fatigue, sleep, and circadian rhythms, attributed to MIS. The midbrain acts mainly as a helping relay-type transmitter of a part of sensory signals like vision and hearing, motor control, sleep/wakefulness cycle, alert signal sensitivity, temperature regulation and is a prime form of the brain, present even at the ancient vertebrates [16]. As its "substantia nigra" fabricates dopamine, a neurotransmitter involved not only in excitation/ movement and motivation/habitude at human and even to some inferior species like insects, but also in the "happiness"/pleasure/ satisfaction sensations, defined within the Informational Model of Consciousness as "emo-states", this function could be associated mainly to IES and collaterally to GTS due to the dopamine release during the sexual act/gratification and also to IGG, due to the agingassociated decreasing of the dopamine secretion. The expected sensation of satisfaction acts therefore as a reward/motivation for the initiation of some movements/actions. The deficiency of dopamine in the brain is the cause of degenerative Parkinson's disease, while the dysfunction of dopamine activity with respect to the cell receptors is involved in schizophrenia, attention deficit hyperactivity and bipolar disorder, Tourette syndrome (stereotype tics and movements) and addiction. Figure 1: Info-neural diagram schematically representing the brain areas and the corresponding informational subsystems according to their main functions, allowing to observe the integration of the acquired information (left side) and the brain evolution/organization (right side). Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Page 4 of 9 Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. IES is mainly related with the limbic system, composed by thalamus, hypothalamus, hippocampus, midbrain and amygdala, responsible for the emotional activities. The limbic system also interacts with the basal ganglia. The basal ganglia, located near the thalamus and hypothalamus transmits/administrates the signal commands from cortex to the motor elements, controlling also the posture and movement. In terms of Informational Model of Consciousness, IES is an essential participant to attitude, which is the info-output of the Operative Informational System (composed by CASI+CDC+IES) for the short/medium-term adaptation, intervening in the posture, as a body external reactive expression of the internal decision. Amygdala is one of the most important component of this system, with functions concerning first of all the detection and reaction to the fear. Amygdala is therefore deeply involved in emotional processes, able to participate in detection/evaluation of danger, including its perception and the strengthening of spatial memory and learning in the adult hippocampus, as emotional experiences. An abnormal function of amygdala induces therefore mental anxiety diseases. Due to its main task, the detection and rapid reaction against the risk/ danger, amygdala plays an important role in attention [17] and the rapid evaluation, within a process which is usually known as the "first impression" [17]. Some functions of hypothalamus refer to parenting attachment behaviour[18], associated to GTS. Due to its central position between the cortex (which is mainly the headquarter of the analysis and decision within CDC) and brainstem/hypophysis, the limbic system is linked to various functions like emotions, sensory (olfaction) processing and action/motor driving, attention/consciousness, autonomic regulation, instincts, memory, but also to dysfunctions like epilepsy, anxiety, bipolar syndrome, schizophrenia [19] Therefore, within the Informational Model of Consciousness, the info-emotional processes are associated to impulsive actions, due to the close/ heavy relation of the amygdala with the reactivity/motor executing elements, initiated by the input information. The cortex is the outer part, superior level of the human and mammals cerebrum, showing a dense folded area of about 0.12 square meters and 2-4 mm thickness, which determines a high efficiency of occupation in the cranial space and represents more that 80% from the brain mass, with about 14-16 billions of nervous cells [20]. The cortex is the representative area where the thought is active and is the center of the information processing, attention, creativity, decision-making and communication, intelligence, judgement, planning, voluntary control/command of the muscles, specific to CDC. For this reason, within the Informational Model of Consciousness, the data field consisting in values/criteria [21, 22], abstract and non-abstract concepts acquired or created on the basis on the existing experience/models stored in CASI and processed by CDC, was defined as the info-creational field, specific to the personal mind universe. This was also the reason to define by the personal representative "I" (myself) the projection into the conscious mind of the informational sub-systems as: CASI =>Iknow, CDC =>Iwant, IES =>Ilove, MIS => Iam, GTS => Icreate, IGG => Icreated and IC =>Ibelieve. The last definition shows that IC is an antientropic pole of the organism, because this operates to select from various uncertainty possibilities only one, as a certain information, reducing therefore the entropy of the analyzed assumed info-system [23, 1]. In order to detect an information in this field, the thought acts as an informational vector/operator, needing an address where this should go [10, 5]. In the prefrontal cortex is stored the momentary received information from the external/internal sensors, while the long-term consolidated information is deposited/stored in the hippocampus, brain areas specific to CASI. This subsystem is connected to internal and external sensors and the associated circuits, from which the signals are received and perceived. Most sensory information attains the cerebral cortex by means of thalamus, excepting the olfactory signals. Within the Informational Model of Consciousness, the attitude, as a decisional information generated by CDC, is the informational output of the informational system of the human body [5, 24], mainly expressed by (but not limited to) the vocal system. Posture and facial expression also contribute to the external display of the internal decision. As a part of CASI, the cerebellum is the brain component responsible for the long-term memory of the acquired skills and abilities, like the playing an instrument or driving a car. These types of information include besides the memory of theoretical concepts the motor abilities, all of them integrated into unique compact infomotor series of acquired info-executive pathways. The cerebellum is therefore involved in the complex learning processes. Within the Informational Model of Consciousness, the muscles and other similar components of the body are execution/transducers elements [1]. Believed to be only a center of motor controls, coordinating the precision/equilibrium/posture as a fine relay and integration of the movement signals received from the spinal cord, cerebellum is actually an important part not only of the human brain, but also a main constituent of the vertebrate brain. However, at human the cerebellum, with a contribution of about 13% from the brain weight together with brainstem, is implied not only in info-motor learning, but also in additional functions like attention, language and emotional fear/pleasure regulation [25], indicating it as a valid partner of IES. A special discussion should be done concerning the IC center. As specified above, this is an antientropic pole of the informational system of the human body, defined in terms of information as an antientropic center, able to decrease the informational entropy (so of uncertainty) consequently to increase the level of certainty by info-acquirement, which has a key role in the equilibrium of the organism [6]. According to the Informational Model of Consciousness, this pole could be connected to the entropic/antientropic field of matter/ antimatter-like system, explaining the phenomena associated with Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) [26, 27] and other extra-power properties of the mind like premonition [28]. In terms of neuroscience, this pole is attributed to the anterior cingulate cortex Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Page 5 of 9 Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. with a demonstrated implication in Religious and Mystic Experience [29, 30]. The cingulate structure is a subcortical layer with various functions implied both in conscious (attention and associated eyes motor, anticipation, decision-making, ethics and morality, emotions and especially error detection [31])and autonomic activities (blood pressure and heart rate) [32], empathy, cooperation, competition, as well as disorders of social cognition [33], constituting practically a managing administrator of information in double senses, from the inferior to the superior direction of the brain and in a reverse order [34]. A summary of this analysis is schematically shown in Figure 1, where the discussed areas of the brain (central side) are represented in correlation with the corresponding informational subsystems of the human body, as defined by IMC (left side). The two columns in the left side of this figure indicate the conscious (left column) and unconscious (right column) components of the informational system of the human body. Within IMC, it was defined as the Operative Informational System (OIS) the sum CASI + CDC + IES, with functions dedicated to info-relation with environment and body for suitable adaptation, and as Programed Informational System (PIS) the sum MIS + GTS + IGG, dedicated to info-management of the metabolic and genetic processes, automatically performed. PIS assures the body maintenance (MIS) and the processing of the genetic input/output information by IGG/GTS respectively. IC is a special automatic body/information and info-social connector/ mediator, as it will be shown also in more details below. From the perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness, the brain hierarchical evolution/organization shows an informational-assisted progressive development from simple/automatic functions/structural organization to complex/ info-decisional structures (right side arrow in Figure 1), and the infointegration by epigenetic processes from complex brain info free-will decisional structures/areas towards automatic/autonomic zones of the brain, determining the acquirement of new traits and the epigenetic adaptation to the external cues (left side arrow in Figure 1), as it is discussed in more details below. Results: Informational-Assisted Brain Organization and Evolution The neuro-properties of the Info-Connection center The experimental findings mentioned above on the activity of the anterior cingulate cortex can be related with the previously defined properties of IC center, as informational/antientropic pole of the organism within the Informational Model of Consciousness (IMC). This correlation shows that this implied brain area intervenes in the evaluation/decision of conflicting situations for the selection of a certainty solution, by the elimination of the error. This is actually the definition of information, discussed earlier within IMC, taking into account that an quantity of information is obtained by the elimination/reduction of uncertainty from an analyzed system [3, 6]. Within such a system, the conflicting data represents actually the YES/NO possible alternatives, anterior cingulate cortex deciding in the favor of the most suitable/convenient solution, according to the organism central pro-life objective, i.e. adaptation for survival. These findings justify therefore the IC concerned functions, stipulated by IMC, and its properties claimed earlier [10, 26, 28]: antientropy (which is favorable to life, against the entropic tendency associated to matter systems), anti-anxiety/equilibrium (conciliation between the contrary opponents), trust (belief in a correct solution by error elimination), security and protection (moderation of pain/fear/distress), peaceful sensation (mediation between amygdala – the alarm center – and the prefrontal awareness cortex), power of multi-events detection (enhancement of the focused/motivated attention and of the view acuity/perception), anticipation (premonition capacity), right judgement (ethics and morality implication), positive orientation of the social relations (empathy stimulation), as claimed within IMC, and even "divine" states experienced by religious practices and evocations [29], as it was shown recently about the Religious and Mystic Experiences, explained by IC-IMC concepts [30]. New experimental evidences on the properties of the anterior cingulate cortex predicted by IC-IMC [10,23,28] were recently reported [35], strongly supporting the IMC and its predictions, mentioned above. One interesting future investigation line should be specifically dedicated to check if the cell microstructure of the cingulate cortex and their functions could be compatible with the quantum assisted processes described within IMC (mind disembodiment and external exploration) and with the quantum-based model proposed earlier [36]. On the other hand, we have to note that on the evolution scale, the cingulate cortex is a novel structure, very well represented and implicated in the human brain functions, as this analysis shows. Formed by distinct type of neurons, named spindle cells, indicating that this layer is recent on the evolutionary scale [37], this should play an important (maybe a fundamental) role in the accelerated human brain specific adaptive evolution and in the acquirement of new brain features and functions. Hierarchical info-integration process In Figure 1 is represented in the left side the increase up/ down sense of the integration process of information by means of the informational subsystems of the organism. This is based on the observation concerning the evolution of received/perceived information by CASI, which is initially non related with body informed matter, but progressively included in the intimate cells mechanisms as a consequence of multiple interactions with them. Therefore, within IMC it was distinguished between virtual (non body matter-related) and matter-related information, as interacted with the body cells, by means of epigenetic mechanisms [4]. During the first stage of info-perception from the external sensors and electro-chemical transmission by neuron and interneuron synapses, the information in CASI follows first of all the acquisition step in the short-term memory (frontal cortex), where Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. Page 6 of 9 this information cannot be stored for more than a few minutes (typically 1 minute or less). The interaction/"binding" of information with matter during this process is therefore fragile, supported by metastable reversible inter-related mechanisms. During a second step however, which consists in a repetitive/intensively expressed/ addressed information, this can be redistributed and stored in the long-term memory (hippocampus). Therefore, besides the contribution of CASI (perception, transmission and storing process), CDC plays an important role, deciding that this information it is, or not important for own system necessities. Within this phase, the repeatability and/or the intensity of the informational signal with respect to its significance for the security/wellbeing/survival of the organism plays a key role in the long-term memorization. For this, the traumatic (intensively recorded) experiences especially by children, whom the capacity of control is still fragile, are deeply stored in memory, affecting negatively the entire life of the traumatized persons [38]. Therefore, as the informational system of the human body is equipped with an alarm system, i.e. amygdala as a part of IES, not always CDC alone could make a decision, specifically in exceptional situations. IES is therefore an engaging partner for integration of a new information within the information system of the human body, not only in special moments/situations, but also during the integration of a certain information implying affectivity. According to IMC, emotions represent actually a body response to the received information, automatic or not, and are stored in CASI too. Amygdala takes automatic decisions and commands, known and expressed by the famous paradigm "fight or flight", transmitting them to the motor elements [20]. Emotional participation for a deep memorization under a stable and consolidated form is therefore an amplification factor for a deeper integration of information. By such processes, informed matter, defined within IMC as any component of the body participating to the reception/transmission of information, acquires a new information for adaptation of the body itself under the new ambient/external conditions, for survival. The mechanisms of the information transference between various interacting components of the body multi-particle system were defined as embodiment/disembodiment of information, understanding by this that information, as an immaterial (action/ change) operator, is incorporated or released into or from body matter itself during the interaction process between information and matter [5].A more complex and complete info-integration step consists in the acquisition of the learned info-motor stereotypical behaviours converted into personal abilities, like playing an instrument or driving of a car. Such automatic info-motor sequences are assimilated with the participation of the corresponding motormemory component of the brain – cerebellum. The acquisition of a typical info-motor sequence, becoming by repetition a standard behaviour, seems to be from the evolutionary point of view a precursor of the automatic/autonomic basic processes, driving the body motor vital functions, managed by MIS. The epigenetic integration process is the ultimate step of infointegration , ready to be transmitted as a genetic information to the offspring. As a consequence of such a process, the new acquired information induced by the external insistent/repetitive cues, is finally codified as acquired traits by the epigenetic core of the cells, without affecting their genetic structure. This process is according to IMC operated by GTS and assumed by IGG of the offspring.The info-integration process described above, suggests therefore that the human brain is able to assure its own and body evolution for adaptation, by hierarchical up/down progressive incorporation of the external received information, perceived as a stress/cue maintained for a long time period, repetitively/intensively applied, and to transmit it to the next generation for the survival continuity. This progressive info-incorporation is successfully finalized by epigenetic codification of the new acquired information into the genetic core of the cells, without affecting its stable structure. The paradigm "function makes the organ" seems to work by means of such intimate mechanisms with implicit participation of information, as an imprescriptible component. Information is therefore a key/fundamental agent directly implicated in the brain/ body evolutionary process. This process starts from the superior level of the brain, able to select the virtual information, and finalizes with the stable matter-related info-integration, following a welldefined trajectory, from CASI-CDC to GTS-IGG via IES and MIS type steps, with the participation of IC (selective antientropic function), as it is shown in the left side of Figure 1. The brain hierarchical evolution/organization The brain evolution and organization could be therefore discussed as a reverse process, from simple to complex structure, where information is an essential participant and active operator for body and functional evolution. This is shown in Figure1 right side, where the scale indicative arrow is oriented from basic (lower) to highly organized (upper) structure. As it was remarked above, the basic structure of the brain is the spinal cord, continued by brainstem, cerebellum and limbic system, with fundamental functions consisting in relay-type transmission from and toward the body, intervening in learning, in time/spatial distribution to the various superior zones of the cortex for info-processing and decision. As the survival is the pivotal objective of the organism, assuring its conditional existence face to the natural conditions, this basic simpler structure is equipped with essential vital tools: the maintainer of the present life operating processes (brainstemMIS + reactive security adviser (amygdala or precursors [39]-IES) + learning tool for adaptation (cerebellum-CASI), and reproduction manager for future life continuity (hypophysis-GTS). By abbreviated names of the informational subsystems indicated in this context, we have to assume only the reduced, primary functions of their activity, completed only if the participation of the superior echelons of the brain, i.e. cortex and cingulate cortex are taken into account. Even so, such a reduced brain system would be auto-sufficient to assure its existence and to affront the living conditions, fulfilling the survival objective. Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. InformationBased Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Page 7 of 9 Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672. The autonomic/automatic working of the most part of such a reduced rudimentary system is by it itself an argument to consider such system a basic, primary form of brain, assuring the minimal but vital functions on the evolutionary scale. Indeed, if we analyse such systems in terms of information/entropy balance, we have to note that these systems dispose of small possible unoccupied states, so of a small capacity for the processing of a new information, because most of them are involved ("occupied") already in automatic chaintype routinist processes. The brain composition of the vertebrates is quite similar with a "reduced" brain, showing a common underlying sub-structure, which appears during the early stages of embryonic (IGG managed) development, before the cortex hemispheres, adapted themselves to the specific necessities within the own living ambient – air, water or land areas [15]. This shows that the brain hemispheres are an adaptable structure, organized latter, upon a basic/primary existing substrate. The embryonic development is actually a quickly-shown movie of the species evolution, nature seems to follow again its learned lesson during a large period of time. In the earlier stage of the development, the brain of vertebrates consists in three distinct structures: hindbrain (medulla, pons and cerebellum), midbrain and forebrain (brain hemispheres), so the minimal basic structure on the evolutionary scale, assuring the brain connection with the body and its vital processes, seems to be the hindbrain. This was confirmed in the case of some very ancient precursors of vertebrates [40]. On the evolutionary scale, IGG is able to configure the anatomic structure and to transmit it by means of GTS to the successors, progressively enriched with the new acquired traits by epigenetic mechanisms [41], successively consolidated and amplified during the lifetime of many generation, if the stress/cue factors are constantly/repetitively maintained [4]. The down/up hierarchical organization of the human brain on the evolutionary scale (Figure 1 right side), from simple to complex structures, starting with basic brainstem assigned to vital automatic functions (MIS) to cerebral cortex (CDC-CASI) via limbic system (IES), is also demonstrated by the cingulate cortex structure (IC site), formed by specific spindle-cells type neurons close to the limbic system, novel on the scale evolution. These cells are able, among many other functions, to detect emotional external feelings [36]. The mothers for instance are sensitive to the child signals by means of these neuronal structures, showing their capability to participate in the inter-human empathic communication. Within IMC, it was shown that this center is implied in the quantum-assisted detection of special range of phenomena, like that associated with NDEs [26], RMEs [30] and PSI (paranormal) experiences [28], as mentioned above. The input information from sensors is received in cortex in a hierarchic way, from down to upper side, excepting the visual information, which was extensively developed at humans more than other senses like smell, ones they were able to walk on two legs. Even so, the visual signals for face recognition are still sent to amygdala near-instantly for rapid evaluation. The smell information, highly developed to animals, especially to dogs, overtaken at humans by sight, is managed by the limbic system, showing its very ancestral connection with the survival objective. Mechanical vibrations of the sound are transformed in electrical signals and transmitted to brainstem and auditory cortex via thalamus. Together with smell, taste has a survival value, allowing the food selection, within an informational down/up (automatic/decisional) hierarchical infocircuit starting from medulla to cortex via thalamus [36]. The brain areas corresponding to the informational subsystems are connected with body by spinal cord and the nervous ramifications of the nervous system [42]. Pain is a primary signal of danger, fundamental in the body surveillance. Following a down/ up hierarchical scale direction, the pain signals alert the brain on a body injury by pain-transmitting nerves present in almost every region, in a circuit starting from the spinal cord area of the brain, passing from amygdala to various cerebral cortex areas and anterior cingulate cortex, for analysis and motor decision [36].The increasing volume occupied by the brain in the cranial cavity from medulla to cortex as indicated by the conic blue profile in Figure 1 is an indication of the increased quantity of the neural cells implied in the operation/processing of information. Indeed, the volume proportions increases from down to upper side on the hierarchical scale as follows: cerebral cortex 77%, midbrain 4%, cerebellum 10%, spinal cord 2%, contrasting with 35% of the rat spinal cord and 31% of its cerebral cortex [43]. Careful autopsy determinations show that the human total brain weight is about 1.5kg, the cerebrum accounting for 87% of the total brain weight, the cerebellum and brainstem for 13%, whereas the contribution of the attached upper spinal cord is practically negligible (<2g) [44]. Looking from the informational point of view to the neural structural organization/evolution of the brain, we have to observe the increasing of the informational potential from the basic autonomic/automatic (PIS) to the complex free-will structures of the cortex (OIS), as shown also by the up-oriented arrow in the right side of Figure 1. Indeed, in an ideal solid state structure, were the atoms are regularly located in a symmetrical lattice cell repetitively reproduced within the entire structure, the quantity of information is reduced taking into account the small quantity of the necessary states useful to obtain the atom regular repartition [45, 46]. Therefore, the diversity multiplies the possible states participating to the entropy/information balance, so the info-processing capability, as it is the case of the neuronal system of the cerebral cortex. The accelerated brain development of the human species could be regarded therefore as a consequence of two main factors: (1) Without sufficient force or other physical performance abilities, the unique tool for adaptation was the training of the intelligent (info-processing) structure, by new info-acquisition. (2) The antientropic activity of the anterior cingulate cortex, a Archives in Neurology and Neuroscience Volume 7-Issue 5 Citation: Florin Gaiseanu. Information Based Hierarchical Brain Organization/Evolution from the Perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness. Arch Neurol & Neurosci. 7(5): 2020. ANN.MS.ID.000672. DOI: 10.33552/ANN.2020.07.000672 Page 8 of 9 novel acquired structure in the human brain, favorable to life and its attributes, contributed to this acceleration. The acquisition of new down/up anatomic/function "layers" was/is assisted/determined by information, as discussed above. On the other hand, as the down-oriented arrow in the left side of Figure 1 shows, the integration up/down of a selected information acting constantly/insistently as a stress/cue from the ambient, is integrated into the stable informational structure of the cell by means of epigenetic mechanisms, adding to human's new genetically transferable traits, so new information. That means in other words that information is able to intervene in the informedmatter structure modifying it accordingly, adding new possible informational operating states to the system. Conclusions On the basis of the recent reported results on the Informational Model of Consciousness and bipolar info-matter structure of the organism, a careful and detailed analysis is given concerning the informational system of the human body, the specific functions and corresponding brain areas of its main informational components defined as CASI (Center of Acquisition and Storing of Information), CDC (Center of Decision and Command), IES (Info-Emotional Center), MIS (Maintenance Informational System), GTS (Genetic Transmission System), IGG (Info-Genetic Generator) and InfoConnection center, which shows that these subsystems are organized in a specific anatomic and functional hierarchical architecture. In the frame of this analysis, a special attention is focused on the activity of amygdala, as a main contributor of IES and on anterior cingulate cortex, finding that its functions fit very well the properties of the Info-Connection center, as stipulated within the Informational Model of Consciousness, strongly supporting it. Indeed, this center is a moderator of the contrary conflicting concepts and actions, i.e. between YES/NO contrary components of the informational unit, eliminating/reducing the errors in the favour of an equilibrated state of the organism. In other words, this center is active in assuring a favourable state of certainty, reducing in terms of information the entropy and increasing the certainty, inspiring confidence and trust. This remarkable property is manifested also by the intervention in the balance between the contrary emotional states, reducing the fare and anxiety initiated by amygdala and even the pain, offering mind-controlled alternatives. The relation with amygdala, which detects with anticipation (before the conscious cortex) the alarming information, could explain some premonition perceptions, intervening also in the "first impression" type evaluation. A special feature attributed to this center is the emphatic info-communication between mother and children, and the emphatic inter-human social communications. Taking into account the matter/antimatter-like properties introduced by IMC to explain the quantum-assisted special phenomena like NDEs, a new and promising gate for further investigations is open both from the neuroscience/neurology and physics/information science. Representing on a hierarchical scale the info-integration process by epigenetic mechanisms, it was shown that information is progressively integrated by the brain informational subsystems from the superior informational levels of the brain (CDC, CASI) to the inferior automatic/autonomic levels, regarding both the conscious/ unconscious degree (from OIS to PIS components) and the brain up/down organization/architecture. That means, the insistent cue external (virtual) information for adaptation perceived by CASI and operated by CDC is integrated by matter-related multicellular epigenetic processes starting from unstable to stable configuration, and genetically transmitted by GTS to IGG of the new generation. Taking into account a reverse down/up evolution/organization hierarchical scale in the same representation, it is argued that the brain evolution is/was actually assisted by information, as a revers process. That means, the automatic/autonomic functions were progressively assumed under stress/cue external conditions by some rudimentary structures (brainstem, limbic system, cerebellum), during large-time phases of repetition/epigenetic process-practicing, evolving to the much more complex structure and functions represented by cortex. The accelerated development of human as species during this evolution, un ununderstood reasonably issue up to date, can be explained both by the intelligence as a unique support qnd tool for adaptation, and the antientropic/organizing-help info-contributing activity of the cingulate cortex. Conflict of Interest No Conflict of interest. Acknowledgment To my son Adrian Gaiseanu and his family, to my daughter Ana Maria Gaiseanu and her family. To the Romanian Academy and to the personalities involved in the promotion of this domain of Information Science. With grateful thanks to Prof MD Sultan Tarlaci, Prof Dr Massimo Pregnolati, Prof Stephan Shafer, Prof Dr Dirck Meijer, Prof Dr Dean Radin, Dr Constantin Bulucea, Honorary Member of Romanian Academy, Dr Cornel Cobianu, Member of the Academy of Romanian Scientists for stimulating discussions and support. Special tanks to Prof MD Sultan Tarlaci, Prof Dr Massimo Pregnolati, Prof MD Stuart Hameroff for their contributing support of this domain. Special thanks to the Editorial Board of this Journal for the professional support and invitation. References 1. Gaiseanu F (2020) Information-Matter Bipolarity of the Human Organism and Its Fundamental Circuits: From Philosophy to Physics/ Neurosciences-Based Modeling. Philosophy Study 10(2): 107-118. 2. Gaiseanu F (2019) Information: from Philosophic to Physics Concepts for Informational Modeling of Consciousness. Philosophy Study 8(8): 368-382. 3. 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Rawls and Rousseau: Amour-Propre and the Strains of Commitment Robert Jubb  Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011 Abstract In this paper I try to illuminate the Rawlsian architectonic through an interpretation of what Rawls' Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy say about Rousseau. I argue that Rawls' emphasis there when discussing Rousseau on interpreting amour-propre so as to make it compatible with a life in at least some societies draws attention to, and helps explicate, an analogous feature of his own work, the strains of commitment broadly conceived. Both are centrally connected with protecting a sense of self which is vital for one's own agency. This allows us to appreciate better than much of the literature presently does the requirement for Rawls that justice and the good are congruent, that a society of justice does not disfigure citizens' ability to live out lives relatively unmarked by relations of domination. Some comments on G. A. Cohen's critiques of Rawls are made. Keywords Amour-propre  Finality  Publicity  Rawls  Rousseau Introduction Perhaps in part because of its undoubted analytic sophistication, contemporary egalitarian political philosophy is not always particularly interested in its prehistory or in its relationship to its precursors. G. A. Cohen's recent Rescuing Justice and Equality, for example, contains no references to Kant or Rousseau despite the centrality of those authors to the evolution of the range of understandings of those two concepts available to us (Cohen 2008, p. 424). Rawls was something of an exception to this. The Kantian inheritance of Justice as Fairness was always both R. Jubb (&) School of Public Policy, UCL, Rubin Building, 29-30 Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9QU, UK e-mail: [email protected] 123 Res Publica DOI 10.1007/s11158-011-9155-1 obvious and self-conscious, for example. The publication of Rawls' Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy offers us further opportunities to come to better understand Rawls' doctrines in light of his assessments of other figures in political philosophy's canon, and perhaps also to see those other figures in a similarly novel light. The Lectures are careful to make it clear that Rawls originally had various quite particular purposes in composing them. After all, these lectures were originally written as a kind of historical preamble to the lectures which eventually became Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, and indeed what Rawls has to say about Mill in particular can probably only be made sense in light of that. It is not clear, though, that Rawls' reasons for finding foreshadowings of his own thought in the past were only narrowly pedagogical. The pedagogical impulse is to be placed in the context of a practically-oriented understanding of the point of political philosophy made only more relevant by the democratic communities in which it was to be exercised. Rawls hoped to 'identify the more central features of liberalism... when liberalism is viewed from within the tradition of democratic constitutionalism' and hence 'interpretations are proposed that seem reasonably accurate to the texts we study and fruitful for my limited purposes in presenting them' (Rawls 2007, hereafter Lectures, p. xvii and xviii). We should not expect the Lectures to be the most compelling interpretations of the texts and authors they discuss. Rather, we should look to them as explorations, through the historical conversation that took place between both its advocates and its critics, of features of Rawls' understanding of a democratic liberalism. They then become a potentially extremely useful resource for understanding Rawls' own thought. We do not just get to see what he thought of these authors, but the presentation of his conclusions illuminates how the tradition's evolution resulted in his own doctrines. It is not merely that he cannot help revealing himself in what he says about others, but that he deliberately seeks to do so. Here, I want to focus on Rawls' treatment of Rousseau in the Lectures. My interest is in understanding Rawls' presentation of Rousseau in the Lectures, and drawing out a particular implication for our understanding of Rawls' own doctrine in light of that. This may seem a rather narrow topic. I do not try and engage with alternative contemporary interpretations of Rousseau, such as those offered by Joshua Cohen or Frederick Neuhouser (Cohen 2010; Neuhouser 2008). Nor do I attempt to adjudicate between these interpretations. My interest here is not in Rousseau interpretation. It is instead in using what Rawls taught undergraduates about Rousseau to understand Rawls better, and so to open up new ways of interrogating his work and that of others. Those new questions will offer potentially fruitful parallels between Rawls and Rousseau as well as for and between other theorists, but I merely indicate, rather than explore, them here. I also hope to encourage others to use the Lectures as a resource for understanding Rawls' work more broadly on the basis of the kind of interpretative maxims I lay out here. What little has been written on them seems to me to misunderstand them. Michael L. Frazer has argued that the Lectures should be understood as an exercise in humility by Rawls and so read as guided by a maxim of charity (see Frazer 2010). This seems wrong. Making that point, though, is subsidiary to the main one about the best way R. Jubb 123 to understand Rawls and the challenges facing political theorists more generally through the discussion of Rousseau in the Lectures. Roughly, the idea is that if we are to understand the Lectures as explorations of the tradition of democratic constitutionalism, then Rawls' insistence on reconciling Rousseau's idea of amour-propre with a just political order should be seen as pointing to an important feature of his understanding of democratic constitutionalism. More, that Rawls presents Rousseau as able to achieve this reconciliation suggests that he thinks we ought to understand this feature of democratic constitutionalism in much the way that Rousseau does. Whereas Locke, Hobbes, Hume, Mill, and Marx have problems with their theories pointed out, Rousseau does not. Thus, in this paper I try and do two things. First, I try and identify the relevant feature of Rawls' own theory he highlights by emphasising the significance of amour-propre in interpreting Rousseau. Second, I explore what we might learn about that feature of Rawls' thought by comparing it with Rousseau's idea of amour-propre. I argue that by pointing to the significance of Rousseau's idea of amour-propre Rawls is emphasising the use he puts formal constraints on the concept of right to when arguing against utilitarianism. I will refer to this feature as the 'strains of commitment' although this is not quite the same as Rawls' own use of the term.1 My reason for identifying this group of ideas as those Rawls' treatment of Rousseau is supposed to point out is the similarity in Rawls' presentation of them. Both are presented not only as being satisfied by the proper public affirmation of all individuals' self-worth, but as importantly relating to agents' conceptions of themselves as purposive actors. I then argue that the strains of commitment in this broad sense have not always had their significance appreciated. The implication of Rawls' comparison is that societies that do not conform to his principles of justice will be disfigured by the kinds of pathologies that Rousseau identifies with corrupt amour-propre. To what extent that is true, to what extent it is true because of reasonable behaviour, and to what extent it matters are not questions which seem to me to have been much considered, let alone satisfactorily answered. As Ivar Labukt puts it, discussion of Rawls' claim to have shown his theory to be superior to utilitarianism 'has almost exclusively been focused on narrow and somewhat technical questions about what it would be rational to want behind a veil of ignorance' rather than on the 'role played by considerations of feasibility or practicability' (Labukt 2009 pp. 201–202). Labukt is only interested in the first of my three questions though. Whilst we reasonably want to know whether societies that do not conform to Rawls' principles of justice will be disfigured by the kinds of pathologies Rousseau identifies with corrupt amour-propre, that does not tell us whether individuals have a claim in justice against being exposed to such pathologies. The claim about feasibility, about whether a society of Rawlsian justice can perpetuate itself, cannot by itself justify justice giving weight to avoiding these 1 Rawls uses the strains of commitment to refer only to considerations of finality, referring to considerations of publicity under the heading of stability. I prefer to use the broader term since both are to do with the excessive demands a political system might make and because stability has unfortunate connotations of a modus vivendi. Rawls and Rousseau 123 pathologies. Perhaps justice should be done though the heavens may fall. We need to answer questions about why individuals are entitled to protection against a society which generates the sorts of pathologies associated with corrupt amourpropre. By developing the framework in which such questions can be productively posed, I hope to begin to the task of providing answers to them. In doing so, I offer new ways of understanding disputes around G. A. Cohen's critiques of Rawls. This paper has three Sections. The first lays out Rawls' interpretation of Rousseau and locates it amongst the available options. The second Section provides an interpretation of Rawls' insistence on the possibility of the society envisaged in On The Social Contract whilst retaining the doctrines of The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality as a condition of the coherence of Rousseau's political philosophy.2 It argues that the insistence shows the centrality of Rawls' own way of ensuring that a just society could avoid systematically disfiguring its citizens' lives to his project. The third Section attempts to further motivate Rawls' constraints, and to draw attention to the way that this motivation for them has often been missed. Obviously, the paper is more aimed at Rawls(ian) than Rousseau(vian) scholars, but I hope that it is of interest to both: perhaps in trying to expose connections between the two, we will come to understand better the difficulties of '[f]ind[ing] a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before' (SC, 1.6.4). Rousseau's Realistic Utopia Rawls made it clear that the Lectures are not best understood as straightforward accounts in the history of ideas. In particular, Rawls seemed to be using his discussion of historical figures in the Lectures to make points about the advantages of the structure of his own doctrine. He does this by using problems in their views to suggest the developments he sees his own theory as having made. His criticisms of Hobbes for lacking a theory of the reasonable distinct from a theory of the rational, for example, can be seen in this light, as can his concerns about Locke's use of a pre-existing moral doctrine (Lectures, p. 87, p. 104, p. 112). We might expect then that Rawls' discussion of Rousseau in the Lectures will have a critique which highlights the appropriateness of a particular feature of Justice as Fairness. However, there seems to be no such critique. What preoccupies Rawls in his discussion of Rousseau is the problem of reconciling the 'dark and pessimistic' Second Discourse with the 'sunnier' Social Contract (Lectures, p. 193). He sees the truth of the claim in the Discourse that human nature is good but has been corrupted as depending on whether political institutions can satisfy both 'the principles of political right' and meet 'the requirements for institutional stability and human happiness' (Lectures, p. 206). Thus, the question becomes whether the Social Contract's vision of possible 2 Citations of On The Social Contract (hereafter SC) will be by book, chapter, and paragraph, but I will refer to page numbers for The Discourse on the Origin of Inequality (hereafter Discourse). R. Jubb 123 legitimate political institutions can be made to work with the Discourse. Rawls concludes that it can. Crucial to his argument is the claim that Rousseau understands amour-propre as naturally being 'a need which directs us to secure for ourselves equal standing along with others' (Lectures, p. 198). This is a need which the society of the Social Contract can meet by replacing personal dependence with interdependence on terms all can accept. Under the social contract, the pathologies of amour-propre are dealt with and so the terrible state of other developed societies will be left behind. Rawls acknowledges that his account of amour-propre and the possibility of a non-destructive form of it draws heavily on work by Nicholas Dent and Frederick Neuhouser. The central role of amour-propre in humankind's descent into vice provided in the Discourse is clear. The question is whether it inevitably brings about the world of base equality where 'Subjects have no other Law left than the will of their Master, and the master no other rule than his passions' that the Discourse ends with (Discourse, p. 185). Dent, for example, has argued that Emile shows that 'the central demand of amour-propre... is capable of being met providing we are clear about what is our due from others-not servility and fawning adulation but a position among men of common regard and common respect' (Dent 2005, p. 105). Nor is this only possible for isolated individuals, but for whole societies. What satisfies amour-propre is a position of common regard and common respect and so 'the demands of any one individual's amour-propre can be met consistently with those of each and every other person' (Dent 2005, p. 105). Rawls' wide reading of amour-propre is then, not widely at variance with the broader literature. Although law alone cannot guarantee all a position of common regard and common respect, as Neuhouser notes, 'equality of respect as citizens' and the 'safeguarding of fundamental interests' can secure a 'recognized standing within the community that is itself a form of respect' (Neuhouser 1993, pp. 390–391). Having thus positioned Rousseau as not just a 'critic of culture and civilization', of 'the deep-rooted evils of contemporary society' and its members' 'vices and miseries', but one who tries to 'describe the basic framework of a political and social world in which they would not be present' (Lectures, p. 192), Rawls then goes on to reconstruct Rousseau's description of such a framework. Obviously, the terms of the social contract are crucial here. Rawls sees the contract as based on four assumptions made by Rousseau. First, those cooperating aim to advance fundamental interests importantly connected 'with the love of self in both of its proper natural forms' (Lectures, p. 217). Amour de soi generates interests in perfectibility and free will and amour-propre an interest in 'having a secure standing... as an equal member of our social group' (Lectures, p. 218). Second, although individual relations of dependence are terrible and an important source of the perversion of amour-propre, social cooperation is both 'necessary and mutually advantageous' (Lectures, p. 218). Third and fourth, we are equally capable of acting to advance the equal interests we have in light of our amour de soi and have a similarly equal capacity for and interest in acting justly, respectively. Hence, mirroring Rousseau's own formula, the question becomes 'how, then, without sacrificing our freedom, to unite with others to secure the fulfilment of our Rawls and Rousseau 123 fundamental interests, and to guarantee the conditions for the development and exercise of our capacities' (Lectures, pp. 219–220). Understanding the question then dictates the proper answer: 'the total alienation of each associate with all his rights to the whole community' (SC, 1.6.6). Rawls then glosses Rousseau's comments on that single clause, noting that the equality of the alienation and the interests in freedom mean this is not a licence for illiberal interference; reading the claim that the 'union is a perfect as it can be' (SC, 1.6.7) as an insistence on the social contract's derivation of principles of ultimate political right; and observing the way in which equal alienation removes relations of personal dependence (Lectures, pp. 220–222). The general will is not then 'the will of an entity that in some way transcends the members of society' but 'a form of deliberative reason shared and exercised by each citizen as a member of the corporate body... that comes into being with the social compact' (Lectures, p. 224, p. 227). This form of deliberative reason is based on citizens' common interests, interests based not on 'people as they actually are in a society marked by extremes of inequality... with the resulting evil of domination and subjection' but rather what Rawls describes as 'Rousseau's conception of the person as a normative idea' (Lectures, p. 226, p. 228). Since these interests are common, they form a kind of public reason: they make up a conception of how 'citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another' ought to reason (Rawls 1993, p. 214). That publicity, which requires mutuality, delivers justice and a kind of equality since each thinks of every other as they think of themselves. Barring some final remarks on Rousseau's views on equality and discussions of the Legislator and the infamous 'forced to be free' passage, this is the broad outline of Rawls' reading of Rousseau in the Lectures. The rather intolerant demands for tolerance, for example, do not get mentioned and Rawls clearly takes extensive pains to make Rousseau seem like an egalitarian liberal; albeit, an egalitarian liberal of a particular stripe, but one who would make a sort of sense in the contemporary scene. That alone seems to me a service, but that is not all that there is to remark on in Rawls' reading of Rousseau. The problem Rawls sets himself in discussing Rousseau, of whether the Social Contract and the Discourse can be made compatible, is answered in the affirmative. By giving its citizens a reciprocallygranted equal status, the society of the social contract tames amour-propre. The question then becomes, if there is not a problem in democratic liberalism that Rawls has a better solution to than Rousseau does, what is Rawls' discussion in the Lectures supposed to teach us about the contours of that tradition? Amour-Propre and the Strains of Commitment We can begin to understand the point of Rawls' discussion of Rousseau by looking more closely at his characterisation of amour-propre and in particular comparing it with his explanation of why the parties in the original position would choose his two principles over utilitarianism. See the two passages below: R. Jubb 123 In its natural... form... amour-propre is a need which directs us to secure for ourselves equal standing along with others and a position among our associates in which we are accepted as having needs and aspirations which must be taken into account on the same basis as those of everyone else. This means that on the basis of our needs and wants we can make claims which are endorsed by others as imposing rightful limits on their conduct. Needing and asking for this acceptance from others involves giving the same to them in return (Lectures, pp. 198–199). What the principle of utility asks is... a sacrifice of [life] prospects. We are to accept the greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the whole course of our life. This is surely an extreme demand. In fact, when society is conceived as a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of its members, it seems quite incredible that some citizens should be expected, on the basis of political principles, to accept lower prospects of life for the sake of others (Rawls 1971, hereafter Theory, p. 178) .3 It seems clear that the discussion of how utilitarianism would fail to meet the strains of commitment is the obverse of the set of demands that the natural form of amour-propre makes. If my 'needs and aspirations must be taken into account on the same basis as those of everyone else', then it would be hard 'to accept the greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the whole course of my life'. It does not do justice to the 'rightful limits on their conduct' which those needs and aspirations impose. Utilitarianism treats people as equals as bearers and producers of utility, but treating them as equals in that sense is not the sense which Rawls' reading of natural amour-propre demands. Doing so does not address the problem of their standing, their status amongst their fellows, or their needs and aspirations.4 Utilitarianism notoriously may justify slavery, and slaves lack equal status, and neither is respecting the utility I and others get from my projects the same as respecting those projects themselves. It is not particularly surprising that Rawls thinks that Rousseau ends up ruling out utilitarianism, given Rawls' own hostility to it. Nor is it obviously an odd reading of Rousseau. As Rawls mentions, it looks like Rousseau's understanding of what the general will aims at is a shared, rather than summed, good (Lectures, p. 230, SC, 2.1.1, 2.3.2). What is distinctive about the two passages above is that Rawls' understanding of what would satisfy natural amour-propre seems to parallel his own reasoning for the rejection of utilitarianism. The features which would make a society publicly governed by utilitarian principles unbearable for some are markedly similar to Rawls' understanding of the distinctive features of a society marked by corrupt amour-propre. What makes those societies unable to meet the strains of commitment is that they do not respond adequately to the demands of something 3 That this is strictly a consideration of stability, I think, shows that it is reasonable to group both considerations of finality and publicity under the idea of the strains of commitment. 4 As Samuel Freeman puts it, '[e]qual consideration in a hypothetical decision process is not a good' in the sense that 'the resources and opportunities that enable people to achieve happiness and lead a good life' are (Freeman 1994, p. 329). Rawls and Rousseau 123 like natural amour-propre. Rawls' emphasis in the Lectures on the importance of being able to reconcile the Discourse's 'darkly pessimistic' description of the evolution of an obsession with status that ultimately leaves people 'capable of living only in the opinion of others' with the Social Contract's 'sunnier' view then comes down to a way of stressing the importance of the strains of commitment (Lectures, p. 200, p. 187, p. 193). By insisting that a society in which amour-propre is satisfied is possible and desirable, Rawls is insisting that a society in which the demands of the strains of commitment are satisfied is also possible and desirable. Bearing in mind Rawls' distinctive purposes in the Lectures, this may also explain various other features of Rawls' discussion of Rousseau there. For example, the absence of any discussion of what Rousseau has to say about religion in the Social Contract avoids bringing up the way in which Rousseau drew the conditions under which one could stand in relations of equality to one's fellow citizens much more narrowly than Rawls did. After all, as a contemporary liberal Rawls could hardly have been happy with the thought that the separation of Church and State makes 'good polity impossible' (SC, 4.8.10). The interesting question here, though, is how to understand the parallels between the strains of commitment and amourpropre: what, more precisely, is the role that the strains of commitment play in Rawls' theory, and how is that role illuminated by the parallel with amour-propre? What are the demands that meeting the strains of commitment imposes, what does meeting them protect, and how does that compare to the demands made by amourpropre and what goods those demands ought to realise? Are societies which fail to meet the strains of commitment as disfigured as societies in which amour-propre is corrupt? The strains of commitment in the broad sense that I am using the term refers to the set of considerations that Rawls argues show the superiority of his two principles to utilitarianism from the point of view of the original position. The reason these considerations matter is because of what Rawls calls 'formal constraints on the concept of right' (Theory, p. 130). Those constraints structure the choice that the parties to the original position are offered, since the principles they choose must meet the constraints Rawls lays out. Two are relevant here, finality and publicity. As I read him, Rawls uses the strains of commitment to refer to the difficulties that any given theory has in meeting the requirements of finality, and means by stability a theory's problems relating to the requirement of publicity. However, for my purposes here it is helpful to be able to group the difficulties utilitarianism has with the two constraints under one heading. Since those difficulties relate to the alleged disfiguring of lives lived under utilitarian principles and so the strain that commitment to those principles would mean for some of those living under them, I use the strains of commitment as a portmanteau term to refer to those difficulties. Publicity requires that principles of right must be 'publicly acknowledged and fully effective moral constitutions of social life': 'general awareness of their universal acceptance should have desirable effects' (Theory, p. 133). Finality means that principles of right must be 'the final court of appeal in practical reasoning' (Theory, p. 135). Because 'reasoning successfully from [principles of right] is conclusive', '[w]e cannot at the end count [claims of existing social arrangements and self-interest] a second time because we do not like the result' (Theory, p. 135). R. Jubb 123 The thought is that the two principles do well under considerations of finality because they 'insure [the parties] against the worst eventualities' and hence avoid making them party to 'undertaking[s] that in actual circumstances they might not be able to keep' (Theory, p. 176). If we could not accept reasoning from principles of right as conclusive, then they would not be final. Since utilitarianism does not ensure parties against the worst eventualities, we cannot be sure that we can accept reasoning from utilitarian principles as final. The way in which publicity creates difficulties for utilitarianism is slightly more complicated. First, there are considerations of whether a conception of right generates its own support, primarily through 'the psychological law that persons tend to love, cherish, and support whatever affirms their own good' (Theory, p. 177). Additionally, there are considerations to do with the public expression of 'men's respect for one another', since '[u]nless we feel that our endeavours are honoured by [others], it is difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing' (Theory, p. 179, p. 178). The two principles do better than a principle of utility under these considerations since 'the principle of utility seems to require a greater identification with the interests of others' (Theory, p. 177). They also do better because they include everyone's good 'in the scheme of mutual benefit and this public affirmation in institutions of each man's endeavours supports men's self-esteem' (Theory, p. 179). Conversely 'it is natural to experience a loss of self-esteem... when we must accept a lesser prospect of life for the sake of others' (Theory, p. 181). By considering both the reasons for imposing these constraints on principles of right and the reasons for thinking that the two principles do better under them than utilitarianism, we can understand which goods meeting the strains of commitment in my broad sense protects. Both the constraints and the reasons for thinking that the two principles do better under them than utilitarianism seem motivated by a concern with autonomy or agency. The finality constraint could be read as a simple assertion of the primacy of moral reasons. However, given that it is operating as a constraint on the decisions made by the parties to the original position, it seems best interpreted as a kind of responsibility criterion. The parties must bear the consequences of their decision in the original position. The requirement of finality requires that parties take their role as both subject and legislator of justice seriously. They must understand themselves as giving themselves a law. Potential principles they could not treat as the 'final court of appeal in practical reasoning'-because they required excessively onerous sacrifices for others-cannot, Rawls claims, be given to ourselves as laws in this sense. The publicity constraint, I think, is best read as an attack on false consciousness about the social system one lives within (see for example Freeman 2007a, p. 6).5 Cultural dupes are not full agents. If I do not understand the normative rationale for the institutions my life is shaped by and within, then I am not exercising full control over that life. It is instead being directed by powers external to me, those which 5 Andrew Williams' use of a publicity restriction against G. A. Cohen's incentives critique of Rawls defends that restriction on the grounds that it makes possible 'a willing identification with the social constraints to which one is subject' and a 'common pursuit of shared ends' (Williams 1998, p. 244). However, this is not the sense I am interested in. Rawls and Rousseau 123 dictate the shape of those institutions. I cannot guide my action by the correct maxims of conduct, because I do not know what those maxims are. I can hardly be giving myself a law when because of the opacity of the putative law's content, I do not know how to use it to guide my actions. Unless a doctrine justifying coercive political institutions can be publicly proclaimed without undermining those institutions or their justification, then individuals cannot be authors of those institutions or the lives they lead within them. Being systematically misled about the principles dictating the structure of one's life and the institutions one lives it out in is not autonomous. Both demand that one could live with the results of one's decision, directly in the case of finality and more obliquely in the case of publicity. One only has reason to care about that though, if one has reason to care about one's life in particular rather than some more directly aggregative consideration. Consequentialists of the sort indifferent to the boundaries between individuals, for example, have tended to reject these kinds of constraints (see for example de Lazari-Radek and Singer 2010). More, the way in which utilitarianism fails the constraints are clearly to do with the ways in which one's acceptance of it would disfigure one's ability to live a life. Utilitarianism may require people to live under a social system whose rules that left them in an unacceptable position and which relatedly systematically denied them a sense of their own importance. Crucially, then, what meeting the strains of commitment responds to the importance of is one's sense of one's own worth, and particularly one's sense of one's own worth relative to and as dependent on others. A bargain to 'acquiesce in a loss of freedom over the course of [one's] life for the sake of a greater good enjoyed by others' 'exceed[s] the capacity of human nature': 'we might wonder whether such an agreement could be made in good faith at all' (Theory, p. 176). The claim is that we cannot countenance making that kind of sacrifice because we cannot value ourselves so poorly compared to others. Similarly, the first point about publicity is one about the difficulty of valuing the good of others over our own-'the principle of utility seems to require a greater identification with the interests of others' (Theory, p. 177). The second is about the public expression of 'men's respect for one another', and the value that that has in terms of one's ability to pursue one's own projects (Theory, p. 179). Having a sense of your own worth in these ways is for Rawls a central feature of being an agent able to direct your own life. To do that, you need a secure sense that you live under a social system which takes your needs and aspirations seriously and which publicly affirms that it does so. Otherwise, at the limit, you would be a cultural dupe whose ability to prescribe yourself laws and hold yourself to them is systematically disrespected and as a consequence likely to have atrophied. This is not so dissimilar from Rousseau's picture of a society in which amourpropre runs wild. There, those on the wrong end of inequality are enslaved to their betters' capricious passions, yet celebrate that slavery: they speak 'contemptuously of those who have not the honour of sharing it' (Discourse, p. 187). However, since the masters are ruled by their passions, they are no better off. They are feted, but by those who hate them, and are just as dependent for their sense of self on that obsequiousness as those who offer it are. Just as Rawls notes that '[s]elf-respect is R. Jubb 123 reciprocally self-supporting' (Theory, p. 179), Rousseau does not think that the materially well-off benefit from standing at the right end of inequalities in an unjust society. They are not only vulnerable to all kinds of violence unrestrained by motives of justice or fellow-feeling (see for example Discourse, p. 186), but also 'forever active... constantly agoniz[ing] in search of ever more strenuous occupations', desperately seeking either 'a position to live, or renounc[ing] life in order to acquire immortality' (Discourse, p. 187). Members of such a society are not full agents. Widespread conflict means they lack security, but more, they are enmeshed in systems of mutual dependence which deprive them of the ability to properly order their own lives. Because their political system does not guarantee them a stable sense of their own worth, they are dependent on the inconstant and unpredictable valuations of other individuals and so descend into a kind of Hobbesian war of all against all over status. They are in the state of nature again but whilst the first was pure, this one 'is the fruit of an excess of corruption' (Discourse, p. 186). Whatever set of terms the social contract of such a society might have, they ask citizens to make agreements 'which exceed the capacity of human nature': they are terms which do not provide them with a secure sense of their own worth, and so terms that agents, who need such a sense, cannot live under. It is obviously significant here that the development of amour-propre is centrally linked to our ability to think of ourselves as agents. As Rousseau puts it, moving from 'the state of nature to the civil state' substitutes 'justice for instinct' in human conduct (SC, 1.8.1). If it were not for the fact that 'the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade [citizens] to beneath the condition [they have left], [they] should ceaselessly bless the happy moment which wrested [them] from it forever': their 'faculties are exercised and developed' and their 'ideas enlarged' and 'sentiments ennobled' (SC, 1.8.1). They move from being 'a stupid and bounded animal' and become 'an intelligent being' (SC, 1.8.1). If humans in the state of nature were little more than beasts, then they, like other beasts, lack the capacity to be agents in the sense that the typical human adult presently possesses. It is reason and the various faculties which make us into moral agents which makes us vulnerable to amour-propre's corruption and the attendant miseries. It therefore, makes sense, on Rousseau's understanding of the evolution of amour-propre, to think of it as a demand for respect for one's status as an agent and so parallel to features of Rawls' view which articulate that demand. Because of this, it also seems a mistake to contrast Rousseau's alleged irrationalism with Rawls' alleged rationalism. The capacities associated with purposive agency are also centrally related to amour-propre and the ways in which purposive agency might be undermined or disrespected are also ways in which corrupt amour-propre might be inflamed. If amour-propre can be satisfied only by a position of common regard and common respect, then it is at least similar to the dispositions to 'love, cherish, and support whatever affirms their own good' and that make it 'difficult if not impossible for us to maintain the conviction that our ends are worth advancing' unless 'we feel that our endeavours are honoured by others'. Rawls talks about dispositions that need to be satisfied in order to meet the constraints on the concept of right, and Rousseau talks about the intellectual Rawls and Rousseau 123 capacities that amour-propre is related to and awakens. What meeting the strains of commitment respects and what is disfigured when amour-propre is corrupt are not only similar, but have their similarity pointed to by Rawls. The Value of Constraints on the Concept of Right The question then becomes, given that similarity, how is Rawls' own view illuminated by the parallel he draws? That the possibility of a just society is constrained even by benign amour-propre does not have to constrain what justice is. We might just not be very well suited to justice. Justice might be feasible for angels but not for us. What matters is that we have a reasonable standing interest in satisfying the demands of our sense of self-worth, and crucially must do if justice is to treat us as agents at all. The constraints on the concept of right which generate the problem of meeting the strains of commitment are responses to concerns about agency and autonomy. The reason we care about finality and publicity is that without those constraints on the concept of right, it would treat us as merely its subjects, rather than also its legislators, and hence not as autonomous. Laws which cannot be known cannot be willed, and neither can ones which require us to sacrifice ourselves totally to others. If justice is to be enacted, it is to be enacted through our acts, our agency. If agency deserves any respect then justice will have to take care not to disfigure our agency by making excessive demands on it. Such demands would enslave us to justice. More, if justice itself aims at protecting agency, it must take care not to disfigure itself by not seeing that its enactment raises questions about its content. A putative demand of justice which in trying to protect or respect agency requires the destruction of someone's ability to coherently direct their life runs the risk of being self-contradictory. Agency can only protect itself by limiting itself, and if those limits are too constrictive, then what is asked for is not protection but selfdestruction. If justice is about protecting or respecting agency, then it must not prevent us from acting as agents, and hence must not make demands on us that disfigure our sense of self in the way that corrupt amour-propre does. Given the obvious centrality of the two moral powers to Rawls' idea of justice, which together make up an idea of agency, the role of meeting the strains of commitment in protecting the possibility of the exercise of agency must also be crucial to Rawls' theory. To put it another way, what is illuminated by the parallel is the demand that justice be congruent with our good. What if justice has to be 'grounded in false beliefs covertly instilled in us' or is 'anchored in submission to authority' (Freeman 2007b, p. 152, p. 153)? What if it is a rationalization which serves to 'mask a lack of self-worth and a sense of failure and weakness' or 'a kind of psychological catastrophe... requiring abnegation of the self and its higher capacities' (Freeman 2007b, p. 153)? What if the shared project of justice is one in which distances us from each other, destroying the possibility of other, more straightforwardly communal ends like those of the family or association? If 'a disposition to... justice is destructive of what is best in human character', then it is unclear why we should R. Jubb 123 care about it (Freeman 2007b, p. 149). Virtues can be debunked, and if justice lacks any resources to explain its importance, then it will be vulnerable to such debunkings. Saying 'because it is justice' presumes rather than demonstrates the presence of such resources. If unjust societies systematically deny us a sense of our own worth, and more, such societies have just some of the features that Rousseau ascribes to amour-propre run wild in the Discourse, we have such resources. Equally, if justice is an important part of ensuring that we do not face such a society, then not only is it not a threat to our sense of our selves as agents, but it can protect it. Justice needs to be something it makes sense for agents to pursue. If not, it will fail to do proper respect to agency, and so will be vulnerable to debunkings which implicitly rely on the value of the exercises of agency which justice rules out, debunkings much like that which Rousseau provided for the France of his contemporaries. This is significant because this does not seem to be how these two constraints have generally been understood in the literature. For example, G. A. Cohen's critiques of defences of Rawls against his incentives argument depend on seeing two requirements which together generate what I have called the strains of commitment as independent of justice qua justice. Contrasting his view with Rawls', he claims that 'while publicity is indeed a desideratum of rules of social regulation in certain areas, it is surely not a requirement of justice itself' (Cohen 2008, p. 325). We may think that there are various good effects which flow from doing justice publicly, but Cohen wants to separate those good effects from justice itself. They are mere desiderata of rules of social regulation, and maybe not always that (see Cohen 2008, pp. 344–371). He goes on to say similar things about the finality requirement (Cohen 2008, pp. 327–330). That claim, however, at best operates at a tangent to the kind of explanation of their significance which I have thus far given here. All other things being equal, a putative principle of justice which requires that people are systematically mistaken about the basis of the political institutions they all support and so mutually impose on each other is unsatisfactory qua principle of justice, fundamental or not. Similarly, a putative principle of justice which fails to generate its own support because the policies needed to realise it are ones which tend to demean and disfigure the lives of some of those who live under them, is, ceterus paribus, an unsatisfactory principle of justice. Indeed, Cohen's recognition of an unspecified personal prerogative which provides an internal constraint on the just pursuit of equality might be thought to be a tacit, untheorised acceptance of such a constraint (see for example Cohen 2008, p. 181). In the absence of a personal prerogative, people would be required to sacrifice their own projects to provide more equality and so be unable to give themselves any special weight in their deliberations in much the same way as is problematic for utilitarianism. Now, of course, all other things never will be equal. The constraints would be fairly meaningless if all they ever prevented were gratuitous harms, so of course we should expect that they require us to bear costs in terms of what we can get from our principles of justice. What we should do in the face of that, though, is not to deny that these are questions about what justice can ask of us, switching that discussion into one of rules of regulation. Instead we should admit that these issues bear on the Rawls and Rousseau 123 question of what justice, simpliciter, is. G. A. Cohen is quite happy to see the question of the permissibility of slavery as bearing on whether or not some principle is a fundamental principle of justice (Cohen 2008, pp. 264–266). The question of the permissibility of 'government house' regimes presumably can play the same sort of role. That is not to say it must play such a role, any more than questions about the permissibility of slavery must. However, a failure to consider seriously the possibility that it might seems unsatisfactory. If it, and with it, questions about one's life lived from the inside, can play that role as a check on the plausibility of some principle of justice, what often amounts to simply ignoring the issue seems both polemically and philosophically unsatisfactory. The proper site of debates about these constraints is instead questions about the costs that would fall under each and whether they ought to be thought of as ones that justice can require us to bear. Perhaps Rawls was wrong about the possible costs of living under utilitarianism and how to assess their importance. Nothing I have said here rules that out, and indeed the analogy with Rousseau suggests that it could be much more difficult than Rawls seemed to believe to generate conditions under which the constraints could be satisfied. For instance, Frederick Neuhouser has attacked what he calls 'Kantian' readings of what it would take to safely satisfy amour-propre. According to him, 'they err insofar as they suppose that the demand to be respected as an abstract person, equal to all others, can or should completely replace the desire to be esteemed for one's particular excellences' (Neuhouser 2008, p. 67). If that is true, then satisfying the Rawlsian constraints I have called the strains of commitment will not tame corrupt amourpropre and Rawls is wrong to compare the two. The strains of commitment focus on respecting individuals' agency, not what they have done with it. If esteem for one's particular excellences is necessary to avoid the pathologies of corrupt amourpropre, then a Rawlsian society may be riven by them. Pointing to the way Rawls draws attention to similarities between the strains of commitment and the demands of amour-propre is not claiming they are identical. Conclusion By using what Rawls does with Rousseau in the Lectures to outline the motivations underlying the constraint I have called the strains of commitment, I do intend to have ruled some things out. I hope to have shown that it is not adequate to treat considerations of publicity and finality as straightforwardly irrelevant to questions of what counts as a principle of justice. Our intuitions about the justice of principles which require slavery, widespread and systematic deception, or the treatment of some as mere means to ends provided by others seem to indicate that there are some costs which putative principles of justice may not be able to bear. Of course, we may be wrong about that. We may come to revise our beliefs about what costs principle of justice can impose in light of other commitments, either theoretical or practical. G. A. Cohen, for example, was sceptical that justice ought to be 'the final court of appeal in practical reasoning' as a result of his commitment to value pluralism (Cohen 2008, pp. 302–304). Consequentialist appeal to the intuitive R. Jubb 123 plausibility of impartial maximization as effectively definitive of the moral seems to serve a similar purpose by casting doubt on the plausibility of constraints which might prevent it. There are two distinct questions here. First, there is the question of what the constraints on the concept of right are. This asks whether appeals to justice really ought to be 'the final court of appeal in practical reasoning' or whether, as Cohen believed, justice is a virtue to be traded off against others in our all-thingsconsidered judgments of what we are required to do. Second, there is the question of how to understand the constraints on the concept of right: whether it matters that we tend to love, cherish and support things which affirm our good, if indeed we do. How much and when should we compromise with human weakness when formulating principles of justice? What are the costs, in terms of our individual plans, projects and purposes, of living under a regime of justice? Cohen, for example, obviously feels that requiring sacrifice of one's own ends to achieving total equality is too much, since he allows for this unspecified personal prerogative to depart from what would otherwise be the demands of justice as a matter of justice. How large should this prerogative be though? Is what it is exercised in defence of it important, or are agents to be left to decide for themselves what gives them an entitlement of justice to ignore justice? Theorising the constraints on the concept of right more completely than has been done thus far would offer a framework in which to consider these questions. As it stands though, much of the literature-and particularly the literature on Rawls-does not address that task, leaving it missing significant parts of the point and vulnerable to various sorts of debunking. In drawing attention to various potentially fruitful comparisons between Rawls and Rousseau, I hope both to have drawn attention to the work that constraints on the concept of right may do and to have pointed to some of the resources that might be used to theorise them. That, I hope illuminates, at least a little, the question of 'finding a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before'. Acknowledgments I would like to acknowledge the generous support of the British Arts and Humanities Research Council who funded the doctorate during which ancestors of this paper were written. It emerged out of a seminar run by Chris Brooke, and I would like to thank him for that and for comments on the paper. Patrick Tomlin also provided comments then, as Christian Schemmel and Chiara Cordelli did later, all of which were very useful. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the referees and editors of Res Publica who helped me clarify my claims and their presentation. Finally, it was presented at Manchester University and Nuffield College, and I would like to thank the audiences there, and especially Martin O'Neill and Chandran Kukathas. References Cohen, Joshua. 2010. Rousseau a free community of equals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cohen, Gerald Allan. 2008. Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. de Lazari-Radek, Katarzyna, and Peter Singer. 2010. Secrecy in consequentialism: A defence of esoteric morality. Ratio XXIII: 34–58. Rawls and Rousseau 123 Dent, Nicholas. 2005. Rousseau. London: Routledge. Frazer, Michael L. 2010. The modest professor: Interpretive charity and interpretive humility in John Rawls's lectures on the history of political philosophy. European Journal of Political Theory 9: 218–226. Freeman, Samuel. 1994. Utilitarianism, deontology, and the priority of right. Philosophy & Public Affairs 23: 313–349. Freeman, Samuel. 2007a. The burdens of public justification: constructivism, contractualism, and publicity. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 6: 5–43. Freeman, Samuel. 2007b. Justice and the social contract: essays on rawlsian political philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Labukt, Ivar. 2009. Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism. Politics, Philosophy & Economics 8: 201–221. Neuhouser, Frederick. 1993. Freedom, dependence, and the general will. Philosophical Review 102: 363–395. Neuhouser, Frederick. 2008. Rousseau's theodicy of self-love: Evil, rationality, and the drive for recognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rawls, John. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 1993. Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement, ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, John. 2007. Lectures on the history of political philosophy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997a [1762]. The social contract and other later political writings, ed. and (trans: Victor Gourevitch). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1997b [1750/1755]. The discourses and other early political writings, ed. and (trans: Victor Gourevitch). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Andrew. 1998. Incentives, inequality, and publicity. Philosophy & Public Affairs 27: 225–247. R. Jubb

SOCIAL NORMS, THE INVISIBLE HAND, AND THE LAW JONNY ANOMALY1 AND GEOFFREY BRENNAN2 Social norms can be oppressive or empowering; and so can laws. Norms are sometimes described as emergent rules or behavioural regularities that arise as solutions to collective action problems of various kinds faced by individuals when they interact with each other. Examples include rules of combat, courtship rituals, and informal systems of property rights that determine what members of a group can do with the food they gather and the objects they create, or whom they can marry.3 The emergence and internalization of norms generally involves an invisible hand process similar to Darwin's idea of natural selection in biology or Smith's account of the operations of markets in economics. In some cases, these 'invisible processes' will be welfare-enhancing, and when they are, we will refer to them as invisible hands.4 In welfare-enhancing cases, a common thought is that the process in which a particular norm emerges as the prevailing one involves norms being tried out, with those that diminish welfare being filtered out over time, so that through a bottom-up, trial-anderror process, welfare-enhancing norms emerge victorious and are preserved and replicated. Of course, social evolution does not always work like this, and people can be trapped at equilibria that are mutually destructive or suboptimal (we call these invisible fists). The bottom-up emergence of norms is often contrasted with the top-down imposition of legislation by larger political units, which tends to displace or alter norms. But this contrast is too stark. For example, in representative governments laws emerge from the interactions of policymakers and citizens, without any one person wielding the power to impose top-down rules on passive subjects. Moreover, politicians and voters are themselves subject to prevailing norms, which influence the content of the laws that are enacted.5 And the institutions within which policy-makers and policy-takers interact are also governed by 'process norms' – concerning, say, who has voice and how collective decisions are appropriately made. In this paper we argue that social norms are emergent orders; that when they are welfare-enhancing they constitute invisible hand processes; and that whether we should rely more heavily on laws or norms to improve social welfare depends on the political institutions in place and the nature of the case under consideration. In other words, we argue that there is no general answer to the question of whether norms or laws should prevail, in part because both emerge from imperfect, path-dependent processes that have their own distinctive advantages and disadvantages. We do, however, suggest some general conditions under which it might be better to rely on laws or on norms to enhance social welfare. 1 Duke University and UNC Chapel Hill. 2 Australian National University, Duke University and UNC Chapel Hill. 3 Elinor Ostrom's work on informal property rights is an influential example of how norms can solve collective action problems. See especially 'Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms' (2000) 14(3) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 137. 4 This nomenclature is not universal. We shall discuss our reasons for it in section 2 below. 5 Indeed, it might be argued that norms play a disproportionate role in electoral processes as compared with market behaviour. For more on this, see Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, Democracy and Decision (Cambridge University Press, 1991). 263 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 I SOCIAL NORMS AS EMERGENT ORDERS As Suri Ratnapala observes, '[t]he idea that all law stems from the will of an identifiable law maker remains influential in law schools despite being contradicted by the natural history of the human race and by what we know of contemporary society'.6 Like Hayek and Leoni before him, Ratnapala distinguishes law from legislation, and argues against the legal positivist tendency to regard legislation as the primary source of social order.7 We broadly agree with Ratnapala on this, though we prefer to contrast norms with laws and maintain the contemporary convention of equating law with legislation. Throughout the essay, we shall use 'norms' and 'social norms' interchangeably.8 By laws, then, we mean legislation, usually backed by sanctions, promulgated from a formal government with the power to enforce the terms of that legislation on its citizens. By norms we mean, roughly, the informal rules that govern the behaviour of members of a group. But this is just a first pass. In an influential article, Richard McAdams defines norms as 'informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both'.9 This is a plausible definition of social norms that apply to a particular group whose members 'feel obligated to follow' them. But since social rules or regularities change over time, and differ between groups, regularities do not need to make everyone (including dissenters, outsiders, and social scientists) feel obligated to follow them in order to count as norms. Robert Ellickson provides a simpler definition of social norms as 'rules governing an individual's behaviour that third parties other than state agents diffusely enforce by means of social sanctions'.10 To this we should add that for a rule to exist as a norm for a particular group, enough people within the group must believe they should follow it.11 Norms are, in this sense, normative: they are action-guiding rules or procedures that govern the behaviour of members of a group. What it means for individuals to follow the norm will be broadly interpreted. Suppose, for example, that there are norms of good performance in an activity like operatic singing which are widely endorsed and are used to determine the quality of 6 Suri Ratnapala, 'Eighteenth Century Evolutionary Thought and its Relevance in the Age of Legislation' (2001) 12 Constitutional Political Economy 51, 52. 7 Friedrich Hayek and Bruno Leoni often contrast laws, by which they mean social norms (especially norms reflected in English common law), with legislation, by which they mean rules promulgated by a legislature. We think this distinction is worth preserving but the terminology is unnecessarily confusing, so we stick with the typical contrast between social norms and (legislated) laws. See Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 2011) ch 4; and Bruno Leoni, Freedom and the Law (Liberty Fund, 1991). 8 We concede that the term 'norm' is both vague and ambiguous. But we are interested in social norms that regulate social behaviour, rather than personal norms that guide private behaviour. In the law and economics tradition, we ignore personal norms, like New Year's resolutions or vows to drink less coffee, and focus instead on rules or regularities that arise in response to conflicts between individual rationality and collective welfare. For a detailed discussion of the many uses of the term 'norm' see Geoffrey Brennan, Lina Eriksson, Robert E Goodin and Nicholas Southwood, Explaining Norms (Oxford University Press, 2013). 9 Richard McAdams, 'The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms' (1997) 96(2) Michigan Law Review 340. 10 Robert Ellickson, 'The Market for Social Norms' (2001) 3(1) American Law and Economics Review 3. 11 Cristina Bicchieri argues that 'the very existence of a social norm depends on a sufficient number of people believing that it exists and pertains to a given type of situation, and expecting that enough other people are following it in those kinds of situations': The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 2. 264 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law different singers. Not everyone is a singer – and even those who are singers might not aspire to professional status – so not everyone observes the relevant norms in their own singing. But those norms determine what criteria the general bulk of opera singers adopt to evaluate performance and hence the level of esteem and disesteem that different performers receive. In a similar sense, there may be norms of heroism in the military that all soldiers aspire to, but only a small number realize in their conduct. We think that these qualify as norms because a) they are widely endorsed within the relevant community (of singers/soldiers), and b) they establish esteem-based incentives for individual soldiers to act more heroically or singers to strive to meet the norms of good singing. They stand as norms even though few soldiers actually qualify as heroes or singers as maestros. In short, we wish to use a more expansive notion of norms than some other theorists of the subject adopt: we do not think it necessary that a majority of individuals exhibit compliance with the norm in their own behaviour. It may be sufficient that they exhibit compliance in their evaluation. Norms can be understood as emerging within social groups to solve collective action problems in which there is a conflict between individual rationality and social welfare. On Cristina Bicchieri's view, 'we need social norms in all those situations in which there is a conflict of interest but also a potential for joint gain'.12 On this view, norms can transform what begin as negative sum games like prisoner's dilemmas into coordination games in which all parties benefit.13 Usually coordination games are impure, since group members have preferences over different possible equilibria in the feasible set. For example, suppose people in a tribe living in Madagascar notice that many of their members are not careful about cleaning up the carcasses of animals they eat. This creates noxious smells, attracts predators, and raises the risk of infectious diseases that all of them would prefer not to endure. In the absence of explicit property rights or rules that require everyone to dispose of animal carcasses in a more hygienic way, each individual has a strong incentive to carry on with the collectively harmful practice since each only bears a fraction of the cost of the problem, but gets the full benefit of not exerting extra energy to clean up carcasses. In other words, the outcome is a Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium, and the game is an n-person prisoner's dilemma. Now suppose the tribe members understand the problem and at least some of them seek a way to solve it. Perhaps a 'norm entrepreneur' – someone with exceptional charisma and leadership – proposes several solutions.14 This entrepreneur may lack the power (or influence) to impose any new norm unilaterally, but he may persuade a few tribesmen to change their behaviour, and encourage them to criticize those who do not. Others propose alternative social rules, or simply imitate how people around them are 12 Ibid 3. 13 We might say that norms often serve this function: but of course it requires extra argument to show that serving that function helps explain a norm's existence. However, we think that requirement is a weak one. After all, the function attributes of norms only have to play some role in the explanation of their existence. The fact that norms solve certain collective action problems can be a contributory factor in accounting for their origin or for the maintenance of the norm in particular cases, without any claim that this line of explanation is the entire story. As Bentham put the point in a slightly different connection, the fact that rights serve a particular social function no more ensures that rights will emerge than the fact of hunger is sufficient to supply bread! – Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies; Being an Examination of the Declarations of Rights (Simpkin, Marshall, & Co., 1843) 501. 14 Ellickson, above n 10, 12. Robert Ellickson defines 'norm entrepreneurs' as people in a group with 'superior technical intelligence, social intelligence, and leadership skills'. He adapts the term from Cass Sunstein, who defines them more generally as 'people interested in changing social norms': 'Social Norms and Social Roles' (1996) 96(4) Columbia Law Review 909. 265 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 acting, and eventually the group converges on a particular norm, or equilibrium, which no individual had the power to impose. Thor Carry Bury Burn Odin Carry 25,30 20,15 5,10 Bury 10,5 35,30 10,10 Burn 5,5 15,10 20,25 Why does convergence on a norm produce net benefits? In this case, assume that each member of the group understands the problem and is willing to follow a rule. Each is made better off by following one rule because it saves time, creates social harmony, and possibly brings economies of scale, such as one big pit where animal carcasses are burned or buried, or one spot in the woods along a clearly marked path where carcasses are dumped. Transaction costs are reduced and social costs are minimized by converging on a single method of disposal. Different methods of disposal may well be preferred by different people – perhaps because they are used to doing things a certain way, because they prefer digging holes to lighting fires, or because some people live close to the proposed burial ground or fire pit and have to endure the extra noise or odor that comes with living near a disposal site. In this case, as in many real world examples, the equilibrium that emerges may not be socially optimal, and none of the equilibria will satisfy everyone equally. But once a norm emerges as an equilibrium of the game, it becomes a selfenforcing convention.15 The stability of norms in cases like this leads Eric Posner to say, somewhat reductively, that a 'social norm is just the label we attach to equilibrium behavior'.16 We think that Posner's description is inadequate because it overlooks the distinctive normative force that attaches to some norms. Some equilibria just are emergent properties. But in such cases, should external conditions change, the equilibrium can change without any additional forces being invoked to restore the prevailing practice. What is characteristic of norms is that compliance is buttressed by additional incentives – by internal or external sanctions that reflect the norm's status as a norm. Put another way, not all equilibria are sustained in the same way. Some are sustained solely by the objective payoffs – in our example, the reduced disease and more pleasant ambient aromas that are associated with carcass removal. Others are sustained (as well) by the fact that if you do not comply with the prevailing practice, you will be the object of contempt, and perhaps risk more material punishments, like being excluded from agreeable social activities (including, possibly, exchange of goods). The issue in explaining norms is not whether norm-governed behaviour constitutes an equilibrium, but rather what the equilibrating forces are. Not all social equilibria involve norms, and not all norms are social equilibria. 15 See Thomas Schelling, Micromotives and Macrobehaviour (W. W. Norton & Co, 2006) ch 3. 16 Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (Harvard University Press, 2002) 58. 266 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law The point is important because it bears on the question of how norms can transform collective action problems into coordination games with salient equilibria. The most general answers are through external sanctions like punishment, on the one hand, and through internal sanctions like guilt and shame, on the other. Shame occurs when an individual believes he has violated a social norm that others are in a position to detect, and believes others will disapprove of him as a result. Guilt occurs when an individual has internalized a social norm, believes he has violated it, and imposes a kind of internal sanction on himself as punishment for doing what he believes is unfair, immoral, or otherwise wrong, even when he knows nobody else knows about it. External sanctions are costly in time and resources,17 and in some situations guilt and shame will achieve the same result at lower cost. Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that moral emotions like guilt and shame may have evolved to minimize conflict among members of close-knit groups.18 Since there is often a conflict between individual and group interests, different individuals are likely to experience different levels of guilt and shame for the same transgression, and it may be that threats of external sanctions are necessary to nudge many people to comply with norms. In political societies, sanctions can take the form of fines, prison sentences, and property seizures. But political sanctions are expensive to enforce, and even when legal rules are clear, people often turn to social norms to solve day to day disputes when the combination of internal sanctions like guilt and shame and external but informal sanctions like social stigma are sufficient to incentivize people to act in socially beneficial ways.19 Social sanctions for violating norms often involve stigma, or diminished social standing, and this can mean fewer opportunities to trade, reduced access to mates or food, less security and protection from other members of a group, and (in extreme cases) threats of physical harm. But if, as Adam Smith thought, the desire for the good opinion of others is hard-wired into our psychological makeup, then individuals will be led to seek other people's esteem even when there are no further consequences. So in cases where guilt is insufficient to coax individuals to comply with norms, social sanctions are important, and these need involve nothing more than the knowledge that observers disapprove of those who violate norms, or approve of those who abide by them. No central authority is involved. Moreover, where the would-be violator is not anonymous, and thus capable of bearing a reputation, esteem incentives can be reinforced in a simple and familiar way: gossip. Gossip would seem like a waste of time and energy for the people who engage in it, since monitoring social infractions and sharing information are public goods. Gossipers incur the full costs of gathering and spreading information, but only get a fraction of the benefits, which are dispersed among the entire group. The fact that useful gossip is a public good seems to create a second-order collective action problem in which each has an incentive to listen but never to talk about instances of other people following or flouting socially useful norms. The problem seems insurmountable in the absence of material incentives. But it is not. 17 There are individuals in every society who get positive enjoyment from inflicting losses on others. Norms enable such individuals to satisfy this desire without enduring guilt or shame in doing so: by directing their anti-social impulses to norm-violators, would-be 'punishers' are licensed to indulge their impulses. On this account, the significance of more formal procedures of the law lies in regularizing and managing anarchic punitive activity rather than in ensuring that incentives for norm compliance are adequate. 18 Darwin vacillates between individual and group selection accounts of the evolution of guilt, shame, and embarrassment. See The Descent of Man (1871), and The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals (1872). 19 Robert Ellickson, Order without Law (Harvard University Press, 1994). 267 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 The second-order collective action problem is only intractable if we assume that people are purely self-interested, or that they don't get intrinsic rewards from sharing information about other people's social behaviour. But it is a familiar fact that most people enjoy gossip, are rewarded by the esteem of others for conveying socially useful gossip, and fear the disesteem that follows from being the subject of negative gossip, or from spreading false rumors. Richard McAdams explicitly connects gossip and esteem to explain how social norms are policed in the absence of formal government. 'The conversation we call "gossip" is often experienced as a benefit, not a cost, and it usually consists of information about how others have deviated from ordinary behaviour'.20 The reasons for this psychological quirk are shrouded in our evolutionary history, though undoubtedly a plausible story can be told about how a propensity to take delight in gossip, along with our disposition to feel shame or guilt for violating social norms, would confer advantages to the members of small groups. Whatever the explanation, our desire for the esteem of others may provide the incentive to gather and reveal information about other people's rule infractions, and to publicly conform to rules ourselves. This sends signals to others that we are disposed to cooperate, and it may bring accolades from people we respect. According to McAdams, 'the desire for esteem makes it possible, though not inevitable, that the group will solve the secondorder collective action problem [of monitoring behaviour and spreading information about rule infractions]. The barrier to norm formation arises from the assumption that any sanction must be costly to impose. If one can costlessly impose a small loss on others by withholding esteem, or costlessly impose a small gain by granting esteem, there is no incentive to free ride'.21 While we agree with the gist of this view, it is clearly an overstatement to conclude that the intrinsic rewards of gossip and the pursuit of esteem remove all incentives to free ride in all cases. Unless norms are fully internalized and guilt is robust, shrewd social climbers might still break social norms in private, and people who are less concerned with the esteem of others might still free ride by failing to respond to gossip about them, or failing to spread socially beneficial gossip. This is especially true if the norm is widely viewed as outdated or unimportant, or if the person tempted to violate the norm has an attenuated sense of guilt and shame, or a low discount rate, perhaps because the costs of leaving the group or the benefits of future cooperation are low. So far we have focused on how social norms can arise as emergent orders in the absence of formal political institutions to transform collective action problems into simple coordination games with clear equilibria. Norms make certain equilibria salient. But some equilibria are better than others. Destructive norms, including those that began as constructive, or those that are constructive for some groups and destructive for others, can create norm traps that make nearly everyone worse off. For example, many have speculated that traditional religious rules, including those that regulate dietary and sexual habits, may have had some advantages for group members by making it clear what kinds of sexual behaviour 20 McAdams, above n 9, 362. 21 Ibid 364. This formulation may suggest that the suppliers of esteem and disesteem are withholding or granting esteem as a conscious activity designed to encourage the esteemed agents in norm compliance. We think that this is neither plausible nor necessary. In most cases, individual observers simply form their judgements spontaneously: observers think that the actor has behaved badly (or well). If the actor knows that the norm is in place and that the opinions of others will track his action, and he cares about the good opinion of others, he will be encouraged to comply. If you fail to wash your hands after using the public lavatory, many observers will think you are a dirty person. But their thinking this does not need to be motivated by a special concern about spreading disease. 268 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law are kosher, and which foods are best avoided. Adding divine threats of punishment for violations helps convince group members who do not feel sufficient guilt or shame to comply for more self-interested reasons. But some of these rules, including prohibitions against homosexuality and consuming shellfish or animals with cloven hooves (both of which are forbidden in traditional Judaism), seem obsolete. Although these dietary rules may have initially helped group members avoid parasitic diseases like trichinosis (from pigs) or Salmonella (from oysters), they no longer seem to promote the welfare of anyone other than pigs and oysters.22 Other norms that are arguably destructive have more sinister origins. For example, Gerry Mackie traces the evolution of footbinding in China and female genital mutilation (FGM) in many African countries, and finds that these practices originated not to serve the interests of most members of the group but to ensure that imperial female slaves would remain faithful to their masters. Broken feet make it difficult for women to seek sexual adventures, and mutilated sex organs make it less appealing, so these are two different solutions to the same problem: keeping women close to home, and ensuring that any children they foster are from the male king, or as the practice spread, the male head of household. Mackie suggests that we need only make three plausible assumptions to support the view that footbinding and FGM could arise and persist as stable equilibria even in a society in which they harm almost everyone: that people are strategically rational, that they desire to raise their own biological children (for men there is always some uncertainty about paternity), and that there is an original condition of female slavery or extreme subservience.23 Once the convention takes hold, people will disapprove of those who do not practice it. In some countries religious leaders attach divine approval to the practice so that people who do not experience enough guilt or shame for not complying may also experience the fear of divine punishment, in addition to the prospect of being less desirable in the marriage market. Thus, even those who oppose these practices may have reasons to mutilate their daughters in order to make them attractive to suitors. Parents are caught in 'belief traps' and the entire society is caught in a 'norm trap'. Posner and Rasmusen define a 'norm trap' as a situation in which 'the transitional costs to a new norm are high enough [that] society is stuck with a suboptimal norm'.24 The cost of transition is especially high if women who resist these practices are less likely to get married, and bear and raise as many offspring as those who follow them. Even if some rebellious women can overcome the guilt, shame, and social stigma associated with violating the norm that requires her to bind her daughter's feet or cut off her clitoris, their daughters are likely to leave fewer descendants, and therefore fail to undermine the norm over the long run. This helps explain why footbinding persisted for 1,000 years in China, and FGM still flourishes in parts of Africa and the Middle East. We will defer discussion about how to respond to destructive norms like these until the final section. The upshot of this section is that whether norms are constructive or destructive, they are usually best thought of as emergent properties, according to which the independent actions of people in a group combine to produce a macropattern that may not be the intended or preferred outcome of anyone in the group. Hayek saw such emergent patterns as a pervasive and important feature of social life: 22 Of course people who avoid these foods now do it for explicitly religious reasons, not for any health benefits. But we suggest that the origin of many such rules lies in the (perceived) benefits they once conferred to the groups of people who adopted them. 23 Gerry Mackie, 'Ending Footbinding and Infibulation: A Convention Account' (1996) 61 American Sociological Review 1010. 24 Richard A Posner and Eric B Rasmusen, 'Creating and Enforcing Norms, with Special Reference to Sanctions' (1999) 19 International Review of Law and Economics 378 269 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 We understand one another and get along with one another, are able to act successfully on our plans, because, most of the time, members of our civilization conform to unconscious patterns of conduct, show a regularity in their actions that is not the result of commands or coercion, often not even of any conscious adherence to known rules, but of firmly established habits and traditions. The general observance of these conventions is a necessary condition of the orderliness of the world in which we live, of our being able to find our way in it, though we do not know their significance and may not even be consciously aware of their existence.25 II EMERGENT ORDERS AND INVISIBLE HANDS What is the relationship between emergent orders and invisible hands? Both are similar ways of explaining social phenomena, and on some views, they are identical. But we think they are worth distinguishing in the following way. Emergent orders are neutral with respect to human welfare, while invisible hand processes are emergent orders that serve to promote human welfare. In other words, invisible hands are one kind of emergent order. This distinction is consistent, we think, with Adam Smith's usage. Although Smith used 'invisible hand' three times in his writings, only two of the occurrences seem to indicate an important economic insight. Smith's first use of the phrase 'invisible hand' is completely unrelated to the second two. In his History of Astronomy Smith complained that whenever Greek and Roman polytheists observed unusual events, they naively saw 'the invisible hand of Jupiter' behind them.26 In the two other occurrences of the phrase in his writings, Smith clearly has in mind a process in which the actions of independent agents, each with their own parochial goals, inadvertently produce a socially beneficial outcome. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments Smith says: The rich only select from the heap what is most precious and agreeable. They consume little more than the poor, and in spite of their natural selfishness and rapacity, though they mean only their own conveniency, though the sole end which they propose from the labours of all the thousands whom they employ, be the gratification of their own vain and insatiable desires, they divide with the poor the produce of all their improvements. They are led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the multiplication of the species.27 In the Wealth of Nations Smith says: By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, he [the capitalist] intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By 25 Hayek above n 7, 123. Cristina Bicchieri agrees, in a passage paraphrasing Adam Ferguson: '[m]any social norms are not the outcome of a plan or a conscious design to enact them; they emerge by human action but not by human design': Bicchieri, above n 11, 40. 26 Here is the relevant passage: 'it may be observed, that in all polytheistic religions, among savages, and in the early ages of heathen antiquity, it is the irregular events of nature only that are ascribed to the agency and power of their gods. Fire burns, and water refreshes; heavy bodies descend, and lighter substances fly upwards, by the necessity of their own natures; nor was the invisible hand of Jupiter ever apprehended to be employed in those matters'. Adam Smith, History of Astronomy (1995) §3, para 2. 27 1759 Book 4, chapter 1, section 10. 270 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good. It is an affectation, indeed, not very common among merchants, and very few words need be employed in dissuading them from it.28 Although the invisible hand metaphor is seen by scholars as one of his greatest insights, Smith does not formally develop the idea. On our account, an invisible hand process must exhibit the following five features: 1. The process gives rise to an identifiable pattern. 2. That pattern emerges through the actions of independent agents. 3. The pattern is one that most participants do not intend to produce. 4. The pattern provides net benefits to the group that (inadvertently) produces it, or has attractive normative properties in some other sense.29 5. The pattern is surprising, unforeseen, or unpredictable by those who produce it. We shall consider each of these in turn, and then say when norms can be construed as arising by an invisible hand process. A Patterns Since some of what we call patterns are merely reifications, or projections onto an indifferent universe – like the constellations in the stars or the man in the moon – we might wish to exclude merely apparent patterns as invisible hand phenomena. But perhaps we should be ecumenical about what count as patterns. All we mean by 'patterns' is the existence of a discernible regularity or structure. Notice that many structures are of no scientific significance but may appear to some people to be significant in another way. When a devout religious believer observes that a passing cloud looks like a famous prophet, an impartial observer will say that although it looks like a prophet because of the pattern of water molecules, it is not in fact a prophet. We can agree that the water molecules that comprise the cloud do exhibit a structure which resembles a prophet's face, but disagree on whether this matters. This case suggests that what constitutes a pattern is in part a scientific question, but also a question of what kinds of facts people think are important to explain and in what terms such explanations run. In the case of human welfare, the invisible hand explanation in the market case is an attempt to show how something that nearly everyone should care about comes to pass: how individuals acting for their own ends can, under the right conditions, increase the welfare of others by engaging in mutually advantageous specialization and trade. The pattern is the aggregate effect, and the explanation is a set of conjectures about the incentives created by opportunities for trade. B Independent agents Invisible hand processes always involve independent agents acting in accordance with their own preferences, beliefs, and goals. This is not to say people's goals do not impact other people, but only that each agent is acting for her own reasons, and under no duress or coercion. In Smith's first invisible hand example, the rich are said to care about nothing but getting cheap labor from the poor whom they employ, but in doing 28 1776 Book 4, chapter 2, section 9. 29 As in Smith's example where the good feature produced is a more equal distribution of 'necessaries'. 271 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 so poor labourers who perceive the job as their best option, end up better off than they would have been in the absence of the selfish employer offering them the job. It is worth stressing that Smith does not think workers and employers are usually exclusively self-interested. The idea is that even under this cynical assumption, we may still get a better allocation of resources if people develop their skills and produce things that other people want in order to increase their own profits, than we would if they devoted their days to acts of charity. C Without intention It is important, we think, to stress that some people might intend to improve social welfare when they act in the marketplace, but Smith's point is that patterns like social welfare improvements need not be intended in order for that general improvement to materialize. Thus, to count as an invisible hand process, we do not need to make the extreme claim that nobody intends a particular outcome that results from independent choices; we only need to assume that nobody needs to intend it in order to bring it about. For example, it is conceivable that some Chinese families bound their daughter's feet not simply because it made her more attractive in the marriage market in 18th century China, but because they thought this is a pattern worth preserving. Of course, no individual has the power to preserve or destroy such a ubiquitous social norm. But it is perfectly possible to say the norm arose or persisted without most people, and in some cases all people, intending to promote the norm. D Socially beneficial In both occurrences of 'invisible hand' in the works of Adam Smith, there is a strong implication that for a process to count as an invisible hand, it must bring benefits to the people to whom it applies. Some disagree with this usage. For example, Robert Nozick argues that 'not every pattern that arises by an invisible-hand process is desirable'.30 We think this matter of word usage is essentially a question of taste. The advantage of Nozick's definition is that it covers cases throughout the natural world, like Hume's account of the evolution of the universe from a few simple laws, or the popular view among biologists that mitochondria began as parasites and eventually became indispensable sources of power to virtually all organisms. But we stick with the usage traditional in economics. When all of the conditions other than (4) are present, and when the outcome is unequivocally bad rather than neutral or good, economists sometimes refer to the 'backside of the invisible hand' or what we call the 'invisible fist'. Thus, the ozone hole that developed in the 1980s from the unregulated use of chlorofluorocarbons is a paradigm case of the invisible fist: nobody who used hair spray products in California intended to raise the risk of skin cancer in Queensland by depleting part of the atmosphere, but this was the result. E Surprising Adam Smith suggests, and many commentators agree,31 that invisible hand explanations are in some sense surprising. Like our third criterion, this needs to be 30 Robert Nozick, 'Invisible-Hand Explanations' (1994) 84(2) The American Economic Review 315. 31 See Edna Ullmann-Margalit, 'Invisible-Hand Explanations' (1978) 39 Synthese 271; Gerald Gaus, 'Explanation, Justification, and Emergent Properties: An Essay on Nozickian Metatheory' in The Cambridge Companion to Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Adrian Vermeule, 'The Invisible Hand in Legal and Political Theory' (2010) 96(6) Virginia Law Review 1422. 272 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law qualified. Invisible hands need not actually surprise everyone, especially social scientists and curious people who enjoy discovering basic principles that explain how the world works. Indeed, although invisible hand explanations are typically surprising to those who first encounter them, they become expected by experts who study them in particular domains. Once we have an explanation for how invisible hands work, we get a deeply satisfying theory, one which generates predictions that are ultimately unsurprising. When these conditions are present, the invisible hand metaphor is apt because, as Brennan and Pettit argue, 'those who remain mere participants in the system, those who fail to adopt a theoretical stance on what happens, will necessarily fail to recognize what is going on ... Participants who are not also theorists are embedded in their individual positions, and are aware of the immediate pushes and pulls that work on them; but they lack any sense of the aggregate shape of things.'32 Many have argued that evolution by natural (and sexual) selection can be thought of as an invisible hand process. Leda Cosmides and John Tooby join Robert Nozick and Friedrich Hayek in describing evolution this way, mainly because it blindly produces what appear to be designed creatures.33 The historical and conceptual link between theories of emergent order in biology and economics is profound. As Hayek reminds us, 'The theory of evolution of traditions and habits which made the formations of spontaneous orders possible stands ... in a close relation to the theory of evolution of particular kinds of spontaneous orders which we call organisms, and has in fact provided the essential concepts on which the latter was built'.34 However, on our view there is an important difference between emergent orders and invisible hands, one that is occasionally obscured by the ambiguity of terms like 'fitness' and 'success' in evolutionary theory. The difference is that evolution does not necessarily produce favourable outcomes according to any widely agreed upon normative benchmark. There are two aspects to this observation. One is resistance to the idea of evolution as progress: there is simply no reason to think that dinosaurs were, in their evolutionary context, in any way 'inferior' to prevalent species in our own context. And what the participants make of the evolutionary processes to which they are subject can make no difference to how those processes work. Evolution simply operates as a blind filter. The other aspect involves recognizing that natural selection is a process that adapts organisms to particular environments, not one that makes them happy or successful in any sense other than differential numbers of surviving offspring. Consider Darwin's discussion of natural selection (a phrase which suggests an invisible hand that selects winners and losers), in which he compares the intentional selection of animal farmers with the unintentional selection of nature: As man can produce and certainly has produced a great result by his methodical and unconscious means of selection, what may not nature effect? Man can act only on external and visible characteristics: nature cares nothing for appearances, except insofar as they may be useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects only for his own good; Nature only for that of the being which she tends ... 32 Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit, 'Hands Invisible and Intangible' (1993) 94 Synthese 200. 33 Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, 'Better than Rational: Evolutionary Psychology and the Invisible Hand' (1994) 84(2) American Economic Association Papers and Proceedings 327. An accessible account of evolution by natural selection as an invisible hand process is Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (W W Norton & Co, 1986). 34 Friedrich Hayek, 'The Results of Human Action but not of Human Design' (1980) Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 101. 273 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 [Man] does not allow the most vigorous males to struggle for the females. He does not rigidly destroy all inferior animals, but protects during each varying season, as far as lies in his power, all his productions. He often begins his selection by some halfmonstrous form; or at least by some modification prominent enough to catch his eye, or to be plainly useful to him. Under nature, the slightest difference or structure or constitution may well turn the nicely-balanced scale in the struggle for life, and so be preserved. How fleeting are the wishes and efforts of man! how short his time! and consequently how poor will his products be, compared with those accumulated by nature during whole geological periods. Can we wonder, then, that nature's productions should be far 'truer' in character than man's productions; that they should be infinitely better adapted to the most complex conditions of life, and should plainly bear the stamp of far higher workmanship?35 Darwin anthropomorphizes Nature throughout the metaphor, and appeals to our tendency to explain the appearance of patterns by intentional action. Darwin is, ironically, using what Daniel Dennett calls the 'design stance' to destroy the argument from design. But his language may suggest to the careless reader that he thinks the organisms that emerge from the evolutionary process are better in some sense than the 'inferior' creatures farmers produce through deliberate selection. This interpretation is a mistake. By 'inferior' creatures Darwin simply means those that are less welladapted to their environment, not creatures that are less happy, or well off.36 Since fitness is just a measure of reproductive success, not social welfare, Darwin's argument suggests that the products of evolution by natural selection are emergent orders but not necessarily invisible hand processes (as we use the terms). Still, some emergent orders that arise through evolution can be described as invisible hands, since they make us better off according to widely accepted normative standards. For example, human intelligence and compassion have arisen through a combination of natural selection, sexual selection, and gene-culture coevolution. If general intelligence is a trait that is both individually beneficial and widely valued because of its social consequences,37 and if compassion and kindness are attractive traits to both men and women, then socially beneficial consequences can result from the process of mate selection in which such consequences are neither foreseen nor intended. By contrast, dysgenic processes in which individual choices lead to socially undesirable outcomes are the back side of the invisible hand, or the invisible fist. If, as some have argued, wealth, education, and IQ are negatively correlated with fertility (the number of children people choose to have), the growth of wealth and welfare in the modern world may inadvertently produce dysgenic effects even if each person would prefer an aggregate outcome in which future people are at least as intelligent as current people.38 As Thomas Schelling put it, 'marriage and romance are exceedingly individual and private activities, but their genetic consequences are altogether aggregate'.39 So far we have described invisible hand processes as emergent orders that promote human welfare. This implies that norms constitute invisible hands when they are welfare-promoting emergent orders. How might they do this? One example is Robert Ellickson's argument that, over time, norms in close-knit communities tend to 35 The Origin of Species (Barnes and Noble Classics, 2003) 76-77. 36 And since the environment of farm animals involves farmers who are cultivating the species for its capacity to produce food other people want to consume, it seems clear that farm animals are evolving to fit their actual environment better than the variants which are bred out. 37 Nicholas Mackintosh, IQ and Human Intelligence (Oxford University Press, 2011). 38 For an overview of the evidence and some possible responses to the problem, see Jonny Anomaly, 'Public Goods and Procreation' Monash Bioethics Review (forthcoming). 39 Schelling, above n 15, 140. 274 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law evolve in ways that maximize the efficient use of scarce resources.40 In a famous case study, Ellickson examined how cattle ranchers in Shasta, California settle disputes involving cattle straying from one farm to another and inflicting damage on neighboring property. What he found is that farmers tend to rely on informal rules that are enforced through social rather than legal sanctions. Even when laws were passed, he observed that ranchers either deliberately ignored them or were ignorant of their existence. Among the reasons he gives for this are: the cost of taking legal action (transaction costs and monetary costs); that laws may be less efficient solutions than norms that emerged from a trial-and-error process; and the fact that norms created within a community tend to have more perceived authority over those who live there than externally imposed laws. One reason people are frequently willing to ignore law is that they often possess more expeditious means for achieving order. For example, neighbors in rural Shasta County are sufficiently close-knit to generate and enforce informal social norms to govern minor irritations such as cattle-trespass and boundary-fence disputes. This closeknittedness enables victims of social transgressions to discipline deviants by means of simple self-help measures such as negative gossip and mild physical reprisals. Under these circumstances, informal social controls are likely to supplant law.41 Ellickson takes the argument further and suggests that laws passed by legislatures can undermine socially beneficial norms, and that 'lawmakers who are unappreciative of the social conditions that foster informal cooperation are likely to create a world in which there is both more law and less order'.42 We do not wish to defend the more optimistic part of Ellickson's thesis – the idea that social norms tend to be efficient in close-knit groups. In fact, we find Ellickson's general claim implausible if it is taken to imply that we should generally defer to norms rather than laws. People can become ensnared in local rather than global optima; some groups can maintain destructive norms for long periods of time; most norms emerge locally with their path-dependent properties tracking local conditions and seem unlikely to be sufficiently sticky to bind together the millions of independent actors in modern nation states. Instead, we take Ellickson's case study to illustrate the importance of understanding norms as emergent orders, and of separating socially beneficial emergent orders (invisible hands) from socially destructive emergent orders (invisible fists). It is, we think, useful to distinguish between processes that emerge invisibly and processes where outcomes are sustained invisibly.43 When Adam Smith describes the market order and the highly beneficial division of labor to which it gives rise, he talks both of how that order arose in the first place – as the 'very slow and gradual consequence' of a possibly 'original principle in human nature' – and of how the equilibria in that emergent order are preserved. Participants in markets typically have no regard to the normative properties of the equilibrium prices and quantities that emerge from competitive market processes; each simply does the best she can for herself. To see the distinction at stake here, consider another familiar process – that of electoral competition under broadly democratic processes. The requirement to be 40 By 'efficient' Ellickson has in mind Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, according to which norms tend to maximize net social welfare even if they result in losses for some members of the group, especially in the short run. Ellickson's thesis resembles Posner's conjecture that the common law tends toward efficiency. 41 Ellickson, above n 19, 282. 42 Ibid 286. 43 This distinction is made by Ullman-Margalit, above n 31. 275 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 elected provides incentives for candidates or contending parties to formulate policies that are believed to be attractive to voters (or strategic groups of them) even if the candidates themselves are motivated predominantly by a desire to further their own political careers. There can be a substantial mismatch between the motives of political agents and the normative justification for the ultimate outcomes. We might then refer to democracy as constituting an invisible hand process, at least in part. But that description – and the question of how well the incentive structure imposed by electoral competition works to produce outcomes that track voter interests – is perfectly consistent with democratic institutions being designed and chosen 'visibly'. Shrewd and well-motivated 'founding fathers' may have designed the institutions under which in-period politics operates specifically with an eye to those institutions' normative properties: but at the in-period level, ambitious political candidates and ordinary voters may be operating with much more self-interested considerations predominant. In that sense, constitutional democracy did not emerge invisibly; but it may operate invisibly. III NORMS AND LAWS, LIBERTY AND WELFARE The main difference between laws and norms, as we understand them, is that laws can be enforced by a central government that has a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, whereas norms are created and enforced with informal social sanctions. This makes it more plausible to describe norms as emergent orders since they typically arise in situations in which no one in a group has the power to unilaterally impose rules on everyone else in the group. But laws can also be thought of as emergent orders of a certain kind, especially in representative governments. Public choice theorists often describe laws as the byproducts of actions lawmakers perform in order to win elections. Laws are, to a large extent, constrained by the wishes of citizens, the incentives created by political institutions, and the prospect for politicians of electoral success or failure. Some laws are simply a codification of widely accepted norms – for example, against murder, theft, and unprovoked violence; and other laws emerge from the decisions of judges. Judges often defer to precedent, and to widely shared norms. This suggests that any particular law in a representative government is shaped by the actions of many different people, with their own individual preferences. But because the state has the power to create and enforce its laws as a singular entity, we think it is worth retaining the (typically exaggerated) conceptual distinction between norms as emergent orders and laws as externally imposed directives.44 Norm optimists (like Elinor Ostrom and Robert Ellickson) tend to think we should give more scope to markets rather than politics, so that groups of people can be left free to develop efficient solutions to local problems. Norm pessimists (like Eric Posner and Richard McAdams) tend to emphasize nasty norms that become entrenched in cultures that would be better off without them: they think laws are often a more effective way to enhance social welfare, individual liberty, and other widely shared values. Like the distinction between bottom-up norms and top-down laws, the distinction between optimists and pessimists is a bit overblown. After all, norm optimists recognize that the populations of modern states are often too big and diverse 44 Moreover, laws themselves operate within a highly structured network of norms – ones that run from the professional norms of judges and lawyers and police to the norms of the general community that allow government to have its 'monopoly on the legitimate use of force' in the first place. When the term 'legitimate' is used here, it refers not so much to what the law says about what officers can do, but to what those subject to the laws will let them do. In well-ordered political societies many people seem to obey the law because it is the law: they assign to the law a certain normative authority. They treat the police as entitled to be obeyed and treat court procedures as entitled to settle disputes. 276 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law for norms to solve large scale collective action problems, and norm pessimists recognize that political solutions have their own problems. According to Ellickson, 'the key difference between [norm optimists and pessimists] appears to be that the optimists have less confidence than the pessimists that government can outperform social forces in reforming inefficient norms'.45 We are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about norms. Instead, we argue that scholars and legislators in representative governments should consider the following questions when thinking about whether to rely more heavily on laws or norms, or harness the power of law to indirectly encourage or discourage the evolution of norms. A How urgent and widespread is the problem? Scholars from Elinor Ostrom to Robert Ellickson have argued that members of a community engaged in repeat interactions will usually find an informal arrangement for solving problems that arise with alternative uses of natural resources. Among the usual provisos are that the relevant actors must have a sufficiently low discount rate to justify cooperation, and that social sanctions attached to norm violations must be strong enough to induce compliance. However, many of the evolutionary views shared by norm optimists rely on a lengthy trial-and-error process during which different norms are tried out until the group converges on a mutually beneficial equilibrium. But when a challenge that requires collective action stems from an imminent threat to a large and diverse group, social norms may not emerge in time to solve the problem. This can be true for the spread of an infectious disease like SARS in China in the 1990s, or the sudden collapse of a population of animals like the American Bald Eagle in the mid-20th century. While social norms can help preserve an endangered species or reduce the threat of an infectious disease, they are typically not as effective as state-sponsored efforts in representative governments whose leaders have the power to coerce, and to impose uniform rules with credible sanctions. This is not to say that states should spend any amount of money to save an endangered species or control an infectious disease, only that social evolution may be too slow a process to rely on for urgent collective action problems. B Are there inter-group or inter-generational externalities? Externalities are a pervasive part of social life. But not all externalities matter from a moral standpoint, and some negative externalities are more efficiently addressed through social norms rather than legal requirements. As a rule of thumb, Adrian Vermeule suggests that 'norms are most plausibly efficient within close-knit groups of repeat interactors who collectively bear both the costs and benefits of the norms they create, so that the group's internal norms do not impose significant externalities. Yet such groups are the exception rather than the rule in large scale modern economies.'46 For this reason, two kinds of inter-group externalities might merit legal intervention rather than reliance on norms to achieve welfare improvements. 45 Ellickson, above n 10, 36. Like Ostrom and Ellickson, Hayek's view is not grounded in reverence for authority or tradition, but stems from the belief that, at least much of the time, social norms survive because they solve problems that we fail to understand, and which we lack the ability to solve by relying on experts who may be over-confident in their own wisdom: 'Far from assuming that those who created the institutions were wiser than we are, the evolutionary view is based on the insight that the result of experimentation of many generations may embody more experience than any one man may possess': Hayek, above n 7, 122. 46 Vermeule, above n 31, 1438. 277 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 First, when a set of norms benefits one group at the expense of another, the norms may be worth altering or supplanting with legal requirements or prohibitions. For example, if one group of people that lives upstream from another catches all of the desirable fish from the river and then floods the river with human waste, the result may be unfair for the group that lives downstream, and socially inefficient when considering the aggregate welfare of both groups. Yet the norms may constitute a social optimum for the upstream group. Second, when a group's norms impose significant negative externalities on future people, there may be reason to use legal mandates to reduce these harms. Obvious cases include current people using scarce resources in a way that maximally benefits themselves at the expense of future people. Anthropogenic climate change, the evolution of antibiotic resistant bacteria, and species extinction are all cases in which current action can threaten future people in ways that may be nearly impossible for social norms alone to solve. We do not mean to suggest that all negative externalities should be eliminated, since they may be part of a process which has compensating benefits. Instead, we suggest that when current practices impose net negative externalities on future people norms are often insufficient to solve the problem. This is partly a function of numbers. When a public good like the preservation of an endangered species or an effective antibiotic requires the coordination of a large and diverse number of people, most people will lack the incentive to make the relevant sacrifices, even if a norm requires them to do so. One reason is the free rider problem, which occurs when each person has an incentive to indulge in a socially costly activity that he would prefer everyone not to engage in. Another is the assurance problem, which occurs when people are willing to sacrifice to produce an outcome that is good for current or future people, but lack the assurance that enough others will sacrifice to make their effort worthwhile. For example, in some circles social norms require us to spend more money to buy a fuel efficient car or an energy efficient light bulb. Many of us happily comply with such norms, but most people either lack the money or the desire to do so under conditions in which the benefits of conservation are socialized but the costs are internalized. By prohibiting or taxing socially costly activities, laws can, in principle, help us converge on a salient equilibrium that is both fair and efficient – across groups, and generations. This is not to say that efficiency is all that matters. Far from it, values like liberty and autonomy should also be considered when thinking about when to rely on emergent norms or formal laws. And the claim that government action can give rise to fair and efficient equilibria does not show that government action will have that effect. C Do existing norms threaten liberties that are important for human autonomy? When there is a trade-off between individual liberty and social welfare, or when liberty is not sufficiently respected by communal norms, the state might intervene with privacy laws, or more generally, constitutional guarantees like the American Bill of Rights. We should distinguish two cases of norms that might interfere with important kinds of liberties: nosy norms, and norms that encourage us to pursue positional goods. 1 Nosy Norms As social creatures, we often have strong opinions about how other people live their lives. This can be beneficial, as when parents and teachers encourage children to develop habits that are likely to benefit them later on but which they fail to understand now. But this disposition has a dark side. For example, growing up in a religious community may provide social benefits, psychological security, and even material 278 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law welfare, especially for the poor and disabled. But it can also be oppressive for deviants who are treated with suspicion and hostility. Coming out as an atheist or homosexual can be personally liberating, but nearly impossible if the predictable social sanctions are severe. Among the sanctions may be foregone job opportunities, public humiliation by former friends and family, and even ostracism and informal punishment by religious authorities (for example, long before Saudi Arabia made it a capital crime to consume alcohol or convert to Christianity, clerics harshly enforced religious traditions, or norms, that prohibited such activities). Even if abstaining from alcohol or conforming to a set of religious requirements makes a community function more efficiently, at least in the short run, these norms are obviously oppressive to some community members. Autonomy can be enhanced in cases like this through constitutional protections of religious and sexual minorities, or statutes that grant religious freedom and remove the state's ability to choose which set of religious traditions it wishes to support. Less direct ways of undermining norms that are corrosive to autonomy is to create privacy laws that make it illegal for citizens, employers, clerics, and other authority figures to access or spread certain kinds of information about people. Even in the absence of religious toleration, privacy laws can make it harder for the conformists to deprive dissenters of important social and economic opportunities.47 2 Positional Goods Some norms solidify rather than solve collective action problems. In particular, some norms lead us to act in ways that are individually beneficial, given the actions of other people, but socially harmful. Positional goods are a clear case in which other people's actions, and expectations, can make all of us worse off. For example, since people around the world find youthful appearance attractive,48 many spend time and money wearing makeup and high heels, using expensive hair dyes and skin creams, whitening teeth, and removing wrinkles with risky and costly cosmetic surgeries. To be sure, social norms sometimes solve collective action problems associated with positional goods. For example, counter-culture hippies in 1960s San Francisco wore unkempt beards and long hair, and rejected makeup and designer clothes in order to distinguish themselves from what they saw as the materialism of mid-twentieth century Americans. But cases like this are rare and transitory, so perhaps socially destructive norms should be taxed or banned. Some scholars emphasize the ubiquity of positional goods, and support using laws that raise the cost of positional goods.49 We do not disagree with this, in principle, but it is worth emphasizing that government intervention can make the problem worse. First, laws require resources to enforce, and enforcing laws against high heels and makeup, for example, might be both expensive and ineffective if people turn to black markets and homemade beauty products to satisfy their preferences. Unless the law carries serious penalties, it is likely to be ignored, and if it did carry serious penalties, it would create new harms by encouraging 47 See McAdams, above n 9, 424. 48 The evolutionary reason men are attracted to youthful appearance is that younger women are typically more fertile. The evolutionary reason women care less about youthful appearance is that men's fertility does not decline quite as steeply with age, and because women – who spend more resources bearing and raising children – must be far more careful about who fathers their children. This makes them more likely to seek out signs of success more than fertility. Thus, men are usually under less pressure to chase the positional good of youthful appearance, though they may be under more pressure to chase the quasi-positional good of financial success. See Geoffrey Miller, The Mating Mind (Anchor, 1999). 49 See especially Robert Frank, Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behaviour and the Quest for Status (Oxford University Press, 1987). 279 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 the usual maladies associated with black markets (assuming some inelasticity in the demand for cosmetics). Second, empowering law makers to decide which positional goods to ban or tax provides them with powers that we may prefer them not to have. Some argue that the pursuit of higher education is a positional good (and in some cases, they are right), but most of us do not think education should be taxed to avert educational arms races, in part because policymakers typically lack the information and incentives to distinguish socially valuable from socially harmful degree programs. D Is the norm a local optimum when a global optimum is achievable at low cost? In strategic interactions with many participants and many equilibria, it is easy to understand how people can be caught in norm traps, or local optima, when other welfare-enhancing norms are available. We have already described norms surrounding pollution disposal, footbinding, and female genital mutilation, as impure coordination games with multiple equilibria. Another interesting norm is the social expectation (which became a legal requirement in some societies) that each man must pay a 'brideprice' to the family of the woman whom he wishes to marry. This practice is so common that it was standard in most preindustrial societies, and persists in many parts of Africa today. The complementary practice that requires the family of women to pay a 'dowry' to the man's family as a condition of marriage became increasingly prevalent in India during the 20th century.50 Some have argued that the practice of brideprice is associated with a strong female role in agriculture, and that dowry is associated with societies in which women have a smaller role in labour-intensive agriculture.51 There also appears to be a correlation between brideprice and polygyny, and between dowry and monogamy. In societies that practice it, a brideprice is typically seen as the cost a husband pays to his wife's family in exchange for her household labour, whereas dowry is often paid by a woman's family to a man's family in exchange for her opportunity to marry into a family of 'superior' social rank. More recently, in some societies, groomprices (direct cash payments to the groom rather than his family) have become prevalent ways for women to increase their social standing. The evolution of norms surrounding marriages may very well be efficient responses to local conditions, but in many cases they are local optima in an unfair game. This is true when they evolve against a backdrop in which women lack access to education or property. When we look at the game more globally, so to speak, we might argue that all of the local equilibria are inferior to an alternative equilibrium in another game. That other game is one in which women are given equal opportunities to own and inherit property, to seek education, and participate in the workforce. Under these conditions – conditions of more equal rights and bargaining power – women would not be forced by circumstance to seek men in higher social classes, or come up with enough money to pay a groom for increased life prospects. But these conditions, and the game itself, may benefit from legislation that ensures property rights and bodily autonomy for each individual, rather than letting norms evolve organically, or simply passing ad hoc laws that attempt to reduce the murder of brides whose family pays insufficient dowry, which appears to be the current response in India and Bangladesh. 50 Siwan Anderson, 'The Economics of Dowry and Brideprice' (2007) 21(4) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 151. 51 Ibid 156. 280 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law E How quickly are destructive norms likely to change in the absence of state intervention? Impersonal laws are often better than norms when groups are large or diverse. But laws can also supplement norm change, and for many of the most troubling norms, the most effective state response may be to indirectly facilitate norm change. Consider again the case of footbinding in China and FGM in Africa. Gerry Mackie argues that although laws against footbinding probably had some effect in hastening the process of subverting the norm, the work of anti-footbinding societies was much more important. According to Mackie, these societies did three things: First, they carried out a modern education campaign, which explained that the rest of the world did not bind women's feet – that China was losing face in the world and was subject to international ridicule. Second, their education campaign explained the advantages of natural feet and the disadvantages of bound feet. Third, they formed natural-foot societies, whose members pledged not to bind their daughters' feet nor to let their sons marry women with bound feet.52 If this is right, the best state action may be to simply allow norm entrepreneurs and public health practitioners to go to work. Outlawing the practice may send a signal of social disapproval to those who think the government is a source of moral authority, but it fails to address the underlying strategic problem unless it enforces legal prohibitions vigorously. The demise of footbinding as a social norm seems to have occurred in part because of information cascades, which altered the strategic considerations parents faced in deciding how to make their daughters attractive in the marriage market. According to Cristina Bicchieri, 'informational cascades occur when it is optimal for an individual, having observed the actions of other individuals, to follow their behavior regardless of his own preferences or information'.53 Once parents understood the alternatives, all they needed was some assurance that enough other people around them would decline to bind their daughters' feet. Anti-footbinding societies could make agreements credible in close-knit communities, even in the absence of state enforcement. As soon as enough parents complied with the new norm, the older and less socially efficient norm vanished. On Mackie's view, similar societies are likely to be effective at ending FGM in African countries where legislation has had little effect. States can facilitate this process by allowing public health professionals to spread information, in addition to outlawing the practice, which has so far been unsuccessful.54 F What are the limits of the law? The evaluation of norms as instruments of social order should be posed as a comparative exercise. It is a familiar conceptual point – much emphasized by public choice theorists – that the mere observation that a norm is not working 'optimally' is not sufficient to justify legal intervention. The aphorism that, to a man with a hammer everything looks like a nail, is applicable here. Policymakers and lawmakers are perhaps inevitably psychologically disposed to think that policy and law are appropriate solutions to all observed problems. In other words, people in the business 52 Mackie, above n 23, 1011. 53 Bicchieri, above n 11, 197. 54 Mackie, above n 23, 1014. 281 University of Queensland Law Journal 2014 of law and policy tend to be blind to the limitation of their own tools.55 Just what these limits are is a matter of normative significance and considerable intellectual interest, but we cannot say much about the question here. But it is worth emphasizing the various gaps between what might be construed as the ideal policy or the ideal law and what gets realized on the ground. In particular: (a) The ideal law many not be the law that is most likely to emerge from political processes. Those processes involve inevitable compromises between the interests of specific influential bodies, and with what an often ill-informed electorate can be induced to vote for, and what vote-hungry politicians can be induced to promote. What finally emerges as law may lie a long way from what the original designer has in mind. (b) The actual law that emerges from the political process has to be interpreted by judges, who may have their own biases and agendas. (c) The law as it applies 'on the street' will be subject to the culture of the police force. There must remain an element of discretion that lies with individual police officers and their decisions as to which laws to enforce and whom to focus their enforcement efforts on. (d) The behavioural response by the general public can be unpredictable – compliance can be secured in ways that legislators did not intend, or actions to avoid or evade the law can have worse effects than the actions the law is designed to proscribe. None of these considerations means that legislative (or other policy) intervention in the face of defective norms is unduly dangerous or presumptively inappropriate. It is merely to underline a set of considerations that policymakers and legislators, by virtue of their location in the law-making process, are disposed to overlook or underestimate. IV CONCLUSION Our object in this paper has been to explore the role of social norms as possible sources of social order – mainly with an eye to the contrast between norms and legislation. We have argued that many social norms function as invisible hands, or socially beneficial emergent orders. But equally, we have conceded that norms can be perverse. They can continue to operate when the conditions that favoured their emergence have long since changed. They can support conditions that significantly favour some groups over others. They can even serve to make almost everyone who is subject to them worse off. And we have emphasized that, though it may be tempting to think of legislation and the processes by which legislation is generated and implemented as lying beyond and above the operation of social norms, this view is mistaken. There is no deus ex machina available. We are suspicious of drawing any general conclusions from accounts of instances where norms have worked well – where they seem to have solved coordination or prisoner's dilemma problems (or what might have been such problems if the relevant norms had not been in play). We do think that there is an important distinction between large number and small number interactions and that norms are more likely to arise and prove stable in small number cases. Where norms emerge locally, there is likely to be 55 Even when they are not blind, they may be induced to background such limits in their public conduct. How many politicians have, for example, been forced to intervene in situations that they believe they should not because to 'fail to act' would be seen by the general public as an inadmissible confession of the politicians' own impotence! 282 Vol 33(2) Social Norms, the Invisible Hand, and the Law an important adjudicative role for government action (and possibly legislation) as the distinct norms of local groups come into conflict. On the other hand, any broad evaluation of norms as sources of social order should ask the 'compared to what?' question. The limits and imperfections of norms must be set against the necessary limits and imperfections of legislative 'solutions'. Those limits and imperfections are not always obvious to those who design such solutions. By their nature, 'visible' processes tend to have more advocates than 'invisible' processes – that is just part of the upshot of being 'invisible'. In that sense, norms may have more going for them than many legislators and would-be policy advisors are apt to recognize.

GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 95 O R I G I N A L A R T I C L E The Problem of Rationality in the History of African Philosophy Okpe Timothy Adie1| Joseph Simon Effenji2 1Department of Philosophy University of Calabar, Calabar, Cross River, 540242, Nigeria. 2 Ashi Polytechnic, Anyun, Benue State, Nigeria. Abstract: It has been the position of many Eurocentric invaders, anthropologists, ethnographers, philosophers among others that Africans are far from rationality, civilization, and philosophy. Eurocentricists sees themselves as rational being and also sees Europe as the home of civilization and philosophy while Africa is regarded as the home of wild animals, people, culture, barbarians and salvages. This Eurocentric mindset is colored with prejudice against Africans, as the rationality of African natives is questioned. This paper attempts to explain that rationality is universal and as such, African views and ideas should be respected. Also, marginalization and subjugation of the human person through racism should be strongly discouraged. The paper employed the method of critical analysis as well as conceptual clarifications. Keywords: Africa, Eurocentricism, Rationality, Philosophy. Relations .Relations. INTRODUCTION The discourse on the problem of rationality among Africans has been associated historically with two related happenings: Western discourse in Africa and the African response to it (Masolo, 1). The Western discourse had come form of such notorious proclamations and claims as "reason is Greek", "emotion is African". To some of them, African beliefs are neither rational nor irrational because the categories just do not apply to them .To them, African beliefs are neither rational nor irrational because the categories just do not apply to them. And the postmodernists have held that the concept of rationality does not apply to Africa since the concept is a contested one that presupposes a language game with its complete rules that do not apply across languages and cultures. The African response has come in different forms and shapes with the African Nationalists, postcolonial African leaders, Pan-Africanists, Scholars intelligentsia, writers and traditionalists alike. The response has sought to re-indigenize, re-africanize the 'natives', to strip her of the alienations of Western modernity that had as it were, made her a person with no identity, hope and force her to return to the 'authentic' and pristine values of a pre-colonial past. The rationality problem is, therefore, the problem of how to determine the place, status and African knowledge in the great debate on the concept of reason (Bassey et el, 1055). It also involves the question of critically analyzing the conceptual issues, implied in the distinction between the civilized and the uncivilized, the logical and the pre-logical or mystical. THE EMERGENCE OF A DOMINANT RATIONALITY GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 96 The rationality debate or problem is understood as the theoretical and practical dimensions depicting the individual's role and impact in the shaping of one's identity and destiny, and control of history and other cultural values. It is the estimation of the basis and merits of cultural norms and the clarification of the supremacy of contending images of man. The debate evolves as claims and counterclaims, justifications and alienations, passed between the two camps: western and non-western. (Masolo, 1). To a large extent, the debate about African philosophy can be summarized as a significant contribution to the discussion and definition of reason or what Hegel called the Reason. Indeed, it is commonly referred to as the "rationality debate". DEFINING RATIONALITY The question of how to define the criteria of rationality has become a central theme in Anglophone philosophy. It has occupied debates among social anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers of science. On one side are the foundationalists who argue that formal rational procedures are the defining feature of science, which supersedes common sense and is universal. On one side of the divide are the pluralists, who argue in favour of the diversity of human experience and systems of representation. Most African cultural relativists fall under the later category. This is because they explain culture as a people's experience and ways of life. And as different people have divers experiences so there would be diverse attitudes towards life and issues of life and this cannot be overlooked in adjudging a people's rationality. The origin of the English word "rational" is the Latin word "ratio" which can be translated as "reason" in English. A rational action or belief is reasonable, one concerning only good reasons for acceptance. "Rationality", as a noun is a power resident in human beings, enabling them to discriminate between reality. Since the action is rational when it is reasonable, it follows that if a reasonable action is that which makes sense, and then a rational action will also be that which makes sense. We could have or lack reasons for holding any belief to be true; we act rationally when we maintain consistent beliefs, and irrationally when we don't. And to a large extent, this determines our actions. One may also say or hold that the availability of evidence supporting our beliefs can also form a basis to adjudge rationality. These beliefs in themselves have no element of rationality, but one thing as Gordon Reddiford observation remains important, that is the consistency of beliefs with actions. Hence Gordon Reddiford defines rationality as: How we come to hold our beliefs, in our attitudes to the evidence for example, and further to the procedures we adopt in maintaining or rejecting them. Thus to ascribe rationality is to comment on our success or failure in continuing to subject them to scrutiny in attempting to maintaining consistency particularly when we express our beliefs in action. (Gordon 43). This position poses a serious moral problem; which is that of accepting as rational, an immoral belief which is expressed consistently in actions. Would Reddiford regard as rational Hitler's belief that the Jews are chickens, which was consistently expressed in action? Would my belief that a particular neighbour of mine as an enemy, which I express in killing him be regarded as rational? Or does a mere good reason for an action makes that action rational? The problems associated with the definition of 'good' would cause a rather quick abandonment of such GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 97 definitions of rationality; they are rather sophistry than normative. This is unlike the positions of some western scholars like Aristotle and Steven Lukes. Lukes identifies criteria, which held beliefs that a set of beliefs has to satisfy for them to be adjudged rational; (i) such systems are logical, that is consistent and admit no contradiction (ii) they are not wholly or partially false, (iii) not nonsensical (iv) not situationally specific or ad-hoc, enduring just for a very short time that is must be universalisable (Umoh, 12). Among all the criteria listed above, the criterion of logicality stands out among others. For if a belief is illogical one can rightly infer that it is nonsensical, partially or wholly false, and inconsistent. The criteria of logicality was first formulated by Aristotle, as Sogolo opines, Aristotle was the first philosopher to systematize all forms of positive thinking about thought the result of which was the invention of formal logic. (68) Since the formulation of formal logic by Aristotle, it has remained indispensable for correct thinking and thus has been describe as the systematic formulation of instinctive logic of common sense (Sogolo, 68). The fundamental laws in formal logic as formulated by Aristotle are (i) the law of identity which simply states that a thing is equal or identical with itself (A equal A) (ii) The law of contradiction. Strictly speaking, it is a negative formulation of the first law. The law of contradiction states, that a thing cannot be unequal to or different from itself; (A is not none-A) (iii) The law of excluded middle. This particular law of formal logic combines, the first and the second. It states that if a thing is equal to itself, it cannot be unequal to or different from itself (if A equal A, it cannot be equal non-A) (Sogolo, 68). The formulation of the Aristotelian logic was meant to serve as a standard, a yardstick for adjudging the intelligibility or otherwise of a thought system, it is normative. Scholars of different ages, like Evans Pritchard, Martin Hollis, Steve Lukes, etc, felt the inclination to insist that for my form of thought or action to be adjudged intelligible or rational, it has to conform to the rules of formal logic. THE BRUHLIAN SOCIO-COGNITIVE BIFURCATIONISM The image of the 'scientific society' set out to be projected by intellectual school pioneered by Tylor and sociologists such as Levy Bruhl, Evan Pritchard, Martin Hollis, and Steven Lukes, is that of "rational excellence" and "institutionalized rationality". It is on this Eurocentric belief that Levy Bruhl bifurcated the human society into two categories-those of a 'primitive mentality' and those with a 'civilized mentality'. Africa by this bifurcation falls under the former category. According to Peterman, Levy Bruhl describes a 'prelogical thought' as one that is unscientific, uncritical and contains evident contradictions. People with such thoughts differ not in degree but in quality from those with a logical mind. (405). The African thought system has been adjudged irrational because according to Bruhl, it is insensitive to the rules of formal logic as formulated by Aristotle. Hollis states that these GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 98 rules render it possible to make a transcultural and comparative judgment as to the degree of rationality and irrationality in a belief and action system (Masolo, 130). This is exactly what levy-Bruhl did when he found contradictions in assertions such as when the Nuer says 'twins are birds" or "crocodiles are spirits'*. From Levy-Bruhl's point of view, it is a clear violation of the rules of logic, which do not permit a thing to be itself and yet another thing. The Nuer is therefore involved in contradiction by saying that a twin is a twin (A is A) and at the same time that a twin is a bird (A is nonA) (Sogolo, 71). On the surface Levy Bruhl could have been said to have made an innocent observation about the thought system of the Nuer people. It is the fact that such interpretation would be inevitable following the Aristotelian logic. For instance, the Nuer people see birds as divine creatures from above because they fly. They also held the belief that twins are likened as birds, special gifts from God and precious to man. This would have been a mere use of metaphor within Western literary expressions and thought system. The expression 'that man is a lion', is no violation of any rule of formal logic. That would simply mean that the man is as strong as a lion, acts like a lion or is fearless and courageous. It goes to show convincingly that, Levy Bruhl's misinterpretation of the Nuer's saying was never an oversight. It was an orchestrated attempt to devaluate the Africaness of the Africans with the aim to foster a Western control and determination of her destiny and identity. Therefore the denial of Africans of rationality by the WestLevy Bruhl, Hegel and the rest, rested on a satanic prejudice against the Africans. The pre-logical mentality connotes that the Africans are not a race different from the animals. This speculation about the Africans as inferior and savages was intertextually entrenched within the universal discourse of tile French, British and German enlightenment thinkers. This Western attitude according to Masolo "had started as a mere cultural bias, supported loosely by a racist or orthodox biblical ideology," which gradually grew into a formidable two-pronged historical realities, slavery and slave trade on the one hand and academic expressions on the other. (130). What Masolo calls the 'academic expressions' were actually seen as the justification for colonizing Africa with the delusion that Europe was spreading civilization. A further choice sampling of the underpinnings of this colonial 'academic expressions' would show clearly their mentality and mindset. Hume was of the conviction that the Africans due to their blackness are precluded from the realm of reason and civilization. He opines: I am apt to suspect that the Negroes, and in general the other species of men to be naturally inferior to whites. There never was a civilized, nation of any complexion than white (Serequeberham, 6). Serequeberham claimed that Kant feels that the fact that Africans were black from head to foot was clear proof that whatever they say was stupid (6). This implies that there are fundamental differences between the two races of man, differences that were more in mental capacities than colour. For Hegel in his 'Philosophy of the World History', the Negroes are beyond the pale of humanity, with the consciousness that has not yet reached an awareness of any substantial objectivity. He articulates this thought thus; Of God or the lawin which the will of man could participate and which he could become aware of his being. The African, in his undifferentiated and GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 99 concentrated unity, has not yet succeeded in making this distinction between himself as an individual and his essential universality so that he knows nothing of an absolute being which is other and higher than his own self (Masolo, 4). Africans from this point of view is neither part of world history, nor part of humanity. People without culture and history, living in a state of innocence, unconscious of themselves as in the natural and primitive state of Adam and Eve in the biblical paradise and will. This state could be likened to the state of nature described by the Social ContractariansHobbes and Locke. In like manner, Marx and Engel articulated these same Eurocentric views as part of their philosophic – historical position (Bassey, 1550) . For them, the colonial Europeanization of the globe was a prerequisite for the possibility of true human freedom, which to them, is communism. These discourses on Africa and Africans underestimated and disparaged African culture and identity. It denied that 'reason' played any significant role in the development of a person, society and culture in Africa, as it did in Europe. To the colonizers then, Africans had no abiding values and lacked generally, the intellectual and moral resources of the Europeans, whose mission in Africa was a 'civilizing mission'. This civilizing mission, which was in the form of colonization and Christianization of the Africans, created a crisis of self-identity and. Africa was 'rapped' through these missions, human dignity was injured and the self-confidence of the Africans sapped, which caused the type of soul-searching, we have in Africa. The civilizing mission of Europeans was an active program by the Europeans to change the African's supposed inferior ways of life to conform to European models in some important areas of human experience such as education, religion, economics, politics etc. The very feet that the Africans were conquered were taken as proof of me unhistoricity and lack of humanness of the colonized. Colonial racism succeeded in alienating many Africans from their own culture (Ikegbu and Bassey, 368). There became a preference for European culture, values, and mores. Some Africans began to see themselves inferior to the whites, and our culture through Christian indoctrination, barbaric, inhuman and devilish. Through education and religion (Christianity), the European languages became official languages of most African countries, to the extent that our children feel ashamed to speak African native languages, and ashamed when unable to speak the so-called language of enlightenment. This implanted colonial and colonizer's mentality, has made it difficult for this ugly situation to be reversed in any way. This is the mentality that makes a formerly colonized person, over-value foreign things coming from his erstwhile colonial master. 'Things here is to be interpreted widely to include not only material objects, but also modes of thought and behavior. (Wiredu and Gyekye, 62). This cultural dislocation landed Africa in the problem of self-definition and identity, forced to ask 'Who are we as a people?" "What were we as a people?" "How do we fashion out an enduring and a viable future?" Africans have found it difficult to find appropriate responses to these questions because Africa today is caught in between a past s/he could not recall and a present and future she could not envisage. Despite all these, the dominance of the colonial mentality was not absolute; and this explains the reason why there is the problem of self-search and definition. Put differently, the obvious fact of this consciousness in Africa shows that indigenous modes of thought and action have not been eclipsed by colonialism (Wiredu and Gyekye, 62). It shows that the colonialists did not take the pain to penetrate and adequately 'educate' the rural interior of African countries. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 100 As a result of this, dome African locales still retained a large part of their indigenous world outlook (Wiredu and Gyekye, 62). These are the sages, according to Oruka, that have not been unduly influenced by Westernism. EXPLAINING "RATIONALITY" AMONG AFRICANS AND CULTURE There have been many dimensions to the question of the rationality of Africans and their culture. These dimensions focus on different aspects of the problem of rationality in Africa such as, the question of whether Africans are as human as other people of the world. The African's philosophical responses and the concept of cultural relativism were attempts by prominent Africa to give answers to some of the questions raised in the problem of rationality, and also to restore self confidences, prestige and honour to Africa, knowing fully well that colonialism which resulted to cultural discontinuity and dislocations made the Africans more of a people who have lost confidence in themselves. (Umoh, 12). The early Pan-Africansists like Edward Blyden, Dubois, Joseph Ki-zerbo, Africans Horton and postcolonial African leaders like Leopald Senghor, Nyerere, Nkrumah, Azikiwe, etc, saw the solution to the crisis of culture and rationality in Africa in the discovery of authentic African ideas and thought systems uninfluenced by alien accretion, which gave birth to concepts like Ujaama, Negitude, African Socialism, etc. In the same vein, contemporary African philosophers like Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Segun Oladipo, Robin Horton, K.C. Anyanwu, Gnyewuenyi, to mention but a few, have upheld the concept of cultural relativism and demonstrated convincingly in their scholarly writings that indeed before Western contact with Africa, Africa had history and culture which was scientific and in fact with traces of the origin of modern medical science They further have held that philosophy did not spring up from vacuum. Philosophers from all ages were tremendously influenced by their society and culture, since most of what they postulated was already fore grounded in their culture. And philosophy being always a corollary of a culture presupposes that no philosophical theme or problem can completely be understood and handled without familiarity with the culture and language from which it originated (Oruka, 90). If there is any modicum of truth in what we are saying above; it would imply that philosophy arises from the culture of a people, that no culture is bereft of philosophy. That Africa is not bereft of philosophy was further demonstrated by Oruka in his four trends/ orientations in African philosophy, where he identifies the various sources and ways in which African philosophy was done-ethno philosophy, philosophy sagacity, the nationalist-ideological philosophy, and the professional philosophy. Senhor came up with his African epistemology; unique African mode of knowing; and Mbiti, his African concept of time. These various responses were articulated to affirm and to put to bed the question of "rationality" among Africans. However, many years after the colonial era, many African countries eventually got political independence, but the vital question still remains 'how can they further demonstrated rationality in African political arena?, especially Africa political leaders who fought slavery and colonialism and eventually took over at different leadership roles within the continent. This would be our concern in the next session of this paper as we also examine our roles in this historical 'rape' of Africa. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 101 THE POSTCOLONIAL AFRICANAND THE PROBLEM OF RATIONALITY Postcolonial Africa is still besieged by problems arising from the accident, and the design of history. The continent boasts of the highest numbers of failed and nearly failed states such as Burundi, Cote D'lvoire, Congo, DR, Zimbabwe, Sudan, Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Angola. Oyeshile has observed that we cannot controvert the fact that ethnic, conflicts and wars have resulted in gross underdevelopment in the African continent (Oyeshile, 10). The wanton destruction of lives and property, human, material and natural resources, the problem of corruption, ethnicity, leadership, poverty, diseases, hunger, death, and diseases, have all been wholly in part attributed to the phenomenon of slavery, colonialism and military incursion into the African body polity. One clearly understands the pulse of those who feel and argue this way. Hence Oguejiofor has recognized that The effect of slavery on African society was thus not limited to visible factors; even of greater consequence and the invisible political, psychological and social effect. The millions of people carted away meant a drastic reduction of the productive capacity, especially when those sought after were those at the bloom of their lives, wars aimed at gathering slaves, and other raids meant serious rupture of economic and social life (Oguejiofor, 19). One way that we have reacted to Africa's predicament, problems and failures has been to put blames on external causes like-slavery, colonialism, and militarism. While these factors have contributed, it would be wrong to assume that the transatlantic slave trade described as the "most iniquitous transaction in human history" (Oguejiofor, 26) was solely perpetrated in the African continent by outsiders. The African chiefs and rulers who through chains of middlemen penetrated the interiors of Africa on behalf of the European slave merchants to capture slaves and negotiate with the buyers aided part of what we have attributed and considered the impacts of slavery (Oguejiofor, 28). It is of great interest that this trade lasted for over four hundred years. It has left one to begin to wonder helplessly how this business was sustained for that long. There were probably excellent strategic management processes and plans on sustainability. Evidence abounds to show that this was big business in all its ramifications for those who engaged in it -Africans and non-Africans alike, as Oguejiofor observes that the "Medieval kingdoms of west Africa derived great wealth through the export for slaves (Oguejiofor, 27). These African traditional rulers might have functioned in different capacities at management levels of slave trading partners or companies. There were, one would suppose excellent succession plans to enhance business growth from generation to generation. One cannot but help to ask "how was Africa able to sustain the supply of slaves consistently to Europe?" Your gaze is as good as mine. The point that we can't fail to make clear here is that whatever mentality that was predominant, and whatever justification given for the Africans participation and partnership in this inhuman and hideous treatment of fellow Africans, some of who as Don Affonso of Congo observes were "sons of the land and sons of our noblemen, vassals and our relatives (Oguejiofor, 25). This could be a reason while Rudyard Kipling branded an African as "half devil and half child" (Ezeh, 213-214). There was no iota of sense of brotherhood and love exhibited by these African merchants. Where was that spirit of communalism that African's were known? For whatever reason, Some African leaders failed, and I think, this justified the description by the Europeans as pre-logical. The era of the slave trade ended, thanks to some Europeans, especially GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 102 some British who were very instrumental to this. The process of independence started with different constitutional developments in Africa, after the Second World War and eventually, many African states became politically autonomous. The African leaders naively embraced the legacies of the colonial administration. It was as Oguejiofor explained a mere change of guards, with the indigenous politicians replacing the Europeans in the same positions, in the same system that they fought for so long to overthrow (Oguejiofor, 47). It seems some Africa countries were not ready for political independence, which has shown in the ways they have managed their affairs, even till now. However, with the ascendance of the military juntas into power in Africa who were, "half-educated, inexperienced and incompetent Corporals, Master Sergeants, Lieutenants and Captains. Africa was further sent into the abyss of political instability and rudderless leadership" (Oguejiofor, 37). Those dark ages of military rule was terrific and horrifying, with such leaders as Idi Amin of Ugandu, Bokassa of Central Africa Republic, Mobutu of Zaire, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethopia, late Samuel Doe of Liberia, Sani Abacha of Nigeria and Michael Mikombero of Burundi. Again this era showed clearly, up to date, our inability to demonstrate rationality and prove the West wrong that we can paddle our boat unaided by them. It is obvious that African leaders, immediate past and present, inherited some devilish traits from the traditional African rulers who aided the slave trade, especially 'selfishness'. For more than half a century in Nigeria, we are still to graduate from our studentship. AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: PROVE THAT AFRICANS ARE RATIONAL However, despite the above, the Eurocentric thinkers of the 19th and early 20th centuries thought that philosophy was a European phenomenon. When the idea of an African philosophy was raised after the publication in 1945 of P. Temples' book, it was a shock to those who had been educated and brought up on the idea that the only genuine philosophy was European philosophy. There is no doubt, however, that India, China, and Japan have long traditions of philosophical reflection Many individuals, both African and non-African, were awakened from a dogmatic slumber. Indeed, the titles of articles written during this period reflect the foregoing in their emphasis on the following: Does African philosophy exist? What is African philosophy? Those and similar questions seemed to indicate that Africa, African cultures, and Africans themselves lacked the dispositions that are presumably essential for philosophy. Some of these writings were based on the views of Eurocentric thinkers such as L. L. Bruhl and others who thought that African philosophy could not exist, because the African mind lacks the attributes that are essential for philosophy. Bruhl coined the idea of the "primitive mentality" of the "savage", and Senghor echoed this sentiment by claiming "reason is Hellenistic while emotion is black". There were many Africans who were ready to endorse such denigrating assertions. The debate about whether African philosophy existed occurred in the context of these assumptions. Thus, for some, the very expression itself was offensive, because it appeared that one was talking about something that did not exist because philosophy was exclusively European. One need not have been born or live in a specific region of the world. Reason is a universal human trait that has different gestalts depending on where and in what contexts it is put to use. It is puzzling that, particularly starting with modernity and the Enlightenment, reasoning has been thought to be the attribute of only a certain segment of humanity. It is this GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 103 phenomenon that inspired many philosophers to engage in the debate. The debate was not in vain because it produced numerous useful philosophical texts. Indeed, the significance of these debates should not be underestimated with regard to their contribution to building the confidence of Africans to both overcome the imperializing of knowledge and produce new knowledge. It is this phenomenon that decisively motivated African philosophers to create philosophical texts that addressed specific philosophical themes. In this regard, the three books edited by E. C. Eze between 1996 and 1998 should be noted. These books treat a wide range of issues. For example, in "African Philosophy's Challenge to Continental Philosophy", R. Bernasconi addressed the issue of whether African philosophy is just like any other philosophy or whether it is unique. He pondered the implications of answering the question one way or the other and eventually underscored that African philosophy has both deconstructive and reconstructive tasks. Through its deconstructive tasks African philosophy points out the contradictions within the texts of continental philosophy. He noted, If continental philosophers would open themselves to critique from African philosophy and thereby learn more about their own tradition seen from "the outside" they would find that the hegemonic concept of reason had been displaced, and they would be better placed to learn to respect other traditions, including those that are not African (Bernasconi, 192). Bernasconi pointed to an important deconstructive task of African philosophy in this regard, highlighting a crucial intercultural phenomenon without mentioning it by name. By referring to how African philosophy is denied or excluded from the philosophy of humankind, he was noting that one of the points that deconstruction could discuss is the exclusion itself. The question of whether Greek philosophy owes a debt to Egyptian philosophy is important. Why has the indebtedness of Greece to Egypt, which was acknowledged by earlier Greek sources, been denied since the dawn of the modern age? What is the contribution of deconstruction to the contemporary dialogue between Western philosophy and African philosophy? Although Bernasconi does not refer to them by name, these are elements of intercultural encounters. Therefore, according to Bernasconi, African philosophy has both deconstructive and reconstructive tasks. The deconstructive task is concerned with, ... the unmasking and undoing of the Eurocentric residue inherited from colonialism. The unmasking aims at the grounding parameters and cultural codes inscribed in these (Eurocentric) political, economic, educational and social organizations that still remain oriented by colonial and European condescending attitudes. What deserves mentioning in this regard is the task of an African(a) philosophy engaged in exposing the racism of Western philosophy (Bernasconi, 190). The reconstructive task of African philosophy involves what it can add to continental philosophy or even to the philosophy of humankind in general. This is an appropriately intercultural practice that involves offering, from an African perspective, concepts, insights, methods, and other contributions that can enrich those who encounter them. CONCLUSION The state, destiny and the value that Africa has today in the globalized village, has to a great extent been determined by the outcome of the flu's debate and the problem of rationality. GNOSI: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Human Theory and Praxis, Vol. 1(1) (2018) (DOI: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3491905) 104 The outcome, of which included the consequent enslavement and colonization of Africans which were justified in the premise that Africans were sub-humans, and indeed needed to be humanized and civilized through servitude and colonialism. As we set out to redefine rationality in the context of African, and Africa's predicament, we recognize the fact that the failure of some African leaders at different ages and eras to demonstrate rationality as we clearly showed is not in any way to be attributed to the totality of Africans (Bassey and Mfonobong, 4). It is also true that when you re-examine closely the 'academic expression' of the West about Africa, they are dosed with irrational and prelogical analyze if and thoughts. There is no logical connection between the complexion of the Africans, with reason or civilization as Hume and Kant believed. And levy Bruhl classification of African's as periodical based on his interpretation of the never say, was also a clear proud exhibition of guidance and total privation of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding. One essential feature of man is his rationality, which distinguishes him from other animals, and this applies to all peoples. There is no evidence to show that God created some people rationally and others irrational. If the biblical records are anything to go by, God created man in his image and likeness. To say that Africans are irrational would imply that God is irrational. Or that African, were not created by God. This is why we consider as a betrayal, the Senghorean theory of African mode of knowing, which seems to suggest that Africans do not rely on the facility of reason in apprehending the external object. The purpose of a society can only be achieved if there is rationality. Co-existence in a society will be hampered without a sense of rationality and attitude to lay, essential society values, such as tolerance, respect, freedom, equality, justice, and value for human life, should be imbibed Of great interest here would be the criteria given by Steven Lukes for the rationality or otherwise of any belief system. This is known as practical rationality. This criterion emphasizes the ability of a practice to aid people in attaining their goals. In other words, this theory also known as instrumental rationality means that acting in a way is maximally efficient in achieving one's goals. Some of the goals Africa, would be to ensure that our religions and cultural differences do not form the basis for hatred, violence, and insecurity, to fly high above the bumps of ethnicity and ethnic consciousness, to overcome hunger, poverty, corruption, war, strive, disease, political and societal values, policies, laws and practices that would ensure freedom, justice, equality and total development of Africa would be very instrumental in achieving our desired goals in Africa. Anything short of this would widely be adjudged irrational in Africa by Africans. WORKS CITED BASSEY, S. A., ENANG, N. R., & Nwaeke, C. U. (2018). REVISITING THE LANGUAGE QUESTION IN AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY. Journal of Social And Humanities Sciences Research (JSHSR), 5(23), 1053-1067. Bassey, Samuel Akpan. "Karl Marx Alienation and the Nigerian Workers." Imperial Journal of Interdisciplinary Research (IJIR) 8th ser 2 (2016): 1550-555.. Bernasconi, Robert. African philosophy's challenge to continental philosophy. 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Oyeshile, Olatunji . Reconciling the Self with the other: An Existentialist Perspective on the Management of Ethnics Conflicts in Africa. Ibadan, Nigeria: Hope Publications 10. (2000). Peterman, Barbara S. "Lévy-Bruhl in Piaget: Hermeneutic Analysis of Text and Context." Developmental Review 20.3 (2000): 405–437. Web. Serequeberhan, Tsenay. African Philosophy: The Point in Question. African Philosophy: The Essential Readings, T. Serequeberhan. Ed. New York: Paragon House. Sogolo, Godwin. (1993). Foundations of African Philosophy. Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 68 (1993). Uroh Chris, Language and Communication. Unpublished Article 12. Uroh, Chris. Cultural syncretism in African, in World Futures Studies Federation Future Bulletin, 12 (1998). Wiredu, Kwame. & Gyekye, Kwasi. Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophy Study I. Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. 62 (1992).

Revue Ouvertures volume 2, octobre 2014 31-09-2014 OUVERTURES Revue internationale de philosophie, théologie et psychanalyse 5 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Jean-Jacques Pinto Cet article, qui se veut lisible aux non-analystes, se propose de parcourir en quatre temps la problématique offerte à notre réflexion : deux temps (de rang impair) d'analyse de l'argument qui en fournit le contexte, et deux (de rang pair) de propositions présentant nos vues sur ce que pourrait être la teneur du discours analytique dans les prochaines années. Après cette introduction, un premier parcours réexaminera point par point mais informellement l'argument de J.-P. Journet en montrant que chacune de ses propositions peut donner lieu à un commentaire "bifide" à même de servir ou de desservir le discours analytique. D'où l'intérêt du "diagnostic différentiel" évoqué dans notre titre, qui fait entrevoir les pièges que l'homonymie peut tendre à ce discours. Puis, pour préparer un second balayage qui ne s'en tienne ni à la doxa analytique, ni aux opinions même autorisées de nos ténors et seniors, il sera proposé deux tentatives de redéfinitions ("apophatique" et "récursive") de ce qu'est l'analyse, ainsi que des outils méthodologiques fonctionnant en aval de ces redéfinitions pour déjouer les embûches de l'homonymie "externe" et "interne" (à partir d'un syllogisme pouvant faire consensus). Le troisième temps sera fait justement de ce second balayage de la problématique, dont les éléments seront reconsidérés et analysés plus méthodiquement : "diagnostic différentiel externe" entre le discours analytique et les discours psychologique, philosophique, sociologique et celui de la science moderne ; et "diagnostic différentiel interne" portant sur l'intrication entre avancées théoriques des analystes et survivance à répétition d'éléments fantasmatiques... Jean-Jacques Pinto titulaire d'un Doctorat en médecine et d'un Certificat de spécialité en psychiatrie" Psychanalyste en cabinet privé à Marseille, Bouches-du-Rhône, France. Enseignant en psychologie, psychanalyse à l'Université du Temps Libre Aix-Marseille. Enseignant en psychiatrie à l'Institut Supérieur d'Ostéopathie d'Aix-en-Provence 6 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Enfin une quatrième partie exposera propositions et perspectives résultant de ces analyses (principe d'économie quant à la source des théorisations analytiques ; dialogue avec les autres champs, mais sans compromissions ; relations spécifiques avec le discours de la science), l'ensemble débouchant sur une invitation, au delà des différends, à renouveler sur certains points la teneur du discours analytique... I. Notre premier balayage de la problématique reprend pas à pas sous l'angle du « diagnostic différentiel » l'argument proposé. Il accepte le risque de faire résonner quelques banalités (aux oreilles des analystes), son but étant non de produire une pensée originale, mais de dégager des lignes qui seront épurées, logicisées dans un second temps, tout en demeurant intelligibles aux non-analystes. • « La psychanalyse se définit comme une pratique clinique ». Ce mot, clinique, est justifié par l'étymologie puisque l'analysant est allongé sur l'équivalent d'un lit, mais il ne s'agit évidemment pas d'un lit d'examen : la clinique analytique est une clinique de la parole "en transfert". Le Dupin "analyste" dans La lettre volée de Poe intervient dans une autre dimension que la spatialité qu'explore en vain, médicalement, la police 1 : Regardons en effet de plus près ce qui arrive aux policiers. On ne nous fait grâce de rien quant aux procédés dont ils fouillent l'espace voué à leur investigation, de la répartition de cet espace en volumes qui n'en laissent pas se dérober une épaisseur, à l'aiguille sondant le mou, et, à défaut de la répercussion sondant le dur, au microscope dénonçant les excréments de la tarière à l'orée de son forage, voire le bâillement infime d'abîmes mesquins. À mesure même que leur réseau se resserre pour qu'ils en viennent, non contents de secouer les pages des livres à les compter, ne voyons-nous pas l'espace s'effeuiller à la semblance de la lettre ? Le problème que peut alors poser le terme clinique, joint aux métaphores médicales que sont cure, traitement, guérison, et au maintien – de Freud aux modernes – des "nosogrammes" névrose, psychose, symptôme etc., est de prêter le flanc aux critiques en semblant placer l'analyse sur le terrain des soins, des thérapies, donc de l'efficacité médicale, de la quantification, de l'évaluation (par INSERM ou autre), là où existe une efficacité d'un autre ordre, où la "guérison de surcroît" vient se greffer sur un succès d'un autre type...2 1 Jacques Lacan, Écrits, Paris, Seuil, 1966, 923 p. 2 Refus de la surenchère évaluative ne veut pas dire rejet de critères qualitatifs... 7 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! • « Cette référence clinique est la seule chose à partir de laquelle peut être élaborée la théorie analytique, la "métapsychologie" ». Certes, seule l'expérience engendrée par le couple association libre / non réponse peut déboucher par induction sur des lois empiriques, et par des monographies exhaustives sur une articulation fine des logiques inconscientes. Mais ne voit-on pas encore trop souvent l'analyste négliger « l'affermissement en lui volontaire de sa nescience quant à chaque sujet venant à lui en analyse, de son ignorance toujours neuve à ce qu'aucun ne soit un cas » (Lacan, ibidem) pour, à l'inverse, plaquer telle grille théorique préalablement apprise sur le vécu et le matériau verbal de la séance, et chercher à retrouver le cas d'école qui renforce la parole des maîtres – depuis le "c'est le Surmoi" étiquetant tel personnage sévère d'un rêve jusqu'au "c'est spéculaire" adressé en supervision à un de mes confrères ? • « Même si cette théorie doit être prête à tous les changements comme elle le montre régulièrement, les choses vraiment nouvelles sont particulièrement rares concernant la constitution psychique de l'humain, et la répétition dans l'expérience pratique fonde la répétition dans la théorie ». La répétition venue du réel de l'expérience, indéniable, répétition éventuellement formalisée, peut (diagnostic différentiel) se voir concurrencée par une répétition "névrotique" dans le discours des analystes, répétition venue du fantasme (soutien du désir) donc relevant de l'automatisme de répétition : "La voix de la raison est basse – dit quelque part Freud –, mais elle dit toujours la même chose". Ce qu'on ne fait pas comme rapprochement c'est que Freud dit exactement la même chose du désir inconscient. À lui aussi sa voix est basse mais son insistance est indestructible.3 • « Or seule cette théorie se déploie et s'exprime dans un discours public ». En effet : secret professionnel, technique et éthique analytique ne permettent pas la divulgation, sauf par fragments anonymisés, du contenu des séances. Voici le rappel inséré, dans un article sur l'analyse du fantasme hors situation analytique, pour écarter tout travail sur le "matériau" analytique luimême : 3 Jacques Lacan, Séminaire Livre XI, Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse, Paris, Seuil, 1973. 8 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Les productions verbales obtenues par l'association libre soulèvent des objections [...] éthiques et pratiques, quant au traitement du matériel obtenu en séance d'analyse [...]. Les objections éthiques : on ne peut enregistrer les patients sans leur accord ; or le fait de se savoir enregistré modifie nécessairement le cours de l'association libre ; et le secret professionnel interdit de publier intégralement le relevé des séances : l'identité du patient pourrait se révéler même s'il n'est pas explicitement nommé. Les objections pratiques : la constitution du corpus va contre la technique analytique elle-même. – l'"attention flottante" est requise chez l'analyste : s'il notait exhaustivement le discours du patient, les "arbres" que livre le mot à mot masqueraient la "forêt" de telle ou telle configuration significative. – la règle d'abstinence impose à l'analyste de ne retirer aucune contre-partie autre que financière de l'écoute de ses patients ; le texte des séances posé en objet de connaissance et source éventuelle de prestige et de reconnaissance y contreviendrait.4 Mais précisément sur ce déploiement théorique, le seul autorisé, vont influer pour le meilleur et pour le pire certaines contraintes liées tant au discours public qu'à la personnalité des discoureurs. Elles sont de trois sortes : – volontaires, conscientes : analogiques, pédagogiques, voire protreptiques : J.-C. Milner5 rappelle que pour Platon et Aristote on distingue l'enseignement exotérique (adressé à ceux qui sont hors de la philosophie), et l'enseignement ésotérique (adressé à ceux qui sont dans la philosophie). Dans les écrits et séminaires analytiques exotériques, il peut y avoir de la protreptique ("discours pour exhorter"), procédure discursive qui a pour fonction d'arracher le sujet à la doxa pour le tourner vers la theoria. Son ton et son style peuvent "éveiller" – ou seulement séduire en prêtant à imitation, ses analogies peuvent inciter à la réflexion – mais "comparaison n'est pas raison", et ses exemples pourtant détournés peuvent être à tort pris à la lettre (tels les philosophes convoqués par Lacan) ; – involontaires : il n'est pas possible d'avoir tout lu ; certaines notions peuvent n'être répercutées que par ouï-dire et filtrées à leur insu par la "réalité psychique" des disciples, comme le souligne Jacques Sédat à propos de la pulsion de 4 Jean-Jacques Pinto, Linguistique et psychanalyse : une approche logiciste, Marges Linguistiques n°8, sous la direction de Michel Arrivé et Izabel Vilela (pp. 88-113), Revue électronique, 2004 [Lien direct vers l'archive : http://t.co/enKhikNh]. 5 Jean-Claude Milner, L'OEuvre claire, Paris, Seuil, 1995. 9 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! mort : « La prédiction de Jung6 reste donc d'actualité : faute de travailler sur les textes mêmes, nombre de psychanalystes continuent à vénérer les erreurs "comme des reliques"... »7 ; – enfin certaines influences sur le discours public oeuvrent consciemment dans le sens d'un arrivisme dont les racines, elles, restent inconscientes : Pour l'analyste au contraire, tremper dans les procédés dont s'habille l'infatuation universitaire, ne vous rate son homme (il y a là comme un espoir) et le jette droit dans une bourde comme de dire que "l'inconscient est la condition du langage" : là il s'agit de se faire auteur aux dépens de ce que j'ai dit, voire seriné, aux intéressés : à savoir que "le langage est la condition de l'inconscient".8 Le mathème, avec sa recherche de transmissibilité intégrale, a été la tentative de Lacan pour solutionner ces deux derniers problèmes. • « Elle pourrait alors apparaître dans la culture comme une théorie d'une autre époque sous les charges dont elle est l'objet ». Ici encore se présentent deux possibilités quant à l'expression "d'une autre époque" : – la reprise dans la culture d'arguments épistémologiques valides faisant état de la péremption d'une théorie à tel point dépassée qu'on ne pourrait même pas, comme Newton dans Einstein, l'inclure au sein d'une théorie plus vaste ; – ou au contraire l'obsolescence injustifiée liée à un effet de mode "hystérique" qui brûle ce qu'il a adoré quelles qu'en soient les qualités. Or dans les sciences du parlant le plus nouveau n'est pas forcément le plus fiable, et l'on y connaît des régressions : malgré ses succès incontestables en linguistique et ailleurs, le "bébé" structuraliste n'a-t-il pas été jeté, après 68, avec "l'eau du bain" d'une mode qui l'a méconnu en l'exhibant ? 9 6 « Votre supposition qu'après mon retrait mes erreurs pourraient être vénérées comme des reliques m'a bien égayé, mais n'a pas rencontré de croyance chez moi. Je pense qu'au contraire les jeunes se dépêcheront de démolir tout ce qui n'est ni rivé ni cloué dans mon héritage. » Freud, Lettre à Jung (19 décembre 1909) 7 Jacques Sédat, La pulsion de mort : hypothèse ou croyance ?, Cliniques méditerranéennes 2008/1 (n° 77), Érès, Paris 8 Jacques Lacan, Radiophonie, in Scilicet 2/3 pp. 55-99, Paris, Seuil, 1970. 9 Jean-Claude Milner, Le Périple structural Figures et paradigme, Verdier, Paris, 2008 10 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! • « De fait, depuis sa fondation, la psychanalyse supporte de nombreuses critiques et a suscité résistances et doutes. Ne sont-ce pas ces mêmes critiques et ces mêmes doutes qui se répètent aujourd'hui ? ». Doutes et critiques sont légitimes dans l'évolution de la connaissance, si l'on évite le Charybde du relativisme cognitif et le Sylla du dogmatisme avec sa (mauvaise) foi. Ils ont été la source d'avancées pour la psychanalyse elle-même (exemple de Lacan critiquant l'annafreudisme). Et si résistances il y a, mieux vaudrait en démonter précisément les mécanismes et apporter ainsi de l'eau au moulin de la théorie, plutôt que d'en invoquer l'existence uniquement pour discréditer les contradicteurs (ce qui justifierait la critique épistémologique d'un Karl Popper)... La théorie psychanalytique dans sa multiplicité n'est pas exempte de dogmes, de non-doutes, de résistances alimentant ses dissensions internes. Sur la question soulevée, le diagnostic différentiel consiste à faire le départ, comme plus haut, entre les critiques et doutes destructeurs se répétant parce qu'ils relèvent de résistances "névrotiques" caractérisables, et les critiques et doutes se répétant du fait de l'incapacité partielle de la psychanalyse à se pencher sur certaines de ses contradictions, et à porter elle-même en son sein le fer d'une critique... constructive ! • « Par exemple, la psychanalyse subit actuellement les assauts d'une partie des neurosciences et des sciences cognitivo-comportementales, et aussi bien de certains politiques, penseurs et intellectuels ». – Il est bon d'avoir précisé "une partie des neurosciences", puisque effectivement, aux deux approches "mixtes" et fort contestables que sont la neuroplasticité de F. Ansermet et P. Magistretti et la neuropsychanalyse participent des neuroscientifiques qui ne rejettent pas la psychanalyse. Sans pouvoir ici nous étendre sur ce sujet, disons que dans une conférence sur la question 10 nous argumentons pour la quatrième option présentée dans le tableau ci-dessous ("il y a deux objets différents et complémentaires explorés par deux modalités différentes et complémentaires de la démarche scientifique") : 10 Jean-Jacques Pinto, Psychanalyse et Neurosciences, Conférence publique au théâtre Comoedia d'Aubagne ("Mardis scientifiques d'Aubagne") le mardi 8 novembre 2011, résumé en quatre pages disponible ici : http://hal-univ-diderot.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/79/81/38/PDF/Psychanalyseneurosciences.pdf 11 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! INCOMPATIBILITÉ COMPATIBILITÉ UN SEUL OBJET un seul objet par réductionnisme car l'autre objet et l'autre approche sont disqualifiés un seul objet sous deux angles différents neuroplasticité, neuropsychanalyse DEUX OBJETS Deux objets différents, donc deux approches incompatibles (Chaperot, Celacu et Pisani) deux objets et deux approches différents et complémentaires Dans cette optique, les attaques de certains neuroscientifiques contre la psychanalyse sont aussi absurdes et vaines que le seraient celles d'électroniciens en mal d'introuvables "circuits grillés", s'en prenant aux analystes-(dé)programmeurs qui cherchent certains dysfonctionnements dans le programme importé plutôt que dans la machine qui l'effectue... – Pour ce qui est des sciences cognitivo-comportementales, elles semblent dans leur simplisme être en retard d'une guerre, et ne pourraient espérer légitimement atteindre la psychanalyse qu'en ayant déjà réussi à "passer sur le corps" de la linguistique, de l'argumentation et de la rhétorique, sans compter la simple observation "sociologique" !11 11 En effet on peut leur objecter ce qui suit (extrait de notre article Fantasme, Discours, Idéologie D'une transmission qui ne serait pas propagande in Topique 2010/2 n° 111 intitulé "Violence ou persuasion", L'Esprit du temps, Paris, 2010) : « L'explication des conduites humaines par le conditionnement est caduque [...], et ce pour trois raisons principales : – Le réflexe conditionné qui permet l'apprentissage animal finit par s'éteindre s'il n'est pas entretenu. – Il procède du code (relation biunivoque entre le stimulus et la réponse) et non du langage qui, fondamentalement ambigu et plurivoque, est doté de possibilités combinatoires quasiment infinies. – Il ne saurait aller vers la recherche du déplaisir [...] exception faite des espèces domestiques qui présentent des ébauches de névrose. Or l'humain peut courir à sa perte en se remettant dans les mêmes impasses, mu par quelque chose "de plus fort que soi" et qui ne s'éteint jamais : dans l'expérience analytique le désir inconscient est indestructible. Là où la mémoire animale servant l'adaptation au milieu utilise le souvenir pour éviter la répétition du déplaisir, la mémoire humaine est mise par le langage au 12 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Les penseurs et intellectuels qui s'en prennent à la psychanalyse sont connus, ainsi que leurs arguments, mais les attaques insidieuses de certains politiques sont souvent moins soupçonnées, et parfois dénoncées par des intellectuels pourtant fort hostiles à la psychanalyse... 12 • « Quelques auteurs s'attachent même ad hominem et ad personam à montrer comment le père de la psychanalyse aurait trafiqué voir manipulé ses résultats ». service de la répétition, même douloureuse – voire suicidaire (automatisme de répétition), l'oubli n'étant qu'apparent (refoulement). C'est avec le langage, permis par la prématuration, donc la dépendance à l'adulte nourricier sans laquelle l'enfant ne pourrait s'intéresser au langage, qu'apparaissent chez l'homme deux nouveaux types de solutions adaptatives : les versants cognitif et subjectif de l'identification. – La face "connaissance" de l'identification sert l'adaptation en fournissant à l'esprit humain des contenus mémoriels et des outils logiques qui le dispensent de devoir tout expérimenter, chaque génération disposant ainsi d'un savoir cumulatif considérable. [...] Ce savoir conscient ou préconscient est ouvert à la révision : si l'expérience le contredit ou si une argumentation le réfute, il pourra (en théorie) être questionné, remanié voire abandonné. – Mais l'enfant n'apprend pas à parler avec un dictionnaire et une grammaire. Il est introduit dans l'ordre symbolique (le "grand Autre") par le discours des "petits autres" que sont ses parents, discours où s'entrelacent inextricablement les connaissances et le désir. Impossible de s'y dérober quand on dépend vitalement d'eux. [...] C'est là le point de départ de l'identification subjective, qui, quoique fille du langage, s'oppose par bien des traits à l'identification cognitive. Inconscient, imaginaire et fantasme font d'elle la face "méconnaissance" de l'identification. [...] Le savoir cognitif était révisable ; mais non le savoir subjectif, du fait qu'il est inconscient : rebelle à l'expérience et à l'argumentation critique, il fait le lit de toute croyance dogmatique. L'inquisition contre Galilée, le créationnisme contre Darwin, voilà, transposée à l'échelle de la société, la contradiction structurale entre identification subjective et identification cognitive, ces soeurs ennemies. » 12 Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen (Réponse à Sophie Bialek, Le Nouvel Observateur, 06-10-2005) : « Il se trouve en effet que j'ai réagi, par un mail envoyé le 24 décembre 2003 à Jacques Bénesteau (auteur de Mensonges freudiens), à l'invitation qu'il m'avait faite à participer à la remise du "Prix Lyssenko" décerné par le Club de l'Horloge à Elisabeth Roudinesco (le prix Lyssenko est attribué chaque année à un auteur ou une personnalité qui "a, par ses écrits ou par ses actes, apporté une contribution exemplaire à la désinformation en matière scientifique ou historique, avec des méthodes et arguments idéologiques"). Je reproduis ci-dessous ce mail, dont j'avais envoyé copie à un grand nombre de personnes, dont Elisabeth Roudinesco et Henry de Lesquen, président du Club de l'Horloge: "Cher Monsieur Bénesteau, Je vous saurais gré de cesser de me faire parvenir la littérature du Club de l'Horloge, officine bien connue de l'extrême-droite française. En ce qui concerne mes rapports avec Elisabeth Roudinesco, il est de notoriété publique que je suis depuis de longues années en désaccord complet avec ses positions. Ceci, toutefois, ne saurait m'inciter à me rallier aux chemises brunes intellectuelles avec lesquelles vous avez jugé bon de vous associer. J'ai le plus grand mépris pour tout ce que représente le Club de l'Horloge et je ressens comme une insulte que vous ayez pu songer un seul instant que je m'associerais à cette provocation. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen". Ce mail devait être lu plus tard par l'avocat d'Elisabeth Roudinesco, Maître Kiejman, lors du procès en diffamation intenté à celle-ci par Jacques Bénesteau et le Club de l'Horloge. » 13 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Nous pensons qu'il importe de distinguer, au sein de ce genre de critiques : – les attaques ad hominem et ad personam portant sur la vie privée de tel ou tel découvreur, attaques qui se disqualifient d'elles-mêmes puisque le savoir mis au jour s'affranchit, par son effet de vérité, de l'enveloppe "humaine, trop humaine" de son inventeur. Se livre-t-on à des investigations aussi poussées sur chacun des grands noms de la recherche scientifique ? – la présomption de manipulation des résultats, dont l'enjeu est indéniable quant à la vérité historique, et à l'aura du personnage (notre opinion sur ce sujet n'est ni faite ni arrêtée), mais qui ne pèse en rien comme le ferait un péché originel sur la validité même du champ d'expériences inauguré, de la méthode analytique, et des résultats "thérapeutiques" ou non obtenus par les contemporains et successeurs de Freud. • « La psychanalyse est-elle "efficace" ? Peut-elle amener à une guérison des personnes qui font une analyse ? Cette pratique peut-elle encore avoir une pertinence, et à quelle condition? Dans un contexte où de nombreuses sciences et d'encore plus nombreuses psychothérapies prétendent proposer une réponse plus rapide et plus efficace aux souffrances des personnes, que pose la psychanalyse ? ». Nous retrouvons ici l'ambiguïté potentielle liée aux métaphores médicales plus haut évoquées. Certes la souffrance est bel et bien vécue dans le corps (dans l'angoisse commune, et dans ces trois types de somatisation que sont les symptômes de conversion, les syndromes fonctionnels de l'angoisse chronique, et les symptômes psychosomatiques). Mais comme la solution s'obtient, sans toucher au corps, en désamarrant l'affect du noeud verbal auquel il s'est trouvé lié, le terme "guérison" entretient le malentendu par l'assimilation d'un automatisme signifiant à une atteinte somatique, malentendu que notre proposition de définition tente ici de dissiper (J.-J. Pinto, Fantasme, Discours, Idéologie, voir note 11) : L'identification subjective, définie comme la connexion signifiant-affect résultant d'une suggestion exercée par le parent sur l'enfant, conduit graduellement d'une situation où plaisir et déplaisir étaient suscités par les besoins (chez le nourrisson) à une situation où c'est le signifiant qui a acquis le pouvoir de les convoquer (chez l'enfant plus grand qui, déjà repu et choyé, demande « racontemoi une histoire », puis chez l'adulte, qui ne manquera jamais de ressources pour s'en inventer). D'où suit (ibidem) le résumé que nous proposons quant à la pertinence de la pratique analytique : Le transfert se définissant comme "temps de fermeture lié à la tromperie de l'amour", l'analyse, en réalisant sa dissolution, fait décroître l'idéalisation amoureuse et l'intensité de la demande d'amour [...]. Fidèle à l'étymologie, elle délie, 14 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! défait les liens, désimaginarise car « il y a du semblable, où s'institue tout ce qui fait lien : c'est l'imaginaire » 13 . Là où l'identification subjective reposait sur la connexion signifiant-affect, l'analyse déconnecte l'affect du signifiant (ainsi quand disparaît une phobie) [...]. Elle donne de l'autonomie au désir qui, chez le névrosé, s'était rivé à des objets anachroniques [...]. Dernière dépendance destinée à défaire les précédentes par la dissolution du transfert, l'analyse apporte la contre-addiction, et relance l'esprit critique. Mais l'autonomie qu'elle confère n'est pas "la Liberté", phare idéologique pour phalènes qui s'y brûlent : elle n'est que le passage d'un déterminisme familial périmé et aveugle aux déterminations actuelles, plus riches de possibilités, que régit un réel rendu plus supportable. Cependant, même si l'on refuse de placer l'analyse sur le terrain fallacieux de la demande de guérison, et que l'on acquiesce globalement à la formulation « la psychothérapie ramène au pire », on peut ne pas mettre toutes les pratiques dans le même baquet mesmérien. Pratiquées par un analyste, une psychothérapie "d'urgence" devant une flambée symptomatique (... si elle ne gêne en rien une psychanalyse ultérieure), ou une "psychothérapie de psychotique" (quel autre terme employer ?) ne sont pas à rejeter. Et la cothérapie associant un prescripteur de chimiothérapie à un analyste peut s'avérer nécessaire dans ce dernier cas. II. Il nous faut à présent, à partir des questions à réponse dédoublée recensées ci-dessus, et pour pouvoir en fin d'article proposer une réponse à la question « Quelle peut être la teneur du discours psychanalytique en 2014 ? », amener deux tentatives de redéfinition de ce qu'est l'analyse, ainsi que deux outils méthodologiques permettant un abord logicisé des pièges de l'homonymie "externe" et "interne". A. Nos deux tentatives de redéfinition sont logiquement liées, et obtenues par "passage à la limite". 1. Définition récursive de l'analyse comme pratique : Dans notre article (déjà cité en note 11), nous annoncions : « ... il nous semble pertinent, à condition d'avoir au préalable défini fantasme, de proposer une définition récursive de l'analyse comme pratique : l'analyse, c'est l'analyse des fantasmes sur l'analyse... ». La récursivité permet entre autres de « définir un concept en invoquant le même concept ». Tel cet exemple célèbre de définition récursive chez Lacan : « Un signifiant, c'est ce qui représente un sujet pour un autre signifiant ». 13 Jean-Claude Milner, Les noms indistincts, Verdier, Paris, 2007 15 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Or il se trouve que le mot fantasme peut être assez clairement défini : – C'est un concept analytique élaboré sur la base d'une expérience "en amont", sur un matériel non montrable, donc non testable (les séances d'analyse) ; – Il possède cependant une ébauche de formalisation : $ ◊ a ; et il peut recevoir une définition linguistique : J.-C. Milner14 rappelle que « selon la théorie freudienne, un fantasme se laisse toujours exprimer par une phrase, ou plus exactement par une formule phrastique, dont chaque variante répond en principe à un fantasme distinct [souligné par nous] » ; – Enfin le fait que ce concept subsume une série d'occurrences verbales est corroborable "en aval", comme on le verra plus bas (par un outil méthodologique dont le matériel est montrable, donc testable ; les procédures d'analyse elles-mêmes sont par ailleurs testables et reproductibles par quiconque manuellement, et simulables informatiquement). Le "passage à la limite" réside dans l'extrapolation d'énoncés provenant des analystes eux-mêmes : [Freud] dira à Jones, à propos de Rank : "Il a déposé sa névrose dans une théorie". Ce qui témoigne qu'il savait différencier une théorie psychanalytique d'une théorie fondée sur la névrose d'un sujet, et un facteur personnel. Ne pourrait-on soutenir qu'avec Au-delà du principe de plaisir, écrit dans un contexte particulièrement difficile de son existence, Freud fait lui-même ce détour par le biologique qu'il avait si finement détecté chez Sabina Spielrein et Otto Rank comme étant des théories névrotiques ? N'aurait-il pas déposé alors, lui aussi, sa névrose dans une théorie ? (Jacques Sédat, voir note 7) Dire "l'analyse, c'est l'analyse des fantasmes sur l'analyse" est une définition en intension (en compréhension). 2. Définition apophatique de l'analyse comme théorie, du discours psychanalytique : L'adjectif apophatique est, selon Larousse, l'attribut « d'une théologie qui approche de la connaissance de Dieu en partant de ce qu'il n'est pas plutôt que de ce qu'il est ». Notre définition propose de caractériser ce discours en procédant par élimination, de dire ce qu'il n'est sûrement pas, en dépit des homonymies externe (discours concurrents) et interne (fantasmes déposés dans des théories). Déjouer l'homonymie externe peut se faire en recourant à l'épistémologie, freudo-lacanienne ou non ; l'homonymie interne sera déjouée, elle, à mesure qu'un savoir guidé par l'exigence d'une analyse littérale identifiera les différents fantasmes dans ce qui se 14 Jean-Claude Milner, Introduction à une science du langage, Paris, Seuil, 1989. 16 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! donne à lire ou entendre. Cela apparaîtra plus clairement quand nous aurons proposé ci-dessous notre outil méthodologique, l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives. Dire "le discours analytique, c'est ce qui reste quand on a retiré ce qu'il n'est pas" est une définition par énumération, donc en extension, mais une extension en creux si l'on peut dire ! B. Les outils méthodologiques pour opérer ce nouveau balayage : 1. Pour déjouer l'homonymie externe entre le discours psychanalytique et les discours "voisins", une démarche épistémologique, qu'elle soit ou non freudolacanienne, peut être sollicitée : Il est deux manières de reconnaître la figure d'un objet. On peut partir de l'intérieur de cet objet et, par une loi ou une composition de lois, en générer les contours. Ainsi fait le géomètre, traçant un cercle ; ainsi fait le linguiste, construisant une grammaire. On peut aussi partir des côtés et de l'extérieur ; prendre en compte la présence des corps voisins ; établir comment ces corps, par leur disposition latérale, déterminent la forme d'un espace où se loge l'objet. Ainsi font les fleuves et les villes, matériellement organisés par les obstacles qui les enserrent et les ignorent. C'est ici la seconde voie qui est choisie : décrire quelques reliefs extérieurs que le discours lacanien a heurtés, contournés, érodés, non sans en recevoir une forme et non sans leur en conférer une. On peut appeler cela un matérialisme discursif. (Jean-Claude Milner, voir note 5) La délimitation, dans notre troisième partie, des champs respectifs des discours psychologique, philosophique, sociologique, et enfin de la science permettra de mieux cerner la spécificité du discours analytique. Et de faire quelques propositions, dans la dernière partie, sur un dialogue, ouvert mais sans compromissions, avec ces autres champs. 2. Pour déjouer l'homonymie interne (fantasmes déposés dans des théories), nous proposons l'outil méthodologique qu'est l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives (A.L.S.), à partir d'un syllogisme pouvant faire consensus : – Toute demande d'analyse, surtout celle qui est porteuse du désir de devenir analyste, émane d'une structure névrotique, même sans symptômes surajoutés : les sujets pervers, psychotiques ou sains n'ont en principe pas de demande d'analyse ; – comme d'autre part il n'existe pas d'analyse terminée, puisque le cours en est asymptotique, – il est logique de s'attendre à trouver chez tout analyste des restes inanalysés de sa structure première. 17 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Tout ce qui sort de la bouche d'un analyste ne saurait de ce fait être tenu pour du discours analytique... La littérature analytique fourmille de conceptualisations suspectes, qui prennent parfois pour alibi la "structure de fiction de la vérité"15 : Sur son terrain, [la psychanalyse] se distingue par cet extraordinaire pouvoir d'errance et de confusion, qui fait de sa littérature quelque chose auquel je vous assure qu'il faudra bien peu de recul pour qu'on la fasse rentrer, tout entière, dans la rubrique de ce qu'on appelle les fous littéraires. (Lacan, Séminaire, Livre XI, voir note 3). La théorie des "Quatre Discours" de Lacan pourrait sembler appropriée pour décrire voire expliquer les chemins de la subjectivité inconsciente, y compris dans les dires des analystes eux-mêmes. Mais ses mathèmes n'empêchent pas les interprétations multiples et parfois fantaisistes des disciples, et des corrélations avec la clinique souvent douteuses. Après le déclin du mathème décrit par J.-C. Milner dans L'OEuvre Claire, ils subsistent parfois paradoxalement comme une certaine forme de propagande, dans la répétition consciencieuse mais peu éclairée qu'en font les disciples, résultat situé aux antipodes de la "transmissibilité intégrale" souhaitée. Ce constat nous a conduit à proposer une approche qui s'en inspire et s'en démarque : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives (A.L.S.), méthode originale d'analyse de discours développée, publiée et enseignée depuis près de trente ans. Refusant les formules ambiguës et peut-être prématurées des "Quatre Discours" pour repartir humblement du mot à mot des énoncés du discours courant, celle-ci décrit des parlers qui ne recoupent qu'en partie les discours de Lacan. Ceci n'empêche nullement la compatibilité de l'A.L.S. avec les prémisses lacaniennes dont elle se veut l'héritière critique, et qu'à nos parlers s'applique par définition ce que J.-C. Milner dit des "Quatre discours" (voir note 5) : Plus profondément, on peut se souvenir qu'un discours ainsi défini n'est en soi rien d'autre qu'un ensemble de règles de synonymie et de non-synonymie. [...] 'dire qu'il y a coupure entre deux discours, c'est seulement dire qu'aucune des propositions de l'un n'est synonyme d`aucune des propositions de l'autre'. [...] On en conclura qu'il ne peut y avoir de synonymies - s'il en existe - qu'à l`intérieur d'un même discours et qu'entre discours différents les seules ressemblances possibles relèvent de l'homonymie. (souligné par nous) Il s'agit donc d'une méthode d'analyse des mots (lexèmes) d'un texte parlé ou écrit qui travaille, sans recourir à la communication non-verbale, sur la sémantique des métaphores en vue d'en déduire la structure identificatoire du locuteur et les réseaux de sympathie ou d'antipathie qu'il génère. 15 Ce qui n'est tout de même pas une raison pour aller chercher mi-dit à quatorze heures... 18 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Prenant en compte le sens des mots non pas globalement (contenu, thèmes) mais en le décomposant en "atomes de sens", donc à un niveau micro-sémantique, elle permet de trouver des invariants subjectifs indépendants du sujet abordé dans le corpus. Résumons-en très schématiquement les principes (on lira l'exposé complet dans l'article Linguistique et psychanalyse : pour une approche logiciste (voir note 4). L'A.L.S. reprend les thèses connues : « l'inconscient c'est le discours de l'Autre » et : « le désir de l'homme c'est le désir de l'Autre, car c'est en tant qu'Autre qu'il désire », en les reformulant ainsi : • C'est le discours parental qui détermine, non de façon linéaire mais avec des transformations elles-mêmes "programmées", le discours fantasmatique de l'enfant, différemment selon qu'il est idéalisé ou rejeté (pour commencer par les cas extrêmes). L'enfant, identifié au texte du désir parental, qualifiera et traitera désormais tout objet (y compris lui-même et son parent) comme on l'a qualifié et souhaité le traiter. C'est la satisfaction du parent, et non la sienne, qu'il exprime et recherche à son insu. Les adjectifs extraits des appréciations du parent, et les verbes décrivant le sort qu'il souhaite à l'enfant, fourniront les atomes valorisés dans les énoncés fantasmatiques, et constitutifs des séries. • Ces adjectifs décrivent l'objet tel qu'il est jugé par le parent (beau, laid, conforme, inattendu, etc.), et tel qu'il devrait être pour rendre possible l'action que le parent veut exercer sur lui ou le comportement qu'il en attend : léger... pour mieux s'en débarrasser s'il est « un fardeau », prudent s'il s'agit de le protéger. • Les verbes, eux, décrivent l'attitude du parent devant l'enfant idéalisé : aimer, adorer, prendre au sérieux, respecter, regarder, voir, contempler, posséder, maîtriser, garder, protéger, enfermer, retenir, contenir, isoler, incorporer (métaphorisé en manger), nourrir, remplir, etc., ou devant l'enfant non désiré : verbes exprimant la déception, la surprise, l'étonnement, la peur, l'horreur; haïr, détester, maudire, ne pas prendre au sérieux, tourner en dérision, ainsi que les moyens de se débarrasser d'un tel enfant, de le faire changer, ou de l' ignorer, tous ces mots étant valorisés secondairement chez l'adulte que cet enfant deviendra. Les verbes exprimant le souhait du parent se retrouveront dans le discours de l'enfant à la voix active, passive, et pronominale. C'est là tout simplement la thèse freudo-lacanienne de la "réversibilité du sujet et de l'objet dans le fantasme". Ainsi la profération par le parent d'énoncés sur l'enfant désiré ou rejeté (cas plus complexes décrits ci-dessous) va mettre en mouvement la répétition d'une série d'éléments verbaux qui vont gouverner à son insu, et dans les dires et dans les actes, la fantasmatique de l'enfant puis celle de l'adulte. 19 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! • Les traits sémantiques minimaux ("atomes") extraits de ces verbes et adjectifs vont constituer deux "séries", cette binarité étant caractéristique de la logique à tiers-exclu du fantasme : – La série "A" (série destruction-disparition-éloignement-changement) concerne l'extérieur, le changement, le désordre, la destruction de l'ancien. Elle se compose d'adjectifs simples comme : ouvert, souple, varié, changeant, nouveau, libre... – La série "B" (conservation-intégrité-stabilité) concerne au contraire l'intérieur, le non-changement, l'ordre, la conservation, et se compose d'adjectifs comme : sérieux , ferme , stable , ancien , durable. (Dans tout ce qui suit, pour faciliter leur repérage, les mots A figureront en italique, et les mots B en gras). • Les mots complexes – adjectifs complexes, noms, verbes et adverbes – seront traités comme des "molécules" dont le sens peut se décomposer en atomes A ou B, et ainsi rattachés, sauf exception, aux séries de même nom. • La "valeur" associée à chaque mot est la résonance qu'a ce mot pour celui qui le dit. Elle peut être positive, négative, neutre ou indécidable. Elle peut changer chez un locuteur donné selon les moments ou les périodes de la vie. On reconnaît dans cette association la connexion signifiant-affect de l'identification subjective. En combinant, pour chaque mot pertinent (voir les critères dans l'article précité) d'un texte, sa série et sa valeur, on obtient des "points de vue", qui peuvent eux aussi changer selon les instants ou les âges de la vie. • Le point de vue "extraverti" (désigné par E) valorise la série A et dévalorise la série B, ce qui peut se noter : A+ = B– = E. Ce point de vue choisira donc ses mots dans la série A pour présenter ce qu'il aime, et dans la série B pour présenter ce qu'il critique, n'aime pas ou même redoute. • Le point de vue " introverti" (désigné par I) valorise la série B et dévalorise la série A, ce qui peut se noter : B+ = A– = I. Ses choix seront donc l'inverse des précédents. Cette notion de point de vue "instantané" (pour le seul mot qu'on analyse) peut être étendue à tout un texte, qui présente en général une dominante "I" ou "E", sauf pour le parler "hésitant" décrit plus bas. • Les parlers, "héritiers critiques" des Discours de Lacan, sont l'extension, cette fois à l'échelle d'une vie entière, de la notion de point de vue, recoupant la notion empirique de personnalité et la notion psychanalytique d'identification : chacun joue "sa" biographie comme un acteur dit "son" texte, en fait écrit par un autre... Ces parlers (dialectes subjectifs ou "subjilectes"), au nombre de quatre 20 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! principaux, recombinent de l'adolescence à la fin de la vie les deux points de vue "I" et "E", ce qui aboutit à : 1. Un parler "conservateur" (I → I), correspondant en gros à la personnalité obsessionnelle (Alceste) : "introverti incorruptible", qui commence "I" et finit "I". 2. Un parler "changement/destruction" (E → E), correspondant grosso modo à la personnalité hystérique (Célimène... ou Mesrine) : "extraverti incorrigible", qui commence "E" et finit "E". Ce parler connaît deux variantes selon que la métaphore est "sublimée" ou passée à l'acte, suivant la gravité du rejet parental. Si la version "bénigne" (changement) peut être socialement encouragée pour sa créativité, sa version "maligne" (destruction) se rencontre chez des sujets portés à l'extrême violence : "ennemis publics", "tueurs en série", "criminels de guerre". 3. Un parler "hésitant" (I ou E, abréviation de l'oscillation I → E → I → E etc.), en gros la personnalité phobique (Philinte) : "éternel indécis", oscillant toute sa vie entre "I" et "E". Résultant de l'ambivalence parentale, il présente une alternance, voire la juxtaposition en discours, de termes des deux séries. La notion de parler "I ou E" aide à mieux comprendre pourquoi les phobiques typiques sont à la fois agoraphobes (point de vue I) et claustrophobes (point de vue E). 4. Un parler "du progrès" ou "constructeur" (E → I), sans équivalent clinique (Marie-Madeleine... ou Henry Ford) : "extraverti repenti", qui commence "E" et finit "I". Dans ce parler de la rédemption, de la réparation, qui est entre autres celui de l'ambitieux, de l'arriviste, du self-made man, la biographie en deux étapes résulterait d'un jugement en deux temps, où le parent rejette au début un enfant jugé non conforme à son attente, puis « se fait une raison » et remédie au "défaut" naturel par l'éducation, la "construction de la personnalité de l'enfant". Ce parler ne correspond à aucune structure névrotique répertoriée, car il passe inaperçu (la vox populi le considérant comme un parcours normal : « il faut bien que jeunesse se passe »), ou est l'objet soit d'une réprobation morale soit d'un éloge inconditionnel16. L'existence de combinaisons de parlers ("E → I raté", "entreprenant" , "attentiste" etc., non présentés ici) montre que la liste actuelle des possibilités, non limitative, se constitue empiriquement, sur le terrain, avant de se chercher une explication théorique, et que l'adéquation à l'observation est préférée à la combinatoire "aveugle". 16 (Jean-Jacques Pinto, voir note 4) : « La confusion possible entre discours obsessionnel et discours de l'Université est surmontée grâce à notre terminologie (parler "conservateur" et parler "constructeur"). En effet Lacan tient souvent ces deux désignations pour synonymes. Or la logique du parler "I → I" (homologue du discours obsessionnel) rend impossible son assimilation au discours universitaire (homologue du parler "E → I") : le premier suppose une perfection initiale, une "science infuse" incompatible avec l'acquisition de connaissances nouvelles (l'obsessionnel est "d'une ignorance crasse", et néanmoins pédant) ; le second suppose une perfectibilité secondaire et permet de "se remplir de savoir" pour racheter une jeunesse "folle" et peu studieuse, et acquérir la respectabilité qu'on n'avait pas au départ. » 21 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Les mêmes raisons qui nous ont dissuadé de travailler sur le texte des séances (productions verbales obtenues par la technique d'association libre) valent pour expliquer pourquoi l'A.L.S. ne peut s'appliquer directement à la "cure" psychanalytique. En revanche, elle peut être appliquée au discours écrit ou retranscrit des analystes. C'est donc cet outil d'analyse qui sera appliqué dans notre troisième partie... III. Abordons à présent le second balayage de la problématique, dont les éléments vont être reconsidérés et analysés plus méthodiquement. A. Déjouant l'homonymie externe entre le discours psychanalytique et les discours "voisins", la démarche épistémologique, freudo-lacanienne ou autre, se propose donc de mieux cerner la spécificité du discours analytique en délimitant les champs respectifs des discours psychologique, philosophique, sociologique, et enfin de la science : – La psychologie est distinguée nettement, voire sévèrement de la psychanalyse par Lacan, dans des termes explicites quant aux différences dans leur objet et dans leur démarche : Dire que la doctrine freudienne est une psychologie est une équivoque grossière. (La direction de la cure) Le moi tel qu'il opère dans l'expérience analytique, n'a rien à faire avec l'unité supposée de la réalité du sujet que la psychologie dite générale abstrait comme instituée dans ses « fonctions synthétiques ». (Introduction au commentaire de Jean Hyppolite) Nous récusons [...] ce qui s'est déjà constitué [...] sous le nom de psychologie. Précisément de ce que nous allons démontrer que la fonction du sujet telle que l'instaure l'expérience freudienne, disqualifie à la racine ce qui sous ce titre ne fait, de quelque forme qu'on en rhabille les prémisses, que perpétuer un cadre académique. Le critère en est l'unité du sujet qui est un des présupposés de cette sorte de psychologie [...] comme s'il s'agissait du retour d'un certain sujet de la connaissance ou s'il fallait que le psychique se fît valoir comme doublant l'organisme. Nous ne parlons pas bien entendu de cet extraordinaire transfert latéral, par où viennent se retremper dans la psychanalyse les catégories d'une psychologie qui en réinvigore ses bas emplois d'exploitation sociale. Pour la raison que nous avons dite, nous considérons le sort de la psychologie comme scellé sans rémission. Rien donc, dans notre biais pour situer Freud, qui s'ordonne de l'astrologie judiciaire où trempe le psychologue. Rien qui procède de la qualité, voire 22 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! de l'intensif, ni d'aucune phénoménologie dont puisse se rassurer l'idéalisme. (Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir) La psychologie [...] a découvert les moyens de se survivre dans les offices qu'elle offre à la technocratie ; voire, comme conclut d'un humour vraiment swiftien un article sensationnel de Canguilhem : dans une glissade de toboggan du Panthéon à la Préfecture de Police. Aussi bien est-ce au niveau de la sélection du créateur dans la science, du recrutement de la recherche et de son entretien, que la psychologie rencontrera son échec. (La science et la vérité) (J. Lacan, Écrits). (Notons de façon annexe l'effort de délimitation interne cette-fois de la psychanalyse moderne d'avec ce qui pourrait dans la psychanalyse classique subsister d'extra-analytique. Outre la remise en question des métaphores énergétiques et biologiques chez Freud, il s'agit de se défaire des hésitations freudiennes sur la notion psycho-philosophique de représentation.17) – Le discours philosophique baigne, aux yeux de l'épistémologie freudienne, dans l'Imaginaire car il repose sur la notion d'être qu'il se propose de décrire et de comprendre sous forme de grands systèmes spéculatifs (conceptions du monde). Ces grands systèmes (Platon, Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, etc.) forcent l'admiration et le respect par leur ingéniosité, subtilité, complexité, et parfois cohérence, mais, tels les règles de nos jeux de cartes (belote, bridge, poker) ils ne renvoient qu'à euxmêmes sans contact proprement démontrable avec le réel physique ou humain, sans réfutabilité logique ou expérimentale, sans applications efficientes, sans pouvoir prédictif, avec en revanche un penchant normatif souvent très prononcé (idéalisme 17 Dans son article La métaphysique, c'est l'hystérie (Le Portique, Revue électronique, 2 | 1998 : Freud et la philosophie) Marc Morali souligne : "Freud partait d'une tentative d'inscrire sur un appareil psychique modélisé les avancées et enseignements issus de sa pratique. [...] Néanmoins, cette tentative véhicule une notion du corps qui va montrer les limites qu'elle impose à sa théorie. Car Freud s'est empêtré dans la notion de représentation : « Cet inconscient auquel Freud ne comprenait rien, ce sont des représentations inconscientes. Unbewuste Vorstellungen, j'ai essayé de fomenter cela pour l'instituer au niveau du symbolique, qui n'a rien n'a faire avec des représentations [...] l'inconscient n'a de corps que de mots. [...] L'idée de représentation inconsciente est une idée totalement vide, folle. C'est une abstraction qui ôte au Réel tout son poids concret » (J. Lacan, Propos sur l'hystérie, 1977). Sur le concept d'inconscient, Lacan s'était déjà séparé de Freud dès 1976. Il tire ici une des conditions de ce franchissement. Cela le conduit alors à souligner la propension de l'hystérique à se retrancher derrière des représentations de circonstances, concluant par une formule péremptoire : la métaphysique, c'est l'hystérie. Comme il n'a jamais cessé de le répéter, Lacan est lecteur de Freud, précisément parce qu'il sait que Freud anticipe scientifiquement la déconstruction de la métaphysique (Sigmund Freud, Psychopathologie de la vie quotidienne, Paris, Payot, 1963) : « Je pense que pour une bonne part, la conception mythologique du monde [...] n'est pas autre qu'une psychologie projetée dans le monde. L'obscure connaissance des facteurs et faits psychiques de l'inconscient (autrement dit la perception endopsychique) se reflète [...] dans la construction d'une réalité suprasensible que la science transforme en une psychologie de l'inconscient. On pourrait se donner pour tache de décomposer les mythes relatifs à Dieu, au bien et au mal, et de traduire la métaphysique en métapsychologie »." 23 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! platonicien, morale kantienne par exemple). Plaisir esthétique considérable, séduction majeure pour les esprits cultivés, pure esthétique et pure séduction qui lui vaudraient légitimement la qualification d'art ou d'ingéniérie para-littéraire, mais en aucun cas celui d'un savoir opérant au plan cognitif 18... Contrairement à la science moderne et à la psychanalyse, la philosophie semble méconnaître (sauf exceptions) l'intrication de l'observateur et de la chose observée : le sujet philosophique, tout comme le Moi, instance imaginaire de méconnaissance, contemple et dissèque le monde dont il ne fait pas partie et des lois duquel il s'excepte19. 18 Nous ne parlons ici que de philosophie spéculative, et non de philosophie des sciences, synonyme d'épistémologie. Dans l'article La psychanalyse n'est pas une école de sagesse, Le Portique n°2 | 1998 : Freud et la philosophie, Patrice Fabrizi écrit, non sans humour, dans le paragraphe Visions du monde et bonnets de nuit : "Ce désir philosophique, on sait que Freud, à l'orée de ses découvertes, s'en méfiait, au point de se priver de la lecture de certaines oeuvres, dont celle de Nietzsche. Il s'en justifiait par la crainte que la démarche spéculative du philosophe et la rencontre soudaine d'intuitions communes eussent pu le rendre aveugle à l'objection des faits et du matériau clinique. Prudence positiviste, de l'avis de Freud. [...] Il y a du transcendantal (origine phylogénétique de l'OEdipe pour Freud, logique du signifiant depuis Lacan), ce n'est pas une raison pour donner dans le délire théorique, l'expérience doit rester la pierre de touche. On ne s'étonnera donc pas (trop) de voir Freud, dans la 35e des Nouvelles conférences critiquer la philosophie au même titre que la religion, réduire leurs productions à des systèmes dogmatiques et complets, des Weltanschauung(en), des « construction(s) intellectuelle(s) qui réso(lvent), de façon homogène, tous les problèmes de notre existence à partir d'une hypothèse qui commande le tout, où, par conséquent, aucun problème ne reste ouvert, et où tout ce à quoi nous nous intéressons trouve sa place déterminée ». À cet égard, un passage de cette même 35e conférence pourrait être éclairant. Il s'agit d'un petit distique de Heine, cité donc par Freud, et qui raille le philosophe : « Avec ses bonnets de nuit et les loques de sa robe de chambre, il bouche les trous de l'édifice du monde »... ". 19 J.-C. Milner, L'OEuvre claire, chapitre II : « ... 'il n'y a rien qui soit hors univers'. Le sujet n'est pas un hors-univers. [...] Qu'il n'y ait rien hors de l'univers est difficile à imaginer. De là la récurrence des figures du hors-univers, Dieu, l'Homme, le Moi, qu'on excepte de l'univers et qui constituent cet univers en un Tout. Cette propriété d'exception reçoit des noms divers : l'âme, instance en l'homme de ce qui l'apparente à Dieu. Quand l'epistèmè le céda à la science moderne, l'âme fit place à la conscience. La psychanalyse reprend le problème de l'univers et le résout ainsi : le concept de ce qu'il y a un univers, de ce que rien ne s'en excepte, pas même l'Homme, c'est le concept qui dit non à la conscience, c'est l'inconscient. Si la conscience et la conscience de soi (philosophique) rassemblent les privilèges de l'homme, comme exception au Tout, la négation dont Freud affecte la conscience frappe d'obsolescence ces privilèges. Ce mouvement atteint aussi l'âme, et en même temps la figure de Dieu, en tant qu'elle serait le hors-univers par excellence. [...] La science requiert l'univers, qui frappe d'impossible tout hors-univers [...]. Un système de propositions visant l'inconscient ne peut s'accomplir que dans la science moderne et l'univers qu'elle fonde. Rabelais : "science sans conscience", et, pour cette seule raison, "ruine de l'âme". La science n'est accomplie qu'en se faisant la science de ce qu'il n'y a pas de conscience et pas d'âme.(voir Lacan, l'Étourdit : « Pour être le langage le plus propre au discours scientifique, la mathématique est la 24 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! L'homonymie externe entre discours philosophique et discours psychanalytique se voit également exemplifiée par Milner (ibidem) dans la disjonction qu'il opère entre deux sens opposés du mot mort : La psychanalyse est une doctrine de l'univers infini et contingent. Ainsi s'éclaire sa doctrine de la mort et de la sexualité. Pour beaucoup la mort est la marque même de la finitude. Mais la psychanalyse suit le lemme moderne, pour qui la finitude n'existe pas, et en donne une version spécifique : 'en tant qu'elle est une marque de finitude, la mort n'est rien dans l'analyse', ou : 'la mort ne compte dans l'analyse qu'en tant qu'elle est une marque d'infinité', ou : 'la mort n'est rien, sinon l'objet d'une pulsion' (fondement du concept de pulsion de mort). On en conclura : – que le mot de mort est un foyer d'homonymies entre fini et infini 20 , – qu'est incompatible avec la possibilité de la psychanalyse toute philosophie où la mort compte en tant que marque de la finitude, – en particulier : si pour Heidegger l'être pour la mort est être pour la finitude, alors la doctrine de la psychanalyse de Lacan est antinomique de la philosophie de Heidegger, et réciproquement. Devant les charmes du discours philosophique, on peut donc être captivé, saisi, mais en aucun cas dessaisi... – Le discours sociologique nous est trop insuffisamment connu pour que nous puissions appuyer sur des arguments épistémologiques précis sa démarcation d'avec le champ de la psychanalyse. Plus modestement, un travail non publié sur la violence scolaire nous avait conduit à examiner quelques arguments tant logiques qu'empiriques sur le rôle respectif des facteurs inconscients et des facteurs sociaux, culturels, économiques, idéologiques dans la genèse de la violence en général. Si l'on prouve que celle-ci implique (au moins) l'intervention de deux facteurs, par exemple le facteur inconscient et le facteur socio-économique, rien ne dit alors qu'ils interviennent simultanément et avec une importance égale. Ils sont parfois dissociés. Deux exemples empiriques : (Accents, magazine du Conseil Général des Bouches-du-Rhône, n° 25) : Accents : Quel est le rôle de la brigade des mineurs ? science sans conscience dont fait promesse notre bon Rabelais, celle à laquelle un philosophe ne peut que rester bouché »)... ». 20 Ce type d'homonymies est précisément celui qu'explorera plus loin notre Analyse des Logiques Subjectives. 25 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Danièle Laborde : Nous traitons des cas de syndromes du bébé secoué, de fugues, d'abus sexuels, de viols, d'exhibition, de violences graves, de violences "habituelles commises sur mineurs" ... Accents : Quelle est la situation à Marseille ? Danièle Laborde : Il faut savoir que la maltraitance n'est pas une affaire de pauvreté, ni de classe sociale, mais d'individus, avec toutes les déviances et les dérives que la condition humaine comporte. (Le Monde, vendredi 27 décembre 2002) : Terrorisme: la pauvreté n'est pas coupable : Une étude portant sur 350 personnes engagées dans l'Armée rouge japonaise, la Bande à Baader, l'I.R.A ou les Brigades rouges a montré que les deux tiers des auteurs d'attentats ont fait des études supérieures et sont de milieux aisés. Opposer au contexte fantasmatique et biographique d'une naissance des facteurs d'ordre socio-économiques contemporains du comportement violent observé opère un changement de plan et un négligence de la chronologie. Ni le désir d'enfant, ni son accueil dans la famille ne peuvent être liés de manière systématique aux conditions sociales, lesquelles ne seront perçues et intégrées par l'enfant que bien après tout ce qui va modeler sa personnalité inconsciente. Anticipons sur une argumentation future plus élaborée en disant, sous forme métaphorique : le bateau connaît le port de pêche (la famille et ses désirs inconscients) avant l'océan (le "social") ou, pour user d'alexandrins : "Avant de se savoir bourgeois ou prolétaire, L'enfant perçoit d'abord le désir de sa mère" – Le discours de la science J.-C. Milner (L'OEuvre claire) analyse très finement comment la psychanalyse n'aurait pu exister sans la science moderne, tout en s'en démarquant ensuite pour se tenir vis-à-vis d'elle à une distance que nous dirons volontiers "respectueuse", terme qui annonce les relations spécifiques que ces deux discours peuvent selon nous entretenir et les perspectives que nous développerons dans la dernière partie. Condensons à l'extrême cette analyse subtile et précise. Lacan (Écrits : La science et la vérité) pose une équation : « le sujet sur quoi nous opérons en psychanalyse ne peut être que le sujet de la science », sans affirmer que la psychanalyse elle-même soit une science : le fait que « sa praxis n'implique d'autre 26 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! sujet que celui de la science » est « à distinguer de la question de savoir si la psychanalyse est une science »21. Le sujet freudien, en tant que la psychanalyse freudienne est intrinsèquement moderne, ne saurait être rien d'autre que le sujet cartésien. La physique mathématisée élimine toutes les qualités des existants ; une théorie du sujet qui souhaite répondre à une telle physique devra dépouiller le sujet de toute qualité. Corrélat sans qualités supposé à une pensée sans qualités (le Cogito), cet existant – nommé sujet par Lacan – répond au geste de la science moderne. C'est le sujet de la science. Or la pensée sans qualités n'est pas seulement appropriée à la science moderne, mais aussi nécessaire à fonder l'inconscient freudien. Constat de Freud : il y a de la pensée dans le rêve – c'est ce qu'établissent la Traumdeutung et les oeuvres ultérieures. Donc la pensée n'est pas un corollaire de la conscience de soi. Dire que le sujet n'a pas la conscience de soi comme propriété constitutive, c'est rectifier la tradition philosophique. La psychanalyse entend donc la notion de sujet plus strictement qu'aucune autre doctrine. Avec netteté, elle sépare deux entités : à l'une, la conscience de soi peut sans contradiction être supposée ne pas être essentielle ; à l'autre, la conscience de soi ne peut sans contradiction être supposée ne pas être essentielle. La première seule répond aux requêtes de la science ; on l'appellera donc le sujet de la science, aussi bien sujet cartésien et sujet freudien. Quant à la seconde, le nom de Moi peut lui convenir autant qu'un autre. La science moderne est galiléenne, c'est-à-dire empirique et mathématisée : – la mathématique peut épeler tout l'empirique, sans égard à aucune hiérarchie de l'être allant du moins parfait au plus parfait ; – la mathématique intervient par ce qu'elle a de littéral, c'est-à-dire par le calcul, plutôt que par la démonstration ; – la mathématique épelle l'empirique comme tel, en ce qu'il a de passager, de non parfait, d'opaque. Les nombres ne fonctionnent plus comme Nombres, clés d'or du Même, mais comme lettres, et doivent saisir le divers en ce qu'il a d'incessamment autre. L'empirique est littéralisable en tant qu'empirique ; la littéralisation n'est pas idéalisation. Les propositions suivantes, qui se tirent à la fois de Freud et de Lacan : 'le Moi a horreur de la science' ; 'le Moi a horreur de la lettre comme telle' ; 'l'imaginaire comme tel est radicalement étranger à la science moderne' ; et surtout 'la science 21 Milner, ibidem : « À l'égard de l'opération analytique, la science ne joue pas le rôle d'un point idéal ; au contraire, elle structure de manière interne la matière même de son objet. La psychanalyse trouvera en elle-même les fondements de ses principes et de ses méthodes. Mieux, elle pourra questionner la science : "Qu'est-ce qu'une science qui inclut la psychanalyse ?". La science elle-même pourrait se révéler la forme la plus consistante d'une activité qu'on nommera l'analyse et qui se retrouve dans toutes les régions du savoir. De cette analyse, la psychanalyse proposerait comme un point idéal, organisateur du champ épistémologique et permettant de s'y orienter. Loin qu'elle consente à l'idéal de la science, il lui revient de construire pour la science un idéal de l'analyse ». 27 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! moderne, en tant que littérale, dissout l'imaginaire' vont trouver dans notre quatrième partie une résonance particulière quant aux relations psychanalyse / science. B. Déjouer l'homonymie interne (les fantasmes déposés dans des théories) peut se faire entre autres, nous l'avons vu, au moyen de l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives, cette héritière critique des "Quatre discours", en décrivant les dialectes de la subjectivité inconsciente dans les dires des analystes eux-mêmes. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne le discours sur les buts assignés à l'analyse comme pratique, il peut exister une complicité inconsciente entre l'analyste et son patient dans un fantasme commun, lorsqu'ils partagent le même parler, ce que l'A.L.S. peut aider à détecter. Or de tels fantasmes retentissent sur la pratique et les effets des analyses, qui dans ce cas, au lieu de renvoyer dos à dos toutes les identifications pour tendre vers le désêtre, la destitution subjective, la traversée du fantasme (Lacan), reconduisent l'analysant dans un discours névrotique seulement habillé de jargon pseudo-analytique. Ils peuvent être formulés : – Dans les termes du parler "conservateur" : retrouver un équilibre psychique perturbé par la névrose, restaurer la complétude perdue en visant à la restitutio ad integrum après une décompensation. – Ou dans les termes du parler "hésitant", à la recherche du compromis, du juste milieu entre les extrêmes : "hystériser les obsessionnels" et "obsessionnaliser les hystériques". – Dans les termes du parler "constructeur" : il y a, bien sûr, la psychanalyse "à l'américaine" avec son orthopédie du Moi redressant le Moi 'tordu' et faible du névrosé pour l'identifier au Moi fort de l'analyste ; mais aussi ces deux métaphores de la prise de valeur, celle du travail enrichissant et celle de la salutaire guérison psychique (d'un esprit imaginé comme un double du corps), qui peuvent se combiner dans un précipité si stable qu'il n'éveille même plus l'attention : le "travail thérapeutique", réendossant toutes les métaphores médicales des débuts de la psychanalyse, et, partant, les critiques extérieures sur l'inefficacité de celle-ci en matière de guérison. – Et enfin, dans les termes du parler du "changement", avec les fantasmes de libération, de renouveau, d'assouplissement psychique, de levée des résistances, d'ouverture dialectique. Pour ce qui est des théorisations, L'A.L.S., suivant en cela notre définition récursive ("l'analyse, c'est l'analyse des fantasmes sur l'analyse"), a son rôle à jouer dans le tri nécessaire à effectuer, dans la jungle luxuriante des productions "analytiques", entre les fausses pistes (banalement fantasmatiques) et les 28 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! hypothèses potentiellement intéressantes, qu'il faudra encore, pour les réfuter ou les corroborer, confronter aux données de l'expérience clinique. Deux exemples : – Le parler "constructeur" fait sentir ses effets dans des fantasmes insus ou assumés sous-tendant l'arrivisme et l'auto-promotion : la croyance en l'individu psychique, ce roi détrôné, peut tenter sa "Restauration" subreptice sous le pseudonyme équivoque du "sujet singulier" qui ambitionne de parler "en son nom propre". On retrouve là le self-made man qui cherche à "se faire un nom", avec la republication dans des ouvrages signés de textes anonymes parus dans Scilicet, « les procédés dont s'habille l'infatuation universitaire quand il s'agit de se faire auteur aux dépens de ce que j'ai dit » (Lacan, déjà cité), voire telle ou telle procédure pour conserver le monopole d'un héritage d'exploitation contestée. – Avec le parler du "changement" pourra s'observer chez les disciples une fétichisation "sincère" de termes polysémiques comme désir ou mort, et de métaphores endormies potentiellement ambiguës fournies par les aînés, comme fente, refente, faille, trou, manque, perte, déchet, ou forclusion, holophrase, gélification de la chaîne, termes et métaphores entendus et promus (comme le montre le contexte de leur emploi) du point de vue banalement "extraverti" et non plus comme des concepts analytiques. Rien n'interdirait d'ailleurs d'interroger en amont le discours de ces aînés eux-mêmes (par exemple sur les justifications qu'ils donnent de certaines modifications de la technique) à la lumière de l'analyse de leurs métaphores... Ce constat de survivance des fantasmes déposés dans les théories et dans les buts assignés à l'analyse aura une conséquence, évoquée dans notre conclusion, à propos des différends qui surviennent entre les porte-paroles du discours analytique et leurs critiques. C. Ici peut se révéler utile une mise en perspective des places respectives du discours psychanalytique, du discours de la science et de l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives. Elle s'aidera d'un schéma construit sur une alternative à la triade "Réel, Symbolique, Imaginaire" de Lacan, alternative proposée pour surmonter les difficultés suivantes : – variations au cours du temps dans la définition des trois termes chez Lacan lui-même, phénomène légitime dans l'évolution d'une discipline. Leur formalisation, à juste titre entreprise par Lacan, se heurte à des difficultés remarquablement exposées par J.-C. Milner dans L'OEuvre claire. – désaccord et confusion chez les disciples sur les définitions et acceptions de ces termes – la mise en relation chronologique, – en fait hiérarchisée – , des trois vocables est sujette à tractations : les "Au commencement était le Verbe" ou "Tout 29 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! est langage" sont le contresens le plus criant chez certains analystes, qui veulent que le Symbolique précède le Réel. D'autres, avec des expressions comme "accéder au Symbolique", veulent que ce dernier soit précédé par l'Imaginaire, confondant ainsi l'imaginaire animal (pré-verbal) avec l'Imaginaire humain uniquement permis par le langage, donc post-verbal. De nombreux passages tirés des textes de Lacan montrent que, pour lui, après la phase "pré-classique" où il les introduit dans l'ordre S, I, R (calqué sur l'ordre Signifiant, Signifié, Référent de la linguistique), le seul ordre logique et chronologique devient et restera R, S, I : Réel, puis Symbolique, puis Imaginaire. Souscrivant dans l'ensemble à la critique de J.-C. Milner 22 (ibidem) sur l'évolution finalement négative de la prometteuse tentative borroméenne, nous n'aborderons pas ici le nouage des termes R, S et I. Pour toutes les raisons précitées, nous proposons une terminologie différente, recourant à des qualificatifs positionnés sur le schéma ci-dessous, temporellement orienté de gauche à droite : 22 « Monstration par monstration, le noeud a entravé le mi-dire en tant que moyen du bien dire, mais les entraves du mi-dire et l'inaccessibilité du bien dire sont une abolition de l'inconscient. Si non seulement le silence est requis, mais aussi possible ('tu dois te taire, donc tu le peux'), c'est que la vérité ne parle pas et que l'inconscient n'existe pas. Il n'y a pas de chose freudienne. Si Wittgenstein l'emporte, si le noeud l'emporte sur l'écrit, Lacan n'est pas seul détruit. » 30 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! 1. Réel, désigné par la lettre R : il est difficile d'éviter l'adjectif substantivé, donc de ne pas dire "le Réel". Lacan donne à ce terme des sens différents et subtils. Pour le moment nous considèrerons qu'il désigne ce qu'étudient les sciences exactes, de la physique des particules jusqu'à la biologie, avec leur formalisation logicomathématique. À nouveau en 1974, dans sa conférence à Rome intitulée Le triomphe de la religion, Lacan réaffirme : « Le symptôme, ce n'est pas encore vraiment le réel. [...] Mais le réel réel, si je puis dire, le vrai réel, c'est celui auquel nous pouvons accéder par une voie tout à fait précise, qui est la voie scientifique. C'est la voie des petites équations. », et plus loin il évoque : « [...] le réel auquel nous accédons avec des petites formules, le vrai réel » (souligné par nous). 2. Réel parlant, désigné par RP : quelque chose "dans le Réel" se met à parler, de façon impersonnelle et involontaire. L'humain, le parlêtre traversé de ce Réel parlant n'en est ni l'auteur ni le maître. RP correspond à ce que Lacan nomme Symbolique. Lacan signale cette filiation en disant « Il y a du signifiant à déchiffrer dans le réel », ou encore « Le signifiant, c'est de la matière qui se transcende en langage », mais ce n'est pas une mince affaire que d'expliquer comment... 31 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! 3. Réel non parlant, RNP : désigne ce qui "dans le Réel" continue à ne pas parler, et qui comme le Réel qu'en fait il prolonge deviendra l'objet des "sciences exactes". La prolongation de R par RNP correspond toutefois à une partie seulement de ce que Lacan nomme Réel. 4. Réel Parlant Unifiant, RPU : quelque chose "dans le Réel Parlant" se met à fonctionner de telle sorte que la fiction de l'Un apparaît ("être", "totalité", "unité", "indivisibilité", "identité à soi-même", etc., ce "Un-de-sens" ne devant pas être confondu avec le "Un comptable"). C'est l'Imaginaire de Lacan. L'être parlant traversé de ce Réel Parlant Unifiant se prend (identification subjective) pour quelqu'un, qui serait l'auteur et le maître du langage, ce qui est un leurre puisque en fait « ce qui parle sans le savoir me fait je, sujet du verbe » (Lacan). Le RPU, tissu des objets qu'étudient les "Sciences Humaines", subsiste hélas dans leur discours qui procède par métaphores et entités, ce qui est épistémologiquement problématique23. On verra que le RPU subsiste également en partie dans le discours psychanalytique. Une flèche portant les mots "prématuration néoténie" indique sur le schéma que c'est cette caractéristique, venue du Réel Non Parlant (biologie humaine), qui favorise l'apparition du RPU ; « Sans cette béance qui l'aliène à sa propre image [la béance qu'ouvre cette prématuration], cette symbiose avec le symbolique n'aurait pu se produire, où il se constitue comme sujet à la mort. » (Lacan, Écrits) Deux rejetons à ce RPU : l'inconscient (a-grammatical dans les rébus, calembours, contrepèteries, anagrammes, où il brise les unités lexicales, "les mots"), et le fantasme (grammatical, car, consistant en une formule phrastique, il respecte "les mots" et leur séquence temporelle, syntagmatique). De cette énumération il ressort qu'à travers ses diverses différenciations, il n'y a que du Réel. Pourrait-il en être autrement ? Une fois rebaptisés les termes de Lacan, il est possible de leur ajouter des termes nommant d'autres aspects du Réel Parlant (le "Symbolique" de Lacan) qui jouent un rôle épistémologique particulier : 5. Réel Parlant Non Unifiant, RPNU : c'est cette branche cognitive du "Réel Parlant" qui va progressivement démentir les énoncés totalisants quand à la description du Réel, et qui amorce chemin en dents de scie à travers la connaissance antique et l'épistèmè grecque le mouvement vers l'écriture logicomathématique des "sciences exactes" (la science galiléenne combinant empiricité et formalisation). 6. Le discours analytique, branché en dérivation sur le RPNU dans sa version science moderne : c'est celle-ci en effet qui (Milner, ibidem) permet 23 Voir mon article (version électronique) : Métaphore et connaissance, HAL Sciences de l'Homme et de la Sociétéhttp://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00802474 32 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! l'apparition de ce discours. Il n'est qu'à moitié du RPNU (Réel Parlant Non Unifiant) car, comme la science le fait pour le Réel, il dément certes les énoncés unifiants quand à la description du psychisme humain. Mais Imaginaire, inconscient et fantasme continuent de l'imprégner, comme le montre entre autres l'A.L.S., d'où les flèches pointillées à double sens. La psychanalyse, permise par la science, est une discipline désimaginarisante, mais ce n'est pas une science. 7. Les analysciences (disciplines-passerelles entre psychanalyse et science) permettent le dialogue entre la science moderne (dotée de méthode, mais s'aveuglant "volontairement" quant à la subjectivité) et la psychanalyse (voyante quant à la subjectivité, mais souvent paralytique quant à la méthode...). L'A.L.S. figure parmi ces analysciences24, bénéficiant d'une démarche logiciste relevant du galiléisme étendu (voir notre quatrième partie), et trouvant ses applications (flèches pointillées à sens unique cette fois) tant dans la description des aspects subjectifs de la découverte en science que dans la description méthodique de la subjectivité (surtout pour le fantasme, en partie pour l'Imaginaire, mais en aucun cas pour l'inconscient a-grammatical...). IV. Notre quatrième partie expose à présent quelques propositions et perspectives résultant de ces analyses, et conclut sur une invitation à renouveler sur certains points la teneur du discours analytique... A. Le principe d'économie dans l'expérience et dans la théorisation analytiques Un tel principe ne peut s'appliquer que rétro-activement, après-coup, et non d'emblée, ce qu'exprime notre définition récursive (l'analyse, c'est l'analyse des fantasmes sur l'analyse...) : ce sont les découvertes ultérieures faites dans les analyses à mesure qu'elles se déroulent qui amènent à revoir les versions initiales du dispositif analytique (exemple du rôle joué par le transfert), et à en remanier tel ou tel élément. Le minimum constitué par la paire règle d'association libre / nonréponse de l'analyste suffit à engendrer une série de phénomènes partagés (« les analystes font partie de l'inconscient ») dont les menus détails ne peuvent être divulgués tels quels. Faisons l'hypothèse qu'une majorité des critiques porterait de ce fait, faute d'accès direct à ces "données", sur le corpus d'interprétations – délivrées par les seuls analystes – d'un champ "d'observation" imaginé dès lors comme la chasse gardée de grands prêtres d'un temple dont les mystères restent 24 Une analyscience serait, selon une définition encore à peaufiner, une discipline hybride entre psychanalyse et science, à savoir : – soit une ébauche de science incluant l'examen de la subjectivité du sujet connaissant ; – soit une ébauche de science s'intéressant à une forme d'inconscient (ex : les recherches expérimentales sur l'inconscient cognitif, qui n'est bien sûr pas le même que l'inconscient subjectif) ; – soit un sous-ensemble de la psychanalyse traitant d'un champ spécifique de la subjectivité, utilisant des méthodes scientifiques (galiléisme étendu), et validé selon des critères scientifiques comme ceux de l'analyse logiciste de J.-C. Gardin. Ceci sera repris dans notre quatrième partie. 33 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! inaccessibles au profane. La négation expéditive de ces phénomènes dans un "athéisme idolâtre", bien éloigné du doute scientifique, en est la rançon. N'appartient-il pas dans ce cas aux analystes de reprendre et rénover l'effort entrepris avec la revue Scilicet (« tu peux savoir ») et le Champ Freudien, quelles qu'en soient les limites, par une mise à plat critique des chemins de la mise en concepts, accessible aux non-analysés (convaincus de la probité des témoignages cliniques sous-jacents), et puisant le moins possible dans des savoirs constitués, si éclairants soient-ils ? Si l'on considère comme établi que le dispositif analytique induit une désidentification laborieuse – Durcharbeitung –, alors cet épluchage clinique de l'oignon psychique pourrait trouver son répondant dans le recours au rasoir d'Ockham pour les concepts théoriques : « Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem », « Les entités ne doivent pas être multipliées par-delà ce qui est nécessaire ». Une critique de l'inflation du vocabulaire surimposé à l'expérience est souhaitable. L'algèbre et la topologie lacanienne, dans leur sobriété, semblent un effort à prolonger, à la condition de ne pas les exiler dans des collages surréalistes coupés de l'expérience. Dans le travail sur les concepts, pourquoi ne pas accepter d'aller, quitte à devoir en revenir, jusqu'à la limite de notre définition récursive, s'il est vrai que les fantasmes sur l'analyse peuvent se continuer dans ces concepts ? Et ne pas oser se demander par exemple, à rebours de Lacan et à partir du dispositif minimal, si l'interprétation est un élément nécessaire et décisif de l'analyse ? Si l'interprétation revient à l'analysant, si les assemblages signifiants se défont ("ce n'était que ça") en laissant le temps au temps sans que l'analyste – qui ne serait en fait qu'un catalyste – joue les mouches du coche, les inquiétudes de Lacan quant à la dissolution du transfert et son empressement clairement verbalisé à la hâter ne seraient-ils pas un fantasme à analyser dans le mot-à-mot même de son texte25 ? Simple hypothèse "extrême" offerte à la cogitation... B. Un dialogue partiel est possible entre la psychanalyse et ces autres champs que sont la psychologie, la sociologie et la philosophie, mais à certaines conditions. 25 Par exemple (Lacan, Écrits ): « On voit là un des écueils que doit éviter l'analyste, et le principe du transfert dans ce qu'il a d'interminable. C'est pourquoi une vacillation calculée de la "neutralité" de l'analyste, peut valoir pour une hystérique plus que toutes les interprétations, au risque de l'affolement qui peut en résulter. » et « Nous n'en dirions pas tant si nous n'étions pas convaincu qu'à expérimenter en un moment, venu à sa conclusion, de notre expérience, ce qu'on a appelé nos séances courtes, nous avons pu faire venir au jour chez tel sujet mâle, des fantasmes de grossesse anale avec le rêve de sa résolution par césarienne, dans un délai où autrement nous en aurions encore été à écouter ses spéculations sur l'art de Dostoïevski. » 34 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Puisque le sujet divisé que la psychanalyse décrit (en le mettant au partitif : il y a "du sujet") n'est plus ni le sujet individuel de la psychologie, ni le sujet collectif de la sociologie26, ni l'être de la philosophie, l'homonymie apparaît indéniable et insurmontable. L'échange avec ces discours ne peut être que d'ordre cognitif, informatif pour les deux premiers (qui procèdent d'un donné pratique et expérimental), et "culturel-critique" avec le discours philosophique spéculatif (qui en est, lui, déconnecté) – de même qu'avec la littérature, domaine que faute de temps et de place nous n'avons pu aborder ici. Pour reprendre la métaphore de Milner sur « la présence des corps voisins, les reliefs extérieurs que le discours lacanien a heurtés, contournés, érodés, non sans en recevoir une forme et non sans leur en conférer une », acceptons avec tolérance le voisinage de ces discours, mais sans compromissions ni collusions paralogiques (confusion sincère) ou sophistiques (arrivisme universitaire duplice) en nous souvenant que Lacan peut actuellement, aux Etats-Unis, être avec Derrida étudié comme... philosophe ! C. Les relations spécifiques entre psychanalyse et discours de la science Le seul dialogue vraiment prometteur est à développer selon nous avec la science, quand elle ne jargonne pas à son tour dans une des idéologies qui la caricaturent (De l'extinction du poppérisme27 reste encore à écrire !). À distance "respectueuse", disions-nous, pour inviter au respect mutuel dans l'inter-critique et la complémentarité. Voyons sur quelles bases : • "La science moderne, en tant que littérale, dissout l'imaginaire", dit Milner. Comme s'y efforce la psychanalyse. En effet science et psychanalyse ont en commun le non-tout, le non-sens, la dissolution de la notion d'être : la science "épluche l'oignon" physique, l'analyse "épluche l'oignon" psychique (note 23). • Sur l'existence du déterminisme (fût-ce sous la forme du chaos déterministe), il y a accord entre le discours scientifique et la psychanalyse, laquelle postule le déterminisme de la vie psychique. 26 « Le groupe se définit d'être une unité synchrone dont les éléments sont les individus. Mais un sujet n'est pas un individu. » (Jacques Lacan, Lettre parue dans Le Matin du 10.3.80 ). Analyse détaillée dans l'article de Jean-Jacques Pinto & Eliane Pons, E. Groupe, individu, sujet, Psychodrame, n°62, SEPT, Paris, 1981 27 De l'extinction du paupérisme est un ouvrage de Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte publié en 1844... Indépendamment des postulats qu'elle se donne pour avancer, la science engendre elle-même ses idéologies, à propagande heureusement limitée : positivisme, rationalisme et empirisme, dès qu'ils s'érigent en idéal, nourris par des fantasmes que le scientifique veut ignorer voire forclore. Ceci nous conduit naturellement à poser avec Karl Popper la question des savoirs dogmatiques, sans souscrire à chacune des réponses qu'il y apporte, et en nous demandant sur quels points le poppérisme serait luimême... réfutable ! 35 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! • Comme la science, la psychanalyse (en principe, mais hélas pas toujours en pratique...) : – a un versant technique induisant certaines transformations réelles (symptômes, personnalité) : – a parfois un pouvoir prédictif lié à l'énoncé de règles empiriques et à une ébauche de formalisation ; – est descriptive et non normative, sans idéal de vie ni direction de conscience, en un mot agnostique ; – et conduit donc, comme la science moderne, à une forme d'antiphilosophie. • Enfin la psychanalyse rencontre elle aussi (transfert/contre-transfert) l'intrication de l'observateur et de la chose observée, phénomène mis en lumière au XXème siècle dans ces deux branches du savoir. Mais, comme on l'a vu, elle reste d'une part (au voisinage des discours universitaires) sujette à des mésalliances avec les discours philosophique, sociologique, psychologique etc., d'autre part (limites des analyses "individuelles") imprégnée de la "triade subjective" Imaginaire, Inconscient, Fantasme. La psychanalyse moderne n'a aucune critique pertinente à adresser à la démarche scientifique. Elle dit seulement que la science a jusqu'à présent eu besoin, pour fonctionner, de tourner le dos à la subjectivité, de la laisser à la porte du laboratoire, donc de s'interdire, par construction même, de la prendre pour objet d'étude. Disons que la science est ici "l'aveugle". Elle s'aveugle pour avancer, et y réussit. La psychanalyse, elle, "voit" (... entend) et lit la subjectivité, mais manque souvent de "jambes" méthodologiques pour faire avancer ses hypothèses... Les disciples ne s'intéressent parfois qu'aux maîtres auxquels ils vouent un culte anachronique, se reposant sur les lauriers de leurs initiateurs. Faible transmissibilité et secret des dieux risquent de faire de la psychanalyse actuelle "le paralytique"... Or science et psychanalyse ont en commun les points cruciaux précités. Mais l'aînée et la cadette se comportent en soeurs ennemies, dans une inter-critique stérile prenant parfois une allure idéologique. La nécessité d'une négociation et de passerelles se fait sentir. Nous plaidons ici, comme la fable de Florian, pour une coopération entre l'aveugle et le paralytique. Le dépassement des antagonismes passe par la reconnaissance de ces manques respectifs (la science amputée de la subjectivité n'avance qu'aspirée par le trou noir du réel qui se dérobe, et il serait paradoxal que l'analyse, qui met le manque au centre de sa théorisation, ne puisse s'assumer manquante...), et 36 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! également par l'effort de dissiper un malentendu à propos de critères de scientificité : Il semble opportun de renvoyer dos à dos deux travers caricaturaux : d'un côté l'impérialisme des Sciences Exactes prétendant coloniser les Sciences dites Humaines : nombre-roi, positivisme des faits, dominance du général sur le particulier ; de l'autre le flou artistique, voire autistique de ceux qui en Sciences Conjecturales et en psychanalyse rejettent toute formalisation28. – La statistique avec son arsenal quantitatif est critiquable dans ces Sciences du parlêtre car le langage humain n'est pas un code biunivoque (polyvalence des hiéroglyphes, polysémie du mot "régime"...) : Nous nous séparons donc d'un point de vue largement répandu, selon lequel il n'y a de science que du quantifiable. Nous dirons plutôt : il n'y a de science que du mathématisable et il y a mathématisation dès qu'il y a littéralisation et fonctionnement aveugle. » (J.-C. Milner, Introduction à une science du langage) – Le cas particulier et la loi générale Une des critiques des Sciences Exactes à la psychanalyse repose sur l'idée fausse qu'il n'y a de science que du général (Aristote). Or la loi statistique résultant de la méthode inductive peut se révéler, on l'a vu, non pertinente quand le langage est en jeu. Inversement, une analyse exhaustive d'un cas précis et limité dans une monographie, si elle est matériellement communicable, est tout aussi généralisable et vaut tout autant qu'une collection de cas traités par la méthode inductive. – Le terme "fait" en science doit être redéfini de façon moins naïve et moins grossière : la linguistique travaille sur des corpus transcrits ou enregistrés, le "fait linguistique" est bien matériel. Une des passerelles que nous nommons analysciences pourrait ainsi user de la linguistique, élément mixte et dénominateur commun pour mettre d'accord les psychanalystes et les scientifiques, puisque les uns parlent d'un inconscientlangage qui se lit comme une écriture, et que les autres ne peuvent nier qu'il y ait matérialité du langage et que la science elle-même passe par le langage pour atteindre à la formule écrite. Le structuralisme, né avec la linguistique saussurienne et enterré trop tôt, est à réhabiliter en partie, une fois débarrassé des effets de mode qui l'ont entouré. L'approche structuraliste résout l'opposition entre approche positiviste à la 28 Il n'y a pas, comme le croient les positivistes ou leurs adversaires amateurs de paranormal, une opposition binaire rationnel/irrationnel, mais trois termes : rationnel, irrationnel, logique, le logique (logos !) structurant de façon différente le rationnel et l'irrationnel. Et la logique de l'irrationnel, c'est la psychanalyse, quand toutefois elle veut bien être logique ! 37 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! recherche de faits et approche compréhensive fondée sur l'introspection : il y a une objectivité, une matérialité logicisable du discours de l'acteur social, ou du locuteur, ou de l'analysant indépendamment de l'exactitude de ce à quoi il se réfère. J.-C. Milner parle de "Galiléisme étendu" : À sa manière, le structuralisme en linguistique est lui aussi une méthode de réduction des qualités sensibles. [...] On peut parler ici d'une mathématisation étendue, rigoureuse et contrainte, mais aussi autonome relativement à l'appareil mathématique. La linguistique devint dans les années 50 une discipline aussi littérale que l'algèbre ou la logique, mais indépendante d'elles, avec des succès empiriques pour l'ensemble des langues naturelles Elle se comportait strictement en science galiléenne. Galiléisme étendu fondé sur une mathématique étendue, et étendu à des objets inédits. Cet objet était le langage, qui sépare l'espèce humaine du règne de la nature. De même, l'anthropologie lévi-straussienne obtenait, avec des méthodes comparables appliquées à des objets non naturels – les systèmes de parenté –, une présentation exhaustive, exacte et démonstrative des fonctionnements. L'appui que Lévi-Strauss trouvait dans la linguistique résidait dans une analogie des procédures et surtout des points de vue constituants. Sur ce fondement, linguistique et anthropologie, s'est déployé un mouvement de pensée dont l'unité méthodologique et l'importance épistémologique ne font aucun doute. Que Lacan, dont le rapport au galiléisme est principiel, et qui saisit son objet plus du côté de la culture que de la nature, ait été compté au rang des structuralistes, cela est éminemment explicable. » (L'OEuvre Claire) Une autre facette du galiléisme étendu se rencontre dans l'analyse logiciste des corpus textuels de Jean-Claude Gardin. Cette méthodologie de validation des énoncés en Sciences Humaines offre une modélisation logique aussi rigoureuse que celle des mathématiques29, mais non quantitative, avec : – la validation interne des modèles théoriques et des analyses d'experts, soit "à la main", en mettant par écrit les règles d'expertise et en les faisant "tourner" sur des exemples ; soit par la confection de Systèmes-experts, programmes informatiques simulant par des techniques d'Intelligence Artificielle le raisonnement de l'expert (tête bien faite), et pas seulement son érudition (tête bien pleine), ce à quoi une simple base de données suffirait. Cette validation permet la vérification de la cohérence du raisonnement de l'expert, détecte la tricherie consciente ou la méconnaissance inconsciente, évite la tentation de plaquer sa "grille d'interprétation" sur le corpus. Elle et correspond à l'exigence de 29 Jean-Claude Gardin, M.-S. Lagrange, J. M. Martin, J. Molino, J. Natali-Smit, La logique du plausible, Essais d'épistémologie pratique en sciences humaines, Éditions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, Paris, 1987 38 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! formalisation dans la science galiléenne. Mais on risque alors de n'aboutir qu'à une cohérence "paranoïaque", coupée du réel : le lien avec l'expérience, l'empiricité, n'existe pas, on peut avoir la validité sans l'exactitude. – D'où le second volet : la validation externe de ces analyses par la fabrication de simulacres. Elle correspond à l'exigence d'empiricité dans la science galiléenne. L'aspect théorique en est formulé par Gardin : « Seuls le pastiche et la fabrication de faux à partir des règles de description constituent une validation externe du corpus ». La simulation, la reproduction artificielle "à s'y méprendre" de tout ou partie des aspects de l'objet étudié atteste que les règles de description de l'expert sont non seulement cohérentes mais également efficientes. Au sein des analysciences pouvant contribuer au dialogue entre science et psychanalyse, l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives, très schématiquement définie comme une "microsémantique du fantasme", répond à un certain nombre des critères évoqués ci-dessus : démarche logiciste relevant du galiléisme étendu et s'efforçant de satisfaire aux critères de validation de J.-C. Gardin30 ; modélisation, à base linguistique – augmentée de la dimension de l'inconscient, d'objets et de structures relevant de la psychanalyse et des Sciences de la culture dans des corpus de discours courant ; méthode opérationnelle, efficiente, reproductible, corroborable et utilisable par les non-experts. Elle pourrait dès lors s'inscrire dans un nouveau courant de recherches faisant dialoguer, sur le mode logiciste, science et psychanalyse par le biais de la modélisation, avec pour horizon commun ce que J.-C. Milner, dans L'OEuvre claire, nomme l'Analyse (voir note 19). Mais les passerelles ne sont que des passerelles, les domaines eux sont distincts, et la meilleure manière de travailler de façon complémentaire est de se partager les tâches différentes dans ces champs complémentaires, avec des méthodes différentes, sans incursion ni annexion, dans une éthique de recherche d'exactitude et de vérité(s) mi-dit(e)s qui conforte le respect mutuel et dissuade les détracteurs. Pour conclure... Parcourir d'un "diagnostic différentiel" les propositions de l'argument initial, pour faire émerger les points de bifurcation et d'équivoque où le discours analytique peut se laisser piéger par l'homonymie, nous a conduit à avancer deux définitions-limite de l'analyse comme pratique et comme théorie. 30 En simulant par menus fragments le résultat de l'identification subjective, donc en inaugurant une "subjectivité artificielle"... 39 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Des outils méthodologiques, l'un très général (recours à l'épistémologie), l'autre plus spécifique (l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives) nous ont ensuite permis d'affiner ce diagnostic différentiel en : – un "diagnostic différentiel externe" délimitant le discours analytique d'avec certains discours voisins dont les séductions peuvent occasionner un import-export conceptuel, mais au prix d'un effet collatéral : les critiques peu informés ou peu scrupuleux pourront dès lors indûment attaquer la psychanalyse sur ces terrains qui ne sont pas le sien ; – et un "diagnostic différentiel interne" portant sur la survivance d'éléments fantasmatiques dans les productions théoriques des analystes, et le moyen d'en aborder la description méthodique. Nous espérons avoir montré, dans la dernière partie, qu'après clarification des relations avec les autres discours et "assainissement" de la fabrique de concepts analytiques, le discours de la science pourrait devenir durablement pour la psychanalyse un interlocuteur différent des autres : il y a plus à gagner qu'à perdre à entretenir avec lui non pas une collaboration directe, puisque objets, méthodes et buts ne se superposent pas, mais une stimulation mutuelle à questionner, pour les renouveler, les fondements de l'un et l'autre discours, sur fond d'une écoute respectueuse, par chacun, de son "autre". Ainsi pourrait se voir enrichie dans les prochaines années, dans ce double mouvement, interne de remise en question méthodique, et externe de dialogue dans la complémentarité, la teneur du discours analytique... Le constat de survivance des fantasmes déposés dans les théories et dans les buts assignés à l'analyse nous conduit à proposer une dernière remarque à propos des différends survenant entre les porte-paroles du discours analytique et leurs critiques. De même que Lacan (Écrits) souligne « On croit faire preuve d'audace à s'intéresser aux effets qu'y aurait la personne de l'analyste. [...] Pensez de quelle hauteur d'âme nous témoignons à nous montrer dans notre argile être faits de la même que ceux que nous pétrissons. », de même y aurait-il à la fois une saine humilité et une ressource digne d'intérêt à nous souvenir de ceci : malgré les deux "longueurs d'avance" que sont notre propre analyse et les enseignements au parfum parfois élitiste qui nous ont été légués, nous sommes encore et toujours faits de la même pâte inconsciente que ceux qui, de bonne ou de mauvaise foi, nous critiquent. Cette continuité indique que non seulement la remise en question peut et doit se faire autant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur, mais qu'elle ne doit pas méconnaître que les adversaires en présence partagent largement les mêmes règles du jeu fantasmatique et imaginaire. « Pourquoi tant de haine » ? Mais pourquoi justement les analystes devraient-ils s'en étonner, si sur cette bande de Moebius de la condition humaine où tous les parlêtres sont compagnons de galère... « l'envers c'est les autres » ? 40 Revue Ouvertures, volume2, octobre 2014 Jean-Jacques Pinto : Diagnostic : Différends? Ciel! Un mot pour finir : Pierre Marie31 rappelle que la psychanalyse n'aurait pu être fondée sans l'agnosticisme de Freud qui est, d'emblée, une position épistémologique. Il y a là un petit espoir pour nos quelques propositions d'inspiration épistémologique, qui pourraient alors ne pas rester au stade de... voeux pieux – s'il est avéré que le discours analytique est un... dit agnostique. 31 Pierre Marie, Psychanalyse, psychothérapie : quelles différences ? Aubier, Paris,

Basura Tu-vis-te la suer-te de na- cer en una casa Todo fueron rega- los y a mí Estu –dias pa –ra aboga –do en la empresa de Siem-pre vas tan bien ves-ti-do ¡ ay ¡ qué En in-vier-no a esquiar. En vera-no a des-can-sar ¡ ay ¡ qué bien. ná. papá. bien. bien. Nos mi-ras mal , te sien-tes su-pe-rior, que va-mos mal ves-ti-dos. Pues mira qué ilu- -sión. Ba- -su-ra gen- te sin amor , ba- su-ra no ma-ta réis mi rock , ba- su-ra gen- te sin amor, ba- su-ra no mat aréis mi rock. Llora jorobado Blues. Primer riff Variación del primer riff : Estribillo : Oh, llo- ra jo- robado . Oh, no es po- si- ble. Vuelvo a ser fe- liz. No gané u –na qui-nie- la , tam- poco ví a Lou Reed. So- lo te ten-go a ti . Con eso es bas-tan-te con eso soy fe-liz Y no me he vuel-to loco , solo te ten-go a ti, a ti . Oye tío estás acabado No quiero ir con nadie, solo estoy mejor, no quiero ir contigo, solo estoy mejor. La ciudad, es ella (B as s p ar t) Siempre vestida con tejanos Parte A. Rock and roll Siem pre ves ti da con te – ja nos . Y con cha- que - ta de cue- ro . Es a sí co- mo me gus- tas Es a – sí como te es - pero . El rock duro y la cer- ve za Te ro ban el co- ra - zón . Con ducir moto ci- cle- tas Es tu má- xi ma obse- sión. Parte B Eres mi cla- se de chi - ca con- ti- go quiero sa- lir . E- res mi cla- se de chi- ca sal- ga- mos ya de a- quí . Parte C Y saldre- mos al cam- po , De- ja – re- mos el as- fal- to, El rock se- rá el sol , La hierba el santu- a- rio . [Title] www.justinguitar.com Mi chica alemana No puedo perder el último tren EL ÚLTIMO TREN He de caminar por la gran ciu-dad Bus-car la estación dón-de es-tará . No pue-do per-der el úl-ti-mo tren No pue-do per-der el úl-ti-mo tren He de en-contrar la es-ta- ción. He de en-con-trar la es-ta- ción. Isachilon Apocalipsis cada día La no - che y las ti-nie-blas En- vuelven la tie-rra. Las ciudades ya tiem-blan Em-pezó al fin la gue-rra. Qué nos di-jo el profe-ta Qué nos di-jo el pro-fe-ta. Apoca- lip-sis ca- da día, cada dí –a el mundo sea- caba. Un día la crisis llegó En la ciudad de las fábricas todo el mundo trabajaba, todo el mundo vivía sin pensar en nada más. Estaban haciéndose daño y no sabían cómo parar. Entre rieras y colinas de arcilla se levantaban sus chimeneas. Un día la crisis llegó las fábricas cerraron, sus muros derribaron , pisos crecieron sobre las ruinas. Ya han ro-ba-do to-das tus fuer-zas ya no puedes lu-char. Y a-sí un dí-a y o-tro dí-a aspirando la contaminación. Tu ce-re-bro no te res-pon-de es dro-ga que con-su-me tu cuer-po. I-re-mos al cam-po y co-rre-re-mos so-bre la hier-ba. Nos fun-di-re-mos en-tre las flo-res, pa-re-ce que aún queda naturaleza. Quemé mi vida Que-m-é mi vi- da de-ma-sia- dos años. Aho-gué mi pena en de-ma-sia- das lágrimas. Música y soledad mis ú-nicas amigas. La mala suer-te iba conmi-go. Y los pro- ble-mas don-de quie-ra que fue-ra. Por amor quemado. Por la gloria cegado. Por amor quemado. Por la gloria cegado. Cruzando el cielo Si no me quieren aquí, por qué no me dicen nada. Conseguirán que pierda mis ideas ahora que tengo tantas. Y libre cruzando el cielo, así quiero verme, no me lo impidas, no me verás más. El fuego eterno No tie-nen bas-tan-te con lle-nar-nos el país. De cocacolas , Travoltas y Parchís. Ahora quieren centrales nucleares. Quién tendrá la culpa cuando mueran nuestros hijos. Los señores de la guerra, siguen jugando con fuego. Im-po-si-ble , im-po-si-ble , im-po-si-ble do-minar el fue-go e-ter-no. Quién ten-drá la cul – pa, Quién pu-dre la pul- pa. Una de mía Algún día encontraré Algún día en-con-traré u-na nue-va situación. Y vi-vir como en un sue-ño y ali-viar mi de-presión. Pon-go en el to-ca-ta al-gún disco de rock. Que sean los Ra-mo-nes o los Rolling Sto-nes. Blues del principiante Superhombres Ven a Bellaterra Let me go Cosecha del 83 No me puede ver "La mujer gigante" "Canta Walt Whitman" & & & & & & & & www.justinguitar.com " Un tomb " "Malabarista" "El gran festín " & & & & & & & & www.justinguitar.com & & & & & & & & www.justinguitar.com Versiones [Title] www.justinguitar.com [Title] www.justinguitar.com [Title] www.justinguitar.com [Title] www.justinguitar.com [Title] www.justinguitar.com [Title] www.justinguitar.com & & & & & & & & www.justinguitar.com & & & & & & & & www.justinguitar.com Nunca pasamos de ser un grupo local de cuarta fila. A mí no me importaba , porque ya era feliz tocando mis propias canciones. No me interesaba hacer grandes canciones porque no creía en ello, solamente quería hacer canciones como tantas otras pero que tuvieran sentido para mí. De la música siempre me había interesado el lado técnico: partituras, notas, silencios, acordes, digitaciones y ya era feliz tocando bien una canción y no necesitaba nada más, ni éxito ni fama ni ganar dinero. Al público no se le debe nada más que una buena interpretación de una canción, sin cometer ningún error y tocando bien todas las notas. Si al público no le gusta esa canción, es su problema, pero no del músico que ya ha hecho su trabajo tocando bien la canción. La vida media de una canción es de unos seis meses. Pasado ese tiempo la canción se va olvidando, ya no interesa ni a su autor pues éste ya está componiendo otras canciones que reflejen más sus nuevos pensamientos y sentimientos del momento y la canción antigua se ve condenada a morir o , si ha tenido suerte y ha sido escrita en un partitura o grabada en un disco, a resucitar de cuando en cuando si alguien la quiere tocar otra vez o quiere escucharla. Toda canción pasa por varias etapas durante su vida. Al principio es la etapa del parto, en la que el autor se estruja las meninges para conseguir expresar lo que quiere decir o lo que siente en esos días y para encontrar los acordes y la melodía adecuados para el pensamiento o el sentimiento que quiere transmitir. La siguiente fase es la de la presentación en sociedad: cuando el autor ha conseguido acabar la canción, necesita imperiosamente presentarla al mundo, primero a sus compañeros músicos para convencerlos de que la canción es buena y para que quieran tocarla y defenderla. Después quiere presentarla al público para observar su reacción ante su nueva canción y para que tenga alguna repercusión en la gente. Seguidamente empieza la vida de la canción como una obrera: se la toca en varios sitios y en muchos conciertos , la gente se la aprende después de una primera reacción de extrañeza ( en la que compara la nueva canción con otras de antiguas que "suenan " parecidas para, finalmente , aceptar la canción después de escucharla varias veces) La canción viaja por el país. La última etapa en la vida de la canción llega al cabo de unos seis meses: la canción ya está muy oída, el mismo autor está cansado de tocarla, pierde el interés por ella, la gente también se cansa de escucharla y pide nuevas canciones y esa pobre canción se ve abandonada y olvidada por todos. Al autor ya no le dice nada esa canción porque ya ha cambiado su pensamiento o sus vivencias y está trabajando en nuevas canciones que le motiven más. No quiere tocarla más porque está cansado de ella y además le cuesta mucho hacerlo porque esa canción ya pertenece a otra época del pasado que no quiere recordar. La canción es finalmente enterrada entre la indiferencia de todos. Hay excepciones a esta vida media de seis meses de toda canción: es el caso de la canción que se convierte en un gran éxito, la misma canción se vuelve inmortal y es tocada constantemente por muchos músicos distintos en muchos países diferentes . La canción deja de pertenecer a su autor y se convierte en patrimonio de la Humanidad. Es una canción que, por fortuna, le ha salido redonda a su autor ( según Julián Ribera en su libro sobre la música árabe, a todo compositor de canciones siempre le salen, a lo largo de su vida y sin saber cómo , dos o tres canciones muy buenas, unas diez de buenas, unas 50 de regulares y unas cien de malas ) y esta canción es un gran éxito mundial. O bien es una canción que han tomado unos productores muy listos que la han refinado y añadido muchos efectos de estudio de grabación para convertirla en una canción-producto irresistible que se va a vender en millones de copias y que la gente no pueda evitar escucharla una y otra vez, porque ha sido diseñada para funcionar como una droga. El autor pierde muchas veces el control sobre su canción original, que ha sido retocada y refinada por los productores y ni la reconoce cuando sale a la venta como disco. Pero el autor se ve obligado, para ganar dinero , a tocar esa canción ,de una manera mecánica ,en galas de TV, en grandes giras, como si estuviera trabajando en una fábrica,de una manera industrial, aunque esa canción ya no le motive ni signifique nada para él. Hay otra excepción a esta vida media de seis meses de toda canción y es ese caso de una canción que pasó desapercibida en su momento y muchos años más tarde es redescubierta, en lo que se llama el "revival" y es apreciada por fin, aunque no por mucho más de seis meses tampoco. Esta vida media de seis meses de las canciones es debida a que son la forma musical más simple posible y es fácil hacer una canción. Al ser tan fáciles de hacer, las canciones son también muy útiles para expresar un sentimiento o un pensamiento pasajero y fugaz, que seis meses más tarde ya habrá cambiado. Pero duran poco y han de ser sustituidas cada seis meses por nuevas canciones. Los músicos del Renacimiento eran conscientes de este problema de la vida corta de las canciones y buscaron nuevas formas musicales más complejas que tuvieran una vida más larga porque su misma dificultad y complejidad interna las hicieran más atractivas para ser escuchadas durante muchos años seguidos e incluso durante los siglos por venir. Así aparecieron las formas musicales de la sinfonía, la sonata, la tocata. Son formas musicales más nobles en el sentido de que no cambian fácilmente su constitución interna aunque su autor haya cambiado años más tarde de su parto. Todo cantautor y compositor de canciones debería ser consciente de que está trabajando con la forma musical más sencilla , que está condenada a sufrir una vida corta, de unos seis meses, por la misma constitución de cada canción dependiente del momento en que se encuentre el autor, de sus sentimientos y de su forma en ese momento. Como todo cambia, al cabo de seis meses las condiciones ambientales en las que se compuso la canción y su constitución (entendiendo por tal las técnicas musicales usadas para crearla y su mensaje o aire) ya habrán cambiado y la canción será vieja y una lata. A veces, lo peor que le puede ocurrir a un cantante o a un grupo es que una canción suya sea un gran éxito, porque ese grupo o cantante se verá obligado el resto de su vida a tocar esa canción: su público se lo exigirá, aunque el grupo o el cantante odie esa canción de tanto tocarla o porque pertenezca a su pasado que no quiere recordar. Como mi mentalidad era de guitarrista profesional y usaba las mismas técnicas musicales y conceptos que los otros músicos profesionales ingleses, americanos o catalanes, pensaba que con hacer bien mi papel, tocar bien cada canción, ya había cumplido. Los choques contra los otros músicos que no sabían música eran constantes porque ellos decían que mi manera de tocar las canciones era demasiado "standard" . Así por ejemplo , ese Patrick no quería que sus canciones se tocaran como las habría tocado cualquier músico de estudio , sino que quería que se tocaran sus canciones " a su manera", que era una manera propia de un ignorante en teoría musical ( ver su canción "Il pleut sur Barcelone" en You Tube como ejemplo de lo Patrick que entendía por tocar " a su manera") Mi grupo de 1983 con Jaume como cantante podría haber seguido muchos años más, sin ningún éxito pero haciendo más y más canciones. Yo ya habría estado satisfecho con ello . No así el cantante que se fue del grupo porque quería tener éxito haciendo "heavy". Desafortunadamente , pocas veces pude tocar con músicos de verdad, ya que en Terrassa los que tenían estudios musicales se dedicaban a la música clásica o al jazz y yo siempre tenía que acabar tocando con gente que no sabía música y que tocaba de cualquier manera. La gente tampoco entendió nunca lo que estaba haciendo y creía que no sabíamos tocar ni hacer canciones. En realidad , las simples canciones que hacíamos eran así intencionadamente , desprovistas de todo el aparato espectacular y estúpido que acompaña a las canciones de los grandes grupos de rock y reducidas a unas pocas fórmulas musicales divertidas que nosotros usábamos en nuestro grupo. Desde que tenía 16 años siempre había visto al rock como una música muy simple llena de anticipaciones rítmicas, estructuras melódicas divertidas y dinámicas , modulaciones brutales y solos muy libres. Para mí el rock no era nada más que eso, una música simple y divertida debido a las fórmulas musicales que usaba. No me interesaba nada el aspecto visual , el glamour , el espectáculo del rock, la fama, el dinero, las fulanas , las drogas o la vida salvaje disfrutando de la vida por encima de la sociedad tecnificada y de todos los funcionarios que la mantienen operativa cada día. Es decir, no me gustaba nada todo lo que se supone que forma parte de la vida de una estrella del rock. Veía que las partituras del Conservatorio me costaban mucho de tocar al piano pero en un grupo de rock esas partituras se podían dividir en varios instrumentos: lo que hacía la mano derecha al piano lo podía hacer la guitarra eléctrica, lo que hacía la mano izquierda ( los acordes) lo podía hacer el teclista, las notas más bajas las podía tocar el bajista y la melodía la podía cantar el cantante. De esta manera facilitada, un grupo musical puede tocar cualquier partitura. Para mí, un grupo de rock no es más que eso. Una división del trabajo que normalmente haría un solo músico de carrera al piano. En un grupo de rock se reparte ese trabajo entre cinco instrumentos. En 1980 pude comprarme la Fender pero resultó ser un modelo experimental, con un mástil algo distinto diseñado para tocar rítmica en canciones disco. Para tocar música disco sonaba muy bien pero para tocar otras cosas era imposible con ese modelo. Me dio muchos problemas esa guitarra y además nunca estaba bien afinada. En todo caso, conectada a un ampli Fender Twin Reverb tenía unas posibilidades de sonido enormes . Creo que en Fender diseñaron especialmente esta guitarra para este ampli Twin Reverb porque enchufada a ese ampli, mi Fender se convertía en otro instrumento con muchas más posibilidades . Compré un Sinmarc de transistores de 50 watios en 1981 porque era el ampli que recomendaban en el Aula, por su sonido claro para tocar jazz, pero a mí no me servía para tocar rock, aunque tocando los acordes sonaba muy bien. En 1983 pude comprarme un Marshall pues creía que el secreto del sonido de Jimi Hendrix, Blackmore, etc, provenía de este ampli pero me encontré con un ampli que siempre sonaba distorsionado y saturado y solamente servía para tocar "heavy". Al final me lo vendí, aunque había conseguido que usándolo sin calentar las válvulas, dejándolas frías, sonara un poco como los amplificadores del rock and roll de los años 50. Para mí el Marshall es un ampli horrible, el peor que hay. En mi Fender usaba cuerdas Picato y una púa de concha. Aprendí mucho del método de Fred Sokolow : "Blues guitar" ( mi solo en "Johnny B. Goode " está sacado de ese método). Las canciones de 1983 salieron en cinco minutos: yo llegaba al local con unos acordes y el cantante llegaba con una letra escrita, empezaba a tocar esos acordes y el cantante empezaba a cantar una melodía que se le ocurría y en cinco minutos ya teníamos hecha una canción. No queríamos obsesionarnos en conseguir hacer una canción perfecta o muy buena. Uno de los dilemas que tenía en ese año es que había visto que hacer rock o pop era tan difícil y trabajoso como hacer música clásica, pero mucho peor considerado socialmente porque tocar rock estaba mal visto : era una música vulgar para la gente vulgar . En cambio, los músicos clásicos estaban muy bien considerados socialmente y tenían una carrera muy bien encarrilada , con sus años de estudio en el Conservatorio y luego sus puestos como profesores de música o como músicos de orquesta. Y resultaba que tocar rock o pop era tan difícil como tocar música clásica, algo que yo había descubierto hacía poco tiempo. Tocando rock hay que esforzarse mucho para componer una buena canción, luego para convertirla en un producto de éxito tras refinarla y retocarla mucho, más tarde hay que grabarla en un estudio, que es un trabajo pesado y nada divertido en que hay repetir muchas veces cada toma hasta que quede perfectamente tocada y grabada. En el escenario hay que tocar la canción bien, estudiar su partitura, memorizarla, tocar cada nota en su sitio sin cometer ningún error. En definitiva, yo había visto que tocar rock pedía tanto trabajo y esfuerzo como tocar música clásica y me había preguntado : ¿entonces por qué no tocar música clásica que está mucho mejor considerada? Durante meses no encontré una solución satisfactoria a ese dilema. Finalmente decidí que lo que había que hacer era rock pero sin matarse: sin volverse loco por encontrar la melodía o los acordes perfectos para una canción perfecta, sin partituras complicadas llenas de notas y de detalles sino solamente con partituras muy básicas, improvisando en los solos cualquier cosa, componiendo las canciones en cinco minutos, sin letras con rima sino con letras de frases sueltas con alguna rima ocasional. De esta manera no se convertía al rock en una música tan pesada de hacer como la música clásica, nosotros nos divertíamos más y dejábamos de preguntarnos para qué nos estábamos matando tanto para tocar bien rock cuando podíamos estar tocando música clásica con el mismo trabajo y tiempo invertidos y con mejor consideración social . Así fueron surgiendo las canciones. La primera creo que fue "Algún dia encontraré" , sobre una secuencia de acordes típica en las canciones pop ( A y D, como en "Heroes" de D. Bowie). Luego vino : "Basura" , que salió en cinco minutos. Los acordes son los de "Communication breakdown" de Led Zeppelin y la letra es del cantante contra los hijos de papá que le fastidiaban mucho en esos años. "Siempre vestida con tejanos" es un típico rock and roll de los años 60 como los que hacían los Rolling Stones por entonces. "Solo te tengo a tí" era una canción lenta depresiva al estilo Velvet Underground, con un estribillo intencionadamente extraño (F, G y F sostenido). Es la única canción en la que hay una corta parte de guitarra al principio que me preparé con antelación ( todo lo demás que tocaba en solos siempre era improvisado) . "Contaminación" es otra canción típica del pop con sus acordes Am – F , acordes que están en otras miles de canciones parecidas. La letra es mía y habla de mis problemas para respirar y el cantante la cantaba con tanto dramatismo que la hacía muy vivida. Dionnet y Gal : "Los ejércitos del conquistador" , en "Totem", 1981. "La ciudad, es ella" surgió de un riff que tocaba el bajista en plan "heavy", yo le añadí el estribillo y la letra que estaba basada en un tebeo de "Totem" sobre una ciudad que mataba poco a poco a los soldados que la habían invadido, también hablaba de mis intentos de irme de Terrassa una y otra vez. Tocaba la canción en plan "funky" con una guitarra rítmica y el pedal compresor. "Un sábado más" es otra canción pop con acordes típicos : Am, F, G y era la única canción que le gustaba al bajista y a su hermano batería. "El fuego eterno" está basada en una famosa canción de Saxon y es un panfleto antinuclear. Yo estaba por entonces muy metido en la ideología ecologista. "Mercenaria" surge de otro riff que tocaba el bajista y habla de las niñas monas del colegio que siempre salían con los chicos guapos de la clase. "Llora jorobado" parte del primer riff que aprendí a tocar a la guitarra en 1976 y luego lo tocábamos como un blues en 1981, más tarde le añadí la segunda parte. La letra habla de los problemas de la gente con deformidades torácicas. "No me puede ver" es una canción que tocaba Jordi en 1981 , la letra no recuerdo de quién es, sobre un adolescente que se lleva mal con el padre de su novia. El esqueleto de Ricardo III , presentando una grave escoliosis. "Quemé mi vida" toma como partida las primeras notas de "This time around" de Glenn Hughes y luego se desarrolla como una canción pop inglesa de finales de los años 60. La letra habla de los problemas para encontrar músicos para el grupo. Algunas versiones que tocábamos: "Stranger in Nevada" porque tenía la partitura que había publicado una revista francesa, "Au fond de tes yeux" y "Borra tus huellas" eran de Patrick, "Autosuficiencia" y "Quiero ser santa" eran de Parálisis Permanente, el grupo más interesante de ese año. "Un día la crisis llegó" deriva de la famosa canción disco de los Doobie Brothers y la letra es de Agustí Bartra, poeta de Terrassa exiliado en México muchos años, de su relato corto "La ciutat de les xemeneies" ( adaptado ). El cantante no quería cantarla porque era demasiado larga y solo la tocamos una vez, la que está en You Tube. "Oye tío, estás acabado" es un rock and roll sencillo con una letra del cantante que sorprende por sarcástica. Solo la tocamos una vez, la que está en You Tube. "Superhombres" es una canción que compuse para Patrick . Más tarde cambié la letra, es sobre un astronauta que contempla los años 70 en el planeta Tierra desde su nave en el espacio, al estilo del Major Tom de David Bowie en su canción "Space odditty". "Ven a Bellaterra" está basada en la canción "Loving the alien" de David Bowie y explica mis impresiones negativas de mis primeras semanas en la universidad. Es la canción más compleja y larga que he hecho. "Mi chica alemana" está basada en los acordes de "Let's dance" de David Bowie y habla de un amigo que se pasaba los veranos ligándose todas las alemanas y holandesas que podía en la costa . Fue un intento de hacer una canción pop comercial. "El último tren" lleva un ritmo constante hacia adelante como si fuera un tren y habla de los problemas que tenía el cantante para no perder el tren a Sabadell donde vivía su novia. También puede interpretarse como lo que ocurre al perder esos trenes que pasan una sola vez en la vida y nunca más. "Me voy al desierto" es una canción muy sencilla , imitando los grupos punk de Madrid de esos años. La letra del cantante , que estaba harto de tanta política en la televisión, resultó ser profética porque efectivamente me largué al desierto de Australia años más tarde. "Una de mía " está basada en los acordes de "Soldier of fortune" y todavía no la he encontrado una letra. "Cosecha del 83" es un instrumental que compuse en casa gracias a un teclado que me prestaron ese año. "Cruzando el cielo" está basada en un rock and roll de Randy Meisner y habla de la vuelta de la mili , intentando volver a tocar con grupos de la ciudad. "Apocalipsis cada día" se quedó sin acabar porque el batería se hacía un lío con el ritmo y está basada en la canción de Jimi Hendrix :"In front of the storm". Añadí la segunda parte después, a partir de un texto antiguo egipcio, que es uno de los textos escritos de tipo apocalíptico más antiguos que se conservan y sirvió de inspiración muchos siglos después a San Juan para escribir su propio y famoso Apocalipsis. A pesar de ser una canción de 1983, es totalmente actual porque en la España de 2013 parece que cada día se tenga que acabar el mundo. La fuente para la letra de la canción es: "Las lamentaciones de Ipuwer". "Let me go" fue un intento de hacer una canción eurovisiva pero no gustó a nadie. Está basada en el "La, la, la " que a su vez está basado en una canción tradicional catalana, pero en nuestra canción la melodía sube en vez de descender. Después de repasar muchos ejemplares de las revistas musicales como "Popular 1" y "Vibraciones" me doy cuenta que a finales de los años 70 era uno más entre miles de jóvenes españoles que soñaban con tener un grupo de rock. Estábamos muy influidos por esas dos revistas y por los escritos encendidos de sus redactores, que ponían por las nubes a la figura del rock de moda de cada año. Sabemos que muchas canciones de DP fueron compuestas a partir de un concepto : es lo que se entiende por música conceptual. La canción más claramente conceptual de DP es , sin duda, "Highway star", que trata de mostrar las sensaciones que tiene un motero que corre a toda velocidad por la carretera o por un circuito de carreras. El principio de la canción tenía que sugerir la excitación de la puesta en marcha de la moto, con los gritos en glissando ascendente de Gillan y la marcha que da el grupo tocando corcheas en obstinato durante bastante rato , con el órgano tocando en cuartas unas variantes del riff principal y la guitarra ( en la versión en directo) igualando los gritos ascendentes de Gillan con el feed-back , al tiempo que el bajista toca un motivo descendente en el último momento que añade excitación a esta primera parte de la canción. La moto arranca con los acordes rotundos D C A y Gillan empieza a explicar su vida, sobre cómo le gusta la moto, la compara con su novia que también "tiene de todo" y probablemente Gillan está hablando de él mismo en esta letra porque en esos años tenía una tienda de motos con un amigo ( años después dirá que la letra no hablaba de él mismo sino de un "friky" ) . Gillan hace la primer exposición de su contento sobre la moto en el acorde de A y luego el grupo cambia al acorde de G, sugiriendo un cambio de marchas en la moto o un cambio de paisaje por la carretera. Toda la canción está concebida como un viaje en moto, así que los acordes se van sucediendo para sugerir las impresiones que se tienen en un viaje. Del acorde de G se pasa al acorde de E y luego al de Bm7 que añade un toque diferente a la canción , hasta entonces dominada por los típicos acordes de cualquier rock, sugiriendo, como hemos dicho antes, este B m 7 otro cambio de marchas o de paisaje en la carretera mientras Gillan grita por encima de ese acorde de Bm7 su afirmación de que nadie le va a quitar su moto ( ni su novia). Luego llega el famoso pasaje de "I am a highway star" que probablemente es obra de Jon Lord porque es un pasaje que no es normal en un rock, es más bien la típica parte de las canciones de DP que está inspirada en algún pasaje de la música clásica. Sabemos que esta canción surgió de una jam en el autocar con Gillan y Blackmore mostrando a los periodistas cómo componían canciones y seguramente esta parte de la canción, en su origen , no debía ser más que repetir varias veces E – F , E – F y luego llegó Lord y añadió E – FG – A – B con una melodía de la voz más trabajada en armonía con esos acordes . La primera versión de "Highway star" que se puede escuchar en You Tube, en directo , cuando todavía no la habían grabado en "Machine Head" es muy básica y consiste solamente en un rock con mucha marcha y poco más, muy primario e improvisado . Se supone que en los meses siguientes, DP fueron añadiendo más y más partes a la canción , como era su estilo : añadían solos, fill-ins, arreglos, armonizaciones y sutilezas aquí y allá, pues como decía el mismo Blackmore, ( que contestaba enfadado cuando comparaban DP con Black Sabbath al considerar que éstos últimos eran solamente unos músicos primitivos que solo sabía tocar cuatro cosas mientras que DP se tomaba mucho trabajo en añadir muchas sutilezas y arreglos a sus canciones y si el público no era capaz de apreciarlas, era su problema , decía Blackmore ). Uno de los fill-ins que añaden a la canción es el que sigue a "I am a Highway star" . Luego añaden los solos. El de órgano empieza con una frase rotunda probablemente sacada de algún motivo musical clásico . Luego sigue una vertiginosa bajada siguiendo los acordes y con Lord tocando muy rápido ( tan rápido que en directo se quejaba de que no podía tocarlo como en el disco ) . Es un pasaje que suena a Bach y que quiere decir : "velocidad a tope en la moto" . Luego el grupo cambia dos veces de acorde para mostrar un cambio de marchas o de paisaje en el viaje y vuelve después a cambiar a otro acorde donde Lord toca una rápida escala descendente con alguna nota " árabe" para volver al riff principal de la canción . Todo el solo de órgano sugiere velocidad, excitación y cambios en el viaje. Cuando Blackmore empieza su solo, todavía va a destacar más el componente de "viaje" que tiene la canción. Sus primeros fraseos son muy voluptuosos ( por la moto o por la novia) y rezuman placer , muestran que al motorista se le cae la baba. Luego el grupo cambia de acorde y la guitarra se estanca un poco como meditando o disfrutando del cambio de paisaje . Empieza luego el famoso pasaje de arpegios inspirados por Bach, Mozart o Vivaldi ( tanto da uno u otro) que también va cambiando según el grupo cambia de acorde, sugiriendo una vez más cambios en el viaje o en la marcha de la moto. Blackmore repite los arpegios doblando la guitarra, como doblando el placer que siente el motorista. Luego viene el rapidísimo pasaje ascendente cromático y que luego desciende. Denota el vértigo de la velocidad. Blackmore se obstina en estas figuras musicales una y otra vez como viciado totalmente en el pilotaje de la moto. Finalmente se cansa y acaba el solo con otro riff voluptuoso, que es como la quietud al final del orgasmo. En directo, Blackmore sigue y sigue su solo ( su orgasmo privado , su borrachera de velocidad ) hasta que el grupo se cansa y Paice le marca con sus redobles de batería la entrada otra vez del cantante. Steve Vai, en su versión en el disco "Machine Head reloaded " todavía nos muestra de una manera más clara los conceptos que hay detrás de esta canción, porque Vai lo toca todo, toca la parte de Blackmore en estudio y la de directo y además incluso toca la intro de Lord al órgano ( del "Made in Japan"). Además, Glenn Hughes canta esta canción , en ese disco de homenaje, de una manera más vivida de cómo la canta Gillan, como para comunicarnos mejor lo que está pensando el motero . ~ 1 ~ GLOVER Y LORD SOBRE "MACHINE HEAD" El video sobre la grabación de "Machine head" nos ofrece interesantes revelaciones de Glover y Lord acerca de cómo funcionaba DP. Lord dice que Ritchie Blackmore era un guitarrista "maverick" ( palabra que puede traducirse como : "astuto y atrevido")que de pronto se ponía a improvisar , antes, en medio o después de una canción, sorprendiendo al resto del grupo así como al público. No había manera de obligarlo a que no hiciera eso. Formaba parte de su personalidad y de su manera de tocar . Glover, por su parte, dice que Blackmore era " como una ametralladora" al principio de cada canción de DP , con riffs contundentes y constantes , como si fuera una máquina de una fábrica. Las canciones de DP estaban dirigidas por esos riffs . Glover dice que el título del álbum "Machine head" puede interpretarse como : "una máquina que tiene cabeza", refiriéndose a la música de DP como una imitación de las máquinas de las fábricas pero con pensamiento. Glover también dice que el sonido de Ritchie en sus solos de ese disco es "vicioso" ( a nosotros nos parece más bien sensual ) con gran uso de la Fender que tenía ese año que le permitía estirar fácilmente las cuerdas, la palanca del vibrato , el amplificador Vox y esas notas " viciosas" que aparecían en sus solos ( como el motivo musical al principio de su solo en "Highway star" a dos guitarras). Según Glover, el secreto de la música de DP consistía en esas dos características: por un lado la imitación del funcionamiento de las máquinas de las industrias y por otro lado un sonido " vicioso" como para escapar de esa vida mecánica esclavizada por las máquinas. Lord dice que cuando Blackmore improvisaba, lo hacía de una manera totalmente imposible de predecir, porque igual se ponía a tocar de una manera parecida a como lo hacían los del " free-jazz" o los de la música aleatoria , fuera del ritmo de la canción y de sus acordes, sin saber por dónde iba a ir su solo , o bien se ponía a tocar el fragmento de un vals o del himno inglés enmedio del solo Era un niño juguetón totalmente libre. Como una reacción a ese otro lado rígido de las canciones de DP dirigidas por sus riffs constantes y que sonaban como una máquina o " como una ametralladora ( machine gun)", una liberación de esa parte de las canciones que tenía que tocar muy profesionalmente para que las canciones retuvieran su forma y para acompañar al cantante . O una liberación de esas largas horas en el estudio de grabación tocando sin fallar ninguna nota en sus solos para que el disco sonara perfecto, un trabajo en estudio que Ritchie siempre ha dicho que odia. ~ 2 ~ Una liberación en el escenario en su otra vida como músico de directo en que Ritchie se ponía a tocar sin saber cómo continuaría su solo ni cómo lo acabaría. A este respecto hay que recordar que la escena en directo en la que Ritchie destroza su guitarra, en medio de un ritmo infernal tocado por el resto del grupo ( es el "Infierno de Blackmore") siempre ha sido justificado por Ritchie como una liberación al final del concierto, una liberación que entiende el público como su propia liberación del trabajo en las fábricas durante toda la semana. O como su venganza personal contra esa guitarra que le esclaviza todo el día, obligado a tocarla muchas horas cada día para poder ofrecer solos impresionantes a su público , y al final del concierto va y rompe la maldita guitarra. En las entrevistas que hay en You Tube con Blackmore a principios de los 70, se nos aparece como un adolescente perpetuo que casi no sabe hablar en inglés o que se ríe de una manera tonta como lo hacen aquellos que saben que están muy por encima del resto de los mortales, en su caso por tocar muy bien la guitarra. En una entrevista en You Tube en 1974 dice que no es cristiano y cree en la lucha por la supervivencia y por eso exige tanto al resto del grupo, para que ellos toquen mejor y conviertan a DP en un grupo de nivel mundial. Con Coverdale y Hughes , se convierte en su instructor y les enseña a " superarse" en la "Blackmore Academy of Rock" en que convierte a DP después de la marcha de Gillan . A esos dos chicos de pueblo, que solo eran unos aficionados hasta entonces, los convierte en estrellas del rock a base de mucha presión y mucha exigencia . Hughes cae en las drogas y Coverdale en el egocentrismo y sin duda algo hay que reprocharle a Blackmore por todo ello. Luego Blackmore se marcha del grupo sin contar con Coverdale para su disco en solitario y éste se cabrea tanto que busca por todo el mundo un sustituto de Blackmore , sin fijarse en que el elegido Bolin es un yonqui ( y que vive a solo dos manzanas de su casa de Los Angeles) Pero Coverdale sabía de la adicción de Bolin , por eso le advierte en la canción "Dealer" . Por su parte, Hughes ve que no se cumple su pacto con el grupo para cantar la mitad de las canciones y que Coverdale le roba "Dealer" y además graba "Coming Home" con Bolin al bajo. Coverdale estaba cansado de que Blackmore manipulara sus canciones para convertirlas en "Blackmore rocks" y dice que sin él, ahora DP va a poder hacer muchas cosas que Ritchie no dejaba hacer. Coverdale acusa a Rainbow de estar anticuados, de estar todavía en la época de "Machine Head" , en unos años 70 en que todos los músicos querían "progresar" en cada disco. ~ 3 ~ Pero el ambiente en DP degenera después de la brillante gira por USA, con Bolin y Hughes fuera de sí y el resto del grupo luchando para que las canciones suenen mínimamente profesionales en el escenario.Coverdale, Lord y Paice deciden dejar el grupo casi al mismo tiempo, después del concierto de Liverpool de 1976. En el escenario, Blackmore parece, a principios de los 70, un apasionado primario que no reflexiona demasiado en lo que hace ( a diferencia de lo que dice Glover acerca de que es una "máquina con pensamiento" ) , sino que se deja llevar por su pasión, de una manera bastante parecida a como lo hacen las folklóricas en España o los del flamenco . Blackmore da la impresión de que no sabe de nada y no le importa nada de lo que sucede en el mundo , excepto tocar la guitarra según la escuela Joe Meek ( como dice Gillan en el video).Es una figura de la guitarra que solo piensa en sus solos y tanto le da tocar en un grupo como en otro. Así era Ritchie a finales de los años 60 y principios de los 70 y debemos preguntarnos si siendo de esa manera estaba representando al hombre medio europeo de principios de los 70, que era igual que él : solamente quería trabajar en lo que le gustaba y ganar dinero y no le importaba nada más de lo que sucedía en el mundo, dirigido en esos años por los tecnócratas. Glover también explica en el video que el solo cromático de órgano en "Pictures of home" simboliza el viento en las montañas y que el extraño pasaje final de la canción representa la locura del protagonista, que se siente solo en las montañas. También explica que el solo de órgano al final de "Smoke..." está tocado al estilo Jimmy Smith, sosteniendo una nota. Lord dice que "Fireball" fue el disco más experimental de DP y que en esos días estaban haciendo cosas que nadie más se atrevía a probar. Su órgano Hammond se convertía en una "bestia" cuando lo conectaba a varios Marshalls , con un sonido incontrolable y le costaba sudar la camiseta sacar de esa "bestia" solos que fueran artísticos y musicales. Dice que a Paice no le gustaba tocar ritmos "shuffle" porque le parecían aburridos ( pues los toca, como en "Hold on") y prefería experimentar con ritmos a su estilo en canciones que habían sido compuestas originalmente con un ritmo "shuffle" , como "Pictures of home". Lord dice que la parte central de "Never before" es suya , imitando el estilo de los Beatles. Y que "Highway Star" podría ser una canción de los Beach Boys. A continuación, un recuerdo de las revistas españolas "Popular 1" y "Vibraciones" que durante muchos años fueron la única fuente de información que disponíamos sobre DP en España, antes de la aparición de "Hush" con su enorme archivo de entrevistas y fotos. ~ 4 ~ "Popular 1" en 1975 publica una entrevista con Glenn Hughes antes de su concierto en París en la que dice que Stormbringer ha sido un fracaso y que Lord está saturado de trabajo .Hughes tiene la costumbre de caminar mucho para estar en forma y ese día respondió a las preguntas del entrevistador caminando arriba y debajo por las escaleras del lugar donde estaban. El reportaje incluye fotos muy buenas de Martin J. Louis. En "Vibraciones" dedican varias páginas a DP en 1975, con Diego Manrique escribiendo en su estilo erudito ( usando material de revistas inglesas ) y diciendo cosas como que Blackmore era muy temperamental y solo tocaba bien cuando quería impresionar a su público. Damián G. Puig escribe en ese "Vibraciones" de 1975 que DP son la típica banda de "heavy " y Blackmore está a la altura de J. Beck y Page con su solo de "Child in Time". "Popular 1" vuelve a publicar sobre DP en 1976 y el concierto en Wembley , con fotos de Hughes un poco gordito del trasero y comentarios sobre Bolin como un guitarrista que solo sabía tocar solos deshilvanados. En los años siguientes aparecen entrevistas cortas en las dos revistas. En "Vibraciones", Coverdale dice que él y Hughes se peleaban constantemente por cantar cada canción " a causa de los problemas de ego". Lord dice que imitaba a los Vanilla Fudge hacia 1968 y que Blackmore solo escuchaba a Hendrix. "Popular 1" publica la entrevista de "Guitar Player" a Blackmore en la que dice que su solo de "Gates of Babylon" es mitad preparado y mitad improvisado. Aparece también un especial con una entrevista a Paice en la que dice que en la época de Stormbringer, Blackmore no colaboraba en mejorar cada canción sino que solo se preocupaba de que sus solos sonaran "mágicos". En 1980 hay una entrevista con Blackmore en la que habla de Graham Bonnet como un auténtico rockero de los años 50. Luego siguen números especiales con el concierto de Rainbow en Barcelona de 1981 y otro en 1982. Deep Purple en 1968. También hay reportajes sobre Whitesnake y Ian Gillan Band. En uno de ellos, Cozy Powell cuenta cómo se llevó a Coverdale de excursión unas semanas por los bosques de Inglaterra, para que "volviera a la tierra y dejara en casa su tarjeta de crédito". ~ 5 ~ Luego llega el reportaje sobre la reunión de 1984 de DP y algunos reportajes menores a lo largo de los años sobre las andanzas de Glenn Hughes , el miembro de DP que siempre ha encantado a la gente de "Popular 1" , que nunca ha sido demasiado seguidora de DP , aunque ha estado obligada por la presión del público "heavy" a publicar reportajes sobre ellos. Desde 1985 hasta hoy, de vez en cuando alguna entrevista más con Coverdale (cuando publica su disco en solitario "In the light" dice que ahora la música de Whitesnake de 1987 le parece solo una exhibición de fuegos artificiales y pirotecnia musical , con los cabellos teñidos de rubio). ~ 6 ~ Fotos muy buenas de Martin J. Louis en "Popular 1 " : ~ 7 ~ ~ 8 ~ ~ 9 ~ ~ 10 ~ ~ 13 ~ ~ 14 ~ Pictures of home: análisis. La canción fue sugerida a Blackmore por una melodía tradicional búlgara que escuchó en una ocasión por la radio. Empieza con un solo de batería muy rápido . Entra todo el grupo en tromba con una melodía pentatónica parecida a otras muchas que podemos encontrar en las músicas china y japonesa. El órgano y el bajo acompañan con las figuras típicas de tresillos que tanto abundan en la música de Deep Purple. Siguen los acordes F sostenido, Em, D , G para volver a Bm , asumiendo que la pieza está escrita en Si menor, relativo menor de Re mayor. Este grupo de acordes son frecuentes en la música de Blackmore, constituyendo lo que él llama el "pasaje místico o mágico" de sus canciones, como ocurre también en otras suyas, como "Spanish Archer" o en el riff de "The gipsy". Este grupo de acordes "místico" proporciona un "subidón" emocional y una grandeza a la pieza musical ( Wagner acostumbraba a usar también grupos de estos acordes "mágicos" en aquellos pasajes que quería que fueran grandiosos). La melodía pentatónica, interpretada al estilo Hank Marvin , acaba en una rapidísima escala descendente , en tresillos como siempre, y pentatónica también con una nota cromática añadida en medio, y que suena como el violín de Stephan Grappelli. La melodía del cantante deambula por el acorde de Bm hasta que aparecen D y Em dando un respiro al agobiante ritmo del bajo , batería y órgano, un contraste frecuente en las canciones de DP. Siguen compases en Em y Bm , convencionales en cualquier canción en su parte media de desarrollo ( tónica y subdominante en Si menor). Irrumpen los acordes de C , D y G dando fuerza a esta parte del estribillo, al modular a la tonalidad de Sol mayor, acabando en un F sostenido 7 que devuelve la canción a la tonalidad de Si menor para concluir el estribillo de una forma bastante frecuente en las canciones de DP. A destacar aquí las líneas del bajo que oscilan entre D, D sostenido y E , y entre F, A , A sostenido y B. Una vez más grupos de tresillos para acabar esta sección de la canción, con el bajo tocando una línea ascendente para ligar con la sección siguiente: A sostenido, B, C, C sostenido, D. El solo de guitarra empìeza con esas frases pentatónicas con alguna nota alterada que Blackmore usa por todo el disco "Machine head". Con gran abundancia de tresillos, como no podía ser de otra manera. Aquí Blackmore se "atasca" en varios compases repitiendo la misma figura en tresillos, una práctica que puede indicar falta de ideas o bien ganas de dotar de gran intensidad, a veces agobiante, a un pasaje musical. Como corresponde al estilo de Blackmore, abundancia de notas de adorno mientras va progresando su solo hacia la parte alta del mástil. Característico también en sus solos el repetir un estiramiento de una cuerda en la parte alta del mástil varias veces y conectar esa nota con frases pentatónicas con su nota alterada enmedio ( aquí es la A sostenido), mientras el grupo toca los acordes "místicos", esos que exaltan a Blackmore y le hacen tocar con más "dramatismo". Acaba su solo con el acostumbrado vibrato con la palanca. Jon Lord empieza su solo con esta figura melódica en dos notas simultáneas: E-G sostenido, E-A, combinando terceras , cuartas y quintas. Sigue con esta figura con el B como pedal: BD, E , F , F sostenido, G. Luego empieza el alucinante dueto en terceras ascendentes cromáticas, desde el B hasta el A en la mano izquierda y desde el D hasta el C en la mano derecha, en una figura rítmica difícil de trasladar al pentagrama: cinco semicorcheas en el espacio en que deberían tocarse cuatro semicorcheas, contribuyendo al efecto de vértigo del pasaje. En la segunda subida cromática Lord se detiene en las notas F y A bemol para descender luego cromáticamente también a B y D. En la tercera subida cromática, Lord no se detiene y sigue por todo el teclado en un pasaje de gran dificultad a dos manos, hasta acabar en las notas E y G para enlazar con la nota F y el estribillo dela canción que, como en el solo de Blackmore, supone el clímax de su solo cuando el resto del grupo toca los acordes "místicos" de los que hablábamos antes, aquellos que los solistas del grupo necesitan para que tenga "dramatismo" su música. En los últimos compases de su solo, Lord toca algunas figuras melódicas inspiradas en la música clásica, como es su estilo, mientras la batería apoya esos grupos de tresillos con los que acaba. Compases finales de Lord en los que parece que esté al límite de su aliento ( efecto producido por prolongar varios compases esas figuras repetitivas con mínimas variaciones) mientras la batería toca junto con él las mismas figuras rítmicas de tresillos. En todo su solo Lord ha encontrado un sonido en su Hammond que no es exactamente el "standard" y que resulta muy atractivo para esta canción, como acostumbraba a hacer jon Lord, llamado por Coverdale el de los " dedos mágicos que extraía acordes de seda de su Hammond". Efectivamente, una de las características del estilo de Lord, además de sus estudiadas y rápidas digitaciones, era su habilidad para extraer de su Hammond y de los drawbars otros sonidos que no eran los convencionales usados por otros cientos de organistas del Hammond. Solo al bajo de Glover, rápido y sin dejar un respiro al grupo tras el solo de órgano. Sube desde C cromáticamente imitando lo que había hecho Lord en su solo, mientras sube alternando en la otra cuerda desde G cromáticamente también. Acaba en la parte alta del mástil en A sostenido y E para luego hacer sonar rotundamente la cuarta cuerda al aire con su E grave. Acaba su solo descendiendo en una imitación de la melodía con la que empieza la canción, jugando con el F sostenido y natural. El batería toca la misma figura rítmica de negras en tresillos, con el bombo. El grupo se permite acabar la canción con una acrobacia musical: los arpegios de los acordes de Bm ( con el F natural), D sostenido (con el A natural), G ( con el C y el F sostenido) , B ( con el F natural y el B bemol)... ...A sostenido ( con el E natural y el A natural) , A ( con el D sostenido y el G sostenido) al que sigue un inesperado silencio en el que resuena el eco de las últimas notas tocadas por el grupo. El grupo retoma el solo de guitarra en un "reprise" en el que Blackmore toca algunas de sus frases más inspiradas, jugando con el A natural y sostenido. Así acaba "Pictures of home", una de las canciones más bonitas y melódicas de Deep Purple, con una letra que habla de la soledad en Montreaux rodeados de montañas, nieve y águilas mientras graban su disco "Machine Head" y Ian Gillan echa un vistazo a sus fotos de la familia: " here in this prison of my own making", porque cantar en un grupo de rock de éxito mundial puede convertirse también en vivir en una jaula dorada de donde no se puede escapar. Enrique Morata

American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 49, Number 3, July 2012 ©2012 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs Guy Axtell and Philip Olson I. Introduction The use of the term "applied ethics" to denote a particular field of moral inquiry (distinct from but related to both normative ethics and meta-ethics) is a relatively new phenomenon. The individuation of applied ethics as a special division of moral investigation gathered momentum in the 1970s and 1980s, largely as a response to earlytwentieth-century moral philosophy's overwhelming concentration on moral semantics and its apparent inattention to practical moral problems that arose in the wake of significant social and technological transformations. The field of applied ethics is now a well established, professional domain sustained by institutional research centers, professional academic appointments, and devoted journals. As the field of applied ethics grew and developed, its contributors predominantly advocated consequentialist and deontological approaches to the problems they address; but lately a significant number of moral philosophers have begun to bring the resources of virtue ethics to bear upon the ever-evolving subject matters of applied ethics. Virtue ethics is an approach emphasizing the centrality of the role of character traits (virtues), the possession of which is needed for persons to be good and to live well. As a distinctive approach within normative ethics, it contrasts especially with theories emphasizing acting in accord with universal rules or duties, or acting in order to bring about good consequences, and so on. Virtue ethicists highlight the moral importance of cultivating habits or dispositions such as generosity, courage, humility, friendship, love, and honesty, along with their associated moral sensitivities. From increasing coverage in textbooks in one or another area of applied ethics to a growing number of essays, edited collections, and monographs, applied virtue theory has clearly become a vibrant area of philosophical research. some would find this a surprising development because they have been antecedently convinced by its detractors that virtue ethics stands conceptually ill equipped to offer practicable moral guidance. (For direct discussion, see Louden 1984, hursthouse 1995, Tiberius 2002, and Zyl 2009.) sheer numbers of researchers and publications, of course, do not make the case against virtue ethics' distracters for the importance of virtue ethicists' contributions to the methods and results of applied ethical inquiry. It is therefore timely, we think, to make a more comprehensive review of the state of research in applied virtue ethics today. The present essay tries to take an inclusive view of virtue ethics, and therefore of applied virtue ethics, admitting almost all methods and models APQ 49_3 text.indd 183 5/14/12 9:29 AM 184 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy that highlight the importance of personal, social, and/or civic virtues for addressing the problems that applied ethicists study. But some of the more exemplary recent works we will address include those in high-profile collections as Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (Oakley and Cocking 2001), Virtue Ethics and Moral Education (Carr and steutel 1999), Working Virtue (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007), Virtue Jurisprudence (Farrelly and solum 2007), Environmental Virtue Ethics (sandler and Cafaro 2005), and Sex and Ethics (halwani 2007). Walker and Ivanhoe's Working Virtue (2007) brings together thirteen essays by many of the foremost moral philosophers of our time, covering a wide range of professions; bioethics; environmental ethics; animal, legal, racial, and sexual ethics; global citizenship; and the role of civic and deliberative virtues in democratic societies. In Farrelly and solum's Virtue Jurisprudence (2007), eight prominent authors working in the areas of legal theory and moral philosophy contribute essays that campaign for an Aristotelian (or neo-Aristotelian) alternative to preference-based (consequentialist) and rights-based (deontological) normative legal theories. Guided by Aristotle's idea that "a state exists for the sake of a good life" (Politics III.9: 1280a, 32), the contributors to Virtue Jurisprudence argue that the law should have human flourishing as its ultimate end. The rapidly growing field of environmental virtue ethicists has recently seen a number of significant contributions. sandler and Cafaro's Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005) offers thirteen essays by some prominent environmental ethicists with the explicit aim of determining "the norms [of character] that should govern our interactions with [nature]" (p. 1) and providing "guidance on what attitudes and dispositions we ought and ought not to have regarding the environment" (p. 2). sandler has since published a manuscript titled Character and Environment: A Virtue Oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics (2007), in which he defends a virtue-theoretic approach to environmental ethics, providing an account of the nature of environmental virtue and applying the resulting ethic to practical moral concerns (e.g., the genetic modification of crops). Most recently, the Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics published a special edition, edited by Cafaro, devoted to environmental virtue ethics (Cafaro 2010).1 Before reviewing the research more closely, it should be noted that the relatively recent revival of virtue ethics, beginning a half-century ago, poses some special problems, for our understanding of the goals and methodology of applied ethics have arguably been largely formulated independently of the contributions that virtue ethics make. sensitivity to the possible contributions of virtue ethics need not require a radical rethinking of the aims of applied ethics, which remain centered on the use of moral norms or theories as resources for addressing practical moral problems that individuals and communities face (or may be expected to face) in their daily lives. But applied virtue ethicists do call into question certain fundamental suppositions that have guided earlier work in applied ethics, assumptions about what is applied in applied ethics (only general rules or principles?) and about the subject matters to which moral norms and theories are to be applied (always overt actions and states of affairs external to moral agents themselves?). Applied virtue ethicists provide normative resources that can in some instances be applied to actions but in other instances are better seen as addressing features internal to moral agents (e.g., affective states, deliberative processes, and perceptual sensitivities). If the suppositions about applied ethics that virtue ethics would challenge (suppositions we will return to clarify further in our concluding section) were allowed to define what applied ethics is and must be, then virtue ethics would certainly APQ 49_3 text.indd 184 5/14/12 9:29 AM be at a disadvantage in comparison with actbased approaches. But the point at present is only that if we acknowledge that taking virtue ethics seriously may call upon us to transform or expand our understanding of what it means for ethical norms or theories to be applied, and of the range of subject matters to which those norms or theories are appropriately applied, then the value of its contributions to the field may be easier to recognize. The following sections survey recent work in multiple subfields of applied ethics. The survey will begin with recent work in professional ethics and in education before proceeding on to environmental ethics and other issues of public concern that focus less around specific professions. The final section attempts to draw a number of methodological concerns out of this review of literature and to suggest some new directions for applied virtue ethics going forward. II. Professional ethics As moral education and the study of problems of practice became more explicit parts of the curriculum in medical and business schools in recent decades, practitioneracademics have increasing come to value educational and training strategies that include aspects of character education-even in the absence of any robust commitments to virtue ethics as a normative theory (see also horner 2000, Clark 2006, Radden 2007, and swanton 2007). Indeed, in many core areas of applied ethics, the strongest impetus for a focus on character traits appears not to have come top-down from virtue theory, but rather bottom-up, from the concerns of practitioneracademics confronting difficulties that arise within practices or within a setting of training for new professions. In Virtue Ethics and Professional Roles (2001), Oakley and Cocking explain that "the rise of systematic approaches to professional ethics in the 1970s saw traditional practices in various professions subjected to critical scrutiny by broad-based ethical theories such as utilitarianism and kantianism," which led to the neglect of some practice-based professional ethical norms in favor of judging professional behavior directly in terms of a standard provided by one or another ethical theory (pp. 2–3; cf. Banks and Gallagher 2008, p. 41). Virtue theory's development has gained some strength by the impression that it offers a more contextually sensitive and detailed treatment of professional roles and practices than do other leading ethical theories, better supporting the bottom-up approach of practitioners.2 This need not render virtue ethics conservative. Virtue theory also has the means to criticize practices and to prescribe new virtues. But the bottom-up approach does not overlook normatively significant differences between various professional contexts; instead, it begins with practice-relative values, which may or may not coincide with practice-neutral values.3 This last point will be taken up more fully in the final section of this essay. The top-down and bottom-up approaches here described are complementary, and although their closer integration remains a difficult task, it is aided both by thorough acquaintance with professional roles and by practice-centered accounts of virtue like that of MacIntyre (1984). According to Oakley (2009), virtue ethics offers a "regulative ideal," a way for the agent to internalize the relation between a favored ethical tradition or theory's criterion of rightness and its account of how agents are to be guided by this criterion (p. 1). But virtue ethics emphasizes that the regulative ideal of an ethical theory- eudaimonia in some versions of virtue ethics, for instance-need not take the form of codifiable principles or rules in order to play a motivating role in moral deliberation and judgment.4 still, certain ends and principles that govern practices such as medicine or law often can, in fact, be codified, rendering them more readily communicable and assessable ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 185 APQ 49_3 text.indd 185 5/14/12 9:29 AM 186 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy among members of a professional community. such is the case with the "statement of values" in many businesses and codes of ethics for various professions, which often directly incorporate virtue language in articulating service ideals and expectations for best professional practices. The choice of such language perhaps reflects a view in which "the 'living morality' of the 'virtuous community of practitioners' must be the starting point to elaborate any code of [professional] conduct that stands a chance of being internalized by its members and, therefore, truly achieving its purpose" (Consoli 2008, pp. 241–242).5 Pellegrino's discussion of medicine in "Professing Medicine, Virtue-Based ethics, and the Retrieval of Professionalism" (2007) attempts to contain any worry about uncodifiability of virtue-ethical norms by employing an end-based "schema." This schema has been especially influential in professional ethics (see also Oakley and Cocking 2001). Though Pellegrino argues that virtue theories in ethics cannot stand entirely on their own, independent of principles and duties, he still supports a fairly robust virtue ethics in which virtue theory has more to offer professional ethics than do other moral theories. Pellegrino anchors his position in the idea that professions are distinct human activities that link virtues to the "defining ends" of professional practice.6 With the medical profession, the "act of profession" which initiates the physician-patient relationship entails certain virtues that foster a moral medical community. This conceptual schema, Pellegrino thinks, has applicability to helping professions beyond medicine: With proper definition of the ends, peculiar to each profession, this schema also defines the good of the lawyer's client, the teacher's student, and the minister's penitent or parishioner. As with medicine, the ends of these other helping professions are linked to a particular activity specific to each profession. each profession has its own "act" of promise which invites trust and entails certain virtue as a result. each has a morality internal to its end and the kind of activity it is. (2007, p. 78) some other authors see this appeal to each profession's telos as problematic on the grounds that teleology itself "has become harder and harder to defend" as a source of moral justification (Bertland 2009, p. 25). Although Bertland does not himself explain what is problematic about teleology, other authors have identified increased sensitivity to apparently irreconcilable conflicts among teloi as the root of the problem (e.g., Louden 1984; Zagzebski 1996, p. 200). yet Pellegrino's passage helps explain the appeal that a practice-oriented approach to the virtues has had for recent authors who emphasize the goods internal to practices such as doctoring and nursing (Armstrong 2007, Barilan 2009, holland 2010a, holland 2010b, Walker 2005), psychiatry (Radden and sadler 2008, Robertson and Walter 2007), counseling (stewart-sicking 2008), public health care (horner 2000; Larkin, Iserson, kassutto et. al. 2009), public administration (Lynch 2004), and social work (Adams 2009, McBeath and Webb 2002, Pellegrino 2007, Pullen-sansfacon 2010). Conceiving virtues as goods internal to practices heightens the contrast between the external moral guidance provided by "thin" institutional norms instantiated in master principles or strict decision procedures, on the one hand, and on the other, those resources for moral deliberation that we find in culturally "thick" conceptions of character traits that provide psychologically internalized moral motivations. These partly descriptive, partly evaluative character traits may be conceived as general traits or as those more specific or local traits that we expect of good or bad lawyers, physicians, patients, nurses, parents, accountants, public servants, eco-citizens, and so on. APQ 49_3 text.indd 186 5/14/12 9:29 AM We have now seen how practitioneracademics have availed themselves of the resources of virtue theory by regarding many or most professions as moral communities containing notions of the good that derive from their core purpose or service ideal, and which can serve as reference points for identifying the virtues within particular professional contexts (Banks and Gallagher 2008, p. 40). Business and management is another place where we find an abundance of work underlining this turn away from "ideal theory" (sandler's term) in favor of conceiving virtues as ways to realize goods intrinsic to practices. Gregg and stoner's collection, Profit, Prudence and Virtue (2009), on the financial crisis of 2009 illustrates that virtue theory need not take practices as givens, but may be used to sharply critique practices as well as to prescribe reformed practices and new attendant virtues. Dobson (2007), Moore (2008), Oakley and White (2005), solomon (2003), and Vogel (2005) are among the most prolific virtue ethicists focusing on business ethics. IT, advertising, media ethics, and journalism have received recent treatments by Volkman (2010); steiner and Okrusch (2006); Murphy (1999); Wyatt (2008); and Adams, Craft, and Cohen (2004). The turn toward practice-centered virtues can also be found within engineering ethics in the essays of Crawford-Brown (1997), harris (2008), and Frey (2010). Viewing engineering practices as inseparable from the personal life of the engineer, Crawford-Brown argues that the cultivation of virtue simultaneously enriches the life of the engineer and improves the norms governing engineering practices by helping engineers to negotiate potentially competing loyalties to clients, colleagues, family, self, and the public. The virtuous engineer is aware of the wider value-context within which the norms of engineering operate and is motivated to sustain an engineering culture that deeply values six kinds of virtue: virtue of ends, virtue of service, virtue of belief, virtue of dialogue, virtue of action, and virtue of will. Athanassoulis and Ross (2009) offer a sophisticated virtue ethical account of making decisions about risk that bears especially on engineering. III. education and Developmental Psychology Perhaps the most appropriate work on which to focus first is the earliest of the areafocused collections here reviewed: namely, Carr and steutel's Virtue Ethics and Moral Education (1999). This edited collection was pioneering in updating and applying virtuetheoretic ideas and analyses to the practical problems and concerns of contemporary educators. Most of the contributors share the view that a virtue ethical conception of moral education best accounts for the ways in which motivational factors must enter into any truly effective appreciation for the value of moral principles. The claim is not that a virtues-focused approach to moral education is original, but rather that it reflects a basically correct view of the nature of human moral psychology and moral development, allowing educators to trade less in deduction from general intellectual principles and more in the cultivation of sensitivity to the particularities of experience. While reflex psychological and character education approaches focus mainly on behavior shaping or training, the ethics of care concentrates on emotional development, and liberal education and cognitive developmental approaches dwell primarily on the rational intellectual aspects of moral understanding, virtue ethics regards moral development as a matter of crucial interplay between all these dimensions of human being and [attempts to] give a coherent account of this interplay. (Carr and steutel 1999, p. 252) The importance of exemplars and narratives for the formation of personal and cultural ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 187 APQ 49_3 text.indd 187 5/14/12 9:29 AM 188 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy moral identity is accorded strong importance by several contributors to the collection, while others draw special attention to the interdependencies between the intellectual and moral virtues in Aristotelian thought and their significance for moral education (see esp. Curren 1999; see also Chappell 2006). empirical work in developmental psychology is of course a crucial consideration, and virtue ethicists have themselves disagreed about how to understand some of the connections between psychology and moral education, including the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention (see also Brady 2010, Goldie 2004, and sherman 2010). Another excellent collection dealing with many of these issues is Character Psychology and Character Education (2005), edited by Lapsley and Power. This collection primarily takes up the question of character education in schools, families/parenting, and sports (see also McDougall 2007 and Austin 2009). The selections by thirteen contributing authors aptly demonstrate the editors' abiding theme of the need for a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary focus on moral character, one that explores several different psychological literatures for insights about moral character. This volume includes perspectives from a number of disciplines, including philosophy, personality and development research, and educational theory. According to the editors, we are clearly at a point where important work in moral psychology and ethical theory is reaching a common juncture. Indeed, increased attention devoted to moral selfhood, character, and identity is the result of movement from two directions. It results from the desire both to expand the explanatory reach of moral psychology beyond structures-of-justice reasoning and to ground ethical theory in a defensible account of moral psychology. Both trends, then, from within moral psychology and philosophical ethics, point toward greater interest in virtues, character, and moral identity. Moreover, it is now evident that important new insights about character and character education will only be possible when there is sustained exploration at the interface of these disciplines. (p. 3) Grasp of the history of character education is important, too. Reflection on strategies that failed in the past may reveal "how not to educate character" (kupperman 2005, p. 201); but the collection also takes positive steps to uncover the art and science of effective character education. This includes attention to the role of self-identity in the formation of character and how it helps us to understand moral motivation, commitment, and self-worth. kupperman states that "what is required is historical (and perhaps sociological and anthropological) analysis to remind us of how situated is our notion of character . . . and its relational functions" (p. 337; see, in addition, Mckinnon's essays, also in Lapsley and Power 2005). Additional education-related research includes a focus on multicultural understanding (katayama 2003), military virtues (sandin 2007, sherman 2007), and leadership virtues (Wilson 2008). Welchman, herself the editor of The Practice of Virtue (2006), argues in "Virtue ethics and human Development: A Pragmatist Approach" that contemporary virtue theorists to their own detriment often focus only on the same group of agents that principle-based theories do. There is "near universal tendency to treat moral agents as if they spring into being as full adults. . . . By contrast, dispositions closely associated with periods of dependency . . . however serviceable they may be to ourselves or others, are either ignored outright or grudgingly allowed an inferior status" (Lapsley and Power 2005, p. 142). In order to bring philosophy of education into closer proximity with our best theories of moral development and aging, as well as to allay this methodological bias in favor of only the most independent and autonomous of moral APQ 49_3 text.indd 188 5/14/12 9:29 AM reasoners, Welchman focuses on virtues that are properly included among what MacIntyre (1999) termed "the virtues of acknowledged dependence" (p. 119). Practical concerns related to the earliest and latest phases of dependent life frequently overlap with some of the central concerns of bioethicists (e.g., abortion, health care, senescence, death, and dying). These intersections generate opportunities yet to be fully seized upon for building dialogue between educational theorists and practitioners, social and developmental psychologists, and bioethicists. IV. Bioethics and environmental Philosophy Walker and Ivanhoe rightly note in the introduction to Working Virtue that "an understanding of bioethics as incorporating the ethics of how we treat non-human animals as well as aspects of environmental ethics is much closer to the original meaning of the term . . . than is the narrow focus on medical ethics that is currently fashionable" (2007, p. 24). A broader conception of bioethics may increase and deepen conversations among virtue ethicists across the subfields of medical ethics, environmental ethics, and animal ethics-as some utilitarian and kantian moral philosophers have done (e.g., singer and Regan). For applied virtue-ethical approaches to our relationship with nonhuman animals, see hursthouse 2006a and Bryant 2009. Virtue ethics has recently been applied to further bioethical topics, including pragmatism and virtue ethics in clinical research (Goldberg 2008); genetic modification of crops (sandler 2005, Farrelly 2007b), Confucian bioethics (Fan 2006); euthanasia (Zyl 2004); abortion (Rovie 2002); hunting (Lovering 2006); divergent views of genetic selection and enhancement (Farrelly 2007b, Oakley 2009, saenz 2010); and postor transhuman challenges to virtue ethics' emphasis on "human" flourishing (Cherry 2009). Applied virtue ethics has made an especially large impact in books and journals on environmental philosophy. Many of the authors that holly (2006) and hull (2005) identify in their review articles as founders of this branch-eVe (environmental virtue ethics)-of applied virtue ethics have also contributed newly commissioned essays in either sandler and Cafaro's Environmental Virtue Ethics (2005) or in the recent special edition of Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics (Cafaro 2010). These notable proponents of eVe include Frasz (2005) and Wensveen (2000, 2005), hill (2005), shaw (2005), Welchman (2008), Westra (2005), and Welchman (2008), along with Cafaro and sandler themselves. New voices such as kawall (2010), Throop (2011), Treanor (2010), and numerous others are also contributing to the conversation over eVe. In the introduction to sandler and Cafaro's Environmental Virtue Ethics, sandler (2005) writes that "once the need for environmental virtue ethics is recognized two questions immediately present themselves. First, what are the attitudes and dispositions that constitute environmental virtue? second, what is the proper role of an ethic of character in an environmental ethic? These two issues . . . are central to environmental virtue ethics and largely orient the philosophical work that appears in this collection" (p. 3). The two questions are distinct but also closely connected in sandler's thought. he outlines four distinct strategies sometimes used to identify environmental virtue: "extensionism, considerations of benefit to the agent, considerations of human excellence, and the study of role models" (pp. 5–6). sandler views these strategies as delineating a range of complementary roles, from instrumental to foundational, that environmental virtue might play within a complete environmental ethic. Proponents of environmental virtue ethics develop the concept of eco-citizenship, ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 189 APQ 49_3 text.indd 189 5/14/12 9:29 AM 190 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy arguing that environmental virtues such as gratitude, respect, solidarity, and caring potentially play an important role in our responses to both local and global environmental problems. eVe's advocates uniformly agree that moral development and education are crucial for a sustainable future (Cafaro 2010, p. 4) and that character education plays an important role here. A good deal of work has also gone into developing the connection between human flourishing and that of other animals and into the rationale for preserving wild nature (Jamal 2004). While these connections may well be fruitful, several critics of eVe share Ralston's concern that a eudaimonic virtue ethics, as sandler puts it, could be "dangerous to the extent that its focus on human flourishing distracts us from the intrinsic value of natural entities that makes environmental virtue possible" (sandler and Cafaro 2005, p. 8; see also hursthouse 2006b, Walker and Ivanhoe 2007, and Wenz 2005). In recognition of this challenge, some defenders of strong, agent-based accounts of ethics, such as sandler, take eVe in a nonanthropocentric direction, sometimes looking to virtue theorists other than Aristotle in order to redefine virtue with reference both to the agent's and the patient's good (compare Zyl 2002). Others, like Walker and Ivanhoe (2007), stay closer to traditional eudaimonism but argue for similarities between human and nonhuman animal flourishing that make nonhuman animal flourishing normative for humans. V. Philosophy of Love and sex One area in which virtue theorists have highlighted the study of certain animal aspects of specifically human nature is the philosophy of love and sex. halwani's two authored books, Philosophy of Love, Sex, and Marriage (2010) and Virtuous Liaisons: Care, Love, Sex, and Virtue Ethics (2003), as well as his edited collection Sex and Ethics: Essays on Sexuality, Virtue, and the Good Life (2007), are notable examples. In his introduction to Sex and Ethics, halwani tries to show that a more open discussion of sexuality may challenge the conservative outlook found in some virtue ethicists' treatments of particular virtues (2007, p. 3). In his own books and articles, halwani argues that a virtue ethics may allow for certain sexual lifestyles that are often deemed wrong by traditional mores: for example, promiscuity, open relationships, and even sex work. Nevertheless, a number of sexually conservative perspectives are also represented. It is hard to imagine how our erotic and sexual nature could be quarantined or exorcized from the workplace, school, civil society, or more private association. Thus, it is not surprising to find that dialogue across subfields of applied ethics is very lively in the philosophy of love and sex, which embraces topics in education, bioethics, political and legal ethics, and feminist ethics. VI. Virtue Jurisprudence Aretaic approaches have made inroads in theories of law and jurisprudence, with the approach called "virtue jurisprudence" (hereafter VJ). In the introduction to their collection of that title, Farrelly and solum (2007) present VJ as an alternative to both realist and neoformalist theories of law. "In moral theory," they say, "virtue ethics offers a third way-an alternative to the deontological and consequentialist approaches that dominated modern moral theory until very recently. What would happen if we transplanted virtue ethics into normative legal theory?" ( p. 1; see also koller 2007). The virtue ethics tradition is cited by the authors as offering insights into the legal profession, criminal liability, judging, and issues such as the legitimacy of judicial review. VJ offers distinctive answers to certain basic questions of law: What is the aim of law? how are we to understand the relationship APQ 49_3 text.indd 190 5/14/12 9:29 AM between law and morality? how can legal institutions do their job of resolving disputes? The aretaic turn, according to the authors, moves toward the reintegration of legal theory and practice and away from efforts to disconnect the academy from the bench and bar (by Posner, for example). VJ does not accept that the central function of law is to prevent actions that harm others or that the purpose of the law is to protect property. Rather, according to Farrelly and solum (2007), VJ "is naturally inclined to the view that the law should enable and sustain the material and social conditions that would enable each and every individual to achieve the highest level of human function that is consistent with a similar level of functioning for all" (p. 2). At its strongest, VJ challenges preference-based and rights-based normative legal theories that identify welfare efficiency, autonomy, or equality as the fundamental concepts of legal philosophy, urging that the central notions of legal theory should be virtue, excellence, and the promotion of human flourishing. Legal scholars disagree on the criteria for good legal decision. Furthermore, the role political ideology plays in the appointment of judges makes it likely that people will disagree about which judges are excellent. Nonetheless, Farrelly and solum (2007) attempt to identify and articulate a set of uncontested judicial virtues over which there is likely to be widespread consensus: "By 'virtue,' we mean a dispositional quality of mind or will that is constitutive of human excellence, and the 'judicial virtues' include both the human virtues that are relevant to judging and particular virtues that are associated with the social role of judge" (p. 7). solum has argued that VJ provides the best contemporary expression of the natural law thesis that there is an essential connection between law and justice; his own contributions to Virtue Jurisprudence suggest that practical wisdom and justice are the key judicial virtues. hursthouse's contribution to this volume turns attention to the professional roles of lawyers and to the difficult moral dilemmas those roles can present. she applies virtue ethics to the Lake Pleasant Bodies Case, in which the defense lawyers knew the location of the victims' bodies but were bound by confidentiality not to reveal the information to the grieving family that sought closure. her treatment of how we would expect the virtuous lawyer to act and feel in situations colored by special professional responsibilities is seen as applying also to a much broader set of professions. VII. Civic Virtues and Deliberative Democracy In his book Justice, Democracy, and Reasonable Agreement (2007a), Farrelly further applies virtue theory to a range of issues in political philosophy, including constitutional design, economic incentives, free speech, and reasonable pluralism (see also Wiggins 2004). A somewhat overlapping collection, Aristotle's Politics Today, edited by Goodman and Talisse (2007), asks how Aristotle's moral and political insights might bear on pressing problems in contemporary liberal politics. One question that several contributors address is whether contemporary liberal theorists have something to gain from setting aside Rawlsian neutralism and embracing substantive moral discourse (as solum thinks). The study of deliberative virtues and the conditions for their vitality has been lively, raising concerns that intersect with epistemology and ethics. Talisse focuses on some specific epistemic virtues that deliberation requires, while Goodman highlights the role that phronesis plays in law and politics. Contributors to this collection also discuss other-regarding moral virtues such as generosity, friendship, justice, and, drawing from the work of Confucius, filial piety (see also Ivanhoe's "Filial Piety as Virtue" in Walker and Ivanhoe, Working Virtue [2007]). ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 191 APQ 49_3 text.indd 191 5/14/12 9:29 AM 192 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy From work on civic virtues (Audi 1998) to more recent discussions of deliberative virtues and how they illuminate moral disagreement, several authors have considered whether and to what extent democracy requires not only institutions like constitutionalism and the rule of law, but also a more active and educated citizenry (see esp. Gutmann and Thompson 1996, Misak 2000, Misak 2009, and Aiken and Clanton 2010). The editors of Deliberative Democracy in Practice (kahane, Weinstock, Leydet, and Williams, 2010) bring together eleven essays devoted to exploring the prospects and obstacles that lie ahead for deliberative democratic theory. Deliberative democracy aims to provide more than just a normative philosophical perspective on political engagement; it also prescribes the active redesign of political processes and institutions in order to increase and to improve citizen participation and to help bring about moral or political agreement among citizens. The political concerns of deliberative democracy clearly overlap with interests in virtue education (see section III, above). One central question addressed by the contributors to Deliberative Democracy in Practice concerns "which traits of character . . . the ideal deliberator possess[es], and what should the role of the state, via the institution of public schools, be in inculcating them?" (kahane et al. 2010, p. 7). endorsing a "weak" version of Rawls's theory of legitimacy, Brighouse hypothesizes that reasonable religious and nonreligious persons are more likely to endorse together the "constitutional essentials" of a democratic polity if the state seeks "to collaborate with religious parents in the provision and regulation of schooling" (Brighouse, 2010, p. 52). Weithman questions "strong deliberativism's" claim that "public deliberation can serve its legitimating function only if participants in public deliberation are prepared to offer one another, and are responsive to, a class of reasons that is inherently public or accessible" (Weithman 2010, p. 65). Weithman draws attention to the danger that members of a privileged class may seek to normatively elevate their discourse by dubbing their reasons "public." As an alternative to strong deliberativism, Weithman offers that "mutual translation" of arguments across discursive traditions "can go some way toward mitigating the problems that are said to be posed by citizens' ineliminable reliance on their conceptions of the good in political argument" (p. 68). To be effective, this alternative requires that schools try to educate students about the rhetorical conventions and the historical and cultural backgrounds that inform different discursive traditions. Weithman's essay foreshadows Ivison, Coulthard, and Valadez's shared concern that the "virtues" of liberal democrats may privilege the political interest of certain participants while marginalizing indigenous, colonized citizens. each of these authors recognizes the demands of deliberative democracy in relation to matters of global justice concerns, rather than merely local or national ones. Relatedly, Tessman's Burdened Virtue: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles (2005) is a reflection upon oppression and liberation and the uneasy role played by "burdened virtues"-that is, traits of character that allow one to endure or to resist political oppression as well as other, less overt kinds of oppression (see also Friedman 2008). Works such as these can also raise the issue of the distinction between a virtue ethics and a "virtue politics" and the need to differentiate between them. VIII. Prospects and Challenges for Applied Virtue ethics This essay concludes with some general observations about the state of applied virtue ethics (and applied ethics more generally), along with some suggestions for future research. As was indicated in the introduction to this essay, virtue ethics challenges certain assumptions that have dominated applied ethAPQ 49_3 text.indd 192 5/14/12 9:29 AM ics, and these challenges, if taken seriously, affect our very conception of the field of applied ethics and of the methods appropriate to it. More specifically, virtue ethics first challenges the idea that what is applied in applied ethics must always be general rules or principles. second, virtue ethics seeks to expand the range of subject matters to which moral norms or theories are appropriately applied. Third, it seeks to refashion our understanding of what it can mean for ethical norms or theories to be applied. The foregoing review of literature clearly demonstrates that work in applied virtue ethics can be motivated by a number of theoretical paths that reveal no unanimity, including over questions about whether virtue ethics offers (1) an independent, "third" moral theory, (2) a theory of right action, (3) a theory of moral decision making, and (4) whether virtues qua character traits are properly conceived as practiceor role-based traits or as more global traits. Nevertheless, recent work in applied virtue ethics is distinctive in a number of important ways. In what follows, three distinctive features of applied virtue ethics will be discussed. As we shall see, one of these features supports a pluralist perspective, which weakens the bite of theoretical disputes that otherwise threaten to sidetrack applied ethicists' shared pursuit of practicable solutions to concrete moral concerns. Finally, this essay will conclude with a reasoned recommendation for increased dialogue across subfields within applied ethics. First, contributions to applied virtue ethics involve a distinctive focus on features of the moral agent herself. These include psychological, characterological, normative, and social features that inform agents' conceptions of the good, as well as agents' moral deliberations. These features (whether they are conceived globally or locally) may serve as independent sources of value, and thus as criteria for the evaluation of moral agents' actions, attitudes, and deliberations. What distinguishes virtue-ethical treatment of agents has to do with the place that these features occupy in the description and evaluation of moral conduct and moral life, although again, virtue ethicists are not the only moral philosophers who consider these features of agents to be important. second, the focus on features of agents expands the purview of applied ethics to include problems directly related to agents themselves. Traditionally, applied ethics has sought to propose solutions to problems that exist within real or imagined states of affairs that exist, as it were, "outside" of the moral agent. If the subject matters of applied ethics are thought to be exclusively these sorts of problems, then it is understandable that the norms appropriate for responding to practical moral concerns will always be action-guiding norms aimed at providing answers to the question, "What must I do?" Contributors to applied virtue ethics draw attention to problems concerning characteristics of agents themselves (i.e., their attitudes, motives, feelings, emotions, deliberative strategies, conceptions of the good, etc.), each of which may affect moral development, reasoning, and conduct. But even when applied virtue ethicists stress the importance of the question, "What kind of person should I be?" they need not be arguing for the universal explanatory or evaluative priority of character-based norms over act-based norms. Third, work in applied virtue ethics is distinctive on account of its diachronic or longitudinal approach to the study of moral agents and moral agency. Whether or not virtue ethics is appropriately understood as offering a theory of right action, it does seek to understand particular actions and particular decisions within the context of the agent's life as a whole. It is this interest in the diachronic that most clearly distinguishes virtue ethical treatments of moral agents from act-based perspectives on moral agency. This feature of ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 193 APQ 49_3 text.indd 193 5/14/12 9:29 AM 194 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy virtue ethics most often leads to its association with eudaimonism. But that connection seems to be less essential to a viable virtue ethics than is a strong connection with moral development and moral education, for even those virtue ethicists who oppose happinessbased conceptions of virtue (e.g., Zagzebski 1996) insist upon the central role of education for the inculcation and exercise of the virtues. Although discussions of moral growth and development are not entirely absent from actbased approaches, virtue ethics has clearly heightened attention to a longitudinal view of moral agents and to the diachronic as opposed to merely synchronic considerations in moral judgment. As kupperman (2009) points out, in numerous versions of virtue ethics (from Aristotle and Confucius to contemporary authors) "there is great attention to a longitudinal view of virtues, with emphasis both on how people can come to be virtuous and on the rewards of a life that centers on being virtuous. This longitudinal view sharply separates virtue ethics from much in contemporary philosophical ethics, especially the emphasis on dramatic cases (e.g., the trolley problem) that lend themselves to atomistic consideration" (p. 250). surely we want to retain norms and procedures that allow us to evaluate human conduct synchronically at the level of acts. But virtue ethics reminds us that the aims of moral inquiry are not all reducible to the distribution of praise or blame for particular actions. One important theme for virtue ethicists to consider is how a longitudinal view of moral agency and moral judgment makes important contributions to the field of applied ethics, and again how these longitudinal considerations potentially change our understanding of how that field should be approached. This third distinctive feature of virtue ethics can easily be taken as recognizing the mutually supportive roles of rules, consequences, and virtues in the assessment of agents' moral growth and development over time. In this way, a diachronic or longitudinal account of moral agency and moral judgment undercuts the theoretical turf battles that drive a great deal of contemporary discourse in ethics. A more pluralistic approach to applied ethics, one that recognizes multiple sources of moral value, could very well have a practical advantage. When the different emphases of "ethics to do" and "ethics to be" harden into dichotomies, the ability of virtue ethics to provide action guidance becomes much more problematic. emphasizing theoretical turf battles in the moral education of nurses, social workers, and other professionals may distract and frustrate students, leading them to lose sight of real-world problems and perhaps encouraging a crude relativism or skepticism about ethics. In the context of moral education, aretaic norms can work in conjunction with deontological and consequentialist norms to inform and facilitate responsible deliberation and action. A virtues aspect to education may help to inculcate appropriate responsiveness to salient moral principles or rules and appropriate sensitivity to significant conditions antecedent to and consequent of particular actions. In effect, an overemphasis on theoretical differences and rivalries undermines a natural (and perhaps well-founded) inclination to view different normative ethical theories as offering complementary tools and resources, all of which are needed to address serious, shared social problems. By transcending the reductionistic spirit so evident in moral theory today, applied virtue ethicists-indeed, all applied ethicists-will better succeed in fulfilling a socially useful role.7 If the subject matters of applied ethics are to include problems concerning the growth and development of moral agents over the course of their lives as a whole (including infancy, childhood, and elder years), then a diachronic approach will help us to appraise and evaluate the moral trajectory of agents. kamtekar (2004) reminds us that an overAPQ 49_3 text.indd 194 5/14/12 9:29 AM emphasis on particular actions and behaviors can overlook "information about subjects' feelings about their actions," which is "information that might further the understanding of why people act as they do" (p. 474). Moreover, kametar (2010) says, practically wise agents use this information to "improve" upon their capacity to order goods and to act rightly (p. 157). Agents engaged in serious moral reflection can make sound, practical use of the "thick" affective and characterological concepts that virtue ethics provides. This is true even if human character and the virtues are more fragmented and less unified, more "modular" or local and less global, than some versions of virtue ethics take them to be. Virtue ethicists are right to challenge the assumption that there is little more to moral motivation and decision than a procedure of applying a criterion of rightness to the choices of action with which one is faced. What kind of person (or what kind of doctor, patient, parent, etc.) one wants to become is an important consideration in one's moral decisions. And becoming a good person, professional, and so on does not require that one know in advance all that it is required to be what one wants to become. The long-acknowledged importance of context in virtue ethics may also illustrate how changing social problems fundamentally change the kinds of persons we need to be in order to flourish. While this may affect personal virtue, it perhaps has a deeper impact on group and public virtues (see MacIntyre 1984, pp. 181–203). A good illustration may be the call for "new" environmental virtues in light of "environmental changes-the realities of global warming for example . . . [which] can bear upon the environmental virtues, having effects not only on the conditions of their application but also altering the concepts themselves" (Thompson 2010, p. 56; see also hursthouse 2006b and Treanor 2010). Changes in social and environmental contexts challenge us to grow and develop as moral agents. It may not be so much that the importance of particular political or public virtues is heightened by the severity of the challenges of one's historical context, as that the importance of imaginatively redefining and then internalizing the virtues is needed to successfully deal with present and foreseeable problems. By prescribing, for instance, new conceptions of eco-citizenship or a new set of public environmental virtues, environmental virtue ethics clarifies our environmental choices and responsibilities. This reminds us that there is something irreducibly pragmatic in virtue ethics' focus on actual practices. The practices with which one starts may be approached critically by applied researchers, and the goods and virtues required by the professions may be persuasively redefined in light of evolving problems of practice. This last observation about the need to rethink virtue and character, with regard to ongoing changes in social and environmental problem contexts, leads into a final recommendation for future work in applied virtue ethics. The foregoing review of literature repeatedly draws attention to the ways in which the problems of applied virtue ethics intersect with one another in important ways. yet there remains a conspicuous lack of explicit dialogue across the various subfields within applied virtue ethics. Clearly, several authors have participated in discussions within a number of different areas of applied ethics; but even if an author's distinct contributions are grounded in a single theoretical perspective, this general theoretical unity cannot replace the sort of practical cooperation between subfields from which applied ethicists, as well as the persons and communities they aim to serve, would more greatly benefit. The force and appeal of applied virtue ethics will strengthen if increased attention is given to the shared perspectives, themes, and practical counsels that virtue ethics provide across all areas of practical moral concern. some ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 195 APQ 49_3 text.indd 195 5/14/12 9:29 AM 196 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy authors are beginning to recognize the need for greater exchange across subfields. For example, in their lengthy and rich introduction to Working Virtue, Walker and Ivanhoe (2007) seek to provide "a general sense of . . . how [the essays] relate to one another . . . how they can be located in the bigger picture of virtue ethics as practical ethics," and how the essays "relate to some of the broader themes in contemporary virtue ethics" (p. 36). still, the essays collected in this wideranging volume are not themselves explicitly in conversation with one another. Perhaps the demands of professional specialization partly explain why these intersections remain largely underexplored. Another plausible explanation has to do with the place of social roles and practices within contemporary applied ethical discourse. As indicated in the introduction to this essay, applied virtue ethics has been strongly influenced by practitioner-academics, whose focus on problems of practice often seeks to identify virtues that are "local" to particular professional roles and practices. Role ethics, and what Radden (2007) calls "roleconstituted virtues," have received a good deal of attention from contemporary applied virtue ethicists. Philosophers and social psychologists who sympathize with recent "situationist" critiques of virtue ethics might find role-constituted virtues more plausible than the "global" conceptions of virtue that certain empirical studies are thought to render untenable (see Doris 2002). yet even roleconstituted virtues might not be local enough to fully satisfy those who argue that traits of character do not even manifest consistency across different concrete situations within practical domains. Most moral philosophers now agree that the "situationist challenge" has brought into focus some serious obstacles to the acquisition of virtue. But contemporary virtue ethicists do not see these obstacles as insurmountable; and even advocates of role-constituted virtues show interest in connecting practice-localized virtues with more general traits of character. In A Theory of Virtue, Adams (2006) argues that virtues local to a type of situation (what he calls "modular virtues") can serve as a moral starting point from which agents may develop virtues that exhibit "sufficient generality and consistency across situations to count as traits of character" (p. 120). Radden shares with Adams what we might call an "expansionist" account of virtue acquisition. In "Virtue ethics as Professional ethics: The Case of Psychiatry" (2007), Radden argues that there is a practical need to identify and sanction, in addition to general moral virtues, traits of character "which, outside the context of professional practice, are morally neutral-neither virtues nor vices-or are at most prudential and intellectual virtues, rather than moral ones" (p. 114). These traits deserve more than an honorific status as virtues because, Radden believes, they advance the goods internal to professional practices and because they "might be expected to spread, eventually affecting the rest of [the practitioner's] non-professional life" (p. 130). Thus, role-constituted virtues can facilitate the development of general virtues, thereby contributing to the agent's self-unity and moral integrity. Whereas Radden's "weak" role ethics presumes a hierarchy of moral obligations and permissions, according to which the more exacting demands of professional roles cannot override more general moral obligations, swanton (2007) advocates "a genuine pluralism of ends" (p. 208) that does not subordinate role virtues to more general, traditional virtues. Following slote (2001), swanton claims that the value of role-defined virtues does not necessarily derive from any contribution that those virtues might make to the good of society at large or to the good of the person possessing those virtues. Recognizing that the goods internal to particular practices may conflict with the human good in general, swanton contends that both sorts APQ 49_3 text.indd 196 5/14/12 9:29 AM of good come into focus together: role virtues offer greater action-guidance than do thinner, "prototype virtues" (e.g., justice, honesty, etc.), while the prototypes help to temper the pursuit of professional goals. Adams, Radden, and swanton each make some use of the bottom-up, practice-based approach to virtue acquisition that practitioner-academics advocate. But a bottom-up approach to applied ethics need not locate roles or practices at the bottom. Indeed, by focusing upon problems rather than practices or roles, applied virtue ethicists could take the lead in fostering greater dialog across any number of subfields within applied ethics. Bottom-up approaches that identify roles and practices as the basis for virtue acquisition and action-guidance face the dilemma of either having to reestablish connections between various roles and practices (as Adams, Radden, and swanton try to do) or having to accept a compartmentalized conception of virtue and human functioning. But a problembased approach avoids this difficulty, while also respecting the practitioner goals and norms that top-down approaches disregard. The various fields of practical moral inquiry are themselves organizations of the conclusions of past inquiries. The goals, methods, and norms that govern these various fields may facilitate intelligent problem solving by providing funds of settled knowledge that serve as resources for addressing the problems of applied ethics. These resources can serve as preconditions for applied ethical inquiry only insofar as they actually help us to define and resolve concrete moral concerns. But different roles and practices do not provide criteria for determining what our problems are or how best to resolve them. Rather, the value of the norms that govern particular practices should be assessed in terms of how well those norms help us to resolve the moral difficulties that we currently face or which we can reasonably expect to face. Furthermore, lasting solutions to our most pressing moral problems are likely to demand the concerted efforts of persons occupying a number of roles and practices. For these reasons, applied virtue ethics could become stronger by focusing more broadly on virtues that facilitate the resolution of shared practical problems instead of on the narrower problems of practice. In practice and in effect, our decisions and actions inevitably have implications that are not confined to the purview of any one role or practice. This fact alone should provide sufficient impetus for developing more fully the kinds of deliberative virtues, processes, and institutions that take these intersections into account. Moreover, we can expect to find more circumspect and more effective solutions to concrete moral problems by drawing simultaneously upon the resources provided by theorists and practitioner-academics in both education and bioethics; in eVe and virtue jurisprudence and business ethics; in education and legal and political ethics and feminist ethics and the ethics of love and sex. It is unwise to pretend to be able, in advance, to define the problems that lie at these intersections. It is a task to be undertaken through processes of cooperative dialog among practitioners and theorists working upon shared (or overlapping) concerns across subfields of applied ethics. some applied virtue ethicists have begun to turn in this direction, prescribing public virtues, which denote actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the community rather than the individual (holland 2010b). Treanor (2010) is probably right to point out that "while both personal and public virtues ultimately contribute to one's flourishing, virtue ethics, including environmental virtue ethics, has tended to focus on the former to the neglect of the latter" (p. 26). And Lapsley and Power (2005) wisely urge that "more emphasis is required on notions of community, on civic virtues proper to democratic citizenship, and on the interpersonal basis of character and its relational functions" (p. 337; see also the ReCeNT WORk IN APPLIeD VIRTUe eThICs / 197 APQ 49_3 text.indd 197 5/14/12 9:29 AM 198 / AMeRICAN PhILOsOPhICAL QUARTeRLy exemplary work of Aiken and Clanton [2010] on group deliberative virtues). Public virtues always contribute essentially to eudaimonia, and applied virtue ethicists will do well to try to balance individualistic notions of trait possession with a more social approach, distancing virtue ethics from the methodological individualism so strong in twentieth-century analytic philosophy. Radford University Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) NOTes 1. While many applied ethicists specialize in one subfield or another, there are others who demonstrate wide-ranging interest, participating in conversations across theoretical and applied virtue ethics, as well as within a number of different areas in applied philosophy. Credit for the development of applied virtue ethics (a lion's share of it going "down under" to research centers in applied philosophy and public ethics in New Zealand and Australia) goes especially to authors like hursthouse; swanton; Zyl; van hooft; solomon; and, of course, to those editors-Carr, Cocking, Oakley, steutel, and others already mentioned-whose collections serve as first-of-their-kind models of research and resources for work in applied virtue ethics. 2. As Rhodes earlier put it, "a virtue-based ethics seems particularly appropriate to professions, because the ethical issues often focus on the nature of the relationships and our responsibility in those relationships-to the client, other colleagues, our supervisors, the agency itself. What sort of person is a 'professional' social worker to be? What is human excellence in that context?" (Banks and Gallagher 2008, p. 41). 3. The distinction between practice-relative and practice-neutral values is an adaptation of Quinn's distinction between "agent-relative" and "agent-neutral" values (Quinn 2007). 4. As McDowell (1998), too, contends, undertaking a particular behavior "as constituent means to eudaimonia . . . [specifies] a distinctive sort of reason an agent can have for behaving as he does. . . . It is the sort of reason for which someone acts when he does what he does because that seems to him to be what a human being, circumstanced as he is, should do" (p. 10). 5. Although the more deontological language of some codes of professional conduct can make them more onerous among professionals themselves, these may be appropriate in some circumstances of public trust and may also occasionally give rise to recognition of "new" professional virtues. 6. "Professions have identifiable and defining ends, that is, each serves certain universal human needs . . . in each of these professions, the end or telos is the welfare of a human being and particular existential state, in need of a specific kind of help. . . . This is the meaning of the very first sentence of Aristotle's Nicomachean ethics-'every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good, and for this reason the good has really been declared that at which all things aim'" (Pellegrino 2007, p. 64). 7. 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Conditionalization Does Not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy MIRIAM SCHOENFIELD The University of Texas at Austin / New York University [email protected] Abstract: Greaves and Wallace argue that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. In this paper I show that their result only applies to a restricted range of cases. I then show that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in general is one in which, upon learning P, we conditionalize, not on P, but on the proposition that we learned P. After proving this result, I provide further generalizations and show that much of the accuracy-first epistemology program is committed to KK-like iteration principles and to the existence of a class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true. 1. Introduction Rational agents revise their beliefs in light of new information they receive. But how should agents revise their beliefs in response to new information? To state this question more precisely, it will be helpful to think of information processing as occurring in two (not necessarily temporal) stages:1 First, there is a non-inferential stage at which an agent, through some non-inferential means, gains some information. We'll call this exogenous information gaining. Metaphorically, we can think of this stage as involving the world 'flinging' some information at the agent. In the second stage, the agent revises her beliefs in response to the exogenous information gaining (the flinging) that took place. These are the revisions that we are interested in evaluating. Sometimes, as a result of such revisions, the agent may come to possess additional information, in which case we'll say that this information came to be possessed endogenously. For example, I may gain the information that Gabe is at the party exogenously, and, as a result of revising my beliefs in response to this information, also come to (endogenously) possess the information that his partner Henry is at the party. 1 The two-stage model is discussed (or implicit) in much of the literature on Bayesian updating. See, for example, Howson and Urbach (1989, p.285), Jeffrey (1992, p.38), Bronfman (2014, p.872) and Miller (forthcoming). More precisely, then, the question we're interested in is this: how does an ideally rational agent revise her opinions in light of the information she receives exogenously? According to Bayesian epistemology, rational agents2 revise their credences by conditionalization. Informally, conditionalizing on E involves setting your new credence in every propositions, P, to what your old credence in P was on the supposition that E. Formally, you conditionalize on E if pnew(⋅) = pold( ⋅ | E) where p(A|B) = p(A&B) / p(B). Since conditionalizing is an operation performed on a proposition, thinking of conditionalizing as a way of responding to new information requires characterizing each possible body of information an agent might receive as a proposition. Since one of the aims of this paper is to evaluate an argument for the claim that conditionalizing is the rational response to gaining information, I will assume for now (as is standard) that any body of information that an agent receives exogenously can be uniquely characterized as a proposition (one that is often a conjunction of many other propositions).3 Later we'll see what happens if we relax this assumption. The proposition that uniquely characterizes the entire body of information the agent exogenously receives is sometimes referred to in the literature as 'the strongest proposition one learns'. To emphasize the exogenous aspect, however, I will sometimes call this proposition 'the strongest proposition one exogenously learns'. For short, I will sometimes just call it 'the proposition one exogenously learns' or 'the proposition one learns'. Note that what I am taking as primitive is the notion of exogenously gaining information. I am using the term 'the strongest proposition one exogenously learns' 2 Unless stated otherwise, when I talk about rational agents, I mean ideally rational agents. I discuss non-ideal agents in §4. 3 Why uniquely? Because if there were more than one proposition that characterized the body of information the agent receives, then the claim that one should conditionalize on the proposition that characterizes one's new information wouldn't make sense. If one claimed that one should conditionalize on a proposition characterizing this information, then conditionalization would no longer output a unique credence function given an agent's priors and the new information she received. Conditionalization, then, would no longer count as an update procedure in the sense that is necessary for the arguments under discussion. as a technical term, which presupposes that any body of information can be uniquely characterized as the sort of thing (a proposition) that one can conditionalize on. Conditionalization is the process of revising one's credences by conditionalizing on the strongest proposition one exogenously learns. Why think that conditionalization is a rational way of revising one's credences? There are a variety of arguments that have been offered,4 but the focus of this paper will be an argument by Hilary Greaves and David Wallace (2006) for the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. The Greaves and Wallace argument is part of a larger philosophical program that has been of increasing interest: accuracy-first epistemology. The basic tenet of accuracy-first epistemology is that accuracy is the fundamental epistemic value, and the central project that accuracy-firsters pursue involves the derivation of rational requirements from accuracy based considerations.5 A cluster of accuracy based arguments for rational requirements, including arguments for the requirement to conditionalize, rely on the following claim: RATACC: The rational update procedures are those that maximize expected accuracy according to a strictly proper scoring rule. (The terms used in this principle will be defined precisely in what follows). I will argue that Greaves and Wallace's result applies only to a restricted range of cases. Thus, even if RATACC is true, Greaves and Wallace's argument does not show that, in general, conditionalizing on the proposition one learns is the update procedure that is rational. So the question then arises: which update procedure maximizes expected accuracy in general? I show that, in fact, what maximizes expected accuracy in general is not conditionalization, but a rule that I will call 'conditionalization*'. Conditionalization* has us conditionalize on the proposition that we learn P, when P is the proposition we learn.6 I will show that conditionalization* happens to coincide 4 See, for example, Teller (1976), Williams (1980) and van Fraassen (1989, p.331-7) and (1999). 5 For an overview, see Pettigrew (2016). 6 I borrow the term 'conditionalization*' from Hutchison (1999). Hutchison describes a class of cases that have been thought to pose problems for conditionalization. One proposal he describes (though does not commit to) for how to deal with these cases is to deny that conditionalization is the rational update procedure. Rather, he proposes, perhaps what's rational, upon learning P, is conditionalizing on the proposition that we learn P. Defenders of conditionalization have offered alternative ways of with conditionalization in the special cases that Greaves and Wallace consider, but it yields different results in all other cases. So my central thesis is the following: Central Thesis: If RATACC is true, then the rational update procedure is conditionalization*, and not conditionalization. I will not, in this paper, evaluate the merits of RATACC or the accuracy-first program. This is why my central thesis is a conditional claim. After arguing for this thesis, I discuss some of the interesting implications of my results for iteration principles in epistemology. In particular, I show that if RATACC is true, it follows that, if we learn P, we're rationally required to be certain that we learned P. I then show that, regardless of how we think about exogenously gaining information, it follows from RATACC that there is a class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true. Since many of the results of the accuracy-first program rely on RATACC, those who deny these claims cannot accept much of what accuracy-first epistemology has to offer. 2. Setup What does it mean to say that an update procedure maximizes expected accuracy? In this section I lay out the formal framework that I will use to prove the main result. 2.1 Accuracy and expected accuracy Accuracy is measured by a scoring rule, A, which takes a state of the world, s, from a partition of states, S, and a credence function c defined over S, from the set of such credence functions, CS, and maps the credence function/state pair to a number between 0 and 1 that represents how accurate the credence function is in that state. A: CS X S à [0,1] Intuitively, we can think of the accuracy of some credence function as its 'closeness to the truth'. c is maximally accurate if it assigns 1 to all truths and 0 to all falsehoods. It is minimally accurate if it assigns 1 to all falsehoods and 0 to all truths. treating the cases that Hutchison describes, though Hutchison raises worries for these proposals. My paper provides an independent argument for Hutchison's proposal that doesn't appeal to the controversial cases discussed in his paper. If an agent does not know which state obtains she will not able to calculate the accuracy of a credence function c. However, if she is probabilistically coherent, she will be able to calculate the expected accuracy of c. (Throughout, I will be assuming that rational agents are probabilistically coherent). The expected accuracy of credence function c ∈ CS relative to a probability function p ∈ CS is: EAp(c) = ∑ p(s) A(c, s) s∈S That is, the expected accuracy of a credence function c relative to p is the average of the accuracy scores c would get in the different states that might obtain, weighted by the probability that p assigns to those states obtaining. A strictly proper scoring rule is a scoring rule with the feature that every probability function maximizes expected accuracy relative to itself. In other words, if A is strictly proper, then the quantity: EAp(c) =∑ p(s) A(c, s) s∈S is maximized when c = p. I will not argue here for the claim that our accuracy measures should be strictly proper. I will simply assume this to be true in what follows since the accuracy based argument for the claim that we should conditionalize (in addition to other arguments in accuracy-first epistemology7) requires strict propriety. 8 See Greaves and Wallace (2006), Gibbard (2008), Joyce (2009), Moss (2011), Horowitz (2013) and Pettigrew (2016) for a discussion of the motivation for using strictly proper scoring rules. 7 For example, the argument for probabilism. See Pettigrew (2016). 8 Although the accuracy based argument for the claim that conditionalization is the rational update procedure requires strict propriety, it's worth noting that Greaves and Wallace state their main result slightly more generally: rather than assuming RATACC and that the scoring rule is strictly proper, they remain neutral on propriety and assume that the rational update procedures will be those in which one adopts a credence function that is recommended by a credence function yielded by an update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy. As a result, their main argument does not show that conditionalization is always rational, but rather, that what they call quasi-conditionalization is always rational. In their Corollary 2, they point out that that if we assume that the scoring rule is strictly proper, conditionalization always maximizes expected accuracy, and so is always rational. It is also true that if we assume that the scoring rule is strictly proper, their constraint on rational update procedures is equivalent to RATACC. In this paper, I'm interested in arguments for the claim that conditionalizing (rather than quasi-conditionalizing) is always rationally required and, for these purposes, RATACC and strict propriety must be assumed. 2.2 Learning experiences and update procedures We're trying to figure out how to revise our credences in light of the exogenous information we gain. What exactly is involved in gaining information? Greaves and Wallace don't say much about this, and I too will remain as neutral as possible. All that is being assumed (by Greaves and Wallace and myself) is that the body of information one exogenously receives can be uniquely characterized as a proposition. Suppose you know that you're going to undergo some experience, E. E might be waking up tomorrow, or arriving at the office. Assuming you are probabilistic, for any proposition P, the set {P, ~P} is a partition of your possibility space. (A partition of a probabilistic agent's possibility space is a set of propositions that the agent regards as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.) So the following is a partition of your possibility space: {I gain some new information upon undergoing E, I don't gain any new information upon undergoing E}. We can represent this partition as follows: I gain some new information upon undergoing E. I don't gain new information upon undergoing E. Now consider all of the possibilities in which you gain new information upon undergoing E. Call these bodies of information: i1, i2... You can further subdivide the region in which you gain new information as follows: I gain i1 I gain i2 I gain i3 I gain i4 ... I don't gain new information upon undergoing E. Since we are assuming for now that we can uniquely characterize each possible body of information that you gain as a proposition, and we are describing the possibility in which you gain a body of information as a case in which you learn that proposition, we can redescribe the partition above as follows: I learn X1 I learn X2 I learn X3 I learn X4 ... I don't gain new information upon undergoing E. (Recall that 'I learn Xi' is short for: Xi is the strongest proposition I exogenously learn.) We'll let L(P) name the proposition that P is the strongest proposition you exogenously learn upon undergoing E. For ease of notation, we'll describe the possibility in which you gain no new information as a case in which you learn the tautology (T). So yet another redescription of the partition above is: L(X1) L(X2) L(X3) L(X4) ... L(T) We'll call an event in which an agent exogenously learns a proposition a learning experience (and note that, given our terminology, it is consistent with this that the agent 'learns' the tautology and so gains no new information). Now suppose that an agent is considering some learning experience that she will undergo. She can represent her future learning experience by the set of propositions that she assigns non-zero credence to exogenously learning. So we'll say that an agent whose possibility space is as depicted above represents her future learning experience by the set: X: {X1, X2, X3..., T} I will sometimes use the name of the set that represents an agent's learning experience as a name for the learning experience itself. It will be useful for what follows to note that, in general, if X represents an agent's future learning experience, and L(X) is the set of propositions L(Xi) for each Xi ∈X, then L(X) is a partition of the agent's possibility space. Here's why: First, imagine a case in which the agent is certain that she will gain some new information upon undergoing the learning experience. Then she will be certain that there will be exactly one proposition in X that uniquely characterizes the new information that she will exogenously receive. Thus, she will be certain that exactly one member of L(X) is true. So if the agent is certain that she will gain some new information, L(X) is a partition of her possibility space. If, on the other hand, the agent leaves open the possibility of gaining no new information, then T will be a member of X. Since our agent is certain that she will gain no new information (learn T) or gain some new information (learn exactly one of the Xi that is not T), but not both, she too is certain that exactly one proposition in L(X) is true. Thus, whether the agent leaves open the possibility of gaining no new information or not, L(X) is a partition of the agent's possibility space. An update procedure, U, in response to a learning experience, X, is a function that assigns a probability distribution to each member of X, with the intended interpretation that an agent conforming to U adopts U(Xi) as her credence function if and only if the proposition she learns upon undergoing the learning experience is Xi. In other words, on the intended interpretation, an agent conforming to U adopts U(Xi) if and only if L(Xi) is true. The fact that an update procedure is a mapping from the propositions the agent might learn to probability functions guarantees that update procedures satisfy what Greaves and Wallace call 'availability': In any two worlds in which the agent learns the same information, the update procedure recommends the same credence function. Conceiving of update procedures in this way is motivated by the thought that what an agent is rationally required to do in response to learning a proposition must be determined completely by which proposition she learns. Later in the paper we'll consider generalizations of the notion that don't take this assumption for granted. It will sometimes be convenient to think of U as assigning to each possible state a credence function. So we can let U(s) be U(Xi), where Xi is the proposition that the agent learns in state s. U(s) = U(Xi) where s∈L(Xi) As we'll see in a moment, what Greaves and Wallace call 'an experiment' is just a special kind of learning experience, and what Greaves and Wallace call 'an available act' is just an update procedure in response to an experiment. So my notions are generalizations of the notions that Greaves and Wallace use. 2.3 Experiments and available acts Greaves and Wallace's discussion assumes that the agent contemplating her future learning experience satisfies the following two conditions: PARTITIONALITY: The propositions that the agent assigns non-zero credence to exogenously learning form a partition of the agent's possibility space. FACTIVITY: The agent is certain that if she learns P, P is true. 9 In cases in which PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY hold, we will say that the agent's future learning experience is representable as an experiment. Greaves and Wallace's definition of an available epistemic act A is: 'an assignment of a probability distribution to each piece of possible information Ej∈E [where E is a partition] with the intended interpretation that if A(Ej) = pj then pj is the probability function that an agent performing act a would adopt as his credence distribution if he received the new information that the actual state was some member of Ej' (p. 611-612). Thus, an available act is just an update procedure in response to an experiment. Now, if every rational agent satisfied PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, then perhaps it wouldn't matter that Greaves and Wallace's result only applies to such agents (for their account could still be a general account of how to revise rational credence functions). So it's worth thinking about whether a rational agent may fail to satisfy these conditions. To begin, note that, prima facie, it would be quite surprising if all rational agents satisfied PARTITIONALITY. To return to our flinging analogy, imagine that the world has a 'bucket' of propositions {X1,X2 ...} that you think it might fling at you. If you know that the world will fling exactly one proposition in the bucket at you, then the set: {the world flings X1, the world flings X2, the world flings X3...} is, indeed, a partition of your possibility space. But so far we've been given no reason to think that the propositions in the bucket itself form a partition of your possibility space. After all, what if the bucket contains both P and P&Q? Since P&Q entails P, any set that contains P&Q and P is not a partition. This means that if an agent leaves open the possibility that P is the strongest proposition she exogenously learns, and also leaves open the possibility that P&Q is the strongest proposition she exogenously 9 Greaves and Wallace are explicit about PARTITIONALITY, but not FACTIVITY. However, as we'll see, FACTIVITY must be assumed for their arguments to work. learns, then the agent doesn't satisfy PARTITIONALITY. But it's hard to see why it would be irrational for an agent to leave open the possibility that the strongest proposition she learns is P, and also leave open the possibility that the strongest proposition she learns is P&Q. To illustrate the strength of the claim that all rational agents satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, it will be helpful to prove the following lemma (I call it a 'lemma' because it will play an important role in a proof that comes later): Lemma 1 An agent satisfies PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY if and only if, for each Xi such that she assigns non-zero credence to Xi being the strongest proposition she exogenously learns, the agent assigns credence 1 to: L(Xi) ↔ Xi Proof Suppose that PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY are satisfied. FACTIVITY entails that the agent assigns credence 1 to the left-to-right direction of the biconditional: L(Xi) à Xi for any Xi. For FACTIVITY says that, for all Xi, the agent is certain that if she learns Xi, Xi is true. What about the right-to-left direction? If PARTITIONALITY holds, then the agent is certain that exactly one proposition in X is true. Since, by assumption, the agent is certain that she will learn one proposition in X, and that (due to FACTIVITY) it will be a true proposition, she will have to learn the one true proposition in X. So if X forms a partition, she is certain that the Xi that is true is the proposition that she will learn. This gives us: Xi à L(Xi). Thus, any agent that satisfies PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY will, for each Xi ∈ X, assign credence 1 to L(Xi) ↔ Xi. Conversely, suppose that for every proposition Xi that an agent assigns nonzero credence to learning, she assigns credence 1 to: L(Xi) ↔ Xi. And recall that the L(Xi) form a partition of the agent's possibility space.10 It follows 10 See §2.2 for the detailed argument for this, but here's the gist: L(Xi) is the proposition that the strongest proposition an agent exogenously learns is Xi. So an agent can't leave open the following possibility: For distinct X1 and X2, the strongest proposition I exogenously learn is X1 and the strongest proposition I exogenously learn is X2. This is because, assuming X1 and X2 are distinct, if the agent exogenously learns X2, then it's false that the strongest proposition she exogenously learns is X1. Since the agent can't leave open the possibility that there are two propositions that are each that an agent who regards the Xi as equivalent to the L(Xi) will be such that the Xi also form a partition of the agent's possibility space. So any agent who is certain that, for each Xi, L(Xi) ↔ Xi, satisfies PARTITIONALITY. And under the assumption that the agent is certain that, for each Xi, L(Xi) à Xi (which is the just the left-to-right direction of the biconditional), it follows that the agent satisfies FACTIVITY as well: she is certain that if she learns some proposition, Xi, that proposition is true. Thus, any agent that is certain that, for each Xi, L(Xi) ↔ Xi satisfies PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. So the question of whether a rational agent could fail to satisfy PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY amounts to the following question: Might there be some proposition, P, such that a rational agent assigns non-zero credence to exogenously learning P, while leaving open the possibility that P is true, though she won't learn it, OR leaving open the possibility that she will learn P, but P isn't true? Let's begin by considering the first type of case: a case in which an agent leaves open the possibility that P, but she doesn't learn that P. P but not L(P) Seemingly, there are many cases in which, for some P that I might learn, I leave open the possibility that P is true though I don't learn it. Suppose, for example, that I am about to turn on my radio and am considering the possible bodies of information I might receive. I think that one possibility is that I learn: R: It is raining in Singapore. and nothing else. I also think, however, that it might be raining in Singapore even if I don't learn that it is when I turn on the radio. This seems perfectly rational, but if so, then it is rational to leave open the possibility that R (a proposition I might learn) is true but I don't learn that it is. In response, one might claim that it is, in fact, irrational for me to leave open the possibility that I exogenously learn R and nothing else. For perhaps one thinks the strongest proposition she exogenously learns, the agent must think that at most one member of the set L(Xi) is true. She will also think that at least one member of the set is true since we are assuming that she is certain that she will undergo a learning experience represented by X: that is, she is certain that she will learn one member of X. (Recall that this is consistent with her leaving open the possibility of gaining no new information and merely 'learning' the tautology.) Thus, she will be certain that at least one member of L(X) is true and that at most one member of L(X) is true. that I should be certain that any case in which I come to exogenously possess the information that R as a result of turning on the radio is a case in which the strongest proposition that I exogenously learn is something like: R(R): It is being reported on the radio that it is raining in Singapore. So, one might claim, if I am certain that I will turn on the radio, I should be certain that if R(R) is true, I will learn that it is. But should I? What if I leave open the possibility that upon turning on the radio all I will hear is static? In that case I might leave open the possibility that it is being reported on the radio that it is raining in Singapore, even if I don't learn that it is being reported on the radio that it is raining in Singapore. Surely it is not irrational to leave such a possibility open. In response to this, one might claim that it is also irrational for me to think of R(R) as a proposition in the bucket of propositions that the world might fling at me (that is, as a potential strongest proposition I exogenously learn). Rather, one might claim, the proposition in the vicinity that I should assign non-zero credence to exogenously learning is: E(R(R)): I have an experience as of it being reported on the radio that it is raining in Singapore. And perhaps, one thinks, I am rationally required to be certain that if E(R(R)) is true, I will learn that it is. Note, however, that for this this strategy to generalize the following two claims must be true: (a) If P is a proposition about one's experience (that one could, in principle, learn about), then a rational agent should regard it as impossible for P to be true without her learning that P. (b) Every agent should assign credence zero to P being the strongest proposition she exogenously learns, unless P is a proposition about her own experience. Why is (b) necessary? Because it's plausible that for any proposition P that is not about an agent's experiences, an agent can rationally leave open the possibility that P is true though the agent doesn't learn that it is. So if agents are to be certain that all propositions they might learn will be true only if they learn them, they must be certain that the only kinds of propositions they will exogenously learn are propositions about their experience. Why is (a) necessary? Because claiming that the only propositions I learn are about my experience will be of no help if I can leave open the possibility that some proposition about my experience is true but I don't learn that it is. But (a) and (b) are far from obvious. Let's begin with (a). Consider, for example, the following proposition: Detailed-E(R(R)): I have an experience as of a reporter with a British accent saying that it is raining in Singapore with a slight emphasis on the word 'raining' and a pause between 'raining' and 'Singapore'. This seems like a proposition I could learn. But it also seems possible that my experience could have the described features and yet I don't exogenously learn that it does. I may not notice the accent, or the pauses, or the emphases, despite the fact that these features are present in my experience. So why couldn't a rational agent leave open the possibility that a proposition like this is true, though she doesn't learn that it is? (b) is also a very substantive assumption. Why should every agent be antecedently certain that propositions about her experience are the only kinds of propositions she will exogenously learn? Presumably small children exogenously learn things: the world flings bodies of information at them. But small children might not even have the conceptual apparatus that makes it possible for them to exogenously learn propositions about their own experience. So one might want to claim that children, at least, can exogenously learn propositions that are not of this sort. But if the world can fling propositions like R, or R(R), into a child's belief box, what should make me antecedently certain that the world won't fling such a proposition at me? In other words, if propositions that aren't about one's experience can, in principle, be exogenously learned, why should every agent be certain that she won't undergo this sort of learning? In sum, while there is nothing incoherent about the view that, for any proposition P one might learn, one is rationally required to be certain that if P is true, one will learn it, such a view requires some rather hefty commitments about the kinds of propositions that can be exogenously learned. The resulting commitments are stronger than even the kinds of luminosity commitments that (some) internalists are happy to sign up for and that Timothy Williamson (2000) and others have argued against. For it's not just that one can't be wrong about one's own experiences. And it's not just that, for some class of experiences, having the experience always puts one in a position to know that one is having it. It's not even that, whenever some proposition is true of one's experience, one in fact comes to know that proposition. It is that every rational agent must antecedently be certain that any proposition P that could be true of her experience (and which it is possible to learn about) is a proposition that she will learn exogenously whenever P is true and that there are no other propositions that she could exogenously learn. L(P) but not P If you think that the word 'learn' is factive, and that any rational agent should be certain of this, you might think that a rational agent can never leave open the possibility of learning a proposition that is false. But let's set aside the semantics of 'learn'. For various reasons, some philosophers have thought that an agent might have a false proposition as part of her evidence.11 So if we redescribed the project as an investigation into how an agent should revise her credences in light of the evidence she receives (instead of 'in light of what she exogenously learns'), we might want an account that allows a rational agent to leave open the possibility of gaining a false proposition as part of her evidence. In this case, we would want an account that would apply to agents that fail to satisfy FACTIVITY. Given the considerations above, I think that it should remain a live possibility that a rational agent may fail to satisfy one of PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY. So if we want a fully general account of credal revision, we should consider how such agents should revise their credences in light of what they learn. This forces us to consider learning experiences that aren't representable as experiments. 2.4 The expected accuracy of update procedures 11 See, for example, Rizzierie (2011), Arnold (2013), Comesaña and McGrath (2014) and Drake (forthcoming). So far, we have defined the expected accuracy of a credence function. But we don't yet have a definition of 'the expected accuracy of an update procedure in response to a future learning experience'. Greaves and Wallace do provide such a definition. However, Greaves and Wallace's definition can only be used to describe the expected accuracy of an update procedure for an agent that satisfies PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. Since, in this paper, I am interested in which update procedures maximize expected accuracy in general, I will have to generalize their notion. So what do we mean by the expected accuracy of an update procedure U in response to a future learning experience X? On an intuitive level, what we're trying to capture is how accurate we expect to be upon learning a member of X if we conform to U. And recall that, on the intended interpretation, an agent conforms to U if she adopts U(Xi) whenever the proposition she learns upon undergoing the learning experience is Xi. Suppose that an agent knows that she will undergo a learning experience represented by X. Let A(U(s),s) represent the accuracy score of an agent conforming to U in s. It is natural to think of the expected accuracy that an agent assigns to U as the weighted average of the accuracy scores that an agent conforming to U would adopt in each state in which she learns a member of X. This gives us the following understanding of the expected accuracy of an update procedure: The expected accuracy of an update procedure U in response to a future learning experience X, relative to an agent's probability function p is:12 EAp(U) = ∑ p(s) A(U(s), s) s∈L(X) = ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(X i)), s) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) 12 My definition of expected accuracy is inspired by the definition provided by Greaves and Wallace (though there is one important difference, the reason for which will become clear shortly). A limitation of defining expected accuracy using summations is that if the number of things being summed over is infinite, the sum may not be defined. Kenny Easwaran (2013) provides an alternative way of understanding the notion of expected accuracy that coincides with Greaves and Wallace's definition when finite quantities are involved, but also applies to cases when the quantities are infinite. The results that follow can be carried out in Easwaran's framework (see note 15). However, since the crucial points in this paper are most easily brought out using the Greaves and Wallace inspired definition, I will continue using summations in the main text. I will now prove a second lemma: Lemma 2 If an agent's future learning experience is representable as an experiment, E, and U is an update procedure in response to E, then: EAp(U) = ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(Ei)), s) = ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(Ei)), s) L(Ei)∈L(E) s∈ L(Ei) Ei∈E s∈ Ei Proof Note that the first (leftmost) double sum is just the definition of the expected accuracy of an update procedure. The second double sum is just like the first except that, rather than summing over the L(Ei), we're summing over the Ei. We know from Lemma 1 that if an agent's future learning experience is representable as an experiment – that is, the agent satisfies PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY – then the agent is certain that for all propositions Ei ∈E : Ei ↔ L(Ei) Given this, there is no harm in replacing the 'L(Ei)' that features in the definition of the expected accuracy of an update procedure with 'Ei'. Since Greaves and Wallace assume PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, they can simply define the expected accuracy of an update procedure (which they call 'an act') in response to an experiment as the average accuracy scores that would result from adopting U(Ei) whenever Ei is true. And this, indeed, is what they do. Their definition of the expected accuracy of an act corresponds to the double sum on the right-hand side of the lemma. But it's important to realize that they wouldn't define expected accuracy this way if they weren't assuming PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. This is because, without these assumptions, the double sum on the right does not represent a weighted average of the scores that would result from an agent performing the act. For Greaves and Wallace, in defining an act, say that an agent performs act U in response to X if she adopts U(Xi) as her credence function if and only if she learns Xi (p.612). But if an agent leaves open the possibility that Xi is true, though she doesn't learn it (PARTITIONALITY fails), or that she learns it, though it's not true (FACTIVITY fails), then an agent performing U would not adopt U(Xi) if and only if Xi is true. Thus, it is only if PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY are assumed that the double sum on the right represents the expected accuracy of the credences that result from an agent performing U. 2.5 Summing up The purpose of this section was to develop a precise definition of the notion of the expected accuracy of an update procedure in response to a learning experience. Although Greaves and Wallace provide a definition for the expected accuracy of an act in response to an experiment, this definition won't apply to cases in which PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY fail. I defined the expected accuracy of an update procedure as the weighted average of the accuracy scores that would result form an agent conforming to the update procedure (adopting U(Xi) whenever she learns Xi). I then showed that if the agent can represent her future learning experience as an experiment, this quantity will equal the weighted average of the accuracy scores that would result from her adopting U(Xi) whenever Xi is true. This gives us Greaves and Wallace's definition of the expected accuracy of an act. Thus, my framework, in terms of update procedures and learning experiences, is a generalization of the framework developed by Greaves and Wallace. In the next section I will use the generalized framework to derive Greaves and Wallace's result: the claim that, for an agent who can represent her future learning experience as an experiment, conditionalizing on the proposition she learns maximizes expected accuracy. I then prove a more general result: for any agent contemplating a future learning experience, the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy is one in which, upon learning Xi, the agent conditionalizes on the proposition that she learned Xi. In cases in which the learning experience is representable as an experiment (and only in such cases), this amounts to the same thing as conditionalizing on Xi. 3. The Greaves and Wallace Result and its Generalization Greaves and Wallace argue that (given a strictly proper scoring rule) conditionalizing on the proposition one learns is the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to an experiment. We can think of the argument for this claim as involving two steps. First, there is a purely formal result that demonstrates that plugging in certain values in certain quantities maximizes those quantities. Second, there is an argument from this formal result to the claim that, given our understanding of update procedures, expected accuracy of update procedures, learning, and experiments, the update procedure (or available act) that maximizes expected accuracy in response to an experiment is the one that has the agent conditionalize on the proposition she learns. It will be important to keep these two steps separate. I will call the purely formal result that can be extracted from Greaves and Wallace's paper 'G&W'. G&W: For any partition of states P: {P1...Pn}, consider the set of functions, F, that assign members of P to probability functions. The member of F, F, that maximizes this quantity: ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(F(Pi), s) Pi∈P s∈Pi is: F(Pi) = Cond(Pi) = p(⋅ | Pi) when A is strictly proper. G&W can be used to derive Greaves and Wallace's claim about experiments: CONDMAX: Suppose you know that you are going to perform an experiment, E. The update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to E, relative to probability function p, is the update-procedure that assigns, to each Ei, p(⋅ | Ei). The argument from G&W to CONDMAX, using our generalized framework, is simple. Proof of CONDMAX: (1) The expected accuracy of an update procedure U in response to an experiment E, relative to a probability function p is: (*) ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(Ei), s) Ei∈E s∈ Ei (from Lemma 2). (2) The value of U that maximizes (*) is U=Cond(Ei). (This follows from G&W and the fact that E is a partition) (3) The update procedure U that maximizes expected accuracy in response to an experiment E is U=Cond(Ei). That is, the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy is the one that has the agent conditionalize on the member of E that she learns. (This follows from (1) and (2)). But what about cases in which our future learning experiences aren't representable as experiments? Which update procedure maximizes expected accuracy in those cases? Here is the answer: GENERALIZED CONDMAX: Suppose you know that you are going to undergo a learning experience, X. The update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to X, relative to probability function p, is the update procedure that assigns, to each Xi, p(⋅|L(Xi)) where L(Xi) is the proposition that Xi is the strongest proposition the agent exogenously learns upon undergoing the learning experience. Proof of GENERALIZED CONDMAX: Recall that the expected accuracy of an update procedure, U, in response to a learning experience X is defined as: (#) ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(Xi)), s) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) We are aiming to show that (#) is maximized when U(Xi) = Cond(L(Xi)). So suppose for reductio that this is false: that is, that there exists a function, U*, such that: ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U*(Xi)), s) > ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(Cond(L(Xi)), s) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) Now, define μ(L(Xi)) as U*(Xi).13 It follows that: ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(μ(L(Xi)), s) > ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(Cond(L(Xi)), s) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) But this is impossible, because it follows from G&W that the quantity: (##) ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(F(L(Xi)), s) L(Xi)∈L(X) s∈ L(Xi) is maximized when F(L(Xi))= Cond(L(Xi)). Thus, there cannot exist a μ that satisfies the inequality above. Contradiction. Here is the lesson to be learned from CONDMAX and its generalization: the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to any learning experience is one in which an agent who learns Xi conditionalizes on the proposition that she learns Xi upon undergoing the learning experience. 14 The reason that conditionalizing on the proposition that one learns maximizes expected accuracy in response to an experiment is that, in these special cases, the agent knows that she will learn Xi if and only if Xi is true. In these cases, conditionalizing on Xi amounts to the very same thing as conditionalizing on L(Xi).15 13 How do we know that there is such a μ? Since there is a bijection between the Xi and the L(Xi), there exists an inverse of L(Xi), which we'll call 'L-(Xi)', such that L-(L(Xi)) = Xi. We can then let μ(L(Xi)) be U* composed with L-. Thus: μ(L(Xi)) = U*(L-(L(Xi)) = U*(Xi). 14 Note that this is true for any proposition that is the strongest proposition one exogenously learns, including propositions that are, themselves, about gaining information. So if, say, in a Monty Hall case, one thinks that the strongest proposition learned is something along the lines of: 'I gained the information that there is a goat behind door 2', the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy will have you conditionalize on: 'I learned that I gained the information that there is a goat behind door 2'. 15 The result can be generalized further to cases in which the possible number of propositions learned is infinite. However, to perform this generalization, we need a notion of expected accuracy that doesn't rely on summation. Easwaran (2013) provides such a notion and argues, using this notion, that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy. Like Greaves and Wallace, however, Easwaran relies on both PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. So some modifications need to be made to derive GENERALIZED CONDMAX using Easwaran's framework. Since Easwaran's notion of expected accuracy is quite complex, I cannot, in this note, explain in general terms how the proof must be modified. But for those readers familiar with Easwaran's argument, here are the relevant details: First, Easwaran's claim that 'V and V' are identical on ~E' (p.136) relies on FACTIVITY. For suppose FACTIVITY is violated. Then it's possible that, for some s, the agent learns E in s but ~E is true in s. In such a state V(s) = I(A, x, s) and V'(s) = I(A, x', s). Since it has not been assumed that x and x' are identical, it cannot be assumed that V and V' are identical on ~E. What can be assumed, however, 4. Iteration Principles The update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in general is not conditionalization. It is conditionalization*: conditionalizing on the proposition that one learned P, when P is the proposition learned. Recall that we are interested in the expected accuracy of update procedures like conditionalization or conditionalization* because of the possibility that expected accuracy considerations can be used to support claims about which update procedures are rational. And recall that underlying the arguments under discussion for the rationality of various update procedures is the following assumption: RATACC: The rational update procedures are those that maximize expected accuracy according to a strictly proper scoring rule. Together, RATACC and GENERALIZED CONDMAX entail: COND*: The rational update procedure is conditionalization*. In other words, upon learning P, an ideally rational agent will conditionalize on the proposition that she learned P.16 Since conditionalizing on any proposition involves assigning credence 1 to that proposition, and conditionalization* has us conditionalize on the proposition that we learned P, when P is learned, it follows from COND* that: LL: If one learns P, one is rationally required to be certain that one learned P. I suspect that people who deny KK – the principle that whenever one knows P one is in a position to know that one knows P17 – or related iteration principles, will find without relying on FACTIVITY, is that V and V' are identical on ~L(E). Second, Easwaran's claim that 'on E, V(s) = I(A, x, s) and V'(s) = I(A, x', s)' (p.136) relies on PARTITIONALITY. For suppose that PARTITIONALITY is violated. Then it's possible that there is some state s in which E is true but the agent doesn't learn E – rather, she learns some other proposition E*. In such a case, V(s) = I(A, f(E*), s) and V'(s) = I(A, f'(E*), s). Since it is not assumed that f(E*) is x, or that f'(E*) is x', we cannot assume that, on E, V(s) = I(A, x, s) and V'(s) = I(A, x', s). What can be assumed, however, without relying on PARTITIONALITY, is that, on L(E), V(s) = I(A, x, s) and V'(s) = I(A, x', s). Plugging in these substitutions throughout the remainder of the proof yields the result that, in general, conditionalizing on L(E) (rather than E), where E is the proposition learned, is the update procedures that maximizes expected accuracy. 16 Recall that the proposition one 'learns' refers to the strongest proposition one exogenously learns. LL unattractive.18 But if LL is rejected, COND* must also be rejected. In this section, I explore a number of ways of resisting the conclusion that conditionalization* is the rational update procedure, and the resulting commitment to LL. The most straightforward way to do this is to simply reject RATACC – the claim that the rational update procedures are those that maximize expected accuracy. Ultimately, I think that this is the most promising route for those who wish to reject COND* and/or LL. But first I'd like to describe two alternatives. The first involves claiming that all rational agents do, in fact, satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. The second involves a modification of RATACC. 4.1 Endorsing the Requirements of PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY The argument against the claim that conditionalization maximizes expected accuracy in general relied on the thought that rational agents may fail to satisfy PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY. I offered considerations that tell against the requirement that rational agents satisfy both of these conditions. But perhaps, upon realizing that endorsing conditionalization* as the rational update procedure brings with it a commitment to LL, one may want to revisit this issue. However, even if a case can be made that all rational agents satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, this won't help the LL-denier. For CONDMAX tells us that if all rational agents satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, ordinary conditionalization will be the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy. However, by Lemma 1, all rational agents who satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY will regard L(P) and P as equivalent. So, if rational agents conditionalize on P, upon learning P, they will assign credence 1 to P. But, since these agents assign credence 1 to P ↔ L(P), conditionalizing on P will result in the agent assigning credence 1 to L(P) as well. Thus, if PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY are satisfied, conditionalization yields the result that an agent that learns P will be certain that she learned P.19 17 See, for example, Williamson (2000). 18 Note, however, that at least some objections to KK don't extend to LL. KK has the consequence that if an agent knows P, she knows that she knows P, she knows that she knows that she knows P, and so on. However, recall that by 'learn' we mean exogenously learn. Thus, LL just says that if an agent exogenously learns P she must become certain that she exogenously learned P. It doesn't say that if she exogenously learns P, she exogenously learns that she exogenously learns P. The certainty in learning P need not, itself, be the result of exogenous learning. Thus, unlike KK, LL 'iterates' only once. 19 Bronfman (2014) gives a related argument for the claim that agents that satisfy these conditions will conform to KK. This brings out an important point: conditionalization and conditionalization* only yield different results when an agent doesn't satisfy at least one of PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY. I suggested that, in many ordinary cases, these requirements are not both satisfied. In such cases, conditionalization*, and not conditionalization, maximizes expected accuracy. But even if one disagrees with me about whether rational agents always satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY, one shouldn't reject the claim that conditionalization* maximizes expected accuracy. For conditionalization and conditionalization* amount to the very same thing when PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY are satisfied. Thus, COND* and LL follow from RATACC even if agents are rationally required to satisfy PARTITIONALITY and FACTIVITY. 4.2 Modifying RATACC Aaron Bronfman (2014, p. 887-8) considers and rejects a rule that is similar to conditionalization*. His reason for rejecting the rule is based on the thought that when we're considering which update procedures maximize expected accuracy, we should only consider those procedures that the agent in question can competently execute. On this view, the rational update procedure isn't the update procedure from the pool of possible update procedures that maximizes expected accuracy. Rather, the rational update procedure is the procedure from the pool of update procedures that the agent can competently execute that maximizes expected accuracy. As an example, suppose that Al fails to satisfy one of PARTITIONALITY or FACTIVITY. I have shown that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy for Al from the pool of possible update procedures is conditionalization*. But now suppose that Al sometimes exogenously learns P, but is unable to realize that he learned P. Arguably, Al can't competently execute conditionalization*.20 If this is right, then according to modified RATACC, which has us consider only update procedures that Al can competently execute, Al is not required to conditionalize*. I think that this is an interesting suggestion, but it is worth noting a few things: First, when we calculate the expected accuracy of update procedures, we always do so from the perspective of the agent prior to undergoing the learning experience. Bronfman's suggestion is that we remove from the pool of candidate update procedures those that the agent cannot execute. But what if the agent has 20 How plausible this claim is depends on the modal scope of 'can'. I will simply assume that someone who is sympathetic to this line of thought will have a way of making sense of the modal that yields the desired result. false (but rational) beliefs about which update procedures she can execute? Then the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy from the pool of procedures that she thinks she can execute may differ from the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy from the pool of procedures that she can execute. But it seems against the spirit of Bronfman's proposal to demand that the agent update in accord with the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy relative to her actual abilities when she has no way of knowing which update procedure this is. One might modify Bronfman's proposal so that what's relevant is not the agent's actual abilities, but the agent's opinions concerning her abilities. But if the only update procedures in the pool that she should be choosing from are those that she is certain that she will be able to execute, the pool may well be empty. Perhaps, then, the pool shouldn't only contain procedures that she is certain she will be able to execute. Maybe it should contain those procedures that she believes she can execute, or those that she is sufficiently confident that she can execute.21 But there are additional complications. For suppose I now rationally believe that I won't be able to refrain from being certain that my child is the best player on the team, whatever evidence I receive. But I am wrong about this. In fact, I will perfectly well be able to evaluate the evidence concerning the relative abilities of my child. The view under consideration entails that even if, when the time comes, all of my evidence suggests that my child is mediocre, and I am capable of recognizing this fact, in virtue of the fact that, at an earlier time, I believed that I couldn't help but be certain that she is best, I am rationally required to be certain that she is the best! This seems highly implausible. I don't mean to claim that these complexities are insurmountable, but it is worth noting that nothing that looks like ordinary conditionalization will emerge as a result of Bronfman's modification. If we modify RATACC in the way Bronfman suggests and thereby avoid a commitment to COND* and LL, what we are left with isn't good old-fashioned conditionalization. Rather, the rational update procedure will be something very messy and agent-relative that can't be neatly characterized in a formal framework. If we want to account for the limitations of non-ideal agents 21 If we included only those procedures that the agent knows she can execute, then, since 'knows' is factive, we will run into the earlier problem. If the agent rationally believes that she can execute all of the procedures in set S, but she only knows that she can execute the procedures in S', then the view would imply that it's rational for her to accord with the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy relative to S'. this is to be expected, but we are now quite far from the project as Greaves and Wallace, and others involved in accuracy-first epistemology, originally conceived of it. In describing the idealized agents under discussion Greaves and Wallace say: 'Real epistemic agents are not (at least not quite) like this. Bayesian epistemology is a normative theory rather than a purely descriptive one' (p. 608). Greaves and Wallace are interested in a notion of ideal rationality that doesn't take an agent's cognitive limitations into account. One might have qualms about such idealizations, but these qualms will extend to Bayesian epistemology more generally and are not ones that I will address here. Still, one might claim, even the idealized notion of rationality that Greaves and Wallace are working with takes into account some of the agent's limitations. After all, if any update procedure were allowed in the pool, then surely the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy would be one that requires that, in every state, the agent assign credence 1 to all the truths and credence 0 to all the falsehoods! Now, as a matter of fact, given the way we have defined 'update procedure', the rule 'assign credence 1 to all truths and 0 to all falsehoods' (let's call it 'the truth rule') simply isn't an update procedure. For recall that an update procedure is just a function from the propositions one might learn to credence functions. Since the truth values of some propositions may vary amongst the worlds in which the agent learns the same information, but the recommended credence function cannot vary amongst these worlds, a function from the propositions the agent might learn to credence functions will not, in general, be one that, when conformed to, results in an agent assigning credence 1 to all truths in every state. Nonetheless, one might think that the reason we defined the notion of an update procedure in a way that rules out the truth rule is that we are only interested in procedures that are, in some sense, available to the agent upon undergoing the learning experience. We don't want to require that the agent be certain that it will rain tomorrow, in virtue of the fact that it will rain tomorrow, if all she learns is, say, that a coin landed Heads. Similarly, you might think, we must find some way of ruling out update procedures that require an agent to be certain that she learned P, in virtue of that fact that she did learn P, even though the only information she exogenously received was that P. Perhaps so. But the issue here will be: available in what sense? It will be helpful to make use of Ned Hall's (2004) distinction between analyst experts and database experts. We defer to database experts because they possess a great deal of information. We defer to analyst experts because of their superior information processing abilities. Thus, we can distinguish agents who are idealized along the database dimension (they are certain of all and only the truths), and agents who are idealized along the analyst dimension. It is the latter kind of idealization that Greaves and Wallace are interested in. They want to know how an idealized analyst will revise her beliefs in light of new information. Since they are interested in idealized information processing, and not idealized information possession, it is clear why they require that update procedures issue the same recommendations in any two states in which the agent gains the same information. It will, however, be difficult to come up with a principled way of ruling out conditionalization* as the ideal update procedure if the ideal in question is ideal information processing. This is because, like conditionalization, conditionalization* is simply an operation performed on the proposition exogenously learned. The operation is the following: If P is the proposition learned, take P, attach an L to it, and conditionalize on the resulting proposition: L(P). If we were happy with ordinary conditionalization, then we were happy with requiring that (ideal!) agents be certain that Q, upon learning P, if P entails Q. In endorsing this commitment we needn't suppose that any event in which one exogenously learns P constitutively involves a learning of Q. Rather, the Q-learning may be a kind of endogenous learning that idealized agents will undergo upon exogenously learning P. The requirement that agents be certain that they learned what they learned is, in the relevant sense, no different from the requirement that agents be certain in the propositions that their evidence entails. Here too, we needn't suppose that any event in which one learns P constitutively involves a learning that one learned P. The claim is rather that ideal agents will come to be certain that they learned P upon appropriate processing of the information that P. In sum, Bronfman's modification of RATACC may well be worth serious consideration, but it does not engage with the project as Greaves and Wallace conceived of it: figuring out the ideally rational way to revise beliefs, where the idealization in question is along the information processing dimension. Conditionalization*, just like conditionalization, is an operation on the proposition an agent learns. If we are interested in ideal information processing, there shouldn't be any restrictions on what operations can be performed on this proposition. 4.3 Giving up RATACC Rather than trying to modify RATACC, one may simply reject the idea that anything in the vicinity of RATACC is true. On this view, there simply is no straightforward connection between the rational way of revising one's credences and considerations of expected accuracy. There is plenty of literature devoted to evaluating the merits of accuracy-first epistemology22 and entering into this debate will take us beyond the scope of this paper. But it is important to realize that RATACC plays an important role in much of the accuracy-first project.23 So I will simply note that this is one way that someone who wants to reject COND* and LL might go. If this turns out to be the only acceptable way to reject these claims, then we will have learned the following interesting fact: Many accuracy-first epistemologists (those who endorse RATACC) are committed to some substantive iteration principles, and, conversely, those who reject such principles are committed to rejecting large portions of the accuracy-first project. 5. Further Generalizations and Further Consequences I have shown that conditionalizing on the propositions we learn does not, in general, maximize expected accuracy. Rather, conditionalizing on the proposition that we learned P, when P is the proposition learned, is the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy. In this section I provide further generalizations of this result and show that, no matter which features of an agent's situation the RATACC-er thinks the rationality of an agent's credence function depends on, she is committed to: LUMINOUS INFALLIBILITY: There is a class of propositions concerning an agent's situation, such that, for any subject S, if S is rational, these propositions will be true of S if and only if she is certain of them. To begin, I will give an argument for the following generalization of GENERALIZED CONDMAX: 22 See, for example, Caie (2013), Greaves (2013), Pettigrew (2016), Konek and Levinstein (forthcoming), and Carr (ms.). 23 Though see Schoenfield (forthcoming), section 4, for an alternative conception of how rationality and accuracy considerations interrelate, which takes accuracy as fundamental, but gives up on RATACC. SUPER GENERALIZED CONDMAX: Let U be a function from a set of propositions X to credence functions with the intended interpretation that an agent conforming to U adopts U(Xi) whenever the agent bears relation R to Xi. Let R(Xi) be the proposition 'The agent bears relation R to Xi'. If the R(Xi) form a partition, then the function, U, such that conforming to U maximizes expected accuracy, is the one that has the agent conditionalize on the proposition 'the agent bears relation R to Xi' whenever the agent bears relation R to Xi. Why is this principle true? Here's the intuitive idea: Suppose you could choose a credence function that you knew an agent would adopt whenever she bears the relation R to some proposition P. Even without knowing anything else about this relation, if you wanted her to be as accurate as possible, the following seems like a sensible first step: have her assign credence 1 to the proposition: she bears relation R to P whenever she bears relation R to P. For this will guarantee that if she conforms to the procedure, she will assign credence 1 to a truth! What conditionalizing on 'she bears relation R to P' adds to this is just that she'll renormalize the rest of her credences in response to her newfound certainty. More formally, note that SUPER GENERALIZED CONDMAX differs from GENERALIZED CONDMAX only in that we are talking about bearing the R relation to a proposition, rather than the learning relation, and we are understanding what it is for an agent to conform to U as the agent adopting U(Xi) whenever she bears R to Xi instead of whenever she learns Xi . But the proof of GENERALIZED CONDMAX didn't rely on any special feature of L. So if, instead of asking how an agent should revise her credences as a function of which proposition she learns, we ask how an agent should revise her credences as a function of which proposition she bears R to, it will turn out that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy is the one that has the agent conditionalize on R(Xi) whenever she bears R to Xi . SUPER GENERALIZED CONDMAX explains why the results in this paper are completely neutral with respect to one's understanding of 'learning'. A theorist can take any notion of learning that she's interested in (coming to assign credence 1 to P, coming to know P, coming to believe P), and partition an agent's possibility space in accord with the different 'learnings' she might undergo (perhaps including a trivial instance of learning to capture a case in which no new information is gained). Then, SUPER GENERALIZED CONDMAX will say that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to whatever kind of learning takes place is conditionalizing on the proposition that the relevant kind of learning has taken place. We can now generalize the result even further. For it also follows from G&W that: SUPER-DUPER (SD) GENERALIZED CONDMAX: Consider any partition of propositions Pi over a set of states Ω. Let U be a function from Pi to credence functions with the intended interpretation that an agent adopts U(Pi) whenever Pi obtains. The U that maximizes expected accuracy is the one that assigns to each Pi the credence function that results from conditionalizing on Pi. Proof Let Pi be a set of propositions that partition Ω. It follows directly from G&W that the function U that maximizes this quantity: ∑ ∑ p(s)* A(U(Pi), s)) Pi ∈Ω s∈ Pi is: U=Cond(Pi). Note that the quantity above represents the expected accuracy of an agent's credences if that agent adopts U(Pi), whenever Pi obtains. It follows that if we understand conforming to U as adopting U(Pi) whenever Pi obtains, the U which is such that conforming to it maximizes expected accuracy is the one that has the agent adopt Cond(Pi) whenever Pi obtains. This result allows us even greater flexibility in terms of how we think about exogenously gaining information because we are no longer required to think of information gaining as an agent coming to bear a relation to a proposition. Suppose, for example, that one thought that the world doesn't fling single propositions at agents, but sets of propositions. We then might ask: how should one revise one's credences in response to learning a set of propositions? SD-GENERALIZED CONDMAX entails that the update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to learning sets of propositions is the one that has the agent conditionalize on the proposition 'S is the set of propositions that was learned' whenever S is the set of propositions learned. Or suppose that, like Richard Jeffrey (1992), one thinks that exogenous learning involves the world shifting around some of an agent's credences. We then might ask: how should one revise one's credences in response to certain credal changes taking place? If we're looking for the update procedure in response to credal changes that maximizes expected accuracy, the answer will not be to Jeffrey-conditionalize. The answer will be to regular-old-conditionalize on the proposition 'such and such credal changes have occurred' whenever such and such credal changes have occurred. There is a sense, then, in which a defender of RATACC can't help but adopt some version of the truth rule. For whatever one's theory of rationality is, one can partition the space of possible situations an agent might find herself in in such a way that the same doxastic state is rational in each cell of the partition. Perhaps, for example, a theorist partitions the space based on what the agent's phenomenology is: {She has phenomenology P1, she has phenomenology P2...} or what she learns {She learns X1, she learns X2...} or what her evidence is: {She possesses E1, She possess E2...}. Call this partition, whatever it is, P. There is, then, a function from the Pi ∈ P to credence functions that (for this theorist) represents the credence function that is rational for an agent to adopt in any given cell of the partition. We'll call the propositions in P the propositions whose truth determines what credence function it is rational for an agent to adopt. Now, suppose that our theorist is a RATACC-er. It follows from SD-GENERALIZED CONDMAX that conditionalizing on Pi whenever Pi obtains is the way to assign credence functions to the members of P that maximizes expected accuracy. So the RATACC-er will think that if Pi is true, a rational agent will conditionalize on Pi and so become certain that it is true. The RATACC-er must also think that if a rational agent is certain that Pi, then Pi is true. This is because the Pi form a partition, and so a rational agent will be certain of at most one Pi. (If she were certain of more than one Pi, then she would be certain of two incompatible propositions). We also know that she will be certain of at least one Pi, since at least one Pi will be true, and we already established that if Pi is true she will be certain that it is (since she will have conditionalized on it). It follows that she will be certain of exactly one Pi: the true one. Thus, for any Pi, the agent will be certain that Pi, if and only if Pi is true. In other words: If RATACC is true, then the propositions whose truth determines what credence function it is rational for an agent to adopt are propositions that a rational agent is luminously infallible about – that is, they are propositions that she will be certain of if and only if they are true. We are now in a better position to recognize the awkwardness that arises in the Greaves and Wallace framework – an awkwardness that, I believe, reflects a tension in our thinking about these issues more generally. In defining an update procedure, Greaves and Wallace committed themselves to the view that which credence function it is rational for an agent to adopt depends on which proposition the agent learns. In other words, for Greaves and Wallace, the Pi – those propositions whose truth determines which credence function it is rational for an agent to adopt – are the L(Xi): the propositions describing which proposition an agent learns. While this seems like a perfectly plausible choice for one's Pi, it would not be plausible to suppose that the credence function that it is rational for an agent to adopt depends on whether, for example, it's raining in Singapore, regardless of what evidence the agent has to that effect. Thus, propositions about the weather conditions in Singapore are not a plausible choice of Pi. But here's the problem: Intuitively, we think that propositions about the weather in Singapore are propositions we might learn, and we all grew up liking the idea that conditionalizing on what we learn is rational. But what follows from SD-GENERALIZED CONDMAX and RATACC is that whichever propositions are such that their truth determines which credence function is rational are the propositions that a rational agent will conditionalize on. So a RATACC-er can't think that which of the L(Xi) is true, determines which credence function is rational, and think that the propositions that the agent will conditionalize on are propositions about the weather, unless she also thinks that the propositions about the weather are equivalent to the propositions in L(X). This is why, to get the Greaves and Wallace result – that conditionalizing on the content of what one learns maximizes expected accuracy – we must impose such severe restrictions on the possible contents of learning. For whatever these contents are, they must be equivalent from our perspective to the proposition that we learn them. 6. Conclusion I have argued that conditionalization is not the update procedure that, in general, maximizes expected accuracy. The update procedure that maximizes expected accuracy is conditionalization*: conditionalizing on the proposition that one learned P when P is the strongest proposition one exogenously learned. Conditionalizing on P, it turns out, only maximizes expected accuracy in cases in which the agent is antecedently certain that, for all P she might learn, if P is true she will learn it, and if she learns P, it is true. If the rational update procedures are those that maximize expected accuracy (that is, if RATACC is true), the fact that conditionalization* maximizes expected accuracy entails that conditionalization* is rational, and if conditionalization* is rational, then one is rationally required to be certain that one learned P whenever it is true that one learned P. These results are instances of a yet deeper phenomenon. Anyone who accepts RATACC is committed to the existence of a class of propositions that rational agents will be luminously infallible about: a class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true. The results in this paper can thus be summarized as follows: It follows from RATACC that: (1) If which credence function it is rational to adopt is determined by which proposition one learns, then conditionalizing on the proposition that one learned Xi, when Xi is the proposition learned, is the rational way of revising one's credences. The class of propositions L(Xi) will be the class of propositions that a rational agent is luminously infallible about. (2) If a rational agent regards any proposition Xi that she might learn as equivalent to L(Xi), the claim that she learned it, then the rational update procedure (conditionalizing on L(Xi)) will amount to the same thing as conditionalizing on Xi. In this case, the class of propositions one might learn (the Xi) are also propositions that a rational agent is luminously infallible about. (3) If which credence function it is rational to adopt is determined by some other feature of an agent's situation, such that, for some partition P, which credence function it is rational for an agent to adopt depends on which member of P is true, then a rational agent will conditionalize on Pi (a member of P) whenever Pi is true. The propositions Pi ∈ P will be the propositions that a rational agent is luminously infallible about. Committed Rat-Accers might take these results as favoring a kind of foundationalist epistemology on which there is some privileged class of propositions that rational agents will be certain of if and only if they are true. Adamant deniers of such an epistemology might take these arguments as a reason to abandon the idea that the rational update procedures are those that maximize expected accuracy. But however we proceed, it is important to be aware of the extent to which the thought that rationality involves maximizing expected accuracy and such claims as LUMINOUS INFALLIBILITY are intertwined. They will, I believe, stand or fall together.24 References Arnold, A. (2013). 'Some Evidence is False', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (1): 165-72 Bronfman, A. (2014). 'Conditionalization and not Knowing that one Knows', Erkenntnis 79(4): 871-92 Caie, M. (2013). 'Rational Probabilistic Incoherence', Philosophical Review 122(4): 527-75 Carr, J. (ms.). 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Open 24 I am grateful to audiences at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Rutgers University, the University of Bristol's epistemic utility theory project, and The University of Texas at Austin for extremely helpful feedback on this paper. Special thanks to Branden Fitelson, Joshua Dever, Sinan Dogramaci, Brian Knab, Maria Lasonen Aarnio, David Sosa and especially Susanna Rinard for helpful discussion and for reading and commenting on earlier drafts. Thanks also to the anonymous referees at Mind for helpful comments and suggestions. Some of the work for this paper was conducted at Oxford University and supported by a grant to the New Insights and Directions for Religious Epistemology project, funded the John Templeton foundation. Court Hutchison, K. (1999). 'What are Conditional Probabilities Conditional Upon?', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50: 665-95 Jeffrey, R. (1992). Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge University Press Joyce, J. (2009). "Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief" in F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.). Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library. 263-297 Konek, J. and Levinstein, B. (forthcoming). 'The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory', Mind Miller, B. (forthcoming). 'How to Be a Bayesian Dogmatist', Australasian Journal of Philosophy Moss, S. (2011). 'Scoring Rules and Epistemic Compromise', Mind 120(480):1053 -69 Pettigrew, R. (2016). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University Press Rizzierie, A. (2011). 'Evidence does Not Equal Knowledge', Philosophical Studies 153(2): 235-242 Schoenfield, M. (forthcoming). 'Bridging Rationality and Accuracy', The Journal of Philosophy Teller, P. (1976). 'Conditionalization, observation, and change of preference' in Harper, W. and Hooker, C.A. (eds.). Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science. D. Reidel van Fraassen, B. (1989). Laws and Symmetry. 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Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions* Shen-yi Liao Paci c Philosophical Quarterly (2013)† Abstract Narrative representations can change our moral actions and thoughts, for better or for worse. In this paper, I develop a theory of ctions' capacity for moral education and moral corruption that is fully sensitive to the diversity of ctions. Speci cally, I argue that the way a ction in uences our moral actions and thoughts importantly depends on its genre. is theory promises new insights into practical ethical debates over pornography and media violence. e way we think and act in the domain of morality is constantly undergoing changes. Sometimes changes in ourmoral actions and thoughts are shaped by the products of solitary intellectual contemplation, but far more oen these changes are induced by external sources. is paper is about ctions' capacity for moral persuasion-the power of narratives to change the way we act and think with respect to moral matters, for better or for worse. Since Aristotle's times, philosophers have written much about the role of ctions in moral persuasion. Most contemporary theorists-Booth (1988), Carroll (2002), Currie (1995), Depaul (1988), Jacobson (1996), Kieran (1996), Murdoch (1970), Nussbaum (1990), Robinson (2005), to name just a few-focus on the use of ctions in moral education. And some of them-such as Currie (1995)-are equally aware of ctions' power for moral corruption. *For helpful criticisms and suggestions, I thank Sarah Buss, Jonathan Gilmore, Daniel Jacobson, Lina Jansson, Ian McCready-Flora, Alex Plakias, Sara Protasi, Nils-Hennes Stear, Dustin Tucker, Kendall Walton, members of the Aesthetics Discussion Group at the University of Michigan, the audience at Carleton College, and an anonymous referee. †PV. For citation and reference, please see the de nitive and nal version in Paci c Philosophical Quarterly 94(2), pp. 269–289. doi: 10.1111/papq.12000. 2 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions Despite the amount of attention devoted to the topic, I argue, philosophers have been insufficiently sensitive to the diversity of ctions in theorizing about ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. Following Walton (1990), ctions are simply representations that prompt imaginings. is broad conception of ction is indifferent to a work's medium: it includes poems, plays, lms, novels, comic books, and video games. It is[end of p. 269] also indifferent to a work's aesthetic worth: it includes both the classic and the kitsch. Finally, as Friend (2008, 2011, 2012) clari es, it includes both nonctive works, such as counterfactual histories, and ctive works, such as historical ctions. On this broad conception, ctions turn out to be a rather heterogenous bunch. However, discussions of ctions tend to take realism-the kind of ctions that are morally and psychologically realistic-as the paradigm. As James Harold notes, Philosophical discussion has therefore focused primarily on [the modern realistic novel]. In fact, it is difficult to nd any sustained discussion of novels outside of this tradition (broadly conceived) in the entire philosophical literature (Harold 2007, 145) Unfortunately, the discourse on ctions' capacity for moral persuasion is no exception. In the context of this discourse, taking realism as the paradigm is problematic because different kinds of ctions can have differentmodes of persuasion: they in uence our moral thoughts and actions in distinct ways. us, an account of how the realistic novel e Golden Bowl functions in moral education is unlikely to help us make sense of how the satirical novel Catch-22 functions in moral education. e focus on realism makes our theories of ctions' capacity for moral persuasion incomplete. We need a theory that accounts for the diversity of ctions. On the theory I develop in this paper, a ction's mode of persuasion importantly depends on the genre it is appropriately classi ed in. Here is a roadmap for what lies ahead. §1 introduces the phenomenon under investigation: how ctions function in moral persuasion. §2 highlights a frequently overlooked aspect of this phenomenon, the diversity of ctions, through an examination of non-realist ctions. §3 develops a theory of ctions' capacity for moral persuasion that accounts for the diversity of ctions. §4 outlines broader implications for cognate elds. 1 Fictions in Moral Persuasion To get a grasp on ctions' role in moral persuasion, it is easiest to start with the case that philosophers have primarily focused on: the mode of persuasion found in realist ctions. Roughly, on the realist mode of persuasion, a ction is responsible for getting us to believe a moral (or immoral) outlook when it is responsible for getting us to imagine a similar moral (or immoral) outlook. In this section, I explain the concepts necessary for characterizing the realist mode of persuasion. First, I differentiate the real-world perspective that a ction gets us to believe and themake-believe perspective that a ction gets us to imagine. Second, I clarify the notion of being responsible for.[end of p. 270] Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 3 1.1 Real-World and Make-Believe Perspectives Our task here is to draw a theoretical distinction between the moral outlook that a ction gets us to imagine and the moral outlook that a ction gets us to believe as a result of our imaginative engagement. Before starting on this task, it makes sense to ask whywe sometimes fail tomake this intuitive distinction. My answer is that the ordinary language used in the ethical criticism of art leads us astray. When we criticize a ction for its "moral aws", we do not always make the target of our criticism clear. As Jacobson (1997) and Mullin (2004) point out, there are at least two kinds of criticism that we could be making. On the one hand, we might be criticizing a ction for being morally troubling, for asking us to imagine an immoral outlook. On the other hand, we might be criticizing a ction for being morally dangerous, for in uencing us to come to believe or accept as true an immoral outlook. Ordinary uses of the term "moral aw" encompass both moral troublingness and moral dangerousness. us, ordinary language blinds us to the distinction between the targets of these two kinds of ethical criticism. In the same spirit, Hanson (1998) warns against confusing the outlook that a ction represents and the outlook that it recommends, andGiovannelli (2007) speci cally criticizes Noël Carroll for not carefully distinguishing these two kinds of ethical criticism. e fact that numerous theorists continue to emphasize this distinction, between the moral outlook that we imagine and the moral outlook that we come to believe or accept as true, underscores how easy it is to confuse them. Perhaps it will be easier for us to remember this distinction if the two targets have simpler names. Call the moral outlooks that various ctions ask us to imagine makebelieve perspectives. Call the moral outlooks that we in fact have, and the moral outlooks that ctions in uence us to believe or accept as true, real-world perspectives. (at these perspectives have to do with morality is hereaer implicit.) To truly capture what we mean by "moral outlook", one more re nement is necessary: the notions of make-believe and real-world perspectives must be broadened beyond, respectively, imaginings and beliefs. Moral outlooks in uence the judgments we make and the actions that we take. Beliefs are undoubtedly important. Still, personal experiences and psychological research give us ample reason to think that our judgments and actions do not always cohere with our professed beliefs.1 In thinking about the psychological in uences on how we judge and how we act, we must also consider other components of the mind, such as desires, emotions, and dispositions. In general, our real-world perspectives include non-cognitive morally-relevant attitudes in addition to beliefs.2 Similarly, the moral outlooks that we adopt during imaginative engagements with ctions are more than just collections of propositional imaginings. Consider the fa- [end of p. 271] miliar example of Triumph of the Will, which asks us to adopt a moral outlook that glori es Nazism. e lm does not mandate us to only propositionally imagine certain 1See Gendler (2008a) and Gendler (2008b) for philosophical discussions of, and references to, the relevant empirical studies. 2Indeed, if expressivists are right, then our moral perspectives consist entirely of non-cognitive attitudes. I thank an anonymous referee for noting this complication. 4 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions moral claims, such as that Nazism is morally praiseworthy. e lm mandates us to also imaginatively adopt non-cognitive attitudes that comport with the relevant propositional imaginings, such as positive affective responses toward Nazism. In general, make-believe perspectives include non-cognitive morally-relevant attitudes in addition to imaginings.3 Moreover, make-believe perspectives can include both the moral worldview of the ctional world and the moral outlooks adopted by characters whom the ction depicts sympathetically.4 1.2 What a Fiction is Responsible For e topic of moral persuasion is neither straightforwardly causal nor straightforwardly normative. On a rough characterization of ctions' role in moral persuasion, a ction is responsible for what a normal audience would come to believe and come to imagine as a result of imaginatively engaging with the ction. What morally educative or corruptive effects that ctions can be said to be responsible for includes both a causal element, concerning imaginative engagement's in uence on the audience, and an evaluative element, concerning what is normal-speci cally what counts as a normal audience. We can get a grasp on the (admittedly elusive) notion of being responsible for through a brief thought experiment. Suppose that there is a ction that is, content-wise, just like the Harry Potter books. is ction has only one reader. As a matter of fact, this ction in uences the reader to come to have strong negative emotions toward boys with scars on their foreheads and accompanying desires to murder them. e real-world perspective that this ction actually gets the reader to have is, safe to say, rather immoral. Yet, it seems unfair to call this ction morally corruptive. Intuitively, the reader has misunderstood the ction in important respects. A normal audience would not respond to this ction in the same way. In assigning moral blame for the immoral real-world perspective that actually results from imaginative engagement, we place the blame squarely on the eccentricity of the reader and not on the content of the ction. In thinking about the morally educative or corruptive effects of a ction, what matters are not the effects it actually has, but the effects that it is responsible for-in just the elusive sense that we are pursuing. A ction is only responsible for the effects that it would have on a normal audience.5 Normality, in the sense I want to endorse, 3It is debatable whether we need to posit imaginative analogues of non-cognitive attitudes in order to explain certain phenomena peculiar to ctions. Walton (1978) argues for imaginative analogues of emotions. Currie and Ravenscro (2002) and Doggett and Egan (2007, 2011) argue for an imaginative analogue of desire. My own view is that we do not need to posit distinctive non-cognitive attitudes to account for the relevant phenomena, but this paper is officially neutral on these debates. What is important is that the desires, emotions, and dispositions-or their imaginative analogues-that we have in response to ctions could have different warrant conditions, or conditions about when they are tting. 4ere is a complication: many ctions present con icting make-believe perspectives. To properly assess the moral effect of a ction, we must assess the relative contributions of all the various make-believe perspectives that a ction presents. 5ere is a complication: some ctions, such as pedophilia fantasies, target audiences that we might antecedently consider psychologically abnormal. To properly assess the moral effect of such ctions, the notion of normality needs to be relativized accordingly. Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 5 is essentially evaluative.6 One standard of correctness that informs our evaluation is whether the audience has correctly understood the work. In other words, normality is [end of p. 272] not synonymous with or reducible to statistical typicality. In the thought experiment above, the statistically typical effect-by stipulation-just is the effect on the reader's real-world perspective. Since we do not think that the effect on the reader is the normal one, the relevant sense of normality must differ from statistical typicality. As a practical matter, wemight use statistical typicality as an imperfect proxy for evaluative normality, but we must also recognize the theoretical distinction between the two. With the central concepts clari ed, I can now sketch a picture of ctions' role in moral persuasion, focusing on the realist mode of persuasion. A ction is responsible for getting us to really adopt a moral (or immoral) real-world perspective when it is responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt a moral (or immoral) make-believe perspective. e exact mechanisms remain controversial.7 But what is incontrovertible is that there exists a relationship between what a ction gets us to imagine and what a ction gets us to think about reality. Let us turn our attention to the nuances of that relationship. 2 e Diversity of Fictions e realist mode of persuasion is a ne starting point for getting a grasp on ctions' role in moral persuasion. However, philosophers' typical focus on realism is dangerous because it tempts us to carelessly slide from this starting point to a problematic theory of ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. On this theory, persuasion invariantism, all ctions function in moral persuasion in the same way: they are are responsible for getting us to really adopt a moral (or immoral) real-world perspective when they are responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt a similar moral (or immoral) makebelieve perspective. In other words, the realistmode of persuasion applies to all ctions. Showing where persuasion invariantism goes wrong exposes the dangers of taking realism as the paradigm in theorizing about ctions' role in moral persuasion. In this section, I argue that once we step outside of the comfortable con nes of realism, persuasion invariantismbegins to look implausible. e problem is the diversity of ctions: speci cally, different ctions have different modes of persuasion. As theorists, wewant to furnish a general account of how ctionsmorally educate and corrupt. To do 6An example from Lance and Little (2004) can help us understand this essentially evaluative sense of normality. A normal soccer game, we say, is played between two teams of 11 players. We could say this while acknowledging that many variants-such as "little league" soccer that is played by two teams of 20 players-exist, and that these variants statistically predominate. What makes 11-on-11 soccer normal, then, cannot be statistical typicality. Rather, 11-on-11 soccer is normal because we understand the variants by referring to and recognizing deviations from it. 7For example, Currie (1995) says that ctions get us to have certain values through the secondary imaginings they prescribe, Jacobson (1996) says that ctions give defeasible warrant for what would be tting to feel through the feelings they prescribe, and Kieran (1996) says that ctions grant us appropriate imaginative understandings to be deployed in moral assessments. Notice that each of these proposals contains a normative element, which is captured by the notion of being responsible for. 6 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions so, we must attend to all ctions and examine the ways in which they morally persuade. (Or, if they do not morally persuade, we must examine why this is so.) First, I consider the satirical novel Catch-22 and multiple interpretations of how it functions in moral persuasion.8 All the interpretations show that satires do not have a mode of persuasion that is the same as realist ctions'. Second, I consider the horror[end of p. 273] comedy lm Evil Dead 2 to further illustrate the diversity in modes of persuasion and to respond to an empirical objection to positing non-realist modes of persuasion. 2.1 Satires: the Case of Catch-22 Catch-22 persuades readers to question and challenge themoral absurdities that are associatedwithwars, militaries, and bureaucracies. Whatmakes it an interesting case in theorizing about ctions' capacity for moral persuasion is that it morally educates in a way that is distinct from theway that realist ctions do. Onmy preferred interpretation, Catch-22 is responsible for getting readers to really adopt amoral real-world perspective because it is responsible for getting readers to imaginatively adopt an immoral makebelieve perspective. Let me spell out this interpretation in more detail. e ctional world of Catch-22 is importantly unlike ours with respect to morality. As Harold notes in his discussion of the novel: First, there are cases ... where the narrator baldly claims that something that is clearly immoral was in fact justi ed: "Clevingerwas guilty, of course, or he would not have been accused, and since the only way to prove it was to nd him guilty, it was their patriotic duty to do so." Second, sometimes characters advocate horrifying moral views, which go unchallenged by the other characters. In these cases the implication is that in the world of the novel, these ideas are not reprehensible. (Harold 2007, 149–150) When engaging with this ction, we readers are prescribed to imaginatively adopt a make-believe perspective that treats themorally absurd as normal and sensible. Perhaps we imaginatively adopt this perspective in order to be immersed in this morally odd ctional world. Perhaps we imaginatively adopt this perspective in order to empathize with the morally odd characters who have similar views. What matters is that, at some point in reading the novel, we imaginatively adopt an immoral make-believe perspective as the ction prescribes us to do. Despite being responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt a make-believe perspective that treats the morally absurd as normal and sensible, Catch-22 is not responsible for getting us to really adopt a real-world perspective that treats themorally absurd as normal and sensible. In fact, it does the opposite. It persuades us to really adopt a real-world perspective that questions and challenges the moral absurdities that are associated with real wars, militaries, and bureaucracies. Catch-22 thus constitutes a counterexample to persuasion invariantism. Persuasion invariantism would tell us that 8is section owes a great deal of intellectual debt to Harold (2007), which, in addition to providing a careful case study of Catch-22, emphasizes the importance of non-realist ctions for theorizing about ctions in general. Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 7 Catch-22 is morally corruptive because it is responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt an immoral make-believe perspective. Accepting persuasion invariantism would therefore lead us to seriously misunderstand Catch-22's moral achievement. [end of p. 274] at is how I interpretCatch-22, at least. Importantly, even ifmy interpretationwere to turn out to be actually incorrect for Catch-22, we could still conceive of an artwork for which my interpretation would be correct.9 e possibility of such an artwork is sufficient for challenging persuasion invariantism. Hence, my foregoing interpretation illustrates one way that a ction can educate us that is distinct from the way that realist ctions do. Since I do not want to stake too much on one particular interpretation of Catch22, I will examine two alternatives next.10 e upshot is that, on these alternative interpretations, Catch-22 still requires us to imaginatively accept norms different from the norms that we really accept. No matter which of these interpretations turns out to be correct in the end, satires such as Catch-22 have a mode of persuasion distinct from that of realist ctions. So persuasion invariantism remains implausible when it comes to satires. Consider Harold's imaginative resistance interpretation. Harold claims that engaging with Catch-22 mandates us to resist imagining the morally outrageous and contradictory claims that the novel makes. Mandating imaginative resistance, he says, is what makes the work aesthetically valuable and successful: In Catch-22, however, imaginative resistance serves to engage the reader more fully with the events and ideas of the work. e book is lled with contradictions, and with morally outrageous propositions, which escalate as the book goes on. Our inability to imagine these propositions contributes to the work's value and success. (Harold 2007, 149) Initially, Harold appears to have a strong case. Imaginative resistance is associated with a jarring phenomenology, and many of the claims in Catch-22 certainly evokes that "what-is-going-on" feeling.11 However, we can see important differences between Catch-22 and paradigmatic imaginative resistance cases. Imaginative resistance-as I understand the phenomenon- 9I thank Jonathan Gilmore for pointing out this dialectical move. 10By no means are these the only other alternative interpretations available. For example, another interpretation may incorporate the notion of an implied author. On this interpretation, Catch-22 is responsible for getting us to question and challenge the moral absurdities that are associated with wars, militaries, and bureaucracies because it is responsible for getting us to imaginatively identify with the implied author, who also questions and challenges the moral absurdities that are associated with wars, militaries, and bureaucracies. Since the notion of an implied author remains controversial in both philosophical aesthetics and literary criticism, adequately presenting and evaluating this interpretation would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, this interpretation remains a radical departure from the realist mode of persuasion. e upshot for this interpretation is thus the same as for the alternative interpretations considered below in text. I thank Sarah Buss for suggesting this interpretation and Daniel Jacobson for further discussion. 11Weatherson (2004) notes that sentences that evoke imaginative resistance tend to generate a striking, jarring reaction. Gendler (2006)'s "pop-out" terminology, as applied to these sentences, suggests a similar phenomenological characterization. 8 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions involves more than just the jarring phenomenology. Readers must also persistently resist imagining and accepting as ctional the claims that the work makes. ere is a nearby phenomenon, hermeneutic recalibration, that shares the phenomenology of imaginative resistance but differs in that readers' resistance is only temporary. It is a common literary technique to evoke hermeneutic recalibration; we frequently see it in, amongst other places, magical realist novels. In cases of hermeneutic recalibration, the jarring phenomenology is employed by the author to prompt readers to reconsider and reinterpret the work. For example, if one were new to magical realism, one might initially nd jarring the claim that a character was literally washed into this world on a great tide of tears. However, aer realizing that magical realist worlds come with their own sets of rules, claims like this cease to be jarring. is example would thus[end of p. 275] be a case of hermeneutic recalibration rather than a case of imaginative resistance. In contrast with paradigmatic imaginative resistance cases, in hermeneutic recalibration cases readers are able to come to a relatively stable reading of the ction on which the initially jarring claims cease to be so. Catch-22 seems to evoke hermeneutic recalibration rather than imaginative resistance.12 We are able to imagine the morally outrageous and contradictory claims once we recognize that the ctional world is importantly unlike ours. What is morally outrageous in our world could be perfectly sensible there. e rules that apply in our world need not apply there. On the relatively stable reading of the work, the morally outrageous and contradictory claims do make sense-not according to the norms that apply in the real world, but according to the norms that apply in the ctional world. Engaging with Catch-22, on this reading, mandates us to not only imagine the propositions asserted, but also to imaginatively adopt some norms that are opposites of the ones that we really hold. Consider now the ironic assertions interpretation.13 On this interpretation, all the moral absurdities and contradictions in Catch-22 are only instances of verbal irony. As is the case with ordinary ironic assertions, the ction asserts absurdities and contradictions only to bring out, to the readers, how ridiculous its subjects-including wars, militaries, and bureaucracies-really are. Does this interpretation entail that audiences need not imaginatively adopt immoral make-believe perspectives while engaging with Catch-22? To answer this question, we must consider the cognition of ordinary ironic assertions. While the matter remains controversial, there are plausible pretense accounts of gurative language in general, and irony in particular.14 In psychology, Clark and Gerrig (1984) argues for a pretense theory of irony. Drawing on Clark and Gerrig's account, Walton provides the following general account of irony: 12Harold could also be using the term "imaginative resistance" to refer to the emotional distance that Catch-22 mandates readers to maintain. As is the case with hermeneutic recalibration, it is a common literary technique to emotionally distance readers where appropriate. More importantly, as is the case with hermeneutic recalibration, emotional distance does not entail the lack of imaginings. I thank Daniel Jacobson for discussion on this point, and for coining the term "hermeneutic recalibration". 13I thank Kendall Walton for suggesting this alternative interpretation. 14Walton (1993) and Egan (2008) defend pretense theories of, respectively, metaphor and idiom. Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 9 To speak ironically is to mimic or mock those one disagrees with, ctionally to assert what they do or might assert. ...One shows what it is like to make certain claims, hoping thereby to demonstrate how absurd or ridiculous it is to do so. (Walton 1990, 222) On Walton's account, ordinary ironic assertions involve mini-games of make-believe. A speaker pretends that some absurd claim φ is not absurd in order to really convey that φ is absurd. In order to understand what is conveyed, a listener imaginatively judges that φ is not absurd in order to really recognize that φ is absurd. e centrality of imaginative perspective-taking to irony recognition is evidenced by psychological research. Individuals with de cits in imagination, such as autistics and schizophrenics, tend to have difficulties with recognizing and comprehending irony.15 erefore, [end of p. 276] recognition of ordinary ironic assertions plausibly requires the use of imagination: to really recognize an absurdity as such, one must imagine as if it were not so. If ironic assertions in ctions function like ordinary ironic assertions, then imaginative perspective-taking is central to understanding them too. Hence, even if the moral absurdities and contradictions in Catch-22 are best characterized as instances of verbal irony, readers are nevertheless required to exercise their imagination-speci cally, they must imaginatively adopt different norms-in order to engage with the ction. In fact, the pretense account of irony shows that persuasion invariantism is fundamentally misguided because it disregards the possibility that we learn about what-it's-like by pretending what-it's-not-like. 2.2 Horror Comedies: the case of Evil Dead 2, and an Empirical Objection Consider another case that further illustrates the diversity in modes of persuasion. Sometimes, despite being responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt an immoral make-believe perspective, a ction is not responsible for getting us to really adopt a similar immoral make-believe perspective. For example, the tting response to a decapitation scene in the horror comedy lm Evil Dead 2 is to laugh rather than be morally outraged. Laughter is the tting response because a decapitation scene in a horror comedy is ctionally worthy of laughter. Of course, Evil Dead 2 does not get us to really think that a decapitation is any more really worthy of laughter than we thought before watching the lm. Despite getting us to imaginatively adopt a makebelieve perspective from which laughing at a decapitation is tting, Evil Dead 2 is not responsible for-contrary to what persuasion invariantism says-getting us to really adopt a real-world perspective from which laughing at a decapitation is tting. Similar 15Happé (1991) documents the difficulties with irony recognition that individuals with Asperger's syndrome encounter. Langdon et al. (2002) surveys the literature on schizophrenia and difficulties with irony recognition. To be precise, these psychologists have attributed difficulties with irony recognition to de cits in meta-representation and theory-of-mind, respectively. However, there is an extensive literature in both philosophy and developmental psychology, as surveyed in Liao and Gendler (2011), on the close ties between imagination, pretense, theory-of-mind, and meta-representation. e differences in details therefore do not threaten the present claim that imaginative perspective-taking is central to irony recognition. 10 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions cases are easy enough to nd once we know where to look: ctions that are morally and psychologically non-realistic. However, the excessive violence in horror comedies also seems to invite an empirical objection for positing non-realistmodes of persuasion.16 On the face of it, the emerging consensus in the empirical literature on violentmedia is that the consumption of violent media in fact in uences people's violent behaviors and attitudes. In philosophy, Hurley (2004) provides a review of this literature. In addition, Hurley draws on the cognitive psychology literature on imitation to argue that violentmedia affect audience's attitudes, desires, and dispositions in largely automatic and unconscious ways. So, the worry is that, even if we do not consciously think Evil Dead 2 morally desensitizes us to realworld decapitations, it in fact does. Of broader signi cance, the empirical literature on violent media appears to support applying the realist mode of persuasion to ctions outside of realism.[end of p. 277] e aw of this objection is the empirical literature that serves as its basis. Researchers of violent media themselves tend to be insensitive to the diversity of ctions. e stimuli used in their research thus tend to be the same kind of ctions on which philosophers have focused in theorizing about ctions' role in moral persuasion: morally and psychologically realistic ctions.17 Consequently, we cannot expect the results that these stimuli generate to be straightforwardly applicable to theorizing about non-realist ctions' role in moral persuasion. In fact, when researchers do take perceived realism into account in their studies, their ndings suggest that horror comedies like Evil Dead 2 are unlikely to be responsible for getting us to really adopt a real-world perspective from which laughing at a decapitation is tting. Even psychologist Rowell Huesmann, who has consistently argued that violentmedia has dangerous real-world effects, acknowledges the importance of recognizing differences in perceived realism: Observational-learning theory suggests that children who identify fairly strongly with an aggressive character or perceive a violent scene as realistic are especially likely to have aggressive ideas primed by the observed violence, to imitate the character, or to acquire a variety of aggressive scripts and schemas. ...Also, realistic portrayals are more likely to increase viewers' aggression than those presented in a more ctionalized or fantastic fashion. (Huesmann and Taylor 2006, 404)18 However, it is important to note that the differences between perceived realism that Huesmann and colleagues highlight are between individuals. So, while these differences suggest that the current empirical literature presents no challenge to positing different modes of persuasion for different kinds of ctions, they do not support positing 16I thank an anonymous referee for advancing this objection. 17Liao and Gendler (2011) press this point further in a related context, the empirical literature on the relationship between transportation (into ctional worlds) and persuasion. 18e basis for these claims is the longitudinal research presented in Huesmann et al. (2003), which provides more details on the role of perceived realism in mediating violent media's in uence on violent behaviors and attitudes. Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 11 different modes of persuasion either. Simply put, there is a need for further research on potential differences in realism between different kinds of ctions by empirical researchers of violent media and related topics. Sensitivity to the diversity of ctions is indispensable to ful lling this need. 3 Persuasion Variantism e implausibility of persuasion invariantism shows that a theory of ctions' capacity for moral persuasion must be sensitive to the diversity of ctions. In this section, I argue that genre is the key: a ction's mode of persuasion importantly depends on its genre. e resulting theory, genre persuasion variantism, is an attractive position because it both captures the variations that exist in the landscape of diverse ctions and preserves the explanatory power necessary for philosophical theorizing. First, I present an alternative development of persuasion variantism. As a foil, it [end of p. 278] shows why genre is useful for theorizing about ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. Second, I give an overviewof genre persuasion variantismbefore developing it in greater detail. ird, as a proof of concept, I show that genre persuasion variantism adequately explains the moral achievement of Catch-22. 3.1 Anti-eoretic Persuasion Variantism Persuasion variantism, as the name indicates, is a broad family of theories that are opposites of persuasion invariantism. It denies that all ctions function in moral persuasion in the same way. And that is all that can be said, according to one possible development of persuasion variantism; anti-theoretic persuasion variantism says that different ctions have different modes of persuasion but there are no principles for capturing these differences. Although we can say true things about particular ctions' capacity for moral persuasion, no true theory exists.19 As theorists, we should nd anti-theoretic persuasion invariantism unsatisfying. In trying to understand ctions' capacity for moral persuasion, we want to understand more than what happens in individual cases. We want to say, for example, that Triumph of theWill and Birth of a Nationmorally corrupt in similar ways, and understand where the similarity lies. We want an explanation of the difference between the ways that realist ctions like e Golden Bowl and satires like Catch-22 morally educate, and not merely acknowledging that there is a difference. Explanatory considerations thus place a presumptive demand of generality on the accounts that we develop. Anti-theoretic persuasion variantism's lack of explanatory power prompts us to search for a better alternative. Such an alternative can be had, I argue, if we bring genre into the picture. (Of course, at the end of the day, it is possible that other considerations will tilt the cost-bene t analysis in favor of anti-theoretic persuasion variantism. My aim is only to motivate the need to consider an alternative, not to make a full comparison.) 19I borrow this characterization of anti-theoretic persuasion variantism from Jacobson (2005)'s characterization of his anti-theoretic position in the ethical criticisms of art debate. is position is also inspired by particularism in ethics. 12 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions 3.2 Genre Persuasion Variantism: An Overview I take a genre to simply be a special grouping of ctions that is recognized by a community as such.20 Walton (1970)'s account of perceptually-distinguishable categories suggests one, but by no means the only, way of lling out this minimalist conception of genre.21 On Walton's account, a ction's appropriate classi cation in a genre depends on factors such as its relevant resemblance to other ctions in that genre, the artist's intentions, critical judgments, and that genre's propensity for aesthetic pleasure. epicture of genre space that falls out is rathermessy.22 ere exist relatively broad genres, such as drama, and relative narrow genres, such as Victorian romance. Some[end of p. 279] ctions may be the only actual exemplar of its genre, as is the case with rst works of new genres.23 Typically, a genre will overlapwith and stand in hierarchical relationships to many other genres. Typically, a ction is appropriately classi ed in multiple genres, someofwhichmay be particularly salient for a given aimor context. All these features of genre space introduce complications for assessing particular ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. But for now, let us set these complications aside to focus on the theoretical role that genre plays in explaining ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. Even though there are a variety of ctions, we have ways of grouping them sensibly that allow us to recognize theoretically-important similarities and differences amongst the diversity. at is what we do when we use terms like "horror comedies", "satires", and "realist ctions". e groupings that these terms pick out allow us to both recognize the diversity of ctions and preserve some theoretical unity. According to genre persuasion variantism: ceteris paribus, a ction's mode of persuasion depends on the genre(s) inwhich it is appropriately classi ed, for a given aimor context. In otherwords, a particular ction's genre offers pro tanto reasons for assessing its mode of persuasion. Next, I develop a version of genre persuasion variantism that takes the realist mode of persuasion andmy interpretation ofCatch-22 as starting points. On this development of genre persuasion variantism, the relationship between the real-world perspective that a ction is responsible for getting us to really adopt and the make-believe perspective that it is responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt partly depends on the genre of the ction. It takes two steps to see how genre can vary the relationship between the make-believe and real-world perspectives that are appropriately associated with a ction. First, we must recognize the symmetry that exists between import, or what we put into imaginative engagements with ctions, and export, or what we take away from imaginative engagements with ctions. Second, we must recognize genre's in uence 20Context plays a role in specifying who the community includes. Which groupings are special for a given community is an empirical matter, and why they are special may require us to look to sociology or literary theory for a non-philosophical explanation. 21In contemporary philosophical aesthetics, Currie (2004) and Laetz and Lopes (2008) suggest other ways of lling out our minimalist conception of genre. 22I thank an anonymous referee for urging me to acknowledge the following complications. 23As an anonymous referee notes, this is a particularly contentious claim, but not without contemporary defenders. Carroll (2000) appears to defend the completeness of genre classi cations-every work belongs to at least one genre-in his extension of Walton's account to lm criticism. In a rather different tradition, Derrida (1980) asserts that "a text cannot belong to no genre, it cannot be without or less a genre. Every text participates in one or several genres, there is no genreless text" (65). Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 13 on import: it partly determines what is warranted to be ctional and what we ought to imagine. I now elaborate on these two steps that connect genre to export. 3.3 e Symmetry between Import and Export e terminology of import and export is introduced in Gendler (2000) to capture two important aspects of our interactions with ctions: what we put in and what we take away. To grasp these notions, we rst consider a realist ction case and focus on propositions that are believed and imagined. As we will see later, however, import and export involve more than just the contents of beliefs and imaginings, and the symmetry between import and export holds for non-realist ctions too. [end of p. 280] Start with import. Fictional worlds are rich entities: the propositions that are true in a ction oen outnumber the propositions that are explicitly expressed. We have rules about which of the non-explicitly-expressed propositions are allowed to be added to a ctional world outright, and which inferences we are allowed to make from what is explicitly expressed.24 ese are the import rules that tell us how to construct rich ctional worlds from the relatively few propositions explicitly expressed by words on a page or images on a screen. As an illustration, we can see import rules at work in our imaginative engagements with Pride and Prejudice. Even though Jane Austen never explicitly states that pride is a vice, we are nevertheless allowed to think so in the ctional world. We are allowed to think so because the ctional worlds of realist ctions are, for the most part, like ours. Since Pride and Prejudice reasonably counts as a realist ction, we can import much of what is true in our world (with some exceptions) into the ctional world, including the fact that pride is a vice.25 Import rules of a realist ction thus warrants us to imagine much of what we believe. Similarity is a symmetric relation.26 If we have good reasons to think that, in a given domain, a proposition is ctional if and only if it is true, then we have good reasons to both judge a proposition to be ctional once we know it is true (import) and judge a proposition to be true once we know that it is ctional (export). So the similarity between the ctional world of Pride and Prejudice and ours tells us more than what we can import; it also tells us what we can export. Speci cally, the export rules of realist ctions warrant us to believe much of what we imagine, at least the relatively general propositions.27 Gendler outlines two ways that export can happen: 24Walton (1990) calls these rules principles of generation and discusses their central role inmake-believe. See also Lewis (1978, 1983) and Currie (1990) for further discussion. 25I do not want to stake too much on this particular example. Although Gendler (2000) calls Pride and Prejudice a realist ction, the novel does contain parts that are melodramatically saccharine as well as parts that satirize societal norms. Perhaps the Henry James novels that Nussbaum (1990) invokes are better examples of the kind of works that I have in mind. 26Note that the symmetry here is epistemic, not metaphysical. Metaphysically, the ctionality of imported propositions depend on their actual truths, but the truth of exported propositions clearly do not depend on their ctionality. I thank Kendall Walton for pressing me to clarify the nature of the symmetry. 27What exactly are we warranted to export? Obviously, we should not export propositions regarding the existence of Elizabeth Bennet andMr. Darcy. As I suggest earlier, plausibly we should export psychological generalizations and broad moral norms. While it is difficult to give any precise answer, a good rule of thumb is that we are not warranted to export the particulars but we arewarranted to export the generalities. 14 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions e rst sort are those which make use of the narrative as clearinghouse: export things from the story that you the storyteller have intentionally and consciously imported, adding them to my stock in the way that I add knowledge gained by testimony. ...e second sort are those which make use of the narrative as factory: I export things from the story whose truth becomes apparent as a result of thinking about the story itself. ese I add to my stock the way I add knowledge gained by modeling. (Gendler 2000, 76–77) Using Pride and Prejudice as clearinghouse, we might come to believe the facts about social norms of the period that we also imagined. Using Pride and Prejudice as factory, we might come to believe that it is unwise to judge people by their rst impressions because we imagined so in response to Elizabeth Bennet's initial assessment of Mr. Darcy. ere is a symmetry between the import and export rules of realist ctions because they are both ultimately grounded in the symmetric relation of similarity that exists between realist ctional worlds and ours. It is worth emphasizing that import and export are about more than the contents of beliefs and imaginings. Hazlett (2009) and Hazlett and Mag Uidhir (2011), for example, adopt Gendler's terminology but narrowly construe import and export only in terms of propositions. However, as Gendler (2006) clari es, import and export also[end of p. 281] apply to other components of the mind: "When we imagine, we draw on our ordinary conceptual repertoire and habits of appraisal, and as the result of imagining, we may nd ourselves with novel insights about, and changed perspectives on, the actual world" (150–151). Conceptual repertoire and habits of appraisal are not reducible to beliefs; they involve our non-cognitive attitudes such as desires, emotions, and dispositions. So, import and export apply to all components of real-world and make-believe perspectives, not just beliefs and imaginings. It is also worth emphasizing that the symmetry between import and export holds for non-realist ctions too. What matters is that there exists some symmetric relation or relations between a ctional world and ours that grounds both import and export. Consider the ctional world of a science ction that is similar to ours with respect to morality but not with respect to physics. e import rules are thus such that we are allowed to add real-world moral norms to the ctional world, but not allowed to add real-world physical laws to the ctional world. Consequently, we are allowed to take away what the ction tells us about moral permissibility, but not allowed to take away what the ctions tells us about physical possibility. In this case, the symmetry between import and export is grounded in the similarity and the dissimilarity between the ctional world and ours. In addition to similarity and dissimilarity, another symmetric relation is opposition. Consider a ctional world that is the opposite of ours with respect to morality. Such a ction might be responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt a make-believe perspective that is the opposite of what we really hold. Since opposition is symmetrical, we are thus to export the opposite of what the ction tells us to make-believe. Indeed, these are plausibly the import and export rules that govern the satirical parts of CatchShen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 15 22. Understanding the symmetry between import and export, and the relations that ground the symmetry, is thus an important step toward understanding how Catch-22 morally educates. More generally, it is also an important step toward understanding how genre in uences export. 3.4 Genre and Import We now consider the other important step: how genre in uences import. e conventions that are associated with a genre constrain which implicit propositions are warranted to be ctional and which inferential patterns are appropriate. In turn, genre conventions inform our expectations about the appropriate ways to approach a ction, such as what we are warranted to imagine. Outside of philosophy, writers, literary theorists, and psychologists have all recognized the signi cance of genre. Writer Henry James claims that our imaginative [end of p. 282] engagements with ctions are informed by our recognitions of genre conventions: "'Kinds' are the very life of literature, and truth and strength come from the complete recognition of them, from abounding to the utmost in their respective senses and sinking deep into their consistency" (James 1899, xvii). Literary theorist Tzvetan Todorov extends James's insight and characterizes genre as having dual functions: "as 'horizons of expectations' for readers and as 'models of writing' for authors" (Todorov 1990, 18). Genre partly determines what is true in a ctional world and what our expectations during imaginative engagements should be. Finally, psychologists have found that genre in uences the way that audiences' engage with ctions and the claims that they accept as ctionally true (Bilandzic and Busselle 2008; Woolley and Cox 2007; Zwaan 1994). e convergence of opinions attests to genre's in uence on our imaginative engagements with ctions. As systematizations of the features common to works in a given genre, genre conventions do not merely catalogue the common features, but say something about the relationships between them. As a simplistic example, a convention of the sciencection genre is that physical laws of the real world need not hold in the ctional world. In one sense, this convention is descriptive: it is in fact typical for works that are appropriately classi ed in sciencection to include violations of real-world physical laws. In another sense, this convention is also normative: being appropriately classi ed in sciencection warrants a work's inclusion of violations of real-world physical laws. Considered in the normative sense, genre conventions constrain the nature of relevant ctional worlds by contributing to the relevant import rules. Genre in uences our responses to ctions because it in uences the extent to which we bring our real-world perspective to bear onmake-believe. e example above shows that there are variations in the extent to which ctions demand us to bring our physical beliefs to bear on make-believe; realist ctions demand us to do so, but science ctions do not. ere are similar variations in the extent to which ctions demand us to bring our moral outlooks to bear on make-believe. For example, the conventions of horror comedies allow ctional worlds to morally deviate from the real world in the same way that the conventions of sciencections allow ctional worlds to nomically deviate from the real world. Consequently, while wemust bring ourmoral outlooks to bear on realist 16 * Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions ctions, we need not do so with horror comedies. 3.5 A Test for Genre Persuasion Variantism: Back to Catch-22 Finally, we can put the previous two points together: genre partly determines the export rules that govern a ction because it partly determines the import rules that govern a ction. As a proof of concept, let us reconsider the case of Catch-22. What[end of p. 283] persuasion invariantism fails to explain is how a ction can have a non-realist mode of persuasion. Genre persuasion variantism can easily explain how. As a ction in the genre of satire, Catch-22 does not ask us to import our moral perspectives into make-believe. Instead, we are to import the opposite: what we really nd morally reprehensible, we are to imaginatively nd it morally unproblematic. Given the symmetry between import and export, we are warranted to export the opposite of what we make-believe. Hence, even though the ction is responsible for getting us to imaginatively adopt an immoral make-believe perspective, the ction is responsible for getting us to come to really adopt a moral real-world perspective. Undoubtedly, even this is a simpli cation of how Catch-22 morally educates. We need not come to really adopt a real-world perspective that is the exact opposite of the make-believe perspective imagined. For some, the novel simply challenges them to examinemore carefully their existing attitudes towardwars, militaries, and bureaucracies. e symmetry between import and export is only an imprecise heuristic, and genre's contribution to import and export rules is only partial. Still, simpli cations have theoretical worth: they illuminate interesting general relationships that hold. Although genre persuasion variantism may only constitute a partial explanation of ctions' role in moral persuasion, it highlights the importance of genre in constructing a complete theory. A promising way to account for the diversity of ctions, I argue, is to recognize that genre gives pro tanto reasons for understanding ctions' capacity for moral persuasion. 4 Broader Implications I have presented a problem for theorizing about ctions' capacity for moral persuasion, the diversity of ctions, and produced a solution to it, genre persuasion variantism. In closing, let me draw attention to two broader implications of the problem and solution this paper develops. Practical ethics. Fictions' capacity for moral persuasion serves as the basis for a multitude of claims in everyday ethical debates. It comes up in campaigns for including "great books"-the classics of Western literature-in primary education curricula. It comes up in criticisms of violent video games' effects on the teenagers that play them. It comes up in criticisms of pornography's negative impact on its consumers andwomen in general. A nuanced theory of ctions' capacity for moral persuasion thus gives us a more informed perspective for engaging in these debates.28 28Liao andProtasi (2013) applies the theoreticalwork in this paper to re neEaton (2007, 2008)'s feminist criticism of inegalitarian pornography. Shen-yi Liao *Moral Persuasion and the Diversity of Fictions * 17 Moral and aesthetic psychology. Besides philosophers, other researchers interested in the real-world impact of narratives should also be sensitive to the diversity of ctions. [end of p. 284] For example, violent media researchers in psychology and communication studies should use stimuli from non-realistic genres in their assessments of violent media's in uence on people's violent behaviors and attitudes. 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In The Possibility of Philosophical Understanding: Reflections on the Thought of Barry Stroud, edited by Jason Bridges, Niko Kolodny & Wai-Hung Wong (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 147-181). Pagination follows the published text. Inside and Outside Language: Stroud's Nonreductionism about Meaning Hannah Ginsborg In the Blue Book, Wittgenstein describes a certain general view of understanding and meaning, namely as mental processes which accompany the signs of our language, and which "give them life." We are tempted, he says, "to think that the action of language consists of two parts: an inorganic part, the handling of signs, and an organic part, which we may call understanding these signs, meaning them, interpreting them, thinking" (Wittgenstein 1958, 3). Wittgenstein thinks that this temptation is to be avoided. In the place of the view he has described, he goes on to suggest an alternative answer to the question of what gives "life" to the otherwise dead signs of language: "if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say it was its use" (1958, 4). The idea that a sign's having meaning is a matter of its being used in a particular kind of way reappears in a famous passage from Philosophical Investigations: "For a large class of cases-though not for all-in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be explained thus: the meaning of a sign is its use in the language" (1953, §43). Wittgenstein's rejection of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes which have to be added to signs to "give them life," and the suggestion in his work of an alternative conception of meaning and understanding which we can label with the formula that "the meaning is the use," have been the focus of a recent series of essays by Barry Stroud.1 Stroud brings out in these essays the pervasiveness of the 1 The essays I have primarily in mind are "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community" (2000), "Meaning, Understanding, and Translation" (2000), "Mind, Meaning, and Practice" (2000) and "Meaning and Understanding" (forthcoming), although I do not discuss the last of these essays here. 148 idea which Wittgenstein aims to undermine, even among philosophers, such as Dummett, Wright, and Kripke, who take themselves to be adopting (or in Kripke's case, interpreting) Wittgenstein's views about language and the mind. With great clarity, and with a simplicity of expression which belies the depth and sophistication of his approach, he both articulates Wittgenstein's challenge to the "disastrous assumption" that thought, meaning, and understanding are "something which accompanies the handling of sounds, marks and other objects" (Stroud 2000, 173), and shows how that challenge undermines a range of more specific misconceptions about meaning. The strategy of the challenge itself can be summarized quite briefly: it consists, Stroud says, "in showing that whatever might be thought to accompany the use of a sound or mark would be nothing better than another 'dead' mark or object or event" (2000, 173). But the misconceptions to be exposed are, in Stroud's words, "deep and compelling" (174), and it is a difficult task to lay out the challenge in a way which makes clear its philosophical force. I believe that Stroud succeeds in accomplishing that difficult task. He shows, to my mind convincingly, the error in a particular, but very widespread, version of the "disastrous assumption," namely that meaning or understanding something by an expression is a matter of being instructed, guided, or justified in the use of that expression. At least to that extent, then, he succeeds in vindicating the idea that the meaning of an expression is not something which underlies the use of an expression, but rather something which the expression has in virtue of how it is used. The doubts I want to articulate in this chapter concern, not Stroud's acceptance of the slogan that "meaning is use," but rather his view of how this "use" is to be understood. Stroud ascribes to Wittgenstein, and endorses, a nonreductionist view of meaning and understanding. While an expression has meaning in virtue of how it is used, that use cannot be characterized except in terms which presuppose the idea of meaning and understanding. The use which is relevant to meaning consists in such things as saying how things are, issuing orders, stating the result of calculations, and so on: that is, it consists in uttering and responding to expressions meaningfully or with understanding. Any explanation of the meaning of terms, then, has, itself, to invoke semantical or intentional notions like meaning and understanding. So there is, in the end, for Stroud, nothing to replace the various misconceived views which aim to account for meaningful use of expressions in terms of guidance by underlying mental states and process. Philosophical reflection can help us clarify the notion of meaning by undermining mistaken attempts to provide a fully general account of meaning, but it cannot offer a substitute for those attempts, since no fully general account is possible: there is no prospect of "explaining the phenomena of meaning and understanding 'from outside them,' as it were, without...supposing that anything means anything or is understood in a certain way to those whose understanding is being accounted for" (viii). I shall argue, in this chapter, for a less pessimistic attitude towards the reductionist project. After a brief exposition of Stroud's view in section 1, I shall go on in sections 2 and 149 3 to examine various considerations which might be thought to motivate his nonreductionism, arguing that none of them is sufficient to rule out traditional reductive approaches. I shall argue in particular that one seeming motivation which he offers rests on an ambiguity in the notion of an explanation "from outside" meaning and understanding. While there is one sense in which the prospects for such an explanation are hopeless, there is another sense, I shall argue, in which the aspiration to explain language "from outside" is reasonable. I shall then try, in section 4, to outline a partially reductive explanation-an explanation "from outside" meaning but not "from outside" all consciousness of normativity-which satisfies this reasonable aspiration while still doing justice to the intuitions which tell against traditionally naturalistic approaches to meaning. And I shall end in section 5 by pointing out an affinity between the central idea of this explanation and an idea developed by Stroud himself in his earlier work on Wittgenstein. I. Stroud articulates his nonreductionist conception of meaning in a number of different contexts. I shall focus on one in particular, namely his criticism, most fully developed in "Mind, Meaning, and Practice" (2000; first published 1996), of Kripke's "skeptical paradox" about rules and meaning. As is by now familiar, Kripke develops his skeptical view of meaning by proposing the skeptical hypothesis that, in all a person's previous uses of "plus," he meant not addition, but the nonstandard function quus or quaddition, defined so that that n quus m is equal to the sum of n and m for all n and m less than 57 (which Kripke assumes to be larger than any numbers that the person has added so far), and to 5 for all other n and m. Kripke uses this hypothesis to argue that "given all the applications of the word that a person has made or responded to in the past, and everything there is or could be 'in his mind,' it is still not determined what he means by the word 'plus'; it is compatible with all those facts that he means and understands by it something different from plus" (2000, 179-180). And Kripke's generalization of the argument has, as Stroud puts it, "the unsettling consequence that there is no such fact as an expression's meaning one thing rather than another" (180). According to Stroud, though, this skeptical conclusion relies on an assumption about meaning which Wittgenstein rightly rejects: that for someone to mean something by an expression, or for the expression to have meaning in a community, there must be something which guides or justifies the individual or the community in the use of the expression. Kripke describes the [skeptical] problem as that of finding a fact that constitutes a person's meaning or understanding an expression in one particular way rather than another, and he holds that any such fact must somehow "contain" within it some 150 "directions" or "instructions" to the person to say or do things in a certain way in virtue of meaning or understanding the expression in the way he does. (180)2 Wittgenstein would agree, according to Stroud, that there can be no such fact. Any item, in the mind or elsewhere, which guided or instructed or directed its possessor in the use of an expression would in turn have to be an item with a meaning which its possessor would have to grasp, so the question of meaning or understanding would arise again for that item. But Wittgenstein would deny that the fact of an expression's meaning something requires that the use of the expression be guided. Rather, for Wittgenstein and for Stroud, "what an expression means is to be found in its use, not in any fact or item which is supposed to give it or specify its meaning" (181). It is the use of the expression, and not some inner state or item lying behind, or more specifically guiding, that use, which gives it its "life" or meaning . How are we to understand the "use" which gives meaning to an expression?3 In a discussion of Wittgenstein which prepares the ground for his criticism of Kripke, Stroud suggests that Wittgenstein understands it as "the distinctive role of an expression in all those human activities in which it is or might be employed" (175). According to Stroud, the idea that "meaning is use" is illustrated by examples like that of the "complete primitive language" described in §2 of Philosophical Investigations, in which a builder issues various commands-"Slab," "Pillar," "Block," and "Beam"-and his assistant responds to them by bringing corresponding building-stones. (Following Stroud, I shall refer to this as "language-game §2.") The "whole use" of the expressions in that language "lies open to view: we can see exactly what role the utterance of each of them plays in the lives of those people" (176). The sounds produced and responded to in the primitive language have "life" or meaning because they have a "use or role in human activities": for example the builder can produce the sound corresponding to the word "slab" in order to get the particular kind of stone he needs for building at that point. The builder and his assistant have mastered their language because they have mastered "the technique of acting and responding linguistically in appropriate ways...and so being capable of the sorts of activities and reactions that language makes possible" (176). Their knowledge of the language is a part of their knowledge of how to carry on the work of building: the builder "knows how to get the building-stones he needs" (176), and the implication is that this is a way of characterizing what he knows in knowing the meanings of his terms. 2 As can be seen from the passages quoted so far, Stroud often writes of someone's meaning something by an expression as distinct from his or her understanding something by it, and, relatedly, of how someone uses an expression as distinct from how he or she responds to it. I think it is important not to lose sight of the distinctions registered by this usage, so I will sometimes follow Stroud in this, but in the interest of brevity I will often follow common practice in taking someone's "meaning" something by an expression to include her understanding something by it, and her "use" of the expression to include her responses to it. 3 The following account of Stroud's answer has been influenced by helpful discussions with Michael Rieppel. 151 Stroud uses the example of the builder and his assistant to bring out the point that there must be a "regularity" in the use of the expressions of the language, or that the use of the signs must be part of a "general practice." Someone who stands near a partly built building and shouts out "Slab!" is not thereby giving an order if there has been no practice of sounds' having been uttered and responded to for certain purposes in certain regular ways in the past. Someone who carries a stone to a building site shortly after hearing such a shout has not thereby understood it to have a particular meaning if there is no general practice of responding to it or to other sounds in that way. The sound "Slab!" would simply have no "life" or use in those circumstances. (178) Stroud motivates this demand by pointing out that "there must be such a thing as the correct way of using or responding to a sound or mark that has meaning or use" (177), something which he takes to require in turn that "there be...some regularities or general practices to which an individual speaker's performance can conform or fail to conform" (177). Stroud allows that we can put this by saying that someone who "utters or responds to an utterance correctly is following a rule for the use of that utterance" (177). But that should not be taken to imply that there is anything which guides or instructs the person in the use of the utterance. It means only that "the person utters or responds to the expression in the right way" (177) where that in turn amounts to using it in conformity with the general regularity or practice prevailing among the users of the language. The participants in language-game §2 are following the rule insofar as they conform to the practice of saying "Slab" where a slab is needed and bringing a slab when the expression "Slab" is heard. That this "rulefollowing" behavior does not require any inner item which guides the behavior is, Stroud says, shown by Wittgenstein's account of how such a language might be taught, namely by training the language-users to produce and respond to the sounds of the language appropriately. There is no need, in this training, to set up a connection between the sounds of the language and any inner items in the "minds" of the pupils. "The teaching is successful if the pupil learns to carry the right kinds of stones to a builder, or to order the stones he needs if he is a builder. That is the only 'connection' the teaching has to establish, since whoever receives the teaching and uses and responds to those sounds in the right ways understands them and knows what they mean" (178). It might seem from this account that it is sufficient for sounds and marks' being meaningful, and more generally for there being rules governing their use, that they be produced and responded to in regular and predictable ways. So the account might seem to leave open that if two automata were programmed to produce the expressions of languagegame §2 under appropriate circumstances, with one automaton capable of detecting locations calling for a slab and programmed to respond to them by making the sound "Slab," and the other capable of discriminating and manipulating different shapes of building-stone, and programmed to respond to the sound "Slab" by bringing a slab to the 152 first automaton, then "Slab" would have "life" or meaning just as it has in the languagegame with humans.4 Similarly, it might seem to allow for the possibility of ascribing meaning to sounds and marks that are regularly produced by nonhuman animals, for example where birds regularly emit cries when predators are approaching, and other birds respond to those cries by flying away. By the same token, it might seem to amount to a reductionist account of meaning for human language, one on which the meaningfulness of the sounds and marks we produce is accounted for in terms of regularities in our production of them, where those regularities are characterized in a way which does not presuppose treating the sounds and marks as already meaningful. Stroud does not consider cases of animal communication, and he touches only fleetingly (179) on the possibility that the speakers of language-game §2 could be automata. But he gives every indication that he takes the meaningful use of language to be specific to humans, and in the introduction to Meaning, Understanding, and Practice he is quite explicit about his attitude to the possibility of reducing the phenomena of meaning and understanding to nonintentional phenomena: "the prospects of [such a reduction] seem to him] to be hopeless" (viii). Stroud's commitment to nonreductionism emerges, in the essay we have been considering, from his criticism of Kripke's skeptical view of meaning. Kripke is right, he thinks, to take nonintentional facts about the past history of the use of an expression to be insufficient to determine what the individual or community means by the expression. The introduction of quus "helps bring...out" that "there are a great many facts about the past behaviour of a community or an individual in connection with a particular expression which do not together imply- and so cannot be taken to be equivalent to-the fact that that expression means what it does" (182). But that does not mean that there are no facts which imply or are equivalent to the fact of an expression's meaning what it does. For example, "it is a contingent matter of fact...whether a community or individual is following a particular set of rules or not," and the fact that they are following a particular set of rules does imply that they use their expressions with a specific meaning: "in identifying the rules or practices they are following, we thereby specify...what a proper understanding of the expressions in question would be" (183). So far this is compatible with the possibility that a community's following a particular set of rules is a nonintentional fact about it, amounting to the fact that its members produce and respond to certain sounds and marks in certain regular ways. But Stroud goes on to exclude that possibility. "What an expression or a speaker means, or what rule for an expression an individual or a group of speakers is following, or what is a correct application of or response to an expression, are not equivalent or reducible to facts which are not themselves specified in similarly intentional or semantical or normative terms" (184). While there is nothing over and above an expression's meaning what it does than its being 4 In fact Warren Goldfarb argues (following a suggestion he credits to Stanley Cavell) that Wittgenstein intends Philosophical Investigations §2 to leave open whether the builders are human beings or something more like automata (see Goldfarb 1983). 153 used in a particular way, that use has to be described in intentional terms: "a description in non-intentional terms of what happens whenever certain sounds are uttered or certain marks are made would not say what human beings are doing with those sounds or marks. It would leave the sounds and marks 'dead' or without 'life' or meaning" (184). Now to deny that semantic facts are reducible to nonintentional facts is not to deny that they are reducible to any other facts at all. For example, we might suppose, with Grice, that we can make sense of meaning in terms of states like belief and intention, conceived of as prior to meaning but as still presupposing intentionality. Is Stroud committed to an austere nonreductionism on which the use which gives "life" or meaning to an expression can be characterized only in terms which presuppose meaning? Or would he allow a less austere and partly reductionist approach on which we could account for meaning in terms of a more basic idea of goal-directed human activity? We saw earlier that Stroud introduces Wittgenstein's view of the use that is relevant to meaning by saying that it is "the distinctive role of an expression in all those human activities in which it is or might be employed" (175), and that he takes the sounds produced and responded to in language-game §2 to have "life" or meaning in virtue of their "use or role in human activities" (176). The obvious candidate for such an "activity" in the case of language-game §2 would appear to be building, where this is thought of as including subordinate activities such as carrying building-stones to the place where they are needed, or bringing it about that they are carried there. It would seem then, that "Slab" has the "life" or meaning that it does because it is used by the builder to get slabs: the builder who knows how to use the expressions of the language knows, according to Stroud, "how to get the building-stones he needs" (2000, 176). This is at least somewhat indicative of the less austere of the two approaches. For it suggests on the face of it that the activities relevant to meaning are not specifically linguistic or communicative: that the expressions of a language get their "life" or meaning from their role in such activities as getting slabs, or calculating the sum, as opposed to ordering slabs, or saying what the sum is. And this opens up the prospect of an account which is at least partially reductive. If we can make sense of the builder and his assistant as engaging purposefully in their building project prior to conceiving of them as meaning or understanding anything by the sounds which are produced as part of their activity, then we can perhaps go on to make sense of the meaning of the sounds in terms of the use which they have in that activity. But Stroud describes the relevant activities in ways which suggest that he has in mind the more austere of the two approaches. He says that the technique one masters when one masters a language is that of "acting and responding linguistically in appropriate ways" (176): the technique the builder has mastered in learning to use expressions like "Slab" is that of "ordering the building-stones he needs" (176-177), and in the case of our expression "plus" the technique is that of "asking for, giving, and in other ways talking about the sum or the addition function in English" (179). This suggests that what gives the expressions their "life" or meaning is in the first instance that we use them to say things, where "saying" includes such acts as asserting, commanding, requesting, and so forth. Even 154 though these activities of saying things in turn have a role to play in activities that are not specifically linguistic, like the activity of cooperative building, we cannot appeal to those nonlinguistic activities as part of a reductive explanation of the meaning of the expressions: rather we have to see the expressions as having meaning in virtue of being used meaningfully. Stroud brings out the austerity of this view in the introduction to Meaning, Understanding, and Practice, where he talks about the possibility of accounting for an individual's meaning something by a term by appealing to his or her conformity to community practice. Someone's meaning or understanding something by a certain word on a certain occasion could...perhaps be explained as the person's engaging in a certain practice or conforming to the way that word is used....But that would account for the person's meaning or understanding that word in a certain particular way only if the description of the general practice says or implies what that word is used to mean in the community in question. (ix) Stroud goes on to give an example of such a description for the case of "red": we describe the use of that term by saying that "in the community the word is used to mean red or to say of things that they are red" (ix). We cannot hope to explain a person's meaning red by "red" on some occasion by saying that she conforms to the practice of a community in which "red" is used, say, to get people to bring red things. All we can say is that she conforms to the practice of a community in which "red" is used to mean red. And since this characterization already draws on the notion of a person's meaning red by "red," this rules out any possibility of a fully general explanation of what it is to mean red by "red." 2. I have offered only a bare outline of Stroud's rich and nuanced discussion of the phenomena of meaning and understanding. But I think it is enough to frame the question I want to raise about Stroud's view: what justifies or motivates his commitment to a nonreductionist account of the use relevant to meaning? In the essay we have been discussing, he suggests that the requirement of nonreductionism emerges as one of the morals of Kripke's skeptical argument. Kripke, he says, is right to understand the skeptical hypothesis as showing that there are no facts of meaning which consist in a person's being guided in her use of an expression by an inner state: "the possibility of 'quus'-like interpretations succeeds in refuting any view of meaning or understanding which requires that there be some item in a speaker's or hearer's 'mind' which tells him what to do in using or responding to an expression" (185). Where Kripke goes wrong, according to Stroud, is in holding that this is sufficient for showing that there are no facts of meaning at all: that it is "never so in the world that, for instance, a builder orders a slab and an assistant obeys the 155 order, or that someone asks for the sum of two numbers and someone else gives the right answer" (185). The "possibility that 'plus' might mean quus," Stroud says, does not show that there are no facts of meaning at all, but "only that facts of meaning or understanding or correctness of response do not follow from and so are not reducible to any non-intentionally described goings-on, no matter how complex and long-standing" (185). Now it is clear that "the possibility that 'plus' might mean quus" is sufficient to show that facts of meaning cannot be reduced to nonintentionally characterized facts about how a term has been used in the past, since no finite list of its (nonintentionally characterized) uses can determine on its own what the term was being used to mean. But it does not obviously follow that there are no nonintentionally characterized facts to which meaning facts can be reduced. In particular, it does not follow that we could not reduce the fact that someone means addition by "plus" to the fact that she is disposed to respond to "plus" questions by giving the sum.5 Whatever the other obstacles standing in the way of such an account-and we will examine some of them below-it does not seem to be vulnerable to the quus hypothesis. This is because the force of the quus hypothesis is to undermine the idea that a person's meaning something by a term is a matter of her being guided, instructed, or justified by some particular item, whether that item is something in her mind, or something external, like a finite series of past uses. As both Kripke and Stroud recognize, a person's past uses of "plus" cannot guide her future uses, or be cited by her to justify them, unless she understands them a certain way, and Kripke's skeptical hypothesis is effective because it shows that nothing warrants her understanding them as meaning quus rather than plus. But the dispositional account is not committed to the idea that there is anything which guides the person to say "125" rather than "5" in response to a prompt of "68 + 57," or which justifies any conviction she might have as to the correctness of her response. So there need be no item-and on the version of the account I want to consider there is no item-for which the question of interpretation arises. There is indeed an epistemological issue of how the person, or anyone else, could come to know that she is disposed to give the sum rather than the quum. But since we are not supposing that she justifies her saying "125" by appealing to the fact that she is disposed to give the sum, this does not undermine the proposal that her meaning plus consists in her being disposed to give the sum. As long as we do not endorse a more general skepticism about dispositions, there is no reason to deny that there is a fact of the matter as to whether she is disposed to give the sum or the quum, and the fact that she is disposed to give the sum is thus available as a candidate for what her meaning addition consists in.6 5 "Giving the sum" here is to be understood as something like "uttering a numeral which denotes the sum": a person can give the sum in this sense without herself understanding the word "sum" or even (although I do not think that this is essential to the point) understanding the numeral she utters. 6 In one passage, from "Meaning, Understanding and Translation," Stroud seems to equate skeptical arguments invoking quus-like interpretations with skeptical arguments against dispositions, suggesting that the problem arising from the possibility of quuslike interpretations is not a special problem about meaning, but only an instance of a more general problem about ascribing abilities or dispositions on the basis of finite evidence(2000, 127-128). But I think that this is a mistake. As will become clearer later in this section, we can allow that someone's past responses to "plus" questions are sufficient evidence for her having a disposition to add (rather than to quadd), but still be skeptical that there is anything about those responses which constitutes her meaning addition (rather than quaddition). 156 Stroud does not discuss the dispositional approach explicitly, but he does make clear that he rejects views on which, as on the dispositional approach I have described, meaning is constituted by extensionally characterized regularities in the utterance of expressions: "To say that a word is regularly applied in a certain community only to things that are red...is not to specify what that word means in that community" (2000, ix). Registering a disagreement with Quine, in his 1995 essay "Quine on Exile and Acquiescence," he says that he sees "no hope of understanding our knowledge of language as simply a matter of our being caused to utter certain sounds or to move in certain ways" (2000, 167). Although we can call our knowledge of language a "disposition," he says, the behavior to which we are disposed must be described using intentional terms like "says that p": "it is a disposition or capacity to say things in some ways and not in others, for example, the disposition we English speakers have to say that there is a rabbit by uttering 'There's a rabbit' and not by uttering 'Ecco un coniglio' " (167). Now it might be that we cannot avoid Quinean worries about indeterminacy without describing the behavior in intentional terms, and this might be one motivation for rejecting the kind of dispositional view I am considering. But if we are concerned only with the kind of worries raised by Kripke, it is less clear why the disposition would have to be intentionally characterized: why we could not say that a speaker means rabbit rather than some quabbit-like alternative in virtue of being disposed, say, to utter or assent to "rabbit" in the presence of rabbits. In the discussion of Kripke on which we have been focusing, Stroud says that "it seems that we would be unable to make the right kind of sense of the familiar phenomena of speaking and meaning and understanding without thinking of them in [intentional] ways. We would be restricted to describing a series of sounds and marks and movements without seeing them as having any particular 'life' or meaning" (187). Part of the idea here is that a mere finite "series" of sounds and marks, on its own, could have no meaning: and this is the idea that is so convincingly brought home by Kripke's quus hypothesis. But it is not clear that the only context which could endow the sounds and marks with meaning would have to be one that already includes meaning-involving activities like reporting, questioning, giving orders, and so on. As I have already suggested in raising the possibility of the "less austere" form of nonreductionism, a possibility which appears to be suggested in some passages by Stroud himself, the required context might include activities which were intentional without being meaning-involving. Or, more to the present point, it might be sufficient that the sounds and marks be implicated in lawlike regularities characterizable without appeal to any intentional notions at all. This, I take it, is the idea underlying the dispositional view and also related views like informational semantics, on which expressions, whether of public language or of a "language of thought," get their 157 meaning from lawlike correlations with extralinguistic circumstances. Proponents of views of this kind recognize, I think, that a finite series of sounds and marks-or of the corresponding inscriptions in a language of thought-cannot in itself have "life" or meaning. But they see it as making all the difference whether or not the sounds and marks in the series are of kinds which are nomologically correlated either with nonlinguistic states of affairs, or (in the case of theories with an inferential or conceptual-role component) with other sounds and marks. If a series of sounds and marks is implicated in a system of nomological correlations, then, according to the intuition driving this kind of view, it has all the context it needs to endow it with meaning. As a way of asking why, from Stroud's point of view, this kind of reductive approach would not be acceptable, it is worth considering whether he would endorse any of the objections which Kripke himself raises against the dispositional account. The most significant of these objections is often described as the "normativity objection," since Kripke at one point summarizes its crux in terms of a contrast between the normative implications of ascribing meaning and the merely descriptive implications of ascribing a disposition (Kripke 1982, 37). Kripke's primary formulation of the objection is in terms of the inadequacy of the dispositional approach to account for the role meaning plays in justifying our uses of or responses to expressions. The skeptic's puzzlement about meaning, Kripke says, concerns "my justification for responding '125'...he thinks my response is no better than a stab in the dark" (1982, 23). But nothing in the dispositional account "indicate[s] that...'125' was an answer justified in terms of instructions I gave myself, rather than a mere jack-in-the-box unjustified and arbitrary response" (23). The dispositionalist's proposal thus "misconceives the sceptic's problem-to find a past fact that justifies my present response. As a candidate for a 'fact' that determines what I mean, it fails to satisfy the basic condition on such a candidate...that it should tell me what I ought to do in each new instance" (24). At least as formulated here by Kripke, this is clearly not an objection which Stroud would endorse. For it makes explicit appeal to the very assumption about meaning which Stroud aims to undermine, an assumption on which meaning "tells us" how to use an expression, or contains "instructions" in the light of which our use can be justified. The failure of reductive dispositionalism or other related accounts, for Stroud, cannot be that they fail to do justice to the guiding or justificatory role of meaning, since the principal thrust of Stroud's discussion is that meaning does not play any such role. What of the other two objections which Kripke raises? One of these concerns what Kripke calls the "finiteness" of dispositions. He claims that not only my actual uses of the "plus" sign, but also the totality of my dispositions with respect to that sign, are finite: in particular, he says, I have no disposition to respond with the sum to numbers that are too large for me to grasp. So even granted that I am disposed to respond with the sum to numbers small enough for me to grasp, nothing rules out the skeptical hypothesis that I understand by "plus" a quaddition-like function yielding 5 as the value for all other numbers (26-27). And it does not help here, Kripke says, to try to overcome this finiteness by 158 appeal to idealized conditions specified in ceteris paribus clauses, for example to spell out what I am disposed to do by saying that I would give the sum if I were given the means to carry out my intentions with respect to the "plus" sign. For that presupposes that I have determinate intentions, which is just what the skeptic challenges. The other objection appeals to the fact that people can be disposed to make arithmetical mistakes. Someone who typically forgets to carry might, for example, be disposed to say "115" when asked to respond to the "68 + 57" query. The dispositionalist seems to be committed to the claim that such a person means, not addition, but a nonstandard function which diverges from addition in just those cases where the person, as we would put it, "makes a mistake" (2830). Here again, according to Kripke, appeal to ceteris paribus clauses is fruitless. We could specify the disposition, Kripke says, only by means of some formulation specifying what I would say if my dispositions to make mistakes were removed, but to make a mistake is just to "give an answer other than the one which accords with the function I meant" (30), so the formulation would again presuppose that I meant something determinate by "plus," which is just what the skeptic challenges. On the face of it, it looks as though these two objections are independent of the normativity objection. So they might be thought to provide a reason for Stroud to reject the dispositional view. But on closer examination they turn out to rely on the same assumption about the guiding or justificatory role of meaning which motivates the normativity objection.7 We can see this by considering an initial response to the two objections which has appeared frequently in the literature on Kripke's Wittgenstein, namely that the difficulties Kripke raises for the dispositional analysis of meaning are not specific to meaning, but simply difficulties with the idea of a disposition as such. Simon Blackburn, in his formulation of this response, points out with respect to the finiteness objection that we can ascribe the disposition of brittleness to a glass even if we allow that the disposition could never be actualized on Alpha Centauri because the glass would decay before it got there (Blackburn 1984, §2). By the same token, it would seem that we should be able to ascribe a disposition to give the sum even while allowing that this disposition could not manifest itself for numbers beyond a certain size. Kripke might reply that no amount of evidence could ever license us in ascribing such a disposition, since the possibility of quaddition like variants could never be ruled out. But the same could be said about the glass. The fact that it breaks when struck in circumstances which we can observe is compatible with an infinite range of possible dispositions which we might ascribe to it (for example, the disposition to break when struck in circumstances which we can observe, and to vaporize when struck in other circumstances). A related point can be made about the objection from the possibility of mistakes. To deny that someone can have a disposition to give the sum on the grounds that she sometimes fails to do so would be like denying that a glass 7 This is suggested by Kripke himself, when he says that "almost all objections to the dispositional account boil down to" the normativity objection (1982, 24), and that "the fact that our answer to the question of which function I meant is justificatory of my present response...leads to all its difficulties" (37). 159 can be brittle or fragile because there are some circumstances in which it does not break when struck. Even if the person has a disposition to make mistakes, for example because she regularly forgets to carry, the parallel with physical dispositions holds: we can ascribe to salt a disposition to dissolve in water while allowing that salt has other dispositions which sometimes prevent the initial disposition from being manifested (e.g., if the solution is saturated or subject to the influence of a strong electric field).8 Why does this response seem not so much as to occur to Kripke? I think that it is because his conception of the dispositional approach is shaped by the same assumption which underlies the normativity objection: that any candidate for the state of meaning something by an expression has to be something which gives instructions for, and in that way justifies, the use of the expression. Kripke assumes that any dispositional approach to meaning must accommodate that requirement, and that leads him to assume that the dispositionalist must offer a characterization of the relevant dispositions which could instruct someone in the use of the corresponding expressions. On the dispositionalist view as Kripke conceives it, then, the disposition which constitutes meaning addition by "plus" cannot simply be characterized as a disposition to add or to give the sum in response to "plus" queries, since from that characterization it could not be determined by a person who did not already understand the meaning of "add" or "sum" that someone with that disposition ought to give the sum rather than the quum in response to "plus" queries.9 This accounts for his rejection, for the case of the supposedly meaning-constituting dispositions to which the dispositionalist approach appeals, of the kind of idealization implicit in the ascription of physical dispositions like fragility. When we call the glass fragile, we are typically content to understand its fragility as a matter of its having a tendency to break when struck, and it does not trouble us that we cannot give a precise and exhaustive characterization of the "ideal conditions" under which that disposition is actualized except by saying that they are the circumstances under which the glass in fact breaks when struck. But Kripke assumes that the dispositionalist could not accept a similarly circular specification of the disposition in virtue of which someone means addition by "plus," namely one on which the ideal conditions are those in which the person gives the sum. For "according to [the dispositionalist] the function someone means is to be 8 For other versions of this line of objection, see Forbes 1984; Wright1984, 772; and Goldfarb 1985, 477. 9 When Kripke first introduces "the dispositional analysis [he has] heard proposed," he characterizes it in a way which does make reference to addition: "To mean addition by '+' is to be disposed, when asked for any sum 'x+y' to give the sum of x and y as the answer" (1982, 22). But later he gives a more formal characterization: "the simple dispositional analysis gives a criterion that will tell me what number theoretic function φ I mean by a binary function symbol 'f ', " namely: "The referent φ of 'f ' is that unique binary function φ such that I am disposed, if queried about 'f(m, n)', where 'm' and 'n' are numerals denoting particular numbers m and n, to reply 'p', where 'p' is a numeral denoting φ(m,n)" (26) The meaning-constituting disposition is specified here simply as the disposition I have to respond to "plus," without reference to addition, and Kripke goes on to make clear why he thinks this is required: "The criterion is meant to enable us to 'read off' which function I mean by a given function symbol from my disposition" (26). Clearly the dispositional analysis as initially proposed cannot provide such a criterion, which is why Kripke amends it in his more formal characterization. 160 read off from his dispositions; it cannot be presupposed in advance which function is meant" (Kripke 1982, 29-30). However, once this condition is rejected, we can see that there is nothing objectionable about a "circular" specification of the disposition. More generally, we can see that the inability to characterize ideal conditions for the actualization of a disposition is no more problematic for supposedly meaning-constituting dispositions than it is for the kinds of dispositions which we invoke in everyday talk about objects. 3. I have been arguing so far that there is nothing in Kripke's skeptical line of argument to motivate Stroud's relatively austere version of nonreductionism. In particular, neither the quus hypothesis itself, nor the points about finiteness and mistakes which Kripke raises against dispositionalism, tell against the kind of dispositional approach I characterized earlier, on which there is no assumption that a person's use of language must be guided by, or justified in terms of, her grasp of the relevant dispositions. More generally, once we have followed Stroud in rejecting the assumption that facts of meaning require that something guide or justify us in our use of expressions, then there appears to be nothing in Kripke's argument to rule out either reductive dispositionalism or any of the related views which aim to reduce facts about meaning to facts about the implication of linguistic occurrences in lawlike regularities characterized in extensional terms. What other considerations, then, might be motivating Stroud to regard the project of reduction as "hopeless"? One moti-vation might be the thought that the phenomena of meaning and understanding are just too complex to be captured by this kind of view. Stroud hints at this in a number of places, for example in a passage from "Mind, Meaning, and Practice" denying that the use relevant to meaning can be captured in terms of criteria of application, where he points out that "only certain words are properly said to be applied to something, for example the word 'peacock' when I say of something directly before me 'That is a peacock' " (Stroud 2000, 175). When someone says "That is a peacock," "is" and "that" have a use and a meaning even though they are not applied to anything; and in the remark "A peacock roaming the garden would certainly enliven the scene," the word "peacock" is no longer being applied to anything, at least not in the same way as it was before (2000, 175). These considerations might seem to cast doubt on any theory which would attempt to characterize meaning simply in terms of correlations between utterances and states of affairs (for example between the presence of peacocks and utterances of "That's a peacock"). The uses of expressions are just too multifarious, it might be thought, for us to be able to describe them without appeal to semantic notions, or to identify nonsemantic dispositions to produce a given expression under such-and-such extensionally described circumstances. Later in the same essay Stroud alludes to the "richness, complexity, and intricate interrelations among the rules, techniques, and practices 161 that determine the meanings of even some of the simplest things we say and understand" (191). This complexity contributes, Stroud makes clear, to the "difficulty of stating clearly and fully what the uses and practices are" (191) and this again would be a possible motivation for endorsing nonreductionism. But this does not seem to offer sufficient ground for rejecting nonreductionist views of the kind we have been considering. First, proponents of naturalistic semantics have shown themselves to be extremely resourceful in coming up with refinements which aim to accommodate some of the complexities while still doing justice to the basic intuition that a term means what it does in virtue of the extensionally characterized regularities in which it figures. One such refinement is the idea that the relevant correlations hold in the first instance for expressions in a language of thought rather than a public language. It is much more plausible to suppose that there is a lawlike connection between the presence of dogs and tokenings of an internal expression dog than that such a connection holds for the word "dog" in a public language.10 Another is the idea, associated with naturalistic inferential or conceptual role semantics, that the correlations which endow a term with meaning hold not between utterances and extralinguistic states of affairs, but between one utterance (or tokening of a sentence in the language of thought) and another.11 Second, we might follow Stroud's own lead in taking as our starting model of language a simplified language like that of language-game §2. There seems to be no difficulty, for that language, in specifying nonaccidental correlations between utterances and states of affairs, or, relatedly, dispositions on the part of its users to produce and respond to utterances under specific circumstances. We can say, for example, that utterances of "Slab" are regularly followed by a slab's being brought to the place where the utterance was made, or that the assistant is disposed to bring a slab when he hears the expression "Slab." If, as the proponent of naturalistic semantics maintains, these facts constitute what it is for "Slab" to have the meaning it does in that primitive language, then, in Stroud's words, "the lessons illustrated schematically in that simple case might be carried over to more realistically complex behaviour" (179). That is, we might argue that if we can come up with a plausible reductionist account for a very simple case, that shows that it is possible in 10 In "Meaning, Understanding, and Translation," Stroud criticizes the language of thought hypothesis on the grounds that it does nothing but shift the problem that it is meant to address. "The problem of saying what it is to understand observable expressions of a natural language has been moved one step inwards and raised about certain hypothesized mental items instead. It is the same problem, with the added difficulty that now we are less sure what sorts of items or expressions we are talking about" (2000, 116). I think that this is a legitimate criticism if the existence of a language of thought is supposed to provide, on its own, an answer to the question of how meaning and understanding are possible. But a language of thought might be hypothesized, not as itself sufficient for the understanding of expressions of a public language, but as facilitating a dispositional or nomological-causal account in the way suggested in the text. In that case the criticism does not apply. For a recent, and more general, formulation of this point, see Margolis and Laurence 2007 (570-571). 11 Or, as on the kind of two-factor approach proposed by Block (1986), that the meaning of an expression is determined by both kinds of correlation. 162 principle, notwithstanding the practical difficulties, to provide the same kind of account for natural language in humans. I described Stroud above as indicating that the complexity of language contributes to "the difficulty...in stating clearly and fully" the ways in which linguistic expressions are used, and I have just suggested that this complexity is not a sufficient reason for endorsing nonreductionism. But Stroud appears to agree, for he goes on in the passage from which I quoted to say that the difficulty "is not just a matter of complexity." Rather, he says, "it is that in giving descriptions of the practices...we must employ and rely on the very concepts and practices and capacities that we are trying to describe and understand" (191). Here he is alluding to what he has characterized a few paragraphs earlier as a "very important point" brought out by consideration of the challenge presented by Kripke: "how someone means or understands certain expressions, or what those expressions mean...in a community, are facts which in general cannot be adequately specified except by using the very concepts that the speakers are thereby said to be master of" (190). This point is one which he develops in detail in two essays both originally published in 1990, "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community" (2000) and "Meaning, Understanding, and Translation" (2000). In the latter essay he argues convincingly that we cannot specify the use in which meaning consists if we are restricted to saying only that someone uses an expression in the same way that the community uses it, or that it is used in the same way as some other mentioned expression. I cannot, for example, say what the word "otiose" means simply by saying that it is used the same way that the word "functionless" is used, that is, by describing a relation between two mentioned expressions, "otiose" and "functionless." I have, rather, to use some expression which is used the same way that those expressions are used, for example when I say "The word 'otiose' means functionless." But I can use the expression "functionless" meaningfully only if I myself possess the same capacity I am attempting to describe when I say what a person means by "otiose." There is thus "no hope of describing [the use which matters to a word's meaning]...by saying that [it] is the same as or different from that of some other mentioned expression. We must speak of the things the word applies to, or state what it can be used to say about them, not just mention some expressions and the relations between them" (124). Is this a reason for nonreductionism? The passage from "Mind, Meaning, and Practice" following Stroud's identification there of the "very important point" suggests that he thinks it is. Because we know what an order is, and can pick out a certain type of stone we call a slab, we can say that builders in language-game §2 who utter "Slab!" are ordering a slab. Equipped as we are with the concept of addition, we can say what a pupil who responds to certain utterances in distinctive ways has mastered; he has got the concept of addition, he understands and gives the right answers to addition problems, he understands "plus" to mean plus. If we were restricted to saying 163 without interpretation only what utterances a speaker responds to, what distinctive movements of his body are caused by those utterances, and what utterances he himself is thereby disposed to make in different circumstances, we could not make the right kind of sense of what he is doing in responding and uttering as he does. (190-191) While there is no explicit argument here for nonreductionism, there is at least the implication of a move from the thought that we need the concepts slab and addition in order to characterize what the builder and the pupil are doing when they use the expressions "slab" and "plus," to the thought-apparently intended to exclude reductive accounts of meaning-that we cannot describe that use in terms of causal relations among utterances, external circumstances, and bodily movements. And Stroud makes clear a few paragraphs later that he takes the "very important point" to have nonreductionist implications, when he characterizes the conclusion to which it leads as one on which "facts of what expressions mean...can in general be expressed only in semantical or intentional statements which make use of the very concepts that they attribute to those they describe" (192). But it seems to me that the move I have described rests on a failure to distinguish clearly between two different ideas: the idea that we cannot characterize the meaning of an expression without using that expression or some other expression with the same meaning, and the idea that we cannot characterize the meaning of an expression without using semantical expressions like "means," "orders," "says that" and so on. In other words, it fails to distinguish the idea that we cannot characterize meaning without drawing on our own grasp of concepts corresponding to the expressions whose meaning we are trying to characterize, from the idea that we cannot characterize meaning without drawing on our grasp of what it is to mean something by those expressions or to entertain those concepts. Stroud is quite right, I think, to hold that we cannot characterize the meaning of a term like "plus" or "slab" without using the concept of addition or of a slab. That was one of the morals which emerged from our discussion of Kripke's "finiteness" and "mistakes" objections to reductive dispositionalism. But as we also saw in the course of that discussion, nothing prevents the dispositionalist from drawing on the notion of addition in characterizing the disposition in which someone's meaning addition is supposed to consist. She can say, for example, that the person's meaning addition by "plus" consists in her being disposed to give the sum in response to "plus" questions. The only thing which stands in the way of her using the concept of addition as part of a characterization of the meaning of "plus" is the assumption against which Stroud so forcefully argues, namely that the characterization of the disposition has to be able to guide or justify the person in her use of "plus." So even though, to go back to the last passage I quoted, facts of what expressions mean "can be expressed only in...statements which make use of the very concepts that they attribute to those they describe," it does not follow that they can be expressed only in "semantical or intentional statements" of that kind. It is at least left 164 open that we can express them with such nonsemantical statements as "When he hears a shout of 'Slab' he brings a slab" or (implausible though this proposal would be given the nonobservational character of "otiose") "She is disposed to apply 'otiose' to things that are functionless." In expressing facts of meaning in this way we would be describing "what utterances a speaker responds to, what distinctive movements of his body are caused by those utterances, and what utterances he himself is thereby disposed to make in different circumstances." But, in using terms like "functionless" and "slab" to characterize what it is for those terms to mean what we do, we would also be relying on the same "concepts and practices and capacities that we are trying to describe and understand." The distinction I am making here is essentially the same as a distinction drawn by John McDowell to clarify Michael Dummett's contrast between modest and full-blooded theories of meaning. The distinction, as McDowell puts it in an essay originally published in 1987, is between a theory "from which someone could derive possession of the concepts expressed by primitive terms of its object language" and a theory which "describes a practical capacity such that to acquire it would be to acquire the concept" (McDowell 1998, 91). McDowell draws this distinction in response to Dummett's characterization of a "fullblooded" theory of meaning as one which would "serve to explain new concepts to someone who does not already have them" (Dummett 1993a [originally published 1975], 5) and, conversely, of a "modest" theory as one which, in the case of a concept expressed by a primitive term, "would be intelligible only to someone who had already grasped the concept" (Dummett 1993a, 6). Dummett argues that a theory of meaning must be fullblooded, but McDowell points out that this is impossible in the sense of "full-bloodedness" corresponding to Dummett's characterizations: "any theory...would need to imply some concepts...and it seems undeniable that any theory of meaning for a language would need to help itself to at least some of the concepts expressible in the language" (McDowell 1998, 88). McDowell suggests, though, that these characterizations do not capture the distinction Dummett intends. Rather, the requirement of full-bloodedness is the requirement that an account of language be "as from outside" in the sense that, in giving an account of a concept, it does not take for granted a grasp of the concept's "role as a determinant of content" (1998, 91). McDowell illustrates the point in connection with Dummett's own sketch of what it would be to grasp the concept square as, at the very least, "to be able to discriminate between things that are square and those that are not," for example by "apply[ing] the word 'square' to square things and not to others" (Dummett 1993b, 98). McDowell points out that this sketch "does not hesitate to employ the concept square," so could not serve to explain the concept square to someone who did not already have it. But it still counts as a characterization of meaning "as from the outside" because "it uses the word 'square' only in first intention-that is, never inside a content-specifying 'that'clause " (McDowell 1998, 91). McDowell's clarification is especially relevant in this context because Stroud often alludes, especially in more recent writings, to the impossibility of characterizing the 165 meaning of expressions "as from outside" language.12 In the introduction to Meaning, Understanding, and Practice, he raises the question of reduction as the question "how far can we get in explaining the phenomena of meaning and understanding from outside them?" (Stroud 2000, viii). And in describing his answer, he writes of the "need to see [meaning and understanding] always from within an engagement with some community's understanding of them" (2000, ix). Now I think that what Stroud means by this talk of "from outside" is the same as what McDowell means by "full-bloodedness." A theory which explains the meaning of the terms of our language "from outside" would be a theory that does not use those expressions in intentional contexts. If it took the form of ascribing capacities to speakers, then for each primitive expression of the language it would, in McDowell's terms, "describe a practical capacity such that to acquire it would be to acquire the concept." As Dummett puts it in registering his acceptance of McDowell's "correction," it would "describe a practice the mastery of which does not demand prior possession of the concept" and thus "make intelligible [a speaker's] acquisition of that concept by coming to speak the language" (Dummett 1987, 267). The kind of reductive account of meaning which I have been provisionally defending would be "from outside" meaning in this sense. It would seek to make the notion of meaning intelligible in nonintentional terms by taking expressions to have the meanings they do in virtue of standing in certain nonintentionally characterized relations to one another or to extralinguistic reality. And this would enable us to explain what it is for a speaker to acquire a concept corresponding to an expression by explaining how her uses of the expression came to stand in those nonintentionally characterized relations. But Stroud is also concerned, as we have seen, to show the impossibility of a theory of meaning which would be "from outside" language in a different and stronger sense, in that it would attempt to state the meaning of all the primitive terms in a language without using either those terms themselves or any other terms synonymous with them. Such a theory would count as "full-blooded" according to Dummett's original characterization: it would be a theory "from which someone could derive possession of the concepts expressed by primitive terms of its object language."13 If such a theory were possible, we could appeal to the idea of it in order to explain how it is that we come to acquire language "from outside," by hypothesizing that we have an implicit grasp of the theory and that its characterizations of the meanings of the expressions of the language serve to guide us in their correct use. It is a theory of this kind which Stroud seems to have in mind when he alludes, at the end of "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community," to "the kind of explanation of meaning and language which we aspire to in philosophy," an aspiration which requires that we "find some facts, the recognition of which would not require that we already speak and understand a language, and some rules which would tell us what, given those facts, it 12 This is a particularly prominent theme in Stroud's forthcoming "Meaning and Understanding." 13 Indeed, in "The Theory of Meaning and the Practice of Communication," Stroud criticizes Dummett himself for advocating a theory which is "from outside" language in this stronger sense (2000, 207-208). 166 was correct to say" (Stroud 2000, 94). This aspiration he says, cannot be met by our ordinary statements of meaning because "they make essential use of words that are already 'alive,' that already have a meaning" and so cannot "serve to get us into language in the first place" (2000, 94). Stroud is quite right, I think, to emphasize the impossibility of a theory which is "from outside" in this stronger sense. There can be no getting into one's first language by being brought to grasp a theory which attempts to characterize the meanings of the expressions in the language, whether or not the theory is framed in intentional or semantic terms. But it is important not to confuse the hopeless aspiration for a theory which can "get us into language" by instructing us in how to speak and understand it, with the prima facie more reasonable aspiration for a theory which is "from outside" language only in the sense that it does not use the expressions of the language in semantic or intentional contexts.14 A theory of this latter kind could not itself "get us into" language because we would already need to have mastered the language of the theory in order to be in a position to be guided by it. However, if Stroud is right in rejecting the assumption that facts of meaning have to instruct or guide us, then the theory would not need to play that role in order to serve as a philosophically satisfactory theory of meaning. It could explain or make intelligible how we "get into language from outside," not by itself being the kind of thing which can "get us into language," but by characterizing the capacities involved in speaking and understanding a language in a way which makes it unmysterious how we can come to acquire them. 4. I have examined a number of considerations which might seem to support Stroud's nonreductionism, and I have argued that none of them is effective. Should we conclude that Stroud is wrong to deny the possibility of reductive dispositionalism about meaning, or of any other kind of view which seeks to explain meaning solely in terms of extensionally characterized regularities in our use of expressions? I shall argue in this section that we should not. Stroud is right, I will suggest, to think that we cannot make sense of the "life" of linguistic expressions solely in terms of their use conforming to regular patterns. But I will argue that this does not commit us to the austere form of nonreductionism which denies the possibility of any general account of meaning and which, in effect, takes 14 There is evidence of this confusion at the end of "Mind, Meaning, and Practice," where Stroud suggests that what is most disappointing about the nonreductionist view is that "if facts of what expressions mean...can in general be expressed only in semantical or intentional statements...then they would seem not to be the kinds of facts that could ever explain how language and meaning in general are possible, or what facts or rules human beings rely on, as it were, to get into language in the first place, from outside it" (2000, 192). This seems to me to run together the reasonable aspiration to "explain how language and meaning in general are possible" with the hopeless aspiration to identify "facts and rules" that human beings can rely on to "get into" language, by using them as a source of guidance or instruction in coming to speak the language. 167 facts about meaning as primitive. Rather, I shall suggest, a proper appreciation of what is objectionable about reductive dispositionalism points the way to a view which allows us to explain meaning "from outside" language without simply identifying the meaningfulness of an expression with its figuring in nonintentionally characterizable regularities. To begin developing this line of argument, I want to return to language-game §2. Stroud holds, as we saw, that we can think of the sounds produced and responded to by the builder and his assistant as having "life" or meaning without supposing that their use is guided or justified by inner states or processes. What makes them meaningful, and gives them the particular meanings they have, is simply a matter of their regular use. But, as we also saw, Stroud holds in addition that this use has to be understood in intentional and indeed in specifically semantic terms. What makes the sounds meaningful is that they are used in the linguistic activity of ordering building-stones. Now I have been arguing in the previous two sections that Stroud does not do enough to motivate the nonreductionist aspect of his view. But this is not because I think that the kind of reductive dispositionalism which we have been considering is correct. On the contrary, I agree with Stroud that we cannot make sense of the sounds in language-game §2 as meaningful simply in virtue of the extensionally characterized lawlike regularities in which they figure. Unlike Stroud, though, I do not see this as a consequence either of Kripke's quus hypothesis, or of the impossibility of trying to characterize meaning "from outside" language. Rather, I see it simply as a reflection of pretheoretical intuitions about what is required for meaning and understanding. If, to reconsider a possibility I mentioned briefly in section 1, automata were programmed to produce and respond to expressions of language-game §2 in just the way the builder and his assistant do, it would be intuitively implausible to claim that the expressions were meaningful, at least for the automata themselves. The same would be true, although perhaps to a lesser extent, in the case of animals who were conditioned to respond to the expressions by fetching the corresponding building-stones. It seems, again intuitively, that there is a distinction between an animal's being disposed to respond in a certain way to a shout of "Slab" and its understanding the shout, or attaching a meaning to it. Even if it is stipulated that the builder and his assistant are human beings, capable of intentional states, and even that they are fully competent speakers of a language like English or German, that still does not seem to be enough to secure the intuition that their use of the expressions, as described in purely extensional terms, is meaningful. We could imagine, for example, that the expressions "Slab," "Pillar" and so on are not part of their language, but that the assistant has the psychological peculiarity that he cannot lift a slab unless he hears the word "Slab," cannot lift a pillar unless he hears the word "Pillar," and so on.15 The assistant might know that he is to bring a slab because of some other sign 15 We might think of the role played by the expressions in this example as an extension of that sometimes played by grunts in weightlifting, humming in jazz piano improvisation, or shouting out Japanese numerals while doing certain martial arts exercises. In these cases making, and perhaps also hearing, certain sounds facilitates certain bodily movements, but in a way which is independent of whether or not they mean anything to the person whose behavior is influenced by them. 168 made by the builder, but be unable to do so unless the builder also shouts "Slab." Or we could even imagine that no other sign is needed: the sound of the word "slab" not only makes it possible for him to bring the slab, but also causes him to do so. We could go still further and imagine that the builder and the assistant are aware of this situation. The builder might know that in order to get the assistant to bring a slab he has to shout "Slab." The assistant for his part might know, when he reflects on why he is picking up this particular building-stone rather than one from another pile, or indeed on why he is picking up any building-stone at all, as opposed to finishing his cup of tea or enjoying a moment of rest in the sunshine, that it was the builder's shout of "Slab" that caused him to do it. This still does not seem sufficient to warrant the claim that the assistant understands the builder's shout of "Slab," as opposed to merely believing that the shout had a certain effect on him. I do not think that Stroud would disagree with any of this. He might well allow that, irrespective of the more theoretical motivations which we considered above, our intuitions about meaningfulness are sufficient to rule out the idea that mere causal regularities can endow expressions with meaning. But now I want to go on to raise a question which, I think, will reveal a serious point of disagreement. What is it about the situation described above which prevents us from accepting it intuitively as one in which the assistant means or understands something by "Slab"? More concretely: what element is missing from the situation, whose addition would allow us to accept it intuitively as one in which "Slab" has a meaning? Now it is clear that Stroud would reject one way of answering this question, namely that what is missing is any kind of instruction or justification by an inner state which "tells" the assistant how to respond. For Stroud, it can be no part of our pretheoretical intuitions that meaningful use requires this kind of guidance. And on this point I agree with him. But I think that he would also go further, and reject the question itself as tendentious. There is nothing to be said about what is "missing" about the assistant's response to "Slab" except that the assistant does not understand the expression, or that his use of it (in the broad sense which includes his responses to it) is not meaningful. Indeed, Stroud might say, the very idea that there is something missing from the situation, whose addition would turn it into something which we could accept as an example of the meaningful use of "Slab," is itself a manifestation of the assumption that he is trying to undermine. Here I disagree. For I think that we can say something substantive about what is missing from the situation without committing ourselves to the objectionable assumption that meaning requires guidance by an inner state. What we can say is missing, I want to suggest, is the assistant's consciousness, when he brings the slab, that he is responding appropriately to the sound he has heard. Let us imagine the situation as I described it above, where the assistant regularly brings a slab on hearing a shout of "Slab" and is aware each time that his behavior is caused by the shout of "Slab," but let us now imagine in addition that, as he brings the slab, he is conscious of what he is doing as appropriate in the light of the builder's shout. We might put this by saying that he takes it to "fit" the sound which 169 the builder has made, or (although in a nonliteral sense) to be "called for" by it. What we are imagining, then, is that he conceives the relation between the builder's shout and his own response not just as causal but also as normative: he takes the shout not only to elicit, but also to make appropriate, the response which he is giving.16 To imagine the situation with this added element, I want to suggest, is to imagine the assistant responding with understanding to the builder's command. So the added element-the assistant's consciousness of the appropriateness of his response to the shout of "Slab"-gives us what we need to accept the situation, intuitively, as one in which "Slab" has a meaning. Does the idea of the assistant's adopting this normative attitude carry with it a commitment to the idea of his being guided or justified by internal instructions? It might seem that it does. For, it might be argued, the assistant cannot take his response to "Slab" to be appropriate if he does not already recognize "Slab" as having a meaning, with which he can take his response to accord. And that in turn would seem to require that there is something he grasps antecedently to taking his response to be appropriate, something which justifies the claim to appropriateness. Even if he does not grasp what "Slab" means, it would seem at the very least that he must recognize it as having some meaning or other, so that there is something which he can take it-if only by sheer luck -to accord. But here I want to deny that the assistant needs to recognize "Slab" as having a meaning prior to taking his response to be appropriate. I want to claim that we can make sense of his having a "primitive" consciousness of the appropriateness of his response which does not depend on the antecedent grasp of a rule or standard determining that response as correct rather than incorrect, or even on the awareness that there is such a rule or standard.17 As I see it, it is perfectly intelligible to suppose that he can, in bringing the slab, take his behavior to "fit" the builder's utterance, without his attitude presupposing either that he grasps the meaning of "Slab" or that he possesses a corresponding concept slab. He does not need to conceive either of the builder as telling him to bring a slab, or of himself as bringing a slab, in order to take what he is doing to be appropriate to the builder's utterance: he can simply think, as he is bringing the slab, that this (what he is now doing) is 16 Note that his awareness of the appropriateness of his response is not a matter of his taking himself to have a reason to respond as he does in the light of the builder's shout. It is not that he takes it, for example, to be the prudent thing to do, or to be morally required. He may indeed have those attitudes toward his response, but they are not part of the consciousness of normativity which I am proposing as the missing element required for his response to be meaningful. 17 It might be objected here that he cannot take his response to be appropriate without antecedently recognizing the possibility that it could be mistaken or incorrect, and that this in turn requires that he recognize a standard governing possible responses. But the normative attitude I am describing does not require antecedent recognition of a contrast between correct and incorrect uses. In taking his response to be appropriate the assistant is, at least in the first instance, contrasting it not with responses which are inappropriate (incorrect, mistaken), but with the broader class of responses which lack the feature of being appropriate. This includes not just (what we would call) cases of incorrectness or being mistaken, but also cases where the question of correctness does not arise, as for example if he were to react to the builder's shout by sneezing, or if a startled bird were to respond by flying away. 170 appropriate to that (what he has just heard). And to make the stronger point: this is something that he can think, not only prior to grasping what "Slab" means or grasping the particular concept of a slab, but prior to thinking of it as so much as meaningful, or of conceiving the slab he is bringing as belonging under a sortal concept at all. If the normative attitude is of this primitive kind, then we can ascribe it to the assistant without committing ourselves to the idea that there is anything guiding his response to the builder's utterance, or instructing him in how to respond. Nothing in our supposition that he takes this attitude to what he is doing requires us to assume a different explanation of his response than would be given on the reductive dispositionalist view. We do not need to think of him as responding as he does because he recognizes his response as appropriate: we can instead explain his response in just the same way that we would have explained it in the initial situation, prior to the addition of the idea that he takes his response to the builder to be appropriate. Nor do we need to think of the normative attitude itself as justified in terms of a rule or principle dictating his response as the correct one. There is nothing about the "normatively enriched" situation which requires us to suppose, any more than we did with respect to the original situation, that there are any rules or instructions determining that it is appropriate for him to bring a slab rather than, say, a pillar.18 Now it is true that we might be committed, in assuming that the assistant adopts the normative attitude I have described, to one aspect of the picture of meaning which Stroud finds objectionable. We might be committed to there being a mental state or process which "accompanies" or "lies behind" the assistant's bringing of the slab: namely, the assistant's consciousness of the appropriateness of what he is doing. But this consciousness, as I have just noted, does not guide, instruct, or justify the assistant in his response to the sign. So it is not vulnerable to the line of argument which Stroud, following Wittgenstein, raises against the picture of meaning as requiring something "lying behind" the use of expressions. That line of argument, as we saw in section 1, turns on the thought that anything which could guide or justify us in the use of an expression would itself have to be meaningful, so that we could not appeal to it in order to account for meaning in general. But the consciousness of normativity which, according to the suggestion which I am making, is responsible for the meaningfulness of expressions, is not something which guides or justifies us in their use, and thus not something which we need to think of as, itself, meaningful. It "gives life" to the signs of language not by "telling us" how they should be used, but simply by making the difference between a merely reflexive response to (or production of) a sign, and the kind of response which we think of as "intelligent" in the sense of involving understanding.19 18 For more on this primitively normative attitude, see Ginsborg, forthcoming . 19 I am assuming here that we can make sense of someone's responding to a sign "with understanding" without drawing on the supposition that there is anything specific that she understands. It might be thought that the assistant can respond to the builder's shout with understanding only in virtue of understanding e.g. that he is bringing a slab, or that the builder has called for a slab. But I think we can make sense of a primitive notion of responding with understanding, that is, of responding intelligently as opposed to reflexively or robotically, which parallels the notion of a primitive consciousness of normativity. This notion does not depend on, but rather can be invoked to make sense of, the notions of understanding that such-and-such is the case, or of understanding a sign as having a specific meaning. According to the account I go on to present in the text, the assistant does indeed understand that he is to bring a slab, but the fact of his doing so 171 Part of my aim in making this suggestion is to offer a motivation for rejecting the dispositionalist view. What is wrong with that view, I am suggesting, is that it does not do justice to the normative attitudes which are a necessary aspect of the meaningful use of language. And this is something which we can recognize, I am suggesting, without being committed to the objectionable assumption that facts of meaning involve our being guided or justified in the use of expressions. This part of my point can be restated in terms of the "normativity objection" which Kripke raises against the dispositional account. I argued in section 2 that Stroud could not endorse this objection in the form that Kripke states it, namely as the objection that meaning facts cannot be dispositional, because dispositions merely describe how we use terms, rather than telling us how we ought to use them. If the suggestion I have made is correct, however, there remains some truth to the objection in its more general form, as the complaint that the dispositional account does not do justice to the normativity of meaning. For even after we have rejected the idea that the meaning of an expression justifies us or instructs us in its use, there remains a sense in which meaning is normative: namely, that the ascription of meaning to an expression implies that its uses can be regarded in normative terms, as being or not being appropriate. And the identification of meaning facts with facts about dispositions fails to capture this normative implication. To say that someone is disposed to respond to "plus" queries with the sum does indeed imply that we can distinguish two kinds of uses she makes of "plus," one in which she behaves as she is disposed, the other in which (perhaps due to interfering factors such as carelessness or distraction) she does not; but it does not imply that a use of the first kind can be regarded as correct or appropriate.20 However, the more important part of my point, in the context of the present chapter, is to show that we can reject reductive dispositionalism without endorsing Stroud's austere form of nonreductionism. For my suggestion offers a way of accounting for the meaningfulness of linguistic expressions which does not require the use of those expressions in semantic or intentional contexts and which is thus "from outside" language in what I have called the "reasonable" sense. As long as we accept the notion of the kind of normative attitude to the use of signs which I have described-an attitude which does not presuppose the prior recognition of the signs as meaningful-then we can draw on is constituted in part by his being disposed to respond intelligently, or with understanding, to a shout of "Slab." 20 See Bridges (ms.) for an insightful discussion of the different ways of understanding Kripke's normativity objection. To state the point in Bridges's terms, I am proposing that there is truth to the objection understood in what he calls the "evaluative" sense, although unlike Bridges I take the relevant kind of normative evaluation to bear not on whether a use is correct or incorrect, but rather on whether it is appropriate as opposed to not being appropriate, where not being appropriate includes not only being incorrect, but also being something to which standards of correctness do not apply (see footnote 17). 172 that notion to provide a partially reductive account of the notions of meaning and understanding. The meaningfulness of expressions on this account is constituted, as on the reductive view, by the fact that we are disposed to use in them in certain regular ways, but with the proviso that, in using them we take our uses to be appropriate in the primitive way which I have outlined. For example we can say, at a first approximation, that what it is for someone to mean addition by "plus" is for her to be disposed to respond to "plus" queries with the sum, where, in each actualization of that disposition, she takes a primitively normative attitude to her response. Now it is at least arguable that someone who takes that attitude to a given response is in a state with intentional content. Even though she need not entertain the intentional content addition, she still has to have a thought with the intentional content appropriate, even if it consists only in the thought this is appropriate to that. So, at least on this way of understanding the consciousness of normativity to which it appeals, my account does not do without intentional notions altogether. But even if it relies on the intentional in this way, it remains "from outside" intentional content in that its explanation of meaning does not appeal to our capacity to grasp concepts corresponding to the expressions of our language. The only intentional content it takes for granted is whatever content is involved in the consciousness of normativity as such. All other contents are, so to speak, constructed, by means of this consciousness, out of the raw material of our nonintentionally characterized responsive dispositions.21 21 It might be helpful here to situate my view explicitly among the various more or less reductive accounts mentioned in the course of this chapter. In section 1, I characterized Stroud's view as "austerely nonreductionist" in that it denies that we can account for the meaning of terms without appeal to specifically semantic notions: this rules out, for example, explaining what it is for "plus" to mean addition without appealing to the idea of saying or asserting that one number is the sum of others, where saying that p of course implies that one grasps the meaning of p. (I am assuming here for convenience that "plus" is a primitive term of the language.) A less austere form of nonreductionism, like Grice's, would account for the fact of "plus" meaning addition in terms of speakers' intentions and beliefs regarding addition, e.g. the intention to get someone else to believe that x is the sum of y and z. Stroud does not explicitly consider this kind of account, and I think he would reject it, but, as noted in section 1, he sometimes hints at a view on which we might explain the meaning of "plus" in terms of its use in intentional activities like calculating. Since I take it that we cannot calculate without having beliefs involving (say) the concept addition, this account would be reductive to the same degree that Grice's is, in that it would reduce semantical notions like meaning addition to intentional notions like believing that x is the sum of y and z. Neither of these accounts is "full-blooded" or "from outside language" in either of the two senses distinguished in section 3, since they both make use of the primitive terms of the language in semantic (Stroud) or more broadly intentional (Grice) contexts. My own account is more reductive than either of these because it seeks to explain the fact of "plus" meaning addition without taking for granted that speakers have intentional attitudes toward addition. But it is less reductive than a straightforwardly dispositional view because it takes for granted the primitive consciousness of normativity which is at least arguably an intentional attitude involving the content appropriate. Both my own view and the kind of dispositional view discussed here are "from outside" language in what I called the reasonable sense, but since they both use terms like "sum" in accounting for the meaning of "plus," and hence draw on the concept of addition, they are not "from outside" language in the stronger sense. It might be possible, dropping the assumption that "plus" is primitive, to offer an even more reductive dispositional account of the meaning of "plus" which would characterize the corresponding disposition without using "sum" or its synonyms, but, as Stroud points out, an account of this kind could not be generalized so as to explain the meanings of all the terms in a 173 Now if this partially reductive account is correct, then someone who is disposed to respond to "plus" questions with the sum, and, in so doing, to regard her response as primitively appropriate, thereby counts as meaning addition by "plus." So whenever she responds to a "plus" query, she is, in virtue of taking her response to be appropriate, using the sign meaningfully, and more specifically, using it to mean addition. This might invite the objection that the "primitive" normative attitude I have been describing is not, after all, prior to grasp of meaning. If the assistant is reliably disposed to bring a slab on a shout of "Slab," then taking his response to be appropriate to the builder's shout on any given occasion does not precede, but rather just is, his understanding "Slab" to mean that he is to bring a slab. So, it might be objected, the proposed account does not offer an explanation of the phenomena of meaning and understanding in terms of attitudes which are not themselves semantic or intentional. Rather, the idea of semantic or intentional content is built into the explanation from the start. But it is important to see that, if the assistant's awareness of the appropriateness of his response to the expression "Slab" and his awareness of it as conforming to the meaning of "Slab" are coeval, this is not a genuine objection to the kind of reductive account I have suggested but rather an indication of its success. For it will be a consequence of any successful philosophical reduction that, once we have accepted it, our thought of the reducing phenomena will imply, and hence in one sense depend on, our thought of the phenomena which are being reduced. If the idea of a philosophical reduction is coherent at all, then this dependence must be compatible with the claim that the reducing phenomena can also be seen as explanatorily prior to, and thus in a more fundamental sense independent of, the phenomena which they are being invoked to explain. 5. The account I have given depends crucially on the assumption that the idea of someone's taking her use of a sign to be appropriate can be made intelligible without appeal to the idea of the sign's being meaningful. Stroud, I suspect, would reject this assumption. He might agree with me that the possibility of using language meaningfully requires the possibility of adopting a normative attitude to one's use of signs. But, at least on the evidence of the series of papers we have been discussing, he would deny that the appropriateness or correctness we might ascribe to a given use could be understood except in terms of language without using any of those terms. Such an explanation, if it were possible, would be "from outside" language in the strong sense. Another kind of reductive approach, not considered in this chapter, is Robert Brandom's explanation of semantic and intentional notions in terms of normative notions that are themselves not further explicable in naturalistic terms. While my own view is like Brandom's in relying on the unreduced notion of a normative attitude, it differs from it in at least two respects. First, as will become clearer in the next section, the relevant norms are not, as they are for Brandom, socially instituted. Second, the relevant normativity for Brandom is essentially connected with reasons and rationality, and applies in the first instance to inferential practices, whereas on my view it is prior to the appreciation of reasons and applies in the first instance to noninferential uses of expressions. 174 conformity to meaning. This denial is implicit in his claim that the correctness of an individual's use of an expression can be determined only by its conformity to a general practice, which for Stroud just is its conformity to the meaning of the sign. For someone's performance to be the correct way to do something there must be some standard or pattern to which it conforms. For the use of linguistic expressions, those standards can be provided ultimately only by the ways in which the expressions are in fact used....[The possibility of correct use requires] that there be some way in which those expressions are used, some regularities or general practices to which an individual speaker's performance can conform or fail to conform. ("Mind, Meaning, and Practice," 2000, 176-177) Or, as he puts it in "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community," "in the case of speaking and understanding a language, there must at the very least be some regularity, some general pattern of activity, for one's performance to conform to. Otherwise there would be no such thing as correctness or incorrectness" (2000, 83). To judge by these passages, Stroud would reject as incoherent the normative attitude I have suggested that we ascribe to the builder's assistant in language-game §2. For to make sense of that attitude we must take the assistant to regard himself as responding appropriately or correctly to the expression "Slab!" without relying on any conception of him as conforming to a general practice in virtue of which the sign is meaningful. I cannot here provide a full defense of the assumption on which my account depends. But I do want to draw attention to some considerations raised by Stroud himself, in a somewhat different context, which I think offer it at least some indirect support. In his very first published paper, "Wittgenstein on Logical Necessity" (2000; first published 1965), Stroud discusses the shared "natural reactions" or, as he also calls them (although always with the word in scare quotes) "judgments," which Wittgenstein sees as underlying our practices of calculating, making inferences, drawing conclusions, and so on.22 Wittgenstein brings these "natural reactions" into relief by using examples of people or communities who do not share them, but instead display "reactions" which are different from ours. These include the pupil at Philosophical Investigations §185 to whom it comes naturally to continue the series "2, 4, 6, 8...1000" by writing "1004," and the wood sellers in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics who set the price for wood proportionally to the surface covered by the wood they are selling. As Stroud points out, we could not explain to the pupil that he was not going on in the same way, or to the wood sellers that they were selling wood wrongly. That would be like trying to correct someone who, in a case which Wittgenstein describes as "presenting similarities" with the pupil who writes 22 Stroud also alludes to these "reactions" in later essays, for example in his "Wittgenstein on Meaning, Understanding, and Community" (2000, 85-86) and less explicitly, but still recognizably, in his "Mind, Meaning, and Practice" (2000, 192). 175 "1004," naturally reacts to the gesture of pointing by looking in the direction of the line from fingertip to wrist. We could not show that person, by pointing, which way she was meant to respond to the initial gesture, since she would bring the same aberrant reactive propensities to the gesture with which we were trying to correct her. And something analogous would be true of the explanations with which we might attempt to influence the behavior of the pupil or the wood sellers (2000, 5). Reflection on how we might attempt to interact with the people in these examples leads Stroud to the conclusion that they "would not be fully intelligible to us...they would be different sorts of beings from us, beings which we could not understand and with which we could not enter into meaningful communication" (13). So the examples, as Stroud understands them, reveal something about the conditions of meaning and understanding. They reveal that the possibility of linguistic communication rests on our according or agreeing in the kinds of natural reactions manifested in our continuing the series with "1002" rather than "1004," or in setting or accepting a price for wood on the basis of its volume or weight rather than the area it covers. I think that these considerations about the conditions of meaningful communication are both true and important. The possibility of linguistic communication rests on agreement in the sorts of reactions brought into relief by Wittgenstein's examples, and, as Stroud is primarily concerned to emphasize, these reactions reflect contingent natural facts about us rather than conventions which we have chosen to adopt. But I find a number of difficulties in Stroud's account of the natural "reactions" on which the possibility of language rests. One difficulty emerges when we ask whether we are to think of them as, so to speak, mere "brute" reactions, or rather as judgments with intentional content. While Stroud refers to them as "judgments," in an allusion to Wittgenstein's mention at Philosophical Investigations §242 of the "agreement in judgments" necessary for communication, he always uses the word in scare quotes, suggesting that he does not think of them as genuine judgments with the kind of content that could figure in a "that"-clause. And the suggestion is made explicit in his claim that the "agreement" to which Wittgenstein refers is not "the unanimous acceptance of a particular truth or set of truths" (14) but rather "the universal accord of human beings in behaving in certain ways" (15). But, on the other hand, he also describes these reactions in ways which suggest that they do after all involve intentional content. The way that we respond to the "add-two" instruction, he says, "will depend in part on what we take to be 'going on in the same way' " (12); and we will defend our claim to have made the correct move by appeal to "something like our 'shared judgment' that putting down '1002' is doing the same as we were doing earlier" (14).23 23 See also the introduction to Meaning, Understanding, and Practice, where Stroud says, apparently alluding to our propensities to the kinds of reactions under discussion: "[It] seems as if even the very general contingent facts which make language and communication possible must themselves be understood in intentional terms in order to be seen to have that role" (2000, viii). 176 There is thus a tension in Stroud's account of the agreement in reactions which makes linguistic communication possible. Does that agreement consist merely in the fact that we all agree in writing down "1002" after "1000," that is, that we all write, or are disposed to write, the same thing? Or does it consist in the fact that we all agree, as he puts it, "in finding" or "supposing" (15) that writing "1002" after "1000" is doing the same that we were doing earlier: that is, in the judgment that writing "1002" is doing the same as we were doing earlier? And if we attempt to resolve the tension by saying that it consists in both of these, then we are faced with the task of understanding how they are related. Do we all put down "1002" because we all agree in the judgment that writing "1002" is doing the same, so that that judgment serves as a reason to which we might appeal to defend the correctness of our writing "1002"? That would seem on the face of it to undermine Stroud's insistence on the natural character of the "reaction" manifested in our writing "1002," and, relatedly, his claim that our agreement in reacting these ways is a matter of our behaving the same way rather than of our unanimously accepting some proposition as true. But the converse relation, according to which we judge that writing "1002" is doing the same because we naturally react to the series by writing "1002," seems implausible. Why would a mere "brute" reaction of writing (or being inclined to write) "1002" give rise to the relatively sophisticated judgment that, in writing "1002" one was (or would be) doing the same as one had been doing earlier? The difficulty I have raised can be put in quite general terms, as a tension between Stroud's characterization of these reactions as consisting in "brute" behavior rather than genuine judgments, and his descriptions of them in terms which suggest that they have intentional content. But there is also a more specific difficulty regarding the particular content invoked in these descriptions. If we do think of the natural reactions as being, or involving, judgments, why should we think of them as judgments, specifically, of sameness? One reason for questioning this characterization of their content is that someone might recognize that writing "1002" after "1000" was going on in the same way as before, but still, when prompted to continue the series, naturally react by writing down "1004" instead. This might be, for instance, because she fails to share our attitude that the appropriate way to continue the series is to do the same thing after "1000" as she had been doing before "1000." Perhaps, to adopt a Kripke-style example, she thinks that when prompted to continue a series of numbers, one should do the quame thing as one had been doing at the beginning of the series, where to do the quame thing is to do the same thing for numbers less than 1000, and otherwise to add 4. A second reason is that it is not clear how far the idea of doing the same can be extended beyond the example of the number series to Wittgenstein's other examples. If our reacting to a hand by looking in the direction of wrist to fingertip, or our calculating the price of a pile of wood based on volume rather than surface area, does consist in or involve a judgment of some kind, it does not seem to be a judgment that one is doing the same as one was doing before. We could imagine two people responding differently to a badly designed directional sign that neither has seen before: one is inclined, on seeing the sign, 177 to go through the corridor to the right, and the other to go up an adjacent flight of stairs. If their disagreement is not just a matter of brute reaction, but involves divergent judgments about what the sign calls for, it is at any rate not obvious that this could be construed as a disagreement about what would count as doing the same as they had been doing previously. Similarly, if we imagine people who had never sold wood before disagreeing about pricesetting practices, and we suppose that they are making genuinely conflicting judgments, there is no reason why the conflicting judgments should concern conformity to previous practice. I think that we can best preserve Stroud's insight, in the face of these difficulties, by reconstruing it in terms of the primitively normative attitude which I described in the previous section. The natural "reaction" brought into relief by the example of the aberrant pupil is that of writing "1002" after "1000" with the consciousness that what one is doing is appropriate. This is more than a "brute" response: it has the character of a judgment. Relatedly, the agreement in reactions which makes communication possible -in this particular case, which makes it possible for us to attach a shared meaning to an expression like "add two"-is not just agreement in writing "1002," but also in taking "1002" to be the appropriate thing to write. But the reaction does not consist, at least at the most fundamental level, in the acceptance of a proposition, for example the proposition that writing "1002" is going on the same way as before. A person who takes "1002" to be the appropriate thing to write might well be described also as accepting that proposition. But, I would suggest, she counts as accepting the proposition only in virtue of being inclined to write "1002" with the consciousness of doing what is appropriate. We can thus resolve the tension I described by identifying the reaction with a judgment, but where the judgment is not in the first instance to be identified with the acceptance of some proposition as true. Rather, it is a more primitive kind of judgment which differs from a "brute" reaction only by being carried out with the awareness of its appropriateness to the circumstances. My point in offering this reconstrual has been to bring out explicitly something which I think is hinted at in Stroud's early discussion of the natural "reactions" underpinning our use of language: namely, that they involve a consciousness of appropriateness which is not based on the recognition of conformity to a general practice. We can see this most clearly in the case of the pointing hand. When we react to the pointing hand by looking in the direction from wrist to fingertip we are also aware, or at least potentially aware, of the appropriateness of that reaction to the hand. We not only look in that direction, but also take that to be the (appropriate) direction to look in, and our taking that direction to be the (appropriate) one to look in is just as much a part of the reaction as the looking itself. But this does not depend on our taking there to be a practice of making and responding to pointing gestures in virtue of which pointing hands come to mean that we should look in that direction. We would think of that way of reacting to the hand as appropriate even if we had no knowledge that this is, in fact, how human beings do typically react to seeing a pointing hand. The same is true in the more complex case of the 178 number series. In this case, admittedly, unlike that of the pointing hand, the relevant "reaction" depends on elements which do require conformity to a general practice: for example one's recognition of the numerals as having the meaning that they do. But to a pupil who is familiar with the numerals and has some facility in working with them, the recognition of "1002" as the appropriate way of going on from the series "2, 4, 6, 8...1000" will not depend on the recognition that there is a general practice of going on in that way. The pupil does not need to have any views about what other people are inclined to write in order to take it that it is "1002" and not "1004" which "fits" the preceding series.24 Let us return, now, to the case of the assistant who brings the slab when he hears the builder shout "Slab." I am suggesting that we can think of this as the same kind of primitive "reaction" which is manifested in the case of the pointing hand. The assistant brings a slab in response to the shout of "Slab" with the awareness that what he is doing is appropriate to what he has heard, in the same way that, when we see a pointing hand, we all look in the direction from wrist to fingertip with the consciousness that, in looking in this direction, we are responding appropriately to the hand. This might at first seem implausible, since there is nothing about the sound "Slab" as such which naturally seems to "point to" the bringing of a slab, in the way that the shape of a hand with index finger extended seems to "point in" the direction from wrist to fingertip, or the number series seems to "point to" "1002" as the correct continuation. The association between "Slab" and the bringing of a slab is arbitrary, in that the assistant could just as well have been trained to bring a slab on a shout of "Platte," or to bring a pillar on a shout of "Slab." But, I am suggesting, the effect of the training is precisely to turn the sound "Slab" into something which functions, for the assistant, in the same kind of way that a pointing hand functions for an untrained person. The training exploits the assistant's natural predispositions to acquire certain habits of response, and to invest each of his habitual responses with a consciousness of its appropriateness to the item he is responding to, so as to bring about that these items come to be perceived by him as calling for, or pointing to, or indicating the responses he gives. That he regularly responds to "Slab" by bringing a slab rather than a pillar is, of course, in part a function of how he has been trained. But the role of the training is limited to that of shaping and directing the same kinds of natural tendencies that he exhibits in finding it appropriate to respond as he does to the pointing hand or the number series. He has a tendency to come to respond to repeated observations, say, of a given sound being uttered by one person, and a slab being brought by another person (who is then, perhaps, rewarded), by himself acquiring a tendency to bring a slab when he hears that sound, and, in so doing, to take himself to be responding 24 This point is of a piece with the point made two paragraphs above, that the relevant judgments in these cases are not judgments of sameness. There, the sameness at issue was, specifically, doing the same as one was doing previously. But we can think of that as a special case of the conformity to a general practice which is at issue here, one in which the practice is confined to an individual rather than a community. (Stroud allows the possibility of such a practice, albeit with qualifications, in "Private Objects, Physical Objects, and Ostension" [2000, 228-229].) 179 appropriately to the sound. And this tendency is no less natural than his tendencies to respond as he does to the pointing hand or, at a more sophisticated level, to the prompt to continue the series "2,4,6,8...1000." It is true that, in contrast to his normative attitudes to the pointing hand and to the number series, the normative attitude he comes to adopt as a result of the training is directed toward an arbitrarily chosen sound. But it is precisely the point of linguistic training, we might say, to bring it about that we come to have the same kinds of normative attitudes to arbitrarily chosen sounds and marks that we naturally have to items like the pointing hand: that we respond to them in certain specific ways with the consciousness that our way of responding is appropriate. The arbitrary character of the items to which our normative attitudes thus come to be directed does not affect the natural, and-in the sense I have described-"primitive" character of the attitudes themselves. I have been arguing, against Stroud, that we can make sense of the phenomena of meaning and understanding "from outside" meaning and understanding, by drawing on the idea of a primitive consciousness of normativity which informs our shared natural reactions to items like the pointing hand or the number series. Linguistic meaning arises, I have suggested, when our shared reactive propensities are directed, through training, toward particular sounds and marks, so that we come to have the same kinds of normative attitudes toward them as we do, without training, to the pointing hand. But my account retains something of the nonreductionist spirit of Stroud's in that I do not think there is any hope of "getting outside" the primitive consciousness of normativity itself. My point here is not just that we need to appeal to normative attitudes in making sense of the contentful character of semantic and intentional states. Although I think that that is true, the present point concerns the impossibility of accounting for the primitive consciousness of normativity through which these attitudes are possible. To account for this consciousness of normativity "from outside" in the stronger of the two senses I distinguished would be to identify a rule or principle in the light of which it is justified, a principle which would tell us, for example, that we are entitled to regard our response to the pointing hand in normative terms as opposed to treating it as a mere brute reaction. Following the same line of reasoning which Stroud emphasizes throughout, I take this to be impossible. For any such principle would have to be an item which we understood or which had meaning for us, and that would require that we adopt the same kind of normative attitude toward it that it is supposed to make possible. The question, then, of what entitles us to regard any of our natural reactions or ways of "going on" as appropriate has to remain unanswered. If the account I have given is correct, then we can indeed say that our doing so is a condition of the possibility of meaning and understanding. But this is not to cite a principle which would justify us in taking our reactions to be appropriate, but merely to restate the thesis that the possibility of meaning and understanding depends on our doing so. This does not in itself rule out the possibility of accounting for the consciousness of normativity "from outside" in the second, reasonable, sense, by explaining, in 180 nonnormative terms, how it is constituted. Perhaps the consciousness of appropriateness involved in our response to the hand could be explained in terms of some psychological state or complex of states characterizable without normative language, for example in terms of feelings of satisfaction when we look in the direction from wrist to fingertip, or feelings of being nonnormatively compelled or constrained to do so. Or perhaps a more refined account might be offered in terms of our psychological responses to the observed reactions of another person observing our behavior when we look at the hand. But here, while I do not want to deny that such an account could be given, it seems to me that it would not so much make the normative attitudes intelligible, as explain them away as illusory. For it would be unable to make sense of the distinction, which is part of what we are committed to if we regard the attitudes as genuine, between the mere occurrence of feelings or other psychological responses in a person, and the person's having those feelings and responses with the consciousness of their appropriateness to the circumstances in which they occur. The proponent of such an account would have to deny the reality of that distinction, claiming that it could always be made out in terms of the presence or absence of further feelings and psychological states characterizable in nonnormative terms. And while this might be a defensible philosophical position on its own terms, it would not answer to the aim of showing, in a nonskeptical spirit, how to make sense of our normative attitudes and of the phenomena of meaning and understanding which depend on them. I agree with Stroud, then, that our distinctively human perspective on the world-a perspective which I take to be informed not only by our semantic and intentional attitudes but also by the more primitive normative attitudes which underlie them-imposes limits on any reductionist approach to meaning and understanding. What I have tried to show in this chapter is that those limits are less restrictive than Stroud believes.25 REFERENCES Blackburn, Simon. 1984. "The Individual Strikes Back." Synthese 58: 281-301. Block, Ned. 1986. "Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology." In Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 10, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling and Howard K. Wettstein. Morris: University of Minnesota, Morris. Bridges, Jason. Manuscript. "Rule-Following Skepticism, Properly So Called." Dummett, Michael. 1987. "Reply to McDowell." In Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy, ed. Barry Taylor. Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht. Dummett, Michael. 1993a. "What is a Theory of Meaning? (I)." In Dummett, The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 25 It is an extraordinary privilege to be Barry Stroud's colleague, and I would like to acknowledge here the contribution he has made to my intellectual life. He has served for me as a model of depth, clarity, seriousness, and integrity in philosophical thinking and teaching, and I have learned a tremendous amount from our discussions over the years. With regard to the present chapter, I would like to thank Barry Stroud again for illuminating discussions of many of the issues addressed here, and the editors of this volume for very helpful comments and suggestions. 181 Dummett, Michael. 1993b. "What Do I Know When I Know a Language?" In Dummett, The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. Forbes, Graeme. 1984. "Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84: 223-237. Ginsborg, Hannah. Forthcoming. "Primitive Normativity and Skepticism about Rules." Journal of Philosophy. Goldfarb, Warren. 1983. "I Want You to Bring Me a Slab." Synthese 56: 265-282 . Goldfarb, Warren. 1985. "Kripke on Wittgenstein on Rules." Journal of Philosophy 829: 471-488. Kripke, Saul. 1982. Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Margolis, Eric, and Stephen Laurence. 2007. "The Ontology of Concepts." Noûs 414: 561593 . McDowell, John. 1998. "In Defence of Modesty." In McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Stroud, Barry. 2000. Meaning, Understanding, and Practice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Stroud, Barry. Forthcoming. "Meaning and Understanding." In Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein, ed. Oskari Kuusela and Marie McGinn. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1953. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. London: Macmillan. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1958. The Blue and Brown Books. London: Blackwell. Wright, Crispin. 1984. "Kripke's Account of the Argument against Private Language." Journal of Philosophy 84: 759-778.

Moral Renegades Robert Mark Simpson The New Rambler Review, 12th July 2016 Review of Strangers Drowning: Voyages to the Brink of Moral Extremity, by Larissa MacFarquhar, London: Allen Lane, 2015, and Doing Good Better: Effective Altruism and a Radical New Way to Make a Difference, by William MacAskill, London: Guardian Books, 2015 Abstract. This piece is a side-by-side review of two books: Strangers Drowning, by Larissa MacFarquhar, and Doing Good Better, by William MacAskill. Both books are concerned with the question of whether we should try to live as morally good a life as possible. MacAskill thinks the answer is 'yes', and his book is an overview of how the Effective Altruist movement approaches the problem of how to achieve a morally optimal life. MacFarquhar's book is a more descriptive account of the lives of people who aim to live in a morally optimal way. Her discussion is nuanced, and somewhat ambivalent about the merits of this aim. My review brings out some commonalities and differences between the two books, and critically digests the arguments on offer. The world is full of terrible suffering, much of which could be prevented, and most people living comfortably in prosperous countries could easily donate something – money, skills, or time – to reduce some of that suffering. So, we should all give, right? Perhaps. Serious misgivings and complications can arise, though, in thinking about where this all leads. The mode of ethical reasoning that tells us we should donate something soon pushes us toward the conclusion that we should give up nearly everything to help others in need. There's no natural, discernible threshold at which anyone can be assured that she's given enough to meet her obligations to others. Moreover, even where our giving can alleviate some people's hardships in the short term, there's little reason to be confident – without systematic change – that our giving will have any real effect on suffering in the grander scheme of things. 2 These problems, Inexhaustibility and Futility, can be fleshed out by reflecting on Peter Singer's well-known thought experiment, asking whether we'd be prepared to jump into a pond to save a drowning child, knowing that this would ruin our shoes or clothes. It would be terrible to prioritise one's wardrobe over the life of a child, Singer reasons, and by extension it would also be terrible to enjoy idle luxuries while doing nothing to try to prevent needless death elsewhere in the world. But the Inexhaustibility problem re-emerges here: in real life we face an unlimited number of ponds and children. Our decision isn't whether to save a drowning child, it's what proportion of our resources we're willing to devote to the rescue of drowning children before we cordon off space for a life of our own. The Futility problem re-emerges too. Major charity organizations have been at work for decades, enacting plans to "make poverty history". Every year, in the U.S. alone, charities receive hundreds of billions of dollars in donations, and a considerable segment of those funds go to international causes. But despite this, extreme poverty remains in fairly rude health, undergirded by complex political and economic forces beyond any of our individual control. The analogue of leaping into a puddle to save a child, for most of us, is being a donor (or maybe an employee) for an antipoverty charity. But if the game is rigged to ensure that poverty withstands all efforts to consign it to history, then 'leaping into the puddle' might well feel pointless. Two books published in 2015 address these kinds of quandaries about how to live as a well-off person in a world like ours, and both resist the suggestion that the quandaries are intractable. William MacAskill's Doing Good Better is an introduction to the ideas of Effective Altruism (EA), a movement that urges people to try to do a lot of good in the world, using empirical research and expected utility reasoning to offer advice on how to achieve this. Larissa MacFarquhar's Strangers Drowning is less interested in advising its readers on how to do good, and more interested in examining the choices others have made in seeking to do as much good as they can. Where MacAskill presents decision-making principles for us to think through, in an orderly sequence, to maximize the good we achieve, MacFarquhar describes the disorderly lives of various 'do-gooders' (her choice of words), making daring attempts to combat suffering, and muddling through with varying degrees of success. One could interpret MacAskill's title, Doing Good Better, as a mild riposte to the lives MacFarquhar chronicles. Her subjects sometimes flounder in their attempts at giving and helping, and while MacAskill's crowd shares in the moral energy that drives these people, they want to be sure they're not spending it on well-meaning but ultimately quixotic projects.  3 MacFarquhar's subjects come from many backgrounds, and in quite a few of the stories their altruistic endeavours play out successfully, in a way that's genuinely inspiring. There's Dorothy Granada, a woman who – after several false starts in the pursuit of a righteous life – becomes a midwife in rural Nicaragua, exhibits great bravery in the face of physical adversity and violence, and wins admiration from her community and adopted homeland. There's Kimberly Brown-Whale, a church pastor in Maryland who – after tumultuous years as a missionary with her family – transforms her church by instituting a radical social justice agenda. There's Julia Wise, who, since childhood, has given away a large portion of her income to charity, despite the relationship complications and social alienation this has sometimes caused for her. There's Ittetsu Nemoto, a Buddhist priest who devotes much of his life to sympathetically listening to suicidal people. We also get an intergenerational saga, in the story of Murlidhar Amte, nicknamed Baba, and his family – wife Indu, and sons Vikas and Prakash – who run a leper colony in a remote Indian jungle region. All of the Amtes show tremendous intelligence, courage, and stamina, as they help large numbers of despised people build a life and livelihood. And they do this not by treating people with leprosy as charity cases, but by creating a financially self-supporting system, from scratch, in which these outcast individuals have full franchise as workers and community members. MacFarquhar tells these stories with an appealing fluency, injecting moments of humour amid much sorrow, and gently conveying the depth of emotion that underlies her subject's life choices. She never fawns over her subjects' triumphs or scolds their failures. Despite her even-handed demeanour, though, MacFarquhar doesn't pretend to be a disinterested narrator. The lives of her subjects are offered up as a kind of argument. In her own words, the question is whether it is "good to try to live as moral a life as possible", or whether, instead, there is "something in the drive to extraordinary goodness that distances a person too much from ordinary humanity". (SD: 11). And this question cannot be answered in the abstract, she says; "only actual lives convey fully and in a visceral way the beauty and cost of a certain kind of moral existence" (SD: 11). So, what do these life stories demonstrate, if we interpret them as an argumentative inquiry? What conclusion do they support? Certainly not an unqualified recommendation of a life devoted to doing good. At the close of the book MacFarquhar says that probably "not everyone should be a do-gooder" (SD: 301). And several of her accounts depict dysfunctions that can beset a life of altruistic zeal. We see Aaron Pitkin, a hardcore animal welfare activist, being weird and difficult across a series of relationships. We see Sue and Hector Badeau, having adopted 22 disadvantaged children, being driven to the verge of breakdown when their best efforts aren't enough to secure a safe and happy life for all of them. MacFarquhar's final narrative vignette focuses on an intellectually restless woman, Stephanie Wykstra, who rejects her youthful Christian enthusiasm to become a part of the EA movement, before eventually becoming estranged from all of the grand moral creeds she once bought into. In the end she feels, albeit with much self-doubt, 4 that it must be okay to reject the ideal of being maximally good, and instead to say, of one's personal ideals, "these are the things I value, this is what I'm going to pursue in life" (SD: 294). The author doesn't say anything to cast doubt on Wykstra's conclusion. On the other hand, MacFarquhar's unwillingness to recommend extreme altruism doesn't mean she's opposed to it. Indeed she takes time out, between telling the life stores, to critique altruism's detractors. Across three chapters she deftly dissects the allegations and analyses that other writers have used to disparage the dogooder. These chapters make the book something much more than a journalistic compendium of fascinating tales. They show how the tendency to treat do-gooding as a pathology has dubious psychological underpinnings, as much as do-gooding itself. First off we get a potted history of altruism's place in the political imagination. Within fifteen pages, nods are made to Mandeville, Kant, Smith, Robespierre, Darwin, Comte, Nietzsche, and Freud. The findings are inconclusive, but it finishes well, with an amusing swipe at second-rate psychoanalysis. The second chapter is narrower in focus, and better for it. It looks at how the Al-Anon movement encouraged people to see altruism as a smokescreen for controlling urges in relationships, the idea being, in short, that we help others only because it's gratifying be needed. MacFarquhar then shows this line of thought resurfacing in contemporary opposition to development NGOs as agents of neo-colonialism. In the third of these critical chapters, exploring the derogation of altruism in literature, MacFarquhar is on song. Although she acknowledges a few notable exceptions, like Camus and Coetzee, she argues that it has generally been a mark of grownup seriousness in literature, all the way back to Shakespeare, that our protagonist is not a moralistic do-gooder, and that the moralistic do-gooders are unmasked as shams and bumblers. As a proponent of this line of thought, she quotes James Baldwin, condemning the sentimentality of Uncle Tom's Cabin, and arguing that fiction which exalts the do-gooder flattens out the lumpy intricacies of real human life. For Baldwin, it is "only within this web of ambiguity, paradox, this hunger, danger, [and] darkness", that we can find "at once ourselves and the power that will free us from ourselves". MacFarquhar paraphrases the thought like this: "on the one side, there is complexity, life, and feeling; on the other side, sentimentality, moralizing, and violence" (SD: 280). MacFarquhar's goal is to draw us away from this Manichean perspective, and help us recognize the false choice that it presents us with. It may be that a wellmeaning do-gooder sometimes does more harm than good, having underestimated the complexity of the situation she's trying to intervene in. But at the same time, it's all too easy to discredit the altruist's intentions, and cynically deride the personality that gives rise to them. Literature, philosophy, psychology, and other critical discourses all nudge us in this direction. When we sympathetically exam5 ine the lives of flesh and blood altruists, though, we see that writing off their compassionate ventures as bad-faith manifestations of hostility or vanity – or instead, just seeing these people as pious bores, devoid of real life and feeling – is simply inaccurate, not to say unfair. The lives that MacFarquhar portrays are as rich and as complex as any. They are full of love, heartbreak, optimism, despair, community, loneliness, hunger (of many kinds), and more danger than most. And as a group they're highly diverse. They don't all embody some shared, underlying personality-type. If the stories of these lives are to be read as an argument, the conclusion of that argument isn't about whether we should or shouldn't give ourselves over to saintly aspirations, all things considered. Its conclusion is that we shouldn't pull ourselves back from such aspirations out of a misplaced apprehension, that in chasing them we will be sacrificing real "complexity, life, and feeling" on the altar of altruism.  In the closing pages of Strangers Drowning, after speaking of the "happy blindness that allows most people, most of the time, to shut their minds to what is unbearable" (SD: 298), MacFarquhar asks What would the world be like if that happy, useful blindness fell away and suddenly everyone became aware, not just intellectually but vividly, of all the world's affliction? (SD: 300) In Middlemarch, George Eliot suggests an answer to this question. In a passage remarking on Dorothea's mundane yet near-unbearable agony in her failing marriage, Eliot says If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heartbeat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence. Among its many ambitions, the EA movement aims to make facing up to the world's afflictions not so fatally overwhelming. By giving us actionable guidelines for how to live in a morally upstanding way, Doing Good Better tries to breed optimistic gusto in place of despair. MacAskill's advice for the person figuring out her life choices in response to suffering works something like this. Start by considering all the vocational options that are available to you over the course of your life, including ones where you'd have to initially spend time in training or education in order to pursue it some way down the line. Then for each of those vocations, try to judge how much good you can achieve through it, by asking (a) how many people you could benefit, and by how much, (b) what your chances of success would be, (c) what the counterfactual scenario looks like (i.e., what would happen if you didn't pursue this option, would someone else step in to do the same 6 tasks you would have done), and relatedly, (d) whether the vocation or goals that you're considering are neglected. With these considerations factored in, the new EA recruit is in a position to decide which pursuit is her best bet for maximizing the good she can achieve. The book's first half elaborates on how EAs tackle these questions and the answers they favor. For questions about how much benefit different programs achieve, MacAskill's approach is to review randomized control trial studies on the cost-effectiveness – measured in Quality Adjusted Life Years, or QALYs – of various health programs. Consulting these metrics, he says, we see that the benefits of distributing bed nets to combat malaria are far greater, in per-dollar terms, than the benefits of distributing condoms to reduce lethal STDs, or distributing free books to promote school attendance in poor communities. When it comes to questions about neglected areas, MacAskill discourages giving to causes that are already well-funded relative to the size of the problem, like disaster relief and guide dog training. And on the matter of counterfactuals, he tells young EAs to avoid careers like general medicine, where their impact would be no greater than that of the replacements who would operate in their stead if they did something else. One of the best options that sidesteps all these pitfalls, he argues, is 'earning to give'. The idea is simple: get a job that makes good money, then give a lot of it away to organizations – like the Against Malaria Foundation – that produce big welfare benefits in a cost-effective way. The primary merit of this vocational strategy, he says, is that it achieves "a difference that wouldn't happen otherwise" (DGB: 93), and all the more so where one gives to relatively neglected causes. Questions about the 'Chance of Success' are tackled using expected-utility reasoning, and with interesting results. Earning to give is a safe bet for someone who wants to do a lot of good, MacAskill says, but "we shouldn't dismiss more speculative or high-risk activities out of hand" because despite the long odds, "they can have an enormous impact" (DGB: 98). In short, people should sometimes punt on a vocation with a tiny chance of having a momentous benefit. He gives the example of Laura Brown, a young Briton who aspires to become an MP and influence UK Parliament towards funding high-quality international aid organizations. The decks are stacked against Brown, but if she does achieve her goal she'll be able to do a great amount of good. And with a few crucial positional advantages tilting the odds in her favor, MacAskill concludes that Brown is making a sound choice in pursuing politics. Naturally the calculations behind this conclusion are 'guesstimations', rather than watertight assessments of the probabilities and benefits. The sums partly turn on what percentage of current Tory ministers studied PPE at Oxford. Still, as MacAskill says, when it comes to careers that have a tiny chance of doing enormous good, we'll do better "if we at least try to make these assessments rather than simply throwing up our hands and randomly choosing an activity to pursue" (DGB: 121-22). This is important, because it indicates why partisans of a radical political agenda – like Marxists, Green Anarchists, and the Occupy movement – don't necessarily have to be cast in the role of EA's ideological 7 enemies. Expressed programmatically, the aim of EA is to "have the greatest positive impact we can" (DGB: 6). If someone has good reason to think that a swingeing overhaul of global capitalism would do immense good, then EA principles can endorse that person's attempts to captain the revolution. The minuscule likelihood of a successful revolution is, by MacAskill's own lights, not reason enough to override that verdict. To be clear, though, MacAskill himself betrays little sympathy for hard-line critiques of capitalism, and Doing Good Better mostly strikes centrist, pro-business notes, as when it states in passing, for instance, that "most of the incredible progress that humanity has made over the last few hundred years has been due... to technology and innovation generally spurred by for-profit companies and governments" (202). These leanings are particularly evident in the book's second half, as he discusses assorted issues that arise when putting EA principles into action. We're given a discussion of the operational and self-reporting credentials of different charity organizations that reads a bit like an investor's guide to assessing stock valuations. And in MacAskill's comments on career-planning, the recommendations – be prepared to change direction, prioritise skill-building when you're starting out – wouldn't be wildly out of place in a general business advice book. The chapter on "The Moral Case for Sweatshop Goods" exemplifies all these tendencies, and in a way that's likely to leave some readers uneasy. Granted, plenty of economists will agree with MacAskill that "low wage, labour-intensive manufacturing is a stepping stone that helps an economy based around cash crops develop into an industrialized, richer society" (DGB: 161-62). But there are grounds for doubt here about whether – if we accept what the climate scientists say: that ecological catastrophe is nigh – the promise of progress via mass industrialization can anchor any sound moral argument. And a more comprehensive engagement with the elementary Leftist objection – that global capitalism's rising tide ultimately sinks more boats than it lifts – would have been valuable. Also, while it's a less weighty issue, it's surprising that MacAskill has such qualms about consumer activism. His usual instinct is to credit efforts to do good that others discount. So instead of speculation about why consumer activists may become averse to heftier moral demands (DGB: 180), one would have hoped for a more 'blue-skies' inquiry into emerging modes of consumer activism that have the potential to bring about major benefits in the future. Today's young idea entrepreneurs like to say they're trying to start a conversation about the ideas they're pitching. Unlike many who parrot that line, MacAskill and company have undoubtedly succeeded in setting off a conversation. And anyone who's informed about the inner workings of the charity sector – the selfserving 'research' methods and financial unaccountability that predominate in many segments of it – should welcome that development, whatever misgivings they might have about EA's deeper (and contestable) cultural affinities. But in the end it's hard to assess MacAskill's book in the same way it's hard to assess any 8 work trying to popularise a movement. In short, its merits cannot be judged independently of the movement it champions. There are important critiques of Effective Altruism – for instance, that it's not equipped to deal with the structural political causes of the suffering it opposes, and that it misconstrues what the ethical life is really about – which are largely set aside, rather than tackled, in Doing Good Better. But even if adequate replies to these criticisms can be given, their inclusion wouldn't necessarily make for an effective primer to the EA movement. And ultimately that's what MacAskill's book is, even it doesn't speak to all of the subterranean sources of angst about the movement.  What will become of EA from this point? Could it help promote institutional reform aimed at countering the underlying sources of poverty in the developing world? Will it become attuned to the political origins of that poverty in the ruthlessly exploitative strategies of powerful states and corporations, and help shine a light on the links between proxy wars, puppet regimes, and extreme need? If so, then its critics might end up embracing it. By contrast, if it evolves into a technocratic policy engine ruled by Silicon Valley types and their moral priorities – like, say, 'curing' the aging process (see DGB: 226) – then its critics will double down in their opposition. Whatever the focus may be in future, to date the EA movement has focused much more attention on the well-off individual's menu of choices than they have on the historical and political structures that set the parameters for those choices. And it's instructive, in this connection, to note certain similarities in perspective in MacAskill's recommendations for doing good and MacFarquhar's tales of the lives of do-gooders. Even the basic formulation of the main question that MacFarquhar poses – whether it's good to try to live as moral a life as possible – chimes with EA's individualized angle on how to deal with global problems. This is partly due to MacFarquhar entering into her subjects' viewpoints. Most of them, when they're jolted by a recognition of how much suffering exists in the world, react by embarking on maverick schemes, alone or with a small band of allies (in several cases, just a beleaguered spouse). MacAskill directs his advice to individuals making choices as individuals, and while it could hardly be otherwise – his readers are individuals – a deeper atomistic outlook is suggested at several moments. His remark that "the action of millions is simply the combined actions of many individuals" (DBG: 107) is stated as a definitional truth for which no argument is needed. In a recent defence of EA against its critics, Jeff McMahan, the White's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, says that we cannot but frame questions in this arena in this individualistic manner. "I am neither a community nor a state" he says, and if I adopt a strategy of trying to change how my state acts, or trying to 9 reform global economic institutions, then "the probability of my making a difference to the lives of badly off individuals may be substantially lower". Of course, as we have seen, certain EAs like Laura Brown may choose to gamble on these long odds. And some people like MacFarquhar's subjects may set their sights on promoting far-reaching structural reforms. But still, this remains in line with the general notion that large-scale social phenomena can all be boiled down to individual actions. Whether or not that's right, it bears remembering that in many quarters historically, and still in some quarters today, people aspiring to do something to address society's afflictions have viewed things through a different lens. In various kinds of political struggles aimed at effecting structural change – from revolutionary wars against oppressive regimes, to the early labour movement and major civil rights crusades – people have called on one another to subsume their individualities into a collective, to let go of any desire that moral credit would accrue to them personally, and abandon themselves to the fate and status of the group. Solidarity isn't yet lost as a social value, but there is a categorical conception of solidarity here that seems unthinkable for most of us today – literally unthinkable; we can only make sense of the choices that it involves by reinterpreting them as highrisk, high-reward attempts to personally accomplish a colossal good. MacAskill's EAs and MacFarquhar's subjects are gripped by the fact that "there are crises everywhere, all the time" (SD: 5), and in consequence, their lives are always like wartime, with the altered ethical expectations that entails (SD: 9-10). What's striking is that some EAs and some of MacFarquhar's subjects seem worried about maximizing their personal impact on the battle. The good soldier is concerned exclusively with whether victory is won, not with how much credit he accrues. That said, the distance between these two concerns only really matters if victory depends on a kind of solidarity that would be jeopardized by people wanting to maximize their own contribution. And then the crucial question is whether the fight against global poverty is such a case. Just like the temptation to see do-gooders as devoid of three-dimensional humanity, it's tempting to see altruistic ambition – of the kinds on display in Strangers Drowning and Doing Good Better – as inimical to transformative solidarity. But things are probably more complicated than that. A few of MacFarquhar's die-hard altruists have an individualistic bent, but most of them express their beneficence in a way that's community-minded through and through. And where individualistic mindsets predominate in the EA movement, this may just be because they predominate nearly everywhere in our society. Whatever effects such individualism may have, the flickerings of a politics of solidarity with the world's poor, both in the EA movement and in the lives of MacFarquhar's subjects, are evident all the same. The evidence consists first and foremost in the fact that these people – whatever the limitations of their perspective might be, and whatever obtuseness they might be accused of – really do seem to be powerfully moved by the suffering of human beings they've never met, in a way that's different to what most of us experience most of the time. For those 10 who would insist that truly effective altruism necessitates a politics of transformative solidarity, in order to topple the economic and political systems used to dominate the world's poor, the question remains: where will these epoch-shifting forces bubble up and coalesce? It doesn't seem absurd to think that these forces could find good contributors and allies among the kind of ardent humanitarians that MacFarquhar examines, or among the hopeful Millennials that MacAskill is recruiting.